KANT'S RELIGIOUS THEORY AND
ITS RELATION TO ENGLISH DEISM

to serve as an

Introduction to a Fresh Translation of Kant's

"RELIGION INNERHALB DER GRENZEN DER BLOSSEN VERNUNFT."
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CHAPTER I.

RATIONAL THEOLOGY IN THE 17th and 18th CENTURIES.

I. The Age of Emancipation.

The Enlightenment Movement, one of the greatest spiritual movements of modern Europe and comparable in importance to the Renaissance and the Reformation, began in the 17th century and flourished in the 18th. Because of its influence on Kant who was in so many essential respects an Enlightenment thinker, it is important for us in this study to recall the main characteristics of this new age.

The movement was essentially revolutionary in spirit, a revolt against every form of traditional authority. Men began to shake off the heavy hand of the Church which had so long controlled secular as well as religious matters, and in general to free themselves from the restricting influences of the past. The soul of the movement was the determined assertion of the freedom of the individual - freedom in affairs social and political, intellectual and religious.

This spirit of freedom expressed itself most emphatically in a new and extravagant belief in the power of reason. Faith in the old traditional presuppositions and authorities, which had so long been considered unquestionably valid, gave way to a spirit of criticism. Faith was sought exclusively by the path of argument; logical demonstration was considered the sole adequate basis for belief; reason claimed to be autonomous and set itself up as the sole court of appeal. And with reason thus the only criterion of value, the mysterious depths of life, the indefinable and incalculable, received scant recognition or appreciation. To the aesthetic and the strictly religious values the age was for the most part blind. All that had about it, from the point of view of reason, an air of mystery, was looked upon with suspicion; man's feelings, emotions and sentiments were in ill repute. The movement thus took on an austere and barren coldness which was welcomed in the beginning as is the first breath of mountain air after the
suffocating heat of the plains; in time, however, it chilled men through and drove
them back to a new appreciation of the sunnier and warmer sides of human life.

If reason was the weapon of the age, humanity, somewhat abstractly viewed,
was its chief concern. The Enlightenment movement followed close upon the heels
of the religious wars in France and Germany and the Revolution in England. It
was marked, consequently, by a revulsion against the intolerance and persecution
which had characterised those religious conflicts. Men lost interest in the older
theological issues; the focus of attention shifted from the next life to this,
from the state of a man’s soul to man’s essential humanity. A new spirit of
benevolence and philanthropy was abroad; severity was condemned; charity and
tolerance became the watchwords of the day.

This humanitarianism rested on the newly acquired conviction of the essen-
tial goodness and the infinite perfectibility of human nature. As God must have
created man good, the vitiating causes which have perverted him must be man-made,
that is, contingent and removable; all that is needed, therefore, is to purify
the race of this evil element. Human nature will then shine forth in its original
purity. And reason, it was felt, is well qualified to undertake this labour of
purification. The long night of spiritual slavery, it was believed, was nearing
its end; reason, once freed, will prove equal to all demands. Is not the world,
men asked, after all a good place to live in? Nay, is it not the best of all
possible world’s? Thus arose an optimism and self-assurance which continued to
flourish in England until Hume and in Germany until the appearance of Kant.

Though it is true that the eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of
those influences which finally gave birth to the Romantic movement, the Enlighten-
ment, representing the counter position, is thoroughly unhistorical in its concep-
tion of man’s nature, origin and vocation. This grave limitation of the Enlighten-
ment thinkers is especially noticeable in their usual mode of conceiving the
relation of religion to its historical sources. True religion, it was believed, is eternal and unchanging; the propositions essential to religion must have constituted the religion of primitive man. Thus rigidly set in its logical, syllogistic mould, and convinced that what is not absolutely true must be absolutely false, the Age was, by the very nature of its outlook, unable to understand or wisely evaluate the religious conceptions of other ages and other races. And owing to its lack of understanding of the part played by historical events in influencing the past, it was equally unsympathetic towards historical influence at work in its own thinking. It failed, in a word, to appreciate the fundamental conception of historical genesis and growth. Even Hume and Kant are by no means free from this characteristic failing of the Enlightenment.

The spirit of emancipation was not restricted to any one phase of human activity. It found expression in the religious as well as the political, the intellectual as well as the social sides of life. Neither was it limited to any one nation. On its philosophical and religious sides, (we shall restrict ourselves to these aspects of the movement,) it first expressed itself in the Netherlands, where a spirit of toleration early provided a refuge for thinkers who found themselves harassed by the laws and prejudices of their native countries. Manifestations of the same spirit were soon visible in England; France followed suit; and before long Germany was permeated with the new doctrine. In England the apostles of the new order were called by some "Free-Thinkers", while on its religious side the movement came to be connected with the appellation "deism."  

1. The terms "Aufklärung" and "deism" are somewhat hard to define. Without at present going into the various meanings, of greater and lesser scope, which have been assigned to each, I shall use the terms as follows: "deism" as signifying the religious viewpoint which is opposed to both atheism and pantheism, and which may be designated as a special form of theism; "Aufklärung" as applying to the German phase of the more general movement of "Emancipation", the equivalent of which in England may be called the movement of Free-thinking. The religious aspect of the "Aufklärung" will then have to be called German deism.
In France the spokesman par excellence was Voltaire; Rousseau, like Kant, is only partially typical of the age in which he lived. The name "Aufklärung" (Enlightenment, Illumination) has been given to the parallel movement in Germany. England it is certain was one of the inspiring sources of the Aufklärung. The primary influences come from England to France and through both England and France to Germany. Yet in a sense the Aufklärung is a native growth, the natural outcome of forces at work in German thought itself. The more general statement that all four countries were in a sense a cultural unit, each to a greater or lesser extent influencing its neighbors, first through its intellectual pioneers and then through the agency of imported books and pamphlets of a more popular variety, comes perhaps nearest to the truth.

English deism is for two reasons of special interest to us in our present study. It had, in the first place, a clear influence upon Kant, in part direct, in part indirect through its general influence on German deism. "English theology as Oman puts it, "was in Germany in those days what German theology is in England today."\(^1\) A statement of its main positions will serve, in the second place, as a useful background against which to study Kant's own modified deism.

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II. English Deism

1. Lord Herbert of Cherbury.

The keynote of English deism may be said to be the distinction which all the deists make between "natural" or "rational" religion on the one hand, and "historical" or "revealed" religion on the other. There exists, they maintain, a religion which derives its validity from its inherent rationality or reasonableness; a religion whose roots are not in history, contingent and evanescent, but in human reason, abiding and absolute; a religion which is not geographically or temporally limited, but which is universally accessible to all men of all lands and all ages; a religion, in short, which is the religion of man qua man.

Lord Herbert of Cherbury was the first Englishman to proclaim this new religion and to formulate its main tenets. In his De Veritate (1624) he sets forth its five fundamental propositions. They are (1) that there is a God; (2) that it is man's duty to worship Him; (3) that virtue and piety are the chief parts of this worship; (4) that sins are to be repented of and turned from; and (5) that goodness is rewarded and evil punished in this life and the next. It is important to note the significance which Herbert attaches to this creed. He declares it in the first place to be the heart of all religion, basic, innate, the common inheritance of all men as men, and revealed to them by that faculty by virtue of which they are men, namely, their natural reason. Going a second step, Herbert makes the further claim, clearly to be distinguished from the one just mentioned, that this was man's original religion, the religion with which God created him. Herbert's explanation of the sad deterioration which religion has obviously undergone since that divine event - an explanation which is echoed and reechoed by later deists - is that it is to be attributed not to the Devil but to his deistic equivalent, the priesthood. It is the priests who have taught men that God should be worshipped in ways other than those originally specified.
by God; at their door, therefore, must be laid the blame for all the superstitious excrescences of a sacerdotal religion.

Here then are the chief "family characteristics" of natural religion with its outstanding weaknesses clearly revealed. To begin with, it is merely assumed that the five fundamental propositions constitute the irreducible kernel of religion. "Herbert" says Pfleiderer, "has nowhere given or even attempted a deduction of these five propositions; he bases them in true empirical fashion upon "universal agreement", which again is a sheer presupposition and in no sense proved—\(^1\). Again, the further supposition that these fundamentals of religion constituted man's original religious creed is hopelessly unscientific and unhistorical. It is merely assumed that religion at its origin is identical with nature religion as here defined; there is as yet no appreciation of the specific characteristics of the actual historical periods. It is, as Pfleiderer points out, an eloquent example of the inability of the Age to escape from its crystallized presuppositions, to transport itself back in history and to conceive of reason as a growing faculty, expressing itself in different forms at different stages of its development. And finally, the naïve assumption that the priests are responsible for all perversion of religion, and, indeed, for all the evil in the world, is thoroughly typical of the whole Enlightenment point of view. Upon the shoulders of the priests was laid the blame for all men's errors and superstitions; making men their dupes, they were the evil power that had brought sin and misery into the world. How the priests themselves fell into a state of perversity and wickedness is not explained save by some meager references to their privileged estate which tempted them to pride and love of power.

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2. Ib. p. 111. English tr. vol I, p. 112
The separate existence and unique character of natural religion having been thus discovered, the question at once arises as to its relation to the historic religions, and especially to Christianity. To this vital question of the relation of the religion of nature to the Christian creed, different deists give different answers, and it is primarily in this succession of answers that the progressive development of deism is to be traced. A sharp distinction is uniformly drawn between true Christianity and the various formulations of it which the Church has developed during the centuries of the Christian era, and all the deists are at one in their condemnation of Christianity in its churchly forms. It is possible, however, to distinguish three quite distinct attitudes towards "true Christianity" as they conceived it.

The first is typified by Locke, to whom Christianity was in the main a republication of natural religion, but who nevertheless believed that the doctrines revealed by Christ were useful and necessary additions to the doctrines revealed by nature. Christianity, that is, though in essence identical with the deistic creed, is nevertheless conceived as supplying certain important truths and sanctions without which natural religion would be definitely the poorer. This is the attitude naturally adopted by those who appreciated the unique value of Christianity and who still felt a marked respect, even a reverence, for Christ.

Gradually, however, the deists (we shall take Tindal as the representative of this second point of view) came to regard Christianity in a different light. All that was true in Christianity, it was now urged, was discoverable by natural reason. Christ merely restored religion to its pristine purity—Christianity was nothing but the republication of the religion of natural man. Christ achieved his peculiar task, which was to purge religion of the superstitions and malpractices which had arisen through the baleful influences of the priests.
After Christ's death, however, the priests had once again gained a mastery over men and had resubjugated them to the yoke of superstition. The function of deism, therefore, was to repeat Christ's cleansing work and restore religion to its twice-lost simplicity and perfection.

But as time went on, deism came to assume an attitude distinctly critical of and hostile to Christianity as a whole. By now historical criticism had begun in earnest; the Bible was being subjected to the searching test of reason; men were questioning the very possibility of miracle and supernatural revelation. It resulted that, among the free-thinkers, Christianity together with all other "revealed" religions fell more and more into disrepute, and the tendency to regard the Bible as on the whole worthless grew more pronounced. Natural religion was now proclaimed to be supreme, the only religion of any value. Further, as we shall see in Hume who is the extreme representative of this third and last stage of deism, the content of natural religion itself evaporated until it was hardly more than a shadow of its former self. So at last deism grew weak and finally passed into scepticism or open atheism.

Though Kant is pronouncedly deistic in many of his conceptions, he cannot, as we shall see, be classed as a thorough going deist; neither is he completely identifiable with any one of the three stages in English deistic thought. In the German deistic movement it is Wolff rather than Kant who holds an analogous place to Locke; Tindal and Kant agree only in so far as Kant's position is still deistic in its general type. On his more negative side Kant has kinship with Hume. Keeping this in mind, let us briefly consider the main positions of Locke, Tindal and Hume.

Seventy one years after the publication of Herbert's De Veritate, there appeared in England Locke's famous Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). The central problem of deism, we have said, was to determine the relation of "natural religion" to "true Christianity". Herbert's chief interest had been to define the former of these terms; Locke now set himself to ascertain the meaning, and formulate the essential doctrines, of the latter. The two central concepts of deism having been thus developed, subsequent deists could devote themselves to testing and redefining these concepts and to determining their relationship to each other.

Herbert's influence was not widely felt, and it is Locke who is most justly called the father of English deism. Though he strenuously repudiated all connection with the deists, the prevention of whose increase he declared to be worthy of the care and endeavor of every true Christian, Locke was, involuntarily, the chief foundation on which all the deists built. "The origin, method and whole tone of his treatises", says Leslie Stephen, "are curiously characteristic of the thought of the coming generation --- Locke strikes, in all subjects of which he treats, the keynote of English speculation in the 18th century."

Locke's indignant and elaborate protests against the charges of atheism, socinianism, and general similarity to the Turks, which various churchmen brought against him, are proof of the fact that he considered himself a sound Christian, though he made no claim to "orthodoxy", a term for which he had little

1. Cf. however S. G. Hefelbower's Locke and English Deism (The University of Chicago Press, 1915) in which the thesis is that Locke is not the "Father of English deism" but that he and English deism "are related as coordinate parts of the larger progressive movement of the age." Unfortunately Mr. Hefelbower's book has been brought to my notice too late to be of use to me here.

2. Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 262. "--- for these (deists or infidels)--- I chiefly designed my book."

His creed is summed up in one of his own sentences. "He that believes one eternal, invisible God, his Lord and King, ceases thereby to be an atheist; and he that believes Jesus to be the Messiah, his King, ordained by God, thereby becomes a Christian; and if he continues in his allegiance to this his King shall receive the reward, eternal life." His whole point of view, indeed, is more Christian than it is deistic,- Christ's Gospel (as he interprets it), rather than natural religion, is the center of his belief. "If thou findest" he begs the reader" that I have mistaken the sense and tenour of the Gospel, as a true Christian set me right in the doctrine of salvation."

Distinguishing in deistic fashion between true Christianity and the Christianity of the churches, he relies upon "the sole reading of the Scriptures for the understanding of the Christian religion." He bases his whole case, that is, upon the Bible - the greater part of his book, indeed, is justly described by Leslie Stephen as a "tedious catena of texts" - and he seems to question no more than did his clerical contemporaries the Bible's authority and infallibility. Yet he considers all portions of the Bible neither equally clear nor equally important. The Old Testament interests him mainly as a record of the promises of God to His people and as containing certain prophecies of the coming of the Messiah. Even within the New Testament, the Epistles of the New Testament, though admittedly "edifying" and illuminating, seem to him to contain no new truth essential to salvation. The Gospels and the Book of Acts are declared to be the heart of the Bible, containing as they do "the preaching of our Saviour and

1. Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 376.
2. Ib, p. 229.
5. English Thought in the 18th Century, vol. I. p. 95
6. Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 5.
the Apostles to those who were yet strangers and ignorant of the faith. In these discourses one may therefore expect to find embodied all Christian truths of primary importance. These then are Locke's two allegiances - to the Bible, and "a collection of writings designed by God for the instruction of the illiterate bulk of mankind in the way of salvation," and to reason, qualified to select, to interpret and to evaluate. Leslie Stephen sums up his position as follows; "Locke accepts the authority at once of reason and the Bible; and never suspects that there will be any difficulty in serving the two masters."

As Locke proceeded with his "attentive and unbiased" search for the true Gospel of Christ, he made what was to him the astounding discovery that what Christ taught his disciples and what they, in turn, preached to the world as the essence of Christianity was something far simpler and clearer than that intricate web of "niceties" and "notions" which the "writers and wranglers" in religion had since spun and forced upon mankind, declaring that a belief in the whole was necessary to salvation. Locke's opposing thesis is that the central tenet of Christianity is the simple belief that Christ was the Messiah. This constitutes "faith"; and to this he is careful to add the important duty of repentance for past sins and sincere endeavor to lead a good life. This drastic reduction of the conditions of salvation at once separated him from the orthodox camp and started critical deism on its way.

1. Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 154
2. It, p. 5.
4. He defines repentance as "an hearty sorrow for our past misdeeds and a sincere resolution and endeavour to the utmost of our power, to conform all our actions to the law of God." (Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 105) Such repentance is a necessary corollary to faith, "as absolute a condition of the covenant of grace as faith; and as necessary to be performed." (Ib. p. 103.)
To the proof that the distinguishing mark of the Christian faith is the belief that Christ is the Messiah, Locke devoted the longest and least impressive portion of his book. His contention is that it was Christ's mission to make known his Messiahship in the surest and safest manner possible. An early disclosure of who he was would have resulted in his premature death; hence his innumerable precautions and contrivances, such as the parabolic method of teaching whereby his true identity was disclosed only to the chosen few and hidden from his innumerable enemies up to the very last. "God" - as Oman sums up Lock's argument - "is shown to have acted in a sensible, business-like manner, and Christ to be the incarnation of the Divine commonsense."¹

Not only did Locke not question the validity of miracles - they were to his mind the one indubitable proof of Christ's divine origin. "The evidence of our Saviour's mission from heaven," he says, "is so great in the multitude of miracles he did before all sorts of people, that what he delivered cannot but be received as the oracles of God, and unquestionable verity. For the miracles he did were so ordered by the divine providence and wisdom, that they never were nor could be denied by any of the enemies, or opposers, of Christianity."²

So little did Locke foresee the development of the movement that hailed him as its founder! God, he explains, exercises a wise economy in the use of miracle, else "miracles would lose their name and force;"³ the miraculous nature of Christ's birth, however, and the miracles he is recorded in the New Testament to have performed, Locke simply accepts⁴ as "matters of fact" and as so much clear evidence of the power of God.

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1. The Problem of Faith and Freedom, p. 105
2. Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 135
Of God's existence and overruling Providence Locke is thus fully persuaded; and the basis of his belief seems to be primarily Biblical. That God revealed Himself to the Jews and that He promised them a Messiah, he never doubts; he even goes so far as to assert that not only was it their duty then, but that it is our duty now, to have faith in the promises of God. Pagan nations, in contrast who had no access to the Jewish revelation and who had to rely solely on their reason for a knowledge of the true God, labored, he feels, under a disadvantage. Philosophers might, and occasionally did, discover the truth. But since men in general are incapable of subtle reasoning their superstitious beliefs are unavoidable and can only be dispelled by Christ's clear and authoritative revelation of the Father. This appreciation of the weakness of natural reason and admission of man's religious need for divine revelation is an instance of Locke's Christian rather than deistic point of view.

Faith, then, means to Locke a faith in Christ and in the doctrines known to come from Christ. It is important to note the stress he lays on the "law of faith" and his clear distinction between it and the "law of works", for later deists, (and this is especially true of Kant)\(^1\), failed to appreciate the significance of this typically Christian doctrine. Locke's view may be stated in his own words. "The law of works is that law which requires perfect obedience without any remission or abatement; so that by that law a man cannot be just, or justified, without an exact performance of every tittle."\(^2\) This "moral law, (which is everywhere the same, the eternal rule of right,) obliges Christians,

\(^1\) The only passage in which Kant seems in the least to mitigate his pitiless rigorism is the one (see below, p. 203) in which he suggests that Christ's judgment of men may be conceived as accrediting to men such imperfect goodness as they may have attained to, whereas the Holy Ghost judges them "according to the utmost rigour of the law" But the emphasis even here does not fall on the need for faith in Christ. Cf. Luther's position, for the Christian point of view, (below, p. 212, seq.)

\(^2\) Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 12
and all men, everywhere.1 But Christian believers have the privilege to be under the law of faith too; which is that law whereby God justifies a man for believing, though by his works he be not just or righteous, i.e. though he come short of perfect obedience to the law of works."2 Locke's recognition of this law of faith has, from the Christian point of view at least, the merit of suggesting a significant modification of pure and unyielding Kantian rigourism; his conception of this faith's objective content must be admitted, nevertheless, to be meagre and unsatisfactory.

Here then we have the essence of true Christianity; "these two, faith and repentance, i.e. believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and a good life, are the inestimable conditions of the new covenant, to be performed by all those who would obtain eternal life."3 Locke, it is plain, has gone a long way in reducing the qualifications necessary to eternal life; and though he still insists that Christian salvation depends upon the two essential elements just mentioned, he shrinks from inferring forthwith that all non-Christians are damned to eternal punishment, and suggests the charitable solution that "God will require of every man, according to what a man hath, and not according to what he hath not."4 Yet this commonsense proposition, which was to become one of the strongest arguments of later deism, he quickly recognizes as a dangerous one, liable to misinterpretation. For it at once raises the question which he now himself asks, "What advantage have we by Jesus Christ?" His answer, in part similar to the answers of later deists, and in part voicing sentiments which they came to reject, excellently illustrates the anomalous position he holds midway between the two opposing camps.

1. Locke's statement up to this point might be taken as an adequate summary of Kant's doctrine of salvation by works.
2. The reasonableness of Christianity p. 15
3. The reasonableness of Christianity, p. 105
4. Ib. p. 132. See also p. 128, "Nobody was or can be required to believe what was never proposed to him to believe."
His first answer shows us Locke in one of his mystical and unrrational moments. "It is", he says, "enough to justify the fitness of anything to be done, by resolving it into the "wisdom of God" who has done it; though our short views and narrow understandings may utterly incapacitate us to see that wisdom or judge rightly of it."

Though such an answer should, in his opinion, be enough for a "rational man or fair searcher after truth," he nevertheless admits the desirability of discovering some more tangible reasons than this for Christ's coming into the world; and such reasons, he adds, are easily to be found.

The first and chief of these is that Christ came to purify men's religious and moral conceptions and to give them a truer notion of God and of our duties to Him. This is an argument much used by later deists, who differ from Locke chiefly in this, that whereas Locke, sceptical of the capacities of man's natural reason, declares Christ to have revealed certain truths previously unknown, they limit Christ's mission to a republication of truth once known, and in Christ's time, as now, merely ignored or forgotten. Men, he argues, had before Christ's coming fallen into evil ways and the priests (who, he is fair enough to perceive, can hardly be held responsible for man's original fall into sin,) had "made it not their business to teach them virtue." Blinded in part by lust, in part by "careless inadvertency", men had fallen victim to "fearful apprehensions" which thus "gave them up into the hands of their priests to fill their heads with false notions of the Deity, and their worship with foolish rites, as they pleased; and what dread and craft once began, devotion soon made sacred."

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2. *Ib.* p. 138
and religion immutable." There were, he admits, a few exceptions — "the rational and thinking part of mankind," the philosophers, in short, were still able, when they tried, to discover for themselves some of the essential truths of religion. But such men were few and far between; they kept what truth they had to themselves; and even they, without the assistance of revelation, were unable to discover other necessary truths. It is a common mistake, he reminds us with an insight his successors seem to have lost, to believe that reason originally discovered what reason at present accepts and that what is clear today has been clear from the first. Though the plight of the wise, therefore, was not desperate, Christ's revelation was able to give, even to them, a wisdom greater than their own. The "labouring and illiterate" masses however, hopelessly entangled as they were in superstition and error of every description, had neither the leisure nor the ability to reason a way out of the darkness into which they had fallen; their only hope was just such a clear and convincing revelation from God as Christ, in the Gospel-story, conveys to them. "The all-merciful God," says Locke, "seems herein to have consulted the poor of this world and the bulk of mankind; — this is a religion suited to vulgar capacities."

Christ's revelation, as Locke conceived it, touches three separate phases of man's religious thinking — his notion, namely, of God, of duty, and of worship. Christ, in the first place, "made the one invisible true God known to the world: and that with such evidence and energy, that polytheism and idolatry

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1. Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 135.
2. Ib. p. 135.
have nowhere been able to withstand it. The Jews, it is true, might have learned this truth from their prophets, though they failed to do so; Christ, however, breaking down the old Jewish barrier, revealed it not only to the Jews but to every nation. Christ, in the second place, made clear to men their moral duty, revealing to them the whole law of morality. "It is true," he says, "there is a law of nature; but who is there that ever did, or undertook, to give it as all entire, as a law?" Natural reason, is able to afford "some light and certainty"; yet he points out that it "nowhere cured, nor was like to cure" men's errors and defects. Christ, then, relying solely upon revelation, supplemented the weakness of human reason by giving us "a full and significant rule for our direction." But Christ did more than this. Where the opinion of philosophers lacked all authority, he added to the moral law all the weight of his divine authority. Locke, it is clear, had the highest respect for the Gospel; it is to him "all pure, all sincere; nothing too much, nothing wanting; but such a complete rule of life as, the wisest men must acknowledge tends entirely to the good of mankind, and that all would be happy if all would practise it." And in the third place, finding that divine worship was encumbered with "stately buildings, costly ornaments, peculiar and uncouth habits and a numerous huddle of pompous, fantastical, cumbersome ceremonies," Christ taught men that "praises and prayer, humbly offered up to the Deity, were the worship He now demanded;
and in these everyone was to look after his own heart and to know that it was that alone which God had regard to and accepted.\(^1\)

Yet another reason given by Locke for Christ's coming to earth was the encouragement he was thus enable to offer men to lead a virtuous and pious life. Anticipating Demes's argument in Hume's *Dialogues*, Locke admits that men might have concluded, had they had sense enough to do so, "that because the good were most of them ill-treated here, there was another place where they should meet with better usage\(^2\) - but, he adds, "it is plain they did not." Before Christ's coming men had no clear conception of a future state and no assurance that life did not end at death. Now, however, Christ gives to good Christians the assurance of future blessedness and makes this incentive to morality even greater by threatening sinners with the torments of hell-fire. That a morality grounded upon such "unspeakable rewards and punishments in another world" might not be the highest or most desirable type never seems to have occurred to him, for he argues, in sharp contrast to Kant, that "upon this foundation, and upon this only, morality stands firm and may defy all competition"\(^3\) Later deists, we may note in passing, disregarded this reason for the coming of Christ.

They differed from Locke further in their failure to attach importance to Christ's promise of assistance. Locke's description of this assured divine aid anticipates Kant's own thought on the subject in a striking way, although the latter assures himself of divine help on moral rather than on Biblical grounds.

"If we do what we can," Locke tells us, "Christ will give us his Spirit to help us to do what and how we should. It will be idle for us, who know not how our own spirits move and act on us, to ask in what manner the spirit of God shall act upon us. --- (Nevertheless) Christ has promised it, (his assistance), who is faithful and just; and we cannot doubt of the performance."\(^4\)

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2. *Ib.* p. 149
3. *Ib.* p. 151
It is clear that in Locke's opinion the Christian revelation is real, unique, and of definite value. Christ does more than republish the law of natural reason; he offers it to men with a simplicity and a completeness hitherto unknown; he places upon it the divine sanction which gives it a unique authority; and he supplements the incentives to morality of a heaven and hell in the next life with the promise of his assistance in this. The whole purpose of Locke's book, however, is to prove that Christianity is reasonable - that the Gospel message is a "plain, intelligible proposition." He recognises the validity of human reason and takes pains to show that "revelation is conformable to reason." He does his best, in a word, to reduce all Christianity to the level of solid common sense. This naturally raises the question regarding those Christian "mysteries" which seem to outrage commonsense and defy all rational comprehension. This is a problem which he either failed to appreciate or deliberately ignored. The possibility of miracles and "external" revelation he never questions - the Biblical accounts of such supernatural events he simply accepts as facts. Yet it is this very problem, which to Locke was hardly a problem at all, that becomes the bone of contention in the subsequent deistic controversy.
3. Typical Deism. Matthew Tindal

Although Locke, in his emphasis on the need for rational conviction in religious matters, unwittingly gave deism its start, he was himself, as we have seen, hardly aware of the logical consequences of his own principles. In Tindal's *Christianity as old as the Creation, or. The Gospel as a Republication of the Religion of Nature*, published\(^1\) thirty five years after the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, we come upon a deism attained to full self-consciousness.

The "deist Bible", as the book has been called, "marked the culminating point of the whole deist controversy"\(^2\) in England. With great clearness it brings out the most essential positions of the deists, attempting more than any other work of the time to formulate a constructive deistic theology. The book is important for us, moreover, because it admirably illustrates the whole Enlightenment point of view, at once reflecting the atmosphere in which Kant, during the larger portion of his life, lived and wrote, and at the same time playing an important part in creating it. It is a significant circumstance\(^3\) that Martin Knutzen, the professor in the University of Königsberg who exercised over Kant a greater influence than any of his other teachers, and who published in 1740, the year in which Kant entered the university, an attack upon English deism, added to the third edition (1742) a special answer to Tindal's main work.\(^4\) For this makes it highly probable that Kant had at least a second-hand knowledge of this book and was familiar with its main argument. The influence of English deism was only beginning to be felt in Germany when Knutzen's book appeared. Once started,

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1. In 1730.
4. Pfleiderer in his *Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 121, asserts that *Christianity as old as the Creation* was translated into German in 1741 by J. L. Smidt, a disciple of Wolff.
however, deistic ideas spread rapidly, and by the time Kant had attained to middle age they had achieved considerable popularity in some circles, notoriety in others. But whatever may have been the direct or indirect influence of Tindal's ideas upon Kant, we shall be able, by comparing Kant's theological treatise with it, to discover how far Kant was deistic in his religious beliefs and to what extent he was able to transcend the elements of weakness in the typically deistic point of view.

If Locke weakened the chains of the past, Tindal completes the task by his deliberate endeavor to cast them off completely and build nothing, as he puts it, "on a thing so uncertain as tradition." If Locke, for all his reliance on reason, quotes from the Bible with all reverence; Tindal, in contrast, selects his numerous quotations, whether from the Bible, the Fathers, or the writings of modern Churchmen, with the air of one whose sole intent is to prove his opponent wrong out of his own mouth. In this whole-hearted refusal to accept any proposition merely "for the sake of authority", Tindal, far more than Locke, deserves the appellation "free-thinker", a name of which he was himself by no means ashamed.

Again, advancing boldly where Locke fears to tread, Tindal vigorously opposes the belief that "a certain set of opinions are necessary to salvation." Locke still clings to the necessity of belief in Christ as a sine qua non at least of Christian salvation. He fails, however, to give this faith any vital meaning; it is a barren doctrine which, because of this very emptiness, suggests a certain irrationality and mystery. His "belief in Christ" seems to operate

1. Christianity as old as the Creation. Preface
2. Ib. p. 139.
inexplicably, almost magically, for one's salvation. It is therefore only natural that Tindal should promptly discard this element of faith in Christ, and indeed deny the importance, as a prerequisite to salvation, of any religious convictions, barring of course the deistic tenets themselves which Tindal always assumed to be discoverable by, and acceptable to all men. Everyone, he argues, universalizing Locke's charitable dictum regarding the heathen, must be acceptable to God, if only he has used to the best of his ability all the powers with which God has endowed him. So, in true 18th century fashion, he preaches the gospel of toleration. His most frequently reiterated charge against ecclesiastical Christianity is its bitter intolerance, which starts by condemning men for holding "wrong" opinions, and ends by persecuting them.\(^1\) The importance which he denies to right opinion he now assigns to right action, and quotes Dr. South, to the effect that "the grand deciding question at the last day will be not what you have said, or what you have believed, but what you have done.\(^2\) Thus giving expression to one more characteristic of deistic teaching, its humanitarianism. "Whoever," as he puts it, "does his best for the good of his fellow creatures does all that either God or man requires."\(^3\)

This humanitarianism, in turn, is closely allied to the shallow optimism of deistic philosophy. God is primarily a good and kindly God, "the best-natured (mind) in the world."\(^4\) Man is by nature a "mild, gentle creature"\(^5\) in whose heart have been sown the "seeds of pity, humanity and tenderness, which, without much difficulty, cannot be eradicated."\(^6\)

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1. Cf. the biting sentence, *Christianity as old as the Creation*, p. 136, "The most cursing and damning churches have always proved the most persecuting."
2. Ib. p. 44.
3. Ib. p. 18
4. *Christianity as old as the Creation*, p. 67.
5. Ib. p. 48
6. Ib. p. 16.
Through the evil agency of the priests men have indeed often been transformed, throughout Christendom as elsewhere, into fierce and cruel monsters, acting with rage and fury against those who have never done them harm. All that is needed, however, is to free mankind from the yoke of superstition which has impelled it to excesses. The laws of God will then be obeyed with joy, "not out of the principle of slavish fear, but from perfect love."3

Tindal's complete faith in the intellectual ability of everyone, whatever his race, religion, or state of culture, to discover the essential elements of religious truth for himself, is equally characteristic of the age in which he lived. In agreement with Hume's Cleanthes he believes that the use of reason, that faculty which alone distinguished men from brutes, is "the only means they have to discern whether there is a God; and whether He concerns Himself with human affairs; or has given them any laws; and what those laws are."4 He is equally sure, in contrast to Hume's predominantly sceptical conclusions, that there is "a clear distinct light, that lightens all men, and which, the moment they attend to it, makes them perceive those eternal truths which are the foundation of all our knowledge."5 Where Locke had admitted that a few chosen spirits achieved a qualified success by depending solely on their own mental resources, Tindal now discovers in all men, even in those of the "meanest capacities", certain "standing rules to distinguish truth from falsehood".6 "God's will," he says, "is so clearly and fully manifested in the Book of Nature that he who runs may read it."7 This being the case, all reliance on tradition and

1. Christianity, as old as the Creation, pp. 62-3
2. By teaching him that morality is the sole purpose of religion. Ib. p. 146
3. Ib. p. 65
4. Ib. p. 5
5. Christianity, as old as the Creation, p. 10, Cf. p. 250
6. Ib. p. 117
7. Ib. p. 24
external authority is as unnecessary as it is inexcusable - man's one reliable
guide, as Kant later insisted, is his own conscience, "the only tribunal God has
erected here on earth."¹

The proposition that God exists and that His nature is revealed to many
by the light of reason is the rock upon which Tindal builds up his whole theolo-
gical system. He himself attempts no proof of this proposition and merely accepts
what had been demonstrated "over and over" as an indisputable fact. "To believe,"
he says, "that everything is governed, ordered, or regulated for the best by
a designing Principle, or Mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect
Theist."²

His first series of inferences from this fundamental proposition lead him
to the notion of an eternal, universal and perfect religion of nature. If God,
Tindal asks, is infinitely good and gracious, as we know Him to be, can we
believe that He would ever leave man without adequate means for discovering His
religious duty? And if God is eminently reasonable and just, will He not avoid
all favouritism and treat all men alike, requiring nothing of a man for which
he cannot be held justly responsible? Or again, if God is eternal and unchanging,
will the laws He delivers to man not be the same from the beginning, for all
times and places? In a word, "can a religion designed for everyone not be within
the reach of everyone? Or that which above all things it concerns all men to
know, not be knowable by all?"³ We have, he argues, only two alternatives-
"the Law of Nature either is or is not a perfect law: if the first, 'tis not
capable of additions; if the last, does it not argue want of wisdom in the
Legislator, in first enacting such an imperfect law, and then in letting it

¹ Christianity as Old as the Creation, p. 92.
² Christianity as Old as the Creation, p. 156. Though Tindal doesn't seem
seem to number himself among the deists, or "Christian deists", as he pre-
ferred to call them, he warmly defends them from Dr. Clarke's attacks and is
³ Christianity as Old as the Creation, p. 267. Cf. pp. 10, 17, etc
continue thus imperfect from age to age?" Tindal, of course, chooses the first of these alternatives. "The religion of nature is absolutely perfect, as necessary since as before the coming of Christ and not only necessary to be observed in this world but in heaven itself, and that too forever."\(^2\)

A second group of inferences from God's nature enables Tindal to define this eternal and universal religion. God, we know "is infinitely happy in Himself,"\(^3\) and perfectly self-dependent. "We can give God nothing nor do Him the least kindness."\(^4\) Further, since He couldn't have brought us into being for His own sake or to satisfy His own need, He must have created us solely for our good. True religion, then, consists exclusively in "a constant disposition of mind to do all the good we can and thereby render ourselves acceptable to God in answering the end of His creation.\(^5\) --- The only way we have to show our real gratitude to our great Creator and Benefactor is to be as useful as we can to His creatures, whom we ought to love as ourselves."\(^6\) Tindal recognizes, it is true, man's irrepressible desire to worship; "the admiration, transport and ecstasy" occasioned by the contemplation of the divine attributes force men to indulge in "raptures of the highest praise and thanksgiving."\(^7\) He even goes so far as to maintain that it is according to "the voice of nature that God should be publicly worshipped."\(^8\) Yet all such worship and prayer\(^9\) have merely subjective value and remain of secondary importance. For "if from excess of devotion a

\(^1\) Christianity as Old as the Creation, p. 118  
\(^2\) Ib. p. 49-50 \(^3\) Ib. p. 11 \(^4\) Ib. p. 62. \(^5\) Ib. p. 18 \(^6\) Ib. p. 62  
\(^7\) Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 13  
\(^8\) Ib. p. 100  
\(^9\) Tindal defines the value of prayer in a way that would make it acceptable, one would imagine, even to Kant. Cf. Ib. p. 37, "Prayer itself, God knowing beforehand what we will ask, chiefly becomes a duty as it raises in us a due contemplation of the divine attributes and an acknowledgment of His great and constant goodness, and serves to keep us in a constant sense of our dependence on Him; and as it disposes us to imitate those perfections we adore in Him, in being kind and beneficent to one another"
man neglects the duties of civil life, he is so far from doing a thing acceptable to God, that he mistakes the end of religion."

The character and purpose of divine punishment is similarly deduced. God is above taking offence at anything we do; His honour requires no vindication and the breaking of His laws no satisfaction. It follows that "whether He punishes or rewards, He acts alike for our good," and for that alone. All divine punishment is therefore purely preventive, on the ground that "what is past can't be helped." Tindal, distinctly improves, however, on both Locke's and Kant's crude conceptions of the divine distribution of rewards and punishments; he at least makes them not detached and arbitrary but inherently connected with the actions they require. "Even in this life", he points out, "rational actions carry with them their own reward, and irrational, their own punishment; --- and if our rational nature is to be the same in the next life as it is in this, our actions must produce effects of the same kind, and that too in a much higher degree."

What then is Tindal's answer to the question of the nature and validity of external revelation and its relation to inner revelation? Though he expressly denies all wish to reject the former and declares that it is rather his purpose to establish it and do it honor, the whole tenor of his argument is that external revelation is unsatisfactory in itself and of doubtful value to men illumined by the inner Light of Nature. He has, it must be remembered, proved to his own complete satisfaction that natural religion is as old as creation, universally knowable and perfect in every respect, - a conclusion which is enough to

1. Christianity as Old as the Creation, p. 39, Cf. p. 132
2. Ib. p. 34
3. Ib. p. 33
4. Ib. p. 21
5. Christianity as old as the Creation, pp. 8, 190, etc.
prejudice him against all external revelation.

Tindal feels called upon to discredit external revelation at length and on a number of counts. He points out in the first place the impracticability of trying, as Locke tended to do, to serve two masters whose respective orders might conflict with each other. A rational and complete reliance on what is revealed by the Light of Nature, or else a blind faith in what purports to be external revelation, must govern human action. Between these two positions Tindal can find no middle ground. Now external revelation, he believes, is peculiarly unfitted to supplant reason and constitute for man a final court of appeal. There is of course the fundamental objection, which Cleanthes urges with such force against Philo's initial scepticism in Hume's *Dialogues* that if reason be distrusted - if once we believe that "our reasoning faculties, duly attended to, can deceive us, we cannot be sure of the truth of any one proposition," all rational conviction simply becomes impossible. And then there is the further consideration, equally unavoidable, that if natural religion is admitted to be perfect, external revelation must, *ex hypothesi*, neither contradict, exceed nor fall short of what has been internally revealed. Setting these objections aside for the moment, however, Tindal examines in detail the character of historical revelation in general and particularly the Christian revelation.

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**Christianity as Old as the Creation**

1. "If you are governed by the latter (external revelation), that supposes you must take everything on trust, or merely because it is said by those for whose dictates you are to have an implicit faith; for to examine into the truth of what they say is renouncing their authority: as on the contrary, if men are to be governed by their reason, they are not to admit anything farther than as they see it reasonable. To suppose both consistent is to suppose it consistent to take, and not to take, things on trust.

2. *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, p. 158

His conclusion is similar in most ways to the one arrived at in Germany some years later, and anticipates in a striking way many of Hume's own arguments in the Enquiry. Tindal marshals in imposing array the numerous difficulties that stand in the way of all belief in tradition and threaten to undermine its value if not wholly to discredit it. Take, for example, the Christian revelation as it is given to us in the Bible - what, he asks, is it worth? He calls attention in the first place to the fact that the original testimony of the writers of the New Testament may be unreliable. We have no way of knowing that these simple men were not deceived - "the prodigious numbers of revelations which from time to time have been in the world show how easily mankind may in this point be imposed on."\(^1\) Or again, they may have deliberately lied, since, as Tindal points out, even inspired persons are subject to the same passions as other men.\(^2\) But even granted that what they originally wrote was trustworthy, may not this teaching have become garbled and distorted in its passage through the centuries? "The probability" in Tindal's estimate, "of facts depending on human testimony must gradually lessen in proportion to the distance of the time when they were done."\(^3\) There accounts, after all, have been handed down to us by men neither infallible nor impecable; translations and transcriptions invite error. Further allowance must be made for the fact that Christ and his disciples were easterners, given to florery and symbolical language. We are of another race and temperament, and must find it correspondingly hard rightly to understand them or appreciate their point of view. Locke's simple rule, in other words, that we must take the words in the Bible in their plain and ordinary meaning, is not as simple as it looks. "Even the moral precepts of Christ" are not to be taken in

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1. Christianity as old as the Creation p. 163, cf. pp. 219, 136
2. Ib. p. 221
3. Ib. p. 163
their obvious and literal meaning. Such commands as turning the other cheek and adding a coat to a cloak must clearly be qualified before they can be made to fit into the practical and commonsense world of modern men. And what, in the end, of the "30,000 various readings in the New Testament" or the "1250 texts relating to the doctrine of the Trinity"? Here an appeal to reason in the shape of interpretation and scholarly erudition is plainly demanded. The Gospel message, it appears, is not plain and simple; even the learned have recourse to the famous "keys of solution" (Tindal quotes a page of them) in their attempt to penetrate to the inner meaning of the text. And to resort to allegory, one of the "keys", leads, as Tindal points out, to a veritable quagmire of doubt and perplexity. And note, he concludes, what all such interpretation and explaining away of difficulties involves - nothing more nor less than an ultimate reliance on reason rather than on the written Word!

Locke, as we saw, conceived the true function of external revelation to be that of supplying to the masses the clear and simple truth about God. Tindal accepts the issue, agreeing that "everyone must judge for himself" and that "true religion can't be but plain, simple and natural." His conclusion,

1. Christianity as old as the Creation, P. 306
2. Ib. p. 260
3. Ib. p. 292
4. To the distinctively Roman solution of the problem, i.e. that all such exegesis and higher criticism be left to the priests, man's "spiritual governors" who are set apart for this very purpose, and that their verdict be accepted without question by the unlettered, Tindal brings forward several objections. The priests have, he points out, a notorious reputation for undependableness. "All Church history is full of the vilest and most pernicious things perpetrated by Christian priests." (Ib. p. 93.) Moreover, even the most learned priests cannot agree among themselves. Consider, he says, "how much the Divines of the same church differ in explaining what they mean by Divine Person, Essence, Trinity, Messiah, etc." (Ib. p. 261)

5. Ib. p. 213
6. Ib. p. 178
7. Ib. p. 249
8. Ib. p. 94
9. Ib. p. 217
however, is very different, namely, that the Christian revelation as contained in
the Bible is wholly unfitted for what Locke believed to be its chief task. Taken
as it stands it is ambiguous and untrustworthy and is even liable, if accepted
as man's sole authority, to lead him seriously astray - witness the public and
private sins recorded in the Old Testament. The only way, in a word, in which
the Bible can be made a source of edification is "to admit all --- that
tends to the Honour of God and the Good of man, and nothing which does not"¹
- to make reason, that is, the judge, Scripture the evidence.

Yet this does not involve, in Tindal's opinion, a rejection of Christianity.
All that is necessitated is its redefinition. Natural religion and external
revelation, he affirms, "like two tallies exactly answer one another, without
any other difference between them but as to the manner of their being delivered,"²
the one being the internal, the other the external revelation of the same unchange-
able God. Our knowledge that the Christian Gospel is "law of absolute perfection"³
rests not on its own or on any supernatural authority, but rather on "the internal
excellency"⁴ of its doctrines. This true Christianity, however, "though the name
is of a later date"⁵, is as old as human nature, "as old as the Creation".
Christ's mission was not to teach men new duties but --- to repent of the breach
of known duties."⁶ "The whole" - he takes the text quite literally and attaches
great importance to it - "need no physician but they that are sick!"

1. Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 297, cf. p. 299
2. Ib. p. 51. cf. p. 2
3. Ib. p. 163
4. Ib. p. 163.
5. Ib. p. 4
6. Ib. p. 41
Having thus completely identified true Christianity with the religion of reason he boldly discards everything in the religion of the churches which seems to savour of mystery and irrationality. Miracles he denounces as proving nothing, since all religions lay claims to the miraculous — it is a case of "miracles for fools and reasons for wise men!" The hypothesis that religious truths are "above reason" he dismisses as an ingenious device of the clergy to pull the wool over the eyes of their followers. What, he asks, could be "more absurd than to imagine that God will show His favour to one for believing what he could not but believe, and His displeasure to another for not believing what he could not believe?"

Though he attacks various Protestant doctrines in slightly veiled language, his scorn for the Roman habit of treating "means", such as the rite of baptism, the cross, certain forms of worship etc., as "ends" of value in themselves, knows no bounds.

Natural religion is thus proved to be the final court of appeal, "the standard of perfection" by which "we must judge, antecedently to any traditional religion, what is, or is not, a law absolutely perfect." It "does not depend upon the uncertain meanings of words and phrases in dead languages, much less on types, metaphores, allegories, parables, or on the skill or honesty of weak and designing transcribers, (not to mention translators) for many years." Rather, it is a good God's choicest gift to man whereby he may reject what is false in every religion and by himself discover eternal truth.

1. Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 170. cf. p. 181
2. Ib. p. 44, cf. p. 183
3. Cf. his comment on the Trinity, p. 75
4. Cf. ib. p. 150, seq., 186, etc.
5. Ib. p. 50
6. Ib. p. 54
"David Hume", says Pfleiderer, "is related to Lockian deism as is Kant to the Wolffian Aufklärung; in both cases a partial critique was transcended by means of one which was carried out to its logical conclusions. But in Kant, this overthrow of the older critique served at the same time as the foundation for a higher point of view, that of speculative ethical rationalism, while in Hume it remained the declaration of bankruptcy on the part of empiricism— an empty, unfruitful scepticism. But Hume and Kant shared to a certain extent the preconceptions of their contemporaries and neither succeeded in freeing himself wholly from the limitations peculiar to the age in which he wrote. Both, as we shall see, were profoundly interested in physico-theology and both were keenly aware of its inability to satisfy man's natural craving for a knowledge of God. In the field of theology they differed primarily in this, that Hume, acutely conscious as he was of the disparity between the longing of his soul and the capacity of his reason to satisfy this longing, developed no constructive theory that would embrace both these sides of human nature; the more energetic Kant, on the other hand, aware of the same inner conflict, boldly laid hold on man's moral consciousness and on this base succeeded in building up an intricately connected if artificially conceived system of moral theology. Or, to put the contrast in other words, the negative critical attitude remained in Hume predominant to the end, whereas Kant's strength lay at least as much in his keen perception of the moral values as in his remarkable critical and speculative insight.

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Hume marked the culmination of the deistic movement in England of which Locke, though priding himself on his loyalty to Christianity and disclaiming all sympathy with his deist admirers, was nevertheless the real founder. Hume, while accepting many of the principles of deism, carried these principles so unhesitatingly to their logical conclusion that there remained in his hands at the last mere wraith of deism - he was, to speak precisely, no deist at all. In these two men, then, we have the boundaries of the movement - Locke with one foot in the camp of orthodoxy, not yet a typical deist - Hume, with rather more than one foot on the barren ground of sheer scepticism, a typical deist no longer.

Among Hume's utterances on theology by far the most important is his famous Dialogues concerning Natural Religion¹. There is evidence to show that Hume had expended upon them some of his best thought and that he attached at least as much importance to them as to any of his other works.² The added fact that Hamann's translation of them was read by Kant³ in 1780 while he was working on the final draft of the first Critique in which he deals with the apriori and teleological proofs, gives the book a peculiar significance for our present study.

There appear in the Dialogues three characters, each presenting a definite point of view, and no single character being exclusively identifiable with the author. Hume finds himself most at ease in stating the arguments of Philo the sceptic; yet he feels a "strong propensity" for the theistic position defended by Cleanthes. The brunt of the argument is born by these two characters, and

¹ Published in 1779.
³ See Ib. p. 4; Also M'Ewen's Introduction to a reprint of the Dialogues (1907), p. xviii.
the conclusions arrived at are so indefinite and so different from each other that an estimate of Hume's final verdict requires an analysis of the two contrasted positions. Demea, the third speaker, who seems to represent the orthodox position, is the character with whom Hume was unquestionably least in sympathy. It is he who defends the *apriori* proof which Hume, anticipating Kant, rejects with such finality. It is he, again, who considers man's present misery an adequate proof of the reality of a future state in which present injustice is recompensed by future justice - a type of reasoning against which Hume, now differing from Kant, vehemently protests. An absolute sceptic with regard to reason, a mystic in religion, and a pessimist on the present course and nature of the world, Demea apparently symbolizes Hume's conception of the orthodox theologian of the day, and as such draws upon himself the scornful protests of the two main characters of the piece.

A common assumption of all these disputants, one, it will be noted, which Kant refuses to make, is that the "being of God" is not to be questioned.1 This deistic presupposition, however, rests not on the *apriori* proofs of God's existence, but on the feeling which even Philo shares, that this is a "fundamental", "unquestionable and self-evident truth" which no reasonable man can doubt. The problem to be considered is, by common consent, God's nature. Yet the determining of God's attributes is so closely bound up with the fundamental question of whether we can assert that God, in any religious sense of the word, actually exists - in other words, Philo's persistent belief that we can know nothing of His nature comes so near to sheer agnosticism regarding His existence - that this initial axiom amounts to little more than the recognition that atheism, (to use the word in its modern sense, as the belief that God does not exist), is foolish and not worthy of serious consideration.

1. Cf. M'Ewen's *Introduction* p. xxv. "In all his writings, without exception, this one proposition (i.e. that God exists) is always adhered to." Cf. *Dialogues*, pp. 389-91. (Page references are to the Green and Grose edition of 1896, volume II)
Hume's analysis of the attempts to discover God's nature by the traditional *apriori* methods is of interest to us only in its two-fold conclusion—first, that the proofs, as Democritus states them in their typical 18th century form, are without validity and must be rejected root and branch; and second, that the consequent loss to religion is negligible. "The argument *apriori*" as Philo puts it, "has seldom been found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical head; --- men ever did and ever will derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning."¹ These conclusions, with both of which Kant is strongly in sympathy, mark a definite advance on the deistic assumption that the *apriori* proofs are not only valid but are the very foundation stones of religion.

There remains the *aposteriori* road to a knowledge of God's nature, and along this road Cleanthes sets out. Philo neatly sums up the latter's position. "Like effects prove like causes. This is the experimental argument and this, you say, is the sole theological argument."² For purposes of analysis there can be distinguished in Hume's reasoning two movements of thought, the one to, the other from design.³ The first merely attempts to prove that design exists in the universe. The second, following from the first and depending on it, tries to determine the nature of the designing intelligence. Hume's willingness to travel the first stage of the journey is clear; how far he is willing to go on the second stage is the more difficult question which we must now try to answer.

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3. Cf. M'Ewan's Introduction, p. lxxxviii. It may be pointed out, however, that such a distinction possesses less significance than would appear at first glance. The two problems are inextricably bound up with each other. The very notion of design carries with it inevitably the concept of a Designer, a designing Intelligence. This is the fundamental reason for Philo's ultimate capitulation; he recognises that his admission that design is a fact in the world forces him to accept some form of theism.
Cleanthes believes from the first in the presence of intention or design in the universe. "Consider," he says to Philo, "anatomize the eye; survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me from your own feeling if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you like that of sensation. ---whatever cavils may be urged; an orderly world will still be received as an incontestable proof of design and intention." The sceptical Philo is somewhat "embarrassed and confounded" by this appeal, and though he makes no immediate answer, he seems to have been convinced by it; for as the debate proceeds he refers to the evidence of design in the universe with increasing sympathy and at last makes the emphatic statement that "a purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker." We may fairly conclude, therefore, that Hume, like Kant, is convinced that the universe is not governed by blind chance.

It is in what 

legitimately be inferred from the experienced character of the world as to the nature and attributes of God that Philo and Cleanthes differ. The latter's central argument, to which he remains loyal to the end, is the argument from analogy. The universe, he insists in typical 18th century fashion, is nothing but a great and intricate machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, all accurately adjusted to each other. Since the whole resembles the productions of human beings, he infers, by the rules of analogy, "that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man." His contention briefly summarized, is, first, that to maintain that God is absolutely incomprehensible and to say that our ideas of God, as far as they go, are not "just and adequate and corresponding to His real nature" is to profess atheism.

1. Dialogues, p. 402
5. Ib. p. 405.
(or what today would be called agnosticism) and to desert the basis of argument agreed upon earlier in the debate; and second, that the method of human analogy is the only possible way of conceiving God's nature. "If we abandon all human analogy," he insists, "I am afraid we abandon all religion and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration." Philo's answer is to marshal the various familiar arguments against anthropomorphism and to insist that such an anthropomorphic deity is worse than none at all. The two characters, it is clear, are at grips over one of the most central problems of religion - a problem of which Locke and Tindal never seem to have been seriously aware. The more the Deity is conceived after the likeness of man, the more are we confronted with all the inadequacies and absurdities of anthropomorphism, whereas the more these anthropomorphic elements are weeded out, the more vague and meaningless, and, from the religious point of view, useless, becomes our conception of God. Hume sees both sides of the dilemma with remarkable clearness. While Cleanthes, unable to meet Philo's objections, nevertheless clings tenaciously to the essential religious value of anthropomorphism, Philo, equally unable to overthrow Cleanthes' main contention that elements of anthropomorphism are indispensable to religion, ruthlessly lays bare the philosophical difficulties attendant upon such a position.

Philo and Cleanthes also fail to agree in their theistic conclusions. The latter's conception of God is more tangible, and for that very reason, perhaps, more liable to criticism. He declares himself in favour of a finite God whose main attributes are "benevolence, regulated by wisdom and limited by necessity." 

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Dialogues
1. Il. p. 444. Cf. p. 412
2. Ib. pp. 412-415, 466-7
3. Ib. p. 444
The term "infinite" as applied to God seems to him to savour more of panegyric than philosophy; the more moderate terms "admirable," "excellent," etc, are, he thinks, enough to satisfy our human need for a Deity and are, moreover, more accurate descriptions of the Author of the universe we know. And having sacrificed God's omnipotence he is now able to avoid the necessity of holding Him responsible for the evil in the world.

Philo, in contrast to Cleanthes, changes his position in a curious and somewhat unaccountable manner. He is at first opposed to theism altogether on the ground that thought is but one of several potent forces in the world, and that to conceive God in terms of mind alone is arbitrary and unwarranted.\(^1\) Instinct, generation and vegetation also afford the basis for theories by which to judge of the origin of the world, for the world may be likened quite as accurately to an animal or a vegetable as to a machine.\(^2\) "Nature", in a word, though vague, is at bottom no more inexplicable than "designing intelligence" - naturalism is as likely an hypothesis as theism. As a sceptic, however, Philo declines to defend either hypothesis and prefers the sceptic's refuge, "a suspense of judgment."

Yet presently, for no explicable reason, (for Cleanthes' answers\(^3\) are most inadequate\(^4\)) he shifts to a form of theism as the most probable explanation of the order apparent in the universe. "The existence of a Deity", he now asserts,

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2. This contention, which Kant supports in his Critique of Judgment, is the final answer to the 18th century argument of design which likens the world to a machine and God to the builder who fashions the machine and gives it its form. Hume and Kant pointed out what is now universally recognized, that organic nature is essentially self-formative, containing within itself potent forces of growth and change. A machine is built; nature, in a very real sense, builds itself. Cf. below pp. 114, 116.
4. Professor Pringle-Pattison (Idea of God pp. 14-15) contends that Philo is fairly convinced by Cleanthes' appeal (Dialogues, p. 425) and is thus won over to a saner viewpoint. I fail to find, however, in Cleanthes' meagre remarks, any argument of sufficient weight to induce Philo to adopt his second position. The change, though admittedly a wise one, is therefore from the point of view of the argument rather inexplicable.
"is plainly ascertained by reason," and suggests "Mind" or "Thought" as a possible synonym for God. This, it is plain, marks an advance from his earlier, purely sceptical, position, and may be regarded as a concession to Cleanthes. The "theism" to which he now subscribed, however, is so very evanescent as to be hardly distinguishable from agnosticism. "The theist," as he himself points out, "allows that the original intelligence is very different from human nature: the atheist (agnostic), that the original principle of order bears some remote analogy to it. Will you quarrel, gentlemen, about the degrees ---?

A third point of difference between Philo and Cleanthes is in regard to God's benevolence. Philo's contention is that there is in the world no evidence of a benevolent Governor or moral Judge. "The whole earth is cursed and polluted" is his cry; nature embitters the life of every living being; man, not content with his real enemies, creates imaginary ones, the demons of his fancy; and death, despite life's misery, is feared so intensely that man is literally terrified into a continuance of his existence. Far from justifying us in inferring a good God, the world seems to Philo to present "nothing but the idea of a blind nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!" And, Philo goes on to add, "we have no more reason to infer that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude than that His benevolence resembles the human." God, he therefore concludes, is so far as we can know neither benevolent nor righteous.

Cleanthes at once admits the importance of the issue and is willing to rest his whole case upon it. "If," addressing Philo, "you can make out the present point and prove mankind to be unhappy and corrupted, there is an end at once to all religion. And to what purpose establish the natural attributes of God while

1. Dialogues p. 457
2. Ib. p. 459
3. Ib. p. 452
4. Ib. p. 453
the moral are still doubtful and uncertain?"¹ Yet here, as Philo is quick to
point out,² Cleanthes has chosen insecure and dangerous ground on which to stand.
Committed to the empirical proposition that no cause, not even God, can be known
but by its known effects, and failing to find in man's moral nature, as did Kant,
an adequate foundation for theology, he is unable to establish God's moral nature³
and is forced to the position (though he says he embraces it willingly), that the
only way of proving the divine benevolence "is to deny absolutely the misery and
wickedness of man." ⁴ This he proceeds to do, accusing Philo of exaggeration, and
insisting flatly that "health is more common than sickness, pleasure than pain,
happiness than misery." From this position nothing will move him and near the end
of the book he even goes so far as to characterize "genuine theism" as teaching
that we are" the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise and powerful; who
created us for happiness, and who, having implanted in us immeasurable desires
of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will transfer us into
an infinite variety of scenes in order to satisfy those desires and render our
felicity complete and durable."⁵ Cleanthes, however, limits himself to describing
the doctrine just quoted as "the most agreeable reflection which it is possible
for the human imagination to suggest" and his complete failure to defend it against
the attacks of Philo justify the conclusion that this doctrine is more what Hume
wanted to believe than what he was able to believe.

The same may be said of Hume's attitude to Cleanthes' view of religion in
contrast to Philo's. Cleanthes' estimate of the value and function of religion,
is, it is true, even more modest than that of Tindal. "The proper office of reli-
gion," he says, "is to regulate the heart of men, harmonize their conduct, [and]
infuse the spirit of temperance, order and obedience."⁶ Though it "enforces

¹. Ib. p. 441. (Ib. has reference to Dialogues)
². Ib. p. 442-3
³. Ib. p. 441-2
⁴. Ib. p. 441.
⁵. Ib. p. 464
M'Ewan, p. cvii) "The proper office of religion is to reform men's lives,
to purify their hearts, to enforce all moral duties, and to secure obedience
to the laws of the civil magistrate."
the motives of morality and justice" it is not to be confounded with these motives; but neither must it be allowed to distinguish itself and act as a separate principle, but must operate in silence; for otherwise it departs "from its proper sphere."

It strengthens men's morals by promulgating the doctrine of a future state, and he therefore urges that "religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all." But this would seem to reduce religion to the category of the useful but untrue, for Cleanthes himself has previously protested against Demea's inference that present evil will be rectified in other regions, a protest which is strongly sustained by Hume himself in his essay on A Particular Providence and a Future State. It seems clear, therefore, that when Cleanthes speaks of true religion as "the chief, the only great comfort in life, and our principle support amidst all the attacks of adverse fortune," he is voicing Hume's yearnings rather than reflecting his rational convictions. Philo, on the other hand, while admitting that hope enters into religion, insists that the "terrors of religion commonly prevail over its comforts" and that fear is the stronger religious principle. Hume, in short, regards both hope and fear as motives impelling men to venture beyond those sceptical conclusions which alone seem justified by reason. His own tendency, nevertheless, is to turn a deaf ear to his alarms as well as to his hopes and to desist from all religious speculation.

The weakness of Cleanthes' position is the hitherto unsuspected weakness of the whole deistic conception of natural religion. One by one the props of deism have been removed - the *a priori* proofs, the untrammelled inferences from the

1. Dialogues, p. 460
2. Ibid. p. 441.
3. Enquiry, Section X.
4. Dialogues, p. 464
teleological proof of God's manifold perfections, the belief in a future life and in a moral order. Cleanthes makes the best of what is left, declaring that "the hypothesis of design in the world is a sufficient foundation for religion,"\(^1\) and resting the benevolence of God and with it the validity of religion itself\(^2\) on the excess among men of pleasure over pain. But Demea and Philo, between them, reveal the barrenness and uselessness of such a religion. "It must," says Demea, "be a slight fabric, indeed, which can be erected on so tottering a foundation. While we are uncertain whether there is one deity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our existence, be perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or alive; what trust and confidence can we repose in them? What devotion or worship address to them? What veneration or obedience pay to them? To all the purposes of life, the theory of religion becomes altogether useless."\(^3\) and while certainty is a prime necessity to the religious mind, Philo points out\(^4\) that Cleanthes rests his whole system of religion on a point which from its very nature must forever remain uncertain, (for who can ever measure all the pain and pleasure in the world?) and thereby tacitly acknowledges the uncertainty of the system itself.

What then is Philo's conception of religion? "If," he says at the end of the debate, "the whole of natural theology resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous or at least undefined proposition that "the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence" --- what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than

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\(^{1}\) Dialogues, p. 415. Cf. Hume's Treatise, note to the Appendix (Works, I. p. 456). "The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind. Nothing more is requisite to give a foundation to all the articles of religion, nor is it necessary that we should form a distinct idea of the force and energy of the Supreme Being."

\(^{2}\) Ib. p. 441.

\(^{3}\) Ib. p. 415.

\(^{4}\) Ib. p. 442
give a plain philosophical assent to the proposition as often as it occurs; and believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie against it.\(^1\) It is to this narrow compass, then, that the "religion of nature", of which the deists were so proud, has shrunk! Philo, it is true, professes his veneration for what he esteems to be true religion - an estimate with which Hume's own definition of religion as "the practise of morality and the assent of the understanding to the proposition that God exists"\(^2\) would seem to agree. Such a "speculative tenet of theism" has, Philo urges, no pernicious effects; it must,\(^3\) however, lie under the inconvenience of always being confined to very few persons. This "philosophical and rational kind" of religion is, moreover, useless to these few, for they do not need it; and to the masses who do stand in need of aid, it remains incomprehensible. And even were they capable of grasping this last shred of natural religion, it could do them no good, for "it affords no inference that affects human life"\(^4\) nor can it be the source of any action or forbearance. For religion "as it is commonly found in the world", on the other hand, Philo has nothing but contempt, and summarily dismisses it as sheer superstition. He believes, indeed, that its influence on men has been overestimated; but such influence as it has is wholly bad. Here again we encounter the deists' distrust of the clergy, their suspicion of "a great profession of religion and devotion", and their indictment of the wars and persecutions perpetrated in the name of religion. Philo's criticism, however, is wider in its scope; all popular religion, all "vulgar superstition" which "weakens men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity," is now his target. The shafts which the

1. dialogues, p. 467
2. Private letter, (1744), Burton's Life, I, p. 162
3. dialogues, p. 463.
deists had aimed at Christianity he now hurles at natural religion with fatal effect.

For Philo, the sceptic, religion, in every real sense of the word, has ceased to be.

What then are we to conclude as to Hume's estimate of the relative merits of the arguments of Philo and Cleanthes? The only portion of the Dialogues which unquestionably reflects Hume's own point of view is his footnote towards the end of the book where he says in so many words that the two disputants differ only in their angle of approach and agree as to the ultimate nature of the problem.

"No philosophical Dogmatist denies, that there are difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolvable. No Sceptic denies, that we lie under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reasoning with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently of assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, the is that the Sceptic, from habit, caprice or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist, for like reasons, on the necessity." When we turn elsewhere for evidence on Hume's preference for Philo or Cleanthes, we find, on the one hand, that Pamphilus (who is not necessarily to be identified with Hume himself) closes the book with the assertion that in his judgment, the principles of Cleanthes, approach nearer to the truth than do Philo's. And Hume himself tells Gilbert Elliott, in writing to him in 1751 about the Dialogues, that Cleanthes is the hero of the piece and that he is anxious to see his position strengthened, if that be possible, in opposition to Philo's sceptical views. This apparent championing of Cleanthes, on the other hand, would seem to be offset by a sentence in Hume's

1. Dialogues, p. 459. N.
2. I rely here on Pringle-Pattison, Idea of God, p. 3
letter to William Strahan dated June 5, 1776 (Hume died on August 25 of the same year) which reads: "I here introduce a Sceptic, who is indeed refuted, and at last gives up the argument, may confesses that he was only amusing himself by all his cavils; yet before he is silenced, he advances several topics which will give umbrage —-.

There is here no sign that Hume regarded Cleanthes with any special favour. Whatever be the feasibility, or desirability, of defending Cleanthes' position, moreover, it seems plain from the inadequacy of the defense in the Dialogues against Philo's attacks that Hume himself never transcended the latter's "attenuated theism." We can be sure that he remained dissatisfied with the sceptical conclusions of Philo when we note his repeated appeals to faith and revelation.

"Believe me, Cleanthes," says Philo at the end of the argument, "the most natural sentiment which a well disposed mind will feel on this occasion is a longing desire and expectation that heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this profound ignorance by affording some more particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the divine object of our faith. A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity." His conception of faith, however, as something essentially irrational, and his sceptical presupposition rendering all divine revelation antecedently impossible, make him incapable of appreciating the true significance of Christianity. "The Christian Religion," he says in the Enquiry, "was not only at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason" (and here he puts his finger on one of the cardinal fallacies of deism) "is insufficient to convince us of its

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1. Cf. for example, Dialogues. End of part X.
2. Dialogues, p. 467. Cf. Enquiry, End of section XII: "Divinity's or theology's best and most solid foundation is faith and revelation."
3. Enquiry, Sections X and XI
4. Ib. end of Section X
veracity; and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." Hume, then, having accomplished the overthrow of natural religion in its deistic form, was able to go no further. Kant succeeded, in part at least by reason of Hume's thorough work, in avoiding the pitfalls of physico-theology. Yet he pressed on where Hume had halted and erected a new theological system on a new foundation, which was man's moral nature.
III. The German Aufklärung.

When we speak of the German Aufklärung we mean by it, roughly, the great spiritual movement active in that country during the period which is covered almost exactly by Kant's life. It was, as we have said, a mighty tendency towards freedom, social, intellectual and religious. A careful analysis of the movement, tremendously complex as it is both in its origins and in the ways in which it expressed itself, is beyond the scope of our present study. We must content ourselves with a brief notice of two of its main aspects which acquire for us a special significance in their bearing on Kant's teaching. The Aufklärung, on its intellectual and religious side, was an attempt to break down the traditional authority and dogmatism of the Church. This attempt assumed two main forms, evangelical pietism, and what may be called, for lack of a better term, rationalistic deism. Kant, born and nurtured in a deeply pietistic home, and surrounded during his university course and after by strong rationalistic tendencies, exhibits in many striking ways the deep impression made on him by both these aspects of the Aufklärung.

1. German Pietism

By the middle of the 17th century the Lutheran Church in Germany had become a "creed-bound theological and sacramentarian institution." Müller, one of the forerunners of pietism, trenchantly described the state of affairs by calling the font, the pulpit, the confessional and the altar "the four dumb idols of the Church." Its theology was highly scholastic, the chief interest of the divines attaching to precise and dogmatic formulation of the Church's accepted positions. The Bible had fallen from the place of honor to which Luther had raised it, and was little read or attended to. Lutheran pastors had formed themselves into a despotic hierarchy and ruled a subdued flock with an almost papal absolutism. Christian faith, in a word, was no longer a thing of the heart but had deteriorated into a matter of correct ceremonial and orthodox belief.
It was against this stagnant condition in which the Church was sunk that the men who were presented by their enemies with the appellation "pietist" arose in protest. The founder of the movement was Philip Jacob Spener (1635-1705), a man of deep religious zeal. Greatly impressed with the need in which the Church stood for moral and religious reform, he began to hold religious meetings in his house, meetings at which the Bible was studied and expounded, a free discussion of religious problems encouraged, and a spirit of prayer and devotion stimulated. In 1675 he published, partly under the inspiration of Arndt's True Christianity, his Pia desideria or An earnest Desire for a Reform of the true Evangelical Church in which he made six practical proposals which throw a flood of light upon the state of affairs against which he was protesting. They are briefly summarized as follows: (1) that the Bible be earnestly studied, (2) that the laity be given a share in Church government, (3) that the practice of Christianity be recognized as an essential supplement to a knowledge of Christian doctrine, (4) that sympathetic and kindly treatment of the heterodox be substituted for the usual bitter attacks upon them, (5) that greater emphasis be put upon devotional life in the university, and (6) that in preaching, rhetorical embellishments give place to a more genuine and devout message. The response to Spener's appeal was considerable, the most notable among his adherents being Francke, under whose leadership, after Spener's death, the movement grew in influence till Francke's own death in 1727. Meanwhile Frederick III of Brandenburg gave the pietists his active assistance both before and after his accession to the throne of Prussia and in 1694 he founded the pietist university of Halle, all of whose professors of theology were, at the beginning, of that persuasion. This university remained for many years an important centre of the movement.

1. The movement may be compared to Methodism in England and to the Jansenist movement in the Catholic Church.
The main characteristics of pietism at its best are plainly discernible in Spener’s initial purpose. The movement was a protest against churchly formalism. It was an attempt to get down through the veneer of ritual to the heart of the Christian experience, a demand that justification and rebirth be actually experienced, not merely regarded as orthodox Christian doctrines. It was, in short, an attempt to revive Christianity as a living religion. This end pietism attempted to achieve in two ways—prayer, and a diligent study of the Bible. The Bible was to be regarded henceforth not as a sourcebook of proof texts but as a divine revelation capable of providing rich nourishment for the soul. The genuineness of the movement manifested itself in its emphasis on the practical side of religious life. This took the form of a spirit of kindliness towards other denominations, an active interest in the needy at home, and a new concern for the heathen abroad. Pietism, finally, proclaimed a new individualism. Religion was no longer to be the concern solely of skilled theologians but the heritage of the common man who was no longer encouraged to find God for himself. Social barriers were broken down; women acquired a new dignity and importance; a life of holiness became the goal to which all might hope to attain.

Yet, as so often happens, the very strength of pietism soon became its weakness. The laudable importance assigned to the Christian experience developed into an exaggerated, almost fanatical, demand (bordering on superstition) for a certain violent and mystical kind of conversion. Such a new birth, it was thought, must be preceded in all cases by agonies of repentance. The pietists’ admirable emphasis on good works soon grew into an overemphasis, and gave certain reason to their opponents’ contention that Christianity had become for them a new salvation by works. Their criticism, moreover, of the weaknesses of the Lutheran church often blinded them to the function and value of the Church as such. But their greatest and most fundamental weakness was a tendency to save their own souls and leave the salvation of the world to the second coming of the
Lord. Despite their orphanages and missions, their chief interest often lay not in Christianizing the world by living its life and taking active part in its affairs, but rather in withdrawing from the world of men as they withdrew from all carnal pleasures, and together with a chosen few, in achieving for themselves a life of holiness.

There are some who have claimed that the sources of the Aufklärung are to be found exclusively in Germany itself, and primarily in German pietism. Though this is clearly an exaggeration, still the influence of pietism upon Germany was considerable, and in its individualism, its emphasis on the practical side of religion, and its opposition to the dogmatism of the church, it helped to prepare the way for, and was indeed part of the vanguard of the Aufklärung. What concerns us more closely, however, is that its influence on Kant's life and teaching was profound. Whereas pietism ran its course before the middle of the 18th century as a distinct movement, its indirect influence through men like Kant continued long after it had ceased to be an important element in the religious life of Germany.
2. **German Deism**

The second and far more typical expression in Germany of the religious side of the Aufklärung was German deism. Though Pietism helped indirectly to prepare the way for this new theological rationalism by weakening the dogmatic armour of the Church, it was, by reason of its very nature, opposed in the main to the more popular and more influential deistic movement. For where the former relied on religious emotion and the feelings, the latter appealed exclusively to reason and the intellect. It was only natural, then, that the two forces should clash, as indeed they did on frequent occasions.

The two main roots of German deism are the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy and English deism. The influence of the latter was first felt in Germany in the end of the 17th, and reached its height in the middle of the 18th century. Herbert of Cherbury was reviewed and criticized as early as 1680. John Toland, Locke's rather disreputable admirer and disciple, lived for a time in Germany after the publication of his *Christianity not Mysterious* and was respectfully criticized by Leibniz. By 1720 the more erudite had become familiar with the main ideas of Toland and Collins through the writings of Pfaff, Gundley and Mosheim, and by 1743 English deism had effected a more general entrance into Germany through the translations of its main works. Fifteen years later it had attained such popularity that the *Freidenkerlexicon* and the *Freidenker-bibliothek* were not only published with impunity but were well received.

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2. Published in 1696, a year after Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity*.
6. Oman remarks of Baumgarten (1706-1757), Wolff's most illustrious disciple, that he "seems to have reviewed almost every deistic and apologetic work in our language." *Problem of Faith and Freedom*, p. 159.
The similarity is striking, moreover, between Reimarus, who may be taken as the typical German deist, and Tindal. The general development of deism in the two countries is indeed so nearly the same, that a very brief mention of its special German peculiarities will suffice for our present purpose. These are to be found for the most part in the earlier and more indigenous stages of its development, and may be discovered by contrasting Wolff and Locke. The chief difference between them consists in the fact that Locke was an empiricist, Wolff a dogmatic rationalist. To the former, our knowledge of God rests on empirical evidence, on a combination of experience and reflection; and the Biblical narratives are to him just so much reliable evidence from which certain conclusions may legitimately be drawn. Wolff rests his belief in God almost entirely on the apriori proofs; God’s existence and nature may be deduced with complete certainty and great adequacy from the idea of Him which each individual finds implanted in his own mind. Another point of contrast between these two philosopher-theologians is the attitude they take towards the Bible and the dogmas of the Church. Locke ignores current, orthodox theology and devotes his attention to the Bible; Wolff pursues the old scholastic method of accepting most of the theological propositions of the Church and trying to build up beneath them a formal and syllogistic foundation.

Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was the most typical and most influential thinker in Germany in the first half of the 18th century. Born of humble parents, (his father was a tanner,) he rose rapidly in the academic world, going in 1706 to the University of Halle where Pietism, after its long conflict with Lutheran dogmatism, had itself come to assume the characteristics of a new orthodoxy. Wolff’s bold rationalistic claims soon drew down upon him the disfavour and finally the open opposition of his theological colleagues, who at last, in 1723, succeeded in persuading the king to expel him from Prussian territory. This struggle with Pietism, however, gave Wolff such wide publicity that by 1737 over two hundred books and pamphlets had appeared for and against his philosophy.
One of the first acts of Frederick the Great after his accession to the throne in 1740 was to recall him to Halle. Wolff's return to the city from which he had been exiled assumed the nature of a triumphal entry, and within three years he was made chancellor of the university. His influence over German thought was now greater than that of any of his contemporaries, and for years, indeed, until he was displaced by Kant, he held in Germany almost undisputed sway. Kant himself was his faithful disciple for a time. It was the Wolffian philosophy which he studied in the university and Wolff's formulation of natural theology upon which he later concentrated his attacks in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Wolff's chief merit lies not in the originality of his ideas but in his noteworthy achievement of systematizing and popularizing certain elements of the Leibnizian philosophy. Up to the time of Wolff's activity, a knowledge of Leibniz had been restricted to a mere handful of scholars; Wolff now succeeded in making many of Leibniz' ideas the common property of the nation. Leibniz had failed in a marked degree to knit together the various strands of his thought into a simple, unified system. Wolff supplied this lack by giving to as much of his master's philosophy as he was able to comprehend and assimilate a systematic unity. These portions of Leibnizianism he then offered to his countrymen in German instead of the usual Latin, (this in itself a marked advance,) and in a relatively simple and popular form. As was natural, however, "this popularizing making was a mere more shallow as well; it was the exoteric Leibnizianism which through Wolff was made the dominating mode of thought of the 18th century Aufklärung." The most easily comprehended elements of the Leibnizian philosophy were laid hold

1. Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit, p. 57
2. Pfleiderer, *Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 94 (my translation)
of and disseminated, while many of the deeper and more profound ideas remained hidden from even such eminent disciples as Wolff himself. On the other hand, the reduction of this spirited philosophy to a dogmatic system robbed it of much of its freshness and supplied in its stead "the aridity of neo-scholastic formulism." The Wolffian framework in which essentially Leibnizian ideas are set forth is indeed itself symbolic\(^2\) of the spirit of an age of which Wolff was quite as much the mirror as the fashioner. It was an age essentially unproductive of new ideas, capable only of reproducing those of earlier thinkers; it now contented itself with selecting from the Leibnizian philosophy that which suited its own temper, and stating, in a way congenial to itself, what it had thus chosen.

Wolff's theology is predominantly metaphysical in character. His main interest is not in the historical basis or the empirical manifestations of religion but in its transcendent metaphysical Object. His theological system is a great syllogistic structure of inferences from certain initial definitions and axioms, and at the base of the whole lie the ontological and cosmological proofs of God's existence and nature. From these proofs Wolff concluded that God is an eternal and unchangeable, intelligent, complete and all-perfect, all-good and omnipotent Spirit, possessing all reality in the highest possible degree. The world in which we live is a perfect machine, created by God out of nothing and running its course, since that divine event, according to the adequate laws of its own mechanism.

Since God is the measure of goodness, wisdom and power, our world which is His handiwork must necessarily have been selected by Him as, of all possible world's, the best adapted to His purpose, which can only be to reveal His own perfection and glory. To bewail the evil and wickedness in the world is therefore to doubt God's wisdom; for though evil is not directly willed by Him, it appears to be so.

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2. Ib. p. 127.
closely allied to His purposes as to be necessary to their fulfilment. Wolff's teleology, finally, is subjective, external and anthropocentric; the purpose and end of things is thought to consist in their usefulness to man.

what place or need is there then in such a perfect world for a divine revelation? The real possibility of such a revelation is accepted by Wolff on the ground, first, that since God is omnipotent, all things, even the purely miraculous, are possible to Him, and second, that divine revelation facilitates the task of reason by disclosing to it various propositions which it would, indeed, have eventually discovered for itself, but only at considerable pains and at a later date. Such revealed truths reason may now accept as given and may devote its energies to establishing on a firm philosophical foundation. After admitting the possibility and value of revelation to this extent, however, Wolff robs this admission of all meaning by laying down various tests to which revelation must measure up if it is to be considered genuine. There must in the first place be a clear need for it. God, that is, must have sufficient grounds for interfering with the regular operation of His own world. Again, revelation, to be true, must in no way contradict any aspects of God's nature already known to man; neither must it contradict any of the "necessary truths" of reason nor any item of man's "sure experience." The "mysteries" of Christian theology, however, Wolff accepts as being above reason and undiscoverable by it. Such mysteries, as, for example, the Virgin Birth, are possible because they contradict no "necessary truths" but only certain "contingent truths", the laws of nature being conveniently classed in the latter category. A third test of the genuineness of divine revelation may be mentioned as an illustration of the pettiness to which Wolff at times descended. Genuine revelation, he holds, must be conveyed to man in unmistakably clear language, as briefly as is consistent with complete clarity, and in sentences
whose grammar is unimpeachable - for surely God will not be believed to have expressed Himself ungrammatically! Thus supernatural revelation is on the one hand declared to be possible and on the other rendered actually impossible through requirement of conformity to conditions which cannot be proved to have been fulfilled in the Bible. The net result of Wolff's theology is therefore to invalidate the concept of an external revelation and to establish speculative reason as the foundation of theology and the bulwark of religion and the church. It is no wonder that when Kant claimed to have unmasked the pretensions of speculative reason and to have proved its inability to discover truth in the real of theology he was called the "Allzermaldende," the "All-destroyer"!

What Tindal did for Locke, Reimarus did for Wolff; he accepted in the main, the latter's philosophical position and carried his rationalistic principles to their logical conclusion. He distinguishes himself from Tindal only in the greater thoroughness with which he isolated natural religion from revealed Christianity and the completeness with which he condemned the latter as not only useless but harmful.

Wolff had claimed that reason and revelation are reconcilable, at least theoretically, and are mutually advantageous to each other. To Reimarus they flatly contradict each other. In denying that natural laws are merely contingent, he destroyed the ground on which Wolff had accepted the possibility of the miraculous, and declared reasonable proof of a supernatural disturbance of the orderly course of nature to be impossible. Like Tindal he then concluded on the one hand that natural religion, resting exclusively on reason, is universally

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1. Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768). His main deistic work, written about 1743, was published by Lessing in 1774-8 as the Wolfenbüttel Fragmente. Reimarus' title for the work had been A Defense for the Rational Worshippers of God.
knowable and is man's sole salvation from the delusions of the so-called revealed religions, and on the other, that the Bible, because it lays claim to, and reports occurrences of, the miraculous, is untrustworthy and from the point of view of religion often harmful. He goes even farther than Tindal, however, in frankly accusing Christ and His disciples of fraud and ambition. The fall of Christianity he therefore considers both inevitable and desirable. It is interesting to note that though Kant differs from Reimarus in many important respects, among others, in his estimate of Christ's character and of the value of Christianity, he yet speaks of Reimarus with respect and admiration.

Reimarus had two outstanding weaknesses, both typical of the 18th century and both shared to an extent by Kant. These limitations two of his contemporaries, Semler and Lessing, succeeded in avoiding, and to a certain extent in remedying. Reimarus had, in the first place, no adequate conception of historical criticism, no notion of investigating Biblical sources in a thorough-going fashion and of testing their age, peculiar character, and worth. Semler, born thirty-six years after Reimarus, seems to have been the first to study the Bible from a truly critical standpoint, where Reimarus had followed the simple method of discarding all references in the Bible to the supernatural and retaining all that remained, Semler acted on the principle that each document and each particular narrative in the Bible must be judged by itself in respect to its authority and value. Though little more than a pioneer, Semler thus succeeded in starting in Germany that constructive Biblical criticism which was so greatly to develop and which produced such fruitful results in the 19th century.

1. Religion innerhalb---p. 81. n. (Page references are to the Berlin Edition (1907), v.
3. Johann Salomo Semler (1725-1791). He published an answer to the Wolfenbüttel Fragment in 1779. Kant seems to have been unacquainted with Semler's writings.
Again, Reimarus lacked all conception of the progressive development of man's religious outlook. Divine revelation was to him, as it was to the Church of his time, something miraculous, imposed upon men from without. The Bible, it was claimed by orthodox divines, was in its entirety the explicit Word of God, and was of equal authority and value throughout. Reimarus defended the only alternative he perceived to exist, that the Bible was from end to end nothing but a human document. Between these two extreme views there is obviously room for a third position which Lessing defined by means of the concept, as Pfleiderer described it, "of a divine revelation which does not descend upon man ready-made from without, but which achieved realization in man, in the development of his religious capacity, and which, for that very reason, is never wholly without truth, yet on the other hand, never quite the whole truth."¹

Kant and his great contemporary Lessing² agree chiefly in those respects in which they are typical of their age; they differ primarily in the particular ways in which they transcend the Enlightenment point of view. Both men were born into deeply religious homes; both studied theology in the university;³ both soon grew impatient with the dogmatic character of contemporary theology and with the narrow intolerance of the clergy, the pressure of whose censorship rested upon each in turn;⁴ both preached a gospel of toleration and freedom of conscience; and both, finally, devoted themselves in their last years to various forms of theological controversy. Lessing shared with Kant, moreover, and abiding distrust of history as an adequate vehicle of truth. Can temporal events, he asks himself, subsequently recorded and handed down from generation to generation, give us the certainty we crave? Can eternal truth be dependent upon the

¹. Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie, p. 106. (My translation)
². Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781)
³. Lessing entered the university of Leipzig as a theological student in 1746.
⁴. Lessing wrote Nathan der Weise after he had been forbidden by the Brunswick government to continue the "Antä-Goeze" controversy over the Wolfenbüttel Fragmenten
uncertainties of history? His final answer is as definite as Kant's—
"Contingent truths of history can never prove necessary truths of reason.
That is the horrible wide ditch which I cannot cross, often and earnestly as I
have made the spring."1 Such eternal truths, he feels sure, are discoverable
only in the immost part of the human soul, in the feelings of the heart. Here
alone, in one's own inner experience, lies the true basis of faith. And this,
as we shall see, is Kant's conclusion when he grounds faith upon our immost
moral consciousness.

Lessing, however, is not content to discard history as unimportant, or to
use it merely as a collection of convenient illustrations of various moral
precepts. He feels, as Oman has stated it, that "the Christianity of the Gospels
has blood in its veins which never throbs in the pale ghost of Rational religion."2
Despite his doubts, to which we have just referred, he sees in history a living
reality, and reads in it the great fact of man's slowly developing intellectual
and religious faculties whereby the meaning "of that with which God has already
furnished us"3 grows increasingly clear. This is the thesis of his Education
of the Human Race. Revelation is no longer conceived as a gift from some external
source but as a development from within. "God", he says, "makes immediate
revelations of mere truths of reason, or has permitted and caused pure truths of
reason to be taught, for some time, as truths of immediate revelation, in order
to promulgate them the more rapidly and ground them the more firmly"4

The genuineness of revelation, as the expression of God's guiding and controlling
hand is not doubted; a new meaning, however, is assigned to the word. "Education
is revelation coming to the individual man; and revelation is education which
has come, and is yet coming, to the human race."5

1. Pfeiderer, "Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie, p. 134. (My translation)
2. Problem of Faith and Freedom, p. 167
4. Ib. #70. Cf. #71. My italics.
5. Ib. #2
for a truth to be preached as a revelation instead of taught as a result of human reason is but God's way in dealing with man. At various appointed times on the road of his progressive development it is to man's interest to believe that his Primer possesses the absolute and abiding value of an immediate divine revelation; for centuries it was well that the Old Testament should be accepted in this light, and most Christians today still need a similar absolute faith in the New Testament as the *ne plus ultra* of religious knowledge. But philosophers know better - they know that these are but stages on the journey man is travelling, and that in time, (or in other words, when its assurance of future rewards and punishments will no longer be necessary to man) the New Testament too will be transcended by the masses. Lessing's ideal of human conduct is strikingly similar to Kant's. "Let us also acknowledge"he says, "that it is a heroic obedience to obey the laws of God simply because they are God's laws, and not because He has promised to reward the obedience of them here and there; to obey them even though there be an entire despair of future recompense, and uncertainty respecting a temporal one." And to doubt that a time will surely come when men will do the right *simply* because it *is* right is to doubt eternal Providence and is nothing short of blasphemy. "It will assuredly come - the time of a new eternal Gospel!"

Lessing's view of the development of the religious consciousness is more truly historical than is Kant's - yet they arrive in the end at the same goal and conceive the essence of religion to consist in much the same thing. The piety of their respective homes remained for each a deep and abiding influence. Both felt for the Jesus of history the most profound respect. Both interpreted the

1. Education of the Human Race, #32, Cf. #35
2. Ib. #36.
"religion of Christ," as distinguished from the "Christian religion,"¹ in predominantly moral terms. For the notion of salvation by reason of this or that particular belief neither had the least sympathy. So long as the adherents of this or that sect or religion "think that they are favoured children of the Divine Father, whom He regards with a complacency with which He does not view the rest of humanity, so long is the fulness of God's idea not attained by them."² What is left, then, is essentially a religion of good works, a religion in which virtue is loved for its own sake alone, a religion of pure humanity which is the true religion of Christ.

1. Cf. A fragment called The Religion of Christ and the Christian Religion. The former is the religion which Christ as a man recognized and practised. It is the true religion of the Gospels, and the religion we must ourselves desire to practise in proportion as we admire Christ the man. The Christian religion, in contrast, is that religion which holds Christ to be more than a man, i. e. an object of worship. This religion is but dimly discernible in the New Testament.

2. Education of the Human Race, Preface, p. xiv-xv
We have now noted the main characteristics of German pietism and German 18th century theological rationalism. Before passing on to Kant's own life and view of religion, it may be of interest to consider briefly the manner in which these two German movements found expression in Königsberg, where Kant was born in the year 1724, where he studied and taught, and where he died.

The general growth of pietism in Germany and then of Wolffian rationalism, the struggle between the two movements, and the final victory of the latter which may be dated by Wolff's return to Halle in 1740, are, in the main, faithfully mirrored in the city of Königsberg. At the beginning of the 18th century the religious life of Königsberg was completely under the control of Lutheran orthodoxy, while the philosophical point of view in the university was thoroughly Aristotelian. By 1724, pietism in religion and Wolffianism in philosophy had grown sufficiently strong to overthrow this Lutheran and Aristotelian dominance; no sooner, however, had these simultaneous victories been consummated than the two victorious movements joined in combat with each other, the first open clash between them occurring in 1725. Though pietism continued the stronger for the next few years, it was doomed to a gradual decline while Wolffianism was destined to increase in influence and popularity. Yet because of the remarkable personality of Schultz, who (in 1731) became the champion of pietism in Königsberg, this movement died more slowly in this city than it did in other parts of Germany, for his influence lasted, though in a diminishing degree, to 1763, the year of his death.

Pietism seems to have owed its start in Königsberg to Gehr, a cabinet-maker, who in 1698 secured from Spener a pietist instructor for his children. These private lessons soon developed into a full-fledged school which, despite the active opposition of the older academical institutions, grew in size, in the scope of its curriculum and the excellence of its teaching, until it was the
best school in the city. In 1740 the king made it a state school (königliche Schule) declaring it to be his aim "to extend God's glory and to bring souls to heaven\(^1\), and gave it the imposing name "Collegium Fridericianum". Its first "director", Lysius, was not only a fine scholar and teacher, but a man who distinguished himself from the prevailing spirit of his time by his tolerance and kindliness; he was above all an ardent pietist whose sole defect, according to his biographer,\(^2\) was that he was "perhaps too strenuous in his zeal for the work of God". The original religious character of the school was steadfastly adhered to; it was, indeed, closely modeled after Frankens famous pietist school in Halle. Schultz, who succeeded Lysius\(^3\) a year after Kant entered the school as a pupil, was as ardent a pietist as his predecessor and did all he could to preserve and intensify the school's religious atmosphere.

The aim of the Collegium Fridericianum, which Kant attended as a day pupil for eight years, is described\(^4\) by Inspector Schiffert, one of Kant's teachers and an enthusiastic admirer of the institution, as consisting "on the one hand, in rescuing its charges from their state of spiritual corruption and implanting true Christianity in their hearts from their youth up, but also, on the other hand, in advancing their temporal well-being." The day started with half an hour of devotions between five and six and came to a close with a similar half hour at nine in the evening. Each class-hour ended with a short but "rousing" prayer; an hour, from seven to eight in the morning, was devoted to religious instruction; and for four weeks before every communion service, the pupils were assembled at frequent intervals, when every endeavour was made to warn them concerning the evil state of their souls, and to encourage them to discover and confess their

\(^{1}\) Stickenberg. Life of Immanuel Kant, p. 20
\(^{2}\) wold. Cf. Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit, p. 16
\(^{3}\) In 1733.
\(^{4}\) See Vorländer, Immanuel Kant's Leben p. 8, seq.
sins. Though the school was the first in the city to teach history, geography and mathematics, the Bible was as far as possible made the textbook, even in secular studies; Greek, for example, was taught solely from the New Testament, history, from the Bible narratives. Sunday was a weary succession of sermons and catechizings, ending, to quote Schiffert again, with a "review of the sermons of the day, when attention was given to the spiritual condition of the youths by pointing out to them the truths that had been heard, and lovingly pressing them home"\(^1\). The whole establishment, in a word, was saturated with the evangelical spirit of pietism.

This spirit, however, was not confined to the precincts of the Collegium. It soon pervaded the religious life of the whole city and gained for a time complete control of the university itself. The pietist, Schultz,\(^2\) was indeed the dominant figure in Königsberg for twenty years after his installation there (in 1730) as pastor of the Altdödliche Kirche. With amazing rapidity he rose from office to office, and undertook with unlimited energy to discharge duties which would normally have kept several hard-working men well occupied. Besides his work as pastor, preacher and school superintendent, he was one of the chief professors in the university, famous for the clearness and thoroughness of his teaching; yet he attained his highest distinction as a government official, affection various church reforms throughout Prussia and spreading the spirit of practical pietism with far-reaching and salutary results.

\(^1\) Quoted by Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant's Leben*, p. 9

\(^2\) Franz Albert Schultz, (1692-1763).
The Wolffian philosophy, in the meantime, secured its first foothold in Königsberg some twenty years after the first seeds of pietism had taken root there. By 1730 several of the professors-extraordinary and lecturers (Privatdozenten) had become strong Wolffians. Yet the pietist influence in the university was still so strong during these earlier decades that the possession of a Wolffian bias was enough to prevent a man's normal rise to the position of full professor - not one of these first disciples of the new philosophy attained that coveted post. They even felt it the part of discretion to keep their philosophical views more or less to themselves. An exception to this was Fischer who refused to be tactful and openly avowed his Wolffian persuasion. As a result he was ordered out of Königsberg and the state of Prussia¹ and not allowed to return until the tide turned in favour of the new movement some fifteen years later. Nevertheless the Wolffian contingent in Königsberg grew steadily in strength and boldness.

Before long, moreover, the influence of English deism began to make itself felt. Quantz, Schultz's chief antagonist, was an enthusiastic friend of the English; Rappolt, who was an important member of the university staff in the early thirties, had studied for some time in England; and Knutzen, Kant's most cherished teacher, was induced by his interest in theology to read the English Free-Thinkers with care. English deism, it is true, was studied in these years chiefly that it might be refuted. When the exiled Fischer published after his return to Königsberg a book in which he treated various Christian doctrines along extreme deistic lines², he was promptly and universally hailed as a dangerous atheist, and was reprimanded by the government and enjoined to silence. Yet the tide was steadily turning against pietism, even in this, one of its firmest strongholds. Thus by 1742 it had seen its best days and was being forced more and more to relinquish its position of control to the opposing party.

¹. In 1725.
². Fischer was an ardent follower of Spinoza.
The decline and fall of Pietism was in a way expedited by the singular attitude which its leader, Schultz, and one of its firmest adherents, Knutzen, adopted towards its natural enemy, Wolffian rationalism. Both Schultz and Knutzen were, curiously enough, at once ardent Pietists and convinced Wolffians; both made it their endeavour to effect a reconciliation between the two opposing viewpoints. Wolff himself is said to have remarked of Schultz, "If any one has understood me, it is Schultz in Königsberg," and in his best days Schultz was claimed by the Wolffians as one of their own number. This friendliness to Wolffianism was reflected in the city of Königsberg, so that even during the years when it was predominantly Pietist in its leanings, "its Pietism was of such a mild order that it did not oppose the fresh influxes of the new spirit in so far as this spirit did not affect destructively the dominant way of thinking."¹

While Schultz was primarily a theologian and then a philosopher, Knutzen's main enthusiasm from the first was for philosophy, though theology always greatly interested him and religion possessed for him, to the end, a vital reality. Like his great pupil, Knutzen was born of poor parents and lived in Königsberg all his life. Though he attended, as a boy, one of the schools which opposed the Collegium, and seems to have been little influenced by Pietism in his early youth, he came into contact with it in the university, where he studied under various Pietists and finally took a course under Schultz with whom he formed a lasting friendship. Once converted to Pietism, Knutzen remained loyal to its principles all the rest of his life. Yet, as we have said, he was also an outspoken and zealous Wolffian and became one of its most prominent representatives in Germany. This double allegiance impeded his academic advancement and

¹ Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit, p. 34.
prevented his getting the professorial chair to which his brilliance entitled him. He was, none the less, a real power in the university, and was so well liked by the students that for years he lectured from four to six hours a day. Yet he is remembered today chiefly because of his close relationship to Kant, who valued him above all his other teachers. Though the youthful Kant was undoubtedly impressed more by Knutzen's Wolffian philosophy than by his religious views, he must have been familiar with his teacher's theology and must to some extent have been influenced by it in his later writings.

Knutzen's main work in theology, A Philosophical Proof of the Truth of the Christian Religion, presents the typical Pietist doctrines attired in the Wolffian garb of mathematical formalism. It possesses for us a two-fold interest. In part, it is a refutation of English deism, especially of Tindal. Though this portion is on the whole rather weak, the mere fact that Knutzen faced some of the questions raised by deism and pronounced an answer to them must have served to draw the attention of some of his readers, among whom we may perhaps reckon Kant, to the main deistic position. The wide-spread popularity of the volume, on the other hand, would seem to suggest that deism was already becoming an important issue in Germany, and that an increasing number of people were anxious to learn more about this new religious doctrine. The book's special value to us, however, is that it presents the main principles of the theology of Pietism. Its constructive purpose was to safeguard from various intellectual doubts those Pietist convictions whose basis was faith and the occasion of whose existence was a deeply-seated religious need. It was, in a word, Knutzen's earnest endeavour to harmonize his religious beliefs and his philosophical convictions - to find for the Christian religion a sound philosophical basis. The depth and scope of

the book's philosophical point of view makes it impossible, therefore, to class it as a typical pietist work. It is further distinguishable, moreover, from that class of writings by its avoidance of the superstitious excesses of later pietism. It forcibly protests, for example, against all fanaticism and mysticism, all substitution of extreme but unproductive repentance for active well-doing, all self-inflicted punishments which render a man unfit to serve God or his fellows. With this protest Kant, as we shall see, was in hearty sympathy. Yet despite all this, Knutzen starts with a definite pietist point of view and gives us a fair statement of pietism at its best. As such the book furnishes us with a standard by which to decide to what extent Kant's own theological writings are pietistic in character. Such a decision, further, is rendered easier by the fact that Knutzen's arguments are, point by point, almost, the flat antithesis of typical deism.

Knutzen's argument contains three propositions: a divine revelation is necessary; it must satisfy certain conditions; and the Christian revelation alone measures up to this test. A supernatural revelation Knutzen affirms to be essential to man's salvation on the ground that human reason alone is unable to discover an adequate means of atoning for man's great guilt. The sin of his disobedience is immeasurably great because his obligation to God is infinite. God's holiness makes it impossible for Him to let this sin go unpunished. The only punishments that reason can discover are the agonies of repentance, the discipline entailed in leading a better life, sacrifices and ceremonies, and various self-devised and self-inflicted castigations. These, however, fall short of what is required and fail to satisfy divine justice. God must therefore add what man is unable to supply.

1. This is shown by the fact that in true pietist style he keeps the dogmatic content of the Christian teaching almost wholly in the background, and by the further circumstance that he states his belief in man's sinful state and his need for a second birth in the actual pietist formulae.

2. The following analysis is based exclusively on Erdmann's Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit, pp. 116 seq
A genuine and adequate divine revelation must in the first place satisfy the two-fold purpose of all God's punishments, i.e. reveal God's holiness, and, making plain to man his state of disobedience, effect his salvation. Furthermore, the genuineness of such a revelation must be attested by some unquestionable miracle.

Christianity is the only religion measuring up to this standard. Christ's sacrificial death reveals God's holiness in the highest possible degree; his supreme sacrifice is a far better means of inspiring man with a wholesome fear of further disobedience than outright punishment would be, for it reveals to him God's immeasurable love and mercy and awakens in him a blessed and virtuous disposition of mind. God's two-fold purpose in punishing men for their sin is thus satisfied. The Christian revelation is proved to be genuine, moreover, by the fact of Christ's resurrection, which Knutzen believes (on the basis of various historical evidences which he proceeds to present) to be an undisputed miracle.

Christianity, then, is God's answer to our need. To make clear to us the meaning and significance of Christ's atoning work, God has also revealed to us the mysterious doctrine of the Trinity, which is hardly discoverable by our unaided reason. We become sharers in the divine means of pardon, when, through God's Word and Spirit, and by means of our sincere appeals to Him, we become actively convinced of our guilt and the punishment thereby incurred. This realization brings with it a complete spiritual change - a rebirth into a new and overwhelming allegiance to the God of mercy, and a genuine willingness to obey our Saviour's commands. All this, finally, expresses itself practically in the love for our fellow men.

These are, in brief, the central doctrines of the pietism in which Kant was nurtured, for which he always preserved a marked respect, and which more deeply influenced his own theology than he himself, perhaps, realized.
CHAPTER II

Religious and Moral Aspects of Kant’s Life and Character
Important Dates

1724 - Born, in Königsberg (50,000 pop.)
5 years before the birth of Moses Mendelssohn and Lessing
25 " " " " " Goethe
35 " " " " " Schiller.
38 " " " " " Fichte.

1732 - Entered the Collegium Fridericianum.
1733 Schultz became director
1737 Kant's Mother died.

1740 - Matriculated at the University of Königsberg.
1740 Wolff was recalled to Halle.
Knutzen's theological work was published.

1746 - Kant's Father died.
1747 - Kant concluded his studies in the university.
1751 - Knutzen died.
1754 - Became a lecturer in the university of Königsberg.
1762 Rousseau's Emile and Contrat social appeared.

1763 - Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration vom Dasein Gottes.
Untersuchungen über die Deutlichkeit der Grundätze der natürlichen
Theologie und Moral.

1766 - Traum eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Traume der Metaphysik
(Tr. Goerwitz, 1903)
1767 Schultz died.

1770 - Appointed ordinary professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Königsberg.
1774-8 Publication of the Wolfenbüttel Fragmenten.
1775 Hume died.
1784 Voltaire and Rousseau died.
1786 Publication of Lessings Education of the Human Race.

1781 - Critique of Pure Reason.
1783 - Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft
wird aufreten können.
1784 - Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?
1785 - Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals.
1786 Frederick the Great died.
1788 Wöllner's Religious Edict.

1788 - Critique of Practical Reason.
1790 - Critique of Judgment.
1791 - Über das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee.
1792 - Part I of the Religion innerhalb
1793 - Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Blosse Vernunft. (Tr. Semple 1838,
Aboy (Part I only)
1794 - Das Ende aller Dinge.
Cabinet Order of the King and Kant's promise not to write any more on
religion
1790 Kant discontinued his lectures.
1797 Frederick William died, Wöllner dismissed.
1793 - Streit des Facultäten
1804 - Kant died.

For a fuller table of the important dates of Kant's life, and a chronological list of his writings with references to English translations, see Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant, his Life and Doctrine*; also Vorländer, "Immanuel Kant's Leben..."
Immanuel Kant, sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen
(Deutsche Bibliothek, herausgegeben von Felix Gross.)
Vorlinder, Immanuel Kant's Leben (1911)
Cassirer, Kant's Leben und Lehre (vol. 11 of a new edition of Kant's works. 1921)
Paulsen, Immanuel Kant, his Life and Doctrine (Eng. Tr. 1902.)
Erdmann, Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit. (1870)
Stückenberg, Life of Immanuel Kant (1882)
THE RELIGIOUS AND MORAL ASPECTS OF KANT'S LIFE AND CHARACTER

Heine once made the remark that no life history of Kant is possible, for he had neither life nor history. A cursory glance at the main events of Kant's life, as well as the conception one gets of the man from his chief works, goes to bear out Heine's uncharitable saying. Kant never travelled, he never saw a mountain, it is quite likely that he never even saw the sea. His youth is as different from Goethe's, for example, as can be imagined. His whole life was spent in what to a man of Goethe's temperament would have been an unbearable, cloister-like seclusion. He had no genuine feeling or love for beauty, in picture, statue or verse. Of melancholy music he frankly disapproved, and music of a cheerful variety seemed to him at best an innocent pleasure, at worst a waste of time. From first to last, his was the lonely, stationary, rigorous life of a scholar. He measured by decades the period of years during which his habit of rising at five in the morning had not suffered a single exception. The inhabitants of Königsberg, it is said, set their clocks as he passed on his daily walk.

The austerity and regularity of his daily life are faithfully reflected, moreover, in his writings. Unlike Rousseau, whose life differed so signally from his professed ideals, Kant harmonized his teaching and his personal conduct in a remarkable degree, the essence of both these being intellectual honesty and moral integrity. The warmth and enthusiasm, however, which distinguish such men as Lessing and Goethe, seem at first sight to be altogether lacking in Kant. We tend to see in him nothing but the rigorous moralist and the austere philosopher and to forget that "there lies hidden behind the Kant as the present-day world pictures him and as he reveals himself in his writings, another Kant to whom all of us have hitherto attended far too little."¹ This other Kant is the

¹ Quoted by Felix Gross (see Bibliography) from Houston Stewart Chamberlain's Immanuel Kant. Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk (München 1905.)
patient, unflinching scholar whom neither physical weakness nor old age could daunt, the eloquent teacher who held large classes spell-bound, the kindly and patient advisor of scores of university students, the brilliant table companion, the lifelong friend of the merchants Green and Motherby, the man of pathetic idiosyncracies and marvellous self-control. This Kant of flesh and blood does more than command our admiration; he wins our affection, and even, at times, our veneration.

It is not our present purpose to examine Kant's life in detail or to study his character in all its various aspects. Our interest confines itself to the religious and moral side of Kant, to the forces that moulded this portion of his character and to the individuals whose influence upon him helped to make, him, morally and religiously, what he was.

"In the year 1724, on Saturday the 22nd of April at five in the morning my son Emanuel was born into the world and on the 23rd received holy baptism. ---

May God preserve him in His covenant of Grace unto his blessed end, for Jesus Christ's sake, Amen." With these pious words Anna Regina Reuterin, the mother of Immanuel Kant, recorded his birth in the family Bible. They symbolize the nature of his early training. Both his parents were religious people and faithful members of the Pietist church. His father, a Scotchman by descent and a saddler by trade, laid great emphasis all his life upon industry and truthfulness. Preeminently a moral rather than a religious man, his chief interest was to make his children hard-working and upright. Kant's mother, on the other hand, was the more ardently and emotionally religious of the two, and seems to have had a more magnetic personality than her husband. Kant himself says of her, "My mother was a sweet-tempered, affectionate, pious and upright woman and a tender mother, who led her children to the fear of God by pious teaching and virtuous example."
She often took me outside of the city, directed my attention to the works of God, expressed herself with a pious rapture over His omnipotence, wisdom and goodness, and impressed on my heart a deep reverence for the Creator of all things. Never shall I forget my mother, for she planted and nourished in me the first seed of goodness - she opened my heart to the impressions of nature; she awakened and enlarged my thoughts, and her instructions have had an abiding and beneficial influence upon my life. She was a woman of little education but of a large natural intelligence and a genuine piety, and although she died when Kant was but fourteen, he never ceased to speak of the profound influence she had had on his life. Yet in spite of his admiration and love for his mother, Kant seems to have attained more nearly to his father's ideal than to hers, for he was not of a religious temperament and was above all else industrious and moral-minded.

The family life, in spite of considerable poverty and a low social status, was one of high moral tone. This very poverty, indeed, was without doubt the source of Kant's industry and frugality and of his simple tastes and habits in later life. The esteem in which Kant held his home is shown in a letter to Lindblom, written in 1797. "My parents," he writes, "gave me an upbringing which on the moral side simply could not have been better and for which, whenever I recall it, I find myself moved with the greatest gratitude." And on another occasion he is said to have exclaimed, "Never, not even once, was I permitted by my parents to hear anything improper or to see anything that was unworthy."^2

A great influence upon Kant's early life was the friendly patronage of Schultz. As their pastor, he seems to have taken a special interest in the family, finding time to visit them often and assisting them in every possible way, even, in the long cold winters, sending them gifts of firewood. He soon became aware that the young Immanuel was a boy of unusual ability and persuaded

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1. Jachman, p. 162-3
2. Quoted by Vorländer, p. 3.
his parents, when he was eight years old, to send him to the pietist academy in the city. He maintained an interest in Kant until his manhood and gave him such good advice and generous assistance that Kant valued his memory all his life, expressing his regret, shortly before he died, that he had never been able to gratify a long-cherished wish to erect a fitting memorial to his friend and teacher.

In his home Kant had encountered pietism at its best. There it was sincere and genuine beyond all question. In the Collegium, however, which he attended as a day scholar for eight years, he came upon a pietism whose zeal fostered a spirit of hypocrisy. When a number of young and active boys are all expected to give evidence of great religious fervour, they are apt to show it in striking disproportion to the emotion actually experienced. Kant's early acquired honesty saved him from such short-cuts to popularity. "He was quite unable," says Borowski, "to acquire a taste for that form of piety, or rather that affected piety to which many of his classmates adapted themselves, often from very low motives."¹

This whole experience in the Collegium, however, seems to have been a painful one. Kant was of a naturally sensitive disposition, and the remark he is said to have made in later life, that "fear and trembling overcame him whenever he recalled those days of youthful slavery"² may well be authentic. Certain it is that he acquired during these years a lasting abhorrence of all religious emotion and would have nothing to do with prayer or the singing of hymns the rest of his life.

What strikes one with wonder, indeed, is not that he revolted against certain phases of the religious experience, but that he did not turn against religion altogether. It was probably the memory of his mother and his acquaintance with men like Schultz and Knutzen, at once zealously religious and thoroughly free

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¹ p. 14.
² Quoted by Vorländer, p. 10.
from hypocrisy and affectation, that accounted for the sanity and justice of his mature estimate of pietism. Instead of condemning it utterly he was able to separate the good from the bad and value the former. "Even if the religious consciousness of the time," we find him writing in his old age to his friend Fink, "and the conceptions of what it called virtue and piety were by no means clear and satisfactory, it yet contained the root of the matter. One can say of pietism what one will; it suffices that the people to whom it was a serious matter were distinguished in a manner deserving of all respect. They possessed the highest good which man can enjoy - that repose, that cheerfulness, that inner peace which is disturbed by no passions. No want or persecution rendered them discontented; no controversy was able to stir them to anger or enmity."1 This surely is a generous verdict, coming as it does from one whose religious convictions differ from pietism in so many essential respects.

In conformity to a university ruling that each matriculated student should enrol himself as a member of one of the university faculties, Kant entered the university of Königsberg as a theological student. Thanks to Schultz' broadening influence in the university he had the privilege, however, of grounding himself thoroughly in philosophy. We know that Schultz had a warm regard for his old pupil Knutzen, and it may have been at his instigation that Kant early came under the latter's influence. Knutzen soon began to take a special interest in Kant, favoured him with personal conferences, gave him the freedom of his excellent library, and in time became Kant's main inspiration and guide. Kant found Knutzen's lectures of such absorbing interest that he presently gave up the plan formed in the Collegium of devoting his life to philology and the classics.

1. Quoted from Paulsen, p. 28-9
It was science and philosophy that now appealed to him most; he eagerly responded to Knutzen's advances, welcomed his suggestions, and became for the time being an ardent Wolffian

We have mentioned Knutzen's allegiance to pietism, and may certainly suppose, though no direct evidence is forthcoming, that Kant's admiration for his teacher led him at least to acquaint himself with Knutzen's theological views. It was not until late in his university course, however, that Kant attended lectures in theology. Then, partly from a general cultural interest, partly from a desire to master the essential principles of theology as a background for his philosophical studies, he attended Schultz' lectures in Dogmatics. A further motive may have been the desire to convince Schultz that he had not grown out of sympathy with the central tenets of the Christian faith. These lectures, we are told, he thoroughly enjoyed, and his work for the course must have been highly satisfactory for at the end of it Schultz called in Kant and two of his companions and offered to secure for them good openings and speedy preferment if they ever cared to enter the ministry. Kant's rationalistic bent of mind, however, combined with a distaste, doubtless acquired during his years in the Collegium, for the more evangelical aspects of religion, influenced him against further theological study. These hours with Schultz, indeed, seem to have been the last he spent on Christian theology for years. Except for certain volumes of Church History which he read with pleasure, he felt to the end of his life no interest in contemporary theological writings. He is even said to have reread an old catechism dating from the days of his youth in order to refresh his memory, before writing, as a man of seventy, his main theological work, the Religion innerhalb --.

Very different from Kant's unprogressiveness in the field of Christian theology is his attitude towards philosophical problems. Here Kant's thought is marked by a steady development from one position to another. "I cling to nothing," he says in a letter to Herder in 1767, "and whether it be my own opinions or those of another, I frequently and with profound impartiality rotate the whole
structure and study it from various points of view, in the hope of finally dis-
covering an angle of approach which will enable me to delineate the truth."
It is this restless questioning of every conclusion, this continual effort to
avoid all presuppositions and prejudices, which makes his writings at once a
baffling medley of different and often antagonistic positions and yet the start-
ing point of modern philosophical thought.

Pursuing this critical method, Kant transcended the Wolffian rational theo-
logy and developed in its place a philosophically grounded theological system
of his own. His whole conception of Christian theology, in contrast, remained
almost unchanged from youth to old age. In this field he did little thinking and
consequently made little progress. To the development of Biblical theology and
Biblical criticism in the 18th century he seems indeed to have paid no attention
at all. The fundamental pietist precepts which had been taught him by his parents
and drilled into him at the Collegium were reinforced at the University by Schultz's
lectures and, we may imagine, by Knutzen's pietist theology. These essential
ideas of pietism became and remained identified in Kant's mind with the Christian-
ity of the Bible. It is the pietist version of Christianity which he seems to
have in view in his later writings. True, he early disassociated himself
from certain aspects of pietism, but its characteristic tenets such as the emphasis
on the moral or practical side of the religious life and on the doctrines of
original sin, rebirth, etc. became part and parcel of his own religious beliefs.

We can do no more than mention the main landmarks of Kant's life after he
left the university. His poverty obliged him to act as family tutor for several
years after completing his university course. Of these years little more is
known than that he performed his duties painstakingly and endeared himself to
the families whom he served. In 1755 he attained a position of greater indepen-
dence when he began work as private lecturer (privat dozent) in the University
of Königsberg. For the next fifteen years he lectured to large classes who were attracted by his brilliance and by the inherent interest of the subjects he taught. These included logic and metaphysics, mathematics and natural science, and the new subject of physical geography. Twice during this period he applied in vain for a vacant professorship. In 1758 he sought the help of Schultz towards this desired advancement. Schultz, we are told, apparently alarmed by the complete separation of religion and science which Kant had urged in the introduction to his first book, *Universal History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens* (1755), refused to aid him until he had answered in a satisfactory manner Schultz' solemn question, "Do you fear God with all your heart?" That Schultz should have felt called upon to ask Kant such a question is an indication of the extent to which Kant was drifting away from pietist orthodoxy. But the fact that Kant should have been able to quiet the fears of his old teacher is proof that he still retained a firm belief in at least this fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion.

During the sixties Kant's intellectual point of view underwent an important change. "The inner world," to quote Paulsen, "the realm of man and of his moral nature, gains an importance at the cost of the mathematico-scientific and even the scholastico-metaphysical." Largely through the influence of Rousseau, whom he acknowledges as his guide and liberator in this respect, Kant came to realise that science and speculation were not of unconditional worth, not ends in themselves, but means to a higher, a moral end. "The primacy of the moral over the intellectual in the evaluation of the individual and in the determination of the purposes of the race remains hereafter a constant feature of Kant's thought."

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1. Paulsen, p. 38
2. Ib. p. 29
In 1770, at the age of forty-six, Kant at last received the ordinary professorship in logic and metaphysics in Königsberg. Both before and after this appointment he received tempting calls to other universities. His physical frailty, however, caused him to fear that such a change might endanger the work on his books which he was pursuing with tremendous diligence, and induced him to decline these offers. During these years his friends complained bitterly of his neglect, and every letter he managed to write opened with a profuse apology for his slowness in answering the letters he had received. In 1781 there appeared the *Critique of Pure Reason*, on which he had labored more or less continually for eleven years. The next few years are those of Kant's greatest literary activity, the *Critique of Practical Reason* appearing seven years after the publication of the first *Critique* and the *Critique of Judgment* two years later. Kant had now not only become the most important figure in the university of Königsberg; his fame had extended by the last decade of the century throughout Germany, and his critical philosophy was being taught in all the German universities, Catholic and Protestant alike.

Kant was never a fighter; his disposition was rather that of the retiring scholar. The only serious conflict in which he ever engaged occurred when he was an old man. From 1771 to 1788 Zedlitz, to whom Kant dedicated the *Critique of Pure Reason*, was the head of the state department of churches and schools. Kant stood high in the esteem of this excellent man, who professed himself a follower of the Kantian philosophy and who certainly acted in his official capacity in hearty accordance with Kant's belief in the freedom of conscience in all religious matters. Frederick the Great, too, thought highly of Kant; it was through his favouring influence, indeed, that Kant was made professor in 1770. In 1780,
however, Frederick, whose toleration Kant had so often praised, died, to be succeeded by the orthodox Frederick William II, while Zedlitz was soon after replaced by Wüllner, whose mysticism, bigotry, and hatred of all that the Aufklärung stood for contrasted sharply with Zedlitz' tolerance and broadmindedness. On the ninth of July of the year he came into power, Wüllner issued a religious edict which threatened civil punishment and dismissal from office to all who deviated from a rigid adherence to the teachings of the Bible. All books dealing in any way with religious subjects were henceforth to be submitted to duly accredited censors and were not to be published until the necessary 
imprimatur
had been secured.

In obedience to this injunction, Kant submitted the first of the four parts of the Religion innerhalb --- to Hillmer, one of the official censors in Berlin. The latter passed the article on the ground that only profound scholars read the Kantian writings, and it accordingly appeared in the April 1792 number of the Berliner Monatschrift. But when Kant submitted the second part of his work for approval, permission to publish was refused by Hillmer and his colleague Hermes on the ground that it controverted the teachings of the Bible.

Kant now found himself in a curious position. He was on the one hand an ardent son of the Aufklärung and a strong advocate of the right and duty of every individual to judge for himself in religious as well as in secular matters. In an interesting little article entitled An Answer to the Question, What is Aufklärung? published eight years earlier (1784) and dedicated to Frederick the Great, Kant declares the motto of the Aufklärung to be "Have courage to make use of your own intellect!" The spirit of the Aufklärung, he says, is the spirit
of freedom, and only a king who in religious matters makes it his duty not to dictate to his people but to leave them free is worthy of the appellation, "enlightened" (aufgeklärt)¹.

But, Kant continues in the same article, the business of the state must proceed. And if the state is to function it must possess a mechanism whose parts are passive in respect to the whole and responsive to orders from above. "Here, indeed, reasoning is not permitted; one must obey." It is a soldier's duty to obey his commanding officer instantly and implicitly. Now the government, even under Frederick the Great, included within its jurisdiction both education and the church. Schultz, for example, made himself unpopular with the more easy-going of the clergy by requiring them to obey various regulations devised to increase their usefulness, and in 1766 Frederick felt called upon to censure severely various professors in the university of Königsberg for neglecting their duties. In his article Kant definitely approves of this conception of the relation between church and state. "A minister," he says, "is bound in dealing with his catechumens and his congregation to conform his discourse to the symbols of the church he serves." As an officer of the church he is not free to teach what he pleases; it is his duty to say, "This is what our church teaches." By adopting such a position Kant apparently closed his own mouth. The state had decided that what he had written was contrary to the orthodox position; as a professor in an institution under state control it would seem to have been his duty to obey the royal command.

¹ The inference is that Frederick the Great is such a king. Kant defines the Aufklärung as man's advance from self-caused pupilage. By pupilage he means the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance. It is self-caused when it is due not to a natural want of intellect but to the lack of resolution and courage to use it.
However, Kant had left himself a loophole of escape. A soldier may as a lecturer on army tactics express himself freely and openly. So too a cleric; "as a scholar, he has perfect freedom and is indeed under an obligation to make known to the public all his carefully proved and well-meant (wohimeinend) opinions regarding what is faulty in [the churchly] symbols and propositions---." Though as a priest he is bound to orthodoxy, as a student of theology he is free.

Such an attitude was far from being agreeable to Wüllner and his associates. Their position is clearly stated in Wüllner's edict; "a subject of the Prussian state," it reads, "is declared free to hold what religious views he likes so long as he quietly performs his duties as a good citizen of the state and so long as he keeps any special opinion to himself and carefully guards himself from spreading it or persuading others [to accept it], making them uncertain in their faith or leading them astray." Opposed as he was to all the external paraphernalia of churchly Christianity, Kant peculiarly resented this attempt to foist the yoke of orthodoxy in so stringent a fashion upon a people struggling for intellectual and spiritual freedom. He had accordingly criticised Wüllner's repressive policy openly, refraining only from mentioning the name of Wüllner himself. The government had at first shrunk from curbing the literary freedom of so famous a thinker as Kant. But when Part II of the Religion innerhalb --- treating various Biblical doctrines in an unorthodox fashion, came under the eyes of the censors, the government at last took action.

1. Cf. Cassirer, pp. 403-5. See also Kant's On the Failure of all philosophical Attempts at a Theodicy (1791)
Kant's deep respect for the authority of the state made it hard for him to apply himself, as he now did, to evading the Berlin censors. The philosophical and theological faculties of several of the German universities had the right to authorize the publication of books dealing with religious subjects. Kant accordingly submitted all four parts of the *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Blossen Vernunft* to the philosophical faculty at Jena and, securing the necessary *imprimatur*, published the book in 1793.

In October of the following year (1794) Kant received the following state communication: "Our highest person has for a long time observed with great displeasure how you misuse your philosophy to undermine and debase many of the most important and fundamental doctrines of the Holy Scriptures and Christianity; how, namely, you have done this in your book, "Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Blossen Vernunft" as well as in other smaller works. --- We demand of you immediately a most conscientious answer and expect that in the future, towards the avoidance of our highest disfavour, you will give no such cause for offence, but rather, in accordance with your duty, employ your talents and authority so that our paternal purpose may be more and more attained. If you continue to resist, you may certainly expect unpleasant consequences to yourself."¹ Thus, as Oman puts it, "was the aged sage and, in his own dry way, the saint of Königsberg treated to a severe spiritual admonition for his dangerous tendencies; the man who spent a laborious life teaching the age the eternal order of personal duty was rebuked by the crude youth whose ill-considered fits of repression were as oil poured upon the furnace of revolt."²

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¹ I have made use here of Paulsen's translation, p. 49. Kant published this order and his own answer in the introduction to the *Streit der Facultäten* (1798).
Kant answered this order at length and in a manner for which he has often been criticized. The first portion of his answer consists in an elaborate defense of himself. As a teacher of the young and as a lecturer, he says, he has never dealt with Christianity at all. As a writer, he has intended all his writings on religion solely for university scholars in the fields of philosophy and theology, whose right to independent thought on these subjects it is to the interest of the government to foster. His only aim in the Religion innerhalb ---, he claims, is to discover how religion may be brought clearly and forcefully to the hearts of the people. This is a question which does not interest the public and which does not concern popular teachers. It is the business of the latter, he admits, to await in these matters the orders of the government. As to the actual contents of the Religion innerhalb ---, Kant insists that his sole purpose was not to evaluate Christianity but the religion of reason, whose practical sufficiency and speculative inadequacy he claims therein to have demonstrated. The failure of natural religion to explain such problems as the origin of evil clearly leaves room, he points out, for a divine revelation. Far from criticizing Christianity, he has shown his high estimation of it by declaring the Bible to be the best vehicle for the instruction of the public in a truly moral religion. His sincerity in expressing these opinions, he says in conclusion, is vouched for by his age and the consideration that he must now look forward to the possibility of soon rendering an account of his life to his Supreme Judge.

Having thus established his innocence Kant proceeds to pledge himself in the following words to future silence: "I hereby, as Your Majesty's most faithful servant, solemnly declare that henceforth I will entirely refrain from all public statements on religion, both natural and revealed, either in lectures or in writings." This promise he kept until the King's death in 1797, when he felt himself relieved of further obligation, on the ground that the phrase "as Your Majesty's most faithful servant" bound him only during the king's lifetime.
Much has been said regarding the obvious mental reservation of Kant's promise to the king. Either open defiance of the government (which would hardly have resulted in serious hardship to himself) or whole-hearted loyalty to the spirit as well as to the letter of his promise would have been worthier of the real Kant. It must be remembered, however, that he was an old man of seventy-one when he wrote his answer to the king. He had always been weak physically, never a day, he tells us himself, wholly free from a dull pain in his chest. He had worked prodigious and had fairly worn himself out in his labours. It is not strange, then, that persecution should have tempted him to stray a step or two from the high ideals of fearless and scrupulous honesty which he had not only professed but lived by all his life.

The last years of Kant's life were lonely and desolate in the extreme. He had sacrificed everything to his work and now, as he writes to Garve in 1798, he was obliged to undergo the tantalizing experience of being in fair bodily health, filled with the desire to continue his writing and complete his life-work, and yet lacking the necessary intellectual vigour. "I have undertaken," he writes, "to complete my account of questions which concern the whole of philosophy, but I never am able to get it done, although I am conscious that it is quite possible of accomplishment." He had stopped lecturing in 1797. Two years later there occurred a pronounced diminution of mental force. Little by little he lost his memory and then his eyesight. One of his sisters and Wasianski, the biographer of his later years, cared for him the last months of his life. He died in 1804 and was buried in Königsberg, the city and university uniting in doing him honour.

1. Among Kant's papers after his death was found the following note: "Recantation and denial of one's inner convictions is base, but silence in a case like the present is a subject's duty; and if all that one says must be true, it does not follow that it is one's duty to tell publicly everything that is true." (Paulsen's translation, p. 50) Kant goes on to remark that nothing in his letter to the king binds him to forbid the publication of a second edition of his book, and that the wording of the letter is such that at the King's death he will be freed from his promise.

2. Wülser was dismissed in 1797 and his edict cancelled shortly after.

3. Paulsen, p. 52
Kant was in the truest sense of the word a self-made man. By dint of constant attention and indefatigable effort he transformed himself from a sensitive and impulsive boy, sickly and of a shy and retiring nature into a companionable and self-possessed host, a steadfast friend, and a teacher and thinker whose painstaking industry and iron self-discipline are the admiration and despair of naturally stronger men.

The dominating motive of his life was the accomplishment of what he conceived to be his duty. He desired to attain certain ends, and to the achievement of these he applied himself with all his energy. He had from childhood a frail body and a weak chest; so delicate was his constitution that the dampness of a freshly printed newspaper often threw him into a fit of sneezing. These infirmities soon made him aware that he must tend his body with care if it were to keep pace with his remarkably active mind. He accordingly prescribed to himself a number of rules which sound pathetic and petty now, until one remembers that it was out of them that Kant built his remarkable character and, incidentally, attained the ripe age of eighty with hardly a day of real illness. Jachman says of him that he was by nature inclined always to obey his first impulse. Finding that this often involved him in unpleasant consequences, he soon began to hedge himself in with one rule after another. Once, for example, he accepted an invitation to go out driving. After being on the road for some time, his host proposed driving still further, and Kant's courtesy forbade remonstrance. As a result he reached home after his hour for retiring, a circumstance which so vexed him that he then and there vowed never again to step into a carriage which he had not himself hired, a promise which he never broke. In ways such as this he transformed himself gradually into a kind of machine; he got up in the morning, worked, ate, exercised and went to bed according to schedule; he even went so far as to leave his handkerchief on a chair on the opposite side of the room from his

1. Jachman. p. 149.
desk that he might thus be compelled to get up occasionally.¹

The result of all this discipline seems to have been a very genuine freedom. "He did nothing," says Jachman, "that he didn't want to do; his will was free, for he was dependent upon the law of his own reason. --- He was able to deny himself all things, he overcame everything, he could make himself do anything, for he was completely master of himself."² In all this he seems to have achieved his own ideal of "culture" as he states it in the Critique of Judgment:

"The culture of training (discipline) is negative, and consists in the freeing of the will from the despotism of desires. By these, tied as we are to certain natural things, we are rendered incapable even of choosing, while we allow those impulses to serve as fetters, which Nature has given us as guiding threads that we should not neglect or injure the destination of our animal nature - we being all the time free enough to strain or relax, to extend or diminish them, according as the purposes of Reason require."³

It was in a similarly conscientious manner that Kant apportioned certain hours of the day to rest and recreation. He completed his serious work at one, the hours from five in the morning until then having been spent in writing and lecturing. From one to about four he devoted himself to his one daily meal, making it an affair of mind as well as body and eating always in the company of friends. Those he selected as his table companions were often merchants, seldom philosophers; but whatever their profession, all serious and technical discussion was banned, in order, as he said, that due honour might be paid to the body. At these meals Kant acquired a certain social reputation. The brilliance of his conversation, the breadth of his reading, the scope and accuracy of his memory, the gay sparkle of his humour, and above all, perhaps, the character of the man shining out from his luminous eyes filled with amazement and delight many

¹ In fairness to Kant it should be added, however, that he did not regulate every portion of his day with such minute thoroughness until well on in life. Had he possessed a stronger physique such excessive regularity might not have been necessary. But, as we have seen, he was never strong; his work as an author did not begin until he had reached middle age; and as the years went by and as the task he set himself grew more and more immense, he realised that if he were to accomplish all that he wished he must economize his physical energy as he grew older and led him in the end to adopt the highly ordered manner of life to which reference has been made. Thus force of circumstances, a natural sense of duty and an abhorrence of unmotivated action, and a sensitiveness which called forth a protecting shield of habit, conspired to the same end.

² Jachman, p. 151.

³ Critique of Judgment, p. 355. (Bernard's translation)
who had thought of him only as a crusty old philosopher bent over his books.

It is no wonder then that Kant made friends, or rather, warm acquaintances. Wasienski, the guardian and companion of his old age, gives us an illuminating account of Kant's own theory of friendship. In his younger days, Wasienski tells us, Kant felt secure in his own strength and dreaded above all else being dependent upon or bound to anyone, and as a consequence, he was wont to indulge in the paradox, "My dear friends, there are no friends!" Esteem, not affection, composed the essence of his early "moral friendships." He felt, he said, no need of friends in the usual meaning of the word, and his solitary life, his refusal to marry and acquire a family, his twenty-four year silence towards his sisters, though both he and they were living all the while in Königsberg, and his habitual sacrifice of his friendships, as with Lambert for instance, to the exigencies and pressure of his work, bear out his admitted desire to remain wholly free from all entangling alliances. One is tempted to discover traces of this attitude in his view of religion. There too he insists that each individual must accomplish his own salvation; each must stand alone and rely wholly on himself. It is significant that, as old age descended upon him, Kant admitted to Wasienski that he now realized the value of true friends. He discovered at last that genuine friendship was not as undesirable as he had once thought.

It is possible, however, to explain Kant's attitude to his friends as we have tried to explain his attitude to religion. Kant's sensitive nature was combined with a calculating disposition. If a natural impulse, an instinctive act, brought him pain, he did all he could to avoid a repetition of the incident.

1. Stückenberg reports him as saying somewhere that a friend in need is much to be desired, "but it is also a great burden to be tied to the fate of others and to be loaded with their needs." *Life of Immanuel Kant*, p. 193
But true friendships, Kant must soon have realized, do involve sacrifice, and the sickness or death of a friend is a source of unavoidable pain and sorrow. After the death of Green, the English merchant who for years was Kant's truest friend, Kant retired into himself, sorrowing and broken. He never went out again in the evenings as long as he lived. May not his theories of friendship and his desire to be wholly free from all ties and obligations have been, initially at least, a protecting shell into which Kant retreated from sheer over-sensitiveness to pain?

Whatever be the explanation of his views on friendship, Kant proved himself a benefactor to the needy and a patient and kindly friend to all who came to him for help. Borowski\(^1\) calls his humanity his most outstanding characteristic. If his friendships never soared on the wings of poetry, they at least rested securely on the firm and reliable foundation of solid prose. His regard for such thinkers as Lambert, Beck and Fichte seems to have waxed and waned more or less as these men found themselves able to agree or compelled to disagree with Kant's philosophy, but his affection for simpler and less critical men like Motherby and Green was ended only by death.

It is not surprising to learn that Kant performed his academic duties with scrupulous fidelity, or that his lectures were thorough and convincing. It is surprising to hear from Jachman of Kant's inspired eloquence. In his lectures, we are told, "Kant was not merely a speculative philosopher—here he was a spirited orator as well who, while satisfying the intellect, carried with him heart and feeling also. --- Oh, how often he moved us almost to tears, how often he mightily quickened our hearts, how often he lifted our spirits and our feelings out of the trammels of self-seeking sudaemonism to the high realization of pure freedom of the will, to an unconditioned subjection to the law of reason and to

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1. Borowski, p. 72-3
the joy of a disinterested performance of duty! --- His hearers certainly never left one of his lectures on ethics without having become better men." It is interesting to hear that Kant took a special interest in theological students, (large numbers of whom flocked to his classes), and gave his lectures in rational theology with special pleasure. He always hoped that the religion of reason might be spread throughout Germany as widely and as quickly as possible.

Kant's lectures revealed, as do his writings today, his chief characteristic as a thinker - an entire independence of all authorities and a complete sincerity. Borowski tells us that such expressions as "think for yourself" and "stand on your own feet," were constantly on his lips. His maxim was to see everything with his own eyes, to test everything to its foundation. This pronounced reliance on himself alone became in time a serious handicap even in the realm of philosophy. From about 1780 onwards he himself was conscious of a growing inability to think himself into the philosophical viewpoint of another. This, together with the fact that he did not apply himself seriously to Christian theology until he was a man of seventy, furnishes at least a partial explanation of the self-sufficiency and the apriori, unhistorical viewpoint of the Religion innerhalb.

With this intellectual autonomy went a passionate desire "to discover truth, pure truth, and to disseminate it once he had found it." His complete faith in his own truthfulness and the unshakeable steadfastness of his moral integrity is evident from a letter which he wrote to Moses Mendelssohn in 1766: "The loss of self-respect", he writes, "which arises from an insincere mind, would be the greatest evil that could ever happen to me, but it is quite certain that it will never happen." and to this declaration of assurance in himself he adds a remark

1. Jachman, pp. 133-4
2. Borowski, p. 82
3. Ib. p. 22
which reveals a shrinking and timid nature markedly different from that of a
Goethe or a Lessing. "It is indeed true that I think many things with the clear­
est conviction and to my great satisfaction which I never have the courage to say;
but I never say anything which I do not think." Surely Kant's victory over
himself must be judged the greater, in view of the natural timidity which from
his earliest youth he had to struggle with and overcome.

Of Kant's theology as we find it stated in his own writings we shall speak
in the next chapter. Mention may be made here of what his biographers tell us
about his religious life and the impression that his religious ideas made upon
them. They are unanimous in declaring that here too Kant consistently practised
what he preached. He had no religious life at all, in the usual meaning of the
phrase; his religion consisted essentially in "plain living and high thinking."
His was a lofty morality combined with certain theological convictions whose hold
on him dated back to his earliest days.

The chief and most firmly established of these was his belief in the exis­
tence of a moral God¹ and a Moral Order. "He was convinced in his heart," says
Jachman, "that the world is in the hands of a wise Providence. Equally firm was
his conviction that the moral law of reason coincides with God's holy will, and
that to know the latter, one has but to inquire into the former. ------
He was in the true sense of the word a worshipper of God."² It is certain that
Kant believed in God long before he had worked out for himself his ethical proof
of God's existence; and the genuine rapture with which in his later years he spoke

¹. Cf. Opus postumum (Adickes, 1920) pp. 776-7,782. For a full and
convincing proof see ib., pp. 829, seq.
². Jachman, p. 159.
to his friends of God's wisdom, goodness and power, bespeaks a certainty of conviction far different from that which rests merely on intellectual persuasion. "Here," to quote Jachman's words, "the heart of the philosopher and the man spoke out in undeniable testimony to an inner feeling and a genuine conviction." A report of Wasianski goes to bear out this conclusion. Kant said to some friends about four years before his death: "I do not fear to die. I shall know how to die. I assure you before God, that were I this night to feel that I were going to die, I would raise my hands, fold them, and exclaim, 'God be praised!' Yes, but if an evil spirit were tormenting me and were whispering in my ear: 'You have made people unhappy!' then, indeed, it would be a different matter!"

Here is evident not only Kant's calm assurance that he had lived a good life on earth, but also his conviction that he had nothing to fear at death - a clear indication that Kant believed firmly that he was living in a moral order and under the suzerainty of a moral God.

These, then, in the eyes of his friends, were the twin pillars of his faith - the existence of God and the objective reality of the moral law. His belief in immortality seems to have been to him of comparatively secondary importance. His faith in a future life was more a conclusion arrived at by a process of reasoning, a genuine Vernunftglaube, than a deep-seated and passionate conviction. Jachmann recounts an interesting story of how Kant once assured him, as they were discussing the pros and cons of immortality, that if an angel from heaven were to offer him his choice of eternal life (the character of such a life remaining wholly unknown) or immediate and complete extinction at death, he would deem it most foolish to choose the former of the two alternatives.

This remark, the loyal Jachmann hastens to add, in no way contradicts Kant's doctrine of a rational belief in a future life, for the moral law, he says, can require one to believe in what one would not naturally wish to believe. Without attaching undue importance to this story, we may accept it as a substantiation of the impression one gets from his writings, that a belief in immortality was to Kant not a matter of such overwhelming importance as it appears to have been to Tennyson, for example, who is reported to have said that if immortality "be not true, I'd sink my head tonight in a chloroformed handkerchief and have done with it all."1 Kant believed in a future life because his theological system seemed to require him to do so; he never, as far as we know, either longed for immortality or exulted in his "practical" faith in its reality.

Kant felt, as did Locke, a profound respect for what he judged to be genuine Christianity. He revered the Jesus of history with all humility and was keenly aware of his own shortcomings and his failures to measure up to Christ's lofty example. When Borowski submitted to Kant his biographical essay for the latter's approval, Kant made the following significant request. "The parallels," he says, "which have been drawn between the Christian ethics and the philosophical ethics which I have sketched might be altered by a few words, so that instead of the names of those [appearing side by side] of whom the one is holy, the other but that of a poor bungler (Stümper) who is trying as best he can to interpret his work, only those expressions which I have indicated be used ---2. "Kant," says Jachmann, "was filled with a great reverence for the high worth of the founder of our religion and for the important influence of his teaching upon the development and improvement of the masses."3 He also held the Bible in

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1. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God, p. 44
2. Cf. Borowski's Introduction, p. 5
3. Jachmann, p. 170
high esteem as a book of instruction for the people, and looked upon the church
as a useful institution for the disciplining of the common people. He believed
further, in several distinctly Christian doctrines, though he interpreted them
in his own way. Here, however, his Christianity ended. He never attended church
services, and even took special pains to avoid them. When a new rector of the
university was inaugurated, it was the custom for the professors to march in
procession to the cathedral to take part in a religious service. Kant marched
with the rest, but except on the occasions when he himself was the rector,
he deserted the procession at the church door. He regarded prayer as not only
useless, but dishonorable, and was wont to declare that to kneel or prostrate
himself on the earth, even for the purpose of symbolizing to himself his reverence
for God, was unworthy of a man. It was said of him that if any of his guests
showed signs of attempting to say grace before a meal (it is the German custom to
say grace standing) he would hurriedly interrupt by asking the guest to be
seated.  
"His whole attitude to religious practices may be summed up in saying
that he abhorred anything that he thought savoured of mysticism. "Kant," says
Jachmann, "has assured me that no word of his is to be taken in a mystical
sense, and that he was anything but a friend of mystical feelings."  
He thus dissociated himself completely from all the usual external forms of re-
ligious devotion, contenting himself with the private and persistent endeavour to
lead a virtuous life.

1. Stuckenberg, p. 354
what then is to be our estimate of Kant's character? It is evident that his was, in the beginning, a sensitive, sympathetic, even impulsive nature. But the circumstances of his life soon produced a change. Schooled by poverty, forced from early youth to overcome the handicap of a weak body, and driven into himself, first by an abhorrence for pietist emotionalism, and later by the vicissitudes and disappointments of life, he little by little built up around himself a rigid structure of maxims which served at once to reinforce his will and shield him from the stress and storm of life. These austere measures of self-discipline gradually became a kind of second nature; as the moral element in him grew strong, the other sides of his nature were repressed. While he was, indeed, kindly to all with whom he came in contact, and while this kindliness on a few occasions even blossomed into friendship, his outstanding characteristic came more and more to be his independence of others, his individualism. His respect for humanity tended to be a respect for man in the abstract, and he did not, it must be confessed, feel a personal affection for many of his fellowbeings. Kant's chief characteristic is therefore not a capacity for love or friendship, though he had many friends. Neither is it religious feeling, though he always venerated God. He is preeminently a thinker and a moralist, the one trait balancing the other. For the world as revealed to him by the exercise of his intellect over-whelms him with its immensity and grandeur and leaves him overpowered with the feeling of man's insignificance. But then the voice of conscience speaks to him of his own moral nature which is of greater significance than all the universe in space and time. Thought casts him down; the moral law within raises him up.

The much quoted sentence from the Critique of Practical Reason epitomises Kant's most matured estimate of life. "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe, the oftener and the more steadfastly we reflect on them; the starry heavens above and the moral law within."

CHAPTER III

The Metaphysical Basis of Kant's Religious Position and his Constructive Ethical Theory.
Bibliography of Chapter III

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CHAPTER III

THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF KANT'S RELIGIOUS POSITION, AND HIS CONSTRUCTIVE ETHICAL THEORY.

Kant's initial role in theology is a negative and destructive one. The first position he assails is that of Wolff's speculative and dogmatic theology. He has no objection, of course, to speculative demonstration as such, nor to a justifiable dogmatism. It is to speculative dogmatism in the realm of theology, to Wolff's attempt to found religious faith on a speculative foundation, that he objects. Pure speculative reason, in and by itself, he insists, can tell us nothing about the Object of our worship. In Scotland Hume had to a large extent anticipated Kant's attacks on the apriori proofs of God's nature and existence. But in Germany Kant is a pioneer. He is the first definitely to destroy the German scholastic philosophy. By disproving once and for all Wolff's formulation of the ontological and cosmological proofs, he demolishes the last remnants of the old metaphysical structure on which the theology of the Aufklärung rested. Religion, he proves, must henceforth rest on a new and wholly different foundation.

Kant's next assault is launched against what he calls physico-theology, a theology which rests upon a teleological interpretation of the world. Once again Kant substantiates Hume's general conclusions. By carrying the deistic reliance on natural reason to its logical issue and inferring from the constitution and behavior of the natural world all that could be thus legitimately inferred as to God's existence and nature, Hume had shown how dangerously near to downright agnosticism the road of natural theology leads us. Hume was restricted, by the nature of his premise that physical nature is man's sole clue to God's existence and nature, from arriving at anything but a theism practically equivalent to agnosticism. Kant saves himself from a similar fate by an appeal to man's moral nature. He agrees with Hume, however, in his estimate of the world of nature, and condemns a dogmatic physico-theology as heartily as he does all theology resting on a purely speculative basis.
But if so, where is faith to rest? If it is neither man's speculative reason nor the world of nature that will supply us with a basis for religion, what salvation is there from sheer agnosticism? Kant's answer is his ethical theology, his doctrine that religion is morality viewed in a certain light, that the basis of morality is man's moral consciousness, and that this basis, interpreted and strengthened by certain metaphysical considerations, yields us the 'practical' certainty we need. This is Kant's doctrine of the primacy of practical reason over the theoretical.

Although it is one of Kant's proudest claims that he has determined once and for all the boundaries of speculative reason, he does not on that account cease to be a rationalist, even in the moral and religious realms. Never for a moment does he dream of believing what his reason has not first established; his reliance in matters of ethics and theology is merely shifted from "speculative" to "practical" reason. Kant's theology will consist entirely in rational inferences. What distinguishes it from both the theology of the Wolffian school and English deism is that the initial basis of these inferences is man's moral nature, his inner consciousness of a moral law. Kant's faith is thus essentially a rational faith; reason remains his one and only guide.

Before proceeding to a consideration of Kant's religious position it is important that we obtain a clear conception of the main results of his negative philosophy and of the outstanding arguments of his constructive theory of ethics.
1. The Critique of Pure Reason.

Let us first attempt to state as briefly as possible the conclusions at which Kant arrives in the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. The Wolffian rationalists had claimed (in their three so-called "sciences," rational psychology, cosmology, and theology,) that they had established, by means of pure speculative reason, the existence and ultimate nature of God and the human soul, and the ultimate nature and origin of the world. Kant now proposes to disprove their arguments and show their conclusions to be invalid.

He considers the claims of rational psychology in the chapter on the paralogisms. Relying solely upon an analysis of the formal judgment "I think," the rationalists claimed that the soul, as the thinking "I," was a simple, numerically identical substance, ultimately distinguishable from things and capable of individual existence. Kant replies that this conclusion is arrived at by means of a fallacious argument, for the unity of self-consciousness in no way proves the absolute unity of the self; (what conditions the unity of consciousness may be highly complex). The conclusions of rational psychology are therefore wholly unreliable, yielding no knowledge of the ultimate nature, origin, or destiny of the soul. All speculative dogmatism, materialism included, is unjustifiable. Speculative reason is here confronted by an insurmountable barrier and must for ever remain agnostic.

In the chapter on the antinomies Kant deals with the conclusions of rational cosmology. These he formulates into four theses, which declare that the world is spatially and temporally finite, that the ultimate unit in the world is simple, that human freedom is reconcilable with the natural law of causality, and that the world has a Creator. In the validity of these propositions, Kant points out, every right-thinking man has a practical interest. To quote his own words: "That the world has a beginning - that the nature of my thinking self is simple and therefore indestructable - that I am a free agent and raised above the
compulsion of nature and her laws - and finally, that the entire order of things which form the world is dependent upon a Supreme Being from whom the whole receives unity and connection - these are so many foundation stones of morality and religion.\(^1\) To these theses Kant opposes four antitheses which seem to deprive us of a basis for religion by maintaining the direct opposite of the theses, namely, that the world is infinite both spatially and temporally, that there exists in the world no simple substance and therefore no such thing as a soul, that there is in the world no room for human freedom, and that there nowhere exists an absolutely necessary Being. This is the creed of the dogmatic empiricists, the conclusions to which an examination of the empirical world seems to lead. Now both the theses and the antitheses, Kant contends, admit of perfectly valid proofs. Reason thus seems to be at conflict with itself\(^2\)

The opposition of these two points of view vividly illustrates the dilemma with which Kant and his contemporaries found themselves faced. Science and religion were engaged in mortal combat; it seemed impossible to be at once an honest thinker and observer of nature, and a man of faith. Deny the antitheses, doubt the absolute regularity of natural laws or their inadequacy to account for all natural phenomena, and all science becomes impossible. Admit the validity of the antitheses, on the other hand, and there is nothing left but the mechanistic universe of science.

1. Critique of Pure Reason. (Meiklejohn's tr.) p. 292-3
2. Cf. an interesting sentence in Kant's letter to Carve (Sept. 21, 1798,) in which he says that it was the philosophical, not the theological problems which first set him to thinking along this line. "The point from which I started was not the investigation of God's existence, of immortality, etc. but the antinomy of pure reason: "The world has a beginning - it has no beginning," etc. to the fourth, "Man is free" as opposed to "There is no freedom and everything in man is natural necessity." It was this which first woke me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason, in order to remove the scandal of the apparent contradiction of reason with itself."
Kant's solution of the antinomies rests on his well-known distinction between the world of appearance and the world of reality—a distinction which plays an important part in his later theological thinking. In the Critique of Practical Reason he develops into a definite doctrine his inferences as to the nature of the noumenal world and its relation to the world of phenomena; here he is merely proposing a speculative hypothesis. May not both theses and antitheses be true, he asks. He has previously shown that the world which constitutes the object of scientific knowledge, the empirical world and man's empirical nature, is not itself reality but only the appearance of reality. May the antitheses not be true if taken to apply solely to phenomena, the world of appearance? There remains the non-empirical world of reality. May the theses not be valid as applying to this noumenal world? This "Intelligible" world, (as he calls it, in contrast to the sensible world,) and man's intelligible nature would on this hypothesis be timeless, unaffected by the world of appearances, yet conditioning the phenomenal world as a whole, though at no single point breaking into the natural casual sequence of empirical events. The notion of transcendental freedom as the law of the noumenal world, would in no way infringe upon or contradict the empirical law of causality, which is thus left to reign supreme over the world of nature. And, finally, the apparent infinity of the causal series in nature would no longer make impossible the notion of an unconditioned Being as the underlying

1. Kant really solves the antinomies in two different ways. His first solution is to declare that they are concerned only with the world of appearance and that both theses and antitheses are meaningless when made to refer to things-in-themselves, for of these speculative reason can know nothing. His second solution he applies only to the third and fourth antinomies. In view of the fact, however, that this limitation is quite arbitrary (Cf. Kemp Smith's Commentary p. 510 seq.), and of the further fact that this second explanation is the one which points ahead to Kant's later theological views, we shall confine our attention to it.
and sustaining ground of the causal series as a whole. In a word, Kant proposes completely to separate science and religion by restricting them to distinct realms, and by this simple device hopes to reconcile the scientific and the religious interpretations of the world. As Paulsen summarizes it: "By banishing religion from the field of science, and science from the field of religion, he afforded freedom and independence to both." It is important to keep in mind, however, that at this stage Kant offers the solution as an hypothesis only. Speculative reason, he insists again and again, cannot prove anything regarding man's immortality, transcendental freedom, the intelligible world, or an unconditioned Being. It can merely point out that nothing in the empirical world, as we know it, contradicts these notions— that they are therefore plausible possibilities. They way is thus left open to practical reason to prove, on the basis of man's moral nature, the practical validity of human freedom and of the existence of a God related to the world.

Kant has thus once again set limits to speculative reason, and by so doing has disclosed the pretensions of both positive and negative theological dogmatism. The attempt of the Wolffians to build up a rational cosmology on the basis of speculative reason is doomed, he has shown, to complete failure. Speculative reason can never afford us knowledge of the nature of ultimate reality. But for this very reason materialism too can never prove its case. "If, as often happens, empiricism, in relation to ideas, becomes itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its phenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the

1. Cf. Vorlesungen über die Religionsphilosophie, pp. 182-3, "-- if there are to be natural events at all the presupposition is that their most immediate cause is in nature itself. The latter must therefore itself be adequate to the occurrence of this event. Yet the cause, like all natural causes, is grounded in God as the highest Cause." "All substances have their ground in God as the prima causa." It may be noted that this conception of God is a marked advance on the 18th century notion of Him as the First Cause, the beginning of the causal series. Cf. Selections from Theism, p. 252, N. 12.
2. Immanuel Kant, his Life and Doctrine, p. 7.
error of intemperance - an error which is here all the more reprehensible, as thereby the practical interest of reason receives an irreparable injury."

Kant next proceeds to disprove the conclusions of rational theology by exposing the fallacies of the three traditional proofs of God's existence. The third of these, the physico-theological or teleological proof, is far more adequately dealt with in the Critique of Judgment. It is, moreover, distinguished from the ontological and cosmological arguments, which are purely apriori in character, in that it starts from empirical data, the marks, namely, of purpose and order in the universe. Kant's treatment of the argument from design may therefore be dealt with conveniently in connection with our statement of the conclusions arrived at in the third Critique.

Kant states the ontological argument after the Wolffian manner. The mind possesses the concept of an ens realissimum, "a Being which contains all reality in itself."

Since non-existence is the negation of reality, not its affirmation, the ens realissimum must possess the attribute of existence. Hence the ens realissimum, or God, exists. Hume had previously summed up the essence of the argument in the simple sentence, "The idea of infinite perfection implies that of actual existence." The cosmological argument moves in a direction opposite to that of the ontological, and may be analysed into two distinct stages. The first is to affirm that if anything contingent exists, there must exist

1. Critique of Pure Reason, (Meiklejohn's tr.) p. 295
2. Selections from the Literature of Theism, p. 185 N. 4
3. Quoted in ib. p. 190. N. 10
4. The first of Kant's criticism of the ontological argument is, first, that the proof rests on the confusion between the logical necessity of thought and the ontological necessity of existence; second, that in an identical judgment, as for example, that "God is omnipotent," both subject and predicate may be rejected without contradiction - as Hume had stated it (quoted in Selections from the Literature of Theism, p. 193, N. 12.) "The contrary of every matter of fact is possible;" and third, that existence can never be a predicate - the possible must always include as much as the actual. "To affirm it is the positing of a thing with all its qualities." (Selections from the Literature of Theism, p. 195, N. 13.) Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, Dialectic, Bk. II, Chap. III, Sec. 4; and Kemp Smith's commentary, p. 527, seq.
a necessary and unconditioned Being as its cause; the second, that since experience can tell us nothing of the nature of such a Being, we must rely on apriori concepts to supply this information. These compel us to identify this necessary Being with the ens realissimum, for it alone contains all the conditions of its existence within itself. Or, as Hume phrased it, ¹ "There is something necessarily existent and what is so is infinitely perfect."²

Kant now rejects both these proofs as fallacious, and denies all objective validity to their conclusions. The ontological argument he condemns on three separate counts, and the first stage of the cosmological on three more; the second stage of the cosmological argument rests, he points out, on the ontological, and since the latter has been proved invalid, the cosmological argument is still further weakened by its reliance upon it. We may note in passing that one of his objections to the third, or teleological, proof of God's existence is that it in turn is based on the cosmological, which, as he, as shown, rests on the ontological proof. The errors of both of the previous arguments are thus inherited by the teleological argument which, in Kant's opinion, is already invalidated by various errors of its own.

¹ Quoted in Selections from the Literature of Theism, p. 203, N. 24
² Kant points out the following fallacies in stage I of the cosmological argument. (1) The very phrase, "an absolutely necessary yet unconditioned Being", is meaningless. Our notion of necessity is bound up completely with our notion of conditions. If, i. e., all conditions are thought away, necessity disappears with them. (2) The underlying assumption, that if the conditioned is given, all the conditions leading up finally to the unconditioned are also given, is disproved by two considerations. a) The principle, "Everything must have a cause," can be taken to apply, as Kant has previously shown, only to the world of sense, and cannot validly be made to transcend the empirical world and apply to God. The category of causality is valid only when limited in its application to the world of sense. b) The assumption that the causal series cannot be infinite is unjustified - speculative reason can neither assert nor deny such infinity. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, Dialectic, Bk. II, Chap. III, Sec. 5; Kemp Smith's Commentary, p. 531, seq.
Kant's rejection of the apriori proofs is completely in line with what has been called his "sceptical" (in contrast to his "idealist") point of view in the Critique as a whole. From this viewpoint, experience is the only criterion of truth and the only source of knowledge. "All our knowledge of existence," as he himself states it,--- belongs entirely to the sphere of experience ---; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining."

And, as has been pointed out, "If knowledge is indissolubly wedded to sense, of course it is vain to speak of our knowing God." Rational theology is therefore discredited in advance; speculative reason can never hope to discover theological truth.

Before leaving the Critique of Pure Reason, however, mention must be made of Kant's "idealist" position, which contradicts these "sceptical" conclusions and is more in harmony with the "critical" positions of the Analytic. It is an argument which Kant nowhere adequately develops. The passages in the Critique which point to it occur chiefly in the introductory portions of the Dialectic; in its later sections Kant is dominated almost completely by his "sceptical" point of view. This "idealist" position is that reason, instead of being forever chained to the realm of experience, is essentially metaphysical, and, in man's search for ultimate truth, a higher court of appeal than experience. The idea of the Unconditioned, of the Absolute, is so fundamental to man's thinking, that, without it, all though would be impossible. The idea of the Infinite is the fundamental presupposition in all thought of the finite. This idea of the Unconditioned, if it is true, is empty of all content and seems meaningless; but that is only because it is so fundamental that it cannot be described in terms

1. Critique of Pure Reason, (Meiklejohn's tr.) p. 369
2. Selections from the Literature of Theism p. 199, N. 18
of any other concepts. It is, in a word, unique, the ground of all rational thinking.

Here then we seem to have a promising metaphysical basis for theism. The "idealist" argument establishes the objective validity of the formal concept of the Unconditioned, (by showing that without it, all rational experience is impossible) and leaves to practical reason the task of supplying the content and revealing the nature of the Unconditioned. Kant fails, however, to develop this "idealist" position. He makes no use of it as a foundation for theism, and never attempts to identify the Unconditioned with the God of his moral theology or the God of his personal belief.

Yet from both the "sceptical" and "idealist" points of view Kant has achieved his negative purpose. He has shown that speculative reason can never "know" God, can never discover the nature of the Unconditioned. From the "sceptical" point of view, which, as we have said, dominates most of the Dialectic, reason in the search for objective truth cannot transcend the world of experience at all.

In the rare "idealist" passages, Kant declares that reason conceives the empty concept of the Unconditioned and is able to establish its objective reality, but that beyond this, it can tell us nothing. The result is the same: apriori speculation is shown to be fundamentally unfitted to furnish man with a theology or provide a basis for religious faith. The question now arises, Can God's nature not be inferred from the nature of world in which we live? Kant's answer to this question is to be found in its most adequate form in the Critique of Judgment.

1. Cf. Kamp Smith's Commentary p, 559, "Consciousness as such is always the awareness of a whole which precedes and conditions its parts. Such consciousness cannot be accounted for on the assumption that we are first conscious of the conditioned, and then proceed to remove limitations and to form for ourselves, by means of the more positive factors involved in this antecedent consciousness, an Idea of the totality within which the given falls. The Idea of the unconditioned --- is one of the apriori conditions of possible experience ---. It is presupposed in the possibility of our contingently given experience."
2. The Critique of Judgment.

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant investigates the problems which arise from the fact that the nature of the world in which we live compels us to conceive and interpret it as purposively adapted to certain ends. Natural bodies, in their own objective existence, seem to be inexplicable except in terms of purposiveness or design. Can we imagine that the curious interconnections and subtle adaptations evident everywhere in nature are the result of blind chance or of the play of unintelligent, mechanical forces? But if there is design, must there not be a Designer, and is the Designer not the God we seek?

The distinction must first of all be drawn between external and internal or organic adaptation. Nature supplies innumerable instances of the external adaptation of one natural existence to the needs of another, of plants, for example, to animals, and of both to man. That this must be the outcome of design, that plants must have been created for the benefit of herbivorous animals, and the whole world for the sake of man, was the argument upon which metaphysics up to Kant's day relied almost entirely for its support of a teleological view of the natural world. Were this a valid argument we should be justified in inferring, as does Philo in Hume's Dialogues, the nature of the Designing

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1. Apart from this objective adaptation to its own ends, the natural world as a whole is adapted to the satisfying of man's subjective, intellectual and aesthetic feelings. The world, to begin with, is an orderly cosmos, capable of being comprehended by a rational mind. This harmony between the structure of the universe and the mind of man is the fundamental presupposition of all scientific inquiry, the sine qua non of all knowledge of the natural world. Nature, again, is adapted in many of its forms to the satisfying of our aesthetic needs; natural objects are such that man can often derive aesthetic pleasure from the contemplation of them. Here again is evident a harmony, this time between Man's aesthetic sense and the line, form and colour of the natural object, a harmony without which all human appreciation of natural beauty would be impossible. How, then, is this obvious adaptation of man's mind and the world of nature to each other to be explained? Since an adequate explanation of nature's objective or internal purposiveness will serve at the same time to explain nature's adaptation to our subjective needs, we can confine ourselves to an examination of the former problem.
Intelligence from the way in which nature serves man, the "lord and end of creation." Hume's dismal picture, (and Kant paints quite as black a one) of the treatment man often receives at nature's hands would then indeed support the inference that this Designing Intelligence is altogether indifferent to man's welfare. Kant, however, makes impossible such an inference by maintaining that the examples in the world of external adaptation may suggest but can never prove the existence of a Designing Intelligence as their source.

There are in the world of nature, however, innumerable examples of a different kind of purposiveness. A tree contains within itself both its cause and its effect. It is essentially a self-caused cause. As a genus, it is self-multiplying, itself the source of trees of its own kind. As an individual, it has the faculty of growth, an internal creative process. It and its members are mutually dependent upon each other; a leaf dies when detached from its tree; the tree dies if repeatedly defoliated. Now such marvelous reciprocal adaptation, in which every part is at once an end and a means, is mechanically inexplicable. Viewed as the chance result of the interplay of blind mechanical forces it is so improbable as to be, to all intents and purposes, impossible. To explain a tree, therefore, we are forced to make use of a special teleological principle. According to this principle a product of nature is "organised" when every part is reciprocally end and means, and what is organised can be explained only as having been somehow purposed or designed. This principle, then, differs from the mechanical

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1 Kant affirms this for two reasons. (a) Since the use of things in such cases is external to the things themselves, it determines nothing as to the mode of their origin; the adaptation may always be an accident. (b) None of these adaptations can be regarded as a purpose of nature unless that to which it is immediately advantageous is itself a purpose of nature; and nowhere in the natural world is a final end discoverable which is capable of justifying and accounting for such design. The suffering which nature continually causes man and the calamities with which it in wont to overwhelm him makes it impossible to designate man as nature's final end. Cf. Critique of Judgment (Bernard tr.) 265 seq., and 346 seq.
in this, that whereas according to the latter principle an effect follows blindly and automatically in the wake of its cause, in an organised body an idea is the basis of its possibility and determines the nature and function of all its parts.\(^1\)

We are now confronted with a dilemma. Both the mechanical and the teleological principles are essential to an explanation of nature, yet the two are in conflict with each other. The mechanical principle, that nature is wholly explicable in terms of blind mechanical laws, is for the purposes of science all-important. Since purposiveness implies a reference to the supersensible, it is, from the point of view of natural science, purely miraculous, and can never be admitted by the man of science as a causal factor. Organised bodies, on the other hand, are mechanically inexplicable. "Absolutely no human reason," says Kant, "can hope to understand the production of even a blade of grass by mere mechanical causes.\(^2\) It is impossible to believe, moreover, that organised matter originally developed out of the purely mechanical and unorganised. "That crude matter should have originally formed itself according to mechanical laws, that life should have sprung from the nature of what is lifeless, that matter should have been able to dispose itself into the form of a self-maintaining purposiveness, this is contradictory to reason.\(^3\) The problem of the origin of natural organisms cannot ultimately be solved in purely mechanical terms. The notion of purpose or design, though essentially incomprehensible, and marking, as it were, an unsolved problem, is yet essential to an explanation of the universe. We are faced, therefore, with an antinomy: it is, on the one hand, a necessary law

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1. The mechanical and teleological principles differ in another respect also. A mechanically causal combination is ever progressive - a thing cannot at the same time be the cause and the effect of something else; in a purposively causal combination, on the other hand, the same thing may properly be called both a cause and an effect. A tree's leaves are both the cause and the effect of the tree's continued existence.
2. Critique of Judgment, (Bernard's tr.) p. 326
3. Ib. pp. 345-6
of the human understanding that all natural processes be judged in terms of mechanical laws; all organised products of nature, on the other hand, are mechanically inexplicable and compel us to resort to the teleological principle of design.

Though Kant's solution of this antinomy does not particularly concern us, the practical relation which the two principles must, in his opinion, be made to bear to each other is of considerable importance. Since each principle is universally extensive, claiming as its domain the entire natural world, they can only be reconciled to each other by complete subordination of one to the other. Science claims that the teleological principle should be subordinated to the mechanical, the assumption being that as scientific knowledge grows more complete, the resort to teleology will gradually become unnecessary - that an omniscient scientific intelligence in the world would be able to explain all nature mechanically. It is significant that Kant supports, instead, the "idealist" position, which wholly subordinates the mechanical to the teleological principle on the ground that the ultimate explanation of nature is more likely to be teleological than mechanical. Yet, of even greater interest to us is Kant's suggestion that there may exist a common supersensible source of both mechanism and design.

"The principle which should render possible the compatibility of both [principles] in judging of nature must be placed in that which lies outside both ---- but yet contains their grounds, i.e. in the supersensible; and each of the two methods of explanation must be referred thereto." Of this common ground,

1. Kant solves the antinomy in a thoroughly "sceptical" fashion, and in the manner in which he solves the first two antinomies in the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (see above p. 105). He declares that these principles are both subjectively necessary; they have no valid reference, however, to objective reality. The thesis and antithesis of this antinomy may therefore be restated as follows: Thesis - Investigate nature as if it were wholly explicable in mechanical terms; go as far along these lines as you possibly can: Antithesis - You will not be able to explain certain natural products mechanically; you will ultimately have to fall back upon a teleological explanation.

2. Critique of Judgment (Bernard's tr.) p. 328. seq.

however, Kant declares with great emphasis that we can know nothing. It remains wholly incomprehensible to both our speculative and our practical reason. Yet it is significant that Kant should have felt the need for a basis of union between the mechanical and teleological principles and should have conceived the idea of a common source of both.  

We have thus far been dealing with the argument to design and have seen that Kant recognises in the world of nature the unmistakable marks of a designing hand. Like Hume he next raises the question, How is this evidence in the world of a plan to be accounted for? "To explain the purposiveness of nature," he says, "men have tried either lifeless matter or a lifeless God, or again, living matter or a living God." The first and second of these attempts he dismisses summarily. The materialistic assertion that the world is nothing but a system of mere mechanical causality is a theory "so plainly absurd that it need not detain us." Organisation requires to be explained, not ignored. Opposed to this is the doctrine of fatality of which Kant takes Spinoza to be the modern exponent. It too fails to give us the explanation we seek; for if the cases of organic adaptation in the world are thought of as derived not from the understanding of an original Being but from the blind and inexorable necessity of his nature, these purposive combinations are again disregarded and left unexplained. Kant considers the theory of hylozoism with greater care. According to this theory, matter either is itself declared to be living and formative, or else it is said to possess an inner and hidden principle of life, a world-soul. As an explanation of our problem, this theory, Kant points out, is inadequate and unsatisfactory.

2. Critique of Judgment (Bernard's tr.) p. 301, N.
3. Cf. ib. #72, 73.
4. Hume, we remember, arrived at the same conclusion, see above, p. 36.
To say that matter is alive amounts to a contradiction in terms, for the fundamental characteristic of matter, as scientifically known, is its inertia, its lifelessness. To resort, on the other hand, to the hypothesis of a world-spirit is nothing but an appeal to the unknown. Hylozoism, therefore, can furnish no *dogmatic* solution to the problem in question. Kant suggests, however, that it is *possible* that organisation is ultimately not different in kind from mechanism, but that it arises from the same hidden source from which the mechanical principle springs, a source which is somehow the supersensible basis of nature. Some form of hylozoism, that is, *may* conceivably be the explanation of which we are in search.

The fourth explanation is theism, which "derives ([the purposes of nature]) from the original ground of the universe as from an intelligent Being, (originally living), who produces them with design."¹ Is this an explanation of whose objective validity we can be dogmatically certain? Kant believes not - for two reasons. There is in the first place the fundamental difficulty referred to in our consideration of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, that *no* dogmatic certainty about the supersensible is attainable by theoretic reason. Hylozoism cannot be proved right; neither can it be proved false - it remains, as far as theoretic reason is concerned, an abiding possibility. And theism, as now appears, is equally unprovable. The teleological argument starts from an experience of the phenomena of the present world, their constitution and disposition, and seeks to mount from this empirical base to a supersensible Being, nature's original Cause. But a Being who cannot, like the world of nature, himself be revealed to us in experience is a Being "of no avail for dogmatic determinations."²

¹. *Critique of Judgment.* (Bernard's tr.) p. 301
². *Ib.* p. 308
Sense experience is the sole source of "knowledge"; and since we can have no such experience of the God of theism, we can make no dogmatic assertions as to His existence. "Experience," as Kant summarises it, "can never --- raise us above nature to the purpose of its existence, and so to the determinate concept of that supreme Intelligence."^1

A second objection^2 to the theistic explanation of the world is its two-fold inadequacy. It fails on the one hand to do justice to the self-organising aspect of natural organisms. The product of a design is external to its cause, whereas the creative forces in nature lie within the organism itself. Nature is not merely organised - it is self-organising. To compare it to a work of art or to a watch is to do less than justice to the distinctive characteristic of living organism^3. And the notion of a designing Intelligence fails, on the other hand, to measure up to our highest ideal of the divine Mind. In our thinking we cannot free ourselves from our own mental limitations; we must reason from the parts to the whole - we must first conceive a plan and then execute it.

2. It is to be noticed that Kant, like Hume, stated the teleological proof of God's existence and nature in typical 18th century fashion. God is thus thought of as quite distinct from the world and as imposing upon it, from without, a certain preconceived form or arrangement. When the argument is stated in these terms it is not strange that God should be likened to a watch-maker who plans his watch, constructs it, and then casts it off, as it were, to run itself. It is the argument in this form which Kant now rejects.
3. Hume, in the mouth of Philo, had already advanced this argument as an objection to Cleanthes' 18th century teleological proof of God's existence. (See above p. 37.) The teleological argument here really passes through three stages. The first is its mechanistic interpretation, most forcefully illustrated, perhaps, by Paley's subsequent watch argument. This 18th century formulation is invalidated by the element of truth in hylozoism, i.e. that organic nature is self-organising and therefore not to be likened to a watch. Both Hume and Kant recognize the truth of this contention. But, as Philo admits when he deserts hylozoism for a form of theism, and as Kant specifically points out in his criticism of hylozoism (above p. 157), that theory, when offered as a metaphysical explanation of the world's ultimate origin and fundamental nature is in many ways unsatisfactory and on the whole less adequate than some form of theism. So hylozoism invalidates a purely mechanical view of nature, and theism strives to supplement hylozoism's deficiencies.
"We can, however think an Understanding which, being not like ourselves, discursive, but intuitive, proceeds from the ______ intuition of the whole as such to the particular, i.e. from the whole to the parts; an Understanding for which to have conceived a plan is to have already executed it, for which the possible and the actual are identical. This concept of an intuitive understanding for which the whole and the parts mutually and organically involve each other has been described as "Kant's conception of God in its profoundest form" and an "inalienable element in the edifice of modern theism."² Again Kant fails to develop the rich possibilities of this conception or to incorporate it adequately into his moral theology.³ It serves, nevertheless to reveal the inadequacy of the notion of a First Cause who first conceives a plan of the universe and then translates that plan into action, and it makes quite impossible a dogmatic acceptance of the theistic hypothesis, in the form stated, as the true explanation of natural adaptation.

1. Critique of Judgment (Abbott's tr.) p. 322
2. Selections from the Literature of Theism, p. 182.
3. Cf. however Kant's conception of a God who views man's endless progress from the lower to the higher degrees of moral perfection as a single whole - who in a single intellectual intuition embraces the whole existence of rational beings. Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, (Abbott's tr.) p. 219; Religion innerhalb-- pp. 66, 72, etc; Vorlesungen Uber die Religionsphilosophie, p. 162, where God is described as having created the world out of nothing by a single intelligible act.
Kant concludes therefore that we can know nothing and explain nothing about the purposiveness of nature with any dogmatic certainty. This is why the phrase "natural purposiveness" is valuable; that nature is somehow purposive we know, but the ultimate explanation of this purposiveness we do not know. Kant accepts theism, however, as "certainly superior to all other grounds of explanation." It is at least non-mechanical and must simply be accepted as the best explanation available.

So much then for theism as an explanation of natural purposiveness. We have but to reverse the problem and ask, "What basis for a theology is there in natural purposiveness?" to see how insufficient physico-theology is to satisfy man's religious needs. When Kant sets himself to discover how much we are justified in inferring from the physical world as to God's nature, his conclusions closely correspond to those of Hume in the Dialogues. The cause of nature may be a single intelligence, but it may also be more than one; as Kant puts it, "we may set beneath natural purposes many intelligent original beings, or only a single one." A demonology wherein the good in the world is the work of good spirits, the evil, of malignant spirits, is by no means impossible. And even granting the more probable proposition that the world is the result of a single Intelligence, what does this tell us of the nature of such an Intelligence? The utmost that we are justified in inferring is the existence of a very powerful World-Architect, which is wholly different from establishing the existence of an omnipotent Creator of the world. Neither can we, by observation of nature,

1. Critique of Judgment, (Bernard's tr.) p. 305
tell whether this Intelligence is infinite or eternal, or (and this concerns the religious consciousness even more closely) whether it possesses a moral nature and is attentive to our moral needs. Physical teleology thus affords no adequate basis for a theology. "It impels us, it is true, to seek a theology; but it cannot produce one, however far we may investigate nature by means of experience—\(^1\)

The utmost it can do is to give "sufficient ground of proof to our theoretical, reflective\(^2\) judgment to assume the being of an intelligent World-Cause."\(^3\) And this, Kant points out, is not a sufficient foundation for a genuine theology.

Kant has now completed his work of destruction. He has shown that speculative reason is unable to attain to a sure or adequate conception of God, whether by the *apriori* or the *aposteriori* road. The teleological argument, he admits, "deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity."\(^4\) And moreover, he continues in an eloquent passage, "it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed."\(^5\) The mind, unceasingly elevated by these considerations --- will not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle speculation; it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty of the universe, and rises from height to height, from condition to condition, till it has elevated itself to the supreme and unconditioned author of all."\(^6\) Yet as argument it is, as Kant has shown, fallacious and unsatisfactory in a number of ways. After Hume had disproved the *apriori* proofs, he hastened to point out that their destruction in no way affected the basis of religious faith: Man's faith in God never did depend on a subtle metaphysical argument.

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2. i.e. a judgment expressing subjective, not objective necessity.
Kant too is conscious of his critics. He first defends himself against the attacks of those who bewail the conclusions to which his destructive philosophy has led by pointing out that these conclusions are honest and therefore unavoidable. "All lamentation or impotent anger," he says to these defenders of the traditional proofs, "on account of the alleged mischief of rendering doubtful the coherency of your chain of reasoning is vain pretentiousness, which would fain have us believe that the doubt here freely expressed as to your argument is a doubting of sacred truth, in order that under this cover, the shallowness of your argument may pass unnoticed."¹

But, he continues, for the encouragement of the more sincere seekers after God, "even if the concept of the original Being could be also found determinately by the merely theoretical path --- it would afterwards be very difficult - perhaps impossible --- to ascribe to this Being by well-grounded proofs a causality in accordance with moral laws; and yet without this, that quasi-theological concept could furnish no foundation for religion."² Once prove God's existence out of the mouth of non-moral nature and you have a non-moral God of no use to the religious consciousness. In Kant's opinion, then, it is all to the good that man is forced to depend upon the moral proofs of God's existence and nature for an adequate theology and a sound basis for religious faith.

¹. Critique of Judgment, (Bernard's tr.) p. 422.
². Ib. p. 423.
3. The Critique of Practical Reason.

Man, the only being on earth with the capacity for setting before himself certain ends and applying himself to their attainment, must be judged the "lord of creation", nature's highest product. "Without men the whole creation would be a mere waste, vain, and without final purpose." It is not man's speculative capacity, however, which Kant admires most: "it is not in reference to man's cognitive faculty, (his theoretical reason) that the being of everything else in the world gets its worth; he is not there merely that there may be someone to contemplate the world." But neither is it as a being capable of happiness that man is of intrinsic value. On this point Kant's teaching is as consistent as it is emphatic. Not only does he believe with Philo in Hume's "Dialogues" that man's fickleness and natural perversity as well as the treatment he receives at the hand's of nature, who "has not taken him for her special darling," makes the attainment of a hedonistic goal quite impossible; that "the value of life for us," as he puts it, "if it is estimated by that which we enjoy (--- i.e. happiness) is easy to decide. It sinks below zero; for who would be willing to enter upon life anew under the same conditions?" It is only man's moral nature that there is ultimate worth. Only in man as a free moral agent do we discover life's highest value. In the last analysis, there remains" nothing but the value which we ourselves give our life; "man is favored above all other animals by being endowed with the capacity to achieve moral excellence.5

1. Critique of Judgment, (Bernard's tr.) p. 370 (But Bernard reads "in vain" instead of "vain."
2. Ib. p. 370
5. Kant's doctrine that it is preeminently on the moral side that man triumphs over nature and proves himself superior to it finds an interesting illustration in his theory of the sublime. as he develops it in the Critique of Judgment, (Bernard's tr. p. 101 seq.). Nature, in its immensity and power, inspires us with a sense of our own limitation; yet by reason of our moral consciousness we know that we are superior to nature. " Humanity in our person remains unhumiliated, though the individual (may) have to submit to (its) dominion." (Ib. p. 126) "Sublimity does not reside in anything of nature, but only in our mind, in so far as we can become conscious that we are superior to nature within, and therefore also to nature without us." (Ib. p. 129)
Man's moral consciousness consists in an innate sense of "ought," a spontaneous recognition of the fact of duty. It involves the consciousness of a standard, the moral law; a respect for that standard, as being a law for me; and a realisation of the discrepancy existing between it and my personal conduct. This moral faculty in man Kant believes to be quite inexplicable. He accepts it as an ultimate and incontrovertible fact, and feels for it unceasing awe and wonder. "Duty! thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind — a law before which all inclinations are dumb — what origin is there worthy of thee?"¹ The contrast with Hume is striking. Whereas Hume concludes his Dialogues by attributing to his Supreme Mind a complete indifference to natural and to moral evil alike, Kant accepts man's moral experience as the surest fact of life and derives from it his assurance of the existence of a moral God, the Author and Maintainer of a moral order. On the constructive side Kant is preeminently a moralist, the ethicist par excellence in modern philosophy. "The universe as a moral system is the last word of the Kantian philosophy."²

The Critique of Practical Reason is devoted to a deduction of various inferences from this central fact of man's moral consciousness. As was evident in the first Critique, the sole interest of speculative reason is cognition, the discovery of speculative truth. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant is concerned with reason in its "practical" function. Now reason is "practical" when it determines man's will, that faculty, possessed by all rational beings, of choosing what reason (as opposed to inclination) recognises as good. Practical reason is thus the rational expression of man's moral consciousness, the rational voice of conscience; it is his reason functioning in the moral sphere; and its law is the moral law.

¹. *Critique of Judgment* (Bernard's tr.) p. 180
In the Critique of Pure Reason it will be remembered that Kant suggests the possibility that man is possessed of a two-fold nature, "sensible" and "intelligible", and belongs to two distinct realms, the phenomenal realm of nature and the supersensible, intelligible realm of noumenal reality. On this hypothesis he would, by reason of his "sensible" nature, belong to the physical world and be wholly obedient to the natural law of cause and effect; as a rational being he would be entirely independent of nature and subservient only to the moral law of reason, a citizen of the "intelligible" world. What speculative reason could only advance as an hypothesis, practical reason now proclaims as a "practical" certainty.

The starting point is our moral consciousness, which is an innate sense of duty or obligation. Now moral freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law. Were there no freedom, our sense of "ought" would be an illusion. Our consciousness of the moral law, on the other hand, Kant calls the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, for it is by reason of it that we first become conscious of the fact that we are free. These two, then, go hand in hand, the moral law, of which we are immediately conscious, and freedom, which is the absolute condition of the validity of that consciousness. Each may be said to verify the genuineness of the other.

Let us follow the steps of Kant's reasoning. The only possible basis for morality is individual freedom. Now we know that man, as a part of the physical world, is not free. He may, however, belong by reason of his rational nature to that other realm, the noumenal realm of freedom, whose existence speculative reason has suggested to us. Practical reason now asserts that this is indeed the true metaphysical basis of moral consciousness since it is the only basis conceivable.\footnote{This is obviously the crux of the argument. Cf. Kemp Smith, Commentary p. 573} Our moral consciousness, to be possible at all, must, says practical reason, rest on this noumenal foundation. But we have started with the assumption that man's moral consciousness is
not only possible but is the surest experience we have. We may therefore rest assured as moral beings, that the moral law of which we are so acutely aware is noumenally grounded and that through it this strange and hidden noumenal realm for once discloses itself directly to the human mind. Our moral consciousness is, as it were, a window, and the only window, through which we see something of the nature of ultimate reality. Kant then reverses the argument. Moral freedom is the transcendental condition of our moral consciousness. We are therefore as certain of the former as we are of the latter. All who have experienced the moral impulse and are convinced of its genuineness can rest assured that as moral beings they are free.

To man's "freedom" therefore, Kant attaches an importance which his constant repetition of the phrase "God, Freedom and Immortality" is apt to conceal. Freedom, on the one hand, and God and immortality on the other, belong to different levels of certainty. "Freedom," he says, "is the only concept of the supersensible which proves its objective reality in nature" and is "to be reckoned under the scibilia." It is unique in being the only characteristic of the supersensible world which practical reason can count on as a "thing of fact".

We are now in a position to determine more exactly the nature of the moral law. Three of its characteristics may be mentioned. (1) It is distinguished from the law of nature in that it defines what ought to be, not what is. Man, it says,

1. Critique of Judgment, (Bernard's tr.) p. 413, my italics. Cf. also pp. 406, 38, and the following, quoted in Pringle-Pattison's Idea of God, p. 31; Freedom "is the only one of all the ideas of the speculative reason of which we know the possibility apriori, because it is the condition of the moral law which we know."
2. Freedom on its negative side is merely an "independence of everything empirical", on its positive side, however, it is a unique dispensation with its own laws and its own causality. Since freedom is the basis of morality, and since morality consists in obeying the dictates of practical reason, it is clear that "the law of freedom", "the law of reason", and "the moral law" are for Kant quite synonymous.
3. A fourth characteristic may be mentioned. The moral law is conceived apriori, and can never be deduced from experience, for it is the law of reason and of the intelligible world of which our sensible experience can tell us nothing.
ought to obey the commands of his reason instead of following his sensuous inclinations — he ought as a rational being to recognise in the law of reason the object of his highest allegiance. (2) It is dictated to each individual by his own reason. Man's reason is autonomous, self-legislative. Man is under obligation to obey not the laws of another, not even the laws of God because they are God's laws. To the dictates of only one tribunal does man owe implicit obedience, and that tribunal is his own conscience, his own rational nature. The moral law, therefore, as a man's own law, is absolutely and unqualifiedly authoritative for him, a "categorical imperative".

(3) And since the moral law is the law of reason, it is uniformly and universally binding upon all rational beings, even upon God as rational. The intrinsic value of the moral law is not that it is God's law; rather, the moral law is God's law because He is a righteous God. Kant even describes God as the personification of the moral law. It is the moral law, in a word, which alone possesses for man intrinsic worth. It is the ultimate standard of value, the sole criterion by which man's will is to be judged good or bad. This moral law, let us repeat, is the foundation-stone of all Kant's ethical and religious teaching.

The form of the moral law follows directly from its nature. In its simplest form it is simply, "Act rationally!" On its more practical side it reads, "Rational nature exists as an end in itself," or, more fully, "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." In this form it may be described as Kant's nearest equivalent to the Golden Rule. In more general terms, again, it may be stated thus, "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Other formulations of the moral law might be given, but these suffice to make clear Kant's fundamental position.
We come now to Kant's doctrine of the *Summum Bonum*, the doctrine which is the connecting link between his ethics proper and his theology. The *Summum Bonum* is man's ideal of the complete and perfect goal of human endeavour; and its two ingredients are *virtue*, that is, moral worth attained by obedience to the moral law, and *happiness*, "the condition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will." Upon the cogency of Kant's argument for the *Summum Bonum* will depend the validity of his proofs of God and immortality; it is therefore important that we have the steps of his reasoning clearly before us.

Virtue is definitely the more important of the two elements of the *Summum Bonum*. The moral law must be the _sole_ determining principle of a will that is to be judged good; "it is even dangerous to allow other motives --- even to _co-operate_ along with the moral law." Man, Kant is never weary of declaring, must do his duty out of pure respect for the law of reason and never from inclination, never from an ulterior motive such as the anticipation of happiness. It is a clear case of "Duty for Duty's sake!"

Though virtue thus taken by itself is, and must remain, the *supreme* good, it is nevertheless not the _whole_ and _perfect_ good. Man's ideal of the highest _human_ good includes _happiness_ as well as virtue. Man's reason demands as the goal of humanity a *Summum Bonum* consisting not only of virtue but happiness, exactly proportioned to virtue, always subordinate to it and conditioned by it, yet making, in conjunction with it, a complete and balanced whole. The introduction of happiness into the *Summum Bonum* seems to be a recognition on Kant's part that man is more than a mere rational machine. "Our weal and woe are of very great importance in the estimation of our practical reason," or, as he puts it elsewhere, "to need happiness, to deserve it, and yet at the same time not to participate in it, cannot be consistent

2. *Ib*. p. 152
with the perfect volition of a rational being.\textsuperscript{1} Now man must exclude the desire for his own happiness from his motives if his will is to be pure. Therefore the demand for happiness is never, in Kant's view, merely the subjective desire of the individual for his own happiness. It is rather that "reason, in prescribing the moral law, prescribes as the final and complete end of all our actions the \textit{Summum Bonum}, i.e. happiness proportioned to moral worth."\textsuperscript{2} The inclusion of happiness as an element in the \textit{Summum Bonum} is reason's demand; the \textit{Summum Bonum}, it must never be forgotten, is man's rational ideal.

And this \textit{Summum Bonum}, Kant makes clear, is absolutely necessary to moral belief. It is, as it were, a pledge that the universe is systematically ordered according to moral purposes. Kant's idea may be expressed somewhat colloquially by saying that the moral law is and must remain the mainspring, the determining motive, of all virtuous conduct; but that unless man can be assured by faith in the \textit{Summum Bonum} that he is living under a just and moral order and can thus be saved from the inhibiting fear that virtue itself may in the end be of no avail, he has not the heart to exert himself to a performance of his duty. It is not enough, says Kant in his \textit{Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion}, for me merely to feel under obligation to obey the moral law; I must want to obey it. He strongly emphasises this distinction between feeling one ought to perform a certain action, and wanting to do it badly enough to do it. There are moral motives "which, as objective, bind me to do something, yet fail to furnish me with the necessary strength and incentives to action (\textit{Triebsfeder}). For if actions

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Critique of Practical Reason, (Abbot's tr.) p. 206
  \item Kemp Smith, Commentary, p. 574.
\end{itemize}
which I recognise to be good and lawful are to materialise, certain subjective motives in me are requisite to drive me to put them [i.e. these actions] into operation.

It is not enough that I merely judge the act to be noble and beautiful; my choice must also be determined to this end.¹ Faith in the Summum Bonum, then, is the outcome of man's rational conviction that only if in the end happiness is proportioned to virtue can his sense of justice be satisfied.

An observation of the state of affairs on earth, however, at once reveals a difficulty. Virtue, it is apparent, does not produce its proportionate quota of happiness; "we cannot expect in the world by the most punctilious observance of the moral laws any necessary connection of happiness with virtue adequate to the Summum Bonum."² Happiness must not be sought for its own sake; neither can it be the motive of truly virtuous conduct; yet, when the moral law is man's sole motive and virtue alone is sought, happiness does not necessarily follow. Now this apparent impossibility of the attainment of the Summum Bonum threatens the very foundations of morality.

For "as the promotion of this Summum Bonum --- is a priori a necessary object of our will, and inseparably attached to the moral law, the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the latter. If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, then the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to vain imaginary ends and must consequently be false."³ But to have to believe that the moral law is "false" would obviously be, from Kant's point of view, the greatest calamity that could overtake us.⁴

¹ Vorlesungen über die Religionsphilosophie, p. 174.
⁴ Mackenzie, in his Manual of Ethics, p. 206 (5th. ed.), summarises the whole situation in a few words. "Kant considers that though the virtuous man does not aim at happiness, yet the complete well-being of a human being includes happiness as well as virtue. And apparently he thought that if we had no ground for believing that the two elements are ultimately conjoined, the ground of morality itself would be removed. For morality rests on a demand of reason; and the possibility of attaining the Summum Bonum is also a demand of reason. If the demands of reason were chimerical in the latter case, they would be equally discredited in the former."
To avert this misfortune Kant makes his two famous postulates, i.e., the existence of a God to equate virtue and happiness, and of a future life in which man may attain to perfect virtue and receive its adequate reward. The *Summum Bonum*, he has proved to his own satisfaction, is an absolute necessity of practical reason, for man must be able to believe in its reality if the moral law is actually to determine his will and reason is ever to be practical. The postulates of God and immortality he now shows to be necessary conditions of the *Summum Bonum*. If the *Summum Bonum* is to be of any use to man it must be possible for him to believe that it is realisable. As it is man's duty to promote the *Summum Bonum*, so now man is under a moral obligation to postulate the conditions which will give it a genuine reality. The basis of the postulates is a necessity arising from man's moral nature and the requirements of the moral law. This basis is not a postulate itself but shares the objective validity which man's moral consciousness and freedom, its metaphysical counterpart, possess. The nature of the postulates, on the other hand, like the nature of the *Summum Bonum*, is determined solely by the limitations of our minds. We have found that the *Summum Bonum* is a necessary ideal of reason; we now discover that "reason finds it impossible to render the *Summum Bonum* conceivable in any other way" than in terms of these postulates. Kant therefore distinguishes the ideal of the *Summum Bonum* and the postulates of God and immortality by calling them objects of "faith", in contrast to the moral law and freedom which, we remember, he has described as things of "fact" to which we are justified in attaching the highest moral certainty.

1. Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason* (Abbott's tr.) p. 242 N., "It is a duty to realise the *Summum Bonum* to the utmost of our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in connection with which alone it is valid."
2. Ib. p. 243
It is important that Kant's three stages of certainty be clearly distinguished from each other. Speculative reason, restricted to its proper sphere, the empirical world, can alone be said to "know." To its legitimate conclusions he attaches the highest validity. Regarding the supersensible, however, the conclusions of speculative reason are largely negative. It can tell us that freedom is not impossible, but cannot assure us that freedom is objectively real, nor can it tell us anything about the soul's immortality or the existence of a moral God. Practical reason can go further. It has access to data which speculative reason must ignore. By starting from man's moral consciousness it is able to push forward in the direction in which speculative reason is facing when it is brought to a standstill. Practical reason never violates the principles of speculative reason, nor contradicts its conclusions; it is still only one and the same reason which, whether in a theoretical or in a practical point of view, judges according to apriori principles."¹ In a sense, practical reason is more important than speculative reason, for all interest is ultimately practical and in its practical employment alone is reason complete. In view of this primacy of practical reason, it is the duty of speculative reason "to accept the propositions which are inseparably attached to the practical interest of pure reason --- and to try to compare and connect them with everything that it has in its power as speculative reason."² Yet the limitations of practical reason must never be forgotten. Our speculative knowledge of the existence or nature of freedom, God and immortality is not increased in the slightest by these investigations. The most that practical reason can do for speculative reason is to provide a practical assurance of the correctness of certain of its hypotheses. Its conclusions can have only a "practical" validity. They are not the dogmatic conclusions of speculative reason and can carry no conviction to the mind of one who doubts the genuineness of our moral nature. They may be accepted

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as genuinely valid, however, by all moral beings, since they are necessary to the definition and the very possibility of the moral standpoint. A further distinction must, finally, be drawn between Kant's two levels of practical certainty. Freedom and the moral law, we have seen, are to be reckoned among the "scibiliae:" their practical validity can be proved and tested. But the solutions of Summum Bonum, God and immortality are objects of "faith." They are only man's best/the problems raised by the moral consciousness. They should, nevertheless, be accepted by us as moral beings, since they are, to the best of our knowledge, the presuppositions of the moral situation in which we find ourselves. An unbeliever, says Kant, is one "who denies all validity to rational ideas because there is wanting a theoretical ground of their reality:" 1 "faith is the moral attitude of reason as to belief in that which is unattainable by theoretical cognition:" 2

Why then, to be more exact, are man's immortality and God's existence necessary postulates of practical reason, necessary objects of faith? Each is required to guarantee one of the two ingredients of the Summum Bonum. The first of these is virtue, the perfect harmony of man's mind with the moral law. Now such harmony, it is obvious, is unattainable by a finite being during his lifetime. Yet it is required of him, for the moral law ordains that man "ought" to be perfectly virtuous, and what is thus required must somehow be possible, else the "moral" order, by demanding the impossible of man, proves itself fundamentally unreasonable and non-moral. We can conceive only one solution to the problem. "For a rational but finite being the only thing possible is an endless progress from the lower to the higher degrees of moral perfection." 3 Further, such infinite progress is possible only if our existence is infinite, that is, if our souls are immortal. "The

Summum Bonum practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason.¹

We have only a few hints of Kant's conception of the nature of this future state. His general attitude is expressed in his own statement that "we know nothing of the future and should seek to know no more than is rationally bound up with the goal of and the incentives to morality."² In general, he conceives the next life as a continuation of this. "At least, man has no ground for believing that a sudden change will take place. Rather, experience of his state on earth and the ordering of nature in general gives him clear proofs that his moral deterioration, with its inevitable punishments, as well as his moral improvement and the well-being resulting therefrom, will continue endlessly, i.e. eternally."³ Kant attaches no importance to the resurrection of the body; "for who is so fond of his body that he would wish to drag it about with him through all eternity if he could get on without it?"⁴ Yet his argument for believing in a future life at all would seem to carry with it the implication that the empirical self will survive the death of the body. The notion of a future state in which virtue will still be sought after with varying success, and happiness, virtue's reward, or its opposite, be awarded in recompense, certainly suggests that we shall be as eager for happiness then as now, and as susceptible to pain. Kant's attitude, however, is not that this conception of a future state possesses any peculiar value in itself, but merely that we must conceive the future state in this manner if morality and religion are to be practically efficient in our lives.⁵

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1. Critique of Practical Reason (Berlin, 1788), Vorlesungen etc. p. 150.
2. Religion innerhalb—, p. 161, N.
4. Cf. also, Religion innerhalb—, p. 126, "--- without belief in a future life religion is altogether incogitable---": and portions of Dreams of a Spirit-seer, (Goerwitz' tr. 1900)
The second ingredient of the *Summum Bonum* is happiness evenly proportioned to virtue. Now Kant has defined happiness as the object of man's desire "that can be satisfied by nature in its beneficence."\(^1\) It has to do with man's sentient side, and is quite impossible of attainment without the co-operation of nature. A perfect balancing of virtue and happiness, that is, a harmony between physical nature and the moral law, is necessary. This law, however, commands, as we have seen, quite independently of nature. Thanks to the thorough-going separation which Kant has effected between the intelligible and the sensible worlds and between man's rational and sensible natures, he now finds that "there is not the least ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as a part of it."\(^2\) In the *Summum Bonum,* however, just such a connection is declared to be necessary. We must therefore postulate the existence of a Being who acts in harmony with the moral law and who is also the ground and cause of nature.

The nature of this Being is determined solely by an analysis of the function of the postulate in our moral life. He must be moral, for it is his function to make the ethical *Summum Bonum* possible. He must be an Intelligence, a rational Being, in order to conceive laws, whether natural or moral. He must be possessed of a will capable of acting in accordance with a certain ideal, for the creation of the world of nature must have been an act of will, and the actualizing of the *Summum Bonum* depends upon his volition. Other aspects of God's nature are determined in a similar manner. "The moral principle admits as possible only the conception

\(^1\) *Critique of Judgment,* (Bernard's tr.) p. 352.

\(^2\) *Critique of Practical Reason,* (Abbott's tr.) p. 220.
of an Author of the world possessed of the highest perfection. He must be omniscient, in order to know my conduct up to the inmost root of my mental state in all possible cases and into all future time; omnipotent, in order to allot to it its fitting consequences; similarly he must be omnipresent, eternal, etc. Thus the moral law, by means of the conception of the **Summum Bonum** as the object of a pure practical reason, determines the concept of the First Being as a **Supreme Being**.¹

It will be remembered that Hume presented in the mouths of Philo and Cleanthes the need for and the disadvantages of an anthropomorphic conception of God. Kant² faces this problem squarely and solves it in a manner consistent with his general point of view. His attitude is summarized in a sentence from his Lectures.

"It is in general to be observed that one should in theory take pains to purify the concept of God of all such human ideas and keep it free from them, though one may from a practical consideration think to oneself and represent to others such predicates (as God's immortality, i.e. eternity) in human fashion, if the idea of God thereby attains to a greater power and strength for our morality."³ In the second Critique Kant states his position more explicitly. We must in the first place refrain, he says, from attributing to God any characteristic which we recognise to be definitely finite. When we think of Him as intelligent, for example, we must not conceive that intelligence as discursive, like our own, but intuitive. There are three attributes which can be ascribed to God uniquely. "He is the only holy, the only blessed, the only wise, because these conceptions already imply the absence of limitation. In the order of these attributes He is also the holy Lawgiver (and creator), the good Governor (and preserver) and the just Judge, three attributes," Kant significantly adds, "which include everything by which God is the object of

2. For Kant's view of the dangers of anthropomorphism, see Religion innerhalb—— pp. 54, N, 168 and N.
3. Vorlesungen etc. p. 156
religion. Other divine attributes we can conceive only by raising human qualities to their highest degree, as for example, power to omnipotence, knowledge to omniscience, etc. Yet whatever be the qualities we attribute to Him, our conception of the God of the moral argument is necessarily anthropomorphic. "If we abstract from it anything one of God's attributes everything anthropomorphic nothing would remain to us but the mere word, without our being able to connect with it the smallest notion by which we could hope for an extension of theoretical knowledge." Kant's conclusion is not, however, that our moral idea of God is therefore useless. It is, rather, that such a God is admirably suited to satisfy our moral needs. These very anthropomorphisms, indeed, prove that our conception of God "is one that belongs originally not to physics, i.e. to speculative reason, but to morals." "Natural theology" he considers a "singular name", a contradiction in terms. Theology cannot be based on nature - to be genuine it must be moral. The existence of God can be established only by practical reason and the only God we can know is a moral God. God, freedom and a moral world, says Kant in his Lectures, are then the only articles of a moral faith. In regard to these three alone, man may transcend experience; and even with regard to these, the goal he arrives at is not cognitive or scientific, but only practical certainty. To go further than this is nothing but Schwärmerei, the indulgence of fanciful dreams. "Here are the limits of our reason clearly delineated. Whoever presumes to overstep them will be punished for his zeal by reason itself with disgust and error. But, if we remain within these limits our reward will be that we shall become both wise and good." 

2. Ib. p. 230
3. p. 238.
4. "Innerhalb dieser Grenzen" i.e. der bloßen Vernunft, of mere reason. The significance of the title of Kant's treatise is now apparent.
5. Vorlesungen -- etc. p. 159
We stand now on the narrow boundary-line between Kant's ethical and his religious ideas. "The moral laws lead through the conception of the Summum Bonum --- to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands." This leads us directly to Kant's general view of religion and his estimate of Christianity.

CHAPTER IV

A Critical Estimate of Kant's View of Religion
Bibliography of Chapter IV.

I have restricted myself (except for one or two references to the 
*DREAMS OF A SPIRIT-SEER*, (1766) to Kant's writings after 1770 on the strength of his 
own wish, expressed to his editor Tieftrunk (Letter, Feb. 6, 1798) that his 
writing earlier than 1770 be not included in a proposed collection of his 
minor works. Of Kant's writings subsequent to 1770, the following deal 
directly with his Theory of Religion:

*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, (1794) 
*Streit der Facultaten*, (published 1798, written between 1793 and 1794) 

(Page references to both works are to the Berlin Edition (1907) 
*Vorlesungen über die Religionsphilosophie*, (written before 1786) 
*Letters to Lavater* (April 22, 1775) and *Fichte* (Feb. 2, 1792).

Adickes, *Kants Opus postumum* (1920) 
Bernard, *Introduction to his translation of the Critique of Judgment* 
Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (1899) 
Cassirer, *Kants Leben und Lehre* (1921) 
Galloway, *Religion and Modern Thought* 
Kemp Smith, *A commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1918) 
Mackintosh, *The Divine Initiative* (1921) 
Oman, *The Problem of Faith and Freedom* (1906) 
Pfeiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of History* 

(English translation, 1886) 

*The Development of Theology etc.* (1890) 
Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* (1920) 
Wehrung, *Reformatorischer Glaube und deutscher Idealismus, in Fest-Gabe für Haering*.
A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF KANT'S VIEW OF RELIGION.

The Religion innerhalb--- is in no sense a fourth Critique, doing for man's religious consciousness what the first Critique did for pure cognition, the second for man's moral consciousness, and the third, inter alia, for his aesthetic sense. It consists of a comparatively brief statement of what, on Kant's own view, religion ought to be, and an estimate, according to this criterion, of the value of various phases of Christianity. Kant takes different Christian doctrines and practices, and, by an analysis of them, seeks to show that one can discover, hidden away under what he considers are mere transitory forms and symbols, a body of pure, rational ethical truth. His attempt is to extract out of orthodox Christianity its true, moral, content. As Cassirer has pointed out, the treatise is consequently more a pedagogical than a purely philosophical or theological work; its purpose is not so much to study religious truth, as such, or to develop a philosophy of religion, as to educate his readers by discriminating, in the Christianity with which they were familiar, between the true and the false, the essential and the unessential. Despite the transitory character which Kant ascribes to the visible church and the Christian formulation of religious truth, he recognizes in certain of the external aspects of Christianity a definite pedagogical value. Even now, he contends, the masses are not yet ready for religion pure and unadulterated. They still seem to him to stand in need of illustrations and symbols, of imaginatively concrete expressions of the basic truth. He seeks therefore not to tear down and destroy, but to analyse and interpret, the Christianity of his time. His desire is not to undermine

1. Cassirer, Kants Leben und Lehre, p. 413.
2. Cf. Religion innerhalb---, p. 157
the authority of religion, but to give this authority a firmer foundation. It is
to this end that he starts with orthodox Christianity, carves out of it its ethical
kernel, justifies certain symbolic forms in which this central truth must continue
to be expressed for the time being, and denounces meanwhile all priestly attempts
to over-emphasize the symbol and neglect the truth it symbolizes, to stress the means
and ignore the end it is intended to promote.

Two reasons may be given for Kant's choice of this particular method, i.e.
of interpreting historical Christianity instead of developing an independent Critique
of man's religious faculty. In the first place, he did not recognize a religious
faculty in man apart from the moral—a unique religious consciousness. His
definition of religion as the envisaging of moral obligation as (als) a divine command
precludes a philosophy of religion fundamentally distinct from a philosophy of ethics.
The fact and significance of man's distinctively religious consciousness was to Kant
a closed book to the end of his days. Once he had completed his analysis of man's
cognitive, aesthetic and moral faculties he had, it seemed to him, considered man's
spiritual life in all its fundamental aspects. The Religion innerhalb—is thus
really nothing but a practical application of his ethical theory to a certain set of
empirical facts, i.e. historical Christianity, its Founder, Book, and doctrine.

A second consideration with him was, doubtless, that of policy. To accept
the fundamental Christian doctrines even in the conditional manner in which he did
accept them was obviously a safer course than to develop a separate and independent
"rational" theology. To interpret the orthodox position and maintain that at its
base lay the highest ethical truth was less likely to arouse opposition than wholly
to disregard it and substitute in its place something essentially different.

2. As Kant uses it, als seems to signify more than our "as", less than our "as if
it were." Theology, he says, views ethical duties as divine commands but can make
no dogmatic assertion regarding the objective validity of such a view.
Kant's letters of the period reveal the extent to which he was conscious of the hand of the censor, ready to pounce upon all semblance of unorthodoxy. In answer to Fichte, for example, who wrote to him to ask him whether his book on the theme, "That faith in a given revelation cannot reasonably be based upon a faith in miracles was likely to receive the necessary imprimatur, Kant replies in February 1792, (i.e. shortly before the publication of the Religion innerhalb—) as follows:

"In view of the maxims which the censorship has apparently adopted, you would hardly succeed in getting by. For according to these maxims, certain portions of Scripture are to be incorporated into one's confession of faith in a fashion so literal, that human reason cannot comprehend them, still less rationally conceive them to be true—.

And then he suggests to Fichte a possible method of satisfying the censors and yet preserving his own intellectual integrity—a media—which he seems himself to have tried to follow in the Religion innerhalb— and which epitomizes his attitude to Christianity in that treatise. "There might still be a way of harmonizing your work with the ideas—of the censor, if you could succeed in making comprehensible and agreeable to him the difference between a dogmatic faith raised above all doubt, and a merely moral acceptance, free, but resting on moral grounds—.

A religious faith, grafted on to a faith in the miraculous through the agency of a morally good disposition might then be formulated somewhat as follows: 'Lord, I believe, (i.e. I willingly accept it, though I can prove it adequately neither to myself nor to others,) help thou my unbelief!' That is, I possess a moral faith as regards all that I can deduce from the narratives of the miraculous for the bettering of my inner self, and I desire to acquire historical [i.e. dogmatic] faith also, in so far as it too can advance this end. My involuntary lack of faith is not
unbelief. But, "Kant adds, unconsciously foreshadowing the fate that was to overtake his own book, "you will hardly make this middle course acceptable to a censor who, one can conjecture, has made the acceptance of the historical creed an indispensable religious duty." Such references as this to the shadow which the rigid Prussian censorship had cast over the land make it clear that Kant had the censors continually in mind when he wrote the Religion innerhalb—. He can hardly have expressed himself as freely or as fully as he would have under happier conditions. Neither would he have taken such pains, under a more liberal regime, to use the language of the church and to express his ideas, as far as possible, in terms of various orthodox doctrines. Yet we need not on that account suspect him of offending his conscience in order to satisfy the demands of the Government, and may trust him when he assures his friends that though he may not be speaking out all the truth that is in him, he is at least saying nothing that he conceives to be untrue. Though limited by the method he had adopted, and by the constraint he is under, to conform to the orthodox formulations of Christianity as far as his conscience will allow it is the ever truthful and sincere Kant who is revealed in the pages of this treatise.

As compared with the three Critiques, therefore, Kant's treatise on religion can hardly be ranked as of first rate importance. Not only are his views of man's religious nature too warped and his outlook too one-sided, to make his solutions of the religious problems acceptable today; his treatment of these ideas, unsatisfactory as it is, remains in the treatise partial and incomplete. It is in his philosophy as a whole that we must expect to find Kant's most valuable contribution to modern theology. "Much less by his formal treatise on religion than by the profound

1. See Religion innerhalb—, p. 190, N.
2. For examples of the boldness of some of Kant's utterances, cf. Religion innerhalb—pp. 113, 133, N.
and suggestive ideas which appear in his general philosophy," says a modern theologian, "has Kant influenced the subsequent course of religious thought. It is the great merit of Kant that, in the course of his speculations, he opens out new lines of thought and puts forth ideas whose vitality is proved by the fact that they are still fresh and fruitful.\(^1\) We must not limit ourselves too closely, then, to the treatise itself if we are to estimate Kant's true worth in the realm of theology.

From another point of view, however, the treatise is of considerable importance. In it, although to a limited extent, Kant is applying the results of his philosophical thinking to religion. Many of the important conclusions of the three Critiques find expression in the treatise, where they are contrasted to Kant's conception of the religion of the Bible and the Christian Church. "The treatise on 'Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason,'" says Caird, "shows, perhaps more decisively than any other of Kant's works, the strength and weakness of his position; for in it he seeks to compare the view of religion to which his own principles lead him with the facts of man's religious history and in particular of the history of Christianity. \(---\) Such a comparison was necessarily the severest of all tests to which the Kantian philosophy could be subjected, and we may, therefore, say that in applying its criteria to Christianity that philosophy criticized itself. Its power of explaining the greatest fact of man's spiritual history furnishes a good measure of its success in penetrating to the principle of man's spiritual life.\(^2\)

Various attempts have been made to discover the basic cause of the admittedly unsatisfactory character of Kant's religious position. His eighteenth century individualism, his "sceptical" estimate of the relation of thought to reality, his rationalistic distrust of the empirical, whether in

\[^{1}\text{Galloway, Religion and Modern Thought, p. 65}\]

\[^{2}\text{Caird, Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II, p. 589}\]
history or in the immediate consciousness of the individual—these and other characteristics have been declared to be the source of all the trouble. Such solutions of the problem, however, are closely related to each other. These different factors are merely different aspects of an attitude which is unified, and to a large extent, consistent with itself.

"If we wish to describe Kant’s position in a single formula," says Paulsen, "we may say that he is at once the finisher and the conqueror of the Illumination. Kant’s early training falls in a period when the two opposing tendencies of pietism and rationalism were influencing the minds of men. The period of his personal activity is the age of the Illumination. The spread of his philosophy towards the end of the century coincides with the decline of the Illumination and the appearance of the new humanism. By the turn of the century, which Kant as an old man lived to see, the critical philosophy together with modern classical literature had victoriously completed the great spiritual revolution in Germany."¹ We must look among the chief characteristics of the Enlightenment movement, then, for the source of Kant’s limitations, which are, in large part, due to his being a child of his time in many essential respects.

One of the characteristics of the Enlightenment is its extreme individualism. This individualism may be traced back to the time of the Reformation. "The Protestant Reformation," as Caird points out,² "had isolated the individual from his fellows and left him alone with God. ——— But the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century went further, and isolated the individual not only from man and nature, but from God. And Kant, as a true son of the eighteenth century, accepted the individualist view of man, only insisting that even when man is left

alone with himself, he is still face to face with the universal law of his being." The individual is absolutely autonomous; he prescribes to himself his own moral law, he recognizes the authority of that law on the basis of his own reason, and apart from that reason and that law he recognizes no authority in heaven or on earth. Man must, moreover, work out his own salvation. He is good only in so far as he makes himself good. Reliance on external aid, whether divine or human, is unjustifiable and unworthy of his high destiny. The individual is thus isolated in his inner moral life; neither man nor God can intervene or aid him if his autonomy is to be preserved.

Such a view of man's nature makes all religion impossible on the face of it. If Christ's two-fold command to love God and one's fellow men be accepted as epitomizing man's religious consciousness and duty, religion involves as its essence a relationship between man and God and between man and his neighbour. Both these relationships, however, are impossible on a strict interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of man's moral will. As a result, this doctrine affects his religious views most profoundly. God, it is true, is in His heaven, but man must struggle on as if He did not exist, and must on no condition depend on Him for help. The church visible performs, for the time being, a useful function, but it is only the negative function of preventing men from injuring and debasing one another. And even in this admission, that men may aid each other in this negative way, Kant would seem to be contradicting his doctrine of man's absolute autonomy. Finally, man may rest assured of the possibility of his own salvation, for since he ought to be virtuous, he can be virtuous. Yet virtue can only be self-achieved— all divine aid is impossible by Kant's very definition of virtue. All that man can "hope" and "believe" is that whatever it may be impossible for him to do because he is a finite being labouring under the disadvantages of a temporarily conditioned nature will, somehow, be done for him by God. All religious faith, hope, and assurance, in the Christian sense, is thus precluded by Kant's initial bias towards
individualism.

Another characteristic of the Enlightenment is its exclusive reliance on reason, when it speaks of humanity, it is rational humanity that it has in mind; man is thought of primarily as a rational individual. The deists, we remember, looked upon reason as man's one hope of salvation from the clutches of superstition and inherited prejudice. Wolff based his whole theology on the "rational sciences". Though Kant parted company with the Wolffians on the question of the legitimate use of speculative reason, he retained, none the less, an abiding trust in apriori reasoning as compared with all empirical deductions, for experience, he argued, can never yield absolute certainty, and history itself is only a source-book of illustrations, never an adequate basis for belief. Even Kant's "moral consciousness" is predominantly rational, since the moral law is essentially the law of reason.

Kant's attitude to all historical revelation is thus pre-determined. The Enlightenment saw in history little more than the chronicle of man's gradual fall into the clutches of the priests and his progressive enslavement to the authority of the Church. This authority had rested on the universal belief that Christianity was infallible because its historical source was miraculous and divine. When therefore the miraculous portions of the New Testament came to be investigated with a critical eye and at last openly doubted, Christian truths too seemed to the Enlightenment thinkers to have lost their authority. This necessitated the discovery of a fresh norm which was now declared to be man's reason. So deism was not interested in history as the source and touchstone of religious truth. Kant shares to the full this indifference to history. 1 How a religious conception has historically arisen is to him a matter of no concern.

This rationalism shows itself, moreover, in an indifference to, and even a contempt for, the notion that an individual can ever become directly aware of the divine Presence, as in the doctrine of the "Inner Light" and all notions related thereto. To Kant with his rationalistic outlook all this is sheer mysticism and superstition. Man can never legitimately claim to be sure of God's immediate presence at any particular time or place. This attitude is quite in line, of course, with his whole "sceptical" point of view. One can never be sure either that one has felt God's presence, or that one has rationally known it. True knowledge has its source only in an analysis of experience by the human understanding. Since Kant can see no possibility of an empirical manifestation of God he doubts whether our understanding can ever directly know God.

It is therefore a religion's intrinsic reasonableness alone that counts, not its origin in history or its appeal to the inner consciousness of the individual. In company with some of the deists he is willing to admit that "if the Gospel had not first taught the universal moral laws in their complete purity, reason would not have apprehended them up to the present time in such completeness. But "whether reason, to attain to this concept of theism, could have been awakened by something which history alone teaches or [in me] by a humanly incomprehensible inner influence --- is a question which is of merely secondary importance, for it only concerns the genesis and growth of the idea." On this basis, how could Kant recognize the heart of the Christian Gospel, the "good news" that God has revealed Himself to man in history?

1. Cf. Ib. pp. 11314, 144 N, 167; also Streit der Facultäten, p. 63 and N, where Kant restates his position and illustrates it from the story of Abraham's sacrifice. When the command came to Abraham, his response, according to Kant, should have been; "Of one thing I am quite certain - that I must not kill my son. But I am not now, and never can be certain that Thou, who dost appear to me, art God.----." It must be born in mind, however, that Kant, in his later thinking, inclined to the position that man experiences God directly in the moral law. "See Adickes' Kants Opus Postumum, and below, p. 155, seq.) Yet even this view is to be distinguished from the notion that God sometimes speaks to man directly and makes His presence felt in a mysterious manner at particular time or place.

That individualism and this rationalism with its disparagement of history and fear of mysticism, all characteristic of the Enlightenment, make inevitable Kant's warped view of religion and its relation to ethics. The latter is to him always the more basic. Religion is an aspect of morality, not a unique, higher consciousness of which morality is a necessary ingredient. It is not God but rational humanity that occupies to the end the centre of the stage.

Our task in the following pages will be to make clearer what seem to be the fallacies of such a position. It must not be forgotten, however, that Kant is really the "conqueror" of the Enlightenment. Or at least, if he does not completely conquer it himself, he points the way along which others were destined to advance to a new conception of man's nature and his relation to the world and God. For Kant himself takes several decided steps in this direction. It is interesting to note that his early pietist training seems to have been the original source of some of his most valuable conceptions. His clear vision of man's essential and abiding worth; his vivid sense of man's deep-seated bias towards evil; the importance he attaches to the active, practical side of the religious life; his doctrine that man must be "born again" if he is to be successful in his attempt to lead a godly life - all these were central doctrines of the pietist communion into which he had been born and in whose atmosphere he had spent his early youth. On the other hand, his valuable theistic suggestions, his doctrine of the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the moral law, and his definition of the boundaries of speculative and scientific thinking which leaves to religion a rational faith in the religious verities - these were advances upon the theological thought of his time, that seem to have arisen out of the creative energy of his own thinking. In criticising some of Kant's less satisfactory religious concepts we must keep in mind these outstanding contributions.
1. **Kant's Conception of God.**

If we were to attempt to determine the weakest point in Kant's theological system, we would probably select his *Summum Bonum* proof of God's existence as he formulates it in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. We have already indicated the main lines of this proof. The moral law is declared to be capable of determining man's will without the help of any other principle or motive of action. Man's reason, however, requires satisfaction on the question of the ultimate relation of happiness to virtue, i.e., it needs to believe in the reality of the *Summum Bonum*. Happiness, as a state of man's sensuous nature, depends upon the co-operation of the natural world with our rational will. This empirical world, however, Kant has declared to be quite independent of the noumenal world whose law is the moral law. In order that happiness and virtue may be perfectly equated, therefore, he postulates the existence of an omnipotent God whose will is in complete accord with the moral law and whose power extends over the entire world of nature because He is the ground and cause of its existence. God is thus introduced, as it were, by the back door to guarantee man's future happiness. He is essentially a *deus ex machina* whose business it is to save an otherwise hopeless situation.

The root difficulty is Kant's dualistic view of man's nature. In order to secure man's freedom he has analysed the human being into two irreconcilable natures, one abstractly rational and noumenal, the other phenomenal and purely sentient. The former is completely severed from the empirical world and all empirical motives, desires or impulses, and is interested only in the performance of joyless duty. The latter is empty of all reasonableness, and intent only on irrational sensuous satisfaction. Man thus bisected is thoroughly unreal, a creature of Kant's own imagination. Consequently both virtue and happiness are
conceived in an artificial and distorted manner.

Virtue is defined in purely rationalistic terms. The moral law is the law of reason and is, by definition, concerned only with man's reason. The rest of him must of necessity remain wholly unrelated to it. The moral law is declared to be capable of determining man's will independently of all external aid such as empirical inclination. Indeed, the will is truly virtuous only so long as the categorical imperative remains its sole motive to action: to want to do one's duty is to Kant a cause for suspicion that the will is not as purely virtuous as it might be. In short, morality is declared to be completely autonomous.

Kant's introduction of happiness into this moral scheme is therefore inconsistent with his own principles, and highly detrimental to them. The Summum Bonum, in which happiness is perfectly equated to virtue, is declared to be an ideal of reason. It must not be a motive of action. Yet without the assurance of its reality, we are told, reason cannot be "practical". Kant states this very plainly in his Lectures. There must be a Being who rules the world with reason and according to moral principles and who has decreed a future state where virtue shall be rewarded, "for otherwise all the subjectively necessary duties which I am under obligation as a rational being to perform, lose their higher reality.

Why should I make myself worthy of happiness by means of moral conduct if there exists no Being who can secure me this happiness? Thus without God I should have to be either a visionary or a scoundrel."

And again, "if morality can offer me no prospect that my need to be happy will be satisfied, neither can it command me." We are thus landed in downright hedonism. As Professor Pringle-Pattison has vividly expressed it, "--- the preacher of duty for duty's sake, who has so rigourously purged his ethics of all considerations of happiness or natural

1. Vorlesungen etc., p. 129
2. Ib. p. 199.
inclination, surprises us with the baldly hedonistic lines on which he rounds off his theory. Job is not to serve God for naught after all. --- An unkind critic might say that although the primacy is accorded to virtue as the supreme condition, yet the definition of virtue as 'worthiness to be happy' seems, on the other hand, to put virtue in a merely instrumental relation towards happiness as the ultimate object of desire and the ultimate end of action.¹ This, however, is surely to debase virtue and sully its purity. As the same writer has expressed it, "the temper of true virtue is not the meticulous claim that Kant formulates for doles of happiness in exact proportion to individual merit. --- It claims no wages as a reward of its well-doing, least of all does it keep a moral ledger with the debit and credit account to be evenly balanced."²

The attempt to save this position by proposing that the individual seek virtue for himself, happiness only for others, cannot be judged to be successful. Kant is never tired of insisting that any appeal to empirical motives, such as happiness, is a pollution of morality, a vitiating of the good will. But if happiness is never to be the motive of action, why should an exception be made with regard to the happiness of others? It is a Kantian principle that "What is right for one must also be fair for the other" - that reason is equally and indiscriminately legislative for all rational beings. If the moral law is to be kept pure it must have nothing to do with happiness, whether my happiness or that of others. "When Kant maintains the one and denies the other he unquestionably contradicts himself. In drawing out the result of his general principles, he should have laid it down that care for the welfare of others was, equally

² Ib. p. 35. Cf. Adickes' Opus Postumum, p. 84b, etc. It is clear from the general tenor of Kant's thinking that he was forced into this untenable position by his artificial Summum Bonum proof of God's existence. That he was perfectly capable of valuing virtue for its own sake is shown in Religion innerhalb---p. 161, seq.; Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Goerwitz tr. p. 120; etc.
with the care for our own welfare, absolutely excluded as an aim of moral activity.

In that case the one-sidedness of his ethics would have been brought more
conspicuously into view - the one-sidedness of the purely formal character of
his moral principle—.¹

This one-sidedness shows itself further in Kant's view of the nature of
happiness. The Summum Bonum argument for God's existence is especially weak
because it rests on the assumption that the happiness man craves now, and will
continue to desire after death, is exclusively sentient and phenomenal, and wholly
unrelated to his higher rational nature. This notion of happiness is in itself
obviously open to criticism. In his Lectures² Kant himself speaks of a self-
satisfaction (Selbtszufriedenheit, as opposed to Glückseligkeit, happiness)
which arises from a consciousness of one's own inner worth. Here is a feeling
which is related to man's moral nature, and which, as all men know, is satisfying
in a high degree. If Kant had started from the concrete unity of the whole man
he might have seen that in this complete, actual man, reason's ideal requirements
are met by certain real instincts, feelings, and affections, in such a manner
that the fulfilment of the moral requirements of reason brings with it naturally
and inevitably a satisfaction of these highest instincts, a feeling, that is,
of the highest happiness.³ Had Kant conceived happiness in some such way as
this, he might somewhat more fittingly have introduced the notion of God to guar­
antee, as it were, the genuineness and durability of the moral order as a whole,
an order in which virtuous action would bring with it as its sure consequence
this feeling of the highest and most genuine satisfaction. "The real postulate
or implied presupposition of ethical action," says Professor Pringle-Pattison,
"is simply that we are not acting in a world which nullifies our efforts, but

². Vorlesungen etc., p. 157-8
that morality expresses a fundamental aspect of reality, so that in our doings and strivings we may be said, in a large sense, to have the universe somehow behind us.--- And of course that was the general idea which Kant intended to express—the broad idea of a universe as a divine moral order, not as a power hostile or indifferent to the life of ethical endeavour."¹ This conception, however, Kant fails to make explicit or clear.² Happiness he conceives as the antithesis of virtue, not its correlate, and he introduces it into the moral ideal of the _Summum Bonum_ in such a way as to be either superfluous, if the moral will is indeed autonomous, or if it isn't, noxious and destructive to it.

Apart from the ethical problem of the true meaning of happiness and virtue, however, an outstanding weakness in Kant's _Summum Bonum_ proof of God's existence is that he rests man's belief in God exclusively on this fragile foundation of happiness—on the supposition that happiness must necessarily be the object of man's most urgent desire both now and in the life to come. He has previously shown that man's sentient nature is phenomenal, and therefore not ultimately real. What assurance have we, then, that this phenomenal, empirical self will continue after death, that in the next life man will continue to desire sentient happiness as ardently as he does in this? On Kant's own principles, none whatsoever! Yet the whole ethical argument rests on this presupposition. A second element of weakness is that God is usually introduced into the scheme of things not as the author of the moral law, not as the ground and basis of all reality, but solely as a means to a highly dubious end—the guaranteeing of sentient happiness in proportion to virtue in the life to come. But "surely if, as Kant insists, it is wrong to treat a human being merely as a means, it must be a false way of putting things to present God Himself in this merely instrumental light."³

¹ Pringle-Pattison, _The Idea of God_, p. 35.
² Cf. however _Religion innerhalb_—pp. 98, 104.
³ Pringle-Pattison, _The Idea of God_, p. 34.
To anticipate our criticism of Kant's view of religion, it is the God thus postulated as a means to a doubtful end whom Kant professes to have in mind when he defines religion as the viewing of the categorical imperative as a divine command. Galloway reveals the complete inadequacy of this whole position by addressing to Kant the following argument: "Moral conduct, I agree, is an essential duty. But the reality and value of my moral duties in no way depends on their being commands of God. As for happiness, it is a minor matter which pertains to the phenomenal world. An empirical and sensuous product which, on your own showing, does not belong to the real world at all, is a slender and uncertain basis on which to ground the momentous inference that God exists. I therefore decline to make the inference and maintain that religion is not essential, for it is neither the ground of moral obligation, nor does it effect the inner worth of the man who reverently obeys the moral law."

We have said in the beginning that the fundamental difficulty with Kant's ethical proof was his dualistic view of human nature. Had his view been more adequate, his proof even along the lines on which he states it, might have been considerably stronger. But now an even greater difficulty is apparent. It is the external, deistic way in which he thinks of God and His relation to the world. Before dealing with this eighteenth century limitation in Kant's theological thinking, however, let us pause for a moment to consider the way in which he himself corrects the most flagrant errors of the proof which we have just been discussing.

The critical analysis of Kant's Opus Postumum, recently published by Adickes, reveals the interesting and significant fact that Kant himself, in his later thinking, found his ethical proof of God's existence unsatisfactory, discarded it, and engaged himself during his last years in the difficult task of redefining

1. Galloway, Religion and Modern Thought, p. 63
his faith in God and seeking for it a more adequate foundation. 1 "The whole teaching of the highest good," says Adickes, "together with the proofs based thereon of God and immortality has now ---- as good as completely disappeared." 2 Kant's chief reason for this change, feels convinced, was the desire to purify his ethical system of the heteronomy and hedonism which had crept into it through his doctrine of the Summum Bonum - his "unnatural basis of faith," as it has been called. Purged of this subversive element, Kant's view of moral duty regains its original consistency and rigorous purity. By the phrase, "recognition of all human duties as divine commands," to which Kant still clings, he now means, Adickes believes, nothing but that "the moral individual is to do what is good only because it is good; he is thus to act without reference to any external ends whatsoever, in this life or the next, but absolutely autonomously, and simply because of the categorical command of his practical reason. As a religious person, however, he simultaneously recognizes that the ideals and ends which he has himself chosen and the laws which he has himself imposed are also God's ideals, ends and laws, and through this recognition his motives to do good are appreciably strengthened. 3 All of the old ethical proof is thus swept aside - only Kant's fundamental conception of morality as furnishing the basis of religion remains.

Thus Kant's basic distinction between faith and knowledge is not only made more emphatic but is carried a step further. In the years of the Critique of Practical Reason Kant sought to supplement the inadequacies of the speculative and teleological proofs by means of an ethical proof - an attempt which led him, as we have seen, to resort to a highly artificial and unconvincing argument.

1. For a full statement of Kant's various attempts in the Opus Postumum, see p. 802
2. Opus Postumum p. 846 - Cf. pp. 843-9, 832, etc.
Now, he insists that God's existence is not provable even in a practical sense. No proof is possible, not even the practical proof of the second Critique.

Adickes summarizes Kant's final position thus: "Of course, there can be no scientific (wissenschaftlich) certainty of God's existence - for no theoretical transcendental proof is possible - otherwise the old transcendent metaphysic would return! (Neither can there be a) practical proof in a literal sense (in the manner in which the postulates, which have now been abandoned, had previously been arrived at.) But the virtuous individual experiences in the categorical imperative the voice of his God and apprehends Him with the certainty of a personal faith as a transcendental reality."¹

¹. Opus Postumum, p. 847. Kemp Smith (Commentary, Appendix C of the new edition not yet published) summarizes Kant's position in the Opus Postumum as follows: "Clearly Kant's views have undergone considerable change since the writing of the Critique of Practical Reason. God is no longer viewed as a Being who must be postulated in order to make possible the coincidence of virtue with happiness. He speaks with the voice of the categorical imperative and thereby reveals himself in a direct manner. But -- this point of view is suggested merely; it is nowhere developed in a systematic manner; and even as thus suggested it is formulated in at least three diverse ways." Kemp Smith restates the three formulations here referred to as follows: "In one set of passages Kant maintains that the religious interpretation of all duties as divine commands is not a supplementary, later interpretation, but is, for every moral being, immediately and necessarily given together with the apprehension of the duties: i.e., the categorical imperative leads directly to God and affords surety of His reality." (I restrict myself to the development of the implications of this point of view as being the most in line with Kant's fundamental viewpoint in the Critique of Practical Reason.) "In a second set of passages Kant makes no reference to the existence of God but only to the idea of God. But in these passages also, duties are alleged to be apprehensible only as divine commands." "In yet another set of passages Kant suggests that God Himself, and not merely the Idea of God as a trans-subjective Being, is immanent in the human spirit."
Kant's scepticism, it seems clear, extends itself to the "knowing" and "proving" of God's existence but not to the belief that God does exist. His general attitude, as revealed in the Opus Postumum, may be called one of "faith", if by that term we merely imply a steadfast allegiance to the belief in God's existence even in the absence of coercive, apriori proofs, whether speculative or practical. This faith is not to be interpreted as a purely personal faith, mysteriously present in this or that individual, in Kant, for instance, and absent in others. Even in the Opus Postumum Kant seems to suggest, rather, that its basis is universally present in all men — that it is, indeed, man's inmost moral and spiritual nature which must lead all men, inevitably, to this profound conviction that God does exist. And since Kant invariably interprets man's inmost nature in terms of practical reason, his "faith" in God must be regarded as an attitude not of his private, sentient nature (i.e., it is not with him a purely personal feeling) but of that universal ratio-moral self whereby he is related to other men. Indeed, it is this universal, objective basis for man's "faith" that Kant is striving to analyse and explain in the Opus Postumum. Yet the fact remains that in his last years Kant gives up the attempt to prove God's existence by apriori argument and turns his attention to the moral vital problem of how man's universal and inevitable faith in God may be most adequately conceived and most reasonably defended.

1. Adickes regards Kant's belief in God as absolutely unquestionable. "A man could write thus," he says, referring to various of Kant's utterances in the Opus Postumum "only from firm, unshakable conviction", (p. 831, cf. pp. 847, 782, 797, 810) Kant's life and writings as a whole would seem to bear this out. Vaihinger, in contrast, attaches great importance to Kant's second formulation (see above, p. 8/7 W.) and defends the view that Kant conceives God as an idea of reason only, and that he ever remains sceptical of His actual existence. (See Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des als ob, 1911)

2. Adickes describes Kant's faith as a "wholly personal avowal" (p. 831) of faith. Such a purely personal faith, however, would be so completely alien to Kant's way of thinking and would imply so complete a reversal of his life-long emphasis on the presence in all men of certain fundamental characteristics and especially on the universal presence of moral consciousness in man qua man, that such an interpretation of Kant's faith is unconvincing. Adickes himself describes it more adequately elsewhere. Kant, he says, is speaking "not as a man of strict science, not as a consistent transcendental philosopher, but as a man, as a believing theologian who indeed recognizes no supernatural revelation and who subscribes to the dogmas of no religious or denominational community whatsoever, but who, from an inner necessity, above all out of regard to the needs of moral conduct, freely confesses to a belief in a personal God." (p. 783. For an account of Kant's frequent references to God as a person, see p. 773.)
The parallel between Kant and Hume is striking. Both men found it impossible to rest satisfied with their scepticism and, though Hume's sincerity has been questioned, both seem in the end to have turned to some form of faith. Neither found it possible, however, to approve, of, or to acquire, a blind, empty, foundationless faith, and Hume at least never achieved the reasonable and intelligent faith he so desired. Both men cut themselves off from the possibility of appreciating the significance of the Christian faith by their attitude to history and their distrust of the historically mediated Christian revelation.

Yet the moral law of which Kant was so vividly and immediately conscious, did for him, to some extent, what Christ does for a Christian. "The categorical imperative," says Kant, "leads directly to God, yes, serves as a pledge of His reality." And again, "... in morally-practical reason and in the categorical imperative God reveals Himself." Kant, that is, seems to experience God in the moral law; he feels that the moral law can be real only in so far as it is the law of a real, personal God. Adickes reproduces the reasoning as follows: "One cannot experience God in the categorical imperative without at the same time experiencing Him as a personality. And there is also given to man in this experience the subjective certainty that this personal God exists apart from his own spirit, i.e. that He has objective (trans-subjective) reality. Man could conceive an abstract law only as purely immanent, as originating in his own spirit and as a power working only within himself. But such a personal God, as the Author, be

1. Quoted by Adickes Opus Postumum p. 501
2. Ib. p. 806.
it only the mediate Author of this law, can be thought and experienced by man only as an actual trans-subjective reality. 1 In a word, Kant moves directly from his experience of the moral law to the God who must be the source and basis of the law's genuineness and reality. This is Kant's faith in God - a faith grounded in his actual experience of the categorical imperative. Compare with this the Christian "Experience" of Christ; that Christ is explicable only on the basis of a belief in Christ's God, and that in Christ, God reveals Himself to man so that in Him man comes, as it were, face to face with God. As it has recently been put; "It is as men gaze at Him, listen to Him, bow in submission before Him, that their mind opens to faith in the Father. A world with Jesus in it -- is a world with a loving God over it. That is why today the watchword is heard on every side: a Christlike God. God, Christianity declares, is thoroughly like Jesus; or, to use the great words cited by St. John, 'I and the Father are one.' 2 If the "moral law" were substituted in this quotation for "Christ" and "Jesus" we should have, it appears, the creed of Kant's later days. The Christian conceives the Deity as the Father and the God of Jesus Christ; Kant conceives Him as the God of the moral law. "I and the Father are one," says Christ; "God is as it were the personified moral law itself," 3 says Kant, epitomising therein his whole religious attitude.

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1. Quoted by Adickes Opus Postumum p. 507.
3. Vorlesungen etc., p. 159, see also p. 34.
We thus find a substantiation in Kant's *Opus Postumum* of our conclusion in an earlier chapter¹ that Kant believed in God quite irrespective of the particular proof of His existence which appeared to him for the moment to be valid. He is, as Jackmann phrased it, a real believer in God. When however he applied himself to finding a reasonable basis for this belief, and, above all, when he sought to define God's nature, we find him ever dependent upon the moral law and, except at the very last, upon his *Summum Bonum* proof. Kant's fullest discussion of God's nature and His relation to the world is to be found in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*.² These were composed while he was still loyal to his *Summum Bonum* proof, as were, indeed, all his published theological works, including the *Religion innerhalb*. After all, these writings must be accepted as giving his theological position. We have clear evidence in his *Opus Postumum*, as has just been shown, that he was dissatisfied with this position - he failed, however, to develop a new and more satisfactory one. Let us, therefore, consider for a moment the God of the *Religion innerhalb*—²

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¹ Above p. 74.
² The first half of Kant's *Lectures* are devoted to onto-theology, cosmo-theology, and physico-theology, and are little more than a popular statement of his position in the *Critiques* to which reference has already been made. The second half, however, is of considerable importance, consisting as it does in a fuller account of his conception of God's nature and of His relation to man and the world. The *Lectures* as a whole serve as an excellent introduction to the *Religion innerhalb*—². We cannot attempt at present to give a full summary of these *Lectures*. It should be added that in so far as Kant deals in the *Lectures* with problems discussed in the "*Religion innerhalb*—²", his general position agrees with that adopted in the later treatise.
The Being through whom moral duties are to be given objective reality must possess the three moral attributes, holiness, goodness and righteousness in an unlimited degree. These are one in God, but our discursive intellects distinguish them into three. Kant himself conceives them in a manner singularly illustrative of his fundamentally deistic position.

It is reason that conceives God as the holy Law-giver, or rather, reason points to the fact that God's will is such that all disagreement with the moral law is wholly impossible. It is to be noticed that it is the law which is basic - God's holiness consists in His perfect agreement with it. The loftiest attribute of the Deity is the fact that He is "as it were, the moral law itself, conceived as personified."¹ In contrast to this it is man's desire for happiness which leads him to attribute goodness to God - a limitless satisfaction in the happiness of others. God is good because He desires that all men should be perfectly happy. But at this point conscience intervenes and assures man that God is not only the world's gracious Governor, desiring all men's happiness, but that He is the righteous judge as well. This attribute is conceived quite negatively, as the limit God sets to His distribution of happiness. God curbs His unlimited desire for universal human happiness, His goodness, by His righteousness the bestowal of happiness only in proportion to the worthiness of the individual.² In this act of self-limitation God's judgment is ruthlessly just; it functions with perfect regularity and suffers no possible exception.

¹ Vorlesungen etc. p. 134.
² In ib. p. 150. seq., Kant conceives God's righteousness as exclusively punitive, its function being to punish man for the evil in him which always overbalances the good.
God's three "moral" attributes, it is plain, are nothing but a personification of Kant's *Summum Bonum* proof of His Existence. As holy, He is the Moral Law; as good, the Dispenser of human happiness; as righteous, the Accountant determining the dole of happiness due to each individual. His goodness, it is significant, is only discoverable on the basis of man's lower, empirical nature, the implication being that if all men were to be relieved of the sensuous desire for happiness, God's goodness would become superfluous, and, to a certain extent, His righteousness as well. We have seen, moreover, that Kant ultimately discards his doctrine of the *Summum Bonum* with its emphasis on happiness. What then becomes of God's goodness? Kant intuitively believes in a good and gracious God.

1. It may be noted in passing that the sin and evil in the world does not tempt Kant, as it did Hume, to doubt God's goodness, though his solution of the problem of evil can hardly be considered satisfactory. God is holy and hates moral evil; He is good and desires man to be happy, not sad and miserable. Whence, Kant therefore asks himself, comes the sin and suffering in the world? His answer is strongly Hegelian in character. Man, he says, was created free and given the chance to work out his own character. His original tendency was good - a latent goodness, however, in need of development. Evil, then, is "the incomplete development of the seed of goodness" (Vorlesungen etc. p. 138) in man. It is essentially negative, the absence of self-achieved moral good.

That is, evil is an inevitable if indirect result (nachfolgen) of man's free nature. God does not will evil; rather "he desires the removal of evil through progress towards the good." (Ib. p. 139) As for the pain and suffering in the world, he declares it to be God's special way of leading man to happiness. It makes man wish for a happier lot; the wish drives him to work, to strive, to strain; and the happiness that crowns the effort is the sweeter by contrast. "Is a better arrangement thinkable?" asks Kant. Hume would answer, yes (Cf. above p. 39) - at the expense, however, of the divine benevolence. Kant chooses the more reverent if less logical alternative. To the final question of why a righteous God has not evenly proportioned happiness and virtue here on earth Kant attempts to defend two mutually destructive positions, first, that the disproportion between happiness and virtue here on earth is not as great as it might be, and second, that this very disproportion furnishes man with the possibility of being virtuous - "were there no disproportion here in the world between morality and wellbeing, he says, "no opportunity would be given us to be genuinely virtuous." (Ib. p. 144.) Kant's reasoning, it is obvious, is unconvincing and even self-destructive. His motive, however, is plain - to preserve God's goodness at any cost and to relieve Him of all responsibility as regards the sin and evil in the world.
His *Summum Bonum* argument, however, can give him but a frail and artificial basis for this belief. And when he gives up this line of argument and strives to move directly from the moral law to God, new difficulties are encountered. The moral law can tell us, let it be granted, that God is holy. But how can it ever tell us that He is good and merciful? The moral law, moreover, is immediately discoverable by each individual. Man's experience of its reality and force is direct and vital. Whereas God, as the personification of the moral law— as the Being to whom we argue or whose existence we infer from the moral law, is farther off, an extra-mundane Reality who has been lifted out of man, as it were, and enthroned above.

This deism does not show itself quite so clearly in his conception of God's Providence or in his doctrine of Creation. The reason for this is that in the development of these doctrines he does not lean so heavily upon his *Summum Bonum* proof. The world, Kant says, does not emanate from God, nor is God to be identified with the world. Rather, He created the world in a single, timeless act. Neither did God merely impose a certain form upon a pre-existent substance. We come nearest the truth that God is absolutely fundamental and basic when we subscribe to the doctrine that God created the world out of nothing. He is, then, the sustainer, the abiding and ultimate Ground of the world. All questions of ultimate origin lead back to God. He is omnipresent, a term, it is true, that is far from accurate, but yet the best available; "space," as Kant puts it, "is a phenomenon of God's omnipresence." God's Providence, then, is really a

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2. Timeless, because time is the form in which we, as phenomenal beings and part of the natural world, think; because, that is, time belongs to the natural world and was created with it.
3. Vorlesungen etc. p. 187
single timeless act which embraces within itself Creation and Preservation alike. We must, however, as time-bound, discursive intellects, distinguish in this single act between God's creation of the world and of the laws by which it is run, His sustaining and governing influence, which consists in holding the world to these laws, and, finally, what Kant calls His "direction" of the world, His determining of single events. This "direction", further, may be distinguished into two varieties - "ordinary", when He works through the laws of the natural world, "extraordinary", when He acts directly and immediately. God's Providence in the form of "extraordinary direction" of particular events is miraculous. Interference with the physical laws of nature does not, however, exhaust the field of the miraculous, for the law of freedom, underlying man's moral, intelligible nature, is as constant as the laws of physics. If, therefore, God directly influences man's will, in response, let us say, to prayer, this too would be miraculous.

Kant's teaching on such divinely miraculous acts is clear and unmistakable. Their abstract possibility he freely admits. "It is not at all impossible, even in a best² world, that natural forces should occasionally need the unmediated assistance of God in order to bring to pass certain great divine ends; not impossible that the Master of nature should sometimes afford these natural forces a complementum ad sufficientiam, in order that His plan might be executed.

1. Cf. Oman, The Problem of Faith and Freedom, p. 172; "On the one hand Kant sought a world in which the law of gravitation would run absolutely, and on the other a world in which the moral law would run equally absolutely. The Law of Gravitation in particular is at the heart of his whole theory. He seeks, as it were, to extend the mechanical idea into the realm of spirit as to prove that the mind is also a planet moving in its own orbit, under its own and not under alien law." 2. One hears an echo of Leibniz, Wolff, and the old metaphysics in Kant's assertion (Vorlesungen etc. p. 169) that the world is the best of all possible worlds since a better world implies a better creative will, and a Being possessed of such a will, someone better than God - which is a contradiction in terms.
Who ventures to be so presumptuous as to wish to judge it possible that everything which God intends here on earth is attainable by means of general laws (alone) and without any extraordinary direction on the part of God? But we must guard ourselves from wishing to determine without further instruction, whether such extraordinary divine guidance has taken place in this or that case. Enough, that all things are under divine direction: that is sufficient for an unlimited trust in God.¹ Extraordinary direction, then, or special miraculous providence is possible, but never discoverable, by man.

We should hardly describe as "deistic" this insistence that no single occurrence, whether in nature or in man's inner life, can be known to be miraculous, though many of the greatest religious minds have given it as their conviction that God, one way or another, has actually manifested His presence in some such miraculous fashion. Kant's doctrine of general Providence would seem to have opened the way to a recognition of the possibility of a genuine, but unmiraculous, divine immanence. The explanation of Kant's deistic attitude to prayer and the religious experience as it is usually understood must be sought not in his doctrine of Providence but, first, in his conception of God's nature and His attitude to man, and second, in his conception of human freedom and the nature of human virtue.² Mention has been made of God's three moral attributes; the question still remains, What does God desire of man? No praise, answers Kant, no flattery! God cannot be persuaded, neither can He be bribed. God requires of man nothing but obedience to His laws, which are the moral laws. And the companion question, to which we shall return, is this; What can a man expect of God? To which Kant

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¹ Vorlesungen etc. p. 192. Cf. Religion innerhalb ---, p. 84 seq. and Kant's letters to Fichte, Feb. 2, 1792, and Lavater, April 28, 1775.
² See below, p. 75.
answers, nothing, but that He supplement man's inevitable short-comings after
man has used his own talents and capacities to the utmost. Here we would seem
to be at the very heart of Kant's deism. The deists believed in God and related
god, in one way or another, to the world; they failed, however, to distinguish as
the essence of the religious experience the communion and fellowship with God,
the active belief in a genuine relation existing between God and man, the conviction that somehow God is co-operating in human affairs.

Now such communion is obviously possible only when man feels assured that
God cares and that He loves all men. Two elements in Kant's doctrine of God
stand out with striking significance. The first is that God is to him a right­
ecious Lawgiver, a Judge and a gracious Distributer of happiness; but never is
He really a God of Love. Very occasionally, it is true, Kant speaks of God's
Love, as when he says in his Lectures\(^1\) that God is no Tyrant or Despot, but rather
a Monarch, a Father (he uses the word) who wishes His orders to be obeyed through
love, not fear. Kant significantly adds, however, that He is a Being who urges
men to consider the reasonableness of His commands and to obey them that He may
be enabled to bestow on them due happiness. The contrast to a thoroughly
Christian conception of God stares us in the face. Kant is here at one with
the deists; it is really with him not a question of God's Love at all, but of
the rationality of virtuous conduct. And indeed, how could Kant have attained
to a conception of the Fatherhood of God by the road of the moral law?

The second significant element in Kant's teaching is his frank satisfaction
in believing that God is unknowable. If we knew, i.e. by means of theoretical,
speculative reason, that there were a God, says Kant, all morality would

\(^1\) Vorlesungen etc. p. 195.
straightway vanish. "Man would at once picture God to himself in all his actions as the Rewarder and Avenger; ---- in place of the moral incentives to action, hope of reward and fear of punishment would enter; man would be virtuous for sensuous motives." Now the objection to such a view is not that speculative proofs of God's nature and existence are of any essential religious value. A God thus proved takes on the colour of the proof and remains a rational concept, not a living Being. It is rather that without assurance of God's existence and some sure knowledge of the kind of God He is, no religion is possible at all.

Kant's premonition, on the other hand, of the evil effects that would befall mankind if God's existence were to be absolutely assured is in itself a striking comment upon his conception of God's nature. The supposition that morality depends on at least a partial ignorance regarding God, and that hedonism must result if God is surely known, points to a fundamentally unmoral conception of God. Once again, the contrast with the Christian position confronts us.

Kant's faith in the moral law has surely been equalled in intensity times without number by the faith of Christians in the Christian God, yet the result can hardly be said to have been, universally at least, a life whose mainspring was a hope of heaven and a fear of hell. But then, neither is the Christian God Kant's benevolent and equitable Paymaster!

This, then, is what we mean by characterizing Kant's conception of God as deistic. If we are to do him justice, however, we must avoid identifying him exclusively with these deistic views, and remember that one of his most fundamental doctrines and at least two of his less developed positions contain fruitful theistic possibilities. The doctrine referred to is Kant's teaching of the autonomy

of the moral will as the foundation of an obligation that cannot be avoided. The moral law is binding to the self, because it is self-imposed; yet it is at the same time a universal law, the law of all rational beings. Thus reason is the bond of connection between all human beings; it is also the connecting link between man and a rational, moral God. Kant, however, "does not see that, in this profound doctrine, he has opened the way to a truer conception of the relation between the human and the divine than is represented by the painfully mechanical theory of a superadded, and strictly superfluous, theological sanction. The fruitful idea of the self as at once the author and the subject of moral legislation - as laying down a law not only for the single self but for all man, and, indeed, as Kant says, for all rational beings, - naturally suggests the question of whether such a self can still be treated as an isolated individual."¹

How is the objectivity of the law of reason to be accounted for? The very notion of law, indeed, suggests an objective standard, or reality, of which the individual who is conscious of such a law must inevitably presuppose.² Obligation implies a relation between him who is obliged and the power which imposes the obligation upon him. The only possible explanation of Kant's doctrine of the legislative will, therefore, would seem to be some form of divine immanence. "The authority claimed by what is commonly called the higher self is only intelligible, if the ideals of that self are recognized as the immediate presence within us of a spirit leading us into all truth and goodness."³ The idea of divine immanence, however, was repugnant to Kant for several reasons. The chief of these was his ardent individualism, which kept him in a state of perpetual fear that the freedom and autonomy of the individual might suffer harm. He was so

concerned in insisting that the moral law is the law of the self that the significance of its being a law at all escaped him. Only that which can be counted as the fruit of man's own endeavour, wholly and entirely, may, he thought, fittingly be termed his virtue - all divine aid or inspiration he regarded as an interference, as an obstacle in the way of man's acquiring the moral worth which he can only achieve for himself. We have mentioned, too, Kant's opposition to pantheism in every form, and his belief that the doctrine of a World-soul or an indwelling Spirit is nothing but an appeal to the unknown. He was driven into the deistic position of separating God from the world and regarding Him as an extra-mundane Being (Kant uses this term repeatedly) by this desire to avoid every appearance of identifying God with the world. Here again Kant veers away from any suggestion of divine immanence. And, finally, the doctrine of an immanent Spirit, dwelling as it were in the hearts and minds of men, would savour to Kant of the mysticism of which he was an avowed enemy. Go but a step further and admit the possibility of being conscious of this indwelling Spirit, and you are landed in the doctrine of the Inner Light, a doctrine for which he had, except perhaps at the very last, nothing but contempt. Man, he admits, may receive divine guidance and help, but he can never be immediately conscious of such assistance and should therefore train himself to ignore its possibility. The attempt to rely on it or call it forth is to him nothing but sheer mysticism and superstition. For these reasons, therefore, Kant seems never really to have appreciated or developed the profound theistic implication of his own doctrine of the legislative practical reason.

Another suggestion which contains rich theistic possibilities is his notion, most fully stated in the Critique of Judgment, of a supersensible substratum,

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a common ground of the mechanical and teleological principles in the physical world and of the sensible and intelligible natures in man. It is thrown out by Kant as a possible solution of the problem with which man finds himself faced when he realized that organic nature is explicable only teleologically, yet, from the point of view of science, must be conceived mechanically. How are these opposing principles, mechanism and design, matter and mind, blind physical causality and purpose to be reconciled to each other? May there not exist a supreme common principle underlying both? This supersensible basis would then be thought of as the ground of the whole world of nature, responsible for its physical laws, and also for the evidences of purpose it exhibits. Now to account for nature's purposiveness, this substratum must possess an intellect, not discursive, like man's, but intuitive. Purpose implies an end, however, and man, not qua sensuous and phenomenal, but qua moral and free, must be nature's chief end. The primal Mind, therefore, must not only be able to account for the mechanism and the teleology of the physical world, but must also be thought of as the ground of man's free and moral activity, the Supreme Lawgiver in the moral kingdom of ends. It must, in a word, be conceived as containing within itself the ultimate explanation of all the principles evident in the world of which man is a part - of nature's mechanism and purposiveness, of man's sensuous and moral natures, of the law of natural causality and the law of freedom. "It is at least possible", says Kant in his most characteristic, and what may be described as his semi-cautious mood, "to consider the material world as a mere phenomenon, and to think as its substrate something like a thing in itself (which is not phenomenon,)

and to attach to this a corresponding intellectual intuition—. Thus there

1. When completely cautious or "sceptical" Kant declares that both mechanism and teleology, natural causality and freedom, are principles that are only subjectively necessary and are applicable only to the phenomenal world. The possibility of a substratum is from this point of view left out of account altogether.
would be, although incognizable by us, a supersensible real ground for nature, to which we ourselves belong; and again, in less guarded fashion, "There must be a ground of the unity of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains." It is evident," says Pfleiderer, "that this inductive method of arriving at the idea of God contrasts favourably with [the ethical, *Summum Bonum* method]; whilst by the [latter] God was postulated only for the dubious object of adding happiness to our autonomous morality, by the [former], His existence is inferred, from a comprehensive survey of external and internal experience, as the necessary condition of a teleological system of things, uniting the natural and moral worlds as means and end. And a corollary of this thought is, that man, not only as a natural but also as a moral being, is dependent upon a Divine Cause of the universe, and that his autonomy must therefore at the same time be an actual (not merely subjectively conceived) theonomy."

Here, then, we have a potential explanation of Kant's doctrine of the relation of the two worlds of nature and freedom to each other. The two worlds are not utterly disparate, nor wholly alien to one another. The intelligible realm of freedom is the more essential, the end in the general scheme of things; it, somehow, expresses itself in the realm of nature, though nowhere interfering with the regular operation of the latter's mechanical laws. Likewise, man's higher nature is somehow at the basis of his lower phenomenal nature. This is, indeed, hardly an adequate or even an intelligible explanation of Kant's highly artificial conception of the two realms and man's two natures, but it does lessen the extreme dualism to which, barring this theory of the substratum, he seems to be committed.

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1. Critique of Judgment, (Bernard's tr.) P. 325.
The theory points out, moreover, a way of escape from Kant's extreme deism and suggests a possible relation between God on the one hand and the world and man on the other. Kant handles the whole conception very gingerly, however, his caution varying somewhat in proportion to the intensity of his "sceptical" outlook, yet remaining sufficient to prevent his working out the theory's implications. "Kant," says Goethe, "seems to have woven a certain element of irony into his method. For, while at one time he seemed to be bent on limiting our faculties of knowledge in the narrowest way, at another time he pointed, as it were with a side gesture, beyond the limits which he himself had drawn." 1

His most characteristic position is the "sceptical" one - since knowledge is strictly limited to the phenomenal world of sense, all knowledge of such a substrate is wholly impossible. And, because of the curious compartmental nature of his thinking, this supersensible ground of nature is nowhere related to the God of his ethical "faith". The conception of a substratum, therefore, remains a hesitating and undeveloped suggestion and nothing more.

To consider at all adequately the nature and significance of what we have referred to as Kant's other theistic suggestion, i.e. his concept of the Unconditioned, 2 would carry us far beyond the scope of our present study. It is, in the Critique of Pure Reason, really more than a suggestion - it is Kant's whole "Idealist" position, the position which was the starting-point of the German Idealist movement that followed close upon the heels of the Kantian philosophy. Yet, as has already been said, it is a position never adequately stated by Kant himself, and one whose theistic significance, even according to his idealist disciples, he never sufficiently realized. All human thought, he teaches, is ultimately conditioned by the Idea of the Absolute, the Whole, the Unconditioned.

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One cannot be conscious of the self without, implicitly at least, conceiving a not-self in contrast to which it acquires its self-hood, its individuality. And one cannot think of the self and of that which is not self, without presupposing an underlying Absolute, which somehow embraces within itself both of these objects of thought and relates them to each other. As Caird has phrased it, "the consciousness of objects is prior to the consciousness of self, and — the consciousness of the unity of subject and objects, or, in other words, the consciousness of God, presupposes both." Caird here assumes the identity of the God of religion and the metaphysical concept of the Absolute, an assumption which Kant can hardly be said to have justified. The God of religion, it would seem, must be conceived in terms of the category of personality — a category which, at the minimum implies intelligence. Kant's notion of the Unconditioned, on the other hand, since it is conceived only as the fundamental condition of all other concepts, is quite empty of content, a bare, metaphysical ideal. The question also arises, of which Kant was acutely aware, Does the mind's Subjective need to think this Unconditioned prove the latter's objective reality? Most of the time Kant's answer to this question is negative. This Idea of reason is "regulative" only, not "constitutive". In the "idealistic" passages of the first Critique however, he affirms the objective reality of the Unconditioned on the ground that since it conditions all our experience it must be as real as our experience, which is as real as anything we know. This position idealists such as Pfleiderer and Caird seek to identify with the true Kant: if it be accepted as valid and if this Unconditioned by identifiable with an intelligent God, the ontological proof of God's existence can be said to have been revived even in Kant's philosophy.

2. Kant's Doctrine of man.

We have suggested that Kant finds it difficult to establish a relationship between God and man at all comparable to the religious experience, not only because of his conception of the nature of God but also by reason of his estimate of man and his definition of human virtue. There are in Kant’s doctrine of man, however, elements not only of weakness but of strength.

It is to his credit in the first place, that he appreciated so vividly man's intrinsic worth. This appreciation was at first limited, on his own confession, to man's intellectual faculty. In this he was a child of his time, and at one with the English deists. It was through Rousseau that he gained a truer conception of the value of the individual as a human being.

"I am," he once wrote, "by disposition an enquirer. I feel the consuming thirst for knowledge, the eager unrest to advance ever further, and the delights of discovery. There was a time when I believed that this is what confers real dignity upon human life and I despised the common people who know nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This imagined advantage vanishes. I learn to honour men and should regard myself as of much less use than the common labourer, if I did not believe that my philosophy will restore to all men the common rights of humanity."¹ By "humanity" Kant has in mind man as a moral being; it is the moral, instead of the purely intellectual side of man that now possesses for him intrinsic worth. Once his eyes are opened to the fact that mere ratiocination can be no end in itself, he does not hesitate to subordinate² the "starry heavens above" to the "moral law within." This recognition of the intrinsic value of the moral individual distinguishes Kant from the deists’s and constitutes one of his

greatest contributions to the thought of his own and succeeding ages. The English deists, for example, contented themselves for the most part with eulogizing the power of reason in men; Kant teaches the profounder doctrine that it is only by virtue of man's moral capacity that he is always to be regarded as an end, never as a means. This moral potentiality in man Kant calls the see of goodness in him. It is "original," that is, part and parcel of man's very nature. God, as he puts it, created man for good. This moral capacity is indestructible, and makes all men, even the most depraved and vicious, of abiding worth. Man is by his very nature eternally free to obey his own moral law, the voice of his inmost self. So great, indeed, is Kant's emphasis upon man's inherent worth, his essential autonomy, and his moral freedom, that he precludes himself from appreciating a fundamental element of religious experience, i.e. the consciousness of dependence.

Kant distinguishes himself further from the point of view of the Enlightenment by his insight into man's essential weakness and sinfulness. The source of this insight is his deep moral earnestness. "The self-complacent optimism of the philosophy of the Aufklärung," says Pfleiderer, "had lacked the recognition of evil as a serious power in human life, while Kant made it the starting-point of his religious philosophy." We have seen how Locke and Tindal estimated man's character and attributed all sin to intellectual blindness and all blindness to the perverting influence of the priests. Kant now corrects this misconception with his doctrine of man's universal propensity for evil.

Man's innate goodness, we have seen, consists according to Kant in the capacity freely to obey the moral law. That is, he makes a distinction between man's essentially good constitution by reason of which he is able to appreciate and respond to the law of morality, and moral character, which he must achieve.

1. Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology, p. 15.
for himself by acting in accordance with the dictates of his conscience. Man makes himself good or bad, according as he does or does not make the moral law his sole motive of action. Man, is, moreover, by the Kantian definition of virtue, either wholly good or wholly evil. The moral law is the only possible source of action that is to be considered virtuous. Now a man must either make the moral law his guiding principle, or he must fail to do so, thereby recognizing some other (necessarily evil) principle as supreme for him. In the former instance he will, by his own free act, be obeying the spirit of the moral law, his actions will necessarily conform to the letter of the law, and he will be a good man through and through. In the latter instance, some principle other than the moral law is made the guiding principle of his life; his actions will consequently be contrary to the spirit of the law. He may, it is true, still be a good man in the popular sense, a man of good morals (bene moratus) for his actions may happen to conform to the letter of the law. However, since this is merely accidental, such actions are really not morally good at all, and no credit is due to the agent, for it is his duty to be a morally good man (moraliter bonus). Thus as regards both a man’s actions and his character, all compromise between good and bad is ruled out. And since only that which is wholly unrelated to the laws of freedom can be fittingly called immoral, morally indifferent characters and actions become a contradiction in terms.

Kant gives us an interesting explanation of how it is possible for a man to become bad. No man ever deliberately abandons the moral law. Rather, it forces itself upon him irresistibly, because of his inherently moral nature. In the absence of other motives he would naturally be good. His physical nature, however, which is in itself simply immoral, (Kant claims to distinguish himself here from the Stoics)\(^1\) induces him to depend upon sensible springs of action as well as upon the moral law. In other words, if he relied wholly on the moral

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law, man would be an angel; if he rejected it whole-heartedly and entirely he would be a devil. He does neither, trying instead to compromise, to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. This attempt is doomed to failure, since, as we have seen, no man can be both good and bad at the same time. Hence the question of whether a man is good or bad is simply a question of subordination i.e. which of the two springs of action he makes the condition of the other. As a matter of fact, says Kant, all men are bad in this sense. They make self-love and the satisfaction of their various inclinations the condition of their obedience to the moral law, instead of making it the supreme motive of their lives.

The element of truth in this conception of man's evil state must be admitted. "To act morally is certainly to have strong distrust of acting according to our liking." Truly virtuous action, it may be granted, consists in setting loyalty to an ethical principle above the satisfaction of the "dear self." The weakness of Kant's position seems rather to lie in his conception of the moral law as purely formal and wholly alien to, if not hostile to, the other sides of man's nature. He explicitly teaches, it is true, that the unreasoning part of man is not evil. But the complete exclusion of this side of him, however in all moral conduct, results in setting man's moral and sensible natures in mutual antagonism. The mistake lies in thinking that the law of reason must be purely formal to have unconditional validity, and in considering all other motives of action, all inclinations, such as a spontaneous desire to do good, as hostile to reason and therefore unvirtuous. Kant fails to see that in truly virtuous conduct man's highest feelings and emotions too may play an important part.

The distinction between man's "capacity" (Ahnung) for good and his "propensity" (Hang) for evil is of great importance, for it is the basis of Kant's profound optimism in the estimate of man's nature which is truer and deeper than the careless optimism of the Enlightenment. Man's evil propensity

is essentially contingent. It is not man's truest nature and is not to be inferred from the specific conception of man as such. Man's basic goodness is indestructible; his consciousness of the moral law and his sensitiveness to the dictates of conscience can never be entirely lost. If the propensity for evil has not been created in us by God, however, it must have been somehow acquired; and the fact that the moral consciousness testifies to our responsibility for it proves that it is we who are to blame, not God. This propensity, Kant finally declares in good pietist fashion, to be absolutely universal and innate, present in all men at birth. The human heart is radically and universally evil. The question at once arises, How can this propensity be at the same time universally and innately present in all men and yet be acquired by the individual and therefore imputable to him? How can it be the result of my own act, and yet be present in me from the day of my birth?

Kant solves this problem, or, to be more accurate, offers an explanation of this human characteristic, by resorting to his theory of man's dual nature. There is the higher, intelligible, noumenal nature by reason of which man is a member of the noumenal, timeless, intelligible world. It is this side of him that is free and lifted above the constraints of natural causality. Then there is his lower, sensible phenomenal nature which is an integral part of the natural world of space and time in which he lives. There exists between these two natures in man, as between the two realms as a whole, a curious, non-reversible causality. Man's noumenal nature is, somehow, the ground and cause of his temporal life as a whole. It never interferes with the unbroken series of natural cause and effect which distinguishes man's phenomenal existence, yet it somehow expresses itself in that life and determines its fundamental nature. Now, says Kant, the only way in which we can explain man's "fall", the innate yet
imputable perversity of the human heart, is to say that every individual, prior
to his earliest phenomenal act, has made some principle other than the moral
law the guiding principle of his life. This intelligible, free, and timeless
act of his becomes, then, the formal cause of all his sensible acts. It
shows itself in his phenomenal life, perverting his entire moral outlook and
making him radically evil. It constitutes, in a word, his propensity for
evil. Man can, moreover, escape from this state of moral evil only through the
door by which he entered into it. He must, that is, effect a second intelligible
act, towards goodness, as the former was towards evil; as a noumenal being he
must make the moral law the determining principle of his life. He must, in pie-
tist phraseology, be born again; he can only become a new man by a revolutionary
change in his attitude as an intelligible being towards the moral law, "as it
were by a new creation and a change of heart." This second act will also
express itself in his phenomenal life, for little by little he will be able to
subdue the opposition of his natural inclinations and transform himself into a
being whose moral character is good.

The influence of pietism on Kant is especially noticeable in this doctrine
of the need of a revolutionary change in man before he can hope to be morally
good. The doctrine is, of course, in harmony with New Testament teaching.
It is, in fact, the Christian doctrine of rebirth translated into philosophical
language, and constitutes, from the Christian point of view at least, one of
Kant's truest conceptions. But the dualistic machinery of which Kant makes use
to account for the deeply rooted evil in human nature and explain the means by
which alone it is to be eradicated seem singularly futile. Here as elsewhere
one is forced to ask, What, after all, does he accomplish with all this
philosophical paraphernalia? He fails to throw light on any of the problems

1. Prior, but not in time. Kant's position is to be distinguished from a
belief in temporal pre-existence or a temporal cycle of lives here on earth.
This intelligible act differs in quality from all phenomenal acts in being essen-
tially timeless, the prius of all "sensible" conduct.
regarding man's evil state which have puzzled the human race since time immemorial.

We must, on his own confession, regard them all as ultimately inexplicable.

If God is to be absolved, man must be thought to start his moral career with an absolutely good disposition. How then does he come to start on the downward path? To call this start an intelligible act explains nothing, since Kant himself admits that this first act of the noumenal man is inexplicable. He merely heaps mystery upon mystery with his hypothesis of an intelligible act, which is and can be nothing but an essentially incomprehensible abstraction. How, again, is man to root out the evil that is in him? By a second intelligible act, replies Kant. Yet he admits it to be quite incomprehensible how the reason which fails to preserve man's pristine purity before his "fall" can re-instate itself, overthrow the evil propensity now firmly in possession, and bring about the necessary intelligible revolution. It is also impossible to see, on Kant's own confession, how one timeless act can wipe out another timeless act. In a word, Kant has taken the Christian doctrine, translated it into none too clear philosophical language, and then admitted that he is unable to solve the essential difficulties. For this latter failure, we can of course not blame him. He does, however, seem to open himself to criticism when he claims, as he does, that Christianity is nothing but a symbolic and figurative version of clear philosophical truth, and that the sooner the symbols are dropped and the truths accepted in all their clarity and simplicity, the better. The obvious answer is that there are some, at least, who prefer the Christian to the Kantian version, on the ground both of simplicity and clarity.

We have spoken so far only of the similarity between Kant's doctrine of rebirth and the Christian doctrine of salvation. They differ, however, more fundamentally than they agree. The difference has to do with the manner in which man's salvation is to be consummated and in the assurance attainable by the individual that the necessary change of heart has actually taken place. It is a difference which we can consider only in the briefest outline. The
whole basis of Kant's argument is his intense consciousness of moral obligation. To this, as has already been mentioned, he added a genuine belief that he was living in a moral order and that man was not the sport of either a careless or a malignant Deity. The consciousness of obligation to lead a moral life, a consciousness which Kant believed to be universal among men, led him to conclude, therefore, that such moral behaviour was possible. "I ought," he argued, "therefore I can:" And his eighteenth century individualism led him to add the words, "by my own efforts." Moral value seemed to him to mean, by definition, that which a man achieves through his own endeavour. His thesis is therefore that man can, because he should, save himself by performing the necessary intelligible act. Kant has been called the philosopher of protestantism, but in one respect at least he would seem to belong to the opposite camp. "Salvation by works" he of course condemns, if "works" be taken to signify merely special ceremonial or sacrificial duties.¹ He does, however, believe in "salvation by work", if the phrase be allowed - a salvation which the individual must work out for and by himself.² He admits, it is true, the theoretical possibility of divine aid to supplement those limitations which are ours because we are finite. And he teaches that if by the second intelligible act we face about in the right direction, God will view our resulting struggles towards moral perfection as a single whole, overlooking, as it were, our essentially finite failings.³ The value of this teaching, however, is neutralized by Kant's further insistence that man can never know whether he himself has achieved this second intelligible act. All he can do is to try to bring about this revolution in his own soul, and then watch his own moral progress from day to day.⁴ If he can honestly and

¹. I am aware that this interpretation of the phrase "salvation by works" lacks historical accuracy. My present concern is merely to point out that where Kant's sole advice to the sinner is "Pull yourself together! Save yourself!" the Christian exhortation is rather "You can save yourself and become a new man with God's help!"
². Cf. Streit der Facultäten, p. 42-3
³. Cf. Religion innerhalb ----, pp. 66-7 and N., 42. See above p. 177.
⁴. Ib. p. 66 seq.
⁵. Ib. p. 77
dispassionately conclude, after years of observation, that he is moving in the right direction, then, says Kant, he may "hope that all is well with him:" if, on the contrary, he finds himself slipping away from instead of advancing towards his goal of virtuous conduct, he must believe that the necessary rebirth has not taken place and that he is still fundamentally wicked at heart. In any case, however, man must rely only on himself. To desire or expect divine guidance is dangerous - to depend or believe it has actually taken place is sheer mysticism and superstition.

There is, as usual, an essential element of truth in what Kant says. Moral character is not transferable, and man must of course do his part in his own regeneration. He must open his heart and stretch forth his hand for aid; no man is saved from evil in the face of his own stubborn opposition. Yet this is only half the truth - of the other half Kant remains oblivious, or, at least, indifferent, to the end. When Kant says "I ought, therefore I can", the Christian admits that he ought, and yet cries that he cannot of himself and by his own strength. Whereas Kant insists that man must stand alone and rely only on himself, it is of the essence of religion that man can hope for victory only as the spirit worketh in him. And finally, where Kant remains in perpetual doubt, or at best, in a state of reason and judicious hopefulness, we have the testimony of great religious characters and the assurance of Christ Himself that true "rebirth", whatever its form, carries with it an assurance that the individual is on the right road and is, as it were, in safe hands. Kant's gospel is essentially to the strong, not to the weak - to those who are surest of themselves rather than to those in desperate need of assistance. As Oman has vividly expressed it, "Kant will have no gospel, and no scheme of morals ever stood in more need of one. His yoke is not easy and his burden is not light. Though he shared with his age the conception of Judaism as a religion of mere ceremonies

and rewards, there is nothing he stood nearer than the religion of the great prophets. Wherefore, in spite of the emphasis he laid on freedom, he cannot make man free, but rather discloses the need of a religion above this morality to raise men to the glorious liberty of the children of God.¹

3. **Kant's Estimate of Christianity.**

The view Kant had of the meaning and significance of Christianity, his appraisal of the Bible, his attitude to Christ and his interpretation of the chief elements of Christian theology are all set forth in considerable detail and clearness in his own writings on religion. Our present purpose requires of us only a sketch of this position sufficient to enable us to compare Kant's views, first, with the typical deistic conceptions to which reference has been made in an earlier chapter, and second, with what may be called a characteristically Biblical or Christian position.

We have seen Kant's deism both in his view of God's relation to man and in his conception of man's relation to God. It also shows itself markedly in his view of what the deists called natural religion. Herbert of Cherbury, it will be remembered, was the first to distinguish between "natural" and "historical" religion. As the creed of the former, he enumerated his five fundamental propositions, and declared natural religion, thus defined, to be not only the true religion of all men today but mankind's original religion as well. Locke, while agreeing in the main with Herbert's position, discovered in historical Christianity elements of intrinsic and unique value -- that Christ not only republished the religion of nature, but in His Person gave to men an object of faith, and in His teachings, certain religious ideas of which neither they nor their ancestors could have been aware before His coming. Then came Tindal, reviving and elaborating Herbert's position, and proclaiming with the utmost assurance the antiquity, universality, and perfect completeness of natural religion, the essence of which consists in doing all one can for one's fellow men. This natural religion he then identified with what he defined as true Christianity and discarded.

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1. Cf. above p. 166.
as of merely subjective value, as useless, or even as positively harmful, all special Christian beliefs and practices not embraced in that definition. Hume, finally, rejected Christianity as an historical religion, reduced natural religion to the merest shadow of theism, and consistently declared his disbelief in miracles and kindred manifestations of the supernatural.

Kant's equivalent of the deistic "religion of nature" is his "pure ethical religion" which consists "not in institutions or observances but in the genuine disposition to fulfil all human duties as divine commands." Several points of similarity are at once apparent. Kant distinguishes true or ethical religion from "mere historical faith", i.e. religious belief whose basis is not a priori and rational but empirical. This distinction is the hallmark of all deistic thinking, and in subscribing to it Kant identifies himself unquestionably with the deistic position. He would, moreover, accept Herbert's five fundamental principles, though with certain qualifications. He carefully chose the phrase "as divine commands," he tells us, to avoid all claim to theoretical knowledge regarding God's existence, since God, as he has shown in the Critiques, is to pure speculative reason no more than a plausible hypothesis. Practical reason, however, can affirm its sure belief in His reality. The English deists, of course, were innocent of all such subtle metaphysical distinctions and accepted God's existence as axiomatic. To Herbert's second and third propositions Kant would have subscribed if allowed to identify "worship" and "piety" with "virtue", the performance of ethical duty. "In a universal religion," he says, in words reminiscent of Tindal, "there are no special duties towards God, for God can receive nothing from us, and we cannot act upon Him nor for Him." To the fourth clause of the deistic creed he would attach supreme importance. In fact, this is to him the essence of all religion - to do our utmost to make ourselves

1. Religion Innerhalb ..., p. 84, Cf. p. 102
2. Ib p. 5.
3. Ib. p. 153. N.
4. Ib.
worthy of divine favour. So strongly does he emphasize this that Herbert's fifth proposition, referring to a future life, would receive from him but scant attention and no more than an unemphatic endorsement. Again, the deists saw in the universal discoverability of natural religion its chief merit, and Kant, we find, attaches importance to the fact that conscience, that guiding voice which is God's representative in every human heart, is present in all men—that they are possessed without exception of a sensitiveness to moral obligation out of which arise all moral and therefore all religious duties. And finally like the deists, Kant makes this universal religion of reason man's highest criterion, the ultimate tribunal of religious truth. Even Christianity must be evaluated according to this standard; "rational religion must supply the supreme canon of all Scriptural exegesis. It is the 'Spirit of God guiding us into all truth.'"¹

So far, then, Kant is unquestionably deistic. In the profundity and thoroughness of his philosophical approach to the whole problem, however, and in his unyielding ethical severity, he differs from the deists completely. His painstaking examination of the theistic proofs, for example, stands in striking contrast to the calm and uncritical acceptance of them by Locke and Tindal. He distinguishes himself further in his identification of religion with morality. "Religion as far as its matter is concerned, differs in no way whatsoever from morality, for it is concerned with duties generally; it differs from it only formally, i.e. reason propounds laws in order by means of its self-conceived notion of God, to strengthen morality's pressure upon the human will towards the fulfilment of all its duties."² In the fields of religion, Kant's tremendous moral earnestness is his most significant and profound characteristic. Where the

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1. Religion innerhalb ——, p.118.  
2. Streit der Facultäten, p. 36.
Deists are comfortably optimistic regarding man's essential goodness, Kant is burdened with the consciousness of a perverse wickedness. Where their chief concern is that each serve his fellow men, Kant is grappling with the sterner and more fundamental problem of how a man is first of all to save himself from the inherent evil of his ways. Both Kant and Tindal, for example, rely on the voice of conscience. Yet the two men differ completely in their estimate of what it is that conscience tells us. To Kant, conscience is the voice of the moral law, the law of "ought", and never the law of "is", that natural law whereby men involuntarily seek happiness. It is precisely this latter law, however, that Tindal makes his rule of conduct. On the principle that all that is is right, Tindal's conscience informs him that "whatever he finds himself obliged to do by the circumstances he is in, he is obliged by God Himself, who has disposed things in that order and placed him in those circumstances." And since "the principle from which all human actions flow is the desire for happiness," this desire is obviously God-given and furnishes the key to the duties God requires of us, i.e. to seek our own happiness and that of our fellow men. In a word, Tindal is as complacently and vaguely eudaemonic as Kant is rigorously moral. Tindal has his eyes fastened on God's benignity, Kant, on His unswerving righteousness.

This moral earnestness lifts Kant far above the level of typical deistic thinking and gives his "ethical religion" greater vitality and genuineness than the "natural religion" of the English deists ever possessed.

1. Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 92. Cf. p. 16.
In his attitude to history, Kant once again differs from the deists in certain important respects. His studies in the fields of anthropology and the religions of primitive peoples save him from making the grotesque mistake of believing, as they did, that primitive man received from God a "natural religion" pure and undefiled, and that throughout the ages the priests were responsible for its gradual perversion. Kant sees clearly that religious belief was in the dawning of human consciousness little more than blind, inarticulate fear and longing, and that only as man's intellectual and moral capacities gradually developed did the mists of superstition begin to clear away and such knowledge of the religious verities as we now possess stand revealed. The present is to Kant, therefore, the age of greatest enlightenment. 1 As for the priests, Kant has, it is true, little use for them and often charges them with negligence and insincerity. He recognizes, however, that they are as human as their fellows and as amenable to the dictates of reason and the voice of conscience. His thesis throughout is deeper and more searching - God created man "for good", giving him an enduring potentiality for goodness, and man's "sinful state", his failure to develop this potentiality, is due to an inexplicable yet positive perverseness, a "power for evil," which it is his high duty to combat with all his strength.

In his estimate of the religious worth to man of historical events and personages, however, Kant is thoroughly deistic. History, he contends, illustrates but does not demonstrate. Historical happenings can supply the foundation for an ecclesiastical creed, never for true religion. While Locke attempted at least to find in historical Christianity some elements of abiding worth, Kant is like Tindal and the other deists in viewing the historical aspects of Christianity as having merely temporary and extrinsic value.

1. Cf. Religion innerhalb ---, p. 131
This profoundly colours his view of Christianity.

Kant's fondness for the *apriori* and his bias against the historical in religion shows itself clearly, for example, in his view of revelation. He does not, it is true, go the length of rejecting the possibility of divine revelation altogether, as did Reimarus. That would be unwarranted dogmatism. He refuses, on the other hand, to allow to revelation any essential religious value. He is willing to admit the possibility of a religion being objectively, i.e. in its essence, natural, and at the same time subjectively revealed, and he further recognizes that it may have been a wise and salutary measure to introduce true religion to the masses by a revelation locally given at a certain time. He insists, however, that the element of revelation be restricted to the manner in which it is introduced, and be in no way allowed to affect its subject matter or any vital principle connected with it. It must exhibit nothing "that mankind could not, and indeed should not, have arrived at by the natural exercise of its own powers, although it might not so soon and in such wide extent have attained this knowledge." Moreover, "when the religion thus ushered in has fairly struck root and become publicly known, each individual can convince himself of its truth independently and by the use of his own reason." If the nature and purpose of revelation be thus defined, Kant is willing to grant that Christianity is a revealed religion. Yet even so guarded an admission of revelation as this would seem to be inconsistent with some of his basic principles. God may guide human affairs and affect men's hearts and minds, he has argued, but man can never know that such supernatural influence has been exerted at any particular time and place. Whether external or internal, revelation can never be recognized as such, and all attempts to do so must be discounted as mystic or superstitious. The doctrine of moral autonomy teaches, moreover, that man must lay down moral laws for and by himself; what is dictated to him from without can place him.

1. Religion innerhalb ——, p. 154-5
2. Ib. p. 155-6
3. Ib. p. 156-6
under no moral obligation. "I presuppose," he writes to Lavater, "that no book, whatever its authority, yes, not even a revelation presenting itself to my own senses, can make anything the religion of my heart which has not already become my duty through the holy law within me to which above all else I must give a reckoning—-". Taking his system as a whole, therefore, "the idea of revelation," as Pfleiderer has phrased it, "remains in Kant a non liquet; he concedes its possibility, perhaps even its necessity, and yet really leaves no room for it." Now this again is typical of deism. Locke allowed revelation considerable importance which he promptly minimized by his defense of reason as the higher standard. Tindal called himself the true defender of external revelation and yet proved it to be both unnecessary and even, as it appears in the Bible, highly unsatisfactory and unreliable. In short, deism throws the weight of its influence on the side of natural religion as contrasted to the revealed, and Kant is in this respect a true deist.

An excellent example of Kant's rationalistic bias is to be found in his attitude to the Bible. If one were to attempt to relate his Biblical criticism to the views of the English deists, one would have to place him midway between Locke and Tindal. In his complete allegiance to reason as against revelation he resembles Tindal; in his high estimate of the worth of the Bible to mankind he more nearly approaches Locke. He distinguishes himself also from all the English deists, barring Locke, by his marked recognition of the important and beneficent influence which the Bible has exerted and still exerts in Christendom, and his arguments and conclusions are for the most part free from the deistic tendency to superficial judgments and quick, careless dismissal of the Bible in part or in whole. Once again, his insight into human nature and knowledge of human history raises him above the group of deistic writers to which he technically

1. April 28, 1775.
2. Pfleiderer, Development of Theology, p. 19.
Following in the footsteps of Tindal and Reimarus, Kant considers the Bible a purely human document; "to place the source of this Book in the inspiration of its authors (deux ex machina)----must weaken rather than strengthen reliance in its moral worth." Unlimited trust in every line, even of the New Testament, is out of the question, for the events narrated are too far distant to permit of such complete confidence in their historical accuracy, and the doctrine of a verbal inspiration is itself one to which reason can give no credence. This historical unreliability of the Bible was to the empirically-minded deists a fatal defect, rendering it at once as good as useless. Kant, in contrast, is secure in his apriori citadel, insisting that its historical accuracy or inaccuracy does not matter. "Why should we involve ourselves in so many learned investigations and disputes over an historical narrative, which should always be kept in its proper place (among the adiaphora), when the question is one of religion? Here faith, in its practical aspect, as imparted to us by reason, is already sufficient in itself." The one thing needful is that "we avoid making a knowledge and a confession of, and a faith in these historical reports an element of religion by means of which we can render ourselves acceptable to God." Kant uses the Bible not as the basis of, but only as an aid to religion. "I seek in the Gospel not the ground of my faith but its support------."  

1. Streit der Facultaten, p. 64.  
2. Cf. his letter to Lavater, April 23, 1775.  
5. Letter to Lavater, April 23, 1775.
Still, if the Bible is to afford man such ethical support, painstaking analysis and interpretation is required. It is to be noted that the aim of this interpretation is not primarily to probe out the true meaning of the text or to discover the sense intended by the author of the passage in question, but it is rather to extract from, or, if necessary, to read into the passage a morally edifying lesson. The Bible, that is, must at all costs be made to conform to the dictates of practical reason. "Passages of Scripture which contain speculative doctrines — that transcend all rational (even moral) comprehension may be interpreted to the advantage of practical reason; those, however, which contain propositions that contradict practical reason must be so interpreted."¹ This is to Kant an absolutely fundamental canon of Biblical criticism, applicable even where the writer's meaning is unmistakably opposed to the teaching of which Kant is in search. "Such an interpretation may no doubt — not only frequently seem, but often really be, strained; nevertheless, if the text makes such a reading in any way possible it must be chosen in preference to the verbal and literal meaning whenever the latter contains nothing of value to morality, or perhaps even opposes itself to moral incentives."²

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¹ Streit der Facultaten, p. 38.
² Religion innerhalb—— p. 110 and N. Kant illustrates his meaning by giving an interpretation of Psalm LIX. Cf. also ib. p. 83, "An endeavour to find in the Scriptures that sense [to which Kant adds in a footnote, 'which, it is at once conceded, is not the only one,'] which best harmonizes with the holiest principles taught by reason is not only allowed but must rather be deemed a duty ———." And see Streit der Facultaten, p. 41, where he cites Biblical passages which require, in his opinion, a deliberate alteration of their obvious meaning.
A fuller statement of Kant's important distinction between pure ethical faith and a justifiable, and, for the time being, necessary ecclesiastical faith will be made in our discussion of Kant's estimate of the church. It is necessary at this point to notice, however, that he does not dismiss all Biblical exegesis as useless, but regards it as of the highest importance for the laying of the foundation of the ecclesiastical faith which the masses, who are unable to breathe the rarified air of pure ethical doctrine, insist upon having. Such popular church doctrine requires an historical basis, and honest, patient criticism is needed to test, so far as is possible, the authenticity and reliability of the sacred historical writings. Yet even here, Kant insists, reason must furnish the ultimate criterion of truth. The fundamental question must always be, Are these doctrines, these events, there alleged miracles, worthy of the God of our practical ethical faith? "Scripture is the only rule of ecclesiastical belief; nor can it have any expounder save the pure religion of reason and Scriptural learning; and of these the former is alone authentic and valid universally for the whole world; while the latter is only doctrinal ——."

Kant's own interest, of course, is that of the philosopher and not that of the Biblical theologian. None of his analyses of Biblical passages, he says, is really intended to be an interpretation of Scripture — a thing that lies outside the province of mere reason. We explain the manner in which a moral use may be

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2. In the Streit der Facultäten Kant deals at considerable length with the inevitable conflict between the philosopher and the Biblical theologian. On pp. 38-48 he lays down the four cardinal principles of Biblical interpretation from the point of view of the philosopher, and then proceeds to state and answer various objections to this exegetical platform.
made of an historical statement without deciding whether this was the meaning of the writer or whether we only introduce it; provided only that it is true in itself, apart from all historical proof, and that it is, at the same time, the only way in which we can derive something for our own improvement from a passage of Scripture which would otherwise be only an unprofitable addition to our historical knowledge.\(^1\) In typical deistic fashion, then, Kant judges the ethical value of various portions of the Bible. He ranks the Old Testament far below the New, regarding the Jewish dispensation as having no doubt served a valuable function in times past but as being of little use to the modern Christian.\(^2\)

"In its pristine form Judaical belief is nothing but an aggregate of statutable laws whereon rested the political constitution. Any ethical additions that may either then or subsequently have been fastened on to it are absolutely foreign to Judaism as such. Judaism, strictly speaking, is no religion at all; it is only an association of a number of individuals who ---- formed themselves into a political commonwealth, not into a church."\(^3\) Christians would therefore do well, the to free themselves from the shackles of the Old Testament and to found their faith solely on the New. Even in the New Testament, the Epistles seem of less value than the Gospels, \(^4\) and in the Gospels themselves, he distinguishes sharply between the teaching of Christ and the reports we have of His teaching. "In order to extract the former in its purity I try first of all

\(^1\) Religion innerhalb---, p. 43 N
\(^2\) For Kant's attitude to Judaism see ib. pp. 79, 125, 127 seq., 166-7.
\(^3\) Religion innerhalb---, p. 125.
\(^4\) Cf. Kant's letter to Lavater, April 28, 1775.
to separate out the ethical teaching from all New Testament dogmas.\footnote{Cf. 10.} This surely is the basic teaching of the Gospel, the rest can only be supplementary to it.\footnote{In all this, Kant is but putting into practice his own deistic canon of interpretation of regarding the Bible as a help to the discovery of religious truth, but practical reason as its only true source.} In all this, Kant is but putting into practice his own deistic canon of interpretation of regarding the Bible as a help to the discovery of religious truth, but practical reason as its only true source.

Nevertheless, Kant is a far stronger supporter of the Bible than Tindal or the later deists. His admiration for it, indeed, though more discriminating, is quite as great as Locke's. As a textbook of popular religious education, he believes its value unequalled. "The existence of the Bible as a book for the people is the greatest benefit which the human race has ever experienced. Every attempt to belittle it or to do away with it entirely --- is a crime against humanity. And if there are to be miracles, this book, in which the accounts of miracles occur only incidentally, as historical confirmation of the doctrines of rational religion, is itself the greatest miracle. For here we have a system of religious doctrines and beliefs that has been built up without the help of Greek philosophy, by unlearned persons, and that has, more than any other exercise, an influence for good in the hearts and lives of men."\footnote{Letter to Lavater, April 28, 1775.}

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1. Cf. 10. "I understand by New Testament dogmas all that regarding which one can attain conviction only through historical reports (i.e. not by reason of their inner ethical worth), but which, nevertheless, it is required that one profess or observe as a condition of salvation." Cf. also Streit der Facultäten, p. 59, "--- the Bible --- seems to point not to supernatural experiences and fanatical states of mind as the means, instead of reason, of bringing about this revolution (i.e. the necessary change of heart). It points rather to the spirit of Christ, that this spirit, as He revealed it in His teaching and by His example, be made ours, or rather, since it is already in us - in our original moral disposition - that room be made for it in our hearts." Cf. Religion Innerhalb ---., p. 132, for the more moderate statement, "--- it seems the most prudent and reasonable course that can be pursued to continue to use this Book, such as it is, as the text-book of ecclesiastical education." Cf. Streit der Facultäten, p. 64.
As the masses advance in education, moreover, the underlying ethical doctrine of
the Bible is admirably qualified to serve as their guide; for "when this lively
mode of presentation... is divested of its mystic veil, its spirit and meaning
are practically valid and obligatory, at all times and for the whole world-.-."

"How fortunate,"^ Kant concludes, "that such a book should have been thrown into
our hands, containing as it does, side by side with its statutes and belief, a
most complete and moral theory of religion!"

Kant has thus far been moving along definitely deistic lines, though the
general quality of his thinking raises him above their level, his angle of attack
and theirs is essentially the same. In passing now to Kant's Christology, the
difference between him and the whole body of deistic writers becomes more
pronounced. The latter have in mind, in all references to Christ, the historical
figure of whom we read in the New Testament. Their outlook is purely empirical
and their estimate of the person and work of Christ has reference to the Jesus
of history alone. Kant's almost exclusive interest, in contrast, is a priori.
His attention is directed, therefore, primarily to the rational ideal, of which
the historical Christ is but a symbol - to the noumenal fact, of which Jesus is
the highest embodiment. Kant starts not from the New Testament but from prac­
tical reason, functioning a priori and independently of all temporal events;
with his rational ideal in view he then goes to the Gospels and claims to find
in them its symbolic equivalent and historical substantiation.

Kant's conception of the rational ideal of humanity may be summarized as
follows. With man's sense of 'ought' there goes inevitably an ideal of duty per­
fectly fulfilled. This is the ideal of "mankind in its entire moral perfection."

1. Religion innerhalb ----, p. 83. Cf. p. 131
2. Equivalent, says Kant, to "How providential!" Ib. p. 107, and N.
3. Religion innerhalb ----, p. 60 seq.
Since God is the head of the moral universe, the idea of such human perfection may be said to "emanate from God's very essence" and to be, therefore, "His only-begotten Son." From man's point of view, however, this idea of moral perfection is but the rationally conceived goal of all ethical endeavour, valid "for all men, at all times, and in all worlds." It is "presented to us by reason for our imitation," and its reality is guaranteed by the moral law within.\(^1\) It matters not in the least, therefore, whether we consider this ideal teleologically or rationally. "We are dealing here with but one and the self-same practical idea, regarding it in the one case as an ideal existing in God and emanating from Him, in the other case, as discoverable in us---"\(^2\) The theological figure of speech, however, has a certain aptness. Since we cannot account for the presence of this ideal in us any more than we can explain the origin of our moral consciousness, it is plain, says Kant, that "we are not the authors of this ideal." It may fittingly be said, therefore, that this ideal "has come down from heaven to us and has assumed our humanity." And since it is the essence of all moral perfection, whereas all mankind is innately sinful, "its union with us may be regarded as a state of humiliation of the Son of God."

Now salvation is to be achieved through this ideal alone. In it man sees the goal of all moral advancement, and it is chiefly by reason of his possession of it that he is distinguished from brute creation. "Self-elevation to this ideal

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1. Cf. Religion innerhalb---, p. 62, "This idea's reality is, in a practical point of view, contained completely within itself, for it lies in our morally-legislative reason. We ought to conform ourselves to it; consequently we can."
2. Ib. p. 119. Cf. ib, "A living belief in the Son of God, considered as the prototype of that in humanity which is well-pleasing to God, does in itself render refer to an ethical idea of reason which serves at once as the standard and the spring of conduct; consequently it is immaterial whether I start with this rational belief or with the principle of the moral life."
of moral perfection ---- is a duty incumbent upon all men, for which ascent this idea itself ---- can give us strength;"1 and only in so far as man approximates this ideal (his inherently finite limitations being duly taken into account) can he hope to attain salvation. It is therefore our redeemer by reason of its very presence in us; in a sense, it is also our vicarious substitute. Salvation2 necessitates a change of heart whereby the individual abandons the principle of self-love which has thus far claimed his highest allegiance and identifies himself with the spirit of the moral ideal. By bringing about this inner change within himself, man identifies himself with the spirit of the moral ideal and thus becomes a new man; yet the sins of the old man remain unpunished and god's inexorable justice is unsatisfied. The old man, however, is beyond punishment since he is dead and completely replaced by the new man. The latter, therefore, must suffer vicariously for the sins of the former. Now whereas the change of heart is, noumenally considered, a single timeless act, its phenomenal expression is the slow and painful formation of a moral character. The punishment due the old man, therefore, is inflicted in this very process of character building; "the passage out of an evil state into a state of goodness, (i.e. 'the death of the old man, the crucifying of the flesh'), is in itself a sacrifice and an entrance upon a long train of sufferings in life, which the new man undertakes in the spirit of the Son of God."3

The only way in which man can make this ideal of moral perfection real to himself is by conceiving it "as a person who is not only prepared to discharge all human duties and by his teachings and his example to spread goodness abroad as widely as possible, but who, further, though assaulted by the highest temptations,

2. Above, p. 79 seq.
is willing to undergo for the sake of the whole world and even for his enemies, the greatest miseries and the most ignominious death. Man can frame to himself no notion of the degree and momentum of a force such as the moral sentiment except by representing it to himself as encircled by obstacles and yet, despite the greatest possible hindrances, as coming forth victorious."¹ The Christ ideal, then, furnishes man with just such a person. In Him Kant sees the personification of the moral ideal, and into the Christian doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement he reads the principles of his own ethical system. He distinguishes very clearly, however, between this idealized Christ and the Jesus of history; "a belief in this archetype in his phenomenal form, as God-man, is an empirical and historical faith and not by any means identical with the principle of a moral life, which is purely rational; and it would be quite a different affair to commence with the former and to try to deduce from it an amended course of conduct."² Such a belief would be possible only to those who were in possession of the necessary historical facts; whereas true rational belief is within the reach of all, irrespective of geographic and temporal circumstances. If belief in a heaven-sent, historical Jesus, moreover, were necessary to salvation, man would very obviously be indebted for such salvation to the divine initiative; part of the emphasis at least would have to fall on what God has done for us. This, however, Kant considers a fundamentally wrong angle of approach to the whole problem of salvation. What concerns us is not God's part in the affair, but ours. Belief in the ethical ideal which is given us by our own reason is the one thing needful for eternal life.

¹. Religion innerhalb—, p. 61
². Ib. p. 127.
Nevertheless, Kant sees in the story of the historical Jesus elements of genuine worth to the human race. Philosophy gives man no more than the a-priori basis of a theology; even the notion of a person, humanity's ideal, is too abstract a conception to satisfy the religious needs of the common man. The skeleton of a-priori argument requires, as it were, to be clothed in the flesh and blood of historical events. It is in supplying this need, then, that the New Testament story seems to him to fulfil a valuable function.

He accepts the Gospel account of Christ's life and death with little criticism, since it adapts itself readily to his ethical purpose. As all men ought to be morally perfect, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there should have lived on earth one such perfect individual. Christ's sinlessness he therefore accepts without further question. The significance to man of Christ's life and death on earth consists, he believes, in the fact that Christ has set men an example, proving once and for all the possibility of perfect obedience to the moral law. That Kant thus sees in Christ man's supreme example rather than his divine or semi-divine Redeemer is of great importance, for it furnishes the key to his interpretation of Christ's life and death. It constrains him, in the first place, to insist on Christ's humanity. For to maintain that Christ is divine can serve no ethical purpose and is but the heaping upon one mystery upon another. The presence of the god-like moral ideal in us is mystery enough.

In Christ we but see our own incipient divinity. Moreover, if we believe that Christ is divine in some unique sense, He is thereby raised so far above man that He can no longer serve as man's example. Kant therefore does not express belief in the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, but offers an explanation of the doctrine's origin, calls attention to certain fallacies in the orthodox theory, points out that an absolute denial of the possibility of Christ's divine origin is unjustifiable dogmatism, and concludes by accepting the doctrine as the symbol
of a moral fact. He dismisses the literal interpretation of the doctrine of the incarnation as ethically useless, since "we cannot require of ourselves approximation to a deity." In Christ's death he sees an example of man's innate goodness in its entire moral perfection. He finds in the stories of Christ's resurrection and ascension definite symbolical value, as bearing on our own hope for a future life, though, as historical narratives, "they cannot come within the sphere of a religion within the limits of mere reason." In a word, whatever in the account of Christ's life and death can be held up as a fit example for general imitation Kant accepts symbolically, and all questions of historical accuracy are dismissed as inconsequent. His whole point of view is epitomized in his doctrine of salvation. "He who is conscious," he says in a striking passage, "of a moral disposition such that he can believe and can place in himself a well-grounded trust that he could, under similar temptations and griefs --- adhere unchangeably to humanity's ideal and remain true to his exemplar --- such a person, I say, and he alone, is entitled to look upon himself as an object not unworthy of the divine complacency."
Attention may be called in passing to Kant's interpretation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. We have already mentioned his acceptance of the Trinity as a concession to man's finitely limited or discursive intellect, which can adequately conceive the Deity only as a threefold moral personality - as Creator and Lawgiver, Governor and Preserver, and righteous Judge. This doctrine of the Trinity, Kant now points out, may be regarded as distinctively Christian in that it was "first embodied in the Christian creed and by it alone publicly offered to the world; its promulgation may therefore be called the revelation of that which, through mankind's own fault, had hitherto remained a mystery." He offers, moreover, an interpretation of the Christian Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. "Man's highest (and never completely attainable) goal of moral perfection is the love of the law. A principle of religious faith would accordingly be 'God is Love.' In Him man can reverence the loving Father (His love being that of moral complacency in creatures in so far as they conform themselves to His holy law); further, in Him they can venerate, in so far as He exhibits Himself agreeably to the idea of His all-preserving character - the beloved and self-begotten archetype of humanity, - the Son; lastly, since He tempers His complacency by having regard to man's satisfaction of the conditions limiting that complacent love, and since He thereby demonstrates that His benignity is sustained by wisdom, they may further reverence in Him the Holy Spirit." In a word, Kant sees in the Christ ideal the gracious, benevolent side of God. Man may invoke Him "in the name of that beloved object [i.e. the Son] which is revered by God Himself above all else." The Holy Ghost, in contrast, is the symbolic representation of the stern, absolutely righteous aspect of God's nature. Where the latter "pronounces doom

1. Religion innerhalb p. 139. Cf. also seq.
4. Ib. p. 146, Cf. Kant's explanation of the term 'Son of Man', ib. p. 140, N.
5. Cf. ib. p. 146, N.
according to the utmost rigour of the law, "Christ, the symbol of man's highest moral ideal, takes into account such moral excellence as each individual may have been able to achieve, even though this achievement inevitably falls short of what his duty demanded of him. Kant comes most nearly to an adequate appreciation of the Christian position in a remarkable passage in which he describes the true nature of the church. "It can best be likened," he says, "to a household, a family, under a common though invisible, moral Father, in as much as God's holy son, who knows His will and who is at the same time related by ties of blood to all the members of the family, stands in the Father's place by making His will better known to them; in Him, therefore, they revere the Father and thus enter into a universal and enduring alliance of hearts."¹ In such a statement as this, Kant's indebtedness to the spirit of the Gospel narrative is obvious. On the whole, however, he preserves his apriori attitude to the whole subject with great consistency, distinguishing himself thereby both from the empirical, deistic and the historical, Christian standpoints.

We come now to Kant's doctrine of the church. The attitude of the deists to the church was one either of indifference or of purely destructive criticism. They uniformly condemned the various forms of ritual, thoroughly distrusted all priests, and regarded the church for the most part as an unmitigated evil. Kant once again surpasses them in discrimination and insight. While condemning what he characterizes as false worship of the Deity, he approaches the whole problem constructively and discovers a need not only for a universal ethical society, an invisible church, but also for a visible church, i.e. definite church organization and ritual. His evaluation of the church² illustrates once again

¹ Religion innerhalb --, p. 102
² Kant's doctrine is fully stated in ib. pp. 91 seq.
his conception of history and of the true nature of religion.

The need for the church arises from the fact that man in an "ethical state of nature" has a bad influence on his fellow men and they on him. Men must therefore band themselves together into an ethical state, a kingdom of virtue, whose object is their mutual protection and the promotion of the common ethical good. Now this state is unlike the political state in that it cannot be organized along democratic lines. The voice of the majority can have no weight with the individual here since it is the essence of morality that the individual be left wholly free to obey the dictates of his own conscience. Yet if this state is to possess any unity and universality it must somehow rest upon an objective basis external to the individual. To this end, Kant introduces the notion of God as public legislator; God is He in respect to whom all real duties may be conceived as founded on His commandments. Here again Kant is confronted with the difficulty of preserving man's moral autonomy and yet somehow relating God to man's moral duties. The relation, here, as elsewhere with Kant, remains external and unsatisfactory. All he can do is to say that "whenever anything is acknowledged to be duty --- obedience to it is enjoined by God." On this basis, then, the members of this ethical society may be fittingly called a "people of God combined under ethical laws."

Now as the very name, "Kingdom of God", implies, only "God Himself must be the author and founder of His own Kingdom". Since man can know nothing of such presumed activity on God's part, however, he "ought to proceed as if everything

1. Cf. Religion innerhalb----, p. 94, "It suffices that they be in one another's company, and that they be men, for them mutually to corrupt one another and plunge one another into evil."
2. Cf. ib. p. 99
3. Ib. p. 99 N.
4. Ib. p. 152. In Kant's statement, "It is contradictory to say that men ought to found a kingdom of God," we have an example of his very occasional recognition of what has been called the "divine initiative". As usual, however, he goes no further than to admit its theoretical possibility.
depended on himself." To found the universal church which is but the community of free ethical individuals is of course not in man's power. His duty, rather, is to build up a visible church which should be as close a copy of the invisible church as possible. Its basis should be that pure religious faith which is capable of being communicated and imparted to everyone. Yet here allowance must be made for the limitations of the masses. Most men refuse to believe that all that God requires of them is a moral life: they insist upon worshipping God in some special way. Here then, until men reach a higher state of rational insight, "ecclesiastical faith" is imperative. Pure religion must be clothed in symbols; alleged revelation must take the place of the dictates of conscience; historical events, instead of the commands of reason, must furnish a foundation for the whole ecclesiastical edifice; and all this symbolism must be kept in harmony throughout with true religion and must be amenable to interpretation in accordance with its principles. Now all these requirements are, in Kant's view, most satisfactorily met by historically grounded Christianity.

The goal of the ecclesiastical organization must be to educate the masses as rapidly as possible to the point where they can dispense with this historical paraphernalia and rely solely on pure ethical religion. "The coverings under which the embryo first moulded itself into the human form must be laid aside when it is ready to come forth into the light of day ----. As long as mankind 'was a child, he understood as a child' and knew the doctrines which had been proposed to him without his connivance----; 'but now that he is become a man, he puts away childish things.'"¹ The essence of "false worship", then, is the disregard of this principle and the viewing of means as ends.²

¹. Religion innerhalb ----, p. 121.
². Cf. Streit der Facultäten, p. 50. "Every ecclesiastical faith, in so far as it presents merely statutory doctrines of faith for genuinely religious doctrines, contains a certain mixture of heathendom, which consists in the presentation of the unessential externals of religion as essential."
Such misconception leads to a "worship of mighty, invisible things" which is the religion of fear; then priests are tempted to an unscrupulous use of the tremendous hold which they at once gain over the people and tend to become despotic officers instead of humble ministers intent on helping the masses to help themselves; and so, finally, a belief in incomprehensible dogmas, a slavish reliance on ceremony, and other similar forms of superstition come to prevail. The corrective for all these evils is, of course, a return to the basic principle of true ethical religion. All religious belief should be made to satisfy the supreme Kantian test, that "everything that mankind fancies he can do, over and above moral conduct, to make himself acceptable to God, is mere religious delusion and a false worship of the Deity."²

1. See Religion innerhalb---, p. 144. W., where Kant insists that regarding "every mystery offered us to be believed, we have a right to insist upon understanding what it means." Cf. also the second of his philosophical principles of Biblical interpretation, which reads, (Streit der Facultaten, p. 41), "Belief in Biblical doctrines which had to be revealed to be known is in itself no merit, and absence of such belief, even doubt regarding it, is in itself no demerit; rather, everything in religion depends upon doing, and this final goal ---- must be made the basis of all biblical articles of faith. "Cf. below p. 170.

2. Religion innerhalb---, p. 170. Cf. ib. p. 174 "It is a superstitious delusion to suppose that we can become acceptable to the Almighty by performing actions that any one can do without thereby becoming morally good."
Upon Christianity as a whole Kant looks with favour tempered with discrimination. He finds in all the chief tenets of natural religion, and identifies its essence with that religion's basic principles. Natural religion, he says, consists of two parts, morality, and the concepts of god and immortality - concepts whose objective validity must be assumed by practical reason. It is so simple, moreover, and its comprehension involves so little speculative ability, that everyone may convince himself of its practical truth. Finally, it is "practically" efficient, in that it helps man to the actual performance of his duty. Now although Christ is "not to be regarded as the founder of this religion, which, free of all doctrines, is engraved on every human heart," His design was none the less to acquaint men with just such a pure religious faith. An analysis of Christ's teachings shows them to be resolvable into the tenets of pure religion.

We can accept them, therefore, not on His authority but by virtue of their own obvious and inherent worth. Take for example Christ's command to love God and one's fellow men. Such a command needs to be interpreted. "Love to God, considered as an inclination (pathological love) is impossible, for He is not an object of the senses --. It is only practical love that is meant in that pith of

2. Ib. p. 159.
3. Cf. ib. p. 159-163. In this analysis Kant would seem to prove his point; his doctrines, so far as they go, are in harmony with Christian teaching. His exegesis is open to criticism, however, where he deliberately forces upon certain passages an interpretation alien to their original meaning and where he discards as useless or harmful some of the most essential elements of the Christian teaching.
4. Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, (Abbott's tr.) p. 226, "--- the Christian principle of morality itself is not theological (so as to be heteronomy) but is autonomy of pure practical reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and His will the foundation of these laws but only the attendant of the Summum Bonum on condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the proper spring of this obedience in the desired results but solely in the conception of duty." Cf. also Kant's letter to Lavater, April 28, 1775, "The most essential and most excellent portion of Christ's teaching is just this, that He places the sum of all religion in being virtuous to the limit of one's power - in the faith, that is, in the unconditioned trust, that God will then add the remaining good which is not in our power."
all laws ——. To love God —— means to do His commandments; to love one's neighbour means to like to practise all duties towards him." Thus understood, "that law of laws, like all the moral precepts of the Gospel, exhibits the moral disposition in all its perfection ——."\(^1\) Or again, take Christ's teaching regarding the Kingdom of God. This doctrine Kant finds to be in perfect harmony with his own concept of the Summum Bonum. "The doctrine of Christianity —— gives —— a conception of the Summum Bonum (the Kingdom of God) which alone satisfies the strictest demand of practical reason."\(^2\) Since the Christian law requires of man perfect holiness, and since all that finite man is capable of is progress in infinitum, he is justified in hoping for an endless duration of his existence, i.e. immortality. As regards the happiness element of the Summum Bonum, "Christian morality —— represents the world in which rational beings devote themselves with all their soul to the moral law as a Kingdom of God, in which nature and morality are brought into a harmony, foreign to each of itself, by the Holy Author, who makes the derived Summum Bonum possible." "Be the history, then, what it may —— [Christ's teachings] can be nothing but precepts of pure reason; and it is these alone that not only prove themselves but furnish the chief basis for faith in the other doctrines."\(^3\) "— — This wonderful religion with its great simplicity of statement has enriched philosophy with far more definite and far purer concepts of morality than it [philosophy] had hitherto been able to furnish. Yet, once proclaimed, they are freely assented to by reason and are regarded as concepts to which it could well have come of itself, and which it could and should have introduced."\(^4\)

2. Ib. p. 224, seq.
4. Critique of Judgment (Bernard's tr. slightly adapted) p. 410, N.
Kant sees in Christianity, moreover, a "learned religion", i.e. one "which propounds certain credenda as necessary, although these statutory articles of faith can by no means be recognized as such by reason." This side of Christianity would not be necessary "if every one were learned"; even Christ, however, recognized the limitations of those among whom He worked and accordingly added to His pure ethical teaching "certain statutes containing forms and observances" which He intended "merely as a means to bring a church --- into existence."¹ As a learned religion, Christianity rests on history and requires for its comprehension historical and Biblical investigation. By constant reference to the touchstone of natural religion, however, it may be kept free from what Kant characterizes as occult doctrines, whose effect upon man's moral conduct is uniformly bad. Among these, Kant numbers miracles, mysteries, works of Grace and means of Grace, when, as often happens, these are misunderstood and consequently misused. As we have already seen, he dismisses miracles as possible but un demonstrable.

He analyzes the concept of a mystery with some care. A religious doctrine may be legitimately mysterious in the sense of being incapable of proof by speculative reason; but it must on no account be unintelligible, and it must possess definite, practical significance.² Works of Grace and means of Grace are distinguished from each other by being made to refer, the one to what God does for us, and the other to what we can do to occasion such divine activity. Of the former we can know nothing; "we can make room for the notion of works of Grace, but we cannot adopt it into our maxims either for practical or for theoretical use."³ And as to the latter, the only legitimate means of Grace are good actions. Beyond an honest striving after a good life we can do nothing to occasion a supernatural operation

¹. Religion innerhalb ---, p. 158.
². The chief of such allowable mysteries is the symbolic Trinity, while three derivative mysteries which fall under the same category are the mystery of our divine calling into a state of freedom and the mysteries of election and redemption. Cf. Religion innerhalb ---, p. 142, seq.
³. Ib. p. 53.
in our behalf. Men often err by attempting to evade this truth in resorting to various subterfuges such as reliance upon church ritual and other religious practices. They lean, that is, upon God's beneficence and forget his other attributes of perfect holiness and righteousness. Kant admits the value of certain rites and ceremonies as aids to the imagination, provided their symbolic character and purely subjective significance be never overlooked. He defines prayer as "conversing in and with yourself under the pretext of communicating more intelligibly with God," and admits that it may be helpful to men of limited capacity as a "leading string of the imagination" and as a means of strengthening one's own moral purposes. The attempt should constantly be made, however, to transcend the need for such verbal prayer and to substitute an attitude of continued respect for the moral law and adoration of God. Similarly, church worship may be of value in infecting others with the contagion of ethical enthusiasm, and the rites of baptism and communion in strengthening the moral disposition of children, parents, and the "society of believers." Undue emphasis, however, should not be placed on these symbols, and the truths underlying them should never be forgotten.

Finally, the New Testament, properly interpreted, may be relied on as a dependable and valuable guide. "We may without hypocrisy, say of the moral teaching of the Gospel that it, first, by the purity of its moral principle, and, at the same time, by its suitability to the limitations of finite beings, brought all the good conduct of men under the discipline of a duty plainly set forth before their eyes, which does not permit them to indulge in dreams of imagined moral perfections; and that it also set the bounds of humility (i.e. self-knowledge) to self-conceit as well as to self-love----".

1. Religion innerhalb----, p. 197.
2. Cf. Religion innerhalb----, pp. 193, 196 n, 198, on church worship; pp. 193, 199, on baptism; and pp. 193, 199 on communion.
What has already been said regarding the fundamental similarity between Kant and the deists in their attitude towards natural religion, the Bible and Christ, applies equally to their respective estimates of Christianity as a whole. Kant's main position is undoubtedly deistic. Against the complete rejection of Christianity by persons of an anti-religious turn of mind on the one hand, and its thorough-going support by more orthodox Christians on the other, Kant and the deists both occupy a position midway between the two hostile camps. Like the deists, Kant approaches Christianity with his mind already made up regarding the source, nature and validity of religious truth, and accepting that in the Christian teaching which harmonizes with his preconceived religious notions, discards the rest. We may with justice repeat that deism, taken in the large, finds in Kant its highest and most persuasive exponent.

An exhaustive criticism of Kant's estimate of Christianity from what may be called a Christian point of view would be quite impossible in the present study. His attitude, however, is so strikingly unchristian in one or two essential respects that a bare mention of these may be of interest. "Christians," says a famous German theologian,¹ "are fully agreed as to the general meaning of Christianity. It is a communion of the soul with the living God through the mediation of Christ." Now Kant does not believe in the soul's communion with God; in this, as we shall presently point out, he is simply unreligious. But neither does he believe in the mediating agency of Christ, and it is this above all else that marks him as fundamentally unchristian. The German theologian, Wehrung, has recently drawn an interesting comparison between Kant and Luther, in which he points out some of their most essential differences.² What then,

2. I refer, in closing this section, to this article by Wehrung (see bibliography of Chapter IV, above p. 137) because it seems to me that in the contrast between Kant, the highest apostle of deism, and Luther, the founder of protestant Christianity, we have epitomised the fundamental difference between the typically deistic and Christian points of view. The passages from Luther are quoted by Wehrung and translated by myself.
in a word, is Luther's central thesis?

It is, in the first place, that not man but God takes the first step in man's redemption. "It is not man who takes hold of and lays the first stone; God alone, apart from all human desire or request, must act first by offering man a pledge. This word of God is, from the beginning, the ground, the rock, upon which all subsequent acts, words and thoughts of man are built; and this divine assurance man must gratefully accept, believing in faith in the divine promise." Be sure, says Luther, that "God is a true God who works mighty, righteous and divine works in you!"

The second and equally essential article of Luther's creed is that it is through Christ that God's promise is revealed to man; in Christ man learns of God's forgiving love. "Advance through Christ's heart into the heart of God—. The deeper and the more steadfastly you reconstruct and gaze upon the figure of Christ, the more does the vision of death fall away of itself and disappear, without strife or vexation, leaving your heart at peace." "Christ, thou art to us the vision of life and grace, our comfort in the face of the vision of sin and death!"

Kant, we have shown, reveres above all else the moral law; the concept of duty arouses in him the highest wonder and reverence; and in man's innate sense of ought he sees his one and only conceivable redeemer. Compare this with Luther's assurance that through faith man is raised above the law. "Laws necessitate and restrict; faith alone breaks through the circle of self-torment, of weariness and labour, and helps on the original unfolding of man's powers for good."

"The Law (die Gebote) can teach man and prescribe to him various good works; that in itself, however, falls far short of securing their accomplishment. It points the way, but offers no assistance; it teaches him what to do, but fails to give him the strength to do it. For this reason it is of use only to this

1. For Kant's answer to this, see Streit der Facultäten, p. 47
end, that through it man sees his incapacity for goodness, learns to doubt himself, and turns elsewhere for assistance, that he may free himself of his evil desires and thus satisfy the law through the help of another—. Now when once man has thus learned and experienced his impotence, so that he feels afraid lest he be not able to satisfy the law, since either the law must be complied with or he must suffer damnation, he is thoroughly humbled and made worthless in his own eyes, finding nothing within himself to render him godly. Then comes to him that other Word, that divine promise and pledge, which says to him: If you desire to fulfill the whole law and to be rid of your evil longings and your sins, even as the law compels and commands you, look you, believe in Christ, in whom I pledge to you all grace, righteousness, peace and freedom—believe, and all these are yours!"

What then is to be our final estimate of Kant's view of religion? "Religion," he says, "is, viewed subjectively, the recognition of all our duties as (als) divine commands." It is highly significant that nothing is said here or elsewhere of the objective reality of religion. It has for him no objective reality; religion is just man's way of regarding morality and nothing more - a subjective point of view and never an objective fact. Kant defines 'true religion' in the first book of the Religion innerhalb ------. "We may divide all religions into two classes - favour-seeking religions (mere worship) and the moral religion, the religion of a good life. By the former, a man either flatters himself that God can make him eternally happy (by remission of his demerits), without his having any need to become a better man; or, if this does not seem possible to him, that God can make him a better man without his having to do anything in the matter himself except to ask for it. ---

But in the moral religion (and amongst all the public religions that have ever existed the Christian alone is moral) it is a fundamental principle that everyone must do as much as lies in his power to become a better man, and that it is only when he has not buried his innate talent (Luke xix, 12-16), when he has used the original capacity for good so as to become a better man, that he can hope that what is not in his power will be supplied by a higher co-operation. --- But then the principle holds good - 'it is not essential and therefore not necessary for everyone to know what God does or has done for his salvation' - but it is essential to know what he himself has to do in order to be worthy of this assistance."² Here again the object of Kant's main emphasis is

2. It. p. 51.
apparent. It is ethical conduct as such, not man's vital relation to God or God's interest in man. His religious theory is anthropocentric, not theocentric. God is not the source of the moral law; it is rather His business to fall in line with the law's requirements. Neither is it man's first duty to seek to obey the voice of God; as Kant points out in the Critique of Practical Reason, God must always be conceived "as estimating the worth of rational beings only by their disinterested behaviour as prescribed to themselves by that idea (of the dignity of man) alone. The essence of things is not altered by their external relations [i.e., among other things, their relation to God], and that which, abstracting from these, alone constitutes the absolute worth of man, is also that by which he must be judged, whoever the judge may be, and even by the Supreme Being."¹ It is in ethics, not religion, that Kant finds revealed the nature of ultimate reality; "pure practical reason" is to him man's only guide in these matters; religion is but the practical faith in the victory of the ethical over the phenomenal world, and God but the personification of this faith. "The Deist believes in a God, the Theist in a living God,"² says Kant, seeking to identify himself with the theistic camp. Now Kant's God is living in the sense that He is not conceived as "an eternal nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme Being who is the free and intelligent Author of things."³ The English deists, however, would admit as much. Neither to them nor to Kant, on the other hand, is God vitally and immediately related to the world to neither is man's active relationship to God a matter of prime concern.

¹. Critique of Practical Reason, (Abbott's tr.) p. 58. My italics
3. Id. p. 383.
Their common attitude may be described as that of conceiving God as an essentially extra-mundane Being whose present relation to the world and man is fundamentally external.

The chief criticism of Kant's religious position, consequently, must be directed to its deistic externality. From the point of view of ethics, on the one hand, religion, as Kant conceived it, is of no essential value. "When the morality of the 'categorical imperative'" says Pfleiderer, "is related to religion by the moral duties being said to be the commandments of a divine legislator who is at the same time the retributive governor and judge of men, this relation is not one that belongs to the principle of morality, it is fortuitous, and has the appearance of an after-thought. We are told that this reference of the moral law to a divine legislation cannot add to its authority, which is based on itself alone; and also that the idea of a retributive judge ought to have no influence with us in the fulfilment of duty, lest that should be tinged with eudaemonism by such a consideration. The whole relation of morality to religion thus becomes a useless appendix to morality, which is sufficient for itself, and the value and importance of the reference are more than problematical." From the point of view of the religion, on the other hand, no place can be found for the unique religious consciousness in Kant's system as a whole. In content, religion as Kant is never weary of reiterating coincides with pure morality, and is distinctive only in its outward form, this symbolic garment in which it clothes itself as a concession to the ignorance of the masses being of no essential or abiding worth. This position may be illustrated by a reference to Kant's discussion of the mechanical and teleological principles in the Critique of Judgment. One of these principles, he there

2. See above p. 113.
points out, must be wholly subordinated to the other, and science seeks to subordinate the teleological to the mechanical principle, viewing the latter as basic and essential, the former as transient and temporary, of merely present subjective value. Kant's attitude to religion is precisely what he has called the scientific attitude to teleology. It is the ethical principle now which is fundamental and abiding and the religious attitude which is subjectively necessary for the moment but which is due to pass away as mankind attains to a clearer understanding of the true nature of ethical truth. And we, in our turn, may criticize Kant as he criticized the scientific estimate of teleology. The religious impulse, we can point out, is a vital and independently real element in human life. The religious consciousness is as genuine as is the moral consciousness of which Kant was so sensitively aware; the two are closely related to each other but are not to be identified. At its lowest, the religious instinct expresses itself in what, on a higher level, is judged to be superstition. Like man's other instincts, it needs to be purified and enriched. But even in its less developed manifestations it is not to be condemned as wholly "false" or worthless. Still less is true religion to be identified exclusively with what Kant conceives to be the essence of morality. It is true that a religion not in harmony with the highest concept of morality known to the religious subject soon sinks into decay, for the religious consciousness must embrace the truest ethical principles which it can discover. But the unique nature and value of all religion or "God-sickness", as it has been called, is a fact not to be lost sight of.

Kant derives religion from ethics, and we have suggested, in contrast, that the two are distinct though closely related aspects of man's spiritual life. May we not go further and consider the religious attitude as the more basic of the two? Of course this is a theme the development of which would carry us far
beyond our present purpose, which is merely to point out the weaknesses in Kant's religious position. Reference, however, should be made to this alternative argument. The German theologian, Troeltsch, for example, develops this theme from the Christian point of view in his criticism of Herrmann's *Ethik*.

Herrmann, Troeltsch points out, is a faithful Kantian except in the one important particular that he teaches that man cannot help himself, as Kant has insisted, but that he must look to Christ for the assistance which He has promised to afford. In agreement with Kant, however, Herrmann asserts the autonomy of the ethical consciousness and the ethical self-sufficiency of the moral law. Troeltsch's thesis, in contrast, is that one of the most important elements of Christ's teaching is His ethical theory, His practical ethical principles which rest upon, and acquire their significance from, His doctrine of God. The Christian concept of a moral God, that is, is not reached through an autonomous ethic; rather, the Christian ethic takes its colour from, and possesses ultimate validity because of, its religious foundation. Or, to state Troeltsch's position in Kantian terminology, the moral law is now conceived to acquire its authority from the fact that it is God's law; God, not man's moral consciousness, is the measure of its perfection. This, it is clear, is to invert Kant's whole position and to make God, not morality as such, basic in the spiritual realm.

In what we have described as Kant's theistic suggestions he himself approaches this idea of God as the fountainhead of reality, the starting-point in all discussion of value. Kant's nearest approach to a recognition of the genuinely religious instinct is to be found in a striking passage in the *Critique of Judgment*. "Suppose," says Kant, "the case of a man at the moment when his mind is disposed to a moral sensation. If surrounded by a beautiful

nature, he is in a state of restful, serene enjoyment of his being, he feels a
want, viz. to be grateful for this to some being or other. Or if another time
he finds himself in the same state of mind when pressed by duties that he can and
will only competently perform by a voluntary sacrifice, he again feels in himself
a want, viz. to have thus executed a command and obeyed a supreme Lord. Or,
again; if he has in some heedless way transgressed his duty, but without becoming
answerable to men, his severe self-reproach will speak to him with the voice of
a judge to whom he has to give account. In a word, he needs a moral Intelligence,
in order to have a Being for the purpose of his existence, which may be --- the
cause of himself and of the world.1 But, Kant characteristically hastens to
add, this need of man is rationally aroused, and is encouraged "on the mere
recommendation of a pure practical reason legislating by itself alone."

His more typical attitude towards God may be illustrated by a passage2
from the same Critique in which he contrasts true religion and superstition.
In a superstitious state, he says, man is not possessed of the assurance which
a moral disposition affords. There is therefore aroused in him "fear and
apprehension of the all-powerful to whose will the terrified man sees himself
subject." He accordingly seeks to pacify the God of wrath with "prostration,
adoration with bent head, with contrite, anxious demeanour and voice." Now
"the man who is actually afraid, because he finds reasons for fear in himself,
whilst conscious by his culpable disposition of offending against a Might whose
will is irresistible and at the same time just, is not in a frame of mind for
admiring the divine greatness." Here, that is, we have, according to Kant,
a case of superstition, not religion. The truly religious and sublime state

of mind, Kant assures us, is rather one of free contemplation and capable of free judgment. "Only if he is conscious of an upright disposition pleasing to God do those operations of might (in nature) serve to awaken in him the Idea of the sublimity of this Being, for then he recognizes in himself a sublimity of disposition conformable to His will; and thus he is raised above the fear of such operations of nature which he no longer regards as outbursts of His wrath. Even humility, in the shape of a stern judgment upon his own faults — which otherwise, with a consciousness of good intentions, could be easily palliated from the frailty of human nature — is a sublime state of mind, consisting in a voluntary subjection of himself to the pain of remorse in order that the causes of this may be gradually removed." Kant concluded that it is from this state of mind that there "arises a religion which consists in a good life."

It has seemed worth while to quote this passage at length because it admirably illustrates Kant's religious position. Without attempting an elaborate analysis — the keynote of the passage is surely Kant's self-reliance, self-respect, self-satisfaction. There is of course much in this attitude to admire, and much in what Kant calls the superstitious attitude to condemn. Man as free, as obedient to his own conscience, as doing his utmost because his conscience tells him that it is his duty — this is perhaps the noblest concept that finds expression in Kant's writings. This self-sufficient, judiciously self-critical attitude is not, however, the truly religious attitude. What great religious mind is not made "conscious by his culpable disposition of offending against a Might whose will is irresistible and at the same time just?" Or what great religious leader is prepared to admit that "he is conscious of an upright disposition pleasing to God?" Or, finally, what religiously-minded person needs to achieve a "voluntary

subjection of himself to the pain of remorse in order that the causes of this may be gradually removed?" Does the religious attitude not rather arise from the fact that God first casts us into the pit of despair by revealing to us our own inadequacy and worthlessness, and then raises us up with the assurance of His assistance and His love? And is the fear of God not driven out of our hearts by virtue of the revelation to us of His Fatherhood, rather than by the complacent consciousness that we have attained to an appreciable degree of worthiness? The religious attitude thus described does not of course preclude the elements of strength in Kant's doctrine of man's autonomy; it rests on the conviction, rather, that human freedom and obedience to God are not mutually exclusive - that man may retain his self respect and freedom and yet acknowledge the active working presence of God in his life. Once again, Kant has his eyes fixed too steadfastly upon man and his heart too set on preserving man's autonomy to allow him to comprehend the part God plays in a genuinely theistic view of religion. Kant's religion, we may repeat, is anthropocentric and therefore no religion at all.

We have spoken of the causes of Kant's limited religious outlook. There is his individualism, which induced him to cut man off from God and from his fellow-men and forced him to believe that man must rely only on himself; there is his distrust of all empirical evidence, historical and psychological alike, and his abiding conviction that only what is attainable a priori is worthy of man's highest trust; finally, there is his abstract intellectualism, which made him suspicious of all man's emotions and feelings and led him to place his sole reliance on man's reason. Kant's appreciation of the moral consciousness is of course a most important exception to this intellectualism. It is strange that

1. Kant approaches this view in the Critique of Practical Reason (Abbott's tr) p. 225, N; "Christian morality --- takes from man all confidence that he can be fully adequate to it, at least in this life, but again sets it up by enabling him to hope that if we act as well as it is in our power to do, then, what is not in our power will come in to our aid from another source, whether we know how this may be or not."
his recognition of the existence and significance of this unique human faculty did not lead him on to an apprehension of the similar yet equally unique religious faculty in man - his hunger for the divine and his innate capacity for appeal and response to God.

Yet the value of Kant's general undertaking in writings on religion is unquestionable. Here we see him making the worthy attempt to separate the form of religion from its substance, the transitory element in it from the abiding. Though his solution of this problem must today be judged highly unsatisfactory, and though he often casts out as unessential or harmful what would appear to be of the very essence of religion, Kant, in company with the English deists, does at least stress the important idea that it is possible to discriminate, in a religion, between essential and unessential elements. His analysis of the church-form of Christianity as he sees it results, moreover, in an emphasis, significantly in harmony with the pietist position, upon certain religious views of undoubted worth. In his objection to all external authority in the realm of religious conviction, his denouncement of all lip-service as a substitute for inner obedience, and his emphasis on the practical side of religion, the "religion of a good life" Kant not only proves his own complete sincerity - he also thereby identifies himself with the long line of reformers so essential to the spiritual health of every religious community.

We have had to deal with Kant's ethical system at some length because of his virtual identification of morality and religion. Professor Pringle-Pattison has pointed out the influence which the heart of Kant's ethical doctrine has had upon subsequent idealist philosophy. Kant's central idea of value, as the determining factor in philosophical explanation, he takes to be "not only sound
in itself but the fundamental contention of all idealist philosophy since Kant's time. Our interest centres rather in the importance to religion of Kant's doctrine of man - of his emphasis on the inherent and abiding value of the individual together with his teaching regarding the "radical evil" in man. And his emphasis on the need for rebirth, his insistence that good works do not make a man good but that a man must be good for his works to be good, is perhaps the finest example of Kant's insight into human nature. It certainly furnishes a forceful illustration of the depths of Kant's thinking in contrast to the superficiality of the more typical thinkers of the age.

Mention should finally be made of Kant's valuable distinction between faith and speculative knowledge. The extreme character of this distinction is open to criticism. Knowledge is far too narrowly restricted in the Kantian philosophy. Too much of the world is declared by Kant in his most characteris tic utterances to be beyond our ken. Thought and reality are separated in his teaching by too wide a chasm. Yet the negative side of his philosophy does religion the service of pointing out with remarkable clearness, that man's desire for a doctrine to be true is no proof of that doctrine's truth, and that no concept is worthy of a place in a man's religion if its retention involves intellectual dishonesty. And surely Kant's central contention that religion rests not on theoretical reasoning but on a reasonable faith is of abiding worth. Every religion has of course its necessary theological background and its inevitable metaphysical presuppositions. Reason must inevitably seek to explain to itself the implications of religious faith and must do its best to arrive at a consistent view of God and His relation to the world and man. Towards the solution of

this problem, Kant's theistic suggestions have been of outstanding value. Religious faith, however does not have its source in rational proofs of God's existence and cannot rest solely on a metaphysical or intellectual basis. Faith cannot be translated into pure rational or speculative insight. Kant approached this view when he related faith to the moral consciousness and made it a function of practical reason. He was prevented from going further by his blindness to the fact of man's unique religious faculty and by his apriori bias which led him to distrust all historically-mediated doctrines centering around personalities. This limitation sharply distinguishes his religious position from what may be called the Christian attitude, which sees in an historical Person at once the source and the object of religious faith. Where Kant has faith only in ideas, "the Christian intuition," as a modern theologian has put it, "is that ideas, divorced from personal lives in which they are embodied and events through which these persons reveal what is in them, remain frail, shadowy, impotent." And where Kant persists in valuing the apriori argument and in declaring all history to be incapable of supplying to the religious consciousness facts of first-rate importance, the modern Christian view is rather that "history is the very sphere and medium of God's redemptive approach to His children," and that from history is to be derived "the very life and enthusiasm of religion." In these and other ways, Kant's view of faith is limited and unsatisfactory. Religion must acknowledge its debt to him, however, for having emphasized the notion of a reasonable faith, for having given it, in religious matters, the primacy over speculative rationalization, and for having made it the vehicle by which man may attain to a vision of the realm of ends and to a serviceable knowledge of God.

1. Mackintosh, _The Divine Initiative_, p. 49.

2. Ib. p. 52.