Since the end of the twenties, since the initiation of Visitations in Electoral Saxony, since the Diet of Speyer, the Reformation had been clothing itself in quite definitely confessional garb. Emergent Protestantism witnesses to the disruptive and creative influence of the Reformation on the totality of political, social, and cultural life.

If, however, Protestantism was a political and cultural phenomenon as well as an ecclesiastical one, the same is true of Catholicism. What confronted one another at the Diet of Regensburg in 1541 were not only two theological alternatives but also two cultural and political alternatives.

Of these two alternatives it is the Protestant one which, understandably, has received the more generous attention. Yet pre-tridentine Catholicism is not without its own peculiar interest, is by no means all disintegration and confusion. The Machiavellianism of Curial diplomacy is as much in line with the trend of things to come as the Erasmianism of the Imperial Court. Even the traditionalist component to pre-tridentine Catholicism is by no means an undifferentiated quantity.

Contarini's activity at Regensburg mirrors the richness and elusiveness of this Catholicism. The very fact of his presence at the Diet cannot be wondered at enough. It is at
least as significant as the eventual failure of his mission. For if it was the inner contradictions of pre-tridentine Catholicism, as exemplified in Contarini, which were to be so cruelly exposed by the Diet, it was these same contradictions which had enabled an exercise in reconciliation to take place at all.

Contarini may have understood something of Lutheran theology. Of Protestantism he had not the slightest comprehension. His ecumenical concern and his understanding of Justification prepared him only to deal with the former. Hence his retreat when faced by the full implications of a Protestant Church and a Protestant culture, first to a confessional Catholicism, and then to an intolerant Curialism.

The dialogue between Protestantism and Catholicism at the Diet of Regensburg in 1541 did not fail. It never took place.
Cardinal Contarini at Regensburg:
a Study in Ecumenism, Catholicism and Curialism.

Peter Clarkson Matheson.

Doctor of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
20 July 1968.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Apology to the Augsburg Confession.</td>
</tr>
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<td>ARG</td>
<td>Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Confessio Augustana.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Corpus Reformatorum.</td>
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<tr>
<td>D/B</td>
<td>Dittrich's biography of Contarini.</td>
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<td>D/R</td>
<td>Dittrich, Regesten und Briefe Contarinis.</td>
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<td>D/Morone</td>
<td>Dittrich, Nuntiaturberichte Morones.1539,1540.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HJ</td>
<td>Historisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAV</td>
<td>Nuovo Archivio Veneto.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NB</td>
<td>Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVRG</td>
<td>Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>Weimar edition of Luther's works.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAB</td>
<td>Weimar edition of Luther's letters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZKG</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION


Heer, from a Catholic humanist point of view\footnote{Friedrich Heer, Die Dritte Kraft: Der europäische Humanismus zwischen den Fronten des konfessionellen Zeitalters (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer Verlag 1959), p. 81.} and Stupperich from a Protestant\footnote{R. Stupperich, Der Humanismus und die Wiedervereinigung der Konfessionen (SVRG 160; Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1936), p. 4.} are at one with the Jesuit historian in seeing Regensburg as the logical conclusion to the various attempts at conciliation that had taken place throughout the thirties. Regensburg, however, like its preparatory stages at Hagenau and Worms, is in one decisive respect different from all that has preceded it. With it we move from the territorial to the imperial level, from the humanist encounter to the confessional confrontation, from the periphery of politics to its turbulent centre. At Regensburg, to a degree unknown even in Augsburg, papal, imperial and territorial interests meet and collide, theological questions become of urgent political importance, political
considerations threaten to force the hands of the theologians. Regensburg had little to do with the "dream of an understanding". Far more it was an attempt to come to terms with the hard realities of a divided and disordered and virtually defenceless Germany. It was neither primarily religious nor primarily political, but rather an attempt to forge a tolerable future for the Germany that Luther had in one sense created, and in another torn apart.

Melanchthon's irenical activity after Augsburg: his correspondence with Schepper, Veldes, Erasmus and Bishop Stadion of Augsburg had raised hopes among many that the schism was not irrevocable. Throughout Europe the humanist circles used their influence in the interests of reconciliation. In France they secured the invitation of Melanchthon and Bucer to a colloquy whose aim was the amicable settlement of the religious differences. Only John Frederick's veto prevented Melanchthon's acceptance. For both Bucer and Melanchthon believed that union could be gained on the basis of a clear statement on the doctrine of justification by a group of unbiased scholars, provided tolerance was exercised on questions of usage. 2

A similar Erasmian spirit reigned in the humanist group gathered around the Dresden Court of Duke George of Saxony, himself a strong defender of the Old Faith. It was on the

1 Ibid., pp. 30-32.
2 Ibid., pp. 33-35.
initiative of one of its most prominent members, Julius Pflug, that the first of the colloquies in the thirties was held in Leipzig. Together with the Ducal Chancellor Carlowitz and representatives of the Archbishop of Mainz, Pflug met on 29 and 30 April 1534 with Melanchthon and Bruck from Electoral Saxony. Agreement was reached on the question of justification. While it was stressed on the one hand that forgiveness was solely by the grace of God, it was conceded on the other that good works were necessary, since they rest on the commandment of God and faith is never unaccompanied by them. The colloquy foundered however, as at Augsburg, on the question of the Mass.\footnote{Ibid., pp.39-40.}

Carlowitz himself was the initiator of the second Leipzig Colloquy which began, without the knowledge of his prince, on 2 January 1539. Hesse and Electoral Saxony were represented respectively by Feige and Bucer, Bruck and Melanchthon, Ducal Saxony (unofficially) by Carlowitz, Fuchs and later Witzel.\footnote{Ibid., pp.40-42.} Carlowitz's programme was anti-papal, anti-imperial, and anti-clerical. The territorial authorities should have the right to determine their own doctrine and
practice on the basis of the practice of the early church.1
This attempt to bypass the confessional strife by a return
to the common ground of the apostolic age, failed when the
Protestants demonstrated that the diversity of practice with¬
in the early church prevented it from being an adequate
criterion. The thought that this diversity itself could be a
criterion occurred, of course, to no one. Agreement was,
nonetheless, reached on the question of faith and works, the
formula being the work this time of Bucer and Witzel. Good
works were described as the inevitable fruits of faith, to
which the faithful should be exhorted. They have no merit
in themselves, but only as the gifts of Christ. This formula

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1 Cf. Bucer's report on the colloquy: Carlowitz's fear was
that if the secular princes did not come to an under¬
standing prior to the arrival of the emperor, the latter,
supported by the spiritual princes, by France, and by the
pope, would "...vordren von allen stenden, im zuzufallen..." welche
dann des keisers meinung nicht annemen möchten, die
wurde man sonder zweifel mit gewalt zur gehorsam bringen.
Auss dem musste dann erfolgen, entweder endliche vertruckung
der waren religion und jemeliche verwustung der kirchen
oder aber ein gantz geflicher kriige, dadurch auch die
tutsche nation leicht gar verheret und zerstörct werden
möchte." The clerics had no desire to reform themselves
but only to extend their power "derhalben ware sich nit
wol anders zu versehen, dann das des keisers und anderer
monarchen furschlag der religion halben dazu dienen wur¬
de, das die genanten geistlichen erst recht wider in allen
iiren pracht und gewalt eingesetzet und befestiget wurden." Without a "gewaltiger trang" on the part of the secular
Estates reform would never be achieved. The "richtscheidt
und mittel" of apostolic practice would remove all secular
power from the spiritual princes, for if there were to be
any real reform and not merely the odd concession on
clerical celibacy and such like, then "müste man die
(kirchen) gentzlich auss diser leuten gewalt erlösen und
sie helfen mit recht geschaffnen fursteheren zu versehen."
Lenz I Nr 23 pp.63 ff.
was accepted by Hesse, and regarded by Carlowitz as proof that as far as doctrine was concerned there was no real dispute. The Wittenberg theologians, however, regarded it as a dangerous compromising of the truth, and at the Furstentag of Gelnhausen only the Elector of Brandenburg was ready to give his backing.¹

Joachim of Brandenburg had been taking advice from the moderates from both camps, from Melanchthon, Pflug, and above all Witzel, who participated in the drafting of a reformed Church Order for Brandenburg. The doctrine of the latter was, in effect, evangelical, its ecclesiastical forms those of the Old Church.² Luther felt able to give his partial approval.³

It is not surprising, therefore, that it was a suggestion of Joachim to Ferdinand, the emperor’s vice-gerent in Germany, in May 1538 which led Charles V to abandon at least for the moment the hope of a Council which he had pursued since the failure of the Colloquy at Augsburg in 1530. Brandenburg’s view was that instead of a Council, which the Protestants would not attend and which would only lead to war, a peaceful

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³ Luther/Joachim II 4/12/39 WAB 8 pp. 620-623.
conference should be convoked. At the cost of certain concessions to the Protestants Germany could be united and the much needed subsidy against the Turks would be secured.¹

Since the death of Clement VII the emperor had come to see that the important question was no longer whether or not a Council should be held, but what kind of a Council it was going to be. By 1538 it was becoming clear to him that there was no prospect whatsoever of a Council that would strengthen Imperial authority by healing the religious schism. Charles was forced to the conclusion that if he were to restore his authority in Germany he would have to do it by his own efforts, while seeking at the same time to minimize the theological consequences of this political action by referring all final decisions to the coming Council. In theory he remained true to the principles of the Roman Church. In practice he found he had to bypass them.

Hence his favourable reaction to Brandenburg's suggestion. At a gathering of the Estates at Frankfurt his representative, the Archbishop of Lund, allowed a Respite to be passed on the nineteenth of April 1539 which provided for a gathering of laymen and theologians in Nuremberg to settle the religious question, and which did not as much as mention the pope and

¹ Stupperich, p. 58.
his legate.\(^1\)

The Protestants were by no means wholly satisfied with the Diet's outcome.\(^2\) Yet for the first time an open discussion of the questions of faith unhindered by papal or episcopal authority had been granted by the emperor. It was therefore, as Bucer explained in a militant letter to Philip of Hesse, an opportunity that the Protestants - who from the beginning had demanded just such a Colloquy - dare not allow to slip by. Even at the risk of war, the secular prince must do all in his power to further the extension of the Kingdom of God.\(^3\) In his reply Philip reaffirmed his support for the Colloquy and wrote to John Frederick suggesting common action on the matter.\(^4\)

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1 France had agreed in the meantime to support the emperor's attempt to bring back the Protestants to the Faith by friendly means. In his letter to Ferdinand of 18 July 1538 Charles wrote to the French King: "... il detto Signor Re ha dimostrato et dimostra haver bonissima volonta et affettione, che le cose se mandino ad effetto sincereamente, et tien per certo, che'il farra ben intender alli detti desviati questa nostra vera et perfetta amicitia, et li farra indur et persuader, et tennera la mano presso loro, ch'ei si riduchino et accordino..." Laemmer p.191.

2 One of the grounds of offence was the ninth clause of the Recess, guaranteeing the Catholic clergy their traditional income: as Bucer said, "... das die pfaffen alles kirchengut zu solichem verderben der kirchen mit offentlichem sacrilegio, das ist kirchenraub, inhalten..." Bucer/Philip 26/5/39 Lenz I Nr 24 p.76. Bucer felt the recess was shameful to all parties "Eventus igitur et actorum summa ejsonodi extitit, ut eujus et piget et pudeat tam oratorem Caesaris quam conciliatores principes quam nos." Ibid. p.77 n.8. Probably the prohibition of further secularisations of Church lands and of any extension of the Schmalkaldic League was the chief ground for complaint.


4 24/6/39 Ibid. Nr 26 esp. p.84 n.2.
theologians were ready to concede the Catholics their Mass and ceremonies if the pure Word were preached.\(^1\) John Frederick's theologians, on the other hand, insisted that in religious questions there could be no middle way. The choice must be made between pure doctrine and error. They, for their part, could not depart from the truth as declared in the Gospel and expounded in the Augsburg Confession. To mask disagreement with ambiguous phrases was futile. The sole purpose of a colloquy would be to test the willingness of the other party to admit the truth of the Lutheran doctrines.\(^2\)

Rome was equally adamant. The Protestants, now at the height of their fortunes\(^3\) may have been disappointed by the results of Frankfurt. Rome, with its back against the wall, was horrified and alarmed. While scarcely "determined to prevent the unification of the Germans"\(^4\) the papacy feared that the proposed conference would end in impermissible concessions.

The case against the holding of colloquies had been classically stated in the Sorbonne opinion of 1534. Since the proper criteria of judgement - the decisions of the

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1 Stupperich p.63.

2 Ibid., pp.63-64.


4 "Ihr Ziel stand fest: die Einigung der Deutschen zu verhindern." Stupperich, p.61.
Councils and the decrees of the pope, apostolic tradition and catholic practice - must be recognised from the beginning, the precondition for discussions with heretics is their prior acknowledgement of their error. Otherwise the sole criterion the Protestants recognise - the authority of the Scriptures - will be wilfully distorted by them to suit their case. Hence discussions with them are to no avail and function rather as a sounding board for Lutheran propaganda.¹ This was still the dominant view in the Roman Curia, though the threat such colloquies posed to the authority of the pope received greater emphasis there.

It was by no means only the fanatical rigorists and curialists who were alarmed by the events at Frankfurt. Cardinal Pole, in a letter to Contarini, lamenting the slight to the papacy and the proposed Nuremberg Colloquy, feared that unless measures were speedily taken against "istis privatis conventibus" an even worse schism would arise - to the grave detriment of papal authority.² Contarini agreed with him.³ Morone, the papal nuncio to Ferdinand, joined all the other papal representatives in Germany in a fierce attack on the "reckless and inept" policy to which the Archbishop of Lund had given his

¹ Le Plat II, pp. 770 ff.
³ Contarini/Pole 22/6/39 Ibid., p. 159.
approval.  

The emperor, riding out the storm of indignation, neither rejected nor confirmed the Recess, and the colloquy at Nuremberg did not, in fact, take place.  

The relief of the papacy was, however, of brief duration. The high hopes which the well-informed Aleander, the papal legate to Ferdinand, had put in the imminent arrival of Charles V in Germany turned towards the end of 1539 to concern that the latter would adopt a neutralist, mediating position between the parties. This, in view of the doubtful loyalty of the German episcopate, could well, wrote Morone, lead to the unification of Germany on the basis of independence from Rome.

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1 Morone/Farnese 19/8/39 D/Morone Nr 8 pp. 12-14.


3 Aleander wrote to Farnese (13/1/40) that he was comforted by the thought of the arrival of the emperor "la cui bontà et pietà singolare havendo sempre remediato che non si sommerghino, mi fa creder che avanti la sua partenza di Germania sii per solevarle et restituirle se non in tutto, almeno in buona parte all'antiqua dignità..." Ibid., Nr 40 p.71. He was, however, disgusted at the substitution of the Archbishop of Lund for Held in the conduct of the negotiations.

4 Morone/Farnese 13/12/39 Ibid., pp.24-25. The exclusion of the papal representatives at Frankfurt showed, argued Morone, that there was no desire for peace on the part of the Protestants, and that it was therefore not only useless but dangerous to engage in negotiations with them unless there were means available to curb their arrogance. Morone/Farnese 30/11/39 D/Morone Nr 32 pp.59-63.
The Curia had to act speedily, and act it did. The whole weight of its diplomacy was thrown into the scales against the threatened compromise with the Protestants. Its formula was simple: united action against the Protestants (including England) and the Turks on the basis, politically, of peace between the Empire and France, and, religiously, of a properly convoked and ordered General Council. 1 Nothing was more dangerous than handling gently such insolent people as the Lutherans. 2

Such admonitions fell, however, on deaf ears, and Cardinal Farnese, sent as a special legate to promote peace between France and the Empire, distrusted the lukewarm attitude of the emperor in his dealings with the Lutherans. 3 Morone feared the worst from the vacillating attitude of the Catholics as a whole and found it necessary to write even to the Archbishop of Mainz (whom he characterised as "superficial, timid, and ambitious") warning him against a draft

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3 He had been refused a copy of the Imperial answer to the Protestant request for a ratification of the Frankfurter Respite, and suspected in this evidence of "la tepidità... che S.Mtà usa con Lutherani..." Ibid., pp.115-119. From now on the complaints of the papal representatives that they were being kept in the dark concerning Imperial policy become distressingly frequent, e.g. the dispatches of 24/3/40, 11/4/40, 174/40. Ibid., pp. 138-141, 165-166, 171-175.
basis of unity - "full of poison in many points" - compiled by Melanchthon and Bucer.¹ Eck lamented that the Lutherans were much more active for their heresy than the Catholics for the true faith.²

This lack of firmness in dealing with the Protestants was the natural outcome of the waning hopes of a peace with France. Neither the truce at Nice nor the negotiations at Aiguesmortes in 1538 had laid the basis of a lasting peace. Milan remained the chief stone of offence. Neither the friendly reception of the emperor as he passed through France to the Netherlands at the end of 1539 nor the various marriage alliances proposed in the months following could disguise the basic incompatibility of Charles' dynastic and imperial ambitions with Francis I's hopes for the future of France.³

When Charles was joined in Ghent by his brother Ferdinand, already deeply involved in the negotiations with the Protestants and desperately concerned that effective measures be taken against the Turks, the balance swung decisively against a rapprochement with France, especially since the latter could only be gained at the expense of the Habsburg family interests. Farnese's despatches to Rome show a growing concern at the

² "...vigilantiores sunt in perfidia quam nostri pro fide." Eck/Fabri 9/2/40 ZKG XIX (1899) p.240.
trend of events. Already at the beginning of February he was reporting that the prospects of peace were uncertain, and as the weeks went by an initial confidence in the emperor's desire to come to terms with Francis turned to doubt and then irritation at his procrastinating tactics. The French King, he feared, would lose confidence and the whole project was in danger of collapsing. Though the negotiations continued to drag on for some time it was abundantly clear by the beginning of April that all hopes of peace were dead.

The significance of this new turn in the Imperial policy is not that the emperor now began to think in terms of a peaceful settlement with the Protestants - this had already been foreseen at Aiguesmortes in 1538 but that he now intended to pursue this aim on his own - to the exclusion of France and, insofar as this was possible, of the papacy. The latter, on the other hand, had now lost the initiative it had won at Nice. What had promised to be a united Catholic action under her aegis against Turk and heretic, to the promotion alike of the security of "Christendom" and the prestige of the papacy,

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1 Farnese/Paul III 7/2/40 NB I,v, Nr 45 pp.77-78.
2 Farnese/Paul III 24/2/40 Ibid., Nr 52 pp.89-92.
3 Farnese/Paul III 5/3/40 Ibid., Nr 59 p.108. Sim.24/3/40 pp. 138-141. Morone's report on the negotiations with Cleves confirmed that the emperor was no longer contemplating peace with France. Morone/Sforza 14/3/40 Ibid.,p.120.
4 Farnese/Paul III 1/4/40 Ibid., Nr 78 pp.144-145.
was threatening to develop into a purely Imperial matter.

The break with France meant, therefore, alienation from the papacy. The insistence with which the papal representatives had harped on the theme of peace, when, to Charles's mind, the French conditions were unacceptable, had reinforced his suspicions as to the francophile tendency of papal policy.¹ Both France and Rome had supported the chimerical idea of a campaign against England.² A number of dynastic, Italian disputes between the emperor and the pope helped to exacerbate relations further.³

Events were now rapidly moving to a crisis. Farnese believed that the threat of the complete Lutheranisation of Germany would force the emperor to decide between forfeiting the Empire and "having to pay more regard to that nation than to the apostolic see". A submission to the threats of the Protestants could well, he feared, lead to the apostasy of all Germany.⁴

Morone was no less pessimistic. The Lutheran princes sought only increase of wealth and power, their scholars prestige and advancement, and the common folk were ashamed

¹ Farnese/Sforza 5/4/40 Ibid., Nr 79 p. 146.
² Farnese/Paul III 24/2/40 Ibid., Nr 52, p. 89-92.
³ Farnese/Paul III 13/3/40 Ibid., pp. 115-119.
⁴ If the emperor stood by the Protestants, wrote Farnese, it could well come about that "la parte cattolica deventi anche lei subito luterani et gia molti se ne lassano intendere, tal che la fede si puo tener per perduta in quella provincia." Farnese/Sforza 23/3/40 Ibid., Nr 74 p. 135-137.
to confess their error though they often recognised it. As to the possible solutions - war, a policy of concord, or the Council - war would be morally questionable and, in view of the discord between France and the Empire, militarily inadvisable. Colloquies, on the other hand, as a misconceived attempt to treat issues which concern all Christendom as if they were private affairs, would be exceedingly dangerous. The Catholic truths were harder to defend since they were not all clearly founded on the Scriptures, whereas the Protestant theses had the semblance of plausibility. The sole effective remedy, despite the enormous difficulties it posed, would be a Council, preceded by reform and backed by a really determined papacy.¹

Charles, however, expected from Paul III neither reform nor determination, nor a Council², and on the eleventh of April Morone received through Ferdinand the bald intimation that within six months a gathering of Catholic princes would be held, probably at Speyers, to discuss the religious question.³ Morone's guarded approval soon vanished when it transpired that Protestants too were to be invited, though he did recognise the truth of Ferdinand's contention that

2 To the later offer of a Council as an alternative to the proposed colloquy at Speyer Charles angrily declared that he wanted nothing more and would attend it himself. "Just let His Holiness open it!"(repeating thrice the "Aprilo S. Stâ") Ibid., Nr 96 p.194.
3 Morone/Paul III 11/4/40 Ibid., Nr 83 pp.165-166.
if he and the emperor had not summoned it, the Estates could well have acted independently and summoned one themselves.\(^1\)

Religious considerations would, he feared, be subordinated to political, questions of principle to a policy of "peace at all costs", and the papacy could expect little support from the Catholics.\(^2\)

Farnese submitted a formal protest to the emperor.\(^3\)

Negotiation with the Protestants is impossible. They are "slippery eels" who do not even abide by their own Augsburg Confession. How much less faith can be put in their adherence to any agreement they may make with the Catholics!

The colloquy would undermine Catholic doctrine. It would be the first stage in a dissolution of the whole structure of the Church\(^4\), for the Protestants demand not the reform but the abolition of the papacy, and would make concessions only

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1 Morone/Farnese 14/4/40 Ibid., Nr 86 p.169. Sim.Poggio's protest, Poggio/Paul III 17/4/40 Ibid., Nr 89 pp.171-175.

2 NB I,v,Nr 87 p.170.

3 Sim. his argument to Granvelle that every Diet convoked to deal with the religious question, as experience had shown, "riuscera scandalosa et damnosa". Farnese/Paul III 20/4/40 Ibid., Nr 92 pp.183-186. His reference, in the protest to the emperor, to the Protestants as being more inimical to Christ than the Turks, has a certain parallel in an early statement by Contarini that the Lutherans were "magiori Inimici di questa santa sede,che non sono li Turchi." Contarini/Senate of Venice 7/6/28. D/R p.29.

4 "totius ordinis ecclesiasticae."
in exchange for the defection of Germany from the Roman obedience.¹

If, on the other hand, it were hoped to win back the Protestants this would necessitate substantial concessions: priestly marriage and the common cup, for example. Once won, however, at a colloquy, no one would be concerned to seek their ratification by Pope or Council, although the fact that such practices are unknown in, say, Spain and France, would destroy the unity of Christendom.²

Only a General Council, therefore, can settle the religious question, either by effecting the submission of the Protestants or by branding them before the world as heretics and thus giving their over-lords authority to reduce them "ad sanirem mentem".³

Farnese's point is clear. If the right of autonomous judgement is granted to Germany, then Rome and the papacy can be side-stepped at will. If authority to determine possible concession lies in Speyer and not in Rome, then why ever bother to have recourse to Rome or to Council at all.

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¹ A recurrent nightmare of the papal representatives in Germany, Morone also feared a concentration of the Lutheran attack on this point. Morone/Sforza 15/4/40 NB I,v,Nr 87 p.170. Farnese believed that to gain their way on this question, "...qual solo è il scopo della loro malignità...", the Protestants would agree with the Catholics on the other dogmatic differences. Farnese/Paul III 17/4/40 Ibid.,Nr 90, pp.175-182.

² He regarded the proposed colloquy as the virtual equivalent of a national Council. Ibid., p.179.

³ Consilium per Cardinalem Farnesiam pontificis legatum Carolo V. Caesari datum de inhibendo conventu Spirensi et responsum breve imperatoris. Le Plat II,634-40.(21/4/40).
authority and jurisdiction of the Roman Church is at stake.

We have reached a critical point. The centre of interest is moving from the diplomatic to the theological scene, from negotiations with France to dealings with the Protestants, from the question of Milan to the question of Germany, from a reasonably harmonious co-operation between emperor and pope to a bitter, long-drawn out struggle between the two. On the one side, a struggle for the unity of Germany. On the other, for the authority of the papacy in Germany. And on both sides a gradual recognition that the one could only be gained at the expense of the other. It was therefore a question of ultimate priorities which lay behind all the particular controversies about the colloquy, council, and peace which were fought out in the months immediately preceding the Diet of Regensburg.

The question of priorities was also a question of time. The emperor, harried by Turk and France alike, pressed for immediate decisions. He had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, from protracted triangular negotiations between himself, the papacy and the Germans. Hence his drive to settle the issue himself, in Germany, and without further delay. He had no sympathy for the anti-Papalism of Frankfurt; he was aware of the scepticism of Wittenberg; he took account of the fears of Rome. Yet he had no option but to pursue

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1 Farnese commented that if the unity of Germany were achieved as the result of Speyer this would be fateful for the Apostolic See, as for France. NB I, v, Nr 90, p. 180. Francis I topped this by saying that it would be the ruin not only of the Apostolic See but of all Christendom. Ibid., Nr 131 p. 265.
what appeared to him the only viable policy. As he pointed out to Farnese, a Council would neither provide the needed money for the Turkish campaign, nor would it, unless it were held in Germany, be attended by any German delegates. Without members, however, no council was possible! The colloquy at Speyer must, therefore, be held, but all final decisions would be reserved to the Council.

Since it was now clear that, with or without papal approval, the policy of mediation would be carried through, the Curia could only seek to gain time, to stall, to drag her feet on the question of unity as the emperor had previously done on the question of peace. A policy of calculated inaction! The divided counsels within the Curia, the involvement of Paul in other, personal matters, and his chronic indecisiveness in such questions, all militated against the formulation of any positive alternative policy. Neither reform, nor the council itself, nor the consolidation of the Catholic forces in Germany were pursued with the necessary thoroughness. Even the despatches from Germany were dealt with in an, to us, inconceivably lethargic and offhanded manner, to the understandable indignation of

1 Cf. Granvelle's question to the protesting Farnese whether he had a better course to suggest! Ibid., Sr 92 p. 185.
2 Le Plat II, 640.
the papal nuncios and legates in Germany.¹

The papal attitude towards the question of its representation in Germany is an illustration of this policy of inaction. At Frankfurt a colloquy had been threatened at which the papacy would not even be represented. If this were permitted Germany would become accustomed to acting quite independently from Rome on religious matters. Farnese, indeed, was convinced that the emperor was bent on bypassing Rome. Why the protracted delay in assenting to the despatch of a papal legate to Speyer if not to make the timely arrival there of a "persona grava" from Rome impossible, someone, that is, of weight and authority who could thwart any possible inclination towards an ill-advised concord with the Lutherans?

To parry this alleged Imperial scheme² Farnese recommended that either Pole or Contarini should be despatched at once to the north of Italy so that immediately the Imperial consent were given the legate could set out for Speyer. He should be armed with the most detailed instructions as to his course of action in the face of Catholic weakness and the demand for concessions from Rome.³

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¹ Cf. e.g. Morone's complaint about "questa ignorantia mia delle cose di Roma" and the false steps it could lead him to. Hence he begs Farnese: "Per tanto supplico V. S. R. si degni far scrive, perche dubitando, non si abbia cura delle cose di qua, mi casca l'animo di servire." (7/7/40) Lämmer, p.288. Cervini promised to attempt to stir up Rome to pay more attention to the German situation or at least to send better and more frequent reports: Cervini/Morone 17/9/40 NB I,v,p.402.

² The Imperial assent was given five days later: Farnese/Paul III 22/4/40 Ibid., Nr 95 p.191.

³ Ibid., Farnese/Paul III 17/4/40 Nr.90 p.180ff.
The reference to detailed instructions is illuminating. The papal representatives were finding their position increasingly intolerable. Ill-informed as to the real wishes of Rome\(^1\), and unable to gain access to the counsels of the emperor they were none the less being pushed into taking weighty decisions on their own initiative. Already Farnese had overstepped his Instructions by offering the emperor the immediate convocation of the council as an alternative to Speyer.\(^2\) Morone was anxious to avoid taking similar responsibilities upon himself at the coming colloquy.\(^3\) Behind, then, the insistent requests of Morone and Farnese that a legate be despatched to the colloquy\(^4\) lay the conviction that only a papal representative of the highest standing, one intimately acquainted with the papal intentions, would be able to weld together the Catholic party, resist effectively the neutralist tendencies of the

\(\footnotesize{\begin{align*}
1 \text{ Farnese/Paul III 20/4/40 Ibid., Nr.92 p.186,} \\
2 \text{ Farnese/Paul III 21/4/40 Ibid.,Nr. 93 pp.186-189. He begged for understanding for his action from the Pope:"... come io l'ho preso in un summo pericolo per il meglio."} \\
3 \text{ 17/4/40 Morone/Paul III D/Morone Nr 61 p.116-118.} \\
4 \text{ Morone/Paul III 17/4/40 NB I,v,p.182; Farnese/Paul III 26/4/40 Ibid., Nr 99 p.201 (where,however, the danger that the presence of a legate might compromise the Apostolic See is noted ); Farnese/Paul III 30/4/40, Ibid., Nr 110 p.226.}
\end{align*}}\)
emperor¹, and take whatever decisions the urgency of the hour might demand.

This point of view did not change when it became clear that the emperor, whatever his original intentions may or may not have been, was now reconciled to the despatch of a legate, as long as he was not, like Aleander, of the unconciliating type. Pole was also excluded, since negotiations with England were under way.² In a conversation with Granvelle, Poggio found that Contarini would be more than acceptable.³ The emperor and Ferdinand, reported Farnese, would be happier with Contarini than with anyone else.⁴ Partly to avoid any unnecessary friction with the emperor, and partly because they shared the latter’s high opinion of Cardinal Farnese, Poggio and Morone supported this choice. Morone, no mean judge of men, believed Contarini possessed all the necessary

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¹ One current rumour passed on by the Bishop of Trent was that the Lutherans were offering (on the English analogy) to make the Emperor Spiritual as well as Temporal Head of Germany! Farnese/Paul III 21/4/40 Ibid., Nr 93 p. 187. Farnese was by this stage openly talking of the need to thwart the imperial plans, and to give more attention to the Catholic princes. Morone suggested the circulation of Farnese’s memorandum amongst the latter. Farnese/Paul III 26/4/40 Ibid., Nr 99 p. 201. Cf. Nr 103 p. 211.

² Ibid., Nr 99 p. 201. Charles cautioned "... che se havi de advertire non venesse qualchuno che facesse maggiore piaga, come il primo legato (et volse per dire del tempo del cardinal Campeggio et del Revmo Brundusino....)" (Aleander).

³ "... et parlando de alchumi, vedo che gli piaceria assai fusse il Revmo Contarini..." Poggio/Paul III 24/4/40 Ibid., Nr 96 p. 197-198.

qualifications - authority, scholarship and simplicity of life - which the papal representative at the colloquies would require. From the beginning, then, Contarini stood above the contending parties.

In principle Contarini had long been ready to undertake a legation to Germany even if, he assured Pole, it were to cost him his life. The Curia was acting with extreme caution. It recalled Farnese at once. The sending of a legate to Speyer, on the other hand, would depend on the future course of events. Farnese himself had already hinted that the honour

1 Morone/Paul III 17/4/40 D/Morone Nr 61 p.116-118.

2 "Quantum ad me pertinet, adscribo humanitati et amori tuo singulari ea quae mihi attribuis, sicuti arrogantis et temerarii esse existimo, praeter caetera pericula et incommoda huiusmodi quidpiam appetere, ita impium existimarem, si oblatum recusarem nulla etiam habita vitae ratione. Nam quid optabilius quam mori pro causa eius, qui nobis veram vitam sua morte comparavit?" Contarini/Pole 22/6/39 D/R p.115.

of the Apostolic See might be less compromised if everything were simply left to the nuncio Morone. This concern was echoed in the Instruction to Morone drafted by Aleander for the Speyer colloquy. He was to avoid all disputation, to protest and withdraw from the city if there were any lack of due regard for the papacy in the negotiations. The possibility of one or more legates being sent later was not excluded, but there could be no question of plenary authority being granted them. This belongs alone to the papacy and the General Council, and cannot be surrendered — to the peril of souls — for the sake of a supposed political necessity. Aleander's indignation was deep and genuine. "The heart of the matter is," he wrote in an accompanying letter to Morone, "that neither the Pope, the Holy College, the sky, the earth nor the rocks wish or can comprehend that matters of such import should be entrusted to four or five people or even to a whole nation, come what may!"

1 Cf. p. 21, n. 4, above. Francis I also approved of the papal decision to defer for the moment the despatch of a legate. Cervini/Farnese 30/5/40. NB I, v, Nr 131 p. 265.

2 Instructio pro R.D. Ioanne Episcopo Mutinensi Apostolico Nuncio missa ex Urbe... 15/5/40. Laemmer, pp. 262-266.

3 Aleander/Morone 15/5/40. "La somma di tutto quello che si scrive, è questa, che N.S., il sacro Collegio, il cielo, la terra, e i sassi non volono ne possano intender, che le cose della Religione di tanta importantia si commettino a quattro o cinque ne anche a tutta una Provincia, intervenghi che si voglii." Laemmer, p. 267.
Morone, who was to act as the papal representative at Hagenau (to which the colloquy was transferred due to an outbreak of the plague in Speyer) was by no means anti-Habsburg. He was convinced, indeed, of Ferdinand's good intentions. Yet his record in opposing colloquies was even more consistent than Aleander's. He had long urged the strengthening of the Catholic League as the sole means to at least minimise the danger of such gatherings. Frankfurt, he believed, had shown that there was no hope of coming to reasonable terms with the Protestants unless "the League is brandished before their faces like a cudgel." The vacillating policy of the Habsburgs, and in particular their failure to intervene when the new Duke Henry forcibly protestantised Ducal Saxony, and to annul the Frankfurt Recess, was only playing into the Protestants' hands.

1 Morone/Farnese 3/6/40 D/Morone Nr 70, pp. 134-137.
2 He had criticised Aleander's agreement to the Imperial Diet to deal with religious questions contemplated by Ferdinand at the end of 1539. Morone/Farnese 17/11/39 D/Morone Nr 28, pp. 47-52.
3 Founded 10/6/38 under the sponsorship of Vice-Chancellor Held at Nuremberg. Its membership included neither pope, emperor nor any electors. Of the bishops only Salzburg and Magdeburg. Its pillars were Duke George of Saxony (d. 17/4/39), the Duke of Braunschweig and the Dukes of Bavaria.
4 "... se non se gli mostra il bastone, nè via alcuna vi è di mostrarlo, che questa della lega..." Morone/Farnese 13/9/39 Ibid., Nr 14, p. 23.
5 Ibid., pp. 21-25. He claimed that the indecisive policy of the Habsburgs was disheartening the Catholics. Morone/Farnese 21/11/39 Ibid., Nr 29, pp. 52-55. Ferdinand informed the emperor that both Eck and Weissenfelder (a counsellor of the Dukes of Bavaria) agreed "que aulcunes Catholiques ne sont sans quelque doute que V.M'té dissimule voulentiers toutes ces choses, pour les mettre en pique et guerre contre les desvoyez, pour apres vous faire le maître deulx tous." NB I, vi, Beilage 25, p. 303.
On the other hand, Granvelle and Ferdinand had never tired of urging the need for the pope to adhere to the League. If Hagenau had an unfortunate outcome, declared Ferdinand, the blame would rest on the shoulders of the pope. 1 Morone, Poggio and Farnese also urged in almost every despatch that the pope should join the League. The opposition of the French Cardinals in the Curia, however, Paul's own fear of abandoning his neutrality, and the consideration that heavy financial obligations might be involved led – as so often in papal policy at this time – to the postponement of any real decision on the matter. 2 The lack of any strong leadership from the pope also afforded the German bishops an ideal excuse for their non-participation in the alliance. 3

For a time, however, it seemed as though Contarini would be sent to Hagenau in place of Morone. Paul III had been agreeable to the suggestion that Contarini be sent, and he was in fact nominated legate to Germany on 21 May. 4 According to Aleander he himself had been the first choice of the pope and

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1 Ferdinand felt that he had the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, he lacked any concrete support from the pope; on the other almost all his difficulties arose from the pope's claim on his allegiance. "... ut me vocant, inquit, papistam." NB I, v, Nr 116, pp. 233-236.


3 Farnese/Paul III 8/5/40 Ibid., p. 234.

4 Contarini/Cervini 26/5/40 Becc. I, ii, pp. 84-85.
many others but had had to refuse on health grounds. He had, however, given his fullest support to Contarini, whom he considered eminently fitted for such an undertaking. Indeed, Aleander would have us believe that it was largely his constancy for his friend in spite of very strong opposition (from the French party within the Curia?) that led the pope to propose Contarini.  

The intention at this point was that Cervini, the newly appointed legate to Charles V, should have the general oversight and authority in Germany, and that Contarini should make his way to the colloquy at a pace befitting his age and dignity. He was expected to leave Rome on 9 June for Belluno, his diocese in the north of Italy, to await there a favourable turn of events to justify his departure.  

Contarini's own correspondence shows no trace of doubt that he would in fact be sent, rather a humble awareness of the difficulty of the undertaking before him, and yet an eagerness to depart as soon as possible. For he is glad, he declares, to be able to do something in this last part of his life to the glory of God. As to the difficulties he commits himself to the prayers of his friends, and the goodness of God.  

1 Aleander/Maffei 21/5/40 NB I,v, Nr 127, pp. 258-259.
2 Sforza/Farnese 14/5/40 Ibid., Nr 123 pp. 252-253. Farnese/Cervini 5/6/40 Ibid., Nr 133 p. 269.
3 Contarini/Sadoleto 26/5/40 D/R p. 126.
The papal decision was enthusiastically welcomed by the Italian reformers Sadoleto, Pole and Carpi, by Morone, Poggio and Cervini in Germany, and by the whole Imperial Party. The rejoicing proved premature. On 9 June Contarini's departure from Rome was postponed indefinitely, and in fact he never left for Hagenau.

Why, then, the change in policy? That it had to do with a resurgence of the opposition against Contarini's person seems unlikely. The official explanation, that the new treaty between Venice and Turkey would make Contarini, a patriotic and aristocratic Venetian, persona non grata with the emperor is at best only part of the truth. For after Charles V had made it clear that in fact Contarini was acceptable still other (even less convincing) reasons were found for the delay - the imminent end of the colloquy, the unfavourable weather and so on.

The original plan had been that Contarini should leave for Germany from North Italy when the time seemed propitious. Paul, by keeping him in Rome, held the final decision as to his departure firmly in his own hands. The lonely ruler of

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1 Cf. e.g. Card. de Carpi/Contarini 29/5/40 D/R p.126; Morone/Farnese 11/6/40 NB I,v,Nr 204 p.429; Cervini/Contarini 24/7/40 Becc.I,ii,pp.84-85; Poggio/Farnese 15/6/40 NB I,v, Nr 144 pp.297-300.

2 Farnese/Cervini 9/6/40 Ibid.,Nr 138 p.281.

3 Farnese/Cervini 26/6/40 Ibid., Nr 149 p. 317.

4 Aleander/Morone 23/7/40 Ibid., Nr 219 pp.453-460.
the Vatican, sending out legates and nuncios to probe the situation on the far side of the Alps, like Noah his dove from the Ark, must have decided that the floods had not yet receded sufficiently for him or his representative to venture out. He would bide his time, postpone the final decision, and in the meantime collect more information. Cervini was given a watching brief over the emperor, whom he was on no account to leave, whether to attend Hagenaun or on any other ground. If it proved advisable to send a legate to the colloquy Contarini would be despatched.¹

Contarini himself was obviously disappointed by the papal decision.² Cervini, on the other hand, in view of the doubt as to the emperor's decisions, approved of it, though he suggested Contarini be sent to Belluno, so that the Habsburgs could be given at least a crumb of comfort.³ Morone, although aware of the danger that the Holy See might be compromised by the presence of the legate, had hoped that his coming would relieve him from his present purgatory, and was convinced of the need for a legate. There was work for ten papal representatives at Hagenaun, and the Habsburgs would see that no harm came to

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¹ Farnese wrote Cervini that "... S.Bne. non intende in alcun modo, che V.S.Rma si mova d'appresso la Mta Ces. alla quale fu destinata, ..."; hence if it should be necessary to have a legate at the Diet, "... si fece la deputatione del Rmo Contarino... et si saria avito verso la sua chiesa che confina con la Germania per passar oltre in diligentia sempre, che ne fusse avisato da V.S. Rma et da Mons. legato Apoc... acc...." 26/6/40 ZKG V p. 588.

² D/B p. 525.

³ Cervini/Farnese 14/6/40 NB I, v, Nr 142 p. 293.
Perhaps his main concern was to avoid a fatal embittering of the relations between the Habsburgs and the papacy and further damage to the reputation of the papacy. Already it was being said that the latter was opposed to the concord of Germany. The failure to send a legate might well, Morone feared, be taken as proof of this.

The key question was that of the intentions of the emperor. The request that the legate come armed with plenary authority indicated the trend of his thinking. The decisions should be made in Germany, not Rome! This request Morone rejected out-of-hand. Even if an angel were sent he did not believe the Apostolic See would give him such a mandate.

The papal representatives with one voice insisted that every part of the coming negotiations be referred to the pope. Acceptance of the authority of the Holy See must be the prior

1 Morone/Cervini 16/6/40 Ibid., Nr 206 p.432; God knew, he wrote Farnese, how much he desired the coming of Contarini, as he himself was not of sufficient stature to deal with the problems that arose. 19/6/40 Laemmer Nr 175 pp.279-80. Morone, while seeing the danger that over-hasty decisions might be taken by the princes as clearly as Rome did, felt this was but an added ground for the dispatch of a man like Contarini who would be able to direct the scholars in their discussions, and thus avert such dangers. Morone/Farnese 1/7/40 NB I,v, Nr 213 p.442.

2 Morone/Contarini 19/6/40 Quirini III, 262-266; When Morone first heard the news of Contarini's appointment, he was also informed that the pope feared and by no means desired "che la Germania si concordi, la qual voce è molto odiosa et dubito verghi da Roma." Morone/Farnese 11/6/40 D/R 127.

3 Morone/Farnese 3/6/40 D/Morone Nr 70 p.137.
condition on which all negotiations would be based.\textsuperscript{1}

The Habsburgs were liberal with their professions of loyalty to Rome, and assigned to the pope the final say on all controverted questions.\textsuperscript{2} But the irresolution of the Catholic Estates\textsuperscript{3} gave cause for concern, as did the characterisation of Morone as an enemy of the Imperial policy of concord and of Cervini as his henchman.\textsuperscript{4} Bernardo Santi, the Bishop of Aquila, whose chief source of information was the Imperial barber, did, it is true, have high hopes for the outcome of the colloquy and an even higher estimation of the "wise judgement" of the emperor.\textsuperscript{5} His judgement, however, was always erratic in the extreme.

\begin{itemize}
\item[1] Cf. e.g. Cervini/Farnese 25/6/40 for the legate’s talk with the emperor where he makes it quite clear that as far as any controverted articles were concerned "... con Luterani non si disputino, non si separino, et non si concordino, o in tutto o in parte, senza remetter ogni cosa a S. Sta,..." NB I, v, Nr 146, pp. 312-314; cf. Poggio/Farnese 25/6/40 for Poggio’s insistence that if anything were to be conceded to the Protestants it must be by the pope himself, for even the slightest injury to his authority by the hand of another would be a fatal blow, and again the emphasis "... che non se dividino le materie." Ibid., Nr 147, p. 306.

\item[2] Morone was convinced of the good intentions of Ferdinand, who represented Charles V at the colloquy of Hagenau. Morone/Farnese 3/6/40 D/Morone Nr 70 p. 136.

\item[3] Morone was afraid that their desire to have peace at any cost would lead them to agree to the exclusion of the papal legate, lest the Protestants be offended. Morone/Farnese 3/6/40, D/Morone Nr 70 p. 135; again in a despatch to Contarini he referred to the disunity of the Catholics, the cowardice of the bishops, the lack of loyalty to the Apostolic See, all of which he feared, might lead to the conclusion of a semi-Lutheran agreement. 19/6/40 Quirini, III, 262-266.


\item[5] Sanzio/Farnese 8/6/40 Ibid., Nr 137 p. 281. He was very optimistic about the emperor’s policies. "Summum verum est, quod Deus est pro Caesare...." Sanzio/Farnese 10/6/40 Ibid., p. 290.
\end{itemize}
The Proposition presented to the Catholic Estates by Ferdinand at Hagenau was phrased in irenical terms. The papacy was not as much as mentioned. It spoke generally of "Christian unity and agreement", "tolerable and Christian means", a return to "Christian unity and a due obedience." Cervini soon concluded that Charles intended to push through a plan of union regardless of the interests of religion or anything else. The distinction between the essential articles and "positive" or disciplinary articles was regarded by him and by Poggio as particularly dangerous. All the articles - also the so-called positive ones - must be referred back to the pope.

Charles exploded. In the present circumstances a military solution was unthinkable. Everyone looked only to his own interests. And what did the papacy do? Nothing! One legate sat in Italy, another refused to leave Brussels (Cervini), and the sole papal representative at Hagenau did his best to torpedo any hope of success!

Cervini returned to the attack. The failure to inform him of the latest demands of the Protestants, the blaming of the pope for the non-convocation of the Council, indeed, a

1 Le Plat II pp.650-654. (12/6/40).

2 Since Charles V appeared to be forcing through a settlement "senza rispetto di religione o di cosa alcuna" the sole remedy Cervini could suggest was that the papacy improve its relations with the other German princes. Cervini/Farnese 25/6/40 NB I,v,p.315. Morone talked darkly of the ruin of Catholicism. Morone/Farnese 15/6/40. Ibid., Nr 205 p.431.

3 Poggio/Farnese 25/6/40 Ibid., Nr 147 p.306.
whole series of measures, each more suspicious than the last, made it imperative, he declared, that the emperor define clearly what the purpose of this colloquy was. ¹

The emperor's reply was a solemn pledge that nothing detrimental to the interests of the faith would be done. Tolerance was requested for the Protestants on the question of the "positive" articles until the Council, but great hopes were expressed of the return of many of them to the Apostolic obedience. While Poggio took this pledge as gospel, Gervini still feared that Charles would not hesitate to pursue reunification if necessary without the pope. Weary of the whole business he begged for his recall and the despatch of Contarini. ²

Contarini, however, remained in Rome. ³ The discouraging news from Hagenau had confirmed Paul in his previous irresolution, despite Morone's urgent requests for assistance. ⁴ Whether Contarini would come to the second gathering at Worms to which the Hagenau Recess of 28 July had referred the religious issues, would depend, as before, on the future course of events. His attendance at the proposed Imperial Diet at Regensburg was, on the other hand, agreed to. ⁵

¹ Cervini/Farnese 2/7/40 Ibid., Nr 153 p.327; cf. Poggio/Farnese 2/7/40 Ibid., Nr 152 pp.321-325.
² Cervini/Farnese 3/7/40 Ibid., Nr 154 p.328.
³ Farnese/Cervini 9/6/40 Ibid., Nr 138 p.281.
⁴ Morone/Farnese 19/6/40 D/Morone Nr 78 pp.152-154.
Rome thus boycotted any attempt to bypass its authority, and refused to give the least shadow of its sanction to a settlement that might well favour the Lutherans. Morone and Cervini, however, found this policy unrealistic. One could not defend the papal authority by alienating the chief supporters of that authority in Germany - the Habsburgs. It was now clear that a disputation at Worms was inevitable, and clear also that there was a danger that it would lead to the granting of virtual tolerance to the Protestants by concessions on the so-called positive articles, and by postponing any final decisions on the others to the Council. But by refusing to send a legate and thus boycotting the colloquy (or at best sending unofficially some private scholars) the Curia would only drive the Habsburgs into the hands of the neutralists.

Already people were saying openly that the papacy cared neither for religion nor for Germany. If no legate were sent this would become the common opinion of all Germany - nay all Christendom. The greatest possible favour Paul III could

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1 Morone/Farnese 1/7/40 Ibid., Nr 213 p.442.

2 By the beginning of September Cervini was convinced both of the inevitability of a religious colloquy with a Diet to follow it, and of the good intentions of the emperor and his brother; it was, he wrote to Farnese, of paramount importance to show confidence in Charles V at this critical time, especially since many people regarded the failure of the papacy to send a legate to Hagenau as evidence of Rome's unconcern for German affairs. 5,6/9/40 Ibid., p.388-392.

3 Unless a legate were sent with the necessary scholars to accompany him, wrote Cervini from Utrecht, they, i.e. the Imperial court, and all Germany, indeed all Christendom would believe that His Holiness had no regard for religion nor for this nation - as many were already saying quite openly. 16?/8/40 D/Morone p.202.
do the emperor would be to prevent Contarini leaving, for then Charles could make an accord with the Lutherans and claim the only one to blame was the pope. The only realistic policy, therefore, would be to despatch the legate accompanied by a group of able scholars so that the dangers could be met and averted on the spot.¹

Farnese, now back in Rome, could see no point in sending a legate when the Protestants would certainly refuse to acknowledge his authority.² So Contarini, with a pious rubric to the effect that he left all to the great wisdom of the pope, had to resign himself to a further stay in Rome.³ Again, at the beginning of September, he was ready to leave, but at the last moment his departure, which had been supported by Ghinucci and Aleander, was cancelled. As a compromise solution the Bishop of Feltre, the guileless brother of the late Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggio, was sent instead.⁴

² Farnese/Morone 24/7/40 Laemmer Nr 183 pp. 297-300.
³ Contarini/Cervini 14/7/40 "Io sempre saro' obbedientissimo a S. Sanctita, la quale con sua molta prudenza, conoscerà bonissimo il tempo de mandarmi, si come quella che vede, et intende attimamente il tutto, et io volontier non mancarò di affaticarmi per l'honor di questa Santa Seda et di Sua Beatitudine in ogni occasione." Becc. I, ii, 95.
⁴ According to Farnese, Charles V himself, through his ambassador Aquilar, made known that he would prefer a simple prelate to be sent to Worms, reserving the despatch of a cardinal to the coming Imperial Diet at Regensburg. Farnese described Tommaso Campeggio as "... persona pratica del paese et assai bene instrutta delli humori et negocii di là..." Farnese/Morone 5/10/40 NB I, v, Nr 229 p. 472-6. Farnese/Poggio 6/10/40 NB I, vi, Nr 301 pp. 152-5; 2/11/40 Ibid., Nr 306 pp. 160-2.
Thus the initiative which the emperor had snatched by the
summoning of Hagenau remained firmly in his hands. Mere nego-
tiations with the Protestants were now to be replaced at Worms
by the much more dangerous theological disputation. It appear-
ed as if it would be the emperor and not the pope who would de-
termine the religious future of Germany.¹

The question that divided papacy and Empire was the question
of Protestantism. At whose cost was this new phenomenon to be
dealt with?

The papacy, which saw the theological consequences, was
ready to sacrifice the Imperial hegemony over Europe - in brief,
Milan - for the sake of a united crusade against the heresy.
The emperor saw the irreversibility of the Protestant move-
ment, and settled for a preferably temporary down-grading of
the papacy.² At Worms these irreconcilable interests came to
a head-on collision.

The pope made no secret of his distaste at the prospect of
the proposed gathering of Worms. However, like Him whose un-
worthy Vicar he was, he was ready to degrade himself to the
uttermost, or in other words despatch Campeggio.³

¹ The Curia was more than aware of this danger, and Farnese
emphasised to Poggio that Rome laid full responsibility for
the outcome of the gathering on the emperor's shoulders alone.
Farnese/Poggio 2/11/40 Ibid., Nr 306 pp.161-162.

² The emperor, of course, never ceased to profess his continued
loyalty to the Apostolic See. His main aim, however, according
to Morone, was now the winning of the support of the Protest-
ants for the defence of Germany against the Turks. Morone/

³ Campeggio's Instruction is a cautious document. He is to act
in concert with Morone, to refer any proposals for reform or
concessions of any kind back to Rome, and to see above all
that if the Catholic and papal cause cannot be furthered, it
will at least not be harmed. NB I,v,Nr 3 pp.5-13.
Morone did not know whether to fear more the success of the failure of the colloquy. The former would, due to the Catholic disunity, almost certainly lead to an agreement favourable to the Lutherans. Failure, on the other hand, could well mean that Charles, in desperation, would either leave things to take their own course, or grant the Protestants an eternal peace. In either case Germany would, freed from the distrains of Imperial authority, collapse into Lutheran licence. This pessimism was almost universal in the papal camp, with the exception of the occasional idealist such as the gentle Gregorio Cortese.

The first victory at Worms, however, where the negotiations had finally got under way on 25 November, went to the papal party. The Hagenau Recess had foreseen a disputation (whose conclusions would admittedly have no final or determinative authority) between eleven representatives of each of the confessions. The papacy, however, was not only in principle opposed to a handling of religious questions in this manner. It also knew that three of the "Catholic" representatives —

1 Morone/Farnese 15/12/40 Ranke DG VI, 172-176. The sole success he hoped for, he said, was that the emperor would have his eyes opened to the real intentions of the Protestants. Morone/Farnese 5/12/40 Ibid., Nr 257 p. 55. He found himself accused from the imperial side of trying to impede the progress of the colloquy at Worms. Cf. e.g. Morone/Santa Croce 12/12/40 D/Morone Nr 129 pp. 236-238.

2 Writing to Contarini he expressed his optimism about the outcome of the colloquy at Worms: "... ed assai più parea riuscibile questa via, che il gran trovaso da un concilio generale." 10/10/40 D/R p. 135.

Brandenburg, Cleves and the Palatinate - were openly Protestant in their theology, while the loyalty of Cologne, Trier and Strasbourg to the Apostolic See was doubtful. Campeggio even believed that the three ecclesiastical electors, the Elector Palatine and the Bishops of Bamberg and Würzburg, had a secret alliance with the Lutherans! It was at any rate evident that in every decision that was taken the loyal papalist group would be outnumbered and outvoted. At all cost, Morone and Campeggio concluded, voting must be prevented. And prevented it was. By an adroit alliance with the Catholic anti-Imperialist forces - led by the Dukes of Bavaria and Brunswick and the Archbishop of Mainz - whose opposition to a peaceful religious settlement was as much political as religious, Morone managed to force Granvelle, who was representing the emperor, to abandon the proposed mode of procedure. The emperor, though furious at what he regarded as an attempt to sabotage the colloquy, dared not precipitate a complete break with the papacy, without whose help, he declared, the Empire would be lost. Granvelle had to capitulate. In order to prevent

1 Campeggio/Farnese 15/12/40 NB I, vi, Nr 265 pp. 68-79; the disunity of the "Catholics" went so far that on 23 December Campeggio had to report to Rome that they had submitted four different views to the Protestants on the questions of original sin, justification, faith and works. The Protestants, on the other hand, were united behind the Augsburg Confession. Ibid., Nr 266 pp. 82-90; Cf. Morone/Farnese 12/1/41 "... la Teologia ora è fatta ministra delle passioni degli uomini." Morone meant that the views of the Catholic theologians varied according to the political interests of their patrons. Ibid., Nr 284 pp. 122 ff.

2 Campeggio/Farnese 23/10/40 Ibid., p. 16.

voting, it was agreed to carry through the disputation by the exchange of written statements from each side, and when this only exposed the dissensions within the "Catholic" ranks,\(^1\) yet another solution had to be found. It was decided that only one spokesman from each side would be allowed - Eck and Melanchthon respectively - and thus the divisions within the "Catholic" party were rendered harmless.\(^2\)

The second round, however, was won by the Imperial party. It soon transpired that the public disputations on the basis of the Augsburg Confession were unlikely to lead to any agreement.\(^3\) The Protestants, and in particular the Saxons under Melanchthon, had the strictest injunctions not to depart from the letter of the Confession.\(^4\) They made not the slightest positive response to the genuinely ecumenical attitude of Campeggio. The only reaction of Calvin, for example, to an irenic speech by the latter on 8 December, was to gloat over

\(^1\) Cf. p.38, n. 1, above.

\(^2\) Morone/Farnese 2/1/41 NB I, vi, Nr275 p.104.

\(^3\) Campeggio/Farnese 18/1/41 Ibid., Nr285 p.126.

\(^4\) Following the Schmalkaldic decisions of April 1540. CR III, 989ff. Confallonero, Morone's secretary, commenting on the widespread view that Melanchthon was more moderate than the other Protestants, writes that he is "il peggior' et più duro de tutti..." Confallonero/Morone 13/11/40 NB, vi, Nr328, p.204.
Campeggio's discomfiture when in the Estates' reply to him the pope's name was not even mentioned. The Catholics, for their part, were represented by Eck, who needed no injunctions to keep him on the path of orthodoxy. Under the catch-word "satis disputatum est" he had reported gloomily to Contarini on the failure to achieve anything at Haguenau and the excellent prospect of another such failure at Worms. Colloquies, to his mind, were only good propaganda occasions for the Protestants, who were impervious alike to reason, the Councils and the Fathers. Campeggio himself felt that the Protestant refusal to recognise the authority of the pope - whose primacy must not be called in question - cast doubt on the sincerity of their desire to negotiate.

The party of conciliation had thus been outmanoeuvred on the open field. Granvelle, therefore, while allowing the formal colloquy to continue - and in fact agreement was reached on the doctrine of original sin - shifted the centre of gravity from the public to the secret plane. His aim was to present the "rigorists" on both sides with a theological fait-accompli - a draft plan of concord agreeable to all parties, which would serve as the basis for a final settlement.

1 "Quae autem ignominia maior hoc statu rerum Papae irrogari potuit, quam ita responderi a Caesare et Ordinibus Imperii eius legato, ut eius nomen prorsus subticeretur... silentiium de Pontifice notabili contemptu non caruit." Calvin/Farel mid-December 1540 Herminjard VI, pp. 410-411.

2 Eck/Contarini 26/8/40 Le Plat II, 674-675.

3 Campeggio/Farnese 15/12/40 NB I, vi, Nr 265 p. 75.
at Regensburg.

On 14 December he summoned Bucer and Capito to himself through his secretary Veltwyck, and gained their eventual agreement to the secret colloquy he proposed. Hesse, in disfavour with the Schmalkaldic League as a result of his bigamous marriage, and afraid that the emperor might put him under the ban of the Empire, was inclined to conciliation and approved the scheme. ¹ The discussions that followed were based on proposals presented by Gropper and despite the Protestants' fears that political capital might be made out of any concessions on their part, came to a reasonably successful end on 31 December. The future Regensburg Book, based on these discussions, was probably drafted by Gropper with the help of Veltwyck, with amendments by Bucer and Capito. Granvelle and Manderscheidt may also have had a part in it. ²

¹ Philip/Bucer 25/12/40 Lenz I Nr 103 pp.279-285. He is not to make too many concessions but "soviel möglich in denen dingen pleibet, so beim Lutero zu erheben seien." (p.281)

Morone, aware that he was being circumvented, complained bitterly that he was being prevented from having any influence on the course of events. Only a legate, he believed, could uphold the authority of the Apostolic See, for the nuncios themselves had neither the authority nor the ability to cope with the situation.¹

He had, all the same, good reason to be content with his achievements at Worms. Together with Campeggio, he had secured the virtual rescinding of the Recess of Hagenau, thus preventing any decisions from being reached under conditions unusually unfavourable to the Apostolic See. The political and numerical predominance of the Protestant or non-papal forces had not been allowed to be brought to bear. Time had been gained, a breathing-space found, the steam-roller impact of the Imperial concord policy broken. "God be thanked that we have emerged from the snares of this colloquy" he sighed with some justification, as it finally came to an end on 18 January.²

The Protestants were rather depressed at the outcome.

¹ Morone/Contarini 10/1/41 NB I,vi,116 "... in somma noi altri Nuntii non avemo nè sufficienza, nè grazia, nè autorità."

² Morone/Farnese 18/1/41 Laemmer,Nr 202 p.337.
Not that they had ever nursed exaggerated hopes from it. But at first their bearing had been described by Campeggio as "very arrogant and confident"; their aim, he felt, was not to negotiate a settlement but to gain adherents. Their divisions, he remarks interestingly, could well be exploited by the emperor, for they feared the effects of the Imperial ban on their commerce, without which they could not live. The Bishop of Aquila likewise described their self-confidence and their feverish activity. They regarded this new colloquy as confirmation that they ranked as the equals of the Catholics, that the issues were now being discussed on their terms, and that they outdid the Catholics in eloquence and scholarship. Hence Campeggio had little confidence in Granvelle's view that the Protestant councillors and theologians could be won over "by force of

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1 If both sides were to seek after God, wrote Bucer to Philip of Hesse from Worms, agreement would soon be arrived at. But the emperor seeks only to extend his power, he regards "die theure gabe Gottes, die deutsche freiheit gewisslich fur ein onleidliche ongehorsame..."; and there is no hope of those like Eck who desire no true reformation. "So kann man auch kein freundtlich und christlich gesprech haben dann allein mit freunden und christen." The main hope was to prepare the way for the Diet by unmasking the unreasonableness of the others. Bucer/Philip 3/11/40 Lenz I Nr 86 pp.221-224.

2 They were "molto superbi et elati". Campeggio/Farnese 6/11/40 NB I,vi,Nr 245 p.19.


4 "...semper disputant, semper scribunt, multa confingunt..." Sanzio/Cervini 16/11/40 Ibid., Nr 249 p.31.

5 Sanzio/Farnese 25/11/40 Ibid., Nr 250 p.33.
money" if not by force of arms, and suggested the postponement of this question to the Diet at Regensburg.  

Morone, to whom the concept "Germany" was now almost synonymous with that of "ruin", also found the Protestants confident, most of the Catholics on the other hand "timid, almost desperate".  

The very peacefulness of the Protestant's demeanour might deceive the emperor, Campeggio feared, into granting them freedom of belief and worship, which would entail a progressive loss of papal and episcopal authority.  

Already the Protestants were said to be making their presence at the coming Diet of Regensburg conditional on the annulling of the judgements of the Imperial Court against them, and on their being granted the right of preaching during the Diet in the city.  

Yet the Protestants had signally failed to exploit the dissensions within the Catholic camp, they had allowed the Recess of Hagenau to be pushed aside, they had been in every respect outmanoeuvred by the papal diplomats. We may not care to pay too much attention to the observation of Campeggio that on the way to the first confrontation between Eck and Melanchthon the Catholics were in a cheerful, the Protestants

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1 Campeggio/Farnese 26/11/40 Ibid., Nr 252 p.44.  
2 "timidi et quasi disperati" Morone/Farnese 15/12/40 DG VI 174.  
3 Campeggio/Farnese 23/12/40 NB I, vi, Nr268 p.88.  
4 Campeggio/Farnese 15/1/41 Ibid., Nr 284 pp.124-126.
in a depressed mood. ¹ If, however, the Protestants were not in fact depressed, then perhaps they should have been. They had let not a few opportunities slip through their fingers.

On the other hand, the victory for the Catholics at Worms was perhaps more apparent than real. It had, like everything, its price. The Regensburg Book was part of that price. A further embittering of Papal-Imperial relations was another. The papal representatives had served their master on the far side of the Alps well. It was, however, a master on the far side of the Alps whom they had served. The Protestants, on the contrary, were Germans, conscious of their nationality, in their way even aggressively patriotic. And throughout the colloquy their studied moderation had hammered away at one point with which they hoped to impress the emperor: if the policy of concord was in danger then the blame could not be laid at the door of the Protestants. The conclusion to be drawn was clear. Whether or not the emperor would draw the consequences from it would be seen at the forthcoming Diet at Regensburg.

¹ Ibid.
In the complicated network of diplomacy and politics that forms the background to the emergence of the Regensburg Book the main movements of immediate concern to us are the anti-Imperial conspiracy of the winter of 1539-40, its collapse, and then its dramatic replacement by a new entente between Philip of Hesse and Charles V, an entente which both drove a wedge between Marburg and Wittenberg, the diplomatic and theological centres respectively of the Protestant camp, and made possible the crystallization of the Imperial peace offensive in the Regensburg Book and Colloquy.

Our account begins - typical of the time - with a suggestion from the Catholic Archbishop of Trier, Johann von Metzenhausen, to Philip, the leader of the Schmalkaldic League, on 7 November 1539. He had heard through Jülich of an agreement between the pope and the emperor to attack certain German princes under the pretext of religion; "... so das geschee,wurd in teutscher nation ein gross blutvergiessen." To prevent this, he suggests that the princes of the Empire should forge a defensive alliance against the emperor on the basis of a religious concord to be arranged at a gathering of the princes prior to the emperor's arrival in Germany. "Kont man sich vergleichen in der religion,wol und gut; wo nicht, das dann di übrigen unverglichen artigkel in gutte angestellt wurden bis zu einer andern bequemen handlung."

This proposal to bypass the pope, stymie the emperor, and provide an amicable settlement of the religious question at one fell blow, was eagerly taken up and promoted by Hesse. The "Respite of Frankfurt", he pointed out to Bucer, had expired, the Bavarians, Mainz and Braunschweig were arming, and it seemed therefore the part of wisdom to accept this offer and thus split the opposition, especially as the bishops appeared to be prepared for far-reaching concessions on the questions of celibacy, communion in both kinds, and above all on the transmission of their spiritual power to coadjutors, provided that their secular power could be retained. ¹

Bucer also enthusiastically supported the plan. ² It harmonised admirably with his conviction that to protect its liberties and the true faith Germany must unite against the emperor and the pope, and that this political unity must be based upon a common determination to carry through a thorough-going reformation. "... one reformation der kirchen und vergleichung der religion sollen wir nur nach keinem bestendigen frieden, gluck oder heil in deutscher nation gedencken, dann Gott wirdts unsa mit geben und ist wider alle Gottes ordnung

² Bucer/Philip 4/12/39 Ibid., Nr 40 p.119.
A common front must be built up to constrain the emperor to abide by the Frankfurt decision anent a colloquy, and to resist the influence of pope, priests, and Dr. Konrad Braun, "...des cammergerichts giffzigster redlinfurer." These latter are agitating so violently against Frankfurt because they know "das sie nie bestohen mögen, wa man zu redlicher handlung mit inen komet." The Palatinate and Brandenburg, however, are in favour of a colloquy, and Cologne and Trier and perhaps even Mainz and Bavaria(!) could be won over. At such a colloquy it would be possible "das schwerdt gottlichs wort recht zu gebrauchen...," and the Protestants, like the ancient Israelites, while grasping a weapon in the one hand, would be able to build up the walls of Jerusalem with the other. In other words a political union against the emperor of this nature would have the further advantage of splitting the Catholic camp.

1 Bucer/Philip 14/1/40 Ibid., Nr 43 p.126; a conviction which he is to repeat again and again: "Der eusser frid, die religion onvertragen, ist bei mir ein vergeblich onmöglich und den kirchen Christi ein hoch schedlich ding." 17/3/40 Ibid., Nr 57 p.151; "Der übrig gantz hauff wolten gern frid, aber on Christo, on reformation, eins teils auss onverstandt, eins teils aus forcht der grissgramenden(?), eins teils auss verderbtem gemiet,da sie das reich Christi nit leiden mögen." 17/7/40 Ibid., Nr 73 p.188; the whole aim of any colloquy would be to convince friendly or wavering powers such as the Palatinate, Cologne, Augsburg, Trier, that the real concern of the Protestants was a true reform of the church. 18/10/40 Ibid., Nr 85 p.217.

2 14/1/40 Ibid., Nr 43 p.126.
Throughout the winter 1539/40 ambassadors scurried from one German court to the other in an attempt to bring this plan to fruition. Nothing particularly outrageous was seen in this attempt to unite Protestant princes and cities with Catholic territories such as Bavaria or even with the spiritual princes of the Rhine in the defence of the German liberties. That it failed was due more to the hesitation on the part of Württemberg, Henry of Saxony and the South German cities, to the rivalries between Jülich and Hesse, the Palatinate and Saxony, and perhaps above all to the natural fears of the ecclesiastical princes on the Rhine as the emperor's army approached, than to any considerations of principle. It would have signified an attempt to secure religious unity or at least tolerance as the condition for a successful defence of political separatism or disunity. Religious innovation would have been yoked to political, and the German "freedoms" would have been as much the rallying cry as that of the "Gospel".

This was a programme which never ceased to exercise its fascination on Hesse, who was the centre of all these intrigues, but also on Bucer with his suspicion of the emperor¹ and

¹ Bucer refers to the need to bring pressure on the emperor to summon the Colloquy, "der uns keinen anstandt gibt zu gut der religion und libertet, sonder allein uff seinen vorteil, beide religion und libertet meer zu swichen..." 8/3/40 Ibid., Nr 51 p.141. Bucer never really trusts the emperor. "Es ist ein dieffer melancholischer kopf." 11/5/40 Ibid., Nr 63 p.169.
hatred of the pope as the foes alike of the "vatterland" and of the Kingdom of God. It seems to have been the latter concept which was operative in all Bucer's political thinking. The function of theologian, preacher and ruler alike is the extension of the Kingdom of God and this tends to be seen in very earthly or earthly terms. Not only are the Protestant princes bound to defend steadfastly the rights of their churches, based on "...das gantz hell und ondisputierlich Gottes- und kirchen recht." The identification between political and eschatological can go so far that members of the Protestant alliance can be described as members "in Christo", while to separate oneself from this alliance would be to "tear oneself away from Christ the Lord" (..sich von Christo den herren abreissen). It is necessarily a militant, but also a flexible, realistic policy that is the consequence. Bucer tends towards idealism, and this leads on the one hand to a stress on the need for real discipline in the church, and on the other to a tendency to be less than particular about the means by which the ideal cause will be achieved. Although, for example, fully aware of the self-interested motives of the Bavarians in their opposition to the emperor, he is able to convince himself that these

1 "christliche obren sind schuldig, den iren und den lieben kirchen vor allen besondren menschen und communen zu recht zu helfen, so weit sich ire macht immer erstrecket." 7/7/39 Ibid., Nr 27 p.90.
2 18/7/40 Ibid., Nr 74 p.192.
somewhat dubious allies may be God's instruments against the undue tyranny of others.\footnote{7/2/40 Ibid., Nr 47 p.136.} Again for the sake of the Kingdom of Christ he is ready to embark on an elaborate deception of Granvelle as to his real aims.\footnote{17/3/40 Ibid., Nr 57 p.153.} The notorious example, of course, to which the Catholic historians have with right drawn our attention is the compromising attitude which he adopted to the question of Hesse's bigamy.\footnote{E.g. his letter to Philip of 18/3/40. "Gott weiss, wie schwer mir selb der handel gewesen, und wie gern ich e.f.g. davon abgewendet hette. Weil ich aber schier gesehen, das on gewisses erwarten ergers oder wares bösen und des, das vom reich Christi scheidet, diese sach nit hat mögen furkomen oder auch uffgehalten werden, lob ich Gott, das er diese mittel und weg so schleunig geben hat; und wollen soliche durch die not abgetrugene zulassung, aber zulassung Christi mit betten, geduldt und stillhalten wol erhalten..." Ibid., Nr 58 p.159.} Here if anywhere he was prepared to make concessions for the sake of the cause, the Protestant cause which depended so largely on the leadership of Hesse.

There were others, however, with less flexible consciences, and it was really the revelation that he was unlikely to gain the backing of his Protestant allies in this matter if the emperor - as was his good right - put him under the ban of the Empire, which impelled Philip to a quite radical change of policy - the change which made the Regensburg Book possible.
Hesse professed himself bitterly disappointed by the reactions of his co-religionists. His previous profligacy had never aroused so much indignation as this new attempt to regulate his relationships. "Wir finden, das uns in diesem handell viel verfolgung begegnet, der uns doch im hurenleben keine begegnet."

If he found no understanding from the Protestants, he threatened, he would seek support of the emperor and the pope. He had no intention of deserting his allies, he wrote Bucer in mid-November. But since no express assurance of support had been given him either by the Protestant theologians, princes, or cities he was compelled to come to an understanding with the emperor. He had been denied support by the Elector of Saxony, Ulrich of Württemberg, the Elector of Brandenburg, and by Duke Henry of Saxony. He had had to contend with the criticism of Augsburg and Ulm. The Elector of Saxony had even declared that if the emperor acted against him on account of the bigamy he would have no right to defend himself. Lacking the confidence and support of his allies he felt compelled to give up the military leadership of the Protestant forces (die Hauptmannschaft der evangelischen Verständnuss) and to accept the

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1 Philip/Bucer 12/7/40 (?) Ibid., Nr 71 p.181.
2 Ibid., p.184.
3 Philip/Bucer 17/11/40 Ibid., Nr 88 p.234.
4 Philip/Bucer 3/12/40 Ibid., Nr 92 p.251.
5 Philip/Bucer 25/12/40 Ibid., Nr 103 p.283.
olive-branch offered by the emperor. Contributory factors were the failure of the "conspiracy of the princes" earlier in the year, and the lukewarm nature of the support from England and from France.

Bucer fought manfully against Hesse's decision, understandably, for it decapitated the Protestant alliance and destroyed all hopes of a united resistance to the emperor. Indeed the latter now would hold the initiative firmly in his hands. Philip would be forced to stand behind the emperor's plans for the settlement of the religious discord in Germany; the danger that Jülich with French help and Protestant backing would sever the life-lines of the Habsburg territories and lead the way to a complete Protestantisation of the Rhine territories would be averted. Granvelle's "grand design" could be brought into operation.

Since the collapse of the "conspiracy of the princes" Bucer had, it is true, approved of every attempt to gain Granvelle's goodwill for the colloquy at Hagenau and then Worms. He had, however, no real confidence in the Imperial politician. He doubted his concern for religion, and a patched-up peace which did not rest on a proper settlement of the religious question was for Bucer "...ein vergeblich, unmöglich und den kirchen Christi ein hoch schedlich ding." As long as the one side regarded the other as heretics and disturbers of the peace there could be no end to the preparations for war and the neglect of the school and the pulpit. In his belief that the emperor was
merely the tool of the pope his nationalism and his Protestantism merged into one. "Dann stercket sich die freiheit deutscher nation und einigkeit der fursten, dieselbige zu handthaben, so ists k.m. räthen ongemeint, stercket sich die religion und neheren sich die stende des reichs in derselbigen besser zu sammen, so ists seinem vatter und schweher (the pope), auch der hispanischen inquisition entreglich." To deal with such people is to run into a double danger. On the one hand if one reveals one's true aims, then they will be repelled for they cannot bear the splendour of the Kingdom of Christ; on the other hand, if one conceals them, they are likely to think one is as little serious about religion as they are themselves.¹ One notes the unquestioning assumption that the "true aims" of the Protestants were in fact of such an elevated nature.

Of this, however, Bucer had no doubt, and was ready to call in the assistance of the French King to redress the balance in favour of "... unser waren religion und freiheit," especially since Hagenau had shown that the emperor would never grant the so often promised National Council or Reichstag, but rather continue to work with Ferdinand against their liberty and faith. "... so wurden wir auss pflicht gegen unserem vatterland und

zuvor gegen Gott getrungen, bei im, Frankreich, als eines könig, der unser nation und freiheit sich von alten her gunstig bewisen, uns in handlung einzulassen, k.mt. als deutscher nation haupt gar nicht zuwider..."

When he heard therefore at the beginning of November that Philip had commenced negotiations with the emperor, the news came as a shattering blow. With all the arguments at his disposal he sought to dissuade Hesse from this new course. The only hope for concord, he argued, is in God not the emperor, whose sole aim is the extension of his power. It is true that those who are concerned for true peace are in the minority, but God has up to now always furthered his cause "durch das kleine heufflin." One should have no illusions about the successes to be won at Worms. Those like Eck who desire no true reformation will never be won over. One can only have a friendly, christian conversation with those who are friends and christians. The main hope can only be to unmask the unreasonableness of their opponents, so that moderate-minded men will be prepared to lend their support in later Diets where the conditions may be better. "The Lord has bestowed upon us Germans his Kingdom and continually given it glorious expansion; it is our duty to serve him loyally in promoting it above all among the Germans!"

On the other hand it is patent that the emperor regards

1 16/8/40 Ibid., Nr 82 pp.211-212.
"God’s precious gift, the German liberty" as a mere pretext for disobedience. Hesse must therefore seek to further the Gospel by the grace of Christ and not that of the emperor by the winning over of those who are already inclined to the Christian religion, i.e. the majority of the Estates. When he thinks of the endless treachery of the Burgundian Court he trembles in every limb at the thought that Philip is thinking of seeking help in that quarter. In the name of the “suffering and passion and glorious incarnation of our dear Lord Jesus” he warns him that the price he will have to pay for help from an emperor who persecutes the Christians in the Netherlands and is more concerned with Italy and Spain than with Germany will be far too high. He could hardly have put it more emphatically. The peace that the emperor is offering is no true religious peace but only a miserable respite from the gallows, "...ein so arme, elende, ongewisse galgenfrist..." For the Imperial court is in the pocket of the pope ("des papsts gefangner"). To handle with it would be to compromise oneself with the enemies of Christ, and in verity this whole project can only arise from debility of faith.

1 3/11/40 Ibid., Nr 86 pp. 221-225. Sim. 22/11/40 Ibid., Nr 89 p. 238, "der hove ist der groste feind aller freiheit und gerechtigkeit deutscher nation."

2 26/11/40 Ibid., Nr 90 p. 243.

3 5/12/40 Ibid., Nr 94 p. 260-261.
Hesse, however, was not to be moved. He assured Bucer that his decision was not taken without his suffering grave qualms of conscience. "...und ist nit ohn, wir tragen gros anfechtung, unns mit denen einzulassen, die nit unserer religion seien." The pious professions apart, however, it was obvious that he had made his decision, and would abide by it. He would, he argued, be able to further the interests of the Protestants if he stood in good favour with the emperor. Probably, however, he did not see in the arrangement anything more than the winning of a breathing space, a truce, until at least the emperor left Germany again. Lenz's suggestion that he was intoxicated by the flattery of Granvelle seems scarcely likely. Politically he could hardly have expected it to be a lasting settlement. Religiously it would have perhaps graver consequences, and these probably he did not fully see, or care to see, although any thought of betraying the "Gospel" was far from his mind. We have no need to doubt his repeated assertions to this effect. Writing, for example, to Bucer and Feige at the beginning of 1541 he declared that he was ready for a concord to the honour of God "... je nit wider sein wordt, gemeiner teutscher nation zu frid, ruhe, und einigkeiz, und darneben zu erhaltung gutes gewissens diene." 

1 Philip/Bucer 29/11/40 Ibid., Nr 91 p.246.
2 Philip/Bucer 10/12/40 Ibid., Nr 96 p.267.
3 Philip/Bucer and Feige 3/1/41 Ibid., Nr 110 p.305.
The rub of the matter, however, was that the emperor made the achievement of a religious concord the precondition for the granting of the imperial indulgence in the matter of the bigamy.\textsuperscript{1} Feige stated quite baldly that it was obviously the aim of Granvelle to exploit Philip's desire for a settlement for imperial interests.\textsuperscript{2} The price of the imperial pardon would be the diligent furthering by Hesse of imperial interests, at and after Regensburg, but above all at the Diet itself. Hence the pardon that was given him prior to the Diet was intentionally of a vague and conditional nature. Hesse promised to be an obedient subject of his majesty and to further in every way the concord of religion and of the other matters to be handled in the coming Diet, while in return the emperor forgave the landgrave "quidquid sit, in quo commississe videbitur contra suam majestatem et imperii constitutiones..." All other outstanding points would be handled when concord had been achieved.\textsuperscript{3} Thus the emperor retained the whippom, and Hesse continued to receive humiliating letters from Granvelle, urging him, for example, to speed his departure to the Diet, for the sooner he arrived, the greater the emperor's favour to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Bucer/Philip 11/1/41 Nr 113 p.310 "Dann so lang wir alss der verdammten religion gehalten wurden, künde oder dorffte k.mt. unser bundtnuss nit lassen aussehen."
  \item \textsuperscript{2} Feige/Philip 23/12/40 Ibid., p.519.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Kaiserliche Gnadenerkärung und Geleitszusicherung für den Landgrafen zu dem Regensburger Reichstage. Speier 1541. Januar 24. Ibid., p.541.
\end{itemize}
him would be!  

It is in this context that the astonishing role for which the theological document we know as the Regensburg Book was destined becomes clear. As we have seen the negotiations at Worms, as at Hagenau, had progressed not at all. Now, however, with the leverage which could be applied on Hesse (and through him on Bucer) it looked as though a case of bigamy might have as important consequences for the German religious situation as a divorce for the English. The most militant of the Protestant leaders could be compelled to champion the irenic alternative. And this at a time when Protestantism seemed to be sweeping all before it.

The truth is probably that for the moment Hesse was weary of his militancy. Since the beginning of 1540 he had been complaining that of all the Protestant Estates only he and the Elector of Saxony were ready to take action and bear responsibility. "Dann warlich, was wir darzu tun konen, das die kirch recht reformirt und die freiheit deutscher nation erhalten werd, das wolten wir gern thun. Wir haben aber warlich gantz wenig hulff weder bei fursten noch steten, sonder ein iglicher sicht uff das sein." The Protestants seemed hopelessly divided. The whole country was weary of war and schism.

1 Granvelle/Philip 15/2/41 Lenz II Nr 117 p. 13.
2 Philip/Bucer and Melanchthon 15/3/40 Lenz I Nr 55 p. 148.
3 Philip/Bucer 15/3/40 Ibid., Nr 56 p. 150.
And now came the emperor offering what appeared to be reasonable terms for the adherents of the new "religion". Would it not be folly to reject them, especially with the pressure from the bigamy question so actual?

What was needed therefore, both for the emperor and for Hesse, was a theological legitimation for the cessation of hostilities, an as it were ideological grounding of the unity of the "teutsche nation", something which would provide the religious undergirding for a new political settlement. The "old faith" no longer provided the framework of the "given", the common ground and shared convictions within which all - Protestant and Catholic alike - could peaceably co-exist. A new set of conventions would have to be found which would recognise the virtues of the reformation and the permanent values which were to be found in the old religion. The emperor, it was reported, was aware of the need for reform and of concessions. The spiritual princes, it appeared, might be ready to renounce the spiritual side of their functions in favour of coadjutors and thus pave the way to reform. The Protestants agreed that not all was well in their own house, and that there were men of good will on the other side. Could not something be done to avoid what seemed to be the only alternative to peaceful settlement of the religious issue - civil war?

A theological concord was thus widely regarded, whether rightly or wrongly, as the necessary precondition for progress in any other field. Whether the battle was against the emperor
or the Turk or the most Christian King of France it was assumed that only a Germany united in religion could fight it. Equally where it was a matter of the war against ignorance, and immorality and disorder. All demanded a prior unity of belief. Now there was one particular theological grouping which seemed ideally suited to pilot this reunion. Namely that of the humanists. They shared, on both sides of the confessional divide, a common love for the fatherland, a desire for moral reformation, and a scholar's appreciation of the virtues of peace. Because perhaps of a certain scepticism about attaining to absolute verities they allowed themselves rather more flexibility of outlook than was customary among more dogmatic spirits. They were frequently handicapped by the ability to see the other person's point of view. Among them we can number with the usual reservations, Gropper, Bucer, Witzel, and Melanchthon. They found in many respects a kindred spirit in Contarini.

Here we are concerned solely with Bucer. He, if anyone, had a genuine desire to safeguard the future of the German nation. He agonised over its disunity, and saw the only solution in terms of a phased revolution. A Protestant victory in the long run he never doubted; it was simply a matter of time. He saw the future of Germany in terms of Protestantism; the Estates were already generally anti-papal,¹ and everywhere the seed of

¹ Bucer/Philip 17/3/40 Ibid., Nr 57 p.153.
the Word was being scattered further. His "tolerance" in no way derives from a willingness to accept something equivalent to a pluralist society, but from his conviction that time was on his side.

With the Wittenberg theologians he was agreed that there could be no departure from the faith of the Augsburg Confession. Only in the questions of church discipline, properties, and ceremonies would give and take be possible, and even here concessions could only be made if the Catholics agreed to the preaching of the doctrine of justification by faith, the right use of the sacraments, and to Christian liberty in matters of primary importance such as marriage. Unlike, however, the Wittenbergers he felt that colloquies were useful and necessary, and that the mere production of books was not enough, for these could so easily be misinterpreted, and ungoverned polemic on the Protestant side had often discouraged people from reading them. For himself he took as his guide the parable of the ninety-nine sheep; for the recovery of the one that was lost all must be done. "... Ich hoffe zu Christo, meinem herren, ich wolle bei der reinen lere auch bleiben und mich in kein glosieren dawider immer mehr einlassen, nach so befinde ich mich des immer schuldig gegen allen irrenden, so lang in (ihnen) handlung und berich anzubieten und zu leisten und sie dagegen geduldig zu hören, so lang sie das leiden mögen."  

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1 7/2/40 Ibid., Nr 47 p.136.
The colloquy was thus for Bucer an aggressive weapon. Belief in the Word of God and in the efficacy of the colloquies at which that Word would be heard fell for him together. The colloquy was not only and not primarily a political enterprise. It was a means to the extension of the Kingdom. Hence Bucer was able in time to adjust himself to the radical change of course which Philip had now embarked upon. Since it was clear that Hesse was not to be moved, he made the best of the situation, and sought now to exploit the possibilities of a peaceful expansion of the Kingdom, this time under the aegis of the emperor.

Now as before the chief enemy remained the pope, and the very fact that the latter was so violently opposed to the colloquies was no doubt an eloquent argument in their favour. At a colloquy Christ himself is present through his Word. "Dann wo er bekennet und seine leer erkleret und vertediget wurdet, da ist er selb zugegen, und erlanget man alweg, das sich der verireten schelfin etliche zum schaffstel Christi tun." The power of the Lord will work through his holy Word. On the non-essentials tolerance should be afforded; the abuses which are contrary to the Scriptures and the canons, such as masses held without the distribution of the elements, or in only one kind, simony etc. must be abolished; and there can be no question of a compromising of the evangelical truth: Bucer would "eert alles leiden dann ein soliche vergleichung eingohen, das wir unss des gegenteils irthumen zu nahen wolten." But the possibility is there that such a colloquy would provide a "grand beginning to
a true reformation of the churches."¹ A concord could be accepted even though it did not meet all the demands of the Protestants, provided that it made their present position more tolerable, did not close any doors to further progress, and on the basic issues accepted the Protestant premisses.

His first reaction, however, to Granvelle's summons to him and Capito through Veltwyck on 14 December was sceptical.² Veltwyck, who excited Bucer's respect by his learning, and before him Gropper, who showed himself "not disinclined to reform" urged on Granvelle's behalf that Capito and Bucer should engage with them in a confidential discussion of the controversial theological questions with a view to finding a way of bridging the differences. It was stressed that the discussion would not be binding on either side, that it would be in no way prejudicial to the public colloquy or the Protestant Estates, and that it would be kept in the tightest secrecy. Granvelle pointed out that he himself was bound to keep the knowledge of it secret, since if any of the violent opponents of the Protestants heard of it they would up and leave Worms immediately.

Bucer immediately discussed the proposal with Peige and Jakob Sturm of Strasbourg. The atmosphere at Worms at this time was not exactly cordial and this, together with the

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¹ "Ein gantz herrlicher anfang warer reformation der kirchen." 2/6/39 Ibid., Nr 28 p.96. "We shall present ourselves as those to whom God has given his pure Gospel and convince the others of the way to the true reformation of the church they have devastated." Ibid., p.97.

² "Es will aber wasser sein." 14/12/40 Ibid., Nr 98 p.269.
dislike of proceeding without the assent of the other Protestant Estates, gave Bucer pause. In view however of the lack of progress on the public plane at Worms, and of Hesse's desire that he should engage Granvelle in such discussions, and above all of the duty of every Christian to bring his neighbours, not to mention his princes "to Christ" (zu Christo furdre) he and Capito eventually gave their consent. ¹ The "grand design" of Granvelle was beginning to take shape.

To cover himself against possible reactions from Saxony and from Strasbourg Bucer requested and gained a warrant to engage in these discussions from Hesse,² and a written promise of secrecy under the imperial seal from Granvelle. He remained suspicious. Why did Granvelle himself refuse to be drawn into any statement of his point of view on the theological issues? If so great a desire for concord and peace existed why was this not more evident in the main colloquy? Was not the suggestion that at first only Hesse be consulted and kept informed on the course of the discussions a dangerous move to detach him still further from the other Protestant allies? On the other hand Granvelle had sworn that his intentions were of the purest, and that he desired nothing but peace, reformation of the churches, and good relations with Hesse. Bucer could only protest his willingness to explain the central tenets of the Protestants' faith in such a way that "ein jeder

¹ 20/12/40 Ibid., Nr 101 pp.274-279.

² Philip/Bucer 25/12/40 Ibid., Nr 103 p.280. Cf. Peige/Philip 20/12/40 Ibid., p.517.
christ, der dice ding richten mochte, wurde zeugnuss geben, das wir in denselbigen anders nicht glaubten oder lereten, dann die alte war apostolische kirch je und je glaubt und gelert hette. "He stressed also that to his mind the greatest hindrance to any hope of agreement was the pope's irrevocable opposition to any true reform, and that therefore the emperor should take the initiative in his own hands and thus rally all Germany behind him. ¹ Feige, who believed that there was a strong group around the emperor which genuinely wanted a fair peace with the Protestants, struck a similar note in a discussion with Granvelle. The latter replied that although the emperor still adhered to the old religion, he was by no means the blind tool of the pope. He recognised that the abuses had to be reformed, and did not intend to further the interests of either of the two parties but rather to promote what was consonant with the divine truth and the Holy Scriptures. This insinuation that the emperor stood above the confessional dispute is no less interesting than the protestation that if a good beginning were made at Worms the emperor would not be concerned about his answerability to the pope, "... dan ir mt. ist der groot furst in der christenheit und wurd das ir dartzu thun und nymands ansehen... " Granvelle's cri de coeur at the

¹ 20/12/40 Ibid., Nr 101 p.275; Bucer believed that the whole aim of the pope was to defeat any attempts at reformation. Bucer/Joachim II, 10/1/41 Ibid., p.529.
end of the conversation: "Aber man lass mich machen! Ir wollet ummer, ich sol mich zuvil suspect machen. So das geschicht, kan ich nichts handeln", illustrates how difficult it was, even for this adroit Imperial statesman, to manoeuvre successfully between the two confessions. ¹

In the meantime the discussions proceeded quite well, "alss wollt es sich in hauptstucken nit so gar ubel zusamen tragen". But Bucer reported that he was "just about off his head with these people", (ich bin diser leut halben ir) as their motives were anything but unambiguous. At one moment it seemed that they genuinely sought a true reformation, but on reflexion there was always fear that they were merely seeking to exploit the hopes of the Protestants in order to gain assistance against the Turks or for other worldly ends.² Philip advised him to abide "as far as possible" by the Lutheran standpoint, to avoid coming to a settlement of the question of the church lands which would be unacceptable to Württemberg, Luneburg and Saxony, and to try to convince Granvelle personally that the Protestant faith was not so black as it was made out to be, "dannost nit

¹ Feige/Philip 30/12/40 Ibid., p.523-525.
² 25/12/40 Ibid., Nr 104 p.286-287; speaking of the emperor's recognition of the need for reform some three weeks later Bucer commented, "Ob aber dies geschehe auss gottesforcht oder auss not obligender hendel, als vom Turcken, Franckreich und andere, will ich nit richten, sonder, das sich zum reich Christi füürderlich erzeiget, ein gnädigs erregen gottlicher gnaden erkennen." Bucer/Joachim II, 10/1/41 Ibid., p.531.
so böse seie als man di mache."¹

Hesse's relations with Württemberg and the Elector of Saxony, whom he accused of sodomy, continued to deteriorate² and he found himself forced to consort ever more closely with the Imperial party. He energetically refused, however, to allow himself to be manoeuvred into an approval of the articles agreed upon at the secret colloquy without the consent of the other Protestant princes.³ He believed that they would serve as a beginning of concord. "Doch so konnen sein f.g. hirin ausserhalb und one die andern ire mitstend nichts bewilligen noch vertrösten oder sich von den andern in sunderheit absondern."⁴

But if he had no intention of being forced into a position of total isolation over against the other Protestants, as Bucer feared might happen,⁵ he was also very sceptical of their desire for concord. The Elector of Saxony might well, he thought, because of his political opposition to the emperor bring pressure

¹ Philip/Bucer 25/12/40 Ibid., Nr 103, p.281.
³ Philip/Bucer and Feige 3/1/41 Ibid., Nr 109, p.304 "Und uf solchs mogen ihr Granvella sagen, dass der Butzer zu mir reiten soll, dem will ich mein Bedenken uf die Artikel sagen; doch nit dergestalt, dass ich mich ohn die andern in etwas mächtigen will ader zusagen, solche Artikel ohn die andern anzunehmen, sondern allein dass ich mein Bedenken, wie ichs fur Gott halt und wenn es mich allein beträf, annehmen willt."
⁵ If the attempts at concord failed, the counsels of the Catholic militants — Mainz, Bavaria, Brunswick — might prevail, and then where would Hesse, isolated from its allies, be? 31/12/40 Ibid., Nr 106, p 293.
on his theologians to show no flexibility even on matters where this could be done without prejudice to the Gospel, and since Luther and Melanchthon had a great influence among the Protestants this could doom the colloquy to failure. Hence he suggested that the emperor try to set aside this political opposition first, and that if this were successful, Bucer should then bring to bear his influence on Luther and Melanchthon to approve the articles. 1

Bucer was also very much aware that the articles which the four collocutors had agreed upon might well be regarded as too conciliatory. His and Capito's criticism, he recognised, had not gone far enough, but he hoped that they would serve as a basis for discussion which after amendments by both sides would be acceptable to any Christian. The theological analysis of the articles we must leave to a later chapter. Here it must suffice to point out that Bucer was agreeably surprised by the degree of unity that had been achieved, and believed - at first sight an unusually superficial judgement - that the crux of the difficulty would lie in the questions of the prayers for the dead, the adoration of the saints and such like. On the central

1 "Wann dann solchs geschee, so kennen wir euch, den Bucerum, der geschicklichkeit, das ir alsdan leichtlich bei den Luthero und Philippo erhuben, das sie in solche vergleichung, die mit Gott und gutem gewissen nach inhalt der schrifft und haltung der alten cristlichen lerer und kirchen geschee möchten, auch geheleten und den Churfursten darein zu bewilligen vermugten;" Philip/Feige and Bucer, 3/1/41 Ibid., Nr 110 p.306.
issues, he believed, complete concord could be achieved at once. On other issues differences would remain, but these could be allowed to rest for a while until the passage of time had calmed down the more fiery spirits and allowed the seed of the good doctrine to have its effect. The important thing was to encourage the men of good will on both sides who were eager for a reconciliation, for through this lengthy controversy Satan has brought it about "das auch der gotsforchtigen gemüter zu beiden teilen solichen unzeitigen eifer gegen einander tragen,das sie in vielen stücken im grund der warheit mer eins sein,dann sie es selbe erkennen und mit worten einander zu verston geben konden." The differences between the two confessions, he believed, were more apparent than real. The Protestant faith, for example, is calumniated and misunderstood as a rejection of all morality and discipline, and not altogether surprisingly in view of the Protestants' failings in this regard and their tendency at first to make very extreme statements (vil hyperbolien), although Melanchthon has moderated this to some extent. The result has been that both sides have become increasingly alienated from one another and that anyone who attempts to mediate is immediately suspected of being about to fall away to the opposing party.

In view of all these difficulties the language of the articles on the main points had been kept deliberately restrained and moderate so that above all the article on justification, "an dem alles gelegen", would be acceptable to the
moderate Catholics and free them from their unjustified suspicions and prejudices about the Protestants, and this applied still more to the secondary articles. The important point, however, is that while the language is different from that to which the Protestants have been accustomed nothing is said which is contrary to the truth.1

The real problem, one concludes, was for Bucer not the theological but the personal-political one. Where goodwill existed on the other side the differences could be bridged, and in fact had been. The outstanding points to be settled were definitely of secondary importance. In Gropper and Veltwyck he had found men whom he could not only respect but trust. They were, in a word, Christians, and between them and him there existed a basic unity of faith which outweighed any disunity. The latter derived mainly from misunderstanding and semantic problems, which time and patience could be trusted to remove.

The parallels here to much in Contarini's thinking cannot be overlooked. A similarity is also to be noted in Bucer's cautious attitude towards Granvelle and the emperor. While he

1 "Weil nun die sach zwischen uns und dem gegenteil steht, wie erzelet, ist vilberurter scharff in worden dermassen temperirt und gemessiger worden, das den gutherzigen auf jenem teil im artikel der justification, an dem alles gelegen, und andern haubtartikeln desto weniger anstoss entgegen geworfen würde, und deshalb alles, so vil möglicher, dahin gerichtet, das man vor eingebildter und unrechter Meinung und verdacht gegen uns füglich begegnet wurde. Und derhalben ... hatt man auch die nebenartikel so weitläufig hinbeigesetzt, in denen doch on weiderhandlung und correction die vergleichung der religion nit möchte troffen werden." Bucer/Joachim II, 10/1/41 Ibid., p.534. Bucer is aware, then, of the limitations of the articles. "Nun wir haben hie die sachen gemilteret, so fil wir konden: Gott gebe, das gut ist." 20/2/41 Lenz II, Nr 118, p.18.
continued to suspect that the enthusiasm of the former for reform came more from concern for his earthly than for his heavenly lord, yet he sympathised with him in his unenviable position, constantly under attack by the "papists" and unable to wrench any concessions from the Protestants. As to the emperor, he acknowledged that if he were truly concerned to further the reformation of the churches there was no one in a position to do so much good for religion. On the other hand, he never tired of stressing the need to bring pressure on the emperor through the Protestant Estates to further the work of reform. The Protestants, above all, must be fully represented at the Diet, and bring their influence to bear both on the other Estates, whose moderation - princes and bishops alike - affords more hope of a settlement than there has ever been before, and on the emperor, for "Es wirdt woll auff die k.mt. mussen durch die stend des reichs getrungen werden" in view of the presence of the papal legate and Braun and the Bavarian following.

1 It seemed to Bucer that Granvelle "kein pâpstler oder ver-teidiger der missbreuchen seie...Es lasst sich auch ansehen, das es die pâpstler wol an im spuren, dann sie im ubel reden in geheim, und er iren halben sich fil schmucken muss; doch mochte sein,er sehe in dem meer uff seins herren dann Christi reich.Wie dem aber, so ist mirs hertzlich leidt, das wir ime nit meer gewilfaret haben; aber es lassen sich die hohen sa-chen gar nicht on der fursten personlich gegenwertigkeit wol aussrichten." 31/12/40 Lenz I,Nr 106 p.291.

2 "Dann wolt k.mt. zur reformation helffen, so konde unsa nie-man meer gute(gutig?) thun,zudem das er unser herr ist und wir durch in trefflich furderung der religion thun konden." 1/1/41 Ibid., Nr 107 p.300.
His position is therefore one of qualified optimism as far as the Diet is concerned.

Just how qualified is shown by his persistent urging of Hesse to take the French offers of an alliance seriously. Certainly in view of the peaceful professions of the emperor no alliance hostile to him should be concluded. On the other hand if, in view of the ominous plottings of the "papists", God has providentially sent this offer of French friendship, which would prejudice no one and might greatly benefit the unfortunate Protestants in France, it would be folly to despise this "gottes-gab".¹ Bucer's scepticism about the sincerity of the imperial peace offensive was obviously by no means fully dispelled.²

All in all it was a strange constellation of circumstances that had made possible the birth of the Regensburg Book. The immorality of Philip of Hesse, the "grand design" of Granvelle, the humanistic circles among theologians, politicians, and jurists, and the failure of the Protestant and Catholic "defensive" alliances to override particular interests and thus dominate the political situation had all played their part. A strange complex of hopes, expectations, anxieties and fears occupied the minds of

1 4/2/41 Ibid., Nr 115 pp.3-7.
2 He found the promise of pardon to Philip disquietingly vaguely phrased, "dann die wort 'salvo semper jure tertii' und 'quod concernit causam religionis' reichen gar weit und fassen in sich,was man will..." The religious issue is the central one. "Diese aber recht zu vertragen,erzeigen sie solich gemet, das ich's besser gehoffet hette." 20/2/41 Ibid., Nr 118 p.17. The actual wording of the Imperial declaration was that Charles "remisit domino lantgravio quicquid sit, in quo commississe videbitur contra suam majestatem et imperii constitutiones...salvo semper interesse terci et quod concernit causam religionis." Lenz I,p.542.
the chief participants in the time before the Diet.

Above all we should keep in mind the secrecy in which the whole affair was clothed, a secrecy which was quite remarkably well kept. Apart from Hesse only Brandenburg was informed about the Book prior to the Diet.¹ This was the essential condition for its success. It had to appear out of the blue, dropped as it were from the heavens by a disinterested but learned deity. It also, however, points unmistakeably to the difficulty of the whole undertaking. Saxony, home and centre of the Reformation, of Luther, and of Wittenberg had played no role in its production. The Elector was to stay away from the Diet, and the great Luther himself was to write off the colloquy as a well-meant attempt at the impossible. But of what sort of a concord would the Book from the basis, if Saxony, Wittenberg and Luther were not participant thereof? The difficulties, one sees, had only just begun.

¹ Bucer/Joachim II, 10/1/41 Ibid., pp.529-538. He too was pledged to secrecy. Ibid., p.534.
CHAPTER 3

THE APPOINTMENT OF CONTARINI

The appointment of Contarini to the German Legation in May 1540 had, as we have seen, given rise to enthusiasm on all sides, and in particular among the papal representatives and the Imperial party in Germany, and among the reforming circles in Italy. The emperor, when he expressed his confidence that Contarini was eminently well suited for the task ahead of him, and added that personally "Lo tiene per molto amico", was speaking for many. Correspondingly great was the disappointment when his departure was put off from month to month. Once again, it seemed, Germany was to be fobbed off with empty promises.

On 8 January 1541, however, the pope finally decided to send him to Regensburg, and on the twenty-eighth of the same month he set out from Rome. The die was cast.

"Ineunte anno humanae salutis millésimo quigentesimo quadragesimo primo Indictione decima quarta, decretus est Legatus in Germaniam Gaspar Cardinalis Contarenus ad Lutheranos in gremium Ecclesiae revocandos, cum Caesar ad id Regia studia polliceretur." Thus the annalist Raynalde at the beginning of his account of the year 1541. The year of the Diet of Regensburg.

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1 Cf. Chapter 1, p. 28, n. 1 above.
2 Poggio/Farnese 15/6/40 NB I, v, Nr 144 p. 298.
3 Farnese/Poggio 8/1/41 NB I, vi, Nr 317 pp. 182-184; on the 10th he was commissioned. "Fuit Consistorium S.D.N. creavit in S.R.E. Rmum Gasparem Presbyterum Cardinalem Contarenunum in partibus Germaniae et ad ea potissimum loca, ad quae eum declinare contigerit cum facultatibus prout in literis D/R p. 140.
It had not been without hesitation, not without the direst forebodings - that Paul III had eventually decided that the despatch of the legate would be the lesser of the evils he had to face. Pulled on the one side by the urging of Contarini, and pushed on the other by the pressure from Germany, he had given way in the end with good grace. Cardinal Farnese, defending the papal decision in a despatch to Dandino, the nuncio at the French Court, spoke of a "unanimous" request for the appointment of Contarini, and certainly as it became clear at the beginning of 1541 that this time the legate was really on his way, the news was received with almost universal satisfaction. As on Contarini's elevation to the Cardinalate it appeared to many that new perspectives were opening up. At last something was going to be done. And Contarini seemed the right man to do it.

The name Contarini, then struck a responsive chord in the most diverse circles - humanist, ecclesiastical and political. Even the Protestants held him in high respect, which all seemed to omen well for the success of his undertaking. Even at this stage, however, a word of warning is in place.

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1 Contarini refers to the many conversations he had held with the pope about the coming colloquy. Contarini/Farnese, 12/2/41, D/R p.146.

2 Farnese/Dandino, 17/1/41, NB I, vi, Nr 294, p.137 n2.

3 Campeggio/Farnese, 23/12/40. Campeggio reported a statement by Granvelle according to which Contarini, Sadoletto, Pole and Fregoso (the bishop of Salerno) were the men in whom the Protestants had most confidence. D/R, pp.137-138; cf. the later characterisation of Contarini by Sarpi as "huomo stimato di eccellente bontà et dottrina"; Pietro Soave Polano (Paolo Sarpi), Historia del Concilio Tridentino (2d ed; Geneva:1629), III, 51, p.97.
First, a legate's powers were severely limited. Even with
the most liberal of instructions Contarini's freedom to develope
initiatives of his own would have been circumscribed. As
Poggio, nuncio to the Imperial Court, emphasised to Granvelle,
at best he would only be authorised to participate in the nego-
tiations, to assist the participants by his counsel and to re-
port on the events to Rome.¹ From the outset, that is, there
was no prospect of Contarini playing anything more than a mar-
ginal role at Regensburg. The chief actors, those who actually
determined the course of events, were those who could make
real decisions - their own decisions. Contarini could encourage
and he could obstruct, and, in the event, he did both. But the
important decisions he could not make. His Instructions ex-
cluded that from the beginning. Hence his coming could not have
been expected to effect in itself any radical alteration in
the situation.

Secondly, as is natural with a man of such outstanding
gifts, a certain mythology has begun to spring up about Con-
tarini, and even the standard biography by Dittrich is not free
from hagiographical tendencies. The source of the trouble
seems to be a rather uncritical acceptance of the baroque elo-
quence of Contarini's own contemporaries, who never tired of

¹ Poggio/Farnese 5/2/41 HJ IV p.661.
described Contarini as an ornament of his age, a paragon of learning, one renowned far and wide for his piety, integrity, and sanctity. Flaminio, for example, on Contarini’s elevation to the Cardinalate, speaks of the choice of this “perfect man”, with which a new epoch was opening. His biographer Beccadelli can find nothing but virtues in him, though he recognises that to those who do not know Contarini personally this may seem mere adulation. Dittrich, throughout his biography, never tires of drawing the reader’s attention to the nobility of his hero, whether as student, diplomat, patriot, reformer, theologian, or peace-maker. The fact that the purpose of the book, as the


2 Morandi, I,ii,p.9; cf. Pallavicini’s judgement: "Elucebat in Contareno prudentia et peritia in civilibus negotiis, doctrina tam in profana quam in sacris disciplinis, studium Religionis ad Petri causam constanter tuendum, integritas vitae..."; his clarity was complemented by profundity, his subtlety with eloquence, his reverence with sincerity. Sforza Pallavicino, Vera Conciliai Tridentini Historia, trans. P.J.B. Giazzino (3 pt; Antwerpae:1673), I,iv,13.

3 Dittrich sees in him "das Idealbild eines Studenten". ("Ein Bedürfnis nach sinnlichen Freuden oder gar geschlechtlichen Genüssen empfand er nicht... Die Erhabenheit der Wissenschaft erfüllte und befriedigte ganz seine Seele.") D/B, p.17; he then becomes "der gewandte Diplomat", and finally the accomplished Cardinal, ibid., pp.127,321 ff; no praise is stinted for his conduct of affairs at Regensburg, "Überhaupt benahm sich Contarini in allweg vortrefflich. Wie ein tüchtiger Capitän dirigirte er seine Theologen, wachte er über seine Dienerschaft." Ibid., p.615,et passim. On one occasion, where in the original (Brown,III,228) Contarini stated that "unless he was drunk at the time" he had been given a certain commission (se non era alhora imbrago) Dittrich finds a little discreet bowlerisation necessary. Contarini, according to his translation, firmly declares,"er sei nicht be- trunken gewesen." D/B,p.60.
Preface explains, is the "paying of a debt of honour, which the catholic Church and scholarship owe to one of their most zealous and energetic champions in a difficult time,"\(^1\) helps to make this understandable. Jedin pictures him as one almost too good for this world, so convinced of the merits of charity and humility and goodwill that he believed they alone would suffice to settle the religious turmoil that beset Church and State.\(^2\) In fact something between a saint and a fool.

We must grant the myth its half-truths. Contarini, however, was no saint and certainly no fool. He was a man who knew the meaning — and the necessity — of compromise, a man of the world as well as a man of the church, an experienced diplomat, trained to observe the world as it was, to exploit human weakness, to flatter and cajole, to express the non-existent confidence or goodwill of his superior. In the course of his diplomatic career he had not been above exploiting, or attempting to exploit, the Christian convictions of the emperor to the advantage of the Republic of Venice, nor even of obstructing, or attempting to obstruct, peace in Europe if this were to be dangerous to the

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1 \(\ldots\) eine Ehrenschuld abtragen, welche die katholische Kirche und Wissenschaft einem ihrer eifrigsten und tüchtigsten Vorkämpfer in schwerer Zeit schuldig ist." Ibid., p.iii.

interests of this same Republic. ¹ To the end of his life he re-

mained an intensely conservative man, an aristocrat of Venice

and of the Church, conscious of the weight of the centuries be-

hind him, moving with ease through the familiar pomp of Court and

Curia.

He was also, of course, to use an unfashionable word, a

quite unusually good man. His whole life was spent in the ser-

vice of others - of the citizens of Venice and of the members

of the Church. He had an exalted view of public duty: humanist

as he was, he refused, despite the constant interruption to his

studies, to allow access to himself to be barred against those

who sought his offices as Cardinal on their behalf. "Io non

penso che Dio benedetto m'habbia chiamato a questo grado per mia

comodità per servitio d'altri, et però non sono qui per me,

¹ On his adept handling of Gattinara cf. Contarini/Council of
Ten, 16/8/24, Brown, III, 376. "It is requisite first of all to

sustain the fancies of the Chancellor, and then adroitly to
dispel them, because he is a man of very small brains, and
when he once takes an impression, he then becomes obstinate." Or of
Clement VII: "Io mi sforzo quanto posso di adolcire et

mitigare l'animo di S. Sant., con la quale bisogna usare di-
verse insinuationi, ne bisogna passare certi termini a chi
cerchi di non irritarlo, ma mitigarlo." Contarini/Senate,
14/6/28 D/R, p. 31. Sim. Ibid., Nr 91, p. 31; Brown IV, Nr 324,
p. 161. For illustrations of the sophistry he could practise

on occasions cf. his defence of Venice's failure to carry out
its obligations under the Treaty of London (Contarini/Council
of Ten, 18/9/21, Brown III, 179), of its seizure of the papal
towns Cervia and Ravenna (D/B, pp. 129 ff.), of its offensive

measures against Faenza on the (false) report of Clement VII's
death (he claimed that the latter were due to a concern to

protect the cities from the emperor! D/B, p. 158). As to his

obstruction of peace, in 1524 he advocated a more vigorous
pursuit of the war between France and the emperor. Venice had

just decided to join the Imperial side, and feared that if
Charles were not occupied with France he would turn his atten-
tion and his armies towards Italy. Contarini/Council of Ten,
16/8/24, Brown III, 376; D/B, p. 81 ff. Three years previously
Contarini - again pursuing Venetian interests - had urged

precisely the opposite course: a suspension of hostilities.
(Brown III, 157). There was, of course, nothing extraordinary,
about such conduct, but that is precisely the point we wish
to make.
ma per chi ha bisogno di me. He used to say that he had great fellow-feeling for the pope, for the higher the office the greater the toil: "...i gradi delle Prelature havevano più gravezza che splendore." He himself worked hard and long, and executed his duties as ambassador, reformer, legate with scrupulous care. He was not petty; he was free from ambition. In true Erasmian spirit he abhorred the fanatic, and yet, as we see particularly from his reforming activity, he did not shrink from speaking his mind frankly whenever the occasion - and his conscience - demanded it.

There is something of the saint or the prophet or the charismatic about Contarini. About his outrageous optimism. About the influence he exercised on men whose opinions appeared to be diametrically opposed to his own. About, in this particular case, his ability to see in Regensburg not a danger, or a shoal to be successfully negotiated, or a futile exercise in rhetoric, but

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1 Morandi, I, ii, p.46; if Casa is to be believed it was out of a sense of public duty that he accepted the Cardinalate in 1535. D/B, pp.320-321.

2 Morandi, I, ii, p.47.

3 There seems no doubt that he was personally a man of great humility. Beccadelli described him as "tanto modesto, et cosi privo d'ambitione, quanto si conviene alla bonta ch'e conoscita, et predicata di lui." Ibid., p.22.

4 "Die Offenheit und der Freimut, jene Charaktereigenschaften, die ihn bei Carl V so beliebt gemacht hatten, behielt Contarini auch als Cardinal bei... Es war etwas nahezu unerhörtes, dass ein Cardinal im Consistorium selbst dem Papst opponirte, und sich dessen Lieblingsplänen widersetzte. Contarini tat das mehr als einmal." D/B, p.327. Beccadelli, e.g. records the occasion when Contarini championed the rights of the Varani family against the papal annexationist policy in the name of justice and the honour of the Apostolic See. Morandi, I, ii, pp.44-45.
an opportunity to be grasped with both hands, an opportunity for which God should be thanked. "I thank God," he wrote to Parnese from Bologna as he made his way towards Germany, "...for the colloquium, and for the good beginning that has already been made, and I hope in God that material considerations (i rispetti estrinsechi) will not intrude themselves, and that, as I have many times said to His Holiness, there will not be such a great disagreement in the essentials as many believe..."¹ Was this a foolish dream of understanding?

The evidence would appear to speak against such a view. On his original appointment as legate in May 1540 he had certainly had no illusions about the difficulty of the task before him. It was far beyond his powers - mental and physical - he wrote Cervini, yet out of obedience to the pope and the desire to do what he can for the blessed church of Christ he gladly accepts the burden, trusting above all in the continuing goodness of God.² Again, speaking to Charles V in Regensburg itself, he said that he believed he had been chosen because of his long-standing desire for the end to discord and the restoration of the church to its original unity, and also because of the good relations between the emperor and himself. He is well aware of the difficulty of the undertaking, but approaches it in good

¹ Contarini/Parnese, 12/2/41, D/R, p.146.
² Contarini/Cervini, 26/5/40, Morandi, I, i, pp.84-85; he writes Sadoleto similarly on the same day. Ibid., p.81.
heart (con buon animo) trusting in the emperor's cooperation and God's abiding love.¹

If there was a sober realism about his approach, then this was largely due to the fact that he was one of the best-informed men in Rome on the German situation. He had been in Worms in 1521 as Venetian ambassador to the emperor when Luther had made his famous stand. Remaining at the Imperial Court until 1525 he had had ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the growing seriousness of the situation. Again, as the Republic's representative at the Curia from 1528-1530, he had noted the helplessness of the papacy in face of the problem.² And finally after his elevation to the Cardinalate, his interest as the leader of the reform party had been primarily given to the preparation for the Council, whose main purpose would be to find a remedy for the German schism.

For two decades, then, he had been in the closest touch with events in Germany, and in the latter months of 1540, with


2 His earlier despatches, it is true, have almost nothing to say about Lutheranism, and the wider implications of the Reformation are obviously beyond the compass of his thought at this stage. In five years of despatches from 1521-1525 there are as many references to Lutheranism. By the late twenties the situation has changed completely. Commenting on Clement's unwillingness to call the Council demanded by Charles V, he wrote at the end of 1528 to the Senate that he considered the Church of Rome to be in great trouble, and did not know to what end the Almighty would lead it. 11/12/28, Brown IV, Nr 378 p.179. Clement "dimostra di essere desiderosa di vedere gli abusi di Santa Chiesa regolati, ma niente di meno egli non manda ad esecuzione alcun simile pensiero, ne si risolve in far provisione alcuna." Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, ed. Eugenio Albéri, (3ser. 15 vola.; Firenze: 1839-1863) 11,III,265. His despatches are full of references to the spread of Lutheranism in Germany and Savoy e.g. 7/4/29, D/R,p.50; 10/7/29, Brown IV,Nr 486, p.221. Cf. D/B,pp.146-151.
his despatch as legate expected any moment, he had been in constant communication with the papal representatives in Germany and had full access to all their despatches to Rome.\(^1\)

Of the concrete content of these despatches enough has already been said in the preceding chapter. It remains to sketch here the spirit in which the papal representatives in Germany approached Regensburg, to compare this with the attitude of Contarini and of the papacy, and then to outline the actual expectations which the papacy, the Protestants, the emperor, and Contarini himself had of his role in the Colloquy. This will prepare the way for the handling, in the next chapter, of the first stages of the negotiations in Regensburg.

Morone was pessimistic about the outcome. Smarting from his experiences in Worms, he was particularly concerned about the danger that the religious issue would be made subservient to purely political considerations. He had seen the Catholic theologians bowing to the will of their respective princes "... la Teologia ora è fatta ministra delle passioni degli uomini." Although, apart from Cleves, the Palatinate and Brandenburg, the Catholics were agreed on the basic doctrines, their attitude to what they termed the "indifferent articles" varied according to what was politically most advantageous to them. Only Mainz

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\(^1\) Morandi actually assumed that many of Morone's despatches had been sent to Contarini in the first instance, and not to Farnese! (e.g. that of 12/1/41, with its detailed analysis of the German situation.) Morandi I,ii, pp.100-105.
and the Bavarians held the papacy in any affection. By comparison the Protestants presented a relatively united front, based on adherence to the Augsburg Confession and Apology and on opposition to the pope. The most moderate among them were the South German cities—Ulm, Augsburg, Nuremberg—together with the Margrave George of Brandenburg.¹

Further evidence of the predominance of political considerations he found in the Imperial plans. Granvelle, he believed, was trying to create divisions within the Catholic ranks in order to facilitate accord with the Lutherans, and Imperial policy seemed to be ready to enter into "ogni concordia etiam mala" in order to secure the subsidy against the Turks. The negotiations therefore could not but be detrimental to the interests of the Apostolic See and the Catholic faith.² The only success he had hoped for at Worms was that the emperor and the King of the Romans would have their eyes opened to the real intentions of the Protestants.³ But this, it was now clear, had not happened; already too much consideration was being given to the Protestants.⁴ Morone's expectations therefore were of the gloomiest. His pessimism was shared by Vergeri, Bishop of

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¹ Morone/Farnese, 12/1/41, NB I,vi,pp.122ff.
³ Cf. p.37,n.1 above; Sanzio, Bishop of Aquila had expressed the same hope about Worms, that as a result of it the emperor would at least "restara clara et capace della malignitate de dissedenti." Sanzio/Farnese, 15/12/40, D/R,p.136.
⁴ Morone/Farnese, 25/2/41, D/R,p.149.
Capo d’Istria, who looking back at Worms, felt it resembled a National Council more than anything else and by the Scot Wauchope, who was convinced on the basis of Worms that such colloquies were not a road to concord, but on the contrary, only spurned the heretics on to greater fury, and served as a sounding board for Protestant propaganda.

Campeggio tended towards a hesitant approval of the project. The emperor, he believed was the sole hope in the situation. He might fail to act effectively, and he might make impermissible concessions to the Lutherans. On the whole, however, Campeggio was guardedly optimistic about the possibilities of a reconciliation, especially in view of the decision to send Contarini. It appeared from what Granvelle said, that Brandenburg and Hesse would be amenable, that all the princes would

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1 Vergerio/Aleander, 23/2/41, Laemmer, p. 357.
2 Wauchop/Farnese, 19/2/41, Ibid., pp. 356-357.
3 Only the emperor, he declared to Granvelle, could decide on such questions as the restitution of church lands, the bearing of the edicts of Nuremberg and Ratisbon on the cases before the Imperial Supreme Court, the right of the Protestants to woo new adherents. Campeggio/Farnese, 25/11/40, NB I, vi, Nr 251, pp. 35-41.
4 The emperor’s primary aim, he felt, was a peaceful settlement of the problem, and "...se non potrà quello vorrà, vorrà quello potrà et darà il carico ad altri che non habino accettati li ricordi soi et satisfatto alle richieste soe." Campeggio/Farnese, 28/11/40, Ibid., Nr 256, p. 54.
5 Campeggio/Farnese, 23/1/41, Ibid., Nr 290, pp. 133-134.
6 Campeggio/Farnese, 18/2/41, Laemmer, pp. 351-352.
come to Regensburg in an obedient spirit, that the threatened National Council could be avoided, and that a gradual improvement of the situation would set in. Granvelle, he was convinced, would do the best he could. Certain concessions would, however, have to be made to the Protestants, if concord were to be achieved. The emperor seemed to be preparing to make substantial concessions on the questions of the church lands, of the cases before the Imperial Court, of clerical marriage, and of the common cup. Agreement would, he thought, be reached on as many issues as possible and the disputed points would be referred to the next General Council.

Poggio, the nuncio at the Imperial Court, also refused to give up all hope of a successful issue to the Diet, although he did not deceive himself as to the difficulties that would have to be surmounted. "Non vi è gia persona che non cognoschi la difficoltà della causa quasi desperata, pure in questa desperatione, si spera come dico." He relayed however, Granvelle's criticisms of his own party. Granvelle's sole thanks for damming, for the moment at least, the flood of controversial writings had been denunciation by the Catholics as a bad Christian. The Catholics had done little or nothing to further

1 Campeggio/Farnese, 20/1/41, NB I,vi,Nr 287,pp.128-129.
2 Campeggio/Farnese, 23/2/41, Ibid., Nr 298,p.146.
3 Ibid., pp.142 ff.
4 Poggio/Cervini, 19/2/41, Laemmer,p.354.
their cause, and, in particular, their scholars at Worms, with the honourable exception of Badia, had done more harm than good. The Lutherans, on the other hand, had been represented by some thirty to forty learned, upright men. Rome, it was true, did preach reform, but all that made itself felt in Germany was her demand for money. Despite all this, however, Poggio reported, "Si è publicato molta speranza di concordia in Germania..."¹

The Bishop of Aquila was, as might be expected, quite confident of success, if only the papacy would give its full support. "Hinc pendent leges et prophetae. Venendo uno o duo legati cum summa auctoritate et non sine auxilio, bene sperandum erit; alioquin vale dubitendum,..."² Now that a new form of colloquy without any danger of voting had been found, there was nothing to be feared, and Eck would never be vanquished by Melanchthon,"...et è necessario et più che necessario, perché passando questo puncto senza fructa, actum erit de Germania..."³

The emperor seemed to have won the goodwill of the princes, and even the Protestants appeared determined,"...di ultimar questa causa della Religione." All waited eagerly on the arrival of the

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¹ Poggio/Farnese, 5/2/41, HJ IV, pp.659-666.
³ Sanzio/Farnese, 20/1/41, NB I, vi, p.131.
legate and praised the decision of the pope to appoint Contarini, when this became known. Hence it could be hoped that all difficulties would be overcome, "...sine damno Religionis."¹

For all had great faith in Contarini: "adeo quod bene sperandum puto."²

Thus we have moved from one extreme to the other: from the pessimism of Morone to the qualified optimism of Poggio and Campeggio to the uninhibited enthusiasm of Bernardo Sanzio. Where does Contarini stand here? Is perhaps the judgement of Pallavicini correct that "nimiaque fortassis de sua opera ac praestantia causae concepta spe, nedom quidem satis doctus experimento rebatur, medicorum vitio, non humorum pravitate morbum prostrahi."³ Did, in other words, his determination to grasp the opportunity offered by Regensburg rest on a misunderstanding of what that opportunity was, on a false diagnosis of the situation?

This much, at least, is clear. His optimism is of a very different category from that of the Bishop of Aquila. He was no blind optimist. Indeed temperamentally he inclined in the opposite direction, to melancholy and depression.⁴ Nor was he unaware of the daunting nature of the task that lay ahead of him.

¹ Sanzio/Farnese, 18/2/41, HJ IV, 668-670.
² Sanzio/Farnese, 27/2/41, Laemmer, p. 363.
³ Pallavicini, I, iv, XIII, 6.
⁴ E.g. his complaint to Pole in 1536 is being "Saepe maesto". Pole/Contarini, 24/6/36 Quirini I, 459.
The scale of probabilities was heavily weighted against success and he knew it. He told Ruggieri, the Ferraraan ambassador to the papal court, that he foresaw an arduous and difficult task ahead of him, especially in view of the entanglement of matters of state with those of religion. Rather did his optimism spring from his faith. His exchange of letters with Eck illustrates this.

At the end of August 1540 Eck had written to Contarini, expressing his rejection of the mode of negotiating with the Protestants which was practised in the colloquies. "Überhaupt soll man nicht mit den Ketzernd disputieren; diesen, die ungeachtet ihres dem Kaiser verpfändeten Wortes ihre Gemeinschaft stets erweitern und stets mehr Kirchengüter an sich reissen, ist mit solchen Mitteln nichts anzuhaben." The whole project, in other words, is futile.

Contarini replied that he had been badly shaken to hear how little hope Eck held out of a reconciliation of the schism. "Verum vehementer commotus sum." Whatever human reason may say to the contrary, he replied, we must hope against hope. Where there is trust in the providence of God and the mercy of Christ there can

1 Farnese/Poggio, 8/1/41, NB I, vi, Nr 317 p.183 Anm.1; Nino Ser- nini wrote Cardinal Gonzaga on 22 January that from what he heard from his secretary Contarini "... ha poca speranza di posser fare cosa buona, scrivendogli il m.ro del sacro palazzo, che si vede pochissimo verso, essendo quei diavoli disuniti più che mai fra di loro, et è il manco quello che si sarebbe da trattare della fede, l'autorità del papa, ma fra di loro è una rabbia crudelissima...et così hanno poco animo di fare cosa buona..." NAV Nuova Serie 25 (1907)p.18.

2 Eck/Contarini 26/8/40 ZKG XIX, 259-261.
be no room for despair. Rather let us pray, pray to the author of all peace to establish the unity of his church, by sending down his Holy Spirit to be with us to the end of time. As to us, let us overcome evil with good so that our adversaries will be ashamed – or at least ought to be – of holding themselves apart from their loving brethren. The rest we can leave to God.¹

Over against any prophecies of doom Contarini had a sovereign freedom. Nothing could be taken for granted, for the future was God's future. Man's obedience in this situation is therefore an ultimate optimism. The Christian can never be paralysed into inaction by fear of the future. In the face of all difficulties he can act creatively and redemptively in furtherance of the will of God.

An idealist gains the impetus to his actions from a convenient inability to see the realities. Precisely because he was not an idealist, Contarini did not shrink from the facts. He recognised that the Diet might well pass resolutions prejudicial to the faith and to the Apostolic See, and that the emperor might well close the Diet and grant the Protestants similar concessions to those they had gained at Frankfurt.² But one must take the risk, and seize the opportunity.

It was a very difficult undertaking he was about to embark on, "et molto infistolita," he wrote to Sadoleto shortly before his departure from Rome; without God's help human efforts can do little. He sets himself on the way, therefore, trusting in the divine goodness, and asks Sadoleto to pray to God for him and the whole Church, and for everything connected with the undertaking. His own prayer is that he may through his Legation be enabled to be of some service, "s'io posso in questa Legatione farci servitio alcuno, quella mi commandi con quella sicurta che recerca l'amor nostro fraterno." This simple, yet impressive statement of intention, written to a close friend, is probably the best indication of the spirit in which Contarini set out for Regensburg.

The contrast between this view and that of the Curia, which, frozen into a defensive posture, dreaded every new development in Germany, is striking. Retreating as far as it could behind the barriers of orthodoxy and the traditional institutions, the Curia expressed its anxiety for the future in an uncritical adulation of the past. Contarini had left with great zeal and high hopes of finding a means to reunite the church, wrote Ruggieri, but "ad altri pare che, anco il valore suo sia molto l'habbia accettata una dura provincia," and that for him to emerge from it honourably would be a superhuman achievement.

1 Contarini/Sadoleto, 13/1/41, Morandi, I, ii, p. 95.
None of the other Cardinals, he added, envied Contarini in the least. The general view was that the Lutherans would be unyielding on all the main questions, not out of any religious concern, but simply from the desire to continue in their previous licentious way of life. Contarini, then, from the outset was under the suspicion of pursuing a policy of appeasement. Pressured by circumstance into sending a legate to Regensburg, into giving its unwilling benediction to what it could only regard as an exceedingly dangerous departure from catholic practice, Rome's chief concern was to minimise the possibilities that Regensburg would — for the Catholics — be a theological Munich. The whole project was approached in Rome, as in Wittenberg, with the utmost caution and suspicion. The only success that was hoped from it was its failure, which would at least demonstrate once and for all the futility of such colloquies.

The despatch of Contarini was really nothing more than a gesture, a tactical manoeuvre, dictated by the need to retain the good-will of the emperor. It would demonstrate that the pope had done everything possible to contain the Protestant threat. It had been alleged that if the colloquy failed this would be due to the lack of papal support. The sending of the legate would "... levare il pretesto a questa calunnia", wrote

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1 Parnese/Poggio, 28/1/41, NB I, vi, p.189, Anm.I.
2 Ruggieri/Ferrara, 12/2/41, Ibid., p.196, Anm.I.
Parnese to Dandino. Perhaps a little too hopefully.

The lack of enthusiasm in Rome for the colloquy, quite apart from considerations of principle ("die Disputationen blühen, es gedeiht die Spaltung") was, after all, understandable enough. If no legate were sent, the papacy would be accused of a total lack of concern for Germany. If, on the other hand, one were sent, his fate would almost certainly be similar to that of the papal representatives at Worms - he would, that is, be accused of obstructing the progress of the work of reconciliation. A further danger was that what was done at Regensburg might be regarded as binding on the papacy. To cover itself against at least this contingency the pope was careful to stress that the responsibility for the outcome rested on the emperor's shoulders. This would not only make the latter more circumspect in his actions. If the worst come to the worst, the whole project could be disowned.

The corollary of the pessimism about a possible reconciliation with the Protestants, was, as the Instructions to Contarini show, that the legation was now primarily orientated towards the emperor. It was the emperor, not the Protestants, from whom Rome had most to fear, and therefore Contarini's main function would be to put a brake on the over-conciliatory

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1 Parnese/Dandino, 6/2/41, Ibid., p.137, Anm.2.
tendencies of the Imperial party. Contarini, believing in the possibility of a genuine reconciliation with the Protestants, had seen his legation as being primarily directed towards them. Because, of the other hand, the Curia was sure that there was no hope of any reasonable accommodation with the Protestants, it laid the main stress on the need to persuade the emperor against accepting, in desperation at the break-down of the colloquy, an injudicious peace.

The Instruction for Contarini was drafted by Ghinucci, the Cardinal Santa Croce and Aleander and revised by Farnese and the pope himself.¹ Aleander's suggestion to Farnese that it would be advisable for the latter to instruct Contarini to study the articles with great care, and to govern his actions accordingly - "et facci quanto in esso si ordina" - and should there be anything in it to which he did not approve to write for fresh instructions - "et se ha qualche cosa in contrario, rescrevi"² - is a veiled indication of the differing conceptions of the purpose of the mission held by Contarini and by Aleander and his colleagues. It is clear that it was expected that the legate would find his Instruction distasteful. It reached him in Trent, when he was on the point of leaving.

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¹ Aleander/Farnese, 15/2/41, NB I, vii, Nr I, p.3; Contarini had worked closely together with both Ghinucci and Aleander in the work of reform in Rome, and in the preparation for a Council. D/B, pp.345,376 ff.

² Aleander/Farnese, 15/2/41, NB I, vii, Nr I, pp.4-5.
His acknowledgement is brief, and confirms his resolution to defend the interests of the Holy See. "Non mancaro di sollecitudine et procurar tutte quelle cose che pensaro essere in onore di S. Sant. et la sede apostolica". From his lack of enthusiasm in this letter it would be unwise to draw any conclusions; the brevity of the letter due to his imminent departure may well explain this. It will rather be his conduct at the Diet which will demonstrate the divergence between his views and those of Rome. At this stage, we can only draw attention to one interesting point.

In the latter part of the Instruction reference is made to Contarini's request for permission to make personal contacts with the Protestants. One would give much to know exactly what was said in the conversations that he had with Farnese and the pope, and probably also with the three Cardinals who drafted his instructions, prior to his departure from Rome. That his optimistic and irenical outlook did not find uncritical acceptance is confirmed by the grudging manner in which his request is agreed to. He is to remember how easily such good-will visits to the Protestants could be falsely interpreted - as a sign of weakness and indecision on his part, or on the other hand, as an attempt to suborn the Protestants. Hence, while showing friendliness to the Protestant scholars insofar as this can be done without harm, he should be careful to show the prudence

and dignity worthy of a legate of the pope and of the Apostolic See. It is the voice of caution that speaks here and the points it makes are not without their force. But the audacious undertaking that Contarini had in mind - the presentation of a totally new image of Catholicism - could never hope to succeed if such pedestrian considerations were to dominate. The Curia's fear was that in attempting to win all, Contarini would only harm the Catholic cause still further. The result was that no real dialogue between him and the Protestants - lay or clerical - took place at Regensburg.

The conflict of interests is clear. To Contarini the first priority at Regensburg was the achievement of reunion on the religious level, while for the papacy the first priority was the defence of papal authority. True, the Instruction explicitly states that the purpose of his mission was the pursuit of a true and holy Concord in the name of the pope. Immediately following this profession, however, are given the reasons why it had been decided not to endow Contarini with an "amplissima concordandi cum Protestantibus facultate." These reasons give us pause for thought.

First, it is argued, since it is not known what the Protestants' intentions are as regards the basic tenets of the faith, including the Primacy, the Sacraments and other articles, it seemed wiser not to grant this power. This argument

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1 Instructio Rmo Dno Card. Contareno in Germaniam Legato die XXVIII mensis Januarii MDXLI. Text in Morandi, I, ii, pp. 112-122; and Quirini, III, 286-299.
might carry some conviction if it were not immediately followed by another to the effect that since from an examination of the Protestants' articles one can almost divine what they will ask, it would be scandalous to make any decision without the consent of the other nations of Christendom. In both cases the conclusion is the same: Not even the pope himself could act on his own responsibility in such questions, far less a mere legate! But the grounds for the conclusion are diametrically opposed. In one case it is because one knows, in another because one does not know what the Protestants are likely to ask. The nature of the arguments, we conclude, is immaterial. Any argument will serve its turn if it supports the conclusion that nothing can be decided at Regensburg, everything must be referred to Rome.

The danger of a concord being undertaken without due regard to papal interests is very much in the forefront throughout, though it is piously noted that the pope can hardly believe this is possible. There can be no question of tolerating an agreement of this sort, for it would be a direct attack on, "...honorem... nostram, et huius S.Sedis auctoritatem, unde Universalis Ecclesiae salus maxime pendet..." ¹ Contarini is to do his utmost to dissuade the emperor from such a course, and in particular to stress that a General Council is the sole fitting

¹ Ibid., p.115.
antidote to schism and heresy.

Should the emperor persevere, despite all his efforts, he must declare that he cannot be a witness to such an agreement, and in the name of the pope forbid it, and if even this is to no avail he is to declare it null and void and withdraw,"...et damnabis, et cassa, et irrita, et damnata dicernes, et praesentiam tuam ex loco...subtrahes..."¹

A similar course of action is to be pursued in two other cases. First, if on the pretext of referring the final judgement to the General Council the Protestants are granted toleration for the meantime. For this is only a Protestant pretext for disobedience. Secondly, if the holding of a General Council in Germany is decided on. This would be absurd and irrational end to the detriment of papal authority and to the peril of souls, since a Council held in Germany would grant the Lutherans just whatever they wanted.

Despite all his exertion in the cause of peace in Europe, the Instruction continues, the pope has seen with distress that the due regard for his authority, "ad quam Religionis judicium, cognitio, et examen spectat..." has not been conspicuous by its presence. Yet trusting in the assurances of the emperor that these negotiations at Regensburg are to a good end, he has borne with it all patiently, and out of the love that he has for all Christians and to the Germans has sought to correct "quae perperam illic fiebant", seeking with all the means at his

¹ Ibid., p.116.
command to end the schism. If, however, it proves that all this exertion has been in vain, or that at the Diet "defraudati fuerimus" he will have no alternative but to condemn anything done "contra Dominum, Ius Nostrum, et huius Sedis Apostolicae auctoritatem", and declare it null and void. His consolation will be the knowledge that he will not have been found wanting in his duty. Contarini, if necessary, is to declare this boldly to the emperor and the Estates.¹

He is further to denounce any attempt to make a concord on the basis of the Nuremberg Peace, unless the emperor first interprets it in favour of the Faith and the Church of God, and is to reject any suggestion of a National Council, even if the Germans say they mean to celebrate it by papal authority. For there is nothing more harmful than the National Council to Imperial and papal authority, as the emperor himself has said.²

That the papacy saw the primary function of Contarini to be the defence of her own interests and authority is not so very surprising. He was, after all, her Ambassador. The defence of papal interests, moreover, was not a mere struggle of one power-complex against another. For the papacy, and to a large extent for Contarini himself³ the interests of the papacy were those

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¹ Ibid., pp.117-119.
² Ibid., pp.119-120.
³ Contarini certainly never had the slightest intention of going behind the back of the pope. Cf. Beccadelli's comment that "nē mai si fermò conclusione, o sillaba in quel Colloquio, che non s'avesse la risposta da Roma del consenso del Papa." Morandi, I,ii,pp. 34-35.
of Christendom. A large part of the Instruction was devoted to the need to promote peace between Charles V and France. Was not this for the good of Christendom - a united front against the Turkish threat?¹ He was to seek the reconciliation of the Protestants and what was more essential for Germany - the greatest bastion of Christendom - than this? True this must be effected by the "debitis modis", either through a General Council convened by the pope or after mature consideration by the pope himself, but was this in fact a restriction? For any other attempted mediation, on a national level, or without the sanction of the Head of the universal Church would only provoke schism, not heal it. For the same reason it had been impossible to promise ratification of decisions arrived at during the Diet. A blank cheque to this effect would have been out of the question.

Peace on the political level could not be bought by concessions on the spiritual. Peace, to be genuine, presupposed the restitution of the true faith and of the rule of justice, that is, the restoration of the lands and properties seized in defiance of all law by the Lutherans from the Church, their rightful owner. There could, therefore, be but one way to peace and the unity of the Church - a Diet in Germany to settle the temporal matters, and a properly convoked Council for the spiritual.

¹ Ibid., pp. 115-116.
It need not be doubted that the pope was concerned with the political stability of Europe. Nor is there any question but that he felt himself committed, as the successor of Peter and vice-gerent of Christ, to the defence of the true faith, handed down from the beginning to the present generation, in whose name he now had to hand it over unimpaired to the generations to come. He recognised also the need for reform, especially of and in the Curia itself. And yet the immediacy and the primacy of his concern lay with the maintenance of the authority of the Holy See. Hence when Farnese exclaimed bitterly in a despatch to Poggio that the pope was as concerned as anyone for the end of the schism in Germany, and that there was no need for the emperor to goad him on to this,1 he was fully justified. And yet, of course, it all revolved round the question how reunion was conceived. Farnese could declare that it was because of his concern for Germany that the pope was opposed to the colloquies,2 and this might well be true. But for the pope the good of Germany was equated with the maintenance of the authority of the papacy and the continuance of the traditional faith. Hence a political realism which was prepared to make compromises concerning the latter for the sake of temporary political advantages

1 Farnese/Poggio, 29/2/41, HJ IV, 667.
could be regarded not only as a threat to Rome, but also as contrary to the real interests of Germany itself.

It is not a question of the sincerity of the papacy when it professed its concern to end the schism and to see the return of peace to Germany. Its concern was real enough, as was that of the emperor and of the Protestants. Nor was it only a question of priorities, although it is clear that for Rome and Wittenberg, unlike the emperor, the doctrinal issue was more of a burning concern than the political. It was also a question of what was understood by the different parties when they spoke of the defence of the faith or the restoration of peace. To the papacy, for whom the critical point was the defence of papal power, the defence of the faith meant the upholding of doctrinal orthodoxy, and political peace in Europe meant the establishment of a balance of power which would prevent a Habsburg predominance and leave Italy free to manage her own affairs.

What, then, did the pope expect of Contarini? An improvement in the relations between papacy and Empire could not be expected. At best Contarini's personal popularity might serve to prevent a further deterioration of relations,¹ while his scholarship and conciliatory disposition would present the Roman case in the best possible light both to the emperor and

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¹ As we have seen it was a widespread view among the adherents of the Imperial party that the pope was not interested in concord. Cf. Campeggio's warning on this point. Campeggio/Farnese, 10/1/41, Morandi, I, ii, p. 109.
the Estates. In the case of a crisis he could be relied upon to act not only as a loyal son of the Church, but also as a skilled and knowledgeable representative of papal interests. The authority of his rank and person would help to prevent anything "detrimental to religion" from taking place.¹ His despatch would demonstrate to the emperor, Farnese believed, the promptness of His Holiness in giving his assistance in the settlement of the religious question, and not only in the traditional ways but also by the unusual one the emperor had advocated.²

Any dealings he might have with the Protestants would be of peripheral interest — possibly one or two individuals would be won over. His main task would be to stiffen the back of the Catholic party, with the help of Eck, Morone, and Conrad Braun, the rigorist lay representative of the Archbishop of Mainz at Worms, who had won Morone's praise there as the saviour of the Catholics,³ and vigilantly to watch out for any threatened course of action that would be prejudicial to the honour of the Apostolic See or the Catholic faith.

So much for the expectations of Paul III. Those of the emperor were rather different. It had been due to the initiative

1 Farnese/Dandino, 6/2/41, NB I, vi, p. 137, Anm. 2.
2 Farnese/Campeggio and Morone, 28/1/41, Ibid., Nr 294, p. 137.
3 Aleander/Farnese, 15/2/41, NB I, vii, Nr 1, pp. 4-5.
of Charles V, as we have seen, that a legate had been sent at all, and it had been on his suggestion that Contarini, in particular, was despatched. What recommended Contarini to the emperor? What did he hope from him? And to what extent were these expectations compatible with those of the pope, or indeed of Contarini himself?

Without doubt, Charles V's previous knowledge of Contarini as Venetian ambassador to the Imperial Court from 1521-1525, and the further encounter with him at Bologna in 1529 had a large influence on his choice. 1 Despite the fact that throughout this period Venice, in its concern to defend Italian independence, had pursued a pro-French policy, Contarini himself had won the favour of the emperor. He had proved himself not only a good diplomat, 2 but a cultured and personable man of the world. He often engaged in friendly conversation with the emperor about non-political matters, 3 having among other things, so Beccadelli tells us, a common interest with Charles in cosmography, a subject of particular interest at a time when

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1 Cf. D/B, pp. 26-124 and Brown III, 114-470, on which Dittrich's account is almost exclusively based.

2 But cf. Brown III, 338, n. 2. He certainly had good judgement, was a fine orator, and enjoyed general popularity. On occasions he tended to credulity, as his conviction that the French King would not desert his Italian allies expressed to Giberti just prior to the peace of Cambrai(!) shows. D/R, Nr 157, p. 51.

the riches of the New World were beginning to come to the notice of Europe. Don Luigi d'Avila, himself an intimate of Charles V, was seen at times asking Contarini to explain to him something concerning the emperor which he himself did not know. The two men seem to have held one another in mutual respect.

The importance of this previous acquaintance should not be pressed too far. Throughout his period in Rome as Venetian ambassador there (May 1528 to December 1529) Contarini had been a zealous advocate of the anti-Imperial policy of Venice, and the emperor cannot have been ignorant of this. Indeed it is important to realise that Contarini remained until his Cardinalate very much the Venetian patriot. It is the freedoms of Italy, not the future of Christendom which are in the forefront of his mind, although precisely the interests of Venice had led him to see the desirability of a lasting and equitable peace between France and the empire and a concentration of war-like

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2 On hearing e.g. of the papal treaty with the emperor in 1529 Contarini did not conceal his dismay and told Clement VII that the Spaniards, "sempre vano così cauti ne le convenzione che fano et in li altri progressi sui, et sempre tengono un capo in mano, per potersi schermir et assassinar il compagno." D/R, Nr 190, p.59. Sim. D/R, Nr 178, p.56. At this stage the emperor is for Contarini the arch-enemy.
energies on the Turkish threat.

More important for the emperor's choice would be Contarini's scholarly reputation. Though of a breadth that today would draw the accusation of dilettantism, his learning, in philosophy and theology particularly, commanded the admiration of all his contemporaries. Beccadelli relates that a professional philosopher of Bologna, Messer Lodovico Bocca di ferro, said that of the many scholars he knew there was none with more learning and better judgement than Contarini. The latter, although for years away from his studies could answer without hesitation the problems he had brought before him, "...parendomi più tosto parlare con un' Angelo che con un' huomo".¹ He is referring here primarily to Contarini's mastery of Aristotle. As regards theology he had a through knowledge of the Summa of Aquinas, and of the Fathers was well read in Augustine, Basil, Chrysostom, Nazianzus and others. In the long summer days his favourite recreation was reading in the Classics, in Latin and Greek history, in Homer, Horace, Vergil and Cicero.² His learning would thus adorn the deliberations at the Colloquy, and if his approval were gained for any agreement, it would be exceedingly difficult for Rome later to reject it.

¹ Morandi, I, ii, p.42; Pietro Pomponazzi dedicated one of his writings to him as a token of his respect. D/B, p. 219.
² Morandi, I, ii, pp.42-43.
Again, not only as a humanist but as a member of the "evangelical" group in Italy\(^1\) he would act as a magnet for the Erasmian forces in Germany — on both sides of the religious divide. The Imperial party was only too well aware how ill the Catholic apologetic had thus far been conducted in Germany.

As Brieger points out, the Catholic cause would now be championed not by Morone, who in Granvelle's opinion had held up the conversations at Worms for months, but by a personality "...an dessen Erscheinen Granvella mit Recht die grössten Hoffnungen für das Gelingen seines Werkes knüpfen mochte."\(^2\) Contarini was a man of a very different stamp from the German controversial theologians. His writings were free from all personal bitterness and polemic.\(^3\) He, if anyone, would be able to win over at least the reasonable elements in the Protestant camp to the Catholic side.

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1 Jedin, History, I,p.378.

2 Theodor Brieger, Gasparo Contarini und das Regensburger Concordienwerk des Jahres 1541, (Gotha: 1870), p.5.

3 In the concluding words to his *Confutatio articulorum Lutheranorum* Contarini wrote: "Non est opus concilio, non disputatiōnibus et syllogismis, non locis ex sacra scriptura excerptis ad sedandos hos Lutheranorum motus; opus est tantum bona voluntate, charitate erga Deum et proximum, animi humilitate opus est..." Gasparo Contarini, Gegenreformatorische Schriften, (1530-1542) ed. F. Hūnermann (Corpus Catholicorum, Nr 7; Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagshandlung, 1923) p.22. In his personal life, too, he was as conciliatory as possible. "Non era nelle dispute contentioso, ma mite et benigno, et s'havesse udito alcuno dir cosa, che si potesse riprendere, et havesse senso buono, a quello s'appigliava, et quello meteva innanzi, et così non lassava, che altri rimanesse confuso." Beccadelli in Morandi, I,11, pp.41-42.
His reforming activities in the much-abused Curia, his concern for the pastoral office of the clergy, the fact that since his elevation to the Cardinalate in 1535 he had been generally recognised as the leader of the "Catholic Reformation" in Italy, together with his own unchallenged personal integrity, would commend him further to the Protestants, and also to the Catholic Estates, who had now for two decades been calling for a redress of their gravamina, for an end to the abuses and absurdities which were threatening the credibility of the old faith.

Finally, by the beginning of the forties he had become a "good European". His experience in Rome had broadened his horizons and extended his loyalties. He had learned to see the problems of Europe as a whole, and while too much of a layman to think like an Italian prince of the Church, he was now also too much of a Churchman to think as a Venetian patrician. The variety of his experience as humanist, diplomat and cardinal had given him a rare openness and breadth of vision. He was, above all, aware of the urgent need for action to meet the chaos in Germany, the schism in the Church, the Turkish menace in the East. He believed, like the emperor, in Christendom, and shared with him the dream of a restoration of the lost harmonies.

1 D/B, pp. 317-422. Almost all the leading reformers - Pole, Sadoleto, Cortese, Badia, Giberti, Caraffa, Fregoso, to name only a few - were personal friends of Contarini.
That all his concerns, as theologian, as reformer, and as one passionately concerned for the peace of Europe, culminated in his ecumenical concern, his yearning for the recovery of the shattered unity of the Church seemed to fit him ideally for the task which the emperor, through his chancellor Granvelle, had prepared for him.

As we have seen, Granvelle, despairing of any agreement being reached at Worms on the basis of the Augsburg Confession, had transferred his activity from the public to the secret plane, hoping thus to be able to present to Protestant and Catholic alike at Regensburg a theological fait-accompli, a formula of concord that would be acceptable to both sides. The papal representatives, accordingly, were kept in the dark, and in their frustration could only recommend the despatch of a legate with the necessary authority to uphold the honour of the Apostolic See.¹

Granvelle had also insisted on the despatch of a legate to Regensburg, but with a totally different motive. Regensburg as he conceived it was to be the stage on which the secretly negotiated agreement would be triumphantly brought out into the open. Regensburg's function would be that of formal ratification, not further disputation. Hence the need for the presence of the emperor with all the authority of his person and office behind the agreement. Hence the concurrent meeting of the Diet to

¹ Cf. Chapter 1, p. 42, n. 1 above.
ratify what the theologians agreed on. Hence the need for a legate with ample power to rubber-stamp the agreement arrived at.¹

It was a question of the manipulation of the various groupings. The crisis inherent in the German situation itself would be brought to bear on the legate, who in turn would use the weight of his authority on the recalcitrants on the Catholic side. The Protestants, on the other hand, would be pressured by the Imperial authority, the papal ducats,² and Contarini’s exemplary life, learning and piety. The result would be an interim solution which would give Germany peace, provide a subsidy against the Turks, prevent any further deterioration in the religious situation, and pave the way for a gradual improvement in the future.³ For the sake of the common good, i.e. the good of Germany, both sides would have made certain concessions, and the role of the legate in the whole would be a minor, though important one. He would act as a pawn in the statesman’s “grand design”.

1 Granvelle had frequently stressed this last point; the lack of such power would, he held, nullify any gain if an agreement were arrived at; for if the latter were not cemented immediately, it would probably not be held to. Poggio/Farnese, 5/2/41, HJ IV, 661.

2 Granvelle thought 50,000 scudi would be necessary. Campeggio/Farnese, 26/11/40, NB I, vi, Nr 252, p.44; Morone/Farnese, 10/1/41, Morandi, I, ii, p.97.

3 Campeggio/Farnese, 20/1/41, NB I, vi, Nr 287, pp.128-129; Granvelle believed the differences could be reduced to a very few articles, but that the Protestants "...non voriano parer convitti da questi theologi che sono loro emuli, ma ben li pare risia poter cedere a theologi de Italia et altre natione et a doi Revmi legati..." Campeggio/Farnese, 23/12/40, Ibid., Nr 268, pp. 89-90.
How little such a plan corresponded to the papacy's intentions is clear. To what extent, though, was it compatible with Contarini's own intentions? What did the legate himself hope to achieve at Regensburg?

First of all, and unlike Granvelle, he viewed Regensburg in terms not only of the political problems and of the German situation. As Brieger says, the presence of Contarini transformed the whole situation. In place of the hope for reconciliation between the new and the old Church in Germany it seemed now that a reunion of Wittenberg and Rome was in the offing, and it was the positive attitude of Contarini to the policy of conciliation that was the basis of this momentous possibility.¹

Secondly, and precisely because Contarini did see Regensburg in this broader context, it was impossible for him to be so optimistic about its outcome as Granvelle. In view of the sombre situation, there seemed scant room even for a highly paradoxical optimism. And yet optimistic he was! Exactly what he hoped to achieve we will probably never know. We can, on the other hand, glean a few significant facts from his background, and indicate certain tendencies which may throw some light on his hopes and expectations as he approached Regensburg.

First of all as a non-conformist himself he believed he understood the language of rebels. He deplored much on the Catholic side that the Protestants also deplored. The wild

¹ Brieger, pp. 9-10.
polemic of some of the Catholic controversialists offended not only his cultured taste but seemed to him often, in its enthusiasm to castigate everything Protestant, quite un-catholic in, for example, its depreciation of faith and grace. ¹ Institutional Catholicism was never attractive to him. One recollects his famous word to Paul III when the latter hinted that his opposition to the nomination of some new cardinals lay in a fear that the influence of the present members would thus be diminished, "...per mio conto, a dir il vero, io non reputo che il Cappello sia il mio maggior onore." ²

His faith had been nurtured in the critical atmosphere of Venice, ³ among his own circle of friends and pilgrims in the

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¹ In two letters in the summer of 1537 he expresses his fear that such writers, in their zeal to oppose Luther in fact oppose Augustine, Ambrose, Bernard, Jerome, and Thomas, and verge towards the Pelagian heresy. D/R, Ined. Nrs 20, 25, pp. 270, 288-290.

² Morandi, I, ii, p. 47.

³ Dittrich describes Padua's University as one which had long been suspect of heresy (D/B, p. 220) and Venice itself as a city which, "...mit Glücksgütern reich gesegnet, inmitten einer herrlich aufblühenden, reich und prunkvoll sich entwickelnden Kunst, in geschmackvollem Luxus und geistreichem Genussleben schwelgte und den geselligen Verkehr mit geistvoller Conversation, ja Schwärmerei für die schönen Wissenschaften über alles hochschätzte." (D/B, p. 205) It is certainly interesting to remark how very sympathetic treatment the Lutherans often received at the hands of the Venetian observer, Carlo Contarini, e.g., even grants the peasants a certain justification for their revolt in 1525 and displays some schadenfreude at the discomfiture of the bishop of Ulm. Brown II, Ns 976, p. 423. Other observers: Ibid., Nr 990, p. 427 and Nr 1007, p. 433ff; Nr 1086 contains this very sympathetic statement: "Luther's whole faith, in short, consists in loving God above all things, and one's neighbour as one's self; and he maintained that so many external ceremonies are unnecessary, because Christ by his passion made atonement for everything..." Ibid., p. 468. Finally one should mention a letter from Zuan Francisco Contarini (Carlo's brother): "Tell the most noble Messer Martin Sanuto that here one cannot even speak of Luther, still less have his works, as this Prince (Archduke Ferdinand) makes the bishop of Vienna search for Lutherans, and if found woe betide them; so he must excuse me in this matter." Vienna, 9/10/24, Ibid., Nr 83, pp. 385ff.
spiritual life, in his own passionate struggle to reach certainty of salvation. His diplomatic career had stripped him of any illusions as regards the papacy in its worldly aspect, and he had proved himself in the thirties to be an outspoken opponent of an exaggerated Curialism. His activity as a Cardinal had been one long struggle against the reactionary forces in the Curia. His knowledge of the history of the church led

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1 Hubert Jedin, *Contarini und Camaldoli* (Edizione di Storia e Letteratura; Estratte dall' Archivio Italiano per la Storia della Pietà, vol. II, 1953); also Jedin’s article, "Das Turmerlebnis des Jungen Contarini", *HZ*, LXX, 115 ff.

2 In 1521 he criticised the belligerence of the pope when the latter, with his eyes on Parma and Piacenza, (promised him by the emperor), opposed any reconciliation with France. *Brown III*, Nr 289, p. 157. "Should a conflict ensue," he wrote, "it must cause great detriment to Christendom, and those who thwarted the adjustment, (at Calais) for the purpose of augmenting their possessions in Italy, will have to give account to the Almighty." *Ibid.*, Nr 345, p. 182. Four years later, hearing of the treaty the pope had signed with England and the emperor because of his fear of the latter, he exclaimed, "Dio voglia, che questa timidità sua non si causi de la ruin d'Italia." *I/R*, Nr 57, p. 23. In a treaty with the emperor Contarini did not hesitate to inform the Senate that "...la natura del Pontefice e supra modum timida et vile..." *I/R*, Nr 191, p. 60. He strongly criticised the pope's pursuit of his own private interests, and defended the refusal of Venice to return Ravenna and Cervia to the papacy "...perche Ravenna et Cervia sono il pretesto del desiderio infinito, che ha de Fiorenza et alle cose de Ferrara, le qual li tochano al commodo privato et al disegno che ha fatto de la esaltation de casa sua." *I/R*, 28/12/28, Nr 121, p. 39.

3 E.g. his writing *De Potestate Pontiflicis in Compositionibus*, *D/B*, pp. 384-389.

him to be critical of many traditional practices, and to recognize that there was guilt on the Catholic side. And yet despite all his criticism he had fought his way through to what he believed to be a both reasonable and biblical position within the Catholic Church.

It would not, therefore, be the Catholicism of the canonist or the school theologian which he would be offering the Protestants, but a Catholicism which he believed to be the fulfilment of the deepest concerns of the Protestants. Is it even possible that he saw them, or at least some of them, as possible future allies in his own fight against reaction within the Curia and elsewhere?

Secondly, as himself a fervid advocate of reform, he had much in common with a Melanchthon or a Bucer. None of the Reformers were more concerned to restore the pastoral work of the clergy

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1 He recommended, for example, the publication of the reforming "consilium de ecclesia emendanda" as a papal Bull in 1537 although this would have amounted to nothing less than a public confession of guilt. D/B, pp. 368 ff.

2 He never interested himself in the study of law "...et la teneva per vana", according to Beccadelli, who also mentions his impatience with cavilling of any kind, following the dictum of his teacher Pietro of Mantua "nil subtilius falsitate". Morandi, I, II, pp. 40-41. We have already noted his opposition to the exaggerated papalism of the canon lawyers. Dittrich comments," Nach seiner Überzeugung war Grund und Quelle der verkehrten Praxis (of Compositions) an der Curie die Lehre gewisse extreme Canonisten, dass der Papst Herr der kirchlichen Gnaden schätze, sowie der ihm von Christus übertragenen jurisdictionellen Befugnisse sei und folglich darüber auch unumschränkt disponiren, dieselben also auch verkaufen köinne, ohne sich der Simonie schuldig zu machen." D/B, p. 384.

to its central place than he. Nor did they outdo him in his zeal to provide instruction in the faith, from the parish level to the Universities, or indeed in his love for learning as such. The very list of the friends whom he had hoped to take with him to Regensburg is significant in this respect — Sadoletto, Marcantonio Flaminio, Cortese.¹ He could already point with justification to the progress that had attended his efforts and those of the reforming party thus far — the raising of the moral and intellectual standard of the Cardinalate, the beginnings of the reform of the Curia, and the campaign against absentee bishops.²

¹ D/R, pp. 126, 134, 135.
² Cf. Jedin, History I, pp. 378, 410 ff. There is no doubt that Contarini was, inter alia, instrumental in persuading his friends to take an active part in the reform programme, e.g. Pole. D/B, p. 360, Anm. I. Admittedly Dittrich over-states the position when discussing the papal plans for the reform of the Church, he adds "...hiebei stand ihm stets mahnend und ratend Contarini zur Seite, dem er sein Vertrauen zuwandte und mit dem er häufig gerade über die Angelegenheit der Reformen conferirte." Ibid., p. 350. It is true that Contarini had the ear of the pope. Yet this is equally true of the leaders of the more conservative party. Paul listened to Contarini and encouraged his reforming endeavours, but refused to identify himself too closely with the party of reform. Dittrich himself notes that in view of the disagreement between the two groups Paul "could not immediately come to a decision" in favour of the progressive party. D/B, p. 389. In reality Contarini's alternate moods of hope and despair reflect very pointedly the fact that he did not possess the full confidence of the pope, who sought to pursue a middle course between the two alternatives. Cf. D/B, pp. 390, 402 ff.
The Church was already being renewed and cleansed from within! When they realised this, how could the Protestants continue to justify their rending of the seamless robe by this ungodly and fearful schism?

Thirdly - and perhaps this is the crucial point - he believed that he not only understood but shared the basic conviction of the Protestants - that of the all-importance of justification by faith. In his theological writing the relation of faith and works was the central concern, and he held that the Lutheran concern for justification by faith was in fact the essence of Catholic faith also. Protestantism, in other words, is essentially Catholic! Only in the false consequences which it draws from its basic doctrines must it be corrected. But if this is so then the Protestant schism was caused by a misunderstanding of Catholicism. To do away with this misunderstanding, which was preventing the Protestants from appreciating the "real" Catholicism, was his great hope.

If we are to learn from Christ mildness and humility of heart then the waging of bitter polemic against our opponents is impossible, he wrote at the end of 1538 to Cochlaeus, congratulating him on the mild tone of his refutation of an attack by Johannes Sturm on the "consilium de ecclesia emendanda".  

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1 "il fundamento dello aedificio de Luterani e verissimo, ne per alcun modo devemo dirli contra, ma accetarlo come vero et catholico, immo come fundamento della religione christiana." D/R, Ined.Nr 90, p.358.

2 Contarini/Cochlaeus, 8/11/38, D/R, pp.296-297. Similarly he urged Pole to excise the hefty polemic from his Pro ecclesiae sticæ unitatis defensione, directed to Henry VIII. D/R, p.430.
The difficulty is that however piously and irreprehensibly we write these days the Lutherans take grave offense.¹

Without doubt Contarini would see in Regensburg this long-sought opportunity. He was, by inclination and temperament, the born teacher. He never lost his temper, Beccadelli tells us. Although he had a passionate temperament, the extreme limit of his anger is said to have been that he called a servant a goose!²

He never sought to display his knowledge, but enjoyed teaching, saying that, "to him who has it is given, and he who is miserly with the grace given him will lose it." He was able to use language that would be understandable to the learner, a skill that would not be without its importance for the confrontation with the Protestants.³

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¹ "Debit fortasse deus optimus maximus nobis occasionem, qua poterimus simul esse, simul agere de his controversiis ac eis ostendere, quam falsa plerumque nobis attribuant, quam negligerenter legerint excellentissimos viros, quos damnant, quod in nonnullis immutarent vocabula, idem tamen dicant, quod scholastici omnem. Ea vero quae falsa praedicant ac in coetus suos receperunt, ostendamus, quantum pugnet cum ratione, cum patribus nostris et cum doctrina sacrae paginae, non verbis amarulentis, non conviciis, sed animo benevolentissimo, amicis verbis, omni corporis gestu miti ac mansueto, qui christianum hominem deceat." Cochlaeus has given of his knowledge experience and piety for the sake of healing the schism, "... ut nostra tempestate videamus ecclesiam Dei unam esse vinculo caritatis et pacis, ac ecclesia germanica, nobilissima et potentissima christianae reipublicae pars, tandem quiescat ac sibi parcat providatque, ne seditionibus his durantibus suis ipsa se viribus conficiat." Contarini/Cochlaeus, 8/11/38, D/R, pp.296-297.

² Morandi, I,ii,p.48.

³ Ibid., p.42.
Yet, as we have seen, his Instruction drastically curtailed his freedom of action in respect to the Protestants. Again significant in this respect is that another of his questions found no echo in the Instruction. He had asked whether, if the Colloquy should come to a decision which, while basically unprejudicial to the faith or to the Holy See, yet left the decision on certain peripheral questions (articoli indifferenti) open, resort could not be had to a gathering of theologians under the authority of the papacy, if it should prove that a General Council was not in prospect. Even this modest attempt to increase somewhat his freedom of manoeuvre was evidently found unacceptable by the Curia.

The Curia could constrain him to abandon his "dangerous" tactics. His exalted hopes, however, he clung to. The result was that the latter were left stranded high and dry, that there crept in a glaring contradiction between his audacious expectations and the totally incongruous methods with which he hoped to realise them. It is with this contradiction - rather than with any supposed illegitimacy or impossibility of the hopes as such - that the historian has to deal. Contarini was perhaps clear enough about what he wanted to achieve. On the question of how it was to be achieved he was intolerably and inexcusably vague.

Without doubt he expected that he would be able to bring to bear his influence on the emperor so that political considerations, the "r spetti estrinsechi" could be excluded, and a truly

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1 Quirini III, 224-225.
Catholic concord attained. Here however he not only fell victim to the typical illusion of the Renaissance diplomat - that history is made by the delivery of speeches - but he overestimated both the power of the emperor and the community of interest between Imperial and papal policy. His dream of the revival of Christendom was an essentially medieval ideal with but scant relevance to the actual situation - to the rise of particularism that was challenging the Imperial authority in the interest of the territories, to the collapse of the Imperial legal and administrative framework, to the alliance of France and Turkey, to the underlying economic realities, to the new secular spirit that resisted the claims of any overarching spiritual hierarchy.

Nor does he appear to have given any consideration to the anomaly of his position as papal legate, to the fact that his authority would be recognised by only one of the two parties at Regensburg. John Frederick, for example, had instructed his representatives to reject any attempt by the legate to exercise the authority of the pope as the head of the Church. True, the unpopularity of the papacy in Germany meant that he would seem to some extent the representative of an alien power to both parties, but this was a thought that can hardly have afforded him much comfort.

How was he to walk the tight-rope between betraying the papal interests - which he was there to represent - and between rebuffing the Protestants, whose recovery for the "Church"

1 CR IV, Nr 2162, pp.125-126.
was the whole point of the exercise?

It was not enough to reply here that if the unity of the Church were to come to pass it would not be the outcome of any human effort, but of the working of the Holy Spirit in men's hearts, the answer to prayer,\textsuperscript{1} unexceptionable though the sentiment may be; Pious verbiage is here masking a confusion of thought. If the brand of Catholicism which Contarini was eager to champion to the Protestants was not in fact quite as near to Protestantism as he believed it was, was it not equally distant from the variety of Catholicism which was predominant in the Curia and which was, in chaste and exalted form, to find expression in the decrees of the Council of Trent?

Contarini's significance has nothing to do with demonstrating the illusoriness of the hope of reunion. It lies rather in the confusion of thinking from which he could not free himself. It lies in his failure to think through the consequences of his own critique of Catholicism.

He stood between two fronts, drawn inwardly now by the one, now by the other. His goal was the evangelizing of the Catholic as much as the catholicizing of the Evangelical. He had made his decision to stay within the Catholic camp, to work from within it for its inner renewal. But had he made himself clear as to the frontiers beyond which a loyalty to the tradition and the institutions would become betrayal to his goal? Had he decided whether his task was to reconcile Catholics and

\footnotetext{1}{\textit{D/R, p.314}.}
Protestants on a basis of "evangelical Catholicism", or whether it was to win back the Protestants to the existing Catholic Church? This one is inclined to doubt.

The result was confusion of thought. The result was that he allowed events to dictate to him, took the easier line of resistance - he was, after all, no youthful radical - and hence retreated under pressure behind the orthodox formulae and the hierarchical structures.

It is not being argued here that Contarini was "really" a Protestant. Nor even that he was not "einwandfrei katholisch". Simply that these terms in themselves do not help us much here, and that a too hasty readiness to use such labels obscures rather than illuminates the issues before us. We will be able to return to this subject after a closer examination of his actions and attitudes at Regensburg.

1 Jedin, Contarini, p.16.
CHAPTER 4

Prelude

On 11 March Contarini arrived in Regensburg. His journey from Rome had taken him through Florence, Bologna, Mantua, Verona and Trent. Everywhere he had been afforded the friendliest of receptions. In Trent he had at last received his Instruction from Rome. Then he had made his way through Germany by way of Brixen, Innsbruck, Rosenheim and Landshut, learning on the way that the emperor had already arrived at Regensburg but as yet none of the princes. *Punctuality, it appears, had not yet become one of the German virtues.*

What was this Germany to which Contarini came? This land with its dark suspicions of the foreigner and inbred hatred of the subtle Italian, the extortionate Roman. This land, courted through for two decades now by the backwash of religious dissent, by chaos, disorder and confusion, by elemental stirrings and frightful repressions, oscillating between benumbed apathy and volcanic dissent. This land where the inns stank, and ignorance fed on rumours, and the overworked few toiled to the limits of their strength and beyond them. Where faith became overnight a banner for disruption. This dangerous land...

This battleground of demonic fears and unparalleled creative energies, of plague, Turk and devil, and of humanism, Lutheranism and the new capitalism, typified perhaps by a Philip of Hesse,

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sensual, energetic, impatient with fools, crashing through his peasants' fields with his hunting companions, a stalwart defender of the Gospel, a devout reader of the Bible! Who possessed or was possessed of a passion mighty enough to embrace this land and people, to forge a faith which spoke to its needs and compassed its politics?

There were the humanists, swinging uneasily between radicalism and conservatism, there were the legally trained counsellors of the princes — secular in spirit and Lutheran in sympathy, there were the statesmen — the great manipulators — Granvelle, Carlowitz, Leonard von Eck, and there were, finally, the theologians.

First the Catholic theologians, a dwindling band, slighted and ignored and misunderstood, moving through a twilight world between reaction and reform, forced into perpetual polemic, battling alternately for their honour or their theology or their Church or their faith.

Then the Protestant theologians, a new race, aggressive, self-confident, the heirs of Luther. To whom the splendid defiance of Luther was becoming something self-evident, the protest a programme, the confession a possession. Who were losing the dialectical relationship to Catholicism, accepting Luther's faith without his doubt, his polemic without his passion, his certainties without his Anfechtungen. Increasingly encumbered by their achievements and lamed by their successes, tending to see the Word as a weapon against the Papists, the Bible as the quarry for a pharisical polemic.
These, then, were the men with whom Contarini would have to reckon. With them and with the princes spiritual and temporal of the land. With honourable and dishonourable exceptions the bishops were moderate men who sought to fulfil within reason the little that was expected of them, fettered by their anxieties and their conventions, more acted upon than themselves actors. The rôle they were to play was a minor one.

All important, on the other hand, were the temporal princes and the representatives of the cities. Here blend scepticism and confessionalism, political considerations and personal rivalries, an incipient nationalism and the blindest particularism, the desire for peace and the age-old tradition of resistance to pope and emperor. Here jostle together the militant and the moderate on both sides, alike alert to their own advantage. A motley group. And it was with them that not only the emperor but also Contarini would have to reckon.

Formally we can and must divide Regensburg into two parts. First the Colloquy at which the theologians attempted to come to grips with the theological problems. Secondly the Diet proper where the politicians dealt, inter alia, with the outcome of the theological discussions. The first stage is characterised by the attempt to arrive at a theological concord, the second by the more politically coloured concern to establish the limits within which tolerance could be exercised. The failure of the first stage – or at least the very limited nature of its success –
conditioned the form which the second had to take. It doomed the "grand design" to immediate and irrevocable failure.

For our purposes, however, this formal distinction is not the decisive one. The real turning-point comes long before the termination of the colloquy, namely in the failure to come to agreement on the nature of the Church. Up to this point one can speak of a qualified optimism, above all on Contarini's part, that a concord might after all be achieved. This optimism reaches its peak with the triumphantly welcomed agreement on the question of justification. Thus far Contarini's main interest was directed to the possibility of reunion — and therefore to the Protestants.

In the following period, which ends with Contarini's reception of Ardinghelli's despatch of 31 May, the legate was primarily occupied with the Catholics, and in particular with the emperor, first in the attempt to prevent the conclusion of a theologically impermissible concord, and then of an ecclesiastically unacceptable toleration project.

Thirdly and lastly comes the period in which Contarini's main concern was to defend himself and his actions over against the pope and the cardinals. Here his attention was directed primarily towards Rome. We can and must speak, therefore, of a progressive and necessary narrowing of his horizons. In the first stage we see Contarini's ecumenism, in the second his Catholicism, in the third his curialism. It will be our task
to see all these three aspects together, in their contrariety indeed, but also in the, to us, bewildering synthesis to which Contarini brought them. First, however, we must turn to the initial stages. To the period of qualified optimism. To Contarini and the Protestants.

We have spoken above of the high hopes which were coupled with the arrival of Contarini and his mission to the Diet. In the light of this the enthusiastic welcome he was accorded in Regensburg is understandable. Crowds lined the streets and, according to his fellow-countryman Francesco Contarini, the Venetian Ambassador to the emperor, cries of "Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domine" were heard as he made his ceremonial entrance to the city on the twelfth. Only the palm branches were missing, it seemed, to complete the Messianic atmosphere. Contarini himself remarked on the unexpected cordiality of his reception.

The audience with the emperor on the following day was

1 Francesco Contarini/Venice, 13/3/41, Ibid., p.154."...par che ogn'uno habbi un contento estremo della venuta sua".

marked by an equally friendly tone. Contarini expressed the papal pleasure at the emperor's convocation of the Diet to settle the religious discord and restore Germany to the "unity of the Church of Christ". In response to this imperial decision and the request of the emperor, the pope, deeply moved alike by the pastoral responsibility for the souls committed to him and by the need to unite Christendom against the Turk, had dispatched Contarini to Regensburg as his legate to the Diet.

Despite his inadequacy for such an undertaking, Contarini continued, he had been chosen because His Holiness knew how long he had yearned for an end to the disunity of the Church and hoped that "God, the author of all good, in the same wise as he had given me this desire, would also grant me the power to carry it into execution". A further ground had been the good personal relationships that existed between him and the emperor. Despite the great difficulties of the task he placed his trust in the wisdom of the emperor and the goodness of God, and promised his

1 Contarini took care to stress the extent of this goodwill to his superiors in Rome. A special despatch was devoted to the correction of a previous statement that he had been met at the city gates by the Bishop of Brixen due to the indisposition of the resident bishop. The latter, it appeared, enjoyed the best of health! It had been to do him the greater honour that Ferdinand's representative in the Tyrol, the Bishop of Brixen, had been assigned the duty of welcoming him! ZKG III, 151, n.1. "Inteso questo, non ho voluto tacerlo a V.S.Rma., perché sappia la verità d'ogni minutia et tanto più conosca il buon animo di questi Sri." He remarks similarly that prior to his audience with the emperor the latter came to meet him as far as the steps "et li humanissamente mi raccolse." Ibid., p.152.

2 "...alla unità della chiesa di Christo." Not, as Dittrich translates, "to the one church of Christ"; ("zu der einen Kirche Christi")! D/B, p.575.
full support to the former's endeavours, provided, of course, nothing was done contrary to the essential points of the faith, among which he mentioned in particular the status of the Apostolic See. 1

The emperor replied courteously, expressing the hope that the pope would be zealous in promoting the cause of peace as he (the emperor) had been in promoting that of the Church, 2 and exhorted the papal representatives to concerted action, having no doubt in mind the experience of Worms, where Campeggio and Morone had been frequently at odds. 3

Morone, the newly appointed nuncio to replace Poggio, unexpectedly recalled by Rome, now presented his credentials. His appointment could hardly have been expected, after Worms, to be welcomed by the emperor. Its purpose, after all, was almost certainly to provide a more reliable foil to the conciliatory legate than the more irenic Poggio. 4 The departure of the latter was regretted by the emperor and, indeed, by the

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1 "...et della Sede Apca., la quale è annexa alle cose essenziali." ZKG III, 153.
2 A point of the emperor's speech which Dittrich has found it expedient to omit!
3 Cf. p. 38, n. 2 above.
4 Morone himself, however, deeply regretted Poggio's departure, largely, of course, because it meant that he would have to take his place, but he seems to have had no mean opinion of him, describing him as much better fitted for the task than himself (assai più atto di me). ZKG III, 612.
whole court, and Contarini himself would have gladly retained him in Regensburg had he not been hamstrung by his Instruction which prevented him from taking any independent decision of this kind. Morone, for his part, was reluctant in the extreme to take up the new post, although Contarini had the highest opinion of him. For the moment, however, his fears that his relationship to the emperor would be an extremely difficult one were dispelled by the gracious welcoming words of the latter, and the audience ended on this cordial note.

The city, meanwhile, was full of rumours. Would the Electors and princes actually arrive, and if so, when?

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1 "La partita del Nuntio Poggio, come è stata inopinata, così dispiace a tutta la corte et non si potrebbe dir, quanto la sentono..." Ibid. He would have been the right person to have established, "un armonia et concerto buono tra la Ces. Maestà et soi Ministri et il Rmo Legato et me" wrote Morone on 23 March. D/R, p.159. On the same day Poggio left Regensburg, "con tanto bon nome da questa Corte, che non e homo che non li dogli la partita sua fino al core." Francesco Contarini/Venice, Ibid., p.160.

2 "Ambedui (i.e. Morone and Poggio) certamente sono qui in questa Dieta necessarissimi et, se non fusse, che debbo et voglio deferir il tutto alla sapientia di sua Bne.,...io havrei usato presuntione di retener Mons. Poggio et darne avviso a sua Sta. et aspettar la risposta..." ZKC III, 155.

3 "Persona tanto prudente, ben qualificata et buon servitore di N.S...." Ibid., p.156. Throughout the Diet Morone and Contarini worked together with the utmost harmony.

4 "Sua Mta ... accettò allegramente et con optime parole il R. Vesc. di Modena..." Ibid., p.155.

5 Speculation centred above all on the possibility of the attendance of the Elector of Saxony, without whose presence Morone considered no reunion negotiations could be entered upon - "senza il quale non si potrebbe far trattato alcuno di concordia." Ibid. p612.
it true that Granvelle had won over some of the leading Protestants? Was Rome really in earnest, and if so why had she sent an ambassador without any authority to conclude any agreement? Would the offensive of the Turks now milling round Buda and Pest in Hungary reach critical proportions? Above all, what were the prospects for a successful outcome to the re¬union negotiations?

The new Legation had begun under reasonably favourable auspices. The fair words on both sides could, however, be no more than a very precarious bridge of confidence between Empire and papacy. Behind them lay the sceptical undertones of Contarini's Instruction with which only Morone had been acquainted, but as to whose tendency the Imperial Court would have had few illusions. Only a few days previously Farnese had forwarded to Contarini a memorandum "di bonissimo loco" which he commended to the legate's attention. This insinuated that the emperor had come to believe that he must either forfeit the allegiance of Germany or abandon the Apostolic See, and that he had accordingly come to the Diet with the fixed intention to settle affairs in Germany whatever the cost might be to religion. Under such circumstances, warned Farnese, the utmost

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1 Morone/Farnese, 10/3/41, Ibid., pp. 610-611.

2 "...con intention di serrar' l'occhio ad ogni cosa per quietare et accordare la Germania", pursuing solely his own interests "...senza mirare ad altro, et che lui proprio si ve decondotto a termine, che gli bisogna o perdere la Germania, o la sede apostolica." NB I, vii, 15, n. 2.
caution was called for. Above all, Contarini should avoid making any rash promises to the Lutherans as had been the case at Worms.(!)¹ For the danger existed that the presence of the legate could be interpreted later as a legitimation for the concessions that the emperor would make under the plea of necessity.² Morone, the professional sceptic, was satisfied, however, on at least one count. Whatever happened, Contarini, with his upright, free, and open way of thinking, would never be partner to any questionable settlement, and if the schemings of the ministers threatened to move in this direction the favour which he had already won on all sides would stand him in good stead, and his influence would be instrumental in convincing the emperor and many of the other Catholics to oppose such a fatal course.³

It was only to be expected, however, that from the outset the legate, as a key figure in the coming negotiations, would be subjected to pressure from the interested parties, and this in fact occurred. With one significant exception. That of the Protestants. And here we must qualify the statement that in the first period of his Legation Contarini was primarily concerned with the Protestants. Prior to the opening of the Diet

¹ Perhaps a reference to Campeggio's speech of 8 December?
³ Morone/Farnese, 12/3/41, ZKG III, 612.
this is not the case. For the latter had not yet arrived at Regensburg when the legate entered the city, and the majority would not do so until the end of March or later. The sole significant personalities present at Regensburg when the legate arrived, apart from some of the bishops, were the emperor himself, the Dukes of Bavaria, and the Duke of Brunswick, and it was with the controversy that had sprung up between the emperor and the Dukes - that is, a dissension within the Catholic ranks - that Contarini's first diplomatic engagement was concerned.

The emperor was determined that this time a peaceful settlement must be arrived at. For the sake of Germany, for the sake of the defence of Christendom against the Turks, for the sake of the unity of religion and the consolidation of the Habsburg Empire and, by no means least, of solidarity against France.

The Bavarians, with their ally Braunschweig, were equally determined to do their all to prevent such a settlement. Primarily from political motives. A scheme so favourable to the interests of the Habsburgs, the traditional rivals of the Wittelsbachs, must necessarily be viewed with scepticism if not dismay. Any consolidation of the Habsburg power must per se be detrimental to Bavarian interests. This political opposition found its theological rationalisation in the dour reactionarism of which Johann Eck was the unparalleled master,
although it would be a mistake to attribute the Bavarian anti-Protestantism to purely political motives.

This clash of interests found its immediate expression in a battle for the favour of the papal legate. Granvelle, Morone thought, was quite sincere in his belief that a concord could be gained without any prejudice to the interests of the Holy See, and he had done his best to assure the Chancellor that he, too, like his predecessor Poggio, desired nothing more than the peace of Germany, provided, as always, the interests of the faith and the papacy were not put in jeopardy. Granvelle certainly spared no efforts to convince the papal representatives that there was ground for optimism about the success of the colloquy and to assure them "...con quanta affectione la Ces.a M.ta et egli si fossero affaticato al bene della Christianita et alla conservatione della Sede ap.ca." ¹

He continued also to urge that Rome despatch the money needed to win over the Protestants. There is for us perhaps no more baffling and intriguing feature at this stage of the events at Regensburg than the apparently genuine conviction of Granvelle that many of the Protestant theologians were hesitating in their allegiance, and might well be brought over to the Catholic cause by the timely distribution of a judicious quantity of hard cash. Bucer had already been won

over by him at Worms, he assured Morone, and there was hope that Melanchthon would also be gained. Of the South German cities Strassburg, Nuremberg, Augsburg and Ulm would be recovered for the Apostolic See. The whole Protestant front, he implied, was crumbling! ¹

This indeed was the vivid, if somewhat apocalyptic and eccentric picture of the state of events which he gave to Contarini on his first visit to the legate after the formal courtesy call. Everything was tending towards ruin. Protestantism, having spread throughout Germany, was now infiltrating into Italy, France and other countries, and the Catholics instead of reacting effectively in face of this crisis were almost all purely self-interested.

But if, on the one side, the danger was great, there were also real signs of hope if the situation were firmly tackled. The Lutherans were divided among themselves, and their followers were becoming increasingly discontented. They saw the consequences of the unbridled way of life which came in the wake of the new teaching. In the cities, moreover, the despotic methods by which Protestantism was enforced had aroused the resentment of the burghers. By now, too, the doctors and

¹ Contarini/Farnese, 18/3/41, Ibid., p.159. Granvelle declared "che non bisognava m'affaticassi per guadagnar il Bucero, perché già era guadagnato, et fin a Vormatia haveva concluso, con lui, ma per timor non si scopriva. Et fu similmente in speranza poter guadagnar il Melanchthone; ma per esser l'Elettore di Sassonia sospettosissimo et il Melanchthone timido essendo già stato due volte vicino alle carceri per simil sospizione, non haveva possuto stringer la pratica...et che sperava fra pochi giorni guadagnar tre altri capi di molta importanza..." Morone/Farnese, 21/3/41, HJ IV,439.
theologians were in constant fear, afraid both of the consequences of continuing in their misguided ways and of the revenge of their misled laity should they confess their errors. For them the coming of Contarini would be a welcome escape since a submission to him would not involve the loss of face which a concession of defeat to the German Catholic theologians would have meant!

The whole amounted to a total misreading of the religious situation. How far Granvelle was aware of this, and consciously raised the hopes of the papal representatives in order to make them more amenable to the proposed settlement, is not clear. The possibility, at any rate, that he was partially convinced by his own rhetoric cannot be left out of account. It is at least clear that for him the primary need was the restoration of order. This was the sumnum bonum to which all his energies were directed. And for the sake of this a certain flexibility on both sides would have to be exercised on issues such as that of the church properties and the theological questions which were not of central importance.

Were the differences, after all, continued Granvelle, really so great? The Protestants recognised the real presence of Christ in the sacraments. Could not the question of transubstantiation be left to the coming General Council to decide? As to the papal primacy there would be no difficulty. The Protestants had said they would return to the episcopal obedience
and the bishops to the pontifical, and even the question of the church properties, with the exceptional case of Württemberg excluded, could be equably adjusted, although it would, of course, have to be a stage by stage procedure. The majority of the incomes had been applied in any case to "pious" purposes. So there seemed no ground for fear about the success of the concord. Contarini could rest assured that he would be consulted at every stage of the proceedings and that nothing would be done without his approval. He himself would be ready to report to the legate in person "come a presidente".¹ If in a rational and friendly way goodwill could be built up there would be no undue difficulties either with the modus procedendi.

There was, in any case, as Granvelle a few days later emphasised, no alternative! The Protestants were every bit as much Germans as the Catholics and equally bellicose. The emperor lacked the resources in men and material to crush them militarily, and even if he had them it would be a highly hazardous undertaking with the Turks and the French lurking as possible allies to the Protestants on the sidelines. This was, finally, no way to win the souls of the Protestants! "...et si havesse la vittoria contra Lutheranì, per questo non sarebbero salve le anime..."² There was, indeed, only one way left, a peaceful solution! A failure at Regensburg would be the ruin of the German nation.

¹ ZKG III, 159-161, 626.
A very different tune was payed by the Bavarian Dukes and by their allies the Duke of Braunschweig and the Archbishop of Mainz. The latter had arrived on 31 March. To them it would be the "success" of the colloquy that would spell the ruin of Germany. First before Morone and then with the arrival of Contarini before the legate himself the Bavarians had polemicized in the most vigorous language against the proposed colloquy.

The stance they adopted was that of loyal Catholics, appalled by the steady spread of Lutheran doctrines and practices throughout the land. For this, they were convinced, the past leniency of the emperor was responsible, and it was time that a lesson was drawn from this sorry history. The only remedy was to take a firm stand. It was a futile waste of time to continue the colloquy begun at Worms and Hagenau, and a solution by means of a General Council was only a theoretical possibility. The time had come for action and not for words! The emperor should in all form declare his will to enforce the Augsburg Recess, and the Catholic rank would then close behind him. For their part they were ready to sacrifice their goods, their sons, yea their own lives for the true faith and the Apostolic See!

1 Laemmer, pp. 359 ff.
2 "tempo gittato via..."! Contarini/Farnese, 30/3/41, ZKIII,165.
3 Ibid., p. 157.
4 Laemmer, p. 364.
The emperor, on the other hand, was even proposing to make a Lutheran prince, Duke Frederick of the Palatinate, one of the Presidents of the Colloquy! If the emperor persisted in this intention they would up horse and leave the Diet forthwith! If at all possible, it was clear, they were determined to prevent the colloquy from even getting off the ground. The so-called "modus procedendi" which they proposed for the colloquy made this abundantly clear. It simply called for the enforcement of the Recess of Augsburg! Such a basis for negotiations would, of course, never be accepted by the Protestants and was not meant to be. As Granvelle remarked it was nothing less than a provocation "...qual non e altro che dar principio alla guerra." The Duke of Braunschweig and the Archbishop of Mainz spoke in much the same terms the former lacing his professions of loyalty to the Apostolic See with vituperations against his old enemy Hesse who had arrived in the city on 27 March, while the

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1 "...se costui sia posto in quel luoco, essi montaranno a cavallo et si partiranno." ZKG III, 158. Frederick certainly had Protestant sympathies. Cf. his reaction to the legate's request that the negotiations be referred to him as papal representative as well as to the Diet. ZKG III, 625.

2 Ibid., pp. 164, 167 ff.

3 Ibid., p. 621.


5 Granvelle informed Morone, "che il Duca di Brunsvich si governa male contro il Lantgravio et non cessa etiam in questo loco di irritarlo con detti et scritti!" ZKG III, 620.
archbishop launched into a quite ungoverned attack on the emperor. Mainz had no hope at all of a successful outcome of the colloquy—"erit, erit dies non pacis, sed majoris discordiae"¹. Like the Bavarians he delivered himself of the opinion that Granvelle was receiving Lutheran bribes, but he went on to predict that if the emperor went through with the colloquy he would lose his reputation, be hoodwinked by Hesse—who really had not the least intention of converting—and, should no settlement be made, probably lose the Imperial Crown altogether—"...et che li principi di Germania faranno un altro Imperatore."²

A further voice in the chorus of despond was the French one. The two French ambassadors at Regensburg, one assigned to the Catholics, the other to the Protestants, counselled their respective partners to stand fast by their positions and oppose the work of concord. Dandino, the papal nuncio to the French court, informed Contarini at the end of March that Francis already had the assurance of several German princes that they would oppose the Imperial plans, for they feared that when a settlement had been achieved the emperor would then turn his power against them. The French court regarded the proceedings at Regensburg, he continued, with anything but enthusiasm.³ The real ground for the dismay was transparent enough. A strengthening of the Imperial position

² Morone/Farnese, 6/4/41, ZKG III, 625-626.
³ Morandi, I, ii, p. 128.
would be automatically detrimental to France. A united Germany would be a formidable opponent indeed! Francis recognised the danger, and acted accordingly. He warned Contarini to beware the dangers of an unworthy concord, to which the legate could only reply that he would rather surrender his life than assent to anything contrary to the weal of the Church, "...che io non sono mai per consentir a cosa, la quali non mi pare honesta et al servitio di Dio et di sua santa chiesa. Et prima che far altramente vi lassarii la vita."¹

Such professions, of course, altered nothing. Throughout the Diet Francis sought to spread scepticism about the outcome of the Diet, not only among the Protestants and Catholics at Regensburg but in Rome itself. All the more understandable the bitterness of the emperor at the large number of French Cardinals created by Paul. There were as many of them at the French Court, he declared, as ordinary clergy at the Imperial.²

Nothing could be more fatal to Charles' plans than an ascendancy of French influence in the Curia. Nothing could be calculated to further France's interests better than a discrediting of the conciliation work being undertaken at Regensburg, and if necessary of the legate whose task it was to represent the papal interests there!

² "Fu poi detto de' Cardinali Francesi, et sua Madre disse: in Corte die Francia li Carli vanno come qui li Clerici." ZKG III, 163.
Again the conflict of interests is clear enough. Contarini's daunting task was to find a way through the maze of intrigues and pressures that surrounded him without losing the confidence of either of the wings of the Catholic party. On the one hand he dare not forfeit the sympathy of the emperor. To retain this was the whole point of his mission! On the other hand, he could not simply rebuff the Bavarians and their allies, the stoutest supporters of the Curia in Germany.

His only option, therefore, was to adopt a neutralist policy, and his tactics in the pursuit of this aim were as deft as they were successful. On the whole he managed to hold himself apart from the controversy, while seeking by his mediatory activity to gain the good will of both sides. On behalf of the Bavarians, for example, he raised with Granvelle the question of the status of Duke Frederick in the colloquy, and was able to assure them as a result that the latter's function would be purely that of reporter to the emperor and Diet on the work of the collocutors, and that it would have no theological or political significance.¹ On the other hand, he and Morone promised Granvelle to do their best to influence the Bavarians to

¹ Ibid., p.161.
Morone remained true to his fundamental scepticism. All the parties, he believed, used religious goals only as a pretext for the pursuit of their own private interests. He fully approved of Contarini's cautious handling of the Bavarians. Their warlike aims would have to be restrained. He had even heard recently that they were planning an alliance with Cologne, Cleves and Braunschweig, France and their old enemy the Duke of Württemberg - ostensibly for the defence of the faith. On the other hand their belligerence could well be a useful foil to the over-conciliatory tendencies of the emperor "...come essi hanno bisogno di freno a ritirarli dalla guerra, qual sarebbe dannosa, così la Ces.a M.ta et li altri hanno bisogno di freno per esser ritenuti dalla concordia, qual per troppo bisogna et desiderio protrebbe (sic) farai di mala sorte."  

Contarini, while assuring Rome and his other correspondents that he would do all he could to further the concord, also took a very sober view of the situation. There was no one, or

1 "Et mi (Morone) pregava, volessi far officio per moderar lui et anche gli Ducì di Bavera, il che in parte ho fatto, essendo in vero cosa enorme in tutti gli modì proceder per queste vie d'inguirie." Ibid., p.620. Contarini wrote to Farnese "Considerì mo V.S. Rma et N.S. et ponderì, con quali cervelli have-mo a fare, et sono però tutti Cathci et sono accordati in quello articolo de peccato originali et costui già li ha fatta un'opera contra. Dio ci adjuti, che iu (sic) lui solo certamente dovemo sperare." 16/3/41, ZKG III, 156. (The reference in D/B,p.579,n.4. is incorrect.)

2 Morone/Farnese, 17/3/41, ZKG III, 613-616.
hardly anyone at Regensburg, he wrote Farnese, who served God with a pure heart. He carefully avoided a head-on confrontation with either party however. When the Bavarians, on ostensibly dogmatic grounds, argued against the Colloquy, he countered by pointing to the purely pragmatic arguments which made an outright rejection of the colloquy by Catholics seem an unwise move. If, he argued, the Bavarians were right about the motives of the Protestants - which he was well ready to believe - then the colloquy was bound to fail anyway. Would it not in this case be better to lay the blame squarely on their shoulders? Let it be the obstinacy of the Protestants that evoked the wrath of the emperor and the general opprobium! There could, after all, be nothing more calamitous for the Catholic cause than the impression that the pope had sent his legate to disrupt the colloquy, or that the Catholics were ashamed to "give

1 "In verito, Mons. Rmo, non ci ed homo, overo sono molti pochi, che servino Dio di bon cuore." Contarini/Farnese, 30/3/41, Ibid., p.166. His estimation of the motives of the Bavarians was at all events harsh enough, "Questi Duchi die (sic) Ba-vera, vedendo, che il lantgravio sia fatto grande et così lDuca di Saxonia et expilano molte città, essendo capi di Lutherani, così vorrino essi farsi grandi con l'arme, essendo capi Catholicci, et, non havendo un quatrino, pensano di far la guerra con li denari di N.Sre et delli Clerici di Germania... Dio per sua bontà li ponga la mano", he continues, "che certo qui in Germania io vedo poco di bono ne mi meraveglio, che li populi siano in questa confusione, essendo nelli capi seculari et ecclesiastici et nelli Religiosi quelle conditions, ch'io vedo, nec alia." Ibid.; Contarini/Pole, 22/3/41: "Vos ut recor, iam fruimini veris amoenitate et nos adhuc versamur in algoribus; vos invicem servatis animi pietatem, apud nos friget pietas et religio." D/R, Nr 627, p.159.
reason for the faith that is in them" (...che noi Catholici diffidassimo della nostra causa fuggendo la luce) They could be confident that he would rather give up a thousand lives than surrender one article of the truth.¹

At all costs, as he tried to convince the Duke of Braunschweig, the impression must be avoided that on the Catholic side anything has been left undone which might promote concord. But this concern to preserve the good image of the Church must be balanced by a determination to avoid even the slightest deviation from the truth.²

On the particular question of the modus procedendi he spared no praise for the concern which the Bavarians had shown for the faith or for their loyalty to the Holy See, but quietly declined to take the initiative himself in requesting the emperor to make the enforcement of the Augsburg Recess the precondition for the coming negotiations. He even departed from his usual practice and brought forward the moral consideration that a Christian should exercise clemency towards the Lutherans and not embitter them.³

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¹ "Poi li soggionsi, che facciasi qual Colloquio si voglia, prima io era per lassar mille vite, che ceder uno punto alla verità." Contarini/Farnese, 30/3/41, ZKG III, 165.

² Reporting to Farnese on an audience which he gave to the Duke of Braunschweig, Contarini writes that he answered him in the same way as the Bavarian dukes, "cio e ch'è da haver gran rispetto, che non para che da noi manchi la concordia, per la quale dovemo far' ogni opera senza pero partirci in un punto da quell che sia guisto et honesto..." 26/3/41, D/R, Ined. Nr. 57, p. 318.

³ Morandi, I, ii, p. 200.
The main thrust of his concern, however, was to demonstrate to the Dukes and their councillors that he understood, appreciated, and even, to a large extent, shared their position. He never tired of protesting, as to the Archbishop of Mainz, that for him there could be no question of compromise on the essential matters of the faith, and that any proposed change in the liturgical and disciplinary sphere would require the most careful scrutiny. Otherwise it would simply spark off worse schism and disorder than before. He had, he pointed out, been given no commission from the pope to grant any concessions to the Protestants. Support for the colloquy in no way precluded concern for orthodoxy.  

Contarini had no more illusions as to the political motivation for the "orthodoxy" of the Bavarians than Morone, and his own sympathies lay far more with the emperor than with such "hotheads." He had to cover himself, however, against the possibility that the emperor would embark on a dubious course, in which case the backing of the rigorists would be his sole support - "Imperoché, quando Cesare volesse tender a

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1 That it was necessary for him to protest in this way his concern for orthodoxy is illustrated by the request which Louis of Bavaria made to the Venetian Ambassador that he use his influence on the legate as a countryman and a relative to urge on him an uncompromising defence of "le cose della religion." Francesco Contarini/Venice, 26/3/41, D/R, Nr 641, p. 161.

2 "Ma certamente il negoziar con questi cervelli è difficillimo et ben ho bisogno dell'adjuto di Dio, nel quale spero, che non mi mancherà," with reference to the Bavarians. Contarini/Farnese, 16/3/41, ZKG III, 158.
via non buona, potrò molto valermi dell'autorità loro et altri Catholi "1. And that the emperor would embark on such a course was, he knew, a distinct possibility.

While, then, to meet the Bavarians' dogmatic rigorism he had brought more tactical considerations to bear, in face of the primarily socio-political argumentation of Granvelle the legate moved on to the theological plane, the question of the real difference between the "Catholics" and the "Lutherans". He made use of the distinction here - so suspect to Morone at Worms! - between the essential and the non-essential articles of the faith. Even as regards the latter, he pointed out to Granvelle, their acceptance by the universal Church led us to believe, as Augustine said, that they rested on the institution of the Apostles. But as regards an article such as that of transubstantiation, an "articolo essentialissimo et certissimo" there could be no question of compromise. Even a Council - to which Granvelle had suggested the article be referred - could not alter the situation here. Admittedly the Protestants had begun by recognising at least the real presence of Christ in the sacrament, but from the Apology it appeared that their views had since changed. Here Contarini stood quite firm.

1 Ibid., p.157. As Contarini quaintly put it, "it seems to me that after the honour of God and of the faith the first thing for which we must have regard is the retention of our friends." Ibid., p.158.
On the more controversial question of whether the primacy of the papacy should be recognised as de iure divino he was prepared, however, to keep a discreet silence.¹

The Bavarian attempts to torpedo the colloquy from the outset failed, not least due to the diplomatic skill of Granvelle. It was the reticence of the legate, however, which had ensured that he remained to some extent above the contending parties, retaining the confidence of both. This neutralised to a considerable degree the danger to the Catholic and papal cause which the radical clash of interests between the conciliatory and the rigorist wings would otherwise have portended. At the same time it meant that the centre of this unity was precisely the papal representative. Contarini could have wished for no happier outcome. That, however, the task of steering between the two groups would require the utmost diplomatic finesse was only too abundantly clear.

It was not made any easier by a further factor which complicated and clouded the relations between Rome and the emperor - the so-called Colonna affair. This issue arose in the very first audience which the emperor granted the legate. It is a sobering reminder of the scale of values of the time that in the early period of the Diet Farnese's despatches to Contarini, as Dittrich points out, contained more about this minor

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¹ ZKG III,159-161. His handling of Granvelle in this discussion gained the full approbation of the pope. Farnese/Contarini,16/4/41,D/R,Nr. 676,p.169.
political disturbance than about the entire religious negotiations.  

Ascanio Colonna, one of the emperor's most loyal supporters in Italy, had already rebelled in 1539 when throughout the Papal States the salt tax was raised. In 1541 he proceeded to armed reprisals when the papal officials made to enforce the new tax and when he was summoned to Rome to answer for his conduct, he refused to appear. All attempts at conciliation by the Imperial ambassador in Rome, the Marchesa d'Aquiliar, were abortive and a papal army under Pier Luigi set out to enforce obedience on the rebellious vassal. The pope was now demanding not only restitution and compensation for the damages inflicted by Colonna but also satisfaction for the outrage against his sovereignty. Colonna, he insisted, must hand over the fortresses Rocca di Papa, Nettuno and Palliano. Paul, it would seem, saw in the revolt a welcome opportunity for further territorial expansion.  

It was widely suspected in the French and in the papal courts that Charles was behind the whole affair, and intended to use it as a means to pressure the pope into agreeing to his projected settlement of the religious question in Germany.  

1 D/B, p. 593.  
3 Morandi I, ii, pp. 128 ff.
Whatever the truth here may be, the exacerbation of the relations with the emperor was acute, and Contarini was entrusted with the delicate task of securing from Charles a denunciation of Colonna's actions. The emperor did indeed disassociate himself from this open flouting of the papal sovereignty, but begged that Paul, for his part, would temper his justice with clemency.¹ It was, in itself, but a minor incident. It illustrated, however, luridly enough not only the incompatibility of the interests of pope and emperor in Italy, but also the lack of any real basis of confidence between the two pillars of Catholic Christendom.

A more severe testing of this confidence and of Contarini's diplomatic ability was now, however, in the offing. Hitherto any radical disagreement had been avoided by a careful skirting on both sides of the most controversial issues—above all of the exact relationship of the authority of the papacy to the decisions to be arrived at in Regensburg. All had been shrouded in a haze of goodwill and vague promises.

Now, however, precisely this issue came to the fore. On the evening of the fourth of April the Bishop of Arras, representing Granvelle, his father, who was in bed with catarrh,

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¹ ZKG III, 152-155. "...(Sua MtÀ) supplicava sua StÀ, che li perdonasse, perché con li loro subditi li Principi non sogliono usar tutto quello, che possono," Ibid., p.154. On the sixth Granvelle renewed this plea that Contarini intercede with the pope to show clemency: "Havete inteso, con quanta modestia l'Imperatore ricerca et prega N.Sre per le cose del Sor Ascanio? Vi prego per honor di sua StÀ et per schifar molti scandalì, vogliate far quelli officij, che si spera." Ibid., p.625.
submitted to Contarini and Morone, for their information and approval, the draft for the Imperial Proposition which would be read at the opening of the Diet before the assembled Estates - or at least such of them as had by then arrived.¹

It was this draft which precipitated the first real brush of the legate with the emperor.

Contarini was present at Regensburg as the representative of the papacy, and it was his understanding of his duties in this capacity that led to the conflict. In the opening passages of the Proposition the presence of the papal legate was, admittedly, mentioned - in highly flattering terms to Contarini personally. Of the part, however, that the legate would play in the colloquy itself there was no mention whatsoever. This Contarini interpreted as an outrageous slight to the Holy See. It was simply stated that the results of the colloquy would be communicated to the emperor and the Estates. The legate and indeed the papacy itself, might as well not have existed! A further but subsidiary failing in Contarini's eyes was the lack of any adequate mention of the Augsburg Recess.² To this latter

1 ZKG III,620,169.

he immediately drew the bishop's attention, calling the Recess "un grandissimo fondamento nostro", and the bishop promised satisfaction on this count. His complaint was, in fact, referred by Granvelle to Duke Frederick and the Imperial Council and he was assured that in the German copy ample mention was made of the Recess.¹

On the crucial point - the mention of the legate - Contarini emphasised that here a quite fundamental point was at issue. It must be made clear that the decision on matters of religion pertained neither to laymen, nor to the Estates, but to His Holiness and his representatives.² He had, after all, come to the Diet at the express wish of the emperor, and the omission seemed to him an indignity alike for the pope and the emperor, who being personally present, should have taken care to mention the papal legate.³ At Hagenau and in the summons to the Diet this had been done. The desire not to exasperate the Protestants was no adequate ground. A courteous and friendly approach to the latter should not degenerate into pusillanimity.

¹ Ibid., p.170. Actually the mention of the Recess was of the briefest. "...dass ihre Majestät mit wohlbedacht zum Augsburger Abschied ohne Nachtheil, etliche guter Gewissen,ehr- und friedliebende Personen...erwählen und verordnen,die streitigen Artikel...zu examiniren..." CR IV,154.

² "...il guidicio delle cose della Religione non apertiene a laici né allo stato dell'Imperio, ma a N.Sre et alli soi representanti..." Contarini/Parnese, 5/4/47, ZKG III,170.

³ "Dipoi che a me parea grande indignità di N.Sre et di sua M.tà, che, essendo qui in persona, havesse rispetto di nominare il Legato Pontificio." Ibid.
This would be unworthy of the emperor and would only encourage the Protestants to further insolence. Friendliness must be complemented by a due gravity and dignity.¹

When the bishop returned with a negative reply from the Council to the effect that to avoid provoking the Protestants - who held that the pope could not act as an impartial arbiter since he had already condemned them - no further mention of the legate would be possible, Contarini heatedly retorted that this amounted to a breach of the solemn assurance that no prejudice would be done to the authority of His Holiness and of the Apostolic See. It was not a matter of his own personal honour. They could call him an ant for all he cared! But he knew very well that the pope would not rest content with an answer such as this.²

The no doubt somewhat shaken bishop retreated and reported this latest exchange to his father. Time pressed. Contarini decided with Morone to tackle the emperor himself on the subject before Mass, for immediately after the latter the Diet would be opened and the Address read.

¹ "Io li replicai, che laudava il proceder con Protestanti humanamente et con ogni charitá, ma non già, che la passasse in viltá, perché questo modo li faria più insolenti nè era degno di sua Móst; insieme si deve procedere humanamente, ma servar però ìe convenienti gravitá et dignitá." Ibid.

² "...hora vedo, che havete respetto a nominare un suo legato per non esasperar Protestanti: non so, quanta speranza possiamo haver di questa conservazione (of the authority of the Holy See) et che pegno ne habbiamo. All'ultimo poi io conclusi, ch'io per me me haveria fatto una formica nè cercava mia gloria alcuna, ma ben sapeva certo, che N.Sre restaria poco satisfatto, et consiñeci fine." Ibid., p.171.
Charles, after the usual exchange of civilities and a pious wish on the part of Contarini that the Holy Spirit would descend into the hearts of them all and also of the Protestants so that a genuine union would be attained, tried to defend the omission at first. The Protestants were like wild animals which could only be tamed gradually, he argued. Patience was necessary. Contarini repeated his previous arguments with some force, and eventually the emperor gave way and ordered Granvelle to alter the document accordingly.

The legate had carried his point. It was a significant diplomatic victory. Contarini had rightly seen the danger that the modus procedendi suggested by the emperor would have given tacit approval to the Protestant doctrine of the church: lay participation in the determination of matters religious, and independence from the magisterial authority of the Roman Church!

The emperor would have come to a tolerable agreement with the Estates on the religious question with no more than a formal gesture in the direction of the papacy. The colloquy and Diet would then have been conducted on the basis of Protestant

1 "...che questi Protestanti erano come animali fieri, li quali bisognava domesticare a poco a poco, sinché si li ponesse li freno." Ibid.

2 Granvelle took the alteration with ill grace. On Morone's attempt to thank him he replied "...non esser bisogno, che lo ringratij, perché l'Imperatore gli l'haveva commandato; benchè sia stata gran difficoltà a far la mutatione nel consiglio della Dieta, nel qual è presidente il Conte Federico Palatino, non perché habbino mal animo verso la Sede apostolica, ma perché quando hanno stabilite le loro cose, son difficili a mutarle." "Nondimeno io credo più tosto il primo" adda Morone. Morone/Farnese, 6/4/41, ZKG III, 625.
presuppositions! That the legate managed to avert this was no inconsiderable service to the papal cause.

The Diet was now set on a middle course which appeared to endanger neither the authority of the pope nor the conduct of friendly negotiations with the Protestants. Both the attempt of the emperor, or perhaps rather Granvelle, to bypass the papacy and that of the Bavarians and their allies to prevent the colloquy taking place at all had been foiled. Contarini could be well content with the success that his mediating policy had achieved thus far. The Diet was now ready to begin.
With a Mass of the Holy Spirit in the Cathedral on 5 April the Diet was formally opened, Contarini being accorded a more than honourable part in the service, due largely, it may be added, to the personal initiative of the Archbishop of Mainz.\(^1\) The legate interpreted this as an indication that he, as the papal representative, was accepted as a full member of the Diet.\(^2\) So closely intertwined were religion and politics that a liturgical arrangement could have the weightiest political consequences. It should be noted here also that there could be no question of the Diet being a neutral political occasion, a confessional no-man's-ground between Protestantism and Catholicism. It began in all form with a Catholic Mass. As far as the Empire was concerned the Protestants must still consider themselves as the outsiders, whose presence was tolerated for the

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1 A description of the service is given by Negri. ZKG III,633. In a letter to the Cardinal of Trent on the seventh Contarini praises the exemplary conduct of Mainz "...il qual mi fa tutte le demostrazione d’onorii et amore che sia possibile..."D/R,Ined. Nr.60, p.320. Contarini laid great weight on such ceremonial honours in the context of the German situation - "...essendo parso al Rmo legato essere in proposito in questi tempi haver simil officij...", and took care to express his cordial gratitude to Mainz through the medium of Morone. ZKG III,626. The emperor himself had been considerably more hesitant in this respect. He had requested Contarini to precede him to the Cathedral lest he, the emperor, be seen in the company of the legate. Ibid., p.627. He had advised him not to participate in the Offertory.Ibid., p.172. And on the legate’s ceremonial entrance into the city he had declined Poggio’s request that he go out personally to greet him.Poggio/Contarini,8/3/41,D/R,Nr.594,p.152.

2 Contarini/Farnese,5/4/41,ZKG III,172."Et è cosa notabile questa et non più usata,che li elettori habbino voluto,che il legato vada all’offertorio nella messa loro,quasi come participe nella Dieta. Il che non è senon di honor grande et autorità della Sede Apo."
moment, but who were definitely something less than full participants in its life and structures.

After the service the Estates then proceeded with the emperor to the Town Hall\(^1\) where the business of the Diet began with the reading by the Count Palatine Frederick, brother of the Elector, of the Imperial Proposition. Contarini remained meanwhile, on the emperor's request, in the church\(^2\).

The Imperial address rehearsed the endeavours of the emperor since the Diet of Regensburg (1532) for the settlement of the religious dispute, his attempts to have a Council convoked, his exertions against the Turks, and justified his long absence from Germany. It explained the purpose of the Diet and summoned the Estates to cooperate with the emperor both in the pursuit of a religious settlement and in the coming campaign against the Turks.\(^3\)

The Turkish situation was indeed at the moment quite unusually critical. Ferdinand seemed tantalisingly near to success. He held Pest on the East side of the Danube and his troops were besieging the Hungarian capital Buda (or Ofen) on the West bank. At the same time, however, came the news that the Turk was hastening to the relief of the besieged city. It was therefore crucial

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2 Ibid., p. 172.
3 CH IV, 151-154; Zeitschrift für Schweizer. Kg. XXVIII, 57-64.
for Ferdinand to snatch a decisive victory before the reinforcements arrived, and to achieve this he hoped to set out for Hungary on Palm Sunday, 9 April, at the head of 20,000 men.¹

The threat of a full-scale Turkish onslaught on the eastern flank of the Empire loomed over Germany throughout the summer of 1541. Hate and fear of the Turk was indeed one of the few cementing elements that still bound the Empire together. Of all the hereditary tasks of the emperor that of directing the defence against the Turks was the one most likely to gain the support and the understanding of the territorial princes. For advantageous as the Turkish presence might be to the Protestants as a factor inclining the emperor towards a conciliatory course, this ultimate enemy was a common one, and all knew that the threat was an ominously real one.

None, of course, more so than the border territories which were directly threatened, or had already suffered from the Turkish depredations - Hungary itself, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and Goerz - whose princes had already appealed to Contarini to intercede for them with the pope that the latter aid them in their struggle against the arch-enemy of the Christian faith.² Ferdinand himself made a similar plea to Contarini to intercede for papal subventions.³ Italy itself, of course,

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¹ DB, 590 ff; P. Heldrich, Karl V und die deutschen Protestanten... (Frankfurter historische Forschungen 5.6; Frankfurt, 1912), pp. 15 ff.

² Morandi, I, ii, pp. 132-134.

³ Morandi I, ii, pp. 135-136. It was, argued Ferdinand, a matter for the whole of Christendom. What was involved was nothing less than the defence of the common safety of Christendom, of religion, honour, security and the glory of God itself.
especially after Venice had made its peace with the Turk, was faced with the threat of a naval invasion by the Turks, and the pope, as Contarini pointed out, had to throw most of his resources into the preparations to avert this danger.¹

Only from the German Estates - Protestant and Catholic alike - could the resources in men and money be found to raise, equip and support an effective campaign in the East. Nothing clamoured more urgently for the settlement of the religious dispute than the need to deal with the Turkish threat. The dynastic interests of the Habsburgs, the defence of the integrity of the Empire, the ideological campaign against the infidel - all demanded that an end be made to the internal conflicts within Germany. The promotion of a certain minimum of trust or at least mutual toleration between the two confessions was the most urgent political task of the hour.² For while unrest and insecurity were of the order of the day the princes, and in particular the Protestants, would never vote away monies and troops which might well be needed for their own defence.

The situation was clear. Without a guarantee of their own security - which only a religious settlement or the granting of tolerance could give - the Protestants would refuse to grant the aids without which the Empire would lie wide open to Turkish

¹ Morandi, I, ii, 136-137. Contarini expressed his full appreciation of all Ferdinand's efforts for the welfare of "populi Christiani, quod praecipue constat in incolumitate Provinciarum, et Regnorum Maiestatis Vestrae" and promised to use his best offices with the pope.

² Thus the emperor to Contarini: "...le forze delli Turchi sono le nostre discordie; se noi fussimo concordi, non sariano grandi." ZKG III, 175.
depredations. The military situation thus exerted the most direct and brutal pressure on the emperor, limited drastically his freedom of manoeuvre, and placed a most valuable bargaining counter in the hands of the Protestants. With the leverage which they possessed by virtue of their "power of the purse" they could well hope to extract from Charles V concessions which in more favourable times he would never have dreamt of granting. To defend Christendom, it seemed, he would have to betray Catholicism! Would Christendom then remain Catholic at all, and if so how elastic would the interpretation of the latter term be?¹

Contarini realised as well as any one the intimate relation between a solution to the internal problems of Germany and the pursuance of the war against the Turks. When, therefore, the Bishop of Agria, sent to Regensburg on behalf of Ferdinand, told the legate he intended to advocate a postponement of the handling of the religious question in favour of the Turkish Contarini replied forthrightly that this could only harm his own cause. For until the religious problems were satisfactorily composed Germany would not be able to act effectively against the Turks.²

In fact, the Estates decided to leave the Turkish problem

¹ Note the vague terms employed by the Protestants in their reply to the emperor: "universa respublica christiana", "pro communi defensione christiani orbis." CR IV, 157 ff.

until later. \(^1\) Predictably enough they concentrated their attention first on the part of the Proposition which referred to the religious settlement. The emperor had there suggested the formation of a small number of "honourable and peace-loving persons" concerned for the welfare of the German nation, whom he himself would appoint, and whose task it would be to examine the disputed articles of religion with a view to finding an end to the controversies. The outcome of their discussions they would then refer to the emperor and the Estates for their decision, and also to the papal legate. \(^2\)

The Bavarian Dukes immediately raised the confessional issue by demanding - with the threat that they would otherwise leave the Diet - that the Protestant and Catholic Estates discuss the Proposition of the emperor separately. \(^3\) The purpose of this move was, of course, to hinder the development of a party of the middle which would straddle the confessional divide and steer the negotiations towards a compromise solution. They won their point. Granvelle was forced to capitulate. Procedurally, at least, the demarcation lines would be clearly drawn.

\(^1\) Contarini/Cardinal of Mantua, 16/4/41, D/R Ined. Nr. 61, p. 321.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 154.

\(^3\) ZKG III, pp. 174, 631.
As usual the Bavarians and the Archbishop of Mainz were assiduously spreading rumours — largely groundless — about Charles' intentions. The colloquy that the emperor was planning would, they asserted, be composed primarily not of theologians at all but of princes to whom a few highly suspect theologians such as Pflug and Cropper would be added. They hinted at dark schemes on the part of the emperor to turn over all the Church properties into the hands of a military order. More important than these allegations, which Granvelle promptly denied, and to which it is unlikely that the papal representatives gave much credence, was that dealing with the vital question of the participation of the legate in the colloquy.

In the German text of the Proposition they discovered a verbal distinction between the reporting of the colloquitors to the emperor and the Estates on the one hand "...ihrer Kais.Maj. auch Churfürsten, Fürsten und Ständen dessen Anzeigung und Bericht thun sollen, sich darauf desto besser haben zu entschliessen,..." and that to the legate, on the other, "...auch mit Päpstlicher Heiligkeit Legaten, vermöge des obgemeldten Hagenauischen Abschieds, zu communiciren." The distinction may in fact have been no distinction at all, but simply have arisen from the hasty last-moment

1 Ibid., p.630. At first the emperor does seem to have considered having laymen among the colloquitors. The Proposition leaves this possibility open, speaking only of "ehr-und friedlieben-de Personen". CR IV,154. Melanchthon, in his profoundly pessimistic letter to Brenz, utters a similar suspicion. Ibid., pp.147-148.

2 ZKG III,630-631.

3 CR IV,154.
appendage of the reference to the legate after Contarini's intervention on this matter with the emperor. Mainz, however, and an unspecified number of the other Catholics saw in the word "communicate" a minimalising of the legate's function and insisted that the same term be used in relation to the latter as to the emperor and the Estates, i.e. that the outcome of the discussions be "referred" to him. Contarini himself shared this concern. It was not enough that he as the papal representative be kept informed. The opinion and the consent of the Apostolic See must be sought.¹ In essence it was the same point that had been raised before. Would the Diet act autonomously in the manner of a National Council, or would the teaching office of the Holy See be the real and ultimate authority? Significantly the question was left unclarified throughout the duration of the Diet.²

The key point, however, was that of the appointment of the collocutors, on whom the main burden of finding a way to reconcile the theological differences would rest. Understandably the emperor wanted to keep the right to select them in his

¹ "...gli pare non esser satisfatto, quando sol si comunicasse con soa Rma Sria et non ricercasse il parer et consenso della Sede apoa." Morone/Farnese, 7/4/41, ZKG III, 631.

² The Protestants would never have tolerated a recognition of the ultimate authority of the pope. The presence of the legate could be tolerated, as John Frederick indicated in the Instructions to his representatives. Any claim, however, on the part of Contarini to be present "von des Papsts wegen auctoritave, als des Haupts der Kirche" must be rejected with all vigour. He was, be it noted, afraid that the Landgrave and perhaps some other Protestants might be ready to admit this claim. CR IV, 126.
hands, for on their "moderation" everything would depend. The Protestants, anxious to gain the Imperial good-will, had, after, some initial hesitation, given their assent to the whole project, leaving everything to the emperor's good judgement. A good tactical move.

The Catholics, on the other hand, were hopelessly divided in their counsels. Mainz expressed his profound mistrust of the whole scheme. The Protestants, he pointed out, had not the slightest intention of uniting with the Catholics. Indeed their aim was to win over the latter to their views! Even if an agreement did come to pass, they would refuse to recognise the authority of the Apostolic See, and the Estates would accordingly simply bypass the latter, and the emperor would be powerless to prevent this. Similar pessimistic statements were made

1 First they advocated a continuation of the exchange of views begun at Worms, which could then be followed by a colloquy on the lines suggested by the emperor, provided they were informed in advance of the names of the collocutors. CR IV, 159-160. Cf. Melanchthon/Theodorus. Ibid., pp. 150 ff. Then, on the emperor's request for full support for his plans they gave their consent, to show, so they said, their trust in his good intentions and desire to do all in their power to further the progress of the colloquy. Ibid., pp. 162-163. Dittrich's statement, "The Protestants raised all manner of objections and recriminations and assigned the whole blame for the regrettable conditions pertaining in Germany to their opponents" is an unusually grotesque exaggeration on his part. D/B, p. 601. The two replies of the Protestants on 9 and 12 April are, in fact, remarkably innocent of any acrimony. CR IV, 156ff; 162ff. His reference on p. 602, Anm. 2 should, of course, read A.a.O 631, not 531.
by Duke William of Bavaria to the papal nuncio.\(^1\) An index of the extent of the disagreements is that it was not until 12 April, a whole week after the opening of the Diet, that the Catholics could agree on an answer to the emperor. This requested for the Catholic Estates a voice in the nomination of the collocutors.\(^2\) The emperor being dissatisfied with this reply they finally agreed on the following day, albeit somewhat reluctantly, to commit the nomination of the collocutors to the discretion of the emperor, still requesting, however, the right to veto the Imperial nominations.\(^3\)

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1 Not, as Dittrich has it, in ZKG III,626 (D/B,p.602,Anm.1) but in Leemmer,p.369. The near identity of William of Bavaria's statement that the emperor would have to choose between breaking with the papacy and coming to terms with the Protestants with the warning transmitted by Farnese to Contarini "di bonissimo loco" confirms one's previous suspicions as to the provenance of this warning. NB I,vii,p.15,n.2.

2 CR IV,163-165; cf. Melanchthon's remarks about the opposition of the Bavarians, Mainz and some of the bishops to the whole project. CR IV,168. One of the principal reasons for the disunity among the Catholics was the traditional rivalry between the cities and the princes. The latter wanted to exclude the former, the more conciliatory group on the religious issue, from the deliberations on the Proposition, and eventually the Catholic cities made a quite separate submission to the emperor. Like the Protestants, they left to him the nomination of the collocutors. The Protestant princes had also to take care not to weaken the Schmalkaldic alliance by alienating the cities of their confession. In the work of smoothing out these rivalries - an added complication for the Imperial plans - Naves, who replaced Held as Vice-Chancellor in May, was to play an important rôle. Heidrich,pp.12 ff.

3 CR IV,165-166.
That it had come eventually to this positive answer was largely due to the exertions of the papal representatives. Morone, on hearing the allegations of the rigorists—which, of course, as far as the unlikelihood of any recognition by the Protestants of the papacy was concerned, were not without their basis in truth—brought the crux of the whole matter before Granvelle—the alleged intention to bypass the Holy See. With hitherto unparalleled vigour Granvelle rebutted the imputation. The emperor, he insisted, would never have countenanced a colloquy which would involve a break with the old faith. Nothing would be done without the knowledge of the legate and the consent of the pope. He himself would rather be transported to a life of destitution at the uttermost end of the earth than suffer any detriment of the authority of the Holy See. These protestations appear to have convinced the papal representatives that the risk involved in continuing their support of the colloquy was the lesser one. They needed no reminder of the dire consequences which a departure of the emperor from Germany without having achieved any settlement would have for the faith. Yet if the Catholics could not even agree on a reply to the Proposition failure seemed imminent. Some of the Catholics were already preparing to leave the city. Contarini and Morone, therefore, took the only course open to them and threw

1 Cf. Negri, ZKG III, 629. "Et se l'Imperatore parte di qui, ch'el non metta qualche buono assetto, che habbia excutione, actum est de tota Germania et forsi di altri lochi vicini."
all their energies into the attempt to remove the obstacles that lay in the way of a beginning to the negotiations. This meant in practice bringing their influence to bear on the Bavarian Dukes and on Mainz. Their response to Granvelle's appeal in this direction was certainly instrumental in making the colloquy possible. The flank attack from the papal representatives caught the rigorist party unawares and put an end to their resistance.

Thus Contarini and Morone distanced themselves, as they had intended, from the schemings of the Bavarians. In an audience with the emperor on 12 April Contarini established that the latter did, after all, intend to nominate theologians and not laymen as collocutors, though it appeared that he had toyed for a while with the notion of having a lay prince as a "neutral" moderator. On the delicate issue of peace with France — avoided thus far by the legate lest it be regarded as a red herring to distract attention from the colloquy — the emperor protested, pale with anger, that on his part no effort had been spared to bring it to pass. God would have to change the hearts of the others. The topic was not pursued any further. A tentative suggestion by Contarini that the emperor might take a personal

1 Laemmer, pp. 370-371.
2 Contarini was concerned to dispel any suspicion that "dal can- to nostro siano posti impedimenti alla concordia..." and the danger that "...tutti li disturbi, proceduti dalla Duchy di Bavera et altri, haveriano (i.e. the Imperial Court) attribuiti a noi come autori di quelli." ZKG III, 174.
3 Ibid., pp. 175-176.
initiative in restoring the true observance of religion in Germany found an equally cool reception. ¹

Holy Week was now well advanced and as a result the course of negotiations was temporarily suspended. "From the ecclesiastical point of view", comments Dittrich, "Regensburg presented in these days a strange spectacle, a picture of the most tragic dismemberment."² It was certainly not altogether edifying.

On Palm Sunday the emperor had worshipped with the Catholic Estates in the Cathedral. The Protestants, on the other hand, gathered, as was their daily wont, in Philip of Hesse's house to hear a sermon by Bucer. The legate participated in the service in the Cathedral but had to refrain, on the emperor's advice, from giving a solemn benediction or proclaiming the indulgence granted by the pope for the occasion lest he rile the absentee Protestants!³ And while the emperor and the legate retreated to a cloister to give a godly example of prayer and fasting to the other Catholics, and -indeed- to the

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¹ "Intrassimo in ragionamento della miseria di questa Provincia, dove non ci è più alcuna religione, extinti li divini officij nè più quasi segno di vera christianità, et a bon proposito dicendo io, che se Dio non desse grazia, che hora si facesse qualche bon principio, essendo commodo a sua Mta, che le sua presentia importaria molto alla executione et al fare, che nelli populi già desviate s'inducesse la Religione. Sua Mta disse, che non era possibile, nè dimostro di haver punto di tal pensiero." Ibid., p.176.

² D/B, p.605.

³ "Your Reverence will note", comments Negri, "to what a pass we have come". ZKG III,633.
Protestants\(^1\), Philip of Hesse and the Elector of Brandenburg partook of a meal on Good Friday itself, at which at least some of the company present partook of meat. The constant meetings and confabulations of the Protestant theologians raised the direst suspicions in the Catholics' minds. To many the licence which Hesse had gained to have Protestant preaching in his house seemed a betrayal of the faith.\(^2\)

Holy Week! What hope, many must have asked themselves, could there possibly be of an end to the schism if the two parties could not even pray together, could not celebrate together the central feast of the faith? What could all reasonableness, all goodwill, all humanistic moderation avail in the face of such unbridgeable differences?

Hopes were not, then, of the highest. Girolamo Negri, Contarini's private secretary, observed that the too tender concern of the emperor for the feelings of the heretics seemed to many Catholics to indicate a lack of warmth for the true faith. Bucer's preaching was an open scandal; Melanchthon was tirelessly producing new books, the latest a bestial polemic against the celibacy of the priesthood. The other Protestant theologians were developing a highly subversive activity among the people.

\(^1\) The personal religious observance of the emperor was above reproach: "...viene con tanta modestia et religion con tutta la sua corte, che un Monasterio de' frai Scapuzzini non sarea piu osservante." Ibid., p.635. Equally so that of the legate. At the end of the month he was still in the monastery, at least partly "...per dar buon odor di se a questi lutherani." Ibid., p.638.

\(^2\) Ibid., p.632.
All in all, he lamented, the state of Germany could not be worse. Although, on the other hand, the very desperateness of the situation might well catalyse the Estates into realising the urgency of the need for reunion!

Ever the optimist, the Bishop of Aquila felt that with the guiding hand of the emperor and the notable reception accorded on all sides to the legate it might be that God would pour into the minds of the dissidents some light so that they would return to the ways of the ancient, true and Christian religion. Contarini himself continued cautiously to hope for the best. "We are anxiously waiting for the outcome of this Diet," he wrote the Venetian Consul in Sicily, "(in the hope) that some worthy settlement may be found to the religious questions in this sorely taxed land. To bring this about His Majesty the Emperor is leaving nothing undone; thus I pray God, that He will bring it to a good end." Unlike his companions, who were longing to leave Germany, Contarini, wrote Negri, was ready to stay there twenty years if he saw any hope of recovering "this lost people."

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1 "Certo le cose sono molto intorbidate. Questa povera Alamagna è in un pessimo stato quanto alla fede di Christo et etiam al resto." ZKG III,629.

2 "Se queste cose procedessero in questo disordine, potrebbe esser che tutto attasse a far nascere qualche unione." Ibid., p.632.

3 Ibid., p. 624.

4 Contarini/Pelegrini Venier,14/4/41,D/R,Nr.674,p.169.

5 ZKG III, 634. He was reconciled to a long stay in Regensburg, "...perche le cose di Germania sempre son longhi..." Contarini/Bembo,26/4/41,D/R,Ined.Nr.63,p. 323.
The Protestants, for their part, were either very cautious about expressing optimism on the outcome of the colloquy or bleakly pessimistic. The Saxons in particular were in no conciliatory mood. For personal, political and theological reasons the Elector's Instructions to his representatives were rigorous in the extreme - even more sceptical about the Diet than the papal Instruction to Contarini!\(^1\) John Frederick's main concern was that there should be no weakening of the Protestant front, which, for the sake of God and conscience, must stand steadfastly by the Augsburg Confession, as had been decided by the Schmalkaldic League at Naumburg in November of the previous year. His own decision not to attend the Diet was in itself significant enough. For once there he was convinced that he would come under pressure from Granvelle to agree to a watering-down of the evangelical truth, as he feared Hesse might be. There must, however, be no yielding of the truth, not even on one single point, nor should any ambiguous formulae be admitted which the Catholics could interpret to their advantage.

This was, argued Frederick, no ordinary worldly transaction in which a certain "give and take" would be of the order of the day. Here God's Word was at stake - that is what the

\(^1\) The heresy decrees in the Netherlands, the threat to his relative the Duke of Jülich, his traditional opposition to the Habsburgs, his bitter enmity to Mainz all played a rôle here. Vetter, pp. 7 ff.
'foreign potentates' - a dig, no doubt, at the emperor - could not understand when they complained of the Protestants' hard-neckedness.\(^1\) It might be that the Catholics would make certain concessions, but they would always refer them to the final arbitration of the pope. But once this - the papal authority - was admitted, all the achievements of the Reformation could be whittled away stage by stage.\(^2\)

The purpose of the Diet for the Elector was therefore two-fold - on the one hand the Protestant cause would be upheld theologically and perhaps new adherents won, and on the other when it became clear that a concord was not to be achieved, the emperor might be moved to grant the Protestants a permanent peace. It was illusory to hope for a genuine agreement, for the papal household was not in the least inclined to give way to God's Word and Truth.\(^3\) Negatively the suspicion must be removed

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1 "...dass es mit Gottes Worts Sachen viel eine andre Gestalt denn mit prophanen Handeln hat. Denn in denen kann ein jeder seinen Rechten wohl entweichen; aber in jenen, wenn alle Artikel erhalten und nachgegeben sollten werde bis auf einen, der nöthig (wäre), und würde begeben: so steckt man doch eben so hoch in Beschwerung und Fahr der Gewissen als sonst." CR IV,127.

2 "...ob man uns gleich etwas einräumen wollt, so müsst es doch mit Zulassung des Papsts, als des Haupts der Kirchen, geschehn, und dargegen sollten wir alles, was wir aufgerichtet, und die übrigen Artikel der Doctrin fallen lassen, und zu ihnen wiederum treten." Ibid.

that the real concern of the Protestants was not the promotion of religion but of "...emporung und uffrur wider Kay,M."¹

The truth of the matter is that the leading Protestants never really expected that a concord would be achieved. To propitiate the emperor, to demonstrate that they did not shrink from the defence of their faith, and in the hope that they might win over the occasional Catholic to their side they had taken part in the discussions. Their main interest, however, lay more in the political realm, in the granting of tolerance. After polemizing against Rome for some twenty years they were hardly prepared to believe that, after all, no real differences existed! They welcomed the irenical spirit of the emperor naturally, but with a surprise not untinged by scepticism. "Imperator aperte nihil ostendit hostile, ut aliqui eius admiranda est in omni apparatu modestia, et in respondendo lenitas", wrote Melanchthon to Jonas at the end of March. ² It seemed, Melanchthon thought, that he was genuinely bent on a resolution of the controversies in a peaceful manner.³

Philip of Hesse, undoubtedly the leading Protestant personality at Regensburg, had, as we have seen, high hopes for himself, if not for Protestantism from the Diet. For the moment, however,

1 WAB IX, 320-322.
2 CR IV, 143.
he was in an exceptional, and exceptionally uncomfortable position. On the one hand, he had to convince the Schmalkaldic League that he had no intention of deserting their cause. On the other hand, he had to act in such a way that the emperor would agree to a quiet settlement of the bigamy question.

He was, of course, a key figure in Granvelle's 'grand design'. Hesse, with Brandenburg and some of the South German cities, would form, it was hoped, the core of a moderate Protestant party which would counteract the influence of the intransigent Saxons. No effort was spared, therefore, from the Imperial side to reconcile the differences between Hesse and Henry of Braunschweig, which threatened otherwise to plunge North Germany into civil war. And though - if we are to believe Contarini - his first audience with the emperor was not exactly cordial, this was no doubt at least partly dictated by the need not to scandalize the Catholics. He was accorded, however, the licence for Bucer to preach in his house, which, if one remembers that the Augsburg Recess was still in force could only

1 "Macedonici (Hesse) concionatores de suo domino etiam bene promittunt. Nidanus (Pistorius) nobis heri narravit, in hoc itinere Macedonem dixisse, se nec a confessione discessurum esse, nec passurum ut abstrahatur a foederatis." Melanchthon/Luther, 29/3/41, Ibid., pp.142-143.


3 "Fu poi il lantgravio il lunedì seguente all'audientia della Cesa Mtà, della quale non ho sino a qui inteso cosa alcuna particolare, senonchè l'Imperatore li fece pochissima dimostrazione di onore nè si mosse più d'un passo nè fece cenno di levarseli la beretta, il che fu notato da tutti." ZKG III, 164.

4 On the other hand Charles refused the request of the Elector of Brandenburg for the use of the Dominican church - and indeed the use of any church - for a service following the Protestant rite. Quirini, III, 254.
be regarded as a precedent of importance - as a licensing of heresy. In the same city as Diet, emperor and legate heretical sermons being preached daily with the explicit approbation of the emperor himself! Perhaps the first step towards a comprehensive policy of toleration? Hesse had even dared to set certain conditions - of a theological nature - for his presence at the opening Mass of the Diet, which, it is true, the emperor had rejected.¹

A new situation had arisen. Catholic faith and practice was no longer the self-evident basis of the Empire. It was now open to question - even, one might say, to bargaining. If next time Hesse's conditions were not so exacting, if Charles were not quite so unyielding...We have already noted the alarm of the Catholics at such prospects, and Mainz's warning that the hope of winning over such a 'slippery eel' as the Landgrave was illusory.² But could the emperor's will to gain the allegiance of a united Germany be reconciled with the demand for an unequivocal recognition of the papal authority?

Unequivocal was certainly hardly the fitting word for another of the key figures at the Diet - Joachim II of Brandenburg. The tragic disunity of Holy Week moved perilously near to the farcical when the Elector proceeded from the notorious meal on

¹ ZKG III, 628.
² Ibid., 626. "...l'Imperatore pensa haver il Lantgravio nelle mani, et ha una Anguilla,..." Laemmer, p. 369.
Good Friday to participating - with all apparent reverence - in the Catholic Mass on Easter Monday. An eloquent if ludicrous illustration of his ambiguous position! Contarini had urged the granting of his request to attend since it seemed more prudent and Christian to do so. And not to exasperate him! With the princes of Hesse and Brandenburg in their mediatorial position Melanchthon associates the towns of Strassburg and Augsburg, and although Morone’s impression that if they were permitted to observe communion in both kinds and to dispense with priestly celibacy they would leave the Schmalkaldic League and return to the Church was a typical misunderstanding they certainly constituted one of the most moderate groupings among the Protestants. Peaceful conditions were of course particularly desirable for their commercial activity.

We return then to the negotiations as they resumed after Holy Week. The agreement of the Estates to the emperor’s nomination of the colloquitors had paved the way for an immediate start to the colloquy as soon as Easter was over. Already on Easter Monday, 18 April, Granvelle came to discuss with the legate the next step - the choice of the colloquitors.

1 HJ I,366.
2 CR IV,578.
3 HJ IV,435.
The question of their selection mirrored the difficulties of the situation for the emperor. For their conclusions to carry weight they had to be representative personalities, recognised champions of Catholicism and Protestantism. It was clear therefore from the beginning that neither Eck nor Melanchthon could be excluded. If, on the other hand, a settlement, a breaking-down of the confessional barriers were to be achieved, then the moderate, conciliatory, liberal elements must predominate, of the calibre of Gropper and Bucer, the two architects of the Regensburg Book. The plan was audacious, and yet the only possible one - to harness reaction and liberalism in the one team and to hope that somehow they could be persuaded to pull together.

The final decision as to the choice of the collocutors lay of course with the emperor. Contarini, however, was kept in the closest of consultation, and indeed from this point on until the failure to reach agreement on the question of transubstantiation the legate participated in every stage of the development. This was only possible because of the mutual trust that now existed between Contarini and Granvelle, a trust that was certainly

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1 Granvelle did, it is true, hope for a while that Eck could be excluded. HJ IV, 430.

2 "...pensarò et il tutto comunicarò con voi", said the emperor to Contarini when the latter enquired about his intentions. ZKG III, 175.
not unlimited but one which made an alliance of forces possible.¹

Granvelle and Contarini discussed the likely candidates.² Cochlaeus, it was agree, lacked the necessary human warmth. Eck, whether warm or not, must, insisted Contarini, be included. The idea of having a lay prince present to act as arbiter was quietly dropped. It would, however, still be necessary to have a president, and it seems that it had been even thought at one time of appointing the Archbishop of Mainz to this post!³ A more recurrent proposal was that Contarini himself should preside.⁴ Granvelle believed, that, were it not for fear of their princes, the Protestant theologians would have had no objection to this.⁵

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¹ Dittrich's talk of a 'change for the better' in Granvelle's intentions—in any case a rather strange phrase for a historian— is, however, quite gratuitous. (D/H, p. 607). Presumably we are to understand by this moral improvement a closer approximation to the papal position. Granvelle remained, however, here as ever, the professional. His task was to win over the legate to full support for the Imperial policies. That he brought to bear assurances of the complete loyalty of the emperor to the pope in order to achieve this end was scarcely a departure from his previous practice, and still less an indication of a 'change for the better'. HJ IV, 366.

² HJ I, 365-367.

³ Vetter suggests, as is possible, that this suggestion came from the papal representatives. Vetter, p. 71.

⁴ ZKG III, 625. Morone pointed to the precedent of Worms where Campeggio had been present at the deliberations.

⁵ HJ I, 365. The text, as Pastor remarks, (Anm. 6) is obviously corrupt here. Dittrich is in two minds as to how it should be translated. In the Regesten (Nr. 680, p. 171) he interprets it as meaning that, albeit unwillingly, the Protestants would accept Contarini out of respect for the wishes of their princes, in the biography (p. 607) that they themselves would gladly accept Contarini but dared not express this because of fear for their princes. The latter is probably the correct translation, being in accord with Granvelle's oft-expressed view that it was out of craven fear about possible reactions that the Protestant theologians tended to be so inflexible.
Granvelle, if he was sincere here, failed to see that for the Protestants admiration of Contarini as a person would in no way have been sufficient to lead them to waive their objection to his presiding over the colloquy in his status as papal legate. As it happened, nothing came of the suggestion.

On 21 April the emperor announced the names of the colloquitors. Predictably Eck and Melanchthon, Gropper and Bucer were among those named. The number was completed by the bishop-elect of Naumburg, Julius Pflug, and the Hessian preacher Pistorius. Three Catholics and three Protestants. The terms in which their function was described were almost identical with those in the Proposition. They would be purely advisory, and, as Melanchthon wrote, the aim was not a disputation but a conciliation. Of the legate and the papacy, however, there was no mention at all, an omission afterwards explained away by Granvelle as a mere scribal error. The desire to avoid a possible altercation with the Protestants is a more likely ground. As Presidents would

1 The exemplary conduct of the Cardinal, wrote Negri, made the Protestants 'curdle'! (cagliano) ZKG III, 633.

2 CR IV, 178-179; Contarini/Bembo, D/R, p. 322; ZKG III, 639. In his 'Historia' Melanchthon wrote: "...Imperator ostendit se paucos delecturum esse, non ut sententiae inter se pugnantae defendentur, sed ut quaeerentur quae dogmata conciliari possint. Ac ne quid periculi esset ex hac deliberatione partibus, praefatus est velle se non teneri quenquam his deliberatis, nec vim ea praebente habere, sed omnia rursus ad consilium principum referenda esse." CR IV, 330.

3 HJ I, 367.
function Granvelle and Count Frederick of the Palatinate and six lay witnesses were added whose duty it was to exercise a calming influence on the theologians.¹

The Catholic doctors, noted Negri, were all able men, independent of any man’s favour, whether that of the pope or the legate or the emperor.² This had its grain of truth. Eck, for example, certainly cannot be regarded as a mere protégé of the Bavarian dukes. On the other hand there can be no denying his dependence upon them. The opposition of the latter to the colloquy had, after all, almost prevented his presence at Regensburg at all.³ The enthusiasm of the Ingolstadt theologian for the colloquy had no Erasmian or irenical basis. He saw it rather as an opportunity for him to collapse the whole Protestant edifice by his rhetoric and scholarship. It in no wise contradicts therefore his usual intransigency.⁴ He came to Regensburg, however, only when he was

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¹ “...acchi questi altri 6 Doctori non vengino alle villanie et perdino tempo in cose impertinenti.” ZKG III, 636. They had been added at the request of the Protestants (CR IV, 179) and Negri suspected them all of Lutheran sympathies. Melanchthon’s hope was that they would exert a favourable influence for the Protestant cause on the emperor. CR IV, 331. They were Heinrich Hase, Franz Burckhard, and Johann Feige, the chancellors of the Palatinate, Electoral Saxony, and of Hesse, Count Manderscheidt, Eberhard Rude, the Steward of the Archbishop of Mainz, and Jacob Sturm, from Strassburg.


³ “Cur autem non vocer Ratisbonam, miror: iniusus non venio.” Eck/Farnese, 1/4/41, D/R Nr. 643, p. 162.

⁴ A justified intransigency? Lortz, II, 92. “Es würde sehr schwer halten, Eck’s Intransigenz für die vierziger Jahre als wesent- lich verfehlt zu erweisen.”
instructed to do so by the Bavarian dukes. The decision of the latter to invite him was, as Dittrich surmises, probably influenced by Contarini and the emperor.\(^1\) The dukes knew well enough, however, that his presence would hardly be calculated to improve the chances of arriving at a peaceful settlement.

Surprising, at first sight at least, is the relatively high estimate which Contarini had of Eck,\(^2\) although he had, of course, the advantage of not knowing him very well. Eck was also, however, in his way a reformer, a scholar, a fighter for the Catholic cause, and had been in constant touch with the legate in the past few months. The comparatively cordial contacts between the two men should warn against too hasty judgements either about the spuriousness of Eck's concern for 'religion', or about Contarini's understanding of the latter. The traditionalism of the legate should not be underestimated. In view, of course, of the catastrophic dearth of able Catholic theologians in Germany he could, on the other hand, hardly afford to be over-selective in his choice of allies. Of the other two Catholic collocutors, Cropper and Pflug, Cropper was without doubt the better equipped theologian. Both, as we have seen, were suspect to the Bavarians and therefore also to Eck as being too conciliatory.

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1 D/B, p. 608.

Melanchthon, the Protestant counter-part to Eck, was profoundly unhappy in his role. Conciliatory by nature, he found himself saddled with the main weight of defending the Protestant cause. He had grave fears, like his Elector, for the solidarity of the Protestant camp, and distrusted his fellow-collocutors Bucer and Pistorius on account of their dependence on Philip of Hesse. "As to the Catholiques, he appears to have been quite unaware of any differences of opinion between the papal representatives and the Bavarians and believed that both were equally opposed to any real colloquy."

He doubted therefore that the good intentions of the emperor — to which he gave full credit — would bear any fruit though he might at least come to realise that the beliefs of the Protestants were not so absurd as they had been made out to be. Handicapped by a very painful — and at first wrongly diagnosed and treated — injury to his hand caused by a fall from his horse on the journey to the Diet, and under the strictest instructions

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1 "Nostri omnes ostendunt, se mansuros esse in sententia Confessionis. Sed tamen quidam languidiores videntur non abhorrere a fucosis conciliationibus." Melanchthon/George of Anhalt, 25/4/41, CR IV, 187; Hesse found it necessary to attempt to dispel Melanchthon’s distrust by a profession of his loyalty to the Protestant cause. Ibid., p.169. Cruciger shared Melanchthon’s distrust of the ‘collaborators’ with the Catholicks. Ibid., p.183.

2 "Sed Contarenus Cardinalis multo est durior. Nulla in re discordi vult a consuetudine Romana. Ideo impedire has deliberationes de concordia sedulo conatur." Ibid., p.188.


4 Ibid., p.331.

5 Ibid., p.142.
not to budge even an inch from the Augsburg Confession, he felt himself surrounded by a myriad of dangers, real and imaginary, far more subtle than had been encountered at Worms, and was profoundly pessimistic about the outcome of the negotiations.¹

He was subjected, moreover, to what amounted to house arrest on the instructions of the Elector. Everything was done to 'protect' him from any fraternisation with the Catholics.² It was, of course, an open secret that the Catholics hoped to win him over to their cause, and the protection from such intrigues was, no doubt, welcome enough. That, however, any normal friendly relationship with the 'other side' was excluded from the outset hardly boded well for the success of the colloquy. Of the other two Protestants, Bucer, heavily compromised by his co-authorship

¹ Ibid., p. 172; "...petimur insidiis aliquanto astutius, quam in Vangionibus." Ibid., p. 176; "Nunquam res instructa est insidiosius. Nec video nos humano consilio ex his laqueis evadere posse." Ibid., p. 186. Burckhard felt similarly that since it was the Protestants alone who were seeking the truth, the Catholics, if they could not suppress the truth would seek to obscure it. Ibid., pp. 184-185. Melanchthon was particularly bitter about the 'levity' of Hesse, which had brought matters to this pass. (the reference, of course, is to his bigamy.) Since Hesse was now ensnared by the Imperialists, Eck, expecting the Protestants to be cowed and disheartened, was behaving with intolerable insolence. More than Eck's raging, however, was to be feared, Melanchthon thought, the moderation of Aenead (Gropper?). Ibid., p. 186. On the Protestant view on Gropper Burckhard is interesting."...vir est satis bonus et modestus, neque etiam indoctus, sed vincetur ab uno clamoribus ab altero astutia, et fortassis ipse quoque suas peculiares proferet opiniones veritati Evangelicae non per omnia consentientes." Burckhard/Bruck, 22/4/41, Ibid., p. 185.

² Hans Hoier was ordered to accompany Melanchthon wherever he went. The councillors were to prevent anyone speaking with Melanchthon alone so that "Wenn nun sabhes vermerkt, wird er unsers Verschens wohl ungeplagt werden...in alle Wege musste sich Philippus auch enthalten nicht zu viel auszugehen, sondem in der Herberge und bei unsern Rathen zu bleiben,..." Ibid., p. 131.
of the Regensburg Book (a carefully guarded secret) had to exercise the utmost caution in order not to lose the confidence of his coreligionists. Pistorius, a relatively unimportant figure, at no time played a decisive rôle in the coming negotiations.¹

Apart from Eck, therefore, none of the collocutors were trained in scholastic theology, and the consensus of opinion certainly lay on the conciliatory side. Given the circumstances, the emperor could hardly have made a better choice.

Contarini and Morone were reasonably content with it, despite the dissatisfaction of the Bavarians with Gropper, Pflug, and even Eck! They might do no good, wrote Morone to Rome, but at least they could do no harm, since they had no mandate to take any decisions but simply to confer together. They noted, however, with concern the lack of any mention in the instructions to the six that they should keep the legate informed of the course of the discussions. This might well have the gravest consequences. The majority of the group was irenically inclined. It could well happen that for the sake of attaining agreement the Catholics would agree to a compromise formula of dubious Catholicity. Pope and emperor would then be powerless against this disastrous fait accompli, for the fact that unity had been achieved at all would have a far more profound impression in Germany than the fact that

it was a unity in error.\textsuperscript{1}

To cover themselves against this nightmare possibility Contarini insisted that he be kept informed daily of the course of negotiations. Any incipient tendency towards error could then be nipped in the bud before it was too late. Granvelle granted this request without demur.\textsuperscript{2} This cautious move by the legate, working here as always in the closest collaboration with Morone, was to prove all-important for the course of the colloquy. In his daily meetings with the three Catholics\textsuperscript{3} before and after the meetings with their Protestant counterparts Contarini was to exercise a quite decisive influence.

Somehow, as we have seen, reaction and liberalism - harnessed together in the one team - had to be made to pull together if the

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{1} HJ IV, 445; HJ I, 367. Cf. also Contarini/Dandalo 267/7/41 "Rimettendosi poi alla trattazione per molti rispetti esservi grandissimo pericolo, se questa si fosse fatta senza mia saputa di quello che si trattava, (imperocché a me non si doveva fare la relazione se non dopo che fosse finita, et fatta a Cesare, et alli Stati dell'Impero) et anchor se io havessi aspettato ad impugnare quella, che li Collocutori, ovvero la maggior parte di loro havesse' conclusa, tutta la Germania gli haveria seguito senza fare conto alcuno di me; però mi sforzai di farmi confidente talmente che la trattazione mi fosse comunicata di giorno in giorno..." Morandii, I, ii, 200 ff. The papal interests required a particularly stout defence at this time. The Colonna affair had done nothing to improve the papal image in Germany and, quite apart from the explicit anti-papalism of the Protestants, many Catholics saw no point in the emperor 'sacrificing' Imperial interests for the sake of Rome. Francesco Contarini/Venice, 25/4/41, D/R, Nr. 683, p. 172.

\item\textsuperscript{2} At first it was only foreseen that Eck should report to the legate every evening on the day's proceedings. HJ I, 368; HJ IV, 445.

\item\textsuperscript{3} Granvelle appears to have attended himself. The only others Contarini was allowed to admit were Morone and Badia. Thus Negri: "Et ogni mattina dopo il principio della disputa vengono qui dal Rmo legato il SOr Nuntio Vescovo da Modena, Monsor di Granveila et li tre dottori et spesso il padre maestro sacri Palatii et stanno inchiusi insieme col Rmo legato per due hore." ZKG III, 639.
\end{footnotes}
whole venture were not to fail miserably. The first result of Contarini's unseen activity behind the scenes was to make this concerted action on the part of the Catholics possible. Secondly Contarini's own ecumenical orientation ensured that the participation of the Catholics would be of a positive nature and that every effort would be made to come to a tolerable settlement.\(^1\) Thirdly, that he exercised this controlling authority precisely as the papal representative guaranteed that the concern for an agreement would not be allowed to end in a sacrifice of the papal interests.

All this was accomplished by Contarini in what was, strictly speaking, a private capacity.\(^2\) It was unthinkable that the Diet would have empowered him in any sense to act qua legate, as the representative of the pope. In fact, the emperor did his best to keep the very existence of these conferences of the legate with Eck, Gropper and Pflug secret. For they meant a decisive departure from the humanistic ideal of a colloquy - of a meeting of minds which were free from all prejudice i.e. literally from all previous decisions, and therefore open to the arguments of the other side, where reason and moderation alone would hold sway.

\(^1\) Contarini was convinced of Granvelle's 'sincerity'. "...in verità a noi pare, che procedino(i.e. the Imperials) in questo negotio sinceramente", he had written on the eighteenth. HJ I, 366.

\(^2\) "...li cattolici per ordine della Cesaria Maesta ogni giorno conferiscono meco come persona privata pero, et non come con legato... ogni cosa con molta secretezza." HJ I, 372. "...non come a legato, ma come a persona amica..." D/R, Ined. Nr. 64, p. 325.
Now, however, the actual decisions would be made, in part at least, prior to and not during the colloquy. All this meant, of course, that to an extraordinary extent all depended on Contarini. On his skill would depend the unity, on his judgement the Catholicism, and on his concern for reunion the 'ecumenicity' of the Catholic collocutors.

The Protestants, for their part, acted in an analogous if more corporate manner, hammering out a concerted policy in the theological conferences which they held throughout the Diet. But because of their essentially defensive attitude - the desire to conserve their revolution - and because, above all, of the Catholicism of the emperor, the onus for taking an initiative lay primarily with the Catholics. It was the unique phenomenon of Contarini - a papal legate who incarnated the most progressive forces within Catholicism - which made this initiative possible. It was without doubt primarily from the Catholic side that the olive branch was extended at Regensburg. Whether it was stretched out far enough or in the right direction or even with a full comprehension of the extent of the gap to be bridged is another matter.

1 The legate was well aware of the responsibility he carried. Despite the exclusion of Wauchope and Pighius from the conferences he would, he wrote Farnese on 28 April, treat them with the greatest of tact, "perché io non voglio in modo alcuno prendermi così gran carico, se non cominciandolo con molti prima, et poi inviando il tutto a Sua Bne." HJI, 371.

2 Vetter comments; "Er (Contarini) kennt die Lage Deutschlands in ihrem vollen Umfange, aber er verkennt ihre Bedeutung; die prinzipiellen Diskrepanzen sind ihm verborgen, er sieht nur die streitigen Artikel, nur den formellen Unterschied. Er vermag es nicht einzusehen, dass es sich nicht um eine Sekte handelt... sondern um eine neue Kirche, die den Entwicklungsgang der mittelalterlichen Kirche negierend an die alte Kirche wieder anzuknüpfen sucht." Vetter, p. 44. That Contarini only saw the formal differences is, however, a somewhat doubtful thesis.
But that it could be stretched out at all is largely to be attributed to the activity in Regensburg of Cardinal Contarini.

On 22 April, the day after the announcement of their names, the collocutors were solemnly sworn in, or so at least Negri informs us. They promised, he reported, to pursue without rancour or strife the aim of finding a means to restore the peace and unity of Germany under the one catholic faith. The Saxon representatives mention nothing of an oath of this nature. At any rate the six came before the emperor and were exhorted by him to spare no effort to find a way to reunite Church and nation. The stage was set for the theological encounter.

Hopes were surprisingly high both in the Imperial and in the papal camp. Contarini, in a personal letter to Bembo, wrote: "The spirits of these Germans are somewhat milder than is their wont and they show great respect for the emperor; it seems that they are concerned about the disastrous state of this land, so that

1 "...sotto Una fede vera et Cathca." ZKG III, 635. For Negri (note the capital 'C' in 'Catholic') catholicity was of course determined by adherence to that part of the Church that remained loyal to the pope. If the Protestants did take an oath of this nature they would have interpreted this differently! Cf. Melanchthon's exposition of catholicity in the Apology. Die Bekennnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche. (5th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 235-236.

2 They mention only the exhortation by the emperor that the six should do their utmost "alles dasjenige, so zu Erforschung der Wahrheit, Gottes Ehre und Erhaltung Frieden Ruhe und Einigkeit im Reich dienstlich, zu suchen und zu fördern, und dass sie von beiden Theilen nichts denn die Ehre Gottes und gemeine Wohlfahrt vor Augen haben, und weder auf ihre eigene Affektion oder Herrschaften diesfalls nicht sehen sollten." CR IV, 188-189.
there is ground for hope, though whether it will come to a successful outcome or not is hard to say."

One of the grounds for optimism was the skilful tactics of the emperor, who was making every endeavour to win over the German princes to his moderation policy. He concentrated particular on the waverers, and went to the length, we read, of a courtesy visit to the wife of the Elector of Brandenburg! He adapted himself to whatever company he was in, being, indeed, 'all things to all men.'

A grave underestimation of the determination of the Protestants was another, more dubious ground for the optimism. Negri, for example, described the Protestant theologians as disheartened men who would recant at once if they did not fear the reaction of their followers. The Elector of Brandenburg was already half-converted. Not only had he heard the Mass with all reverence, but had declared that he would live and die by the rite and the faith of the emperor, and if he had been misled up to now he was eager to take the opportunity which Regensburg offered him of clarifying his position and turning his back on his previous errors. He asserted further that Hesse was of the same mind as

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2 "...et fa (the emperor) con questi tedeschi le cerimonie tedesche benissimo, con spagnoli le spagnole, con gli italiani le italiane, in modo che fa la simia eccellentissimamente;" ZKG III, 635.
3 "Sapia V.S., che questi heretici sono più stanchi che non siamo noi et desiderano trovar modo di ridursi, sed timent plebem, la qual hanno già tanti anni seduta. Il Marchese di Brandenburg Elettore, ... è mezzo convertito et già confessa il primato del Papa et molte altre cose". Ibid., pp. 635, 637.
himself. It seemed, Negri concluded, that a divine deliverance of the poor deluded people of Germany was at hand.¹

Contarini reported to Farnese on the discussions which Eck — of all men — had held with Brandenburg and Hesse. With the latter surprisingly much common ground had been found. Only on the questions of priestly celibacy, communion in both kinds, and the papal primacy had Philip been found difficult. The Elector, who had also spoken with Eck, shared Hesse's scruples about the first two points, and also raised doubts as to the sacrificial nature of the Mass, but was quite ready, on the other hand, to recognise the papal primacy in view of the need for unity of faith and practice among all Christians.²

The spectacle of two of the leading Protestant princes engaging in friendly discussions with the most militant of the Catholic controversial theologians was indeed something new, even though one suspects that Eck probably exaggerated somewhat the success of his persuasive powers on the princes. Granvelle's plans appeared to be coming to fruition, the Protestant front to be crumbling, and the winning over of the moderates to the Catholic position seemed only a matter of time!

It was in the context of such sanguine expectations that Contarini made his first acquaintance with the Regensburg Book,

¹ Ibid., p.638.
² Contarini/Farnese, 28/4/41, Quirini III, 254-255.
Granvelle’s last and best trump card.¹ On 23 April de Praet and Granvelle, after swearing the legate to secrecy, explained that the emperor had considered what would be the best modus procedendi for the colloquy and had decided against proceeding on the basis of Melanchthon’s Confession² as the Protestants would not give way on the slightest point of this. He had, however, had placed in his hands a book composed by certain learned theologians in Flanders which dealt with the controverted articles, and believed that it would provide a better basis for discussion. He asked the legate to scrutinise the document and stressed anew the need for absolute secrecy. Gropper’s assistance in the examination of the book was offered.³ The next two days were devoted to

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¹ Its appearance put to a premature end the fifteen articles produced by some of the Catholics as a basis for the negotiations. These had placed, as Cruciger remarked, all the ‘most repellant’ articles at the beginning, the articles to which the Protestants were most likely to take exception: the ‘venerable sacrament of the Eucharist’, the authority of the Church, and of the papacy etc. The article on justification came a very lame last and its very wording was a provocation. ‘De fide justificante et de meritis et de bonis operibus’. ZKG III, 639. A slightly varying version in CR IV, 161-164; cf. Melanchthon/Baumgart, 20/4/41, Ibid., p. 178.

² Contarini in his report says that it was Melanchthon’s Apologia that was to be replaced, but this is a slip. It was the Confession that had been used at Worms.

³ That Contarini did not at once enquire more closely into this unlikely story about the Flanders theologians is astonishing. Diplomatic tact? One can only surmise that the legate was too occupied by his purely theological interest in the contents to spare any thought for the question of its origin. He soon remedied this, however, surmising correctly from Gropper’s conduct that he was the author. HJ I, 368; likewise Morone: HJ IV, 454. The adjuration to secrecy seems to have been well kept. Even Contarini’s private secretary Negri had, as late as the 30 April, no knowledge of the existence of the Book, as Dittrich points out. D/B, 609, Anm. 3.
the reading of the Book by Contarini, Morone and Gropper, the latter betraying his authorship of the Book by the close acquaintance of it he displayed. He accepted all the twenty-odd corrections which Contarini thought necessary. On Monday, 25 April, Contarini expressed to Granvelle his satisfaction with the thus amended document, stressing however, that this was only his own personal opinion. He was careful to avoid giving any official blessing to it in his status as legate, and covered himself further by saying that a more careful reading might well reveal further errors. ¹

Granvelle, who was not unacquainted with the capacity of theologians for discovering further errors, recommended the immediate submission of the Book, again under the seal of secrecy - to Badia and the three Catholic collocutors. ² The Catholic representatives thus had an opportunity to examine the document - unlike their Protestant counterparts - prior to the commencement of the colloquy proper.

At this second scrutiny Eck polemicized sharply against the Book, whose conciliatory language led him to suspect that Witzel was its author. His attack was mainly directed against the alleged philosophical weaknesses in the articles. It earned

¹ HJ I, 369.

² Vetter's statement that it was the failure to gain Contarini's official imprimatur which led Granvelle to lay it before the other Catholics has little to recommend it. Vetter, p. 77. Granvelle knew well that an approval of that kind was in the highest degree unlikely.
him a sharp rebuke from Badia.¹

Events were now moving fast. Granvelle was forcing the pace. Not only had much time been lost already, but a prolonged theological discussion among the Catholics at this stage could hardly further the hopes of reunion. The faster the theologians were forced to work, the less time they would have to find fault with the Book. Accordingly, although Eck was still far from satisfied, the first joint meeting of the collocutors took place on the same day - the twenty-seventh - and Count Frederick of the Palatinate, on behalf of the emperor, exhorted the collocutors once again to a collected and pious determination to pursue the end of concord, and introduced - to the Protestants for the first time - the Regensburg Book as a basis of negotiations specially fitted by its moderation to the emperor's irenic intentions. The Protestants, who would have preferred the Confession, deferred to the wishes of the others lest they be 'uncivil' to the emperor, who had suggested the Book, and in view of the eminently reasonable condition that it should be altered wherever it was not in accord with Scripture.² Melanchthon soon recognised in the Book the writing that had been transmitted to Luther and the other Wittenberg theologians by

¹ HJ I, 369. As Vetter points out there is no evidence that Eck carried though substantial amendments, as Dittrich asserts. D/B, p. 610. Cf. Vetter, p. 77, Anm. 1.

² C/R IV, 332.
Joachim of Brandenburg.  

The speed and the secrecy with which the negotiations were now being pushed forward caught the Protestants by surprise, and forced them to proceed along this new tack without prior consultation with Luther and the Elector of Saxony. They were given a bare hour (!) to read the first part of the Book - too brief to allow them to have a copy of it made - and then it was given to the Catholic collocutors, likewise for an hour.  

The attitude of Eck, however, threatened to make any progress impossible. Both de Praet and Granvelle turned therefore to the legate, and complained bitterly about Eck's intolerable conduct, begged him to exhort Eck to abandon his uncooperative attitude. Contarini agreed to exert his influence in the required direction.  

He pointed out to Eck 'amorevolmente' that it was unseemly to launch such an attack on the Book. The latter had, after all, been laid before them by the emperor, and in view of the obstinacy of

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1 CR IV, 253. (It was not until 5 May that the Saxon delegates informed the Elector of the intention to proceed on the basis of the Book.)

2 HJ I, 370. As Vetter remarks (Vetter, p. 86) Granvelle kept the Book in his own hands throughout the colloquy, removing it himself at the end of every session. CR IV, 338. The aim was probably to prevent as far as possible an intervention on the part of Luther or the Elector in the form of a critique of the Book. He made of course no attempt to hinder the representatives from informing their prince on the course of events at Regensburg. Ibid., pp. 255-256.

3 "...hieri alli 27. venne a me Monsigr. di Prato, et mi narrò le furie che haveva fatto l'Ecochio contro quel libro vituperando infinitamente..." HJ I, 369-370.
the Protestants it was understandable that he had preferred it to the Confession. He had, finally, only submitted it for their scrutiny. On the particular points, such as Eck's fear that behind the description of Christ as the "causa subefficiens", of God, on the other hand, as the "causa efficiens" of our salvation lurked the Arian error, Contarini was able to set his mind at rest. The definition, he explained, referred to the humanity of Christ, and in this sense had ample precedent. He met and convinced Eck therefore on the level of scholarship. It was, as Dittrich says, "no small achievement" on the part of the legate, for from this time on Eck behaved considerably more reasonably. 1

The lonely, embittered and rather vain man had met more than his match in the Cardinal.

The satisfaction of the Imperial court at this turn of events was evidenced in the instruction which Granvelle gave at this point to the three Catholics to confer with the legate daily for a theological briefing prior to meeting with the Protestants. Any independent action by Eck would thus, it was hoped, be rendered impossible. The interests of 'moderation' were thus championed by the closest working alliance between the representatives of papacy and emperor. An intriguing spectacle!

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1 D/B, p.611. Melanchthon, who had hoped (CR IV, 186) that the accustomed vehemence of Eck would speedily bring the burdensome negotiations to an abrupt end noted the change. "Essemus iam tota hac molestia liberati, si Eccius suo more pugnaret; sed seu collegae seu alii eius impetum moderantur." CR IV, 239.
Morone comments on this satisfaction with the "goodness, sagacity, and learning" of the legate, and the total dependence of the three Catholics on Contarini. He was particularly critical of Eck. The latter, confident in his powers of memory and intelligence, proud of his leading rôle against the heretics in the past, and full of hate for the Protestants, had hoped to be the leading personality at Regensburg, although, because of his unnecessary contentiousness, this would have been palatable to no one. Now, however, he had allowed himself with a quite unwonted mildness to be guided by the legate, and on two occasions had deferred to the latter on many points of theology and philosophy which he had hitherto obdurately defended.

This success of Contarini in winning over Eck even led Morone — an interesting train of thought — to the hope that he might have equal success with the Protestants so that they would come eventually to a recognition of his status as legate by way of an appreciation of his personal qualities. Such gleams of hope convinced him that the colloquy must be furthered with all energy. He strongly opposed the intention of the Bavarians to

1 Similarly Negri: "Il Rmo legato si sta con li suoi theologi, il Mro sacri palazzi, il Cocleo, il Pighio, l'Ecchio, Groppero etc. et instruit aciem da buon capitano; omnia credit, omnia sperat, omnia sustinet." Negri/Bishop of Corfu, 27/4/41, ZKG III, p.635.

2 HJ IV,449,454.
withdraw Eck from the colloquy. This would, he insisted to them, be a catastrophic move. The only reasonable course was to await the outcome of events; after a few days it would be quite clear in what direction the Protestants were moving and whether there was any hope of concord. He hoped for a satisfactory outcome, but doubted all the same whether agreement would be reached on all the articles. They could only pray God to bring them safely to harbour now that they had embarked on the waters.\textsuperscript{1}

Eck, as the sole champion of the intransigents, thus found himself in an impossible position. Not only was he quite isolated among the colloquitors themselves, but Granvelle's success in gaining Contarini's agreement to the exclusion of Pighius and Wauchop\textsuperscript{2} from the preliminary conferences – in which, apart from the legate and the nuntio only Badia was to be allowed to confer with the three Catholics – meant that he was there also in a hopeless minority of one.

The first of the conferences on the morning of 28 April showed how unenviable his position was. The doctrine of justification was handled. Eck's obduracy only lost him something of his reputation in the eyes both of Badia and of Contarini, and

\begin{itemize}
\item[1] "La qual cosa parendomi piena di pericolo et di scandalo et ignominiosa alli Catholicì, ho dissuaso, ma non senza fati- ca..." Morone saw that if Eck was allowed to leave it could be later claimed that all the others were Lutherans and therefore their deliberations worthless. HJ IV, 449-450.
\item[2] To the understandable disgust of the two concerned. Contarini accepted Granvelle's judgement that Pighius was unsuitable. The Scot was rejected on the grounds of his garrulity at Worms. HJ I, 371.
\end{itemize}
got him nowhere. It was probably at this meeting that the ground for the most significant achievement of the colloquy — the agreement on the question of justification — began to be laid. Gropper\(^1\), Badia, and Contarini were all agreed on the issue, and the Catholics generally appear to have been hopeful of agreement with the Protestants on this point.\(^2\)

The discussion of the Book was now going steadily ahead, beginning, like Alice, at the beginning. At first — on 27 April — all went well. The pressures of time, the reluctance to show undue obduracy at this early stage, the fact that the first articles — on the state of man before the Fall, the freedom of the will, the cause of sin, and on original sin — were all briefly and unpolemically formulated all contributed to the speedy progress. "De his locis", wrote Melanchthon, "nunc quidem rixae nullae fuerunt."\(^3\) Melanchthon and Eok swallowed, for the

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1 Not Poggio, as it stands in the text HJ I, 371. Cf. D/B, p. 612, Anm. 1. The text here is very corrupt.


3 CR IV, 332.
moment at least, any doubts they had\(^1\) and although neither side was fully content\(^2\) the differences were evidently not felt to be great enough to justify a serious conflict at this point. All were well aware that it was on the fifth article - that on justification - that the real issues at stake could be expected to come into the open, and that any already incipient conflicts would there come to full articulation. Since Contarini's first morning conference on 28 April already dealt with this article it seems probable that the first four articles had all been disposed of on the 27th.\(^3\)

From 28 April to 2 May came the dramatic discussions on article five - de justificacione hominis. The secrecy in which all was shrouded at the time, and the apologetic motives which coloured all later representations make an exact reconstruction of these negotiations difficult. The main outline, however, is clear enough.

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1 E.g. Melanchthon: "...und wiewohl sie im guten Verstande mögen hingehen, so habe ich doch nicht klein Missfallen gehabt, dass der Meister des Buchs, wo er das Unsre zulässt, doch also dunkel redet und verstreicht, dass es wenig scheinet...Nun habe ich Geduld gehabt, das man nicht sagte, ich wollte die Handlung ohne grosse Ursache umstossen." Ibid., p.420.

2 "Als hat man solch Buch vor die Hand genommen, und die vor-dern Artikel, bis auf den Artikel der Justification gelesen, aber nicht darinne geschlossen; denn Doctor Bck hat etliche Punkte angefochten, so haben es die unsern auch nicht allent-halben approbirt, darum es also hangen blieben, und der Art-tikel von der Justification vorgenommen..." Saxon Councillors/Elector, 5/5/41, Ibid., p.254.

3 Cf. Vetter, p.89, n.5.
Neither Eck nor Melanchthon were disposed to tolerate the longwinded and highly ambiguous article which stood in the Book. Unlike Contarini, who had been content with making occasional amendments, they demanded that the Book be laid aside altogether and free discussion on the nature of justification allowed between the two parties. Both hoped that they would thus be rid of the Book for good. This must have been a surprise move on the part of Eck. We have no hint that even the possibility of departing from the Book had been contemplated in the morning conference with the legate. Eck's deference to the latter should, therefore, not be overestimated. If he had thus far been forced into cooperation he had played his part with dragging feet, and without any real inner conviction. Melanchthon's discontent with the obscurities of the Book then gave him the opportunity to escape from his previous isolation by forging an alliance - if only in a common hatred of the Book - with his main contestant Melanchthon!

In the face of this formidable alliance Granvelle had to capitulate, and the Book was set aside. Accounts differ as to whether in the subsequent debate the first draft to be laid before

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2 It is reasonable to assume that a certain number of his twenty odd corrections would have been devoted to this article.

3 CR IV,582.
the collocutors came from Melanchthon or from the Catholic side.\(^1\) It is in the last resort immaterial. Probably, however, Melanchthon opened with a summary statement of the Protestant position. The Catholics took exception to its terminology and it was therefore rejected. Then the Protestants in turn rejected on 29 April the Catholic draft.\(^2\) An attempt on the part of the legate to intervene with an amended version of his own met with a derisive reception from the no doubt overwrought Melanchthon and brought matters no further.\(^3\) The collocutors returned to the Catholic draft.

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1 According to the report of the Saxon representatives the first draft was put forward by the Catholics. CR IV, 254. Melanchthon's short report of 30 April would seem to indicate the opposite. Ibid., p. 239. Also Cruciger's (somewhat tendentious) account, which ascribes the first Catholic formula to Contarini, probably confusing it with the later intervention by the legate. CR IV, 252.

2 Eck then appears to have proposed a formula of his own. Melanchthon: "Nosstras formulas amplecti metuit, (i.e. Eck) ac nunc de ipsius formula rixamur. Heri totam formulam ipsorum repudiaram, sed etsi corrigunt, ut nos abrumpere negotium non sinant." Melanchthon/Luther, 30/4/41, CR IV, 239.

3 Melanchthon writes: "Da wir disputirten, dass unrecht ist, zweifeln ob wir in Gottes Gnaden sind etc., sendet uns der Päpstliche Legat ein Form die war ihr selb widerwärtig, dass ich lachet, so bald ich sie ansahe. Ward also diese Form von allen verworfen, und sahe man wohl, dass sie sich von wegen des Legaten schämten,..." CR IV, 582. "Sed erat certamen acerrimum de multis partibus, et miserat Contarenus insulsissimam formulam, quae tota repudiata est." Ibid., p. 306. Melanchthon's assertion that the Catholics were visibly ashamed of their legate's intervention will be an exaggeration. It could, however, point to some sign of open dissatisfaction on Eck's part. Brieger's suggestion that Contarini's draft formula referred only to the special point of certainty of justification is not (pace Vetter, p. 92, Anm. 2) without a certain probability. It seems the most likely interpretation of Melanchthon's words above. It is, moreover, quite improbable that the legate would have attempted to draw up a complete new draft of the article himself. In view of his close collaboration with the collocutors this was unnecessary and would have been tactically unwise. A personal intervention on a particular point, on the other hand, could well have recommended itself to Contarini, though it was, of course contrary to the spirit and to the letter of his Instruction. An intervention of this sort could have been construed later as implying papal approval of or commitment to the outcome of the colloquy.
A fierce tussle now ensued within the two parties. Melanchthon took the chance to advocate openly the breaking-off of negotiations. It would be better, he argued, for the Protestants to act now than to allow themselves to be entangled in the still more hateful articles that lay ahead. The blame for the collapse of the negotiations could easily be shrugged off onto Eck. However, supported by Sturm, reiterated his familiar argument that an acceptance of the Protestant doctrine of justification by the Catholics would be a great advance, paving the way for further reforms within the Catholic camp. As a hopeful sign they pointed to the fact that the standpoint represented by Groppler and Pflug was markedly more liberal than that of Eck. They did not hesitate to accuse Melanchthon of deliberately trying to sabotage the colloquy at the behest of the Elector. Melanchthon was forced to give way and the disputation continued. Groppler and Pflug, manifestly with the backing of the legate, allowed the Protestants to amend the Catholic draft so radically that nothing remained in it which they found incompatible with the Augsburg Confession.

1 "...da der Unglimpf auf Eckcn liegen würde." CR IV,420.

2 In their report to the Elector the Saxon councillors refer to it as a formula which was "...von den Theologen dieses Theils in der Substanz mit nichten der Confession und Apologia zu-wider oder ungemäss geachtet wirdet, auch an Worten klar genug, dass er zu keinem Missverstand mag gedeutet werden. Und obwohl solcher Artikel etwas kurz und weiter Erklärung bedürf-tig, so ist doch derselbige in der Confession und Apologia ganz wohl erklärt, welchen man dieses Theils in allweg vorzubehalten ten und darinnen nichts zu vergeben bedacht und entschlossen..." Ibid., p.254.
Agreement on the doctrine of justification had been achieved!

Granvelle himself - a final histrionic touch - wrote out the agreed version of the article in his own hand, and sealed his triumph by managing to wrench even from the reluctant Eck an eventual, grudging consent. It had been a great triumph for his diplomacy. How, however, would the theologians react? And how the world outside Regensburg?

The reaction among the Protestants in Regensburg was strangely subdued, ranging from cautious expressions of pleasure to stunned disbelief. The incredulity was, after all, understandable. Wittenberg and Rome had now been at odds for two decades. Those who had been young men when the struggle had begun had by now lived under the shadow of the schism for the best part of their lives. Those who were now young had never known anything else but schism. Those who had been of mature years in 1517 and had experienced something of what a united Christendom meant were now largely dead.

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1 If we are to believe Peucer he at first refused to append his signature, but was eventually pushed into doing so by Granvelle. Dedication to Tom. IV of the Opp. Melanchthonis quoted in D/B, p. 622, Anm. 7.

2 The need for secrecy remained, now as before, and therefore any open discussion about, far less rejoicing over the agreement was in any cause excluded.

3 Dittrich's assertion (D/B, p. 625) that Contarini's "Dio laudato" also "filled the breast of many a Protestant" gives a quite misleading impression. His sole authority is a quotation from Cruciger wrenching it out of its context. Indeed, his whole picture of a sudden outburst of ecumenical cordiality and conviviality on the successful conclusion of the agreement could hardly be more misleading.
The schism had lasted too long. It had become something self-evident, a part of the fabric of life. Men had long since made their decision between the two possibilities that lay open to them - in the rare case that such decisions were in their power. In any case they had become accustomed themselves to the new order of things. Was it now to be upset overnight by the confabulations of a few theologians? The wall of distrust from behind which the two parties now regarded one another, and the vested interests in a continuation of the status quo (in which the economic is only one of the many factors to be taken into account) made any such dramatic development seem in the highest degree unlikely.

To the Protestants it was as if they had been defrauded by a confidence trick of their own most precious possession - the doctrine on justification that was distinctively and characteristically theirs, and which by a sleight of hand the Catholics were now appropriating for themselves. For it was generally agreed that there was nothing in the agreed article to which one could take exception from the Protestant point of view. It was fully consonant with the Confession and the Apology although the latter were more explicit and alone could be relied upon for a full statement of the faith.\(^1\) One of the most friendly reactions

\(^1\) Thus Burckhard: CR IV, 256.
was that of Cruciger who remarked that the formula "...quae etsi non est a nostris composita, sed utrinque consarcinata, tamen a nostra doctrina, quod discrepet, nihil habet, quare si haec de quibus inter delectos convenit accipiantur publico consensu doctrina nostrarum ecclesiarum approbata et recepta est."¹ "You will marvel," wrote Calvin to Farel, "when you read the copy(of the article on justification)...that our adversaries have conceded so much. For they have committed themselves to the essentials of what is our true teaching. Nothing is to be found in it which does not stand in our writings. I know that you would prefer a more explicit exposition and in this you are at one with myself. But if you consider with what sort of men we have to deal, you will acknowledge that a great deal has been achieved."²

How was this undeniable fact that hitherto unthinkable concessions had here been made by the Catholics to be explained?³ Burckhard reacted with the now familiar suspicion that it could only be a Catholic dodge. The latter could not be sincere in their avowed desire for reformation. That would be cutting their own throats, "actum siquidem esset de ipsorum regno si recepta

¹ Ibid., p.259.
² Herminjard VII,p.111.
veritate pia et christianæ reformationi, ad quam tamen Caesar propensus videtur, instituenda esset." It was to be feared, therefore, that they would seek to confuse the Protestants with obscure and ambiguous formulae; and hence some of the Protestants would probably not even accept the agreement on the fifth article until they saw whether a genuine concord could be attained on the other points. This, however, was an impossibility. ¹ This cautious, waiting attitude was indeed the general reaction of the Protestants. ² The apparent 'change of heart' among the Catholics would have to be put first to the test in the discussion of the other articles before any one should give way to rejoicing, which at this stage would be premature.

Among the Catholics, on the other hand, apart from Eck, the reaction was considerably more positive. Even Morone had a temporary relapse into optimism. Melanchthon, it was true, he wrote to Rome, remained stiff-necked as ever, bound by his mandate from the Elector. In Bucer, however, who was exerting himself to the utmost for the attainment of a concord, Morone set the highest hopes, believing indeed that he was already regained for the

¹ "Verum non possum mihi persuadereullo modo, quod de hac tanta causa, in qua tam multae sunt non verbales sed reales controversiae, tam facile convenire possit... Sed fortassis vix recipiatur hic articulus ab omnibus, nisi integra fiat concordia, quae est impossibilis." Ibid.

² E.g. Cruciger, in whose breast, according to Dittrich, there was room for nothing but joy. Cruciger does indeed show pleasure at what he interprets as a victory for the Protestant position. "Quare, quod faustum foelixque sit et salutare Ecclesiis, de hoc articulo convenit e tenus, ut ad Caesarem et Principes referatur et nostri subscribant;" Here, in mid-sentence Dittrich has closed the quotation. Cruciger, however, continues immediately "... subscribant; quod tamen non existimo prius futurum esse, quam de cæteris articulis certum sit." Exactly, in other words, the cautious standpoint of the other Protestants. Ibid., pp. 252-253.
Church, and was only holding back from an open declaration of
his change of allegiance in order to work more effectively with-
in the Protestant ranks. With his help, he hoped, Melanchthon's
resistance could be overcome in the difficult negotiations that
lay ahead, as had already happened at Worms on the question of
original sin. For Gropper also, Bucer's Catholic counterpart,
he had only the highest praise.¹

Contarini himself greeted the news with a heartfelt "dio
laudato!" The article, he reported to Farnese, had been adjudged
by Badia, Cochlaeus, Morone and himself, with the three Cathol-
ic collocutors, to be "cattolica et santa". No mention, as Dittrich points out², of the differences of opinion within the
Catholic camp! In his concern to win the consent of Rome the le-
gate did not shrink from giving what amounted to a false picture
of the situation at Regensburg! With his report went a copy of
the article, and a renewed plea for the need for the greatest of
secrecy, in view of attempts from Italy, of which Granvelle had
news, to disturb the work of reunion.³

A further attempt to gain backing among his friends in Italy
for the agreement was his sending of a further copy, again with

¹ "Stimiamo, che l'autor del libro sia il Groppero, qual vera-
mente mostra gran modestia con singolare zelo di concordia
Christiana et anche bona dottrina." HJ IV, 453-454. Sim.
Contarini, HJ I, 374.

² D/B, p. 620.

³ HJ I, 371-372.
the strictest injunction to secrecy, to his friend Ercole Gonzaga, Cardinal of Mantua. He asked the cardinal to show it to Cortese and Messer Angelo, his own theological adviser, (and to none other) and to inform him with all speed of their judgement upon it. He enclosed an explanation on two of the points which he considered most controversial.1

How far, then, had Contarini contributed to the achievement of the agreement on the fifth article? His moderating influence on Eck, his approval of Gropper's mediatorial work, his excellent relations with Granvelle we have already noted. His endeavours, however, precisely in this period, went one step further. As far indeed, as Vetter says, as his Instruction would allow him.2 He entered into his first friendly relations with the Protestants.

His moderation and learning had in fact made a very favourable impression at Regensburg, even to some extent on the Protestants. The satisfaction with Contarini was growing with every hour, wrote Morone immediately after the successful outcome of the discussions on the fifth article. Granvelle and other of the Imperial ministers were on record as attributing his presence at Regensburg, endowed with the gifts he had, to the

1 Contarini/Cardinal of Mantua, 3/5/41, D/R, Nr. 64, pp. 324-325.
2 Vetter, p. 95.
working of Providence. For the Protestants were already beginning not only to love him personally (amarlo), but in their reverence for him to pay tribute indirectly to the pope and to the Apostolic See.¹

This palpable exaggeration has, however, its grain of truth. What Contarini certainly succeeded in doing was to improve the image of Rome in Germany, both among Catholics and Protestants. Almost to a Machiavellian extent he was conscious of the importance of his task here, as we see from his words to Cervini in his advocacy of the petitions of the Archbishop of Salzburg and of the Bishop of Freising to the Curia for a mitigation of the financial demands being made upon them. The one was the brother of the Bavarian Dukes, the other of the influential Count Frederick of the Palatinate. "These are men of weight in this land, and on the death of his brother Count Frederick will be Elector and the emperor has shown a high opinion of him in this Diet, and therefore it seems to be that it would be very good to show our high estimation of him and of the Archbishop of Salzburg also."² In countless other ways he sought by his considerate

¹ HJ IV,454 "...Monsr di Granvella et gli altri Ministri dicono, ch'Iddio per sua bontà l'ha creato a questo effetto, perché si porta con grandissima mansuetudine, prudentia et dottrina, nella quale...è reputato avanzare tutti gl' altri, quali sono in questo luoco, di maniera che gli adversarii istessi cominciano non solo ad amarlo, ma ancora a reverirlo con grande honore di N.S. et de quella Santa Sede Apostolica."

² Contarini/Cervini,29/4/41,D/R,Nr.693,p.175.
treatment of the various complaints and requests of the Germans to refurbish the sadly-tarnished image of the papacy in Germany, and with considerable success.¹ He tactfully avoided acting in a way that would be unnecessarily provocative, taking, for example, Granvelle's advice that it would be better not to proceed to a solemn publication of the papal Bull of Indulgence designed for the Diet.² Papal representatives in Germany had not hitherto been noted for their tact.

As far as the Protestants were concerned Contarini had begun to break down some of the distrust with which any representative of the papacy had automatically to contend. Even to have attained the point, as he himself put it, where he was "...non mal visto da protestanti"³ was in this context a considerable achievement. Concrete evidence of the new atmosphere was the visit of Johann Sturm to the legate which, however — since the legate did not think it opportune — did not deal with the theological controversies. It ended, all the same, on the friendliest of terms, Sturm showing the legate all due reverence and resolving, as Contarini heard afterwards from Wauchop, to repeat the visit at a later opportunity.⁴ Equally cordial was a meeting arranged by

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1 D/B, pp. 614-615. A large amount of his time was taken up with such matters. His integrity made a great impression. One German is said to have burst out, "O mores insolitos, utinam sic semper, non enim nunc laboraremus." Morandi, I, ii, p. 35.

2 ZKG III, 637; Quirini, III, 254.

3 Contarini/Dandino, 1/5/41, D/R, Ined. 63 a, p. 323.

4 Contarini/Farnese, 3/5/41, HJ I, 373.
Veltwyck with Bucer in which the latter responded to Contarini's exhortation to do all in his power to promote concord in a way which filled the legate with the highest hopes. Bucer also, he thought, would be repeating his visit.¹

A further initiative on the part of the legate was the sending of his greetings to the Elector of Brandenburg, after an initial sounding of his relation, the Cardinal of Mainz. Joachim received Contarini's emissaries with great courtesy and replied with a lengthy profession of his desire for an end to the religious discord. Contarini drew in particular the attention of Farnese to the fact that the Elector had addressed him in his reply as "Legatus missus a Sanctissimo Domino nostro Paulo tertio," for this seemed firm evidence that these friendly contacts were bearing the desired fruit — a more amenable temper on the part of the Protestants.² A picturesque touch was added by the Elector sending his instrumentalists to serenade the Cardinal, for which Contarini did not fail to express his cordial thanks.

The significance of all this activity one should neither over-estimate nor under-estimate. Morone had already conducted

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¹ Contarini makes no mention of Bucer's remark, reported by Beccadelli, that there was fault on both sides, the Protestants having defended many things too stubbornly, the Catholics having left many abuses uncorrected. Morandi I,ii,p.34. Lest the Curia take this amiss? Cf. D/B,p.617,Anm. 2.

² "...il che ho voluto significare a V. Sig. Revma. perché vegga come questi animi danno qualche segno di umiliarsi, il che a Dio piaccia segua in effetto." HJ I,374.
personal conversations with Sturm, Bucer and Melanchthon in Worms. In itself, that was nothing new. Nor can the so frequently cited remark of Jacob Sturm that five or six papal councillors of the stamp of Contarini would be enough to persuade him to abandon any doubts as to the correctness of the papal decrees be taken with such gospel seriousness.\(^1\) One can, moreover, ask oneself what Bucer thought of Contarini's promise that his efforts in the interests of reunion would gain for him the gratitude not only of God but of the pope and the emperor.\(^2\) For the Strassburg reformer such trinitarian cooperation of God, pope and emperor was not perhaps quite such a self-evident proposition as for the legate. The world in which Contarini moved was truly a very different one from that of the German Protestants, and personal contacts, however friendly, would have to reach a much deeper level if the cultural, not to speak of the theological gap were to be bridged.

On Melanchthon he had totally failed to make any impression, or if anything, only a negative one. The cloistered seclusion of the latter, and his almost neurotic fear of the subtleties of Roman and Imperial diplomacy kept the two men apart. They never met. This in itself points to the superficiality of the encounter between the two sides at Regensburg. Special circumstances, of course, played a rôle in Melanchthon's case. Calvin,

\(^1\) Morandi I,ii,p.35.
\(^2\) HJ I,373.
however, was equally sceptical. He does not spare us the cheapest of polemic against the legate and apparently believed that the latter was opposed to any genuine discussion and that the support for it which he professed was only a sham. The aim of the papal representatives, he argued, remained now as before the reduction of the Protestants. Contarini only differed from his predecessors in preferring this, if possible, to be a bloodless business. Which, of course, was not without a certain element of truth!

The truth is that, at best, Contarini's tentative gestures of friendship in the direction of the Protestants were only a modest step forward. Foundations had been laid on which, given time, a structure of confidence and good will could have been gradually built up. The dialogue at Regensburg, however, never reached any depth. To ask whether, given more favourable circumstances, it could ever have done so is to speculate. We can only observe that even from the modest beginnings that were made the

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1 "Contarenus Cardinalis (adest) pro suo pontifice: qui nobis primo ingessu tot cruces aspersit, ut biduo post brachium illi ex fatigatvtone laborasse arbitrer..." Calvin/Parle, 29/3/41, Herminjard, p.58.

2 "Contarent sine sanguine subigere nos cupit. Proinde tentat omnes vias conficiendi ex sua utilitate negocii citra arma. Mutinensis (Morone) totus est sanguinarius...Uterque in hoc totus est, ut omnes amicas tractationes praecidat." Ibid., pp. 58,62.

3 When, e.g., Contarini speaks in the following terms: "questi animi danno qualche segno di humiliarci..." the tendency of this thinking is not far removed from that which Calvin attributes to him. HJ I,374.
practical and psychological conditions had been created in which a breakthrough on the question of justification became possible. On the human level, Contarini's achievement at Regensburg was not inconsiderable, especially when we bear in mind how minimal his actual potentialities for action were, how limited his room for manoeuvre, how pessimistically the chances of success had been adjudged. For a moment of time divided Christendom had seen a flickering of hope. The visitation was brief. Its fascination remains.
The success of the colloquy thus far had been preeminently Contarini's success. Yet ultimately the colloquy was to fail. Should not this final failure also be laid at the door of the legate?

Contarini had come to Regensburg with a twofold aim: to restore the unity of the Church and to defend the inviolability of the Catholic faith and the interests of the papacy. The success of his mission rested on the presumption of the compatibility of these two aims. At no point had he entertained the idea of purchasing unity at the cost of "the truth". The agreement on the article on justification had only been acceptable to him because he believed in its genuine Catholicism.

If, in the negotiations which followed, his attitude appeared to undergo an abrupt change this was, in fact, not the case. He remained as concerned for unity as ever he had been. What had changed, however, was his conviction that agreement was possible without a sacrifice of the orthodox position, that his ecumenism need not endanger his Catholicism. His two aims no longer appeared to be compatible.

1 Others had, of course, played their part - Gropper, Bucer, and not least Granvelle - yet without the lead given by the legate, their efforts would have had little hope of succeeding.

2 "Et come per l'altre mie scrisse a V.S., quella li faccia pur ampia fede per mio nome, ch'io sto con l'occhio aperto et mai non consentiro a cosa, che non sia in honor di Dio et della sua santa fede, ne N.S. mi ha mandato qui ad altro effetto se non per questo." Contarini/Dandino,1/5/41,D/R,Ined.Nr. 63 a,p.323.
We can, and indeed must, attribute to Contarini part of the responsibility for the failure of the colloquy. This, is, however, only another way of saying that his concern for "Catholicism" was as passionate as that for "unity". The point at issue here is what he understood by this "Catholicism". As we have already seen it was an understanding flexible enough to permit the acceptance of a statement on justification which satisfied many Protestants. Where, however, did this flexibility find its limit? At what point did Contarini come to believe that the substance of Catholicism was threatened? The following chapter will attempt an answer to this question.

Agreement having been reached on justification, discussion proceeded on 3 May to the next section of the Regensburg Book,\(^1\) that dealing with the Church. Article VI dealt with the 'notes' of the Church and its authority, Article VII with the 'note of the Word' (de nota Verbi), Article IX\(^2\) dealt with the authority of the Church in regard to Scripture.

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\(^1\) Or rather returned to the Book again. Both Melanchthon and Eck had argued for a continuation of the previous free discussion. Cf. Melanchthon's report: "Da wir von diesem Artikel (i.e. on justification) kommen meinen Eck und ich, wir sollten nun des Buchs lose seyn, und nach Ordnung der Confessio fortschreiten. Aber Granvel wolt haben, dass wir das Buch wiederum vor die Hand nehmen sollten. Dazu trieben auch Groperus und Bucerus, sagten, dieses wäre der bequemste Weg zu handeln und zur Concordia." CR IV, 582. Apparently Pistorius supported Melanchthon. Ibid., p. 441.

\(^2\) Article VIII, apparently out of place here, asserted, against the Novatians and the Cathari, the need for "poenitentia post lapsam" to deal with mortal as well as venial sin. Le Plat III, 20-22; CR IV, pp. 205-208.
Predictably, Article IX gave most trouble. The others occasioned little dispute, being drafted in general and conciliatory terms. The reference in Article VI to the damnation of heretics and schismatics did arouse a certain amount of unrest among the Protestants, though it could, of course, be interpreted

1 "Hora trattano l'articolo de Ecclesia, nel quale gli adversarii sin qui non vogliono admettere l'autorità delli concili, come doverebbono." Morone/Parnese, 3/5/41, HJ IV, 545, quoted in D/B, p. 628, Anm. 2.


3 Melanchthon comments: "Legitur locus de Ecclesia, ubi est acerba obiurgatio eorum qui discedunt ab Ecclesia. Res in genere dicitur, ne nobis contradicere liceret, sed tela ex insidiis emissa haereret in nobis." CR IV, 414. Concerning this point the Protestant Estates remarked in July: "Quod autem damnat idem articulus eos, qui discedunt ab Ecclesia, articulus loquitur de iis, qui discedunt a recte docentibus. Et fatemur ab his non esse discedendum. Sed antithesis addenda est: iuste discedi ab iis, qui defendunt falsam doctrinam, et qui homines innocentes propter piae doctrinae confessionem interficiunt." CR IV, 487.
in different ways. In general the Protestants were, if not content with these articles, at least ready to postpone open dissent until the discussion of the ninth article. Accordingly, it was soon possible to dispose of them, and on the same day, the third of May, discussion could move on to Article IX.

This handled the questions of the interpretation of Scripture and the authority of the Councils with great restraint.¹ There was no trace of anti-Protestant polemic or of an exaggerated theologia gloriae. The treatment was predominantly historical. Both Scripture and the authority of the Church in regard to it were interpreted as divinely given to prevent the distortion of the original tradition. Lest the spoken word² be forgotten or falsely transmitted the written Scriptures were introduced, and to ensure their proper delimitation and interpretation the Church was given authority to determine the Canon³ and the true understanding of these Scriptures. It was not claimed that the Church stood above Scripture, and indeed Scripture was ranked far above any human authority.⁴ It was futile, the article argued, to dispute whether Church or Scripture had the greater authority, for

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¹ "De auctoritate ecclesiae in discernenda et interpretanda scripture." CR IV, 208-212.

² "Quod quasi per manus (Deus) tradi et communicari voluit." Ibid., p.208.

³ "Auctoritatem iudicandi inter scripturas, et discernendi Canonicam a non Canonica..." Ibid., p.209.

⁴ Note the ambiguity. It was a matter of dispute whether the Church was, in fact, a human authority in this sense.
both were directed and inspired by the one Holy Spirit, working in both through the instrumentality of men.¹

Further, many doctrines — those of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ — were implicit rather than explicit in the Scriptures. The latter needed interpretation, the Church’s interpretation. One might have expected a reference here to the teaching office of the papacy, but there is at least no direct mention of this. The stress was laid instead on the whole Church, the consensus of all the pious as against the individual believer. It was this consensus which was recorded in the first Councils and orthodox Christian writers of every age;² the decrees of the first ecumenical Councils in particular, insofar as they refer to the dogmas which are necessary for salvation, were infallible.

So much for the content of the article. It will hardly be denied that, if the "Catholic" position were to be retained at all, it could not have been framed in a more conciliatory manner. Yet it met with the instant and vehement opposition of Melancthon. It could scarcely have been otherwise.

¹ "Ut frustra et irreligiose disputetur, num autoritas Ecclesiæ scripturis antequera sit; num Ecclesia abolere seu mutare possit tradita in verbo Dei, num statuere quid possit contra verbum Dei...;" God wished "ut autoritas interpretandi scripturæ apud Ecclesiam, quæ Spiritu suo regitur, esset, ut idem, qui scripturæ autor est, Spiritus, eis etiam sit interpres..." ibid., p.209.

² "Hoc enim universalis ille consensus, et admirabilis in unam eandemque doctrinam conspiratio proprium habet, ut eius interpretationi standum sit, quod notis infallibilibus nitatur, quæ sunt promissiones divinae de Spiritu veritatis, Ecclesiæ nunquam defutura doctrinae concordia, et cum scripturis consensio." CR IV,211-212.
True, in deference to the expected Protestant objections, nothing had been said about the mystical or - in contemporary thought closely allied \(^1\) - the hierarchical nature of the Church. Was, however, the organic, corporate understanding of the Church, the stress - so typical of Gropper - on the historical continuities, really any more acceptable? It was all more than vaguely disquieting to Protestant ears, accustomed to the note of the Church "under the Word".

Disquiet became, however, implacable opposition at the point where concreteness could no longer be avoided - on the question of the infallible authority of the orthodox Councils. \(^2\) The assertion of this was only the logical consequence of Gropper's whole doctrine of the Church. Any system of thought which understands the integrity or orthodoxy of the faith in terms of an ideological continuity must necessarily posit infallible instances, or at least an infallible instance whose decisions ground and constitute that continuity. In Gropper's thought - for all the freedom his positive theology and critical scholarship accorded him - the Word was bound not only to Scripture but also to the dogmatic tradition of the Church. The alternative "Church

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1 Note the recurrent mention of the mystic writing De ecclesiae hierarchia of Dionysius the Areopagite in the Catholic writing of this period.

2 "et in somma li Protestantì sono convenuti con il Catholici salvo che parlando de conciliis non hanno voluto admettere che il concilio non possa errare interpretandis scripturis." Contarini/Parnese, 4/5/41, HJ I, 375.
under Scripture" or "Scripture under Church" became here abruptly actual.

Bucer, in accepting the article originally, had apparently not seen this, and at Regensburg too, he argued for the acceptance of this article. His attempts, however, to gloss over the differences do him no credit. To Melanchthon, on the other hand, assent here would have been a betrayal of his conscience, and of the truth itself. As he saw it, a concession on this issue would have meant a capitulation all the way along the line, in effect a surrender of the whole Lutheran position.

If the principle of sola scriptura, with its ultimate basis in the absolute polarity of the divine will and human "traditions" were sacrificed, the whole Protestant front could be rolled back and Catholic faith and practice defended at every critical point. Here there could be no retreat. Since, however, this applied equally to the Catholics, deadlock seemed imminent and the whole

1 Melanchthon's reference to "mein Gesell" who "mir den Artikel viel glossiren wollt" is obviously a reference to Bucer. CR IV, 582.

2 "Denn sich die Theologen dieses Theils standhaftig und wohl bis anhero gehalten, und insonderheit hat sich Magister Philippus auch in Gegenwartigkeit der verordneten Theologen und der andern vernehmen lassen, dass er eher sterben, denn ichts wider sein Gewissen und Wahrheit einräumen wollte...." Saxon Councils/Elector, 5/5/41, ibid., p.255. Melanchthon was of course, under hefty pressure from his Elector to take up an uncompromising position.

3 "Denn so man den Concilien diese Gewalt geben sollt, wie sie sagten, würd'en wir viel Irrthum der vorigen Concilien bestäti- gen, und zu künftig alle nachkommen mit diesem prejudicio schrecklich beschweren." Ibid., p.582; sim. Cruciger's comment: "Nunc ventum est ad articulum de Ecclesia et eius authoritate, in quo adversarii neceio an facile discessuri sint ab eo, quod ipsis adhuc reliquum est profugium defendendi et retinendi tradi- tiones extra scriptureae testimonium, titulo universalis consensus publice recepti." Ibid., p.253; cf. ibid., pp.432-433.
colloquy threatened to grind to a halt. For the moment a tactical rescue operation by the politicians saved the day.

Granvelle tried at first — a grotesque irrelevancy — to urge Melanchthon to read the articles "more industriously". The discussions had led nowhere, he seemed to be indicating, because Melanchthon had not properly digested the content of the article. Indignant at the imputation that he had been neglecting his homework, Melanchthon retorted that he had studied the Book thoroughly both in Wittenberg and in Regensburg. He was neither willing nor able to approve of the articles, and that was an end to it! ¹

Duke Frederick of the Palatinate, the other President, then proposed that the Protestant colloquitors submit their own views in an irenic alternative or counter-draft and this was duly presented. ²

Like the original article this Protestant draft was also unpolemical, and went far to meet the Catholic position. Not only was the interpretative rôle of the Church readily admitted. As far as its authority in determining the limits of the Canon were

1 Ibid., p. 582.
2 "Da hat Pfalzgrave Friedrich eine Weise vorgeschlagen, dass die Colloquienten unsers Theils einen eigenen Artikel stellten; doch nit zänkisch. Also ist ein Gegenartikel übergeben..." Ibid., pp. 583-584; text in ibid., pp. 349-352.
concerned, the Protestants could say in conscious continuity with Augustine, "Evangelio non crederem, nisi me ecclesiae catholicae commoveret auctoritas"! Further they agreed that the true understanding of Scripture was to be found in the Church alone.

On the other hand, however, they protested that this gift of interpretation was not bound to particular persons or places, but pertained to those pious men whose teachings were at one with the testimonies of Scripture and the general consensus of the Church. Authority was not bound to office.

It was true that the Church had also to decide on doctrinal matters. While, however, the witness of the Early Church, derived as it was ultimately from the apostles, could be a guide here, the final authority must always be the Word of God. The Councils must be obeyed where they had interpreted the Word of God aright, but there had also been synods — such as that of Sirmium — which had erred. On historical, therefore, as well as theological grounds the infallibility of the Councils and of the Early Church Fathers could not be accepted.

The new Protestant article brought the two sides no closer to one another, and Granvelle, seeing that a prolongation of the

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1 "Ita est quidem donum interpretationis penes veram Ecclesiam, sed non est certis personis aut locis alligatum. Et alias est in pluribus, alias in pauciioribus, alias magis, alias minus illustre aut purum... Cum igitur in Ecclesia sit donum interpretationis, audiri Ecclesiam docentem necesse est, et qui habeant donum, haec duo ostendent: scripturae testimonia vere consentientia, et catholicus consensus." Ibid., pp. 350-351.
discussion at this stage would only mean that the two sides entrenched themselves even more deeply behind their established positions, reluctantly decided to postpone the settlement of the conflict to the end of the colloquy. According to Melanchthon he did not want it said that the colloquy had foundered on the attitude of the Catholics to the Councils.¹

The gravity of this failure to come to terms on the nature of the Church cannot be overemphasised. It meant, as we can now see in retrospect, the failure of the colloquy.² On the question of authority neither sides would surrender, and neither the urgent desire for an accommodation, nor the common respect for the Church's patristic heritage, could bridge the chasm. The parting of the ways had already been reached - only three days after the agreement on justification! The postponement of the issue may have been politic; theologically it was a confession ¹

¹ "dieweil wir unverglichen blieben, und Granvel sahe, dass sie wenig Glimps haben würden, so man sagt (sagen würde), dass sich die Handlung in diesem Streit von den Concilien gestossehhaben sie eine Höflichkeit geübet, gesagt, man soll diese materia suspendire, und fort schreiten." Ibid., p.583.

² "Hic sperabam finem totius actionis fore: nam et collegae quia videbant, adversarios non de veritate sed de autoritate sua dimicare, minus spei habeant, nec me poenitet dissen-sisse." Ibid., p. 414. Thus Melanchthon. Certainly, however, Cruciger did not regard the breakdown of negotiations as final. "De aliis articulis etiam coepit disputare, sed quia in illis non ita facile et subito convenire potest, audio quorundam diiudicacione suspensa pergi ad alios..." CR IV, 259; ibid., p.262. Contarini himself could make the strange statement that on the whole agreement had been reached. Only (1) on the question of the infallibility of the councils in the interpretation of scripture did disagreement remain. Is this a hang-over from the euphoria about Article V? "Et in somma li Protestanti sono convenuti con il Catholicli salvo che parlando de conciliiis non hanno voluto admettere che il concilio non possa errare interpretandis scripturis." Contarini/Farnese, 4/5/41, HJ I,375.
of bankruptcy. From now on the advocates of reunion would be in the invidious position of having to paper over the ominous cracks that were beginning to appear, but which had not been squarely faced. The evasion of the issue of authority had already settled the doom of the colloquy. The later debate on transubstantiation would only provide the occasion for its demise.

The uncertainty in the Catholic camp on the question of authority may well have contributed to the decision to postpone its discussion for the moment. Contarini had, of course, accepted the formulation of Article IX about the infallibility of the Councils. He was, however, only too well aware that this was a disputed point among the Catholic theologians. Pighius, for example, argued that the papacy was the sole infallible instance, and that the Councils were not infallible. Contarini, while himself inclined to the anti-Parisian school, which placed the pope above the Councils, felt it would be the part of wisdom to avoid too close a definition of this theoretical point.¹

¹ Contarini/Farnese, 9/5/41, HJ I, 379-381; for Pighius cf. Walter Friedensburg, "Beiträge zum Briefwechsel der katholischen Gelehrten Deutschlands", ZKG XXIII, 110-155; esp. p. 144: "Stupendum profecto est quam absurda invenerimus etiam nostrorum theologorum, quos Parisensis nobis schola subministravit, his in rebus judicia, eorum presertim quos Cesar magnis alit et dita-vit stipendiis et facit maximi, ut in multitiiis iisque precipuis adversariorum non paulo quam illorum tolerabilior sit senten-tia." Cochlaeus was also impressed by Pighius' arguments, but felt that his book, Hierarchiae Ecclesiasticæ Assertio, had appeared at an unpropitious time. Cochlaeus/Morone, 12/1/38, ZKG XVIII, 279-280.
These differences were, of course, of quite secondary importance to those with the Protestants, who rejected any infallibility of the Church, whether attributed to Councils or to pope. However it would be embarrassing if in the attempt to prove the historical validity of this infallibility, the differences within the Catholic camp should come to light. The historical arguments (Sirmium!) used by the Protestants had a startling resemblance to those which Pighius himself had brought to play.\(^1\)

Certainly Contarini's hesitation here prevented him from coming forward with any initiative of his own. He had to rest content that the Catholic theologians had rebutted the Protestant errors. Since the Catholics were not in a position to define their views exactly, neither side emerged from their established positions, and the debate had to be broken off prematurely. A debate comparable with that on justification could not develop. A descent into detail would have embarrassed the Catholics, while a continued tussle on the level of general principles could only lose time and exasperate the Protestants. Contarini was left little choice but to agree to the suspension of the debate on 4 May, and a transition to the question of the sacraments.

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\(^1\) Cf. Vetter, p.111.
Above all, Contarini was concerned - with German Catholicism in its present state and the mana of the papacy at a nadir - to avoid a discussion on the authority of the Roman See. Although Article IX had side-stepped this point, the precision of the differences which a longer debate would have brought about must inevitably have raised it. It followed on logically from the question of the authority of the Councils and, indeed, Eck suggested that the collocutors should now occupy themselves with the papacy,¹ instead of with the sacraments. The legate firmly resisted this suggestion.

It would, he believed, almost of necessity lead to the total breakdown of the discussions. If the colloquy were to fail, "quod Deus avertat", let it be on the nature of the sacraments rather than on the papacy, for it would be disastrous for the papal cause in Germany if the colloquy were to founder precisely on the question of Rome's authority.² It would be better to tackle the other less controversial articles first, for if agreement were reached on them the chances of the Protestants accepting papal authority would be greater.³

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1 Contarini/Farnese, 9/5/41, D/R, p.179.
2 Morone believed that this was what the Protestants were hoping for. Morone/Farnese, 9/5/41, HJ IV, 459.
3 Contarini/Farnese, 9/5/41, HJ I, 376.
In a sense this was, again, only a postponement of the evil day, and yet Contarini had done well to avoid a discussion. With the Catholic camp split, there was no telling what the outcome of a debate about the Primacy at such a time, in such a situation, would have been. Certainly claims to papal infallibility would have been swept aside by many a Catholic; if, however, other Catholics doubted Conciliar infallibility the Protestants could have asked very pointedly: just where did the infallibility of the Church lie?

To say the least the Protestants would have been in a strong bargaining position. Rome, the one-time symbol of the unity of the Church, could have been represented as stumbling-block in the way of recovery of unity. Not a few would have been willing to purchase that unity at the expense of papal claims and powers.

What, however, the German Catholics had to say about the papacy never came to utterance. The collocutors proceeded instead on the same day, 4 May, to discuss the sacraments.

For the moment, all went harmoniously. Agreement was reached on Article X, on exceedingly innocuous little discussion of the sacraments in general. Based on the Augustinian distinction between res and signum it managed to avoid every controversial

1 CR IV, 212-213.
point. It comes as a perhaps salutary surprise to see that there were points about the sacraments on which Protestants and Catholics still agreed!

Even more surprisingly, agreement was also reached about the sacrament (!) of ordination, as explained in Article XI. Lest individuals should arbitrarily take the preaching of the Gospel into their own hands, it explained, God had established a certain order. In this way any uncertainty about the truth, any vaunting of the personality above the office, would be avoided. This power of ordination, and indeed this order was a sacrament. The "word" of the sacrament was Christ’s command to preach and baptize, its "element" the laying on of hands, its "power" (vis) embraced the potestas ordinis - the ministry of the Word, the administration of the sacraments, and the governing of the Churches - and the potestas jurisdictionis - the power of binding and loosing. In the final paragraph a distinction was made between the four principal sacraments: baptism, ordination, the Eucharist and absolution "sine quibus Ecclesia non consistit" and those

1 The number of the sacraments was not specified, the article referring only to "sacramentis numero paucissimis". The 'opere operato' controversy is avoided; the sacraments are "non signa, ut tantum signent, sed ut sanctificent..." Ibid., p.212.

2 Ibid., pp.213-214.

3 "Hanc ordinationis vim, atque adeo ordinem esse sacramentum..." In Melanchthon's text we read "ordinem esse sacramentorum." Ibid., p.213.
which, though sacred symbols and useful for strengthening man's infirmity, were not necessary in the same way.

The Protestants were even ready, as Melanchthon had been at Augsburg, to recognize the right of the bishops to ordain the clergy, providing they first took in hand the long promised programme of reform. As Bucer pointed out, the Protestants did, in any case, regard their pastors as bishops.¹

The "moderation" of the Protestants on this question was largely a matter of tactics.¹ We see the same in the following two articles, on baptism and confirmation, to which they also agreed. Melanchthon added a caveat to the effect that he did not accept the dominical institution of confirmation, but, rather than raise controversy over these "lesser ceremonies", would stipulate only that the abuses connected with them be abolished.³

The Protestants, in other words, reluctant to attract the emperor's wrath for "obstinacy" on their part, concentrated their fire on a few major articles, and were prepared to let the others slip by, relatively unscathed by their criticism. The next article,

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¹ Ibid., p.422. Contarini understood this to mean that the Protestants conceded to the bishops the right to reordain their clergy. Contarini/Farnese, HJ I,376.
² Melanchthon explains that they had shown themselves "ganz gelinde...", "dass man uns nicht Schuld kann geben, wir haben nichts nachgegeben." OR IV,422.
³ "Das Buch zählt die Confirmatio und Oelung auch unter die Sacrament. Davon hab ich klar gesagt, dass mir nicht gefalle, dass mans unter die Sacrament, die Christus eingesetzt,ziehelt; doch wollte ich die geringe Ceremonien nicht hoch streiten,son dern die Missbrüche abgethan würden, und durch die Confirmatio der Catechismus angericht würde etc. Habe sie also pas-siren lassen." Ibid.
however, the fourteenth, which dealt with the eucharist, was bound to raise controversy, and in fact did.

The discussion of Articles VI-IX on the nature of the Church had lasted one day, that of Articles X-XIII even less. The debates that raged around Article XIV, however, continued for a record nine days, twice as long as the time taken to agree on justification. In view of Granvelle's parsimony in the allocation of time for discussion, this indicates — perhaps better than anything else — how desperately anxious he was to arrive at agreement on this subject. If the colloquy were to have any chance of success at all, agreement simply must be attained!

At no point did the political pressures on the theologians become so overt as here. The failure in the event to reach agreement was, therefore, a signal victory for the theologians at the expense of the statesmen, above all for Melanchthon on the Protestant side, and for Contarini on the Catholic. In the debate on justification the impulse to unity had not lacked a genuinely theological element; now a mediate position was being urged for purely political reasons. Neither Melanchthon nor Contarini, conciliatory as they might be by inclination, could have been expected to give ground under such auspices. We are confronted not by an authentic theological debate — for the critical issues were not really aired — but with a tactical juggling of diplomatic formulae in which considerations of truth and
falsehood threatened to become altogether irrelevant.

One is pushed back again to the fundamental question: what was the colloquy meant to achieve, what was the Regensburg Book itself meant to be? Should it represent a confession of faith of purely theological character, or merely a unitary formula, the highest common denominator of agreement possible in the circumstances? Granvelle consistently furthered the latter alternative, a formula which, admittedly, would not clarify all the issues, would leave much unsaid, and satisfy neither side entirely, but yet would provide a workable basis of unity for a joint attack on what Granvelle regarded as the real problems before Germany - the reform of the Church, restoration of law and order, a united resistance against France and the Turk. Here was truly grandiose, far-seeing thinking. The emperor's determination to force this statesman-like programme through was understandable.

And yet, this scheme had one fatal flaw. It assumed that the differences between the confessions, great and bitter though they might be, were not in the last resort fundamental to the Faith itself. They were due either to semantic misunderstandings or to particular doctrinal points which could be "frozen", or put into suspension until the Council finally met. For the rest it was a matter of setting aside the stubbornness, pride, wilfulness, hate, and fear, the personal antagonism and ambitions which perpetuated the schism. Disunity, to Granvelle, was an indication of the
moral immaturity of the theologians, and we will not deny his diagnosis its measure of truth.

At heart, however, it was false. It failed to recognize that Protestantism was in its very essence, by origin and intention and ethos, protest, and protest against the very heart of Catholicism. Protestantism existed to protest. It could only make its peace with the object of its protest by denying its own most inmost being.

The situation was, of course, complicated by the emergence of a reformed or reforming Catholicism, which could not be immediately and unambiguously identified with the traditional object of Protestant protest. If it is true that Protestantism existed to protest, it is equally true that where and when and insofar as its protest had been recognized and met it must cease not only to protest but to exist at all. A Protestantism which has lost this readiness to desist seeks itself alone and is thus a new Catholicism. Its continued existence can be justified only by the continued and clamant need for protest.

The Protestants at Regensburg believed that such a need was only too distressingly present. The "reform" the Catholics promised was not radical enough. Despite the irenic language of the Regensburg Book, despite the reform enthusiasm of a Cropper or a Contarini, despite the agreement on justification, the Protestants remained suspicious. In the coming few days their suspicions were to be confirmed.
Granvelle's scheme also failed to recognize the impossibility of Catholicism's coming to terms with a movement which threatened to destroy the very bulwarks on which it rested - the authority of tradition and of the bearers of tradition, the priestly mediation of grace, the primacy of the sacramental. If it were not to cut its own throat Catholicism dared not give any ground. For both Catholicism and Protestantism the substance of their self-understanding was at stake. No reason - humane, political, or whatever - could justify to them their yielding here. The stage was set for a head-on collision.

Contarini himself was in no position to avert this. He had, at his very first reading of the Book, insisted on the insertion in the article of a reference to transubstantiation.¹ It is not immediately obvious why Contarini should have laid such stress on this point. There were other far more glaring omissions in the article from the point of view of Catholic orthodoxy - the sacrificial nature of the sacrament, the participation of the priest, the communication of habitual grace - while, on the other hand, the article leaves no doubt as to the true and substantial presence (vere et substantialiter) of the body

¹ "A questa parte de sacrament.altaris, quando io la lessi insieme al Nontio et il Gropper, per quella prima acciata nota, che in questa parte mancava questa transubstantiazione et la feci aggiungere in margine con circa venti luoghi che coressi..." Contarini/Parnese, 9/5/41, HJ I, 377.
and blood of Christ after the consecration, which is then distributed to the faithful "sub specie panis et vini". This formulation neither explicitly affirms nor denies transubstantiation. It would be open to both sides to understand it as they wanted. Possibly, however, Contarini was concerned to avoid any suggestion of doubt in the Catholics' camp about a teaching which had figured so prominently in the inter-confessional polemic.¹

It may well be significant that even before it came to disagreement about transubstantiation the collocutors had disputed about the reservation of the Host, and its ceremonial circumstation.² The abandonment of the doctrine of transubstantiation would make the defence of these practices exceedingly difficult. Contarini's own conservatism as far as Catholic practice and ritual were concerned would thus be an added ground for his defence of transubstantiation. The Protestants certainly believed that the aim of their adversaries was to defend their Catholic practice and, above all, their "idolatrous masses".³

¹ Text of the article, CR IV, 216-217; it is clear that Contarini was not so well informed about the Protestant views on the sacraments as he had been on the question of justification. In his despatch to Farnese of 9 May he writes: "sono... entrati nelle sacramenti nelle quali questi Protestanti hanno havuto grandi errori et nel Santissimo Sacramento dell'Eucharistia, oltre l'opinione mia, non trovato grandissimi errori dell quali pero non si fa menzione alcuna nella confessione d'Augusta ne nell'Apologia loro." HJ I, 376.

² CR IV, 256.

Even after the first day of discussion doubts were felt on the Protestant side as to whether any further progress in the colloquy would be possible; Burchard echoed the general view when he opined that a cessation to the proceedings would be "to the glory of the Evangel". The "steadfastness" of Melanchthon, and Philipp of Hesse's support for this, found universal favour. If the Catholics remained obstinately by their views a continuation of the discussion would, Cruciger thought, be scarcely possible.

Prior to the discussions, which began on the fifth and were to last until the thirteenth of May, the Catholic collocutors had met, as was usual, with the legate, together with Veltwyck. Then they gathered again in the evening with Contarini, Morone

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1 "Quod si fit, haud dubie in gloriam Evangelii fiet." Ibid., p.257.

2 "Es werden aber mit Gottes Hilfe die Theologen dieses Theils beständig bleiben, und wider Gott und Gewissen nichts einräumen. So hat auch der Landgrave sich nochmals gestern und heut vernehmen lassen, und insonderheit auch Philippo angezeigt, was man mit Gott und Gewissen nicht thun könne, in keinem Weg zu weichen, sondern bei der Wahrheit, und also der Confession, Apologia und Schmalkaldischen Rathschlag zu bleiben." Saxon Councillors/Elector, 5/5/41, ibid., p.256.

3 "in quo si pertinaciter nunc resistant haud scio, an ulterus progressurae sint conciliationes." Cruciger/Menius, 5/5/41, ibid., p.259.

4 Contarini/Farnese, 9/5/41, HJ 1,377. The chronology is not absolutely clear from Contarini's despatch, but he discusses the meeting and then says "et cosi si partirono da me et il giorno seguente, che fu Venere alli 6, furono insieme li Cattolici et Protestanti..." Ibid., p.378. Dittrich sets it in the morning of 5 May, but does not specify when the previous meeting with Veltwyck took place. D/B, pp.629-630.
and Badia. There "some one"\textsuperscript{1} suggested that it would suffice to declare that Christ was present "realiter et personaliter", and to defer the other questions to the Council in view of the probable obduracy of the Protestants. This course Contarini rejected at once. The aim of the Catholics must be to stand by the truth, and to arrive at an agreement on the basis of the truth.\textsuperscript{2} The words of Christ and of Paul, the interpretation of all the Church's teachers modern and ancient, Greek and Latin, the determination of the celebrated Council under Innocent III, all testified clearly to the truth of the doctrine. Hence he could not tolerate any doubt being cast upon it. If agreement could only be reached by the use of ambiguous formulae the Catholics must stand by the truth and reject them.\textsuperscript{3} Contarini had no doubts either about the truth or about the importance of the doctrine, and his stand evidently convinced the others.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Probably Cropper. The suppression of the name is hardly accidental, an attempt to shield the individual from the wrath of the Curia.
\item "di far concordia nella verità", HJ I, 377.
\item Ibid., p. 378.
\item "Mia riposta fu laudata." Ibid. Dittrich takes this a degree further: "Diese entschiedene Antwort machte jede Einrede verstummen." D/B, p. 630.
\end{enumerate}
On 6 May the collocutors decided to abandon the discussion of the article in the Book, as had been done so successfully in the question of justification, and to seek another basis for agreement. The two parties retired to compose their separate drafts. The Catholic one was laid before Contarini by Pflug and Gropper and found his approval.\(^1\) This much is clear. For the rest, however, we are confronted by a series of riddles. First of all, what was this formula?

If, as Pastor and Vetter suggest\(^2\), it is the short statement "De transsubstantiatione"\(^3\) then this triggers off another series of questions, for the latter is a very eccentric exposition of Catholic belief. While affirming the real presence, the permissibility of the adoration and reservation of the sacrament, and of the term 'transubstantiation', it interpreted the latter in, to say the least, an unusual way. The bread is still

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1 "Dopo lungo tempo, havendo gia desinato, ritornarono da me il Gropperet il Fluch et mi portarono una scrittura fatta fra loro, la quale stava benissimo, onde pensai, che dovessero essere d'accordo." Contarini/Farnese, 9/5/41, HJ I, 378.

2 Vetter suggests that it was composed on the fifth, but all the evidence would point to the afternoon of the sixth. His further comment that Bretschneider offers no evidence for his view that only part of the formula has survived appears to overlook Bretschneider's belief that the following document (CR IV, 262-263) was the Protestant reply to this Catholic formula. Bretschneider then had to explain the fact that the Protestant statement cited phrases not found in the latter, and did so by saying that the copy we possess is an incomplete one. Ibid., p. 261. Vetter, p. 112, Anm. 2.

3 CR IV, 261-262.
present after the consecration, but as a mystical, supernatural bread. "Convenit, quod ubi verba Christi deprompta sunt, iam esse et dici corpus Christi. Et interim etiam panem, sed non communem, verum supernaturalem et supersubstantialem." The term 'transubstantiation' is used to define not the mode but only the fact of a mutation."...doctores, nedum veteres sed et recentiores iubeant abstinere a scrutinatione, per quem modum fiat transsubstantiatio..." The scholastic explanation of the trans¬action in terms of substance and accident has, in fact, been thrown to the winds. The traditional term has been retained but the thought categories are quite different. It can come as no surprise that in the final paragraph the postponement of any discussion of the exact understanding of transubstant¬iation to the end of the colloquy is suggested, and the avoid¬ance of such terminology in preaching is advocated. The simple folk should merely be exhorted to believe in the real presence.

Could this possibly have been the formula of which Conta¬rini approved? For this hypothesis would speak the fact that apparently only Gropper and Pflug were responsible for it. Eck, who took a very vigorous part in the discussions on this article 1

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1 "De conversione panis in coena domini magnam tragoediam excitavit Eccius." Thus Melanchthon. Ibid., p.415. It appears that Eck had accused the Protestants of misrepresenting the Church Fathers on the subject."Wir hören aber, dass Doctor Eck gegen Ew.Gnaden uns nach der übergebenen unserer confessio beschwerlich dargegeben, und crimen falsi aufgelegt haben soll, dass wir zu unsern Vorteil etlich allegata verkehren, auch Bastard-Schriften anziehen, und mit solcher Auflage uns beschweren will, dass man unsern angezogenen Gründen nicht soll Glauben geben." Ibid., p.274.
is not even mentioned. Gropper's own treatment of the Eucharist in his Enchiridion is primarily patristic; he shows no great interest in the scholastic interpretation, and the stress on preaching the essentials would suit him, and Pflug with his humanist background, very well. On the other hand, quite apart from any considerations of content, we know that Contarini was later strongly opposed to the deferment of the question of transsubstantiation to the end of the colloquy. Would he have been likely to agree to it here?

The formula we must deal with next is, if anything, even more mysterious. It has inscribed on the back, "De sacramento censura D. Theologorum nostrae partis ad articulos nuper transmissos", and is regarded by Bretschneider as the Protestant reply to the document we have just been studying. Incredibly Dittrich accepts

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1 He does not, of course, deny the change of substance; to deny this would be for him to doubt the omnipotence of God's word and he gives a traditional account of the doctrine of transsubstantiation. His main interest, however, is in the union of the believer with Christ. "Unde id consequitur...nempe nos virtute huius tam eximii sacramenti non solum spiritualiter...sed et corporaliter Christo uniri..." Johann Gropper, Enchiridion Christianae Institutionis (in Canones Concilii Provincialis Coloniensis; Köln: 1538), p.110. It is Christ who is both the priest and the victim; "...in hoc sacramento nihil proprium est sacerdotis, sed totum agit Christus." Ibid., p.103. Insofar as the Church offers the true body and blood of Christ "...sacrificium mere representativum est eius quod in cruce semel est peractum." Insofar as the Church offers itself, as Christ's mystical body this is a true but spiritual sacrifice. "Immolatur ergo Christus in altari, sed sacramentaliter et mystice." Ibid., p.105. The real Presence is thus a spiritual one; "missa non tantum representativum, sed praesens etiam ac verum, sed spirituale sacrificium...", and one in which faith places the primary part. "In missa primas partes tenet fides, hoc est, fiducia remissionis peccatorum per Christum..." Ibid., p.107.

2 CR IV, 262-263.

3 Ibid., p.261.
this hypothesis.¹

It begins by accepting the teaching of the real presence and by protesting that "eam praesentiam defensam esse scriptis mul-torum in nostris ecclesiis." It proceeds to accept a 'mystical mutation' of the elements, and suggests again that the closer definition of 'transubstantiation' be left until the end of the colloquy. The adoration of Christ as present in the sacrament is not rejected, provided the abuses which have arisen in connection with this are remedied.

This draft article could not possibly have been that which Melanchthon laid before the collocutors on 7 May as the official statement of the Protestant position, for this omitted any reference to transubstantiation and appears to have been a strong statement of the normal Lutheran position. Melanchthon's own statements and those of his colleagues all point to his having taken a firm stand at this point.²

Much more probable is that the formula stems from Bucer, who was working in close collaboration with Gropper in the attempt to arrive at a compromise solution. It may even be that we have here the explanation for Granvelle's puzzling statement to Morone

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1 D/B, p.630, Anm.7.

2 "Volunt mutari panem et repositum adorari. Nolui assentiri, fuique durior quam meus parastetes, qui olim maxime oppugnavit illam adorationem." Melanchthon/Camerarius, 10/5/41, CR IV, 281.
that Bucer had declared himself ready to preach transubstantiation if agreement were reached at Regensburg.¹ For by 'transubstantiation' he would have meant no more than the explanation of our Catholic formula that after the consecration it was a 'spiritual' bread which was present.

These two formulae may well, therefore, represent the attempt of a mediating party to bridge the differences by stressing the common ground (the real Presence) and the common foes (the Sacramentarians) of both Catholics and Lutherans, the 'spiritual' or 'mystical' character of the change in the elements, and the need for practical reform. In the unlikely case of the first formula being the one which Contarini accepted, his hope that it would form a basis for agreement becomes somewhat more intelligible.² Such flexibility on his part would have been made possible by the imprecision of his understanding of transubstantiation. If he found it attested in Basil and Chrysostom and even in Christ's own words, then he presumably cannot have meant by it the relation of the substance of the elements to their accidents.³ The second formula, however, cannot possibly be the 'official' Protestant answer, which has unfortunately been lost.⁴ Its composer

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¹ Morone/Farnese, 11/5/41, D/R, p.180. Vetter suggests that this may well have been a convenient diplomatic lie. Vetter, p.116.
² Cf. p.238, n.1, above.
³ Contarini/Farnese, 9/5/41, HJ I, 377.
⁴ As Vetter remarks. Vetter, p.113, Anm.2.
will probably have been Bucer, and may be related to the talks with Gropper on a possible compromise formula to which Granvelle had commissioned him on the seventh.

Melanchthon’s unbending attitude alarmed Granvelle, who threatened him with the disfavour of the emperor. Granvelle’s concern was understandable, for with the original article rejected, and the alternative articles of the Protestants and the Catholics unacceptable, deadlock seemed not far away. It may well have been to meet this situation that Bucer’s mediating formula, if it was his, was composed.

Melanchthon’s reaction to this heavy pressure was, however, the opposite to that of Bucer. Instead of bowing before the storm, he sought the backing of the Protestant Estates for his position. The theological ‘opinion’ they commissioned from the other Protestant theologians at Regensburg was a complete vindication of Melanchthon’s stand. On Sunday, 8 May, they reported to the Protestant Estates that neither transubstantiation nor adoration or reservation of the elements could be tolerated. It had come in the meantime to hefty disputes between Bucer and some of his colleagues.

On the tenth the Protestant collocutors, following the command of their Estates, presented Granvelle with an account of the

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1 Contarini/Farnese, 9/5/41, HJ I, 378.

2 CR IV, 279. Gropper reported to Contarini, "...che in dicendis sententiis il Melantone et il Bucero sono stati molto modesti, ma il Bencio, Musculo, et Capitone sono stati veementissimi, et che fra loro sono in grandi dispiaceri et controversie." HJ I, 379.
reasons why they could not accept the Catholic position. Granvelle, understandably, refused to receive this statement. Not only had the recourse to the other twenty-one theologians been a breach of the pledge of secrecy which the collocutors had given, the involvement of the Protestant Estates had brought about exactly what the colloquy had been intended to avoid: the head-on collision of 'official' representatives.

Cropper presented another Catholic draft, and Granvelle exerted all his influence to secure its acceptance. With the departure of Eck, who had been stricken down by a hefty fever, Pistorius had also had to leave so that both sides were still equally represented. Melanchthon was now therefore the sole one among the five present who was opposed to a compromise agreement, and was under very considerable pressure. Cropper himself was ready to omit the word 'transubstantiation', but when he showed the draft to Contarini in the evening the legate enforced its reintroduction.

The eleventh saw the presentation of a further article by

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1 This text was in Latin, CR IV, 275-278; a German text (ibid., pp. 271-275) was submitted to the other president, Duke Frederick, who agreed to accept it. Ibid., p. 279.

2 Vetter, p. 115.

3 CR IV, 280; the dispute about this article was, from all accounts, one of the bitterest in the whole colloquy, and Melanchthon suggests that it may have taken a toll on Eck's health: "In diesem Gespräch ward Eck krank, mochte sich vielleicht zu hart bewegt haben, und darnach sehr getrunken, dass ein febris folget." CR IV, 583.

4 Contarini/Farnese, 11/5/41, HJ I, 382.
the Protestants, which the Catholics retired to discuss with Contarini, while the Protestants conferred about Gropper's draft. Contarini's attitude to the Protestants had now hardened considerably. In his despatch on the ninth he spoke of new and dangerous errors in the Protestant position. Their opposition to the adoration of the Host, and denial of the continued presence of Christ in the sacrament after communion were to be attributed, he thought, to an inner-Protestant attempt to conciliate the Zwinglians. The denial of transubstantiation had apparently become confused in his mind with the denial of the Real Presence. Hence it was not enough for him that the Protestant draft of 11 May lacked any explicit errors. Now that he knew the mind of the Protestants he realised that these errors lurked behind the formula, and he was not prepared to turn a blind eye to this in the interests of unity. In his commendable concern for a genuine concord "in the truth" he has turned inquisitor. The word 'transubstantiation' has become for him a shibboleth, a pointer to the real intentions of the Protestants, to the vital differences between the parties which must not be papered over with glib formulae.

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1 Ibid.

2 HJ I,376-377; the Protestants, he said, "non hanno né ragioni né dirò vere né verisimili, ma dirò etiam né pur sofistiche né autorità né cosa alcuna se non la sua mera volontà." Ibid., p. 378.

3 He would have had no doubts about accepting it, "se io non sapessi il suo errore..." HJ I,382.
Unlike Bucer, Melanchthon and Pflug Contarini had had no previous experience of a colloquy of this nature. No doubt he felt that the ground was slipping away from his feet, that he was getting out of his depth, that the bartering over the formulae was endangering the substance of the faith. Nothing is more understandable in such circumstances than the resort to a fixed point of impeccable orthodoxy. Between the world of dogmatic tradition and the relativities of committee theology Contarini's preference was emphatically for the former.

Lest the whole colloquy grind to a halt over this one issue Granvelle suggested despairingly that the entire question of the eucharist be deferred to the end of the colloquy. Contarini, however, refused to countenance this if it implied casting any doubt on such a central issue. He could only allow it, he said, if it were explicitly declared to be on the wish of the Protestants and not to any uncertainty or need for clarification on the Catholic side.¹

On 12 May therefore, the discussions were continued. The Protestants demanded amendments to Gropper's draft of the tenth of May, concentrating on the reference to transubstantiation, and Gropper and Pflug advised the legate to accept this. They reported that Melanchthon and Bucer, due to the influence of the other Protestant theologians, were unable to yield, and that

¹ Ibid., p.383.
if the Catholics did not concede the point deadlock would ensue. Each side would have to present the emperor with their own separate article. Contarini remained adamant. The breakdown of the discussions, and the possible collapse of the colloquy would be preferable to what would be regarded in Rome as apostasy. The Protestants, as he read the situation, were intent on smuggling in their dogmas under the cover of a false concord.¹

The thirteenth saw the continuation of the debate, held this time in Granvelle's own residence. The crucial discussions were no longer, however, those between the collocutors, who were agreed that the term "transubstantiation" could be dispensed with, but those between the Catholic collocutors and the legate, to whom they brought two draft articles, one from each party. Gropper's own draft, as Contarini saw at once, omitted the reference to transubstantiation.

This was by now, of course, an overt and deliberate defiance of the legate's wishes by Gropper and Pflug. The Catholic front was irreparably broken, and a Protestant victory seemed on the cards. Contarini's decisiveness managed to avoid this, but at a high cost. By refusing his assent to the amendment he sealed the fate of the colloquy.

It was the most critical moment of the whole colloquy. Granvelle, informed of Contarini's intentions, appeared on the scene at once and remonstrated with the legate. He described his untiring efforts in the last eight days to win over the Protestants to an agreement, and begged Contarini not to bring about the failure of the colloquy.

¹ The Protestant amendments made it clear, Contarini argued, that "sub involvere verborum volevano nascondere li loro dogmi e fare una concordia paliata." Contarini/Farnese, 13/5/41, HJ I, 384.
Contarini retorted that he wanted no such thing, but that he would never surrender one point of Catholic truth or allow it to be obscured. Otherwise he, with the emperor, would be regarded as a heretic by the whole of Christianity. At the instance of the Protestants he was ready to permit the postponement of further debate until the end of the colloquy, but on no account could the reference to transubstantiation be omitted from the Catholic draft.¹

On the human level, Contarini sympathised with Granvelle,² but his last word had obviously been spoken. Granvelle had to give way. In the evening he returned to the legate after a further session with the collocutors on the two drafts. In the Catholic draft the clause in which the 'transformatio' involved in the sacrament was described as 'transsubstantiatio' had been restored. The Protestants insisted that the substance of the bread remained after the consecration of the elements. It was clear, Contarini concluded, that the differences were genuine, not merely verbal.³ He was ready to meet the Protestants' request that he clarify some points, but Granvelle explained that they meant at the close of the colloquy. In the meantime

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¹ Ibid., p.385.
² "perché in vero fa grandissima fatica, ma alla verità non si doveva far preguiditio..." Ibid.
³ Gropper and Pflug had claimed previously that Melanchthon and Bucer agreed with the Catholic formula 'per il senso'. The Protestants' insistence that the substance of the bread remained after the consecration proved however, said Contarini, "che noi differentiamo nel senso et però si faceva difficoltà nelle parole." Ibid.
any further discussion of the question was suspended.

Any hope of a successful outcome to the colloquy was now, of course, almost totally extinguished. As Contarini put it, "unless God brings about a miracle, I shall not see concord between us." He feared that Granvelle would try to shrug off the responsibility for its failure on to the papacy, but was determined to present the Holy See positively not as the disturber of ecumenical endeavour but as the "guardian of Christian doctrine." His concern for Catholicism was beginning to merge into his concern for the Curia.

The discussions which now followed, and indeed which continued until the end of the month, were no longer animated with any real hope of success. It was rather a matter of going through the prescribed motions, of pursuing the delicate task of finding the scapegoats and allotting the blame. Contarini himself has begun to speak of the Protestants in moralising terms, as "highly obstinate and stubborn."

The transition on the next day, 14 May, to the article on penance and absolution brought little relief. As might have been expected, the Protestants refused to agree that the

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1 "...ne spero, se Dio non fa miracoli, verrà concordia fra noi." Ibid., p.386.
2 "conservatrice deli dogmi christiani." Ibid.
3 "ostinati molto e pertinaci." Ibid.
enumeration of all mortal sins was necessary. On the question of satisfaction Melanchthon stoutly resisted with Biblical arguments the "auctoritates patrum et ecclesiae" which the Catholics adduced to support their case. Since he was having to bear the brunt of the struggle for the Protestants, he would gladly have seen the colloquy broken off. His inflexibility won him Burckhard’s cordial praise, while Bucer’s behaviour was described as "fast wankend". ¹

The Protestants’ refusal to recognise the necessity for auricular confession, while conceding its utility in many cases, prompted Contarini to energetic intervention. On the fifteenth he presented himself before the emperor. ² His driving concern was to avoid the compromising of the Catholic position.

The emergence of the new errors about penance, together with their previous attitude to the eucharist, made it evident, he explained, that a reunion with the Protestants was out of the question. The central doctrines of the Christian faith were the trinity, the incarnation, and the eucharist. ³ Without a

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¹ Burckhard/John Frederick, 14/5/41, ibid., p.291; the Elector’s representatives also compared Melanchthon and Pistorius with Bucer to the latter’s discredit. "Und da gleich Bucerus etwas wankend wollt werden, wie denn seine Reden gemeiniglich mit halben Munde gehen, so werden doch die andern, ob Gott will, nichts begeben, das der Confession und Schmalkaldischen Rathschlag entgegen." Ibid., p.293.

² HJ I,388; the memorandum he presented to Charles V in D/R, Ined. Nr. 65, pp.325-326.

³ Only on the trinity, on christology, and on this sacramental issue had the Church made dogmatically binding pronouncements; hence Contarini could say that the sacramente of the eucharist, together with the other two, constituted the three principal articles in the Christian faith, "nelli quali bisognava l'intelletto a veramente essere Christiano." HJ I, 388.
recognition of them all no union was possible. The sole remedy he could suggest was that the emperor exert his authority over the Protestant princes and theologians, and thus induce them to depart from their erroneous ways.¹

Charles replied that while he was no theologian, he had been informed that the difference was only over the single word 'transubstantiation', and that the Protestants were ready to re-introduce the practice of auricular confession. This being the case the best policy seemed to be not the abandonment of the discussions but the extraction of a maximum of concessions from the Protestants. At the end of the colloquy an attempt could then be made to resolve all outstanding disagreements.

Contarini's answer is interesting. He compared the term 'transubstantiatio' with the Nicene 'consubstantialis'. Just as in the latter case it was not a dispute over a mere word so in the article on the eucharist it was not a matter of terminology but of the substance of a central article of the faith.² This had been promulgated by a Council attended by patriarchs, archbishops, and between eight hundred and a thousand bishops which had chosen that term 'transubstantiatio' in order to explain exactly the mutation of the bread and of the wine into the body and blood of Christ. On such key articles there can be no wavering;

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¹ "per rimoverli da questo senso loro erroneo..." Ibid.
² "quella parola importava il tutto..." Ibid., p.389.
we must be ready to sacrifice our very lives for them.¹

Meanwhile Melanchthon was showing an equal disinclination to compromise his principles. In the conference on 15 May Melanchthon declared that he would no more make concessions on auricular confession than on private masses, the adoration of the saints, or the primacy of the papacy.² He was firmly committed to a completely unconciliatory position. The displeasure with which the agreement on justification had been greeted in Wittenberg had led to a new instruction by the Elector John Frederick, that nothing was to be agreed on in future without Luther's prior consent.³ The other Protestant theologians in Regensburg also tended to influence Melanchthon towards a more rigorist approach. It would all the same be foolish to deny that Melanchthon's opposition to Bucer's mediating course had its basis in his own very personal convictions. Granvelle's rather ham-handed attempt to

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¹ Wordly, political considerations must be subordinated to religious ones, Contarini argued. At the time of the martyrs Christians had no temporal possessions, and then the Faith, whose body and substance are the articles now being dealt with, was at its most effective. Compared with this the temporal welfare of Christendom is a mere external good. HJ I, 389. This argumentation makes it quite clear that for Contarini the debate is not a theological one at all, for the Protestants have no genuine basis for their views, but a struggle of the true faith against mere indifferentism.

² CR IV, 300.

³ "Nun hätten wir wohl leiden mögen,... dass wir zu jeder Zeit, was in solchem Gespräch vorgelaufen, unverzüglich Bericht bekommen hätten, nachdem E.L. und Ihr wissen, was an dieser grosswichtigen Sache gelegen, und, so von den Worten unserer Confession gewichen würde werden,... dass wir nicht unterlassen würden, solches jedes Mal an Doctor Martinus zu verleihen, und seine Meinung, Bedenken und Willen darzu zu hören und zu vernnehmen." John Frederick/Wolfgang of Anhalt, 10/5/41, ibid., p. 282.
bring pressure on him had the very opposite effect from that intended. On the sixteenth he threatened that unless freedom of speech were granted him, he would absent himself from all future deliberations. This threat produced an apology from Granvelle, but the discussions made no progress.\footnote{Gropper being ill, Pflug affirmed his determination to abide by the Catholic viewpoint, and Melanchthon produced a Protestant counter-article.} In his audience with the emperor on 15 May Contarini had suggested that the sole way out of the impasse might be for pressure to be brought to bear on the Protestant princes and theologians. The resort of Melanchthon to the Protestant Estates on the question of transubstantiation had been the first hint that the Erasmian theory of an independent colloquy of the learned was proving hard to realise in practice. Contarini's suggestion was a further vote of no-confidence in the colloquy

\footnote{\textquotedblleft...wiewohl wir einen gelinden Artikel gestellt samt einer längern Bestätigunng, so war dennoch Granvel nicht zufrieden, gabe mir viel böser Wort, dass ich mich des andern Tags in Anfang der Reden beklagt, und sagt, so es die Meinung haben sollt, dass mir nicht zugelassen meine Meinung zu sagen, wollt ich fürohin daraus bleiben. Darauf er sich entschuldiget, und sind also fort geschritten an den dritten Theil des Buchs..." Ibid., p.584; cf. pp.300,305.}

\footnote{Contarini/Farnese,18/5/41,HJ I,390.}

\footnote{The text in CR IV,354-363.}
method, and an even more important one, for in his desperation Granvelle gave it his support.¹

On 17 May Philipp of Hesse was summoned before the emperor. His reply to complaints about the extremism and stubbornness of the Protestant theologians was to propose — presumably with a straight face — that Luther be invited to participate. He was, after all, a keen advocate of the reform of the Church!²

On the eighteenth it was the turn of the representatives of Electoral Saxony to appear before Charles. The emperor protested anew his desire for the unification and reform of the Church, and urged that the Protestant theologians show themselves more conciliatory and keep the secrecy of the negotiations better so that this end could be achieved.³ The Margrave of Brandenburg and the representatives of the free cities were also treated to

¹ Contarini had argued in his memorandum, "...che con questi Theologi Protestanti et con li loro Principi V. Maesta interponendo la sua autorita facesse efficace officio, accioche mossi dalla verita explicatali per bocca di V. Maesta lasciassero le loro errenee innovationi et ritornassino al senso cathanico di tutta la chiesa, perche senza questo impossibile e di far unione alcuna." D/R, Ined. Nr.65, p.326; he thanked Granvelle for his decision to have the Protestants summoned before the emperor, but did not spare him a further lecture on the need to retain intact the truth of the faith, to avoid ambiguous terminology, and to ensure that the blame for the continuance of the schism was attributed not to the Holy See but to the obstinacy of the Protestants. HJ I, 391.

² The emperor complained that he had heard "wie doctor Lauter Philippo Melanthoni ein instruction zugeschickt habe, daruber Philippus nicht schreiten dorfe..."; Philipp replied, "Philippus sei an zweivel wedder an Francreich noch Lutheran gepunden, sonder sehe an zweivel auf Got; so mocht s.f.g. irez teils leiden, das Lutherus hie were; derselb, wan er das gut gemut sehe, das die notwendigen artigkel nachgelassen wurden und ein christlich ehrlich reformation furgenomen, so wurde (er) schidlicher sein dan der andern keiner; man hat zu Schmalkalden von artigkel, was man thun konte, geredt, derine sei Lutherus nicht unschidlich gewesen." Lenz III, 75, 78.

³ CR IV, 293-298.
similar expositions.  

All this activity, however, availed little. For the third time an article had to be set aside as unresolved. Granvelle could only hope to force through agreement on the other articles, and by bringing political pressure to bear on the Protestant princes to force them to accept the Catholic point of view on the Church, the eucharist and confession. A forlorn enough hope. The next article, that on marriage, which was discussed on the nineteenth, occasioned no great controversy, although marriage was described as a sacrament. The question of divorce was deferred until later. The Protestants also allowed the seventeenth article on Extreme Unction to go through, provided the abuses connected with it were abolished, and the miniscule eighteenth article on charity as the third note of the Church raised no objections. They were without doubt saving their energy for the major rumpus which was to be expected over the following article, "De Ecclesiae hierarchico ordine, et in constituenda politia autoritate."

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2 HJ I, 391.
3 "Quae vero de divorciis et matrimonialibus iudiciis deliberanda erunt, reserventur ad reformationem." CR IV, 219.
5 Ibid., pp. 221-224.
The very title was a provocation for Melanchthon, who launched a frontal attack on the whole article, although it had obviously been framed with exquisite care. Any language offensive to Protestant ears had been excised, many noble things were said about the diversity of gifts, the bond of charity, and Christian freedom. The quotations were drawn from Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian and Augustine, from Paul and the Gospels; not one from the scholastics.

To maintain the unity of the Church, it reasoned, above all among the bishops, who preside in the place of the apostles, Christ had ordained that Peter, while possessing no more power or honour than any other of the apostles, should be their chief, the fount of their unity. To follow the apostles and thus maintain the unity of the Church in its hierarchical order came the bishops, among whom some were archbishops and patriarchs. Of these the Roman bishop, obtaining as it were the chair of Peter in vicarious succession, was adjudged the Primate, excelling the others by the extent of his compassion and — that the unity of the Church might be preserved — by his powers of jurisdiction.

This order is maintained by the legitimate episcopal succession, and by the power committed to the bishops of administering the ecclesiastical polity, both as regards ceremonies and discipline, in neither of which, however, rests our hope of salvation,
which lies "in the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ."  

The major part which the discussions on this article played in the reports of the Protestant theologians shows the importance which they attached to it. It is the logical continuation to the article on the Church, and is dealt with in the context of the third note of the Church, the bond of charity. Melanchthon detected an intention to extract generalised concessions from the Protestants in the former article which would then be twisted to their disadvantage in the nineteenth. 

The term 'hierarchy' displeased him - he would have preferred 'church order' - as it smacked of domination. He drew unflattering comparisons between the claims of the bishops to be the followers of the apostles and the actual conduct of the German bishops, and pointed to the abuses which had arisen from the episcopal jurisdiction over ceremonial and disciplinary

1 "Sic tamen, ut hae Ceremoniae et disciplina hoc fine in Ecclesia instituantur et administrantur, non ut in illis fiducia salutis, quae in gratia domini Jesu consistit, reponatur... Sed tantum ut sint incitamenta et retinacula pietatis, ut omnia in Ecclesia pie, decenter, honeste et ordine flant..." Ibid., pp. 223-224.

2 E.g. Ibid., pp. 422-424; 442-443; 584.

3 "Darnach ist ein tückischer Artikel gefolget, den sie nennen: von Ordnung der Kirchenherrschaft. Der Dichter dieses Buchs hat gethan wie ein listiger Hauptmann, der die Haufen hin und her versteckt. Also in diesem Buch siehet ein Artikel auf den andern, und sind die Tück mit grossem Fleiss versteckt... Drob en hat das Buch gesagt, die Kirche sey die Versammlung der Heiligen und Unheiligen; nun kommt dieser Artikel und erklärt dasselbige, nämlic: unter Einem Haupte, dem römischen Bischoff; und sagt weiter: zusammengeführt mit dem Band der Liebe, das ist, mit Gehorsam in Menschensatzungen." CR IV, 422-423.
matters. He opposed the recognition of the papal primacy.\(^1\)

Melanchthon was alone in this attack on the article, for Bucer joined with Cropper and Granvelle in urging him to accept it. Granvelle pointed to the critical state of the deliberations. If this article were not agreed upon the whole colloquy would fail and the hope of a reformed and unified German church vanish. Feige, the Hessian chancellor, and Joachim II, Elector of Brandenburg, also attempted to win Melanchthon over.\(^2\) Master Philipp was, however, not to be shaken, and so yet another article remained unresolved.

Contarini had long foreseen that the question of the hierarchy and in particular of the papacy was bound to cause trouble. He had drafted, while the article on the Church was being discussed, two statements with which he hoped to secure an agreement, and at the same time avoid bringing to light the difference of opinion within the Catholic camp on the relative standing of papacy and councils. On the councils he simply pointed to the historical fact that in the past General Councils had been called to settle disputed points in the understanding of Scripture, and that where these had been duly called and assembled in the Holy Spirit, their authority had never been challenged. As to

\(^1\) CR IV, 423; "...qui hanno detto che laudano tutto quest'ordine, ma che non sanno, come li loro Vescovi qui in Germania possano essere Vescovi, che significa sopraintendenti, non attendendo essi punto ad alcuna sopraintendenza del suo grege..." Contarini/Parnese, 23/5/41, D/R, Ined. Nr. 66, p. 327.

\(^2\) CR IV, 584. Philip of Hesse was already engaged in secret negotiations with the emperor through Gerhard Veltwyck in preparation for their treaty of the thirteenth of June. Lenz III, 78 ff.
the papacy he derived its institution from Christ who had set
the Roman bishop over the other bishops for the sake of the
Church's unity by according to him the general jurisdiction
over the whole church.¹ Not only are none of the controversial
questions resolved here; there is also a distressing lack of
any theological insight into the issues involved.

This impression of superficiality can only be strengthened
by the reactions of the legate to the debates on the hierarchy.
To the Protestant criticisms of the German bishops he had nothing
better to offer than the rather trite distinction between office
and office-bearer, and with it a childish play on logic. The
Protestants should be asked if the German bishops had or had
not sinned by the negligent execution of their duties. Either
the Protestants must admit that they had not sinned, because
they were not real bishops in any case, or that they had sinned,
which latter alternative would however be an admission that
they were genuine bishops!² Can Contarini really have imagined
that a Melanchthon would be impressed by such logical gymnast-
ics? Did he have any understanding at all of the Protestant
standpoint on this issue? As compared to his understanding of
justification his appreciation of this issue certainly seems
deficient.

¹ Contarini/Parnese, 9/5/41, HJ I, 379-381.
The discussion of this article had lasted into 20 May, and on the same day the next article, the twentieth, was read. We are now in the dying stages of the colloquy. The last few articles were dealt with in less than three days. Both Catholics and Protestants aimed at a speedy despatch of the outstanding business since it was obvious that a successful outcome was out of the question.¹

The twentieth article dealt with certain 'dogmata' — the adoration of the saints, the Mass, celibacy, monasticism — which were derived not from the Scripture but from the authority of the Church. It admitted the existence of abuses in connection with them, but adhered to the traditional Catholic position throughout.² No genuine meeting of minds took place on any of these questions. According to Contarini Bucer was ready to accept the canon of the Mass, and the Elector of Brandenburg spoke in similar terms to Gropper,³ but these were isolated voices. To every one of the disputed points Melanchthon handed in a counter-article.⁴

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¹ Cruciger's comment could be taken as representative for the Protestant side. "Tales fuerunt actiones et certamina, ut valde optaverimus liberari ac praecidi institutum colloquium." CR IV,305.

² Ibid., pp.224-231.


⁴ CR IV,369-371.
The following article on the use of the sacraments compared the Catholic and Protestant position to the disadvantage of the latter, and the celebration of private masses, the limitation of the cup to the clergy, and the use of Latin in the liturgy were declared at least as justified, if not more so, than the Protestant practice. Again the Protestants submitted a counter-article.

On the question of ecclesiastical discipline much common ground was found. The twenty-second article urged, for example, the reform of the clergy and the founding of schools at cathedrals, collegiate churches and monasteries. Melanchthon, however, insisted on an explicit recognition of the right of priests to marry, and did not hesitate to remark that the best reform for the monasteries would be their abolition.

The final article dealt with the reform of the laity, and also with other lesser questions. Without coming to any agreement the colloquy, to the relief of all concerned, ground to a halt on 22 May. The colloquitors gathered together the revised

1 Ibid., pp.224-231.
2 Ibid., pp.271-374.
3 Ibid., pp.233-237.
4 "Sed de hac tota causa referimus nos ad caetera nostra scripta de coniugio et de votis Monachorum; quorum vitae genus, ut fuit hactenus, quam multum habeat errorum alibi declaravimus. Et cum in multis locis desint stipendia Pastoribus Ecclesiariarum, et docentibus literas ac scholasticis pauperibus, necessitas publica postulat, praecipue illis ex reeditibus Monasteriorum consuli." Ibid., p.376.
articles on the twenty-fourth and the twenty-fifth, and on the last day of the month they were presented to the emperor, together with the nine counter-articles of the Protestants. The colloquy was over.

The speed with which these last articles were dispatched, and the end to the dramatic possibility of a reconciliation, meant that Contarini's rôle decreased in importance. His reports tend to be generalised and to obscure the real depth of the differences. At times, one wonders if he has not lost all grip on reality. When, for example, Granvelle asked him whether he thought Luther should be invited to participate in the negotiations he replied, "Do what the Holy Spirit leads you to do; but without doubt it would be a matter of the greatest importance, if Luther could be won over." 2

Contarini still hoped that - although there seemed to be conflict on many articles - many of the differences could still be resolved. 3 Without doubt he set his main hope now on the

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1 Ibid., pp. 237-238; D/R Ined. Nr. 66, p. 327; Fr. Contarini/Senate, 31/5/41, ibid., p. 191.

2 "Fatte quello, che v'inspiri lo Spirito Santo; non vi è dubio, che se si potesse guadagnar Luthero, sarebbe cosa di grandissima importanza..." Contarini/Farnese, 23/5/41, ibid., Ined. 68, p. 332.

3 He noted the lack of any reference in the book to monastic vows, to fasting, and of any explicit treatment of the question of purgatory, and added that "...vedo, che siamo molto lontani d'accordo." Contarini/Farnese, 29/5/41, Ibid., Ined. Nr. 71, pp. 333-334; but he could also say: "A me pare, che la differenzi a, ancorche pare essere in molto articoli, pure molti si potranno accettare, ma quelli di cui de eucharistia et de confessione sono li importantissimi." Contarini/Farnese, 23/5/41, ibid., Ined. Nr. 68, p. 331.
authority of the emperor.¹ He was, of course, bitterly disappointed at the sorry end to the colloquy. The sole gain that could be registered, he thought, was that it must now be clear to the emperor, and indeed to all, that the pope had placed no hindrance in the way of the attempt at reconciliation, and that the articles in which they disagreed did not relate to the Primacy or any papal interests.² He was as determined as ever not to counteract any agreement which would allow the preaching of falsehood.³

On every point his analysis of the situation was faulty. There was neither hope of a future resolution of the differences,

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¹ "Io replicai, che il negotio era difficile, pure che sperava in Dio prima, et in sua Maestà, la quale usando la desterrità et autorità sua, lo condurrà a buon fine, né più si ha processo in detta trattazione della religione." Ibid., Ined. Nr. 66, p. 328.

² "A me pare di vedere etiam la Cesarea Maesta et esso Mons. di Granvello in grandissimo travaglio di animo, non sanno come possono uscire da questo laberinto con honor suo... Mi dispiace sino al cuore che le cose vadino alla rovina, si come vanno. Pure fra tanto male ci è quel bene. Prima che Cesare e tutti conoscano che da noi et da quella santa sede non è stato posto impedimento alcuno alla concordia." Contarini/Parnese, 2/6/41, HJ I, 477.

³ "...come quà siamo sul trattato della Religione con questi Protestanti, del quale per ancho io non potrei fare indito alcuno della riuscita; imperocché per tutti questi di passati s'è atteso alla collazione ch'hanno fatto insieme li dottori Catholici et Protestanti, li quali in alcuni articoli di non poca importanza sono rimasi differenti, hora tutti insieme hanno fatto la sua relacione a Cesare et datoli ogni cosa in scritto; io siccome altre volte ho scritto a Roma et a Messer Hieronimo Bandino, non sono per consentire a risolutione alcuna, la quale non sia Catholica et secondo il senso della Chiesa con honor della Sede Apostolica..." ZKG III, 509-510.
nor of the emperor's authority being of any avail, nor that the emperor or anyone else was likely to be impressed by the exertions on the papal side. If the Imperial wrath was to a large extent directed towards Melanchthon, it also fell in large measure upon the papacy, whose legate's direct intervention had forestalled any hope of agreement on the eucharist and on penance. Contarini's well-meant crusade had failed, and as the search for scapegoats for the collapse of the colloquy became more avid, he was to find himself one of the most eligible of the contestants.
The colloquy had not been a complete failure. Bucer even believed that all the essential points of Christian faith and life had been covered by the agreed articles, and that a genuine basis for a lasting concord had been laid. It is certainly true that a beginning had been made, and this itself, in view of the long-standing differences between the confessions and the exclusively negative attitude of some of the principal parties involved, is astounding enough.

Yet Granvelle's hopes had been irremediably shattered; his "grand design" lay in ruins. He had hoped, after the conclusion of the private theological discussions, to be able to present the Diet with an amended version of the Regensburg Book, agreed upon by the collocutors from both sides, which would serve as a blueprint for a lasting religious settlement. Instead he had to lay before the Estates two very different documents: the Regensburg Book itself, and no less than nine Protestant counter-articles. The "professionals" had failed to reach theological agreement. Was there much hope that the politicians would do any better?

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1 In his account of the colloquy he affirmed that the agreed articles contained, "...alles dasjenige so dazu von nötten sein mag, das wir vor Gott und in seiner gemeyn gotseliglich gerecht und heilig leben. Und was nit verglichen das selbige ist auch nit not zu wissen noch zu gebrauchen und mag on alle gefahr des heyls onerkant und ongehalten bleiben. "Alle Handlungen und Schrifften zu vergleichung der Religion durch die Key, Mai Churfürsten Fürsten und Stände aller theylen Auch den Päbstat.Legaten auf jüngst gehaltenen Reichstag zu Regensburg verhandlet und einbracht (Strassburg:bei Wendel Kihel, 1541), p.153.
The Catholics had proposed no counter-articles, partly because they had been afforded an opportunity prior to the colloquy of amending the Book, partly because the Book had been found, in substance, more favourable to a Catholic than to a Protestant interpretation. Yet by no means all of the Catholics were satisfied with the Book. The gap between the confessions seemed unbridgeable, and the hoped-for theological consensus on which a religious settlement could be built evidently did not exist. A quite radical change of policy seemed called for.

Granvelle read the signs of the times and drew the consequences. He scrapped the "grand design", the hoped-for reconciliation of the confessions based on a genuine theological concord, and substituted a much less ambitious project, the promotion of a policy of toleration. The measure of agreement achieved thus far must be consolidated, and if possible extended by the extraction of further concessions from the Protestants. Where, however, complete agreement could not be reached the two confessions must agree to disagree, at least until the next General Council. Differences which could not be bridged must be overlooked. If unanimity were unattainable tolerance of the other side's point of view on certain issues must take its place. This would enable a reform programme to be carried out, peace and order to be restored, and a united defence against

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1 Unless we include the additional paragraph on "Satisfaction" in Article XV.
the Turks to be mounted. Not the Edict of Worms, it appeared, and not the Recess of Augsburg, but the Respite of Frankfurt was to set the future pattern for the religious policy of the Empire.

The opposition of the papacy and its allies to any such plan, was, of course, to be anticipated. The stern resistance of the Protestants to any attempt to tie tolerance to theological concessions was to be expected. These obstacles might, in happier circumstances, have been circumvented. The situation after the failure of the colloquy, however, gave no ground for hope.

The unwelcome addition of the nine Protestant counter-articles was the least of the difficulties. They only symbolised the "negative" spirit which now dominated the deliberations of both parties. The relative optimism of the earlier period had wholly vanished. The "moderates" among the theologians had lost the initiative — Bucer on the Protestant side, Gropper and Pflug on the Catholic side had both been signally rebuffed by their colleagues. With the loss of the concern for a genuine reconciliation — in any case never very prominent on the Protestant side — the main concern of both parties was to defend their own positions, to avoid losing face or prestige, to capitalise on the weaknesses of their opponents. The secrecy of the discussions had been breached; intrigues had developed on both sides. Granvelle's hope that a "third party" would
develop - astride the confessional differences - had not been realised.

Granvelle's chances of success for his new toleration policy were, therefore, minimal from the outset. Yet he unleashed an almost frantic activity in the pursuit of his end. Nothing was left untried. Pressure was put on Catholics and Protestants, princes and theologians alike, secret treaties were signed, a delegation sent off to the arch-heretic Luther, a new set of conciliatory articles brought forward, a reform programme drawn up. Whatever could be retrieved from the wreck, Granvelle was determined to retrieve.¹

One factor, at least, was in his favour. With the transfer of the religious discussions from the academic realm of the theological colloquy to the political forum of the Diet, the negotiations moved into a sphere where Granvelle was not the novice but a past master. Hitherto he had been attempting to further his essentially political ends by rather dubious theological means - to produce a concord *de jure* where none existed *de facto*. Now, however, he was defending his right as a politician to meet the immediate situation with a compromise settlement, and it was the churchmen who were attempting to further their essentially theological or "religious" ends by rather dubious political manoeuvres. The real conflict at Regensburg

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¹ He even raised again the old proposal that the papacy should provide funds with which some of the Protestants could be bought over. Contarini/Parnese, 28/5/41, D/R, Ined. Nr. 74, p. 334.
is not between theological and political interests as such, but between theologising politicians and politically minded churchmen. It is one thing to defend one's concern for the truth as such against the pragmatism of the politician. It is another to demand that the pragmatic tools of the latter be laid at the sole service of the particular understanding of the truth which one represents.

On 22 May the colloquy had ended. The ceremonial reading of the Recess with which the Diet itself ended did not come until 29 July. The hectic political activity between these two dates concentrated around two main events: the presentation of the Regensburg Book to the Estates on 8 June, and secondly, the emperor's draft suggestions for the Recess to the Diet which began to appear as early as 12 July. Before we come to deal with these, however, we must first note the immediate consequences both of the collapse of the colloquy and of the new directions to Contarini which arrived in Regensburg from Rome on 8 June.

The failure of the colloquy had released the venom of all those forces which had opposed it from the beginning, and could now rejoice in the discomfiture of both emperor and legate. They immediately resumed the intrigues with which they had originally hoped to forestall the colloquy altogether. These activities, in turn, met the energetic resistance of Granvelle.
Granvelle concentrated first on a renewed attempt to extract further concessions from the Protestants. Pressure was brought on Philip of Hesse to change his standpoint on the controverted articles, but he had remained firm to the general Protestant position that they were unacceptable.¹ Doctrinally, if not politically, he refused to be detached from his fellow-religionists. Hence he told Veltwyck on 24 May that, “Was wir auch mit Gott und gutem gewissen thun konten, das wolten wir gern thun, disse sach aber stehe an uns allein nit, sonder an Gott, wie der den andern leuten einen synn gibet.”²

On 3 June the Elector of Brandenburg and Johann von Weeze, the former archbishop of Lund, used Philip’s mediation to enter into negotiations with the Protestant Estates about the controverted articles, but their plea for a compromise solution won no favour on the Protestant side.³ Philip did, however, agree

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¹ Burckhard/Briick, 26/5/41, CR IV, 340.
² Lenz III, Nr. 4, p. 80.
to continue to cooperate with them in their endeavours, a promise which was of little worth in view of his declared intention to leave Regensburg in the near future.¹

Joachim II then launched another attempt to coax the Protestants away from their counter-articles, by presenting them, again through Philip, with six mediating articles. Hesse summoned the Estates on Saturday, 11 June, to discuss these.² The latter declined to comment on these new articles, on the pretext that they had not yet received their copies of the Regensburg Book, which was still being copied.³ Instead they referred them to their theologians, some of whom were impressed by the Elector's stress on the need for flexibility on both sides for the sake of peace and a joint programme of reform.⁴ Melanchthon, however, carried the majority with his argument that the mediating articles were too ambiguous to merit discussion.⁵

While these attempts were still being made to bring the Protestants to further concessions, Granvelle had already begun

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¹ "Und wolte je s.f.g. gern alles das thun, das zu tun möglich were etc. Sovil s.f.g. abzyhen betrifft, bleib sie bei voriger meinung, wissen das nu nicht mehr zu endern etc." Lenz III, Nr. 5, p. 84.

² The articles dealt with the authority of the Church and of the Councils, the eucharist, the enumeration of sins in auricular confession, the Roman primacy, holy days and fasts. Herminjard, VII, 204–205; cf. CR IV, 401–402.

³ Ibid., p. 403.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 574–575; p. 585.

⁵ As Calvin reported, "Hosce cum perlegissemus, Melanchthon, nostrorum omnium corde et ore, responsionem germanice conscriptum, in qua petiit ut finem imponerent nostri fuocosis illis conciliationibus." Herminjard VII, 205; cf. CR IV, 402.
to concentrate on his main aim - to persuade them to accept the already agreed articles, and to tolerate for the meantime the Catholic views on the controverted ones. Here the opinions within the Protestant camp varied widely. There is some evidence of a substantial grouping being ready to accept Granvelle's suggestion that the two sides co-exist with their differing views. It appeared, after all, a highly realistic policy. The Protestants had safeguarded their point of view by the counter-articles, and these they would be allowed - by the highest court of the Empire - to profess. Protestantism would be legalised, and its existence and views recognised - at least until the Council. The need for peace and unity would be met.

The Elector of Saxony, on the other hand, led the party which was resolutely opposed to the acceptance of the agreed articles. He wanted tolerance for Protestantism, but a tolerance which was not tied to theological concessions, a purely pragmatic and political agreement. His reaction to the agreement on the fifth article had been anything but favourable. Both he and Luther had rejected the article as ambiguous. Hence he refused his imprimatur to the agreed articles, and thereby to Granvelle's whole plan.

1 Ibid., pp. 283 ff.; Luther referred to it as, "...diese weit-leufftige geflickte Notel...", and only cautioned John Frederick: "E.k.f. g.wolten M. Philipps und den unseren Ja nicht zu hart schreiben, Damit er nicht aber mal sich zu tod greme." WAB IX, 406, 409.

2 CR IV, 346.
It was the attempt to outflank this Saxon inflexibility which led to one of the most bizarre episodes of the Diet. Immediately after the colloquy had concluded Melanchthon, under strong criticism from Granvelle for his pugnacity, had suggested, either tongue-in cheek or to shake off the burden of responsibility from himself - that it would be best to deal directly with Luther, who was himself very much concerned for the reunification of the Church. Luther could be contacted and invited to Regensburg. Informing Contarini of this proposal, Granvelle remarked that it seemed an excellent one. Even the emperor, it seems, approved of it.¹

The hope was a desperate enough one, and indicates that by this time Granvelle was clutching at any straw that came his way. The resistance of the Elector was the rock on which all previous attempts to induce a more conciliatory frame of mind among the Protestants had foundered. A direct contact with Luther was perhaps the only way to circumnavigate it.

An actual invitation of Luther to the Diet was, however, out of the question. Instead Granvelle despatched a secret delegation to him, through the mediation of the Brandenburg Elector. This arrived in Wittenberg on 9 June, led by John and George of Anhalt, and including the Scot Alexander Alesius. Both the Elector and Luther, however, had got wind of what was intended - to their mutual and hefty indignation.¹ Alesius informed Brück

¹ CR IV, 385-386; WAB IX, 433-436.
secretly of the ambassador's instructions, which were written in the name of the Elector Joachim and the Margrave George of Brandenburg. They were to argue that agreement had been reached on the central articles of the faith, i.e. on the doctrinal questions. Disagreement centred more of matters of usage and ceremony, on which Luther himself had said there could be liberty of opinion.¹

Luther's written answer of 12 June was not wholly unfavourable. It bound, however, the acceptance of the agreed articles on original sin, free will, faith and works, and justification to the installation of preachers who would expound them "purely", and only under certain conditions could the controverted articles be tolerated. Luther, at this stage at least, was not quite so totally unsympathetic to the project as his Elector.²

If Granvelle had found but scant encouragement among the Protestants, he was to be given even less by the Catholics. There was no question of extorting further concessions from them, of closing the gap between their views and that of the Protestants' counter-articles. Granvelle had enough to do to secure their commitment to the agreed articles, and to convince them of the virtues of tolerating what they themselves could not accept.

¹ CR IV,394-399.
² WAB IX,442.
The failure of the colloquy had, of course, greatly strengthened the hand of those elements among the Catholics who had predicted this from the beginning. The moderates, who had invested their prestige in the colloquy, were correspondingly weakened. They lacked in any case the aggressive political leadership which the rigorists - in the persons of the archbishop of Mainz and the Dukes of Bavaria - possessed. The moderates might have the backing of the emperor, their opponents had that both of France and the papacy.

The aim of the militants was to precipitate the emperor into an armed confrontation with the Protestants, which meant that the policy of toleration must be abandoned, the Catholic League strengthened, and the Regensburg Book finally repudiated. Their immediate tactics concentrated on driving a wedge between the papal legate and the emperor, for as long as Rome could be persuaded to support the conciliatory policies of Charles and Granvelle their own plans had no chance of success.

Accordingly they urged the emperor to join the League, and Albrecht of Mainz refused even to discuss with the emperor how the future negotiations with the Protestants should be conducted. Negotiations did not interest him. It was his view, and that of the Bavarian dukes, that the emperor should lead the Catholics in a war against the Protestants. If Charles failed in his duty here, he told Contarini, it would be as

1 Contarini/Farnese, 4/6/41, D/R, Ined. Nr. 73, p. 335.
well for the Germans to choose a new emperor.¹

When Contarini queried the expediency of a war in view of
the degree to which Germany was infiltrated by Protestantism,
the archbishop expressed his confidence that it would bear fruit,
and that only the weakness of the emperor had made other princes
hesitate to join the League. Contarini, asked by the Elector what
his own view on the matter was, side-stepped the question.²

The rigorists also sought to cast doubt on the loyalty of
the emperor to the old faith and to the Roman See. The Bavarian
dukes attempted to convince the papal representatives that the
emperor intended to concede the Protestants complete tolerance
for their heretical views.³ The archbishop of Salzburg reported
that Charles had attributed to the papacy less concern for Ger-
many than for the prevention of the granting of tolerance.⁴
Contarini carefully avoided identifying himself with their views,
but certainly, he wrote Farnese, the emperor had got himself in-
to a vast labyrinth, from which he would not easily extract him-
self.⁵ He was soon, however, to be forced into a much closer
association with their position.

¹ Contarini/Farnese, 8/6/41, ibid., Nr. 74, p. 337.
² He did not, as the summary of Pastor states, speak emphatic-
ally against the proposal of an offensive against the Pro-
testants "Der Erzbischof will Krieg gegen die Protestanten.
Contarini spricht nachdrücklich gegen diesen Vorschlag." HJ
I, 477; Vetter also claims that the legate "...sich sehr be-
stimmt gegen jede kriegerische Aktion aussprach." Vetter,
³ Morone/Farnese, 23/5/41 HJ IV, 464.
⁴ Morone/Farnese, 28, 28/5/41, ibid., p. 465.
⁵ D/R, p. 336.
On 8 June, the same day on which Granvelle laid the Regensburg Book, together with the Protestant counter-articles, before the assembled Estates, there arrived in Regensburg a despatch from Rome for Contarini, signed by Niccolo Ardinghelli on Cardinal Farnese's behalf.¹

Contarini had requested that the progress of the negotiations in Regensburg be kept as secret as possible, since he had heard that there were forces in Italy which were seeking to sabotage the colloquy. He himself, or his household in Regensburg, however, had preserved this secrecy very ill, the despatch complained. From Venice and elsewhere copies of the article on justification and of letters describing the course of events in Regensburg had been circulating throughout Italy. He was asked to document his references to the opponents of the negotiations so that action could be taken against them.

The agreed article on justification was described as ambiguous,² and he was instructed henceforth to agree to no article or part of an article, either explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, or to let it pass after only slight resistance unless it corresponded quite clearly both in substance and terminology to the Catholic position. Whatever he did, he was not to "approvare cosa alcuna", either as a private person or as papal legate, but must refer everything, as his Instruction

¹ Ardinghelli/Contarini, 29/5/41, Quirini III, 231-240.
² "...presupposto che il senso sia cattholico, le parole potessero esser piu chiare." Ibid., p.232.
stipulated, to the Apostolic See. It would cause great harm if the Protestants even seemed to be justified in citing his opinion as favourable to their views. He must therefore take care that his concern for peace did not lead him to make harmful concessions to the Protestants.

His suggested formulae on papal and conciliar authority aroused particular displeasure on account of their ambiguity, "non si esprimendo la sustantia principale di tali Articoli..." His postponement of discussion on the papacy was criticised, for "la concordia di tutto il resto sarebbe vana, se in questa parte si restasse in discordia." The Curia took grave exception to his failure to stipulate that General Councils must be summoned by, and have their decrees ratified by the papacy, and to make it clear that the papacy was of direct dominical institution.1 The fear here was that the Protestants might capitulate in all the other articles, in order, at the end, to gain their point on the papacy.

As if to rub salt into the wounds, Farnese praised Eck for his excellent learning and knowledge of the German situation, but above all for his loyalty to the Holy See. Polite pleasure was expressed at the good bearing of Gropper, "massime havendo da lui fumo molto diverso come ella anche accennò per le sue lettere, d'onde S.Santità hebbe non piccola displicientia, vedendo, che in la deputatione si fusse havuto piu rispetto a Protestanti che a

1 Ibid., p.236.
Catholici." Veritably a back handed compliment!¹

Finally Contarini had brought to his notice the complaints of the French King that in his deference to the emperor, the legate had neglected not only the interests of the other Catholics, but also of the Catholic faith itself.²

The language of the despatch was restrained, but its barbs were none the less effective for that. It was a considered and sustained reproof unprecedented in Contarini's long experience. His previous diplomatic missions had not always been successful, but never before had his own performance, judgement, and even loyalty been questioned. Coming on top of the failure of the colloquy, a dressing-down of this nature - to a man of his seniority - could have been expected to have an almost traumatic effect upon Contarini, and in fact it did.

But this is more than a mere personal tragedy. It was not only that Contarini had got himself too far out on a limb, and that he had the limb cut down from under him for his pains. The vote of no-confidence in his conduct of affairs in Regensburg

¹ Ibid., p.239; cf. Wauchop's critical report to the pope on the conduct of Cropper and Pflug. 7/6/41, Le Plat III, 116.

² Quirini III, 240; Dandino, the papal nuncio at the French court had already informed Contarini that the King had accused him of exercising, "...troppo modestia, rispetto et taciturnità..." in defence of the Catholic cause at Regensburg. 17/5/41, ibid., p.276.
meant the defeat of his party in Italy, and with it the loss of any hope of a Catholic ecumenical initiative for decades, if not centuries to come. It meant more than the replacement of one faction by another in the Curia, more than a different conception of the tactics best suited to the German situation. For what was at stake was Contarini's whole understanding of the faith, of Catholicism. It had been the legate's successes, not his failure, which had alarmed Paul III and his advisers on the German situation - Farnese, Caraffa, Aleander - and which led them to a decisive rejection of Contarini's brand of evangelical Catholicism.

The despatch had its immediate and drastic effect on the conduct of Contarini. It effectively forestalled any future attempts by him to develop a personal initiative of his own. From now on he had no room at all to manoeuvre. There was only one rôle he could play, one for which he was, fortunately, eminently qualified, that of the professional diplomat.

In his official actions at the Diet he became henceforth the submissive tool of papal politics, and lost all independence from the Catholic Opposition. His relations with the emperor became more than cool, and he was soon to be the butt of enthusiastic

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1 Cf. e.g. his letter to Farnese of 9 June in which he says that Morone had felt that the less controversy about the question of the papal primacy the better, "...et io sarìa stato dell' istesso parere, quando non fosse stato altrimenti avvertito, ma a me basta l'obbedire." HJ I, 479.
Protestant polemics. His original optimism had allowed Contarini to adopt an offensive stance, to take the initiative, to steer, or help to steer, the course of events. Increasingly he had been pushed back on to a purely defensive position, at first in relation to Catholic orthodoxy, and now to the papal cause. He was no longer the man whom "all Germany" set their hopes, nor even primarily the defender of the Catholic position, but the representative of the papal and curial interests in Germany, a papal legate like any other. As such, the weeks from the conclusion of the colloquy to the end of the Diet were to bring him nothing but trials.

The situation, then, had been radically altered. Contarini had been deprived of every vestige of independent judgement, and been driven into the arms of the rigorist party. Yet we must not over-estimate the effect of the Ardinghelli despatch. There are continuities as well as discontinuities to be discerned. We cannot speak of a total reversal of policy. Contarini had long since recognised that, barring a miracle, the colloquy had failed, and where he regarded it as having succeeded - above all on the question of justification - he stood to his guns. His capitulation was by no means unconditional.

As far as the article on justification was concerned, not only his personal honour, but his orthodoxy itself was at stake. To gain support for his position he decided to submit the Book to a further reading, in company with the papal theologians at
Regensburg, to establish its orthodoxy. The emperor readily agreed to this provided the Imperial theologians could join Badia, Pighius and Wauchop in their scrutiny of the Book. On the first day the errors of the Protestant counter-articles were noted, and then, on the emperor's request, it was stated where their views were agreeable with Catholic teaching. It was noted that some articles in the Book required further explanation, and Contarini introduced a new article on the papacy which he had drafted to meet the objections from Rome. The theologians were unanimous that there could be no piece-meal acceptance of the "agreed articles." Unless the Protestants were at one with the Catholics in the main articles (by which those on the Church, the eucharist, and penance were certainly meant) none of the "agreed articles" could be accepted, for this would then be regarded as legitimising at least some of the Protestants' beliefs.

1 Contarini/Farnese, 9/6/41, HJ I, 479; D/B, pp. 724ff; Contarini/Farnese, 14/6/41, HJ I, 481.

2 Not later than 13 June; cf. Vetter, p. 170, Anm. 2.

3 He complained to Farnese that it was the tardy reaction of Rome to his formulations on the primacy which had made it impossible to amend the article in the Book. Now that the colloquy was over his attempt to insert the new article in the margin of the Book had been rejected by Cranvelle, on the grounds that it would appear to be a forgery. Contarini/Farnese, 9/6/41, HJ I, 479.

4 "...siamo tutti noi d'accordo rissoluti che non convenendo li Protestanti con li Catholici in alcuni capitoli essentiali, che noi abbiamo notati, la Mtà. Ces. g. facci opera, che non s'approvi cos'altr. del libro, ma resti ogni cosa si come tra noi non fusse mai fatto colloquio alcuno, acciochè li Protestanti non possino mai dire che siamo convenuti con loro in punto alcuno." Contarini/Farnese, 14/6/41, HJ I, 482; his letter to Farnese on the day following points to a certain amount of disagreement among the Catholics, for some felt that if the Protestants agreed on the essential points, no further difficulties should be made. HJ I, 482-483.
This uncompromising attitude was obviously conditioned by the receipt of the despatch from Rome. On the other hand the firm opposition which the legate offered to Granvelle's advocacy of toleration was quite in line with his previous view-point. At no stage had Contarini considered the possibility of toleration - even as a temporary measure - for the Protestants' erroneous views. Contarini's standpoint here was impeccably traditionalist, unsullied by Erasmian relativism. He consistently regarded tolerance to error as a betrayal of the faith and tolerance to schism as an open affront to the authority of Rome. The lesson to be drawn from the colloquy, he believed, was not that the Catholics should be more conciliatory, but that they should stand more firmly by their beliefs. In a despatch sent to Rome on 29 May he had recommended the strengthening of the Catholic League and a reform of the episcopate, of instruction and preaching. Catholicism should be reinforced from within and from without. The sole concession which he contemplated was the granting of Communion in both kinds.¹

His relations with the emperor had already deteriorated; on 31 May, more than a week before the despatch from Rome arrived, Contarini had rejected the Imperial proposal that a limited toleration be granted the Protestants. Charles had pointed out that since there was no hope of securing further concessions from

¹ Contarini/Farnese, 29/6/41, HJ I, 474-476.
the Protestants, and since a war against them was unthinkable, some measure of toleration was inevitable. 1 Contarini replied that he wanted neither war nor civil unrest, but that a feigned agreement of the Apostolic See and the emperor to the false teachings of the Protestants - or even the turning of a blind eye to them - would only precipitate a still worse schism, for others would use such an agreement as a pretext for teaching falsehood instead of the truth. If peace had to be made without any agreement having been reached on the religious issue then the Catholics must distance themselves emphatically from the Protestants, not only by withholding their consent to their doctrines, but by denouncing the latter, albeit charitably. 2 Unlike the Archbishop of Mainz and the Bavarians, however, Contarini wanted to avert war, and was remarkably free from bitterness against the Protestants. 3

1 "...perche non si potea sperar ch'essi Lutherani si lasciassero redurre in piu di quel haveno fatto, et proponea esser necessario per schifar l'incomodita et impossibilita della guerra far qualche toleranza, et per metter uno ostaculo all' impeto di quest'heresia, pigliando quel guadagno che si potea per adesso." Morone/Farnese, 2/6/41, Laemmer, p. 272.

2 "...che bisognando haver la pace in Germania senza la vera concordia della Religione, era similmente necessario far ch'ogn'uno conoscesse che gli Catholici da Protestanti nelli dogma erano separati, et non solamente con essi non si potea consentire, ma ne anche si potea restare di reprobarli, con mansuetudine pero et senza strepito di guerra." Ibid.

3 He attributes the failure of the colloquy to human sinfulness generally rather than to that of the Protestants in particular. Contarini/Cardinal of Burgos, 9/6/41, Morandi, I, ii, pp. 175-176.
He defended himself vigorously against some of the particular criticisms in the despatch,¹ against the allegation of coldness in the defence of the Catholic faith and of undue deference to the emperor. He made no secret of his suspicion that it was from the Bavarians that these insinuations had originated,² and did his best to dispel any doubts as to the vigour with which he had stood by the truth.³

Such was the atmosphere in which Granvelle tried to launch his new toleration policy – one of disappointment, bitterness and mutual recrimination. On 8 June he laid the Book, together with the Protestant articles, before the assembled Estates.⁴ It was clear, as the Venetian ambassador wrote on the following day, that there was disagreement on many articles, and particularly on the most important articles.⁵ It was certainly an ill omen for the successful outcome of the negotiations that Philip of Hesse chose this critical moment to leave Regensburg, despite the entreaties

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¹ E.g. about the conduct of his household at Regensburg. He had forbidden them to broadcast any information, "ma il tutto sia per altre vie et viene scritte da diverse in diverse bande." Contarini/Parnese, 9/6/41, HJ I, 478 ff.

² "...li quali senza volersi dimostrare haveriano voluto rompere questa concordia et non paresse che venisse da loro, ma voleano usar me per instrumento..." Contarini/Parnese, 14/6/41, D/R, Ined.Nr.75, pp.338-339.

³ His reply is not without bitterness. Contarini/Parnese, 9/6/41, HJ I, 480.

⁴ CR IV, 389-391, 392.

⁵ On 19 June he added that there was little hope of any agreement, "...ma si tiene per certo, si trovera qualche via et modo di qualche assettamento..." Pr. Contarini/Senate, D/R, pp.196, 200.
of Granvelle. He had, of late, been rather stouter in his profession of Protestantism, but he lacked the full-blooded bigotry of the Elector of Saxony, whose influence among the Protestants now increased. Philip left Regensburg on the fourteenth, after having secured a conditional amnesty from the emperor for his bigamy, in exchange for an undertaking not to conclude alliances with France, England, or Cleves, and to oppose the admission of the latter to the Schmalkaldic League.

His departure was the signal for many of the Protestant theologians to leave Regensburg. Melanchthon himself was instructed by the Elector, on Luther's wish, to return to Wittenberg, but the express command of the emperor forced him to remain in Regensburg until the Diet was over.

The Estates, then, had been requested to state their opinion on the Book. In his address to them the emperor had reported on the progress of the colloquy. A good number of disputed points,

1 "Sovil s.f.g. abzynen betrifft, bleib sie bei voriger meinung, wissen das nu nicht mehr zu endern etc." Lenz III, Nr. 5, p. 84.
2 Ibid., pp. 91-96; cf. Fr. Contarini/Senate, D/R, p. 199; Vetter, pp. 156 ff.
4 CR IV, 408; WAB IX, 430 ff.
5 CR IV, 565.
and by no means the least important ones, had been agreed upon by the collocutors. Let the Estates show their Christian concern by a careful consideration of the articles and the Protestant counter-articles, and then inform the emperor what they believed would be a good and rational course to follow. They were also asked to suggest the measures they considered necessary for a reform of the abuses in the spiritual and the secular estates. The papal legate, the emperor was confident, would gladly give his assistance in this matter.

Neither the Protestants nor the Catholics were of one mind about the Book. We have already noted that the Protestants had reacted in different ways to Elector Joachim's six articles. On the thirteenth they received their copies of the Book, and at once disagreements made themselves felt. Bucer argued that the Book should be viewed favourably by the Protestants. Melanchthon, who dubbed it the "hyaena" wanted it rejected in toto.

The Saxon Elector had, of course, consistently recommended an

1 Ibid., pp.389-391.
2 "... und ist ihre Maj.der ungezweifelten Zuversicht,dass der Päpstlichen Heiligkeit Legat sich zu diesem auch werde geneigt finden lassen, alles zu thun, das an ihme seyn wird." Ibid., p.391.
3 Herminjard VII,157.
4 CR IV,409,410.
unwavering allegiance to the Augsburg Confession and Apology.¹

On 25 June the deliberations of the Protestant theologians on the Book began, in the presence of their princes.² First Melanchthon gave his judgement on the Book. This took the form of an account of the negotiations throughout the colloquy. From the beginning, he avowed, he had been suspicious of the ambiguity of the articles; they obscured the full meaning of the Protestant views, and decked out Catholic opinions in a seductively attractive manner.³ As far as possible he and his colleagues had shown moderation; but for the sake of true doctrine they had been forced to dissent on some articles. The Catholics were not truly concerned with agreement but with a "reductio" of the Protestants. He rejected the claim that the acceptance of the Book would be a step towards a reform of the German Church; on the contrary, it would encourage the maintenance of false teachings and practices, and it might even encourage the development

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1 "...wer sich vergleichen will, der vergleiche sich mit Gott und seinem Wort, und nehme dasselbige und diese Lehre an, wie wir andern dieses Theils auch gethan haben." Ibid., p.346; he criticised Philip of Hesse bitterly for his approval of the article on justification:"Darum wir es nicht dafür gehalten hätten, dass unser Vetter und Bruder, der Landgraf, denselben hohen und wichtigsten Artikel ihme dergestalt sollte haben gefallen lassen, als ob er unser Confession und Schmalkaldischen Vergleichung nicht widerwürtig sondern gemäss ware." Ibid., p.400.

2 CR IV,437-440.

3 "...so habe ich doch nicht klein Missfallen gehabt, dass der Meister des Buchs, wo er das Unsre zulässt, doch also dunkel redet und verstreicht, dass es wenig scheint; wo er aber etwas hat auf der Papisten Seiten, das leidlich, dieses schmückt er und pranget damit." Ibid., p.420.
of a third party and thus extend the schism still further. Nor should true doctrine be mutilated for the sake of securing order and peace. He subdivided the articles into three categories: those which were completely rejected by the Protestants, some, such as confirmation and extreme unction, which were accepted for the moment, and "some which have been called agreed articles" (etliche die man nennet verglichen). There could be no question of accepting or modifying the rejected articles, the acceptance of the second class was dependent on the other articles being agreed to, and even the third class of "agreed articles" would have to be corrected, e.g. that on justification. Since, then, the Book was self-contradictory and so full of dangers Melanchthon could not, and would not accept it.¹

Bucer rejoined that it was necessary to take account of the men of goodwill on the other side. Charity demanded that something be done for them. He then defended, evidently at some length, his own conduct against the criticisms of some of the theologians. It seems, however, that he was alone in his defence of the Book.²

On 29 June, after an interruption due to the discussions about the aid to be granted the emperor for the campaign against the

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¹ "Aus disen erzählten Ursachen schliesse ich auf Gottes Wort und mit gutem Gewissen, dass ich diess Buch nicht kann, auch nicht will annehmen..." Ibid., p.430.

² Ibid., p.438.
Turks, the deliberations of the theologians in the presence of the Estates were resumed. They were unanimous that they must abide in all points by the Confession and Apology. Melanchthon's distinction between the three classes of articles in the Book was accepted. If the agreed articles could be expanded and modified they would not be unacceptable, indeed they had no greater wish than that such articles should be taught and preached, as they would then be in harmony with the Augsburg Confession.

This was, in fact, equivalent to a rejection of the Book, since the chances of the Catholics agreeing to such modifications were, as the Protestants well knew, minimal. We have only scattered references to the later discussions of the Book by the Protestant Estates. According to a report of the representatives of Electoral Saxony the Protestant Estates examined the articles one by one, and finally the majority decided that the Book should not be rejected in its entirety. The articles on Original Sin and Justification in particular were found good. Melanchthon had expected all long that there would be those "qui recipi Librum, et mitigari reiectos articulos volent." The arrival of

1 According to the Venetian ambassador a speech by Frangipani, bishop of Agria, on 9 June about the ravages of the Turks had moved the princes to tears. Fr. Contarini/Senate, 10/6/41, D/R, p.196; the Protestants' readiness to grant a subsidy was conditional, however, on their securing toleration for their beliefs. "...gli Protestanti promettono adiuto, ma con condizione della pace generale et la libertà del credere a ciascuno a suo modo et libertà di predicare." Morone/Farnese, 21/6/41, HJ IV, 621.

2 CR IV, 439-440.

3 Dresdner Archiv, quoted by Vetter, p.191.

4 CR IV, 457.
the memorandum from Luther and Bugenhagen, however, which recommended the rejection of the "agreed articles", strengthened the hand of the rigorists. 1 The eventual form of the Protestant reply to the emperor was a compromise between the two groups. 2 It was agreed that the Book could be the basis of an agreement, and if this did come to pass, they were prepared, given certain amendments, to accept the "agreed articles," while their adherence to the counter-articles remained firm. As Vetter says: "...under the appearance of a complete acquiescence in the emperor's intentions in fact the plans of the latter were stymied and rejected." 3

How, meantime, were the Catholics reacting? They, too, were divided in their counsels, the Electoral council being amenable to the acceptance of the "agreed articles", the princes opposing it. The princes tended to be dominated by the Dukes of Bavaria and the Duke of Braunschweig who accepted Eck's contention that the Book, being full of errors, was unacceptable, and, that, instead of using the language of the Church and the Fathers, it "Melanchthonised". 4 Despite the more conciliatory temper of Count Otto Henry of the Palatinate, of the Bishops of Augsburg,

1 WAB IX, 459-463; on article V they remarked: "Darum ist dieser artikel, so er soll also bloss und wackelent ausgeschrieben werden, viel zu dünne..." Ibid., p. 462. "Summa summarum, sie müssen in diesen Artickeln widerruffen, verdammen, verfluchen alle ihre Theologia, alle Sententionarios, Decreten... Aller Bepst, Cardinalen und Bischoff standt und wesen, sampt allem, das mit diesem Irthum, Abgötterey, Lesterung, Lügen genommen haben." Ibid., p. 463; cf. CR IV, 515.

2 CR IV, 476-505.


4 CR IV, 475.
Lund, and Cleve, and of the Abbot of Kempten\(^1\) the Bavarians and their allies won the day, and on 1 July delivered a highly polemical statement to the Elector.\(^2\)

Among the Electors, however, only the Archbishops of Mainz and Trier were opposed to the acceptance of the "agreed articles", and on the following day they suggested to the council of princes and bishops a much more conciliatory reply to the emperor.\(^3\) On 5 July, the final compromise answer of the Catholics was handed over to the emperor. It evaded the issue, by refusing to deliver any independent judgement on the Book, and by requesting instead that the emperor, together with the legate, should examine the "agreed articles" and determine whether or not they were in accord with the Catholic faith, and if not to amend them accordingly.\(^4\) The emperor expressed in no uncertain language his disappointment at this answer, and while agreeing to refer the articles to the legate, voiced the desire that the Estates themselves would continue to consider ways and means of arriving at a peaceful settlement.\(^5\) He also had to spring to the defence of Gropper and Pflug, to whom Eck, while denying for himself any association with the Book(!), had ascribed all the blame for its "insipidity".\(^6\)

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1 Ibid., p.467; Vetter remarks that Burckhard has confused the (very orthodox) Bishop of Regensburg with the Bishop of Augsburg in his account. Vetter, p.181, Anm.3.
2 CR IV, 450-455.
3 For dating of proceedings cf. Vetter, p.182, Anm.3.
4 CR IV, 455-456; Contarini/Farnese, 5/7/41, HJ I, 489.
5 CR IV, 465-466.
6 Ibid., pp.459-465.
The Catholics were, therefore, hopelessly divided. Hitherto, during the course of the colloquy, Contarini had at least been able to prevent the rents becoming visible. Courted by all sides, he had been able, by skilful conciliation, to direct the Catholic view-point and to hold the different factions together. He was no longer able to do this. The failure of the colloquy, the lack of firm support from Rome, the growing alienation from the emperor had knocked away, one by one, all the props on which his independent, mediatory platform rested. He found himself alone, isolated, and powerless, trapped between the upper and nether mill-stones of Imperial and papal displeasure.

Already by mid-June the papal representatives were complaining that they were not being properly informed by Granvelle of the course of events. Contarini’s position, that none of the articles could be certificated as sound and catholic unless on the essential ones agreement were arrived at naturally set him at odds with Charles, whom he now suspected of desiring to concede complete tolerance to everyone, and, for the rest, pursuing his own interests. The cooling-off of relations with the emperor was paralleled by a much closer entendre with the rigorists.

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1 "Mons. di Granvelle non mi dice cosa alcuna sopra queste materie della Germania, anch’ora che gli ne habbia domandato. Il che credo proceda perche vede verificare quanto l’ho advertito per il passato, et etiam verificarsi che si cercava la concordia di Germania in tutti gli modi. Non la concordia della Religio e la reduttione deli disvati, della qual ragionevolmente non si potea sperar... successo alcuno." Morone/Farnese, 14/6/41, Laemmer, pp. 373-374.
Through Morone Contarini had been informed of the determination of the Bavarians, Albert of Mainz and their allies not to concede anything to the Protestants. Willy-nilly Contarini was forced now to align himself with them. He had urged on Charles the impossibility of a piece-meal acceptance of some of the articles, the need to check any further Protestant expansion by a strengthening of the League, and his bounden duty as emperor to put the interests of God and the Faith before all others. He had complained further about the activity of the Protestant preachers in the town. But while Charles had given him an attentive audience his impression was that in fact he would not act decisively to meet the danger of the situation. Contarini was forced, therefore, to consider an approach to the Catholic princes. It was now he who had to go begging for support.

He told the Bavarians of his position on the Book and the need to strengthen the League, which they approved, and urged that no conditions should be set for entry to the League which would repel the emperor from joining it. He was now committed to the anti-Imperial party, which was already involved in negotiations with France. The Archbishop of Mainz hinted that Charles' sole concern was for the arrangement of an external

1 Ibid., p. 373.

2 Contarini/Farnese, 19/6/41, HJ I, 483-486; cf. Wauchop's similar complaint about the Protestants' activities. Le Plat III, 116-118.

3 HJ I, 485-486.
peace. If he did not demonstrate his readiness to defend the true religion he and his supporters would make an approach to France. 1

Charles, on the other hand, now declared that if the Bavarians did not change their tune, he would come to an accommodation with the Protestants. He was unimpressed by Contarini's news that the papacy had decided to lift the suspension of the Council and to give its support to the League. Why this sudden enthusiasm of the papacy for the Council at this stage? 2

Contarini, understandably, was in deep depression. Even if the emperor and he were to remain for another three years he was doubtful if any remedy would be found. The Protestants appeared to be immoveable in their opinions. 3 By now a further

1 Morone/Farnese, 21/6/41, HJ IV, 620.
2 Contarini, while praising Charles' unwillingness to be dragged into war, suggested that it might well be wise to make the requisite preparations for the latter, lest the Protestants become too arrogant. Charles retorted that it was the conduct of the Bavarians which made the Protestants arrogant, and that if they did not change their ways he would make other provisions, "...accennando, imo quasi expressamente significando, che prenderà appuntamento con Protestanti." ZKG III, 178.
3 "...perché già i popoli sono persuasi et gli par buona cosa viver in questa licenza e senza alcun freno...Luterani addimandano, non sia innovata cosa alcuna circa la religione, sin tanto non siano decise le differenze per guiderci non sospetti, gli quali non si troveranno mai...Ho parlato con diversi protestanti dottori, col Melanthon e altri, parmi siano risolutissimi nelle opinioni loro, né cessano ogni di seminar' il mal seme con le predicazioni, col scrivere e in ogni modo possibile." Thus Contarini's secretary Hier.Negri/Marcantonio Michieli, 28/6/41, D/R, pp. 206–207.
despatch from Rome had arrived which warned in the strongest terms against lending any support to a policy of toleration.¹ No wonder Contarini longed to return to Italy.²

He had been requested, as we have seen, by the Catholic Estates to give his opinion on the Book.³ There was no doubt in Contarini's mind what his answer must be. The toleration policy, with its postponement of the theological issues to the Council, was totally unacceptable, for it implied that essential articles of the Faith were in doubt. This was not the case, and not even a future Council could submit the dogmatic definitions of the Church to a new scrutiny in this way. Moreover an interim peace was unacceptable as long as the church lands had not been restored.⁴ This view when he communicated it to the militants found a predictably enthusiastic reception. Like the bishops, whom Contarini had summoned before him a few days previously, they urged that the pope should convocate the promised Council as speedily as possible.⁵

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1 The granting of toleration to Germany was out of the question for if the papacy were to allow this, the rest of Christendom would take the chance to follow suit; "...e lasciare di pigliar da qui innanzi la norma della Fede et Religione sua da questa S. Sede, come per l’addietro ha fatto, poiché la vedesse variar da se stessa... essendo la tolerantia nel Papa vero consenso, e statuto...." Ardinghelli/Contarini, 15/6/41, Quirini III, 240-249; for the various drafts of this despatch cf. ZKG V, 595 ff.

2 "Non invenio spiritum caritatis, sed spiritum aemulationis et discordiae, il quale mi dubito, che mandera in ruina tuta questa provincia. Mi duole nel core, ma non si puole fare altro." Contarini/Bembo, 4/7/41, D/R, Ined. Nr. 80, p. 344.

3 CR IV, 456.

4 Morone/Farnese, 4/7/41, D/R, p. 209.

5 The bishops urged that "presb, presto e piu che presto celebressi il concilio senza fallo alcuno..." Contarini/Farnese, 10/7/41, HJ I, 491-492.
In an icy audience with the emperor on 10 July Contarini explained that since the Protestants had shown their divergence from the received opinion of the Catholic Church no decision could be made about and no approval given to the Book, but the whole matter should be referred to the Supreme Pontiff and the Apostolic See, which would deal with it either by the General Council shortly to be held, or in another expedient way. The Book, in other words, was rejected in toto; the colloquy might as well never have taken place.

Charles expressed bitterness and disillusion about pope, Council and princes. He had wasted his time at Regensburg. He had gained neither a subsidy against the Turks nor an agreement on religious matters. And now he heard that the pope was planning to enter the League without him and was allying with Venice and the King of France. Groundless as this rumour appears to have been, the legate's proposal that the disputed articles should be referred to the pope was hardly likely to commend itself to Charles in his present mood, especially since Contarini himself had been one of the most effective opponents of the conciliatory programme on which he had staked all his hopes.

1 Ibid., pp. 492-495; Contarini believed that any further negotiations would only irritate the Protestants and "...deponere in dubio gl'articuli certi..." Contarini/Parnese, 5/7/41, HJ I, 489-490.

2 Ibid., p. 493.

3 "...di non ponere in dubio gl'articuli certi e tutto il resto rimettere a N.Sig.re..." Ibid., p. 491.
Almost the sole concern which the legate and the emperor now had in common was that for reform. Here for Contarini was at least one issue on which personal inclination, official instructions, and Imperial policy were in harmony. Yet it is perhaps significant that even in this matter the initiative for the convocation of the bishops to hear an address from Contarini on this subject had come not from himself but from the emperor.¹ The time for initiatives on the part of Contarini was long since past. Eventually, after repeated requests by Charles, he addressed the assembled prelates on 7 July, and his exhortation appears to have been well received.²

It began with the usual admonition to sobriety and simplicity of life, which should afford no ground for scandal, and set a good example to the people. The primary note, however, is that of pastoral concern.

Contarini stressed the need for the bishop to reside in the most populous places of his diocese, so that he could at once take appropriate action if any decline from the Faith were detected. He should set up an information network for the other parts of the diocese, and conduct frequent visitations, as generals inspect the defences of cities besieged by the enemy.³ He should pay particular attention to the conduct of worship and the equitable distribution of diocesan funds.

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¹ As Vetter points out; Vetter, p.186.
² HJ I,492; the text in Le Plat III,91-93; CR IV,506-509.
³ "...quo more uti solent imperatores in uribus obsessis et oppugnatis ab hostibus." Ibid., p.508.
He referred to the urgent need for learned preachers to propagate orthodox doctrine and sound morals by word and example, while eschewing bitter polemic, which neither edified the faithful nor won over the adversary. They should rather work lovingly for the salvation of their opponents.

Equally important was the foundation of Catholic schools to counter-act the influence of the new Protestant schools, to which the future nobility of Germany was streaming, attracted by the renown of the Protestant teachers, imboring not only secular learning but Lutheran doctrine. Parents must be warned against such schools, and every support given to the erection of Catholic institutions of equal standing where orthodox doctrine would be upheld.

These, Contarini concluded, were the guide-lines for reform, which he had submitted to them at the express wish of the pope. They, the bishops, would be able to draw the necessary conclusions, and to devise the measures required to meet the actual situation as they knew it.

This was a realistic enough assessment of the situation. It surrendered the myth of a Catholic Germany, and recognised that Protestantism, far from being a bizarre sect, admittedly seductive and dangerous but essentially a transient, peripheral phenomenon, now threatened the existence of Catholicism itself. Not only did it boast an immense popular following and a heterodox theology. That in itself would not be so disturbing; Church
history, after all, was littered with the wrecks of such movements. But it was recognised as having penetrated into the very fabric of national and social life, rooting itself so deeply in the political and ecclesiastical and educational structures that the only realistic policy for Catholicism to adopt was the preparation for a hard, long-drawn struggle in which, initially at least, the Old Church would find itself very much on the defensive. Protestantism was becoming institutionalised. Catholicism faced the uneasy future of a beleaguered fortress.

Contarini's use of the military metaphor is not accidental. His programme breathes the spirit of the Counter-reformation. This is the language of Aleander and Caraffa in Rome, of Loyola's new movement, of St. Theresa in Spain. Hitherto Contarini had seen reform in the perspective of reunion. It had been his hope that a reformed Catholicism would prepare the way for the return of the Protestants to the true Faith. Now, however, the keyword is consolidation, reform seen as a weapon against Protestantism. The future lies with the Council of Trent, the Jesuits, and the Inquisition.

Accordingly Contarini now joined Eck in denouncing or at least renouncing the Book, joined the Bavarians and their allies in resisting the emperor, joined the authoritarian elements in the Church and the particularist elements in the Empire. The shattering of his dream of a renewed and reunited Christendom was not, then, the end for him. He still had his functions to
fulfil, his work to do. He still had his obedience.

The toleration policy had failed. Neither Protestants nor Catholics seemed prepared to accept the "agreed articles" as a workable basis to a long-term settlement, but were falling back on the traditional bulwarks of the authority of Rome and of Wittenberg respectively. Yet despite this total lack of success some sort of working arrangement had to be devised, an at least temporary settlement patched up, the most urgent needs of the Empire met. However unthinkable toleration might be to the theologians, politically it remained the only option open.

A clash of interests was therefore inevitable when, on 12 July, having received the Protestant verdict on the Book, Charles laid before the Estates his proposals for the Recess, together with Contarini's judgement on the Book and his admonition to the bishops.¹ The full extent of the emperor's alienation from the Curia and its representatives was now revealed. The promised Council rated a mention but little more;² the whole emphasis was on the need for an immediate settlement. The Estates were requested to consider giving their approval to the "agreed articles"

¹ Ibid., pp.509-513; p.506; Contarini had strenuously objected to the submission of his reform proposals to the Diet lest the bishops be offended, but his objections had been brushed aside. Contarini/Farnese, 13/7/41, D/R, Ined. Nr.81, p.344; Morene/Farnese, 13/7/41, D/R, p.213. Charles had already requested from the Catholic Estates on 7 July their proposals for a lasting peace. Vetter, p.195.

² Charles promised that when he, in the near future, saw the pope he would ascertain "...was des Concilii halben zu verhoffen sey." CR IV,512.
as an interim statement of belief, at least until the General Council should decide on the matter,\textsuperscript{1} or failing this another Imperial assembly. For the meantime the Nuremberg Peace should remain in force. With brazen effrontery the proposal claimed that the papal legate was in favour of a provisional acceptance of the "agreed articles".\textsuperscript{2}

On 14 July the first of the replies to the Imperial proposal arrived - that of the Protestants.\textsuperscript{3} Despite their theological qualms and Luther's scepticism, they agreed to the acceptance of the "agreed articles" provided they were given a proper Christian interpretation, and hoped that they would serve as the basis for a full concord and pave the way to a Christian reformation of the churches. They raised no objection to the reference of the other, controversial articles to a General Council, but requested the annulling of the Augsburg Recess as a hindrance to reconciliation (zur Concordia undienstlich), and expressed their usual objection to any Council in which the pope and his followers presumed "von der Religion Sache zu richten und zu urteilen..." If a Council could not be arranged in Germany they left it to the emperor's discretion whether another Diet should be summoned to deal with the matter.

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\textsuperscript{1} \textit{...die Puncten, deren sich die Colloquenten beiderseits verglichen haben, also für gut zu halten, und es dabei bleiben zu lassen, zum wenigsten bis auf das nächst künftige gemeine Concilium...} Ibid., p.511.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{...zum wenigsten bis auf das nächst künftige gemeine Concilium, dem die endliche Erörterung dieser und der andern Puncten vorbehalten seyn solle, dieweil der Päpstlichen H. Legat das auch selbst für gut ansieht...} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., pp.516-520.
Predictably they could not countenance the suppression of religious and theological literature in the interim, and while seeking nothing more ardently than the continuation of the Nuremberg Peace begged that the "misunderstandings" it had given rise to be dealt with. If the Supreme Court were reformed, and the Protestants given a representation upon it they would give it their support. They requested the appointment of commissioners to investigate past abuses. They were, finally, willing to make their contribution to the immediately needed (eilend) subsidy for the Turkish campaign, but made no mention of any regular contribution.

Together with this reply to the emperor went a statement on the conditions necessary to ensure peace.¹ This urged a thorough reform of the clergy, communion in both kinds, and an end to the enforcement of clerical celibacy. The controversial articles should be left to the discretion of the territorial authorities, and the Nuremberg Peace should be interpreted to mean that no territory should interfere with the mode in which another dealt with such questions.² While forcible ejection of the incumbents of the monasteries was deplored, sufficient provision should be made for the financing of preaching, schooling and worship. The bans pronounced upon the Protestants in the

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¹ Ibid., pp.469-474; cf. Vetter, p.195, Anm.3.
² This is the real aim of the Protestants - territorial autonomy on such questions.
Supreme Court should be annulled, and the disputes between the two religious parties should be heard anew by the reformed Court.

All in all these statements showed a certain community of interest between the Protestants and Charles; at least it would afford him some support for the campaign against the Turks and establish a temporary *modus vivendi*. The answer from the Electors, where moderate opinion was in the majority, was still more favourable, in fact they were ready to go further than the emperor himself. They not only supported the acceptance of the "agreed articles" for the meantime, but insisted that the future Council be free, Christian, and held in Germany. If this were impossible, a National Council or Imperial assembly should be held. The answer of the free cities was also generally favourable.

On the other hand the Catholic princes, under the leadership of the Bavarians and the bishops, rejected the conciliated articles, and demanded that the Augsburg Recess remain in force as the one real remedy for the heresies rampant in the land until a General Council was convoked. Even they, however, insisted that the Council be held in a location suitable to the German

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1 Dittrich's comment that the emperor's proposal displeased all parties ("missfiel auf allen Seiten") is therefore quite misleading. D/B, p. 753. Among the Electors opposition to any acceptance of the "agreed articles" came from the Archbishop of Mainz and Trier. Contarini/Farnese, 19/7/41, HJ I, 497.

2 Submitted on 17 July; CR IV, 524-526.

3 Ibid., pp. 552-553.
nation. Following the lead of the memorandum by Eck they accused the Catholic collocutors of having made inadmissible concessions in the "agreed articles" which would have to be thoroughly revised. In any case everything would have to be deferred to the General Council.  

Contarini's position was anything but enviable. Both his instructions from Rome and his own personal convictions forced him to oppose any policy which permitted the Diet to usurp rights that were the prerogative of the papacy, of the teaching office of the Church. As a result he now found himself in almost total isolation. Not one major grouping in Germany supported the full papal position. Even the rigorists were ready to contemplate a National Council. He had to come to Regensburg to mediate between Catholic and Protestant, pope and emperor, Italy and Germany. His actions had already earned him a humiliating rebuke from Rome. Now his isolation in the Curia was duplicated by that in the German situation.

On 16 July he eventually secured an audience with the emperor. He made it clear that he regarded the latter's willingness to approve the conciliated articles, with the apparent claim that he had agreed to this, the delay in granting him an audience and

1 Ibid., pp.459-460.

2 Submitted on 17 July; Ibid., pp.526-529; their decision had been preceded by a hefty debate, in which Duke Otto Henry and the Bishops of Augsburg and Constance argued the case for a more conciliatory approach. Calvin/Parel, 25/7/41, Herminjard VII, 194.
the lack of any mention of the papacy in reference to the Council, as all being part of a deliberate policy of making emperor and Diet the judges on matters pertaining to religion, to the complete exclusion of the pope and the papal representative. The emperor's presentation to the Diet, contrary to Contarini's express wish, of the legate's private admonition to the bishops was another example of the misuse of religious matters for political ends. Even the pope himself, who unlike emperor and Diet, did have the right to legislate on such matters, would never have acted in such a cavalier way, but would have first consulted the other nations of Christendom.

Charles, not a whit abashed, retorted that he had carried out his duty before God, and would not hesitate to accept the responsibility for what he had done. He had not sought the approbation of the Estates for the articles, but only their opinion, after which everything would first be referred to the Council. A mention of the pope in connection with the Council would only have triggered off a violent reaction, which would not have been confined to the Protestants. If the Council were preceded by the carrying out of reforms he would be convinced that it had been convoked in the Holy Spirit. Otherwise he would not know what to believe. 1

The clash of interests was now quite clear. Contarini's policy of reform, League, and Council offered no help to Charles

1 Contarini/Farnese, 17/7/41, HJ I, 495-497.
in his present predicament. The emperor could not afford to use the Diet for the consolidation of specifically Roman or even Catholic interests, and now that the wider hope of reunion was shattered his only thought was to patch up a reasonable peace and arrange as speedy a conclusion to the Diet as possible. He planned his departure for 22 July.¹

Of all the answers to his proposal of 12 July that of the princes alone had totally rejected the acceptance of the "agreed articles". But the Archbishops of Mainz and Trier had advocated the same point of view in the Electoral court, and to alienate the majority of the German bishops and princes would only be playing into the hands of France, especially when they had the backing of Rome, as represented by Contarini. It would be a dangerous game to provoke the Curia too far.²

While, then, the emperor, anxious to draw the Diet to a close and to leave for Italy, was now setting the pace, it was the Catholic opposition who had the initiative firmly in their hands. The bishops felt that the emperor was betraying their hopes of a restitution of the Church lands, and were correspondingly uncooperative.³ Mainz and Trier, outnumbered in the Electoral court, secured from Contarini a second statement on the conciliated

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¹ Fr. Contarini/Senate, 16/7/41, D/R, p. 213.

² Cf. Morone/Farnese, 21/6/41, HJ IV, 620 ff; there were also Charles' Italian interests to be considered. Cf. Vetter, p. 200.

³ Leopold von Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation (5 vols; 8th. ed.; 1948), IV, 159.
articles. This new writing, while denying that there was any ambiguity in his previous declaration of 10 July, interpreted the latter as neither approving or tolerating any articles until the Council, but referring the whole negotiation, and all the articles to the pope and the Apostolic See. Nothing could have been more explicit.

It is an exaggeration to say that Contarini had now no mind of his own, that he was merely a tool in the hands of others. It was his own conviction that the emperor had embarked on a completely wrong policy, and had, as a result, lost his reputation and the good-will of the German nation. Having brought about nothing but chaos, Charles now wished that he had never come to Germany. "I would never have thought", concluded Contarini, "that His Majesty would let himself be influenced to act in this way with such slight justification."

Sincere as Contarini certainly was in this assessment of the situation, there can be no doubt that his conduct was also influenced by the Curia's desire that he work in the closest harmony with the rigorist party. The leaders of the latter did

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1 CR IV, 554-555; written on 17 July; on 18 July Contarini agreed to a further emendation suggested by Mainz and Trier. Contarini/Farnese, 19/7/41, HJ I, 497.

2 "Sed tractatum praedictum totum, omnesque eiusdem artículos summo Pontifici et Apostolicae sedi...diffiniendum remisimus..." CR IV, 555.

3 Vetter describes him as the "...willenlose Werkzeug anderer..." Vetter, p. 201.

4 "...mai non haveria pensato che si fosse mossa Sua Maestà con si poco fondamento." HJ I, 497.
their best to drive the wedge between the legate and emperor even further. The papal representatives were troubled by the determination of the emperor to take up a "neutral" standpoint above the competing confessions, by his threat to leave the Diet even before the Recess was negotiated, and by his reluctance to join the Catholic League. Above all his support for the holding of a Council in Germany alarmed them. To this was added the cold disdain with which he now greeted their repeated requests for an assurance that no toleration would be granted. The Archbishop of Mainz increased their unease by confidentially informing them that the emperor was sending troops to Italy in far greater numbers than he had disclosed, and that he intended nothing less than the forcible submission of the Curia to his will. In view of the anti-clerical feeling at the court Morone believed it was possible that this might be true. He was even ready to attribute to the emperor ambitions on the Church lands.

Under such heavy pressure from the rigorists, Charles had no alternative but to present on 23 July a new draft for the Recess which met almost all their demands. Nothing was said about an approval of the "agreed articles". The whole negotiation was to

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1 Morone/Farnese, 19/7/41, HJ IV, 638.
2 "Io parli poi a Soa M. tâ circa le cose della Religione, pre-gandola, che non comportasse, che qui si facesse tolerantia alcuna...Quella mi rispose, che si faria, quanto Noi volevamo, et mostrò di dirlo con alquanto di sdegno." Contarini/Farnese, 22/7/41, ZKG III, 182.
3 HJ IV, 639.
4 CR IV, 586-589.
be referred to a General Council, or National Council, which the emperor would request Paul III to summon. Should this fall through he would himself call another Imperial assembly to deal with the religious question. In the meantime the Protestants were to abide by the "agreed articles" and the bishops to carry out a thorough reformation.

This provoked, in turn, an angry reaction on the part of the Protestants, especially against the one-sided stipulation that they, but not the Catholics, should abide by the conciliated articles and should refrain from further proselytizing. They would not undertake to maintain monasteries, churches, and clergy which were serving no useful purpose, and objected to the continuance of an Imperial jurisdiction based on the Augsburg Recess and administered by those biased against their confession. Finally they demanded an explicit suspension of the bans against Goslar and Minden, and of the lawsuits before the Supreme Court.¹

A refusal by the Protestants to subscribe to the Recess now seemed on the cards. This, however, carried with it the danger of civil war, and possibly a Protestant alliance with France, such as the Duke of Cleves had already concluded during the Diet.²

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¹ Submitted on 25 July; ibid., 589-594.
² Ranke, IV, 161.
Through the Elector of Brandenburg, with whom he had made a secret treaty only two days earlier, the emperor suggested a compromise solution, which offered tolerance on the "cuius regio" principle, and proposed that the Catholics tolerate married priests and Communion in both kinds.\(^1\)

This solution, however, while acceptable to the Protestants, was rejected out of hand by the Catholics, who, with some minor qualifications, were well content with the proposals of 23 July.\(^2\) Not so Contarini! He had been kept deliberately in the dark about its contents by Charles, and when by means of his own he discovered what they were and hurried to the emperor, he was refused an audience, and had to resort on 26 July to a direct appeal to the Estates.\(^3\) This urged the rejection of any suggestion of a National Council, which was incompetent to decide controversies about the Faith. "et quidquid ibi determinaretur, esset nullum, irritum et inane." Such unilateral action would only set off a chain reaction of seditious movements, in Germany and out of it. He ended by defending his action in addressing the Estates in this way: "hoc officium noluimus obmittere, tum ut pareremus mandatis Sanctitatis suae, tum etiam ut non deessemus officio personae legati, nobis a sede Apostolica iniunctae."

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1 OR IV, 594-595.
2 Ibid., pp. 595-600; 634.
3 Ibid., p. 600; Contarini/Farnese, 26/7/41, ZKG III, 183.
The answer of the Estates - and this at a time when the Catholic opposition was in the ascendant - was sharp. The present situation was not only dangerous, it was intolerable. The best way to avoid a National Council would be for the Apostolic See to convene the General Council it had so often promised. If, however, this was not done, the logic of the situation demanded that the controversies be settled by a National Council or Imperial assembly.1

Contarini had already had to hear from the German bishops that the papacy was to blame for the repeated delay of the Council.2 Now the entire Catholic Estates dismissed his contention that the decisions of a National Council were void, and, to add insult to injury, insisted that the General Council, if it were held, should meet in Germany. Contarini was treated even by the Catholics as the representative of an alien power with but little understanding of the German situation, whose pretensions could, if necessary be ignored. The anti-Protestant was by no means necessarily a pro-papalist. The legate's humiliation was extreme. As the Diet wound to a close he found himself regarded as a near non-entity, uninformed by the emperor, ignored by the Estates, the target of vicious abuse from the Protestants. His attempt to gain exacter information from King Ferdinand on the form which the Recess would

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1 CR IV, 601-602.
2 Cf. p. 296, n. 5, above.
take were brushed aside with the remark that it would give little pleasure to anyone—pope, king, or Protestant—a not inaccurate forecast.¹

The problem of the emperor was how some sort of settlement could be arranged with the Protestants without alienating the Catholic party. In view of the rejection of Brandenburg's proposals, he laid before the Estates yet another draft on 27 July, which differed little from that of 23 July,² and therefore immediately led to a protest by the Protestants, in effect a repetition of their objections to the previous draft.³ In one last desperate effort to gain an agreement Charles summoned the Estates to his quarters on 28 July, and in marathon negotiations which lasted from early morning well into the night managed to satisfy many of the Protestant objections by a secret Declaration on how the Recess was to be interpreted.⁴ Further objections from the Protestants on the following day led to a final amended Declaration by the emperor.⁵

The Protestants were allowed to interpret the conciliated articles in a wholly Protestant way. They were given virtually a free hand in the reformation of the monasteries and the

¹ ZKG III, 183.
² CR IV, 612-616.
³ Ibid., pp. 616-619.
⁴ Ibid., p. 622.
⁵ Ibid., p. 623.
financing of their churches and schools from the income of the Church properties. Protestantism was given a certain juridical status by the guarantee of the Protestant as well as the Catholic clergy in their possessions, the Augsburg Recess was to have no validity in religious matters, and the ban pronounced upon Goslar was expressly included in the general suspension of the law suits and Imperial bans directed against the Protestants.

At the same time Charles pacified the Catholics by joining the League, but a League from which any commitments liable to involve him in a premature war against the Protestants had been removed. On 29 July the Recess was formally read and after a last fierce skirmish between the two confessions was finally accepted. The emperor left Regensburg at once. The Diet was over.

1 Vetter, p. 212.
2 CR IV, 625-630; accepted by the Protestants on the condition that it be interpreted according to the Imperial Declaration. Ibid., p. 631.
CHAPTER 8

THE CATHOLICISM OF CONTARINI

The conviction lying behind this final chapter is that an understanding of Contarini's activity at Regensburg is not without relevance for the understanding of his theology. Its purpose is to urge the need for a reassessment of Contarini's theology in the light of the events of Regensburg, and to suggest some of the new perspectives from which this reassessment will have to be conducted.

It is not merely that research in the Reformation period has progressed considerably since Brieger,1 Dittrich, and Rückert2 dealt with the subject. The incredible changes both within and without the theological world since the Second World War have shattered the old perspectives and the old securities. The ecumenical theologian in a secular world is constrained to ask different questions from those posed by a Dittrich.

Above all, the hermeneutical problem has to be faced. For Dittrich it was enough to give a resumé of Contarini's arguments, to interject these with the odd pious comment, and to append a

1 Theodor Brieger, Gasparo Contarini und das Regensburger Concordienwerk des Jahres 1541, Gotha: 1870; "Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Cardinal Contarini", Theologische Studien und Kritiken, XLV (1872), 87-150.

2 Hanns Rückert, Die Theologische Entwicklung Gasparo Contarinis. (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, VI), Berlin: 1926.
cautionary tale. ¹ However misplaced, there can be no doubting his conviction of solidarity with Contarini across the centuries in the defence of the Catholic cause. From a totally different standpoint, Brieger also believed that he had identified the genuine beliefs of Contarini— but this time as essentially Protestant. ² Both could indulge in this confessional shadow-boxing because they were not conscious of any alienation from the language and thought of their hero. Their Catholicism or Protestantism was his. He was 'their man in Regensburg'.

The denizen of the modern theological world, however, furiously engaged in demythologizing his God-talk, is confronted with the almost total incomprehensibility of Contarini's language and thought-patterns. At best the purely formal analysis of his theological writings has a certain technical interest. Origins can be

¹ On specific points Dittrich can describe Contarini's view as incorrect or incompatible with the later definitions of the Council of Trent. E.g. D/B, pp.657-659. While these deviations are not bagatellised they do not constitute, for Dittrich, ground enough to doubt Contarini's Catholicism. Egelhaaf comments that Dittrich's monograph offers less a critical appreciation of Contarini's life and work than a presentation of this life from the point of view of Contarini himself. Review in Historische Zeitschrift, LVIII (1887), 120-124.

traced, source-material compared and contrasted,\(^1\) linguistic divergencies from the Catholic or Protestant norm recorded. But this, of course, is at best only a first step towards an understanding of Contarini's thought, and the code, it appears, has yet to be cracked.

This is most obviously the case with the formal theological writings which, to tell the truth, exhibit a profoundly un-original mind.\(^2\) His arguments are generally second-hand, second-rate, and stilted. They move in a creaking Aristotelian framework, philosophical axioms jostling with Biblical proof texts and papal decrees. To read them is to doubt whether Contarini ever had a single original thought in theology.

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1 The publication by Jedin of thirty letters from Contarini to the Camaldolese monks, Tommaso Giustiniani and Vincenzo Quirini, between 1511 and 1523 has been the most important find here. Hubert Jedin, Contarini und Camaldoli. Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. Estratto dall'Archivio Italiano per la Storia della Pietà, II (1953). His interpretation of the material in "Turmerlebnis des jungen Contarini", HJ LXX (1951), 115 ff.

Lenz's initiative in providing a critical edition of the original form of the Regensburg Book (Lenz III, 31-72) has been followed up by the theological evaluation of Robert Stupperich in Der Humanismus und die Wiedervereinigung der Konfessionen (SVRG, LIII, II), Leipzig:1936; and in his article, "Der Ursprung des Regensburger Buches von 1541 und seine Rechtfertigungslehre", ARG XXVI (1939), 88-116.

2 Contarini's main philosophical and theological writings were gathered together by his nephew, Luigi Contarini: Gasparis Contareni Cardinalis Opera, Parisius:1571. Friedrich Hünermann has re-issued four of the controversial works: Confutatio articulorum seu quaeestionum Lutheranorum, Epistola de justificatione, De potestate Pontificis, and De praedestinatione in, Gasparo Contarini: Gegenreformatorische Schriften (1530c.-1542) (Corpus Catholicorum, VII), Münster:1923; Jedin has provided a German translation of the Confutatio in, Kardinal Contarini als Kontroversetheologe (Katholisches Leben und Kampfen im Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung, IX; Münster:1949), pp. 19-48.
Now this is, to say the least, surprising. Why should Contarini's systematic theological work be so uninspired and un-inspiring when the man himself, his life and work, is so full of interest? Whence this dichotomy between radical action and traditionalist thought?

It is not as if Contarini were a man of action who was uninterested in such theoretical matters. As the very considerable number of his theological writings demonstrates, he was passionately concerned for the doctrine as well as the reform of the Church. Yet of the few, for example, who have ventured on the reading of his *De Predestinatione*¹ the number who have plodded through to the end must be small indeed, and the number who would claim to have received any illumination thereby infinitesimal.

Considerably less obscure, on the other hand, are Contarini's letters. Where they deal with theological matters we approach that coinherence of thought and personality so characteristic of Luther, and encounter something of the spontaneity and freshness Contarini's action would have led us to expect. Partly, of course, this is because of the more immediate and personal appeal which all correspondence has, partly also, however, because he is relatively free here from the conventions of scholastic argumentation.

¹ Hünermann, pp.44-67.
If, then, we are prepared to admit the difficulty of understanding Contarini's thought – and a failure to do so will simply mean the continued misappropriation and misunderstanding of the latter by our own pietisms and prejudices – the most promising point of departure would appear to be his correspondence, where the air is somewhat less rarified, where he writes in the immediate context of a situation familiar to us. The amateur theologian Contarini has too long been left to the somewhat disembodied treatment of the professional historians of doctrine. Valuable as the work of the latter has been, it has left many of the most important questions unasked, and has tended to overlook the diffidence with which Contarini moved in the purely doctrinal field. It was at Regensburg, where doctrinal and diplomatic issues were scarcely to be disentangled, that Contarini, the professional diplomat, was at his most natural. Hence the value of interrogating him as to his theology within this setting.

One of the most immediate problems which the confessional confrontation at Regensburg sets us is that of the adequacy of our understanding of 'Catholicism' or 'Protestantism'. Just where

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is the line to be drawn between the two when a Calvin and a Contarini can both be convinced of the essential correctness of the Regensburg formula on justification - "fides quae est efficax per charitatem"? We have already noted that both Rome and Wittenberg later rejected the article as ambiguous. But what does this mean? Does it necessarily follow that it was neither Catholic nor Protestant, or not 'fully' so? Do we accept a purely positivist criterion: whatever Rome accepts is Catholic, whatever Wittenberg (or Weimar) accepts is Protestant? This would be to cast doubt both on Contarini's Catholicism and on Calvin's Protestantism.

But we must not restrict our discussion to this single article. We have already indicated the many similarities between the thought of the Catholic Gropper and the Protestant Bucer. Even the expert in the field of theological archaeology would have difficulty at times in distinguishing their utterances from one another. Distinctions can be made, and on certain points obviously must be made. Very often, however, one does not seem far from hair-splitting. It is assumed a priori that a difference must exist, and by looking long enough and hard enough one is indeed found. The exercise, however, carries little conviction, and certainly does not establish that the differences were grave enough to justify the continued division of the Church.

1 CR IV,200.
The whole Regensburg Book raises, then, in the sharpest manner, the question as to the adequacy of our interpretative categories. We have seen how the Book was conditioned through and through by its character as a response to a socio-political crisis, just as the theology of Wittenberg was a response to a personal and ecclesiastical crisis. Does this make its articles any less 'Protestant', or more 'humanist'? Does Bucer necessarily stand condemned as an opportunist because of his support for them?

Certainly for the modern Catholic and Protestant treatments of the Diet these questions do not appear to arise. The Regensburg Book is written off as an unhappy compromise which could never succeed,¹ or as an exercise in self deception.² Does this not, however, seem to indicate a rather unrealistic theological purism? What else could a public theological document like this be but a compromise? How were the decrees of the Council

1 Thus Agosta, p.43.

2 Speaking, e.g. of the welcome given Article V by both sides at Regensburg Stupperich comments, "An dieser Stelle zeigte sich aber, wie sehr man sich auf beiden Seiten durch Worte hatte täuschen lassen... Der Fortgang der Verhandlungen zeigte, wie wenig man sich tatsächlich verständigt hatte." Der Humanismus und die Wiedervereinigung der Konfessionen, pp. 100-101; Jedin even assigns to Regensburg, "eine geradezu providentielle Funktion. Denn in Regensburg ist versucht worden, das Unmögliche doch noch möglich zu machen..."; its failure demonstrated once for all the futility of such attempts and prepared the way for the Council of Trent. "Geschichtlich betrachtet ist nicht einzusehen wie ein anderer Weg hätte gefunden werden können." "Das Konzil von Trient und der Unionsgedanke", Theologie und Glaube, XL(1950),503,513; Gutierrez describes it as more of a treaty between the two confessions than a doctrinal agreement. Miscelanea Comillas, IV,23.
of Trent arrived at if not by a series of compromises? Who would care to argue that the creedal statements of the Early Church descended straight from heaven, or dispute that they were often catapulted into existence by the painful necessity to clarify Imperial policy on matters religious if political disorders were to be avoided? The theological purist tends to be impelled here by confessional imperialism rather than by any clear appreciation of the situation.¹

What, then, of Contarini’s Catholicism? The question has been posed before now. Indeed the legate’s activity at Regensburg, and the attention which the Inquisition later devoted both to his works and his friends was bound to encourage speculation about his orthodoxy.² Jedin’s view that his inherent goodness and his concern for the unity of the Church may have led him to make some imprudent concessions to the Protestants, but that basically he remained always “unquestionably Catholic”³ can be

¹ Rivière, e.g. speaks of the danger to Catholic orthodoxy and concludes that, "le protestantisme menaçait évidemment d'introduire la confusion dans bien des esprits. Il était temps pour l'Église d'intervenir." *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique*, VIII, ii, p.2164.

² The amendments made by the Inquisition to the Venetian editions of 1578 and 1589 of the Opera are collected in Hünermann, *Gegenreformatorische Schriften*, pp. XXXIV-XXXVII.

³ "einwandfrei katholisch", *Contarini als Kontroverstheologe* p.16; Jedin rejects on dogmatic grounds the possibility that Contarini’s views on justification were an admixture of orthodox and unorthodox thought, "for in the sphere of faith there can be no middle course, that is, there is no half-truth but only truth and error." *History*, I,383,n.2.
taken as representing the attitude of the great majority of Catholic scholars.\(^1\) Protestant historians have tended to lay somewhat more emphasis on the Lutheran colouring to his understanding of justification, but Rückert's analysis of his teaching has discouraged any from following Brieger's rash example in claiming him for Protestantism.\(^2\)

It will be seen that on the question of Contarini's Catholicism a certain consensus of opinion has been arrived at, but one based rather narrowly on a consideration of Contarini's teaching on justification. It was natural enough that attention should be concentrated on this one issue, for it was Contarini's approval for the controversial Article V which, both at the time

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1 Referring to Contarini's statement that without the authority of the Church he not only could not accept any doubtful statements but could not even accept the Gospel of John, Agosta exclaims: "In un uomo che pensa così, ogni vena è cattolica." Agosta, p. 44; Joseph Lortz speaks of "...so absolut kirchen- und papsttreue, religiös und sittlich so wertvolle...Männer wie Kardinal Contarini und Gropper...", Reformation, II, 228; Hürnermann, however, speaks of Contarini slipping gradually "in eine immer größere Annäherung an die reformatorischen Ideen..." Tübinger Theologische Quartalschrift, CII, 21; Wilhelm Braun, a Modernist, uses terms reminiscent of those of Brieger. He concludes that "...wenn auch der Theologe Contarini katholisch gelehrt hat, doch der Mensch, der Christ evangelisch empfunden hat." Kardinal Gasparo Contarini oder der Reformkatholizismus' unserer Tage im Licht der Geschichte, (Leipzig: 1903), p. 69.

2 Seeberg believes that the main element in Contarini's double justice theory remains that of inherent righteousness and that "...die Eigenart der imputierten Gerechtigkeit ist nicht klar erfassst, weil sie eben ein übernommenes fremdes Element in dem Begriffssgefuge war." Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, IV, ii, p. 749; Philip McNair believes Contarini "...accepted the doctrine of Justification ex sola fide not so much because it was taught by Luther as because it seemed to him to be supported by the sturdiest pillars of the Catholic doctrinal tradition." Peter Martyr in Italy: An Anatomy of Apostasy (Oxford: 1967), p. 13.
and later, attracted the suspicion that he held unorthodox views,\(^1\) and the Council of Trent, of course, explicitly condemned the doctrine of 'double justice'. In determining the nature of Contarini's Catholicism an examination of this article and his statements on it obviously has a central place. It should not, however, as it unfortunately has, have usurped the place of all other considerations.

Above all it should have been complemented by an examination of Contarini's conduct at Regensburg, for it is the latter which affords the key to Contarini's understanding of Justification. It is not enough to know the origins and trace the development of this doctrine in Contarini's thought; we must also know the intentions with which he furthered it, and this we can only learn from the Diet itself. There is one further point. It is as important for an appreciation of Contarini's Catholicism to see where he did not diverge from the trodden path as to note where he did, as illuminating to examine his attitude to the articles on the Church and on the Sacraments - the ones on which the colloquy foundered - as to pore over the article on Justification which seemed to pave the way to its success.

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\(^1\) Pole's ecstatic welcome for the agreement was quite untypical. Pole/Contarini, 17/5/41, D/R, p. 185. The first reaction in Roman circles was deep suspicion of the Lutherans', though not of Contarini's motives. Priuli/Beccadelli, 21/5/41, Quirini III, 46-49; in the lively controversy which ensued opinion soon hardened against the formula though care was taken not to implicate Contarini personally in the criticism. Bembo/Contarini, 29/5/41, D/R, p. 188.
If we do this we will discover that the question as to the nature of Contarini's Catholicism is falsely, or at least too narrowly posed. Contarini was a many-layered individual, and his concern for Catholicism was only one side to his character. Throughout this study we have attempted to demonstrate that at least three different factors determined his decisions at Regensburg - his ecumenism, his Catholicism, and his Curialism. We would suggest that the clue to Contarini's theology lies here, in the coexistence, in rather unstable equilibrium, of these three elements.

The question as to whether Contarini was 'basically' a Catholic or a Protestant is thereby revealed as inappropriate. It is certainly true that in some situations his 'ecumenical' concern, for example, could become so dominant that all other considerations seemed to disappear, as happened during the successful negotiations over the fifth article on Justification. In fact, however, it was only because he was convinced that his other loyalties - to the traditional teaching of the Church, and to the Papal See - were not endangered that he could act as he did. Even in this instance, far from acting as a Protestant, Contarini did not even act exclusively for 'ecumenical' reasons.

Contarini was, of course, a Catholic, but scarcely 'basically' a Catholic. 'Basically' he was an eclectic, not out of vacillation or weakness of character, but because he felt himself compelled to do justice to all his different allegiances, as a man of the Renaissance, of the Church, and of the Curia.
There can be no doubt about his inner integrity when his fundamental convictions were at stake. The difficulty arose, however, when a conflict arose between his various loyalties, where his concern for Christian unity clashed with his allegiance to Catholic truth. It is in the light of this crisis, in which priorities had to be determined, that the nature of Contarini's Catholicism is best revealed. Under pressure, the liberal Contarini was forced back on the traditional authoritarianism.

A reassessment of Contarini's Catholicism will therefore have to keep the following factors in mind. First of all, Contarini found that he had to dissociate himself from the Protestants not on their 'central article' of Justification, which, indeed, he believed they understood better than some Catholics, but in their doctrine of Church and Sacraments.

Secondly, the refusal of the Protestants to abandon their views on Church and Sacraments was regarded by him as sheer obstinacy, for it was in no way the logical outcome of the doctrine of Justification but a wilful refusal to accept the authority of the Church. The important point here is not that Contarini's attitude to the Church's authority was the traditional Catholic one, but that he was able to hold it at the same time as he adhered to a doctrine of Justification acceptable to the Protestants, for this shows that his understanding of Justification must also have been radically different from the Protestant one far more clearly than any detailed examination of his theological terminology. The acid test of one's appreciation of the doctrine of
justification by faith alone is, after all, one's interpretation of the nature of the Church and the Sacraments.

This has relevance for the whole debate about the nature of Italian 'evangelism', of which Contarini is one of the most notable exemplars.¹ How is its Protestant-sounding terminology to be evaluated? Contarini's case would appear to throw some light on this. For while accepting a doctrine of imputed righteousness he is able, as it were, to insulate it off from the other doctrines. The doctrine of justification by faith is not, as for Luther, the article of belief around which all the others must be grouped, in terms of which they must be interpreted or reinterpreted. In practice it does not appear to have this central place for Contarini. Its relevance tends rather to be restricted to the realm of private piety, to the spiritual life of the individual. It is not far removed from being a gnostic teaching for the spiritual élite, and one suspects that Italian evangelism as a whole is not altogether free of this tendency.

This leads, thirdly, to the question of the authority of the Church. Luther had radically 'reduced' the Church to the eschatological community in which and into which the Gospel was bodied out in Word and Sacrament. For Contarini, on the other hand, the eschaton has receded to the limits of time, the inbreaking Kingdom has been replaced by the transcendentental doctrines of the Church. The task of the Church is primarily didactic not kerygmatic.

¹ Cf. McNair, pp.1-50.
Hence personal faith is not enough. Side by side with an emphasis on the sole sufficiency of grace and faith for the salvation of the believer stands an insistence on the necessity for an objective, supra-personal authority, whose function it is to provide the framework within which this individual faith can be nourished. To put it pointedly, the presupposition to faith in Christ is faith in the infallibility of the Church within which this Christ is preached and believed.

The controversy over transubstantiation at Regensburg made this quite clear. The unconditional faith which the Lutherans reserved for the incomprehensible Word of forgiveness and release, for the Gospel, must also be given, according to Contarini, to the teaching authority of the Church. His refusal even to entertain the thought that a properly constituted Council could err in its definitions of the faith sprang logically from his conviction that the Word is not limited to the preaching of Scripture but can find and has found final incarnation in the dogmatic tradition of the Church. In the hierarchy of the Church he sees the divinely ordained guardian of this dogmatic tradition, to whom the appropriate response is that of humble submission.

Contarini had not, in other words, rethought his whole doctrine of the Church in terms of his understanding of Justification. The various elements in his thought lay unresolved beside one another. He might be willing to characterise, with Luther, the Christian individual as "simul iustus et peccator"; the
Christian Church he was certainly not.

One is driven to the conclusion that Contarini's understanding of Luther was as limited as his interest in him, i.e. in an individualistic misappropriation of the Lutheran doctrine of Justification. There are no signs of any appreciation of Luther's teaching on the Word of God, with its implications for the nature and structure of the Church and for the relation of theology to philosophy, still less of Luther's eschatology. Hence Contarini's astonishment at Regensburg when he discovered what the Protestants' views on the Church actually were, and his inability to explain their adherence to them except as pure obduracy.

Luther, however, is not the sole norm by which Contarini's Catholicism should be measured, and perhaps not even the most important one. Contarini was certainly loyal to the pope and the papacy, and he certainly accepted the authority of the Church, unquestioningly defending its dogmas where they were endangered. But with this papalism and Catholicism he sought to combine a wider concern for the culture and politics of his age. As a churchman who knew something of the problems of the statesmen, he shared many of their concerns - for reform, for peace, for an effective defence against the Turks. As a Venetian who had travelled Europe, he could not be content with the blinkered view of the world as seen from the Curia. In a narrowly doctrinal sense his Catholicism was, on the whole, conventional enough. In its commitment to the world about him it offered an attractive alternative to the ghetto mentality which was
eventually to triumph at and after the Council of Trent.

It would be pleasant to be more precise, to be able to notch Contarini into the category of 'good Catholic' or 'genuine evangelical', to lay bare the fabric of his thought, and dissolve the man in the analysis. For to all of us Regensburg is an irritant. It irks the tolerant by its failure, the Catholic by its divergence from Trent, the Protestant by its deviation from Lutheranism. Yet Contarini and Regensburg explain one another, and it is quite illegitimate to laud the one and damn the other. The Catholicism of Contarini can as little be understood apart from Regensburg as it can be reconciled with that of Trent.

We will have to move towards a rather more differentiated conception of pre-Tridentine Catholicism if justice is to be done to Contarini, and cease regarding it as a rather inadequate stepping-stone for pilgrims towards Trent. For the historian at least there is nothing inevitable about the progression of events which eventually led to Trent. It is time that pre-Tridentine Catholicism was studied in its own terms and for its own sake. Inconsequential it may often have been, but its inner contradictions were as often its strength as its weakness. Contarini's conduct at Regensburg is one long parable illustrating this theme.
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