THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF MORALITY
IN ISLAMIC CULTURE
UNDER THE IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILISATION

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by
Mohammed El Alaie (Al 'Alā'ī)

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In this limited work I have concentrated upon the task of presenting the living character of the Western impact upon Islamic culture, while integrating the presentation with my living thought, experience, intellectual reflection and assimilation. The ambitious task of breaking with the confining rigidity of specialisation, my relatively recent acquaintance with the language as well as the confining nature of official scholarship; have had their limiting influence upon the scope of my attempt. Writing on such an abstract level has painfully widened the gap between the demands of my thoughts, and my expressiveness in the English language, with the result of enlarging the difficulty of exposition, occasionally disturbing the logical movement of argument, and imparting to the form of presentation considerable unease and apparent entanglement. If my keen and lively devotion to the subject has sustained my will to complete the work, and my courage to recognise it after
completion; my impression of its final form has numbed my awareness of ending this academic task, and embarrassed my sense of relief.

In the first part of this work, I have applied my effort to characterise the ultimate conviction underlying the conceptual structure of Islamic morality while in the second part the attempt has been made to characterise the impact of Western civilisation upon this structure and the resultant cultural antithesis. Although I have not been able to contribute satisfactorily towards the solution of the problem, or its systematic presentation, I feel that I have to some extent indicated its nature, underlining the principal features of the dilemma created by the varied manifestations of the Western concept of freedom and progress.
INTRODUCTION

Western civilisation, with its progressive voluntarism and intellectualism, and its varied manifestation of expansive movement and penetration of thought, appears to have presented man with the first experience of being entrusted solely to his own judgement and rationality. This ambitious undertaking of the Western spirit, and its tendency to break with the transcendent authority of institutional patterns and with the conceptual structure of human relationships, has charged the consciousness of man with the ordeal of freedom and the agony of decision. By its revolt against the sanctity of inward value and the challenge to its personal pressure and communal authority, the Western spirit came to undertake and declare the heavy responsibility of liberation from the spiritual foundation of history, expounding the right and obligation of man to revise rationally his institutional legacy, to review objectively his relation to the universe and to remould consciously the pattern of human activities and
relationships. This extensive and far-reaching tendency to liberate society from the authority of history, and to free the individual from the personal pressure of society, has entrusted to man's rationality the burden of maintaining the balance between freedom and necessity, as well as protecting his humanistic rationality against the danger of human rationalisation. Sustained by the joyous sense of liberty and the brilliant achievement of capitalistic civilisation, this process seemed to conceal its alarming features under the proud consciousness of converting the spiritual and physical energy of life into originative progress and formative creation. Through this proud consciousness the external resistance of nature and fate appeared to have been happily overcome by relieving man's inner determination of the rigid and confining scheme of history and of its confining subjectivism.

In relation to the inner unity of society and to the ethical character and mode of valuation underlying human activity and aspiration, the Western concept of progressive freedom tended
to present the present life as the fundamental reality for man, thereby heightening the impulse towards the outward form of existence and its practical satisfactions. This Western orientation towards the material content of life, and its manifestation of wealth and power, inclined to intensify the conflict of national expansionism on the one hand, and on the other, the conflict of social strata. While the conflict of nations served to give rise to the moral appeal of international justice, the conflict of social strata served to give rise to the moral appeal of national justice. Within the Western world, the spiritual recession concurrent with the concept of freedom from the super-human structure of life, in favour of a humanistic presentation of reality, worked to increase the consciousness of inner vacuity and outward insecurity. Thus the inner vacuity, combined with the outward discontent, came to enhance the sense of dependence upon the state and public institutions. The impersonal pattern of modern society, the sense of alienation, and the consequent increasing demand for security, have contributed towards
the formation of socialistic ideology, with its tendency to replace the negative character of freedom by the positive nature of security. In spite of this division in the ideological character of practical morality and in spite of the strain and anxiety of freedom and individualism, Western society has been able to sustain the cultural resistance through confronting the destructive relativism of objective civilisation with the accumulation of wealth and power, as well as with the inner self-active continuation of history. Thus, although departing from the conceptual foundation of value, with its super-human form of permanence, the Western mode of valuation has remained sustained by the Western capacity for balancing the decline of inner independence by outward practical satisfaction. Moreover the self-active continuation of Western culture has provided the ethical character of life with the unifying function of the spiritual aspiration of the Hebrews, the rational integration of the Greeks, and the civic and pragmatic attitude of the Romans.

While Western realism has extended its universal validity and application through the
prestige-suggestion of the West, the Western capacity for unification, with its moral, rational and pragmatic integration, has remained remote, and insufficiently adaptable to non-Western cultures.

The encounter with Western civilisation has mainly resulted in presenting non-Western cultures with the dual character of optimistic enthusiasm for the concept of progress on the one side, and apprehensive self-preservation against Western influence on the other. This dual character has tended to confuse the inner continuity of history, and the traditional conceptual structure of human relationships. In connection with the great nations, this duality seemed to result in restless ambition for power, and in the substitution of forcible unification for the inward unity of culture. In connection with nations of limited potentialities, this duality has largely perverted the relationship to history and shaken confidence in its commanding conviction, thereby reducing cultural resistance to mere compulsive self-preservation, and
the concept of progress to mere indefinite movement and restless disorientation. Hence, divested of its underlying self-active synthesis, its outward formative creation and its native cultural resistance, the Western concept of freedom and has tended to sap the vitality of the spiritual foundation of value in non-Western cultures. Consequently the vague concept of Western progress has tended to replace the inner security and independence of non-Western cultures by moral humiliation, a deep sense of alienation, a restless feeling of frustration, and dependence upon the outward institutions and conditions of existence.

Thus the decline of super-human stability, of permanence and of axiomatic certitude under the suggestive character of Western realism and dynamic progress has exposed the non-Western cultures to the most dangerous trial of human history, thereby presenting the Western conscience with the gravest responsibilities.

Islamic culture, by virtue of its historical challenge to Western Christendom, its favourable disposition towards the immediate form of
existence and its situation within the Western sphere of influence, has suffered most intensely the impact of the West and the consequent confusion of emotional ambivalence towards the Western world. This ambivalence has tended to intensify the dual character of freedom, freedom from history and freedom from Western authority. Whereas the enthusiasm for Western progress demanded freedom from the spiritual scheme of history, the national ambition of liberation from the West demanded the self-preservation relationship with history. Hence, the mode of valuation has suffered the shallowing process of oscillation between the shadowy and recessive conception of permanence and the rootless conception of dynamic change. This oscillation between recessive spirituality and frustrated progress has given rise to the danger of distorting the psychological reality of life and perverting the moral aspiration to the extent of seeking to resolve this dilemma through the unifying regimentation of society. Hence the impulsive orientation towards power
and freedom has presented the Western, as well as the non-Western, world, with the imperative necessity for a humanistic value capable of extending the vision of human sympathy beyond the barriers of time and space. The close union of humanity, the excessive accumulation of power, and the restless impulse towards the immediate reality, have all combined to render the destiny of man dependent upon his ability to overcome the cultural antitheses resulting from the impact of Western civilisation. Since the recourse to power as a means to unification constitutes a threat of annihilation, the only alternative would seem to be a humanistic value, capable of commanding universal reverence by laying the emotional foundation of man's dignity far deeper than the utilitarian rationalisation of nations, classes and individuals.
PART I.

THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE
OF ISLAMIC MORALITY
The emergence of a new religion or a great religious movement is usually the manifestation of spiritual energy with its centralising force and formative conviction. This spiritual energy in the first place tends towards either, concentration or expansion. In the case of the former it would signify that the previous pattern of culture has exhausted its potentialities and become no longer capable of providing the vital impulse for a living society. In the latter case it would indicate that the previous pattern of culture has been outgrown and only new contents and new values are required to inspire the society towards new hopes and new activities. And so, it is the sub-spiritual stage (that is, the condition of society prior to the emergence of the new movement) which determines the direction and the outlet for the new religion and indicates the line of its development, whether in the form of an intensifying retreat, or in the form of an impulsive advance. Such an impulsive advance is represented in the clearest possible manner by the
advent of Islam and the first stages of its development. Responding to, and conditioned by the existing circumstances, Islam, from the very beginning forced its spiritual energy into an influential expansion, rather than a contemplative concentration. The pre-Islamic stage, that is to say - the material on which Islam had to impose its spiritual conception of reality, was in a state of restless ambition and anxious aspiration. The desire for inner unity was painfully felt, and the glad tidings of a new prophet, to unify the divided efforts and scattered forces, was joyfully heard and anticipated. The conflicting elements of tribal polytheism on one hand, and on the other, the antithetical elements of vague Christianity and Judaism, made the pre-Islamic society increasingly aware of the spiritual vacuity of its life, and paved the way for the spiritual synthesis of the new religion. Beside these contradictory religious elements, there was a growing consciousness of the fundamental contradictions of life. The dichotomies of fate and freedom, egoism and altruism, life and death, were poetically expressed
in an atmosphere of restlessness and scepticism. The existing institutions and formulae were no longer capable of reconciling these contradictions, and overcoming their divisive influences. It was therefore, the task of Islam to deal with these religious and social problems, which have been the constant theme of man's emotional and intellectual reflection, since he became conscious of his human situation and destiny. Being first and foremost, a religion of salvation and law, of inner reality and external relationships, Islam had to revise and modify human life in every aspect, and, as a whole. Theocratic in nature and character, the new religion made its spiritual conviction the supreme frame of reference, both for individual and social existence, and for the relationship to the supernatural. This dual attitude, towards life as a whole on the one side, and towards life in its minutest details on the other, conferred on Islam the right to claim dominion over all departments of life, material and spiritual, human and divine. Thus, the interrelation between the two realms, temporal and
eternal, required of Islam that it should interpret every natural phenomenon, and pass a judgment on every human issue, after its own manner and mode of valuation. The life-power behind the new religion, was for the most part, supplied by a thirst for a spiritual reality, an inward unity, and for a more objective life and expansive existence. This life-power was spiritualized and elevated to the level of the supernatural, and guided by revelation which became the highest authority, and the first reference for every type of activity and reflection. In so doing, the immediate world was subjected to the spiritual impulse, and at the same time the idea of the next world, was placed in the centre of gravity, to direct the impetus of life, and to inspire its youthful energy. This close union of the divine, with the immediate world, had the effect of reducing the human capacity for freedom of action and understanding, to mere interpretation of the divine revelation.

A religion with such a positive and creative attitude, had naturally to focus its spiritual
synthesis on the moral consciousness of those who professed the new faith. Thus, the moral consciousness, was the first sphere to come under the influence of the new religion, and to be the subject of its spiritual legislation. Hence, the foundation of Islamic morality, has from its inception been authoritarian in nature, and metaphysical in character.

The tendency of Islam towards reconciliation and adjustment, directed the antipathy of the new religion against its immediate opponents, the adherents of existing religious principles and institutions, rather than those principles and institutions themselves. While Judaism and Christianity were confirmed and given full recognition by Islam, Jews and Christians were repudiated, and while polytheism was uncompromisingly rejected, the pantheon of its idols remained the sacred place for reverence and pilgrimage. Meanwhile, the tribal customs, and established procedures, did not suffer any serious attack at the hand of Islam, on the contrary, they were preserved to regulate social relationships, and
to serve as simple conceptions of life and being. Although assuming different aspects and having a new complexion, the pre-Islamic social virtues did not undergo any drastic change. The legendary heroism of self-sacrifice, and material benevolence, associated with the pre-Islamic life, did survive under Islam, and enjoyed the highest degree of honour and appreciation. These legends constituted a very large and significant proportion of Islamic literature, and served for the most part, as a fertile source of anecdote and moral precept and, in the form of poetry, or proverb, or as axioms, most of these virtues were preserved, cherished, and idealized by the Muslim community. In this way, the reconciliatory attitude of Islam towards previous religions on the one hand, and towards tribalism on the other, had the effect of maintaining the pre-Islamic mode of valuation, in which the three elements, tribal, Jewish and Christian were all substantially represented.

Apart from religious considerations, all the tribes of the peninsula, whether polytheistic, Jewish or Christian, were subject to the
same conditioning factors and environmental influences. In consequence, the tribal mode of moral valuation was not confined to the polytheistic tribes, but also prevailed among the neighbouring Jews and Christians. This type of valuation was, in the first place, based and developed on a closed morality. The motive force behind this closed morality was, to a very large extent, the rude sense of social and individual self-preservation. In such a closed morality as this, the security of the tribe and its prosperity were the ultimate goal of all moral teaching, and every ethical consideration. Through the collective sense of solidarity, created by common motives and common aims, the moral consciousness of the individual was limited exclusively to the narrow circle of his clan and tribe. Under this collective pattern of tribalism, the consciousness of the individual was for the most part, dominated by natural relations and the kinship principle. Man's moral impulse, characterized by self-denial and self-sacrifice,
had no higher object than the honour and glory of the tribe, the manifestation of its energy and the assertion of its existence. The collective bond, or the unifying sympathy which connected the members of a tribe or closed circle of allied tribes, was fostered and developed, chiefly by common fear and hatred of their potential enemies and immediate rivals. Hence the feeling for the sanctity of human life, which is the foundation of moral consciousness, remained until the advent of Islam, narrow in scope, shallow in content, and operative only within the closed circle of blood relationship.

Under such conditions, the soul of the individual must have been devoid of inner independence, and dedicated wholly to the relentless necessities and obscure fate of the community. The individual had no true power and joy of his own, no independent position to raise him above the collective necessity, and, to establish for him a domain of original inner life, with its private content and values. In
pre-Islamic poetry, this collective pattern was clearly illustrated and given full expression, not only in its communal aspect but also in those of personal emotions and relationships. A poet rarely derived any pride from his own characteristic qualities, unless they served to contribute to the honour and dignity of his clan or tribe. Even the most intimate emotion, that of love, was traditionally interpreted to mean a common, shared experience, rather than the private passion of the poet. But prior to Islam, tribal collectivism had begun to display some symptoms of decline or relaxation, as a result of contact with the outside world, and with previous civilizations. Judaism and Christianity also exerted an influence in this direction, and through that influence, the soul of the individual began to be alive to the possibility of its liberation, from the closed and narrow pattern of tribal collectivism. Towards the advent of Islam, the conflict between freedom and necessity, that is to say, between the suppressed soul of the individual and the external need of collective
bonds, was consciously felt, and gave rise to the anxiety which prepared the way for the spiritual individualism of Islam. This type of individualism, revolutionized the cultural pattern of the age, and replaced tribal collectivism, by what may be termed "spiritual nationalism."

Being an unlettered nation, the pre-Islamic Arabs had no capacity for abstract thought and systematized ideas, their wisdom and learning were the product of collective experience, crystallized in the form of commercial institutions, and poetically elaborated. It was form, rather than content, which had the magic quality of fascinating their minds, and firing their imaginations. The value of expression was raised to a position of absolute superiority, and excellence in the art of verbal expression, became the recognized means for the attainment of legitimate pride and self-realization. Furthermore, the art of expression, whose permanent theme comprised their communal sentiments, was elevated to the level of supernatural inspiration. The condensed and concise form was considered the highest literary
achievement. Its popularity was probably due to the fact that both the poet in composing and delivering his work, and the audience in retaining it, had to rely on memory. This art had the extremely important function of heightening their feelings and emotions, and serving the cause of their collective and moral existence. Having no personal realm, pre-Islamic poetry was actuated by, and directed towards social life and communal sentiments. Conditioned by the collective necessities of life, this form of expression had no aim other than to glorify the popular sentiments and to make them an inseparable part of the individual’s life and being. In consequence, communal morality was closely connected with pre-Islamic literature, and constituted a very significant proportion of its poetry and prose. In this way, the art of poetry helped to sustain the collective pattern of pre-Islamic culture, and preserved the significant features of communal life with their moral meaning and values. Thus, it created a type of inner continuity for pre-Islamic life, assisted the collective memory in retaining the past, against the effacing process
of time, and in addition, emphasized the moral sanction through the popular forms of eulogy and satire.

Before the rise of Islam, however, the language of poetry reached its height and revealed a great dexterity in the expression of psychological subtleties of thought and feeling. This maturity of language suggested among other things that different possibilities and different levels of life were in simultaneous co-existence, and that the individual had outgrown the tribal pattern governed by collective necessity, regulated by custom, and motivated by natural impulse. The individual, consciously or unconsciously, seemed to have been rising up against the pressure of tribal authority, and aspiring towards more content for his soul, and towards a higher meaning and value for life. The ambition on the part of the individual to replace the compulsion of custom by moral aspiration and personal relationships, was actuated by the desire to break away from the tribal circle and to substitute a
spiritual unity for that of the blood relation. The division and conflict between the soul of the individual on one hand, and communal pressure, on the other, had to be met and overcome through a spiritual synthesis and a unifying principle which would centralize and re-organize the scattered forces, and liberate them from the original order of tribalism. Islam took this task upon itself, and made the attempt to elevate man to a higher level of life and reality, to re-orientate his spiritual energy towards wider horizons and more spacious hopes. The forces liberated from the tribal circle were not seeking a peaceful refuge in Islam, but rather a vigorous movement and unrestricted expansion. Islam, with its dual attitude, that is to say, being a religion both of salvation, and of temporal activity, provided these forces with a motive and a guiding channel and aroused in the individual the long suppressed desire for self-reflection, and independent activities. Through the process of separation and individualization of Islam, the moral
sentiments of the individual underwent a considerable transformation. They were liberated from the pressure of collective self-preservation and assisted to enter into a direct relationship both with the immediate world, and with the supernatural. By the transforming power of Islam, the forces which were operating at isolated points, and within tribal circles, became unified and merged. For the first time men found themselves united by their common relation to the superhuman, instead of by the chain of necessity, imposed on them by communal existence. The release of these forces, from the narrow and limited circle of tribalism, resulted in an immense accumulation of power, which shook the existing civilization to its foundation, and determined the course of history for several centuries. This elemental movement did not suffer from the strenuous debilitating effects of a declining civilization; on the contrary, it was vigorous, youthful, replete with the ambition for earthly triumph, and moved by the hope of heavenly treasure.
In like manner, through the process of individualization originated by Islam, the individual's sympathy was liberated from direct hostility to his immediate rivals, and was elevated to a higher level and given a wider scope. The individual's consciousness of the sanctity of human life was so deepened and enlarged as to embrace the whole world and all races, so long as they professed the same faith, and pronounced the same formula. The deep significance of this transformation was that it transferred the centre of value from the sensual and visible world to the invisible and spiritual realm. Raised to the level of the supernatural, the consciousness of the "sanctity of human life", which is the essence of morality, acquired a new character and complexion. Instead of being centred round self-defence and social preservation, morality was translated into spiritual terms, and became a relation of man to the divine, rather than a relation of man to man. This process with its creation of an inner world for the individual, had the far reaching effect of elevating
man from the plane of closed morality based on social pressure, to that of universal moral consciousness inspired by spiritual aspiration.

This historical process with its upward-striving towards independence and self-consciousness, was such as to reduce the social element within the moral sentiment of the individual. The motive behind the moral sentiment became, in the most part, a personal and spiritual response to the inner reality of man, and derived its authoritarian character from the divine order of reward and punishment. Freedom from tribal bondage and from collective emotionalism, imparted to the individual a sense of independence, and opened up for each the possibility of personal ambition and moral achievement. Instead of being determined by position within the tribe and by the position of the tribe itself in the larger society as well as by the accidental relations of birth and place, the social status of the individual was determined on the level of free activity and personal decision. In this way the scope both of self-assertion, which is a vital element in the
moral sentiment, and of moral aspiration, was so enlarged as to embrace the realm of the present world, and that of the next, and thus to make possible the enrichment produced by the ideals of the two worlds reacting upon one another. Such an inward elevation of the individual, with its outward reaction, possessed man's soul, mobilised his spiritual energy, and gave him the right to aspire independently towards a divine truth which would act as a standard for all human activity. Liberated from an externally imposed social position, the individual became conscious of his own being and, through this consciousness, his natural impulse of self-assertion operated as a moral stimulus assisted by the desire for and the opportunity of self-determination. This individualistic mode of self-assertion had the effect of providing the individual with a fresh impulse for self-valuation and independent moral judgement, with the result that the tribal self-regulating custom was, to a large extent, replaced or coloured by the spiritual interpretation of the new religion.

The thought-element, at the time of Islam, was not so developed as to be capable of penetrating
into the impulsive nature of feeling and emotion. It was as a life-power, rather than a process of reasoning, that the new religion made its irresistible appeal to the emotional side of man, and it concentrated its energy on the supremacy of faith as a source of power over this world, and a means of salvation in the next. Besides its function as a spiritually unifying force, faith under Islam had the task of elevating man's consciousness of himself as a cosmic being. Raised to the plane of feeling himself to be the centre of the universe, man found in Islam a new synthesis for life, and a new foundation for self-realization. Furthermore, having overcome the contradictory elements of vague and Arabicised Christianity and Judaism and tribal polytheism, through the all-embracing faith of Islam, the individual became increasingly conscious of his superior position and of his right to claim divine favour and earthly expansion. This feeling of superiority inspired by the new faith was intensified not only by the attitude towards the past and towards previous religions and cultures, but also by the attitude towards the future and by the
insistence of Islam on being the last divine revelation, and the final communication between heaven and earth. The direct relationship of man to the divine, with its accompanying spiritual interpretation of all human activity, enabled the individual to construct his moral consciousness and base his moral disposition, upon a sentiment of superiority and self-assertion. This proud self-consciousness generated by spiritual superiority and developed by worldly theocracy, imposed on Islam the task of satisfying the curiosity of the human mind, and defining the place of man in the universe. Hence the new religion had to attempt the reinterpretation of the universe and to re-establish for man the foundation of spiritual, moral, and legal activities.

Detaching its adherents from the tribal sense of solidarity and cohesion, Islam assigned the highest value to the new faith, and so exalted it, as to envelop the individual in a consciousness of proud superiority. Hence the new faith had to be deepened and firmly-rooted in men's innermost
being and emotions, if they were to meet and overcome the overwhelming challenge and threat of the conservative forces. Facing alone the inflexible movement of fate, and deprived of the sense of security given by tribal solidarity, the individual had nothing other than the new faith, to draw upon for strength and certainty. The great loss of security suffered through the alienation of the individual from the traditional form of tribalism, created an acute consciousness of weakness and limitation, and made the religious faith with its spiritual unity, the only solid foundation and secure possession.

The psychical content of faith was enriched in such a manner as to constitute for the rising community, a common thought-world, and to impart to its members, a profound sense of common destiny. The anxiety caused by the process of uprooting the individual from the long-established sentiment of tribal collectivism, contributed in a great measure, towards the consolidation of the new faith, as a means of compensating for the lost sense of "belonging"
and stability. Familiar with the narrow and confining restrictions of tribal circles and unaccustomed to the burden of personal decision and moral responsibility, the individual found in the authoritarian character of Islam, with its divine retribution, a substitute for the declining authority and pressure of tribal existence. Nevertheless, the newly acquired freedom weighed heavily upon the consciousness of some of the new converts, and had the effect of making them oscillate between spiritual universality, and traditional tribalism. This heavy feeling of an unearned freedom among the Muslim proselytes tended to unite men, to link up their fears, and hopes, and demanded of them the continual strengthening and affirmation of the religious faith. And thus the theocentric conception of life, came to be the only source of firm confidence and unbending power. This confidence and power were, in part, the manifestation of a reaction from the psychical vacuity caused by the process of breaking away from the inherent pattern of life and by an inner alienation of feeling resulting from the collapse of the solid heritage of
tradition. Hence the new converts were subject to the influence of opposing impulses, on the one side, the new faith with its spiritual freedom, personal aspiration and restless activity, and, on the other, the tribal sense of belonging, with its secure foundation, self-evident authority, and commanding motive of individual and social preservation. In reality, this conflict which accompanied the rise of Islam and divided men into supporters, opponents, and "hypocrites", was the result of the antithesis between two different stages of life, and two different modes of valuation. The conservative element reflected the tendency towards the traditional world of the first appearance, with its restful and unreflective obedience to custom, while the liberal and enterprising element, reflected the movement towards the world of an independent inner life, with its spiritual freedom and inviting possibilities. Even when Islam became established the conflict between these two trends remained a permanent source of tension and division, causing frequent relapses into tribal prejudices, and racial discrimination. Such an oscillation between
inwardly spiritual idealism, and outwardly tribal ethos remained an active factor behind the manifold vicissitudes of Muslim history. As a religion of an uprising community, with vital energy and thirsty emotions, Islam did not assume the attitude of rejecting life, and did not look upon it as an endless sorrow, suffering, and necessity. To administer human life and motivate all dispositions therein, the new religion enlarged the spiritual sphere of influence, and developed its conception in such a manner, as to embrace the negation of life, as well as, its affirmation. The attempt to combine these two contrasting attitudes towards life in one spiritual synthesis, resulted in a continual conflict between inward negation, and outward affirmation, not only in communal life, but also within the individual soul. Being an all-embracing faith, actuated by a vigorous life-current, and a vital desire for actuality, Islam neither concentrated on the present world of immediate existence, nor emphasized its final renunciation. This reconciliation (on the part of Islam) of two conflicting dispositions under one spiritual synthesis, tended to bring
about an apprehension of reality, both from within, and from without, and to divide the consciousness of the individual between the sense-world, with its outward attraction, and the soul-world with its inward hopes and eternal possibilities. Inspired by a youthful feeling of strength, by imperative forces, and by firm convictions, Islam was disposed towards the affirmation, and optimistic representation of life, so as to provide its adherents with the desired actuality, and promised prosperity and expansion. Recognising at the same time, the dark side of human nature, its rigid limits, frustrations and disillusions, the new religion inclined also towards the negation of life, emphasizing its value only, in so far as it symbolized, or reflected the other world.

The fact that a sharp division existed between the traditional pattern of life, and a spiritual movement of universal character, subjected the uprising religion both to the claims of the inner world of self-denial, and to the counter-claims of the sensuous world with all its self-satisfaction and gratification. Especially in the
first phase, Islam had a predominant tendency towards emphasizing the inner relationship of man to the universe, enlarging the tragic sense of the immediate reality, exposing its futility, and establishing its characteristic eschatology on the consciousness of the infinite value of the human soul. Such a strenuous resistance to the absorption of the whole man in the sensuality of the present world, and in the merely human, enabled the new religion to develop itself spiritually, and to exert all its capacity to confirm and consolidate, the religious conviction in which the standard of goodness and truth was to be firmly rooted. The process of reorganisation attempted by the Prophetic office, was in essence, a striving towards a spiritualized unity which would carry with it a transformation of values, and impress the necessity for a new mode of evaluation. This unity was founded essentially on a different conception, and a different picture of reality from that which preceded Islam.

As a new religion, with an independent interpretation of nature, Islam had to replace the
conceptions of nature, prevailing under the antithetical religious doctrines of polytheism, Judaism and Christianity. This new interpretation of nature had two functions; first to satisfy the inherent desire of the human mind for a systematic and coherent scheme and vision of reality; and secondly, to establish the unifying inner conception of the universe as a whole. At the same time the world of sense-presentation was explained, as essentially the manifestation of a transcendental and all-embracing Power, and this explanation in its turn had the effect of satisfying man's intuitive desire to discover the sources of things and their destiny. In order to spiritualise the external impressions of existence, the Islamic synthesis made each phenomenon stand within a whole, and this whole was subject to the encompassing and compelling influence of Providence. The idea of design and purposefulness was also insisted on, in such a manner, as to give to man a cosmic character and privilege position. Furthermore, man became the vicegerent of God on earth, and the whole Creation was significant, solely in relation to man's purposes and desires. The celestial bodies, for
instance, were merely meant to be an adornment to the present world, and were endowed with light, in the service of man; and the crescents, and their lunar phases, were simply indications of time, and marked out the seasons of pilgrimage.

As a consequence of this simple conception of the universe as a whole, man found himself on an essentially new spiritual plane. One this plane, his experience of the world of sense impressions, became unified and at the same time unifying, and developed in him a sense of superiority over the world of phenomena. This mode of interpreting nature seemed to be capable of elevating and enlarging the consciousness of the individual, and thus, lifting him above the sphere of necessity and social self-preservation, gave him a sense of sharing in the wealth of life and of participating in reality. Through this relationship of man to the transcendental and omnipotent, man felt himself able to overcome, or at least to smooth away, the contrast between his own internal determination and the external limitations imposed by his social and natural environment. Hence the vital and youthful energy
latent in the Arab race was spiritualised through this religious conception, which inspired the confidence of the race to shape the world towards its spiritual aim. The unique character of this inward appropriation of the Truth about life and nature, tended to bring the Muslim world into an intimate relation with the Divine, and to project an eternal complexion on to temporal thought and activity. Thus the conception of the Divine, as the central fact, and the measure of reality, gave rise to the feeling, that the outward life lay more or less within the realm of the individual's capacity and aspirations. As a result of developing such an attitude towards the outward world of phenomena through the close union with supernatural Power, reality appeared to assume an inward character, and seemed to have more spiritual content, and less outward resistance.

This spiritual and superior way of viewing things, was not merely a contemplative doctrine, but a vigorous life process which captured the whole of men's imaginations and emotions. At the same time the idea of emphasising nature's relation to God as
a divine gift to man, lent nature more life and splendour, and inspired men to think more highly of their relation to the universe as a whole, thus inducing them to place a higher value on their personal conduct and decisions. On this level of man's spiritual superiority over nature, the standard of his conduct and decisions, was related, not to the outward necessity of collective and compulsive self-preservation, but to the inward and personal experience of spiritual freedom.

Thus conceived, Nature became, or appeared to become more responsive, and accommodating to man's desires and apprehensions. This contributed on the one hand towards the process of individualisation, by mitigating the necessity of communal struggle against the environment. On the other hand it tended towards the consolidation of the supra-tribal society, by creating on the average level of life, a cultural sentiment within the common thought-world. In this way a new freedom, and a new independence were acquired by the individual, and outward existence seemed to him — through his relation to the supernatural — less
obscure, and more imbued with possibilities. In its representation of man's relationship with Nature, Islam was not unaware of the other side of the picture. Just as the favour of Nature was attainable through Divine grace, so also the forces of Nature were represented as a constant threat to the unbeliever, or the potential transgressor.

And so Islam, in its familiar capacity for reconciliation, had answered and given expression to man's inherent ambivalent attitude towards Nature. That is to say, by spiritualising the two deep-rooted and antithetical characteristics of fear, and hope, in man, the new religion had placed these within the comprehensive synthesis of man's relation to the Divine.

Besides raising the standard of spiritual existence through such a sympathetic relationship with Nature the new religion extended its inner synthesis to embrace the world of history. Islam, as a religion, had undertaken the task of transferring the conception of history from the sphere of tribal narrative and collective emotionalism, to a realm of a timeless and spiritual order. Instead
of relating the past to the present, in such a manner as to preserve the esoteric continuity and to provide the collective memory, with idealised deeds of the ancestors, and their glorified heroism, Islam shifted the emphasis to the spiritual universality of the world's history as a whole. As the inspired author of the new culture, Islam made the attempt to liberate the emotions of its adherents from passionate confinement to outward effects and impressions, and so to detach their present, from the accidental character of the past. With the power of the spoken word, and highly dramatic exposition, Islam succeeded in elevating the historical sense to a spiritual universality, and in converting history into a spiritual whole, with a moral and eschatological significance. In such a manner the content of history was spiritually reviewed, and the past gathered together into a whole, so as to be inwardly experienced by each individual, as well as at the same time contributing towards the inner unity of the rising society.

As a religious order of life, motivated by a life-impulse towards unity, movement, and expansion,
Islam turned to history, which it presented as a moral support, and inspiring power within its own sphere of reality. Hence the picture of the past had assumed a different position, and taken on a different complexion, in complete accordance with the nature of the new religion. The conception of history was transposed from the collective representation of tribal existence, to the realm of universal and comprehensive relationships, centred around God and his dealings with man. In this way Islam imparted a considerable significance and vitality to the content and structure of the past. Responding to the same tendency of spiritual individualisation, Islam from the very beginning inclined to uproot the individual from the atmosphere of collective associations, which had the effect in pre-Islamic times, of holding him fast against his own personal dispositions and impulses. In constructing the inner world, which was conceived and presented as, the standard of the good and the true, the new religion made the attempt to wave aside the tribal traditions with their confined and limited communal sentiments. This recession of the pre-
Islamic mode of historical valuation, resulted in a psychological vacuum, which, however, was filled and compensated for by the spiritual reconstruction of history. In such a way the function of history was raised to the level of an open society, and directed towards seizing the vital centre of the past, and offering it, as a living present charged with content, inspiration, and demands. Instead of being conceived of, as a pale and shadowy chain of sequences, the movement of the world's history had been so moralized and given such a clear formulation, that it secured an eternal element in the core of the present life. By seeking the whole in the particular, Islam seemed to have re-diverted history into the realm of personal life, thus making it capable of being individually experienced, and inwardly assimilated. Rejecting the esoteric history of the closed tribal life, with its passionate and exciting associations, Islam turned to the universal content of history and, concentrating upon this material, reproduced it in such a manner as to provide its adherents with new impulses and a new ideology. The pre-Islamic idealisation of ancestral
deeds and tribal deities, was replaced by the conception of the world as the manifestation of one Divine Will, permeating the course of history, moulding and remoulding its happenings and events. This religious representation, according to which history appeared to be the miraculous activity of one omnipotent God, imparted to human life a considerable spiritual meaning, and infinite value. Further, this way of looking upon history as a movement towards indissoluble unity, under the supreme reign of one Divine Will, had the effect of projecting on the past, a permanent character and an irresistible moral purpose. The occurrences of the past were explained as God working in the universe for the benefit of man, and the world of existence, as being pervaded by this Divine purpose, awakening the whole of life and stirring it to activity. God stretched the Heaven and founded the Earth, simply and solely to be worshiped by all His creatures therein, including man, whose sin and fall\(^1\) constituted the central theme for the drama

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1) This refers to the specifically Islamic representation of this universal theme.
of history, and explained the causality of good and evil, in terms of the inter-relation of human with Divine. In the light of this interpretation, history seemed to unfold, through and through, a continuous challenge and conflict between Good, as Divine Will, and Evil, as human impulse. The world of man with its value and significance became, through this conception of history, a co-operation in a great movement of the universe towards advancing life and reconciling man to the will of his Creator. History - with the power of the whole operating within it - was looked upon as witness to Divine Truth and to the ultimate triumph of good over evil, and at the same time witness to the ruthless elimination of evil-doers. God was just and omnibenevolent, but at the same time stern and omnipotent. He delegated His Divine message to the prophets, but not infrequently prophets were rejected, and scorned by their peoples. When ultimately people overstepped the moral confines set by their Creator, and evil seemed to depress the level of life, then the will of God interfered, the Divine revenge descended, and the prophets were
witness to the fate of evil and of all transgressors.

By reproducing and revitalising this historical material, Islam was indirectly expressing its own character and disposition, and exposing the predominant features that it had in common with the Hebrew ethos and heritage. The central characteristic of this Hebrew background was, in the main the combination of inward conception of life with the assimilation of outward reality under one religious order, and one spiritual synthesis. This religious order presented life as a whole, and placed the individual within the firm structure of a spiritually closed community. The present world of immediate existence, and the elements furnished within it, by nature, constituted for man the only possible sphere of his movement, activity and aspiration. Life, according to this Hebrew representation, was the focus around which the relation of man to God centred: man, as privileged being, capable of improving and advancing the world, God, as omnipotent and omniscient moral guardian and authority. Such a conception was largely in
harmony with the spirit of Islam, as a religion of movement and actuality, with the inner motive force of a theo-centric view of the universe.

In this historical perspective, Islam conceived of life - with its rich possibilities, and with its Divine judgement over man's destiny - as the domain, and the only domain, of man's ambitions and expectations. Human nature, in both its limited capacity and its unlimited aspiration, was given full expression and dramatic representation. And thus, by taking over the task of literary presentation, from poetry, and communal folk-lore, and undertaking the function of social dramatic idealisation, Islam found in Hebrew material, with its imaginative and spiritual appeal, the answer to, and expression of, the constant human propensities and emotions. As the founder of a new culture, Islam demanded a new dramatised ideal, to sustain and nourish the psychical life of man, just as much in times of pain, and actual affliction, as in times of joy and happy attachment, to the content of reality. In this theocentric realm of history, Islam with its characteristic exposition, disclosed
Abraham - with his exalted emotional appeal to all contemporary Christians, Jews, and Heathen - as the Father and the knight of the Faith. His supreme confidence in maintaining his hope and desire for begetting was the highest instance of man overcoming the inevitable nature of things through his relationship to the Divine. The story of the sacrifice, with its mortifying ordeal, represented the sublime triumph of the faithful soul, over his dearest sentiments and affections, in the face of the Divine command. In a different vein, Job stood for human suffering, in its extreme form, and exemplified a Godlike despair, when man became afflicted in the innermost centre of his being. Further, the disposition of Islam towards outward reality, and its tendency to place the forces of nature in an intimate and fruitful relationship to the invisible world of the Divine, found in the story of David and Solomon, an impressive theme for the inherent human dream and ambition of attaining control and mastery over nature. They towered high in the dramatised Quranic exposition, as two conspicuous figures who, through Divine favour, mastered
natural phenomena and acquired a miraculous power over the immediate world of existence and its elements. The life content, in its attraction and splendour, was displayed in the story of these two Hebrew prophets, in order to offer nourishment to human fantasy and imagination, in its craving to overcome the resistance of the outer world, and to annihilate the feeling of distance - as well as to satisfy the human longing for Divine wisdom and justice on earth. Again the story of Moses, with its Godlike struggle against long-established and tenacious authority, bore a strong analogy to the situation of Islam in the process of construction, and therefore constituted the most frequent theme of the Quranic exposition of History. The reconciliatory attitude of Islam, and its impulse towards presenting the immediate world as within man's spiritual sphere, inclined it to form its conception of History mainly on this Hebrew material, which made the relationship of man to God, the principal means of achieving consciousness of superiority over the cycle of existence. This historical perspective had the effect of directing
the restless sentiments and activities, towards a spiritual unity, and thus integrating and awakening many of the otherwise scattered and latent forces. It also had the effect of sapping the morale of the opponents of the new religion, by perpetuating the conviction that the future was on the side of God, in spite of all outward resistance, and adverse circumstances. The Hebrew conception of history as a causal order, with its concentration of all isolated events, had the effect of answering the need of Islam, as a new religion, for a comprehensive unity and weaving together of all natural phenomena, of eternal and temporal, human and Divine, within one spiritual scheme, and into a relationship of reciprocal and sympathetic activity. This Hebrew background also met the demand of Islam for the awakening, in its adherents, of the impulse of conceiving the world as a whole - a characteristic of every spiritual or religious movement. In this way the Hebrew theocentric scheme of the universe, with its cosmic and moral significance to the new religion, constituted the positive side of Islam, by accepting and cherishing the present life as the sphere of
inter-relation between man and God, and by emphasising the life impulse in its originative power, and determined attachment to the immediate world of existence. These two prominent features of the Hebrew culture; on the one side, regarding nature as the subject-matter of man's interest, and his sphere of aspirations and activities, and on the other, viewing history as God's dealings with man — these two features harmonised with the motive forces of Islam, to strengthen its tendency of enriching life and enlarging the scope of human activity. The affirmation of life through such a theocratic conception of nature and history contributed likewise towards the inner synthesis of the new religion, and thereby provided the newly unified adherents of Islam with a well-defined character, and with a consciousness of superiority to external resistance and the outward world of experience. With this all-embracing synthesis capable of overcoming the previous antithetical notions about nature and history, Islam succeeded in spiritualising the inner determination of its adherents and in elevating their incentives and potentialities, to the plane of a
comprehensive and universal scheme of relationship. By clearing the field of the contradictory and antithetical notions about Nature and History, or rather by reconstructing and vitalising the spiritual elements in them, Islam developed the impulse towards a universally valid standard of valuation, superior to the independent conceptions of tribal life—each with its own religious views and convictions. This Islamic conception of God, with his omnipotence in the realm of nature and his absolute righteousness in the sphere of history, rose to the new demand for spiritual unity, and at the same time, operated to increase for man the possibilities of Providence. Meanwhile, this conception, in its function of psychical unification, assisted Islam in the task of breaking down the tribal barriers and placing all individuals on the same level of spiritual right and duty, as well as inspiring the human mind with a clear vision of theocratic unity and moral equality. Such emphasis on a spiritual equality had the effect of enlarging human sympathy and broadening man's imagination, so as to be capable of realising the actual experience
of others. The idea of one righteous God in nature and history, as one all-embracing moral Providence, tended to develop man's imagination and sympathy in such a manner, as to enable him to appreciate spiritual facts and causes, and to grasp the notion of moral equality in its Divine meaning and significance. In the face of one common fate engendered by spiritual unity, the mutual tribal hatreds and ferocities, envies and rancours, were transferred to the enemy of the new faith. Henceforth the principle of valuation became in this way theocentric, working from within outwardly, and determined by, and related to, one moral Patron and Authority. This liberation from the world of first appearances with the spiritual individualism resulting therefrom, was to a great extent the source of psychical energy and moral regeneration.

History, as the divine drama of moral conflict, stimulated in the inner synthesis of Islam, a new mode of valuation, mitigated the compulsive and commanding character of communal customs, and imparted to the past a new moral depth and spiritual content. The past became for the Muslim world a
long struggle between the will of God and the will of man - the former tending towards Good and Unity, the latter towards Evil and Transgression. Within the Hebrew world of history as presented by Islam, each Prophet rose against a certain type of human evil, and made the attempt to reconcile the two wills, thus bringing man into unity and harmony with the Lord of wrath and vengeance. In this Hebrew world, was the stage - and the only stage - on which this moral conflict between two wills, human and Divine, was performed, and the earthly society alone was subject to this Divine scheme of reward and punishment. Hence the material world, with its content, immediate impressions and sense experience, constituted for the Hebrews the main theme of man's relationship with the Divine. Elemental catastrophe, subjugation to the enemy, or the elimination of transgressors, and setting up of a new society on earth, were usually the constant threat, if not the actual and final vengeance of the righteous and moral Guardian of the Universe.

Although the Hebrew culture was exclusively religious, the hereafter and the Day of Judgement
had hardly any significance, the whole emphasis being placed in, and attached to the present world of experience. The life of the soul was looked at from a communal standpoint, and in this Hebrew scheme of spiritual collectivism, any breach of the unity of the group, was regarded as a grievous social sin, and a deadly threat to the moral and religious order. Since the doctrine of the immortality of the soul hardly existed among the earlier Hebrews, the individual had no unique moral being and did not seem to enjoy an independent religious fate, apart from that of his community. Although accepting the Hebrew vision of history and confirming and reproducing its moral and religious orientation, Islam proceeded further in the direction of developing spiritual individualism through an insistence on the immortality of the human soul. By adopting and developing from the outset the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, Islam made the concept of the Last Day, or the Day of Judgement, the fundamental theme of its eschatology. This doctrine of immortality with its characteristic Islamic exposition had a bearing on the problem of
morality, in so far as it assisted the process of spiritual individualisation and tended to liberate moral consciousness from communal pressure and outward necessity. It is obvious that the consequence of elaborating and emphasizing such a doctrine, was to assist the impulse towards moral independence, personal decision, and spiritual freedom. Setting itself against the confining and limiting communal sentiments, Islam enlarged upon this doctrine of the Day of Judgement with its implied spiritual individuality, which was given clear and decisive expression in this typical verse:

"On the day when a man shall flee from his brother,  
From his mother and his father,  
And from his wife and sons,  
Each man that day will have his own preoccupying affairs."

By enlarging upon the concept of resurrection, Islam was giving expression, and at the same time recognition, to the negative side of human life, so as to raise man above the doubts and necessities of the existing situation, and the temporal circumstances of the new religion. Besides
developing the direct relationship of man with reality, representing history as the miraculous triumph of the Divine Will over the will of man, nature as man's proper sphere of activity and the field of divine retribution—besides all this, Islam was keenly aware of death and of its spiritual impact on the human mind and imagination. The idea of death, with its eschatological significance and its inherent and overwhelming effect on human emotions, assisted Islam in the task of constructing the inner world with its spiritual synthesis, based on the three main conceptions of nature, history, and death. While serving as a unifying spiritual conception, the idea of death, together with reflection upon its associations, constituted the conspicuous feature of the independent inner world of the Islamic synthesis. In the harmony with the Hebrew ethos and disposition, as well as with the Hebrew spiritual attitude towards the material world—with its tendency to enrich, augment, and cherish the present life—Islam affirmed the meaning and value of immediate reality. Nevertheless, in the face of the rigid character of fate,
of the outward necessities and resistance, the new religion inclined to mitigate the affirmative disposition towards life, by dwelling on the concept of death, as an inexhaustible source of spiritual reflection and self-composure for the soul of the individual. The spiritual materialism round which the Hebrew mode of valuation revolved, constituted the affirmative aspect of the new religion, and harmonised with Islam, in its tendency to increase the vigour of life, and to enrich its possibilities of power and superiority within the Divinely prescribed boundaries. Although Islam developed this direct relationship to the immediate reality with its determined attachment to the present world, yet at the same time it departed from the Hebrew background, and to a considerable extent, negated life by concentrating upon death as an eschatological theme and independent fate for the individual soul. As a theocratic order based upon "spiritual unity" rather than upon "group-soul," and also as a religion of unified forces, disposed towards power and domination, Islam affirmed life in so far as the outward resistance permitted such affirmation, while
tending to emphasize and develop the idea of death and the insignificance of immediate existence, in the face of human despair and frustration. Although this dual attitude resulted in a division of existence, and a dichotomy within the spiritual synthesis of Islam, it had the effect of answering psychologically, to the human problem of fate and freedom - or, rather, of spiritually alleviating the situation of man, between the dispensation of fate, and the pressure of passions and desires.

The active relationship of Islam towards reality, together with its acceptance of the immediate world, revealed the positive tendency of the new religion to regard the present life as man's domain of ambitions, effort and joyful achievement. In this way, Islam inclined to raise nature, and elevate natural existence, to a spiritual plane, thus spiritualising human desire and passion within Divinely prescribed moral limits - rather than rejecting such desires altogether, and thereby reducing the vigour of life, and escaping from its struggles and necessities. Hence, by incorporating human desires within the spiritual order and
religious scheme, instead of eliminating them by separating man entirely from nature, and demanding his joyous and absolute withdrawal within the individual soul, the new religion gave recognition to the two opposed impulses inherent in man as a natural, and at the same time, spiritual being. On the one side there was man's natural existence with its outer world, and its domain of self-denial; Islam solved this enigmatic situation by maintaining a balance between freedom and necessity. In its reconciliatory capacity, Islam allowed each of the two conflicting impulses in man its weight, that is to say, it recognised man, both as a social being belonging to nature, and as an individual being, endowed with a spiritual tendency and cosmic character. These two conflicting impulses constituted the two elements inherent in human nature - the "existential"(1) tendency of assimilating, and affirming the outward

1) The term "existential" in this context, has no connection with the doctrine of Existentialism. It indicates the disposition towards the immediate form of existence, and the relationship of man to his immediate environment, in contrast to the inward and spiritual independence.
reality of first appearance, and the "mystical" tendency of conceiving and comprehending the world as a whole. Each of the two tendencies was recognised and developed by the new religion, with its varied and actual experience in the process of construction, and the opportunity thereby afforded, of experiencing and expressing different and various human modes and dispositions. The existential element of the Islamic synthesis, with its spiritualised conception of history and nature, reflected the vigorous and militant feature of the new religion, and thus tended to present the Divine as the Lord of wrath and vengeance. Furthermore, this existential tendency, with its overflowing energy, and newly unified forces motivated by a desire for more objective and extensive experience, a desire which had not been exhausted by the strain of previous civilization - this tendency gave Islam the impetus towards theocratic advance and expansion. But while the existential element constituted the Islamic unity, in its expanding and vigorous form; the mystical element constituted the nucleus of spiritual individuality and self-concentration, and
thus presented the Divine as the Lord of mercy, compassion and forgiveness. The first tendency inclined to conceive of God as a transcendental and merciless moral guardian, whereas the second tendency, conceived of Him rather as an immanent Being, permeating life with Divine grace and loving kindness, the source of joyous independence, and firm tranquillity.

In response to the existing situation and to the possibilities it offered, the inner determination of this positive tendency towards outward reality, exhausted itself in the process of unfolding these possibilities, especially in the Islamic phase of theocratic expansion and domination. This inner determination of the uprising society was stimulated by the vacillating resistance of the immediate environment. Hence the pessimism which usually results from the inner determination being overshadowed and thwarted by external resistance - or else frustrated by the overpowering strain of a declining civilization - had no place within the Islamic synthesis in its youthful and energetic stage of construction. The absence of such pessimism
in the rise of Islam (except in passing phases) resulted in an optimistic group attitude, and at the same time, had the effect of inclining the new religion to lay the main emphasis upon the human will. Through this affirmative tendency of Islam, with its vigorous and militant features, and its impulse towards the outward possibilities, the new religion inclined to emphasize the freedom of the human will, and individual spiritual responsibility. Confronted by no rigid resistance, this positive tendency inspired the adherents of Islam, and provided them with firm confidence, spiritual optimism, and volitional freedom, thus giving them the motivation and impetus to impose their unifying inner synthesis. Meanwhile, such a tendency, with its inner motivation and outward aspiration, its spiritual optimism and firm confidence, in the contribution of human volition to the Divine cause, constituted the theocratic hopes and ideals, and reflected the supra-tribal unity, in its ambitious and universal form. In this respect, by imposing such unity through its positive tendency, the new religion was enlarging and extending the sphere of its
spiritual synthesis. In this way it imposed the acceptance of a timeless standard, and thereby broadened the scope of human sympathy and the sanctity of the human soul, so as to raise the group-attitude and group morality to the level of spiritual relationships. Despite the commercial environment, with its multiplied points of contact, the Islamic synthesis did not have the advantage of any previous unifying principle, of a national or political nature, capable of overcoming the fierce tribal struggle over the possibilities of subsistence and of paving the way for the mutual vision of responsibility and moral attitude in group relations.

Hence the formative task of this positive tendency towards expansion and the natural form of existence, resulted in charging the inner synthesis of the new religion with the imperative and supreme value of social unification, and the comprehensive cohesive principle. Thus the affirmative optimism of Islam, with its powerful inner motivation, and the absence of effective resistance, assisted this tendency in the task of realising itself, and of
unfolding the actual possibilities of theocratic influence and autonomy. Motivated by an inner relation to reality and strengthened through the external opportunities, such a unity was at first the major demand of the new religion, to enable its existential aspect to overcome the existing contradictions, by assuming the religious and theocratic privilege, offered by the growing consciousness of the need for a comprehensive synthesis and all-embracing conviction. As a life-movement actuated by spiritualised energy, and directed by a unifying principle, this positive tendency of Islam was capable of extending the theocratic influence over the whole of existence, and of elevating itself above the prevailing antitheses. Emerging and developing with no unifying principle in the environmental background, this positive tendency of the new religion appeared to justify its militant features, and at the same time its extreme insistence upon the sense of unity, while imparting to the unifying faith, such a value, and in such a manner, as to make it a dominant part of each individual's consciousness. Thus the need to unify the whole through the manifestation of the inner synthesis in each, appeared
to justify the new religion in the unfolding of its existential ambition and aspiration by means of forceful expansion and the superimposing of the universal validity of its new faith and conviction. Having no groundwork of political or national sentiment on which to build, Islam, as a religion of spiritual guidance and formative force, was most decisive in its demand for unity, and thus tended to impart a specific form to the inner reality of man, so as to secure the foundation of unified effort, psychical structure, and extensive movement. Furthermore, in order to consolidate the emerging society and its inward synthesis against the danger of a relapse into the closed communal pattern, the new religion most emphatically regarded any breach of unity, in the form of apostasy, or polytheistic notions, as the cardinal and unforgivable sin. In the sight of the new religion, such a breach of unity was so grievous and significant as to justify the theocracy in removing the protection of authority from the spiritual immunity, and moral sanctity of the individual's life and property. Hence, with the
theocentric conception of life as a motive force, the existential trend of Islam towards outward expansion succeeded in compelling the attainment of inner unity, and thus replacing the external unification of the closed patterns, by a universal valuation and spiritual standard. The movement towards outward reality was characterised by existence in time, and extension in space, at the same time as it was motivated by an inner synthesis, but the manifestation of so positive a movement appeared to express in the new religion, the submission of the inward, to the outward, and the subordination of the eternal element, to the temporal. Thus the permanent element, with its timeless standard and infinite valuation, was charged with the task of movement and change, necessitated by theocratic advance and expansion. Hence self-concentration was outweighed by self-expansion, and inner synthesis overshadowed by outward achievement.

Besides constituting the dynamic element of the new religion, this positive tendency projected its own features and complexion on to the
Hereafter, and sought to represent the doctrine of the Last Judgement, in such a manner as to strengthen its own motive forces. It represented the other world as a sensuous picture, extending to it the mode of natural existence. In this way the doctrine of the Last Judgement, largely contributed towards the spiritual motivation of the positive characteristics of Islam, in the stage of its dynamic expansion, popularising the Hereafter as an alternative, or second opportunity to the present world of first appearance and sense impression. Hence by spiritualising the motivation and by releasing and unifying the elemental forces and energy of the closed collective pattern, this dynamic tendency advanced the frontier of Islamic theocracy, and at the same time imparted to that advancement, a moral character and spiritual content. With this theocratic conception of the immediate world characteristic of the Hebrew culture, enlarged and augmented by Islamic eschatology, and the doctrine of the Last Judgement, the new religion exploited to the fullest, its outward possibilities and exhausted its abundant
energies. This rapid dynamic expansion had the effect of waiving aside the conflicting notions, and imposing the Islamic synthesis, with its timeless standard and spiritual valuation. Besides achieving material advancement and spatial expansion, this theocracy succeeded in extending the sphere of human sympathy, enlarging the circle of spiritual dignity, and enlarging the scope of the religious sanctity of the individual soul. With its inner synthesis imposed upon outward existence, Islam strengthened the groundwork of moral apprehension, basing the standard of human relationships, on a spiritual foundation and firm conviction. Hence, in its existential tendency, and unifying character, the new religion was a historical mutation, and a breach in the continuity of the form of human relationships, and social structure. By detaching man from the narrow and closed pattern of immediate self-preservation, and elevating him to a plane of wider vision and inward unification, his standard of valuation was transferred from outer, to inner being, and thereby deeply rooted in religious conviction, and imaginatively
extended beyond the limited scope of immediate existence. The ultimate value came to be spiritualised, and the criteria of conduct related to the invisible realm of Divine essence, thus imparting to the moral reality a comprehensive and metaphysical nature, at the same time, enlarging its sphere and endowing it with universal validity. Although spiritualising the form of the moral reality and extending its basis in human sympathy, Islam seemed largely to preserve the content of that reality, retaining its emotional foundation and traditional strength, in order to consolidate the new ethical structure. Responding to the Hebrew background and its orientation towards the world of first appearance, and at the same time conditioned by the impulsive nature of its own unified forces, Islam tended to spiritualise particularly the positive features of the moral reality, and to elevate militant self-preservation, to the plane of spiritual self-affirmation and religious expansion. Such a transformation assisted the new religion in releasing the spiritualised energy, with the result of imposing a
comprehensive theocracy, with its religious standard, and mode of valuation.

Assuming a unified character in the face of divided and incoherent resistance, this spiritualised energy, with its youthful impetus, was capable of extending the ambitious theocracy, and thereby of imparting to the merging circles of tribalism, a consciousness of superiority and theocentric fraternity, based upon the dignity of the individual soul, and the sanctity of human life. As a consequence of such super-imposed unification, the moral reality was largely diverted of its collective features—thus becoming spiritually individualised—and was able to integrate individual relationships within the theocratic pattern. This process of individualisation, with its actual semi-urbanisation, resulted in dissolving the traditional regulative and self-evident customs. Hence the process gave rise to what may be termed "spiritual authoritarianism," and in the course of time, culminated in the four eminent Schools of theocentric jurisdiction. At the birth of the new religion, the moral consciousness
and aspiration were so highly developed - as is re-
vealed through the maturity of the contemporary
poetic expression with its ethical appeal - so as to
accept and appreciate the ethical inspiration of
Islam, especially in its mystical tendency, and spiri-
tual freedom of self-concentration and comprehensive
vision. Nevertheless, the positive tendency of Islam,
as subject to the theocratic influence, and to the
power of actuality, was ethically constrained by the
necessity of compromising with long-established
norms and procedures. While heightening and enrich-
ing the ethical consciousness by the religious sense
of dignified unity, Islam as a theocracy was con-
fined to, and influenced by, inter-tribal moral
limitations. It thus tended to apply social modi-
fications and spiritual sanctions to its own en-
lightened morals and conventions, in order to achieve
an Islamic character and complexion.

The conception of justice, in the sphere
of theocratic authority and Divine sanction, was
largely in harmony with the existing mode of valu-
atation and the moral sensitivity, as expressed
in the maturity of the ethical phraseology, and
and its humane and emotional appeal. But instead of its being applied within the narrow and closed tribal circles of outward relations, Islam elevated the conception of justice to the level of universal application, and extended its validity with a more enlightened vision, and comprehensive imagination. However, while recognising the limited human ideals and moral limitations under the pressure of practical necessity, and within the boundaries of the institutional patterns, the theocracy of the new religion tended to compensate for such actual limitation, by projecting the utopian conception of justice on to the Hereafter, and by setting therein the ideals of absolute equality, and Divine equity. Besides being an actual necessity, the acceptance of this moral reality by Islam - with spiritualisation of its form, and universalisation of its content - served to maintain a sense of continuity with respect to outward procedure, thus preserving moral stability along with its conventional support. As a part of the inter-tribal psychical structure, the institution of slavery, came to be accepted and recognised by the new
religion, and at the same time given theocratic sanction. But while accepting and recognising the institutional content, the form was spiritualised, and the act of manumission was charged with a high ethical spiritual and religious value.

Hence the inherent attitude towards life, with its quantum of energy, remained at the birth of the new religion, the main factor in determining the scheme of values, and in reconciling spiritual ideals to actual necessity, and to existing norms. Such reconciliation, with its Divine sanction and theocratic authority, came to be the ultimate source, and supreme reference, for the moral reality of Islam, and thus accidental precedents became, in the course of time, universal and permanent. Although inward and spiritual in character and authority, such universalised precedents were subject to outward influence, and to the merely human, and in a large measure reflected the strain exerted by parochial necessities of the formative stage, upon the freedom of the religious ideals of Islam. In this way the scheme of values, determined by social compromise, and necessitated by the natural
existence of time and space, came to be raised by
the new religion, to the plane of the timeless, and
absolute. This had the effect of projecting an
"eternal" complexion on to the "temporal", of
presenting the human, in the form of the Divine,
and of accepting the positive value of self-assertion,
to the detriment of self-judgement. In this way
the permanent element was influenced by the transi-
tory; and the expanding theocracy appeared to con-
solidate its authority, by drawing upon two sources
of human "fear": the fear of theocratic retribu-
tion in this life, and of Divine eschatology. The
derivation of authority from these sources was
mainly due to the character of the formative stage,
which imparted its values to the theocracy, es-
pecially the feature of self-assertion, this being
translated by the theocracy into an authority based
on the fear of God and of his vicegerent on earth.
Having lost its authoritative pressure by the
religious process of individualisation, dogmatic
custom largely imparted its content, to theocratic
justice, and thus became enforced by its eschatology,
and its "restrictive ordinances." So considerable
was the collapse of traditional collective sanctions, as to necessitate a stringent theocratic discipline, based on humiliating corporal retribution, and on the terrifying threat of the Islamic eschatology. Hence, being heavily burdened by ministering to the security of the spiritually individualised members of the new society, the theocracy was not allowed absolute spiritual freedom to develop to "its logical conclusion" the ideal of ethical tolerance, nor to establish it entirely upon the sentiment of love and forgiveness. The theocracy therefore tended to draw upon the sentiment of fear, both in the present world, and the next, thus combining in one synthesis the nature and destiny of man, and at the same time reflecting the disposition of fear, in the ruthless attributes of God, and in the theocratic "restrictive ordinances"

Not only was the positive tendency of the new religion - as presented in its theocratic self-expanding and preservative activities - disposed towards change and movement, but its timeless mode of valuation was also subject to the influence of time. As a result of its very existence, the
theocracy tended to submit its practical ideal, to the actual necessities of the present situation thus exposing its moral reality with its cosmic conception and permanent character to the world of change and transience. In the formative stage of Islam, this resulted in exposing the Revelation as well as the Tradition to the process of modification and alteration, and hence the phenomenon of "Abrogated and Abrogating" remained the manifestation of the interpretation of the permanent, and the changing, in one inner synthesis. The constraint exercised upon the permanent and timeless element, by the transitory situation of movement and change, had the effect of restricting in practice the ideal of theocracy, and at the same time confining its moral freedom and aspiration by the limitations of outward pressure and actuality. As a consequence of placing the practical ideal, with its content of time and space, upon a foundation superior to time and space, the transitory content was manifest in the permanent form with the result that a social ethic of the institutional structure was formulated under the influence of
immediate existence. Thus, by raising Revelation and Tradition to the plane of permanent form and to the timeless realm, the practical ideal of theocracy came to develop what may be termed a "historical fixation", and human moral consciousness in the sphere of social ethics became retrospective, rather than prospective.

Such a "historical fixation", with its theocratic authority, had the effect of giving the social ethics of the formative stage of the new religion, a supra-rational character; of securing the sanctity of its transitory content, and spiritual form, against the curiosity of human intelligence; and of protecting its continuity against the caprice of human emotion. Relating transitional happenings and immediate peculiarities to the timeless order, with the "historical fixation" resulting therefrom, appeared to hinder the society, as well as the individual, from converting events into independent social and personal experience, and thus from advancing the practical ideal of theocratic jurisdiction. Moreover, the human propensity to idealise also exerted its influence, in transferring
practical morality, from social and personal experience, to the universalised criteria of the formative stage, and so arrested the possibilities of humanistic ethics, from being developed towards the reality of self-activity, and self-realisation. This theocratic moral reality, with its sanctified social structure and transitory precedents, remained in the realm of the supra-rational, even after the Mu'tazilite mind was set alight by the flash of the Greek intellect, and the question was raised "whether good was ordained by God because it was good? Or good was good because it was ordained by God?"

In spite of such isolated controversy, the practical ideal of theocracy continued to be retrospective in outlook, and constrained by the historical fixation. Its moral aspiration was related to, and dependent upon, the Revelation, Tradition, inherent consensus, and - at a more liberal level - analogical deduction. Hence the formative stage of the new religion, with its dynamic expansion, and multiplied experiences, constituted the existential tendency of Islam; spiritualized and formulated the
ideal of social structure; sanctified the status of the individual within the cultural pattern, imposed inner unity, and finally encompassed the moral, with Divine form.

Nevertheless, in seeking to maintain the balance between spiritual freedom and actual necessity - an attempt characteristic of every human authority - the theocracy based the ideal of social ethics upon the disposition of "fear". Thus the ideal was presented as authoritarian in character, and metaphysical in nature, and at the same time, as being based upon the immediate nature and disposition of man.

With its emphasis on the human will in the form of expanding activity, and its open recognition of the sensuous world, the existential tendency of Islam unfolded its characteristic nature in theocratic domination, thereby establishing the practical ideal with its positive values. But these positive values were conditioned by the traditional pattern of the formative stage, and contributed towards the mobilisation and motivation of the spiritualised energy, at the same time canalizing
this energy in the direction of self-assertion and self expansion. The latent antithesis of the new religion, between the inner world of destiny, and the outer world of nature, remained concealed so long as the unified forces were apprehensive of the external threat, and the reactionary tribal challenge. However, as soon as the dynamic stage of expansion began to manifest the symptoms of exhaustion, and the spiritualised energy to degenerate into conflict and sedition, the antithesis became apparent, and the relapse into outward relationships, appeared to justify division and schism on religious grounds, and spiritual principles. The solidarity of the inner and common thought-world, was not sufficiently coherent and intense, to be capable of absorbing the heterogeneous elements, with their conflicting backgrounds and outlooks. Thus when the dynamic phase lost its momentum, and expansion exhausted the elemental energy of the unified forces, the emphasis came to be partly shifted from the positive value of the human will, to that of the human intellect, and the theocentric phase of expansion, gave way
to a phase of theocentric intellectualisation. The phase of the dynamic will, imposed the practical ideal of theocracy, and established its spiritual authoritarianism, the phase of theocentric intellectualisation undertook the task of intellectualising the new faith, and reconciling its conceptual structure to the formal logic of Greece. The inner synthesis, with its disposition towards immediate existence and outward activity, was not sufficiently self-concentrated, to withstand the tide of the sensuous world. In the course of a few decades of expanding theocracy, this inner synthesis, with its spiritual form of the moral reality, displayed a symptomatic aspect of conflict, division, indulgence, and sensuality. The outward flood of wealth and prosperity, together with the strain of social individualisation, exerted its influence in disclosing the dual character of, and the dichotomy between self-expansion and self-concentration. The inward foundation, was unequal to the task of resisting the outward possibilities. Hence, when the phase of expansion absorbed the spiritualised energy, in the direction of self-assertion, the
existential tendency of Islam, degenerated into the sensuous world.

This sensual current was reflected throughout Arabic literature, from the time of Ibn Abi Rabi’a, and later in the poetry of Abu Nuwas. The subjective fatigue resulting from the rapid expansion, with its possibilities in the sensuous world, had the effect of revealing the latent contrasts of human life and of uncovering the irrational element in social existence. Nevertheless, along with the current of sensual indulgence, some isolated circles of sensitive and genuine souls, became conscious of the relaxation of the moral order, and of the detachment from the inward foundation of reality. These circles made the attempt to deepen the inner synthesis of the new religion, and to secure for man a firm inner confidence, so as to enable him to confront the contrasts of life, to overcome its unreasonable elements, and to convert the sorrow and miseries of existence, into an inner joy and Divine tranquillity. This trend was given expression in the sermons of Al Ḥasan al Baṣrī, and later in the ascetic poetry of Abu’l ‘Atāhiya.
Disillusioned by the theocratic expansion, and by the violent contrasts resulting therefrom; disillusioned by the contradictions of life and its divisions and upheavals; disillusioned also by the contradictory demands, of the inner world and the immediate existence, and by the detachment from the inward relationship to moral reality, such sensitive souls, tended to draw upon the spiritual sources opened by the mystical and timeless tendency of the new religion. Here, then, the "mystical" tendency of Islam inclined towards the inner world of self-concentration, assuming first the form of asceticism, and later culminating in Islamic mysticism.

The "existential" tendency, with its actual theocracy constituted the practical ideal in the form of theocentric authoritarianism; this "mystical" tendency, with its timeless inwardness, reflected the pure ideal based upon spiritual aspiration, ethical freedom, and love of God. While the practical ideal—with its fixed frame of reference—was charged with the task of regulating the social structure, by detailing the spiritual and theocratic authority,
the pure ideal was liberating itself from the merely human, elevating its moral aspiration to the timeless plane, and grasping the permanent element in Revelation and Tradition. The practical ideal met and inspired the needs of the changing world, and fused the moral order, with the fear of God and theocratic authority, at the same time working the details of the authoritarian ethics, into the theocentric jurisdiction. The pure ideal in its mystical form tended to develop the tranquillity and peace of inner unity, self-denial and inward heroism, Divine love and holy affection. Raised above the perplexities and confusions of outward activities, above the conflict of powers and self-assertion, and above the world of desires and sensuality, the pure ideal oriented towards absolute and spiritual reality, and was capable of intensifying the inner synthesis of Islam, and of heightening its universality, so as to obliterate the contrast between Divine love and justice.

After exhausting the outward possibilities of expansion, the unified and spiritualised energy lapsed into the sensuous world, particularly around
the theocratic centres, where the fruit of theocratic expansion turned into luxury, splendour, and a flexible moral order. As a consequence, the theocentric codification — inspired by the practical ideal with its arrested fundamentals — could possess neither administrative ingenuity, nor the power of self-evident custom. The strain of such a civilisation, with its semi-urbanised society, immature individualism, and severe contrast between extreme austerity, and extreme luxury, invited the task of enlarging and deepening the universal features of the inner synthesis of the new religion, and at the same time created the urge to seek refuge from the world of first appearance, in the spiritual reality of self-withdrawal and self-concentration. It was here that sensual indulgence began indirectly to contribute towards the virtue of piety, which found expression in the early asceticism, and later mysticism of Iraq, Syria and Egypt. In this manner, the disposition towards eternal destiny came to consolidate its demands against the disposition towards nature and its passionate immediacy. While
intellectual activity exerted itself over the relation of faith to reason, formulating the conceptual structure of the Islamic synthesis, the self-active spiritual feature within this synthesis, assumed the position of negating the immediate world and purifying the timeless and permanent, of the effect of the particular and changing, until the two strains converged in the mystical rationality of Al Ghazālī. Meanwhile the heterogeneous elements in the vanquished lands and acquired cities, with their disillusionment and mystical traditions, also contributed towards the process of universalising the inwardness of the new religion, and establishing its timeless features upon a foundation of firm confidence and deep relationship to the Divine reality. Thus the moral order was liberated from the practical ideal of theocracy, and elevated to the mystical plane of spiritual universality.

Hence on the affirmative side of the religious synthesis of Islam, the transitory content of the moral reality was raised to the plane of permanence, and given a spiritual form
and timeless character. Being conditioned by, and subjected to the outward, this transitory content of the moral reality converted the practical ideal into a static and authoritarian ethic, based on and actuated by, human fear and apprehension. With the Hebrew conception of nature as the domain of Divine retribution, and of man's activity, and with the conception of history as a dramatic conflict between the will of God, and the will of man, the existential tendency absorbed the outward possibilities, and exhausted its energy in the process of theocratic domination.

On the negative side, when the contrast between inward motivation and outward activities, became apparent and violent, the pure ideal of the mystical tendency began to seek refuge from the contradictions of life, turning from nature to destiny, concentrating upon the spiritual sources, and converting their timeless elements into religious experience. Away from the theocratic upheavals - with their arrested ideal and authoritarian morality - the mystical tendency
conceived of life as a whole, and of God as the living truth, and the immanent good; absorbed itself in the universal feature of the moral reality, enlarging and extending the timeless rather than the transitory, and promoting the eternal, rather than the merely human. Unrestricted by the dictates of necessity, and the passionate attachment to immediate existence, the mystical tendency possessed the freedom of self-activity, and the inward power of liberating its pure ideal, from the disposition of fear, basing this ideal instead, upon the close union with the Divine, and upon the eternal element of love. By turning away from outward complications and seeking its own path through the inner relationship to the whole, and through the religious experience of the infinity of this whole, the pure ideal of the mystical tendency, represented the spiritual rebirth of Islam. In this manner, it freed the Islamic synthesis, from the dichotomy of permanence and change, and from the immediate view of the world, detaching moral aspiration from the mere ego, and from the dictates of self-preservation. If the existential tendency presented
morality as a social order, and translated the transitory into the permanent, thereby arresting the practical ideal and giving it an authoritarian character, the mystical tendency presented morality as the self-active appropriation of spiritual life, and as personal freedom from egotism, thus liberating the pure ideal from fear and hope, and endowing it with a universal character, operating towards cosmic ideality, and holy perfection.

Through the whole extent of the history of Islam, the inner foundation of morality remained subject to the tension and division between the two ideals - the "pure," with its timeless, absolute disposition of love, humility, and self-concentration, and the "practical," with its universalised particularities, its disposition of fear and apprehension, and its orientation towards the outward world of sense-impression. When expansion, sensuality, and the strain of civilisation, sapped the vitality of the Islamic culture - materially and spiritually - the "pure" ideal degenerated into popular "fraternities," and the "practical" ideal, into vulgar orthodoxy. Even in their degenerate forms, however, both remained a
source of inspiration, the practical ideal underlying the attitude of nostalgic optimism towards self-assertion, the affirmation of life, and the assimilation of outward existence, the pure ideal operating to alleviate pessimism and frustration, tending towards the negation of life, and towards the search for refuge in inner self-concentration, and freedom from suffering, struggle, and necessity.
PART II.

THE ENCOUNTER WITH WESTERN CIVILISATION:
ITS SCOPE, CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE.
THE ENCOUNTER WITH WESTERN CIVILISATION:
ITS SCOPE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE

In the preceding section, it has been observed that the foundation of Islamic culture was a two-fold synthesis, and that this synthesis manifested its moral energy in two ideals, namely the practical and the pure. Whereas the former was operative only within a fragment of reality, regulating its outward activities, the latter conceived of, and comprehended the whole reality, elevating the element of self active spirituality to a place superior to time and space. Meanwhile, the practical ideal was the product of the "existential" tendency with its theocratic expansion, and the pure ideal the product of the mystical tendency, with its spiritual self-concentration. In its two-fold manifestation, the inner synthesis of Islam was based upon the axiomatic conviction of the new religion, and at the same time inspired by the conception of life as a unified whole, as well as by the conception of Divine activity in the sphere of history and nature. And therefore the ultimate value behind the Islamic pattern of culture - both in its regulative capacity and in its spiritual aspiration both in affirming life and in rejecting its sensuous world - remained theocentric.
in character and metaphysical in nature. In this manner, the solidarity of the culture-pattern was related to, and dependent upon, the inner unity with its emotional organisation and theocentric mode of value. In the sphere of contact with the external world, the Islamic synthesis appeared to disclose or expose its existential tendency of self-preservation and self-assertion, thus reviving the practical ideal, in its orthodox form and inspired capacity of counteracting and resisting the outside challenge and danger. At the same time, being superior to outward strife and necessity, the mystical tendency remained an open source of spiritual alleviation and popular self-withdrawal.

In spite of internal divisions and strife, which left the Islamic synthesis ineffective and in a state of strain and passivity, the inner unity persisted as a unifying principle until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, in the third decade of the present century. However, the encounter with the Western world has been the most conspicuous event in the history of the Islamic synthesis, has and had the most effective impact on the spiritual structure of its cultural pattern. Although the
impact of this encounter has not yet decisively culminated in a settled form, the encounter has exerted an irresistible influence on the Islamic synthesis, and has impressed clearly discernible features upon its ideological tendencies. The process of despiritualisation, with its characteristic departure from traditional authority, has been directly and indirectly sapping the metaphysical foundation of the culture and has tended to transfer the centre of gravity, from the subjective and emotional conception of life, to the objective and rational organisation of society. Likewise, the relation of man to reality has been oriented towards energetic and effective contact with nature, and towards scientific control over the conditions of outward existence. The spiritual disposition towards the past, present, and future has been profoundly disturbed and distorted by the actual acceleration of life, by an overwhelming technological superiority, and by immeasurable wealth of knowledge and experience. Migrating to the Muslim world within a halo of power and prestige, this wealth of knowledge, experience, theories and counter-theories, was apt to acquire
an even more influential and authoritative character than it possessed in its native environment. This appears to have resulted in a disposition to apply to the whole of the standards of judgement characteristic of a certain part of the whole, that is to say, the power and the certainty which characterised the physical sciences, came to be projected on to the other departments of knowledge.

On the theoretical side, the influence of Western intellectualism came to be effective, first by virtue of its penetrating quality and originality, and secondly by its close association with material superiority, military triumph, and ingenious capacity for organisation. Further, the vagueness and imprecision which Western intellectualism presented or exposed, contributed towards dividing the ideological tendency against itself, and towards arousing impulsive enthusiasm in one direction, naive reaction in the other. Nevertheless, the source and underlying motive of the two reactions is the ambivalent attitude, of exaggerated enthusiasm for the West, and antipathy towards it. The first encounter of the Muslim world with the
West - or, rather, the first effective encounter, took the form of Western military domination, which stimulated in the Muslim nation the contradictory emotions of admiration and antipathy. As the West did not interfere with the ultimate conception of the Islamic synthesis or with the emotional organisation of its institutional pattern, the problematic character of this new ideology was left to be resolved by the climate of opinion and by the natural, psychological process of development. Hence the first attempt at Westernisation was made in response to the defensive position, in which the Muslim world was placed by virtue of Western technical advancement, with its superior and overwhelming power. Apart from military Westernisation dictated by the necessity of self-preservation, the Muslim world remained subject to the self-suggestive prestige of the West, as well as to its ideological and social impact.

Thus the Muslim world was placed between, on the one hand, History, with its spiritual stability, emotional authority, and self-evident tradition, and on the other hand, Western ideology,
with its brilliant achievement, profound rationality, and overpowering triumph. Being more accessible and easier of comprehension, the material side of Western civilisation was first to exert its influential character, particularly in the sphere of militarism and in the field of economics. The former established for the West an unquestionable superiority of power, while the latter reduced the feeling of self-sufficiency in the Muslim world, and imposed upon it the necessity of recognising an interdependence with the outside world, thereby imparting a new arrangement to its internal economic activities.

Besides the influence exerted on the Muslim mind by Western intellectualism, the Muslim world was forced in to close association with the West, by the reality of economic interdependence and Western military superiority. This association has been a principal factor in determining the attitude of the Muslim nation to the external world, and in replacing the inherent sense of superiority and self-sufficiency, by that of resignation and dependence; at the same time it has submitted the
Muslim relationship to the outside world to international charters and regulations. Hence the overpowering effectiveness of Western technology, and Western industrial and commercial ingenuity, together with a mysterious and vague Western spirit, developed in the Muslim world a disposition to adopt the Western mode of life, not only in the concrete field of material advancement, but also in the other departments of thought and valuation. And here, in the sphere of thought and valuation, the process of Westernisation manifested its enigmatic character and complex nature. Here, in the sphere of doctrine and values, the cultural crisis appeared to disclose its confusions and complexities, and the historical situation to disclose its symptoms of disorientation. If the material advancement of technology lends itself to adoption by virtue of its demonstrable advantages, and tangible effectiveness, the spiritual realm is hardly accessible, by virtue of its subtlety and intangibility, and its imperative demand for originality.

This historical situation has presented the Muslim world with the real crisis, and has
demonstrated the collision between culture and civilisation, between inner continuity and outward progress, and between the demand of reason and the demand of emotion. The features of this crisis with its conflict and inner division, can be discerned in the ideological formations in political and social life, as well as their spiritual and intellectual manifestations. The enthusiastic admiration of the Muslim mind for, and its acceptance of, Western progress in the sphere of controlling nature and regulating the conditions of life, and at the same time its conscious or unconscious lamenting of the lost sense of historical superiority and privileged spiritual legacy, tended to foster this ambivalent attitude towards the West, and the oscillation between self-affirmative history and the progressive present. Furthermore, the fact of adopting the material technology by mere application, has tended to increase the impression of Western superiority, and to decrease the feeling of self-sufficiency - instead of providing a joyous sense of achievement and creative ability (as was the case within the Western World).
Hence, the absence of a living synthesis behind the application of the material technology in the Muslim world, contributed towards intensifying the conflict and heightening the ambivalent attitude towards the new civilization. In a similar vein, Western intellectualism has had its own conditioning factors, the power of actuality and vital synthesis, behind its substantial development, its movement and counter-movement. By contrast, the Muslim world received this intellectualism without such actuality and vital synthesis, with the result that — in spite of its original character — it assumed a shadowy and lifeless existence. Nevertheless, by virtue of its association with Western prestige, it produced a disintegrating effect on the emotional values of the traditional Muslim culture.

In the Western world, the rise of the modern spirit, has centred round the concept of freedom, from the rigid mediaeval structure, and liberation from the traditional authority and the static pattern of culture. The inner continuity of history began to give way to the outward
possibilities of remoulding the world according to man's needs and desires. The demand for freedom has been the prominent feature of the Western spirit - freedom of economic activity from the static guild organisations, and from feudalism, freedom of the human intellect from conceptual formalism, freedom of religious faith from ecclesiasticism, freedom of society from the State, freedom of the individual from society, and freedom of the present from the past. This concept of "freedom" has characterised the emergence from Mediaevalism and the process of releasing physical and mental energy, as well as the departure from a static culture to a dynamic civilization. Behind these self-active movements and counter-movements, there has always been the Western spirit with its living synthesis and power of actuality. Thus the idea of freedom has been motivated by the enthusiastic optimism towards progress, and sustained by the increasingly accumulating facts in the field of nature, in the mechanism of life, and in the sphere of human conduct and experience. Hence, through the concept of freedom, the task of religion
and tradition was transferred to thought and experience. As to the ultimate value, the emphasis was shifted from God to man - to man, whose capacity for thought and experience, whose indwelling reason, raised him so high, that he claimed to be the standard of valuation and the centre of humanistic civilization. This self-conscious mode of valuation inclined to place the dignity of man upon his presupposed reason and experience, while keeping his relation to God, and to the universe as a whole, in the spiritual background.

On the practical side, the concept of freedom in the Western world came to express a development beyond the Mediaeval pattern, with its rigid limitations, its cosmic scheme of life, and its Divine sanction of the existing order. With the motive force of economic pressure and with the youthful spirit of enterprise, this concept of freedom tended to give impetus to the process of breaking away from the inner continuity of history, and of revolting against any form of inherited privilege and sanctified authority
The most violent expression of this process of departing from inner continuity was the French revolution, with its impulsive determination to thrust aside the idea of God together with every sacred tradition, and to establish a humanistic scheme of life, with man and his self-deification in the centre of the picture. This eventful movement, with its dynamic motives and capacity for rationalisation, represented the transition from Divine sanction of the culture pattern, to human rationality, and from the rigid and closed social scheme, to the open social pattern of *laisser faire* and liberal enterprise. The psychological vacuum resulting from such a process of uprooting man from his inward conception of life as a whole, was to a considerable extent compensated for, by the joyful sense of emancipation from the fixed structure of history, by the equal opportunity of achievement, by the feeling of the victory over the authoritative tradition, by technical superiority over nature, and by the proud consciousness of power over the outward conditions of existence. Furthermore, although
the sense of security inspired by the religious conception, - with its stability of permanence and unquestionable conviction - had been lost, a substitute was found in the political sanctity projected on to the state constitution, with its rationalistic sanction of "social contract" and "general will". Thus the transition from religious synthesis to political synthesis was facilitated, on the one hand by capitalistic expansion and accomplishment, and on the other by the self-active Western voluntarism and philosophy. With the Christian mode of valuation in the background, the Western mind has been drawing upon the rich and fertile sources of the Greco-Roman heritage. While the pragmatic attitude - bequeathed to the Western mind by the Roman disposition assisted the democratic institution in the task of commanding civic reverence and responsibility: the development and elaboration of the Greek attitude of aesthetic contemplation - with its world of rationalism and idealism - contributed towards the elevation of man to the semi-spiritual plane, and towards placing the sanctity of the political constitution upon the dignity of man as a rational
being. Hence political morality was ideologically formulated in the liberal principle of Bentham, and in "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" through the protection of freedom, equality of opportunity, and the fair play of individual interests. Based upon and sanctioned by the presupposed rationality of the individual, this capitalistic scheme in its democratic form imparted to the conception of the State such value and significance as to make it the unifying principle, the vehicle of reason, the source of security, and the chief power for securing internal and external possibilities for the vigorous and adventurous spirit of liberal and progressive enterprise. But in spite of its brilliant success, of its valuable contribution to the cause of civilization, this capitalistic liberal nationalism gave rise to a conspicuous reaction of internationalism. Those who had the ability to participate in this economic individualism, either in its actual activity, or in its administration, were too preoccupied to reflect upon the ideological philosophy of such
a régime. But the average worker, who was losing his soul without gaining the world, felt the frustration of ambition in the face of open opportunity, the spiritual vacuity caused by detachment from the inner foundation of life. Thus the political ethics of this reaction was ideologically formulated upon the dignity, not of human rationality, but of human labour, with its Marxian principle and its unifying capacity.

The concept of freedom in the form of democratic representation and unrestricted individual economic activities, and the class structure this implied, tended to create a degree of disillusionment with the rationality of the capitalistic system, and with its institutional arrangements. This resulted in dividing political thought and activities into "right" and "left", that is to say, on the one side the liberal tendency, with its orientation towards freedom of action, based upon the assumption of man's rationality, and on the other side the socialistic tendency, with its orientation towards collective security, based upon comprehensive planning and
positive equality of social rights as well as social obligations. The conflict between these two tendencies constituted the political and social perspective of the Western world. This conflict was crystallised by the economic complications of the nineteenth century, and gave expression to the idea of socialism with its communal sentiment and moral appeal - in direct opposition to the idea of individual freedom and the competitive spirit of capitalism. The formation of these two ideological tendencies was conditioned by the actual struggle, first, against the rigidity of the medieval structure, and, secondly, against the rising middle class with its capitalistic influence and industrial domination. Western political life manifested its thought and activity within these two ideological tendencies, and the ethical balance presented a class attitude ranging from avowed conservatism, through moderate liberalism, to avowed socialism. Hence, behind the demand for freedom and the demand for security, the living synthesis of economic interest, has been acting and reacting upon the democratic
institution affecting and being affected by the national and international current of events. Further, this ideological tension presented itself in the sphere of social ethics as a division between two theses: on the one hand, the negative justice of a free and open social pattern, and on the other, the positive justice of a secure and rigid social scheme. But this tension appears to have assumed a somewhat different character and complexion, since the rise as world powers, of the Soviet Union, and the U.S.A., the former claiming to stand for socialistic ethics and to represent the ideological orientation towards social justice, the latter claiming to stand for individualistic ethics, and to represent the democratic justice of free economic activities. With such two powers, each representing one ideological extremity, the problem has transferred its significance and emphasis from the sphere of social ethics, to the sphere of national self-preservation. And here, international relations, together with national historical traditions, social factors, national outlooks, material
potentialities, and spiritual matrices, began to play an appreciable role in determining the attitude, either towards the extreme of individualistic ethics, or towards the extreme of socialistic ethics.

However, whether in an individualistic or a socialistic form, or in the form of a middle course of social democracy, the main current of modern politics came to point in one direction in the direction of immediate outward existence. That is to say, the whole tendency was directed towards raising the material standard of the masses, either on the ground of their electoral capacity, or as the legitimate owners of the means of production. Thus economic forces became increasingly the formative power in most departments of life, to such an extent as to permit this phase to be termed the "Economic Age", the age of the utilitarian valuation of life or of the material interpretation of economic determinism.

Within the Muslim world, the concept of freedom, particularly freedom of economic activity with its political implications, emerged and
developed in a different atmosphere from that of the Western world. The medieval pattern of Europe, characterised by its rigid structure, its fixed status of man, its inherited rights and privileges, did not establish itself in the Muslim world as it did in the West. The Muslim world received the Western concept of economic and political freedom, devoid of its actual pressure against the Medieval background, divested of its living synthesis, and detached from its triumphant outlook, and hence this concept became effective in Muslim society, only by virtue of its close connection with Western success and with Western material expansion and overpowering domination. Nevertheless, even without its original motive force and power of actuality, this concept of freedom had such an impact upon Muslim thought, as to transform the political aspiration and to remould the ideological disposition. But while freedom in its constitutional form of democratic representation originated in the West, as the effect of creative energy and progressive development towards mastery over nature,
and dominion over outward conditions of life, in the Muslim world it came to be adopted, not as the effect but as the cause of, a progressive orientation, and as the means of challenging and improving existing social and human conditions.

This process of turning away from the theocentric pattern of culture, and adopting Western political institutions solely because of their connection with Western material success, was a most significant feature in the modern development of Muslim ideology. Instead of being inwardly unified by a common tradition, a common conviction, a common spiritual conception of nature and history, and by a common belief in fate or destiny, the Muslim community came, under Western influence to be moved merely by a vague aspiration and striving towards Western political rationality. In the sphere of politics therefore the human aspiration seemed to thrust aside history with its permanent, static form of culture, in order to embrace the Western dynamic attitude towards the world of nature and human progress. The concept of civic state thus came to the fore, expressing the political
sentiments newly acquired through the encounter with the West - sentiments towards humanistic modes of valuation based upon the summation of reason.

In this direction the spiritual content of life together with the practical ideal which was inherent in the emotional organisation of the Islamic culture, and sanctioned by the conceptual structure of the religious synthesis, was exposed to, and affected by, the prestige suggestion of Western ideology. Whereas, the process of transition from a theocentric culture to an ethnocentric civilisation, occurred in the Western world as a specific development of life, yet in the Muslim world, it took the form of a mental attitude inspired and motivated by mere national ambition, and sheer political aspiration. Thus the absence of a creative and living synthesis behind the democratic institution in the Muslim world, tended to give the process of transition different characteristics from those which it assumed in Western democracy. The consequence was the creation in Islamic culture of a conflict,
partly latent, partly open, between the traditional element of ruling through divinely sanctioned power, and the Western element of ruling through reason.

Hence by adopting the rational freedom of the West, the supra-rational conception of human life as a whole, tended to lose for the Muslim world a significant feature of its spiritual character - the feature of the practical ideal with its theocentric morality, and timeless mode of valuation. This departure from the practical ideal of the Islamic synthesis involved a sense of resignation to, and recognition of, Western rationality and superiority, while at the same time in face of Western domination, the Muslim world tended sub-consciously to hold fast to its religious heritage, deriving from its historical legacy a spiritual self-assertion and self-preservation. This attitude of mental submission towards the Western institution of rational freedom, of outward dominion over nature, on the one hand, and on the other, the inner necessity of maintaining spiritual self-assertion by recourse
to the realm of history, gave rise in the Muslim world to a cultural antithesis, thus intensifying the ambivalence towards Western civilisation, and consequently sharpening the inward division of social and national ideology.

Being adopted only as a mental attitude, and through mere ambition towards a vague progressive orientation, the conception of the civic state with its democratic institutions was not for the Muslim world a vital life movement, capable of extending itself over the whole of life, and imparting its specific form to a scheme of values comprised by such a movement. The concept of freedom in Western Europe infused into the conception of the state three main principles: the first, political, aspiring towards national power and domination, the second democratic, inspiring towards participation of individuals in the process of government, the third economic, aspiring towards the elevation of the material standard of the masses as independent units constituting the rational structure of the state. The synthesis underlying this constitutional pattern comprised
the European achievement, and touched with its formative influence every department of Western activity, thereby fulfilling more hopes than it frustrated. For the Muslim world the concept of political freedom lacked the vital spirit of the Western synthesis, and hence its development took a different form and assumed different features. Instead of being a self-active movement towards power, rational organisation and material advancement, the concept of freedom assumed for the Muslim mind a dual character intimating liberation from history and liberation from Western domination and intervention. Having this dual character of releasing the present from the past, and freeing the present also from the Western powers, and at the same time lacking the formative synthesis of enhancing the vitality of life, the concept of freedom for the Muslim world underwent a severe limitation and paralysing conflict. In this way not only has this concept been arrested and prevented from developing upon a purely humanistic line of thought and evolving upon a healthy sentiment, but it has also presented
the Muslim world with a highly complicated situation and sharp unconscious tension.

This appears to have resulted in dividing the concept of freedom against itself, on the one hand, freedom from history and tradition, and on the other, from Western superiority, and interference. The former implied enthusiastic admiration for the Western political institutions, whilst the latter implied a sharp antipathy towards the Westerners, and a struggle against their intrusion. That is to say, freedom from history involved the departure from an all-embracing Islamic synthesis, with its firm foundation, secure conviction and spiritual self-assertion; at the same time, freedom from the West demanded and necessitated the tenacious retention of such cultural synthesis, as the source of spiritual power against the West, and as a means of moral self-preservation.

This dual character and disorientation of freedom, and its division between liberation from historical authority, and liberation from Western influence, has had the effect of disturbing
the main current of ideology, thus causing it to oscillate between theocentric stability and progressive rationality, between spiritual authoritarianism and dynamic Western democracy. The impulse to democratic institutions however, has come to acquire in the Muslim world enthusiastic acceptation, and has been adopted in one form or another, according to the circumstantial situation of each Muslim country.

In contrast to this mental acceptation, the Western European democratic institution itself, was founded upon the assumption of a timeless Reason existing in reality and existing also in each individual, and on the assumption that through democratic exercise of individual freedom, human society can secure mastery of the good and the true. Resting upon the philosophy of the Enlightenment, and supported by the optimistic spirit of economic and national expansionism, the concept of freedom developed in the West upon a semi-spiritual and absolute mode of valuation. But deprived of this substantial synthesis and of its living philosophy, the concept of political
freedom has lost within the Muslim world its vitality and moving spirit, thus becoming arrested in development and profoundly inflicted with a paralysing ambivalent relationship towards Western civilisation.

The cultural antithesis created by such ambivalence, with its contradictory relationship which commanded on the one hand, profound respect for, and idealisation of, Western institution of democratic freedom, and on the other, stimulated a sentiment of antipathy and distrust of Westerners - this cultural antithesis came to confuse and disturb the inner continuity of history and tradition. By adopting the Western concept of freedom in its political form, the Muslim mind was consciously expressing open admission of the superiority of the democratic institution to the practical ideal of the Islamic synthesis, whilst subconsciously adhering to the theocentric and ultimate foundation of its own culture. This procedure of replacing the spiritual jurisdiction by the Western constitution and law, involved the actual demolition of an integral part of the theocratic foundation of the Islamic synthesis.
Such a situation has an inherent contradiction in that, on the one hand, it involves glorification of the cultural synthesis and its historical ideal, while on the other subconsciously denying it any superiority to the Western political institution. This contradiction has therefore forced anxiety and instability upon the Muslim consciousness, thus disturbing the trend of application of European democracy. As a consequence of incorporating the Western institution in respect of form rather than of content, that is to say, devoid of its Medieval matrix, originative forces, substantial accomplishment and modern philosophy, this institution assumed a pale and lifless character of mere rules, laws and formulae. This, moreover, uprooted the cultural standard of valuation from the theocratic conception of life as a whole, without being able to strike a deep root in the Western rationality. The imperative conviction upon which a standard of valuation must be rooted became insecure through this cultural antithesis, and through the division between the spiritual conception of life as a whole, and a
rational formulation of one aspect of life.

The existential tendency of the Islamic synthesis, with its practical ideal, was spiritually favourable to the materialistic attitude towards life and towards man's immediate sense-existence. This existential element, with its religious modernism, tended to reduce the resistance to the materialistic outlook of Western civilisation. Further, in contrast to the Medieval background of Europe, the practical ideal of Islam was not unfavourable to equality of opportunity and free individual activity. In reality, therefore, the application of the Western concept of freedom in the Muslim world was not capable of introducing drastic change in the actual conditions of life, as it had done in the West, and thus it did not enjoy that spirit of self-assertion against a confining and rigid background, which it had possessed in Europe, nor was it heightened by victory and control over nature. Moreover, the process of Westernizing the underlying ideal of political and social ethics, resulted in waving aside the cultural continuation, with its religious tradition
and spiritual authority, bringing to the forefront instead the careerist politicians, bureaucratic middle class, and quasi-Westernized intelligensia, and thus breaking the continuity of the inner history and the collective cultural experience. Hence, the transposition from a spiritual to a rational conception of life implied a breach of inward continuity, without being balanced by outward power and achievement.

This departure from the inner synthesis of culture had the effect of shaking that theocentric conception in which the standard of political and social ethics had originated. Meanwhile the experience of democratic institutions lacked the vital interest behind the formation of political parties, besides being based upon a conviction contradictory to the fundamental conviction of the ultimate cultural synthesis. Consequently, the inward detachment from the foundation of culture, the outward frustration of failing to achieve dominion over nature, and increasing consciousness of austerity, combined to create a spiritual vacuum and a consciousness of insecurity.
as well as marked inclinations towards dependence upon the state and public institutions.

The theo-centric structure of life, with its imperative conviction, receded to the cultural background as something irrelevant to the new mode of rational valuation and the dynamic progress of modern civilisation. Depriving man of his inner solidarity and making him increasingly dependent upon the outward environment, such a process tended to produce a type of inward poverty and material discontent. The spiritual insecurity attendant upon the loss of inner independence without the compensating acquisition of the Western content of material civilisation, with its joyous sense of power and rationality, created in the Muslim world an experience of partial ideology, together with conflicting orientation. Under such circumstances of inner insecurity, and outward discontent neither the Muslim historical ideal, nor the ideal of democratic progress, was capable of coming to figure as an end in itself, and thereby commanding the whole life and energy/steering it into formative activities.
This position of uncertainty with regard to history, and incapacity to strike out on a new path towards universal rationality, magnified both the soulless and powerless character of the democratic institution, with its concept of freedom and its negative and positive influence upon the emotional organisation of Islamic culture. Hence the abandonment of the practical ideal of history with its foundation of universal validity, and theocentric axiomatic certitude, in favour of rational freedom and constitutional stability, resulted in a spiritual impoverishment, thus disclosing the gap between political ambition, and the actual capacity of life. The relation to the West together with its ambivalent attitude towards Western superiority, has been effectively operative in reducing in the Muslim world its inner independence, and in stimulating within its consciousness the life impulse towards material advancement and response to the immediate external forms of existence. The undercurrent realisation of a diminishing spiritual reality, together with the undercurrent recognition of the inadequacy of progressive reason,
tended to provoke a tide of reaction in two directions: the one, purely spiritual, the other purely material. In this way the spiritual insecurity, together with the material discontent, gave rise to a type of disillusionment with the Western concept of individualistic rational freedom, while at the same time the conception of the state, as the centre of gravity, with its relevant form of political and social ethics, were retained as the nucleus of progressive activities.

Ideologically, the reaction to the frustrating experience of Western democratic institution, appeared to assume in the Muslim world, two apparently conflicting characters, both however, pointing mainly in the same direction, and motivated by the same consciousness of cultural antithesis. The first tendency of this reaction reveals the disposition towards "history", with its spiritual security and authoritarian tradition, whereas, the second reveals the disposition towards a "futuristic" progress, with its dynamic materialism and scientific objectivity. In the form of religious organisations, the first reflects the nostalgic sentiments
towards the historical ideal, representing it in the form of a comprehensive synthesis capable of overcoming the present situation with its antithetical elements. The second, in a Marxist form, reflects the impulsive sentiments towards a futuristic ideal, representing it in the form of an all-embracing synthesis, capable of overcoming present contradictions with its material universality. In response to the inner necessity, together with the emotional continuity with its traditional authority, the former ideological tendency demanded the sentimentalization of history, and the spiritualization of the conception of the state, in such a manner as to place the dignity of man upon the infinite value of his soul, thus reconciling the fundamentals of Islam with the requirements of progressive civilisation.

In contrast to this, the latter ideological tendency demanded absolute departure from history, with its static elements and timeless mode of valuation, sentimentalising technological advancement and dynamic progress, and thus resting the dignity of man, on his capacity for objective
movement and collective mastery over nature.

However, the motive and objective of the two ideological tendencies have mainly been the product of the inner impulse to restore to the Muslim world the disposition of self-assertion against the superior position of Western rationality and materialism. Being thus formulated and developed in isolation and far from the sphere of government, with its stern reality of pressure and compromise, these two ideological trends serve to satisfy the social propensity for extreme idealisation, and therefore accumulated - partly on their own merit, and partly through the unfulfilled promises of Western democracy - a considerable spiritual and emotional impetus. The spiritual tendency, with its appeal to religious tradition and the historical prestige, tended to relieve the Muslim consciousness from the painful admission of Western superiority in the sphere of jurisdiction and administration, through the attempt to revive the practical ideal of the Islamic synthesis, thereby promising a divine security and restoration to the privileged position
of power and prosperity.

In its ideological function and popular appeal, this tendency has been able to command reverence and to stimulate enthusiasm, on the one hand through alleviating the ambivalence towards the West, and on the other, through the attempt to mitigate the pessimism resulting from the discrepancy between inner aspiration and outward resistance. With its modernised conception of justice, its promise of spiritual and material salvation, its intrinsic relationship to the inner structure of history, its capacity for affirming life in the face of inviting possibilities, and negating it in the face of inevitable despair and inflexible fate, this religious orientation came to acquire an effective position and commanding character. Within the context of its emotional atmosphere, the tension between the requirement of history as a source of moral self-preservation on the one side, and the requirement of a progressive impetus, and rational civilisation on the other, seemed happily overcome by means of the application of the Islamic synthesis (with its
theocratic justice) in such a way as to act as an inward motivation towards outward expansion.

It is not without significance that the ideological reaction to Western civilisation took the form, not of the mystical tendency of Islam, with its benevolent love and tranquil surrender, but of the existential tendency, with its practical ideal and theocratic self-affirmative disposition. By making the attempt to re-establish the inner conviction with history, this tendency appeared to have been a mere process of self-recolletion, motivated by, and aspiring towards a farther phase of Westernisation.

The unstable experiment of the democratic institution, with its unfulfilled aims, and its inadequacy in the direction of progress, expressed the painful alienation from the ultimate foundation of culture, thus pressing to the surface the need for a basic conviction capable of introducing a commanding standard of valuation, to replace the rational standard of Western democracy.

Nevertheless, although this tendency is ideologically apt to smooth away the cultural antithesis by its emotional enthusiasm, in reality
it has only concealed the antithesis rather than overcome it, by a comprehensive synthesis. By thus drawing upon a Western mode of valuation, by its adherence to the principle of the civic state as the centre of power and social justice, by its ambition towards raising the average level of life, by its favourable disposition towards technical advancement, this religious tendency reduced itself to a mere ideological attempt to spiritualize the main features of Western civilisation, at the same time presenting these features in an agreeable and divinely sanctioned form. Furthermore, the fact of being attended by the effort to modernize and translate the practical ideal of Islam into Western activities, does suggest that the tendency is not an intrinsic and self-active movement, capable of standing as an end in itself, reflecting the inner continuity of history; but is rather a spiritual method for achieving the content of Western civilisation in a native form. Consequently, as a mere compulsive reaction it has only endeavoured to recover the spiritual standard of valuation, in order to meet
the requirement of Western Utilitarianism of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Hence, it does not lie in its power to overcome the ambivalent attitude towards the West.

Meanwhile, if the religious tendency was disposed to base Western Utilitarianism upon the theocentric standard of valuation, the Marxist tendency was inclined rather to break away entirely from the metaphysical tradition, and base its political ethics upon man's right to practical satisfaction in his relations with his immediate environment.

Although differing in their manner and direction, both tendencies seem to be the result of the same psychological mechanism, initiated by the ambivalent position towards the advance of Western civilisation. But whereas the religious trend sought to combine spiritual security with material satisfaction, the Marxist trend sought to replace the spiritual security by extremist ambition towards practical security, by means of collective and joyous achievement of material improvement and progress.
Furthermore, the two tendencies thus appeared to be affected by disillusionment with the Western concept of freedom, but the religious one reacted by having recourse to the spiritual authoritarianism in the form of a modernised conception of the state, whilst the Marxist reacted by having recourse to the authoritarian collectivism of socialistic obligation. At the same time, the two ideological streams are charged with the same ambition characteristic of the modern Western way of life, in its devotion to the end of promoting immediate human well-being. Apart, therefore, from its ideological passion, the Marxist tendency, like the religious, has reduced itself to a mere method for achieving a Western life-content in an anti-Western form. But in its ideological capacity, this tendency seemed to conceal the cultural antithesis resulting from the ambivalence towards the West, not by resting the progressive impulse upon a historical foundation, as the religious trend inclined to do, but rather by deriving its moral confidence from the success of the Russian experiment, and from the
Eastern antagonistic outlook towards the West. Further, with its materialistic interpretation of history, Marxism has been apt to relieve the tension between the demand of culture and the requirements of progressive civilisation, by relegating the authority of history, together with the absolute mode of valuation, to the stern reality of economic determinism, thereby alleviating the social consciousness of the specific responsibilities associated with the cultural complications of particular situations. By transferring the position of value from the realm of the spiritual and the rational, to the sphere of economic interactions, it seemed capable of soothing away the anxiety caused by uprooting the standard of valuation from the cultural soil, and thus relieving political thought, of the confusion and complexity of metaphysics and abstract reflection. Likewise, through its dogmatic conviction of conceiving social consciousness, with its ideas and values, as a mere formal product of the underlying economic patterns and interests, the process of national and social conflict came
to assume a systematised character, and to take
the form of an all-embracing conception, capable
of satisfying the human need for a dogmatic
systematisation.

By virtue of its self-evident material
attraction, its moral appeal of communal security,
its emotional satisfaction of promising practical
freedom from want, Marxism tended ideologically
to alleviate Muslim consciousness of national in-
dignation by basing the dignity of man upon a
supra-racial, and supra-national level, and through
reducing the superiority of Western power to a
mere class conflict, in respect of the surplus
value of productive forces. Hence, as an ideologi-
cal trend, Marxism constituted a political senti-
ment capable of covering the ambivalence towards
the West and thus concealing the cultural anti-
thesis, rather than overcoming it by intrinsic
and comprehensive synthesis. But, in spite of its
semi-spiritual optimism in trusting the process
of social change to inflexible economic laws and
formulae, in spite of its moral appeal of social-
istic ethics, the Marxist movement has been gathering
force, not from the vital interest of productive elements in Muslim society, but rather from the compulsive reaction against the West, together with the decreased vitality of the concept of the democratic system, as well as from the ambition towards the Western content of life. Thus in the sphere of practical morality, the impact of Western expansion has manifested itself in the process of detaching the Muslim mind from the traditional authority, and charging it with the aspiration towards the deliberate arrangement of social conditions - a deliberate arrangement based upon conscious rationality. Being formulated as a mental attitude, and not as a specific development of life, and being fostered by the ambivalent attitude towards the West, this aspiration for rational freedom gave rise to a highly complicated psychological mechanism, with respect to the formation of practical ideology.

Under the impact of the West, the present situation of the Muslim world has been placed between history, on the one hand, with its unconscious values, and on other the aspiration towards
a conscious mode of valuation. In other words, between the theocentric emotional organisation and the ethnocentric rational organisation of human society, through the autonomy of reason and its regulative capacity.

As a result of the lack of the Western back-ground of philosophical interpretation, combined with the absence of a vital social interest behind the formation of political parties, and being externally directed against Western domination, the rational concept of freedom served to arouse in the Muslim world an under-current realisation of a deep division, and sharp antithesis. Nevertheless, the enthusiastic admiration for the main features of Western life, remained the centre of gravity, whilst the ambition towards Western rationality, receded ideologically into the back-ground. Hence the foundation for political ethics, has become operative particularly after it began to be felt that the concept of freedom was pale, shadowy, and unreal. Hence the return to history in its religious form, does not seem to be a self-active relationship to the ultimate foundation of
culture, but rather a subsidiary trend, motivated by the Western concept of progress.

In a similar vein, the Marxist reaction to the Western concept of freedom tended to satisfy the ambivalence towards the West. The emotion (for) the West was satisfied by maintaining the substantial feature of Western progress, as an end in itself, while the emotion (against) the West was satisfied by rejecting the Western form of rational arrangements. In this connection, the emphasis was transferred from a specific conflict with the West, to a universal class struggle, and thereby the rational superiority of Western culture, together with its material power, was explained away, as a mere by-product of economic determinism.

Hence, the two ideological streams can be seen as the consequences of the concept of freedom being arrested in development, thus creating in the Muslim consciousness, a spiritual vacuum and material discontent. Both tendencies, retained the Western feature of concentrating upon man's relationship to his immediate environment,
the religious tendency leaning towards history for a regulative standard of valuation, in the form of individualistic ethics, based upon a modernised practical ideal of Islam. The Marxist tendency on the other hand, leaned towards the Russian experiment for its regulative standard of valuation in the form of socialistic ethics, based upon the futuristic prospect of man's dominion over nature and his imperative right and obligation.

Henceforward, the absence of a living synthesis behind the concept of freedom in the Muslim world resulted in disturbing the inner current of the practical morality of Islam, and in giving rise to two modes of valuation - one purely spiritual, basing the morality of political and economic life upon a religious foundation, the other purely material, basing the practical morality upon the foundation of immediate satisfaction and communal security. The value-judgement, therefore, with respect to the problem of social re-organisation came to be under the influence of Western utilitarianism, without possessing either
its motive force or its rational solidarity of organisation. In addition to the national and international factors, with their psychological and social nature, the impulse towards Western utilitarianism, without possessing its living synthesis, tended ideologically to drive the practical morality in the Muslim world to a direct, dogmatic and tangible foundation, either in the form of theocracy, with its individualistic ethics, or in the form of materialism, with its socialistic ethics.

Along with the development of the capitalistic civilisation, the Western concept of freedom has been operative in practically every department of modern European thought and activity. The transition from an authoritative theocentric conception of the universe as a whole, has been an integral part of the Western life-movement, with its material advance on one side, and on the other its cultural and spiritual resistance to the impact of this material advance upon the position of value. In its religious form, the concept of freedom assumed neither the impulsive character of breaking away entirely from
the inner traditional structure of life, nor of departing from the inward synthesis of history with its ethico-religious and emotional organisation. The pantheistic mode of thought—with its spiritualisation of nature, intellectual joy and love, and its disposition towards immanence—was in itself a manifestation of the extrovert attitude of the modern spirit, and of its orientation towards the external world in such a manner as to project the inward spirituality on to the immediate form of existence and sense experience, thus retaining the equilibrium between the inner continuity of history and the outward character of modern life.

As a conspicuous feature of the life-process of the Western Spirit, the Reformation came to express the general tendency towards individualisation, together with the modern human attitude towards transferring the emphasis from authoritative tradition, over to the soul of the individual. In this connection, the concept of freedom tended to harmonise with the specific development of the main current of Western life. Although the inner unity of the ecclesiastical
scheme of existence was openly undermined through a religious schism, spiritual faith retained its position within the individual as a moral order capable of counteracting, to a considerable extent, the tide of the self-conscious dynamic progress of material civilisation. On the other hand, the departure from the universality of Catholicism was psychologically compensated for by the joyous sense of individual liberation, the sympathetic relation to nature, the consciousness of power over the conditions of life, and by enthusiastic confidence in political institutions and national ambition, and superiority. The relationship of man to God, together with his relationship to the universe as a whole, became direct, and accordingly the concept of religious freedom constituted a salient feature of the transition from an authoritative theocentric conception of life, to a humanistic pattern of individual and spiritual independence. In spite of the increasing dominion over nature, in spite of the accumulation of facts in the sphere of matter and life, and in spite of the utilitarian
and rational interpretation connected with the intellectualisation of morality, the ethico-religious background of the Western spirit persisted (although on the defensive) in sheltering a value judgement against the reflective and passionless curiosity of the scientific attitude. Although the organised curiosity of Western Science has forced upon the Western consciousness a new picture of the universe incompatible with that presented by the theocentric conception, it has likewise, through realising human limitations and the infinitude of nature, contributed indirectly towards inspiring intellectual humility and thus allowing the co-existence of opposite, but not opposed, conceptions of the two worlds of facts and values. Thus, although in harmony with the individualising process characteristic of the modern Western orientation, the concept of religious freedom came to undermine the authoritative validity of the traditional picture with its all-embracing unity, nevertheless this tended to elevate the Western spirituality from the plane of temporal activities and actual pressure, to the plane of intrinsic self-value and the pure ideal
of personal relationships. While the religious authority conceded the central point of life to the political authority, the former had to draw more and more upon its timeless resources and to recover its self-active appropriation of spiritual truth in the face of dynamic movement, restless curiosity, and the ever-changing atmosphere of intellectualism. In spite of frequent and relentless attacks upon religion—which by virtue of their passionate nature, psychologically signify attachment to religion, rather than detachment—religion, as a spontaneous part of the life-movement, has been striving to secure the inner relationship with history, and to maintain the metaphysical foundation of the ethico-religious conception of humanity.

Being one of the three elements constituting the background of Western development—the aesthetic attitude of Greece, the pragmatic attitude of the Romans, and the ethical attitude of the Hebrews—being one of these three elements, religion in its conflict with the other two life-attitudes reflected a struggle over the degree
of emphasis, rather than over the replacement of one by the other. Although the interchange of emphasis between these three inherent elements has been a source of moral crises, not only within the individual soul, but also within the social structure, such moral crises appear to have been a manifestation of the life process, each of its component elements aspiring towards predominance. But the predominance of one of these three life-attitudes is determined by the mode and character of each phase of European history, according to the degree of its demand for a religious, aesthetic, or pragmatic outlook and interpretation.

As has been previously stated, the encounter of Islamic culture with Western civilisation, has mainly been on a material and technological plane. On this plane the West has exercised upon the Muslim consciousness an unrivalled superiority and unchallenged prestige. Under the influence of the irreflective enthusiasm for the Western concept of progress, and through the process of evaluating practically every Western
movement according to the standard of physical science and material technology, the Muslim mind abandoned the theocentric side of the Islamic synthesis in favour of Western political institutions. But being an all-embracing synthesis, (all God's and nothing Caesar's), the Islamic synthesis as a cultural foundation seemed to have been inaccessible to the Western concept of religious freedom with its compromise and separation of state and church. Thus, on account of the indivisibility of the Islamic synthesis, the conception of the political state in the Muslim world came to foster two extreme forms of ideological reaction: a purely theocentric and a purely atheistic one.

The concept of religious freedom in the West tended to signify a departure from the authoritative form of universal validity, while retaining the fundamental spiritual content of the religious faith, and thus maintaining a relationship with history in an individual form, rather than in a form of hierarchical representation. In this way, the timeless element, with its coherent synthesis
of Western spirituality, came to lose only in respect of practical authority, whilst gaining in self-composure and self-concentration. In other words, the religious concept of freedom as an integral part of self-active movement, diminished in significance to mere endeavour towards individual independence of authority and hierarchical organisation. Assisted in this task by the formative life-energy and power of actuality, together with the Greco-Roman background, this Western movement was expressive of the modern tendency to break away from the form of history, while at the same time maintaining the fundamental content of its perspective, that is to say, of the Greek and Roman heritage.

Although Islamic culture at its height struggled to integrate the Greek philosophy with its mental activity and to inject the conceptual structure of its religious synthesis with logical formalism, the reality of the Greek life-attitude underlying this logic and philosophy proved to lie beyond mere scholastic and mental curiosity. In spite of its intrinsic value, the Greek logic
was by no means the active force behind the brilliant Greek achievement, but rather the characteristic form of the Greek life-content, together with its contemplative and aesthetic attitude towards the reality of things. This profound attitude was in essence the psychological reality of the Greek representation of life as a harmonious whole, an aesthetic order, and a unique work of art. Through this conception of reality, the Greek disposition came to revolt against any notion of disharmony, and created as a result, a world of form over that of matter, in which its ideal of harmony was to be imaginatively expressed and idealistically realised. Likewise, through this conception of reality, logical formulae have been originated in order effectively to arm the universe of thought and discourse against possible contradiction.

The classic encounter of Islamic culture with the Greek heritage resulted in the former absorbing the philosophy of the Greeks without attaining to their inherent life-attitude and emotional background. Being profoundly based
upon the theocentric emotional organisation, and upon a Semitic apperception, the aesthetic sense of Islamic culture was not capable of harmonising with the artistic attitude underlying Greek logic and philosophy. Henceforward, Islamic literature and art remained in the main true to the Arabic tradition, and faithful to the Semitic apperception except when the mystical tendency of Islam fused with Neo-Platonism in reacting against the existential tendency of Islamic theocracy. The Greek element, therefore tended to lose, within the context of the Islamic heritage, its capacity for inspiring aesthetic judgement, thus failing to revolutionise the Muslim emotion and disposition towards the concept of beauty, as in the case of modern Western art and literature. Hence, when the theocentric emotional organisation constituting the Muslim world came to relax, through the modern encounter with the West on a material plane, the process of relaxation has been apt to give rise to an acute consciousness of inward poverty, and outward impotence, thereby disturbing the balance of value judgement and confusing the relationship
with history. In the West, the situation has been psychologically different. When the life-process began to transfer the main emphasis from the theocentric emotional organisation to the outward form of existence, the Western spirit had within its cultural background the latent, but living, Greek life-attitude to draw upon for inspiration. By drawing upon this life-attitude as a source of aesthetic inspiration, the Western spirit, in some measure, counteracted the impersonal scientific picture of the universe through the development of the aesthetic sense so presenting nature and experience as endowed with Romantic soul, and thereby preserving, to a considerable extent the inner content of history.

The aesthetic attitude inherent in Western culture, with its rational manifestation and disposition towards harmony, and its endeavour to maintain a sympathetic relationship between subject and object, tended to balance and alleviate the process of liberation from the authoritative and theocentric medieval conception of reality. With its philosophical and artistic integration this aesthetic element of Greece served to provide the
Western spirit with a basic unification in relation to the measure of reality, and the standard of good, beauty, and truth. Through the assistance of such an inherent attitude and through its capacity for unification, the Western disposition has, in the main, been able to retain stability of value-judgement, and a sense of proportion with regard to the problem of the relationship to nature and history, thus counter-balancing the impulse of freedom from the religious emotional organisation by the unifying function of aesthetic and rational integration.

Even though it exhibited throughout the logical and philosophical features of Greek thought, the Islamic heritage, as represented in art and literature, remained dominated by the theocentric attitude, and by the Semitic apperception, and thus was incapable of enlivening the Greek life-attitude underlying these logical and philosophical features. Hence, in its "renaissance" and "enlightenment" under the impact of the West, the Muslim world has been placed between a spiritual theocentric history and Western materialism; that is to say, between a religious emotional background and an imperfectly balanced conception of Western progress.
Through this sharp division, between axiomatic certainty and unstable mental attitude, the Muslim psychology, ideologically speaking, has been inclined either, to the extravagant defence of the historical ideal against the West, or to an excessive departure from this ideal in order to emulate the West in its material advancement. In consequence, the standard of valuation has become either purely theocentric or purely material, since there was no foundation for any middle course. Divested of its indigenous attitude, the Greek element manifested in Islamic culture, was not capable of balancing the concept of freedom from the religious theocentric organisation, and thus could not provide the rational foundation for an equilibrium between ideological extremes.

Thus the aesthetic element in the Muslim world—with its disposition towards philosophical and artistic integration, and with its capacity for psychological unification together with its idealistic presentation of life and experience—has suffered under the impact of the West a shallowing confusion and division between, adherence
to the historical ideal, and rootless emulation of the Western tradition. Through the nature of the encounter with the West, Western aestheticism has the strong appeal of Western superiority, while the cultural heritage has an appeal of self-evident originality and moral self-preservation. Especially in the Arabic speaking world - on account of its inherent linguistic relationship 1) to history with its psychological implications - the conflict of the historical literary ideal, with the attempt at emotional westernisation, appears to be one of the main factors operative behind the symptomatic manifestation of social perplexities and collision of standards. Western aestheticism is rootless and is evaluated according to the standard of prestige - suggestion of Western

1) The absence of this inherent linguistic relationship to history in the case of Turkey with neither the privileged participation of Persia in Islamic culture, nor the challenge of Hinduism in Pakistan, seemed to have rendered Turkey more capable than other Islamic countries of overcoming the cultural resistance to the process of westernization.
advancement, while a certain fading of confidence in historical aestheticism in comparison with the over-valuated Western ideals is becoming characteristic. Hence neither the traditional ideal nor the Western ideal has come to command the whole aesthetic energy, gaining the position of being an end in itself, and constituting a spontaneous life-movement. Literary practice, therefore, within the Muslim world has been reduced to the exercise of mere rhetorical dexterity, expressing a disorientation of feeling, a division of ideal and the absence of a genuine life-attitude. Such symptoms are to be found in the poetry of Shawqi (the national poet of Egypt), who gives sociological expression to the displacement of the social and individual soul, disclosing the division of sentiment between; loyalty to the inner theocentric unity, and loyalty to the outward national unity of the civil state; between reverence to the Islamic tradition, and reverence to Western progress; between enthusiasm for the literary heritage and enthusiasm for European inspiration; and between lauding Western superiority, and repudiating Western moral
reliability. Through poetic and linguistic ability, he reflected the contradictory and disharmonious elements of old and new, of Western and Oriental, while none of these elements had the power of commanding originality, or of amounting to more than versification of flaring popular sentimentalism. This division between fading shadowy tradition, and rootless innovation, together with the disorientation of the aesthetic attitude and artistic activities, seemed rather to signify the absence of profound "value" — bequeathed by the pure and timeless continuity of history, and invigorated by the original and refined power of nature, — in order, thereby, to intensify the spiritual energy of inward appropriation, to concentrate the emotional vitality of outward assimilation, and to integrate the experience of joy and sorrow, into a personal whole, reflecting upon the sources of life and the realm of contents. The theme of frustration has therefore, through the incapacity for self-realisation, become more than any other theme, characterized by originality, or at least, by its element
of truthfulness.

In the West, the all-embracing process of European life served to revive the aesthetic elements of Greece, with its life-attitude towards harmony and aesthetic unification. This revival stimulated the European disposition towards the external form of existence and outward world of nature, thus giving rise to the movements of Humanism and Romanticism, with their capacity for intensifying and concentrating upon the contrasts of human experience and the sympathetic relation to nature. Side by side with this, the aesthetic attitude worked to produce the rational disposition in order to explain away or alleviate the irresistible contradiction of human existence. Compared with this European background, with its development of thought and emotion, in the Muslim world the theocentric foundation of culture has been the only life-attitude, and the only unifying conception. By conceding superiority to the Western structure of life, the Islamic synthesis exposed its ultimate conviction - with its unifying capacity - to the danger of uncertainty and
possible disintegration. The departure from this ultimate conviction, without a simultaneous transference of the main theocentric emphasis, to the human capacity for aesthetic feeling and rational thought, resulted in the absence of a unified disposition with its living standard of value. Hence the problem of social morality, as well as the problem of political morality, came to oscillate between a pallid theocentric mode of valuation, and a rootless Western mode of valuation. Thus the lack of a unified value-judgement, deep-rooted in a solid and original life-attitude, seemed to have stifled within the Muslim world the sense of proportion, and the capacity for intensified idealisation, for aesthetic and rational achievement, and philosophical interpretation, with the result therefore, of giving rise to a type of extreme valuation, an ideology devoid of a sense of proportion. This situation in which the standard of valuation is detached from the ultimate theocentric conviction of culture without being placed upon the foundation of humanistic thought
and rational integration, has exposed the Muslim mind in the sphere of political and social morality to the danger of the immediate impression of indefinite movement and of formless excitement.

Furthermore, when the Western world tended to shift the emphasis from the cosmic foundation of life with its metaphysical implication, the Western spirit came to take refuge in the practical attitude towards the immediate form of existence, thus converting its latent energy into formative and regulative activities. The Roman element inherent in European culture, with its pragmatic capacity for organisation, was stimulated by the Western process and by its all-embracing tendency towards unfolding the possibilities of nature and realising the potentialities of human life and experience. Thus the freedom of the individual from social and self-regulative value rooted in the traditional emotional structure and sustained by personal relationships of "face to face" group life, this freedom was mitigated in the West through the
revival of the Roman background with traditional discipline and strict organisation. In this way, under the ever-increasing activities of modern life, and under the ever growing conception of the civil state with its impersonal and multiplied points of contact, the unconscious value began to give way to the conscious and deliberate arrangement of society. With the spiritual view of life as a moral order, combined with the background of the philosophical integration of Western aestheticism and rationalism, the Roman attitude in its capacity for civil organisation rose to the task of alleviating the movement of individual freedom and smoothing away the process of transition from unconscious valuation to the deliberate arrangements of social and political institutions. In order to protect society against the individual, that is to say, to protect social morality, based upon the assumption of individual rationality, against the danger of individual rationalisation of passion and desire, modern Western life came to draw upon the pragmatic attitude of the Romans and its
regulative function. With the rise of modern life, the stability of traditionally valid and spiritually sanctioned value, showed a tendency to recede in the face of the growing concept of individual freedom and the impulsive impression of liberation from the rigid Medieval scheme of existence. In these circumstances the imperative need of human nature for inner stability gave rise to the task of replacing the threatened stability of super-rational value by that of rationally sanctified constitutions, laws and formulas. In the Age of individualism and impersonal relationships, this type of stability served to mitigate the danger of the multiplication of individual value-j judgements and excessive subjectivism. The liberation of the individual from the pressure of authority, together with the density of industrial life, came to force upon Western consciousness the imperative necessity of a strict and rigorous sense of organisation and of social re-arrangement. Hence, in spite of recognising the freedom of the individual,
the close union of humanity created by modern urbanisation demanded increasing concentration upon general relationships, and upon the average level of life. The concept of individual freedom, therefore, collided with the demands of the social structure. This collision tended to open up rich sources of social morality, and philanthropic altruism. Besides elevating the level of moral aspiration, this conflict between the right of the individual to freedom, and the demand of the social structure for security, contributed towards heightening the conception of the state and charging its authority with highly ethico-political obligation. However, through the operation of such claims and counter-claims of the individual and society, the margin of freedom conceded to the individual, appeared to be reasonably adequate for developing a type of social morality based upon a civic conception of conduct, as well as upon personal decision. The task of pragmatic organisation necessitated by the close union of industrial organisation— with its impersonal conduct
and interconnection of interests—served to transfer the obligation of the state from the sphere of negative function to that of positive regulation and social justice.

In its capacity of pragmatic re-arrangement the Roman background has been effectively operative behind the Western state, utilising modern methods of communication and annihilation of distance, in this way unifying civic sentiment and fortifying social morality, and thereby contributing towards the consolidation of rational value, against the threat of possible rationalisation of individual passion.

In the Muslim world, the attempt to break away from the unconscious value-judgement, based upon a theocentric attitude of life, had the effect of shaking the inner independence and disturbing the inward life-content, with its sense of belonging and stability. In this way, the favourable reaction to the Western outward manifestation on the part of the existential tendency of Islam, combined with spiritual recession, worked to produce a disposition of inner discontent and
outward dependence. The psychological separation of the individual from the inherent pattern of culture, with neither self-active motives nor outward possibilities of power over nature, contributed towards the decline of spiritual self-confidence and moral reliance, rather than towards the joyous sense of liberty and individual freedom characteristic of the West. This passive "freedom from", with no corresponding positive "freedom to", resulted in individual liberty becoming a state of psychological anxiety and restless activity, rather than one of purposeful and constructive life-movement and creative energy. As a consequence of a recessive spirituality and formless individualism, the concept of freedom has come to imply an inward vacuity and outward frustration and discontent.

Thus the desperate reliance and dependence upon the state, has become increasingly the only refuge from the unstable present and insecure future. Under such a heavy burden of outward dependence on the part of individuals,
the state remained confused by a division between the Western concept of individual freedom, and the growing demand of a helpless society for practical satisfaction and secure conditions of existence. The situation of the state became more difficult through the discrepancy between limited material resources, and unlimited aspirations towards social welfare in addition to an undercurrent of disillusionment with individual freedom. Moreover, the negative function of such individual freedom which developed with the rise of liberal capitalism, began to lose ground, even in the West, to the demand for a positive function and socially comprehensive planning. One of the main factors behind the decline of confidence in the liberal approach to political and social salvation within the Muslim world, has been the absence of the pragmatic life-attitude, with its civic morality and capacity for unification. The deliberate value-judgement of the West was received by the Muslim mind divested of its rational spirit and pragmatic life-content. Not being sustained by the
Greek and Roman elements, the foundation of liberal individualism came to suffer from the pressure of actual necessities, and from the growth of unlimited demands which were excited by Western materialism, while not satisfied by the Western outlook. Thus, the attempt to replace the unconscious value, by conscious rearrangement of human existence, tended to create a conflict between the rule of law and the rule of power, between the dictates of duty, and the dictates of passion, and between demands of principle and demands of expediency. Apart, therefore, from the ideological extremes fermented by such a situation, the transition from the unconscious to the conscious mode of valuation, without the possibility of falling back upon the inner-world of philosophical and pragmatic integration, resulted in reducing the capacity of constitutions and laws for providing the Muslim world with an integral sense of political and social stability.

In addition to this, the process of urbanisation within the Muslim world has been
dissimilar from that of the West; it has produced not a closed union of productive forces, but rather a density of administrative centralisation, consisting in the main of discordant human elements having neither unified background, nor a unified outlook and standard of values, capable of concentrating the moral consciousness, intensifying philanthropic emotions, and directing progressive energy. Hence, unmitigated by pragmatic capacity, progressive creation and rational reflection, the freedom of the individual from the deep-rooted value-judgement - sanctioned by direct apprehension and fortified by the authority of personal relationship - has exposed the Muslim mind to the danger of a transitory impression, formless excitation, subjective self-assertion, craving for change, restless vagaries of fashion, and thirst for modernity. The recession of the inner thought-world of religion, without its unifying function being replaced by the pragmatic and rational mode of thought, tended to inflict individual freedom in the Muslim world with a multiplicity of
standards, thus making freedom of such a nature as to assume a character of impulsive separation from tradition. In consequence, the consciousness of Western superiority served to create a type of modernity opposed to tradition. This modernity was characterised by the superficial craving for the new, and the restless search for the exciting and sensational. Hence the absence of a unifying inner world to modify the process of social individualisation, has caused value-judgements to swing from one extreme to the other, infecting even genuine greatness with vanity. Thus individualism has come largely to signify an outward self-assertion, Epicurean self-gratification. This situation has been contributing towards the distortion of the psychological reality in relation to social individualism, reducing the inherent element of individual self-assertion to a type of subjective self-preserving contempt, or subjective self-elevating admiration and enthusiasm.

With regard to the intellect in its impact upon Islamic culture, the empiricism of
Western civilisation tended to exert more influence than any other department of Western thought and knowledge. Being the prominent and characteristic feature of modern scientific advance, and by virtue of its universal and objective character, together with its self-conscious power over nature, and over the outward form of existence, empiricism - rather than rationalism and idealism - has been for the non-Western world the most effective and influential manifestation of European achievement. Through this tangible and demonstrable world of fact, combined with its ambitious promise to bend the inflexible character of fate, to explain away the mystery of human life, and to present man with dominion over the elemental forces, empiricism exalted itself to a position of independent validity, universal prestige and permanent authority. Its impersonal nature and detachment from the world of emotion contributed towards its strength and ability to overcome cultural resistance, or to reduce such resistance to a mere compulsive reaction against the Western form
of life rather than against the Western life-content. The danger of empiricism, with its destructive curiosity, with its passionless the penetration into/ultimate conception of nature, of life and of human personality, the danger of empiricism with its restless attack upon the integrity of value and upon the intuitive emotional organisation, has been overshadowed by its manifest power of eliminating the barriers of time and space, of relieving the outward necessities and softening the external hardships of human existence. In spite of being the subject of the first attacks of empiricism, Western culture has been capable of offering more resistance to its subsequent penetration than any that outside culture. At the same time/it has developed the empirical tendency, with its capacity for revelation of facts, indication of possibilities and invigoration of life, the Western spirit - although itself the author of empiricism - seems to have been conscious of the imperative task of countering the destructive
force of empiricism by not conceding ultimate validity to its word. Phase by phase, the Western spirit remained in a state of self-recollection and defence against the empirical investigation of its historical and independent world of rationalism and idealism, with its timeless divinity and timeless reason. Even when metaphysical reflection conceded the centre of life and activity to empiricism - under the influence of the ethical utilitarianism of the latter - rational thought tended to extend its philosophical discipline and methodology to the empirical realm, thereby inculcating logical prudence and intellectual humility, in contrast to the popular attribution to empiricism of absolute certainty. Mitigated by such a spiritual self-preservative attitude, the empirical tendency in the West persisted in its course of establishing - through the imperative demand for law - its scientific integration of the universe, of the mechanism of human life, of and/the human soul. Nevertheless, the disposition
towards accepting the revolutionary picture of humanity and nature - with its radical integration by Copernicus, Darwin, Freud and Marx - the disposition towards accepting these scientific pictures has not been capable of obliterating the pictures drawn by Luther, Spinoza, Hegel and Bergson. Hence, while the empirical activity served to invigorate life, enrich experience and impart immeasurable knowledge and content, the rational and spiritual activity served to preserve a relative stability of relationship with history, thereby providing the world of value with historical dignity and reserve in the face of the dynamic world of fact.

Nevertheless by concentrating upon separate aspects of reality, by sacrificing the individual for the universal - in/search for "law" uniformity and regularity - Western empiricism came to exercise a pronounced influence upon practically every department of human thought and discipline. The concept of law tended to preoccupy the sphere of investigation in order to establish uniformity of occurrence. Even in history, the concept of law
was sought and developed in such a manner as to eliminate irregularity and exclude non-conformity to law in the world of phenomena. In connection with the human soul as well as with human relationships, sociology, economics, and particularly psychology rose up to claim the status of exact sciences, endowing their speculative interpretation with quasi-scientific authority. Moreover, the empirical tendency, with its concentration upon the immediate reality and outward form of sense-experience worked to present the external world as the fundamental reality for man, thereby stimulating unlimited demand for power on the part of the state and unlimited demand for practical satisfaction on the part of the individual. Whereas the demand of nationalism for power—power with its inherent utilitarian ethics of recognising no end transcending itself—contributed towards the relapse of some Western states into Fascism and Nazism, the demand of the individual for practical satisfaction contributed towards heightening the concept of social justice and thus elevating the general level of material existence.
However detached from the inner world of rationalism and idealism, Western empiricism appeared to have excessive influence in converting human activity and ambition into a distorted mode of valuation, and in turning the life-process into restless energy and anaemic spirituality. In its journey Eastwards, Western empiricism resulted in totalitarian rejection of history. In its journey Westward, it resulted in compulsive utilitarianism, to the extent of regarding utility as a measure of truth and reality, in which connection American philosophy - on account of its relative detachment from history - took the lead in formulating the doctrine of Pragmatism.

In its development, the empirical tendency was not a mere philosophical doctrine, but rather the manifestation of Western voluntarism towards transferring the main emphasis of life over to the outward reality of sense-experience and sense-perception. Thus objective realism, with its actual life-content, became the centre of man's ambition and achievement. The tension, therefore, between the world of modern realism, and that of
idealism and rationalism, came to constitute, not a collision of philosophical doctrines, but a collision of rival realities. While the former laid the emphasis upon the outward content of life, the latter laid the emphasis upon the inward content of the human soul. But in spite of its claim for independence, realism - when raised to the plane of viewing life as a whole - is not capable of valuing human life without recourse to an idealistic foundation for value-judgement, and for the intrinsic appreciation of human progress. Thus realism, in spite of its apparent attack upon the inner foundation of value-judgement, has been serving indirectly to heighten the idealistic background of value, by enriching the outward content of life and presenting its actual content as the fundamental object of man's aspiration towards human justice. In this way the struggle of nations, as well as the struggle of individuals and social strata, over the material content of existence, - under the influence of Western realism - resulted in raising the level of the social, national and
international conception of the right of man, together with the right of the community, to participate in the material wealth of nature. Nevertheless, this conception of right has been exposed, within nations suffering from limited resources and unlimited demands, to the danger of ideological sentimentalism, while in the principal nations it has been exposed to the danger of power, with its utilitarian disposition towards the value of human life, and its compromising interest in connection with the dignity of man.

While the empirical tendency developed in the West as the manifestation of a realistic impulse towards binding humanity to the immediate possibilities, this tendency descended upon the Muslim world, not in the form of power bestowed upon man over life and nature, but rather in the form of power originated by Western man in order to extend his dominion over the realm of others. Such an emotional reception to Western realism seems to have produced a highly complicated
psychological mechanism with respect to the sociological process of moulding the attitude towards Western culture and Western civilisation. This mechanism has been characterized by a self-preserving antipathy against the West, while at the same time this antipathy has become overshadowed by self-elevating admiration and enthusiasm for the life-content of Western realism. Although the cultural resistance of the Muslim world to the new civilisation tended to differ in degree from one Muslim community to the other — according to the type of relationship with history bequeathed to each, and according to the circumstantial capacity of each to depart from such relationship — the fundamental nature of the encounter assumed the common character of concentrating ambition upon the immediate reality, and advancing its outward actuality through the Western realistic and scientific approach. Such a transition of human aspiration from the inward spiritual content of life to the outward material content of existence resulted in a psychological
conflict between a retreating culture and advancing realism. Stimulated on the one side by the prestige-suggestion of the West, and on the other by its inherent motive force, the impulse towards enriching life, and assimilating the immediate reality of sense-experience revolted against the spiritual approach to life and nature, in favour of the empirical and scientific approach.

Hence, it has come to pass that the disposition to human learning tended to redirect its aspiration towards the pragmatic knowledge of life and nature. In this manner the motive force of learning, came to be largely transferred from the plane of spiritual salvation, to that of practical application. Although maintaining for the theocentric traditional learning a tolerant position of charitable dignity and formal reverence, the cultural resistance conceded the main authority and prestige to the centre of secular learning, and to the Westernized seats of academic departments. But in spite of the spiritual recession of the traditional learning in the face of expansive Western and pragmatic
knowledge, the former - in response to the disposition towards historical self-preservation on the one hand, and on the other, the absence of revolutionised spirituality has retained its conception of the universe by its mere capacity for cultural continuation. But the inner conceptual structure of life related to the traditional learning tended virtually to lose the impetus of self-value and spontaneous orientation, under the pressure of Western realism, with its empirical knowledge, pragmatic application, and its promise of invigorating life and enlarging its actuality. Meanwhile, the empirical learning, in spite of being divested of the joyous sense of power and creation, and converted into mere academic application has been - by virtue of its identification with Western superiority, as well as by its inherent promise to enhance the vitality of life - in a position to disturb the continuity of the theocentric conception of life, without being able to replace it by a comprehensive view and interpretation of reality. Thus unmitigated by philosophical
integration and overestimated in relation to its Western character and performance, empirical learning has come to assume a more destructive nature than on its native soil.

Furthermore, the gradual development of empiricism in the West served to protect the foundation of culture from the impetus of concentrated attack, thus giving the inner world extensive opportunity for self-defence and self-recollection. In the Muslim world on the one hand, the accumulated wealth of empirical facts and knowledge in the form of academic exposition, armed with the suggestive superiority of the West, and acting through the self-elevating acceptance, came flooding in upon the new centres of learning with neither a gradual order of action and reaction, nor a gradual consciousness of its penetration. Being the outstanding characteristic of the new man and the universal feature of the modern civilisation, as well as being the self-evident method of transforming life and relieving its long-term necessities, Western empiricism - in spite of, or probably because of, its vague
character - presented the Muslim world with an ambiguous type of intellectual freedom. In this connection, the freedom of the intellect from a theocentric conception of society, history, and nature, not being sustained by the philosophical integration of an inner world, seemed rather to assume the character of a naive extremity of realism, or vague and compulsive spiritualisation of realism.

Meanwhile, the middle course between these two extremes became characterised by what might be termed "intellectual expediency" in relation to thought and literary practice. This unhappy characteristic of unprincipled thought–activity, with its utilitarian and marketing orientation, has served to subject the intellectual capacity to mass-opinion, thereby exposing the unformed social mentality to the danger of dwelling upon the sensational, flippant, untimely translations and inadequate exposition of Western literature and popular philosophy. Such untimely translation and unbalanced exposition of Romanticism, humanism and even psychologism, combined with the vague and
uncreative empirical academicism, together with the cultural reaction towards historicism, appeared largely to reduce the freedom of the intellect within the Muslim world either to perverted independence of mental revolt, or to a paralysing confusion of indifference. Being either theocentric, or Western in origin, the philosophical element integrated into the academic learning has not been equal to the task of constructing an inner world and maintaining its stability in the face of the dynamic and exhilarated movement of modern thought and experience. Hence, therefore, the philosophical element within the Muslim world has remained incapable of converting itself into a life-attitude and thus contributing towards a new reconciliation and logical prudence to mitigate oscillation between extremes. The inherent dichotomy of man, with his dual disposition towards permanence and change, towards the static and the dynamic, and towards stability and movement, this inherent dichotomy seems to underly the manifest conflict and contradiction between the nostalgic impulse
of freedom. By elevating the enlightened collective value and relating it to the divine frame of reference, religion came to consolidate the foundation of culture, raising its social stability above the scepticism of individual egoism. Thus the spiritual conception with its integration of society, history and nature systematised by religion, or in relation to religion seemed, to have provided the human mind with a type of satisfaction for its dual nature, of, on the one hand, longing for knowledge of reality, and on the other, fear of departing from the secure stability of history. Within the Western world, the relative separation of man from his spiritual home of history, and the liberation of his intellect from the conceptual structure of the universe through the rise of empiricism, was alleviated by a balanced orientation of freedom. The departure from the spiritual conception assumed in the West a modified character and a proud form of consciousness. The blow directed to the dignity of man by conceiving of his planet, not as the centre of the universe, with the whole
creation around redounding to his glory, but rather as an insignificant body running its course within the cosmic scheme, dominated by the rigidly uniform and indifferent forces of nature, - this blow to the dignity of man was softened in the first place by the pride of its discovery and through the growing consciousness of the Western hemisphere as the summit of historical structure, the cradle of new civilisation, and the centre of a vigorous and expansive dominion over the external world and the elemental forces of nature. Similarly, the spiritual humiliation of the evolutionary picture - although exerting an excessive influence upon some thinkers such as Nietzsche - was not felt so acutely as to disturb the balance of the Western spirit and outlook. Through the cultural resistance of the historical inner world, the Western mind was capable of withstanding this spiritual humiliation of the changed conception of man. Instead of conceiving himself as a privileged being whose creation after the image of his Creator exalted him to the position of regarding the
present world as too narrow for the aspiration of his truth, too shallow for the depth of his goodness and too finite for the infinity of his soul, he reconciled himself to the possibility of being the rebellious descendant of the brutes, whose arrogant rebellion forced upon him the eternal penalty of carrying within his consciousness the shuddering concept of death, and moving through the terror of its shadow under the relentless necessity of the struggle for existence, toiling vainly to recover his sense of belonging under the disintegrating uncertainty of survival. This spiritual humiliation with its underlying assumption of dethroning man from his moral kingdom and relegating the sanctity of its value to the stratagem of the weaker in order to disarm the stronger of his natural right, while harmonising with the dynamic movement of modern life, failed to shake confidence in the deep-rooted conception of life as a moral order.

Hence in spite of its revolutionary and penetrating effect, the conception of evolution as a systematised interpretation of the world
came to lose its initial momentum through impartial investigation and the temperate outlook. Moreover the concept of gradual development with its implication of each human stage as dialectically leading upward through the rational collision of ideas — according to the cosmic logic of Hegel — seemed to prepare the Western intellect and to consolidate it against the excessive influence of Darwinism. Even on the assumption of conceding the timeless sanctity of man's soul to the claim of evolution, the Western mind was able to draw upon the inner world of Rationalism and Idealism, thereby compensating for the loss of timeless sanctity by the dignity of timeless reason. Thus, in spite of its humiliation, and apart from the exciting wave of initial modernity, the Western spirit, sustained by the accumulation of mastery over life and by the consciousness of revealing its ancient mystery, was able to place the evolutionary interpretation upon a hypothetical plane, entrusting its details to the impartiality of science while reserving final judgement and
maintaining a fair balance of intellectual freedom.

Thus the doctrine of evolution came to be the main scientific systematisation inspired by the modern character of Western activity with its persistent tendency to convert the life-energy into progressive movement while advancing the frontier of knowledge beyond the inner world of religion and idealism and beyond its limited pattern, static conception and permanent form. But while the outward orientation of Western life and activity accepted the implication of the evolutionary doctrine, in response to its realistic approach to human life in its immediate relation to environment, the Western mind remained capable of maintaining its freedom both from compulsive reaction towards the inner thought world with its conceptual permanence, and from impulsive acceptance of the realistic interpretation with its dynamic and ceaseless transitions. Hence the comparative stability of the Western inner thought world with its timeless spirituality and timeless reason,
together with the aesthetic and pragmatic capacity for the unification of the human disposition and life-attitude, served to preserve the ethical character of life and to consolidate the position of value against the scientific approach and its destructive relativism. The relationship maintained by the Western spirit with the timeless content of history, together with the impulse aroused by modern realism towards the immediate form of existence, combined to heighten the consciousness of a commanding morality with the effect of revising the right of average humanity for participation in the material wealth of life. This inward continuity of history, and this outward transformation of social conditions and requirements combined to secure for the practical value of morality, a firm conception supported and stabilised on the one side by relegating the dignity of man to the timeless spirituality, with its inner necessity working from within outwardly, and on the other, by the pressure of outward necessity with imperative appeal
to abstract justice in relation to the conflict of individual classes and nations. Although intellectually conceding a considerable part of its metaphysical character under the weight of evolutionary, Marxian, Freudian, and Behavioristic interpretations, the conceptual structure of morality came to enliven its pure content and self-active orientation. This enlivenement has been aroused partly through the historical inwardness of the Greek and Hebrew, and partly through the imperative necessity for stimulating the moral consciousness in relation to the pragmatic rearrangement of the close union of modern humanity, with its impersonal relationships and restless conflict over the outward content of existence. Hence, in spite of being, or probably because it is, the author of empirical learning and realistic interpretation of history, society and nature, the Western spirit has not been severely shaken by the tendency of modern realism towards replacing the inward permanence of value, by the concept of outward determination and transition. This inherent
resistance of Western culture to the destructive relativism of the empirical tendency has mitigated the impulse towards reducing the position of value - in favour of fact - to a mere formation of outward necessity and imperative response of collective adaptation. Hence the position of value appears to remain capable of holding its own, despite the exposure of its conceptual foundation to the freedom of intellect and to the passionless approach of human intelligence. Nevertheless this relatively firm position of value is open to the possibility of being conditioned by the limited continuation of inward energy generated through the spiritual heroism of countless generations, while destined - under the overflowing current of realism - to decline with the exhaustion of its self-active power of regeneration. The Western mind has for the first time exposed mankind to the danger of undertaking the task of life, bearing upon its conscience the heavy burden of conscious re-fashioning of the human pattern and the realisation of its social and individual potentialities.
But while Western dominion over matter has heightened the universal validity of fact, Western dominion over mind has not yet proved capable of heightening the universal dignity of value.

The conceptual structure of traditional learning within the Muslim world with its acquiescence in religious truth and its permanent superiority to time and space, came to lose its self-active synthesis while retaining its self-preservation form. Through the suggestive power and superiority of the West, the empirical impression of dynamic change and progressive movement seized hold of men's minds with the result of heightening the prestige of Western naturalisation and over-evaluating the character of its philosophical conception. Thus the conflict between the doctrine of permanence with its conceptual stability and the doctrine of change, with its ceaseless transitions, has been sharpened by the restless and anxious disposition resulting from the theoretical impression of naturalism, while
frustrated by the failure to enhance the practical vitality of life. This frustration of the impulse towards progressive movement of life, while suffering the process of inward alienation and spiritual separation from history resulted in the division and distortion of the psychological reality and the conceptual structure of man and the universe. The freedom from the theocentric and supernatural doctrine of permanence seemed rather to expose the soul to the danger of formless and threatening reality, to the absence of conceptual integration and the presence of destructive relativism. Meanwhile, the sentiment against such freedom expressed the impulsive reaction to the cultural antithesis, together with the tendency to motivate the temporal ambition and activity by the spiritual and permanent mode of valuation. Hence the relapse into the cultural synthesis in this form appeared to inflict the conception of history with the conflict of inner nationalism, and theocracy with the outward nationalism of civic community. Moreover,
this compulsive return to history has involved the inherent division of relating the concept of change and movement to the plane of a permanent and timeless frame of reference. Hence the collision of the conceptual structure of traditional learning with the implication of empirical learning, seems rather to deprive the former of its spiritual stability and the inward superiority of its truth to time, while depriving the latter of its joyous sense of aspiration towards objective truth. The human need, therefore, in the Muslim world, for a systematised conception of life has been under the influence of the cultural antithesis, with its inherent ambivalence. In the Western world the strain of freedom from the conceptual structure of religious truth has been alleviated on the one side, by the self-active continuity of Greek rationality, the Roman pragmatic solidarity and the Hebrew moral aspiration, and on the other by a mitigation of the absolute character of fate through the security of power and the superiority of formative creation. Hence the
inward resistance of Western culture, combined with the outward dynamic advance of Western civilisation, have been charged with the task of smoothing away the anxiety of spiritual recession and providing the individual soul with the security of civic constitution and the stability of an inner thought-world.

In the Muslim world the theocentric conception of life alone, with its doctrine of permanence, constituted the conceptual structure of culture. Its ultimate conviction came to be the only foundation for inner unity and the only unified measure of reality. Hence the traditional ideal of human learning was confined to the conscientious communication of this spiritual truth to the successive generations. With its inward superiority to time and space, this cultural synthesis tended to extend its spiritual independence beyond national boundaries, imparting to the formations of life a spiritual character. Hence within the Muslim world the freedom of mind
from the spiritual conception of history seemed to present a type of emotional separation, created by the recession of the authoritative conviction with its capacity for holding fast the individual and society against ceaseless change. Through the suggestive superiority of the West, the evolutionary interpretation with its doctrines of change, its presentation of the immediate life as the fundamental reality for man and its destructive relativism, has formed a considerable part of the impact of Western civilisation upon the cultural synthesis and upon its inherent resistance. While imparting to the external world its empirical learning, with its concept of change and progress the West has not been capable of imparting the living synthesis of its thought-world and life-attitude. Hence, by shaking confidence in the doctrine of permanence, and disturbing its conceptual stability, spiritual security and inner independence the encounter with the West has had the effect of sapping the ultimate foundation of culture,
exposing its inward unity of spiritual truth to the threat of a subjective, indefinite and formless process of de-spiritualisation. Although heightening the ethical character of social justice, Western realism, by presenting the immediate form of existence as the fundamental reality of man's ambition and activity, divesting the conception of history, society and nature of the Divine Will and its miraculous activity - this realism has tended to despiritualise the standard of value and detach it from its permanent foundation.

The inspired intuition of man (even at a sub-spiritual level) demanded the elevation of value to the super-human plane, with the result of consolidating communal stability against the restless human intelligence and against the transitory subjectivism of change. While such elevation of value to the timeless plane has cost man centuries of toil, tears, blood, sacrifice and martyrdom, Western realism has been dethroning this value with no compensation either of proud consciousness of power or joyous
sense of formative creation. Western civilisation has pioneered the cause of liberty, charging the consciousness of man with the strain of freedom from authority and entrusting him with the burden of thought and experience and with the anxious desire to re-shape the world towards his own end. If the West has succeeded in pioneering the cause of freedom from superhuman authority and in presenting man with such overwhelming power, the question remains whether the West is capable of pioneering the cause of a humanistic value equal to the task of balancing the new dynamic conception of life and unifying the inner vision of moral aspiration, and thus justifying the position of man as the ultimate reference of his own life.