GOD AND THE CREATURE

IN THE

TRINITARIAN METHODOLOGY OF KARL BARTH.

GORDON, W. WATSON.

Thesis presented to the Faculty of Divinity, University of Edinburgh, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.  
Summary.  

## Chapter 1. The Place Of The Trinity In Barth's Theological Development.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Die christliche Dogmatics.</strong></td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth's Relationship With Neo-Protestantism.</td>
<td>13.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleiermacher And Barth in <em>Die christliche Dogmatics</em>.</td>
<td>19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Relation Between Theology And Philosophy</td>
<td>29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Schicksal Und Idee In Der Theologie.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth And St. Anselm.</td>
<td>40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth And St. Anselm's Proof For The Existence Of God.</td>
<td>54.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth's Exposition Of St. Anselm's Proof For The Existence Of God.</td>
<td>61.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment Of Barth's Interpretation Of St. Anselm's Proofs.</td>
<td>72.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth's Study Of St. Anselm And The Place Of The Trinity In The Church Dogmatics.</td>
<td>86.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth's Starting Point And The Development Of The Trinity.</td>
<td>98.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 2. The Doctrine Of The Trinity And Its Relationship To Christology.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Doctrine Of The Trinity.</td>
<td>115.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Root Of The Doctrine Of The Trinity And The Divinity Of Jesus Christ.</td>
<td>120.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. We Believe In One Lord Jesus Christ.</td>
<td>129.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Begotten Of The Father Before All Time.</td>
<td>130.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Begotten Not Created.</td>
<td>132.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Of One Substance With The Father.</td>
<td>133.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. Through Whom All Things Were Made.</td>
<td>134.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Holy Spirit And The Root Of The Doctrine Of The Trinity.

1. We Believe In The Holy Spirit, The Lord. 136.

ii. We Believe In The Holy Spirit, The Life Creating. 141.

iii. We Believe In The Holy Spirit, Who Proceedeth From The Father And The Son. 143.

iv. Procession From The Father Through The Son? 144.

v. The Question Of A Spirituque. 146.

Barth's Doctrine Of The Three-In-Oneness Of God. 150.

God's One-In-Threeness. 154.

Person Or Mode Of Being. 160.

The Relationship Between The Doctrine Of The Trinity And Christology. 163.

The Christological Form Of Revelation: Jesus Christ, The Objective Reality And Possibility Of Revelation. 166.

The Relationship Between The Time Of Revelation And The Time Of The Witnesses To Revelation. 169.

The Christological Problem And The Confession: Jesus Christ, Very God And Very Man. 172.

Jesus Christ: Very God And Very Man. 176.

Egeneto: The Inconceivable Act In Which The Word Is Flesh. 179.

The Miracle Of Christmas: The Form Of Revelation And The Question Of The Unity Of The Word Which Became Flesh. 185.

Conceptus De Spiritus Sancto. 189.

Conclusion. 195.

Chapter 3. The Relationship Between The Doctrine Of The Trinity And The Doctrine Of Creation. I.

The Orientation Of The Doctrine Of Creation Within The Structure Of Barth's Thought. 199.
The Unity Of The Being Of The Self Revealing God And The Unity Of God And The Creature. 203.


Predestinatio Gemina And History 216.

The Doctrine Of Creation And The Covenant. 220.

Creation As The External Basis Of The Covenant. 225.

The Covenant As The Internal Basis Of Creation. 238.

The Relationship Between Knowledge Of God And Knowledge Of The Creature. 252.

Creaturely Knowledge Of God And Creaturely Knowledge Of The Creature. 258.

Karl Barth's Doctrine Of Analogy. 268.

Knowledge Of The Creature In Relation To Knowledge Of God: Analogia Fidei And Analologia Relationis. 284.

Chapter 4. The Relationship Between The Doctrine Of The Trinity And The Doctrine Of Creation. II.

Problems Attendant On The Positing Of The God-Creature Relationship. 292.

Catholic And Reformed Understanding Of The God-Creature Relationship. 301.

i. The Methodological Importance Of The Humanity Of Jesus In Reformed Theology. 310.

ii. The Doctrines Of An And Enhypostasis As Christological Formulae. 319.

(a) The Concept Of Person Entailed In The Doctrine Of Enhypostasis 323.

(b) The Influence Of Aristotelian Metaphysics On Christology. 325.

(c) The Aristotelian Doctrine Of Substance. 337.
The Viability Of Barth's Trinitarian Method Of Understanding The God-Creature Relation. 347.

Conclusion. 358.

i. The Dogma Of The Trinity In The East And West. 358.


(a) The Relation Between Kerygma And Dogma In St. Basil. 367.

(b) The Deity Of The Spirit. 368.

(c) Nicea And The Unity Of God. 370.

(d) Tertullian And The Trinity In The West. 382.

Appendices. A. 399.
B. 403.
C. 407.
D. 411.
E. 414.

Bibliography. 423.
I wish to gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to those who have made it possible for me to write this thesis. My theological teachers who in lectures, seminar and discussion have deepened my understanding of the primal mystery of the Christian faith: To Rev. Prof. C. Williams formerly of Queen's College, University of Melbourne, presently Dean of the Faculty of Divinity Yale University, and the staff of the Department of Christian Dogmatics, Edinburgh University, The Rev. Prof. T.F. Torrance, The Revs. J.B. Torrance, R.G. Walls, J. Zizioulas. I would tender my thanks for the patience and co-operation both of the Librarian and Mr. I. Hope of the New College Library. I must say, also, that I have appreciated the courtesy and co-operation of Mrs. L. Stupart, Secretary of the Post-Graduate Studies Committee of the Faculty of Divinity.

A special word of thanks is due to my wife, without whose encouragement and support this work would have been impossible. Lastly, may I say how much I personally owe to my parents, my late father, and my mother by whose prodigious generosity our stay in Scotland was made possible; and as my first and best teachers introduced me to the Truth that makes men free indeed.
SUMMARY.

In this thesis we are concerned to present an analysis of the development, meaning and implications of the doctrine of the Trinity in the thought of Karl Barth, as it relates to the question of the relationship between God and the creature.

To this end we begin our presentation with an analysis of the development in which, it is contended, the doctrine of the Trinity assumed a constitutive place in Barth's theological programme. As a result of a critical re-appraisal of his first systematic work, which attempted a confrontation with theological realism and idealism in contemporary Protestant and Catholic thought, Barth is understood to have seen the doctrine of the Trinity as of continuing critical importance in his developing thought. Not least in the factors influencing Barth's thinking in this direction was his understanding of St. Anselm's theological scheme. The doctrine of the Trinity within the concept of his Prolegomena to Dogmatics served to emphasise the lesson that he learned from St. Anselm. For if the possibility and necessity of Theology are rooted and grounded in the nature of God's being who He is, then the doctrine of the Trinity within the doctrine of Revelation serves to emphasise that the possibility and necessity of Revelation are rooted in God's self revelation. Dogmatics can only give an account of itself by describing the reality which posits the possibility and validates the truth of past, present and future revelation in and by its own actuality.

We raise the question at the conclusion of this presentation whether Barth's way of understanding and expounding both the point of departure and the substance of the doctrine of the Trinity does not preclude appreciation of factors which have been felt to be important in understanding the Trinity. One of these is understood to be the relation-
ship between the creaturely form of God's revelation and life of the creature as such or its experience of God's salvation within the sphere of the church; where the soteriological purpose of the trinitarian economy is actively pressing towards a consummation in history.

Subsequently we present an analysis of the relationship between Barth's exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology. The significance of this exercise is that it elucidates the relationship, presupposed by the event of God's Self revelation as subsisting between God and the creature, in terms of the unitive act in which God constitutes Himself as the creature's Lord in His Self revelation. Thus the creaturely form of revelation can only be understood in terms of the possibility which posits the actuality of God's Self revealed Lordship. The christological question is a viewing from a different perspective of the same question by which the doctrine of the Trinity was raised to understanding: "Who" is the Self revealing God? It is a viewing of this question from the specific point of view of what this God who reveals Himself as Lord does for us and in us. The importance of the conclusions reached in this chapter relates to an understanding of how Barth, on the basis of his view of the worldly forms of revelation established in this context, considers the relationship between God and the creature which is presupposed by this event.

When we therefore come to consider the doctrine of Creation and its orientation within Barth's systematic perspective we note that we can only posit the reality and possibility of creaturely existence as the technical possibility of the realisation of the divine compact and decision in which God determines Himself to be "Who" He is. Thus the doctrine of Creation is rooted and grounded in the doctrine of Election considered as part of the doctrine of God. Therefore the
creature is raised to understanding in terms of the being and action of God who, in revealing Himself, presupposes the Self positing of His eternal election of Himself and the creature in the majesty of His freedom; which is the grace of Jesus Christ. Consequently, all the relationships between God and the creature, and creature and creature, are expounded in terms of this reality. Both the origin and goal, the goal because it is the origin, of all God's ways and works \( \text{ad extra} \) are seen to be rooted and grounded in the unity and diversity of God's self constitutive act in which He posits Himself as man's Lord.

An analysis is then presented of the God-creator and creature-creature relationship, in terms of what Barth's theological method presupposes and implies for understanding the question of knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature. This analysis serves to confirm the conclusions reached so far and to pose the question which is then taken up in our final chapter: the relative importance of the structures of creaturely existence in understanding the question of God's relationship to the world.

In the final chapter we thus explore the issue of God's relationship to the creature by posing what we believe to be pertinent questions in understanding God's transcendence and immanence. In this we make use of material from both the Catholic and Reformed traditions. It is held that for both traditions the God-creature relationship entails a proper emphasis on the relative structure and being of creaturely existence in appreciating the full implications of God's creation.

The view is expressed and developed that elements within the Eastern and Reformed traditions prove helpful in overcoming what is seen to be a lack, a methodological hiatus, in Barth's exposition of the God-creature relationship within a trinitarian context. As distinct from Barth's presentation we put forward the view that in understanding the
Trinity in relation to creation it is necessary to see the unique and undivided act of God's self revelation in terms which provide, methodologically, for the meaningfulness of the worldliness of revelations form. That is, both the unity of God and the unity of God and the creature are such as to be declared to us, not only amidst or with, but through and by the worldliness of its form. It is felt that the analysis of the event structure of revelation and its subsequent development in the doctrines of the Trinity, God and Creation, preclude Barth's appreciation of what we would see as an important aspect of the problem. Unless the worldliness of Christ is allowed to stand, determining how God speaks, we have nothing left in understanding God's relation to the creature but the intra trinitarian speaking and acting of God which presupposes the event of revelation ad extra. Instead we should understand God the Son and the unity of God's self revelation by means of the Sonship actually achieved towards man in the incarnate Christ. This Sonship, celebrated in the Spirit by the church's liturgy, is, as such, the means by which the church is pressed and called forward toward the consummation of the creature's vocation in history.
CHAPTER I

The Place of the Trinity in Barth's Theological Development.

In this chapter we shall attempt to assess the place, and consequently the methodological significance, of the doctrine of the Trinity in Barth's thought prior to its maturation in the *Kirkliche Dogmatik*. (1) To further this purpose we intend to evaluate the developments and modifications of Barth's thought from this point of view. Our point of departure will be Barth's first attempt at systematic presentation of his views on dogmatics, *Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes: Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik*. (2) As our task is not seen to consist in presenting a history of Barth's thought our attention will be directed to those subsequent works which are considered important to our defined area of interest.

Writing to his friend Eduard Thurneysen in March 1924, Barth said of his own thought as he began the task of formulating his dogmatic position prior to publication of his first attempt at a Prolegomena:

"In regard to the incarnation it is best at any rate to proceed cautiously that one may not run his head into the exclusive 'Jesus Christ' - pit of the Lutherans. Everything depends upon this denominator, but this denominator 'somehow' under everything. A Trinity of being, not just an economic Trinity! At all costs the doctrine of the Trinity! If I could get the right key in my hand there, then everything would come out right;"


2. Barth, K. *Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf*. 
but one is always coming to premature conclusions which then take their revenge somewhere." (1)

It is worth noting two things evinced by this statement which have relevance both for our understanding of Barth's view of the Trinity and what will later be taken up in critical evaluation of this view. We refer to Barth's emphasis on the systematic importance of the Trinity of 'being' as opposed to what is taken to be a merely economic Trinity. A lready we discover here what will later become Barth's classical stance in relation to the problem of natural theology in Roman Catholicism and Neo-Protestantism. He insists on the fact that God's being cannot be quantified in terms of man's understanding of himself and the process of history. A merely economic Trinity suggests to Barth the possibility of just such a quantification in terms of man's self understanding. As opposed to this Barth is consciously seeking a way to express, by means of a Trinity of being, both the problems and the solutions to the problems inherent in the position he is setting out to oppose.

In our opinion it would take Barth another six years to arrive at the point where the issues raised for the church's understanding by the historical revelation of God's being could be satisfactorily understood in terms of,

"a Trinity of being, not just an economic Trinity." (2)

The nature of this development in Barth's thought, from 1924 until the publication of the Anselm book in 1931, has the importance that in so far as one asserts that after 1931 the Trinity assumed a strategic importance which it did not possess previously, then this is to be understood as a judgment of considerable hermeneutical weight for it.

1. Barth, K., & Thurneysen, E. Revolutionary Theology In The Making: Correspondence 1914-1925. p. 176.

will determine to a large extent the evaluation of Barth's work as a whole. (1)

This chapter, therefore, examines the evidence presented in Barth's own writings from this period in order to support the thesis that whatever change took place during this period was related to Barth's concern to relativise the theological problems created by man's attempt to understand the being of God and its relations to historical revelation by means of a deeper understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. It is, therefore, in the area of theology's formulating of the question which it has to answer, in which regard Barth was later to be decisively helped by his study of Anselm, that we begin our exposition of Barth's initial systematic attempt. Our effort will be directed toward establishing the way in which Barth understood the question of theological method as posed by the subject matter of theology and the place of the Trinity in this context.

_Die christliche Dogmatik._

As Barth later looked back on this work he could only conclude it was,

"a re-adoption of the line Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Herrmann, and because in any thinkable continuation of this line I can only see the plain destruction of Protestant theology .... I can therefore only say No here." (2)

1. Barth.K. *Anaelsmifides quaeerens intellectum: Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of His Theological Scheme.* The exact nature of this development is a subject of dispute. Cf. Torrance.T. _Karl Barth: An Introduction To His Early Theology. 1910-1931._ Here a distinction is drawn between dialectical and dogmatic thinking in Barth and a transition from one to the other. pp. 48 ff. & 133 ff. A similar comparison is drawn by Balthasar.von.H. _Karl Barth: Darstellung Und Deutung Seiner Theologie._ pp. 71ff & 93ff. However, others, e.g. Smart.J.D. _The Divided Mind of Modern Theology_ maintain there is a more fluid relationship between Barth's earlier and later thought of this period. p. 224.

Barth therefore saw the work compromised in the very direction from which, at the time of writing, it was conceived as a conscious departure. (1)

The method which Barth had adopted since the second edition of his *Epistle to the Romans*, (2) in an effort to counter the systematising of theology by anthropological presuppositions, was a radical dialectical method taken over largely from S. Kierkegaard. It should be noted that Barth's use of the dialectical method was conditioned by other factors. If we compare, for example, the second edition of the *Epistle to the Romans* with *Die christliche Dogmatik* we are conscious of the fact that in the later work the Incarnation is no longer seen simply as a mathematical point in time; an attempt is made to consider the meaning of its historical actuality. According to the Romans commentary Jesus Christ is not to be understood as a historical figure at all, he is simply the point where non-historical eternity intersects but does not extend into time and history. (3) The life of Jesus constitutes the historical and temporal co-ordinates, the neighbourhood, of the point where the wholly other world impinges upon the world of space and time. This intersecting point cannot be identified in historical terms with the life of Jesus. (4) Therefore faith, as the human response to the work and word of Jesus, can only be described as a void. (5) So too, the


   "Ernstlich und in grösserer Breite ist er erst um 1919, in der kritischen Wende zwischen der ersten und der zweiten Auflage meines 'Romerbriefs', in mein Denken eingetreten, um dann auch in meinen literarischen Ausserungen in wichtiger Rolle sichtbar zu werden."


5. Ibid. pp. 42, 40, 57, 82, 88, 110.
the resurrection of Jesus cannot be considered a part of history but its frontier. (1) The empty tomb, as a historical fact, is a matter of indifference in relation to its significance for the Christian faith. (2)

When Barth set about writing *Die christliche Dogmatik*, at the urging of his friend Thurneysen and the pressing need to systematise his thought with respect to his responsibilities as a University teacher, we find that he takes as his point of departure a theme which had occupied him earlier; (3) the question of the necessity and possibility of Christian speech about God. Barth states the question by means of a dilemma. Of necessity the church must speak of God to be the church, yet because the church brings to its task its own human language it cannot speak of God. The resolution of this dilemma is to be found in the action of God alone. It is to be found in His freedom to speak the truth concerning Himself. Theology, then, begins at the point of the church's most acute embarrassment, its attempted speech about God. Consequently, as opposed to all forms of direct communication, Christian speech about God can only be described as a venture. (4) This description emphasises the weakness of the preacher over against the current attempt of the church to arrive at self-certainty. To this Barth opposes a theological simplicity which believes and ventures. (5) If the Word of God 'happens' through the witness of the human words of the


5. Barth, K. *Die christliche Dogmatik*, p.56.
Bible and Christian speech about God it is because the commission of God pressing upon man to utter His Word coincides with His permission, His personal presence as actus purus. (1) So too, in terms of the other side of the relationship presupposed by the situation of Christian speech about God; man as hearer of the Word of God cannot be understood by encompassing the relationship between God and man in general with a neutral anthropology. This side of the relationship constituted by the event of God's Word can only be understood in terms of God's act. Anthropology must therefore be seen as defined by the situation in which both the preacher and the hearer are confronted by God's Word. It is only before God that man can both speak of and hear the Word of God and understand Himself as man. (2) Because the Word of God is both the question to and the answer of man's existence, or from the side of man's knowledge of this event, the given answer which poses the question of meaning for his existence, man's understanding of himself can never be static or neutral; it remains an event, not in spite of the given answer in the Word of God but precisely because of it. Human understanding of God and man is a gift, not a state of being given (3). Barth finds support for this analysis of the situation of man before God as the focal point from which all knowledge of God both begins and returns in St Anselm's understanding of the certainty of knowledge of God only in God. (4)

3. Ibid. p.96.
4. Ibid. p.98.
He declares that this concept of Anselm's has not been grasped out of the air but follows necessarily from an analysis of the situation of the preacher and the hearer of the Word of God. God is known through God and in God; rather we do not know Him, but in Him we are known. (1)

As a result of the above analysis Barth insists that dogma cannot be understood either as a reflection of the self consciousness of the individual Christian or the Church. Consequently he also rejects the notion that it can be considered as an objective verbal statement. Dogma can only be conceived of as an eschatological concept for which the church hopes and prays. (2) These conclusions follow from the event structure of the Word of God and faith.

With respect to the dogma of the Trinity, Barth's analysis of the point of departure for theological understanding means that it will take a definite form and have a specific "root" (3) which will in turn shape its form. For if its true that the "root" of the doctrine of the Trinity is to be found in the fact that in the situation of the preacher and the hearer God reveals Himself as the Lord in the manner described above, then the revelation of God is not subject to definition by factors other than those which are presupposed in the event of revelation itself. God is wholly present in His revelation or He is not present at all. (4) The event structure of man's knowledge of God in the situation of the preacher and hearer of the Word of God precludes the possibility that God's revelation of Himself as the Lord can be understood by means which are presupposed by man's natural understanding.

of himself and the world. God's revelation is not capable of being quantified by this means. He is not a partly known and partly unknown God. There can never be, therefore, any alliance between a revealed and natural knowledge of God precisely because of the way in which God reveals Himself as the Lord. Thus the event structure of the knowledge of the Word of God, considered as the "root" of the doctrine of the Trinity, determines that in that dogma there cannot be any metaphysical hinter ground which is apart from the freedom of God to reveal Himself as the Lord. (1)

Here we find the same concern which Barth evinced in his earlier statement to his friend Thurneysen (2), that his concern was for a Trinity of being not merely an economic Trinity. An economic Trinity, one which assumed a distinction between the revelation of God and the ineffable being of God in Himself, (3) presupposes a distinction in the event of revelation which is not presupposed by revelation itself considered as God's personal presence; as actus purus. (4) That this view of the doctrine of the economy of salvation history as it relates to the dogma of the Trinity is both true and adequate is a question we shall take up at a later point. It is sufficient at this stage of our exposition to point out that by means of the dogma of the Trinity, understood in terms of the event structure of the knowledge of God by man in the situation of the preacher and the hearer of the Word of God, Barth has been able to speak of the event of revelation and thus reach understanding by moving within the circle of knowledge which follows

2. See above, p.1.
the contours of the structure of being of the self revealing God. The hidden God is the revealed God, but precisely for that reason whoever knows the revealed God knows that he does not know him because he has co-ordinated certain data and formed a conception of God. Whoever knows the revealed God knows the hidden God who reveals Himself by His own free act. God is both the object and the subject of the statement, "God speaks". There is then a qualitative difference between man's reason and religious experiences on the one side and revelation and faith on the other. (1).

Because Barth thus defines a very specific path to knowledge of God by means of his understanding of the nature of God's act of self revelation certain important consequences ensue which have an important bearing on our understanding of his theology as a whole and the doctrine of the Trinity in particular. The role which one assigns to historical revelation in formulating the doctrine of the Trinity is largely determined by one's understanding of history. Barth has a particular understanding of history. This follows from his view of the event of God's self revelation.

According to Barth we must distinguish between Übergeschichte and Urgeschichte in understanding the historical nature of God's revelation. (2) The former term refers to,

"jenes ewige Geschehen zwischen Gott Vater, Sohn, und heiligen Geist." (3)

1. Op. Cit. pp.139, 206-207. This distinction which Barth draws between revelation and religion on the basis of the structure of God's revelation of Himself will be taken up by Barth in the Church Dogmatics and developed within the context of the doctrine of Revelation in a Trinitarian framework. Church Dogmatics Vol.1,2, pp.280ff.


3. Ibid.
This distinguishes it from the event in which God gives Himself to be known. Revelation, while it consists of all that is involved in the event of Urbgeschichte, for it consists of the personal presence of God as actus purus, is never the less not itself Urbgeschichte. Revelation is something "more" than the "history" which is God's eternity. (1) The Word assumes this "more than eternity", and in so far as this happens revelation is historical. This statement cannot be reversed thereby implying that history becomes revelation. No examination of history can lead us to the revealed God. (2) History understood as God's revelation is thus a special history: Urbgeschichte. This view of history is formulated from the point of view of dogmatics and not from the study of history in general. The historical event of revelation considered apart from the point of view of dogmatics, considered in itself as part of world history, is and remains ambiguous even mythological. (3) Positively, but again from the point of view of the dogmatic concept of history, world history both before and after the Urbgeschichtliche event can be said to reflect or echo the voice of revelation. Hence if it is true that revelation is history under the sign of man's contradiction of God, in this sense it is the Urbild of all history. General history is the periphery of this middle point. (4) In like manner the church, as distinct from the world, can be said to be an echo or reflection of the greater distinction between Urgeschichte and history.

Of particular interest in this context, as shedding light on Earth's estimate of historical relationships on the intra-personal level, is his view of the historical relationship between Jesus and the

1. Ibid. p.232.
2. Ibid. p.233.
Apostolic band. They become witnesses not through the historical relationship which they formed with Him considered as a figure of history. Their authority and their witness derive from direct urgeschichtliche confrontation with revelation without historical co-ordinates. Thus the disciples find themselves as participants in this event one with the fathers of the Old Testament. The difference between them lies not in their relationship to the event of 1-30 A.D., but in their relationship to the urgeschichtliche content of that time; therefore not to Jesus' character as a historical figure but to His character as a witness. (1)

Barth has achieved in this account of the event structure of revelation, associated with his understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, an understanding of the relationship, between the reality of God's presence in history and the rational, verbal, nature of human language as the vehicle of God's Word on the other. By means of the doctrine of the Trinity, the situation of man before God considered from the point of view of the preacher and the hearer, Barth has given an account of the revelation of God which, while safeguarding the freedom and non-objectivity of God is yet able to understand man as the object of this activity. It may indeed be true to say that there are many questions left unanswered by Barth's account which gives rise to doubts as to its validity. Barth himself is not unaware of these questions. (2) However I think it can be said that at this stage of his theological development Barth has succeeded in confronting what he saw as the danger of neo-Protestant co-positing of man with

God with a radically alternative way of understanding the relationship between God and the world.

It is true that Barth's emphasis on the Word of God as sheer act carries with it a sharply dialectical way of thinking and that as long as this is the case,

"an existentialism of some kind was bound to arise if only to anchor the event down to earth or to clothe it with flesh". (1)

That this is bound to lead to,

"the projection of the human decision into the essential nature of Revelation, and could only lead to some form of self redemption. That in turn could only be held in check by a severe and critical form of dialectical thinking backed up by forensic justification". (2)

But Barth has made a beginning in the direction which was to become decisive for the formulation of his later dogmatic thought; grounding the church's understanding of God's self revelation in the triune being of God so that the structure of man's knowledge of God, as the basis for his relationship to Him, is grounded in the being of God who freely elects Himself in Jesus Christ to be for man and Man for Himself in the unity of the Holy Spirit. (3) Barth has also been able to counter the neo-Protestant attempt to co-posit man and God in a neutral concept of being apart from the freedom of God to be with and for man in His self revelation. Barth's exposition of revelation, while emphasising the freedom and non-objectivity of God to man, gives an

2. Ibid.
account of man before God in the situation where human language is made the vehicle of His self communication.

Barth's Relationship with Neo-Protestantism: Barth and Schleiermacher.

We have spoken of neo-Protestantism and its co-positioning of man and God in a neutral concept of being as forming the object of Barth's polemical posture. In order to appreciate the meaning of Barth's stance in the context in which it appeared, we now turn to an examination of the structure of the thought of that theologian with whom Barth, though highly respecting, fundamentally disagreed. His name is F. Schleiermacher. (1)

Barth spent a good deal of time toward the end of 1923 and the beginning of 1924 studying Schleiermacher. (2) From this emerged two rather lengthy essays. (3) He saw Schleiermacher as a theologian concerned with the inexpressibility of the divine.

"Even the most religiously adequate expression and presentation of reality in words is an emptying, a kenosis, if not a profanation of reality". (4)

For Schleiermacher, therefore, all dogmatic propositions terminated as descriptions of human self-consciousness and were not to be considered


"Anyone who has never loved here, and is not in a position to love again may not hate either."


"There is no doubt that Schleiermacher, whether we look backwards or forwards in the history of theology was the prince of all anthropocentric, and so all liberal, theologians."


as descriptions of something particular in the nature of God. (1) Thus all Schleiermacher's effort, whether in the field of systematic theology, preaching, apologetics or dialectics, was directed towards an "X" which combines an equilibrium of two opposing forces, a common element in a diversity. (2)

"What is called in the sermons the Kingdom of God is obviously the absolute Subject-Object, the highest knowledge in its identity with the highest being. It is the innermost basis and source of our finite knowing and being .... it stands over against our existence in the duality of reason and nature, and is never identical with but is always related to our knowing in the duality of the ideal and the real, ethics and physics." (3)

This centre is actually reached by no finite knowing: to make the antithesis relative would mean subsuming the totality of finite being and knowing with its contradictions under knowing and being without contradiction, which is impossible. (4) Schleiermacher was not willing to make the step toward a philosophy of identity as Hegel did. However he did postulate, as a correlate of the absolute given foundation of finite being and knowing, an anthropological determination beyond the psychological realm of thinking and willing understood as a unity of feeling. This determination was not disconnected with the psychological realm of thinking and willing but related in the sense of being the

2. Ibid. p.167.
3. Ibid. p.168.
given basis of their certainty. In this Schleiermacher found the
"original foundation" established even in us. (1) As soon as this
original foundation enters the sphere of discursive thought what holds
good for the sphere of knowledge in general applies also to it; only
a refracted image of the original foundation which makes this knowledge
actual. (2)

While Barth is conscious of the strong tendency in Schleiermacher
towards undifferentiated unity, "placid silence", he realises that the
actuality of the individual also held a place of no mean importance in
his scheme of thought. Against Schelling, Schleiermacher speaks of the,
"lofty arbitrariness of Christianity". (3) The cause of this seemingly
inimical emphasis is, according to Barth, to be found in Schleiermacher's
insistance that the original ground of being does not teach but acts.

"What makes Revelation is not that it is true, but
that it is effective." (4)

This effectiveness is understood in terms of modification of the
individuals religious self consciousness and is therefore directly
related to life. God is to be understood as the non-objective cause whose
effects are everywhere objective in terms of pure feeling, as opposed
to being merely cognizable.

The historical figure of Jesus is understood by Schleiermacher
in terms of His power to impart to others the strength of his God
consciousness in the form of absolute dependence upon the original ground
of being. (5) Since through Jesus we come to an experience of absolute

3. Ibid. pp.178.
5. Th.id. p.187.
dependence we must conclude that His God consciousness is not only the proto-type but the archetype. If humanity had the power to produce of itself this archetype then its actual condition of sin, its incomplete feeling of dependence, would be inexplicable. It follows that the possession of such consciousness can only be explained in terms of a divine creative act. Jesus Christ does not help men because He is the Redeemer, He is the Redeemer because He helps them. Barth sees this Christology compromised in the fact that the establishment of communion between God and man is justified by a concept of human nature which serves as the higher order in which a move from the sensuous to the spiritual is possible. Its logic can be summarily put thus,

"substantiate an existent divine life; conclude from this divine an activity witnessing to it; and from this activity deduce a correspondingly endowed active being". (1)

Barth can see nothing but an ultimate dichotomy between Schleiermacher's concern for the individual and a Christology which derives its significance from the,"higher order of human nature." (2)

He concludes that Schleiermacher allowed himself to be pushed by his concern for apologetics into a mystico-naturalistic corner where the historical element in Christianity could play only a questionable role. (3)

He qualifies this conclusion as a tentative one and allows that his debate with Schleiermacher is a continuous one. (4)

2. Ibid. p.189.
3. Ibid. p.198.
Barth's conclusions concerning Schleiermacher's theology seem to stem from his concern for the unity of man's knowledge of God to be grounded in the unity of God's being and act in His self revelation. The unity of God's Word and Act in the event of revelation is not to be located in the relative differences which exist on the intra mundane level of existence, but solely in God Himself who stands in a qualitatively different relationship to the world than that in which individuals stand to one another. Thus Barth cannot allow a meaningful theological relationship to exist between Schleiermacher's realism which breaks through in his insistence on the importance of the individual and experience on the one hand and his formal philisophico-theological principle of the "centre". Since, for Barth, Schleiermacher was not to be understood as a theologian or philosopher of absolute difference he must, despite his protestations, (1) be an advocate of identity.

It is a paradoxical fact that Barth's criticism of Schleiermacher is exactly what Schleiermacher strove so energetically to avoid; the identification of God with a state of being in contingent existence. We must agree with the judgment that,

"there can be no doubt that on the one hand his (i.e., Schleiermacher's) critical idealism was the obverse side of a very serious realism for his doctrine of dependence was intended to be a decisive expression of the ultimate objectivity of God which must not be confounded with our own objectivity." (2)

The problem of the reduction of Schleiermacher's theology to an anthropology

is grounded in his emphasis that God is exempted from any direct relation to the sphere in which we have only relative knowledge. By exempting God as the Absolute from such a relationship, Schleiermacher is forced to make Him the wholly Other. He is One with whom we must have strictly non-cognitive relations. (1) In such a situation it is inevitable that theology should devolve into anthropology if only for the reason that theology is a human undertaking.

However it may at this point be pertinent to ask if Barth himself is free from the same difficulty in the alternative which he proposes. We have already noted, (2) that the sharpness of the dialectic involved in Barth's understanding of the event of God's self revelation inevitably gives rise to some form of existentialism and therefore of an anthropological determination of the being of God in His Act of self revelation. Balthasar has drawn attention to this aspect of the relationship between Barth and Schleiermacher at this stage of Barth's theological development in a number of parallels which exist between the two theologians understanding of the basis of theology. We draw attention to two of these.

"Der höchste Punkt ist Zweiheit und Überwindung der Zweiheit zugleich: bei Schleiermacher die Zweiheit von 'Anschauung und Gefühl', im Sinne von Rezeptivität und Spontaneität, die aber in einer letzten Identität des Gottbewusstseins (primär und vorbildlich in Christus, durch ihn aber auch im frommen Gemüt) überwunden ist, bei Barth durch die weit schärfere Zweiheit von Offenbarung Gottes und Glauben des Manschen.


2. See above, p.12.
die aber in der den Menschen ergreifenden Tat des Heiligen Geistes zur Einheit in actu überwunden wird."

And further,

"Der Punkt, von dem her das Sein und das Gegenständliche zu erklären ist: er ist als Punkt der Einheit somit auch der der Allheit im unfassendsten Sinn: für Schleiermacher ist vom Punkt der Subjekt-Objekteinheit, der Gott ist, die ganze Welt abzuleiten, aber vor allem von diesem Punkt, sofern er der Quell aller Frömmigkeit und Mystik ist, alle Kultur zu entfalten, für Barth ist jener Punkt, als Einheit Gottes und des Menschen in Jesus Christus der Punkt, aus dem die Schöpfung enstanden, von dem her aber auch alle Erlösung gewirkt wird und alle Kulturarbeit zu wirken ist .......

It will be of continuing critical importance for us to note how Barth is able to overcome the anthropological implications of his sharply dialectical way of understanding the being of God in His Act of self revelation, while still at the same time acknowledging the importance of the intramundane relationships presupposed by the history of salvation as bearing on the meaning of dogma. For the moment we turn to the way in which Barth deals with the problem presented to him by Schleiermacher in *Die christliche Dogmatik*,

Schleiermacher and Barth in *Die christliche Dogmatik*.

It is with reference to the doctrine of the Trinity that Barth formulates his defence against Schleiermacher; a Trinity that is understood from the point of view of the question as to the possibility of human speech and hearing of the Word of God. He therefore emphasises

in his point of departure two fundamental characteristics of God's activity which Schleiermacher found difficult to express. These are, the objectivity of the self revealing God as the Subject of the event of revelation and the relationship of this personal presence of God to the human activity of speech. (1)

In Die christliche Dogmatik Barth re-emphasises his view that Schleiermacher's methodology can only lead to a situation in which the reality of religion and the subjective possibility of revelation are one and the same thing. (2)

The actualising of this ability by man is only a question of comprehension and sympathy. (3) This implies that an essential and general element in human nature is one with the divine. (4) Hence man is understood by Schleiermacher as standing, from the outset, before and with God. Consequently man does not need God in order to be before Him. There is no question of an irreparable guilt which cannot be made good by man, but simply a blank, direct, and only quantitatively distinguishable relation between God and man. (5) It is inevitable that such a God will be objectless, since His relation with the creature is the unending nature of life as a whole, of One in all and through all. If man calls this "whole" God, and thinks of this God as personal it will depend upon his own personal inclination and imagination. Schleiermacher never concealed the fact that his fancy did not run in this direction and that ultimately the concept of God is not necessary at all.

1. See Appendix A.
5. Ibid. p. 308.
"Eine Religion ohne Gott kann besser sein als eine andere mit Gott," since, "Gott ist nicht alles in der Religion, sondern Eines, und das Universum ist mehr." (1)

Thus the feeling of absolute dependence does not have God as its object at all. God must be seen in terms of the mode of the relationship presupposed by the feeling of absolute dependence. He is the whence of the feeling of absolute dependence in its originality. (2) It is only meant symbolically if this whence is conveyed as an object. With respect, therefore, to the God-man relationship it remains on the far side of man understood in terms of his self conscious thinking and willing. (3)

Against such an interpretation of God in His relationship to man Barth emphasises the sheer actuality of God's personal presence in His revelation and the crisis this precipitates for man in the radical decision of faith and obedience. The pathos of Schleiermacher's theology is its "objectlessness", against which must be asserted, on the basis of God's self revelation, the necessity of speaking of man in his sheer humanity without any open or concealed possession which mitigates his need before God. Only thus, form the point of view of the preacher and the hearer of the Word of God, can it be made clear that faith in God is a hazardous venture. (4) The relationship between God and man must be understood dynamically as drama and struggle, the continuity of which is to be sought and found wholly in God's gracious approach to man.

When Schleiermacher maintains:

"Zur vollkommnenen Wahrheit würde gehören, dass Gott sich kund machte, wie er an und für sich ist; eine

2. Ibid. p.310.
3. Ibid. p.312.
4. Ibid. p.313.
solche (Kundmachung) aber könnte weder ausserlich aus irgendeiner Tatsache hervorgeben ja auch eine solche auf unbegreifliche Weise an eine menschliche Seele gelangte, könnte sie nicht von derselben ausgefasst und als Gedanke festgehalten werden, und wenn auf keine Weise wahrgenommen und festgehalten, könnte sie auch nicht wirksam sein." (1)

For Barth the contrary is the case, this is precisely what has to happen and does happen in the existential struggle of faith in relation to the Holy Spirit. (2) In this either/or struggle created by the actuality of the presence of God to man there stands the subjective possibility of revelation and nowhere else. The strategic place of the Trinity in Barth's theology at this stage of his development may be said to derive from his concern to oppose Schleiermacher's objectless theology with its anthropological implications.

The "root" of the doctrine of the Trinity is seen by Barth to consist in,

"Gott in sich selbst begründetes Reden"; it is,

"Dei loquentis persona". (3)

Since in all forms of revelation, even the ungrounded event of the person of Jesus Christ, it is God alone who speaks, the secondary forms of revelation, the humanity of Jesus, the Scriptures considered as a human document, and the preacher's word, must be understood as relative to actual revelation as God's own personal speech. (4) It is

2. Ibid. p.315.
3. Ibid. p.131.
4. Ibid. p.135.
the case that:

"Gott seine Ehre keinem Andern lässt. Nie und nirgends ist oder wird diese Form etwa zum Subjekt der Offenbarung." (1)

This entails that in His revelation God is either wholly revealed or not at all; there can be no quantifying of God's personal presence in revelation. For this reason natural theology, which attempts to divide the knowledge of God between revealed and natural knowledge of God, is shown to be an impossible enterprise by the fact of the manner of God's self revelation. (2) Therefore the unknowability of God is not co-determinate with the limit of the structures of human cognition. The incomprehensibility of God is rooted in the freedom of God to reveal or not to reveal Himself.

"Die Herrschaft Gottes ist eine einfache Wahrheit, die entweder ganz oder gar nicht erkannt wird. Diese einfache Wahrheit ist freilich, indem sie sich offenbart, höchstes Geheimnis, so dass es kein cognoscere Deum gibt ohne Anerkennung seiner incomprehensibilitas, woruber ebenfalls zu Beginn der eigentlichen Dogmatik weiter zu reden ist." (3)

Luther's polemic concerning the hidden and revealed God is interpreted by Barth as safeguarding just this point. The non-necessity, the sheer actuality of the presence of God in His revelation means not only God is unknowable apart from the event of revelation, but that in the light of this revelation God's incomprehensibility is not an unknown

3. Ibid. p.137.
quantity in God but the freedom which presupposes His personal presence with and for men. Therefore only he who knows the revealed God knows the hidden God.

"Wer den offenbaren Gott erkennt, der und nur der erkennt auch den verborgenen Gott." (1)

As Barth expounds this fundamental feature of revelation in a trinitarian context it comes to mean that the Subject and Object of the statement, "God speaks", is God Himself. To impugn this conclusion is to question the reality of God's lordship in the event of His self revelation. If God reveals Himself to man this means He is the One who Speaks, the Word spoken and the One who Hears in the event revelation. (2) Man as a creature cannot presuppose any continuity with this event. If this were not the case then according to Barth man's thought and feeling would have to be understood as an efflux or continuation of the person of God. Against such tendencies it must be rigidly affirmed that God is both the Subject and Object of the act of revelation. (3)

Whatever has to be said about the stringent dialectic which Barth develops in his exposition of revelation in relation to the creature, and we shall take up this point further in a moment, it must be admitted that the trinitarian form of Barth's exposition of the event of revelation secured for him a bulwark against what he conceived to be the dangers of contemporary theological thought. It enabled him to preclude on the one hand a quantitative, direct, historical relationship between God and the creature qua creature, on the other

2. Ibid. p.139.
3. Ibid.
hand he is able to speak realistically of the sheer actuality of God's presence in history as the Subject-Object in the event of revelation. The doctrine of the Trinity is the "Nagel", (1) which while supporting and co-ordinating Barth's conclusions also justified their truth.

However the very structure of Barth's thought prevented the Trinity from having the stategic importance he obviously intended it to have. This basic weakness became evident to Barth as he read the reviews of his book. (2) On the one hand he was criticised for not developing a consistent anthropology which would correspond to his doctrine of God and serve as a basis for his exposition, on the other hand he was accused of attempting an existentialist proof of the doctrine of the Trinity because of the structural relation between his analysis of the situation of the preacher and hearer of the Word of God and his exposition of the doctrine. Barth was consequently faced with a contradiction. Both those who criticised his theology for being non-anthropologically orientated and those who objected to his anthropologising of theology could find a basis for their, albeit contradictory, points of view in his work.

The rigid dialectic which Barth had built into his thought, as an attempt to give expression to the sheer actuality of the event of the Word of God to man, meant that the determination of man by the Word of God could only be understood under the cover of an extreme form of forensic justification. This precluded any appreciation of the ontological continuity of the creature as addressee apart from the purely noetic aspect of acknowledgement. (3) This had two results.

It meant that Barth was driven to find some phenomenology in order to ground or earth the event of revelation in history. This aspect was taken up by those who wanted Barth to develop this side of his thought more systematically and accused him of only being partially successful in the presentation of his theological position. (1) But this aspect of Barth’s thought was seized upon by other critics who pointed out that since Barth located the doctrine of the Trinity immediately after his analysis of the situation of the preacher and the hearer of the Word of God, and furthermore in this analysis had used the technical terms associated with existentialist philosophy, that he was attempting some sort of proof of the dogma in terms of the foregoing analysis; attempting to establish the possibility of revelation on a basis other than its actuality. (2)

Barth’s intention in his presentation of the doctrine of the Trinity in relation to the situation of the preacher and the hearer was clearly to understand how man participated in the actuality of God’s self-revelation. But when God’s revelation is understood purely in terms of the actuality of his presence, without consideration for a corresponding historical ontology of the creature established in this act, then there is the inevitable problem of establishing a meaningful relationship between God and man in history. This problem arose as Barth attempted to emphasise one side of his understanding of revelation over against Schleiermacher’s Absolute who was incapable of movement towards man.

On the other hand by countering Schleiermacher’s wordless

2. Ibid. pp. 141ff., 196.
revelation by emphasising the locus of revelation in the situation of the preacher and the hearer, and thus the possibility of its verbal form in history, Barth gave credence to the suggestion that he was attempting an existential proof of the Trinity. This factor is complicated by the structure of *Die christliche Dogmatik* in which Barth considers the doctrine of the Trinity in relation to the situation of the preacher and the hearer, but it derives its significance from the material content of the work as well. For example we read in the first chapter under the section concerned with man's acknowledgement of the Word of God:

"Das Wort Gottes ist nicht nur Rede, sondern Un-Rede.
Eben darum ist das Wort Gottes ein Begriff, der nur einem existenziellen Deken überhaupt zugänglich ist." (1)

That the conclusions drawn from such a statement implying Barth's dependence on a general ontology were not part of Barth's intention

1. Barth,K. *Die christliche Dogmatik*, p.111. The final form of the material presented in this work does not deviate significantly from the programmatic sketch he had given of his projected *Dogmatik* on 1924.
Barth,K. & Thurneysen,E. Op.cit. pp182-183. He stated then that in dealing with the analysis of the Word of God it must always be understood as an,

"answer which is already presupposed in the question of man - and so; the relation with God primarily based in the human question." (Ibid. Underlining indicates the word is in italics in the original.)
should be clear from his attempt to relate the doctrine of the Trinity to his understanding of revelation in which God reveals Himself as the Lord. However the statements are there and Barth's critics had evidence which he could not very well deny. (1) It was therefore patently obvious to Barth that he had to solve the question of a genuine relation between God and man on the basis of God's act of revelation which, while avoiding the pitfalls of correlating revelation with an independent anthropology, was nevertheless able to establish a direct relation with the historicity of the creature. If this was to be accomplished while still remaining true to the basic structure of his dogmatic thought as expressed in Die christlich Dogmatik, it meant a more diligent search into the reality of the being of God in His act of revelation. This would mean a re-examination of the doctrine of God which could only be understood by Barth in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity as the basis for understanding His self disclosure. We now investigate the way Barth took as he set out to solve the problems raised by the reception of his first major systematic work. The material we choose for this purpose, which of necessity is limited, will hopefully represent Barth's developing theological style and be of importance in understanding the final form of Barth's mature thought. We thus turn to Barth's exposition of the relation between theology and philosophy as expressed in a series of lectures delivered in Dortmund 1929 (2) and his study of St. Anselm's proof for the existence of God published in


The Relation Between Theology and Philosophy: "Schicksal Und Idee In Der Theologie"

In this work Barth attempts to clarify the two poles of human thought which had emerged in the critical appraisal of Die christliche Dogmatik. On the one hand those who criticised Barth's attempt to justify the doctrine of the Trinity in terms of the structures of human existence involved in his analysis of the situation the preacher and the hearer raised the question of whether God was tied to the giveness of human existence as a kind of fate. On the other hand those who criticised Barth's work in terms of it being a kind of timeless ideology unrelated to the historicity of human existence raised the question of the competence of the human mind to judge the question of truth in dogmatics.

Barth perceived that these two problems were not peculiar to theology. They were questions with which philosophers had also concerned themselves. Basically they both devolved into the question of how the knowing subject is related to the object of knowledge. In theology this means how the ordering of human thought is to be defined if God is the object of man's knowledge.

"Sie (i.e., theology) ist sachlich geordnete Erforschung der Wahrheit in Beziehung auf Gott als den Gegenstand der kirklichen Verkündigung." (2)

Barth's definition of the problem of theological knowledge indicates that it is one which is tied to its object so that its terms of reference are determined by its nature. It is consequently a churchly activity.

Theology does not ask after,

"der Wahrheit Gottes an sich"; (3)

3. Ibid. p.55.
it is concerned with the,

"besonderes Lebensbereichs der Kirche." (1)

For evangelical theology this implies the concrete life of the church not,

"leeren Raum oberhalb der Kirchen und Konfessionen." (2)

This definiteness of the Object and sphere of activity of theology derives from the fact that the God with whom it has to do is not One who has to be sought by man but,

"der sich uns zu finden geben hat." (3)

Consequently, since the Object and sphere of activity for theology is defined by the gracious approach of God to man, the objectivity of theology's Object is never at man's disposal.

"Theologie hat also Gott nicht nur zum Objekt,
sondern zum Objekt nur sofern sie ihn ..... Subjekt hat." (4)

This is of decisive importance when it is remembered that theology is not carried out in heaven but on earth, in the midst of other more general or specific intellectual disciplines with the same human instrument as that used in these other spheres. If within the varied disciplines which make up the spectrum of human knowledge theology also has a place then it must be seen that this fact is not dependent upon the characteristics of human knowledge as such. Theology as a human undertaking depends upon and must serve,

"das Wunder Gottes." (5)

Therefore those characteristics which shape human thought in its wide

2. Ibid. p.56.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p.58.
variety of activity and opinion must, in theology, play a different role than that which they do normally. (1)

Barth illustrates this point by means of the history of theology. There are, he points out, those theologies which emphasise that aspect of human thought which in its understanding of reality draws attention to the fact that things outside of us as well as ourselves "are". The theologies which emphasise this aspect of the phenomenon of human knowledge Barth describes as "realist". As the term implies reality is primarily understood from the point of view of the fact of existence. Since both God and things "are" in some sense, a link exists between God and the creature simply in terms of this fact. God then becomes man's fate; a relationship of mutual reciprocity is posited by the fact of existence. This realism found its classical expression in Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of analogia entis. Barth understands this to mean,

"dass alles Seiende als solches Anteil an Gott hat,
in Höchster Unähnlichkeit als blosses Geschöpf dem Schöpfer doch darin höchst ähnlich, dass auch es Sein hat: analogia entis." (2)

On this interpretation it is understandable how Barth sees these theologies as making God ontologically, and therefore noetically, man's fate. However what these realist theologies emphasise is, according to Barth, a proper theological concern. For if one describes God as the Object of theology then one is involved in making a typically realistic statement. Moreover, since christian theology is related to a

2. Ibid. p.62.
God who has revealed Himself in the historical event of Jesus of Nazareth, it means that the God with whom it has to do enters into the mode of being which is characteristic of nature and history generally. (1)

In Christian theology which takes the legitimate concern of realism seriously certain definite qualifications have to be made regarding the subjective and objective nature of the giveness of being. The subjective and objective giveness of being which is presupposed in realist theology have to be understood strictly in terms of the subjective and objective possibilities included in the event of revelation and not simply in terms of a neutral ontology. God's self objectification for us rests entirely upon the possibilities opened up for us by our relationship to Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. By this means the possibility of God's objectivity being confused or compared with the objectivity of being in general is averted by reference to the free approach of God to man in His gracious condescension to man.

It should not be overlooked on the other hand that this act which makes possible man's conceiving the objectivity and existence of God also finds its parallel in the human sphere, in the I-Thou relationship. (2) But although Barth acknowledges this similitudo Dei (3), the truth which this parallel reflects in the creaturely sphere is rooted and grounded in the reality and actuality of the freely chosen relationship which God establishes in His self revelation by Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. (4) Therefore theology does not ask if it is to speak

1. Barth, K. Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie ... p.65.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. p.67.
realistically but,

"inwiefern sie selbst realistisch denken und reden
darf." (1)

It may speak realistically only under the condition that His revelation be understood as His act and therefore, as far as His objectivity and being are concerned, as,

"Offenbarung und nicht eine Offenbartheit." (2)

Here we observe a development in Barth's position as it found expression in Die christliche Dogmatik. In that work, partly through an undisciplined use of existentialist categories, he was led to postulate a correlation between God's act of revelation and human existence considered from the point of view of the preacher and the hearer, this correlation was only prevented from developing into a full blown ontology by a sharp dialectic reinforced by a doctrine of forensic justification. Now Barth seems to be feeling his way toward a view of the Trinity which has a Christological content that enables him to relate the creatures experience of earthly reality to the divine act of revelation while at the same time maintaining, on the basis of God's freedom in relation to the world, a distinction between the given actuality of worldly reality and the newness of God's act of self revelation.

However the problem still remains for Barth to spell this out in more explicit details in his theological work. This task still lay ahead of him. We must remember the nature of the work under discussion.

2. Ibid. p.70.
philosophy, and we cannot expect a detailed exposition of every aspect of Barth's theological position. But the question still remains, if Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit are simply two poles of an objectivity which resides solely in the eternal trinitarian life of God how the relativity of the human life and experience of the historical Jesus can be included in this definition of the objectivity of revelation. Barth certainly speaks of,

"das Wort und also Gott, mit dem wir es zu tun haben, ging ein in die Seinsweise der Natur und Geschichte, in unsere eigene Seinsweise." (1)

But this will need to be expounded if the illegitimate interpretations of theological realists are to be averted. The theological realist finds his perennial attraction in the attempt to understand the reality of God in terms of the creature. But the freedom of God which Barth is determined to emphasise in his opposition to theological realism will not be truly protected simply by emphasising the reality and objectivity of God in His own eternal triune life. This reality and objectivity must in some way be related in a theologically relevant way to the historical reality and objectivity of Jesus, as both the humiliated and exalted Lord.

The other pole of human thought with which theology is concerned is that which takes its point of departure from the question which is posited in relation to the basis of realist thought. It is the question of a possible correlation between the outward and inward givenness of reality from which realistic thought takes its rise. It asks the question,

"Was ist Wahrheit". (1)

This concern is seen by Barth as a legitimate concern of theology too. It finds classical expression in the *via negative* of Thomas Aquinas.

Here an attempt is made to abstract from the individual reality of things to the idea of being itself. Wherever the idea of God is entertained seriously there will be a legitimate attempt to distinguish between the giveness of God and that of all other being. In relation to God all other being must be described in terms of non being. (2)

Barth asks himself whether it is not necessary that the idealist element be present in a theology which attempts to distinguish between God's revelation and all other giveness. Further, is not all theological thought idealist in so far as it is thought which is understanding and interpretation of the given. (3) Genuine idealism will be similar to a hyperbole movement of thought:

"die allerdings von der Wirklichkeit weg in den Raum der mit jener nicht selbstverständlich zusammenfallenden Wahrheit, aber auch von da zurück in die nun als Raum der Wahrheiten verstandens führt." (4)

Abstraction from the given in these terms means, not the negation of its giveness, but its refraction precisely in order to strengthen the status of the given. (5) Idealism in a theological context means emphasising the fact that though the Word became flesh the flesh did

2. Ibid. pp. 73-74.
3. Ibid. p.75.
5. Ibid.
not become the Word. Theological idealism makes sure of the aspect of veiling in the act of God's self revelation. It does not deny the givenness of historical reality,

"er möchte sie aber als transparent verstanden wissen, damit die Wahrheit sie durchleuchte, ohne welche sie nicht die Wirklichkeit Gottes wäre." (1)

Barth criticises theological idealism because it so often side steps the starting point of the hyperbole in the particularity of God's revelation and posits, on its own authority, a general openness of man to the truth of God. (2)

"Er musste also Offenbarung nicht für eine allgemeine Möglichkeit des Menschen, sondern für eine besondere Möglichkeit Gottes, und zwar als christlicher Theologie für die in Christu bzw. in dem biblisch-kirchlichen Zeugnis von Christus gegebene Möglichkeit Gottes halten." (3)

This means that the establishment of truth in genuine theological idealism is achieved in recognising the fact that it is established by God alone.

"nicht als Gottes und des Menschen, sondern als Gottes alleinige Tat." (4)

Thus knowledge of the truth in this connection must mean acknowledgement. It means faith, in which human reason is wholly passive and determined by that which is above it.

2. Ibid. p.78.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. p.80. Words underlined are in italics in the original.
"Dieses Oberhalb, dem wir gehorsam sind, selber wieder in die Antithetik von Spontaneität und Rezeptivitat hineinzuziehen, wäre aber sinnlos." (1)

This antithesis which has its place in the sphere where we have knowledge of things cannot find a place in the object of faith, hence reason cannot of itself seek and find the truth between the given and the not given in the event of revelation. Here on the contrary is the, "Reich der ewigen Spannungen." (2)

It is just as disastrous for theology to attempt to identify human reason with God as it is for theological realism to identify God with nature. (3) Barth therefore rejects both a one sided realism and a one sided idealism while recognising the legitimate interest of both. By so doing Barth acknowledges that theology does its work within the same "room" as philosophy. Theology, as distinct from both realist and idealist philosophy, opposes all attempts to achieve a synthesis in the human process of knowing by either the realist or idealist emphasis. Such attempts reveal for Barth the essential hubris of all human endeavour and can only lead to the exposure of the contradiction in which man lives before God.

"Es ist der Begriff der Sünde, des gefallenen Menschen, den wir schon dem Realismus und Idealismus gegenüber geltend machen mussten." (4)

But since theology uses the same human instruments as philosophy, and is after all a human enterprise, precisely the same problem besets it as philosophy. The only guarantee, as also the criterion of its truth, which theology has that it does not do its work in vain is the freely elected presence of the Word of God to man.

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.p.86 Cf.p.87. Word underlined is in italics in the original.
"Der theoretische Hintergrund dieses praktischen Kriteriums ist der Gedanke der freien göttlichen Erwählung." (1)

The epistemological relevance of election in this context is that theology must acknowledge both the speaking and hearing of the truth is a matter which is entirely dependent on God's free decision. (2) Theology is therefore justified in relation to the truth in so far as it acknowledges by the openness of its thought towards its Object that it serves this very specific freedom of God's choice. There is therefore no justification for theology outside the context where faith confesses this free unmerited approach of God to man. (3) The practical implications of this situation is that theology will be orientated towards christology as an expression of its dependence upon the gracious condescension of God to the creature. (4)

In this discussion we see Barth viewing his appreciation of the idealist's critique of naive realism, which would tend to identify being with actuality, from a point of view conditioned by his understanding of the nature of the divine decision to be present with and for men in Jesus Christ. Barth has sought to achieve the synthesis of thought and being, which idealists attempt in terms of the nature of human reason, by asking after the free ground of the particular event of revelation in the being of the triune God. Here again we see something of an advance on the view of the Trinity than that which was evident in Die christliche Dogmatik. In that work the Trinity served

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p.92.
4. Ibid.
to emphasise the sheer actuality of the event of revelation in its stark giveness. Here the relationship of the preacher and hearer to the Word of God could only be conceived in terms of a radical dialectic backed up by an extreme version of forensic justification, as a seeing that was blind, an echo, an existence which could only be thought as non-existence. Barth now stresses neither pure negation nor affirmation of man before God, but reconciliation in terms of the free election of God.

"Das Gesprochensein des Wortes und unser Vernehmen des Wortes immer Sache der freien Gnade Gottes ist." (1)

By locating the doctrine of election within the eternal relationships of the triune being of God Barth has been able to make an advance in his understanding of the rationality which corresponds to the actuality of revelation in Jesus. Barth is able to correlate the rationality of man with the rationality of God while still maintaining the lordship of God in the event of revelation by grounding this event in the free election of God; which as the choosing of man in Jesus Christ is identical with the ground of God's being as well. However by identifying "das Gesprochensein des Wortes", (2) with the election of God, implying thereby an identity between its actuality and the self affirmation of God of Himself, Barth has taken the first steps along the way in which it will be difficult to take into account the contingency and relativity of the human life of Jesus in his developing understanding of the Trinity. The life of Jesus is in danger of becoming merely

2. Ibid.
illustrative of a pre-mundane divine decision. We must at this stage signify our reservations with respect to this aspect of Barth's thought concerning the relationship between God and the creature which is presupposed by his view of the relevance of the Trinity to our understanding of revelation. We shall develop this point further in the last chapter.

We must therefore place a question mark over Barth's assertion,

"Dieses Oberhalb, dem wir gehorsam sind, selber wieder in die Antithetik von Spontaneität und Rezeptivität hineinzuziehen, ware aber offenbar sinnlos. Diese Antithetik hat ihren Ort dar, wo mir es mit der Erkenntnis von Dingen zu tun haben. Hier ist das Reich der ewigen Spannungen." (1)

We would feel that it is precisely because it is the place here described with all its contradictions that we cannot ask after an above in which these contradictions find no place in determining the meaning of revelation as an event in human history. (2)

Barth and St. Anselm.

Before we discuss Barth's interpretation of St. Anselm and the important influence St. Anselm had on Barth's developing theological method, it is necessary to arrive at some independent assessment of some key ideas which occur in St. Anselm's writings. The concepts which we have in mind are


2. Cf. Balthasar, H.U. Op.cit. pp.212-214. Balthasar speaks of a, "Punkt der höchsten Intensität", in Barth which is a common phenomena in idealist and absolute idealist theologies and philosophies. See also Hendry, G.S. The Dogmatic Form of Barth's Theology. Theology Today. Vol.XIII. 1956-1957 pp300ff, 314. Hendry's suggested solution to the problem we have raised is that Barth should somehow combine the anthropological implications of the dialectic which he developed in his earlier works with the later intra-trinitarian dialectic in a "higher synthesis".
"veritas" (truth) and "rectitudo" (rightness). (1)

It is our intention to discuss these concepts with specific reference to St. Anselm's understanding of the part played by the humanity of the historical Jesus in God's act of reconciliation. We do this because it is in this area that Barth finds his greatest difficulty with St. Anselm's thought. (2) Also this discussion will derive its importance from the fact that it will introduce a problem, which we shall later develop, with respect to Barth's understanding of the dogma of the Trinity. This problem is the relative importance in determining the meaning of dogma that the historical humanity of Jesus should or should not have.

For St. Anselm God is the Supreme Truth,

"therefore, there is truth in the essence of all that exists, because all things are what they are in the Supreme Truth." (3)

This Supreme Truth is the cause of all else that is said to be true, both propositions and states of affairs.

"Although all the different kinds of rightness .... are what they are because the things they are in either are as they ought to be or else do what they ought to do, nevertheless the Supreme Truth is not rightness because it is under obligation. All things are obliged to it, and it is obliged to nothing else." (4)

1. In attempting to show that every form of truth is a form of rightness, Anselm investigates the properties of right thoughts, upright willing, righteous action, correct perception. The relationship between the two concepts depends on the presence in Latin of a single term which can be applied in all these cases mentioned above: rectitudo. English has no such expression. Cf. Chaps. XI. & XII. of Concerning the Truth. English translation, Hopkins, J. & Richardson, H.


Truth is integrally related by St. Anselm to rightness. The two words signify the same reality. (1) Everything that is has a certain truth and rightness which makes it an integrated part of a complex of relationships. (2) Every creaturely thing, even though it has no will, appears under an obligation that is determined by its rightness. This obligation is specifically related to the Supreme Truth of all things. (3) This Truth, although it is itself not identical with any particular, is that which allows it to be said of this or that thing, state of affairs etc., "the truth of that thing" (4) etc. While St. Anselm was aware of the distinct characteristics of different categories of entities he wishes to emphasise that each thing stands under its respective obligation to the Truth. One can therefore only come to an understanding of the truth and rightness of things when it is understood in what relationship they stand to the Supreme Truth. In Chp. 11. of Concerning the Truth, Anselm speaks through the disciple of things participating (participando) (5) in the Truth. But it should be noted that the idea of participation in its Platonic form is not to be inferred from this, since St. Anselm makes a distinction between a things truth and that which is the cause of its truth. Just as the cause of a true proposition is not in the proposition itself, so a true proposition

4. Ibid. Chp. XII. p.120.
does not participate in its cause. This must be kept in mind with respect to chp. XII. of Concerning the Truth, for in concluding that Truth is one in all things St. Anselm does not wish to suggest that all particular truth shares in a simple divine nature. (1)

St. Anselm states emphatically that the Supreme Truth is radically different from any creaturely truth. (2) Truth and rightness with respect to God has a very specific meaning. The formula with which St. Anselm conducts his celebrated proof of the existence of God, that God is "than which nothing greater can be conceived" (3), is sufficient reason for the decisive importance St. Anselm attaches to the ineffable nature of the Creator and Lord of all things visible and invisible. He is not to be measured by or conceived to be dependent upon anything apart from Himself. (4) The eternal Son is the Truth of all created things, (5) not because He corresponds to the world but because He is its Truth. (6)

The necessary reasons which serve as premisses by which St. Anselm demonstrates his arguments signify aspects of the exalted Truth and Mystery which remains exalted and mysterious, beyond the grasp of the

2. Ibid. Chp. X.p.108.
human intellect. (1) Therefore St. Anselm's demonstrations of the various articles of faith make more than simple logical connections between premiss and conclusion. In each case cohesion is achieved, in terms of understanding, by presupposing factors which while cohering in reality cannot be contained in the logical connections of the demonstration. Propositions and concepts are not the cause of truth. (2) Propositions and concepts become true as they express the truth or rightness of things or states of affairs in their proper order established by their obligation to the Supreme Truth. Anselm therefore left indeterminate the exact character of the relationship between created truth and the Supreme Truth. Although one may come to recognise that a thing or state of affairs exists in truth, one may nevertheless not describe or picture exactly the nature of the right relationship involved. But we can partially perceive the truth of the ineffable Creator and sustainer of truth through created truth, it is God's truth that we perceive if only partially. (3) The "fool" who denies the existence of God perceives truth entirely in terms of the definitions of words and concepts

1. We therefore find it hard to agree with the interpretation of St. Anselm put forward by Prenter, R. Glauben und Erkennen bei Karl Barth. Kerygma Und Dogma. Vol. II. 1956. pp. 176 ff. He suggests that St. Anselm's distinction between faith and understanding leads to a neglect of the creaturely objectivity of the event of revelation; that Anselm is too dependent upon Augustine's neo-Platonism. (pp. 180-181.) This interpretation also finds expression in the article Die Einheit von Schöpfung und Erlösung. Theologische Zeitschrift. 2. 1946. pp. 161 ff. It seems too presumptive to read into St. Anselm criticisms which one wishes to direct against Barth's method of understanding the relationship between faith and understanding without further argument.


irrespective of their relationship to the reality to which they refer. (1) For St. Anselm on the other hand, the truth is directly related to the nature of objective reality to which the words etc., refer. The indeterminancy of St. Anselm's method of understanding this relationship between things and states of affairs that are said to be true and the Supreme Truth implies an openness to objective reality as a vehicle of truth that is necessitated by his understanding of the ineffable nature of the divine Truth. (2)

In the light of these judgments we now take up the question of Barth's difficulty with respect to St. Anselm's understanding of the relationship between the Incarnation and the Atonement as this is expressed in *Cur Deus Homo*. (3) Barth discusses St. Anselm's position in the light of his understanding of the event of revelation from the point of view that it is an event in which Jesus Christ, the Lord, is a Servant. (4) Barth says with reference to the divine forgiveness entailed in this event that it reveals man's sin as,

"the fact that man is God's debtor. He is a debtor who cannot pay. God has to excuse him .... Indeed when we see what the debt is we see that no other reaction to it is adequate but the divine forgiveness." (5)

Since man's debt to God is of such a nature that he is in no position

5. Ibid. p. 484.
to pay it we must conclude that God forgives man,

"primarily and decisively because His forgiveness alone is the restitution of the right which has been broken by the sin of man." (1)

Barth therefore agrees with St. Anselm's definition of sin as man's debt to God. (2) He finds St. Anselm's presentation of the matter,

"very accurate and complete." (3)

But he insists that the question needs closer examination. (4) By this Barth means we must emphasise the fact that man's guilt and debt toward God is both revealed and removed by God's act of pardon.

"His (i.e. God's) forgiveness makes good our repudiation and failure and thus overcomes the hurt we do to God .... His forgiveness repels chaos." (5)

In this context Barth rejects decisively St. Anselm's exposition of the matter since,

"he makes the remarkable assertion that it is not worthy of God to forgive man his sin sola misericordia. and therefore purely and absolutely and unconditionally. The divine forgiveness has to be thought of as conditioned by a prior satisfaction .... the

2. Ibid. p. 485.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. p. 486.
5. Ibid.
restitution of that which man has stolen from God." (1)

In this Barth can see a threat to the view which he is seeking to defend; that God's intervention on behalf of sinners of His pure mercy is at one and the same time the revelation of sin and its removal. There can be no quantitative division made between the revelation of sin in Jesus Christ and its removal. Barth fears that this is the case with regard to St. Anselm's view of a prior condition.

"Is there any event more serious or incisive or effective than that in which God forgives man all his sins? And does not the recognition of the divine decision in this event depend upon the fact that it is understood as pure and free forgiveness?" (2)

The argument will be developed to show that the prior condition to which Barth takes exception in St. Anselm's view derives from St. Anselm's emphasis on the importance of the personal choice of the man Jesus in fulfilling God's will in the act of reconciliation. This will be developed to show that Barth's rejection of St. Anselm's exposition at this point also raises doubts concerning the validity of Barth's interpretation of St. Anselm's understanding of the meaning of his "proof" for the existence of God in the Proslogion. If it is shown that this aspect of Barth's understanding of St. Anselm's methodology is also significant for his exposition of the dogma of the Trinity in his mature thought then we will have established a


2. Ibid. p. 487.
position which is of no mean hermeneutical importance in expounding Barth's theological position.

To appreciate St. Anselm's point concerning a prior condition we must see that prior to the chapter (1) in which Barth finds his evidence for the view that St. Anselm construes the divine act of forgiveness as,

"having to be conditioned before it can be accepted as a serious divine action," (2)

St. Anselm had set about proving that Christ's death was not the result of a direct divine command but a free, voluntary self offering of the Son to the Father.

"The Father did not compel him to suffer death, or even allow him to be slain, against his will, but of his own accord he endured death for the salvation of men." (3)

Death could not be demanded of one who was so purely good as our Lord if He was unwilling to die, (4) since death is God's judgment upon man in so far as he turns away from the truth and rightness of his created being. With respect to Christ no such judgment could be said to be his. If in fact He does die it must be seen that this act derives from the voluntary obedience of Christ to the Father's will: that as man becomes subject to judgment and death by an act of voluntary disobedience, so man could only be reconciled to God through an act of voluntary obedience. The only way in which it can

be said that the Father willed the death of Christ is that He willed that man should not be restored except through the voluntarily offered obedience of the creature. Thus the Son may say the Father desires His death in so far as the Son wills to suffer rather than that the whole human race should perish. (1)

It will be seen that contrary to Barth's opinion St. Anselm is just as concerned as he is to view sin and its removal in terms of an act relating to God's decision regarding man's sin. The difference would appear to arise between them as to the exact nature of the decision concerned. St. Anselm is concerned to emphasise the reality of the human struggle and voluntary obedience of the Son of God; Barth on the other hand seems to see such an emphasis as compromising the freedom and unity of God's act of revelation. In considering St. Anselm's position he would appear to be interested in understanding the divine decision concerning human sin and its forgiveness a posteriori, after consideration of the actual way taken by the Son of God from Bethlehem to Golgotha. On the other hand Barth seems to overshadow the significance of the human struggle and obedience of Jesus for our understanding, by an a priori view of the possible way in which a divine decision can be understood. Any understanding of an event in human history that is not presupposed by a divine decision, which concludes every aspect of the event under the rubric of God's freedom in relation to man, can only consider such emphasis as St. Anselm gives to the human obedience of Jesus as compromising this divine freedom or grace.

It is therefore the voluntary nature of the Son's self

offering that is of interest to St. Anselm as distinct from simply a
divine decision which included both the aspect of divine command and
human obedience. As if to emphasise the point that he makes,
St. Anselm reiterates the contention he has developed in the chapter
under discussion concerning the Son's obedience in relation to the
Father by taking it up in the following chapter once more. (1) Here
he expounds an alternative series of texts which would seem to
implicate the Father in the death of the Son in such a manner as to
preclude the Son's voluntary human obedience.

"For whatsoever things are said of Him, similar
to these which have been mentioned, they are all
to be explained in accordance with the belief that
he died, not by compulsion, but by free choice." (2)

This is the background against which we must understand the view which
St. Anselm expresses of the "fittingness" (3) of the Son's death,
which in chapter XII gives rise to the view that God could not forgive
sin by compassion alone, to which Barth takes such exception.
Between Chapters X and XII, Anselm deals with the problem of human
sin in terms of a debt which needs satisfaction. This exposition,
as we noted, Barth finds,

"very accurate and complete." (4)

It will be recalled that St. Anselm's understanding of the truth
and rightness of things and states of affairs meant that they
fulfilled an obligation or debt to that which they were in relation
to the Supreme Truth. It would appear to us that there is a case for

3. Ibid. Chp. XII, pp. 205 & 206. Cf. in this connection, Anstey, C. R. P.
suggesting a link between St. Anselm's understanding of truth and
correctness in relation to created entities and his emphasis on the
Son's voluntary obedience in the matter of reconciliation. For
St. Anselm the only being in which it was possible to conceive sin, as
a failure to fulfill an obligation to the truth, was the creature.
God, we recall, as the Supreme Truth is under obligation to no one.
If man's sin was to be dealt with the Son must assume the being of
the creature and as creature fulfill for the creature what it had so
lamentably failed to do. Thus St. Anselm's idea of sin as a debt,
with which Barth agrees, is integrally related to his emphasis on the
obedience of the Son as a creature which Barth interprets as a
condition which can only impugn the freedom and lordship of God in the
divine act of reconciliation.

There would seem to be a case for the suggestion that Barth
has not fully appreciated the importance of the human obedience of
the man Jesus to St. Anselm's way of understanding the relationship

1. This is the probable reason why Torrance, T. E. Space, Time and
Incarnation, finds it difficult to understand why there is not
a closer link in Barth's theological work between createdly
thought forms and the conceptuality of theological formulations.
"Created rationalities thus embody an element of necessity,
i.e., the impossibility of being other than they are, in
relation to the Supreme Truth of God. It is in virtue of
this ontic necessity that theological knowledge cannot be
arbitrary, but must be controlled through objective relation
to the Truth of the divine Being.

Now if we accept Anselm's account of this relationship there
ought to be a closer connection between the created
conceptualities of theology and those of natural science than
we find in the thought of Karl Barth, even when we take
into account the necessary shift in meaning that theological
concepts involve in accordance with the nature of their
divine Object." (p.65).

Cf. also the important article by the same author, The Ethical
established by God with man in the act of reconciliation. This is further suggested in the manner in which Barth deals with the objection which Boso had brought to St. Anselm's argument. Boso had asked St. Anselm;

"For since God is free as to be subject to no law, and to the judgment of no one, and is so merciful as that nothing more merciful can be conceived; and nothing is right or fit save as he wills; it seems a strange thing to say that he is wholly unwilling or unable to put away an injury done to himself, when we are wont to apply to him for indulgence with regard to those offences which we commit against others." (1)

Barth believes that,

St. Anselm, "thinks he can overcome this by saying that the freedom of God is inwardly conditioned by that quod expedit aut decet, nec benignitas dicenda est, quae aliquid Deo indecens operatur. A God who willed to lie would not be God. Nor would a God who willed to forgive without the prior fulfilment of this condition." (2)

But it must be realised that the fittingness of which St. Anselm speaks is concerned to express the actual way which God has taken in the obedience rendered in the humanity of the man Jesus. That is why there is no liberty, quod expedit aut quod decest. Since this is how

it in fact stands in the act of reconciliation it is impossible to say that God can lie, i.e., allow sin to be subject to no law as is the case with Himself. (1) The basis of this impossibility is no abstract theory about what God can and cannot do, but what He has actually done in Jesus. To say that God cannot lie is the same as saying, in the context of St. Anselm's argument, that Jesus was truly man. This we take to be the substance of St. Anselm's reply to Boso which Barth interprets as a piece of abstract theorising. (2)

In our examination of the material from Barth's Die christliche Dogmatik and Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie, we have repeatedly come upon the problem of the relationship established by Barth's view of the nature of the revelatory event between God and the creature considered in terms of its historical existence. We have seen in consideration of the Die christliche Dogmatik that Barth was ambivalent in his understanding of the role of the creature in revelation; this ambivalence was somewhat modified in Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie by consideration of the relationship established by revelation with the creature in terms of the intra-trinitarian relations of God's being. But we also raised the question there whether Barth's understanding of these relations precluded full appreciation of the relativity and contingency of creaturely being. Now in considering Barth's relationship to St. Anselm in the vital area of their respective understanding of reconciliation we light upon a similar problem. The question arises once more as to the importance Barth is able to give to the historical andcreaturely content of the event of revelation.

as this has been considered in relation to the importance or otherwise of the human obedience of the man Jesus in understanding God's act of reconciliation. It remains now to be considered if our study of Barth's relationship to St. Anselm so far throws any light upon the interpretation which Barth offers of St. Anselm's proof for the existence of God.

**Barth and St. Anselm's Proof for the Existence of God.**

In examining Barth's interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and theology presented in *Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie*, we saw how he attempted to understand the polarity of human thought reflected in theological realism and idealism in terms of the free, self affirming and electing act of God in His being for man in Jesus Christ. He there offered as a solution to the problem posed by both theological realism and idealism, a theological realism tempered by his understanding of the central epistemological significance of the doctrine of election.

When Barth's work on St. Anselm appeared the apparent novelty of its exposition caused both theologians and philosophers to take sides on the question of Barth's exegesis. (1) A notable thing about the controversy is that it centred not so much on the proof as a proof for the existence of God, as to the intention of St. Anselm's theological method. The discussion centred upon this issue because the relationship between theology and philosophy is decided by what attitude one adopts towards Barth's interpretation of St. Anselm's theological scheme in which his proof finds its place.

1. Eg. Gilson, E. *Sens et nature de l'argument de Saint Anselme*. Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age, IX, 1934. Gilson maintains against Barth that St. Anselm's name for God expresses an "essence" - a content of thought. (p.7, Note,1.) An analysis of this content is sufficient to prove God's existence. (p.8.) Barth, on the contrary, holds that the revealed name has only a noetic content, i.e. one which cannot be abstracted from the event of revelation without destroying its meaning. Cf. Barth, K. Anselm. Op. cit. p.75.
Catholic critics of Barth were particularly concerned to establish that St. Anselm's proof was applicable to human reason as such, apart from faith. (1) For his part Barth devoted a good deal of time in his presentation establishing that the proof must be understood within the context of a specific theological scheme. (2) If Barth's conclusions concerning the proof are to be appreciated then it is critical that they be seen within the context of his exposition of St. Anselm's theological programme. I don't think it would be going too far to say that Barth's conclusions concerning the meaning of *Proslogion* chps. II and III, illustrate St. Anselm's methodology which Barth establishes independently. Corresponding to this state of affairs we will devote the larger part of our exposition to an examination of Barth's interpretation of St. Anselm's theological programme.

Barth contends that St. Anselm does not attempt to demonstrate by means of an "independent" proof any article of the Credo which he affirmed to be true in faith, but simply demonstrated by means of a proof how such affirmations are true. (3) Such understanding that is achieved by this means must be interpreted within the context of faith as its attempt to understand what it already affirms to be true. (4) Thus the proofs which St. Anselm uses to

4. Cf. Bouillard, H. *Parole De Dieu Et Existence Humaine* Pt.II. "Ce nom de Dieu est la donnee a, empruntee au Credo, grace a laquelle 1' existence de Dieu posee comme x, doit se transformer de grandeur inconnue (quoique crue) en une grandeur connue." p.146.
demonstrate the truth which is affirmed in faith cannot be seen to arise out of any philosophic doubt or from any merely human idea of the divine. (1)

Before we look at Barth's reasons why St. Anselm needs to be interpreted in this way we will look at his exposition of St. Anselm's view of faith and its necessity in relation to knowledge of the truth. Here it is seen that St. Anselm's idea of "ratio" is of decisive importance. (2) By means of this concept St. Anselm establishes the relationship between the human capacity for knowledge and the reality of things that are known, above all between the human capacity for knowledge and the reality of the Object of theological knowledge. This relationship within the theological context is termed the "ratio fidei". (3) In correlation with his doctrine of truth St. Anselm is seen to understand the relationships between all the different uses of ratio as conditioned by the fact that the Word of God is the ratio veritatis. (4) The result of this correlation is understood, as with St. Anselm's doctrine of truth, to be the dependence of the noetic and ontic rationes on the ratio veritatis. As distinct from the noetic and ontic rationes the ratio veritatis has truth, not because it is ratio, but is ratio because it is the Truth.

"The following holds good of all those other rationes with which the ratio Dei is not identical but which as the ratio of his creation participate

2. Ibid. p.44.
3. Ibid. p.45.
4. Ibid.
in the ratio Dei: Truth is not bound to it but it is bound to Truth." (1)

The truth of the noetic ratio in this context is dependent upon its correspondence to the ontic ratio for the establishment of the veracity of its concepts and propositions; under no circumstances can it be conceived to be creative.

"Thus from time to time in the event of knowing, it happens that the noetic ratio of the veritas conforms to the ontic and to that extent is or is not vera ratio - or (and this is normally the case in praxi) is to some extent aliquatatemus. Fundamentally, the ratio either as ontic or noetic is never higher than the truth but truth itself is the master of all rationes beyond the contrast between ontic and noetic, deciding for itself, now here, now there, what is vera ratio." (2)

Because Truth disposes of all rationes the revelation of Truth must be in the form of authority. The human capacity for reason itself becomes a vera ratio when it conforms to this something that is dictated. (3)

1. Op.cit. p.46. The emphasis placed by Barth on the idea of participation here seems heavier than justified according to our understanding of St.Anselm's doctrine of Truth. The original text of Barth's exposition reads, "aber als die seines Geschöpf an ihr teilnehmender ratio".

Barth,K. Anselm's Beweis der Existenz Gottes im Zusammenhang seines theologische Programms. p.44.


3. Ibid. p.48.
This is not to be understood as a sacrifice of intellectual integrity, but the only possible and ultimately rational attitude one can assume before the authority of the believed but hidden ratio of the Object of faith.

"The antithesis between auctoritas and ratio does not coincide with the difference between God and man but represents the distinction between two stages of one divine road along which man first attains faith and then on the basis of faith (but now sola ratione) attains knowledge." (1)

We now see why the fides quaerens intellectum as a description of St. Anselm's theological programme is so important for Barth. (2) It is seen by Barth that the necessity of faith's search for understanding, the point of departure for theological knowledge, resides in the nature of the ratio of the Object of faith not in the inquiring human intellect as such. Faith and understanding could never be opposed to one another in St. Anselm's thought, or conceived in terms of a higher and a lower form of knowledge. (3) This brings out what is fundamental in Barth's understanding of St. Anselm's theological scheme: faith and understanding are to be understood not as a striving of the human will and reason toward God, but,

"a striving of the human will into God." (4)

Therefore the process of both faith and understanding presuppose the gracious approach of God to man.

2. Ibid. pp.16-17.
Whether *intelligere* is achieved by the believer or not there is no question of the result of the quest raising doubts about the existence of *fides*, since it is only in *fides* that man can begin to understand the outward authority of the Object of faith. The phenomenon of the fool who denies the existence of God poses the question for St. Anselm of how such a thing is possible in the light of the Object of faith. (1) In this light we understand that faith as a description of the necessary relation of man to the Truth indicates no general human possibility. Thus this relation between God and man in which alone understanding of the Truth is achieved is entirely dependent upon the actuality of the Truth making itself known. (2) For Barth this means that the possibility of faith is wholly dependent upon hearing the Word of God, and hearing comes only by preaching. (3) Consequently St. Anselm's method of understanding God roots theology within the concrete and particular sphere associated with the call and commission of God: this is the specific area of the Christian church. This conclusion explains in some measure why theology is closely associated with prayer in St. Anselm's thought. For,

"everything depends not only on the fact that God grants him (i.e. the believer) grace to think correctly about Him, but also the fact that God himself comes within his system as the object of his thinking." (4)

2. Ibid. pp.18ff.
3. Ibid. p.22.
This must happen if the *intelligere* of faith is not to be a delusion. (1)

It is therefore essential from Barth's point of view to see St. Anselm as concerned in his proof for the existence of God to address himself to believers on the basis of their faith and not to man in general on the basis of an assumed common *noetic ratio* which for the moment is not determined by the Truth. (2) The unbeliever's question must be understood within the context of faith.

"Anselm's proof works on the assumption that there is a solidarity between the theologian and the worldling which has not come about because the theologian has become one of the crowd, or one voice in a universal debating chamber, but because he is determined to address the worldling as one with whom he has at least this in common - theology." (3)

The audacity of St. Anselm's theological scheme consists in the way which he assumes the fool's ignorance to be a failure to understand a reality which applies to both believer and unbeliever alike. St. Anselm sees the unbeliever not only,

"within the precincts of theology, but more important within the precincts of the Church."(4)

The possibility of the fools misunderstanding and misreading of the reality of the situation which applies to both believer and fool in

3. Ibid. p.68
4. Ibid. p.70.
part explains his existence, but by no means justified him. In view of the,

"power of the objective ratio of the object of faith that enlightens and is enlightened from above by the summa veritas;"

the fools position must be regarded in the final analysis as absurd and cannot be taken seriously but,

"with a certain sense of humour." (1)

There is no other way to address the unbeliever than as a sinner who is reckoned not to have sinned."(2)

Barth's Exposition of St. Anselm's Proof For the Existence of God.

Barth interprets St. Anselm's presentation of the revealed name of God with which he conducts his proof for the existence of God in close relation to the self grounded nature of the summa veritas which we have encountered in his understanding of the relation of fides to ratio and intelligere. The formula,

"that than which nothing greater can be conceived", (3) must not be interpreted from the point of view of any possible conception derived from human experience of the world.

"It (the revealed name of God) is deliberately chosen in such a way that the object which it describes emerges as something completely independent of whether men in actual fact conceive

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p.123.
It or can conceive it." (1)

Its emergence as the divine name is meant to draw attention to an essentially unexpressed condition. (2) Therefore the formula must be understood as a strictly noetic rule, by this is meant,

"it contains nothing in the way of statements about the existence or about the nature of the object described." (3)

This latter point is rather crucial to Barth's interpretation of St. Anselm's proof. In particular the relationship he sees between chapters II and III of the Proslogion. For the moment it is sufficient to note that by emphasising the fact that the revealed name has a strict noetic content Barth does two things which will be of importance to his understanding of the doctrine of God and the doctrine of the Trinity in the Church Dogmatics. Firstly, it will be deduced that since the revealed name of God is a strict noetic rule the existence of God is not derivable from an idea of His nature. He is known wholly in the event of revelation or not at all, since He is who He is in the event of His self revelation. Secondly, Barth will stress the fact that the historical distinctions which are involved in the revelation of God in human history, as such, do not enter into the meaning of the relationship between these distinctions and revelation. Rather the ontic distinctions involved in the historical event of revelation derive their meaning from their relationship with the summa veritas, so they must be understood from

2. Ibid. pp. 74-75.
3. Ibid. p. 75.
the point of view of the *summa veritas* and not vice-versa. As we shall note in expounding Barth's doctrine of the Trinity this aspect of his interpretation of St. Anselm's proof has far reaching consequences.

Therefore the revealed name of God can only establish a, "strong and discernible", (1)

connection with the revelation and existence of God, it cannot be used as the basis for an analysis of the nature of God. For strictly speaking God is not a content of thought at all. (2) From this it must be concluded that the,

"presupposition of this Name has without doubt a strictly theological character." (3)

The objection which may be brought against St. Anselm's name, that it is simply an expression of the human desire to express the inexpressible, and consequently has no more meaning than this particular desire, (4) fails to realise that the incomprehensibility of the name is defined by the revelation of God. It is precisely because He is the *revealed* God that He is the veiled and incomprehensible God; the whole point of the proof is to raise this incomprehensibility of God from being an article of faith to the level of understanding its necessity in terms of the Object of theological knowledge. (5) Thus


   "Dieu ne ressemble a rien, n'appartient a aucun classement conceptuel. C'est tout autrement qu'il faut entendre l'idee de Dieu: non l'essence s'offrant au regard de l'homme, mais la designation de l'essence: aliquid quo majus cogitari potest ......"


the revealed name of God indicates,

"nothing about the nature of God, but rather lays down a rule of thought which, if we follow it, enables us to endorse the statements about the nature of God accepted in faith as our own necessary thoughts." (1)

Consequently the incomprehensibility of God presupposed by the revealed name is distinguished from say the arbitrary limit which the free roving human intellect may draw for itself as the limit of comprehensibility.

The same argument is applied when it is suggested that the divine Name is merely a "vox". Here Barth points out that St. Anselm had declared in Proslogion.1:

"Non teneo, Domine, penetrare altitudinem tuae ..... sed desidero aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam." (2)

That this *aliquatenus* cannot signify,

"a quantitative limitation of the range of human insight into the nature of God simply because this Name of God is lacking in ontic content." (3)

The lack of ontic content means that God can be known within the sphere of faith alone, in which the ratio of the Object of faith can be conceived in a manner appropriate to it. Hence the words used in this specific context and determined by this known but inconceivable Object become, in the guise of mere words, the divine revelation.

2. Ibid. p.83.
3. Ibid.
It is with respect to this characteristic that the proof offered in Proslogion II and III is to be understood as superior to the proof offered in the Monologion. (1)

In the Monologion St. Anselm had arrived at the formula, variously expressed, meaning in substance that God is that which is greater than all. (2) Such a formula, precisely because of its implied relationship to the continent, factual, non-necessary existence of things, was incapable of rigorous demonstration. The formula in the Monologion meant that it was in fact quite possible to conceive the factual non-existence of God. The formula offered in the Proslogion, precisely because of its strict noetic character excludes its dependence upon the existence of things in general and indicates that the sphere of meaning in which it is found is wholly dependent upon the determination of the ratio of the Object of faith. The exclusion of the ontic content from the formula found in the Proslogion corresponds to the fact that St. Anselm demonstrates the existence of the free, self-sufficient God who in His grace stoops to reveal Himself to the creature. This change in the structure of the Proslogion proof means that there is no longer a separation between essentia and esse, potentiality and actuality, in understanding the existence of God. The exclusion of the ontic reference in the proof has this consequence for St. Anselm's doctrine of God.

"God is all that he is, not through participation in certain potentialities not identical with his actual Power; all his potentialities do not first require to be actualised in the reality of his

2. Ibid. p. 84, n. 4.
Power, but he is himself what he ever is and what he ever is, he is himself." (1)

The same kind of considerations are brought to bear by Barth on the distinction he draws between the nature of the proofs in Proslogion II and III. In chapter II St. Anselm is seen to be concerned to establish that since the fool conceives something when he hears the divine Name, and what he conceives exists in the knowledge of what he conceives; but the God of the revealed Name cannot be conceived as existing in the mind alone but also in reality, so there is implied his extra mental existence. (2) For St. Anselm, to exist extra mentally is greater than to exist in the intellect alone. (3) This axiom derives, according to Barth, from St. Anselm's doctrine of Truth and Knowledge. (4) But this proof which asserts that a being's extra mental existence is greater than an existence solo intellectu, does not identify the being who is thus conceived as greater because extra mental. It simply recognises the possibility of such an existent


2. Barth,K. Ibid. p.123.

3. Ibid. p.125.

4. Ibid.
being in intellectu and in re. Nothing has been proved except the conclusion that it is impossible, if God exists, for Him to exist solo intellectu: he must exist also in re.

"The positive statement about the genuine and extramental existence of God (in the general sense of the concept 'existence') does not stem from the proof and is in no sense derived from it but is proved by the proof only in so far as the opposite statement about God's merely intramental existence is shown to be absurd". (1)

It is because St. Anselm's argument in Proslogion II has a general idea of existence in mind, and consequently an ontic content that is not presupposed by the Object of faith, that Barth calls it a "general" proof for the existence of God. (2) It may be true that what we know as actually existing in the mind and in reality we cannot at one and the same time conceive as existing and not existing. But it is possible to conceive a state of affairs in which that which is thus known does not, or is no longer existing ------ the hypothetical denial of its existence is not absurd. The reason why this is so is the general concept of existence with which the proof operates. The proof can have therefore only a negative value in that it does not, like the proof of Proslogion III, exclude even the hypothetical non-existence of the Object of proof. It is to that extent inferior to the proof of the "special" existence of God that is developed in Proslogion III. (3)

2. Ibid. p.100
In Proslogion III the revealed name of God is concerned to indicate that though our acquaintance with things gives us the assurance that they do not exist only in the mind, but also in reality, it does not have the power to forbid us thinking of their hypothetical non-existence. But the proof of Proslogion III has this specific power which the proof of Proslogion II, lacked. (1) There is then in Proslogion III, no analogous statement about God's existence in terms of the existence of things in general, including man's own conception of himself as existing. St. Anselm is not Descartes. (2)

"Out of the vere esse there now arises significantly before us a vere esse whose reality has its basis neither merely subjectively nor merely subjectively and objectively but is based beyond this contrast a se, in itself." (3)

The nerve of the proof in Proslogion III, is seen to consist in what it denies rather than in what it asserts. By what His revealed name forbids God is distinguished from all things whose existence can possibly be conceived as non-existent. Therefore the proof must be seen in a very specific context if it is to be understood. The proof can only be understood,

"if an article of faith, fixed in itself as such, has been proved in such a way that the opposite statement would be reduced ad absurdum by means of the statement of the Name of God which

2. Ibid. p.139.
is likewise assumed to be revealed and believed .... *Intelligere* means to see into the noetic rationality and therefore into the noetic necessity of the statements that are revealed, on the basis that they possess ontic rationality and necessity as revealed statements, prior to all *Intelligere*, to all proof and therefore not based on proof". (1)

That God's existence is subject to proof in this very unique way is shown further, according to Barth, by the way in which St. Anselm constructs his proof by means of an address to God in prayer. God therefore stands over against the man who seeks understanding by means of the proof,

"not as an 'it', not even as 'he', but as 'thou', as the unmediated 'thou' of the Lord." (2)

This factor conditions not only our understanding of the noetic necessity of faith in relation to its Object, but also the believer's thinking and speaking about all created reality. For,

"along with his existence, he also has his thinking about existence, its values and its degrees, all entirely from the Creator." (3)

The fool who fails to achieve understanding by means of the revealed Name is to be considered neither as a rational nor moral defective, but simply as a fool. (4) He accomplishes that which, in the light of God's unique existence, is "forbidden to attempt". (5)

2. Ibid. p.151.
3. Ibid. p.152.
5. Ibid. p.159.
This attempt by the fool to deny the existence of God has its theological parallel in the sinner’s attempt to justify himself over against the unconditional gracious approach of God to man in Jesus Christ. (1) Barth sees a connection between St. Anselm’s proof of Proslogion III, and the unconditional grace of God which calls the sinner righteous. The fool is one who cannot appreciate, at the decisive point, the inexpressible freedom of God in His movement toward the creature; by this fact he is revealed to be simply a fool. But it needs to be emphasised at once that if St. Anselm, as a believer, reaches understanding of God’s unique existence by means of the revealed Name then he too must see himself, as this one who now understands, in exactly the same position as the fool. The epistemological implications of the freedom of God’s election of man has this effect for both the fool and the believer.

"It is only by the grace of God that Anselm’s solidarity with him (i.e. the fool) has been ended. The insipiens thinks and speaks as one who is not saved by the grace of God. That

1. Op.cit. p.160. There is an obvious connection between Barth’s estimate here of the theological significance of the existence of the fool and his view of evil as "das Nichtige". Cf. Barth,K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.3.3. pp.327ff. This aspect of Barth’s thought is developed further in Vols. 4.1., 2, 3. Here sin is described under a number of heads all of which derive their meaning from the fact that in Jesus Christ God has revealed His unique freedom in approaching sinful man. Criticism of the universalistic implications of Barth’s view of sin has generally not taken into account that it is from his doctrine of God that Barth derives his doctrine of sin. Cf. Hartwell, H. The Theology of Karl Barth; An Introduction. pp.186-187.
is the reason for his perversity, and why he can say, *Deus non est*. The reproach does not imply any uncharitableness. It is with just this reproach upon his lips that Anselm takes his place as near as it is possible to be and therefore with as much promise as there could possibly be, alongside this fellow mortal whose action is so unintelligible." (1)

The proof in *Prosligion* III expressed as a noetic rule, takes cognizance of the implications, in the sphere of epistemology, of Barth's view that the doctrine of election is an integral part of the doctrine of God. (2) The lack of reference to ontic factors not presupposed by the event in which God reveals Himself corresponds to the freedom and majesty of God who in choosing Himself, chooses Himself for man and man for Himself in His Son Jesus Christ. The substance of the fool's contention consists in his insistence on transferring to the being of God the idea of existence derived from the ontic distinctions which occur on the creaturely level generally. This, of course, opens up the possibility of conceiving the non-existence of God. Such a possibility was opened up in Barth's reading of the proof offered by St. Anselm in *Prosligion* II. (3) The fact that *Prosligion* III expresses a proof in terms of a noetic rule, without reference to ontic factors, corresponds to the state of affairs indicated by Barth's view of the status and meaning of the doctrine of


3. Ibid. p.165.
election. The proof of the noetic rule in Proslogion III presupposes
the event of divine revelation in which man's thinking and willing is
unconditionally determined by the unconditional freedom and grace of
God in His movement towards the creature. God is both Object and
Subject in the event of revelation in which He is who He is, the Lord.
The only rational response the believer can make in this situation,
in understanding himself and the world, is one which

"assents to the Name of God as an article of
faith and presupposes it for all that follows
...... it is able to illumine the noetic necessity
of faith .... by the roundabout route of ontic
necessity which is inseparable from ontic
rationality. Thus theology can know what is
believed, that is, prove it." (1)

Assessment of Barth's Interpretation of St. Anselm's Proofs For The
Existence of God.

We now take up the question of Barth's interpretation of
St. Anselm's theological programme which it will appear had a decisive
effect on his understanding of the revised structure of his Dogmatik.
We take up this question with particular reference to the relationship
Barth establishes between Proslogion Chps. II and III. We recall that
Barth had distinguished between the two chapters by means of the
terms "general" and "special". The latter is found to be superior
to the former in so far as it lacks reference to a relationship between
God and the existence of the creature which is not presupposed by the
event of revelation.

"By the mere fact that God exists in just the same way as any other object, the problem of his existence is still not answered as far as Anselm is concerned (unlike Gaunilo). God is 'outside', God stands over against the thinking in the unique manner in which the Creator stands over against the thinking of creation ..... That is what is to be proved in Pros.3." (1)

The proof in Proslogion II, is seen to be a preliminary stage on the way to the proof proper in Proslogion III. Here in Proslogion III the proof is seen to consist in a "noetic rule"; in being such it corresponds to the unique nature of the act of God in His unconditioned free condescension to the creature. By excluding reference to any ontic factor the proof in Proslogion III assumes that the question raised by the revelation of God concerning His existence is one which can only be asked meaningfully in the context in which the same revelation determines the structure of the event in which God makes himself known. It is not a question of "if" God's existence is proved but in what way it is proved.

But Barth is also concerned to show that Proslogion II, is really on the way to the proof of Proslogion III, understood in this way. The conclusion of Proslogion II, that God cannot exist in the understanding alone but in the understanding and in reality, Barth asserts rests on the fact that:

"The positive statement about the genuine and extra mental existence of God (in the general

sense of the concept existence) does not stem from the proof and is in no sense derived from it but is proved by the proof only in so far as the opposite statement about God's merely intramental existence is shown to be absurd...... If that is a 'proof' then it is a proof of an article of faith which still holds good apart from all proof." (1)

Barth's view is that the proof of Proslogion II concludes in a negative statement to the effect that if God exists He could not do so in thought alone; but the positive statement which refers to God's unique existence, does not have its origin in this general proof.

H. Bouillard in an analysis of St. Anselm's proofs, (2) concedes Barth's general point that St. Anselm proceeds negatively and indirectly, by way of reduction to the absurd, in Proslogion II's argument. However, Bouillard insists that although the proof of Proslogion II is limited to showing the internal contradictions involved in the denial of the existence of a Being such as that no greater could be conceived, in doing so St. Anselm wishes to establish the necessity of affirming its real extra mental existence. St. Anselm wishes to derive a positive conclusion, albeit in a negative form, and to object that such conclusions come from faith establishes nothing more than that for St. Anselm every proposition of faith in intelligible and therefore deductible.


Bouillard lays emphasis on the fact that the fool understands the formula expressing the divine name in Proslogion II, and this possibility is open to anyone who reflects upon the temporal and supra-temporal nature of things. There would seem to be a good deal of evidence that St. Anselm understood the formula in Proslogion II in this way; as meaningful for the fool apart from faith. In his reply to Gaunilo's answer on behalf of the fool St. Anselm stresses the fact that the meaningfulness of the formula in Proslogion II is related to reflection upon things which are more or less good. (1) What is implied by St. Anselm's procedure understood in this way is that it is encumbent upon the unbeliever to show that the propositions of faith which St. Anselm is attempting to understand are meaningless. St. Anselm argues that the unbeliever has to show not merely that within our experience we do not compare things absolutely, as greater or more perfect, but that necessarily it is the case that things are not greater or more perfect in this sense. He would be thus forced by St. Anselm's argument to say that the things within our experience are necessarily the only things and that the notion of God is meaningless by definition. (2)

Bouillard's interpretation of St. Anselm's intention certainly has evidence to support the claims that he makes in opposition to Barth. He maintains that,

"even if one thought that the proof of the existence of God set forth in the Proslogion were not of a philosophical order because it worked on a notion furnished through faith,


one would be obliged to admit that from its author's point of view it could become such. And it would become such without changing a single word, since the initial concept would remain formally the same." (1)

Bouillard's position is that though Barth has emphasised a long overlooked aspect of St. Anselm's proofs, their close connection with the structure of *fides quaerens intellectum*, he has neglected to emphasise the equally important fact that the proof so constituted reflects a rationality which has meaning and coherence apart from faith. (2)

In this discussion it is important to note that Bouillard in his own way is drawing attention to an aspect of Barth's understanding of St. Anselm which we have had occasion to notice. We refer to our exposition of Barth's view of St. Anselm's understanding of the voluntary nature of the obedience of Jesus in determining the meaning of the sin of man. Here too it would appear that Barth under plays the


2. Bouillard, H. The Knowledge of God. p. 94. maintains, "the believer surely recognizes that God manifests himself in revelation and that man submits himself to this manifestation when he recognizes it. His thought is indeed, as Barth says, an obedient thought. But it is not any the less a thought. The Christian is not reduced to repeating the Word of God by spelling it out. Barth surely intends to do something else since he is seeking an understanding of faith. According to him the proof for the existence of God must be limited to establishing an intelligible link between two propositions both of which are believed without establishing a foundation for our belief in God. This is insufficient. God certainly has no need of our proofs; but we have need of them .... It (the proof) formulates the inner assurance that our belief in God is not arbitrary and that our obedient thought is a true thought." Cf. also p. 90.
importance of the "rational intra structure" of human language and logic in arriving at the meaning of the proofs. (1) It would appear that Barth has methodological reservations which preclude an adequate appreciation of this side of St. Anselm's theological programme. These reservations will become more apparent when we consider, within the context of Barth's doctrine of revelation in the *Church Dogmatics*, the relationship between the Trinity and Christology. But we recognise that these reservations are already present in Barth's exposition of St. Anselm.

In his analysis of the argument directed against St. Anselm that the existence of God indicated by the revealed name is nothing but something utterly unknown, Barth asserts that this argument leaves out of account,

"the fact that along with God's name and existence which is being proved here, God's nature is also revealed. If this is taken into account, as is reasonable, then the objection becomes absolutely impossible." (2)

The impossibility to which Barth refers is posited in the fact that revelation,

"is the revelation of God in his world, in the world which is so constituted that God's nature can be manifest therein." (3)

This does not mean God's self revelation is a state of being of


3. Ibid. p. 117.
the world, so that inference could be made from the structure of created reality to the nature of God. In revelation we do not have to do with a state of being revealed but an act which cannot be separated from the personal presence of God. God's nature and existence cannot be separated from consideration of this event. Therefore, "the man outside the church, the man who is without revelation and faith, knows nothing in actual practice of him who bears the Name. (1)

But given the event of revelation which includes the reality and possibility of man's knowledge of God, the church actualises a possibility though open to all men is hidden from them by the fall and the concrete mystery of God's election. (2) Thus at any given point Barth can distinguish between knowledge of God that is validly an inference from the structure of worldly reality in the event of revelation, as the believer seeks to understand what he believes, and that which is invalid on the basis of the actuality of the event of revelation.

"Here within the church, there takes place a conicere, an inference from experience of the world as to the nature of God just as truly as this does not take place outside the church." (3)

The position adopted by Barth in his exposition of St. Anselm's proof implies a structural hiddeness of revelation which has

2. Ibid. p.117.
3. Ibid.
methodological implications for theology. It means that the rationality of human thought forms and language is dependent upon their correspondence to the structure of the event in which God reveals Himself. It is this fact, we believe, which precludes Barth's appreciation of the point made by Bouillard with respect to the possible meaning of St. Anselm's proofs. He had stated that they conceded a common rational structure to both believer and unbeliever and that therefore the proofs have a general validity. For Barth all the distinctions and relations presupposed by the event of revelation considered as an historical event and to which the rationality of the creature can be related, must be understood within the context of the event of revelation and the nature of God who there reveals Himself. (1)

1. This interpretation echoes that given by Jüngel, E. *Gottes Sein ist im Werden*. This paraphrase of Barth's thought has been defended by Barth himself. Barth, K. *How My Mind Has Changed*. Ed. Godsey, J. p.82.

Jüngel's book begins with a significant discussion of the interpretation of Barth offered by Gollwitzer, H. *The Existence of God as Confessed by Faith*. The discussion involves the question which we have raised in concert with Bouillard's interpretation of St. Anselm's proofs; whether the relativity and contingency of creaturely being and rationality as such enters into the meaning of valid theological statements. Gollwitzer asserted the legitimacy of speech about God in terms of our understanding of the existence of things in the world. (Op. cit., pp.240ff., 200ff.) He refuses therefore to presuppose knowledge of revelation by an understanding of revelation which makes the structural hiddenness of revelation in the world necessary in the interests of safeguarding the lordship of God in His revelation. Gollwitzer argues for a distinction to be made between the event of revelation and the nature of God considered as such. We must, he says, be able to speak of God as He is in and for Himself, so that between Him and the event of revelation there is no, "structural but a functional similarity." (Op. cit. p.185)

Jüngel on the other hand rejects any attempt to infer from Barth's position a theological validity for speech (continued on p.80.)
It is of interest to note with respect to our exposition of Barth's interpretation of St. Anselm's proofs and what will be seen to be the 1. continued: about God which distinguishes between the being of God in revelation and His being in and for Himself by means of the historical nature of the event of revelation. Therefore to speak of the being of God in terms of the non being of the man Jesus in death considered as a limit of human existence is to run the risk of docetism! The implication being that the death of the man Jesus can only be understood as it presupposes the being of God as God to which the statement of the ancient church, ἐν Θεῷ ἦσας Ἰησοῦς Ἰησοῦς, 
Similarly Jüngel rejects the suggestion of Gollwitzer that we must distinguish between the event of revelation as a revelation of God's "will", (Op.cit.p.186) and the being of God as God, as He is in and for Himself. Jüngel counters this suggestion by reference to Barth's explicit defence of the proposition that we cannot distinguish between God's essence and His will.
"Gott selber nicht anders existiert und darum nicht anders verstanden werden will darf als eben in dieser konkreten Lebendigkeit (sc. seiner Entscheidung), in dieser Bestimmheit seines Willens, die als solche auch eine Bestimmheit seines Wesens ist."
According to Jüngel the question which Gollwitzer raised in connection with his attempt to understand the relativity of the event structure of revelation in relation to the being of God can only be answered if we keep in mind the fact, that,
strategic placement of his analysis of the nature of the Word of God
in the doctrine of Revelation, just how consistent and necessary in
their own way are the conclusions which derive from the method of
theological understanding he adopts. We shall conclude with a brief
resume of what Barth sees as the heart of his Church Dogmatics. (1)

What we notice firstly about Barth's doctrine of Reconciliation
is that its structure is dependent upon the way in which God has
acted in Jesus Christ. (2) There is no question of presupposing
the church's understanding of dogma by a possibility related to an
abstract view of the nature of God or man. The reality and possibility
of the doctrine resides in the being an Act of God who is revealed in
Jesus Christ. Therefore the divinity of the Mediator is understood by
asking after the reality and the possibility posited by the revelation
of Jesus Christ as God for man, how this One,

"takes part in the event which constitutes
the divine being." (3)

From the way in which God is related to man in Jesus Christ we must
conclude,

"in this way, in this condescension, He is
the eternal Son of the eternal Father" ....

"This is how God is God." (4)

The outward form of the event of revelation reveals the,

"inward divine event." (5)

The humanity of Jesus is therefore that which corresponds to this

1. Barth, K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.4.1,p.3.
2. Ibid, p.128.
3. Ibid, p.129.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
inward divine event. As a man Jesus can only be understood in the light of the fact that,

"as the true God, i.e., the God who humbles Himself, Jesus Christ is this true man, i.e., the man who in all His creatureliness is exalted above His creatureliness." (1)

Barth's understanding of the doctrine of the two natures of Christ, divine and human, shapes his view of doctrine of the two states of Christ, humiliated and exalted. (2) The historical distinctions implied by the earthly life, death, resurrection, ascension and reign of Christ are to be understood in terms of the structure of the event of revelation in which God is God.

"We have not spoken of the two states (status) of Jesus Christ which succeed one another, but of two sides or directions or forms of that which took place in Jesus Christ for the reconciliation of man to God...... His one work, which cannot be divided into different stages or periods of His existence, but which fills out and constitutes His existence in this twofold form." (3)

If the divinity and the humanity of Christ are to be understood in terms of aspects of the nature of the Word of God to man, so too the aspect of man's involvement in this event, its

2. Ibid. pp.132ff.
3. Ibid. p.133.
relationship to the creature, is to be understood from a third
dimension of the same Word of God. If the being of Jesus Christ
is to be understood in terms of God's determination of Himself for
man and man for Himself, then the relationship of the creature to
this event is to be understood from the point of view of the unity
of this twofold determination of God. (1)

"There can be no question of trying to see a
third thing .... Everything that can be said
materially concerning Jesus Christ and the
atonement made in Him has been said exhaustively
in the twofold fact .... that He is very God and
very man, i.e., the Lord who became a servan t
and the servant who became Lord ..... The
third aspect can only be the viewing of this
history in its unity and completeness." (2)

In this third aspect of the Word of God which forms the basis of
the doctrine of reconciliation we find a precise correlation with
Barth's definition of the nature of the Word of God in the mystery
of its Spirituality, as the previous two aspects corresponded to
the nature of Word of God as language and act, Speaker and Spoken.
This third aspect of the doctrine of reconciliation as that which
expresses the inconceivable unity of God's being as Word and Act,
is the \textit{summa veritas} of all ontic and noetic rationes involved in
God's self revelation to man. (3) Therefore the resurrection of
2. Ibid. p.136.
3. Ibid. pp.147-148, 151-152, 202-204. Cf. following section on
The nature of The Word of God.
Jesus Christ, considered as an event historically distinct from His life and death, must be understood as that which corresponds to the fact that:

"God willed to give to His eternity (i.e., the Son in relation to the Father) with Him and therefore to Himself an earthly form. He willed to give to the inner secret radiance of His glory an outward radiance in the sphere of creation and its history. He willed to give to His eternal life space and time. And that is what He did when He called Jesus Christ to life from the dead." (1)

The fact that according to the New Testament Jesus was raised from the dead by the Holy Spirit confirms for Barth that the historical life and obedience of Jesus do not enter, as such, into the definition of the nature of the event. Since,

"the fact that Jesus Christ was raised from the dead by the Holy Spirit and therefore justified confirms that it pleased God to reveal and express Himself to the crucified and dead and buried Jesus Christ in unity of the Father with the Son and therefore in the glory of the free love which is His essence." (2)

The structure of Barth's doctrine under the general heads of

Jesus Christ, the Lord as Servant, the Servant as Lord and the True Witness, corresponds both to his analysis of the nature of the Word of God and, since this analysis serves as the basis for the dogma, the doctrine of the Trinity. It is for this reason that Barth could not find a place for St. Anselm's understanding of the voluntary nature of Christ's obedience in his understanding of sin within the context of the atoning deed. Also we might add it is the reason why Barth would have difficulty in accepting the kind of explanation of St. Anselm's proofs offered by Bouillard. For if it were to be admitted that the humanity of our Lord was to be considered in relation to a view of sin which entailed consideration of the voluntary nature of human sin as an act of the creatures will, then it would be impossible to conceive the rationality and necessity of the doctrine of reconciliation purely in terms of the nature of the being and act in which God is the God that He is in the revelation of Himself to man. This is why Barth finds St. Anselm's conditioning of the forgiveness of sins by the voluntary nature of Christ's obedience as man so unacceptable. The same would hold good for any attempt to consider the rationality of the revealed name apart from the specific context in which the Word of God was directed to man. Barth, therefore, must conclude any consideration of the obligation of the creature to God in terms of the nature of the eternal triune life of the Creator.

"The character of man's obligation (to God)
and commitment to Him corresponds to this
(the Trinity's) being and essence". (1)

Any postulate which presupposes a freedom of the creature either to know or obey God that does not correspond to the reality and possibility presupposed by the actual freedom of God for man in Jesus Christ finds no place in Barth's thought, it is methodologically excluded.

**Barth's Study of St. Anselm and the Place of the Trinity in the Church Dogmatics.**

We pass now to the question of the influence of St. Anselm's theological method, as understood by Barth, on his own theological development. Barth acknowledges the decisive importance of his study of St. Anselm.

"Ich hatte mich in diesen Jahren von den letzten Resten einer philosophischen bezw. anthropologischen .... Begründung und Erklärung der christlichen Lehre zu lösen. Das eigentliche Dokument dieses Abschieds is nicht etwa die vielgelessen kleine Schrift (Nein!) gegen Brunner von 1934, sondern das 1931 erschienene Buch über den Gottesbeweis des Anselm von Canterbury, das ich von allen meinen Büchern mit der größten Liebe beschrieben zu haben meine und das in Amerika wohl gar nicht und auch in Europa von allen meinen Büchern am wenigsten gelesen worden ist. Das positiv Neue war dieses: ich hatte in diesen Jahren zu lernen, dass die christliche Lehre ausschliesslich und in folgerichtig und in alln ihren Aussagen direkt
Lehre von Jesus Christus als von dem uns
gesagten lebendigen Wort Gottes sein muss, um
ihren Namen zu verdienen und um die christliche
Kirche in der Welt zu erbauen, wie sie als
christliche Kirche erbaut sein will." (1)

The more explicit significance of what Barth learned at the feet of
St. Anselm is seen when we compare the way in which Barth understands
the starting point of theology in the *Church Dogmatics* to that in
*Die christliche Dogmatik*. In his study of St. Anselm's theological
scheme Barth had come to see that to believe,

"does not mean simply a striving of the human
will towards God but a striving of the human will
into God and so a participation (albeit in a
manner limited by creatureliness) in God's
mode of being and so a similar participation
in God's aseity, in the matchless glory of his
very Self, and therefore also in God's utter
absence of necessity." (2)

Consequently,

"on no account can the givenness or non-givenness
of the results of intelligere involve for faith
the question of its existence. Therefore the aim
of theology cannot be to lead men to faith, nor
to confirm them in the faith, nor even to deliver

their faith from doubt." (1)

The freedom of theological knowledge which corresponds to the truth of its Object means that its possibility and necessity is now understood to be rooted and grounded in the nature of the Word of God. (2) In the *Church Dogmatics* any suggestion that the possibility and necessity of revelation being found in an analysis of the situation of the preacher and the hearer is dropped.

In direct relation to the way in which Barth conceives the freedom and uniqueness of God's existence is the fact of the particularity of the sphere in which theological knowledge is validated by its Object. This sphere is the church, where it is undertaken to speak in human words, on the basis of past revelation and in expectation of future revelation, of the Word of God. (3) The possibility of putting the question of truth regarding this human undertaking is not to be divorced from the ontic and noetic context in which the question is raised by God's own self witness. Dogmatics, therefore, as the church's testing of the language that it uses to express the truth of revelation is situated, as a discipline, between the past witness to revelation in the Scriptures and the present attempt by the church to speak the Word of God. Thus dogmatics inquires into the *summa veritas*, the ratio which grounds both the ontic and noetic necessity and rationality of both Scripture and Proclamation. Dogmatics can only give an account of its task, as a churchly undertaking, by describing the reality which posits the

possibility and validates the truth of both past and present
revelation in and by itself.

It is this understanding of dogmatics which leads directly
from the view of God's unique being established in the course of
Barth's exposition of St. Anselm's proof to the doctrine of the Trinity
as the "proof" of God's unique Lordship revealed in the event of
revelation. (1) The doctrine of the Trinity is the expression at
one and the same time of God's aseity, His incomprehensible mercy
by which He is present with and for man, and the fact that the God
who speaks His Word in the event of revelation is not a mere cipher
but One who is personally present in the event of revelation. (2)

The structure of the first part volume of the Church Dogmatics
indicates how seriously Barth took the lesson he had learned from
St. Anselm concerning the possibility of knowledge of the unique being
of God. As distinct from the procedure adopted in Die christliche
Dogmatik, the Church Dogmatics relates the determination of the ontic
forms of the Word of God, the event of revelation, Scripture and
Proclamation, and the noetic determination of the creature as the one
who receives revelation, to the nature of the Word of God. (3)
Barth divides his understanding of the nature of the Word of God into
three major aspects. (4) With regard to the first, the main

2. Ibid. pp. 16, 163, 369, 158.
   God's Language as God's Act. 184ff. God's Language as God's
   Mystery. This analysis of the nature of the Word of God is the
   link between the sections 4 and 5 in which the ontic and neotic
   forms of the Word of God are expounded.
4. Ibid.
contention is directed toward establishing that God's Word is not a symbol for any kind of theoretical system which man may erect, but God's Word means "God speaks". (1) His self communication is His self communication. As opposed to all irrationalism and mysticism which seeks an other worldly reality behind and above the verbal character of language, the Word of God is to be understood as supremely rational. But, corresponding to the unique existence of God is His unique address. God's speech does not derive its character as address from the structure of human language as such, but from God's own self address. (2)

"What God utters is never in any way known and true in abstraction from God Himself." (3)

The effective barrier which prevents God's Word being reduced to a system of syntax because of its verbal nature, or defined as something irrational because of its personal nature, is the equation,

"God's Word is God's Son". (4)

The wortliche nature of God's Word determines both its personal and rational nature since He is,

"the Lord of the verbal character of His Word. He is not bound to it, but it is bound to Him." (5)

From the way in which the Word of God is addressed to man Barth demonstrates that it is the Word of God the Creator, Reconciler.
and Redeemer. (1) Barth thus avoids in this way the possible repetition of the error he found he had committed in understanding the possibility of revelation in Die christliche Dogmatik. There it had been left open, by the consideration of the Word of God in relation to the structure of the situation of the preacher and the hearer, what the reality of revelation might be if it is to be revelation for man. The danger resided in the suggestion of a possibility of revelation which was not identical with its reality. (2) Here Barth is concerned to establish the possibility of revelation from the point of view of its reality.

From the way in which the Word of God is addressed to man, as a Word which grasps his existence and conditions it, it is to be understood as the Word of God the Creator. From the fact that the Word of God is the Word of One who is unknown, yet makes Himself known, there is indicated a,

"criticism of the reality of the relationship existing between us and Him, but on the other hand a declaration of His purpose to maintain it in standing and to establish it anew from His side in spite of and along with the criticism which He makes." (3)

From the reality of God's address in this manner we know Him as the Reconciler. And precisely because this Reconciler promises Himself to man as man's future we are to understand His Word as the Word of God the Redeemer too. (4)

4. Ibid. p.162.
When Barth further clarifies the nature of the Word of God as God's language which is also His Act and His Mystery he emphasises that he is not adding anything to what has been said concerning God's Word as God's language, but is simply a viewing of the same reality from another angle. (1) The analysis does not introduce any new possibility which is not present in the reality of God's Word as His personal presence.

To speak of the Word of God as God's Act is to refer to that specific Act in which God speaks His Word. It emphasises the fact that the "wortliche" nature of God is active,

"as a mere word it is the divine Person, the Person of the Lord of history, whose self utterance as such is an alteration and an absolute alteration of the world, whose passio in history is as such an actio". (2)

This means that to understand God's act as historical we must not assume its possible historicity from the understanding of historical events which we may already have. The distinctions which may be involved in the threefold form of the Word of God, Revelation, Scripture and Proclamation, considered merely phenomenologically, are not the ground for understanding its nature as the Word of God. For,

"the varying positions in God's order distinguishes these three times in a way not otherwise characteristic of man's times, a way in which they differ only here, in which only the times of the Word of God differ." (3)

2. Ibid. p.164. Words underlined are in italics.
Since, "however seriously they may be taken as such, the differences inherent in history are not sufficient to justify a serious use of the concept 'Word of God'." (1)

Therefore the Word of God as God's Act is only understood when it is realised that it has,

"nothing to do with the general problem of historical understanding .... Rather this knowledge is referred in O.T. and N.T. to election, revelation, calling, setting apart, new birth .... apart from all historical connections, though these undeniably exist; in these connections but not through them." (2)

Corresponding to the freedom of God's Word as God's Act which makes history and expresses itself epistemologically in election, we see that its effect on the creature is decisive. Man is not confronted with a choice by the Word of God as His Act; a possibility which he may accept or reject. It is, by its nature as God's Act,

"a transposition of man into the wholly new position of one who has apprehended this promise, appropriated it to himself, who lives no longer without, but, whatever his attitude to it, with this promise." (3)

3. Ibid. p.173.
The determination of the creature by the nature of the Word of God considered as His act is not limited to the individual, it holds good.

"mutatis mutandis of the relation of the Word of God to the human cosmos in general .... the world of man which confronts the Word of God must also be considered as a whole, as a world subjected to a decisive change". (1)

We cannot therefore take the world seriously in its godlessness. (2)

From the way in which Barth has described the Word of God as God’s language which is His Act it is obvious that this Act, which cannot be understood in terms of the intra-mundane historical reality, is rooted and grounded in the decision in which God is Himself Act. In this decision God determines not only Himself as God but also the nature of the Word of God. If the aseity of God is not to be misunderstood as some meta-physical hinterground, then in terms of the Word of God as God’s act it must be clearly seen that if;

"God is a se. That holds without reserve of His Word also." (3)

It is only when this is seen that the Word of God can be understood as Act and Event; for its historical nature derives from the freedom in which God chooses Himself as man’s Lord. The possibility of His Lordship in His Word therefore is identical with His nature and is not in any way grounded in the event characteristics of the historical forms of revelation.

"The Word of God is not to be regarded primarily

2. Ibid.
as history, and then, and as such, as decision
also, but first and fundamentally as a decision
and then, and as such, as history also." (1)

It is to bring out the unique nature of the Word of God as God's
Language and Act in terms of the relationship between the decision of
God and the Word of God as Act and event, that Barth treats the
Language of God as His Mystery. (2) The distinction which Barth
had made under the two previous heads, the Word of God as God's
Language understood in its personal and rational nature as God's self
presence and the decision of God which grounds the Word of God as
event and act in the freedom of God's to be who He is, refers to the
relationship between the worldly form and the divine content of the
Word of God. It would still be possible in Barth's view to conceive
the verbal character of revelation and God's address as well as the
event of revelation and God's decision within a dialectical relation
as if the one implied the other. Barth considers it necessary to
"prove" the nature of the Word of God in such a way that the
distinction between worldly form and divine content is in no way
connected with the being of the creature which is implied by the
form of the Word of God as worldly event. This is a similar situation
as that encountered in our interpretation of Barth's exposition of
St. Anselm's proofs in Proslogion II and III. There we noted that
though the existence of God was proved within the context of faith
in the argument of Proslogion II it was never the less possible to conceive the factual non existence of God because the proof assumed a relationship between the existence of God and empirical reality. Barth saw the existence of God as proved in Proslogion III to be superior precisely because it did not assume such a relationship. Here too, Barth is concerned to understand the truth of the nature of the Word of God as His Language and His Act entirely within its own presuppositions. (1)

Barth achieves understanding of the nature of the Word of God from the point of view of it being the Word of God as God's mystery, by consideration of the relationship between the Word of God as God's language and God's act in terms of the inconceivable consumption of the relationship in the mystery of God's own self determination as God. This mystery is therefore, at one and the same time, the


"A removal of the distinction, may opposition, between form and content we cannot achieve. The coincidence of both is God, but it is not discernible by us. What is discernible by us is always form without content or content without form. We may, of course, think realistically or idealistically, but we cannot think in a Christian sense .... In faith and in the thought of faith it is not the case of thinking this synthesis. Faith means rather recognising that this synthesis cannot be achieved, committing it to God and seeking and finding it in God."

Barth goes on to indicate that though the thought of faith remains either idealistic or realistic, with all the attendant problems which he had outlined in Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie, it is justified as the thought of faith in its godlessness by the Object of faith as genuine knowledge. Cf. Barth, K. A Theological Dialogue Theology Today. Vol.19. 1962-1963. pp.171ff. Here Barth speaks of the relative distinctions involved in understanding the forms of the Word of God in relation to other historical distinctions.

"The history in question is a history which not only happened but happens and will happen in all times as the same history." (p.175) Underlining my own.
impenetrable mystery of God's own eternal being and the unique basis of all our knowledge of Him in His relationship to the creature in His Word. This twofold form of the mystery of God, the mystery of His being as God and the mystery whereby God's speech and act correspond in our knowledge of His Word, can only be understood by means of the being of the Holy Spirit.

"To say the Holy Spirit in preaching or theology is always to say a final word. For we are speaking ... of the event in which the Word of God is not only revealed to man but also believed in by him; .... where it is real and where it is believed in by man, it is finally and ultimately itself the ground of this event." (1)

In this exposition of the nature of the Word of God under a threefold aspect Barth has indicated the basis upon which he will later understand and prove the doctrine of the Trinity. The central significance and strategic importance of this analysis of the Word of God should not be overlooked. It is of importance to note that the analysis of the nature of the Word of God is placed between the material of dogmatics in the proclamation of the Word and the basis of this proclamation in the threefold form of the Word of God, Secs., 3 and 4, and the noetic or epistemological relevance of the Word of God for man's understanding of God in His revelation, Secs. 6 and 7. Thus Barth "proves" the relationship between the Word of God and its threefold form and the knowing subject not by asking after a possibility

possibility inherent in the situation of the preacher or hearer, but asking after the possibility only in terms of its reality, i.e., in what way is the Word of God the Word of God in its threefold form and epistemological relevance. Here Barth's understanding of St. Anselm's theological programme is seen to be of paramount importance in determining the way in which Barth places the analysis of the nature of the Word of God between the twin poles of the ontic form and noetic basis of the Word of God considered as the material content of dogmatics. It follows that if the doctrine of the Trinity assumes critical hermeneutical status in Barth's theological method then the lessons he learnt at the feet of St. Anselm will have a decisive bearing on the whole structure of his later dogmatic thought. Since it is from Barth's analysis of the nature of the Word of God; the way in which God is Lord in the act of revelation, that the reality and possibility of the dogma of the Trinity arises. (1)

Barth's Starting Point And The Development Of The Dogma Of The Trinity.

The structure of Barth's strategy in understanding the ontic and noetic aspects of revelation and proclamation by means of his analysis of the nature of the Word of God is one which we have contended derives from his view of St. Anselm's theological programme. It derives from what Barth understands to be St. Anselm's idea of the unique existence of God and what this implies for our modes of theological rationality in articulating the meaning of His revelation.

Barth's analysis of the nature of the Word of God which we have previously indicated, makes it plain that the only possible

way of understanding revelation ...... its content and form ...... is by way of a posteriori questioning of the reality and possibility which it presupposes. In the rest of the Vol.1. Barth will set forth the exegetical basis of the doctrine of the Trinity which His analysis of the Word of God, and the mode of God's Lordship thereby presupposed, makes plain.

In this approach Barth has averted the possibility of repeating the error he found in his exposition in Die christliche Dogmatik. There, we recall, he had so emphasised the act of God in the event of revelation that it was necessary to make use of some anthropological categories, inherent in the situation of the preacher and the hearer, to as it were "earth" (1) the event in time and space. Now, by directly relating the ontic and noetic aspects of revelation to an analysis of the lordship of God in the event of His unveiling in His Word, Barth conditions understanding of the event of revelation by bringing it into relation with God's being in His act of unveiling. Now the form and content of the event of revelation will be understood as it presupposes the act of God in His Being who He is and His being who He is in this act. For this reason, as we indicate in the following chapter, Barth's definition of the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity is in terms of the being of Jesus Christ who, as God and Man, is ultimate in its identity with the act and being of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is in this very specific sense that we must understand why Barth's analysis of the nature of the Word of God implies that,

"revelation absolutely insists on being regarded from the side of its subject, God." (1)

Therefore any inquiry concerning the scriptural witness to revelation must include not only acknowledgement of its reality but also its possibility in the Subject who there reveals Himself. While Barth indicates the doctrine of the Trinity is in no more insecure or embarrassing position than any other dogma, or even proclamation, in relation to the truth of the reality of the Word of God, (2) he maintains that:

"The inquiry about the self revealing God,

...... cannot ...... be separated at all from the second question, how it happens, how it is real, that this God reveals Himself. Or from the third, What is the result? What is the effect of this event upon man whom it befalls." (3)

In this sense,

"the proposition or propositions about the Trinity of God, of course, claim to be, not directly but indirectly, identical with the proposition about revelation." (4)

By this Barth means that it, i.e., the doctrine of the Trinity, is a necessary and relevant analysis of revelation. (5)

2. Ibid. p. 354.
4. Ibid. p. 355.
5. Ibid. p. 356.
This intimate connection between revelation and its analysis in trinitarian form, points to an important characteristic of Barth's understanding of the dogma of the Trinity. This will become clearer in the following chapter where we elucidate its main features. Here we simply note that for Barth the doctrine of the Trinity is not arrived at by a combination of data concerning the history of revelation or other more or less independent insights about the nature of God and the world. The doctrine does not rest upon what explicit indicators of trinitarianism there may be in the Bible, or in piecing together affirmations about the deity of Christ and the Spirit and their unity with what is taken to be the idea of divine unity contained in traditional monotheism. Such a view of the doctrine would rest on the false, from Barth's point of view, separation of form and content of the event of revelation. Barth's distinctive emphasis derives directly from his view of the nature of the self revealing God. (1) The point of departure for understanding both the unity and threefoldness of God being for Barth one and the same, viz., God in His self revelation an analysis of which in content is indirectly identical with revelation.

Consequently Barth's point of departure necessitates his differing from the expositions we find in traditional Protestant theological texts. Here the emphasis is on understanding how disparate elements in the Biblical and theological tradition can be seen in a trinitarian context. In the structure of Calvin's Institutes the doctrine of the Trinity arises only after

"discussing how we can come to know God." (1)

The question is then asked,

"about the content of such knowledge." (2)

This kind of view of the basis of the trinitarian dogma is, in comparison to Barth's, in a measure synthetic; it is secondary in relation to other primary affirmations of faith. Barth describes his view as "analytic" in the sense that,

"there is no distinction between form and content." (3)

Similarly when we look at the lines taken in the classical patristic period in formulating the trinitarian dogma we find that though it may be true that Barth is "very close" (4) to what has been taken to be classical church doctrine, his unique way of understanding the existence of God in His revelation adds to his interpretation a

   For similar approach to the question of the Trinity, as distinct from the substance of the doctrine, see Whale,J.S. Christian Doctrine. pp.107-108: Hodgson,L. The Doctrine of the Trinity. pp.98.ff.
   On the rise of the question concerning the trinitarian God see Prestige,G.L. God in Patristic Thought. pp.76.ff.

2. Ibid.


4. Barth,K. Table Talk. p.50.
a new dynamic dimension. The main differences that appear will relate to the form of argument by which the dogma is established. It would appear that the Fathers, by their use of ontological categories taken from the metaphysical tradition of Greek philosophy and their use of arguments which appealed to church practice and experience, (1) allowed greater value to the given structures of creaturely thought and experience than Barth's approach would permit.

It is beyond the scope of our investigation to give a full resume of the development of the classical church doctrine of the Trinity. We intend merely to indicate what is taken to be the manner in which the church resolved the main theological problem related to God's unity as this came to expression in defence of the deity of the Son. If we take as a guide the formulation of the Athanasian creed we find that, at least in the West where it has its origin, (2) the substitutes for orthodox trinitarianism are excluded by emphasising the unity of God as consisting of a threefold lordship. His lordship is not three but one.

"We worship One God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity, neither confounding the persons or dividing the substance. For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is One, the glory equal


the majesty co-eternal." (1)

The substitutes which were excluded by this formulation may take either of two forms.

"A doctrine of emanation which lent itself with peculiar appropriateness .... to a principle of subordinationism .... this system cannot meet the criticism that, at each stage of the descent from absolute deity, the divine principle is made to project an emanation inferior both to itself and the previous emanation." (2)

This kind of thought characterised Arianism in its denial of the full deity of the Son and the Spirit. As an alternative, if such subordinationism is rejected,

"it was open to speculative thinkers to suggest, as the Sabellians did, that the three forms of divine presentation were mere forms and nothing more, that behind each mask there stood individually the same actor." (3)

To understand the manner in which the early church excluded both these possibilities as an interpretation of the problem posed to it by the simple evangelical assertions regarding Christ's unity with and distinction from the Father, we take the declaration of the Nicene creed that the Son is homoousion with the Father. (4) In approving the use of this term the church at least saw the problem

with which it had to do in some sort of relation with the kind of issue which had been associated with the idea of *ousia* (substance) in classical Greek thought. Whatever may be the modifications which have to be made to the idea in view of the peculiar problems which faced the church in its relation to the person of Christ, the church indicated that the problem of God's unity was one which involved understanding how the structures of human rationality and speech generally could be related to its unique task. As we shall indicate, although the category of substance remains ambivalent in its classical form in Aristotle, the church recognised that human language is so constructed that it cannot avoid employing categories such as substance and attribute. For qualities are qualities of "things" not qualities of other qualities. In this sense the concept of *ousia* in Aristotle is concerned to

"give as comprehensive an account as possible of such notions as thing, quality, existence, causality, truth, which enter into discourse concerning any subject-matter whatsoever ..." (1)

Consequently the church presupposed that the kind of questioning involved in the use of such ontological categories as substance was necessary; for it was concerned to clarify the relationships between different kinds of assertion about a particular historical event. It was at least concerned, by the employment of such a term, not simply to assert a conceptual construction aimed at making a set of propositions mutually consistent, but sought to make clear the

relationships which existed between its primitive assertions concerning the person of Christ. The question would remain apart from this process,

"if we eschew the kind of interrogation that the use of ontological categories imposes on us, do we not leave on one side the question whether we believe that a life has been lived of which we say that what we say of the deeds done in it, the words spoken, the sufferings endured, we say of that which belongs to one substantially identical with the Father except that he is Father and the liver of the life Son?" (1)

The peculiar ambivalence in Aristotle's treatment of the problem of ousia is comparable to the kind of problem confronting the church in indicating the relationship between propositions asserting Christ's dependence upon the Father and His equality with Him. For in the Categoriae (2) Aristotle proposes to identify the prote ousia with the concrete thing as distinct from deutera ousia which may be characterised as the circumstances, characteristics, qualities and experiences which are associated with concrete things.

"Substance in the most literal and primary and common sense of the term is that which is neither predicated of a subject, nor exists in a subject, as for example, the individual man or horse. Those things are called secondary

2. Translation follows that given by McIntyre, J. The Shape of Christology pp. 86 ff.
substances to which, as species, belong the things called substances in the primary sense and also the genera of the species. For example, the individual man belongs to the species man, and the genus of the species is animal. These then are called secondary substances as for example both man and animal." (1)

Consequently,

"Everything except primary substances is either predicable of primary substances or present in them as subjects .... Animal is predicating of man, and therefore of individual man; for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicating, it could not be predicating of man at all .... Everything is either predicating of primary substances or present in them; and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist." (2)

In the Metaphysics Aristotle is by no means as clear in his understanding of the relationships between the concrete individual thing and that which makes it what it is:

"for what is that concrete thing apart from the form which makes it what is is?" (3)

Since the kind of thing that can be a subject is the individual, this man etc., and every individual is a compound of matter and form,

2. Ibid. 2a. 34.ff.
we may ask which of these may be regarded as substance? There are
Aristotle holds good grounds for treating the matter of a thing as
the substantial element within it, yet if we mean by substance
something definite, the notions of matter and substance are opposed.

"By matter I mean that which in itself is
neither a particular thing nor of a certain
quality nor assigned to any other of the
categories by which being is determined. For
there is something of which each of these is
predicated, so that its being is different from
that of each of the predicates; for predicates
other than substance are predicated of substance,
while substance is predicated of matter ....
If we adopt this point of view, then it follows
that matter is substance. But this is impossible;
for both separability and individuality are
thought to belong chiefly to substance." (1)

Aristotle's vacillation in respect of the locus of primary
substantiality, (2) derives from the fact that he nowhere explains
the paradox involved in the relationship between form, matter and
substance; but seems to hold that it is only when invested with
some degree of form that matter can begin to appear substantial. (3)

The assertion by the Council of Nicea of the Son's being
_homoousion_ with the Father left unresolved the kind of tensions which

1. Aristotle, _Metaphysics_ Bk.Z.1029a, 20-28. Cf. 1038b. 9-13,
   1039a, 5-10; 15-20.
we have encountered in Aristotle's analysis of the relationship between the nature of the individual thing and that which makes it what it is. Subsequent developments show that the church's understanding of Christ's relationship with the Father had within it elements which emphasised the concrete particularity of Christ's being as holding the key to the question of divine unity, that Christ is numerically identical with the Father and that this identity as expressed by homo instead of monoousion was the proper way to approach the question of God's Trinity; on the other hand there were those who argued for a more generic understanding of ousia to safeguard against Sabellianism which they saw as incipient in the other approach. (1)

While it may be true that overtly the Council of Nicea left the problem of divine unity unresolved,

"the party which can later be designated Athanasian regarded the term homoousios as containing within itself the true and proper solution of that problem also." (2)

The Council affirmed the meaning of homoousios as excluding Arianism in the sense that the

"Son of God bears no resemblance to the genetos creatures, but that He is in every way assimilated to the Father alone who begat Him." (3)

But such a bland assertion of the Son's unity with the Father leaves out of account the kind of tension that must be involved in any

statement of the relation of an individual creature to God. Therefore the conservative critics of the Council, who favoured the use of homoeousios instead of homoousios, were afraid that unless safeguarded by a proper stress on the distinctiveness of Christ from the Father the term homoousios lent itself to Sabellianism. (1) But to emphasise the generic sense of ousia, which sense the homoeousions favoured, was to leave open the possibility of comparing the divine being to physical objects. In these terms the Father and the Son could be thought of as sharing a third common substance. Such a view, taken to extreme, could obviously lead to the problems of Arianism or Tritheism as did actually occur. (2)

The development of an orthodox trinitarian doctrine depended upon these two aspects of the problem of God's unity being kept in balance. Athanasius was instrumental in initiating a movement which was to culminate in the Cappadocian settlement. (3) A practical factor of no little significance was his chairmanship of the Council of Alexandria (362) which clarified and reconciled divergent theological opinions. He had previously acted in a conciliatory way towards the homoeousion party calling them brothers who were in essentials at one with himself. For if they recognised that the Son was out of the Father's ousia and not from another, they were in fact admitting the homoousion. (4) The Council of Alexandria formally recognised,

"the formula three hypostases, hitherto

suspect to the Nicenes because it sounded in their ears painfully like three ousai, i.e., three divine beings .... legitimate provided it did not carry the Arian connotation of utterly distinct, alien hypostases ... The opposite formula, one hypostasis, so disturbing to anti-Nicenes of every school, was equally approved, its adherents having explained that they had no Sabellian intent but equating hypostasis with ousia, were merely trying to bring out the unity of nature between Father and Son." (1)

The union between the two parties was virtually sealed and the formula which was approved there indicated the direction in which orthodoxy would find its expression of the faith:

"one ousia, three hypostaseis". (2)

As the Council of Alexandria had shown, and also subsequent development, the two key words in the Greek trinitarian theology hypostasis and ousia could both indicate concrete objects of presentation. For the sake of completeness a formula had to be found to ensure that whatever term one started with, in the East this came to be more and more the three hypostaseis, the unity of God was always safeguarded. The term perichoresis (circuminessaio) was adopted, (3) to emphasise both the unity of ousia and, by implication,

2. Ibid. p.254.
the real distinction of hypostases. The Greek view of the Trinity has been admirably summarised by G.L. Prestige who sees it as viewing God as,

"one object in Himself and three objects to Himself." (1)

The Latin view of the Trinity (una substantia, tres personae) which took its own path in attempting to understand the divine unity and triplicity, (2) found the Greek use of hypostasis to express God's objective self presentation unsatisfactory. Instead the word personae was substituted. For the Latins hypostasis was understood

"in the same sense as the Latin substantia, of which hypostasis is the exact philological equivalent." (3)

Such an equation could lead to tritheism. (4) Gregory of Nazianzus speaking of the difficulty remarks that though the Italians meant the same as the East,

"owing to the scantiness of the Latin vocabulary and its penury of terms, they were unable to distinguish between ousia and hypostasis, and were therefore compelled to fall back on the term prosopa (i.e. personae) in order to avoid

4. Ibid. p.188.
the assertion of three ousai." (1)

The manner of the development of orthodox trinitarianism in
the church indicates that the Fathers, in their attempt to speak
meaningfully about the relationship presupposed by the church's faith
to exist between the concrete figure of Christ and the mystery of
God's being, took into account the fundamental kind of analysis of
language and experience which was available to them in secular
learning. This is not to say that such analyses were not stretched
and given new aspects of meaning in the service to which they were now
put. But at least they recognised in their use of ontological
categories that the doctrine of the Trinity was rooted in the concre
historicity of the man Jesus whose very historicity involved the same
sorts of questions which men put in relation to their experience and
understanding of reality in general.

The peculiar significance of Barth's development of the meaning
of the doctrine of the Trinity, as we shall see in the next chapter,
is that the basis of its meaning is wholly presupposed by the form
and content of the event of revelation. What God reveals about
Himself is that He can reveal Himself, which entails that in
understanding revelation we must always move from the question of its
actuality to its possibility. That God can reveal Himself is God's
lordship. Therefore no independent attention can be given to the
fact of Jesus as an empirical figure of history in determining the
meaning and structure of the doctrine of the Trinity. The nature of

Schlink.2. The Coming Christ and the Coming Church. p.81;
the event of revelation prohibits any search for a basis of understanding God's trinitarian nature which does not presuppose the inconceivable freedom in which God actualises His being who He is among us and for us as Lord. The haunting emptiness which lies at the heart of Barth's trinitarian identification of God results directly from his refusal to attempt to relate the event of revelation with the historical nexus which presupposes it. In giving the dogma a dynamic dimension by identifying it with the act of God in His being who He is in the event of revelation, Barth also raises the question whether in so doing he has sacrificed an essential element of trinitarian doctrine as this relates to the experience and life of the creature within the context of the church.
CHAPTER II.

The Doctrine of the Trinity and its Relationship to Christology.

In Barth's theological development consequent upon the publication of his first systematic exposition of dogmatic prolegomena we have noted a consistent development in terms of an attempt to eliminate methodological dependence upon presuppositions which did not correspond to the nature of the event of revelation. It has been indicated how, in this development, Barth's understanding of St. Anselm's theological scheme was of prime importance. The ontic and noetic forms of revelation are now seen by Barth in terms of their reality and possibility in revelation itself. Consequently the analysis of the nature of the Word of God as Word, Act and Mystery is understood as the point of departure for understanding the meaning of the material content of dogmatics.

For Barth, then, it would not be a genuine interpretation of the ontic and noetic aspects of the event of revelation if it did not throw light on the reality and possibility which they presupposed in the Word of God. If theology was concerned simply with the objective and subjective aspects of the event of revelation, without being necessitated by the nature of revelation itself to seek an understanding of them in the freedom of God's approach to man in His Word, then it would not be God's revelation with which it had to do. If the ontic and noetic forms of revelation are to be understood in terms of their being answers to the question of their reality and possibility in the Word of God, then we must allow that the question to which revelation is the answer is our question too. Therefore credere by its very nature must become intelligere.
If this does not happen, as Barth discovered despite his intentions in *Die christliche Dogmatik*, then the possibility of understanding the Word of God is sought either idealistically or realistically in a determination of the creature. (1) In this case the revelation of God becomes a state of revealedness and the freedom of God in His relation to the creature, His freedom to be the God that He is in His Word, which is the structural basis and necessity of the relationship between *credere* and *intelligere*, is predicable of the creature qua creature. God is sought in the creature and thus idolatry is rampant. It is this which leads Barth to place under the ban of the holiness of God any attempt to understand revelation simply in terms of the historical form of Jesus of Nazareth. (2)


2. Compare Barth's attitude to Herrmann's attempt to emphasise the significance of the humanity of Jesus as the essential condition of real encounter with God. Barth labels such an attempt as monophysite, since it attempts to objectivise the being of God in the human sphere. Barth, K. *Theology and Church*, pp.238ff, 264. Also see, *Church Dogmatics* Vol.1.1. pp369-372. Here Barth insists that, "the *humanitas Christi* comes under the reservation of God's holiness i.e., that the power and continuity in which the man Jesus of Nazareth .... was in fact the revealed word, consisted here also in the power and continuity of the divine action in this form and not in the continuity of this form as such." Ibid. p.371.
It is therefore entirely consistent for Barth to seek the basis for the doctrine of the Trinity in his analysis of the nature of the Word of God which he had arrived at in his attempt to understand the ontic and noetic forms of the event of revelation. That God is Lord, the extent to which He is Lord, in the forms of revelation is the question which posits the possibility of the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus the starting point of the exposition of the trinitarian doctrine is not determined by the forms of revelation considered in themselves as such, but in terms of the maxim that 'faith seeks understanding', an asking after the divine freedom which posits the ontic and noetic rationality of the forms of revelation. This entails that Barth will insist that no distinction can be made between God's freedom entailed in the question of understanding the forms of revelation and the freedom of God to be the God that He is in Himself. (1) God's revelation is in no way to be understood as a provisional form of the being and life of God, an illustration perhaps of the divine essence, behind which we must assume a metaphysical hinterground in which the true God dwells. Revelation is God's self interpretation. There is no basis therefore in the forms of revelation by which a distinction could be made between God's being in and for Himself and His being for us, pro nobis. The only distinctions which are possible on Barth's analysis between God in and for Himself and God for us are those which are entailed in the inconceivable Word, Act and Mystery in which God is the God He determines Himself to be. Precisely because God is in and for Himself what He is in His revelation to us, and so His revelation becomes His self interpretation, the ontic and noetic forms of revelation

must derive their rationality and necessity from the same inconceivably free act in which God elects Himself as God.

Barth divides his exposition of the doctrine of Revelation into three parts. In the first major section it is a question of understanding the doctrine of the Trinity as the answer to the question posed by an analysis of the nature of the Word of God by which means understanding is reached of the forms of revelation which constitute the material content of dogmatics. The dogma is understood in terms of a question which asks after the reality and possibility of God's lordship in the event of revelation. How far God in His inconceivable freedom constitutes Himself Subject and Object in the event of revelation. (1) It is only after Barth has established the reality and possibility of God's self revelation in the freedom whereby God constitutes Himself as man's Lord, that is in the light of the fact and the way God is Lord in His threefold mode of existence, that in the second major portion of the doctrine of revelation consideration is given to the Christological question. This question derives its meaning in terms of the question directed to the reality of God's self revelation: how far is this God free for man? (2) Thus the historical form presupposed by the Christological question, the figure of Jesus of Nazareth, is considered in direct relation to the question of the mode in which the God, who is understood in terms of Barth's analysis of the event of revelation and the doctrine of the Trinity, constitutes Himself the Lord of the creature. In direct relation to Barth's exposition of the nature of the Word of God, the


third part of the doctrine of revelation is considered as a question which revolves around the reality and possibility in the freedom of God who reveals Himself as man's Lord for man to participate in the unity of the Objectivity and Subjectivity of the self revealing God. (1) Thus the question of man's knowledge of God is understood within a context determined by Barth's view of theology as faith seeking understanding. This entails that the order of knowing follows the order of being of the self interpretation of God. The presuppositions and conclusions of the question concerning man's knowledge of the revealed God must confirm and lead back to the conclusions reached in the consideration of the doctrines of the Trinity and Christology in which God's Lordship was discussed in terms of Him who is the Subject and Object of the event of revelation. The third and fourth sections of the second volume of the dogmatics in which Barth had expounded the doctrine of revelation returns to the material content of dogmatics in the Scripture witness to the Word of God and the Proclamation of the Word in the church. These are then understood in a comprehensive sense made possible by Barth's tripartite doctrine of revelation. (2)

It is seen that Barth achieves understanding of the revelation of God and the whole of the massive Prolegomena is knit together in a structure of architectonic symmetry from the point of view of the understanding of theological method which Barth had derived from St. Anselm. (3) The noetic necessity of faith is established by the roundabout route of arguing

for the rationality and necessity of the Object of faith in terms of the reality and possibility of the inconceivable freedom in which God constitutes Himself man's lord.

The Doctrine of the Trinity.

If Barth's analysis of the nature of the Word of God served as the basis for understanding the forms which revelation assumes in the world, then the doctrine of the Trinity arises as an answer to the question concerning the inner structure and relationships presupposed by and in this analysis. It is a question of **who** this God is who realises His revelation, speaks His Word, to man in this way. (1) The other question, which forms the basis of the Christological enquiry, attempts to elucidate, by means of the answer given by the dogma of the Trinity, **what** this God who so reveals Himself effects. But this question can only be asked as it attempts to seek an answer to the question **what** in terms of another mode of the question **who** which forms the basis of the trinitarian enquiry. The same procedure is adopted in relation to the Pneumatological question. (2)

Although the forms of the Word of God were the material which prompted the question after the possibility of revelation by seeking to understand them in terms of the nature of the Word of God, when it comes to seeking an explication of the meaning of the Lordship thus understood in this analysis the procedure is reversed. For if Barth's analysis of the Word of God had indicated that God's revelation was God's personal presence with man as his Lord, God's self revelation, then this implied that no distinction could be made on the basis of the forms of revelation

as such, between what God is in Himself and what He is in His self revelation. Consequently, when it is a matter of understanding the forms of revelation the procedure which must be adopted is that which moves from revelation to the material content of revelation. (1) For Barth, "this is the at first merely indicative fact from which we get the hint to begin the doctrine of revelation with the doctrine of the Triune God." (2)

The unity in variety and variety in unity of the forms of revelation must be understood in terms of an answer to the question Who this God is who reveals Himself as the Lord in this way. To suggest any other possible way of reaching understanding of the forms of revelation, say with reference to the worldly form of revelation and its relation to similar creaturely entities, would be to imply a possibility of revelation which by passes the reality of revelation, the manner in which God is Lord in His revelation. (3) This alternative way of understanding revelation would call into question the maxim that God is who He is in His self revelation.

Since revelation is "Dei loquentis persona" (4), it has its truth, "wholly and in every respect, i.e. ontically and noetically, within itself." (5)

2. Ibid. p.340.
3. Ibid. pp.343-348.
4. Ibid. p.349.
5. Ibid. p.350.
This entails, as we have observed in Barth's exposition of St. Anselm, that if God reveals Himself He is to be regarded as the ground of the ontic and noetic relations presupposed by revelation. Therefore, "the distinction between form and content cannot be applied to the Biblical concept of revelation. Hence, where according to the Bible revelation is an event, there is no second inquiry as to what its content may be." (1)

The statement, "God reveals Himself", is to be regarded as an "analytical judgment". (2) This means that the forms of revelation as such have no independent meaning, they cannot be regarded as the root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the various distinct forms which they assume as worldly phenomena. Thus, since revelation is,


2. Ibid. Cf. Hodgson, L. The Doctrine of the Trinity: Some Further Thoughts Journal of Theological Studies, 5, 1954, pp. 49ff. and by the same author The Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 229. Hodgson makes the criticism of Barth's idea of the root of the Trinity in the revealed lordship of God that it is too intellectualistic. Hodgson's main concern seems to be his belief that Barth pays too little attention to the actual empirical form of revelation in arriving at the root of the doctrine of the threefold nature of God's revelation. Such assumptions as those which Barth implies in the statement, "God reveals Himself as the Lord", is an analytical judgment which precludes independent significance for the worldly forms of revelation betray the inherent rationalism of Barth's procedure. However Hodgson does not seem to have taken into account sufficiently the very specific basis upon which Barth makes this judgment. Barth's idea of analytic judgment presupposes his whole exposition of the forms of revelation in relation to his analysis of the nature of the Word of God. To label Barth rationalist, one who holds to the power of reason to posit the logical connections by which truth may be deduced, is to apparently neglect the whole foregoing analysis given by Barth which presupposes his exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. Cf. McIntyre, J. The Shape of Christology. pp. 157ff.
"indistinguishable from God's own direct speaking and therefore indistinguishable from God Himself," (1) the reality and possibility of distinctions in the forms of revelation must be presupposed in the manner in which God interprets Himself in the event of revelation. It is therefore quite consistent for Barth to find the "root" of the threefold nature of God's revelation in the statement,

"God reveals Himself as the Lord." (2)

The distinctions which Barth of course makes between Scripture and Proclamation on the one hand and revelation on the other, on the basis that the latter does not "become" revelation as the former, the distinctions between the historical relationships between Jesus of Nazareth and the Apostles and Jesus as resurrected and ascended, the Lord of the church, all must be understood in the light of what they presuppose in the nature of the freedom whereby God determines Himself as man's Lord in the event of revelation. (3) It is in this sense that the statement, "God reveals Himself as the Lord", is to be understood as the analytical root of the doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore "analytic" has a quite distinct theological connotation in Barth's usage. By it he indicates that,

"Godhead in the Bible means ontic and noetic independence......It is precisely that self-sufficiency or immediacy, so characteristic of

2. Ibid. p.351.
3. The question of the status of the time form of these relationships will be considered in the context of Barth's exposition of the Christological dogma. Church Dogmatics. Vol.1.2. The Time of Revelation. pp.45.ff.
Bible revelation, which characterises this revelation on the one hand as the revelation of God, on the other hand as the revelation of lordship." (1) The analytic nature of the statement, "God reveals Himself as the Lord", as the root of the doctrine of the Trinity is brought out more clearly as Barth proceeds to define more closely the "narrower" root of the doctrine. (2) This narrower root is sought in asking after the reality and possibility which presupposes the revelation of the lordship of God in Jesus Christ. The question of the divinity of Jesus Christ is that which forms the

"real theme of the Biblical witness." (3)

**The Root of the Doctrine of the Trinity and the Divinity of Jesus Christ.**

The meaning of the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity brings before us the understanding of lordship with which Barth had attempted to interpret the root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the broadest sense. Here we see what it is, in Barth's understanding of the event of revelation, which necessarily presupposes the doctrine of the Trinity. Here we see what Barth means by the concept of lordship being understood in an analytic sense as the root of the doctrine of the Trinity. For while it is of course true that historically the figure of Jesus of Nazareth confronts us with the question of the revelation of God and when the Bible speaks of revelation it narrates a story the content of which is the self-unveiling of God; nevertheless the self-unveiling

2. Ibid. pp.361.ff.
3. Ibid.
related in these accounts cannot be described as the "logically material" (1) centre of these stories. For the self-unveiling involved in these accounts is related to the fact that the God who is unveiled cannot be unveiled in terms of the content of these stories considered as part of the historical process. The fact that God exists for the men of the Bible,

"as Esau existed for Jacob, as Mount Horeb or the ark of the covenant for the people of Israel, as John for Peter or Paul for his church," (2) is an event which cannot be explained or derived from,

"the will and act of man nor the rest of the world's course." (3)

Consequently the self-unveiling of God in the event of revelation is not something to be considered in terms of the factuality or the individuality of the event as such, for what is at stake in the event of revelation is the ability of God,

"to distinguish Himself from Himself, i.e., in Himself and hiddenly to be God and yet at the same time in quite another way, namely manifestly, i.e., in the form of something He Himself is not, to be God a second time." (4)

Thus the secret of the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity, the question of the self-unveiling of God in the event of revelation, is the

2. Ibid. p.363.
3. Ibid.
fact that His objectivity in the event of revelation, His being Himself and yet another at the same time, rests on the reality and possibility of God being objective to Himself. (1) The veiling of the self-unveiling of God in the event of revelation, the Lordship of God in the event of revelation, is an expression of the truth that since God is who He is in revelation of His Name, the objectivity associated with the account of revelation in the Bible is the inconceivable objectivity of God who is both One and Another in the manner in which He is God. This fact has the effect of making the objectivity of the event of revelation as inconceivable as only God in the inconceivable self positing of His existence is inconceivable. Barth is not therefore engaging in some sort of clever dialectic when he says concerning the unveiling of God in relation to the form of revelation:

"It is the Deus revelatus who is the Deus Absconditus." (2)

From this consideration of God's lordship in the event of revelation Barth deduces that the reality and possibility of revelation as coinciding with God's ability to distinguish Himself from Himself, means that God as unveiled is the Son and as veiled the Father. (3)

Before we proceed to indicate how Barth links his concept of the lordship of God in the event of revelation with the fact that it implies God's being Lord in yet a third way, we take a step forward and examine the way in which Barth establishes the divinity of the Son in terms of his idea of the veiling and unveiling of God in the event of revelation.

revelation. For it is by means of proving the divinity of the Son that Barth attempts to establish the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity. (1)

"The statement of the divinity of Christ is to be understood in the sense that Christ reveals his Father. But this Father of his is God. Therefore to reveal Him is to reveal God. But who can reveal God but God Himself? .... If he reveals God, he must himself be God, whatever be the relation with his creatureliness." (2)

Therefore the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity is seen to be a closer definition of the lordship of God in the event of revelation. For we find that Barth's understanding of the form of the event of revelation, in this case, the figure of Jesus, corresponds to what, in his definition of the root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the lordship of God in the event of revelation, was understood in a formal manner to be the limits of the event. The narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity located in the deity of Jesus entails that the limits of his creaturely existence correspond to the veiling of God in His revelation. The revelation, the self-unveiling of God takes place beyond these limits. Jesus is the revelation of God who is, "known absolutely in the death of man, at the end of his existence." (3)

The lordship of God in the event of revelation understood in the narrower sense as the root of the doctrine of the Trinity means that the

2. Ibid. p.465.
life and death of Jesus, considered as such, can only be understood as
the revelation of God from the point of view which presupposes the
event of the resurrection from the dead. Since this latter event
presupposes the inconceivable freedom in which God distinguishes Himself
from Himself it cannot be thought that the revelation of God has a
dialectical relation with the limit of the existence of the creature in
death. The revelation of God,

"enters the life of man, not identically with
death, nor yet merely in the manner of death,
but really along with death, executing death
upon man, impressing the signs of death upon
man ..... The life that His will creates
(in this context that means the self-unveiling
of God) will be a life that has passed through
death, risen from death, eternal life, a
really new birth." (1)

Therefore the continuity between the life of Jesus and His resurrection
is a continuity which is posited in God alone, for Jesus is the
revelation of God as His being corresponds to and is that inconceivable
act in which God distinguishes Himself from Himself. Hence the
distinction between life and death, the Deus absconditus and the Deus
revalatus is that which presupposes the distinction in which God is God

both in and for Himself and for us. (1)

Barth gives further clarification of his understanding of the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity in terms of the deity of the Son revealed in the resurrection by an exposition of the relevant section of the "Symb. Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum", (2)

1. "We believe in One Lord Jesus Christ" (3)

Since Barth maintains that the divinity of the Son (Deus revelatus) is established as He is the revelation of the Father (Deus absconditus), and that this revelation is established beyond the creaturely limit of death in the resurrection from the dead as an act which corresponds to the inconceivable freedom in which God distinguishes Himself from Himself; it is entirely consistent that he should interpret

1. Op. cit. pp. 446-447, 448-450. This relationship between the life and death of Jesus and the resurrection which Barth establishes here in the context of his exposition of the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the deity of Christ also has decisive importance for his understanding of the epistemology suitable for the doctrine of creation. Since the Son's divinity is established as He reveals the Father beyond the negative limit of His life in the resurrection from the dead, a distinction which corresponds to the distinction in which God determines Himself as Man's Lord, knowledge of the creature as revealed in Jesus Christ who presupposes it will be necessarily bound to the same distinction. Knowledge of the creature will necessarily presuppose the same faith as the event of revelation necessitates it with respect to the knowledge of the hidden and revealed God. Cf. Barth. K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.3.1. pp.13-15, 18-19, 24ff., 28, 31-32. Vol.3.2. pp.47-52, 55ff., 132ff., 152ff.


the "One" of the credal statement before us in direct relationship with
the intra divine act with which he had understood the narrower root
of the doctrine of the Trinity.

"The phrase 'the one' Lord unites Jesus Christ
immediately to the Father, of whom the confession
in the first article had said emphatically, He is
one God. If there can be no rivalry between the
two concepts God and Lord, if they refer to the
one Being in the way in which statements about
creation and reconciliation refer to one operation
of this one Being then by means of this stipulation
the decisive statement is already made, that
Jesus Christ is Himself this being, not His legate
or plenipotententiary, but identical with Him." (1)

ii. "Begotten of the Father Before All Time." (2)

As in Barth's consideration of the meaning of the "One"
of the credal statement so here, when it is a question of reaching
understanding of the time mentioned in this part of the confession the
issue is referred to the structure of the event in which Jesus is
revealed as One with the Father beyond the creaturely limit of death in
the resurrection. Understanding of the "before all time" is established
as an aspect of the inconceivable act in which God distinguishes
Himself from Himself. Therefore the meaning of the words in question
is such that we must understand that they do,

"not exclude time, either illic et tune of
revelation as it is attested in Scripture,

2. Ibid. pp.488ff.
or the *hic et nuc* in which it is to become

revelation for us. It does not exclude, it

includes time, (concretely, this time, the
time of revelation); and so with history.

But this very fact that time (time of our
time, the sinful creature's time and history
.... which is also the time and history of
revelation) is included in a divine 'before
all time' .... this does not go without
saying, this is a grace, a mystery, a
foundation to be recognised in the fear of God." (1)

To understand the meaning of the 'before all time' we must therefore
presuppose the nature of the time involved in the inconceivable act in
which God distinguishes Himself from Himself. It must not be presupposed
that the temporal nature of the event of revelation can be understood
apart from the nature of Him who there reveals Himself as both One and
Another. While it is true then that the event of revelation is marked by
its relation to the process of human history and its relative time
scale,

"this marked nature which they have does not
itself originate and proceed from time." (2)

If any other presupposition is interposed as a basis for understanding
the temporal nature of the event of revelation than that which seeks to
understand it in terms of the act in which God determines Himself as
both One and Another, then the inevitable result would be that the event
in question,


"would only be relatively marked ...... of
which there are many others of the kind." (1)

This method of understanding the relative, temporal, nature of
the event of revelation entails that Barth will also characterise his
understanding of the distinctions involved between the trinitarian
hypostases with a similar kind of argument. In Barth's exposition of
the doctrine of the Trinity his use of the doctrine of the Appropriations
will correspond to what is here seen as the meaning of the 'marked'
nature of the event of revelation. (2)

iii. Begotten Not Created. (3)

This aspect of the credal statement concerning the deity
of the Son presents somewhat of a problem for Barth, for it seeks to
understand the relationship between the Father and the Son by means of,
"a figure from the creaturely realm." (4)

As such, and as a description of the relation between the modes of God's
existence presupposed by the event of revelation it is,
"a fragile, disputable figure." (5)

Since the 'begotten' implies a 'becoming' in the sense in which everything
created comes to be, it can only be appropriately applied to the human
nature of Jesus. It is not true,
"of Him who here assumes human nature, i.e.,
who here exists as man." (6)

2. The problem with this method of understanding the distinctions involved
in the dogma of the Trinity is that it is difficult to see how, in
terms of the relative difference between the forms of revelation, one
is to determine which of the hypostases is incarnate. Cf. Rahner, K.
The Trinity, pp.24-30.
4. Ibid. p.493.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. p.492.
The begotten of the credal statement must be regarded as a, "knowing non-knowledge". (1)

Since in Barth's estimation what the begotten refers to cannot be understood in terms of the creaturely realm, it must be related to what is entailed in the ineffable act whereby God posits Himself as God.

"The mystery of generation is originally and properly not a creaturely but a divine mystery, perhaps we ought to say outright, the divine mystery." (2)

This means that the distinctions implied by the word begotten refer to the, "Freedom in which God posits His own reality", (3) and must be clearly distinguished from the, "freedom in which (God) posits a reality distinct from Him," (4)

It is to the former, the way in which God posits Himself, that we must refer the "full meaning of begotten, not created." (5)

iv. Of One Substance With The Father. (6)

The word homousion presents problems of its own from the point of view which Barth has chosen to understand the narrower root of

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
the doctrine of the Trinity in the deity of Christ. Barth has reservations about the interpretation proposed by the Eastern church in which *homoousion* means equality of essence. Since such an interpretation assumes some distinction between the hypostases which is not presupposed by consideration of the ineffable act in which God is who He is in the *self* interpretation of His being in revelation; the danger of this procedure is one of polytheism. (1)

Barth considers the Western interpretation of the *homoousion* more in line with what he takes to be the intention of the Fathers. Here the emphasis is on the oneness of the essence of God as opposed to that of equality of the hypostases characteristic of the East. The emphasis of oneness of essence is understood by Barth to refer to the way in which God posits Himself as the One He is in the revelation of His Name. Consequently when we take this word, *homoousion*, upon our lips, we

"do not know what we are saying." (2)

v. Through Whom All Things Were Made. (3)

In correspondence to the way in which Barth established the nature of the Word of God as the Word of the Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer, Barth expresses the meaning of this, the last section of the Symbol dealing with the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the deity of Christ, as an,

"indirect but all the more expressive

confirmation of the homoousios and thereby all

preceding stipulations." (4)

We take this to imply that the revelation of Jesus as the Son of God,

2. Ibid. p.505.
4. Ibid. p.506.
Deus revelatus, thereby uniting Him with the One who He reveals, Deus absconditus, entails that the act in which this event is established includes within itself the presupposition of the creature's existence. "The Word which we hear in revelation, the Word by which we are called to the undeserved and, from our standpoint, impossible communion of God with sinners ... this Word is none other than that by which we who should hear it, together with the whole reality that is distinct from God, are called into existence .......

(1)

Consequently the creature's knowledge of his creatureliness and his Creator are tied to one and the same event. (2) For the creature's being and activity as an entity distinct from God is presupposed by the unity and distinctions involved in the event of revelation understood as the self interpretation of God. By its "Through whom", the creed distinguishes the Son completely from the Father. By its "all things", it wholly combines the Son with the Father. (3) But both these distinctions, as we have previously noted, belong to the inconceivable act in which God posits Himself as God. Thus to predicate creatorship of the Word, is to predicate, "divinity in its originality, above and beyond all creatureliness." (4)

We arrive at the same point in this section as we had in the previous

2. Ibid. p.510.
3. Ibid. p.512.
4. Ibid.
analyses of Barth's understanding of the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the deity of Christ as this is set forth in his exposition of the Creed; the ineffable act in which God reveals Himself as both One and Another in the event of revelation is the point from which and to which Barth begins and returns in his discussion.

Before we take up the question of how Barth relates his understanding of the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the deity of Christ to the dogma of God's three in oneness and one in threeness, we take up the question of the meaning of the Holy Spirit in terms of Barth's exposition of the deity of Christ. This will confirm and strengthen our interpretation of Barth's method of understanding both the deity of Christ and the unity and distinctions in the Godhead which this exposition has so far elucidated.

The Holy Spirit and the Root of the Doctrine of the Trinity.

The question involved in the relationship between the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity and the Holy Spirit is that the Biblical view of revelation presupposes that it is historical, it reaches man. (1) But we must understand that historical here has a very specific theological meaning.

"We should at once have to discard all that was previously said about the mystery in revelation, did we wish now to describe just a single one of the events of revelation in the Bible as 'historical', i.e., as apprehensible by a neutral observer .... What the neutral observer

of these events might apprehend or may have apprehended of these events was the form of revelation." (1)

The important thing about the historicity of the events of revelation is not the more or less correct content of the statements which refer to them but,

"the fact of them." (2)

The factuality of the events of revelation, as distinct from the more or less correct content of historical statements, corresponds to and presupposes the fact that the God who is revealed cannot be revealed by man. As the life of Jesus is concluded under the Deus absconditus and the resurrected Jesus the Deus revelatus, so in consideration of the event of revelation it is seen that there is

"no court of reference above it by which it could be inspected as a fact and as this fact."

"It is a fact as it takes place, vertically from heaven." (3)

Therefore the historicity of the event of revelation, its factuality, corresponds to a dialectic between the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus which is

"really not a cognisable dialectic, i.e., one achievable by ourselves, but merely one that can be ascertained and acknowledged as actually taking place." (4)

Thus the mystery of the historicity of the event of revelation

4. Ibid. p.379.
by which the creature is present at the point where God who cannot be unveiled is nevertheless revealed, is understood by Barth in terms of the concrete relationship between the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus.

"As by unveiling we ultimately mean nothing but Easter and then, with an inevitable glance back at the source of revelation, by veiling nothing but Good Friday, so now with a glance forward, with a glance at man in whom and for whom revelation becomes an event ... we mean nothing but Pentecost, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit." (1)

By the same logic with which Barth established and understood the deity of Christ as the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity, he here contends that the self-disclosing unity of the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus, He who unites the inconceivable act in which God posits Himself as both One and Another, must be the Lord.

"The fact of His doing this, this third thing also ... which does not follow obviously from the first and the second, as surely as there is nothing, absolutely nothing, obvious in their existence and co-existence either ... that there is such a manifestation of the Father and the Son, is what we mean when we say that He reveals Himself as the Lord." (2)

The Holy Spirit then is Lord in so far as we understand the

2. Ibid. pp.381-382. See Appendix.B.
unity of the self disclosing act in which God is for man in the event of revelation. But we must see that this entails, in so far as the act is understood to include the presence of man at the event of revelation, that God is Lord not only as it were from His side of the act but also subjectively, from man's side as well. The Holy Spirit is the reality of God,

"by being subjectively present to men not only from without, from above, but also from within, from beneath. It is reality, therefore, by God not only coming to man, but meeting Himself from man's end." (1)

Therefore,

"The Spirit is obviously less the reality in which God makes us sure of Him, as on the contrary the reality in which He makes Himself sure of us, in which by His immediate presence He makes good and executes His claim as Lord upon us." (2)

It is for this reason that Barth has doubts about the basis upon which St. Athanasius posits the "conceivability" of the Spirit in

2. Ibid, p.520.
his defence of the Spirit's deity. (1) Any attempt to posit the
person of the Holy Spirit in terms of the form of the event of
revelation apart from the act in which God posits Himself as Lord in a
threefold manner must be interpreted by Barth as attempt to presuppose
the existence of God by some aspect of creaturely existence and this
can only mean in Barth's terms an attempt to make faith sight or the
Holy Spirit a creature. (2) It is for this reason that any attempt to
describe the actual relationship established by the Spirit between God
and man in terms of the creaturely experience, must be described in,
"only eschatological pronouncements." (3)

By this Barth means that we can only conceive of God in ourselves by
conceiving ourselves in God. (4) Since the creature's presence at
revelation is understood by Barth in relation to the way in which God
posits His own unique existence eschatological here means; to be
understood in terms of the inconceivable act of God's self interpretation.

   concerning the deity of the Spirit by taking into full account the
   forms of revelation, so that the humanity of Jesus as such and its
   significance for the sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, i.e.,
   the church's experience of salvation, play a major role. This kind
   of argument is called into question by Barth's insistence that the
   conceivability of the creature's presence at the event of revelation
   coincides with the conceivability of the unique existence of God.
   On St.Athanasius's arguments see: Select Library of Nicene and Post
   Nicene Fathers. Vol.4. St.Athanasius. Four Discourses Against The
   Arians pp.303ff. Discourse. 1.Chp.9, Sec.39.p.329, Secs.43-45,
   Chp.21,Secs.62ff,pp382ff. Discourse.3,Chp.26, Secs.29ff, pp.409ff.
   St.Athanasius. On the Incarnation of the Word.
   Secs.4-9, pp.38-41, Secs. 42-45, pp.59-61.
   St.Athanasius. Letters Concerning the Holy Spirit.
   Epistle 1. Sec.25,pp.128-129. Sec.29,pp.136-139.
   Sec.9,pp.80-84. (See note,13,p.82.) Sec.22-23, pp.


3. Ibid. p.531.

4. Ibid. p.532.
To posit any conceivability of the creature's participation apart from this act is to posit a freedom of the creature which does not presuppose the freedom of God for the creature which is a contradiction in terms. Man's presence at revelation,

"cannot be the presence of a partner or opposite, that from his presence no claims or privileges can arise for him against God, that it can only be a factual, inconceivable, miraculous presence, factual because God is there; ..... not only objectively but also subjectively ....." (1)

We find that Barth consistently follows through the argument with which he had understood the deity of the Son with reference to the Holy Spirit. The Spirit, as He through whom and in whom we come to understand the event nature of revelation, is God in so far as He actualises the relationship presupposed by Barth's understanding of the event of the revelation of the Son in terms of the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus. We turn now to clarify this conclusion concerning Barth's methodological consistency by analysing his view of the traditional dogma regarding the deity of the Spirit.

We Believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord. (2)

Barth begins his exposition of the traditional material by making clear that the deity of the Spirit must be established,

"with a back reference to the Ἔναν Νομον of the second article." (3)

3. Ibid. p.536.
Since Barth establishes the deity of the Son, His oneness with the Father, in terms of the relationship presupposed between the *Deus revelatus* and the *Deus absconditus*, the divinity of the Spirit must be understood in and with the same relationship. The Spirit is,

"with the Father and the Son, the one sovereign, divine, Subject, the Subject who is not liable to any disposal or inspection by another subject." (1)

The fact that *ἀνθρώπινον* is of the neuter gender draws our attention to, hints at this fact. His Lordship is one of reciprocity in the relationship posited by Barth's analysis of revelation between the Father and the Son.

"The special feature of the Holy Spirit's divine mode of existence consists, paradoxically enough, in Him being the common factor between the mode of existence of God the Father and that of God the Son. Not what is common to them, so far as they are the one God, but what is common to them so far as they are the Father and the Son." (2)

The act and being of God in so far as He confirms Himself as God could not be considered anything less than God. Faith reaches understanding of the divinity of the Spirit, not by reading off His person from the experience of the church or deducting His distinctness from the temporal sequence of revelation, but in terms of the reality and possibility posited by the event of revelation in which event God is understood as the Lord.

2. Ibid. p.537.
We Believe in the Holy Spirit, the Life Creating. (1)

When Barth dealt with the Symbol's description of the Son as the One "through whom all things were made", he was concerned to understand this reference as speaking of the oneness of the Son with the Father in a relationship which presupposed the deity of the Son. It is an extension of this when Barth interprets the unity of the Spirit with Christ as presupposing His role as Creator and Lord.

"Just as in reconciliation and as its presupposition God the Father becomes manifest through the Son, i.e., God the Creator, and as the work of creation becomes manifest as having taken place through the same Word that became flesh in Jesus Christ .... so too the Holy Spirit now becomes manifest, as He who also co-operates in creation in His own way." (2)

It is therefore the deity of the Son, understood in terms of the dialectic of the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus, which is the basis upon which Barth understands the deity of the Spirit and his work as Creator. For this reason knowledge of the Spirit's work in creation and providence, as knowledge of the work of the Son, cannot be divorced from the act of revelation in which God reveals Himself as the Lord. So,

"as little as the per quem omnia facta sunt of the second article as little as the dogma of creation in general, can it (i.e., the work of the Spirit in creation) be the object of a universal, independent knowledge, preceding the knowledge of

This means that creaturely history in general considered from the point of view of the Spirit's activity, is as inconceivable as the event nature of the act of revelation itself. (2)

We Believe in the Holy Spirit, Who Proceedeth from the Father and the Son. (3)

   "I would say that we need to have from him (Barth) much more than he has yet given us, a thoroughly worked out doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and along with that a clarification and deepening of the doctrine of a living union with Jesus Christ."
   (Ibid. p.209)

From Torrance's own clarification and deepening of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit we understand his concern to be centred on a deeper appreciation of the work of the Holy Spirit in relation to the historical humanity of Jesus. For Barth such a procedure would imply some kind of independent interest in the form of revelation which did not presuppose what he takes to be the unique act in which God as the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus posits the event of revelation in relation to the unique structure of His being. Torrance on the other hand is concerned to understand the person of the Spirit in terms of the two nature Christological model and thus concentrate attention on the way in which the believer is united with Christ in an ontological union which presupposes the divine and human natures of the Incarnate.

"The Holy Spirit in his new coming is mediated to us through Christ in his divine and human natures. It behoved Christ to be God that he might give his Spirit to men, for only God can give God. It behoved Christ also to be Man that he might receive the Spirit of God in our human nature and mediate it to his brethren through himself."


In his defence of the Western addition of the *filioque* Barth sees,

"No less than the entire statement of our view of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity in general." Since, "we are completely tied to the rule ... and regard this as fundamental that pronouncements upon the reality of the divine modes of existence antecedently in themselves could not in content be any different from those made about their reality in revelation." (1)

That which the *filioque* draws our attention to in understanding the event nature of revelation is that,

"there exists not only for us, but exists in God Himself no possibility of an opening and readiness and capacity in man for God." (2)

The *filioque* therefore confirms the way in which Barth had understood the person of the Spirit and His work in creation and redemption. Understood in this way the *filioque* is a kind of a 'proof' of Barth's method of understanding the event of revelation in which the presence of the creature at this event was posited on the presupposition of the inconceivable relationship between the *Deus absconditus* and the *Deus revelatus*. Any attempt to seek understanding of revelation which by passes the freedom of God for man posited by the person of the Spirit in the event of revelation must presuppose a freedom of the creature for God


2. Ibid. p.549.
which is not presupposed by the event of revelation; therefore to seek understanding on this basis would be tantamount to intellectual suicide. For it would be assumed that the noetic ratio of the creature was free in relation to the object of faith, that is free in and of itself, apart from the exercise of Lordship in the event of revelation. Hence any attempt to understand the person of the Spirit apart from the structure of the event of revelation, for example in terms of the distinctions between the forms of the revelation of the Son and the Spirit, can only lead to a denial of the Spirit's lordship.

"Every thinkable and assignable distinction inevitably leads to the denial once more, either of the divinity or of the independence of the divine mode of existence of the Holy Spirit." (1)

Procession from the Father Through the Son?

Barth rejects any attempt to interpret the 'and' of the filioque doctrine as 'through' the Son. (2) This modified interpretation disputes the relatio originis between the Son and the Spirit so that the Spirit can be called the Spirit of the Son only improperly. The basis upon which Barth makes this rejection is again related to his view of the unity of the self-revealing God.

The doctrine of 'through' the Son presupposes a distinction between the revelation of God and God in and for Himself apart from the nature of the self-revealing God. Therefore the relatio originis of the Spirit is integrally related to Barth's hermeneutical method which presupposes that what God is He is in the event of His self-revelation.

2. Ibid. p.551.ff.
To question this is to question the relationship which Barth has already established, by his analysis of the nature of the Word of God and his understanding of the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity, between faith and its object. To relegate the relatio originis between the Son and the Spirit to some other realm apart from the event of God's self-revelation is to presuppose a distinction between God and His revelation which is not included in the event of revelation. It is consequently in the interests of the Tri-unity of God that Barth adheres to the filioque and rejects the "curious juxtaposition of the Father and the Son with respect to the Spirit", (1)

implicit in the Eastern church's doctrine.

But Barth is not simply content to defend the filioque in terms of what it excludes. The positive significance of the Western addition is that it places particular emphasis on the manner and extent to which God is free for the creature. It is seen to bring to understanding the ontic and noetic rationality of faith in the deity of the Son and the Spirit. It shows that, "pronouncements upon the reality of the divine modes of existence, 'Antecedently in themselves', could not in content be any different from those that have to be made about their reality in revelation." (2)

What the filioque proves is the basis upon which the creature is

2. Ibid. p.548.
present at revelation. It brings to understanding that what God is in His relationship to us He is in and for Himself from all eternity.

"By being the Father who brings forth the Son, He brings forth the Son of love; for, by bringing forth the Son, God already negates in Himself, from all eternity, in His utter simplicity, existence in loneliness .... God is directed toward the Other, refuses to be without the Other, will only possess Himself, by possessing Himself along with the Other, in fact in the Other." (1)

With respect to the creature who is other than the Other who by bringing forth God negates loneliness in His own being and life, its being and life presuppose this distinction and relationship posited in and by God.

"In the Son of His love, i.e., in the Son in and with whom He brings forth as love, He then brings forth also in the opus ad extra, in creation the creaturely reality distinct from Himself, and in revelation reconciliation and peace for the creature that has fallen away from Him. The Love which meets us in reconciliation and, looking backwards from that, in creation, is therefore and thereby Love, the highest law and ultimate reality, because God is Love antecedently in Himself .......

But He is love antecedently in Himself, by

posing Himself as the Father of the Son.
That is the interpretation and proof of the
qui procedit Patre." (1)

Since it is by bringing forth the Son that God negates existence in loneliness, and since He who is brought forth could not be less the origin of the love in which God negates loneliness as He affirms Himself as the Father, in view of God's work in creation and reconciliation it must be further asked:

"If revelation would not be revelation without the outpouring and impartation of the Spirit, by which man becomes God's child, should not the Spirit be directly the Spirit of the Son as well? But if so ...... how can He be so, if He is not in reality, in the reality of God antecedently in Himself? So He is also the spirator Spiritus ...... In this way we interpret and prove the qui procedit ex Patre Filioque." (2)

It is seen that Barth's defence of the filioque is nothing less than a defence of his whole understanding of the nature of revelation and the proper method of theological understanding appropriate to that nature. Barth could not allow that revelation, as the self interpretation of God, could be interpreted by either the forms of the revelatory event or the creatures experience of revelation considered in themselves. Such attempts must inevitably lead either to modalism

2. Ibid. p.554.
or polytheism.

"We do not assert that the doctrine of the Trinity is merely an interpretation of revelation and not also an interpretation of God who reveals Himself in revelation. That would be meaningless because after all revelation is the self interpretation of this God. If we have to do with his revelation we have to do with Himself and not, as modalists of all periods have thought, with an entity distinct from Himself." (1)

The Question of a Spiritual. (2)

Barth is not unaware of the difficulties that may seem to arise from his understanding of the filioque with respect to the fact that if


it is true that the structure of the event of revelation is that which determines our understanding of its form then the possibility arises of a realtic originis between the Spirit and the Son. If the forms of revelation are taken into account in determining its nature this problem is somewhat less obvious, since the historical distinctions related to those forms would seem to indicate an order and structure in the divine being. Therefore Barth asks the question,

"whether, to correspond with the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son, there ought not also be asserted a procession of the Son from the Father and the Spirit." (1)

There are, Barth admits, certain exametical reasons why this question should at least be raised. But there is also a systematic argument which may be used to defend a spirituque.

"If we apply our rule here also, that dogmatic pronouncements upon the immanent Trinity can and must be read off according to content from the determinations about God's modes of existence in revelation, are we not in that case forced to assume also between the Spirit and the Son an original relationship, which in that case would be neither generation nor breathing but a third thing? ....... that only then is the circle of mutual relations, in which God is One in three modes of existence, a complete and self enclosed one, and that already for that reason such an origin of the Son from the Father

and the Spirit is to be postulated." (1)

This systematic argument may "at once be dismissed." (2) If the argument is to be complete an origin of the Father would have to be postulated from the Son and the Spirit. But the mutual relations of the intratrinitarian being of God is not such as to involve origins as such, but modes of existence of the one God. (3) The postulate of the systematic argument may be allowed in the sense that it is "a further description of the homoousia of the Father, Son and Spirit, but with begetting and breathing in themselves it has nothing to do, and so moreover does not require any completions in this direction." (4)

The question immediately arises with respect to the systematic argument, if the unity of God of which Barth allows that the argument is a "further description", is conceived in terms of the unique act in which God posits Himself as Lord, and the forms of revelation are understood as presupposing this unique act, why should not the argument apply to the 'origins' as well as the 'modes' of God's existence? In principle it would appear difficult for Barth to distinguish between modes of existence and the way in which God posits Himself as God. Barth uses a distinction here which would appear necessary to rebut the systematic argument for a Spirituque, but for which there appears little foundation in his own exposition of the nature of the event of revelation (5)

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
   "The argument with which Barth follows the tradition of Western theology in resisting this inference is singularly unconvincing."
This weakness in Barth’s defence of his position against the suggestion of a Spirituque is somewhat compounded when he comes to consider the exegetical material which raises the same question. Thus Barth declares that in consideration of the textual material,

"we must observe throughout, that the work of the Holy Spirit regarding the Son in revelation, which is the subject of discourse ...... is not the sort of thing that might be described as commensurable with the eternal generation of the Son through the Father or the eternal breathing of the Spirit through the Father and the Son, so that from it a further eternal relation of origin might possibly or necessarily be read off." (1)

But again we must assume a distinction between the form of revelation to which the texts bear witness, for example the relationship of the Holy Spirit to Mary’s child, and the question of hypostatic origins. But such a distinction would seem to be highly questionable in terms of Barth’s own exposition of the nature of the event of revelation. The event to which the text refers is concluded by Barth’s schema under the Deus absconditus, to assume now a distinction in this aspect of the revelatory event apart from the relationship it has to the Deus revelatus and the unique act in which God posits His existence, and therefore the relationships between God’s modes of existence, would appear to be excluded. Barth refers the work of the Spirit in the Incarnation to His prototypical work as the One in whom the sons of men become the

children of God, as distinct from His ectypical work in the relation between the Father and the Son.

"What is ascribed to the Holy Spirit in the birth of Christ, is the assumption of human-ness in the Virgin Mary into unity with God in the Logos mode of existence ..... This work of the Spirit is proto-typical of the work of the Spirit in the becoming of the children of God .... But the work of the Spirit is not ectypical of a work of the Spirit upon the Son of God Himself .... So what is to be inferred from these passages for the understanding of the eternal Trinity, has nothing to do with an origin in God." (1)

Barth's Doctrine of the Three-In-Oneness of God. (2)

Our method of procedure in examining the way in which Barth relates the threeness to the unity and the unity to the threeness of God

1. Op.cit. p.556.Cf. Schilder.K. Zur Begriffsgeschichte des 'Paradoxon' mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Calvins und des nach-Kierkegaardischen 'Paradoxon'. p.338. Schilder indicates that the reason why Barth is left with the problem we have indicated with respect to the relationship between his view of revelation and the textual material is that he detaches the paradox involved in understanding the event of revelation from the relationship between the communication and the receiver in order to make it an attribute of the communication. Cf. also Downing,P.G. Has Christianity a Revelation? pp.171, 227-228. Kuitert,H.M. Gott in Menschengestalt. pp.101-107. Certain Catholic writers have used Barth's distinction between the proto-typical and ectypical work of the Spirit to accuse Barth of ecclesiological Nestorianism in so far as Barth refuses to allow the same relationship to apply to the church as to the humanity of Jesus in his exposition of the relationship between the work of the Spirit in the Incarnation and His mode of being understood in terms of Barth's view of revelation. See O'Grady,C. The Church in the Theology of Karl Barth. Vol.2. pp.264.ff.

will consist in an examination of the manner in which he brings his thoughts on these two issues together. We shall then draw attention to what we consider to be the important aspects of our exposition from the sections in the dogmatics where Barth deals with the threefoldness and the unity of God as separate issues.

We have seen that Barth's understanding of the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the deity of the Son entailed that the form of revelation was understood in terms of the reality and possibility presupposed by Barth's analysis of the nature of the Word of God and His lordship. This means that in considerations related to the threeness and unity of God the forms of revelation will have precisely the same relationship to the understanding of dogma as Barth has already made clear in the foregoing analysis.

"God's essence and His operation are not twain but one. God's operation or effect is His essence in its relation to the reality distinct from Him." (1)

Since God's essence and His operation are not to be distinguished in terms of the differing forms of revelation, those activities of God attributable to differing modes of God's existence can only be understood in direct relation to the reality and possibility of the unique act in which God in revealing Himself also interprets Himself. But,

"although the operation of God is the essence of God, it is necessary and important to distinguish His essence from His operation." (2)

2. Ibid.
The importance of this distinction derives from the fact that we must always remember that God's operation is in no way necessary to His essence. (1) On the inconceivable freedom of God to distinguish Himself from Himself and to be in His revelation the One He is in and for Himself, rests the reality and possibility of the distinction between God's essence and His operations. Since it is through His operation that we come to know God's threeness it must be seen that the distinctions involved in the forms of revelation cannot be considered in themselves as consisting in the distinctions posited by the freedom of God in which He both distinguishes His essence from His operation and Himself from Himself in being the One He is in His operation. The inconceivability of the Scripture witness to the distinctions in the forms of revelation, as too, the distinctions posited by the church doctrine of the Trinity are,

"absolutely separate", (2)

from the distinctions posited by God in His inconceivable freedom.

That we know God in His three in oneness as a result of the distinctions involved in the forms themselves depends upon the freedom in which God distinguishes Himself from Himself becoming the conceivability of these other, "absolutely separate", distinctions. Just as the distinction between God's essence and His operation depended upon the inconceivable freedom in which God, while distinguishing Himself from Himself, nevertheless remains who He is in His self interpretation, so also the distinction between the conceivability posited by the forms of revelation in their relation to the threeness of God's modes of


2. Ibid.
existence and the conceivability posited by the actuality of these distinctions in God depends upon the free movement of God toward man. The freedom of this movement necessitates that in our conceiving of the distinctions involved in the forms of revelation

"we do not conceive the distinctions in the divine modes of existence," (1)

But since God is free in His movement toward man, in His inconceivable freedom He distinguishes Himself from Himself and is who He is in His self interpretation, He "goes bail", (2) for the truth of the distinctions involved in the forms of revelation and their ability to,

"make us aware of the distinctions in the divine modes of existence." (3)

If this proviso were not made, and we did not ask after the reality and possibility of the distinctions in the divine modes of existence by seeking understanding of the distinctions involved in the forms of revelation in the freedom in which God in distinguishing His essence from His operation distinguishes Himself from Himself in His self interpretation,

"we would be assuming three gods or a tripartite essence of God .... Thus we must believe that those distinctions in the operation of God really take place within the sphere and limits of our conceivability, but that even here they neither properly nor primarily signify the last word in the

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
hidden essence of God, that in these distinctions cannot rest the distinctions in God Himself." (1)

We arrive at a similar point in our discussion of Barth's view of the threefoldness of God's modes of existence as that in which we discussed Barth's view of the narrower root of the Trinity in the deity of the Son of God and the relationship between this "root" and the person of the Holy Spirit; the forms of revelation are interpreted as serving the question as to their reality and possibility in the unique act in which God determines Himself for man and man for Himself. It is therefore quite consistent for Barth to elaborate his understanding of the conceivability posited by the forms of revelation considered in themselves, the hint which they give in their,

"utter preliminarity", (2)

of the inconceivable act which they presuppose, by means of the doctrine of "Appropriations". (3)

In relating Barth's understanding of the conceivability posited by the forms of revelation with the conceivability posited by the distinctions in which God posits His own existence, we find ourselves in agreement with E.Jungel. Jungel sees the relationship between the two in terms of Barth's idea of the essence of God consisting in the reality and possibility of His self positing in His inconceivable freedom. Since in His self positing God distinguishes His essence from His operation, in so far as this distinction presupposes the utter freedom in which God makes Himself the Lord of the creature, the relationship between the two

2. Ibid. p.428.
3. Ibid. & pp.ff.
conceivabilities mentioned above is understood by Barth in terms of
the relationship between the doctrine of Appropriations and the doctrine
of Perichoresis. The former gives expression to the nature of the
concreteness presupposed by God's act of Lordship in the event of His
self interpretation, the latter calls our attention back to the
ineffability of the act which presupposes this concrete lordship of God
in His self revelation.

"Haben die Appropriationen ihre ratio essendi
in der ihre Unterschiedenheit artikulierenden
Gemeinschaft der göttlichen Seinsweisen selbst.
Die Zueignung ist derjenige Vorgang, in dem Gott
in der konkreten Eintracht seiner Seinsweisen
sich sein Sein als Vater, als Sohn, und als Geist
zuspricht. Die Appropriation ist Zueignung
sofern Gott sich, sein als dreieiniger Gott selbst
zuspricht ....... Gott ist konkret, indem er selbst
in der Eintracht seiner Seinsweisen als der zur
Sprache bringt, als der er sein will. Kürzer:
Gott ist konkret, indem er sich sein Sein als
Vater, als Sohn und als Geist zuspricht und so
sich entspricht. In dieser Konkretheit des Seins
Gottes ist es begründet dass Gott sich offenbaren
kann und dass es in der Offenbarung zu einer
genauen Entsprechung des Ineinander und Miteinander
der drei Seinsweisen im Wirken Gottes zu, dem
Ineinander und Miteinander der drei Seinsweisen im
Wesen Gottes kommt." (1)

We thus return to the proposition that the "hint" by which the
document of the Appropriations is suggested as a means of describing the
distinctions involved in the forms of revelation in relation to the
inconceivable act in which God posits Himself, a hint which
"recognises the unattainability of the thing itself." (2)
is a hint and an unattainability which have nothing to do with a puzzle
which is in principle soluble, but is only understood as a hint in
terms of the inconceivably free act which it presupposes. It is to this
fact that the doctrine of Perichoresis would call our attention. It
stands in dialectical tension with the doctrine of Appropriations in so
far as they both together express the dynamic involved in the
concreteness of God's self interpretation as this is seen to involve the
inconceivable freedom in which God posits His existence as man's Lord.
In this sense the doctrine of Perichoresis with the doctrine of
Appropriations is,
"the dialectical completion of the concept of
three-in-oneness." (3)

God's One-In-Threeness.
The unity of the being of God, that which came to expression in the
last section under the considerations which attempted to expound how
Barth understood the concrete threeness of God in terms of the
inconceivably free act in which God affirms His lordship, that which the

3. Barth.K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.1.1.p.431. This understanding of the
   relationship between the two doctrines provides the dogmatic basis
   for the rule,
   "opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa" (Ibid.p.430.)
Continued on p.161.
doctrine of \textit{Perichoresis} emphasised over against the doctrine of Appropriations, is here seen by Barth in terms of the concept of Lordship. This means,

"the divine \textit{ousia}, \textit{essentia}, \textit{natura}

or \textit{substantia}," (1)

3. (Continued from p.160)

Cf. Hendry, G.S. Op. cit. p.458. This writer comments that Barth's method of arriving at this rule by means of a dialectic which brings to expression the inconceivably free act in which God posits Himself as Lord involves,

"the external operations of the Trinity are not only undivided, they have become indistinguishable."

Hendry argues for a greater degree of meaning for the forms of revelation as such to be considered as bearing on the meaning of the distinctions in the Godhead. Cf. Jungel's defence of Barth's position, Op. cit. p.43.

K. Rahner. Op. cit. pp.14-15, 23. ff., criticises the doctrine of Appropriations from the point of view that if the concrete distinctions involved in the forms of revelation do not speak of the specific characteristics of the particular person of the Trinity whose work is under discussion, then it would appear immaterial which of the divine persons is involved.

1. Ibid. p.401. It is of interest to note that despite the fact that Barth takes his bearings for understanding the meaning of Perichoresis from John of Damascus (Ibid. p.425) who related the doctrine to trinitarian theology in as much as it proclaims that one of the divine modes of existence is as invariably in the other two modes of existence as the two are in the one; the original meaning of the term was orientated toward Christology. See Prestige, G.L. God in Patristic Thought pp.291. ff. This writer indicates that the word originally referred to the relationship established by God between Himself and the creature in the person of the Son. Since this relationship was one which involved all the Persons of the Trinity to that which was not God, the relationship was not conceived as perichoresis "in" (en) or "through" (dia) one another, but always "to" (eis) or (pros) one another, (Ibid. p.294.) Since Barth emphasises the doctrine of Perichoresis in the context of the unity of God understood in terms of His inconceivably free act of Lordship, it is not surprising that he should be glad to be reminded by the Western interpretation of the doctrine of Perichoresis of the inappropriateness of the Eastern interpretation which still clings to the idea of temporal successiveness implied by the original consideration of the doctrine in relation to the human nature of our Lord.

"We are glad to be reminded of the inappropriateness of this figure (the result of the literal meaning of \textit{περιχορεσις}) by the fact that instead of a temporal sequence the Latin church adopted a spatial togetherness of the three persons and so preferred to speak of a \textit{circuminsessio} (dwelling in one another, \textit{immanentia}, \textit{inexistentia}) rather than of a \textit{circuminsessio}.") (Barth, K. Op. cit. p.425.)
If the *ousia* of God is understood as His Lordship then this entails that we understand His threefoldness as the way in which He is ineffably One. (1) If we ask after the basis upon which Barth establishes this view of the unity of God, then it is to the, "concept of the Lordship of God, with which we found the whole Biblical concept of revelation to be related," (2) that we are referred.

As it was made plain there the distinctions involved in the forms of revelation were understood in terms of the nature of the Word of God so here Barth is careful to point out that, "the concept of the revealed unity of the revealed God .... does not exclude but includes a distinction (*distinctio* or *discretio*), an arrangement (*dispositio* or *oeconomia*), in the essence of God." (3)

Therefore, "the more the distinction of Persons is regarded as taking place and being grounded in the divine

1. Op. cit. p.402. Cf. the criticism of Hodgson. L. The Doctrine of the Trinity p.229, who claims that Barth's idea of the unity of God is essentially rationalistic. This is seen by Hodgson to derive from Barth's failure to allow the empirical evidence of biblical revelation to enter into the idea of unity that Barth expresses. It would appear impossible for Barth to accede to Hodgson's suggestion since the whole of Barth's theological method depends upon the fact that in any discussion of the being of God we cannot raise any questions as to its reality from some point outside of it. This would seem to be the implications of Hodgson's suggestion .... that Barth should do just that.

2. Ibid. p.401.

3. Ibid. p.407.
essence itself, the more conceivable in fact
becomes the inconceivability of this distinction:
this distinction participates in the
inconceivability of the divine essence, which
would not be the essence of the revealed God,
if it were conceivable." (1)

Person or Mode of Being?

One of the questions which arises in connection with the way in
which Barth understands the threefoldness and the unity of God is related
to how the distinctions in the Godhead are to be understood. In
emphasising the connection between these distinctions and the manner in
which God exercises His unique freedom as Lord of the creature, Barth is
not at all satisfied with the concept of "person" as adequate for the
purpose. The concept of person brings with it traditional and contemporary
philosophical and psychological associations which make it difficult for
anyone to use the word in the service of understanding the distinctions
posed by God's own act of existence.

In a sympathetic analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas' modification of
the Boethian-Aristotelian definition of person as,

"naturae rationabilis individua substantia:" (2)

Barth draws attention to the fact that the only elements of this
definition which prove tenable in Aquinas' modification are those which
indicate the "subsistere" and the "incommunicabilitas" of the hypostases. (3)
Since Thomas does not give his explanation of these terms by means of
the concept "persona", but by means of the concept of relation, Barth feels

3. Ibid. p.414.
free to abandon any reserve towards the term hallowed by traditional usage. (1)

Barth himself prefers to say of the distinction presupposed by his view of the nature of the event of revelation that we have to do in God with three modes of His being. By mode of being Barth wishes to express those elements which should have been expressed by the concept person but which proved impossible in the light of its secular usage and meaning. It expresses those elements:

"not absolutely but relatively better, more simply and more clearly .... It is thus a case of not introducing a new concept, but of bringing to the centre a subsidiary concept used in the analysis of the concept of person .... i.e., The one Lord, the one personal God is what He is not in one mode only, but .... we appeal in support simply to the result of our analysis of the Biblical concept of revelation .... in the mode of Father, in the mode of Son, in the mode of the Holy Spirit." (2)

Therefore Barth's emphasis of the element of subsistere in his analysis of the concept of person,

"what makes it a single essence, when the fact that it is a single essence is set aside," (3)

means that the concept of person, as modified by the concept of mode of

3. Ibid. p.410.
being, is brought into relation with the act in which God posits Himself as God. It is the freedom of this act, the freedom which enabled Barth to distinguish previously between God's essence and His operations and yet still maintain that God's was Himself essentially in His operations, this freedom is that by which the subsistere entailed by the concept mode of being is understood. We may recall at this juncture a similar argument used by Barth to understand the unity and threefoldness of God; this was the dialectical relation between the doctrines of Perichoresis and Appropriations. The former was that which implied the unity of God in terms of the inconceivable act of His self existence.

The other element which Barth sees as tenable in Thomas' interpretation of the concept 'person' is that of incommunicalitas. (1) We may take this as parallel to Barth's understanding of the doctrine of Appropriations since this refers to the fact that the three modes of divine existence are not to be regarded as divine attributes.

That God is God, "three times in another way",
means, "only in this three times otherness that
He is God, .... that this otherness is irremovable." (2)

As the idea of subsistere was understood by means of the unique act in which God posits His existence and so effectively excluded any rationalistic idea of unity from God, so too the incommunicalitas does not refer to any distinctions read off from the forms of revelation considered in themselves which may imply a freedom of the creature for God which was not presupposed by His freedom for the creature, but is understood in 1. Barth.K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.1.1.p.414.
2. Ibid.
terms of the Lordship God exercises in His operation.

"Thus distinct from the First there is, as the Second, Revelation itself, as the event of the manifestation of what was previously hidden. And the common result of these two elements, constituting the Third, a Revealedness." On the basis of these, "regularly recurring mutual relations .... is founded God's threeness in oneness." (1)

Thus the concept of mode of being brings to understanding how the oneness and threeness of God's being is related to the way in which in inconceivable freedom He posits Himself as man's Lord; who is able to be for us what He is in and for Himself.

The Relationship Between the Doctrine of the Trinity and Christology.

The comprehensive answer to the question put by Barth to the Biblical witness to revelation, "Who is the self revealing God?", is "that we are impelled to consider the Three-in-oneness of God". (2)

In this way Barth has sought to develop the doctrine of the Trinity in terms of asking after the way in which this self revealing God is Lord. The trinitarian dogma as Barth understands it is a self enclosed circle; it is concerned to state in what way the Lord is the Lord by posing questions which presuppose that the forms of revelation are structured


2. Ibid. p.348.
according to the fact that His Lordship is such that He reveals Himself through Himself by Himself.

"The doctrine of the Trinity states that our God ... namely, He who makes Himself ours in His revelation ... is really God. And to the question, But who is God? it would be equally simple to reply, Just this God of ours." (1)

The question which raises to understanding the correct view of the relationship between the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology can only be one which seeks to view the question which raised to understanding the doctrine of the Trinity, "Who is this self revealing God?," must see this question from a different perspective. (2) The former question in which Barth developed his understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, obviously presupposed that,

"we had before us the further questions about what God does for us and what God does in us." (3)

Since these further questions are presupposed by the nature of the answer necessitated by the kind of question posed in relation to the event of revelation. The self enclosed and self validating circle of knowledge of the God who reveals Himself which was entailed in the doctrine of the Trinity, validates the question which forms the basis for Barth's initial Christological exposition in the Prolegomena.

"How far God in His revelation is free for us, i.e., free to reveal Himself to us, free to be our God without at the same time ceasing to be the Lord." (4)

2. Ibid. p.348.
4. Ibid.
In the doctrine of the Trinity Barth has shown us the answer to the question "Who" this self revealing God is in terms of the factuality of the event of revelation; now Barth seeks to understand this factuality of the event of revelation in terms of the answer he has given, which answer presupposed the fact of revelation to be the event in which God revealed Himself as Lord.

Thus the existence of the man Jesus as a historical figure among other intra-mundane realities, cannot be understood in terms of the possibilities presupposed by these realities. The objectivity of the man Jesus cannot be understood without,

"visualising the possibility presupposed and made available to knowledge in the reality of the revelation of God." (1)

Since this possibility has already received the answer in the doctrine of the Trinity that the God who reveals Himself is the Lord, the existence of the man Jesus cannot be interpreted apart from the freedom in which God determines Himself as the Lord. Hence,

"It would not be a genuine interpretation of the reality that is there, if it did not at the same time throw light upon its possibility as well. We have not genuinely let ourselves be told, if we cannot also as a result tell ourselves what has been told us .... It would not be serious awareness of this reality, were it not immediately to turn to understanding also. That would not be credere, which did not force

If the question as to the existence of the man Jesus did not issue in an interpretation which was conditioned by the question as to the freedom of God to be man's Lord, then the question of fact would have been put wrongly. (2) Any attempt to interpret the fact in terms of a theoretically proposed possibility, or any attempt to interpret the possibility prior to the fact, is not thought which seeks understanding of the ontic and noetic rationality of faith in terms of the reality and possibility posited by the Object of faith. (3)

The Christological Form of Revelation: Jesus Christ, the Objective Reality and Possibility of Revelation.

The question as to the objective reality and possibility of revelation arises in the context of the consideration of the Christological question in terms of how far this God who reveals Himself as Lord is free for us, by an exposition of the form of the event of revelation as an event which presupposes time. It is a question after the reality and possibility of the time of revelation, the time which God has for us as He is free in Jesus Christ to be our Lord. (4)

"If by the statement, 'God reveals Himself', is meant the revelation attested in Holy Scripture,


2. Barth points out that in the first edition of his Prolegomena he was guilty of just such an error. There he attempted to prove, "that if the triune God wishes to reveal Himself to man He would have to become man, because only as a man could He be at once hidden and manifest." (Barth.K. Ibid. pp.9-10.)

Barth indicates that here he was seeking after a possibility which did not reside in the reality of revelation.


4. On the basis that they do not take this into consideration in formulating the meaning of the event of revelation Barth is able to exclude both Docetism and Ebionism. Barth.K. Ibid. pp.14.ff., 17,20,28-31.
it is a statement about the occurrence of
an event. That means it also includes an
assertion about a time proper to revelation." (1)

In precisely the same manner in which Barth established the meaning of
the form of revelation in relation to the narrower root of the doctrine of
the Trinity in the deity of Christ, here we find that Barth seeks the
meaning of the Christological form of the event of revelation as an
event which presupposes time, by seeing that,

"we have no other time than the time God has for
us, and that God has no other time for us than
the time of His revelation." (2)

Therefore the time which we possess, that is the time which we think we
have as we reflect upon our experience, cannot be considered as that
which presupposes the event characteristic of the Christological form of
revelation. The relationship of the time which we possess and the time
God has for us, is precisely that which was presupposed by Barth's analysis
of the forms of revelation in terms of the nature of the Word of God.
There we noted that the forms of revelation were brought to understanding
by considering them in relation to the nature of the Word of God as
God's language, act and mystery. In so far as the nature of the Word of
God as language, act and mystery issued in understanding the forms of
revelation as presupposing God's lordship and that this in turn meant
that the event nature of God's lordship presupposed an inconceivable
relationship between the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus, it is
entirely consistent that Barth should assert that the time of revelation

2. Ibid.
in its relation to our time is hidden time. Not hidden in the sense that it may some day be found, that is relatively hidden, but hidden as something can only be hidden which presupposes the inconceivable freedom in which God posits Himself as Lord of the creature. (1)

Consequently the time form of the form of revelation in its Christological aspect, as posing the question of the extent to which God is actually free for us, involves consideration of the fact that,

"the Word spoken from eternity raises the time into which it is uttered (without dissolving it as time), up into His own eternity as now His own time, and gives it part in the existence of God which is alone real." (2)

Time considered in this sense may therefore be said to be,

"Gottes Sein in der Tat konkret artikulierendes Tat-Wort Gottes." (3)

Without our having knowledge of it, given the presupposition upon which it is a reality, the time which God has for us in Jesus Christ is a time which coincides with,

"God's inconceivable freeness and so His existence for us." (4)

As God's time for us it is never "not yet" or "no longer", (5) as the time of the event of revelation it is "mastered time", "fulfilled time", (6)

2. Ibid. p.52.
5. Ibid. p.52.
6. Ibid.
and as such does not pass away. The possibility of distinguishing this time from the time of the creature as such is not one which is inherent in the creature's self understanding of its temporality. This is a distinction which only God can make since it involves the exercise of His lordship, and thus presupposes His freedom to be the Lord of the creature. (1)

The Relationship Between the Time of Revelation And the Time Of The Witnesses To Revelation In The Old And New Testaments.

Barth proceeds to apply the dogmatic concept of time which he has derived from his understanding of Jesus Christ as the objective reality and possibility of revelation in terms of the freedom in which the God "who" is understood by the doctrine of the Trinity as Lord is actually free for the creature. In this section we take up the particular


There are those who have interpreted Barth's solution to the problem of the relationship between history and revelation as a flight from history, in so far as all historical distinctions are referred to the structure of the event of revelation and thus have no independent meaning. (Cf. Pannenborg,J. Redemptive Event and History in Westermann,C. Essays On Old Testament Interpretation. pp.314.ff. Niebuhr,R. Resurrection and Historical Reason. pp.42-51, 84-89, 178-179. Fairweather,A.M. The Word As Truth pp.124, 75-86.)
way in which Barth understands the particularity of the time of the Prophets and Apostles in its relation to the event of revelation.

The particularity of the time of the Prophets and Apostles does not as such enter in to the meaning of the event of revelation.

"What is in question here is not the independent significance belonging to the history as such which is attested in the Old Testament. The historical uniqueness of Israel, particularly the originality of its religious history, is another matter." (1)

Therefore the relationship of "previousness" with respect to the witness of the Prophets, and "pastness" with respect to the witness of the Apostles, to the event of revelation is one which does not presuppose the distinctions which eminate from their historical separateness.

"Where expectation is genuine, 'previously' does not mean 'not yet'; just as, where recollection is genuine, 'subsequently' does not mean 'no longer'. Genuine expectation and recollection are different, but one in their content, in their object, in the thing attested, and also one in that for them this thing attested is neither merely future nor merely past; as 'future' and as 'past' it is present." (2)

Hence genuine expectation and recollection considered as a phenomenon of

2. Ibid.
history is hidden in a similar way as revelation itself is hidden.

"Like revelation itself, genuine expectation of it is also surrounded by hiddenness." (1)

As the form of revelation itself was seen as presupposing the Deus absconditus from the point of view of the Deus revelatus of the resurrected Jesus Christ, so also genuine expectation and recollection can only be understood as it presupposes this non-cognisable dialectic which involves the act in which God reveals Himself as the Lord.

"His death on the cross proves the truth of the statement (concerning the O.T. as genuine expectation), and it proves it by the power of His resurrection." (2)

It is this relationship between the "hiddenness" of revelation and the "hiddenness" of the expectation and recollection of the witnesses to revelation, that makes it possible to posit the Subject of the expectation and the revelation to be the same, and therefore genuine expectation. In this sense,

"Christ was indeed suffering Israel, the suffering prophet, the suffering righteous man. Not an idea of Christ, but the real historical Christ qui passus est sub Pilato." (3)

If the time of expectation of revelation is considered apart from the relationship it has with the hiddenness of revelation then it becomes a,

"Jewish abstraction." (4)

Similar considerations are brought to bear on the nature of the

New Testament witness considered as one which looks back from its perspective to the event of revelation. The time which is subsequent to the event of revelation

"as little coincides with the time post Christum natum as preceding time does with the time ante Christum natum." (1)

It is just as hard and just as easy to understand the relationship between the time of the Apostolic witness to revelation and the time of revelation as it is with respect to the Prophetic witness and revelation.

"The connexion .... can as little rest upon an illuminating historical relation, say, between the New Testament religion and its founder, as previously upon the relation between the Old Testament religion and the original religious personality of Jesus rooted in it." (2)

The difference between the Old and New Testament is not to be sought therefore in the differences of the times of their respective witnesses considered as historically prior or subsequent to the historical figure of Jesus. The difference and connexion between the two Testaments is considered by Barth from the point of view of their relative relation to the hiddenness of God which is common to both.

"The No of the New Testament, its witness to the hiddenness of God, is no less than the demonstration of the manifest glory of the Son of God. If the same is said also of the No

2. Ibid. p.102.
of the Old Testament... as it must and can be said.... it is because we are taught to say it by the New Testament." (1)

Barth achieves understanding of the fact that statements concerning revelation attested in Scripture, are statements "about the occurrence of an event," which "includes an assertion about a time proper to revelation." (2)

He has achieved this in precisely the same way as he achieved understanding of the reality and possibility posted by the forms of revelation in connection with the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the deity of Jesus Christ. There the form of revelation was seen, as historical phenomena, in terms of the hiddenness of God which presupposed His revelation beyond the limit of creaturely existence in the resurrection from the dead. So here too, when it is a question of understanding the meaning of the Christological question in terms of the time form presupposed by revelation and its witnesses it is a matter of understanding the question in the light of the answer given in the structure of the revelatory event seen as the manner in which God is inconceivably free for the creature.

The Christological Problem and the Confession: Jesus Christ. Very God and Very Man.

In harmony with Barth's foregoing conclusions, the Christological problem is one which can only be considered as an enquiry into,

"the presuppositions of this work and event, hidden in the life and passion of Christ and revealed in His resurrection." (3)

2. Ibid. p.45.
This entails that the event of Jesus Christ, His life and work, is a problem which can only be understood in terms of the nature of the Subject who is active. The dogmatic formula of the church are thus considered as fixing,

"the fact regarding the subject active in revelation." (1)

Thus the person and work of Jesus Christ will be considered within the context of Barth's understanding of the dynamic dialectic which presupposes the revelation of the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus in the mystery of Pentecost. The specific problem with which Christology is concerned is understanding the manner in which the "and" in the confession, Jesus Christ, Very God and Very Man, finds its rationality and necessity in the inconceivable freedom in which God is Lord of the creature.

It is not accidental that Barth should choose as the basis for his understanding of the Christological problem the words of St. John. 1:14,

Each section corresponds with the "Word", (2) "Flesh", (3) and "Becoming". (4) Each section corresponds to the division in Barth's analysis of the nature of the Word of God and the narrower root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the deity of the Son. The "Flesh" is understood in terms of the "Word", that is the Deus absconditus by the Deus revelatus and both the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus in their inter relationship as the Revealedness of God; the "Becoming" of the Word in the Flesh. The

2. Ibid. pp.132.ff.
3. Ibid. pp.147.ff.
4. Ibid. pp.159.ff.
understanding of the Christological problem is directly related to Barth's hermeneutical base for expounding the dogma of the Trinity. It is therefore a consequence of Barth's method of treating the Christological problem that the person of Jesus Christ cannot be considered apart from His work; as if on the basis of some freedom of the creature for God which was not presupposed by God's freedom for the creature a distinction could be drawn between what Jesus Christ is in and for Himself and what He is for us.

Perhaps the best example of the structure of Barth's Christology is the structure of his doctrine of Reconciliation. Here Barth achieves an all encompassing connection with classical Christology in so far as the meaning of the doctrine of the person of Christ as true God, true Man, true God-man, is understood in terms of the event in which God constitutes Himself the Lord. (1) The "being" involved is a history. Jesus Christ is God and Man only in the event in which God reconciles and man is reconciled. His being as God-man consists in this deed, in His history (2) Now the content of the movements which make up Christ's history, and so His person, is humiliation and exaltation. God humbles Himself to man and exalts man to Himself. Since these two movements are the two natures of Christ it follows, as we indicated in chapter 1., that the doctrine of the "states" of Christ, of His humiliation and exaltation, must be identical with the doctrine of His person. (3) The structure of Christ's


3. Ibid. pp.145.ff., 132.ff. Hence the structure of Barth's doctrine follows the movement of God's condescension which presupposes man's exaltation and the unity between these two movements corresponds to the inconceivable freedom in which God determines Himself as our Lord. Therefore Vol.4.1. emphasises the condescension of Jesus Christ as God: "Jesus Christ, the Lord as Servant". pp.159.ff. Vol.4.2. takes up the exaltation of man which is presupposed by God's condescension: pp.3.ff. Vol.4.3. expresses the unity of this movement of condescension and exaltation in the inconceivable unity of both in the movements self revelation as the Truth. "Jesus Christ, the True Witness". pp.3.ff. The unmistakeable structural relationship between Barth's doctrine of reconciliation and his doctrine of revelation is obvious.
being is identical with the history between God and man. Christ's Godhead is identical with God's work of reconciliation, which is the history in which God works. His humanity is identical with man's response as the one who is reconciled. His existence as the God-man is precisely the unity in which these two histories occur. (1)

Jesus Christ: Very God and Very Man.

In understanding the way in which Barth considers the deity and humanity of Christ in the doctrine of Revelation we must note the way in which he relates the "Word" and the "Flesh" in his basic text. In considering the unity of Him who is very God and very Man we shall have to draw attention to the manner in which Barth understands the "Becoming" involved in the text.

Barth repeats the view that the divinity of the Word, as the One "through whom all things were made", is to be understood in terms of the inconceivable freedom in which God posits Himself as both One and Another. (2) Therefore all that befalls the Word in the 'becoming flesh' must be understood from the point of view that the Word is the Subject. (3) By this is meant that the whole event of the Incarnation can only be understood as it is seen within the context of the inconceivable freedom by which God posits Himself as Lord of the creature.

"The word speaks, the Word acts, the Word prevails, the Word reveals, the Word reconciles .... Even as incarnate He derives

3. Ibid. p.134.
His being to all eternity from the Father
and from Himself, and not from the flesh." (1)

The significance of the form of revelation in this section dealing
with Christ as very God can be seen in the way in which Barth understands
the Virgin Mary as Theotokos. (2) Here Barth will make clear that the
only proper method of understanding the form of the Incarnation is to
presuppose the nature of the acting Subject of the event. In this way
it will be made clear that,

"there is no condition of the world or man
which can form the basis of a claim or
capacity whereby this becoming (of the
Word) can be predicted. This becoming
cannot be brought into connexion with
creation" .......... "in His Word becoming
flesh, God acts with inward freedom and not
in fulfilment of a law to which He is
supposedly subject." (3)

In relation to explaining the meaning of Very God, the term Theotokos is,
"sensible, permissible and necessary as
an auxiliary christological proposition." (4)

It explains the 'becoming' of the Word by asserting that it means simply

2. Ibid. pp.138 ff.
the Catholic doctrines associated with Mariology as Barth sees it is
that they seek a freedom of the creature which is not presupposed
by the freedom of God. It is only the non-classical nature of
neo-Protestantism that has prevented it from developing its own
Mariology. (Ibid. pp.139-146.)
4. Ibid. p.138.
"born". (1) But above all the word means that,

"He who is born in time is the very same who
in eternity is born of the Father". (2)

The word does not simply relate to the actuality of the virgin
birth as such, considering the motherhood of Mary as an independent
phenomenon. The birth of Mary can only be understood in the context
which presupposes the event of revelation as a whole. This is that,

"Jesus Christ, the Word of God, exists and
reigns and rules in as sovereign a way within
the created world as He does from eternity
with the Father." (3)

Thus the term Theotokos gives expression to the fact of the inconceivably
free movement of God to man and man to God in Jesus Christ. It does
this by portraying that God insists,

"that He alone is Lord by espousing the
cause of man." (4)

No event of natural generation could be the sign of the mystery involved
in God's movement to man at this point. (5) Thus it is as a sign which
indicates the freedom of God's grace, the lack of presuppositions on the
creatures part that the virgin birth, Mary as the Theotokos, becomes a
sensible and permissible Christological proposition. It brings to
understanding that the Subject active in revelation is,

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p.146.
4. Ibid. p.192.
5. Ibid.
"God Himself, God in the fullest and strictest sense of the term .... namely, the Lord of all lords. He who is Lord because of Himself and not because of another, the Lord to whom man belongs before ever, and to an infinitely greater extent than, he belongs to himself, to whom he owes himself entirely, and to whom he remains in utter obligation, the Lord upon whose grace he is utterly thrown, and in whose promise alone his future consists." (1)

As Barth describes the Word of the basal Christological text with reference to the divinity of the Subject active in revelation, so too the reality and possibility of revelation being rooted and grounded in the same subject involves the flesh which the Word became to be brought to understanding by the same means. Therefore the particularity of the event of revelation considered from the point of view of the Christological question of the manner in which God is free for man can only be understood in the very specific sense which God's revelation presupposes. For the particularity of revelation as "flesh" is concerned with,

"the narrower concept of the man who is liable to the judgment and verdict of God, who having become incapable of knowing and loving God, must incur the wrath of God, whose existence has become exposed to death because he has sinned against God." (2)

This decisive qualification has to be put over against any idea that the

flesh which the Word became could be grasped by some independent neutral concept. This qualification, plus the presupposition of the particularity of the event of revelation in the inconceivably free movement of God to man implies that the flesh of Christ considered as the revelation of God is doubly inconceivable, doubly hidden.

"He would not be revelation if He were not man. And He would not be man if He were not "flesh" in this definite sense. That the Word became "flesh" in this definite sense, this consumation of God's condescension, this inconceivability which is greater than the inconceivability of the divine majesty and the inconceivability of human darkness put together: this is the revelation of the Word of God." (1)

Hence the particularity of the form of revelation considered as such does not define the particularity of the Word as flesh. This is meant not only in the sense which precludes the Adoptionist error that the flesh of Christ is

"itself the work of the Word, and not its presupposition;" (2)

but in the more precise sense that the particularity of the event of revelation corresponds to the movement in and by which God interprets Himself. Consequently Jesus cannot be understood as flesh, as man, from the point of view of an independent observer. For example, the sinlessness of Jesus in this context cannot be understood from the point of view of His obedience to the Law as a man. Jesus' sinlessness is as hidden as the particular nature of His being flesh. His sinlessness consists in the

2. Ibid. p.149.
fact that,

"He willed to be and was this one thing with all its consequences, God in the flesh, the divine bearer of the burden which man as a sinner must bear." (1)

Jesus is sinless in so far as the One who knows what flesh is He acknowledges the impossibility of His existence before God. (2) Jesus' sinlessness has precisely the same relationship to the unique freedom of God's existence as the particularity of the event of revelation. Barth of course admits that the New Testament has treated the *vere homo* so seriously that it has portrayed Jesus' sinlessness, His obedience, as a "struggle", as a "seeking and finding". (3)

But this kind of evidence cannot be brought into systematic connection with the fact of Jesus' sinlessness.

"From the facts of the case no deductions can be made without obscuring the point at issue in the assertion of sinlessness." (4)

Barth means that if any connection is made between the sinlessness of Jesus and the particular form of the event of revelation apart from that which presupposes the inconceivable movement of God to man, then the sinlessness of Jesus would be postulated as a possibility of the created process as such. It was this aspect of the work of Christ which Barth found so questionable in St. Anselm of Canterbury that we examined in the

2. Ibid.
Egeneto: The Inconceivable Act in Which The Word is Flesh.

The third aspect of Barth's Christological text points to the unity of the other two aspects of his exposition in the inconceivable act in which God, the hidden and revealed God, Jesus Christ Very God and Very Man, are one.

"It points to the centre, to the mystery of revelation, the happening of the inconceivable fact that God is among us and with us." (2)

But the unity of the God man, since it presupposes the same act, must be understood as the unity of God Himself. According to Barth's exposition the unity of God's Three-In-Oneness could only be understood in terms of a dialectical relation between the doctrines of Appropriations and Perichoresis, this gave attention to both the hidden and revealed aspects of God's self interpretation while still maintaining by means of the dialectic the mysterious nature of their unity in God's unique act of self positing. Here in the realm of Christology the same considerations apply, except that now the unity under consideration is specifically the manner, the way, in which God's inconceivable unity is revealed. It is to safeguard this inconceivable unity of God that Barth interprets the

egeneto of the text in the sense that,

"the Word assumed flesh." (1)

By clarifying the "becoming" in this way Barth believes any misunderstanding as to the nature of the Subject of this event is obviated.

"His becoming is not an event which in any sense befalls Him, in which in any sense He is determined from without by something else." (2)


2. Ibid. Cf. the comment by Godet.F. Commentary on the Gospel of St.John.

"It is a curious fact that Protestant orthodoxy, whether Lutheran or Reformed, has also refused till now to accept the meaning of this word 'become' in all its strictness. It is evaded in the former case by means of the theory of communicatio idiomatum, in virtue of which the divine subject, the Word, chose somehow at will, and at every moment, between the two modes of divine and human existence, transferring alternatively to the one the attribute of the other; in the latter case, by asserting more strictly the distinctions between the two modes of being .... Neither the one nor the other of these views .... corresponds to the real meaning of the word to 'become'. The proposition: 'The Word became flesh', can only, as it seems to me, signify one thing, viz., that the divine subject entered into the human mode of being at the cost of renouncing His divine mode of being." (p.362.)
His assumption of flesh makes it clear that, in no way
"in the incarnation the Word ceases to be entirely
Himself and equal to Himself, i.e., in the full
sense of Word of God." (1)

Enlarging on his intention to interpret the becoming of the Word
in terms of His assumption of flesh, Barth considers the meaning of
the doctrines of 'an' and 'an' hypostasis in this context. The mystery
of the unity of the act which presupposed the Word and the flesh of the
basal Christological text as presupposing the mystery of the unity of the
being of God can be expressed by the traditional doctrines of 'an' and
'en' hypostasis in the sense that,

"Εγένετο, the event of the incarnation
of the Word, of the unio hypostaticae has to be
understood as a completed event, but also as a
completed event." (2)

The former, the anhypostatic reference, emphasises that aspect of the
egeneto which finds characteristic expression in traditional Lutheran
Christology. This maintained that,

"without becoming unlike Himself (the Word)
assumed this likeness to us, and that now He
is to be sought and found of us here, namely
in His human being. There is no other form or
manifestation in heaven or on earth save the
one child in the stable, the one Man on the cross." (3)


doctrines of 'an' and 'en' hypostasis see, Bruce.A.B. The Humiliation
Of Christ. pp.82.ff. Hoogland.M. Calvin's Perspective On The

3. Ibid. Cf. p.166 .
For Barth this kind of emphasis in Christology underlines the "static ontic" aspect of the event of revelation. It has its dangers, as is evident from some forms of Lutheran Christology, in so far as a *Perichoresis* was maintained

"between the Word of God and the human being of Christ, i.e., a reversal of the statement about the *enhypostasis* of Christ's human nature, to the effect that as humanity only has reality through the Word, so too the Word only has reality through and in the humanity." (1)

In this event what occurs is not revelation but,

"a state instead of an event." (2)

Consequently there is inferred a process of mutual conditioning between the Creator and the creature which destroys the original emphasis of the *anhypostasis*. It was meant to explain that the event of the Incarnation considered from the point of view of the sole initiative of God, was a *completed* event, it is this which gives the Incarnation its,

"ontological reference." (3)

But since the objectivity of the *completed* event is the objectivity of an act of God, and since the Lutheran emphasis needs to be counter balanced, this ontic aspect of the *egeneto* must be seen in relation to the emphasis of the *enhypostasis*. This draws attention to the fact that the objectivity of the event of revelation is the objectivity of an *act* of

2. Ibid. p.164.
3. Ibid. p.165.
God. In seeing this and bringing it to understanding theology must travel,

"the inconceivable path that is trodden again from the closed to the open mystery, from the cross to the resurrection." (1)

By seeing this aspect of the event of revelation we visualise,

"the dynamic element in the ἐκεντροῦ," and as such it, "preserves the noetic interest of the Christology." (2)

However this aspect can be over emphasised to the detriment of Christology too. By distinguishing between the Word who assumed the flesh and the flesh assumed there are the seeds of an incipient Nestorianism which obscures the end for which the ἐγένητο stands, i.e., the union of both. To speak with clarity Barth suggests that all reflection on the way to this end should be dropped. (3)

The Miracle of Christmas: The Form of Revelation and the Question of the Unity of the Word which Became Flesh.

In this section we will be concerned to consider further the way in which Barth understands the unity of the person of Christ from another aspect of the event of revelation. It will be seen how Barth raises to understanding the question of the relationship between the Word's conception by the Holy Spirit and birth of the Virgin Mary.

2. Ibid. p.170. See Appendix.C.
As with respect to the question of the meaning of the doctrines of \textit{an} and \textit{en hypostasis}, Barth was concerned to see the unity of the Word made flesh from the point of view of the non cognisable dialectic in which God determines Himself as both One and Another in His mysterious act of unity, so here the relationship between the forms of revelation are considered in terms of the same unifying act. This should not be considered as novel in any way given Barth's vigorous defence of the \textit{homoousion} of the Spirit by means of \textit{filioque}. (1)

1. The separation by Barth of consideration of the person of the Spirit from the actual form of revelation, that is, in terms of the relationship between the Deus \textit{absconditus} and the Deus \textit{revelatus} rather than in terms of the Scripture witness which posits the Son as receiving, being given or being born by the Spirit, gives rise to a particular view of the role of the Spirit in Baptism. Here Barth separates baptism by water from baptism by the Spirit. This would not seem to have been Barth's original intention with respect to this matter. He had intended to consider the doctrine of Baptism in the context of the doctrine of Reconciliation, as part of the gathering of the church by the awakening power of the Holy Spirit. (Cf. Barth, K. Church Dogmatics. Vol. 4. 1. pp. 151 ff.) According to Barth's final determination the doctrine of Baptism forms part of the ethical section related to the doctrine of Reconciliation. (Barth, K. Church Dogmatics Vol. 4. 4. pp. viii - ix)

In this volume Barth sees Baptism with the Holy Spirit as the 'objective' aspect, and water Baptism as the 'subjective' aspect of initiation in the Christian life. (Ibid. p. 45.) The 'objective' aspect, Baptism with the Spirit, corresponds to the fact that in the history of Jesus Christ, "on the way from Bethlehem to Golgotha", (Ibid. p. 17.) an objective turning of all men from "unfaithfulness to faithfulness took place." (Ibid. p. 13.) But since this 'objective' basis for the Baptism with the Spirit corresponds to the form of the event of revelation which Barth relates to the Deus \textit{absconditus}, which only becomes the Deus \textit{revelatus} as it presupposes the disjunction between the cross and resurrection, a disjunction which presupposes the incomceivable unity of the Deus \textit{absconditus} and the Deus \textit{revelatus} in the relationship between the Father and the Son in the Spirit, then its objectivity can only be understood by precisely the same method as Barth understood the form of revelation as such.

Water Baptism, as the act of men, can only follow and have meaning subsequent to the awakening of man by the Holy Spirit to the objective truth which applies to him in the event of revelation. Water Baptism corresponds to the human decision in which a man becomes a Christian. (Ibid. p. 32.) Any attempt to bring the human decision into relation with its 'objective' basis can only presuppose a freedom of the creature which is not presupposed by the freedom of God. In fact such a procedure

(Continued on p. 77.)
While the historical question may raise the problem of understanding the meaning of the conception by the Holy Spirit and birth of the Virgin Mary, the historical question cannot determine how far in this event God is free for man. The actual rationality and necessity of the dogmas in question lies elsewhere. It, "lies, as it were, on a different level of testimony from the dogma or New Testament knowledge of the true divinity and true humanity of Jesus Christ. It denotes not so much the christological reality of revelation as the mystery of that reality, the inconceivability of it, its character as a fact in which God has acted solely through God and in which God can be known solely through God .... The dogma of the Virgin Birth is thus the confession of the boundless hiddenness of the *vere Deus vere Homo* ..." (1)

Since the hiddenness of the *Deus absconditus* is only established by the *Deus revelatus* in the act in which God posits Himself as both One and Another in the mysterious unity of His Spiritual Being, the dogma of the

1. (Continued from p.76.) makes water Baptism "docetic" in the sense that it attempts to deny its truly human character. Baptism relates to the one divine work, but it itself is not a divine work. "It is not a mystery or a sacrament." (Ibid.p.102. Cf. pp.101-102.) (Cf. the criticisms of this aspect of Barth's doctrine of the Spirit in relation to Baptism Vogel,H. *The First Sacrament: Baptism*, Scottish Journal of Theology Vol.17.1954., pp.41-ff., 44-45. On the question of the relationship of the Spirit to Baptism considered within a Christological context which attempts to take seriously the relationship of the Spirit to the humanity of Jesus see, Torrance,T.F. *Theology in Reconstruction*, pp.192-ff., 240-ff. and *God And Rationality* pp.156-ff.)

conception and birth of the Word of God cannot be understood in terms of the historical form presupposed by the New Testament witness. The only question which can be legitimately raised against those who deny the historical basis of the dogma is whether such can still acknowledge,

"that in His revelation to us .... to our measureless astonishment and in measureless hiddenness the initiative is wholly with God."

..... "May it not be the case that the only one who hears the witness of the thing is the one who keeps to the sign by which the witness has actually signified it?" (1)

Paradoxically the sign is a sign in terms of its empirical content solely in virtue of the fact that it confronts man with the measureless hiddenness of God, but to know it as a sign one must presuppose the thing signified as the inconceivable freedom and mystery of the act in which God determines Himself as man's Lord. For this reason Barth rejects E. Brunner's interpretation of the Virgin Birth in terms of it being a biological miracle. For Brunner the interpretation of the Virgin Birth as a biological miracle proves its non necessity as part of the Christian faith. Barth opposes Brunner's rejection of the Virgin Birth, not because he wishes to assert that the biological nature of the basis of the dogma is meaningful in itself for the dogma in question, but because Brunner's rejection presupposes an illegitimate question. (2)

Natus Ex Maria Virgine.

The measureless hiddenness of the sign associated with Jesus:

2. Ibid. pp.185-186.
conception by the Holy Spirit, in exact parallel to Barth's understanding of Jesus humanity under the sign of the cross, is derived from the fact that what is at issue in the sign is not simply the hiddenness of God from the creature qua creature, but the hiddenness of God from the sinful creature.

"The decisive point of view, from which the natum ex virgine was always regarded in early dogmatics, was rightly, the recollection of inherited sin, or original sin as it is better expressed in the Latin peccatum originale." (1)

The sign is thus comparable to what "flesh" signified in Barth's basal Christological text. In precisely the same way as there, where Barth considered the relationship between Jesus being "flesh" and sinless, he will here consider the relationship between the divine origin of Jesus as conceived by the Holy Spirit and His birth of the Virgin Mary. Barth understood Jesus' being "flesh" in terms of the inconceivable freedom of God posited by the relationship between the death and resurrection: His sinlessness as the One who became flesh was revealed in the resurrection as the Deus absconditus, God in the "flesh". There was seen to be no positive connection between the fact that there a man was involved in a serious struggle of obedience and Jesus' sinlessness. Jesus was sinless because He was God in the "flesh", the Lord who became a servant, His sinlessness was therefore one of measureless hiddenness.

In the same way the particularity of the sign of the virgin birth as such is not directly related to the meaning of the dogma. Barth seeks 1. Barth, K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.1.2.p.189.
to raise to understanding the figure of Mary in terms of her being representational rather than particular. Just as the particular struggle of the man Jesus was not related to His sinlessness so the virginity of this particular female has no systematic link with the meaning of dogma. She is understood as a sign which presupposes the same inconceivable freedom as that which presupposed the revelation of the Deus absconditus as the sinless Son of God. In this sense Mary is seen to involve the consideration,

"that in birth without previous sexual union of man and woman ...., man is indeed involved only in the form of the virgo Maria, i.e., only in the form of non-willing, non-achieving, non-creative, non-sovereign man, only in the form of man who can merely receive, merely be ready, merely let something be done to and with herself" ..... (and) ....."It is not as if the virginity as a human possibility constitutes the point of connexion for the divine grace." (1)

In this sense the rationality and necessity of the dogma of the virgin birth is seen to consist in it,

"not being a repetition or description of the vere Deus vere Homo, although in its own way it also expresses, explains and throws light upon it." (2)

The dogma thus can be understood as an aspect of the consideration of the unity of the person of Christ in the sense that it brings to

2. Ibid. p.177.
understanding the figure of Mary as a representational figure of the creature before God as presupposing the same inconceivable freedom which posits the unity of the event of revelation considered from the point of view of the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus. It therefore finds its place within the Christological context as indicating an aspect of the way and the manner in which God is free for the creature.

Concensus de Spiritus Sancto.

This aspect of the dogma related to the virgin birth brings to understanding the relationship which in the last section was posited between the sign and the thing signified in terms of the inconceivable unity of God's act of self revelation into "full view" (1)

It thus raises to understanding the usefulness of the dogma as an interpretation and explanation of the unity of the person of Christ. Since the unity of the person of Christ is understood by Barth in terms of the unity of God: The Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus being related in the inconceivable act of God's positing Himself as man's Lord. In the doctrine of reconciliation this means the unity of 'the Lord who became a Servant' and 'the Servant who became Lord' in the inconceivable freedom which presupposes 'Jesus Christ, the true witness.' Here it means that the relationship of the Holy Spirit to Mary considered as a representational figure presupposes that,

"the Holy Spirit is God Himself in His freedom exercised in revelation to be present to His creature, even to dwell in him personally, and thereby to achieve his meeting with Himself in His Word and by this achievement to make it possible." (2)

2. Ibid. p.198.
Since the Spirit is that mode of God's being in which He is present to Himself as Father and Son, and since God in the inconceivable freedom of the unique act in which He posits Himself as God is the God who in Jesus Christ wills to be God for man and Man for God, and since God is who He is in the revelation of His name, that is antecedently in Himself He is who He is in His self revelation, then,

"only through the Holy Spirit can man be there for God, be free for God's work on him, believe, be a recipient of His revelation, the object of the divine reconciliation." (1)

In this way the presence of the Holy Spirit at the virgin birth,
"points back to the connexion which exists between our reconciliation and the existence of the Reconcilior, to the primary realisation of the work of the Holy Spirit. For it is on this ground that the same work .... can happen to us also." (2)

Conclusion.

In this chapter we have been concerned to understand the relationship between Barth's exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity within the context of the doctrine of Revelation and his understanding of the Christology which is appropriate to this Prolegomena to Dogmatics. The obvious basis for this concern is that if we are to understand the relationship posited by Barth's doctrine of Creation between the trinitarian God of the doctrine of Revelation and the creature posited by the doctrine of Creation, then the significance of Barth's understanding

2. Ibid.p.200.
of the unity of God and man in the manner in which God reveals Himself cannot be underestimated.

We have seen that the way in which Barth considers the Christological question, moving from the reality to the possibility of the event of revelation in order to understand the manner in which the God who reveals Himself effects His purpose, presupposes that in the life and work of Jesus Christ we have to do not with a static being, but with an event, with a happening. God has not revealed Himself through formulas or images, but through a life history. It follows that the God whom Barth understood in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity as a deed, an event and not a static piece of being, presupposes the manner in which He reveals Himself with the fact that His doing, His deed, is ultimate. God is event, act, life. (1) Therefore the relationship that is established between the Trinity and Christology in the Prolegomena is one which gives rise to a dynamic interpretation of the ontological categories in which the traditional formula of Christological doctrine have been expressed.

The importance of this relationship for our understanding of the creature in Barth's theology will be seen not only in the structure of Barth's doctrine of creation, but more specifically for our purposes the creature can only be understood in terms of the unity of the act in which the God who is who He reveals Himself to be determines Himself to be God for man and Man for God. It will thus follow that the creature can only be understood in terms of the act, deed, decision in which God exists as the Creator and Lord. Therefore the essential nature of creaturely existence presupposed by the nature of God will be one which is act;

involvement in the history in which God is who He is in the
determination of Himself in Jesus Christ to be the creature's Lord. (1)
Hence any understanding of the creature which attempts to assume
a freedom of the creature which does not presuppose the freedom
in which God is its Lord presupposes a static state of being which
by definition, in the relationship posited by Barth between God and
the creature, would be non-being. (2)

CHAPTER 3.

The Relationship Between The Doctrine Of The Trinity And The Doctrine Of Creation. I.

The Orientation Of The Doctrine Of Creation Within The Structure Of Barth's Thought.

It is of paramount importance for understanding the doctrine of Creation within the trinitarian perspective developed by Barth in the doctrine of Revelation, that we indicate how Barth's central concern in expounding the doctrine of the Trinity in the doctrine of Revelation conditions the structure of Barth's doctrine of Creation. This investigation will show not only the inner consistency of Barth's thought, how he 'proves' the existence of the creature in relation to the presupposed unique existence of the Creator as the material content of the doctrine of Creation, but also his understanding of the God who so reveals Himself in the doctrine of Revelation determines the structure of the doctrine.

The first item which one should consider in determining the place of the doctrine of Creation within Barth's dogmatic programme as a whole is the fact that he interposes between the doctrine of Revelation and the doctrine of Creation the doctrine of God. This fact is of critical importance in determining the meaning of Barth's doctrine of Creation. In this sense we agree with von Balthasar's assertion:

"das Kernproblem der Theologie Karl Barths
in ihrer letzten Gestalt in Begriff der
Voraussetzung zusammendrangt sehen ...." (1)

The presuppositions which we believe are important in understanding the place of the doctrine of Creation in Barth's thought are precisely those

which he has developed in his presentation of the doctrine of the Trinity and its relationship to Christology in the doctrine of Revelation.

We have already drawn attention to the fact that in Barth’s exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity within the context of his exposition of the event of revelation, he insists that the fundamental starting point of the doctrine of revelation is that the church begins with the beginning presupposed by the fact that God reveals Himself. The doctrine of the Trinity arises as an attempt to answer "Who" this God is who reveals Himself. The method adopted in understanding the doctrine of the Trinity and its relationship to Christology in the context of a consideration of the meaning of the event of revelation in terms of God’s lordship, means that in consideration of the relationship between the Trinity and Creation we are thrown back upon the same theme. That is, the form of the event of revelation will be considered by means of that which it presupposes in the unique existence of God as that which establishes the relationship between God and the creature. If an attempt were to be made to understand the relationship between God and the creature in terms of the creaturely form of the event of revelation considered as such, then it could not be shown how the freedom of God which presupposes the event nature of revelation is a freedom which in no way is conditioned by the relationship between God and the world presupposed by the event of revelation. If the self revealing God is Lord in the unique way in which Barth has developed this concept in his exposition of the doctrines of the Trinity and Christology, then it follows that He is Lord of the transcendent relationship in which He stands as Lord of the creature in the event of His self revelation.

Of course it remains true that we can only ask questions about
God and His relationship to the world as we presuppose the reality of this relationship in the fact that God,

"is who He is in His works." (1)

But since He is who He is in His works, we must see that we can neither know who God is in His works or what His works are unless we allow that God is God apart from His being, act and life amongst and for the creature in the event of revelation. In terms of the event of revelation, and as a basis for understanding the doctrine of the Trinity, we may say that the God who reveals Himself is event, act and life. But it must be seen that,

"God is also the One who is event, act and life in His own way, as distinct from everything that He is not Himself, even though He is its source, reconciliation and goal. God is not merely differentiated from all other actuality generally and as such, or as its essence and principle, so that, while He is differentiated from all other actuality, He is still connected to it .... He is, of course, differentiated from it in this way too .... But the particularity of His working and therefore His being as God is not exhausted by this dialectical transcendence which, however strictly it may be understood, must always be understood with equal strictness as immanence. On the contrary, without prejudice to and yet without dependence upon

this relationship to what is event, act
and life outside Him, God is in Himself free
event, free act and free life." (1)

It is this aspect of God's primary positing of His being in freedom and
love that is presupposed by the doctrine of revelation that Barth
considers, after the doctrine of Revelation and before the doctrine of
Creation, in the doctrine of God. Since the doctrine of Revelation
presupposed God's lordship to consist in His act of self revelation, that
God is who He is in this event; precisely because His revelation is self
revelation He is who He is apart from the event in which He makes
Himself known. This primary positing of God's being is what Barth is
concerned to emphasise over against any realist or idealist attempt to
correlate the event of God's self revelation with aspects of the subject-
object relationship inherent in the mode of revelation. Thus the
necessity of a consideration of the being of God consequent on the doctrine
of revelation and before consideration of the relationship between God
and the creature, resides in the nature of the God who reveals Himself
as the Lord in the event of His self revelation. (2)


2. Two commentators who have noted the importance of this distinction
pp.52-53, 60.ff. It is of some interest to note that the distinction
which Barth draws on the basis of God's self revelation between the
event or act in which God posits Himself as God in inconceivable
freedom and the event or act in which He is the God who reveals Himself
is related to his understanding of person in the doctrine of the
Trinity. The distinction thus posited by Barth entails that the
possibility and necessity of the event character of revelation is
rooted in the self constituting act in which God posits Himself. If
we are to understand the personal relationship which God establishes
between Himself and the world, so that God is God not in and for
Himself but God for us in His being for Himself, we must see it as,
"simply interpreting the triune being of God
as Father and Son in the unity of the Holy Spirit
proceeding from both." (Barth.K. Op.cit.p.268.)

(Continued on p.203.)
The Unity Of The Being Of The Self Revealing God And The Unity Of God And The Creature.

If God is who He reveals Himself to be then the relationship established between God and the creature must be seen within the context of the two fundamental characteristics of the being of God presupposed by the event of His self revelation. These are that God posits Himself. As He reveals Himself to be the One that He is, the event character of revelation presupposes that God is the specific God that He reveals Himself to be. But God is also One who posits Himself, the event nature of revelation presupposing the transcendent character of the relationship between God and the creature entails that God is free in relation to this relationship. But since in His self revelation God is known because He is God who posits Himself as this particular God then this aspect of His being as God must be the primary consideration in understanding the freedom in which God posits Himself. We cannot proceed from an abstract view of freedom in order to understand God's positing of Himself presupposed by the specific event of His self revelation.

Consequently Barth considers the being of God in the act of His self positing as the being of God as,

"the One who Loves." (1)

2. (Continued from p.202.)
This understanding is in accord with what Barth determined as the possible meaning of person in the doctrine of the Trinity. It was seen to be understood in terms of the dialectical relationship between the doctrines of Perichoresis and Appropriations as that which presupposes the inconceivable freedom and love in which God posits Himself as God. Person is that which refers primarily to that which constitutes the divine unity. The "I" of the divine being expressing its inconceivable unity rather than the distinctness presupposed by the forms of revelation distinguishes Barth's exposition of person. (Cf. Barth.K. Ibid.,pp.265-272. and Jüngel,Op. cit., pp.78-79.)

This conclusion has already been presupposed by Barth's consideration of the doctrine of the Trinity in the context of his doctrine of Revelation. The revelation of God as Lord in the event of His self revelation understood in terms of His being One and Another in the inconceivable unity of a Third, negates the possibility of understanding God's being from any standpoint which does not presuppose the reality of this act. (1) In the doctrine of God this means,

"the act that becomes visible to us in God's revelation, in which He is who He is, and from which we must conclude what and how He is, can only make manifest in fact that He is who He is." (2)

That this statement is not a tautology is excluded by the fact which the doctrine of revelation has made clear ....... He who makes Himself known is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The fact that He reveals Himself as the One He is in no way jeopardises the fact, it lightens it up, that He would be God in all His fullness apart from the other to whom as God He reveals Himself. If from the actuality of the event of His self revelation God is known as He who posits Himself as the One who loves, then this must be seen as,

"an overflow which is not demanded or presupposed by any necessity or obligation." (3)

Barth turns to the other aspect which has to be taken into account in considering the nature of God's being as the One who reveals


Himself in the event of revelation. If the event of revelation presupposed the fact that God posits Himself, it also presupposed that God posits Himself.

This aspect of Barth's analysis confronts us with the, "mystery of His (God's) freedom." (1) Since the question of God's freedom as the One who posits Himself is understood subsequent to the fact that the event nature of revelation presupposes that God posits Himself as love, the freedom of His self positing must be seen as the freedom of His love.

"We could not complete our consideration of the life and love of God as such without realising at every stage the peculiar and distinctive characteristics of this divine living and loving .... We understood this loving to be for its own sake, an unconditioned, utterly sovereign love, positing its own basis and purpose. Without this .... we are not speaking of God's living and loving." (2) Thus the freedom in which God posits Himself must be seen as the, "specific action of His love." (3)

The fact that God posits Himself in this way means that there is a depth to the divinity of God which has important consequences for understanding the relationship He establishes with the creature. It is because God's being has this depth in the love in which He posits Himself

2. Ibid. p.300.
3. Ibid. p.299.
that the creature to whom He relates Himself is not swallowed up in His absoluteness. Since God is free in relation to His own being in the manner presupposed by Barth's understanding of God positing Himself, the transcendent relationship which He establishes with the creature can include His being with and for the creature as God without the creature being called into question as a creature. It may be said of God, He does not

"need His own being in order to be who He is, 'since,' He affirms it in being who He is. It is not, of course, that His being needs this affirmation. But He does actually affirm it in this way." (1)

Consequently God's transcendence in relation to the creature cannot be understood in terms of a transcendence posited simply by the form of the event of revelation considered as a contingent historical event.

"The freedom of God is primarily and fundamentally defined as God's freedom in Himself, and only from that point of view understood as His independence of the world, and therefore His absoluteness in the usual sense of the term." (2)

Therefore the transcendence and immanence presupposed by the event of revelation in which God is who He is as the One who posits Himself is one which is wholly determined by the freedom and particularity in


2. Ibid. p. 309.
which God affirms or posits Himself as the One who loves. In this sense,

"there cannot be a being and existence of
the other which imperils the divine
absoluteness or limits the divine
freedom ..... There cannot, then, be
any divinisation of the world or
demonisation of this other." (1)

It is the freedom and transcendence of God in relation to Himself
and the relationship he posits within Himself with the creature that
presupposes the transcendence and immanence of the relationship between
God and the creature. The ontic and noetic necessity of the creature is
therefore to be considered in precisely the same terms as the ontic and
noetic necessity of the event nature of revelation. The ontic and noetic
necessity of the creature presupposed by the event of revelation in which
God reveals Himself as the One He is, can only be understood in terms of
the freedom and love in which God is both One and Another in the
inconceivable unity of a Third. (2)


2. This factor in Barth's consideration of the doctrine of God is of
decisive importance in understanding the way in which Barth connects
up the doctrine of Creation with the doctrine of God by means of the
idea of the Covenant which is based in the doctrine of election as part
of the doctrine of God. The distinction here alluded to is not only
the means by which Barth will distinguish between the Covenant which
God establishes with the creature in positing Himself in Jesus Christ
as God for man and Man for God, and the being of God who in the
freedom of His love affirms Himself as this God: but it will also be
the means whereby a distinction is drawn between the existence of
the creature as the external basis of the covenant and the covenant
which is the internal basis of the existence of the creature. Not only
the relationship between God the Creator and the creature will be
understood from this point of view but also the relationship between
creature and creature will be determined from this standpoint.
Consequently both knowledge of the relationship between God and the
creature and knowledge of the relationship between creature and creature
will presuppose the inconceivable freedom in which God is God.

We would compare the point we would make here with respect to Barth's

(Continued on p.208.)
The essence of the unity of God in which He posits Himself is for Barth only that unity and variety which is subsumed under the meaning of the person of Jesus Christ. It is in Him and through Him that God is the God He is in the height, in the freedom presupposed by the fact that He is God who posits Himself, and in the depth, in His self humiliation, His becoming who He is in His own eternal being ad extra. Therefore the unity of God in terms of which Barth understands God's being as presupposed by the event of revelation to be one which consists in

2. (Continued from p.207.)

understanding of the being of God as the One who loves in freedom with Jüngel's exposition in which he defends Barth's view of God from that which would see God simply as pure relationship and so jeopardise the freedom of God's love which must be understood not only in terms of the fact that God posits Himself, but also that He posits Himself.

"Gottes Selbstbezogenheit grundet im "Ja" Gott zu sich selbst. In diesem "Ja" Gott zu sich selbst setzt Gott sich selbst in Beziehung, um so der zu sein, der er ist. In diesem Sinne ist Gott Sein im Werden. "Ja" Beziehung kann also nur das Prädikat, niemals aber das Subject eines auf Gott bezogenen Satzes sein. Aber dieses Prädikat kann eines analytischen und eines synthetischen Satzes Prädikat sein. Im Blick auf die trinitarische Selbstbezogenheit Gottes wird dieses Prädikat als das eines analytischen Satzes zu verstehen sein. Im Blick auf Gottes Offenbarung wird dieses Prädikat als eines synthetischer Satzes zu verstehen sein. Diese Entsprechung besagt: Gottes Sein als Selbstbezogenheit ist ein Sein im Werden, dem es eigentümlich ist, dass es sich wiederholen .... Kann so verstanden kann Gott in seiner Offenbarung Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν σείναι, ohne von diesem σείναι abhängig zu sein."


Jüngel also notes that the distinction thus understood is the basis upon which the creature is understood in terms of an analogia relationis in relation to the freedom in which God posits Himself as both One and Another. There is a proportionality grounded in the inconceivable freedom and love in which God posits Himself, between the being of God thus posited and His being the creature, man, ad extra. As the unity of the God and man was considered in Christology from the point of view of the unity of God, and as the creature is understood in terms of the being of God as He is ad extra in the event of revelation, then the ontic and noetic rationality and necessity of the creature must presuppose the inconceivable freedom and love in which God posits Himself. (See Jüngel, E. Op. cit. p.116.n.155.)
free love is identical with Jesus Christ. (1)

"In Him God has loved Himself from all
eternity. In Him He has loved the
world." (2)

Jesus Christ is thus the centre from which we must understand the
primary and secondary ways in which God is present to Himself as God in
the inconceivable freedom of His love and present as God to the creature.
If it is true that the event of revelation presupposes that the
relationship between God and the creature can only be understood in terms
of the unity of the being of God who loves in freedom, then it follows
that the ontic and noetic rationality and necessity of the creature must
be sought in Jesus Christ. He is,

"not merely the focus and crown of all
relationship and fellowship between God
and the world, but also their basis
principle, their possibility and
presupposition in the life of the Godhead." (3)

Thus if the unity of God and the creature in the doctrine of creation
presupposes the unity of God who is who He is in the event of His self
revelation which is expounded by Barth in the doctrine of God in terms
of God's freedom and love, and if God's freedom and love both in and for
Himself and for us is identical with Jesus Christ, then it is proper
from Barth's point of view that the relationship between God and the
creature should already be considered as part of the doctrine of God.

2. Ibid. p.321.
The Doctrine of Election As Part Of The Doctrine Of God.

As Barth has already made clear, the fact that the God who reveals Himself is One who begins with Himself not only in relation to the creature but also, as the One who posits Himself in freedom and love, begins with Himself in relation to Himself; the fact that God is a self revealing God entails that He is a self electing God. It would be an abstraction if the doctrine of God was developed apart from the relationship that is presupposed by the event of revelation in which God is who He is, between the freedom and love in which God posits Himself as concretely related to the other who is not God.

"It is not as though God is forced into this relationship. It is not as though He is in any way constrained or compelled by this other .... God is love. But He is also perfect freedom. Even if there were no such relationship, even if there were no other outside Him, He would still be love. But positively, in the free decision of His love, God is God in the very fact, and in such a way, that He does stand in this relationship, in a definite relationship with the other. We cannot go back on this decision, if we would know God and speak accurately of God .... This relationship belongs to the subject God ... not in His being in and for Himself, but His being within this relationship." (1)

The reality of God's determination of Himself for the creature is part of
the doctrine of God in so far as this relationship is the way in which God posits Himself as God. The distinction which Barth mentions between the existence of God in this relationship with the other and His existence in and for Himself is not posited on the basis of some dialectic between two kinds of God, one who reveals Himself and one who does not, God is who He is in His self revelation. But as Barth has indicated God not only posits Himself, He posits Himself. He is Lord of His being in so far as He posits Himself in relation to the other as God. But that He is this God who posits Himself in this relationship entails that this relationship with the other is posited with the same majesty and freedom as that in which God is this God. As such,

"Gottes Selbstbezogenheit (τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ) wäre dann die Kraft seines ἐν ἑαυτῷ
Gottes ewige Liebe, in der Vater, Sohn und
Heiliger Geist sich ewig einig werden, wäre
dann der Grund seiner (im Blick auf alles,
was nicht Gott ist) grundlosen Barmherzigkeit.
Gottes Sein ἐν ἑαυτῷ ist also kein
Abschied von sich selbst. Gottes
Für-uns-Sein ist ebensowenig von sich selbst
wie es ein Zu-sich-selbst-Kommen Gottes ist." (1)

In understanding Barth's insistence on the doctrine of Election being part of the doctrine God he brings to fruition the twin concepts which have guided his consideration of the being of God in view of the event of God's self revelation. God is the God who posits Himself in the inconceivable freedom of His love as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

He brings them to fruition in terms of the primal decision of God to be for and with the other as the self constituting affirmation by which God posits Himself. It is not to be understood in terms of a synthetic dialectic based on an idea of a relationship between God and the world. It is,

"the primal and basic decision in which He wills to be and actually is God, in the mystery of what takes place from and to all eternity within Himself, within His true being, God is none other than the One who in His Son or Word elects Himself, and in and with Himself elects His people." (1)

This entails that we understand Jesus Christ, the Son of God, not only as one with the Father and the Spirit as the electing God, the God who in inconceivable freedom posits Himself as God for the other, the creature, but also the One who is determined by this election as the creature. (2) The unity of God, as was the case in our consideration of the unity of Jesus Christ in the section on Christology, thus entails Barth's understanding of the unity of God and the creature.

As one with the Father and the Spirit, and therefore very God Himself, Jesus Christ may at once be said to be,

"at the beginning of all things, at the beginning of God's dealings with the reality that is distinct from Himself." (3) But as such He may not be said to be,

"at the beginning of God, for God has indeed no beginning." (4)

3. Ibid. p.102.
4. Ibid.
By this Barth means that as Jesus Christ is truly God, what is said of God must be said of Him. The distinction posited by the inconceivable freedom and love in which God posits Himself, by Himself, means that God can be God in relation to that which is not God without ceasing to be the God that He ever was. Jesus Christ as one with the Father and the Spirit can be said to be at the beginning of all God's ways and works toward the creature, but precisely because He is this His self determination in this manner cannot be identified with the beginning of God. God is inconceivably free love, the relationship He establishes with the creature in determining His own being to be for and not against the creature cannot be correlated with any aspect of the being of God or the creature which presupposes this relationship. (1)

The same consideration holds good for the truth established by Barth's understanding of the unity of God in terms of God being the One who posits Himself, by Himself, in so far as the emphasis falls on the fact that God posits Himself as specific. Jesus Christ is not only electing God in unity with the Father and the Spirit, He is also the Object of that election. He is elected Man. But in being the Object of God's election, as corresponding to the fact that God posits Himself, determines Himself to be this specific God, He must never be abstracted from the inconceivable freedom in which God posits Himself. Jesus Christ's being the Object of God's electing will, of which He too with the Father and the Spirit is the Subject, presupposes the inconceivable freedom and love in which God is God.

1. This factor in Barth's exposition will appear to us to negate the attempt by some commentators to establish an analogia entis in Barth's understanding of the God-creature relationship. It will be seen that we do not think such a thesis can be established.
"It is true, of course, that even as God He (the Son) is elected; the elected of His Father. But because as the Son of the Father He has no need of any special election, we must add at once that He is the Son of God elected in His oneness with man, and in fulfilment of God's covenant with man. Primarily, then, electing is the divine determination of the existence of Jesus Christ, and election, (being elected) the human." (1)

As such it may be said that Jesus Christ is,

"not merely one of the elect but the elect of God. From the very beginning (from eternity itself), as elected man He does not stand alongside the rest of the elect, but before and above them as the One who is originally and properly the Elect." (2)

Neither as electing God nor as elected Man can Jesus Christ presuppose anything but the inconceivable freedom and love in which God affirms Himself as God. The doctrine of election considered as a development of and explanation of Barth's exposition of the reality of God's being as the One who loves in freedom, orientates the doctrine of Creation towards the truth that its understanding of the God-creature relationship must presuppose the freedom and love in which God posits Himself as the One God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.


In this analysis we note the correspondence with our foregoing exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology within the context of the doctrine of Revelation. There we noted that the hypostasis of the Son as Incarnate was understood in terms of the unity of God's essential being as God. We see now that the unity of God and the hypostatic unity of the God-man both presuppose the inconceivable freedom and love in which God posits Himself as God. This entails that one cannot presuppose any relationship between God and the creature which does not presuppose this unity and this freedom and love. Any attempt to do so could only mean that an attempt is being made to divinise the creature or divide the Godhead. (1)

1. In this connection we would refer to Barth's vigorous defence of the "filioque" in his exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. He saw his defence there as a defence of

"no less than the entire statement of our view of the Holy Spirit and of the Trinity in general."

(Barth.K. Church Dogmatics, Vol.1.1.p.548.)

For if, as is made plain in Barth's exposition of the doctrine of Reconciliation, (Barth.K. Church Dogmatics, Vol.1.4.1.pp.10.ff., 22.ff., 128.ff., 135-137, Vol.4.3. Pt.1.pp.3 ff., 7-8.) the Holy Spirit were to be understood in terms of the form of revelation considered as an historical event and apart from the divine act which constitutes God's essential unity, then a possibility of a freedom of the creature for God would be postulated apart from the freedom of God for man in Jesus Christ, understood as electing God and elected Man. This, for Barth, would both deny the divinity of God by postulating another God apart from Him who electing Himself in Jesus Christ also elects the creature; and the creatureliness of the creature by postulating a relationship with God which presupposes a freedom of the creature for God apart from God's freedom for it; such a relationship attempts to posit a natural affinity between the nature of the creature and the nature of God. We recall that it was Barth's concern to expound the filioque as an expression of the fact that God's presence with the creature was not related to an idea of a general presence of God with man but the particular presence of Him whose divine mode of existence corresponds to the Act in which God posits Himself in freedom and love as both One and Another. The Holy Spirit can therefore only be considered in terms of the Act in which the Deus revelatus reveals the Deus absconditus beyond the negative limit of creaturely existence. It is therefore a

"viewing of this history (i.e., the history of the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus) in its unity and completeness, the viewing of Jesus Christ Himself." (Barth.K. Church Dogmatics, Vol.4.1.p.136, Cf., Vol.4.3.Pt.1.pp.7-8.)
Predestinatio Gemina And History.

We link the concept of predestinatio gemina with the existence of the creature because Earth's exposition of the content of the divine election, Jesus Christ, involves a double answer to the question: 'Who is it that God elects in the election of Jesus Christ?' This is necessitated by the fact that the self revelation of God presupposed that God is God in so far as in electing and determining Himself for the creature He elects and determines the creature for Himself. To the election of God there belongs both electing God and elected Man. (1) Since this is so we may say,

"the eternal will of God is a divine activity in the form of history, encounter and decision between God and man .... God does not therefore become the living God when He works or decides to work ad extra .... in His being ad extra He is, of course, the living God in a different way .... but his being and activity ad extra is merely an overflowing of His inward activity and being, of the inward vitality which He has in Himself. It is a proclamation of the decision in which in Himself He is who He is." (2)

This 'overflow' of the 'history' in which God is God in the inconceivable freedom of His love is that which presupposes creaturely existence. The autonomy of the creature, its creatureliness, is its

2. Ibid. p.175.
determination by this 'overflow' since this overflow is the decision posited in the freedom and love in which God is God. That God posits Himself, entails that the absoluteness of God in no way jeopardises the creatureliness of the creature since He is who He is in the inconceivable freedom of His love. That God posits Himself, entails that the creatureliness of the creature's existence is guaranteed by the majesty of the decision in which God posits Himself in the inconceivable freedom of His love. Since the creature's free existence is presupposed by God's freedom and love,

"Christology .... must always constitute the basis and criterion for the apprehension and interpretation of the freedom of God in His immanence. The legitimacy of every theory concerning the relationship of God and man or God and the world can be tested by considering whether it can be understood also as an interpretation of the relationship created and sustained in Jesus Christ ...." (1)

There is, therefore, confrontation and decision between God and


This corresponds to the, "purpose and meaning of the eternal divine election of grace (which) consists in the fact that the one who is elected from all eternity man and does elect God in return."

man in the eternal being of God Himself. In Jesus Christ God and man meet in an event which is the origin and type of all other history. (1) It is in this sense that Barth speaks of Jesus Christ, of the event in which God posits Himself as electing God and elected man, as the inner divine possibility of all relationship, of all fellowship, between God and His creatures.

"God Himself is the Son who is the basic truth of that which is other than God. As the Son of God this Other is God Himself. But God Himself becomes Another in the person of His Son. The existence of the world is not needed in order that there should be otherness for Him. Before all worlds, in His Son, He has otherness in Himself from eternity to eternity. But because this is so, the creation and preservation of the world, and relationship and fellowship with it, realised as they are in perfect freedom, without compulsion or necessity, do not signify an alien or contradictory expression of God's being, but a natural, the natural expression of it ad extra. ...... in this singular and supreme relationship and fellowship between God and the world realised in the incarnation we have the quintessence of all possible

relationship and fellowship generally and as such, and that in the transcendent freedom of God thus expressed we see the archetype and the norm of all possible ways in which He expresses His freedom in this relationship and fellowship." (1)

That God exists in His own unique manner includes the fact that creaturely existence is presupposed by His freedom and love. In this Barth is continuing the line He has developed in understanding the form of the event of revelation in terms of the question 'who' this God is who reveals Himself by means of the doctrine of the Trinity. The Christological question was then understood as the 'manner' in which this God who reveals Himself effects His purpose. But in the doctrine of God Barth has made plain 'who' and 'how' the God revealed in Jesus Christ is in the inconceivable freedom of His love. That Barth sees the doctrine of *predestination semina* within the doctrine of God follows from the fact that since God is who He is in the revelation of His name, this 'overflow' of God's being in which He is who He is for the creature, while determining the manner of creaturely existence, is in no way entailed or necessitated by the being of God. It also proves the point which for Barth is essential in understanding the question 'who' God is in the revelation of His name, viz.,

"since God Himself is one He may only be known either altogether or not at all. When He is known He is known all at once and altogether." (2)

There can be no dividing up of our knowledge of God as He who reveals *Himself* in the event of revelation. It is just this that Barth objects to in the traditional formulations of the doctrine of election. It presupposed some kind of division between a hidden and revealed God which could only be made if it were presupposed that the event of revelation is not identical with the being and will of the electing God. For Barth, on the other hand,

"the eternal will of God which is before all time is the same as the eternal will of God which is above all time, and which reveals itself as such and operates as such in time. In fact we perceive the one in the other. For God's eternity is one. God Himself is one." (1)

The Doctrine Of Creation And The Covenant.

The event of which we have spoken in the doctrine of *predestinatio gemina* as part of the doctrine of God in which Barth saw the origin of all God's ways and works *ad extra* in the decision of God to be who He is in the event of His self revelation in Jesus Christ, is also described by Barth as the original covenant. (2) As this resolve of God in which He exists is essentially historical, as the fundamental compact between God and man in Jesus Christ, it stands in a fundamental relationship to all other history. Barth uses the term *Urgeschichte*, "primal history", (3) to describe this history. As a history in God, who is the origin of all

2. Ibid. p.157.
3. Ibid. pp.7, 8.ff.
things, it is the law of all other history. (1)

It is therefore quite understandable that Barth should declare:

"The decisive anchorage of the recognition that creation and covenant belong to each other is the recognition that God the Creator is the Triune God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit." (2)

In this way Barth indicates his intention to 'prove', to bring to understanding the existence of the creature in relation to the existence of God which He has already elucidated in the doctrine of Revelation and the doctrine of God. The doctrine of the Trinity, within the doctrine of Revelation, found its rationality and necessity in the fact that the God who reveals Himself reveals Himself as Lord. In the doctrine of God the fact of God's self revelation, His Lordship, indicated that as the self revealing God He is the self electing God in the inconceivable freedom of His love. Both the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of God draw our attention to the essentially dynamic nature of the being of God as He who posits Himself in the free dom of His love as not only God in and for Himself, but as this God who is in and for Himself He is God for us. In Jesus Christ He is both electing God and elected Man. The connection between the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of Creation is therefore to be understood by means of this essentially historical nature of the being of God which Barth has derived from his exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of God. Since God is in Himself for Another in the unity of the Act in which He is who

He is, it is appropriate but not necessary that He is the God who is for the creature. That He is who He is in Jesus Christ as both electing God and elected Man, presupposes the inconceivable love in which God is free. But God is free love. Who He is in Jesus Christ cannot be deduced or understood in terms of anything but the inconceivable freedom of God to be who He is. Nevertheless in that He is who He reveals Himself to be,

"we can see how far it was not only appropriate and worthy but necessary that God should be the Creator." (1)

As God posits Himself, the Lord, the Father determines Himself for man and man for Himself, and thus presupposes creation in its existence and goodness, in Him in whom He posits Himself as such, Jesus Christ the electing God and the elected Man. The Act in which this positing of God is consumated, and therefore made in a sense historical in its eternity, is the Spirit understood as the relationship between the Father as the Father and the Son as the Son.

"He (the Spirit) is the communion and self impartation realised and consisting between both from all eternity; the principle of their mutual love proceeding from both and equal in essence; the eternal reality of their separateness, mutuality and convolution, of their distinctness and interconnexion. To this extent it may well be said that it is in the Holy Spirit that the mystery of God's trinitarian essence attains its full profundity and clarity .... It is in the Holy Spirit

that the commission of the Father and the obedience of the Son .... coincide in the decree which is the intra divine beginning of all things." (1)

When the compact between God and man is understood in this sense then the Trinity will be seen to be the effective means by which Barth achieves understanding of the creature in its relationship with God.

"The recognition of the unity of the divine being and its particularity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit will prove effective ..... for the recognition not only of the inter-connexions but also the variations in the relation between creation and covenant." (2)

As in the doctrine of Revelation in the context of which the Trinity was expounded by Barth in terms of the lordly nature of the self revealing God, he placed heavy emphasis on the filioque as a way in which God's lordship could be understood, so here in the context of his understanding of the relationship between the Trinity and creation subsequent to the analysis of the being of God who loves in freedom we find the same concern. In the doctrine of Revelation the subjective reality and possibility of revelation was rooted in the act of unity between the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus beyond the negative limit of creaturely existence in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. In terms of the relationship between the Trinity and creation subsequent to Barth's exposition of the doctrine of God the Spirit as,

2. Ibid. pp.48-49.
"the unity and agreement between the Father and the Son," (1) is He who,

"makes the existence of the creature as such possible, permitting it to exist, maintaining it in existence, and forming the point of reference of its existence." (2)

In a word, precisely because He is the mutuality of the bond in which the decision of God in Jesus Christ to be with and for the creature is actual He may be said to be the One in whom,

"the creature as such pre-exists." (3)

Hence in considering the relationship between the Trinity and creation in terms of the covenant which is identical with the being of Jesus Christ as the electing God and elected Man, every aspect of created reality, its ontic and noetic rationality and necessity, will be grounded in the being of God as He posits Himself in inconceivable freedom as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

We shall in due course examine the implications of this conclusion with respect to Barth's understanding of the relationship between knowledge of God in the doctrine of God as this is understood in terms of the self revelation of God, and knowledge of the creature as this finds expression in the doctrine of Creation. It will be seen that

2. Ibid. p.56.
3. Ibid.
Precisely the same reasons prevail in defending the view that the unity of the self revealed God excludes natural knowledge of God in the doctrine of God as those which exclude real natural knowledge of the creature in the doctrine of Creation.

For the moment however, we concentrate our attention on the way in which Barth develops his understanding of the relationship between the doctrine of the Trinity and creation by means of his exposition of the relationship between the covenant and creation. In this material it will be seen how the manner in which the revealed unity of God's triune being posits and determines the reality and possibility of creaturely existence, also determines the structure of the doctrine of Creation.

Creation As The External Basis Of The Covenant.

Just as Barth understood the being of God as presupposed by the event nature of revelation under the twin aspects of the being of God who posits Himself and the being of God who posits Himself as the being of God who loves in freedom, which also found expression in Barth's understanding of the Jesus Christ as electing God and elected Man, so too the relationship between God and the creature considered within the context of this primal compact must express the truth of the reality of the being of God who is who He is in His self revelation. Precisely because God's self revelation posited that God is God as He posits Himself, the relationship between Himself and the creature is one of which He Himself is transcendent. The absoluteness of God's freedom as He who posits Himself ensures both that the reality of the creature will not be swallowed up by God's absoluteness and that God is in no way conditioned or determined by the existence of the creature. Since the
existence of the creature presupposes the freedom in which God posits Himself, and since in this freedom God does not 'need' His being in order to be the God that He is, there is no reason in God or the creature that the covenant should be the beginning in God of all His ways and works ad extra. Therefore, this freedom of God in which He posits Himself is that which distinguishes the existence of the creature from the existence of the covenant. That He posits Himself as the Lord of the creature can only be understood in the light of the fact that He does this, that in fact He is this God and not another. Thus the creature's, "creation and continuance and preservation point beyond themselves to an exercise and fulfilment of (God's) love which do not take place merely with the fact that the creature is posited .... " (1)

It will become evident when we come to examine some Catholic commentators view that in so explaining the existence of the creature as presupposing and pointing to God's grace Barth has assumed an analogia entis within the positing of the creature's existence. In our opinion Barth consistently carries through his intention to understand the ontic and noetic rationality of creaturely existence in terms of the freedom and love in which God posits Himself. The fact of the covenant, that the Creator

"wills really to exist for the creature", (2)

presupposes the inconceivable freedom of the love in which God posits

2. Ibid.
Thus the creature's existence does not presuppose any neutral ontology which can be understood apart from the decision and act of God in which He determines Himself for man and man for Himself in Jesus Christ. The existence of the creature can only be understood in terms of the fact that,

"the love of God could not be satisfied with the eternal covenant as such; as it willed to execute it and give it form outside the divine sphere, it made itself this external ground of the covenant, i.e., it made necessary the being of the creature and therefore of creation." (1)

The relationship between the covenant and creation cannot be understood in terms of the creature's existence which is wholly determined by the freedom in which God distinguishes Himself from Himself as He posits Himself. Understanding of the creature can only be reached in faith which presupposes, since it corresponds to, the act of inconceivable freedom in which God determines Himself as the creature's Lord.

"As everything which exists outside the Creator owes its existence to Him and Him alone, so any knowledge of existence which arises outside Him can only come to be because He does not conceal but reveals His infallible knowledge of His own existence (which is the ground of all other existence). This self-disclosure of the Creator, i.e., this revelation of

of His own infallible knowledge of His existence (the ground of all else that exists) is the living confrontation which meets creaturely consciousness and in virtue of which knowledge of existence, reality and being is possible and real even outside God. This knowledge begins with knowledge of the existence of God, and then, descending from this its primary and proper object, it becomes knowledge of the existence of the knower and his environment." (1)

This noetic determination of the creature corresponds to its ontic determination as the external basis of the covenant, the covenant's technical possibility. (2) As God distinguishes Himself from Himself the creature is established as that which presupposes, "the divine intention of love." (3)

1. Barth, K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.3, pp.348-349. Cf. the whole section with respect to the way in which Barth considers the reality and possibility of the creature in terms of it being the external basis of the covenant. We would draw particular attention to Barth's understanding of the creature's "actualisation", (Ibid., pp.344-365) On the same topic see pp.110.ff., 120-121, with respect to the creation of light and, pp.126.ff., on the creation of time in relation to light.

2. Ibid. p.97.

3. Ibid. p.96. (Word underlined is in italics in the text.) Cf. Jungel, E. Die Möglichkeit theologischer Anthropologie auf dem Grunde der Analogie: Eine Untersuchung zum Analogie verständnis Karl Barth's. Evangelische Theologie, 22, 1962, pp.535.ff. Jungel relates the relationship between the covenant as the inner ground of creation and creation as the outer ground of the covenant to Barth's understanding of analogia relationis. (Ibid., pp.534-544). In his exposition Jungel denies that Barth presupposes an analogia entis in his analogia relationis as a basis for understanding creaturely being.

(Continued on p.229.)
Since it is the divine intention which presupposes the creature's existence, it can only be understood in terms of the inconceivable freedom in which this intention is actualised in God's election of Himself and the creature in Jesus Christ, and therefore in faith.

Barth finds support for his contention that the creation is to be understood as external basis of the covenant concluded with man in the decision of God in Jesus Christ by the way in which Scripture presents the first account of the creation. He sees the writer envisaging the creature,

"clearly enough to make the teleology of creation apparent; but with sufficient reticence not to allow us to forget that creation is one thing .... the covenant of grace quite another." (1)

The teleology of creaturely existence as that which presupposes the freedom in which God posits Himself and as such is distinguished from the existence of the covenant which is identical with the love in which God posits Himself, is seen to be

"one long preparation, and therefore the

3. (continued from p.228.)

"Barths analogia relationis ist eine Entspruehung von Beziehungen, die durch ein Ja konstituiert sind, das so das Sein des Seienden, zu dem Ja gesagt wird, allrerst ermöglicht. Es ist das Ja der freien Liebe Gottes, das der drienige Gott zu sich selber spricht, das er dann auch zu seinem Geschöpf spricht, und das sich so seine Entspruehung schafft" (Ibid. p.547.)

1. Ibid. p.98.
being and the existence of the creature one long readiness, for what God will intend and do with it in the history of the covenant. Its nature is simply equipment for grace. Its creatureliness is pure promise, expectation and prophecy .... In this way creation is the road to the covenant, its external power and external basis, ...." (1)

In illustrating how Barth understands the creature under this aspect of its being we take one example from Barth's long exposition of the Biblical material, viz., that God creates man in His image and likeness. For Barth the image of God considered from this point of view is directly related to the fact that the writer of Genesis indicates the bi-sexual nature of man, God creates man as man and woman. (2) As distinct from all other creatures who share this determination and distinction, man alone has this as the characteristic which defines his creatureliness. The image of God then is not some peculiar ontological addition which man has over and above his creatureliness understood in this way, it is simply his creatureliness.

"There is no point in asking in which of man's peculiar attributes and attitudes it (i.e., the

2. Ibid. p.184. Cf. the useful discussion of this aspect of Barth's theology in relation to the question of analogy in Come.A. An Introduction To Barth's Dogmatics For Preachers. pp.146.ff.
image of God.) consists. It does not consist in anything that man is or does. It consists as man himself consists as the creature of God ....... He is the image of God in the fact that he is man." (1)

That which provides the theological basis for this understanding of the determination of the creature as the image of God is the inconceivable freedom in which the self revealing, and therefore self electing God, determines Himself as both One and Another in Jesus Christ.

"The tertium comparationis, the analogy between God and man is simply the existence of the I-Thou in confrontation. This is first constitutive for God, and then for man created by God. To reverse it is tantamount to removing the divine from God as well as the human from man. On neither side can it be thought away." (2)

If it were supposed that the image of God consisted in a quality or determination of the creature which could be given or on the other hand lost, as something which was over and above creatureliness as such, then there would be presupposed a being of the creature in its relation to God which was not determined by the unique freedom in which God determines Himself as the creature's Lord. Among other things the view that Barth advances has the effect that all aspects of the relationship between God and man are presupposed by the relationship

2. Ibid. p.185.
The creature's being the image of God is therefore not dependent upon its attitude to God. It remains the image of God in so far and precisely because God remains God. That creation is the external basis of the covenant in which God wills to be God not only for Himself but also for man in Jesus Christ decides the fact that, "the divine likeness cannot actually exist for him (i.e., the creature) in the continuance or even progressive development of a deposited quality, but can only be the object of his hope in God his Creator; that as man he can only look for the man who is not only created in this image and after this likeness, but in accordance with it will actually be God's image." Thus, "the creation of man as male and female, and therefore in the image and likeness of God, is not overthrown by the episode of the fall, but remains even in face of the total contradiction between it and the being of man." (2)


2. Barth,K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.3.1.p.190. Cf. pp.195;200. The ontological impugnity of the image of God in man to the assault of evil derives from the fact which we have already noted that the existence of the creature in this condition presupposes the determination of God as Lord (Continued on p.233.)
The distinction between man as the external basis of the covenant and the covenant which is identical with Jesus Christ is the same as that

(Continued from p.232.)

of the creature. Hence that which is inimical to the creature must be understood in terms of that which God rejected in positing Himself as its Lord. (Cf. Barth, K. Ibid. pp.102.ff. where Barth deals with the phenomenon of the 'chaos' mentioned in Gen.1:2.) In view of the actualising by God of His existence to be the Lord of the creature in Jesus Christ, that which is inimical to God's creation can only be understood as that which God rejected in determining Himself as the creature's Lord. It is that which God passed over, rejected as a possibility, and can therefore only refer to "the past of the real cosmos." (Barth, K. Ibid. p.108.) Man may attempt to conjure up 'the shadow' of Gen.1:2 (Barth, K. Ibid. p.109.), but since God in His own self determination passes over this chaos and actualises his creation which presupposes His self positing as both One and Another, He will not allow "the myth (shadow) to become a reality". (Barth, K. Ibid.)

The teleology of the creature as the image of God involves the creature qua creature being ontologically bound by the determination posited for it by God's self determination. Any other possibility of the creature's existence is excluded on the grounds that God does not cease to be God. This has wide implications for Barth's theology, not least in the sphere of social ethics. Since no human judgment or action can relativise the goodness of creation in virtue of its determination for the covenant, relative moral judgments cease to have significance for man's relation to God. In this respect we would draw attention to the criticisms offered by West, C. Communism And The Theologians: Study Of An Encounter. West, who cannot be considered an unsympathetic interpreter of Barth, finds the chief difficulty with Barth's approach to the reality of the empirical analysis of specific historical situations to be rooted in Barth's notion of "all embracing grace". (West, C. Op. cit. p.313.) West does not attempt to give any analysis of Barth's dogmatic presuppositions which condition the problem he has isolated in the sphere of social and political ethics. However, West is conscious of the fact that the difficulties he finds in Barth's inability to deal with the relative historical differences as being of significant theological importance derive from his refusal to allow that these decisions have meaning in the creature's relation with God.

We may conclude, on the basis of Barth's analysis so far, that if he were to allow for West's criticism by emphasising the relativity of creaturely existence as meaningful in itself, as contributing more or less to the reality of the creature's relationship with God, then in Barth's terms one would have to presuppose a freedom of the creature which was not presupposed by the freedom in which God is free for the creature in Jesus Christ. This Barth could not do on methodological grounds. The freedom of God for the creature is identical with Jesus Christ who is both one with the Father as electing God and one with the creature as elected Man. Since Jesus Christ is the beginning before which there is no other beginning except the inconceivable freedom and love in which God is God, and since the

(Continued on p.234.)
presupposed by the fact that God posits himself in freedom, it is therefore the same as that between God and the creature as such. Jesus Christ as electing God and elected man, as one with the Father He determines and posits himself with the same freedom and love as the Father and the Spirit; it is just this freedom which allows him, as not needing any specific determination of his being, to determine and be determined as man for God. (1) That the creature, man, is determined for Jesus Christ does not mean that this determination is an immanent aspect of his being as a creature, since both aspects of the covenant in Jesus Christ, God's being for man and His being man for God, presupposes the same freedom and love in which God determines himself as God. If the creature is nevertheless determined in this way then it can

2. (Continued from p.233.)


only be understood as a miracle of free grace to be received with faith. Hence the empirical form of the creature considered as such can never ipso facto be identified with the image of God, the determination of man for the covenant. The empirical form of the creature's existence can only be understood in faith as this corresponds to the presupposition of the creature's existence in the reality of the covenant concluded in the freedom of God's grace in Jesus Christ.

"According to 1.Cor.11:7 there is a man who actually is the άνθρωπος θεός and from this standpoint the same can be said of every man. And side by side with this man there is a woman who is His θεός as He (the Head of the woman but not without her) is the θεός of God, and from the standpoint of this woman, or rather of her Husband, the same can be said of every woman. This man together with this woman is the man who is the image of God, who is it and does not merely indicate it or establish its physical possibility, like Adam and Seth and all the subsequent members of the genealogical tree." (1)

But who is this image of God of which Adam and Seth and the rest of human kind are merely the physical possibility? It is,

"the body of which Jesus Christ is Head, the community of which He is Lord .... It is with them that Jesus Christ is God's image." (2)

2. Ibid. p.205.
Hence the promise, the teleology of human existence, as the external basis of the covenant, precisely because it corresponds to and presupposes the inconceivable freedom and love in which God is Lord of the creature cannot be identified with any given actuality of creaturely existence as such. The equation which makes this characterisation of human existence the image of God, is one which assumes the grace which presupposes the reality of the participation of the creature in the relationship between Jesus Christ and His church. (1) Jüngel is therefore quite correct, in our opinion, when he posits the possibility of a theological anthropology on the basis of Barth's understanding of the *analogia relationis* in relation to the double predestination of God in Jesus Christ.


We further agree that by so doing Barth has remained consistent in his understanding of creaturely existence to the maxim which he derived from his study of St. Anselm, which Barth justified in terms of the unique existence of God, that the church must necessarily reach understanding, prove its faith in terms of *fides quaerens intellectum*. (2) To posit any other method of understanding the creature would be to look into the abyss of non-being, the nothingness which is excluded by the fact of God’s choice to be the creature’s Lord in Jesus Christ. (3) Creation then, considered as the external basis of the covenant, can only be understood when it is seen that its creaturely reality and necessity presupposes, "the divine meaning and necessity which .... is God’s free love, i.e., the love of God in which He wills and posits another by Himself and is Himself for it .... the free love in which He accomplishes this willing and this positing in His own power and by His own independent resolve. It is in the same free love that He Himself is God, i.e., the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father by the Holy Spirit. Again, it is in the same free love that He has resolved in Himself from all eternity on fellowship with man in the person of His own Son.

2. Ibid. p. 553.
As this free love is revealed, i.e., made visible outside His own being, His hidden glory is revealed. And this is creation to the extent that it makes the creature the exponent, sign and witness of the divine meaning and necessity."

(1)

In this manner Barth has 'proven' from the point of view of the creature's being understood as the external basis of the covenant what he declared to be the decisive

"anchorage of the recognition that creation and covenant belong together." (2)

This was

"the recognition of the unity of the divine being and its particularity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit ... for the recognition not only of the interconnexions but also of the variations in the relation between creation and covenant." (3)

The Covenant As The Internal Basis Of Creation.

In this section we consider from a different perspective the existence of the creature as it is understood by Barth to be an exponent and sign of the divine meaning and necessity posited by God's election. If the consideration of creation as the external basis of the covenant corresponded to the freedom in which God posits Himself, the understanding of the covenant as the internal basis of creation corresponds to the

2. Ibid. p.48.
love in which the self revealing, self electing God posits Himself. This does not add or subtract anything to what has already been said concerning creation as the external basis of the covenant.

"The main interest now is not how creation promises, proclaims and prophesies the covenant, but how it prefigures and to that extent anticipates it without being identical with it.... not Jesus Christ as the goal, but Jesus Christ as the beginning (the beginning just because He is the goal) of creation." (1)

Barth is still moving within the bounds of his understanding of the unity of the triune God as he proceeds to discuss the ontological structure of the creature, not simply as the creature whose existence is determined for the covenant of grace which might suggest a freedom of the creature not only for God but also from God; since the creature may be seen to be an existent which has a future destiny but whose actual existence is free in relation to this future. Barth now understands the ontology of the creature by raising its existence to understanding in terms of the fact that God posits Himself. His freedom is the definite and specific freedom of His love. So too the creature, whose existence presupposes this specific choice of God, is from the beginning one whose goal in the covenant of grace

"is not something added later to the reality of the creature, as though the history of creation might equally have been succeeded

by any other history. It (i.e., the covenant) already characterises creation itself and as such, and therefore the being and existence of the creature." (1)

Barth finds justification for this view of the relationship between the covenant and creation not simply in the relationship between his doctrine of revelation in which he considered the doctrines of the Trinity and Christology and the doctrine of God, but in the way in which the writer of the second creation narrative (Gen.2:4b-25) views the matter. Without this scriptural justification Barth maintains his theological scheme could not be sustained.

"It must be conceded at once .... we could hardly have the temerity to do this." (2)

We take up again, in our examination of this aspect of Barth's exposition of the doctrine of creation, his understanding of the man as the image of God. We recall that previously it was seen that precisely because the image of God was identified by Barth as consisting in the I-Thou relationship of man and woman and this was understood as referring to the fulfilment of the covenant in the relationship between Jesus Christ and His Church, that empirical man could not be identified with the image of God as such. The validity of the equation that man and woman in their relationship to each other is the image of God presupposed the inconceivable freedom in which God posited Himself. Therefore the being of the creature as the image of God, considered under this aspect as the external basis of the covenant, could only be known in faith. The continuities and connections in which the historical existence of the

2. Ibid. p.232.
creature is the image of God as the external basis of the covenant are essentially unknowable. This followed from the fact that these continuities and connections presuppose the distinction between the covenant and creation and this entails the distinctions and continuities in which God posits Himself as One.

We come to essentially the same conclusion when we examine Barth's exposition of the existence of the creature in the context of the second creation narrative. The second creation narrative may be seen as an extended exposition of Barth's anthropology. He sees the peculiarity of the second narrative as concerned to express the nature of the covenant as the internal basis of the creation. The second narrative is,

"a story of the emergence of man, of the sphere of his activity, of his environment. There is only casual reference to the coming into being of earth and heaven." For this reason the ancient author was right who suggested that, "Gen.1., tells the story of the natural, pagan man, and Gen.2. that of the Jew, i.e., the man of the history of salvation." (1)

Since Barth wishes to explain this narrative from the point of view of the covenant being the internal basis of creation, we should expect that since God in Jesus Christ did not will to become a fish or a stone, but man, that Barth would understand the narrative more from the

anthropological rather than the cosmological aspects of the narrative. (1)

The first major aspect of the narrative to which Barth draws attention is that man is understood as created out of the dust of the earth. In this man

"owes his existence wholly and utterly to the fact that from a particular handful of earth God willed to make him .... The only difference between him and the beast is that he is dust formed into a human body .... Primarily, then, the distinctive election of man is merely that he is formed from this dust as opposed to all other dust and given this form which is distinct from that of the beasts." (2)

Man is thus set, with all the beasts, under the law of mortality.

"If man is not renewed, the fact that he was once quickened will not prevent him from sharing the fate of the beasts and becoming again what he was: arid, barren, dead, dust, earth of earth." (3)

But man has a distinct characteristic which he does not share with any beast. In this,

"we have a material parallel to what the first account called his divine likeness." (4)

As opposed to the beasts man becomes here a living soul as God breathes into him the breath of life,


3. Ibid.

"in a most direct and personal and most special act." (1)

It is to be emphasised that this act as such, "rests on the wholly free and special election and compassion of God, and that it stands or falls with it." (2)

The parallel which Barth sees between this act and the account in the first narrative of man as the image of God is that this man like the first has his existence as man as he "proceeds from death to life. But the realisation of this hope waits for man as the being which, earthly by nature, will triumph over the aridity, barrenness and deadness of the earth because God is his refuge and hope, because God has constituted Himself as such." (3)

And it is "Jesus Christ, (who) is the man whose existence was necessary for the perfecting of the earth; for the redemption of its aridity, barrenness and death .... He is the man who, taken from all creation, all humanity and all Israel, and yet belonging to them and a victim of their curse, was in that direct, personal and special immediacy of God to Him a creature, man, the seed of Abraham and the Son of David ...."
"The man of whom the saga spoke, objectively if not subjectively, is ..... in respect of the solution of the riddle of Israel and the fulfilment of its hope ... this man Jesus." (1)

As in Barth's understanding of the image of God in relation to man, so here we are confronted by the fact that man's being as such cannot be identified with the man whose existence is determined by the covenant as its internal basis. Man can only be said to have his internal basis in the covenant as his existence is seen to be determined for the covenant, but determined for the covenant because he is determined by it in the sense that Jesus Christ does not participate in man's humanity but man participates in His. (2) In Jesus Christ God "already confronts man in a readiness to perfect that which is utterly unattainable and to give life to that which is intrinsically dead." (3)

Precisely because man proceeds from this Creator his being as man is as immeasurably hidden as God himself. The covenant as the internal basis of the creature's existence presupposes the same inconceivable free love as that in which God posits Himself. The same considerations apply here as those with which we became familiar in the doctrine of revelation where the form of the event of revelation was understood in terms of the inconceivable act which presupposed the unity of Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus beyond the limits of creaturely existence in the

resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. There the unity was conceived by Barth in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity in which God's positing of Himself as both One and Another in the unity of a Third was the act of His Lordship in His self revelation. We have also considered how Barth related this view of the Trinity to the question raised by Christology. Now it is seen from a different perspective how the creature presupposing the same essential act, as that which constitutes its existence proceeding from the aridity and barrenness of the earth to life, is essentially and necessarily hidden from itself.

Barth broadens and deepens his understanding of the creation of man from the point of view of the second creation narrative by concentrating attention on the way in which woman is formed by God out of man. In this it is a matter of seeing

"a successive constitution of the being of man now reaching its climax. In reference to man's formation from the dust of the earth, to his animation ... the concern has always been with the distinct elements in the whole man. But who and what the whole man is must now be stated." (1)

The creation of woman is not an abrogation of the determination of man as presupposing the covenant as the internal basis of creation. It is a broadening and deepening of the understanding of the creature in the light of the divine "soliloquy" (2), which constitutes itself the internal basis of creation. In this sense then, as God Himself is both

2. Ibid. p.290.
One and Another in the inconceivable unity of a Third, to be God's partner in such a covenant as that which is constituted by the act in which God posits Himself,

"man himself needed a partner .... In virtue of his nature man must be formally prepared for grace. This takes place as he is not left alone but is given a creaturely helpmeet." (1)

It is important to emphasise in this connection what Barth here means by,

"in virtue of his nature man must be formally prepared for grace."

This preparation cannot be separated from the covenant which it presupposes. Therefore, as will become obvious in Barth's linking of the deep sleep which fell upon Adam with the death of Christ, and Adam's recognition of the woman as the Thou which corresponds to his I with Christ's recognition of man in His resurrection, the preparation of man for grace, his being I and Thou in confrontation and community, presupposes the inconceivable act in which God is God and can therefore never become the subject of an independent anthropology. True man as prepared for, because he comes from, grace is as deeply hidden from man as the hiddenness which presupposes the freedom in which Christ as the elected God and Man is the Deus revelatus. Thus,

"the completion of all creation described here, i.e., the completion of man by the creation of woman, is not only one secret but the secret, the heart of all secrets of God the Creator .... The preparation

of his nature for God's grace, and the basis, concealed in his creaturely existence, of God's merciful good pleasure in him, is the secret of God. It is sufficient that man can say Yes to the result of this preparation and foundation and therefore to his own humanity and nature .... But in the divine act which creates the presupposition for his knowledge and confession he does not participate either actively or consciously." (1)

To elucidate the basis of this assertion in Barth's exposition we need to take a jump over his detailed analysis of woman's creation: that God caused a deep sleep to fall upon man during which God takes from him a rib from which He fashions woman whom He then brings to man who joyfully recognises her as the helpmeet granted to him by God. In all this Barth sees the intrinsic determination of the creature by the covenant as the internal basis of creation. The covenant in which Jesus Christ in His unity with the Father and the Spirit is God who posits Himself for man and in His distinction from the Father in the unity of the Spirit is God who determines Himself as Man for God.

"Why could not man be alone? .... Why could his creation, his emergence as man, be completed only with the creation of woman? .... because the man Jesus, the Son of God, whose earthly existence was envisaged at creation .... was not to be alone .... in the church which believes in Him He was to have His counterpart, His environment, His helpmeet and servants ......

"Why did the first man have to fall into that deep sleep when the work of God was done in which woman had her origin? because the church of Jesus Christ was to have its origin in His mortal sleep and to stand complete before Him in His resurrection."

"Why can man jubilantly exclaim: 'This is now ....?' Because the Church of Jesus did not first recognise Him but was first recognised by Him, being created for Him by divine omnipotence in the power of His resurrection .... In and with its election, His own election is complete in and with its revelation, His own revelation is finally accomplished." (1)

Here the common theme which presupposes and necessitates the intrinsic determination of man, his preparation for grace, is the fact that the covenant which forms the inner basis of creation is identical with the covenant revealed and consummated in Jesus Christ's death and resurrection. The unity of the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus as that which constituted the exposition of the trinitarian dogma in the doctrine of revelation and which presupposed the being of the self electing God in the doctrine of God, is seen to be that which defines and necessitates the creaturely being of man. But this entails that, as in the doctrine of revelation with respect to the event nature of the form of revelation and the humanity of Christ in Christology, empirical man has precisely the same relationship with the real Man whose existence coincides with the covenant as that which is presupposed in the doctrine of revelation between the form of revelation and revelation itself.

Consequently knowledge of the creature as that which presupposes the covenant as the internal basis of its existence must presuppose the unity of the electing God and the elected Man in Jesus Christ, that is, 1. Op.cit. pp.321-322.
in the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Therefore the
"noetic basis of the whole matter", (1)
concerning the relationship between man and woman as creatures of this Creator is brought out in the narrative when it is realised that the woman, and the mystery which she represents for man, i.e., the unity of Christ and His church,

"is not exhausted by the mere existence of the woman. It also belongs to this reality that she is brought to man. The account does not merely introduce woman .... God Himself brings her to him." (2)

"God Himself gives her to him. Without this link, everything which precedes and follows is unthinkable .... He creates not only the I and Thou, man and woman, but also their mutual relationship." (3)

Why must this be so? Because the creaturely ontology corresponds to the specific unity of the covenanting God who makes Himself the presupposition, the internal basis of the creature's existence. As God who reveals Himself is triune, the Father and the Son in the unity of the Holy Spirit, and the covenant which is the inner basis of the creature's existence is constituted in this divine unity both from the point of view of God and Man, so the creature who is prepared for the grace of this covenant has its being in correspondence to this inconceivably free unitive act

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
of divine grace. To postulate a freedom of the creature which did not presuppose this unity of the electing God would be to deny both the truth of the self-revealing God and the truth of the creature whose existence presupposes the fact that He is who He is in the revelation of His name. Hence the ontic and noetic truth of creaturely existence is not to be sought in any independent ontology of the creature but in the

"divine action, thus indicating that it escapes all observation and concepts." (1)

If it were otherwise then man

"would no more be man than God would be

God if He could lie." (2)

Consequently, despite the obviously contradictory picture presented to the writers of Gen. 2, and the Song of Songs concerning the activity of empirical man, they could exalt the erotic relationship between the sexes. For ultimately they do not speak of man and woman as they appear in history, but man and woman as they presuppose the unity of their gracious electing God. What interested them

"was the fact that in the relationship between man and woman .... even prior to its character as the basis of the father-mother-child relationship .... we have to do primarily with the question of an incomparable covenant, an irresistibly purposed and effected union." (3)

They speak of the man-woman relationship as they do, despite the fact of their observations concerning historical man,

2. Ibid. p. 299.
"because they know the broken covenant is still for God the unbroken covenant, intact and fulfilled on both sides; that as such it was already the inner basis of creation, and that as such it will again be revealed at the end." (1)

So from the opposite point of view, from the point of view which presumes God's being as that in which He posits Himself, Barth has raised to understanding the being of the creature in terms of the covenant considered as the internal basis of creation. Of course the aspects of the creature's being which Barth has considered, its existence as determined for the covenant as that which presupposes the self revealing God as the electing God to be One who posits Himself, and its existence as determined for the covenant because it comes from the covenant as that which presupposes the self revealing God to be One who posits Himself, these twin aspects of creaturely existence belong inseparably together. Not in the sense of a dialectical unity which is ultimately open to scrutiny and manipulation by the creature, but in a unity where the distinctions presupposed by the different aspects of the creature's existence which Barth has considered correspond to the unity and distinctions in which God posits Himself as the creature's Lord. In this sense we may say Barth has remained profoundly consistent with his dogmatic method. The existence of the creature is raised to understanding in terms of the unique existence of the self revealing God by means of questions which presuppose that the answers correspond to the principle of fides quaerens intellectum. As the doctrine of the reality of God's

being proved that the self revealing trinitarian God is God in so far as He posits Himself in the freedom of His love, so too the doctrine of God's election which presupposes this inconceivable self positing of God, is that by which the creation is proved to be the external basis of the covenant which is posited in God as its internal basis. We may therefore agree that for Barth creation is

"intrinsically trinitarian in its ontology." (1)

The Relationship Between Knowledge Of God And Knowledge Of The Creature.

In our concern to understand the relationship between God and the creature in the trinitarian methodology adopted by Barth as a means of understanding creation, we intend now to take up the theme of the relationship in terms of the way in which Barth relates creaturely knowledge of God and creaturely knowledge of the creature. We do this as a means of elucidating the relationship between God and the creature which has emerged in our exposition of Barth's dogmatic method.

It is not our intention to give a comprehensive expose of Barth's theological epistemology, but to establish a connection between his exposition of the knowledge of God in the doctrine of God which presupposes the doctrine of the revelation of the triune God and the knowledge of the creature in the doctrine of creation which presupposes the self election of God in the doctrine of God. In this way, from the point of view of the epistemeology involved, we will be able to understand from a specific perspective the relationship presupposed by Barth between the triune God and the creature. This course will enable us to appreciate how Barth understands the knowing subject, man, in relation to the God who presupposes his existence as his Creator and Lord.

In the doctrine of revelation Barth had shown that as God reveals Himself as Lord He is known by and through Himself. We cannot ask in terms of the event nature of revelation considered as a phenomena of creaturely history whether and how God is knowable. Where the actuality of God's revelation is there is also the corresponding possibility. Apart from the actuality of revelation which presupposes the event nature of its form in the world there is no possible knowledge of God.

"The question (as to knowledge of God) cannot be posed *in abstracto* but only *in concreto*; not *a priori* but only *a posteriori*, the *in abstracto* and *a priori* question after the possibility of the knowledge of God obviously presupposes the existence of a place outside the knowledge of God itself from which this knowledge can be judged ... (but) Just as the reality of the Word of God in Jesus Christ bears its possibility within itself, as does also the reality of the Holy Spirit, by whom the Word of God comes to man, so too the possibility of the knowledge of God and therefore the knowability of God cannot be questioned *in vacuo*, or by means of a general criterion of knowledge determining the knowledge of God from without, but only from within this real knowledge itself." (1)

So in considering the question of the objectivity involved in the fact

1. Barth, K. *Church Dogmatics*. Vol.2,1. p.5. The underlining indicates the original is in italics. The brackets are mine.
that as an event in creaturely history knowledge of the revealed God is mediated knowledge, Barth distinguishes between the objectivity in which God knows Himself from the objectivity in which in knowing Himself He gives the creature knowledge of His own self knowledge in revelation of Himself.

"If we ascribe objectivity to God (as we inevitably do when we speak of the knowledge of God) a distinction becomes unavoidable. As He certainly knows Himself first of all, God is first and foremost objective to Himself. ... In His triune life as such, objectivity, and with it knowledge, is divine reality before creaturely objectivity and knowledge exist. We call this the primary objectivity of God and distinguish from it the secondary, i.e., the objectivity which He has for us too in His revelation, in which He gives Himself to be known by us as He knows Himself." (1)

Consequently when Barth considers the limits of creaturely knowledge of God, the actual knowledge by the creature of God based in revelation, it is in terms of the distinctions posited in God's distinguishing of Himself from Himself as He posits Himself in the inconceivable freedom of His love.

"What happens when God is known becomes clear and understandable to us, and visible to us

as a form, when we know the **terminus a quo** and
the **terminus ad quem** of this event, the point
with which it begins and the point with which
it ends." (1)

Since the self revealing God posits Himself the **terminus a quo** of
the knowledge of God it must be sought in the hiddenness in which God in
inconceivable freedom posits **Himself**. This has nothing in common with an
arbitrary limit which may be established by creaturely knowledge as it
prescribes a limit to itself.

"The **terminus a quo** of the knowledge of God is
not, therefore, identical with the **terminus ad
quem** which we can reach when we discern the
inability .... i.e., the limitation, of our
perception and discursive thinking." (2)

If we know the genuine **terminus a quo** of the knowledge of God we can
only confess that we do not know it of ourselves. But even this
judgment presupposes that we stand in the realm of the actual knowledge
of God.

"The capacity to know God is taken away from
us by revelation and can be ascribed to us
again only by revelation." (3)

Thus the origin and goal of creaturely knowledge of God is by and
through God's giving of Himself to be known. Both the **terminus a quo** and

2. Ibid. p.184. This entails that the revelation of God alone can
invalidate the attempt of man to know God in terms of his 'natural'
the terminus ad quem of this creaturely knowledge is defined in terms of the fact which has been proved in the doctrine of revelation and the doctrine of God. God is God as He posits Himself and as He posits Himself in the freedom of His love. As God knows Himself in Jesus Christ as electing God and elected Man the creature is given to participate in God's own self knowledge. Hence all our knowledge of God is necessarily Christological knowledge. Its terminus a quo is in the unity of Jesus Christ with God in that freedom in which God posits Himself; its terminus ad quem is in the unity of Jesus Christ with God who posits Himself in the freedom of His love as God for man. Both the origin and goal of creaturely knowledge of God presupposes the unity of God's self constituting act in which He posits Himself as man's Lord in Jesus Christ. (1) But precisely because this is true in Jesus Christ we too can be in the place where God is known within the genuine limits in which this knowledge is valid for the creature.

"For it is because He is this place, but only because He is, that we too become and are this place. If we are this place it is only by faith in Him. But this means by letting Him be this place .... In Him who is true God and true man it is true that in His true revelation God gives to man a part in the truth of His knowing, and therefore gives to man's knowing similarity with His own and therefore truth." (2)

The justification for the use in theology of analogical speech

2. Ibid. p.253.
about God, as this speech presupposes neither a complete disparity or parity between human speech about God and the truth of God itself, must be sought in the correspondence posited by God between His knowing of Himself as God and His knowing of Himself in Jesus Christ as man. When revelation authorises human speech about God, He

"takes to Himself something that belongs originally and properly to Him." (1)

Since this "taking to Himself" presupposes the inconceivable freedom in which God in positing Himself posits Himself in Jesus Christ as Man for God, there can be no question of any control of God's self knowledge by the fact that we know Him by means of human language. For,

"our thought and language in their appropriateness to this object are also His creation. Therefore the truth in which we know this appropriate object in the way appropriate to us is His creation, His truth." (2)

So in the terminus ad quem of creaturely knowledge of God we are confronted with the same lordship as in its terminus a quo.

"Because God is always God, He is also in His revelation (again in His entirety and therefore without deduction of a part of His being, of which something else might be said) the hidden God, who is definitely not the object of the views, concepts and words which we may apply to Him .... He is hidden in so far as His grace is grace." (3)

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p.235.
The correspondence posited by the legitimate use of analogical speech about God is that which is validated by God Himself as He veils Himself in His self unveiling. It is true in the unity posited by God between the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus: Because "unveiling and veiling thus designate the way which God goes with us, not a contradiction which He pronounces against us, into which He impels us, and which we have to suffer and bear as such. From first to last on this way it is a question of the one saving fulfilment of fellowship between Him and us." (1)

Creaturally Knowledge Of God And Creaturally Knowledge Of The Creature.

As we have seen in our analysis of the way in which Barth considers the actuality and determination of the creature in terms of its being the external basis of the covenant which is its internal ground, the creation is necessarily considered from the perspective of the inconceivable freedom and love in which the self revealing and self electing God posits Himself as the creature's Lord. We have indicated that this involves consideration of the question of creaturally knowledge of God in terms of the limits posited by, because made actual by, the election of the creature in Jesus Christ who as one with the Father is the electing God and as He posits and is posited as the elected Man one with the creature.

The question now arises of understanding not only the possibility of creaturally knowledge of God in terms of its actuality in Jesus Christ, but also how this Christological basis allows us to understand the possibility of creaturally knowledge of the creature who is posited as the 1. Barth.K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.2.1.p.236.
covenant partner of God in Jesus Christ.

The first thing we should note in taking up this question is that Barth develops his understanding of this issue within the context of an exposition of the creature which is deliberately anthropocentric. That is to say he does not consider the question of the creature in general, that is, the relationship between God and the cosmos as such. The reason for this is that "God's eternal Son and Logos did not will to be an angel or an animal but a man, and that this and this alone was the content of the eternal divine election ...... He (in His humanity) is the centre of all creation, of the reality of which the creed says that God created it."  

This means that the limits of creaturely knowledge of the creature, its **terminus a quo** and its **terminus ad quem** is posited in and with the same inconceivable act in which the limits of creaturely knowledge of God is posited. It is now a matter of understanding the relationships between creatures in terms of the relation which is posited between the creature who is determined for because it comes from the covenant and the creature whose existence is the covenant. In Jesus Christ we see "the One in whose identity with Himself we must recognise at once the identity of God with Himself." So God does not, "infringe His own sovereignty. He does not lose Himself by being present and revealed in His existence .... This man is there in and by

the sovereign being of God .... Not two juxtaposed realities .... a divine and then a human, or even less a human and then a divine .... constitute the essence of man, this man, but one, divine reality, in which as such the human is posited contained and included .... This is the distinction which is His and His alone." (1)

Since this is the Man, the Man who is for God in such a way that He is identical with God's being for man, who is envisaged by the creation saga's account of the creature, the creature as such could not be identified with the image of God. The image of God could not be destroyed by man's fall since its truth depended on this other Man. But precisely because He is this Man who exists as Man as He exists for God and is God, the same distinctions posited by God in distinguishing Himself from the Creature in the inconceivable freedom and love distinguishes this Man from other men. What is involved in the existence of Jesus Christ in human history therefore is something which

"corresponds externally to the inner life of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost." (2)

Consequently knowledge of the creature cannot simply be a deduction from Christology.

"We remember that between the man Jesus and ourselves as men there stands not only the mystery of our sin, but primarily and decisively the mystery of His identity with God. It is impossible to understand Him even as man


except in this identity. But it is impossible to understand ourselves in this identity. We are here confronted by the irremovable difference between Him and us. There can be no question, therefore, of a direct knowledge of the nature of man in general from that of the man Jesus." (1)

A "direct" knowledge of the creature would obviate the necessity of faith which is presupposed by the existence of this Man on the basis of the inconceivable freedom and love in which God is God. We must proceed to knowledge of man in precisely the same way as the question of the knowability of God was answered. From the actuality of the existence of this Man we ask the question how far real man is knowable in terms of the freedom and love which presuppose this Man's existence among other men.

The first thing to note in relation to the actuality of the existence of this man as Man among other men is

"that a decision has been made concerning the being and nature of every man by the mere fact that with him and among all other men He too has been a man .... every man in his place and time is changed, i.e., he is something other than what he would have been if this one had not been man too." (2)

Nothing in earth or heaven can alter the determination of the creature by the fact of the existence of this Man among other men;

"for the man who is with Jesus ... and this is man's ontological determination ... is with God. If he denies God he denies himself. He is then something which he cannot be in the Counterpart in which he is. He chooses his own impossibility." (1)

Hence the first and primary characteristic of man derived from the actuality of the Man Jesus among other men is that in the same inconceivable freedom and love, with the same majesty, as He is Man for God, they are determined to be with God. The terminus a quo of creaturely knowledge of the creature in the light of Jesus Christ is established when it is seen that Jesus Christ is Man for God in the same inconceivable freedom and love in which He, in unity with the Father and the Spirit, is God for man.

The terminus ad quem of the knowledge of the creature established by the existence of the Man Jesus Christ corresponds to the fact that He is not only in Himself Man for God but as He exists on earth and under heaven He is a cosmic being. In so doing

"He belongs to God, but he is still a creature and not God. The one thing does not contradict the other but explains it." (2)

If on the basis of the fact of the existence of the Man Jesus as Man for God, man is ontologically determined to be with God, we must also see that as the Man Jesus is not only Man for God He is also as a cosmic being Man for other men. But in both of these aspects of the being of the Man Jesus we have to do with the same freedom and love in which the

self revealing God is the self electing covenanting God, the Lord of the creature. Consequently in both the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of creaturely knowledge of the creature we have to do with the same necessity for faith as the only path to understanding. The cosmic determination of the being of Jesus has an "ontological" (1), connection with the determination of Jesus as Man for God. His being Man for man corresponds to and derives from His being Man for God.

"That His divinity has its correlative in this form of His humanity, that it is 'human' in this specific sense, i.e., in address to other men, is not arbitrary or accidental. Jesus would not be Jesus at all if we could say anything else concerning Him .... His orientation to others and reciprocal relationship with them are not accidental, external or subsequent, but primary, internal and necessary. It is on the basis of this eternal order that He shows Himself to be Neighbour." (2)

As we ask after the terminus ad quem of the reality and possibility of creaturely knowledge of the creature in terms of the cosmic determination of the Man Jesus we are confronted with the same inconceivable freedom and love as that which presupposes His being Man for God. It could hardly be other since,

"God repeats in this relationship ad extra a relationship proper to Himself in His inner divine essence. Entering into this relationship He makes a copy of Himself." .... "The

humanity of Jesus, His fellow humanity, His being for man as the direct correlative of His being for God, indicates, attests and reveals this correspondence and similarity .... It follows the essence, the inner being of God. It is this inner being which takes this form ad extra in the humanity of Jesus, and in this form, for all the disparity of sphere and object, remains true to itself and therefore reflects itself." (1)

If man in his relationship with woman, in the I-Thou relationship, presupposes the truth of the Man Jesus in His being Man for other men in the cosmic determination of His being, then in so far as He presupposes this reality he is hidden from himself.

Man is not "intrinsically recognisable as this sign. Even in respect of this natural correspondence and similarity of human nature there is no natural knowledge of God. Even in this matter we are concealed from ourselves, and need the Word of God to know ourselves. But .... there is something in ourselves to know. In virtue of this correspondence and similarity, our humanity too has a real part in the mystery of faith." (2)

2. Ibid. p.207.
The reality and possibility of creaturely knowledge of the creature as being with God and being for the other presupposes the same inconceivable freedom as that which posits God's being Himself the One He is for us.

For the existence of Jesus Christ as the One Barth has described necessitates the reality of God's in and for Himself being, being His being for us. (1)

1. Taking up the implications of this aspect of Barth's thought Jüngel.E., is adamant in his rejection of the suggestion put forward by Gollwitzer,H., in the course of a development in his views on the existence of God as confessed by faith that in the interests of the freedom of God's voluntary condescension to man we must distinguish between God's in-and-for-Himself-being and His being-for-us, on the basis of the event nature of revelation. Gollwitzer had indicated that his views were to be associated with the theological method of Karl Barth. Jüngel asserts that for Barth the whole point turns on the fact that the distinction between God's being in and for Himself and His being for us is one which presupposes His self positing. That God in being for another in His being for us, repeats ad extra His being for Himself. Precisely because His being for Himself is a being in relation He can be in relation ad extra without there by ceasing to be who He is and for Himself by being dependent upon the other, the creature, for His being in relation. To postulate, as Gollwitzer does, a distinction between God's being in and for Himself and His being for us on the basis of the creaturely nature of the event of revelation is to presuppose a freedom of God for the creature which does not correspond to God's being in and for Himself, consequently God is in some sense different from who He is in His self revelation. On the other hand it suggests a freedom of the creature which does not presuppose the freedom of God and thus entails some form of natural theology.

Jüngel asserts on the contrary:

"Eine bewusst oder unbewusst natürliche Theologie wird nicht schon dadurch evangelisch, dass sie die Relation zur Grundkategorie ihrer Aussagen macht." Why? Because, "Gottes selbstbezogenheit εἰναι τὸ ἐπεξεργασθὲν Gottes ewige Liebe, in der Vater, Sohn und Heiliger Geist sich ewig einig werden, wäre dann der Grund seiner (im Blick auf alles, was nicht Gott ist) grundloster Barmherzigkeit. Gottes Sein τὸ ἐπεξεργασθὲν ist also kein Abschied von sich selbst. Gottes Für-uns-Sein ist ebensowenig Abschied von sich selbst wie es ein Zu-sich-selbst-Kommen Gottes ist." (Jüngel.E. Gottes Sein ist Im Werden, p.113.)

The distinction between the relationship in which God affirms His existence as God and the relationship in which He exists as this God with and for the creature is one which presupposes the same inconceivable freedom and love as that in which God distinguishes Himself from

(Continued on p.266.)
The only meaningful question that one can ask concerning the nature of man as the creature who presupposes the existence among other men of Jesus Christ as Man for God and Man for other men is:

"How far as men they are beings which can be represented by the man Jesus in His suffering and conquering. We have to ask what it is that makes them possible for the covenant which is revealed and operative for them." (1)

1. (Continued from p.265.)

Himself as God. However, we may use the word 'analytic' to describe the relationship in which God exists in relation in and for Himself and the word 'synthetic' to describe the relationship in which this same God exists as God for us in His self revelation. It must be remembered that in both cases the same God is the Subject:

"dieses Prädikat kann eines analytischen und eines synthetischen Satzes Prädikat sein. Im Blick auf die trinitarische Selbstbezogenheit Gottes wird dieses Prädikat als das eines analytischen Satzes zu verstehen sein. Im Blick auf Gottes Offenbarung wird dieses Prädikat als das dieses synthetischen Satzes zu verstehen sein. Der synthetische Satz entspricht allerdings dem analytischen satz. Diese Entsprechung besagt: Gottes Sein als Selbstbezogenheit ist ein Sein im Werden, dem es eigentümlich ist, dass es sich wiederholen kann"  


The method by which Barth determines the basis for his anthropology in the relationship between the being of God in and for Himself and His being for us in Jesus Christ has led some critics to contend that by so relating the creature to the structure of the divine being the creaturely nature of man's existence is compromised by it becoming merely representational of the divine being and life. Cf. the following: Prenter,R. Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth's Positivism of Revelation in Smith,R.G. ed. World Come of Age. pp.93.ff. Prenter,R. Einheit Schöpfung und Erlösung Theologische Zeitschrift. 2.1946.pp.161.ff., 167-168, 170-171, 174. : Rodding,G. Das Seinsproblem in der Schöpfungslehre Karl Barth's. Kerygma und Dogma. 10. 1964.pp.1.ff., 28-29, 33-34.

(Continued on p.267.)
That Barth finds the I-Thou relationship to be constitutive of man as the creature determined for because it comes from the covenant concluded by God with man in Jesus Christ, does not entail that in this relationship we have a likeness to God in the creature which can become the basis for an independent ontology of the creature and thus the basis for a natural knowledge of God. The creature's correspondence with and preparation for the grace of the covenant, the fact of its being represented by Jesus Christ as the Man for other men, rests upon the decision made in the freedom and love in which God posits Himself. Therefore the distinction between Jesus Christ and other men in their

1. (Continued from p. 266.)


It would seem to be true that there is a structural relationship between the being of God and that of the creature in Barth's method of understanding the existence of the creature in terms of the covenant. However it does not seem to have been realised that the kind of representationalism of which Barth is accused, whereby creaturely existence is but a pale reflection of the divine being and life, leaves out of account what would appear to be basic for Barth's position. The beginning of all things different from God is a choice made by God, what He chooses is that the creature's existence should demonstrate that choice. The relationship between the choice and its demonstration are of course inseparable in that the choice of man in Jesus Christ involves its fulfilment in the existence of the creature as the external basis of the covenant so concluded. But this choice and this demonstration do not annul the historicity and freedom of the creature as a creature in its relationship with God. In fact this choice, as presupposing the inconceivable freedom and love in which God is God, establish the creaturely nature of the creature with the sovereignty of a decision of God. That God's choice of man in Jesus Christ presupposes his existence as a creature does not seem to entail, as such, the kind of monism which the critics assume. The nature of the relationship between this choice, in which God determines Himself for man and man for Himself in Jesus Christ, and God's being in and for Himself, preclude the understanding of created reality simply as or merely as a mirror of an eternal reality. Cf. Jungel, E. Op cit. pp.114 ff.; Jenson, R. Alpha And Omega, pp.84 ff. 
respective being for others is the same as that which is involved between the Creator and the creature.

"The tertium comparationis, the feature common to both likeness and reality, to both copy and original, consists in both cases, between man and his fellow man on the one hand and God and man on the other, in an indestructable connexion and fellowship between two subjects which are indestructably distinct. The only point of comparison is that on both sides there is a firm and genuine covenant ..... apart from this common feature everything is different. On the one side we have a union of creature with creature in virtue of the creaturely nature ..... on the other we have a union of the Creator and His creature, in which the Creator is the free Lord of the covenant .... It thus follows that natural theology cannot find here a point of contact for the proclamation of the grace and revelation of God." (1)

Karl Barth's Doctrine of Analogy

Any discussion of the relationship between God and creature in terms of Barth's view of the relationship between knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature would be incomplete without specific reference to the way in which Barth develops his method of understanding God and the creature by means of his view of analogy.

We have already established a direct relationship between the way in which Barth understands the reality and possibility of creaturely knowledge of God on the basis of his views expressed in the doctrine of Revelation and the doctrine of God and his understanding of the creature in the doctrine of creation in terms of the unity of the creation and covenant by means of the doctrine of election understood as part of the doctrine of God. As a development of our thesis with respect to this relationship we now take up the question of analogy. It is our view that in this respect we shall see how remarkably consistent Barth's exposition is in terms of its presupposition so far elucidated. For this reason we find ourselves in opposition to the views of some commentators who see a change in Barth's position, particularly with respect to the doctrine of *analogia entis*.

In 1932 Barth wrote, in the context of his attempt to purge his theology of any appearance that it sought to justify the Word of God in terms of a correlation with the structure of the human situation, that such an attempt could only lead to a compromise with the doctrine of *analogia entis*.

"I can see no third possibility between play with the *analogia entis*, legitimate only on Roman Catholic ground, between the greatness and misery of a so called natural knowledge of God in the sense of the *Vaticanum*, and a Protestant theology self nourished at its own source." ....... "I regard the *analogia entis* as the invention of AntiChrist, and think that because of it one cannot become a Catholic. Where upon I at the same time allow
myself to regard all other possible reasons for not becoming Catholic, as short sighted and lacking seriousness." (1)

In 1940, after an examination and interpretation of the doctrine of *analogia entis* by the Catholic scholar G. Sohngen, Barth wrote:

"If this is the Roman Catholic doctrine of *analogia entis*, then naturally I must withdraw my earlier statement that I regard the *analogia entis* as the 'invention of anti-Christ.'" (2)

Then in 1955 Barth said of the development of his Church Dogmatics,

"In the twenty three years since I started this work I have found myself so held and directed that, as far as I can see, there have been no important breaks and contradictions in the presentation; no retractions have been necessary (except in detail) .... That is how I myself see it, and it is my view that my contemporaries (and even perhaps successors) ought to speak at least more circumspectly when at this point or that they think they have discovered a 'new Barth' .... there is perhaps more inward and outward continuity in the matter than some hasty observers and rash interjectors can at first sight credit." (3)


It is our view that we should take Barth quite seriously in this contention of his regarding the consistency of his theology. This is particularly the case in a matter which he has continually regarded as one, if not the chief, of the problems he has faced, i.e., the doctrine of *analogia entis*. We propose to show that the correlation we have established between Barth's doctrines of the knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature in terms of the unity of the self revealing triune God, also prevails in his understanding of the doctrine of analogy. Both with respect to analogy in relation to the knowledge of God, the *analogia fidei*, and analogy in relation to knowledge of the creature, the *analogia relationis*, Barth excludes the doctrine of *analogia entis*.

In understanding Barth's opposition to the doctrine of *analogia entis* we agree with the judgment of G.C. Berkouwer:

"however important this question of interpretation may be (i.e., the interpretation of the meaning of *analogia entis*) particularly as the analysis bears on Thomism, our first concern is to understand what Barth intends to achieve in his opposition to the *analogia entis*." (1)

The problem of the *analogia entis*, in the context of creaturely knowledge of God, is for Barth that it presupposes

"a posse which is not included in and with the ..... divine encroachment." (2)

In this the Catholic doctrine, while it may not wish to speak of another God

"its procedure in the noetic question is different from that in the ontological. To

2. Barth, K. *Church Dogmatics*. Vol.2.1, p.79.
that extent it certainly intends to make a provisional division or partition in regard to the knowability of God, and this will inevitably lead to a partitioning of the one God as well .... The primary reference of our contradiction is to this partition ... We have taken the unity of God seriously, not only in theory but in practice. We have answered the question of the knowability of God in the light of this unity." (1)

Barth's primary opposition to the doctrine of *analogia entis* is that it presupposes a freedom of the creature which is not presupposed by the freedom of God. It denies the revealed unity of the revealed God in so far as it places a question mark over the fact which is essential for Barth's position that God is who He is in the revelation of His name.

The doctrine of *analogia entis* attempts to look

"away and above what God is among us and for us. It thinks it necessary for assurance about the truth of God to look away and above in this way. It first establishes the fact of the existence of God ..... in the light of this affirmation it then decides that God is knowable ..... knowable even without His revelation .... But over against this being of God a certain being is also ascribed to man, although on another plane and in another manner. In the first instance God and man are seen together on a ground common to both

and therefore neutral. It is on this ground that the question of truth is decided in Roman Catholic theology." The intolerable and unpardonable thing in Roman Catholic theology is that there is this splitting up of the concept of God, and hand in hand with it the abstraction from the real work and activity of God in favour of a general being of God which he has in common with us and all beings." (1)

The differences that emerge between Barth's answer to the question of creaturely knowledge of God and that of the doctrine of analogia entis stem from the fundamental different questions which both pose as to the knowability of God. There is, therefore, little point in discussing the differing answers to what are fundamentally different questions. (2) The possibility of a knowability of God only arises for Barth when we see it as a question of asking after a possibility which presupposes the actuality of God's self movement toward man. (3) This means asking after a possibility which is grounded in the revealed unity of the revealed God. We have investigated this and found that this possibility resides in the election of God in Jesus Christ to be Man for God and Man for other men. On the other hand Barth sees the Catholic error to consist in a presupposing of the actuality of God's self movement toward man in Jesus Christ with the abstract question of

3. Ibid. pp.4.ff.
the possibility of a knowledge of God in virtue of the fact that both God and creatures exist. (1) What obviates the necessity of the question which Barth sees as grounding the doctrine of *analogia entis* is the unity of the revealed God. In Barth's presentation of his views on analogy it is important that we keep this in mind; for Barth's attack on the *analogia entis* takes place as he develops his own methodology. It is not an independent theme. If Barth denies the possibility of the *analogia entis* it is only in the course of 'proving' his own way to knowledge of God and the creature in view of God's self revelation. Hence,

"we cannot therefore attack it in detail. For how can we attack it? We can only say
Yes and Amen to it as far as it applies to the god, the false god, to whom it refers. It is itself incorrigible. But we cannot allow that it says anything about God at all." (2)

We have already indicated in our exposition of Barth's doctrine of the knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature in terms of the unity of the self revealing God that knowledge of God and the creature presuppose the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of this knowledge in the inconceivable freedom and love in which God is God. In discussing the question of analogy as appropriate in this connection it could never be the case that the use of analogical speech about God and the creature is justified simply in terms of the inadequacies of human language and speech concerning God. The necessity of analogical speech is seen in the necessity of the doctrine of God consequent on the

2. Ibid. p.84.
doctrines of revelation. The God who starts with Himself in revelation, reveals Himself as Lord, starts with Himself in all His relations ad intra and ad extra. As the self revealing God He is the self electing God. The actuality and possibility of God's in-and-for-Himself-being, being His being-for-us-being, grounds the possibility of analogical speech. "Between our views, concepts and words, and God as their object, there exists, on the basis of the revelation of God, the relationship of analogy, of similarity, of partial correspondence and agreement. On the basis of this similarity there is true human knowledge of God and therefore the human knowledge of God reaches its goal. But how does this partial correspondence and agreement arise? ... we must affirm that, as and before it occurs, as and before our word comes to participate in it, it obviously subsists in God Himself as the subject and Lord who in His revelation controls His own work. Therefore the relationship between what He is in Himself and what He is in our work is only a relationship of similarity. Yet while this is true, it is also true that both in Himself and in our work He is not another. And because in our work He is this One on the basis of His revelation, because His revelation in its relationship to us is grace, we shall have to say that He is this One first of all in Himself, and on this basis He is it secondly (not as Another, but in another way) for us,
in our work grounded in His revelation." (1)

The word analogy as such, since it is to be understood in this specific context is simply of no interest to Barth.

"We are not concerned with the words as such. In a sense we simply turn our backs on them. We look at the true revelation of God. And by it we are pushed away from the words parity and disparity .... pressed again by the true revelation of God, we are pushed on to the word 'analogy'. In itself and as such it is no better than the words parity and disparity." (2)

That God authorises the use of human language to convey the truth of His self revelation presupposes that He is not doing anything that is originally foreign to Him. In it,

"He takes to Himself something that already belongs originally and properly to Him .... It is obviously His truth originally.


2. Ibid. Cf. pp.211-213. See also in this connection Clark, G.H. Karl Barth’s Theological Method, pp.142-147. Clark seems to miss the point of Barth's discussion of the suitability of the work analogy in speech about God. He contends that Barth is involved in a logical contradiction in his argument for the word analogy as distinct from the words parity and disparity. Barth’s argument does not depend upon the word analogy being the "revealed word". The theological necessity of the word analogy resides in the distinction, posited by God’s self revelation, between His being in and for Himself and His being for us.

If we are to criticise Barth's doctrine of analogy it seems to us inappropriate to attempt this in terms of the logical law of non-contradiction concerning the use of certain words: the fact that Barth speaks of a "similarity that is not similar to ordinary similarity". (Ibid.p.146.)

Clark appears to fail in his appreciation of the relationship between Barth's view of analogy and his theological method as a whole. In a study devoted to Barth's theological method this would seem to be a major inadequacy.
primarily, independently and properly, because creatively. It is our truth only subsequently, secondarily, dependently and improperly, because creaturely." (1)

The partiality then entailed in the knowledge of God that is implied by the word analogy, as distinct from parity or disparity, does not derive from the fact that knowledge of God can be split up or quantified, as if some words or concepts were in themselves more appropriate than others. The partiality of analogical predication presupposes the distinction between God's knowing and affirming Himself and His knowing and affirming Himself as the creature's Lord. And as the Lord who determines Himself for Man and Man for Himself in Jesus Christ He is in Him not only originally and properly the Object of human thought and speech about Himself, He is also the Subject. He is not only the electing God He is the elect Man.

"In Him who is true God and true man it is true that in His self revelation God gives to man a part in the truth of His knowing, and therefore gives to man's knowing similarity with His own and therefore truth." .... "It is not our knowledge of God, but the knowledge which is and will be present in this man Jesus, that we have described in our description of its reality, its possibility, and now finally its limit." (2)

In Barth's understanding of analogical predication and its appropriateness


2. Ibid. p.252.
in the context of creaturely knowledge of God he has given expression again to the principle which follows from his dogmatic presuppositions, namely that one can only move from the actuality of the revealed unity of God to the possibility of creaturely knowledge of God, and as we shall see of the creature as well. Any other possible way of understanding God and the world is negated by the actuality of the creature's presence with God in the circle of God's own self knowledge in Jesus Christ. The truth of human knowledge concerning God and man is

"the power of our faith .... that God has accepted His Son in the flesh, that He has comforted this man Jesus in eternity. And in Him He has already comforted us all in advance .... moving in our circulus veritatis Dei we are in the sphere of Jesus Christ, where that which in an earlier context we called the veiling and unveiling of God, the way from the one to the other, forms the household rule from which we cannot except ourselves." (1)

The way from the veiling to the unveiling of God of which Barth speaks is that from the Deus absconditus to the Deus revelatus which from the doctrine of revelation we have learned is the way in which God is Himself for us in His being amongst us as the One He is in Himself, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The actuality of creaturely knowledge of God coincides with the unity of the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus, i.e., in the Holy Spirit. That God in this His self revealed unity is who He is both in and for Himself and for us presupposes the actuality and possibility of

analogical speech's veracity in relation to the truth of God.

It is for this reason that Barth's discussion of the doctrine of analogy advanced by the orthodox Lutheran theologian A. Quenstedt, takes such a critical turn. (1) According to Quenstedt the question of the knowledge of God in terms of analogy derives from the fact that both univocal and equivocal predication show themselves to be inadequate in the matter. Concerning univocal predication it is seen

"that what the creatures have in common with God they have in dependence on Him, so that it exists first in Him, then only through Him in them. Hence it cannot be expressed univoce of Him and the creatures." (2)

Equivocal predication, on the other hand, is when

"the same term, applied to two different objects, designates a different thing in one and the other."

For example, "as God is essentia et substantia singularissima, so too, the creatures are propriae entia essentia et substantiae .......

But Quenstedt, agreeing with Aquinas, believed that equivocal predication understood in this sense must be rejected too; by itself equivocal predication states that both sides of the analogical relationship are what they are. Without further elucidation, equivocal predication means that,

"God cannot be known from the creature." (4)

2. Ibid. p.237. Underlining indicates the original is in italics.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Quenstedt therefore rejects both *analogia inaequalitatis* and *analogia proportionalitatis*. In proper analogy we do not have the kind of similarity

"which exists, e.g., between different species of one *genus,*" or that which exists "when some determinations of two objects agree but at the same time disagree." (1)

Quenstedt answers to the effect that proper analogy between God and the creature must be understood in terms of an *analogia attributionis*. By this he means that the,

"analogia is analogans in the first and analogata in the second." (2)

What we have then is a relationship in which what is predicated exists first and properly in one, and then because the second is dependent on the first, in the second as well. The predication is not attributed to the secondary side of the relation in a merely external manner but in terms of

"an *analogia attributionis intrinsicae.*" (3)

If this were not the case then one would be back in the position of equivocal predication and there would be no possibility of knowledge of God from the creature. Therefore,

"the analogy *proprie* belongs both to the analogans and the analogatum. It is inward both to God and to the creature, although to the last only δευτερων *et per dependentiam.*" (4)

2. Ibid. p.238.
3. Ibid.
Barth does not object to Quenstedt's use of analogical language in speech about God, but that the necessity for this is different from that which he posits. "Though we agree with his attack on the thesis of parity and disparity between human words and divine being, in his case it has another sense than with us. With us the rejection of parity is a defence against the denial of the veiling of God in His revelation. But with him it is a defence against the denial of the distinction between absolute and relative being as such. With us the rejection of the thesis of disparity is a defence against the denial of unveiling in God's revelation. With him it is a defence against the denial of the unity of relative and absolute being in truth." (1)

If Quenstedt had seen the proper necessity for analogical predication in speech about God in terms of the nature of God's self revealed unity, the Father as Deus absconditus, the Son as Deus revelatus and the Holy Spirit as the inconceivable unity of both the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus, he could not insist that the relationship between God and the creature is one of intrinsic attribution. Since "what makes the creature into an analogue of God does not lie in itself and its nature, not even in the sense that God will acknowledge and accept as an analogue (in itself) something 1. Op. cit. p.240.
of that which lies in the nature of the creature.

What converts the creature into an analogue of
God lies only in the veracity of the object
known analogously in the knowledge of God, and
therefore in the veracity of God Himself." (1)

Barth, therefore, supports the view, which is opposed to Quenstedt's idea
of intrinsic attribution, that the relationship posited between God and
the creature by the unity of the self revelation of God is one which,
depending upon the inconceivable freedom and love in which God determines
Himself for Man and Man for Himself in Jesus Christ, can only be
understood by faith which depends upon the actuality and possibility of
creaturely knowledge of God being one with the Holy Spirit. As the Holy
Spirit's mode of divine existence is that which unites the Father as the
Father and the Son as the Son, He incorporates and thus establishes
creaturely knowledge of God in the "circulus veritatis Dei." (2) Hence
Barth speaks of extrinsic as opposed to intrinsic attribution to emphasise
the majesty of the grace that is involved in the actuality and possibility
of creaturely knowledge of God in this way.

The creature is analogous to the Creator,

"extrinseca in the form of apprehensio and
not at all intrinseca." (3)

Barth's insistence on the extrinsic nature of the relationship posited in
the creature's analogical relation to God corresponds to the fact that
creaturely existence presupposes the freedom and love in which God
Himself posits His being as the creature's Lord in Jesus Christ. It is

2. Ibid. p.254.
important to realise that Barth's rejection of Quenstedt's exposition of analogy is based on dogmatic presuppositions and not simply on an analysis of what has been traditionally understood as the creature's analogical relation to God. Barth grounds the reality and possibility of an analogical relation between God and the creature in his analysis of the dogmatic distinctions posited in God Himself between His being in and for Himself and His being for us in Jesus Christ. The fact of the unity of the self revealing triune God posits the analogical relation as an aspect of the way in which the creature may participate in God's own knowledge of Himself. (1) In the doctrine of revelation this self revealed unity of God was understood in terms of the dialectic between the doctrines of perichoresis and appropriations: in the doctrine of God the self revelation of God presupposed His self election, the fact that God not only posits Himself but also posits Himself as the God who loves in freedom. Subsequently we have indicated the relationship between this aspect of the doctrine of God and Barth's analysis of the covenant as the internal basis of the creation which was conceived as its external or technical possibility. We now see that Barth's conception of the relationship between God and the creature, considered from the point of view of knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature, raises the creature to understanding as a creature in terms of the unity of the self revealed God. This implies that all creaturely reality, its continuities and distinctions, presuppose the continuities and distinctions of the being of its Creator and Lord.

It now remains for us to justify this conclusion by reference to Barth's analysis of the relationship between knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature, by examining the way he relates knowledge of

1. See Appendix E.
God analogy fidei to knowledge of the creature analogy relationis.

Knowledge Of The Creature In Relation To Knowledge Of God: Analogia Fidei And Analogia Relationis.

We have already indicated that the determination of Jesus in his cosmic or worldly relation with and for the creature presupposed His being Man for God, real Man, in which determination He is identical with the determination of God for man. Precisely because Jesus in His cosmic relation presupposed the truth of God's own self determination, the creature which corresponds to this determination in its being for the other in the I-Thou relationship, is essentially hidden from itself. Hence the continuity between the existence of Jesus as Man for other men and the truth of creaturely existence in its being for the other presupposes the same inconceivable freedom as that which is posited between the death and resurrection of Jesus, between the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus. Consequently the continuity is one which corresponds to, as it subsits in, the continuity in which the Father is the Father and the Son the Son in the Unity of the Holy Spirit.

"The divinity of the man Jesus is to be described comprehensively in the statement that He is man for God, His humanity can and must be described no less succinctly in the proposition that He is man for man, for other men, His fellows." (1)

But in the humanity of Jesus, as the One who presupposes the truth of creaturely existence we stand,

"before the true and original correspondence the fact that the man Jesus in His being for man repeats and reflects the

inner being or essence of God and this confirms His being for God. The humanity of Jesus is not merely the repetition and reflection of His divinity, or of God's controlling will; it is the repetition and reflection of God Himself, no more and no less. It is the image of God, the *imago Dei.* (1)

As the creature in its relationship with the other may be known as the image of God the relationship between this reality and the reality of Jesus' being man for other men is precisely the same as that which presupposes the distinction between God and the creature. For the truth of creaturely existence in this relationship is presupposed by the truth of Jesus being man for other men, in the sense that He is in His humanity the reality and possibility of God being not only in and for Himself but also for us. *Analogia relationis* as that which speaks of the relationship posited between Jesus being man for other men and the truth of creaturely existence in its relationship with another is correctly summarised by Jüngel when he says,

"Gott in der Offenbarung an seiner konkreten relationalen Existenz als Gott Vater, Sohn und Geist teiligt in der Weise der Wiederholung. Die Wiederholung ist als Relation Gottes zu uns die Entsprechung zu Gottes Selbstbezogenheit: analogia relationis." (2)

The *analogia relationis* is then primarily a Christological reference. It expresses the way in which Jesus is the image of God as the


One who presupposes the creature's existence in the unity of the triune God. What is at issue in Barth's understanding of this analogical relationship is,

"the relationship within the being of God on the one side and the being of God and that of man on the other." (1)

Since He who reveals Himself in the secondary analogate, the man Jesus in His being for other men, is none other than He who posits Himself as the One He is as the primary analogate, there can be no question of deducing directly from the humanity of Jesus a Christian anthropology. (2) Man can only be understood in terms of the *analogia relationis* by asking after the reality and possibility of the creature which is presupposed by Jesus being in His cosmic relation man for other men.

The anthropological question which raises to understanding the being of the creature is one which presupposes

"the inconceivable grace of God, that He concludes this covenant with man." (3)

If we ask after the reality and possibility of the creature on this basis we must ask after

"a basic form of the humanity . . . . of man in general, in which there is given and revealed the fact that the man Jesus can be for them . . . . How far as men they are beings which can be represented by the man Jesus." (4)


3. Barth,K. *Church Dogmatics.* Vol.3.2.*p.224.*

Now if Jesus' being for other men presupposes and corresponds to the
inconceivable freedom and love in which God determines Himself to be God
for Man and Man for God, then the correspondence which is established
between man's being for others and Jesus' being for others, that is the
relationship between God and the creature established by the unity of the
self revealed God, will be one which despite all the disparity that is
involved is one in which

"there is presupposed a common factor, a
parity, not merely between Jesus and other
men, but because between Jesus and other
men, between God and man generally." (1)

As the *analogia fidei* presupposed an analogical as opposed to a relation-
ship of parity or disparity between God and the creature, so too the
*analogia relationis* presupposes the same thing for precisely the same
reason. In both cases we see that the necessity and rationality of the
relationship in question reposes on the freedom of God to be who He is in
His self revelation.

The structure of Barth's doctrine of *analogia relationis* which
defines his understanding of the relationship between God and the creature
has been admirably summarised by E. Jüngel:

"(a) Den Beziehungen im innergottlichen Sein
entspricht die Beziehung zwischen Gott
und dem Menschen Jesus.

(b) Der Beziehung zwischen dem Menschen Jesus
und Gott entspricht die Beziehung zwischen
dem Menschen Jesus und den Menschen überhaupt.

(c) Der Beziehung dem Menschen Jesus und dem Menschen überhaupt entspricht die Beziehung zwischen den Menschen überhaupt.

(d) Die Beziehung zwischen den Menschen überhaupt entspricht den Beziehungen in innergöttlichen Sein und Wesen.

(e) Den Beziehung in innergöttlichen Sein und Wessen entspricht die Beziehung zwischen Gott und dem Menschen überhaupt." (1)

Thus the image of God in man generally as representing the relationship between God and the creature may be described as extrinsec in precisely the same sense and for precisely the same reason as knowledge of God in terms of the creature was described by Barth in terms of an analogia attributionis extrinsec. Both forms of the analogy, in respect to knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature, confirm and prove Barth's fundamental theological method in which one moves from the reality and possibility posited by the God's self revelation to the reality and possibility of the creature. (2)

We see therefore that Barth's analysis of the possibility of


2. For this reason we find Brunner's reasoning difficult to follow when he states concerning the Church Dogmatics, Vol.3.2., in which Barth deals with the anthropological question, that "Barth himself will surely not contest the fact that what stands in the sixth volume is in contradiction to much that was said in earlier volumes." (Brunner, E. The New Barth Scottish Journal of Theology. Vol.4.1951.p.124.)

(Continued on p.289.)
knowledge of the creature confirms our previous conclusions concerning the way in which the unity of God and the creature and their distinctness in the God-creature relationship is determined by his understanding of the unity of the self revealed and self-electing God. All other questions as

2. (Continued from p.288.)

On the contrary we find that Barth is highly consistent with his dogmatic presuppositions, worked out in the doctrines of revelation and God, when he comes to examine the reality of the creature. What Brunner has to say about Barth's doctrine of the creature would seem to confirm what Barth said about his relationship with Brunner in an interview with a B.B.C. reporter:

"In his good creation, God saw fit to create such diverse creatures as an elephant and a whale. Each has his own function and purpose. But they are so different that they cannot communicate with each other or even fight with each other. As a result, they also cannot conclude a peace pact with each other. Why God chose to place such diverse creatures in the same universe no one knows. For the answer to this question we must wait until the eschaton. Only then will it become clear as to why God created the elephant and the whale." (Nehta.V. The New Theologian, pp.143-144.)

Firstly Brunner appears to understand Barth's "Real Man", Jesus Christ, the One who directly corresponds to God's determination of Himself for man, as empirical man, man as he actually exists. (Ibid.p.125) Having assumed this Brunner finds it hard to understand why Barth should criticise his presentation of a theological anthropology which had taken as its point of departure man as he actually exists in contradiction with God. (Ibid.) It is little wonder that having assumed that Barth means by "Real Man", man as he actually exists, that the way in which Barth develops his view of "Real Man" is irreconcilable with the Christian doctrine of sin. (Ibid.p.126.) By this is meant that Barth's "Real Man" is ontologically immune to sin. (Ibid.p.129.) Brunner overlooks the fact that "Real Man" for Barth presupposes the inconceivable freedom and love in which God in determining Himself for man determines man for Himself in Jesus Christ; hence it is somewhat beside the point for Brunner to suggest that Barth should substitute for this understanding of "Real Man" one which sees him as empirical man in contradiction to God. Jesus Christ then would appear as "True Man" who contradicts "Real Man's" contradiction of God. (Ibid.p.126.)

Secondly Brunner seems to fail to understand the import of Barth's view of analogia relationis. Brunner sees it as,

"the I-Thou relationship between God and man and between man and man are related to one another. Between these I-Thou relationships their exists, says Barth, an analogy, that is analogia relationis." (Ibid.p.127.)
to the possibility of conceiving the relationship between God and the creature are pre-empted by the fact that God is who He is in the event of His self revelation. To posit any relationship between God and the creature apart from that which is presupposed by the love and freedom which

2. (Continued from p.289.)

Brunner finds difficulty in accepting that this relationship is a determination of man's being,

"that it is an ontological determination." (Ibid., p.127.)

In agreement with R. Prenter, Brunner believes that this entails that the,

"analogia relationis becomes an analogia entis." (Ibid., p.127)

As Brunner failed to grasp the meaning of Barth's definition of "Real Man", so it seems he also misses the point of Barth's understanding of analogia relationis. The analogia relationis precludes an analogia entis as it posits the relationship between God and the creature in its distinctions and continuities in terms of the freedom and love which presupposes God's being for us in Jesus Christ. If man corresponds to this truth in the sense of an analogia relationis this can only be understood in the faith which is necessitated by the freedom and love in which God is God. Thus the comparison involved in the analogia relationis is not a comparison between the being of God on the one hand and the being of man on the other. As we have indicated, and as Barth indicates on the page reference given by Brunner in this connection;

"The being of God cannot be compared with that of man. But it is not a question of this twofold being. It is a question of the relationship within the being of God on the one side and between the being of God and that of man on the other. Between the two relationships as such ••• there is correspondence and similarity. There is an analogia relationis." (Barth, K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.3,2. p.220. Cf. p.262.)

The analogia relationis does not presuppose the existence of the creature with anything but the inconceivable freedom and love of God to be for us who He is in and for Himself. If the creature in its relationship with the other corresponds to the truth of the humanity of Jesus as Man for other men as He is determined by His being Man for God, then the creature's being ••• its actuality and possibility ••• can only be postulated as it presupposes the fact that God is who He is in Jesus Christ. It is precisely because Barth views the reality of the creature from this perspective that he sees Brunner's doctrine of man which takes its point of departure from empirical man, man in contradiction, as a doctrine which

(Continued on p.291.)
posits this event is to make the irrational attempt to seek understanding of the creature apart from its reality and possibility posited in Jesus Christ.

2. (Continued from p.290.)

speaks of man as a


CHAPTER 4.

The Relationship Between The Doctrine Of The Trinity And The Doctrine Of Creation II.

Problems Attendant On The Positing Of The God-Creature Relationship.

It is our intention in this chapter to critically assess the manner in which Barth achieves understanding of the relationship between God and the creature in terms of a methodology orientated by his doctrine of the Trinity. We will continue to take as our point of departure the network of relationships posted by Barth between his doctrines of Revelation, God and Creation which we have sought to elucidate in our analysis of the relationship between knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature.

In this analysis we have become conscious of the fact that Barth's theological effort forms a unity in terms of his determination to understand God and man, not by means of a general category of understanding, but by and in the concrete revelation of God who reveals Himself in Christ. Not a God and a man with being and attributes, but an act, an event, which when we see the actor so acting, we presume to presuppose certain things about the reality of His being in His relation to Himself and that which He distinguishes from Himself by His activity. He is the living God, beyond or behind which there is no transcendent depth of Being, no static eternity in which this action and event is contained. Consequently we have seen that for Barth both the Ordo Essendi and the Ordo Conspescendi, the order of being and the order of knowledge, start with the concrete event of God's action in Jesus Christ. In the doctrine of Creation this meant that no general truths about God and man could be drawn from the being of the creature as such. The truth of the creature, which follows its being, derives from the light shed by God's activity
towards it. This truth was seen to presuppose a special moment in which God, on the basis of His own inner will and decision, turned outward. The creature is as it is from and for the concrete reality which is the unity of the relationships of God's triune life presupposed by the event of His self revealed Lordship. In summary form: the being of the creature in its relationship with God derives from,

"the attitude of God .... to the man Jesus,
His election of this man; His becoming and remaining one with Him; His self revelation, action and glorification in Him and through Him; His love addressed to Him and through Him .... His freedom and sovereignty which in this man find their creaturely dwelling and form, their Bearer and Representative." (1)

Because God exists as this One who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ, because God knows Himself in Jesus Christ, and all creation and all men in and through Jesus Christ; because of God's free decision to be for us, we human beings can be and know of our own existence as coming from Him. (2)

Now the question which we wish to take up in this context is the viability of Barth's method of understanding creation in terms of what is taken to be the central issue of any statement of the christian doctrine of creation. In short a christian view of creation is committed to the proposition that the

"created forms of rationality (are) to be

distinguished from the eternal rationality of God. In creating and knowing them God remains free from any necessity in the relationship, although they remain grounded in the Supreme Truth of His Being". (1)

This view of the relationship between God and the creature has been seen to be of importance in emphasising the created integrity of the creature and as such, in part, facilitated the development of modern experimental science. (2) For in giving the creature a rationality and integrity of its own, which was dependent upon His action directed toward it, God "endowed the universe with an immanent rationality making it determinate and knowable. Over against the creation God remains quite free in His eternal Self-existence and therefore cannot be known in the determinate way in which created things are known, but the creation also remains free in its utterly contingent character and is therefore to be known in its natural processes only out of itself." (3)

The fact that in these circumstances the immanent rationality of the


creature cannot give a final account of itself in terms of its own inner structure can be taken as the obverse side of the truth that the connection between creaturely being and its ground in the creative will of God is "grounded in God alone, and does not rest partly in God and partly in creation." (1)

This view of the relationship between God and the creature is one which is to be distinguished from other views concerned to address themselves to the same general problem. According to M. Foster, (2) the christian doctrine that nature is created signifies "the main differences between the methods of ancient and the methods of modern natural science." (3)

That the difference is directly attributable to, "the Christian and Greek conception of God and of God's relation to the world." (4)

The principle practical result of this difference was that experience rather than logical definition played the major role in man's understanding of nature.

"Modern science describes natural substances instead of defining them, it discovers their properties by observation and experiment instead of by 'intuitive induction' and

4. Ibid.
demonstration, it classifies their species instead of dividing their genera, it establishes between them the relation of cause and effect instead of the relation of ground and consequent." (1)

The Greek method involved the assumption that the form of a thing, that which makes it intelligible to reason, was the prime attribute of material things. The form makes a thing to be what it is, whereas matter does not contribute any positive element to a thing's being.

"Matter is the correlative, in the object, of sense in the subject, as form is the correlative to reason; and thus the Greek assumption about science, that there can be no empirical evidence for scientific conclusions, depends upon the Greek assumption about nature which may be loosely designated the assumption of the 'unreality of matter'." (2)

This view entails that in relation to God neither element in nature can be seen to be dependent upon a creative power outside itself for its being what it is, neither element can be understood as created.

"If matter were created it would possess positive being", and "if form were created it would not be intelligible." (3)

Nature may be conceived to be dependent upon a Superior Power for the action whereby the two elements in nature are brought together, but not

2. Ibid. p. 455.
3. Ibid. p. 456.
for the being of either element. Plato's Demiurge functions as both informative and purposive. It is

"confined to the information of given matter

...... and directed by the antecedent

conception of an end." (1)

The same assumption, with certain qualifications, also holds good for the Aristotelian view of creation. (2)

The distinctive characteristics of a doctrine of creation which presuppose a Creator, rather than an Artificer, will be that instead of seeking a correlation between the divine and human 'logoi' in understanding and defining matter, it will be seen that the

"voluntary activity of the Creator (i.e., that in his activity which exceeds determination by reason) terminates on the contingent being of the creature (i.e., on that element of its being which eludes determination by form, namely its matter and the characteristics it possesses qua material.) If such voluntary activity is essential to God, it follows that the element of contingency is essential to what he creates." ...... "This 'something more', the element in nature which depends upon the voluntary activity of God, is incapable of becoming an object to reason, and science must therefore depend, in regard to this


element, upon the evidence of sensation.
The reliance upon the senses for evidence, not merely for illustration, is what constitutes the empirical character peculiar to modern natural science; and the conclusion follows that only a created nature is proper object of an empirical science." (1)

Foster develops this thesis of the relation between the Christian doctrine of creation and the rise of modern natural science, (2) by criticising the view presented by St. Augustine of the relationship between the Logos or Word of God and the creature in his work on "The Trinity" (3). Augustine is seen to overcome one of the problems inherent in the Greek view of God's relation to the world in so far as he identifies the Word with God's own self utterance. By linking this Word with the rationality of the creature St. Augustine avoids Plato's dilemma of the form and matter of the world being co-eternal with God. God is freed from any necessary connection with the world by being the author of His own thought. But the problem remains in St. Augustine of distinguishing between the natural generation of the Son of God and His incarnation in time. The world is thus presented as an inferior representation of the divine reason of God. (4)

Thus a distinction is seen to be necessary which emphasises the fact that while in creating the world God establishes a relationship between Himself and the creature this is not something which proceeds from His nature considered as His own, but in terms of His will which

3. Ibid.
constitutes the rationality of the creature as distinct, with its own integrity, from that which is God's by nature. (1) H. Gollwitzer, speaking to the same problem in the context of a discussion of the appropriateness of human speech about God, maintains that

"the fact that revelation's mode of being is definable only with reference to persons has its ground not in the nature of God, but in the will of God, i.e., it is not possible to argue back from it to the nature of God in the sense of how God is constituted, but only to the nature of his will, i.e., from his will as made known in history to his eternal will as the will of his free love." (2)

There is therefore to be understood a functional and not a structural similarity between the being of God and that of the creature. (3)

Barth too is not unaware of the problem involved. Although it is true, and Barth's whole theology depends upon the equation, that

"God's essence and His operations are not twain but one" (4);

he nevertheless maintains, while

"the operation of God is the essence of God, it is necessary and important to distinguish His essence as such from His operation." (5)


3. Ibid. p.185.


5. Ibid.
The necessity is grounded in the self revealed Lordship of God in that
His revelation corresponds to

"a free divine decision .... He remains free,
in operating, in giving Himself." (1)

Foster's thesis raises the question of understanding theologically
the distinction considered necessary between the rationality of God's
being which remains implacably indeterminate in His transcendence vis-a-vis
the creature and the determinate nature of the relationship into which
He enters voluntarily in the Creation and the Incarnation. By
emphasising either one of these aspects of the problem errors can arise. (2)
Over emphasis on the transcendence of the Creator can make the
relationship which God establishes between Himself and the world appear to
have no basis in God Himself whose being remains inscrutable. We recall
Barth's vigorous defence of the Filioque in the context of the doctrine of
the Trinity where his whole position depended upon the equation that what
God is in His revelation He is antecedently in Himself.

"The reality of God in His revelation is not
to be bracketed with an 'only', as though
somewhere behind this revelation there
stood another reality of God .... the reality
of God which meets us in revelation is His
reality in all the depths of eternity." (3)

Over emphasis on the contingent nature of created reality can induce

forgetfulness of its dependence upon the continued presence of God with and for the creature. Once the primacy of God's gracious approach to the creature is called into question then the contingency of the creature can be converted into a necessity which finds no room for God's active participation in creaturely history. Deism on this basis asserts that there is room for God only at the ultimate beginning, whilst agnosticism asserts the reality of the contingent necessity of nature alone. Thus,

"the risk of Deism or agnosticism is the price," (1)

one has to pay for asserting the contingent nature of created reality as it is understood in its being as the term of an act of God's will which is distinct from that in which God wills Himself.

Therefore in any account of the God-creature relationship considered from the point of view of the relationship between knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature, both sides of the problem illustrated by Foster's thesis must be taken into account. This will entail for the purposes of our discussion the emphasis of both the side of the Object over against the human knower and the side of the human subject in its distinct integrity over against the Object known.

**Catholic And Reformed Understanding Of The God-Creature Relationship.**

In order to widen our perspective and to gain a vantage point from which Earth's treatment of the problem may be assessed, we now take up the questions raised by Foster in the context of proffered answers from both Catholic and Reformed traditions. We look at the views expressed by E.L. Mascall, whom we take to be a representative of neo-Thomism in 1. Torrance, T.F. *Theological Science*, p.67.n.1.
an Anglican form (1) and T.F. Torrance whom we take to be representative of the Reformed viewpoint. (2)

Mascall maintains that the unique Christian contribution to understanding creation in the manner presupposed by Foster's analysis is best seen in the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas. (3) St. Thomas, over against Aristotle, placed emphasis on the act of existence of things rather than the existence of things being defined in terms of their essence. An essence, expressed by means of concepts, and serving as the basis of major premises of syllogistic argumentation, cannot be the object of experimentation or argumentation. (4) On the other hand when essence is understood as act of existence its definition will receive formulation in propositions based on personal judgments that are open to experimental verification. Precisely because Thomas refused to hold that a things existence is an addition to its essence, (5) there can be no question of the world having to conform to a predetermined scheme of universals and particulars. (6) Instead of a theory of universals and

2. Torrance, T.F. Theology in Reconstruction: Theological Science: Space, Time and Incarnation.
5. Ibid. p. 50.
6. Ibid. p. 62.
particulars, of form and matter, the relationship between the rationality of created being and its transcendental cause will be analogical. Analogical thought in this context derives its meaning from St. Thomas' denial of the Aristotelian essentialist metaphysic and his substituting his own existentialist variety. This latter seeks to understand the creature in relation to God in terms of the actual contingency of creaturely existence and does not attempt a logical correlation of the structures of reason and being. (1)

Therefore the basis upon which Mascall relates the contingent being of the creature to the Creator is by means of an analysis of creaturely existence as such. The distinction between God and the creature will be posited by the difference presupposed between the relationship of existence to essence in creaturely beings and in God. The non-necessary nature of the relationship between existence and essence in creaturely being postulates its contingency in relation to God in whom existence and essence coincide naturally. Analogical thought and speech of God in His relation to the creature is legitimised by the contingent relationship in which the creature stands vis-a-vis God. The form of this analogical relationship will be governed by the discrepency between the relationship of existence to essence in the creature and God. Hence though existence may be predicated of God and the creature, the mode of predication differs with respect to God and the creature. (2)

Consequently one cannot add together the relationship of existence to essence in God and the creature and make a significant statement about them. This entails that though the creature is related to God, and is

2. Ibid. pp.117-120.
thereby guaranteed its existence qua creature, there is no direct proportion between God's willing of Himself and His willing of the creature. Thus while the contingent nature of the creature is not threatened by the fact it is simply a pale reflection of the divinity, its definition by natural laws cannot contain its description since its existence presupposes an act of will on the part of the Creator. (1)

The relationship posited between God and the creature in terms of Mascall's analysis of the relationship between knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature in St. Thomas's existentialist metaphysic is one which entails the meaningfulness of human speech and language as such within a theological context. That is it presupposes its understanding of God in His relationship with the world by the structures of creaturely being which are knowable apart from any direct reference to a particular revelation of God. This may be seen by Mascall's understanding of St. Thomas' use of analogy.

Mascall holds that for St. Thomas being was not a genus, since there is nothing outside it from which it may be differentiated. (2)

Something has to be and therefore is a being. From God to dust everything is. What is true of beings in their relation to one another is true also of the relation between God and things. But since being is not a genus the relationship between God and creatures is one that can only be spoken of analogously, as opposed to univocal or equivocal predication. According to Mascall, St. Thomas distinguishes between two fundamental types of analogy:

that classified as 'two to a third' and 'one to another'. This latter type, for obvious reasons, is the only one appropriate for consideration of the God creature relationship. God could not be compared with something else in which He with the creature participated in different ways. The analogy of 'one to another' is divided into two sub-types: analogy of attribution and proportionality. (1) In the former the predicate belongs formally and properly to one analogate and only relatively and derivatively to the second. The analogy of proportionality rescues the analogy of attribution from being simply an assertion that if creatures are God is. It states,

"that the analogue under discussion is found formally in each of the analogates but in a mode that is determined by the nature of the analogate itself." (2)

It is also obvious that St. Thomas' use of analogous speech about God and the creature depends upon the assumption that there is likeness between cause and effect. (3) This is not an assumption imported into the God creature relationship but is an explanation of the creaturely existence as non-necessary in the light of the relationship which subsists in creaturely being between existence and essence. (4)

In developing his interpretation of St. Thomas Mascall is consciously opposing the thesis of Cardinal Cajetan who asserted that the only proper analogy recognised by St. Thomas was that of proportionality.

2. Ibid. p.104.
4. Ibid. p.68.
Mascall holds that the purpose of analogy in St. Thomas is not to allow us to form concepts of the divine essence but to affirm its existence. If proportionality were the only valid analogy then it would collapse either from its essentialist and univocal predication or in avoiding this would lapse into agnosticism since there would be no way of judging what relationship the analogates stood with respect to each other. (1)

"Without the analogy of proportionality it is very doubtful whether the attributes we predicate of God can be ascribed to Him in more than a merely virtual sense; without the analogy of attribution it hardly seems possible to avoid agnosticism." (2)

The analogical relationship between God and the creature must, therefore, be seen to entail a

"combining in a tightly interlocked union both the analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality." (3)

Since the perfections of the creature are predicated of God eminently according to the analogy of proportionality, the whole question of theological analogy is that of distinguishing, on the basis of the analogy of attribution, the mode of signification of the perfection in the creature and the mode of signification in God. (4) The difference between the mode of signification and the thing signified, in terms of existential


judgments formed about created nature, grounds the theological use of analogical predication in speech about God and the creature. By thus co-joining the analogies of proportionality and attribution the transcendence as well as the immanence of God in His relation to the creature can be held together.

Where Mascall seeks to understand the Creator-creature relationship in terms of an analysis of creaturely existence facilitated by Thomist metaphysics, T.F. Torrance seeks to speak to the same question in a more specifically theological manner by means of the Reformed view of the person of Christ. Consequently his understanding of the phenomena noted by M. Foster will differ from Mascall. (1) Torrance emphasises the change in the doctrine of God which took place in the Reformation, renewing earlier Patristic insights, as decisive for the kind of doctrine of creation which was conducive to the scientific development to which Foster refers.

According to Torrance the Reformers destroyed the systematic connection between thought and being, Creator and creature, which prevailed in post-Augustinian Western theology and entailed that nature was impregnated with final causes posited by the eternal knowing and willing of the creature by God. (2) They did this in two main ways. In the first place they challenged the reversibility of the relationship between God and man by the doctrine of election. (3) This questioned the assumption that there is an inherent relationship between the form structure of


2. Cf. Torrance’s comment on Aquinas in this connection. Theological Science, p.60. n.1 & 2.

reason and that of being. The relationship is one which is freely posited by God and therefore irreversible. Thus the transcendence of God, signified by the doctrine of election, is understood to safeguard both the freedom of God and the contingent nature of creaturely existence vis-à-vis the existence of God. Secondly, emphasizing the integrity of creaturely existence as posited freely by God, the Reformers, in particular Calvin, spoke of God's condescension to man in such a manner that he adapts and 'accommodates' Himself in Jesus Christ to our creaturely ways of speaking and knowing. (1) This means that our statements about God and the creature arise out of and take form which expresses at once both the nature of the Object and our mode of cognition of it.

Therefore the Reformed account of the God-creature relationship which presupposes its view of the reality and possibility of creaturely knowledge of God is one which issues from its understanding of God's accommodation of Himself to human ways of thinking and speaking in Jesus Christ, which act is grounded in His free divine election of or covenant with the creature. (2) This implies that the reality of human knowledge of God in His relation with the creature is tied to the factuality of the event in which God adapts Himself as and for the creature. Hence the actual humanity of Jesus will be methodologically important in this context, both as guarantor that creaturely statements about God repose upon the reality of God's movement toward the creature and that creaturely existence in its created contingency is in itself important not simply as a means through which men might look to the eternal realm but as having its own integrity. While the logic of creaturely statements about God will


involve a necessary "ana-logic" (1) as presupposing God's movement toward the creature, it also entails that human knowledge of the creature as such will play an integral part in creaturely knowledge of the Creator and the creature. Thus the Incarnation guarantees that creaturely statements about God repose upon reality, for

"apart from the homoousion there is no real and objective connection between our human knowing and speaking of God, and God Himself." (2)

yet since it is God's movement to man no correlation can be made between the structure of creaturely being as such and the being of God. For this reason Torrance rejects any attempt to construct a natural knowledge of God as a prior conceptual system of its own abstracted from the actuality of the movement of God whereby He accommodates Himself to the structures of our being and knowing.

"Rather must it be undertaken in an integrated unity with positive theology in which it plays an indispensible part in our inquiry and understanding of God." (3)

Before we pass to a consideration of Torrance's understanding of the analogical relationship between God and the creature which is assumed by his approach, we look at what we take to be an important but often overlooked emphasis which the Reformed viewpoint adopts. I refer to the

1. Torrance, T.F. Theology in Reconstruction. pp.34.ff.
2. Ibid. p.39.
methodological importance given to the human nature of Jesus in understanding the God creature relationship.

i. The Methodological Importance of the Humanity of Jesus in Reformed Theology.

We have already drawn attention in another context (1), to a way in which the Reformed emphasis on the humanity of Jesus became one of its distinguishing characteristics. In the present context we wish to show how Torrance takes up certain aspects of Calvin's theology to explain in more detail his view of the God creature relationship.

To the question of how God is known Calvin gives a clear answer. It is only by an act of God's grace beyond the natural capacity of the human mind. (2) In order to know God it is necessary to go beyond our own judgments, since God's truth is too transcendent for us to estimate. (3) Therefore,

"we must go outside of ourselves and not measure God by the capacity of our minds." (4)

Hence faith is called knowledge in the sense that,

"we intend not so much a comprehension as men commonly have of those things which fall under the notice of their senses. For it is so superior, that the human mind must exceed and rise above itself, in order to attain to it. Nor does the mind which attains it comprehend what it perceives, but being persuaded of

that which it cannot comprehend, it understands more by the certainty of this persuasion, than it would any human object by the exercise of its natural capacity." (1)

That we cannot know God without such a stretching of our capacity to know does not entail that we take leave of our senses. (2) On the contrary the stretching necessitated by the knowledge of faith presupposes God's letting Himself down to the measure of our understanding.

"As we are corporeal, always creeping upon the ground, cleaving to terrestrial and carnal objects, and incapable of understanding or conceiving of anything of a spiritual nature, our merciful Lord, in His infinite indulgence, accommodates Himself to our capacity, condescending to lead us to Himself .... and in the flesh itself to present to us a mirror of spiritual blessings." (3)

Two recurring themes help to explain Calvin's understanding of the essential path to true knowledge of God, which involves God's accommodation of Himself to our creaturely limitations that He may raise us up to knowledge of Himself. On the one hand it takes seriously the reality of God's condescension to the creature whilst on the other His exalted power and glory is not called into question by this act. The first of these is the fact that God's accommodation and adaptation for our sakes takes place in all its aspects as a voluntary act. Secondly and

closely related to this is the fact that Calvin emphasises that this voluntary act takes place not for the sake of God, but for our sakes. In discussing Christ's humiliation Calvin reminds his readers of these two considerations. (1)

Because Christ's humiliation in all its aspects was voluntary, Calvin insists that it in no sense detracts from His glory and power.

"If it takes nothing from His glory, that he was altogether 'emptied', neither does it degrade Him, that He chose not only to grow in body, but to make progress in mind." (2)

With regard to the baptism of Christ Calvin says,

"And so Christ bids him (John) consider what was suitable to the character of a servant, which he had undertaken; for a voluntary subjection takes nothing from his glory". (3)

The consideration that God's humiliation in Christ was voluntary makes it

   On the incarnation as such Commentary on John 10.17.
   On His baptism Commentary on Matthew 3.13.
   On the voluntary and vicarious nature of Christ's humiliation. Commentary on John 19.12; 11.53; 14.30; 18.1, 4, 8, 12. On the question of Christ's obedience in Calvin's thought see van Buren, P. Christ In Our Place: The Substitutionary Character of Calvin's Doctrine of Reconciliation. pp.27 ff. This dissertation prepared under Barth's guidance shows, at critical points, the reserve towards Calvin's emphasis on the empirical humanity of Christ as meaningful in determining the structure of the doctrine of God which Barth himself feels necessary. pp.11-13, 16-18, 38-29.


possible for Calvin to perceive the grace and glory of Christ through His accommodation. This is reinforced by Calvin's insistence that Christ's voluntary condescension was for our sakes.

It was our shame, our sin, our guilt, our curse, our humiliation, that Christ voluntarily bore. In this 'not His but ours' lies the reason why Calvin sees a double aspect to all Christ's sufferings. He is at the same time accursed and beloved by the Father. Christ is accursed for our sake, but beloved because He is obedient to the Father's will. (1) Since God's condescension was for our sakes the glory and power of God is in no way diminished or altered by His accommodation. It is therefore in no way surprising that Calvin should concentrate on the practical significance of God's humiliation in Christ. From the fact that Christ learned obediently by the things that he suffered it follows

"that they in no way detract from His dignity, but indeed are to His glory." (2)

On another occasion Calvin expressly sees the idea of Christ's high rank especially visible on the cross because He died for us. (3) Because Calvin relates the glory of the cross to the fact that Christ's humiliation was for our salvation he frequently speaks of the triumph of Christ on the cross over Satan and all His enemies. (4) In this we see it is evident

4. Ibid. 17.1. Cf. Commentary on Colossians. 2.15.
that for Calvin the power of Christ was neither suspended nor contradicted by the depth of His humiliation but was rather manifested precisely there where he obediently suffered for our sakes.

Now the purpose of this short excurses into Calvin's thought is to link up the emphasis we have located there with an aspect of Torrance's understanding of the God-creature relationship. For Torrance is at pains to give due weight to both the transcendence of God in relation to the creature, as we have indicated by his use of the doctrine of election, and the intimate relationship in which God stands with the creature as this is rooted in the condescension of God to man in Jesus Christ. As Calvin asserted the transcendence and immanence of God by means of the complimentary concepts of Christ's voluntary condescension for our sakes in considering the relationship between His majesty and humiliation, Torrance achieves a similar purpose with respect to knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature by his use of the doctrines of an and enhypostasis with respect to the hypostatic union. (1) This means that

"by anhypostasia classical Christology asserted that in the assumptio carnis the human nature of Christ had no independent per se subsistence apart from the event of the incarnation, apart from the hypostatic union. By enhypostasia, however, it asserted that in the assumptio carnis the human nature of Christ was given a real concrete subsistence within the hypostatic union ... it was enhypostatic in the Word. Anhypostasia and enhypostasia are

1. Torrance, T.F., Theological Science, pp. 217, 269."
inseparable. In the incarnation the eternal Son assumed human nature into oneness with Himself, but in that assumption Jesus Christ is not only real man but a man. (1)

Whilst Torrance is careful to point out that these technical terms cannot be developed into a

"masterful idea of a system of thought," (2)
divorced from the reality to which it points in the form of the mystery of the person of the Incarnate, he nevertheless sees its usefulness in directing us to both the

"unconditional priority of God's grace, that everything in theological knowledge derives from God's grace",

and a,

"full unimpaired place for human decision, human response, and human thinking in relation to the Truth of God's Grace." (3)

Thus while the Incarnation does not mean that God is limited by His creaturely form, the use of the terms *an* and *enhypostasia* entail recognition of the reality of the creaturely structure of thought and being in all our relations with God. Therefore, the Incarnation in its relation to creation establishes

"the infinite freedom and the unique kind of necessity that hold between God and the world, which not only preserve its contingence but

which so ground it in the rationality of
God as to provide for us in our creaturely
existence an intelligible medium and an
objective basis for all our relations
with God." (1)

For this reason Torrance does not see any methodological
necessity to exclude natural knowledge of created reality from playing
a meaningful part in theological speech about God. In fact he holds, on
the basis of the above analysis, that

"it is no longer possible to operate scientifically
with a separation between natural theology and
revealed theology." (2)

He therefore has reservations about Barth's procedure in this area. (3)
As if reminiscent of Barth's language in his discussion of Quenstedt's
formulation of the doctrine of *analogia entis*, Torrance claims contrary to
Barth that natural knowledge within the context of his exposition of the
doctrines of *an* and *enhypostasis* is no longer to be considered

"extrinsic but intrinsic to actual knowledge of
God." (4)

The theological relevance of Torrance's interpretation may be seen in
the way he relates his view of the enhypostatic humanity of Jesus to
the Greek fathers understanding of Christ's economic condescension. The
child Jesus,

2. Ibid. p. 69.
4. Ibid. p. 70.
"cut his way forward (proekopte) as he grew in wisdom and in favour with God and man. (Luke.2.52.) In other words Jesus' growth in wisdom was regarded as opening up a way for man to rise to true knowledge of the Father. Jesus Christ is not only the Truth who has accommodated himself to us in order to reveal himself, not only the Word become flesh, but he is also Man hearing and obeying that Word, apprehending that Truth throughout his life on earth, so that he provides for us in his own obedient sonship within our human nature the Way whereby we are carried up to knowledge of God the Father." (1)

The essentially practical implications of Torrance's position is seen in his re-interpretation of the unity of Christ's person, the unity of the an and enhypostasia in the person of the Son. (2) For the unity of the person of Christ is developed by Torrance in a Trinitarian context which relates it to the church and the Eucharist. (3) Torrance maintains that the notion of person relates to the specifically Christian dogma of the Trinity and the Incarnation. But through Augustine's concentration on the interior life of the believer the idea of person in his hands became fatally twisted in an individualistic manner. It was thus easily identifiable with the logical subject of Aristotelian logic which through the influence of Boethius became dominant in Western


theological thought. (1) Over against this individualistic and logical definition of Boethius', that

"persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia", (2)

Torrance seeks an alternative idea of person deriving from Patristic sources and developed by Richard of St. Victor. This idea of person was derived "ontologically"(3) from the doctrine of the Trinity. It entailed the notion that,

"person here is at once a relational and an ontological notion, for the relationship is not just a determination of our understanding but an inherent and ontic determination of personal existence." (4) So,

"God is personal in his own mode of Being involving all his existence and acts." (5)

This was the teaching which according to Torrance (6) was taken over by J. Calvin who reconstructed it in relation to the inter-relation of the knowledge of God and ourselves which is grounded in the person of Jesus Christ. This entails that theological knowledge is not only personal, but personal in the sense of being a direct

3. Ibid. Cf. Theology in Reconstruction, p.85.
5. Ibid.
"dialogical encounter with God in Christ for it is only through our sharing in the knowledge of the Son by the Father and the knowledge of the Father by the Son, that we can know God as He has given Himself to us in Jesus Christ. Thus the organic unity of theology goes back in Christ to the unity of the Godhead." (1)

Theological statements therefore

"participate sacramentally in the mystery of Christ as the Truth whom they refer to and upon which they rely for their reality." (2)

ii. The Doctrines of An and Enhypostasis as Christological Formulae.

Before we assess the contribution of both Mascall and Torrance to our understanding of the God-creature relationship in terms of the question of the knowledge of God and the creature, we look at criticisms which have been raised against the doctrines of an and enhypostasis.

According to J. McIntyre, (3) the doctrine of enhypostasis arose out of the indecision of the Council of Chalcedon concerning the reality of the human individuality of the man Jesus within the hypostatic union, "the vacuum which was created by the indecision of Chalcedon on the matter of an hypostasis for the human nature was one to be abhorred." (4)

The vacuum can only be understood if we see with McIntyre that the christological controversies of the fifth and sixth centuries were firmly rooted in the Aristotelian principle of

"no physis anhypostatos." (1)

This principle derived from Aristotle's understanding of the distinction between

"primary substance (prote ousia) and secondary substance (deutera ousia)." (2)

The primary substance is seen as the subject to which different predicates are referable. The actual subject is not predicable of anything, it exists in its own right. It is

"neither predicated of a subject nor exists in a subject." (3)

Secondary substance on the other hand, is predicated of something else and must always exist in something else.

"These things are called secondary substances to which, as species, belong the things called substances in the primary sense and also the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs to the species man, and the genus of the species is animal. These, then, are called secondary substances as for example both man and animal." (4)

2. Ibid. p.86.
3. Ibid. p.87.
In the christological controversies to which McIntyre refers it is contended that the participants substituted for the distinction

"between prote ousia and deutera ousia ....
that between hypostasis and physis." (1)

Since it was determinative for Aristotle that

"without primary substance it would be
impossible for anything else to exist," (2)
in the christological context this implied the

"determinative influence of this single
principle of no physis without an hypostasis." (3)

In the Chalcedonion decree there is no question of there being a second hypostasis beside that of the Word who is the subject of the incarnational situation.

"In other words there cannot be a human
hypostasis." (4)

It is assumed in the definition that this lack does not reduce the true humanity of Christ. However McIntyre sees the doctrine of enhypostasis developed by Leontius of Byzantium as an attempt to fill the vacuum created, within the context of the Aristotelian definitions, by this

"impersonal view of the human nature of
Christ (anhypostasia)" (5)

While Leontius holds that the human nature of Jesus has no hypostasis

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p.89.
5. Ibid.
of its own, it is in fact an enhypostatic nature.

"It finds its hypostasis in (en) the hypostasis of the Logos." (1)

McIntyre points out that Leontius’ theory has major defects which mitigate against it adequately filling the abhorrent vacuum created by the Chalcedonian decree.

"In the Aristotelian paradigm ... the prote ousia is the individual in which the duetera ousia is particularised". If the particularity and individuality of the man Jesus is subsumed in the hypostasis of the Logos, "it would be impossible to differentiate the man Jesus from the man Peter or the man John unless, in some way, the human hypostasis were retained."

And if, "the hypostasis is an essential part of what we associate with humanity .... then in respect of his humanity, Christ is not completely one with us." Soteriologically this would mean on the principle, "what Christ did not take, he did not redeem", that if the "hypostasis forms part of what it means to be human", then man is not fully redeemed. (2)

If McIntyre’s strictures concerning the doctrine of enhypostasis are valid then it would appear that Torrance’s development of the Reformed emphasis on the humanity of Christ in terms of this doctrine are

2. Ibid. pp.96-97.
jeopardised. However I think that the modifications introduced by Torrance enable his interpretation of enhypostasis to overcome the difficulties enumerated by McIntyre. We suggest three ways in which this may be understood.

(a) The concept of person entailed in the doctrine of enhypostasis

According to McIntyre the decisive influence of Aristotelian logic in the matter of understanding the person of Christ was due to the distinction between proté ousia and deutéra ousia being substituted for the distinction between hypostasis and physis in the christological debates. (1) From this, as we have indicated, it is deduced that if the human physis has no hypostasis,

"No physis anhypostatos", (2) then in some way Jesus' humanity is "impersonal". (3)

Now it is specifically the Aristotelian view of person which McIntyre sees underlying the christological debate and produced the doctrine of enhyposis that Torrance rejects. According to Torrance it is the "logical" (4) nature of the personal subject entailed by the Aristotelian definition that is excluded by the christian revelation. McIntyre's criticism which assumes an "impersonal" human nature in Christ on the basis of the thesis "no physis anhypostatos", depends for its validity on the Aristotelian definition of personal in terms of the individualistic notion entailed by the logical relation between first and second substances. (5) This view gave rise to the Boethian definition

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p.94.
which we have already noted. Against such a view of person, Torrance opposes one which is derived from Richard of St. Victor. (1) This depends upon the specifically Christian dogma of the Trinity and is at once a "relational and an ontological notion". (2)

By this is meant that the relationship, as identical with "the divine Essence and Existence in the Person (or Persons) of God", "is not just a determination of our understanding but an inherent and ontic determination of personal existence." (3)

This entails that as God makes Himself known in Jesus Christ we must acknowledge the fact that "He alone is personalizing Person, and it is ultimately from His Word that all that is truly personal among us derives. We cannot understand His unique Person by explaining it from our persons, but only through the fact that His person explains ours". (4)

In this essentially trinitarian understanding of person our statements about ourselves in relation to God "derive their basic form from the life and obedience of Jesus as the incarnate Son toward the Father in heaven." (5)

3. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p. 160.
"It is in Christ, therefore, that there has been minted out of our human life the material mode of speech and thought that is truly adapted to God." (1)

In this sense I see no reason for Torrance to disagree with H.M. Relton's understanding of the doctrine of *enhypostasis*. He sees the humanity of Jesus not as impersonal but as "inpersonal". For,

"without God, human personality is incomplete, and that He alone can supply it with that which alone can help it to its full realization." (2)

Thus the humanity of Jesus is not less personal but more fully personal than any other man because of its complete union with God.

(b) *The Influence of Aristotelian Metaphysics On Christology.*

McIntyre rejects the view that the *enhypostatic* view of the humanity of Christ employs Aristotelian terminology only "as an aid to commend an idea, which in itself is quite distinct and independent of the philosophical setting." (3)

Although he allows that with respect to the way in which this view has been applied to modern christologies it may very well be true. (4) Therefore while holding to the Aristotelianism of Leontius' development of the


2. Relton,H.M. *A Study in Christology.* p.226.Cf.pp.91.ff. Cf. McIntyre,J. Op.cit.p.85. "What we must not allow ourselves to forget is that it is the soteriological interest that is predominant in the discussion of the human nature of Christ ... not the logical or even the metaphysical."


4. Ibid.
enhypostatic view of the human nature of Christ, McIntyre allows other influences to modify and develop the implications of Aristotle's metaphysics. But it would also appear to be the case that the all pervading influence of Aristotelian logic which McIntyre sees in pre and post-Chalcedonian times, (1) needs to be seen in a wider context than that indicated by his analysis. This is not to imply that Aristotelian logic did not influence the course of the christological controversies of the fifth and sixth centuries. McIntyre certainly shows that this was the case. But he seems to leave out of account an influential section of the church in his survey of the pre and post-Chalcedonian church.

We would take the view that the position evinced by Cyril of Alexandria and later the monophysites in their opposition to Chalcedon, entails an alternative to the views which McIntyre understands to be so heavily influenced by Aristotle. McIntyre understands the enhypostatic theory developed by Leontius to be concerned to emphasise the fact that the humanity of Christ is not absorbed into the hypostasis of the Logos.

"Its integrity is preserved through its sharing in the hypostasis of the Logos .... In this way he has secured a form of Chalcedonianism against the principle that it is impermissible, even impossible, to affirm a physis without an hypostasis." (2)

By way of introducing the kind of alternative offered by the thinking of Cyril of Alexandria we would draw attention to the analysis of the concept physis in classical Greek philosophy carried out by M. Heidegger. (3)

2. Ibid. p.96.
Heidegger has shown that originally the word referred to an emerging, an appearing. (1) This was connected by the Greeks with their view of being as such.

"The essence of being is physis. Appearing is the power that emerges. Appearing makes manifest .... causes to emerge from concealment." (2)

Since physis as such is

"it places itself in and stands in unconcealment, aletheia." (3)

On the basis of the unique relationship between that which emerges and is therefore unconcealed, between being and truth, Heidegger understands that the Greeks would hold that,

"The essent is true insofar as it is. The true as such is essent. This means: The power that manifests itself stands in unconcealment. In showing itself, the unconcealed as such comes to stand. Truth as un-concealment is not an appendage to being." (4)

This intimate relationship between physis and aletheia, being and truth, in terms of the coming to be, the unconcealment of that which is, brings out attention to the characteristic way in which Cyril of Alexandria understood the incarnation of the Logos in opposition to the Nestorian

2. Ibid. p.86.
3. Ibid.
heresy. We do not contend that Cyril drew his inspiration from the classical Greek philosophers as Heidegger, but we simply note a parallel between what Heidegger understands the Greeks to say about the relationship between physis and aletheia and Cyril's most characteristic way of understanding the Incarnation. (1) As opposed to the Antiochene view of physis as an assemblage of attributes, (2) which made it amenable to the kind of thought typified by the "no physis anhypostatos" principle which McIntyre finds so ubiquitous, Cyril uses the word in the sense which it had borne in Alexandria since the early fourth century, (3) that of a "concrete individual, or independent existent." (4) As such it could become virtually synonymous with hypostasis. (5) Consequently when Cyril wanted to express the unity of the Incarnate as God and man his point of departure was always from the reality of the actual historical humanity of Christ. Because of the reality of the union between the two it is a union "kata phusin or kat hypostasin". (6) These latter always taking as their point of departure, as to their meaning, the concrete reality of the coming to be of the man Jesus.

1. Quotations from Cyril are taken from the English translation in 'A Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church, of Cyril.St., Five Tome Contradiction of the Blasphemies of Nestorius.pp.1.ff. It should be noted that without exception the translator renders hypostasis in Cyril's writings as person.pp.8.n.7, 19.n.k.


4. Ibid.p.318.


6. Ibid.p.320.
We may illustrate our thesis concerning Cyril by taking as an example his defence of the term *Theotokos* used as a title for Mary. This term had been questioned by Nestorius, (1) who wished to replace it with *Christokos* to indicate that Mary bore the human nature alone, which nature was conjoined with the divine nature. (2) We note that Cyril uses the same distinction based on the historical humanity of Christ which we have met already in our discussion of J. Calvin. The actual particularity of Jesus as man and the way that he went as man distinguishes the event of the Incarnation, as taking place voluntarily for the sake of the creature, from the nature of God as such considered from the point of view of His transcendent being in and for Himself. Cyril calls this event and the complex of historical relationships which comprise the events of Incarnation, life, death and resurrection of Jesus, the economy of the Word. It is important to note, as T.F. Torrance points out, that the use of the word economy with respect to the Incarnation does not detract from the fact that here

"God really imparts to us knowledge of Himself as He is, for He is antecedently and eternally in his own Being what He reveals of Himself in His Incarnation and humiliation in Christ." (3)

This use of the term is to be distinguished from what it came to mean later on;

"as when an act of God was spoken of as
'only economical' ... oikonomia then has the
sense of reserve, on the part of God, for he
is not to be taken as being in Himself quite
what he appears to be in the economic act
in question .... (man) is not to understand
it strictly in the way it appears." (1)
The use of the word economy allows Cyril to both emphasise the
unchangeable nature of God, the Word remains ever what He was, and the
voluntary nature of God’s condescension to the creature. If within this
context the particularity of the human being of Jesus is called into
question as delineating God’s movement to the creature, then the whole
process of redemption is jeopardised. For there is then no basis for
distinguishing the particular condescension of God to man; the Incarnation
merely illustrates a general truth of God’s relationship with the creature:
further, if God is thus related to the creature in this general way the
creature becomes semi-divine and the deity circumscribed by space and time.
It is for these reasons that Cyril takes such exception to Nestorius’s
position with respect to the relationship between the nature of God and the
nature of man in the Incarnate.

"He who is out of God by nature, the Only
Begotten, He which is in the bosom of the
Father, He through whom are all things,
albeit having before every age and time
His own Existence, and ever co-existing

with Him Who begat Him, descended into voluntary emptiness in the last times of the world, and took the servants form, i.e., became in our condition and Man economically and was made in all things like unto His brethren by partaking similarly of blood and flesh, and that He thus underwent birth with us and like us, and took into Himself the passing into being of His own flesh, not as needing a second beginning unto being (for the Word was in the beginning and was God) but, that He might gather together the human race, a second firstfruits of all things after the first one, ..... Necessary therefore, alike to the faith of the Mystery and to the exact demonstration thereof, is the fact of the true Union, I mean of Person (hypostasis), that the mode of generation according to the flesh of the Only-Begotten may be without blame, Who was (as I said) called to no second existence (for Himself is the Maker of the worlds), but lowered Himself economically to manhood for our sakes, and despised not the laws of human
nature but chose rather to have as His own together with the flesh the fleshly generation too. Therefore do we say that He was born after the flesh Who is ever Co-existent with the Father." (1)

On the other hand Nestorius could only conceive Cyril's position to entail the Theotokos to be a goddess, for he was committed to the view, which ignores the economy of the Word, that the nature of God as such is born of Mary.

"I (i.e. Nestorius) often asked them (i.e., Cyril), do you say that Godhead has been begotten of the holy Virgin. They straightway recoil at the saying .... then when I reply to this, What then is incongruous do we say in advising to flee the word (Theotokos) and come to the common phrase significant of the two natures? .... Either clearly acknowledge that the Godhead has been born of the blessed Mary, or if you flee this expression as blasphemy, why saying the same as I, dost thou feign thou sayest it not?" (2)

The fundamental problem with Nestorius' position according to Cyril was that he refused to understand the economy of God's movement toward the creature in terms of the particularity of Jesus humanity. Instead he sought to relate God and the creature in terms of an analysis of the

2. Ibid. p.7.
relationship between the nature of God and the nature of man in Jesus Christ. (1) By so doing Nestorius precludes the only basis upon which God and man may be distinguished, viz., the particularity of the man Jesus in his relationship with God. In Cyril's view, this circumventing of the economy destroys both the deity of God and the creatureliness of the creature.

If the Word of God in the economy of salvation is understood simply in terms of the nature of God as such, in its relationship with that of man in the person of the Son, it implies that the Godhead as such is the recipient of movement from place to place.

"If the Godhead be unembodied, at large and everywhere, and not in place and circumscript, how will it pass through a single body?" (2)

Further, if the humanity of Jesus is distinguished from the actual economic condensation of the Son then the act of incarnation may be predicated of any of the trinitarian hypostases, since the birth from the Virgin

1. It is no accident therefore that the differing Latin and Greek versions of the Chalcedonian decree derive from their rendering of the statement concerning the unity of the person of Christ; whether it is "ek", out of two natures or "en", in two natures. The former corresponding to Cyril's determination to understand the difference between the natures of God and man in terms of the particularity of the humanity of Jesus as the economic condensation of the Son for the sake of the creature as distinct from His eternal being with the Father and the Spirit in and for Himself, the latter corresponding to the Nestorian concern to understand the relationship in terms of the internal structure of the being of the man Jesus. See: Schaff, F. The Creeds of Christendom, p.64. n.4.; Dorner, I. A. The Person of Christ, Vol.1, Pt.2, p.411.; Sellers, R. V. Op. cit., pp.217, 258.; Bindley, T. H. The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith, p.197.; Loofs, F. Nestorius and His Place in the History of Christian Doctrine, pp.110-111.

does not coincide with the coming to be of the Word of God.

"For if he (i.e. Nestorius) says that the matter is true of Emmanuel singly and alone, let him teach the reason why

...Hence not once for all but many times over shall we find that God has been made man, and not only the Word out of God the Father, but I will add both the Father Himself and besides, the Holy Spirit." (1)

But not only does Nestorius divide the Godhead by making it circumscribed by assuming that the nature of deity passed through Mary, but also, despite his deepest intentions, he denies the humanity our Jesus. Since Nestorius allots the human frailties of Jesus to the human nature and likewise the being raised from the dead and his exaltation, he must assume that the worship of the church is directed toward a creature. The co-worshipped natures indicates that the humanity far from being safeguarded from the Appolinarian error, is deified.

"But tell me who ask, what is it that severs the natures one from the other and what will be the mode of their difference? You will (I suppose) surely answer that the one thing is manhood, another God or Godhead; and the one exalted incomparably above the other, and it is as much inferior as is man less than God. How then (tell me) dost thou deem right to honour with one worship things of so unlike nature and parted, as regards their

mode of being, by incomparable differences."

Nestorius, who, "feareth the charge of man-worship, is caught in the act of being a man worshipper, and is holden in the meshes of his own mis-counsel." (1)

"That which is co-worshipped with another is altogether other than that with which it is co-worshipped. But WE are accustomed to worship Emmanuel with one worship, not severing from the Word the Body That was Personally (hypostatically) united to Him." (2)

While we may not agree with the judgment of I.Dorner that,

"an unprejudiced consideration of the course which this dogma (i.e. Christology) pursued, must convince us that prior to the Council of


2. Ibid.p.70.Cf.pp.71-72. The text reads, "οἱ Διαθήκες τοῦ Λέγου τοῦ εὐθείων καὶ σωσίαν εἰς τὸν Μεγάλην". "Cyrilli Archiepiscopi Alexandrini: Libri Quinque Contra Nestorium, Ed.Pusey,F.E.p.122. Cf. on the same point Cyril's defence of the Nicean "made man", against what he understands to be the Nestorian implication that the words are a tautological euphemism. Nestorius cannot, by distinguishing the natures in the union and referring the birth to the human nature, say that the words of the creed refer to anything more significant than the being made man of a man. Cyril asks,

"Do they (i.e. the Fathers of Nicea) therefore (tell me) in saying that He was both Incarnate and made Man mean ought else than that He was begotten after the flesh? for this would be (and alone) the mode of incarnation to one who has his existence both external to the flesh and in his proper nature; for no one would say (I suppose) that the flesh has been made flesh nor will anyone be made what he was already. But one should conceive a certain economic change to have been made regarding him unto somewhat else which he was not, the expression will then have great fitness." Cyril.St.Op.cit. Tome.i.p.32. Cf.Tome.i.p.47-48, 49-50.
Chalcedon, the doctrine of the duality of natures within the unio, was not really a doctrine of the church;" (1) it is not without significance that the monophysite party who claimed Cyril’s authority opposed Chalcedon because it introduced new dogmas which went beyond those of Nicea which they claimed had settled, not only that Christ was God, but also the way in which He was to be understood as man. (2) R.V. Sellers and A. Grillmeier are probably closer to the truth when they see a complimentarity between the fundamental intentions of the Cyrillian party and those in Antioch who opposed him. (3) The one concerned to emphasise the soteriological importance of the unity of Christ and the other the necessary theological task of enquiry and distinction between contending views of the person of Christ. But on either view, from the evidence presented, it would not appear to be the case that the Aristotelian principle, "no physis anhypostatos", was as ubiquitous as McIntyre contends. The Cyrillian party at least provide an alternative way of safeguarding the particularity of the human nature


of Christ which does not necessarily involve dependence upon the Aristotelian analysis.

C. The Aristotelian doctrine of Substance.

McIntyre's analysis of the influence of Aristotelian metaphysics on pre and post Chalcedonian christology of the principle "no physis anhypostatos", depends in large measure upon the view of substance given by Aristotle in the *Categories*. (1) As McIntyre points out Aristotle deals with substance in terms of the concepts of *prote ousia* and *deutera ousia* in this work. (2) For example,

"Substance in the most literal and primary and common sense of the term is that which is neither predicated of a subject nor exists in a subject, as for example, the individual man or horse. These things are called secondary substances to which, as species, belong the things called substances in the primary sense and also the genera of these species. For example the individual man belongs to the species man, and the genus of the species is animal. These, then, are called secondary substances as for example both man and animal." (3)

This is interpreted by McIntyre to mean that the individual person or thing is the subject to which is referred different predicates.

2. Ibid.
"not just in the grammatical sense, in which a subject is so-called in relation to the predicate of the sentence, but the actual subject who has these qualitites, adopts certain attitudes or reaches certain decisions, (1)

is the primary substance. In this sense the primary substance is neither predicated of a subject nor exists in a subject. Secondary substance on the other hand is that which is predicated of something else. It can be either the inclusive genus or the more specific species. Therefore,

"everything except primary substances is either predicable of primary substances or present in them as subject ... Animal is predicated of man, and therefore of individual man; for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of man at all

.... Everything is either predicated of primary substances or present in them; and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist." (2)

Aristotle is here understood to be affirming, contrary to Plato who argued that universals exist ante res, that universals exist in rebus, that is, only as realised in particular subjects. Since without primary substance it would be impossible for anything else to exist, the relationship which became crucial for the christological problem between primary

and secondary substances assumed the form of no *physis anhypostatos*.

For Aristotle's primary and secondary substances we need to substitute the terms *hypostasis* and *physis*. (1) Following Aristotle

"*Physis* is to be defined in terms of genus, species and essential qualities and properties

.... hypostasis on the other hand carries the reference to the principle of self existence." (2)

Thus the problem arose in terms of the two nature model of Christ's person of how to accommodate the two *hypostasis* required by Aristotelian logic in the one person without deifying the humanity or humanising God.

As we have indicated McIntyre understands the Chalcedonian solution to leave this basic question unanswered and thus place a question mark over the particular humanity of Jesus by speaking of only one person and hypostasis of the Word incarnate. (3)

Now the particular problem to which we wish to address ourselves in this sub-section is whether McIntyre has oversimplified the position with respect to the relationship between the Aristotelian position, as he sets it forth, and the christological problem. It would appear to be the case that the relationship between primary and secondary substances which McIntyre delineates from Aristotle's *Categoriae*, and finds so determinative for the christological question, is not as clear cut as would appear from McIntyre's presentation of the evidence.


2. Ibid. p.95.

3. Ibid. p.93.
As McIntyre has shown with reference to the *Categories*, Aristotle thought of the individual existent in terms of primary substance, whereas the genus and species (animal and man) which may be predicated of the individual are termed secondary substances. However, as we have indicated above, (1) Aristotle is unwilling

"in very many places to follow the clear doctrine of the Categories in identifying prote ousia with the concrete thing; for what is that concrete thing apart from the form which makes it what it is?" (2)

This ambivalence in Aristotle's thought makes it difficult to sustain the kind of argument which Mcintyre attempts. It would seem that the onus is on Mcintyre to show that the specific doctrine of substance found in the *Categories* is the only possible view one can take of Aristotle's doctrine. For his argument depends upon this view being Aristotle's view, with the all pervading influence which such a unitary theory is assumed to have.

We do not think Mcintyre has submitted the evidence to suggest that this was in fact the case. His view concerning the relationship between Aristotle's first and second substances and the principle "no physis enhypostatos", while not to be dismissed as having no influence on the christological debate, cannot be seen to have the determinative role which he suggests. We would contend not only for a modified interpretation of Aristotle, but also a greater appreciation of the specific theological factors influencing the course and shape of the discussion. We would therefore have a more positive appreciation of the doctrine of enhypostasis than that which would follow from Mcintyre's analysis.


The importance of the particularity of the humanity of Christ within the hypostatic union, to which the doctrine of *enhypostasis* is understood by Torrance to draw attention, also provides the basis for his understanding of the relationship between God and the creature conceived in terms of the doctrine of analogy. As opposed to Mascall who relates the analogies of proportionality and attribution in our knowledge of God and the creature in terms of St. Thomas' metaphysic by concentrating attention on human existence in general, Torrance seeks to explicate the same relationship in terms of the specific movement of God to man in Jesus Christ. Torrance sees the fundamental mistake of any doctrine of analogy which seeks understanding in terms of a neutral ontology to consist in a side stepping of the dynamic movement of God to man in Christ. (1) Therefore, if there

"is a true analogy of proportionality, as the
Thomists aver, it must be grounded, not in
any abstractly conceived ontological continuity
between man and God, but on the *unio hypostatica*
in which we have the union of God and man as
God himself has set it forth in Christ." (2)

But as we have seen in discussing Mascall's analysis of the
doctrine of analogy the analogy of proportionality needs the analogy of attribution to save it from collapsing into univocal predication. Whereas Mascall used the distinction between the mode of predication in the
creature and that in God to form the basis of the analogy of attribution. Torrance seeks to use the historical distinctness of the humanity of Christ to achieve the same purpose. As opposed to the view that the unio hypostatica can be used to "illustrate" the relationship between God and man in general, Torrance contends that the proper form of the analogy should run,

"as divine and human natures are related in Christ, so in the Church Christ and human nature are related .... The analogy then takes the proper form; as A is to B, so C is to D, where C is: A to B .... But when the false form of the analogy is drawn .... then the human nature of Christ is omitted from it and that means that C is replaced by A in the form: as A is to B, so A is to D. Thus this doctrine of the church turns out to be monophysite." (1)

Thus whilst not denying the place of creaturely knowledge, in fact by emphasising its integrity as affirmed by the voluntary condescension of God to the creature and His accommodation to our mode of thinking and speaking, Torrance insists that it can only be understood within the context of God's movement toward the creature.

"The analogia entis is entirely grounded upon the analogia gratiae, and only in an analogia.

Both Torrance and Mascall in their own way seek to understand the problem of the relationship between God and the creature, as posed by Foster's thesis, by emphasising the particularity and integrity of creaturely knowledge of the creature. Though they achieve their purposes in different ways we find Torrance's account more convincing; not least because he is able to relate the particularity of the Christian revelation to the immanent and determinate rationality of the creature. He is able to show how over against creation God remains quite free in His eternal self existence and therefore cannot be known in the determinate way in which created things are known, that creation also remains free in its utterly contingent character and is therefore to be known in its natural processes only out of itself. But consequent upon the interaction of God with the world in the Creation and the Incarnation He binds us to the created structures of creaturely rationality in all our relations with Him. It is therefore,

"no longer possible to operate scientifically with a separation between natural and revealed theology." (2)

Torrance is therefore able to set forth both

"the infinite freedom and the unique kind of necessity that hold between God and the world.


which not only preserve its contingency but
which so ground it in the being and
rationality of God as to provide us in our
creaturely existence an intelligible medium
and an objective basis for all our relations
with God." (1)

Now if we agree with Torrance's, and in a more general sense the
Reformed, understanding of the part played by the natural structures of
understanding in conceiving the relationship between God and the creature
in the light of God's movement toward the creature in Jesus Christ, then
we will necessarily raise some questions with regard to Barth's analysis
of the problem as outlined in the preceding chapters. These questions
will obviously relate to the viability of the structure of Barth's
trinitarian method as a means of understanding the God-creature relation-
ship. In terms of the specific perspective we have chosen from which to
view this relationship in Barth's theology, the question of the relationship
between knowledge of God and knowledge of the creature, it will be
concerned to emphasise how we may understand the fact that McIntyre has
drawn attention to in his defence of Quenstedt's doctrine of analogy of
 attribution which is intrinsic not extrinsic as in Barth.

"Quenstedt discerns the inadequacy of analogy of
 attribution in respect of extrinsic denomination,
namely, that this analogy does not affirm anything
of the internal nature of the secondary
analogates; and further, that he wishes to
emphasise that when God creates, He creates beings
whose creation constitutes their being. He is

endeavouring to find out how you may speak of creatures who prior to salvation are, and in fact must be in order to be saved." (1)

We have indicated in our analysis of T.F. Torrance's position vis-a-vis E.L. Mascall, that the concentration of attention on the integrity of creaturely being as such does not necessarily pre-empt appreciation of both the transcendence and immanence of God when seen within the context of the particularity of the Christian revelation in Jesus Christ. Here the particularity of the humanity of Jesus expresses both the freedom of God in His condescension to the creature and grounds the natural structure of human thought and language as the intelligible medium through which God and the creature are known. (2)

The possibility of appreciating the natural integrity of creaturely being and speech within the context of the God-creature relationship presupposed by Barth's trinitarian methodology seems to be precluded. The question arises of whether Barth's trinitarian method of understanding the relationship between God and the creature jeopardises the integrity of creaturely being's contingent yet dependent status. Consequently we must ask if the structure of Barth's doctrine of the Trinity needs modification. For if it appears to be the case that the particularity and integrity of creaturely being and language as such are precluded from entering into the definition of the God-creature relationship, then it would follow that the determinate and creaturely nature of the creature is called into question. In the context of the discussion of the God-creature relationship, by means of the relationship between knowledge of God and


knowledge of the creature set forth in Barth's theology, it entails questioning whether Barth has discovered any new way of understanding God's freedom in and for Himself over against His being for us in the concrete form of His revelation in time which does not take account of the creaturely being in time which pre-supposes this event. Barth's doctrine of analogy which presupposes his understanding of the relationship between God and the creature consequent on the development of his doctrine of the Trinity and doctrine of God involves the two sides of the God-creature relationship necessary to any Christian doctrine of creation. He maintains that God is what happens in respect of the ensemble of relationships presupposed by the structure of the event of revelation in Jesus Christ. But he also wants to proclaim the freedom and transcendence of God over against what He is for and with us. He thinks that to do this he must postulate a reality of God in Himself distinct from God-for-us. But lest, through consideration of this distinction in terms of the creaturely nature of revelation as such, the being of God is divided so that the being of God in Himself becomes different from God-for-us, and a God behind God is postulated on the basis of creaturely existence, (in which case a fatal religious a priori would be presupposed in creaturely existence and the being of God would be divided) all the distinctions and continuities in the relationships between God and the creature and the creatures are presupposed in God's distinguishing of Himself from Himself. In this case God in Himself is the proto type of God in His revelation. All we are to say of God in Himself is that His revelation is His image. Time is the image of eternity, which means that eternity is simply whatever it must be if time is to be its image. But, as we have indicated in our analysis of the doctrine of analogy in both Catholic and Reformed thought, the analogy of proportionality needs the analogy of attribution based on the
analysis of creaturely existence as such in Catholic thought, or on the particularity of the humanity of Christ in Reformed thought, to save it from collapsing into univocal predication or agnosticism. What, therefore, can possibly be the content of saying that God in Himself is whatever is the proto-type of His life in time? Either this sentence is perfectly empty; or the statement makes some sort of comparison between God's own characteristics and His temporal characteristics. In this sense we feel some sympathy with H. Bouillard when he complains of Barth's treatment of the problem of analogy that:

"To affirm that the correspondence between human speech and divine reality is assured only through the grace of revelation is to leave untouched the classical question of analogy ... Whether or not they are supported by revelation, the concepts and terms which we use about God are our own; they are human. It is a question of knowing under what title a human discourse, even one based on the Bible, can direct us to God. To say that it does so in virtue of revelation is to answer the question by the question." (1)

The Viability of Barth's Trinitarian Method Of Understanding The God-Creature Relation.

Before we attempt to assess the meaning of Barth's understanding of the God-creature relationship in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity it is necessary that we summarise the position reached in our analysis of 1. Bouillard, H. The Knowledge of God. p. 117. Cf. p. 118.
Barth's thought in the preceding chapters. For as we have indicated, Barth's position with respect to the doctrine of analogy derives from the foundations of his dogmatic method and not from any incidental view of the doctrine of analogy.

The mere position of the doctrine of the Trinity in the Church Dogmatics is itself arresting and important. It appears as we have seen at the beginning as part of the doctrine of Revelation, as part of the discussion of how and why the church must speak of God. This makes it clear that Barth is not talking about an entity called "God", but about the particular being revealed in Jesus Christ. The only possible legitimate question that can be asked of the revelation of God is, "Who" this God is who reveals Himself. The reality and possibility of the question is presupposed by the nature of the event of revelation. For God so reveals Himself as to make it impossible to attempt to get behind the agency and activity of revelation to ask any prior question which might assume an independent standpoint apart from the personal presence of God to man.

Consequently the nature of Barth's discussion of the triune being of God as the Subject of the revelatory events which relate God and the creature, entails that the discussion of the nature of God must succeed the discussion of His triune being. For a not yet trinitarian doctrine of the nature of God could be discussed first only if it is thought possible to identify God without reference to the exercise of His Lordship which presupposes the event of revelation. The doctrine of the Trinity is an analysis and interpretation of this event. The answer which the doctrine of the Trinity gives to the proposition, "God reveals Himself", is that God
God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself, He reveals Himself. The agent is God, what happens is God, and what is accomplished is God with us and for us. In the analysis the second and third statements repeat the first, and necessarily so since otherwise the revealed unity of the revealed God would be presupposed by a freedom of the creature for God which did not presuppose the freedom of God for the creature who is who He is in the event of His self revelation. God so reveals Himself as to make impossible any attempt to get behind the agency and activity of Him who reveals Himself.

But the revealed Lordship of God in the event of revelation presupposes that God is a God who is able, who is free, to be our God in the event of revelation. What God reveals Himself as, is exactly as the One who is able to reveal Himself. There can therefore be no separation of form and content in the event of revelation. For the identification of form and content is precisely the way in which Barth expresses God's lordship in the event of revelation. And it is an analysis of the lordship of God so expressed which is the root of the doctrine of the Trinity.

Since God's Lordship in the event of revelation is the lordship of One who is able, who is free to be Lord, we cannot reduce the three factors involved in the statement, "God reveals Himself as Lord", to one common denominator. For if God as Revealer, Revelation and Revealedness are really all the same then the true God is some divine hinterground apart from what will be regarded as mere forms of God's self revelation. On this basis the unity of the revealed God, the identity of form and content in the event of revelation, will be called into question. But Barth's analysis of the Lordship of God in the event of revelation entails
that God possesses His deity in one and the same act in which He distinguishes Himself from Himself. It is to this fact that the dialectical relationship of the doctrines of Appropriations and Perichoresis calls our attention. In that God repeats Himself, is free to be Himself as three and not an undifferentiated monad, consists His unique lordship, His unity.

In considering the manner in which God reveals Himself we indicated that the relationship between the doctrines of the Trinity and Christology in the doctrine of Revelation further developed the question "Who" God is who reveals Himself in the event of revelation. That God takes form amongst us, God's distinguishing Himself from Himself in a mode of being other than His own hidden mode of being, is brought to understanding in terms of the question that He who so reveals Himself can reveal Himself in this way. The objective reality of Jesus Christ entails the possibility of God's being free in this specific manner. In that God takes this form, no middle being between God and man results. It is characteristic of God Himself that in being God once a gain and wholly otherwise, He can remain wholly Himself. Precisely God's inconceivable freedom from .... and consequently His freedom for .... His own revelation is the lordship which is the content of the manner in which God reveals Himself. To know that God can be with us is to know both that He can become other than Himself and that He can nevertheless remain Himself in this alienation.

If the trinitarian doctrine is rooted in the lordship presupposed by the structure of the event of God's self-revelation, then the answer to the question of God's reality must be sought as an answer to the question of what sort of being God must have to be triune. The doctrine
of God is built on this presupposition. The doctrine of Revelation understood God from the point of view of the event of revelation as the concrete reality who in His self-relatedness is absolutely free. The formulation with which Barth seeks to comprehend the unique lordship of God in the doctrine of God is that He is One who loves in freedom. That God is who He is in His self revealed unity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit presupposes that He is able to be such. The particularity of His revelation is not to be taken as defining the freedom of God in relation to the creature. However strictly it may be understood such freedom also entails with equal strictness God's relatedness. Without dependence upon this relationship to what is event God is in Himself event, act and life. God is free event, independent even of His own nature yet nonetheless having a specific nature because He decides to be who He is. The content of this decision is His relatedness to Himself and us in Jesus Christ. He is thus God who loves freely. And therewith we return to the doctrine of the Trinity, to the One who is related to us and free in that relationship.

The relationship between God and the creature that emerges from our exposition of the doctrine of Revelation and the doctrine of God, finds its concrete basis in the fact that the doctrine of election is considered as part of the doctrine of God. The content of God's free decision to be who He is in His self relatedness, His love, does not exclude but includes the creature. God's determining of Himself to be both Subject and Object of His choice, to be not only Himself in relation but Himself in relation to the "other", entails that He is the basis of the reality and possibility of creaturely existence in relation not only to Himself, but also the creatures relation to the creature. All the distinctions and
continuities of creaturely existence are presupposed by the reality of God's choice of man in His Son Jesus Christ. The confrontation and communion which is the trinitarian life of God is the confrontation and communion between the Father and His Son who is Jesus of Nazareth: the choice, which is itself God's choice of purpose for Himself, coincides with the life of this man. The covenant between this man and the Father is the reality in God of His free choice, His decision to be not only God in and for Himself, but to be God for and with the creature. On the one hand there is God's eternal communion with Himself, on the other his communion in time with us; as the unity in God's freedom of these two there is His eternal Son who is Jesus. The Father and the Son in the unity of the Spirit will that the Son shall live for His Father as the man Jesus. This is the reason why the doctrine of election is an integral part of the doctrine of God and forms the basis for understanding the relationship between God and the creature. The double decree of predestination which presupposes the existence of the creature is in fact identical with the decision in which God chooses purpose for His own life.

Consequently Barth's view of the basis of the event of revelation in Jesus Christ makes it plain that the creature can in no way presuppose the decision and choice of God revealed in Jesus Christ who, as Man for God and Man for other men, repeats and confirms the free Lordship of God which consists in His choice of Himself for man and man for Himself. That Barth's doctrine of creation is anthropologically orientated corresponds precisely to the fact that the Son of God in the inconceivable freedom and love which He shares with the Father and the Spirit chose to be a man, not a fish or a stone. In this decision there is decided what created reality is and can be. To be a creature is to be such as to presuppose
the existence of this Man, Jesus Christ, among us and for us. Humanity is not that which defines the Son's assumption of it, but is that which is defined by the Son's choice to be man. The creature is defined by that meeting between the Jesus of Nazareth and the Father. The true story of the creature is its being the technical possibility of the actualisation of this reality. Whether we so experience our lives as such or not does not alter what we are as creatures whose being presupposes this compact, this decision.

The relationship established between God and the creature and considered from the point of view of Barth's understanding of the basis of knowledge of the creature, the *analogia relationis*, was one whose structure was determined both on the side of God and the side of the creature by the nature of the decision in which God exists for the creature in Jesus Christ. This decision pre-empts any attempt to elucidate the nature of creaturely reality from any point of view which does not presuppose this decision. In our discussion of Barth's doctrine of analogy we have drawn attention to the fact that his methodological exclusion of this possibility casts doubts on the viability of his view of the God-creature relationship. We have indicated that to establish the freedom of God in relation to the creature, and the integrity of creaturely existence as creaturely existence in relation to God, that it is necessary in one way or another to accommodate in the definition of the relationship between God and creature the integrity of the created structures of creaturely being and rationality. Whether in terms of the Thomist concentration on the nature of creaturely existence as such or the Reformed emphasis on the significance of the particularity of the humanity of Jesus life story, both are able to find a way of expressing what is
essential to any understanding of the relationship between God and the creature. In terms of the reality of created existence they both are able to express how God is and is not related to the creature; in Christological terms, how God is and is not in Jesus Christ, both that we already are what we are in Jesus' story and are not yet. This dialectic which is unavoidable in any understanding of the God creature relation, both in the interests of God's freedom and the created integrity of creaturely existence, presupposes a temporal element which could not be consistently sustained within the frame of reference of Barth's methodology. As we have seen the created distinctions and continuities are, in Barth's terms, presupposed by the nature of the compact in which God in Jesus Christ determines Himself for man and man for Himself. Barth avoids consideration of the God creature relation in terms of a freedom of the creature for God which does not presuppose the freedom of God for the creature by emphasising the importance of the unity of God's self revelation with the freedom and love in which God chooses Himself. In that the "Yes" which God speaks to the creature in Jesus Christ is spoken in the inconceivable freedom in which God speaks the "Yes" to Himself in His choice to be who He is, Barth secures the transcendence of God over the creature. This transcendence is such that God can be who He is in relation to the creature without compromising His being the free God. But in considering the immanent relation of the creature to this God, the continuity of creaturely existence is postulated on the basis of God's freedom to repeat and confirm what He is in and for Himself ad extra, for us. It does not appear that Barth has discovered any new way of conceptualising God's freedom over against His being for us in Jesus Christ, since his method specifically excludes consideration of what we take to be essential to such an undertaking. This is the consideration of the relationship between
God and the creature in such a way as to presuppose the event of revelation, the event of God’s free movement toward the creature, with the fact that the creature exists; indeed must exist in order to be the object of God’s gracious condescension.

We therefore share von Balthasar’s concern with respect to this aspect of Barth’s theology.

"Die Gnadenordnung der Menschwerdung setzt sich die Schöpfungsordnung voraus, die, von ihr verschieden, doch immer wieder zu sehr auf sie reduziert wird." (1)

"Die Verengung wurde an der Stelle klar, wo wir feststellen mussten, dass Barth zwischen Schöpfung und Bund nicht den ganzen nötigen Raum, die geforderte Spannweite, die freies Atmen erlaubt, offen lässt, dass Voraus der Setzung in seiner relativen, aber wirklichen Eigenständigkeit nicht ganz zur Geltung kommt. Mag es noch so wahr sein, dass der letztsinn von Christus stammt, dass nichts Abschliessendes über den (völligen) geschöpflichen Sinn gesagt werden darf, bevor die Rücksicht auf diesen letztsinn genommen ist, mag es auch wahr sein, dass der letztsinn der ontologische Grund für das Vorhandensein jedes andern, vorläufigen Sinnes ist: es bleibt nicht minder wahr, dass

This problem, in Barth's consideration of the God-creature relationship, of the importance of the relative structures of creaturely being having a place as such in understanding God's movement toward the creature; raises the question of the viability of the dogma of the Trinity as a means of understanding the God-creature relationship. For it would appear that Barth's development of the doctrine of the Trinity from an analysis of the event structure of revelation entails methodological exclusion of what we have taken to be an important element in the theological meaning of the God-creature relationship. This is the place given within this relationship to the relative structures of creaturely being in determining how we may speak at once both of God's being related to and not related to the world, of being in and not in Jesus Christ, a


"lest the old corruptions through naturalistic fallacies, which worked such havoc in the history of protestant theology, should be given a chance to come back and (therefore) tends to restrict the relation between them to the event of grace, without developing, at any rate in any adequate way, the ontology of the creaturely structures which it assumes."

See also by the same author, Space, Time and Incarnation, p. 65; Prenter, R. Einheit Schöpfung und Erlösung Theologische Zeitschrift, 1946, No. 2, pp. 161 ff. and Glauben und Erkennen bei Karl Barth Kerygma und Dogma, Vol. 2, 1956, pp. 176 ff.; Rodding, G. Das Seinsproblem in der

(Continued on p. 357.)
notion of His transcendence which has more than an apparently epistemological function in that it is causal with respect to the relative structures of creaturely being. (1)

1. (Continued from p.356.)


CONCLUSION

We believe that the issues raised in our analysis of Barth's understanding of the God-creature relation confront us with a wider problem than an assessment of the doctrine of the Trinity as developed specifically by Barth. In conclusion we wish to indicate how the issue we have raised with respect to Barth's presentation of the God-creature relationship involves a wider ecumenical problem of the function and structure of the dogma of the Trinity in the life of the church. We have seen and analysed Barth's development of the doctrine of the Trinity as a "critical principle", (1) by which he made a one hundred and eighty degree turn in the direction of Protestant theology; in this sense the doctrine of the Trinity became a basic hermeneutical key for understanding the whole scope of Christian doctrine from God and Creation to Reconciliation and Redemption. Yet in one whole area of the church's life, in the East, the Trinity has been understood less as doctrine and more as that which expresses the life that is lived by the church consequent on the interaction of God with the creature in Creation, Incarnation and future Redemption. Here the relativity of creaturely existence is taken to be an integral part of the structure of dogma, without there being any question that such a procedure jeopardises either the divine unity or the creatureliness of the creature as such a presupposition would entail on Barth's reading of the problem.

(1) The Dogma of the Trinity in the East and West.

E. Schlink (2) has drawn attention to the significance of the different


kinds of statements which are involved in the church's speech about God. The contradictory nature of complementary statements about Jesus' historicity and His unity with the eternal God call attention to the fact that here we do not have to do with finite objects that can be neatly defined over against one another and over against the one who is speaking about them. The contradictory character of the expressions calls attention to God's infinity, which remains a mystery to finite understanding, even though the speaker experiences God's infinity in His movement towards the creature in the aspects of the events of salvation which lead to the formulation of the language which speaks of Christ's unity with God and His unity with us. The structure of such statements Schlink designates as doxological. (1) They are statements about God on the basis of events that have been experienced as having occurred from Him. Since designations and relations drawn from the finite realm are transferred to the eternal and infinite God, contradictory conceptions inescapably result. Human conceptualisation sacrifices itself in adoration. Reference of theological words to the divine reality itself is, "withdrawn from our purview by the very act of adoration." (2)

In using this expression, doxological, to refer to the reference of human verbal expressions to the infinite being of God on the basis of the experience of God's soteriological purpose directed through historical events, Schlink distinguishes between kerygmatic and doxological forms of expression. Kerygmatic statements speak of definite earthly events

that are understood as events that come from God, they are

"chiefly concerned with transmission of fixed pieces of church tradition. This includes the tradition of our Lord's sayings, reports of Jesus' deeds, and His passion as well as the appearances of the risen Lord." (1)

Doxological statements on the other hand, intend to speak of God's eternal being as such. They are praise of the eternal God on the basis of His deeds.

"Doxology is not only concerned with God's activity in history but with God Himself in His own eternal reality ... Consequently in the development of doxology we can observe the appearance of statements about God's existence, essence and properties, whose purpose is to exalt His eternal unchangableness which comprehends all history." (2)

Thus in the act of praising adoration of God's eternity, the finite conceptions in which praise takes place on the basis of definite finite occurrences are broken.

For this reason, doxological statements cannot be used as premises from which conclusions can be drawn without further ado. Statements about God in a doxological form are transferred to God in the sense that they are consigned to God's infinity in an act of adoration.

2. Ibid. pp.21-22.
In such statements the conceptual clarity disappears. Therefore God's historical activity cannot be deduced from the doctrine of the Trinity or from the statement of the divinity of Jesus. (1) While in kerygmatic statements the "I" of the witness expressly appears and vouches for the truth that is witnessed to, in doxological statements the "I" who speaks disappears. (2) For such a statement only the divine content comes into view, yet

"the absence of the "I" from the text of many doxologies does not imply an uncommitted lack of concern, but indicates utmost devotion. For although the "I" of the worshipper does not occur in the text, it is contained in the actual performance of worship. The "I" is sacrificed in doxology. Thus doxology is always a sacrifice of praise." (3)

If the kerygmatic and doxological statements used in Christian speech about God are not to be simply expressions of man's own subjective self consciousness, it is important to realise that the liturgical structure of such statements needs to be controlled and shaped by the reality it serves. In this the church is inevitably thrown back upon the strategic importance of the humanity of Jesus in which God


2. Ibid. p.22.

assimilates to Himself the creaturely structures of created existence and opens them up to the truth of His eternal being.

"He is the one place in our humanity where the divine Light shines through to us undimmed and unobstructed by damaged relations or distorting forms of thought and speech; but in Jesus Christ we are given more than the creative mould for our human responses, we are provided with the very essence and core of man's worship to God .... for He constitutes in His vicarious humanity the eloquent reality of our worship." (1)

Therefore the relationship between the different kinds of statements to which Schlink has drawn attention should be sought in the way which God has taken in His condescension to us, His accommodation to our creaturely forms and structures in the man Jesus. Here the distinction between God and the creature is given reality by the Creator Himself in relation to Himself. Here the notion of transcendence implicit in God's being the Lord and Creator entails affirmation of the creaturely structures of rationality as these are opened up to the truth of God's relationship to the creature. There is then no methodological exclusion of creaturely being and rationality as such in our speech about God in 1. Torrance, T.F. God and Rationality, pp.157-158. See also report (unpublished) to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Worship in The Reformed Church, prepared by Torrance, J.B. Cf. Torrance T.F. Theology in Reconstruction, pp.38.ff.
relation to the world. As the particularity of the liturgical Sitz im Leben of kerygmatic and doxological statements draws our attention to the fact that the believers participation in the soteriological activity of God depends upon His free grace, so the particularity of the humanity of Jesus, His obedience which constitutes the basis of the liturgy, both maintains the distinction between God and the creature and yet teaches that God is active within our creaturely existence in space and time. (1)

We now turn to examine how these considerations are related to the development of the doctrine of the Trinity in the East and the West.

(ii) St. Basil "De Spiritu Sancto". (2)

Our prime concern is not to consider the historical circumstances under which this treatise was written or the effect it had in terms of the history of subsequent dogmatic developments. We are simply concerned to point out the manner in which St. Basil defends, to use the Western terms, the consubstantiality, of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son. We shall particularly note the importance of the experience of salvation within the liturgical structure of St. Basil's argument as illustrative of Schlink's thesis concerning the relationship between kerygmatic and doxological statements in terms of the events of the history of salvation which constitute the basis of the church's celebration.

It is certainly not without significance that the dispute with which St. Basil is concerned in this work arose in the context of his celebration of the liturgy.


"When praying with the people and using the doxology to God the Father in both forms, at one time 'with the Son together with the Holy Ghost', and at another time 'through the Son in the Holy Ghost', I was attacked by some of those present on the ground that I was introducing novel and at the same time mutually contradictory terms." (1)

The deniers of the Spirit's deity maintained that since the preposition "in" predicated creaturely circumscription to that which is essentially uncircumscribed then by definition the Spirit cannot be equal with the Father which the copula "with" implies in the doxological ascription. (2) St. Basil replies that such an assertion springs from the failure to distinguish between the essential undivided unity of God which is the object of all our doxological statements and the temporal missions of the several hypostases which forms the historical basis of this doxology. (3) The former, as that which is common to all hypostases, cannot be thought of as divided in any sense. Therefore to predicate creaturely circumscription to the Son or the Spirit in so far as they are one with the Father makes the Father a creature as well. (4)

"For whatsoever audacity a man be guilty of against the Son he cannot but transfer to the

2. Ibid. chp.4.Sec.6.p.5.
3. Ibid. chp.5. Sec.7.p.5.
Father. If he assigns to the Father the upper place of precedence, and asserts that the only begotten Son sits below, he will find that to the creature of his imagination attach all consequent conditions of body." (1)

If any of the hypostases is impugned with respect to its being one with each other in the ineffable divine unity, then all are called into question. St. Basil thus agrees with his opponents that the unity of the being of the triune God cannot be described in earthly terms. (2)

But on that account he does not deny that predicates such as "of" "through" and "in" are properly ascribed to God. The church, says St. Basil, recognises both aspects. The ineffable and undivided unity and the distinct hypostases, of which is predictable on the basis of the history of salvation those words which were taken by St. Basil's opponents to divide the deity.

"I say the church recognises both uses and deprecates neither as subversive of the other. For whenever we are contemplating the majesty of the nature of the Only Begotten, and the excellence of His dignity, we bear witness that the glory is with the Father; while on the other hand, whenever we bethink us of His bestowal on us of good gifts, and of our access to and admission into, the household of God, we confess that this grace is effected for us through Him

2. Ibid. p.9.
and by Him. It follows that the one phrase "with whom" is the proper one to be used in the ascription of glory, while the other, "through whom" is specially appropriate in giving thanks". (1)

We notice here that the hypostatic distinctions are understood in terms of the time conditioned elements in the history of salvation and the unity of these hypostases is understood to be ineffable in terms of the transcendence implied by these elements. The unity of God is not therefore logically related to the hypostatic distinctions. Rather it is that which is ascribed to God in doxological ascription on the basis of the history of salvation. Only Arians, who refuse to acknowledge the liturgical basis of St. Basil's understanding of the unity of deity could introduce an above and below, an a priori and an a posteriori, into the discussion. (2)

Further, St. Basil points out, (3) the freedom of God in relation to the creature, the voluntary nature of the "economy" of the Salvation, is understood in precisely the same way as the unity of God in relation to the distinctions involved in the history of salvation. For the economy takes place, not for the purpose of the enrichment of the eternal being of God, but precisely for the enrichment of the being of the creature with the newness of life that the church celebrates and is rooted in the creaturely elements of the history of salvation. As God is worshipped as one on the basis of the history of His deeds so He is

2. Ibid. Chp. 8, Sec. 18, p. 12.
3. Ibid.
acknowledged as free for precisely the same reason.

(a) The Relation Between Kerygma and Dogma in St. Basil.

The distinction which St. Basil draws between the ineffable unity of the being of God and the distinctiveness of the hypostases on the basis of the history of God's activity is related to a distinction which he draws between dogma and kerygma. Dogma refers to that ineffable unity of God's being and is

"observed in silence", while kerygma refers to the story of God's redemptive acts in history and is

"proclaimed to the world," (1)

In order to prevent the kind of logical projection which the Arians practised, in which the time conditioned predicated related to the economy were applied to the being of deity as such, St. Basil maintains that dogma is made difficult

"to understand for the very advantage of the reader." (2)

The difficulty to which St. Basil alludes concerns the legitimate use of both the predicates "with" and "in" in reference to the basically liturgical structure of his presentation. The difficulty refers to the suspension of logical form in the relationship between the two kinds of statements made in the liturgical celebration of the creature's renewal by God's redeeming activity. This celebration presupposes the voluntary condescension of God to man and His accommodation to the creaturely structures of being, opening them up as it were from above to the truth

2. Ibid. p. 42.
of His life. This difficulty in relating the two sets of statements, that which gives rise to the offence felt by the Arians, is precisely the basis of the church's thanksgiving. St. Basil therefore asks his opponents,

"Shall this His care for us degrade to meanness our thoughts of Him?" (1)

(b) The Deity of the Spirit.

In understanding the deity of the Spirit St. Basil applies the same argument as that with which he defends the deity of the Son. Those predicates which the Arians use to degrade the Spirit as a creature, the ascription of "in" as distinct from "with", are not to be understood as if the deity is divided but to indicate the free condescension of God to the creature in the economy of salvation. (2) The Spirit does not participate in Godhead as if He needed to be given anything. His being "given" takes place not for His sake but for ours. Thus He is

"impassibly divided, shared without loss of ceasing to be entire ... to everyone who receives it, as though given to him alone, and yet it sends forth grace sufficient and full for all mankind." (3)

As with the Son, so with the Spirit, to question His being "with" the Father is to divide the deity; to question His being "in" is to deny His voluntary condescension to the creature. With respect to the latter,

3. Ibid.
to deny the economy of the Spirit is to deny the economy of the Son.

For, "the things done in the dispensation of the coming of our Lord in the flesh, all is through the Spirit .... And He did not leave Him when He had risen from the dead; for when renewing man, and by breathing on the face of the disciples, restoring the grace, that came of the inbreathing of God, which man had lost, what did the Lord say? 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost'." (1)

We thus see that theological activity for St. Basil, as opposed to the Arians, was not simply a matter of language as such, but a penetration behind the statements which occur in the liturgy to the actions of God, and in the light of what they are, we articulate our understanding and formulate our statements about the truth. It is therefore an activity which can only take place in the power and communion of the Spirit in whom we come to know God through the conformity of our thinking to the economic condescension of the Word.

The significance of St. Basil's argument is that his thought related to the unity and triplicity of God originates from and returns to the particular action of God in history accomplishing the salvation and regeneration of man, of history, of the creaturely world. (2)

Therefore it is not surprising that the notion of God's unity which
developed in the Eastern church was not one which was concerned to emphasise the idea of intra trinitarian relations, but to see it in terms of the unique characteristics of the hypostases revealed in the economy. It was therefore conceived as a "hypostatic unity". (1) We may see the importance of this understanding of the unity of God if we glance at developments subsequent to the council of Nicea.

(c) Nicea and the Unity of God.

At the council of Nicea Jesus Christ was declared to be homoousion with God the Father. The anathema of the creed against those who asserted that the Son came into existence from the non-existent, or from another hypostasis or ousia distinct from the Father, entailed that for the Fathers these two terms which later became associated with the unity and triplicity of God, were "substantially identical". (2)

We may assume from this that the objective revelation of the Son in the economy of salvation, the manner of God's presentation of Himself in the flesh, was the point of departure for understanding the divine unity. This was despite the fact that,

"the history of the term homoousios itself, in both its secular and theological usages prior to Nicea always conveyed primarily at any rate, the generic sense" of unity. (3)

As St. Basil later points out what Nicea specifically excluded was a conception of the divine unity which implied, as when two copper coins

1. Nissiotis, N. The Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity for Church Life and Theology, in The Orthodox Ethos, Vol. 1, p. 43.


alike are made of the same substance, that the Father and the Son are derived from a third. (1) The *homoousion* of Nicea expresses the view based on the particularity of the Son's revelation that whatever the Father is, the Son is in identical measure. As the particularity of the Son's revelation was the point of departure for understanding the divine unity this conception of the unity as identity of substance did not entail Sabellianism, a unitary object cannot be *homoousios* with itself. The term implied plurality of objective hypostases whilst maintaining the identity of substance. Therefore we agree with Prestige in his claim that

"so far as the Council of Nicea is concerned the problem of divine unity did not arise," since, "the party which can later be designated Athanasian regarded the term *homoousios* as containing within itself the true and proper solution of that problem also." (2)

It must be admitted that subsequent to the council those who did not share the Athanasian approach to God's unity and diversity on the basis of the *homoousion* grew suspicious of the assumed identity by the council of the terms *ousia* and *hypostasis*. At the council of Alexandria (361) (3), under the leadership of Athanasius, it was formally recognised that the formula "three hypostases" hitherto suspect by some because it sounded like three separate deities was pronounced legitimate provided it did not

carry the Arian connotation. Also the opposite formula, "one hypostasis", was equally proved provided there was no Sabellian intent. After the work of the Cappadocians when the doctrine of the trinity finally came to be formulated in the East as one ousia and three hypostases

"it implied that God, regarded from the point of view of internal analysis, is one object, but that regarded from the point of view of external presentation, He is three objects; His unity being safe guarded by the doctrine that these three objects of presentation are not merely precisely similar .... but in a sense identically one." (1)

This view of the unity of God in the East, from the point of view of "internal analysis", needs to be constantly balanced against the fact that the Cappadocians

"theory is that the unity of the ousia, or Godhead, follows from the unity of the divine action (energeia) which is disclosed in revelation." (2)

Gregory of Nyssa puts it this way,

"If we observe a single activity of the Father Son and Holy Spirit, in no respect different in the case of any, we are obliged to infer unity of nature from identity of activity; for Father, Son and Holy Spirit co-operate in sanctifying, quickening, consoling and so on." (3)

This statement of Gregory's brings us back again to the concern in the East with the practical significance of the trinitarian dogma. It is rooted and grounded in the life of the church, in man's experience of the redemptive activity of God. It was precisely this practical concern that led to the development in the Eastern church of the distinctive doctrine of union according to the divine energeia. (1) To safeguard the reality of the unity of the creature with God celebrated in the liturgy and to distinguish it from that unity between God and the creature established by God in the economy of the Son a doctrine of union according to the divine energies was developed. If no such distinction were developed either the reality of God's unity with the creature as such would be called into question in the interests of His freedom and transcendence or there would be no basis for a distinction between the divine economy of salvation and the creation of the world. (2)

The doctrine of the energies designates the kind of relationship which God establishes between Himself and the creature on the basis of the trinitarian economy of salvation. The relationship which God establishes cannot be interiorized within the divine being as if it were a natural determination. So, for instance, the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit can never be reduced to being a relationship between the Father and the Son; such concern for a common nature in understanding the divine unity should never preempt the distinctiveness of the Spirit's work in the dynamic economy of salvation. (3) The conciliar decisions in the


fourteenth century, consequent on the dispute between St. Gregory Palamas and the Calabrian monk Barlaam, established an "ineffable distinction, other than that between His (God's) essence and His persons according to which He is, under different aspects, both totally inaccessible and at the same time totally accessible. This distinction is that between the essence of God, or His nature, properly so called, which is inaccessible, unknowable and incommunicable; and the energies or divine operations, .... in which He goes forth from Himself, manifests, communicates and gives Himself." (1)

Palamas, "accepts that the Son and the Spirit should also be called energies of the Father, but hypostatic energies (ἐνεργεία ἀρσενική) distinct from the non-hypostatic ones (οὐκ ἐνεργεία) which constitute the existence of God ad extra and which belong to the three hypostases." (2)

He therefore proposes an "essential union, hypostatic union and union through the energies." (3)


3. Ibid. p.183.
This development of the Eastern understanding of the dogma of the Trinity indicates how closely its dogmatic thought is bound up with the union between God and the creature which is celebrated in the liturgy, the point emphasised by E. Schlink.

"It is quite certain that, throughout the centuries of the church's history, the Trinitarian God has always been the beginning and the end of theological reasoning, not primarily as a formulated dogma, but as the basic reality from which the life of the church springs." (1)

Consequently the *epiclesis* (2), as supplication for the coming of the Holy Spirit, in whom God goes forth from Himself, manifests Himself, communicates and gives Himself, is answered by the *paraclesis* (3), in which is re-enacted the whole divine economy of salvation. This is why it is so integrally related to the Eucharist. For while it is true that

"in the East the eucharistic celebration makes operative the whole economy of salvation, in which the whole Trinity is involved", (4)

it nevertheless depends upon the Holy Spirit's personal presence in response to the invocation and not merely the recital of words. (5) We

may grasp something of the meaning of K. Rahner's observation with respect to the development of the trinitarian dogma in the East and its relation to the life and experience of the church celebrated in the liturgy if we follow the commentary on the liturgy of Chrysostom by Simeon of Thessalonica (d. 1429.) (1) Rahner observes that the development of the trinitarian dogma in the East,

"implies and presupposes ultimately a real-ontological communication to man of the revealed reality as such." (2)

We note in Simeon's commentary that the trinitarian emphasis of the celebration is both dramatic and cosmic. (3) The community, together with the celebrant, dramatically re-enact the economy of salvation from the creation to the consumation and beyond as it participates the mystery of Christ's presence in the Holy Spirit. The Bishop, who is about to celebrate, descends from the throne in which he has been stationed, typifying the condescension of God the Son. Putting on the holy stole he proclaims the Lord's holy incarnation and going towards the West, as far as the church doors, His manifestation on earth even till his death and descent into hell. When the liturgy is begun the prayers and antiphons unite the old and new covenants with emphasis on the part played by the Theotokos. On entering the sanctuary the celebrant censes the holy table as a sign of the advent of the Holy Spirit.

"For the Spirit came to us from heaven, when Christ went up into heaven." (4)


The **Trisagion**, which is said forthwith, manifests the mystery of the Trinity which the incarnation of one person of the Trinity made manifest to men. Then advancing to the throne in the sanctuary, and facing the West, the celebrant proclaims Christ's ascension to the right hand of the Father and as such, in blessing the people with a three headed taper crosswise, assures them of sanctification through the Trinity.

"That Christ, having ascended into heaven sent down upon us the splendour of the Trinity, typified by the light (of the taper) and the blessing." (1)

Then the procession of the divine gifts takes place with,

"great pomp of Readers, Deacons, and Priests, with the lamps and holy vessels preceding and following: because this symbolises the last advent of Christ, when he shall come with glory." (2)

Having praised the mystery of the economy the celebrant,

"goes on to the commencement of the mysteries." (3)

After uttering the holy words, the same which our Lord used when sacrificing Himself, the celebrant invokes upon himself, and upon the Mysteries laid on the table, the gift of the Holy Spirit.

"We offer unto Thee this reasonable and unbloody sacrifice: and beseech Thee and pray and

2. Ibid, p.xxix.
3. Ibid. p.xxxiii.
supplicate; send down Thy Holy Ghost upon us, and on these proposed gifts." (1)

Symeon comments that,

"he forthwith beholds the living Jesus lying before him, and Him in His very essence, being truly the Bread and the Cup." (2)

It is the sign of,

"our being united to God through the Only Begotten by the Holy Ghost." (3)

This dramatic and cosmic-eschatological dimension of the liturgical celebration of the creature's renewal in Jesus Christ gives to the Eastern church's theology a peculiar relationship with the liturgy. This is not to assert a reduction of theology to liturgy,

"its transformation into liturgical theology," (4)

but as having as its ultimate term of reference,

"the faith of the church, as manifested and communicated in the liturgy, that catholic vision and experience." (5)


3. Ibid. p.xxxiv.


5. Ibid.
The peculiar relationship springs from the fact that the church is understood to be the mystery of the new creation in Christ. Attention is not focused on the church as an institution as such, nor upon the experience of the community as such; but upon the church and the experience of the community because the very nature and purpose of the institution is not to exist for itself but to be the epiphany of the new creation.

"In this sense, their (i.e. the Eastern Fathers) whole theology is ecclesiological for it has the church, the experience of the new life, the communion of the Holy Spirit as its source and context." (1)

A similar view of the relationship between liturgy and theology has been expounded, in a Western context, by Prof. T. F. Torrance. (2) In expounding the significance of the *homoousion* of the Spirit for Worship he emphasises the fact that the Holy Spirit

"is not only the Spirit sent by Christ but the Spirit of response to Christ.... Not only is He God the Holy Spirit descending to us, the Spirit by whom God bears witness to himself, but God the Holy Spirit lifting up all creation in praise and rejoicing in God...." (3)

The basis upon which this view of Spirit's work is given is the relation-

3. Ibid. p. 242.
ship between the incarnate obedience of Christ and the new coming of the Holy Spirit consequent upon this work and the resurrection and the ascension. (1) The distinction between the relationship of the Spirit to creation as such and the church is seen to depend upon the Mediator taking

"his place on the throne of God in his consecrated and glorified humanity." (2)

"In his new coming, therefore, the Spirit came not simply as the one Spirit who proceeds eternally from the Father but as the Spirit mediated through the human nature and experience of the Incarnate Son." (3)

Since,

"It was only at infinite cost that Jesus Christ gained for us the gift of the Holy Spirit, receiving him in all his consuming holiness into the human nature which he took from our fallen and alienated condition .... Until he had sanctified himself and perfected in our human nature his one offering for all men .... the divine Spirit could not be poured out upon human flesh or be received by sinful mortal men." (4)

2. Ibid. p.247.
3. Ibid. p.246.
4. Ibid. p.247.
As the Holy Spirit's person is understood in inextricable connection with the actual historical life struggle and victory of Jesus in His incarnation, life, death and resurrection, so too is His work in relation to the church. The church comes into being in history as a result of a movement of

"recreation through atoning sanctification,
for through the Holy Spirit the full creative impact of the divine Word broke in upon the apostolic church constituting it a new creation in Christ, and so bringing it into a new state of being in which it was renewed after the image of God." (1)

Human speaking and thinking about the truth of God can only take place in the context which speaks of a similar creative reshaping of our rationality. This means within the context of worship from which the task of witnessing is inseparable. (2)

Consequently the whole Trinity is seen in relation to the worshipping life and witness of the church. The Father through the Son and in the Holy Spirit creates, directs and perfects all things. (3)

The relationship between dogma and liturgy presupposes this connection and the epiclesis in the Eastern liturgy emphasises the point that the wholeness of the Trinity participates in the renewal of the creature for the anthropological dimension is included in the person of the priest and

the people. This understanding of theology stems from the very nature of its source, that is the "faith of the church". For the faith which founds the church is that,

"living relationship to certain events: the Life, Death, Resurrection and Glorification of Jesus Christ, His ascension to heaven, the descent of the Holy Spirit ... a relationship which makes her a constant 'witness' and 'participant' of these events; of their saving, redeeming, life giving and life-transfiguring reality ... Her faith thus is not only not detachable from her experience of these events, but is indeed that experience itself .... Her lex credendi is revealed in her life." (1)

(d) Tertullian and the Trinity in the West.

The distinction between the Eastern and Western approaches to the dogma of the Trinity has been commented on in theological text books; we need only note at this stage the problem to which they draw attention. But it is necessary to indicate the question before we proceed to present the approach to the Trinity evinced by Western theologians. G.L. Prestige maintains that the

"Groundwork of the Cappadocian Father's thought lay in the triplcity of equal hypostaseis, and the identity of the divine ousia came second in order of prominence

K. Rahner contends that the Greeks,

"considered only the (for them subsequent)
problem of the unity of the three persons,
whom they encountered as distinct both in
their theology and in salvation history." (2)

In contrast to this approach, for which the history of salvation and the experience of salvation celebrated in the liturgy is essential, the Western view,

"begins with the one God, the one divine essence
as a whole and only afterwards does it see God
as three persons." (3)

Or the Latin view is seen to emphasise the fact that

"God is one Object and three Subjects (una
substantia, tres personae." (4)

Consequently, as Rahner emphasises, the West's dogmatics were characterised by a separation between God's threefoldness and His unity, (5) the latter taking precedence over the former. The result is that the doctrine of God becomes,

"quite philosophical and abstract and refers
hardly at all to salvation history. It speaks

3. Ibid. p. 17.
of the necessary metaphysical properties of God, and not very explicitly of God as experienced in salvation history in his free relations to his creatures. For should one make use of salvation history, it would soon become apparent that one speaks always of him whom Scripture and Jesus himself calls the Father, Jesus' Father, who sends the Son and gives himself to us in the Spirit, in his Spirit." (1)

When we look at the way Tertullian understands the threefoldness of God in his treatise "Ad Praxeum", the thing that strikes one is that the concept of "economy" serves to explain the eternal intra-divine relationships on the principle that division of authority does not entail division of nature. (2) Attention is focused away from the history of salvation on to the problem of how God's threeness and unity can be understood as real and yet not self-contradictory.

"Single individual rule, "which, does not, because it is government of one, preclude him whose government it is, either from having a son, or from having made himself actually a son to himself, or from ministering his own monarchy by whatever agents he will." (3)

Tertullian then uses the comparison, which later on in the hands of St. Augustine was to assume some importance, between human thought


and consciousness to indicate that the trinitarian mode of being was not a threat to God's unity. (1) It is this comparison which governs Tertullian's notion of the distinction between the persons rather than reference to the distinctions involved in the history of salvation. (2) The substantiality of the Son is understood in terms of His being the Reason or Wisdom of God; and that which is the Reason or Wisdom of all created rationality cannot itself be without substance.

"What ever, therefore, was the substance of the Word that I designate a Person, I claim for it the name Son, while I recognise the Son, I assert his distinction as second to the Father." (3)

Harnack maintains that a distinction drawn on this basis is nothing but a "juristic distinction", and a "legal fiction." (4) It must, I think, be admitted that Tertullian's approach to the divine economy is one in which "the conception of function is becoming very prominent .... this should not be allowed to confuse the reader into thinking that the economy is .... that of the Incarnation, even though the economy came in Greek to be the normal term for expressing the Incarnation.

The economy of which Tertullian is speaking

3. Ibid.
is not that of the Son, whether in redemption or any other connection. It is expressly 'His economy', that is the economy of the being of God .... it is not an economy of redemption nor an economy of revelation, but an economy of divine being."

(1) The Holy Spirit is seen in terms of the economy of the divine being as a relationship between the Father and the Son.

"Just as the fruit of the tree is third from the root, or as the stream out of the river is third from the fountain, or as the apex of the ray is third from the sun." (2)

The idea of unity thus expressed has been aptly called "organic"; (3) in that it is established by a unifying and organising source which administers its authority in a threefold manner. (4)

Since the content of the history of salvation is not the basis upon which the unity and threefoldness of God is understood, the relationship between God and the creature which this conception of the economy presupposes will be structural rather than functional. (5) That is, it will presuppose a similarity between the creaturely content of the history and the essential nature of deity. Instead of allowing the particularity of the history concerned to enter into the definition of a notion of the freedom and transcendence of God who condescends to relate

Himself to the creature, the intra-mundane relationships will now be seen as a reflection of eternity itself. We would therefore tend to agree with the judgments of both Harnack and A. Grillmeier concerning this trend in Tertullian's theology. On the one hand Harnack points out, (1) that there is a direct link between Tertullian's Montanism and his view of the economy in relation to history. He sees a structural relationship between the dispensations of the Father and the Son in the history that is passed and the dispensation of the Spirit and the history that is to come. World history is thus structured according to the economy of the divine being in a manner which would be impossible on the basis of the Greek view of the economy of salvation. On the other hand Grillmeier maintains that in such a view of the economy as evinced by Tertullian,

"creation and history threaten to become factors in the inner processions of God. The neat distinctions between the processiones and the missiones outside him (i.e. God) must be developed in a careful process without the two being separated. Only in this way can the danger of pantheism, and also of subordinationism, be avoided. The tremendous attempt to make the doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation into a Weltanschauung had come to grief on this idea of oikonomia." (2)

It is of interest to compare the approaches to the doctrine of the Trinity in the East and the West by viewing the differences in approach
to the economy seen in Tertullian and Irenaeus. Harnack draws attention to the significant point, even though he cannot be regarded as sympathetic to what he understands as the physical view of salvation advocated by the East, that,

"whereas Tertullian developed the Logos doctrine without reference to the historical Jesus, the truth rather being that he simply added the incarnation to the already existing theory of the subject, there is no doubt that Irenaeus, as a rule, made Jesus Christ, whom he knew as God and man, the starting point of his speculations." (1)

The central significance of the history of salvation for Irenaeus' view of the economy of the Son may be grasped from the key concept which he uses to expound the work of Christ, i.e., Recapitulation. (2) The foundation of this conception is the idea that in the humanity of Jesus God went over the ground which man since Adam had traversed, but in the reverse direction.

"He has therefore, in His work of recapitulation, summed up all things, both waging war against our enemy, and crushing him who at the beginning had led us away captive in Adam .... in order that, as our species went down to death through a


vanquished man, so we may ascend to life again through a victorious one." (1)

In fulfilling His work, the strategic importance of the humanity of Jesus is evident in that at every point He placed Himself in the same circumstances as Adam, and was confronted with the same choices. Thus was wrought out in time the decisive victory the benefits of which can pass to mankind because Christ was acting as the champion of humanity. (2) In spite of all the temptations of the Devil, and under these conditions, Christ kept the commandments of the Law perfectly.

"As a consequence there was done away that infringement of God's commandment which had occurred in Adam." (3)

Irenaeus constantly emphasises that it was a real and grim, yet completely victorious, mortal struggle of the Incarnate that robbed Satan of his power and saved man. The climax of all this was Christ's passion and death.

"It is clear that the Lord suffered death, in obedience to His Father." (4)

"The trespass which came by the tree was undone by the tree of obedience, when, harkening unto God, the Son of Man was nailed to the tree." (5)

"The Lord, our Christ, underwent a valid passion .... and established fallen man by His own strength." (1)

Irenaeus' view of the scope of the recapitulating activity of Christ's work may be seen in the fact, alluded to above, that the whole of the incarnate life is significant. The Son of God persevered from childhood to manhood in a life of perfect obedience. The importance of this aspect of Irenaeus' theology may be compared with the reason given by St. Athanasius for the Incarnation in his work on that subject. (2) Like Irenaeus, Athanasius wrote to vindicate the Incarnation of God the Son as the necessary foundation for and central fact in the Gospel. However, the reason he gives for the continuance of the Incarnate upon the earth for the course of a complete human life was that if this had not occurred the human race would not have known that the Incarnation had happened. (3)

The central importance of the Incarnation and its soteriological significance in relation to the whole of Jesus' earthly activity up to and including the resurrection has its corollary in the kind of relationship which the risen Christ has with the church in the Spirit. The dominating conception here is that man is made god, theosis, (4) or a son of God.

"He who was the Son of God became the Son of Man, that man ... might become the son of God." (5)

2. St. Athanasius. De Incarnatione Verbi Dei. Trans. and edited by a Religious of C.S.M.V.
3. Ibid. Chp.16.p.44.
As the Mediator of the Spirit in which man participates in the new relation established by His obedience Christ confers upon us the gift of communion with and subjection to our Creator. (1) In this sense,

"man is rendered spiritual and perfect because of the outpouring of the Spirit." (2)

Regeneration and Adoption are also terms used by Irenaeus to describe this spiritual union of God and man. (3) In this account of the soteriological effect of the union between God and man mediated by Jesus Christ in the Spirit we link up with another aspect of Irenaeus' thought which joins the history of salvation with the creation of the world.

In opposing the Gnostic view of an absolute disjunction between God and the world as both logically contradictory and theologically meaningless, (4) Irenaeus develops his own distinctive view of the way in which God is immediately present and active with and for the creature. It is by the Son and in the Spirit, understood as the "hands" of God, that Irenaeus puts forward his view of the relationship between God and the creature which is restored in Christ.

"It was not angels, therefore, who made us or formed us .... For God did not stand in need of these, in order to the accomplishing of what He had Himself determined with Himself beforehand should be done, as if He did not

possess His own hands. For with Him were always present the Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, by whom and in whom, freely and spontaneously He made all things." (1)

In the metaphor of the hand of God Irenaeus found Himself in company with a figure which in the Old and New Testaments was used to express the active intervention of God in the historical process in creation, in protecting His people, in revelation or in prophetic utterance and inspiration. (2) Irenaeus uses the formula in such a way that from his understanding of God's activity in the economy of creation and redemption both the Son and the Spirit are conceived as of equal status with the Father. For as the, "hands of God", is an expression of the immediacy of God's presence in the creative and redemptive process, the activity of the Son and the Spirit implies their unity with the Father.

As,

"the Father planning everything well and giving His commands, the Son carrying these into execution and performing the work of creating, and the Spirit nourishing and increasing"; so "we should know that He who made, and formed .... and nourishes us by means of the creation, establishing all things by His Word, and binding them together by His Wisdom .... this is He who is the only true God." (3)

We would conclude our discussion by drawing attention to the

the differences in approach evinced by Tertullian and Irenaeus to the nature of the divine economy. These differences are fundamentally rooted in the different roles assigned in their respective theological systems to the significance of the history of salvation as entering into their understanding of the relationship between God and the creature established in the economy. The difference as far as Western Christianity is concerned may be illustrated by the manner in which St. Augustine takes up and develops the idea of unity which we found in Tertullian to predominate over the distinctiveness of the activity of God in the history of salvation. Here the conception of God as absolute being, simple and indivisible, forms the ever present background to thought. (1) When this idea of unity is associated with the idea that,

"in the mind itself, even before it is a partaker of God, His image is found", so that, "there is set forth an inherent kinship between divine and human being or a pre-established harmony between ultimate truth and human truth," (2)

the significance of historical activity in relationship with God's communication with the creature will obviously be of less significance.

For such a view,

"fails to wrestle seriously with the basic fact upon which the Christian Gospel rests and with which it stands or falls, the condescension of God to enter our lowly and creaturely existence in Jesus Christ, to break through the discrepancy

between us and God .... and restore man to union with God." (1)

It is not therefore surprising that conception of the distinctions in relation to the unity of God posed somewhat of a problem for Augustine. These distinctions which for the Greeks were concerned to express the reality of God's activity in His self communication to the creature in creation and redemption, are now primarily understood from the point of view of God's internal relationship with Himself. But if the Father and the Son are Begetter and Begotten what is the relationship of the Spirit wherein He differs from the Son? (2) Augustine concludes that the Spirit is the mutual relation, the mutual love of the Father and the Son. (3) It is consequently inevitable that attention should be thus focused away from the cosmological reference of the economy of salvation and on the "key position of anthropology." (4)

K. Rahner had indicated the methodological difficulty in attempting to understand the dogma of the Trinity from this point of view. Not only is it true that such a view of the unity and threefoldness of God,

"must produce the impression that it can make only formal statements about the three divine persons, with the help of concepts about the two processions and about the relations." But, "even these statements, however, refer only to a Trinity which is absolutely locked within itself

3. Ibid. Bk.1.chp.7.
one, which is not, in its reality, open to anything distinct from it." (1)

Anthropology as such cannot supply the key to understanding the Trinity, since we cannot derive from human experience

"the fact that we know about the Trinity because the Father's Word has entered our history and given us his Spirit .... this starting point should not only be tacitly presupposed; the treatise should really start by positing it as such." (2)

The anthropological concern must be balanced by, not excluded by, a view of the history of salvation which,

"implies and presupposes ultimately a real-ontological communication to man of the revealed reality as such. Hence it cannot be interpreted .... as a merely verbal communication, since this interpretation does not modify the real relation between him who communicates (as three personal) and the hearer." (3)

But if we do justice to both the aspect of human experience and the objectivity of God's approach to the creature, we find ourselves back in the situation where from earliest times in the Eastern church theology found its place. That is, in relation to the Sitz im Leben of the liturgical celebration of God's creative and redemptive purposes. Here statements about God's activity, whilst involving creaturely experience

and rationality, are shaped and controlled by the reality which they serve. This is made possible by the fact that in the particular historical humanity of Jesus, creaturely being and rationality is opened up to the transcendent depths of the truth of God's eternal life and love. So relation to Jesus Christ in the Spirit entails that we participate "in the sacramental area where human knowledge of God may actually and truthfully correspond to God's revelation of Himself." (1)

Here the concrete experience of human life as lived by Jesus and ourselves is taken up and given rational coherence and meaning in terms of a transcendent relationship in which, while we are intimately involved, we can not specify or reduce to clear cut delimited notions or conceptions. (2)

We are thus confronted with the fact that the only meaningful way in which both the transcendent freedom of God and the creaturely nature of the creature can be given their proper integrity, without denying the intimate relationship which exists between both consequent on God's creative and redemptive activity, is in a situation which corresponds to the setting in life of the liturgy.

In this sense we agree with the judgement of V. Lossky that, "trinitarian theology is ... a theology of union, a mystical theology which appeals to experience, and which presupposes a continuous and progressive series of changes in created nature, a more intimate communion of the human person with the Holy Trinity." (3)

Consequently the kind of relationship which such a view of the trinitarian dogma presupposes as subsisting between God and the creature is one which is rooted and grounded in the economy which is celebrated in the liturgy. As the Word and Spirit are agents of creation, as the Son becomes flesh and the Spirit makes His dwelling place a human body and soul, as this union is celebrated in the same Spirit within the life of the church in space and time, the created and contingent universe has then established within it its vocation; to become the kingdom of Christ that it may be transformed into the eternal kingdom of God. In this way the relative integrity of the creature is acknowledged and given its place within the structure of the God-creature relationship. Christ's dominion now has an actual history in space and time. Whilst His Lordship is at once absolute, it nevertheless pushes outward to embrace all creation. (1)

We would therefore propose that the dogma of the Trinity provides a viable way of understanding the God-creature relationship, indeed in the most eminent sense viable, as it is understood within the context of the life of the church as

"the unshakeable foundation of all religious thought, of all piety, of all spiritual life, of all experience." (2)

Here the trinity is understood in a dialectical relationship with the experience of the church both past and present. It is not the case that


either the experience of the church creates the dogma or that the dogma creates the experience. It is the pressure of reality itself .... the situation in which men find themselves; the actual events that take place within that situation that creates both experience and interpretation (1). In this sense, and primarily for this reason, we believe that Barth's understanding of the unity and threefoldness of God needs to be developed and expounded. The uniqueness of the being and activity of God in this relation to the creature, and the uniqueness of the creature's being in relation to God, can only be understood if the unity of God in His Word is declared to us, not simply amidst or with, but in and through and by the worldliness of its form. Unless the worldliness of Christ is allowed to stand, determining how God speaks, we have nothing left in our hands to prevent the error of understanding God and the creature in terms of our view of God's intra trinitarian speech; instead of understanding God by means of the sonship actually achieved by God toward man and which is celebrated in the liturgy.

The problem with Schleiermacher's theology as Barth understood it may also be illustrated in his more philosophical writings.

In his *Dialektik* (1) Schleiermacher gives the following exposition of the relationship between God and the world. The idea of the world is expressed as,

"die grenz unseres Denkens". (2)

Since the transcendental ground of thought lies outside thought itself, the expression of the concept of the world as a finite limit gives only,

"den Weg zum transcendenten Grunde". (3)

In this relation between the incompleteness of finite thought and the transendent ground of its possibility as a limiting concept, we have a compliment to Schleiermacher's idea which plays a significant theological role; this is the unmediated self-consciousness.

But while the idea of the world and God are correlated they can never coincide. This is because,

"denn im Gedanken ist die Gottheit immer als Einheit gesetzt ohne Vielheit, die Welt aber als Vielheit ohne Einheit: die Welt ist Raum und Zeit erfüllend, die Gottheit raum und zeitlos; die Welt ist die Totalität der Gegensätze, die Gottheit die reale Negation aller Gegensätze. Zu denken ist aber eins nicht ohne das andere." (4)


2. Ibid. p.224.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. p.227.
Here the relationship is dialectically balanced on the basis of the given plurality and antitheses of temporal knowing and being and their negation in the divine transcendent ground of being. But the correlation is positively grounded in the fact that,

"wir nur von dem durch die Welt in uns Hervorgebrachten auf Gott kommen," (1)

The dialectical relation cannot be reduced any further if it is to remain meaningful.

Schleiermacher finds support for his position in the fact that it is seen to overcome the problems involved in the old difficulty of conceiving God as existing either "outside" or "inside" the world. On the one hand to think of God as existing outside the world is to,

"setzt einen Gegensatz, der notwendig rückwirkend in Gott einen Gegensatz zwischen Selbsttätigkeit und Empfänglichkeit hervorbringt, wie davon die natürlichen Theologien, welche auf der Schöpfungstheorie ruhen, voll sind." (2)

On the other hand the problem is,

"das innerhalb geht wesentlich zurück darauf, Gott zu natura naturans und Weltordnung zu machen." (3)

But the question arises, despite Schleiermacher's insistence upon the integrity of the dialectic, that if the conception of God is meaningful as the dialectic presupposes then such meaning that it has can only

2. Ibid. p. 228.
3. Ibid.
be derived from the kind of relationship which is specifically excluded by Schleiermacher, viz., causal dependence. This relationship is excluded on the basis of precluding from the concept of God, "einen Gegensatz zwischen Selbsttätigkeit und Empfänglichkeit." (1)

The validity of Schleiermacher's enterprise depends upon the possibility of comparing absolute and relative in an absolute but non-conceptual manner. (2) As the hermeneutical basis for Christian dogma it entails that it can only be understood as descriptions of the determinations of human self-consciousness in its relation to the comprehensive feeling of absolute dependence. The feeling of absolute dependence in which the relationship between God and the world is established can only be known in the time conditioned descriptions of its various states.


2. This appears to have been overlooked in the analysis given by Niebuhr, H.R. Schleiermacher On Christ And Religion. pp.184-185. Here it is simply stated that, "Schleiermacher does not permit any cognitive dissolution of the finite-infinite distinction, for it is the relation and not the identity of terms that he stresses in his description and analysis."

To justify this statement in terms of the phenomenological givenness of human existence only begs the question why this dissolution is not possible. There would need to be introduced extra logical factors, necessitated by, say, the historical relationship between the Incarnation of the Word and other men, to establish Schleiermacher's argument. But it is just such a relationship which Schleiermacher excludes in the interests of what Barth terms the higher concept of human nature.
This means it can only be known indirectly. (1) Schleiermacher posits a direct non-cognitive relation between God and the world which we find given but not known in the feeling of absolute dependence, just as the actuality of knowledge amidst change is the given non-deducible basis for the dialektik. (2)


"Gegensatz des Allgemeinen und Besonderen: Letzteres das im Denken nicht rein Darstellbare, ersteres das im Sein nicht rein Gegebene. Die Auflösung: Beide konstituieren die beiden Asymptoten des Wissens."

This ground is the possibility of all knowledge; without faith in the continuity within discontinuity there could be no affirmation of knowledge. Therefore, "Das absolut höchste Sein und Denken in seiner Identität ist nicht ein blosses Postulat, sondern es ist in Jeden einzelnen Akt des Wissens das allein Reale und Gewisse." p.136.
APPENDIX B.

In a sympathetic and acute presentation of Barth's doctrine of the Trinity, Welch, C. *The Trinity in Contemporary Theology pp. 161 ff.*, finds difficulty in accepting the implications of Barth's method of understanding the person of the Holy Spirit. Welch complains that,

"there seems to be no immediate transition from the notion of commoness in the origin of the Spirit to the concept of the community." (p. 201.)

Welch puts forward an alternative approach to Barth. He wishes to begin from the experience of the Spirit in revelation and work back to its eternal ground.

"Instead of arguing from the commoness in the origin of the Spirit to the notion of communion and thence to the notion of this divine communion as the ground between God and man, we should be moving directly from the understanding of the Spirit in revelation as communion and love to the eternal basis of that love in the communion of the Father and the Son." (Ibid.)

But it is difficult to see how such a suggestion is really an alternative that is compatible with Barth's theological method. To suggest that a move can be made to the eternal basis of the communion which is experienced by man in the event of revelation to the eternal basis in the intra-trinitarian relation which constitutes the Spirit's hypostasis, is to suggest that understanding of the event of revelation presupposes the existence of the creature. Such
a move would be from our point of view directly contrary to Barth's intention in considering the Spirit in terms of the inconceivable act in which God in distinguishing Himself from Himself is related to the creature in the event of revelation.

The weakness in Welch's alternative position becomes obvious when he attempts to relate his understanding of the Spirit to the trinitarian teaching of D. Baillie. (pp. 208 ff.) Baillie reaches understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity by relating it to the Christian's experience of salvation, the experience of the "paradox of grace." (p. 209.) Welch would link the subjective understanding with objective analysis given by Barth. But Barth himself is well aware of the contradiction between his method and that of D. Baillie. He states concerning Baillie's attempt to understand dogma in terms of the experience of the paradox of grace,

"This is entirely wrong. I would begin with grace, but I would ask, 'The grace of whom?'; 'What grace?', I do not like Baillie here."

Barth, K. Table Talk, p. 51. Cf. Church Dogmatics, Vol. 4.2, pp. 55-56 and Robinson, N.H. G.

Trinitarianism and Post-Barthian Theology.

The same sort of apparent contradiction in an estimation of Barth's theological method is apparent in an earlier but no less acute assessment presented by Camfield, F.W. Revelation and the Holy Spirit: An Essay in Barthian Theology. In agreement with Barth's
view of the knowledge of revelation in terms of the person of the Holy Spirit Camfield says,

"the New Testament witness is that not in Him (i.e. Christ) treated from an historical point of view does revelation lie. Not Christ after the flesh, the Christ who is tractable to historical enquiry, but the Christ after the Spirit is the subject of revelation; and between these two there is a dualism, certainly not ultimate or revelation would be impossible, but rationally ultimate, the dualism marked by the words death and resurrection ...... The Christ according to the flesh, and the Christ according to the Spirit belong to two circles. These circles are rationally disparate, completely non-coincident. Revelation consists in the manifestation of their divine, transcendent coincidence, expressed by the New Testament term, the Holy Spirit." (pp.64-65, Cf. 79, 217.ff., 222, 86, 281.ff.)

Having correctly seen the relationship posited by Barth's theological method between the historical event of revelation and man's understanding of it, Camfield then proceeds to consider the negativity of human history as expressing a correlation with the event of revelation so described.

"The need which postulates revelation is an
a priori sense of negativity. It is not simply that there is an a priori in the soul of man, in the sense of a positive apprehension of the religious object as continuous with his life, it is there as an a priori of a negative kind." (p.21. Cf. the estimation given by this interpreter of Barth of the negativity of human existence and that given by Bultmann. R. Prophecy and Fulfillment in Essays on Old Testament Interpretation ed. Westermann, C. pp.50.ff. and Bultmann. R. The Significance of the Old Testament for the Christian Faith. in Anderson. B. ed. The Old Testament and the Christian Faith. pp.8.ff.)
APPENDIX C.

As Barth points out, his discussion of the significance of the doctrine of enhypostasis is related to what in Calvin's writing became known as the extra Calvinisticum. (Barth, K. Church Dogmatics Vol.1,2, pp.168 ff. Cf. Vol.4,1, pp. 180 ff., 52-53.) Barth understands the concern of Calvin at this point to mean that the

"λόγος ἀρχαῖος is to be regarded equally seriously as the terminus a quo, as the λόγος ἐναρχικός was regarded as the terminus ad quem of the incarnation."

(Ibid. p.169.)

However it would appear that Barth's attempt to interpret the doctrines of an and en hypostasis in terms of his view of the relationship between the form of revelation and the inconceivable act in which God determines Himself as God for Man and Man for God in Jesus Christ to some degree changes the meaning of the enhypostatic doctrine and its relation to what Calvin's extra Calvinisticum signified. Barth views both the doctrine of enhypostasis and the extra Calvinisticum as visualising the dynamic noetic aspect of Christology. This we take to mean that aspect of Barth's interpretation of the event of revelation in which the form of the event is considered as presupposing the mystery of the unity of the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus. In the doctrine of the Trinity this mystery was associated with the person of the Holy Spirit whose mode of being corresponded to the reciprocity of the act in which the Father determined Himself for the Son and the Son the Father. In Barth's interpretation of the extra Calvinisticum in the sense indicated above we see the intimate connection between his view of the Trinity
and Christology. But we doubt whether this connection and its interpretation is what either the doctrine of *enhypostasis* or the extra Calvinisticum meant. To take the latter first.

It would appear that the extra Calvinisticum grew out of Calvin's concern to concentrate attention on the fact of what God willed Christ to be for us as Mediator of Creation and Redemption, as distinct from God's invisible and incomprehensible essence. This distinction which can only be understood by Barth in terms of the inconceivable freedom of the act which presupposes God's positing of his unique existence, is nevertheless understood by Calvin in terms of the distinction between the historical form of revelation, the actuality of Christ as incarnate, and the incomprehensible nature of God. This distinction presupposed that the nature of Christ's condescension was one which could not be understood in terms of the being of God, it did not presuppose, as it would appear to be the case with Barth, a correspondence between the nature of God and the form of the event of revelation. (Cf. on a similar point Barth's stringent criticism of Calvin's doctrine of election and his openness on the question of natural theology because he refused to consider both questions from the point of view of the presupposition of the event of revelation in the being of God. Barth, K. Church Dogmatics, Vol.2.2.pp.106-112, 166.ff. and Vol.4.1.pp.366-367; Vol.2.1.pp.127.ff.) It was Calvin's insistence on this point which brought him into conflict with the Lutheran theologian Osiander, who attempted to draw a structural relationship between the being of God and the event of the Incarnation. (Calvin, J. *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Bk.2.Chp.12.Secs.4-7. Cf. Willis, D. *Calvin's Catholic Christology*.)
The Role of the So-Called Extra Calvinisticum. pp.70-71, 79.ff.) It is Calvin's distinction between the role of Christ as the Mediator of Creation and Redemption on the basis of the specific, particular, nature of the form of revelation considered as an historical event, that principally accounts for his insistence that the act of Redemption is in no way entailed by Creation. This aspect of Calvin's thought resulted in a realistic appreciation of the historical nature of the believer's communion with the living Lord within the community of the church which pressed towards the realisation of its eschatological mission in the process of history. (On this point, see Willis.D. Op.cit. pp.85.ff., 91.ff. Hoogland.M. Op.cit. pp.50.ff., 168-188, 192.ff. Torrance.T.F. Eschatology One of four papers read to the Society for the Study of Theology. Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers.No.2. 1952. pp.55-60.)

Historically the doctrine of enhypostasis has been associated with Leontius of Byzantium. (c.485-543.) (On Leontius see. McIntyre.J. The Shape of Christology. pp.95.ff. Sellers.R.V. The Council of Chalcedon. pp.316.ff.) The doctrine was brought into being to emphasise the reality of the particular humanity of Jesus against interpretations of the Chalcedonian decree which tended to absorb the human nature into the divine. As far as I can see the over riding interest of its author concerned the fact that the,

"human nature is personalised in the Divine Logos which assumes it, and is thus not impersonal (\textit{\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\n
It does not appear to be concerned to express the "noetic interest", of Christology considered in relation to the inconceivable freedom in which God in determining Himself as both One and Another posits Himself as the Lord of the creature. It simply asserts that,

"in the assumptio carnis the human nature of Christ was given a real concrete subsistence within the hypostatic union." (Torrance, T.F., Atonement and the Oneness of the Church. Op. cit., p. 249.

On the question of the part played by natural theology in Calvin's theology, which was mentioned above as a co-lateral consideration with respect to Barth’s view of Calvin’s distinction between Christ as the Mediator of Creation and Redemption, see by the same author Calvin’s Doctrine of Man. pp. 13 ff., 30-31, 39-40, 59-61, 63-64.)
Some commentators have criticised Barth because he does not allow validity in man's knowledge of God to man's ability to know and compare different sorts of created entities. Meynell, H. Grace Versus Nature: Studies in Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, pp.41 ff., contends that since Barth does not allow this kind of knowledge to enter into his understanding of the knowledge of God then to say that

"God is infinitely powerful, would entail that we just as well ascribe impotence as power to God." For such a statement as used such distinctions would do so on the basis of man's experience, "that some men are more powerful than others, or an elephant powerful as compared with a mouse." (Ibid. p.41.)

The main point of Barth's procedure which seems to have been overlooked by Meynell is that Barth does not wish to deny creaturely knowledge of the world in human speech about God, the fact that God exists for instance as Aaron existed for Moses, but to affirm it with all the power of God's own election of man in Jesus Christ. Because Barth affirms creaturely knowledge of God on this basis he denies Meynell's thesis that creaturely knowledge as such presupposes creaturely knowledge of God. Meynell, as an exponent of the "Thomist theory" (Ibid. p.38.) of knowledge, divides the possibility of creaturely knowledge of God from its actuality in God self revelation. He, therefore, from Barth's point of view, divides the deity and deifies the creature.

For similar reasons we could not accept the criticisms advanced by Pöhlman, H.G. Analogia Entis order Analogia Fidei? Die Frage der
Analogie bei Karl Barth. p.111., who considers that Barth's position on the relation of natural knowledge of God to the veracity of knowledge of God to be akin to that of Marcion. Marcion denied the creation as being good because of his view of the creature. But it is precisely this presupposition that Barth's method excludes. From Barth's point of view Pöhlman's attempt to argue for a natural theology on the basis of creaturely existence evinces precisely the same presuppositions as those upon which Marcion's theology was founded. (Cf. Barth.K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.3.1. pp.334.ff., 337.ff.)

Also we find difficulty in accepting the contention of Mondin.B. The Principle Of Analogy In Protestant And Catholic Thought. pp.169-170. n.1. where he attempts to link Barth's views with those of the Thomist doctrine. In the distinction Thomas draws between the thing signified and the mode of signification Mondin sees Thomas just as concerned as Barth to ensure the priority of God over man in the field of knowledge of Himself. Barth in our view is not specifically concerned to ensure the priority of God over man as such. Barth's views on the analoeia entis spring from the fact that the specific priority of God over man consists in His election of man in Jesus Christ. It is not the principle of priority of God over man which Barth is concerned to defend in our view, but His election of man in Jesus Christ obviates the kind of question which presupposes the analoeia entis as a viable approach to the question of the knowledge of God. The same kind of criticism from the Lutheran point of view is found in Prenter.R. Einheit Schöpfung und Erlösung Theologische Zeitschrift.1946.2. pp.161.ff. and Glauben und Erkennen bei Karl Barth Kerygma und Dogma.11.1956.pp.176.ff. Rodding.G. Op.cit.pp.1.ff., 22.ff.,
McIntyre. J. Analogy Scottish Journal of Theology. Vol. 12. 1959. pp. 1 ff. seeks to explain Barth’s rejection of Quenstedt’s view of analogical predication in terms of Quenstedt’s improper presentation of the doctrine of analogy. It is contended that Barth’s strictures against the use of analogy in theology cease to have their force if the proper doctrine of analogy is presented. Barth’s criticism of Quenstedt’s idea of *analogia attributionis intrinsecas* because it corresponds to the Catholic doctrine of *analogia entis* is seen by McIntyre to be somewhat misguided. McIntyre argues,

"Quenstedt discerns the inadequacy of analogy of attribution in respect of extrinsic denomination, namely, that this analogy does not affirm anything of the internal nature of the secondary analogates; and further, that he wishes to emphasise that when God creates, He creates beings whose creation constitutes their being. He is endeavouring to find out how you may speak of creatures who prior to salvation are, and in fact must be in order to be saved." (McIntyre. J. Op. cit. p. 17.)

But it appears that McIntyre overlooks the fact that according to Barth’s dogmatic presuppositions it is quite improper to consider the existence of the creature as such prior to the event of God’s self revelation. The existence of the creature and its knowledge of God, and itself, presuppose for Barth the unity of God’s being for us in Jesus Christ with God as He is in Himself. To separate the existence of the
creature as an independent question to be answered prior to and beside the event of God's self revelation would be to presuppose a freedom of the creature for God which was not presupposed by the freedom of God for man in Jesus Christ. It would be to divide the Godhead and deify the creature by attempting to distinguish between the God who creates and the God who redeems on the basis of the existence of the creature. The existence of the creature, for Barth, presupposes that the self revealing God is the self electing God, the God of the covenant, it is to emphasise the connection between this covenant concluded in Jesus Christ from all eternity and creation that Barth necessarily insists on the extrinsic determination of the creature's relationship with God.

It would appear that the same sort of misunderstanding concerning Barth's understanding of the doctrine of analogy is to be found in Bouillard.H. The Knowledge Of God. pp.97.ff. Bouillard asserts that according to Barth,

"the truth which our words have in God does not become truth for us except when the grace of revelation lends them analogy with God .... This gift can never be transformed by us into a given. What comes to us through revelation is not something we would know outside of it .... It is a work of grace, a mode of divine revelation."

Thus the partial correspondence implied by analogical predication means,

"that even within revelation God remains hidden .... we are sent back to the reciprocal immanence of veiling and unveiling .... When we speak of partial
correspondence between our words and the Being of God, the word 'partial' recalls that God is hidden and thus designates the limit of our knowledge; but the link to revelation which the word correspondence evokes is also the promise which accompanies our enterprise of knowing God if it is undertaken in obedience." (Bouillard, H., Op. cit. pp.100-101.)

Bouillard has seen the link between Barth's doctrine of revelation in which God is both hidden and revealed and his doctrine of analogy. But has he seen it correctly? We think not.

Bouillard notes that for Barth 'partial' in analogical predication is posited by the relationship which God establishes between Himself and the creature in His self revelation. But this partiality does not consist in a limit considered in respect to creaturely knowledge. The partiality of which Barth speaks corresponds to the way in which God in positing Himself for man in Jesus Christ repeats in Him, in His self revelation ad extra, what He is in and for Himself. He reveals Himself. The self revelation of God which implies His self election presupposes the inconceivable freedom and love in which God is God. Partial therefore does not draw our attention to a limit of creaturely knowledge of God but to the fact that the reality of creaturely knowledge of God presupposes God's freedom to be for us in Jesus Christ as the One He is in Himself. It is this dogmatic presupposition of Barth's understanding of the relationship which exists between the doctrine of revelation and the doctrine of God, in which the doctrine of election finds its place,
that defines what Barth means by partial in the doctrine of analogy. This is what Barth would draw attention to in his insistence on the relationship between God and the creature being extrinsece not intrinsice. This is what we take Barth to mean when he maintains that when our human language and concepts speak truly of God He

"establishes the one truth, His own as the truth of our views, concepts and words .... When he claims them, He does not confirm Himself but us. But in them He does in fact confirm Himself." (Barth. K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.2, 1, p.229.)

Bouillard seems to recognise this fundamental fact of Barth's presentation of the doctrine of analogy for he sees little use in discussing this question with Barth in terms of the classical definitions since to do this

"would miss Barth's main contention .... In his eyes, all of them commit the same mistake, that of looking to analogy for a road towards a natural theology." (Bouillard. H. Op. cit. pp.113-114.)

Since he notes that Barth,

"instead of re-examining through formal analysis the relationship between representation and signification, ...... clarifies the meaning of the word 'partial' in a completely new way." (Bouillard. H. Op. cit. p.115.)
Despite this Bouillard goes on to criticise Barth for failing to realise that his analysis of the problem of analogy leaves untouched its central concern: since Barth,

"abandons the field of structure, or meaning, for that of event." (Bouillard.H. Op.cit. p.115.)

Bouillard means by this, that

"to affirm that the correspondence between human speech and divine reality is assumed only through the grace of revelation is to leave untouched the classical question of analogy. Our discourse still attempts to respond to revelation or to express a natural knowledge in which the concepts we use are thought to have been chosen by God or by us. Whether or not they are supported by revelation, the concepts and terms which we use about God are our own; they are human .... The problem is the situation of human language in regard to divine mystery" ..... The problem as Bouillard sees it is that Barth, "conceives of analogy as representation whose truth is guaranteed by revelation, he keeps theology on the level of representation while it should, in some way or another, be raised to that of reflection." (Bouillard.H. Op.cit. pp.117-118.)

What it appears Bouillard really wants Barth to do is to leave
the context in which he defines the partiality of analogical predication in terms of his understanding of the unity of the self revealed God and characterise the partiality in a context defined by the Thomist method of "negation of the mode of signification."


But Bouillard's contention with respect to Barth's presentation only holds good if two fundamental features of his argument are true of Barth's presentation. The first is that by representation Barth's argument is taken to mean that the event nature of revelation conveys a univocal relationship with creaturely language and concepts indiscriminately. The second, which follows from this, is given this view of the event nature of revelation how are we to distinguish between the natural use and meaning of words and the meaning they have when used within the context of God's self revelation.

We contend that both of these presuppositions are excluded as being relevant to Barth's understanding of analogical predication. Barth does not analyse the concept of analogy in terms of representation which is safeguarded from objectifying thought about God by the event nature of revelation. Analogy is not defined in terms of the event nature of revelation in relation to human concepts etc. Since Barth bases his understanding of analogy on the reality and possibility of God being for us what He is in Himself, and since this reality and possibility presupposes creaturely existence, there is no neutral sphere of creaturely existence which can form the basis for reflection on the usefulness or otherwise of this or that concept, word etc. Analogy for Barth presupposes God's knowing of Himself as the Lord of the creature in Jesus Christ, a self
knowledge which in its continuities and distinctions includes the reality and possibility of creaturely knowledge of God and creaturely knowledge of the creature.

We therefore find ourselves at variance with Bouillard when he asserts, in concert with G. Sohngen, that Barth's concept of *analogia fidei*

"expresses a conception and even an ensemble of conceptions essential to Catholicism. One must take it, and not the *analogia entis*, as the starting point to define the relationship between nature and grace .... We can say then that the *analogia fidei*, far from excluding the *analogia entis*, assumes it, repairs its deficiencies, and elevates it." (Bouillard, H., Op. cit. p. 123. Underlining indicates the original is in italics.)

But Bouillard's interpretation of the relationship between the *analogia fidei* and the *analogia entis* in terms of Christology would appear to be quite different from Barth's. He states that the relationship is understood and justified Christologically when it is seen that

"Jesus Christ, God and man .... is our *analogia fidei* assuming the *analogia entis*." (Bouillard, H., Op. cit. p. 123. Underlining indicates the original is in italics.)

What Bouillard here presupposes to be an assuming of the human nature of Jesus by the Word would seem to indicate that such an assumption, because it presupposes the existence of the creature, justifies an *analogia entis* within the structure of the Christological event. But as we understand
Barth this is what is excluded by his understanding of Christology within the context of his doctrine of revelation in terms of the unity of the self revealing God. To presuppose the event of revelation by the existence of the creature is to suggest a freedom of the creature which is not presupposed by the freedom of God. Barth will not consider the existence of the creature as presupposing anything than what he makes clear in his doctrine of revelation; the self revealing God is the self electing God and the self electing God is the Lord of the covenant which is the internal basis of the creature's existence. Therefore creaturely existence can only be understood in terms of the inconceivable freedom and love which presupposes that God's being in and for Himself is His being for us in Jesus Christ, who as Man for God and Man for other men presupposes in Himself all the distinctions and continuities of the creatures knowledge of God and man.

It is true of course that Barth supports Söhngen's revision of the Catholic doctrine of *analogia entis* which Bouillard takes up in his discussion with Barth, viz., that,

"*operari sequitur esse* .... action follows being.

This is valid in the order of being. And therefore the metaphysician strives to trace activities back to their entitive foundations.

But this very procedure shows that our knowledge moves in the reverse direction.

*Esse sequitur operari* .... the knowledge of being follows the knowledge of activity." (Barth.K. Church Dogmatics. Vol.2.1.p.82.)

But Barth maintains that he assents

"only to the main features"
BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The bibliography is divided into three sections: The writings of K. Barth which are cited in the text of the thesis, secondary sources related to questions raised in the thesis and articles of the same nature.

Primary Sources:


Secondary Sources:


Anselm, St.  
*Proslogium; Monologium; Cur Deus Homo; Reply To Gaunilon's Answer In Behalf Of The Fool and Gaunilon's On Behalf Of The Fool.* Translated Deane, S. Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1962.

Aristotle.  

Athanasius, St.  

Athanasius. St.  

Augustine. St.  

Aulen, G.  

Baillie, D.  

Baillie, J.  
*Our Knowledge Of God.* Oxford University Press, 1939.


Basil, St.  

Berkouwer, G.C.  

Berkouwer, G.C.  

Berkouwer, G.C.  

Bindley, T.H.  

Bonhoeffer, D.  


Loofs, F.  Nestorius And His Place In The History Of Christian Doctrine. Translated. Southall and others. Cambridge University Press, 1914.


Niesel, W. The Theology Of Calvin. Translated: Knight, H.

Niesel, W. Reformed Symbolics : A Comparison Of Catholicism, Orthodoxy, And Protestantism. Translated: Lewis, D.


Ott, H. Objectification And Existentialism in Bartsch, H.W.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publishers and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rawlinson, A.E.</td>
<td>ed. Essays On The Trinity And Incarnation, Longman Green</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schilder, K.</td>
<td>Zur Begriffsgeschichte des 'Paradoxon' mit besonderer</td>
<td>Berücksichtigung Calvins und das nach Kierkegaardschen 'Paradoxon'. Kok.J. Kampen, 1933.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Edinburgh, 1928.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schlink, E.</td>
<td>The Coming Christ And The Coming Church. Translated: Der</td>
<td>Kommende Christus und die kirchliche Traditionen. Vandenhoeck &amp; Ruprecht, Göttingen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schrey, H.H.</td>
<td>The Biblical Doctrine Of Justice And Law, S.C. M.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tertullian.  
No. 11. Translated: Holmes, F. T. & T. Clark
Edinburgh, 1870.

Torrance, T.F.  

Torrance, T.F.  

Torrance, T.F.  
Karl Barth: An Introduction To His Early Thought

Torrance, T.F.  
Calvin's Doctrine Of Man, Lutterworth Press, London,
1949.

Torrance, T.F.  

Vahanian, G.  

Welch, C.  
The Trinity In Contemporary Theology, S.C.M., London,
1953.

West, C.  
Communism And The Theologians: Study Of An Encounter

Willis, E.D.  
Calvin's Catholic Christology: The Function Of The
So-called Extra Calvinisticum In Calvin's Theology.

Wingren, G.  
Man And Incarnation: A Study In The Biblical Theology
Of Irenaeus, Translated: Mackenzie, R. Manniskan och

Zahrnt, H.  
The Question Of God: Protestant Theology In The
20th Century. Translated: Wilson, R.A., Collins,

Zernov, N.  
Eastern Christendom: A Study Of The Origin And
Development Of The Eastern Orthodox Church.

Articles:

Aldwinckle, R.F.  
Karl Barth And Religious Language, Canadian Journal

Anstey, C.R.P.  
St. Anselm Demythologised, Theology. Vol.,LXIV,

Baillie, J.  
Christianity And The Ideals Of The West, Christianity

Bebis, G.S.  
Liturgy And Theology, The Greek Orthodox Theological


Jungel, E.


Jungel, E.


Karmasin, J.


Lehmann, P.


McIntyre, J.


McIntyre, J.


Mueller, D.


Otwell, J.H.


Ott, H.


Paliard, J.


Pannenborg, W.


Pauck, W.


Prenter, R.


Prenter, R.


Ramsey, P.


Robinson, N.H.G.

Rödding, G. 

Romanides, J. 

Schleiermacher, F. 

Stead, G.C. 

Torrance, T.F. 

Torrance, T.F. 

Torrance, T.F. 

Torrance, T.F. 

Torrance, T.F. 

Torrance, T.F. 

Torrance, T.F. 

Torrance, J.B. 

Ullman, W. 

Verghese, P. 

Verghese, P. 

Vogel, H. 