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Informal Diplomacy and Rome
From the First Macedonian War to the Assassination of Ti. Gracchus

Masayuki Ito

Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Edinburgh
2015
Declaration

I confirm that this thesis presented for the degree of PhD has been composed entirely by myself. I also declare that it contains solely the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Masayuki Ito
Abstract

This study examines the influence of Rome's diplomatic management in channels apart from official ones and open contacts among states, on her expansion and Republic from the 200s to 133 BCE. In this thesis such involvement in foreign affairs is called *informal diplomacy*. This terminology was not used by the Romans directly but is useful in showing the following. In the period of Rome's advance into the Greek world, she approached not only foreign states but also individuals, while individual Romans also increasingly participated in such contacts independently. These acts sometimes took place openly and/or while using formal diplomatic exchanges and sometimes informally and secretly. The aim of the Romans concerned was to win over the people approached and their fellow citizens, and international public opinion, and these approaches were developed in parallel to official negotiations among states. This diplomacy enabled Rome to manage foreign affairs flexibly and contributed to her increasing the dependence of foreign states and individuals on her, in particular those in the Greek world. This thesis also argues that informal diplomacy caused struggles among the Romans symbolised by the violence that occurred in the tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. This situation originated from the ill-defined relationship between informal diplomacy, legality, and the collective leadership of the senators. As informal diplomacy became more common among the Romans, the users individually rose among the leading Romans. This tendency undermined the dignity of the Senate, but this organ had no method to control it. Consideration of legitimacy of using informal diplomacy had been tacitly avoided by the Romans because of its ad hoc utility, and the Senate had not necessarily
been the sole decision-maker in the Republic. Its leadership could be legitimately denied by the users of informal diplomacy if they had some authority and were supported by the people in and beyond Rome. All the Senate could do in order to maintain its dignity was to attempt to control them with political tactics and violence. This was a foretaste of the conflict that was to occur in the final century of the Republic. Through demonstrating these advantages and disadvantages of informal diplomacy to Rome, I show this diplomatic concept is a valuable and fruitful one to employ in the study of Rome during the period of remarkable expansion and afterwards.
Acknowledgements

I have been interested in the contacts of the Romans with outsiders who had different languages, cultures, and ideas, not only at a state level but also on a more personal one, since I wrote my graduation thesis at the University of Tokyo. As a postgraduate, I have searched after the way of considering the stage of Roman diplomacy in which such official and unofficial interchanges interlaced, comprehensively, and found an answer, here, at the University of Edinburgh. The following discussion is the results.

I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Andrew Erskine, my first supervisor. The concept of informal diplomacy, the key topic of this study, is clearly the product of a great many discussions with him. I will always appreciate his strong and steady support for my development since I came to this country in 2011.

Furthermore, I would like to express my thanks to Ulrike Roth, Dominic Berry, and Benjamin Gray, my secondary supervisors, John Holton, my reviewer, and Alex Imrie, my proofreader. They provided me with a good deal of suggestion about my discussion and manuscript as my seniors and friends. I am also grateful to David Lewis and Shane Wallace, who readily undertook the role of the examiners to this thesis. Their reviews improved my argument and dissertation further.

My final thanks should be addressed to my parents and grandparents in my country. Their constant cheer often encouraged me under a foreign sky.

I would like to offer my sincere thanks to them again.
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Abbreviations

1. Ancient Authors and Works

App. Appianos.

BC Bellum Civile.

Hann. Hannibalica.

Hisp. Hispanica.

Illy. Illyrica.

Mac. Macedonica.

Mithr. Mithridatica.

Pun. Punica.

Sam. Samnitica.

Syr. Syrica.

Aristot. Aristoteles.

AP Athenaiion Politeia.

Athen. Athenaios.

Cic. Cicero.

Acad. Academica.

Amic. De Amicitia.

Brut. Brutus.

Cael. Oratio pro M. Caelio.

Cat. Orationes in Catilinam.

Deiot. Oratio pro Rege Deiotaro.

Div. De Divinatione.

Dom. Oratio de Domo Sua.

Inv.Rhet. De Inventione Rhetorica.

Leg. De Legibus.

Mur. Oratio pro L. Murena.

Off. De Officiis.

Or. De Oratore.

Phil. Orationes Philippicae.

Sen. De Senectute.

Verr. Orationes Verrinae.

Diod. Diodoros Sikeliotes.

Dion.Hal. Dionysios of Halikarnassos

RA Roman Antiquities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Eutrop.</td>
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<td>Flor.</td>
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<td>Gell.</td>
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<td>Joseph.</td>
<td>Josephus</td>
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<td>AJ</td>
<td>Antiquitates Judaeorum</td>
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<td>Just.</td>
<td>Justinus</td>
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<td>Liv.</td>
<td>Livius, Ab Urbe Condita Libri</td>
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<td>Oxy.</td>
<td>Epitome found at Oxyrrhyncus</td>
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<td>Per.</td>
<td>T. Livi ab Urbe Condita Periochae</td>
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<td>Plinius the Elder</td>
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<td>Naturalis Historia</td>
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<td>Valerius Maximus.</td>
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<td>Vergilius.</td>
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<td>Aeneis.</td>
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<td>[Vict.]</td>
<td>Pseudo Aurelius Victor.</td>
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<td>Vir.Ill.</td>
<td>De Viris Illustribus.</td>
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<td>Hell.</td>
<td>Hellenica.</td>
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<td>Memorabilia.</td>
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<td>Zonar.</td>
<td>Zonaras.</td>
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2. Works of Reference

ABSA  Annual of the British School at Athens.
AJAH  American Journal of Ancient History.
AJAH NS American Journal of Ancient History: New Series.
AJPh  American Journal of Philology.
ANRW  Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt.


CIL  Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. 1863-
CPh  Classical Philology.
CQ  Classical Quarterly.
EA  Epigraphica Anatolica.

FD III  Fouilles de Delphes, III. Épigraphie. 1929-
FGH  Fragmenta graecorum historiorum. 1923-
GRBS  Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies.
HSCP  Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.

IC  Inscriptiones Creticae. Rome.

I.Délos  Inscriptions de Délos. 1926-72.
IG  Inscriptiones Graecae. 1873-
IGR  Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes. 1901-27.

IGSK  Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasiien.
I.Priene


ISE


I.Thrac.Aeg.


IvO


JHS

*Journal of Hellenic Studies*.

JRA

*Journal of Roman Archaeology*.

JRS

*Journal of Roman Studies*.

MRR


PBSR

*Papers of the British School at Rome*.

PCPS

*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*.

RAL

*Rendiconti dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*.

RDGE


REA

*Revue des études anciennes*.

REG

*Revue des études grecques*.

SEG


SGDI


StVII


*TAPA*  
*Transactions of the American Philological Association.*

*TAPhA*  
*Transactions and proceedings of the American Philological Association.*

*ZPE*  
*Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik.*
Introduction

1. Informal Diplomacy and the Aim of this Study

This thesis examines Roman diplomacy as conducted not only through official channels but also through unofficial ones, and considers its influence on Roman expansion and the constitution in the period from the 200s to 133 BCE. In these decades Rome established her hegemony over the Mediterranean world, but also suffered from a number of internal struggles. I argue that these phenomena in part resulted from the following two aspects peculiar to this period, and show the validity of the argument while proposing a concept of diplomacy to explain the success and failure of Rome comprehensibly. First, the leading Romans collectively and individually had contacts with foreign states and individuals through channels that were not constrained by the factors in the official sphere such as legality, publicity, and legitimacy. I call this practice informal diplomacy since it was developed in parallel to diplomacy through formal channels. I argue that its appearance enabled Rome to manage foreign affairs flexibly and allowed her to establish her leadership of the Greek states and wider Mediterranean world swiftly. Second, the development of informal diplomacy within the broader context of Roman diplomacy more generally enabled individual Romans, especially those with some authority, for example that as a magistrate, to participate in international politics independently and to rise among the people in and beyond Rome. This was irreconcilable with the constitution of the Roman

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1 All dates are assumed to be BCE.
Republic practically managed by the magistrates and the Senate consisting of the leading Romans legitimately and collectively. This disharmony was spurred by the ill-definition of the relationship between informal diplomacy, formal procedures, and the collective leadership of the Roman aristocracy in the name of the Senate. The senators tended to respect legality and the authority of the Senate, but sometimes used informal diplomacy or approved its use by others for ad hoc necessities of Rome and the users themselves. This complexity caused tensions among the Romans, and the conflict peaked at the violence over the movement of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 133.

However, in advance of the main discussion, it is reasonable to explain why I propose this diplomatic notion and focus on the informal sphere of foreign affairs and its relationship with other factors of Roman diplomacy from the end of the third century to 133. The idea of examining informal channels in diplomacy has been advanced by E. Badian. He argues that Rome developed the notion of the private and vertical relation between patronus and cliens and used it in contacts with foreign states and individuals as a theoretical framework for controlling them, and calls it foreign clientela. His argument demonstrated the significance of informal relations in Roman diplomacy and encouraged many scholars, who have tended to pay more attention to legal and official aspects in foreign affairs of Rome, to follow him. I accept the general importance of unofficial channels in diplomacy. Furthermore, Rome’s conception of patronage shows that she was sensitive to personal and informal relations. Such a tendency may well have

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2 Badian 1958: esp. 1·11, 68, 82-7, and 155.
3 E.g. Dahlheim 1968: 1·4; Errington 1972: ix-x.
influenced her diplomacy. However, I do not agree with the argument of foreign clientela as a whole that regards patronage as the basis of Rome’s informal contacts with outsiders. The idea that the Romans behaved as the patroni of foreign states and individuals does not have sufficient support in the sources.\(^5\) Focusing on patronage in particular is not a profitable way to examine the significance of informal channels in Roman diplomacy.

An alternative approach to Badian’s has recently been proposed by P. J. Burton. Instead of patronage he treats amicitia, i.e. friendship, as the basis of informal or private contacts of Rome with other states. He examines how and how often it appears in the sources about Roman diplomacy from the fourth to the second century, and succeeds in confirming the frequent appearance of the term amicitia.\(^6\) His discussion, at least, strengthens the argument that Rome had contacts with outsiders through more informal channels, in addition to formal, legal relationships.

However, Burton’s theory has a problem. He is aware that the notion amicitia has multiple meanings and can appear even in contexts apart from informal diplomatic contacts, but does not consider sufficiently the possibility that this diversity results from the change of this notion in the three centuries concerned in some way. For instance, Burton analyses cross-status friendships, but his sources are largely from the Late Republic and the meanings of amicitia shown there might not be so appropriate in, e.g. diplomatic contacts in the third century.\(^7\) It is therefore doubtful whether the notion amicitia consistently worked

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\(^7\) Burton 2011: 28-75, esp. 46-53.
as a basis of informal contacts of Rome with outsiders even though this term frequently appears in the cases concerned.

Moreover, both Burton and Badian assume that the Romans used some Roman notion about personal relations as a model in their contacts with outsiders in channels apart from official ones, but this approach itself is not necessarily reasonable. It is questionable whether the Romans had a definition of unofficial diplomatic actions, and their thoughts about such behaviour could be influenced by outsiders and change with the times. At least, the ideas of personal relations could be developed even beyond Rome. The Greeks had developed several, such as προξενία, the connection between a state and a foreign individual,⁸ even before the 200s. As Rome increased her power in regions occupied by Greeks, the ideas she encountered there may well have influenced her own.

This thesis deals with these problems by proposing a new concept of foreign affairs, informal diplomacy. I propose this idea for the following reason. The Romans made a variety of contacts with others through both official and unofficial channels. Some of them can be possibly treated as the cases of clientela and amicitia. But, in the light of previous studies, it is not fruitful to seek a rigid Latin definition of the phenomenon. This may well go too for Greek and other ancient notions. Hence, I create a concept that embraces all types of contact that was carried on through channels apart from official ones. At least, the Romans used such methods in diplomacy as is argued by Badian, Burton, and their supporters. It is still useful to consider the significance of such behaviour. Creating the term informal diplomacy as a notion corresponding to the actions in question

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⁸ Mack 2015: e.g. 1·4.
contributes to analysing them comprehensively. Moreover, proposing such a concept enables us easily to examine how the ordinary diplomatic methods constrained by legality, publicity, and legitimacy, that is, the elements comprising formal diplomacy, were connected to other ways of conducting interstate relations, i.e. with informal diplomacy. This point of view is not discussed in depth by scholars, who devote attention to the theories that terminology derived from personal relationships was used by Romans in their contacts with foreigners. Yet, the increased prominence of ‘informal diplomacy’ did not result in the disappearance of formal diplomatic channels. They coexisted, even though there was some conflict between the two phenomena. In order to understand the significance of unofficial or unorthodox channels in Roman diplomacy, it is necessary to consider the relation between both kinds of diplomacy as much as how informal methods worked. In contrast to theories based on ancient ideas such as clientela and amicitia, informal diplomacy offers a simpler, less complex concept that can embrace all diplomatic activity outside formal channels.

I now explain why my study of informal diplomacy focuses on the period from the 200s to 133. Although some scholars choose to emphasise the influence of the Second Macedonian War on the Roman advance into Greece,9 I argue that it was the First Macedonian War in the late third century that was more significant. In my opinion, the contact with the Greeks in this conflict was a catalyst for a change in Roman diplomacy, at least from the viewpoint of Rome’s active use of the diplomatic methods that this thesis calls informal diplomacy. The Greeks themselves had been accustomed to such informal diplomatic actions even

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as far back as the Peloponnesian War (e.g. Thuk. 1.128.3 and 2.67.1). I argue, therefore, that it is diplomatic contact with the Greeks in the 200s that made Rome aware of the value of approaching outsiders through informal channels and start to exploit methods that had not been utilised previously. 133 marks the end of my study as it is in this year that informal diplomacy and domestic politics collided to produce the violent tribunate of Ti. Gracchus, in the subject of Chapter 6. I think that the struggle at that time was also a prelude to the rise of prominent individuals, such as Sulla and Pompeius, in the first century, a phenomenon considered by many scholars to be a major turning point in Roman history.10

This study aims, therefore, to show the crucial role played by diplomacy, especially informal diplomacy, in Roman imperial expansion and the changes that this brought about in the Roman state.

2. Diplomacy of Rome and the Hellenistic States

In order to develop the discussion in the main chapters smoothly, it is also useful to show the following two aspects as the premise of the arguments. First, Roman diplomacy in the decades concerned was generally managed by the senior magistrates and the Senate collectively.11 In particular, the latter consisted of the leading Romans, and held formal negotiations with foreign diplomats as the practical representative of the Roman Republic. The resolution of the Senate was generally regarded as the will of the state of Rome by outsiders and this went for the senators themselves. The Senate also had responsibility for the appointment

11 For a general consideration of their power, see Lintott 1999: 65-88 and 94-120.
of delegations and the allotment of generals. Official channels of Roman diplomacy were thus under the collective leadership of the senators.\textsuperscript{12} Meanwhile, as E. S. Gruen shows, Rome was indifferent to training specialist diplomats and did not necessarily respect even the opinion of experts in their fields.\textsuperscript{13} While the Senate constantly managed diplomacy, its diplomatic decisions resulted not from specialised knowledge but from ad hoc political games among the senators. The Senate was also influenced by the citizen body, i.e. domestic public opinion. This resulted from the rule that no diplomatic agreement took effect without the approval of the assembly (e.g. Liv. 37.19.2; Polyb. 6.14.11 and 21.10.8). Even for each senator, in order to win elections as a magistrate, the support of the citizens was necessary.\textsuperscript{14} This may have been true of other states, but it was particularly important in the study of Rome from the 200s to 133. She had conquered the west of the Mediterranean world by the end of the third century and in the second century would go on to increase her power in the East. The opinion of the citizens at Rome influenced the leading Romans and their attitude to outsiders.

Yet, this does not mean that the Romans, in particular the senators at this time, ignored the viewpoint of outsiders in any decision-making that concerned diplomacy. Indeed, the Senate and Roman statesmen could have informal and private contacts with foreign visitors. As Rome consolidated her control of the Mediterranean world, foreign states and individuals who wanted to use her power in order to solve their ad hoc problems increasingly visited individual senators at Rome or her diplomats and magistrates in the field. The leading Romans also

\textsuperscript{12} The authority of the Senate in diplomatic management was also noticed by Polybios (at 6.13.5-7). Walbank 1957: 679-81; Brennan 2004: 56; Pina Polo 2011: 58-9.

\textsuperscript{13} Gruen 1984: 203-49.

\textsuperscript{14} For the power of the people in Roman politics in the period concerned, see Polyb. 6.14, Walbank 1957: 682-8, and Millar 1998: 24-5.
liked to have contacts with such visitors in order to manage their ad hoc tasks and to increase their influence in and beyond Rome. This was a kind of informal diplomacy. As a result not only did the number of practitioners of informal diplomacy among the Romans increase in this period, but the collective leadership of the Senate gradually decreased, which will be discussed in particular in chapters 5 and 6.

What should also be noticed is the relationship between Greek and Roman diplomacy. It is now useful to give its outline in advance of arguing the influence of the contact with the Greeks on the beginning of the use of informal diplomacy by Rome. Although the Romans used it actively after they began to have regular contact with the Greeks in the 200s, it does not mean this diplomatic concept was of Greek origin. However, the Greeks had been accustomed to informal diplomacy and sensitive to the relationship between the formal and informal aspects of diplomatic action since at least fifth century.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, just as in Rome, the Greek states hardly had any professional diplomats, and foreign policy resulted from the political games of amateur leaders engaged in winning over ordinary citizens.\textsuperscript{16}

It is, meanwhile, noticeable that there were significant differences in the way that Greeks and Romans conducted their diplomacy at the end of the third century, notably in the part played by the individual. In Greek diplomacy individuals had been able to play an important role among state relations. A good example is the notion of προξενία. While it originally had a variety of connotations, from the fifth century onwards the title προξενος was given by one state to a

\textsuperscript{15} Battesti 2013: 39-57; Magnetto 2013: 227-41.
\textsuperscript{16} Mosley 1971: 319-20.
citizen of another state who acted on its behalf. It is important to note that by bestowing such a title the relationship between the parties was, in fact, formalised. Its holders and their descendants were expected to maintain the connection permanently and to speak in front of their fellow citizens for the community that had given the title (e.g. Thuk. 5.43.2; Xen. Hell. 6.3.4). The relationship worked for the state giving the title as a tool to approach outsiders, and for the conferees as a way of participating in foreign affairs independently, in parallel to official contacts among states. This kind of custom also existed in Rome. It was called hospitium. The relationship was originally formed between a visitor and a private host in Italy, and then was used even in the contact between Rome, her neighbouring states and individuals of both. It is regarded as a direct counterpart of ξένια, i.e. guest-friendship, in the Homeric works, and dates back to the legendary period. This custom hospitium was used even in the first century. However, there is little evidence in the sources that it had much influence on Roman diplomacy. Making a connection between the Romans and individual foreigners could also be achieved by the concept amicitia. But considering the diversity of this term as was mentioned in the previous section and the practical lack of the counterpart(s) of προξενία (and ξένια) in Roman diplomacy, Rome had comparatively little interest in developing the methods of approaching outsiders, at least before she fully had contacts with the Greeks around the 200s.

3. The Sources

It is also necessary to outline my attitude to the sources used in this thesis. Literary records are of particular importance for our understanding of Rome’s informal diplomatic actions, because they are rich in information about such behaviour, but it is not reasonable to accept each reference at face value. The authors of the sources in existence could make some mistake in their description. This was recognised by ancient authors as well. For example, Polybios, a historian of Achaia in the second century, uses Roman epigraphic archives to argue that Philinos, a Sicilian writer in the third century, was mistaken in his view of the relationship between Rome and Carthage on the eve of the First Punic War (3.26.1-6).\(^{19}\) Livius, a historian of the Augustan era, also relates that for the achievements of Rome in the Battle of Thermopylai in 191 there is a difference among Latin and Greek sources (36.19.11-12).\(^{20}\)

Moreover, as T. J. Cornell indicates, it is very difficult to determine the historicity of events in the early centuries of Rome.\(^{21}\) Even for ancient historians it was not easy to collect material about a period far from their own (e.g. Liv. 1.pr.7-9). These are problems that are particularly significant to my discussion about informal diplomatic actions of Rome. When considering early periods, ancient authors may well have found it more difficult to collect information about unofficial or secret contacts than about official diplomatic actions, which were necessarily more public.

\(^{19}\) Walbank 1957: 353-5. But Serrati 2006: 120-30 does not completely accept Philinos’ mistake here on ground of Livius’ references to the relationship between both states.
\(^{21}\) Cornell 1995: 4-5.
It is also important to recognise the historians’ aims and perspectives. These inevitably influenced their selection of information and the manner of expression. For instance, the Romans from the second century onwards tended to observe Rome’s moral corruption caused by wealth resulting from foreign conquest and Greek luxury that spread among the Romans, and so idealise the earlier Republic.22 In light of this tendency, authors sometimes could aim to show moral lessons, not history, to the readers. This does not mean that their works are fiction, but they might select and manipulate historical materials based on their views. The patriotism and sympathy or antipathy of the writers to particular individuals should be also noticed. The influence of these factors may well vary in their works according to the topic.

Hence, after this consideration of the general character of literary records, I shall now briefly enumerate the main sources of this thesis and show how they are treated in connection with my primary focus.

The best known of my sources is Polybios. He was an eyewitness of the advance of Rome into the Hellenistic world. His aim was to provide lessons and experience for later politicians and to teach general readers how to endure the changes of Fortune through πραγματική ιστορία, that is, political and military narrative (1.1.2; cf. 9.1·2).23 His text gives the most important information about diplomatic actions of Rome and her rivals not only in the second but also in the third century, although part of his text is lost. Yet, as Polybios himself partly notices, his historiography is under the influence of the bias of his sources. For instance, in the description about the Rhodians on the eve of the Second

22 Lintott 1972: 626·38.
Macedonian War he uses their records (16.14.2-15.8). Their patriotic attitude in them prevents him from analysing their affairs.\textsuperscript{24} His own view of history and morality is also sometimes controversial.\textsuperscript{25} He behaves as a neutral historian, and his account seems based on the general neutrality and morality. But sometimes it appears to result from utilitarianism in order to make the readers agree with his view of history, or patriotism towards his own state. For example, in his account of the conflict between Achaia and Aitolia in the third century, he cannot maintain an impartial attitude.\textsuperscript{26} Although he can be fairer in other cases of Achaia’s contact with its neighbours,\textsuperscript{27} his way of referring to Achaian affairs, the nature of his moralistic attitude, and the influence of these on his work will be continuously noticed in the main chapters. In addition, it is necessary to consider how his quotation of speeches should be treated, although this is controversial even in the work of other historians, as Thukydides’ famous observations on his own practice demonstrate (at 1.22.1). Polybios seems to try to investigate the details of each speech as much as possible (2.56.10, 3.20.1-5, 29.12.2-10, and 36.1; cf. 12.25b).\textsuperscript{28} Yet, modern historians cannot confirm his claim. Hence, unless the author of the text has found many witnesses of the speech itself, it is reasonable not to focus on each of the phrases used but rather to expect that Polybios informs his readers of its general substance in an attempt to make them feel present at the meeting.\textsuperscript{29}

For the quantity and quality of information, next, we should next turn to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Wiemer 2001a: 60-5.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Derow 1970: 12-23; 1979: 1-15; 1994: 73-90; Eckstein 1995a: e.g. 16-27.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Champion 2011: 357-61.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Sacks 1975: 92-106.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Marincola 2011a: 120-3.
\item \textsuperscript{29} As regards the general discussion about speeches in Greek historiography, see also Walbank 1985: 242-61.
\end{itemize}
Livius’ history of Rome. His books regarding the period after 167 are lost, as are Books 11-20, but Books 1-10 treat the early history of Rome and Books 21-45 cover the period from the beginning of the Hannibalic War to 167, that is, most of the decades focused on by this study. Although for events in the East Polybios was of fundamental importance to Livius, the history is largely based on official Roman records and various works of Latin, that is, Roman, authors, and record many names of leading Romans and their behaviour in an annalistic style. His work reflects the viewpoint of contemporary Romans of each event and their descendants. Yet, his text includes information which may have been distorted by his sources, his moralistic agenda, or patriotism, just as Polybios’ work does. Livius also seems to regard the role of each Pentad in the whole of his work as more important than solving contradictions among his sources. Further, his historiography is greatly influenced by his ideal of the leading Romans in the Early and Middle Republic. This attitude and the possibility of his arbitrary or ideological selection and shaping of materials should be always noticed.

It is also necessary to refer to other historians whose works are useful in making up for the deficiency of information of Polybios and Livius. For example, the summary of Cn. Pompeius Trogus by Justinus is noticeable. Trogus wrote his books around the former half of the reign of Augustus. He offers a well-balanced

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30 For example, in the second Pentad Livius uses at least six works of Roman annalistic historians such as Q. Claudius Quadrigarius. Forsythe 2011: 391. For more general discussion about Livius’ sources, see Cornell, Bispham, Rich, and Smith 2013: 82-8.
31 For instance, Scafuro 1987: 253-9 shows this tendency in Livius’ reference to the matters on the eve of the Roman war against Antiochos III of the Seleucids in the end of the seventh and in the beginning of the eighth group of his books, by examining some discrepancies of the information about chronology and the development of the events between Books 35 and 36.
32 Kapust 2011: 81-110.
description of Rome’s enemies.\textsuperscript{33} Even though what survives is not his work but the summary, the information is useful in analysing some cases examined in this thesis more precisely, and considering the bias of pro-Roman historians like Livius and the critical views about Rome. The work of Sicilian historian Diodoros must also be noted. He was born in the Late Republic and wrote a general history of the Mediterranean world.\textsuperscript{34} Although there are many errors in his calculation of chronology and his descriptions, he collects several reliable historical sources which are not referred to by other historians, and balances pro- and anti-Roman viewpoints. His work also bridges the gap among the main sources in some case studies.

Meanwhile, the tradition of Valerius Maximus is useful in considering the viewpoint of the Romans with the analysis of the Livian text. He aims to show the importance of morality and the dignity of Rome to the Romans in and after the reign of Tiberius (\textit{praef}). His work is not necessarily historiography, but he uses the texts of Cicero, Livius and Trogus, and also those of several lost authors.\textsuperscript{35} His books, too, make up for the lack of information about several diplomatic cases.

For more on the subject of diplomacy, two Greek works of the age of Roman emperors are added. One of them is that of Appianos. He is said to be one of the first Greek historians introducing the history of Rome and her conquests of the rivals from a Roman perspective to provincial Greeks.\textsuperscript{36} In contrast to him, Plutarchos produces considerable number of books, in particular, \textit{Parallel Lives} of famous Greeks and Romans, to demonstrate the dignity of Greece to the Romans.

\textsuperscript{33} Levene 2011: 287-9.
\textsuperscript{34} Marincola 2011b: 176-8.
\textsuperscript{36} Gowing 1992: 284-6.
He is not interested so much in writing history as writing about ways of life from an ethical viewpoint (Alex. 1).\textsuperscript{37} Yet, his works also contribute to the case studies of this thesis, in particular those not covered by Polybios and Livius, such as that of Ti. Gracchus.

Last, it is necessary to remember the value of epigraphy. This gives my study contemporary Roman records despite sometimes being written in Greek, and those of the Greeks approaching the Romans and other contemporaries. For instance, the inscriptions of \textit{Senatus Consulta} collected by R. K. Sherk enables this thesis to confirm that the Senate gave pecuniary gifts to foreign diplomats individually in the second century, and that many Roman elites were collectively connected with the management of Asia Minor after the murder of Gracchus.\textsuperscript{38}

The resolutions of the investment of the title πρόξενος upon individual Romans by some Greek states in the middle of the third century show that Rome had observed this Hellenistic practice of making a connection with foreign individuals even before Rome herself started to have regular contact with the Greek states in the 200s (e.g. \textit{IG IX.1²}.1.17; \textit{SEG XXX.1120}). Such inscriptions support the participation of individuals in international politics alluded by literary sources, and enable my study to clarify the actual process more precisely while considering the viewpoint of contemporaries (or the close relatives) of the cases concerned.

The goal of this thesis, the demonstration of the role of informal diplomacy in the period of the Roman expansion, is achieved through careful consideration of these sources and their specific circumstances.

\textsuperscript{37} Russell 1966: 141-8.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{RDGE} 9, 10, and 12.
4. The Plan of Discussion

Finally, I show how these discussions are developed. This thesis demonstrates the validity of using the concept of informal diplomacy in the study of Roman diplomacy and its influence on Rome’s expansion and the Roman Republic from the 200s to 133 through the following seven chapters.

I first explain how informal diplomacy worked through analysing the custom of Rome of gift-giving to foreign envoys. Gifts were given by the Senate in the course of official contacts with foreign ambassadors. The receivers were indebted to Rome individually and were expected to favour Rome before their fellow citizens as a result of the idea of reciprocity embedded in the culture of the Mediterranean world. Rome made foreign envoys her unofficial channel to their states. This is a form of informal diplomacy. It is important to note that our earliest reference to this custom occurs in 205, and that it was continuously used in the period of her advance into the Greek world. This does not necessarily show this custom and informal diplomacy appeared for the first time in the 200s. The extant information before the latter part of the third century is often vague, although from the beginning of the Second Punic War in 218 it becomes much more plentiful. Through these analyses, I will argue that, in order to demonstrate the significance of informal diplomacy in Roman history in detail, it is reasonable to focus on the contacts with the eastern Greeks from this period onwards, in particular around the First Macedonian War above all. These points about the mechanism of informal diplomacy and the reason why the contacts with the Greek states from the 200s onwards are noticed are shown as the first step of the main discussion of the significance of this diplomatic concept.
Chapter 2 treats the diplomatic practices of Rome and the eastern Greeks at the end of the third century, and considers to what extent informal diplomacy functioned in managing the foreign affairs of each of them. What will be shown is the following three aspects. First, the Greeks managed international politics with both formal and informal methods of approaching outsiders, i.e. informal diplomacy, before and during the First Macedonian War. Second, Rome was comparatively indifferent to outsiders and did not appreciate the value of this diplomatic concept, although she could accept such approaches by the Greeks. Third, this difference caused Rome’s isolation in the middle of the First Macedonian War and the decrease of her sphere of influence despite the fact that she did not suffer any military failure. That is to say, her defeat was diplomatic rather than military. These arguments are demonstrated by the analyses of the diplomatic manoeuvres of some leading Greeks such as Aratos of Achaia, Philippos V of Macedonia, pro- and anti-Macedonians in Aitolia, the mediators for the Macedonian War, and the reactive actions of the Roman generals. These results enable this thesis to confirm the significance of informal diplomacy in the events concerned and to argue for Rome’s awareness of it in this period.

Chapter 3 shows the initial use of informal diplomacy among the Romans and its contribution to Rome’s advance into the Hellenistic world. This is achieved by analysing the manoeuvres of the promoters of the Second Macedonian War among the leading Romans on its eve. In this period Philippos and the Seleucid king Antiochos III secretly made a pact against the Ptolemies or at least some informal partnership. Attalos I of Pergamon and Rhodes matched it with their joint campaign and then the alliance with Rome. The hawks against Macedonia among the Romans used this situation and approached the people in and beyond
Rome to promote Rome’s dispatch of troops to Greece, despite initially lacking the
support of the majority of their fellow citizens. In the end they succeeded in
winning over not only other Romans but also many outsiders, while using open
and sometimes informal approaches to both. These manoeuvres and methods
were informal diplomacy enacted by a group of individual Romans. Through
showing these points, I confirm the value of using this concept in understanding
of Rome’s advance into the Greek world and a sign of the change in her diplomacy.

Chapter 4 treats the spread of informal diplomacy not only among Rome’s
factions but also among Roman individuals, and its contribution to the Republic’s
further rise in the Hellenistic world. It is shown by the analyses of the actions of
T. Quinctius Flamininus, who defeated Macedonia, and P. Cornelius Scipio
Africanus, the victor over Carthage, and the political groups around these two
individuals in Rome’s struggle with Aitolia and the Seleucids from 193 to 189. The
leading Romans in question competed with one another for position within the
state. The Greeks also actively had contacts with such Romans, in particular
Flamininus and Africanus chiefly because of their influence in and beyond Rome,
although the results of the negotiations with them did not necessarily influence
Rome’s decision. Such contacts enabled her and the Greeks to manage the
complicated interests of the people concerned flexibly. Although the legitimacy of
each negotiation could be questionable, this was never mentioned by either group.
These results confirm the spread of informal diplomacy in Rome and its
contribution to her expansion in parallel to military power.

It is argued in Chapter 5 that informal diplomacy became more common
among Roman individuals, and that it not only contributed to Rome’s continued
rise but it also became a factor of struggles in and beyond Rome from 188 to 167.
After Rome established her dominance over the Greek states, the Greeks approached the state of Rome and her individuals formally and informally in order to manage their local problems with Rome's support. This enabled Roman individuals to participate in Greek affairs with their own connections and policy. The Roman Senate approved this, at least initially. The increase in informal diplomacy in relation to Greek affairs ensured that Greek states managed local problems in a way favourable to Rome. But the rivals of such pro-Roman Greeks in Greece criticised this tendency with legal arguments. While their essential aim was to maintain their independence from Rome, Rome officially respected legality despite her favourable attitude to informal diplomacy. The opposition among the Greeks was solved when Rome sent troops to Greece in the Third Macedonian War and the Greeks generally became obedient to the Romans, but the troubles caused by informal diplomacy of individual Romans in the war led the Senate to try to control its use. The Senate not only managed the problems brought about by some Roman individuals with informal diplomacy but strove to recover its collective leadership over diplomacy that had comparatively decreased by the spread of informal diplomacy and the rise of its users. It did this by issuing senatorial decrees that prevented individual Romans from acting independently. Yet, even after this, informal diplomacy continued to be used by them and even to be approved by the Senate and outsiders because of its convenience. The relationship between the Senate, individual Romans, independent actions or informal diplomacy, and legal powers or legitimacy was still ill-defined. These advantages and disadvantages of informal diplomacy to Rome in these decades are shown.

In Chapter 6 the impact of the lack of a satisfactory position for informal diplomacy in the Roman Republic from the end of the Third Macedonian War to
133 is discussed. This is achieved by analysing the decrease of the leadership of the Senate that had, to some extent, controlled this diplomatic concept during the Macedonian War and the reaction of the senators who strove to maintain their collective leadership against the second rise of individual users of informal diplomacy, in the following three steps. First, it is shown that informal diplomacy was still used by Rome, while many of the users collectively and anonymously had such informal contacts with outsiders. It is important to observe, however, that the Senate lacked a way to stop the users legitimately when some of them wanted to act for their own interests. Second, it is argued that, in parallel to this tendency, the *tribuni plebis* rose in the management of foreign affairs through taking advantage of their tribunician powers, such as the access to the popular assembly. This is not directly connected with informal diplomacy. Yet, their rise comparatively decreased the legal advantage of the Senate in the management of foreign and domestic affairs. Their authorities could hinder the operation of the senators if the *tribuni* were supported by the citizen body and some of leading Romans. Third, these two tendencies enabled Ti. Gracchus, the *tribunus* of 133, to manage home and foreign affairs while bypassing the Senate. He had private connections with other states and then could access and lead the assembly to decide favourably to the results of his contact with outsiders, i.e. informal diplomacy, with his authority and the support of the citizens. His independent combination between his tribunician power and informal diplomacy brought the collective leadership of the Senate and the Republic to a crisis. The violence against him happened not because of the opposition of his rivals to each of his policies but because many senators regarded the combination as dangerous and proceeded to extremities although it could not be justified legally. Through these
analyses, I argue that informal diplomacy contributed to Rome’s managing foreign affairs flexibly but disrupted the essential factor of the Roman Republic, i.e. the collective and legitimate management by the leading Romans.

Last, I consider whether or not playing an important role in Rome’s foreign affairs by informal diplomacy was peculiar to the period from the end of the third century onwards in order to enforce my argument that it was an significant factor in Rome’s immediate expansion and the change of the Republic from the 200s to 133. Although its practical novelty has been suggested by Chapter 1 and 2, it is difficult to give a complete answer. The extant sources for the earlier period are much less detailed than those for the 200s onwards. Yet, the case studies about gifts from foreigners to Romans and about Rome’s management of diplomatic disputes similarly show the following characters in her diplomatic practice before the 200s. First, Rome had been interested in the opinion of her citizens and foreigners, and sometimes accepted the approach of outsiders with informal diplomacy. Second, Rome, however, did not understand it as a diplomatic concept, much less use it. Third, Rome, moreover, justified each diplomatic action mainly with official tools of managing foreign affairs such as legal arguments. This was effective in convincing the people on her side of her justice but was not so in winning over outsiders. Rome did not actively care about the opinion of such people through channels apart from such formal ones. At least, the surviving sources do not report it. These support an argument for the novelty of informal diplomacy for Rome from the 200s onwards and that of its significance in her immediate advance into the Hellenistic states, her establishment of the leadership over the Mediterranean world, and the change of the Roman Republic across a relatively small number of decades.
Chapter 1
Informal Diplomacy and the Custom of Gift-Giving

Introduction

This chapter discusses how informal diplomacy worked through analysing Rome’s custom of giving gifts to foreign envoys, and argues that the analysis with this diplomatic concept contributes to understanding Rome in the period of her advance into the Greek world from the 200s onwards. As shown in Introduction, I use this term for diplomatic contacts with foreign states and individuals that were not subject to the constraints of public scrutiny or law, and for participation in international politics without the official authority to do so. It is therefore distinct from official diplomacy, in which only states and their representatives could participate, and decisions were made in public, based on official procedures. The act of giving gifts to envoys is an important phenomenon within this complex diplomatic context, and demonstrates, furthermore, the value in distinguishing between official and unofficial actions in connection with Rome’s foreign affairs. One could be forgiven for thinking that gift-giving was, in reality, bribing someone for ad hoc necessities. Certainly, gifts could be regarded as bribes.¹ Their function as a more significant diplomatic tool, however, was noticed in Greece.² The value of gift-giving as an instrument of games with others was also eventually recognised by Rome (e.g. Cic. Off. 1.48; Verg. Aen. 2.49).³ Indeed, gift-giving was

² Herman 1987: 91.
employed during the Roman expansion, at least from the 200s onwards. By analysing the process of Roman gift-giving, I will argue that informal diplomacy was a significant factor in Roman success during the period.

In order to reach the goal, I begin the discussion by arguing that the act of gift-giving functioned in Roman diplomacy as a tool of approaching outsiders in an unofficial capacity. I will then use case studies to confirm that the act was a custom or a tactic continuously used by Rome from the 200s to the 130s, and show that it is useful to focus on her contacts with the Greeks in the East around the 200s in the next chapter in developing the study about the significance of informal diplomacy.

Section 1: Gifts and the Mechanism

This section shows what I call informal diplomacy, and that the Roman act of gift-giving was a vehicle of it, by analysing a case of the act. What is picked up is a senatorial meeting in c. 170, after the beginning of the Third Macedonian War. Livius relates (at 43.6.1-10, esp. 10) that Rome received envoys from Athens, Miletos, Alabanda, and Lampsakos here. Athens and Miletos declared for Rome and promised to send supplies to her. Alabanda and Lampsakos also supported her. The Senate expressed its thanks to the four states, and decided that ‘each of the delegates receive a gift of 2,000 asses (\textit{munera omnibus in singulos binum milium aeris data}).’

Regarding the act of gift-giving in this context as a diplomatic tool might

\footnote{Briscoe 2012: 8-26.}
appear initially to be dubious. Indeed, scholars have assumed that such gifts were merely to cover expenses for the stay of the envoys in Rome.\(^5\) Recent studies of diplomacy do not notice this act, either. Furthermore, that the gifts were given to the visiting envoys based on the decision of the Senate seemingly shows that this gift-giving was a simple formal action. However, this was effective in more ways than the surface, official level. The gifts made the recipients indebted to Rome and encouraged them to promote Rome among their home communities. In other words, it was a tactic that allowed Rome to interact with foreigners on a more personal level, too.

This is shown by analysing how the gifts functioned in the relationship between Rome, the four states, the envoys, and their fellow citizens. The gifts appeared to form part of Rome’s return to the four cities, within the wider exchange of favour between states. Yet, 2,000 asses were given directly to the envoys. The formal exchange between Rome and the four cities was completed through reciprocal announcements of support and gratitude, while the gifts created another relationship between Rome and the envoys. They were personally indebted to Rome. They might have contributed to the decision of their states to support her, but they were not responsible for cordial diplomatic relations in an official sense; accordingly, in order to repay the obligation, the envoys would influence their home states by offering a pro-Roman voice and reporting favourably about their interaction with Rome. Since the gifts were given in a public session, the envoys must have felt an expectation of contemporaries to return favour. It is noteworthy that being indebted to Rome might be felt by the

envoys unfavourably, but the gifts were nominally given by the Senate to thank their states and it was impossible to decline them. The Senate thus exploited the friendly reply to the four states to make the envoys themselves indebted to Rome. They became an unofficial channel by which Rome could approach the states and citizens in question, one that was quite separate from any formal negotiations or pronouncements. There is no direct evidence regarding how far the reports of envoys actually affected the policy of their states, but it must be noted that the diplomats were clearly men whose views were trusted. It is plausible to imagine that these four states would have become more pro-Roman afterwards owing to the acts of their envoys.6

This hypothesis is also supported by considering the fundamental value of the gift of 2,000 asses. Although it is difficult to assess its value in real terms,7 a clue can be found in the Lex Fannia of 161 (Athen. 6.274c; Gell. 2.24; Macrob. Sat. 3.17.5). It allowed a maximum of 100 asses per day to be spent on dinner or certain festivals by the host. The regulations concerned private rather than public affairs, and were not necessarily practical.8 Yet, the evidence suggests that 100 asses was sufficient for most customary functions. The gifts in c. 170, thus, sufficiently made the envoys personally indebted to Rome, and even functioned as a symbolic display of Roman generosity in light of the fact that they were given in public.

6 The significance or pressure of a debt made in public for contemporary elites can be further confirmed by a case of Thoas of Aitolia, despite not being connected with gift-giving (Polyb. 28.4.1-12). During the very Third Macedonian War, Rome regarded Nikandros of Aitolia as anti-Roman and restrained him, and Thoas seemed to support this measure. His opponents, then, criticised his attitude on ground that he had borne considerable responsibility for Aitolia’s acts against Rome from 192 to 189 but had been pardoned by her as a result of Nikandros’ negotiations with the Senate. This charge of ingratitude led to Thoas’ loss of trust as a politician with his fellow citizens. For the careers of the two Aitolians, see Grainger 2000: 245 and 321.


A sceptic about my position might argue against this discussion from the viewpoint of the situation of the source and the nature of topic. This reference of Livius to gifts in c. 170 or similar cases are not covered by Polybios, a contemporary historian, at all although he was involved in the Macedonian War and then at least devoted quite a few chapters in Book 27 to the detail of the negotiations between Rome and the Greek states in the first few years of the struggle. It might partly result from the gaps in his records about this period. But Livius’ text here is not supported by any other ancient authors. This, seemingly, suggests his references to gift-giving are included in error, or are fictionalised. The former seems unlikely, however, since he includes many examples of such gifts throughout his text. More needs to be said regarding the possibility that these gifts are a fictional creation, though. The Romans from the second century onwards, including Livius (and Polybios who stayed in Rome), tended to observe moral corruption of Rome. This view of history might therefore lead Livius unrealistically to give the impression that Rome engaged in plutocratic diplomacy. It might have been useful to pick up the act of giving money in instilling into his readers with this view if Livius wanted to do so.

However, inscriptions preserving senatorial decrees demonstrate that gift-giving was, in fact, employed by Rome in the second century. For example, in c. 140 the Senate mediated a dispute between Melitaia and Narthakion. It resolved that ξένια τε ἐκατέρως Γάιος Ὀστίλιος στρατηγὸς τὸν ταμίαν δούναι κε/λεύσῃ ἀπὸ σηστερίων νόμων ἐκατόν εἴκοσι / [πέ]/γυτε εἰς ἑκάστην πρεσβείαν (RDGE

9.11.67-70). The envoys of Narthakion were individually given 125 HS after the mediation. Similarly, a dispute between Priene and Samos was arbitrated before and in c. 135. After a decision was reached, gifts were given to the envoys of Priene with decrees stating that ξένια τε αὐ/[τοῖς ... (magistrate’ name) ὑπατος(?)] τὸν ταμίαν ἀποστείλαι κελεύσῃ ἐως ἀπὸ νόμιμων σηστερίων ἐκατόν εἰκοσι πέντε καθ’ ἐκάστην / [πρεσβείαν,] and that τούτοις τε ξένιοι εἰς ἐκάστην πρεσβείαν ἐως / ἀπὸ σηστερίων νόμιν ἐκατόν εἰκοσι [πέντε Σέριους Φόλιον Κοίντου ὑπατος τὸν ταμίαν ἀποστείλαι κε[λεύσῃ], ... (SEG LIII.1349.SC I.11.9-11 and SC II.11.12-13). Each of the envoys received 120 HS in the first decree and possibly 125 HS in the second one. While the monetary amount differs from that of c. 170, it is clear that gift-giving was not Livian fiction but a custom of Roman diplomacy.

Further, it is possible to demonstrate that Livius does not exaggerate or manipulate his description of public gift-giving to make any kind of moral point. This act could not be used to show Rome’s corruption even by authors conforming the view of history. This is confirmed by an episode of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus in 133 (Liv. Per. 57). He openly received gifts from the Seleucids although ‘it was the habit of other generals to hide (celare aliis imperatoribus ... mos essed’) any gifts, and instead gave them to his soldiers. According to Polybios (at 31.25-6, esp. 25.4, 8, and 10), he was unlike many of his generation in resisting ‘Greek dissoluteness (τῶν Ἑλλήνων ... εὐχέρειαν),’ hoping instead to show his ‘greatness of soul and purity in regard to money (περὶ τὰ χρήματα μεγαλοψυχία καὶ καθαρότητι),’ and possessing ‘a general recognition of his goodness and self-

Polybios does not refer to the episode in 133, but, considering Aemilianus' reputation and his receiving and giving the gifts in question in public, it is plausible that this was a known and plausible example of his virtue, a phenomenon to which Polybios did refer, and then was later picked up specifically by Livius. It is certain here that he, and Polybios for his moralising reference to Aemilianus, show the readers Rome’s corruption while using monetary topics as a key. In the light of the influence and availability of their texts, it is likely that this view influenced later writers. It is, however, important that Livius thinks here that receiving and giving gifts in reasonable manners such as in public and using them as reward to soldiers are not indicative of corruption and rather demonstrate the virtue of the individual concerned. This does not suggest Livius rather liked to concoct a moralising story including gift-giving to praise Aemilianus in 133 (and Rome in c. 170) unrealistically. The agenda that Livius and Polybios seem to emphasise is based on the antipathy to Greek luxury and the ideal of Roman austerity, in which monetary generosity does not provoke admiration. Livius, therefore, notices a moralistic aspect in the episode of 133, but has no ideological reason to invent a story of gift-giving in it. For the matters of public gifts, Livius writes what he regards as the case, although this may not go for other ways of gift-giving, for example that in private since he indirectly criticises the generals who were contemporary with Aemilianus.

Polybios’ silence on the gifts of c. 170 and similar cases and Livius’ lack of support from other authors here can also be explained reasonably. Polybios is not

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14 Astin 1967a: 32.
particularly interested in the details of senatorial decrees.\textsuperscript{16} It is the substance, even of the diplomatic exchange, that matters to him, not the gift-giving that followed. Nor was the custom an unfamiliar one in the Greek world. For instance, in 242 the Koan diplomats were given 20 drachmas by Gonnoi and 10 staters by Phaistos following their successful mission to have the cities recognise the ἀσυλία of the temple of Asklepios in Kos (\textit{SEG} LI.1056.B.1.6; LIII.850.1.17).\textsuperscript{17} In c. 201, Arkades similarly awarded gifts to Teos' envoys after acknowledging the Teian ἀσυλία (\textit{IC} I.v.52.ll.44-5).\textsuperscript{18} Gift-giving had been a sort of ordinary appendage following main negotiations for the Greeks although these two cases also suggest that the Greeks had had an idea of indebted foreign envoys to their state through pecuniary gifts. In the light of this, it is not strange that Polybios does not refer to the gift-giving by the Senate in c. 170 or similar cases and other authors followed him, although this suggests that Livius, who does refer to the custom, is rather unusual among ancient historians.

It is also noticeable that the gifts in c. 170, just as in the epigraphic cases, were given by the Senate as part of its answer to the states that sent envoys, and so resulted in connections being made between the envoys and the Senate, not particular senators or magistrates. This means that the Senate collectively and legitimately approached foreign individuals and indirectly their fellow citizens with a tool apart from official contacts among states, i.e. the method in informal diplomacy as I call it. This suggests the significance of the Senate in Roman diplomacy. This is supported by Polybios. He relates (at 6.13.6-7, esp. 7) that ‘all (πάντα)’ contacts with outsiders are decided by the Senate, and that ‘the people

\textsuperscript{16} Briscoe 1973: 2-3.
\textsuperscript{17} Rigsby 1996: 106-53.
\textsuperscript{18} Savalli-Lestrade 2012: 172.
have nothing to do with such business (προς δὲ τὸν δῆμον καθάπαξ οὐδὲν ἐστι τῶν προειρημένων).’ At 6.13.8, he calls the order ‘the perfectly aristocratic constitution (τελείως ἀριστοκρατικὴ ... ἡ πολιτεία),’ emphasising the collective leadership of the senators. These Polybian references have been noticed by scholars.  

Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider the senatorial influence in greater detail, in order to show the significance of informal diplomacy in Roman diplomacy, I shall, on occasion, refer to the Senate in later chapters, noting, in particular, that it collectively managed Roman diplomacy while using a combination of both official and unofficial methods.

These analyses show that the custom of gift-giving clearly functioned as a tool of Roman diplomacy, and that the mechanism is just that of informal diplomacy. There is generally no reason to doubt the information about gift-giving although it is not covered by other ancient historians except Livius. The outstanding question is whether the custom was used accidentally in c. 170, 140, and before and in c. 135, or continuously, and when the practice worked, if the latter is the case, although the epigraphic examples have suggested that it was a consistent practice over many years. Analysing these two questions has a direct bearing on how far we can identify informal diplomacy in the context of Rome’s foreign affairs during the period of expansion in the Greek world. These topics, as well as, the role of gift-giving in this diplomatic concept in Rome’s rise, are further considered below with case studies.

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19 E.g. Lintott 1999: 196-9; Yakobson 2009: 52-4; Pina Polo 2011: 58; Seager 2013: 250.
Section 2: Gift-Giving and the Further Approach to Informal Diplomacy

I shall now argue that the practice of gift-giving occurred repeatedly in Roman diplomacy, and actually at least from the 200s to the 130s, and that the results suggest that it is fruitful to notice the contacts of Rome with the Greeks during the period in the subsequent chapters, in order to demonstrate the significance of informal diplomacy to Rome.

What should be first confirmed is the custom was a diplomatic method of Rome under the Senate to approach outsiders in the 200s. This aim is first achieved by analysing a case of 200 in which Rome was contacted by the Ptolemies just before the Second Macedonian War. The envoys visited the Senate and announced that their king would support a Roman advance into Greece (Liv. 31.9.1-5). It is noteworthy that Livius states (at 31.9.5) that the Senate expressed its gratitude to the king, and resolved that ‘each of the envoys be presented 5,000 asses as a gift (munera deinde legatis in singulos quinum milium aeris ... missa).’ Alongside the exchange of favour between Rome and the king, the Senate used its reply to his message to make the envoys, who may well have been the elites in the dynasty, individually indebted to Rome, just as in the case of c. 170, and with gifts of even greater value. The envoys had not shown her any kindness on the stage of official diplomacy, although they might have contributed to the kingdom's decision to support Rome. In the course of the friendly exchange of favour between both states, it was impossible for the envoys to decline the gifts. Since the gifts were given in the senatorial session, the envoys were expected to

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be friendly to Rome afterwards. The Roman state strengthened its relationship with the Ptolemies both through official contacts, and with the use of gifts to win favour with the Ptolemaic envoys, providing Rome with another avenue through which to approach the kingdom. Furthermore, the gifts appeared, in part, as a response to the king’s support for Roman intervention against ‘treacherous (infida)’ Macedonia (31.1.9). The gifts are not analysed in a moralistic sense of the Romans, or with reference to their monetary self-restraint. Livius and his sources, possibly different Rome’s annalists, do not refer to or invent this episode to suggest Rome’s moral decline, but more simply relate the episode in a similar style to that of c. 170.

A similar situation can also be found in the case of 203, when the Senate welcomed a deputation from Masinissa of Numidia, i.e. a non-Greek state. It approved his kingship and presented splendid gifts, awarding 5,000 asses to each of the envoys (Liv. 30.17.6-14). This was near the close of the Second Punic War: Masinissa had been made king by P. Cornelius Scipio, later Africanus, and was in the midst of the campaign against Carthage and its supporters. The Senate here strengthened its relationship with Masinissa, and created a new, unofficial, one with the envoys through the gifts. While gift-giving as such was an official action of Rome and showed her generosity, making the envoys indebted to her in public enabled her to use them as a channel for cultivating a closer friendship with Masinissa and for approaching other Numidians, outside of formal contacts at a state level. It is important that this was also profitable to Rome’s concluding the campaign swiftly. Masinissa had not possessed control of Numidia. In fact, in

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22 Eckstein 1987a: 244.
the Battle of Zama, Carthage mobilised many Numidians (App. *Pun.* 33; Diod. 27.10; Liv. 30.33.3; Polyb. 15.3.5-7 and 11.3). The gifts to the envoys therefore were used to increase Rome’s influence in Africa against Carthage soon in parallel to the official contact with Masinissa (and the continuing campaign of him and Africanus) more than simply making a good impression on outsiders. What should be furthermore confirmed is that, considering this context, there is no reason to think that Livius and his sources exaggerated the gifts here with any moralising agenda just as the cases that have been picked up.

The earliest recorded example comes from the last years of the Second Punic War. In 205, the Senate received envoys from Saguntum in Hispania. The senators praised the city’s pro-Roman stance shown on the eve of the Punic War, and gave 10,000 asses to each of the diplomats (Liv. 28.39.16-19). Although the precise relationship between Rome and Saguntum before the war is controversial, in 205 the Senate confirmed its friendship with the city and the gift-giving functioned as part of the practice while indebting the envoys to Rome and making them a channel to approach their fellow citizens. It is furthermore noteworthy that the gifts here also worked as a tool of the wider approach to other contemporaries. The envoys were introduced to the Senate when Africanus reported the conquest of Hispania. The gratitude expressed by Rome for the support of Saguntum, and the gifts of even greater value than those of 203 and 202

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24 Richardson 1986: 63.
25 In addition, the Senate here decided that ‘lodgings and hospitality (*locus ... latiaque*)’ be provided for the delegates in parallel to the pecuniary gifts (Liv. 28.39.19). This suggests that gifts were not necessarily to cover expenses for the stay of envoys in Rome.
200, were part of an attempt to showcase ‘a model to all nations (documentum omnibus gentibus)’ of loyalty for Rome (28.39.17), and her generosity and victory. This attitude of the contemporary leading Romans might be confirmed by an inscription from the city. It informs that P(ublio) Scipioni co(n)s(uli) / imp(eratori) ob restitutam Saguntum / ex s(enatus) c(onsulto) bello Punico secundo (CIL II.3836). This displayed the special relation between Saguntum, Africanus and the Senate, Rome’s generous support to the citizens, and her eventual victory. The reference of ‘P. Scipio, the consul and the imperator’ favouring the citizens of Saguntum around the period of ‘the Second Punic War’ could appear only in the context of Africanus’ arrangement of Hispania after his victory over Carthage in the region.27 The existence of this inscription suggests that Africanus and other contemporary Romans liked to display their friendship with the city and their generosity, although the extant inscription seems a renovated one of the Augustan era and the original is said to have been erected in the Late Republic.28 In any case, the monetary gifts given to the Saguntine envoys functioned as part of these various approaches to the diverse outsiders.

It is important to note, however, that despite such frequent appearance in the cases mentioned above, there is no information regarding gifts to foreign envoys by Rome before 205 in any of the extant sources.29 Nowhere in Livius’ seven preceding books on the Second Punic War and Roman diplomacy during the period is there any reference to this custom,30 much less in his first and second

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28 Badian 1958: 116-9; Richardson 1986: 64 n.10; MacMullen 2000: 75 and 159.
30 For instance, he describes, in detail, the dialogue between Rome and the delegates sent by Hieron II of Syracuse about his support for Rome in 216, and the discussions among the Romans during the contacts with the envoy of Hannibal after the Battle of Cannae, but there is no reference to gifts to the diplomats (22.37 and 58-61).
This absence of reference to gift-giving by Rome in the surviving works of Livius, much less other authors, suggests that it appeared just in the 200s. Yet, this lack of information might also result simply from a loss of literary, epigraphic and other material sources. It is furthermore possible that the sources employed by Livius in his description of the period before 205 omitted any mention of the custom although it was really used. It might be the case that Livius’ sources considered Rome’s relative austerity in the pre-205 period to be an ideal, consequently exaggerating the later moral decline by emphasising the custom’s role and prominence in the later period. Certainly, as was shown, Livius himself does not criticise the act of gift-giving as illegitimate, but his sources might have opposed it in any way. Considering the situation of source survival and the possibilities of trouble of transmission of information expected based on it, it is difficult to regard directly the lack of evidence for the gift-giving by Rome before 205 as a sign that the custom was adopted by her in this decade. Nevertheless, it is at least possible to argue that Rome exploited gift-giving, approaching or manipulating outsiders through channels apart from official contacts among states, continuously from 205 onwards, that is, when Rome increased her influence particularly in the East. There is more evidence to support this position.

In 190, for example, the Senate gave each of the Ptolemaic envoys 4,000 asses. These gifts were awarded as part of the Roman response to the kingdom’s embassy that congratulated Rome on her success in driving Antiochos III out of Greece and urged the Romans to continue the war into Asia Minor (Liv. 37.3.9-11). This exchange confirmed the friendship between the Roman and Ptolemaic

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31 Yet, unfortunately, the second Decade covering the years 292-219 is no longer extant except the epitome of the books. Levene 2010: 5-9.
regimes. Once again, however, the gifts given to the envoys publicly displayed Rome's generosity, while simultaneously indebting them to Rome on a personal level. Furthermore, this example of informal diplomacy would soon work in Rome's favour. The Ptolemies also offered their military support at this time, but Rome did not want their intervention and declined it (37.3.11). The Ptolemies wanted to exploit her attack on Antiochos as an opportunity to attack him by themselves, but could not do it freely. They had made a treaty with him.\textsuperscript{33} If Rome had responded to their offer positively, however, they would have been able to treat the answer as a request for support by an ally, thus using it as a pretext for attacking him despite the pact. Nevertheless, Rome ignored the proposal and so prevented them from intervening in the war. This disregard could be perceived as a display of her disrespect towards the Ptolemies despite the friendship between both emphasised here and at least in 200.\textsuperscript{34} However, Rome's friendly response to the Ptolemies’ congratulations would have encouraged the envoys to receive the gifts. This would have made it difficult for them to complain about Rome's reaction to the offer of military support, and led them to put in a good word for her in Egypt. The gifts functioned as a tool of managing the contacts with outsiders delicately just as in the cases in the 200s.

In 173, envoys from Antiochos IV visited Rome to renew their alliance and friendship. The Senate accepted the request and gave Apollonios, the leader of the deputation, 100,000 asses (Liv. 42.6.6-11).\textsuperscript{35} This was clearly a staggering figure.\textsuperscript{36} He was thus greatly indebted to Rome, becoming a strong supporter as

\textsuperscript{33} Eckstein 2008: 309-10; Grainger 2010: 276-7.
\textsuperscript{34} As regards the formation of the friendship, see Gruen 1984: 62-3.
\textsuperscript{36} Gera 1998: 118-9.
well as an unofficial method of approaching the Seleucid dynasty, although there is no direct evidence regarding his contact with Rome in the following years. This gift also functioned as a way of unofficially managing relations with eastern states, distinct from the delivery of official messages. Antiochos had just succeeded to the throne and needed to prepare for an expected attack by the Ptolemies. The latter were officially Rome’s ally, but Rome did not overly desire a Ptolemaic victory. The positive treatment of Apollonios, the Seleucid king’s chief retainer, by granting more luxurious gifts than usual, showed the Ptolemies (and possibly other rivals) that Rome supported Antiochos beyond simply recognising his kingship. The gift functioned as a method of discouraging any open attack on him. This was particularly effective, since it showed Rome’s consideration for Antiochos but did not openly antagonise others: gift-giving could hardly be classed as a hostile action.

There is another example of gift-giving in a senatorial session of 172, when some Thracians visited Rome around the time of the latter’s decision to attack Macedonia. They were from the Maedi, the Cepnati, and the Asti, and asked the Senate to agree to an alliance and friendship. The senators presented 2,000 asses to each of the envoys, along with their agreement (Liv. 42.19.6-7, esp. 7). It is noteworthy that in this case, Rome noticed that the tribes were ‘at the back of Macedonia (ab tergo Macedoniae),’ and therefore exploited the alliance to contain the Macedonians. This is confirmed by the fact that the meeting was held in open session, unlike that with Eumenes II of Pergamon during the same period.

37 Briscoe 2012: 173-5.
38 Mittag 2006: 159-60.
39 For his other actions under this king, see Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 49.
(42.14.1). Rome showed Macedonia and other contemporaries her friendship with the tribes and her advantage by gaining new allies in an important place. In this political game the gifts functioned as a tool of strengthening Rome’s partnership with the Thracians and publicising her generosity to the tribes and others beyond, while also indebting the envoys to Rome personally.

A similar contact is observed in a case of c. 170, in which envoys from Carthage and Masinissa visited Rome to bring an offering of grain and troops for Rome’s war against Macedonia. The Senate gave 2,000 asses to each of the ambassadors along with its declaration of gratitude to their states (Liv. 43.6.11-14). These gifts made the envoys indebted to Rome and made them a vehicle through which she could contact local elites and their fellow citizens further. This contact also showed others that her friendship with the two African states was firmer than a relationship maintained only through official contacts. This, in turn, would have highlighted the increasing nature of Roman power to other contemporaries, encouraging them to support Rome. Macedonia, by contrast, was experiencing difficulties in even influencing its closest neighbours in Greece (42.46; Polyb 27.4.1-5.8). Indeed, in 169, Pamphylia and a Gallic tribe asked Rome to renew and establish a friendship. The Senate gladly agreed to their requests and gave each of the envoys of the Pamphylians 2,000 asses, although for the Gauls, several luxurious items were given to the chieftain, while there is no reference to his envoys (Liv. 44.14.1-4). These gifts involved foreign diplomats in Rome’s diplomacy as an unofficial instrument to influence the envoys’

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homelands and other states alongside official diplomacy.

Up to this point, I have shown how gift-giving functioned as a tool of Roman diplomacy in cases where relations between the states in question were already cordial. This might still suggest that gifts were given simply as a token of friendship, and as a bonus to the messengers of favourable missives without ulterior motives. However, the custom was used even in more hostile situations. In 170, for example, the envoys from Chalkis visited Rome to complain about the actions of Roman generals in the Third Macedonian War. The Senate criticised the commanders concerned and resolved that the situation would be rectified, giving 2,000 asses to each of the diplomats (Liv. 43.8.7-9).\(^4^5\) In the context of a Roman apology, they were obligated to accept the gifts. It ensured that the envoys reported the result of the meeting in Rome favourably upon their return to Chalkis. They effectively worked as an unofficial tool of Roman diplomacy while relaying Rome’s official message to their fellow citizens. Moreover, by treating the delegation with kindness and criticising the generals, the Senate declared that their behaviour was not a true reflection of Rome. This improved the Senate’s standing, while simultaneously shifting any blame wholly onto the generals. The gifts here functioned as a tool of manipulating the relationship between Rome or the Senate and Chalkis, in parallel to the official negotiations, in an identical fashion to those enacted with allied states, considered above.

A similar case can be observed around the end of the Third Macedonian War. Livius relates (44.14.5-15.8, esp. 15.8) that Rhodes tried to arbitrate between Rome and Macedonia. The Senate angrily rejected their overtures, ‘but, 2,000

\(^4^5\) Errington 1990: 215 and 293.
asses were given to each of the envoys (*munus tamen legatis in singulos binum milium aeris missum est*),’ although they declined to accept the gift.46 One would be forgiven for assuming that this episode derives from nothing more than some confusion on the part of Livius or his sources, as suggested by some scholars.47 Considering the unusual reaction of the Rhodian envoys, however, I would argue that the practice of gift-giving did take place. Even if Livius and his sources did confuse points of chronology or other detail, they had no reason to invent the story. They might have intended to emphasise that the Rhodians behaved ‘arrogantly (*superbe*)’ in the meeting (44.14.8). Referring to their refusal to accept monetary gifts, however, does not demonstrate here any such arrogance. It was a natural response on this occasion, since the offer of arbitration had been denied, and the Senate had also freed Caria and Lykia from Rhodian control (44.15.1-2).48 It is significant that, even in this fraught context, the Senate treated the envoys favourably by giving gifts. It functioned as a suggestion that the relationship between Rhodes and Rome was not completely broken. If Rome had regarded Rhodes as an enemy, there would have been no attempt to make the envoys a vehicle for approaching Rhodes unofficially. The diplomats would have been expelled from Italy at the end of any negotiations, similar to those of Macedonia at the beginning of the war (42.36.7; cf. Diod. 30.1; Liv. 42.48.3; Polyb. 27.6.3).49 The Rhodian envoys thus avoided becoming Roman agents, but may well have noticed that Rhodes, as a whole, was not yet regarded as an enemy by Rome. Indeed, new diplomats later asked the Senate not to attack Rhodes, and promised

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46 For the background of the Rhodian attempt of arbitration, see Ager 1991: 33-7.
49 Briscoe 2012: 269-70.
their loyalty, blaming its role in the recent arbitration on a number of Rhodians favourable to Macedonia. The majority of the senators accepted the petition, albeit in a patronising manner (Diod. 31.5.3; Gell. 6.3.5-55; Liv. 44.35.4-5 and 45.10.4-15; Per. 46; Polyb. 30.4-5 and 31, esp. 30.31.14). The gifts failed to succeed as a tool in winning over individual Rhodian envoys but indirectly contributed to Rome’s managing the Rhodian negotiations in parallel to official discussions that were frequently hostile.

This trend is also seen in connection with Rome’s negotiations with Kotys IV of Thrace in c. 167, and Numantia in Hispania in 136. The former was an enemy of Rome in the Third Macedonian War. Shortly after the conflict, however, he sent the delegates to account for his conduct during the hostilities. The Senate welcomed his envoys and gave 2,000 asses to each of them (Liv. 45.42.6-12). The senators did not, in fact, accept Kotys’ account completely, but wanted to secure his friendship in order to control Thrace.50 The monetary gifts contributed to Rome’s relieving his tension soon through the reports of the envoys favourably to Rome in parallel to the Roman state’s official acceptance of his account. In the latter case, the delegates from Numantia were given gifts at Rome at a time when her troops were forced to make a truce in the difficulties and many Romans were unwilling to ratify it (Cassius Dio fr.79.1-3).51 While the pact was eventually repudiated, the gifts functioned as a method of maintaining a positive relationship with the envoys during the Romans’ internal debate. In these cases gift-giving was a lubricant between Rome and the two states in parallel to the official negotiations, in an identical fashion to relationships with more receptive parties.

Considering these examples offered in this chapter, it is clear that the Senate frequently used the custom of gift-giving at least from the 200s to the 130s to manipulate outsiders. This result suggests that informal diplomacy was a key component in Rome’s diplomatic practice during the period of expansion into the East. However, this conclusion so far results only from the analysis of gift-giving. In order to achieve the aim of this thesis, i.e. to show the validity of using this concept and its significance from the 200s to 133 (and afterwards), it is necessary to reveal more actions that can be categorised into informal diplomacy and the evidence that they played a more significant role in Rome during the decades than gift-giving which could be regarded by contemporaries as a mere appendage after the main negotiations.

I shall therefore end this chapter with considering how this aim is achieved. It is reasonable to remember that Rome’s gift-giving first appears in 205 in the extant sources. Considering the likely reasons of the lack of its information before the year as shown, this does not necessarily demonstrate that the custom was adopted by her in 205. But this shows that it is useful to consider if Roman diplomacy changed in this period from the viewpoint of approaching outsiders through informal channels. If some evidence that such methods apart from gift-giving played an important role in Roman diplomacy is found, it can also be used as a part of that of the significance of informal diplomacy in Rome from the 200s to 133.

So, which event around 205 should be noticed? What should be remembered is that Rome waged the Second Punic War and the First Macedonian War in this period. It is reasonable to focus on one of them or both, since there may well have been many opportunities for the people concerned to make diplomatic actions
during the struggle(s). The problem is which war should be picked up or whether both of them should be noticed. The cases of gift-giving in the negotiations with Saguntum and Masinissa might suggest the Second Punic War has to be picked up, at any rate. This might be supported by demographic evidence relating that the war carried a heavy human cost. According to the data taken from the census, the number of Roman citizens was c. 270,000 or 280,000 in 234/3, while, in 204/3, it had dropped to 214,000 (Liv. 29.37.7; Per. 20 and 29).\textsuperscript{52} Considering the lack of any serious defeat of Rome in the Macedonian War, these results of census show that for Romans of the period, Carthaginians easily represented the most foreign of all outsiders. There is, however, little evidence to suggest that the process of informal diplomacy worked between these powers. Hannibal’s ‘liberation’ of Italian troops and cities, to win them over to his cause, might initially seem to conform to a model of informal diplomacy (Polyb. 3.77.3-7 and 85.3-4). This policy might even have been later emulated by Rome during the advance against Greece from the 200s onwards. During the Punic War, however, Hannibal’s actions were not effective, owing to the lack of a tradition that emphasised autonomy and freedom against imperial states among the Italians.\textsuperscript{53} While Carthage was also secretly approached by some of Rome’s allies who wanted to defect (Liv. 23.41.13-43.5; Polyb. 7.2.1-5.8), these cases resulted from ad hoc necessities of the people concerned. It is doubtful whether the case of the Second Punic War demonstrates the significance of informal diplomacy to Rome.

I think that an alternative body of evidence can be found in the Roman contact with eastern Greeks in the context of the First Macedonian War. As I have

\textsuperscript{52} Brunt 1971a: 13, 46, and 62-3.
\textsuperscript{53} Erskine 1993: 58-62.
shown in the analysis of Polybios’ attitude to gift-giving, the Greeks were already comfortable with the practice of approaching outsiders through unorthodox channels. It is reasonable to expect that similar ideas and manners are found in the analysis of the diplomatic games. Moreover, unlike the Punic War, the Macedonian War ended with a peace in which no party was officially treated as a loser. In the process diplomacy may well have been as important as, or possibly more significant, than military affairs. The experience in the stage could encourage Rome to approach outsiders even beyond Greece such as in Hispania with informal diplomacy. However, I do not suggest that Roman informal diplomacy was only born of Rome’s encountering Greeks in the 200s. In fact, Rome had been engaging in some form of this practice since the fourth century, when interacting with the Samnites. According to Livius (at 9.20.3), in 318 many Samnite states approached Rome to renew a treaty between them. Although the Senate rejected the proposal, the Samnite envoys obtained a two year truce by appealing to ‘(Roman) individuals (singulos).’ This was obviously an approach through channels detached from the conventional channels and should therefore be classed as an example of informal diplomacy. While both Rome and the Samnites might not have considered the nature of this diplomatic contact, it remains clear that the contact with the Greeks in the 200s was not the encounter with informal diplomacy for Rome. However, even if informal diplomatic actions and the concept were not necessarily novel to her by the 200s, the appearance of gift-giving in 205 in Livius’ source, despite the lack of the information about this custom in his books for the first ten years of the Punic War and early centuries of

Rome, suggests that the conflict with the eastern Greeks during this decade acted as a catalyst, a time at which Rome realised the value of diplomacy conducted through unofficial channels and used them continuously afterwards. This hypothesis is supported by the difference between the Romans and the Greeks of the extent of using the methods of approaching outsiders individually. The Greeks had developed that kind of diplomacy and for example used fully the notion προξενία on the stage even before the 200s.\(^55\) In contrast, Rome had developed the concepts of patrocinium (or clientela), amicitia, and hospitium in connection with personal relationships, probably by the Middle Republic.\(^56\) Rome had not used such ideas in diplomacy frequently, though. In light of these factors, it is reasonable to expect that the contacts with such Greeks promoted the use of the channels apart from official ones by the Romans, and that the analysis of those in the context of First Macedonian War contributes to the demonstration.

**Conclusion**

From 205 to 136, the custom of gift-giving functioned as a tool of Roman diplomacy, turning the recipients into supporters of Rome and creating a more personal method of contacting foreign populations. This is informal diplomacy. This practice was a key component of Roman diplomacy in the period of her advance into the Greek world. The first appearance of the phenomenon, in 205, and the conditions of informal diplomatic channels in contemporaries show that it is useful to focus on the contacts of Rome with the eastern Greeks in the period

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\(^{55}\) Adcock and Mosley 1975: 11 and 161-4; Mitchell 1997: 182.

\(^{56}\) Nybakken 1946: 248-53; Badian 1958: 1-2; Burton 2011: 1, 49, 64, and 158.
of the First Macedonian War next in developing further the discussion of the extent to which unofficial diplomatic practice was visible, and the validity of inventing the concept of informal diplomacy in the study of Roman imperial expansion and the changing character of the Roman Republic.
Chapter 2

Informal Diplomacy and the Eastern Greeks

Introduction

This chapter aims to show that the concept of informal diplomacy is useful in understanding Rome from the 200s onwards, in particular, in the context of her connection with the eastern Greeks. Rome failed to control the negotiations with them in the First Macedonian War and was consequently forced to withdraw from Greece. I argue that this occurred because leading Greeks were skilled in balancing the competing interests of the groups concerned, whether those interests were explicitly articulated or not, whereas Rome comparatively disregarded such concerns and had few methods for dealing with them. The Greeks used not only official and legal practices, but also other methods that were not in the public eye, and were therefore not constrained by legality or legitimacy, in order to win over the people in and beyond their state. A number of individuals lacking the official authority to participate in the management of foreign affairs could thus be approached, and could themselves intervene in foreign affairs, and in pursuit of their own interests, in the process that I have labelled informal diplomacy. This supported the Greeks’ winning over their fellow citizens and their neighbours. While Roman diplomats were willing to receive such informal approaches from foreigners, they did not understand the concept, much less employ any methods of informal diplomacy. I argue that this difference led to Rome’s isolation at the end of the Macedonian War and her withdrawal from Greece despite never suffering a military defeat.
This chapter begins by showing the use of informal diplomacy by the Greeks and the little interest in outsiders of Rome on the eve of the Macedonian War. Next, I argue that in the 210s, in the prelude to the war and at its outset, Rome was involved in the diplomatic games of such Greeks, in particular those of Philippos V of Macedonia and those pitched against him in Aitolia. Lastly, I will demonstrate that it was Rome’s lack of informal diplomacy that contributed to her failure in the Macedonian War, an outcome that made Rome aware of its significance. The impact of this revelation on her immediate expansion in the East shown in these discussions will form the subject of the subsequent chapters.

Section 1: Greece on the Eve of the First Macedonian War

This section shows that eastern Greeks had used not only official but also informal channels in their diplomacy just before their full encounter with Rome, and that contemporary Romans, in contrast, had little interest in outsiders, much less used informal diplomacy, despite their tactical use of the custom of gift-giving from the 200s onwards shown by Chapter 1.

In order to achieve this aim, we begin by noting the actions of Aratos. He was an Achaian leader, but influenced the whole of Greece in the immediate prelude to the initial encounter between the Romans and eastern Greeks during the First Macedonian War. Analysing his diplomacy enables this section to consider the diplomatic manners of the Greeks in this period. His actions are shown in detail by Plutarchos and Polybios. According to them (Plut. Arat. 16-23; Polyb. 2.43.4), Aratos seized Akrokorinthos in 243/2 from Macedonia, and won fame in Achaia. In the following decades, he strengthened his leadership by

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increasing Achaia’s power, attacking the neighbouring tyrants supported by Macedonia. In particular, after the death of Demetrios II in 229, he took advantage of their unrest and extended Achaia aggressively (2.44.2-6; cf. Plut. *Arat.* 24.3 and 30.4).¹ His persuading the Macedonians into abandoning Peiraieus in c. 228 also resulted from this campaign (Paus. 2.8.6; Plut. *Arat.* 34.4-6; *Syll*² 497.II.10-17).

Aratos was later to seek an alliance with Macedonia, though. Achaia began a war against Sparta in 229/8, and faced military difficulties. Aratos regarded it necessary to take control of the situation, planning to ally with Macedonia (Plut. *Arat.* 11-12 and 41; Polyb. 2.47.1-52.4, esp. 47.7, 48.4, and 50.10). He did not, however, have any contact with Macedonia ‘openly (προδήλως).’ The kingdom had been an enemy for many Achaians. There was the possibility that they would object to any such alliance. Moreover, Sparta and Aitolia, other rivals of Achaia, could block the plan in some way. Consequently, Aratos first approached his friends in Megalopolis ‘secretly (δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων).’ This city was a member of the Achaian Federation, but had friendly relations with Macedonia. With the support of the friends Aratos persuaded Megalopolis into sending its envoys, who were the friends of Aratos in question, to propose at the meeting of Achaia that military support from Antigonos III, the successor of Demetrios, should be sought through dispatching the Megalopolitan envoys to Macedonia under the name of Achaia. After the motion was approved, the friends of Aratos visited Antigonos, meaning that Aratos was able to negotiate informally with Antigonos through them. Aratos indicated the danger of Sparta and Aitolia, suggesting that Macedonia offer its

² For a chronology of the inscription, and a supplement, see Habicht 1982: 118-27.
support to Achaia, to compete against them. Antigonos agreed with this plan. He might have regarded it as a chance to advance into Greece but, in any case, he offered Achaia military support. This news was received favourably by some Achaians because Sparta was still on the offensive. At the ‘national council (τὸ κοινὸν βουλευτήριον)’ i.e. on the official stage of diplomacy, Aratos then dared to offer a cautious view about inviting Antigonos’ troops. Aratos wanted that the act of summoning Macedonia should be decided in accordance with the general will of Achaia without his being regarded as its advocator. He was worried that if he took a leading part in inviting Macedonia back into the Peloponnesos despite his achievements as an anti-Macedonian politician in previous decades, and moreover if the king brought some disadvantage to Achaia later, he would disappoint many fellow citizens, in particular Achaian soldiers who had fought for the federation, and possibly be criticised by his rivals (2.50.7-9). Aratos thus carefully led the great majority of his fellow citizens to agree with inviting Macedonia while manipulating his Megalopolitan friends, Antigonos, and the Achaians through a network of informal contacts and formal statements. His efforts were rewarded in 224, with the creation of the Hellenic League, including Thessalia, Epeiros, Akarnania, Boiotia, Phokis, Euboia and perhaps Opuntanian Lokris. They were led by Antigonos, and defeated Sparta in 222 (Just. 28.4.1-10; Plut. Arat. 46.1; Polyb. 2.52.5, 54.1-4, and 66.4-69.11; Syll² 518).³ One might be tempted to regard this manoeuvre as a simple case of political trickery, but I would argue that this was an example of informal diplomacy being carried out by an individual: Aratos had independently controlled foreign affairs through a combination of methods.

³ Walbank 1940: 15-16; Bringmann, Steuben and Ameling 1995: no.135.
E. S. Gruen is sceptical about the historicity of this secret manoeuvre. He sees it as a story developed by the pro-Spartan historian Phylarchos, one of Polybios’ and Plutarchos’ sources. But this view is unacceptable, as P. Paschidis argues. Megalopolis approached Macedonia in public under the approval of Achaia. If Polybios had drawn the picture unrealistically, his near contemporaries would have criticised him. Furthermore, if Aratos had not thought of reconciliation with Macedonia, his previously anti-Macedonian pedigree makes it likely that he would have attempted to prevent Megalopolis from approaching Antigonus, stopping the city from persuading Achaia to dispatch envoys to the king. In light of the fact that Aratos succeeded in sending his son as an envoy to Macedonia after Antigonus’ offer of support (Polyb. 2.51.5), Aratos’ position in Achaia was still strong. Therefore, Achaia’s decision to approach Macedonia was decided with Aratos’ private support and advice, and the historicity of his manoeuvre, described by Polybios, is reliable.

It is noteworthy that such individual participation in foreign affairs, comprising both formal and informal channels, was an acceptable method of diplomacy by Greek contemporaries. Polybios claims that Aratos did not admit to his manoeuvres, but the author analyses them while differentiating between the official and informal actions, without criticising Aratos (2.47.7-11). A similar recognition of the two avenues of public and private, official and informal, and the acceptance of the act in both ways can also be observed in several roughly contemporary honorific decrees. For example, in the middle of the third century Iasos in Caria invested the title of πρόξενος and several privileges upon Heroides

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of Theangela, because he was an ἀνήρ καλός καὶ ἀγαθὸς περὶ τήν Ἱασέων / ... , ἰδίαι τε τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τῶν / πολιτῶν ἥρκος παρεχόμενος καὶ κοινῆ / ὑπέρ τῆς πόλεως καὶ λέγων καὶ πράσσων / ἀγαθὸν ὅ τι ἢν δύνηται (SEG LVII.1067.II.6–11). Iasos announced that not only had he κοινῆ, i.e. officially, participated in the formation of contacts between both states, but also ἰδίαι, privately, supported the citizens, considering such actions as praiseworthy. Samothrake also honoured a Ptolemaic governor of the Hellespont and Thrace for διακείμενος δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον [εὐνό]ϊ/ως πάσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται καὶ κοινῆ τῆ[ς πό]λεως καὶ ἰδίαι τῶν πρός αὐτὸν ἀφικνουμένων (SyII² 502A.II.14–16). He was praised for officially taking part in the contacts between Samothrake and the Ptolemies, and for privately supporting visitors from the island. Considering this evidence, then, there was no difficulty for the honourees and the honourers when such informal connections were disclosed. The similarity of the phrases with the antithetical terms of ἰδίαι and κοινῆ suggests that they formed a set expression, and that such varied participation in diplomacy was an accepted practice. Aratos’ case and these other examples reveal the blurring between the boundaries of official and informal diplomatic action among the Greeks. It supports my hypothesis stressing the crucial nature of informal diplomacy as a method of political practice, and confirms the skilful and flexible approach to outsiders utilised by states and individuals within the Greek world.

The act of approaching outsiders was not, in fact, peculiar to the Greeks on the eve of the Macedonian War. Rome was also interested, to an extent, in public

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6 This is supported by some literary sources such as Aristot. AP 40.2, Thuk. 1.141.3, Xen. Hell. 1.2.10 and Mem. 2.1.12. Usual usage of this formula in Greek proxeny decrees is also indicated by Mack 2015: 49–51. For the honorary inscription from Samothrake, see also IG XII.8.156, Austin 2006: 467–8, and Dmitrova 2008: no.170.
opinion when conducting diplomacy. This is observed in her interaction with Greeks in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War. In 229, Rome sent troops against Teuta, the queen of Ardiaei, who had engaged in piracy around the Adriatic. The Senate had vowed to take revenge, and the operation was concluded successfully. Consequently, Rome obtained several cities and tribes as her subjects. It was in this context that the Senate sent envoys to Aitolia, Achaia, Corinth, and Athens, to explain its rationale for sending troops (App. Illy. 7·8; Polyb. 2.11·12).

This was, however, an unusual action. Rome had had a few contacts with the Greeks since her war against Pyrrhos of Epeiros, around 280. The contacts before the Illyrian War were basically made on the initiative of the Greeks. For example, in c. 263 a certain L. Volceius was given the title of πρόξενος by Aitolia (IG IX.1².1.17.l.51). In the same period, Eresos of Lesbos bestowed the same honorary title on some Romans although this might have occurred in later decades (XII.Suppl.127.ll.48 and 62). In the latter half of the third century, Akarnania approached the Senate when the former was attacked by Aitolia (Just. 28.1·2), and Apollonia also made contact with Rome, although the purpose of the city is unclear (Cassius Dio fr.42.1; Liv. Per. 15; Val.Max. 6.6.5; Zonar. 8.7). In every case, the Romans were the passive, recipient people. In the light of this general tendency, Rome’s interest in opinion of the Greeks in c. 229 seems to be an unusual action, although it should be noted that the Illyrian War and the dispatch of envoys to Hellenistic states in the aftermath were executed on Roman initiative and Rome had sent her envoys to Egypt in 273 and possibly after the

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7 De Souza 1999: 76·9.
8 Mack 2012: 218·23.
First Punic War (Cassius Dio fr.41; Dion.Hal. RA 20.14; Eutrop. 3.1; Just. 18.2.8-9; Liv. Per. 14; Val.Max. 4.3.9; Zonar. 8.6). At least, Rome was unaccustomed to weighing international public opinions into her diplomacy and to using informal methods of it, such as those already employed by contemporary Greeks.

This argument is supported by Rome’s attack on the Illyrians, led by Demetrios of Pharos, in 219. This offensive allegedly resulted from his violation of a friendship with Rome and allying with Macedonia (Polyb. 3.16 and 18-19). In depicting his disloyalty, however, Polybios and his sources, such as Fabius Pictor and Aratos, betray their own prejudice. Whatever the true nature of Rome’s relationship with Demetrios was, her antagonism essentially resulted from his success in ‘uniting the Illyrians, disrupting the system of small and thus unthreatening political units that the Romans had set up.’ It is important to note that Rome did not seek any input from her Greek neighbours here, although Demetrios was an ally of the king of Macedonia, the leader of the Hellenic League. H. J. Dell argues, based on some Latin sources (e.g. Eutrop. 3.7; Oros. 4.13.16), that Rome’s goal here was to secure a route through which to bring supplies into north-eastern Italy. His argument partly explains why Rome did not seem to be interested in the Greeks at that time. Yet, if Rome had been always mindful of outsiders, she would have attempted to convince Demetrios’ neighbours of the legitimacy of her campaign here. In addition, sources such as Pictor and Polybios, who were interested in the relation between Rome and the Greeks, would have referred to it, if any such contact took place. Their silence and the lack of evidence for any approach to the Greeks indicates Rome’s meagre interest in outsiders.

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11 Petzold 1971: 212.
This nature of Roman diplomacy can also be observed in an inscription from Pharos. Rome restored the independence of the islanders after Demetrios’ defeat. It is noteworthy that they immediately managed their diplomacy without her intervention (SEG XXIII.489). The reference in line 8 of the fragment A to a συμμαχία between Pharos and Rome might appear to count against my argument. As P. S. Derow suggests, it might be the creation of a formal alliance that ‘consists of fully reciprocal undertakings by each party.’ There is no sign, however, that Pharos was treated as a foedus sociale, practically Rome’s dependant, although the inscription was surely produced shortly after the Second Illyrian War. Moreover, after the brief reference to the συμμαχία, the inscription records, in great detail, Pharos’ attempt ‘to rebuild the state (εἰς ἑπανόρθωσιν τῆς πόλεως),’ with ‘the support (βοηθῶσι)’ of Paros and Athens, and to re-establish friendships with other Greeks (A.ll.10·41, esp. ll.14·15 and 35·6). There is no reference to Rome. This suggests the Republic had little interest in Illyria, although Pharos seemed to be regarded as a Roman dependent by contemporaries (cf. Polyb. 7.9.13) and N. G. L. Hammond supposes that Rome and Macedonia were ‘engaged in a cold war’ for Demetrios’ exclusion. Indeed, if Rome had regarded Macedonia as an enemy, or if Rome had always considered international public opinion, she would have supported Pharos eagerly and displayed it to curry favour with contemporaries, when Rome wanted to ensure the security of the Adriatic in advance of the coming war against Carthage (3.16.1). Moreover, in this period, the balance of power in Greece changed by the establishment of the Hellenic League led by Macedonia.

14 Eckstein 1999: 398·418.  
15 Hammond 1968: 6·12.
It is noticeable that the Greeks were interested in the affairs of Rome, and used them in their own diplomatic struggles. This is observed in a speech attributed to Agelaos of Naupaktos by Polybios. Agelaos was an Aitolian leader in the Social War, fought between Achaia and Aitolia. Philippos V, the successor of Antigonos, had supported Achaia in his capacity as the leader of the Hellenic League, and Aitolia came close to being defeated. According to Polybios (5.104.1-4), Agelaos presented the following argument in the peace meeting at Naupaktos in 217:

... ὃς ἔφη δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε πολεμεῖν τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἀλλήλῳς, ἀλλὰ μεγάλην χάριν ἔχειν τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰ λέγοντες ἐν καὶ ταῦτο πάντες καὶ συμπλέκοντες τὰς χεῖρας, καθάπερ οἱ τοὺς ποταμοὺς διαβαίνοντες, δύναντο τὰς τῶν βαρβάρων ἑφόδους ἀποτριφόμενοι συσσώζειν σφάς αὐτοῦς καὶ τὰς πόλεις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ παράπαν τούτο μὴ δυνατόν, κατὰ γε τὸ παρόν ἡξίου συμφορονεῖν καὶ φυλάττεσθαι, προϊδομένους τὸ βάρος τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ συνεστῶτος πρὸς ταῖς δύσεσι πολέμου. δήλον γάρ εἶναι παντὶ τῷ καὶ μετρίως περὶ τὰ κοινὰ στοιχάζοντι καὶ νῦν, ὡς ἐὰν τὰς παράπαν τὸν Καρχηδόνιον ἔστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡξίους τοῖς παραπάντων τοὺς ἤξελειν, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς κατὰ τοὺς ἱππολόπως καὶ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν πέρα τοῦ δέοντος. διότερον ἡξίου πάντας μὲν φυλάξασθαι τὸν καρὸν, μάλιστα δὲ Φιλίππον.

Agelaos appealed to his listeners to prevent the Greeks from fighting each other, in order to prepare for the advance of the eventual victor of the Second Punic War into Greece. He treated Rome and Carthage as βάρβαροι that were to be resisted. J. Deininger considers this speech, and the subsequent peace (5.105.2), a sign that

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the Greeks regarded Rome as a menace. However, Aitolia would break this peace in 211, allying with Rome. The distrustful attitude towards Rome did not represent Aitolia’s opinion, and was used rhetorically. It is noteworthy that although Philippos was impressed by the speech, he also had already decided to make peace. He had been persuaded by Demetrios, who had been under his protection since 219, to attack Rome while she struggled in the war against Hannibal (5.101.7-10 and 105.1-2). The Carthaginians were also treated as βάρβαροι in Agelaos’ speech, but Philippos would ally with them and no one criticised it even after its being disclosed. The negative attitude towards Rome (and Carthage) in 217 thus was ‘shared’ among the Greeks regardless of their real thoughts of the non-Greeks concerned.

It is important to realise that the labelling the Romans as βάρβαροι was, nevertheless, not a simple rhetoric but functioned as a tool of maximising diplomatic interests for Aitolia and Philippos. The latter found an opportunity to rehabilitate Demetrios and to extend Macedonia’s influence in the Adriatic. Aitolia’s argument justified Philippos’ concluding the present war, while also establishing his leadership in Greece, and helped to persuade the states that accepted the peace the legitimacy of his new campaign in Illyria. The speech enabled Aitolia to end the Social War officially in an armistice, rather than any one side achieving victory. It was finished ostensibly on the behalf of the entirety of Greece. This kept up Aitolia’s appearances without accepting defeat, although the peace treaty provided that both parties retained what they possessed, and forced Aitolia to abandon many of its cities (Polyb. 5.103.7). A hostile image of

Rome was invoked by both parties to bridge the gap between their positions and achieve their aims on an informal level. This is not strictly an example of informal diplomacy. The negotiation was developed in an official context by representatives of both states. It does, however, bear similarities to the process. Both sides managed their diplomacy with legitimate tools, arguing that the defence of Greece was a top priority in securing a peace. However, they also informally considered that their individual interests that were best served by peacefully concluding the war. Aitolia’s reputation would be salvaged and Philippos’ side would gain territory. These aspects of the negotiations were politely accepted by the participants and others, although no reference was made to them in public.

One might doubt this conclusion on ground that the speech might be a sort of invention as O. Mørkholm thinks.\textsuperscript{18} Certainly, it is impossible to confirm whether Agelaos spoke as Polybios claims. The majority of scholars, however, recognise the veracity of the basic contents.\textsuperscript{19} This might result partly from the fact that Polybios promises to make every effort to inform his readers of precise phrases of each speech (cf. 12.25a–b). It is also important to remember that the image of Greek unity against βάρβαροι had been continuously and opportunistically used by Hellenistic diplomats, including those of Macedonia.\textsuperscript{20} Thus for Agelaos and his contemporaries including Philippos, it may well have been easy to exploit and accept. Moreover, Polybios and his sources could have met people who actually remembered or attended the meeting, and the existence of the descendants of such people among his readership might have prevented him from embellishing it excessively.

\textsuperscript{18} Mørkholm 1974: 132.
\textsuperscript{19} E.g. Walbank 1940: 66; Champion 1997: 111-4 and 123-6; Dmitriev 2011a: 149.
\textsuperscript{20} Wallace 2010: 148.
It is noticeable that conduct resembling that of Agelaos and informal diplomacy was also performed by Philippos. This is shown by an inscription recording letters sent by him to Larisa from 217 to 215, to encourage the citizens to reconstruct the city after the Social War. In the messages he referred to Rome as follows (Syll² 543.11.29-34):²¹

ὅτι γὰρ πάντων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν ὡς πλείστων μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος / τὴν τε πάλιν ἵσχυειν καὶ τὴν χώραν μή ὡσπερ νῦν αἰσχρῶς χερσευέσθαι, ... ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ τοὺς λαοὺς τοὺς ταῖς ὁμοίαις πολιτογραφίαις χρωμένους θεωρεῖν ὅν καὶ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι εἰσίν, οἱ καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας όταν ἐλευθερώσωσιν, προσδεχόμενοι εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα καὶ τῶν ἀρχαῖων με|[ταδι]δόντες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου ὃν μόνον τὴν ἰδίαν πατρίδα ἐπημεῖκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκίας <σ> χεδόν / [εἰς ἕβ]δομήκοντα τόπους ἐκπεπομφασιν.

He refers to Rome's system of citizenship as an example of how best to increase the spread of the franchise. There is no sign of his antipathy towards Rome as a non-Greek state, despite his acceptance of Agelaos' argument at Naupaktos at around the same time. It is more important to note that despite what he asserts, Roman freedmen were not given the same access to official power as free-born citizens.²² Philippos therefore invoked the image of Rome to show his consideration to Larisa, but he and his subjects lacked detailed knowledge even about one of Rome's most distinctive laws. The erection of this inscription means that Larisa also had no precise information about this topic, or cared little regarding the accuracy of what he claimed. What was important for Philippos and

²² Liv. Per. 20 reports freedmen were registered in four voting districts, but the authenticity of this reference is doubtful. Admission to office was allowed to their sons and descendants. Austin 2006: 76. Cf. Habicht 1970: 273; CAHVII.²:672.
Larisa was displaying his favour and goodwill towards the city, although he also seems to instruct Larisa to admit more outsiders to citizenship. Rome’s name and her misunderstood law were used as a tool for this aim. This use of a factually questionable argument to achieve an unspoken agenda bears similarities to the meeting at Naupaktos, and to the wider process of informal diplomacy.

These cases show the difference between the eastern Greeks and Romans on the eve of their encounter. The former consciously managed diplomacy while interweaving official channels and what were not constrained by matters of legality, publicity, and reasonability. These were examples of informal diplomacy and similar phenomena in action, and enabled the Greeks to adapt to diplomatic difficulties flexibly and cleverly. By contrast, Rome had little interest in the viewpoint of such Greeks, much less using the methods that could be categorised as informal diplomacy. This difference between both peoples actually would influence their full encounter.

Section 2: Philippos and the Aitolian Hawks

The significance of informal diplomacy during the First Macedonian War will now be considered. This is achieved by analysing the manoeuvres of the groups concerned on the Greek side and modifying the present image of this struggle from the viewpoint of their use of this diplomatic concept. Some scholars have characterised the conflict as a defensive war of Rome, waged around the Adriatic and Greece in order to prevent Philippos from advancing into Italy, where
his ally, Hannibal, was still at large. Rome allegedly therefore approached Aitolia to achieve this goal. Examination of the informal diplomacy employed by the eastern Greeks at this time, however, offers a different view of the situation that Philippos led not only Rome but also Hannibal around by the nose and that some Aitolians manoeuvred to persuade their fellow citizens to attack Philippos by using Rome.

1) Philippos’ Relations with Rome and Hannibal

The full encounter between Rome and the eastern Greeks commenced with Philippos’ intervention in the Second Punic War. This is confirmed by his alliance in 215 with Hannibal, supporting the offensive against Rome in Italy. Philippos sent envoys to him while making ‘them avoid (vitantes)’ areas guarded by Rome, keeping the visit a secret (Liv. 23.33.1-34.9, esp. 33.4; Polyb. 7.9). This is an example of informal diplomacy on the part of Philippos, despite his being a representative of a state, engaging in clandestine negotiations and failing to announce the forming of a treaty, although Rome later intercepted the envoys and discovered his deception. It is also noteworthy that the Carthaginians had been called βάρβαροι at Naupaktos, and Philippos had officially accepted the label, but had secretly contacted them to form an alliance, nevertheless. This secret approach might have been designed partly to avoid provoking Rome. Yet, it also fitted with his official attitude towards βάρβαροι. The secrecy of his contact with Carthage enabled him formally not to contradict the official rationale of the peace

24 For an outline of the war in this period, see Rawlings 2011: 299-303 and 318-9.  
in 217, while also allowing him to profit materially from the new alliance.

It is also significant that, despite his alliance with Carthage, Philippos did not attack Rome aggressively (App. *Mac.* 1; Just. 29.4.1-3; Liv. 23.34.1-9, 38.1-5, and 24.40.1-17; Plut. *Arat.* 51.1-2; Polyb 8.8.1-9, 12.1, and 13.1-14.11; Zonar. 9.4). This partly resulted from the weakness of his fleet and the difficulty of maintaining communications with Hannibal. Despite Rome’s naval superiority, Philippos temporarily occupied Corcyra, a Roman friend, but he did not prevent Rome from recapturing the island, and in c. 213, captured Lissos, not her ally, advancing into Messenia in Greece. Regarding this inconsistency, some scholars think that Philippos only targeted areas of Illyria outside of Roman control and, when he achieved this in 213, he ceased the campaign in the Adriatic. However, if attacking Roman dependants had not been included in his original plan, it is questionable whether he would have allied with Hannibal. The alliance would have met with Roman resistance once it was discovered, and would therefore increase the difficulty of Philippos’ campaign. Moreover, in 216, he tried to attack Apollonia, Rome’s ally since 229 (Polyb. 2.11.8 and 5.109-10). Thus, it is more plausible that he allied with Carthage in order to conquer the Illyrians whether or not they were Roman dependants, even though he elected not to attack Rome openly, for some reason.

The situation is clarified through analysing Philippos’ actions then more closely. According to Livius (23.33.10-12), the treaty with Hannibal stated that Philippos should go to ‘Italy with as large a fleet as possible’ and it was thought

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28 E.g. Dany 1999: 151; Errington 2008: 188.
that he would make it 200 ships - and ... the states in Greece and the islands around Macedonia belong to him and be a part of his kingdom (quam maxima classe - ducentas autem naves videbatur effecturus - in Italiam traireret et ... quae civitates continentes quaeque insulae ad Macedoniam vergunt, eae Philippi regnique eius essent).’ Polybios does not describe how Philippos was to support Hannibal. M. P. Fronda thinks the reference in Livius’ text is an invention by ancient authors after Polybios. Polybios relates at 7.9.13, however, that Philippos and Hannibal would make a peace treaty that would ‘not allow the Romans to have power over Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnos, Pharos, Dimallum, Parthini, and Atitania (μηδ’ είναι Ρωμαίους κυρίους Κερκυραίων μηδ’ Απολλωνιατών και Επιδαμνίων μηδέ Φάρου μηδὲ Διμάλης και Παρθίνων μηδ’ Ατιντανίας).’ Despite the difference regarding the details, both historians agree Philippos was permitted to take Rome’s place in the Adriatic, but was not promised to have any share in Italy, although undoubtedly his support for Hannibal there was expected. There is no reference to how Philippos regarded the fact that it would not necessarily be to his advantage to advance into Italy. Nevertheless, he accepted the conditions. This shows once again that his aim was to conquer Illyria and Rome’s dependants there, and also suggests the secret contact with Hannibal was an opportunistic manoeuvre. If Philippos had been successful in concealing his plan from Rome, he would have been able to launch a surprise attack on the Roman allies and the Romans in Illyria. Although he had tried to occupy Apollonia in vain, Rome had not noticed the attempt itself. His partnership with Hannibal would have been noticed by Rome once Philippos

29 Fronda 2010: 212 n.103.
started the campaign, but the presence of Hannibal in Italy would have prevented Rome from engaging Philippos actively in Illyria. Even though the pact was eventually detected, it was not wholly disastrous for him. Rome prevented him and Hannibal from moving jointly around Italy, but could not counter him decisively, owing to Hannibal’s presence in Italy once again. In this situation, although Philippos could not damage Rome easily, owing to the weakness of the fleet, he could wait for an opportunity to attack while also affording himself plenty of time, in the expectation that Roman power in Illyria would disintegrate. In the 210s, it seemed entirely possible that Hannibal would defeat Rome. Philippos thus advanced into Messenia at a slow pace, and did not strengthen his fleet to attack Rome directly until the 200s (Liv. 28.8.18). Furthermore, the secrecy of his alliance enabled him to feign ignorance before other states if he was ever criticised by Carthage for not fulfilling his role as an ally. Thus, he used Hannibal to conquer the Illyrians as easily as possible, without damaging his image as the defender of Greece against βάρβαροι. I argue that this behaviour was founded in the concept of informal diplomacy. The Romans (and Hannibal) were thus involved in Philippos’ own political machinations.

2) The Aitolian Hawks against Macedonia and Rome

The diplomatic practice of the hawks against Philippos in Aitolia, and their use of informal diplomacy, formed a more significant influence on Rome at the beginning of the First Macedonian War. It is thought that M. Valerius Laevinus, the Roman commander in the Adriatic, visited Aitolia as a petitioner in 212 or 211, in the midst of the problems being caused by Hannibal and Philippos, and
asked the federation to ally with Rome, ‘succeeding’ though only in exchange for many concessions. The alliance served to reduce the immediate pressure on Rome, but an analysis of its clauses and the circumstances of its establishment modifies the traditional view, and casts a new light on this treaty.

It is useful first to confirm that some factors suggest that the treaty was not, in fact, initiated by Rome, but by Aitolia. It was doubtlessly concluded after Laevinus successfully curried favour with the Aitolians in their assembly, by offering to support their attempt to regain their presence in Greece (Liv. 26.24.1-15). Yet, it does not mean that the negotiation began with a Roman appeal. Indeed, the extant sources do not report that she asked Aitolia to make an alliance. Furthermore, the war was later seen not as a conflict between Rome and Philippos, but instead between him and the Aitolians (Philippum atque Aetolos), by the Greeks (e.g. 27.30.4). These suggest that partnership between Rome and Aitolia was formed and developed in the war under the initiative not of Rome, but of Aitolia.

It is tempting to view this literary silence as indicative of Rome’s relative impotence, at that point in time, the Republic unable to refuse Aitolia’s myriad demands. This view is supported by a provision for share of war trophies found in an inscription from Thyrrheion in Akarnania (IG IX.1².2.241.ll.3-21). It provides that Rome was to cede every occupied city to Aitolia. Livius also says (at 26.24.11) that the alliance stated that, ‘of the cities between Aitolia’s border and
Corcyra, the soil, buildings and city walls, with their territory, should belong to the Aitolians, and all the rest of the booty should belong to the Romans (\textit{urbium Corcyrae tenus ab Aetolia incipienti solum tectaque et muri cum agris Aetolorum, alia omnis praeda populi Romani esset}). These are treated as proof that the alliance was the result of a Roman initiative.\textsuperscript{34} Aitolia was to have the occupied areas, even those captured by operations in which the federation did not participate. Rome also promised not to enlarge her own territory, a feature supported by the account of Polybios (at 9.39.3) and several other sources.\textsuperscript{35} Such diplomatic inequality is rarely seen in Aitolia’s treaties, and suggests that Rome was considered to be a unique case.\textsuperscript{36} It confirms neither the validity of W. V. Harris’ theory, that Rome’s ambition for territory in Greece was checked by Aitolia in exchange for their partnership, nor that of Gruen and A. M. Eckstein, that Rome was originally indifferent regarding the annexation of the land and simply stated her indifference to it in the treaty.\textsuperscript{37} Among the extant sources, there is no reference to Roman interest in the territory of Greece. However, Rome’s promise not to acquire any new territory means that the alliance was unequal, whether the provision was important for her or not. The situation of this clause, as such, supports the traditional theory that Aitolia accepted Rome’s petition for alliance in exchange for many concessions to the federation.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{34} Hammond and Walbank 1988: 400.
\textsuperscript{35} StVIII Nr.536.
\textsuperscript{36} For instance, the Aitolians allied to the Illyrian leader, Skerdilaidas, with the provision of spoils in the Social War (Polyb. 4.16.9-10), and pledged to break up Akarnania with Epeiros in the 250s or the 240s (2.45.1). There is no unequal division in these treaties. For the sources about the two events and their historicity, see StVIII Nrn.485 and 515; Walbank 1957: 239-45 and 463-4. As to other important treaties of Aitolia, see Mackil 2013: nos.48, 53, and 57.
\textsuperscript{37} Harris 1979: 207; Gruen 1984: 289; Eckstein 2008: 89.
\textsuperscript{38} Cf. Gruen 1984: 19.
According to Livius (26.24.6), however, in the Aitolian assembly before the conclusion of the alliance, ‘for the Akarnanians whose secession from the federation of the Aitolians they resented, Laevinus said that he would restore them to the old terms by which the Aitolians’ rights and suzerainty over them were guaranteed (Acarnanas, quos aegre ferr Aetoli a corpore suo diremptos, restituturum se in antiquam formulam iurisque ac dicionis eorum).’\(^{39}\) Livius relates that the attendees were pleased by this statement, and consequently decided to ally with Rome (26.24.8). The unilateral character of this promise would appear to support the view of the superiority of Aitolia, in a similar fashion to the inscription referring to war trophies. However, there are several inconsistencies with this viewpoint. For example, Aitolia conducted a large-scale operation against Akarnania in 211. Rome supported it and occupied Oiniadai and Nasos, giving them to Aitolia, as per the terms of the treaty (26.24.15; Polyb. 9.39.2). Yet, Aitolia stopped the campaign when Philippos came to the aid of Akarnania (Liv. 26.25.1-17; Polyb. 9.40.4-6).\(^{40}\) Akarnania also seems to have lost Phoitiai, Matropolis, Astakos, and Korontai by 208/7, for unknown reasons, according to a later inscription recording its approval of inviolability of a festival of Artemis Leukophryene at Magnesia-ad-Maiandros (I.Magnesia 31).\(^{41}\) Nevertheless, there is no further reference to any damage inflicted upon Akarnania in this period. This suggests that the leading Aitolians neither strove to conquer Akarnania, nor wanted Rome to do so, despite the supposed influence of Laevinus’ promise on the decision of Aitolia’s assembly. As scholars have

\(^{39}\) For the separation of Akarnania, see Dany 1999: 87-95.


agreed,\textsuperscript{42} this does not deny the historicity of the provision, but it suggests that the assembly and the leading Aitolians did not act on the same idea, casting doubt on the validity of the traditional view that considers Rome to be the suppliant party in this negotiation. It seems certain that Laevinus made a speech and referred to Akarnania before the Aitolians: on the official stage, Rome asked Aitolia to make an alliance while offering a number of concessions and incentives as bargaining tools. If the reference to Akarnania resulted completely from a Roman initiative, however, its fulfilment would have been one of the most important objectives for Rome during the war, since any failure to fulfil her vow could be criticised by Aitolia later. Yet, the sources mention no such blame, even after Rome and Aitolia had become hostile towards one another, in the 190s, and the latter reproached the Republic for its ingratitude (e.g. Liv. 35.48.11-12). This inconsistency shows the promise does not necessarily imply the superiority of Aitolia to Rome, nor does it guarantee that the negotiations resulted from a Roman approach.

In order to explain this contradiction, I would argue that the treaty was initiated not by Rome’s appeal but by that of Aitolia, in particular some Aitolians, and was a product of their informal diplomacy. If they unofficially wanted Laevinus to make an alliance first and then he made the promise about Akarnania in the assembly, it is understandable that its fulfilment was not actively sought although the treaty was generally favourable to Aitolia. That Rome’s obligation was actually not heavy is also observed in another provision. According to Livius (26.24.10), the treaty provides that Aitolia begin the war against Macedonia on

\textsuperscript{42} Oberhummer 1887: 187; Oost 1954a: 34; Dany 1999: 154-5.
land immediately and Rome support it with not less than 25 quinqueremes. It appears to impose a definite duty on her and shows Aitolia's superiority again. But this simply set the lower limit of the troops that Rome had to send, and was rather advantageous to her. In so far as she sent 25 quinqueremes, Aitolia would have to recognise Rome fulfilled her obligation, regardless of how the war progressed. It is also significant that, as R. M. Errington indicates, the number of ships demanded was almost the same as all the ships that could be moved across the Adriatic by Laevinus. He had been ordered to protect the Italian coast and to prevent Philippos from landing on Italy with 55 ships (23.38.9-10). Since Carthage retained a significant naval force, and continued to occupy southern Italy, 25 quinqueremes reflected the maximum naval power that Laevinus could send to the Adriatic front. This suggests that the clause about these ships resulted from Aitolia's consideration for this situation, or his appeal to the Aitolian negotiators. If Rome had asked Aitolia to make an alliance, there is no reason why the latter should not have demanded more ships and men from Rome, and yet Aitolia made just such a compromise. Their actions support the theory that the treaty was initiated by Aitolians, rather than Rome.

One might dispute this argument with an episode of M. Claudius Marcellus in this period (Liv. 25.23.8-9, esp. 9). He was sent to Sicily as a Roman general and, during the siege of Syracuse, captured Damippos, who had been sent by the besieged city to make contact with Philippos. Marcellus, in turn, quickly arranged the release of this envoy because he was a Spartan, and ‘the friendship with the Aitolians, who were the allies of the Spartans, was desired by the Romans just at

this time *iam tum Aetolorum, quibus socii Lacedaemonii erant, amicitiam
affectantibus Romanis*.' This would appear to suggest Rome took the initiative
in negotiating with Aitolia. This view is not necessarily correct, though. In the
case that some Aitolians did visit Laevinus, he would have reported it to other
leading Romans, and only then would those who were interested in the alliance
consider the opinion of Aitolia and its allies.

This notion is supported by another reference to the negotiation between
Laevinus and the Aitolians. Livius informs us (26.24.1) that ‘M. Valerius Laevinus,
who had secret interviews with some leading Aitolians and ascertained their ideas,
came on a swift sailing fleet to the *concilium*, (i.e. the assembly in this case,)45 of
the Aitolians that had been appointed for that very purpose (*M. Valerius Laevinus,
temptatis prius per secreta conloquia principum animis, ad indictum ante ad id
ipsum concilium Aetolorum classe expedita venit*).’ This appears to suggest that
Laevinus secretly approached some Aitolians with the proposed alliance, and
later made his official address in Aitolia’s assembly with their support. But after
he ascertained *animi principum* i.e. what the leading Aitolians thought, through
*colloquii*, that is, direct conversations, he went to Aitolia. Interpreting Livius’
reference literally implies that some Aitolians had direct contact with Laevinus
in places where it was unnecessary for him to use ships to visit, before he made
his speech in Aitolia. It is unlikely, however, that such informal meetings would
have taken place outside Aitolia, unless the Aitolians had wanted to establish
contact. One might think this results simply from Livius omitting a reference to
Laevinus’ visits to the leading Aitolians in Aitolia before that to the assembly.

However, if he had visited them solely to ask Aitolia as a whole to make an alliance, there would have been no reason for him to make contact with some Aitolians through *secreta conloquia*, i.e. secret or private conferences withheld from the public. He would not have needed to ascertain their personal views, but to win over them and their fellow citizens before the assembly. I argue that some Aitolians visited Laevinus with the proposal for alliance, and then he needed to ascertain what they thought, such as its conditions like the clause concerning Akarnania, and whether there was something underlying the offer, and eventually visited the assembly of Aitolia arranged by the visitors.

It is important, then, to note that this contact is an example of informal diplomacy on the part of Aitolia’s negotiators. If Aitolia had decided to ally with Rome formally, it would have been unnecessary for Laevinus to persuade Aitolia’s assembly to support the alliance. The final treaty was the result of preliminary negotiations and his speech, in particular his reference to Akarnania. This shows that the Aitolian negotiators visited him independently, and persuaded him to encourage their fellow citizens into supporting an official alliance with Rome. Their approach might have been supported by the magistrates of that year.\(^{46}\)

Even so, however, it remains an example of informal diplomacy in action. They talked with Laevinus without the approval of the assembly, which managed decisions of war and peace, and used him to encourage the organ to conclude a treaty with a foreign power. They manipulated Aitolian public opinion by winning over Laevinus, just as Aratos did in the 220s with his Megalopolitan friends and Antigonos.

\(^{46}\) In these decades Aitolia had some sort of inner council apart from the assembly, at least (e.g. Liv. 35.35.4 and 36.28.8). For the general situation of its constitution, see Larsen 1952: 1-33 and Grainger 1999: 169-87.
This assessment derives exclusively from Livius’ text, but it is supported when the situation of Aitolia in this period is considered. Based on the terms of the alliance, I would argue that the Aitolian negotiators were, in fact, the hawks against Macedonia. Analysis of their position and acts helps to explain further the nature of the negotiation between Aitolia and Rome. The results of this examination also confirms the significance of informal diplomacy in this alliance.

In order to reach the goal, it is necessary first to confirm the existence of the hawks against Macedonia and their nature. This is achieved by analysing Aitolian foreign affairs from the time of the Social War to that of the First Macedonian War. According to Polybios (4.5.9), the Social War was opened by Dorimachos and Skopas ‘without any resolution of the assembly and while bypassing the committees about war (οὐτε κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν προσδεξέσθαι συνόδον οὐτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμμεταδόντες).’ They were delegated the authority of Ariston, the στρατηγὸς of 221/0, because of his physical weakness and his blood relation to them (4.5.1). Their target was Messenia, since they regarded its intention to make an alliance with Achaia and Macedonia as a sign of its hostility (4.5.8).47 They furthermore attacked Epeiros, Achaia, Akarnania, and Macedonia (4.5.10), that is, the members of the Hellenic League, and in the spring of 220 mobilised large numbers of troops against them (4.6.7). Polybios, displaying his pro-Achaian prejudice, 48 severely criticises Aitolia here, in particular, Dorimachos (4.3.5-6.3). It is, nonetheless, noteworthy that the two Aitolians engaged in informal diplomacy, inasmuch as they commenced a war without official procedures, but succeeded in moving troops, and in winning over

47 Walbank 1957: 453.
their fellow citizens. Skopas further assumed the role of στρατηγός in 220/19 (4.37.1-2). These show afresh that this kind of informal diplomatic action came naturally to the Greeks, and reveal that there were many Aitolians who had an antipathy toward the Hellenic League or Macedonia, i.e. the hawks against the kingdom and its supporters. The latter point is further supported by the fact that, at the close of the 220s, Aitolia strengthened its relations with other populations in and beyond Greece, such as the Attalids, by making an alliance against Macedonia (4.65.6: CID IV.85), and by granting the title of πρόξενος to foreign leaders (e.g. IG IX.1².1.31.ll.48-50). The hawks were strong in Aitolia, and, Skopas’ assumption of στρατηγός and Polybios’ remarks about Dorimachos suggest that the hawks considered the two Aitolians their leaders.

The hawks were not always in the majority in Aitolia, though. This is shown by the election of Agelaos as the στρατηγός in 217/6. When Aitolia faced difficulties during the Social War, he was a negotiator at the conference at Naupaktos. After his speech noted earlier in this chapter, he was elected to the office because of his ‘contribution (συμβεβλήσθαι)’ to the negotiations, and withstood ‘unreasonable opposition and censure (ἀλογίαν καὶ μέμψιν)’ from the Aitolians who criticised the terms of the peace (Polyb. 5.107.5-7). The treaty was practically an acknowledgment of Aitolia’s defeat, and favoured Achaia, and Polybios’ description of Agelaos and the attitude of his opponents cannot be accepted completely. His election as the στρατηγός, however, and his success in preventing further resistance to the treaty by his opponents or the hawks, show that, although many regions were lost as a result of his negotiation, the Aitolians

generally supported him and possibly his supporters, the moderates, by extension.\textsuperscript{50}

The hawks, however, seemed to regain power in 214/3, to some extent. This is suggested by the fact that a network of relationships with other states was reformed. For example, Aitolia granted the title πρόξενος to individuals from Chalkis, Amphissa, Chios, Corcyra, Antiocheia, Aigion, Histiaia, and Athens (\textit{IG IX.1 \textsuperscript{2}.1.31.ll.144-81}).\textsuperscript{51} This suggests that many Aitolians wanted to strengthen their connection with states in and beyond Greece again through ties of friendship. This is supported by another decree to ensure the safety of Mytilene (XII.2.15.ll.1-6).\textsuperscript{52} These measures to establish friendly relations with foreign individuals and states were normal in the Greek world, however, so it must be stressed that the general policy of Aitolia cannot be observed through this process alone. But these were the first approaches to other states after the Social War,\textsuperscript{53} and suggest a change in Aitolian diplomacy. This tendency was continued in the following year, in which citizenship was granted to certain Smyrnians (\textit{IX.1 \textsuperscript{2}.1.59B}). In light of the cities recorded in these inscriptions, Aitolia sought to develop connections with states that had not allied with the Hellenic League. Yet, the federation also approached Aigion and Chalkis, which had been aligned with Macedonia. Considering its relationship with the Attalids in this period as well (Liv. 26.24.9),\textsuperscript{54} Aitolia favoured the diplomatic approach of the hawks before the outbreak of the Social War. Such renewal of relationships with its neighbours would not, in itself, antagonise Macedonia. This approach here, however, was

\textsuperscript{50} Walbank 1957: 629; Scholten 2000: 227-8.
\textsuperscript{51} Grainger 2000: 261.
\textsuperscript{52} Funke 2008: 264.
\textsuperscript{53} Grainger 1999: 298-9.
\textsuperscript{54} McShane 1964: 106-7.
undeniably linked with the revival of the hawks, whose position had suffered, following the *de facto* defeat of Aitolia in the Social War. For instance, Dorimachos assumed the office of στρατηγός in 219/8 (Polyb. 4.67.1), but the lack of any evidence for his career over the next few years suggests that the peace damaged him politically. In 213/2, however, he appeared as the first among the judges (δικασται) in the decree of arbitration between Melitaia and Pereia, in which Pantaleon, the ex-στρατηγός of 214/3, worked as one of the προσσοτάται, the sponsors of the decision (*IG* IX.1².1.188.ll.1·2 and 33·6). Dorimachos was recognised as a man worthy of representing Aitolia again in almost the same way as the politician who had just led the state. Conceivably, the decree in honour of Hagetas, the στρατηγός of 218/7, which is dated between 218 and 212, might also have occurred in this context (IX.1².1.59A). Dorimachos led Aitolia in the war (Polyb. 5.96.1: *IG* IX.2.62), and energetically raised the morale of its citizens by emphasising a message of Aitolian unity through literary works such as those of Aristodama, a woman poet from Smyrna who was honoured for her poems commemorating the Aitolians in this period (*FD* III.3.145; *Syll*² 532). He failed to improve the war situation, though. While there is no information about his actions during the Macedonian War, except the honorary decree, he was certainly close to the hawks. He assumed the position of στρατηγός again in c. 201/0 (*IG* IX.1².3.614: *SGDI* 2049), when Philippos’ campaigning provoked Aitolia again. In addition, Skopas was also elected as the στρατηγός of 212/1 and Dorimachos later assumed it in 211/0 (Liv. 26.24.7; Polyb. 9.42.1). These politicians, who had

55 While he seemed to make some benefaction to Kallipolis during his term as the στρατηγός, the date that the inscription was erected is uncertain. Grainger 2000: 181; Scholten 2000: 217·8.
56 Burstein 1985: no.64; Mackil 2013: 120·1.
been blamed for Aitolia’s defeat in the Social War, were gradually rehabilitated. This shows that the hawks eventually recovered their power and influence, and won over their neighbours again.

It is important to note that the negotiations with Laevinus were also managed by the hawks. Skopas, the στρατηγός, and Dorimachos, princeps Aetolorum, supported Laevinus when he visited Aitolia (Liv. 26.24.7). The participation of the hawks in the dialogue with Rome is also suggested by the fact that a Corcyrean was recognised as a πρόξενος in 214/3 (IG IX.1².1.31.11.158-9). Corcyra was under Roman control, but Philippos had seized it in c. 215. Laevinus recaptured it in c. 213 (App. Mac. 1; Zonar. 9.4).58 It was in this context that Aitolia awarded a Corcyrean the honorific title. J. D. Grainger thinks that Aitolia indirectly declared for Rome by this action.59 This conclusion is excessive, but the fact that Aitolia made a connection with a Corcyrean suggests that the hawks were interested in the western situation, and that they had some contacts with the Romans who recaptured Corcyra. Laevinus may well have noticed the situation of the island then, even if Rome seems to have been generally indifferent to outsiders. His invitation to the assembly and the preliminaries happened in this context of the approaches by the hawks to many outsiders. With the increase of the hawks in the power, these manoeuvres in and beyond Aitolia, in formal and informal spheres, are examples of informal diplomacy by a political group.

The actions of the hawks, however, resulted partly from their own domestic difficulties. Laevinus’ speech in the assembly was effectively their measure to win over the fellow citizens through his announcement of terms of alliance that were

59 Grainger 1999: 300-1.
favourable to Aitolia. This meant, however, that the hawks became indebted to Rome. This inevitably made the provisions of the treaty comparatively favourable towards the Republic. If the hawks could have encouraged their fellow citizens by themselves, this measure would not have been taken.

This difficulty for the hawks is confirmed by the election in 214/3, when honouring foreign individuals with the title of προξένος began. Aitolia selected Pantaleon as the στρατηγός and Agelaos of Arsinoe as the ἵππαρχος although the name of the γραμματεύς cannot be read. \(IG\) IX.1\(^2\).1.31.ll.144-8. Pantaleon had not been connected with the Aitolian leadership during the Social War, and his political position was ambiguous in these years. Agelaos assumed the role of στρατηγός in 206/5,\(^\text{60}\) when Aitolia was defeated by Macedonia again and the peace treaty was agreed. Considering this career, it is unlikely that Agelaos was a member of the hawks, even by 214/3. Anyone connected with them would not have been elected when the war went against Aitolia and the citizens may well have been distrustful of them. In light of the careers of the two Aitolians, the hawks were not overwhelmingly favoured by the fellow citizens in 214/3.

Considering the approach to Smyrna in 213/2 and Skopas’ election to the στρατηγός of 212/1, the influence of the hawks grew steadily. One should not underestimate the influence of people outside this circle, though. There is no sign that the hawks controlled the magistrates in 213/2 (IX.1\(^2\).1.59B).\(^\text{61}\) Moreover, in order to compete with Philippos, it was necessary for the hawks to have some

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\(^{60}\) His election is supported by \textit{SEG} XXXVIII.1476. The date is agreed by the editors of \textit{SEG} LIII.1719. Cf. Paschidis 2008: 328-32. On the identification of Agelaos in \textit{IG} IX.1\(^2\).1.31, see Bousquet 1988: 26-7, Rigsby 1996: no.67, Funke 2000: 516 n.41, and Grainger 2000: 82.

\(^{61}\) Grainger 2000: 71, 205, 310, and 314.
strong supporters among other states. Even in the period of the Social War, Aitolia failed to defeat him. After the loss of a number of cities, it had become impossible to fight alone against him. Therefore, despite the recovery of their power in Aitolia, the hawks had faced a quandary regarding how they should meet the expectations of voters who were hostile towards Macedonia. Their informal diplomacy in the contacts with Laevinus, and the alliance with Rome through his support, solved these problems. The outbreak of a new war silenced all but the hawks. The partnership with Rome, the western super-power, assisted their campaigns significantly, if not fully. The advance of Skopas into Akarnania, shortly after the approval of the treaty by the assembly, and Dorimachos' election as στρατηγός in 211/0, show that they officially controlled Aitolia. That a few clauses in the treaty were actually favourable to Rome was the price of success for the hawks, consolidating their position in and beyond Aitolia.

This argument is strengthened by considering the way that each of the two states viewed the treaty, after it had been concluded. Aitolia immediately advanced into Akarnania. By contrast, the Senate did not even ratify the alliance until 209, some two years later. The Aitolian envoys were detained diutius, for a considerable time, in Rome (Liv. 26.24.14-15). Although no reason is given, if it had been Rome who had asked Aitolia for an alliance, there should have been no delay in the ratification. The negotiation, therefore, was developed by the Aitolian hawks, who wanted to declare war on Macedonia but lacked official approval from the citizens. Laevinus and the Senate accepted their offer, an act of informal diplomacy, incorporating some clauses actually favourable to Rome.

This situation is confirmed by the clause in the treaty concerning prospective allies. According to Livius (26.24.9), both states expected to further ally with Elis, Sparta, Pleuratos, Skerdilaidas, and Attalos I of Pergamon. While Skerdilaidas and Pleuratos, his son, might have been friends to Rome, others were unfamiliar to her. It suggests that Aitolia had prepared for the war more thoroughly than Rome. Skerdilaidas had been also a friend of Aitolia since the Social War (Polyb. 4.16.9-11). Once the hawks had recovered the power in Aitolia, they rallied the states that were considered to be hostile towards Macedonia. Rome was the first to accept a military partnership. The treaty of 211 therefore resulted from the manoeuvres of the hawks, in and beyond Aitolia, to forge a grand alliance against Macedonia while silencing their domestic political rivals.

This would explain why some clauses were actually favourable to Rome, despite the difficulties she faced, and why the subject of Akarnania was treated lightly after the conclusion of the treaty, despite its importance in persuading the Aitolian people to support the union. Once the hawks made an alliance, controlled Aitolia, and commenced a new war, the implementation of individual provisions was no longer important. If Macedonia was defeated, everything would fall into place. Since the new Aitolian government did not worry about carrying out each term strictly, Rome also had no reason to execute them vigorously and could not be legitimately criticised for failing to complete any of them.

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63 Hammond 1968: 15-16 and 18.
64 The friendship of Aitolia with Athamania is also noteworthy, although the name does not appear in Livius’ text here. Considering a Delphic decree about ἵερομνήμων, the diplomat sent to Amphiktyonia of Delphoi, under Aitolia at this time (CID IV.86.1.9), this kingdom was close to the federation around 210. Indeed, Philippos could not win over Athamania before giving Zakynthos as a bribe in 206 (Liv. 36.31.11). Fine 1932: 143-5; Oost 1957: 3-4.
At the beginning of the First Macedonian War, Philippos and the Aitolian hawks negotiated their respective alliances secretly and unofficially. This was informal diplomacy in action. Rome sought to control, to some extent, such manoeuvres, since in this period she surely defended her sphere of power. Her management of the acts of the eastern Greeks was, however, generally not active, as in the prelude to the war, considered in Section 1. Although this might result partly from the difficulties of the war against Hannibal, the situation confirms that there was a difference in the manner of diplomatic practice between Rome and the eastern Greeks, in particular from the viewpoint of the use of informal diplomacy. The following section strengthens this, by focusing on the diplomatic movement of the Greeks in the period after the alliance between Rome and Aitolia had been agreed. What is, in particular, noticed is the games of the diplomats, who would attempt to mediate between the states involved in the First Macedonian War. The results show the significance of informal diplomacy in managing foreign affairs, and Rome’s history, at the end of the third century.

**Section 3: The Mediation and Rome’s Failure**

I would argue here that in the 200s Rome failed to control foreign affairs in Greece, and this was caused by her indifference to influencing outsiders, not only in official channels, but also in informal ones. This contrasts with the Greeks, who were far more aware of public opinion and used both formal and informal channels to influence it. This section will explore this hypothesis by analysing the manoeuvres and the interests of the mediators in the Macedonian War, the
Aitolians (other than the hawks), and Philippos, confirming the contribution of informal diplomacy to the close of the war and the games of the people concerned at that time.

I shall first survey the war situation from 211 onwards and the people concerned with this context. Aitolia went to war against Philippos in 211 and, through a joint campaign with Rome, occupied Antikyra in 210, and further obtained Aigina (Liv. 26.26.2; Polyb. 9.42.5-8).65 By 209, Attalos and Sparta had entered the war on Aitolia’s side (Liv. 27.29.9-10). This was a diplomatic victory for the hawks, their plan of the grand alliance against Macedonia being realised. But their scheme gradually unravelled (27.30.1-3; Polyb. 9.41-2).66 Dorimachos failed to rescue Echinos in Thessaly in 210, despite the support of P. Sulpicius Galba, Laevinus’ successor. Furthermore, in 209, Aitolia was damaged by Philippos at Lamia. It was at this time that a new group of negotiators were to appear as a new diplomatic faction. They were the ambassadors of the Ptolemies, the small city-states around the Aegean Sea, and Rhodes. According to Livius (27.30.4), they came ‘to intervene in the war between Philippos and the Aitolians (ad dirimendum inter Philippum atque Aetolos bellum).67 The diplomacy of the mediators influenced the development of the Macedonian War.

In order to understand the diplomatic influence of the mediators, it is useful to consider the character of their intervention and the lack of reference to

65 Rome occupied Aigina and turned it over to Aitolia, adhering to the treaty. The latter sold it to Attalos immediately. McShane 1964: 107; Allen 1971: 1. It is confirmed by a decree about προξένος for a citizen of the island under the name of Pyrrrias, the στρατηγός of 210/9 (IG IX.1².1.29.11.7-8). It shows that, in the year, Aigina no longer belonged to Aitolia.
67 For the sources concerned and the historiography, see Ager 1996: no.57.
Aitolia’s allies, in particular Rome, in Livius’ explanation for their aims. For this, W. Huß and Eckstein think that the mediating states were concerned about the detrimental effect of the war on their business interests around the Aegean Sea, mainly caused by the resumption of Aitolian piracy, but were apathetic regarding the struggle on land.\textsuperscript{68} Certainly, the mediators approached Philippos and Aitolia, in 209, but ignored Rome. The extant sources, however, do not record that they pursued their commercial interests, much less that Rome was left out for that reason. Furthermore, as long as Rome and the Attalids were at war, the Aegean Sea was unsafe, owing to their naval activity. If business and commerce formed the primary concern of the mediators, their manner was ineffective.

It is, therefore, reasonable to focus on the political aspect of the mediators’ actions, as some other scholars do.\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, Livius claims that (27.30.5) ‘their general concern was not so much for the Aitolians, who were more warlike than the rest of the Greeks, but for the liberty of Greece, which would be seriously endangered if Philippos and his kingdom took an active part in Greek affairs (\textit{omnium autem non tanta pro Aetolis cura erat, ferociori quam pro ingenii Graecorum gente, quam ne Philippus regnumque eius grave libertati futurum rebus Graeciae immiseretur}).’ This reference seems to derive from Polybios, Livius’ main source for this period.\textsuperscript{70} It is reasonable to accept its authenticity here, even though Achaia supported the mediation then (27.30.4-6). As Livius and possibly Polybios suggest here, the more decisively Philippos defeated Aitolia, the greater his influence became over not only the conquered Aitolians, but also over other Greeks, including his allies. I would, therefore, argue that the apparent

\textsuperscript{69} Cf. Ager 1996: 159-60.  
\textsuperscript{70} Walbank 1940: 89-90; Eckstein 2002: 274.
disregard of the mediators for Aitolia’s allies in 209 did not result from indifference or hostility towards them. From the viewpoint of checking the rise of Philippos, the support of its friends for Aitolia was favourable to the mediators. Although a Polybian fragment reports that a speaker took a hostile attitude towards Rome here (10.25.3-5, esp. 5), he seems not to have been a mediator, but rather a Macedonian. The mediators had to be officially neutral and could not characterise the possible victory of Aitolia as something that was ‘forbidden by the gods (ὁ μὴ δόξειε τοῖς θεοῖς).’ Moreover, when the mediation started, the forces of Rome and Attalos were absent from Greece (Liv. 27.30.11). The mediators could not help but begin their process without them. Thus, their absence in 209 does not mean that the mediators felt indifferent or hostile towards either party.

This is further supported by the mediators’ actions in 208. They established diplomatic contact with Aitolia and Rome at this time, although the mediation ended in failure, because Philippos did not agree to terms (Liv. 28.7.13-14). Eckstein thinks that the mediators did not intend to realise a comprehensive peace and that the Romans’ participation in the meeting was accidental. At this time, however, both the Roman and Attalid fleets had commenced operations. Skerdilaidas, Pleuratos, Sparta and some Thracian tribes had also attacked Philippos and his allies. He was thus compelled to fight difficult battles in a number of locations (27.31.9-33.5, 28.5.1-6.12, and 7.1-12; Polyb. 10.41-2). Given this situation, it is natural to think the mediators actively approached Aitolia’s allies. If some comprehensive treaty could have been made between Aitolia, its allies, and Philippos, in the context of his military difficulties, his power could

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have been tempered far more easily than through a separate peace. Furthermore, the mediators visited Herakleia of Aitolia, because they knew that the leading Aitolians gathered there in order to consider the immediate steps to be taken (Liv. 28.7.14). In such a meeting, some participation by representatives of Aitolian allies, such as Rome and Attalos, was to be expected (cf. 28.5.15). Thus, in 208 the mediators intentionally negotiated with Rome to succeed in their own political agenda, to assert some degree of control over Philippos' rise.

The attitude of the mediators towards Rome changed, however, in 207, from which time they began to display hostility towards the Republic. In particular, according to Polybios (11.4-6, esp. 5.6 and 9), a speaker, who is perhaps to be identified with Thrasykrates of Rhodes, called Rome's behaviour in the occupied cities 'barbaric (βαρβαρικόν),' and argued that Aitolia's alliance with her was 'the beginning of great miseries for all Greeks (κακῶν ἀρχήν μεγάλων ἀπασι τοῖς Ἕλληνσιν).' It is impossible to decide conclusively whether he really said so. Considering the similarity with Agelaos' speech emphasising the threat of Rome, the statement of 207 might result from Polybios' view of history and his manipulation of information. Nevertheless, the historicity of the hostility to Rome shown by the mediators here is recognised by a number of scholars.

Conversely, such an attitude, displayed by the mediators, might not have reflected their true opinion regarding Rome, at least that of Rhodes, just as in 209

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73 Polybios does not name the speaker, but the speech is tentatively attributed to this Rhodian by scholars. Walbank 1967: 274-5.
74 Deininger 1971: 32.
75 Walbank 1967: 205; Champion 2000: 434; Eckstein 2002: 290. Considering the fact that Polybios does not have to relate the speech, and in detail, here as Champion 2000: 437 indicates, however, the choice of this statement with the polemical phrase against Rome like βαρβαρικός in his description can be regarded as a sort of antipathy of him towards her.
and 208. Although it is difficult to assess whether Polybios’ reference to continuous contact between Rome and Rhodes taking place since the end of the fourth century is acceptable (30.5.6), as R. M. Berthold argues, Rhodes looked favourably upon Rome for her hostility towards the Illyrian pirates, who had ravaged the Aegean cities, in the previous decades (4.16.6-8). Moreover, while the mediators criticised Rome for her treatment of the inhabitants of Aigina and Oreos in Euboia (11.5.8), these were captured in 210 and 208 (Liv. 28.6). If Rome’s conduct towards them had really been problematic, the mediators would have stated so in the mediation of 209 and 208. It is more likely, therefore, that their criticism resulted from rhetorical tactics, rather than the reality of the occupation.

In order to understand the mediators’ diplomacy, it is useful to remember Agelaos’ speech. In Naupaktos, he invoked the threat of Rome to end the Social War conveniently. The situation of 207 was similar. Philippos’ side was on the offensive, in contrast to the situation of 208. Attalos could not go to Greece, owing to the danger posed to his state from Bithynia, Philippos’ ally (Liv. 28.7.10). Sparta was defeated by Achaia, another of his friends. Other Aitolian allies other than Rome, and Aitolia itself were forced to keep a low profile (Polyb. 11.4.1-6.8, 7.2-3, and 11.1-18.10). The mediators may well have thought that Aitolia and Rome should end the war now, to check Philippos’ rise, or that Rome should do more to support Aitolia. But Rome was indifferent to the situation, and the interests of the mediators. According to Appianos (Mac. 3), in the meeting with them before the Aitolians, Galba opposed their offer of peace and observed that ‘it

79 Habicht 1956: 92-5.
was not in his power to conclude peace, but wrote privately to the Senate that it was to the advantage of the Romans that the Aitolians should continue the war against Philippos (οὐκ εἶναι κυρίον περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τι κρίναι, καὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν κρύφα ἔπιστέλλοντος ὅτι Ῥωμαίοις συμφέρει πολέμειν Αἰτωλοὺς Φιλίππῳ),

prompting the Senate to forbid him officially to conclude any treaty. In light of the fact that Laevinus had negotiated with the Aitolian hawks and others in Aitolia’s assembly of 211, Galba told a lie here. The mediators and the Aitolians noticed the deception, and thought that he had opportunistically cited Roman legality in order to hinder the negotiation. Despite Appianos’ additional reference, Rome does not seem to have sent troops to support Aitolia, either. Considering Galba’s suggestion and the decision of the Senate, Rome did not consider the opinion and the interests of Aitolia and the mediating states who really wanted to control Philippos. Since Rome’s reluctance to support Aitolia had been exposed, it was reasonable for the mediators to criticise Rome, despite their genuine hostility towards Philippos. In order to prevent him from increasing his power even further, ending the war between him and Aitolia, abandoned by Rome, was now the best option. The speech attributed to Thrasykrates labelling the Romans βάρβαροι and requesting an end to the war for the Greeks created a pretext for formulating a peace settlement with Aitolia, similar to Agelaos’ case, earlier.

This is confirmed by the fact the speech was to arrange a gap between the official position and informal interests of Aitolia. Regarding Rome as an enemy of Greece enabled Aitolia to make peace and to solve its military difficulty without loss of reputation. The Aitolians, however, could not ‘remember’ this logic by

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80 For the attribution of this reference to the context of 207, see Eckstein 2002: 284-8.
themselves, since Aitolia had allied with Rome, an initiative that enjoyed the support of the majority of the citizens. This argument could not be ‘reminded’ by the people on Philippos’ side either. If Aitolia accepted any argument of him or his friends, in particular, during a time of military difficulty, it was tantamount to an acceptance of justice of his position and Aitolia’s defeat, meaning that the eventual peace terms would be more severe. Indeed, when Lykiskos of Akarnania labelled Rome as a threat to Greece in c. 210, Aitolia ignored it (Polyb. 9.32-9). The speech attributed to Thrasykrates, a mediator, solved this problem of using this argument, and enabled Aitolia to make a peace with honour. This is not informal diplomacy. This game was made in the meeting of mediation, an official stage. Yet, in light of the fact that the mediator considered not only Aitolia’s formal interests, namely its military difficulties, but also indirectly that the Aitolians could not profit from labelling the Romans βάρβαροι by themselves. This manner of the mediators can be seen to bear hallmarks of informal diplomacy.

In this process the mediators also exploited Philippos’ attitude, in order to prevent him gaining too much power. He had repeatedly said that ‘if the Aitolians chose peace, he would accept it (αὑρομένων μὲν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὴν εἰρήνην ἑτοίμως δέχεσθαι)’ while continuing his campaigns against Aitolia and its allies (Polyb. 11.6.9-10, esp. 10; cf. Liv. 27.30.14, 28.7.15-16, and 8.1-6). He officially respected the peace of Greece, though it might have been to make a good impression on the Greek states. He had to accept the peace if Aitolia was

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82 While this speech was made in an open discussion with the Spartans directly, to persuade them not to ally with Aitolia against Philippos, Aitolia’s envoy also attended it. Thus, it was a message of Philippos’ side not only to Sparta but also to Aitolia. Walbank 1967: 162-82; Deininger 1971: 32-3; Wooten 1974: 239-40; Dany 1999: 157-8; Eckstein 2002: 290 n.77.
‘persuaded’ by the mediators and wanted to end the war ‘for Greece.’ The mediators thus directed the king, to an extent. Yet, the manoeuvre was actually favourable to him because he had been compelled to fight against several of his neighbours at the same time. The logic of the mediators enabled him to end the war in Greece with a practical victory, yet without taking any more risks. It is impossible to decide how he regarded the behaviour of the mediators and their real intention, but their statements matched his formal and informal interests well.

The manoeuvres and considerations of the mediators also influenced the national politics of Aitolia. According to Appianos (Mac. 3), they assembled in Aitolia possibly in 207 again, and ‘said it was very evident that the struggle between Philippos and the Aitolians subjected the Greeks to servitude to the Romans (πολλὰ φανερῶς ἐλεγον, ὅτι Φίλιππος καὶ Αἰτωλοί διαφερόμενοι τούς Ἑλλήνας ἐς δουλείαν Ῥωμαίοις ύποβάλλουσιν),’ and then ‘when Sulpicius (Galba) rose to reply to them, the crowd did not hear him but shouted that the envoys had told the truth (ἐφ’ ὁδ’ ὁ μὲν Σουλπίκιος ἀντιλέξων ἀνίστατο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ὅκυ ἠκουσεν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεκράγεσαν τοὺς πρέσβεις εὐ λέγειν).’ He was apparently prevented from speaking by the uncontrollable crowd. The Aitolians who were against Galba, the Roman who wanted to continue the war, however, were organised by some leaders opposed to the Aitolian hawks at that time. An inscription from Thermos, Aitolia’s religious centre, reveals the rise of the Aitolians apart from the hawks. If the dating of Aitolia’s magistracies by Klaffenbach, the editor of IG IX, is correct, Damokritos assumed the position of ἵππαρχος in 208/7 (IX.1^2.1.31.1.61). His later opposition as the στρατηγός of 200/199 to Aitolia’s joining the Roman side in the Second Macedonian War
suggests that his election at this time reflected Aitolian disillusion with the war against Macedonia (Liv. 31.32.1). While his action against Rome in 200/199 was allegedly prompted by a bribe from Macedonia, this episode, in any case, suggests he had originally not sought votes of the people against Macedonia. His hipparchy might have been in 209/8, not in 208/7. Nevertheless, his appearance suggests the people opposed to the hawks gained influence as the war dragged on. In 207/6 the offices of ἵππαρχος and γραμματεύς were held by Alexandros and Phaineas respectively (IG IX.1².1.31.lI.75-6). The former was a rival of Dorimachos and Skopas (Polyb. 13.1a), and was elected as the στρατηγός in 204/3, following the peace with Macedonia (IG IX.1².1.95 and 192). Phaineas would lead Aitolia in the Second Macedonian War but was not a zealous warmonger, and then did not seem to belong to the hawks. It is possible that the offices held by Alexandros and Phaineas in 207/6 were not those of the federation, but those of a local district of Aitolia. The inscription refers to their names with Dorimachos, who assumed the βούλαρχος, a local but prestigious office (IX.1².1.31.lI.74-5). In any case, the power of the hawks waned in light of Aitolia’s military difficulties. Yet, for the Aitolians opposed to the hawks it was still difficult to control the federation. Considering his fourth term of the office in 202/1 (IG IX.1².1.30), Dorimachos was

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85 Grainger 2000: 71 and 141.
87 He directed the war against Macedonia as the στρατηγός of 198/7 while negotiating with Rome flexibly (Liv. 32.33:11, 33.3:9, and 13.6:13; Polyb. 18.1.4 and 38.3:39.1: SGD1 2000-1 and 2073-4). Cf. Grainger 2000: 266.
88 This office seems to have been selected in each district and constituent city-state of the Aitolian federation. The name of the βούλαρχος sometimes appeared in the dating formula of the documents just as the στρατηγός (e.g. IGIX.1².1.8). It is said to show the importance of the office and that of the βουλὰ. Sherk 1990: 259; Scholten 2000: 62:3.
elected as the στρατηγός in the middle of the 200s. The hawks were still powerful at this time, and the mediation of 207 failed. A peace during times of difficulty was equated with a defeat for the hawks, and so they may well have stopped the mediation. In the approach of the mediators and Philippos’ repeated suggestion favourable to peace, however, the Aitolian non-hawks gradually gained power. The hostility of the crowd towards Galba resulted from this shift. It is important that it was a sort of informal diplomacy by the Aitolians concerned, and practically connected with the mediators (and Philippos). They failed to win over the majority of the Aitolians at that time. The rejection of Galba could not be considered as an official statement by Aitolia, since the assembly had refused to accept mediation. Yet, their voice prevented Galba from speaking, and thus influenced the development of the negotiations. Above all, their attack on Galba showed to their contemporaries that they were strong enough to denounce Rome, and shared the rhetorical convention of labelling her as a menace to Greece alongside the mediators (and Philippos’ side). It served to practically cement a tacit partnership among them.

Galba and the Senate took no measures against the partnership. When Athamania supported Philippos and he attacked Thermos of Aitolia in 207 (Liv. 36.31.11; Polyb. 11.7.2), they ignored its difficulties and the expected decrease of the power of the hawks. Even when Agelaos of Arsinoe, who was not a supporter of the war, became the στρατηγός in 206/5 (SEG XXXVIII.1476), Rome was indifferent again. If she had been sensitive to this situation and the interests of outsiders, some approach to Aitolia and the mediators would likely have been

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90 Walbank 1967: 278.
made before new Roman troops were dispatched in 205.

The separate peace of Aitolia with Philippos in 206 resulted from these factors (App. Mac. 4; Liv. 29.12.1-2). There is no information about the negotiation and the provisions of the treaty, but the king may well have abstained from imposing severe conditions on Aitolia. The federation, no longer led by the hawks, may well have officially declared Rome to be a menace to Greece, in a similar way to the earlier speech of Agelaos. Philippos and his allies had shown a favourable attitude towards a peace on this basis. It may have satisfied the mediators, hoping to limit his growing power, and the Aitolians who, by then, were tired of war. It is further possible that Philippos was also content to have increased his leadership in Greece. It was a diplomatic victory for the mediators, the anti-war Aitolians, and Philippos over the Aitolian hawks and Rome. Despite Skopas having responsibility for a committee dealing with the problem of debt in 205, his influence was in decline and he soon exiled himself to Egypt (Polyb. 13.1-2; IG IX.1².1.31.ll.106-8). The leadership of Rome’s partners inside Aitolia collapsed, and the new Aitolian government now could not be friendly to Rome (Liv. 29.12.4-16). Other Aitolian allies against Macedonia had also abandoned the war. Rome was isolated in Greece. These signalled the failure of Roman diplomacy in Greece.

The Peace of Phoinike of 205 was made in this context (Liv. 29.12.12-16). It is noteworthy that this treaty also resulted from informal diplomacy on the part of the Greeks. Rome was forced to defend the Adriatic coasts against Philippos, who had established his leadership in Greece, as the Punic War was still waged. P. Sempronius Tuditanus, Galba’s successor, barely maintained the status quo,

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92 Walbank 1985: 44-5.
and did little to reverse the situation. And yet it was difficult even for Philippos to defeat Rome, whose forces engaged in a tenacious defence. He was also worried that Aitolia would change its mind and accept Tuditanus’ offer to fight against him again, if the war was prolonged (29.12.5-7). The result was a stalemate.

At this time, Epeiros mediated between them. Its representatives complained about its difficulties caused by the war (Liv. 29.12.8). It gave the warring parties a pretext to end their hostilities. Through accepting this request, they could make a peace without deciding a victor and loser in the conflict. However, this was not a mediation in the manner that Rome might have expected. Epeiros was a member of the Hellenic League, and Philippos was better than Rome at the management of diplomacy. He visited Phoinike, an important city of Epeiros, earlier than Tuditanus and ‘had a preliminary interview (\textit{prius conlocutus}) with the Epeirotes, and then, as soon as the official meeting started, the Epeirotes asked Tuditanus to finish the war for them (29.12.11-12, esp. 11). This is an example of informal diplomacy by Philippos, through the preliminary meeting, where he ensured that negotiations took place without Rome’s knowledge. When the peace was requested, Tuditanus had no choice but to treat it favourably, and show some conciliatory plan. He had accepted the mediation, as such. If Epeiros had asked Philippos to make a peace before asking Rome, he would have been forced to show his plan with some compromises, and Rome would have been able to demand more concessions. By means of the preliminary meeting, then, Philippos was able to prevent Rome from gaining the initiative in the negotiations. In fact, although Rome was not defeated militarily, according to Livius (29.12.13), Tuditanus said ‘that Parthini, Dimallum, Bargullum and Eugenium should belong to Rome but Atintania could be annexed
by Macedonia, if envoys sent to Rome could prevail on the Senate to agree (ut Parthini et Dimallum et Bargullum et Eugenium Romanorum essent, Atintania, si missis Romam legatis ab senatu impetrasset, ut Macedoniae accederet). He cited the necessity of senatorial approval as a form of forestalling any further request of compromise, but was compelled to propose a conciliatory plan. Atintania had been occupied by the Romans but subsequently lost (cf. 27.30.12-13). For its recapture, it would have been necessary for Rome either to continue the war or to arrange that Philippos should abandon it by negotiation. Epeiros’ entreaty made her commit to a plan of ending the war quickly, and prevented her from asking Philippos to withdraw from the region, and from announcing that the battle should be resumed if he did not accept her demand. He had tricked Rome into accepting his annexation of Atintania. The surrender of this region might have been a small loss for Rome, since there is no evidence that an important base was built there, or any tax was imposed on the region. Philippos, for his part, seems to have abandoned Lissos before 209. His menace to Italy practically disappeared. Indeed, there was no necessity for Rome to continue the war. The annexation of Atintania, however, enabled Philippos to behave as if he had the upper hand in the war. Thus, the Peace of Phoinike resulted from his diplomatic victory over Rome by using informal diplomacy.

Again, this argument depends on Livius’ text, alone. Yet, the historicity and the authenticity of the source are recognised by scholars. This is further confirmed by Livius’ text as follows (29.12.14):

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93 For the relation of Atintania with Rome, see Hammond 1989: 11-25.
94 May 1946: 49-52.
95 StVIII Nr.543; Gruen 1984: 381; Eckstein 2002: 293-4.
in eas condiciones cum pax conueniret, ab rege foederi adscripti
Prusia Bithyniae rex, Achaei Boeoti Thessali Acarnanes Epirotae: ab
Romanis Ilienses, Attalus rex, Pleuratus, Nabis Lacedaemoniorum
tyranthus, Elei Messenii Athenienses.

What should be noted here is the appearance of *adscripti*, a form of witness. This was a feature of Greek diplomatic practice. Indeed, there is no comparable case in Rome's contemporary treaties, while the notion was generally expressed as *συμπεριλαμβάνειν ταίς συνθήκαις* (e.g. *Syll* 591.1.64). The term *συμπεριλαμβάνειν* appears in the negotiation between Rome and Pyrrhos. It was used, however, for the people connected with the treaty, not as a witness, but as a key figure in the agreement (App. *Sam.* 10.3). Thus, Livius' text about this treaty derives not from Roman writers, but Greek ones. Polybios is the most reasonable candidate, since he was Livius' main Greek source for events in the East. It was easy for him to gather detailed information for this event of 205. This feature lends extra credibility to the Livian text.

It is noticeable that the lists of the *adscripti* demonstrate before contemporaries Philippos' advantage over Rome. He was supported by the major states in Greece, while Rome could not secure any comparable support. She seemingly collected as many signatures as Philippos, and established friendship with some Greek states, but her *adscripti* were minor powers, nevertheless. No permanent relationship seems to be made with them. In contrast, those on Philippos' side were connected through the ties of the Hellenic League. Moreover, some on Rome's side, such as Ilion and Athens, might be the invention

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96 *StVIII*: 283.
97 Petzold 1940: 19.
98 Gruen 1990: 78.
99 Walbank 1940: 15-16.
of later pro-Roman authors.\textsuperscript{100} Certainly, Rome negotiated with the Attalids for the transfer of Magna Mater from Asia Minor to Rome at that time. She could have asked Ilion and Athens on the way to Pergamon to write their signature as *adscripti.*\textsuperscript{101} The fact remains, however, that Rome collected only minor supporters. It is also noticeable that Aitolia does not appear in the list, and Epeiros, the mediator, was on Philippos’ side. This showed the states concerned and contemporaries that Rome had been abandoned by the federation, and that Epeiros actually sided with Macedonia. Rome was preparing to advance into Africa, and was satisfied with the peace in Greece, rewarding Tuditanus with the consulship of 204 (Liv. 29.12.16). The reputation and dignity of the leading Romans in and beyond Rome were undermined, though. Rome’s satisfaction might have been based upon the assumption that the peace was temporary (App. *Mac.* 4: Liv. 29.12.16). Upon observing the members of the *adscripti* of both sides, and the development of the negotiations, the Romans may well have noticed that they had been neatly deceived by Epeiros and Philippos with their secret partnership. Thus, Rome was isolated by the informal diplomacy of the mediators from the Aegean Sea (as well as the Aitolians opposing the hawks, and Philippos himself), being labelled the menace to Greece. Rome was then cheated by the informal diplomacy between Philippos and Epeiros, the latter siding with Macedonia while behaving as a neutral mediator. The result was the loss of part of the Roman sphere of influence in Illyria, despite no military defeat being sustained. These represented a failure of Rome, caused largely by the Greeks’ considering not only official position and interests of the people concerned, but also those that could

\textsuperscript{100} Larsen 1937: 25; Petzold 1940: 26; Warrior 1996a: 13; Eckstein 2008: 114 and 211.

\textsuperscript{101} Erskine 2001: 222.
not be shown officially through the formal channels, with informal diplomacy.

**Conclusion**

From the eve of the First Macedonian War to the Peace of Phoinike, Rome and the eastern Greeks managed their diplomacy in different ways. The differences are crucial to our understanding of whether informal diplomacy worked or not. I have argued that it decided the outcome of the Macedonian War. Rome’s failure to manage her contacts with eastern Greeks might partly have resulted from her difficulties in the Second Punic War. Yet, this should not be overestimated. The Greeks too were at odds each other, and had other enemies moreover, but succeeded in adapting to the conflicts of interest. In the light of this, the giving of gifts to the envoys from Saguntum in 205 shown in Chapter 1 suggests that it was in these years that Rome had become accustomed to the practice, and to the concept of informal diplomacy, in observing its usage by the Greeks. There is no direct evidence for Rome’s adoption of Greek methods of diplomacy. During the Macedonian War, however, Rome was involved in the games of the Greeks using informal diplomacy and was forced to withdraw from Greece owing to diplomatic isolation directed by such Greek diplomats, rather than military defeat. The significance of informal diplomacy was even more apparent for the Romans at the conclusion of the Peace of Phoinike. It is reasonable to think that Rome’s experience of the Macedonian War worked as a catalyst in changing Roman diplomatic practice. The examples of gift-giving in 205 and 203, picked up in the previous chapter as well, are products of this transition.
What has been shown, so far, is the failure of Rome in her management of the First Macedonian War and the significance of informal diplomacy for achieving wider diplomatic success. The influence of this concept on Rome during the period of her advance into the Greek world has only been partly confirmed, though. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate its significance in her expansion more generally. It is important to note that informal diplomacy was gradually employed by Rome. This has been suggested by the analysis of gift-giving undertaken in Chapter 1. Next, I will strengthen this argument by considering the actions of Rome’s diplomatic managers from the end of the Macedonian War, in particular her advocates of a second intervention in Greece, and those of her new allies among the Greeks on the eve of it.
Chapter 3

The Second Macedonian War and Roman Informal Diplomacy

Introduction

This chapter argues for the appearance of informal diplomacy in Rome’s diplomatic practice, by analysing Roman promoters of the Second Macedonian War, in the prelude to the hostilities. As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Rome was left isolated in Greece, during the first conflict, owing to her failure in matching the Greeks’ informal diplomacy. By contrast, Roman advocates of the second war managed to win over both domestic and international public opinion, resulting in a successful isolation of Macedonia. They achieved this change with a mixture of official tools, such as senatorial resolutions and open contacts with other states, and informal ones, for example by announcing Rome’s position as the defender of her allies in Greece, despite not yet having the approval of the assembly. These developments were the result of individual Romans’ participation in international politics, advocating war and acting as a group. Highlighting this phenomenon allows us to see clearly the value of informal diplomacy to the wider study of Roman diplomacy, and to identify Rome’s use of it, during this period, even if contemporaries did not use this terminology. It is also important that the Macedonian War, beginning in 200, was a turning point in the Roman history. It was the beginning of the Republic’s expansion into the Greek world. So, revealing the appearance of informal diplomacy in connection with Rome here also allows this thesis to develop the discussion later about its influence on her advance into the East even in the following decades, since the success against Macedonia may
well have led the Romans to use similar diplomatic strategies even after the war.

This chapter achieves these aims through the following three steps. Firstly, the rise of the future promoters of the Second Macedonian War from the end of the first struggle in Greece, and their character as hawks against Macedonia and as diplomats of considering not only formal but also informal sphere of diplomacy, will be shown. Secondly, I argue that, after the First Macedonian War, the power relationship among the leading Greek states changed significantly, and their informal diplomacy enabled Rome to participate in Greek affairs. Through analysing the actions of Rhodes and Attalos I of Pergamon in 201, with regard to the campaigns of Philippos V of Macedonia and Antiochos III of the Seleucids, the influence of informal actions on international politics in the Greek world and Romans will be discussed. The final section demonstrates that Roman hawks encouraged their fellow citizens to send troops into Greece while also attempting to win the support of the Greeks, and despite lacking the authority even to do this at the beginning. They were thus navigating the formal and informal interests of the people in and beyond Rome. These actions bear the hallmark of informal diplomacy, and its usage by Rome on the eve of the Second Macedonian War.

Section 1: The Roman Hawks against Macedonia

In order to demonstrate the emergence of Roman informal diplomacy, it is first necessary to identify the Romans that utilised it. This can be achieved by considering the rise of those encouraging the Second Macedonian War, following Rome’s first conflict in Greece. This period, after the Peace of Phoinike in 205, also encompassed the last phase of the Second Punic War. Rome had thus concentrated
the vast majority of her attention on the defeat of Carthage.\footnote{Fronda 2010: 277-9 and 329-30; Rawlings 2011: 302, 312, and 316-8.} Nevertheless, the Senate sent troops into Greece as early as 200, with the support of many Greek states, moreover. Even before that, individuals pressing for another war appear to have emerged and won over public opinion in Rome and beyond. In this section, I show who manoeuvred to achieve them, and that such Romans approached their fellow citizens and the Greeks with both formal and informal channels. The results of this enquiry enable us to see better the context of the second war and to notice the validity of using the concept of informal diplomacy in the analysis of the early stages of Rome’s expansion into the Greek world.

An initial appearance of such Romans that were keen to engage with the Greeks and connected with Rome’s new conflict with Macedonia is attested in Rome’s summoning of the Magna Mater from Pessinus in Asia Minor.\footnote{For this goddess, see Erskine 2001: 219-23.} This was officially designed to solve Rome’s difficulties in Italy caused by the Punic War based on a prediction found in the Sibylline Books in 205 (App. \textit{Hann.} 56a; Liv. 29.10.4-8 and 11.5-8). This was ostensibly a religious event, and might suggest that Rome was concentrating on solely Italian affairs.\footnote{Burton 1996: 60-3; Eckstein 2008: 123.} However, these factors were not very important for the architects of this project. After the Battle of Metaurus in 207, Rome had overwhelmed Carthage in Italy.\footnote{Gruen 1990: 6-7.} Even without the support of the foreign goddess, Roman victory was inevitable. It should be acknowledged, then, that some senators were rather interested in affairs beyond Italy. Considering the senatorial influence on the interpretation of the mysterious messages from the Sibylline Books, it is unlikely that its decree to summon the
goddess of Asia Minor, far from Italy, resulted from a simplistic decoding of prophecy.\footnote{Cf. Evans 2012: 27.}

In fact, the promoters of this project had ulterior motives, aside from any religious rationale. Roman envoys were sent not to Pessinus directly but first to Attalos, to ask him to support this project, on ground that Rome had no allies left in Asia Minor, aside from him (Liv. 29.11.1-2). For his part, he had only fought alongside Rome for a few years in the First Macedonian War. No source relates that they made a formal alliance. It is noteworthy that this contact was made shortly before the conclusion of peace at Phoinike, and that as I discussed at the end of Chapter 2, representatives of Athens and Ilion, on route to Pergamon, appeared with Attalos as \textit{adscripti} for Rome in the treaty (29.12.14). As E. M. Orlin argues,\footnote{Orlin 2002: 110-1.} this suggests that the act of summoning the Magna Mater was not only performed to finish the Punic War, but also to gather Roman supporters together.

It should be further noted that the delegates were led by M. Valerius Laevinus, who fought around the Adriatic and made the alliance with Aitolia in the 210s as shown in Chapter 2 (Liv. 24.40 and 26.24).\footnote{Cf. \textit{MRR}: 255, 260, 265, 269, and 275.} It is possible that his appointment simply resulted from his experience and achievements in Greece. As E. S. Gruen successfully argues,\footnote{Gruen 1984: 203-49.} however, Rome did not consider expertise about regional and foreign affairs to be of great importance, when appointing officials. In this case, his theory is supported by the appearance of Ser. Sulpicius Galba among the delegates. He was probably a brother of P. Sulpicius Galba, Laevinus’

\begin{footnotes}
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successor, who fought against Philippos with Attalos (Polyb. 9.42 and 10.41-2). Servius was apparently selected to manage the negotiation with Attalos smoothly, on the basis of the relationship between Publius and Attalos. If such a connection was very important, though, Publius himself would have been a better candidate. There is no record of his assuming office between 205 and 204. Furthermore, no source relates that Servius exploited Publius’ connection during the negotiation with Attalos. Servius’ dispatch resulted not from Publius’ connection with Attalos, then, but Servius’ relationship with Publius influenced his selection as an envoy. Considering Servius’ prior achievement, the Senate had no reason to select him. He had not assumed any important office, while other members of the delegation were elected to the praetorship around this year. His relationship with Publius, who had risen to the consulship, is the only plausible reason for Servius’ selection. Moreover, even for the other members, there is no sign that they had been previously connected with Greek affairs. The envoys sent to Asia Minor were selected not owing to their experience but because they were influential senators, or had a connection with such politicians, and displayed an interest in making contact with the Greeks in light of the character of the errand, and possibly hostility towards Macedonia. Considering their actions of 200 as hawks against Philippos, mentioned later, Laevinus and P. Galba had an interest in Greek affairs and Rome’s conflict with Macedonia, and then in the appointment of Laevinus’ junior colleagues their closeness to these interests of the two Romans may well have been also important. The summoning of the Magna Mater, thus, largely resulted from a rise of such Romans in the Senate.

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9 Eckstein 2009: 279 n.122.
10 MRR: 304.
With regard to the type of statesman oriented to participating in Greek affairs, several scholars have noticed a particular party that they have termed the Claudian group.\(^\text{11}\) It can be observed in a number of episodes. M. Claudius Marcellus, the Roman commander in Sicily, for example, considered public opinion among the Greeks in 212, by treating a captured citizen of Sparta, Aitolia’s friend, in a kindly fashion, when the federation negotiated with Rome about an alliance against Philippos (Liv. 25.23.8-9). In 196, the consul, possibly Marcellus’ son of the same name, wanted to be sent to Greece despite the plan of the Senate to defend Italy, and almost succeeded in persuading it to authorise his dispatch (33.25.4-6).\(^\text{12}\) The Claudii (and their friends) were interested in Greek affairs. There is no sign, however, that they directed the contacts with the Greeks in the 200s. As a consequence, it is not reasonable to use terms such as the Claudian group in the discussion of Roman diplomacy in this period.

Meanwhile, it is possible to confirm further that, from 205 onwards, there was a group of senators that was hostile to Macedonia, desired to win recognition for Rome within Greece, and became gradually more powerful. Another deputation was sent in the same year. The envoys brought booty seized from the troops of Hasdrubal, Hannibal’s brother, to Delphoi (Liv. 28.45.12); they were led by M. Pomponius Matho, who assumed the praetorship in 204 and then may well have exercised considerable influence in 205. Their errand was officially religious and Rome had often sent such envoys to Delphoi (e.g. 1.56.4-14, 5.15-16, 5.28.1-5, and 23.11.1-6), but the aim of the promoters of this project of 205 was also a demonstration to Greece of Roman dominance in Italy. Delphoi was an oracular

\(^\text{11}\) Patterson 1942: 319-40; Dorey 1959: 291.
centre, under the control of Aitolia.\textsuperscript{13} The dedication of booty, a sign of Roman victory, was noticed by many Greeks, in particular the Aitolians, who had been hostile towards Macedonia.\textsuperscript{14} Given the context of the envoys’ dispatch before the Peace of Phoinike (cf. 29.10.6 and 11.5), one of the aims of sending envoys was to persuade Aitolia into resuming the fight against Philippos, or to collect its signature as one of \textit{adscripti}. In any case, the dispatch of deputations to Delphoi and Pergamon shows that a number of senators, not only those selected as the envoys, but also those supporting the motions in the Senate, were interested in Greek affairs, the conflict with Macedonia, and eager to have further contact with states throughout the Greek world.

One could still assume that these initiatives in 205 were the result of nothing more than a Roman desire to end the First Macedonian War in as swift and acceptable fashion as possible. However, that there was a group of leading Romans interested in Greek affairs and hostile to Macedonia is, furthermore, supported by an event following the Peace of Phoinike, namely the visit of ‘the envoys from the allies in Greece (\textit{legati sociarum urbi ex Graecia})’ to Rome in 203 (Liv. 30.26.1-4, esp. 2). While no specific Greek states are named by Livius, these delegates complained of Philippos’ pressure and reported his military support for Carthage, flagrantly disregarding his peace with Rome. The Senate sent M. Aurelius to protest about this to him (30.42.1-10). Aurelius, however, not only remonstrated with Philippos about his behaviour, but also stirred up ill feeling against him among his neighbours. Philippos, in turn, sent envoys to Rome,

\textsuperscript{13} Grainger 1995a: 318-43.
\textsuperscript{14} There is also a good example of other states attracting attention through making of dedications at Delphoi to be found in the approach of Attalos on the eve of the Social War. Cf. Allen 1983: 70-1.
to protest about Aurelius around the beginning of 201. Aurelius himself dispatched a certain M. Furius to argue against Philippos before the Senate. While there is no information regarding the result of the dispute, we know that Aurelius was not recalled (31.3.4 and 5.5-7). This event suggests that the hawks against Philippos rose and participated in Greek affairs with a significant degree of independence. Furius’ dispatch by Aurelius shows that his approaches to Philippos’ neighbours were not part of his original order; it would not have been necessary, otherwise, for him to account for his action before the Senate through a messenger. If many senators had not supported Aurelius, it is likely that he would have been recalled. While his behaviour is a clear example of informal diplomacy, the Senate chose to overlook it. Considering this episode, there were many senators, eager to have contact with the Greeks, and who were hostile towards Philippos. Aurelius was supported by or acted as an agent of these senators. For their part, they did not hesitate to approach outsiders, despite lacking the official approval of the Roman state.

Several scholars doubt the historicity of this event.\footnote{E.g. Holleaux 1921: 278 n.1; \textit{MRR}: 322 n.3; Gruen 1984: 222 n.86.} Certainly, no source confirms that there really were Roman allies in Greece in 203. Moreover, Philippos’ military support for Carthage is not covered by Polybios, a near-contemporary.\footnote{Walbank 1967: 456.} However, as V. M. Warrior argues, this does not confirm that Livius’ text was mistaken.\footnote{Warrior 1996a: 101-3. Cf. Walbank 1963: 3.} Polybios refers to the capture of some Greek cities by Philippos around this year (18.1.14). Some of them could have sent their diplomats to complain about the situation to Rome, who would warmly receive the embassies. Livius or his sources could have casually labelled them as Rome’s allies.
Furthermore, Carthage requested soldiers from foreign states at that time. Some Macedonians could have been employed, whether they were sent by Philippos or operated privately as mercenaries. In any case, the appearance of such Macedonians could be regarded as an indicator of Philippos’ support for Carthage. There is no reason to doubt the visit of the envoys from Greece to Rome, Aurelius’ dispatch, and the analysis of hawks within the Senate.

An interest in Greek affairs among leading Romans after 205 can also be observed in contemporary literature. In the *Stichus*, which was first performed in the autumn of 200, Plautus relates that while visitors from Ambrakia were treated as ‘the best guests (*summi viri*),’ Gelasimus, possibly a *cliens* of a Roman notable, was treated like an *infinitus infinitus*, that is, like vermin (454-504, esp. 492-3). Plautus teased or criticised some leading Romans for warmly welcoming the Greeks despite their cold reception to traditional friends, namely fellow Roman citizens. We must be careful not to exaggerate any reference to contemporary politics in Plautus’ literary works, as he was not a leading Roman but a playwright. Furthermore, as Gruen argues, he liked to parody the misapprehension of leading Romans about the Greeks and their culture, but not necessarily to depict accurate social conditions. The appearance of Greeks in the *Stichus* might therefore simply reflect a general interest among the Romans in Greek culture and ideas during the third century. However, this is not plausible from the viewpoint of Plautus’ manner of making a play interesting. Plautus was born in the middle of the third century, and had written his works under the influence of Greek writers such as Menandros. Furthermore, Roman elites had

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nurtured contacts with the Greeks in Italy and Sicily individually, even before the 200s, demonstrated, for instance, by an early third century inscription from Entella concerning the investment of the title of πρόξενος in a certain Ti. Claudius (*SEG* XXX.1120). I argue that it is not plausible that, in 200, Plautus was concerned simply with relating the interest of some leading Roman in the Greeks. Considering the timing of the *Stichus*’ publication on the eve of sending troops to Greece, Plautus’ satirical tendency, and the appearance of the Hellenes from Greece itself (rather than southern Italy or Sicily) in his play, he wrote the scene mentioned above with an eye on the contemporary situation of leading Romans. There were many leading senators who were more interested in Greek affairs than those of their fellow citizens, and had established a variety of formal and private contacts with Greeks themselves.

The influence of the Romans who were interested in Greek affairs, or of the hawks against Philippos, should not be overestimated, though. When Aitolia’s diplomats visited Rome to ask the Republic to fight against Macedonia again in c. 202, the Senate curtly refused the request, owing to Aitolia’s ‘serious defection (τῆς οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ μεταβολῆς)’ in the First Macedonian War (*App. Mac.* 4.2), i.e. its separate peace with him in 206. This visit of this Aitolian embassy suggests that the approaches of the hawks to the Greeks from 205, mentioned above, were effective, as suggested also by the visit of the envoys ‘from the allies in Greece.’ Rome was, now, noticed by the Greeks in contrast to the last phase of the previous war. The blunt refusal of the Aitolian offer by the Senate, however, means that

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21 Ampolo 2001: 18-19. In addition, Entella was, strictly speaking, not a Greek but a hellenised Sicilian city, but the Hellenisation of the populace seems to have completed by the end of the fourth century. Berger 1992: 78.

the Romans had generally become as apathetic towards Aitolia as they were
towards Philippos, a tendency that the hawks could not control. One reason for
this refusal might be that the Punic War had not been concluded. If the hawks
had controlled Rome, though, they would have persuaded their fellow citizens to
engage with Aitolia’s appeal in some way, despite their antipathy towards the
federation. Rome’s intervention in Greece would have enabled the hawks to have
a chance to render services, and some of them, who had been connected with the
previous war, to redeem themselves for their failure to defeat Philippos.

The attitude of Rome towards Aitolia also allows us to estimate when the
hawks gained control of the Senate. In the fall of 201, after the defeat of Carthage,
envoys from Rhodes and Pergamon visited Rome to complain about Philippos’
campaigns (App. Mac. 4.2; Liv. 31.2.1-2).23 In contrast to its response to Aitolia,
the Senate treated these two states favourably and sent its deputation to several
Greek states, including Aitolia, to declare against him and to ask them to support
Rome’s new war (Polyb. 16.27.2-4). This shows that, after the visit of the Aitolian
envoys, the Roman hawks controlled the Senate and were publicly hostile towards
Philippos, using the approach of Rhodes and Pergamon to justify their hostility.
This hypothesis is not beyond question. The order of Appianos’ description
mentioned above suggests that Aitolia’s approach to Rome was, in fact, after that
of Rhodes and Pergamon.24 Rome’s approach to Aitolia after the fall of 201,
however, shows that the visit of its envoys to Rome was prior to her dispatch of
those to Greece.25 Otherwise, this would mean that Rome had decided to

reproached Aitolia while simultaneously attempting to win over the federation. This is implausible. Appianos writes of the situation of Asia Minor after the Peace of Phoinike, and the approach of the two states attacked by Philippos to Rome in 201, describing the situation in Greece, and the action of Aitolia, after 205. It is impossible to determine precisely when Aitolia approached Rome. Yet, after the Senate’s unfriendly contact with Aitolia, the hawks won a majority in the fall of 201, after the end of the Punic War, at the latest, and exploited the visit of the envoys from Rhodes and Pergamon to approach the Greeks, including Aitolia, with the notion of attacking Philippos.

In general, from the time of the Peace of Phoinike, some Romans led Rome to approach the Greeks on several pretexts. They were united in their interest in Greek affairs and their antipathy towards Macedonia. Considering the results of elections during this period, their influence gradually increased. They often independently and privately established contacts with the Greeks of the mainland. These were partly acts of informal diplomacy. The leading Romans, or the hawks against Philippos, thus increased their influence in Rome and her presence in the East and, in 201, at last led the Senate to display hostility towards him.

Section 2: Rhodes and Pergamon in 201 and Informal Diplomacy

Section 1 demonstrated the rise of the hawks against Macedonia in Rome; nevertheless, as suggested by Plautus’ negative reference to them, Rome’s citizens did not necessarily support them, despite their majority in the Senate. This

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26 Walbank 1967: 446.
suggests that although the dispatch of troops was made based on the approval of the assembly in 200, it was not easy for the jingoists to win over their fellow citizens, and that, even in 201, the appeal of Rhodes and Pergamon only barely enabled them to lead the Senate to show hostility to Philippos.\textsuperscript{27} Actually, it is useful to consider the relationship between the uneasy situation for the hawks in Rome and the opposition to him in the Greek world, in order to demonstrate the significance of informal diplomacy in Rome at the close of the third century. In this section, I will show it through considering particularly the diplomacy of Rhodes and Pergamon in 201. The result will provide an important context of the war, and contribute to revealing the influence of informal diplomacy on the Greek world at that time here, and that on Rome on the eve of the Second Macedonian War in the following section.

In order to achieve these aims, I shall analyse the context of the appeal of Rhodes and Pergamon to Rome in their opposition to Philippos. He had been supported by the majority of Greek states when the Peace of Phoinike was concluded in 205. Rhodes had been among the states that mediated between the king and Aitolia and indirectly supported him (e.g. Polyb. 11.4-6).\textsuperscript{28} The approach of Rhodes to Rome with Pergamon, one of Rome’s \textit{adscripti} in 205, shows that the dynamic between the Greek states, and between them and Rome, had changed.

This picture is confirmed by noticing that in the latter half of the 200s, the power balance among the leading states, in particular the three major royal dynasties, in the Hellenistic world changed.\textsuperscript{29} Firstly, Philippos made a peace with Aitolia when his campaign against the federation was going favourably. It

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Liv. 31.2.1-2 and 6.1; Briscoe 1973: 42-45 and 55-6.

\textsuperscript{28} Walbank 1967: 274-7.

\textsuperscript{29} Gruen 1984: 532.
consolidated his position in Greece, and enabled him to advance overseas. Secondly, Antiochos had recovered many regions across Asia Minor, extending to Mesopotamia, by c. 203. Finally, the Ptolemies had faced a revolt of the native Egyptians in the midst of domestic unrest caused by the succession of the infant king, Ptolemaios V (Porph. \((FGH\ 260)\) 45). This was an opportunity for Philippo and Antiochos to enlarge their kingdoms further. They attacked the Ptolemies in Asia Minor and Syria. Modern scholars highlight here a secret pact between the two kings, to divide Ptolemaic territory, as an indicator of the dynamic changes in international politics during this period. This information appears in several sources (e.g. App. \(Mac.\ 4\); Diod. 28.2.1-4.1; Polyb. 3.2.8 and 15.20.1-8), and its contents and historicity have been discussed extensively, owing to their supposed impact on contemporaries.\(^{30}\) I will also notice this pact in analysing the manoeuvres of Rhodes and Pergamon, revealing the importance of informal diplomacy in the games between the Greeks concerned and Rome or the hawks.

On first examination, it might appear unusual that this chapter highlights the Hellenistic pact in the context of arguing for the significance of informal diplomacy in Rome since, among other things, it was allegedly concluded by the two kings, the formal decision-makers in the Greek world. Moreover, although many scholars think that the pact encouraged Rome to send troops to Greece in order to prevent the kings from increasing their powers,\(^{31}\) a causal link between both is not necessarily clear. There is also reason to doubt the historicity of the pact.\(^{32}\) However, it was allegedly a pact that was secret from the neighbouring

\(^{30}\) \textit{StVIII}: Nr.547; Eckstein 2008: 129-80.
states of the two kings, such as Rhodes and Pergamon, although the information did spread among them. These states, and others, accounted for the potential Macedonian-Selucid partnership in their decision-making. The appeal of Rhodes and Pergamon to Rome, their attack on Philippos before that, and Rome’s dispatch of envoys to the Greek states were made in this context. It is reasonable to discuss the alleged pact in this study of informal diplomacy embracing clandestine actions.

It is useful now to consider the events that led to Rhodes and Pergamon sending envoys to Rome and attacking Philippos prior to the former. Philippos intervened in Aegean affairs after 205. This disturbed the interests of the two states, in particular those of Rhodes. Philippos sent troops to the Cretans, who had been at war with the Rhodians since 205. Furthermore, Perdikkas, his agent, intervened in the decision-making of several Cretan cities, concerning their investment of ἀσυλία in Teos around 201 (IC I.v.52, xiv.1, 2, 15, II.i.1, v.17, xii.21, and xvi.1), demonstrating Philippos’ influence over Crete and neighbouring regions. The king also secretly sabotaged Rhodian warships, although Rhodes appears not to have noticed this (Diod. 27.3 and 28.1; Polyai. Strat. 5.17.2). Finally, Philippos seems to have attempted to annex Iasos and Nisyros, Rhodian dependants (I.Iasos 150: IG XII.3.91). These were provocative actions. In 202 he captured Chalkedon and Kios (Aitolian allies), and took Thasos, despite its friendly disposition towards him. The visit of Aitolia’s envoys to Rome mentioned above resulted from these actions. Rhodes negotiated with Philippos to save Kios, and allegedly, after its failure, decided to attack him (Polyb. 15.21-4; cf. Str.

34 Savalli-Lestraide 2012: 156 and 172.
36 Eckstein 2008: 211-3.
12.4.3). Indeed, in 201, Rhodes damaged his fleet in the sea-fight near Chios, alongside Pergamon (Polyb. 16.2-9). The allied states failed to stop Philippos’ campaign, however, owing to the disparity in their military strengths. Consequently, they made contact with Rome in the autumn of 201.

It is important to note that Rhodes and Pergamon had not been openly attacked by Philippos; nevertheless, they attacked him by themselves, despite lacking sufficient power to defeat him. The two states only succeeded in damaging his fleet in the sea (Polyb. 16.2.9-10), as noted above. On land, however, they appeared even more powerless to prevent his sacking of their territory (Liv. 31.16.7; Polyb. 16.1, 11, 24, and 29-34). Although its failure in saving Kios might have been unpleasant for Rhodes (15.22.3-4 and 23.1-9), Rhodes appears to have taken reckless and unnecessary risks. It is also noteworthy that Rhodes and Attalos had not been friendly neighbours. This is confirmed by an episode in which Rhodes was hit by an earthquake, in 227, and was supported by many of the neighbouring states (Plin. NH 34.41; Polyb. 5.88-90; Str. 14.2.5). Attalos is not listed among those that contributed. The extant sources give no sign that their relationship changed after that. Thus, in 201 Rhodes and Attalos suddenly joined together to attack Philippos, despite their previous discord, their military inferiority, and the lack of any direct threat to them being posed by Macedonia.

So, what provoked Rhodes and Pergamon to undertake such seemingly inexplicable actions? This has been discussed by scholars from several viewpoints. For instance, Rhodes is said to have regarded commercial interests as its first priority in foreign policy, and to have acted based on them in 201. According to

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this theory, Philippos’ advance upon the Aegean states threatened the security of Rhodian trade routes, prompting an attack on him to clear the area. Certainly, ancient authors refer to Rhodes’ constant interests in commerce (e.g. Diod. 20.81.2-3; Polyb. 30.5.8; Str. 14.2.5). In 201, Rhodes might have regarded Philippos’ campaigns around the Hellespontos, such as the capture of Kios, as a menace to its trade.39 This suggestion does not necessarily explain, however, why Rhodes took the risk of war against a state that was obviously stronger, militarily. Philippos and Prusias I of Bithynia had been related by a marriage of their royal families for some years (Polyb. 15.22.1).40 The trade routes of the Hellespontos and the northern part of the Aegean Sea were practically under Macedonian control, from that point. While the increase of Philippos’ power around the strait might be unfavourable to Rhodes, it did not occur suddenly in 201.

In order to resolve this contradiction, other scholars argue that Rhodes was apprehensive about the political impact of Philippos’ advance.41 Rhodes had established its leadership in the Aegean Sea by the 220s (Polyb. 4.47.1). Macedonian campaigns in the 200s were regarded as a menace to it, and perhaps even to Rhodes’ independence, leading Rhodes to try to solve it at all costs. This theory offers an explanation for Rhodes’ hostility towards him in this period. This does not sufficiently explain, though, why Rhodes attacked him in 201, a time at which the former was significantly weaker diplomatically as well as in military strength. Philippos had established a hegemony in Greece by 205. Conflict with him might therefore have caused Rhodes’ isolation among the Greek states. In addition, he had not attacked the Rhodians officially. In fact, they seem to have

41 Wiemer 2002: 200-1; Eckstein 2008: 194.
had a genuine choice not to attack Macedonia, at that time. In order to understand Rhodes’ sudden offensive and diplomatic overtures towards Pergamon and Rome, it is necessary to consider the reason why Rhodes did not or could not wait for the international situation to change, at a time when Philippos was well prepared for the advance.

Concerning Attalos, it is also difficult to discern his rationale for fighting alongside Rhodes, against Macedonia in 201. He had reinforced his navy and increased his influence in the Aegean Sea since the 220s, and obtained Aigina in the First Macedonian War (Liv. 28.5.1; Polyb. 4.65.6-17, 9.42.5, 11.5.8, and 22.8.9-10). He was traditionally a rival of Rhodes, on the sea.42 The alliance in 201 was therefore a remarkable change in his diplomacy. Moreover, he had not been threatened by Macedonia but had been attacked by other neighbours. Bithynia had captured part of Mysia in the north, following the Macedonian War, and Antiochus had taken Teos, in the south, by c. 203.43 It was seemingly inconceivable for Attalos to attack Philippos with Rhodes, then.

Regarding Attalos’ motive for the partnership with Rhodes, Gruen argues that he was afraid of the combination between Philippos and Prusias.44 This is a reasonable suggestion, to some extent. Bithynia was Attalos’ enemy, and had obtained Kios based on the agreement with Philippos after he took the inhabitants and the spoils (Polyb.15.23.10). Attalos might have wanted to check the activities

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42 McShane 1964: 100; Eckstein 2008: 195-6. For the Attalid navy, see also Ma 2013: 61-2.
43 Mysia seems to have been ruled by Bithynia from the 200s to 188 (Liv. 38.39.15: Polyb. 21.46.10). Habicht 2006: 4-6. The Teians were ‘liberated’ from the Attalid tribute by Antiochus, when he entered into Teos with his troops and recognised their ἀσυλία around 203 (SEG XLI.1003, esp. ll.17-22). For the date of the decree and the Teian position, see Errington 1980: 280, Giovannini 1983: 181-3, Gruen 1984: 532, Dmitriev 1999: 403, Dreyer 2002b: 129-31, and Ma 2002: 308-11.
44 Gruen 1984: 533.
of the kings. Yet, this does not explain why he decided to make an alliance with another rival, Rhodes, and to attack Macedonia in 201. Philippos had not supported Prusias’ anti-Attalid actions directly. The attack upon Philippos here was more likely to trigger a direct counterattack with the assistance of Bithynia. The impact of the relationship between these kings on Attalos’ decision in 201 should not be overstated, then.

What should be remembered here is the secret pact, mentioned above, to divide Ptolemaic territory between Philippos and Antiochos. Historically, scholars have discussed it with reference to the decision of Rome to commence the Second Macedonian War. However, as A. M. Eckstein notices, the agreement, allegedly concluded in 202, is also important for analysing the actions of Rhodes and Pergamon in 201. The possibility of cooperation between the two kings was more serious for the Greek states nearby, than for Rome. For the Republic, the increase of the power of the two dynasties in the East, far from Italy, was not an urgent menace. For Rhodes and Pergamon, though, it could transform their already strong neighbours into super-powers. This situation explains their attack on Philippos in 201, despite the difficulties mentioned above. Blocking the kings’ joint manoeuvres was an urgent issue. It is further important to note that for analysing the impact of the secret pact on the two states, whether or not it was really concluded, is immaterial. The significance would be the same so long as they believed that such an alliance had occurred. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the pact as a factor behind the decision of Rhodes and Pergamon to attack Philippos; this is confirmed not through analysing the pact’s historicity, but through

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45 Eckstein 2008: 184-98.
analysing whether the secret alliance, informal diplomacy between the kings, was assumed by other states or not. If Rhodes and Pergamon perceived the partnership of the two kings before their attack upon Philippos, it is reasonable to think that the secret pact was a factor encouraging them to open hostilities against him, and to approach Rome, owing to the expected impact of the pact on them. The result also confirms that informal diplomacy played an important role in the Greek world then, just as in the First Macedonian War.

What should be noted here is how the secret pact was treated by contemporaries. A hint can be found in the literary sources. These inform us that the Ptolemies, the target of the agreement, had not been attacked by Philippos before 201.\(^{46}\) It looks to suggest that Rhodes and Pergamon had not observed the two kings’ combined activity when they attacked Philippos. Indeed, in the reference to the contact between the Senate and them in the fall of 201, Appianos relates that Rhodes informed Rome of the pact simply as a δόξα, a rumour (Mac. 4).\(^{47}\) Furthermore, other sources, including Polybios, do not show when the pact was noticed (3.2.8; cf. Just. 30.2; Liv. 31.14.5).\(^{48}\) Polybios uses sources from contemporary Rhodians (cf. 16.14). The lack of a detailed reference to the pact in his text (and those of later authors using his as their source) shows that Rhodes, and others, had no precise and official information on any such plan, even in 201.

But this situation does not mean Rhodes and Pergamon could not have known of the pact when they attacked Philippos. In light of Rhodes’ reference to the ‘rumour’, the two states had observed several indications of such an alliance.

\(^{46}\) Wörrle 1988: 436; Eckstein 2008: 159-61.
\(^{47}\) For more on the interpretation of this word, see Schmitt 1964: 243; Eckstein 2008: 177.
Furthermore, Polybios relates (at 16.1.8) that Philippos demanded supplies for his army from Zeuxis, the Seleucid governor of the west of Tauros ‘according to the pact (κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας).’ The historicity of this event is generally recognised.\(^{49}\) Although this was during Philippos’ campaign in Caria, after the battle off Chios, and Zeuxis did not help him significantly (16.1.9), that there was some partnership between the two dynasties seemed beyond question for contemporaries. The two kings did not seem to announce it, but did not strive to hide it, since supplies could not be transported in secret.

This candidness is supported by an inscription from Eleutherna on Crete (\textit{IC II.xii.21}), in which Teos was invested with ἀσυλία. This was decided on the basis of the Teian request, with the support of Hagesandros, who had been dispatched by Antiochos to stop the struggle around Crete, and that of Perdikkas mentioned above (ll.13-19). I argue that the appearance of the Seleucid diplomat, not that of Attalos, and that of Perdikkas, in the appeal of Teos, shows that this event happened after Antiochos ‘liberated’ the city from Pergamon in c. 203, and that he intervened in the Cretan War, alongside Philippos. Contemporary Rhodians, the enemies of the Cretan cities, may well have noticed the partnership of the kings when the people of Eleutherna discussed the topic in the assembly and erected the inscription in c. 201.

This is also suggested by another epigraphic source, inscribed in c. 200 or the 180s after the Peace of Apameia, which records as follows (\textit{SEG} LII.1038.ll.10-13):

\[
\ldots \textit{συνοτάντος δὲ πολέμου βασιλεί Αντιόχωι ποτὶ βασιλῆ}
\]


This was found at Bargylia in Caria, and was initially published in 2000. Recent scholars agree that it is a copy of a Rhodian decree, in light of the dialect and the form of the Greek infinitive used. The general contents of the resolution are uncertain. It is also impossible to decide whether Philippos ceded Theangela to Antiochos during or after his advance into Caria, in 201. Yet, the reference quoted above suggests that the two kings made a partnership to attack the Ptolemies, and that their contemporaries noticed it. The passage refers to Philippos’ campaign, and that of Antiochos against Ptolemaios from 202, in the Fifth Syrian War (or around 203 in his advance into Asia Minor), by which the erectors show the readers when the events picked up by the inscription concerned happened. Bargylia and Rhodes seem to have believed that Philippos and Antiochos opposed the Ptolemies together in the 200s, although, if the decree was made in the 180s, this might be a conclusion they reached some years after the pact itself.

Another sign that the partnership was ‘noticed’ by Rhodes can be found in an event around the Battle of Kynoskephalai (Liv. 33.19.10-20.3 and 10). At that time, Antiochos was advancing into southern Asia Minor. Rhodes demanded that he not advance west of Cape Chelidonion. Rhodes stopped his advance by force, to ‘prevent him from meeting Philippos (ne coniungi eum Philipppo paterentur),’ even though the number of ships of the Seleucid fleet was around 300 (33.20.3). Rhodes permitted Antiochos to go through, however, when Philippos’ defeat was known.

Rhodes did not want to fight against Antiochos, but ‘noticed’ the partnership with Philippos, deciding to prevent them only from fighting together at all costs.\(^{51}\)

It is plausible that neither Rhodes nor Pergamon had any precise information about the contents of the pact between the two kings. Yet, the secret partnership, an act of informal diplomacy, was apparent. Despite several scholars’ supposition that the two states noticed the pact of the kings after their attack on Philippos, and complained about the situation to Rome in panic,\(^{52}\) the decision of the two states to attack him was more likely made while considering not only his actions around the Aegean Sea, but also his partnership with Antiochos.

The role of Antiochos also explains why Rhodes and Pergamon attacked Philippos in 201, and not later. Antiochos had waged campaigns in Asia Minor during the 200s. In 202, however, he turned his troops to Koile-Syria. This might have resulted from the pact which stipulated that he obtain Egypt and Cyprus (\textit{Mac. 4}).\(^{53}\) At the very least, his contemporaries ‘expected’ that Antiochos aimed to capture Koile-Syria. This situation was favourable to Rhodes and Pergamon, having ‘believed’ that the two kings were in partnership. Following the Battle of Raphia (Polyb. 5.81-6), once the Seleucids advanced into Syria, the Ptolemies defended the region with all their force. Antiochos would not be able to act jointly with Philippos in Asia Minor for a considerable time. Although Philippos’ troops and supporters there, such as Prusias and Zeuxis, were still strong, it was easier for Rhodes and Pergamon to resist Philippos in Antiochos’ absence, rather than to fight against both kings at the same time. Meanwhile, the Ptolemies’ power was

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\(^{51}\) Concerning context and the historicity of the Livian information, see Briscoe 1973: 284-8.

\(^{52}\) E.g. McDonald and Walbank 1937: 187; Berthold 1976: 100.

in decline, and Antiochos was expected to achieve victory in Syria and to return to Asia Minor, before long. The space of time in which Rhodes and Pergamon could respond to the advance of the kings separately was short. In 201, the international situation was unfavourable to the two states but, since the kings’ partnership had been ‘noticed’, the decision to attack Philippos represented the lesser of two evils.

This view is supported by the fact that, in 201, Rhodes did not mediate between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids to save the former, despite their traditional friendship and the commercial contacts emphasised by ancient scholars (e.g. Diod. 20.88-99 and 21.81.4; Polyb. 4.51.5 and 5.67.11).\(^5\) Rhodes hoped that the war between the dynasties would drag on, and decided to remove Philippos from the Aegean Sea while Antiochos was in Syria, although, in c. 197, Rhodes appeared to mediate between the two dynasties (Porph. (FGH 260) 47).

This plan of countering the advance of Philippos, in Antiochos’ absence, did, in fact, have some hope of success. As the sea-fight off Chios shows, the scale of the combined fleet of Rhodes and Pergamon rivalled that of Macedonia. If they had defeated Philippos at sea, his campaign would have been frustrated, despite his superiority on land. Without the fleet, he could not maintain any occupied territory. The Rhodians informed Attalos of what they had observed and what they were planning, although he may well have independently discovered some signs of the partnership between the kings, winning him over. Thus, the decision of the two states to make an alliance against Philippos, despite his military and diplomatic dominance in 201, can be understood when their observation of the informal diplomacy between the kings is noticed.

It is also important to note that Rhodes and Pergamon originally planned to finish the war against Philippos without involving other states beyond the Aegean Sea. In fact, although they fought against Philippos with small Aegean cities in the sea-fight off Chios (Polyb. 16.2.10), the two states sent their envoys to Rome in the fall of 201, almost after the warring season had passed. It was not until after 201 that Attalos tried to ally with Athens and Aitolia (Liv. 31.14-15; Polyb. 16.25-6). If Rhodes and Pergamon had wanted to make an alliance with states further away from the Aegean Sea from the beginning, at least Aitolia, Attalos’ old friend since the 220s (4.65.6-7), would have been asked to fight, before the outbreak of war. The extant sources do not explain the reason for this relatively late attempt at forging diplomatic ties. Yet, considering the action around the Cape Chelidonion, Rhodes and Pergamon seemed very apprehensive about joint action between the two kings. In order to stop it, it was sensible not to increase the scale of war. If Philippos was attacked on several fronts, it could cause Antiochos’ intervention to save the former. Considering Rhodes’ flexible attitude to Antiochos before Kynoskephalai as well, Rhodes and Pergamon tried to manage the two kings delicately.

Rhodes and Pergamon failed to stop Philippos around the Aegean Sea in the season of campaign in 201, though. They attacked him near Lade, but were badly beaten (Polyb. 16.15), and tried in vain to impose a blockade on his fleet, near Bargylia (Polyai. Strat. 4.18.2; Polyb. 16.24). Meanwhile, Antiochos had

56 Eckstein 2008: 164 simply regards the battle off Chios as the second one after that of Lade. But, as Berthold 1975: 150-1 notes, there is a complicated debate over which came first. A number of scholars tend to place the battle off Chios before that of Lade, although it is not necessary, for our purposes, to reach a final conclusion in this section. Cf. Schmitt 1957: 61; Walbank 1967: 497-500.
advanced into Gaza and was on the offensive. While the Ptolemies fought tenaciously, from the siege of the city to the Battle of Panion in 200 (16.18.2 and 22a.1-6), Rhodes and Pergamon around the autumn of 201 thought that there was little to prevent the two kings from moving jointly. Their appeal to other states was a reaction to control the situation. This might not be the most favourable choice for the two states. If some state accepted their offer, the war against Philippos inevitably dragged on. Since Antiochos seems to have all but defeated the Ptolemies, as long as Philippos continued his campaigns, Antiochos would want to cooperate with him. Yet, winning over other states would compel Philippos to fight on fronts other than around the Aegean Sea, where Rhodes and Pergamon were at their most apprehensive of the joint action of the kings. In order to avoid a crushing defeat, Rhodes and Pergamon enlarged the scale of war against Philippos, while accepting the increased risk of Antiochos’ intervention.

These analyses demonstrate the influence of the kings’ secret partnership, their informal diplomacy, on the Rhodians and Attalos and, moreover, the Romans. The pact was not announced, but was not hidden. Rhodes and Pergamon believed that the kings had made an informal alliance, attacking Philippos and approaching Rome to prevent it from succeeding. Their approach prompted the dispatch of Roman envoys to Greece, in the fall of 201, mentioned in Section 1. The informal diplomacy of the Macedonian and Seleucid kings therefore caused Rhodes and Pergamon to enter into partnership and approach Rome, and thus indirectly provoked her action against Philippos, although it has not been confirmed, yet, that Rome had understood the nature of the informal diplomacy.

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Section 3: The Roman Hawks and Informal Diplomacy

The results of analysis in Section 2 reveal the context of the approach of Rhodes and Pergamon to Rome but, meanwhile, seem to make it more difficult to understand the situation outlined in Section 1, namely that although the Senate showed its hostility to Philippos from the fall of 201 onwards, Roman citizens did not necessarily support a new war, and that Rome's decision to act was, nevertheless, triggered by the sudden appeal of Rhodes and Pergamon, that resulted from the change of their original strategic plan. It may well have been difficult for Rome to accept such an approach, and to send troops in 200. Since the 210s, Rome had been at war with Carthage. The citizenry was exhausted.\textsuperscript{58} Nevertheless, as soon as Rhodes and Pergamon had a contact with the Senate, Rome approached the Greeks while showing her hostility to Philippos, even though some of them might have held antipathy towards Rome since the previous war. It could be argued that the secret pact related by Rhodes and Pergamon formed the catalyst in Rome's decision here.\textsuperscript{59} While the two kings' partnership was suspected, however, neither of the Greek states could tell Rome of its contents precisely. It was of relatively little importance to Rome, if the kings really had made an alliance, and there is no sign that Rome noticed the alleged pact. It is therefore impossible simply to accept that it prompted her decision to go to war. Now, I propose the theory that, despite such difficulties faced by Rome and her citizens, the hawks against Philippos pressed for the dispatch of troops, convincing other Romans, particularly following the dispatch of envoys to the

\textsuperscript{58} Cornell 1996: 103-11.
\textsuperscript{59} Holleaux 1921: 309-22; McDonald and Walbank 1937: 182-90; Eckstein 2005: 233-42.
Greek states. As I showed in Section 1, a group of Romans advocating a new war against Macedonia had come into being. The dispatch of envoys was connected with this group's rise. I consider that many of the official decisions in the domestic and foreign affairs of the Roman state, from the contact with Rhodes and Pergamon to Rome's dispatch of troops, also resulted from the manoeuvres of such Roman hawks, who participated in international politics by controlling the Senate, and in the acts that they engaged in informal diplomacy in a similar fashion to which the Romans had observed, or been involved in, during the period of the First Macedonian War. In this section, I expand this hypothesis by analysing the manoeuvres of the warmongers from the fall of 201 onwards. The results enable this study to pinpoint the use of informal diplomacy in Rome, and its significance at the beginning of her advance into the Greek world.

The appearance of informal diplomatic practices in Rome can be observed by analysing the conduct of those who argued for Rome to go to war against Macedonia, again. In advance of the analysis, it is worth noting several points about the general situation of Rome when she sent envoys to the Greek states after the contact with those of Rhodes and Pergamon. Firstly, the dispatch was to demonstrate Rome's hostility towards Macedonia to the Greeks, while also directly responding to the appeal of Rhodes and Pergamon. Rome intervened in Greek affairs as their supporter, and actively wanted to garner the support of other Greeks. Otherwise, the Roman envoys would have been sent only to the two states and Philippos. This situation suggests that Rome had learned a lesson from the previous war, in which the Republic had negotiated almost exclusively with Aitolia, and had thus been isolated as soon as the federation had made peace with Macedonia. Officially, however, the Romans had been excluded from Greece as
It was therefore not so easy to enter into partnership with other Greeks. Secondly, while Rome had defeated Carthage, the frontier of northern Italy was still troubled by unrest (Liv. 31.2.5-11, 10.1-4, and 11.4). Indeed, P. Aelius Paetus, the consul of 201, had failed to deal with the raids of the Boii. In 200 the remnants of the Carthaginian army, having been led either by Hasdrubal or Mago, attacked Rome’s colonies with the neighbouring tribes, despite being repulsed soon (31.21.1-22.3). Rome could not afford to focus her undivided attention upon Greece. Thirdly, although the hawks succeeded in making the Senate send envoys to the East to declare against Philippos, this does not mean that they exerted control over Roman diplomatic practice. Many citizens regarded the new war negatively, including a number of active politicians, as is shown by the events picked up in this section later. Overall, despite their success in making the Senate make a friendly response to Rhodes and Pergamon, the hawks had many difficulties in ensuring that Rome went to war against Macedonia.

Nevertheless, Rome dispatched troops in 200, even though it was ‘the late fall (autumno ferme exacto),’ an unsuitable season to commence a war (Liv. 31.22.4). The Senate, under the hawks, made every effort to attack as early as possible, and secured a majority in the assembly to do so. They also persuaded many Greeks to join their cause quickly (31.28.1, 41.1, and 32.19.1-23.13). In the winter of 200/199, the Illyrians led by Skerdilaidas, Athamania, and Dardania, allied themselves with Rome. By 198, Roman forces were also supported by Aitolia and Achaia. As the Battle of Aoi Stena demonstrates (32.14.5-8; Plut. Flam. 4.1), Rome struggled to penetrate Philippos’ defence line in western Greece, since he

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60 Briscoe 1973: 58-60 and 82-4.
61 Bickerman 1985: 131; Warrior 1996a: 34.
utilised steep mountain terrain with great skill. When many Greek states supported the Roman offensive, however, he was forced to withdraw to his own territory despite not being defeated. This shows that Rome under the hawks won the support of the Greeks not necessarily through any display of military power, but through diplomatic approaches, and succeeded in hunting down Macedonia, in contrast to the previous war. This section now analyses how the hawks made these two coups in and beyond Rome, and clarifies the significance of informal diplomacy by Rome during this period.

To begin with, I analyse the approach of the hawk-dominated Senate towards the Greek world. According to Livius (at 31.2.3-4), after the contact with Rhodes and Pergamon, Rome sent C. Claudius Nero, M. Aemilius Lepidus, and P. Sempronius Tuditanus to Egypt to express her gratitude for the Ptolemaic king’s ‘faithful attitude (fīde)’ to her during the Second Punic War, and to request that the (new) king ‘maintain (conservaret)’ it during the coming struggle with Philippos, also labelling his actions ‘an injustice (iniuria).’ The Ptolemies did not give their reply immediately, but sent a delegation to Rome around the spring of 200 (31.9.1-5, esp. 3), and announced that they would support Rome’s dispatch of troops to Greece ‘to defend the allies (socios defendere).’ The Ptolemies accepted her request of 201, and practically promised not to use or accept any rhetoric that was hostile towards her, as long as she officially fought in Greece for her ‘allies.’

It is noticeable that this Ptolemaic response was a result of a Roman tactic of considering the former’s interests. Rome requested that the Ptolemies

\[63\] Briscoe 1973: 42-7 and 56-8.
\[64\] Meadows 1993: 40-2.
‘maintain’ their friendly attitude. I would argue that this was a kind of deception. In previous years, they had not been friendly towards Rome (cf. Liv. 27.4.10, 30.4, and 29.12.14). In the middle of the Second Punic (and the First Macedonian) War, Rome had sent envoys to court the Ptolemies, but they had not supported her. Instead, they mediated between Aitolia and Philippos without Rome. In 201, however, Rome overlooked the events of the past. This new Roman attitude and approach were to prove helpful to the Ptolemies. Previously, Athens, their ally, had complained of Philippos, and he had also occupied Samos, a Ptolemaic dependency, but the Ptolemies could not support them for saving face. Their troops had been defeated by Antiochos at Panion (Paus. 1.36.5-6; Polyb. 16.2.9 and 18.2-19.11). In addition, native Egyptian rebels were still strong. Supporting Rome’s struggle with Philippos, and thereby redressing his trespasses in Greece, thus enabled the Ptolemies effectively to abandon those areas attacked by him, and to turn their attention to combatting Antiochos and the rebellious Egyptians. The Ptolemaic decision in 200 to support Rome’s saving ‘allies’ in Greece means that the dynasty accepted the scenario proposed by Rome, whether she actually possessed such allies. The Romans had taken advantage of the current weakness of the Ptolemaic kingdom, exploiting it to bring the Ptolemies onside. This approach could have provoked their hostility, but Rome also strove to make a good impression. 5,000 asses were given to each of Ptolemaic delegates at this time (Liv. 31.9.5). As was analysed in Chapter 1, the envoys may well have made a favourable report of her in Egypt. Rome considered the interests and opinions of the Ptolemies.

65 Walbank 1967: 523; Briscoe 1973: 44 n.3 and 79.
What is important here is the character of these tactics employed by Rome. On initial examination, this might not appear to form an example of informal diplomacy, since contact was made only through official negotiations. Yet, the consideration of Ptolemaic interests that were unspoken, and the use of gift-giving, belong to this concept. Considering these factors, I would argue that Rome did engage in informal diplomacy. One might question that this diplomatic action was taken under the direction of the hawks. This is confirmed, however, by the selection of the envoys. P. Sempronius Tuditanus was a general present at the conference at Phoinike. His appointment might have resulted partly from his experience in the previous war. In 205, though, he had been cheated by Philippos, as I discussed in Chapter 2. Even though the Romans had approved the peace in 205, it seems unlikely that Tuditanus’ appearance resulted only from his achievements. Considering the task of the deputation, he may have aspired to avenge himself against Philippos through the trip, a desire that the hawks would have supported. C. Claudius Nero had been an advocate of summoning the Magna Mater, effectively the initial approach of the hawks towards the Greeks, and supported it as the censor of 204 (Liv. 29.37.2). M. Aemilius Lepidus could also have been interested in Greek affairs and connected with them. During this trip, he seemed to make a connection with the Ptolemies, setting aside the question of whether he undertook the guardianship of the young king as several sources relate (cf. Just. 30.3.1-4 and 31.1.1-2; Val.Max. 6.6.1). The choice of members for the delegation suggests that the hawks effectively stage-managed the measure to win over the Ptolemies to the Roman side.

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The hawks’ leadership in foreign affairs is also confirmed by other senatorial measures. For example, the Senate appointed M. Valerius Laevinus, the first Roman commander in the First Macedonian War, as the admiral of a fleet sent to the Adriatic based on the arrangement of Paetus, the consul of 201 (Liv. 31.3.2 and 5.5-6). Reaching there, Laevinus informed the Senate and his fellow citizens of Philippos’ armament and the threat to Italy in a letter, along with the report of Aurelius, who was still around Macedonia. They wanted to encourage other Romans to declare war.\textsuperscript{68} Considering his contribution to Laevinus’ dispatch and the contents of the letters, I argue that Paetus and the two Romans were hawks. Their manoeuvres show furthermore that this group controlled the Senate.

In addition, the formation of the \textit{decemviri agris assignandis}, the ten senators to distribute land to the veterans who had fought under P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, resulted from this situation (Liv. 31.4.1-3). The committee was formed shortly after the dispatch of the envoys to Egypt. It was designed to prompt the beneficiaries to support the members (and the supporters of this project). Many of the commissioners included the hawks. For instance, the hawkish Paetus was a member of the committee. He would also serve on the \textit{decem legati} for T. Quinctius Flamininus, after the Battle of Kynoskephalai. Furthermore, P. Villius Tappulus, who was sent to Greece to attack Philippos in 199, and Flamininus, his successor, were important members of the hawks considering their consulship after the beginning of the Macedonian War.\textsuperscript{69} It is noteworthy that the distribution of land to veterans was an unprecedented act,

\textsuperscript{68} Some scholars doubt the historicity of the mobilisation of Laevinus’ fleet. E.g. Petzold 1940: 71; Walbank 1940: 127 n.7. Later scholars have successfully shown its authenticity, though. E.g. Thiel 1946: 219-23; Briscoe 1973: 60.

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{MRR} : 304, 322, and 337.
and a privilege for contemporaries. The hawks made a good impression on the soldiers under Africanus, their families, and on the general himself. For him, the privilege was proof that his achievement with the soldiers was exceptional. While it might have partly resulted from his request, these examples show that the hawks controlled the Senate and approached the people in and beyond Rome, by using senatorial measures and considering their interests. These approaches were developed on the official stage of home and foreign affairs, and are not, therefore, examples of informal diplomacy. However, considering that the hawks made preparations in and beyond Rome for a new war against Macedonia before it had been approved by the majority of the citizens, their behaviour was an informal participation in international politics, and the idea is similar to the concept, in practice.

This tendency is also observed in the approach of Rome to other Greeks. According to Polybius (16.27.1-4), in the spring of 200 the Senate, through its delegates, admonished Philippos, ordering him ‘to make no war on any Greek state (τῶν … Ἑλλήνων μηδενὶ πολεμεῖν),’ and to submit to arbitration for ‘the injuries that he had inflicted on Attalos (τῶν … γεγονότων εἰς Ἄτταλον ἀδικημάτων).’ They also showed that the peace with Philippos would be annulled if he did not follow Rome’s demands. Scholars agree that the messengers are to be identified with the envoys sent to Egypt. It seems clear, then, that this contact with Macedonia was made under the leadership of the hawks. What should be furthermore noted is their tactic. Some scholars think this message was simply a final note to Philippos in the name of Rome. Certainly, it was shown first to

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72 E.g. Bickerman 1945: 138-9; Oost 1954b: 153; Meadows 1993: 58; Koehn 2007a:
Nikanor, Philippos’ general attacking Athens. Yet, if this was a mere ultimatum,\textsuperscript{73} it would have been unnecessary to show it ‘to the people of Epeiros, Amynandros of Athamania, Aitolia, and Achaia (καὶ πρὸς Ἡπειρώτας ... καὶ πρὸς Ἀμύνανδρον ... εἰς Ἀθαμανίαν ... καὶ πρὸς Αἴτωλοὺς ... καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς’). Since Rome openly warned him not to attack the Greeks, the message was her announcement or propaganda towards contemporaries. This seems distinct from the Freedom of Greece, the concept that Rome advocated around the end of the war.\textsuperscript{74} Yet, it, at least, concerned the complaint from Rhodes and Pergamon of Philippos’ violence, and was intended to criticise the king, while characterising Rome as the defender of his victims. The announcement was thus partly a threat to him and his supporters, one that also gave the latter (and other Greeks) a pretext to desert him, even if they had previously made peace or had friendly connections with him. The coming war would involve their territories, if they were on Philippos’ side. Labelling him as a menace to the Greeks, meanwhile, justified their estrangement from him. Rome’s announcement under the hawks resulted from a consideration about good causes for war and also from that about the formal and informal interests of the Greeks. It was developed on the official stage of foreign affairs and was not informal diplomacy, but the practical participation of the hawks in this official contact, and their manner of approaching the Greeks while considering the different concerns of the latter, are based on a similar concept.

It is noteworthy that these measures taken by the hawks were also intended to manage a Roman weakness. This is suggested in an exchange between Philippos and Lepidus, one of the Republic’s three envoys. For this dialogue

\textsuperscript{192} Ager 2009: 21.
\textsuperscript{73} For a discussion of the legal structure in this case, see Rich 1976: 73-87.
\textsuperscript{74} Dmitriev 2011a: 166-9.
Polybios informs us as follows (16.34.3-4 and 7):

ὁς καὶ συμμίξας περὶ τὴν Ἀβυδον διεσάφει τῷ βασιλεῖ διότι δέδοκται τῇ συγκλήτῳ παρακαλεῖν αὐτὸν μήτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων μηδὲν πολεμεῖν μήτε τοῖς Πτολεμαίοις πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς Ατταλον καὶ Ροδίους ἀδικημάτων δίκας ὑποσχεῖν, καὶ διὸ ταῦτα μὲν οὐτω πράττοντι τὴν εἰρήνην ἅγειν ἐξέσται, μὴ βουλομένῳ δὲ πειθαρχεῖν ἐτοίμος ὑπάρξειν τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίοις πόλεμον. ... “ἐγὼ δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἀξίω Ῥωμαίους” ἔφη “μὴ παραβαίνειν τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ πολεμεῖν ἡμῖν: ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ ποιῶσιν, ἀμυνοῦμεθα γενναίως, παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς θεοὺς”.

This meeting took place after the summer of 200 in the suburbs of Abydos, which had been attacked by Philippos. Lepidus ordered him not to attack any Greek state, as in Rome’s previous message. No source relates that the statement was brought to other Greek states, but it was announced in the official meeting. The populace of this city (and possibly others) could have attended it or found out what was spoken there. It is plausible that both sides would have taken to the floor in the expectation that their statements would be known to others. It is significant that Lepidus here picked up Philippos’ attack on Ptolemaic, Rhodian, and Pergamene territories. The increased number of demands from those outlined in Athens, resulted from Ptolemaic support for Rome in 200, and possibly also from some arrangement between Roman envoys and the Rhodians, forged during the stay of the former in Rhodes before this meeting (16.34.2). 75 In any case, Lepidus at Abydos emphasised Rome’s good reason again, and informed Philippos (and other Greeks) of the increase in the number of Rome’s supporters. Meanwhile, the king contradicted Lepidus’ statement with legal arguments. He argued that

Rome’s attack on him would be a violation of the Peace of Phoinike. It is noticeable that Lepidus did not object to this. This means that the hawks recognised the difficulty of justifying the war legally, and also suggests that they planned to compensate for it by winning over the Greeks, designating Rome as a guardian of Greece (and the three states mentioned above). Otherwise, Lepidus would have (and ought to have) argued against Philippos’ statement concerning legality in some way. The announcements of Abydos and Athens resulted from the hawks’ consideration regarding not only how to win over the Greeks but also how to manage Rome’s diplomatic difficulties.

The problem of legality is also confirmed by Appianos’ text. He relates (at *Mac.* 4) that Philippos attacked Attalos, Rhodes, Samos under the Ptolemies, and Athens because ‘none of them was connected with the Romans (οὐδὲν τῶν Ῥωμαίων προσηκόντων).’\(^{76}\) He took care not to violate the peace with Rome. Considering the reference mentioned above, Polybios also appears to have thought in the same way. In the text of Livius, who used not only Polybios but also Roman writers as his sources for the contacts between Rome and Philippos in 200,\(^{77}\) there is no sign that Rome displayed any logic for justifying her from the viewpoint of legality. The Romans, or the hawks, were tacitly aware of their lack of any legal legitimacy. The demand for Philippos to avoid attacking any Greek state, which was different from the usage of legal arguments by P. Sulpicius Galba in the previous war (App. *Mac.* 3), partly reflected this difficulty faced by Rome.

Rome’s silence regarding her legal quandary, meanwhile, resulted partly from the hawks’ choice of how the negotiations should be conducted. Even from a

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\(^{76}\) For the nature of Appianos’ reference in this chapter, see Eckstein 2008: 152.

\(^{77}\) Walbank 1967: 536-7 and 543-4; Briscoe 1973: 1.
legal viewpoint, Rome could find a pretext for criticising Philippos. As I showed in Section 1, he was said to have informally sent troops to support Hannibal. Indeed, Rome had taken some Macedonian prisoners at Zama (Liv. 30.42.4). While Philippos might have referred to the behaviour of M. Aurelius, mentioned above, Rome could have justified her position legally, to a degree, nonetheless. The absence of legal argument during the scenes in Athens and Abydos not only shows Rome's relative weakness but also suggests that she intentionally avoided introducing the topic, which was unconnected with any party other than Rome and Macedonia, and attracted no attention from the Greeks. Indeed, Rome did not demand the restoration of Atintania, territory lost in 205. For the hawks, the two messages were just to show good cause, to win over the Greeks while considering their interests.

This hypothesis is supported by the Republic's explanation of the new war to Masinissa of Numidia, after the Roman assembly had approved it in the spring of 200. In the message, Rome justified the war by criticising Philippos' support for Hannibal (Liv. 31.11.7-10). Considering Masinissa's rivalry with Carthage and partnership with Rome during the Second Punic War, he would have been bound to support the Romans against Philippos, Hannibal's ally. Rome thus altered her rhetoric according to whose support was at stake, while also considering the position of the people concerned. This way of citing just cause is also a sign of the change in Roman diplomacy from the previous one, which emphasised legal legitimacy only.

This variety of the ways in which the hawks managed their opening the

79 Briscoe 1973: 84-5.
new war, and their practical intervention in Rome’s management of foreign affairs, can also be observed in their encouragement of the assembly to approve the plan. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, in opening the Second Macedonian War, the hawks’ control of the Senate did not mean that they similarly exercised total control over Roman diplomacy. It was caused by an anti-war mood among the citizens, and by the influence of some leaders apart from the hawks. Now, I shall consider the hawks’ management of home affairs through their controlling the Senate.

The outlook of Romans other than the hawks is confirmed by the events surrounding the proposal by P. Sulpicius Galba to the assembly to open hostilities against Macedonia, immediately after his assumption of the consulship in 200, based on a senatorial order resulting from his own proposal to the Senate (Liv. 31.5.2-3, 9, and 6.1). He had been one of the Roman commanders during the First Macedonian War.80 Considering this career and his approach to the Senate for the motion of war, he was a person of considerable influence among the hawks, and enacted their aims, although these tasks could have been achieved by C. Aurelius Cotta, Galba’s consular colleague. It is possible that he was a member of the family of M. Aurelius, the hawks’ agent mentioned above. In any case, for Galba and the other hawks, this motion before the assembly was the final step of a manoeuvre to ensure the new war in domestic politics. But the plan went wrong. The anti-war mood prevailed among the citizens, owing to the exhausting conditions experienced during the Punic War. The members of the comitia centuriata subsequently rejected the bill (31.6.3). The hawks might have noticed

80 MRR: 280, 287, 292, 296, and 300.
that their countrymen were impoverished, but this result would still have been unexpected. This was the only case in which a motion for opening war, based upon senatorial approval, was voted down in the assembly, as far as the extant sources report.\textsuperscript{81} The hawks may well have thought that, since they had won over the Senate and occupied the consulship, their fellow citizens would support the motion out of respect for this body and these offices.\textsuperscript{82} The rejection suggests that the citizens did not necessarily respect them. This tendency is confirmed by the episode of Tappulus, mentioned above, (32.3.2-7). He faced a mutiny among his troops when he was sent to Greece as the successor of Galba, who had succeeded in managing the problem of the assembly. It prevented him from waging war.\textsuperscript{83} Setting aside the direct causes, this incident and Galba’s failure in the assembly show that the officer sent by the Senate, the hawks controlling it for the new war, and the Senate itself, by implication, were not respected by the people at large.

Such a movement can be linked with that of some leading Romans other than the hawks. This is shown by an event in which ‘private citizens (\textit{privati})’ crowded into the Senate House (Liv. 31.13.2-9). This occurred when the senators, led by the hawks, decided not to repay a debt that had been incurred in 210 to deal with the war against Hannibal,\textsuperscript{84} in order to prepare for the new Macedonian war. The citizens protested this senatorial measure: their argument was legitimate, and the Senate could do nothing but permit them to use public lands at a low rate, rather than pay, following their request.\textsuperscript{85} This situation shows that ‘the citizens’ were creditors, and that the government faced a financial crisis. It is

\textsuperscript{81} Rich 1993: 55-6.
\textsuperscript{82} Eckstein 2010: 235-6; Pina Polo 2011: 102-3.
\textsuperscript{84} Buraselis 1996: 156-71.
\textsuperscript{85} Briscoe 1973: 91-3.
more important to note that many of the creditors were senators or members of their extended families (26.36.2-12). The petition, then, was an objection to the Senate and the hawks by people who were connected with leading Romans and could influence the public.

Furthermore, the Senate under the hawks was attacked, in 200, by Q. Baebius, one of the tribuni plebis. He criticised the war-like attitude in the Senate, and was apparently supported by many citizens opposing the new war, as well as some intellectual and influential Romans (Liv. 31.6.4). It is useful to remember that Plautus’ Stichus was published in 200. The contents of this play suggest that Roman elites made light of the common people’s lives and, conversely, were highly interested in Greek affairs (155-95 and 454-504). His work was a criticism of the hawks who hurried to attack Macedonia. It was performed in the Ludi Plebeii in the fall of 200, and was directed by Cn. Baebius, one of the two plebeian aediles, and a member of the family of Q. Baebius (Liv. 31.50.3). His anti-war movement was supported by his family. They formed a minority in the Senate, in light of its approval of Galba’s motion for war. Their influence was not inconsiderable, though, since the Baebii were connected with Africanus. No source relates how he considered the conflict with Macedonia, but he had become the engineer of victory in the Second Punic War, as a result of a series of military and diplomatic successes in 201. The hawks could not help noticing his fame, and his influence on Roman citizens and politicians connected with his family, whether this tribunus was really acting on his suggestions or not.

87 Owens 2000: 404. For the season of the Roman festival, see Ripka 2009: 44-5.
89 Dorey 1959: 294-5.
The hawks dealt with these difficulties by dividing their opponents with official and informal tools. This has been suggested partly by their compromise with the creditors. The loan of public lands by senatorial decree practically led them to agree with the use of the money in preparation for a new war. Baebius was silenced by threats from a number of senators (Liv. 31.6.4-6), apparently advocates of war and others won over by them, and thus through an informal channel of politics. They soon encouraged Galba to propose a second motion to the assembly, to open hostilities with Philippos, justifying this through treating the citizens’ attitude as ‘idleness (segnitia)’ promoted by the tribunus plebis, using ‘the traditional way (viam antiquam)’ of ‘abusing (criminandi)’ the senators. This stalled the anti-war movement and its prospective supporters, in the Senate and beyond, but was partly a measure designed to win them over. The hawks silenced the agent of the people opposed to them in the Senate, while indirectly making it easy for other Romans to change their position by treating only Baebius as an unreasonable agitator.

This kind of management in domestic affairs by the hawks can also be observed in their approach to Africanus and his associates, other than Baebius. After submitting the second motion to the assembly, the Senate decided that the soldiers, after fighting under him in Africa, were not compelled to serve in the army sent to Greece, and that the allotment of land not only to the soldiers who had served under him in Africa but also to those who had fought in Hispania be made (Liv. 31.8.6 and 49.5). 90 These measures were designed to appease him and the citizens connected with him. In addition, Africanus was elected to the

censorship in 199 with Paetus, one of the hawks. According to Livius (32.7.3), they worked together ‘in perfect harmony (magna inter se concordia).’ This might not have been a political alliance between Africanus and Paetus (and the friends of both sides), in light of Paetus’ hostility towards him in the Punic War. Their cooperation, however, ensured that their respective interests were met. The good treatment to Africanus’ soldiers might have been proposed by him, personally. He might have made the Senate concede the distribution of land to his soldiers in 201, and taken advantage of the hawks’ weakness in 200. In any case, the hawks secured the votes of the people connected with Africanus in the assembly by advancing his and his soldiers’ private interests, and by involving him in the formation of senatorial decrees for the new war with the promise to cater for Africanus and his associates after the assembly.

In 199, Tappulus was to suffer a mutiny among his troops. Approaching Africanus, his soldiers and the creditors, then, did not mean that the hawks had considered the anti-war people as a whole. The negotiations with the creditors took place after the approval of the assembly for the new war and was possibly not part of the hawks’ original plan. Galba, however, submitted the motion for war to the assembly again, while being encouraged to ‘correct (castigaretque)’ the people’s idleness, and reasoned before the attendees that Philippos was a menace to Italy. This motion was easily approved, clearly because the people under Africanus ‘accepted’ the hawks’ rhetoric, despite their opposition in the previous session held only a short time previously (Liv. 31.6.5 and 7.1-8.1). Considering

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91 Scullard 1951: 80-1; Briscoe 1973: 33 and 177.
92 The authenticity of the basic information found in the speech in Livius’ text is confirmed by Eckstein 2008: 254-5. The lack of a long delay between the first and the second motions for war is shown by Warrior 1996a: 65.
the case of Tappulus, the publication of the *Stichus* around the period of dispatching troops to Greece, and the direct petition of the creditors, it is evident that antipathy towards the war, Senate, and the hawks still persisted among the citizens. Yet, they no longer held the majority, and the number of the people who could or wanted to lead them gradually decreased. The decision of Rome regarding the new war and her preparation were made through the tactics of the hawks, who wanted to minimise the scale of concession to the people beyond them, but also to weaken the anti-war movement as effectively as possible.

It is significant that these acts represented participation in international politics and informal diplomacy, by the hawks manipulating the Senate and their fellow citizens. The hawks failed in encouraging the majority of the voters to approve the plan before the second motion. The diplomatic manoeuvres before that were, then, strictly informal actions. These were not illegal. They were developed under the senatorial authority. Contact with outsiders was within its discretion.93 Yet, a series of active approaches by the hawks towards the people in and beyond Rome was a way to achieve their particular aim that was not necessarily compatible with the interests of the majority of their fellow citizens. The hawks also blurred the boundaries of official and informal spheres of diplomatic activity in Rome to achieve their aim. This situation thus differed perceptibly from that of the First Macedonian War.

The sensitive regard for the people beyond the hawks, however, was not always shown. Tappulus was frowned upon in Greece for his ruthless attitude towards the inhabitants in his campaign (Paus. 7.7.8-9, 8.2, and 10.36.6).94 Galba

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94 Arafat 1996: 81 n.4.
executed people of full age in Antipatreia, in 200/199 (Liv. 31.27.3-4). 95 Flamininus, their successor, destroyed several Greek cities for terroristic purposes (32.15.2-3, 16.15-17, 17.1, 32.14.6, and 24.6-7: Plut. Flam. 5.1). 96 While they might have made examples of the people concerned, the hawks’ ideas of waging war were similar, in part, to the traditional one symbolised by Galba’s brutal behaviour in cities occupied during the previous war (cf. Polyb. 11.5.8).

Nevertheless, the hawks generally considered the interests of the people in and beyond Rome. They secured the support of Rhodes and Pergamon and, around the spring or by the summer of 200, at the latest, won over the Ptolemies and the Roman assembly. 97 This is in contrast to the peace summit at Phoinike, when Rome had been isolated in Greece and lacked the methods to solve these difficulties. The hawks had realised this by the time of the new struggle that they had advocated for, winning public opinion, in and beyond Rome, through informal diplomacy.

It is noteworthy that such manoeuvres also influenced the Greeks. For example, Philippos broke off his campaign in the East when he learned the news of Rhodes’ and Pergamon’s successful contact with Rome in the winter of 201/0 (Polyb. 16.24.2-3). This sudden approach suggests that the damage wrought on the two states was so serious that they had to ask Rome to assist them. 98 He may have realised it but, in 200, he set about occupying Abydos in the Hellespontos before finishing them off, in order to prevent Rome from using the city as a base

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95 Briscoe 1973: 126.
97 Warrior 1996a: 76.
98 Allen 1983: 72. Although Starr 1938: 65-7 and McShane 1964: 127 think that their approach to Rome while halting their joint campaign against Philippos resulted from their mutual distrust, there is no evidence of their discord.
in the coming war, although this might also have resulted partly from Philippos’
apprehension for Aitolia’s nullification of its peace with him (16.29.1; cf. 24.2).

Rome’s presence enabled Rhodes and Pergamon to recover their power. After Philippos stopped his campaigns against them to combat the Roman advance, Rhodes could afford to counterattack against Macedonia in Caria (Syll$^3$
586), and succeeded in making an alliance with the islands in the Kyklades and in establishing the basis of the Second Nesiotic League. Attalos had contact with the three Roman diplomats in Peiraieus, and, with the results of the negotiation, persuaded Athens to declare war against Philippos (Liv. 31.15.6-16.3; Polyb. 16.25-6). The indirect support for Attalos’ persuasion of Athens also contributed to Rome’s approach towards Greece. The Athenians criticised Philippos’ desecration of the sanctuaries around their city before the Aitolians in 199 (Liv. 31.29-30). His envoys treated the Romans as a gang disturbing the peace of Greece, and reminded their listeners of the rhetoric presenting them as βάρβαροι. Athens’ argument enabled Aitolia (and other Greeks), however, to label him as a more barbarous figure, and to ally with Rome. The speech related by Livius might partly result from his manipulation of sources to justify Rome’s war for his readership. But Philippos’ profanities were not a fiction. They are also described by Polybios (at 16.27.1), who would have had many living witnesses to the event. It seems irrefutable that Athens condemned Philippos for his desecration, and emphasised the good cause of fighting against him before contemporaries. This encouraged Aitolia and probably Achaia to support Rome,

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100 Sheedy 1996: 431-3.
101 For more information on the contact between Athens and Rome themselves, see Eckstein 2008: 206-11.
although the military pressure posed by the Roman and allied forces was also important (Liv. 31.40.7-43.7 and 32.19.1-23.13). Thus, Roman diplomacy under the hawks influenced Greece even before Rome’s dispatch of troops.

It is significant that such movements in the Greek world were consciously engineered by the hawks. This is supported by the fact that they encouraged their fellow citizens to send troops even in the late fall of 200, as soon as was humanly possible. It appears to have resulted from knowledge of the secret pact between Philippos and Antiochos. This seems unlikely, though. As I have shown, there is no sign that the hawks and other Romans noticed the pact, unlike Rhodes and Pergamon. Meanwhile, their eventual observation of such a secret alliance caused a war between them and Philippos. It provided a just cause to Rome for promoting a new struggle. She would lose this pretext, though, if Philippos defeated the two states. His success around the Aegean Sea was apparently a matter of time, since his enemies had failed to stop him in 201. The rapid dispatch of troops was to secure a just cause for Rome, and shows that the approaches of the advocates of a new war to the Greeks, from the fall of 201 or the end of the previous conflict, resulted from their recognition of the importance of winning over the Greeks in the war in the Greek world. There would have been no necessity, otherwise, to send troops in 200, much less in the late fall (an unusual season for war), and to provoke Philippos with two messages while declaring Rome’s justice to other Greeks. Thus, sending troops within 200 and the approach to the Greeks, before and after that, are a sign that Roman diplomatic practice had changed since the First Macedonian War, and a new tendency had appeared.

103 Larsen 1952: 22-3; Eckstein 1987b: 141-3.
What should be noted last is that the Second Macedonian War and informal diplomacy were necessary for the hawks and for the Senate to maintain their influence within the Roman state, itself. It is useful to remember that creditors crowded into the Senate House, that soldiers disobeyed Tappulus’ order, that Baebius, a tribunus plebis, openly criticised the Senate and the hawks, and that Galba failed to persuade the assembly to agree to his first motion. The Senate and members of the hawks were held in contempt by the citizenry. Their leadership had been secured in the war against Hannibal. Galba assumed the dictatorship in 203. Tuditanus was elected the consul of 204 (Liv. 29.12.16 and 30.26.12). Yet, the Punic War had ended. It appears to have been achieved by Africanus, the victor in Hispania and Africa. He was not connected with the hawks, and had his own supporters such as the veterans. It was necessary for the hawks and the Senate to offset their blunder and the comparative decrease of their influence soon. The approach of Rhodes and Pergamon answered their informal requirements. It is ironic that the support of Africanus and his supporters should have been secured to realise the new war. If the hawks had not moved then, however, Philippos would have defeated Rhodes and Pergamon before long, regardless of whether or not he had a secret pact with Antiochos. The power-balance among the Romans would have also changed soon, owing to Africanus’ exclusive rise. The outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, the Roman diplomacy on its eve, and the hawks’ acts are understood when this situation of Rome’s domestic and international politics is considered. The hawks participated in the struggle, despite lacking the full authority to do so, at least in the beginning, and achieved their goals with the Senate. This was informal diplomacy in action.
Conclusion

Considering these analyses, the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War immediately after the end of the Second Punic War, and the ascendancy of Rome in the new war were not inevitable at all. They resulted from a series of manoeuvres of the hawks against Macedonia among the leading Romans, who had noticed the importance of winning over not only domestic but also international public opinion through considering official and informal interests of the people concerned, although an informal diplomacy in the Greek world played a role in this diplomatic game. The advocates of the new war in Rome succeeded in persuading the Senate, their fellow citizens, and many Greeks, despite lacking the official authority to do so, for their own interests. It was informal diplomacy, that had been employed by the Greeks and Rome had failed to manage during the First Macedonian War owing to a lack of understanding. Such a contrast in Rome’s management of foreign affairs, and the political victory of the hawks, in and beyond Rome, demonstrate the change of Roman diplomacy with a new factor, informal diplomacy.

What should be considered now is the impact of this on Rome. The manoeuvres of the hawks, based on ideas and acts in informal diplomacy, enabled Rome to advance into Greece with the support of many Hellenes. The victory of Rome over Philippos, a few years later, established Rome as one of the leading states of the Greek world, and the success of the hawks may well have encouraged not only them but also other Romans to use similar diplomatic methods collectively, and possibly individually, in parallel to official ones, even after the war. This might have consolidated the role of informal practices in Roman
diplomacy. I will explore this matter further, focusing, in particular, on the usage of informal diplomacy by Roman individuals in the 190s. The results enable this study to show the further spread of this concept in Rome and its significance within the foreign and domestic affairs of Rome during the period of her expansion into the Greek world.
Chapter 4

The Emergence of Informal Diplomacy among Individual Romans

Introduction

This chapter argues that the continuing and expanding use of informal diplomacy after the Second Macedonian War was one of the factors that led to the growing prominence of the individual within Roman politics. As I showed in Chapter 3, Rome's hawks had used informal diplomacy on the eve of the war, in order to commence the hostilities with the support of their fellow citizens and many Greeks, besides.\(^1\) Even after the war, the Romans developed diplomatic practices that operated through channels apart from the formal, official ones, and this was also sometimes promoted by the Greeks, who actively accepted and even encouraged their use by Rome. I shall demonstrate that this tendency brought about the rise of Roman individual users of informal diplomacy, in parallel to Rome's further advance into the Greek world through her defeat of Aitolia and Antiochos III of the Seleucids.

This chapter shows the validity of these views through the analysis of two prominent Roman individuals, namely, T. Quinctius Flamininus and P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, from 193 to 189, the period of Rome's conflict with Aitolia and Antiochos. Flamininus had defeated Philippos V of Macedonia in 197, and Africanus had overcome Hannibal in 202. Remarkably, they both re-emerged in a

\(^1\) For the situation at the beginning of the war, see Hammond 1966: 45-53. As to that from 200 to 197, see Eckstein 1976: 126-42 and Hammond 1988: 60-77.
diplomatic context after the Macedonian War, despite lacking full authority to do so. This study argues that their appearance resulted largely from informal diplomacy on their part and that this consequently promoted the spread of this practice among other Romans. Consideration of Flamininus and Africanus helps to demonstrate the factors that enabled them and potentially other Romans to participate in diplomacy and to advance their own personal agenda, even if this tendency was at odds with the collective ideology of the Roman nobility and legality, as expressed through the Senate and annual magistracies. The results of this analysis confirm that the concept informal diplomacy is useful in understanding Rome’s expansion and the Republic from the 200s to 133. This chapter therefore commences by assessing Flamininus’ participation in diplomacy, following his return to Rome in 194.

Section 1: T. Quinctius Flamininus from 193 to 191

Flamininus achieved Roman victory in the Second Macedonian War, announcing the Freedom of Greece at the Isthmian Games. This made him a notable Roman not only among the Romans but also among the Greeks. He celebrated a triumph when he returned to Rome with his troops in 194 (Liv. 34.50.10-52.12). The Romans thus recognised his achievements, but it is worth noting that he also won fame in Greece, a factor that is well documented by the sources (e.g. App. Mac. 13; IG XII.9.931; SEG XXII.214 and 266.ll.13-14; XXIII.412; Syll²592 and 616). Celebration of a triumph, meanwhile, meant that

his imperium had expired. He therefore lost the authority to participate in diplomacy officially. However, he played a remarkable role in international politics even after that. Some of his actions were examples of informal diplomacy, although his very participation was partly a result of the machinations and struggles between different political groups. As I showed in Chapter 3, the hawks against Philippos had risen to prominence on the eve of the Macedonian War. Flamininus was among their number. Nevertheless, his appearance in diplomacy after 194 was symbolic of a rise of the individual Roman, using informal diplomacy reminiscent of the hawks. So, this section considers Flamininus’ actions after 194 from two perspectives. Firstly, the extent to which he really represented a unique presence in diplomacy, and the nature of his diplomatic actions are considered. Secondly, the question to what extent the manoeuvres of the political group to which he belonged, along with those of other Romans, influenced his participation in diplomacy is discussed. These analyses show that his actions and the wider Roman advance into the Greek world, during this period, are better understood by employing the concept informal diplomacy.

1) Flamininus’ Participation in Diplomacy and its Limitations

To begin with, it is useful to confirm Flamininus’ appearance in diplomacy. An example can be found when delegates from the Greek states and Seleucid envoys, Menippos and Hegesianax, visited Rome in the spring of 193. In the middle of the senatorial session ratifying the arrangement in Greece that Flamininus and the ten legati had organised, following his victory over Macedonia, he asked the Senate to invite the diplomats to complete the process effectively.
According to Livius (at 34.57.5), this was accepted, and he ‘was charged (mandatum)’ with listening to the Greek, and moreover, the Seleucid ambassadors and responding to them ‘for the dignity and interests of the Roman people (ex dignitate atque utilitate populi Romani).’ He held no office, but was temporarily given full power and authority to negotiate as Rome’s representative. C. Scribonius, the praetor urbanus in 193, here filled only the role of a guide for the visitors into the Senate House (34.57.3). M. Valerius Messala, the praetor peregrinus, did not even appear, as far as Livius informs us, despite playing a remarkable role in another contact with the Seleucids, mentioned later. This situation resulted directly from Flamininus’ request to the Senate. Even after the consuls had left for their provinces (34.57.1), however, from the viewpoint of the ordinary management of the contact with outsiders, there is no reason why it should have been Flamininus, rather the praetors, who was entrusted to negotiate with the Greek and the Seleucid envoys (34.57.3-59.7). This is undoubtedly an irregular type of participation in diplomatic practice, setting aside for now the question whether it can be classed as informal diplomacy or not.

What should be noted here is the impact of Flamininus’ action on the wider relationship between Rome and outsiders. He talked with the delegates, in particular those of the Seleucids, who visited Rome to want the Republic to make an alliance and to approve the Seleucid control over several regions recently

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4 As Briscoe 1981: 137 shows, Livius uses here largely Polybios’ lost text as the immediate source. This means that the Livian description is credible. The Achaian could have derived information about this event from contemporaries, or their immediate descendants, in Rome. Furthermore, if the contents had been remarkably different from their memory, he would have been criticised by them. Cf. Warrior 1996b: 357-60; Dmitriev 2011b: 127.
6 For these two offices in this period, see Brennan 2000: 98-135.
conquered by Antiochos, and after the debate with the latter, Flamininus declared before the Greek and the Seleucid envoys that Rome wanted Antiochos to quit his territory in Europe and, that if the king did not accept it, Rome would liberate the Greeks by force, as the champion of their liberty not only in Greece, but also in Asia Minor (Diod. 28.15.3-4; Liv. 34.58.10-12 and 59.4-5). Considering the attendance of the Greek envoys and Flamininus' statements in the formal session or more probably sessions, this was not only a message to the Seleucids, but also a political demonstration, designed to give the Greeks an impression that Antiochos was an enemy of Greek freedom, and that supporting Rome would be useful for them. Flamininus played the leading role in this, over the elected officers. Since his proposal to the Senate triggered this show of strength, he wanted to participate in Roman diplomacy actively, and to distinguish himself in such a stage before his contemporaries. His appearance here did not necessarily result only from his interests and individuality, though. His statements in the dispute with the Seleucids did not derive from his own policy. His declaration meant that Rome objected to Antiochos' supremacy over some of his subjects, and promised to enforce Roman will by military action, if necessary. This could have been regarded by the Seleucids as an ultimatum, whether Flamininus meant it or simply made a defiant and rhetorical threat. If his statements had not been arranged with other senators, he would likely have been criticised by them soon. Furthermore, the main content of his message, the question of the legitimacy of Antiochos' advance into Europe, was similar to speeches heard in the previous meeting between the king and other senators at Lysimacheia in 196 (App. Syr. 3; Grainger 2002: 120-40.)
This contact had not been made under Flamininus’ control. His statements in 193 were therefore consistent with previous Roman policy, rather than indicative of a personal agenda. Indeed, even after 193, the negotiation with the Seleucids regarding their spheres of influence was continued by the Senate (cf. Liv. 35.13.6-17.3).

My argument focuses on the relationship between the Senate and Flamininus, an individual, and between regularity and irregularity in diplomacy distinctively, in order to demonstrate his unique position in Roman diplomacy after 194. This approach, however, would be rejected by some scholars, who argue that Rome generally managed the selection of her diplomatic managers, and their relative authority, in a flexible manner. In particular, L. M. Yarrow urges that it is not useful to consider the power of a person appointed to deal with some task by distinguishing between the formal or legal sphere and the informal one, since it depended on his dignity. This is reasonable to some extent. Considering Flamininus’ fame in Greece, it looks to have been natural for the senators to entrust him, not the praetors, with talking to the envoys. Nevertheless, this argument regarding flexibility within Roman diplomacy does not explain why he simply followed, or was compelled to follow, the approach to the Seleucids that had been developed by other senators. Furthermore, even in this period, Rome considered the official position and procedure important. This is supported by Flamininus’ letter to the Chyretians, when he was the general in Greece. He first

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8 Bickerman 1932: 47-76; Badian 1959: 82-92.
12 Yarrow 2012: 169-84.
announced that he was a στρατηγὸς ὑπατος, the proconsul,¹³ and then assured the Chyretians that Rome would return landed property and buildings (IG IX.2.338.11.1-2 and 8-10).¹⁴ This respect for the official position is also seen in the letter of C. Livius Salinator to Delphoi in 189/8. At the beginning, he introduced himself as the consul (RDGE 38.l.1).¹⁵ In the senatorial decree to Thisbe in c. 170, Q. Maenius, the proposer, appeared as the praetor, first of all (RDGE 2.l.1).¹⁶ Flamininus and his contemporaries considered it important that the message to other states was made by people with authority, and that this power was shown publicly. The flexibility emphasised by Yarrow does not explain these situations, nor does it explain Flamininus’ appearance in place of the state officers in 193.

Yarrow’s argument, however, does provide a hint to the nature of Flamininus’ strange position in 193. He was distinctly different from other Romans, having won great fame in Greece by ending the Macedonian War in 197 and announcing the Freedom of Greece in 196. The Romans were sensitive not only to what was said, but also who spoke it. This was embodied in the notion of auctoritas, a respect for an extra-legal authority. They regarded it as a means of influencing others through moral superiority and confidence.¹⁷ Considering this, the proposal by Flamininus, and the approval by the Senate of his talking with the Greeks and the Seleucids, derived from this very Roman idea. This also means

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¹³ For the translation, the term ἀνθύπατος was used from the latter half of the century onwards. In the period of Flamininus, however, this had not been adopted yet, as the other instances after his letters also show, and then στρατηγὸς ὑπατος was used just as the case of the consul even when the precise position was proconsul (e.g. Syll² 591.1.69 and 592.1.1). Mason 1974: 106 and 165-6.
¹⁴ Cf. RDGE 33; Armstrong and Walsh 1986: 32-46.
¹⁵ Bagnall and Derow 2004: no.41.
¹⁶ Ibid.: no.45.
that the Senate attempted here to win over international public opinion around Greece with an extra-legal power. In light of the fact that Rome’s negotiation with the Seleucids had come to a deadlock in 196, it is reasonable to believe that Rome used this approach. Winning over neighbours might change the situation favourably towards Rome. Thus, Flamininus’ appearance in 193 shows that Rome had noticed the importance of international public opinion, and had developed the idea of using an extra-legal or a channel apart from official contacts among states in diplomatic games.

It is further noteworthy that, in 193, the Senate used such an extra-legal power, while at the same time making it compatible with legal procedure and senatorial leadership within the Roman diplomatic framework. This is confirmed by the term *mandatum* in the above Livian text at 34.57.5. Flamininus’ irregular participation in the negotiation was legitimised by the Senate’s permission. The senators noticed and exploited his extra-legal power but also respected legality, harmonising both aspects. Moreover, their permission was issued in public. It made contemporaries notice that Flamininus was able to talk with the envoys only because the Senate approved it, and that the Senate was therefore superior to him, despite his seemingly crucial role in the negotiation. With this in mind, Flamininus’ appearance in 193 can be now labelled an act of informal diplomacy, driven partly by himself, but largely by the Senate. He used his extra-legal power to distinguish himself. The Senate employed his personal influence while considering its legal position and the views of other contemporaries.

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19 For the similarity of this chapter to that of Diodoros, and the historicity inferred by their sources, see Briscoe 1981: 137.
The leadership of the Senate in conducting negotiations with the Seleucids is further confirmed by a letter from Rome to Teos, to invest the Ionian city with ἀσυλία and ἀφορολογησία in this year of 193 (RDGE 34.11.20-1). In lines 1 to 8, these privileges were bestowed by M. Valerius Messala, the praetor peregrinus, as well as the tribuni plebis and the Senate, based on Teos' request. It is noteworthy that this was brought by Menippos, one of the Seleucid envoys mentioned above, to these Romans. Messala was not mentioned in connection with the discussion with the Seleucids before the Greeks. In contrast, this Teian case was managed by him with the senators (and the tribun). There is no sign, in this case, that Flamininus was connected with it. Other than matters particularly entrusted to him, the remaining negotiations were conducted in the usual manner. This letter also shows that the Senate (and ordinary officers) generally managed complicated interests of outsiders, those of the Hellenistic states here, while showing the pattern to contemporaries just as in the senatorial announcement with the term mandatum in Flamininus' case. This is confirmed by considering the significance of Rome's recognition of ἀφορολογησία for Teos, setting aside that of ἀσυλία. The Romans might not have understood the notion ἀσυλία in this period. There is no similar case before it. Livius does not mention this investment in his description of 193, or in that of Rome's campaign to Teos in the war against Antiochos, a few years later (cf. 37.27-8). Yet, for ἀφορολογησία, the exemption from tribute, Rome could not have misunderstood its importance in international politics. It is significant that Antiochos had invested Teos with ἀσυλία and ἀφορολογησία in c. 203, while 'liberating' the city from the payment due to

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Attalos I of Pergamon (*SEG* XLI.1003.lI.17-22).\(^{22}\) The Attalids had informed Rome about their difficulties in 201, and of the Seleucids’ threat in the Macedonian War (Liv. 31.2.1 and 32.8.8-10).\(^{23}\) The Romans had been therefore aware of what Antiochos had done in Teos. The announcement of ἀφορολογησία in Messala’s letter supported the Seleucids’ action against Attalos. The message meant that Rome recognised that Teos was worthy of being privileged as a city with tax exemption, just as Antiochos had done and contrary to Attalos. This message to Teos certainly resulted from a consideration of the complicated situation in international politics. In the negotiations with the Seleucids of 193, Flamininus appeared to be the director of Roman diplomacy before the Greek envoys. The letter regarding Teos, however, demonstrated that the real leaders in this process remained the senators and magistrates. Participation in foreign affairs by individuals, through the irregular procedure of informal diplomacy, might have been accepted by the Romans, but this development could not necessarily influence Roman diplomacy as a whole, yet.

However, in the field, Flamininus’ celebrity gave him a unique and more independent position. This can be observed in 192. During this year, Aitolia plotted to start a war against Rome with the Seleucids. Flamininus was sent as one of the legati to reduce tensions in Greece, visiting Athens, Chalkis, Thessalia, Demetrias, Aitolia, and Achaia (Liv. 35.31-4).\(^{24}\) During these travels, Zenon, a pro-Roman leader of Demetrias, mentioned to the assembly that ‘the Magnetes (in which the citizens of Demetrias were included) were indebted to T. Quinctius and the Romans not only for their liberty but also everything (*Magnetas non

\(^{22}\) Cf. n.43 in Chapter 3.
\(^{23}\) Cf. Badian 1959: 82-4.
\(^{24}\) Larsen 1952: 1; Grainger 2002: 151.
libertatem modo, sed omnia ... T. Quinctio et populo Romano debere),’ although present in the session was not only Flamininus but some or all of the other Roman envoys (35.31.4-16, esp. 15). While his colleagues were ignored, his presence encouraged the pro-Romans within the city. If Aitolia had not mobilised its troops quickly (35.34.1-12), Demetrias would have supported Rome. This tendency is also seen in the statements of Rome’s enemies. After Antiochos landed in Greece with his troops in the fall of 192, Aitolia sent delegates to Achaia’s council, to request Achaia to maintain its neutrality. In the course of the appeal, one of the Aitolians asserted the just nature of their cause, and ‘then criticised unrestrained abuse of the Romans in general and in particular that of Quinctius (provectus deinde est intemperantia linguae in maledicta nunc communiter Romanorum, nunc proprie ipsius Quinctii),’ while referring to Aitolia’s contribution to Rome’s victory over Macedonia and to his ingratitude toward Aitolia’s support during the war (35.48.10-13, esp. 11). In fact, Aitolia’s opposition to Rome seemed to result from his refusal to hand over Larisa Cremaste, Echinos, and Pharsalos as rewards for its supporting Rome, after the war. The validity of Aitolia’s complaints was accepted even by contemporaries such as Polybios (3.7.1-3 and 18.38.3-39.2; cf. Liv. 33.13.6-13). Flamininus was a symbolic figure even for people beyond the Romans or Roman sympathisers.

The strength of Flamininus’ influence in Greece is also evident in his dealings with Messenia in 191. After Antiochos’ defeat at Thermopylai, Messenia was urged by Achaia to join its federation. In order to avoid further pressure, the Messenians ‘sent their message through the envoys to T. Quinctius at Chalkis to

27 Sacks 1975: 93; Walsh 1993: 35.
the effect that he was the author of their liberty and then they would open their
gates to the Romans and surrender their city to them, but not to the Achaians
(legatos Chalcidem ad T. Quinctium, auctorem libertatis, miserunt, qui
nuntiarent Messenios Romanis, non Achaeis, et aperire portas et dedere urbem
paratos esse). Flamininus ‘ordered (imperavit)’ that Achaia not attack Messenia,
that Messenia should become a member of the Achaian League, and that if
Messenia wished to voice a concern, then they should complain about it to him at
Corinth (Liv. 36.31.5-9, esp. 5 and 9). His judgement was accepted by both parties.

It is noteworthy that Livius uses the term impero here. Using this verb was not
necessarily restricted to the magistrates with imperium, but its usage suggests
that Flamininus behaved as if he possessed the power to demand or enjoin
outsiders, even though he was only a legatus. Polybios also treats his observation
here as a διάγραμμα (ordinance) at 22.10.6. Contemporaries, such as this
Polybios, considered Flamininus’ statement to be a form of order to both states, a
viewpoint that was followed by later historians, such as Livius. These confirm
that Flamininus’ influence in Greece was much stronger than in Rome, and
suggest that he conducted informal diplomacy; he lacked any suitable authority,
but exercised power in a channel apart from official authority, participating
actively in Roman diplomacy.

One might argue that Flamininus’ behaviour should be rather explained by
the flexibility of Roman diplomacy, and that it was not a deviation from the
traditional authority given to legati. Certainly, similar cases of envoys
participating in disputes among outsiders can be found. One such example is that

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of the three senators sent to Carthage in 195 (Liv. 33.47.3-9). They endeavoured to disgrace Hannibal, following the request of his rivals. Such actions, however, resulted from a senatorial order issued beforehand. By contrast, Flamininus accepted Messenia’s appeal without any specific senatorial order, judged it independently, and announced that any further dispute should be brought to him. He had been sent to reduce friction between the Romans and the Greeks before the war.settling this dispute between Messenia and Achaia, after its outbreak, was beyond the mandate of his original task or the flexible management of it. Furthermore, at this time, imperium in Greece was held by M. Acilius Glabrio, the consul, who was assigned to Greece as his provincia and had recently defeated Antiochos at Thermopylai. There is no indication that Flamininus had been ordered to manage the appeals from Messenia by Glabrio or the Senate. From the viewpoint of legality, then, this Messenian case should have been brought by Flamininus to the two official decision-makers; nevertheless, Flamininus accepted the appeal himself. He exploited the fact that Messenia depended on him, as an opportunity to participate in diplomacy, and issued independently a message that would be treated as an order by the Greeks. The two Greek states, then, followed it. This partly resulted from the fact that Flamininus' decision was favourable to them. In fact, Diophanes, who managed the negotiation as Achaia’s στρατηγός of this 192/1, would be praised by the federation later for his contribution to the unification of the Peloponnesos (Paus. 8.30.5). For Achaia, Flamininus' judgement was acceptable, whether his authority was absolute or not, although Achaia was forced by him to cede Zakynthos to Rome (Liv. 36.31.9-32.9:

Grainger 2002: 120.

For the relation between Achaia and Messenia, see Luraghi and Magnetto 2012: 516-7.
Plut. Flarn. 17.2). For Messenia, it was better to follow his decision, and thus to secure a channel for negotiation about its future position, than to reject the judgement and continue the war, especially since Messenia was inferior in strength to Achaia. In any case, Flamininus acted not as an instrument of the Senate, but rather as a significant participant in diplomacy, with authority over the consul and the Senate. This was informal diplomacy by a powerful Roman individual, strengthening his dignity in and beyond Rome.

However, Flamininus participated in diplomacy here not solely because he wanted to do so. This is shown by considering the factors that enabled him to take part in this case. In fact, the Messenian case resulted largely from the fact that Glabrio had driven Antiochos from Greece, regardless of any influence of Flamininus (App. Syr. 17-20; Liv. 36.17-19 and 21). Greeks who had sided with Antiochos, such as the Messenians, had to make amends with Rome quickly. Even for Achaia, Rome’s victory meant Roman dominance. It was sensible to negotiate with an influential Roman, whether he was really a representative of the state or not. This is an imperfect analysis, though. Certainly, Antiochos’ defeat may well have softened the attitude of the Greeks towards Rome. It does not explain, however, why Messenia did not make contact with Glabrio, the victor of Thermopylai, but rather with Flamininus. Perhaps he was visited by the Massenians because he was the physically closest to them, but this is not reasonable either. When he was approached by them, he was at Chalkis. Glabrio had taken Herakleia and was confronting the Aitolians at Naupaktos (36.27-30). The difference of the distances between the two Romans and the Messenians, then,

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32 For more detail on the campaign of Antiochos and the Aitolians, from his landing on Greece to the Battle of Thermopylai, see Grainger 2002: 192-246.
does not explain their decision. Furthermore, they must have understood the superiority of the consul to Flamininus, since the former had troops, while the latter was without arms. There appears to be little reason for Messenia to request Flamininus to act as a judge, instead of Glabrio. It is useful to remember that the Messenians announced that they sent envoys to him because he was the *auctor libertatis* (36.31.5). This does not mean Flamininus liberated Messenia, but it shows that what was important for them was not his military or legal powers, but his achievements and reputation. The Messenians expected that if any Greek state asked him to defend its position as a free state, he would treat it favourably, since he had gained fame partly owing of his declaration of the Freedom of Greece. If he had ignored the request, his reputation, and that of Rome, by implication, would have been damaged. This approach was therefore an effective one for Messenia, when opening negotiations with Achaia. The federation was also guaranteed independence, as a Greek state, and benefitted from the announcement. So, Achaia could do little but respect the spirit of the proclamation and the judgements of its sponsor: Flamininus. Thus, while he behaved as an independent decision-maker, his fame as a guarantor of the Freedom of Greece was used, in a sense, by Messenia. The Messenian case was not only an informal diplomacy by him resulting from his unique power but also that by Messenia using it.

This informal diplomacy of Flamininus, and the imperfect nature thereof, are also observed in Livius’ text regarding an event at the end of the war against Aitolia at 36.34.4-6:

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This occurred when Antiochos had withdrawn from Greece and Naupaktos, a city of Aitolia abandoned by him, had almost fallen in 191. Flamininus approached the citizens in front of the Roman soldiers under Glabrio. Upon hearing the citizens’ plea for support, Flamininus announced that he could not help them by himself, but wanted to mediate between the populace and the consul. This behaviour is unquestionably an example of informal diplomacy. He intervened in an active campaign, without any order from Rome, and despite lacking full authority. Plutarchos relates that Flamininus appeared in front of the citizens, but told nothing about mediation, though even in this description, his independent mediation between the consul and populace is supported (Flam. 15.3 and 5). It is, meanwhile, significant that in both texts Flamininus showed the citizens that the decision was Glabrio’s to make, whether before or eventually during the mediation, in contrast to his conduct in the Messenian case. Flamininus approached the citizens while apparently expecting that they would ask him to support them by participating in the negotiation. He did not hesitate to show his influence in public, but also did not compete with the consul or official power. This pattern follows for the case of the negotiations with Achaia in the same year. In the meeting, he was still noticed by the Romans and the Greeks.

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The extant sources relate that he made a speech there, despite Glabrio’s attendance (Liv. 36.35.7; Plut. Philop. 17.2-6). Flamininus distinguished himself, but it was nonetheless apparent for the Greek attendees that he was inferior in authority to Glabrio, a consul with imperium and troops, who acted as an ordinary representative of Rome. Flamininus did not dare to show his influence before the attendees, except in his speech.

Overall, Flamininus repeatedly participated in Greek affairs by means of a reputation gained in his campaign in Greece, despite lacking full authority to do so. His influence over the Greeks was recognised and accepted by the senators. The Greeks took note of him, whether he had authority or not. This situation sometimes enabled him to behave as an entity distinct from Roman representatives, namely the consul and the Senate, in Greece. Considering the respect of the Romans toward formal legality in this period, this position of Flamininus did not result simply from a flexibility within Roman diplomacy, but was a sign of the rising importance of extra-legal powers, and their users, on the international stage. This phenomenon would obviously conflict with the traditional order at the heart of Roman diplomacy. At least, as I have shown in the first three chapters, it had been managed under the collective authority of the Senate, even if some individuals played important roles.

Flamininus, meanwhile, possessed considerable extra-legal power, but could not wield it as freely as he desired, and was conscious of this. In the negotiation with the Seleucids, his informal influence was generally utilised by the Senate, and in the field was regarded as inferior in power to the consular

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35 Concerning the political context of the meeting and the discussion about the sources, see Eckstein 1995a: 271-89 and Pfeilschifter 2005: 236-7.
authority by Flamininus himself. The success of his intervention in other Greek affairs partly depended on the Greeks’ interests in addition to Rome’s ascendancy there. Nevertheless, he certainly could behave as a distinctive diplomatic player. I would argue that there is therefore a grey area in Roman diplomacy in this period, in terms of how authority was quantified. There is, actually, a way to clarify the mechanism more. It is useful to remember that, as Chapter 3 revealed, hawks played an important role in international politics on the eve of the Second Macedonian War, despite lacking full authority at the beginning. Flamininus’ participation in diplomacy was occurring only shortly after their informal actions. He was apparently a supporter of the Macedonian War. This suggests that his appearance in diplomacy should also be set in the context of the rise of factionalism among leading Romans, and that the degree of Flamininus’ independence partly depended on his relationship with the dominant group and moreover its rivals, after the war. This chapter now focuses on his political position, and the trends observed in connection with leading Romans, during this period. This contributes to a better understanding of his informal diplomacy, and to finding the underlying factors behind independent diplomatic action.

2) Flamininus and the Political Groups of Rome

It is now necessary to show that the former hawks against Macedonia had maintained power in Rome, even after Philippos’ defeat. This is first confirmed by the selection of the envoys chosen to negotiate with the Seleucids after 193. Rome dispatched P. Sulpicius Galba, P. Villius Tappulus and P. Aelius Paetus (Liv. 34.59.8). As was shown in Chapter 3, they had assumed high offices, such as the
consulship and the censorship, and had been important leaders among the hawks against Macedonia. Sending these three senators means that the former advocates of the Macedonian War still held sway in Roman diplomacy towards the Hellenistic states. This tendency is confirmed by the censorship of Sex. Aelius Paetus in 194. He was a younger brother of P. Paetus and had assumed the consulship with Flamininus in 198, when the Macedonian War had been directed by the hawks.\textsuperscript{36} Considering the number of such senators who assumed high offices, and their close relationship with one another (suggested by their participation in the same delegation and ties of blood relations), the influence of the former hawks against Macedonia was clearly maintained.

This may well have been a factor in enabling Flamininus’ success in the negotiations with the Greek and the Seleucid envoys in 193. He had belonged to the group that encouraged the Macedonian War. With Tappulus and P. Paetus, Flamininus had served on a committee, in 201, to assign land to the soldiers who had fought in Africa in the Hannibalic War (Liv. 31.4.1-3). This had been a measure by the hawks, designed to win over voters in Rome, in order to persuade the assembly to support the dispatch of troops to Greece. Flamininus had worked as a member of this group on the eve and in the middle of the Macedonian War and was, in turn, supported by them, in light of his remarkable assumption of the consulship in 198.\textsuperscript{37} His appearance in 193 resulted from his own influence over the Greeks, but also partly from the fact that this group strove to maintain its influence on the management of the Greek affairs.

\textsuperscript{36} Eckstein 1976: 123.
\textsuperscript{37} He had not been elected to the praetorship, and was only about thirty years old in 198. For a discussion of his consulship, see also Pfeilschifter 2005: 52-65 and Eckstein 2008: 279-80.
It is true that the significance of political groups in the Middle Republic is generally controversial.\textsuperscript{38} Certainly, it is unreasonable to agree with the previous theories about them, particularly in connection with the Roman advance into Greece. For example, H. H. Scullard thinks that, in the 190s, members of the so-called Claudian Group restrained the philhellenism of Flamininus and his other dogmatic actions, by appointing other senators to the managers of Greek affairs.\textsuperscript{39} There is, however, no sign of a disagreement, at least, between him and the envoys sent to Asia Minor after his negotiations at Rome in 193. Rather, Galba supported Flamininus in those with the Seleucids at Rome (Liv. 34.59.1-2).\textsuperscript{40} J. P. V. D. Balsdon, meanwhile, argues against the theory of the Claudian Group, and attempts to show the rise of the group of experts on Greek affairs in several negotiations with the Greeks and the Seleucids in the 190s.\textsuperscript{41} This is more acceptable, to an extent. In this decade, aspects of Rome’s negotiations with the eastern Greeks were continuously managed under the leadership of Flamininus, who may well have known more about them than other Romans. This pattern follows for the three senators mentioned above, because they assumed important offices and led the Romans from the middle of the Macedonian War.\textsuperscript{42} Yet, their frequent appearance did not result wholly from their expertise. E. S. Gruen successfully shows that Rome did not regard this factor as very important in matters of diplomatic management.\textsuperscript{43} Moreover, the Republic could not find many experts on Greece easily in the 190s. Galba, Tappulus and Paetus achieved

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. Hölkeskamp 2001: 92-105.
\textsuperscript{39} Scullard 1951: 107.
\textsuperscript{40} For the context, see Dmitriev 2011a: 209-23.
\textsuperscript{41} Balsdon 1967: 185-6.
\textsuperscript{43} Gruen 1984: 203-19.
nothing great during the Second Macedonian War (cf. 31.2.5-11, 32.1-5, 40.1-6, and 32.3.2-7). Therefore, the appearance of Flamininus in 193 is better explained by the idea that the former warmongers still maintained an influence on Roman diplomacy. Considering this, his absence from the delegation after his negotiations in Rome, in 193, might also be understood as an arrangement to afford other members of the faction access to opportunities for gaining renown.

Flamininus is absent from the delegation dispatched to Asia Minor after the negotiations at Rome in 193, but was sent to Greece in 192. It is in this dispatch that the influence of the former hawks can also be observed. Tappulus was a member of the deputation (Liv. 35.23.5). The appointment of Cn. Octavius as their colleague may also support this view. He had served on the committee for the colonisation at Crotona in 194, with C. Laetorius (34.45.5). Laetorius seemed to be identified as the lieutenant of P. Sempronius Tuditanus, one of the lead advocates of the Macedonian War (29.12.5 and 31.2.1-4).⁴⁴ As was shown by the distribution of land for the soldiers who had fought in Africa, selection for committees resulted primarily from the political position of the candidates concerned, at least in this period. Octavius may well have been a friend of Laetorius, and one of those who had promoted the Macedonian War, or been their ally. Moreover, in 192, L. Quinctius Flamininus, the brother of T. Flamininus, was elected as the consul (35.10.10). T. Flamininus and his colleagues were dispatched under the influence of the former promoters of the war, their families and friends.

The influence of the former hawks against Macedonia, to whom Flamininus had belonged, however, was not the only factor in his dispatch to Greece in 192.

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⁴⁴ Briscoe 1973: 112.
It also resulted from their political struggles with their rivals. There was at least one more group determined to participate in directing Greek affairs within the Senate, during this period: that of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus. Setting aside whether or not it was really led by Africanus, now, the existence of a group opposed to that of Flamininus is revealed by considering the management of Rome’s military affairs in 192. In this period, Nabis, Sparta’s king and an anti-Roman leader beyond Aitolia, began the campaign to restore his influence in the Peloponnesos, and Aitolia also started to move its troops.\textsuperscript{45} While the Senate sent Flamininus and his colleagues to negotiate with the Greek states, L. Oppius Salinator and M. Baebius Tamphilus were simultaneously ordered to protect Sicily and southern Italy respectively (Liv. 35.23.5-6). Since, during the election for the magistrates of 192, the Romans had expected a conflict with Antiochos and Aitolia,\textsuperscript{46} these were the measures designed to prepare the Republic for the coming war against them (and possibly against Nabis). It is noteworthy that Oppius had only assumed the plebeian \textit{aedilis} in 193 and, in 192, took part in the operation as a \textit{legatus cum imperio}. There are actually few recorded cases of this kind of \textit{legatus}.\textsuperscript{47} When the Senate needed generals, the consul and praetor, and sometimes those who had assumed the offices, were normally appointed. Salinator’s appointment seemingly suggests that the Senate could not find good candidates in the usual way and selected him as an extraordinary measure. Yet, there were other senators with sufficient credentials: Flamininus and Tappulus. They had assumed the consulship, but the Senate had sent them as its

\textsuperscript{46} Tatum 2001: 391.
\textsuperscript{47} Briscoe 1973: 194.
ambassadors to Greece. If the leadership of the former hawks had been still definitely strong, they would likely have stopped this plan. In fact, it may well have been possible to negotiate with the Greeks from Sicily and southern Italy, through letters and envoys, even while defending these regions. In particular, considering the difference in celebrity between Tappulus and Flamininus, the Senate could have selected the former as its commander. Although there is no information about Salinator’s political position, the dispatch of Flamininus and Tappulus to Greece suggests that the former advocates of the Macedonian War still could participate in Greek affairs, but that someone or some senators consciously and tactically prevented them from controlling Roman foreign affairs completely, especially in light of Salinator’s irregular selection for the military command and of the significance of southern Italy and Sicily when a war with eastern states was expected.

This view is supported by Tamphilus’ eventual dispatch to Greece with troops, and Africanus’ influence over the decision. Tamphilus was originally assigned to Hispania Citerior by ballot, but the Senate changed the result and sent him and his troops to Bruttium (Liv. 35.20.8-9 and 11), before transferring both to protect Tarentum and Brundisium, when Flamininus had been sent to Greece (35.23.5). Finally, Tamphilus advanced into Apollonia on the eve of Seleucid troops’ arriving in Greece (35.24.7). It was not odd that he, as praetor, controlled troops, but the region assigned to him was decided by the Senate only after the ordinary casting of lots. His appointment as the general was a product of senatorial intervention. So, what made the Senate decide to follow this path? It is necessary to consider the precise conditions surrounding the rise of a faction opposed to that of Flamininus. Tamphilus was apparently a relative of Q. Baebius,
the *tribunus plebis* of 200, and Cn. Baebius Tamphilus, the *aedilis* of the same year (31.6.4-6 and 50.3). They had criticised the hawks against Macedonia, and seemed to be tied with Africanus. Africanus had compromised with the hawks in 200 (cf. 31.8.6 and 49.5), but following the withdrawal of the troops with Flamininus from Greece in 194, something that was decided against Africanus’ wishes (34.43.3-9), he had broken away from them. Indeed, the canvassing for the consular election for 192 was ‘keener than had ever been before (*magis quam umquam alias*)’, and resulted in L. Flamininus and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus being elected (35.10.1 and 10). The former had served in the Macedonian War as a *legatus cum imperio*, on the order of the Senate, itself under the control of the hawks (32.16.2, 33.17.2, and 15), and hence he may have been their friend. Domitius would serve as a *legatus* under L. Scipio, Africanus’ brother, in 190, and would play an active part in the campaign against Aitolia and Antiochos (cf. App. Syr. 30-6). Domitius was trusted by the Scipiones. Thus, in 192, Africanus’ influence was comparable to that of Flamininus’ group, and both were in competition with one another. Considering the familial relationship between Africanus and the Baebii, Tamphilus’ dispatch to Apollonia shows that Africanus’ side controlled military affairs, possibly along with Salinator. Since P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica had failed to be elected in the election for the consulship of 192, despite Africanus’ support (Liv. 35.8.1-9, 10.1-11, and 24.4), the latter’s position was not completely superior to the supporters of Flamininus. Nevertheless, Flamininus’ special position in Greece in 192 resulted not only from his extra-

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49 Dorey 1959: 293-5.
50 Cf. *MRR*: 332.
legal influence, the tactics of the Greeks, and the influence of his friends, but also from the rise of Africanus and his friends in managing Roman foreign affairs.

The lack of troops, as a result of such political infighting, influenced Flamininus’ diplomatic approach in Greece. After Nabis began his campaign to recover Lakonia, Achaia planned to counter Sparta. Flamininus wanted Achaia to wait until Rome’s troops had arrived. However, Philopoimen, Achaia’s leader, urged his fellow citizens not to accept the request, but to open hostilities immediately. They followed his advice (Liv. 35.25.5-12; cf. Plut. Philop. 14).\textsuperscript{52} It is a sign of the Achaians’ respect for Flamininus that they listened to the request,\textsuperscript{53} but they rejected it. If he had possessed troops, as in the period before 194, I would argue that Achaia would likely have accepted his request. In 195, while possessing soldiers and \textit{imperium}, he had wanted to make peace with Nabis, despite the desire of Achaia and other Greek states who had sent troops to support Flamininus in order to dethrone the king, and they reluctantly withdrew their soldiers (Liv. 34.33.4-34.9, 38.3, and 43.1-2). In contrast to 195, in 192 he was only a \textit{legatus} without troops. The Achaians observed his lack of practical power and politely ignored his request that, in contrast to the Messenian case, was not profitable to them.

Flamininus, nevertheless, tenaciously participated in Roman diplomacy, while tactically using his extra-legal power, and thus increased his influence on this stage. Indeed, neither the Senate nor Glabrio tried to stop Flamininus, or

\textsuperscript{52} Burton 2011: 209-10.
\textsuperscript{53} Their attitude towards Flamininus might have partly resulted from the alliance between Rome and Achaia, which is said to have concluded in c. 192/1. Badian 1952: 80; Eckstein 2008: 332-3. Cf. Gruen 1984: 33-8; De Libero 1997: 272. If it had been made, it enabled Flamininus to want Achaia to do something and led Achaia to listen to it, as well as his reputation in Greece.
criticised his attitude towards Messenia. It might have been partly because, for the Roman authorities, this case was trivial. Once Messenia lacked any will to fight against Rome, whether the former belonged to Achaia was of no consequence to Rome’s war against Aitolia and the Seleucids, who had not yet been completely defeated. If Glabrio and the Senate had been able to criticise Flamininus, however, I would argue that they would have done so. Glabrio had been defeated in the consular election of 192 by L. Flamininus and Domitius (Liv. 35.10.3 and 10), and had no reason for overlooking Flamininus’ action if it was illegal, even though he had obtained Zakynthos. The same can be said for the Senate, in which Africanus’ influence had risen. Their silence means that, although Flamininus’ behaviour might be irregular, it was not so outrageous that they could criticise him. Considering his action at Naupaktos as well, he was sensitive to what could be achieved by his extra-legal power, and therefore took part in Roman diplomacy as often as possible, to increase his individual influence.

Even for Flamininus, though, it was impossible to balance decisively the relationship between his informal diplomacy, the Senate’s official authority, and the political manoeuvres of other senators. This is shown by his failure when he supported Aitolia’s peace negotiations with Rome. Through his good offices at Naupaktos in 191, an armistice was granted by Glabrio. (Liv. 36.35.6). Considering the fact that he confiscated the Aitolians’ properties in Delphoi in this period (RDGE 37: SEG XXVII.123), Glabrio did not stop his campaign completely. Yet, the truce pleased Aitolia, and displayed Flamininus’ influence.

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54 Glabrio, meanwhile, may well have been a supporter of Africanus and then a friend of Domitius because he had supported Africanus’ prolongation of imperium in his African campaign in 201 (Liv. 30.40.9-16 and 43.2-3). Cf. Briscoe 1972: 38.
56 Rousset 2002: no.41.
This should be counted as a triumph of informal diplomacy by Flamininus, since it resulted from his independent approach to the citizens of Naupaktos. Yet, his further participation in diplomacy was forestalled. After Glabrio permitted Aitolia to negotiate with the Senate about peace, Flamininus promised Aitolia that he would support the negotiations in Rome, and returned home with its envoys, but the attitude of the Senate was hostile. It announced that the Aitolians should place themselves unreservedly in the hands of the Romans or to pay a fine of one thousand talents, and should hold the same friends and enemies as the Romans. The envoys could not help but return home without any result (Liv. 37.1.1-6).\(^57\) Flamininus may have told the envoys how to talk in the Senate, and perhaps engaged in negotiations behind the scenes with the senators, but these appear to have had no impact on them. This situation might have resulted largely from the weakness of his friends within the Senate. During this period, L. Scipio, the brother of Africanus, and C. Laelius, his friend, were elected as the consuls of 190 (36.45.9).\(^58\) It was natural, then, that, despite Flamininus’ support, there were more senators declaring against Aitolia than those for it, while supporting him (37.1.4). Thus, the influence of Flamininus’ rivals, and the collective, official power of the Senate here, combined to restrict his informal diplomacy, although his independent support for Aitolia was not criticised.

It is significant that this failure dented Flamininus’ reputation, and might have decreased his informal power in the management of Greek affairs. Even after the meeting in Rome, negotiations persisted. The peace was concluded in 189 but, importantly, it was achieved by the mediation of Rhodes, Athens, and


other Roman individuals (Liv. 38.10.4-6: Polyb. 21.25.10-11, 21.26.7-19, and 21.31.5-16).\textsuperscript{59} Considering his aggressive attitude towards intervening in Greek affairs in the Messenian case, and the pose shown at Naupaktos, Flamininus might have wanted to participate in the negotiation further, but he could not be connected with it. The Senate, under the control of Africanus’ faction, easily and legitimately prevented Flamininus’ continued participation in the negotiations. In this situation, there was no reason for Aitolia to depend on him. Without any approach by other Romans or the Greeks, he could not appear on the stage of diplomacy. Analysis of the significance of political factions among the leading Romans therefore reveals an aspect of Flamininus’ informal diplomacy in this period. It resulted from a extra-legal power, and its relative authority was influenced by political machinations among competing senators, as well as the changing attitudes of outsiders.

Flamininus obtained the censorship in 189, and was sent to the East as an envoy in the same decade (Liv. 37.58.2; Plut. \textit{Flam.} 18 and 20). His achievements during his term as consul and proconsul during the Second Macedonian War and those even after that in the 190s were respected by the Romans. He ascended to the seat of power in the Republic and, moreover, maintained contact with various Greek factions. His informal diplomacy allowed him to advance his career, and the expectation that he would direct Greek affairs among the Romans did not disappear. Meanwhile, the situation in the final phase of peace negotiation with Aitolia shows that the appeal of outsiders was also a factor in enabling individual

\textsuperscript{59} Deininger 1971: 105-7; Austin 2006: 174-6.
Romans to participate in foreign affairs, despite their lacking the authority to do so. This is suggested by the fact that the Messenians asked Flamininus to support them by intervening in their conflict with the Achaians. The success of his intervention was also dependent on the competing interests found in Roman internal politics and the degree of Roman superiority in international politics. Flamininus’ statement was respected when his friends led the Senate and Rome defeated her enemies more than when her rivals and those of him were powerful and he lacked practical power. His informal diplomacy depended on the interaction of these factors but, crucially, he lacked the ability to control them.

However, these cases demonstrate that Flamininus, as an individual, sometimes succeeded in participating in diplomacy over and above the official decision-makers, and promoted Rome’s further advance into Greece by his personal influence over the Greeks. This resulted partly from the manoeuvres of political groups within Roman politics, and that he was given some positions that enabled him to talk with outsiders despite not serving as a commander. The fact remains, though, that he actively and successfully took part in diplomacy with his quasi-legal power, while also managing its relationship with other factors, such as written law, in Roman diplomacy. This is an archetypal example of informal diplomacy. His success in displaying his influence before contemporaries may well have provided them with a remarkable exemplar, although the terminology of informal diplomacy was not employed by them.
Section 2: P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus after the Second Punic War

One might, however, argue that Flamininus’ case was a special one, on the basis that his extra-legal power came from his great success in the Macedonian War, meaning that the Greeks naturally respected him, while other Romans could not follow him so easily. This is not reasonable, though. I argue that his case was rather symbolic of a new tendency within Roman diplomacy, namely the appearance of informal diplomacy by individuals. The factors enabling him to participate in diplomacy through unofficial channels, or something similar, could actually be held by Romans other than Flamininus. In order to demonstrate this, this section analyses the actions by a Roman statesman equal to Flamininus in stature: Africanus.

I shall first confirm that Africanus had informal power, and that it influenced the development of Roman domestic and foreign affairs, at the beginning of the Roman advance into the Greek world. He had been responsible for the final defeat of Carthage (Liv. 30.45), achieving a fame comparable to Flamininus. In the period of the Second Macedonian War, however, Africanus did not appear in international politics, in public. This is not unusual, since before he was elected as the consul of 194, he assumed no diplomatic office (34.43.3). Behind the scenes of domestic politics, however, he was noticed by other Romans. This is confirmed, for instance, by the fact that the veterans who had fought in Africa under him were assigned land and were permitted to avoid serving in the Macedonian War (31.4.1-3, 8.6, and 49.5). This was an exceptional and selective treatment, in the sense that there were other soldiers involved in the war and they did not receive such favourable treatment. Moreover, considering the
relationship between Africanus and the Baebii, the critical behaviour of Q. Baebius, mentioned above, towards the promoters of the Macedonian War in 200, was a sign that Africanus indirectly influenced foreign affairs. This does not necessarily mean that he wanted to stop the new conflict, but the special treatment of his veterans was decided shortly after the hawks succeeded in persuading the Senate and the assembly to commence the war. The veterans who had fought in Hispania under Africanus were also assigned land around the period in which Plautus' *Stichus* was performed, the comedy that was mentioned in Section 1 and 3 of Chapter 3 and apparently scathing about Rome's new war in Greece,\(^60\) under Cn. Baebius, an *aedilis* mentioned above (31.2.3-4, 8.1, 49.3, 5, and 50.3). The advocates of the campaign could not ignore Africanus and his associates, and consequently curried favour with them, in order to advance their plans for war (31.49.12). He did not participate, then, in diplomacy directly but, despite lacking any diplomatic office, he still influenced Roman diplomacy in an informal manner, during the period of the Macedonian War.

In light of the analysis of Flamininus' membership of the advocates of the Macedonian War, and of their struggle with Africanus' group (shown in Section 1), I would argue that Africanus was interested in Roman diplomacy, and in advancing his interests, and those of his friends, on the stage even after the war. With this in mind, this chapter further considers how he participated in the Roman advance into the Greek world, and whether the notion of informal diplomacy is useful for understanding of this development. I will achieve this by analysing his political actions at Rome, before the dispatch of L. Cornelius Scipio,

his brother, to Greece, as the general against Aitolia and Antiochos, and Africanus’ actions during the campaigns.

1) Africanus’ Diplomatic Actions at Rome

Africanus’ direct and remarkable attempt to participate in Roman diplomacy is first confirmed after the Second Macedonian War, and it was made through an official channel. He ran for the consulate of 194. On gaining the office, he argued that one consul should be sent to Macedonia on the basis that a new war was impending with Antiochos and the Aitolians (Liv. 34.43.3-5). Africanus appears to have wanted to take personal command of the army in the East, in order to counterbalance the increase of the influence of Flamininus and his friends.61 This suggests that participating in Greek affairs was the most effective way of increasing one’s individual influence, especially in light of a similar proposal made in 196 by M. Claudius Marcellus, the consul (33.25.4-6). This also shows that Africanus opposed the policies of the former hawks against Macedonia. In 196, Flamininus had promised to withdraw Rome’s troops and garrisons, an act that the Senate, controlled by his friends, had approved (cf. Polyb. 18.44-6).62 Encouraged by victory in the election, and expecting the support of the majority of the Romans, Africanus wanted to change the decision. This was, however, unsuccessful. The Senate decided to send both consuls of 194 to northern Italy, and the troops in Greece were withdrawn and dismissed. Africanus failed to participate in Greek affairs publicly. Nevertheless, he almost succeeded. He was

62 For more on the decision-making behind the evacuation, see Eckstein 1990: 45-51.
elected as the *princeps senatus* in the same year. His suggestion about the allocation of consular *provinciae* was seriously debated by the senators (34.43.6-9 and 44.4). Meanwhile, this situation suggests that he and a number of other senators did not necessarily regard consistency in public announcements, or international public opinion, to be important. If Rome had sent a consul to Greece in 194, the Greeks would have considered it a breach of Flamininus’ declaration in 196. He and his allies had recognised the importance of the viewpoint of foreigners as much as that of their fellow Roman citizens, something that cannot be said for all of the senators. In any case, considering Africanus’ suggestion about the consular allocation, and his indirect intervention in the Macedonian War, he depended first and foremost on official diplomatic authority, though sometimes upon informal powers in domestic politics. He was comparatively indifferent to international public opinion, in contrast to Flamininus and his associates.

This view is supported by Africanus’ second attempt at participating in Greek affairs. He intervened in the selection of the general to fight against Aitolia and Antiochos, after they were defeated at Thermopylai. In the winter of 191/0 the Senate decided that L. Cornelius Scipio, the brother of Africanus, was to command the army. He was the serving consul and would later be dubbed *Asiaticus* (this chapter refers to him as such henceforth for convenience). It is important to note that the decisive factor in persuading the Senate send him to Asia Minor was Africanus’ speech on his behalf. According to Livius (at 37.1.8-10, esp. 9), Africanus encouraged Asiaticus to leave the decision of the command in

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63 Badian 1964: 122-3.
the hands of the Senate, and declared before the senators that, if the Greek affairs were assigned to Asiaticus, ‘he would serve under the brother as a legatus (se ei legatum iturum).’ The senators expected that Africanus would steer Rome to victory over Antiochos, who was accompanied by Hannibal who had already lost to Africanus in the Second Punic War, deciding to dispatch Asiaticus.64 J. D. Grainger doubts that Africanus’ argument directly brought an end to all debate regarding the allocation. J. Briscoe also notices the difficulty in clarifying the precise process. There are several versions that describe this scene in the extant sources (App. Syr. 21; Cic. Mur. 32; Phil. 11.17; Val. Max. 5.5.1).65 However, no author denies Africanus’ intervention. Indeed, it is natural that he was connected with the selection of a general, both as a consular senator and as Asiaticus’ brother. Africanus used blood relationship and his fame as a remarkable general, effectively an informal influence, over his countrymen and the official session of the Senate, in which it was easy for him to control the discussion because he was a princeps senatus, and thus obtained a position as legatus in Asiaticus’ troops.

It is significant here that these sources show that, while using these official and unofficial powers, Africanus practically announced that he would take part in the decision-making of his brother, the commander, and yet this was not criticised by other Romans. This acquiescence can be equated with their general allowance of his participation in foreign affairs alongside or over the consul, a form of informal diplomacy. He was not a representative of the Roman government. The approval of the senators, however, may also have partly resulted from the increasing influence of his friends in the Senate during this period, as

was shown in the previous section. This confirms that informal diplomacy was connected with political rivalries among the senators. Meanwhile, it is important that the tacit approval of Africanus’ informal diplomacy is not the same as that of Flamininus. Flamininus’ leadership in the negotiations with the Greeks resulted from his celebrity in Greece, and the expectation of Roman and Greek alike that he would influence the other side favourably towards them. In contrast, Africanus promised to support Asiaticus as a *legatus*, a staff officer in the expeditionary force. The people looking to him were the senators, and they noticed his overtly military contribution to Rome. This was also informal diplomacy of an individual, but is different from that of Flamininus.

This different character of Africanus’ participation in diplomacy from that of Flamininus might partly result from the difference in the nature of both Romans’ reputation. Flamininus achieved fame for military and diplomatic success in Greece. His appearance in front of the Greeks was expected to influence their behaviour. He also consciously utilised this situation to win them over. Meanwhile, Africanus gained fame for his success in the Punic War. While his renown might have spread to the Greek world, his fellow citizens could not expect that he would win over the Greeks, as Flamininus had done. Africanus could certainly not behave as a person who knew the Greeks intimately.

What should be noticed, nevertheless, is that Africanus participated in the selection of the commander in Greece, and practically compelled other senators to approve his future participation in the decision-making of the general, despite lacking authority equal to the holder of *imperium*. I would argue that this suggests that informal diplomacy gradually spread among the Romans, and there were, in fact, several factors enabling an individual Roman to take part in foreign
affairs irregularly. Africanus was one of the first people who realised this, just as Flamininus had, but their manners were radically different from each other. It is important that this diversity also could influence Roman diplomacy. The conflict with Aitolia and Antiochos eventually consolidated the Roman ascendancy in the Greek world. The actions of both Romans, in the Greek context, provide remarkable examples of the manner of how diplomacy was conducted towards the people in and beyond Rome. This situation paved the way for other contemporaries to follow. The next sub-division confirms these by analysing how Africanus’ informal diplomacy was in practice developed, despite the differences from that of Flamininus, in Greece and Asia Minor under Asiaticus.

2) Africanus’ Diplomatic Actions in the Campaign of Asiaticus

Africanus was a more active diplomatic participant in the field than at Rome, similar to Flamininus. This is first confirmed by the details of the Roman negotiation with Aitolia. After Flamininus’ failure in Rome, Africanus arrived in Greece with Asiaticus. Athens’ envoys visited their camp to mediate between Rome and Aitolia. They approached Africanus, and then had a contact with Asiaticus. Furthermore, when Aitolia was encouraged by the Athenians to send its envoys to the Romans, Aitolia’s diplomats also visited Africanus before his brother (Liv. 37.6.4–6). The envoys of Athens and Aitolia regarded him as the person to negotiate with. He gladly accepted contacts with them, despite lacking any connection with them before that point. Africanus, one of the legati,

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66 For more on the war against Aitolia and Antiochos after Thermopylai, see Grainger 2002: 247–75.
participated, or was involved by the Greeks, in negotiations before the consul. This is a clear example of informal diplomacy in action. Indeed, his behaviour here was similar to that of Flamininus, when Messenia was pressed by Achaia.

It is, however, necessary to analyse the actions of Africanus and, moreover, those of Asiaticus, in order to observe the true nature of Africanus’ behaviour in connection with Aitolia. Africanus had not been connected with the Greeks, in any meaningful way. Asiaticus apparently had no reason to overlook the negotiations occurring around him, unlike the cases of Flamininus, whose influence in Greece had been expected to support Rome in some way. It is important here to note what Africanus did and did not do. He was asked to moderate the terms for peace by Aitolia, a request that he treated favourably. Asiaticus’ attitude towards Aitolia, however, did not soften (Liv. 37.6.7 and 7.2-4). Scholars suppose that this resulted from a conflict between the brothers or Asiaticus’ distaste for Africanus’ arbitrary action. Yet, there is no sign of the discord between the brothers, except in their different attitudes here. It is noticeable that the extant sources do not report Africanus’ support for Aitolia in their depictions of the meeting between the Aitolian delegates and Asiaticus. This suggests either that Africanus’ influence on the formal decision-making process was not remarkable, or he did not intend to help Aitolia here, despite his sentiments during the preliminary contacts. In this event, the former possibility is impossible. Asiaticus owed his command to Africanus. If the latter had publicly ‘advised’ Asiaticus to make peace with Aitolia, with favourable conditions to the federation, it would have been impossible for the consul to refuse. Aitolia’s failure here shows that Africanus did not help them at

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this time, although he had made contacts among the Greek envoys, independently of Asiaticus.

This position is supported by considering Africanus’ and Asiaticus’ complicated interests. Africanus’ behaviour confirms that he was not interested in satisfying Aitolia and potentially other outsiders, as might have been inferred by his suggestions regarding the consular allocation in 194. Nonetheless, his behaviour here does not simply show his insincere attitude to outsiders. He and Asiaticus faced a significant dilemma. They had to finish the war in Greece and fight against Antiochos. While Asiaticus’ provincia was Greece and not Asia Minor, the Senate had decided that ‘if it seemed to be useful for the state, he should take his troops into Asia (si e re publica videretur esse, exercitum in Asiam traireret)’ to attack Antiochos (Liv. 37.2.3).\(^{68}\) The brothers had also been given the power to decide whether Philippos was to be excused from the payment of his remaining indemnity (App. Syr. 23). It is impossible to discern precisely Rome’s relationship with him, at that point,\(^ {69}\) but the brothers did obtain his cooperation by proposing an exemption from the payment, when their troops advanced into Asia Minor through Macedonia and Thrace. The brothers and the Senate had expected the campaign in Asia Minor and prepared for it. If the brothers had been slow in getting there, they would likely have been criticised by other Romans. But this does not mean the war against Aitolia was a supplementary task for the Romans, despite Briscoe’s supposition.\(^ {70}\) Asiaticus’ provincia was Greece. His basic task

\(^{68}\) This text does not seem to derive from Polybios, a contemporary, but there is also no sign of confusion in Livius’ sources, and no reason to doubt the historicity in light of the fact that the senatorial decree was shown to the general public and it was too difficult for any author to manipulate information in it. Cf. Briscoe 1981: 3 and 289.

\(^{69}\) Gruen 1973: 124-36.

\(^{70}\) Briscoe 1981: 291.
was to direct the war against Aitolia. The brothers could not easily compromise with the Aitolians and, moreover, this situation could not be allowed to become noticed by other Greek states. Otherwise, Aitolia would have actively demanded the brothers to make concessions towards the federation. At this time, however, the Romans could not ratify any agreement with more favourable terms to Aitolia than those that had been shown when Flamininus failed to support Aitolia in Rome (Liv. 37.1.5). In military terms, Rome was superior to Aitolia. The brothers therefore had to go to Asia Minor, but settle these Greek affairs in a way that would win over their fellow countrymen.

Considering the common interests of the brothers, the friendly contacts of Africanus with the Aitolian and Athenian diplomats, contrasted with Asiaticus’ blunt attitude to Aitolia, actually resulted from the brothers’ dividing their roles in order to solve their dilemma. I would argue that they attempted to settle the Greek affair by making a truce, based on Aitolia’s request. In this case, it was not necessary for the brothers to negotiate over peace terms or to make any concession, and the brothers could go to Asia Minor sooner. Indeed, their seemingly conflicting attitudes towards the Greek envoys worked as a tool of encouraging the latter to ask the brothers for a truce. Africanus informally suggested to the Greek envoys that there was still scope for negotiating, while Asiaticus officially showed that he could not compromise on the peace terms. The brothers thus led the Greeks not to give up any negotiation, but to change their request. While this kind of approach might have been too complicated to be used effectively by the brothers, the Aitolians and other Greeks had recently observed that Glabrio had made a truce and allowed Aitolia to send its envoys to Rome. The brothers could therefore expect that Aitolia or Athens would realise that there was still scope for further
negociation. The execution of this plan by the brothers is confirmed by their attitude towards the Greeks who approached them again (Liv. 37.7.4-7). Asiaticus announced afresh that the terms of peace could not be changed without reason. After that, Echedemos, an Athenian envoy, led the Aitolians to ask Asiaticus to make a truce, in order to continue the negotiation at Rome. This Athenian might have been led to do so by Africanus. In any case, Aitolia approached Africanus again with the changed request. He immediately introduced the envoys to Asiaticus. Subsequently, the consul permitted Aitolia to negotiate with the Senate, and advanced into Asia Minor. The brothers therefore divided the diplomatic management of the Greek theatre, in order to fight against Antiochos without any compromise with Aitolia on peace terms. Africanus’ participation in negotiation, another example of informal diplomacy, was actually a tool used by the brothers to satisfy their practical, political requirements.

It is necessary here to refer to the fact that Africanus was also interested in approaching other states, as was suggested by his tactical treatment of the Athenian and Aitolian envoys, although he tended (and arguably needed) to regard the viewpoint of his countrymen as more important than that of outsiders. Inscriptions from Delos confirm that he strove to increase his publicity among the Greeks by supporting the inhabitants of the island, one of the Greek religious centres (e.g. *I.Délos* 442B.1.102, 1429A.1.26, and 1450A.1.68; *IG* XI.4.712). Considering the lack of the reference to his office in some of them, he appears to have been interested in announcing his name beyond Rome, even when he was only a consular senator. Moreover, it is important that it had not necessarily been

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remarkable for Roman elites to increase their publicity, among their neighbours, through private contacts. The decrees about the investment of the title of πρόξενος in Aitolia and Entella, and the scenes of Plautus’ play *Stichus*, show that individual Romans had connections with the Greek states and their citizens, even in the third century (e.g. *IG* IX.1².1.17; *SEG* XXX.1120; *Stichus* 454-504). These do not necessarily mean that every influential Roman possessed an idea of winning over international public opinion. Private contacts with outsiders, however, with the Greeks, in particular, had gradually become popular among Roman elites. Africanus operated within this context. For the consideration and exploitation of international public opinion, Flamininus and his friends were ahead of their contemporaries, and this contributed to his independent participation in diplomacy, but Africanus and other Romans were not very backward in this field.⁷³

Indeed, to a point, Africanus participated in diplomacy more actively than his predecessors, including Flamininus, during this period. After the negotiation with Aitolia, Africanus sent a letter to Prusias I of Bithynia. In order to win him over, Africanus explained how Rome and he had been generous to the monarchs of many regions. This relieved Prusias’ anxiety, and led him to take a neutral attitude towards Rome’s war against Antiochos (Liv. 37.25.7-12; Polyb. 21.11.3-10). Unlike the approaches from Athens and Aitolia, here Africanus approached a foreign king despite lacking the position of Rome’s representative, and in parallel

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⁷³ At least, *SEG* XXX.1073 informs us that in the period of Rome’s war against Antiochos when Romans other than Flamininus and his friends had influenced Roman diplomacy, a Chian leader had contacts with the Romans and instituted the rituals of the goddess Roma and some Roman heroes at his own expense through the contacts with the Romans sent to the East and Chios itself. Cf. Derow and Forrest 1982: 79-92; Salvo 2012: 125-37.
to the approach of Asiaticus. This action had not been undertaken before, even by Flamininus, who had made contact with the Greeks in Naupaktos and Aigion before Glabrio, but did not meddle in the consul’s approach towards them. Prusias might have thought that the brothers were almost equal, or worked as one body, even if he did notice that Africanus was legally inferior to Asiaticus.

Considering the political necessity shared between the brothers, not to mention other Romans, the contents of Africanus’ letter did not result solely from his own policy. Nevertheless, Africanus approached Prusias with Asiaticus, and took part in diplomacy by himself, using the informal influence gained from his previous achievements out of Greece. Although it is difficult to decide whether this can be undoubtedly called informal diplomacy, since Asiaticus may well have approved Africanus’ sending the letter, his behaviour was similar, at least, to the concept, and he participated in diplomacy more actively than Flamininus.

This position is supported by several inscriptions. For instance, in a fragment of a letter of the brothers to Kolophon in Ionia, there is a phrase of Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Πο/πλιού στρατηγός ὑπατός Ῥωμαίων καὶ [Πό/πλιος Κορνήλιος] ἀδελφός Κολοφονίων τῆ[ι / βουλῆ καὶ τῷ δή][μῳ] χαίρειν (RDGE 36.II.1-4). It is impossible to know the contents of this letter precisely, although the recognition of the ἀσυλία of the temple of Apollon seems to be related. In any case, the brothers jointly made contact with Kolophon, in the middle of the war against Antiochus. Africanus here appears as the ἀδελφός of the consul, a

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74 Prusias’ neutrality was officially promised in his contact with C. Livius Salinator, a legatus, after the approach of the brothers (Liv. 37.25.13-14; Polyb. 21.11.12). Habicht 2006: 1-2.
77 Ibid.: 160; Bengtson 1943: 503.
person without any official position. This signals the informal character in his appearance in the official letter. A similar situation can be seen in a letter to Herakleia ad Latmos in Caria, in 190. In this letter, confirming some rights of the citizens, there is a phrase of [Λεύκιος Κορηλίος Σκιπίων] στρατηγός ὑπατος Ροναιών / [και Πόπλιος Σκιπίων ἀδελ]φός Ήρακλεωτῶν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῶι ὑπὸ[μωι χαίζειν] (RDGE 35.11.1-3). 78 If the restoration is accepted, Africanus participated in diplomacy alongside Asiaticus, despite lacking the authority to do so, again. 79 This kind of participation in the official contacts with the Asian cities might be observed further in a letter to Herakleia Pontike. Memnon relates that Africanus sent a communication to this city in order to win over the citizens to Asiaticus' campaign (FGH 434 F18.6-8). In this source, Africanus is erroneously treated as a proconsul, owing to the lack of any similar case, and scholars have not decided whether the contact was made before or after the Battle of Magnesia. 80 The historicity of the event is recognised, however, and this letter also seems to show that, despite lacking any official power, Africanus openly behaved like a person with the full authority of the state, in parallel to a serving consul. What

79 Wörrle 1988: 428-9 reports that the last nu of [Λεύκιος Κορηλίος Σκιπίων] is clearly visible and ἀδελ]φός in line 2 should be read. This situation means that this letter could not be sent by other Roman consuls, such as Cn. Manlius Vulso, who was dispatched to Asia Minor in 189. There is no information about any remarkable brother who could behave as a joint sender with the consul except Africanus. This is supported by the lines 10 to 12 and 16 to 17. They relate that the senders acknowledged that the citizens maintained their freedom, possessions, and own laws, and dispatched a certain L. Orbius to defend the city-state. These show that the Roman consul and his brother were in the middle of a war, and suggests that Herakleia surrendered to the brothers and Rome here for the first time. If a city submitted to Rome after the first submission, the Republic had to treat that city more severely. Considering these factors, this letter was sent by Asiaticus and Africanus when Rome sent troops to Asia Minor, for the first time, to attack Antiochos. Cf. SEG I.440: Ma 2002: 368-9; Bagnal and Derow 2004: 76-7.
should be noticed here again is that these actions were made with Asiaticus’ support. He could have prevented Africanus from appearing in the letters legally, if he intended so. Africanus thus participated in diplomacy more actively than Flamininus, owing largely to his relationship to the consul.

This pattern can also be observed in approaches made by the Greeks, during the same period. For instance, Aptera in Crete invested Λεύκιον Κορνήλιον Ποπλίου Σκιπίωνα with the title of προξένος (IC II.iii.5A.11.2-4).81 If the supplements are correct, this inscription suggests that Africanus was noticed by the Cretans on a level with Asiaticus, even if they realised that he did not have any official title and authority, and that his presence in diplomacy depended on the presence of the consul. This tendency had been observed during the negotiations with the Aitolian and Athenian envoys. They visited Africanus, and then negotiated with Asiaticus. They recognised that Africanus was not a formal decision-maker, but dared to involve him in their affairs, nonetheless. His participation in diplomacy without any definite authority largely resulted from Asiaticus’ support which was acknowledged and, indeed, expected by outsiders.

Africanus’ own presence, however, certainly heightened the Greeks’ expectations for him, in negotiations. He had been responsible for Rome’s victory in the Second Punic War, and they expected that his suggestions influenced other Romans, Asiaticus in particular, even regarding the war in the East. The presence of 5,000 volunteers in Asiaticus’ camp who had fought under Africanus might also have made outsiders feel his influence during the campaign (cf. Liv. 37.4.3). If he

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81 For this inscription see also Chaniotis 1996: 42 n.212 and 280 n.1516.
had been a hitherto unknown brother of the consul, the Greeks would not have thought of visiting him before Asiaticus, and Prusias would not have received Africanus’ letter.

One might think, here, that the respect of the Greeks for Africanus resulted, instead, from their recognition of him as a practical commander. This, however, is an argument that is difficult to sustain, as a passage of Livius about contact between Africanus and Antiochos helps demonstrate (37.34.3-4):

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\text{in eo maximam spem habebat, praeterquam quod et magnitudo animi et satietas gloriae placabilem eum maxime faciebat, notumque erat gentibus, qui victor ille in Hispania, qui deinde in Africa fuisse t}
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This is Antiochos’ order to Herakleides, his envoy, when Roman troops under Asiaticus reached Asia Minor. He wanted to make peace through negotiations with Africanus.\(^{82}\) This reference is not in Polybios’ text (cf. 21.13-15),\(^{83}\) but he also relates that Antiochos expected Africanus to be active, despite lacking the command, while sending Herakleides (21.13.2-3 and 9). Livius seems to use the same or similar sources as Polybios, a contemporary, or perhaps even his lost text, a factor that renders the Livian explanation believable. It is important that Africanus was considered to have given so remarkable services to Rome that he could generously receive negotiators. Although the Seleucids considered him an influential Roman, his military leadership in this campaign was apparently not noticed. One might still argue, on grounds that Polybios relates at 21.13.9, ‘the matters principally depended on how he (Africanus) thought (\(\tau\eta\nu\ \pi\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\iota\nu\ \rho\omicron\omicron\iota\nu\)...

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\(^{82}\) For the military situation from the conclusion of the truce with Aitolia to the landing of Asiaticus’ troops on Asia Minor, see Wiemer 2001a: 111-26 and Grainger 2002: 278-317.

keίσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν τῇ 'κείνου προαιρέσει),' that contemporaries regarded him as a practical leader of Asiaticus’ troops. But Antiochos did not regard Africanus’ absence and illness when Asiaticus’ troops reached Asia Minor, before the Battle of Magnesia, as an opportunity to attack the Romans, although the Seleucids were fully aware of it (App. Syr. 30; Liv. 37.33.7-34.8 and 37.6-9; Polyb. 21.13.9). If Africanus had been considered the practical commander, Antiochos would likely have attacked the Roman troops immediately. Moreover, even after the defeat of Magnesia, Antiochos still wanted to have contact with Africanus earlier than Asiaticus, who had vanquished the Seleucids without Africanus, and certainly increased his leading position among the Romans (Liv. 37.45.4-6). Antiochos respected and regarded Africanus as the main person to negotiate with, not for what he would accomplish as a commander in Asia Minor, but for what he had done in other regions and for the expected sincerity resulting from it. This pattern is also observed in Antiochos’ relation with Cn. Manlius Vulso, the consul of 189 and Asiaticus’ successor. Antiochos avoided meeting with Vulso. He wanted to upset the pact for peace made in the negotiation with Asiaticus, through Africanus’ good offices in the winter of 190/89, in order to forge his own achievement (38.45.1-2; cf. 37.45.4-21; Polyb. 21.16-17).84 Vulso and possibly Asiaticus appear to have thirsted for military conquest. Africanus was expected by Antiochos, and possibly other Greeks, to lack this ambition, owing to his fame already being established among the Romans, and possibly his lack of the authority to direct military operations.

Meanwhile, this episode shows that the people concerned, and Polybios and

84 For more regarding Vulso’s attitude to the Seleucids and the inhabitants of Asia Minor, and his necessity in the field, see Grainger 1995b: 23-41.
Livius, noticed the difference between the formal and informal spheres of diplomacy, at least in this case, and the contacts between Africanus and Antiochos were most assuredly informal in nature. Herakleides made contact with Africanus ‘privately (privatim),’ based on Antiochos’ instructions, in parallel to the contact with Asiaticus in the official consilium (Liv. 37.34.3, 35.1, and 36.1). Polybios also relates at 21.13.6 that this envoy showed Asiaticus Antiochos’ offer regarding conditions of peace κατὰ κοινὸν, in the public audience with the consul, and sent a message to Africanus ἰδίᾳ (privately),’ while offering the restoration of his son, who had been taken prisoner, without ransom, and the payment of money to him (cf. Liv. 37.36.2). He is said to have replied that the topic should be brought οваться κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν … ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ συνεδρίον, not to him privately, but to the place of the public negotiation (Polyb. 21.15.1-6). The Seleucids recognised that the negotiation with Africanus was informal. He did not regard the meeting as a place to make a formal agreement, but did not avoid having contacts with the dynasty. Both sides, contemporaries such as Polybios, and later historians like Livius, clearly distinguished between official and unofficial fields of negotiation. This means that the contacts made through informal channels were consciously made, even though this vocabulary was not employed.

Overall, Africanus participated in diplomacy in the field, despite lacking authority, and his actions were therefore examples of informal diplomacy. Meanwhile, he did not consider the viewpoint of the Greeks, as Flamininus had done, but took part in the Roman advance among the Greeks by using his fame, a

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extra-legal power, more actively than Flamininus. Africanus’ actions were, however, closely connected with those of Asiaticus, and often constituted ad hoc political necessities of the brothers, in the Roman context. The Greeks expected much of Africanus, because he had gained fame and would influence the consul by means of his reputation and blood relationship, not because he could manage complicated disagreements between the Greeks and Romans, as Flamininus had done. This emphasises the different nature and factors comprising informal diplomacy.

Africanus did not appear on the stage of diplomacy following his brother’s magistracy. This confirms the significance of his connection with Asiaticus, the legitimate holder of official diplomatic power. Yet, even before the dispatch of Asiaticus as the general, Africanus could influence Roman diplomacy as an important senator. A connection with official power was an important factor of informal diplomacy, then, but I argue that it was not prerequisite for it. It is also noteworthy that his appearance in international politics, despite lacking authority, was not criticised by his contemporaries. This partly resulted from Rome’s ascendancy in the Hellenistic world, and the strength of his allies in political power games taking place in Rome. The Greeks may have been indifferent to whether the contacts with Africanus was illegal or not. It was nearly impossible, after all, for other Romans to stop him participating in diplomatic actions. Asiaticus could have done so, but had no reason since his own interests were shared with Africanus. Yet, even in the trial of 187, his participation in diplomacy was not directly criticised, although he was suspected of bribery during his contact
with Antiochos (Liv. 38.51.1-6). Since the difference between official and unofficial sphere had been noticed, informal diplomacy was now being tacitly approved by contemporary Romans, even though it had the potential to influence decision-making both in and outside of Rome.

**Conclusion**

Flamininus and Africanus, two elite Roman individuals participated in diplomacy during Rome’s advance into the Greek world, following the Second Macedonian War, despite their lacking any authority to do so. Their successes largely resulted from their exploitation of their remarkable fame, a extra-legal power. Yet, these men did not operate in a vacuum. The informal diplomacy undertaken by these two Romans followed the manoeuvres of the former hawks against Macedonia, and the rise of increasingly competitive political groups. The approval, tacit or otherwise, of contemporary Romans for Flamininus and Africanus partly resulted from this tendency in which unofficial channels could be employed to win over the people in and beyond Rome. The influence of the two Romans on Roman diplomacy certainly depended on the machinations of their political groups. Furthermore, the appearance of Flamininus and Africanus in diplomacy also resulted from the fact that the Greeks already possessed an idea of making informal contacts with individual Romans with some extra-legal power. If the Greeks had not approached or accepted the intervention of the two Romans in diplomacy, it would have been difficult for them to influence people. This is

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natural in light of the fact that since informal diplomacy had been used by Rome's hawks against Macedonia and the Greeks in order to manage ad hoc affairs, and functioned effectively when people accepted the approach of its users for their own interests. The informal diplomacy of Flamininus and Africanus, thus, continued the actions of their predecessors, and worked as a part of the pre-existing network of contacts between Rome and Greece while, at the same time, it supported Rome's expansion and increased the personal influence of the two Romans discussed.

It is also important to note the differences in the manner of participating in diplomacy, and the nature of the extra-legal power, between Flamininus and Africanus. Flamininus' fame derived from his victory over Macedonia in Greece. He was thus expected by the Romans and the Greeks to address the troubles between both peoples. He largely considered the opinions of the Greeks, although he certainly used the contacts with them to further advance his personal agenda. Africanus, by contrast, was not expected by other Romans to win over the Greeks with his fame, and was comparatively uninterested in trying to impress them. Flamininus was careful not to intrude upon the actions of the Senate and the official power of the consul, despite his general interest in participating actively. Africanus, however, was closely connected with the approach of the consul towards the Greeks. These situations resulted largely from the peculiar circumstances of the two Romans, but also show that the relationship of informal diplomacy with state law was ambiguous. This suggests that, although remarkable reputation was generally important in the cases of Flamininus and Africanus, even other Romans without the same extra-legal power could follow their example. Indeed, the advocates of the Macedonian War had lacked any heroic leader, at least internationally, on its eve, but had influenced the people in
and beyond Rome. This example in the Macedonian War, in addition to those of Flamininus and Africanus, may well have encouraged other Romans to do the same thing. Considering these factors, the appearance of the two individuals in diplomacy during Rome’s expansion into the Greek world from 193 to 189, resulted from the wider spread of informal diplomacy in Rome’s international politics, and worked as a factor of advancing it further, even though contemporaries did not refer to the phenomenon in these terms.

Meanwhile, this thesis notices that the diversity of aspect of informal diplomacy, in particular, its ambiguous or conflicting relationship with the collectivity of the leading Romans and formal diplomacy, has begun to appear. This difference between official and unofficial sphere was noticed by contemporaries, but did not become tangible as a problem during this period, largely because of tactical manoeuvres by the users of informal diplomacy. Its spread among the Romans, however, meant an increased possibility that this conflict could become problematic. It would certainly play an important role in the development of the Republic after 189. In Chapter 5, I will consider this more along with the further spread of informal diplomacy among the Romans, and demonstrate their impact upon Roman diplomacy while, at the same time, confirming the significance of informal diplomacy to the study of Roman history from the 200s to 133.
Chapter 5

Informal Diplomacy and Political Tension

Introduction

This chapter argues that informal diplomacy became increasingly important to the Romans, but also led to conflict and tensions arising both in and beyond Rome, from 188 to 167, that is to say from the Peace of Apameia to the aftermath of the Macedonian defeat at Pydna. We have already observed how the Romans used this diplomatic concept during the period between the Second Macedonian War and the struggle against Aitolia and the Seleucids. It enabled those who urged the wars to participate in international politics, and contributed to Rome's flexible management of foreign affairs and establishment of her dominion over the Greeks under the Peace of Apameia in 188.\(^1\) This chapter argues that, after its conclusion, the use of informal diplomacy by the Romans further increased, particularly in their contacts with the Greeks. Such cases are frequently observed partly because Polybios, a contemporary, presents much of the information about negotiations between Rome and Greece based on his own interests. Yet, in the new political order after the peace, the Greeks certainly negotiated actively with Rome, as the actions of Pergamon and Rhodes in the negotiations for the peace suggest.\(^2\) Given this tendency, individual Romans and Greeks could participate in the contact between their states and advance their own interests. Consequently, it is reasonable to consider the contacts between


Rome and Greece after 188, in order to develop the study of informal diplomacy. With these ideas in mind, I will demonstrate its further spread in Rome and its contribution to her consolidating the leadership in the Greek and the Mediterranean world.

This chapter also argues that it was in this period that opposition to informal diplomacy emerged, most strikingly among the Achaians in the 180s and the Roman Senate during the Third Macedonian War. Its opponents questioned the legitimacy of informal diplomacy and insisted on the importance of law or justice as the basis for any action. This partly resulted from a conflict among contemporaries regarding the relationship between informal diplomacy and formal legality or legitimacy. In order to understand the dispute, though, it is also necessary to consider the aims of the people concerned in each case. This is demonstrated by focusing on Polybios. Not only did he have an enormous influence on those ancient writers who subsequently wrote about the second century, he was also involved in the events as an Achaian politician and a member of the group that was trying to maintain an equal relationship between Achaia and Rome. His attitude towards Rome, in particular her dominant behaviour, mingle admiration and antipathy, while he openly considered that informal diplomacy had a negative impact on contacts between Rome and the Greeks at that time. Analysing the character of his description and his influence on other authors, while also considering the interests of contemporaries and the significance of informal diplomacy in the cases concerned, exposes an image of the tensions within Roman diplomacy from 188 to the end of the Third Macedonian

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War, when the Roman hegemony was further established. The results will reveal the advantages and disadvantages of informal diplomacy for Rome.

These aims are achieved through the following steps. First, it is argued that there was an increase in informal diplomacy by the Romans in their contacts with Greeks during the 180s. From this, it is shown that many contemporaries approved of these practices, but that some Greeks opposed them by means of legal arguments. Secondly, it will become evident that the Greeks also generally employed informal methods, as well as more official diplomacy, in their approaches to Rome in her advance into the Greek world, although the former could be regarded negatively, analysing the image of informal diplomacy further. Thirdly, it will be argued that the Senate sought to establish greater control over independent actions and informal diplomacy from the middle of the Third Macedonian War onwards, and that this consequently generated tensions between the Senate and individual Romans.

**Section 1: Informal Diplomacy by Roman Individuals**

I shall now demonstrate the spread of informal diplomacy among the Romans after Apameia, particularly in contact with the Greeks, during the 180s. In this discussion, I argue that the Greeks noticed the Roman practice, some of them taking advantage of it, while some leaders in Greece opposed it with legal arguments. The aim of this opposition was primarily to prevent Rome and her supporters in Greece from increasing their influence in the region, but the ill-defined relationship between informal diplomacy and legality or legitimacy was to be exposed in the games of those concerned. This is best seen by considering a
series of examples of informal diplomacy undertaken by the Romans after 188, and the nature of the sources referring to them, in particular that of Polybios.

The spread of informal diplomacy among the Romans after the Peace of Apameia is first seen in the case of M. Aemilius Lepidus. During his consulship of 187, envoys from Ambrakia visited the Senate. This city belonged to Aitolia and had been attacked by M. Fulvius Nobilior, the consul in 189, in the final phase of Rome’s war against Aitolia. As a result of a long siege and negotiations, Ambrakia surrendered to Nobilior (Liv. 38.3.8–7.13; Polyb. 21.26.1–28.18 and 29.6–15). It is important to note that, although the original errand is unclear, in 187 Lepidus seems to have encouraged the envoys of the city to bring a charge against Nobilior, during some kind of informal meeting with them before their official contact with the Senate, in light of the text of Livius as follows (38.43.2–3):

*Itaque ad invidiam ei faciendam legatos Ambraciensis in senatum subornatos criminibus introduxit, qui sibi, cum in pace essent imperataque prioribus consulibus fecissent et eadem oboedienter praestare M. Fulvio parati essent, bellum illatum questi, agros primum depopulatos, terrorem direptionis et caedis urbi iniectum, ut eo metu claudere cogerentur portas.*

The envoys were ‘instructed (subornatos)’ by Lepidus to criticise Nobilior, and were introduced into the Senate. They followed his instruction, and complained that Ambrakia had been unfairly treated by Nobilior. Their speech moved the senators to resolve to investigate his alleged misdeeds (38.43.4 and 39.4–5). To date, scholars have tended to discuss this incident in the context of conflicts among influential politicians or their families and factions, rather than in

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connection with diplomatic actions. Certainly, the senators thought that the complaint by the delegates resulted from ‘inimicitia (hostility)’ between Nobilior and Lepidus, who had been defeated by the former in the consular election, two years previously (38.43.1). But it is also noticeable that this episode can be treated as a sign of the spread of informal diplomacy. The envoys accepted Lepidus’ private suggestion and decided to complain about Nobilior; their speech led the Senate to doubt him and thus influenced the decision-making of the Roman state. This is clearly an intervention by Lepidus (and the envoys) in the contact between Rome and Ambrakia and is, therefore, an example of informal diplomacy, although Lepidus was a consul and could have contacts with foreign envoys to introduce them to the Senate. It is further noteworthy that Lepidus’ approach to the envoys was not criticised by the senators. Since his attack on Nobilior followed the speech of the envoys (38.44.1), the senators were assured of some partnership between Lepidus and the envoys. Nobilior’s supporters, such as C. Flaminius, another consul, are said to have claimed that the complaint of the envoys was prompted by Lepidus’ private hostility towards Nobilior. Lepidus was thought to have used his consular role for his own interest. As J. Briscoe argues, Livius’ use of the term suborno in this context suggests that Lepidus was regarded negatively by many senators (and their descendants). Nevertheless, his contemporaries did not criticise him directly (cf. 34.43.7-13). This might have resulted partly from a lack of evidence regarding his intervention. It might have been also important that the envoys actively criticised Nobilior, owing to their resentment against him. It was difficult for the senators to avoid investigating the actual conditions of the

6 Pina Polo 2011: 58.
siege. It is still remarkable, however, that, although Lepidus was thought to have intervened in the contact between Rome and Ambrakia independently, the Senate did not investigate it and under the influence of Lepidus largely granted the Ambrakian requests, including the restoration of property (38.44.4). His informal diplomacy was practically overlooked.

This situation is also seen in other cases connected to Lepidus. For instance, in the same year, the Spartans visited Rome to complain about Achaia’s treatment of Sparta in 188. They obtained a letter from Lepidus to Achaia, in which he criticised its attitude towards Sparta (Polyb. 22.3.1-3). Yet, Lepidus’ statements were not founded on any senatorial decision. This is shown by a subsequent contact between the Senate and envoys from Achaia who had heard Lepidus’ announcement. The Senate showed here its opposition to the attitude of Achaia towards Sparta, but observed that an invalidation of Achaia’s decisions would not be requested (22.7.5-6). This means that Lepidus had intervened in the dispute independently. Nevertheless, he did not seem to be criticised by other Romans for this. In fact, contemporaries overlooked his action. In addition, he seems to have made contact with Delphoi. He was honoured with the title of πρόξενος in the early 180s at a time when he is not known to have held any office (FD III.4.427B.I). This suggests that he supported the city in some negotiation, despite lacking official authority. This was a private intervention in the formal contacts between states. Meanwhile, the erection of the inscription shows that his actions were taken in public and were not criticised by others, at the time.

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8 For the sources concerned, and the political context of the conflict between Achaia and Sparta (which was annexed to Achaia by Philopoimen), from the 180s onwards, see Aymard 1967: 23-4, Walbank 1979: 177-8, and Gray 2013: 346-53.
9 Cf. Syll² 585; Briscoe 2008: 155.
Lepidus had contacts not only with Ambrakia’s envoys, but also with other Greeks privately, and continued to participate in the foreign affairs of Rome and several Greek states. The absence of criticism of this by the Greeks might have resulted partly from Rome’s defeat of her rivals in Greece, meaning that the Greeks could not ignore him even though his behaviour was not founded on the will of the Roman state. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that such independent participation in international politics, a stark example of informal diplomacy, was overlooked by Rome, just as it had been in the cases of Flamininus and Africanus in the 190s.

This kind of independent action can be observed on another occasion in Roman dealings with Achaia. In 185, Q. Caecilius Metellus visited the League (Liv. 39.24.13-14 and 26.1-29.3; Polyb. 22.6.4-6 and 10.1-15). His original task concerned Macedonia but, after completing his mission, he made a detour to Achaia on his way home. While there, he complained about Achaia’s policy regarding Sparta before the leaders of the League, causing disagreement among them. Polybios’ account is as follows (22.10.3-5 and 10-14):

11 For the character of the meeting of Achaia, see Walbank 1979: 192.
Initially, it looked as if Metellus’ demands would be accepted. Aristainos, the ἑσπεριγός, did not argue against him. The Achaian wanted tacitly to criticise Philopoimen, who led the strict policy against Sparta. Moreover, Diophanes, another rival of Philopoimen, drew Metellus’ attention to problems in Messenia, criticising Philopoimen’s measures there. Consequently, Metellus demanded that the ἐκκλησία be summoned, attempting to change Achaia’s attitude towards Sparta (and Messenia). However, other leading Achaians thought that the two Hellenes aimed to attack Philopoimen in collusion with Metellus, and observed that unless a man brought ‘a written request from the Senate (ἐγγραπτὰ παρὰ τῆς συγκλήτου)’ stating the subject on which the Achaians were to summon the assembly, ‘their laws (οἱ νόμοι)’ forbade them to do so, and thus refused Metellus’ request (Polyb. 22.10.12). Metellus did not argue that he was ordered to intervene in the affairs by the Senate, but instead returned home in anger. Hence, he independently pressured Achaia to change its policies, despite lacking authority. This is an example of informal diplomacy, even though his request was not accepted by the Achaians.

In this case, moreover, there are three notable points for further understanding Rome's informal diplomacy with the Greeks. Firstly, Achaia thought that Rome had made informal contacts in diplomacy. Secondly, Polybios, the most important contemporary author, sometimes depicts the events negatively and unrealistically. I will consider these two points together. These are shown by analysing his texts for the case. He relates at 22.10.14 that ‘the Achaians (οἱ Ἀχαῖοι)’ thought that Aristainos and Diophanes had made private contacts with Rome because of their hostility to Philopoimen, and observes at 22.10.4 that the two Achaians did not plead for the Achaians (περὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν).’ Polybios leads the readers to regard the two Achaians as traitors, of a sort, whose actions resulted from their ‘political opposition (ἀντιπολιτεία)’ to Philopoimen and, furthermore, to think that other Achaians opposed them, as a whole. Aristainos was the στρατηγός, though. Diophanes had assumed the office in 192/1 and succeeded in annexing Messenia (cf. Liv. 36.31.1–9). They could not be isolated from other Achaians. Moreover, Polybios was favourable to Philopoimen since Lykortas, the author’s father, supported him (Polyb. 22.10.8 and 23.12.8). Polybios’ references to Aristainos and Diophanes tend to be unfavourable. However, this does not deny the historicity of this event, as presented by Polybios. If he had blatantly faked an event of open diplomatic contacts in his period, he would likely have been criticised by contemporaries. Thus, considering Achaia’s negative reaction to Metellus as well, I would argue that many Achaians thought that there was some partnership between him and the two Achaians, and many contemporaries believed Rome’s use of informal diplomacy and the two politicians’ using the tendency.

That the Achaians, and possibly other contemporaries, thought that Rome
had nurtured informal contacts with outsiders, and that it was regarded negatively by Polybios, moreover, are supported by a case of Aigion in 188. This city had long been the regular meeting place of Achaia until, in that year, Philopoimen abandoned the practice of a single meeting place in favour of holding a rotating assembly. The people of Aigion opposed his decision and asked Nobilior, mentioned above, to support them, an appeal that he accepted. This is another example of informal diplomacy. Aigion, while a member of the Achaian League, went into partnership with a Roman general independently. This also suggests that the city had expected that the Romans could have accepted this kind of approach, exploiting the informal tendency. It is furthermore important that Nobilior’s request for the city is said to have been refused by ‘almost all (omnes ferme)’ of the Achaians and, owing to the strength of opposition, he was forced to concede (Liv. 38.30.1-5, esp. 5). Polybios’ text for this case is lost, but scholars have shown that Livius uses it in his work. The outline in Livius’ text is credible, while the method of description is influenced by Polybios. This suggests that many contemporaries recognised a partnership between Aigion and Nobilior, that is, Rome’s acceptance of informal diplomatic approach, and that if Livius follows Polybios’ description faithfully, the latter depicted it negatively to his readers, in light of Livius’ using the emphatic phrase omnes ferme, whether or not ‘almost all’ Achaians had really opposed it.

Third, Achaia refused the informal approach of Metellus, acting as a Roman envoy, by indicating his lack of any senatorial decree, using legal arguments to force him to withdraw his requests. The demand for him to show a

resolution might not mean that Achaia’s assembly was held whenever it was proposed, but instead shows Achaia’s prudence in dealing with the contact with Rome. Achaia did not refuse Metellus’ request bluntly. This might be due, in part, to the apparent alliance between Achaia and Rome. Yet, their relationship was literally equal (Liv. 39.37.9-17). The treaty could not allow Rome’s envoys to interfere in the Achaian affairs independently. So, Achaia’s careful refusal largely resulted from its recognition of Rome’s ascendancy in Greece. Metellus must have taken advantage of this and tried to intervene in Achaia, otherwise Achaia would have paid no attention to him. Thus, Achaia’s legalistic response might have resulted partly from its attention to law, but largely from its consideration of power relations with Rome. It is noteworthy that such legal arguments from Achaia succeeded in silencing Metellus. He did not want to ignore the law openly, even if he had not hesitated to intervene in Achaia on his own initiative. It is difficult to know whether the Achaians had expected this double-standard from him. As E. S. Gruen points out, the Romans rarely referred to legal relations, such as foedera, in their contacts with the Greeks. It might also be possible that Metellus never even imagined that any law should be relevant in this case. Nevertheless, Achaia’s reaction politely stopped him and revealed to contemporaries that Rome had used informal diplomacy but its relationship with formal law was ill-defined among the Romans.

One might think that the picture of Metellus’ defeat by legal arguments resulted from Polybios’ manipulation of information, in order to emphasise Achaia’s legitimacy. Such doubt is cleared up, though, by considering a senatorial

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15 Walbank 1979: 194.
session in which Metellus reported the incident in Achaia and its envoys explained why Achaia’s assembly had not been held. Listening to both sides, the Senate resolved that the situation about Sparta should be investigated by a new deputation, and then, according to Polybios (at 22.12.8), observed that ‘the Achaians should pay attention to the envoys from the Romans from time to time and show them proper respect as the Romans did to theirs (τοῖς δὲ πρεσβευταῖς τοῖς αἰεὶ παρ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἐκπεμπομένοις παρῆνει προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ καταδοχὴν ποιεῖθαι τὴν ἀμισόους, καθάπερ καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι ποιοῦνται τῶν παραγινομένων πρὸς αὐτοὺς πρεσβευτῶν).’ The Senate avoided referring to Achaia’s legal arguments, but wanted Achaia to accept the request of Rome’s envoys in the future without complaint. Considering the fact that the dialogue was held before many senators and Achaians, and possibly other foreigners, the Senate surely made this kind of statement, which suggests afresh that the Senate had approved of informal diplomacy. This is further supported by a text from Rome’s perspective. Livius informs us (at 39.33.8) that ‘the Senate pointed out to Achaia’s envoys that Rome’s envoys should have at all times an opportunity of approaching Achaia’s concilium, the assembly in this case, just as the senatorial audience was granted to the Achaian envoys whenever they wanted it (ostendit senatus curae iis esse debere, ut legatis Romanis semper adeundi concilium gentis potestas fieret, quem ad modum et illis quotiens vellent senatus daretur).’ Livius re-arranges Polybios’ text by comparing Achaia’s meeting with the senatorial session, even though these were different.18 He seems to justify Metellus’ request by suggesting that the Senate generously permitted Achaia’s envoys to explain the legitimacy of its

position in this case. In any event, Livius and his other sources appear not to deny the Polybian picture, generally. Thus, Metellus and other Romans did not and could not realistically criticise Achaia’s legal arguments and refusal of the envoy’s request, based on them.

Meanwhile, considering the question of the reliability of Polybios’ text, it is also important to note that the Senate hoped that intervention by its envoys would be permitted by Achaia (and potentially other outsiders) regardless of their legal standing. This might have resulted partly from the flexible character of Roman diplomacy and, in addition, Rome’s vague attitude to Achaia in the 180s, recently debated by scholars.19 Certainly, the senatorial messages written by Polybios and Livius suggest that the Senate wanted to control the contact between Rome and Achaia, and others by implication, without adhering to legal rules, but hesitated to show this to outsiders too openly. Nevertheless, the Senate clearly meant that Roman delegates should be able to attempt to affect the policy of other states, even in cases where the Senate had given no such instruction. This is not a case of flexible diplomacy on the part of the Romans, but rather senatorial acquiescence to the independent and informal diplomatic initiatives of individuals. Furthermore, the Senate was clearly displeased with Achaia’s legal defence, but avoided criticising it directly, which means that the senators were aware of the conflict between informal diplomacy and legal arguments, something that Polybios leads his readers to see this too. Rome tried here to reconcile Achaia’s respect for law with the independent actions of Roman envoys by encouraging Achaia to remain silent regarding questions of legality. Thus, this case of informal

19 Yarrow 2012: 171; Luraghi and Magnetto 2012: 517.
diplomacy demonstrates its spread among the Romans and their opportunistic, or imperialistic, tendencies during Rome’s ascendancy over the Greeks and other outsiders. These features are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin.

This situation is observed in a case of T. Quinctius Flamininus, the victor of the Second Macedonian War. In 187/6, he tried to rehabilitate Zeuxippos of Boiotia. He was Flamininus’ friend and an exile (Polyb. 22.4). Flamininus persuaded the Senate to instruct Boiotia to allow Zeuxippos’ return from exile, apparently owing solely to Zeuxippos' personal appeal to Flamininus. At this time Flamininus held no office. This was, in effect, an informal intervention in Boiotia based on his private connection, while tacitly exploiting the political reality of Roman ascendancy in Greece. Boiotia, however, refused the request, on the grounds that its treatment of Zeuxippos had been decided by its courts in an entirely legal way. Although the Senate did not cancel its resolution, this case was not pursued. This shows that it was difficult for Rome to make the Greeks follow her requests, even in the 180s. However, what is significant here is that the senators accepted Flamininus’ proposal, even though his private connection with Zeuxippos may well have been noticed, and tried to interfere in the Boiotian affairs, but the attempt was easily abandoned when Boiotia opposed it with legal arguments. This might have resulted partly from Rome’s consideration for the tense internal situation in Boiotia (22.4.11-17). But this case also shows that Rome looked favourably upon the participation of individual Romans in international politics in this kind of opportunistic or imperialistic fashion, but was not prepared to deny formal legal systems openly.

This kind of diplomatic manoeuvre in the contacts between Rome and Greece, during Rome’s ascendancy in the region, can further be observed in the case of Ap. Claudius Pulcher in 184. He visited Achaia following a mission in Macedonia, and intervened in Achaia’s conflict with Sparta (Liv. 39.35.5-37.21). He had been ordered by the Senate to investigate it (39.35.5; Polyb. 22.12.4). This intervention could not be not refused by Achaia. Lykortas, the στρατηγός, however, tried to prevent Rome’s intervention through legal arguments just as Achaia had done in the previous cases. According to Livius (at 39.36.9 and 37.10), Lykortas referred to the violation by Sparta of a treaty with Achaia that had been made under Flamininus’ direction, which prohibited Sparta from interfering with the ex-Spartan coastal area, and also to the unreasonableness of Rome’s intervening in the affairs of a region conquered by Achaia, despite an alliance between Achaia and Rome being in effect. Furthermore, Pausanias relates at 7.9.4 that Lykortas also referred to the contravention of the pact between Rome and Achaia that forbade any city of the Achaian League to negotiate with Rome individually. Polybios’ text for Lykortas’ speech is lost, but scholars agree that both Livius and Pausanias use it in their descriptions here. Moreover, Lykortas’ legal arguments in the two texts are compatible with the previous cases regarding the Achaians’ protests against Roman intervention, written by Polybios. It is safe to conclude that Lykortas probably did develop his argument here based on legal precedent.

23 Deininger 1971: 123.
25 This is supported by the general use of legal precedent by the Hellenistic civic states in diplomacy as the case of Eresos’ negotiations with the Macedonian kings for the treatment of the exiled relatives of the tyrants of the city at the end of the fourth
What should be noticed is how this manoeuvre was developed by the individuals concerned, and is a new phenomenon. As a response to Lykortas, Pulcher is said (at Liv. 39.37.19) to have observed that ‘they (the Achaians) should court the favour (of the Romans) while they could do so of their own free-will lest they should soon be compelled to do so against their will (dum liceret voluntate sua facere, gratiam inirent, ne mox inviti et coacti facerent).’ This went beyond his original task, namely to investigate the Spartan case, and was tantamount to a blatant act of intimidation. It is impossible to know to what extent this attitude was supported by other Romans and how far this sentence reflects his real statement. Yet, considering the reliance of Livius on Polybios for this period, Pulcher’s alleged observation may well have derived from Polybios’ text. Furthermore, in light of the fact that this was delivered in an open discussion in Achaia, the information about Pulcher here is fundamentally believable. Thus, the following three points should be noted. Firstly, from the viewpoint of his deviating from the formal task, Pulcher acted independently in the meeting. This was informal diplomacy in action. Secondly, in light of Pulcher’s silence on Lykortas’ legal arguments and the former’s observation that went beyond the sphere of investigation, Lykortas and his supporters may well have noticed Pulcher’s informal diplomacy and thus the vulnerability of his argument. Thirdly, however, unlike the previous cases, the Achaians were afraid of what might happen if they refused his intervention, making a concession and cancelling the sentence against some Spartans (Liv. 39.37.20-1). The Achaian League had no method with which to manage the interference of Rome’s envoys if they did not

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withdraw, despite their legal weakness, and when the possibility that Rome would take strong measures was inferred. These factors show an increase in the significance of informal diplomacy in the contacts between Rome and Greece, and confirm its ill-defined relationship with law on the international stage. Rome oscillated between depicting herself as a mild friend and firm superior while worrying about the two factors, and yet the Greeks could not have any firm attitude to her, considering her general ascendancy in the area.

This situation is also seen in the case of Flamininus, in 184/3. In this year he was asked by Deinokrates, his Messenian friend, to support Messenia in a conflict with Achaia over membership of the League, when he was sent to Asia Minor as an envoy (Polyb. 23.5).26 He accepted the request and made contact with Achaia despite lacking any order to do so. He (and Deinokrates) must have expected that now Achaia would compromise with Rome. Flamininus sent a document requesting the Achaians to hold the ἐκκλησία without constraint. They did not meet his expectation, though. At this time, the Senate had not announced any deputation to negotiate regarding Messenian affairs. Achaia, under the leadership of Philopoimen, welcomed Flamininus, but ‘calmly (τὴν ἴσωσας εἶχον)’ wanted him to provide the details of the dispute through a formal senatorial letter, withdrawing him (23.5.15-18). When Rome did not seem to want to intervene strongly, Achaia could persevere with legal arguments and prevent individual Romans, and Greeks connected with Rome, from acting in such an informal manner. Nevertheless, independent actions were still not directly criticised by contemporaries. Even Polybios only emphasises the reasonability of Achaia’s

26 For more on his connection with Deinokrates and the Messenian affairs at that time, see Gruen 1984: 494 and Pfeilschifter 2005: 352-4.
arguments, or praises its attitude towards the Romans involved, while referring to their lack of legal legitimacy. The appearance, then, of informal diplomacy practically was noticed by contemporaries, including Polybios, but its relationship with written law was still ambiguous.

These cases in the 180s demonstrate that informal diplomacy had spread among the Romans, and that the Greeks noticed and sometimes utilised it by accepting their approaches and approaching them, in turn. Although contemporaries were not conversant in the exact terminology, the mention of Lepidus’ private hostility toward Nobilior, and the frequent references to the lack of legitimate reasons for Roman intervention in Greek affairs, in the extant sources show that they recognised the notion of intervening in diplomacy through channels aside from official ones. There was also a conflict over the relationship between informal diplomacy and law or legitimacy. The use of informal diplomacy was not directly criticised, although this partly resulted from their recognition of Rome’s imperial ascendancy in Greece. Legal arguments, however, were also respected, and prevented Roman individuals from using informal diplomacy, whether or not they admitted their lack of legal basis or illegitimacy, in light of the anger of Metellus in 185. Furthermore, considering Polybios’ influence on the extant texts concerned, this picture might partly come from his personal perspective or political agenda. As an Achaian, he is clearly favourable to his compatriots who tried to prevent Rome from intervening in the Achaian affairs with legal arguments. His picture of the conflict between legality and informal intervention, that lacked legal substance, functioned as a tool for justifying Achaian actions to his readers. Nevertheless, these diplomatic manoeuvres were developed in open sessions and other contemporaries could check the historicity
of his claims easily. In this situation, based on the analysis of the surviving sources, the general contents of Polybios’ text, and the picture of informal diplomacy and opposition thereto, are generally believable.

Section 2: Informal Diplomacy and Greek Individuals

This chapter has so far mainly analysed Roman actions, that is to say the way that the Romans made use of informal diplomacy in their dealings with Greeks, in the 180s. As was shown, it is reasonable to notice the cases in Greece where Rome’s ascendancy was in the process of being established and her contacts with outsiders may well have been the most actively made, in order to show the general situation over informal diplomacy in Rome. It is still necessary, however, to consider the approach of the Greeks to Rome during the same period, to achieve this aim. It is also important to note the fact that informal diplomacy caused conflicts in the contacts between the Romans and the Greeks in the cases of Section 1. As I have shown, the latter had long made use of this concept. It appears odd that the appearance of informal diplomacy by the Romans could have been an issue in the contacts between both peoples. This section, therefore, will focus on several examples that bring out both the use of informal diplomacy by Greeks and the conflicting attitudes towards it among Greeks in Rome’s advance into the East.

I will begin by showing that informal diplomacy occurred in the contact between Rome and the Greeks, even when initiated by the Greeks, by analysing an event of 184/3. In this year, a huge number of Greek petitioners visited Rome to complain about Philippos V of Macedonia. According to Polybios (23.1-3, esp.
1.3: cf. Liv. 39.46.6–47.11, esp. 46.7–8), 27 ‘some of them privately, some of them as envoys of their cities, and some of them as representatives of national groups (οἱ μὲν κατ’ ἵδιαν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πόλιν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἑθνικὰς συντάξεις)’ made contact with the Senate. 28 The act of visiting Rome κατ’ ἵδιαν was one of informal diplomacy by the individual Greeks. Their visit to Rome also shows that they expected the Senate’s acceptance of this approach. Indeed, Rome did listen to their appeal. The Greeks thus confirmed the spread of this diplomatic idea to the Roman state. Their recognition was strengthened by the fact that, after the debate, Rome expressed her confidence in Demetrios, despite her favourable attitude towards the complainants. 29 He was Philippos’ prince who had spent time in Rome as a hostage, and was one of the delegates here. Rome respected Demetrios as if he was the Macedonian leader, over his father. Moreover, Flamininus flattered this prince openly and sent a letter to Philippos, despite lacking any office, praising Demetrios (23.3.7–8). He was more respected than might be expected of his official position as a prince and diplomat. Polybios thinks that Flamininus and other Romans tried to divide the Macedonians, while Livius who, by contrast, is favourable to Flamininus, regards this picture as too unfavourable to Rome. 30 In any case, these contacts represent the involvement of Demetrios in the official dialogue between Rome and Macedonia, something technically beyond his formal position, or a measure by Rome in using this prince as an unofficial

27 As Briscoe 2008: 374-5 indicates, Livius’ text for this event clearly derives from Polybios.
28 For the phrase κατ’ ἵδιαν, Polybios uses it with the context of taking aside a person at 4.84.8. But in this scene of 184/3, it does not make sense. As Livius interprets it as ‘private individuals (singuli ... privatim)’ at 39.46.8, it is reasonable to think that some Greeks privately and individually visited Rome.
30 Briscoe 2008: 378-82.
tool of approaching Macedonia, indebting him through hospitality reminiscent of the custom of gift-giving. These contacts were made before the Greek petitioners, although Flamininus’ letter might not have been opened before them. It is safe to conclude that approaches to outsiders, outside of the formal diplomatic framework between states, informal diplomacy, had become established as a tool of Roman and Greek diplomacy, and its use by Rome is here confirmed by the Greeks.

I will now note the conflicting views of the Greeks regarding informal diplomacy. Section 1 showed that it could be treated negatively, although this image partly derived specifically from Polybios’ interests and, moreover, its use was not necessarily criticised directly, even by him. Nevertheless, as shown in 184/3 (Polyb. 23.1-3), many Greeks also used informal diplomacy. A good case to investigate this inconsistency is Kallikrates’ action in 181/0. According to Polybios (24.8-10), he was sent by Achaia to Rome, to defend his state’s policy against some Spartan exiles. Yet, this was not what he spoke about in Rome; instead, he asked the Senate to give its support to those Greeks who respected Roman requests. The Senate responded positively, and observed that the Greek states needed more men like him, helping him control Achaia and restore the rights of the Spartans, based on his personal policy and senatorial suggestions (24.8.1-9, 10.6-7, and 15).31 The obvious deviation from his official task is an example of informal diplomacy by a Greek diplomat, while the Senate’s reaction shows that Rome was quite willing to receive this kind of approach. Yet, Kallikrates’ intervention here was controversial, and much criticised by Polybios. It therefore offers a valuable opportunity to examine the way that such informal diplomacy might be viewed by the Greeks.

31 The restoration of the rights is also confirmed by Syll2 634. Cf. IvO 300: Derow 1970: 17.
It is useful, here, to notice how Polybios describes this event. He relates at 24.9.2-3 that Kallikrates told the Senate that ‘in all the current democratic states there were two parties: one recommending obedience to the requests by the Romans, and holding neither law nor stelai nor anything else to be superior to the will of the Romans; the other always quoting laws, oaths and stelai, and exhorting the people to be careful about breaking them (δυεῖν γὰρ οὕσων αἰρέσεων κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐν πᾶσαις ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς πολιτείαις, καὶ τῶν μὲν φασκόντων δείν ἀκαλουθεῖν τοῖς γραφομένοις ὑπὸ Ρωμαίων καὶ μήτε νόμον μήτε στῆλην μήτ᾽ ἄλλο μηθὲν προφερομένον νομίζειν τῆς Ῥωμαίων προαφέσεως, τῶν δὲ τοὺς νόμους προφερομένων καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους καὶ στήλας καὶ παρακαλοῦντων τὰ πλήθη μὴ ὀφείλειν ταύτα παραβαίνειν).’ It is impossible to know whether Kallikrates really said the things that Polybios attributes to him, but the author leads his readers to imagine a conflict between the people accepting Rome’s requests regardless of their legality i.e. making an act of informal diplomacy, and the opponents to it through legal arguments. Moreover, considering the open debate in Achaia between the group led by Kallikrates and the στρατηγὸς, Hyperbatos, which advocated the acceptance of Rome’s request favouring Sparta, and that led by Polybios’ father Lykortas, which argued for opposing it based on the laws (24.8.2-6), it is clear that this contrast was noticed by contemporaries, meaning that Polybios’ text is, therefore, generally believable. It is further noteworthy that he treats the behaviour of Kallikrates negatively, and with moralising terms.\(^{32}\) This situation is confirmed by the following. Polybios relates at 24.10.4 that, after Kallikrates’ speech, Rome started to weaken the power of

the people working for ‘the best (τὸ βέλτιστον)’ in their states, and began to support those appealing to her ‘whether it was right or wrong (καὶ δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως).’ What he considered ‘the best’ was that Achaia maintained the privilege of having contacts with Rome ‘on something like equal terms (κατὰ ποσὸν ἰσολογίαν)’ based on their partnership in the previous wars against Philippos and the Seleucids (24.10.9). Polybios therefore treats Kallikrates’ action at 24.10.12-13 as ‘that of the opposite (κατὰ τούναντίον)’ of reminding Rome of the claims ‘of justice (τῶν δικαίων),’ and argues to his readers that what had to be achieved was not to increase the number of ‘flatters (κολάχων)’ but to maintain that of ‘true friends (φίλων ἀληθινῶν),’ like the Achaians trying to keep equal relations with Rome (24.10.5). Kallikrates’ success encouraged others to behave in a similarly informal fashion, regardless of legality, and prevented men like Polybios and his circles from halting it, from the viewpoint of this historian.

It is noticeable that Polybios, however, does not criticise Kallikrates’ deviation itself from the task imposed on him through the legal procedures of the Achaian state. As P. S. Derow and A. M. Eckstein indicate, Polybios does not call the speech betrayal.33 As he puts it at 24.10.8, ‘Kallikrates had unconsciously become the author of the great evils for the Greeks, particularly the Achaians (οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτι μεγάλων κακῶν ἀρχηγὸς γέγονε πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλησι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαίοις).’ What bothered Polybios was that the consequences of the speech made it impossible for Achaia to maintain an equal relationship with Rome, not necessarily that Kallikrates’ action was of questionable legality. This is supported by Polybios’ use of the phrase καὶ δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως at 24.10.9, mentioned above.

Approaching Rome privately or exceeding the authority as a delegate was not always unjust. He tacitly admits that such unofficial diplomatic acts, i.e. informal diplomacy, could be used reasonably, or ‘for the Greeks, particularly the Achaians,’ although he praises Achaia in the 180s for trying to halt the use of it by Rome, and some of the Achaians connected with her, for defending Achaia’s interests through legal arguments, and criticises Kallikrates’ speech here.

One may argue against this utilitarian view of Polybios, on the grounds that he generally seems to respect those who regarded legitimacy and ethics as important. But his moralising attitude is closely connected with his political ideal, namely the prosperity of Achaia. For instance, he praises the Megalopolitans at 2.61.8, because in 223 they maintained their faith with an ally, foregoing their own immediate interests, despite losing their city. He calls their behaviour ‘the most respectable and the best (τὴν σεμνοτάτην καὶ βελτίστην).’ This seems to reflect Polybios’ distinctive moral vision. However, his praise for Megalopolis does not necessarily result from his general ethics. Megalopolis had preserved its relationship with Achaia. Polybios’ respect for the city-state largely derives from its contribution to the federation. This is confirmed by an event during the Second Macedonian War (Liv. 32.25; cf. Polyb. 18.15.3). The author regards the surrender of Argos, a member of Achaia, by the Argive leaders to Philippos as an act of treachery, even though their decision was based on the support of the majority of the citizens, owing to Argos’ traditional friendship with Macedonia (Liv. 32.22.11). Polybios’ criteria for good and bad acts, then, are closely connected with the interests of Achaia. This is also suggested by his reference to Aratos’

informal diplomatic actions. As shown in Section 1 of Chapter 2, in the war against Sparta in the 220s, Aratos secretly negotiated with Macedonia, a traditional enemy of Achaia, regarding an alliance in response to its contemporary difficulties (Polyb. 2.47.1-54.4). This was informal diplomacy. The reason why he hid the negotiation was to prevent the obstruction of Sparta and Aitolia and his rivals in Achaia, and the demoralisation of Achaia’s soldiers (2.47.7-9). These manoeuvres are not criticised by Polybios. Although he did not praise this behaviour, he does not abandon his respect for Aratos as ‘the originator (ἀρχηγός)’ and ‘the guide (καθηγέμων)’ of ‘the most glorious achievement (τὸ καλλιστὸν ἔργον)’ of Achaia, ‘the unification of the Peloponnesos (Πελοποννησίων ὀμόνοια),’ as he puts it (2.40.1-2). Overall, independent diplomatic action, as such, was not blameworthy for Polybios. Actions against Achaia were not praiseworthy, even though the people concerned had some reason. Considering these tendencies, his way of describing Kallikrates’ action results from its negative impact on Achaia, from the perspective of Polybios’ ideal and sense of patriotism, not from the general ethics or unconditional opposition to informal diplomacy against legality.

Meanwhile, these results, in particular those concerning Aratos, suggest that Polybios, his circles and other contemporaries, did really consider informal diplomacy to contrast with formal legality. Otherwise, his political associates would not have proposed distinctively legal arguments to the users of informal diplomacy in the 180s and Polybios would not have do so before his readers. This is further supported by several epigraphic sources, quite independent of his description of the diplomatic contacts with the Romans. For instance, it is useful to note a decree of Araxa in Lykia (SEG XVIII.570). In this document, Orthagoras, a citizen of the city, is praised for several services. Among his merits, the contacts
with certain Appius and Publius, Rome’s diplomats, are referred to in lines 62 to 68. While this inscription seems to have been erected sometime after 167, this part concerns the negotiations around the Peace of Apameia.\(^\text{36}\) The envoys appear to be Ap. Claudius Nero and P. Cornelius Lentulus or P. Aelius Tubero, the members of the ten legati of Cn. Manlius Vulso, their general.\(^\text{37}\) The Lykians faced a crisis following the defeat of the Seleucids, and tried to maintain their rights against Rhodes by winning over Rome (Polyb. 22.5.1-4).\(^\text{38}\) The reference concerned shows that the connection with the Romans at that time was far from problematic, being remembered as one of Orthagoras’ merits by the erectors of the inscription and the contemporaries of his contacts with the envoys. According to the lines 69 to 77, furthermore, he twice joined the Lykian festival of the goddess Roma as Araxa’s θεωρός. He was respected as a leading citizen after making contact with the Romans, and was expected to manage the formal affairs of Araxa concerning Rome by using this connection, possibly from the 180s to the 160s. Similarly, a fragmentary decree from Chios, probably around the time of Apameia, informs us that an anonymous politician of the island was honoured for his support for Rome during the war against the Seleucids, his introduction of the rituals of the goddess Roma and the Roman heroes among his fellow citizens, and his favourable treatment of the Romans visiting Chios (SEG XXX.1073).\(^\text{39}\) If the consideration by scholars about the historical context is correct, the honouree led


\(^{37}\) Errington 1987: 114-8 supposes that the two Romans might be Ap. Claudius Centho and P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, who visited Asia Minor in the 150s and the 140s respectively. Bresson 1999: 114-6 also supports this theory. However, many scholars think that Orthagoras was honoured shortly after 167 because there is no sign of Rhodes’ control over Lykia in the decree, and proof that the decree was made much later than the year. Cf. Ager 1996: no.130.


Chios to support Rome when the latter defeated the Seleucids.\textsuperscript{40} His fellow citizens recognised it as a personal achievement on his part, balancing direct and semi-private contacts. The actions recorded in these epigraphic cases were not completely informal diplomacy. The honourees did approach the leading Romans formally, at least at the beginning. However, their fellow citizens praised them, not only for the approach with personal contacts, and thus managing ad hoc problems, but also for their maintaining and exploiting the connection with the Romans afterwards. This idea should be in informal diplomacy. Furthermore, the positive attitude of those concerned towards it was shown to others through erection of the inscriptions.\textsuperscript{41} The Greeks thus recognised a connection between personal relationships and legal tasks distinctively, as Polybios does in the cases of the 180s. The former, however, could be a nice tool of diplomacy just as the latter, despite the negative picture sometimes proposed by his ethical phrases. Considering this situation, Kallikrates’ success really encouraged his

\textsuperscript{40} Derow and Forrest 1982: 82 and 88-90, meanwhile, propose the possibility that the honorand was an Attalid king because of the appearance of the term \textit{ἀναγκαῖοι} (kinsmen) in line 2, or Hermokles, the Chian \textit{ἰερομνήμων} at Delphi, around 190 because of the reference to the interests of the honouree to wine, Muses, Rome, and international activity. But these are pure supposition. Other scholars abstain from identifying the honorand in the study of this decree.

\textsuperscript{41} This situation is also seen in the case of Philippides of Athens, who approached Lysimachos individually and was praised by the Athenians for the private connection and the contribution to the city with it, although it was in the 280s (\textit{Syll} III 374). Cf. Austin 2006: no.54. Furthermore, a Delphic honorary decree of 182/1 for Eumenes II of Pergamon seems to be understood in this context. According to this inscription (\textit{Syll} III 630.II.1-4 and 17-18), one of the reasons why he deserved praise was his ‘friendship (φιλία)’ with the Romans, depicted as ‘οἱ κοινοὶ ἐυγέρται (the common benefactors),’ if the supplement is correct. He was a king, and the contact with Rome was not completely a private one, but Delphi emphasised favourably that he was connected with the Romans by friendship, i.e. a direct human relation, unlike Polybios (and his circles) in the cases mentioned above, although this might partly result from the fact that Delphi owed its independence from Aitolia around 190 to Rome. Cf. \textit{CID} IV.107; \textit{FD} III.3.261; Erskine 1994: 70-5; Grainger 1999: 502; Austin 2006: no.237. As regards the common benefactors in the Greek world, see Herrmann 1965: 33-6, Habicht 1989: 333-4, and Ma 2002: no.17.
contemporaries to use these manners in informal diplomacy further, as Polybios
tells, but without any conflict between justice and injustice, especially among
those who did not consider the prevention of Roman intervention as profitable.
The erection of the Lykian decree, shortly after 167, seems to have occurred in
this context.

Overall, these case studies show the following points. Informal diplomacy
or the approach in channels apart from official ones actively functioned in the
Greeks’ contacts with Rome, owing to her increasing acceptance of it. Polybios
criticises this tendency with legal and sometimes ethical arguments. They could
be supported by many Greeks in light of the cases considered in Section 1, and in
the attitude of Achaia before Kallikrates’ speech, but the criticism arises from the
political interests of the people concerned. Even then, informal diplomacy was not
always denied. However, the distinction between the two channels drawn by
Polybios is not a fiction, since the Greeks treated informal or private contacts and
ordinary or impersonal ones differently. This means that the relationship between
both tools of diplomacy was not defined in the 180s even among the Greeks, who
had long used informal diplomacy, much less among the Romans and other
contemporaries. Indeed, its users in Rome and Greece gained an advantage over
their opponents by making use of Rome’s domination in Greece, and with ad hoc
political tactics. This spread and yet ill-definition of informal diplomacy was thus
an aspect of Roman international politics in the 180s, one that further developed
in the following decades.
Section 3: Informal Diplomacy and Tensions among the Romans

I will finally argue that the spread of informal diplomacy among the Romans, and the poorly defined nature of its role (shown in the previous two sections), caused tensions among the Romans. This can be seen by analysing Rome’s management of foreign affairs during the Third Macedonian War. To do this it is necessary to examine the relationship between individual Romans, foreign states, and the Senate in particular. The senators, the Roman elite, had managed state diplomacy collectively, while the spread of informal diplomacy resulted in the senators themselves making increasing use of it, and accepting (or overlooking) its use by their colleagues. This increased the influence of individual users of it over Roman diplomacy, and decreased the collective leadership of the Senate. I will show here that it was this tendency that caused troubles for the Romans, as a whole.

In order to achieve this aim, it must first be noted that informal diplomacy was actively used by the Romans after the 180s as well. This is confirmed by a case of 173 (Liv. 42.6.1-2). In this year, M. Claudius Marcellus visited Achaia and called conventus, a meeting of the league. During this session, he praised Achaia for having maintained a decree forbidding Macedonia’s kings from entering its territory. This was practically a display of Rome’s hostility towards Perseus, Philippos’ successor. Yet, Marcellus’ task was settling the troubles in Aitolia (42.5.10-12).42 The Achaian affair was not included in his mission. His request was therefore an independent action, and an example of informal diplomacy. It is

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noticeable that, although he seemed to show no legitimate reason, Achaia did not insist on its laws or a senatorial order. One may think this simply results from the state of the evidence. Polybios’ text for this case is lost, and Livius only briefly refers to Marcellus’ visit of Achaia. But this does not deny Marcellus’ independent approach to Achaia. Furthermore, considering Marcellus’ reference to the decree of Achaia against Macedonia during the meeting, he could easily make Achaia hold it. He had to explain to the Achaians beforehand what he wanted to announce. It is too difficult to identify when Rome determined to attack Perseus, but Achaia may well have thought here that Rome had intended to do so in the near future, and that if Achaia were to reject Marcellus’ request, he would report it to the Senate as a sign of its support for Macedonia. Thus, his demand for holding the meeting was practically to compel Achaia to regard Macedonia as its enemy, and possibly to check the increase of Perseus’ influence within Greece. Macedonia had regained its seat in the Delphic Amphiktyonia after the death of Philippos (CID IV.108.11.5-7), and had been able to have contacts with the Greeks easily. It made no sense here for Achaia to propose legal objections, unless it was ready to compete against a Rome which had substantially increased her influence in Greece. Marcellus successfully conducted informal diplomacy while exploiting this political situation and, moreover, secured Achaia’s support in the coming war for Rome.

A similar case is observed at the beginning of the Third Macedonian War. In the consular year of 172, Rome sent seven senators, as her delegates, to Greece to survey the situation of the Greeks and win them over, with some 2,000 soldiers.

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45 Habicht 1987: 60.
The legitimacy of sending troops under the command of the envoys was questionable, since it was shortly before the declaration of war. Indeed, Perseus challenged the Romans about it. According to Livius (at 42.37, esp. 6), the diplomats decided that ‘no written reply be sent, but the bearer of the dispatch (from Perseus) be told that the Romans were doing it for the protection of the (Greek) cities (cui rescribi non placuit, nuntio ipsius qui litteras attulerat dici, praesidii causa ipsarum urbis Romanos facere).’ Rome’s envoys had no senatorial order regarding how to explain their task, and had to manage the question by themselves. Consequently, their statements and method of answering were examples of informal diplomacy. The Senate apparently expected that they would deal with such a situation by acting independently. Just as in Marcellus’ case, the informal diplomacy here followed closely the interests of Rome and the Senate that had sent the envoys.

This tendency is also seen in the case of Q. Marcius Philippus, one of the seven envoys. When Rome’s hostility to Perseus was apparent, the king tried to persuade Rome not to attack him. Philippus insincerely encouraged him to send his envoys to Rome, although this envoy knew that the Senate had resolutely decided to attack Macedonia, the Romans thus making use of Perseus’ attempt to gain time to start the war favourably (Liv. 42.38.8–43.3; Polyb. 27.4.1–2). This was made independently by Philippus, and should consequently be classed as informal diplomacy. Some senators in Rome regarded it as a treacherous action, far from Rome’s traditional fairness, calling such sharpness nova sapientia negatively (Liv.

46 Walbank 1941: 82-93; Briscoe 2012: 270-4. For the chronology of the beginning of the war, see Wiemer 2004: 22-37.
Yet, Philippus was still elected as the consul of 169 (43.11.5). His playing for time was regarded as a merit by many Romans. These cases show that informal diplomacy was actively used by Roman individuals after the 180s as well, and was approved, possibly even expected, by many Romans for its contribution to the state or the Senate.

But these successes of informal diplomacy partly resulted from the Greeks accepting Roman demands, even when made informally. They expected Rome’s military superiority to Perseus. It was thus hopeless for them to argue with Rome about the legitimacy of each of the Romans’ actions. This is confirmed by the decision of Rhodes, in its contact with C. Lucretius Gallus, the praetor of the fleet, in 171. He wanted the Rhodians to send their ships through Sokrates, an ordinary citizen. This irregular procedure caused some to suspect that the request was counterfeit, although Rhodes did dispatch the fleet, eventually. Lucretius announced, however, that there would be no naval battle, and sent it back (Liv. 42.56.1-7; Polyb. 27.7.1-16). Considering the irregularity of the approach towards Rhodes, and the arbitrariness of the treatment of its troops, apparently without any order from Rome, his actions are clearly informal diplomacy, although they were not necessarily illegal because of his authority as a general. Yet, Rhodes did not complain about him, officially. Polybios, a contemporary Achaian leader, also treats Rhodes’ attitude here favourably, despite his negative references to the actions of Roman envoys that had behaved independently in the cases of the 180s. Instead, he regards (at 27.7.12) Deinon and Polyaratos, the Rhodian leaders criticising Lucretius' method of request here, as ‘avaricious and bold (φιλάργυρον

50 Wiemer 2001a: 166.
όντα καὶ θρασύν).' From the viewpoint of contemporary Rhodians and Polybios, showing hostility to Rome was imprudent, regardless of the questionable legitimacy of the Romans’ actions. This situation might partly result from the tendency of Polybios’ source from Rhodes, which would be criticised by Rome after the Macedonian War and fix the two leaders with the liability. ⁵¹ However, Polybios also shows a similar attitude in his description of the disruption in Boiotia during this period (27.1·2). Boiotia had longstanding connections with Macedonia. The citizens had plunged into civil strife over whether Perseus should be supported or not. ⁵² Considering Polybios’ moral vision shown in several cases, such as that of the contribution of Megalopolis to Achaia in the 220s, some Boiotians’ maintaining loyalty to Macedonia could be considered praiseworthy, even if their actions courted disaster. But there is no praise for the Boiotians who supported Perseus (at 27.2.10): in taking the side of Macedonia, they are behaving ‘irrationally (ἀλογίστως)’ and ‘childishly (παιδαριωδῶς).’ Moreover, in Achaia, Polybios and many Achaians during this period supported Rome under the leadership of Archon, rather than advocating neutrality, like Lykortas (28.3.7·8 and 6.1·9). ⁵³ Polybios and a number of Greeks seem to have pragmatically regarded supporting Rome, regardless of the legality of her actions, as reasonable. He even justifies it by criticising his opponents with moralistic phrases. Considering the fact that Polybios was writing in Rome under detention, partly for his actions in this very war, his behaviour at the time might have been different from his later description. Nevertheless, his picture of the general situation is believable, since he would have been criticised by many eyewitnesses

⁵³ Eckstein 1995b: 5; Baronowski 2012: 170·1.
of the events concerned if he had manipulated information in his text excessively. This situation confirms that the opposition of Polybios and many Greeks to informal diplomacy in the previous cases resulted from ad hoc decisions to navigate their relationship with a Roman state that was becoming more imperialistic, rather than from any genuine sense of morality.\textsuperscript{54}

This also means that informal diplomacy here depended on the military situation. This is suggested by the fact that when the war went against Rome, people in and beyond Rome tended to criticise the individual Romans in the field. It is important to note that, after Perseus defeated Roman troops at Kallinikos,\textsuperscript{55} the Chalkidians complained of the plunder and violence by Lucretius and L. Hortensius, the praetor in 170, despite their obedience to Rome (Liv. 43.7.5-8.10).\textsuperscript{56} Rome accepted this complaint and recalled Lucretius. Moreover, M'. Juventius Thalna and Cn. Aufidius, the \textit{tribuni plebis}, put him on a trial. He was fined 100,000 asses. Hortensius was also reproached by the Senate (43.8.7 and 9). While this Livian reference seems to be derived from Polybios' lost text,\textsuperscript{57} the actions of the Senate and the \textit{tribuni} were made openly, meaning that the information is believable.

I argue that this is also a sign of a new senatorial attempt to strengthen its power, and of a change in the situation of Rome's informal diplomacy, even though the actions of Lucretius and Hortensius do not necessarily represent examples of it. This is suggested by the senatorial message in managing the complaint of the two generals. According to Livius at 43.8.5-6, the Senate issued a decree to the

\textsuperscript{54} Golan 1989: 114 and 126.
\textsuperscript{55} Hammond and Walbank 1988: 512-23.
\textsuperscript{56} Rutledge 2007: 189.
\textsuperscript{57} Briscoe 2012: 411.
effect that the war against Perseus was ‘for the liberty of Greece (libertas Graeciae),’ that ‘Roman friends and allies should not suffer at the hands of the magistrates (non ut ea a magistratibus suis socii atque amici paterentur),’ and that ‘such acts could not be done in accordance with the wish or the concurrence of the Senate (ea neque facta neque fieri voluntate senatus quem non posse existimare).’ The Senate treated the actions in question as ‘misdeeds’ made by the two generals ‘arbitrarily,’ and promised to impose a check on such ‘deviation from Rome’s real intention.’ This resulted directly from the unfavourable military situation facing Rome. Indeed, the Senate gave pecuniary gifts to each of the complainants, currying their favour (43.8.8-9). Yet, it is noteworthy that the Senate referred to its respect for its good cause, the Freedom of Greece. This was also shown in its letter to Delphoi during this period (RDGE 40B.II.20-1).58 In the message to the Delphians (and other Greeks), the Senate criticises Perseus for his attempt ‘to break the freedom given to you by our generals through throwing the whole Greek nation into disorders (τὸ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν διὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων στρατηγῶν δοθείσαν ἀφανίζειν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ ἔθνος εἰς ταραχὰς.’ It is difficult to decide whether this letter was sent before or after the message to the Chalkidians. In any case, considering the reference to this good cause, and also the criticism of the generals, the Senate aimed not only to win over international public opinion afresh, but to show to contemporaries that no-one but the Senate would fulfil the pledge as a manager of Roman diplomacy. This suggests that the Senate decided to condemn any independent action, including informal diplomacy, as arbitrary actions, if it seemed necessary.

58 Austin 2006: no.93.
I would also argue that the Senate strengthened its control over Roman individuals, but not necessarily with legal legitimacy. For instance, in the case of 170, it criticised the ‘arbitrary’ actions of Lucretius and Hortensius, who had imperium, disgracing them with moral arguments. In the criticism, its resolution, i.e. official power was exercised, but the Senate did not punish them directly, since the authority to punish generals was held by the assembly, not the Senate (cf. Polyb. 6.14.6). Yet, by criticising the actions concerned as misdeeds, the Senate encouraged the tribuni, who could impeach generals, and their fellow citizens to attack Lucretius in court, while also reproaching Hortensius, and thus behaved as the arbiter of Roman diplomacy before its contemporaries. This approach was also used in the cancellation of a measure taken by P. Licinius Crassus, the consul of 171, during this period. According to Livius’ Periochae 43, he sacked several towns in Greece. Legally, this was within his discretion. The Senate, nevertheless, observed that it was done ‘cruelly (crudeliter)’ and that the captives should be released, pushing the announcement like an ‘order’ before contemporaries.

There is a similar situation in a case of C. Cassius Longinus, the consul of 171 (43.1.4-12). He had been assigned to the defence of northern Italy but left his province and began marching through Illyria with a view to gaining fame by attacking Perseus. This was an independent action. According to Livius (at 43.1.5), the inhabitants in his provincia reported it to the Senate for ‘their unsatisfactory defence among the hostile nations (infirmam necdum satis munitam inter infestas nationes).’ The Senate accepted the petition and made a decree to the effect that ‘he should wage any war against no nation without the authorisation of the Senate

59 Lintott 1999: 20·1, 40·2, and 150·1.
60 Eckstein 2010: 244.
(ne bellum cum ulla gente moveat, nisi cum qua senatus gerendum),’ forcing him to withdraw his troops (43.1.11). The intervention of the Senate with a resolution against the actions of serving generals was unexpected. They were independent acts in international politics but, crucially, were not illegal. The Senate, however, publicised its decree as superior to individual Romans and their actions. This manner worked well: the Senate won over the people in and beyond Rome by criticising individuals with moral arguments, and thereby strengthened its leadership, decreasing the scope for independent actions or informal diplomacy by individual Romans, although the Senate did not necessarily possess the legal basis to control them.

It is tempting to think that this negative attitude to independent action, which may well have included informal diplomacy, within the Senate resulted from a literary manipulation by Polybios, the main source of Livius for this period, on analogy of his utilitarian attitude in the previous cases. Yet, this is denied by analysing a senatorial decree of 169. Livius relates (at 43.17.2-10, esp. 2-3) that, in this year, the Senate announced to the Greeks that ‘no one should make any contribution to Rome’s officers for the war other than what the Senate had fixed (ne quis ullam rem in bellum magistratibus Romanis conferret praeterquam quod senatus censuisset),’ and that ‘this order created confidence for the future (among the Greeks) because they were relieved from the incessant drain of the burdens and expenses which had been imposed on them (hoc fiduciam in posterum quoque praebuerat levatos se oneribusque impensisque quibus, alia aliis imperantibus, exhausierant).’ From the perspective of directing the war, this decree was designed to win over the Greeks further, while Perseus still fought well, and many
Greeks secretly supported him.\(^{62}\) Meanwhile, in the context of managing diplomacy, this was a prohibition by the Senate of independent requests by individual Roman commanders to the Greek populace, i.e. informal diplomacy. It is also important that the Livian text (at 43.17.3) treats this decree with the phrase ‘they were released from the burdens and expenses (\textit{levatos se oneribusque impensisque}),’ in a positive and moralistic tone. Livius’ reference to this senatorial resolution derives from Polybios’ text at 28.3-5, and some of his lost work referring to it.\(^{63}\) These terms and tones seemingly result from some image given by Polybios, similar to the previous cases of informal diplomacy, regardless of the views offered by other contemporaries. Certainly, he and his political friends were favourable towards Rome during this period. He may well treat her attitude to the Greeks favourably here, to show his readers the validity of his and his circles’ policy, in contrast to his way of describing the cases of the 180s. But his main topic, at 28.3-5, was the contemporary practices of the Greeks, not the decree.\(^{64}\) He had no reason to propose moralistic references unrealistically here, or in the section now lost, regarding the approval of the resolution in Rome. In light of the fact that Livius’ description regarding the announcement of the decree before the Greeks is much briefer than that of Polybios,\(^{65}\) Livius does not seem to manipulate his sources, that is, Polybios’ text and possibly other ones, regardless of their manner of description. Considering, furthermore, that the decree was shown to many contemporaries, it would have been difficult for Polybios and other contemporary authors to manipulate the information. Thus, the Senate probably did use moral

\(^{63}\) Walbank 1979: 330; Briscoe 2012: 2 and 447.
\(^{64}\) Gruen 1984: 347 n.160.
\(^{65}\) Briscoe 2012: 447.
arguments to exert control over Roman individuals and, without defining the legal basis of senatorial power, the authority of the individual Romans, and thereby informal diplomacy.

I argue that this senatorial attitude influenced individual Romans immediately. This is supported by a case of C. Popillius Laenas and Cn. Octavius when they showed the decree of 169, mentioned above, to the Greeks (Polyb. 28.3-5; SEG XVI.255.lI.5-6). They seemed to want to attack some Greeks that they regarded as anti-Roman (Polyb. 28.3.4-9). Some of the leading Greeks hoped to use it for themselves, moreover. This was partly because, after Kallinikos, Rome had held a number of Aitolians. They had been blamed for the defeat (Liv. 42.60.8-9), but the Greeks had thought that Rome was actually removing potential enemies (Polyb. 27.15.14 and 28.4.6). Therefore, when the two Romans visited the Greeks, some of them assumed, owing to the attitude of the envoys, that they would do the same thing, and such Greeks hoped to show their own loyalty to Rome while labelling their rivals as pro-Macedonians (28.4.5-11 and 5.1-5). However, while the envoys were interested in their private appeal or slander, they took no measure against the people concerned independently. This might result from the fact that there was no evidence, and the majority of other Greeks did not support such behaviour. Yet, the main reason was that the envoys regarded only ‘following the senatorial intention (τῇ τῆς συνεκλήσεως προθέσει)’ shown in the decree concerned as reasonable action (28.3.9 and 5.6-7, esp. 7). The new senatorial attitude thus prevented an independent action or informal diplomacy by the two Romans.

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66 Cf. ISE 42; Walbank 1979: 329.
However, although this senatorial attitude made it difficult for individual Romans to act independently, it did not completely restrain them. This is suggested by a case concerning Q. Marcius Philippus, mentioned above. In 169, he, as the general against Perseus, suggested κατ’ ἰδίαν, namely privately, to a Rhodian envoy Agepolis that Rhodes begin mediation. This was informal diplomacy. It is noteworthy that Philippus did not refer to which war he wanted to stop. This embarrassed Rhodes. During this period, there was the war between the Seleucids and the Ptolemies and that between Rome and Perseus (Polyb. 28.17, esp. 4). This contact is therefore regarded as a model of nova sapientia of some Romans. It seemed to be a stratagem designed to lead Rhodes to intervene in the Macedonian War, and to give Rome a pretext to criticise Rhodes later. This is, however, unreasonable, although the discussion of scholars about the historicity of this case is understandable. I would argue that Philippus did not want to confuse Rhodes about which dispute he referred to. For him, Rhodes could not be asked informally to mediate between the two dynasties. The Ptolemies had asked Rome to support them. The Senate had ordered Philippus to manage the dispute. He had officially requested Achaia to mediate between the dynasties (28.1.9 and 29.25.2-4; cf. 28.1.1-2 and 16.5). He had no reason to ask Rhodes secretly to negotiate with them. He certainly wanted Rhodes to mediate between Rome and Macedonia, although Rhodes was embarrassed to do so. It is significant that this was informal diplomacy on the part of a general, but his method of suggestion resulted from military necessity in his campaign against Macedonia, and from the senatorial attitude regarding independent actions on the part of individual

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71 For an analysis of the chronological order, see Mittag 2006: 161-5.
Romans. Any peace without defeating Perseus despite Rome’s having attacked him was equated with her practical defeat. Naturally, the Senate had not considered it. If Philippus had openly asked Rhodes to mediate between Rome and Macedonia in this situation, the Senate would have criticised his action because it would have meant disgrace for Rome, regardless of the legal legitimacy of his suggestion and of its value to his campaign. His manner here thus enabled him to defend himself. If his request had been reported to the Senate by Rhodes, he would have been able to challenge it by indicating a lack of evidence. The mediation by Rhodes, meanwhile, would shake Perseus, something that could be useful for Philippus’ campaign. The king had wanted to stop the war even after Kallinikos (e.g. App. Mac. 12; Polyb. 28.8.1-10.5), and Philippus had bought time before the outbreak of hostilities, by making use of Perseus’ hope for peace (Liv. 42.38.8-43.3; Polyb. 27.4.1-2). The strict moralistic attitude of the Senate towards individual Romans did not completely prevent Philippus from behaving independently, although he had to be very careful, even while directing the war favourably.

I also notice that these two cases demonstrate that there was still a demand for informal diplomacy among individual Romans, to advance the interests of Rome and their own, that the Greeks could accept such actions, and that this caused tensions between the Senate and individual Romans. These elements are confirmed by a case of Laenas, mentioned above, in 168, following the Battle of Pydna. In Egypt, Laenas showed a senatorial decree that ordered Antiochos IV of the Seleucids to cease the war, there (Polyb. 29.27.1-8). Although both were old friends when Antiochos was a hostage in Rome (cf. Just. 34.3.2), Laenas drew a circle round him with a vine stick and told him to give the answer to the Senate’s
demand before stepping out from it. Antiochos was embarrassed with this attitude, but accepted Rome’s demand. For this dramatic event, many ancients and modern scholars focus on Laenas’ haughty attitude following Rome’s defeat of Perseus and establishment of hegemony in the Mediterranean world.\textsuperscript{72} While Roman victory in Greece might be felt lightly by contemporaries in other regions,\textsuperscript{73} for the Greeks this event in Egypt generally symbolised the relationship between Rome and Greece at this time. This also partly resulted from the fact that theatricality had become an important concept in their political life.\textsuperscript{74} Consequently, they tended to notice the symbolic aspect of incidents. Indeed, Polybios (at 29.27.12), the main source for other ancient writers regarding this case,\textsuperscript{75} treats Perseus’ defeat and Antiochos’ withdrawal from Egypt, as the result of ‘the fate (τῆς τύχης)’, with admiration. This largely results from the significance that Polybios places on it in his view of history.\textsuperscript{76} However, in the context of a study of Roman diplomacy, what should be noted here is the description of Laenas. Polybios (at 29.27.4) describes his attitude towards Antiochos as ‘offensive (βαρὺ)’ and ‘exceedingly arrogant (τελέως ὑπερήφανον).’ Indeed, this behaviour could hardly be written down in the decree. Hence, this was an independent action on his part, a sort of informal diplomacy. It is significant that this actually arose as a result of the Senate beginning to control independent actions by Roman individuals.

It is tempting simply to ascribe Laenas’ behaviour to his seeming arrogant character.\textsuperscript{77} Yet, he had held the consulship in 172, and had suitable experience

\textsuperscript{72} Cf. App. Syr. 66; Diod. 31.2.1-2; Liv. 45.12.1-6; Plut. Mor. 202E-203A; Porph. (\textit{FGH} 260) 50; Val.Max. 6.4.3; Zonar. 9.25; Paltiel 1982: 233-40.

\textsuperscript{73} Gruen 2004: 254 and 266.

\textsuperscript{74} Chaniotis 1997: 220-42.

\textsuperscript{75} Briscoe 2012: 638.

\textsuperscript{76} Walbank 2002: 248-50.

\textsuperscript{77} Cf. Ager 1991: 38; Balot 2010: 494.
as a statesman. Moreover, he announced the senatorial decree in Greece in 169, and understood the strict attitude of the Senate regarding independent actions. Considering these points, as O. Mørkholm and P. F. Mittag suggest, Laenas behaved tactically in Egypt, for some reason. In fact, he, as an envoy, faced some difficulties. He was sent around the end of the Macedonian War with C. Decimius and C. Hostilius, after the Ptolemies complained to Rome of Antiochos’ attack on them (Liv. 44.19.6-14). According to Livius at 44.19.14, the Senate issued a decree that ‘(the two dynasties) should conclude the war, and if either of the sides refused it, the party would not be considered a (Roman) friend or ally (ni absistatur bello, per utrum stetisset, eum non pro amico nec pro socio habituros esse).’ The severe contents of this declaration suggest that the Senate really wanted to stop the struggle. However, the three Romans did not go to Egypt directly. On the one hand, this might have been prompted, to an extent, by Antiochos’ temporary return to Syria. On the other hand, they neither approached him with peace terms nor made contact with the Ptolemies but, instead, participated in a naval campaign against Macedonia, as if to kill time, until the Battle of Pydna (44.29.1-4). Meantime, Antiochos took Ptolemaios VI into custody and ascended to the Egyptian throne (Diod. 30.18.1-2; Joseph. AJ 12.243; Polyb. 28.1; Porph. (FGH 260) 49a). The Roman envoys seem to have entirely disregarded their mission. It is noteworthy, however, that there was little prospect that Antiochos would

78 MRR: 410.
81 Morgan 1990: 68.
82 While Livius does not refer to Antiochos’ enthronement, Swain 1944: 83-4 shows the validity of the sources and other scholars are favourable to the view. Cf. Mittag 2006: 171-3.
accept Rome's request when they were dispatched. Rome was in the middle of waging the Macedonian War. She could not put a lot of pressure on him; nevertheless, Laenas and his colleagues had to conclude the war in Egypt at all cost. Their dispatch was not the first attempt that Rome had made. She had previously sent T. Numisius Tarquiniensis (Polyb. 29.25.3-4). While it is impossible to decide when he was sent, the fact remains that the negotiation ended in failure. Considering his lack of any office, one would be forgiven for thinking that Rome had made no real effort to succeed. He had, however, participated in the negotiations with the pro-Romans in Thisbe of Boiotia in 170, and would join in the committee for L. Aemilius Paullus, the victor over Perseus, after Pydna (RDGE 2.1.5; Liv. 45.17.3). The evidence therefore suggests that Rome seriously wanted to solve the problem in Egypt, by sending a senator expected to manage complicated matters among the Greeks. Laenas and his colleagues were sent after the failure of this theoretically influential person. If the mediation had failed again, Rome's dignity would have been damaged. Yet, the international situation was unchanged after Numisius' dispatch. This explains why the new envoys did not go to Egypt directly. They waited for a change in the situation, such as Perseus' defeat.

I also argue that considering these tactics of Laenas, his apparent arrogance in Egypt resulted from the fact that even the victory at Pydna was not a definite factor in conducting the negotiations, otherwise he would have avoided showing arrogance that could be criticised later from the moralistic viewpoint by the Senate. Indeed, Antiochos had the option of procrastinating the negotiation.

84 Morgan 1990: 57.
85 Bagnall and Derow 2004: 83-5.
He controlled many regions of Egypt.\textsuperscript{86} There was therefore room to defeat the Ptolemies, or make a favourable pact with them, although he might have had trouble with capturing Alexandreia. If he had realised one of these two scenarios before the decision of Rome’s assembly to attack him, Rome would have lost her pretext to intervene in the Egyptian affair. This would have been viewed as a diplomatic defeat for Rome, and Laenas’ failure. He needed to prevent Antiochos from delaying the negotiations, while leading or misleading the king into assuming that Rome regarded him in a more hostile fashion, beyond the reference in the senatorial decree to a suspension of friendship. Laenas’ haughty and independent action before Antiochos resulted from these necessities, and can thus be labelled as informal diplomacy.

It is furthermore significant that Laenas considered the interests of Antiochos and the Ptolemies and forestalled any complaint against himself later. After Antiochos reluctantly stopped the war, Laenas went to Cyprus and made Antiochos’ troops withdraw for the Ptolemies. Antiochos was, however, permitted to bring any booty seized to Syria (Polyb. 29.27.9-10 and 30.26.9). Koile-Syria, the flashpoint of the war between the two dynasties, remained under his control.\textsuperscript{87} These terms seem to have been made on Laenas’ authority. He saved Antiochos’ reputation, to some extent. The Ptolemies, however, escaped from a crisis, thanks to Laenas, and could not complain to the Senate. He settled the Egyptian affair while managing their difficulties delicately. These points, regarding Laenas’ behaviour in his mission, suggest that it was difficult for the Senate to control Roman individuals. If their task was safely managed, and outsiders did not

\textsuperscript{86} Swain 1944: 91.
\textsuperscript{87} Grainger 2010: 293-4 and 300-8.
complain about the manner, it was difficult for the Senate to intervene in the affair concerned, since the organ had criticised individual Romans based on moral arguments, not on legal superiority.

This situation can also be observed in Laenas’ contact with Rhodes. While on the way to Egypt, after Pydna, the Rhodians asked his deputation to visit Rhodes (Liv. 45.10.5). At the close of the Macedonian War, they had tried to mediate between Rome and Macedonia. This had resulted from Philippus’ suggestion, but Rome regarded it as a practical support for Macedonia and had criticised the Rhodians. Thereafter, the latter made every effort to be pardoned. 88 The invitation of Laenas’ deputation was part of the attempt. The envoys refused it at first but, following a repeated appeal, went to Rhodes’ general meeting. In this session, Laenas made a fierce speech and led the Rhodians to believe that he represented the feelings of the Senate, as a whole (45.10.7-9). Meanwhile, Decimius, his colleague, ‘more modestly (moderatio)’ declared that the blame did not rest with the people, but with a few agitators (45.10.10). This was applauded. Rhodes immediately resolved that anyone convicted of saying or doing anything against Rome, on behalf of Perseus, should be put to death (45.10.10-13). Considering the reluctant nature of their visit, the envoys consciously showed that they did not speak as representatives of Rome, regarding Rhodes’ mediation. Laenas and Decimius did not conceal the fact that they lacked a unified opinion. This might have been a trick of some kind, to make Rhodes oppress the anti-Romans, although Rome herself seemed indifferent towards them. 89 In any case, the envoys independently participated in Rhodian affairs, and this was clearly an

example of informal diplomacy. The Roman individuals concerned undertook this action while also considering the senatorial desire for control over independent actions in light of their refusal of visit to Rhodes at the beginning, while the outsiders in question entertained them, nevertheless. Informal diplomacy was thus still considered to be a necessity by many people in and beyond Rome. Considering Laenas’ obtaining the second consulship in 158, around ten years after his visit to Rhodes and Egypt, his informal diplomacy was not necessarily considered favourably by other Romans, or senators. However, they could not maintain their complete control over its use by individual Romans.

Just as in previous cases, Livius’ text here derives from Polybios. Some Rhodian authors used by him might have also influenced it through Livius’ use of the Polybian text. The picture of Laenas, then, as ‘a man of fierce temper (vir asper ingenio)’ with ‘severity (asperitas)’, appears to result from the criticism of him by Livius’ sources (45.10.8 and 15). Livius himself, however, does not criticise the intervention of Laenas (and Decimius) in the Rhodian affair. Instead, Livius notices that the envoys refused to visit Rhodes at the beginning, practically showed their lack of authority to intervene in Rhodian affairs, and that the envoys went to its assembly and made their speeches only after repeated invitation by Rhodes, equating to a tacit recognition of their informal character. Thus, the surviving evidence is generally neither very critical nor favourable to the envoys, and does not seem to draw any unrealistic or exaggerated conclusions.

The Senate, however, still strove to control the actions of Roman individuals. In 167, after the Macedonian War, it appointed fifteen legati for

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90 MRR: 446.
91 Briscoe 2012: 2.
Paullus, mentioned above, and L. Anicius Gallus, the victor over Perseus’ ally in Illyria, Gentios. According to Livius (at 45.17.6-7), the Senate stated here that ‘although they (the fifteen) were men of such standing that it could reasonably be hoped that the generals acted on their advice and formed no decision unworthy of the Roman people’s clemency or honour, the main principles of the settlement were discussed in the Senate in order that the (fifteen) legati might carry them in outline to the generals (ceterum quamquam tales viri mitterentur, quorum de consilio sperari posset imperatores nihil indignum nec clementia nec gravitate populi Romani decreturos esse, tamen in senatu quoque agitata sunt summa consiliorum, ut inchoata omnia legati ab domo ferre ad imperatores possent).’

What occurred in Macedonia and Illyria was to be decided not by the generals and the legati, but by the Senate. The generals were only to execute its order, after being informed by the legati, who were senior senators with auctoritas derived from their careers, and were to supervise the generals. This was a different situation from that experienced by previous commanders. For instance, Cn. Manlius Vulso attacked the inhabitants in Asia Minor after the war against the Seleucids. His legati tried to stop it owing to the absence of any declaration of war, but failed. He was criticised for this independent action, but his triumph was granted (38.16.1-23.11, 25.1-27.9, and 44.9-50.3; Polyb. 21.37 and 39). While Vulso had been assertive, the discretion of officers in the field had been respected by the Senate. In contrast to this, Paullus and Anicius (and the legati) were ordered in advance that they were not to act upon their own authority, but to follow the senatorial order, on the pretext of maintaining Rome’s clemency and

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93 Cf. MRR: 435.
honour. This was a restriction of their independent actions and scope for engaging in informal diplomacy.

This decree was clearly announced, and its historicity is credible. The contents confirm that the Senate strove to control these individual Romans. Indeed, the generals seemed to be there, simply to execute its orders during the plunder in Epeiros, and in the detainment of leading politicians in many Greek states (Polyb. 30.13 and 15; cf. App. Ill. 9: Liv. 45.31.1 and 33.8–34.9: Plut. Aem. 29.1–30.1). Polybios might relate that Paullus reluctantly followed the orders, owing to a prejudice in favour of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, the son of Paullus, and Polybios’ friend. Paullus, certainly, behaved as a representative of Rome before the Greeks, as is shown by the inscriptions from Delphoi and Maroneia (CIL 1.622; SEG LIII.658). Overall, however, he, Anicius, and the legati experienced senatorial pressure much more strongly than Vulso.

Nevertheless, it is significant that the tensions between the Senate and individual Romans persisted. The position of informal diplomacy within wider Roman state diplomacy and of the senatorial leadership was still ill-defined. This is suggested by a case of Thalna, mentioned above, in 167 (Liv. 45.21; Polyb. 30.4.4). He was the praetor in this year and, in the assembly, proposed a motion that war should be declared against Rhodes, following its attempt to mediate between Rome and Perseus, apparently on behalf of the latter. The attendees were favourable but, according to Livius (at 45.21.4), it was stopped by the veto of the tribuni plebis because ‘he acted in defiance of precedent and made the proposal on his own initiative without consulting the Senate or informing the consuls of...

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95 Scullard 1945: 60; Walbank 1979: 434–9; Ziolkowski 1986: 69.
97 As for the latter inscription, see also I.Thrac.Aeg. 168.
the question that he was going to put (novo maloque exemplo rem ingressus erat, quod non ante consulto senatu, non consulibus certioribus factis de sua unius sententia rogationem ferret). The Senate had controlled Roman diplomacy through its decrees and its officers. Considering the reason for the veto shown before the citizens, the tribuni stopped Thalna here based on the suggestion of the Senate (or the consuls, at least). However, he almost succeeded in an independent participation in Roman diplomacy, and was criticised, not owing to the illegality of his actions, but for defiance of 'precedent (exemplo).'</I argue, then, that senatorial leadership could, therefore, be legally denied by individuals possessing some other authority.

Overall, the ascendancy of the Senate with its decrees and use of official power over individual Romans, and their informal diplomacy, by implication, was clearly shown to contemporaries. Its collective leadership worked well, since Roman individuals were certainly put under a lot of pressure. A series of decrees to establish this situation resulted directly from difficulties experienced during the Macedonian War, but also, essentially, from the Senate's feeling a sense of crisis at the increasing influence of Roman individuals, who acted independently in matters of diplomacy, in light of the preventive measures by the Senate to control its officers in the field, and its emphasising the significance of decrees resulting from the discussion of many senators. The Senate, however, had to be content with the relative revival of its collective leadership. Informal diplomacy could be still necessary and useful for the people in and beyond Rome, and individual Romans could make independent actions or informal diplomacy even

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in conflict with the Senate, providing they held the support of outsiders. Above all, the Senate lacked any definite authority to control the situation, or any measure to define the relationship between its leadership, individual Romans, and informal diplomacy.

**Conclusion**

From the Peace of Apameia, acts of informal diplomacy increased within the wider Roman diplomatic framework. This tendency influenced Rome’s further advance into the Greek world, following the defeat of her rivals. Meanwhile, informal diplomacy caused tensions, particularly in some Greek states and in Rome herself. Those in Greece essentially resulted from the resistance of the Greeks to Roman power but, importantly, there remained basic distinction, and sometimes a conflict arising from a poorly defined relationship between informal diplomacy and legality, as noted by opponents to the Roman advance. It was not addressed in the contacts between Rome and Greece in the 180s, and the settlement depended on ad hoc diplomatic manoeuvres taking place, against the backdrop of Roman imperial ascendancy. Informal diplomacy also caused internal tensions among the Romans, and the difficult position of this concept within their state diplomacy did influence the development after the 180s. The Senate regarded independent actions of individual Romans as an obstacle to its collective leadership from around the middle of the Third Macedonian War, and informal diplomacy was clearly a primary target for its attempt to regain control. However, the attempt by the Senate to strengthen its leadership, in a sense, displayed its own lack of legal legitimacy to control individual Romans completely, especially
in light of the fact that senators always depended on ad hoc moral arguments and the support of people in and beyond Rome. Indeed, there was still room for Roman individuals to take some independent action in the diplomatic context, all with the support of outsiders. At the end of the Macedonian War, the Senate increased its collective leadership with a series of decrees, but the fundamental tension in Roman diplomacy, caused by the rise of the individuals engaging in informal diplomacy, not to mention the very poorly defined nature of the relationship between the Senate and individual Romans, legal power and informal diplomatic initiatives, persisted. Informal diplomacy still functioned as a factor to support Roman expansion from 188 to 167, but also became a seed of discord in international politics of Rome during this period, and remained so, even afterwards.
Chapter 6

Informal Diplomacy and the Crisis of the Republic in 133

Introduction

This chapter is designed to show that informal diplomacy caused tensions among the Romans after Pydna, and ultimately brought about the violence that occurred during the tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. During the Third Macedonian War, the Roman Senate attempted to restrict activities associated with informal diplomacy and thereby to strengthen its collective leadership. But the relationship between informal diplomacy, legality and the collectivity of the leading Romans was poorly defined. Owing to this lack of definition, informal diplomacy spread among the Romans once again, and undermined the political order which many senators attempted to sustain by emphasising the anonymity and plurality of the leaders. This situation would eventually bring armed conflict to Rome.

To examine the problem fully, this chapter will therefore be split into three sections. In Section 1, I will argue that, since the Third Macedonian War, the Senate controlled foreign affairs, but that participation by individual Romans and foreigners was often accepted and sometimes even expected, to address ad hoc necessities. Such intervention in diplomacy was, meanwhile, mainly made anonymously and collectively. This manner was compatible with the desire of many senators to maintain their collective leadership, but there was no definitive way to control such individuals if they participated in diplomacy for their own interests, especially if they held some kind of personal authority.
In the second section, the rise of the *tribuni plebis* in foreign affairs during the same period will be noted. This will show that this phenomenon decreased the collective leadership of the senators, in parallel to informal diplomacy. The *tribuni* presided over the popular assembly, Rome’s supreme organisation, and had the power to influence the Senate and other officers for the defence of the ordinary people. The latter role had been all but forgotten for centuries,¹ but from the period of the Macedonian War onwards, the *tribuni* increased their influence, not only in domestic, but also in foreign affairs. The Senate had no legitimate method to control them. Wielding tribunician power itself was not informal diplomacy, but the analysis of the *tribuni* confirms the uncertainty regarding formal legality and the collective leadership of the senators, and gives hints to consider its influence, with informal diplomacy, on the violence in 133.

In Section 3, I will argue that, in 133, these two factors, i.e. the continued use of informal diplomacy among the Romans and the increase of the influence of the *tribuni*, combined to accelerate Gracchus’ rise. He had private connections with the Attalids and other outsiders. He was also a *tribunus* and could control the assembly and frustrate the working of the Senate. Informal diplomacy and the tribunician power enabled him to manage independently national and foreign affairs at the same time. His opponents, by contrast, had no legitimate method to stop him. Gracchus’ advantage was, furthermore, almost prolonged by his repeated assumption of the tribunate. These elements threatened the collective leadership of the Senate. Those who wanted to maintain the current political order were effectively compelled, therefore, to take extreme counter-measures.

This incident revealed the lack of definition in the relationship between informal diplomacy, legality, and the collective leadership of the senators afresh. Even after the fall of Gracchus, leading Romans struggled to find a solution. Thus, the conflict of 133 heralded the final century of the Republic, in which violence could be a tool in the political struggles between Romans.

By means of these three discussions, this chapter demonstrates the complicated relationship between individuals and state in Rome, and, with the results of the previous chapters, the significance of informal diplomacy in Rome from the 200s to 133, and even afterwards.

**Section 1: Informal Diplomacy, the Senate, and Roman Individuals**

We must now consider that acts of informal diplomacy were often permitted or expected, even following the senatorial pronouncements during the Third Macedonian War designed to control the phenomenon, discussed in the previous chapter. This analysis proves that informal diplomacy was still a convenient tool of the Roman state. It also demonstrates that the senators strove to maintain their collective leadership, and nevertheless, suffered the tension arising from informal diplomacy among them.

The use of informal diplomacy after the Macedonian War, to begin with, can be confirmed in the visit of Attalos, the younger brother of Eumenes II of Pergamon, to Rome in 167 (Liv. 45.19.1-20.3; Polyb. 30.1-3). He congratulated the Senate on Rome’s victory over Macedonia, but the Senate remained distrustful of Eumenes. It had previously thought that the king had secretly wanted to support Macedonia. But there was no evidence to substantiate such an accusation. He had
rather supported Rome militarily. As a consequence, the senators received Attalos’ congratulations warmly. However, this cordiality also appears to have been prompted by an ulterior motive. The Senate had formed a good impression of Attalos and, subsequently, according to Polybios (30.1.7), ‘some men of high rank got Attalos under their influence, and urged him to lay aside the role of ambassador and to speak in his own right (ἐνιοί τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν λαμβάνοντες εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τὸν Ἀτταλὸν παρεκάλουν τὴν μὲν ὑπὲρ τάδελφοῦ πρεσβείαν ἀποθέοσαι, περὶ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους).’ Out of session, Attalos was approached by some senators who encouraged him to petition the Senate to approve his own claim to the throne. In effect, they wanted to weaken the Pergamene kingdom by dividing it into two. Clearly tempted by the senators’ charm or cajoling, Attalos almost expressed such a desire, during the formal meeting. The historicity of this episode is supported by Livius (45.19.4-5), and modern scholars also generally follow him. In light of the fact that Polybios was in Rome under detention from 167 onward, this is reasonable. However, considering Polybios’ favourable attitude towards Eumenes, emphasising his ‘great confidence (μεγίστην … πίστιν)’ in Stratios, who was ‘a man of great sense and powers of persuasion (τι νουνὲχες καὶ πειστικόν)’ and persuaded Attalos not to follow any offer of Rome (30.2.2-3), we must exercise caution not to overestimate the malice shown by the senators in question. Nevertheless, this is a clear case of informal diplomacy. It is also noteworthy that the extant sources offer no details of the individuals who approached Attalos. The senators concerned had a contact with him informally, in the context of a foreign diplomat making an

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2 Dmitriev 2010: 106·7 and 114; Baronowski 2012: 78·9; Briscoe 2012: 662·8.
3 Coşkun 2011: 94·112.
official speech before the Senate. It was an independent and unsanctioned participation in diplomacy, but they did not otherwise make their presence felt. This could be interpreted to mean that the approach was a trick concocted not by them, but by the Senate collectively. The anonymous senators promised to support Attalos if he asked the Senate to give him the throne. It is possible that they had obtained the approval of other senators, and planned to act informally here but openly with them afterwards. In any case, this approach remains an example of informal diplomacy made anonymously.

One could argue that the anonymous nature of the senators concerned was accidental. There are similar cases, however, in Roman contacts with Rhodes. Before Pydna, in 172 Rhodian envoys visited *patroni* and *hospites* in Rome, to mitigate the negative image of Rhodes created by Eumenes (Liv. 42.14.7). This passage does not necessarily prove that Rhodes regarded specific Romans as its *patroni*, despite Livius’ terminology. There is no evidence, for example, that contemporary Rhodians used the term *patronus* or *πάτρων* in their texts. Yet, it is important to note that Rhodes here established private contacts with unnamed Romans. In 168/7, moreover, when the Senate regarded Rhodes’ attempt at mediating between Rome and Macedonia as an action designed to assist the latter, and became enraged with the Rhodians, Rhodes sent its envoys to Rome and assessed the situation ἐκ τῶν ἐντευξίων καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν, by formal and informal meetings, with anonymous Roman statesmen (Polyb. 30.4.3).

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6 Wiemer 2001a: 175-9; Dillon and Garland 2005: 263-4. As regards the term ἐντευξίς, Bevan 1927: 160-1 emphasises in his study of the Ptolemies that it was used in formal petitions to seniors, such as the contacts between subjects and the kings, while in Polybios’ text, vertical relation and formality are not necessarily emphasised, whether
cases, Rhodes used obviously unofficial tools of negotiation, and thus engaged in informal diplomacy. Rome appears not to have objected to this practice, even if the Senate had endeavoured to control its use by individual Romans. It is important that, in a similar fashion to the case of Attalos, none of the Romans connected with Rhodes in this period are named directly. They accepted Rhodes’ approach but avoided engaging with it, in order to exaggerate the individual nature of their success. In 167, M. Porcius Cato the Elder defended Rhodes in a famous speech (Gell. 6.3.5-55; Liv. 45.25.3-4), but did not even refer to the private friendship that existed with the Rhodians, much less cite it as a reason to support them. This does not contradict the possibility that he was previously asked to help Rhodes or that he was, in fact, its patronus, as D. Bloy has argued.\(^7\) Whatever the reality, Cato and the other Romans concerned downplayed their private connection to increase their own fame.

This pattern of the contact between the Romans and outsiders is also suggested by the Teian action to save Abdera, sometime in the middle of the 160s, when Kotys IV of Thrace asked the Senate to give him Abdera’s territory. Teos interceded for Abdera, on account of the kinship between the two city-states

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\(^7\) Bloy 2012: 175-6.
According to the Abderan decree (ll.21-2), Teos’ delegates ‘met with the leading men of the Romans and won them over by their daily patience (ἐντυγχάνοντες μὲν τοῖς ἡγουμένοις Ῥωμαίων καὶ ἐξομηθεῦν/όμενοι διὰ τῆς καθ’ ἡμέρας[ν καὶ]τερήσεως).’ While the erection of this inscription suggests that Teos’ intercession was successful, it resulted partly from the informal diplomacy of the delegates and the Roman individuals concerned. They established contacts privately, and influenced the decision reached by Rome. Once again, no individual Roman was spotlighted in this inscription. Although this was an honorary decree for Teos’ ambassadors, the anonymity of the Romans involved suggests that they accepted the envoys’ informal petitions, but did not actively show their personal influence in public, similar to the cases of Attalos and Rhodes. The evidence suggests, then, that some Roman individuals felt it comfortable to use informal diplomacy in this period, albeit collectively and anonymously.

This rejection of notoriety and otherwise passive attitude in the contacts with outsiders is also observed in the case of Charops, who had dominated Epeiros.

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8 Cf. Herrmann 1971: 72-7; Graham 1992: 48-59. For the close relationship between the two cities, see Youni 2007: 725 and Fragoulaki 2013: 266. As to the significance of kinship in Greek diplomacy, see Jones 1999: e.g. 1·17 and Patterson 2010: e.g. 1·44.  
9 Although the term ἔξομηθεῦω is normally interpreted as ‘bind by taking hostages’, for this Abderan inscription ‘win over’ has become the preferred translation among scholars. E.g. Sherk 1984: no.26; Eilers 2002: 238-9.  
10 There is disagreement regarding the chronology of this inscription. Several scholars think the decree was not made in the 160s. Kotys IV allied with Macedonia during the Third Macedonian War. It seemed difficult for him to ask Rome to give him any territory. Chiranky 1982: 461-70 and 473; Marek 1997: 169-77; Eilers 2002: 114-32; Camia 2009: 160-3. But many scholars do not support this theory, owing to the compatibility of the decree with the political situation in the 160s. E.g. Magie 1939b: 177; Jehne 2009: 159 n.75; Bloy 2012: 168-201. Moreover, during this period, Prusias II of Bithynia had attempted to mediate between Macedonia and Rome in the war, as Rhodes had done, and seemed to arouse the senatorial hostility; nevertheless, after he apologised for his mediation and Rome treated him favourably, he asked the Senate to give a territory in Asia Minor (Liv. 42.12.3 and 45.44.3-8; Polyb. 30.18). It is not strange that Kotys tried to gain Abdera’s territory in the 160s.
In 160/59, he visited M. Aemilius Lepidus, the pontifex maximus and the princeps senatus, and L. Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedonia, to ask them to support his appeal to the Senate, requesting recognition of his control over Epeiros. The two Romans refused his visit ‘to their homes (εἰς τὰς οἰκίας αὐτῶν)’ owing to his brutality towards the Epeirotes (Polyb. 32.6.5). Polybios’ report for this episode confirms that the Greeks and Romans had become accustomed to having private contacts before senatorial sessions, thus engaging in informal diplomacy. Lepidus and Paullus refused to meet Charops not because they did not want to meet a foreigner privately, but because they were aware of his conduct in Epeiros, and apparently loathed him for his acts. At the same time, though, the Romans were passive throughout this episode. Their refusal of his visit was viewed favourably by other Greeks opposed to him (32.6.6). Both Romans would likely have increased their personal fame if they had publicly shown such Greeks their ‘antipathy to knaves (τὸ μισοπόνηρον),’ but, instead, they took no action at all. This expression of informal diplomacy bears considerable similarities to that of the cases mentioned above.

The pattern is also observed in the case of Herakleides, a courtier of Antiochos IV (Polyb. 33.15.1-2 and 18.5-14).12 After the death of the king and the usurpation of throne by Demetrios I,13 he visited Rome in 153 with Alexandros Balas, Antiochos’ alleged heir, asking the Senate to support Balas’ claim to the throne. Polybios claims that Herakleides won over the senators ‘through idle talks and corruption (μετὰ τερατείας ἀμα καὶ κακουργίας),’ a rather negative way of

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12 Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 56-7 and 76.
referring to private approaches (33.15.2), and succeeded in securing an official meeting with the Senate and in persuading it to grant Balas the authority to regain the throne. Some ‘moderate people (τοῖς ... μετρίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων’), though, the author claims, regarded Herakleides’ manner negatively (33.18.10). Herakleides, and the senators who supported him, conducted informal diplomacy. Meanwhile, considering the fact that Polybios had supported Demetrios on the occasion of the latter’s return home to succeed to the throne (31.12.8), Polybios’ moralistic references to Herakleides and some senators opposing his manner of approaching other leading Romans cannot be accepted at face value. They work as a tool of emphasising the legitimacy of Demetrios’ throne and the support for him by the author himself. The senators might have easily accepted Herakleides’ approach, owing to their enmity with the Seleucids. His proposal, if successful, would cause internal trouble to the dynasty and decrease its power. In any case, the majority of the senators accepted his unofficial approach. It is significant that, even in this case, the senators did not get into the limelight, whether they were positively disposed towards Herakleides or not, similar to the other cases, mentioned above. This might partly result, here, from Polybios’ indifference to making it clear who supported Herakleides, or his unwillingness to do so. The senators in question were Polybios’ contemporaries. Considering his favourable attitude towards Demetrios, however, it was safer and more reasonable for Polybios to make it clear who the moderate people were, if it was possible. I would argue, then, that the lack of any reference to such senators realistically reflects the situation in which Romans accepted the use of informal diplomacy, but tended

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to engage in it anonymously.

A similar pattern may further be seen in the case of Demetrios, a priest of the Sarapieion at Delos, under Athens. He apparently bypassed the Athenian assembly and asked the Roman Senate to order Athens to cancel a decision concerning the shrine, which was unfavourable to him, in c. 164. His request was accepted (RDGE 5).\textsuperscript{16} Although this decree might have been passed in the mid-first century,\textsuperscript{17} if the traditional date is correct, this episode also represents an example of informal diplomacy occurring in the 160s. It is further noteworthy that, as J. L. Ferrary explains,\textsuperscript{18} the Senate sent neither a letter nor an envoy to present its decree regarding this case to Athens. Demetrios brought it, instead, to the Athenians himself (ll.4-7). Rome had thereby tacitly approved his private intervention in international politics. Several senators supported him and consequently proposed the motion on his behalf (ll.15-23). However, their support remained collective and passive. They did not actively try to garner personal fame by sending someone, or a public letter, to Athens. This management of informal diplomacy contrasted with the way that the Romans had utilised it during the period before the Third Macedonian War, considered in the previous chapter.

This attitude was not shared by all leading Romans, however, as proved by an event surrounding Rome’s arbitration of a dispute in 149, between Attalos II and Prusias II, based on the request of the latter. The Senate instructed the praetor of the year to select members for the delegation.\textsuperscript{19} According to Appianos

\textsuperscript{16} For more on the relation between Athens and Delos in this decade, see Tracy 1979: 214.
\textsuperscript{17} Canali de Rossi 2000: 72-82. While Ferrary 2009: 127-8 still dates this event to the 160s, Chaniotis 2009: 5-6 reserves the decision.
\textsuperscript{18} Ferrary 2009: 127-8 and 132-5.
\textsuperscript{19} As for the war between the Attalids and Bithynia, see Hopp 1977: 86-92.
(Mithr. 6; cf. Diod. 32.20.1, Liv. Per. 50, Plut. Cato Mai. 9; Polyb. 36.14), this unnamed officer delayed the deliberation and, "through favour towards Attalos (χαριζόμενος Ἀττάλῳ)," chose three senators who apparently lacked the ability to deal with the dispute. Attalos enjoyed an advantageous position compared to Prusias, and the failure of negotiations would enable the former to dictate the affair even more favourably. Thus, this was a case of the result of informal diplomacy, since the praetor had intervened in Roman state diplomacy on his behalf. It is noteworthy that his action was observed by other Romans, in light of Cato’s comment upon the lack of ability of the selected senators, with irony, in Polybios’ text (36.14.4-5); nevertheless, the selection was not corrected. Based on this evidence, I would argue that Romans were still interested in advancing their own agenda in diplomacy, during this period, and it could either be overlooked or tacitly approved by others. Ironically, in this case, however, the authors of the extant sources highlight the unsuitability of the delegates, rather than the name of the praetor.

This attempt to decrease anonymity in Roman diplomacy in the face of many senators’ efforts to maintain it was more conspicuous in the field. In 164/3, for example, the Senate doubted Eumenes’ loyalty, and sent C. Sulpicius Galus to investigate the situation. He visited Sardeis and declared that anyone who wished to bring an accusation against Eumenes could meet with him (Diod. 31.7.2, Polyb. 31.1.6-8 and 6.1-6). It is tempting to explain this overtly rude action by citing Galus’ reproachful character, as Polybios does (31.6.4-5), or to the generally

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20 Ancient authors, except Valerius Maximus, tend to report his cognomen as Gallus, but Fasti Capitolini 66 and Fasti Triumphales 105 spell it as Galus, as the Roman writer does (at 6.3.10, 8.1.absol.2, and 11.1). Cf. Briscoe 2008: 478.
negative image of Eumenes among the Romans, at that point. Galus, however, appears to have been a sensible and rational character. It was he, for example, that had predicted the lunar eclipse shortly before the Battle of Pydna, and advised Paullus to settle the nerves of his soldiers (Frontin. *Strat.* 1.12.8; Liv. 44.37.5-9; Plin. *NH* 2.53). Yet, his mission was to investigate the situation of Asia Minor, not to encourage the inhabitants to abuse Eumenes (Polyb. 31.1.8). Galus therefore collected unfavourable rumours relating to him independently, but in a rational manner. This is an example of informal diplomacy while exceeding his position as a diplomat. For this, however, he was not criticised by the Senate, and thereby expressed his individuality within the political framework successfully. Regardless of whether there was tacit expectation or approval for his additional actions, one point that clearly emerges from this episode is that diplomatic anonymity was not observed in the field as clearly as it was in Rome.

The diplomatic situation is further complicated, however, by the fact that many leading Romans still strove to prevent individuals from winning fame independently, despite also overlooking other examples of informal diplomacy in action. This is suggested by the arbitration between the warring Attalos and Prusias in 155/4. The Senate sent ten diplomats to persuade Prusias to accept its resolution to end the hostilities. While it is possible that this resulted from the idea that the collective influence of ten senators would be stronger than that of one, the plurality also served to prevent any from being distinguished themselves. This is confirmed by their actions after Prusias rejected the senatorial

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22 Briscoe 2012: 584-6.
23 The role of collectivity has been indicated by Yarrow 2012: 169.
decree. The envoys renounced the friendship and alliance between Rome and him and, significantly, visited his neighbours to encourage them to desert him. Then, when the war situation became advantageous to the Attalids owing to the support of the envoys, in 154, Prusias accepted the peace, based on the senatorial decree (Polyb. 33.7 and 12.13). It is significant, here, that the senators’ approach to Prusias’ neighbours, had little formal basis (33.12.8-9). This does not mean, however, they deviated from the Senate’s original order. They had compelled Prusias to accept its demand, but had also acted on their own authority and engaged in informal diplomacy. It is further noteworthy that Polybios does not relate that they gained fame. Only the names of the three leaders of the deputation are known. The senatorial delegation thus managed their task with informal diplomacy but did not or could not make others take notice of them individually. This might partly result from the fact that Polybios devotes more attention here to Rome’s imperialistic attitude to the Greeks, than to the individual Romans involved. According to the author, the strict attitude of the envoys derived from ‘the antipathy of the Senate to (Prusias’) disregard of its orders (καταφρόνησιν τῶν τῆς συγκλήτου παραγγελμάτων’), despite the equal partnership between Rome and Prusias inferred by the alliance referred to by the delegates (33.7.1). If this arbitration, however, had been made by a small number of senators, and the envoys had been interested in emphasising their influence, they would likely have attracted attention of contemporaries easily, owing to the sheer number of Prusias’ neighbours that were approached by the Roman deputation. I would argue, instead, that the anonymity of the envoys in Polybios’

text suggests that the senators sending them, and the envoys themselves, consciously maintained collective diplomatic control of the situation, despite engaging in elements of informal diplomacy.

This method of managing foreign affairs could not work in the military sphere, though. The generals had sole authority, and punishment for them was decided in the assembly, as shown by Lucretius’ case in Chapter 5. The Senate could not therefore prevent them completely from acting in their own interests. This is confirmed by some episodes during the war in Hispania. In 151, L. Licinius Lucullus, the consul, attacked the Vaccaei without any resolution. In the following year, Ser. Sulpicius Galba, the propraetor, joined the campaign on his own authority (App. Hisp. 51-5 and 59). These are examples of informal diplomacy inasmuch as they represent independent participation in foreign affairs, even though their official power as a general was cited. Interestingly, Lucullus was not criticised for this action, while Galba was later prosecuted. Even Galba, however, was not reprimanded for his impetuous campaign, despite lacking order of the Senate or the assembly, but rather for the offences against his misdeed in the campaigns, primarily from a moral perspective. Moreover, he was eventually cleared even of these charges (Liv. Per. 49). This situation resulted from the military achievements of both commanders, and Galba’s individual conduct in the popular court under the name of the assembly. He tactically invoked the people’s mercy by referring to his children and others in his family, and the audience was moved with sympathy (Cic. Brut. 80 and 89-90; Or. 1.227-8; Val.Max. 8.1.2).²⁵ He later failed to obtain the consulship until 144: it is possible that the accusations...
might have had a lingering, negative effect upon his reputation. Discounting his subsequent misfortune, however, these cases suggest that generals in the field actively managed foreign affairs to advance their own agenda and interests. Possessing authority (and troops), they could not be controlled completely, even by the collective leadership of the Senate.

This pattern can also be observed in the case of Hispania in 137. The Senate had made a resolution to end the war against the Vaccaei when M. Aemilius Lepidus engaged them, since this tribe had not violated its treaty with Rome. However, the general refused to follow the decree, nonetheless. D. Iunius Brutus, his colleague in Hispania, also supported his operation. Lepidus argued that since his troops, and those of Brutus, had commenced their operations, it had become too dangerous simply to cease, even though they began without a decree from the Senate or the assembly. He was consequently deprived of his command and later fined, but Brutus was still able to celebrate a triumph for the engagement. Furthermore, Lepidus' punishment was not for his independent action, but for military failure (App. *Hisp.* 80-3; Eutrop. 4.19; Plut. *TGrac.* 21).

The Senate could not seem to control the generals, unless some pretext outside the remit of their military power was discovered to criticise them. This situation may have resulted from a senatorial hesitation to reprimand the generals excessively; affairs in Hispania had become fraught, and Rome had a genuine requirement for able generals. Nevertheless, it is incontroversible that there was no legitimate method to forestall such individuals who possessed any real authority, and whose

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28 For the legal discussion about Lepidus’ punishment, see Bauman 1968: 37-50.
29 Richardson 1986: 154-5.
achievements in the field made them appear even more accomplished.

Another similar case can also be found in Italy. Ap. Claudius Pulcher, the consul, attacked the Salassi without any resolution of the Senate or the assembly in 143 (Cassius Dio fr.74.1-2). He allegedly obtained no victory, but tried to celebrate a triumph. It was forbidden by the Senate, but he held it privately, regardless. Considering the fact that Livius’ *Periochae* (53) reports on his subduing the Salassi, Dio’s report might be based on other sources’ unrealistic criticism of Pulcher. It is difficult to clarify the results of his campaign. In any case, his unauthorised triumph was reported by several authors (Cic. *Cael.* 34; Oros. 5.4.7; Suet. *Tib.* 2.4), and seems credible. In effect, then, Pulcher appears to have conducted two kinds of informal diplomacy: independently attacking a tribe, and then awarding himself a triumph as a victor over Rome’s enemies. Despite such blatant behaviour, he appears to have escaped punishment, and possibly even increased his fame. He was not elected as the censor in 142, but assumed it in 136 (Liv. *Per.* 56; Plut. *Aem.* 38.3-6; *Mor.* 200.C-D; *TGrac.* 4.2). The citizens appear not to have noticed his engaging in foreign affairs independently. The Senate prevented him from holding a triumph, but could not control his image wholly, nor the attitude of the people towards him.

I also would argue that envoys could participate in foreign affairs independently, even if they lacked the support of many senators. Evidence for this can be found out around the outbreak of the Achaian War. From c. 149, Rome mediated between Achaia and Sparta, but neither party sought to end the dispute. In this situation, L. Aurelius Orestes, one of the delegates sent to the

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Peloponnesos, reported to Rome that he was threatened by the Achaian, ‘while exaggerating the truth and exercising invention (μετ’ αυξήσεως και καινολογίας),’ stirring up ill feeling against Achaia among the senators independently (Polyb. 38.9.1-3, esp. 2). These remarks caused Rome to display antipathy towards Achaia, and subsequently provoked a war between the federation and Rome (Liv. Per. 51; Paus. 7.12-15; Polyb. 38.10-13). Yet, Pausanias relates that Orestes showed a senatorial decree requesting Achaia to make not only Sparta independent, but several other cities too, and that this enraged the Achaians (7.14.1-3). Polybios claims that Rome, nevertheless, did not originally want to dissolve Achaia, and that some demagogues in Achaia prevented the Roman negotiators and the ‘moderate’ Achaians from managing the dispute (38.9.6 and 10.1-13.8). These references are often accepted by scholars, although Polybios’ antipathy towards the Achaian hawks against Rome also appears to have influenced his method of description. The significance of Orestes’ report, thus, should not be overestimated. Indeed, Rome continued with the negotiations following his return, and Achaia did not expect the eventual attack of Q. Caecilius Metellus, who had been originally sent to pacify Macedonia (Oros. 5.3.2-3; Paus. 7.14.3-4 and 15.1-4; Polyb. 38.10.1-12.9; cf. Liv. Per. 50; Zonar. 9.28).

Nevertheless, Orestes’ report increased the Romans’ ill feeling towards Achaia. This suggests that envoys wanted to and could intervene in Rome’s decision-making process while distinguishing themselves, although the Senate continued in its attempt to maintain collective management of diplomatic activity.

It is noteworthy that such persistent use of informal diplomacy gradually

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enabled some individual Romans to influence the people in and beyond Rome continuously. This is shown by the actions of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus the Elder. He was the father of the *tribunus plebis* in 133, and was sent to Asia Minor in the 160s to inspect the situation (Polyb. 30.27.1). The Senate distrusted both Eumenes II and Antiochos IV. According to Polybios (30.30.8), however, ‘the kings succeeded in relaxing the vigour of the deputation (led by Gracchus) by the warmth of their reception (*οὕτως αὐτοὺς οἱ βασιλεῖς ἔξετέμοντο τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντησιν φιλανθρωπίᾳ*).’ Polybios thinks Gracchus was naively corrupted.32 Whether Polybios’ view was correct or not,33 Gracchus established friendly and private dialogues with both kings, and arranged their contacts with Rome (30.30.7). This was independent participation in Rome’s decision-making. During the same period, he also reported favourably on Ariarathes V, the Cappadocian king, and on Demetrios I, who had fled from Rome, despite being a hostage, and usurped the throne of Antiochos V. Gracchus persuaded the Senate to recognise their kingship (App. *Syr.* 46; Diod. 31.17; Polyb. 31.2-3, 11-15, and 32-3; Zonar. 9.25). The kings had taken their thrones and desired Roman recognition,34 and Gracchus favoured the two monarchs, as well as Eumenes and Antiochos IV. These do not necessarily mean he extended *beneficia* or vertical relationships to them, despite D. C. Earl’s supposition.35 They might simply have won over Gracchus and thereby established a friendship with Rome commencing with his support, as Polybios thinks. In any case, these connections with the kings made other Romans regard ‘Tiberius (Gracchus) as a person familiar with all (eastern)

32 Walbank 1979: 454 and 456.
35 Earl 1963: 165.
affairs (τὸν Τεβέριον ... πάντων αὐτόπτην γεγονέναι),’ and his opinions about them were relied upon (Polyb. 31.2.6-11 and 15.9.11, esp. 11). Consequently, he influenced Roman diplomacy continuously thereafter, until his death in c. 154 (cf. Cic. Div. 1.36 and 2.62: Plin. NH 7.122 and 34.24: Plut. TGrac. 1.4-7). His leadership was exercised for less than ten years. In fact, the mediation between the Attalids and Bithynia in 155/4, mentioned above, was conducted by other envoys collectively. According to Plutarchos (TGrac. 1.3), though, his wife Cornelia received an offer of marriage from Ptolemaios VIII of Egypt after Gracchus’ death. This suggests that his influence was still substantial, although, it might also be significant that she was a daughter of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, and the proposal itself might be a fiction designed to increase her dignity and that of the Gracchi by their supporters.36 Gracchus’ connection with the kings enabled him to occupy a special position in Roman diplomatic affairs, and influenced the attitude of others towards his family.

This continuous influence over diplomacy can also be observed in the actions of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, the son of L. Aemilius Paullus. For instance, he was invited by the Macedonians to solve their disputes in 151, as the successor of his family. This was regarded by other Romans as a reasonable rationale, and he was conscious of it. He said before the Senate that ‘personally (the task) was suitable for him (κατ᾿ ἰδίαν ... οἰκειοτέραν),’ even though his political experience, at the time, was limited to the quaestorship, at best (Polyb. 35.4.9-11, esp. 10).37 This pattern is also observed when he declined the offer from Macedonia and volunteered instead to serve as a staff officer for the war in

Hispania. Since he was Africanus’ grandson by adoption, he was eventually sent to Masinissa, Numidia’s king and Africanus’ friend, by Lucullus, the general dispatched to Hispania at that time. Lucullus used him specifically to ask the king to send elephants (Val.Max. 2.10.4). Indeed, according to Appianos (Pun. 72a), when Aemilianus visited Numidia, Masinissa treated him graciously ‘for the friendship with the ancestor (οἷα φίλον ἐκ πάππου).’ Moreover, Carthage observed his visit to Africa and petitioned him to mediate in its trouble with Numidia.He accepted this invitation, even though it had not been ordered by Lucullus. Aemilianus was expected by his seniors and outsiders to support them, to participate in foreign affairs. He consciously used longstanding family connections, engaged in informal diplomacy, and thereby increased his own personal fame.

It is, however, noteworthy that others were even more active in exploiting Aemilianus’ influence than he was. This can be confirmed, for example, by a case dating to the middle of the Third Punic War. In 148, Masinissa asked the Senate to send Aemilianus to intervene in his sons’ succession to his throne (App. Pun. 105; Val.Max. 5.2.ext.4). The king considered the connection with Africanus’ descendants important, and wanted, moreover, to extend this association to his sons. This request may well have displayed afresh Aemilianus’ private influence. However, this was also a sign of Masinissa’s disagreement with Roman policy to Rome. He was angry with her declaration of war on Carthage. Hostilities had been commenced without any notice and without an offer to divide the military results

39 For the dispute between Carthage and Numidia, see Kunze 2011: 403-8 and 411.
40 For more on the outbreak of the war, see Baronowski 1995: 16-31 and Le Bohec 2011: 430-40 and 445.
with him, thus denying his territorial ambitions in the region (App. *Pun.* 94).\(^{41}\) It is in this context that he dared to name the young Roman, who had previously not been connected with decision-making in Rome, as his preferred mediator. Aemilianus was therefore used as a tool to subtly voice the king’s ill feeling.

In addition, Aemilianus was approached by the Achaians, and contributed to the release of their hostages in 150. They had been taken to Italy during the Third Macedonian War (Plut. *Cato Mai.* 9.2-3; Polyb. 35.6).\(^{42}\) Yet, this decision of Rome was achieved relatively simply through the direct support of senior statesmen, such as Cato. Aemilianus merely liaised between them and the Achaians. He also had contacts with eastern dynasties, such as the Attalids, during the 140s and the 130s (Cic. *Deiot.* 19; Diod. 33.18.1-4; Just. 38.8.8-11; Str. 14.5.2),\(^{43}\) but he did not seem to participate independently in any of the contacts between these states and Rome. Looking at the evidence as a whole, he appears to have used his influence in foreign affairs to advance his position infrequently, whereas others seem to have been keener to exploit it in championing their ad hoc interests. However, we should avoid viewing Aemilianus as a passive participant. Indeed, this situation could only have resulted from the fact that he was willing to lend his influence to the people approaching him. While leading Romans and outsiders used him and his continued influence in diplomacy, they lacked any method to control him if he behaved independently.

Overall, we can observe that informal diplomacy was used by the Romans even after the Third Macedonian War. During the period, it is clear that outsiders also expected to experience such instances of personal influence in their contacts

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\(^{41}\) Braund 1983: 36-7.


\(^{43}\) Hopp 1977: 116.
with Rome. Meanwhile, many Romans were also committed to maintaining and
developing collective and anonymous diplomacy, preventing the rise of individual
Romans. However, Rome had no method of completely controlling them in
diplomacy, even when advancing their own interests. The leading Romans could
not invent any way to achieve it. This can be explained, to some extent, by the
fact that most cases of informal diplomacy did not threaten their collective
leadership, and many Romans felt no necessity of solving the problem drastically.
However, the demand for informal diplomacy among the Romans, and outsiders,
not to mention the lack of an effective method to control the phenomenon, could
cause conflict between those who advocated maintaining collective, anonymous
diplomacy, and those who would continuously express their individuality if the
opportunity presented itself. The cases of Gracchus the Elder and Aemilianus only
avoided provoking internal conflict among the Romans because the former was
old, and the latter never confronted the collective leadership of the senators.
Within this potentially volatile context, it is important to remember that Rome’s
constitution could actually promote the exclusive rise of individuals and the
decrease of the collective leadership of the leading Romans or the Senate. This is
key to understanding better the violence of 133, and the advantages and
disadvantages of informal diplomacy in Rome. The following section prepares this
important discussion, by analysing the rise of the *tribuni plebis* from the period
of the Macedonian War onwards that occurred in parallel to that of informal
diplomacy in the Roman context.
Section 2: The Tribuni Plebis in Foreign Affairs

Before examining the increasing importance of the tribunate in Roman diplomacy from the period of the Third Macedonian War, it is useful to consider its general condition prior to the 160s. Some scholars think that the tribuni plebis were under the influence of the Senate from the approval of the Lex Hortensia in 287, until the dispute caused by Gracchus in 133.\(^{44}\) Indeed, their actions after 287 mainly resulted from arrangements with the Senate, and were basically for home affairs (e.g. Liv. 32.29.3-4, 34.53.1-2, and 35.7.1-6; Macrob. Sat. 3.17.2). The plebiscite in 192 for allocation of the officers was exceptional, but was made under the senatorial advice (Liv. 35.20.9). Furthermore, the tribuni originally looked to personify Rome’s democratic aspect, but from the viewpoint of many contemporary Greeks and monarchs (6.13.8-9), Rome’s constitution in Polybios’ period was a de facto aristocracy controlled by the senators. This appearance might have been prompted by inequalities in the voting system,\(^{45}\) and by the increasing ascendancy of elite elements, senators and their relations. This does not mean that Rome’s popular sovereignty had been lost completely, though. As F. Millar argues, the citizens’ assembly was still Rome’s legitimate legislative chamber, and so the political elites simply could not ignore them.\(^{46}\) However, Polybios refers to a tribuniciam power that could hinder the operation of the Senate and reflected the wishes of the people (6.16.4-5), but also emphasises the senatorial leadership (cf. 6.15.3-8 and 17.1-8). Many tribuni were incorporated

into the order embodied by the senators, with familial relations to other leaders, wealth and dignity.\textsuperscript{47}

Even if the \textit{tribuni} were generally under the Senate, though, they were still treated as an independent group in official letters, during the first quarter of the second century (\textit{e.g.} \textit{RDGE} 34.11.2-3; \textit{CID} IV.105.1.1-2).\textsuperscript{48} Moreover, Rome’s legal framework enabled the \textit{tribuni} to show their influence in home affairs. C. Flaminius, the \textit{tribunus} of 231, and C. Valerius Tappo, that of 188, carried their bills to the popular assembly while bypassing the Senate, and legislated them based on the \textit{Lex Hortensia} (Liv. 38.76.7-9; Polyb. 2.21.7-9).\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, the \textit{tribuni} sometimes showed their influence by accusing senators and generals of misdeeds,\textsuperscript{50} and maintained special powers such as the sacred inviolability, the veto, and the authority to incarcerate any officer.\textsuperscript{51} The evidence suggests, then, that the \textit{tribuni} remained a potential rival to the Senate, during this period. What should be noticed now is that they increasingly participated even in foreign affairs through these influences, particularly from the period of the Third Macedonian War. This does not necessarily mean they conducted informal diplomacy. They succeeded in directing some policy by using their official powers, and were supported by senators, initially, at least. But the rise of the \textit{tribuni} in diplomacy eventually decreased the collective leadership of the Senate. Analysis of this situation contributes to demonstrating the significance of the relationship between informal diplomacy and other factors in Rome’s foreign and home affairs, such as the Senate and legality, in the incident of 133 and in wider Roman history.

\textsuperscript{49} Stockton 1979: 63.
\textsuperscript{50} Taylor 1962: 21-7; Williams 2004: 281-94.
during the second century, and afterwards.

The rise of the *tribuni* in foreign affairs can first be observed when Rhodes tried to mediate between Rome and Macedonia during the Third Macedonian War. The Senate openly expressed its fury regarding the situation, after Pydna. At this time, M. Iuventius Thalna, the praetor, appealed to the citizens to attack Rhodes, and to select him as the general, without senatorial consent. Against this action, M. Antonius and possibly M. Pomponius, the *tribuni*, exercised the veto, and introduced Rhodes’ envoys to the Senate, thus giving them an opportunity to sue for a pardon (Liv. 45.21.1-8; Polyb. 30.4.4-6).\textsuperscript{52} The *tribuni* helped Rhodes and supported the senatorial leadership by stopping Thalna, and participated in diplomacy by themselves. The Senate listened to the envoys and managed the affair peacefully. This participation of the *tribuni* in diplomacy was not necessarily independent, though, much less informal. The envoys may well have been introduced on the wishes of many senators, despite P. J. Burton’s argument that Rome regarded Rhodes as a traitor and wanted to wreak reprisals for this moral reason.\textsuperscript{53} If many senators had planned to attack Rhodes, it would have been impossible to introduce the envoys to the Senate. It is also worth noting that the veto was used although it had rarely been required, previously.\textsuperscript{54} These factors make it highly likely that the *tribuni* played a role in Roman diplomacy here, and suggest that their authority, and their relationship with the Senate were the contributing factors.

This pattern can also be observed in some other cases connected to the Macedonian War. In 170, for example, the *tribuni*, including Thalna, accused C.

\textsuperscript{52} Berthold 1984: 196-7.
\textsuperscript{53} Burton 2003: 363-4.
\textsuperscript{54} Cf. Millar 1984: 5.
Lucretius Gallus, one of the Roman commanders, after many Greeks complained about his misdeeds in his campaign (Liv. 43.7.5-8.2). The Senate approved the prosecution in the assembly. This was nominally an act of redress through the tribunician power, but also enabled the office bearers to draw attention to their presence in national and international politics. The trial may well have been noticed by people in and beyond Rome. Yet, if the Senate had sympathised with Lucretius, while respecting his power as a general, and used its collective authority to suggest to the *tribuni* that they stop their prosecution,\(^55\) it would have been difficult for the latter to sustain their charges. The opening of the trial and their intervention in the conduct of the war, therefore, resulted not only from their authority, but also from senatorial approval. A similar situation is found after Pydna, in an episode during which the Senate instructed Q. Cassius, the praetor, to arrange with the *tribuni* that they should propose a motion regarding triumphs to the assembly (45.35.4).\(^56\) This further suggests the rise of the *tribuni* in the conduct of foreign affairs, by virtue of their tribunician powers, while their participation was largely dependent on the Senate, which strove to recover its collective leadership.

One might be forgiven for thinking that these cases show that the *tribuni* were simply subordinate to the Senate. Yet, despite the scant nature of the evidence for the *tribuni* after Pydna, they intervened increasingly in foreign affairs, and did so independently. For instance, in 151, the consuls had difficulty in levying soldiers for the war in Hispania (App. *Hisp.* 49; Liv. *Per.* 48; Polyb. 35.3-4). Indeed, Rome faced a worsening manpower shortage. Citizens were unwilling

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\(^{55}\) As to the legal relationship between the Senate and the generals in the field at this time, see Brennan 2000: 213-4.

\(^{56}\) For the control of the Senate over triumphs, see Richardson 1975: 56.
to serve in the war, a situation exacerbated by the lack of opportunities to amass booty. The consuls enforced conscription, provoking unrest. At this time, the *tribuni* restrained the consuls, following complaints from the people. This equated to an intervention by them in both home and foreign affairs. The prevention of conscription was pressed in opposition to the Senate directing the war, through the consuls.

It is important that, in this case of 151, the consuls and the Senate accepted the restrictions enforced by the *tribuni*. This shows that their action was legitimate and could not be stopped, legally. But, as I argued above, the exercising of tribunician powers had depended previously on the guidance of the Senate. The situation in 151 signifies of considerable change in the relationship. For this point, A. E. Astin has cited the influence of public opinion as a factor. Certainly, many citizens tried to evade conscription, owing to war weariness (e.g. App. *Hisp.* 49; Polyb. 35. 4.1-8). This encouraged the *tribuni* to prevent the consuls from levying troops, since their original role was to represent the ordinary people. While the development of this case might be explained in basic terms, however, this is not a complete answer. The war in Hispania was not the first one in which citizens were unwilling to enlist. Indeed, the citizens refused to serve at the outset of the Second Macedonian War. The assembly rejected the motion, and moreover, Q. Baebius, the *tribunus* in 200, criticised those promoting the war, reflecting the opinion of the citizenry (Liv. 31.5-8). At that point, however, many senators exerted considerable pressure on him to desist. He was thus prevented from hindering the consul’s second motion for war before the assembly, even though Baebius could

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57 Taylor 1962: 22.
58 Badian 1972: 710.
have vetoed it legitimately (31.6.4-6). Public opinion was aligned with the *tribuni*, both in 200 and 151: the difference in the results suggests, however, that this alignment was not the defining factor that enabled the *tribuni* to wield their authority and to participate in foreign affairs.

What, then, was the difference between the two cases? A clue can be found in the case of L. Scribonius Libo, the *tribunus* in 149. He proposed a law that the Lusitanians, who had surrendered but had been betrayed by Ser. Sulpicius Galba (mentioned in Section 1) in 150, should be liberated (Liv. *Per.* 49). Cato sympathised with this proposal, but, owing to Galba’s public conduct, considered above, the proposal was rejected, nevertheless. One could argue that this episode simply displays Cato’s private criticism of the magistrates’ misdeeds, or that Libo criticised Galba on the basis of morality alongside Cato, but in vain. Yet, it is noticeable that there was a division among the senators, and this enabled Libo to charge Galba while also participating in Rome’s decision-making of foreign affairs. Considering Cato’s career and huge influence, his validation of Libo would realistically result in the support of a number of senators. Indeed, if many leading Romans had not agreed with him, they would likely have pressured him to withdraw the accusation, as they had done in Baebius’ case. As a general, Galba could legitimately take highly destructive actions, such as destroying an entire tribe. The accusation could be dismissed legally. Although the court returned a verdict of not guilty against him, this was down to his solid defence, rather than any other, more nebulous, factors. The very process of opening a trial means that many leading Romans approved of Libo’s accusation and, in so doing, gave tacit

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acceptance of the *tribunus* participation in foreign affairs, regardless of the motives of the people involved. With this in mind, the increasing ability to win over a number of senators, not necessarily the collective will of the Senate itself, was a factor in the rise of the *tribuni*, detached from their authority and the constraints of public opinion.

This view is supported by the case of L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, the *tribunus* in 149. He succeeded in establishing a standing court for prosecuting extortion by the field officers, following a heated argument (Cic. *Brut.* 106; *Off.* 2.75). It created a procedure by which provincials could complain about Roman generals and governors, although the means for the recovery of estates and property seized were still of limited help to the alleged victims.62 Piso’s action was clearly an intervention into foreign affairs. It is important to note that the bill’s adoption apparently resulted from his successful appeal to a variety of people in and beyond the Senate. He debated the bill with many opponents, but managed to convince the majority of the people and senators. The sources do not report on his political friends or enemies, but I would suggest that his opponents may well have been those in positions of power, given the reformatory character of the law about high-ranking officers. Nevertheless, they failed to prevent Piso from legislating for the court and from participating in the supervision of generals, an undeniably important element of Roman foreign policy. His partnership with many senators, or their political divisions, was therefore a factor that enabled the *tribunus* to participate in foreign affairs.

The appointment of Aemilianus as consul can also be understood by

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noticing this pattern. He was sent to Africa and Hispania as the consul in 147 and 134 (App. Pun. 112; Hisp. 84; Liv. Per. 51; Val. Max. 8.15.4), despite the fact that he was too young to stand for the office. In both cases, the *tribuni* cancelled the law for the limit temporarily in the assembly. He had pre-existing connections with the inhabitants in the regions. The *tribuni*, their supporters, and perhaps even Aemilianus, himself, expected him to use them as a general.⁶³ This is another example of participation in foreign affairs being undertaken by the *tribuni*, but this does not mean they, with the support of the citizens, antagonised other officers and the Senate directing the wars. Certainly, in both cases, mass emotion or the act complaining to senatorial moral authority played an important role among the citizens, and the *tribuni* came to expect its own significant influence.⁶⁴ Yet, their motions to the assembly were also approved by the senators. They were pressured by citizens, but if the senators had opposed the actions of the *tribuni*, the citizens, and Aemilianus on common ground, the *tribuni* would have hesitated to push through his assumption of the consulship, and dispatch to Africa and Hispania, owing to the senators’ influence over sending supplies to the troops (cf. Polyb. 6.15.4-5). Securing some form of partnership with many senators was also a factor of enabling the *tribuni* to rise to prominence in connection with foreign affairs, even here.

For all of this, though, the *tribuni* also seemed increasingly prepared to confront the Senate and other officers. In 138, they imprisoned the consuls in another dispute concerning the levy (Liv. Per. 55; Oxy. 55; cf. Cic. Leg. 3.20).⁶⁵

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⁶³ For the political and military situations in the two periods, see Scullard 1960: 60-74.
⁶⁴ Astin 1967a: 67-8 and 183-5.
⁶⁵ Steel 2013: 15-16.
While there are few sources about this event, the consuls appear to have been released quickly. Since Brutus, as one of the consuls of 138, commenced a campaign in Hispania during his term (Liv. *Per.* 55), the people concerned compromised in some way. Yet, given this collection of evidence, it is clear that the *tribuni* did not hesitate to use their authority against the senators, and the latter could do nothing to stop it.

These cases show the rise of the *tribuni* in Roman foreign affairs after the Third Macedonian War. They were able to participate by virtue of their authority, and sometimes with the support the citizens and leading Romans. The Senate had previously manipulated tribunician power and collectively influenced the *tribuni*, but was increasingly unable to control them, possessing no legitimate method to prevent them from becoming more prominent in state diplomacy. The Senate seems to have ignored the situation. This might result partly from the fact that the number of *tribuni* who wanted to participate in foreign affairs independently was still negligible, across several decades. Nevertheless, in parallel with the rise of informal diplomacy in Rome, the collective leadership of the Senate comparatively waned, something observed by contemporaries. These factors are important in understanding the rise of Gracchus and the violence of 133. The next section develops these points further, focusing on his combination of informal diplomacy and tribunician power, its legality, and its relationship with the collective leadership of the Romans, and considers the role of manners within this diplomatic concept in the Roman context.
The conflict surrounding Gracchus’ tribunate in 133 was the first violent struggle observed among the Romans, since the opening period of the Republic. This therefore represents a major turning point in Roman history. Indeed, there has been a considerable amount written about this event, and previous scholars have proposed many factors contributing to the discord. Many of their considerations are generally correct, but there is still one factor that has not been given the attention it deserves: informal diplomacy. This section aims to show that an analysis of the events employing this concept, and noting its relationship with official state powers, enables us to understand better the nature of the violence and its influence on Rome.

In order to achieve this, it is first useful to indicate that there are two stages to the events concerning Gracchus in 133. The first one is the political struggle caused by his attempt to improve the conditions of ordinary citizens, and to recover Roman manpower, by distributing public land, previously rented at excessive rates.\textsuperscript{66} The disputes in this phase did not cause the violence of 133, though. His agrarian law negatively affected the moneyed classes and the senators, provoking their antipathy.\textsuperscript{67} There is little evidence to suggest, however, that it was his agrarian policy that made other Romans assault him.\textsuperscript{68} It could also be argued that the hostility of his opponents was provoked by the dismissal of M. Octavius in the course of enacting his legislation on agrarian reform, thus prompting violence. Octavius was his tribunician colleague, after all, and was

\textsuperscript{66} Earl 1963: 20-38; Stockton 1979: 40-60.
\textsuperscript{67} Tweedie 2011: 473.
\textsuperscript{68} De Ligt 2004: 726-8.
connected to his opponents. Octavius’ resistance to Gracchus, by use of the veto, and his removal from office by Gracchus’ motion, seemed both shocking to contemporaries (App. BC 1.11-12; Cassius Dio fr. 83.4-6; Flor. 2.2.5; Liv. Per. 58; Oros. 5.8.3; Plut. TGrac. 10.1-12.6). The legal arguments of the two tribuni over the agrarian law, and the questionable legitimacy of Octavius’ dismissal, were not settled satisfactorily. These certainly fuelled the anger of Gracchus’ opponents. However, Octavius was excluded without any formal opposition by contemporaries. The agrarian law was adopted in the assembly (App. BC 1.11-12; Liv. Per. 58; Plut. TGrac. 9.1, 10.1-12.6, and 13.1). I would argue, then, that the political struggle surrounding land distribution, and other social, home affairs, does not explain Gracchus’ opponents later resorting to violence.

It is now necessary to consider the second stage of the events in 133, namely Gracchus’ intervention in the Attalid affair by informal diplomacy after the approval of his agrarian law, his attempt to gain a second tribunate, and his murder in the tribuniciam election for 132. During this period, he became aware of the bequest of the Attalid kingdom left by Attalos III to the Romans through private contact with Eudemos, the Pergamene envoy visiting Rome, and persuaded the assembly to devote it to realising his agrarian reform, completely bypassing the Senate (Flor. 2.3.3; Liv. Per. 58; Oros. 5.8.4; Plut. TGrac. 14.1-4). Gracchus’ primary aim might have been to increase the available land to allocate, and to remove any obstruction to the distribution brought forth by his opponents. The Senate was under their influence. They had prevented the agrarian

71 Badian 1972: 706-12.
committee, led by Gracchus, from distributing land, owing to the senatorial control over national resources (Liv. Per. 58: Plut. TGrac. 13.2-3). However, I would argue, his motion regarding Attalos’ bequest, based on the Lex Hortensia, not only offered a legitimate solution to such problems, but also damaged the senatorial leadership, in connection with diplomacy. Indeed, the conflict between Gracchus and his opponents intensified (Plut. TGrac. 14.2-6), and exploded into violence at the tribunician election. During the confusion, many senators led by P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, the pontifex maximus, murdered Gracchus (App. BC 1.15-17; Flor. 2.2.6-7; Liv. Per. 58-9; Oros. 5.9.1-3; Plut. TGrac. 17.1-20.4). I think, then, that the direct and crucial factors in causing the violence were Gracchus’ intervention in Attalos’ bequest, and his attempt to seek re-election following it, although his agrarian policy had opened the struggle. The following discussion therefore focuses on his actions during this phase, and highlights the role of informal diplomacy, in connection with the tribunate, in the downward spiral towards violence.

Several scholars rather pinpoint Gracchus’ intervention in the financial management of Attalos’ bequest as the key factor in violence. It was certainly in violation of senatorial authority, and might have provoked anger in Gracchus’ opponents. Yet, the agrarian law had been also connected with financial affairs but had been legislated without such a conflict taking place. Moreover, there are precedents of the tribuni participating in the distribution of national resources. In 194, for example, Q. Aelius Tubero proposed a motion to the popular assembly to build two Latin colonies, following a senatorial suggestion (Liv. 34.53.1-2). In

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172, M. Lucretius proposed a bill to lease formal estates in Campania that had been appropriated by private individuals (42.19.1-2). He was related to C. Lucretius Gallus, the praetor of 171, and possibly Sp. Lucretius, that of 172. It is plausible that he was supported by his powerful family connections, and friends in the Senate. Leading Romans did not object to the participation of tribuni in the management of public land, i.e. finance. The influence of Gracchus’ intervention in this sphere, then, on the outbreak of the violence, should not be overestimated.

In contrast to his intervention in finance, Gracchus’ participation in diplomacy, and the attempt to obtain the second tribunate, changed the situation completely. According to Plutarchos (TGrac. 14, esp. 2), he had private contacts with Eudemos, and became aware of Attalos’ bequest, persuading the assembly to devote it to his agrarian law while arguing that ‘(the bequest) did not belong to the Senate to deliberate about it (οὐδέν ἐφη τῇ συγκλήτῳ βουλευόμαι προσήκειν).’ Given the absence of terms reminiscent of patronage, such as clientes, it is impossible to decide whether this contact with Eudemos occurred to secure clientage between the Gracchi and the Attalids, although Gracchus the Elder had connections with them, as shown in Section 1. Yet, Eudemos’ visit to Gracchus before senatorial sessions should be categorised as an example of informal diplomacy. It is significant that Gracchus did not discuss the bequest in the Senate but persuaded the popular assembly to use it for his agrarian law, instead. This was an act founded on his tribunician authority and was unquestionably legitimate, but he had also independently managed home and foreign affairs, namely contact with the Attalids and the distribution of the king’s bequest, with

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the additional use of informal diplomacy. He effectively controlled the state of Rome singlehandedly, during this case. Furthermore, shortly after this, he started to try to obtain a second tribunate. This would have been an effective measure in prolonging or otherwise perpetuating his power over national and international politics. As we have seen in previous sections, there was no clearly defined method to stop informal diplomacy or the tribuniciam power, much less the two elements combined. From the perspective of Gracchus’ opponents, the struggle with him was no longer simply a political one over individual policies.

Yet, in order to confirm this view, it is necessary to consider Gracchus’ sway over people in and beyond Rome, and to what extent such influence was noticed by his opponents. The combination between informal diplomacy and tribuniciam authority depended on his connection with foreigners, the support of fellow citizens, and at least a section of the leading Roman elite. Even if he had enjoyed such influence, moreover, if it had not been clear for his opponents, they would not have stopped him by force while taking a risk. With that in mind, this section now considers his support base and the extent to which it was noticed by others.

Gracchan supporters among leading Romans will be considered first. According to Plutarchos (TGrac. 9.1), he was supported by Ap. Claudius Pulcher, his father-in-law, the consul of 143 and the censor of 136, and P. Mucius Scaevola, the consul of 133. This suggests their own supporters also have been favourable towards Gracchus, and infers both that he was not isolated from the Senate, and that his links would have been public knowledge. Secondly, he could exert influence over many fellow citizens and outsiders following his behaviour in the Spanish campaign led by C. Hostilius Mancinus. In 137, Mancinus’ troops attacked Numantia, but became trapped by the enemy. He wanted to negotiate
with the city to facilitate a withdrawal, but Numantia demanded to talk with Gracchus instead, even though the latter was only a *quaestor* (5·6). This was due, in part, to the popularity of Gracchus the Elder in Hispania. Several decades previously, he had given land to the inhabitants.\(^{78}\) The Numantians might also have felt that the young noble would be an easier target to manipulate. In any case, he was involved in the negotiation, despite lacking any authority about diplomacy. This was a form of informal diplomacy. His private relationship eventually influenced the nature of the official contact. The conclusion of a peace also increased his celebrity in Rome (and possibly Hispania). This personal connection was reinforced when the treaty made by Gracchus and Numantia was rejected by the Senate in 136. This decision was motivated by the senators’ objection to the peace being concluded in the inferior war situation. Moreover, the Numantians had seized booty from Mancinus’ camp (6.1·7.1). Gracchus and Mancinus had both apparently failed to defend Rome’s dignity. The rejection should have left a stain on Gracchus’ career,\(^{79}\) but, instead, he obtained considerable support from many citizens. Mancinus’ soldiers, who had escaped death, thanks to the peace, and their families were grateful to Gracchus (7.1). This support base must have contributed to his obtaining the tribunate, and to his willingness to exercise its powers freely, and with the support of the Roman statesmen mentioned above. This situation must have been noticed by contemporaries.

His connection with outsiders and his contemporaries’ notice of it are also corroborated by an episode of C. Gracchus, Tiberius’ younger brother (Plut. *CGrac.*

\(^{78}\) Degrassi 1967: 129·34; Richardson 1986: 107·13.

\(^{79}\) Morgan and Walsh 1978: 201·4; Rosenstein 1986: 230·52.
In c. 126, Gaius was sent to Sardinia as a quaestor under L. Aurelius Orestes against local rebels. Micipsa, the Numidian king, sent corn to Gaius, to support his draft of supplies. He does not seem to have gained Micipsa’s gratitude by himself. The king supported him because he was a member of the Gracchi, and therefore may well have curried favour with Aemilianus, Gaius’ cousin and the direct successor to the friendship between Africanus and Masinissa.\textsuperscript{80} The Senate had a great aversion towards Micipsa for this kindness towards Gaius when the king reported his support for Gaius to the organ. This might have resulted largely from its dispute with Tiberius. In any case, Ti. Gracchus may well also have been somehow connected with Numidia, as he was with the Attalids and Numantia. In light of Micipsa’s behaviour, such connections were not concealed from contemporaries.

The influence held by Gracchus is also suggested by the fact that many friends and supporters criticised Nasica as the architect of Gracchus’ fall, shortly after his murder (Cic. \textit{Or}. 2.285; Plut. \textit{TGrac}. 21.1\textsuperscript{-}4). The Senate could not suppress the accusations and subsequently dispatched Nasica to Asia Minor. While this might have been partly to deal with the emergence in the territory of the ex-Attalids caused by the pretender, Aristonikos,\textsuperscript{81} it is more likely a sign that Nasica’s assault on Gracchus could not be convincingly and legally defended. If it had been possible, Gracchus’ opponents would have declared Nasica’s innocence in court, while at the same time sending other statesman to Asia Minor. Furthermore, if Gracchus had been supported by many on an ad hoc basis only, his opponents would not have avoided facing off his supporters but rather sought

\textsuperscript{80} Roller 2003: 18\textsuperscript{-}20.
\textsuperscript{81} Hopp 1977: 107\textsuperscript{-}31; Jones 2004: 482\textsuperscript{-}3.
reconciliation with the ordinary citizens, by means of incentives, similar to the way in which the advocates of the Second Macedonian War had managed Baebius, the leader of the anti-war movement, and Africanus, his friends, and other citizens, by separating them from one another. Gracchus had many supporters, but they could not be divided so easily, and this feature was noticed by his opponents.

This hypothesis is supported by some other measures taken by the Senate, in the aftermath of Gracchus' murder. For instance, it sent a religious embassy to Enna in Sicily, based on the oracle of the Sibylline Books (Cic. Verr. 2.4.108; Val.Max.1.1.1c). This seems to have been a measure promoted by his opponents to appease Ceres for Gracchus' violation of the laws connected to her divine power, specifically his perversion of the tribunician sacrosanctitas, in his dismissal of Octavius, and his attempt to overthrow the Republic, in order to justify religiously his assassination in the name of the Senate, although his name was not directly referred to in the proceedings.82 His opponents emphasised his 'crime,' from the religious viewpoint to contemporaries, and compensated for the antipathy of his supporters by exploiting the senatorial control over religious affairs. The use of this indirect strategy, however, suggests that it was dangerous for his opponents to criticise the murdered tribunus directly. Secondly, his opponents won over people who had supported him simply for his agrarian policy in 133, even though this group might not have represented the majority of his supporters. The committee for land distribution was maintained. P. Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus succeeded Gracchus (Plut. TGrac. 21.1-3; CIL I².719).83 Mucianus was

83 Bauman 1979: 385-408.
one of Gracchus’ advisers when he drafted the agrarian law, and was Scaevola’s brother (Cic. Acad. 2.5; Plut. TGrac. 9.1). It is not clear whether Mucianus supported Gracchus before the latter’s assassination. In any case, his opponents reconciled with part of his senatorial supporters, and expected recipients of land. This strategy clearly suggests that Gracchus’ opponents had noticed the strength of his supporters.

With Gracchus’ considerable influence confirmed, it is noteworthy that his opponents, nevertheless, stopped him by force. This suggests that he was not attacked simply because of their opposition to his (potentially financially damaging) agrarian policy, but because some other factor compelled his opponents to defeat him at any cost. This can be shown by analysing their attitude towards him. According to Plutarchos (TGrac. 19.3), on the day of trinbunal election for 132, Nasica advocated ‘the defeat of the tyrant, (Gracchus,) to save the state (τῇ πόλει βοηθεῖν καὶ καταλύειν τὸν τύραννον).’ This seems to derive from a source written by an unnamed anti-Gracchan author, although the use of the term tyrant, here, might also appear owing to Plutarchos’ personal interest in the issue of tyranny and opposition to it. Yet, it is noticeable that Gracchus, a tribunus, was regarded as a man holding supreme power, and representing an enemy of the Republic, by his opponents. This is not a stereotypical criticism of the tribuni. They had been connected intermittently with home and foreign affairs, in competition with many senators, even before 133, but there is no evidence to suggest that they were labelled as tyrants. Referring to Gracchus so, then, shows

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84 Bernstein 1972: 42-6.
86 Mossé 2006: 188-96. The term tyrannus had been used by Romans in the third and the second century such as Ennius and Pacuvius, and the negative connotations had been well-established by Gracchus’ period. Erskine 1991: 106-20.
that his power was regarded as exceeding that normally connected to *tribuni*, and thereby really threatening his contemporary political order, by many people during and following his period. This perception of Gracchus provides a more compelling explanation for why he was so vigorously attacked by his opponents.

This view is supported by considering the risks which the anti-Gracchans run during their attack on Gracchus. For instance, according to Plutarchos, Q. Pompeius, the consul of 141, told his contemporaries that he had seen Gracchus’ receipt for a crown and a royal robe, procured by Eudemos (*TGrac.* 14.2). While this seems to be a simple case of an anti-Gracchan slander, if Pompeius related Gracchus’ contact with Eudemos, and hinted at Gracchus’ alleged ambition with such a connection before contemporaries, it would understandably amplify the negative feeling towards the fallen *tribunus*. Meanwhile, Pompeius’ report would show them that Gracchus’ opponents were also capable of underhanded and voyeuristic actions, despite their lofty claim of defending the Republic. Some contemporaries would likely be disappointed in Pompeius and other anti-Gracchans. His report, then, suggests that Gracchus’ opponents wanted to destroy him bare-knuckle. In addition, the assault led by Nasica, who advocated the defeat of a tyrant, upon Gracchus at the tribunician election was also highly risky. Nasica and other anti-Gracchans opened themselves to a direct counterattack by Gracchus’ supporters. Nasica himself bore the brunt of their criticism as well. Although the rhetoric of tyranny might be a Plutarchan exaggeration designed to highlight the danger of his rise conveniently, it remains clear that Gracchus’ opponents realistically decided to defeat him at all costs.

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87 Stockton 1979: 69-70.
So, what made Gracchus’ opponents attack him? One may regard his attempt to obtain a second tribunate as the primary cause. Certainly, although there was a precedent for its repeated assumption, the case of C. Licinius Stolo in the fourth century, and even after him there was no law to prevent it, Gracchus’ attempt was unorthodox, nonetheless. This could be regarded as a challenge to the traditional political order. Indeed, he was attacked in the process of the election. However, C. Gracchus succeeded in assuming the tribunate in 123 and 122 consecutively, and was killed after his failure in securing a third term. The significance of Tiberius’ attempt to secure a second term should not be overestimated.

Considering the role of the tribunate in the events in 133 further, however, is useful in understanding them. The tribuni presided over the popular assembly. If they were supported by the citizens, they could easily make the assembly approve their bills. This situation indeed enabled Gracchus, who was firmly supported by the citizens, to legitimise the results of his private negotiations with the Attalids, bypassing the Senate. It is noticeable that this legislation resulted from his combination of informal diplomacy and official tribunician power, used with the backing of his fellow citizens against the collective leadership of the senators. With both factors, Gracchus effectively directed a matter of foreign affairs, though connected to home affairs as well, independently. Furthermore, as long as he was a tribunus, he could potentially control not only other home matters, but also other diplomatic affairs synthetically. If he had obtained the second tribunate, he would have prolonged

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this political advantage for at least one more year. His pressing concern might have been to defend himself from accusations following his first term (App. BC 1.13·14; Oros. 5.8.4): nevertheless, the repeated election of such a person would have presented a significant menace to the collective leadership of the Senate. While it consisted of the leading Romans, rich in monetary wealth and dignity, it had no legitimate way to stop the tribunician power and informal diplomacy, much less an individual who was able to use them synthetically and to prolong its advantage by extending his term of office.

Gracchus’ opponents, in particular the senior senators, must have noticed the nature of his power. They had surely remembered the strength and the growth of tribunician power across the preceding three decades. They also had understood the influence of informal diplomacy. Nasica was a grandson of Africanus, who had forged many connections in Hispania, Africa, and possibly in Greece. Pompeius had been a general in Hispania for years, where a connection with the inhabitants could influence negotiations, as shown in Gracchus’ own case. Furthermore, the criticism of Gracchus levelled by Metellus, the consul of 143, supports this view. He attacked Gracchus in 133 (Plut. TGrac. 14.3), and had noticed the influence of informal diplomacy. He had served in the Achaian War, in Greece, where it was still actively used in many cases, such as the negotiations for release of Achaian hostages in 150. For such senior senators, the danger of a person combining private connections with outsiders with tribunician authority, to the collective

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91 Acimovic 2007: 132.
92 MRR: 477, 480, and 482.
94 For regarding Gracchus and his actions as dangerous to the state, Aemilianus is also counted among the anti-Gracchan politicians, although he was in Hispania in 133 (Plut. TGrac. 21.4). Smith 1955: 165; Henderson 1968: 51·2 and 64.
leadership of the Senate, was easily understood.

These analyses explain why Gracchus was regarded as a menace to Rome, and show that his assassination in the middle of the election can be interpreted as a reaction to his opponents’ defeat in the political struggle. They had noticed that Gracchus could exploit connections with the Attalids and other outsiders, such as the Numantians, for himself, contravening the Senate’s collective and anonymous management of Roman diplomacy. They lacked any method to stop it, though. They had observed that Gracchus persuaded the assembly to approve his motion, combining his private contact with Eudemos, his tribunician power, and the support of the ordinary citizens, but still his opponents could not prevent him from bypassing the Senate, independently. Moreover, their prevention of his election as tribunus, on the day of violence, almost ended in failure (Plut. TGrac. 16.18). Finally, they failed to check his continuous combination of informal diplomacy and the tribuniciam powers, through the collective dignity of the Senate, in the immediate prelude to the violent attack. This is confirmed in a dialogue between Nasica and Scaevola, the consul, in the senatorial session on the day.95 Nasica wanted him to stop Gracchus as a tyrant (19.3), and aimed here to defeat him by some senatorial decree. As Baebius’ case before the Second Macedonian War shows, when the senators collectively opposed an action of a tribunus, much more under the name of the Senate, it was difficult for him to carry out his will. In 133, Gracchus’ opponents seemed to form the majority of the senators.96 If it had been a more regular situation, they would have managed to stop Gracchus

95 Although Plutarchos does not refer to the consul talking with Nasica here by name, another consul, L. Calpurnius Piso, had been sent to settle the rebel in Sicily (Diod. 34.8.1-9.1; Frontin. Strat. 4.1.26; Oros. 5.9.6; Val.Max. 2.7.9 and 4.3.10). Keaveney 1998: 73-82.
from developing his policy independently further, even if the senatorial decree would not permit his enemies to attack him directly. But Scaevola, who presided at the session, was a Gracchan supporter, and prevented Nasica and his associates from taking any action against Gracchus in the name of the Senate, for the reason that attacking someone without trial was illegal. On the political stage, then, his opponents were defeated completely.

Meanwhile, Gracchus was, however, wrong to assume that his opponents would still behave as players in a political game, rather than engage in a form of power politics in which physical violence was also a tool. They attacked him without the support of the Senate, privately and yet openly. This is confirmed by references to those assaulting him as optimates (Liv. Per. 58), nobilitas (Flor. 2.2.6; Oros. 5.9.1; [Vict.] Vir.Ill. 64.7), or boni (Val.Max. 3.2.17; Vell. 2.3.2). Even Plutarchos (TGrac. 19.3-4), who seems to use sources unfavourable to Gracchus,\(^97\) refers to them as ‘those who wish to succour the laws (οἱ βουλόμενοι τοῖς νόμοις βοηθεῖν)’ without the support of ‘the chief magistrate (ὁ ἄρχων).’ Gracchus’ opponents acted as a political group that consisted of the majority of the senators, and as elites seeking to defend their collective leadership under the Republic privately, similar, to an extent, to the way that Gracchus had used unofficial channels in conducting foreign affairs. He had not prepared for this case, and the result was his violent death.

This attitude of Gracchus’ opponents, promoting themselves as the defenders of sound, collective, Roman government, is also observed in the senatorial resolutions regarding Attalid affairs after Gracchus had died, and

\(^{97}\) Cf. Clark 2007: 130.
many of his friends in the Senate had stopped resisting his enemies. The Senate put all matters previously managed by him under its collective leadership, once again. For instance, Attalos' will about his kingdom and the rights of the cities under the dynasty was accepted again by a senatorial decree (IGR IV.289). Five commissioners were sent to Asia Minor, as early as the end of 133, to organise the new province (Str. 14.1.38). While this might be partly to defend Nasica from the vengeance of Gracchus' supporters, the annexation of the region was further announced in c. 132 (IGR IV.301). Considering that the five senators seemed to lack specific authority, such as imperium, the Senate wanted to manage the Attalid matters quickly and collectively, while preventing individual Romans from exercising leadership and concealing Gracchus' decisions under the authority of the Senate.

However, these measures erased Gracchus' influence as such, but did not solve the wider problem of the lack of way to control informal diplomacy and tribunician power. This is suggested by the development of the management of Asia Minor. It was not made easy, owing to Aristonikos' resistance (Str. 14.1.38). In order to defeat him, the Senate could not help sending generals, and overlooking the connections that they forged with the inhabitants. For instance, Mucianus, mentioned above, was sent there during his consulship of 131, and secured the friendship of neighbouring leaders while using his mastery of all Greek dialects (Eutrop. 4.20; Val.Max. 8.7.6). M. Perperna, his successor, also

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100 Jones 2004: 469-85, esp. 484.
formed connections with the cities through direct contacts, such as participating in their festivals (I.Priene 108.11.223-32). Furthermore, M’. Aquillius was sent there as the consul in 129, and ordered the people in Asia Minor to call Cn. Domitius, one of his legati, ἀντιστρατηγός, and to treat him as a local commander, without any reference to senatorial approval, also apparently making private connections in and beyond the new territory (App. BC 1.22; Mithr. 57; I.Iasos 612.11.13-16). These were not illegal, as the actions of generals in the field, but enabled them to increase their own interests. The Senate sent ten commissioners to arrange the settlement of Asia Minor after Aristonikos’ defeat. This move might have been designed to manage the Attalid affairs under a collective leadership, once again. In addition, the Senatus Consultum de Agro Pergameno (RDGE 12) of c. 129, shows that more than fifty members of the Roman elite were connected with the management of Pergamene land, as the members of the concilium of the motion. Although this decree might have been made around the end of the second century, the large-scale concilium suggests that the Senate strove to prevent a mere few Romans from enjoying connections with the people in Asia Minor, after Gracchus’ murder. In many senatorial decrees before the 130s, the number of the members connected with a motion was around five. Nevertheless, in the 120s Aquillius was accused of bribery by the people of Asia Minor, and of catering to them, that is to say by nurturing private contacts and

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105 Tibiletti 1957: 136-7; Dignas 2002: 115-6. For the restoration of the inscription, see also SEG XXXIII.986.
107 E.g. IG IX.1².4.796 (in c. 175-160); IX.2.89 (possibly in c. 140). Cf. RDGE 4 and 9; Brennan 2000: 343 n.31.
informal diplomacy with them (App. BC 1.22; Mithr. 57). The lack of any definite
and legitimate way to control this concept still prevented Rome from arranging
the divide between the Senate, oriented towards maintaining collective leadership,
and individual Romans, who hoped to make connections with outsiders and to
increase their own interests.

Concerning the power of the *tribuni*, Rome also lacked any effective
measure, even after Gracchus’ death. This is confirmed by the actions of C.
Papirius Carbo, who was a member of the agrarian committee during his
tribunate, some point in the closing years of the 130s. He appealed before the
assembly for a law legalising repeated tribunates, and that of expanding the act
voting by secret ballot (Cic. Amic. 96; Or. 2.170; Leg. 3.35; Liv. Per. 59; Plut. CGrac.
8.2).\(^{108}\) The former was rejected in the assembly following a speech of Aemilianus.
The consecutive assumption of the tribunate, however, was not banned. C.
Gracchus gained the office in 123 and 122. The law about secret ballot was
approved, and made it more difficult for leading Romans to influence the citizens
with their collective dignity, although it should be noted that, despite this voting
reform, Roman elections did not necessarily become more democratic.\(^{109}\)
Moreover, when Gaius assumed the tribunate, the leading Romans could not
prevent him from legislating a new agrarian law, and planning to bestow
citizenship upon the Latins, and Latin status upon the Italians, satisfying people
in and beyond Rome, while also making contacts with them in the period, before
he failed to obtain a third tribunate (App. BC 1.26; Cic. Cat. 1.4 and 4.13; Dom.
102; Phil. 8.14; Diod. 34.29.1-30.1 and 39.7.4; Flor. 2.3.4-6; Liv. Per. 61; Plut.

\(^{108}\) Lea Beness 2009: 60-70.
Furthermore, the attack on him, in 121, was carried out by the consul L. Opimius, under the so-called *Senatus Consultum Ultimum*, which was seemingly more sophisticated or legitimate than the attack on Tiberius earlier, but the fact remains that Opimius himself thought this attack upon Gaius was against the law forbidding the slaying of the citizens without trial (Cic. *Or.* 2.132). Its legitimacy was, therefore, ethically and legally dubious. Thus, even after 133, Rome lacked any legitimate way to control the exclusive rise of the *tribuni*, just as that of those using informal diplomacy, and could not help depending on the last, ‘ultimate’ resort in power politics to deal with it.

Overall, the rise of Ti. Gracchus in 133 revealed the lack of definition in the relationship between informal diplomacy, legality and the collective leadership of the Senate in the Roman Republic. An individual Roman with connections to outsiders, and the power to control the assembly, could legitimately (and democratically) direct home and foreign affairs. The Senate could be bypassed completely in this event. Gracchus (and his younger brother in the 120s) almost eternalised this power, by the repeated assumption of the tribunate, whose significance had risen against the waning collective leadership of the Senate. Leading Romans understood what was happening and felt keenly the absence of any way to manage it legitimately, regarding it as a menace to the political order. In the events of 133, some coincidences partly served to heighten the disorder; Attalos’ bequest is a good example. But the violence itself resulted from a general spread of informal diplomacy in Rome, and its ill-defined relation with the law and senatorial collectivity. If the contacts with outsiders through informal

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channels had been strange or been controlled by legal guidelines, no individual would have been able to exert influence in home and foreign affairs at the same time, even if he had the tribunate, or any other office, and was vocally supported by the citizens. The development of the events and violence in 133 are explained consistently when this situation of governance and the senators are understood. I would argue, then, that the concept informal diplomacy is fundamentally important in this pattern.

**Conclusion**

Even after the Third Macedonian War informal diplomacy was used by the Romans. Although many of them strove to maintain the collective leadership of the senators and anonymity in diplomacy, the users of this concept gradually increased their influence, and other Romans had no definite method to control it. In parallel with this tendency of informal diplomacy, the *tribuni plebis* rose to prominence in Roman diplomacy. They wielded a power that could hinder the operation of other officers, and even the Senate, if they were supported by the ordinary citizens and some leading Romans. These two factors decreased the collective leadership of the senators. Gracchus’ ascendancy in 133 resulted from this situation. The combination between informal diplomacy and tribunician power enabled him to control home and foreign affairs legitimately and alone. If he had succeeded in holding the tribunate for a second term, he would have prolonged further this unusual degree of political control. As his opponents and the authors argued, however unfavourably, he really did enjoy an authority reminiscent of monarchical power. It was inconsistent with the collective
leadership of the Senate or the traditional Republic. But there was no legitimate method to control Gracchus and to prevent his accumulation of powers. His opponents could not help but resort to extreme measures, no matter how illegitimate. Yet, even after 133, they still could not find a method to solve the ill-defined relationship between informal diplomacy, legality, and the senatorial collective leadership, much less prevent the appearance of similar situations, again.

These discussions, combined with the results of those in the previous chapters, show that the concept of informal diplomacy is useful in understanding the development of wider Roman history, from the 200s to 133, and afterwards. Certainly, contemporaries did not know or use this label. But Romans and outsiders realistically and consciously had contacts with each other through channels that had no connection to official state dialogues. Although some of these connections could be categorised as patronage, or could be called friendship by the Romans, it is reasonable to treat them all as a homogenous group of diplomatic manners, labelling them informal diplomacy in order to contrast them with contacts that were constrained by legality, publicity, and legitimacy. As I have shown through the previous discussions, noticing the relationship between informal diplomacy, legality, and the desire to maintain collective leadership among the senators, which appeared in parallel to the spread of informal diplomacy, is useful in understanding Rome’s advance overseas, and the increasing tensions observed among the Romans. In fact, it is central to the wider transformation of the Roman Republic from the 200s to 133 and the beginning of its end.

 Meanwhile, these conclusions raise a question, namely to what extent
informal diplomacy was a novel development for Rome in the decades concerned. The preceding discussions have shown that its use spread in Roman diplomacy during this period, and played an important role in Rome's advance overseas, not to mention the beginning of internal discord and strife. These suggest that diplomatic actions and ideas relating to this concept clearly appeared to the Romans for the first time, at the beginning of this period. This view is particularly supported by the results of the discussions in Chapters 1 and 2, namely the appearance of gift-giving in 205 and Rome's failure in managing Greek informal diplomacy during the First Macedonian War. Yet, these do not necessarily mean that informal diplomacy had not played any role in Rome's diplomatic practice and governance before the end of the third century. It is still possible that informal diplomacy had been present in Rome, in some other way. So, in order to consider its precise significance from the 200s to 133, it is now useful to consider whether the actions and ideas that it embraced were foreign to the Romans before the 200s. This will be the subject of the final chapter.
Chapter 7

Was Informal Diplomacy New?

Introduction

The final topic of this thesis is whether informal diplomacy was a new factor in Roman diplomatic practice from the 200s to 133. The previous chapters have shown the utility of this concept in studying Rome's advance into the Greek world, and the changing nature of the Republic. I will now reinforce these points, while arguing that informal diplomacy had not played an important role in Roman foreign affairs before the end of the third century.

Meanwhile, the sources before the end of the third century are much vaguer than those for after it. This makes it difficult to demonstrate conclusively the absence of informal diplomacy in Rome before the period in question. However, I would argue that it is still possible to observe its novelty from the 200s onwards. This is achieved by considering Rome's manner of approaching outsiders before the period in question. This discussion therefore consists of three parts. Firstly, the Roman attitude to gifts from outsiders will be discussed. As shown in Chapter 1, as far as the sources report, gift-giving was employed by Rome from 205 onwards. Yet, there are some cases of gifts from outsiders to Roman individuals earlier, around the 270s. The analysis of these and the character of the sources suggests that Rome lacked a real sense of informal diplomacy, at that point. Secondly, I will demonstrate that this situation is further observed in Rome's diplomatic practice during the period from 264 to 210. Rome might have considered public opinion within and beyond the Republic, but the Romans were
mainly interested in how every action was justified from the viewpoint of legality, namely in the official channels of managing foreign affairs. This was persuasive to the Romans themselves, and pro-Romans, but was much less effective against opponents and other outsiders. Nevertheless, Rome does not seem to have approached these parties either with alternative, official channels, or through informal contacts, even though the Romans sometimes accepted such approaches from outsiders. These elements strengthen the argument that informal diplomacy was only understood properly, and used actively, by Rome from the 200s onwards.

Thirdly, I shall look at the period before 280 and show that there is no evidence that informal diplomacy played any significant role then in the diplomatic activity of the Republic. This is achieved by an analysis of Rome's management of diplomatic conflicts during the fourth century. Through these three steps, I will argue that Rome neither understood nor used informal diplomacy in any fixed way before the end of the third century. These results effectively close the discussion regarding its novelty, and that of its significance within Rome, during the period of her expansion in the East and in the wider context of the transformation of the Republic.

Section 1: Gifts from Outsiders

I shall, now, analyse gift-giving by outsiders, and argue that in the early third century Rome lacked the idea of approaching outsiders through the channels apart from official ones, i.e. informal diplomacy. One such example occurred in 280, during Rome's negotiation with Pyrrhos of Epeiros. He had come to Italy to
support Tarentum’s resistance to Rome.\(^1\) Defeating the Romans at Herakleia, he sent Kineas to suggest peace. Plutarchos relates (at *Pyrrh. 18.2*) that this envoy here had contacts with ‘individual leading Romans and their families with gifts from the king (τοῖς δυνατοῖς, καὶ δῶρα παραίν αὐτῶν καὶ γυναιξίν ... παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως).’ Rome regarded this as an act of bribery, and was subsequently hostile towards him (cf. Diod. 22.6.3). It is significant that, unlike from 205 onwards, Rome is not recorded as having given a gift to Kineas here, even though the nature of the custom is a key topic of this episode (Liv. 34.4.6; *Per. 13*; Plin. *NH* 7.88; Plut. *Pyrrh. 18–19*). Ancient writers simply treat him negatively, and praise the integrity of the Romans. I would argue that this suggests Rome lacked the custom of diplomatic gift-giving in 280.

However, as noted in Chapter 1, the information about gifts might have been manipulated by the ancient authors, themselves intent on idealising the Early and Middle Republic. In order to analyse the cases of gifts, then, it is necessary to consider the possibility that the authors draw an unrealistically moral picture of Rome despite her actual engagement with gift-giving. It is difficult to deny this directly, in particular for Plutarchos, who tends to construct his character studies from an ethical viewpoint.\(^2\) Yet, analysing the lack of gifts by Rome in the context of those proposed by outsiders enables us to suggest that Rome had not been accustomed to both gift-giving and the art of approaching outsiders through unofficial channels in the period concerned. Indeed, even if some moralising agenda had influenced the extant texts about the case of 280, I would argue, if gift-giving had been commonly used by the Romans, they would

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1 Rosenstein 2012: 38-46.
likely have given something to Kineas and displayed Rome’s generosity, even
while refusing his offer of peace and gifts, similar to the contact with Rhodes later,
in the 160s (Liv. 44.14.5-15.8). The authors would have referred to it. It would
have glorified Rome more to highlight this, rather than simply criticising Kineas.
Moreover, gift-giving was an ordinary step of diplomatic contacts for at least the
Greeks from the archaic period onwards, and even Rome from 205 onwards, as
noted in Chapter 1. The lack of gifts from Rome to Kineas, who presented gifts,
can be conversely regarded even as an example of her bad manners. If the authors
had known Rome’s real usage of the custom, I contend that they would have
referred to it, regardless of how they individually regarded gift-giving. Thus, the
lack of reference to gifts in 280 suggests that Rome simply lacked the custom and
the very concept of informal diplomacy, at that point.

This argument is strengthened by another episode, probably of the same
year. Pyrrhos tried to give money to Rome’s envoys, who had come to negotiate
about prisoners, and asked their leader, C. Fabricius, to make a connection of
hospitality (ξενία), while offering more gifts, however, Fabricius declined (App.
Sam. 10; Plut. Mor. 194F-195A; Pyrrh. 20.1-10, esp. 1; Zonar. 8.4). It is worth
noting that no similar approach was directed by Rome to Pyrrhos, or other
Epeirotes, to make them indebted to her. This suggests again that this kind of
contact was alien to Rome in 280. Yet, there is still a possibility that the records
in existence result from some manipulation of information by the authors, based
on their moralising agenda. Indeed, authors clearly treat this episode as an
example of morality of Roman statesmen during this period. Furthermore,

4 StVIII: Nr.467; Buszard 2005: 482-5; Canali De Rossi 2005: no.357.
whether the gifts from Epeiros were bribes or a token of good faith based on the Greek custom, Rome in 280 might have regarded them, specifically, as an act of corruption, simply because the Epeirotes were her enemies at this time, thus abstaining from taking any action that could be treated similarly, despite normally engaging in the practice. The historicity of the gifts, nevertheless, is generally accepted in studies concerning the bias and confusion in the sources that record them. The lack of any reference to Roman gifts here suggests that she lacked the custom. Otherwise, giving gifts to the Epeirotes in some reasonable way, connected to the senatorial decree, for example, would have glorified Rome more than simply refusing Epeiros’ offer, or supressing the evidence of her usage of gifts. There seems to be a clear shift in Rome’s attitude towards gifts and informal diplomacy between 280 the later 200s onwards.

This pattern is also seen in a contact with Ptolemaios II in 273 (Dion.Hal. RA 20.14; cf. Val.Max. 4.3.9). In Egypt, Rome’s envoys were honoured with ‘gifts for each of them (δωρεαὶς ἱδίαις).’ They accepted, but submitted the gifts to the Senate when they returned home. The Senate praised them for ‘all their achievements (πάντων ἀγασθείσα τῶν ἐγγανῶν),’ and ordered them to bring the goods to their homes as ‘good examples to posterity (κόσμοι ἐκγόνοις).’ This reaction shows afresh that Rome was inexperienced in the custom of gift-giving. Otherwise, the Senate would have expected that some gifts would be given by the other party negotiating, and decided how to respond, beforehand. If the envoys had gone through this process, the act of simply following the rules regarding gifts from outsiders would hardly have been subject to so much praise. Indeed, it makes

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5 Lefkowitz 1959: 158.
no different, even if the gifts were actually not brought to Rome by the envoys as Justinus’ digest of Trogus’ work informs (at 18.2.8). According to this source, they left the gifts on Ptolemaios’ statue in Egypt, returning home. Trogus identifies it as an example of Roman ‘incorruptibility (continentia).’ Yet, it could also be regarded as an insult. For whatever reason, the envoys returned a token of good faith: nevertheless, this aspect is not explored in the digest. If Rome in 273 was accustomed to gifts, it is strange that Trogus and his sources only praise the envoys’ temperance or innocence. It is impossible to decide which information is accurate. In any case, Dionysios and Trogus inform us about the event, from a position that Rome had not thought about how to treat gifts given reasonably. One might argue that this inexperience results from a distortion of information, deliberately done to emphasise the Romans’ simple and sturdy character. Yet, in Trogus’ reference, the envoys behaved rather impolitely. Even in Dionysios’ work, they did not necessarily behave in a moral fashion. They received gifts, not bribes, from Ptolemaios and formed a friendship with him personally, but arbitrarily dissolved this relationship by submitting his gifts to the Senate. Again, moralising agenda might have influenced the two authors, but it is unreasonable to think they falsely depicted Rome as a state inexperienced in gift-giving customs here. As they relate, the Roman attitude to the practice, and to informal diplomacy, in 273 is markedly different from that from the 200s onwards.

There is another similar case in 278 (Gell. 1.14; Val.Max. 4.3.6). Fabricius, mentioned above, was visited by envoys from a Samnite state. They gave him gifts when they saw his humble house and mode of life. He declined on the basis that

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he considered wealth to be unnecessary. Gellius and Valerius Maximus use this episode as proof of his *continentia* from the moralising agenda.⁹ Their works focus on a comparison between the incorruptible statesman and Rome’s luxurious neighbours during the third century, and also the Romans of their own time.¹⁰ Yet, Fabricius’ attitude suggests that Rome in 278 was inexperienced with gifts, compared with the later 200s onwards. Otherwise, even though the virtue found in poverty was the obvious topic here, he would likely have been drawn as a leader treating visitors as generously as possible, despite refusing their gifts, by the sources of Gellius and Maximus, and the two writers could still have regarded it as more suitable for proposing moralistic themes.

A similar situation is also found in a case of c. 270, in which M’. Curius Dentatus, a consular senator, rejected gifts (Val.Max. 4.3.5; cf. Cic. *Sen.* 55-6; Plut. *Cato Mai.* 2). They were given by Samnite envoys ‘in public (publice)’ and ‘in friendly terms (benignis uerbis),’ just as the Senate’s approach from 205 onwards.¹¹ Maximus and other authors seem reluctant to relate the event precisely, but prefer to show ‘an example of bravery (fortitudinis … specimen),’ manipulating their sources to emphasise the gift as ‘that invented for the ill of mankind (malo hominum excogitatum),’ as Curius puts it, again stemming from a moralising agenda or the image of luxury versus austerity.¹² Nevertheless, if Rome in c. 270 really had experience of the gift-giving custom, he would surely have been depicted by the authors not as a man of maligning the favour of others, but rather as one treating the envoys as generously as possible, even while

refusing their gifts, because it was more favourable to their literary moralising. Thus, even if moralistic agenda influenced the extant sources, Rome’s attitude to gifts here and in the 270s as a whole is clearly different from that from the 200s onwards.

It is also noteworthy that gifts were given not only by Hellenistic diplomats, but by some Samnites as well. This means that the custom could be known to Rome, even before the 270s, since Roman contact with the Samnites had begun by the mid fourth century.13 It suggests that Rome’s negative attitude towards gifts and informal diplomacy in these cases was not a unique phenomenon in Roman diplomacy around the 270s, and changed from c. 270s to 205, when Roman gift-giving customs commenced, as far as the sources report. The gifts in the cases mentioned above appeared in different contexts, but simultaneously show that the Romans had been generally inexperienced in gift-giving in diplomatic contacts.

One might be tempted here to doubt this argument because, for Rome, giving gifts might have been regarded as very different from receiving them. Theoretically, it was possible to give them to outsiders while declining to receive them. Indeed, utilitarian use of giving and receiving is sometimes observed in Greece.14 Furthermore, the *Lex Cincia de Donis*, in 204, forbade the Romans to receive gifts from *patroni* (*Cic. Or. 2.286; Sen. 10; Liv. 34.4.9*),15 while it did not restrict them from giving anything to others. The *Lex Fannia* in 161, alluded to in Chapter 1, is only connected with accommodating others, not with receiving entertainment. Rome clearly treated the acts of giving and receiving separately.

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14 Mitchell 1997: e.g. 164-6.
However, it is too difficult to decide whether this distinction was clear in the minds of the Romans around the 270s, owing to the sparse nature of the evidence. Considering the year of the establishment of the *Lex Cîncia*, I would suggest, rather, that the difference between giving and receiving was recognised, late in the 200s, at which time the act of gift-giving by Rome appeared in the sources.

These analyses strengthen the argument that Rome was inexperienced in gift-giving and approaching outsiders through informal diplomacy around and before the 270s. But the period from c. 270 to 205, when the first case of gift-giving appears in Livius’ text, is not covered by these case studies and the results, since there is no surviving example. Although the previous chapters demonstrated Rome’s relative inexperience in, and gradually increasing usage of, informal diplomacy from the 200s onwards, Rome might actually have understood the concept, even before the 200s, despite her failure during the First Macedonian War. In order to show the novelty of informal diplomacy for Rome from the 200s onwards, and its significance during the very period, I will now notice her diplomatic disputes after the 270s, precisely from 264 to 210, and consider whether some kind of informal diplomacy other than gift-giving was actually used by Rome at that time.

**Section 2: Rome and Informal Diplomacy from 264 to 210**

In support of the argument regarding Rome’s lack of informal diplomacy during the period that is not covered by our analysis of gift-giving, it is useful to consider Rome’s approach when faced with the hostility of outsiders. Despite their sketchiness, the surviving sources repeatedly report that, after the 270s, she had
an idea of considering not only the people on her side, but also foreigners. Nevertheless, Rome tended to justify each action only in official channels, such as legal arguments, an approach that was not necessarily reasonable or appropriate when liaising with outsiders. This section argues that, she had not had the idea of approaching such people through unofficial channels, namely informal diplomacy, in parallel to formal ones before the end of the third century, while analysing her management of diplomatic disputes after the 270s.

As a first example, I will now focus on a discussion among the Romans at the beginning of the First Punic War, regarding the Republic’s decision to support the Mamertini in Sicily, in 264 (Liv. Per. 16; Polyb. 1.7.1-11.4, esp. 10.4; cf. Cic. Verr. 2.5.50 and 158-64; Plut. Pomp. 10.2).\(^\text{16}\) When the latter declared *deditio*, their surrender,\(^\text{17}\) to Rome, the Senate hesitated to accept it. They had been mercenaries from Campania, but had captured Messana and allied with rebellious Roman troops in Rhegium.\(^\text{18}\) Indeed, Rome had already punished the rebels. In 264, the Mamertini were also almost defeated by Hieron II of Syracuse. Their surrender was designed to defend themselves, with Roman support, from the vengeful Sicilians. If Rome protected such Mamertini, despite their being partners of the rebels, who had seized Rhegium, it would be regarded as ‘infidelity (ἁμαρτία)’ to Messana and Rhegium. Meanwhile, the Senate was also apprehensive about Carthage’s expansion in Sicily. If Rome refused to support the Mamertini, they could easily ally with Carthage, presenting a further potential menace to Italy. The Senate could not make a decision and therefore left it to the

\(^{16}\) Ameling 2011: 51-7.
\(^{18}\) Champion 2013: 149.
assembly. The citizen body decided to send troops, probably motivated, to some extent, by the fact that Carthage had sent troops to Messana. It is important, however, to observe that, considering the hesitation of the Senate, Rome was not indifferent to the public justification of her actions before outsiders, though there is no sign, in this case, that the Roman state strove to convince them of the validity of its decision through some official tool, such as senatorial decrees, or by unofficial means, such as gift-giving to foreign individuals. The surviving sources, among whom Polybios is the most prominent, might simply have failed to notice such approaches. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Rome decided to support the Mamertini consciously, following discussion in the Senate and assembly, both official channels, and yet seems to have failed to manage the expected antipathy of outsiders, either by official or informal means.

A similar situation can be seen in the contact between Rome and Carthage during the same period. The ancient authors, in this case, appear to be interested, predominantly, in the legal aspect of the relationship between both states. According to Philinos, one of Polybios’ sources, they had a treaty, and Rome’s dispatch of troops to Sicily in 264 contravened it. Polybios denies it, however (3.26.3-7), since his other sources do not support this writer. Philinos’ accuracy here is doubted by modern scholars, partly because he was a known pro-Carthaginian. Yet, as J. Serrati argues in an analysis of the treaties between both states, Philinos’ reference to the pact in question is not a complete fiction. Indeed, Livius’ Periochae (at 14) reports that, by Carthage’s aid to Tarentum in 272, ‘the treaty (between the two states) was violated (foedus violatum est),’ but

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does not tell whether it was completely and formally nullified at that time. It is, now, impossible to find the cause of this divergence between Polybios, Philinos, and Livius, and to gauge the precise relationship between Rome and Carthage around the early third century.\textsuperscript{21} Nevertheless, whether or not there was an official treaty, Rome’s advance clearly provided a reason for outsiders to criticise the Republic (cf. Diod. 23.2.1). Indeed, Livius and Polybios here defend the Romans, and on the basis on legal arguments. These elements suggest that the people in Rome were convinced of Roman justice through this legal argument and that of the threat posed by Carthage, although this might partly result from the way of criticism of anti-Romans, such as Philinos. It is also noticeable that there is no sign that Rome strove to convince such outsiders as to the legitimacy of her position. She had contacts with both Carthage and Hieron, but soon attacked them without discussing the rationale (Polyb. 1.11.11-12).\textsuperscript{22} Other cities did not agree to support Rome, until she exerted military pressure on them. This image of Roman silence towards outsiders might partly result from the fact that Polybios and other writers were uninterested in the details of her approach to outsiders, here. Furthermore, it was almost impossible for Rome to make foreigners recognise her acquisition of Messana during negotiations after all. There was no reason for the Sicilians and Carthage to approve Rome’s advance into the island. But if Rome had striven to convince outsiders of her justice, or to compensate their opposition with some strategies like gifts, the extant sources would likely have referred to it, in the light of the extent of their other efforts to discuss Roman legitimacy with legal arguments. Rome, then, might have conceived an idea of


\textsuperscript{22} Welwei 1978: 573-87; Flach and Schraven 2007: 137-48.
convincing contemporaries of her righteousness, but seemed incapable of managing those, who did not accept her arguments proposed through official channels, with some other formal, or informal methods, although it remains needless to say that we are restricted by the limitations of sources in this matter.

Another example can be identified, dating to shortly after the end of the Punic War. In 238/7, the soldiers of Sardinia revolted against Carthage. They asked Rome to help them, just as the Mamertini had done. Again, Rome accepted the request, prompting Carthage to protest against the decision. Rome responded with a resolution of war. Polybios is critical of this course of action, and reports that the Romans acted without any ‘reasonable (εὐλογος)’ ‘pretext (πρόφασις)’ or ‘cause (αἰτία),’ but that Carthage could not help ceding Sardinia to Rome, owing of the former’s military weakness (3.28.1; cf. 1.88.8-12).24

It is noticeable that Polybios criticises Rome neither from the viewpoint of morality nor from that of legality, but does so instead on the grounds that Rome lacked any discernible justification, as D. W. Baronowski points out (3.22-32).25 Strictly speaking, pretexts were offered. Polybios, and later authors using his text, inform us that Rome treated the capture of Sardinia as compensation for Carthage’s seizure of an Italian ship, although the writers regard this as an unreasonable claim, because the dispute was solved before the conflict over Sardinia even began (App. Hisp. 4: Pun. 5 and 86; Polyb. 1.83.7-8 and 3.28.3-4; Zonar. 8.18). Some Latin writers observe that Sardinia was considered part of the spoils of war, and justified Rome’s action (Eutrop. 3.2.2; Liv. 22.54.11; Oros. 4.11.2).

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But the dispute occurred in 238, while the Punic War had ended in 241. The people on Rome’s side might accept these pretexts but, for those who knew the circumstances and had no reason to support her unconditionally, these were far from acceptable.

In addition, contemporary Romans may well have proposed legal arguments to justify their action, although these are not referred to directly by the extant sources. As W. L. Carey notices, Rome supported Carthage when a rebellion of mercenaries broke out in Africa, the most serious crisis to strike Carthage after the Punic War, and nevertheless, Rome sent troops to Sardinia, responding to the request of soldiers who had rebelled against Carthage, in parallel to the incident in Africa. Carey explains the timing and logic of Rome’s decision as follows. Sardinia was occupied by the mercenaries. Rome did not directly exploit the rebellion in Sardinia and Africa against Carthage to occupy the island since she respected its ownership. But the rebellious soldiers in Sardinia were eventually defeated by the islanders, and nevertheless Sardinia was ignored by Carthage for a few years, owing to the war in Africa. From the viewpoint of Roman law, Carthage’s ownership of Sardinia had ceased here. As a consequence, Rome regarded her occupation of the island as reasonable, and opposed the objection from Carthage at this timing, from a position of legalistic morality. This view explains the apparent inconsistency in Rome’s attitude towards Carthage successfully. The lack of any reference to legal arguments in Polybios’ text appears to refute this (cf. 3.28.1-4), but he criticises Rome for a lack of legitimate cause from his viewpoint. He does not necessarily comprehend

26 Walbank 1957: 150.
27 Carey 1996: 210-6 and 221-2.
28 For more information on the rebellion in Africa, see Hoyos 2000: 369-80.
completely the arguments presented by Rome. He may well have omitted arguments that he considered unworthy of discussion, and Roman law was categorised into this, since her idea of ownership, not shared with the Greek states and Carthage, may well have been more unconvincing than the pretexts of an Italian ship and the trophy of the Punic War, for outsiders.

The details surrounding Rome's advance into Sardinia show afresh that the Romans did not strive to convince outsiders of their position. Otherwise, Rome would likely have tried to win them over by approaching them even through informal channels, in parallel to official arguments mentioned above. Fabius Pictor, who actively justifies Rome's conduct in many cases around the end of the third century, would also have defended her position, even here. Considering his celebrity in the second century, Polybios would surely have referred to his explanation, if some reasonable cause had been proposed by Rome and subsequently recorded by the writer. Polybios' criticism regarding Rome's lack of any reasonable explanation for this case suggests, once again, that Rome did not actively court any outsiders who did not accept her official pretext, either by official or informal means, and that pro-Roman writers, like Pictor, could not completely defend this attitude of Rome.

This tendency of Rome in managing diplomatic disputes is also suggested by a similar case, found later in the same decade. In 236, C. Licinius Varus, the consul, was ordered to conquer Corsica (Zonar. 8.18). He sent M. Claudius Clineas, his lieutenant, ahead with a force. But Clineas made peace with the Corsicans instead of attacking them. Their military strength overwhelmed that of his troops.

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29 The publicity of Pictor is confirmed by the list of famous writers on a Sicilian inscription (*SEG* XXVI.1123). For an analysis of this epigraphy, and his stance on the historiography, see also Battistoni 2006: 175-7 and Dillery 2009: 78-81.
It is noteworthy that he negotiated as the αὐτοκράτωρ, Rome’s representative, in ending the war, and nevertheless, Varus considered it to be a dishonourable settlement, attacking and conquering Corsica. Following this, the senators ‘sent Claudius (Clineas) to Corsicans to divert from themselves the blame for breaking the compact (τὸ παρασπονδήμα άποπροσποιούμενοι ἐπεμψαν αὐτοῖς ἐκδιδόντες τὸν Κλαύδιον).’ Rome condemned his agreement as ‘shameful (turpem)’ and treated it as an arbitrary and unauthorised decision on his part, despite his position as the αὐτοκράτωρ. The Corsicans did not accept such logic and consequently refused to receive him as a criminal (Val.Max. 6.3.3a; cf. Cassius Dio 12.45.1).\(^{30}\) In 236, Rome attempted to justify her aggressive action before people in and beyond her through surrendering the negotiator labelled as a false one to Corsica. This argument seems to have been reasonable as far as the Romans were concerned. This is considered to represent an example of Roman sternness and ‘discipline (disciplina)’ by Valerius Maximus, who idealised the era of the Early and Middle Republic.\(^{31}\) This solution, however, left the Corsicans and other outsiders far from satisfied. Even though Rome’s action was legally justified, from her perspective, the islanders had been cheated by Varus. Zonaras’ reference here shows that some authors disapproved of the Romans’ actions in this case, and thus presented the events in a negative fashion. It is clear that Rome considered it important to justify her foreign policy to the domestic and possibly international audiences through legal arguments: nevertheless, she does not seem to have devoted any significant effort to win over those who did not accept their narratives, with other strategies, such as gift-giving.

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It is also useful to notice a case of 210, around 25 years afterwards, and during the Second Punic War. According to Livius at 26.29.1-6 (cf. Plut. Marc. 23: Val.Max. 4.1.7), the Senate allotted provinciae to the consuls, and decided to replace M. Claudius Marcellus with M. Valerius Laevinus as the governor of Sicily, where the Roman control had only recently been re-established, following a campaign of the former. This senatorial decision resulted from an appeal from the Sicilian cities. Their envoys lobbied for the change of governor and ‘went round to the homes of senators (circumibant ... senatorum domos),’ complaining about Marcellus’ actions in Sicily.\(^{32}\) It is rare in Livius’ text that an informal process underlying the formation of senatorial consensus can be seen.\(^{33}\) It is, however, remarkable that the senators received such private visits, effectively acts of informal diplomacy, considered the petition, and changed the governor, even though Marcellus had been due to continue in office before the envoys’ visit,\(^{34}\) while the senators did not criticise him, instead letting him transfer to Italy as a commander against Hannibal. They defended Marcellus and his achievements, which must have delighted the Roman citizenry, but at the same time satisfied the Sicilians, who had been recently conquered and practically outsiders. Meanwhile, Rome only reactively managed the request of the Sicilians as far as her official justice and interests, i.e. her conquest, were not spoiled. Rome was considering the needs and interests of the people in and beyond her, as in previous cases, but she had not yet discovered a method and idea of actively controlling both domestic and international public opinion, through customs such as gift-giving, despite accepting the informal diplomatic approach by outsiders.

\(^{32}\) Wells 2010: 230-1.
\(^{34}\) Stewart 1998: 147.
In the cases from 264 to 210, the following points should be observed. Firstly, Rome was interested in the opinion of outsiders, even in this period. Secondly, it was, nonetheless, more important for the Republic to convince the people on its side of its righteous position, and Rome tended to achieve this through official channels, in particular legal arguments. Thirdly, Rome lacked concepts and methods of how to win over those who did not accept her justification in official channels, at least in these cases. Considering the appearance of gifts around the 270s as well, Rome certainly observed informal diplomacy being carried out by outsiders, but does not seem to have used it, or even understood it, from 280 to 210. These results are, of course, based on the limited evidence that is available, and do not completely demonstrate the novelty of informal diplomacy for Rome from the 200s onwards. Nevertheless, many of the cases in these two sections were important incidents for Rome's expansion in the western Mediterranean world. The lack of informal diplomacy in them, therefore, shows that this diplomatic concept was not significant in the Romans' wider diplomatic practice, in comparison to the period of expansion into the East. Despite this, however, the nature of the evidence means that it is still possible to think that Rome, by chance, abstained from using informal diplomacy in these cases, despite her familiarity with it. In order to refute this possibility, I will, now, analyse Rome’s management of diplomatic disputes before 280. If the cases in the period concerned show that informal diplomacy did not play a central role even before 280, the results enable us to confirm the peculiar significance of this concept in connection with Rome from the 200s onwards.
Section 3: The Date of Rome’s Encounter with Informal Diplomacy

Our previous discussions have only covered Roman diplomacy after 280; how Rome handled the issue before that date is the subject of the present section. However, it is not practical to check every case from her foundation to 280, since the early centuries are half legendary and it is too difficult to confirm the reality of any event before the Gallic attack. Nevertheless, there are more than two hundred diplomatic events from that attack at the beginning of the fourth century to the 200s, reported in the sources. Analyzing these cases strengthens our central argument regarding the significance of informal diplomacy being peculiar to the period from the end of the third century onwards.

Rome’s dealings with the Gallic king Brennus, following the sack of Rome, offers one of the earliest examples from the fourth century. It is noteworthy that it follows the pattern that this chapter has already observed in previous sections. In 390 or 387/6, Rome was defeated and her capital was almost occupied, prompting the Republic to sue for peace. He accepted on the condition that Rome paid compensation. In the middle of making payment, however, M. Furius Camillus, the dictator, is said to have arrived with new troops, and cancelled the pact concluded between Brennus and Q. Sulpicius, the tribunus militum with

36 Canali De Rossi 2005: nos.186-381; 2007: nos.401-515. Quite a few of them can be confirmed by StV II: Nrn.251, 302, 316, and 326; StV III: Nrn.461-2, 466-7, 473-5, 478-9, 483, 488, 493-4, 500, 503, 509, 521-2, 530, 534-5, 540-1, 544, and 548.
37 According to Polybios (1.6.1-2), it happened in 387/6. Livius, however, dates it to 390 (5.36.12). Although there is no reason to doubt the former, as Walbank 1957: 46-7 indicates, it remains difficult to date the events conclusively. Ogilvie 1965: 719-52; Oakley 1997: 104-6 and 360-5. Indeed, recent studies abstain from deciding it although they accept the historicity of this event. E.g. Rosenberger 2003: 365; Flower 2010: 37.
consular power. According to the extant authors (Liv. 5.49.1-3, esp. 2; Plut. Cam. 29.2-3), Brennus reacted furiously, but Camillus legitimised his action by pointing to the fact that the accord was concluded ‘by a magistrate with inferior authority without his order (iniussu suo ab inferioris iuris magistrate)’ after his assumption of the dictator, and subsequently took no notice of any protest. Brennus could not help withdrawing, since Rome had recovered her power.

It is significant that Rome justified the nullification of Sulpicius’ pact on the pretext of an imperfection in the procedure, a factor that the authors reporting the events seem to have considered favourably. Ancient writers tend to gloss over Rome’s disgrace here with many heroic and sometimes fictional episodes, which seem to include the acts of Camillus (e.g. Diod. 14.116.6-7; Plut. Cam. 21). At least, the silence of Trogus (cf. Just. 43.5.8) and Polybios (at 1.6.2-3) on him suggests that this episode is a fiction. It is important to note, however, that whether this was fictitious or not, his argument (or rather that attributed to him by the sources) does not confute Brennus’ claim. Seemingly, Camillus cleverly made the king withdraw, but he had ceased attacking Rome because Sulpicius, as the lawful Roman representative, had sued for peace and promised to offer gold. Even if the legal objection proposed by Camillus was reasonable, there was no reason why Brennus should have suffered unilaterally from the cancellation of the peace. Nevertheless, this episode is favourably informed by the extant sources. This suggests that contemporary Romans and/or early authors and descendants tended to like to achieve diplomatic aims through legal arguments, but were also comparatively uninterested in those who did not accept them, particularly

foreigners. Otherwise, it is likely that they would have emphasised the other methods employed by Rome to win over such people as well. For example, for outsiders Brennus’ injustice in the middle of payment of indemnity by Sulpicius would have been more persuasive than the order of Roman magistrates as the reason of cancellation of the pact (Liv. 5.48.9), even if both were fictions.\(^{40}\) The current situation of the sources about the Gallic sack confirms the relative lack of approach by Rome before the 200s to outsiders through the channels apart from official ones.

One might argue that this event is exceptional in the whole history of Rome, too singular to find any clue in demonstrating Rome’s typical attitude to outsiders. There is a similar case, though. According to Dionysios of Halikarnassos (RA 15.10.1-2), in 327 Rome opened war against some Samnite states and sent the *fetiales* to make the declaration.\(^{41}\) As soon as they returned, Rome mobilised troops. The Samnites, however, did not recognise it as a declaration of war with Rome. They also had a custom of sending *fetiales*, and in their system, even after the contact with the priests, the states concerned could have negotiate further to avoid war.\(^{42}\) The Samnites were therefore attacked unexpectedly by the Roman forces.\(^{43}\) Both Rome and Dionysios’ sources, however, do not appear to have been

\(^{40}\) Luce 1971: 277-83 and 289-97.
\(^{41}\) For the introduction of the priesthood and the rules the extant sources are inconsistent, but they were fully engaged in these duties by 362, at the latest. Wiedemann 1986: 478-9; Penella 1987: 233-7; Oakley 1998: 313. Moreover, according to Livius (7.32.1), in 343, the ritual of the priests was treated as *sollemnis mos*, as a usual method, in the process of opening hostilities. For their religious and legal importance in procedures connected to Roman warfare, see Rich 1976: 56-60 and Beard, North, and Price 1998: 26-7.
\(^{42}\) The existence of the Samnite *fetiales* is also confirmed in the case of 322 (Liv. 8.39.14), and their historicity is generally accepted by scholars. Salmon 1967: 145-6 and 219.
concerned regarding this discrepancy and the unfair result. This confirms the argument of Th. Wiedemann that the custom of employing *fetiales* was a mechanism designed to persuade the Roman populace to wage wars with a psychological certainty that the gods supported them.\(^4\) It is impossible to decide, in the absence of further evidence, whether the Samnites protested about their perceived injustice, and how Rome responded to it; nevertheless, the establishment of a set of rules of war in Rome, and her manner of using it, here show, once again, that the Romans were interested in approaching the people in and possibly beyond them by legal arguments, but were indifferent to approach further those who might not favour the official approach. Indeed, Dionysios, a Greek rhetorician of the first century, seems dissatisfied with Rome’s attitude here, despite his general respect for her moral qualities in earlier centuries,\(^5\) specifically noting the unfair usage of the *fetiales*, and the resulting disadvantage that the Samnites faced. Livius, by contrast, emphasises only Rome’s fairness and the bellicose attitude of the Samnites here (8.22.5-23.10).

These Roman attitudes towards people inside and beyond the Republic, and Rome’s methods of justification, are seen in our next case, the nullification of the so-called Caudine Peace (Liv. 9.4.1-5.3, 8.1-10, and 9.1-12.2). In 321, a Roman force was trapped in Caudium by Pontius, a leader of the Samnite states.\(^6\) Rome’s generals were forced to sue for peace, to avoid the complete destruction of the army. Although Pontius wanted to conclude a *foedus aequum*, an equal peace treaty, the generals persuaded him to accept a *sponsio*, a verbal engagement, as a step towards concluding a treaty, and successfully withdrew from the field. The

\(^4\) Wiedemann 1986: 481.
Roman assembly rejected the pact at Caudium, though. This allegedly resulted from the speech of Sp. Postumius, one of the trapped generals. He argued that the sponsio was not made ‘by the order of the Roman people (iniussu populi),’ applied only to the guarantors, and could be cancelled by surrendering them to the Samnites (9.9.4). The Romans in the assembly approved his legal argument, while praising him for his ‘wisdom and services (consilio et opera)’ according to Livius (9.10.4). Then, the ritual to hand over Postumius and other senior officers was performed by the fetiales to void the pact officially. Pontius criticised it and refused to accept the surrender, but he could do nothing else, realistically. The Roman soldiers had returned home. Once again, then, Rome liked to justify her actions with legal arguments to both citizens and outsiders, and many contemporary and early and possibly later Roman descendants looked favourably upon these events, in light of Livius’ description. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Rome was unsuccessful in managing the antipathy of outsiders, lacking other official or unofficial tools to approach them further.

One might question my argument here from the viewpoint of the problem of the historicity of this event. The defeat at Caudium as such is an accepted fact, though. There would be no reason for Rome to invent a fictional disgrace. Nevertheless, the defeat was shocking not only for contemporary Romans but also for their descendants, and both groups seemed to justify and glorify the actions of the protagonists, while adding some fictional elements.\footnote{Ash 1998: 27-44; Aston 1999: 5-32; Forsythe 2005: 299-300; Ando 2008: 494-501.} Indeed, many scholars notice this problem in the sources, and think that the rejection of the peace was a fiction, and it was actually concluded in 320.\footnote{E.g. Burger 1898: 24-45; Salmon 1967: 227-9; Crawford 1973: 2; Rosenstein 1986: 230-52; Rüpke 1990: 111; Forsythe 1999: 71; Oakley 2005: 37-8.} The opposition to my argument
based on their hypothesis is, nonetheless, not convincing, as the following discussion shows. This theory regarding a falsified, or fictionalised, rejection depends on the similarity between this incident and one of 137-6. The latter was triggered by the defeat of C. Hostilius Mancinus, during his consulship of 137. He was trapped at Numantia, and, with Ti. Gracchus, secured a peace that was effectively an act of capitulation. In 136, the Romans rejected the pact formed in such shameful conditions and surrendered Mancinus to Numantia, while cancelling the settlement, on the pretext that he had made ‘a disgraceful treaty without their authorisation (ἀνευ σφῶν αἰσχράς συνθήκας),’ and argued that it could be compensated by his surrender, reminiscent of the generals ‘having made similar treaties without their order (ὁμοία χαρώς αὐτῶν συνθεμένους)’ in Rome’s conflict with the Samnites (App. Hisp. 83). Numantia angrily refused to receive Mancinus, just as Pontius did. Scholars think, then, that Rome in 136 wanted to cancel the pact, and invented the story about the Caudine Peace to provide a precedent justifying her denouncing the pact with Numantia. If this is the case, Rome actually accepted the Caudine Peace and stopped fighting in 320, despite Livius’ references to the war after that (e.g. 9.12.9-15.8 and 16.1-11). However, this theory is problematic, as T. J. Cornell has argued. An inscription shows that the consul, L. Papirius Sp.f. L.n. Cursor, celebrated a triumph over the Samnites in 319 (Fasti Capitolini 96). Furthermore, not only Livius, but also some other sources in the first century, inform us that the war was continued even after 320 (Cic. Inv.Rhet. 2.91; Diod. 19.10.1; Dion.Hal. RA 16.1.3). There is no reason to think that all of them were prepared to distort history, or were deceived

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by an invented story after the 130s, even if such an attempt was really made at that time.

A case of 318 confirms the error in the view regarding the ratification of peace, while also strengthening the argument of Rome’s lack of informal diplomacy. In this year, diplomats from many Samnite states made a request for the ‘renewal of a treaty (de foedere renovando)’ and, after the Senate rejected it, they ‘importuned individual Romans (fatigassent singulos precibus)’ and obtained a two years’ truce (Liv. 9.20.1-3, esp. 3). Scholars recognise the historicity of the armistice owing to the coherency of the sources concerned, referring to the advantage gained by Rome in Southern Italy at that time.52 It is important to identify which treaty the Samnites wanted to renew. Considering the lack of any specific reference, it is likely that they requested renewal of the directly preceding arrangement. If Rome had accepted the peace in 320, they wanted her to renew the pact concluded by her defeat in 321.53 It is not plausible, however, that Rome was expected to accept it, given her increasing superiority in 318.54 The most likely treaty being referred to in the extant sources is that of 341. This was the last peace, except that of Caudium, for both peoples in 318, in which the Samnites had supplied a year’s pay and three months’ rations to Rome’s army in compensation (8.1.7-2.4).55 This fits better with Rome’s strategic advantage in 318, and was a treaty that Rome could be expected to renew, reasonably. These

54 This is indicated by Oakley 2005: 264 n.2, but he, instead, thinks that the treaty expected to renew was that of 354, based on the assumption of Salmon 1967: 187-93 that it was an agreement founded on mutual respect and benefit to territorial interests. However, this is not consistent with the military superiority of Rome in the 310s, either. Cf. Forsythe 2005: 283-4.
factors support Cornell’s theory regarding the rejection of peace in 320, and the historicity of contemporary and early descendant Romans’ justification through legal arguments. It is also noteworthy that, in 318, the Samnite envoys forged private contacts with individual Romans, in their attempt to change the senatorial decision, and that the citizens accepted such approaches and compromised, to some extent, just as the senators did in 210. This is a striking example of informal diplomacy. Rome therefore can be seen to have observed it, even before the 200s, and considered the viewpoint of outsiders. Yet, just as in 210, Rome did not seem to recognise this kind of approach as a viable diplomatic method, much less its potential significance. The Republic only accepted the request of the envoys as far as the integrity of Rome’s laws, and the state’s other interests, were maintained. Rome did not seek to win over the Samnites in any way, whether formal or informal. This passive attitude towards outsiders is supported by the fact that primary Roman writers do not seem to emphasise Pontius’ order, to send Roman prisoners with only a single garment under the yoke, to justify Rome’s decision of 320 in light of the brief description of the extant sources (e.g. App. *Sam.* 8; Cassius Dio fr.36.10; Cic. *Off.* 3.109; Dion.Hal. *RA* 16.1.4; Flor. 1.11.11; Gell. 17.21.36; Liv. 9.4.3; Val.Max. 7.2.ext.17). This might have been legitimate under Roman law, but could still be regarded as unfair by people outside Rome. If contemporary Romans had been interested in winning over foreigners, this episode would likely have been used as an extra-legal justification of their rejection, in parallel to Postumius’ legal arguments and the procedures directed by the *fetiales*, and later authors would have followed such a line.

Overall, even before the third century, then, Rome had observed and come into contact with examples of informal diplomacy. However, the Romans seem not to have recognised it as an appropriate diplomatic method, or at least did not use it by themselves, in the important events discussed here. The Republic was interested in public opinion, both in and beyond Rome, but any approach was made through the lens and language of official diplomacy, particularly legal arguments. Even if outsiders reacted against Roman initiatives, Rome, herself, does not seem to have attempted to approach such people through alternative channels. At least, informal diplomacy does not seem to have played an important role in her management of important diplomatic disputes, similar to the period from 280 to 210.

**Conclusion**

As far as the extant sources record, the Romans had observed informal diplomacy, even before the First Macedonian War, but seemed neither to understand nor to employ it, in their contacts with outsiders. Given the nature of the surviving information, it is impossible to examine Rome’s diplomatic practice continuously, in particular the detail of contacts with foreigners through informal channels, unlike from the end of the third century onwards. And yet, the Romans’ indifference towards those who did not accept Rome’s justification of her actions by official measures, such as legal arguments, has been identified in this chapter, in addition to Rome’s ad hoc, reactive responses to acts of informal diplomacy by outsiders. The absence of references in our sources to the methods employed in this diplomatic concept, shows that it did not play an active part in her diplomacy,
during the period concerned. These elements support an argument emphasising the novelty of informal diplomacy for Rome at the close of the third century and, furthermore, the results built on previous chapters, emphasising its significance to Rome’s establishment of a hegemony in the Mediterranean world, and to the gradual process of change that characterised the Republic in the very period from the 200s to 133, and afterwards.
Conclusion

This thesis has analysed Roman diplomacy mainly from the 200s to 133, through the lens of informal diplomacy. Now, I shall conclude by a brief summing-up with some general consideration and future prospects.

Focusing on the distinction between the formal and informal spheres in diplomatic activity reveals a gradual increase of the diversity of Rome’s contacts with outsiders, during the period under discussion. In fact, it becomes clear that Rome increasingly used channels that were not subject to formal diplomatic constraints, in her approach to other states. The custom of gift-giving is indicative of this general transformation. The giving of gifts to foreign envoys was performed by the Senate, as part of the official diplomatic exchange, but made the receivers indebted to Rome. As a result, they were more likely to act in support of her, and thus to become an unofficial channel through which she could approach their fellow citizens. This combination of formal and informal approaches in diplomacy was effective in creating a good impression, not only on Roman citizens and supporters, but also outsiders. This was more useful to Rome than simply declaring the legitimacy of every diplomatic action through official media, such as legal arguments. By defining the new concept of informal diplomacy, this thesis has demonstrated the value in observing whom each diplomat approached, and how effectively unofficial methods were used to solve diplomatic conflicts in which the interests of the people concerned were officially incompatible or not explicit.

The concept of informal diplomacy has also enabled this thesis to reveal the rise of powerful individuals within Rome’s diplomatic practice. This resulted from its increasing significance. In this context, people who lacked full authority to
participate in diplomacy could be involved, either by their own or by foreign states, and such individuals could also gradually behave increasingly independently. This pattern sometimes amplified the influence of the individuals concerned, both in and beyond Rome, in parallel to their legitimate connections with official power or other officers of the state, as shown in the case of Africanus, for example. Once the participation of individuals in diplomatic actions was generally approved by other Romans and contemporaries, it was all too easy for such people to influence negotiations and the decision-making process of Rome and other states, in pursuit not only of her ad hoc necessities but also of their own interests.

In an associated development, the rise of individuals within the diplomatic framework advanced Rome’s prominence among other states, those of the Greek world, in particular. The increasing significance of Roman leaders in international politics brought an upsurge in the number of connections between them and foreign states and individuals. This made it easier for Rome to control outsiders, by actively supporting and interacting with the foreigners connected with Rome’s leaders. As shown in the cases of the Achaians in the 180s, some outsiders could react negatively to this process, but they had no practical method to stop it decisively. Since Rome’s military superiority was generally recognised, it became impossible for any state to prevent its citizens from having contacts with the superpower, in pursuit of their own interests. Informal diplomacy and military power were thus complementary factors in Rome’s expansion.

The rise of powerful individuals, meanwhile, also caused internal conflicts among the Romans. As the custom of gift-giving, and the acts of Flamininus, have shown, informal diplomacy functioned as part of Rome’s approach to other states, based initially, at least, on the tacit approval of many leading Romans, during the
period of Rome’s expansion into the Greek world. Roman diplomacy had been previously managed by the senators collectively, and this was an essential feature of the Roman Republic; nevertheless, the rise of Roman individuals gradually challenged the Senate’s control of diplomacy. The increasing influence of some individuals through informal diplomacy, for whatever reason, damaged the collective leadership of the Senate. The independent actions of individuals could even upset foreign powers. However, as I argued in Chapter 5, this latter tension disappeared as Rome’s hegemony was established, and this network of contacts rather helped to ensure the security of communities beyond Rome. When the rise of individuals caused internal struggles over state leadership, between them and the Senate in Rome, however, there was no such factor that acted as a release valve to forestall civic unrest and conflict. This worsening crisis was emphasised by the fact that the Senate was not the only legislative body present in Rome. While the senators strengthened their collective leadership during the 160s, this was achieved only by winning over contemporaries in and beyond Rome, and indirectly controlling the individuals using informal diplomacy. The position of informal diplomacy in Rome was poorly defined; it could be tacitly approved by leading Romans and outsiders in ad hoc diplomatic events, but those who employed informal diplomacy could still be criticised by the Senate.

Finally, I have shown that the violence surrounding the tribunate of Ti. Gracchus resulted from this ill-definition of informal diplomacy within Roman politics. His assassination in 133 was partly brought about by a series of coincidences, but essentially by the tension caused by the lack of a clearly defined relationship between informal diplomacy, the Senate, and legal powers. Gracchus combined his tribunician authority and own influence over people in and beyond
Rome, and temporarily held the power to dominate home and foreign affairs by winning over the assembly, while bypassing the Senate. Many senators noticed the essence of his power, but possessed no legitimate method to stop him. All that they could do was to suppress him with violence. Through his assassination, the collective leadership of the Senate was preserved, but the Republic had entered a new phase. Leading Romans displayed their will to defend their collective leadership, but it was also shown that the political order could only be maintained though physical force, while informal diplomacy could be still used without its position in Roman politics being defined. The leading Romans wanted to manage foreign and home affairs collectively, but also to exploit informal diplomacy to manage ad hoc diplomatic matters and, moreover, hoped to increase their personal influence with its use.

These results show that informal diplomacy is an important factor for understanding Rome, both during the period of expansion into the Greek world, and in the context of the changing political complexion of the Republic. The diplomatic methods embraced in this concept might have appeared in Roman diplomacy even before the 200s, and it should be remembered that the ancients did not use this term to understand diplomatic manners in the unofficial sphere synthetically; nevertheless, contemporaries recognised that many of the activities which comprise this concept played an important role in Roman diplomacy, during the decades concerned. I would stress, furthermore, that the increase of influence of informal diplomacy continued to enable individual leading Romans to rise which, in turn, sowed the seeds of bitter and eventually deadly struggles between the Romans, themselves. The lack of a way to prevent the rise of individuals and the consequent assassination of Gracchus, who had possessed a unique level of
influence in and beyond Rome in 133, were a foreshadowing of the imperators and the civil wars that characterised the later first century. Informal diplomacy of Rome therefore functioned as a tool of her expansion, in parallel to her other advantages, such as military strength, and was more effective than any other state usage of this concept. This success, however, also brought about a fundamental conflict among the Romans, from the middle of the second century onwards, even after the shocking violence of 133. In conclusion, these results of my study contribute not only to understanding Rome from the 200s to 133, but also the process by which the Republic was to collapse, in parallel with Roman unification of the Mediterranean world under prominent leaders, such as Caesar and Augustus.
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