To those engaged in a daily social struggle to invent
a new material and discursive reality in the Sudan
Declaration

This thesis has been composed by me and is entirely my own work, and has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Ashraf K. Abdelhay
ABSTRACT
The National Congress Party (NCP), representing the government of the Sudan, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed key peace protocols on the 26th May 2004 in the Kenyan town of Naivasha. The Protocol on Power–sharing contains a significant section on language policy. Having a language policy interwoven within the very discoursal fabric of the Protocol on Power–sharing is an arena of intense power struggle between the south and the north. Indeed, it has been so since the emergence of the colonial Southern Policy. The historical social struggle between the south and the north of Sudan, which incorporates unequal power relations, is encoded in the linguistic signs of the language policy. The current Interim National Constitution has adopted the Naivasha Language Policy. The study has four main objectives. The first objective is to historicise the Naivasha Language Policy. The study aims to disinvent the ‘naturalised’ notions of ‘indigenous languages’, ‘north Sudan’, and ‘south Sudan’ by revealing their colonial constructedness. The social and semiotic processes involved in the colonial representation of the discursive differentiation of the ‘south’ from the ‘north’ are examined. The historical analysis of the colonial Southern Policy reveals the hidden agenda that lies behind what might be termed the ‘politics of linguistic indigenousness’. The analysis demonstrates that the technical phrase ‘indigenous languages’ is used as part of a metaphorical strategy of symbolic differentiation of the ‘African south’ from the ‘Arab north’. The fact that the south is to gain the right to external self–determination in four years’ time points to the political instrumentality of the notion of linguistic indigenousness in language planning. The second objective is to examine the language rights regime embodied in the Naivasha Language Policy. One of the central arguments is that the language rights embedded in the Naivasha Language Policy should not be conceptualised in essentialising and totalising terms as a set of abstract universal givens. Instead, the contention is that the notion of language rights should be treated as part of the ‘habitus’ of the concerned community of practice. The employment of the concept of habitus as an analytic tool can help us avoid the essentialist trap of the mainstream ‘language–rights’ paradigm by asserting the social constructedness of languages, identities, and rights. Thus, grounding the advocacy of language rights in the notion of habitus can
provide a means of uncoupling language from religion and race in the Sudan. It is demonstrated that the colonial construction of identities in the Sudan involved, among other things, the invention of traditions, the construction of languages, the (re)creation of tribal boundaries, and the racial classification of people.

The third objective of the study is a comparative analysis between the proposed structural political system and the discourse of the Naivasha Language Policy. The argument here is that a faithful implementation of the Naivasha Language Policy within a multinational democratic federation informed by the principle of active citizenship can act as both: 1) a strategic corrective to the divisive monolingual ideology of Arabicisation, and 2) a foundation for a new regime of language rights determined by a bottom–up approach. The fourth objective is to explore the relationship between the allocation of political power in the peace protocols and the language policy, and to investigate the ways in which power relations may influence the realisation of the language policy. The analysis shows that the proposed configuration of power relations would mainly affect the language situation in the south of Sudan. The thesis concludes with an assessment of the current status of the institutional implementation of the language policy text.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>Critical Language Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>(UN) Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFT</td>
<td>First Fail Try</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPF</td>
<td>Just Peace Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Members’ Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCRC</td>
<td>National Constitutional Review Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLP</td>
<td>Naivasha Language Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACDNU</td>
<td>Sudan African Closed District National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOAS</td>
<td>The School of Oriental and African Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLC</td>
<td>The Tima Language Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ARABIC WORDS

The practice adopted in this thesis concerning Arabic words is that the transliterated words are placed into two inverted commas to be followed by an English translation placed into two brackets. For the Arabic public announcements cited in Chapter Five, the practice followed in this thesis is that the announcement is reproduced in its totality (without any intervention), and then a context and translation are provided under the announcement. Translations of the political announcements are mine. The list below gives an English equivalent to the Arabic words used in the text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic Word</th>
<th>English Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abid</td>
<td>slaves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>almashru alhadar</td>
<td>Islamist Civilisation Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awlad Albalad</td>
<td>inheritors of the land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awlad Al’arb</td>
<td>children of Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>halabi</td>
<td>belonging to a Gypsy–type racial group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khalwa</td>
<td>Quranic pre-elementary schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khawaja</td>
<td>European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khatuba</td>
<td>religious preaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lahjat</td>
<td>dialects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lughat</td>
<td>languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma’had</td>
<td>an Islamic school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mondokoro</td>
<td>Arabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahideen (jadiya)</td>
<td>soldiers fighting for Muslim beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>omdas</td>
<td>tribal leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baqt</td>
<td>pact/treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qadis</td>
<td>Judges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharia</td>
<td>Islamic law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sheikh algarya</td>
<td>village leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tafsir</td>
<td>religious explanation/interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayid</td>
<td>master</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to acknowledge a deep sense of gratitude to Prof. John Joseph for supervising this thesis starting from when it was nothing more than an idea. I am deeply indebted to him for encouraging me to work on the Naivasha Language Policy as a timely research topic, and for introducing me to the social anthropological area of nationalism studies on which I draw largely in this work. I should express my debt to my second supervisor Joseph Gafaranga for his help and support during the course of conducting this study. I am grateful to Hugh Trappes Lomax for his encouragement and advice.

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All errors and shortcomings in this work are my own responsibility.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the problem

Nation-builders in the Sudan have, unsurprisingly, conceptualised ‘multilingualism, language change, and non–standard usage’ as ‘threats to the very foundation of a culture, since the language itself is the principal text in which the culture’s mental past and its present coherence are grounded’ (Joseph 2006a: 33). Yet, the consideration given to language in the Naivasha peace accord is an indication that the two rivals who signed them, or at least one of them, have recovered from a kind of imperial amnesia – ‘the inability or refusal to confront the complexity of history from which emerged various discourses on language and education’ (Tupas 2003: 1) – and have recognised the fact that the question of language is there at the heart of the struggle. The Naivasha Language Policy (NLP) is shaped by the social relations of power between the NCP (National Congress party) and the SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army). The peace agreement in its totality is intended to create new social conditions at societal and institutional levels that can be summed up in the ideologically charged phrase of ‘New Sudan’. The political project of ‘New Sudan’ is expected to transform the old social order with its associated institutions.

The month of May 2004 was a landmark in the history of the Sudan when the Government of the Sudan (represented by the National Congress Party, NCP) and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A, the major southern opposition) signed key peace protocols on the 26th in Naivasha, Kenya. The Protocol on Power Sharing contains an important section of language policy which has become a fundamental part of the current Interim National Constitution. The main five statements which constitute the Naivasha language policy are:

2.8 Language:

2.8.1 All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be respected, developed and promoted.

2.8.2 Arabic language is the widely spoken national language in the Sudan.

2.8.3 Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the official working languages of the National Government business and languages of instruction for higher education.
2.8.4 In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-national level of government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working language(s) at its level.

2.8.5 The use of either language at any level of government or education shall not be discriminated against.

This thesis is concerned with the analysis of the above five statements. To construct a historically informed interpretation of these five clauses, I shall look at the politics of linguistic indigenousness, the historical genealogy of Arabicisation, the colonial narrative of language planning, the social construction of social identities, the politics of racial identity, and the development in the epistemological and methodological foundations which inform the linguistic analysis of language policy discourses.

The current reality of the disparate polities in Sudan challenges us to make the practice of language planning more politically accountable, and not to remain disengaged from the ideological question of how we became the way we are. Colonial and postcolonial language policies that are designed on the basis of ideologically–laden views of ‘who we should be’ rather than ‘who we really are’ have resulted in the construction of unequal power relations between the south and the north. A critical invocation of the constructed national diachronic narrative may provide just one reply to the question of how we came to be the way we are. History is certainly bilingual, as Makoni (2007) has asserted, in the sense that different nationalist groups in the Sudan have their own readings of the past. The claim that the blind imposition of a particular top–down nationalist project in a pluralist ecology was an act of betrayal to the cultural and linguistic diversity of the land, while provocative to nationalists, is in my view quite tenable. To argue that language is not part of the power struggle over material and discursive resources plays into the conspiracy of silence that aims at wiping out the very multilinguality of history. The dynamic and contingent struggle between a multiplicity of interpretations over ‘who we should be’ (e.g., an Arab, African, Afro–Arab country, etc.) rather than over ‘who we really are’ shatters any claim to ‘neutrality’ held by many ideological positions. Despite the availability of alternatives, nationalists and power holders chose plans which resulted in linguistic and cultural homogenisation, deploying coercive means
of implementation. This was backed up with the machinery of state–education and centralised bureaucratic incorporation. The state–nation practice of language planning and policy has engaged at some stage in the constitutionalisation of linguistic inequality. The postcolonial practice of language planning not only constructed but also ‘naturalised’, among other things, the colonial constructedness of some linguistic resources as ‘indigenous languages’, the invention of artificial tribal boundaries, and the designing of racial/ethnic typologies. These colonial constructs were the base upon which two self–contained identities in the Sudan were invented: the south vs. the north. Colonial and postcolonial policies, I would argue, led to the fixation of particular ideological constructions of identity as ‘given’, ‘natural’, and ‘obvious’. Hence, the centrality of the practice of linguistic standardisation in the ‘politics of linguistic indigenousness’ is all the more important in the social struggle over ‘who we really are’, and ultimately over ‘who is/is not part of the soil’. The colonial construction of ‘indigenous languages’ and ‘indigenous people’ relied upon ‘a dialectic of collective remembering and forgetting’ (Billig 1995: 10). Here a caveat should be added. There is little doubt that the ‘tribe’ in the African or Arabic universe of discourse is a precolonial social organisation. The European view of the ‘tribe’, on the other hand, is somewhat different. The colonial order did not view the ‘tribe’ as a natural social group; rather it viewed it as a social unit with a ‘tribal chief’ invested with sufficient political power. In order to bring into existence these ‘tribal chiefs’ with moral and material power, ‘tribes’ in this strict European sense were reconstructed, and in some situations, invented. Kurita (1994: 203) explains the difference between the different representations of the ‘tribe’ as follows:

Sometimes, especially in the south and in some parts of the Nuba Mountains, the British encountered societies which were, unlike northern Sudanese society, unmistakably ‘tribal’, but totally different from the ideal ‘tribe’ the British had in mind. They lacked a tribal chief, an asset essential in the eyes of the colonial administrators. They were examples of what Evans-Prichard called a ‘stateless society’, a society presumably lacking any form of government. Undaunted, the British administrators managed to invent ‘tribal chiefs’ in these cases. (Kurita 1994: 203)
The point here is that although part of the focus in this thesis is on the colonial narrative of social identities in the Sudan, this should not be taken to imply that the pre-colonial history is unimportant or should be ignored. A view which adopts this position is ahistorical. Rather, there was an interaction between the pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial histories. This continuist perspective asserts the fact that the colonial and postcolonial orders did not take place in a social vacuum.

It is language that always has the decisive job in the operation of this ideology and the construction of all forms of ideological consciousness (Voloshinov 1973: 13). Thus, the ‘demythologising’ of the common-place beliefs about our linguistic identity depends on a critical examination of concrete patterns of discourse (Billig 1996: 17). The discourse of the Naivasha Language Policy remains, at least at the level of political conviction, an endeavour to demythologise the taken-for-grantedness of linguistic inequality, and to construct a new discursive identity instead.

1.2 The objectives of the study

The study sets out:

1. To provide a sociohistorical contextualisation of the discourse of the language policy. The aim here is to understand the distribution of languages in the Sudan prior to the institutional intervention of language planning. The linguistic typology of African languages by Greenberg (1963a) provides an analytic and logical piece of evidence against the dominant language ideologies. The (colonial/postcolonial) language ideologies conceptualise the north and the south in monolithic and essentialising terms as two separate identities. Another related objective here is to identify the sociopolitical implications of Greenberg’s work. The focus here is not on the purely technical aspect of the ways in which Greenberg implements a morphological analysis to draw structural resemblances between languages.

2. To historicise the statement that ‘all indigenous languages are national languages’ by constructing an interpretation of overt and hidden effects behind this political status–planning declaration. I perform a critical analysis
of the social historical conditions (at textual, intertextual, and contextual levels) which have led to the discursive construction of the ‘indigenous’ as both ‘language’ and ‘national’. In the course of doing so, I contend that the (colonial/postcolonial) practice of language planning in the Sudan in itself has acted, in the language of Blommaert (1999a: 9), as an ‘ideology broker’, both when: 1) it has ideologically and coercively ‘objectified’ and ‘naturalized’ the imposition of the Arabic language as a single official/national language upon non–Arabic speaking regions, and 2) when it has endorsed a top–down approach with the intention to shape the linguistic social practices of the diverse multilingual polities. I show that the expression ‘indigenous languages’ in the NLP is intended to act as a metaphorical strategy of symbolic differentiation of the ‘African south’ from the ‘Arab north’. I would contend that what is called ‘indigenous languages’ in the Sudan is a colonial invention intended as a dialectical part of the project of constructing two separate social identities in the Sudan. Hence it is my objective to ‘disinvent’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006) the ‘normalised’ notions of ‘indigenous languages’, the ‘north Sudan’, and the ‘south Sudan’ by revealing their colonial constructedness. Drawing on Irvine and Gal (2000), I investigate the social and semiotic processes involved in the colonial representation of the ‘south’ and the ‘north’. I argue that the political notions of the ‘south’ and the ‘north’ are in themselves social creations that involved the colonial construction of linguistic differentiation. A discussion of the colonial institutional practices requires a consideration of the policies of Arabicisation/Arabisation (‘Arabisation’ and ‘Arabicisation’ will be used interchangeably) and Islamisation. During the course of analysing the historical contexts which have conditioned or shaped the north-south relation, I have come to the view that Phillipson’s (1992) critique of English linguistic imperialism does not quite fit the colonial social context in the southern Sudan, where English served alongside local languages in the resistance to Arabicisation. I point out that that the necessary correlation of Arabic with Islam is a product of the colonial policy in the Sudan that involved the process of ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), creations
of tribes, construction of ‘indigenous languages’, etc. I show that the linguistic dimension of the colonial Southern Policy provides one of the significant and meaningful social contexts for understanding the historical genealogy of the southern social struggle; hence it is revealing of the ‘hidden agenda’ that lies behind what might be termed the ‘politics of linguistic indigenousness’. It is my intention to indicate that the discourse of linguistic indigenousness is far from being innocent, but rather it is politically motivated. The fact that the south is granted the right to external self-determination in four years time now points to the political instrumentality and the ideological implications of the notion of ‘indigenousness’ in the language policy. Viewed in this way, it is my objective to show that the use of the term ‘indigenous’ is not desultory but rather perfectly intertextual and compatible with the international legal discourse on the rights of indigenous people. I shall show that language has always been a site of, and had a stake in, the colonial/postcolonial struggle over political and material power in the Sudan. This ideological struggle which is largely discursive is encoded in the textual system of the Naivasha Language Policy. I shall argue for a radical conceptual reframing in the Sudanese folk and institutional discourse of the role language should play in the gradual restructuring of the existing sociopolitical configuration, and consequently, the construction of a new sociolinguistic order, as part of the project of ‘New Sudan’. Otherwise the Naivasha language policy will remain a rhetorical device that will be employed by power holders to perpetuate the existing structures of the Arabicisation policy which is widely blamed for the current social disorder.

3. To analyse the language rights regime embodied in the NLP. I contend that the language rights embedded in the NLP should not be viewed in universalising and totalising terms. The argument here is that the concept of language rights should be firmly based in Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ rather than being treated in a decontextualised manner as an abstract universal construct. Language is a practice that is embodied in the social structure through socialisation. I argue that the notion of language rights, and particularly the right to use mother tongue in education should be viewed as
part of the ‘habitus’ of speakers of a given community, rather than to be imposed on them under the banner of territorially based language rights. Here I tend to concur with Joseph (2006a: 55) that ‘languages belong to people, not to places’. Conceptualized in this way, the embodied discursive practices of a given number of native speakers are a constituent part of their identity. This understanding of language rights can help us avoid the political polarisation of the south and the north along essentialising linguistic lines (Arabic–north vs. English/local language–south). The endorsement of the concept of habitus can lead us to avoid the essentialist trap of the mainstream ‘language–rights’ paradigm by asserting the social constructedness of languages and identities; hence can help us uncouple language from religion and race. I contend that British colonial rule in collaboration with key local figures (whose authority itself is a colonial invention) in the Sudan constructed the political national identity out of the habitus of the northern riverain social groups, while others’ habitus was misrecognised.

4. To draw a comparison between the structural political system and the discourse of the NLP. My argument here is that a faithful implementation of the NLP within a multinational democratic federation informed by the principle of active citizenship can act as both: 1) a strategic corrective to the divisive monolingual ideology of Arabicisation, and 2) a foundation for a new regime of language rights determined by a bottom–up approach.

5. To explore the relationship between the allocation of political power in the peace protocols and the language policy, and to examine the ways in which power relations may influence the realisation of the NLP.

6. To examine the type of language change that the language policy may bring about, and more importantly the areas that are likely to be influenced by this change.

7. To provide an assessment of ‘where we are’ with respect to the institutional–implementation process of the NLP.

1.3 Research questions
In pursuing the above aims and objectives, the study will attempt to tackle the following research questions:

1. What are the overt and covert interpretations of the way in which the NLP is worded? What is the hidden agenda behind the status–planning statement that ‘all indigenous languages are national languages’? Does the technical phrase ‘indigenous languages’ have any political implications for the speakers who are identified or self–identified as ‘indigenous’? If so, what are these implications? What are the social processes involved in the colonial construction of ‘indigenous languages’ in the southern Sudan?

2. What role did the colonial/postcolonial practice of language planning play in the ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) including the social construction of ‘indigenous languages’ and the artificial creation of tribes in the Sudan?

3. What are the types of language rights embodied in the NLP? How can a reconceptualisation of the notion ‘language rights’ as a contextualised part of one’s ‘habitus’ (in Bourdieu’s 1977, 1991 sense of the term) help us avoid the political polarisation of the south and the north along reductionist linguistic lines (Arabic–north vs. English/local language–south)? How can language–in–education planning in the Sudan draw on the insights that the notion of ‘habitus’ provides?

4. Can the way in which political power is distributed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (henceforth CPA) influence the implementation of the language policy? If so, what are the regions that are most likely to be affected sociolinguistically by this political distribution of power relations in the Sudan? What implications and ramifications does the distribution of political power in the peace protocols have for the implementational process of the NLP?

1.4 The scope of the study

One of the primary objectives of this work is to perform a critical analysis of the historical conditions in which the NLP has been produced. However, it is beyond the capacity of the thesis to go through all the peace protocols. Therefore, only a passing
reference to some Articles in the peace protocols will be made, where analysis of the language policy makes this appropriate. With regard to the academic contribution of the linguistic anthropologist Joseph Greenberg (Chapter 2), it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the (purely) technical aspect of the ways in which Greenberg implements a morphological analysis to identify a word. Rather, the focus will be on the social conditions which influenced his scholarship with the hope that more light will be shed on the sociohistorical implications of his work. Another point related to the scope of this research is that although colonial and postcolonial language policies have impacted on the whole Sudan, much of the focus in this thesis is on the south/north relation. This is not to imply that other regions in the Sudan are linguistically homogeneous. The current civil conflict in the western Sudan (Darfur) indicates that the opposite is quite true. Rather, the reason behind this restriction is that the CPA was signed exclusively between the major Southern Opposition movement (the SLPM) and the NCP (representing the government of the Sudan). A second justification for my concentration on the south/north relation is that the question of the ‘national language’ was/has been an arena of the longest civil wars in Africa (see Miller 2003a: 163). Thus, the historical narrative of the way in which the new sociolinguistic order as foreseen in the Naivasha language policy was constructed should be critically considered from the perspective of the south-north relationship.

With respect to the historical development of official language policies in the Sudan (Chapter 4), I periodise language policies in the Sudan, following other writers, into two stages: colonial and postcolonial. The colonial period here refers, unless otherwise indicated, to the Condominium 1898–1956 (The Anglo–Egyptian rule of Sudan). A complete survey of the evolutionary development of the language planning and policies beyond the Anglo–Egyptian period is beyond the limitations of the thesis, albeit an occasional mention will be made where necessary. This restriction can be accounted for by the fact that most of the language policies were made during the British colonial rule of the Sudan. Finally, I do not attempt to make the case that the proposed language policy is much more promising than the old policy of Arabicisation. Rather, the ultimate purpose is to engage with questions of
power and inequality in language planning, and to uncover the implications of adopting one reading position over another in order to come to a better understanding of the NLP.

1.5 The significance of the study
The primary aim of the study is to provide a critical analysis of the NLP. The analysis of the sociohistorical conditions of the production of the NLP supports the argument that ‘indigenous languages’ in the Sudan are colonial inventions. The study examines the social processes which ultimately led to the social construction of ‘languages’ as ‘indigenous’. This requires a critical reinterpretation of the colonial policy in the Sudan. I show that the colonial project constructed ‘languages’, recreated ‘tribes’, invented traditions, etc. in order to develop two incompatible identities in the Sudan (the north vs. the south). The practice of language planning, I would argue, was instrumental in the colonial/postcolonial project of social invention of identities in the Sudan. The analysis also shows that the fate of local languages is always determined, at least at status–planning level, by power holders, and concludes that nationalism–based and utilitarian language policies have produced resistance and disintegration instead of unity and homogeneity in Sudan. Language, I maintain, is always instrumental in the production, maintenance and reproduction of unequal power relations in the Sudan.

I examine the language rights regime embedded in the text of the language policy, and I argue for a reframing of the notion of ‘language rights’ as part of the habitus. A related argument is that the desire to operationalise a language as a medium of instruction should stem from the speakers of a language, rather than be imposed upon them. I draw on my visit to the Nuba Mountains in the western part of Sudan to show that a grassroots level of engagement in the process of language planning can be successful and effective. I touch on the new language policy of the southern Sudan since it is legislated under the framework of the NLP. Here I show that the statement concerning sign language is problematic and misleading, and I explore alternative possibilities of (re)reading the sign language policy statement in the southern Sudan Interim Constitution.
I argue that the appropriate structural system for the implementation of the NLP is a kind of ‘multinational’ federalism, and show that the discourse of the NLP is compatible with the proposed structural system. I review the relationship between the configuration of power relations in the CPA and the distribution of linguistic resources in the country, and examine the influence of the new configuration of political power relations on the language situation in the Sudan. I conclude by providing an assessment of the status of the implementation of the NLP. The ultimate purpose which drives this work has to do with the ways in which one can and should attempt to ‘increase consciousness of how language contributes to domination of some people by others, because consciousness is the first step towards emancipation’ (Fairclough 2001: 193). Hence, the reasons for carrying out this study are based on the hope that useful implications can be drawn from it.

1.6 Definition of key terms

1. **Language** is understood in this thesis as ‘the principal means of our socialisation into our group and the principal means of our meaning making. Language can be a tool for inclusion and exclusion. Language builds human societies, solidarity and cooperation but it also plays a crucial role in the distribution of power and resources within a society and among societies. In non-democratic societies it serves to mark class and caste acquired through non-linguistic means; in democratic societies it is power itself, since authority in a democracy derives ultimately from a leader’s ability to persuade the electorate to accord to authority’ (Wright 2004: 5, 7).

2. **Ideology** is employed to refer to ‘ways of representing and interpreting reality, and there is no life outside of them. Ideologies are always partial and partisan to one’s community. They are more or less liberatory or oppressive, depending on the social practice of historical background of the community. They change in relation to the historical conditions and social practices of the respective communities’ (Canagarajah 2000: 123–130).

3. **North and south Sudan.** According to Deng (1995: 2-4), Sudan is a country of immense racial, cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. The diversities involved in the country’s composition are frequently referred to as falling into two main
divisions, the north and the south. The north, making up two-thirds of the country in land and population, is inhabited by local tribal groups of which the dominant intermarried with incoming Arab traders, and over the centuries produced a genetically mixed African–Arab racial and cultural hybrid. Although there are large numbers of non–Arab communities in the north, the north has adopted Islam and uses Arabic language as a common system of communication. The south, which constitutes the remaining third in land and population, adopts African identity in its racial and cultural composition, and is characterised by Christianity, the English language and local languages. It should be noted that this North-South broad demarcation works only at the political/ideological level but does not reflect the reality of the complex social fabrics of the Sudan. The north should not be conceptualised in monolithic and reductionist terms as a linguistically homogenous part. Rather, it is a linguistically heterogeneous area and its cultural and linguistic diversity is reflected in the number of languages spoken by the different tribal groups residing in the northern part of the country. Suffice it here to note that the current humanitarian crisis in the Darfurian region has problematised the very political notion of the ‘North’ and revealed the cultural diversity of the western Sudan which was historically framed as part of the northern Sudan.

1.7 The structure of the thesis
This thesis is composed of six chapters (including this introductory chapter). In Chapter 2, the distribution of languages in the Sudan is surveyed, and the academic scholarship of Greenberg in relation to language situation in the Sudan is reviewed. Chapter 3 surveys the conceptual and terminological definitions in the field of language planning and policy, and the key actors and elements involved in the process of language planning. A number of descriptive and critical approaches to language planning are reviewed. The chapter finishes with a broad review of the language situation in Nigeria for comparative purposes. In Chapter 4, I review the history of language planning and policy in the Sudan. Part of the discussion involves considerable attention to the postcolonial policies of Arabicisation in the north and the south. In Chapter 5, I perform a critical analysis of the NLP, with special historical analytic focus on the ‘politics of linguistic indigenousness’ in the Sudan.
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LANGUAGES IN THE SUDAN

This chapter has four objectives. The first is to produce a reconstruction of the distribution of the languages of the Sudan prior to the spread of the Arabic language in the Sudan (Section 2.1). The second is to place the Sudanese languages within the African linguistic context by reviewing one of the most commonly cited systems of linguistic classifications, Joseph Greenberg’s (sub-section 2.1.1). The third is to examine the notion of the Hamitic hypothesis as a racial statement of identity and its deployment in the linguistic classification of African languages and races including those of the Sudan. The scholarly stance of Greenberg on the mobilisation of the Hamitic hypothesis in linguistic typologies is examined. The final aim of the chapter is to trace the genealogy and spread of the Arabic language in the Sudan prior to the state intervention (Section 2.3). The whole chapter is intended to provide a textured view of the ecolinguistic environment within which later official language policies have been made by colonial and postcolonial regimes in the Sudan (see Chapter 4).

With regard to the intellectual achievement of the linguistic anthropologist Joseph Greenberg, I should note that the focus on the work of Greenberg as a central theme of the chapter can be justified on three grounds: first, the contribution of Greenberg to the description of African languages is important in itself. Secondly, the distribution of Sudanese languages can best be understood through the typological model of Greenberg. Thirdly, the analysis of the social implications of Greenberg’s work can provide us with insights into understanding the discursive relationship between the North and South of Sudan. It is worth mentioning that I have not found a single source in the literature which examines the social implications of Greenberg’s work, particularly for the Sudanese languages, as a free–standing topic. Historical linguists whom I have consulted at Edinburgh University and at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at London University have told me that they have not encountered any specific research into this question. This, I would suggest, undoubtedly points to a visible gap in the general field of knowledge that I cannot pretend to fill. Rather, the aim is to scrutinise the issue and to attempt to open a
debate wider on this research question by examining the historical and intellectual environment which shaped Greenberg’s linguistic contribution. Another point that should be mentioned in relation to Greenberg’s work is that the main interest will not be in the purely technical aspect of how Greenberg goes about analysing a language, or how he implements his methods of morphological analysis to get a word. Rather, the prime focus lies in the historical and contextual understanding of the intellectual climate which shaped Greenberg’s antagonism to the practice of deploying the physical anthropological concept of race in the description of African languages (Section 2.1.2). An investigation of the alliance between racial theories and philology in the nineteenth century is meant to provide a historical background against which one can comprehend the way in which the notion of race has been mobilised by both political theoreticians and practitioners under the banner of a particular version of monolithic linguistic nationalism in postcolonial Sudanese politics (see Chapter 4). It is hoped that light can be shed on the possible sociopolitical implications of Greenberg’s linguistic typology of African languages. So the objectives behind the focus on the work of Greenberg are closely related.

2.1 Distribution of languages in the Sudan

The Sudan is rich in the variety of its languages, cultures and peoples, each of which is part of the total heritage and contributes to the pattern of national life. The Sudan prides itself on being the ‘crossroads of Africa’ (Stevenson 1971: 11). The importance of the geographical location of the Sudan within Africa can be appreciated when it is realised that the country contains within its borders representatives of all the major defined African language families, except the Khoisan languages of South Africa (see Map 2.1). The linguistic wealth of the Sudan has brought it to the frontline in the scholarship of African languages.

A note about the key sources for the present overview of the distribution of languages in the Sudan is in order. The first source is the Summer Institute of Linguistics’ Ethnologue database (www.ethnologue.com), which provides detailed information about the distribution of Sudanese languages. The second source is Thelwall (1978), which contains a comprehensive linguistic profile of the country.
Thelwall’s analytic study is based on the First Population Census of 1955 which contains tables concerning ‘Tribe, Nationality, and Language’ (see Thelwall 1978: 1). The figures Thelwall cites concerning the distribution of languages in the Sudan, particularly the ones spoken in the southern Sudan (e.g., Shilluk and Anuak) are far from being up-to-date in the view of the significant political and structural transformations that the whole country has witnessed since Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Thelwall (1978: 1) makes a cautious note that ‘the figures given should be treated as indicative of the varying ingredients of complexity in each area rather than exact measures’. The third source is Miller (2006), a paper containing a statistical analysis of the finding of the 1993 Population Census which included a question on language.

The number of languages of the Sudan listed in the Ethnologue database is 142, of which 134 are living languages, and eight are extinct. The national and official language of the Sudan before 2005 was Arabic. The current peace agreement, which ended one of the longest wars in Africa between the north and the south of the Sudan and was enshrined in the Interim National Constitution, names both English and Arabic as official languages (see Protocol of Power sharing, Appendix). Arabic is a widely distributed language in the northern part of the country due to the fact that Arabic had, and still enjoys, the status of the national and official language of the whole country, with the exception of the southern Sudan. There are a number of forms of Arabic used in the northern part, including: a) Standard Arabic, which is employed as the language of government transactions, education, and broadcasting; b) Khartoum Arabic (i.e., Sudanese colloquial Arabic), a variety spoken by around 15,000,000 persons (see Ethnologue). Arabic is also used as a lingua franca in multilingual areas. It is not an exaggeration to say that Arabic has become the dominant and the dominating language in the Sudan (see Nyombe 1997; Miller 2003a; Yokwe 1984; Abdelhay 2004, 2006). The inception of this domination had already been observed by the prominent anthropologist Franz Boas in 1920 when he noted that ‘Arabic is superseding the native speech in North Africa’ (Boas 1966: 211). One of the defining features of what Boas calls ‘native speech’ (i.e., vernaculars) in the Sudan is tribal or ethnical affiliation (see Map 2.1; Table 2.1).
The problematic term ‘tribe’ may be defined in the Sudanese context as ‘a political form based on a territory and marked by traditional customs and by political organisation in terms of chiefly office’ (Greenberg 1965a: 207). The reason why many studies and national censuses have selected the tribal language as the primary marker of ethnic identification in the Sudan or in Africa generally can be seen in the following remark:

In Africa language is clearly fundamental since the tribe, still the social grouping to which the vast majority of Africans give their primary allegiance, is defined mainly on linguistic lines. A linguistic map of Africa will hardly differ from a tribal map. (Greenberg 1966: 242)

However, there is no necessary connection between a given tribal identity and a given local language in the Sudan. Table 2.1, which is based on the 1993 Population National Census, furnishes us with information indicating an increasing discrepancy between the ethnic first language and tribal identity in the northern Sudan (see Miller 2006: 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Nuba</th>
<th>Beja</th>
<th>Nubiyin</th>
<th>Darfurian</th>
<th>West African</th>
<th>South Sudanese</th>
<th>Funj</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Not Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>51,79</td>
<td>4,71</td>
<td>6,41</td>
<td>3,22</td>
<td>22,12</td>
<td>7,42</td>
<td>1,74</td>
<td>1,31</td>
<td>0,77</td>
<td>0,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>73,84</td>
<td>2,49</td>
<td>4,55</td>
<td>0,94</td>
<td>9,99</td>
<td>5,22</td>
<td>1,59</td>
<td>0,74</td>
<td>0,21</td>
<td>0,43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1. Ethnic Affiliation and Mother Tongue in Northern Sudan according to the 1993 Population Census (Source: Miller 2006: 4). (Note: the Census categories have been clustered into major ethnic and language groups).

The above observation calls for a note about the widely observed phenomenon of language shift from the vernacular to Arabic. First, it should be remarked that shift to the Arabic language varies according to ethnic affiliation and region (Miller 2006: 4). For instance, if we compare in Table 2.2 and 2.3 the claimed language uses with claimed ethnicity in what can be regarded as the homeland of each major ethnic group, we find that the Nubiyins in the northern Sudan, the Nuba (in the Southern Kordofan) and the Darfurian speaking groups (in Darfur) seem to be more influenced by language shift to Arabic than the Beja in eastern Sudan and West Africans in most regions (ibid.).
Table 2.2. Distribution of Major Ethnic Groups by Northern States according to 1993 Population Census (Source: Miller 2006: 4–5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Beja</th>
<th>Nubiyin</th>
<th>Nuba</th>
<th>Funj</th>
<th>Southerners</th>
<th>Darfurian</th>
<th>West African</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Not stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>44.07</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>46.66</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahr al Nil</td>
<td>82.28</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>66.49</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>18.37</td>
<td>48.90</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>9.51</td>
<td>11.51</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedaref</td>
<td>46.37</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>20.22</td>
<td>16.94</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>0.44</td>
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<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>57.24</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.70</td>
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<td>Gezira</td>
<td>83.26</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<td>Sennar</td>
<td>62.04</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>22.75</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Nile</td>
<td>76.86</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>25.77</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>37.46</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>20.83</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kordofan</td>
<td>81.09</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kordofan</td>
<td>79.33</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>10.51</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kordofan</td>
<td>31.84</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>37.83</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>10.15</td>
<td>18.09</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur</td>
<td>12.97</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>78.20</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Darfur</td>
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<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>85.80</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Darfur</td>
<td>38.54</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>49.27</td>
<td>8.76</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51.79</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>22.12</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3. Distribution of Major Language Groups by Northern States according to 1993 Population Census (Source: Miller 2006: 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Beja</th>
<th>Nubiyin</th>
<th>Nuba</th>
<th>Funj</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Darfurian</th>
<th>West African</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Not stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>76.81</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>17.74</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahr al Nil</td>
<td>97.44</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>25.91</td>
<td>63.77</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>30.67</td>
<td>43.93</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedaref</td>
<td>63.98</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>18.12</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>85.44</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gezira</td>
<td>93.80</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sennar</td>
<td>75.48</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>19.38</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Nile</td>
<td>90.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>40.38</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>29.36</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>20.34</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Kordofan</td>
<td>95.82</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Kordofan.</td>
<td>90.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Kordofan.</td>
<td>64.71</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>23.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>9.86</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Darfur</td>
<td>66.89</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>31.68</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Darfur</td>
<td>22.86</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>72.64</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Darfur</td>
<td>76.66</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>18.13</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73.84</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>9.99</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The difference between first language and ethnic identity is accounted for by a number of factors including the historical processes of Arabisation, very intense linguistic diversity, and lower demographic weight and higher mobility. For instance, the outbreak of war in the Nuba Mountains in the west of Sudan in the mid 1980s accelerated the process of language shift (Mugadam 2006: 292). Miller and Abu–Manga (1992: 1) observe that migration and settlement of non–Arabic groups in the Khartoum Area in the central Sudan could lead in the long run to a modification of the linguistic map of the country. Mugadam (2006) has found out that age, education and urbanisation have significant effects on the shift from the ethnic languages in the Nuba Mountains. Women were also reported to have played a part in the process of language shift in the Nuba Mountains. This is due to the increasing role of women in the socioeconomic life and their increasing educational opportunities (Mugadam 2006: 290). According to Miller, the massive population movement of the last two decades to central Sudan and Khartoum, which were almost entirely Arabic–speaking in 1956 (90–100%), led to an increasing ethnic and linguistic diversity. Table 2.4 based on the results of the 1955 and 1993 Population National Censuses underlines this observation.

Apart from Arabic, the Dinka language in the southern Sudan represents a major language spoken by more than 10% of the total population (Miller and Abu–Manga 1992: 8). Fifteen state–based local languages with a significant population size are spoken in the Sudan, which now has 25 states. Table 2.5 orders them by population, with the figures taken from Thelwall (1978), and the Ethnologue database. Thelwall (1978: 1) refers to the languages listed in Table 2.5 as ‘minor languages’, but since this expression has potential ideological connotations I will refer to them, following other researchers (e.g., Miller and Abu–Manga 1992: 8), as non–Arabic languages.

Most of these languages are distributed in the regional states: border zones of the West (Chadian border) and the East (Ethiopian Borderlands), the Red Sea Mountains, the extreme north (Nubia) and the southern Sudan (Miller and Abu–Manga 1992: 8). The fact that none of the local languages has obtained the status of a
national language or official language or a dominant lingua franca is remarkable in view of the political considerations that will be discussed in Chapter 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>1956 (Thelwall 1978)</th>
<th>1993 (Miller 2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum State.</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
<td>85.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuba</td>
<td>3.97%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South S.</td>
<td>4.46%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sudan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>74.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Sennar, Gezira, BN, West African</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; W.N Berta–Burun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4. Language Distribution in Central Sudan according to the 1956 and 1993 National Censuses (Source: Miller 2006: 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beja</td>
<td>472,534</td>
<td>951,000</td>
<td>Masalit</td>
<td>162,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td>464,159</td>
<td>740,000</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>156,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur</td>
<td>265,565</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>Koalib</td>
<td>154,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teso</td>
<td>219,301</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>118,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zande</td>
<td>218,769</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>Lotuko</td>
<td>116,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nubian</td>
<td>167,831</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>Moru–Madi</td>
<td>102,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Nile Nubian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>167,568</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>Shilluk (including Anuak)</td>
<td>107,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,350000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5. The Distribution of Non–Arabic Languages in the Sudan by Population

It is worth noting that the ethno–linguistic data provided by the 1993 National Census, which makes use of the same ethnic and language categories, do not cater for the southern Sudan on account of the civil wars in the region (see Miller 2006: 4). The analytic studies provided by Thelwall which are based on the 1955 Population
National census include information on the southern Sudan (see Thelwall 1978: 4–5). A final note concerns the distribution of European and Asian languages in the Sudan (see Table 2.6). Since there is no up–to–date statistical study which shows the distribution of these languages in the Sudan, Thelwall (1978) remains our only available resource. The English language is the most common second language, and the majority of older members of the educated classes have a fluent command of it by virtue of having received their entire secondary schooling through the medium of English (Thelwall 1978: 4). The policies of Arabisation, especially of higher education since 1989, have had a negative impact on the status of the English language. The Naivasha peace accord signed in 2005 has reinstated English as an official language, side by side with Arabic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LANGUAGE GROUP</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Sub–Language</th>
<th>Number of persons</th>
<th>LANGUAGE GROUP</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Sub–Language</th>
<th>Number of persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUROPEAN</td>
<td>East European</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,725</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West European</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,637</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>Serbo–Croatian</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>Other European</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>Yiddish</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>610</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Languages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6. Distribution of European and Asian Languages in the Sudan Based on 1955 National Census (Source: Thelwall 1978: 14)

2.1.1 Linguistic classification of Sudanese languages: Greenberg’s typology
The papers presented by Greenberg and Stevenson at the February 1968 conference on ‘The Sudan in Africa’ (under the auspices of the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum) emphasised the importance of the Sudan for the languages of Africa and ‘pointed to its key position in containing within its borders a substantial number of languages which are historically of vital importance in this field’ (Stevenson 1975: 58). Hence, the task of describing and classifying the languages of the Sudan is not possible without reference to the languages of Africa generally. Equally important, a discussion of African languages cannot be carried out without reference to the methodologies employed in historical and comparative linguistics. For a systematic review, I shall first try to broadly define the commonly employed approaches to the linguistic classification, especially the ones used in the definition of African languages. I will then try to consider Greenberg’s linguistic typology, with special reference to Sudan.

To begin with, there are three different methodologies of language classification in the literature: the genetic, the typological and the areal. Genetic classification lies at the heart of historical and comparative linguistics. Comparative linguistics is mainly concerned with the description and classification of languages into mutually exclusive families, each containing related languages. A family of languages may be defined as a set of distinct languages presumed to have evolved from a single ancestral language, the so-called protolanguage (Greenberg 1964: 176). The genetic classification as a historical approach to the description of languages may be defined as ‘classification based on common origin’ (Greenberg 1957a: 66, 1957b: 93), and it is founded on the evolutionary theory of language which assumes the existence of some forms ancestral to all human languages. Greenberg’s widely celebrated book *The Languages of Africa* (1963a) is considered by scholars as one of the pioneering contributions to the genetic classification of African languages. Greenberg (1963a: 1) makes it clear at the outset that his work ‘contains a complete genetic classification of the languages of Africa’. Greenberg notes that the genetic methodology has three distinguishing features: non-arbitrariness, exhaustiveness and uniqueness. The feature of non-arbitrariness refers to the fact that ‘there is no choice of criteria leading to different and equally legitimate results’ (Greenberg 1957a: 66). The
‘exhaustiveness’ of a classification designates that all human languages are classified into families (ibid.). ‘Uniqueness’ refers to the fact that no language should be classified into more than one class (Greenberg 1957a: 66, 1957b: 93).

According to Greenberg (1963a: 1–5) there are three basic methodological principles underlying the genetic classification of languages: similarity of sound and meaning in a pair of languages, mass comparison, and the basing of classifications exclusively on linguistic evidence. The first fundamental is defined as ‘the sole relevance in comparison of resemblances involving sound and meaning in specific forms’ (Greenberg 1963a: 1). That is to say, a phonetic similarity should be accompanied by a corresponding semantic similarity. The second principle underlying the genetic classification is the availability of what Greenberg calls ‘mass comparison’ between pairs of languages. The third principle is self-explanatory: classification of languages should be founded solely on linguistic evidence, without regard to historical or anthropological considerations.

The second type of linguistic comparison is the typological method. This method of classification is non–historical since it employs criteria that refer to ‘similarities which may arise without any necessary implication of historical connection through either contact or common origin’ (Greenberg 1968: 291–292). It is founded on the fundamentals: similarity of sound without meaning, similarity of meaning without sound, or both. An instructive instance for phonetic similarity is the classification of all world languages into two typological classes: tonal system and non–tonal. Greenberg argues that this approach to classification suffers from the problem that it is not exhaustive as a result of the multiplicity of criteria which may leave some languages un–classified. One of the pioneers of this approach is Carl Meinhof, whose work on comparative phonology and comparative grammar came to form the basis of Bantu linguistics (Greenberg 1965b: 221). The third scheme of linguistic classification is the areal method. Areal classifications are concerned with effects of languages upon one another, whether they are related or unrelated. This approach depends on criteria which involve historical processes such as linguistic contact,
which are of four types: borrowing, order, semantic influence, and phonetic influence.

In what follows, I shall reproduce the linguistic groupings of African languages as proposed by Greenberg (1963a). Sudanese languages and other African languages spoken in the Sudan (see Stevenson 1971: 10–12) are italicised. I should note that the enumeration of the African or Sudanese languages is far from complete and would comprise many more. Greenberg’s typology postulates four families: Niger–Kordofanian, Nilo–Saharan, and Afroasiatic, and Khoisan (see Map 2.2).

2.1.1.1 Niger–Kordofanian: is divided into two sub–families: Niger–Congo and Kordofanian.

2.1.1.1.1 Niger–Congo: consists of six main branches:


2.1.1.2 Kordofanian: These are the languages of the Nuba hills of Kordofan. The Kordofanian group is completely contained in the Nuba hills area of West Sudan (Stevenson 1975: 58). The members of this family are as follows:

1. Koalib group: Koalib, Kanderma, Heiban, Laro, Otoro, Kawama, Shwai, Tira, Moro, Fungor.
2. Tegali group: Tegali, Rashad, Tagoi, Tumale.
2.1.1.2 Nilo–Saharan: Greenberg was reported to have said at a conference on ‘Sudan in Africa’ in 1968 that ‘the Sudan comprises the heartland of the Nilo–Saharan family and the single most comprehensive task of Sudanese linguistics is the comparative study of this language family’ (Stevenson 1975: 58). The Nilo–Saharan family consists of six branches:

1. Songhai: Songhai (not an indigenous language but can be heard in the Sudan).
2. Saharan: a) Kanuri, Kanembu; (b) Teda, Daza; (c) Zaghawa, Berti
3. Maban: Masalit, Maba (not indigenous languages but heard in Sudan), Runga, Mimi (of Nachtigal), Mime (of Gaudefroy–Demombynes).
4. Fur: Fur
5. Chari–Nile: consists of two branches: Eastern Sudanic and Central Sudanic:

2.1.1.3 Afroasiatic: traditionally named Hamito–Semitic languages, but Greenberg replaced this by Afroasiatic and also abandoned the term Hamite since it ‘has led to a
racial theory in which the majority of the native population of Negro Africa is considered to be the result of mixture between Hamites and Negroes’ (Greenberg 1963a: 49, see also Section 2.1.2 for the discussion of the relation between the Hamitic hypothesis and linguistic typologies of African languages). This Afroasiatic family has five coordinate branches:

(1) Semitic: Arabic.

(2) Berber.

(3) Ancient and Middle Egyptian (an ancient language).


(5) Chad: this group of Afroasiatic languages is mainly spoken in the region of Lake Chad (Chad, as a name of a country, is neighbouring Sudan). The Chad languages are classified into nine groups. The arrangement is approximately from west to east:

1. (a) Hausa (not indigenous, spoken by immigrants), Gwandara; (b) Ngizim, Mober, Auyokawa, Shirawa, Bede; (c) (i) Warjawa, Afawa, Diriya, Miyawa, Sirawa, (ii) Gezawa, Seiyawa, Barawa of Dass; (d) (i) Bolewa, Karekare, Ngamo, Gerawa, Gerumawa, Kirifawa, Dera (Kanakuru), Tangale, Pia, Pero, Chongee, Miriam, Montol, Sura, Tal, Gerka, (iii) Ron. 2. Kotoko group: Logone, Ngala, Buduma, Kuri, Gulfei, Affade, Shoe, Kuseri. 3. Bata–Margi group: (a) Bachama, Demsa, Gudo, Malabu, Njei (Kobochi, Nzangi, Zany), Zumu (Jimo), Holma, Kapsiki, Baza, Hiji, Gude (Cheke), Fali of Mubi, Fali of Kiria, Fali of Jilbu, Margi, Chibak, Kilba, Sukur, Vizik, Vemgo, Woga, Tur, Bura, Pabir, Podokwo; (b) Gabin, Hona, Tera, Jera, Hinna (Hina). 4. (a) Hina, Daba, Musgoi, Gauar; (b) Gisiga, Balda, Muturua, Mofu, Matakam. 5. Gidder. 6. Mandara, Gamergu. 7. Musgu. 8. Bana, Banana (Masa), Lame, Kulung. 9. (a) Somrai, Tumak, Ndam, Miltu, Sarwa, Gulei; (b) Gabere, Chiri,
Dormo, Nangire; (c) Sokoro (Bedanga), Barein; (d) Modgel; (e) Tuburi; (f) Mubi (not indigenous), Karbo.

2.1.1.4 Khoisan: This is the only language family that is not represented in the Sudan. The term is composed of two parts: the first part (Khoi) which refers to name of the Hottentot, while the second part (San) stands for the Bushmen (Greenberg 1963a: 66). The most conspicuous feature of the languages of this family is the presence of click–sounds. The members of this language family are: Hottentot, Bushman, Sandawe, and Hatsa.

Map 2.2. Greenberg’s Classification of African Languages (Source: Greenberg 1963a)

2.1.2 Joseph Greenberg and the Hamitic hypothesis as a fictitious discourse of identity
The aim behind this sub-section is twofold: first, to launch an investigation into the relationship between one of the dominant nineteenth-century physical anthropological theories of race, the so-called ‘Hamitic hypothesis’, and the discipline which was concerned with the classification of languages, philology. The other related aim is to highlight the intellectual stance of Greenberg on the issue of the connection of language to race and identity politics. It is immensely difficult to pursue a full coverage of the historical complexities involved in the nineteenth-century concept of race. Three factors necessarily restrict the scope of the discussion: first, given the historically conditioned disciplinary fragmentation of social sciences in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, the ramifications of racial thought should (but cannot) be traced into the various intellectual areas of historical, social, literary, philological, biological and political thought, as well as into European colonialism, nationalism, slavery, and all the innumerable events and processes that helped delineate thinking about the problem of human differences (see Stocking 1968a: 44). Secondly, the question as to why Greenberg distanced himself from the use of racial materials in his study of African languages, which was a current practice at the time, appears to hinge on a careful investigation of the historical environment which informed the set of linguistic typologies devised by scholars who preceded Greenberg, including Boas, whose revolutionary approach to language description and classification had a shaping influence on Greenberg’s scholarship. The third reason is that the Hamitic hypothesis had very serious ramifications for the lives of African people in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Suffice it at this stage to point out that the findings of some physical anthropological studies were instrumental in deciding what educational provisions would be made in a number of African countries. The fact that the British colonial government in the Sudan relied almost entirely on Seligman’s study of the races of South Sudan in deciding whether to provide the southern Sudanese with education is an instructive case in point (see Seligman 1913: 593; Sanderson et al. 1981: 68).

To begin with, in Africa, examples of linguistic and anthropological taxonomies which operate on the basis of a constant correlation of linguistic, cultural and physical traits are in abundance. A good illustration is the use of the term ‘Hamite’
with its racial extensions in a number of linguistic and anthropological classifications. The vagueness of Hamite as a linguistic and ethnological racial term led to a racial theory known as the Hamitic hypothesis, according to which the majority of the native population of Africa is the product of a mixture between Hamites and Negroes (Greenberg 1963a: 49). The Hamitic hypothesis holds that everything of value ever found in the black continent was brought there by the Hamites allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race (Sanders 1969: 521). A key example of work taking this view is the standard study by C.G. Seligman *Races of Africa* (1930), in which he formulates the hypothesis in the following terms:

> Apart from relatively late Semitic influence – whether Phoenician (Carthaginian) and strictly limited, or Arab (Muhammadan) and widely diffused – the civilisations of Africa are the civilisations of Hamites, its history the record of these peoples and of their interaction with the two more primitive African stocks, the Negro and the Bushman, whether this influence was exerted by highly civilised Egyptians or by such wilder pastoralists as are represented at the present day by the Beja [a major tribe in the eastern Sudan] and Somalis … The Hamites – who are Caucasians, i.e., belong to the same great branch of mankind as almost all Europeans – are commonly divided into the great branches, Eastern and Northern. (Seligman 1930: 96–97)

On a closer look at the intellectual genealogy of the concept, it becomes crystal clear that the Hamitic hypothesis is suggestive of the nature of race relations (Sanders 1969: 521). Broadly speaking, the mythical story states that the term ‘Ham’ appears for the first time in the Genesis, Chapter 5, where Noah curses his youngest son Ham and his descendants with blackness. It is worth noting that the Bible makes no reference to the racial differences among the ancestors of humankind. It is much later that a concept of race emerged with reference to the descendants of Ham. The Babylonian Talmud, a collection of oral traditions of the Jews dating to the sixth century after Christ depicts Ham as a sinful man and identifies the Hamites with Negroes.

This hypothesis was not accepted universally. Sanders (1969: 522) counter–argues that 'these oral traditions grew out of a need of the Israelites to rationalise their subjugation of Canaan, a historical fact validated by the myth of Noah’s curse’. Sanders contends that this myth has been normalised at a particular point of time to achieve a particular economic project: ‘Ideas have a way of being accepted when
they become useful as a rationalisation of an economic fact of life’ (ibid.). Sanders states that the mythical hypothesis permitted the exploitation of the Negro for economic gain to continue undisturbed by any religious or moral concerns. She remarks that Christian cosmology could remain at peace since the identification of the Negro as a Hamite kept him in the family of man in accordance with the story of the creation of mankind in the Bible. But this theological interpretation of the peopling of the universe would be challenged by men of the Enlightenment who attempted to apply the scientific method to the study of human history. The point here is that there was intense controversy over the Negro’s place in nature.

Two explanations of this physical diversity dominated the debate: the first was offered by those who supported the unity of humankind by a single creation (i.e., monogenism), and the second view assumed multiple creations of humankind (i.e., polygenism). Before proceeding to outline the main points of this controversy, it would be useful to explain how the two approaches (i.e., monogenetic and polygenetic), among others, are based on the theory of evolution. Although the term ‘evolution’ is characterised by a multiplicity of definitions, the basic idea underlying all evolutionary approaches is that they provide an explanation of how a variety of forms, whether biological species, cultural systems, or languages came to be (for a full discussion of the evolutionary theory of language see Greenberg 1957c, 1959). Of the four approaches offered in the literature to account for racial diversity, two are based on the theory of evolution. The four approaches are: (1) the evolutionary monogenetic; (2) the evolutionary polygenetic; (3) the creationist; and (4) the catastrophic. The first and third approaches assume single creations, while the second and fourth ones, multiple creations; the second and fourth views assume transformation of species, and the third and fourth, fixity of species. The creationist was the generally accepted view concerning the biological species before Darwin. In linguistics, the creationist view is represented by the traditional Tower of Babel account of the origin of linguistic diversity, according to which all linguistic variation was created at the same time by the confusion of tongues (Greenberg 1957c: 80, 1959: 111). I shall only be concerned here with the identification of the evolutionary views since they formed the basis of the controversy over the definition
of the Hamitic hypothesis. With the definition of the evolutionary monogenist and polygenist approaches in the background, let us now resume our discussion of the intellectual genealogy of the Hamitic hypothesis.

Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt led to the emergence of a new form of the Hamitic theory. The scientists and experts who accompanied Napoleon discovered signs of ancient civilisations such as well-preserved mummies. But these archaeological discoveries in a land populated by a Negroid race were incompatible with the dominant Western ideologies. A widespread notion was that the Western civilisation was the oldest civilisation; another was that Negroes were innately inferior. To resolve the ideological contradiction between such views and the archaeological findings, the history of the Egyptians had to be re-written, thus laying the basis for a new Hamitic theory.

One the one hand, the new Hamitic theory identified the Egyptians with the Caucasian race and not with the African Negroes, and on the other; a new Biblical interpretation was offered. The new theological explanation of races claimed that the Egyptians were descendants of Mizraim, son of Ham (Mizr being the name of Egypt in Arabic), and that Noah had only cursed Ham’s son Canaan. Hence, Ham himself and his other sons, and their children, were uncursed. Language was mobilised by polygenists to lend support to this racial hierarchisation. Polygenist theories of race assumed that since each race was created separately, it was endowed with its own language. Polygenists drew the conclusion that nations who spoke related languages must have evolved from one parental stock (Sanders 1969: 526).

The late nineteenth century produced two new ideologies which utilised and elaborated the concept of the Caucasoid Hamite: colonialism and modern racism (ibid.: 528). Both shaped Western attitudes to Africa and Africans. Hamites were now considered as early culture-bearers in Africa due to the natural superiority of character and intellect of all Caucasoids (ibid.). Such a representation had dual utility: it perpetuated the image of the Negro as an inferior being, and it enforced the alleged fact that he could be developed only by intervention of the white race. Now
the Hamite found himself in an unclear situation. On the one hand, he was designated as superior for his Caucasian affiliations. One the other hand, he was an African native, making him part of ‘the white man’s burden’ (ibid.: 529). Here the Teutonic theory of race was rallied to settle what looked as an inconsistency in the working of the hypothesis. Having devised a hierarchy within the Caucasian race, the designers of the theory placed the Teutonic Anglo–Saxons on the top of the rung of the ladder, with the Slavs on the lower rung. But the lower space is open–ended and could always be added to, and this is where the Hamites came to fit. Hence, the alliance of politics and race ‘provided a seemingly cogent ideological framework for colonial expansion and exploitation’ (ibid.).

The start of the twentieth century saw the Caucasoid–Hamite firmly established (ibid.). Racial classifications devised a separate Hamitic branch of the Caucasian race, closely following the creation of a linguistic entity called the family of Hamitic languages (ibid.). Linguistic typologies were founded on racial types and racial classifications on linguistic identifications. For instance, the early racial typology of Sergi (1901) identified certain peoples as Hamitic primarily on the basis of their linguistic identity. Seligman (1930) followed in the steps of Sergi and kept the term ‘Hamite’ in his typology. Seligman (1930: 15–16) put it bluntly that linguistics play an important part in his typology. He writes:

The study of the races of Africa has been so largely determined by the interest in speech, and it is so much easier to acquire a working knowledge of a language than of any other part of man’s cultural make–up, that names based upon linguistic criteria are constantly applied to large groups of mankind and, indeed, if intelligently based, often fit quite well. Hence, in describing the great racial groups of Africa, terms such as ‘Bantu,’ which strictly speaking have no more than a linguistic significance, are habitually employed … [L]inguistic criteria will play a considerable part in the somewhat mixed classification adopted. (Seligman 1930: 9–10)

It is worth mentioning that Seligman and his wife paid two academic visits to Sudan in the winters of 1909–1910 and 1912 on behalf of the British colonial government. Seligman acknowledges that the two expeditions to Sudan led him to argue the case that ‘many of the customs and ideas which exist in the Sudan are not Negro, Arab or even Islamic as they appear at first sight’ (Seligman 1913: 593). The data Seligman collected with his wife led him to claim that some of the peoples in the Sudan are
Hamites or at least have Hamitic blood in their veins. He published his claims, relying on cultural and anatomical evidence, in a paper entitled ‘Some Aspects of the Hamitic Problem in the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan’ (1913). It is remarkable that among the prominent figures whose help Seligman acknowledges in his paper is the anthropologist B. Malinowski. The appearance in connection with Seligman’s argument for the existence of the Hamites in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan of the names of outstanding figures such as Malinowski, who changed the historical path of linguistics with his concept of the ‘Context of situation’, which was taken up by the prominent British linguist J. R. Firth and later by his student M. A. K. Halliday, cannot go unnoticed. The scope of my research forestalls any attempt to investigate Malinowski’s views on the relationship between language and the Hamitic hypothesis. However, his assistance, in the words of Seligman (1913: 594), ‘by the skill and care with which he has followed up a number of obscure references’, indicates that Malinowski was aware of and may have had a hand in Seligman’s racial typology of the peoples of the Sudan.

Returning to Seligman’s paper in which he claims that some of the Sudanese tribes are of Hamitic origin, we find him beginning his argument by claiming that ‘just as the Zulu–Kaffirs contain a strong Hamitic element, so the Nilotic Negroids of the Sudan contain a varying, and in some tribes considerable, amount of Hamitic blood’ (Seligman 1913: 595). Seligman (ibid.) refers to these Hamites as a ‘primitive Aryan race’ whose physical identities shall never be known. It is worth mentioning that the Nilotic–speaking tribes in the Sudan include southern groups such as Nuer and Dinka (see Section 2.1.1 above) whose languages have not only been completely ignored by post–independence language policies (see Chapter 4), but who have also been dealt with as belonging to the ‘slave race’. Seligman describes the area of the true Hamitic people of the Sudan as follows:

At present day the true Hamitic area of the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan extends from the Red Sea to the Nile, from the Egyptian boundary in the north to the neighbourhood of the junction of the Atbara with the Nile. The area so defined embraces the Red Sea coastal plain and the whole of the Eastern Desert. (Seligman 1913: 596)

Despite its racial extension, the term Hamite was still kept by a number of the designers of early scientific classifications of African languages (see Smith 1935:
Richard Lepsius (1863), a nineteenth-century Egyptologist and the inventor of a standard alphabet, classified the African languages into three families: (1) Semitic; (2) Hamitic; (3) Primitive African, including (a) Bantu and (b) mixed Negro (see Cust 1883: 56–57). Friedrich Müller of Vienna devised a typology of African languages into six families, again keeping the term Hamite: 1) Semitic; (2) Hamitic; (3) Nuba–Fula; (4) Negro; (5) Bantu; (6) Hottentot–Bushman (see Cust 1883: 1, 56). Friedrich Müller of Vienna should not be confused with Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900), the Oxford professor of comparative philology, on whom see Di Gregorio 2002: 96; Joseph 2004: 46-47.). Friedrich Müller’s typology was adopted by Robert Needham Cust in his Sketch of the Modern Languages of Africa (1883), long a standard reference. D. Westermann refined Cust’s typology and combined the Hamitic and Semitic into one language family: (1) the Khoisan family; (2) Negro languages, including (a) Sudanic, (b) Bantu and (c) Nilotic languages; (3) Hamito–Semitic languages. The anthropologist Smith makes his protest against Westermann’s use of the value–laden expression ‘Negro languages’, though he did not suggest an alternative, when he argues that:

‘Negro’ describes a racial type, and a word which has a physical connotation cannot be properly applied to a language: Men may be Negroes, but a form of speech cannot be Negro. Negersprachen should mean ‘languages spoken by Negroes’ and can this be said when we do not know precisely what differentiates the Negro and when the people speaking these tongues are of such diverse physical types as Fulani, Masai, Mandigo? (Smith 1935: 44)

The same racial units were embraced by Meinhof whose work attracted wide attention through A. Werner’s (1915) popular book The Language–Families of Africa. Meinhof describes the complex linguistic situation of Africa in terms of five families: (1) Semitic; (2) Hamitic; (3) Bantu; (4) Sudanese; (5) Bushman. Meinhof goes on to claim that Bantu is a mixed language descended from a Hamitic father and a Negro mother (Greenberg 1963a: 49). More significantly, since the Hamites found in Africa south of the Sahara were denoted as pastoralists, and since the traditional occupation of the Negro was allegedly agriculture, pastoralism and all its qualities then became endowed with an aura of cultural superiority. Therefore, the term Hamites added another defining dimension: cultural identity (Sanders 1969: 530). Sayce provides another rebuttal against the nineteenth-century philologists’ support of the racial theories:
Though language is no mark of race, it is a mark of society. Even the most rudimentary society could not exist without it; certainly no civilised society could do so. It is social in its origin and nature, the creation and mirror of society, as well as the bond that keeps society together. Had men always led isolated lives, any means of communication with one another would have been unnecessary, and language need never have been elaborated. (Sayce 1876: 212)

The above quote contains three significant terms which have been a source of controversy that led to further divisions among scholars of linguistics. The three terms or concepts which came to act later as the cornerstone of many leading contemporary linguistic theories are: (1) language is a social construction (i.e., creation of society), (2) language is a representation, be it perfect or distorted, of society (i.e., a mirror), (3) language is a socially–shared property. The significance of the above formulation of language, which is very much with us today, lies in the fact that it leads us to view twentieth–century linguistics, of which Greenberg is a part, from a ‘continuist perspective’, rather than a ‘progressivist’ one. According to the continuist view, twentieth–century thinking about language should be considered as a continuation of the debate and development of the same themes, arguments, questions, issues that preoccupied the Western scholarship of language since its start.

The progressivist perspective, on the other hand, treats linguistic thought as ‘a matter of progress towards the theories that have now attained the status of academic standards’ (Joseph et al. 2001: vii). In what follows, I will have space for only a relatively brief discussion of the views of some scholars such as Boas and Sapir on the relationship between language, cultural identity, and thought, in order to understand or infer where Greenberg stands. It is beyond the capacity of this section to produce a full examination of their views; hence my review is bound to be highly selective.

I start with the views of the American Sanskritist and linguist William Dwight Whitney (1827–1894). Whitney defines language as an institution, a historical product created by speakers to encode already existing thought (see Joseph 2004: 46–47). It should be noted that Whitney’s argument was produced in a context that was dominated by the German romanticist view of language in the spirit of the Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). Before talking about the nineteenth–century theory of language evolution, it should be mentioned that there are many
evolutionary theories. Joseph (2006b) reviews the evolutionary theories of language from ancient to modern times. Joseph defines the term ‘evolutionary’ to refer to ‘any enquiry into the origin of language that assumes it appeared not fully blown, but in some rudimentary form that then developed toward the kind of language we know today’ (Joseph 2006b:365). The German Romantic theory of language assumed three stages of evolutionary advance in language in terms of the analysis of morphological complexity of words in languages: isolating, agglutinative and inflectional. The internal morphological structure of isolating languages is composed of a single morpheme. For the agglutinative languages, a word consists of more than one morpheme, and, basically, does not have irregular morphophonemic forms, while inflectional languages have different morphophonemic constructions and irregular alternations. The line of evolutionary advance, according to this view, is from the isolating stage (i.e., with simple morphemic constructions), through the agglutinative to the inflectional stage (i.e., with internally complex words). And this was defined as an intellectual development from the analytic to the synthetic stage; thus grouping peoples into ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ (Greenberg 1957c; Joseph 2004: 46). According to Joseph (2004: 45–46), Humboldt held that the intellectual power of a language was decided by its purity in its type (whether isolating, agglutinating, or inflectional). It could be the case that Humboldt’s work might have been a source of inspiration for Greenberg to focus on the morphological structure of a language as a key to understanding the working of a language.

Another prominent linguistic anthropologist who was concerned with the description of, to use a term of the time, ‘exotic’ languages is Franz Boas (1858–1942). Boas launched a devastating critique of the racialistic and evolutionary assumptions in ethnology. Boas’s intellectual research was shaped by the nineteenth–century German historicism and materialism, romanticism, and liberalism. The force of his anthropological critique led towards twentieth–century cultural relativism (Handler 1990: 252). A number of Boasians (e.g., Alfred Louis Kroeber, Edward Sapir, Robert Lowie, Melville Herskovits, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead) were cultural critics who looked to anthropology to account for the social and political controversies of their time. Boasian anthropology was determined above all to disseminate a
Boas’s critique of the nineteenth-century polygenist racial thought transformed him, in the words of Stocking, into ‘a kind of mythical hero figure carrying the torch to reason into irrational racial darkness’ (ibid.) to clarify the situation. Boas founded an approach to language that came to be known as ‘American descriptivism’ (see Joseph et al. 2001: 2; Jakobson 1944). One of the primary contributions of Boas to American linguistics was to design a method of transcribing native languages of America employing a set of descriptive labels that was different from the ones used in the description of European languages (Joseph et al. 2001: 3). The main concern of Boas was to reveal the historical affiliations of various American Indian languages, and this is where he broke away from a German-dominated Indo-European linguistics which was preoccupied with the reconstruction of a proto-Indo European language. Boas argues that many linguistic similarities result from acculturation (i.e., cultural contact) among peoples, and that this influences all levels of language structure i.e., phonology, vocabulary, and grammar (ibid.: 4). Although mainly associated with synchronic study, Boas argues that his synchronic enquiry was actually a way to history: ‘For him every social science was in the last resort a historic science’ (Jakobson 1944: 194). And this principle is evidently a continuation of Whitney’s tradition (ibid.).

Boas’ conception of acculturation was further developed by his student Edward Sapir who was regarded as the principal practitioner of Boasian linguistic anthropology (Joseph et al. 2001: 4). There is a trend in the literature to trace Sapir’s writings on the relationship between language and culture (the so-called Sapir–Whorfian hypothesis in its strong interpretation) to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German Romantic theories of language. But actually Sapir did not follow the German Romantic view of language (for a detailed discussion of the immediate sources to the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis see Joseph 1996). Sapir’s suggestion that a language, whether simple or complex in structure, should not be necessarily connected with thought is evident in his widely celebrated statement: ‘When it comes to linguistic form, Plato walks with the Macedonian swineherd, Confucius with the head-hunting savage of Assam’ (Sapir 1921: 219). Sapir was strongly opposed to
any thesis which draws a causal connection between language, race and culture. He writes:

The very fact that races and cultures which are brought into historical contact tend to assimilate in the long run, while neighbouring languages assimilate each other only casually and in superficial respects, indicates that there is no profound causal relation between the development of language and the specific development of race and of culture. (Sapir 1921: 216)

From the mid–1920s Sapir paid more attention to individual personality as an important dimension in the understanding of human experience (Joseph et al. 2001: 12). Sapir (1921) proposed ‘a destructive analysis of the familiar’ in cross–cultural comparison which one writer likened to deconstruction (e.g., Handler 1990: 255). This approach offers a useful way to de–naturalise the racial concept of the ‘Hamite’ and could eventually lead us to view the whole question of race in discoursal rather than in physical terms:

Destructive analysis of the familiar is the only method of approach to an understanding of fundamentally different modes of expression. When one has learned to feel what is fortuitous or illogical or unbalanced in the structure of his own language, he is already well on the way toward a sympathetic grasp of the expression of the various classes of concepts in alien types of speech. Not everything that is ‘outlandish’ is intrinsically illogical or farfetched. It is often precisely the familiar that a wider perspective reveals as the curiously exceptional. (Sapir 1921: 89)

Let us now turn to Joseph Greenberg to see where he stands on the question of the Hamitic hypothesis, and what possible sociopolitical implications of his scholarship one could draw within that context. Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning that the contribution of Joseph Greenberg and particularly his intellectual opposition to the use of the Hamitic hypothesis in African linguistic classification neither appeared suddenly nor constituted the only resisting scholarship. There had been considerable amount of research in Europe which resisted the deployment of the Hamitic theory in linguistics that paved the way for Greenberg’s linguistic typology. For example, the Semitic linguist Marcel Cohen (1884-1974) commented on the uncertainty concerning the possible extension of the ‘Hamito-Semitic’ languages in Africa by pointing out that (cited in Greenberg 1955: 43):

The question is … complex and irritating. What must be determined is whether certain of these languages or even the majority of them should
not be considered to be members of the Hamito-Semitic family whose definition should be revised in consequence.

The work of Tucker and Bryan (1956), who were in a minority of linguists involved in the survey of the languages spoken in the Sudan during the colonial regime, deserves special mention. It should be noted that Tucker and Bryan (1956: 153) used the term ‘Hamitic’ in their early work, although they were aware of the connotations associated with this term. Tucker and Bryan (ibid.: 152) justified their use of the racial category of the Hamitic (particularly the Nilo-Hamitic) in their work of the 1950s in that, among other reasons, ‘the term Nilo-Hamitic is already well known, and no satisfactory alternative has yet been put forward’. In their later writings, Tucker and Bryan (1966) Tucker (1967) abandoned the term ‘Hamitic’ and suggested the term ‘Erythraic’ instead, which is based on the Greek word for the Red Sea. Moreover, Hodge (1972, 1983) suggested the term ‘Lisramic’ as a replacement of the term ‘Hamitic’, which is based on the roots for ‘people’ and ‘tongue’ in some of the languages which make up the language group (see Fellman 1978: 604). Although there were changes in nomenclature, the content of the language group was more or less the same. The point here is that the scholarship of Greenberg should be viewed as a continuation of the practice of constructing linguistic typologies on non-racial basis.

As a point of departure we may ask: what was the relevant intellectual context in which Greenberg’s thinking developed? What were the figures upon which Greenberg might have drawn or to which he might be related? A reply to these two questions hinges on providing a brief biographical and intellectual background about Greenberg (for a detailed bibliographical review of Greenberg see Croft 2007).

Joseph Harold Greenberg (1915–2001) was born in Brooklyn, New York. Greenberg showed early interest in language studies and began learning Hebrew, Latin and German at school and Greek and a few other languages on his own. As an undergraduate student at Columbia College, he attended the linguistic seminars of Franz Boas. His parents expected him to develop his musical aptitude and perhaps become a pianist, but Greenberg wanted to dedicate his life to medieval history, a field in which he thought his motivation in languages could be of advantage.
However things went contrary to what young Greenberg planned. A conversation with Alexander Lesser, his anthropological teacher, led to his being recommended by Franz Boas and Ruth Benedict for a Social Science Research Council pre–doctoral fellowship in Anthropology. At Northwestern University Greenberg met the major pioneer of African studies, Melville J. Herskovits. However, Northwestern University lacked the resources for linguistic research that Greenberg required. He spent a year at Yale University where he met Sapir’s successor Leonard Bloomfield, and Bloomfield's former student Bernard Bloch (see Anwar 1971: xi–xiv). Bloomfield introduced Greenberg to logical positivism when he advised him to read Carnap. Logical positivism had a significant impact on Greenberg particularly in its general rigour of argumentation (Croft: 2001: 816). After completing a year’s field work in West Africa, he returned to Northwestern University where he received a Ph.D. in anthropology. In 1946, Greenberg published his monograph *The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion* and began teaching at the University of Minnesota. In 1948 Greenberg joined Columbia University. Roman Jakobson and André Martinet had arrived from Europe and had established the Linguistic Circle of New York. It was through these prominent scholars that Greenberg was exposed to the structuralism of the Prague school, including the work of Trubetzkoy on markedness (ibid.). He then moved to Stanford University in 1962, where in addition to his duties as Professor of Anthropology, he became Chairman of the Committee on African Studies and Director of the National Defence Education Act African Language and Area Program. Greenberg’s book *The Languages of Africa* (1963a) attracted international attention, and his system of linguistic classification sparked a great deal of controversy (see Anwar 1971: xi–xii).

Greenberg’s interests did not stop with African languages, but included the classification of the languages of the Americas, Australia, and other parts of the world (for a complete bibliography of his publications see Croft 2007). Greenberg’s reputation as one of the most prominent linguists in the area of African languages had already been established with the publication of his *Essays in Linguistics* (1957a). Anwar (1971: xiii) comments that ‘his bold methodological explorations and his outstanding ability to reduce a great mass of facts to precise generalisations is
[sic] seen in this small but important book’. The significance of this book was recognised by a number of prominent scholars who reviewed it. For instance, Chomsky (1959: 214, 218) acknowledges in his review that Greenberg’s proposals for morphemic analysis are the most complete and detailed of their kind. Chomsky adds that the work of Greenberg makes a definite contribution towards raising the level of methodological discussion.

It is worth mentioning that Greenberg’s typological linguistics is based on the premise that language is in constant change, and that language change can only be systematically studied at the level of ‘performance’ and not ‘competence’. Greenberg’s interest lies in the interaction between the human mind and the social environment. Here one can see the shadow of the Darwinian theory of evolution looming large over Greenberg’s thinking about language. Greenberg asserted this point when he was interviewed by Paul Newman in 1991:

The way the mind works shows itself in how it works on material. And this, in a way, is an evolutionary adaptation. Language must constantly adapt because certain quite natural changes produce consequences in the system which, at a particular moment, may seem unnatural; but these aberrancies do get ironed out in the course of historical change. (Newman 1991: 460)

Although Greenberg talked about the evolutionary adaptation of language as a fundamental principle upon which a language should be studied, he was antagonistic to any theory that associated evolutionary progress with greater complexity. Greenberg produces the following counter–argument displaying their methodological defects:

Traditional theories of language evolution have … assumed a correlation between complexity and advance which is unjustified … Just the opposite seems more likely to be the case, so that in this limited aspect the despised pidgin languages are more advanced than such cherished forms of speech as classical Sanskrit. (Greenberg 1957c: 91)

Greenberg was against the hierarchisation of languages when he pointed at the functional equality of all human languages:

Languages are equal in the sense they are all ‘created equal,’ that is, have equal potentialities. In fact, some which have undergone cultivation probably have greater resources of expression, but this is not owing to any inherent superiority. Any language placed in the same position through non–linguistic factor will be capable of similar development. (Greenberg 1957c: 92)
The core of Greenberg’s argument which could rightly sum up his opposition to certain evolutionary theories of language is that ‘it is not language as such which evolves but rather communication in general’ (Greenberg 1957c: 91). It is this preoccupation with ‘communication’ that allowed his approach to be classified under the banner of functionality. Greenberg provides the following functional definition of language:

Language is the prerequisite for the acculturation and transmission of other cultural traits. Such fundamental aspects of human society as organised political life, legal systems, religion and science are inconceivable without that most basic and human of tools, a linguistic system of communication. Language is not only a necessary condition for culture, it is itself a part of culture. (Greenberg 1963b: 156)

The above quoted conception of language shows the influence of Sapir. Newman rightly noted that: ‘Throughout his work, Greenberg has always been in the Sapirian tradition’ (Newman 1991: 454). I should note that although Sapir was, in the language of Croft (2001: 819), ‘always Joe’s linguistic hero’, the two men never met because Sapir was already in his final illness when Greenberg arrived at Yale (ibid.: 816). Another important point to be made here is that since the basic function of language in Greenberg’s understanding is communication, and that language is a fundamental part of the cultural identity, then the cultural identity, or some aspects of it, is essentially constructed during the process of communication itself. Put another way, Greenberg believes that language is instrumental in the construction and reconstruction of the sociocultural identity of the African polities. Anwar rightly observed that:

Guided by the belief that language provides one of the fundamental bases for the reconstruction of human history, Greenberg’s genetic classification of African languages provides penetrating insights into the sociocultural identity of the African people. (Anwar 1971: xii)

Greenberg was careful to draw attention to the fact that a functional definition of language should extend beyond viewing language as a ‘mere’ means of communication to represent the sociopolitical reality of the people who speak it. Greenberg notes that ‘language is perhaps the most important single criterion of group identification’ (Greenberg 1965a: 205). This point could be illustrated by reference to the fact that in Africa tribal identity is defined mainly on the basis of first language, and Africans themselves are conscious of the fact that the loss of their tribal identity would almost inevitably lead to the loss of their first language.
Greenberg argues that since language is a basic source of tribal cohesion in Africa, then ‘any political and social planning that would count on the loss of tribal identity through the universal use of a lingua franca in the next generation, at least, is not realistic’ (Greenberg 1965a: 207). Greenberg in more than one place emphasises the vital role of language in the reconstruction of the history of Africa. For instance, Greenberg (1960a: 139) states that the languages spoken in Africa reflect its history. One interpretation, which I can do no more than suggest at this level, is that the African past can be retold from the perspective of local discourses in Africa (cf. Makoni’s 2007 argument on the bilinguality of history). History should be multimodal to include local dancing, signing, etc. The statement of the former Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie in 1967 points to the role linguistics can play in the reconstruction of the African past (cited in Anwar 1971: xii–xiii):

In a continent where the written record is so scant, the work of Professor Greenberg, which scientifically reconstructs an important aspect of the African past, is of the highest importance for our greater knowledge of this continent.

It should not then be surprising that the ultimate aim of Greenberg’s linguistic anthropological methods should be the establishment of a connection between the distributions of the linguistic resources on the one hand, and the political and economic resources on the other, in a given geographical area, along with the recognition of the role that politics and economics play in the domination or the ultimate eclipse of a given linguistic idiom. The following statement which Greenberg made while he was developing a quantitative approach for measuring the linguistic diversity corroborates this point:

The examination of any map of linguistic distributions for an extended area will show some regions of great diversity … The problem considered here is that of developing quantitative measures of this diversity in order to render such impressions more objective, allow the comparison of disparate geographical areas, and eventually to correlate varying degrees of linguistic diversity with political, economic, geographic, historic, and other non–linguistic factors … The increase of communication that goes with greater economic productivity and more extensive political organisation will lead typically to the spread of a lingua franca, whether indigenous or imported, resulting in widespread bilingualism and the ultimate disappearance of all except a single dominant language. (Greenberg 1956: 68, 70)

Although Greenberg casts his view on the relationship between language and cultural identity, he refuses not only to use the term ‘Hamitic’ as a racial unit of analysis in
his classification, but is also a hostile critic of all the linguistic anthropological studies which did so. Greenberg rejects wholesale any one–to–one connection between language and race: ‘There is no necessary correlation between race and language, since a people can adopt the language of a different race or, on the other hand, retain their language in spite of thoroughgoing physical modification by another race’ (Greenberg 1960b: 135). In this connection, one can note that Greenberg’s view of the relationship between language and race is completely compatible with that of Whitney and Sapir (see above). Greenberg backs up his argument on this point by referring to the status of Arabic in the Sudan and Ethiopia:

> Of the Semitic languages proper, Arabic has spread widely in the Sudan and is sometimes spoken by people who are hardly to be distinguished racially from their Negro neighbours. So likewise the dominant group of Ethiopia speak Semitic languages brought over the Red Sea from Southern Arabia some time before the Christian era. (Greenberg 1960a: 140)

Greenberg strongly criticises the linguistic typologies which are grounded in the Hamitic hypothesis such as those of Meinhof and Seligman (see Greenberg 1963a: 49–50). This point can be supported by the fact that Greenberg devoted significant parts of his 1963a Classification of African Languages to combating the previous linguistic classifications that had been made on racial basis. When asked by Newman (1991: 455–456) about his reaction to Meinhof’s typology, which is based on the Hamitic hypothesis, Greenberg replied:

> As I recall, I did work out my classification initially in reconsidering Meinhof’s extended form of the Hamitic theory and the status of Hamitic as a valid linguistic unit … As I began to look at the matter, what struck me was the extent to which people were being misled by labels. Once you call something Nilo–Hamitic, you feel that it is different from ordinary Nilotic; but if you just had the languages in front of you and they weren’t given labels, you wouldn’t see anything all that special about them, apart, perhaps, from the typological observation that a lot of these languages (for example, Masai and Turkana) have sex gender.

The implication is that Meinhof and other typologists prior to Greenberg were blinded to linguistic reality by the classificatory labels they used and the theories behind them, not least the Hamitic theory. Greenberg’s book was a reaction not only to the type of philology that was fashionable at the time, but also against the very ethics of using racial terms such as ‘Hamitic’ as units of linguistic classification. Greenberg subscribes to the view that the term Hamitic was a socially and politically
dangerous myth and that it was driven by racial considerations (see Newman 1991: 456).

In conclusion, Greenberg’s criticism of the enterprise of typologising African languages on a racial basis, which is now beyond the pale of intellectual discourse, could only, I suspect, be fully appreciated after a much more systematic attempt to locate him in his historical context. The teaching and learning of his linguistic typologies in terms of the present–day intellectual climate obscures this fact. Another point is that critical examination of the historical/intellectual context of Greenberg’s scholarship, of nineteenth–century racial thought, and of the role played by such scholars such as Boas, Sapir and Jakobson in shaping Greenberg’s intellectual outlook, help draw out a number of significant social and political interpretations of Greenberg’s linguistic groupings of African languages. One of these interpretations leads back to Boas and the idea of the functional equality of all languages, and by implication the equality of all races. I should note here that the above brief survey should not be taken to indicate that Greenberg’s thought is immune from rebuttal, nor to imply that Greenberg led a life free of epistemological crises (see Croft 2001: 818). For example, Greenberg employed the expression ‘linguistic democracy’ (see Newman 1991: 456) in, at best, an ‘undemocratic manner’, when he completely ignored the centrality of the producer of a language in the process of what I consider one of the most important manifestations of democracy:

From my point of view of language history and classification, it doesn’t matter how many people speak a language: in determining relationships, the essential thing is to look at the linguistic evidence and not pay attention to extraneous factors. (Newman 1991:456)

However, given the fact that newly independent African states tended to implement a European model of nation–state which required a significant degree of linguistic homogenisation, Greenberg’s intellectual contribution could be used as incontrovertible linguistic anthropological evidence in support of the cultural identities of the African groups, or as a defence against nationalist projects which threaten the very survival of historically–rooted African identities. Another significant interpretation is that the work of Greenberg problematises the fixed–givenness of the notion of ‘indigenous languages’, since for Greenberg the basic function of language is communication, and identities are socially constructed and
reconstructed in and through communication (for a detailed critical review of the politics of linguistic indigenousness see Chapter 5). And it should be added that Greenberg was well aware of the relationship between language and politics when he noted that ‘language not only furnishes a primary basis for ethnicity but itself becomes a political issue’ (Greenberg 1966: 242). Greenberg had evidently no quarrel with the well known thesis that ‘class and status differences are reflected in, and indeed are partially marked by, language difference’ (Greenberg 1966: 240). This particular intellectual stance recalls the Marxist conceptualisation of the relationship between language and social class which was fully articulated in Voloshinov (1973). In a word, if Greenberg was to be credited with one thing, it would be his call to look at language as a defining part of the ‘infrastructure’, in the Marxist sense, of a country, and not to dismiss it as a mere ‘superstructural’ component. It is this stance, coupled with his uncompromising position against the use of the myth of the Hamitic hypothesis as a source in the classification of African languages, that made him appropriating Croft’s language (2001: 824), ‘the scholar’s scholar’:

The question of language … has more than local import. Because tribalism, as a basic political factor in Africa, is tied to the question of the survival of communities, each with its own peculiar linguistic heritage, the question of language becomes a fundamental one for the newly independent African states. A degree of linguistic unity is a presupposition of European nationalism. In Africa, outside Somalia and the Malagasy Republic, this linguistic unity is lacking … I propose merely to point out that there is a problem of language in relation to nationalism … The language situation, taken in a broad sense, is a substantial part of what economists call the ‘infrastructure’ of development. (Greenberg 1965a: 208–209, 210)

2.2 Spread of the Arabic language in the Sudan
Generally speaking, the spread of Arabic is closely linked with the spread of Islam and the creation of Muslim empires. However, the relationship between the two is far from simple and has been at the centre of controversy in the literature. This controversy stems partly (as we will see in more details in Chapter 4) from the sensitive connection of Arabic to Islam (i.e., the language of the Quran) on the one hand, and to Arab nationalism on the other (i.e., a marker of Arabic identity). For instance, the Sudanese historian Hasan (1967: 174) argues that ‘the processes of
Arabisation and Islamisation had probably gone hand in hand and it would be difficult to separate the two’. The French linguist Miller (2003a: 154) counter–argues that there was no necessary connection between Islamisation and Arabisation since either of them could occur without necessarily leading to the other. Miller explains that the only global feature of Islamisation is the use of the language of the Quran for prayers. However, ‘tafsir’ (religious explanations) and ‘khutba’ (religious preaching) can be conducted in the local language. This is the case in a number of non–Arabic speaking areas in the world where Arabs are in a minority. Miller notes that ‘wherever Arabs were in minority [sic] or when Islamisation was achieved by non–Arabs, Arabic never became the dominant language and did not expand into the secular aspects of life’ (ibid.).

Miller (ibid.) points out that the causes behind the variation in the spread and dominance of the Arabic language in the countries invaded by Arabs are unknown. According to MacMichael (1922: 195–196), the Arabs of the Sudan form a single entity in two respects: first, they are all Mohammedans, yet their Mohammedanism has been trained by the local traditions and superstitions of the various autochthonous inhabitants among whom they have settled; secondly they speak Arabic. This is linguistically evident, MacMichael argues, in the fact that Sudanese colloquial Arabic contains a number of phrases and words which would be unintelligible to Egyptians and Syrians. In the following two sub–sections, I will first describe the spread of the Arabic language in the north; and then I shall move on to consider its spread in the south of the Sudan.

2.2.1 Spread of the Arabic language in the north

According to Hasan (1967: 135) the creation of a culturally Arabised stock in the Sudan was the direct product of the penetration of large numbers of Arab immigrant tribes. It is remarkable that little is reported in the literature on the way in which Arabisation was accomplished (see Miller 2003a: 155; Hasan 1967: 135). The whole of our information is derived from two different kinds of sources: medieval Arabic writings and a large collection of Sudanese genealogical traditions (for a genealogical typology of Sudanese tribes see MacMichael 1922; Hasan 1967).
According to Miller (2003a: 161), the Arabicisation of the Sudan began late and spread gradually. A similar view is held by Hasan (1967: 176) when he notes that ‘despite the tremendous impact of Arabic as the language of Islam, and possibly of trade, its adoption by the majority of the population as a lingua franca took many generations’. The ‘baqt’ treaty that regulated Arab–Nubian relations from AD 652 up to the fall of the Christian Kingdoms protected the land from direct Arab colonisation. The Arabicisation of central Sudan took place between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries due to the Arab migration. However, it does not appear that Arabs launched military campaigns to spread Islam. That is to say, no organised sectarian persecution or military expedition was reported in this area of the country (Miller 2003a: 161). Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, Islamisation and partial Arabicisation spread westward and eastward but was mainly restricted to the Arabicisation of local ruling elites of the Muslim Kingdoms (Miller 2003a: 161). The degree of Arabisation varies from one tribe to another and differs among the various branches of a single tribe (Hasan 1967: 175).

According to Miller (2003a: 161), full Arabicisation took place not only in areas of extensive Arab migration and intermarriage with local population (central Sudan and lowlands of western and eastern Sudan), but also spread to other areas where Arabic penetrated local languages and became the religious language or a lingua franca. The processes of Islamisation and Arabisation led to the sociopolitical situation where remote Sudanese regions came to define themselves as part of the Arab world. A number of Sudanese ruling elites and tribes adopted Arab genealogies (see MacMichael 1922 for a detailed discussion of the history of Arabian tribes in the Sudan; Hasan 1967: 143). Beshir (1969: 4) argues that although there had been contact between the Arabs and Kush, Nubian, or Ethiopian before Islam, the dominance of the Arabic culture in the northern regions started after the spread of Islam. Arabic was adopted by local people as a language and Islam as a religion. However, Beshir adds, two regions were not affected by this language change: Nubia and the Beja land. Few Arab tribes settled among the Beja due to the fact that their land was less attractive as grazing areas for their livestock. For the Nubia, the Nubian language had already developed a writing system during the Christian period, and
this enabled them to survive the new language invasion up to the present day. Hasan (1967: 176) subscribes to the same view when he pointed out that ‘the Nubians and the Baja, the first people of the Sudan to have contacts with the Arabs, continue to speak their own language’. According to Beshir (1969: 5), three factors led to the emergence of religious education in northern Sudan: the spread of Islam, the settlement of Arab tribes, and the rise of Muslim societies. Religious education demanded knowledge of the language of the Quran (i.e., Arabic). Learning the Quran was a duty of all Muslims, and parents were required to create the right conditions for its learning. The Arab settlers wanted to educate their children in order to achieve cultural and political dominance over the native population of the country. The main educational institutions were mosques and ‘Khalwas’ (Quranic pre-elementary schools).

The Turco–Egyptian invasion (1820–1885) provided the country for the first time with a central government (Beshir 1969: 12). Accordingly, Sudan became part of Egypt and lost control over its cultural and economic resources. The Turco–Egyptian regime opened a number of modern schools and allowed, even encouraged, the Christian missionaries to operate in the country. The Mahdist regime (1885–1898), which put an end to the Turco–Egyptian rule in the Sudan, abandoned the missionary work and the schools established by the Turco–Egyptian government. The Mahdi’s movement advocated a return to pure Islam, and the Arabic language played a decisive role in this project. The Mahdist state was brought to an end by the Anglo–Egyptian conquest of Sudan (1899–1956). This marked the beginning of a new regime that would intervene to change the linguistic map of the country, particularly in the south (see Chapter 4).

A number of sociolinguistic surveys and language studies have been conducted to assess the use of the Arabic language vis-à-vis other Sudanese languages. One of the major sociolinguistic surveys was called the ‘Language Survey of the Sudan, 1972’. This major sociolinguistic survey was undertaken by Bjorn Jernudd, a Visiting Research Fellow at the time at the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, with the collaboration of Sayed Hurreiz and the assistance of Ushari
The Language Survey of the Sudan was initiated by the Institute of African and Asian Studies, Khartoum University. The Language Survey of the Sudan consisted of two phases. The first phase focused on patterns of language use, and teachers and students in the first year of the junior secondary schools in the northern Sudan (Dongola, Sinkat, Kabushiyya, al–Fasher, Dilling, Heiban, Salara, Sinja, Dinder, and New Halfa). The survey also administered questionnaires in the selected schools. Its scope was nationwide. The first phase covers schools from all provinces of the country except the southern provinces of Bahr al–Ghazal and Equatoria. It should be noted here that the first phase of the survey took place just after the peace agreement of Addis Ababa had been signed; hence the southern provinces were left out until refugees return and settle in the south (Hurreiz and Bell 1975a: 1). Phase two of the survey was initiated in 1973, and the focus was entirely on the province of Bahr al–Ghazal. Intensive interviews were conducted with teachers, students, labourers, merchants, farmers, and government workers. The second phase was intended to assess the degree of multilingualism in the area, and to address the question of the spread of Arabic, English, Dinka and other local languages in the south as second languages (ibid.). The launching of the second phase coincided with the second census of the Sudan in April 1973. It should be mentioned that the first census in 1955–56 contained a question on the ‘language spoken at home’, but such a question failed to describe the repertoires that individuals had, and led to some misleading generalisations (ibid.: 2). Returning to the survey, Jernudd found out that the language of instruction in secondary schools was Arabic. Teachers were educated in both Arabic and English, and more importantly, their employability depended on excellent knowledge of Arabic, particularly the classical form (Jernudd 1975: 19). This last condition could explain why it was not unusual for many teachers to claim Arabic as their mother tongue. Jernudd found out that around less than the half of the Arab teachers expressed willingness to learn a local language.

Jernudd also notes that all literature was in Arabic, and that students had already been selected out of the primary school partly on the basis of linguistic ability and on the condition that they master Arabic. Based on the findings of this project, Jernudd
(1975: 21) argues that a policy which encourages the development and use of local languages in schools would not conflict in any way with the Arabic language policy. We should recall that interest in the Sudanese colloquial Arabic, let alone other vernacular languages, was at some point in history considered ‘a blasphemous venture which would ultimately lead to the neglect of the language of the Qur’an (classical Arabic)’ (Hurreiz and Bell 1975b: 79). However, the Arabic linguist Awn al–Sharif Qasim (1975: 94), who shed more systematic light on this Sudanese variety of Arabic, rejects such a claim outright and argues instead that Sudanese Colloquial Arabic has its own distinguishing social environment which deserves to be given scholarly attention. For him, the Arabic proto–language is unknown.

Another significant language survey of the Sudan was carried out by Thelwall (1978). Thelwall orders the provinces on the basis of their degree of linguistic fragmentation (for the distribution of the languages of Sudan according to Dalby’s linguistic fragmentation belt see Tucker 1978). His study shows that local languages play a significant role throughout the Sudan. Arabic dominates the northern part of Sudan with 91%. Nubian makes up 19%; whereas in eastern Sudan Beja dominates the Kasala province (50% to 36.3 %). Hausa and Fulani languages (from West Africa) constitute 11%. Having outlined the distribution of languages in the northern part of the Sudan, I shall now proceed to consider the southern part of the country.

2.2.2 Spread of the Arabic language in the south
According to Nyombe (1997: 100), before the making of the new Sudanese state, the people of the southern Sudan spoke a variety of their own vernaculars. Miller (2003a: 161) notes that the spread of Arabic in the southern Sudan occurred in very specific historical circumstances: the establishment of a large–scale slave trade in the nineteenth century, and subsequently the building of trade and military centres which led to the emergence of a specific Arabic pidgin used primarily as a lingua franca (for a detailed discussion of the relationship between slavery and language change in the southern Sudan see Mahmud 1983). Miller (2003a: 161) adds that the Arabic language was introduced as a lingua franca in the southern Sudan during the second half of the nineteenth century following the incursion into southern Sudan by
Turkish–Egyptian rule in 1841. Mahmud provides the following dialectic explanation, which deserves to be quoted in full, of the genealogy of the Arabic varieties spoken in the southern Sudan which he traced back to the nineteenth century:

At that time, the historical development of southern communities was disrupted and their socio–economic structures were radically being transformed under the coercive domination by foreign merchants from the northern Sudan, Egypt and Europe. Successive alien rulers and colonial administration have effectively succeeded in articulating the southern communities into the periphery of the capitalist system. In the dynamics of this articulation process, a political and economic centralisation of the previously disparate tribal–linguistic groups evolved. These processes fostered and determined the emergence, development, and spread of what can be referred to as ‘Southern Sudanese Arabic’. (Mahmud 1983: 10)

Prior to the conquest, the southern part of the Sudan was presumed to be a relatively isolated region, protected from outside influences by mountains, vast swamps and sudds (Nyombe 1997: 100). Thus, the Turco–Egyptian invasion not only seemed to have marked the first contact of the south with the outside world, but also opened up the south to future invasions and influences. However, Nyombe argues that the southerners had been interacting with their northern Arab neighbours long before the Turco–Egyptian conquest of the area. The essence of Nyombe’s argument is that there was already a tolerably widespread use of Arabic in the south as a trade language before the Turco–Egyptian invasion. Mahmud (1983: 17) counter–argues that mere trade contact which was then monopolised by the local ruling classes could not affect language change. Mahmud (ibid.) claims that ‘Arabic could not have spread in southern communities without a sustained contact produced by a transformation of the pre–existing socio–economic structures’. The Mahdist uprising (i.e., a religious movement) of 1884 brought to an end the Turco Egyptian rule in the Sudan. The Mahdists created a theocratic state in the Sudan and renewed attempts to spread Arabic culture and the teachings of the Quran in the south (Nyombe 1997: 102). By 1884, the Mahdists established their control over Bahr al–Ghazal, and later over Equatoria which they lost control of shortly. In Equatoria, they took control of Rejaf from the Belgians, who were also trying to dominate the source of the Nile in 1888. The Mahdists recruited southern slaves who converted to Islam into the Mahdi’s army, forming ‘mujahideen’ or ‘jadiya’ (soldiers fighting for Muslim
beliefs) in Bari. Nyombe notes that the local members of this army were instrumental in the spread of Arabic and Islam in the Equatoria region. Nevertheless, the scattered remnants of the Turco–Egyptian army, the local people, and the Belgians formed an alliance and forced the Mahdists to withdraw from the Rejaf in 1897. Then, the Belgians assumed control of the area and renamed it ‘Lado Enclave’, and Lingala became the lingua franca of the area (Nyombe 1997: 102). In 1898, the British, who had colonised Egypt, decided to gain control of the Sudan. A joint Anglo–Egyptian invasion led to the famous Anglo–Egyptian Condominium rule of the Sudan, and consequently to radical political, socioeconomic, cultural and linguistic changes in the Sudan. The British government assumed the administration of the south in 1900. The first two decades of the British Condominium (1900–1917) did not witness any official language planning due to the fact that the British were still relying on Arabic–speaking Egyptian officers and civil servants. From 1924 to 1946, the British made significant language policies with the aim at changing the language situation in the south. English and the local languages were given a pride of place while Arabic was almost eliminated in the whole of the southern Sudan (see Chapter 4).

Before closing, a note about the type of Arabic spoken in the south is in order. The variety of the Arabic language spoken in the southern Sudan is referred to in the everyday language as Juba Arabic (i.e., technically Southern Arabic or pidgin–creole). It is worth noting that ‘there are probably no varieties of Arabic more divergent from the classical than Juba Arabic and Ki–Nubi of Uganda’ (Hurreiz and Bell 1975b: 79). As a pidgin, Juba Arabic was a product of the contact between African languages and Arabic (ibid.: 80). It is spoken only as a second language acting as a lingua franca of the multilingual local group, but children are starting to acquire it as a mother tongue (Nhial 1975: 81). Nhial claims that Juba Arabic and Ki–Nubi probably evolved from the military Arabic of the southern Sudan in the nineteenth century (ibid.). It should be noted that Nhial’s comment on the status of Juba Arabic is out of date, since Juba Arabic is now the mother tongue of many young, southerners particularly in urban areas. Mahmud points out that Juba Arabic was ‘born and nurtured in conditions of massive social dislocation’ (Mahmud 1983: 1).
In conclusion, although the English language was given a pride of place in the southern Sudan and the whole country, none of the local languages or the Arabic pidgin–creole in the southern Sudan has been given any consideration by postcolonial governments in the distribution of political and material resources of the country. I end by raising the following question which will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5: Could the use of the southern vernaculars as media of education lead to an equal distribution of economic resources, and ultimately to the elimination of class hierarchisation, which has been a product of the domination of Arabic, between the southerners themselves in the first place, and between the south and the north in the second place? The thesis of linguistic hegemony is suggestive of a reply to this question since ‘one of the major issues in the struggle by the south to end northern hegemony was that of the role of the vernaculars in education’ (Mahmud 1983: 5):

Language–related problems plague the southern Sudan. The fifty vernacular languages and the Arabic pidgin–creole varieties that are spoken by the overwhelming majority of the people have virtually no place in the context of the political power distribution and of access to the socio–economic resources – controlled and organised by the state mainly through the medium of English. Under this arrangement, structural inequalities continue to reproduce themselves and are continually maintained and guarded by a constellation of hegemonic forces, one of which is language. Thus language becomes a critical ingredient in the evolution of a class divided society in the southern Sudan. (Mahmud 1983: 2)

2.3 Summary

In this chapter I have attempted to produce a reconstruction of the linguistic map of the Sudan prior to the spread of the Arabic language particularly in the northern Sudan. I have situated the languages spoken in the Sudan within the African social context by reviewing one of the widely cited linguistic typologies of African languages, Greenberg’s (1963a) classification of African languages. Although Greenberg’s ultimately remains an artificial construction, it points to the structural similarities between the languages spoken in the very north (e.g., Nubiin languages) and the languages spoken in the very south (Nilotic languages). I have provided a sociohistorical understanding of the academic climate which shaped Greenberg’s
opposition to the mobilisation of the physical anthropological notion of race in the
typology of African languages. The analysis has shown that there is no necessary
link between language and ethnicity. In Chapter 5 I will argue that this indexical
representation of the relationship between Arabic and Islam on the one hand and
English and Christianity on the other hand is a colonial/postcolonial invention. The
work of Greenberg also provides an analytic and logical piece of evidence against the
language ideology which conceptualises each part of the country (the north and the
south) in monolithic and singular terms as discursively homogeneous. This
background is important for I will argue in Chapter 5 that the language ideologies
that the south and the north are linguistically incompatible are a colonial invention.
The ideological notions of the south and the north are in themselves colonial
creations that involved the colonial construction of linguistic differentiation. The
chapter also examined the historical genealogy of the Arabicisation before the
institutional intervention of language planning whether in the colonial or postcolonial
period. With this in mind, I shall contend in Chapter 5 that the official declaration of
Arabic and Islam as state policies in the northern Sudan is a colonial creation.
CHAPTER THREE: LANGUAGE PLANNING AND LANGUAGE POLICY: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND

In the previous chapter I broadly surveyed the distribution and linguistic classification of Sudanese languages prior to any official intervention by colonial or postcolonial governments. The deliberate act of intervention into the structural system of a language or its functional domains of use is generally known as ‘language planning and policy’. In this chapter I review the major themes in the scholarship of language planning and policy. The chapter is thematically organised into the following sections: Section 3.1 is concerned with conceptual and terminological definitions in the field, and locates the domain of language planning contextually by examining the key elements and actors involved in the process of language planning. The section also surveys the various frameworks and intellectual approaches to language planning. Section 3.2 explores the relationship between language planning and power, with a focus on the construct of ‘language rights’ and different language rights regimes available in the literature. Section 3.3 reviews the critical perspectives to literacy education. Section 3.4 examines the concept of critical language awareness in educational planning. Section 3.5 discusses the link between language planning and national identity, and Section 3.6 broadly reviews the language situation in Nigeria for comparative purposes. The whole chapter is intended to provide a theoretical grounding for Chapter 5.

3.1. A terminological and conceptual basis for language planning and policy

3.1.1 Language planning and policy: Definitions

Haugen (1959) was the first to use the term ‘language planning’ to refer to the process of developing a new standard national language in Norway following independence from Denmark (see Karam 1974: 104; Fettes 1997: 13). Haugen defined language planning as follows:

By language planning I understand the activity of preparing a normative orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the guidance of writers and speakers in a non–homogeneous speech community. In this practical application of linguistic knowledge we are proceeding beyond descriptive linguistics into an area where judgement must be exercised.
in the form of choices among available linguistic forms. (Haugen 1959: 8)

Various terms such as ‘language engineering’ had previously been used to refer more or less to the same activity (see Karam 1974: 104). Language planning and policy as an academic field has a comparatively recent history associated with decolonisation and the language problems of newly independent states (Ferguson 2006: 1). According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: ix), our knowledge of language planning as a phenomenon is a constituent part of human beings’ ways of meaning making, thus it is old as recorded human history. However, there is a general consensus among scholars that the early (i.e., classical/traditional/mainstream) version of language planning and policy was born within sociolinguistics in the 1960s and 1970s, and was dominated by positivist paradigms. Joseph (1987: 14) points out that language planning as an academic field is a product of the sociolinguistic attention to language standardisation in the 1950s and 1960s. Wright (2004: 1) has argued that despite the fact that language planning as a discipline is a relatively new development, it is as old as language itself. It should be noted that scholars of language planning and policy are not consistent in their use of terminology when they refer to the field. For instance, the terms ‘language planning’ and ‘language policy’ are frequently used either synonymously or in tandem, either with the same or different technical range of application. Some scholars such as Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: xi) maintain that the two terms describe two distinct aspects of language change process. The researchers define ‘language policy’ as ‘a body of ideas, laws, regulation, rules and practices intended to achieve the planned language change in the society, group or system’ (ibid.). ‘Language planning’, on the other hand, is an activity that is usually undertaken by governments with the aim to ‘promote some systematic linguistic change in some community of speakers’ (ibid.). According to Spolsky (2006: 87), the term ‘language policy’ denotes two senses: First, it describes ‘the customary consensual judgements and practices of a speech community with regards to the appropriateness of a large number of significant choices among all the kinds of variants allowed in speech or writing’. Secondly, the term ‘language policy’ points to ‘a specific policy adopted and explicitly stated for a defined circumstance and place’ (ibid.).
There are likewise a number of definitions and interpretations of the term ‘language planning’ in the literature. According to Baldauf (1990: 14), language planning is a complex series of processes which involve deliberate language change in the system of language by the concerned planning bodies. Rubin and Jernudd (1971a: xvi) point out that developing a language plan needs ‘the mobilisation of a great variety of disciplines because it implies the channelling of problems and values to and through some administrative structure’. Baldauf (1990: 15) remarks that although language planners should consult widely before developing a language policy, they usually work under specific social and political constraints, and within the resources and bureaucratic structures that are available.

Language planning is not intended to be theory driven, but rather ‘responsive to real–world interdisciplinary solutions of immediate practical problems’ (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: xi). Rubin (1971) states that good planning includes steps such as extensive fact–finding, the consideration of alternative plans of action, decision–making, and the implementation of decisions in specific ways. Rubin (ibid.: 218) characterised language planning as ‘an activity whereby goals are established, means are selected, and the outcomes predicted in a systematic and explicit manner’ (ibid.: 218). Language planning concentrates on the solutions to language problems ‘through decisions about alternative goals, means, and outcomes to solve these problems’ (ibid.). Rubin and Jernudd (1971a: xvi) make much the same point that language planning is focused on ‘problem solving and is characterised by the formulation and evaluation of alternatives for solving language problems to find the best (or optimal, most efficient) decision’. Fishman (1974a: 79) treats language planning as ‘the organised pursuit of solutions to language problems’. Rubin (1973) notes that a proper implementation of language planning depends upon access to the right kind of information about the sociolinguistic habits of the target population and about the social basis for language policy in order to project productive directions of change. It is generally recognised that when linguistic differences are mirrored in religious, social and economic differences, the selection of a language may be fraught with dangers (see Das Gupta 1971). Rubin and Jernudd’s (1971b) collection
raised the question of whether a language can be planned at all. Fishman (1974b) believes that:

Members of the language–sciences community have passed beyond wondering whether language should be planned. Obviously, language has been planned, in one way or another, for a good long time … Obviously, too, it has at times been planned with considerable success. Finally, it will clearly continue to be planned in the future, both in connection with the further cultivation of previously modernised languages, as well as in connection with the modernisation of languages thus far utilised for traditional pursuits alone. (Fishman 1974b: 25–26, emphasis in original)

Critical linguistic researchers, and particularly critical language planning researchers (an intellectual orientation developed by Pennycook 2001, 2006; Tollefson 2006), situate the practice of language planning and policy within social theory, and problematise the foundations upon which traditional language planning is based. Wright (2004) has argued that language planning and policy should be placed within broader social and political contexts. She has contended that ‘language planning plays a crucial role in the distribution of power and resources in all societies’ and it is ‘integral to such activity and deserves to be studied explicitly from this political perspective’ (Wright 2004: 1). A similar view is provided by Tollefson:

Language planning–policy means the institutionalisation of language as a basis for distinctions among social groups (classes). That is, language policy is one mechanism for locating language within social structure so that language determines who has access to political power and economic resources. Language policy is one mechanism by which dominant groups establish hegemony in language use. (Tollefson 1991: 16)

Another charge against mainstream language planning is that it aimed at projecting European notions of the nation–state in postcolonial African states in which people are unified around one standard language (Ferguson 2006: 3–4). Bamgbose (1994) expresses the same charge when he argues that nation–builders in Africa were preoccupied with number ‘one’:

In Africa, it seems that we are obsessed with the number ‘one’. Not only must we have one national language, we must also have a one–party system. The mistaken belief is that in such oneness of language and party we would achieve socio–cultural cohesion and political unity in our multi–ethnic, multilingual and multicultural societies. (Bamgbose 1994: 36)

Another criticism levelled against traditional language planning is that it intends to objectify and naturalise language i.e., treat it as a natural entity (see Pennycook
To avoid this view of language as a fixed–given object, a number of researchers have conceptually reframed language or replaced it with another dynamic notion (e.g., discourse). Researchers in critical applied linguistics (i.e., a critical form of linguistics proposed by Pennycook 2001) interrogate the view of languages as ontological entities with their natural fixed structural properties (Pennycook 2006: 66). Proponents of postmodernism urge us to reconceptualise the ontology of language as a colonial/modernist construction (see Pennycook 2006; Tollefson 2006). Harris (1996, 1997) suggests an integrationalist approach to language in which languages are seen not as bounded or isolated entities but rather as placed within a much wider system of multimodal semiotics. Gafaranga and Torras (2001) contend that the traditional sociolinguistic notion of language cannot adequately account for speakers’ language choices in bilingual interaction, and suggest the term ‘medium’ instead. Joseph (2002, 2004: 10) has proposed reconceptualising ‘language’ as a ‘process’ noun, hence stressing the dynamism of the semantic features. Ruiz (1984) suggests a typology of orientations to language policy which consists of language–as–problem, language–as–right, and/or, language–as–resource (see Churchill 1986 for a comparable typology of language policies). Joseph (2004: 125, 2006a) has suggested that languages, whether standard or non–standard, should be viewed as political inventions. More importantly, linguists reject the classical language thesis that languages are equal. Hymes (1992: 1) holds that although languages are structurally and potentially equal, they are not socially so because ‘social meaning includes evaluation of languages themselves’. The same view was held by Joseph (1987: 88) when he condemned as extremist the relativistic pronouncement by modern linguistics that ‘all dialects are equal’. Canagarajah (2006: 156) has expressed the same proposition when he has argued that languages are ‘positioned unequally in power relations’.

Luke et al. (1990: 28) argue that what is missing in classical language planning is an ‘exploration of the complex theoretical relationship between language, discourse, ideology and social organisation’, and these are the exact concerns of neo–Marxist social theorising, critical discourse analysis, and post–structuralist and critical theory. Social elites have social, political and economic power, and thus may be able to
control the language planning processes for their own benefit. Haugen (1983: 286) points to the possibility that language implementation can be part of a ‘political constellation’. According to Fishman (1994a), the thrust of the neo–Marxist and post–structuralist arguments against classical language planning is based on five points: 1) Classical language planning is conducted by elites who are driven by their own self–interest; 2) It reproduces sociocultural and econotechnical inequalities rather than overcomes them; 3) It counteracts multiculturalism; 4) It supports westernisation and modernisation resulting in new sociocultural, econotechnical and conceptual colonialism, and 5) Only ethnography can save the field (for a detailed reaction to these charges see Fishman 1994a: 98). Spolsky (2004: 14) states that language ideologies can count as a language policy which can be intended to modify or confirm language practices (for a detailed discussion of language ideologies see Joseph and Taylor 1990; Blommaert 1999; Woolward and Schieffelin 1994). Shannon (1999: 185) points out that in the absence of a language policy in the southwestern region of the USA, bilingual teachers pattern their practice after the dominant language ideology. Spolsky and Shohamy (2000) distinguish between the language practice of a community and its language ideology. While the language practice of a community defines ‘its ethnography of community or patterned use of its linguistic repertoire’, its language ideology refers to ‘the consensus on what varieties are appropriate for what purposes’ (ibid.: 1).

3.1.2 The context of language planning and policy
According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 5), language planning and planners should be situated in their sociopolitical context since ‘resources for language planning should compete with the demands made by other planning areas for funds’. Language planning in its macro (larger) sense is identified as an aspect of national resource development planning. National resource development planning is said to fall into two main categories: human resource development planning and natural resource development planning (for the difference between these two types of planning see Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 4–5). Figure 3.1 contextualises the language planning process and shows the main elements and actors involved in the process of language planning.
Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 5) identified four main areas concerned with language planning: 1) governmental bodies; 2) the educational sector; 3) quasi–governmental or non–governmental bodies, and 4) individuals and organisations. Broadly speaking, language planning is a function of governments and their bureaucratic systems which
can penetrate a number of sectors of society (ibid.: 122). Joseph (1987: 111) notes that governmental bodies employ certain linguists and educationalists as language planning experts, or as members of language planning boards, or in similar positions with different titles. The Scandinavian countries are a typical example of countries with permanent commissions or committees (see Haugen 1976). Joseph (1987: 111) writes that some governments jointly sponsor international commissions on specific languages. The East African Swahili Committee founded in 1930 and the Hausa Language Board founded in 1955 are cases in point (see Whiteley 1969; Paden 1968: 202).

According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 8), the education sector has to make a number of language planning and policy decisions among which are the following: 1) It must decide on the languages to be taught within the curriculum; 2) It has to prepare and train, at both pre-service and in-service stages, teachers who will teach the new language in the curriculum; 3) It has to determine the level of students who will learn the languages and has to get parental and community support for teaching the planned languages; 4) It has to decide and prepare the language teaching materials included in the curriculum, and to determine the methodologies that will be used to teach the curriculum languages; 5) It has to define the assessment procedures to measure students, teacher and system performance, and 6) It has to determine the financial source for funding and maintaining the language education programme in the short and long-terms.

The non/quasi governmental sector includes language agencies, national language academies, and Language Planning Boards (see Joseph 1987: 110–115; Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 9). The Goethe Institute for German (see Ammon 1992), the British Council for English and the Japan Foundation for Japan (Hirataka 1992) are examples of language agencies. The function of these bodies is the preparation of grammar books, dictionaries, and lexical development, with the aim to preserve the purity of their national languages. National language academies were instrumental in the spread and the preservation of the purity of what was planned to be the national language. Examples of countries with such national language academies are Italy
(Accademia della Crusca 1582), Spain (Real Academia Espanola 1713), and Portugal (Institute de Alta Cultura) (see Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 10; for language academies in the Middle East see Altoma 1974).

According to Joseph (1987: 112), language academies and Language Planning Boards differ primarily in terms of the qualifications for membership and the intellectual orientation under which they are established. Members of language academies in most countries are selected on the basis of literary achievement, and their pronouncements point to a belief that language is decaying and should be restored. Language Planning Boards, on the other hand, show a commitment to principles of scientific research, although they have an advisory status. It is worth noting that the most widely spread language (English) did not have a language academy and that may be attributed to the fact that the emergence of Samuel Johnson’s uniquely authoritative Dictionary of the English Language in the 1755 rendered the attempt to found an academy unnecessary (ibid.). Ricento (2006: 20) has noted that although it is difficult to regulate language on the internet, official bodies such as universities and language academies continue to control ways in which language should be used on the internet. Certain organisations with a core function that is not–language related nevertheless play a role in the process of language planning, the United States Postal Service and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service being cases in point (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 12). Joseph (1987: 114) observes that editors play a significant role in the process of controlling and planning a language.

3.1.3 A typology of language planning processes and activities

Language planning researchers draw a significant distinction between language planning processes/steps which involve a series of activities and language planning goals/functions (see Hornberger 1990; Nahir 1984). Nahir (1984: 297) illustrates the distinction between the two conceptual categories with the following example: 'when the Canadian Public Service Commission provides French or English training to public servants, it is seeking the goal of Language Spread. The same type of activity, however, could be related to other goals, such as Language Revival or Language...
Maintenance’. The point here is that language planning activities do not in themselves point to a sociopolitical orientation; rather ‘it is the goals that are assigned to the language–planning activities that determine the direction of change envisioned’ (Hornberger 1990: 21). The language planning goal which is sought by a particular language planning activity/process represents the intention of the language planning body (see Section 3.1.2 for the different language planning elements involved in the process of language planning). Scholars of language planning have suggested various typologies of language planning activities to carry out specific language functions. For example, Kloss’s (1969) dichotomy contains status and corpus planning. Haugen’s (1983) typology consists of selection, codification, implementation, and elaboration. Neustupný’s (1974) classification is composed of policy approach and cultivation approach. This section discusses four types of language planning activities: status planning, corpus planning, language–in–education planning, and discourse planning. I have combined status and corpus planning under one sub–heading since ‘corpus planning, in itself, is an expression of a status planning agenda, albeit in more muted, disguised, or indirect terms than those openly avowed in governmental or other authoritative declarations’ (Fishman 2000: 48).

3.1.3.1 Status planning and corpus planning

Kloss (1969) was the first to introduce the terms status and corpus planning in the literature of language policy and planning. Status planning is intended to address the functions of language(s) in society and it typically refers to the assigning of languages to official domains of language use such as those of the government and education (Ferguson 2006: 20). Status planning is rarely assigned to language experts, but rather it is viewed as the job of politicians. The output of status planning is laws, clauses in constitutions and regulations prescribing the official standing of languages, and their use in social domains of public administration (Lo Bianco 2004: 742). Kale (1990: 185–186) suggests five selectional criteria for using a social variety for official purposes: political neutrality, dominance, prestige, a great tradition, and a real affinity.
Corpus planning, on the other hand, is intended to change the code or the form of the selected language (Ferguson 2006: 21). Corpus activities are usually undertaken by languages experts resulting in the production of grammars, dictionaries, literacy manuals, and writing style and pronunciation guides (Lo Bianco 2004: 742; Ferguson 2006: 21). However, like status planning, corpus planning is also driven by political considerations extending beyond the code itself (Ferguson 2006: 21). Haugen (1983) proposes a four-way matrix of language planning processes yielding four processes: selection of norm, codification, elaboration of function, and implementation (i.e., acceptance/propagation in Haugen 1966, 1969 respectively). Selection and implementation are viewed as status planning activities, whereas codification and elaboration are seen as corpus planning processes. Although Ferguson’s (1968: 28–33) typology of language development (i.e., graphisation, modernisation, and standardisation) corresponds roughly to the functions of corpus planning activities (see Hornberger 2006: 30), modernisation may be interpreted to partake in status planning and corpus planning (i.e., modernisation partly includes Haugen’s selection at the status planning level, see Ferguson 1968: 29). Drawing mainly on Nahir’s (1984) work, Hornberger (1990: 20) listed the following sociopolitical goals or functions of status and corpus planning activities: officialisation, nationalisation, status standardisation, vernacularisation, revival, spread, maintenance, interlingual communication, purification, reform, corpus standardisation, lexical modernisation, terminology unification, stylistic simplification, auxiliary code standardisation (e.g., unifying the rules of transliteration), and graphisation (for definitional issues see Nahir 1984; Hornberger 1990, 2006).

Standardisation, which is generally perceived as a corpus planning activity, has received much attention in the literature of language planning. A crucial part of the standardisation process is ‘codification’. Codification is ‘the process of giving explicit definition to the norm, principally through the production of authoritative grammars, dictionaries, spellers, and the like’ (Ferguson 2006: 21). It is usually performed by a single individual who ‘decides to give explicit, usually written, form to the norm he has chosen’ (Haugen 1983: 271). Codification is always tied to prescription (Fairclough 2001: 48). The aim of codification is to minimise variation
in form and to maximise variation in function (Haugen 1966). That is to say, language planners should work with the goal of minimising misunderstanding and maximising efficiency (Milroy and Milroy 1985). Joseph (1987: x), who provides a detailed historical investigation of the nature of language standardisation, draws a distinction between ‘language standards’ and ‘standard languages’: ‘While “language standards” exist in every linguistic community, “standard languages” represent a specifically European concept, whose defining criteria are based on the attributes of European languages and on European cultural values’. Thus, evaluating non-European languages by the same standardisation extent (e.g., codified grammars) would have serious implications for these languages (for a detailed discussion of the different conceptualisations of language standardisation in modern linguistics see Joseph 1987: 11–16). Ferguson (2006: 21) has defined standardisation as ‘the construction – and subsequent dissemination – of a uniform supradialectal normative variety’. Milroy and Milroy (1985) identify standardisation as a strategy employed to suppress the internal variability of a language. Joseph (1987: 63) shares the same opinion when he notes that standardisation is intended to ‘overcome dialectal diversity by providing the ideal medium for communication among all members of the unit of loyalty’. Wright (2004: 54) argues that ‘standardisation is in part a fiction’. Milroy (1999: 18) states that standard languages ‘are fixed and uniform–state idealisations – not empirically verifiable realities’. Ferguson (2006: 22) has stated that standardisation is an ideological process since the language selected to play the role of the standard legitimates and consolidates the social and economic dominance of a group of elites. Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 123) identify the standard language as ‘a set of discursive, cultural and historical practices – a set of widely accepted communal solutions to discourse problems’. Fairclough (2001: 47) equates the process of standardisation with the ‘process of colonisation’, whereby the standard language develops at the expense of other languages and gradually takes over major social institutions. Fairclough remarks that there is ‘an element of schizophrenia’ about standard languages (e.g., English), in the sense that the selected variety ‘aspires to be (and is certainly portrayed as) a national language belonging to all classes and sections of the society, and yet remains in many respects a class dialect’ (ibid.: 48).
3.1.3.2 Language–in–education planning

According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 122), language–in–education (Cooper’s 1989 acquisition planning) substantially involves the educational sector of the society. The educational arena is usually chosen as an implementation site for language policies. Since educational institutions deal with the standard versions of language, and standard languages are considered a symbol of cultural unity, it follows that the role of education is to induct individuals into the dominant culture of the society (see Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 122; 2006: 46–49).

Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 125) list five steps which form the major considerations for language–in–education policy and implementation: curriculum, personnel, materials, community, and evaluation. Critical language theorists draw a distinction between language training and language education. One of the objectives of language teaching in schools is the achievement of some degree of bilingualism in the target language among the target population within a limited period (see Romaine 1989, Li Wei 2000 for a detailed definition of bilingualism). Fairclough (2001: 197) notes that language training concentrates on the ‘transmission of knowledge and skill, whose content is assumed to be unproblematic and whose social origins are ignored’. Fairclough argues that it is exactly this alienating concept of language that was traditionally transmitted in schools. Fairclough refers to this view as the ‘instrumental ideology of language’: ‘Language as a tool for getting things done’ (ibid.: 96). Language education by contrast focuses on the raising of children’s critical awareness of their environment and the development of their capabilities to participate in the shaping and reshaping of their social world.

A number of concerns have recently dominated the agenda of language teaching and particularly teaching English as a second language (ESL). One concern addresses the inequalities in the relation between the constructs of ‘native’ and ‘non–native’ speaker (see Leung, Harris and Rampton 1997; Cook 1999; Davies 2003). Another theme investigates the issue of social identity and ways of teaching languages. For example Ibrahim (1999) has investigated the social identity of a group of French–
speaking immigrant and refugee continental African youths attending an urban high school in Ontario. Ibrahim (1999: 349) has found out that these students ‘become Black’ as they enter a ‘social imaginary—a discursive space in which they are already imagined, constructed and thus treated as Blacks by hegemonic discourses and groups’. Ibrahim (ibid.) concluded that ‘ESL is neither neutral nor without its politics and pedagogy of desire and investment’. Lin (1999: 411) has discovered that particular ways of teaching English in Hong Kong might lead to the reproduction or transformation of social worlds.

The questions of gender, sexuality and sexual identity are among the themes that have received careful consideration in recent years in the area of ESL. Nelson (1999: 388) argues that ‘within ESL, learners, teachers, teacher educators, and material developers need to be able to refer to and discuss not just straight but also lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgenderal, or queer identities’. Drawing on Freire’s participatory education as a critical pedagogy, Frye (1999: 512) maintains that the first step towards women’s liberation is that individual women should start to wrestle with the dominant social norms that have oppressed them.

Within the field of the sociology of education a new critical approach to the curriculum called the ‘new sociology of education’ was developed by a neo–Marxist group of sociologists to examine the taken–for–granted educational practices (for a critique of this approach see Young and Whitty 1977; Young 1971; Esland 1971; Kiddie 1971; Whitty 1977; Heyman 1981). This orientation is mainly concerned with the analysis of the mechanics and causes of the social and economic reproduction through education (Heyman 1981: 457). An alternative form of theorising, which can be seen as a mirror image of the new sociology, is advocated by Althusser (1971) who defines education as the main ‘ideological State apparatus’ for capitalism. For Althusser (ibid.: 128), the school teaches the ‘know–how’ but in ways which ensure submission to the ruling ideology or submission to the mastery of its practice. This perspective which is widely held by classical Marxists has been heavily criticised. Young and Whitty (1977: 20) argue that Althusser’s theorising is naïve since it ‘stimulates an unfortunate form of quietism’ among teachers. Althusser’s (1971: 140)
stance is that the struggle is rooted not in ideology but rather in the infrastructure and production relations that are exploitative and constitute the foundation for class relations.

### 3.1.3.3 Discourse planning

Discourse planning as an analytic category is suggested by Lo Bianco (2004). Lo Bianco (ibid.: 751) holds that the theorisation of language planning and policy demands the inclusion of a category of ‘discourse planning’ to account for a policy action in which language is the focus of attention, particularly in domains where there is conflict, dispute, and contest. The primary objective is to explain the language of politics in language planning practice, the way in which language problems are interpreted discursively for policy attention, a process which leads to selective elevation of some linguistic issues for policy treatment, while disregarding alternative claims.

The addition of the political discursive strand within the domain of language planning and policy aims to understand the construction of language problems as a performative practice, engaging the persuasive language, traditional concepts of rhetoric, and the actual achievement of goals of language policy through ideological structuring (ibid.). In spite of the fact that discourse is inherently dialogical, contestable and negotiable in the sense that it exists in intertextual relations with other discourses, discourse planning is concerned with ‘the efforts of institutions and diverse interests to shape, direct, and influence discursive practices and patterns’ (ibid.: 743). Lo Bianco believes that discourse planning is reflexive in the sense that it aims to influence the way in which people think, behave and value language itself.

### 3.1.4 Models and frameworks of language planning and language policy

To begin with, language planning should not be seen as a one–off activity. Rather, it should be viewed as an on–going activity. There are a number of models and frameworks of language planning and policy in the literature. The list of the frameworks and models of language planning, which is by no means exhaustive, includes: Haugen (1966, 1969, 1983); Ferguson (1968); Kloss (1969); Stewart
Hornberger’s (2006) integrative model of language planning is composed of two main axes (see Figure 3.2) which point to a conceptual distinction made between language planning types (e.g., status planning), and language planning approaches which focus on the form or/and function of language (e.g., corpus planning). On the one hand, the vertical axis presents a distinction between three types of language planning activities: status planning, acquisition planning and corpus planning. Cooper (1989) proposes the category of acquisition planning (see language–in–education planning, Section 3.1.3.2).

The horizontal axis, on the other hand, shows a typological distinction made by Neustupný (1974) between ‘policy’ and a ‘cultivation’ approach to language planning. The policy approach, which corresponds to the status planning at the societal level, deals with language matters of a nation ‘emphasising the distribution of languages/literacies, and mainly concerned with standard languages’ (Hornberger 2006: 28). The cultivation approach, which is interpreted as being equivalent to corpus planning, is concerned with matters of language and literacy at the microscopic level. Haugen (1983) combined the two binary distinctions of
status/corpus and policy/cultivation into a fourfold matrix that can be viewed either from a societal or a linguistic focus of attention. The societal perspective, which is designated ‘status planning’, refers to the selection and implementation of the selected language. The linguistic perspective (corpus planning), on the other hand, refers to the codification and elaboration of the form. Drawing on Haugen’s work and Cooper’s (1989) acquisition planning, Hornberger has designed her integrative model as a matrix with six dimensions of language/literacy planning (see Figure 3.2). Drawing on Nahir (1984) and other scholars, Hornberger (2006: 30) has included 30 goals in her integrative framework. Hornberger’s integrative model incorporates Ferguson’s (1968: 28–33) typology of language planning activities (i.e., standardisation, graphisation, and modernisation) that comes under corpus policy and cultivation planning (see Section 3.1.3.1 for a detailed discussion of standardisation). Hornberger (2006: 30) has defined standardisation of corpus as the ‘development of a literacy norm which overrides regional and social literacies’. Graphisation is concerned with ‘the provision of a writing system for a hitherto unwritten language’ (ibid.). Modernisation involves ‘the lexical and stylistic development of a language/literacy for its expansion into hitherto unused domains’ (ibid.).

In Hornberger’s integrative framework, standardisation and graphisation focus on the form of language, while modernisation concentrates on the function of language. In Figure 3.2 we find that revival (cf. Fishman’s 1991 reversing language shift), maintenance, spread and interlingual communication constitute the activities of cultivation of a language’s status (cf. Haugen’s implementation 1983: 272).

In the integrative framework of language planning, status standardisation is defined as ‘language planning activities that accept or impose a language as the standard’, and corpus standardisation as ‘language–planning activities that codify the linguistic forms of that standard as a uniform norm’ (Hornberger 2006: 31). Standardisation of

Standardising or modifying the marginal, auxiliary aspects of language such as signs for the deaf, place names, and rules of transliteration and transcription, either to reduce ambiguity and thus improve communication or to meet changing social, political, or other needs or aspirations. (Nahir 1984: 318)

In addition to the status standardisation, the status–policy dimension of planning (cf. Haugen’s 1983 selection) includes three functions: officialisation (cf. Stewart 1968), nationalisation and proscription (see Hornberger 2006: 32). Cooper’s (1989) acquisition planning attends to the users of language in contrast to the status planning which focuses on the use of a language. Cooper (1989) lists the following as possible functions of acquisition planning: maintenance, foreign/second language acquisition, and reacquisition (see Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 14–26 for comparative definitions and discussion of terms such as foreign/nation/regional language). Hornberger (2006: 32) has added ‘language shift’ as another possibility to Cooper’s list of goals of acquisition planning. Hence each goal in the acquisition–cultivation dimension has a corresponding goal in the status–cultivation dimension i.e., revival–reacquisition, maintenance–maintenance, spread–shift, interlingual communication–foreign/second language acquisition (see Hornberger 2006: 32). For the acquisition–policy dimension, Stewart’s (1968) typology of goals, as revised by Cooper (1989), includes the six foci of this dimension: group, education/school, literature, religion, mass media, and work (see Hornberger 2006: 32). In short, Hornberger (2006: 33) has suggested that ‘LPP [language policy and planning] will be most effectively carried out if all the six dimensions depicted in the framework are attended to’.

3.1.5 Approaches to language planning and policy

I start with two broad competing analytic approaches to language planning and policy: the Neoclassical approach (Tollefson’s 1991 term for traditional language planning) and the historical–structural approach (see Tollefson 1991: 22–42, 2006: 48–49; Wood 1982; Bach and Schraml 1982). The differences between the two approaches can be considered in terms of the conceptual and methodological basis of each approach; the unit of analysis employed, and the historical specificity of the investigation (see Wood 1982: 299). According to Tollefson, the conceptual
differences between the two approaches reflect the underlying ideological orientations of the supporters of the two perspectives, and their different stances on the relative importance of individual choice and collective behaviour in social research. On the one hand, the historical–structural approach draws its conceptual inspiration from Marx’s historical materialism as well as from social theory (Wood 1982: 302). It conceptualises language planning as an historical process inextricably bound with structural considerations including class–based structures. The historical structural approach aims at examining the historical basis of language policies and revealing the structural pressures and mechanisms by which policy decisions serve or undermine specific socioeconomic interests (Tollefson 1991: 22–42; for the implementation of this approach see McCarty 2002). On the other hand, the Neoclassical approach is ahistorical and concentrates primarily on the rational calculus of the individual actor (Wood 1982: 300). The historical–structuralist rejects this conception on the grounds that it is reductionistic and precludes analysis of the underlying causes of the structural parameters within which individual choices are made (ibid.: 303). The historical structural perspective assumes that individual variables such as motivation have some hidden explanation, and views it as a historical product rather than as a primary factor in language acquisition. With origins firmly rooted in Marxist tradition, the historical–structural approach locates the individual within classes or class fractions which constitute a specific social formation (ibid.). Critics of the historical–structural model reject the historical data on class and class struggle as metaphysical concerns (ibid.: 308). The proponents of the historical–structural perspective charge that traditional language planning and policy gives no insight into the structural and ideological basis of language policies, nor their relationship with power, dominance, and hegemony, or their role in exploitation and struggle (Tollefson 1991). Bach and Schraml (1982: 320, 321) note that the supporters of the two approaches ‘have become essentially separate intellectual communities’, because the opposition between them is ‘a clash of paradigm, a conflict of world visions that preclude meaningful dialogue’.

A third approach to the field of language planning and policy has been marked by the emergence at the end of the cold war of a critique of the Anglophone dominance
termed linguistic imperialism by Robert Philipson (1992, 2006). Phillipson’s (1992: 1) critique of linguistic imperialism states that ‘whereas Britannia ruled the waves, now it is English which rules them’. Linguistic imperialism is a sub-type or an example of ‘linguicism’, a term coined by Phillipson to refer to ‘ideologies, structures and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources, both material and immaterial, between groups which are defined on the basis of language’ (ibid.: 47). Working exclusively within the context of English linguistic imperialism, Phillipson argues that the English language has been aided by ideological support to be made the dominating language in the world. Phillipson identifies English linguistic imperialism as the process whereby ‘the dominance of English is asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages’ (ibid.). Furthermore, Phillipson argues that the expansion of the English language is promoted by organisations and institutional bodies including: TESOL (especially its American and British variants), globalisation, language experts and teachers, the World Bank, and the ‘McDonaldisation’ of the world through commercial firms and media.

The critique of linguistic imperialism has sparked a heated controversy (see Davies–Phillipson debate: Davies 1996, 1997, Phillipson 1997; the Crystal–Phillipson debate: Phillipson 1999, Crystal 2000). The reaction of the English Language Teaching (ELT) establishment was that they were not ‘doing politics’ and that they were simply implementing research–oriented methodologies (see Joseph 2006a: 51). For Phillipson (1992: 48), professionalism is not a rationale for not taking part in rectifying the problem of the domination of English. Joseph (2006a: 50) has contended that the historical basis on which the critique was based is fundamentally flawed. Joseph has constructed his argument upon the historical fact that the colonial practices of Britain, in contrast to, France promoted the use of local vernaculars: ‘The British colonial administration in London did not support having colonial subjects educated in English’ (ibid.). Brutt–Griffler (2006: 37) has made the same argument that the British Empire implemented linguistic exclusionist strategies as part of a containment policy where it constructed indigenous languages as national
languages to separate the non–English masses from the English speaking elite. Joseph (2006a: 53) has noted that part of the problematic character of Phillipson’s thesis of linguistic imperialism lies in the fact that it portrays eloquent scholars from Third World countries as suffering from a false consciousness or as traitors of their local societies. Canagarajah (1999a; 1999b) is strongly critical of Phillipson’s theorisation of linguistic imperialism. Canagarajah (1999b: 207) argues that linguistic imperialism pictures people as passive to be converted to new languages: ‘People are not always passive or blind to be converted heart and soul to new discourses’. Canagarajah maintains that the critique is insensitive to ‘the ways of modifying, mixing, appropriating, and even resisting discourses’ (ibid.). Rajagopalan (1999a: 200) tries to invalidate the conditions of linguistic imperialism when he argues that ‘the whole thesis is based on premises that no longer hold good in a world marked by cultural intermixing and growing multilingualism at a hitherto unprecedented level, leading to unstable identities and shifting conceptual contours’. Rajagopalan believes that ‘it is in the very nature of human languages, all of them, to be riven by power inequalities’ (1999a: 205), and consequently that ‘viewing language as an arena of permanent conflict entails that there will always be losers as well as winners’ (1999b: 115). It is beyond the capacity of English language teachers, Rajagopalan (1999a: 205–206) continues, to do anything about the loss of local languages as a result of the spread of the English language: ‘Language planning and language teaching necessarily entail rehashing of existing power relations simply because power is exercised in and through language’. Canagarajah (1999b: 210) counters the stance of Rajagopalan by arguing that: ‘We are urged to bury our eyes ostrich–like to the political evils and ideological temptations outside. Divorcing our moral sensibility and social consciousness from our profession’. Spolsky (2004: 91), another opponent of the Phillipson critique, contends that the spread of English is not a product of direct or covert language policy, and that any language policy of any nation should take into account the global place of the English language. Pennycook (2001: 62) notes that language for Phillipson is only a reflection of global relations, and that the thesis of linguistic imperialism lacks ‘a view of how English is taken up, how people use English, why people choose to use English’. As an alternative,
Pennycook (2000, 2001) has proposed the theorising of ‘postcolonial performativity’ that focuses on the concept of appropriation and resistance.

The thesis of linguistic imperialism has direct implications for language–in–education planning. Joseph (2006a: 51) has remarked that (English) linguistic imperialism is ‘embedded in the very structure of the education system and even the set–up of the classroom’. According to Ricento (2006: 16), the critique of linguistic imperialism raised a number of questions about the morality of teaching international languages such as English in developing countries, and about the privileging of native speakers over non–native speakers in employment opportunities (for more details on how the critique of linguistic imperialism informs the practice of language planning see Phillipson 2006).

Another development in the field of language planning and policy is inspired by the systemic–functional linguistics of M. A. K Halliday (see Halliday 1985, 1993). Halliday differentiates between institutional and systemic language planning. On one hand, systemic language planning is based on sema–history concepts: historical stages and the connections between language and materialism, sex, class, and race. The main distinction between systemic language planning and policy and conventional language planning is that semantics is given priority over form in Halliday’s systemic–functional approach. Halliday’s conceptualisation of the relationship between language structure and the semiotic system of a given community (culture) generates an approach to language planning which views language as a system of signs (meaning) which is part of ‘a set of systems of meaning, all of which interrelate’ (Halliday and Hasan 1985: 4). According to Halliday, the grammar should be able to accommodate the diversity of discourses and identities that coexist in the postmodern community. A concrete illustration of this line of argumentation is the emergence of ‘New Varieties of English’ (NVEs), which have appropriated and remoulded the system of English to serve the semiotic needs of their speakers who belong to non–European or ‘non–modernist’ cultures. Halliday criticises the inability of the practice of traditional language planning to
intervene, and particularly to import some design into these inevitably historical processes.

Institutional language planning, on the other hand, is concerned not with the formal system of language, but rather with the relationship between a language and users of the language. The main task here is to ensure that people in a society have access to the languages they need. This strand of language planning involves making policies, implementing them, and providing measures to ensure their implementation. Educational measures provide the institutional context for second language teaching, language maintenance, and vernacular literacy (Halliday 1993: 142). For systemic planning, on the other hand, the objective is to design the language itself in order to enlarge its potential for meaning. This type of planning is usually undertaken to create new functional domains (i.e., new registers) for a language undergoing development. Planning at this level involves the establishment of principles for the creation of new words, and the application of these principles in order to develop technical typologies in specific registers defined by the discipline (Halliday 1990: 142). Apart from the grammatical processes used in the creation of new terms, Halliday argues that language planning has devoted little attention to the development of the language itself. Halliday (ibid.) holds that the effort in traditional language planning is dedicated to the ‘standardisation and correction of errors’, rather than to the development of novel grammatical patterns (for various views on the evolutionary changes to grammar see Halliday 1990: 144–171). Hence, most of the activities of traditional language planning are institutional rather than systemic (Halliday 1993: 225, 1990: 142–143).

Halliday (1993: 221) argues that the practice of classical language and educational planning were paralysed by what he called ‘first failed try’ (FFT), in the sense that if a theory–driven practice in language planning failed on the first attempt, people would abandon it or reintroduce it with a new understanding. According to Halliday, any attempt to introduce design into the system of language can succeed under the right conditions, and that we have to understand the process we are intervening in. For instance, if corpus planners want to design a grammar, then they need to
understand how grammars operate, and this presupposes the existence of some theory of grammar, or ‘grammatics’ (ibid.: 222). The fact that what Halliday called ‘language design’ involves intervention into a naturally evolving system places the enterprise of language planning at the intersection of two very different and potentially oppositional themes: semiotic and design (Halliday: 1990: 142). A concrete example of systemically inspired education planning research are the Sydney–based programmes which have been developed by, among others, Jim Martin, Joan Rothery, and Frances Christie. The work produced by this group has involved developing ethnographies first for primary school children, and recently for secondary school–based curriculum and workforces. The work of these language educators in the area of literacy education has shown ‘how a grammatics can open up access to the elaborated discourses of education and employment’ (Halliday 1993: 228). Since the Hallidayan–based language planning and policy is, in the terms of Halliday (1993: 223), ‘a mode of intervention in critical social practices’, it is then partial. Halliday’s (1993: 224) stance is that a theory is partial does not necessarily entail that every metalinguistic practice is ideologically charged or that all the users of a theory share a homogeneous political orientation.

Another approach to language planning derives from critical approaches to language study. The term ‘critical’ has a number of definitions in the literature (see Scollon 2001: 141–142; Wodak 2001: 9). According to Tollefson (2006: 42), the concept ‘critical’ has three interrelated sense in language planning: 1) It refers to work which is critical of traditional approaches to language planning research; 2) It includes work which aims at social transformation, and 3) It describes research that draws on the insights of critical social theory. Critical social theory involves work by prominent figures such as Bourdieu (1991), Foucault (1970, 1972, 1979), Gramsci (1988), Habermas (1974, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988), and Giddens (1971, 1982a, 1982b, 1984, 1985, 1987). According to Tollefson (2006: 43–50), much of the research in critical theory, which embodies a rethinking of Marxist theory and critiques of Marxist and neo–Marxist analysis, has directly inspired critical language planning research (e.g., Ndhlovu 2006 has examined the marginalisation of the Ndebele language in Zimbabwe using Gramsci’s 1988 theory of hegemony).
Critical linguistics was developed in the 1970s and 1980s at the University of East Anglia by Roger Fowler, Tony Trew, and Gunther Kress (see Wodak 2001; Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000). Research in critical linguistics has been influenced by the writings of prominent thinkers such as George Orwell (1903–1950) who focused on how language can be used to persuade and influence the masses (see Fowler 1995; Joseph et al. 2001: 29–42). The work of Fowler and his colleagues led to the development of ‘critical discourse analysis’ (CDA henceforth) (Wodak 2001: 3).

Wodak (2001: 4) has traced the intellectual genealogy of CDA to the aftermath of a symposium in Amsterdam in January 1991. By accident and through the support of the University of Amsterdam, Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak confronted each other with their very diverse approaches to the analysis of discourse (see Fairclough and Wodak 1997). The emergence of CDA is also marked by the publication of van Dijk’s journal *Discourse & Society* (1990). Wodak (2001: 2) defines the enterprise of CDA as a committed interdisciplinary approach that ‘aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use (or in discourse)’. Fairclough (2001: 4) treats CDA as the analysis of ‘social interactions in a way which focuses upon their linguistic elements, and which sets out to show up their generally hidden determinants in the system of social relationships, as well as hidden effects they may have upon that system’. Most scholars of CDA would endorse Joseph’s (2006a: 17) declaration that ‘language is political from top to bottom’. A similar view held by Gee (1999: 1) notes that CDA conceptualises language as ‘everywhere and always’ political. Wodak (2001: 2) remarks that CDA takes the ‘larger discursive unit of text’ to be the basic unit of analysis. Fairclough (2001: 73) argues that a text whether written or spoken in CDA is both a site of and a stake in social struggle, and that ideological struggle occurs in discourse. CDA pays particular attention to the intertextual and interdiscursive relations i.e., relationships between texts (Meyer 2001: 15; Wodak 2001; Fairclough 2001: 127–129).
According to Fairclough (2001: 34), CDA views language as ‘social practice determined by social structures’. Trappes–Lomax (2004: 146) comments that CDA problematises the concept of ‘context of culture’ in terms of discourses and orders of discourse in a way which reveals the power and ideologies that lie behind them and which are covertly encoded in them. The expression ‘orders of discourse’ refers to the linguistic elements of social practices in Fairclough’s (2001) version of CDA. Trappes–Lomax (ibid.: 140) identifies the political agenda of CDA as non–conformist, neo–Marxist, anti–elitist, and anti–neo–liberal. Meyer (2001: 23) has pointed out that it is imperative that CDA should be perceived of not as ‘a well–defined empirical method but rather as a cluster of approaches with a similar theoretical base and similar research questions’. Examples of critical approaches to discourse analysis include: French discourse analysis (the work of Foucault, Pêcheux, and others); Fairclough’s (2001; 1995) CDA; Wodak’s (1996, 2001, 2006; Wodak et al. 1999) discourse–historical approach; van Dijk’s (2001) socio–cognitive discourse analysis; Scollon’s (2001) mediated discourse analysis (for the differences between these approaches see Wodak and Meyer 2001; Fairclough and Wodak 1997).

Despite the theoretical diversity in the approaches to discourse analysis that operate under the banner of criticality, three basic concepts figure invariably in all approaches to CDA: power, history and ideology (Wodak 2001: 3). Fairclough (2001: 3) views language as the primary domain of ideology, and ideology as the favoured vehicle to power in its capacity as ‘a prime means of manufacturing consent’. Tollefson (1991: 10) defines ideology as ‘normally unconscious assumptions that come to be seen as common sense’. Common–sense assumptions are part of what Fairclough (2001) refers to as ‘members’ resources’ (MRs) (i.e., interpretative procedures). Fairclough (2001: 117) points out that common–sense notions are the focus of CDA because they ‘incorporate ideologies which accord with power relations’. Wodak (2001: 10) states that CDA sees ideology ‘as an important aspect of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations’.
It should be noted that CDA is not without opponents. For instance, Pennycook (2001: 85) strongly criticises the theorising of CDA for its inability to problematise its status of scientific knowledge, and for its lack of an element of self-reflexivity. Another source of criticism stems from what has come to be known as the Widdowson–Fairclough debate (Widdowson 1995, 1996; Fairclough 1996). Widdowson condemned the term ‘discourse’ as vague and fashionable: ‘Discourse is something everybody is talking about but without knowing with any certainty just what it is’ (Widdowson 1995: 158). Widdowson (ibid.: 169) contended that CDA ‘cannot provide analysis but only partial interpretation’. Fairclough (1996: 51) replied that that Widdowson’s definition of the term ‘analysis’ reflects ‘a very narrow view of analysis’. Fairclough (1996: 51-52) defines analysis as ‘any reasonably systematic application of reasonably well-defined procedures to a reasonably well-defined body of data’. Fairclough argues that Widdowson’s argument is based on a classical liberal view which draws a distinction between ideology (partiality) and science (objectivity). In Fairclough’s view (ibid.: 52–53), ‘we are all – including Widdowson – writing from within particular discursive parties entailing interest, commitments, inclusions, exclusions, and so forth’. Pennycook (2004: 792) thinks that language planning and policy require ‘a critical approach to social relations’. Pennycook has explained that the practice of language planning and policy falls easily into the scope of critical (applied) linguistics ‘since it would appear from the outset to operate with a political view of language’ (ibid.). A CDA–inspired practice of planning and policy would treat texts of national language policies as sites of, and stakes in power and ideological struggle (see Tollefson 2006).

Another critical approach to language planning is critical ethnography (Canagarajah 1993, 1994, 2006; Braine 1994). The ethnographic perspective can be applied in the different stages of language planning. For instance, in status planning ethnography suggests that competing languages in different social domains in a multilingual state should be given attention. In corpus planning ethnography can help people understand its valuation of competing language varieties and select the variety most effective for education and other official purposes (Canagarajah 2006: 158).
Another type of theorisation that has informed the practice of language planning and policy comes from the field of ‘language rights’, ‘linguistic rights’ and/or ‘linguistic human rights’ (the three terms are commonly used interchangeably; for the intellectual genealogy of these concepts see Joseph 2006a: 55–58; Paulston 1997; Spolsky 2004: 114–132). The leading proponents of this approach are Robert Phillipson and Tove Skutnabb–Kangas (Skutnabb–Kangas and Phillipson 1994; Phillipson and Skutnabb–Kangas 1995). Phillipson and Skutnabb–Kangas (1995: 483) considered the field of linguistic human rights (LHRs) as one branch of human rights, an aim of which, among other things, is to encourage education in the mother tongue. Skutnabb–Kangas (2001: 201, 2006: 285) has stated that linguistic human rights might be one of the means to: 1) prevent linguistic genocide; 2) promote social integration and to defend people against forced assimilation; 3) promote positive state policies toward minority languages; 4) promote conflict prevention and self–determination, and 5) promote linguistic diversity (for a critique of this approach see Paulston 1997; Brutt–Griffler 2006; Joseph 2006a: 54–58).

Another facet of language planning is ecolinguistics which was introduced by Haugen (1972) with the aim of protecting linguistic diversity using an analogy with the need to preserve diversity in nature. Spolsky (2004: 8) argues that it is social changes that influence linguistic diversity, so it is social policy rather than language policy that should protect it. According to Wright (2004: 12), ecolinguistics has been developed from a concern for the disappearance of indigenous ways of making meaning. Wright contends that ecolinguistics remains metaphorical, and that it is hard to support a case of linguistic diversity on the basis of preserving the diversity of species.

Another kind of linguistics that would produce a radically original orientation to language planning is provided by Le Page and Tabouret–Keller (Le Page 1988; Le Page and Tabouret–Keller 1985). This approach is firmly founded on the methodological assumption that language, which is defined as ‘a repertoire of socially marked systems’, is ‘essentially idiosyncratic’ (Le Page and Tabouret–Keller
1985: 2, 16). The scholars hold that a language and a social group are created through acts of identity which individuals make within themselves and with each other (ibid.: 2).

Another perspective to language planning is psycho–sociological analysis (Baker 2006). This approach seeks to provide an analysis and understanding of the effects of language policies on individuals and speech communities with the aim to develop effective and more realistic language planning strategies and goals. Psycho–sociological research on language policy draws on academic constructs such as language attitudes, on political and bureaucratic mechanisms such as language censuses, and on the insights of action research (ibid.: 210).

Drawing on Giles, Bourhis and Taylor’s 1977 ‘structural analysis of ethnolinguistic vitality’, Cartwright (2006) has proposed using geolinguistics as an approach to the analysis of language policies. This approach is concerned with ‘the investigation of historical processes that have contributed to the development of current patterns of human contact and interaction between and among different cultural groups’ (Cartwright 2006: 194). One of the basic assumptions of the geolinguistic analysis is that: ‘Cultural domains are significant to the retention of ethnic identity, and as cultural space between ethnic groups erodes through domain sharing as opposed to domain exclusion, it is possible to anticipate demands for cultural protection’ (ibid.).

A recent pair of approaches to language planning that operate from a critical perspective are postmodernism and governmentality (see Pennycook 2001, 2006; Moore 2002; Tollefson 2006). Dean’s (1994: 4) definition of postmodernism as ‘the restive problematisation of the given’ underlies the postmodernist approach to language and language planning. A postmodernist approach to language planning is concerned with the reframing, disinvention and reconstruction of the ways we think about language planning and policy (Pennycook: 2006: 69–70). The postmodernist understanding of language planning and policy involves: 1) raising significant concerns about how power operates in connection with the different forms of social integration; 2) emphasising situated, local and contextual ways of understanding
language policies; 3) reframing languages as social constructions, and 4) questioning grand narratives (ibid.: 64). The notion of ‘language governmentality’, which was introduced by Foucault (1991), examines the techniques and practices by which government power operates at the micro–level (Pennycook 2002, 2006: 64–65; Tollefson 2002, 2006: 49–50). Language governmentality is a critical way of investigating the ways in which language policy decisions regulate thought and action of different forms of social grouping (Pennycook 2006: 65). Stroud’s (2001: 339) conception of linguistic citizenship as ‘away of capturing how issues of language may be accorded a central place on the arena of education and politics’, embodies the relationship between language and governance (see Stroud and Heugh 2004; McGroarty 2002).

3.2 Language planning and policy and power
According to Luke et al. (1990), language planning should go beyond the acritical, abstract or rhetorical identifications of sociolinguistic problems of those whose language is undergoing planning. The writers suggest that language planning should explore the complex theoretical relationships between language, ideology, discourse and social organisation. Haugen (1983: 286–287) proposes that the scholarship of language planning should examine ‘how much influence can be consciously exerted by the manipulation of sources of power and how much linguistic change is due to underlying and uncontrollable social forces’. There is no agreement among linguists on the definition of power. This is evident from the titles of books written on the subject including: Foucault’s (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972–1977; Joseph’s (1987) Eloquence and Power: The Rise of Language Standards and Standard Languages; Honey’s (1997) Language Is Power; Fairclough’s (2001) Language and Power; Bourdieu’s (1991) Language and Symbolic Power, or Lakoff’s (1990) Talking Power: The Politics of Language.

Critical discourse analysts take into consideration the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of relations of power within social structures (Fairclough 2001; Wooffit 2005: 138). Tollefson (1991: 9) defines power as ‘the ability to achieve one’s goals and to control events through intentional actions’. CDA
is based on the premise that it is capable of ‘capturing the “dynamic” nature of both power relations and text production by uncovering the hegemonic structures within texts’ (Joseph: 2004: 58, 2006a: 127). For critical linguists such as Wodak (2001: 10), language is by no means powerful on its own, but rather it acquires power by the use that is made of it by powerful people. Some linguists such as Honey (1997) take a different position when they claim that standard versions of languages are in themselves powerful, and thus can divide equal opportunities between different classes of people.

Tollefson (1991: 10) remarks that power is central to both social structure and individual actions, and that there is a dynamic relation between structure and power. There is a dialectical relationship between human agency which produces social structures, and the social structures which provide meaning for their actions (ibid.: 13). Despite the fact that power denotes dominance, it produces resistance in the sense that people in subordinate positions in social relations can never be completely powerless (ibid.: 10). This may be illustrated by the fact that individuals can hold their labour in highly centralised bureaucratic systems. Tollefson (ibid.: 10) noted that ‘language policy is one of the key mechanisms for state control of labour’.

### 3.2.1 Language planning and policy, class and the state

The way critical accounts of language employ the term ‘class’ differs almost completely from the one in traditional sociolinguistics. In mainstream sociolinguistics, class is used in the non–Marxist sense to refer to ‘social strata – groupings of people who are similar to one another in occupation, education or other standard sociological variables’ (Fairclough 2001: 8). Critical theorists of language and education deal with social class as a structural category of analysis from a classical Marxist perspective, and define it as an ‘expression of a relationship to the means of production’ (Young and Whitty: 1977: 16). Fairclough (2001: 6) provides a similar definition of social class as ‘social forces which occupy different positions in economic production, which have different and antagonistic interests, and whose struggle is what determines the course of social history’. Social groups identified by class, ethnicity or language continuously struggle with each other to gain and sustain
power. Critical versions of linguistics define the term ‘struggle’ not as a transitional period such as a physical conflict, but rather as ‘the process whereby social groupings with different interests engage with one another’ (Fairclough 2001: 28).

Luke et al. (1990) contend that classical language planning has intended to avoid addressing larger political and social problems such as class and power. The writers hold that the powerful class can ‘decide what language(s) uses can be deemed to be politically correct, should be encouraged and furthered, respectively demoted and discouraged’ (ibid.: 28). The researchers quoted the existence of examples such as low and high prestige languages or pidgin and standard languages as indication of class relations. They observed that extreme cases of linguistic oppression include ‘the total or partial criminalisation of the use of local or vernacular idioms’ (ibid.). Wright (2004: 44) has refused to accept that the development of a standard language can be presented as a vehicle of class differentiation. For Wright ‘class differentiation was always there’ (ibid.).

Tollefson (1991: 10) states that language planning and policy is instrumental in the control and reproduction of power by the state and the groups controlling its policy, and therefore it is ‘fundamentally rooted in the rise of modern state’. Viewed in this way, a language policy might be interpreted as both a component in social struggle and a product of it. That is, particular language policies in some states lead to and contribute to class relationships (Tollefson 1991: 14). The perception of a language policy by different individuals is constrained by their position within the system of class relations in which they contribute. One way in which a language policy can block consciousness of inequality and class relations is by being expressed as commonsensically natural, and this is the realm of ideology (ibid.).

3.2.2 Top–down planning vs. Bottom–up policy

Broadly speaking, the distinction between top–down and bottom–up approaches to language planning and policy is understood to point to the ‘relationship between state authored policy and the community affected by language policy’ (Johnson 2004: 93). The concept of ‘top–down’ planning is used to refer to ‘people with power and
authority who make language related decisions for groups, often with little or no consultation with the ultimate language learners or users’ (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 196). Part of the historical development of ‘language planning’ embodied the sense of being a top–down process (cf. language engineering) since it was viewed as ‘the normative work of language academies and committees’ (Haugen 1969: 287) to determine ‘all forms’ (ibid.) of language cultivation and ‘all proposals’ (ibid.) for language standardisation. The term ‘planning’ in itself is indicative of this one–street relationship since it is concerned with ‘official policy formation by authorities in control of power’ (Fishman 1974a: 79). This historical denotation of the term ‘language planning’ has now substantially changed in the sense that the term can now be collocated with impossible–to–plan social practices, such as discourse planning. Spolsky (2006) has become convinced that language planning conceptualised as ‘an effort by someone with or claiming authority to change the language practice (or ideology) of someone else’ (Spolsky and Shohamy 2000: 1) has failed in the empowerment of speakers of marginalised languages, and in the protection of threatened languages. The death of a number of Jewish varieties points to the dark side of the language management (Spolsky’s 2004 term for language planning) in Israel. Kaplan and Baldauf (1997) charge that the literature of traditional language planning does not mention the agency of the language policy decision, and that the agent is typically disguised through the use of passivisation. Being influenced by the scientific neutrality of the mainstream linguistics, language planning has been represented in empirical terms as objective, ideologically natural and technologically informed practice. The identity of language planners within this conceptualisation of language planning is of little value as long as they have the technical qualifications needed (ibid.: 196). It is generally observed that the top–down approach has been used by governments for nation and state–building purposes in postcolonial countries.

Luke et al (1990) maintain that the problematisation of authority involved in the process of language planning goes beyond the class which controls the language to implicate the linguists and social planners employed. Luke et al. (ibid.: 30) used the term ‘supply side’ ideology to describe the type of planning which regards people
whose language is undergoing planning as ‘manipulable objects of economic, political and educational engineering’. The researchers add that the supply side of planning is a job undertaken by social scientists that possess the cultural and linguistic capital which is to be desired. As a consequence, supply side planners ignore the interests of the powerless plannees, phrasing the interest of the powerless in a series of abstractions such as equality and sociolinguistic rights rather than presenting a concrete analysis of their relationship to social structures of power and employment (ibid.: 31). The scholars observe that labouring people, particularly in East Asian states, have no say on the content of a language plan:

In the case of such South East Asian states … the ‘clients’ of a language plan have limited, if any, effective electoral franchise, and insofar as the illusion of franchise exists, legislators’ options are delimited by the authoritarian mandates of a ruling class, party or elite. (Luke et al. 1990: 29–30)

The essence of the argument of Luke et al. (1990) lies in their claim that the type of language planning that lacks a bottom–up element in the sense that it does not involve the masses is essentially authoritarian. The danger here is that the social institutions, particularly the educational ones, can be turned into a site of social conflicts. Calvet (1998: 203) argues that ‘all planning is carried out by a handful of planners possessing all the power over a people who are planned’ (cf. Tollefson’s 1981 ‘centralised language planning’). Calvet warns that language planners should exercise caution since all planning presupposes the policy of those in power, and this confronts the language planner with a deontological problem: ‘By intervening in the languages, he becomes part of the power game’ (ibid.). Freire’s concept of ‘banking education’ which is a ‘top to bottom’ communicative approach illustrates the kind of top–down planning in language education (see Mayo 1999: 84). However, Ricento (2006: 19–20) has noted that educators, legislators, and businesses are largely influenced by bottom–up social practices and change. The women’s movement has been instrumental in changing attitudes to sexist language in English and other languages. The efforts made by the Civil Rights movement in the USA led to the abandonment of English literacy as a requirement for voting in the south and the provision of bilingual ballots where more than 5 percent of the electorate cannot vote in English. The Mother Tongue Movement in Taiwan led to two historical events: it led to the review of the Broadcast Bill of 1993, under which local languages were
allowed as languages of domestic broadcasts, and it resulted in the reformulation of the language–in–education policy which sanctioned the teaching of Taiwanese local languages in primary schools (see Chen 2006: 323). The Bafu, Kom, and Nso’ language committees in Northwest Cameroon have acted as a bottom–up agency in the development of minority languages (Trudell 2006; for other cases in which local language speakers acted as bottom–up agents of language planning see Hornberger 1996). The resistance to dominant language policies and construction of alternative language practices by marginalised groups can be a case of language planning from below (Canagarajah 2006: 154, 160). Scholars of critical language planning express a concern about the role ethnolinguistic societies play in the process of making and evaluating language policies. Some critical linguists went so far as to argue that only ethnography–based research can save the scholarship of language planning (see Fishman 1994a). Canagarajah (2006) has noted that ethnography can provide a bottom–up component to the top–down language planning:

While LPP [language planning and policy] largely works in a top–down fashion to shape the linguistic behaviour of the community according to the imperatives of policy–makers, ethnography develops grounded theories about language as it is practised in localised contexts. (Canagarajah 2006: 153)

It is a moral and democratic imperative for language planners to ‘accept the political principle that people who experience the consequences of language policy should have a major role in making policy decisions’ (Tollefson 2006: 45). Johnson (2004: 93) rejects the binary distinctions of top–down and bottom–up language planning and policy by contending that they ‘obfuscate the multiple levels of context which influence language policy decisions and ignore how policy making power can be differentially allocated within the community’.

3.2.3 Language rights
The concept of ‘language rights’ has a resonance with the critique of linguistic imperialism (for a comparative analysis see Joseph 2006a: 54–58; Pennycook 2006: 67–69). Skutnabb–Kangas (2001: 201) claims that languages are being killed off faster than ever before. According to Paulston (1997: 74), language rights are primarily about the legislation or lack of legislation for the privileges and rights of
languages and their speakers. Turi defines language legislation in the following terms:

The fundamental goal of all language legislation is to resolve, in one way or another, the linguistic problems arising from those linguistic contacts, conflicts and inequalities, by legally determining and establishing the status and use of the languages in question. (Turi 1994: 111)

According to Joseph (2006a: 54), the concept of language rights begins with the claim that communities have the basic human right to use their first language in public domains and to have their children educated in it even though it is not the majority or official language of the place where they live. Joseph has noted that language rights are recent claims which imply that language rights exist in natural law and consequently should be enshrined in statue or constitutional law (for the historical development of the language rights movement see Joseph 2006a: 55).

More recently some researchers of political science/theory and philosophers have intervened into the field of language rights and language policy to produce a perspective from a normative political theory to the issue of linguistic diversity (see Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1989, 1995, 2001; Patten 2001; Kymlicka and Grin 2003; Kymlicka and Patten 2003; Schmidt 2006). One of the central issues dominating political debates over language policy is how to achieve justice and equality among ethnolinguistic groups (for the debate between assimilationists and pluralists see Schmidt 2006: 104). Kymlicka (1995, 1989, 2001) provides a liberal view of minority rights, and suggests principles for the evaluation of the legitimacy of different kinds of claims by minority groups within a liberal–democratic model. The essence of Kymlicka’s (1989: 164) argument is that individual choices about what is good are necessarily made within a ‘context for choice’ which provides them with different ways of life. Kymlicka states that the processes by which individuals evaluate choices and options are linguistic and historical: ‘Our language and history are the media through which we come to an awareness of the options available to us, and their significance; and this is a precondition of making intelligent judgements about how to lead our lives’ (ibid.: 165). Kymlicka contends that liberals should protect cultural structures because ‘it is only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options
available to them, and intelligently examine their value’ (ibid.). Kymlicka rejects the ‘benign neglect’ argument that the state should not promote or inhibit the survival of any specific language or culture:

Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognising, accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic and national groups. The state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others. Once we recognise this, we need to rethink the justice of minority rights claims. (Kymlicka 1995: 108)

Luke et al (1990: 29) counter-argue that by resorting to universal laws of justice and equality which are strictly applicable under idealized circumstances, state governments ‘allow the rich man to get away while they string up the sheep thief and the poacher’ (for a critique of the liberal notion of language rights see Coulmas 1998; Pennycook 1998; Phillipson 1998; Chen 1998; Annamalai 1998; Rasool 1998; Abdussalam 1998). In the following sub-sections I briefly outline the different regimes of language rights in the literature.

3.2.3.1 Tolerance–oriented vs. promotion–oriented rights

Kloss (1971; 1977) proposed a distinction between tolerance–oriented and promotion–oriented rights with reference to the language rights of minority immigrants. Kloss (1971: 259) points out that a declaration about language rights of minority immigrants should be based on this distinction. A government or any official body is said to promote a given dominant or non dominant language if they make use of it in their activities including the teaching of a language in state schools, the purchasing of minority language books by local libraries; using it in legal proceedings, or using it in street signs. Kloss states that all of these rights allow for various degrees of intensity. For example, there is a large difference between whether a law is printed in a minority’s language for information only or for actual use by courts of justice.

Tolerance–oriented or acquiescent rights, on the other hand, grant members of a minority group the freedom to use their language in private sociocultural domains including establishing of newspaper and periodicals, holding meetings, setting up private libraries and educational institutions, running commercial establishments, and
using their languages over the phone and in the street. The fact that Kloss was a Nazi party member can explain the ultra-fascist notion that a government could conceivably have any right even to contemplate regulating how people talk in the street or over the phone (see Joseph 2006a: 25). Kloss suggests that tolerance–oriented rights should be given whenever a minority group indigenous or not wants to cultivate their linguistic and cultural practices on condition that they are ready to make a concession not to claim any promotion–oriented rights. In return, it is the public fund that should incur the costs of protecting these rights, and not the members of minority groups or their associations. For Kloss (1971: 260), an immigrant minority can make a claim of promotion–oriented rights only ‘after the language can be held to have taken root’, or, in the terms of Paulston (1997: 77), after ‘three generations of human rights’. It should be stressed that this distinction applies only to immigrant groups and not national groups (for the difference between the two social groups see Kloss 1971). Drawing on the work of Kloss, Macias (1979) proposes two categories of language–related rights: 1) the right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language, and 2) the right to use your language in the activities of communal life.

**3.2.3.2 Norm–and–accommodation vs. official language rights**

According to Patten and Kymlicka (2003), the norm–and–accommodation approach refers to the domination of some language as a means of public communication. That is, a particular language is selected to be used in the courts, in the delivery of public services and as a medium of public communication. But what about the minority group that lacks proficiency in the majority language? The answer, according to this approach, is that a special kind of accommodation is made for those who lack fluency in the majority language. The accommodation may involve the provision of translators or hiring of bilingual staff. The official–language rights approach, on the other hand, refers to the selection of some languages and granting them a form of an official recognition. In other words, ‘this approach typically involves a degree of equality between the different languages that are selected for official status’ (Patten and Kymlicka 2003: 28).
3.2.3.3 Personal vs. territoriality rights

Generally speaking, officially bilingual or multilingual states adopt either personal or territoriality principles of language rights in their legislation (see Paulston 1997; Turi: 1994). According to Cartwright (2006: 202–203), the principle of territoriality refers to the situation ‘under which an individual has the right to receive services in the language of the majority in a given area’, whereas the principle of personality describes the situation where ‘every person is free to obtain services in the language of his or her choice throughout a nation or designated area within a nation’. According to Patten and Kymlicka (2003: 29), the personality principle refers to the ‘principle that citizens should enjoy the same set of official language rights no matter where they are in the country’. That is, persons have the right to speak a particular language wherever they desire to live in the state. Personal rights are portable and belong to the individual wherever he or she goes and interacts with bodies of the state (Schiffman 1996: 29). The territoriality principle, on other hand, states that ‘language rights should vary from region to region according to local conditions’ (Patten and Kymlicka 2003: 29). In this sense, language rights rely on what part of the territory of the country people find themselves in. But to avoid any essentialism, Joseph (2006a: 55) reminds us that ‘languages belong to people, not to places’.

It is strongly believed that the territoriality principle refers to an attempt to divide a polylingual country into a series of sublingual regions in which only the local majority language gets used in a wide range of situations. Van Parijs (2000: 218) believes that ‘if weaker languages are to survive, the countries in which they are spoken will have to insist on the linguistic territoriality principle’. The widely cited example of a country which applies the personal principle is Canada. The federal Canadian legislation asserts the right to services in English or French regardless of territory (see Nelde et al. 1992). For the territoriality principle, Belgium and Switzerland are cases in point (see Patten and Kymlicka 2003; Schmidt 2006).

3.2.3.4 Universal and group differentiated rights

This argument was accepted and turned into a reality in 1996 in Barcelona when a World Conference on Linguistic Rights signed a Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights submitted to the UN to render it into a convention of the United Nation with Skutnabb-Kangas acting as one of the consultants representing the International Association of Applied Linguistics (see the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights). Researchers distinguish between individual and collective rights, although the Universal Declaration covers both dimensions of language rights (see Patten and Kymlicka 2003). Universal rights may be defined as ‘rights that everyone in the relevant jurisdiction has, irrespective of the particular language group to which they belong’ (Patten and Kymlicka 2003: 30). In contrast, group–differentiated rights involve ‘rights that can be exercised only by members of designated language groups’ (ibid.). A good example of a region that applies this principle of language rights option is Quebec in Canada. Moreover, this type of language rights decides whether a person has a right to claim a linguistic accommodation at all.

3.3 Educational planning and literacy: Critical approaches to literacy
According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 149) the formulation of literacy policy depends on the way the term ‘literacy’ is conceptualised. For instance, yesterday’s literacy in the sense of encoding and decoding written information has changed significantly in today’s society (ibid.). Today literacy may refer to that ‘set of skills required, by any given society, of individuals who wish to function above the subsistence level’ (ibid.: 145). Archer (2006: 449) has contended that the visual/verbal divide should be problematised and a multimodal approach to language education and communication should be endorsed. March (2006) has investigated the type of understanding and knowledge of multimodal texts developed by nursery children. March has concluded that ‘early childhood educators need to understand the nature of new authorial practices if they are to provide appropriate scaffolding for children’s learning in the new media age’ (ibid.: 493). Drawing on Gee’s (1990) distinction between primary (e.g., informal home discourse) and secondary (e.g., university lecture) discourses, Gough and Bock (2001: 95) have found that traditional communities in South Africa have both historically–rooted primary and secondary discourses.
Critical linguists use the expression ‘literacy myth’ to refer to a view which confers on literacy many profound sociopolitical effects (Pennycook 2001: 76). The development of critical approaches to literacy in 1970s and 1980s has marked a significant and evolving orientation to literacy education. This led to a shift away from individualist and psychological frameworks of reading and writing towards those approaches which use cultural, sociological, and discourse theory to reframe textual practices, the literate subject, and classroom pedagogy (Luke 1997: 143). In Australia, Canada, and the US, critical approaches to literacy have been productively allied with other social theorisations (e.g., neo–Marxist cultural studies, post–structuralist discourse theory, and postcolonial and feminist studies) to develop new pedagogical approaches to the teaching of textual representation and practice, action and agency (ibid.). Clark and Ivanič (1997: 20) argue that the values attached to writing are ‘all essentially political and bound up with the way in which a social formation operates’. Joseph (2006a: 29) states that ‘the maintenance of even a minimally distinctive writing system is a potent way of performing a distinct national identity’.

The critical view of literacy does not see literacy as a monolithic entity, rather as ‘a set of contextualised social practices’ (Pennycook 2001: 77). Although critical approaches to literacy share an orientation towards viewing literacy or literacies as social practices related to wider social and political concerns, there is some variation between them (see Luke 1997; Luke and Freebody 1997: 1). Critical approaches to literacy investigate literacy as plural social practices situated within their social environment, examples of which include: literacy practices (Baynham 1995), social literacies (Gee 1990; Street 1995), multiliteracies (Cope and Kalantzis 2000; New London Group 1996), multilingual literacies (Martin–Jones and Jones 2000), and situated literacies (Barton, Hamilton and Ivanič 2000). Clark (1992: 137) points out that a significant aspect of critical literacy awareness is to enable learners to emancipate themselves by developing alternatives to dominant conventions. Pennycook (2001: 78) states that it is not sufficient to socially contextualise literacy practices but also to ‘offer a political critique of those contexts or an adequate vision
of change’. According to Luke (1997), there are a number of different orientations to critical literacy, including Freirean–based critical pedagogy, text analytic approaches, and feminist and post–structuralist approaches. In the subsequent space I shall try to outline the main theoretical principles of each of these critical approaches.

Critical pedagogical approaches to literacy have emerged predominantly from the North American context, and have been primarily concerned with the ‘voices’ of marginalised learners (Pennycook 2001: 100). Scholars of critical pedagogy argue that ‘the dominant curriculum and teaching practices of mainstream schools silence the ideas, cultures, languages, and voices of students from other backgrounds’ (ibid.). The term ‘voice’ here does not refer exclusively to oral language, it refers to the opening up of a possibility for the marginalised to talk, read, or write, so that the voicing of their social conditions might change both their lives and the social system that excluded them. (ibid.: 101). Paulo Freire (1970), who is generally associated with this line of critical literacy, views literacy as away of empowering and liberating the oppressed. Freire defined the ‘illiterate’ in the following terms:

The illiterate is no longer a person living on the fringe of society, a marginal man, but rather a representative of the dominated strata of society, in conscious or unconscious opposition to those who, in the same structure, treat him as a thing. Thus also teaching men to read and write is no longer an inconsequential matter of ba, be, bi, bo, bu, of memorising an alienated word, but a difficult apprenticeship in naming the world. (Freire 1994: 255)

Freire (1970: 58) uses the concept of ‘banking education’ (cf. Luke et al’s 1990 supply side ideology; Reddy’s 1979 conduit metaphor) to describe the kind of pedagogy in which a teacher is viewed as a depositor and students as depositories. The alternative is a dialogic character of education as a practice of freedom. Freire (1970: 69) writes: ‘Education as the practice of freedom – as opposed to education as the practice of domination – denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from men’. Freire’s widely cited book the Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970) embodies a view of a ‘pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity’ (ibid.: 33). Freire (ibid.: 40) states that the pedagogy of the oppressed, as a humanist and libertarian pedagogy, consists of two stages. In the first stage, the oppressed discover
the world of oppression and through praxis (i.e., reflection and action upon the world to change it) commit themselves to transforming it. In the second stage, in which the reality of the oppression has already been changed, this pedagogy becomes pedagogy of all people in the process of permanent liberation. The product of this process is the emergence of a ‘new man’ who is neither oppressor nor oppressed (ibid.: 42). The pedagogy of the oppressed as a form of liberatory education deals with the local concerns and social conditions of the people from which a list of thematic and generative words are developed. Freire views literacy education as a form of conscientisation that would lead people to understand that their social conditions are alterable by cultural actions. Freire holds that ‘it is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors’ (ibid.: 42). Luke (1997: 146) comments that this intellectual stance reframes literacy as ‘a site of dialogue, ideology critique and productive cultural action’.

Another critical orientation to literacy is embodied in those feminist and post–structuralist approaches which draw on the work of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and others. The main theoretical premise is that classroom contexts should be restructured to encourage a critical understanding of how discourse constructs cultures and identities, life worlds and trajectories (Luke 1997: 146). Rockhill writes:

The politics of literacy are integral to the cultural genocide of a people, as well as the gendering of society. The construction of literacy is embedded in the discursive practices and power relations of everyday life – it is socially constructed, materially produced, morally regulated, and carries a symbolic significance which cannot be captured by its reduction to any one of these. (Rockhill 1994: 247)

Post–structuralist and feminist educational approaches to literacy concentrate on the investigation of the ways in which dominant discourses and texts define and position human subjects in relations to knowledge and power (Luke 1997: 147). This led to a classroom focus on the critical deconstruction of discourses of literary and popular culture, concentrating on the ways in which power relations operate through discourse. Luke characterises the objectives of these approaches in these terms:

Poststructuralist and feminist educational work sets as its goal a critical deconstruction of master narratives, of patriarchal discourses and ‘regimes of power’ at work in everyday life. Its normative goal, then, is neither utopian nor revolutionary, but entails the provision of pedagogy
conducive to the critique of fixed meanings, and the generation of new and different kinds of texts, identities, and voices. (Luke 1997: 147)

According to Luke (ibid.), post–structuralist and feminist educational approaches aim at providing students with critical perspectives on identity in modern society, a critical understanding of how modes of discourse construct and position viewers and readers. Deconstructive analyses have become the primary practice for revealing ways of constructing texts and identities in contestation with taken–for–granted classifications and categories of popular texts. One of the criticisms against post–structuralist and Freirean–based approaches to literacy is that their focus on text deconstruction and ideological analysis might fail to provide marginalised students with extensive knowledge about how texts work (ibid.).

A third critical perspective to literacy is ‘genre’ approaches. Unlike post–structuralist and feminist approaches, supporters of genre approaches to literacy argue for an explicit teaching of the canonical discourse and texts which are associated with institutional power and access in capitalist economies (see Cope and Kalantzis 1993). For instance, the genre approach to literacy which emerged in North America through the work of Delpit (1995), calls for the explicit exposition of Black and minority students to the culture and language of power. Although North American approaches to genre focus on the need for social power, they do not address directly questions of ideology critique or the teaching of literacy as a means for the redistribution of material resources (Luke 1997: 148). A similar genre–based approach to critical literacy was developed in Australia. This genre–based literacy movement, which emerged as a reaction to the weakness of student–centred approaches, holds that the implicit teaching of liberal progressivism marginalises students form minority backgrounds. Alternatively, this approach proposes a form of critical literacy based on overt teaching of genres (Pennycook 2001: 96). This approach has drawn on the insights of systemic–functional grammar, and has been implemented in a number of states (see Halliday and Martin 1993; Halliday 1996; Hasan 1996). Systemic– functional approaches define critical literacy as ‘the demystification of how specialised academic texts and scientific discourses work, and the provision of a flexible repertoire of functional linguistic tools that will enable broader and expanded access to dominant social institutions’ (Luke 1997: 148).
A fourth approach to critical literacy is CDA and critical language awareness (henceforth CLA) (see Fairclough 2001; 1992; Section 3.1.5 and next section). These models teach students how to use the tools of discourse analysis to critically evaluate, challenge and reconstruct a range of literacy and popular texts. These approaches have been implemented in areas of English as a second language teaching, adult basic education, postcolonial education, literary studies and early childhood literacy programmes (e.g., Hamilton, Barton and Ivanič 1994). These models focus on the explicit teaching of students how discourses of domination work in connection to particular linguistic markets (Luke 1997: 148). Fairclough (2000: 162) remarks that the way in which language is framed has a pervasive effect both on views of literacy education and on theories of semiosis. Fairclough suggests that the notions of ‘order of discourse’ (i.e., linguistic social practice) and ‘intertextuality’ can provide ‘a means of systematically mapping properties of society and culture on to properties of texts by way of intertextual analysis’ (ibid.: 174).

A recent approach to critical literacy is ‘applied postlinguistic approach’ developed by Pennycook (2001). The main theoretical premises of this approach are that language and literacy are always political and that literacy practices and texts are always embedded in social contexts. The focus is on the production and reception of texts. It aims at explaining power, and uses textual analysis as a means for doing so, while developing ways in which students can resist and transform discourses (ibid.: 112).

3.4 Language planning and language education: Critical language awareness
According to Tollefson (1991: 7), language education is fundamental to understanding a number of aspects of social organisation including ethnic and linguistic conflicts, the allocation of economic resources, and the structure of labour force. Tollefson (1991: 13) notes that education is the arena in which social struggle is the most obvious. Dominant and subordinate groups often get involved in struggle over recognition of various cultures and languages in the educational curriculum. Fairclough (2001: 54) maintains that ‘the educational system has the major
immediate responsibility for differentials in access’. Tollefson (1991: 8) believes that whenever individuals are required to learn a new language to have access to education, language becomes a cause in the creation and maintenance of economic and social divisions. Educational institutions, particularly in Africa, act as gatekeepers for the work force, determining which different kinds of jobs are open to different groups and individuals. Joseph (1987: 43) points out that in the past educational and cultural institutions widened the gap between power holders and the masses through controlling access to language of power.

Pennycook (2001: 94–96) states that CLA is developed as a critique of liberal pedagogies, and is intended to bring CDA into the classroom as a pedagogical device. CLA is sometimes thought of as a combination of critical discourse analysis and critical literacy (ibid.: 12). Fairclough (2001: 198–202) provides a model of CLA based on the insights of his critical form of discourse analysis, which I reproduce below. The model is based on two guiding principles:

1. Marrying awareness and practice: developing children’s potential language capabilities relies on a marriage of purposeful discourse practice and critical language awareness. This principle suggests that awareness may best be achieved through the development of children’s self–consciousness about their own purposeful discourse, and that the range of purposeful discourse available to children should be enhanced as their awareness develops. Two levels in the development of CLA should be distinguished:
   Level 1: Awareness of MRs (members’ resources) in the production and interpretation: this level corresponds to the stage of interpretation of the CDA procedure as suggested by Fairclough (2001).
   Level 2: Awareness of the social determinants of MRs: this level corresponds to the stage of explanation of the CDA procedure. It involves investigating the social origins and the ideological effects of relations of power upon MRs, and the ways in which both MRs and the social relations underlying them are reproduced and transformed in discourse. The task here is to develop the capabilities of children to the level where the common–sense practices of dominant orders of discourse are challenged and ultimately transformed.
2. Building on experience: CLA should be based on the experience of children and their existing language capabilities. Fairclough suggests a cyclical metalanguage model to enable children to talk about texts, interaction, and social contexts (i.e., principle 2). This model shows how children should be taught about language:

(i) Reflection on experience: children are asked to reflect on their own discourse and their experience of social constraints upon it, and to share their reflections with the class.

(ii) Systematising experience: the teacher intervenes to show students how they can express their reflections in a systematic form, giving them the status of knowledge.

(iii) Explanation: this knowledge is subjected to further collective reflection and analysis by the class, and social explanations are sought (level 2 of CLA)

(iv) Developing practice: the awareness resulting from (i)–(iii) is employed to develop the child’s capability for purposeful discourse (Principle 1). Children at this stage should be able to produce ‘emancipatory’ discourse which goes outside the dominant conventions in some ways (for a concrete illustration of the whole model see Fairclough 2001: 201)

3.5 Language planning and the construction of national languages and identities

Fishman (1968) draws a distinction between four types of social integration, each having particular language needs: nation, nationality, nationalism, and nationism. The term ‘nation’ is defined as a ‘politico–geographic entity’ (ibid.: 39), and it does not have to have a high degree of sociocultural unity. Nationality is conceptualised as a ‘sociocultural entity’ (ibid.), which may possess no corresponding politico–geographic accomplishment. The term ‘nationalism’ is used in three different senses in political science and social anthropology. First, ‘nationalism’ describes the process through which nationalities successfully acquire a politico–geographical entity (i.e., becomes a nation with state). In this sense ‘nationalism’ describes the ‘driving or organising dynamic’ process which transforms nationality into nation (ibid.: 40). Secondly, the term ‘nationalism’ is used to describe the process whereby ‘nations
have constantly gone on to absorb and consolidate territories peopled by quite different nationalities’ (ibid.). Thirdly, the term ‘nationalism’ is also operationalised by some researchers to identify the processes through which nationalities were themselves established, out of prior tradition–bound ethnic groups (ibid.). As a result of symbolic elaboration, the daily social practices which constitute traditional ethnicity (e.g., ways of speaking and celebrating), turn out to be seen not as ideologised, particularised and localised practices, but rather as representations of common values, history, goals, etc. A number of postcolonial countries in Africa and Asia have gone through this ideological transformation from tradition–bound ethnicity to homogenising nationality. This change is reflected in language because the differences between the national, the local, and the marginal obtain, and because the actual range of varieties in the nationality–conscious speech elaborates (ibid.: 41).

Fishman proposes the term ‘nationism’ (political integration within an established nation–state), which he defines in the following way: ‘Whenever the boundary of the nation, however, is more ideologised than that of the nationality we may also begin to find pressure building up for “authentic” cultural unification or intensification. These are the nationalistic consequences of nationism’ (ibid.: 42–43). Each of these forces (nationalism or nationism) produces specific language problems. For example, for a population actively seeking the sociocultural unification to suit those whose common nationality is manifest, the selection of a national language is not a goal because it is already a saliently ideologised sign. The language problems for this type of nationalism are language maintenance, modernisation (including codification and elaboration) and reinforcement so as to cultivate the nationalistic superiority of the vertical sociocultural entity. Nationism (i.e., the geographical boundaries are far in advance of sociocultural unity), by contrast, faces a different type of language problems. Problems related to horizontal sociocultural integration including an immediate language and widespread literacy become imperatives for the functional existence itself of the nation (ibid.: 43). Nationalism views language as one of its key markers of both self identity and group identity, i.e., sociocultural integration,
whereas nationism sees (a standard) language as a vehicle for operational efficiency, i.e., political integration (ibid.: 43–44).

Ferguson (2006: 17) has noted that language planning is historically associated with the state formation and nation–building in Europe. Ferguson has added that the newly emerged states of African and Asia were considered the appropriate arena for language planning and policy because their patterns of language allocation were viewed as less fixed than those of the European counties (ibid.: 1–2). France instituted the principle of ‘one nation, one language’ which has ever since governed the language ideologies of nation–states (Spolsky 2006: 89). Kedourie (1960: 9) describes nationalism as ‘a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century’. Gellner (1997: 10–11) rejects Kedourie’s view that nationalism is just an ideological construction, rather he believes that it emerged out of particular social conditions, though he agrees it is not a natural development. Baycroft (1998: 3) argues that ‘the history of Europe from 1789 to 1945 is synonymous with the history of the growth and development of modern nations’.

Two broad approaches to the study of nationalism are generally recognised: the primordialist and the modernist (or constructionist) approaches (see Fishman 2002). Primordialism is used to refer to researchers who believe in the antiquity and naturalness of nations (Ozikirimli 2000: 64). Language is among the objects of ethnic attachments which define an ethnic nation. Edward Shils (1957) and Clifford Geertz (1973) are generally identified with primordialism. Unlike the primordialist approach to language, the constructionist approach deals with language and identity as historical and ideological constructs. According to Joseph (2004: 84), the constructionist paradigm treats identity as a ‘process in which individuals construct categorical belonging, both for themselves and for others with whom they come in contact’. The contributions of Eric Hobsbawm (1983) Benedict Anderson (1991) are examples of a constructivist interpretation. Hobsbawm (1983) asserts the role of ‘invented traditions’ in the production of feelings of belonging and solidarity. Anderson (1991: 6) defines a nation as ‘an imagined political community’. Anderson focuses on the role of print language and its products such as newspapers in the
forging of national consciousness by promoting standardisation of vernacular languages. Carmichael (2000: 282) strongly criticises Hobsbawm and Anderson’s focus on the constructedness of national identities when she notes that even if national identities are constructed, the construction derives from some actual historical past. Joseph (2004; 2006c: 262) has remarked that there is a shift in the study of social identities from an essentialist to a constructionist perspective; however, he has warned against losing sight of the fact that linguistic identities themselves function in an essentialising way by allowing us to identify who people are according to the way they speak—a function of enormous importance regardless of whether the identifications made are well-founded. Joseph (2004: 13) charges that Anderson does not consider the relationship between language and identity from a dialectical perspective: ‘Anderson gives all his attention to how national languages shape national identities and none to how national identities shape national languages, which they do very profoundly’.

Ivanič (1997) has examined the discoursal construction of identity in academic writing and surveyed the different terms employed by different scholars to describe identity. Ivanič comments on the problematic character of the term ‘identity’:

The term ‘identity’ is useful, because it is the everyday word for people’s sense of who they are, but it doesn’t automatically carry with it the connotations of social reproduction and constraint which are foregrounded by the terms ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’. It is also a misleading singular word. The plural word ‘identities’ is sometimes better, because it captures the idea of people identifying simultaneously with a variety of social groups. (Ivanič 1997: 10–11)

Wright (2004) has reviewed the history of language planning from nationalism to globalisation, and she has made a distinction between state–nations and nation–states according to the different state building processes they have undergone. On one hand, in state–nations such as France, boundaries were first fixed and then a long-term process of homogenising the people began. Religious unity was the main concern of the European leaders, who believed that ‘national identity would develop in part from this unity of populations in religious practice’ (ibid.: 27). The nineteenth–century nationalist projects encouraged deliberate linguistic unification in terms of corpus planning within a national community of communication, and divergence or differentiation from other speech communities (ibid.: 42). The latter
function (i.e., differentiation) may explain why mutually intelligible dialects such as Czech and Slovak, or Croatian and Serbian, were differentiated by nationalist movements. In other words, linguistic differentiation was one of the effective political strategies that can be employed to achieve the project of a separate national community or statehood. Thus, corpus planning has two missions: it differentiates a particular language from its neighbours and reinforces internal cohesion and unity. In nation states (e.g., Germany), on the other hand, the existence of a particular nationalist discourse of an ethnic group based on a belief in the primordial unity, common history, and language motivated them to have their own state. The connection of language to nation furnished language with a foundational role in European nationalism (ibid.: 17–18). According to Wright, the nineteenth–century nationalists believed that both missions can be accomplished by constantly policing the language, i.e., preserving a language in its purest form (for different types of ‘purism’ see Thomas 1991).

Kloss (1967) introduces the terms ‘Abstand’ and ‘Ausbau’ to identify the type of linguistic dimension of difference among languages (e.g., the difference between a dialect and a language). ‘Abstand’ varieties are those languages which are clearly identifiable as languages separate from those around them in linguistic terms. Abstand or structural difference grants the designation of ‘language’ to a given idiom on a non–political basis (Joseph 1987: 2). Speakers of Abstand languages are on linguistic islands (Wright 2004: 48). For a social dialect to be identified as a separate language ‘the idiom must show a considerable amount of internal disparity from all related “languages” under which it might conceivably be subsumed’ (Joseph 1987: 2). Examples of Abstand languages include the Basque which is one of the few pre–Indo–European idioms to have survived in the West, and Albanian which is an Indo–European language but in a separate branch on its own (Wright 2004: 48). These Abstand languages have played a significant role in claims for a separate national identity by their speakers (ibid.). ‘Ausbau’ languages, on the other hand, emerged as dialects on a continuum and then later were recognised as distinct languages as a result of the application of corpus planning processes of codification and elaboration (ibid.). The Ausbau process which may be defined as ‘differentiation through
elaboration and development’ was instrumental in the realisation of a number of nineteenth-century nationalist projects (ibid.). Fishman (2000: 45) defines Ausbau as ‘autonomy–motivated distancing’. Ferguson (2006: 21) has remarked that conscious differentiation through the Ausbau process of the national language variety from other related varieties is one aspect of linguistic unification. Joseph (1987) charges that the explanatory power of the Klossian concepts is limited, and that they focus almost entirely on variables related to language and its use, ignoring language–external political variables which may overrule the linguistic variables: ‘When a linguistic criterion comes into contact with a political one, the latter is likely to dominate’ (ibid.: 3). Another aspect of linguistic unification is standardisation (see Section 3.1.3.1). Fairclough (2001: 47) contends that standardisation plays an ideological role in the establishment of nationhood, and ‘nation–state is the favoured form of capitalism’. Wiley (2006: 135) has pointed out that linguistic standardisation is a key constituent of the nation–building projects: ‘Linguistic standardisation and dialect homogenisation through the promotion of mass literacy are recipes from the nation–builder’s cookbook that can be reduced to a step–by–step formula of status and corpus planning’. It should be mentioned that the opposite process of Ausbau is Einbau which has as its objective ‘the drawing of two languages closer together, so that they may become more similar to each other and, perhaps, ultimately, fuse into one’ (Fishman 2000:45).

Critical linguists inspired by the work of Foucault and Bourdieu treat identity as a product of discourse and intersubjective product of the social (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 8). The turn to post–structuralism led to the rejection of essentialist accounts in favour of ‘constructionist’ modes of thinking (ibid.). This led to the emergence of a number of theories and approaches to the study of identities including discursive and ideological approaches rooted in social theory and theories of performativity (ibid.). Pennycook (2006: 64) has stated that postmodernism raises a number of questions for language planning about the ways in which power operates in relation to nation–state and about the way governance is achieved through language. Joseph (2004, 2006c, 2006d) has commented that identity itself is a performative function of language. Billig (1995) introduces the term ‘banal nationalism’ to describe the daily
use of national symbols such as flags and coins in the continuous reproduction and reinforcement of national sentiments in a population. According to Tollefson (1991: 9), national languages serve the interests of dominant groups by controlling access to political institutions of power. Tollefson concludes that ‘national languages, which restrict access to decision making in the name of nationhood, are inherently ideological’ (ibid.). Joseph (2004, 2006c: 262) has argued that identity is a double-edge sword: while it productively functions to provide us with a sense of belonging, it does so by distinguishing an ‘us’ from a ‘them’ which becomes quite easy to demonise.

3. 6 Language planning and language policy in Africa: The case of Nigeria

To round off this chapter, the present section examines language policy and planning in an African country with a history broadly similar to that of Sudan in certain respects, in order to provide a comparative counterpoint for the Sudanese case that will form the subject of the rest of this thesis. The comparison will help us to gauge which aspects of the Sudanese situation are unique and which represent more general trends. This in turn will allow for a better informed choice regarding possible and likely outcomes and solutions.

Nigeria as a geographical political entity came into being in 1914 when the British colonial regime merged the Northern and Southern Protectorates into a single administrative entity (Aguolu 1979: 517). A number of culturally diverse ancient kingdoms were amalgamated to establish the new nation that came to be known as Nigeria. These are the Hausa–Fulani and Kanem empires of the north, and the Benin, Oyo and Igbo (or Ibo) Kingdoms of the south (Attah 1987: 400). Hence, the enormous ethnolinguistic, religious, and cultural diversity of Nigeria is traceable to the arbitrary colonial partitioning of Africa which was incompatible with the precolonial politico-linguistic and socio-ethnic groupings. With an area of 356,669 square miles, Nigeria contains some 250 ethnic groups, the Hausa–Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo (or Igbo) being the dominant ones (Aguolu 1979: 513). The Hausa–Fulani are concentrated in the north, the Yoruba in the west and the Ibo in the eastern part of the country. Muslims who dominate in the north are said to make up over 45% of the
national population; Christians who dominate mainly in the south constitute around 35%, and followers of traditional religions or animists compose the rest. Northern Nigeria adopted Islam as far back as the eleventh century when West Africa was invaded by the Arabs from North Africa (a similar distribution of global religions obtains in Sudan, where Islam dominates in the north and Christianity in the south, as will be seen in Chapter 4).

The number of languages listed in Ethnologue for Nigeria is 521, of which 510 are living languages, and two are second languages without native speakers, and nine are extinct languages (see Ethnologue, Languages of Nigeria; Map 3.1). Of the four language phyla into which Greenberg (1963a) classifies African languages, three are represented in Nigeria. The language family that is not represented in Nigeria is Khoisan (the same linguistic representation obtains in the Sudan—Chapter 2). According to Aguolu (1979: 516), because of the sizeable number of Nigerian languages, post–independent governments kept the colonial language English as the official language of the country.

It is generally believed that ethnic and cultural diversity acted as a barrier to national unity, and was among the forces behind the Nigeria–Biafra war (1967–1970). Peshkin (1967: 323) points out that ‘colonial and military force and administration created a semblance of peace and unity over diverse tribal territories’.

Peshkin argued that British colonial policies hindered the development of national consciousness in Nigeria. First, the British colonial administration introduced separate government structures for different parts of the country, particularly for the northern and southern provinces, from 1900 to 1922 (cf. the Closed District Order in the Sudan, Chapter 4). Education in the Northern and Southern Provinces of Nigeria was separately managed until 1928 (Peshkin, ibid.). Secondly, the colonial administration implemented the principle of Indirect Rule, which led to the rejection of Western education, particularly by the Hausa–Fulani tribal leaders in the north (cf. the effects of the Indirect Rule in the Sudan, Chapter 4). Aguolu (1979: 517) argues that ‘the colonial officials discouraged, in fact, debarred the diffusion of Christianity
and Western education in the Moslem North, which the northern leaders considered deleterious to their traditional beliefs, customs, and deeply entrenched interests.’


According to Aguolu (1979: 517), the 1951 Constitution led to the establishment of regional governments in 1952. Each of the three regions of the North, East, and West was dominated by a particular ethnic group: the Hausa–Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the West, and the Ibo (or Igbo) in the East. The year 1954 witnessed the introduction of federalism. The Eastern and Western Regions gained self-government within the federation in 1957, and the Northern Region in 1959. Nigeria achieved its independence in 1960. A military decree of May 1967 divided the regions into twelve states (for detailed information about Nigeria’s federalism see Afigbo 1991; Olowu 1991; Adamolekun 1991; Osaghae 1991). The aim of the twelve–state structure was to protect minority ethnic groups from the domination of
Aguolu (1979: 515) maintains that ‘ethnicity is the most powerful determinant of access to education’, and that ‘cultural, values and personality traits’ led to different level of educational attainment among ethnic groups. Some scholars blame the educational apparatus for failure to cultivate a unified cultural identity over the whole country. Peshkin (1967) argues strongly that it is the broader social structure within which education is embedded which should be held accountable for the disunity between the south and the north. Peshkin (ibid.: 331) writes: ‘schools do not usually create beliefs, attitudes, or values; they communicate them from sources outside the school’. The words of Alhaji Ahmed Bello (1909–1966), the late Prime Minister of the Northern Region, may lend support to Peshkin’s argument:

We had no sentimental illusions about leaving the others [the southerners]: they had acted in such a way that it was abundantly clear to us that they would sooner see the back of us … We must aim at a looser structure for Nigeria while preserving its general pattern – a structure which would give the Regions the greatest possible freedom of movement and action; a structure which would reduce the powers of the Centre to the absolute minimum and yet retain sufficient national unity for practical and international purposes. (Bello 1962: 136)

The fact that Nigeria’s federalism is an inherited practice from the colonial period has led a number of scholars who are sympathetic to the cause of Nigerian nationalism to blame it for the postcolonial sociopolitical divisiveness in the country (Afigbo 1991: 13). Afigbo notes that one methodological problem in the study of Nigerian federalism is the tendency to examine it through a synchronic analysis of the sociopolitical conditions of Nigeria, when the decision to federate was made as far back as 1946–1954. Afigbo argues for the importance of adopting a historical approach to show the forces that moulded the Nigeria’s political history and constitutional structure (ibid.: 13–14). The adoption of a federal system in Nigeria has affected the practice of language planning and policy. Although there has been substantial disagreement on the number of state units, there is a general consensus among three dominant linguistic groups (Yorubas, Hausa–Fulanis, and Igbos) that their languages should be granted constitutional recognition as national languages (see Olowu 1991: 166–167). The Articles on the language policy in the 1979
Constitution, which have been retained in the 1989 Constitution (see Olowu 1991: 167; UNESCO, Most Clearing House, Linguistic Rights), stipulate:

**Article 5**

3. Every person who is arrested or detained shall be informed in writing within 24 hours, and in a language that he understands, of the facts and grounds for his arrest or detention.

**Article 6**

Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled:

(a) To be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of offence;

(f) To have without payment the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the offence.

**Article 19**

4. Government shall promote the learning of indigenous languages.

**Article 53**

The business of the National Assembly shall be conducted in English and in Hausa, Ibo [or Igbo] and Yoruba when adequate arrangements have been made therefore.

**Article 95**

The business of a House of Assembly shall be conducted in English, but the House may in addition to English conduct the business of the House in one or more other languages spoken in the state as the House may by resolution approve.

According to Olowu (1991: 166), two considerations dominated debates on language in Nigeria. The first is that some people oppose the use of English on the grounds that local languages are systems of cultural representations, and that the majority of the population are illiterate. The second consideration is that the use of a lingua franca is inevitable since it can act as a symbol of cohesion throughout Nigeria. However, those who agree on the importance of having a lingua franca argue that English, as an inheritance from the colonial rule, should not play this role (for the powerful status of English in Nigeria see Wolf and Igboanusi 2006). Alternatives that have been suggested as the lingua franca include: Swahili and Wazobia (i.e., a newly
constructed language from Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo). In conclusion, Nigeria, as one of the few African countries with long experience of federalism, and particularly linguistic federalism, can furnish a model experience for other African states in similar circumstances and with similarly complex sociolinguistic structure.

3.7 Summary

In this chapter the key concepts and terminology in the scholarship of language planning and policy have been surveyed. The different and contestable definitions of key terms in language planning have been reviewed. The key actors and elements involved in the process of language planning have been identified, as have the key theoretical and analytic approaches. The relationship between language planning and power has been examined; the various language rights regimes in the literature have been analysed; the different critical approaches to literacy education with special focus on the concept of critical language awareness in educational planning have been reviewed. The role language planning has played in the construction of national identity has been discussed. Finally, the language situation in Nigeria has been broadly examined for comparative purposes.
CHAPTER FOUR: LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICY IN
SUDAN, 1898–2005

This chapter is concerned with the investigation of two major themes: the first is the historical development of language policies and language planning in the Sudan from 1898 (the beginning of the Anglo–Egyptian rule) to 2005; and the second is the Arabisation policy in the Sudan. Before commencing the survey, some points concerning the scope and the organisation of the chapter should be made. The first point regards the chronological periodisation of the language policies. Following other researchers, I will approach the historical development of official language policies in the Sudan by periodising it into two stages: colonial and postcolonial. By the colonial period here I mean the Anglo–Egyptian rule of Sudan (or the Condominium, 1898–1956). A detailed and complete review of the historical evolution of the language planning and policies beyond the Anglo–Egyptian period is beyond the capacity of this chapter, though an occasional mention will be made where necessary. The reason for this is quite simple: most of the language plans and policies at the state level (i.e., in the sense of modern state nation) have been made from the British colonial period onward. Another point relating to the scope is that although the colonial and postcolonial language policies have impacted on the whole Sudan, with its four different directions, much of the attention in this chapter is paid to the south/north relation. My emphasis is in no way to imply that other regions of the Sudan are not equally worth scholarly attention. In fact, multilingualism, as the discussion of the distribution of languages (Chapter 2) has shown, is inherently a defining feature of the whole country.

However, there are, in my view, good reasons for this particular restriction. The first relates to the fact that until the mid 1980s, the linguistic conflicts that spanned the colonial and postcolonial periods mainly reflected the south/north polarisation (Miller 2006: 1). The second reason for my focus on the south/north relation is that the conflict over the national language policy was a constituent cause of one of the longest wars in African history, between the north and the south of the Sudan (Miller 2003a: 163). Hence, the historical narrative of how the new linguistic configuration
of the whole Sudan as foreseen in the Naivasha language policy was constructed should be told critically from the perspective of the south-north relationship. A third point that should be clarified here is that a reasonable understanding of the logic and rationalisation behind the language policies and educational programmes in the Sudan requires situating them within their social–political environment. This is accountable for by the fact that language policies and ‘formal educational systems in all countries are related to the political institutions of the societies concerned’ (Sanderson 1976: 72). The Sudan is no different since ‘language issues cannot be separated from other political and social issues as linguistic policies stem directly from the ideological choices of the State’ (Miller 2003a: 160). And ‘conflicts about language issues and language planning in the Sudan have accompanied the Sudanese political life since the early twentieth century’ (ibid.: 1). However, only the historical conditions that supply a meaningful context to the language policy under consideration will be provided. A final point has to do with the internal structure of the historical review (i.e., the way the content is structured). Few studies have been devoted to a systematic analysis of the sociopolitical context of the language policies in the Sudan as a free–standing topic. Therefore, any attempt to survey the development of the language policies in the Sudan must undergo a textual process of three stages: a general analysis of the contextual information involving language issues in general books of history and political science; synthesis of the different information collected from the different sources; and then systematisation into a coherent meaningful whole. The chapter is divided into three main parts: colonial period, postcolonial period, and the Arabicisation policy in the Sudan.

4.1 The colonial period

The colonial period began with an agreement signed on 19 January 1899 between Great Britain and Egypt to co–rule the Sudan. In reality, however, it was the British who governed single–handedly, with more attention paid to the southern part of the country (Albino 1970: 16). To understand the language policies exercised during the Anglo–Egyptian era, I shall focus on what is called the ‘Southern Policy’ of the British government. The first remark about the early years of the Anglo–Egyptian rule (1900–1928) is that there was no official language policy, not only in the south
but in the whole Sudan. This can be accounted for by the fact that the British policy in the African colonies was driven by the theory of ‘laissez-faire’ in education. This held that educational policies should be made by private and voluntary bodies such as Christian missionaries, and that the state should not intervene in the making of such policies (Beshir 1969:25). For the southern Sudan, no language or educational policies were made at this earlier time given the fact that the British could not bring the whole southern region under tight control.

According to Sanderson (1962), the educational policy was rather negative in character during this period. In 1898 the question was not what kind of education to make available, but rather whether there could be any education at all in the southern regions. Therefore, the policy of British colonial rule was to ‘tolerate rather than to encourage education and to see what resulted’ (Sanderson 1962: 105). The southern tribes that were ruled by chiefs vowed to resist to the death any incursions by foreigners. The task of the British government was ‘the imposition of the Pax Britannia upon a land that had not known peace since the coming of the ivory traders, and this occupied the Government for the best part of twenty or thirty years’ (Albino 1970: 17).

The early periods of the Condominium rule were characterised by the return of missionaries to the south. It was these Christian missionaries who made the education policies during the period from 1900 to 1926 (Sanderson 1962: 105). Although the British government allowed Christian missionaries to develop their own education polices, they were restricted to operating exclusively in the south. This is attributed to the fact that Lord Cromer, who laid down the fundamental principles upon which educational development was to rely, was profoundly suspicious of the Christian missionaries. As a result of his Egyptian administrative experience, he was completely aware of the dangers to the condominium rule posed by the fanatical Islamic insurrections in the northern part of the country. This awareness made him state categorically that the Arabic language would be the medium of instruction at the elementary school level, and that religious education would be in the Islamic faith in the north (Sanderson 1976: 72–73).
The educational missions established by Christian societies were that of the Italian Roman Catholic Verona Fathers to the Shilluk in 1901, that of the Anglican Missionary society to the Malek in 1905, and that of the American United Mission to peoples of the Sobat River in 1902. Australian and New Zealand missionaries took part starting in 1913 (Albino 1970: 17; Beshir 1968: 31). To control the Christian missions’ activities, the British government assigned each Christian denomination a ‘sphere of influence’; hence, each area was dominated by one mission and one pattern of education. This division had negative consequences on the type of education and the distribution of economic resources in the different parts of the south (Albino 1970: 18). The quality and amount of education in each area were determined by the economic resources and the educational policy of each mission. For instance, the Roman Catholics, who had greater financial resources and longer historical ties with the land than their Anglican and Protestant counterparts, were capable of providing more schools and churches (Beshir 1968: 31). The medium of instruction in these schools were the various vernaculars and the English language at least in the higher classes, and a significant amount of time was devoted to Christian education (ibid.).

According to Beshir (1968: 32), four major problems confronted Christian education: 1) the fact that the conceptualisation of education by some tribes acted as a barrier to Christian education, 2) the fact that Arabic and English had to be used as media of instruction until local languages were to be learned by missionary teachers and writing systems were developed for them, 3) the shortage of teachers, 4) the lack of financial resources. The division of the south into spheres of influence as part of the governmental educational policy did not allow the Catholics to expand their activities beyond their sphere, and led to cultural separation between the different areas within the south, and between the south and the north. The actual missionary education in the south began with the establishment of some schools by the Verona Fathers in the three southern provinces: in the Upper Nile province at Lul and Detwok in 1901, in Bahr al–Ghazal province at Kayango, and Wau in 1905, and in Equatorial province in 1913. The American Presbyterian mission started educational work in Upper Nile
province at Doleib Hill in 1902. The Sudan United Mission established a small boarding school for male students at Róm and Paloich and a co–educational school at Melut in 1913. The Church Missionary Society opened one school at Bor in 1905, another at Malek in 1906 and a third in Yei in 1917. The educational schools were divided into four types: village or bush, elementary, intermediate and trade schools. Bush schools differed in size and academic standards and used the vernacular as the medium of instruction. The elementary schools provided a four–year programme, and English was the medium of instruction for all subjects except religion, which was taught in the vernacular. There were a few bush and elementary schools for girls and they were taught hygiene and domestic sciences. It should be mentioned here that the education of girls was recognised as important and given serious attention.

During the colonial period significant development was made in the production of dictionaries and grammar books in Zande, Dinka, Shilluk, Bari, and Nuer. According to the report on ‘The Progress of Southern Education’ prepared in 1933 by Mr. Hickson, Resident Inspector for Southern Education, the linguistic research conducted by missionaries on these languages ‘represents much hard work and a great advance in the amount of literature available’ (for the full text of the report see Said 1965: 176–184). In short, the missionary societies succeeded in laying the foundations of the educational system in the south but failed to achieve a unity in the system. Educational policies and practice in the south were different from that in the north. Education in the north was geared to employment, while in the south it was equipped to spread Christianity and suppress Islam (Beshir 1968).

To do justice to the topic, it is important to know the view of northern Sudanese and non–Sudanese scholars towards the Christian educational activities. Some scholars such as Abu Bakr charge that Christian education by its very nature did not favour the existence of Arabic in the southern Sudan. Abu Bakr made the following criticism:

As in many African countries, the foundation of present education in the southern Sudan was laid down by Christian missionaries. Since the aim of the missionaries was conversion and the introduction of Christian cultures, one can then understand why language policy had removed completely and firmly the Arabic language from the sphere of
education in the multilingual southern Sudan … No Arabic was ever taught in the southern schools during the first half of this century. (Abu Bakr 1975: 13)

Another broadside against the Christian education is provided by the Kenyan–American social scientist Ali Mazrui, who contends that that there was a ‘profound incongruence’ at the heart of the ‘imported educational system’ in the colonies in Africa. Christian missionaries were bringing into Africa a sectarian feature of Western civilisation in a form which most Western states had already abandoned in the course of their modernisation. Put in simple terms, Mazrui is arguing that the entire foundation upon which education was built in the southern Sudan by the Christian missions was fundamentally faulty:

The wrong western values were being provided as an infrastructure for the wrong Western skills. This gap between norms and techniques may be called the ‘techno–cultural gap’ of western heritage in Africa and parts of Asia. A major reason for this gap in the field of education lies in the paradoxical role of the missionary school. On the one hand, the missionary school was supposed to be the principal medium for the promotion of ‘modern civilisation’ especially in Africa. On the other hand, western civilisation on its home ground in Europe was becoming increasingly secular. In the colonies the missionaries were propagating a concept of Christian religiosity which was already anachronistic in the West. (Mazrui 1979: 33)

Here Mazrui is not defending an Islamic type of education since the same rebuttal can be made of this education. Mazrui is advocating the teaching of technically advanced skills required for industrialised communities. The core of Mazrui’s argument against the educational policies of the missionaries is that technical skills were given a religious infrastructure (Mazrui 1979: 35). In the face of these criticisms, some scholars have been far from silent. To subvert Mazrui’s claim that Christian missions were propagating the wrong Western values, the educationalist Lillian Sanderson made the following counter–argument:

Some ‘Western’ progress had come as a result of Christian evangelistic confidence and from the concept of the moral value of hard work. The cultivation of ‘obedience’ in school did not necessarily stifle initiative any more in the southern Sudan than elsewhere. Had there been more secondary and post–secondary education before independence there would have been more people with more initiative, at independence. Even by 1956 a few Southern Sudanese had succeeded in reconciling personal aspiration with social obligation. (Sanderson 1980: 169)

Another argument in support of the educational policy of the missionaries is provided by Albino. Albino (1970: 18) argues that ‘if it were not for the churches,
there would have been no education in the south’. By 1926, there were twenty–two
boys’ intermediate, and one boy’s trade school, in addition to numerous village
vernacular schools’. After the First World War, the British rule adopted what came to
be known as the ‘Southern Policy’, intended to separate the south from the north.
The Southern Policy was officially declared in 1930. In a secret memorandum on
Southern Policy (for the full text of the memorandum see Beshir 1968: 115–118;
Abdel–Rahim 1969: 244–249; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 19–25), the then Civil Secretary
of the Sudan stated:

The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a
series of self–contained racial and tribal units with structure and
organisation based, to whatever extent the requirements of the equity
and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional
usage, and beliefs… Apart from the fact that the restriction of Arabic is
an essential feature of the general scheme it must not be forgotten that
Arabic, being neither the language of the governing nor the governed,
will progressively deteriorate. The type of Arabic at present spoken
provides signal proof of this. It cannot be used as a means of
communication on anything but the most simple matters, and only if it
were first unlearned and then relearned in a less crude form and adopted
as the language of instruction in the schools could it fulfil the growing
requirements of the future. The local vernaculars and English, on the
other hand, will in every case be the language of one of the two parties
conversing and one party will therefore always be improving the other.
The most scathing refutation of the above quoted formulation of the colonial
Southern Policy has been made by the French political scientist Gerard Prunier.
Prunier strongly criticises the British colonial policy for choosing tribal
administration as a way of governing the whole Sudan. Prunier (2005: 32) argues
that tribal organisation was ‘a poor model for the future of an independent Sudan;
indeed this benign neglect and glorification of tribal ways and days was exactly the
kind of romantic “nativism” which led to the problems of Southern Sudan and
Northern Nigeria’. Probably the most telling succinct argument against the colonial
educational policy was furnished by J. S. R. Duncan when he dubbed it the policy of
the ‘zoo mentality’:

There is something in this of the ‘Zoo’ mentality, a little pompous and
out of touch with reality. What is more the pity; it was completely out
of balance with the race for education, as an end in itself, that was
beginning in the northern Sudan and which was to leave the south far
behind. ‘Happiness’ in this race for education cannot, in the very nature
of the development, find any prominent place. In the second or third
generation, when educated parents exist, there may be some chance of happiness for the children, but it is impossible for the first generation to avoid being embittered; to have their inevitably unbalanced dreams of self-importance shattered; and to be perhaps: expendable. (Duncan 1952: 217)
The question that immediately arises is: What were the causes that lay behind this policy? There were a number of developments and political events that led to the adoption of the policy. One salient development was the emergence of the League of Nations, and the debating of the affairs of the colonies shed light on the need to develop local societies. Another critical event was the rise of Sudanese nationalism in 1924 which was a source of alarm to the British administration. A third development was that the policy of Indirect Rule had become the principle of the Sudan administration since the end of the World War I (Beshir 1968: 40). It was Frederick Lugard (1965) who in the 1920s provided the theoretical base for the policy of ‘Indirect Rule’ that Britain implemented in the Sudan and the African colonies. In educational terms, the policy of Indirect Rule initiated a period of less financial assistance for Gordon Memorial College (now the University of Khartoum) and primary school boys, and more support for religious instruction at elementary level in the most remote rural territories. A logical result of this was that Arabic and Islamic culture would have to be eliminated from the southern Sudan, and it was this line of thinking that dominated the famous Southern Policy (Albino 1970: 19–20).
Collins notes:

In order to encourage indigenous, African customs in the South, all Northern Sudanese, Moslem, Arab influences were to be eradicated, for African traditions, already weakened by a century of chaos, could hardly hope to flourish in the face of the dynamic and expansive culture of the northern Sudan. (Collins 1966: 381)

However, the form of Indirect Rule which was implemented by the British colonial administration to protect the local languages and cultural traditions is not without opponents. The Sudanese intellectuals, especially the graduate of Gordon College, viewed this policy as a strategy to exclude them from power and participation in the running of the Sudan (Sanderson 1976: 75). Sanderson (2005: 29) states that the British Government’s reply was that it was accommodating the needs of the Sudanese people as a whole. Prunier contends that the policy of Indirect Rule was a guise for what he describes as a ‘colonial benign neglect’. Mazrui (1971: 252) argues that the suppression of Arabic in the south during the colonial period was ‘part of the
presumed competition between the Islamic culture and British civilisation’. Caught up in this battle of civilisation, Mazrui continues, was the issue of the means of education. It was widely perceived that ‘the British and missionary policy was to encourage the use of English rather than Arabic, and there was favouritism toward Christian mission education’ (Shepherd 1966: 199–200). Northern elites viewed these educational changes as a product of the implementation of the principle of Indirect rule, and not of the 1924 nationalist movement, which in their view had meant to divide the country into two. Sanderson (1976: 76) argues that the educational modifications that followed 1924 were a direct result of the revolution, and not of the policy of Indirect Rule. She argues that although there is no material evidence to prove the causal relation between the 1924 revolution and the changes in the quality and quantity of education, the fact that they followed the 1924 disturbances points to that conclusion.

On the whole, these developments and events marked and defined the colonial Southern Policy (i.e., the colonial administrative policy in the south), an aim of which until 1946 was to separate the south from the north. In the following sub–sections, I shall briefly discuss the major measures taken to implement this policy.

4.1.1 Rejaf Language Conference 1928
According to Beshir (1968: 44), one of the significant measures intended to separate the south religiously, culturally and politically was the Rejaf Language Conference. The conference took place at Rejaf in Mongalla province, southern Sudan, in April 1928, under the chairmanship of Mr. J.G. Mathew, Secretary of Education and Health for the Sudan (Werner 1929: 426). The conference was sponsored by the colonial government and attended by missionary representatives from the Congo, Uganda, and the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures (Beshir 1968: 44). The aims of the Rejaf language conference were:

1. To draw up a classified list of languages and dialects spoken in the southern Sudan;
2. To make recommendations as to whether a system of group languages should be adopted for educational purposes, and if so, which of these languages should be selected, for the various areas;
3. To consider and report as to the adoption of a unified system of orthography;
4. To make proposals for co-operation in the production of text–books; and the adoption of skeleton grammars, reading book, and primers for general use.

The deliberations of the conference were greatly facilitated by the attendance of Diedrich Westermann, Professor in the International Institute of African Languages and Culture, as a linguistic expert (Werner 1929: 426). Westermann conducted a special study of the Shilluk language, which is an essential language in the area under discussion. It was decided that Westermann should draw up a revised list of languages because the preparation of the teaching materials for vernacular elementary education was urgent (Sanderson 1980: 114). But the great number of languages and dialect spoken in the south constituted a challenge to the conference which had to select some representatives of them. This problem was solved by dividing the languages into groups, and then selecting a principal member of each group as a representative language (for the list of language groups see Tucker 1934: 30).

The resolution concerning the chosen languages read as follows:

The conference is of the opinion that the following group languages are suitable for development and that the preparation of the text–books in these languages for use in the elementary vernacular schools of the southern Sudan is a matter of urgency: Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Lotuko, Shilluk, Zande. Acholi and Madi are in a different category, as only a very small proportion of the people speaking these languages live in the Sudan. Literature for these languages must, therefore, be drawn from elsewhere. It is recognised that in sub–grade schools the use of other vernaculars may still be necessary. Colloquial Arabic in Roman script will also be required in certain communities where the use of no other vernacular is practicable. (Report of the Rejaf Language Conference, 1928, cited in Tucker 1934: 31)

A number of sociolinguistic observations have been made about this resolution. The first observation is that no immediate provision was made for the Ndogo group, the Bongo–Baka group, or the large Moru–Avukaya section of the Madi group. This was because the Conference more or less understood that the Zande language, which had
already been used as a means of instruction in these areas, could continue in that capacity. Accordingly, missionaries who had been teaching in Ndogo had to change over to the Zande language (Tucker 1934: 31–32). Another observation is that no representation was made of the Didinga and Beir group since they were remote from the educational centre to receive any attention at the time from the Conference (ibid.). Werner (1929: 426) also noted that the Acholi language is almost a dialect of Shilluk, and it may have seemed clear that the existing Shilluk language literature could be used for it.

According to Tucker (1934: 31), the implementation of the Conference resolutions faced a number of difficulties. Chief among them was that the tribes and areas over which some of the standard languages were supposed to apply were not clearly defined; therefore, the possibility of rival standard languages was to be expected. To define the language boundaries, the policy of the government involved returning migrating tribes to their original area. The new provincial repatriation policy led to a great majority of Zande being returned to the south. Consequently, the teachers who were working in the Ndogo had to learn the Zande language from Zande–speaking European missionaries or from imported Zande colleagues. In Wau itself, where Ndogo is widely spoken, government officials found the Zande language relatively difficult to apply to their Ndogo people. And to resolve this language barrier, they had to resort to pidgin Arabic or Zande interpreters. So the repatriation of the Zande group, which is primarily an invading group, led to language confusion (Tucker 1934: 32).

Moreover the Conference stipulated that colloquial Arabic in Roman script was to be used where no other vernacular was workable. The alphabet adopted by the conference followed the system proposed in the Memorandum of the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures (Werner 1929: 426). Tucker (1934: 33) noted that the issue of developing a standard orthography was not completely settled at the Rejaf Conference. This led to a situation where two or more missionary societies were involved in writing a single language, and any two mission societies that were engaged on any one language almost always had different views
concerning the way in which the Rejaf alphabet should be implemented. Tucker argues that the national identity of a mission society might have a shaping influence on the type of written symbols it chooses for developing a new language, and this led to a conflict between mission societies over the writing system.

A Textbook Committee was set up and its report was adopted for the planned co-operation of the government and missions in the production of teaching materials. This resulted in the appointment of Archibald Tucker, a South African with a doctorate from the University of London, as advisor to the southern Sudan on the preparation of teaching materials from 1929 to 1931 (Sanderson 1980: 114). The languages were introduced in the first two years of schooling, with English as a subject. When learners reach the third year, they used only English as a means of instruction (Abu Bakr 1975: 13). The Juba Arabic that had been the lingua franca of the south was rejected and abandoned (Albino 1970: 18). The policy of the government also required that all southern administrators should speak the language of the people of their district or alternatively English, but never Arabic. They were also directed to acquaint themselves as closely as possible with local traditions and beliefs. The following citation from the Civil Secretary’s memorandum on the Southern Policy serves to illustrate this principle (for the full text of the memorandum see Beshir 1968: 115–118; Abdel–Rahim 1969: 244–249; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 19–25):

*It can not be stressed too strongly that to speak the natural language of the people whom he controls is the first duty of the administrator.* Arabic is not that language, and indeed to the bulk of the population of the south it is a new, or partly new, tongue. Officials should avoid the error of thinking that by speaking Arabic they are in some way conforming to the principle that the administrator should converse with his people in their own language. (emphasis in original)

Some scholars argue that the Report of the Rejaf Language Conference was not value–neutral. For instance, Abu Bakr argues that the main aim of writing local languages in Roman script was to ‘ensure the isolation of the south from the impact of Arabic language and culture’ (Abu Bakr 1975: 13). Sanderson (1980: 113) provides the counter–argument that an authoritative language conference was needed to consider educational media of instruction. Abu Bakr’s (1975: 13) stance, which can be interpreted as a reply to Sanderson’s argument, is that the diversity and
multiplicity of languages in the south complicated the problem of choosing the media of instruction. Sanderson’s (1970: 158) response was that ‘this would seem unplausible [sic] contention to most educationalists: it can hardly be accepted without convincing positive evidence’. Tucker argues that the people who could speak Arabic before the Rejaf Language Conference were in a minority, and this had affected the life of the people and led to institutional racism and injustice. For example, Tucker notes that Arabic in the south had:

A great prestige as being the language best calculated to win favour with the police, for the native police are not, as a rule, recruited from the tribes among which they function, but from neighbouring or even distant tribes, speaking totally different languages. Ultimately, of course, it was a useful language to know, should one’s case come before the District Commissioner, since it enabled the plaintiff to evade the court interpreter, who was not always to be trusted to translate fairly unless well bribed. It was with the idea of putting an end to this lingua franca and getting into closer touch with the people that the government initiated its language policy. (Tucker 1934: 29)

Tucker points out that the conference encouraged missionaries and linguistic experts to research local languages, and to write and publish textbooks, grammars, and dictionaries for these languages (for the full list of post–Rejaf Language Conference publications in the group languages see Tucker 1934: 37–39). It is in the light of this linguistic work that the report is seen by Werner (1929: 427) to have marked ‘a distinctive advance in the organisation of African linguistic research’.

4.1.2 The creation of no–man’s land

The British authorities had implemented much tighter measures and procedures from 1930 to 1945 before it shifted its policy position towards the south–north relationship. As mentioned above, the policies and measures adopted during this period were intended to separate the south from the north culturally, socially and politically, and came to be known as the ‘Southern Policy’ of the British rule. One of the measures adopted by the British government to restrict the spread of the Arabic language in the south was the creation of what has come to be known as ‘the no man’s land’. The policy of creating this ‘no man’s land’ is embodied in the following statement which is worth quoting in full:

Another aspect of the implementation of the Southern Policy required that contact between the southern tribes and their neighbouring Arab
tribes should be discouraged. Tribes such as the Banda, Dongo, Kreish, Feruge, Nyangulgule and Togoyo, which had been greatly influenced by Islam and Arabic culture and were in constant contact with the Arab tribes in Darfur and Kordofan, were removed from their regions and rehabilitated in other areas away from the influence of their Northern Arab neighbours. The indigenous inhabitants of the western district who lived in and around the administrative post of Kafia Kinge were grouped together according to tribe and resettled south of the Raga–Kafia Kingi road so that no Southern Sudanese lived more than ten miles north of the River Boro. This created a vast ‘no–man’s land’ between the tribes of the southern Sudan and the Arab Nomadic tribes North of the Bahr al Arab River in Darfur, which acted as a barrier between the two. (Beshir 1968: 50–51, my emphasis)

4.1.3 The Closed District Order 1929

This regulation was intended to exclude the Egyptians, the northern Sudanese, and Muslims from the south (Beshir 1968: 42). The ultimate target was to protect the south from the influence of the Arabic language and culture. As a result, northerners were prohibited from entering the south without the prior consent of the British authorities. This measure also demanded that tribal leaders and their followers should abandon Arabic dress and the use of Arabic names (Beshir 1968: 52; Albino 1970: 21; Gray 1963: 2). This colonial policy was strongly challenged not only by northern intellectuals but also by some southerners. For instance, Alier counters:

The prohibition of Arabic, the abolition of Arab names, the wholesale accusations against all Northerners of being slave dealers, and the advantage given to Christian missionaries over Moslem preachers, made the whole policy somewhat ridiculous … As for names, it is the private business of the father and the mother to choose a name for their child and for a grown–up to change his. A Government which thus engaged in the prohibition of particular names betrayed its own inherent democracy. (Alier 1973: 15)

Another remark about this policy is that ‘the suppression of Islam went hand–in–hand with the suppression of the Arabic language’ (Beshir 1968: 53). Put in another way, the British colonial government was the first to clearly fuse the Arabic language and Islam in its linguistic policy (Miller 2003a: 165). The aim of the policy has been characterised in the following terms:

The colonial policy from 1900–1946 was by and large to develop the two parts of the country as different entities. In that regard, the Closed District Act … was imposed, virtually putting the south and the western parts of the country off limits to Northern Sudanese. Visas were required to travel from the north to either the west or the south and vice
versa. The purported justification for the act was, among other things, to keep out Arab influence and Islam from these regions in order to protect the indigenous cultures and languages from ‘corrupting’ influence of Islam and the Arabic language. (Nyombe 1997: 106)

To protect the indigenous languages and cultures of the south from the influence of Islam and the Arabic language, the policy of the British government from 1930 up to the 1946 had been to develop the three southern provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr al–Ghazal and Equatoria along distinctively Negroid and African lines, and to exclude northern and Arabic culture as much as possible. This stance constituted the core of the British ‘Southern Policy’ that was summed up by the Governor–General in 1945 as follows (Khartoum Secret Despatch No. 89, August 4, 1945, cited in B.V. Marwood, Governor Equatoria, to M. B. Stubbs, District Commissioner, Western District, December 23, 1946, Bahr al–Ghazal, 1/1/2, SGA, cited in Beshir 1968: 122):

The approved policy is to act upon the fact that the people of the Southern Sudan are distinctly African and Negroid, and that our obvious duty to them is therefore to push ahead as fast as we can with their economic and educational development on African and Negroid lines, and not upon the Middle Eastern and Arab lines of progress which are suitable for the northern Sudan. It is only by economic and educational development that these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their future lot be eventually cast with the northern Sudan or with East Africa (or partly with each).

To recapitulate, the educational system in the south during the colonial period was intentionally committed to the suppression of the Arabic language as far as possible (Mazrui 1971: 253). Nyombe (1997: 105) defends the British colonial policy by arguing that the essence of the policy up to 1946 was to return the traumatised southerners to the use of indigenous languages. It should be pointed out that a number of northern Sudanese scholars and politicians do not see the disruption of the spread of Arabic during the colonial period in a positive way. In his argument against the colonial policy, the northern scholar Said affirmed that the colonial policy did indeed obstruct the spread of Arabic:

Until 1945 the policy was to build up in the southern Sudan a series of self–contained racial or tribal units based on indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs. A firm barrier to Arabisation was created. Everybody, administrator and missionary, acted upon the fact that the peoples of the south provinces were distinctly African and Negroid. (Said 1965: 152, my emphasis)
Another criticism levelled against the Southern Policy was provided by Beshir. Beshir (1968: 54) argues that ‘missionary education was as disrupting to tribal life and values as Muslim influence was’. It should be remarked here that it is not only northern Sudanese researchers and politicians and some British officials who opposed the colonial policy which was preoccupied with task of the elimination of the Arabic language from the southern Sudan. Some southern intellectuals have been critical of the colonial Southern Policy. For example, the southern Sudanese writer and statesman Abel Alier strongly argues that the prohibition of the Arabic language by the colonial Southern Policy made, among other things, the whole policy look ridiculous. Alier explains:

It is in the interest of anyone (and the southerner is no exception) to know as many foreign languages as he is able to learn. The prohibition of the Arabic in the southern Sudan was not in any conceivable manner in the interest of the people, whether they were ultimately to be independent, or to throw their lot with the north or East Africa. (Alier 1973: 15)

Another criticism of the separatist Southern Policy was provided by the Graduates’ Congress which was founded in 1938 in the north of the Sudan. In a note on education submitted to the British government in 1939, the Graduates’ Congress expressed its strong opposition to the educational policy in the south and demanded the unification of the educational system in the whole country, and the removal of restrictions on northern merchants (for the full text of the memorandum see Beshir 1969: 237–253). These developments made the British government rethink its separatist policy. Nyombe (1997: 106) argues that when Britain changed the Southern Policy it was acting in its best interest. Britain was bargaining for a more lucrative strategic international position to retain control over the Suez Canal, hence had to gain the support of the northern and Egyptian nationalists. Another factor that caused the British to change their policy was that Arab nationalism in the Middle East was at its extreme. For all these factors and developments, the colonial policy was to change radically in 1946 (Albino 1970: 23). Now the new British policy was to treat the south and the north as one country (Nyombe 1997: 106). In a letter addressed to Governors of southern Provinces and Directors of Departments (Civil Secretary’s Office, Circular Letter No. CS/SCR/LCI. – 16.12.1946; for the full text of the memorandum see Beshir 1968: 119–121; Abdel–Rahim 1969: 253–256; Said
1965: 162–165; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 29–32), Mr Robertson, the Civil Secretary announced the official end of the Southern Policy:

The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle–eastern and arabicised Northern Sudan; and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be required to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.

In 1949, the Legislative Assembly, which was made up only of northerners, passed a resolution that made Arabic the official language of the whole country (Nyombe 1997: 107). The English language was replaced by Arabic in many official domains in the south. A number of anxious northern officials in Juba established evening classes for the Arabic language, though Arabic was introduced in intermediate schools (Albino 1970: 78). The ending of the Closed District Act in 1946 witnessed a huge migration of northern traders into the south, and mosques and Quranic schools were hastily established (Nyombe 1997: 107). This is considered the most important period of interaction and contact between the southern and northern cultures, languages and religions. Nyombe (ibid.: 107) points out that ‘after so many years of isolation and oversentimentalisation of their historical past by both parties, the initial contacts were bound to be far from spontaneous and easy’. The change of the language policy from English to Arabic in the south did not go without resistance and resentment in that region. The results of the change in language policy were twofold: first, two patterns of education were created, one in the north and the other in the south. For the south, the first two years of elementary education were to be conducted in the vernacular as a means of instruction. English replaced the vernacular as a means of instruction from elementary three, with Arabic introduced as a subject. In the north, on the other hand, Arabic was used as a means of instruction from the first year of elementary education onward. These two tiers of education ‘added to further strain on relations between the two parts of the country’ (Nyombe 1997: 107). The second result of the shift in language policy is that many southern intellectuals who could only function in English became economically and socially disadvantaged because of the shift to Arabic. Despite the southern
objections, the British government continued its plan ‘for joint independence for the two halves of the country, regions it had taken great pain to keep apart for nearly half a century’ (Nyombe 1997: 108).

4.2 The post colonial period
Upon the adjournment of the Juba conference which was held in 1947 to decide the fate of the southern Sudan, a joined Legislative Assembly Ordinance representing the whole Sudan was drafted in 1948, and the Assembly was officially opened on the 15 December of the same year. The laws and resolutions of the Legislative Assembly were subject to the Governor General’s approval (Albino 1970: 26). Some assurances were sent to the southerners that their rights were still under the protection of the British government. The life span of this legislative body was from 1948 to 1953. The years 1948 to 1950 marked an instant change in the educational policy of the southern Sudan (ibid.: 28). For instance, financial assistance to Christian schools was raised, and in 1948 the first secondary school was opened at Atar (in the Upper Nile), and then transferred to Rumbek (in Bahr al–Ghazal). The tradition of sending students to Makerere College for higher education was abandoned and Gordon College in Khartoum (now University of Khartoum) was used instead. But the most crucial change was the introduction of Arabic in 1950 as an academic subject in all schools above the primary level, with the ultimate goal of making it the means of instruction. This was accomplished in 1957, when all Christian schools in the south came under the control of the central government, and all private schools were prohibited (though they were still operating in the north). It was remarkable that the number of southerners in the Legislative Assembly was very low (thirteen southerners out of ninety-five members). Decisions in the Assembly were carried out by simple majority. Southern politicians requested to be allowed to run their own affairs, and by 1950 they were firm on their demand for federal status within a united Sudan (Albino 1970: 31). To avoid southern opposition to independence from Britain, northern politicians promised their southern counterparts that their demand for a federal system of government would be paid serious consideration (Deng and Khalil 2004: 2). As it became clear in the beginning of 1958 before the general elections for Parliament (the Constituent Assembly), the
southerners were positive about the kind of federalism they were seeking. In fact, a member of the Liberal Party Parliamentary Group, Mr. Ezbon Mondiri, not only described what kind of federalist system was demanded by the southerners, but also drafted a constitution on U.S.A lines for presentation to the Parliament. Mr. Mondiri was imprisoned for seven years for his determined pursuance of the southern demands (Albino 1970: 4). Federalism meant to the uneducated southerners protection against the domination of Arab northerners. Segal notes:

The demand for ‘federation’ had, however, spread widely, beyond the small educated elite to the Chiefs, village headmen and their followers, since it reflected the general Southern – and Black African – fear of Arab Northern domination. (Segal 1961: 448)

On 26 March 1951, a Constitution Commission was selected to advise the Governor–General on steps to be taken for granting the south self–government. The representative of the south in the Commission, Mr. Buth Dui, demanded a federal constitution, but his proposal was rejected by the northern members of the Commission. He walked out of the meeting, and finally withdrew from the Commission as a result of the uncompromising stance of the northerners (Albino 1970: 30). It was this breach of the promise to consider the southerners’ demand for a federal rule that deeply ‘aggravated southern fears and mistrust’ (Deng and Khalil 2004: 2). Thus, northerners and some British officials were left to determine the fate of the south within the context of a united Sudan. The southern struggle continued during and after the fall of the military regime of Aboud (1958–1964). The caretaker government, which was described as ‘the people’s government’, under the leadership of the Prime Minister Sir el Khatim el Khalifa openly acknowledged that the problem of the southern Sudan is cultural as well as political. In his opening address to the Round Table Conference on 16 March 1965 (for the full text of the speech see Beshir 1968: 167–173; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 39–47), which was intended to discuss the southern problem, Mr. Khalifa said:

The Government is determined to admit with courage and full understanding the failures of the past and face up to its difficulties. It also recognises fully the ethical and cultural difference between North and South which have been brought about largely through geographical and historical factors.

The Round Table Conference provided a healthy forum to discuss the southern problem, a situation for which southerners were grateful (Albino 1970: 50). The
common theme of proposals made by northern parties was that ‘the system of government shall be based on principles that guarantee the continued existence of the Sudan as one sovereign entity’ (for the full text of the scheme of proposals made by the northern political parties see Beshir 1968: 174–178). The stance of the southern parties that participated in the conference was that ‘the people of the Southern Sudan must decide their future’ (for the full text of the scheme of proposals and views made by southern political parties see Beshir 1968: 179–182; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 48–52). More significantly, the southern delegates proposed a plebiscite in the southern Sudan to give the southerners the right to choose one of the following three options:

1. Federation;
2. Unity with the north;
3. Separation (to become an independent state).

Northern political parties strongly rejected the southern proposal for establishing a federal system of government in the Sudan: ‘There is no place in the Sudan for a federal system of Government’ (for full text of the scheme of proposals made by northern political parties see Beshir 1968: 174–178). Some of the distinguished southern politicians emphasised the linguistic and cultural differences between the north and the south to argue the case for self–determination at the Round Table Conference. For instance, Mr. Aggrey Jaden, the President of the Sudan African National Union (SANO) expressed this point in bald terms (cited in Shepherd 1966: 195):

> The Sudan falls sharply into two distinct areas, both in geographical area, ethnic group, and cultural systems. The northern Sudan is occupied by a hybrid Arab race who are united by their common language, common culture, and common religion; and they look to the Arab world for their cultural and political inspiration. The people of the southern Sudan, on the other hand, belong to the African ethnic group of East Africa. They do not only differ from the hybrid Arab race in origin, arrangement and basic systems, but in all conceivable purposes … There is nothing in common between the various sections of the community; no body of shared beliefs, no identity of interests, no local signs of unity and above all, the Sudan has failed to compose a single community.

Although the Round Table Conference did not achieve any conclusive results, it did adopt some resolutions (the resolutions of the conference are fully reproduced in Beshir 1968: 183–185). The resolutions included ‘Southernisation’ of the public
services, freedom of religion, freedom to open private schools, the appointment of head teachers whether southerners or northerners, and the establishment of a university in the southern Sudan. A twelve–man committee was set up to carry on the work of the conference with special focus on the possible constitutional solutions, and to look after the implementation of the resolutions. But the committee never worked satisfactorily and none of the resolutions was implemented (Albino 1970: 58).

The situation in the southern Sudan continued to escalate from bad to worse politically, especially after the defeat of the southern self–assertion. What started as a rebellion in 1955 developed into a fully–fledged war of liberation and continued for 17 years to come (Nyombe 1997: 108). The new power holders exerted planned efforts to bring the south into the mainstream of ‘Sudanese way of life’ (ibid.): a Sudan with one language, one religion, and one culture. This view was enforced by the Islamic Constitution that was drafted by a Constitution Committee in December 1956. This Constitution was approved later by the Parliament ignoring the demands of the southern members of the Committee for a federal constitution (Albino 1970: 41). The explanation provided by the government of the time (1956–1957) was that federation could not work in the Sudan (ibid.). Upon this rejection, southern representatives withdrew from the General Assembly. Hence, the northerners were left to draft their one–sided unitary constitution in which Islam was declared the religion of the state and Arabic the national language (Oduho and Deng 1963: 35). Oduho and Deng describe the language situation in the southern schools as a result of these political events in the following terms:

Since independence the introduction and compulsory use in the south of the Arabic language as the medium of education has wiped out the solid foundations of the educational system laid down by British administration, thus Southern elite is now considered ‘illiterate’ by Sudanese standards, and one of the main difficulties confronting Southerners in finding jobs is a lack of how to read and write Arabic. (Oduho and Deng 1963: 47)

The preoccupying concern of northerners at independence was to rectify the divisive effects of the separatist policies of the British rule. To achieve this purpose, the Government selected the path of the forced assimilation of the south through Arabicisation and Islamisation. Southerners viewed these policies as an attempt by
northerners to replace the British colonisation with Arab hegemony (Deng 1995: 12). The education system was nationalised in 1956, and the missionary societies were expelled in 1964. Therefore, the term nationalisation signified to the southerners the confiscation of Christian schools in the south by the Government to spread Islam. This sense of the term ‘nationalisation’ as it was experienced by southern politicians and scholars is not entirely without justification. Addressing the second sitting of the first session of Parliament in 1958 (cited in Albino 1970: 98), Mr. Ali Abdul Rahman, the then Minister of Interior in an Umma–PDP (People’s Democratic Party) coalition stated: ‘It is my government’s concern to support religious education, and that is clearly shown by the progress by the Religious Affairs Department and the development of Ma’hads [Islamic Schools] under its aegis’. Deng and Khalil (2004: 2) point out that the determination of successive northern governments to promote national unity and integration in the south by recourse to state–sponsored measures of Arabicisation and Islamisation aroused fear of religious and cultural assimilation. Again this fear is not without basis since it is quite easy to provide them with proof in the form of concrete documentary evidence. For instance, in 1957 the Minister of Education made an official statement in the Parliament on the new educational policy for schools. Although the Minister assured the southerners that religious education, local needs, and freedom of faith would be provided and protected (for full text of the speech and the debates that followed it see Said 1965: 190–198), the following aim of his new policy justifies the southerners’ fear of assimilation:

One major advantage is that the new policy enables the Ministry to develop and expand the Southern system of education according to one co–ordinated plan for the whole country. It also enables the Ministry to step up the assimilation of the Southern educational system to its Northern counterpart so that a single unified and national system of education is established throughout the country … A major objective is to iron out all the big differences in the existing system of education in the Southern Provinces, weld it into one coherent set–up and assimilate it to its Northern counterpart so that there may be one unified system of education for the whole Sudan. Consequently, the policy of Sudanisation in the south meant in practical terms nearly denying the southerners education, since Islamic educational institutions were set up without taking the needs of the local people into account. For example, the Ma’had (Islamic school) established in Yei (Equatoria Province) was of no practical value to the local population of the area since all the pupils in it were Christians (Albino
1970: 98). For the southerner, the government would spread education in the south provided that they submitted to Arabisation and Islam, and gave political support to the government. Alier condemns this policy since it would have disastrous implications on local languages:

Post–independent development of languages and cultures in the South has been stopped. Not only that, these languages have been abolished in schools and replaced by Arabic, English and French. Teachers who could only teach in Southern languages lost their jobs if they did not pass a course in Arabic. (Alier 1973: 16)

Mazrui (1971) makes much the same point when he notes that since independence there has been a more concerted effort by northern governments to grant Arabic a new status in the south. Northern teachers, an increased promotion of the teaching of Arabic, and a new Arabic curriculum are all major aspects of the entire Arabisation policy pursued in the southern Sudan since independence. The position of the northern Sudanese politicians was that the Christian missionaries were the tools for implementing the colonialist policy of divide and rule. Southern scholars such as Nyombe disagree that the inequality between the north and the south is entirely a product of the British policy of divide and rule. Nyombe maintains that although it is true that the British language (educational) policy in the south resulted in overt class differences, marked by socioeconomic disparity and political inequality between the two parts of the country, all northern governments went out of their way to exacerbate them instead of eradicating the perceived injustices after independence.

The new language policy of the 1950s was made to introduce Arabic as a subject immediately in all southern schools. This new policy has led to the emergence of two patterns of education that would be run side by side in the south for two decades to come (Abu Bakr 1975: 13). The two patterns are: 1) the local pattern of the south in which local languages were used as means of instruction in the first two years with English as a subject in the same level and as means of instruction from the third year, together with Arabic as a subject throughout all levels, and 2) the national pattern or system in which Arabic was used as the means of instruction from the first year with English as a subject from the fifth year (ibid.). Some commentators such as Nyombe argue that ‘these were not bad objectives in themselves, but immoderate northern zeal to convert southerners into Moslems and Arabic language speakers in the shortest time possible often drifted into extreme and intolerant policies’ (Nyombe
1997: 109). Oduho and Deng charge that ‘the efforts made and the money spent for the Islamisation of the south is perhaps the most preoccupying concern of the Sudanese Arabs both as Government and individuals’ (Oduho and Deng 1963: 54).

To recap, the language situation in the southern Sudan changed immediately after independence. The national government confiscated all missionary–run educational institutions including schools, nurseries, kindergartens, and maternity hospitals. Nyombe describes the social effects of the new language policy in Sudan:

From 1985 to the present, the Sudan has become a de facto theocratic state, run by religious zealots. Knowledge of the Arabic language is now mandatory in the Sudan. Islam is being imposed on non–Muslims. All education in the country, including university education, has been changed to Arabic–medium without ample preparation. University professors who have no workable knowledge of the Arabic language are being forced to either retire or undergo further tutoring in the Arabic language. It goes without saying that the people affected by this come mostly from the non–Arab parts of the country, especially the southern Sudan. (Nyombe 1997: 109–110)

The northern Sudanese scholar Said (1965: 151) strongly rejects the accusation that the north has always wanted to dominate the south: ‘The north is ready and determined to extend all help it can afford to its fellow citizens in the south. Nobody wishes to dominate southerners; nobody could even if they wanted to’. Nyombe argues that the adoption of the monolingual and monocultural system of education in support of one nationality to the exclusion of all others is to motivate social and political upheaval. Nyombe (1997:111) points out that ‘assimilating the educational system to its counterpart in the north in reality meant assimilating it to an Arab–Islamic way of life’. One way to achieve this assimilatory project of Sudanisation was by discouraging the use of local languages by non–Arab peoples of the Sudan. Another mechanism of implementation of this policy was to run the mass media such as radio, the press, and television exclusively in the Arabic language. During Ibrahim Aboud’s military regime (1958–1964), and other subsequent northern governments especially from the period of 1958 to 1969, there was a definite policy to Arabise the south (ibid.: 112). The strategies of Arabicisation and Islamisation were deployed more vigorously to achieve this goal (Deng 1995: 12). For the south, military regimes meant the silencing of any demands for federation (Albino 1970: 44). A recurring theme in Nyombe (1997) is that the introduction and enforcement of
Arabic as a national language in the south of Sudan had far-reaching educational, political and socioeconomic effects. This view reflects a wide consensus, at least among southerners. Many southern teachers in the village schools were made redundant because the local languages that had been once emphasised under the British colonial policy had lost their significance in the new linguistic order. The same paralysis extended to cover English-educated southern elites who lost their jobs, since they lacked the required functional literacy in the newly imposed Arabic language (Nyombe 1997: 114).

The implementation of the Arabicisation policy in the southern Sudan came into force on the eve of Independence. Addressing the National Assembly in 1953, the first Minister of Education made the following declaration (cited in Nyombe 1997: 112):

> As the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions, it is of great importance that there should be one language which is understood by all its citizens. That language could only be Arabic and Arabic must therefore be taught in all schools.

In this context, Nyombe argues that while the colonial Southern Policy from 1930 to 1945 could be viewed as ‘de-Arabisation’ of the people of the southern Sudan, the new postcolonial policy could be construed as ‘recolonisation’ of the south by the north. Nyombe states that closing down the publishing houses in the south marked the end of producing materials for educational or literary purposes. Indigenous languages were completely discarded in the educational system, and the Arabic language was now to be taught in all schools including rural ones. Some attempt was made to change the writing system of vernaculars by rewriting them in Arabic instead of the Roman script. The languages selected to undergo this process were Bari, Dinka, Lotuho, Zande, Nuer and Shilluk. This language project was not achieved for a number of technical and social problems. On the social and cultural implications of the use of Arabic script to write a local language, Oduho and Deng had the following to say on the conflict over the written symbol in the south:

> The insistence by the Sudan Government on Arabic and Arabic characters has gone to the extent of bringing pressure to bear on Christian churches not to impart Christianity in writing except in Arabic letters. In 1960 a Christian centre was closed down and the instructor imprisoned because a blackboard with Roman characters (numbers) was
found in the chapel by the District Commissioner of Yei. (Oduho and Deng 1963: 48)

Bell and Haashim (2006: 4) reiterate the same theme when they said that ‘each script has its own rationale. The Arabic script is associated with a belief in its role for national unity’. And this conviction has led some scholars such as the Egyptian language expert Khalil Asakir and the northern Sudanese scholar Yusuf Abu Bakr to develop educational materials in the Arabic script for the southern Sudan languages. Their goal was to ‘provide a bridge into Arabic as the principal language of the independent Sudan’ (ibid.). In his report of 1953 on the teaching of Arabic in the south, Abd Allah Al–Tayyib, the Professor of the Arabic language at the University of Khartoum, suggested a programme to help southern students to have their Sudan School Certificate examinations in Arabic in 1973 (Abu Bakr 1975: 14). Since 1966 no local language was used as a medium of instruction for education in government schools. Christianity began to be taught in the Arabic language in all southern schools that were run on the national pattern from 1970. In 1971, all southern students in junior secondary schools in the Upper Nile Province had their final examinations in Arabic to enter Malakal Senior Secondary School (national pattern – Arabic). The Senior Secondary School of Malakal began to award the Sudan School Certificate for entrance into university education in Arabic studies for the first time (ibid.). In May 1972, all southern students sat their final examination in Arabic in the final year of primary education (class six) competing with their northern counterparts. The desire to implement the Arabicisation policy has reached its extreme with the current Islamic military regime (1989 – present) who signed the peace agreement with SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, the major southern opposition). A blueprint of the National Islamic Front’s (NIF) vision of the Sudan called the ‘National Charter for Political Action’ (cited in Nyombe 1997: 115) declares that:

The adoption of Islamic Sharia and the federal system within the framework of comprehensive national unity is a further enrichment of our national experience pioneered by the nation’s loyal sons who steadfastly sacrifice their souls for the sake of its protection throughout the decades.

It should be noted that the difference between the NIF and the previous governments is the focus of the former on the element of religion. While previous ruling northern governments have used language overtly and religion covertly as means of
implementing the project of Arab nationalism in the Sudan, the NIF has openly declared Islam as a means of national unity (Nyombe 1997: 115). In other words, the NIF, which adopts an Islamist discourse, views Arabic as a means to Islam, whereas the majority of other northern parties, which adopt a nationalist discourse, look at Arabic as an end in itself (Miller 2003a: 152–153). The unilateral imposition of postcolonial policies by the north led to the unfortunate war that broke between the south and north in 1955, and which was to last until 1969. The war ended in March 1972 following the Addis Ababa Agreement between Nimeiri’s military regime and Anya–Nya Two, the major southern Opposition at the time (for the full text of the Addis Ababa Agreement see Beshir 1975: 158–177). Some scholars strongly argue that the ‘conflicting views on the respective roles of Arabic, English and the vernacular languages were an element in the 17-year struggle which ended in the accord of Addis Ababa’ (Hurreiz and Bell 1975a: 1). This war changed the southern educational theatre and the institutions massively. During the course of the fight, the northern army destroyed the schools, libraries, and churches. Southern educated intellectuals were pursued for elimination, since they were seen as the most antagonistic to the spread of Arabism and Islam in the south of Sudan (Nyombe 1997: 116). A significant number of southerners were made to leave the country. While abroad, southerners reorganised into an army of freedom fighters known as Anya–Nya. Far from the control of the central government, the Anya–Nya established its schools in the southern areas that came under their control. These schools were run according to the old pattern of education: vernacular as medium in the first and second year of primary education with English as a subject in these two years, and as a medium of instruction from the third year onward (Abu Bakr 1975: 14). It should be mentioned that this war stopped the spread of the Arabic language and Islam in the south because life and education were frequently disrupted. In fact, during times of war southerners had the chance to communicate in their own local languages. Children also had the opportunity to be taught in the local language. Hence, southerners have resisted assimilation by adopting strategies ranging from direct war to the use of ‘avoidance tactics’ (Nyombe 1997: 121).
The first Regional Assembly passed a bill in 1974 that reversed the language situation in the south, returning it to the 1928 British colonial position (Nyombe 1997: 116). An educational conference was organised. At the meeting, the Regional Minister of Education advised the conference to tackle the language situation in the south from the educational point of view and not to be influenced by old attitudes towards the Arabic language (ibid.). A regional institute was established to train vernacular instructors and to prepare educational language and literacy materials for schools. Languages were chosen and grouped into two categories: A and B. The languages included in category A were: Bari, Dinka, Kresh, Lotuho, Moru, Ndogo, and Nuer. Those selected for category B were: Anuak, Baka, Banda, Didinga, Forge, Jur–Luo, Kaliko, Shilluk, Zande, Mundari, Murle, Toposa, Acholi, Jur–beli, Kakwa, and Mad. The languages in the first category were to be used as means of instruction in primary schools (grades 1–3), whereas those in the second category were targeted for literacy purposes. It is worth mentioning that this categorisation of languages is not fixed in the sense that functions can be shifted from group A to B and vice versa when the need emerges. Some scholars believe that if the 23 selected languages were employed for writing and reading, it would be at least possible that every southern child could have access to education through a familiar language (ibid.: 117). In the rural educational schools, the vernacular is the means of instruction from primary 1–3, while English and Arabic are taught as subjects. In Primary 4–6, Arabic becomes the medium of instruction. English is taught as a subject, and the vernacular is dropped. The same policy applies to Junior 1–3. In the secondary school, English becomes the medium of instruction while Arabic is taught as a subject. The educational situation in urban schools is the same as that of the rural schools, except that the vernacular is not taught in urban schools (ibid.).

The reintegration of vernacular languages into the southern educational system caused what Nyombe (1997: 118) described as a ‘constitutional controversy’ between the regional government in Juba and the central government as a result of the different interpretations of some articles in the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan National Constitution. Neither the Addis Ababa agreement nor the southern Regional Self–Government Act of 1972 contained items on language–in–education
policy (Abu Bakr 1975: 13; Nyombe 1997: 118). Nevertheless, there are some general points on educational planning and on language in administration. The Regional Self–Government Act, Chapter 2, Section 5 stipulates that:

Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan and English the principal language for the Southern Sudan, without prejudice to the use of any language or languages which may serve the practical necessity for the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative functions of the region.

This stipulation is contradicted by Chapter 2, Section 6 of the same accord, which goes on to stipulate that ‘neither the People’s Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of national nature which are … [including among others] Educational Planning’. Another observation is that other parts of the same agreement confuse the previous contradictory sections. Chapter 5 gives the Regional Assembly and the executive apparatus of the regional government of the southern Sudan the right to legislate on matters of education (Nyombe 1997: 119). Chapter 4 on the Legislature stipulates that:

The People’s Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security … and in particular in the following: [among others] … Establishment, maintenance and administration of the public schools at all levels in accordance with national plans for education and economic and social development, promotion of local languages and cultures.

The Constitution of the Sudan of 1973, on the other hand, stated that Arabic is the official language of the country (Nyombe 1997: 119). Thus, there is a clear contradiction between the Constitution, which does not mention English, and the southern Regional Self–Government Act. There was an attempt to amend this constitutional article during the debate in the People’s Assembly by including the preservation of local languages, but it did not succeed (Abu Bakr 1975: 15). English is considered the principal language of the southern Sudan as sanctioned by the Addis Ababa Agreement and some parts of the Regional Self–Government Act of 1972. But the introduction of English as a means of instruction in the southern schools would be a violation of Chapter 2 of the Regional Self–Government Act of 1972, which granted the jurisdiction of the central government the right to legislate on matters of educational planning (Nyombe 1997: 119). The central government did not discuss this contradiction because ‘the transitional period through which the
south is passing might have necessitated this solution’ (Abu Bakr 1975: 16). Therefore, this educational policy represented the view of the central government, since language planning was not the responsibility of the southern Regional Self-Government. Apart from the above contradictions and confusion, the new educational language policy in the southern Sudan reconsidered local languages as media for teaching, and allowed English and Arabic to be used in some situations.

Hurreiz and Bell (1975a: 1) charge that ‘there have been only limited attempts to define the role of vernacular languages in the life of the nation’. The question of identity also drove the southerners to oppose the imposition of Arabic as the national language of the country. The fear was caused by the fact that Arabic is not a widely used language in south of the Sudan. If southerners were to be made to speak only Arabic, they would be alienated from the rest of the Africans, and would instead identify themselves further with the Arab world. These fears were confirmed later by the national government’s over-identification with Arab nationalism, and particularly its preoccupation with the imposition of Islamic Sharia on the whole country. In 1985 President Jaffar Nimeiri (leader of a military regime, 1969–1985) proclaimed the Sudan to be an Islamic state run by Islamic Sharia (Nyombe 1997: 120). In earlier years, observers had applauded the regime of Nimeiri for bringing an end to the long southern armed struggle through the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 (see above). Peace and order were restored in the whole Sudan, and an elected autonomous administration was established in the city of Juba. Some years later, President Nimeiri completely changed his ideology from secularism to sectarianism, and assumed the role of an Islamic head of state. As an implication of this dramatic shift in his state policy, the South was rendered incompatible with his new ideology. So Nimeiri started to curtail the authority of the southern Regional government by dividing it into regions with fewer powers than those enjoyed under the peace accord. As a result, Nimeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa peace agreement, triggering the formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (the SPLM/A, this is the movement which later signed the Naivasha peace agreement with the current Islamic ruling regime). The declared objective of the SPLM/A was the creation of a new, democratic, secular and pluralistic Sudan (Deng 1995: 13). The tension reached its
extreme when in 1983 Nimeiri implemented what came to be known as the ‘September Laws’, which was ‘a programme aimed at Islamising the legal system’ (Deng and Khalil 2004: 3). The implementation of this Sharia-based law led southerners to believe that peaceful coexistence was no longer possible. President Nimeiri was accused by opposition parties of exacerbating the south-north problem and extending the civil war. Abbas (1991) points out that the NIF (now NCP) allied itself to the military regime of Nimeiri from 1978 to 1985 in order to get control over two important areas: economy and education. Nimeiri’s decision to Islamise the economy granted the NIF an unprecedented opportunity to control the Sudan economically through the new Islamic banking system. The NIF then manipulated its economic power to infiltrate all the networks of elites through the use of patronage. In education, Nimeiri’s military rule granted the NIF a free hand in higher education in return for the NIF’s pledge to maintain control in universities. Consequently, the voice of the members and supporters of opposition parties was silenced not only by the regime’s security apparatus but also by the violent tactics employed by the NIF supporters. Thus the NIF exercised a complete monopoly over political activity in the educational institutions, whereas opposition parties had to operate secretly. The NIF’s obsessive preoccupation with the student movement stems from two factors: first from the elitist nature of its political philosophy; and secondly from its failure to dominate trade unions and professional associations that are entirely opposed to its policies. By now non–Arabic speaking groups in other areas of the northern parts including the Darfurian region became partially aware of their linguistic rights (Miller 2006: 1). Not only did the language awareness spread, but also the culture of federalism became fashionable especially among northern political parties which previously resisted it (Miller 2003a: 163).

A public uprising led to the fall of Nimeiri’s military regime, and marked the beginning of a new democratic era. According to Deng and Khalil (2004: 3), when the Umma Party and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which are both northern political parties, came to office as a result of the general elections of 1985–1986, they did not take any meaningful measures towards the resolution of the south–north conflict, partly because they feared the rising power of radical Islamist movements.
such as the NIF (now NCP: National Congress Party, the current ruling partner). However, a sizeable number of politicians, trade unions, and professional associations started to speak openly in support of the southern cause. A few weeks before the end of democratic life, more than fifty organisations, including all political parties except the National Islamic Front (NIF), signed a national programme calling for the government to enter into a peace agreement with the SPLM/A. The poor administration of the government speeded up the end of the democratic era when Brigadier Omar al Bashir seized power on 30 June 1989 by a military coup d’état on behalf of the National Islamic Front (NIF). It is generally argued that the NIF’s military coup was timed to prevent the implementation of that national programme, and went on to declare the whole Sudan an Islamic state (ibid.: 3). At the end of 1989, some presidential decrees were issued concerning the policy of the regime on higher education. One was about the establishment of five new public and private universities. The second stated that Arabic should be the main and only medium of instruction at the higher education level. The question of using the Arabic language as a means of teaching in university education has long been considered by the older universities (with the obvious exception of the Islamic University of Omdurman, which has used Arabic since its establishment). The policy of Arabicisation stirred much debate over its moral principles, the timing, and the preparations required. The NIF–controlled regime held a conference in September 1990 to discuss the problems of general education; however, university education was the focal point of its deliberations. Abbas criticises this educational conference on the grounds that its hidden agenda was to Islamise the general and higher education in the Sudan:

There is no emphasis in NIF discourse on the pedagogical arguments which the advocates of Arabicisation usually advance – e.g., that students learn better in their own language. There is also very little emphasis on the need to improve standards or on the educational and pedagogical problems involved. The stress is rather on the need to root education in the ‘culture’ and ‘traditions’ of Sudan – as interpreted by the NIF. (Abbas 1991: 25)

On the other side, the war in the southern Sudan continued leading to more destruction, misery, and chaos. The resources of the country were being severely depleted; a generation of children went without education or care. Around two million persons died on the battlefield or as a result of war–related causes or famine, and a great many were displaced to the northern towns and to other countries. Even
the north has suffered from the way in which the country has been run. By now the struggle for a new Sudan has acquired its own momentum in other areas of the country. The concept of ‘New Sudan’ offers a counterforce to the concept of Arab–Islamic hegemony pursued by General Bashir’s government and its fundamentalist supporters (Abbas 1991: 14).

Under the influence of African and international pressure, two rounds of peace negotiations (Abuja 1 and Abuja 2) were held in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in June 1992, and April–May 1993. The peace negotiations broke down over, among other things, the issue of the southern demand for a federal system. The SPLM/A (representing the south) was adamant in its demand for confederation, which the government of Sudan rejected outright. In September 1993, the Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (henceforth IGAD) undertook the task of mediating between the two parties. After consultations with the two sides of the conflict, IGAD suggested a proposal that came to be known as the ‘Declaration of Principles’ (henceforth DOP) (see also Deng and Khalil 2004: 4). The DOP of the IGAD achieved little success despite the fact that both parties agreed to accept it as a basis for negotiations. The failure of DOP to achieve any real progress was due partly to the uncompromising position of the two parties at the negotiating table, and partly to the lack of clarity in non–IGAD documents, such as the 1994 Asmara Declaration of the National Democratic Alliance (henceforth NDA). The IGAD initiative excluded all the NDA member parties other than SPLM/A in the peace negotiations (ibid.: 5). Peace talks between the two parties were resumed through the IGAD initiative under the pressure of the international community, especially of the USA. The peace process began to achieve some progress and led to the Machakos negotiations, which in turn led to the signing of the Machakos Protocol on 20 July 2002 (ibid.). This protocol confirmed the status of the Sudan as a united state, but granted the south the right to self–determination after a six–year Interim period. All the northern political parties now were convinced that the south should be given the right to determine its fate through a referendum, with variation on the length of the Interim period. The Machakos Protocol provided six years for such a decisive referendum to be held in the southern Sudan. Most importantly, Machakos provided
a framework for future meetings and negotiations. On the 26 May 2004 the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A signed key peace protocols in the Kenyan town of Naivasha. And on the 9 January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, bringing to an end the 20-year war between the two parts of the country.

The Protocol on Power Sharing contains an important section on language policy. The new language policy is considered a landmark in the history of the Sudan, since it provides the constitutional infrastructure for a multilingual language policy (see Abdelhay 2004, 2006; Miller 2006). In October 2005, a new national Interim Constitution was ratified, and a new government was sworn in (with the dominance of the NCP, the Islamic ruling partner). A new autonomous government was formed in the southern Sudan, and it has drafted and ratified its own constitution. More significantly, the southern Sudan Constitution contains a section on language (see Chapter 5). A referendum will be held in six years’ time to decide the status of the southern Sudan, either to be separate or to be part of a united Sudan. In language planning terms, the state government, especially the dominant NCP, is changing its political rhetoric, which previously glorified the monolingual policy of Arabicisation, to embrace instead, at least theoretically, a new political discourse. This shifting of positions can be attributed to, among other things, the external forces that have direct bearing on language issue. Miller writes:

In Sudan, the last decade has witnessed a progressive shift from a dominant state discourse and an active state policy supporting a pro–Arabicisation policy to a new emerging discourse supporting (at least theoretically) a multilingual policy. This shift occurs in a world–wide context where linguistic rights tend to be more and more considered as one of the basic universal human rights. It occurs also in an African Horn–regional context where new political powers (like in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea) tend to implement an ethno–regional linguistic policy, each region being associated with a dominant ethno–linguistic group. (Miller 2006: 2)

A summary of the developments of language policies and language planning during the colonial and postcolonial period is provided in a tabular form. Table 4.1 presents an overview of the language policies during the period from 1920 to 2004. The Table also contains an interpretation of the ideologies behind the language policies, subsequent results and other factors that have influenced the present linguistic
situation in Sudan (see Idris 2006: 1–2). Table 4.2 provides a chronological evolution of language policies in Sudan, including the different measures implemented by different political regimes (see El Rayah 1995: 4–7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Language policy</th>
<th>Results/Other factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956–1972</td>
<td>National unity by Arabisation and Islam.</td>
<td>Arabic was the only official language. Attempts to transcribe southern Sudanese languages into Arabic script.</td>
<td>Civil war in the south, Arabic and northern Sudanese political, cultural and economic domination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972–1989</td>
<td>Addis Ababa Peace accord: Recognition of the cultural and linguistic diversity of Sudan, but still no defined roles for the Sudanese languages (besides being part of cultural heritage and as MOI in primary school).</td>
<td>Arabic the only official language. English has a special status ‘as principal language’ in the south. Primary education in some southern Sudanese languages.</td>
<td>Civil war in the south and droughts in the 1980’s lead to mass migrations and urbanization, that resulted in increasing use of Arabic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989–2004</td>
<td>Promotion of Arabic and Islam. Arabisation of higher education. Anti–Western and nationalistic sentiments.</td>
<td>Arabic the only official language.</td>
<td>Continued civil war in the south and other regional armed conflicts resulted in migrations and urbanization, i.e., an increasing use of Arabic. Linguistic awareness awakened as a reaction against Arabisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004–</td>
<td>Peace agreement: Recognition of the cultural and linguistic diversity.</td>
<td>Arabic and English are official languages, and all other Sudanese languages are categorized as national languages.</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1. A Chronological Overview of Language Policies in Sudan 1920–2004
(Source: Idris 2006: 2)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Official language</th>
<th>Primary education</th>
<th>Intermediate education</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
<th>University education</th>
<th>Mass media</th>
<th>Other remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1821</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arabic only is used in Quranic schools (i.e., Islamic institutes) and official documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821-85: The Turkish Period</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885–98: The Mahdist Period</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A return to the old educational system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898–1928: The Anglo Egyptian Condominium</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Arabic (north)</td>
<td>Arabic (north)</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td>English and vernaculars to be encouraged in the south</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928–56: After Rejaf Language conference</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Arabic (north)</td>
<td>Arabic (north)</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td></td>
<td>English and vernaculars to be encouraged in South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956– After Independence</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>English all over the country except Islamic institutes</td>
<td>English except the Cairo University Khartoum Branch</td>
<td>Arabic, English and vernaculars in some Radio broadcasts)</td>
<td>Arabic is declared as an official language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 – After the October Revolution</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic except missionary schools (north)</td>
<td>English except the Omdurman Islamic University and the Cairo University</td>
<td>Arabic, English and vernaculars</td>
<td>Secondary education being Arabicised in the north</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–73: the New Education system</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Arabic, English and vernaculars</td>
<td>English taught starting from Standard VII instead of V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973–after the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Arabic, English and vernaculars</td>
<td>A recognition of the roles of Arabic-English and vernaculars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1990: The 1975 Constitution</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Arabic, English and vernaculars</td>
<td>Proceedings of the National Assembly to be conducted in Arabic...Any language other than Arabic maybe used with the permission of the Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-Higher Ed. Revolution, Intro. of Basic Schools System</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arabicicisation</td>
<td>Arabic, English and vernaculars</td>
<td>English taught starting from Standard V of Basic Level Schools instead of standard VII. But number of school years reduced from 12 to 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2. The Chronological Development of Language Policies (Source: El Rayah 1995: 4–7)
4.3 Arabicisation policy in the Sudan: Definitions

Having described the postcolonial policies, I will focus in the remaining part of this chapter on the policy of Arabicisation in the Sudan. Since the term ‘Arabicisation’ is the nub of the following discussion, it will be useful to specify a few definitions distinguishing the different kinds of meaning. There is a good cause justifying the dedication of a complete section to the exposition of the different implementations of this term. While the word ‘Arabicisation’ (or Arabisation) has extensive contemporary currency, it suffers from variable usage and conceptual ambiguity. The concept of ‘Arabicisation’ necessarily differs in individual instances, since it is interpreted in a variety of ways due in some cases to the ideological orientation of the user: nationalist, pluralist, Islamist, Marxist, melting pot adherent, etc. So wide is the variation that at times it seems difficult to discover the common denominator, which may be linguistic, racial, ideological or some combination of the three. Before proceeding, however, two points relating to the themes of this section should be clarified. The first of these concerns the relationship between the Arabic language and the question of national identity in the Sudan. As the discussion will show, the question of the status of the Arabic language is always associated with the debate over nationalism in the Sudan. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this section to provide a detailed critical review of the different types of nationalism in the Sudan. The second point that needs to be mentioned is that although the Arabic language constitutes the main topic of the section, I will be primarily concerned with its political and social status in the Sudan. A discussion of the grammatical system (in the full Chomskyan sense of the term grammar) of the Arabic language is immaterial here, though a casual reference will be made where appropriate. This section will be mainly restricted to the definition of the term ‘Arabicisation’, and the last two sections will examine its implementation in the north and the southern Sudan.

To begin with, the word ‘Arabicisation’ has several meanings. In one sense, the term is used to refer to the ‘process of racial, religious and cultural assimilation of indigenous ethnic groups of the northern Sudan, for example, the Nubians, Beja and other Negroid peoples by the Arabs’ (Yokwe 1984: 155). In this sociocultural sense, the process of Arabicisation led to the Islamisation and Arabicisation of the six
former northern provinces (Sudan is now divided into 25 states), leaving the south almost untouched by these influences (Abdel–Rahim 1971: 230). Similarly, Bell notes that anchoring Arabic to Islam led to linguistic hierarchisation in Sudan. The essence of Bell’s argument is contained in the following quotation:

From the point of view of Islam there was not then, nor will there ever be any justification for considering any other language equal to Arabic. Both because of its religious position and because of its utility as a lingua franca, Arabic can be described as nothing less than the primary language of Sudan. (Bell 1989: 192)

Miller (2003a: 164) points out that the language policies which reflect the ideological choices of the rulers have an extremely important symbolic effect. She explains that the southern Sudanese resisted the official Arabisation policy because it is a clear sign of northern political and cultural domination. Southern Sudanese see in the Arabisation policy the association between Arabic and Islam, and between Arabic culture and Arabic racial hegemony. A majority of researchers and politicians reject completely the Arabisation policy in its racial sense. Gray (1963: 1) argues that ‘often it is not colour or facial features which distinguish a Northerner from a Southerner, but speech, mannerisms and upbringing’. Antagonists of the racial and cultural policy of Arabisation claim that the Sudanese sociocultural system is the product of a mixture of multifarious ethnic groups. This line of thinking, referred to in the literature as a melting pot argument, holds that the contact between different ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups led to the production of a new Sudanese blood. Abdel–Rahim (1971: 237) joins this line of argument and states that ‘Arabism and Africanism have become so completely fused in the northern Sudan that it is impossible to distinguish between the two even from the most abstract point of view’. The melting pot argument opposes the organisation of distinctly ethnic political bodies and interest groups. Supporters of this line of thinking believe that the cultural and linguistic boundaries between disparate groups in the Sudan would eventually disappear. The adherents consider it a matter of time before southern Sudanese minorities – the cultural and linguistic groups which remain defiant to the assimilationist policies of the Khartoum–based elites – assimilate and become part of the larger Sudanese cultural totality. However, this argument was demolished by another referred to in the literature as the ‘cultural pluralism argument’, which holds that ‘Sudan is a patchwork of ethnic enclaves’ (AbdelSalam 1989: 34). Supporters of
this school of thought argue that the persistence and continuous resistance of linguistic minorities of the south have invalidated the melting pot theory. Wai (1979: 74) writes:

The southern Sudanese have no crisis of identity: they know they are African and feel so racially and culturally. They have no objection to the northern Sudanese identifying themselves as Arabs, but they resent being included in this category.

The argument here is that linguistic, cultural, and ethnic variations do exist in Sudan and can never be wiped out. Supporters of this argument including Sudanese communists, socialists and the SPLM/A consider Sudan to be ‘a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously but within a united Sudan in the enterprise of self–realisation through the perfection of men according to their own kind’ (AbdelSalam 1989: 34). Other progressive forces under the banner of the National Democratic Alliance endorsed the pluralist option to counteract the present Islamic regime (Miller 2003a: 1963). Marginalised and minority groups embrace this argument and see in it their liberation from the centrally based power of the elites. Adherents strongly argue that Sudanese society still retains ‘long–standing ethnic distinctions which are operative in the country’s social and political life, and which show every evidence of persisting’ (ibid.). The protection of local languages, promotion of bilingualism, and the various cultural and conventional practices are always the objective of any language planning based on this line of thinking. This point can be illustrated with reference to the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. Although the Addis Ababa agreement was not signed for the good of all Sudan, it could still be considered a voice against the assimilatory policies of power holders (Abdelhay 2004: 31). Mazrui (1973: 72) notes that ‘it becomes possible to envisage a situation when more and more Sudanese become linguistically and by claimed descent, Arab Sudanese’. Miller (2003a: 161) expresses the same point that local ruling elites in the Sudan elaborated and claimed Arab genealogies.

According to Deng (1995: 4), in the south, the remaining third of the Sudan in land and population, the African identity both in its racial and cultural composition has survived the onslaught of Arabism and Islam. Miller (2006: 8) argues that Islamisation in the Sudan was not the primary force behind the monolithic policy of Arabicisation, and that the two should not essentially be linked. She argues that
Arabicisation is a form of linguistic nationalism that emerged as a reaction to the colonial Southern Policy of divide and rule. Language conflicts in the Middle East, including Sudan, have little to do with Islam, and more with the emergence of nationalist movements such as Arab and Turkish ones (Miller 2003a: 152–153). It is remarkable that the controversy over Sudanese national identity stems partly from definitional problems, the resolution of which depends on providing an all–inclusive identification of the different peoples in the country. Stevenson defines (1971: 11) Sudan as a ‘crossroads of Africa’, since it is ‘rich in the variety of its peoples, languages and cultures’ which ‘are part of the total heritage, to be welcomed as contributing, each in its particular way, to the pattern of national life’. Another similar definition comes from Abdel–Rahim (1971: 228) who views Sudan with all its physical, cultural, and ethical diversity as ‘a microcosm of Africa’ because it constitutes ‘a unique meeting point of Arabism and Africanism’. Another similar view is held by Mazrui (1971: 251) who views Sudan as a place of ‘multiple marginality’. Mazrui employs the term ‘marginality’ with special sense to denote ‘specific traits in the Sudan which place it significantly in an intermediate category between two distinct sectors of Africa’. Mazrui notes that the ‘fascination about Sudan is that it signifies a borderline case between English–Speaking Africa and Arabic–speaking Africa, a rarer phenomenon than the Franco–Arabic duality’ (ibid.).

A second sense of Arabicisation is political. The concept of Arabicisation in this political sense refers to ‘a deliberate attempt by the northern politicians to identify and shape the future goal of the country toward Arab nationalism instead of African nationalism’ (Yokwe: 1984: 155). Champions of this line of thinking assume that ‘there is a core culture pattern in the Sudan, composed of essentially Islamic Afro–Arab values, life styles, and identifications, to which a great number of ethnic cultures except perhaps for the south – are in some way related’ (AbdelSalam 1989: 36).

Proponents of this line of thought, including the National Islamic Front (NIF), believe that Islam coupled with the Arabic language should be the unifying force of disparate ethnic groups. This way of representation considers that the southern Sudan
had been separated by force from the rest of the country by the colonial policy. Supporters of this school argue that ‘Arabicisation and Islamisation of the southern people would counteract the colonial policy and enhance national integration’ (Miller 2003a: 162). Viewed from this perspective, the conflict that emerged between the south and north is then attributed to the fact that the ‘Arab policy of political assimilation is clearly not aimed at a union between equals, but is calculated to nip African aspirations in the bud in order to upgrade Arab nationalism’ (Albino 1970: 6). Albino is not resistant to the idea of having an Arab nationalism in the Sudan. He argues that the two nationalisms could coexist, and the problem aroused when the state attempted to suppress the African nationalism in favour of the Arab one. Gray (1963: 1) confirms this point by pointing out that ‘the fact is that one group looks primarily towards the Arab Middle East and the other mainly towards Africa South of the Sahara’. Another criticism of the policy of Arabicisation is provided by Deng (1995: 3) who argues that Islam and the assimilationist Arab culture permitted the northern Sudanese to view their Arab–Islamic identity as superior, and accordingly they strongly resist any attempt by the non–Arab groups to identify the country with black Africa.

According to Yokwe (1984: 157), the existing language policy in the north of Sudan was decided on the basis of the policy of Arabicisation. That is, the promotion of ‘Arab nationalism’ as the future goal of the Sudan. Arab nationalism was being promoted and transformed into the national language policy by the government to the exclusion of the rest of the cultures and languages of local polities (ibid.). The insistence by the northerners on directing the whole country towards the Arab world could be clearly seen in the political speeches of many northern leaders. For example, Mr. Ali Abdel Rahman, then Minister of the Interior in a People’s Democratic Party (PDP) – Umma coalition, was reported to have said: ‘The Sudan is an integral part of the Arab world, and as such, must accept the leadership of the two Islamic leaders of the Sudan … Anybody dissenting from this view must quit the country’ (Parliamentary Proceedings: Second Sitting of the First Session of Parliament, 1958, P. 3, cited in Albino 1970: 6).
Nyombe (1997: 112) argues that Arab nationalism was endorsed and rendered into a national language policy, to such an extreme degree that the rest of the languages and cultures of the indigenous peoples were excluded. Nyombe (1997: 114) points out that it is this essential desire to build an Arab identity in the Sudan on the basis of religion and language that has cultivated hatred and tensions between the Arabic and non–Arabic speaking peoples. Miller (2006: 8) shares a similar view by stating that attempts to mobilise the Arabic language by politicians to achieve the nationalist project of Arab nationalism have unfairly disadvantaged other non–Arabic speaking groups.

A third conception of Arabicisation policy is concerned with ‘the linguistic role of the Arabic language as a means for achieving national integration and unity of the Sudanese people’ (Yokwe 1984: 156). This linguistic definition was thought to have provided the country with a stable and unifying national identity. It holds that ‘a person is an Arab if his mother tongue is Arabic’ (Mazrui 1973: 55). This linguistic definition depends not on biological integration but on cultural and linguistic assimilation. Proponents of this view believe that national integration and unity may easily be achieved by the adoption and enforcement of a single national language. It is the Arabic language that was assigned this nationalistic role in the Sudan (Yokwe 1984: 156). A significant number of northern scholars emphasise the linguistic definition of Arab. For example, Abdel–Rahim argues:

> Arabism is a cultural, linguistic and non–racial link that binds together numerous races: black, white, and brown. Had Arabism been anything else but this, most modern Arabs, whether Africans or Asian, including the entire population of the northern Sudan, would cease to be ‘Arab’ at all. And just as Arabism is a cultural and non–racial bond, Africanism also is a geographical, political and cultural, but a non–racial link which binds together the various peoples of Africa irrespective of differences of race, colour or language. Hence the close association between Arabism and Africanism not only within the bounds of Africa itself, but on inter–regional and international levels as well. (Abdel–Rahim 1971: 237)

Miller (2003a: 160) points out that ‘while linguistic diversity reminds us that Sudan is an African country, it shares with the Arab world the emotional investment towards the Arabic language’. She went on to point out that Islamist and nationalist discourses pursued the same monolithic policy of Arabicisation. Yet, there is a
difference of hierarchy between the Islamists and nationalists. For the former, Arabicisation is perceived as a means to reach Islamisation. For the latter (including Christians) Arabicisation is an end in itself. The French scholar reminds us that ‘we should not forget that in the Muslim world, some of the harshest linguistic policies towards minorities have been endorsed by secular states’ (Miller 2003a: 153). It is not only local languages that would be victimised to implement the Arabicisation policy, but also the colloquial varieties of the Arabic language. Both ideologies refuse to come to terms with the fact that the Arabic language is ‘not a fixed–given idiom, it is a human language on a par with other human languages’ (Abdelhay 2006: 1).

Southern politicians and scholars reject outright the linguistic concept of the policy of Arabicisation as a defining criterion for the identity of the whole Sudan. This does not necessarily mean that they are against the Arabic language, but rather they want ‘a language policy that is comprehensive enough to include the vernaculars in its structure and yet promote Arabic language as a national language’ (Yokwe 1984: 157). Yokwe (ibid.: 156) points out that the declaration of Arabic as the national language is ‘bound to affect the outlook of the self–identification of the Sudanese nation as a whole’. This is exactly the notion of the Arabicisation policy upon which language policy is based in the Sudan (ibid.). Hence, it is no accident that the national language policy of the Sudan ignores the local languages, particularly in the northern Sudan where Arabic is widely used as an official working language and as a lingua franca as well.

Yokwe argues that the tireless pursuance of the Arabicisation policy in this exclusionary sense by different northern governments forced the African tribes in the north to give up their African traditions, and to abandon the idea of promoting and preserving their local languages. Southern politicians such as Nyombe (1997: 115) reject the whole package of the Arabicisation policy whether in its linguistic or religious sense. The core of Nyombe’s argument is that language and religion were manipulated by northerners to claim a majority status. Accordingly, issues of religion
and languages will continue to dominate the Sudanese political arena so long as the north continues to conceptualise its identity in terms of language and religion.

**4.3.1 Arabicisation policy in the north**

According to Yokwe (1984: 157), the existing language policy in the north of Sudan was made on the basis of the policy of Arabicisation, that is, the promotion of ‘Arab nationalism’ as the future goal of the Sudan. At Independence, the question of national identity stirred much debate between two main trends. The debate, which is still very much with us today, was over the definition of the Sudan as either a Muslim–Arab or Afro–Arab country (Miller 2003a: 162). The northern political parties which dominated the political arena were of two types. The first type was created from religious groups such as Ansar and Khatmiyya. Whereas the second type is influenced by the pan–Arabist movement (some of the parties have some religious affiliation) such as Nasserist, Baathiste, and Muslim Brotherhood movements (these movements have a religious affiliation in addition to its pan–Arabist identity). For these political parties, the Sudan was indisputably an Arab and Muslim nation and the selection of Arabic as the official language was a rational choice. The post-Independence Sudanese government followed suit when it chose to implement the Arabicisation policy including the Arabicisation and Islamisation of the southern Sudan. This is evident from the fact that the 1956 National Constitution stipulated that Sudan is a united country (article 1), with Islam as the state religion (article 5), and Arabic as the official language (article 4). The Arabicisation policy was both linguistic in the sense that the speaking of Arabic by the whole population became imperative, and cultural in its orientation. The cultural and social practices of the central Sudan became the standard and dominant values that were to be spread throughout the whole country by the vehicles of education and urbanisation (Miller 2003a: 162). The Muslim Arab nationalists, rather than the Islamists, have dominated the Sudanese political arena from 1956 up to the present day, with the exception of some short intervals during which the defenders of cultural pluralism fought to get their voice heard at least in public debates. The cultural pluralism argument expressed itself in the revolutionary movement of 1964 up to the first earlier years of
Nimeiri’s military regime (1968–1972), and the last democratic period of 1985–1989 (ibid.: 163).

According to Miller (2003a: 163), non-Arabic minorities in the northern Sudan did not at first oppose the Arabicisation policies despite the fact that not a single vernacular language was officially recognised. The first claims made by the newly created regional groups such as the Beja Front or the Nuba Front in 1965 were more economic and socio-political, concentrating on better political representation and economic equity (ibid.). But since the mid-1980s, more and more cultural demands have appeared on the agenda of the northern regional groups. Today, the issue of cultural diversity within the whole country has become a focal point of debate. The northern regional groups have adopted more or less the ideological discourse of the SPLM/A. Now even major northern political parties have no choice but to embrace the same discourse:

Even the more religious formations like the Umma Party or the National Islamic Front (NIF) have had to recognise that the dream of a monocultural Sudan is totally inadequate. All the Sudanese Newspapers published daily papers, columns and letters discussing the issue of the Sudanese cultural diversity and many books, conferences, symposium have been dedicated to this issue. (Miller 2003a: 163)

From 1958 onward, the Arabic language has become the means of instruction from primary level right up to the secondary level of education in the north. The English language is taught as a subject from the intermediate level of schooling onward, and it has become the most common second language (ibid.). Attempts to Arabicise secondary education continued until 1965 when the first Conference of Secondary Schools Teachers was held (Mugadam 2002: 56). The conference made a decision that the Arabic language would be the medium of instruction in secondary schools from June 1965. To guarantee the immediate compliance of the Ministry of Education, the members of the conference demanded that their decisions be approved or they would not mark the Sudan School Certificate examinations. Although the Ministry of Education had grave concerns for the drawbacks an abrupt implementation of the policy might produce, it approved the decision of the conference. The government started implementing the policy without an ample
preparation of teachers or materials. After the Arabicisation of the secondary schools, prominent voices began demanding the implementation of the Arabicisation policy in the university education. In 1970, the Ministerial and Technical Committee of the University of Khartoum held a conference with the aim to discuss the problem of the Arabicisation at the university level (ibid.). After a discussion the conference was convinced that there was no logical ground for continuing to use English as a medium of instruction in the university. The conference made the following recommendations:

1. The Arabic language should be used as a means of instruction in the University, and that no other language is allowed to be used without a prior permission from the University Senate;
2. The University should work in collaboration with Arab universities to find effective solutions to the problems concerning textbooks, references and teacher training;
3. A living language should be introduced as a subject in order to help students with their research work;
4. Arabic should be the University official language, and that all communications, meetings of the University Senate and academic committees should be made in the Arabic language.

Although none of the above recommendations was implemented due to many causes including hesitation and delay, the language policy of Arabicisation was later reinforced by the permanent constitution of the Sudan of 1973. This constitution, referred to as ‘The southern Self–government Act, 1972’ or ‘Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972’, became a constituent part of the national constitution and allowed the south to form an autonomous regional government within the united Sudan. Yokwe (1984: 159) shares with Nyombe (1997) the view that ‘this constitution is one of the brakes against absolute Arabicisation policy, including language policy’. Yokwe points out that the central government had no language policy for the north at the time in the technical sense of assigning to language social functions within the respective communities. What the central government did, Yokwe (ibid.) continues, was that it stated the obvious: ‘The Sudan is an Arab country and so Arabic is the language for every function. No consideration is given to the other African languages
spoken in the north’. Bell and Haashim subscribe to the same view when they note that:

Arabic was the ‘official’ language of the Sudan. Other Sudanese languages were widely regarded as an inconvenience: ‘Are they lugat ‘languages’ or lahjat ‘dialects’? There was no effective language policy aiming to achieve equilibrium among Sudanese languages. (Bell and Haashim 2006: 2)

In 1976, a committee was formed by the Faculty of Arts at the University of Khartoum with the aim of preparing a detailed report about the departments that could be Arabicised and about the effects of Arabicisation on students’ academic performance, including a review of the Arabicisation policies implemented in the Arab world (see Mugadam 2002: 57). In 1980 a national committee for Arabicisation was set up by a ministerial decision. Yet, no practical progress was made for the actual implementation of the policy of Arabicisation at the university level. In 1990, a presidential decree was issued stating that Arabic should be adopted as the medium of instruction in all universities starting from the academic year 1990/1991. This language policy was part of what the National Islamic Front (NIF) called the Higher Education Revolution (El Rayah 1995: 2). The decision was immediately implemented without any concern for the availability of Arabic reference works and textbooks and teacher training. An Arabic language academy was established to help implement the Arabicisation policy. Later, the High Commission of Arabicisation was formed with the aim of supplying the universities with Arabic reference works and textbooks in different disciplines. Yet, little has been achieved by this planning body, and even the Arabic texts that have been brought in from other Arab universities suffer from problems concerning terminology and translation. El Rayah (ibid.) notes that the post-independence period changed the language situation by the adoption of the Arabic language as the official and national language of the whole country, and the gradual Arabicisation of secondary and higher education institutions.

Miller (2003a: 163–164) points out that since Independence the cultural situation in the Sudan has become worse and is now chaotic. Arabic has dominated the whole country and members of many minority groups are losing their mother tongues. Arabicisation, whether in its linguistic or cultural aspect, has failed to achieve the
expected social cohesion. National integration has been torn apart since the mid–
1980s. Ethnic cleavages are widening and civil war is looming large over the western
part of the country (the Nuba Mountains and Darfur) and the south east (the
Ingessana area). Social groups which once lived peacefully side by side are now at
war with each other. Miller attributes the failure of the Arabicisation project to
achieve social cohesion in the north Sudan to economic and political inequities.

4.3.2 Arabicisation policy in the south
The question of language has never been far from the surface of politics in the south
of Sudan (Hurreiz and Bell 1975a: 11). Vernacular languages especially in the
southern Sudan pose one of the most critical questions facing the country as a whole.
One question regards their role alongside Arabic in the nationwide network of
education and communication. Few would disagree with Yokwe (1984: 159) that
Arabicisation, with its aim of national integration by the process of sociocultural
assimilation of the southern polities did not succeed. In other words, the linguistic
and sociocultural assimilative policies that were implemented in the northern Sudan
in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries had very little success in the south.
This is evident from the fact that southerners still remain a socially, linguistically,
and culturally distinct community. Yokwe (1984: 159) observes that ‘nobody has
come up with a definite answer based on solid research as to why this gap between
Northerners and Southerners is still so wide and deep’. Yokwe believes that the
long–standing problem between the two parts of the country stems from their distrust
of one another. Miller attributes the lack of trust between the two regions to the
colonial period. Miller (2003a: 161) argues that the harshness of the colonial period
‘for the southern tribes must not be forgotten for it sowed the seeds of distrust and
fear between Southerners and Northerners, seeds that the British used to their
maximum benefit’. This feeling of distrust is deepened by the attempt of northern
governments to extend the Arabisation and Islamisation to the southern Sudan.

In the same line of thinking, Beshir (1968: 80) notes that ‘when the parliamentary
system disappeared, and political parties were suppressed, the advocates of
compulsion and integration of the North and South by force of arms had the upper
hand’. The military rule of 1958 that was considered by most southern officials as a result of a conspiracy by the northerners was indeed dominated by the Arab northerners. The military regime suppressed the political opposition in the whole country and continued to implement the policy of Arabicisation on the full scale in the south (Yokwe 1984: 159). Beshir (1968: 81) argues that the military regime of 1958 ‘stepped up the spread of the Arabic and Islamisation, in the belief that this was the only way to achieve unity in the future’. Yokwe notes that the assimilative policies were chosen and imposed on the south by Khartoum government under the pretext that it was the only option to achieve unity in the future. Consequently, the southern people found themselves confronted with ‘a clear and conscious choice between two rival religious, ethical and cultural systems’ (Sanderson et al. 1981: 394).

Framing the conflict between the south and the north in terms of the struggle and monopoly of power may explain why ‘even with the very best intentions, no Arab Government will consciously devote its time to a development programme in the south that may result in a seizure of power by the Africans’ (Albino 1970: 5). So, politically, the northerners have looked towards the Arab Middle East as the home of their political aspirations and pan–Islamic culture, while southerners have looked towards the rest of Africa as their locus of origin (Albino 1970: 6). The conflict over the monopoly of the national language was at the heart of both the civil wars and peace between the south and north. In short, although the sociocultural policy of Arabicisation failed to replace the historically–rooted local languages in the south, the Arabic language still retains its status as a symbol of political power. Nonetheless, ‘it is not and never will be a substitute for the vernaculars which are still serving very important communicative roles, especially among the families in the rural areas of the Sudan’ (Yokwe 1984: 152).

4.4 Summary

In this chapter I have surveyed the diachronic development of the institutional practice of language planning in the Sudan from the Anglo–Egyptian rule of 1898 to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the south and
the north in 2005. The analysis has shown that the colonial language policy was intended to separate the south from the north. A number of measures were operationalised to linguistically differentiate the south from the north including the Rejaf Language Conference of 1928, the construction of no–man's land, and the creation of the Closed District Order. These measures taken together constitute what came to be known as the Southern Policy. The chapter has paid considerable attention to the postcolonial policies of Arabicisation in the north and the south. The analysis has shown that Arabic was instrumental in the attempt to build a unified and homogeneous nation–state. This state–declared policy of Arabicisation has been strongly resisted by the southerners. The refusal of the northern power holders to accommodate the needs of the southerners in postcolonial Sudan has led to the eruption of civil war between the two parts of the country. The civil war has recently been settled by the CPA. The CPA contains a significant language policy. The next chapter will provide a critical examination of the Naivasha Language Policy (NLP), and its role in the construction of the ‘New Sudan’, a new social order.
CHAPTER FIVE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NAIVASHA LANGUAGE POLICY (NLP)

5.1 Data and methods of data analysis

The aim behind producing a new language policy as part of the CPA is to reconfigure the sociolinguistic order in the Sudan. It is intended to deal with the problematic character of the Pre–Naivasha sociolinguistic order in which only one language (the Arabic language) is constitutionally and institutionally honoured. The NLP is embedded in the Protocol of Power–sharing which is one of the six constitutive protocols of the CPA. The data for this chapter are composed of the text of the NLP, which contains five main statements embodied in the Protocol of Power–sharing in addition to other language–related statements scattered in other protocols of the CPA. Political speeches, public announcements, and national and international documents and reports also form part of the data upon which the critical analysis will be based. Another source of data is ethnographic observation conducted during my visit to the Nuba Mountains (known in Arabic as Jibal Al–Nuba) in the Southern Kordofan State and to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in Khartoum in December 2006.

A critical analysis of the NLP requires a historical understanding of the colonial language policies, particularly the Southern Policy (see Chapter 4). The linguistic policies of Arabisation reviewed in Chapter 2 and 4 will also be drawn upon in the analysis of the historical forces that led to the emergence of the NLP. Greenberg’s (1963a) typology of Sudanese languages will be drawn on to understand the ‘politics of linguistic indigenousness’ in the NLP (see Chapter 2 for an overview of Greenberg’s work). I operationalise the critical approaches to language planning reviewed in Chapter 3 in the analysis of the Naivasha language policy.

It will be useful to clarify some of the key conceptual terms used in the analysis. I should note that there is a lack of common consensus in academic writings about the definition of terms such as ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’. Guibernau (1996: 47) defines ‘nation’ as ‘a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common
culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself’. The term ‘nationalism’ is used to describe ‘political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments’ (Breuilly 1993: 2). A nationalist argument or an ideology of nationalism, according to Breuilly (ibid.), is the political doctrine which holds that: 1) there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar identity; 2) the interest and values of a nation take precedence over all other values and interests, and 3) a nation should be independent, and this demands at least the achievement of political sovereignty (for a comparable definition see Smith 1994: 379). A ‘nation–state’ is identified by the confluence of the nation and the state in Gellner’s (1983: 1) understanding of political/ideological nationalism: ‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’. The building of a nation–state is conducted principally through the formation and imposition of a common language and civil culture, and through state agencies including education (May 2001: 56). This position is termed modernist (alternative terms include instrumentalist/social constructionist) in the literature. Social constructionism/constructivism emphasises ‘the contingent, fractured, ambivalent and reflexive nature of culture and identity as these are played out in the context of power and domination’ (Werbner 1997: 226). The modernist perspective views nation–state (and national identity) as a product of political nationalism (i.e., nation–state congruence) and modernity (see Kedourie 1960; Hobsbawm 1992a: 4; Nairn 1981; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Anderson 1991; Breuilly 1993). Modern sovereign nation–states, according to modernist commentators, are a direct product of the eighteenth–century ideology of nationalism and post-Enlightenment political rationalism (May 2001: 62; for a detailed review of the various approaches to nationalism see Ozkirimli 2000: ch. 3; Breuilly 1993: 404–424; Smith 1971: 153–230). For some modernist writers (e.g., Hobsbawm 1992b), ethnicity and nationalism are quite different things. The modernist model is contrasted with the primordialist one which recognises the existence of ethnic/cultural nations (e.g., indigenous populations) that are not represented by corresponding boundaries of a particular state of their own (see Geertz 1963, 1973; Shills 1957, 1981; van den Bergh 1981, 1995). Guibernau (1999: 16) terms these

At base ethnicity involves a claim to be a particular kind of person. Whether the impetus to such a claim lies in an innate tendency to favour kin (even fictive kin), ecological adaptation, shared positions in structures of production and distribution, or emotional sustenance, ethnic–identity claims involve symbolic construal of sensations of likeness and difference, and these sensations must somehow be accounted for. (Bentley 1987: 27)

The late eighteenth–century ‘German Romanticist’ movement of Humboldt, Herder and Fichte advocated ‘organic’ or ‘linguistic nationalism’. The German Romantics considered nations as ancient/natural (continuous) forms of human organisation, with particular emphasis on race (or blood), soil, and language as central to the essence of the nation. This resulted in the emergence of the ideology of ‘one language, one nation, one state’ as a linear principle of linguistic/organic nationalism (the reverse holds true as a principle of political nationalism, May 2001: 91; for a review of the German Romantic theory see Joseph 2004: 42–46). Although it is obvious that this intellectual position is both essentialist and determinist, it should be put in perspective as a reactionary theorising against the totalising and universalising discourse of the political nationalism of the French Revolution (May 2001: 58).

A number of alternative models have been developed to transcend the primordialist–constructivist dichotomy (for a review of various models see Ozikirimli 2000; May 2001). One of the ways in which both approaches are effectively incorporated is through Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990a, 1990b; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990) ‘theory of practice’, particularly his notion of ‘habitus’ (for the implementation of ‘habitus’ or the notion of ‘practice’ as analytic tools see May 1999; Bentley 1987; Wicker 1997; Lin 1999; Moore and Carling 1982). Bourdieu defines the habitus as follows:

The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g., the material conditions of existence characteristic of class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable transposable dispositions … The habitus is the product of the work of inculcation and appropriation necessary in order for those products of collective history, the objective
structures (e.g., language, economy, etc.) to succeed in reproducing themselves more or less completely, in the form of durable dispositions, in the organisms (which one can, if one wishes, call individuals) lastingly subjected to the same conditionings, and hence placed in the same material conditions of existence (Bourdieu 1977: 72, 85, emphasis in original).

Following her ethnographic analysis of four classrooms in Hong Kong, Lin (1999: 407) defines habitus as ‘the language use, skills, and orientations, attitudes, dispositions, and schemes of perception that children are endowed with by virtue of socialisation in their families and communities’. Collins (1993: 116) notes that ‘language and power are linked in Bourdieu’s work, embedded in a larger dynamic of material conditioning and symbolic power’. For Bourdieu, all areas of human activities are socially charged ‘fields’ which are in turn instances of the habitus (Joseph 2004: 74). The notion of ‘fields’ may be conceptualised as ‘the arenas of social life and struggles’ (Collins 1993: 116). The material conditions of existence, which are mediated by symbolic systems of representations, generate in different individuals dispositions to act in different ways (Bentley 1987: 27). The generation of the practices by a given habitus is regular without being governed by any rule (Joseph 2004: 74). However, the relationship between the habitus and the material structural conditions of existence is dialectical (Bourdieu 1977: 82–83). Collins (1993: 116) remarks that ‘Bourdieu problematises our usual ways of thinking about couplets such as necessity/freedom, structure/practice, and determination/contingency’. Joseph (2004: 74) comments that ‘the habitus is inhabited by an active human agent who is defined by the system but, crucially, not merely its passive object’. It should be noted that theories of practice, including Bourdieu’s, originated from the Marxist imperative to relate class consciousness to structural conditions of existence (Bentley 1987: 27; for a detailed account on the relationship between ‘class consciousness’ and ‘practice’ see Lukacs 1971). According to Joseph (2004: 74), Bourdieu tried to ‘reconnect the Marxist and structuralist lines by renouncing the structuralist dismissal of the human “subject”’. As Thompson (1991: 29) notes, the weakness of most versions of Marxist analysis in Bourdieu’s understanding is that they tend to deal with the social world as a one-dimensional space in which developments are accounted for with reference to the unfolding of the economic modes of production and class antagonisms resulting from
it. For Bourdieu, the social world is ‘a multi-dimensional space, differentiated into relatively autonomous fields determined by the quantities of different type of capital they possess’ (ibid.). It is the different contexts mediated by power relations that determine the value of the capital in different social fields (Pennycook 2001: 123). Unlike the classical Marxist view of political economy, Bourdieu recognises different forms of capital including economic, social, cultural, linguistic, and symbolic capital (ibid.). On the relevance of symbolic capital to other forms of capital, Pennycook (ibid.: 123–124) points out that ‘one’s ability to use differential access to material goods only relates to power to the extent that it is combined with cultural, linguistic, social, and symbolic capital’. In Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) work, linguistic capital is understood as basically a matter of class dialects (see Collins 1993: 118). Despite the fact that practices produced by habitus are determined by productive historical conditions, this determination is not mechanical, but rather dialectical (Bourdieu 1977: 72–73). The habitus is not open to the consciousness, nor is it a ‘product of genuine strategic intention’ (ibid.: 73).

With respect to ethnicity and national identity, the notion of habitus can effectively be applied to the analysis of ethnicity and national identity when it is used as a social method rather than as a social theory (May 2001: 47). According to May (ibid.), ‘ethnicity as socially constructed and as a material form of life is addressed by the concept of habitus’. The concentration of Bourdieu is on ‘regional’ and ‘ethnic’ identity (see Joseph 2004: 13). According to Bourdieu, although these classifications and categories essentialise the arbitrary boundaries between peoples, once defined they become real as if they were part of the natural order (ibid.) Bourdieu writes:

Struggles over ethnic or regional identity – in other words, over the properties (stigmata or emblems) linked with the origin through the place of origin and its associated durable marks, such as accent – are a particular case of the different struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognise, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups. (Bourdieu 1991: 221, emphasis in original)

Bentley (1987: 27) shares the same conviction when he notes that ‘this proposition [habitus] finds substantial support in the existing literature. It provides the objective grounding for ethnic subjectivity sought by both primordialists and instrumentalists
and, in addition, it accounts for phenomenon they cannot’. The concept of habitus is intended primarily by Bourdieu to explore power inequalities between dominant and dominated groups, with the habitus of the former recognised as ‘cultural capital’ (socially valuable), while the habitus of the latter is downgraded (May 2001: 48). Bourdieu uses the notion of the habitus as an analytic tool specifically in relation to the standard language as a product of ‘normalisation’ by pointing to the ways in which they construct possibilities for symbolic domination/violence (Joseph 2004: 74; for the definition of these concepts see Bourdieu 1991: 51). Collins (1993: 117) notes that the ‘concepts of capital, field, and habitus have been useful in thinking about the role of language in the reproduction of class positions’ (for a critique see Luke 1996; Pennycook 2001: 123–130; Joseph: 2004: 75).

Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’, I would contend that the British colonial rule in collaboration with key local figures (whose authority itself is a colonial invention) in the Sudan constructed the political national identity out of the habitus of the northern riverain social groups, while others’ habitus was misrecognised. This process partly involved ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), construction of languages, (re)creation of tribal boundaries, and racial typology of people in both the south and the north (for critical accounts on the invention of tribes/ethnicities and/or languages see Vail 1989; Harries 1988; Nagel 1994; Sollors 1989; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Irvine and Gal 2000; Joseph 2006a; Brutt–Griffler 2006; Makoni and Pennycook 2006). Postcolonial governments instrumentally manipulated this habitus in service of collective political mobilisation and material interests.

In order to engage in a sequential and systematic presentation, the structural organisation of this chapter is ordered in terms of the salient theme(s) each language policy statement seems to designate. With respect to the first policy statement, I examine the concept of the politics of linguistic indigenousness. My working hypothesis here is that the use of the technical phrase ‘indigenous languages’ is a politically motivated act intended to function as a metaphorical strategy of symbolic differentiation of African groups in the southern Sudan from the Arabised ones in the
northern Sudan. The argument here is that what are called ‘indigenous languages’ in the Sudan are colonial creations. The aim of these colonial constructs is purely ideological and pragmatic. Employing their European conceptual apparatuses, the British colonial rule invented ‘indigenous languages’ out of the existing linguistic resources (habitus), created artificial tribal boundaries, established ‘imperial families’ in the north, and constructed different racial hierarchical classifications of the populations. The process of the colonial construction of linguistic differences led to the situation where Arabic and Islam were communicated and interpreted as congruent boundary system markers in the north. The focus here is not so much on the authenticity/falsity of national identity, rather it is on the ‘mode of generation of practices’ (Bourdieu 1977: 72), and the ways in which these practices are constructed/imagined; and the role played by language as a practice in the production and maintenance of social order. Drawing on Irvine and Gal (2000), I broadly examine the semiotic processes of the colonial construction of social and linguistic differentiation of the south from the north. The researchers identify three semiotic processes involved in the construction of the ideological representations of linguistic differences: iconisation, fractal recursivity, and erasure (ibid.: 37). Iconisation describes a ‘transformation of the sign relationship between linguistic features (or varieties) and the social images with which they are linked’ (ibid.). Fractal recursivity refers to the ‘projection of an opposition, salient at some level of relationship, onto some other level’ (ibid.: 38). Erasure describes the ‘process in which ideology, in simplifying the sociolinguistic field, renders some persons or activities (or sociolinguistic phenomena) invisible’ (ibid.). According to Wallman (1978: 205), social boundaries are symbolic though they can be marked by real things (cf. Armstrong’s 1982: 6 ‘symbolic border guards’). In other words, once national communities (and national languages) are constructed, they become communities of culture and power, Durkheimian ‘social facts’ (Smith 1995b: 4). If ‘indigenous languages’ are colonial inventions in the Sudan, then the assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between ethnic identities and languages is an ideologically motivated practice. Such a practice, which amounts to cultural and linguistic determinism, is part of the power struggle in the Sudan over material resources. There is no inevitable connection between a given language and a given
ethnic/tribal identity in such a multilingual society as Sudan. However, as May (2001: 129) rightly notes, ‘to say that language is not an inevitable feature of identity is not the same thing as saying it is unimportant’. Ethnic identifications within the north itself and between the north and the south should be largely viewed as a product of social interaction which incorporates unequal relations of power (cf. situational ethnicity, see Eriksen 1992: 18–19; May 2001: 30–32; Barth 1969).

The empirical concentration on the colonial/neo–colonial invention and reinvention of ethnic boundaries can avoid us the essentialist trap of commonsensically viewing the ‘northern’ and the ‘southern’ identities as unproblematically and statically fixed–given. Conceptualising ethnic boundaries as contextually dynamic and interactively dialogic can permit us to visualise the role of the ‘ideologies of linguistic differentiation’ (Irvine and Gal 2000) in the processes of fixing and ‘naturalising’ ethnolinguistic boundaries. Arabic and Islam are among the significant boundary resources through which the north is categorically defined (and self–defined) by colonial/postcolonial rules in relation to the south. Viewing language as a resource (Ruiz 1984) can help us understand the ideological use of Arabic as a boundary marker in the struggle over national identity and ultimately political power. For instance, viewing Arabic as a resource boundary marker can lead us to reject the essentialising monolithic view of Arabic as a ‘property’ of the north. There is solid ethnographic evidence pointing to the fact that southern Equatorials do invoke ‘Juba Arabic’ to signal their southern identity in the capital Khartoum (see Miller 2003b).

For the second policy statement, my working hypothesis is that the NLP is intended to act as a corrective to the divisive ideology of monolingualism by contributing to the emancipatory project of ‘New Sudan’. There is a piece of ethnographic evidence showing that GOSS and its people regard education as a liberating tool from the cultural control of northern governments (see Breidlid 2006). The philosophy of ‘New Sudan’ aims at a material and discursive transformation of the current inequitable social order. With respect to the third statement, the focus is on the type of language rights sanctioned by the policy statement at the federal level. The argument here is that the notion of language rights, and particularly the right to use
mother tongue education should be viewed as part of the ‘habitus’ of speakers of a
given community. Seen in this way, the embodied discursive practices of a given
number of native students are a constituent part of their identity. This understanding
of language rights can help us avoid the political polarisation of the south and the
north along essentialising linguistic lines (Arabic–north vs. English/local language–
south). Viewed in this way, Juba Arabic can be viewed as part of the embodied
cultural identity of the (Equatorial) southerners; it partly defines who they are.

With respect to the fourth policy statement, I focus on the analysis of the political
structural system which is compatible with the discourse of the NLP. I perform a
comparative analysis between the types of federalism underlying the Arabicisation
policy of the NCP and the NLP. My argument here is that a faithful implementation
of the NLP within a multinational democratic federation informed by the principle of
active citizenship can contain not only the divisive monolingualism but also the
southern nationalism. The other language–related statements scattered in the
protocols of the CPA will be dealt with as part of the analysis of the key language
policy statements. I have underlined the NLP statements to distinguish them from
other language policies. International and regional conventions on the rights of
indigenous peoples are stated in tabulated form.

5.2. Data analysis

5.2.1 The NLP and the politics of linguistic indigenousness

The first policy statement stipulates:

All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be respected
developed and promoted.

I shall start with a broad description of the functional organisation of the above
policy statement in terms of Halliday’s (2004) systemic functional analysis. Firstly,
the field of discourse of the statement (which is encoded in its experiential meaning)
embodies a particular representation of a sociolinguistic reality in the Sudan: ‘all the
indigenous languages are national languages’. The situational category of the field
also includes processes and activities such as ‘respecting’, ‘developing’, ‘promoting’, ‘national languages’, and ‘indigenous languages’.

Secondly, the tenor of discourse (which is activated by the interpersonal value of the text) encompasses the social relations between the political forces which signed the CPA. This social relationship which is reflected interpersonally incorporates unequal power relationships between these political forces. But this tenor is grammatically disguised through the textual organisation of the text (the use of passivisation). Thirdly, the mode of discourse of the policy formulation (which is realised in its textual value) is a written language belonging to the genre of language polices. Part of this policy announcement has the speech function of asserting a particular linguistic reality as objective and true without any further qualification by using the epistemic non-modal present tense ‘are’.

The categorical commitment to the truth of the claim that ‘all’ indigenous languages ‘are’ national languages is grammatically encoded by the non-modal present tense. The second part of the policy formulation which contains firm decisions is expressed through the deontic use of what is called the ‘legal shall’. The actions of ‘respecting’, ‘developing’ and ‘promoting’ are obligatory (directives) and this obligation is expressed through the deontic use of modality (‘shall’ here is more or less equivalent to ‘must’). The use of passive here is significant: the policy statement does not specify who will be responsible for ‘respecting’, ‘developing’ and ‘promoting’ the ‘indigenous languages’. It is implied that it is the responsibility of all people to ‘respect’ local languages, the responsibility of a small group of people to ‘develop’ them, and the responsibility of a governmental office to ‘promote’ them. However, the strategic use of the passive can enable the agents of these processes to evade responsibility.

At the lexical level, the terms ‘national’, ‘indigenous’ and ‘language’ are collocates, and that they are part of a lexical set which includes other terms such as ‘promote’ and ‘develop’. Another observation about the lexical organisation of the first policy statement is that the drafters deployed the rhetorical strategy of vagueness as we will
see in detail. For instance, it is unclear how a language can be ‘respected’. At the level of pragmatic analysis, there are presuppositions or assumptions of various types. For instance, the expression ‘indigenous languages’ is an existential presupposition in that local varieties of communication are ‘languages’ in the sociolinguistic sense of the term, and are ‘indigenous’ to Sudan. This way of texturing status–planning decisions is commonsensical, and thus can be ideological. The point here is that evaluations, whether explicit or implicit, can be viewed as a ‘halfway house between statements and demands’ (Fairclough 2003: 112). Yet this interpretation relies on a specific understanding of the term ‘indigenous’, and a detailed examination of the sociohistorical relationship between the south and the north. But, the term ‘indigenous’ is in itself a source of ambiguity, since it opens a complex web of possibilities of interpretation. For example, is Arabic an indigenous language in the Sudan? Hence, a discussion of the first policy statement should begin by defining the word ‘indigenous’.

Generally speaking, ‘indigenous’ people are identified as ‘ethnic minorities’ (for typologies of social minorities see Eriksen 1993: ch. 7; May 2001: 82–89; Churchill 1986: 6–8; Fenton 1999: 32–42; Ogbu 1987). The Minority Rights Group (1990) provides the following definition of ‘minorities’:

A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non–dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, tradition, religion or language. (Minority Rights Group 1990: xiv)

The term ‘minority’ here highlights the limited access to rights and power, rather than just the numerical size of the social group. According to May (2001: 83), sociological minorities (or ethnic minorities) are defined by a history of sociopolitical marginalisation and/or exploitation by dominant ethnic groups (see also Eriksen 1992, 1993: ch. 7; Hechter 1975; Dench 1986; Thornberry 1991). According to Eriksen (1993: 125–131), the term ‘indigenous people’ is employed in anthropology to refer to non–state people (or nonsecessionist) who are always linked with a non–industrial mode of production. In other words, indigenous people represent a way of life that makes them vulnerable with respect to the state and
modernisation (Eriksen 1993: 125). Kloss (1971: 253) draws a distinction between two categories of social formation: indigenous and immigrant groups. An indigenous group is ‘every group a majority of whose adult members are natives of native parentage’. For Kloss, the designation ‘indigenous’ obtains a particular type of language rights (promotion–oriented rights). Commonly cited examples of indigenous groups include, but need not be restricted to: Sami (Lapps) in Norway, Inuit (Eskimos) and Native Canadians in Canada, Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders in Australia (May 2001: 79). Some of these groups have been granted by their states varying degrees of educational, linguistic, and administrative autonomy partly as a consequence of indigenous advocacy at the national/international level for greater autonomy within their nation-states (ibid.). In what follows I broadly examine international, regional, and national contexts in which the term ‘indigenous’ is used.

5.2.1.1 The definition of ‘indigenous’ in the international legal discourse

Regarding the international context in which the term indigenous is used, Macias (1979: 86) points out that prior to the set up of international organisations in the nineteenth century, the international legal protection of linguistic minorities was minimal. The first international constitutional protection of linguistic minorities emerged with the establishment of the League of Nations. A significant number of nations:

... undertook to ‘assure full and complete protection of life and liberty’ to all their inhabitants ‘without distinction’ of ‘language’, and to assure all their nationals equality before the law and enjoyment of the ‘same civil and political rights’ without distinctions as to ‘language’. (McDougal et al. 1976: 161)

A number of specialised international and regional agencies, non–governmental organisations (NGOs), and advocacy groups are devoted to the human rights concerns of indigenous populations (for a review of the various specialised agencies see Hannum 1987–1988). In what follows I focus on the legal definition of the word ‘indigenous’ by international bodies such as the UN. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted in 1957 the first binding international instrument (Convention No.107) on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples (for a detailed review of this Convention see Barsh 1986; for the full text of the Convention No.107

1. Children belonging to the peoples concerned shall, wherever practicable, be taught to read and write in their own indigenous language or in the language most commonly used by the group to which they belong. When this is not practicable, the competent authorities shall undertake consultations with these peoples with a view to the adoption of measures to achieve this objective.

2. Adequate measures shall be taken to ensure that these peoples have the opportunity to attain fluency in the national language or in one of the official languages of the country.

3. Measures shall be taken to preserve and promote the development and practice of the indigenous languages of the peoples concerned.

Table 5.1. ILO Convention No. 169, Article 28 (Source: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm)

Convention No.169 (Article 1.1) provides a definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ upon which the above language-in-education policy should be based.
a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;

(b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

2. Self–identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.

Table 5.2. ILO Convention No. 169, Article 1.1 (Source [http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm](http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm))

As the above article shows, the Convention highlights the right of ‘self–identification’ of indigenous people ‘irrespective of their legal status’. As a way of refusing to recognise the indigenous groups in their territories, states such as India, Malaysia, Burma, and Bangladesh claimed that all social groups were indigenous and no group is hence entitled to any special treatment (see de Varennes 1996; May 2001: 275). The Convention is intended to protect the cultural practices that distinguish tribal systems of social order (including language). In the context of Australia, May (2001: 274) argues that the protectionist policies towards the aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders have simply been employed as a variant of assimilation. In a similar vein, Fishman (1991) attacks this form of protectionism by noting that

> Even in such settings indigenous populations are robbed of control of the natural resources that could constitute the economic bases of a more self–regulatory collective life and, therefore, robbed also of a possible avenue of cultural viability as well. (Fishman 1991: 62)
1. Education programmes and services for the peoples concerned shall be
developed and implemented in co–operation with them to address their special
needs, and shall incorporate their histories, their knowledge and technologies,
their value systems and their further social, economic and cultural aspirations.
2. The competent authority shall ensure the training of members of these
peoples and their involvement in the formulation and implementation of
education programmes, with a view to the progressive transfer of responsibility
for the conduct of these programmes to these peoples as appropriate.
3. In addition, governments shall recognise the right of these peoples to
establish their own educational institutions and facilities, provided that such
institutions meet minimum standards established by the competent authority in
consultation with these peoples. Appropriate resources shall be provided for
this purpose.

Table 5.3. ILO Convention No. 169, Article 27 (Source: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm)

Regarding language planning and policy, the ILO’s Convention No.169 Article 27
(Table 5.3) encourages a bottom–up approach in the sense that the design of
pedagogical programmes should be carried out in cooperation with and consultation
with indigenous peoples (see de Varennes 1995). Another international instrument is
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (henceforth Working
Group). The Working Group was established by the UN Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) in 1982 (see de Varennes 1995). Membership of the Working
Group includes five international legal experts drawn from the UN Sub–commission
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (see Williams 1990:
665). The effort of the Working Group in coordination with other bodies has led to
the (1993) UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (see May 2001:
276). On 29 June 2006 the Human Rights Council adopted the ‘Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ and recommended its adoption by the General
Assembly. The General Assembly has adopted Declaration on the 13 September
2007 (for full text of the Declaration see
Article 3 grants ‘indigenous’ people the right to self-determination (Table 5.4)

Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Table 5.4. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2006), Article 3 (Source: http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm)

What is at stake here is the issue of ‘national identity’. Articles 6 and 9 in the Declaration deal with this question (Table 5.5).

| Article 6: Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality. |
| Article 9: Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned. No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right. |

Table 5.5. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2006), Articles 6 and 9 (Source: http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm)

In language planning terms, Article 14 in the Declaration states that indigenous groups and individuals have the right to run their own educational institutions in their languages. The same article directs that states, where possible, should provide education for indigenous children living outside of their communities in their own languages. In other words, the Declaration encourages bilingual education in the dominant and indigenous languages at the early years of education (Table 5.6).

One of the United Nations comprehensive surveys of the status of indigenous peoples in the world is Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations (known as the Indigenous Study). Jose Martinez Cobo was appointed as Special Rapporteur. This detailed survey carried a comparative study of the various defining criteria of ‘indigenous populations’ contained in the legal and constitutional documents of the countries surveyed (see Vol. 2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.1).
Article 14:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and forms of education of the State without discrimination.
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language.

Table 5.6. The UN Declaration on Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2006, Article 14
(Source: http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm)

The Special Rapporteur notes that ‘several governments have stated explicitly that there are no legal definitions of indigenous populations in their countries’ (for the names of these countries see Vol.2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6, p. 44). Even countries which have legal definitions differ with respect to the scope of application and purposes of these definitions. The Indigenous Study considers vernacular languages as one of the defining characteristics of indigenous communities, and it treats them as separate criteria (Vol.2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6, p.32) (Table 5.7).

172. The use of a vernacular language by an individual group or community has always been considered one of the criteria for classifying them as indigenous.

173. Language or tongue is one of the cultural elements, but deserves particular mention because of its special importance. It must be separated from the rest of the cultural elements and regarded as a separate criterion.

Table 5.7. Indigenous languages in the Indigenous Study (Source: Martinez Cobo 1986/7: 32)

It is clear that the term ‘indigenous’ is deeply vague and ambiguous in the discourse of international law. In practical reality it becomes hard to draw a demarcation line between ‘tribal population’ and ‘tribal people’. Beteille rightly notes:

There are of course regions of the globe where the tribal population is the indigenous population and this can be clearly established by historical evidence. There are other regions, very large ones at that, where this is by no means the case, and the blanket use of ‘indigenous people’ is misleading. (Beteille 1998: 188)
It should be noted that the terms ‘people’ and ‘population’ have significant implications in international law (for a detailed analysis of the historical development of indigenous rights in international law see Stamatopoulou 1994; Tennant 1994). It is generally agreed that the former emphasises the associated rights of self-determination, whereas the latter does not (May 2001: 278; notice that the ‘P’ in the SPLM/A refers to ‘people’ and not ‘population’). The ILO’s Convention 107 of 1957 completely avoided the expression ‘indigenous peoples’ and used instead ‘indigenous populations’. The Working Group was made to replace the term ‘peoples’ with ‘populations’ in the first draft of the ‘UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ following the opposition of, among others, the UK, the USA, and France to the use of the word ‘peoples’ (Barsh 1996: 797). This terminological problematic may be the reason behind the fact the ILO’s Convention 169 not only contained both terms in its title, but also had to add the caveat that: ‘The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law’ (Article 1:3). It is worth mentioning that the 1945 United Nations Charter (Chapter 1, Article 1, Part 2; for full text see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch–cont.htm) unambiguously recognises ‘the self–determination of all peoples’. The right to self-determination for ‘people’ is reiterated by the (1966) International Convent on Civil and Political Rights (Article 1:1; for full text see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm) which clearly outlines that ‘all people have the right to self–determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. Yet, the meaning of the term ‘people’ is not precisely defined by the UN. Rather, it has been interpreted as recognition of the right of colonised nations to establish their own states, rather than of national minorities, including indigenous peoples, within nation states (May 2001: 277). Kymlicka (1999: 284) comments that the scope of the term ‘people’ has been restricted by the so–called ‘salt–water thesis’: ‘People who are subject to colonisation from overseas have the right to independence, but national minorities within (a territorially contiguous) state do not have the right to independence’. According to May (2001: 278), some countries called for a more restricted concept of self–determination termed ‘internal self–
determination’ or ‘autonomy’. Internal self-determination focuses on ‘negotiated power-sharing both through constitutional reform and within existing institutions, and extends well beyond the desultory measures of local autonomy already established for some indigenous groups’ (ibid.: 279).

At the regional level, one of the legal instruments that has attended to the issue of cultural and linguistic diversity is the African Union (AU). The point which concerns us here is the reason behind the inclusion of the Arabic, English, and Portuguese languages in the list of its working languages (for the full text of the Constitutive Act see http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm). Article 25 in the Constitutive Act of the African Union lists the working languages of the AU (Table 5.8).

| Article 25: |
| The working languages of the Union and all its institutions shall be, if possible, African languages, Arabic, English, French and Portuguese. |
| Article 33: |
| 5. This Act, drawn up in four (4) original texts in the Arabic, English, French and Portuguese languages, all four (4) being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the OAU and, after its entry into force, with the Chairman of the Commission who shall transmit a certified true copy of the Act to the Government of each signatory State. The Secretary-General of the OAU and the Chairman of the Commission shall notify all signatory States of the dates of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or accession and shall upon entry into force of this Act register the same with the Secretariat of the United Nations. |

**Table 5.8. The Language Policy of the African Union** (Source http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm)

Some researchers have justified the adoption of English and Arabic in the category of ‘indigenous African languages on the grounds that Arabic is indigenous to the Arab nations of North Africa and Sudan, while English is native to the white settlers in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Kenya’ (Ajulo 1997: 35; Afolayan 1982). The AU
language policy grants Arabic, English, French and Portuguese ‘equal validity’ (legal texts in these languages are original) (Table 5.8).

The point here is that the word ‘indigenous’ again is shrouded in vagueness in legal documents of regional instruments such as the African Union (for a critique of AU language policy see Ajulo 1997). Having examined the use of the word ‘indigenous’ in international and regional contexts, I move now to consider the way in which the term ‘indigenous’ is viewed and understood in the Sudan at the national level. I focus on the British colonial policy which is known as the ‘Southern Policy’, since the historical context in which it was produced affords insights into the disambiguation of the term ‘indigenous’.

5.2.1.2 The colonial Southern Policy and the invention of indigenous languages

As explained in the preceding chapter, after the First World War, the British rule adopted what came to be known as the ‘Southern Policy’, which intended to ideologically construct the south and the north as separate social identities. In essence, the Southern Policy is a colonial project of inventing ideological representations of social and discursive differences between the south and the north. The Southern Policy was officially declared in 1930 (see Chapter 4).

The colonial intention to construct ‘racial and tribal units’, ‘indigenous customs’, and ‘traditional usage’ (in the European conceptual representation of these terms) is evidenced. Irvine and Gal (2000: 50) describe the colonial and academic representations of speakers of African languages in the nineteenth century:

‘Tribes’ or ‘races’ reflect, among other things, Africans’ loss of political autonomy – or at least their right to political autonomy in European eyes. Although some of those ‘tribes’ are best understood as the population subject of a particular precolonial policy, to describe them in terms of language and customs made it possible to imply that indigenous political structures were epiphenomenal and dispensable. (Irvine and Gal 2000: 50)

The Southern Policy aimed at inventing two social identities in the Sudan: an African south with local languages/English and an Arabised north with Arabic and Islam. The discursive features (e.g., religion, language, etc.) employed in this colonial invention of monolithic social identities are interpreted as indexical. The indexical
representation of the south in terms of Christianity and English on the one hand, and
the north in terms of Islam and Arabic on the other, has shaped and strengthened the
essentialising interpretation of necessity.

The Southern Policy as a colonial project of inventing social and linguistic
differences involved the semiotic process of ‘erasure’ (Irvine and Gal 2000: 38). That
is, the representation of the north as inherently heterogeneous was(has been
ruthlessly suppressed, since it was incongruent with the colonial invention of two
incompatible social identities (the north vs. the south). The same process was
employed in the invention or imagination of a homogeneous southern identity.
Language policy and planning was instrumental in this colonial construction.
Through the language planning processes of Ausbau (i.e., differentiation through
development, see Chapter 3), the colonial regime invented ‘indigenous’ languages
out of the ‘tribalised material’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006: 13) in the south. The
Southern Policy validated southern ethnic practices with English and Christianity in
local idioms as valuable forms of life. In order to routinise and perpetuate these
selected languages, the colonial government exercised a kind of geopolitical and
ethnolinguistic control where Arabic and Islam were to be stamped out of the
educational and administrative system in the whole of southern Sudan.

In his attempt to obtain the approval of the British Foreign Secretary on the
elimination of Arabic from the southern Sudan, the Civil Secretary MacMichael
asserted the potential political dangers behind this move (cited in Woodward 1979:
10–11):

To encourage the spread of Arabic in the south would be to sprinkle
gunpowder in the neighbourhood of a powder magazine or to sow
weeds because they grow more quickly than corn … [the Southerners
should be encouraged in] the cultivation of their languages,
conservation and sublimation of all that is of value in their customs and
institutions … in the process a solid barrier will be created against the
insidious political intrigue which must, in the ordinary course of event,
increasingly beset our path in the north.

The invention of ‘indigenous languages’ by the colonial ideological apparatus is
dialectical with the process of inventing a ‘distinctly African and Negroid’ identity in
the southern Sudan. In other words, the relationship between the two processes is
dialectical and not a one–way street as Anderson (1991) argues in his seminal work (for a critique of Anderson’s 1991 view of language see Joseph 2004: 13). To protect the constructed ‘indigenous’ southern ways of life, the colonial government deployed coercive measures such as the construction of a ‘no–man’s land’ as well as the physical removal of northern Arabic–speaking groups from the southern Sudan (for a discussion of measures taken by the colonial rule see Chapter 4). The focus of the colonial rule from 1930 up to 1946 had been to construct the three southern provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr al–Ghazal, and Equatoria along distinctively African lines and the north across Arabic ones.

It should be mentioned that the ostensible objective of the Rejaf Language Conference was purely instrumental, but the real goal was political. The conference was intended to invent a number of ‘indigenous languages’ in the southern Sudan using the processes of Ausbau i.e., differentiation through development and elaboration and Einbau i.e., the drawing of two or more languages together (cf. Chapter 3). The naming of the languages by the colonial administration coincided with the naming of the ethnicities residing in the southern Sudan. These linguistic processes of Ausbau and Einbau were not value–neutral, and this is reflected in the language groups formed by the conference. For instance, Werner (1929: 426) notes that the Acholi language is almost a dialect of the Shilluk language, and it may have seemed clear that the existing Shilluk language literature could be used for it. The point here is that the ‘epistemic violence’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006: 16) over the recognition/misrecognition of language boundaries points to the arbitrariness of the process of ‘invention of traditions’. The Rejaf Language Conference is a politically–motivated measure intended to (discursively) construct a sense of social homogeneity and political solidarity among southerners vis–à–vis northerners, hence the conflict between linguistic and ideological criteria. In this connection, I entirely agree with Joseph (1987: 3) that ‘when a linguistic criterion comes into contact with a political one, the latter is likely to dominate’. The work of Greenberg (1963a) is insightful here, since it points to the fact that the linguistic boundaries between the southern and northern linguistic resources are colonial creations. Greenberg’s (1963a) linguistic typology of Sudanese languages lends linguistic support to the fact that the
majority of ethnic communities in the Sudan share key cultural ties. Suffice it to say that the Nilo–Saharan language family provides evidential basis for the fact that the languages (by extension the people) of the ‘Nile Nubian’ in the very north (e.g., Mahas–Fadidja and Kenuzi–Dongola), the languages of ‘Kordofanian Nubian’ in the west (e.g., Dilling, Dair, Gulfan, Teiman), and the ‘Nilotic languages’ in the south (e.g., Shilluk, Anuak, Dinka, Nuer) are structurally related (see Greenberg 1963a; Stevenson 1971: 10–12; Chapter 2).

In corpus planning terms, the colonial government encouraged and funded the study of dialectal variation in Sudanese Arabic. The production of bilingual dictionaries in English and Arabic as well as the study of social practices of local peoples are strongly supported. For instance, among the studies published during the colonial regime we find H. F. S Amery’s Sudan Arabic: English–Arabic Vocabulary (Hillelson 1930); Sudan Arabic Texts (Hillelson 1935); Sudan Courtesy Customs: A Foreigner Guide to Polite Phrases (Griffiths and Taha 1936), and Sudan Colloquial Arabic (Trimingham 1946). In this connection, I would contend that Phillipson’s (1992) critique of English linguistic imperialism does not quite fit the British colonial context in the southern Sudan, where English served alongside local languages in the resistance to Arabicisation. On the contrary, the colonial government had no quarrel with the dominant distribution of Arabic in the southern region from the period of 1899 to the early 1920s. Sanderson and Sanderson note:

To the ordinary Southerner, the [Anglo–Egyptian] Condominium Government presented itself as an Arabic–speaking institution. Apart from the occasional British inspector, remote or Olympian, all the officials whom he was likely to meet (including the warders if he went to jail) spoke Arabic either as their mother–tongue or as an effective second language usually acquired early in life. A Southerner who wished to be considered ‘civilised’ took these men, and especially the Arabised and Islamised Blacks in the Army, as his models; and for a Southerner to function as a ‘chief’ or notable under the administration, some ability to communicate in Arabic was virtually indispensable.

(Sanderson and Sanderson 1981: 78)

More importantly, the teaching of English was considered in the early years of the Condominium as just dangerous. Warburg (2003: 68) writes: ‘The principle guiding the British government in Sudan, as in its colonies, was that the teaching of English
or the establishment of a modern educational system was not only superfluous but potentially harmful’.

I would suggest that the interpretation of the colonial status of English in the southern Sudan accords with Pennycook’s (2000, 2001) theorising of ‘postcolonial performativity’. However, we should exercise caution when considering the historical status of English during the colonial regime with reference to Pennycook’s discourse of performativity. English was sanctioned by the British colonial regime as an official administrative language in alliance with what would later come to be known as ‘indigenous languages’, to resist not the dominant modernist discourses of the West but rather the spread of Arabicisation in the south. The point here is that Pennycook’s theorising of ‘postcolonial performativity’ should not be viewed as a project intended to deal exclusively with the hegemony of European languages, since this essentialising understanding may run the risk of escaping the hegemony exercised by other international, regional, or local languages.

Christian missionaries’ control over the educational system in the southern Sudan led to the emergence of a language ideology that connects English and Christianity (hence language and religion). Arabic and Islam in the north were viewed as the constituent elements of the Muslim identity. A one–to–one correspondence between religion and language was established and reproduced during the period of the colonial Southern Policy. Malwal (1981: 15) states:

There is no one dominant language in the southern Sudan. Each tribe has its own language irrespective of its size. Because of the domination of Arabic as a language in northern Sudan, and because it is the language of Islam, the colonial authorities in the Sudan did not interfere with it, and indeed encouraged it as a lingua franca for the north; it was however, discouraged in southern Sudan, where both tribal languages and English were fostered and taught in schools. Along with the English language, the colonial authorities officially encouraged Christianity, in southern Sudan. As a result, most of the educated Southerners at Independence were Christians whose only working language was English. Not only differences in language but also differences in religion came to play an important role in the South–North conflict. (Malwal 1981: 15–16)

This essentialist understanding of the relationship between language and religion is a colonial inheritance that has been manipulated by northern religious bourgeois
parties to serve their own material interests in the postcolonial period. I use the term ‘essentialism’ here to refer to the process by which particular social groups come to be defined on the basis of fundamental, immutable, and fixed characteristics (see May 2001: 18; Werbner 1997). Miller (2003a: 165) points out that the British colonial government was the first to clearly fuse the Arabic language and Islam in its linguistic policy. Postcolonial practice of language (education) planning has inherited this essentialist view of the relationship between language and religion.

It is worth mentioning that the colonial Southern Policy (1928–1945) succeeded in the removal of Arabic from the southern educational system; however, it failed to control the everyday discoursal practices of the southern people during the first half of the nineteenth century. Miller (2003a: 164) states that ‘the Sudanese case shows the relative ineffectiveness of planned language policies on daily language use’. Apart from a few studies on the Juba Pidgin Arabic (e.g., Mahmud 1983; Miller and Rendyang 1984; Miller 2003a, 2003b, 2006), the early practice of language planning paid scant attention to the folk discursive practices of the southerners outside of the educational arena. It is generally agreed that language is inherently dialogical, contestable, and negotiable in the sense that it exists in intertextual relations with other discourses. The argument that the Southern Policy in its linguistic dimension failed to plan the everyday use of Arabic in the south can be supported by a number of pieces of textual evidence. For instance, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the southern Sudan during August 1955 hinted at the conclusion that the Southern Policy could not replace Juba Arabic by English as a lingua franca in Equatoria in the southern Sudan:

In Equatoria there are not less than forty different tribes, each with their own traditions, beliefs and customs. The most numerous of these are Azande and the Baria. They speak different languages and dialects. A very crude form of Arabic serves as a lingua franca. Attempts to introduce English or other languages as a lingua Franca have failed. (Report of the Commission of Inquiry 1955: 4, my emphasis)

The argument here is that Juba Arabic in the southern Sudan has become an ‘appropriated’ marker of the communal identity of the Equatorian. Miller and Rendyang (1984) point out that Juba Arabic is more than a common instrument of communication in Equatoria. Rather, it is a symbol of the Equatorian identity:
JA [Juba Arabic] is considered as a local language, carrying African cultural values. JA is not linked with Arabic culture, it’s a symbol of the Equatorian feeling … At the end of the civil war, people coming from different ethnies were regrouped in Juba town. They were all sharing a common refusal toward Islamisation and Arabisation and claiming their African origin. But none of the vernacular languages could succeed in becoming a common medium … So little by little JA appeared as a symbol of the Equatorian identity and people start to consider it as an Afro–Arab language. (Miller and Rendyang 1984: 4, 5)

Miller and Rendyang’s statement was made more than two decades ago, and it can hardly be accepted at face value as a descriptive account of the present–day status of Juba Arabic in Equatoria. Miller (2003b) has recently found out that Juba Arabic is a way of signifying the southern Sudanese identity not just in the southern Sudan but also in the capital Khartoum. Suffice it here to say that the dialectical variability of Sudanese Arabic has contributed and continues to contribute to the reproduction and maintenance of a hierarchical social order not only among tribal groups in the Sudan but also between the northern Sudanese and their Middle Eastern counterparts.

Halliday (1978: 179) points out that ‘the social function of dialect variation is to express, symbolise and maintain the social order; and the social order is an essentially hierarchic one’. For instance, southerners are discursively positioned within a social system of national relations in the same discursive way in which northerners are positioned within the system of Middle Eastern (Arab) relations. The social system at national, regional, and international levels is essentially hierarchic and multilayered. The point I am trying to make here is that the historical genealogy and the social conditions within which Juba Arabic has emerged lead to the conclusion that it can be viewed as a southern property. Although Juba Arabic might be understood as a product of the historical subjugation of southerners (through the slave trade; see Miller 2003a: 161), it can still be viewed as a counter–hegemonic language to the nationalist discourse of northern governments, as well as an identity boundary resource as the case of the Equatorian musical group in Khartoum has shown (Miller 2003b). But the question that immediately arises is: if Juba Arabic is viewed as a property of the south, is there any possibility to see it instated by the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) as an official working language within the framework of the NLP? One legitimate criticism that can be levelled against the southern elites who controlled the southern region during the 1970s (a peaceful
period following the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement 1972) is: Why did they not recognise Juba Arabic and further strengthen the official status of local languages? Mahmud (1983) strongly criticises the southern elites for the overestimation of English and underestimation of the role Juba Arabic and local languages could have played in the power struggle:

Language–related problems plague the southern Sudan. The fifty vernacular languages and the Arabic pidgin–creole varieties that are spoken by the overwhelming majority of the people have virtually no place in the context of political power distribution and of access to the socio–economic resources – controlled and organised by the state mainly through the medium of English. Under this arrangement, structural inequalities continue to reproduce themselves and are continually maintained and guarded by a constellation of hegemonic forces, one of which is language. (Mahmud 1983: 1)

I have so far discussed the colonial invention of ‘indigenous’ languages in the southern Sudan. I proceed now to broadly consider the colonial practice of ‘inventing traditions’ in the north. The northern part (which is itself a colonial construct) has been subjected to the process of invention of traditions during the colonial/postcolonial period. Colonial invention of the northern identity vis–à–vis the southern one was conducted along strictly ethnolinguistic lines. The colonial government represented and validated the north as an ‘anti–society’ to the south, and its discursive practices as ‘anti–languages’ to its southern counterpart (the terms are Halliday’s 1978: 154). Put in crude terms, the ‘north and the ‘south’ as part of a present–day sovereign Sudan nation–state are colonial creations. Wakoson (1980) states that:

It was under the Anglo–Egyptian Administration of 1898–1956 that the boundaries of the Sudan were formally drawn. The British being the stronger partners in the Condominium rule, created perhaps the most artificial of many administrative political units ever created in the course of European colonisation of Africa. (Wakoson 1980: 87)

With this in mind, the ideology of ‘New Sudan’ encapsulated in the CPA is intended to ‘disinvent’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006) the old terms of this colonial/neocolonial construction and to reinvent/reconstruct a new democratic Sudan on new terms. The late John Garang comments that:

The reality of the Sudanese society is that modern Sudan is a product of historical development before, during, and after the alternate colonial rule of the Turks, the British and the Egyptians. In this we are not alone.
Like other nations, nations and states are products of history. At present our immediate task is to form a new Sudan. (Garang 1992: 127)

It is significant to point out that the institutionalisation of Arabic and Islam as the policy of the northern Sudan is a colonial invention. O’Fahey (1996: 260) states that ‘a consciously institutionalised Islamic policy in the Sudan is a British invention’. The British colonial rule imported to the Sudan policies fashioned in India. Ultimately the legal system in the Sudan with respect to Muslims emanated from the Indian Penal Code of 1837 and the later Indian Civil Procedure Code (Mahgoub 1974: 35; see Warburg 1971: 124–136; Johnson 2003: 13; Fluehr–Lobban 1985). In respect of Islamic practices in matters of personal status such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, the Sharia law was implemented. In criminal matters, as under the Funj and Darfur Sultanates, secular or state law was applied (see O’Fahey 1996: 260). According to O’Fahey (ibid.:261), ‘an important British legacy was the institutionalisation of law; the creation of institutions for training “qadis”, the formalisation of distinctions between state and private–status law, and a recognition of the potentiality for a conflict of laws’.

Furthermore, ‘the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance’, informed by the Lugardian project of ‘Indirect Rule’ (see Sanderson 1976: 74–75, Lugard 1965; Ibrahim 1985: 31–32; MacMichael 1934: 243–257; Johnson 2003: ch. 2; Chapter 4) regulated the power of ‘tribal’ leaders. The ‘village Courts Ordinance’ 1925, was also invented to grant ‘Omdas’ [tribal leaders] the power to impose limited amount of fines (see Sanderson 1989: 74). The principle of Indirect Rule (known also as the native administration or devolution, see Woodward 1979: 8; MacMichael 1934: 243–257; Johnson 2003: 11) was primarily invented to act as an ‘anti–nationalist strategy’ against the nationalist aspirations of the intelligentsia and against the potential rise of the Neo–Mahdism (Mahdism is the religious movement [1881–1898] which ended the Turco–Egyptian rule in 1885, see Sanderson 1989: 81; for a detailed review of the Mahdist state in the Sudan see Holt 1970).

The Nigerian style of Indirect Rule was set as an example to be emulated in the Sudan (for a comparative analysis see Chapter 4; Sanderson 1989). The words of
John Maffey (Governor-General, 1926–1933) clearly assert the main objective behind the invention of this tradition, which is (cited in Sanderson 1989: 81):

To frustrate the development of nationalism by partitioning the rural Sudan to genuinely viable native states, autocratically ruled by the natural leaders of the people. In this way the country will be parcelled out into nicely balanced compartments; protective glands against the septic germs (of nationalism) which will inevitably be passed on from the Khartoum of the future.

According to Sanderson (1989: 82-83), the invention of ‘truly native and traditional’ tribal groups has been obstructed by a number of difficulties. For instance, large tribal units invariably were composed of enclaves of tribally alien inhabitants. The solution taken was to amalgamate certain tribes into territorial units. This led to mutually hostile social groups being cobbled together into units that were far from being ‘truly native and traditional’ (ibid.). Sanderson (bid.: 83) comments that ‘it was from the outset very unlikely that these heterogeneous and artificial creations could ever achieve the authority, and generate the loyalties, which would make them effective “protective glands” against nationalism’. The point here is that, as Nagel (1994: 166) notes, the ‘British conception of “tribes” and “tribal” shaped many of their colonial policies, such as geographic administrative boundaries, education policies, and hiring practices’. The editorial policy of the Sudan Notes and Records (a periodical established by colonial government in 1918) ‘favoured notables and tribal chiefs, rather than the intelligentsia, by allotting space in this periodical to articles “written” by Sudanese sheikhs, a phenomenon occurring at a time when the policy of Indirect Rule figured most prominently in the calculation of the administration’ (Hamad 1995: 239).

Moreover, the British colonial regime contributed to the invention of political bourgeois parties along strictly demarcated ethnolinguistic and religious lines. The dominant political parties ‘were based on supra–ethnic avowedly Islamic organisation’ (O’Fahey 1996: 261). The colonially established tribal structure directly shaped the type of power relations between the major northern bourgeois political parties on the one hand, and southern social groups. Apart from the NCP which emerged in the 1960s under the name of Islamic Charter, the major agricultural/commercial political forces and revolutionary socialist formations were
formed during the Second World War (see Mahmud 1983: 110). The Ashiqqa (literally blood brothers) Party was established in 1943; the Umma Party was formed in 1945, and the Communist Political Party was founded in 1946. The two large bourgeois political forces which would dominate the northern political arena for several decades to come are closely aligned with major Islamic sects in the Sudan: the Umma with the Mahdists and the Ashiqqa with Khatmiyya (Mahmud 1983: 110; Morton 1989: 63). The Mahdist Movement ended the Turco–Egyptian rule in the late nineteenth century, whereas Khatmiyya is a Sufi order introduced into northern Sudan in the early nineteenth century (see Morton 1989: 63). Each religious order ‘has a large following in the rural areas, where allegiance to an order tends to go hand in hand with tribal identity’ (ibid.).

The colonial strategy of ‘inventing traditions’, which involved the processes of codification of the power of tribal people, is among other things, intended to contain potential nationalist movements. It is this new class of religious masters (the term ‘Sayid’ as a social title in Arabic means ‘master’ in English) who colluded with the colonial government in constraining the nationalist aspirations of the educated elite. To abort any other potential nationalist sentiments by educated elites or by Neo–Mahdists, and to control regional interaction between the south and the north, the British colonial government started to institutionalise and glorify the tribal styles of life, and by extension the power of religious leaders and tribal chiefs. This administrative strategy of ‘romantic nativism’ (in the terms of Prunier 2005: 32) was part and parcel of the colonial Southern Policy which is intended to construct southern and northern Sudan along distinct cultural lines.

The 1920s witnessed various anti–colonial demonstrations in the Sudan. For instance, the ‘White Flag League’, founded in 1924 by a military officer from the south, was one of the significant anti–colonial formations in the north (for a detailed historical review of this nationalist movement see Kurita 1989). At this time, the Sudanese agricultural capitalists were in complete alliance with the colonial rule, and were antagonistic to this anti–colonial movement. The editor of ‘Hadar’ (a pro–British newspaper established in 1920, see Woodward 1979: 6) which was owned by
Sayid Abel Rahman Almahdi, Sayid Ali Al–Mirghani and Sayid Shareif Al–Hindi attacked the anti–colonial movement of 1924. The words used in the textual assault point clearly to the already socially and racially–stratified nature of the northern society at the time (cited in Mahmud 1983: 110):

The White Flag League should know that it is embarrassing the entire country. Those who demonstrated were the poorest and of the lowest strata of unrecognised members of the Sudanese Society … The storm created by the scum of society disturbed people of status, merchants, businessmen and the men of good origin.

In 1946, the colonial government decided to radically change its policy (for a discussion of the reasons behind this change in policy see Chapter 4). The new position adopted by the government is now to unify the south and the north into one nation–state (see Albino 1970: 23; Nyombe 1997: 106). In a letter addressed to Governors of Southern Provinces and Directors of Departments, Mr Robertson, the Civil Secretary announced the official end of the colonial Southern Policy (for the full text of the memorandum see Beshir 1968: 119–121; Abdel–Rahim 1969: 253–256; Said 1965: 162–165; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 29–32; Chapter 4):

The British colonial government selected the habitus of the dominant northern group (the riverain culture) as the ‘Staatsvolk’, in Connor’s (1993) terms, upon which the new nation–state was planned to be constructed. Colonial constructs such as ‘the Muslim north’ and the ‘Christian south’ have been inherited and maintained by postcolonial governments in the modern Sudan. Thus, the riverain habitus along with the social practices it produces has come to constitute ‘cultural capital’ with Arabic as its ‘linguistic capital’. Arabic has become a symbol of oppression. The end product is that we have a ‘nation’ constructed (or rather, unsuccessfully constructed) on a culturally homogeneous and ethnically exclusive basis that is directly opposed to the material and discursive realities. It is the postcolonial governments that continued the effort of building a homogeneous nation through the normativisation of riverain habitus as the standard cultural frame of reference, and through institutionalisation of its social practices in the social system. The educational system was and still continues to be largely counted on as a primary socialising agency to internalise the values of the dominant groups into individual personalities. Joseph (2006a: 46) reminds us that ‘if language and politics were a country, education
would be its capital, the great centralised and centralising metropolis that everyone passes through, from which the country is run and where its future course is determined’. Hence, the centrality of the discourse of Arabicisation is more visible. The definition of ‘national’ identity has become, in the words of Deng (1995: 11) ‘an internecine war of visions’. This ideological struggle which is largely discursive is encoded in the structural system of the NLP. Political nationalism in the Gellnerian sense and citizenship are not necessarily equivalent (see May 2001: 77). This conceptual distinction may explain the endorsement by the CPA of differentiated ‘citizenship rights’ including language rights, rather than ‘the nation’s rights’, as the collective common base upon which a sense of belonging to the state should be constructed. What is at stake here is, in the terms of Wimmer (1997), ‘who owns the state’. It is within this context that the project of the ‘New Sudan’ can be interpreted. The words of the late John Garang (the founder of the SPM) can summarise the colonial and neocolonial invention and maintenance of the social order/identity by colonial and postcolonial governments:

The history of the Sudanese people from time immemorial has been the struggle of the masses of the people against internal and external oppression. The oppressor has time and again employed various policies and methods of destroying or weakening the just struggle of our people, including the most notorious policy of ‘divide and rule’. To this end the oppressor has divided the Sudanese people into Northerners and Southerners; Westerners and Easterners, Halfawin and the so-called Awlad et Balad who have hitherto wielded political power in Khartoum; while in the south, people have been politicised along tribal lines resulting in such ridiculous slogans as ‘Dinka Unity’, ‘Great Equatoria’, ‘Bari Speakers’, ‘Luo Unity’ and so forth. The oppressor has also divided us into Muslims and Christians, and into Arabs and Africans. (Garang 1992: 19)

Given the historical relationship between the northern Arabised cultural practices and, in Halliday’s words (1978: 154), their southern ‘antilanguages’ and ‘antisocieties’, the first policy statement can be interpreted as a rejection of the existing social order within which only Arabic is viewed as a national language. An antilanguage ‘arises when the alternative reality is counter–reality, set up in opposition to some established reality’ (Halliday 1978: 171, emphasis in original). In this sense, the Dinka language in the southern Sudan, the Beja language in the eastern Sudan, and the Fur language in the western Sudan, to name a few, can be considered, in Halliday’s (1978: 185) terms, as ‘protest languages’ of ‘social conflict
– of passive resistance or active opposition’, as well as media of articulating and maintaining the ‘structure of the antisociety’.

One can counter-argue that the first policy statement is merely symbolic in the sense that it is rhetorically constructed to accord with the principle of ‘ethnolinguistic democracy’ (Fishman 1994b). But ‘ethnolinguistic democracy’ does not necessarily entail or mean ‘ethnolinguistic equality’ (Fishman 1994b: 51). Symbolic ethnicity is, as Gans (1979: 9) defines it, ‘characterised by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour’ (cf. ‘instrumental ethnicity’, see Fenton 1999; May 2001: 35–38). This argument is not completely unfounded. For example, in Peru, the phrase ‘national languages’ designates all indigenous languages of the nation (Heath 1978: 53). According to this interpretation, the term ‘national languages’ in the context of the first policy statement refers to languages ‘symbolic of national identity’ (Ruiz 1990: 20). This conception is contrasted with the definition of a ‘national language’ as a language the use of which is functionally and geographically widespread (ibid.). It is in this sense that language ideologies in the north have represented Arabic as the national language of the whole country by virtue of its function as a lingua franca, and then has been institutionally enforced and declared by central governments as the official language of the country (for a detailed discussion of language ideologies see Joseph and Taylor 1990; Woolward and Schieffelin 1994; Blommaert 1999 (ed.); Thompson 1984; Dorian 1998). So this argument goes on to claim that the language policy statement assigns local languages a non–instrumental value, since there is practically no state that can grant all its local languages the functional status of a national language (for a definition of non–instrumental language rights see Rubio–Marin 2003; for a typology of language policies in relation to language status see Ruiz 1990). I argue that a symbolic recognition of the ‘indigenousness’ of some languages (and by extension their language users) can itself have significant political implications. I have shown above that some international legal bodies such as the ILO and the Working Group sanction self–determination as an automatic human right for indigenous peoples. The legal discourse of Machakos Protocol i.e., one of
the constituent protocols of the CPA, accords well with this international human right of ‘indigenous peoples’ (the targeted words are emphasised). Thus, the Machakos Protocol fixes the interpretation of the term ‘indigenous’ in the NLP as a designation of the southern Sudan:

The Parties [SPLM and NCP] have reached specific agreement on the Right to Self–Determination for the people of South Sudan, State and Religion, as well as the Preamble, Principles, and the Transition Process from the Draft Framework, the initialled texts of which are annexed hereto, and all of which will be subsequently incorporated into the Final Agreement.

The Protocol on Power–Sharing, i.e., another constituent protocol of the CPA, refers to the mechanism through which the right of southerners to self–determination will be granted. Hence, the Protocol of Power-sharing reinforces the specific interpretation of the word indigenous in the NLP (see the Appendix):

2.10.1.5 An ad–hoc Commission to monitor and ensure accuracy, legitimacy, and transparency of the Referendum as mentioned in the Machakos Protocol on Self–Determination for the People of South Sudan, which shall also include international experts.

Chapter 2 in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan which has been ratified in 2005, has used the principle of ‘indigenousness’ as one of the central defining criteria for granting a person the right to vote on the referendum that will be held in four years time (for full text of constitution see http://www.cushcommunity.org). In short, the term ‘indigenous’ is intended to designate the cultural identity of the southern Sudanese, and the way in which it is employed in the CPA is compatible with the legal discourse of some international instruments on the human rights of indigenous peoples (the right to self–determination, see for example ILO’s Convention No.169). The point here is that the focus of southern politicians is not on the indigenousness of their African race/ethnicity per se, but rather on the international legal implications of being recognised as ‘indigenous’. Put bluntly, the focus here is on the right to external self–determination. Viewed in this way, the expressions ‘indigenous languages’ and ‘national languages’ not only signify a symbolic sense of belonging but also an instrumental one, since they constitute the base for the claim to have access to the rights associated with ‘indigenousness’ (e.g., right to external self–determination). A referendum will be held in four years’ time for the southerners to determine whether to be part of a united Sudan or to have their own independent nation–state. A historical analysis of the power relations between
the south and the north can reveal that the difference–blind statist (linguistic) nationalism of northern governments is the prime cause, if not the only cause, behind the emergence of the southern voice for self-determination as the route to social emancipation. For instance, in a 1963 petition to the United Nations on behalf of the people of southern Sudan, the Sudan African Closed District National Union (henceforth SACDNU Petition) stated:

Reason for the petition: To ask the United Nations to investigate political conditions in the southern Sudan and to enable the southern Sudanese to decide their political future in accordance with the principle of self-determination. (SACDNU Petition 1963: 2)

It should be noted that the very naming practice adopted by the major southern opposition (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, SPLM/A), who signed the CPA with the NCP points to the conclusion that southern Sudanese are a ‘people’ who are entitled to ‘external self-determination’.

Be that as it may be, the argument that the referent of the term ‘indigenous languages/peoples’ are the southern Sudan languages and people requires an immediate qualification to avoid any essentialising interpretations (e.g., southerners are the only ‘indigenous’ population). The fact that the peace agreement is signed by two parties (NCP and SPLM/A) with unequal power relations (the former has much more political power than the other), and with unequal discursive rights (Arabic is dominating in official domains) supports the above interpretation of the term ‘indigenous’. I have shown above that the Machakos Protocol and the Protocol of Power-sharing have explicitly assigned the south, and not the north, the right to self-determination. However, this does not necessarily suffice to exclude Arabic from the ‘fictive’ list of ‘indigenous’ languages of the Sudan, nor does it preclude the potential demand of the right to self-determination by Arabic speakers. Although self-determination is always claimed by structurally marginalised communities, it does not mean that dominant groups are naturally denied this ‘indigenous’ right.

The point here is that if the very definition of the term ‘indigenous’ in international law always holds true, then the same indigenous human rights to self-determination should be extended to northern Sudanese Arabic speaking communities. This rationalisation is not completely hypothetical. A new (religious) nationalist
movement with an openly secessionist approach has emerged in the north demanding self-determination from the south. This nationalist movement is called the ‘Just Peace Forum’ (henceforth JPF), and was founded by Al-Tayeeb Mustafa (the uncle of President Beshir and a member of the NCP). The ethnicist discourse of the JPF is based on stereotypic representations of the north as predominantly Muslim with the Arabic language as its primary tongue in contrast to the Christian, non-Arabic southern. The nationalist discourse of the JPF considers the CPA as a threat to the ‘Sharia’ (Islamic law) in the north (see Young 2005: 537). The JPF is using different discursive spaces (e.g., a newspaper) for mobilising northerners around its separatist objectives. The JPF exploits the discourse of religious diversity between the south and north as a reason for rejecting the philosophy of the ‘New Sudan’ (the social construction of a new social order in the Sudan pending a faithful implementation of the CPA). The nationalist ideology of JPF is constituted out of a set of essentialist categorisations that describes the north (including the east and the west) as inherently Muslim and Arab on the one hand, and the south as indexically Christian and anti-Arab on the other hand. The JPF, I would suggest, is the illustration of ‘ethnicism’ in the present day Sudan, i.e., a culturally/ethnically argued racism (see Skutnabb-Kangas 1998: 16–18; May 2001: 33–35). The JPF has indirectly uncovered the ‘banality’ of a historical triumph of a specific culture and language (the riverain Arabic culture) over other cultures and languages as a product of a process of attempting to construct a homogeneous nation (cf. Connor’s 1993 ‘Staatsvolk’).

Billing rightly states:

The battle for nationhood is a battle for hegemony, by which a part claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence. The achievement of national hegemony is well illustrated by the triumph of official national languages and the suppression of rivals — a triumph which has so often accompanied the construction of statehood … The triumph of a particular nationalism is seldom achieved without the defeat of alternative nationalisms and other ways of imagining peoplehood. (Billig 1995: 27–28)

Figure 5.1 points to the ways in which this nationalist ideology has capitalised on the colonially invented essentialising categorisations.
Figure 5.1. A Board Announcement of the Just Peace Forum at the University of Khartoum, Sudan, December 2006
Translation: 1. ‘Together …. Against the project of the New Sudan. The Just Peace Forum Students’ (Left–hand side announcement), 2. ‘Separation is the ideal option for the peoples of the south and the north. The Just Peace Forum Students’ (right–hand side announcement).

5.2.2 The NLP as a corrective to the nationalist policy of Arabisation
The second Naivasha language policy statement stipulates:

Arabic language is the widely spoken national language in the Sudan.

The way in which the second policy statement is written warrants a brief comment. Systemically speaking, the field of discourse of the statement (the experiential metafunction of the text) is about the status of Arabic in the Sudan. The tenor of discourse (the interpersonal metafunction) points to the hierarchically structured relation of power between a group whose language is widely spoken and those whose languages are less spoken in the Sudan. With regard to the mode of discourse (the
textual metafunction), it is a written descriptive statement which has the speech function of categorically identifying the status of Arabic as ‘widely spoken language’. This categorical assertion is expressed through the epistemic use of non-modal present tense (‘is’). That is, the status of the Arabic language is expressed in a categorical non-modal present tense ‘is’.

The dominant distribution of the Arabic language is textually realised by the phrase ‘widely spoken’. The expression ‘widely spoken’ might be seen as a euphemism for ‘dominant’. Williams (1992: 127) points out that the expression ‘the language of wider communication’ is a depoliticised manner of referring to a single dominant language: ‘What is labelled the “language of wider communication” is little more than an agency of ideological control which facilitates world domination’. The reference ‘the’ is significant, since it implies that the spread of Arabic is a fact recognised by both the writer and the potential reader of this sentence.

The immediate question is: why is the term ‘national’ repeated in juxtaposition with Arabic in the second statement? The term ‘national’ is already mentioned in the first policy statement in collocation with ‘indigenous languages’. This lexical repetition of the term ‘national’ in the NLP is ideological and asserts the aforementioned interpretation in respect of the first statement (that ‘indigenous’ designates southern languages). This statement is a confirmation of the current state of affairs: the Arabic language is a medium of wider communication (i.e., a lingua franca), since it dominates the official functional domains including education, legislature, business transactions, and political debating and deliberations across communities who primarily speak mutually incomprehensible languages. The question that may disclose other implications is that, if this is a simple statement of fact, why then need it be stipulated in such constitutional documents? At least part of the explanation, if not all of it, lies in the fact that the peace protocols are for settling a conflict not so much between two regions but rather between two almost completely different ideologies: the north, which is characterised by the Arabic language and Islam, and the south, which is characterised by English, local languages, and Christianity.
The dominant language ideologies underlying the (colonially constructed) relationship between Arabic and Islam entails that if the status of Arabic was to be challenged, the status of Islam would be challenged correspondingly. Hence, the implied message is one of social and linguistic security sent to Arabic speakers that the CPA would do no harm to their language or religious status in Sudan. It is remarkable to the observation that the Machakos Protocol is a compromise between Sharia (Islamic law) and right to self-determination for the south (see Young 2005: 535).

Put in crude terms, the first policy statement asserts the African character of the country’s national identity, while the second one asserts the Arabic/Arab identity of the same country. One prominent northern scholar went to the extreme of suggesting that the Sudan (which literally means Land of the Blacks) should change its name, since it is reminiscent of a racial banner (Deng 1995: 3).

Race, a colonial principle of typology, is manipulated and mobilised by northern sectarian governments as a boundary marker of ‘us’ against ‘them’. It is in this sense that ethnicity is objectified and naturalised as a sociobiological phenomenon (van den Berghe 1981, 1995) culminating in an ethnic layering of populations into ‘mondokoro’ (Arabs) and ‘abid’ (slaves) (see Miller 2003a: 166). The colour of the riverain people (the Arabised dominant groups) is socially constructed and interpreted as ‘brown’. The ‘brown’ skin colour has been represented as the standard stereotypical representation of the north, and by extension the whole state. This social construct has become an effective exclusionary boundary marker of the northern identity. Deng (1995) comments:

Northern racial pride focuses on the right brown colour of the skin, considered the standard for the north and therefore for the Sudan. To be too light for a Sudanese is to risk being considered a foreigner, a khawajah (European), a Middle Eastern Arab, or worse, a Halabi, a term used for a Gypsy–type racial group, considered among the lowest of the light–skinned races. The other side of the coin is, of course, looking down on the black race as inferior, a condition from which one has mercifully been redeemed. Northern Sudanese racism and cultural chauvinism, therefore, condemns both the very dark and the very light. (Deng 1995: 5)
The social construction of the ‘non–brown’, ‘non–Arabic speaking’, and ‘non–Muslim’ as the ‘Other’ has been instrumental in the contrastive identification of the riverain groups as the ‘master race’. Deng notes:

Virtually all ethnic groups in the country have their primary roots in the black African tribes. Evidence of this fact is still visible in all the tribes, including those in the north who identify themselves as Arabs. Their identification with Arabism is, however, the result of a process in which races and religions were ranked, with Arabs and Muslims respected as free, superior, and a race of slave masters, while Negroes, blacks, and heathens were viewed as a legitimate target of slavery, if they were not in fact already slaves. Given a situation where non–Arabs were allowed to alter their lot dramatically by converting to Islam, learning to speak the Arabic language, intermarrying with the Arabs, and identifying genealogically with the master race, the move to assimilation was irresistible. (Deng 1995: 4–5)

As the above argument of Deng shows, two sets of cultural and social representations have been essentialisingly operative to mark the social interface between the south and the north. The first set of cultural representations which includes ‘heathen’ ‘African’, ‘slave’, ‘Negro’, and ‘black’ is ascribed to southerners, while the second set which contains features ‘Arab’, ‘Muslim’, ‘master’, and ‘Arabic–speaking’ is attributed to northerners. These essentialised cultural distinctions have given rise to new form of racism that define social groups in inherently or indexically cultural and ethnic terms (for a discussion of ‘New Racism’ or ‘ethnicism’ see Barker 1981; Skutnabb–Kangas 1998; Wetherall and Potter 1992; van Dijk 1993; May 2001: 33–35). By contrast to a biologically argued racism, ethnicism has emerged as a culturally/ethnically argued racism, and ‘linguicism’ as a linguistically argued racism (Skutnabb–Kangas 1998: 16–18).

The point here is that the policy statement that Arabic is the ‘national’ language points to a particular ideological stance. It is intertextual with the 1998 National Constitution language policy of the NCP. So we have two schemes of classification of the discursive social order in the Sudan; each is based on a specific ideological view. The first scheme (of the SPLM/A) refers to the linguistic human rights of all social groups in the Sudan and demands an equal social position with respect to their African identity, while the second scheme (of the NCP) indicates that local languages are not functionally equal (not widely spoken) with the Arabic language. In other
words, two forms of identities are textualised in the first two statements: the first sentence projects an African identity on Sudan (this view is mainly held by the SPLM/A), while the second sentence projects a dominant Arab identity. In other words, the first policy statement belongs to the scheme that views Sudan as inherently an African state whose local languages are part of its national resources (this pluralist view is championed by the SPLM/A). In contrast, the second scheme, which is textually represented in the second policy statement views Sudan as an ‘Arab’ or ‘Arabised’ country (this nationalist view is endorsed by the NCP). That is to say, the first policy statement represents a pluralist discourse (the SPLM/A), while the second policy statement represents a mono–nationalist discourse (the NCP). Both of these antagonistic ideological representations are discursively encoded in the language policy. Hence, one can argue that the discourse of the language policy is structurally a site of, and pragmatically has a stake in, the ideological struggle between the socialist principle that conceptualises Sudan in pluralist terms, and the nationalist principle that frames Sudan as a monolingual nation–state. Or to say the same thing in a different way, we have two ideological frameworks: ‘left’ (represented by the SPLM/A) and ‘right’ (represented by the NCP) struggling over the definition of the sociolinguistic order in the Sudan. The social relations between the NCP and the SPLM/A are textually encoded in the relational values of the words of the policy (indigenous, national, widely spoken, major, etc.). This tension within the lexical system of the NLP points to the conclusion that the language policy is an arena of social struggle between the south and the north over the identification of the discursive character of the Sudan. In the terms of Deng (1995: 5), ‘in the Sudanese context, the more the North asserts its Arabness, the more the South asserts Africanness as a counter–identity’. In other words, the historical conflict over national identity between the south and north that inherently incorporates a conflict of power relations is enacted in the structural system of the NLP. The NLP should be viewed (and it partly is) as a product of a long process of meaningful negotiations between the NCP and the SPLM/A (as part of the peace negotiations) that ultimately led to the CPA.

5.2.3 The NLP and university bilingual education
The third language policy statement stipulates:

Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the official working languages of the National Government business and languages of instruction for higher education.

To begin with a systemic analysis of the policy statement, it can be noted that the field of this stretch of discourse (the experiential meaning) is the official status of English and Arabic as media of university education and governmental business. The field also includes contextual elements and processes such as ‘National Government’, ‘languages of instruction’ and ‘higher education’. With reference to the tenor of this discourse (the interpersonal meaning), the actors or players who are responsible for the implementation of this language policy are the NCP and SPLM/A. It is remarkable that again this tenor is disguised through the grammatical use of the passive construction (which is part of the textual meaning of the sentence). With respect to the mode of discourse (the textual meaning), the use of English and Arabic in higher education is obligatory. This sense of obligation is actualised through the deontic use of the ‘legal shall’. Another observation is that the third policy statement in the NLP consists of a matrix clause with embedded subordinate phrases. The subordinate phrase (a major language at the national level) is a rewording of the second policy statement (the widely spoken national language in the Sudan). Regarding lexical items, one can remark that the terms ‘major’ ‘national’ ‘language’ ‘Arabic’ ‘higher education’ are collocates and that they are part of the same lexical set referred to above in the analysis of the first and second policy statement. There is also a collocational relation set up between Arabic as a ‘widely spoken language’ (second statement), and Arabic as ‘a major language’ (third statement) which evidentially carries a particular experiential view of this language. The terms ‘widely’ and ‘major’ are another synonymous wording of ‘dominating’ and ‘dominant’. Viewed in this way, the interpretation here is that the sociolinguistic domination by the Arabic language of ‘indigenous’ languages is textually disguised and reproduced by exploiting the lexical system of the language policy. The rewording and overwording of the status of Arabic point to a preoccupation of the NCP with a particular aspect of the sociolinguistic order in the Sudan. The
punctuation marks (e.g., syntactic markers of subordinate relations) and the thematic organisation of the third policy statement are ideologically significant. The subordinate phrase ‘as a major language at the national language’ is not the theme of the sentence; rather it is kept in the background. The test for this language ideology is provided by the way in which it is syntactically encoded in the sentence: it can be deleted without disturbing the semantic equilibrium of the sentence.

Another significant observation about the third policy statement is that, constitutionally (at the status–planning level), it assigns Arabic and English equal official status. The term ‘official’ warrants some comment here. Generally speaking, there are two conceptions of the term ‘official language’ in the literature. The first conception defines official language with reference to authoritative policy statements. The second sense identifies official language by reference to use in specific domains such as education and media (see Conrad and Fishman 1977; Ruiz 1990; Keller 1983; Cobarrubias 1983). Cobarrubias (1983: 43) distinguishes between three types of state with reference to official language: endoglossic, exoglossic, and mixed state. An endoglossic state is one in which the official language is an ‘indigenous’ language (e.g., Welsh and Gaelic in the UK.). Here, an ‘indigenous’ language is understood to refer to a language that is ‘spoken natively by a sizeable segment of the population’ (ibid.). An exoglossic state is one where the official language is an imported language or excolonial language (e.g., Nigeria, Kenya, etc.). A mixed state is one in which the status of the official language is granted to both an indigenous and an imported language. As for the third policy statement, the term ‘official’ refers axiomatically to the authoritative declaration of English and Arabic as official languages. The equal use of English and Arabic in official domains has yet to be seen. With respect to Cobarrubias’s (1983) typology of official language states, the third language policy shows Sudan to be of a ‘mixed’ type: Arabic is interpreted by its speakers as an ‘indigenous’ language (in the north) and English as an excolonial language. Yet, I would argue that Cobarrubias’s category of official languages imposes a deterministic and fixed typecasting of languages into ‘endoglossic’ (or indigenous) and ‘exoglossic’ (or colonial/outside). First, it seems to have escaped the dynamic and social constructedness of official language situations...
in countries such as the Sudan. I have already demonstrated the role the British colonial regime played in the invention of ‘indigenous’ languages in southern Sudan to antagonise the northern nationalist ideology. Secondly, if an ex–colonial language has undergone a strategic process of appropriation or Abstand planning, then its modified resisting form can become the property of its speakers (see Joseph 2006a: 54). Historically speaking, Arabic is an ex–colonial language in the Sudan in the southern view (exoglossic in Cobarrubias’ 1983 terms); however, it has undergone a process of linguistic appropriation in the sense that it has become not only a native tongue but also a marker of collective identities in the north.

Moreover, the subordinate phrase in the third policy statement can act as a rationalisation for selecting Arabic as an official language (because it is a major language in the Sudan). There is no rationalisation given for extending the same official recognition to English. In other words, the recognition of English is not qualified by any evaluative words to justify its selection as an official working language. This opens the door for a range of possible interpretations. For instance, some interpreters of the policy may be led to construct their own interpretation of English as a ‘neutral language’ in the social struggle between the two social forces (the NCP and the SPLM/A). This interpretation is implausible for two reasons. I have shown that the northern nationalist parties including the NCP strategically viewed English as an ‘antilanguage’ (in terms of Halliday 1978: 154) to the linguistic policy of Arabicisation. Hence with respect to the nationalist northern political parties, English ipso facto not a neutral language. In the discussion of the colonial Southern Policy above, I have demonstrated that English colluded with local languages in the resistance to the nationalist discourse of Arabicisation. The colonial Southern Policy can act as one of the intertextual contexts for rendering intelligible the historical cause behind the officialisation of English in the NLP. So for southerners, I would conclude, English is historically implicated in the southern struggle against any linguistic neo–colonisation.

More importantly, a historical analysis of the southern social struggle through organised political movements shows that the proposal to have English and Arabic as
official languages within a federal state is not a novelty. The Federal Party (a postcolonial southern party formed by Ezboni Mondiri, a graduate of the Faculty of Arts, the University of Khartoum), included in its manifesto a draft constitution for a federal state in the Sudan (Bob and Wassara 1989: 306–307; Sanderson and Sanderson 1981: 353–354). The manifesto demanded recognition of both English and Arabic as official languages. It also called for the recognition of both Christianity and Islam as state religions as well as a separate civil service for the south. The Federal Party demanded that the south control its own educational system and be crowned by a university. Another controversial demand by the Federal Party was ‘the transfer of Sudan from the Arab world to the African’. On this demand, Sanderson and Sanderson (1981: 354) comment that ‘extravagant as this demand may seem, it nonetheless articulated one of the deepest southern misgivings’. Ezboni Mondiri won the February elections of 1958; however, he was arrested before taking his seat in the parliament. The third policy statement in the NLP can rightly be interpreted as a product of the long social and armed struggle of SPLM for a federal system within which English and Arabic are equally weighted as official languages. The NLP can be viewed as a discursive (and interdiscursive) hybridisation of two historically conflicting ideologies in the Sudan (secular socialism by the SPLM/A vs. sectarian nationalism by the NCP). The thrust of the argument then is that the selection of English as an official working language in the NLP is not purely instrumental but also ideological. In a word, within the context of the NLP English is undergoing a dual process of decolonisation and ‘indigenisation’ in Sudan. The point here is that the NLP has to be historicised to have a meaningful historical context for understanding the language situation in the Sudan.

Furthermore, the third policy statement has significant future ideological and political implications and ramifications for the linguistic social order in the Sudan: societal bilingualism without diglossia in Arabic and English is likely to emerge. In the course of doing so, the NLP can contribute to the creation of a democratic space for what Foucault (1980: 82) calls ‘subjugated knowledges’. Foucault defines ‘subjugated knowledges’ as ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located
low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientficity’ (ibid.). The NLP focuses on bilingual education at university level and grants the regional states the right to structure non–university education in the way that suits them.

It should be remarked that bilingual education in a non–official local language and Arabic/English is a rarity in the Sudan. An explanation for the lack of provision of education in other local languages has to invoke the historical relationship between the linguistic policies of Arabicisation and the ideology of nation building. It is not my purpose here to offer a detailed critique of the linguistic policies of Arabicisation. I have already touched on such a critique when I reviewed the relationship between the policy of Arabicisation and ‘Sudanisation’ as a postcolonial nationalist ideology in Chapter 4. Instead, I shall confine my attention to an examination of the role played by the social institutions of education in the social construction of a homogeneous Sudan.

The official declaration of the Arabic language by the Ministry of Education in the early 1950s as the ‘only’ medium of instruction in all national schools cannot be understood as a value–neutral act. Blommaert (1999b: 429) rightly points out that ‘whenever language is drawn into nationalist struggles, it becomes more than “just a language”’. The discussion of the 1947 Juba Conference in Chapter 4 has shown that the question of national identity (and national language) was a site of struggle between the south and the north (for a critical review of the Juba Conference see Loiria 1989). Postcolonial politicians have strategically reinforced the link between Arabic and Islam as a semiotic aspect of the Sudanese national identity.

It is exactly the proponents of the above ideological view who have essentialised the link between ‘Arab nationalism’, ‘Islam’, and ‘the Arabic language’, and ultimately have rationalised the state monolingual policy of Arabicisation (for a detailed review of the religious politicisation of national identity in the Sudan see Deng 1995: ch. 2). A succinct reaction to the deeply exclusive and exclusionary ideology–regarding
view of the northern statist nationalism can be found in the SACDNU Petition (1963). The following reaction points to the stance of the SACDNU on the southern cultural identity:

The people of the north tell us proudly that they are Arabs and as they are in control, they have declared the Sudan a member of the Arab league … We in the south have nothing against Arab unity but what we do object to is Arab interference in denying us freedom and making it impossible for us to choose our link which naturally will be with Black Africa with which we have blood ties. We are looked upon by the Arabs as inferior but we have nothing to be afraid of in our negro [sic] race. It is true nothing much has been written about Black Africa but this does not rule out the fact that the Black race has contributed and still contributes to the general progress of mankind. (SACDNU Petition 1963: 3)

It should be remarked here that the SACDNU adopted a nationalist separatist discourse when, among other things, the Liberal Party, the only party which represented southern political interests was dissolved by the military junta of General Ibrahim Aboud (for a review of the history of southern political movements see Bob and Wassara 1989; Wakoson 1980). The SACDNU Petition (1963: 1) bluntly stated its nationalist policy: ‘Our policy is Independence for Southern Sudan; Southern Sudan for Southern Sudanese within the framework of Black African Unity’. In arguing its case, The SACDNU drew on (colonially constructed) essentialising categories of the social groups (e.g., ‘Negro’, ‘Arab’, etc). The SPLM/A (formed in 1983) which signed the CPA with the NCP has distanced itself from this determinist identification of the southern cultural identity. The ideological aim of the SPLM/A is not secessionism from the north (for a detailed review of the historical genealogy of the SPLM/A see Scott 1985). Quite the reverse; the SPLM/A endorses a socialist ideology which defines the Sudan on new terms, and which is incompatible with the sectarian nationalist ideology of the NCP. The following words by the late John Garang on the principles and objectives of the SPLM/A points clearly to the ideological orientation of movement:

The anarchy in production, the separatist tendencies in the various regions of our beloved country, the moral decay and all the ills that I have enumerated can only be solved within the context of a united Sudan under a socialist system that affords democratic and human rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religions, beliefs and outlooks. The slogans of the SPLA are ‘National Unity’, ‘Socialism’, ‘Autonomy’, where and when necessary, and ‘Religious
Freedom’. Our belief in and commitment to these slogans are irrevocable. The SPLA welcomes and embraces all Sudanese nationalities, patriots and socialists; in short, the movement belongs to the whole Sudanese people and will fight for their unity, peace and progress. (Garang 1992: 23, 25, emphasis in original)

The above identification of the ideological orientation of the SPLM/A vis–à–vis the nationalist ideology of the NCP is a further substantiation of the argument that the discourse of the NLP is a site of social struggle between two diametrically oppositional ideologies. The argument here is that the nature of the ideological relationship, and ultimately the configuration of social relations of power, between the SPLM/A and the NCP are determinative of the way in which the NLP can and cannot be faithfully implemented. Tollefson (2002: 180) states that ‘ideologies of language are linked to other ideologies that can influence and constrain the development of language policies’. Arabic is not just a tool of mutual understanding but also a discoursal way in and through which regional and global Arab solidarity is constructed. Anderson (1991: 13) rightly notes that religious communities such as Islamic Ummah and Christendom are connected through ‘a sacred language and written script’. In the case of Islam, the ‘sacred text’ existed only in classical Arabic. Hence, ‘written Arabic functioned like Chinese characters to create a community out of signs, not sounds’ (ibid.: 13). Anderson (ibid.) points out that ‘the deader the written language – the farther it was from speech – the better’ since ‘in principle everyone has access to a pure world of signs’. In Sudan, the Arabic script in itself is viewed by non–Arabic speaking groups as a force for social assimilation. It should be mentioned that one of the objectives of the colonial Southern Policy was to ‘de–essentialise’ the link between Arabic and the symbols used in its writing. One of the recommendations of the Rejaf Language Conference is the rewriting of Arabic in the Roman script: ‘Colloquial Arabic in Roman script will also be required in certain communities where the use of no other vernacular is practicable’ (Report of the Rejaf Language Conference, 1928, cited in Tucker 1934: 31).

As the above extract shows, the Rejaf Language policy considers colloquial Arabic as an optional extra in the southern resistance to Arabicisation; it is among the divide–and–rule strategies intended to construct and communicate a sense of social solidarity among the southerners. The point of emphasis here is on the social
functions each language is made to serve. The unequal distribution of the social functions between southern Arabic and Khartoum Arabic not only reflects the hierarchic character of the social system but also reproduces and maintains the same system of unequal relations. The social functions performed by southern Arabic vis-à-vis northern Arabic are determined and determinative of the underlying social system and the historical relations between the south and the north. The discursive project of constructing a writing system for southern Arabic in Latin script (as an objective of the Rejaf Language Conference) may be interpreted as an attempt at fixing the ‘antisocial–system–indicating properties’ in southern Arabic, hence assigning a linguistic sense of continuity to the system of unequal class relations in the Sudan.

It is worth noting that regional and international educational planning bodies were implicated in the marginalisation of local languages, and the imposition of the Arabic language as a unifying instrumental force. For example, the recommendations of the International Education Commission on Secondary Education in 1955 recommended the use of the Arabic language as a means of instruction in secondary education. The report was opposed to the use of local languages as media of instruction in the southern schools. The explanation for this antagonistic stance against the vernaculars is stated by the report as follows (cited in Yokwe 1984: 157):

It would be a waste of time and energy to try to teach the children of the south in their own Vernaculars in which they will not be able to pursue any reading after they leave school: such vernaculars have no literature and cannot be used as cultural media.

The above quoted representation of vernacular languages is clearly informed by the sociolinguistic structural functionalist conception of society ‘in which rational actors follow social norms for the general good of society and their own social welfare’ (Pennycook 2001: 50; Williams 1992: 7–8). The intellectual stance of the International Commission hints at the role played by the problem–oriented version of language planning (Ruiz 1984) in the construction of negative stereotypical representations of tribal/ethnic languages in the Sudan. This led to a language situation in which ‘the escape from little languages is viewed as liberating, as joyful, as self–fulfilling, as self–actualising’ (Fishman 1978: 47). The social representation of learning and teaching of local languages as ‘a waste of time’ is informed by a
variant of ‘social/sociolinguistic Darwinism’ (Ruiz 1985: 19; May 2001: 3; Williams 1992: 7) where the fittest languages can and should only survive, and the ‘weak’ languages and cultures will be destroyed. Nation–building versions of language educational planning premised on this structural functionalist principle justified the marginalisation and the disappearance/destruction of local languages as a ‘necessary’ price of progress and modernity (see Hurreiz 1968: 8–10). The social Darwinist perspective as Williams (1992: 8) notes, ‘would appear to impose the blame for the disappearance upon the very form which disappears rather than upon that which survives’.

The point here is that the ideology of nation–state educational planners in the early 1950s and 1960s was compatible with Skutnabb–Kangas’s (1998: 17–18) three–part process of: 1) glorifying the language of the dominant group (e.g., by exclusively associating Arabic with modern education), 2) stigmatising/peripheralising/devaluing the languages of dominated groups (e.g., learning of tribal languages is a waste of time), and 3) ‘rationalising’ politically, psychologically, educationally, or sociologically this unequal relationship as ‘functional’ and ‘beneficiary’ to the speakers of dominated languages (e.g., vernaculars lack literature). The same recommendation of the International Commission is reiterated by a United Nations expert who was reported to have said at a conference on ‘Adult Education in the Sudan’ in the late 1963 (cited in Yokwe 1984: 158) that:

The tribal languages of the south have no script of their own and even if the Latin alphabet is used for the different languages, there is no literature worth speaking of, which can be read with pleasure and profit. Pennycook (2001: 59) terms the above view of language as ‘colonial celebratory’, showing disdain for local languages and arrogant approval of international languages such as English. The process of rationalising the stigmatisation (e.g., lack of literature) of tribal languages in newly constructed nation–states is based on what Skutnabb–Kangas (1998: 18) calls ‘the ideology of monolingual reductionism’, which she identifies as:

An ideology which is used to rationalise the linguistic genocide (in education) committed by states which ‘see’ the existence of (unassimilated) linguistic minorities as a threat leading to the potential disintegration of nation–states. (Skutnabb–Kangas 1998: 14)
SACDNU which represented the southern opposition in the 1960s strongly opposed the educational policy which viewed and still continues to view tribal languages as inherently deficient:

Children in the south are made to study their lessons in Arabic at the early stages of education because the idea is to make Arabic the mother tongue. This we think is wrong according to educational psychology principles. The child should begin with his native language not with a foreign one. (SACDNU Petition 1963: 15–16)

The argument of the SACDNU is compatible with the UNESCO declaration on ‘The Use of Vernacular Language in Education’, 1953 (cited in McDougal et al. 1976: 154):

It is axiomatic that the best medium of teaching a child is his mother tongue. Psychologically, it is the system of meaningful signs that in his mind works automatically for expression and understanding. Sociologically, it is a means of identification among the members of the community to which he belongs. Educationally, he learns more quickly through it than through an unfamiliar linguistic medium.

The point here is that the social stereotyping embodied in the academic and official commentary on the southern discursive and cultural practices has been influential in the construction of a hierarchical social system. Within this social system tribal languages are represented as inherently ‘primitive’ and dominant languages such as Arabic as intrinsically ‘rational’ (cf. ‘the mythology of monolingualism’; see Fishman 1978). The education system has been instrumental in the representation, or imagining, of Arabic as a political institutional language with no ideological bearing. For instance, addressing the National Assembly in 1953, the first Minister of Education made the following declaration (cited in Nyombe 1997: 112):

As the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions, it is of great importance that there should be one language which is understood by all its citizens. That language could only be Arabic and Arabic must therefore be taught in all schools.

What the above extract clearly demonstrates is that the postcolonial nationalist project endorsed by northern power holders is based on the underlying principles of what Churchill (1996: 266) terms the ‘philosophical matrix of nation–state’. The nationalist ideology that was/has been current in the north was predicated on the Gellnerian principle of ‘nation–state congruence’. Gellner’s (1983: 1) definition of nationalism as ‘a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones’, distinctly explains the preoccupation of
northern politicians with cultural and linguistic homogeneity associated with the state policies of Arabisation and Islamisation. Islamism/Islamisation refers to the ‘organised expression of specific religious and political ideology’ (O’Fahey 1996: 258–267). Consequently, the linguistic rights and cultural wants of the dominated ethnic groups in the south have been ignored. Coulmas (1998: 67) cogently states that ‘the nation state as it has evolved since the French Revolution is the natural enemy of minorities’. The political discourse of northern nation–builders evidently reflects a deep–seated obsession with the representation of Arabic as a homogenising tool (the key terms in the speech of the First Minister are ‘one country ’, ‘one set of political institutions’ and ‘one language’).

The point here is that the educational system, particularly the pre–university one, was carefully designed to induct the masses in the whole Sudan into the ‘national’ culture. The speech of the First Minister of Education represents the way in which nation–builders conceptualised Arabic in the early years of Independence, and it hints at the way in which the educational institutions were discursively to be run in the decades to come. The Minister of Education employs the argumentation strategy of rationalisation to legitimate and institutionalise Arabic as a ‘national language’ (cf. Skutnabb–Kangas’s [1998: 17] process of glorifying the dominant language). The political discourse of the First Minister of Education is a rationalisation of the discursive domination of Arabic in the name of ‘modernisation’ and educational value–neutrality. Legitimation is used here to refer to the ‘formal recognition accorded to the language by the nation–state – usually by the constitutional and/or legislative benediction of official status’ (May 2001: 6). Institutionalisation is concerned with ‘the process by which the language comes to be accepted, or “taken for granted”, in a wide range of social, cultural and linguistic domains or contexts, both formal and informal’ (ibid.). Besides the argumentation and rhetorical strategies, other modalities of implementation such as coercion in different forms were operationalised to culturally homogenise the different parts of the country. One important conclusion to be drawn from the ideological discourse of postcolonial politicians is that ‘language planning emerged side by side with the theory of modernisation which not only was closely integrated with a specific theoretical
perspective – structural functionalism – but also involved a specific conception of the
typology of orientations to language policy, it is evident that the early commentary of
language planning in the Sudan has endorsed the fashionable at the time perspective
of ‘language–as–problem’ which holds Karam’s (1974: 108) view that ‘theoretically,
wherever there is a communication problem concerning language, language planning
is possible’.

5.2.4 The NLP and language rights as habitus within a federal system

The fourth statement in NLP reads:

In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub–national level of
Government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working
language(s) at its level’

With respect to the field of discourse (which is reflected in the experiential value of
the text), the subject matter of the above policy statement addresses the use of an
additional local language as an official language at the level of regional states. The
field of this discourse also contains references to activities, processes and states (e.g.,
government). The tenor of discourse (which is predicted by the interpersonal value of
the text) can be said to include the SPLM, the NCP, and the legislature of regional
states. For the mode of discourse, (which is activated in the textual value of the text),
the policy statement is a written permission which allows regional states to use a
third additional language. The granting of this permission is realised deontically
through the use of the modal auxiliary ‘may’ (the policy states what is possible).
With respect to the lexical organisation of the statement, the terms ‘Arabic’
‘English’, ‘language’, ‘official’, ‘working’, and ‘national’ are collocates. The terms
‘legislature’, ‘Government’, and ‘sub–legislature’ refer to a particular type of genre:
the state including its government and social institutions. The CPA suggests a
specific structural system, which provides the right environment for the application
of the language policy, namely federalism. I agree with Wright (2004: 70) that the
appropriate structural system in such multilingual contexts is decentralisation or
federalism, since it encourages linguistic pluralism and multiculturalism (for the
distinction between ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralised’ language planning see Tollefson 1981). It should be remarked that the CPA, at least at the level of theory, is aware of this principle on which the language policy is based and could be implemented, and which could lead to the empowerment of minority groups. In the Protocol of Power–sharing (see Appendix), the NCP and the SPLM/A who signed the protocols put it bluntly that:

[The Parties are] convinced that decentralisation and empowerment of all levels of government are cardinal principles of effective and fair administration of the country.

Yet, it should be noted that the NCP claims that it had already applied a federal system and had divided the country into regional states since the beginning of the 1990s. If this is the case, then the question that imposes itself here is: what differentiates the two federalisms and how do they affect the linguistic map of the country? Before embarking on attempting a possible reply to this question, it should be made clear at the outset that any rhetoric on ‘decentralisation’, ‘empowerment’, or any linguistic project aiming at empowering the masses in the absence of freedom of speech is, in principle, truly infinitesimal. Freedom of speech and linguistic projects aimed at empowering masses go hand in hand, since the populace under utilitarian regimes, as Fishman (1994a: 95) puts it, ‘would be leery of giving information or expressing opinions that would enable survey researchers to gauge whatever oppositional and anti–hegemonic thought might exist under such regimes’.

Generally speaking, political scientists draw a distinction among three concepts: federalism, federal political systems, and federations. Federalism is generally identified in scholarly literature as a normative political philosophy that combines both joint action and self–government (see O’Leary 2001: 277; King 1982; Watts 1998). The second conceptual term, ‘federal political systems’, refers to a ‘genus of political organisation that is marked by the combination of shared rule and self–rule’ (Watts 1998: 120). The list of federal political systems include federations, confederations, federacies, unions, associated states, condominiums, leagues, and cross–border functional authorities (for definitions of these terms see Watt 1998; Elazar 1987). Watts provides the following definition for ‘federation’:

A federation is a compound polity combining constituent units and a general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the
people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of a significant portion of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected by its citizens. (Watts 1998: 121)

According to Watts (1998: 123), one of the distinctive features of federal political systems is ‘the simultaneous existence of powerful motives for constituent units to be united (for certain shared purposes) and their deep–rooted desires for self–government (for other purposes)’. What differentiates federations from decentralised unitary systems is not only the limit of decentralised powers but the ‘constitutional guarantee of autonomy for the constituent governments in the responsibilities they perform’ (ibid.: 124). Political scientific researchers categorise federations into two major categories: national federations and multinational/multiethnic federations (see O’Leary 2001). The United States illustrates a form of national federalism which has been emulated by some Latin American countries, namely Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina (ibid.: 280). The American national federalism played an instrumental role in the construction of an assimilated nation through the implementation of homogenising cultural practices (see Gordon 1964; Beer 1993). Mono–national federalism is compatible with Gellner’s (1983) theorising on nationalism as one nation one culture (see O’Leary 2001). O’Leary (ibid.: 284) points out that ‘integrationist nation–builders in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean have distrusted federalism precisely because it provides secessionist opportunities’.

Multinational federalism, on the other hand, ‘seeks to express, institutionalise and protect at least two national or ethnic cultures, often on a permanent basis’ (ibid.: 280). It rejects outright the assimilationist and integrationist aims of national federalism (ibid.). According to Williams (1992: 7), ‘integration’ refers to the ‘mutual interdependence of the structurally differentiated parts and the coordination of their functions’. Social integration, as May (2001: 118) notes, should be understood as ‘a reciprocal process rather than a simple accommodation of ethnic–minority groups to the majoritarian national culture’ (emphasis in original). Examples of multinational federal systems include, but with varying decrees of success, Canada, the Caribbean, Nigeria, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Belgium, and Spain (O’Leary 2001: 280; for a review of the Nigerian federalism see Chapter 3). With this broad theoretical background in mind, let us now move to
examine the federalist system within which the NCP’s linguistic policy of Arabicisation is embedded.

The first remark is that the NCP started the Arabicisation process of higher education in the Sudan, willy-nilly, by a top–down presidential decree in the beginning of the 1990s. This should not be surprising, for all nationalist linguistic policies in the Sudan have been imposed by various centralist (national) governments rather than developed systematically as an output of democratic deliberation and consultation. The result of the unilateral imposition of such hegemonic language policies is what Phillipson (1992: 47) calls ‘linguicism’: ‘Ideologies, structures, and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language’. More importantly, another repercussion of this undemocratic linguistic situation is what Myers–Scotton (1993: 163) describes as ‘elite closure’, which is ‘accomplished when the elite successfully employ official language policies and their own nonformalised language usage patterns to limit access to nonelite groups to political position and socioeconomic advancement’. Concomitantly, the official Arabic language has become a symbol of power and prestige in the state and has impacted on the instrumental value and status of other vernacular languages. The point here is that the maintenance of a pluralistic society should afford linguistic minorities the opportunities for, wherever possible, meaning–making in local languages as well as in elite languages including world languages.

The policy of Arabicisation seeks cultural assimilation, and has the planned goal of making all people into Arabic speakers; hence it is deeply hostile to any forms of accommodation that may obstruct this goal including federalism. The only type of federal political system, if any at all, that is clearly compatible with the policy of Arabicisation is a ‘mono–national federalism’. This would turn the nationalist project of the NCP into one that is ‘federal in form and centralised unitary in content’. This type of national federation was part and parcel of the NCP’s proselytising discourse of building a sectarian nation in the 1990s under the banner of ‘almashru alhadari’ (Islamist Civilisation Project). This argument can be evidentially supported by the
following extract from the NCP ‘National Charter for Political Action’ (cited in Nyombe 1997: 115):

The adoption of Islamic Sharia and the federal system within the framework of comprehensive national unity is a further enrichment of our national experience pioneered by the nation’s loyal sons who steadfastly sacrifice their souls for the sake of its protection throughout the decades.

The type of political organisation expressed by the above quote is completely incompatible with the SPLM/A, whose ideology belongs to a completely different philosophy of federalism. The kind of federal political system that is advocated by the SPLM/A and by the different ethnolinguistic groups is a ‘multiethnic’ or ‘multinational’ federalism that unites ‘people who seek the advantages of membership of a common political unit [citizenship], but differ markedly in descent, language and culture’ (Forsyth 1989: 4). So, the congruent context for the implementation of the new language policy is a type of structural system that rightly adopts multiethnic federalism as a principle of political governing. This will lead us to the conclusion that the term ‘national languages’ (which is mentioned in the first statement and repeated in the fourth policy statement) holds two socio–politically incongruent implications in relation to the ideologies of the two political parties (the SPLM/A and the NCP). For the SPLM/A, which believes in social transformation and cultural pluralism, the implication is that the current supreme status enjoyed by Arabic–speaking nationality is rejected outright, since local languages equally grant their speaking ethnic groups the status of Sudanese nationals. The SPLM/A, Sudanese communists, and socialists consider, or aspire to see, Sudan as ‘a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously but within a united Sudan in the enterprise of self–realisation through the perfection of men according to their own kind’ (AbdelSalam 1989: 34). Hence, this binary act of pluralizing and indigenising of national identity on the basis of linguistic diversity can be interpreted as a strategic recasting of the political concept ‘nations without states’ (Guibernau 1999: 16), which refers to ‘nations which, in spite of having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more states, by and large do not identify with them’ (ibid.). The potential of witnessing the southern Sudan as an independent sovereign state in the international system of nation–states lends support to this interpretation.
The new language policy can be said to apply, using the relevant technical terminology, the ‘territoriality and personality principle’ of language planning (see Kloss 1971, 1977). At its simplest, according to the territoriality principle the choice of official languages varies from region to region in terms of local conditions. For example, the western region could choose X as an official language according to its local conditions, thus the selected official language in that region may not be the same as the official language in the eastern or southern regions of Sudan. The ‘personality principle’ signifies that English and Arabic are the official languages at the national level. The 1998 Constitutional language policy grants local languages a tolerance–oriented right i.e., ‘their existence is recognised but officially ignored’ (Cobarrubias 1983: 44). The tolerance–oriented stance endorsed by nationalist regimes since Independence amounts or leads in some social situations to linguistic genocide through passivity ‘to let a language die’ (Skutnabb–Kangas 1998: 13). This personality principle is protected by the last policy statement which grants the users of these languages the ‘right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language’ (for a detailed discussion of this type of language right see Macias 1979; McDougal et al. 1976; Table 5.9 shows the types of language rights embodied in the NLP).

The fifth policy statement stipulates:

The use of either language at any level of government or education shall not be discriminated against.

A systemic functional analysis of the above policy statement may show that the field of discourse (the experiential meaning) is about the imposition of a prohibition to discriminate against people on the basis of language. The tenor of discourse is disguised through the use of nominalisation (which is part of the textual meaning). Yet, it is not difficult to predict it: the tenor should include the government officials and language teachers/educationalists (this interpretation is lexically triggered by the terms ‘government’ and ‘education’). The mode of discourse is a written directive which performs the speech act of imposing a prohibition against linguistic discrimination. This prohibition is actualised by the deontic use of ‘shall not’ (in the
legal use of ‘shall’). With reference to Ruiz’s (1984) typology of orientations in language planning, the NLP evidently endorses the positions of ‘language–as–right’ (but a contextualised right), and ‘language–as–resource’ (see Table 5.9). The officialisation of a local language(s) at the regional state level is based on the view of vernaculars in positive terms as ‘resources’ that can be mobilised to serve the concerned polity. By contrast, the linguistic policies of Arabicisation, unsurprisingly, conceptualise linguistic diversity as an obstruction to the nationalist project of building an Arab nation in the Sudan. Suffice it here to note that the embodiment of these language rights in the NLP, at least at the level of theory, is a watershed. However, a caveat should be added here. The concept of language rights embedded in the NLP should not be viewed in universalising and totalising terms (for a critique of the liberal notion of language rights see Stroud 2001; Stroud and Heugh: 2004; Coulmas 1998; Pennycook 1998; Phillipson 1998; Chen 1998; Annamalai 1998; Rasool 1998; Abdussalam 1998). The concept of language rights presupposes an essential connection between language and identity. I argue that the concept of language rights should be firmly based in Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’, rather than being treated in a decontextualised manner as an abstract universal construct. Language is a practice that is embodied in the social structure through socialisation. The voice of the local agency should be taken into consideration in the sense that policy decisions should be founded on the wish of the language users to have their language institutionalised as a medium of instruction. The concept of ‘linguistic citizenship’ endorses a bottom–up approach which concentrates on local agency and voice (for a detailed definition of ‘linguistic citizenship’ see Stroud 2001; Stroud and Heugh 2004; McGroarty 2002; for a comparative analysis of ‘language rights’ and ‘linguistic citizenship’ see Trudell 2007). The assumption that people are unaware of their rights, including those who are victims of false consciousness in the Marxist sense, as the thesis of English ‘linguistic imperialism’ (Phillipson 1992) holds, is misplaced (for a critique see Joseph 2006a: 49–58). This view of language rights is an illustration of top–down planning by educational policy makers on behalf of language speakers. Tollefson (2002: 328) notes that ‘while professional linguists, teachers, and other language specialists can contribute in many ways to the success of language programmes, the broad involvement of parents and other community
members is critical’. May (2001: 167) reminds us that ‘the fate of a language cannot be borne on the back of education alone’. The failure of the Irish language policies is a case in point (see May 2001: ch. 4). Postmodernist commentators who focus on local agency stress that ‘schools are far greater agents of social reproduction than of social change’ (Pennycook 2001: 121). Understanding language rights as part of the habitus of the concerned speakers can give them the right to have their mother tongue institutionalised and made official, in a form more legitimate, more primordial, more inalienable than if this right is treated as a merely legal provision within the gift of the regime in power. I am not arguing that language policy and planning should be a completely bottom–up practice. There must always be a top–down element in the planning process, or there would be no ‘planning’ or ‘process’ at all, but the desire to operationalise a mother tongue as a medium of teaching should stem from its speakers. If the speakers of a given language view it as part of their habitus and share the desire to have their children taught in it, then their government is contractually bound to accommodate this collective wish.

It is worth mentioning that the language rights recognised by the NLP are structurally grounded not only in the principle of multinational federalism, but also in the principle of citizenship. But the NCP in its 1998 National Constitution anchored tolerance–oriented rights for non–Arabic speaking groups in citizenship, among other forms of social integration. Article 27 in 1998 National Constitution (cited in the UNESCO, MOST Clearing House) stipulates that:

There shall be guaranteed for every community or group of citizens the right to preserve their particular culture, language or religion and rear children freely within the framework of their particularity, and the same shall not by coercion be effaced.

Marshall (1963: 87) defines citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed’ (for a review of citizenship as ‘social practice’ see Lister 1998; Oldfield 1990). The relationship between citizenship as a status and as a practice is similar to that of social structure and human agency in that it is dialectical and dynamic (Lister 1998: 27). In language planning terms, citizenship rights can be contextualised or particularised for the affirmation of cultural and linguistic diversity (ibid.). Stroud (2001) points out that
the meaning of citizenship should be extended to address language diversity and equal political representation. Kymlicka (1995, 1989, 2001), an advocate of ‘multicultural citizenship’ assigning special status to national minorities within a liberal theory of rights, contends that liberals should protect cultural structures because ‘it is only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligently examine their value’ (Kymlicka 1989: 165; see Chapter 3).

With respect to language policies in the Sudan, the notion of citizenship in the 1998 National Constitutional language policy is exclusionary and severely bedevilled by the strict pursuance and coercive implementation of the policy of Arabicisation as a ruling ideology across the whole country. Educated northern elites occupying the Nile Valley have constructed themselves as ‘Awlad Albalad’ (inheritors of the land) and ‘Awlad A’rab’ (children of Arabs; see Willemse 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The NLP statements</th>
<th>Language rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Government of National Unity shall implement an information campaign throughout Sudan in all national languages in Sudan to popularise the Peace Agreement, and to foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding.</td>
<td>Promotion–oriented language right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be respected, developed and promoted.</td>
<td>Promotion–oriented language right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the official working languages of the National Government business and languages of instruction for higher education</td>
<td>Personality–oriented language right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-national level of government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working language(s) at its level.</td>
<td>Territoriality–oriented language right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of either language at any level of government or education shall not be discriminated against.</td>
<td>The right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.</td>
<td>The right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to … measures of protection as are required by his/her status as a minor.</td>
<td>The right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9. Language Rights in the Naivasha Language Policy (NLP)
Willemse (2006: 7) states that Sudan has been invented as both an Arab and Islamic state. The main objective of the state-declared ideology (Islamist Civilisation Project) was to construct a ‘new Sudanese citizen’ (ibid.: 8). This ideological project, which Willemse termed ‘a project of differentiating order’ was a (re)construction of a southerner as the ‘Other’. Willemse (ibid.: 14) correctly points out that ‘the search for citizenship is one of securing boundaries of the Sudanese national identity whereby apart from women, “Blacks” are constructed as eternal “others”’. The point here is that the sectarian nationalism promoted by the NCP or other northern parties with a similar political orientation are founded on, using Mazrui’s (1975: 466) terms, ‘a structure of domination and a structure of damnation’. The structure of damnation uses ‘the sanctions of religious experience as part of the process of obtaining obedience and submission’ (ibid.). Willemse (2006: 11) rightly notes that ‘a citizenship open to all Sudanese subjects was never part of the nationalist project’. Young (1989: 251) argues for ‘differentiated citizenship as group representation’ as ‘the best way to realise the inclusion and participation of everyone in full citizenship’, which in turn requires ‘the articulation of special rights that attend to group differences in order to undermine oppression and disadvantage’. The notion of ‘differentiated citizenship’ is compatible with the concept of language rights, which lies at the heart of the NLP.

The point here is that the endorsement of the concept of habitus can help us avoid the essentialist trap of the mainstream ‘language–rights’ paradigm by asserting the social constructedness of languages and identities; hence it can help us uncouple language from religion/race (see Skutnabb–Kangas and Phillipson 1994; Skutnabb–Kangas 1998). Willemse (2006: 14) notes that ‘the history of Sudan and the construction of Sudanese nationalism is [sic] related to processes of Islamisation and Arabisation’. But May (2001: 105) reminds us that ‘all nationalist histories are therapeutic to some extent and contain inevitable elisions and absences’. That is, nationalist histories require the forgetting of the constructedness of a nation out of contradictory histories, and the equal remembering of a common ‘undivided’ historical narrative or collective sense of history (see May 2001: 59–60).
I conclude this section by broadly reviewing two cases which have relevance to our discussion. The first case illustrates bottom–up engagement in the process of language planning in the Sudan. I broadly review the contribution of a language committee in the development of social literacies. The second example is a statement in the new language policy of the southern Sudan. It will be shown that the top–down discourse in which the statement is realised is misleading and problematic.

The Tima tribe has set an example to be followed by other tribal communities with respect to the grassroots contribution in the development of local languages. The tribe of Tima is part of a multilingual area of the Nuba Mountains in western central Sudan. It administratively belongs to the State of the Southern Kordofan which in turn is ruled by the SPLM/A and NCP under the CPA. The tribe consists of four villages each with a leader called ‘sheikh algarya’ (village leader). The Tima people have expressed their desire to have Tima as a means of instruction in basic education. Some of them including the leaders have established the Tima Language Committee (henceforth the TLC). The academic attention to the Tima language has emanated from the tribal people themselves when they contacted the African and Asian Institute at Khartoum University. The TLC is basically dedicated to the task of developing a writing system for the Tima language. This collective body has produced two books in the Tima language using the Roman script. The tribe has two primary schools, one of which consists of 557 students of both sexes, with seven teachers, five of whom are men and two women. The means of instruction is English, and the curriculum is based on Kenyan materials (Abdelhay 2007: direct observation). One of the teachers said that they were seeking an educational curriculum in the Tima language. The social actions taken by the TLC in coordination with the majority of the tribal people of both sexes is transformative in the sense that it was initiated at the grassroots level. The books produced by the TLC have demonstrably problematised the dominant language ideology in which only Arabic is designated as a ‘language’ and the ‘Other’ as a ‘local dialect’ on the basis of whether a language has a writing system. More importantly, the linguistic work by the TLC provides an avenue into how tribal people can deconstruct essentialist views
of language and identity in the Sudan. The TLC has succeeded in mobilising the sectors of the Tima community around the first sociolinguistic survey on their social attitudes to Tima (Mugadam 2007). Natives, particularly young girls, have participated in the process of data collection by administering the survey questionnaires in the four Tima villages. The TLC has set an example of a kind of ‘cooperative language planning’ (Ruiz 1984: 29) in which tribal people and academic researchers engage in resourceful joint sociolinguistic projects. The tribe has proved to be a genuine agent in the construction of its Tima language, and has practically shown how bottom–up inclusive language planning can work effectively. The conclusion to be drawn here is that the discipline of language planning should not only welcome tribal intervention in the working of languages but should draw on the insights of linguistic work carried out by local people. The case of the TLC is a reminder of the fact that ‘when the “expert” is an outsider to the culture under study, there is an important sense in which every insider to the culture is an expert in it, and the outsider is their student’ (Joseph 2006a: 26).

It is worth stating that language has always been a site of intense social struggle between power holders in the centre and the tribal peoples in the Nuba Mountains over the national identity. This conflict is historical in the sense that the Nuba people have been involved in a social struggle against the assimilationist and unfair social policies of central governments for most of its postcolonial history (for the effect of the colonial Southern Policy on the Nuba Mountains see Ibrahim 1985; Chapter 4). For instance, the stance of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (a major northern political party) on the south and Nuba Mountains as it was expressed in its ‘DUP Working Paper on the South 1986’ (cited in Nyombe 1997: 115) points to the discursive aspect of this social struggle:

It is extremely important to spread the use of Arabic language in the southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. Arabic is the most effective instrument for spreading Arabic Islamic culture. The spread of Arabic language in those areas [South and Nuba Mountains] is one for the most important arenas for struggle in the name of the God and the Arab nation.

The ideological stance embodied in the above quote can at best be described, in the words of Fishman (1978: 44), as ‘cruel self-aggrandisement, sanctimoniously
masquerading as sanity and sanctity’. Dominated ethnies in the Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan strongly reject the above ostensible ‘instrumentalist view’, although latently ideological, upon which language policies are based in the Sudan. Language for them is not just ‘an instrument’ that can be regulated and replaced by ‘Arabic as a more effective instrument’ as religious leaders would have them (see Tauli 1974 who brazenly supported this orientation to language planning). Northern nationalist elites (and the early academic commentary) have failed to see that language holds symbolic purchase for the dominated ethnies in the Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan in the sense that it is a significant, thought not an essential, symbol of social identification.

The situation in the Nuba Mountains is riddled with contradictions and tensions with respect to the educational policy (English curriculum), and the language used outside school in the community (Arabic–Tima–English). This observation should be supported by more ethnographic studies of classroom/community language practices to reveal the multilayered tensions and contradictions that are embedded within wider local, national, regional, and global contexts. For example, examination of the repercussions of globalisation as an international socioeconomic discourse in the Nuba Mountains should be given consideration by the practice of language planning in the Sudan. Globalisation refers to the ‘processes, operating on a global scale, which cut across national boundaries, integrating and connecting communities and organisations in new space–time combinations, making the world in reality and in experience more interconnected’ (Hall 1992: 299). One way of doing this is by conducting (critical) ethnographic or (critical) discourse–analytic research on the semiotic practices of the polities in the area. The analysis of the public notices in Dilling City (one of the biggest cities in the Nuba Mountains) points to the conclusion that globalisation is at work in the area. For example, locals in this area keep abreast with what is happening in the English Premier League (see Figure 5.1). Watts (1998: 129) is right to point out that ‘governments increasingly face the paradoxical desires of their people to be both global consumers and local citizens’ (cf. Courchene 1993 ‘glocalisation’). Watts (1998: 129) suggests that ‘various forms of federal relationships between different interacting levels of government seem to
provide a way to mediate the variety of global and local citizen preferences’. Under the banner of the NLP, it should be one of the objectives of language (educational) planning at different levels of state organisations in the Sudan to examine the tensions between these centripetal and centrifugal tendencies (Schermerhorn 1970: 81), and the ways in which these tensions and contradictions are accommodated and appropriated in the discursive practices of ethnic groups. We need ‘linguistics of social contradictions’ (Collins 1993: 128) to understand the social situation in the Nuba Mountains. The concluding point here is that the negative stereotypical representation of the ethnolinguistic identities in the Nuba Mountains by dominant language ideologies is misleading and misplaced. The ethnolinguistic groups in the Nuba Mountains do not champion ethnic parochialism, monolingual chauvinism (the region is inherently multilingual), or tribal particularism (e.g., Figure 5.2 indicates that locals are not oppositional to globalisation). The tribe of Tima as a social group simply wants to be, following Fishman (1978: 49), ‘the master of its own house’: it wants to become modern but on its own terms, rather than the terms set by dominant nationalist groups at the centre of power, in its own Tima fashion, and in its own Tima language. Three conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion which has relevance to the aforementioned view of language rights as habitus. First, the language rights embedded in the NLP (see Table 5.1) should be historically, culturally, politically, and ideologically contextualised. They should be treated as part of the habitus of the people. Rasool notes:

Societal language relations cannot be conceptualised outside a consideration of the speakers of different languages, their lived experience and their place within society. Neither can the question of language rights of different groups of people be analysed meaningfully without taking account of the dynamic and multi–layered interactions between history, culture, politics and ideology. (Rasool 1998: 90)
Secondly, the case of the Tima language has provided a bottom–up account of how a community in practice can resist top–down centralised state policies by being guided by a collective effort to standardise their language. Although basic school teachers and educationists can contribute to the project of social transformation in those areas, they are always constrained by a number of structural forces such as the lack of electrical power (there is no electricity in the Tima area), and lack of resources essential for establishing the necessary educational infrastructure (e.g., classrooms). Pennycook (2000: 19) reminds that that classrooms are ‘sociopolitical spaces that exist in a complex relationship to the world outside’.

The second case is a statement in the new language policy of southern Sudan. The GOSS has recently ratified its regional Interim Constitution (ratified in 2005). The
southern Sudan language policy is designed within the framework of the NLP. The last statement in the southern Sudan language policy holds that ‘the Government of Southern Sudan shall promote the development of a sign language for the benefit of people with special needs’. This policy statement warrants a brief comment. Sign languages may workably be defined as the languages which are ‘used in communities of Deaf people for intra–group communication’ (Reagan 2006: 331; Lucas 2001; for the distinction between ‘Deaf’ and ‘deaf’ see Reagan et al. 2006: 188). It is certainly a novel practice in the history of language planning in the Sudan to provide a constitutional right for users of other semiotic means of communication. Siegel (2006: 256) states that ‘deaf and hard–hearing children should have a constitutional right to communication and language’, since language is inextricably tied with the democratic process of voting and freedom of speech. However, the way in which the statement is drafted is not entirely unproblematic. There is an underlying misleading assumption that there are no existing sign languages in the region, and that the task of the GOSS will be to ‘promote the development of a sign language’. There is another assumption that the task–oriented objective of promoting the ‘development’ of ‘a sign language’ in the region can be done unproblematically. What does the term ‘development’ mean in this policy statement? When I asked Susan Fischer, one of the leading scholars in the field of sign language research, about the way in which language planning research can ‘develop’ a sign language in a multilingual region such as southern Sudan, she strongly reacted by asserting ‘we don’t develop sign languages’ (Fischer 2007: personal communication). Fischer believes that for a sign language policy to work it should involve grassroots native signing adults. The term ‘development’ may carry the historical baggage of the top–down practice of language planning; and this may be the reason why Fischer strongly believes that ‘language planning works only when there is grassroots support’. The contentious policy statement could have been structured in away that it implies the government would resort to existing signing practices of deaf communities in the southern Sudan. For instance, one way would have been ‘the GOSS shall promote the development of one or two languages as necessary for people of special needs from the existing sign languages in the region’. Alternatively, the statement could have endorsed grammatical ambiguity as a strategy of opening a complex web of
different possibilities of interpreting the statement (for example by using ‘sign language’ as a mass noun). Drafters of the national language policy of South Africa, which is embedded in the National Constitution of 1996, have endorsed this strategy towards sign language: ‘A Pan South African Language Board established by national legislation must: a) promote and create conditions for the development and use of, [among other things], sign language’ (for full text see UNESCO MOST Clearing House; for a review see Aarons and Akach 2000). One crucial difference between the two sign language policy statements (of South Africa and southern Sudan) is that the South African policy creates the conditions where sign language develops by itself — that is, in the habitus of deaf South Africans— whereas the southern Sudanese policy statement implies top–down planning. The use of the term ‘development’ in the South African context is compatible with Fischer’s view that we create the conditions for a language to develop on its own.

5.2.5 The NLP and the configuration of power relations during the Interim Period

I conclude the textual analysis of the NLP with the following two questions: 1) is the distribution of language rights in the NLP compatible with the division of political power in the Protocol on Power-sharing (see Appendix)? If there can be any language change at the status level, what is the most likely region to be affected by that change? It is worth mentioning that the social situation in the north (including the western part) in practical reality is dynamic and unpredictable given the current civil war in western Sudan. A broad review of the configuration of the political power relations in the CPA can assist us in predicting the likelihood of a particular trend with respect to the implementation of the NLP (Figures 5.3, 5.5).

As can been seen from Figure 5.3, there is an uneven distribution of political power among the political forces in northern Sudan (including the west and the east). The NCP has the highest number of seats (52%), while the SPLM/A comes in second place with political power amounting to 28%. Northern political forces, including historically rooted political bourgeois parties with massive tribal loyalty, share 14%. Other southern opposition parties were only assigned 6%. It should be unnecessary to
point out that the dominant language in the northern part of the country is Arabic and the dominant ethnic group are the Arabised tribes (see Figure 5.4).

For the distribution of political power in the southern Sudan, the two most salient observations to be drawn from Figure 5.5 are that, first, the SPLM/A has the highest amount of power in the GOSS (70%), whereas the NCP has a relatively small amount of power (15%). Secondly, with the exception of the NCP, other northern political forces have not been allocated any amount of power in the GOSS. With this background in mind, let us now return to the two questions posed above. The first concerns the implications that the allocation of political power at national and southern Sudan level has for the NLP.

It is evident in Figure 5.3 that the NCP (the Islamic ruling party), which has Arabicised the university educational system, maintains domination in the north. Thus, the implication is that the NLP is unlikely to significantly change the linguistic situation of local languages in some of the major northern areas, particularly the central part of the country.
Although English is granted the constitutional recognition as a co–official working language at the national level, it is the practice, or language ideologies, that will structure its ethoglossia (Cobarrubias 1983: 48) or social functions in the north. For the western part of the Sudan, the situation is dynamic and completely unpredictable due to the civil conflict in Darfur. Be that as it may be, one can speculate (‘but speculation is not a substitute for finding out’ in Halliday’s 1978: 177 cautious terms) that what is rejected by the ‘African’ tribes is not Arabic per se since the majority of the population of western Sudan are bilingual in Arabic. Rather, it is the imperialism that accompanies the language that is rejected by those people. The southern Sudan is expected to witness significant language change vis-à-vis the north. The expectation that there will be less language change in the north than in the south can be supported by the following observations: first, it will not be easy for the ruling elites to change their policy of Arabicisation, since they consider it as one of their great achievements. In the early 1990s, the NCP has established an Arabicisation unit at the University of Khartoum and an Arabic language academy to help implement the Arabicisation of higher education. Obviously these planning bodies will delay the implementation of bilingual education at the university level.
Yet English is more likely to dominate due to the fact that a sizeable number of private English–medium primary schools have emerged in Khartoum.

The second observation is that local languages are more likely to emerge and occupy the southern territory. More than forty local languages are being developed in terms of corpus planning to meet literacy requirements (Gilley 2004: personal communication).

![Figure 5.5. Configuration of Political Power Relations in the Southern Sudan during the Interim Period (Southern Sudan Assembly and GOSS, based on the Protocol on the Power–Sharing 2004)](image)

A third observation is that local languages are more likely to be revived in the south because of the fact that southern political leaders themselves speak local languages as their mother tongues. It should be stated that as I write there is a war going on between the opposition in western Sudan and the NCP–backed militias, which may affect the distribution of power in the signed agreement if the ruling regime is to refuse to accommodate the needs of the western opposition in the same way as it has accommodated the needs of southern opposition. The point here is that the current war in western Sudan does not make the fate of the language policy easily predictable. However, the solid conclusion that can be drawn is that power relations
always impact on the implementation of language policies in such multilingual contexts as Sudan, no matter how utopian such policies look in official documents and internationally recognised peace protocols. The NLP on its own cannot produce a social change. It has been my conviction that theses of utilitarian language policies that are imposed by a top–down diktat in a pluralistic society will always produce their antithesis, which may take the form either of peaceful struggle or of military conflict such as the current inescapable reality.

5.3 Summary

In this chapter I have reviewed the different definitions of the term ‘indigenous’, and I have argued that what are called ‘indigenous languages’ in the Sudan are colonial inventions. I have shown that the colonial Southern Policy, particularly in its linguistic dimension (e.g., Rejaf Language Conference), was an ideological project intended to construct social and discursive differences between the south and the north. I have demonstrated that the term ‘indigenous’ can have serious political implications in some social situations. In the case of the CPA, the implications and ramifications are textually encoded. The use of the expression ‘indigenous languages’ in the NLP is compatible with the right to ‘external self–determination’ stated in the Machakos Protocol. Thus, the use of the term ‘indigenous’ is ideologically motivated. I have examined the type of language rights embodied in the NLP. I have argued for the consideration of the language educational rights as part of the habitus of the people and not as an unsituated given. I have shown that the NLP gives English and Arabic equal constitutional status as official working languages at the national level. Trilingualism is likely to emerge in regional states in case the government at the regional state level chooses a third local language as an additional working language. I have also shown that the compatible structural system with the NLP is a federal political system. This compatibility is achieved at the status planning level, and its implementation at practical level remains to be seen with respect to the northern part of the Sudan. I have compared the distribution of political power in the CPA and the distribution of languages in the Sudan. I have shown that the south is much more likely to witness (it partly has witnessed) significant language change vis–à–vis the north.
CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study set out to provide a critical analysis of the NLP in the CPA signed between the NCP (representing the government of the Sudan) and the SPLM/A (representing the southern opposition). To construct a historically informed understanding of the NLP, I have situated the linguistic resources of the Sudan within the African social context by surveying one of the most commonly quoted typological models of African languages, Greenberg’s (1963a) classificatory system of African languages.

The work of Greenberg is particularly drawn upon to survey the distribution of Sudanese languages. This overview of the linguistic map of the Sudan through the descriptive model of Greenberg provides a necessary background to the understanding of the way in which linguistic differences between the south and the north were semiotically created by colonial and postcolonial language planning practice. The structural similarities shown by Greenberg between a significant number of languages in the south and the north have revealed the political inventedness of these linguistic differences. I have shown that the contribution of Greenberg provides a solid evidential basis against the view which frames the south and the north as linguistically unrelated parts.

The critical review of the use of the Hamitic hypothesis in linguistic classifications has provided insight into understanding the ways in which the policies of Arabicisation were made to iconise a particular racial affiliation in the Sudan. The discussion of the Hamitic hypothesis has shown that the linguistic anthropology of Greenberg has refused to take ethnic attribution into account in the typology of African languages including the Sudanese languages. I have drawn upon the insight of the analysis of the Hamitic hypothesis to show that the postcolonial government discourse continues to operate on the basis of ethnic determinism (racial version of Arabicisation policy).
I have complemented the historical review of the distribution of languages in the Sudan by surveying the historical genealogy of Arabic in the Sudan. Since the analysis of the NLP requires understanding of the key analytic and methodological concepts in language planning, I have reviewed the major themes in the field including the various elements and actors in the process of language planning, critical approaches, descriptive and analytic models, and conceptual frameworks used in the analysis of language policy discourses.

The notions of ‘language rights’ and ‘critical language awareness’ have been examined. The relationships between language planning and power; language planning and social class, and language planning and national identity have been identified. The various critical approaches to literacy education have been surveyed. The language situation in Nigeria has been examined in order to have a comparative yardstick for the analysis of the NLP. I have operationalised the various critical approaches in the analysis of the NLP. Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ has been used as a method of analysis of the language rights in the NLP.

The institutional development of language planning in the Sudan has been reviewed to provide a historical context for the analysis of the NLP. I have surveyed the colonial and postcolonial practice of language planning in the Sudan through the analysis of official language policies. The various linguistic measures employed by the colonial rule to invent the ‘South’ and the ‘North’ as separate identities have been identified. I have shown that understanding the term ‘indigenous’ requires invoking the historiography of the way in which social space was divided by the colonial rule between the south and the north.

I have constructed the interpretation that the colonial Southern Policy is an ideological project intended to invent different social identities in the Sudan. The semiotic processes involved in this colonial structuring of the differences between the South and the North were analysed. The interpretation of the colonial Southern Policy is important for disambiguating the term ‘indigenous’ in the NLP. I have demonstrated that the use of the term ‘indigenous’ in the NLP is politically
motivated, and that it is compatible with the right to ‘external self-determination’ stated in the Machakos Protocol (another constituent protocol of the CPA).

The historical analysis has shown that the indexical relationship between Arabic and Islam on the one hand, and between English and Christianity on the other hand is a creation of colonial intervention. The relationship between structural political systems and language plans in the Sudan has been examined, and the compatible structural system with NLP has been defined. I have compared the configuration of political power in the CPA and the distribution of languages in the Sudan. The type of language rights regime embedded in the NLP has been analysed.

The social implications of the political power configuration in the CPA for the implementation of the NLP have been discussed. I have shown that the implementation of the NLP can lead to official trilingualism at the regional state level, and to official bilingualism at higher educational level. I have drawn on my ethnographic observation of the sociolinguistic practices of the people in the Nuba Mountains to argue the case that language planning from bottom-up can achieve not just its immediate aims, but can also contribute to the community development of linguistic resources. To support this argument, the linguistic contribution of the TLC in the development of social literacies has been reviewed.

I have demonstrated that the NLP acts as a framework under which regional states’ language policies can be made. The southern Sudan language policy is broadly reviewed with a focus on sign language research in the Sudan. The discussion of the status of Sudanese sign language planning has pointed to the fact that language planning works only when there is grassroots support. I have demonstrated that the NLP is designed as a corrective to the nationalist policies of Arabicisation. I have shown that the inclusion of the NLP in the Protocol of Power Sharing lends support to the argument that language planning is an arena of social struggle in the Sudan to construct an alternative reality. The NLP is a constituent element of this alternative reality, metaphorically termed the ‘New Sudan’.
The study had the following related objectives:

1. To provide an overview of the nature of the sociolinguistic order in the Sudan before the institutional intervention of state–driven language planning, with particular concentration on the historical genealogy of the policies of Arabicisation. Another related aim has been to identify the sociopolitical implications of Greenberg’s linguistic work within the context of the Sudan language situation;

2. To survey the historical development of language policies in the Sudan during the colonial and postcolonial periods. The aim here has been to identify the linguistic measures adopted by the colonial rule to construct two self–contained social identities in the Sudan;

3. To examine the politics of linguistic indigenousness that is triggered by the statement ‘all indigenous languages are national languages’. The aim here has been to ‘disinvent’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006) the ‘naturalised’ notions of ‘indigenous languages’, the ‘north Sudan’, and the ‘south Sudan’ by revealing their colonial constructedness;

4. To analyse the type of language rights sanctioned in the NLP;

5. To examine the relationship between structural political systems and language policies in the Sudan with a focus on identifying the compatible structural system for the implementation of the NLP;

6. To identify the relationship between the allocation of political power in the peace protocols and the NLP, with a concentration on the ways in which power relations may impact on the realisation of the language policy. A related objective has been to anticipate the type of language change that the language policy may bring about given the distribution of political ideologies in the peace agreement. The aim of providing an initial assessment with respect to the institutional implementation of the Naivasha language policy will be broadly dealt with in this chapter.

For the first objective, I have produced a reconstruction of the linguistic map of the Sudan prior to the spread of the Arabic language particularly in the northern Sudan. I have socially contextualised the languages spoken in the Sudan by reviewing one of
the commonly cited linguistic typologies of African languages, Greenberg’s (1963a) classification of African languages. I have provided a sociohistorical understanding of the intellectual context which shaped Greenberg’s antagonism to the mobilisation of the physical anthropological concept of ‘race’ in the description of African languages. I have shown that the historical environment at the time was dominated by the Hamitic hypothesis, which in turn depended on philology in its construction of racial typecasting of Africans into Hamitic (and Half–Hamitic in Seligman’s typology), Semitic, Negro, etc. The Teutonic theory/Hamitic hypothesis was in alliance with politics, and both were assisted by philology. It has been shown that researchers including Lepsius, Muller, Cust, Westermann, Tucker, and Meinhof manipulated the racial construct of the ‘Hamitic’ as a descriptive category in their typologies. Greenberg debunked the use of the Hamitic hypothesis in linguistic analysis to the extent that his book of 1963a is considered by some critics as a reaction against Meinhof’s typology. Greenberg’s work on African languages can be interpreted, among other things, as an attempt to de–politicise and de–racialise the study of African languages by first abandoning the very use of the term ‘Hamitic’ and secondly by conceptually treating all African languages on an equal footing. It has been my contention that the stance of trying to be ‘apolitical’ in such a context so riven with ideologically–laden views is itself political. Devoting the machinery of linguistics to de–naturalising the link of race (or identity) to language lies (or should lie) at the heart of political linguistics. The argument here has been that Greenberg provides a counter–evidential argument against the language ideologies which view the Sudan in terms of abstract, polarised and categorically racial/religious/linguistic constructs (the south vs. the north Sudan). I have shown that these political constructs are in themselves colonial inventions, the construction of which involved complex social processes of linguistic differentiation. I have also reviewed the way in which Arabic was spreading in the Sudan before the emergence of the institutional practice of language planning. I have argued that the official declaration of Islam and the Arabic language as state policy in the north was a colonial practice that directly served the interests of power holders in the north at the price of the interests of their southern counterparts.
For the second objective of the study, I have reviewed the diachronic development of the institutional practice of language planning in the Sudan from the start Anglo–Egyptian rule in 1898 to the signing of the CPA in 2005. The analysis has shown that the colonial language policy was intended to separate the south from the north Sudan. I have demonstrated that a number of linguistic measures were employed to differentiate the south from the north including the Rejaf Language Conference of 1928, the construction of no–man’s land, and the creation of the Closed District Order. These measures taken together constitute what came to be known as the Southern Policy. I have surveyed the postcolonial policies of Arabicisation in the Sudan. The analysis has shown that Arabic was a key tool in the attempt to build a unified and homogeneous nation–state in the Sudan. I have shown that the state–declared policy of Arabicisation has been strongly resisted by southerners. The refusal of the northern power holders to accommodate the political demands of their fellow citizens led to the eruption of civil war.

For the third objective, I have attempted to construct an interpretation of overt and hidden effects of the status–planning statement that ‘all indigenous languages are national languages’. I have analysed the sociohistorical conditions (at textual, intertextual, and contextual levels) that led to the discursive construction of the ‘indigenous’ as both ‘language’ and ‘national’. I have argued that the colonial and postcolonial practice of language planning in the Sudan in themselves have acted as an ‘ideology broker’ (Blommaert 1999a: 9) both when they have ‘objectified’ and ‘naturalised’ the ideological construction of Arabic as a single national language, and when they have endorsed a top–down approach with the aim to shape the social linguistic practices of the diverse multilingual communities. I have shown that the postcolonial version of language planning in the Sudan, informed by the structural functional view of language, is implicated in the ideological processes of the ‘objectification’, ‘naturalisation’, and justification of imposing Arabic as a national language upon the diverse communities in the Sudan. I have argued for a radical conceptual reframing in the Sudanese folk and institutional discourse of the role language should play in the gradual restructuring of the existing sociopolitical configuration, and consequently, the construction of a new sociolinguistic order, as
part of the project of ‘New Sudan’. Otherwise, the Naivasha language policy will remain a rhetorical tool that may be manipulated by power holders to perpetuate the existing structures of the Arabisation policy which is widely blamed for the current social disorder. I have shown that the term ‘indigenous languages’ in the NLP is intended to function as a metaphorical strategy of symbolic differentiation of the ‘African south’ from the ‘Arab north’.

I have argued the case that ‘indigenous languages’ in the Sudan are a colonial invention intended as a dialectical part of the project of constructing two isolated/isolating social identities in the Sudan. I have drawn on Irvine and Gal (2000) to identify the processes involved in the colonial construction of the linguistic difference between the ‘south’ and the ‘north’. Contrary to Phillipson’s argument of ‘linguistic imperialism’, I have argued that English served alongside vernacular languages in the resistance to Arabisation. I have demonstrated that the essential connection of Arabic to Islam is a consequence of the colonial policy in the Sudan which involved the processes of ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), creations of tribes, construction of ‘indigenous languages’, etc. I have contended that the historicisation of the NLP provides an informed avenue for understanding the genealogical continuity of the southern social struggle. I have pointed out that the discourse of linguistic indigenousness is far from being innocent, but rather politically motivated. The fact that the south is given the right to external self–determination in four years’ time now points to the ideological implications and political instrumentality of the notion of indigenousness in the NLP. I have shown that this employment of the term ‘indigenous’ is perfectly intertextual and compatible with the international legal discourse on the rights of indigenous people. The analysis has shown that language has always been a site of, and had a stake in, the colonial/postcolonial struggle over political and material power in the Sudan. I have shown that the language policy encodes this social struggle. The discourse of the NLP is riddled with tensions and contradictions due to the historical fact that it is a discursive compromise between two different ideological projects.
I have contended that the politics of linguistic indigenousness may lead to, among other things, the emergence of ‘cultural racism’. This point has been exemplified by the fact that the JPF, a very recent northern nationalist movement with an overtly separatist political agenda, is mobilising northerners around essentialising ideological discourse (e.g., that the CPA threatens the Islamic and Arabic culture in the north). It publicly demands the separation of the north from the south (the north seen in monolithic terms constitutes the majority with respect to political power). I have argued that the emergence of this northern secessionist movement has exposed the ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995) of the dominant northern social group. The historical cultural and material domination by the north is ‘overlooked, forgotten, even theoretically denied’ (Billig 1995: 17). In the past, secessionist ideologies used to be strategically projected on the southerners, while the (cultural) nationalism of the dominant northern people was objectified and naturalised as the determinant of the essence of the whole nation–state.

For the fourth aim, the analysis has shown that the language policy requires that bilingual education in English and Arabic be implemented at higher educational levels. It has also been shown that trilingualism is likely to emerge in regional states if a local language is selected as a third additional working language at the concerned regional level (territoriality principle of language rights). The analysis has explained that English and Arabic are granted equal constitutional status as official working languages at the national level (personality principle of language rights). I have strongly argued for the consideration of language (educational) rights as part of the habitus of the people and not as an unsituated fixed–given.

For the fifth objective, it has been shown that the monolingual language policies of Arabicisation are congruent with a centralised unitary political system. The analysis has shown that there is a high degree of compatibility between the proposed structural system and the distribution of language rights suggested by the NLP. The compatible structural system with the NLP is a federal political system. This compatibility is achieved at the status planning level, and its implementation at the practical level remains to be seen with respect to the northern part of the Sudan. I
have examined the new southern Sudan language policy and I have shown that it is in accordance with its matrix framework of NLP.

For the sixth aim, I have compared the distribution of political power in the Protocol on Power–sharing and the distribution of languages in the Sudan. The analysis has shown that the peace agreement imposes an uneven allocation of power with the ruling party (NCP) maintaining domination at the national level and the southern opposition (SPLM/A) dominating the south of the country. Other major northern political forces which have a mass of public loyalty have been granted little power in the north. Such an unequal distribution of authority and power is less likely to bring any language change in the north (with the exception of the west and the east), and thus the policy of Arabicisation may not be affected. The language policy is much more likely to be fully realised in the southern Sudan because Arabic–speaking elites would have little power in the region; and thus local languages can be revived and maintained. The western Sudan – another multilingual region – which, as I write this conclusion, is suffering the bitterest civil war the world has witnessed since that in Rwanda, is more likely to redistribute the map of power and thus render the whole current peace agreement invalid and the proposed language policy void. For such a language policy to survive and to succeed in achieving the goals of egalitarianism and accessibility of power to local people, a radical transformation in the political environment may be required; notably some form of a decentralised and democratically–based system that can shake up the present structural power. Yet, I am not claiming that the proposed language policy, if it was to be implemented faithfully, would blur power inequalities and would reconstruct a Sudanese society that is free of power conflicts. I am very well aware of Rajagopalan’s (1999a: 205–206) argument that ‘in any society, language planning and language teaching necessarily entail rehashing of existing power relations simply because power is exercised in and through language’. However such a position, as Canagarajah (1999b: 211) cogently counter–argues, ‘urges us to bury our eyes ostrich–like to the political evils and ideological temptations outside. Divorcing our moral sensibility and social consciousness from our profession’. The point is that ‘a lot of things can in fact be done to negotiate, modify, and even change power – at least in certain
limited domains – creating in the process relatively more democratic relations’ (ibid.).

I end this thesis with the following remarks about the implementation stage of the NLP. One cannot sensibly and meaningfully talk about the implementation of the NLP in a manner decontextualised from the current social conditions. The ensuing broad remarks stem from direct observation of the language situation in material reality following my visit to the Sudan from 4 December 2006 – 10 January 2007.

I started to investigate the implementation process of the language policy at Khartoum University. The guiding question was whether the university has been teaching bilingually in English and Arabic according to the new language policy. First, I have observed that there are a number of commercial photocopying shops in University area. I noticed that materials which the majority of students belonging to different disciplines bring to the shop to have copied are exclusively in Arabic. When I asked some students whether there had been an English version, they replied in the negative. Apart from departments of languages and the Department of Linguistics which teaches in both languages, the rest of departments teach in the Arabic language. I asked some of the university teachers why they did not implement the new language policy. One of the senior lecturers reported that the University Vice–Chancellor’s Office had not yet made an official decision directing teachers to do so. I went to the Vice–Chancellor’s Office, and was transferred to the officials who are assumed to hold information about the new language policy decisions. When I met them, they said there was nothing issued to teachers concerning the issue of bilingual education, since they have yet to receive an official directive from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. I went to the Ministry, which is a walkable distance from the University of Khartoum. I visited the Office Manager of the Minister of Higher Education and, surprisingly, I found out that the new language policy is, literally speaking, unheard of there among the majority of officials. I was directed to the person who was said to be part of a language committee established by the National Council for Higher Education and Scientific Research. I found out that this committee was formed to deal with the issue of ‘decline’ of English and
Arabic at the university level. When I enquired as to whether the implementation of the NLP had ever been started, a committee member replied that it deserves to be attended to. The committee member went on to explain his interpretation of the language policy, which is that the NLP grants universities the right to use ‘either’ English ‘or’ Arabic, and that the Ministry should not ‘discriminate’ between languages in the sense that it should not intervene to influence a university’s choice of language. Clearly this interpretation is based on both statement 5 of the language policy that forbids linguistic discrimination, and statement 3. Yet, this way of reading the policy has changed the term ‘and’ in statement 3 to ‘either’. This is where the risk lies in the ambiguity of the statements. Another significant observation is that official correspondence in the Ministry of Higher Education is still carried out in Arabic only, instead of Arabic and English. The Implementation Modalities of the Protocol of Power–Sharing (signed 31 December 2004) prescribes that there should be a national council for development and promotion of national languages (see Table 6.1). The law for this language policy has been drafted by the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), but it has yet to be ratified and passed by the national parliament (http://www.smc.sd/en/artopic.asp?artID=18499&aCK=ED).

To say that the text of the language policy has yet to be ‘faithfully’ implemented is understatement. As I write this paragraph, a crisis has broken out between the two the peace partners. This crisis has been marked by the decision of the SPLM/A on 11th October 2007 to suspend its participation in the Government of National Unity (GONU). The SPLM/A has accused the NCP of failing to meet its commitments in relation to the implementation of the CPA. The NCP has returned the same accusations. It is assumed by commentators that the crisis will be/should be resolved soon or the whole peace agreement will be threatened. The implementation of the NLP must now be carried out within this environment which is ridden with contradictions and tensions. However, the question remains whether the parts of the language policy that were meant to be implemented starting from the pre–Interim period have ever been implemented (see Table 6.1).
Pantuliano (2006) has carried out an ethnographic research on the public perception of the peace agreement in the Eastern Sudan, and has found that:

The CPA was seen by most actors in the region (eastern Sudan] as a bilateral agreement between the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A, which has failed to take into account the instances of the many different groups living in the Sudan. Many people emphasised that the title ‘comprehensive’ is highly inappropriate for an agreement that has been so exclusive. Most of the people interviewed in eastern Sudan felt that the signing of the Machakos Protocol [between the Government and the SPLM] and the process leading to the signing of the other protocols has led other groups to resort to armed confrontation (e.g., in Dar Fur) or to escalate fighting (e.g., in eastern Sudan).

(Pantuliano 2006: 5)

Pantuliano (2006: 712) has found out that ‘a number of Beja actors claimed that their culture and their language have been discriminated against by a series of governments and that it is important for the Beja to preserve the use of TuBedawye [the Beja language]’. Morton (1989: 66) defines the Beja as ‘the indigenous inhabitants of all but the eastern tip of Red Sea Province, and much of Kassala Province, and are the largest of the peripheral northern groups to speak a single language’ (for a detailed historical account on the Beja tribes see Paul 1954; Hasan 1967). Greenberg (1963a) describes the Beja language as Afro–Asiatic of the northern Cushitic branch (for the classification of Sudanese languages see Chapter 2). The interpretation of Pantuliano’s findings with respect to the educational planning is that the Beja language is a means of socialisation of children into the cultures of those parts of eastern Sudan. Halliday’s remark on the importance of language in the process of the child’s socialisation points to the role the postcolonial practice of language planning in the Sudan would have played:

Every child is brought up in a culture, and he has to learn the patterns of that culture in the process of becoming a member of it. The principal means whereby the culture is made available to him is through language: language is not the only channel, but it is the most significant one. Even the most intimate of personal relationships, that of the child with its mother, is from an early age mediated through language; and language plays some part in practically all his social learning. (Halliday 1978: 213)

Pantuliano has observed that a majority of rural people in eastern Sudan cannot claim their rights for the simple reason that they are unaware of them:

An important element which emerged throughout the assessment is that most people, particularly rural communities as well as of much of the
people living in urban slums know very little about the CPA, its provisions and the implications it will have for the East and the country as a whole. An important issue for the region, for instance is the establishment of the Land Commission envisaged in the Wealth Sharing Protocol, but it is not clear how people in remote rural areas will be made aware of the Commission in order to claim back land where they are entitled to it. The mechanisms of implementation of the agreement are not even clear to some of the leadership in the region. (Pantuliano 2006: 7)

The argument here is that the general awareness of common people across the Sudan of their rights embodied in the CPA is inseparable from the implementation of the NLP. A language policy statement in the Protocol on Power–Sharing (Article 2.5.9) reads:

The Government of National Unity shall implement an information campaign throughout Sudan in all national languages in Sudan to popularize the Peace Agreement, and to foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding.

The conducting of the above linguistic campaign is detailed in the Implementation Modalities of the language policy. According to the Implementation Modalities, the timing for implementing the linguistic campaign is ‘from the beginning of the pre–Interim till the end of the Interim period’. The Implementation Modalities state that the executing bodies of the linguistic campaign are the ‘parties’ [NCP and SPLM/A], and ‘all levels of government’. The Implementation Modalities further stipulate that the ‘parties and all levels of government’ should fund the linguistic campaign. The direct involvement of the ruling political parties as one of the funding sources makes this policy formulation a straightforward statement of promotion–oriented rights for non–Arabic speaking ethnies (see Kloss 197, 1977). The Implementation Modalities indicate that the organisation of this campaign will be under the supervision of the ‘parties and GONU’. The Implementation Modalities state that the procedures and processes through which the campaign will be conducted should include: ‘Media, seminars, workshops, leaflets, political public rallies, etc’. The point that I need to make here is that the implementation of the linguistic campaign would probably have contributed to raising the general awareness of the ways in which Beja people in rural areas could redress the problems concerning the establishment of the ‘Land Commission’. An understanding of the cultural representation of land in the
collective culture of the Beja tribes might itself substantiate their claim to the rights of ‘indigenous people’ as they are understood in the international legal discourse (for a discussion of the politics of linguistic indigenousness see Chapter 5) For the Beja, land is an objective cultural element which sets them apart from the Arabic–speaking groups, and supports their demand for regionalism. Morton writes:

One notable feature of Beja society is the territorial system, by which a strong cultural and emotional value is placed on the land claimed by a patrilineage, while actual regulation of the use of the land is in fact freer and more complex … The Arabic–speakers often have attitudes of extreme condescension towards Beja, whom they see as primitive and aggressive. Yet Beja see the city [Port Sudan] as built on their land, and many see the Arabic–speakers as trespassers upon it. It has in fact been land, and not the Beja language or separate cultural identity, that has been the major motivating symbol for Beja regionalism. The Phrase *uhash hashon* (the land is our land), so often used in intra–Beja land disputes, is taking on the character of a political slogan; and some Beja use the characteristic gesture of waving a handful of dust from the ground under the nose of an Arabic–speaker (meaning; is this yours?). (Morton 1989: 66–67)

Pantuliano (2006) has provided evidence that neither the GONU nor the state government in eastern Sudan has started implementing the linguistic campaign in the Beja language. The argument which can link (adult) education with democracy and critical citizenry as a (discursive) practice is that people should not assume that (undemocratic) ruling regimes will always look after their rights. Rather, rights have to be consistently and incessantly argued and struggle for by people (see Crowther and Tett 2001: 112). Crowther and Tett (ibid.) state that ‘an education that does not alert people to the forces that infringe their rights and examine ways in which they can be protected and extended will sell them out’. The point here is that the implementation of the NLP is inseparable from the philosophy of the ‘New Sudan’ as an ideological project of constructing a new active citizenship in the Sudan. The critical language planning researcher Tollefson (2002: 336) reminds us that ‘a conception of “citizenship” must be developed that acknowledges the important social function of ethnolinguistic identity but does not lead to the creation of classes of citizens with unequal rights and privileges’.

It should be mentioned that the evaluation of the status of the implementation of the NLP is not a one-off event, but rather an ongoing process (for a discussion of
evaluation of language policies see Chapter 3). I believe that it is worth recognising that only democratically inspired language planning will make possible a representation of local voices in the country of Sudan. Speakers of minority languages should be empowered to participate in the ongoing struggle towards protecting and preserving their local idioms, cultural practices, and identities. My visit to the Tima tribe, which I have drawn on in the previous chapter, points to the conclusion that the desire to achieve these purposes should stem bottom–up from the people themselves. In a word, it is hoped that the thesis might contribute not just to combating the ideology of the standard monolingual policy of Arabicisation, but also towards providing insights upon which the governmental practice of language planning in the Sudan can draw. I conclude this thesis with the following suggestions:

1. There is a vital need to see how the resolution of the conflict in the western region of Darfur will alter power relations in the CPA and consequently the implementation of the NLP itself.

2. A careful study is required with the aim of developing critical awareness of local language practices of minority groups, since it is the basis on which any just language policy in such a country as Sudan should be established.

3. The analysis could not touch on the issue of the input (e.g., sociolinguistic surveys) on which the proposed language policy was made due to the lack of information. Thus there is an urgent need to know the type of input politicians made use of in their reformulations of the policy statements. One piece of anecdotal evidence states that the statements which stipulate the recognition of all ‘indigenous’ languages as national languages and the permission to use a local language at the regional state level stem from a dialogue between southern tribal leaders and the late John Garang (the founder of the SPLM/A).

4. The dynamics of the language situation in the Sudan, and the ways in which peoples perceive of it should be researched ethnographically.

5. There is a need to examine the ‘collateral damage’ of the NLP.

6. The issue of linguistic appropriation should be further researched. There is a need to understand the different historical contexts under which Arabic is invoked as a boundary marker by non–Arabised ethnic groups in the Sudan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Executing Body</th>
<th>Funding Resource</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Procedures, process, and criteria</th>
<th>Reference in the Agreement</th>
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<td>35. Development &amp; promotion of national languages:</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Enactment of a founding law</td>
<td>After enactment of Interim National Constitution</td>
<td>GONU</td>
<td>GONU</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Seat of National Legislature</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Establishment of a council for development and promotion of national languages</td>
<td>After the enactment of law</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Information campaign in all languages to popularise the peace agreement and to foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding</td>
<td>From the beginning of the pre–Interim till the end of the Interim period</td>
<td>Parties and all levels of government</td>
<td>Parties and all levels of government</td>
<td>The Parties and GONU</td>
<td>All over Sudan</td>
<td>Media, Seminars, Conferences, Workshops, Leaflets, Political Public Rallies, Meetings, etc.</td>
<td>2.5.9</td>
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| Table 6.1. The Implementation Modalities of the Naivasha Language Policy |
| (Source: Implementation Modalities of the Power–sharing Protocol, 2004: 19, 23) |
Appendix

Protocol

Between

THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN (GOS)

AND

THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (SPLM)

ON

POWER SHARING

Naivasha, Kenya, Wednesday, May 26, 2004

PREAMBLE:

CONSCIOUS of the need for an expeditious termination of Sudan's protracted and costly war;

MINDFUL AND AWARE of the yearning of all the Sudanese for a quick, just and sustainable peace;

ENCOURAGED by the progress made thus far in our pursuit for realizing comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan;

DETERMINED to crown the valuable achievement of this Peace Process by arriving at an equitable and fair formula for sharing power in the Sudan;

RESOLVED to usher in an era of responsible, just, transparent, people-led and integrity based governance;

CONVINCED that decentralization and empowerment of all levels of government are cardinal principles of effective and fair administration of the country;

COGNIZANT of the fact that the smooth and successful implementation of this agreement shall, to a large measure, hinge on rallying the majority of the Sudanese people behind it; and

CONVINCED that the successful implementation of this agreement shall provide a model for good governance in Sudan that shall help to create a solid basis to make unity of the country attractive and preserve peace.

NOW THEREFORE, the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) hereby agree as follows:-

PART I

1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1.1 In accordance with the Machakos Protocol agreed to at Machakos, Kenya, on 20th July, 2002, the following Protocol on Power Sharing forms an integral part of the overall Peace Agreement.

1.2 The Parties reaffirm their acceptance of the Agreed Principles (of Governance) as stipulated in the Machakos Protocol of 20th July, 2002. The modalities of implementation of these principles are the object of the present Protocol on Power Sharing.

1.3 In accordance with the Machakos Protocol, the structures of governments in the Sudan shall be as follows during the Interim Period:-

1.3.1 The National level of Government which shall exercise authority so as to protect and promote the national sovereignty of Sudan and the welfare of its people;
1.3.2 The Southern Sudan level of Government which shall exercise authority in respect of the people and States in the South;
1.3.3 The States throughout Sudan which shall exercise authority at the state level and render public services through the level of government close to the people; and
1.3.4 The level of local government throughout the Sudan.

1.4 The Parties agree that the following principles shall guide the distribution of powers and the establishment of structures:

1.4.1 Recognition of both the sovereignty of the nation as vested in its people as well as the need for autonomy of the Government of Southern Sudan and States throughout the Sudan;
1.4.2 Affirmation of the need for both national as well as state and Southern Sudan norms and standards so as to reflect the unity of the country and the diversity of the Sudanese people;
1.4.3 Acknowledgement of the need to promote the welfare of the people and protect their human rights and fundamental freedoms;
1.4.4 Recognition of the need for the involvement and participation of the people of South Sudan at all levels of government and
National institutions as an expression of the national unity of the country;

1.4.5 Pursuit of good governance, accountability, transparency, democracy, and the rule of law at all levels of government to achieve lasting peace;

1.4.6 Recognizing the need to legitimize the arrangements agreed to herein, fair electoral laws shall be adopted, including the free establishment of political parties. Elections at all levels of government shall be held by universal adult suffrage.

1.5 Principles of Administration and Inter-Governmental Linkages:

1.5.1 In the administration of the Government of National Unity, the following provisions shall be respected:-

1.5.1.1 There shall be a decentralized system of government with significant devolution of powers, having regard to the National, Southern Sudan, State, and Local levels of government;

1.5.1.2 The Interim National Constitution, being the legal and constitutional framework text adopted as contemplated in paragraph 2.12.6 herein, shall be the Supreme Law of the land and the Southern Sudan Constitution, state constitutions, and the laws of all levels of government must comply with it;

1.5.1.3 The linkage between the National Government and the states in the Southern Sudan shall be through the Government of Southern Sudan, subject to paragraph 1.5.1.4 below, and as provided for in the Interim National Constitution and the Southern Sudan Constitution;

1.5.1.4 In their relationships with each other or with other government organs, all levels of government and particularly National, Southern Sudan, and State Governments shall:
(a) Respect each others’ autonomy;
(b) Collaborate rather than compete, in the task of
governing and assist each other in fulfilling
each others’ constitutional obligations;
(c) Perform their functions and exercise their powers so as:
i) Not to encroach on another level’s
powers or functions;
ii) Not to assume another level’s powers
or functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution;
iii) To promote co-operation between
them;
iv) To promote open communication
between government and levels of
government;
v) To strive to render assistance and
support to other levels of
government;
vi) To advance the good co-ordination of
governmental functions;
vii) To adhere to procedures of inter-
governmental interaction as agreed
upon;
viii) To promote amicable settlement of
disputes before attempting litigation;
ix) To respect the status and institutions
of other levels of government.
(d) Allow the harmonious and collaborative
interaction of the different levels of
government within the context of national
unity and for the achievement of a better
quality of life for all.

1.6 **Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:**
1.6.1 The Republic of the Sudan, including all levels of Government throughout the country, shall comply fully with its obligations under the international human rights treaties to which it is or becomes a party. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Slavery Convention of 1926, as amended, and the related Supplementary Convention, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Related Protocol, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. The Republic of the Sudan should endeavor to ratify other human rights treaties which it has signed.

1.6.2. The rights and freedoms to be enjoyed under Sudanese law, in accordance with the provisions of the treaties referred to above, include in particular the following:-

1.6.2.1 **Life**

Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his/her life;

1.6.2.2 **Personal Liberty**

Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his/her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law;
1.6.2.3  **Slavery**

No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms shall be prohibited. No one shall be held in servitude or be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;

1.6.2.4  **Torture**

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

1.6.2.5  **Fair Trial**

(a) Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his/her arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him/her;

(b) In the determination of any criminal charges against him/her, or of his/her rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law;

(c) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;

(d) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed;

(e) In the determination of any criminal charge against him/her, everyone shall be entitled, in
full equality, to be tried without undue delay, to be tried in his/her presence and to defend himself/herself in person or through legal assistance of his/her own choosing and to have legal assistance assigned to him/her in any case where the interests of justice so require.

1.6.2.6 Privacy

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his/her privacy, family, home or correspondence;

1.6.2.7 Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;

1.6.2.8 Freedom of Expression

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;

1.6.2.9 Freedom of Assembly and Association

The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his/her interests;

1.6.2.10 Family and Marriage

(a) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State;
(b) The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized, according to their respective family laws.

1.6.2.11 Right to Vote

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without distinctions and unreasonable restrictions, to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

1.6.2.12 Equality Before the Law

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law;

1.6.2.13 Freedom from Discrimination

The law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status;

1.6.2.14 Freedom of Movement

Everyone has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his/her residence;

1.6.2.15 The Rights of Children

Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his/her status as a minor.;

1.6.2.16 Equal Rights of Men and Women

(a) The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and all economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights shall be ensured;

(b) The human rights and fundamental freedoms embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) shall also be reflected in the Interim National Constitution. No derogation from these rights and freedoms shall be made under the Constitution or under the ICCPR except in accordance with the provisions thereof and only with the approval of the Presidency and the National Legislature, as required by Section 2.3.14 herein;

(c) These human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be monitored by the Human Rights Commission specified in paragraph 2.10.1.2 herein.

1.7 Reconciliation:

The Parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace building process. Its mechanisms and forms shall be worked out by the Government of National Unity.

1.8 Population Census, Elections and Representation:
1.8.1 Population census throughout the Sudan shall be conducted and completed by the end of the second year of the Interim Period;

1.8.2 The preparation, planning and organization for the census shall commence as soon as the Peace Agreement is signed;

1.8.3 General Elections at all levels of government shall be completed by the end of the third year of the Interim Period;

1.8.4 Six months before the end of the periods referred to in Sub-Paragraphs 1.8.1 and 1.8.3 the Parties shall meet and review the feasibility of the dates set out in the above-mentioned sub-Paragraphs.

1.8.5 Certain considerations, while not conditional upon their completion, should be taken into account with respect to the timing of the elections (including, inter alia, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction, repatriation, building of structures and institutions, and consolidation of the Peace Agreement);

1.8.6 Whoever runs in any election must respect, abide by, and enforce the Peace Agreement;

1.8.7 International observers shall participate in the observation of elections;

1.8.8 Representation of the North and the South at the National level shall be based on population ratio;

1.8.9 The percentages agreed herein are temporary and shall either be confirmed or adjusted on the basis of the census results.
PART II

2. INSTITUTIONS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL:

2.1 During the Interim Period, the Institutions at the National level shall consist of:-

2.1.1 The Legislature;
2.1.2 The Executive;
2.1.3 The Judiciary; and
2.1.4 The Institutions and Commissions specified in this Agreement and the Interim National Constitution.

2.2. The National Legislature:

2.2.1 There shall be a bicameral National Legislature comprised of:-

2.2.1.1 A National Assembly; and
2.2.1.2 A Council of States.

2.2.2. In the establishment of the National Legislature, the following principles shall apply:-

2.2.2.1. There shall be equitable representation of the people of South Sudan in both legislative chambers; and
2.2.2.2. Relevant considerations shall be taken into account in determining what constitutes equitable representation.

2.2.3 The National Legislature shall be structured and operate as follows:-

2.2.3.1 The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with the procedures set forth by an impartial and representative Electoral Commission and in accordance with fair electoral laws;
2.2.3.2 There shall be a Council of States comprised of two representatives from each state;

2.2.3.3 Free and fair elections for the National Assembly shall be conducted in accordance with the Interim National Constitution governing the Interim Period. The date shall be determined by the Parties signatory to this Agreement, after consulting with the Electoral Commission.

2.2.4 Pending the elections referred to above, the National Assembly shall consist of such members representing the Parties to the Agreement, and other forces in the North and South so as to promote inclusiveness and stability, in such proportions to be determined by the parties prior to the conclusion of the Peace Agreement.

2.2.5 Prior to the Parliamentary elections, the seats of the National Assembly shall be allocated as follows:

(a) National Congress Party (NCP) shall be represented by Fifty Two Per Cent (52%);
(b) Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) shall be represented by Twenty Eight Per Cent (28%);
(c) Other Northern political forces shall be represented by Fourteen Per Cent (14%);
(d) Other Southern political forces shall be represented by Six Percent (6%);

2.2.6 Both Chambers of the National Legislature shall approve the allocation of resources and revenues, in accordance with the agreement of Wealth Sharing. The National Assembly shall approve the annual National budget.

2.2.7 Amendments to the National Constitution shall require:-

2.2.7.1 The approval of three-quarters (75%) of all the members of each chamber, both chambers sitting separately, and only after introduction of the draft amendment at least two months prior to debate;
2.2.7.2 Amendments to the Interim National Constitution affecting the provisions of the Peace Agreement may be introduced only with the approval of both Parties signatory to this Agreement;

2.2.7.3 A sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66.6%) majority in the Council of States is required to pass legislation that affects the interests of the states and a simple majority vote of both chambers is required to pass all other legislation.

2.2.8 Any bill duly approved by the National Legislature shall be signed into law by the President within thirty (30) days, failing which it shall be deemed to have been so signed. Where the President withholds his/her signature, he/she must present reasons for his/her refusal to so sign when reintroducing the bill to the National Legislature within the 30-day period stated herein. The Bill shall become law if the National Legislature again passes the bill by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the respective house or houses and the assent of the President shall not be required.

2.2.9. The exclusive legislative powers of the National Legislature shall be in respect of the matters set forth in Schedule A, annexed hereto.

2.2.10 The concurrent legislative powers of the National Legislature shall be those matters as set forth in Schedule D, read together with Schedule F, annexed hereto.

2.2.11 The residual legislative powers shall be exercised in accordance with Schedule E annexed hereto.

2.2.12 Both chambers of the National Legislature shall elect their respective Speakers, Deputy Speakers and other officers at their first sitting. The two Parties shall be adequately represented in these offices.

2.2.13 Both Chambers of the National Legislature shall respectively determine their own rules, procedures, committees, and other matters of a similar nature.

2.3. **The National Executive:**
2.3.1 The National Executive shall consist of the Presidency and a Council of Ministers.

2.3.2 There shall be established the Institution of the Presidency consisting of the President and two Vice Presidents.

2.3.3 The functions of the two Vice Presidents shall be clearly defined by the parties to this agreement.

2.3.4 There shall be a partnership and collegial decision-making process within the Institution of the Presidency in order to safeguard the Peace Agreement.

2.3.5 Until such time as elections are held, the current incumbent President (or his successor) shall be the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces {SAF}. The current SPLM Chairman (or his successor) shall be the First Vice President and shall at the same time hold the posts of President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

2.3.6 In respect of the following matters, the President shall take decisions with the consent of the First Vice President, namely:-

2.3.6.1 Declaration and termination of a state of emergency;
2.3.6.2 Declaration of war;
2.3.6.3 Appointments that the President is required to make according to the Peace Agreement, {to be specified}; and
2.3.6.4 Summoning, adjourning, or proroguing the National Legislature.

2.3.7 The President shall be elected in national elections, the timing of which shall be subject to the agreement of the two parties. The President elect shall appoint two Vice Presidents, one from the South and the other from the North. If the President-elect is from the North, the position of the First Vice President shall be filled by the person who has been elected to
the post of President of the Government of Southern Sudan, as the President's appointee to the said position. In the event that a person from the South wins the Presidential elections, the President-elect shall appoint the First Vice President from the North. All the other provisions in this agreement relating to the presidency shall continue to apply.

2.3.8 Should the post of the President fall vacant, the functions of the President shall be assumed by a Presidential Council comprising of the Speaker of the National Assembly, the First Vice President and the Vice President.

2.3.8.1 The Speaker of the National Assembly shall be Chairperson of the Council in the period prior to elections, after elections the First Vice President shall be the chairperson of the Council;

2.3.8.2 The Presidential Council shall take its decision by consensus;

2.3.8.3 The Vice President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces {SAF}.

2.3.9 Should the post of the President fall vacant in the period prior to elections, the Office of the President shall be filled by the nominee of the National Congress Party within two weeks.

2.3.10 Should the post of the President fall vacant in the period after the elections, the post shall be filled through presidential elections which shall be held within sixty \(60\) days.

2.3.11 Should the post of the First Vice President fall vacant:-

2.3.11.1 Prior to elections, the office of the First Vice President shall be filled by the nominee of the SPLM within two weeks;

2.3.11.2 After the elections, the President shall appoint a First Vice President in accordance with the Interim National Constitution and the provisions of this Peace Agreement.

2.3.12 The President shall, within 30 days of the entry into force of the Peace Agreement, and in consultation with the First Vice President, establish a Council of Ministers, having due regard to the need for inclusiveness and diversity in the establishment of a Government of National Unity. The Cabinet Ministers shall be accountable to the President and the
National Assembly in the performance of their functions and may be removed by a resolution supported by two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly.

2.3. 13 The President, the First Vice President and the Vice President shall be members of the Council of Ministers.

2.3. 14 The National Legislature shall be required to approve declarations of war or state of emergency, but in either event, there shall be no derogation from the provisions of the Peace Agreement, except as may be provided herein.

2.3. 15 Any Executive Orders or other legal acts by the President of the Republic shall be discussed with, and adopted by the Council of Ministers.

2.4 National Capital:

2.4.1 Khartoum shall be the Capital of the Republic of the Sudan. The National Capital shall be a symbol of national unity that reflects the diversity of Sudan.

2.4.2 The Administration of the National Capital shall be representative; and during the Interim Period the two Parties shall be adequately represented in the administration of the National Capital.

2.4.3 Human rights and fundamental freedoms as specified in the Machakos Protocol, and in the Agreement herein, including respect for all religions, beliefs and customs, shall be guaranteed and enforced in the National Capital, as well as throughout the whole of Sudan, and shall be enshrined in the Interim National Constitution.

2.4.4 Law enforcement agencies of the Capital shall be representative of the population of Sudan and shall be adequately trained and made sensitive to the cultural, religious and social diversity of all Sudanese.

2.4.5 Without prejudice to the competency of any National Institution to promulgate laws, Judges and law enforcement agents shall, in
dispensing justice and enforcing current laws in the National Capital
be guided by the following:-

2.4.5.1 Tolerance shall be the basis of coexistence between the
Sudanese people of different cultures, religions and traditions;
2.4.5.2 Behaviour based on cultural practices and traditions which does
not disturb public order, is not disdainful of other traditions,
and not in flagrant disregard of the law or disturbing public
order shall be deemed in the eyes of the law as an exercise of
personal freedoms;
2.4.5.3 Personal privacy is inviolable and evidence obtained in violation
of such privacy shall not be admissible in the court of law;
2.4.5.4 The judicial discretion of courts to impose penalties on non-
Muslims shall observe the long-established legal {Sharia} principle that non-Muslims are not subject to prescribed
penalties, and therefore remitted penalties shall apply;
2.4.5.5 Leniency and granting the accused the benefit of doubt are
legal principles of universal application, especially in the
circumstances of a poor society like the Sudan, which is just
emerging from war, characterized by prevalent poverty and
subject to massive displacement of people.

2.4.6 A special commission shall be appointed by the Presidency to ensure
that the rights of non-Muslims are protected in accordance with the
aforementioned guidelines and not adversely affected by the
application of Sharia Law in the Capital. The said commission shall
make its observations and recommendations to the Presidency.

2.4.7 Additionally, a system of mechanisms of guarantees shall be
established to operationalise the above points, which includes:-

2.4.7.1 Judicial circulars to guide the courts as to how to observe the
foregoing principles;
2.4.7.2 Establishment of specialized courts; and
2.4.7.3 Establishment of specialized Attorney General circuits to
conduct investigations and pre-trial proceedings related to
offences involving these principles.
2.5. **The Government of National Unity:**

2.5.1 During the Interim Period, there shall be a Government of National Unity reflecting the need for inclusiveness, the promotion of national unity, and the defense of national sovereignty, and the respect and implementation of Peace Agreement.

2.5.2 The Presidency and Council of Ministers shall exercise the Executive powers and competencies in respect of the matters in Schedules A and D, read together with Schedules E and F, and as conferred upon it by this Agreement and the Interim National Constitution.

2.5.3 Cabinet posts and portfolios in all clusters, including the National Sovereignty Ministries, shall be shared equitably and qualitatively by the two Parties. The Parties agree to cluster the National ministries under the implementation modalities.

2.5.4 Representation of the SPLM and other political forces from the South in each of the clusters shall be determined by the Parties Signatory to Agreement prior to the conclusion of the Peace Agreement.

2.5.5 Prior to elections, the seats of the National Executive shall be allocated as follows:-

   (a) The National Congress Party shall be represented by Fifty Two Percent (52%);
   (b) Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) shall be represented by Twenty Eight Per Cent (28%);
   (c) Other Northern political forces shall be represented by Fourteen Per Cent (14%);
   (d) Other Southern political forces shall be represented by Six Percent (6%);

2.5.6 The Government of National Unity shall be responsible for the administration and functioning of the State and the formulation and
implementation of national policies in accordance with the Interim National Constitution.

2.5.6 The Government of National Unity shall be responsible for establishing recruitment systems and admission policies to national universities, national institutes, and other institutions of higher education based on fair competition, giving equal opportunity to all citizens.

2.5.8 The Government of National Unity shall make decisions related to the ongoing or future activities of the organizations of the United Nations, bilateral, national, or international governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with a view toward ensuring equitable and transparent distribution of projects, activities, and employment of personnel in the whole of Sudan and especially the reconstruction of the war affected areas. There is to be an equivalent obligation on all levels of Government.

2.5.9 The Government of National Unity shall implement an information campaign throughout Sudan in all national languages in Sudan to popularize the Peace Agreement, and to foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding.

2.6 **Civil Service:**

2.6.1 The Government of National Unity shall also ensure that the National Civil Service, notably at the senior and middle-levels, is representative of the people of Sudan. In so doing, the following principles shall be recognized:

2.6.1.1 Imbalances and disadvantages which exist must be redressed;
2.6.1.2 Merit is important and training is necessary;
2.6.1.3 There must be fair competition for jobs in the National Civil Service;
2.6.1.4 No level of government shall discriminate against any qualified Sudanese citizen on the basis of religion, ethnicity, region, gender, or political beliefs;
2.6.1.5 The National Civil Service will fairly represent all the people of the Sudan and will utilize affirmative action and job training to achieve equitable targets for representation within an agreed time frame;
2.6.1.6 Additional educational opportunities shall be created for war-affected people.

2.6.2 In order to create a sense of national belonging and address imbalances in the National Civil Service, a National Civil Service Commission shall be established with the task of:-

2.6.2.1 Formulating policies for training and recruitment into the civil service, targeting between Twenty – Thirty Percent (20% - 30%) of the positions, confirmed upon the outcome of the census referred to herein, for people of South Sudan who qualify;

2.6.2.2 Ensuring that not less than Twenty Percent (20%) of the middle and upper level positions in the National Civil Service (including the positions of Under Secretaries) are filled with qualified persons from the South within the first three years and achieving twenty Five Percent (25%) in five years and the final target figure referred to in sub-paragraph 2.6.2.1 above, within six years; and

2.6.2.3 Reviewing, after the first three years of the beginning of the Interim Period the progress made as a result of the policies and setting new goals and targets as necessary, taking into account the census results.

2.7 National Security:

2.7.1 The National Security Council:

2.7.1.1 There shall be at the National level a National Security Council, the composition and functions of which shall be determined by the law;
2.7.1.2 The National Security Council shall define the new national security strategy based on the analysis of the new security threats.

2.7.2 National Security Service:

2.7.2.1 There shall be one National Security Service. The details of its establishment shall be worked out under the implementation modalities;

2.7.2.2 The National Security Service shall be representative of the population and reflect the partnership of the negotiating Parties;

2.7.2.3 The South shall be equitably represented in the National Security Service;

2.7.2.4 The National Security Service shall be professional and its mandate shall be advisory and focused on information gathering and analysis;

2.7.2.5 There shall be established security committees at the Government of Southern Sudan and State levels, their composition and functions shall be determined by the law;

2.7.2.6 The National Security Service shall be anchored in the Presidency;

2.7.2.7 There shall be a National Security Act that shall reflect the mandate of the National Security Service and the provisions of this Agreement relating to the National Security;

2.7.2.8 That all the assets of the respective security organs of the two Parties shall accrue to the National Security Service.

2.8 Language:

2.8.6 All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be respected, developed and promoted.

2.8.7 Arabic language is the widely spoken national language in the Sudan.
2.8.8 Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the official working languages of the National Government business and languages of instruction for higher education.

2.8.9 In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-national level of government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working language(s) at its level.

2.8.10 The use of either language at any level of government or education shall not be discriminated against.

2.9 Foreign Policy:

2.9.1 During the Interim Period, as a matter of principle Sudan's Foreign Policy shall serve first and foremost Sudan's national interests to achieve the following objectives:-

2.9.1.1 Promotion of international cooperation, especially within the UN and other International and Regional Organizations for the consolidation of universal peace, respect of international law and treaty obligations and the promotion of a just world economic order;

2.9.1.2 To achieve the latter, enhancement of South-South and international cooperation;

2.9.1.3 Striving to achieve African and Arab integration, each within the ongoing regional plans and forums as well as promoting African and Arab Unity and Afro-Arab cooperation;

2.9.1.4 Non-interference in the affairs of other states and promotion of good-neighbourliness and mutual cooperation among all Sudan's neighbours;

2.9.1.5 Combating international and transnational organized crimes and terrorism.
2.10 Other Independent and/or National Institutions to be Established in Accordance with the Peace Agreement:

2.10.1 The National Constitutional Review Commission, as detailed in Section 2.12 herein, shall also detail the mandate and provide for the appointment and other mechanisms to ensure the independence of the following institutions:-

2.10.1.1 An impartial and representative National Electoral Commission;

2.10.1.2 A Human Rights Commission;
2.10.1.3 A National Judicial Service Commission;
2.10.1.4 A National Civil Service Commission;
2.10.1.5 An ad-hoc Commission to monitor and ensure accuracy, legitimacy, and transparency of the Referendum as mentioned in the Machakos Protocol on Self-Determination for the People of South Sudan, which shall also include international experts;

2.10.1.6 A Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission;

2.10.1.7 Any other independent commission/institution set forth in the Peace Agreement or as agreed upon by the Parties.

2.11 The National Judiciary:

2.11.1 The powers of the Judiciary shall be exercised by Courts and other tribunals. The Judiciary shall be independent of the Legislature and the Executive. Its independence shall be guaranteed in the Interim National Constitution.

2.11.2. There shall be established at the National Level:-

2.11.2.1. A Constitutional Court;
2.11.2.2. A National Supreme Court;
2.11.2.3. National Courts of Appeal; and
2.11.2.4. Any other National Courts or tribunals as deemed
necessary to be established by law.

2.11.3. **The Constitutional Court:**

2.11.3.1 There shall be established a Constitutional Court in accordance with the provisions of this Peace Agreement and the Interim National Constitution.

2. 11.3.2. The Constitutional Court shall:-

(i) Be independent from the Judiciary and any other courts in the country. It shall be headed by the President of the Constitutional Court, duly appointed by the President with the consent of the First Vice President, and shall be answerable to the Presidency;

(ii) Uphold the Interim National, Southern Sudan, and State Constitutions and its composition shall be representative;

(iii) Have original jurisdiction to decide disputes that arise under the National Interim Constitution and the constitutions of Northern States at the instance of individuals, juridical entities or of government;

(iv) Adjudicate on the constitutionality of laws and set aside or strike down laws or provisions of laws that do not comply with the National, Southern Sudan, or the relevant State constitutions;

(v) Have appellate jurisdiction on appeals against the decisions of Southern Sudan Supreme Court on the Constitution of Southern Sudan and the constitutions of Southern Sudan states;

(vi) Adjudicate on constitutional disputes between organs and levels of government, with respect to areas of exclusive or concurrent competencies;

(vii) Protect human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(viii) Have criminal jurisdiction over the President, the two Vice Presidents of the Republic, the two Speakers of the National Legislature, and the Justices of the National and Southern Sudan Supreme Courts.

2. 11.3.3. Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be final and binding.
2. 11.4. The National Supreme Court:

2. 11.4.1 The National Supreme Court shall:-

(i) Be a court of review and cassation in respect of any criminal or civil matter arising out of or under national laws;
(ii) Have criminal jurisdiction over the Justices of the Constitutional Court;
(iii) Review death sentences imposed by any Court in respect to matters arising out of or under National Laws; and
(iv) Have such other jurisdiction as determined by the Interim National Constitution, the Peace Agreement, and law.

2. 11.4.2. The National Supreme Court may establish panels for the purposes of considering and deciding appeals on matters requiring special expertise including commercial, personal, or labour matters.

2. 11.4.3. The Justices of the Constitutional and National Supreme Courts and all the judges of other National Courts shall perform their functions without political interference; they shall be independent, and shall administer justice without fear or favour. The Interim National Constitution and the law shall protect their independence.

2. 11.4.4. Judges other than the Justices referred to in Section 2.11.4.6 herein shall be appointed by the Presidency on the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission.

2. 11.4.5. The National Judicial Service Commission shall be chaired by the Chief Justice. Amongst others, representatives of academia, judges, members of the legal profession, members of the National Legislature, and the Minister of Justice shall sit on this Commission. The National Judicial Service Commission shall be as determined in the Interim National Constitution referred to in paragraph 2.12 herein and shall reflect the need for appropriate representation, inclusiveness, and diversity.
2. 11.4.6. (i) All Justices of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed by the Presidency on the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission, subject to approval by two-thirds majority of all the members of the Council of States, having regard to competence, credibility and the need for fair representation.

(ii) All Justices of the National Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Presidency on the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission, having regard to competence and credibility.

(iii) Southern Sudan shall be adequately represented in the Constitutional Court, the National Supreme Court and other national courts that are situated in the National Capital, by qualified lawyers having regard to competence and credibility;

2. 11.4.7. The tenure of Judges shall not be affected by their judicial decisions. Judges may only be removed for gross misconduct, incompetence, incapacity, or otherwise in accordance with the law, and only on the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission.

2.12 **Constitutional Review Process:**

2.12.1 The Peace Agreement shall be signed by the leaders of the two Parties.

2.12.2 Upon signature, the Parties shall be bound by the Agreement and shall assume the obligations arising there from, more especially the obligations to implement the Agreement and to give legal and constitutional effect to the arrangements agreed therein.

2.12.3 Upon signature the Parties commit themselves to ensure that all the organs, committees and structures under their control, including their members, shall observe the terms of the Agreement.
2.12.4 After the Agreement has been signed:

2.12.4.1 The text thereof shall be forwarded to the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council for approval as is;

2.12.4.2 A representative National Constitutional Review Commission shall be established, as is more fully described below, which shall within six (6) weeks of receipt of the Agreement prepare a Legal and Constitutional Framework ("The Constitutional Text");

2.12.4.3 The National Constitutional Review Commission shall be comprised of the NCP, SPLM and representatives of such other political forces and civil society as agreed by the Parties. Such composition shall be reflected in the final Peace Agreement.

2.12.5 The National Constitutional Review Commission shall have as its first task the preparation of a Legal and Constitutional Framework text in the constitutionally appropriate form, based on the Peace Agreement and the current Sudan Constitution, for adoption by the National Assembly. The same text shall be presented to the SPLM National Liberation Council for adoption. In the event of a contradiction, the terms of the Peace Agreement shall prevail in so far as that contradiction exists.

2.12.6 Without prejudice to the provisions of 2.12.5 above, the National Constitutional Review Commission in the preparation of the Legal and Constitutional Framework Text, shall draw upon relevant experiences and documents as may be presented by the Parties.

2.12.7 Upon adoption by the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council, the Constitutional Text shall become the Interim National Constitution for the Sudan during the Interim Period.

2.12.8 Pending the adoption of the Constitutional Text, the Parties agree that the legal status quo in their respective areas shall remain in force.
2.12.9 The National Constitutional Review Commission shall also be required to prepare such other legal instruments as is required to give effect to the Peace Agreement. It shall provide in such draft statutes or in the Constitutional Text for the appointment and other mechanisms to ensure the independence of such National Institutions as are referred to in Section 2.10 herein.

2.12.10 Without prejudice to the provisions of the Peace Agreement, as a subsequent task and during the course of the six-year Interim Period, the National Constitutional Review Commission shall be responsible for organizing an inclusive Constitutional Review Process. The process must provide for political inclusiveness and public participation.

2.12.11 Without prejudice to the functions of the State Legislatures, the National Constitutional Review Commission shall prepare model Constitutions for the States, subject to compliance with the National Constitution, and, as relevant, the Constitution of Southern Sudan.

2.12.12 The National Ministry of Justice shall, with the assistance of concerned attorneys, declare the compatibility of the constitution of Southern Sudan with the Interim National Constitution, and also declare the compatibility of the constitutions of the States with the Interim National Constitution and, as appropriate, with the constitution of Southern Sudan. Upon such declaration, the same constitutions shall be signed by the head of the appropriate level of government.

PART III

3. GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN:

3.1 In respect of the Southern Sudan, there shall be a Government of Southern Sudan {GOSS}, as per the borders of 1/1/56, which shall consist of:-

3.1.1 The Legislature of Southern Sudan;
3.1.2 The Executive of Southern Sudan;
The Judiciary of Southern Sudan;

3.2 The Government of Southern Sudan shall function in accordance with a Southern Sudan Constitution, which shall be drafted by an inclusive Southern Sudan Constitutional Drafting Committee and adopted by the Transitional Assembly of Southern Sudan by a two-thirds majority of all members. It shall conform with the Interim National Constitution.

3.3 The powers of the Government of Southern Sudan shall be as set forth in Schedules B and D, read together with Schedules E and F, the Interim National Constitution, Southern Sudan Constitution, and the Peace Agreement.

3.4 A primary responsibility of the Government of Southern Sudan will be to act as an authority in respect of the States of Southern Sudan, to act as a link with the National Government and to ensure that the rights and interests of the people of Southern Sudan are safeguarded during the Interim Period.

3.5 Legislature of Southern Sudan:

3.5.1 Pending the elections, the First Southern Sudan Assembly shall be an inclusive, constituent legislature comprised of:-

3.5.1.1 The SPLM shall be represented by Seventy Percent (70%);
3.5.1.2 The NCP shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%);
3.5.1.3 The other Southern political forces shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%).

3.5.2 The Southern Sudan Assembly shall, in accordance with the Constitution adopted by it, provide for the election of its Speaker and other office holders.

3.5.3 When enacting the Constitution of Southern Sudan, the Assembly of Southern Sudan shall be empowered to assign such powers as set forth in Schedules B and D, read together with Schedules E and F, to the Government of Southern Sudan.
3.5.4 The Southern Sudan Constitution shall make provision for the Assembly of Southern Sudan to be re-constituted through elections in accordance with the provisions herein related to the timing of general elections. The Constitution of the Southern Sudan shall also make provision for the election of the President and appointment of the Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan. Such elections shall be in accordance with the provisions set forth by the National Electoral Commission specified in sub-paragraph 2.10.1.1 herein.

3.5.5 The Assembly of Southern Sudan may amend the Constitution of the Southern Sudan by a two-thirds majority vote of all members.

3.5.6 Apart from applicable national legislation, legislative authority in Southern Sudan shall be vested in the Assembly of Southern Sudan. It shall establish its own offices, committees and rules of procedure. It shall elect a Speaker and Deputy Speaker and other officers at its first meeting.

3.6 The Southern Sudan Executive:

3.6.1 An Executive Council of Ministers appointed by the President of the Government of Southern Sudan, in consultation with his/her Vice President and approved by the Assembly of Southern Sudan, shall be established in accordance with the Southern Sudan Constitution. The Executive Council of Ministers shall be accountable to the President of the Government of Southern Sudan and the Southern Sudan Assembly in the performance of their functions and may be removed by a motion supported by two-thirds of all the members of the Southern Sudan Assembly.

3.6.2 The Executive Authority of Southern Sudan shall establish such independent institutions as the Peace Agreement, the Interim National Constitution and the Southern Sudan Constitution contemplate. It shall be empowered to establish such further commissions and institutions compatible with its powers as it deems necessary to promote the welfare of its people, good governance and justice.
3.6.3 The Government of Southern Sudan shall be established with due regard to the need for inclusiveness.

3.6.4 Prior to elections, the Government of Southern Sudan shall be allocated as follows:-

3.6.4.1 The SPLM shall be represented by Seventy Percent (70%);
3.6.4.2 The NCP shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%);
3.6.4.3 The other Southern political forces shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%).

3.6.5 The Government of Southern Sudan shall discharge its obligations and exercise such rights and powers in regard to administration, security, financial, and development issues as is set forth in the Southern Sudan Constitution, the Interim National Constitution, the Peace Agreement and any other agreement relating to the reconstruction and development of the Southern Sudan.

3.6.6 (a) Should the post of the President of GOSS fall vacant, and pending the nomination and swearing in of the new President, the functions of the President shall be assumed by the Vice President of GOSS;

(b) Should the post of the President of GOSS fall vacant in the period prior to elections, the Office of the President of GOSS shall be filled by a nominee of the SPLM within two weeks;

(c) Should the post of the President fall vacant in the period after the elections, the post shall be filled through elections which shall be held within sixty (60) days.

3.7 The Judiciary of Southern Sudan:

3.7.1 There shall be at the Southern Sudan Level:-

3.7.1.1 A Supreme Court of Southern Sudan;
3.7.1.2 Courts of Appeal; and
3.7.1.3 Any such other courts or tribunals as deemed necessary to be established in accordance with the Southern Sudan Constitution and the law.

3.7.2 The Constitution of Southern Sudan shall provide for a Supreme Court for Southern Sudan which shall be the highest court in the South and to which appeals may lie from Southern state courts or other Courts of Southern Sudan on matters brought under or relating to Southern state, Southern Sudan or National law, as may be determined by the Constitution of Southern Sudan.

3.7.3 The Southern Sudan Supreme Court shall:-

3.7.3.1 Be the court of final judicial instance in respect of any litigation or prosecution under Southern State or Southern Sudan law, including statutory and customary law, save that any decisions arising under National Laws shall be subject to review and decision by the National Supreme Court;

3.7.3.2 Have original jurisdiction to decide on disputes that arise under the Constitution of Southern Sudan and the constitutions of Southern Sudan states at the instance of individuals, juridical entities or of government;

3.7.3.3 Adjudicate on the constitutionality of laws and set aside or strike down laws or provisions of laws that contradict the Constitution of Southern Sudan or the constitutions of Southern Sudan states;

3.7.3.4 Be a court of review and cassation in respect of any criminal or civil matter arising out or under Southern Sudan Laws;

3.7.3.5 Have criminal jurisdiction over the President and Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and the Speaker of Southern Sudan Legislature;

3.7.3.6 Review death sentences imposed by Southern Sudan courts in respect of matters arising out of or under Southern Sudan Laws;

3.7.3.7 Have such other jurisdictions as determined by Southern Sudan Constitution, the Peace Agreement and the Law.

3.7.4 Judges of the Courts of Southern Sudan shall perform their functions without political interference, shall be independent, and shall administer
the law without fear or favour. The provisions of the Southern Sudan Constitution and the Law shall protect their independence.

3.7.5 Without prejudice to Sub-Para. 2.11.4.4, the Legislature of Southern Sudan shall provide for appointments, terms of service and dismissal of Southern Sudan appointed Judges.

PART IV

4. INSTITUTIONS AT THE STATE LEVEL

4.1 The Institutions at the State level shall consist of:-

4.1.1 The State Legislature;
4.1.2 The State Executive; and
4.1.3 The State Judiciary.

4.2 There shall be legislative, executive, and judicial institutions at state level which shall function in accordance with this Agreement, the Interim National Constitution and, in respect of the states of Southern Sudan, also with the Constitution of Southern Sudan.

4.3 Local Government is an important level of Government and its election, organization and proper functioning shall be the responsibility of the states, in accordance with the relevant state constitution.

4.4 The State Legislature:

4.4.1 There shall be a State Legislature comprised of members elected in accordance with the electoral provisions herein and as set forth by the National Electoral Commission referred to in sub-paragraph 2.10.1.1 herein.

4.4.2 Pending the elections referred to in sub-article 4.4.1 herein, the composition of the state legislatures shall be comprised as follows:-
4.4.2.1. The NCP is to hold Seventy Percent (70%) in the Northern states, and the SPLM Seventy Percent (70%) in the Southern states;
4.4.2.2. The remaining Thirty Percent (30%) in the Northern and the Southern states shall be allocated as follows:-

(i) Ten Percent (10%) in the Southern states to be filled by the NCP;
(ii) Ten Percent (10%) in the Northern states to be filled by the SPLM; and
(iii) Twenty Percent (20%) in the Northern and Southern states to be filled by representatives of other Northern and Southern political forces respectively.

4.4.3. The elections referred to in sub-article 4.4.1. herein shall take place on the same date as the elections for the National Assembly referred to in Section 1.8.3.

4.4.4. The state legislatures shall prepare and adopt state constitutions provided that they are in conformity with the National Constitution, the Peace Agreement, and for Southern States, also in conformity with the Constitution of Southern Sudan.

4.4.5. The State Legislature shall have law-making competency in respect of the functional areas listed in Schedules C and D, read together with Schedules E and F.

4.4.6. Members of the State Legislature and the State Council of Ministers, including the Governor, shall have such immunities as are provided by law.

4.4.7. The State Legislature shall decide its own rules, procedures, and committees, and elect its Speaker and other officers.

4.5 The State Executive:

4.5.1 Prior to elections the state executives shall be allocated as follows:-
4.5.1.1 The NCP is to hold Seventy Percent (70%) in the Northern states, and the SPLM Seventy Percent (70%) in the Southern states;

4.5.1.2 The remaining Thirty Percent (30%) in the Northern and the Southern states shall be allocated as follows:-

(i) Ten Percent (10%) in the Southern states to be filled by the NCP;
(ii) Ten Percent (10%) in the Northern states to be filled by the SPLM; and
(iii) Twenty Percent (20%) in the Northern and Southern states to be filled by representatives of other Northern and Southern political forces, respectively.

4.5.2 As part of the Ten Percent (10%) share of the NCP in Southern states the two Parties agreed as follows:-

(i) The Governor of one Southern State shall be a nominee of the NCP;
(ii) One Deputy Governor in a different Southern State shall be a nominee of the NCP.

4.5.3 The States’ Council of Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor in accordance with the State Constitution, having regard to the need for inclusiveness. The State Ministers shall be accountable to the Governor and the State Legislature in the performance of their functions and may be removed by the Governor on a motion supported by two-thirds of all the members of the State Legislature.

4.5.4 The Governor shall, together with the States’ Council of Ministers appointed by him/her, exercise the executive powers of the state which shall be in respect of the functional areas listed in Schedules C and D, read together with Schedules E and F, and such other executive competencies as are conferred upon the State by the Interim National Constitution, the Southern Sudan Constitutions, the State Constitutions, and the Peace Agreement.
4.5.5 State Governors must sign any law duly approved by the State Legislature, failing which, after thirty (30) days it shall be deemed to have been signed into law by the State Governor. Where the State Governor withholds his/her signature, he/she must present reasons for his/her refusal to so sign when re-introducing the bill to the State Legislature within the 30-day period stated within. The Bill shall become law if the State Legislature again passes the bill by two-thirds majority of all the members and the assent of the Governor shall not be required.

4.6 **State Judicial Institutions:**

4.6.1 The State Constitutions shall provide for the establishment of such state courts by the State Judiciary as necessary.

4.6.2 State legislation must provide for:-

4.6.2.1 The appointment and dismissal of State-appointed judges (lay magistrates); and

4.6.2.2 Guarantees of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and ensure that judges shall not be subject to political or other interference.

4.6.3 State Courts shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction in respect of State, Southern Sudan, and National Laws, save that a right of appeal shall lie as provided in this Agreement.

4.6.4 Notwithstanding sub-paragraph 4.6.3, the National Legislature shall determine the civil and criminal procedures to be followed in respect of litigation or prosecution under National laws in accordance with the Interim National Constitution.

4.6.5 The structures and powers of the Courts of the States of Southern Sudan shall be subject to the provisions of this Agreement and the Constitution of Southern Sudan.

**PART V: SCHEDULES**
SCHEDULE A: NATIONAL POWERS

Exclusive competencies (Legislative and Executive Powers) of the National Government.

1. National Defense and National Security and Protection of the National Borders;
2. Foreign Affairs and International Representation;
3. Nationality and Naturalization;
4. Passports and Visas;
5. Immigration and Aliens;
6. Currency, Coinage and Exchange Control;
7. Constitutional Court and such National Courts responsible for enforcing or applying National laws;
8. National Police (including Criminal Investigation Department - CID), Coordination of International, Regional and bilateral Criminal Matters, and Standards and Regulations including the standards for training the police in the National Capital);
9. The fixing of and providing for salaries and allowances of civil and other officers of the National Government;
10. Postal Services;
11. Civil Aviation;
12. Maritime shipment;
13. Beacons;
14. Navigation and Shipment;
15. National Lands and National natural resources;
16. Central Bank, the Incorporation of National banks and issuing of paper money;
17. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes;
18. Weights, Measures and Standards, Dates and Standards of Time;
19. Meteorology;
20. Establishment and Maintenance of National Prisons;
21. National Institutions as envisaged under the Peace Agreement or as set forth in the Interim National Constitution;
22. Customs, Excise and Export Duties;
23. Intellectual Property Rights, including Patents and Copyright;
24. National Flag, National Emblem and National Anthem;
25. Signing of International Treaties on behalf of the Republic of Sudan;
26. National Debt and borrowing on public credit;
27. National Census, National Surveys and National Statistics;
28. National States of Emergency;
29. International and Inter-State Transport, including roads, airports, waterways, harbours and railways;
30. National Public Utilities;
31. National Museums and National Heritage Sites;
32. National Economic Policy and Planning;
33. Nile Water Commission, the management of the Nile Waters, transboundary waters and disputes arising from the management of interstate waters between Northern states and any dispute between Northern and Southern states;
34. National information, publications, telecommunications regulations;
35. National Taxation and National Revenue Raising;
36. National Budget;
37. Laws providing for National elections and their supervision by the Electoral Commission;
38. Issuance of National ID Card.

**SCHEDULE B: POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN**

The exclusive legislative and executive powers of the Government of Southern Sudan shall be:

1. The adoption and amendment of the Constitution of the Government of Southern Sudan (subject to compliance with the Interim National Constitution);
2. Police, Prisons and Wildlife Services;
3. Security and military forces during the Interim Period (subject to Agreement on Security Arrangements);
4. Legislation relating to the Government of Southern Sudan structures for the delivery of services at all levels of Government of Southern Sudan;
5. Borrowing of money on the sole credit of the Government of Southern Sudan within the national macro-economic policy;
6. Planning for Southern Sudan Government services including health, education, and welfare, etc;
7. The appointment, tenure and payment of Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) officers and civil servants;
8. Development of financial resources for the Government of Southern Sudan;
9. The co-ordination of Southern Sudan services or the establishment of minimum Southern Sudan standards or the establishment of Southern Sudan uniform norms in respect of any matter or service referred to in Schedule C or Schedule D, read together with Schedule E, with the exception of Item 1 of Schedule C, including but not limited to, education, health, welfare, police (without prejudice to the National Standards and Regulations), prisons, state public services, such authority over civil and criminal laws and judicial institutions as is specified in the Schedules, lands, reformatories, personal law, intra-state business, commerce and trade, tourism, environment, agriculture, disaster intervention, fire and medical emergency services, commercial regulation, provision of electricity, water and waste management services, local Government, animal control and veterinary services, consumer protection, and any other matters referred to in the above Schedules;
10. Any power that a State or the National Government requests it to exercise on its behalf, subject to the agreement of the Government of Southern Sudan or that for reasons of efficiency the Government of Southern Sudan itself requests to exercise in Southern Sudan and that other level agrees;
11. Referenda in Southern Sudan on matters affecting Southern Sudan as a whole within the competencies of Southern Sudan Government;
12. Taxation and revenue raising in Southern Sudan as a whole;
13. Southern Sudan Budget, subject to the agreement on Wealth Sharing;
14. GOSS Public utilities;
15. GOSS flag, emblem;
16. Reconstruction and development of the Southern Sudan as a whole, subject to the provisions of the Wealth Sharing Agreement;
17. GOSS information, publications, media and telecommunications utilities;
18. Rehabilitation and benefits to disabled war veterans, orphans, widows and care for the dependents of deceased war fallen heroes;
19. Any matter relating to an item referred to in schedule D that cannot be dealt with effectively by a single State and requires GOSS legislation or intervention including, but not limited to the following:-

19.1. Matters relating to businesses, trade licenses and conditions of operation;
19.2. Natural resources and forestry;
19.3. Town and rural planning;
19.4 Disputes arising from the management of interstate waters strictly within Southern Sudan;
19.5. Fire fighting and ambulance services;
19.6. GOSS reformatory institutions;
19.7. Firearm licenses within Southern Sudan; and
19.8. GOSS recreation and sports.

20. Such matters relating to taxation, royalties and economic planning as is specified in the Agreement on Wealth Sharing as a matter or matters in regard to which the Government of Southern Sudan is accorded exclusive authority;
21. Southern Sudan census and statistics within the competence of the Southern Sudan Government;
22. Issuance of identity cards within Southern Sudan, driving licenses and other appropriate documentation.

**SCHEDULE C: POWERS OF STATES**

Exclusive executive and legislative competencies of the individual States of Sudan shall be as set out hereunder:-

1. The Constitution of the State, subject to compliance with the National Constitution, and, as relevant, the Constitution of Southern Sudan;
2. State Police, prisons;
3. Local Government;
4. State information, state publications and state media;
5. Social Welfare including State pensions;
6. The Civil Service at the State level;
7. The State Judiciary and administration of justice at State level including maintenance and organization of State Courts, and subject to national norms and standards, civil and criminal procedure;
8. State Land and State Natural Resources;
9. Cultural matters within the State;
10. Regulation of religious matters subject to the National Constitution and the Peace Agreement;
11. Internal and external borrowing of money on the sole credit of the State within the National macro-economic framework;
12. The establishment, tenure, appointment, and payment of State officers;
13. The management, lease and utilization of lands belonging to the State;
14. The establishment, maintenance and management of reformatory institutions;
15. The establishment, regulation, and provision of health care, including hospitals and other health institutions;
16. Regulation of businesses, trade licenses, working conditions, hours, and holidays within the State;
17. Local works and undertakings;
18. Registration of marriage, divorce, inheritance, births, deaths, adoption and affiliations;
19. Enforcement of State laws;
20. Statutes enacted under the Penal Law power, save for the penalization for the breach of National laws relating to the national competencies;
21. The development, conservation and management of State natural resources and State forestry resources;
22. Primary and secondary schools and education administration in regard thereto;
23. Laws in relation to Agriculture within the State;
24. Airstrips other than international and national airports within civil aviation regulations;
25. Intrastate public transport and roads;
26. Population policy and family planning;
27. Pollution control;
28. State statistics, and State surveys;
29. State referenda;
30. Charities and endowment;
31. Quarrying regulations, (subject to the Agreement on Wealth Sharing);
32. Town and rural planning;
33. State cultural and heritage sites, State libraries, State museums, and other historical sites;
34. Traditional and customary law;
35. State finances;
36. State irrigation and embankments;
37. State Budget;
38. State archives, antiquities, and monuments;
39. Direct and indirect taxation within the State in order to raise revenue for the State;
40. State public utilities;
41. Vehicle licensing;
42. Fire fighting and ambulance services;
43. Recreation and sport within the State;
44. Firearms Licenses;
45. Flag and emblem.

SCHEDULE D: CONCURRENT POWERS

The National Government, the Government of Southern Sudan and State Governments, shall have legislative and executive competencies on any of the matters listed below during the Interim Period:-

1. Economic and Social Development in Southern Sudan;
2. Legal and other professions and their associations;
3. Tertiary education, education policy and scientific research;
4. Health policy;
5. Urban development, planning and housing;
6. Trade, commerce, Industry and industrial development;
7. Delivery of public services;
8. Banking and insurance;
9. Bankruptcy and insolvency;
10. Manufacturing licenses;
11. Airports only with respect to the GOSS in accordance with Civil Aviation standards and regulations;
12. River transport;
13. Disaster preparedness, management and relief and epidemics control;
14. Traffic regulations;
15. Electricity generation and water and waste management;
16. Information, Publications, Media, Broadcasting and Telecommunications;
17. Environmental management, conservation and protection;
18. Relief, Repatriation, Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction;
19. Without prejudice to the National Regulation, and in the case of Southern States, the regulation of Southern Sudan Government, the initiation, negotiation and conclusion of International and Regional Agreements on culture, sports, trade, investment, credit, loans, grants and technical assistance with foreign governments and foreign non-governmental organizations;
20. Financial and economic policies and planning;
21. Women’s empowerment;
22. Gender policy;
23. Animal and livestock control, animal diseases, pastures and veterinary services;
24. Consumer safety and protection;
25. Residual powers, subject to schedule E;
26. Mother, Child protection and care;
27. Water Resources other than interstate waters;
28. Notwithstanding Schedules A, B and C, such matters relating to taxation, royalties and economic planning as specified in the Agreement on Wealth Sharing;
29. Southern Sudan and State Courts responsible for enforcing or applying National laws;
30. Such matters relating to taxation, royalties and economic planning as is specified in the Agreement on Wealth Sharing as a matter or matters in regard to which the Government of Southern Sudan is accorded concurrent authority;
31. Human and animal drug quality control.

SCHEDULE E: RESIDUAL POWERS

The residual powers shall be dealt with according to its nature (e.g., if the power pertains to a national matter, requires a national standard, or
is a matter which cannot be regulated by a single state, it shall be exercised by the National Government. If the power pertains to a matter that is usually exercised by the state or local government, it shall be exercised by the state). Where a matter is susceptible to Southern Sudan regulation, in respect of the states of Southern Sudan, it shall be exercised by the Government of Southern Sudan.

SCHEDULE F: Resolution of Conflicts in Respect of Concurrent Powers:

If there is a contradiction between the provisions of Southern Sudan law and/or a State law and/or a National law, on the matters referred in Schedule D, the law of the level of government which shall prevail shall be that which most effectively deals with the subject matter of the law, having regard to:-

1. The need to recognize the sovereignty of the Nation while accommodating the autonomy of Southern Sudan or of the States;
2. Whether there is a need for National or Southern Sudan norms and standards;
3. The principle of subsidiarity;
4. The need to promote the welfare of the people and to protect each person’s human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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