THE RISE AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PRINCETON SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of Divinity
University of Edinburgh

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Penrose St. Amant, M.A., Th.D.

May 1952
For Jessie
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origins of American Presbyterianism with</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>special reference to divergent tendencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginnings of colonial American Presbyterianism</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization and growth of colonial American</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterianism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergent tendencies and conflict</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Edwards and the New England theology</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure from historic Calvinism</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Princeton critique of the New England theology</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The resulting conflict</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Plan of Union</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for the Plan</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salient features of the Plan</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results of the Plan</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER AND THE PRINCETON SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY TO 1840</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The origin of Princeton Theological Seminary and the Princeton Review</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for organizing the Seminary</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Princeton Seminary</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controversy concerning the &quot;New Measures&quot;</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The policy of Princeton Seminary</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander's critique of the &quot;New Measures&quot;</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The evidences of Christianity</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander's apologetic writing</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of reason</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biblical authority</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine of the atonement</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of James Murdock</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander's reply</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing theological tensions</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander's conservative leadership</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander's doctrine of original sin</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander's doctrine of &quot;inability&quot;</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton Seminary, the New England theology and the disruption</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude of Princeton Seminary toward the New England theology</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy of Princeton Seminary concerning the New England theology</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton Seminary and the disruption of the Church</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III. CHARLES HODGE, 1797-1878</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European study</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris, Halle, and Berlin</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander's concern for Hodge's orthodoxy</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing reputation</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resumption of professorship</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary on Romans</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional history of the Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles on ecclesiology</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor of theology</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theological viewpoint</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday afternoon conferences</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward slavery</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavery and the Scriptures</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavery and the disruption</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution of the slavery problem</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton Seminary and the Civil War</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine of the atonement</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The theory of Nathan Beaman</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hodge's reply to Beaman's view</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An implication</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The doctrine of imputation</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Representative&quot; theory of imputation</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critique of the New England doctrine</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The knowledge of God</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to theism</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposition of theistic arguments</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematic theologian</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <strong>Systematic Theology</strong></td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idea of authority</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophical theism and Princeton orthodoxy</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The doctrine of the Trinity</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The origin of man</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The &quot;original state&quot; of man</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man's total depravity and the sovereignty of God</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The provision and realization of salvation</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divine decrees and human free agency</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of grace</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eschatology</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER HODGE, 1823-1886</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early career</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and professor</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theological outlook</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton professor</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theologian</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence upon his father</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father and son: similarities and differences</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popularizer of Calvinism</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theological transition</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critique of &quot;progressive&quot; theology</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to theological change</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRINCETON SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY DISPLAYED</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to describe the rise and early development of the Princeton school of theology with special reference to Archibald Alexander, Charles Hodge, and Archibald Alexander Hodge. Excluding the historical background, the period covered is from the founding of Princeton Theological Seminary, in 1812, until the death of Archibald Alexander Hodge, in 1886.

Extensive search has failed to disclose a single published work which deals critically with this important phase of American theological history. Dr. Kenneth S. Gapp, Librarian at Princeton Seminary, has indicated that "there is still a great deal of scholarly work to be done on this topic" and that "no exhaustive studies are being undertaken at the present time." x The author visited the Libraries of the Princeton Theological Seminary and Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey, and the Presbyterian Historical Foundation in Montreat, North Carolina. The Seminary Library afforded ample primary sources—letters, lecture notes, unpublished sermons, and manuscripts from the pens of the men of Princeton—but neither this library nor any other visited revealed a work of the type undertaken in

---

1 Letter of Kenneth S. Gapp to Penrose St. Amant, October 5, 1950.
During and immediately following the period under investigation many estimates of the Princeton school appeared. The Princeton professors wrote voluminously, especially in the Princeton Review. Ample biographical material about Alexander and the Hodges is available. Comments about the Princeton school are scattered throughout many of the religious periodicals of the period. In the very nature of the case, this constitutes a mass of valuable but biased material, which must be handled with caution by the historian. It provides the estimate which, for the most part, the Princeton school gave of itself. The writings by the partisans of the Princeton position, of course, treat the Princeton theology in a normative and, therefore, unhistorical fashion and consider it the final theological formulation.

From the New England theologians came a similar type of source material but, of course, devoted to a searching

2 The three following theses have been found which deal with aspects of the Princeton school of theology:
criticism of Princeton and all her works. The two schools, Princeton and New England, were rooted in a common Calvinism but a deep doctrinal cleavage nevertheless separated them. The great mass of material produced in this polemical struggle is, of course, singularly prejudiced. Little objective study has been expended upon these sources with the view to a historical reconstruction of the Princeton school, of which there is, therefore, no critical historical study. There are two ample and objective treatments of the New England theology but both suffer from a failure to appreciate the significance of the Princeton school, against which the nineteenth century New England divines worked out their doctrinal views. The writer feels that a genuine gap exists in American theological history as result of this striking neglect. This has militated against the achievement of a proper historical perspective by students of American theology. A desire to fill part of this lacuna has prompted this thesis.

The historical importance of the Princeton school has increased in recent years due to the revival of interest in

Calvinism by Protestant theologians. The theological liberalism which displaced both the Princeton and New England schools in America at the beginning of the twentieth century has been under sustained attack for the past twenty years and has been largely displaced by "neo-orthodoxy." This new school of American theology which seeks to preserve both Biblical Christianity and the critical temper born of the historical and scientific movements, though far removed in many respects from the scholastic Calvinism of the Hodges, has nevertheless reawakened interest in the Princeton school of theology. This study, therefore, has as its object not only the solution of a purely historical problem but to provide a historical appraisal of Princeton Calvinism in order that it might be related critically to the current theological situation in America.

The author began this study without any conscious design to substantiate any particular interpretation of the Princeton school. Predilections produced by previous reading in the field of nineteenth century American Christianity were held in abeyance and the data relevant to the research undertaken were subjected to a historical examination which strove toward the ideal of objectivity. Selection from the

---

4 See George Hammar, Christian Realism in Contemporary American Theology (Uppsala: 1940).
voluminous sources which deal with the subject was made in terms of what seemed typical and a sustained effort was exerted to treat the Princeton school from a purely historical point of view. No one could be more aware than the writer of his failure to reach this goal, except in an approximate fashion, but he has striven to be as objective as possible.

Evaluations of the Princeton school of theology in this thesis are not purely personal reactions, it is believed, but are the result of a historical perspective which enables the writer to measure the Princeton position not only against the background of nineteenth century American theology but also to see this movement as an aspect of the larger process of American history in a century of vast changes, produced, in some measure, by the receding frontier, continuing waves of immigration, the Civil War and its aftermath, the impact of science, and the rise of an industrial economy in the North. Is it not a part of the responsibility of the historian to go beyond mere description to some judgment of the issues his descriptive study has exposed? An effort has been made to distinguish throughout the thesis between reliable historical data and value judgments, whether made in the sources themselves or by the author of this study. This, again, remains an ideal only approximately realized. The writer has sought to write objective history but he is at the same time a Christian who frankly doubts the validity of
the scholastic Calvinism developed at Princeton. The conclusions reached in this thesis, even in the area of the bare description of doctrines, are somewhat different from those that would be realized by one who believed Charles Hodge's *Systematic Theology* from beginning to end. While the author has not consciously allowed his personal theological beliefs to influence his statements of fact, they have doubtless affected the interpretation of the material treated. It is hoped this avowal, designed to put readers on their guard from the first, will contribute more to the usefulness of the study than would any effort by the writer, however successful, to suppress his personal convictions.

It should be added that in treating the theology of Charles Hodge, the author endeavored to strike a balance between the earlier and somewhat more polemical writings and the later systematic and somewhat more irenic statement that is given in the *Systematic Theology*. This has involved some repetition in the treatment of a few doctrines but it serves to indicate the earlier and later formulations of the same doctrines and demonstrates an unbroken doctrinal continuity from Hodge's initial to his most mature writings. Since Charles Hodge was the central figure in the Princeton school of theology and since he was a voluminous writer, the third chapter of this thesis, which deals with his contribution,
is necessarily somewhat longer than the others. The comparatively short chapter which deals with Archibald Alexander Hodge is due to the fact that the younger Hodge largely reproduced the theology of his father.

*Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language* has been used as the criterion for the spelling and meaning of words used in this thesis.
Presbyterianism in the American colonies was derived from two principal sources, English Puritanism and Scottish Calvinism, each of which had been modified by passing a time in another country that had influenced its life and thought. The Puritanism which provided a significant source for American Presbyterianism was conditioned by the colonial culture to which it was adapted. The Presbyterianism of Scottish origin that came to the colonies in the eighteenth century had been modified by the poverty and persecution encountered in Ireland. It was inevitable, therefore, that American Presbyterianism should emerge without any particular pattern and that the attempts to develop normative forms and standards would evoke the claims of both the original and modified sources. Subsidiary sources also made their contribution, such as Huguenot, Dutch, Welch, and German. These various Presbyterian traditions were challenged by the new world, particularly the American frontier, and the Presbyterianism which finally appeared was something different from any one of its sources or all of its sources combined.¹ In the

nineteenth century, the Princeton school of theology played an important role in the process of definition out of which a distinctive American Presbyterianism emerged.

I. ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PRESBYTERIANISM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DIVERGENT TENDENCIES

The Scottish Calvinism which the Princeton theologians regarded as normative was brought to America by the emigrants from Scotland and Ireland who came to the colonies in the eighteenth century. The Scots and the Scotch-Irish were inclined to require strict subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith and recognized the authority of the General Assembly in Scotland. The Puritans were not disposed to require strict subscription to the Westminster standards and did not recognize the authority of the Scottish General Assembly.

Thus two mutually opposed tendencies may be observed in the history of American Presbyterianism. One tendency was expressed in a movement already established in the colonies before the stream of emigrants from Ireland and Scotland began to arrive. Less concerned with strict doctrinal standards than the more conservative newcomers, this strand of the Church tended to blend with Congregationalism and, broadly speaking, may be called Puritan, or New England, Presbyterianism. Especially in Connecticut, Congregationalism showed marked
Presbyterian tendencies in the early eighteenth century. Most of the Puritan churches in Long Island and New Jersey were planted from Connecticut and showed even more marked tendencies toward Presbyterianism than those exhibited in the mother colony. These churches in Long Island and to the southward were the first in which Presbyterian tendencies became strong enough to produce specifically Presbyterian churches.²

The second major element in early American Presbyterianism was made up largely of Scotch-Irish and Scottish emigrants who came in great numbers beginning shortly after 1700. At first, the emigrants were apparently not particularly conscious of the differences between their views and those of the Puritans. A clear distinction had not yet been drawn between Congregationalists and Presbyterians much less between Scottish and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, on the one hand, and Puritan Presbyterians on the other. But these distinctions became increasingly clear as the eighteenth century advanced. Within three decades, violent and sometimes bitter controversy between two interpretations of Presbyterianism was raging. The emigrants quickly developed a distinct party that stressed strict subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith and regarded Congregationalism as an

² Ibid., pp. 15-16.
heretical expression of Christianity, from which Presbyterians should be entirely separated. Furthermore, these newcomers looked askance upon those who regarded themselves as Presbyterians but who had come out of a Congregational background. These two divergent tendencies persisted into the nineteenth century, in which Princeton Seminary became the chief apologist for the conservative element against the New England school.

Beginnings of Colonial American Presbyterianism. The first "Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Church Government" at Princeton Theological Seminary, Samuel Miller, wrote a series of Letters to Presbyterians, in 1833, in which he stated categorically that the Presbyterian Church in America was founded chiefly by ministers and members from Scotland and the North of Ireland. These "pious founders," he wrote, "were warmly attached to the Westminster Confession of Faith and to the Presbyterian form of ecclesiastical government." After the organization of the first American presbytery, in 1706,

... some who had been bred Congregationalists in South Britain or New England, acceded to the new body, and consented to bear the name and act under the order and discipline of Presbyterians. ... In a few years, however, ... [they] wished for many abatements and modifications of Presbyterianism, and were found frequently encroaching on the order of that form of ecclesiastical government. 3

3 Samuel Miller, Letters to Presbyterians (Philadelphia: 1833), pp. 3-5.
Miller's view concerning the origin of American Presbyterianism was shared by Charles Hodge, who, in 1838, wrote: "American Presbyterianism was originally the same with that of Scotland." After the Church had been formally organized and its doctrine and government determined, people from old and New England who really remained Congregationalists and who, therefore, were not in agreement with the allegedly normative Presbyterianism derived from Scottish and Scotch-Irish sources came into the Church and produced a disturbing element.

L. J. Trinterud has challenged the foregoing historical reconstruction, which he calls "the propaganda line" of the Old School party in the nineteenth century, by demonstrating conclusively that American Presbyterianism came from a variety of sources and that the view popularized by the Princeton school is not historically defensible, even though it has "attained to the stature of historical fact." The Scottish Reformation, of course, furnished a very important element but was not the only significant source of the Presbyterian Church in the colonies. Francis Allison, the eighteenth century leader of the Old Side Presbyterian party,

---


with which Miller, Hodge, and their Old School colleagues professed agreement, mentioned the several sources from which the Presbyterian movement in America sprang and presents "a much truer picture"\(^6\) than the Princeton position. Allison wrote that Pennsylvania,

\[\ldots a \text{ Province Distinguished for civil and religious Liberty, has been peopled with numbers from England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, Sweden, Germany, and Holland and some French refugees; that those in general who held a party among all Gospel Ministers (the Dutch excepted) united and formed Churches after the Presbyterian Plan, both in this and the neighboring Provinces of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, etc, and at length their ministers agreed to hold a Synodical Meeting once a year in the City of Philadelphia.}\(^7\)

In other words, an extraordinarily heterogeneous company of settlers who were drawn together by common Presbyterian convictions concerning the nature of the Christian ministry united and formed churches of the Presbyterian pattern. Each group probably had its own unique understanding of Presbyterianism but each had as valid a right as the other to the name.\(^8\) In 1758, on the occasion of the reunion of the Old

---


Side and New Side parties, Allison wrote:

In a church like ours in America, collected from different churches of Christ in Europe, who have followed different modes and ways of obeying the "great and general command of the Gospel," there is a peculiar call for charity and forebearance.9

The story of Presbyterian origins in New England also invalidates the thesis held by the Princeton school that American Presbyterianism was primarily Scottish and Scotch-Irish in origin. There was a "large Presbyterian Puritan element in early New England,"10 and, though it was largely absorbed by the Congregational Church, its influence nevertheless persisted on the level of the local churches in the "Congregational-Presbyterian" type of church government which was set forth in The Cambridge Platform, in 1648. This curious type of church polity, which was the result of the fusion of the Congregational and Presbyterian systems, meant, in actual practice, that the churches in New England were governed in a presbyterian manner on the local level, beyond which they conformed to the congregational system. In other words, each church was governed by a "Congregational Presbytery"11 but was autonomous in government and was, therefore, not subject


to any human authority beyond itself. The Cambridge Platform, to which the churches in New England subscribed, incorporated the Westminster Confession of Faith, which thereby became the doctrinal standard of the New England churches. There is no evidence that strict subscription to the Confession was required.

Many sources show the influence of Presbyterianism upon the Congregational churches in New England. For example, in 1643, Thomas Parker, minister of the church at Newberry, Massachusetts, wrote a letter to "a member of the Assembly of Divines now at Westminster, Declaring his judgment touching the government practiced in the Churches of New England" and stating "that the ordinary exercise of government must be so in the Presbyters, as not to depend upon the expresse votes and suffrages of the people." In 1665, John Eliot of Roxbury, Massachusetts, produced his privately printed Communion of Churches, in which he magnified the presbyterian organization of the Church. He differed from Westminster Presbyterianism chiefly in "denying

\[\text{Cited sources:}\]

12 For The Cambridge Platform, see P. G. Mode, editor, Sourcebook and Bibliographical Guide for American Church History (Menasha, Wisconsin: 1921), pp. 75-77.


that higher Presbyteries have 'juridical power' over the lower." Other ministers in New England "inclined to Presbyterian views of Church government" were James Noyes of Newberry, Massachusetts, Peter Hobart of Hingham, Massachusetts, John Young and Richard Denton of Long Island.15 There were many more.

Henry M. Dexter, an American Congregational historian of the last century, stated that "the early Congregationalism of this country was ... a Congregationalized Presbyterianism or a Presbyterianized Congregationalism which had its roots in one and its branches in the other."16 As has been pointed out, the Cambridge Platform reflected the fusion of these two types of church government. Though the Platform was never unanimously accepted, it was approved by the General Court, in 1651, and remained the recognized "pattern of ecclesiastical practice in Massachusetts" for thirty years and persisted in many churches until the end of the eighteenth century.17 This "Presbyterianism in embryo," as Sweet describes it, appeared again in the Massachusetts Proposals, of 1705, and the Connecticut Saybrook Platform, of 1708, and

15 Briggs, op. cit., p. 94.


17 Sweet, op. cit., p. 105.
became full fledged Presbyterianism as it spread southward. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, a number of Puritan churches of New England origin were formed on Long Island, in northern New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina. The tendency of Congregationalists to become Presbyterians upon leaving New England may be observed in the fact that "by the year 1700 from ten to fifteen germinal Presbyterian Churches were found in New York and New Jersey alone."  

It is clear, therefore, that Presbyterian tendencies were already present in New England and a variety of Presbyterian traditions were already established in the Middle colonies when the Scotch-Irish first appeared in America.

Organization and growth of Colonial American Presbyterianism. The first American presbytery, which was formed in Philadelphia in 1706, was a happy union of several Presbyterian traditions. It was an interesting combination composed of Francis Makemie, a Scotch-Irishman, John Hampton, an Irishman, George McMish, a Scotsman, Jedediah Andrews, John Wilson, Nathaniel Taylor, and Samuel Davis. Andrews, Wilson, Taylor, and Davis were missionaries from New England.

18 Ibid., p. 245.
who had settled in the Middle colonies. Makemie was apparently the leading figure in this group of seven Presbyterian pioneers. He shared strong friendships with leaders in the Dissenting clergy. A voluminous correspondence between Makemie and Increase Mather has been preserved. He was an inveterate traveler and had a wide knowledge of conditions in the colonies. His liberal attitude toward the English Puritans, as revealed in his association with the United Brethren, in his Pastoral Letter to Barbados and in his cordial acceptability among Puritan congregations he visited during his journeys, indicates a man of broad sympathies and interests, ideally suited for leadership in the founding of a colonial presbytery made up of men of many backgrounds.

The question of the origins of the seven men who formed the first American presbytery was vigorously debated by several factions within the later Presbyterian Church. It was often assumed that the acceptability of certain doctrines and practices in the American Presbyterian Church was determined by whether or not these views and policies were held by the founding fathers. This fallacious line of reasoning was pursued throughout the nineteenth century, especially by exponents of the Old School position and the Princeton theologians, who sought to prove that the first presbytery was committed to their understanding of Presbyterianism.
Actually, the founding fathers were of mixed origins and were derived from varied backgrounds. Francis Makemie was a Scotch-Irishman, who had strong ties with both old and New England. Samuel Davis, the pastor at Lewes, Delaware, probably came from Ireland. Three of the members of the first presbytery were from New England. Jedediah Andrews, pastor of the church at Philadelphia, had come to the Middle colonies from New England Presbyterianism and was a graduate of Harvard College. John Wilson, pastor at New Castle, was likewise from New England and had been sent to Delaware by Increase and Cotton Mather. Nathaniel Taylor, pastor at Patuxent, Maryland, was the third minister from New England. George McNish and John Hampton, sent to the colonies by the United Brethren, were the other two members of the original presbytery. McNish was a Scot and Hampton was Scotch-Irish. The congregations over whom these men presided had been formed largely by settlers from old and New England, augmented by Scotch-Irish and Scottish members and a few accessions from Dutch, Huguenot, Welsh, and German sources. The first presbytery in the colonies was, therefore, not predominantly Scottish and Scotch-Irish in constituency, and did not intend to pattern the American Presbyterian Church after the Scottish model. Thus the contention of the Old School party and the Princeton school in the nineteenth century is clearly groundless. The claims of the Princeton school are further
controverted by the fact that the first American presbytery did not seek authority from the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland or the Synod of Ulster.¹⁹

The initial colonial presbytery marked the first formal organization of American Presbyterianism beyond the level of the local churches. "Churches after the Presbyterian plan," to use Allison's phrase, were in existence long before 1706. Presbyterian ministers had labored in the colonies and, of course, a number of churches were in existence before the formation of the first presbytery. The seven so-called founders came to the colonies not as leaders of potential congregations with whom they traveled but as individuals to regions where the groundwork for the churches to which they ministered had already been prepared by others. It is clear, therefore, that the beginnings of the Presbyterian

¹⁹ See Trinterud, The Forming of an American Tradition, pp. 31-32. "For many years the closest ties of the presbytery were with New England and London. Though pleas were sent to Scotland and Ireland also, most of the ministerial recruits and the financial aid that came to the early presbytery were from Boston and London. The minutes of the Synod of Ulster record only one plea from the presbytery in America upon which any action was taken. This plea received in 1712, met with indifferent handling. The Presbyterian ministers of Dublin, who were much less strict in their adherence to Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism, were, however, of aid to the colonial Church on several occasions. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland gave the colonial presbytery some assistance, as did also the Synod of Glasgow and various Scottish individuals. Except for such financial aid, however, the presbytery began and continued as a purely indigenous organization."
movement in the colonies and the organization of the first presbytery antedated the mass migrations of the Scotch-Irish to the new world, which began in 1717.  

The growth of American Presbyterianism was given added impetus with the coming of the Scotch-Irish. Economic hardships and religious disabilities imposed by the Irish Parliament impelled multitudes of Scots whose families had lived in Ireland for a brief period to forsake their new Irish home for the American colonies in the eighteenth century. Within ten years of its beginning, the migration had developed into a steady stream of from three to six thousand colonists a year. The newcomers soon discovered that they were not welcome in the towns of New England and were encouraged to form buffer settlements on the frontier to protect the colonies against Indian infiltration and attack. Many Presbyterian churches founded by the emigrants in this region became Congregational so that "Scotch-Irish emigration into New England tended rather to send recruits to Congregationalism than to spread Presbyterianism in New England." Thus Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism largely


21 Henry J. Ford, The Scotch-Irish in America (Princeton, New Jersey: 1915), Chap. XII. This is an excellent study of the conflicts and adjustments of New England Congregationalism and Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism.
lost its identity in New England and was quickly assimilated by Congregational Puritanism.

The Scotch-Irish, who initially came into New England, were deflected not only to the frontier in Massachusetts and Connecticut but also southward by the inhospitality of the Puritans. The Delaware River towns of Lewes, New Castle, and Philadelphia became ports of disembarkation of the great majority of these colonists, who eventually established themselves in southwestern Pennsylvania and Maryland. Some of the Ulster colonists followed the Delaware River northward and arrived in Bucks County in 1720. Simultaneously other groups settled on the Susquehanna River and beyond in what is now Cumberland County. Twenty years later, emigrants were settling along the Carolina frontier, and, by 1750, Charleston, South Carolina, was an important colonial port for the settlers. From the Atlantic seaboard, one stream moved southward into Georgia and another northward, fusing with fellow Scotch-Irish who were leaving New England. About 1750, there was a large influx of Scottish Highlanders, many of whom settled on the Cape Fear River in North Carolina. At the end of the colonial period, more than five-hundred distinct communities of Scottish and Scotch-Irish emigrants had been established in the new world. 22

American Presbyterian Church was the product of the mingling of people of various backgrounds, the two most important parts of which were the settlers from Scotland and Ireland, who came in the eighteenth century, and the English Puritans, most of whom came to the colonies a century earlier.

As the Church grew both by accession in the colonies and by the coming of new settlers, "a rather definite set of patterns" emerged. On Long Island, in New York, and the northern and southern parts of New Jersey, Presbyterianism was predominantly derived from New England. Mixed backgrounds prevailed in the Church in central New Jersey, the area of which Philadelphia is the center, and the Atlantic seaboard as far south as Virginia. The rural regions of Pennsylvania, central New Jersey, Maryland, the Valley of Virginia, and the Carolinas were settled almost entirely by the Scotch-Irish and a few Highland Scots. This geographic distribution of the Presbyterians is an important reason why the leadership of the Church remained largely with those of New England origin throughout most of the colonial period. The Scotch-Irish emigrants settled mainly on the outer edges of the frontier, where opportunities for leadership were relatively less propitious than in the more developed areas populated by Puritan Presbyterians. The numerical superiority eventually gained by the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians over those from other backgrounds failed to counterbalance the leadership
in the Church which remained with the men and ideas derived largely from New England. The older and more settled regions provided the bulk of leadership for colonial Presbyterianism.  

Jonathan Dickinson, a New Englander by birth and training, has been characterized by Charles A. Briggs as "the great representative American Presbyterian of the colonial period."

**Divergent tendencies and conflict.** It is clear that two dominant and distinct types of Presbyterianism prevailed in America after the coming of the Scotch-Irish and Scottish settlers. The first type was made up of Presbyterian Puritans from New England. Presbyterianism asserted itself at the beginning of the colonial period, as evidenced by the existence of congregational presbyteries in many churches, though it was largely neutralized as a separate movement by the dominant Congregationalism. Furthermore, as has been pointed out, Congregationalists tended to become Presbyterians upon leaving New England and provided leadership for Presbyterianism in the Middle colonies. There were also scattered churches in the Middle colonies which embraced Presbyterianism before the coming of the colonists from Ireland and Scotland. The majority of this pre-Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism found

---


the leadership of the New England Presbyterians more congenial than the more strict and less American type of leadership furnished by the Scotch-Irish in the eighteenth century.

The rapid influx of the Scotch-Irish in the eighteenth century introduced a new and somewhat different Presbyterianism which inevitably came into conflict with the existing Presbyterianism and produced tensions which persisted into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

As the two, distinct traditions spread into the colonies, definite geographic patterns appeared. New England Presbyterianism was notably strong in settled and secure sections, thickly populated centers of culture and commerce. Thesolidly Scotch-Irish section of the Church was strong in the frontier regions, away from the nerve centers of colonial life. These two tendencies in colonial Presbyterianism have not been sufficiently distinguished by church historians, as a consequence of which the important role of New England Presbyterianism in American church history has been largely overlooked and the impact of Scottish and Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism made too singly determinative. For example, William Warren Sweet has written that the emigrants from Ireland and Scotland "constituted the stuff out of which colonial Presbyterianism was chiefly made."25

In a sense the statement is, of course, correct but it is nevertheless ambiguous. The ambiguity is the result of a failure to draw a clear distinction between numerical preponderance, which the Scotch-Irish and Scottish Presbyterians eventually achieved, and actual leadership in the Church, which was maintained in the colonial period, for the most part, by New England men.

The year 1716 marked the formation of the Synod of Philadelphia, which was intended to comprise four presbyteries—Philadelphia, New Castle, Long Island, and Snow Hill—though the last named was never erected. This first American synod was actually only "the presbytery of the whole, while the three newly formed presbyteries functioned as local or regional courts."26 It was an independent body, sustaining no official relationship to the General Assembly in Scotland or the Synod of Ulster. There is no evidence that subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith was a condition of membership in the Synod, as even Charles Hodge

25 (Contd.) (March, 1936), 32. "The importance of the New England element in the Presbyterian Church is constantly neglected by historical writers, for whom it is more convenient to label colonial Presbyterianism as mostly Scotch-Irish; but it is impossible to understand Presbyterian history of the eighteenth century and since on this basis."

26 Trinterud, The Forming of an American Tradition, p. 34.
Seventeen ministers had joined the Church since the organization of the first presbytery, in 1706. Five had come from New England, three from Wales, six from Scotland, two from Ireland, and one was of uncertain origin. Of the eight Scottish and Scotch-Irish ministers, three had been sent to America by the Presbyterians of London. Among the new ministers was a man who became one of the most eminent figures in American Presbyterianism, Jonathan Dickinson, a Puritan divine from New England, who at this time officially affiliated with the Presbyterians. His calm judgment and even temper were of inestimable value in the early history of the young Church. His irenic spirit was a steadying force in the controversy produced by extreme demands for theological conformity which grew with the growth of the Scotch-Irish party.

A nice example of the influence of New England leadership appears in the early history of the Presbyterian Church in New York City, founded in 1717. The minister, James Anderson, apparently a tactless man, offended a considerable portion of his congregation, who withdrew in 1722, organized another church, and called young Jonathan Edwards, a

Congregationalist from Connecticut, who was later to gain fame as the founder of the New England theology. The coming of a Congregationalist to be the Minister of a Presbyterian church in New York suggests the close tie between the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches in the American Colonies during most of the colonial period. The interchange between the Presbyterianism of the Middle colonies and particularly the Congregationalism of Connecticut was especially marked after the adoption of the Saybrook Platform, in 1708, which expanded and strengthened the Congregational-Presbyterian type of church government that had more or less prevailed in New England since the adoption of the Cambridge Platform. This call of Edwards to serve a Presbyterian congregation in New York was not strange in the light of the cordial relationship between the Congregationalists and Presbyterians. In fact, a movement was in progress precisely at this time to unite "the Connecticut Presbyterianized-Congregational churches" with the recently organized Philadelphia Synod of the Presbyterian Church. The synod had already admitted the Puritan churches in New Jersey and New York and there seemed to be no good reason why the Connecticut churches should not also affiliate with the Presbyterian organization. Though such a union was not consummated, the very fact that serious consideration was given to it indicates how thin the line was between the two
Churches and foreshadows the Plan of Union of 1801.\textsuperscript{28}

There was, however, another side to this picture which must not be overlooked. Beneath the placid surface of this harmonious relationship were surging currents of suspicion which grew with the growth of the Scotch-Irish community. The emigrants from Ulster regarded with increasing criticism the doctrinal latitude and quasi-congregational polity of the churches in New England and were suspicious of the soundness of the Presbyterian churches in the Middle colonies which carried on cooperative endeavors with the New England churches. There was, however, little that this conservative element could do about its grievances, except sporadically, until after the end of the colonial period. The perspective provided by time and distance permits the historian to discern a wedge which was being slowly driven between the Congregationalists and the Presbyterians by the Scotch-Irish leaders and which was to result in severe repercussions within Presbyterianism and between the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches in the nineteenth century.

The next step in Presbyterian organization after the first Synod was established was the Adopting Act of 1729.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28} Sweet, op. cit., pp. 261-262.

which prescribed rather broad, uniform doctrinal standards for American Presbyterianism. The impetus which accounts for this development was a combination of factors in Scotland and Ireland, where "heretical" opinions among the Presbyterian clergy were causing concern, and in the American colonies, where the Scotch-Irish, who were more theologically strict than the Puritan Presbyterians, were settling in ever increasing numbers. It is, of course, beyond the scope of this study to deal in detail with the theological controversies in Ireland and Scotland at this time which were the result of efforts to impose strict standards of orthodoxy on the clergy to prevent "heresy" from securing a foothold. However, brief attention must be given to this matter because it is closely linked with American Presbyterian history. In 1693, the Scottish Parliament required all clergymen to subscribe to the Westminster Confession of Faith. Before this, the Church of Scotland had approved the Confession "as agreeable to the Word of God and in nothing contrary to the received doctrine of this Church" but had not demanded individual subscription.30 The Synod of Ulster passed what came to be called the Act of 1705, requiring all who planned to secure a license to preach "to subscribe the Westminster Confession of Faith to be the confession of their faith and

30 Sweet, op. cit., pp. 263-264.
promise to adhere to the doctrine, worship, discipline, and
government of this Church." 31 This gave rise in Ulster to
the subscription controversy centering in charges of heresy
against Professor John Simson of the theological faculty of
the University of Glasgow, who had been the tutor of many
of the ministers in Northern Ireland. Many of the professor's
former students sprang to his defense and opposed sub-
scription to any humanly contrived criterion of orthodoxy,
though they claimed to believe the doctrines set forth in
the Westminster Confession. 32 The division precipitated by
charges and counter charges growing out of the subscription
controversy gave rise, in 1729, to what came to be called the
Pacific Act, by which the Synod of Ulster sought to hold the
two factions together by stating that any who should, as it
was quaintly put, "scruple any phrase in the Confession . . .
shall have leave to use his own expressions." 33 The purpose
of the Pacific Act was not realized and the Irish Synod was
eventually divided into two bodies. But the Act had an
important consequence in America, where it formed the ground-
work for the Adopting Act which was passed by the Philadelphia

31 John Eliot and John H. Orr, editors, *Records of the
General Synod of Ulster from 1691 to 1820.* 3 vols. (Belfast:
1890), I, 109.

32 W. T. Latimer, *A History of Irish Presbyterians
(Belfast: 1902), pp. 298 ff.

33 *Records of Ulster Synod,* I, 522.
Synod in 1729.

The movement which demanded theological conformity on the basis of the Westminster Confession of Faith was not successful in Ireland and only succeeded in creating strife. A similar movement in American Presbyterianism was equally unsuccessful but theological strife was kept at a minimum due to the strength and wise leadership of the New England element in the Church. In the colonies, party alignments soon appeared on the basis of the subscription issue. It is significant that the party opposed to unqualified subscription, led by Jonathan Dickinson, was made up largely of ministers who had been trained in New England, and that the party favoring strict subscription was led principally by Scotch-Irish and Scottish ministers, spearheaded by the New Castle Presbytery.

Dickinson held that strict subscription would not produce unity but division—a prophesy fulfilled in the 1741 and 1837 schisms in American Presbyterianism—and to prove his point he cited the divisive effects of the Nicene Creed, which, he said, "flowed from the corrupt fountain of impositions and subscriptions." He declared that the Church had no authority

34 The Adopting Act, cited by Briggs, op. cit., pp. 216-221.

35 Briggs, op. cit., chap. VI. See Letter of Jedediah Andrews to Dr. Coleman of Boston, April 7, 1729, in C. Hodge, Constitutional History, p. 142. "I think all the Scotch are on one side," wrote Andrews, "and all the English and Welch on the other, to a man."
to make new laws or add to the plain teachings of Scripture. "I challenge the world," he said in a sermon, "to produce any such dedimus potestatem from Christ, or the least lisp in the Bible that countenances such regal power."\(^{36}\) Replying to John Thompson of the New Castle Presbytery, who believed that strict subscription would prevent "corrupt doctrine and gross errors,"\(^{37}\) Dickinson reminded him that "the churches of New England have all continued from their first foundation nonsubscribers; and yet retain their faith and love."\(^{38}\) Instead of subscription, he proposed (a) strict examination of ministerial candidates, (b) severe discipline of scandalous and unfaithful ministers, and (c) that ministers should be "diligent, faithful, and painful in the discharge of their awful trust."\(^{39}\)

Due primarily to Dickinson's influence, strict subscription to the Confession was not made mandatory. Reduced to its simplest statement, the Adopting Act, which was quite similar to the Pacific Act of the Ulster Synod, required ministers to subscribe only to "necessary and essential


\(^{37}\) John Thompson, Concerning the Overture in Favor of Subscription, 1729, cited by Briggs, op. cit., p. 212.

\(^{38}\) Letter of Jonathan Dickinson to John Thompson, April 10, 1729, in Briggs, op. cit., p. 213. Italics his.

\(^{39}\) Loc. cit.
articles" of the Westminster standards. What these "essential articles" were to which subscription was required were not defined. Thus a victory was won by the New England party despite its numerical inferiority. There were twenty-five members of the synod, only eight of whom could be said to be of New England origin or persuasion, and yet the Scotch-Irish party, though numerically superior, was unable to achieve its goal.

Not unexpectedly, the conservatives were most dissatisfied with the Adopting Act and, in 1736, when Dickinson and most of the "liberal subscriptionists" were absent from the synod, were able to rule that the "good old received doctrine contained in the ... Confession" would be adopted and enforced "without the least variation or alteration." This reversal of the intention of the Adopting Act was short


41 Records of the Philadelphia Synod, 1736, p. 127, cited by Trinterud, "Colonial American Presbyterianism," Church History, XVII, p. 38. See Charles Hodge, Constitutional History, 1, 183 ff. He took the position that the Act of 1736 only interpreted the actual meaning of the Adopting Act of 1729. But surely this is indefensible. He admitted, ibid., p. 180, that the Act of 1729 was a compromise between two extremes. It, therefore, follows that the intent of the Act of 1736 was to eliminate the element of compromise. "Hodge, of course, was trying to show that unqualified subscription had always been demanded in Presbyterianism until the rise of the New School against whom he planned and wrote the Constitutional History." Trinterud, The Forming of an American Tradition, p. 326.
lived, as will be seen presently, and is important only because it clearly discloses the principle espoused by the strict subscriptionists, a principle which actuated the nineteenth century Old School party, with which the Princeton school was identified. The principle was that the *Westminster Confession* was sacrosanct, that it represented without qualification the teaching of infallible Scripture, and that any departure from its exact verbal meaning was heretical. Over against this principle was another which distinctly marked the New England party in the subscription controversy, which was perpetuated in the nineteenth century by the New School party in the Presbyterian Church, and with which the New England theologians were identified. The principle was that creeds were not sacrosanct, were legitimate objects of critical examination, and should be adjusted to new historical situations.

The clash of these two principles may be observed in a controversy which split the Presbyterian Church in 1741 and produced the Synod of New York in 1745. The new synod was formed by the New Englanders and Log College men due

---

42 In 1735, William Tennant, Sr., opened a school in Neshaminy, Pennsylvania, in a log house, which was, therefore, called "The Log College." Tennant was a warm friend of George Whitefield, whose evangelistic passion he shared. He belonged to the New Side party and supported the broad views of Jonathan Dickinson in the controversy which finally disrupted American Presbyterianism in 1741. See Trinterud,
to increasing differences with the Scotch-Irish portion of the church concerning creedal subscription, revivalism, and the authority of presbyteries and synods. The New England men and their supporters, called New Side, favored qualified subscription to the Confession, sponsored revivalism, and insisted upon the priority of the presbyteries in the government of the church. The Scotch-Irish element and those who sympathized with it, called Old Side, stressed strict subscription to the Confession, opposed revivalism, and insisted upon the priority of the synod to the presbytery in church government.

The first step in the breach which divided American Presbyterianism into two rival synods in 1745 was taken at the meeting of the Philadelphia Synod in 1741, when the anti-revivalistic majority, largely Scotch-Irish, expelled

42 (Contd.) The Forming of an American Tradition, p. 64. "The main body of the Scotch-Irish clergy, who were the subscriptionist-anti-revival party, and for whom Scotland and Ulster were the sources of all norms and standards, refused to consider anyone an educated minister if he were not from a Scottish University. Tennant's school soon received the scornful title of 'Log College.'" See also C. Hodge, Constitutional History, II, 121. Hodge charged the Log College men with "great disorderliness in professional conduct, in ecclesiastical polity, and in doctrinal emphasis." But see Trinterud, The Forming of an American Tradition, p. 94. Trinterud says that the Log College men were "more orderly and legal in ecclesiastical matters than were the opposition during the whole period. As for doctrinal matters, they were never guilty of error according to the then acknowledged creeds and standard authors."
the pro-revivalistic minority, mainly of New England origin. The three New Side presbyteries, made up of New England and Log College men, established the Synod of New York, in which their own views might prevail.\textsuperscript{43} When the two synods united, in 1759, the principles of qualified subscription to the Confession and the priority of the presbyteries prevailed and were written into the platform. When the General Assembly was organized, in 1788, these principles were reaffirmed and made a part of the constitution.\textsuperscript{44} Thus another victory was won by the New England party. The outcome of the controversy was, of course, contrary to the view of the Scottish and Scotch-Irish element, which held that final power, legislative as well as judicial, was vested in the General Assembly, which then granted to the presbyteries such

\textsuperscript{43} See Sweet, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 280. "Thus, in the very midst of the revival, at a time when the frontier was rapidly filling up with a population overwhelmingly Scotch-Irish and Presbyterian, the Presbyterian forces in colonial America were divided. Neither side had been blameless, but the chief responsibility must be borne by the stiff-backed conservatives, who seemed more concerned about preserving the Presbyterian system than for the spiritual welfare of the new population swarming into the back country."

\textsuperscript{44} The priority of the presbyteries in church government was rejected by the Princeton and Old School party in the nineteenth century in its war upon the New England element but it was reaffirmed in the reunion of 1869. Also, strict subscription was reaffirmed by the conservatives in the nineteenth century disruption, 1837-1869, but was rejected in favor of qualified subscription in the reunion.
rights as were deemed proper. 45

The issue which divided American Presbyterianism—the Scots and Scotch-Irish from the New Englanders—was whether or not the Presbyterianism derived from Scotland and Ireland was to be considered normative in the Church in the new world. The victory of the liberal group was a step toward the creation of a genuinely American Presbyterian Church, more responsive to the American ethos than Scottish Calvinism could possibly be. The ecclesiastical system which emerged was decentralized, granting key authority to the presbyteries. Strict subscription to the Confession was not made a condition of ministerial communion. It should be observed that the Old School party of the nineteenth century constantly challenged the concept of presbyterial authority in the Church and opposed limited or qualified subscription to the Confession and revivalism and was, therefore, a continuation of Scotch-Irish and Scottish usages into that century. The basis on which the Old School party attacked the principles which underlay the New School was that they were not

45 This view was later defended by the Princeton school. See C. Hodge, "General Assembly of 1838," Princeton Review, X, 476. "The General Assembly has always acted as the parliament of the Presbyterian Church, exercising legislative as well as judicial powers, making rules binding on synods, presbyteries, and churches, restrained by nothing but the Word of God, the laws of the land, and its own written constitution."
congruous with the belief and practice of the Church in Scotland and Ireland.

The New England-Log College party, as it may now be described, was less insistent on uniform dogmatic norms and more democratic in its conception of church government than its opponents. The New England element in the Church made possible a much more heterogenous membership than was permitted in the conservative churches, where usages which had grown up in Scotland and Ireland were meticulously retained. Concerning this matter Trinterud has commented:

... people of all backgrounds and descents could freely join the Presbyterian Church in those areas controlled by the New England-Log College party. In so doing they were not made to feel that they were joining a Scottish or an Irish Church, but rather an American Presbyterian Church in which they would have as full a part as anyone of another ancestry. 46

The Log College party, led by William Tennant, Sr., which, as has been observed, was not sympathetic with the strict theological demands made by the Scotch-Irish element, fused with the New England group in the formation of the Synod of New York. The fusion of the Log College group and the New England element produced what Trinterud calls "the genius of American Presbyterianism." 47 It was a union of


second- and third-generation New England Puritan Presbyterians and a group of younger Scotch-Irish Presbyterians who had been imbued with the piety and zeal of English Puritanism, largely through the influence of William Tennant, Sr. Revivalism was thus assimilated by Puritan orthodoxy and a colonial American Church was created. The clergy of the New York Synod were largely colonial in origin. They were committed to revivalism and missionary endeavor. Thus they "far outstripped the Old World Presbyterianism that had been transplanted into the colonies, and gave birth to a new order of Presbyterianism, an American Church."48

The Log College and the coterie it produced swiftly became the intellectual center of the party. When the Log College was superseded, in 1746, by the College of New Jersey, which later became Princeton University, it was through the efforts of the New Side, pro-revivalist party. New England contributed to the new College her first three presidents, two of whom, Jonathan Dickinson and Jonathan Edwards, were towering figures in colonial American Christianity. The conception of Christianity held by these two men and their lesser known contemporaries and successors who were of a kindred spirit were incalculably influential in shaping the American Presbyterian tradition. The New England and Log

48 Loc. cit.
College men mediated to colonial Presbyterianism the broad Calvinism of the Edwardean school. The intellectual activity of the New England party far outstripped the Scotch-Irish element in both acuteness and productivity. Trinterud points out that "from 1710 to 1753 the clergy of the New England group published sixty-seven books and pamphlets, the Log College men one-hundred nine, and the main body of the Scotch-Irish six." In the colonial period, the New England-Log Cabin men established three colleges and numerous academies. Meanwhile the Scotch-Irish party established only one relatively small academy. The Puritan Presbyterians and those of a like mind were, therefore, chiefly responsible for the educational life of the Church in the colonial period.

The New England influence upon the College of New Jersey was terminated in 1768, when John Witherspoon came from Scotland to assume the presidency. Though the new president attempted to assume an attitude of neutrality toward the tensions he found in the American Presbyterian

49 Trinterud, "Colonial American Presbyterianism," Church History, XVII, 43.

50 Ibid., p. 42.

Church, his administration marked the end of New England domination and the beginning of Scottish and Scotch-Irish leadership in the policies of the College. He labored against philosophical idealism and, therefore, against the theology of Jonathan Edwards. "Dr. Witherspoon has a sad time of it," wrote Charles Chauncy of Boston to Ezra Styles, "as the New Jersey College is the fountain of . . . corruption [the New Divinity]. He will do what he can to purge it." Witherspoon's effort "to purge" the college of the Edwardean theology was largely successful. The capture of the College by the conservatives immeasurably enhanced the prestige of those in the Church who belonged to the Scottish and Scotch-Irish group and was a significant step in the development of that party (later known as the Old School) which was completely opposed to New England and all her works.

II. JONATHAN EDWARDS AND THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY

Somewhat intemperate admiration caused Charles A. Briggs to regard Jonathan Edwards as "the father of modern British and American theology" but it cannot be denied that he was a formidable thinker and was surely the keenest

intellect in colonial America. He was the father of the New England theology, against which the Princeton school arrayed itself in constant controversy in the nineteenth century. A sketch of the salient features of the Edwardean view and its development is, therefore, appropriate.

**Departure from historic Calvinism.** Jonathan Edwards, "fully conscious of his departure from Calvinism," wrote in the preface to his "Freedom of the Will":

> I utterly disclaim a dependance on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold because he believed and taught them; and cannot be justly charged with believing in everything just as he taught."55

A modern theologian says that Edwards' "success in defending the old creed was due to the fact that he relived it and rethought it in a highly original fashion."56 The "original" element in his theology was the consequence of a fusion of Puritan Calvinism and "Locke's sensationalism developed in the direction of a Berkeleyan idealism."57

---


In addition to this "un-Calvinistic philosophy"\textsuperscript{58} in Edwards' theology, the Edwardean position contained a covert semi-Pelagianism,\textsuperscript{59} which was an outgrowth of revivalism. Edwards stressed "holy affections" quite as much as correct beliefs. Theology was not his religion, though his followers tended to make a religion of his theology, and his critics have sometimes sent their shafts at his theology abstracted from the overwhelming sense of the majesty of God, which, after all, was the central feature of his religious viewpoint. He wrote:

After the saints in heaven have had the pleasure of beholding the face of God millions of ages, it will not grow a dull story; the relish of this delight will be as exquisite as ever.\textsuperscript{60}

And it may be strongly surmised that he shared something of this beatific vision while he still stood on the soil of New England.

Edwards' versatility, expressed in his varied abilities as a preacher, theologian, philosopher, and saint, accounts for "the germs of diverse fruitage"\textsuperscript{61} buried in his writings.


The task of interpreting the significance and influence of this creative figure in American thought is further complicated by the fact that his writings were left incomplete due to his untimely death. He had just moved to the presidency of the College of New Jersey from his missionary labors at Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and embarked upon a treatise which was to cover the whole range of Christian doctrine when he was stricken with a fever which swiftly took his life. It is, nevertheless, clear that he was a Calvinist, though his Calvinism, which he defended against the criticisms of the Arminian school of Daniel Whitby and John Taylor, was neither a parrot-like repeating of the teachings of Calvin nor a revival of seventeenth century Puritan orthodoxy. Hammar says, "It is . . . possible to interpret Edwards in a conservative or Calvinistic way, but he stands neither on Luther's nor on Calvin's ground." The theology of Edwards may be regarded as "transitional," providing a medium through which the revivalistic tradition entered Calvinism. Hammar says again, "After Edwards it was easy [for American theology] to slide into anthropocentricity." The departures from Calvinism which appear in the writings of Edwards and his school may be expressed in five major

62 Hammar, op. cit., p. 89.

63 Ibid., p. 90.
divergencies:

(1) Edwards distinguished between "natural and moral ability and inability" and thus laid the groundwork for a gradual modification of the Calvinistic doctrine of man. By "natural ability and inability," he meant the power of "what is commonly called nature," or the lack of it, requisite to the accomplishment of a contemplated end. By "moral ability and inability," he meant "inclination," or the lack of it, concerning a contemplated course of action. The following passage from The Freedom of the Will, in which Edwards discussed the doctrine of inability, gives the distinction under consideration:

We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it, or because of some impending defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral inability consists ... either in the want of inclination, or the strength of contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives to


65 Loc. cit.

66 See Frank Hugh Foster, A Genetic History of the New England Theology (Chicago: 1907), p. 78. Also see W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology (New York: 1891), II, 220. "Natural ability for Edwards is the possession of the requisite mental faculties viewed apart from the moral state or condition. In so viewing them, he differs from the elder Calvinists, who regarded a mental faculty and its moral condition as inseparable." Italics his.
the contrary. 67

Causality, then, may be moral or it may be natural, an inclination or an earthquake. The principle which underlay the Edwardean idea of natural and moral ability and inability was that all events, natural and moral, have antecedents and consequences. 68 Edwards' treatise on The Freedom of the Will actually denied that the will was free by resolving choice into motive and motive into an other-than-human causality which was ultimately identified with the First Cause. 69 However, he was concerned not with the cause but with the nature of volition. Jonathan Edwards, Jr., said that his father demonstrated "the absurdity, the manifold contradictions, the inconceivableness, and the impossibility of a self-determining power" and proved "that the essence of the virtue and vice existing in the disposition of the heart and the acts of the will lies not in their cause but in their nature." 70 This


69 Edwards, "Freedom of the Will," Works, II, 190-191. See Haroutunian, op. cit., p. 232. "In Edwards' thought a volitional act is a mental act, not in the sense that the mind is an agent, but in the sense of a conscious act."

resulted in the rather curious doctrine that not the cause but the nature of a given volition determined the degree of the agent's responsibility for it. Charles Hodge found this distinction useful in dealing with the dilemma produced by God's sovereignty and human freedom.71

Edwards' successors made little use of these subtle distinctions concerning man's ability and inability but were attracted by the practical implications which these innovations suggested; in their hands the New England theology became increasingly Arminian. In spite of Edwards' powerful polemic against Arminianism, there was an unconscious logic in his evangelical preaching and piety that could not long be denied. With reference to this matter, Walter M. Horton says,

Edwards preached as if his hearers had the ability to repent; and he granted them in theory the "natural ability" to respond to the Gospel, while insisting on their "moral inability" to stir an inch out of the bog in which they were stuck, unless predestined and effectively called thereto by irresistible divine grace, which chose whom it pleased and passed by whom it pleased. In the hands of his successors, this purely formal and academic distinction between "natural ability" and "moral inability" grew into an affirmation of genuine free-will, so that Nathaniel Taylor at last could say, "A man not only can if he will, but he can if he won't."72

---

71 Infra, pp. 273-274.
72 Horton, op. cit., p. 20. Italics his.
F. H. Foster has fittingly observed, "Edwards introduced an ability which in process of time became a true ability, under which revival preaching arose."73

(2) Meanwhile the doctrine of God was undergoing a corresponding modification, especially in the hands of Edwards' successors. Edwards developed, in his Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue, a definition of moral conduct in terms of disinterested benevolence toward "being in general,"74 but since he did not measure God's conduct by the standard set for man, "his Deity was thus exposed to the charge of callous self-absorption and gross unfairness."75

Concerning the doctrine of "disinterested benevolence toward being in general," he wrote:

The first object of a virtuous benevolence is being, simply considered; and if being, simply considered, be its object, then being in general is its object; and what it has an ultimate propensity to is the highest good of being in general. And it will seek the good of every individual being unless it be considered as not consistent with the highest good of being in general."76

73 Foster, op. cit., p. 78. Italics his.
75 Horton, op. cit., p. 20.
76 Edwards, "The Nature of True Virtue," Works, III, 97. Italics his. This essay was warmly praised by the younger Fichte, who concluded with the words: "So has this solitary thinker of North America risen to the deepest and loftiest ground which can underlay the principle of morals." System d. Ethik, I, 69, cited by George Park Fisher, Remarks on Edwards and His Theology (New York: 1903), p. 46.
In his treatise on the nature of virtue, Edwards was wrestling with the relation of theology to ethics. He was trying to construct a theodicy to justify his Calvinism. "Edwards' successors endeavored vainly to prove that in behaving Calvinistically—predestinating men to sin, and then condemning them to eternal punishment—God was exhibiting disinterested benevolence to Being-in-general." 77 Joseph Bellamy, a student of Edwards, maintained that God "does as he would be done by, when he punishes sinners to all eternity." Jonathan Edwards, Jr., stated that "God acts not from any contracted, selfish motives, but from the most noble benevolence and regard to the public good." 78 The justification of the sovereignty of God by Edwards' immediate followers became in the hands of later members of the New England school, such as Nathaniel Taylor, an actual limitation of the Divine sovereignty.

Edwards' doctrine of disinterested benevolence had an ethical as well as a theological significance. He stated that "benevolent propensity of heart to being in general, and a temper or disposition to love God supremely, are in effect the same thing." 79 For Edwards, benevolence was a

77 Horton, op. cit., p. 21.
78 See Foster, op. cit., p. 203.
concern for the happiness of one's fellow men "only in so far as true happiness consists in the worship and service of God, and in seeking the glory of God."  

For the followers of Edwards, benevolence came to be identical with "a disinterested affection toward God expressed in and through a disinterested affection toward one's fellow men." Thus the Calvinistic concern for the glory of God, central in Edwards' conception, was gradually displaced by the legalistic notion that the highest human happiness for the individual and his fellow men could be attained through obedience to the law of God disclosed in the Bible. Thus theology, which for Edwards was literally a worship of the Divine Being, became an instrument to achieve human felicity. Theology became a medium through which the good life might be attained. John Barnard, a Congregationalist theologian in the pre-revolutionary generation, said in a series of sermons that "the great end and design" of God's commandments were "to make us truly wise, truly good, and truly happy." It was in this direction, though not always so explicitly, 

80 Haroutunian, op. cit., p. 75.


82 Haroutunian, op. cit., p. 94.

that Edwards' doctrine of benevolence was developed by the New England theologians, finally creating "an independent school of ethics, as well as theology." 84

(3) A single principle of wise benevolence in the universe as a whole prevailed alike in the salvation of the redeemed and the punishment of the unregenerate, Edwards taught. "The highest good of being in general" took precedence over the alleged and apparent good of the individual, which God seemed sometimes to oppose. Edwards wrote that when the "good" of an individual being was "not consistent with the highest good of being in general, . . . the good of a particular being may be given up for the sake of the highest good of being in general." 85 This aspect of Edwardianism was developed particularly by Samuel Hopkins, who held that even "eternal punishment" ultimately constituted "an infinite good." He wrote:

This eternal punishment of the wicked must be unspeakably to their advantage, and will add such immense degrees of glory and happiness to the Kingdom of God, as inconceivably to overbalance all they will suffer who shall fall under this righteous judgment, and render it all in this view and connection an infinite good. 86

84 Foster, op. cit., p. 101.
In a passage in which Hopkins oddly foreshadowed a view held later by Charles Hodge, he surmised that the number of the saved would far outstrip that of the lost—"it may be," he wrote, "many thousands to one." The effort to put punishment on the basis of benevolence and not merely justice characterized the entire New England theological development. Edwards A. Park, the last significant representative of the New England school, spoke of punishment as something "designed to honor the character of the Lawgiver. It expresses His benevolence," he continued, "because he thereby inflicts those evils which are necessary to the promotion of good. . . . Hence the design of punishment is to prevent sin in the subjects of the law, and to promote their holiness." In other words, punishment was really a benevolent act designed to prevent sin and promote holiness, and not merely to satisfy God's justice.

(4) Edwards believed that Adam and his posterity were one agent. The notion which underlay this theory should not be confused with the "realistic" view of the imputation of sin later espoused by Phillip Schaff and W. G. T. Shedd.

87 Loc. cit. See infra, p. 287.
89 Infra, pp. 212-214.
It was, rather, a unique position, peculiar to Edwards in theological history, which depended upon the idea of "identity," apparently inspired by John Locke's curious chapter on "Identity and Diversity." Edwards wrote:

If the existence of created substance, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of God's immediate power in that moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of nothing, then what exists at this moment by this power, is a new effect; and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it and follows it accordingly to a certain established method.90

In other words, "the continued existence of every created entity, whether person or thing, is nothing but the continued creation of God."91 Continued identity was, therefore, a continuity produced by God's absolutely constant creativity. The concretion observed in the world was accounted for by the "arbitrary constitution of God." In view of this, "Adam and the race may, therefore, be the same person, and so the loss of Adam be the loss of his posterity."92 According to Edwards, all who should ever be born participated in the act by which "the species first rebelled against God."93

This curious theory of identity made it possible for him to


91 Foster, op. cit., p. 88.

92 Loc. cit.

hold that "sin is imputed . . . not in order to make it the sin of all men but because it is the sin of all men, for they have committed it in Adam." 94

Current Calvinism assumed that sin was both voluntary and involuntary. 95 Death, the penalty of sin, came to all men and, therefore, all men were guilty of sin, whether voluntary, involuntary, or both. Infants, therefore, shared in the guilt of the race. Edwards accepted the federal headship of Adam and recognized the guilt of mankind not only for "actual" sin but also for the "original sin" of Adam. But his theory of identity obliterated the distinction which made some sin voluntary and other sin involuntary and resulted in the view that all sin is voluntary. The identity of the race with Adam meant that each member of the race committed the "original sin" in Adam. Each individual was, therefore, as justly charged with the guilt of the primal sin as if he himself had committed it. This view permitted Edwards to reject the common criticism that when men are charged with the sin of Adam they are charged with something they have not done. This emphasis upon the apparently voluntary character of all sin had far-reaching consequences on Edwards' successors, who stressed increasingly the freedom in which

94 Foster, op. cit., p. 87.
95 Ibid., p. 86.
man sins. A distinguishing doctrine of the New England theology that all sin consists in choice, developed particularly by Nathaniel W. Taylor, with whom Charles Hodge was in constant controversy, undoubtedly finds its germ in the Edwardean idea of identity.

(5) The doctrine of the atonement held by Jonathan Edwards seems on the surface to be in close conformity with current Calvinism but actually contains a variety of subtle deviations from Calvinistic orthodoxy. John McLeod Campbell was surely wrong when he wrote that Edwards' conception of the atonement was typical of "the earlier Calvinism." Edwards A. Park, the able nineteenth century exponent of New England theology at Andover Seminary, was much nearer the truth of the matter when he wrote that Edwards "adopted, in general, both the views and the phrases of the older Calvinists with regard to the atonement but . . . made various remarks which have suggested the more modern theory." By "the more modern theory," Park evidently meant that peculiar blending of Anselmic and Grotian principles which characterized the


New England doctrine of the work of Christ. Professor Park noted the "germs" in the writings of Edwards from which the Edwardean theory sprang. (a) He stressed God's sovereign grace in man's salvation and did not ground the Divine-human reconciliation in a strict satisfaction of distributive justice. A distinction was drawn between the punishment of the unregenerate, which is an act of justice, and the redemption of the redeemed, which is "an act of free and sovereign grace." (b) He distinguished sharply between the sufferings endured by Christ and the punishment for which his sufferings were substituted. In other words, he did not identify in degree and kind the sufferings of Christ and the sufferings which were allegedly deserved by those redeemed from sin. "The misery of the wicked in hell," Edwards wrote, "will be immeasurably more dreadful, in nature and degree, than those sufferings with which Christ's soul was so much overwhelmed." (c) He gave greater emphasis to love and less to justice than the old Calvinists in his treatment of the motive which lay behind the atonement. Edwards wrote: "That great act of suffering in which he especially


stood for them (the elect) was grounded in love." 101 It was love and pity which prompted Christ to substitute himself for sinners. 102 The satisfaction of justice was an important but subsidiary motive underlying the Cross. (d) He stressed not "distributive justice . . . which was satisfied with the literal punishment of a mediator" but "general justice" which was "satisfied with such sufferings of a mediator as are equivalent to the punishment of the transgressors." 103 Here the distinction, so important in the New England theology, between distributive and general justice appears. "To punish sin, without punishing the sinner," Edwards wrote, "is to punish in general, but not in the specific sense of that term." 104 It was this emphasis, and this distinction, which prompted Edwards to write such sentences as, "God is to be considered, in this affair, as the Supreme Regulator and Rector of the universe," 105 with which his essays on the atonement are sprinkled. Perhaps this point might be put in

---


104 Ibid., p. xxxiii.

the following way: Christ bore not the exact punishment deserved by the redeemed sinners but only that punishment which God in his sovereign wisdom determined should be exacted as a substitute for the sins of all the sinners who should be redeemed.

The Edwardean theory of the atonement, implicitly present in certain aspects of the teachings of the elder Edwards, was developed in the controversy between the followers of Edwards and the Universalists. The younger Edwards played a leading role in this process of definition. He wrote:

The followers of Mr. Edwards have proved that the atonement does not consist in the payment of a debt. It consists rather in doing that which, for the purpose of establishing the authority of the divine law, ... is equivalent to the punishment of the sinner according to the letter of the law.106

A full statement of the developed doctrine was given by Edwards the younger in three sermons preached in New Haven, in 1785, entitled, "The Necessity of Atonement."107 God was treated in these discourses not as the "offended party" to whom satisfaction must be made but as "ruler," the authority of whose law must be maintained. The atonement was regarded


not as a satisfaction to distributive justice but only to general justice or the well-being of the universe. 108

Stephen West, a contemporary of the younger Edwards, drew out the implications of the New England view more clearly than the younger Edwards but in complete accord with him. He held that God's concern for the general good was the basis of the divine government and was convinced that "there is nothing in God . . . but benevolence and love."109 Therefore, "the love of God to his creatures . . . leads Him for their sake not to forgive without the atonement."110 It should be added that most of the New England theologians, following the example of Samuel Hopkins, surrendered the doctrine of a limited atonement.

Thus both the penal view of the sufferings of Christ and the doctrine of a limited atonement, which L. W. Grensted called "the two most characteristic tenets of ordinary Calvinism,"111 were explicitly repudiated in the early history of the New England theology. The very literal interpretation which historic Calvinism placed upon the sufferings of Christ

110 Ibid., p. 96.
as the satisfaction of justice was robbed of much of its crudeness by the belief that Christ's sufferings were only such as the wisdom of God deemed to be necessary in order to preserve the honor of the law. Viewing the atonement as generally available to all who should believe at least had the merit of providing a defensible basis for God's love, which was almost impossible to recognize in the old Calvinistic view that the salvation provided in the Cross was limited to the elect. Grensted registers surprise that "the Rectoral theory" of the New England theologians should have "grown up within the pale of Calvinism" and regards this as evidence that "Calvinism was . . . played out, so far at least as its theory of atonement was concerned." ¹¹² But Calvinism was far from "played out" and was to reassert itself vigorously with the rise of the Princeton school in the nineteenth century. Much of the writing which emanated from the Princeton circle was directed against the innovations introduced by the New England theologians with reference to the doctrine of the atonement and its implications. To speak of Calvinism as "played out" in America by the beginning of the nineteenth century is to betray a common error in the estimate of American theology which entirely overlooks the Princeton development. What actually happened was that the

¹¹² Ibid., p. 305.
conception of the atonement developed by Jonathan Edwards, Jr., Stephen West, Samuel Hopkins, and others became the dominant view in America in both Congregationalism and that part of Presbyterianism which was influenced by the New England theory. But the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians rejected this doctrinal innovation and sought to conserve the historic Calvinistic view of the atonement, with which the Princeton school was in complete accord in the nineteenth century.

The Princeton critique of the New England theology. Concerning the impact of the New England theology, Williston Walker has written:

Edwardean opinions . . . spread widely among Presbyterians of the northern Middle States, though opposed wherever Scotch or Protestant Irish influence was strong by an older form of Calvinism.

In the nineteenth century, Princeton Seminary became the citadel of this "older form of Calvinism," which was somewhat uniquely defined and persistently propagated. The Princeton school regarded Edwardean Calvinism as a dangerous departure from Westminster orthodoxy. In 1858, an article appeared in the Princeton Review entitled "Successive Forms of the New


114 Walker, op. cit., p. 305.
Divinity," in which Professor Lyman H. Atwater took the position that the "successive forms" in which Edwardean theology appeared meant a gradually increasing departure from Biblical truth and Calvinistic orthodoxy. The article is illuminating because it brings into sharp focus the acute differences between the mid-nineteenth century Calvinism of Princeton and the Edwardean or New England Calvinism, which was the dominant theological view in both Congregationalism and New School Presbyterianism. Atwater's article was in the form of a review of a pamphlet by Yale Professor George Park Fisher, who, in an objective sketch of the history of the New England theology, had said:

It is proper to notice what Yale College has done for theological science. The fathers of the New England theology—Edwards, Bellamy, Hopkins, West, Smalley, Emmons, and Dwight—went forth from Yale. Bellamy


116 The younger Edwards was a graduate of Nassau Hall.
and Hopkins were pupils of Edwards. From Hopkins, West derived his theology; Smalley studied with Bellamy, and Emmons with Smalley. . . . Whatever is distinctive of American theology as contrasted with the general theology of the church, may be traced to them.\textsuperscript{117}

According to Fisher, the election of Timothy Dwight as President of Yale College marked the triumph of the Edwardean theology in New England. Dwight perpetuated the Edwardean position through such successors as Nathaniel Taylor, Moses Stuart, Lyman Beecher, and Edwards A. Park. A recent historian has denied that Dwight occupied the crucial role in the development of the New England theology which Fisher attributed to him and has attempted to prove that the Yale president was in reality quite sympathetic with the old Calvinism.\textsuperscript{118} On the other hand, Atwater, writing in 1858, stated that Dwight's "system differed in several points from the theology of the Church" and contained "novel elements" which gave rise to the "new divinity" of Taylor, Stuart, Park, and others. Whatever was the precise place Dwight held in the development of the New England theology, it is clear that the Edwardean position underwent a steady development which took it increasingly away from the

\textsuperscript{117} George Park Fisher, \textit{The History of the Church of Christ in Yale College} (New Haven, Connecticut: 1858), pp. 36-37.

Calvinism of the Princeton school.

Fisher concluded his comment as follows:

By a variety of agencies, the party professing the ancient Calvinism and eschewing 'the improvements' of the New Divinity, has been quite obliterated in New England. Eighty years ago, the followers of President Edwards among the Calvinistic clergy were said by his son, the younger Edwards, to be few in number. At the present time [1858], there are some who are scarcely aware that there was ever a time since his death when the Calvinists of New England did not regard President Edwards as the most authoritative expounder of their principles. His theology, however, it cannot be denied, had from the beginning the respect of many who refused to adopt the additions proposed by his disciples. It is still a mooted point among interpreters of his writings, whether he deviated from Calvin in anything except modes of statement.\(^{119}\)

Professor Atwater's critique of Fisher's pamphlet provides what might be called the Princeton view of the New England theory.\(^{120}\) Three aspects of this view will be examined:

(1) Jonathan Edwards, Atwater held, departed from the "old Calvinism" only in that "he taught . . . the mediate imputation of Adam's sin and . . . that he held an eccentric philosophical theory of the nature of virtue as consisting wholly in love to being in general." Furthermore, he stated . . .

\(^{119}\) Fisher, History of Church of Christ in Yale College, pp. 80-82.

\(^{120}\) For a critique of Charles Hodge's view of the New England theology, see Enoch Pond, "Dr. Hodge and the New England Theology," The Bibliotheca Sacra and Theological Eclectic, XXX (April, 1873), 371-381.
that "the distinctive features of this New Divinity, in all its successive forms, are utterly abhorrent to his entire system." Atwater believed that Princeton and the Old School Presbyterians, not Yale and the Congregationalists, were the true heirs of the theology of Jonathan Edwards. However, as has been pointed out, Edwards himself denied direct dependence upon Calvin and exhibited an independence of mind and a preoccupation with the philosophical implications of theology which widely separated him from the traditionalism and Biblicism of the Princeton school. Perry Miller's recent study of the thought of Edwards clearly establishes its sharp difference from the prosaic and wooden orthodoxy of Atwater and the Hodges. Indeed, neither the followers of Edwards nor the Princeton thinkers were able to grasp the tremendous sweep of Edwards' imaginative Calvinism and both reduced it to a pedestrian defense of party shibboleths.

There was a wing of opinion in the Old School Presbyterian Church which refused to accept the adoption of Edwards by Princeton and insisted that he was not only the source from which the New England theology had sprung but that he

121 Atwater, op. cit., p. 589.
122 Supra, p. 36.
himself was as heretical as his followers. Samuel J. Baird was a representative of this view of Edwards. He criticized "Edwards' metaphysical gloss upon the doctrine of imputation" and insisted that

he held and propagated two or three pregnant errors. The first was that all sin consists in selfishness; and all holiness in virtue, in disinterested benevolence. The second grows out of this—If holiness consists in disinterested benevolence, God, when he brought creation into existence, was bound, as a holy being, to produce that system which would secure the greatest possible amount of happiness to the universe. Edwards also insisted upon the distinction between natural and moral ability. Of the latter only is the sinner devoid with respect to evangelical obedience.

Baird believed that these "errors were so incorporated by Edwards into his doctrinal system that, when they are taken away, nothing but a wreck remains."124 Thus there was a difference of opinion within the Old School party as to precisely what relation Edwards sustained to the theology which bore his name.

The Princeton position as to Edwards' real role in

the New England theological development, which Atwater sought to state, was not quite consistently sustained by the Princeton school, which, occasionally, was disposed to find fault with the views of Edwards himself. On the whole, however, the Seminary claimed that the theology of Edwards was largely identical with its own theological position.

(2) Atwater denied the claim of Edwards the younger that his father made "ten improvements" in theology and disagreed sharply with the estimate which the younger Edwards gave of his father's theological influence. Each of the ten points which the son regarded as "improvements" exhibited by his father's view over the old Calvinism was refuted by the Princeton professor. A detailed statement of Atwater's effort to claim Edwards for Princeton would serve no purpose in this study. It is sufficient to say that Atwater and Edwards, Jr., reached diametrically opposite conclusions concerning both the content and purpose of the theology of the elder Edwards. The surmise that the antithetically extreme positions of the two apologists were both wrong is justified by the historical evidence. It is clear that, although Edwards did not deviate from historic Calvinism generally,

125 For Princeton criticisms of Edwards, see C. Hodge, Systematic Theology (London: 1884), I, 423; II, 219; III, 563, 569-570.

126 Edwards, Jr., op. cit., I, 481-492.
there are, nevertheless, important particulars in which his original and keen mind refashioned the Calvinistic tradition. What Edwards said about himself should settle the matter once and for all. "I should not take it amiss," he wrote, "to be called a Calvinist, for distinction's sake: though I utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin. . . ." He was willing to say that he agreed with Calvin on his "general scheme of divinity" but not more.

(3) Atwater stated "four radical points" in which the "New Divinity," the culmination of the New England theology, expounded by Nathaniel W. Taylor, went beyond previous Edwardean positions:

(a) In asserting the native sinlessness of our race;
(b) in asserting the plenary ability of the sinner to renovate his own soul; (c) in asserting self-love, or the desire for happiness, to be the primary cause, and the happiness of the agent the end, of all voluntary action; (d) in asserting the inability of God to prevent sin without destroying moral agency.

127 Supra, pp. 35-55. This effort to identify Edwards with the old Calvinism and, therefore, to deny he was the real founder of the New England theology, allegedly produced by his followers who misunderstood him, may be called the "Princeton view" of the matter and suggests special pleading rather than historical appraisal. It is also a nice example of the way in which an apologetic attitude militates against objective historical writing. See Warfield, op. cit., pp. 221-227.


129 Ibid., p. 12.

130 Atwater, op. cit., p. 609.
As a kind of final stroke which presumably summarized most of his objections to the New England theology, he asserted that the "denial of original sin" by Taylor was the fruit of the "denial of imputation" by his predecessors.\(^\text{131}\)

**The resulting conflict.** In the entire controversy between the New England and Princeton apologists, Professor Enoch Pond of Bangor Theological Seminary, in Maine, holds the dubious honor of having made the greatest single understatement when he wrote: "It has been long understood that the Princeton theology differs somewhat from the standard orthodoxy of New England."\(^\text{132}\) A substitution of "sharply" for "somewhat" in the preceding sentence would make it much more correct. The article from which the passage by Pond was taken is sufficient evidence itself of the necessity for revising the sentence. The difference between the two schools was, indeed, not "somewhat" but "sharp." Pond badly asserted that Hodge's estimate of the New England theology in the *Systematic Theology* was filled with "misrepresentations," seven of which he meticulously marked.\(^\text{133}\)

Since the two schools hurled derogatory epithets back

---


and forth at each other, with "misrepresentations" flying thick and fast, the historian must proceed with extreme caution in order to approximate an objective reconstruction of what they espoused. For one thing, a distinction must be made between the historically demonstrable difference between the elder Edwards and the Princeton school, on the one hand, and the belief held by Atwater and Hodge that the two theologies were largely congruous, on the other. Also, a distinction must be drawn between the actual historical connection Edwards sustained to his successors and the denial of such a connection by the Princeton men. It should also be remembered that the Princeton theology was quite as much the product of its misunderstanding as of its understanding of the New England position.

Atwater's attitude was succinctly summarized in a closing paragraph of his article on the New Divinity:

We have shown that Edwards' theology was, with scarcely a variation, one with the old Calvinism, and at war with all those successive forms of New Divinity which have been so industriously and adroitly linked with his name; and that the early forms of the New England theology as contrasted with the general theory of the Church, developed by his son and others, differ from his system on cardinal points, while they themselves differ widely from the later forms of New Divinity.135

134 Supra, pp. 36-38.
135 Atwater, op. cit., p. 619.
The points at which Atwater differed from Edwards were regarded as "eccentric theories outside his system." He was confident that "old Calvinism" would "outlive all assaults and alleged improvements attempted on any of its marked and characteristic features" and believed with equal assurance that the New England theology was irreconcilable with the Westminster Confession of Faith, a view completely shared by Charles Hodge.

Atwater and Hodge held that a consistent carrying out of the new theology would eventually disrupt the Calvinistic system, a verdict which has been partially justified by history. The tensions which resulted from the attempt of the New England theologians in the Presbyterian Church to reconcile the Confession with their speculations proved in the end to be disruptive of the modified Calvinism they espoused and were resolved only when the Westminster Confession of Faith was surrendered as a final theological criterion.

136 Loc. cit. See Warfield, op. cit., p. 226. Warfield similarly maintained that Edwards' "individualisms--an eccentric theory of virtue, mediate imputation--were in no way characteristic of his teachings." However, see C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 433. Here Hodge attached Edwards to the "heresy" that "sin is the necessary means to the greatest good."

137 Atwater, op. cit., p. 620.

138 The theological liberalism which developed at Union Seminary and which laid the groundwork for the present
really felt the influence of the Confession and who were willing frankly to face its rigorous intellectual demands tended either to break away from the historic Calvinistic tradition or to relapse back into the old Calvinism. W. G. T. Shedd of Union Theological Seminary, in New York, is a case in point. He was a graduate of Andover Seminary, where he had been instructed by Leonard Woods and Edwards A. Park, exponents of the modified Calvinism of New England. But Shedd said in substance that the entire New England theological development, from its beginning in Edwards to its culmination in Taylor and Park, was fundamentally mistaken and had ended in failure. To him the alternative

---

138 (Contd.) ecumenical theology there was made possible when assent to the Westminster Standards ceased to be required of the professors in 1905.

139 Shedd did not mention Woods and Park in his *Dogmatic Theology*, in which the old Calvinism was expounded with a remorseless rigour. His position was in the nature of a condemnation of the New England theology with which his predecessor, Henry B. Smith, had at least been sympathetic, and prepared the way unwittingly for a non-confessional type of theology in American Presbyterianism. Shedd retired in 1890 and was succeeded by John H. Worcester, who was followed in 1893 by William Adams Brown, a young theologian of "liberal" tendencies. Brown had studied for two years with Adolf Harnack in the University of Berlin and was neither an old Calvinist nor an exponent of the New England theology. See Samuel McCrea Cavert, "William Adams Brown: Servant of the Church of Christ," *The Church Through Half a Century* (New York: 1936), pp. 13-16.
was between the old, pre-Edwardean Calvinism or no Calvinism at all; and he was a Calvinist. Shedd, though at Union, which had been founded by the New School Presbyterians, was in almost absolute agreement with the Princeton school, with which he shared a strong antipathy for all the alleged "improvements" in theology proposed by the New England theologians.

As F. H. Foster has somewhere observed, Princeton might well have said to New Haven what Luther said to Zwingli: *Ihr habt einen anderen Geist denn wir.*

**III. THE PLAN OF UNION**

The story of the Plan of Union has been written largely under the influence of denominational propaganda and, therefore, has seldom achieved the stature of genuine history. Congregational and Presbyterian historians have vied with one another in charging each the other denomination with the alleged dire consequences which followed in the wake of the Plan. This approach has militated against an understanding of the actual historical forces which account for the Plan's formation and disruption. The reasons which account for the formation of this cooperative endeavor between Presbyterians and Congregationalists in 1801 have roots which run deeply into the histories of the colonial Congregational and Presbyterian Churches and the forces
which explain the rupture of this common effort are related to a history which is somewhat obscure. The Scottish and Scotch-Irish element in American Presbyterianism opposed the Plan from the beginning but it was only after this party was consolidated and given the intellectual prestige and power with which it was furnished by the Princeton school that it was able to bring sufficient influence to bear upon the policy of the Church to disrupt this common enterprise.

**Reasons for the Plan.** After the American Revolution, the movement of hosts of people across the new nation grew in an ever increasing stream. The gradually receding frontier was at first in central-western New York, the southern shore of Lake Erie, now Ohio—then called Connecticut's Western Reserve—and western Virginia. The Congregational churches of New England and the Presbyterian churches of the Middle States manifested a missionary concern for the frontier people by establishing churches and supplying missionaries for the new communities. In New York and Ohio especially, Congregationalist emigrants from New England encountered settlers from the old Middle colonies who had been trained in Presbyterianism and for whose instruction the Presbyterian Church was sending missionaries at the same time and at the same places to which Congregational missionaries were being dispatched. This resulted in widespread overlapping of
missionary activities and personnel and it, therefore, seemed desirable that some cooperative measures should be undertaken.

The practical compulsion for fusion produced by the circumstances on the American frontier was implemented by the similarity between the theology and government of the two denominations at this time. As has been pointed out, the New England element in Presbyterianism had strongly influenced the colonial Presbyterian Church and prepared the minds of the people for closer cooperation with the Congregationalists. The elder Edwards, a Congregationalist, had served a Presbyterian church in New York as minister for a short period, and had been President of the Presbyterian College of New Jersey, of which his son was a graduate. Nearly half the trustees of the College during Edwards' incumbency were alumni of Yale College. Furthermore, the Congregational churches of Connecticut were inclining increasingly toward Presbyterianism, a process which was accelerated by the adoption of the Saybrook Platform in 1707. This Platform provided that the churches of Connecticut should be grouped in "consociations" or standing councils, at least one of which functioned in each county. These councils reviewed and decided cases which could not be adequately

140 Supra, pp. 2-3, 32-34.
handled in the local churches. The decision of the council was final except in extremely difficult cases, which could be examined by a neighboring council in connection with the consociation that had original jurisdiction. The assistance of the consociation should be sought by each church affiliated with it "upon all occasions ecclesiasticall," which included ordinations, additions, and dismissions. The ministers of the colony were placed in "associations," which possessed the power of ministerial licensure. The "General Association," comprising the entire county, was constituted by delegates from the associations.

The consociational system of Connecticut, which closely resembled Presbyterian polity, inclined many Congregationalists in that State to regard the Connecticut churches as closer in form of government to the Presbyterian than the Congregational churches of Massachusetts which were regulated by the Cambridge Platform. This explains why the Congregational churches of Connecticut were often designated by their ministers and members as "Presbyterian." A formal


142 Walker, op. cit., p. 208. See ibid., p. 315. The General Association of Connecticut in 1805 described the Saybrook Platform as the "constitution of the Presbyterian Church in Connecticut."

143 Ibid., p. 315.
declaration by the Hartford North Association, in 1799, stated that the constitution of the churches of Connecticut "contains the essentials of the Church of Scotland, or the Presbyterian Church of America." 144

Similarity in the government of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches in the period prior to the Plan of Union was complemented by a similarity in doctrine. In the case of government, Congregationalism adapted itself to Presbyterianism; in the case of doctrine, the Presbyterian Church, led by the New England party, tended to adapt itself to the broader theological position of Congregationalism. Both Churches accepted the Westminster Confession of Faith but neither required strict subscription to it as a condition of ordination or ministerial communion. The policies of the two Churches were largely fashioned by men who had been trained in New England. The Scotch-Irish element in the Presbyterian Church was always uneasy about this cordial relationship to Congregationalism and was able to muster enough strength by 1837 to abrogate the Plan of Union and split the Church. However, the Presbyterian Church which joined the Congregationalists in the Plan of Union in 1801,

was still dominated by the New England party.

Salient features of the Plan. In view of the situation sketched above, the union of the two Churches in common missionary enterprises on the frontier is not at all surprising. In May, 1801, the Plan of Union was adopted by the Presbyterian General Assembly, \(^{145}\) and, in June of the same year, it was approved by the Congregational General Association of Connecticut. \(^{146}\) This cooperative endeavor thus originated with the Presbyterians and was proposed to the Connecticut Congregationalists by the Presbyterian Church.

There were four provisions in the Plan of Union:

1. Missionaries of the two Churches were enjoined "to promote mutual forbearance and a spirit of accommodation" between the Presbyterians and Congregationalists in the same frontier churches and communities.

2. A Congregational Church which engaged a Presbyterian minister was allowed to continue its congregational government and settle its difficulties within the local church. Any serious problem arising between the minister and the church, or any member of it, was referred to the presbytery to which the minister

---


belonged, unless the congregation opposed this procedure, in which case it was referred to a council consisting of an equal number of Congregationalists and Presbyterians. (3) A Presbyterian Church which had a Congregational minister was permitted to continue its Presbyterian polity. Any difficulty which arose between the minister and the church, or any member of it, should be examined by the association to which the minister belonged, provided the church agreed; otherwise, the problem was reviewed by a council consisting equally of Presbyterians and Congregationalists. (4) Each church formed a "standing committee" whose responsibility it was "to call to account" members who had lived "inconsistently with the laws of Christianity." Any Presbyterian "condemned" by this committee had the right of appeal to the appropriate presbytery. If he were a Congregationalist, he might appeal to "the body of the male communicants of the church" of which he was a member. In the former case, the appeal to the presbytery was final unless the church consented to an appeal to the synod or General Assembly. In the latter case, appeal might be made to a "mutual council" in the local church. The "standing committee" of each church could send to the presbytery a Congregational representative, who possessed every privilege accorded "a ruling elder of the Presbyterian Church." 147

147 "Regulations Adopted by the General Assembly of
The Plan of Union continued in full force until it was repudiated by the Old School party of the Presbyterian Church in 1837.\(^{148}\) It was maintained by the New School Presbyterians until abandoned by the Congregationalists in 1852.\(^ {149}\)

Results of the Plan. Samuel J. Baird, a leader of the Old School Presbyterians, fulminated constantly against the Plan, which, he said, was adopted by the General Assembly "seduced by the siren of union and peace." It was regarded by Old School partisans as an instrument "for corrupting the doctrines of the Church"\(^ {150}\) and "for Congregationalizing the Presbyterian Church."\(^ {151}\) The Congregational element in the Presbyterian Church, "remained unassimilated," he said, "and engaged in the most strenuous, varied, and persistent exertions to accomplish the transforma-


\(^{148}\) See G. N. Judd, \textit{et al.}, \textit{A History of the Division of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America} (New York: 1852), chap. I. This is a specimen of the New School view of the Plan of Union and its abrogation. See also Baird, \textit{op. cit.}, chap. X. This is an example of the Old School view of the Plan of Union and its repudiation.

\(^{149}\) See Nichols, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 29-30, 50.

\(^{150}\) Baird, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 159.

\(^{151}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 166.
tion of the Church in doctrine and order. . . ."152 This is a somewhat extreme statement of a view which was shared by the Princeton school.

In 1837, Charles Hodge wrote that the Plan of Union was entirely unconstitutional and that "the parties by which it was adopted were incompetent to make such an arrangement." In other words, the General Assembly, in 1801, which committed the Church to the Plan, had no authority to do so because the constitution of the Presbyterian Church was "designed for Presbyterians and for them only" and "none others can rightfully come under its provisions, nor take part in its administration." What was particularly reprehensible to Hodge was the provision in the Plan which permitted a Congregationalist, as a deputy of a standing committee from a church organized according to the terms of the Plan of Union, to attend a presbytery and to have the same rights as a ruling elder of the Presbyterian Church.153 He wrote:

It is a deception, however innocently done, to certify that a man is an elder in our sense of the term who has never been ordained. And it is no less a deception that such persons should be entered on the minutes of Presbyteries as elders.154

152 Ibid., p. 327.


154 Ibid., p. 432.
The "grand evil," as he phrased it, was that the Plan subverted the Presbyterian system of government, confession of faith, and constitution. Then he came to the point toward which his entire discussion had been aimed from the beginning and mentioned the "two great parties" in the Presbyterian Church. He described them as follows: "One of the parties is in favor of a strict adherence to our doctrinal standards, the other in favor of a liberal construction and latitude of interpretation." The "liberal party" was strong, he pointed out, in precisely the region where the Plan of Union had operated. The liberal or New School party had, therefore, he believed, come into the Presbyterian Church "under that Plan." This "lax party," he said, advocated "error" and opposed "discipline for opinions." "Nameless disorders and irregularities which disgraced the Church" came, he believed, from the same district where the New School was dominant. These excerpts show how closely identified Princeton Seminary was with the

155 Loc. cit.

156 Ibid., p. 433. Actually, the antecedents of the New School party went much further back than the Plan of Union and were present in the very beginning of the Presbyterian movement in America, almost a century before the arrival in the new world of the Scotch-Irish who were the antecedents of the Old School party.

157 Ibid., p. 434.
Old School party, which became the Old School Presbyterian Church in 1837, and suggest the significant role which the Princeton school occupied in the policy of that party.

The tensions incident to the Plan of Union were the inevitable result of the clash of two traditions within American Presbyterianism. The first tendency was informed strongly with the broader theology and less strict government of Congregationalism. The second stream, of which the Princeton school was an important element, was characterized by an emphasis on strict subscription to the Westminster Confession and historic polity of Presbyterianism and was a continuation of customs and thought-forms derived directly from the Scottish Reformation.
"The Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America" was founded by men whom A. A. Hodge considered "Calvinists of the old school, of the special type represented by the Westminster standards." The theological tensions which were to result in the separation of the conservative Calvinists from the New England school were not acute in 1812, when the institution was organized, and the leaders of the Church do not seem to have been particularly cognizant of the predominantly conservative character of the founding fathers of the Seminary. The General Assembly was apparently unaware of the potentiality of a particular school of theology at Princeton and intended simply to establish a training school for ministers in "the Presbyterian Church in the United States" to serve the multiplying churches of the new west. The founders of the Seminary, most of whom were of a conservative temper, were nevertheless not unanimously "Calvinists of the old school."

For example, one of the leaders in the movement to establish

---

Princeton Seminary was James Richards, afterwards a professor in Auburn Seminary, who refused to follow the conservative party in excising certain synods and presbyteries from the General Assembly in 1837 for alleged doctrinal laxity. He was likewise a leader in the formation of the New School Presbyterian Church in 1838. President Timothy Dwight of Yale College, a Congregationalist, who was a delegate to the 1809 General Assembly from Connecticut, was chairman of the committee to whom the recommendation was referred regarding the establishment of Princeton Seminary. Not only was Dwight a Congregationalist but he was also a leading exponent of the New England theology.

The tendency of the Seminary from the beginning was, nevertheless, to stress strict subscription to the Westminster Confession and to magnify the authority of the General Assembly, though the doctrinal latitude allowed was unquestionably greater at the beginning. Archibald Alexander, the first professor, was of Scotch-Irish descent and "was

---


universally ranked among the leaders of the old...
Calvinism of the seventeenth century." However, he was too much a diplomat to engage in theological controversy with the liberal party at first, since the new Seminary needed the undivided support of the entire Church. It is nevertheless true that, as the Seminary became increasingly secure and, therefore, less dependent upon a unified Church, and as the party lines within the Church became increasingly distinct, Professor Alexander unequivocally placed the Seminary on the side of the Old School party.

Samuel Miller, the second professor, who came to the Seminary in 1813, was also an exponent of the strict Scotch-Irish viewpoint but, like his colleague, valued peace and unity too much to stress his conservatism at the beginning. Moreover, he was a man of conciliatory disposition, especially in the early years of his professorship, though, even then, he was sometimes given to extreme statements in the heat of debate. But usually his was an irenic spirit. For example, in 1810, he refused to vote against accepting into the Presbytery of New York a young minister, Gardiner Spring, who had been accused of "Hopkinsian" errors. Some were suspicious of his theology but Dr. Miller said, "Gentlemen, you may condemn the views of that young man; but in

condemning him you condemn me." But this is not typical of Miller's attitude toward the New England theology, concerning which he became increasingly critical as he grew older. For example, in 1836, Miller led a movement to brand Albert Barnes with heresy because he made certain statements in his *Notes on Romans* which were allegedly at variance with the *Confession of Faith*. Barnes was Minister of the First Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia and a member of the New School party. Miller's personal history mirrored the history of the Seminary, which, by 1836, had cast its lot without question with the conservative party, for which it had become an intellectual rallying point. The scholastic Calvinism of the Princeton school was only potential at first but gradually became the actual position of the Seminary in the controversies with the New England men. The writings of Alexander, Miller, and Hodge leave no doubt whatsoever where the Seminary stood by 1840.

The figure who looms largest in the formative years of the Princeton school is undoubtedly Archibald Alexander. At the age of forty, he was chosen by the General Assembly to occupy the first theological post in the first Seminary established by American Presbyterians. Gillett has

---


characterized him as "artless, frank, unassuming, and transparent in simplicity and integrity."8 Dr. John A. Mackay has spoken of him as "the greatest man, taking him all in all, who ever had to do with Princeton Theological Seminary."9 He shaped the policies of Princeton until 1840, when he surrendered the professorship of theology to Charles Hodge, then on the threshold of his brilliant career.

I. THE ORIGIN OF PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY AND THE PRINCETON REVIEW

Reasons for organizing the Seminary. Prior to the establishment of Princeton Seminary, the training of young men for the ministry in the Presbyterian Church of America was provided by those ministers who were willing and able to assume responsibility for instructing clerical aspirants and, of course, by the College of New Jersey.10 Broad religious instruction was provided for every student. There are evidences that the appointment of a Professor of Divinity at the College was advocated as early as 1760. The project was deferred, however, allegedly because of a lack of funds. The

8 Gillett, op. cit., I, 567.
10 It should be noted here that the "Log College" and a few "academies" had furnished some training for Presbyterian ministerial candidates before the founding of the College of New Jersey.
Synod of New York and Philadelphia continued to pursue the matter and declared, in 1761, that "the Church suffers greatly for want of an opportunity to instruct students in the knowledge of divinity." It was, therefore, agreed that every ministerial student who had finished college should "read carefully and closely on this subject at least one year, under the care of some minister of an approved character for his skill in theology" and should discuss under his direction "difficult points in divinity, forming sermons, lectures, and such other useful exercises as he may be directed to, in the course of his studies."\(^1\)

John Witherspoon, who had come to the Presidency of the College from Scotland, in 1768, stated in his opening lecture on divinity that he hoped he "might be instrumental in furnishing the minds, and improving the talents of those who might hereafter be the ministers of the everlasting gospel."\(^2\) But even during the administration of this staunch Scottish clergyman, the atmosphere of the College became more and more non-sectarian and, therefore, less and less devoted to a specifically denominational emphasis. This

---


was not due to any lack of interest by Witherspoon in the welfare of the Church but to circumstances which were gradually changing the character of American colleges and creating curricula to meet the needs of all students and not merely members of one Christian denomination. Such theological training as was provided was not adequate to meet the professional needs of the clergy in a rapidly expanding Church.13

The type of theology taught in the College was a "moderate Calvinism," as Dr. Samuel S. Smith, who was a Professor of Theology in the College before the Seminary was established, described his "system."14 Shortly before Dr. Henry Kollock went to the College as teacher of theology in 1603, he wrote to Bishop Hobart: "I have found myself obliged to renounce the sentiments of the rigid Calvinists. The doctrine of imputation, as held by them, appears to me inconsistent with the justice of God. My mind revolts from the idea."15 It is not surprising that the College, which

13 See James W. Alexander, The Life of Archibald Alexander, D.D. (New York: 1854), p. 363. When Princeton Seminary, an institution totally distinct from the College, was opened in 1812, "all strictly professional lessons in divinity ceased to be delivered in the College."

14 Samuel Stanhope Smith, Lectures to Theological Students, cited by Gillett, op. cit., II, 222.

had been founded by the New Side Presbyterians, though long since controlled by the conservatives, still exhibited evidences of the New England theology in its classrooms in the early nineteenth century.

The vastly increased responsibilities which confronted the Church in the new century due to an expanding western frontier and the rapidity with which new churches were being organized to accommodate the mass accessions resulting from the revivals increased the demand for a theological school to provide leadership for American Presbyterianism. This need was felt with special keenness by the Scottish and Scotch-Irish element in the Church, who looked with some disfavor upon the recently established Congregational Seminary at Andover, Massachusetts, and for whom the curriculum at the College of New Jersey was much too devoid of specific theological content. Moreover, the "moderate Calvinism" taught in the College was regarded with suspicion by the great body of conservative Calvinists, who believed in strict subscription to the Confession of Faith. How could the Scotch-Irish possibly be satisfied with the theology dispensed in the College by Professor Kollock, who openly "renounce the sentiments of the rigid Calvinists?"

The disbalance in leadership which had favored the New England men in the Presbyterian Church in the eighteenth century was being gradually overcome as the churches on the
frontier grew stronger, and, as a consequence, shortly after the turn of the century, the leadership of the Church was rather equally divided between liberal and conservative elements. One of the main driving forces in the establishing of Princeton Seminary was an effort to hold these divergent tendencies in the denomination together. This is suggested in certain provisions in the plan for the anticipated Seminary,\textsuperscript{16} accepted by the General Assembly in 1811. "The true design of the founders of this institution . . . .," it was stated in the seventh provision, "is to promote harmony and unity of sentiment among the ministers of our Church, by educating a large body of them under the same teachers, and in the same course of study."\textsuperscript{17} The ninth provision expressed the same design: "It is to preserve the unity of our Church, by educating her ministers in an enlightened attachment, not only to the same doctrines, but to the same plan of government."\textsuperscript{18} There is nothing in this Plan for the Seminary or in the Articles of Faith\textsuperscript{19} which

\textsuperscript{16}Plan for the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (Princeton, New Jersey: 1838). This is the original Plan which was adopted in 1811 plus additions to it in 1838.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{18}Loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 15. For a statement of the formula to which all Seminary professors subscribed, see infra, pp. 148-149.
were proposed as the basis of instruction to suggest that twenty-six years after its founding the Seminary would be completely captured by the conservative party in the Church. There was no forewarning of the impending split in the Church or that shortly the institution established "to promote harmony and unity of sentiment" and "to preserve the unity" of the Church would be used by the Old School party as an instrument of divisive propaganda. But this consequence is not at all surprising when viewed in perspective. Both the location and the leadership of the Seminary augured an increasingly conservative position, especially in view of the steadily increasing strength with which the Scotch-Irish Calvinists entered the nineteenth century.

**Organization of Princeton Seminary.** Ashbel Green addressed an overture to the General Assembly on the subject of theological education in 1805. It declared:

> Give us ministers, such is the cry of the missionary region; give us ministers, is the importunate entreaty of our numerous and increasing vacancies; give us ministers, is the demand of many large and important congregations in our most populous cities and towns.

This emergency could be met, the overture advised, only by trained ministers. This recommendation by Dr. Green contained, Gillett believed, "the germ of the project which

---

issued in the establishment of Princeton Theological Seminary." In 1806, the College of New Jersey sought generously but unsuccessfully to meet the need in the Church for more trained ministers. A letter from the Trustees to the presbyteries stated that theological students might pursue their studies at the College "at the moderate charge of one dollar a week for board, and enjoy the assistance of the President and Professor of Theology, without any fee for instruction." To the leadership of the Church, makeshift methods which treated theological training as an incidental part of the curriculum were increasingly recognized as inadequate. It was likewise seen that a specialized type of training involving professional preparation for the ministry, beyond what the College could offer, was desperately needed.

Thus, in 1806, Archibald Alexander, who was to become the first professor in the new institution, in a sermon before the General Assembly, of which he had been Moderator the previous year, suggested that "every Presbytery, or at least every Synod, shall have under its direction a seminary for the single purpose of educating youth for the ministry." He

21 Gillett, op. cit., I, 462.

22 Letter of the Trustees of the College of New Jersey to the Presbyteries, 1806, in Gillett, op. cit., p. 462.
registered serious doubt "whether the system of education pursued in our colleges and universities is the best adapted to prepare a young man for the work of the ministry." Apparently Alexander was envisaging a more orderly and thorough type of theological training than then existed and was merely suggesting that "at least every Synod," as he phrased it, should provide a school for ministerial candidates rather than to depend upon the inadequate curriculum in the College of New Jersey or spontaneous arrangements between student and teacher. There is no evidence that Alexander had as yet come to see either the feasibility or the necessity of a single Theological Seminary, though he recognised the need of a "single purpose of educating youth for the ministry," which he believed could be best realized by establishing a number of small schools scattered throughout the domain of the Church.

In 1809, the Presbytery of Philadelphia, encouraged by the favor with which Alexander's suggestion had been received, sent to the General Assembly an overture which proposed that definite plans should be made for theological education under the auspices of the Presbyterian Church. The Assembly accordingly submitted three plans for the promotion of

theological education and determined to adopt the one which gained the greatest favor in the Church within the succeeding year. The three plans were: (a) to establish "one great school" in a central location; (b) to establish two schools, one for the northern and another for the southern region of the Church; (c) to organize one school in each synod. The first of these proposals met with the approval of the Assembly in 1810, and it was decided that a single Seminary to serve the entire Church should be organized with at least "three professors, who should hold their office during the pleasure of the General Assembly." A committee, of which Dr. Green was chairman, was appointed to prepare the constitution of the proposed institution. The constitution was submitted to the Assembly, in 1811, and was accepted with "slight alterations." Measures were taken for collecting funds for the proposed institution by appointing agents who visited the synods and explained the needs and purpose of the school. A committee was also appointed to confer with the Trustees of the College of New Jersey to determine what facilities and privileges might be expected

24 Gillett, op. cit., I, 463.


26 See Plan of the Theological Seminary, pp. 9-45.
if the Seminary should be established at Princeton. At the meeting of the next General Assembly, the location of the Seminary was fixed at Princeton, New Jersey, and a Board of Directors, whose first meeting was held June 30, 1812, was elected.27

The election of the first professor, in 1812, was described by "one who was present" at the meeting of the Assembly in the following words:

Silently and prayerfully these guardians of the Church began to prepare their votes. They felt the solemnity of the occasion, the importance of their trust. Not a word was spoken, not a whisper heard, as the teller passed round to collect the result. The votes were counted, the result declared, and the Rev. Dr. Archibald Alexander was pronounced elected.28

Dr. Samuel Miller, who was to be elected the second professor in the new Seminary the following year and who had vigorously supported the plan for theological education from the beginning, arose and said that "he hoped the brother elected would not decline, however, reluctant he might feel to accept."29

At the time of his election to the Princeton professorship, Archibald Alexander was Minister of the Third Presby-

27 Gillett, op. cit., p. 463.

28 James W. Alexander, op. cit., pp. 327-328, citing "one who was present at the election" but otherwise anonymous.

29 Ibid., p. 326.
terian Church in Philadelphia. "The predominating ingredient in the congregation," wrote James W. Alexander, the minister's son, "was the old-fashioned Scotch and Irish Presbyterianism." The son, who was a small boy at the time, remembered the "zeal and tenacity" with which the Church clung to "covenanted doctrine and ancient usage" and a "disposition on the part of some to look with distrust on hortatory preaching, and any measures toward revival. . . ." 30 Dr. Alexander, who was himself a staunch Scotch-Irish Presbyterian, found this conservative church to his liking and left it for his new post with great reluctance. In his farewell address to his church, he said:

I do not know a single congregation within the bounds of our Church of which I would choose to be pastor in preference to this. No invitation, therefore, from any other would have separated us. I did expect to live and die with you. 31

Archibald Alexander accepted his new charge only because he believed it was a "call of providence," 32 and was inaugurated into his office as the first professor in the first Presbyterian Seminary in America, on August 12, 1812. The first discourse given on this historic occasion was by


32 Ibid., p. 329.
Samuel Miller on "The Duty of the Church to take Measures for Providing an Able and Faithful Ministry." The crux of the address was that the new Seminary would assuredly provide "sound, thorough, and faithful" instruction, which, he believed, would produce theological unity and prevent schism in "our growing and happy Church." From the day of its beginning, Princeton Seminary was seen by the Scotch-Irish party as a citadel of orthodoxy, which would prevent schism in the Church, premonitions of which were on the horizon, by inculcating the old Calvinism. Arguing for the superiority of a Seminary controlled by the Presbyterian Church to "private instructors," he stated that such a school made it possible for the Church to "inspect and regulate" the course of theological training and to "direct and control the instructors." A school responsible to the Church, he continued, made possible "a uniform course of education" derived from "the same approved fountains" and would produce men who would "agree in their views of evangelical truth and order." Thus, he believed, could "the unity and peace of the Church" be preserved. How different

33 Samuel Miller, "The Duty of the Church," Inaugural Collection (New York: 1812), CCCXIV, 7-54.
34 James W. Alexander, op. cit., p. 338.
36 Ibid., p. 338. Italics his.
was the consequence from the intention! It is an arguable point that Princeton Seminary, founded to promote unity in the Church, was the main cause of the division of American Presbyterianism in 1837. There can be no doubt at all that the Seminary was the spearhead in preserving the disruption once the division had been effected.

Professor Alexander’s inaugural address was based on the words, "Search the Scriptures," John 5:39, and was a "learned argument in behalf of Biblical study." He believed in "strict adherence to the Reformed tenets," for which he claimed the support of allegedly infallible Scripture. This inaugural discourse was a defense of the authority of the Bible and formed the nucleus of a book which Alexander later wrote on the Biblical canon. The Biblicism which was central to the scholastic Calvinism he espoused was thus declared to be the central feature in the proposed program of theological training. In this manner, Princeton Seminary was launched by Alexander as the sole professor with three students, who attended classes in the professor’s home, which was "at once library, chapel, and auditorium."
Samuel Miller, who had been a leading figure in the founding of Princeton Seminary, became, in 1813, the second professor and the first teacher of church history. He had written a two volume work, published in 1803, entitled *A Brief Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century*, which displayed wide general knowledge, and a second work of equal length, in 1809, entitled *Letters on the Constitution and Order of the Christian Ministry*. He continued to write rather voluminously on historical subjects, becoming increasingly the defender of Scottish and Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism as normative in the American Church. Charles Hodge, who had served for a short time as assistant teacher of oriental languages, was elected "Professor of Oriental and Biblical Literature," in 1822. Dr. Alexander "early discerned his talents and regarded him more as a beloved son than even as a cherished pupil."41

The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review. The Biblical Repertory, to which the terms "and Princeton


Review," were added in 1837, was begun by Hodge in 1825. The volume for the first year bears the title, *Biblical Repertory, a Collection of Tracts in Biblical Literature*. It was at first merely "a repository for tracts on Biblical subjects, selected from various sources" and "was not intended to be original in its general character, but to consist of selections from the writings of the most distinguished scholars." The avowedly historical intention of the review articles was, however, never actually achieved because from the very beginning Hodge used the *Repertory* as a medium through which to propagate the Princeton theology. In 1829, the character of the publication was changed and it ceased to be a mere collection of comments on foreign works in the field of Biblical study and included "all subjects suitable for a Theological Quarterly Review." The title of the review was changed to *The Biblical Repertory, a Journal of Biblical Literature and Theological Science*, edited by "an


association of Gentlemen in Princeton and its Vicinity."  

The January, 1829, issue of the review began a new series and was called Volume I. Hodge said that the "association of gentlemen" who joined him in editorial responsibility for the journal in 1829 "was not defined within very strict limits" but it is obvious that it was a group connected with the Seminary and the College. However, the Review, with good reason, was often called "Mr. Hodge's work" because he remained through the year 1871 "the principal exponent of its plans and aims."  

Hodge admitted that even after "the association of gentlemen" joined him that "the laboring oar was still in one pair of hands," by which he meant his own hands. Altogether, he contributed to the publication one-

45 C. Hodge, "History of Princeton Review," Princeton Review, index vol., p. 1. During the editor's absence in Europe in 1827-1828, the journal was edited by Professor Robert Patton of the College of New Jersey.


47 C. Hodge, "History of Princeton Review," Princeton Review, index vol., p. 2. See ibid., pp. 2-3. Here Hodge paid tribute to a colleague who contributed one-hundred and one articles to the Review. "To no one," Hodge wrote, "are the pages of this Review more indebted than to . . . Dr. James W. Alexander." The fact that Alexander's articles were largely of an expository character and were seldom involved in the controversies in which the journal engaged renders them of little value as a source for the Princeton theology. What Alexander said on theological topics, whether from an expository or polemical viewpoint, were in line with the more trenchant articles by Professor Hodge.
hundred and forty-two articles, each of which, with very few exceptions, occupied at least fifty pages. The editor said, in 1865, that "he had carried the Review as a ball and chain for forty years, with scarcely any other compensation than the high privilege of making it an organ for upholding sound Presbyterianism. . . ." 49

The Princeton Review was based on the belief "that the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession of Faith, the system of the Reformed Church, and of Augustinians in all ages, is the truth of God. . . ." and that "the organization of the Presbyterian Church, its form of government and discipline, was more nearly conformed than any other to the Scriptural model." 50 In 1871, the British Quarterly, a conservative, Nonconformist journal, stated that the Princeton Review was . . . beyond all question the greatest purely theological review that has ever been published in the English tongue, and has waged war in defense of the Westminster standards . . . with a polemic vigor and unity of design without any parallel in the history of religious journalism." 51


Many will probably wish to make reservations about the assertion that the *Princeton Review* was "the greatest purely theological review . . . in the English tongue," but few would question that the "polemic vigor and unity of design" of the Princeton publication was "without any parallel in the history of religious journalism."

That the journal had been "engaged in controversy during the whole course of its existence"\(^{52}\) was considered by Hodge to be a badge of honor. The polemical element was always to the forefront. Hodge especially was almost constantly engaged in controversy. He wrote vigorously, and it must be recorded with considerable virtuosity, on a wide range of theological topics in opposition to the views expounded by his leading contemporaries who did not share the Princeton Calvinism. The major controversies in which he engaged were with Moses Stuart, in 1833, and with Albert Barnes, in 1835, on the doctrine of imputation; with John W. Niven, a former pupil and editor of the *Mercersburg Review*, in 1848, on the function of philosophy in the formation of Christian doctrine; with Edwards A. Park, in 1851, on "the theology of the intellect and that of the feelings"; with

\(^{52}\) C. Hodge, "History of the Princeton Review," *Princeton Review*, index vol., p. 4. See ibid., p. 38. In 1871, Hodge admitted that the Review had "sometimes been unduly severe in its criticisms" and added that "the few contributors who still survive would be glad to make any possible atonement."
Philip Schaff, in 1854, on the doctrine of historical development; and with Horace Bushnell, in 1866, on the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice. The constantly controversial character of the publication was, of course, the result of its militantly apologetic exposition of the Princeton school of theology, of which it is, therefore, an important historical source. Referring to this journal, James W. Alexander said that it had "contributed more than any other agency to make known those opinions which belong to what some have chosen to call the Princeton school."53

II. CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE "NEW MEASURES"

The policy of Princeton Seminary. The period from about 1820 to 1840 was marked by intense theological ferment elicited partly by the "indecorous propagandism"54 of the frontier revivals and issued in a controversy concerning the "new measures."55 The "measures" used by Charles G. Finney in producing revivals of religion were particularly reprehensible to the Princeton men. Archibald Alexander and Samuel Miller attempted to counteract this revivalistic trend by distinguishing between true and false ways of in-

54 Ibid., p. 424.
55 Ibid., pp. 425-428.
spiring Christian conversion. For example, Alexander distinguished between what he called "the genuine work of Divine grace," with which he associated genuine Calvinistic preaching, and "the exercise of rash and fanatical instruments," with which he identified the enthusiasts of the revivals. Miller defined "a genuine revival" as one "produced by the exhibition of GOSPEL TRUTH, faithfully presented to the mind, and applied by the power of the Holy Spirit." "Spurious revivals" were produced "by means other than the impression of truth," such as the use of "vehement addresses and fine music," and, far from evoking genuine conversion, succeeded only in arousing "the animal feelings." Since the characteristics of revivalism to which Alexander and Miller objected were those which stood out most clearly in the frontier revivals, it is obvious that both men, and Princeton Seminary, of which they were the leading spokesmen, were in almost absolute opposition to the movement which was sweeping the new west.

The policy of Princeton Seminary concerning the frontier revivals, which were adding masses of people to the Baptist and Methodist denominations especially, is surely one

56 Ibid., p. 427.
reason why the American Presbyterian Church failed to capture the frontier commensurately with its major rivals. The enthusiasm of the Methodist circuit riders and the evangelistic fervor of the Baptist farmer preachers thrust these two groups out into the crude frontier settlements, whereas the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians were preoccupied with maintaining "their most sacred exercises" and sought to restrain their "hot and valorous youth." Nowhere is the conflict between the staid traditions of the Scottish Reformation, perpetuated in America by the eighteenth century emigrants, and the dynamic, untraditional new world more clearly represented than in the condescending attitude manifested by the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians toward frontier revivalism. They were shocked by the crudities of frontier life and religion. They sought to build a relatively unmodified Scottish and Scotch-Irish Church in America. The Princeton school was an exponent of this conception of American Presbyterianism, which was American in little more than name. To Professor Trinterud's thesis that the conservative tradition in American Presbyterianism was essentially an effort to perpetuate the customs and thought forms brought to the colonies by the Scots and Scotch-Irish, 59


may be added the contention of this thesis, that the Princeton theology was essentially the intellectual justification of this tradition.

Closely connected with the controversy concerning the mode of producing and managing revivals, called "the new measures," was a spirit of theological unrest which gave the Seminary grave concern. Referring to this situation, James W. Alexander wrote: "There was . . . an increasing anxiety in the Presbyterian Church upon a number of questions, both doctrinal and practical." Fears were widespread that "the diversity of theological opinion" among Presbyterian ministers was "too great to be comprehended within common symbols." The views of Samuel Hopkins and Nathaniel Emmons were widely discussed and accepted by the New England party in the Church. For example, it was questioned whether the mind was merely "a series of exercises" of which God was the sole agent and whether submission to the will of God involved a willingness to be damned for the Divine glory. Throughout the Church, a debate was carried on concerning the effects of the Fall of man, the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, the imputation of Christ's righteousness to believers, the matter of natural and moral ability, and the extent of the atonement. These questions were agitated in

60 James W. Alexander, op. cit., p. 424.
the great revivals and were especially brought into view in
the instruction given to the new converts. A growing
tendency appeared among those Presbyterians, largely of New
England derivation, who favored revivalism to depart from the
"old theology" espoused at Princeton. These Puritan Presby-
terians believed that the scholastic Calvinism which was being
developed at Princeton Seminary militated against the missionary
and evangelistic vigor needed especially on an expanding
frontier. The Seminary opposed both the revival movement
and the theological innovations which were brought into
sharp focus, and partly produced by, the enthusiasm generated
by the revivals.

Alexander's critique of the "New Measures." In 1832,
in response to a request by W. B. Sprague, who was preparing
a book on revivals, Alexander wrote an extended letter in
which he provided a systematic statement showing the grounds
for his skepticism about "the system of means" employed in
revivalism. There were eight points in his critique: (1) He
pled for a distinction between "genuine" and "spurious"

61 Ibid., p. 425.
62 Loc. cit.
63 W. B. Sprague, Lectures on Revivals of Religion
(Albany, New York: 1832). See Miller, op. cit., pp. 165-171,
180-183. Here Miller commented on Sprague's lectures.
revivals and said that the difference could be determined by "the doctrines inculcated, the measures adopted, and the fruits produced." The Spirit of God might have nothing to do with religious excitement. (2) Revivals were conducive, he said, to "religious impressions" that often proved not to be genuine. Most convictions produced at a public meeting in which "strong excitements" prevailed were apt to be "as evanescent as the morning cloud or the early dew." (3) "Much enthusiasm and disorder" mingled with "a real work of the Spirit" made a "spurious mixture." The "fanaticism" engendered by strong religious feeling often issued in "error, spiritual pride, and delusion." (4) There was a concurrence between revivalistic churches and doctrinal errors. The Methodists, Baptists, and Cumberland Presbyterians were guilty of heretical teachings. After all, how could doctrinal errors be genuine instruments of grace? (5) "Genuine revivals," in which the Word of God was taught, involved, he continued, "no wildness or extravagance" and "very little commotion of the animal feelings." Genuine outpourings of God's Spirit were characterized by "great solemnity and silence" rather than emotional excesses. (6) "A lively state of piety" as a permanent aspect of the life of the Church was

64 See Miller, op. cit., pp. 154-158. Here Miller made the same distinction between "genuine" and "spurious" revivals offered by Alexander. This was the Princeton approach to the problem.
regarded as much more preferable than "temporary excitements," which were too often followed by "a deplorable state of declension." (7) He recognized the inscrutability of God's "dispensations" and warned against a total rejection of revivalism. But even here he counseled care lest "heresy" should seduce the Church through enthusiastic excesses. (8) With some repetition, he connected "spurious excitements" with "error and heresy." Alexander concluded his comment by speaking of the "new measures," which he admitted he had not actually witnessed. He said, "All means and measures which produce a high degree of excitement . . . should be avoided."

"Pride and vainglory" rather than genuine piety were often produced by revivals. Private conversation between minister and the seeking sinner was regarded as superior to public exhortation and testimony. All measures which tended to "diminish the solemnity of divine worship" should be avoided. He concluded by saying: "The premature and injudicious publication of revivals is now a great evil. There is often in these accounts a cant which disgusts sensible men; there is an exaggeration which confounds those who know the facts."65

This somewhat repetitious document is important because it expresses the attitude toward revivalism held not only by

Princeton Seminary but by conservative Presbyterians in general.

The revival issue, which had divided the Church in 1741, thus appeared again and was a factor in the formation of two parties in Presbyterianism and in the rupture of the Church in 1837. The anti-revivalistic element in the Church was at this period—as it had been in 1741—made up largely of people of Scottish and Scotch-Irish descent. With this group, Princeton was aligned against the pro-revivalistic party derived mainly from New England. The Seminary played a major role in reviving the conflict which had divided the Church in the eighteenth century. It is clear that the Princeton theology, represented in this period by Professor Alexander, was a major factor in justifying the anti-revivalistic attitude of the Scottish and Scotch-Irish wing of the American Presbyterian Church. According to his son, Alexander's "theological opinions were settled" at this time. "He was universally ranked among the leaders of the old, or as it may be deemed, the obsolete Calvinism of the seventeenth century." He refused to "quicken his pace so as to keep abreast of the moving column." The prevailing controversy" forced him "go guard his pupils against the errors of the age," a task

66 Supra, pp. 28-30.
68 Ibid., p. 427.
which came more and more to characterize the Seminary with
the passing of the years. Thus from the first major con-
troversy into which the Seminary was drawn until relatively
recent years Scottish and Scotch-Irish Calvinism—and the
policies it implied—were resolutely defended and propagated.

III. THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY

Alexander's apologetic writing. Almost all of the
writing which came from the able stalwarts of Princeton for
a century was of an apologetic nature, elicited by some
current controversy. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the commencement of Professor Alexander's serious writing
must be dated from the revival controversy and its theological
repercussions. He had done some writing intermittently prior
to this period for the *Virginia Religious Magazine* and
other periodicals, such as the publication of the General
Assembly, "and had amassed piles of manuscript upon theological
subjects," but he did not begin to write seriously for publica-
tion until 1824, when he was fifty-two years of age. His son
said that he was a rigorous critic of what he wrote and was
"always dissatisfied with himself." He wrote without freedom
in the flow of composition and, therefore, rather laboriously--

69 Extensive search has failed to procure a single
copy of this magazine.
"he went always for the thought rather than the words," but nevertheless found it necessary to "amend, erase, transpose, and frequently cancel" what he had written.  

His first published volume grew out of a sermon he delivered in the chapel of the College of New Jersey, in 1823, to answer "a little knot of skeptics." The text was Luke 12:27, "Yea, and why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?" and the subject was, "The Evidences of Christianity." The sermon was expanded into a treatise which was published under the title, Outlines of the Evidences of Christianity. It passed through numerous editions in England and America and was translated into "several languages." To the last, improved edition of the Evidences, published in 1842, was added a treatise on The Canon of the Old and New Testaments, which appeared first in 1826. He prepared his work on the canon afresh for the press in the last years of his life.

---

71 Ibid., p. 429.
72 Loc. cit. See Archibald Alexander, Evidences of the Authenticity, Inspiration, and Canonical Authority of the Holy Scriptures (new edition; Philadelphia: 1842). This was a work in which he combined the treatise on Christian evidences with his study of the canon.
73 See Archibald Alexander, The Canon of the Old and New Testaments Ascertained, or the Bible Complete Without the Apocrypha and Unwritten Traditions (Philadelphia: 1851).
The role of reason. The current conception of reason, modified by the author's intellectual eccentricities and theological viewpoint, pervades the book on *Evidences*. He wrote:

Without reason we can form no conception of a truth of any kind; and when we receive anything as true, whatever may be the evidences on which it is founded, we must view the reception of it as reasonable. Truth and reason are so intimately connected that they can never with propriety be separated. Truth is the object, and reason is the faculty by which it is apprehended—whatever be the nature of the truth or of the evidences by which it is established.74

The conception of reason which is presupposed in the previous passage is a specimen of the current "faculty" psychology,75 in which reason, abstracted from the total personality, appears as the discursive faculty which apprehends the object. Reason was conceived as an independent, autonomous faculty. Developing his argument, the author widened the meaning he attached to this faculty by speaking of "right reason"76 and "the proper exercise of reason."77 The "improper use of this faculty"78 was the cause assigned for the

77 Ibid., p. 11.
78 Ibid., p. 12.
vast variety of conclusions which apparently equally reasonable men reached when dealing with precisely the same object. He believed that "the cold, speculative, subtle skeptics" who attacked "the truth of revelation" were guilty of "artfully assuming false principles as the premises of their reasoning" because of their "vanity." This is presumably an example of the "improper" use of reason. Turning to the "right" use of reason, he stated that "the declaration of God is the highest reason which we can have for believing anything." To set up "our opinions" against "the plain expression of His will is surely presumption of the highest kind." What was this alleged "plain expression of His will?" Alexander answered the question in a way which was absolutely normative for the Princeton theology. "The divine system of heavenly truth" was given once and for all in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The "will" of God was thus conceived in legalistic and propositional terms as the "doctrines of revelation." According to Alexander, the function of reason is "to obtain the sense of the several parts of the document [the Bible]; and this presumably ended the theological quest--this is the truth. "To form one's opinions by the Word of God," he wrote, is to use reason

80 Ibid., p. 15.
properly. Thus revelation was identified with the written Word, which provided a "system of heavenly truth." It is significant that the author did not use the term "faith" in his introductory discussion of "Christian evidences." This should not be surprising because there was really no place for it. Starting with the external authority of the Bible, which disclosed a system of infallible truth, he proceeded to "reason," whose highest use was to accept the doctrines thus revealed as true. For Alexander, as for the whole Princeton school in its subsequent development, faith was simply the highest use of reason by which man accepted truths beyond reason but not contrary to it on the authority of the Bible. The Princeton writers, therefore, constantly referred to theology as a "science" which reduced the "truths" of revelation to systematic statement.

**Biblical authority.** What was the basis of the alleged infallible authority of the truths of revelation given in the Bible? Alexander answered the question by stating that

---

81 See A. Alexander, "Symington on the Atonement," *Biblical Repertory*, VIII (April, 1836), 212.

82 See C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology* (London: 1883), I, 1-2. "We find in nature the facts which the chemist or mechanical philosopher has to examine, and from them to ascertain the laws by which they are determined. So the Bible contains the truths which the theologian has to collect, authenticate, arrange, and exhibit in their internal relation to each other."
the occurrence of miracles of which God was the author and by which revelation was attested and the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies confirmed the claim made for the authority of the Scriptures. He wrote:

Supposing a revelation to be given, what would be a satisfactory attestation of its origin? It must be some sign or evidence not capable of being counterfeited; something by which God should in some way manifest himself. And how could this be effected but by the exertion of his power or the manifestation of his infinite knowledge? That is, by miracles, or by prophecies, or by both.  

These external confirmations of the truth of the Biblical revelation had been provided by God, Alexander thought, "to enable all sincere inquirers to know that it derives its origin from him."  

"Miracles," he said, "furnish the most conclusive proof of Biblical inspiration."  

Professor Alexander regarded miracles as "the best proof for the establishment of a revelation" and defined a miracle as "a visible suspension of the laws of nature," than which "nothing can be conceived which will more strikingly indicate God's power and presence."  

The author was

83 A. Alexander, Evidences, p. 74.
84 Loc. cit. If all "sincere inquirers" could know the divine origin of Scripture, presumably everyone who rejected the "supernatural" source of the Bible was insincere. The difficulty was considered moral and not intellectual.
85 Ibid., p. 294.
86 Ibid., p. 75.
aware of the criticism of miracles which had been made by David Hume, with whose words he began his refutation of the Scottish philosopher: "A miracle," wrote Hume, "supported by any human testimony is more properly a subject of derision than of argument. No testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to more than a probability." The elaborate answer which Alexander gave to Hume's doctrine of the relativity of all human testimony cannot here be followed in detail but a cursory survey of the reply is pertinent because it provides a sample of a type of Christian apologetic which was developed with increasing subtlety by the Princeton school. He began by criticizing Hume's definition of a miracle as "a violation of the laws of nature" and stated,

The simple truth is that the laws of nature are nothing else than the common operations of divine power in the government of the world, which depend entirely for their existence and continuance on the divine will; and a miracle is nothing else than the exertion of the same power in a way different from that which is common; or it may be a mere suspension of that power which is commonly observed to operate in the world.87

Continuing to quote passages from Hume, wrested from their contexts, the apologist pursued his criticism by seeking to make the philosopher's argument seem absurd and then pointing out that it was marked by a basic skepticism concerning orthodox Christianity, an irresponsible use of the word

87 Ibid., p. 80.
"experience," and a desire to establish a "false principle." Alexander concluded his critique by saying that Hume himself "on reflection seems to have been convinced his argument was unsound." Actually, Hume and Alexander proceeded on diametrically opposite premises and this accounted for the sharp difference between them. The Scottish philosopher believed in the "uniformity of natural causation" and was skeptical of "the competency of testimony which implied a deviation from that uniformity." He was a naturalist and a relativist; whereas the Princeton professor believed that "the First Cause could suspend or alter the laws of nature" and asserted that "nothing is impossible to Him [God] which does not imply a contradiction, or is repugnant to his attributes." Alexander was a Christian theist who believed whatever the Bible asserted to be true without any qualification. His use of epithets and insinuations of dishonesty with reference to Hume's views was entirely irrelevant to a serious discussion of the issues in the case. But it is important to observe the method Alexander used—oversimplifying the opponent's position and attributing unworthy motives to him—because it unfortunately came increasingly to characterize

88 Ibid., p. 86.
89 Ibid., p. 96.
90 Ibid., p. 104.
the Princeton apologetic.

Much was made in the book of the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies, which he held was an added proof of the divine origin and inspiration of Scripture. The detailed fulfillment of predictions concerning the person and work of Christ was asserted, and this in turn was regarded as a solid basis for Biblical authority. With reference to prophecies allegedly fulfilled in the manner of Christ's death, he wrote:

Most of these particulars were fulfilled by the free actions of the enemies of Jesus, who had no idea that they were fulfilling any divine prophecy. It is impossible that so many circumstances literally predicted, should have been fulfilled by a mere fortuitous concurrence. 91

The treatise was concluded with a discussion of the Biblical canon and an attempt to justify the claim that the Bible in every detail was absolutely trustworthy. Concerning the New Testament, he believed it was possible to "demonstrate that these books were originally written by the men to whom they have been always ascribed" and that "the books which were in the hands of the early Christians contained the same things which are now found in them." 92 The theory that the autographs of Scripture, though not extant, 93

---

91 Ibid., p. 196.
92 Ibid., p. 382.
93 Ibid., p. 338.
were nevertheless inerrant, and furthermore that belief in their inerrancy was a part of orthodoxy was integral to Alexander's view. It is not clear how inerrancy could be attributed to documents which had long since ceased to be extant. This position, which became a part of the Princeton orthodoxy perpetuated by Alexander's successors, at least demonstrates the lengths of absurdity to which a theologically controlled approach to a historical problem may be driven.

IV. DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT

Theory of James Murdock. In 1824, Dr. Alexander sought to answer a published sermon by Professor James Murdock of Andover Seminary on The Nature of the Atonement. Murdock maintained that the atonement was "a mere symbolical transaction" which removed "only that ground of punishment which arises from the tendency of sin to disturb the good order and happiness of the universe" and was not a satisfaction

94 Ibid., p. 282.
98 A. Alexander, Christian Advocate, 1824, p. 76,
to distributive justice. The discourse teaches that the atonement was designed to exert a moral influence upon man by disclosing the righteousness of God. In other words, the righteousness of God, according to this view, was exhibited in the atonement, whose sole purpose was achieved subjectively in those who were impressed by this mighty manifestation of the Divine character. The Andover professor stated that "the supposition that the Son of God . . . satisfied the demands of the law upon us by suffering in our stead" was a hypothesis to which "there are strong objections." The judicial theory, Murdock thought, "would make the atonement a legal satisfaction for sin; and then the acquittal would be no pardon at all but would follow in the regular course of law." 99

**Alexander's reply.** The immediate rejoinder of Alexander was that "this theory is wholly unsupported by the testimony of God in his word" and that "Dr. M [Murdock] has not resorted to the Bible at all for evidence for the truth of his opinions." 100 This was regarded as "suspicious" because the highest wisdom was "to receive the doctrines of


the Word of God simply as they are revealed." Criticizing Murdock's doctrine of the atonement, Alexander stated that the exhibition of God's righteousness was one but not the only nor the most important end accomplished by the death of Christ. "Besides," he wrote, "it may exhibit the righteousness of God by being the execution of the penalty of the law upon the sinners surety." Christ on the cross satisfied the demands of the law, suffered the execution of its penalty, and removed the elect sinner's guilt—this was the true doctrine, Alexander held. He wrote: "An atonement for the sins of men must contain in it a satisfaction to God on account of their sin." "The death of Christ" was "a satisfaction to law and justice in behalf of sinners."

Murdock declared the "justification of believers to be an act of the sovereign mercy of God, a departure from the regular course of justice; and such a departure as leaves the claims of the law forever unsatisfied." The salvation of the sinner was, therefore, purely an act of grace and was in no sense a legal transaction. Christ was not a substitute for the sinner but only the symbol of God's righteousness,

101 Ibid., p. 432.
102 Ibid., p. 431.
103 Ibid., p. 437. Italics his.
104 Ibid., p. 443-444.
maintaining the dignity of the divine justice and providing a moral stimulus for man. The caustic rejoinder of the orthodox Princeton Calvinist to this view is certainly not unexpected. Murdock denied the basic idea in Alexander's conception of the atonement when he rejected the view that Christ's death satisfied distributive justice for the elect. Alexander wrote:

This, we must think, is a kind of justification never heard of before. The law which binds the creature, and which is immutable, remains forever unsatisfied and the person is justified... Here we see that the attributes of justice and mercy are so far from harmonizing in the plan of salvation, that the former is utterly disregarded, to make way for the latter.105

The argument against Murdock occupied twenty-five pages and was placed under seven headings, foreshadowing the policy of The Biblical Repertory, which was published for the first time the following year--1825--, to dissect opposing views mercilessly and to treat them as true or false in the extent to which they were or were not congruous with the Calvinism of the Princeton school. Alexander referred to Murdock's sermon again in The Biblical Repertory of 1836106 in the course of a favorable review of a book on the atonement by the Rev. William Symington.107 Another practice

105 Ibid., pp. 443-444.


which increasingly characterized the book reviews given in the Princeton publication is clearly exhibited in this article. It was the use of reviews as media through which to propagate the Princeton theology. Alexander devoted the first five pages to Symington's view of the atonement and then stated that he proposed "to occupy some space" to give his own opinion of the matter, which occupied some space, exactly twenty-eight pages! It was Alexander not "Symington on the Atonement."  

V. GROWING THEOLOGICAL TENSIONS

Alexander's conservative leadership. "Of American divines," Charles Hodge wrote, in 1868, "the names of Edwards and Alexander take first place." Though this estimate of the Princeton professor suggests uncritical admiration more than sober historical judgment, it is nevertheless true that Archibald Alexander was the theological leader of conservative American Presbyterianism for almost a half century. He was especially well known and admired in the southern portion of the Church. A native Virginian,


109 Ibid., pp. 201-233.

he often visited his home State, where he had served as President of Hampden Sidney College. It is not surprising that he was invited to assume a professorship, in 1831, at the Union Theological Seminary "yet in its infancy" at Charlottesville, Virginia. Dr. John H. Rice, "its father on earth," as he was styled by the Synod of Virginia, had been taken by death and the pivotal post he had held in Southern Presbyterianism was offered to the Princeton professor. Alexander, who came from the same Scotch-Irish background as those who supported Union Seminary, considered the invitation tendered him but declined it with "a serious struggle of feeling." The Synods of Virginia and North Carolina, which controlled the institution, had complete confidence that Dr. Alexander would pursue the same conservative policies as the founder. This offer is further evidence of the high esteem in which he was held by the conservative, Scotch-Irish element in the Church, which at this time was drawing away from the "liberal" group, deriving mainly from New England.

The period prior to the cleavage in the Church that occurred in 1837 was a time of increasing theological tension. Apologetic writing on ecclesiastical as well as theological questions increased with the increasing tempo of controversy. Professor Alexander, who unflinchingly played his part in

these debates, was particularly preoccupied with a defense of the old Calvinism. His pen was active and many of his articles were published in the Biblical Repertory, the most important of which deserve attention in this study.

**Alexander's doctrine of original sin.** An essay appeared in the January, 1830, issue entitled "The Early History of Pelagianism," in which, by contrasting the Pelagian and Augustinian views of man, he was able to throw in bold relief his own theory of original sin and its consequences. Against the allegation of Pelagius that Augustine "invented the doctrine of original sin," Alexander advanced the notion that the very absence of controversy concerning the doctrine in the early centuries of Christian history was evidence for the unbroken continuity of this teaching from the time of the New Testament until Augustine. Alexander believed that Augustine simply defined accurately a truth already held but which, prior to the debate with Pelagius, had not been questioned. "When any doctrine is indisputed," Alexander wrote, "... it is never made the subject of accurate definition." This argument from silence is similar to


to the Roman Catholic claim which holds that doctrines appearing in the historical unfolding of the Church are explicit formulations of truth already implicitly revealed but previously unsystematized because previously unchallenged. It is an argument which, whatever merit it may have, permits theological speculation to assume the guise of Biblical teaching. N. P. Williams thought that the doctrine of original sin as taught by Augustinians was a speculative view superimposed upon "the very general, loose, and undefined teaching of St. Paul." But Alexander, following Augustine, was confident that the doctrine of original sin was a teaching of Scripture.

After a historical interlude in which Alexander traced the development of the Pelagian heresy, with which he compared the Augustinian view, the Princeton apologist gave what he considered to be "the doctrine of the Church" on original sin. "The first sin of Adam," he wrote, "was imputed to all his posterity by the righteous appointment of God." The effects were that all "were born destitute of original righteousness, subject to the sentence of death, and obnoxious to the extent of external separation from God." The


116 Ibid., p. 89.
first act of transgression was "the criminal act of Adam as an individual" but as he was "the root and principle of our whole nature" it was also "the sin of the human race." The "voluntary act" of Adam was reckoned that of his descendants not "strictly and properly, (for those not yet born could not perform an act), but interpretatively or by imputation." Alexander thus adopted the "representative" rather than the "realistic" doctrine of imputation, a view in which he was followed by his colleagues and successors in the Princeton school. There was, of course, nothing unique in this insistence upon the doctrine of imputation, which was an integral part of traditional Calvinism, but the "representative" theory of the manner in which sin was imputed was a distinctive feature which separated the Princeton coterie not only from the Edwardeans but also from many with whom agreement was practically unanimous on other theological questions.

According to Alexander, man was born with not only the tendency to future sins latent in him but also subject to personal guilt and responsibility for the primal sin. Original sin was also original guilt. He had a keen sense of the intellectual and moral difficulties which this doctrine posed and appreciated the reason for but nevertheless rejected the

117 Ibid., p. 90.
118 Infra, pp. 210-214.
Pelagian solution that infants were born in the same condition as Adam before the Fall with unimpaired free will and no psychological handicaps. He saw that Pelagianism was not merely a modification but a denial of the doctrine of original sin. He was well aware of the reasons which lay behind the Pelagian rejection of the doctrine and admitted their apparent plausibility "but," as he put it, "the question with us is—is it taught in the Bible?" Since he thought the Augustinian doctrine was a teaching of Scripture, he was prepared to rationalize the "many difficulties" the theory entailed. For example, he wrote that "the evidence of original sin is deeply recorded in the acknowledged depravity of our race." To reject what he regarded as the Biblical view resulted in the solution of one set of difficulties only to produce others more complex. He wrote: "We may escape one set of difficulties by embracing the Pelagian theory but shall assuredly plunge into others more formidable. . . ." His conclusion was that "all the sins and evils of the world are due to the imputation of the first sin of Adam; and that no other theory of original sin is capable of standing the test of an impartial scrutiny."

Alexander's discussion of this doctrine was continued in October, 1830, with a treatise entitled, "The Doctrine of

Original Sin as Held by the Church, both Before and After the Reformation." After brief treatments of Semi-Pelagianism and the view of Thomas Aquinas, the author turned to "the opinions of the reformers" on the doctrine of original sin. He believed there was "perfect agreement of all the reformers on the subject of the imputation of the first sin of Adam to all his posterity." After disposing of various arguments against the doctrine, he submitted "proof" from Scripture and experience which he felt substantiated his Calvinistic theory of the imputation of sin. (a) He cited Genesis 8:21, "For the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." This was taken to be evidence which conformed to "the fact that all men sin and do nothing else but sin from the moment they are capable of actual transgression." Mere imitation could not possibly account for so universal an effect. (b) Romans 3:10, "There is none righteous, no not one," was his next proof text. The fact that all are unrighteous could be accounted for, he believed, only on the basis of an inherited corruption of human nature. (c) The seventh chapter of Romans, in which Paul spoke of the indwelling "law of

120 Ibid., II, 485. See Williams, op. cit., p. 427. The differences between the Lutheran and Calvinistic views of the doctrine of original sin, Williams said, were "inconsiderable."

121 A. Alexander, "Doctrine of Original Sin," *Princeton Review*, II (October, 1830), 496.
sin and death," which Alexander regarded as "an abiding principle" of human nature, was given as the third Scriptural proof of the doctrine. (d) He concluded his argument by citing a variety of Biblical passages which gave further support to his view and saying that "it is sufficient refutation of this Pelagian doctrine that it is nowhere found in Scripture, and nothing should be received as an article of faith which cannot be proved from this source."122

An example of the scholastic subtlety with which the Princeton school was characterized is exhibited by Alexander's concluding summary of this doctrine. "Hereditary depravity" meant, he said, that infants possessed "a nature not conformable to the law of God" and should be treated as "guilty on account of their own personal depravity." How, then, since God is the author of the depraved nature possessed by the child could the conclusion be avoided that He was the author of sin? Following Augustine, the writer distinguished between "nature and the depravity of nature, one of which is good, the other evil." He held that "nature" had for its cause "the good pleasure of God" and "the depravity of nature" was a result of "the perverse will of the first man."123 It is clear that original sin meant original guilt

122 Ibid., p. 498.
123 Ibid., pp. 499, 503.
and that responsibility was asserted by Alexander not only for sinful acts but also for the original state in which man is born. To regard "that disease of man's nature which renders him prone to sin" as not of itself "of the nature of sin," he held, neutralized responsibility also for sinful acts, which proceed from the sinful state by "a sort of necessity."124

**Alexander's doctrine of "inability."** The triology of articles on the nature of man was completed with a study dealing with the "inability of the sinner."125 The treatise sought to defend the "culpability" of the "unregenerate" despite his "total inability." Alexander insisted that the "strivings of the unregenerate" had nothing to do with the bestowal of God's grace upon the sinner and turned, rather surprisingly, to the Edwardean distinction between "natural

---

124 Ibid., pp. 500-501. See Williams, op. cit., pp. 432-433. "A position which is common to both the great schools of Reformation divines . . . is that in the last analysis original sin—the sin of universal human nature as such, apart from the actual sins of individuals—is the only real sin that exists. Actual sin is regarded as being merely an epiphenomenon—a loathsome efflorescence of which the foul root is the inherent sinfulness of humanity." This was substantially the view held by Alexander.

and moral ability" is an effort to solve the problem of the responsibility of the sinner to secure a salvation which man has no "moral ability" to seek. He drew the distinction between the two kinds of ability by summarizing the view of Jonathan Edwards, who, he said, taught

... that every man possessed a natural ability to do all that God required of him; but that every sinner labored under a moral inability to obey God, which, however, could not be pleaded in excuse for his disobedience, as it consisted in corrupt dispositions of the heart, for which every man was responsible.126

He regretted that "old Calvinistic authors" had neglected the distinction made by Edwards and cited an array of orthodox Calvinists who, he claimed, had held it. He admitted that the "Dutch and Scotch writers" on theology had not adopted the distinction Edwards introduced because they thought it diminished "the miserable and sinful state of man."127 But Alexander assured his readers that those who held the true doctrine of man's natural ability did not deny the total depravity of human nature.128

The Princeton professor seized upon this innovation, which was integral to the New England theology,129 in an

126 Ibid., p. 362.
127 Ibid., pp. 362-363.
128 Ibid., p. 369.
129 Supra, pp. 39-42.
effort to defend the sinner's accountability despite his moral inability. Man possessed "all the physical powers requisite . . . to perform the whole will of God" but nevertheless had "no ability to repent and turn to God."130 Man "has no ability to repent" and yet should be blamed for not repenting. His moral inability neutralized any desire to repent, even though his natural ability presumably enabled him to perform "the whole will of God." In the last analysis, however, the distinction between the two kinds of ability was not integral to Alexander's theology and was purely verbal. Even the verbal distinction was discarded by Charles Hodge, Alexander's celebrated student and successor, and cannot in any sense be regarded as a doctrine of the later, systematized Princeton school.

VI. PRINCETON SEMINARY, THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY AND THE DISRUPTION

Attitude of Princeton Seminary toward the New England theology. Seventeenth century Protestant scholasticism was the decisive factor in the formation of Professor Alexander's theological outlook. The Institutio Theologiae Elenchiticae of Francis Turretin—"ponderous, scholastic, and in a dead

language”—was required reading for all Seminary students. Alexander referred to Augustine much more than Calvin and saw Calvinism through the eyes of the Protestant scholastics, especially Turretin. Seventeenth century Puritanism in New England also provided a source for the Princeton position. Perry Miller has dealt with this period in his *New England Mind* and has shown that "the Augustinian strain of piety" was crucial in the creation of the Puritan ethos. He wrote: "Augustine exerted the greatest single influence upon Puritan thought next to the Bible itself, and in reality a greater one than did John Calvin." Therefore, Miller continued, the seventeenth century Puritans "served to leave the impress of Augustine upon the American character." The Princeton school was indebted to this seventeenth century American Puritanism, with its strong Augustinian element, as well as to the Calvinism of the *Westminster Confession of Faith* and the writings of Francis Turretin, John Owen, and other Protestant scholastics. For Princeton, the "new theology" inspired by Jonathan Edwards in the eighteenth century and perpetuated in Congregational Calvinism and New School Presbyterianism was, with unimportant exceptions, essentially


an aberration. Samuel J. Baird, an Old School Presbyterian, in his *History of the New School*, stated that the influence of Edwards "has been most disastrous" and that the "New England theology in all its phases is characterized by rejection of the doctrine of imputation, identified as it was supposed to be with his doctrine of identity." This is an estimate with which the Princeton party largely concurred. Alexander was somewhat more appreciative of Edwards than his successor, Charles Hodge, but they were united in a common repudiation of the alleged "improvements" which the followers of Edwards made on the theology of their master. There was also agreement between Alexander and Hodge as to the normative character of the Augustinian-Calvinistic theology expounded by the seventeenth century's Protestant scholastics.

It does not come within the province of this thesis to render a minute historical examination of the views of Jonathan Edwards and his school, though a sketch has been given in order to provide a point of comparison between the Princeton position and the Edwardean development. The


135 *Supra*, pp. 35-55.
estimate given of the New England theology by the Princeton party cannot be historically justified but what is important for this thesis is not so much a detailed account of what the Edwardeans actually held as what the Princeton professors believed about Edwardeanism and its fruits. The Princeton position was characterized by constant criticism which, at times, went so far as to identify the New England view with Arianism and Socinianism as equally pernicious. F. H. Foster has put the matter tersely: "Princeton specially recognized in everything New England a permanent enemy." A distinction must be made between seventeenth century Puritan theology in New England and what has come to be called the New England theology, a product of Jonathan Edwards and his school in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was this latter theological development in New England which Princeton opposed and recognized as "a permanent enemy."

An incident occurred in 1816 in the Synod of New York which proves that Princeton Seminary was aligned against the

136 Supra, pp. 55-63.

New England theology even before the issue which led to the disruption in 1837 became dominant among American Presbyterians. The incident which illustrates this alignment involved the Rev. William Gray, a minister of Hopkinsian sympathies, who had been called as minister by a majority of the congregation of Goodwill in the Presbytery of Hudson. The presbytery refused to confirm the call of the congregation, who immediately appealed to the Synod. The decision of the presbytery was reversed and the call of the congregation was confirmed. Against this reversal, Professor Alexander of Princeton and others entered a protest and appealed to the General Assembly, which overrode the Synod and confirmed the presbytery in its refusal to allow Gray to assume the church at Goodwill.  

The leading part played by Alexander in this episode was roundly denounced by the New England party.  

Policy of Princeton Seminary concerning the New England theology. In the ensuing controversy, of which the foregoing incident was but a minor, though typical, example, Princeton Seminary, led by Archibald Alexander, Samuel Miller,  


139 Samuel Whelpley, The Triangle, p. 245, cited by Baird, op. cit., p. 245. The pamphlets entitled The Triangle were collected and published in one volume in 1832.
and the young Charles Hodge, sought in public policy to adopt a mediating position but actually identified its view with the conservative element from the beginning. In 1816, Samuel Whelpley, a proponent of the Hopkinsian version of the New England theology, asked, "Are we ... to understand that young men educated for the Church in [Princeton] ... Seminary are to be ... sent forth to preach down Hopkinsian heresy?" He then proceeded to castigate the critics of Hopkinsianism and to criticize Princeton Seminary, whose graduates, he said,

... go forth and preach all the points of imputation contended for one by one;--a limited atonement;--know nothing about moral inability, and count that important distinction [between natural and moral ability] ... nothing but hodge podge; ... make disinterested benevolence a sacrécrow, and a little selfishness a good thing. They never fail to impress the hearer that he is, in every sense, unable to do his duty, yet will be condemned for not doing it;--that he ought to believe in Christ, though faith is a divine principle implanted and can be given to no one but those whose debt to justice Christ has paid;--that men are moral agents to do wrong but not to do right; and, in a word, that sinners are not in a state of probation.

This extract is a specimen of a popular and, of course, somewhat overdrawn critique of the Princeton theology and is further evidence of the deepening cleavage between the New England and Scotch-Irish elements in the Church. It also

---

140 Whelpley, op. cit., p. 244, cited by Baird, op. cit., p. 244.

indicates the position which Princeton Seminary occupied in the increasingly bitter controversy.

It is true that as late as 1834—three years before the division—Alexander appeared in a conciliatory role and endeavored to prevent the breach but there can be no doubt that his personal opinions, and those of his colleagues, overwhelmingly favored the Old School party, of which he was shortly to be regarded as the theologian par excellence. His son stated that

... no single man can be found ... who employed his pen more laboriously in defense of the doctrines which distinguish what had begun [in 1830] to be called Old School theology. ... In regard to theological tenets ... he did not yield to the most impetuous of his brethren. 142

If the reason for Alexander's theological intransigence is sought, it may be found in his conviction that "a considerable number of ministers in the Church" had departed from Calvinism of the "Westminster type" and in so doing "had deviated from the standards of the Church." 143 The Princeton professor was entirely sympathetic with the conservative element which was seeking to impose theological conformity upon the whole of American Presbyterianism but was checked somewhat in his public utterances, in which he attempted to conciliate the two parties, because the Seminary was, as he

142 James W. Alexander, op. cit., p. 471.
143 Loc. cit.
put it in a letter in 1828, "forced to look to New England for students." After all, Princeton Seminary had been founded to serve the entire Church and not simply the conservative party with whose theology it was in agreement. This fact was surely the main deterrent in restraining Alexander in the controversy which preceded the division in the Church and prevented him from openly declaring the policy of his school. Princeton Seminary was regarded by both parties as a "moderate" party which was seeking to keep the Church together, but a reading of the relevant sources of the period leaves no doubt that the Princeton professors were actually, though seldom publicly, strong partisans of the conservative position. Professor Alexander, whose views were meticulously followed by Miller and Hodge, was seriously concerned about the alleged heretical teachings of certain Presbyterian ministers who, he felt, had drunk much too deeply from the wells of the New England theology.

In 1832, Alexander wrote an article for the Biblical Repertory on "The Present Condition and Prospects of the Presbyterian Church," which clearly revealed his opinions


concerning the threatened cleavage in the Church. It was the first article in the official organ of the Seminary to recognize explicitly the tensions which had been growing within the Church for many years and whose roots ran deeply into more than a century of American Presbyterian history. He wrote:

That there exists a difference of opinion in the Church in reference to certain doctrinal points, and as to the precise import of the act of adopting the Confession of Faith by candidates at their ordination, cannot be denied or concealed.  

He stated that the two parties, the Old and New School "as they have been called," were about equal in strength in the General Assembly. He insisted that the difference was not primarily in "certain ecclesiastical transactions, relative to missionary operations and the training of candidates for the ministry," as it seemed to some. "This difference," he wrote, "may be considered as having its foundation in a diversity of theological opinion."  

An article written by

---

145 (Contd.) reference to the above article which J. W. Alexander attributed to his father Dr. C. Hodge remarked: "This article . . . is attributed to Dr. Samuel Miller by others. See Life of Samuel Miller by his son, Vol. II, p. 271." Whether by Alexander or Miller, the article has the same significance in this study because it expressed the view shared by the entire faculty of the Seminary.


147 Loc. cit.
another but to which his son says Alexander "is known to have given his assent" discloses how grave he considered the theological problem that had arisen. The article stated:

We wished it to be understood that we were the determined opponents of all those in our communion who manifested a leaning toward Arminian or Pelagian opinions in theology, or who discovered a disposition to invade the principles of Presbyterian Church government, or to exchange them for those of the Congregational system.148

Princeton Seminary and the disruption of the Church.

Reluctantly, Dr. Alexander was being driven by events to the conclusion that separation from those in the Presbyterian Church who espoused the New England theology was inevitable. In a letter, in 1833, to the Rev. Henry R. Weed, he said:

I hope that your Presbytery has honored you with a seat in the next General Assembly. Men of nerve should have hold of the vessel in the time of tempest, for doubtless the New School brethren will rage and clamor loudly. . . . It is necessary for our very existence that we should be separate.149

About four years later, he wrote to the Rev. W. S. Plumer:

I tremble for the ark. I see dark lowering clouds collecting. The new Revival Measures connected with the New Theology, are gaining strength and popularity every day. The stream is deepening and widening, and will shortly pour forth such a torrent as will reach over the whole surface of this land. Our Church cannot proceed much further under her present organization.150


He desired peace in the Church but was increasingly convinced that the price of peace was too great and division was inescapable.

Dr. Alexander did not play a prominent part in the actual separation, though he actively advocated the abrogation of the Plan of Union and voted for the excision of Western Reserve Synod from the General Assembly in 1837. However, once the division was an accomplished fact and the Old and New School Presbyterian Churches had become two separate organizations in 1838, he clearly espoused the cause of the Old School—"he certainly never manifested the slightest hesitation as to which party was right." "There was no man," said his son of him, "who took a livelier interest in the success of the Old School Assembly." It should be added that the professors in the Seminary "were perfectly united in all their views concerning all the points in the controversy."\(^{151}\)

In 1838, Charles Hodge asked:

Who are the New School party? It is in a great measure a Congregational party. One of its leading organs advocates the amalgamation of all sects; another insists especially on the union in one denomination of Presbyterians and Congregationalists. The presbyteries of which the party is composed have some three or four hundred Congregational churches in connexion with them. There is scarcely a leading man of the New School party who was not born and educated

a Congregationalist. 152

Then he gave what he considered to be the real reason for the break: "This New School party is notoriously disaffected toward the doctrinal standards of our Church." 153 Again he wrote:

Here is the real reason for our troubles. A large portion of the Church believe that another portion is unsound in doctrine, and the inconsistency of their [the New School] declarations has impaired confidence in their sincerity and candor. 154

The Old School party, of which Hodge became an unequivocal champion, distrusted and disliked the New England element, whether Congregational or Presbyterian, because of its broader doctrinal outlook, more democratic church polity, and anti-slavery attitude. 155 The reasons for the disruption, precipitated by the Old School, high ecclesiastical element, for which Princeton Seminary furnished intellectual and ministerial leadership, were, therefore, theological, ecclesiological, and social. The Scottish and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, who made up the bulk of the Old School party, were largely conservative in their theological views and


153 Loc. cit.

154 Ibid., p. 462.

endeavored to enforce conformity to the Westminster Confession of Faith. The vast majority of these people were high churchmen, who believed in the unqualified finality of the General Assembly, legislative as well as judicial. They feared that the Church might, with the continued growth and influence of the New School party, become Americanized and so lose the purity of its thoroughgoing Scottish traditions. They were quite numerous in rural areas and had spread throughout much of the South, particularly into Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. They tended to be pro-slavery in their sentiments whether they lived in the North or South. The Civil War sounded the death knell of this party perhaps primarily because it destroyed the social system of which it was an integral part.

Whatever opportunistic vacillation may have marked the policy of the Princeton school with reference to the growing tensions in American Presbyterianism prior to the disruption of the Church, there can be no doubt that after the organization of the Old School party the Seminary became the chief

---

156 See Thomas Carey Johnson, The Southern Presbyterians, p. 359, cited by Bacon, op. cit., pp. 296-297. The "victory" of the Old School party in 1837 was won, Johnson wrote, "only by virtue of an almost solid South."

157 The new national culture militated against sectarianism in the victorious North after the Civil War. The removal of the frontier and the frontier spirit to a more remote west also helped to allay denominational strife and heal broken denominations.
apologist for conformity to the *Westminster Confession of Faith* and strict adherence to the traditions derived from the Scottish Reformation. Old School Presbyterianism presented a theological and social complex for which the Princeton school provided a systematic defense, supported by alleged divine sanctions.
CHAPTER III

CHARLES HODGE, 1797-1878

Charles Hodge was born on December 27, 1797 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was the son of Hugh Hodge, a physician, and a grandson of Andrew Hodge, who emigrated from the north of Ireland to America about 1730. His mother was Mary Blanchard of Boston, who was of Huguenot descent. His father died in the yellow fever epidemic of 1797, leaving Mrs. Hodge in limited financial circumstances with two sons. Early in 1812, Charles, his older brother, Hugh, and their mother moved to Princeton, New Jersey so that the boys might attend school. In May, 1812, Charles entered the Academy. It was later the same year that Princeton Theological Seminary was founded and Dr. Archibald Alexander inaugurated as the first professor. "I can well remember," wrote Hodge many years later, "then a boy of fourteen, lying at length on the rail of the gallery in the church at Princeton listening to the doctor's inaugural address and watching the ceremony of investiture." One day during the same Summer, young Hodge was "stammering over a verse in the Greek Testament" and into the classroom walked Professor Alexander, who was vastly amused at what he heard. He asked Hodge what ΠΟΣΟΣ was derived from and there was no response. Hodge's instructor apologized for him, explaining that the
young student had been studying Greek only about a month. "This occurrence," wrote Hodge in 1879, "was the first thread of a cord which bound me to Dr. Alexander—a cord never broken." Thus began a warm friendship that lasted through the years of Hodge's student life in the College of New Jersey, from which he was graduated in 1816, and the Seminary, which he finished in 1819, and was perpetuated during the years of their labor as colleagues on the Seminary faculty, and beyond—a cord never broken."¹ Hodge often referred to his great indebtedness to Archibald Alexander, by whose "character and instructions he was moulded more than by all other external influences combined."² Robert Hastings Nichols says that Hodge's "training in theology [at Princeton Seminary], especially that which he received from Archibald Alexander, determined his thought and life-work."³

Early in 1819, Alexander expressed the hope that young Hodge might become a professor in the Seminary, subject, of course, to the judgment of the General Assembly. With this possibility in mind, the young theological graduate

spent about one year in Philadelphia in the study of Hebrew with Dr. Joseph Banks, an eminent linguist. In a letter written by Hodge to his beloved professor at Princeton in December, 1819, he said, "You do not know, sir, how much I owe you, and no one can know." Dr. Alexander in many ways occupied a paternal role in his relationship to his brilliant student. It is not surprising, therefore, that when Hodge returned to Princeton in June, 1820, as "assistant teacher of the original languages of Scripture," he boarded in the home of Professor Alexander and was his constant companion.

In October, 1820, the young theological professor—he was not yet twenty-three years of age—and a friend, Benjamin Wisner, who had been asked to preach as a candidate before the Old South Church of Boston, Massachusetts, traveled to that New England city together in "Mr. Hodge's old fashioned two-wheeled gig..." They stopped for two days in New Haven, Connecticut, and stayed with "Mr. Taylor, a young minister, who is the pride of the southern part of Connecticut." Hodge remarked in a letter to his mother that Taylor "differed very considerably in his theological opinions

---

4 Letter of Charles Hodge to Archibald Alexander, December 2, 1819, in A. A. Hodge, Life of Charles Hodge, p. 105. "There is no person excepting my mother to whom I feel so deeply obligated." See loc. cit. "From my boyhood I have experienced your paternal kindness." Also see ibid., p. 109. Here Hodge referred to Alexander as "my dear father."

5 A. A. Hodge, Life of C. Hodge, p. 77.
from the Princeton gentlemen. He kept us in animated through temperate discussion of our differences. The "Mr. Taylor" to whom Hodge referred was, of course, Nathaniel W. Taylor, afterwards the Professor of Theology in Yale College, who became a distinguished exponent of the New England theology and developed a system called "Taylorism," against which the polemic fulminations of the Princeton professors were hurled for fifty years. Hodge was right—Taylor differed "very considerably" from the Princeton position, and the difference widened with the passing of the years.

In May, 1821, Charles Hodge was confirmed as a teacher in the Seminary by the General Assembly. One year later, he became "Professor of Oriental and Biblical Literature" and signed the following pledge, required of all professors:

In the presence of God and the Directors of this Seminary, I do solemnly, and ex animo adopt, receive, and subscribe the Confession of Faith and Catechisms of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, as the confession of my faith; or, as a summary and just exhibition of that system of doctrine and religious belief which is contained in holy Scripture and therein revealed by God to man for his salvation; and I do solemnly, ex animo profess to receive the Form of Government of said Church, as agreeable to the inspired oracles. And I do solemnly promise and engage, not to inculcate, teach, or insinuate any thing which shall appear to me to contradict or contravene, either directly or impliedly, any thing taught in the said

6 Letter of C. Hodge to his Mother, October 25, 1820, in A. A. Hodge, Life of C. Hodge, p. 79.
Confession of Faith or Catechisms; nor to oppose any of the fundamental principles of Presbyterian Church Government, while I shall continue a Professor in this Seminary.  

The type of subscription to the Confession of Faith required in the foregoing declaration of belief demanded of professors in the Seminary is reminiscent of the requirement of the Scottish and Scotch-Irish party in the subscription controversy of the eighteenth century, though perhaps the Princeton requirement was a little less strict, and shows that the Seminary was at least potentially a stronghold of the conservative party at the very beginning of its history. Hodge's inaugural address followed the expected line of stressing the basic importance of Biblical interpretation in theological study.

In an "introductory lecture," given in November, 1822, Professor Hodge stated that "Biblical literature" was one of the "departments of theology." The "doctrines of the Bible" were regarded as the central concern of students of the Scriptures. Hodge's preoccupation with the doctrinal

7 Plan for the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (Princeton, New Jersey: 1838), p. 15. See ibid., p. 14. The Board of Directors of the Seminary possessed the power to depose a professor whose continuance was judged "highly dangerous" due to doctrinal or moral laxity.

8 Supra, p. 27.

9 A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 94.
dimension of the Bible is evident at the very beginning of his teaching career. The young professor, nevertheless, expended serious and sustained labors on the historical aspect of Biblical study. He said,

We should be acquainted with the language of Holy Scripture, be satisfied the Book we now have is essentially the Book written by the sacred penmen, be familiar with the principles on which it is explained, and examine the various sources whence it may be elucidated before we proceed to the doctrines it may teach.10

Lecture notes from Hodge's pen in the early years of his professorship bear witness to the meticulous study he expended upon critical problems related to Biblical studies.11 He was widely read for a young man and possessed an insatiable intellectual interest.

I. EUROPEAN STUDY

**Paris, Halle, and Berlin.** The young professor realized the need for further study and resolved to go abroad to gain "access to the most learned and able teachers of Biblical science."12 During his absence13 from October, 1826, to

10 Charles Hodge, "Introductory Lecture," (unpublished notes, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1822), file D.


12 A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 100.

13 During Hodge's absence, John W. Niven, a member of
September, 1828, he studied and traveled in Europe. After three and one-half months in Paris, where he studied French, Arabic, and Syriac with De Sacy, he went to Halle in Germany. Here he met Gesenius and Tholuck. The skeptical strain in the former shocked the young American student, who wrote that Gesenius was not interested "in any discussion not purely of a critical character" and "says a book is genuine or not, without caring in the least whether it pleases one party or another." An historical approach to the Bible, unhampered by an a priori theological norm, was new and somewhat shocking to the young professor, who recognized Gesenius' genius but was afraid he was doing "the most harm . . . of all the critics." Concerning the philosophical emphasis he found in German theological circles, Hodge said, "It seems to me a great misfortune that philosophy is mixed up with religion in this country."

13 (Contd.) the class just graduating, served as interim professor. He later achieved an international reputation as the founder of the Mercersburg school of theology. Niven and Hodge engaged in a vigorous theological debate in 1848. Supra, p. 99.


16 Loc. cit.

At Halle, he attended Tholuck's lectures in theology. Hodge's interests were more Biblical than strictly theological but he was anxious "to gain an acquaintance with theological literature." As later events proved, this interest in theology was deep-seated and continued to grow. Perhaps Tholuck, with whom he formed a personal friendship that persisted unabated to the end of his life, was responsible, in some measure, for kindling the early fire which later burned so brightly in Hodge's theological writings. The young Princeton professor found that Tholuck's theological views conformed more nearly to his own than any scholar he encountered in his European studies. Reporting remarks made in an informal evening conversation, Hodge wrote that "Tholuck said he thought the doctrine of depravity was the most important doctrine of the gospel, and that he did not believe a Pelagian could be a Christian." It is interesting to note, however, that Tholuck entertained the doctrine of "second probation" after death for the unregenerate, a point which became a live issue in American theology in the late nineteenth century. Needless to say, Hodge rejected this position but, nevertheless, regarded Tholuck as the only

18 Letter of C. Hodge to A. Alexander, May, 1827, in A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 117.

19 C. Hodge, Journal (Halle, Germany, March 4, 1827), p. 3.
"orthodox" professor in the University. 20

After eight months spent in study in Halle and travel in Germany, he went to Berlin in October, 1827. Here he heard Schleiermacher, Neander, and Hengstenberg, with the last of whom he formed a warm friendship. From a *Journal* in which Hodge recorded his impressions of theological professors and study in Germany, the following observations, taken almost at random, provide insight into the young American's mind as it grappled with a situation so strange to him:

I went to hear Schleiermacher, not knowing any more evangelical preacher who had service in the morning. The sermon was peculiar. The words were Biblical, but the whole tenor so general, the ideas so vague and indefinite, that it was impossible for me to understand exactly what he meant. 21

Concerning Neander he wrote:

He was disposed to recognize the infallibility of the apostles in all doctrinal points but not in their manner of proving them. Thus it was certain that Christ was God, but all Paul's arguments in support of the doctrine from the Old Testament are not in force. . . . He was opposed to the doctrine of predestination. Calvin, Neander said, makes God the author of sin. . . . He also maintained that . . . those who had no offer of the Gospel in this world, will have it in the world to come. 22

In another entry in his *Journal*, he wrote:

---


This evening I drank tea with Hengstenberg. I was surprised to hear him ... say that the idea usually entertained of the learning of the German clergy generally was erroneous, that he was sure the majority could not read the Greek New Testament. This he ascribed to the influence of rationalism.23

Alexander's concern for Hodge's orthodoxy. Concerning Hodge's study in Europe, Francis L. Patton commented: "Of course, he came in contact with German philosophy, and his colleagues in Princeton were not free from anxiety on his account."24 Archibald Alexander especially was deeply troubled about the possible effects of German thought upon Hodge's inquisitive mind. To his young colleague, he wrote:

Remember that you breathe a poisoned atmosphere. If you lose the lively and deep impression of divine truth—if you fall into skepticism or even into coldness, you will lose more than you gain from all the German professors and Libraries."25

Again he wrote: "I pray God to keep you from the poison of Neology! I wish you to come home enriched with Biblical learning but abhorring German philosophy and theology."26 Later, and almost unbelievably, Alexander added: "It will be worthwhile to have gone to Germany to know there is but

23 Ibid., February 27, 1828, cited by A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, pp. 174-175.
26 Loc. cit. Italics his.
little worth going for."27

The above excerpts from Professor Alexander's letters reveal the provincialism of the Princeton theology in the early nineteenth century, a provincialism which persisted in the writings of Charles and A. A. Hodge. Professor Alexander, who was the founder and at this time the leading spokesman of the Princeton school—and who, it must be added, was a leading figure in American theology—hoped that Hodge had "gone to Germany to know there was little worth going for." Judged by the standards of this period, Alexander was an uncommonly learned theologian, familiar with the history of western thought and a competent linguist, but his learning was completely controlled by the strict dogmatic presuppositions of the old Calvinism, as a consequence of which he was immediately suspicious of any position which deviated from the Biblical revelation as he understood it. What was true of Alexander was equally true of the Hodges.

Having been assured by Hodge that his orthodoxy had not been infected by the "poisoned atmosphere" of German infidelity, Alexander replied: "I rejoice to learn that you live in an infected atmosphere, without being yourself infected. May God preserve you."28 Actually, there was never

27 Ibid., August 16, 1827, in loc. cit.
28 Ibid., October 30, 1827, in loc. cit.
any need to worry because Professor Hodge had not been in any danger in Germany! He had been thoroughly schooled in the intricacies of the Princeton theology by his older colleague, to whom he was bound by intimate personal and professional ties that made deviation from what he had been taught all but impossible. Furthermore, the position to which Hodge was returning at the end of his study in Europe demanded that he should closely conform to the Calvinism he had learned from Alexander. The thought of the Princeton school as later developed by Hodge was largely a systematic elucidation of the views bequeathed to him by his honored and beloved predecessor.

II. GROWING REPUTATION

Resumption of professorship. Returning to Princeton in September, 1828, Professor Hodge resumed his work. In the lecture which opened the 1828-1829 session of the Seminary, he allayed any possible suspicions concerning the effect of his European studies on his outlook and reaffirmed his irreproachable orthodoxy. After expatiating on "the great importance of civil and religious liberty" and "the training of youth in knowledge and religion," he concluded with a discussion of "the intimate connection between speculative opinion and moral character."29 On the basis of his observation of the

"religious parties" of Germany, which he styled as "orthodox, rationalist, and pantheist," he observed that

... holiness is essential to correct knowledge of divine things, and the great security from error. Wherever you find vital piety, that is, penitence and a devotional spirit, there you will find the doctrines of the fall, of depravity, of regeneration, of atonement, and the Deity of Jesus Christ.

Then the crux of his argument appeared when he said, "I never saw nor heard of a single individual who exhibited a spirit of piety who rejected any one of these doctrines." 30 Thus "piety" was regarded as the sine qua non of theological "orthodoxy." This position oversimplified the theological problem and tended to render Hodge and his followers suspicious of the "piety" of those who rejected the Princeton theology.

The years following Hodge's return from Europe were crucial ones both for the Presbyterian Church, which divided in 1837, and also for the young professor, who

... achieved his reputation as a scholar, teacher, writer, and pre-eminently as an effective controversialist and church leader. He returned from Europe comparatively an unknown young man, and he entered upon his new professorship of Didactic theology in 1840 with very much the same reputation he enjoyed to the end of his life. 31

For about a decade of this period, "an obscure

30 Ibid., pp. 94-96.
31 A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, pp. 202-203.
infection in the thigh of the right leg resulting in his protracted confinement. He met his classes in his own house. The years of enforced confinement were years of diligent study and writing. From 1829 to 1840, he wrote thirty-six articles for the *Princeton Review*, besides reading and editing all the rest. These articles, his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, and *The Constitutional History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America*, written during this period, established his position as a leading Presbyterian theologian.

*Commentary on Romans.* Professor Patton said that the *Commentary* was "the monument of Dr. Hodge's exegetical talent." During the writing of this exegetical work in 1834 and 1835, the author, who was confined to his couch by lameness, communicated with Dr. Alexander by an exchange of notes, which disclose how eager the young professor was to receive the approbation of his "beloved teacher" concerning what he

---


wrote. Whatever tendencies Hodge might have had to deviate from his older colleague's view were quickly arrested by Alexander's sometimes subtle, sometimes not so subtle, warnings. Once Hodge wrote to Alexander in the odd exchange of notes that accompanied the writing of the commentary and expressed slight skepticism concerning the conventional exegetical approach: "There seem to be many passages in which the sacred writers . . . are obscure and confused in themselves"—but only once. Alexander's warnings were always heeded and his exegetical opinions followed meticulously.

"You can hardly know," Hodge wrote to Alexander, "how much peace of mind your *imprimatur*, my revered Father, gives me." At every point at which a difference of opinion arose between the two men, the young exegete deferred to the old master. Multiplied instances of this kind led A. A. Hodge to say that "Dr. Hodge never departed from the theology of his beloved teacher." One critic who reviewed the *Commentary* spoke of Hodge's having written it "under the pupilage of

37 Note of C. Hodge to A. Alexander, in A. A. Hodge, *C. Hodge*, p. 274.


39 A. A. Hodge, *C. Hodge*, p. 273. To say that Hodge "never departed" from the theology of Alexander seems too categorical, though there was absolute doctrinal continuity between the two men on all major Christian beliefs. Italics mine.
Dr. Alexander the elder,/*40 a judgment confirmed both by the content of the work and the circumstances under which it was written. Undoubtedly the strongest single positive influence in the situation in which Hodge wrote the Commentary was the old Calvinism of his older colleague.

A. A. Hodge spoke of the "two qualities" evident in his father's commentary. The first was a concern for historical exegesis, and the second was "a prevailingly doctrinal interest." The arrangement of the Commentary was quite traditional. After an introductory statement in which the commentator sketched the historical background and general argument of the epistle, he provided a summary of each chapter, following each of which the alleged "logical" arrangement of the Apostle's argument was given and discussed in detail. Each chapter was concluded with "a minute statement of all the doctrines taught" in it, followed by "practical" observations./*41

A modern student who reads the Commentary would probably be convinced that doctrine—or, more properly, scholastic Calvinism—was often superimposed by the author upon the historical meaning of the document, and, therefore,

---

40 C. E. Stowe, "Review of Commentary on Romans by Charles Hodge," The Bibliotheca Sacra, XXII (January, 1865), 160.

41 A. A. Hodge, G. Hodge, p. 272.
that the work is hardly a commentary at all from the historical point of view but a theological treatise designed to prove the truth of a priori theological convictions and to provide weapons for theological controversy. This would be a correct judgment but hardly a surprising one in view of Hodge’s strong theological predilections and impatience with painstaking historical study.\(^42\) Even B. B. Warfield, a member of the Princeton school who had studied under Hodge, for whom he had the highest regard,\(^43\) admitted that the Princeton professor had “no taste for the technicalities of exegesis” and that “theological predilection” rather than objective data often determined his “discussion of disputed grammatical or lexical points.” He further observed that “texts were often quoted to support doctrines of which they did not treat; and a meaning was sometimes extracted from a passage which it was far from bearing.”\(^44\)

There were also other reasons for Hodge’s preoccupation with the theological implications of the Roman letter than the Calvinism he learned from Alexander. The period in

\(^{42}\) See ibid., p. 279. A. A. Hodge said that historical writing was “the least natural and most laborious work my father ever undertook.”

\(^{43}\) Letter of Benjamin B. Warfield to A. A. Hodge, 1878, in A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 590.

\(^{44}\) _Loc. cit._ in _ibid._, pp. 589–590.
which this commentary was composed was a time of rising theological controversy between the Princeton and New England schools concerning the doctrine of original sin, the imputation of the guilt of the primal sin to the human race, the nature of regeneration, and the role of the atonement in the satisfaction for sin. The Roman letter lent itself admirably as a medium through which to discuss these issues.

Professor Moses Stuart⁴⁵ of Andover Seminary, a Congregationalist, and the Rev. Albert Barnes⁴⁶ of the New School Presbyterian party, published commentaries on Romans shortly before Hodge began work on his. The treatises by Stuart and Barnes were only slightly less theological in purpose than Hodge's commentary but, of course, were written from a different standpoint. They were expositions which sought to substantiate the New England position by appeals to Pauline authority. The Princeton professor thus produced his commentary under the strong negative influence of the New England theology and especially the two aforementioned

---

⁴⁵ Moses Stuart, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, with a Translation and Various Excursus (Andover, Massachusetts: 1832).

⁴⁶ Albert Barnes, Notes, Explanatory and Practical on the Epistle to the Romans, Designed for Bible-Classes and Sunday Schools (New York: 1834). Barnes was minister of the influential First Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and was subjected to numerous heresy trials in various Church courts because of his views.
works of Stuart and Barnes. Something of the strength of these treatises as a negative factor in the production of the Princeton professor's commentary may be seen in Hodge's review of the two works written by the two New England theologians.47

(1) Thirty-five pages were consumed in the review of Stuart's work. Hodge was sure that certain doctrinal statements made by Stuart were the result not of "the process of interpretation" but of "mere prejudice."48 The review is marked throughout with such remarks as, "Professor Stuart takes a false view"49 or "Professor Stuart is so obviously and hopelessly in conflict with the plain meaning . . . of the Apostle."50 The trouble with Stuart, Hodge thought, was his futile effort to circumvent the doctrine of imputation, which included both "the transmission of a corrupt nature" from Adam to all men and of Christ's righteousness to the regenerate, and the doctrine of the Federal headship of Adam and Christ.51 He, therefore, challenged the Andover


49 Ibid., p. 389.

50 Ibid., p. 386.

51 Loc. cit.
professor's exegesis of Romans 5:12-19, with which the greater part of the review was occupied, and concluded by stating that two things had been proved:

First, that the doctrine of imputation is not touched either by Professor Stuart's exegesis or metaphysics. It is precisely where it was before; and, second, that his whole exposition of Romans 5:12-19 is so inconsistent with itself that it cannot possibly be correct.52

(2) The pattern of the criticism exhibited by Hodge's review of the commentary by Barnes is precisely the same as in the preceding case. Again the attack was made against the author's conception of imputation, which Hodge said the commentator "did not understand."53 Barnes asserted that "where Paul states a simple fact, men often advance a theory. . . . The simple fact is stated by Paul that Adam's . . . sin was followed by the sin and ruin of all his posterity." The explanation of this "fact" expounded by the theologians is that Adam's sin was "imputed" to his posterity. "This is theory," Barnes stated, and "men insensibly forget that it is mere theory." Though the tone of the commentary is practical and Barnes said he sought to be "independent" of "any theological system,"54 the New England theology lurks

52 Ibid., p. 416.
54 Albert Barnes, Notes on Romans, p. xi.
behind many of the allegedly untheological and practical comments. His rejection of "the theory of imputation," for example, is exactly in line with a strong tendency in the New England school at this time.

All of this elicited the expected criticisms from Hodge's pen. Barnes was denounced for failing to conform to the Westminster Confession and chided for presuming to produce a commentary on Romans at all at the youthful age of thirty-six years. (Hodge was almost exactly the same age and was preparing a commentary on Romans himself!) He reminded Barnes that the opinions of theologians and exegetes changed with the passing of the years and that it was, therefore, better to wait for maturity before expressing one's self freely in writing. This did not apply, he said, to "a confession of faith, or old school man, who is not expected to change his mind at all." Hodge, of course, was of this type and took great pride in the claim that he never changed his mind on theological questions. This presumably explained why he, at thirty-six years of age, considered himself exempt from the dangers which "immaturity" imposed upon the young commentator, also thirty-six, he was so freely criticizing. This curious attitude reveals a marked characteristic of the

Princeton school, the tendency to regard every theological position except its own as relative. The pitfalls into which his young contemporary had allegedly been snared by his immaturity held no fear for young Hodge, for whom Princeton Calvinism was the absolutely true theology, derived from infallible Divine oracles. Hodge believed that Barnes' commentary was marked with "inaccuracy and inconsistency" on the subjects of depravity, ability, imputation, and salvation. The work was regarded as a "gratuitous attack upon some of the most important doctrines of the Church."\(^5^6\) He sincerely hoped Barnes would see fit to revise his treatise and bring it into line with the Confession of Faith. This insistence upon strict subscription to the Confession as a condition of ministerial communion and leadership in the Church was soon to bring the Old School party, which advocated it, into an open break with the New School party, which opposed it. This controversy which shattered the unity of the American Presbyterian Church and crippled it severely in a decisive period of American history was the most important single factor in determining the viewpoint from which Hodge's commentary was written and the others criticized. It is necessary to recapture something of the bitterness and deep-feeling with which these hectic days were pervaded in order

\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 323.
to understand what was written in this period. This controversy, very much dead in so far as the modern historian is concerned, was very much alive to the participants. Historical objectivity at this point, therefore, demands that the historian should seek to grasp the very unobjective claims and counter claims with which this sharp controversy was marked.

The commentary by Professor Hodge is a nice example of the dogmatic exegesis which marked the Princeton school and also demonstrates the tendency to utilize apparently "historical" studies as weapons in theological debate. The echo of current controversies is constantly heard in the commentary, as, for example, in a comment on Romans 7:18, when Hodge remarked that "inability is consistent with accountability." Exegesis of Scripture was a harmonistic device designed to exhibit the unity of Biblical teaching, which was then shown to be the basis of Calvinistic orthodoxy, which in turn was defined as conformity to the Westminster symbols as a creed and the Genevan Turretin as a technique. The result of this process, conditioned by the psychological and theological predilections of Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge in particular and the conservative culture of which Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism was an

important element in general, was the Princeton school of theology.

The Princeton theology, identified by its exponents with Divinely guaranteed truth, went forth confidently to challenge everybody and everything that opposed it. The nineteenth century was marked by a constantly shifting theological situation as the new nation, flushed by its independence, surged restlessly westward. Religious and political liberty plus the individualism of the frontier produced increasing denominational and theological diversity. The Princeton apologetic was forced by its very genius to engage this vast diversity wherever it impinged upon the theological problem and in this process of criticism the school developed many of its characteristic emphases. The faith once for all delivered to Princeton by Archibald Alexander, Samuel Miller, and Charles Hodge was defended and propagated with a dogged tenacity, and acquired a rigidity which increased commensurately with the increasing theological diversity it opposed. Hodge not only criticized the New England theologians for rejecting his view of imputation but also the Old School theologians who held the "realistic" rather than the "representative" theory of imputation. He even went so far as to write a book in which he gave the Princeton view of evolution! Francis Patton was, therefore, wrong when he wrote that "Princeton orthodoxy . . . is a
distinctive term only in so far as Princeton has won the reputation of being the redoubtable champion of Westminster orthodoxy."58 There is something uniquely "Princeton" about this theology which distinguishes as well as relates it to the theological tradition of which it was a particular expression. Hodge's *Commentary on Romans*, his reviews of works on the same letter by Stuart and Barnes, and the vigorous Princeton apologetic which these writings elicited provide a kind of epitome of the entire Princeton school of theology.

Constitutional History of the Presbyterian Church.
The second major work from Dr. Hodge's pen in the period prior to his assumption of the mantle of leadership in the Seminary from Dr. Alexander in 1840 was the *Constitutional History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States*,59 the first

See A. A. Hodge, "Princeton," Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge, 3rd edition, III, 1929. "The term Princeton theology originated in New England about 1831 or 1832, and was applied to the general characteristics of that system advocated by the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review in its controversies with the disciples of Drs. Hopkins, Emmons, Finney, and Taylor, the leaders of various phases of the New England school. Of this 'Princeton theology' the characteristic was close and persistent adherence to the type of Calvinism taught in the Westminster standards as those are interpreted in the light of the classical literature of the Swiss and Dutch and English Puritan theologians who wrote after the date of the Synod of Dort, especially Francis Turretin of Geneva and John Owen of England."

volume of which appeared early in 1839 and the second a year later. In a letter written to his brother, in 1838, Hodge set forth in one sentence the purpose which was to infuse the proposed history. He wrote, "I want to state in a few words what were the constituent materials and peculiar views of our church at the beginning. . . ."60 In the preface to the first volume, written in March, 1839, the design and character of the work were given. A group of Presbyterians in Philadelphia, members of the Old School party, acted on a suggestion made by the Rev. James Hoge of Ohio, who had written a friend in Philadelphia stating that a work dealing with "the present controversies in our Church" should be produced. Dr. Hoge believed that "a proper exhibition of the subject" would involve a "documentary history of the formation of the first Presbytery, of the Adopting Act, of the great Schism, of the Union of the two Synods, and of the formation of our present constitution."61 The group in Philadelphia asked Dr. Hodge to write this history, which, by the time it was finished, had developed larger proportions than either the writer or the sponsors originally supposed. The work finally became a constitutional history of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, though the use of

60 Letter of C. Hodge to Hugh L. Hodge, October 12, 1838, in A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 279.

61 C. Hodge, Constitutional History, I, iii.
the designation "United States" in the title is not defensible since most of the work dealt with the colonial period. The author stated that the purpose of his book was "to show on what principles the Church was founded and governed" or, in other words, "to exhibit historically its constitution, both as to doctrine and order." 62

This "history" of the Presbyterian Church suffers from an apologetic interest which appears on the very first page. It was an effort to justify the position of the Old School party in the disruption of 1837 by attempting to show that the policies pursued by the party were those of historical Presbyterianism. Hodge stated that "one party"—obviously the Old School—favored "a stricter adherence to the standards of the Church, as to doctrine and order, than the other" 63—the New School party.

He then sketched the contentions of the two parties as to crucial points in the constitutional history of the Church. The New School party, he said, contended that the Westminster Confession of Faith was adopted as the confession of the American Presbyterian Church "only in a very qualified manner" and that "ministerial communion" presupposed agreement only on points "essential and necessary in doctrine, worship,

62 Ibid., p. iv.
63 Ibid., p. 9.
and government." It insisted that American Presbyterianism was something "very different from the Scottish system," that the "higher judicatures have only judicial and advisory powers," and that the General Assembly was only "an appellate court and advisory council." Some of the more extreme adherents of the New School party, he said, contended that "Congregationalism was the basis of Presbyterianism in this country."64

The features of the contention of the Old School party, with which Hodge was closely identified and for which he was writing the "history," were then given. It was claimed that the Church in America "ever since it had a constitution at all" had been "strictly Calvinistic in doctrine and purely Presbyterian in church government" and that "ministerial communion" from the beginning was conditioned not merely upon agreement "in the essential doctrines of the Gospel" but upon "the adoption of that system of doctrine which is contained in the Westminster Confession and Catechisms." At this point in his exhibition of party differences in the Church, he completely abandoned any semblance of an objective historical attitude and frankly aligned himself with the strict subscriptionists and insisted that "our church," as he subjectively put it, adopted at the beginning and continued

64 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
to exercise "that form of government which has been previously adopted in Scotland, Ireland, Holland, and among the Protestants of France." This was called "the Scottish system" which, Hodge claimed, had "always" been the basis of the "avowed principles of the American Presbyterian Church." He admitted that the early history of the Church in America was involved in "great obscurity" but nevertheless found it possible to "prove" his historical contention despite the admitted absence of historical data. This so-called "proof" is quite unconvincing and is another nice example of the typical Princeton method of using history as an apologetic device. The very variety of American Presbyterianism in the seventeenth century, of which much was made by Hodge, actually militates against the theory that the Church was "Scottish" in origin, doctrine, and order.

Turning his attention to the formation of the first American presbytery in 1706, Hodge endeavored to prove that it was "Scottish in constituency and viewpoint." Actually, the first presbytery was "a happy union of several Presbyterian

65 Ibid., pp. 11-13.
66 Ibid., p. 19.
68 Supra, pp. 1-10.
69 C. Hodge, Constitutional History, I, 76-79.
traditions" and did not seek authority from the Church of Scotland or the Synod of Ulster, points which Hodge conveniently omitted. Concerning the Adopting Act of 1729, he endeavored to prove that it enjoined "assent to the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession of Faith" in a largely unqualified sense. It was impossible to prove that the Adopting Act, which merely required acceptance of undefined "essential and necessary articles" of the Confession, enjoined strict subscription, which was what Hodge himself advocated, so he did the next best thing and interpreted the Act in the strictest possible manner suggested by the words "essential and necessary." "Essential" was taken to mean not merely essential to orthodoxy in general but essential to the "peculiar character" of Confessional Calvinism. Trinterud states the issue clearly when he writes that Hodge

... was trying to show that unqualified subscription had always been demanded in Presbyterianism until the rise of the New School against whom he planned and wrote the Constitutional History. Ashbel Green, as ardent an advocate of unqualified subscription as Hodge, proves the fallacy of views such as Hodge's in his denunciation of the 1729 Act.

---

70 Supra, pp. 10-13.
71 C. Hodge, Constitutional History, I, 215.
72 Ibid., p. 150.
It is obvious that Professor Hodge was troubled by the latitude allowed by the Adopting Act and sought to explain it away in order to provide his strict subscription party with "historical" proof of its position. This he did not succeed in doing, as indeed he could not, because the Adopting Act in plain language allowed each presbytery to decide whether any given candidate who stated his scruples with regard to any article or articles in the Confession might nevertheless be admitted to the ministry if the presbytery judged the candidate's scruples related to "articles not essential and necessary in doctrine, worship, or government." 74

This implied that certain articles, which were not defined, were apparently regarded as not essential or necessary in the doctrine, worship, and government of the Church, and, furthermore, that each presbytery could make its own decision concerning what were and what were not "essential" articles. 75


75 See L. J. Trinterud, "The New England Contribution to Colonial American Presbyterianism," Church History, XVII (March, 1948), 38. Trinterud describes this procedure as the "concept of so adopting an historic creed as to require a frequent and searching discussion of what new ideas could or could not be considered as compatible with its essence or with its traditional phrasing."
The decision of the presbytery was final and, therefore, could not be appealed to a higher court. The Adopting Act differed from strict Scotch-Irish Presbyterian tradition both in the doctrinal latitude it made possible and in granting final authority to the presbytery in judging the fitness of a ministerial candidate. It should be added that the futile effort of Hodge to bend the Adopting Act to his apologetic purposes was likewise attempted by Samuel Miller, who tried to prove that the adoption of the Act in 1729 was a victory for the conservative party and that Jonathan Dickinson, the leader of those who opposed strict subscription, was opposed to the Act, which was allegedly passed over his opposition.76 Actually, the Adopting Act was sponsored by Dickinson and its adoption was a victory for him and his party.77

The Constitutional History of Hodge and the Letters to Presbyterians of Miller are specimens of the apologetic writing which abounded in American Christianity in this period, in which denominational lines were being quickly formed and broken. The use of history as a device to substantiate a theological position was particularly prominent in the Princeton school and a practice to which Hodge and


77 Supra, pp. 25-27.
Miller were especially given. It must be recorded that these efforts to derive American Presbyterianism solely from the "Scottish system" and to prove that strict subscription to the Westminster Confession was demanded from the beginning in the American Presbyterian Church were ingenious but largely unsuccessful ventures.

Articles on ecclesiology. In 1835, Hodge began to write a series of articles in the Biblical Repertory which undertook to recapitulate and analyze the proceedings of the General Assembly. A. A. Hodge believed that his father contributed each of the articles in this series from 1835 to 1867 inclusive, with the probable exception of 1841. These expositions, in which he made "no pretensions to indifference and neutrality," are valuable historically because they provide rather informal comment by Professor Hodge on the


79 A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 286. Referring to articles dealing with the General Assembly, he said, "They contain a summary of the arguments used by prominent speakers on each side of disputed questions; they are . . . of great historical value, affording information not elsewhere accessible."

80 Loc. cit.
constitution and administration of the Church and give his views of the varied vicissitudes through which American Presbyterianism passed in these years. These articles plus a series of studies appearing in the Princeton Review from 1845 to 1856 on "The Idea of the Church" constitute the sources from which the posthumous work on The Church and its Polity was compiled by the Rev. William Durant. Strangely enough, it is this work on ecclesiology, published posthumously, rather than his massive Systematic Theology, the treatise which crowned his career, that interests most modern students of American Christianity. The book by James Moffatt on The Presbyterian Churches is indebted to Hodge, whom the author called "one of the soundest Presbyterian churchmen."32

The early writings of the Princeton school concerning the Church are suggested by the foregoing consideration of ecclesiology. The first controversy in which the Biblical Repertory participated was with Dr. Moses Stuart of Andover Seminary concerning the relationship of the American Education Society to the Presbyterian Church.33 As early as 1818,

33 James Carnahan, "The General Assembly's Board of
when Hodge was still a theological student, Princeton Seminary had gone on record as favoring one educational society which should be under the direct control of the General Assembly. The American Education Society had been organized in Boston in 1815, sustained no official relation to the General Assembly, and was widely suspected by conservative Presbyterians to be a device by which Congregationalists were seeking to infiltrate the Presbyterian Church. Samuel J. Baird, an extremely partisan leader of conservative Presbyterianism, went so far as to say that the Education Society was "devised by our Congregational brethren for training a ministry for the Presbyterian Church." In 1829, the General Assembly organized the Board of Education and asked the churches to sustain it by contributions to help defray the expenses of candidates for the ministry. At almost exactly the same time, the American Education Society offered to grant aid to candidates for the Christian ministry anywhere in the United States. Branch


84 Letters of Committee of the Synod of Philadelphia, 1818, in Baird, op. cit., p. 284. "The committee . . . found it to be the opinion of the professors of the Theological Seminary at Princeton . . . that one general education society should be established."

85 Baird, op. cit., p. 334.
societies were planted throughout the nation and many Presbyterian churches contributed to the support of this organization in preference to the Presbyterian Board of Education. This situation elicited the aforementioned article by Dr. James Carnahan, President of the College of New Jersey, in which objections to the American Society were stated. Professor Stuart replied in a "long communication" which was printed in the October, 1829, issue of the Repertory, with a rejoinder by Professor Hodge. The discussion was continued and ended in the January, 1830, issue of the journal. Hodge thus began his career of almost uninterrupted controversy by writing against the alleged machinations of the American Society, which was criticized for a variety of reasons, the most important of which were that the Society was not completely controlled by the Presbyterian Church and was the agent of a heretical theology. The criticism that the Society, which required all candidates under its


care to give their notes for sums received, made debtors of those whom it assisted was subsidiary to the criticism, only implicit at first, that the Society sponsored a suspect theology. The theological dimension of the Princeton critique was clearly brought to light shortly after the American Home Missionary Society, sponsored largely by the New School Presbyterians, was included in the indictment made by Hodge against the American Society. In 1828, the General Assembly reorganized its Board of Domestic Missions, which was immediately and inevitably drawn into controversy with the American Home Missionary Society, since both organizations sought support from the same people for work in the same places. Hodge led the attack upon both the American Society and the American Home Missionary Society. His criticisms of these "voluntary societies" had become explicitly theological by 1836, when he spoke of the Home Missionary Society as "a great party engine, devoting . . . its immense influence to revolutionizing the Church." It was "to a large degree controlled by Congregationalists" and, therefore, hostile to both the polity and doctrines of the Presbyterian Church. "It sent out men," Hodge wrote, "educated in New England, holding sentiments condemned . . . by Old School Presbyterians." He regarded the controversy over the relative merits of the "voluntary societies" and the Boards of the Church as "the
proximate cause of the disruption."^89

III. PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY

Theological viewpoint. Charles Hodge became "Professor of Exegetical and Didactic Theology" in Princeton Seminary in May, 1840, assuming the chair occupied from the opening of the institution by Archibald Alexander, who, because of advancing age, took a less strenuous role in the school. The professorship of theology was the key position in the Seminary and carried with it the responsibility to serve as "president of the faculty."^90 Thus Professor Hodge was transferred from the field of Biblical studies to dogmatics, a change which he at first regretted since he had spent twenty years as a teacher of Biblical languages and literature. This change, nevertheless, must be regarded as "one of the capital and most advantageous turning points" in his career.^91 It could hardly have been a surprise either to Hodge or the Seminary community for him to succeed Alexander. Furthermore, Hodge's interest had been more theological than strictly exegetical from the very beginning. This theological


^90 Plan of Princeton Seminary, p. 16.

^91 A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 322.
interest was surely strengthened by his study with Tholuck at Halle. A. A. Hodge thought that his father's "natural qualifications for the attainment of eminent excellence and usefulness in the new chair were far greater than any he possessed for the attainment of the same rank in the old one." The subsequent career of Charles Hodge was a complete confirmation of this judgment.

The fact that Hodge was thoroughly grounded in Biblical studies surely accounts in large measure for the apparent Bibliocentricity of his theology and consequently for his suspicion of "speculative theology," as he phrased it. He wrote: "When men forsake the word of God, and profess to be wise above that which is written, they inevitably and universally lose themselves in vain speculations." It is true, of course, that his scholastic way of handling the Bible militated against a genuine Biblical theology, especially in his doctrine of revelation, with which he identified the communication of supernatural truths, but this weakness he regarded as a strength because it seemed to provide an unassailable, objective basis for theology. This alleged

92 Supra, pp. 152-153.
93 A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 322.
objectivity made "a speculative theology independent of Scripture" both unnecessary and dangerous. 95 He, therefore, wrote tirelessly against "theological metaphysics," 96 which at least had the merit of being vague, though by these terms he must have meant any theological point which he felt was not an implication of Biblical teaching.

B. B. Warfield, a graduate of Princeton Seminary, has vividly described Professor Hodge as a teacher of New Testament. After a "strikingly appropriate prayer," Warfield wrote, he would open his "well thumbed Greek Testament, look at the passage for a second, and then throwing his head back, and closing his eyes, begin his exposition. He scarcely again glanced at the Testament during the hour..." His exegesis "flowed from subject to subject, simple, clear, cogent, unfailingly reverent." His "sense of the general meaning of a passage was unsurpassed." 97 This method, whatever else may be said of it, was certainly not calculated to supply a carefully wrought historical exegesis of the text. With his eyes closed, how could he provide his students with anything other than "the general meaning of a passage?" His method of teaching

96 Ibid., p. 370.
the New Testament, where he sought to develop the broad, comprehensive meanings rather than the strict historical sense of Scripture is further evidence of the primary place theology occupied in his approach to the Bible. The shift from the Biblical field to that of theology involved no real transition for Hodge but simply meant a slightly more systematic, and less historical, type of exegesis.

An examination of the classroom procedure which Hodge followed in teaching theology reveals a preoccupation with Protestant scholasticism, especially Francis Turretin's *Institutes of Theology*, a seventeenth century exposition of scholastic Calvinism, sections of which were successively assigned as the basis of recitation, involving question and answer, the results of which were recorded in note books. Written answers to questions propounded by the professor were then required on the basis of the recitation and further reading. Thus the students built up "systems of theology." An unpublished commentary on Turretin's *Institutes* by Dr. Hodge is further evidence of the great debt the Princeton professor owed to the Genevan scholastic.\(^{98}\) Calvinism as conceived by Turretin and interpreted in terms of the predilections of the Princeton school was the foundation of

\(^{98}\) Charles Hodge, "Commentary on Turretin's *Institutio Theologiae Eleneticae,*" (unpublished manuscript, Princeton Theological Seminary, n. d.).
Hodge's theological instruction, as it had been for Alexander. This renders somewhat suspicious the statement of A. A. Hodge that his father made "the natural interpretation of the inspired Word the basis of all doctrinal induction." It was not the "natural" interpretation of the Bible but the doctrines of Scripture as systematized by Turretin that Hodge stressed. Of course, Hodge made no distinction between Biblical teaching and the Calvinistic theological system as expounded by Turretin and the Protestant scholastics and regarded the latter as the implicate of the former.

**Sunday afternoon conferences.** After the death of Archibald Alexander, in 1651, Professor Hodge was the central figure in the Sunday afternoon conferences held in the Seminary for faculty and students. Here is a glimpse of Hodge in a rather informal role, "discussing questions relating to experimental religion and the duties of the Christian life." An examination of his papers after his death disclosed that every conference discourse was carefully written.

---

99 *Supra*, pp. 131-132.

100 A. A. Hodge, *C. Hodge*, p. 323.


102 See Charles Hodge, *Princeton Sermons* (London: 1879). Many of his conference papers were preserved and subsequently published under the foregoing title.
though he spoke without notes. He talked freely and his discourses were "in the highest degree earnest, fervent, and tender to tears."

A. A. Hodge spoke of the "great tenderness" which disclosed itself in these discussions by his father. Hodge's personality prompted Archibald Alexander, who knew his colleague better than any other living person, to say that "the mental constitution of Dr. Hodge was more than that of any man he knew like that of John Calvin, without his severity." This "tenderness" seldom showed itself when Hodge occupied his role as a Calvinistic theologian, where he tended to be ultra dogmatic in his own views and sometimes severely caustic in his criticism of views with which he disagreed. His rigorous "fidelity to Christ" really meant fidelity to the Calvinistic conception of Christ because the propositional view of revelation he held tended to obscure the personal dimension of God's revelatory activity. He was accordingly "suspicious of every, even the least, divergence from this system of truth." Theology was a system of truth which mainly engaged the intellect, or at least demanded intellectual assent to propositions for

103 A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 458.


which divine infallibility was claimed. Therefore, when dealing with doctrinal issues in the classroom "the dry and cold attributes of scientific theology moving in the sphere of intellect" were dominant. In the conference, the dominance of the intellectual process "gave place to the warmth of personal religious experience and the spiritual light of divinely illumined intuition." This distinction between systematic theology and practical religion which marked Hodge's outlook can be readily observed in Hodge's theological position. He treated theology as an objective science and believed that subjectivism should be banished at all costs. Thus his theology and his personal religion tended to occupy separate categories and failed to interpenetrate each other in a dynamic relationship. The sharp difference in the approach which Hodge made to systematic theology, on the one hand, and to the personal dimension of the Divine-human encounter, on other, is clearly revealed by a comparison of his theological writings with the discourses delivered at the Sunday afternoon conferences, embodied in his Princeton Sermons. This tendency to isolate systematic theology from Christian experience was a characteristic of the Princeton school.

IV. ATTITUDE TOWARD SLAVERY

106 A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 453.
Slavery and the Scriptures. Hodge's Biblicism is nowhere more evident than in the slavery controversy, a burning issue at this time. After the Civil War was over, Hodge commented in retrospect concerning the position the Princeton Review had assumed toward slavery:

If . . . the Scriptures under the old dispensation permitted men to hold slave slaves, and if the New Testament nowhere condemns slaveholding, but prescribes the relative duties of masters and slaves, then to pronounce slaveholding to be in itself sinful is contrary to the Scriptures. . . . It is as much contrary to our allegiance to the Bible to make our own notions of right and wrong the rule of duty as to make our own reason the rule of faith. . . . The doctrine that slaveholding is itself a crime is anti-scriptural and subversive of the authority of the Word of God.107

The articles in the Princeton Review devoted specifically to the subject of slavery were entitled, "Slavery,"108 "Abolitionism,"109 and "Emancipation."110 During the Civil War, the matter was discussed in articles dealing with various aspects of that conflict. The principles maintained in these articles were: (a) the slave is the property of his master, but (b) "can be used only as a rational, moral, and immortal

creature can, according to divine law, be rightfully used." (c) The master is bound to provide for the moral and intellectual education of the slave, respect the conjugal and parental rights of those held in bondage, and provide fair compensation for labor. (d) "The consequences of acting upon these principles would be the peaceful and speedy abolition of slavery." Thus ran the tortuous argument of Hodge and the Princeton school on the subject of slavery. An institution supported by proof-texts from the Bible could be abrogated by the inculcation of a Biblical attitude toward the slaves.

The students in the Seminary accepted Hodge's construction of the slavery issue with apparent unanimity. In 1844, "The New College Missionary Association" of Edinburgh sent to "The Society of Inquiry and Missions" at Princeton a letter which stated categorically that in Scotland "a slaveholder would be denied Christian communion by every evangelical Church." Abraham Gosman, who was secretary of the Princeton Society, replied by defending the proposition that slaveholding was not "in itself sinful." Speaking for the Society, he said, "We think the Bible clearly recognizes the relationship of master and slave without condemning it." 112


The same position was reiterated in another letter sent to the New College Association by the Princeton Society later the same year. "Slavery per se," it declared, "was not regarded as a sin in the Bible."\(^{113}\)

**Slavery and the disruption.** The New School party in the Presbyterian Church was largely anti-slavery in sentiment. The religious revival led by Charles G. Finney, which reached its height in New York State in 1830, added impetus to abolitionism among members of the New School group. In 1836, the General Assembly, dominated by New School men, seemed on the verge of division over the slavery issue, so insistent were the demands that actions be taken against this evil.\(^{114}\)

It is noteworthy that at the next meeting of the General Assembly, with Old School men in control, four of the New School synods and eventually five-hundred and thirty-three churches and more than one-hundred thousand members were read out of the Church by a strictly party vote. The *Cincinnati Journal* reported that the reason for excising the four Synods was their anti-slavery stand. The newspaper stated:

> We have no doubt, when the course of the General Assembly was manifested, and when the four Synods were cut off, of the cause which was urging on that body to

\(^{113}\) Letter of William Barnard to the New College Missionary Association of Edinburgh, Scotland, September 26, 1845.

\(^{114}\) Minutes of the General Assembly, 1836, p. 273.
such extremes of violence. . . . The question is not between the new and old school—is not in relation to doctrinal errors, but it is slavery and anti-slavery. It is not the standards that are to be protected, but the system of slavery. 115

This obviously over-simplified but partly true analysis was totally rejected by the Princeton Review. 116 Of course, the immediate cause of the division was a sharp doctrinal difference but it cannot be successful denied that the abolitionism of the New School men 117 and the pro-slavery tendencies of the Old School party 118 hastened the breach by providing a divisive social issue to which the theological difference was attached. For example, the resolutions for excluding the Synods of Utica, Geneva, and Genesee were presented to the General Assembly by W. S. Plumer, whose address "was designed to excite the south to vote as one man against those Synods, because they had dared oppose southern slavery." 119 Another example which proves that

115 Editorial in the Cincinnati Journal, June 6, 1837.


119 Editorial in the Cincinnati Journal, June 6, 1837.
slavery was a factor in the division of the Church is the view expressed by the Rev. Dr. Baxter, a Virginian who belonged to the Old School party. After returning from the General Assembly of 1837, he told a group of theological students that one advantage of excising the New School Synods was that it would "put an end to the abolition question and disturbances in the Presbyterian Church." 120

The Old School party "was no more disposed to tamper with the social order than with true doctrine." 121 The conservative view of slavery held by this party and strongly supported by Princeton Seminary points up the coincidence between social and theological conservatism in this movement.

120 New York Observer, July 15, 1837, p. 110, cited by Irving Stoddard Kull, "Presbyterian Attitudes Toward Slavery," Church History, VII (June, 1938), 107. See William Warren Sweet, The Story of Religion in America (revised and enlarged edition; New York: 1950), pp. 262-263. "It is now definitely known that slavery played an important part in the Old School-New School controversy which divided the church in 1837, although none of the Presbyterian historians has noted that fact. . . . Previous to the meeting of the General Assembly of 1837, an Old School convention had been held in which it was agreed that the slavery issue should not be discussed on the floor of the General Assembly, since they feared that it would divide the Old School delegates and therefore defeat their purpose of purging the church of heresy and looseness of polity. . . . Since slavery did not appear as an issue on the floor of the Assembly it has been wrongly assumed that it had nothing to do with the division of the church." And see C. Bruce Staiger, "Abolitionism and the Presbyterian Schism of 1837-1838," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXVI (December, 1949), 391-414.

A South Carolina presbytery, in October, 1836, stated that

... the Church has no right to prescribe rules and dictate principles which can bind or effect the conscience in reference to slavery; and such attempt would constitute ecclesiastical tyranny; that slavery has existed from the days of those good old slave holders and patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; that the existence of slavery is not opposed to the will of God, and whoever has a conscience too tender to recognize this relation as lawful, is righteous overmuch, is wise above what is written, and has submitted his neck to the yoke of man, sacrificed his Christian liberty of conscience, and leaves the infallible word of God for the fancies and doctrines of men.122

The Princeton theology provided a justification for the social as well as the theological conservatism of the Old School party and thus gave divine sanction for a conservative social philosophy in general and the institution of human slavery in particular.

Solution of the slavery problem. Professor Hodge believed that slaveholding was not necessarily sinful, as has been pointed out, and, in 1836, severely criticized the abolitionists of the North who, he thought, were chiefly responsible for the growing tension in the nation over slavery. The abolitionists assumed that "slavery was a heinous crime in the sight of God," a position Hodge could not accept. He insisted upon a distinction between slavery

as an institution, which Christ and His Apostles did not condemn and the Scriptures sanctioned, and the evil abuses which often marked that institution. And he believed that slavery might exist without the evils with which it was usually associated. This curious distinction was prompted by a desire to

... vindicate the character of the inspired writings, and inspired men, from the charge of having overlooked the blackest of human crimes. . . . We say, therefore, that an institution which deprives a certain portion of the community of their personal liberty . . . is not necessarily sinful.

Even more curiously, Hodge asserted that he did not regard slavery as a desirable institution and favored its "extinction." The obvious ambiguity of his position grew out of the assumption, forced upon him by his theory of Scriptural infallibility, that a genuine distinction could be made between the static, abstract conception of slavery as an institution and the dynamic, concrete reality of slavery as exploited servitude. This distinction was clearly drawn in the unheeded advice he gave to the nation in which he spoke of "slavery" and "slaves." He wrote:

Let the North remember that they are bound to follow the example of Christ in their manner of treating slavery, and the South, that they are


124 Ibid., p. 295.
bound to follow the precepts of Christ in their manner of treating their slaves. 125

The simple fact was, of course, that it was impossible to have slavery without also having the evils which inevitably flow from power which presides over those who are defenseless. Hodge's effort to reconcile what he regarded as a Biblical teaching, namely, that the existence of slavery was a morally neutral condition, with the monstrous evils with which the actual practice of slaveholding were characterized is a nice example of the extent to which his Biblicism could drive him. The psychology of this and other similar efforts is clear. Since he believed whatever he thought the Bible taught to be true, regardless of the intellectual or moral difficulties engendered, it was possible for him to rationalize the problems his view sometimes posed, no matter how ridiculous the rationalization might appear to those who rejected his presupposition of Biblical infallibility.

Hodge felt that the only ultimate solution to the slavery issue was that the white and negro races "should separate" and that the negroes should be allowed to develop distinct communities of their own in America or, if that did not prove to be feasible, be sent back to Africa. He

125 Ibid., p. 305. Italics mine.
referred to the African colonization of American negroes as "one of the noblest enterprises of modern benevolence," a viewpoint shared with equal enthusiasm by Archibald Alexander. By 1849, Hodge was willing to state categorically that "emancipation of the slaves is a duty and a necessity," though there is no reason to suppose he ever changed his mind concerning the moral neutrality of slavery as an institution.

**Princeton Seminary and the Civil War.** In January, 1861, on the eve of the Civil War, the Princeton Review took the position that "the complaints of the South against the North ... were either altogether unfounded or did not furnish any justification for the dissolution of the national union" and that "secession was not a constitutional mode of redressing evils." In April, 1861, when secession was an accomplished fact and the war about to begin, an article appeared in the Princeton Review entitled "The Church and the Country" which was "designed as a plea for the unity of the

---

126 Loc. cit.


Old School Presbyterian Church, even in the event of a
dissolution of the national union."\textsuperscript{130} Reluctantly, Hodge
was forced to be more outspoken against the "unscriptural
sentiments" in the South, which, "instead of regarding
slavery as merely allowable under certain circumstances, had
come to advocate it as a good."\textsuperscript{131} The Princeton position,
though conservative with reference to the institution of
slavery, positively opposed the secession of the South and
unequivocally favored the preservation of the Union.

The organization of the Presbyterian Church in the
Confederate States of America in 1861 split Old School
Presbyterianism and the resulting weakness of the Old
School Church in the North as compared with the New School
Presbyterians, whose unity had been relatively undisturbed
by the war, partly accounts for the reunion of the two
Northern branches of the Church in 1870. Hodge strenuously
opposed the reunion because he believed it would involve a
"surrender" by the Old School party of the principle of a
strict interpretation of the standards of the Church. He
recognized that the strength of the Church would be greatly
increased by union, which made it "exceedingly painful to
stand aloof from such a movement," but he was afraid of the

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Loc. cit.}
theological compromise it might involve. He, therefore, wrote: "If the truth be lost, all is lost. Our numbers, wealth, and influence will avail nothing."^132 Even after the union was consummated, Hodge still did not approve of it but recognized his duty "to bow to the will of the majority constitutionally expressed. . . ."^133

V. DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT

The theory of Nathan Beaman. In 1644, Nathan Beaman published a pamphlet on the doctrine of the atonement which was reviewed by Professor Hodge. The review article was read much more widely than the article itself and added to Hodge's reputation as a theologian and controversialist. The article was published separately in America and


134 Nathan S. S. Beaman, Christ, the Only Sacrifice, or the Atonement in its Relation to God and Man (second edition; New York: 1844).


Scotland and was praised highly by Dr. William Cunningham, the Scottish Free Church leader, who wrote a "recommendatory preface" for it.\textsuperscript{137}

"The miserable theory propounded by Dr. Beaman,"\textsuperscript{138} as Hodge phrased it, was given a searching criticism which developed into a small book on the atonement. Following a common custom of the period—and particularly of the Princeton Review—the reviewer quoted only brief excerpts here and there from the article and did not give a connected statement of the author's position. Beaman was treated as incompetent, and insinuations that he was unaware of the implications of his view characterize the review article. For example, Hodge wrote: "Any ordinary reader of the Bible would know better than what Beaman represented in St. Paul's understanding of the Gospel to be."\textsuperscript{139} Again the reviewer

\textsuperscript{137} C. Hodge, The Orthodox Doctrine Regarding the Extent of the Atonement Vindicated (Edinburgh: 1846). See A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 338, and C. Hodge, "Claims of the Free Church of Scotland," Princeton Review, XVI (April, 1844). The article on the Free Church was elicited by his warm friendship with William Cunningham, the Scottish leader, and demonstrates the close affinity between the outlook of Old School Presbyterianism in America and the Free Church of Scotland at this time. The article, extracts from which were read to the Free Church Assembly by Cunningham, was taken to be evidence that "our principles," i.e., those of the Free Church, "are already working for good in America." See also Letter of Samuel Miller, Jr., to the New College Missionary Association, September 30, 1843.

\textsuperscript{138} C. Hodge, "Beaman on the Atonement," Essays and Reviews, p. 183.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., p. 186.
wrote that "this is a doctrine which we see not how any man can practically believe and be a Christian." In the revision of the article which Hodge wrote for publication in Scotland, he revised the foregoing sentence and stated categorically that "this view of the atonement no man can believe and be a Christian." Since it must be assumed that the author of the article believed what he wrote, it must be concluded that Hodge was declaring that Beaman was not a Christian. The Princeton professor was quite capable of "dealing damnation 'round the land" ex cathedra in a fashion quite equal to Roman Catholic popes and bishops.

Enoch Pond, himself an exponent of the New England theology, stated that

... the view of the atonement presented by Dr. Beaman is that commonly known as the governmental theory; the same that was advocated by Doctors Edwards, Griffin, Emmons, Burge, and many others. According to this view, the atonement is an expedient of infinite love and mercy, adopted with a view to satisfy the justice of God and sustain his law and government in extending pardon and salvation to guilty men.

Hodge's reply to Beaman's view. The review article

140 Ibid., p. 184.
141 C. Hodge, Extent of Atonement, p. 70.
stated that Beaman regarded the atonement as necessary "to secure the order and prosperity of the universe." Hodge responded to his own phrasing of Beaman's view as follows:

The theory that the end of punishment, even in the divine government, is to prevent crime, is only one expression of the more general theory that happiness is the end of creation, and that all holiness is resolvable into benevolence.143

Is this not mainly a polemic against the New England theology of the New School Presbyterians? Beaman was Minister of the First Presbyterian Church in Troy, New York, and a leader in the New School party.

Continuing his criticism of Beaman's position, Hodge wrote: "The Bible teaches that Christ was a sacrifice, that he bore our sins, that he propitiated God; was a ransom; was made sin that we might be made righteous."144 Christ "bore the penalty due to our sins, satisfied divine justice, and secured for all in whose behalf that sacrifice is accepted the pardon of sin and restoration to divine favor."145 Again he wrote:

The law pronounces accursed all who do not obey every command; no man has ever rendered this perfect obedience, therefore, all men are under the curse; but Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law,

143 C. Hodge, "Beaman on the Atonement," Essays and Reviews, p. 132.
144 Ibid., p. 144.
145 Ibid., p. 149.
having been made a curse for us.\textsuperscript{146}

A summary of the salient features of what he considered the orthodox doctrine of the atonement was given by Hodge as follows: (a) sin for its own sake deserves the curse of God. (b) God, being just, is immutably determined to punish sin. (c) In order to redeem man from the demands and curse of the law, God, in sovereign and infinite love, sent his own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, who in his own person fulfilled the demands and endured the curse in man's stead. The righteousness and merit of Christ, thus wrought out, is imputed to all for whom the sacrifice was made.\textsuperscript{147}

Hodge thus elaborated a somewhat unique version of the satisfaction theory of the atonement, the main features of which Alexander had taught.\textsuperscript{148} This Princeton theory of the atonement, of course, owed much to the view of Anselm, but Hodge's position, in which the satisfaction wrought by Christ was conceived as vicarious punishment, should not be identified entirely with the Anselmic theory, in which satisfaction was considered as a substitute for punishment.\textsuperscript{149}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 153.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Ibid., pp. 161-162.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Supra, pp. 117-121.
\end{itemize}
George B. Stevens thought that Melanchthon and especially Turretin were chiefly responsible for the penal-satisfaction theory of the atonement developed by the Princeton school. 150 Calvin, whom Hodge professed to follow meticulously, gave greater emphasis to God's love as the source and to the divine decree as the necessity of redemption than the immediate demands of distributive justice, to which the Princeton professor gave priority. 151 Perhaps Stevens has overemphasized the difference between the view of the Reformers and the seventeenth century Protestant scholastics with reference to this doctrine but it is clear that writers like Turretin stressed the purely judicial element in the atonement more than Calvin and Luther and that Hodge followed Turretin and other scholastic theologians more than he did the Reformers in his doctrine of the meaning of Christ's death.


According to Hodge, Christ, the substitute, satisfied the demands of distributive justice in behalf of the elect, for whom justification was thereby secured. He insisted upon the doctrine of Christ's work as a satisfaction but denied the *quid pro quo* theory, which absolutely identified Christ's penal sufferings in degree and kind with those deserved by every sinner for whom He died. But how could "distributive justice" be satisfied in the case of an individual unless the satisfaction provided was identical with the penal sufferings presumably deserved? Actually, Hodge's view of the atonement involves the *quid pro quo* doctrine because it was fundamentally a legalistic theory in which salvation was provided for individual sinners on the basis of Christ's satisfaction of distributive justice. He held that Christ's sufferings were penal in that they were the substitute for man's iniquities, which were laid on Him; as a sacrifice, He endured the death sinful men deserved. Christ was made a curse from which men are redeemed by His bearing it in their

---

152 See ibid., p. 177. "According to the doctrine of election, God, of his mere good pleasure, before the foundation of the world, chose some to everlasting life, and, for infinitely wise and holy reasons, left others to perish in their sins." See also ibid., pp. 171-175. God's "design" in the "death of Christ" was to save only the elect, for whom the atonement, therefore, was solely intended. The doctrine of a "limited atonement" was thus advocated.

153 Ibid., p. 168.
According to this theory, God must punish either the sinner on account of his sins or a substitute who suffers for them.

The satisfaction of Christ was thus the discharge of man's debt, as a consequence of which there could be no genuine forgiveness because there is nothing left to forgive. Since the atonement allegedly paid every debt, past or possible in the future, many times over for the elect, it is unjust to consider man a debtor. Christ's atoning deed was an act which fulfilled the demands of justice. The complete satisfaction of God's justice by Christ in behalf of the sinner excluded the necessity of Divine mercy. The two ideas, satisfaction and forgiveness, are mutually exclusive. It is significant that "forgiveness" and "pardon" of sin are not found in the indexes of the doctrinal disquisitions of Charles Hodge and his son.

At the risk of repetition but in the interest of clarity, let it be said again that Hodge defined the punishment Christ allegedly endured as suffering inflicted by God for the satisfaction of justice in behalf of the elect. Strictly speaking, this would lead logically to the strict penal theory, according to which the offender himself must pay for his crime, but Hodge made an attempt to avoid its

154 Ibid., p. 147 et passim.
greatest inconsistency. He admitted that the demand of the penal law is not merely for punishment in general but for punishment of the particular offender who breaks the law. In commercial law, it is of no consequence who pays the debt, the debtor or someone else, as long as the debt is paid. In penal law the offender himself must pay. This would exclude the possibility of vicarious satisfaction. But Hodge, of course, refused to accept this conclusion, though he accepted the distinction between penal and commercial law, which would logically rule out the possibility of vicarious satisfaction in the case of penal debt. This antinomy forced him to take refuge in his rigorous doctrine of the Divine sovereignty. It was within the right of the Sovereign Power, he said, to make a covenant by which an innocent person might suffer the punishment of the guilty. Seeking an analogy for the doctrine, Hodge wrote: "Penal satisfaction does not ipso facto liberate; the acceptance is a matter of arrangement or covenant, and the terms of that covenant must depend on the will of the parties." The analogy given by Hodge in the preceding sentence does not apply to the question of whether vicarious punishment

155 Ibid., pp. 165-166. See C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, 470-471.
156 C. Hodge, "Beaman on the Atonement," Essays and Reviews, pp. 165-166.
can be applied for the payment of a penal debt. Can the arbitrary "will of the two parties" really satisfy penal justice by substituting an innocent victim for the guilty party? The answer must be negative. One who is guilty of a penal offense must satisfy the law himself. The law is not satisfied if the penalty required is exacted from an innocent party. Presumably this fact forced Hodge finally to retreat again to the doctrine of God's sovereignty, which in this case means little more than His arbitrary will to set aside the ethical and legal demands required by penal justice. God has seen fit, according to Hodge, to substitute the innocent Christ's sufferings for the punishment due the guilty sinner. The "right" of God to do this was taken to be a teaching of Scripture and required no other proof. 157

An implication. "The penal-satisfaction theory" of the atonement, G. B. Stevens said, was developed by the divines of "the seventeenth century, that period of Protestant scholasticism and hyper orthodoxy." 158 He held that Hodge's view accorded only with this "provincial hyper-orthodoxy" and felt it was "as unwarranted by historical orthodoxy in general as it was foreign to the Christian concept of God and

157 Ibid., p. 169.
repugnant to the moral sense of mankind.\textsuperscript{159} This doctrine of the atonement—and, indeed, the Princeton theology in general—as systematized by Hodge in the framework provided by Alexander\textsuperscript{160} was more a version of seventeenth century Protestant scholasticism than the Biblical theology it honestly professed to be. Hodge, however, never tired of reminding his readers that the theology espoused by Princeton was "known to be held by a decided majority of evangelical Christendom"\textsuperscript{161} and seemed to be entirely unaware of any deviation from Biblical truth or Protestant orthodoxy. This belief that the theological position of the Seminary was in absolute conformity with the "decided majority of evangelical Christendom" was presumably what prompted Hodge's oft quoted remark made at the semi-centennial celebration of his professorship in 1872: "I am not afraid to say that a new idea never originated in this Seminary." This remark was made in connection with a statement in which Hodge linked his theological position with that of his former colleagues, Archibald Alexander and Samuel Miller. They, he said, "were not speculative men. They were not given to new methods or

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., pp. 178-179, footnote 3.

\textsuperscript{160} Supra., pp. 117-121.

\textsuperscript{161} C. Hodge, "Inquiries Respecting the Doctrine of Imputation," \textit{Biblical Repertory}, II (July, 1830), 430.
new theories. They were content with the faith once delivered to the saints. . . . What the Bible says, God says. That ends the matter." 162

VI. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION

"Representative" theory of imputation. Hodge was pre-occupied with the doctrine of imputation through most of his career. 163 Articles in the Princeton Review touching this doctrine were elicited without exception by the appearance of doctrinal statements relating to imputation with which he disagreed. In answer to Dr. Phillip Schaff, who had "freely controverted the views, and what he considered to be the views of this journal, [The Princeton Review], and its conductors," he wrote an elaborate treatise entitled, "The Relation of Adam's First Sin to the Fall of the Race." 164 He stated the main foci of the doctrine under eight headings: (1) A covenant was made between God and man in which "God stipulated life (which included perfect and perpetual

162 C. Hodge, Semi-Centennial Address, April 24, 1872, cited by A. A. Hodge, G. Hodge, p. 521.

163 Articles touching the doctrines of imputation appeared in the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review in the following years: 1830, 1831, 1832, 1839, 1860, 1865, 1870.

holiness and blessedness) on condition of perfect and personal obedience and death (which included every form of evil) on condition of disobedience." (2) This covenant with Adam "was not for himself alone but for his posterity, so that whatever the event and consequences of his trial, penal or otherwise, should be to himself, they should be the same to all his offspring." Precisely the same "evils have been inflicted on their posterity which were inflicted upon Adam and Eve for eating the forbidden fruit." (3) In this transaction, Adam, who was regarded as an historical person in conformity with current orthodoxy, "acted representatively for his posterity." He contained mankind "seminally and potentially" and was "the federal head" of the race. "Literally and personally" the first transgression was "the sin of the first parents." But "their act" was also that of their posterity, "not literally and personally, but constructively and representatively." (4) The "death" which issued from the Fall was both physical and spiritual. Adam and Eve "fell from their original righteousness" and "became dead in sin and wholly defiled in all faculties and parts of soul and body." This "death in sin and corrupted nature were conveyed to all their posterity proceeding from them by ordinary generation." The Fall thus produced "an original corruption of nature, out of which proceeds all actual transgressions." (6) "The first and frontal element
in original sin is the guilt of Adam's first sin." (7)

"Original sin is the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of man's whole nature." (8) This state of "native corruption is itself sinful, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it." Thus, in complete conformity with Archibald Alexander, 165 he asserted the guilt of all men for the sin of the first man. Original sin is also original guilt.

In the foregoing exposition, Hodge constantly stressed Adam as both the "natural" and the "representative" head of the race, which, therefore, "representatively sins" in him, as it was cumbersomely put. Against Schaff's "realistic" theory of imputation, Hodge insisted upon the "representative" view, which he identified with the Westminster Confession of Faith. 166 The "realistic" theory, Hodge held, implied the imputation of the sin of Adam to the race because of man-

---

165 Supra, pp. 123-129.


167 See Henry B. Smith, "Review of Charles Hodge's Systematic Theology, vol. II," The Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review, 1 (April, 1872), 399. Smith held that both theories of imputation—representative and realistic (also called immediate and mediate)—had rightful places in the Reformed theology. He felt that Hodge's theory did not coincide with the view of Augustine, Calvin, and Edwards. Smith thought the words of the Catechism, "We sinned in Adam and fell with him in his first transgression," meant "more than a representation of individuals."
kind's alleged "literal and real participation in it."\textsuperscript{168} Against this doctrine, he advanced the theory of "representative" imputation both of sin from Adam and righteousness from Christ.\textsuperscript{169} This, significantly, was the teaching of Turretin transmitted to Hodge by Archibald Alexander.\textsuperscript{170} In 1830, Alexander wrote:

That sin which has brought death on all men, although committed by Adam alone, as it was a personal act, yet may be considered as the sin of human nature, since he stood as the representative of us all, who were then included in his loins; and all are therefore laid under an obligation to suffer the punishment of his sin.\textsuperscript{171}

Thus the "representative" view of the imputation of sin to the race through Adam's transgression was undoubtedly the doctrine held by the Princeton School. In 1864, Lyman H. Atwater, another ardent advocate of the Princeton position, reviewing Dr. W. G. T. Shedd's \textit{History of Christian Doctrine},\textsuperscript{172} in which the "realistic" view was taken, made the following comment:

The chief question of moment between him and us relates to the kind of union in virtue of which Adam's sin was accounted and treated as the sin of the race.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} C. Hodge, "Adam's First Sin," \textit{Princeton Review}, p. 252.
\item \textsuperscript{169} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 254.
\item \textsuperscript{170} \textit{Supra}, pp. 124-125.
\item \textsuperscript{171} A. Alexander, "Early History of Pelagianism," \textit{Biblical Repertory}, \textit{II} (January, 1830), 95. Italics mine.
\item \textsuperscript{172} W. G. T. Shedd, \textit{A History of Christian Doctrine} (New York: 1863).
\end{itemize}
We hold that we sinned in Adam, as he was our federal head and representative. . . . Shed speaks holds that when Adam sinned the race sinned.\(^{173}\)

Alexander, Hodge, and Atwater of Princeton held the "representative" theory against Schaff, Shedd, and Smith of Union, who taught the "realistic" view. Hodge, as usual, claimed that his position was in conformity with Augustine, Calvin, and the Confession. Shedd argued that "an examination of the Westminster standards evinces that in the judgment of their authors natural or substantial union is the true ground of the imputation of Adam's sin, and that vicarious representation is inadequate."\(^{174}\)

**Critique of the New England doctrine.** Hodge's theological hair-splitting in the debate with Schaff was but a prelude for his fierce fulminations in the same article against "the so-called New England theology" on the subject of the imputation of sin. Beginning with Jonathan Edwards, "whose great treatise on original sin vacillates between mediate and immediate imputation," the Princeton professor proceeded to castigate the entire New England theological development in his customary style. Edwards, he said, sought

---


... to defend the doctrine of natural depravity by the theory of identity; i.e., a divinely constituted oneness of Adam and his race, by which his posterity should be born in his moral image, whether good or bad, according to the law that like begats like.175

From this alleged heretical beginning, "the New England doctrine eventually ... crystallized into a definite anti-imputationism,"176 Hodge believed. Early in the development of the New England theology, the position was taken that the visitation upon the race for Adam's sin was not of the nature of punishment for it. According to Hodge, the New Haven school conceded

... the transmission of a depraved nature as a consequence of Adam's sin but denied that this native corruption had the quality of sin, yet maintained that it insured the certainty of sinning in all individuals of the race as soon as moral agency began.177

In other words, original sin was affirmed by the New Haven school but not the Augustinian corollary of original guilt. These New England divines differed from "the Princeton scheme not in the fact that ... evils are the consequence of Adam's sin but simply and solely whether they are properly termed the punishment of his posterity."178 Hodge held "not

177 Loc. cit.
178 Ibid., p. 258.
only that all suffer the consequences of Adam's sin," which the New Haven school admitted, "but that these consequences are the penalty of sin for which 'judgment came upon all men to condemnation.'—Romans 5:17-18. "179 He taught not only an inherited tendency to sin in human nature, which the New Haven school admitted, but also man's responsibility for the depraved tendency, which the New Haven theologians, led by Nathaniel W. Taylor, denied. Again, the sharp antithesis between New England and Princeton may be observed.

VII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Approach to theism. It is rather remarkable that the problem of the knowledge of God—"a question which lies at the foundation of all religion"—180 was not dealt with by Hodge in the Princeton Review until 1864. Perhaps this may be attributed to his strong preoccupation with Biblical studies and his equally strong aversion to "speculative" theology. The Bible, of course, simply assumes that God exists and can be known. Since this fact ended the argument once and for all for him, he did not turn his attention to this matter until he began in earnest to prepare himself to write his Systematic Theology, the first volume of which

179 Ibid., p. 260.

appeared in 1871, in which the necessity of producing a
systematic statement of his position forced him to a con-
sideration of "natural theology." A. A. Hodge wrote:

The preparation of the first part of this vast work
[the Systematic Theology], treating ... the
foundations of natural theology and its relation to
materialism and other anti-theistic theories, scientific
and philosophical and traditional, exacted of him a
great amount of reading and reflection.181

In the aforementioned article, Hodge asserted that
three answers might be given to the question—can God be
known? The one is "a distinct affirmative answer; another
as distinctly negative; and the third is a qualified affirma-
tive." He took the third position that the knowledge of God
was "qualified,"182 and sought to disprove the first two theories,
especially the second. His writing betrays a sometimes
secondhand and usually inadequate acquaintance with "the
modern speculative school of philosophers and philosophical
theologians," as he described them. He wrote easily but
artificially about Hegel, Schelling, Kant, and Pascal.
Constant references were made to H. L. Mansel and Sir William
Hamilton, who attacked the belief that God's existence was
rationally demonstrable. In all of this, Hodge lacked the
sure command he held over the theological field and it is


182 C. Hodge, "Can God Be Known?," Princeton Review, XXXVI,
pp. 122-123.
obvious that what he learned about the "philosophers and philosophical theologians" was the result of a period of study in which he engaged shortly before embarking upon this article. He suddenly seems to have realized that he had neglected this area and, too late, tried to make up for his deficiency.

The theme of the article was "to state in what sense, according to the Scriptures and common faith of the Church, God can and may be known." He, therefore, declared that

... the Scriptures teach and the whole church believes that God is a proper object of knowledge; that while we cannot conceive him in infinitude, nor comprehend his nature, his perfections, nor his relation to his creatures, yet our partial knowledge is correct knowledge; that he really is what he declares himself to be—a self-conscious, intelligent, voluntary agent, infinite, eternal, and immutable in his being and attributes. In the ensuing argument designed to prove that God exists and can be known, the staunch Biblical theologian depended more upon Greek theistic argument than the Biblical viewpoint. "Natural" theology was regarded as the first of two steps in acquiring a knowledge of God, the second being "revealed" theology. This is obviously not only Thomistic but also Reformed orthodoxy, wholeheartedly adopted by Hodge. The Princeton professor accepted the traditional "theistic

183 Ibid., p. 141.
184 Ibid., p. 144.
Proofs" uncritically and failed to reckon with the sweeping criticisms which had been made of this approach by David Hume and Imanuel Kant. In the article, Kant was mentioned—and misunderstood—twice, and Hume considered not at all.

Anthropomorphism appeared at the very beginning of the article. He wrote:

We form our notion, or idea, of God by attributing to him the perfections of our own nature without limitation, and in an infinite degree, and in so doing we attain a definite and correct knowledge of what God is. . . . The ground why we are authorized to ascribe to God the perfections of our own nature is that we are his children.185

How strange to read from the pen of the Princeton arch-Calvinist the statement that "we were created in God's image; we are, therefore, like him, and he is like us."186 The entire article was devoted to the effort to prove "that this method of forming our ideas of God is trustworthy, or that God really is what we are led to think him to be."187

Exposition of theistic arguments. The article contained seven separate considerations. (1) "The conviction that God is what he has revealed himself to be rests on belief in . . . the veracity of consciousness, or the

185 Ibid., p. 145.
186 Loc. cit.
187 Ibid., p. 146.
trustworthiness of the laws of belief impressed upon the constitution of our own nature.\textsuperscript{188} The problem of the relativity of knowledge was brushed aside with the assertion that the knowledge of God was limited but nevertheless true.

(2) It was stated that "all men are conscious of accountability to a being superior to themselves, who knows what they are, and what they do, and who has the will and purpose to reward or punish men according to their works." This God "is revealed in our moral nature.\textsuperscript{189} Unless this "revelation" is true "our whole nature is a lie.\textsuperscript{190} Using Schleiermacher's phrase, "sense of dependence upon a superior power," he proceeded in a Kantian fashion to stress "the moral obligation" involved in the consciousness of dependence, which, he said, implied "the existence of a moral (and of course a personal) Deity. . . .\textsuperscript{191}

(3) "Religious consciousness" demands "a personal God--a God clothed with the attributes of a nature like our own. . . ." Consequently, "unless our whole nature is a contradiction and a falsehood, we arrive at a true knowledge of God when we attribute to him the perfections of our

\textsuperscript{188} Loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p. 147.
\textsuperscript{190} Loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., p. 148.
nature."192

(4) The only alternative to "anthropomorphism" is "atheism," he held. "Those who reject this method of forming an idea of God, who deny that we are to refer to him the perfections of our nature, have become atheists."193 When Kant concluded that the existence of God was not capable of rational proof, he fell back from speculative to practical reason, which Hodge identified with "blind faith"194 and thereby produced a progeny of atheists!195 The claim based on "blind faith" in God was regarded as "unavailing" unless it could be shown that it was well founded on rational proof.

(5) "The works of God" were held to "manifest the attributes of a nature like our own." The teleological argument for God's existence was then briefly sketched. The design exhibited in the universe must be the result of a cause characterized by "intelligence, wisdom, power, and moral excellencies."196 Thus "the revelation made of the

192 Loc. cit.
193 Ibid., pp. 149-150.
194 This is, of course, an incredible misunderstanding of Kant's meaning. The Kantian "practical reason" is not "blind faith" but has reference to the realities of the moral life, through which the God, unavailable by the route of "pure reason," could be reached.
195 Ibid., p. 150.
196 Loc. cit.
nature of God in the external world authenticates the revelation of himself which has been made in the constitution of our being." \(^1^9^7\)

(6) At this point, he sought to prove that the God revealed in Scripture was identical with the God disclosed in "the perfections of our own nature." An example of the argument pursued here is, "We are self-conscious; so is God. We are persons; so is God, etc." What is found within man's nature by introspection and referred to God is what Scripture declares God to be. \(^1^9^8\) Thus a continuity was affirmed between natural and revealed theology, between nature and grace, in spite of Hodge's doctrine of total depravity, which would seem to forbid a theology of Divine-human continuity. Apparently this inconsistency was never really recognized by Hodge, who wrote with equal assurance about the striking similarity between man and God, on the one hand, and man's total depravity, or total dissimilarity from God, on the other. The Princeton professor did draw a distinction between the effect of the Fall upon man's "original righteousness," which was entirely lost, and the essential attributes of human nature, such as reason, will, and conscience, which were not lost. \(^1^9^9\) The distinction,

---

197 Ibid., p. 151.
198 Loc. cit.
however, is not maintained because he proceeded on the assumption that the "original corruption affects the whole man." If man is infected with a "total depravity" how is it possible to argue from any point in human nature to the Divine nature?

(7) Concluding the article, he turned entirely away from "natural theology," and the effort to show the continuity between natural and revealed theology, to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Here the Biblical viewpoint appeared for the first time, sustaining an apparent but not actual relation to what preceded. He quoted a passage of Scripture which would seem to demolish much of what he had asserted: "No man knoweth the Father but the Son and he to whom the Son shall reveal him." And so "philosophy must seal her lips in the presence of God thus manifest in the flesh, and not pretend to declare that he is not, or is not known to be, what he has revealed himself as being."  

Hodge insisted upon the inferential character of man's knowledge of God and accordingly committed himself to a position which the skeptics could easily demolish. He idealized the human, from which he inferred the Divine, and

200 Ibid., pp. 231, 233-234.

failed to see the impossibility of transcending the purely human category by merely idealizing it. His unsuccessful effort to confound the skeptics points up the unresolved tension within the Princeton position between natural and revealed theology. This unrecognized hiatus was, of course, not peculiar to the Princeton school—it was, and is, part and parcel of Catholic and Protestant orthodoxy—but a recognition of this unsolved problem in the Princeton position is important in this study because it shows the failure of even the allegedly intense Biblical theology of Professor Hodge to reach a Biblical understanding of the relation of reason and revelation.

VIII. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGIAN

The Systematic Theology. Dr. Hodge's Systematic Theology was his magnum opus. A. A. Hodge thought that the work was "probably projected" as early as 1864 but registered the opinion that it was "not grappled with very earnestly before 1867."202 The article in the Princeton Review, "Can God be Known?," is probably evidence that he had begun to

202 The synthesis of Greek and Hebrew-Christian elements in Thomism provides presuppositions for natural theology unavailable in the Reformed tradition, to which the Greek elements (and, therefore, natural theology) constitute little more than an appendage.

anticipate the Systematic Theology about 1864, when the article was written, because the burden of the foregoing discussion was a consideration of matters which might well have been preparatory for the larger work. A comparison of this massive work of two-thousand two-hundred large octavo pages with his articles on theological subjects in the Princeton Review and extant copies of classroom lectures discloses that the Systematic Theology was the result of an almost complete rewriting, though the views expressed remained the same. The Systematic Theology, then, was not the product of a piecing together of previous writing but a unified work which evinces the systematic unfolding of a single purpose from beginning to end. Most of this treatise was written after Hodge had reached seventy years of age and is irenic in comparison with most of his articles in the Princeton Review. The spirit of controversy, however, often appears, as result of which the work lacks symmetry and is sometimes rather repetitious. Hodge's purpose was not only to elucidate his Calvinistic position but also to combat current "heresies." The polemical purpose, \(^{204}\) though sublimated to the grand design, pervades the entire work and definitely "dates" the treatise. Hodge wrote quite as much to counteract the New England theology as to set forth a positive

position. His emphases were, therefore, often determined by recent and current controversies with the New England school, which by 1900 had almost entirely ceased to be a factor in American theology.

It should be noted that the impact of European, especially German, theological scholarship, particularly the historical criticism of the Bible, and the growing prestige of science produced a radically different situation in America at about the same time that saw the passing of the New England theology. This critical tendency was resisted in some quarters, notably at Princeton Seminary, but it eventually demolished the presuppositions of Biblical infallibility upon which Hodge's work rested. Hodge's theology, nevertheless, filled a widespread need in the period in which it was produced, though the period was swiftly swept away by the impact of science and industrialization, and must be regarded as one of the outstanding—if not the outstanding—Calvinistic system developed in America in the nineteenth century. To say "it stands at the head of the dogmatic literature of our language," as Francis Patton


put it, however, seems hardly justified.

Idea of authority. A friendly critic stated that the Systematic Theology was "conditioned by two all-pervading principles: the author's unfaltering belief in the plenary inspiration and infallible authority of the Bible, and his uncompromising opposition to speculative theology." The idea of Biblical authority which controlled Hodge's theology is suggested by the following statement which appears at the beginning of his treatise:

The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the Word of God, written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and are infallible, and of divine authority in all things pertaining to faith and practice, and consequently free from all error whether of doctrine, fact, or precept.

Thus, "the Bible contains the truths which the theologian has to collect, arrange, and exhibit in their internal relation to each other." The task of the theologian was simply to arrange the "truths" displayed by the Biblical exegete into a system. "It is the business of the theologian," Hodge wrote, "to set forth what the Bible teaches." Presumably the exegete and the theologian had identical tasks, except

207 Ibid., p. 371.
208 Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 152.
209 Ibid., p. 1.
210 Ibid., p. 166.
that the latter's function was of a more systematic character. Furthermore, the function of the theologian was identical with the function of the physical scientist with respect to the relation between the investigator and the object of his investigation. Speaking of the theologian, Hodge wrote: "His business is simply to exhibit the contents of the Bible in scientific form. His relation to the Scriptures is analogous to that of the man of science to nature." 211 The objectivity of revelation was said to be identical with the objectivity of nature, the secrets of both of which were available only to the subject who submitted himself to the objective "facts" of Scripture or the physical world, observed the relation these "facts" stood to each other, and thence deduced the "laws" which determined that relation. 212

Accordingly, Hodge believed that

"... the object of revelation is the communication of knowledge, and the object of inspiration is to secure infallibility in teaching. ... The effect of revelation was to render the recipient wiser, and the effect of inspiration was to preserve him from error in teaching." 213

Therefore, he held "that inspired men were the organs of God

---


212 Loc. cit., supra, pp. 111-112, for Alexander's identical view.

213 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 155.
in such a sense that their words are to be received . . . as the words of God."214 Alleged "discrepancies" in the Bible were uniformly regarded as merely "apparent" or the result of "errors of transcribers,"215 which were, therefore, professedly absent from the autographs. Thus "the words of Scripture . . . taken in their plain historical sense"216 were understood to be the "words of God,"217 and, therefore, "all the great questions which for ages have agitated the minds of men are settled with infallible certainty."218

There was no problem of truth and error in the Bible itself, every jot and tittle of which was unqualifiedly true, but only the problem of correct Biblical exegesis and the

214 Ibid., p. 157.
215 Ibid., p. 169.
216 Ibid., p. 187.

217 Ibid., p. 157. See J. L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought (Philadelphia: 1946), II, 292. "Hodge allows more room for the human agency in the composition of the Bible than in the older Calvinism. True, he teaches plenary inspiration and holds that all the books of the Bible are equally inspired. 'Inspiration,' Hodge says, 'extends to everything which any sacred writer asserts to be true, including incidental circumstances, or facts of apparently minor importance, as, for example, that Satan tempted our first parents in the form of a serpent.' But he wants the theologian to distinguish between what the sacred writers themselves thought or believed, and what they teach. They may have believed that the sun moves around the earth, but they do not so teach.'" C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 163, 170.

218 Ibid., p. 171
exhibition of the exegetical conclusions in "their internal relation to each other." 219

The theological problem was thus quite simple. The sole source of valid religious knowledge was the ipsissima verba of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. 220 The witness of the Spirit in the heart of the Christian was limited to a drawing out and clarification of the truths already disclosed in the Bible. Hodge said that "the object of the inward teaching of the Spirit is to enable us to discern the truth and excellence of what has already been objectively revealed in the Bible." 221 Here he shared the Protestant orthodoxy of his age, though it should be noticed that the exponents of the New England theology were more favorably disposed than the Princeton school toward the whole field of the psychological verification of Christian truth. The Edwardean theology had been wrought out against the background of revival preaching by Edwards himself and many of his successors, such as Timothy Dwight and Charles Finney. 222

219 Ibid., p. 1.

220 This principle was followed by Hodge except in discussions of natural theology, where God was allegedly deduced from "the constitution of our nature and the external world," as well as Scripture. But even then he thought that his philosophical theism simply confirmed what the Bible already taught. See Patton, "C. Hodge, Presbyterian Review, p. 371.

221 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 68.

222 As has been pointed out, the Princeton theology was anti-revivalistic. Supra, p. 100-108.
"The gospel of the blessed God," wrote Edwards, "does not go abroad a begging for its evidence so much as some think; it has its highest and most proper evidence in itself."

Foster has observed that "Edwards did not neglect the external arguments, as Calvin had not; but . . . he placed the weight of argument in the inner certainty of the specific Christian experience." 224

Hodge also held that Christianity had "its highest and most proper evidence in itself," as Edwards had expressed it, and believed generally in the self-authenticating character of truth, 225 but his fear of subjectivism forced him in actual practice to suspect all claims to religious truth unsupported by the external authority of the Bible. "The divinely authenticated written Word," he asserted, "is the criterion by which a man can test . . . inward impulses . . . and determine which are from the Spirit of God, and which are from his own heart or from Satan. . . ." 226

He submitted the following "proofs" of the "plenary" inspiration and, therefore, infallible authority of the


224 Foster, History of the New England Theology, p. 59.

225 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 636. "Undoubtedly the highest evidence of the truth is the truth itself."

226 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
(1) The organic unity of the Scriptures proves them to be the product of one mind... and that mind must be the mind of God. He only knows the end from the beginning. He only could know what the Bible reveals. 

(2) "We have the witness to the infallibility of Scripture in ourselves." The adaptability of "the truths revealed in the Bible to our souls" was said to prove that Scripture is "true," "divine," a "supernatural revelation." (3) Christ declared "the Scriptures to be the Word of God" and, therefore, the Christian must accept this estimate of them on His authority. 

(4) "The evidence of miracles is important and decisive as a proof of a divine revelation." The "sacred writers" and "Christ himself" appealed to "these wonders" as proofs of the Divine character of the Gospel. But he also argued that miracles were credible because of "the authority of Scripture." For example, Hume's celebrated argument against miracles, based on the theory of probabilities and the fallibility of human testimony, was brushed aside with the statement that "the miracles recorded in the Scriptures..." 

227 Ibid., pp. 166-168.

228 Ibid., pp. 635-636. See ibid., p. 618. "A miracle may be defined to be an event in the external world, brought about by the immediate efficacy, or simple volition of God." For Archibald Alexander's definition of a miracle and concept of the role miracles occupied in theology, supra, 113-116.

229 Ibid., p. 621.
are a competent part of the great system of truth therein revealed."

Scriptural infallibility was not proved but presupposed in the entire argument for the authority of the Bible. Believing in infallibility, he concluded that "the truths revealed in the Bible" were, without exception, contemporporaneously adaptable. Believing in infallibility, he concluded that Christ did also. The credibility of miracles was derived from the prior belief in infallibility, and then the alleged occurrence of miracles was held to prove Biblical infallibility. The difficulties in the way of proving the infallibility of any historical concretion, whether book, Church, or experience are, of course, absolutely insuperable. Whatever is historical, be it the mind of the theologian or the idea of authority with which he works, is necessarily relative. This problem was never faced frankly by the Princeton school, which claimed that a rejection of the infallibility of Scripture was the result of an evil design rather than of rigorous thought.

For Hodge, as for the scholastics both Protestant and Catholic, authority was inseparable from infallibility, and, therefore, to reject infallibility was tantamount to a surrender of authority. Authority without infallibility was

---

230 Ibid., p. 635.
for him utterly inconceivable. So he wrote: "We cannot believe one part of the Bible without believing the whole."231 There is, of course, nothing peculiarly "Princeton" about this position, which was more or less shared by the Protestant orthodoxy of this period, but Hodge and his colleagues stressed the all-or-none character of the assent demanded to the "truths" of Scripture more than any other contemporary school of theology in America. The Princeton school was completely convinced that belief in an infallible Bible was the only barrier which could withstand the assaults of the skeptics upon Christianity. Subjectivism was regarded as the inevitable consequence of the surrender of Scriptural infallibility; subjectivism issued inevitably in theological anarchy and finally skepticism. Hodge wrote: "To tell men to look within for an authoritative guide, and to trust their irresistible convictions, is to give them a guide which will lead them to destruction."232 The thoughts that dwell in the mind of a man who seeks Christian truth apart from Hodge's theory of authority "are his own imaginings, the character of which depends upon his own subjective state, and whatever they are, they are of man and not of God."233

231 Ibid., p. 621.
232 Ibid., p. 102.
233 Ibid., p. 68.
Biblical infallibility was for Hodge the guarantee of the truth of the propositions he believed to be contained in the Scriptures. Revelation was the means by which the truths of Scripture were communicated to man, namely the words of the Bible, the result of which was to provide men with a body of knowledge otherwise unobtainable. Faith was, therefore, largely a matter of assent to such propositions as were said to be revealed, and theology was little more than the sum of those doctrines by believing which one was set apart as a Christian, and which, by the witness of the Holy Spirit, were confirmed as true.

Philosophical theism and Princeton orthodoxy. For Hodge, the philosophical approach to theism yielded a knowledge of God, though the knowledge thus gained was regarded as less complete than what was given in the Bible. This twofold approach to the knowledge of God is reflected in the structure of Hodge’s Systematic Theology. In the first chapters of the initial volume, the Greek argument for the existence and nature of God is in the forefront and is

234 Supra, pp. 216-224. In the foregoing section of the thesis is given a specimen of Hodge’s philosophical theism which appeared in 1864. The argument in the Systematic Theology, I, 233-240, is precisely the same as what was given in "Can God Be Known?," Princeton Review, XXXVI, 122-152.


236 He followed the philosophical arguments "usually
followed for the remainder of the work by entire reliance upon the Biblical revelation. Hodge thus recognized, at least by implication, a continuity between the Greek and Biblical approaches to theism. He regarded the Greek and Biblical attitudes as complementary steps in the same direction, believing that the Greek approach provided inadequate but reliable knowledge about the same God more fully revealed in the Scriptures. Hodge simply shared the orthodoxy of his time on this point, which sought a synthesis between the Greek and Biblical approaches to the theological problem and tended to conceive the Biblical God in the fashion of the Greeks.

It does not seem necessary in this study to deal fully with Hodge's treatment of the Divine attributes. What was said was paralleled in a general way by the orthodox theologians of the period, though the Princeton professor, strangely enough, gave greater stress to an anthropocentric approach to God's nature than many of his orthodox contemporaries. In this emphasis, he was influenced by the Thomistic tradition, though he made no reference to it. "We are the children of God," wrote Hodge, "and, therefore, we are like him... We are, therefore, authorized to ascribe

236 (Contd.) urged," as he phrased it, for theism: ontological, cosmological, teleological, and moral. See ibid., pp. 191-240.
to Him all the attributes of our own nature as rational creatures, without limitation, and to an infinite degree."237 This is simply Thomism in Princeton garb. Hodge argued analogically from human to divine attributes. The attributes of God, he held, were known a posteriori, i.e., finding them in man, he argued analogically from man to God. That he did not consistently follow the analogical argument for God's attributes is proved by the intermittent appearance in his discussion of this matter of the a priori argument, i.e., the attributes of God are given in the Bible—"they are Scriptural facts,"238 he wrote. And so he turned finally to the Westminster Catechism, which, he thought, provided "the best definition of God ever penned by man: 'God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.'"239 Perhaps it would be fairer to say that Hodge believed the argument which proceeded analogically from human to divine attributes simply confirmed what the exegete discovered the Biblical teaching about the Divine attributes actually to be. The result was, therefore, the same, whether the argument elucidating the attributes of God moved a priori from allegedly

237 Ibid., p. 339.
238 Ibid., p. 366.
239 Ibid., p. 367.
infallible Biblical teaching or a *posteriori* from human attributes. In either case, the knowledge of God was held to be mediated and not a direct knowledge. The claim of "immediate intuition of the infinite,"\(^{240}\) as he phrased it, was for him the rankest heresy, which he classified as "mysticism."\(^{241}\) Man's knowledge of God was mediated, Hodge thought, by analogical reasoning which proceeded from man to God, and by the infallible Bible, through which knowledge of the Divine attributes was given to man. The Holy Spirit functioned, he said, not to provide a direct knowledge of God, but "to enable us to discern the truth and excellence of what has been already revealed in the Bible."\(^{242}\)

The striking similarity between Hodge's view and the

---


\(^{241}\) See *loc. cit.* Here Hodge declared that "mysticism is contrary to the Scriptures." Yet he argued at length seeking to prove that the knowledge of God was partly intuitive. *Ibid.*, pp. 191-203. A close reading of this section discloses he means to teach that only the bare existence of God is "intuitive" and that a knowledge of the attributes of God is the consequence of "analysis" or "inference." "Very little is given by intuition," he wrote. *Ibid.*, p. 200. That God exists, he held to be "intuitive;" what God is like, he regarded as "inferential." He, however, did not maintain this distinction throughout the *Systematic Theology* and came very close to confining all knowledge of God to inferences from idealized human nature, the external world, and the Bible, the last of which had a particular priority. For example, he wrote: "Without the written Word, men everywhere and in all ages are ignorant of divine things. . . ." *Ibid.*, p. 101.

Thomistic tradition is somewhat surprising unless it is remembered that the Princeton theology relied heavily upon Protestant scholasticism, which, in turn, owed much to Thomism. The Princeton school held positions largely identical with both Protestant and Catholic scholasticism with reference to revelation, faith, and the knowledge of God. Revelation was regarded as a series of divinely guaranteed propositions which provided man with a body of knowledge otherwise unavailable. These propositions were indubitably true because they were given by God. The idea of an infallible book containing true propositions is largely a heritage from Catholicism. Faith was conceived as intellectual assent to these allegedly infallible propositions. It was mainly an exercise of the intellect, justified by the unqualified truth claimed for the propositions to which the mind gave assent. Faith was thus reduced to an almost purely cognitive activity by which the mind gave assent to truths beyond reason but not contrary to it. The knowledge of God available in these "infallible" propositions was augmented by the analogical argument which moved from human to divine attributes. In both cases, the knowledge of God was regarded as inferential.

The doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity, which Hodge regarded as "at once the beginning and end of all
insight into Christianity," was presented under two aspects: the Biblical form and the ecclesiastical and philosophical form. He insisted that only the Biblical form of the doctrine was binding upon the Christian mind and then stated frankly that "no such doctrine as that of the Trinity can be adequately proved by a citation of Scripture passages." He, therefore, appealed "to the general teachings of Scripture" in contrast to his usual method of citing proof-texts.

Only the general line of argument pursued by Hodge in submitting his "Scriptural proof of the doctrine" needs to be repeated here because it follows the traditional pattern of presentation. He began by asserting alleged "intimations" of the doctrine in the book of Genesis, such as "the names of God are in the plural form" and "the personal pronouns are often in the first personal plural ('Let us make man in our image')." Much was made of the

243 Ibid., p. 443.

244 Ibid., p. 446. This admission is somewhat surprising in view of Hodge's usual method of claiming proof-text authority for doctrine. But it is, of course, correct. The doctrine of the Trinity is taught only implicitly in the Bible, and it is not perhaps until the third century that an explicit formulation appeared. See James Morgan, The Importance of Tertullian in the Development of Christian Dogma (London: 1928), pp. 103-107.

245 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 466.
"fact" that in "all the early books of Scripture a distinction is made between Jehovah and the angel of Jehovah," to both of whom divine worship was rendered. The "angel of Jehovah" was actually "the Son of God" and was regarded by Hodge as the pre-incarnate Christ. The personal and divine character of the Spirit of God in the Old as well as the New Testament was strongly asserted. "This Spirit," he wrote, "is not an agency, but an agent, who teaches and selects; who can be sinned against and grieved; and who ... is unmistakably revealed as a distinct person." 246 The formula of baptism and the apostolic benediction in the New Testament with their trinitarian implications were said succinctly to summarize the Biblical evidence for the doctrine. 247 Hodge, therefore, concluded that the Bible gave warrant for the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. "Everywhere in the Bible," he stated, "is taught the unity of the Divine Being, the personality and divinity of the Father, Son, and Spirit, and their mutual relations." 248

Proceeding to the "church form" of the doctrine, Hodge defended the features of trinitarian theory which developed in the creeds of the early Christian centuries by seeking to

246 Ibid., p. 447.
247 Ibid., pp. 447-448.
248 Ibid., p. 448.
prove their implicit Biblical basis. The most serious omission in his treatment of the historical development of this doctrine was Tertullian, whom he did not mention even though this church father founded the terminology of orthodox trinitarianism. Hodge, therefore, did not deal adequately with the appearance and meaning of the Latin word persona, which Tertullian introduced to describe the distinctions within the Godhead. The Latin fathers preferred to speak of "three personae in one essence or substance" rather than "three substances in one essence," since the words "substance" and "essence" had precisely the same meaning for them. The Latin word persona properly meant a mask by whose wearing an actor was enabled to adopt a certain role. It did not mean what the English word "person" later came to mean—a center of self-consciousness and self-determination. And yet it was in this latter, developed sense in which Hodge used the term "person" in his formation of the "orthodox" doctrine of the Trinity. He wrote: "The Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct persons—a person is an intelligent subject who can say I, who can be addressed as Thou, and who can act and be the object of action."\(^{249}\) Again he observed: "The Church doctrine asserts that the Father, Son, and Spirit \ldots\ are personal designations, so that the Father is one person, the

\(^{249}\) Ibid., p. 444.
Son another person, and the Spirit another person."\(^{250}\) He stated again: "The idea expressed by the word "person" in its application to the distinctions in the Godhead is just as clear and definite as in its application to men."\(^{251}\) Hodge's doctrine of the Trinity was logically tritheistic and perpetuated a needless theological complexity.\(^{252}\)

An elaborate explanation and defense was given of the doctrine as set forth in the Nicene, Constantinopolitan, and Athanasian creeds, among which, he held, "there is no difference, except as to amplification."\(^{253}\) Three emphases in Hodge's account of the doctrine of the Trinity as set forth in these creeds and developed further by the Nicene Fathers will suffice:

\(^{250}\) Ibid., p. 459.

\(^{251}\) Loc. cit.

\(^{252}\) See ibid., p. 462. "The fact of the intimate union, communion, and inhabitation of the persons of the Trinity is the reason why everywhere in Scripture ... God as God is addressed as a person, in perfect consistency with the Tripersonality of the Godhead. We can, and do pray to each of the Persons separately; and we pray to God as God; for the three persons are one God; one not only in substance, but in knowledge, will, and power. To expect that we ... should understand the mysteries of the Godhead is to the last degree unreasonable. But as in every other sphere we must believe what we cannot understand; so we may believe all that God has revealed in His Word concerning Himself...."

\(^{253}\) Ibid., p. 459. See ibid., p. 462. "The creeds are nothing more than a well ordered arrangement of the facts of Scripture which concern the doctrine of the Trinity."
(1) He doubted the doctrine of the "eternal generation of the Son" as explained by the Nicene Fathers, for whom sonship meant derivation of essence. He described this doctrine, which he thought, was based upon a mistaken interpretation of John 5:26, as follows: "The First Person of the Trinity is Father, because He communicates the essence of the Godhead to the Second Person; and the Second Person is Son, because He derives that essence from the First Person." This process was allegedly "an eternal movement in the divine essence." Hodge's treatment of this doctrine is a clear example of the determinative character which a single passage of Scripture might have for the Princeton school. With reference to the doctrine under

254 Fisher was wrong when he wrote: "By him Charles Hodge the church doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son was defended." See George Park Fisher, A History of Christian Doctrine (Edinburgh: 1896), p. 444. This book is a typical example of the neglect of the Princeton school in American theological history. Less than one page is devoted to the Princeton theology as compared to thirty-two to the New England school. And what little Fisher said about the Princeton theology was obviously based on general impressions rather than a careful reading of the relevant historical sources.

255 He believed in "a distinction between the speculations of the Nicene Fathers and the decisions of the Nicene Council." See C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 471.

256 "As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given the Son to have life in himself."

257 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 468.

258 Ibid., p. 469.
consideration, a finely drawn exegetical point was the determining factor in its rejection. Hodge believed that the passage in question dealt with the Son not in the sense of the eternal Ἰησοῦς but in the sense of the incarnate Christ and, therefore, when it was said that the Father "has given the Son to have life in himself," the teaching "concerns the constitution of Christ's person as he appeared on earth, and not the nature of the relation of the Father to the Son in the Godhead." 259

(2) The Nicene Creed—as amplified in that of Constantinople—asserted the "subordination" of the Son to the Father and the Spirit to the Father and the Son "as to mode of subsistence and operation." 260 Hodge objected not to the idea of subordination in the foregoing sense, which he believed to be Scriptural, 261 but to the effort made by the Nicene Fathers "to explain what was the nature of that subordination." 262 He thought the speculations of the Fathers tended to undercut the necessary and self-existence of the Son and the Spirit and consequently he wrote that

... self-existence and necessary existence, as well as omnipotence and all other divine attributes, belong

259 Ibid., p. 471.
260 Ibid., p. 462.
261 Ibid., pp. 464-465.
262 Ibid., p. 465.
to the divine essence common to all the persons of the Trinity, and therefore it is the Triune God who is self-existent, and not one person in distinction from other persons. . . . And, therefore, as Calvin says, when the word God is used indefinitely it means the Triune God, and not the Father in distinction from the Son and Spirit. 263

Hodge admitted that the nature of the subordination supposed to subsist within the Godhead was an utterly incomprehensible mystery but nevertheless accepted the idea of subordination "as to mode of subsistence and operation"—not "as to being and perfection"—because he believed it was a teaching of Scripture.

(3) The "eternal sonship" of Christ was asserted against all views which implied that He became the Son of God at a point in time. The word "Son" as applied to Christ was, he said, "not a term of office but of nature" and expressed "the relation which the Second Person in the Trinity from eternity bears to the First Person, and . . . the relation thus indicated is sameness of nature, so that sonship, in the case of Christ, includes equality with God." 264 In answer to the objection that if Christ is Son, He is "not self-existent and independent," Hodge stated that "self-existence and independence are attributes of the divine essence, and not of one person in distinction from the

263 Ibid., p. 467.
264 Ibid., p. 471.
others." He admitted that the term "Son" signified subordination as to mode of subsistence and operation" but insisted also upon the "perfect and equal Godhead of the Father and the Son." The subordination of the Son to the Father as to "mode of subsistence" and the equality of the Father and the Son as to "essence" were two apparently contradictory propositions which Hodge regarded as consistent since he held that they were both Scriptural "facts." The "incomprehensibility" of a doctrine never prevented Hodge from precise formulation of it as long as he believed it had a Biblical basis.

The origin of man. Writing about the origin of man, Hodge asserted that "man's body was formed by the immediate intervention of God. . . . It was not produced by any process of development." The "soul was derived from God." He thus rejected the doctrine of "theistic evolution," which was just beginning to gain popularity in America. The evolutionary theory of human origin was an implication of Charles Darwin's *Origin of the Species*, which appeared in


267 Theologians contemporary to Hodge in America who adapted the evolutionary theory to theological speculation were James Woodrow of the Presbyterian Seminary at Columbia, South Carolina, who was dismissed for his views; James McCosh and Charles W. Shields of the College of New Jersey; and George W. Wright of Oberlin College.
1859. In 1874, Hodge wrote a "reply" in *What is Darwinism?*, in which he took the position that the theory of evolution excluded all teleology and, therefore, led to atheism.

Herbert W. Schneider stated that the "strategy" of several "leading controversialists," including Dr. Hodge, was

... to defy evolutionary theory on the ground that it was not genuine science, but merely the old design argument weakened by the omission of a designer. True science, they thought, could not possibly conflict with true theology, because it would not meddle with teleology.

This statement of the case by a modern historian fails to disclose the sharp and utterly irreconcilable distinction which Hodge, at least, made between his view and what he considered Darwin's to be. He was probably unaware of assuming any "strategy" and surely did not try to "adapt" himself "to the new scientific climate created by Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer." Hodge believed in the "immediate

268 C. Hodge, *What is Darwinism?*, (London: 1874), pp. 52-53. The argument in this book was developed on the basis of Hodge's discussion of the Darwinian theory in the *Systematic Theology*, II, 12-33. Hodge answered the question, "What is Darwinism?" by saying, "It is atheism." Since Hodge was the most influential Presbyterian theologian in America, what he said had a vast influence. Multitudes who had never read Darwin understood that Darwinism implied atheism.


270 *loc. cit.*
creation and immutability" of each species\textsuperscript{271} and rejected
the "error" of Darwinism, which he described as follows:

The distinctive doctrine of Mr. Darwin\textsuperscript{19} that
species owe their origin, not to the original intention
of the divine mind; not to the special acts of creation
calling new forms into existence at certain epochs;
not to the constant and everywhere operative efficiency
of God, guiding physical causes in the production of
intended effects; but to the gradual accumulation of
unintended variations of structure and instinct, secur-
ing some advantage in their subjects.\textsuperscript{272}

Hodge, therefore, set himself unequivocally against the
"mere hypothesis"\textsuperscript{273} of evolution and sought to vindicate
what he considered the Biblical view of the origin of the
species and especially man.

James McCosh and Charles W. Shields of the College
of New Jersey rejected Hodge's anti-evolutionary speculations
and sought to present "the evolutionary point-of-view . . .
as a new version of traditional faith, as itself the
substance of the Christian gospel."\textsuperscript{274} Evolutionary theology,
involving an adaptation of Darwinism to a revised Calvinistic
orthodoxy, "found its stronghold among Presbyterians,"

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{271}C. Hodge, \textit{Systematic Theology}, II, 78-79.
\item \textsuperscript{272}C. Hodge, \textit{Darwinism}, pp. 52-53. See Frank H.
Foster, \textit{The Modern Movement in American Theology} (New York:
1939), p. 48. "In general, Hodge constantly pushes his
opponent too hard, forcing meanings upon his expressions
which Darwin would not have admitted."
\item \textsuperscript{273}C. Hodge, \textit{Systematic Theology}, II, 19.
\item \textsuperscript{274}Schneider, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 370.
\end{itemize}
according to Schneider, who somewhat overstated the case. Princeton Seminary, led by Charles Hodge, was the citadel of conservative Presbyterianism and was anything but a "stronghold" of evolutionary theology. However, the College of New Jersey, a strong Presbyterian institution, led by James McCosh, was much more responsive than the Seminary to contemporary scientific and philosophical developments and did nurture a theology which sought to absorb the theory of evolution. In the Seminary, Calvinism was the enemy of the evolutionary doctrine; in the College, a "Calvinistic version of Darwinism" was expounded.

The "original state" of man. Professor Hodge stated at the very beginning of his discussion of anthropology that the "primitive state... was not one of barbarism from which men have raised themselves by a slow process of improvement" but "the highest state" from which they have "more or less deteriorated." This "highest state" of man was

275 Loc. cit. Another type of evolutionary theology, chiefly inspired by Herbert Spencer, was adopted by the Unitarians, who made it the basis of an "optimistic faith in the evanescence of evil."


277 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, 93-94.
characterized by "original righteousness," which was constituted by (a) "perfect harmony" within "the original constitution of man" and (b) "moral perfection in which man resembled God in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness."

This "original righteousness," he said, was "concreated," which, in this context, seems to mean "imputed." This doctrine of original righteousness was set against the "Pelagians and Rationalists" who held that "man was created a rational and free agent, but without moral character." According to the Pelagian view, human nature was neutral as to moral content, possessing no proclivities at all toward good or evil. Character depended upon the use to which a man put his free will and rational capacity. There could be no original righteousness and no original sin. Obligation was limited by ability. The Pelagian position, Hodge said, "works an entire change in the whole system of Christian doctrine." He was opposed to this "change," which he believed subverted Christian truth, and devoted an extended argument to the defense of the Augustinian view, in which original righteousness, lost by the Fall, and original sin, infecting the whole race, were both presupposed. (1) "We do attribute,"

278 Ibid., p. 106.
279 Loc. cit.
280 Ibid., p. 107.
he wrote, "moral character to principles which precede all voluntary action and which are entirely independent of the power of the will." The "testimony of consciousness" justified this view, he believed. "Dispositions or states of mind," whether "hereditary" or the results of free acts or both, are regarded by men, he held, as "abiding principles" for which the individual possessing them is regarded as morally responsible. (2) The Scriptures, he continued, "everywhere distinguish between principles and acts, and everywhere attribute moral character to the former, and to acts only so far as they proceed from principles."281 The Bible "constantly assumed," he believed, that "the greater part of what constitutes our character as good and evil is lower . . . than even consciousness itself." He cited an array of passages from the Scriptures which, he felt, proved this point: men are "conceived in sin. They are children of wrath by nature. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, i.e., carnal, morally corrupt."282 (3) "The universal faith of the Church" supported this doctrine, he contended. All Churches taught, he said, that "men need regeneration as soon as they are born."283 (4) "The moral character of dispo-
tions," he asserted, "... depends on their nature and not on their origin." Moral character" might be attributed, he said, not only to dispositions which have been acquired through a repetition of voluntary acts but also to dispositions which are "concreated, inate, or infused." Man was thus treated as responsible for his "dispositions" regardless of their origin. Responsibility for sin was, therefore, attributed to man despite the inevitability of sin.

According to Hodge's view, God treated man "according to his character" regardless of the causes which accounted for it. He wrote: "If a creature is holy he will be regarded and treated by God as holy. If he is sinful, he will be regarded and treated as sinful." This assertion succinctly discloses the crux of the difficulty in this doctrine. "The difficulty," Hodge asserted, "is not in God's treating his creatures according to their true character, but in reconciling with his holiness and justice that a sinful character should be acquired without the creature's personal agency."

284 Supra, pp. 40-41. See Jonathan Edwards, Jr., "Remarks on the improvements Made in Theology by His Father, President Edwards, Works (Andover, Massachusetts: 1842), I, 482. See also Haroutunian, op. cit., p. 232. Hodge's view that the "moral character of dispositions" depends on their nature and not their origin was adopted, without acknowledgement, almost verbatim from Jonathan Edwards."

The solution to this problem, he believed, was given in the Bible, which

... reveals to us the principle of representation, on the ground of which the penalty of Adam's sin has come upon his posterity, as the reward of Christ's righteousness comes upon his people. In the one case the penalty brings subjective sinfulness, and in the other the reward brings subjective holiness.  

Man's total depravity and the sovereignty of God.

Hodge made the "federal system" of John Coccejus a constituent part of his theology. According to this view God entered into a covenant with Adam as the head and representative of the whole race. Consequently everything promised or granted to Adam, or threatened against him, has a bearing upon the whole race. A "covenant of life" was entered into by God with man "upon condition of perfect obedience." The consequence of a breach of this covenant was "death," which included "all penal evil." God and Adam were partners to the original covenant, whose breach brought the penalty of

286 Ibid., p. 114.

287 Ibid., p. 118. "This covenant is sometimes called a covenant of life, because life was promised as the reward of obedience. Sometimes it is called the covenant of works, because works were the condition on which that promise was suspended, and because it is thus distinguished from the new covenant which promises life on condition of faith."

288 Ibid., p. 120. "Any and every form of evil which is inflicted as the punishment of sin is comprehended in the word 'death.'"
"death" to the whole race, of which the first man was "the head and representative." In other words, "the penalty which Adam incurred has fallen upon his whole race;-- . . . by the offense of one all were made sinners." Adam's disobedience, to which he was tempted by "Satan," who appeared in the guise of a serpent, resulted from doubt of God's goodness, disbelief in his threatened punishment, and pride which sought forbidden knowledge. The "original sin" which resulted in the Fall of man immediately became a permanent part of human nature and produced a "corruption of nature that affects the whole soul." This "corruption of nature," Hodge continued, which

... consists in the loss or absence of original righteousness, and consequent entire moral depravity of our nature, is truly and properly of the nature of sin, involving both guilt and pollution; it retains its character as sin even in the regenerated and renders the soul spiritually dead, so that the natural, or unrenewed man, is entirely unable of himself to do anything good in the sight of God." Hodge endeavored to prove this doctrine of man's total depravity by asserting "the universality of sin" among men, "the entire sinfulness of men," and "the early

---

289 Ibid., p. 121.
290 Ibid., pp. 127-128.
292 Ibid., 231.
293 Ibid., p. 233.
manifestation of sin."\textsuperscript{294} Each argument was supplied with appropriate—\textcolor{red}{and some not so appropriate—}proof texts, with alleged corroborative evidence from human experience and history.

After an elaborate defense of the fact and consequences of original sin, he dealt with

\begin{quote}
... three general views as to the ability of fallen man which have prevailed in the Church. The first is the Pelagian doctrine, which asserts the plenary ability of sinners to do all that God requires of them. The second is the Semi-Pelagian doctrine, which admits the powers of man to have been weakened by the fall of the race but denies that he lost all ability to perform what is spiritually good. And thirdly the Augustinian or Protestant doctrine, which teaches that such is the nature of inherent, hereditary depravity that men since the fall are utterly unable to turn themselves to God, or to do anything truly good in his sight.\textsuperscript{295}
\end{quote}

Corresponding views of grace were said to accompany the three historical views of "ability." Hodge stated that

Pelagians deny the necessity of any supernatural influence of the Spirit in the regeneration and sanctification of men. Semi-Pelagians admit the necessity of such divine influence to assist the enfeebled powers of man in the work of turning unto God, but claim that the sinner cooperates in that work and that upon his voluntary cooperation the issue depends. Augustinians and Protestants ascribe the whole of regeneration to the Spirit of God, the soul being passive therein, the subject, and not the object of the change.\textsuperscript{296}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid., p. 237. \\
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid., p. 257. \\
\textsuperscript{296} Loc. cit.
\end{flushright}
It is clear from the foregoing passages that Hodge taught the "total depravity" and, therefore, the "total inability" of man to do anything at all about salvation. "Men since the fall," he wrote, "are utterly unable to turn themselves to God." He criticized the distinction between "moral and natural ability" which Jonathan Edwards and his school stressed and which even Archibald Alexander had vainly sought to adopt into the Princeton system. Hodge refused to qualify in any sense man's total inability and produced an array of proof texts to prove his point. The New England theologians were seeking a form of the doctrine which would preserve the Calvinistic presupposition of man's "moral inability" and at the same time provide a basis for human responsibility. This was no problem for Hodge, who seldom seemed troubled by the moral and logical difficulties posed by his rigorous Calvinism, which he believed was based on the infallible, though sometimes admittedly inscrutable, Word of God. When a doctrine seemed to have a basis which was demonstrably Biblical nothing more need be done except to accept it as an integral part of Divine truth. All


efforts by New England men in particular or Protestant scholars in general to deal with theological difficulties either through historical examination of the rise and development of Christianity or by utilizing insights drawn from the fields of philosophy or science were met with immediate and unqualified opposition. These efforts to understand the historical processes in which the Christian revelation came to man or to glean some fruitful insight from a hitherto untapped source were summarily dismissed with one word—"299 neology." All logical antinomies and moral problems posed by his extreme Biblicism were allegedly resolved by an appeal to the same Biblicism. He often said: "What the Bible says, God says. That ends the matter."300

One of the most serious problems in Hodge's theology is the consequence of a consistent application of the doctrine of "inability." This "inability," which arose from "the corruption of our whole nature" could be "removed only by regeneration,"301 which was an act of "sovereign grace"302 and in no sense "an act of moral suasion."303 According to

299 Supra, p. 154.
300 C. Hodge, Semi-Centennial Address, Princeton Seminary, April 24, 1872, cited by A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 521.
301 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, 264.
302 Ibid., III, 39.
303 Ibid., p. 31.
this view, stripped of the theological language with which it was surrounded, men are condemned by God for a "hereditary depravity" to which all are doomed except those whom God has determined to rescue by His sovereign grace, which is bestowed or withheld for inscrutable reasons known only by the Divine wisdom. This position bristles with difficulties, the foremost of which is the problem it poses with reference to the justice of God. How could it be just to condemn a man for an "original sin" presumably committed by Adam? How could it be just to bring mankind under Divine condemnation because of the sin of one man? How could it be just for God to impute to man a "hereditary" sin from which he is absolutely impotent to turn even in repentance, which is purely a divine gift and in no sense a free act? How could it be just for God "according to his own good pleasure" to "pardon some and condemn others," since justice demands equality of opportunity for all? How could obligation to seek salvation be sustained on the basis of man's "total inability" to do so? Hodge admitted these difficulties were produced by what he considered the Biblical view of sin and grace but rested "content with the solution of them given in the same Scriptures."
This "solution," broadly speaking, was founded upon the assumption of the essential justice of the universal condemnation deriving from the sin of Adam,\(^{307}\) and, therefore, upon the further implication that provision for the salvation of the elect only was in no sense a requirement of justice but a bestowal of sheer grace. "All men," Hodge asserted, "might in justice be left to perish."\(^{308}\) Again he wrote: "If God was not bound to save any, he is at liberty to save whom he pleases. If he need not provide salvation for any, there could be no injustice in providing it for some and not for others."\(^{309}\) Hodge was able totally to disavow God's responsibility "to save any" by holding that all men were implicated in the guilt of the fall of the first man. However, since his own view involved a Divine decree which rendered the Fall certain,\(^{310}\) it is difficult to see how man's responsibility for the Fall and its consequences could have any logical defense.

There is a relentless determinism about Hodge's theological scheme, which at every turn defies any effort to defend it as just, right, or true except on a purely author-

\(^{307}\) Ibid., II, 339.
\(^{308}\) Loc. cit.
\(^{309}\) C. Hodge, Extent of the Atonement, p. 58.
\(^{310}\) C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, 541.
itarian basis. This is presumably what led him finally to fall back upon "the sovereign pleasure of God" as the solution to all difficulties elicited by his Biblical literalism. At whatever point in his theology a problem arose, sooner or later he sought refuge in a rigid authoritarianism. In this instance, God's sovereignty was the master key, as was often the case, which unlocked an otherwise impenetrable mystery. It was the doctrine of the Divine sovereignty which enabled Hodge to reconcile all injustice, disease, and suffering with God's goodness. Not by qualifying God's power but by bowing before the Divine omnipotence in utter submission did Hodge reconcile his theism with the inequalities and the gigantic evils of the world. God in His sovereign wisdom and power, Hodge held,

... distributes his providential blessings, which include temporal good but also religious advantages and opportunities, as an absolute sovereign according to his own good pleasure, and not as an impartial judge.\(^{311}\)

Human criteria of justice were held not to apply to God at all. The question posed by the apparent injustices which flow from

\(^{311}\) Ibid., II, 337-338. See Ibid., III, 270. "It was not wrong for the Hebrews to spoil the Egyptians or to dispossess the Canaanites because He whose is the earth and the fullness thereof authorized those acts. He had a right to take the property of one people and give it to another. The extermination of the idolatrous inhabitants of the promised land and the command of Joshua was as much an act of God as though it had been effected by pestilence or famine. It was a judicial execution by the Supreme Ruler."
the Divine providence "can be answered in the language of our Lord, 'Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight.'"\textsuperscript{312} Hodge's conception of the Divine sovereignty made a theodicy unnecessary, sanctified the status quo, and tended to sanction social injustice and economic exploitation. It was a view possible only for people in relative security. Victims of social and economic injustice found little consolation in being told that their plight was the will of God and grew increasingly critical of a theology which deliberately dulled the cutting edge of their struggle against oppression. It was, therefore, inevitable that the Princeton theology should become increasingly irrelevant in the industrial era which supplanted the aristocratically controlled agrarian civilization after the Civil War. It is also quite clear why the rising social Christianity in the post Civil War period largely discarded Calvinism and adopted a "liberal" theology.

The provision and realization of salvation. On the objective side of Hodge's doctrine of salvation, emphasis was placed upon "the eternal principles of justice."\textsuperscript{313} Absolute obedience to the will of God was the condition of

\textsuperscript{312} Ibid., III, 39. See Matthew 11:26.

\textsuperscript{313} Ibid., II, 122.
salvation. The obedience by which justice was preserved and salvation secured must be either the result of a personal conformity or the conformity of Christ to God's law as a personal substitute. Either the individual or a substitute must obey God's law. 314 This substitute was Christ, who "obeyed the law of God perfectly in all the forms in which it had been made obligatory on man." 315 Either the sinner or a substitute for the sinner must be punished. 316 This substitute was Christ, who

... bore our sins, was a curse for us, offered himself a sacrifice, or propitiation to God in expiation of the sins of men. This involved his whole life of humiliation ... and his ignominious death upon the cross. 317

Hodge believed that the "covenant of grace" which God offered on condition of faith in Christ was a covenant between "God and mankind in general and all mankind equally." The offer of salvation in Christ, in this sense, "was to every man." But the covenant of grace nevertheless had

314 Loc. cit.
315 Ibid., p. 362.
316 Ibid., p. 495.
"special reference to the elect" because to them and them alone God had promised His Spirit in regenerating power. Actually, the covenant of grace had not special but sole reference to the elect for, after all, only the elect were its beneficiaries. Can a genuine offer of salvation in Christ "to every man" be made consistent with Hodge's doctrine of election and limited atonement? The answer is obviously in the negative for a genuine offer would carry with it at least the possibility of acceptance. Hodge nevertheless attempted to distinguish between a "covenant of redemption" which involved the Father and the Son and which included only the elect, and a "covenant of grace" which involved God and man and which included all mankind. Christ was represented as a "party to the covenant of redemption and as the mediator of the covenant of grace." But how could the covenant of grace be extended to all men without qualification when the covenant of redemption which contemplated only the elect was the presupposition and instrument of the covenant of grace?

318 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, 363.

319 The main proof-text for this doctrine was the statement attributed to Jesus in John 6:37: "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me, I will in no wise cast out."

320 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, 495.
Dr. Hodge taught that salvation was realized through regeneration, which marked "the commencement of the spiritual life." Regeneration is "objectively an act of God" by which "He imparts a new form of life to the soul." Again he said: "Regeneration means that supernatural change effected by the Spirit of God by which a soul is made spiritually alive." This "act of God's almighty power," for which baptism was in no sense an indispensable condition, produced "a new life," "a new birth," "a new heart." These "changes wrought in the soul" constituted the subjective side of the same doctrine. His insistence upon a "new nature" as the consequence of regeneration was contrary to the view of the New England theologian Nathaniel Emmons, who held that "the Spirit of God in regeneration produces nothing but the love of benevolence." Hodge's

321 Ibid., III, 7.
322 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
323 Ibid., p. 591.
324 Ibid., pp. 600, 604. Infra, pp. 281-284 for Hodge's view of baptism as a "means of grace," his view of infant baptism, and his belief that all children were saved until they reached the age of moral responsibility.
325 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, III, 32-34.
326 Nathaniel Emmons, "Sermon 51," Works (Boston: 1842), V, 112-114. "Those in the state of nature," Emmons said, "stand in no need of having any new power, or faculty, or principles of action produced in them, in order to their becoming holy. They are just as capable of loving as hating God."
doctrine of original sin \textsuperscript{327} and the "total depravity" which flowed from it made mandatory a "new nature" bestowed by God's sovereign grace in order to accomplish man's salvation. The "total alienation of the soul from God" made it impossible for any "unrenewed" man either to understand or seek God, toward whom the unregenerate person is an enemy.\textsuperscript{328} This situation in which man by his sin is alienated from God can be changed into a condition of reconciliation between man and God only by an "act of God's omnipotence,"\textsuperscript{329} which results in a "new nature."\textsuperscript{330} Emmons' "love of benevolence" produced by the Spirit of God as the only effect of regeneration was, therefore, from the standpoint of the presuppositions of the Princeton professor, an utterly inadequate estimate of the sinful situation in which man stood.

Hodge attributed "free agency" to all men but defined it simply as "the power to decide according to our character."\textsuperscript{331} Since the "character" of "unrenewed" man was totally depraved, no possible exertion of his natural powers could remove him

\textsuperscript{327} For Emmons' view on this point, see \textit{op. cit.}, II, 596. "Adam was the only person who committed and who was guilty of original sin."

\textsuperscript{328} C. Hodge, \textit{Systematic Theology}, II, 234.

\textsuperscript{329} \textit{Ibid.}, III, 31.

\textsuperscript{330} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{331} \textit{Ibid.}, II, 293.
from the vicious circle of his sin, provide a point-of
contact for God's Spirit, or even enable him to respond to
God's saving grace. Total inability, produced by total
deprivity, could be mitigated not one whit by anything
except a "new nature" given by the Divine Spirit entirely
on God's initiative. Emmons, on the other hand, believed
that "sinners possess all the necessary natural powers
and faculties" to make them "capable ... of performing
every duty enjoined upon them by divine authority."332
Thus all men possessed a "natural ability,"333 which the
Spirit could change into "moral ability" without implanting
any new power beyond the production of "benevolent love, from
which all holy feelings and conduct naturally spring."334
Emmons also criticized the extreme Calvinists for supposing
that "sinners are entirely passive in regeneration" and
asserted that activity, not passivity, accompanied regenera-
tion.335 Hodge replied by stating categorically that "the

332 Emmons, op. cit., V, 112.
333 Ibid., pp. 123-129.
334 Ibid., pp. 115, 119.
335 Ibid., pp. 128-129. "In regeneration God does
not create any new nature, disposition, or principle of
action, but only works in men holy and benevolent exercises,
in which they are completely free and active; there is a plain
absurdity in calling the renovation of the heart a miraculous
or supernatural change. This is carrying the passivity of the
creature in regeneration to an extravagant height, and so as
soul is passive in regeneration, which is a change wrought in us, and not an act performed by us.”

An equally serious clash between Hodge's view of regeneration and the position of Charles G. Finney also left its impression upon the Princeton theology. Finney held that regeneration was an "instantaneous" change "from entire sinfulness to entire holiness.” He believed that the obligation to obey "moral law" was conditioned upon the possibility of obeying it. "To talk of inability to obey moral law is to talk sheer nonsense," he wrote. "To deny the ability of man to obey the commandments of God," he continued, "is to represent God as a hard taskmaster, as requiring a natural impossibility of his creatures. . . ." The sumnum bonum of life was "the ultimate good of being," which was held to be a human possibility. With all of this, Hodge was in sharp disagreement. He denied the possibility

335 (Contd.) to destroy all obligation of sinners to do the least duty, until a miracle has been wrought upon them." Italics his. The pantheistic tendencies in Emmons' thought logically excluded any genuine human freedom but the logic was not pressed and a real free agency was affirmed. For a criticism of Emmons, see C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, III, 7-8, 14-15.

338 Ibid., p. 509.
339 Ibid., p. 45 sqq.
of even regenerate man's ability perfectly to conform to God's law. Sin was a perennial fact in all human life, upon all conceivable levels of moral achievement. For Hodge, it was sheer nonsense to talk of ability completely to observe the moral law. He held that regeneration resulted in a change effected by the Holy Spirit's "operation on the soul" producing "new views of God, Christ, sin, holiness, the world, the gospel, and the life to come"—a "new nature"—but insisted upon the persistence of sin in the life of the redeemed. Furthermore, the "imputation" of the righteousness of Christ to the believer "does not of itself," he wrote, "change the inward subjective state of the person to whom the imputation is made." Imputed righteousness was sharply distinguished from both the infused and actual righteousness which appeared in the "new life communicated to the soul"—

340 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, III, 34. See C. Hodge, "Regeneration," Biblical Repertory, II (April, 1830), 266.

341 Ibid., p. 35.

342 Ibid., pp. 245-250.

343 Hodge did not use the terms "infused" and "actual" but they stand for important distinctions in his thought nevertheless. God regarded the Christian as righteous in virtue of imputed righteousness; God "communicated a new life to the soul" in regeneration; and the Christian was a free moral agent whose character was affected by his sense of obligation toward the moral law.

344 Ibid., p. 35.
and in "holy acts and states" as result of the divine action for and in man. He stressed the "imputed" perfection of the Christian but believed with equal assurance and consistency that human righteousness--"holy acts and states"--whether communicated by God, actually achieved, or both, always fell short of perfection "on this side of the grave." Against Oberlin perfectionism particularly, he argued that everyone--Christians included--"have sin cleaving to them" until death, at which, but not before, "the souls of believers are made perfect in holiness." This position, which involved the view that sin persisted in the life of Christians

345 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
346 Ibid., p. 246.
347 See C. Hodge, "Finney's Lectures on Theology," Princeton Review, XIX (April, 1847), 237-277, especially pp. 273-276. See also Finney's reply to Hodge's review. Charles G. Finney, "An Examination of the Review of Finney's Systematic Theology, Published in the 'Biblical Repertory,' April, 1847," Lectures on Systematic Theology, pp. 916-961. Hodge's criticism, Finney said, "when reduced to a logical formula would stand thus: whatever is inconsistent with old schoolism must be absurd; the book under review is inconsistent with old schoolism; therefore its doctrines and conclusions are absurd." And see Benjamin B. Warfield, "Oberlin Perfectionism," Princeton Theological Review, XIX (January, April, July, October, 1921), pp. 1-63, 225-288, 451-528, and especially pp. 568-619, where he dealt with the theology of Finney.

348 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, III, 246.
349 Ibid., p. 725. "There is nothing contrary to Scripture ... in the assumption of a sudden and immediate change from imperfect to perfect holiness at death."
until death, at which the souls of the redeemed were immediately "made perfect," permitted Hodge to reject both the Protestant doctrine of a possible human perfection in history and the Roman Catholic dogma of a purgatorial cleansing after death. The Christian was regarded as a redeemed sinner but still a sinner until death, before which perfection was, therefore, impossible. But the Christian was made perfect at the moment of death, following which purgatorial satisfaction was therefore unnecessary. 350

Perhaps the pattern into which Hodge placed the doctrines of regeneration, justification, and sanctification might be properly put as follows: justification is an act of God which, on the basis of the imputed righteousness of Christ, declares the sinner to be righteous; 351 regeneration is an act of God by which a spiritual change is wrought in the soul of the believer by the "communication of new life" so that the "things of the "Spirit become the chief objects of desire and pursuit; 352 sanctification is a progressive work

350 Loc. cit. The "intermediate state," in which the disembodied souls of all who die before the second-advent of Christ dwell, either in bliss or punishment, preceded the final state ushered in by the resurrection of the body. The destiny of the soul was decided at death but the finality and completeness of salvation or condemnation were held to await the end of the world.

351 Ibid., pp. 144-145.

352 Ibid., p. 35.
of God, made possible on the Divine side by justification and on the human side by regeneration, as result of which the soul "is gradually transformed into the image of Christ," i.e., is sanctified.\textsuperscript{353}

**Divine decrees and human free agency.** The foregoing discussion of the doctrine of salvation, in which stress was placed upon the Divine sovereignty in the bestowal of saving grace upon sinful man, has raised the broader question of God's relation to the world and especially man as understood by Professor Hodge. Of central importance in this connection is the relation between Divine sovereignty and human "free agency,"\textsuperscript{354} which the Princeton professor endeavored to hold together in a paradoxical equilibrium. By divine decrees, Hodge meant "God's eternal purpose" by which "all events are rendered absolutely certain."\textsuperscript{355} The logical problem posed by this definition must be examined. What solution did he

\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., p. 226. Sanctification "calls for unremitting and strenuous exertion" but "is nevertheless the work of God."

\textsuperscript{354} See ibid., II, 288-289. "The will," broadly defined, included "all the faculties of the soul" not belonging to the "understanding." In this sense, "all liking and disliking, all preferring, all inclination and disinclination, are the will." In the "restricted sense of the word, the will means the power of self-determination or the faculty by which we decide our acts. In this sense, only purposes and imperative volitions are acts of the will."

\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., I, 553, 542.
offer with reference to the antinomy raised by God's presumed foreknowledge and foreordination of "free acts"? The "solution" is another paradox which asserts that God's absolute certainty of all events is consistent with human liberty. He, therefore, attempted to prove that the two mutually exclusive propositions were corroborated by both Scripture and experience. First, he held that "God knows human acts before they occur in time." 356 All human acts were, therefore, regarded as absolutely certain. This certainty of free acts that he believed God possessed was the result of God's foreknowledge and foreordination. Hodge, accordingly, taught that God was absolutely certain of all the future volitions of free agents. The course of future volitions would, therefore, seem to be as certain as those which belong to the past. Second, he asserted that "free agency" was a fact of consciousness 357 and was not impaired by the Divine certitude of all human choices. He wrote: "We are not more sure of our existence than we are of our free agency." 358 "It is conceded that every man is conscious of liberty in his voluntary acts." 359 Hodge seemed to regard

356 Ibid., II, 299.
357 Ibid., p. 303.
358 Ibid., p. 301.
359 Ibid., p. 303.
the consciousness of liberty in an act as a guarantee of human freedom regardless of the ultimate cause which lay behind the act. In this view, he adopted a position of which Jonathan Edwards had made much in his *Freedom of the Will*. Hodge, however, traced his position not to any man, not even Edwards, but to God, who in His Word had declared it. And so, according to his usual method, Hodge once more identified his own view with the testimony of the Bible.

Developing the implications of the foregoing position, he endeavored to defend what amounts to his doctrine of Divine providence. He wrote:

We must believe in our free agency; and as by a necessity scarcely less imperative we must believe that all things are known to God from eternity, and that if foreknown their occurrence is certain, we thus cannot deny that certainty is consistent with free agency.

Again he asserted: "God foreordains whatever comes to pass so that the occurrence of all events is determined with unalterable certainty." Succinctly stated, Hodge held that God foreknew and foreordained with absolute certainty all events, including, of course, all the future acts of free agents.

---

The foregoing conclusion was disentangled from its apparent "fatalism," which was defined as "physical or blind necessity" that precluded "the idea of foresight or plan, or of the voluntary selection of an end and the adoption of means for its accomplishment."\(^{364}\) The fatalistic theory meant that all the acts of men are governed by an ineluctable physical necessity. Hodge refused to accept the "Pelagian" doctrine of "contingency" in his effort to combat fatalism because he felt that the admission of contingency, or the power of contrary choice, was inconsistent with his doctrine of certainty. He, therefore, opposed the argument that God's foreknowledge does not extend to impossibilities, one of which is the impossibility of an absolute knowledge of future free acts, that impossibilities are not objects of knowledge, and, therefore, that not to foreknow them is not a limitation of the Divine knowledge.\(^{365}\) This argument for contingency, he held, rejected not only the "necessity" but also the "certainty" of future events and he, therefore, opposed it. He insisted on the certainty, though not the necessity, of all events and believed certainty and free agency could be reconciled. Professor Hodge was opposed both to the fatalistic doctrine of physical or natural necessity and the doctrine of


contingency. He believed the first was subversive of human responsibility and the teachings of Scripture and that the second undercut the Biblical doctrine of providence, which rested upon God's ability "to render the free acts of his creatures certin."\textsuperscript{366} Therefore, he wrote: "Foreknowledge supposes certainty; foreordination determines it. ... If certainty be compatible with freedom, providence which only secures certainty cannot be inconsistent with it."\textsuperscript{367}

How absolute certainty could be any more compatible with genuine freedom than physical necessity was admitted to be an incomprehensible mystery. Hodge wrote that man "is not able to comprehend how God can effectively govern free agents without destroying their nature."\textsuperscript{368} Why, it may be asked, was an admittedly incomprehensible doctrine defended with such rigorous consistency? The answer is clear, even if not convincing. He believed that the only alternative to the doctrine of God's certainty of all future acts by persons was either chance (contingency) or fate (necessity) and that to surrender his position, so central in his theology, would entail "no prophecy, no prayer, no thanksgiving, no promises, no security of salvation, no certainty whether in the end God

\textsuperscript{366} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 302.
\textsuperscript{367} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 301.
\textsuperscript{368} \textit{Loc. cit.}
or Satan is to be triumphant, whether heaven or hell is to be the consummation." 369 Again he wrote in the same vein: "Any theory which makes contingency or uncertainty essential to liberty must be irreconcilable with some of the most precious doctrines of the Scriptures." 370

The difficulty with the foregoing solution of the problem is that it fails to show how God's absolute certainty of all events renders them any less "necessary" than is demanded by the doctrine of natural necessity. Inevitability remains inevitability whatever the cause. Inevitability remains inevitability whether the inevitable events are or are not informed with a purpose. This impasse suggests a serious defect in the Princeton school, namely, its excessive intellectualism, which was much too preoccupied with the purely cognitive aspects of theology and, therefore, left in its wake a host of serious intellectual difficulties that could be "solved" only by an appeal to Biblical authority. Theology was a set of beliefs held by the mind as reasonable because derived from an alleged divine revelation which insured their truth regardless of the logical problems which their mutual relations might involve. This is the reason for

369 Loc. cit.

370 Ibid., p. 302. God "can by his grace, without violating the freedom of man, make it absolutely certain that they will repent and believe, and persevere in holiness."
a kind of "hidden rationalism" in the Princeton theology. Horace Bushnell described this rationalism, which had curiously become intrenched within the position of one of the bitterest enemies of historical rationalism, when he declared:

The possibility of reasoning out religion, though denied in words, has yet been tacitly assumed. Not allowing ourselves to be rationalists over the Scriptures, we have yet been as active and confident rationalists under them, as it was possible to be.371

**Means of grace.** Dr. Hodge considered the Scriptures and the sacraments as the major "means of grace." God had "ordained" that these two institutions should serve as "the ordinary channels of grace." He believed that these "means of grace" were particular bearers of the "supernatural influences of the Holy Spirit to the souls of men."372

(1) The written Word, which was identified with the Word of God, contained "truths" which were "indispensable means of salvation" for "adults."373 This Word of God was regarded not only as "necessary to salvation" but also as "divinely


373 *Loc. cit.* See *ibid.*, I, 26-27. He apparently considered all infants who died in infancy among the elect because he wrote: "All who die in infancy are saved." Here Hodge's humanity overcame his logic and he failed to follow Calvin, who spoke of the "eternal death" of "infant children" who were not among the elect. Calvin, *Institutes*, III, xxiii, 7. "The fall of Adam," Calvin wrote, "involves . . . many nations with their infant children in eternal death without remedy. . . ."
efficacious to the accomplishment of that end.\textsuperscript{374} The view that the Bible is a necessary instrument in salvation was based on (a) the commission of Christ to His disciples, especially the injunction to "teach all nations" what He had taught them, (b) the manner in which the Apostles executed this commission to teach and make disciples, and (c) "many distinct assertions in the Bible."\textsuperscript{375} Thus Biblical authority was once again invoked to prove the truth of Biblical injunctions.\textsuperscript{376} He, of course, was completely convinced that "this doctrine of the Bible is fully confirmed by the experience of the Church and of the world."\textsuperscript{377} This conviction was corroborated, he thought, by the depraved condition of the people where the Bible was not known and the presence of "true religion" where "indoctrination in the truths of the Bible prevailed."\textsuperscript{378}

Why did some accept and others reject this Word of God, whose truth Hodge taught was historically and logically demonstrable? He answered with an assertion containing a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{374} C. Hodge, \textit{Systematic Theology}, III, 466.
\item \textsuperscript{375} Ibid., pp. 466-467.
\item \textsuperscript{376} Ibid., p. 468. "There can be no doubt that the Scriptures teach that the Word of God is the specially appointed means for the sanctification and the salvation of men."
\item \textsuperscript{377} Loc. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{378} Ibid., p. 470.
\end{itemize}
negative and a positive element. He wrote:

The minds of men since the Fall are not in a condition to receive the transforming and saving power of the truths of the Bible, and therefore it is necessary, in order to render the Word of God an effective means of salvation, that it should be attended by the supernatural power of the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{379}

Even as Christ is a mere man to the "spiritually blind multitudes," so the Bible is a mere human book to those whose minds have not been quickened by the Spirit of God. The saving grace of God in Jesus Christ disclosed in Scripture is, therefore, subject to the sovereignty of His Spirit.\textsuperscript{380} The Bible becomes a means of grace only for those whom God has chosen. Only the elect could possibly discern the true purpose of Scripture. Rejection of the "truths" of the Bible was, therefore, attributed negatively to man's fall into sin, which blinded human understanding, and positively to God, who saw fit to remove only the elect from this condition of blindness. This condition of unbelief was a situation from which man could not possibly extricate himself by a consideration of this or that evidence of Biblical truth. Hodge left no doubt at all on this point, when he wrote:

Christians are Christians not because they are better than other men; not because they cooperate with the common and sufficient grace given to all men; not

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{379} Ibid., pp. 472-473.
\item \textsuperscript{380} Ibid., p. 476.
\end{itemize}
because they yield to, while others resist, the operation of the Divine Word; but because God in His sovereign mercy made them willing in the day of His power.\footnote{381}

(2) The two sacraments, baptism and the Lord's Supper, were also regarded by Hodge as "means of grace." He cited with approval the definition of a sacrament given in question ninety-two of the Westminster Shorter Catechism: "A sacrament is an holy ordinance instituted by Christ wherein, by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the New Covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers." In Hodge's own words the sacraments were "real means of grace . . . appointed and employed by Christ for conveying the benefits of his redemption to his people."\footnote{382} What made the sacraments efficacious? Their efficacy, Hodge taught, resided "not in the elements," nor "in the sacramental actions" of the presiding minister or the recipient, but in "the working of the Spirit and the blessing of Christ."\footnote{383}

Baptism was regarded by Hodge as a Christian duty,\footnote{384} a "sign" of the truth that "the soul is cleansed from the guilt of sin by the sprinkling of the blood of Christ,"\footnote{385}
the "seal and pledge" of Christ's promise to redeem men, and a "means of grace" to those who believe,386 but not an indispensable condition of salvation.387 Baptism accompanied by "an act of faith" was regarded as a "means of grace" but "baptism, without faith, is without effect."388 At this point Hodge raised the question as to whether the baptism of infants constituted a "means of grace" for those baptized. "If the saving benefits of Baptism," he asked, "are suspended on the condition of faith in the recipient, what benefit can there be in the baptism of infants?" He answered this troublesome question by saying that "the benefits of redemption may . . . be conferred on infants at the time of their baptism. That is in the hands of God."389 But how can this view be made consistent with the contention of Hodge that all infants who died in infancy were saved.390 Apparently "the benefits of redemption" were conferred at least as early as the time of birth upon these, for whom baptism could not possibly have the significance Hodge attri-

389 Loc. cit. Italics mine.
buted to it. To infants who grew to maturity, their baptism in infancy, he said, "assures them of salvation if they do not renounce their baptismal covenant." The baptism of infants destined to die in infancy is thus not a means of grace because Hodge considered them among the elect whether baptized or not. Baptism became a means of grace only for those baptized in infancy who, upon reaching the age of moral responsibility, confirmed the spiritual significance of their previous baptism. In any case, Hodge did not regard baptism as a means of grace for infants during infancy and it only became a means of grace retroactively for those baptized in infancy who personally confirmed the baptismal covenant. For infants destined to reach the age of moral accountability, Hodge believed that their baptism in infancy might be a means of their later salvation. And so he wrote this sentence which shows that he was occasionally capable of lapsing from his rigorous Calvinism: "Do let the little ones have their names written in the Lamb's book of life, even if they afterwards choose to erase them. Being thus enrolled may be the means of their salvation." He also counseled the baptism of infants because he believed it was a "commandment of God" and secured membership in the

391 Ibid., III, 590.
392 Ibid., p. 588.
"visible church."³⁹³

The Lord's Supper was likewise a means of grace only by virtue of "the blessing of Christ and the working of his Spirit in them that receive it." The efficacy of the sacrament was conditioned on the objective fact of Christ's blessing and the working of His Spirit and the subjective fact of a believing human response.³⁹⁴ Concerning "the sense in which Christ is present in the Supper," Hodge carefully distinguished his view from both transubstantiation and consubstantiation and adopted a position which, broadly speaking, may be called Zwinglian. Zwingli's explanation of the meaning of "the real presence of Christ" as simply an effort to distinguish between His "real" and "imaginary" presence was received with approval. The "real presence" of Christ, psychologically mediated by the Supper, is nevertheless more than a subjective condition induced by a contemplation of what the Lord has done in His death. Hodge wrote: "Christ is really

³⁹³ Ibid., p. 590.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 648-649. "The efficacy of this sacrament . . . is not to be referred to any virtue in the ordinance itself, whether in its elements or actions; much less to any virtue in the administrator; nor to the mere power of the truths which it signifies; nor to the inherent, divine power in the word or promise by which it is attended; nor to the real presence of the material body and blood of Christ . . . whether by way of transubstantiation or consubstantiation; nor to a supernatural life-giving influence emanating from the glorified body of Christ in heaven, nor in the communication of the theanthropic nature of Christ. . . ."
present to his people in this sacrament, not bodily, but in spirit; not in the sense of local nearness, but of efficacious operation."^395

Thus both the sacraments and the Scriptures were regarded as means of grace. And, since God presumably chose those upon whom to pour out his Spirit through sacraments and Scriptures and left the remainder to their own evil devices, the efficacy of both means of grace depended ultimately upon Divine election. The deterministic character of Hodge's theology appears at every crucial point.

Eschatology. Dr. Hodge believed in "the continued conscious existence of the soul after the dissolution of the body" and rejected both the "materialistic" doctrine that the soul was a mere function of the body that perished at death and "the doctrine of the sleep of the soul during the interval between death and the resurrection."^397 The reason underlying

395 Ibid., p. 650. "The union between Christ and the believer thus signified and effected is not corporeal union, not a mixture of substances, but a spiritual and mystical union due to the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. The efficacy of this sacrament as a means of grace, is not in the signs, nor in the service, nor in the minister, nor in the word, but in the attending influence of the Holy Spirit."

396 See ibid., p. 708. Prayer was also regarded as a "means which God has ordained for the end of communicating the life-giving and sanctifying influences of the Spirit to the souls of men."

397 Ibid., p. 713. Supra, p. 271 for Hodge's doctrine of the "intermediate state."
his belief in "a future life" was, of course, largely based on Biblical assertions. The Old Testament as well as the New was a source of incontrovertible evidence, he believed, for personal immortality. Especially Christ "revealed the nature of this future state, and showed how, for the people of God, that state was one of life."[^398] The doctrines of a future life taught by the New Testament writers "were derived not from men, but from the revelation of God as contained in the Old Testament, and as made by Christ."[^399]

Though Hodge used the term "soul" in a way which was surely more Greek than Biblical, he never explicitly adopted any of the Greek arguments for immortality. The Platonic tradition was apparently considered valueless. Indeed, he asserted categorically that "philosophy, when divorced from the Bible, leads us only to negations, darkness, and despair."[^400]

The eschatological scheme which Hodge followed was the traditional arrangement, in which a literal second-advent of Christ[^401] was predicted as an event immediately preceding a

[^399]: Ibid., p. 721.
[^400]: Ibid., p. 789.
[^401]: Ibid., pp. 792-800. See *ibid.*, p. 813. The "anti-christ," which was identified with the Roman Catholic Church, was predicted to appear before the second-advent of Christ.
general resurrection, a final judgment, and the final states of the righteous and the wicked, heaven and hell. A continuity of identity between the mortal body and "the resurrection body" was assumed but the nature of the identity which preserved the continuity was said to be unknown. 402

One remark should be made about Hodge's doctrine of the endless punishment of the unregenerate in hell. He sought to soften this severe tenet by saying that "we have reason to believe that the number of the finally lost, in comparison with the whole number of the saved, will be very inconsiderable." 403 Hodge undoubtedly held a more liberal view than the older Calvinists with reference to "the number of the saved," a position he shared with Samuel Hopkins, the New England theologian. 404 J. L. Neve believes that this view is the "most significant" deviation in Hodge's theology from the "older Calvinism." 405

The extreme Biblicism of the Princeton position resulted in a wooden, mechanical eschatological doctrine. Hodge's

402 Ibid., pp. 774-785.


404 Supra, p. 46.

405 Neve, op. cit., II, 292.
eschatology was largely futurist, involving the destiny of individuals and the consummation of history. It was a doctrine which dealt exclusively with the end—the end of life in the world and the end of history—and, therefore, hardly appeared until the end of his theological treatise. Here Hodge stood squarely with the Protestant orthodoxy of his time, for which revelation was essentially the communication of a system of truths, the last of which was concerned with a largely self-contained sphere called eschatology.
CHAPTER IV

ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER HODGE, 1823-1886

Archibald Alexander Hodge, named for the founder of the Princeton school, followed his father as a professor in the Seminary in 1877. Hodge the younger thus succeeded to the chair of theology which had been occupied only by Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge for more than sixty-five years. The old Calvinism of Alexander on which the Seminary had been established and which the elder Hodge had systematically developed was perpetuated in a popular fashion by the younger Hodge. Francis L. Patton stated that A. A. Hodge "was loyal beyond measure to the ideas with which Princeton was identified. . . . He taught the same theology that his father had taught before him." ¹ Concerning the younger Hodge, Robert Hastings Nichols has observed that "in his teaching and writings he upheld with conviction his father's Calvinistic theology, prolonging its reign at Princeton and its power in American religious life."² In the period of seventy-four years--1812 to 1886--which is the

¹ Francis L. Patton, A Discourse in Memory of Archibald Alexander Hodge (Philadelphia: 1887), p. 22.
central concern of this thesis, the Princeton school, therefore, exhibited an unbroken continuity of theological tradition, expounded by three men guided by the same loyalties, whose theological perspectives were largely identical and for whom the theological problem admitted of similar solutions. There were, of course, differences among them but the differences were much less important than the similarities. There was fundamental agreement among them on the central doctrines of the old Calvinism.

Hodge the younger was born and reared in Princeton, New Jersey, on the campus of the Seminary. During his boyhood, he was a constant companion of his father, in whose biography he has given many touching glimpses of family life in the Hodge household. That deep piety should have marked this home is, of course, entirely expected and needs no comment except to observe that it was a piety much more explicitly theological than is usually found even in the homes of theological professors! Writing about his father, the son said that

---

3 Archibald Alexander was inaugurated as the first professor in Princeton Theological Seminary on August 12, 1812, and Archibald Alexander Hodge died on November 11, 1886.

4 The occupants of the chair of theology in this period were: Archibald Alexander, founder, 1812-1840; Charles Hodge, systematizer, 1840-1877; Archibald Alexander Hodge, popularizer, 1877-1886.

he prayed for us all at family prayers, and
singly, and taught us to pray at his knees with such
soul-felt tenderness that however bad we were our
hearts all melted at his touch. During later years
he always caused his family to repeat after him at
morning worship the Apostles' Creed, and a formula
of his own composition, professing personal consecra-
tion to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy
Ghost. 6

Another factor which must have had an important bear-
ing on the cast of young Hodge's mind was his constant con-
tact with many of his father's learned friends. Often he
peered from "the shadowy corners" of his father's study and
listened to discussion and debate. Into this study "almost
every night for long years" came distinguished men from all
fields of endeavor. The younger Hodge remembered listening
as a lad to "the most wonderful debates and discussions,"
with which these sessions in the study were filled, as his
father and his guests reviewed "the highest themes of
philosophy, science, literature, theology, morals, and
politics." 7

Young Hodge graduated from the College of New Jersey
in 1841 and was retained as a tutor in mathematics and
natural science, subjects in which he maintained a marked
interest throughout his life. In 1843--the year of the
Scottish disruption--he entered Princeton Seminary, manifest-

6 Ibid., p. 227.

7 Ibid., pp. 239-240.
ing a particular interest in the study of Christian doctrine. In 1844, Dr. William Cunningham of Scotland visited Dr. Charles Hodge at Princeton and made a lasting impression upon Archibald, who remembered especially discussions between the two men concerning "the great Free Church exodus, slavery, New England theology, and voluntary societies."8 Patton registered the opinion that the younger Hodge's theology was influenced by Cunningham's conservative views.9

Graduating from the Seminary in 1846, he went to India as a missionary the following year but was forced to return to America in less than three years due to his and his wife's increasingly poor health. His missionary zeal nevertheless remained unabated and was especially evident in his teaching. It also helps to account for young Hodge's great popular appeal as a speaker. He frequently addressed the Inter-Seminary Missionary Conference and a wide variety of Church groups interested in the popular propagation of Christianity. For him, theology was a discipline designed to propagate Christianity quite as much as to expound and defend it.

8 Ibid., p. 354.

9 Patton, A. A. Hodge, p. 32.
I. EARLY CAREER

Minister and professor. Young Hodge served three churches in Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania before assuming the chair of "Didactic Theology" in Western Theological Seminary, Allegheny, Pennsylvania, in 1864. In the parish ministry, he discovered what a biographer has called "an unsuspected gift ... of apt and interesting extemporaneous speech in the exposition of theology." Hodge's Outlines of Theology, which first appeared in 1860, when he was minister at Fredericksburg, Virginia, was the outcome of popular lectures to his congregation delivered on Tuesday evenings. The debt which he owed his father was gratefully acknowledged in the preface. "I have used," he wrote, "the list of questions given by my father to his classes of forty-five and forty-six [1845 and 1846] ... and have adapted his questions to my new purpose by omissions, additions, or a different distribution." He also drew from the elder Hodge's published articles but, with two exceptions, had not heard nor read manuscripts of his father's theological lectures.


11 A. A. Hodge, Outlines, pp. viii-ix.

12 The two exceptions were, "The Scriptures the Only Rule of Faith and Judge of Controversies" and "The Second Advent."
used after 1846. The son was thus, even in his first published work, a popularizer of his father's theology, a function to which the rest of his life was largely dedicated. This conclusion, to which the culminative evidence of this thesis points, is the result of a comparison of the theological writings of the two men and is confirmed by many of the younger Hodge's remarks as well as the estimate of his contemporaries.

The inaugural address given by the younger Hodge at Western Theological Seminary on November 4, 1864, in which he gave his conception of the theological task, was largely a recapitulation of his father's theology. He defined theology as

... that science which embraces the literature of the inspired Book, its accurate interpretation, the systematic construction and exhibition of its doctrinal contents, and the deduction therefrom of practical principles and rules.

He shared his father's confidence that theology properly conceived "answers all objections, reconciles all anomalies, and solves or justifies all mysteries."

He remained at Western Seminary for thirteen years. In

13 Infra, pp. 315-318.


15 Ibid., p. 23.
this period, he published a monograph on the doctrine of the atonement, an exposition of the *Westminster Confession of Faith*, and a little book entitled *Questions in Theology*. With his teaching and rather sporadic writing, he combined a parish ministry in the North Presbyterian Church of Allegheny, of which he was the regular minister from 1866 until 1877, when he went to Princeton Seminary as his father's successor.

**Theological outlook.** The treatise on the atonement which came from Hodge's pen in this pre-Princeton period was based on a series of articles written for the *Presbyterian Banner* of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1867. The doctrine of Christ's death defended in this volume exactly parallels the judicial theory propounded by Charles Hodge and Archibald Alexander and, therefore, needs no further elucidation here. Remarks made at the beginning of the book, however, cast so much light upon the theological outlook of the younger Hodge, who was to become a professor in Princeton Seminary nine years later, that some notice should be taken of them. In the preface, Hodge stated that the purpose of the volume was a "vindication of the ancient faith of the Presbyterian


Church and an elucidation of the unquestionable and only legitimate interpretation of her standards." He sought to "guard the essential principles of the Calvinistic system" and to "repel" with all his might...

... alike all those positive heresies which attack it openly, and with even greater solicitude that latitudinarian indifference to exact conceptions and careful statements of doctrine which tends secretly, yet not less certainly, to destroy the truth, and which in the present age [1868] is our chief source of danger. 19

He said that the following schools of thought 20 were seeking "to make void the teaching of Scripture" on the doctrine of the atonement: Rationalism, Socinianism, Arianism, the "semi-pantheistic monism" of Schleiermacher, the American Mercersburg theology, Arminianism, "Calvinistic advocates of general redemption," the "Pelagianizing speculations of the New England theologians," and "the neoplatonizing Rationalists of the Broad Church school in England and America." 21 That is to say, everybody was trying to make the teaching of Scripture "void" except that special brand of Calvinists who held that Christ died to satisfy the justice

19 A. A. Hodge, Atonement, pp. v-vi.

20 The list given is important because it shows the vast variety of theological opinion with which Hodge felt it necessary to debate and indicates the conception he held of the dominant theological currents in 1868.

21 Ibid., pp. 14-15. See Ibid., p. 17. He called the view of the atonement widely held in New England "the hybrid governmental theory."
of God in behalf of the elect only. He insisted that "the true doctrine of the redemptive work of Christ" could be reached only through "a full and fair induction from all the Scriptures teach on the subject" undertaken by "a mind unprejudiced by theories,"\textsuperscript{22} which was presumably Hodge's mind. He also claimed that he intended

\[\ldots\] to prove that the true Church has always, from the days of the apostles to the present, in all its branches, been in essential agreement as to the essential elements of the doctrine, as taught at large in the Confessions of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches.\textsuperscript{23}

The author then turned his attention to the "subtle" factor which underlay much of the "heretical" teaching against which he set himself. This factor was "the naturalistic spirit of modern philosophy, whether intuitional or sensational," which was "disposed to deny the supernatural as impossible, or to ignore it as unknowable" and which "tended to lead theologians away from the simplicity of the Gospel."\textsuperscript{24}

"Rational explanation of the mysteries of revelation" was one baneful consequence of naturalism. This was to make revelation the servant of reason. The corrective of this tendency was to give priority to revelation, whose unqualified truth was guaranteed by the "plenary" inspiration of the

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 22.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 23.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid., pp. 15-16.
\end{enumerate}
Scriptures, and for reason to submit itself to the humble role of elucidating the prior revelation. He wrote:

The inspired Scriptures alone contain the system of divine truth as a whole, as well as the separate elements of that system. The true system... is in the Scriptures, inseparable from the facts, just as the true theory of astronomy has been from the creation with the stars in the sky, whether mankind read them aright or not. The theologian, like the astronomer, is nothing more than the interpreter, who observes the facts, who gradually reads the system in the facts, and who teaches others what he has read in the Book, neither more nor less.25

He thus followed his predecessors at Princeton in regarding revelation as a body of infallibly true propositions, to which the appropriate response was intellectual assent.

Princeton professor. In 1877, Archibald Alexander Hodge was installed as "Associate Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology" in Princeton Seminary and shortly thereafter succeeded his father as "Professor of Polemic Theology" in Princeton Seminary in what was considered the most important chair in the institution. The coming of Hodge the younger to Princeton was not encouraged by his father, who naturally wished to avoid any appearance of nepotism, but the elder Hodge was deeply gratified when the Directors chose his own son to succeed him. Prior to the election,

25 Ibid., p. 21. He said that "the teachings of the Holy Scriptures with respect to the nature of the atonement...are as definite as any statement which can possibly be constructed in the use of human speech."
Hodge the elder was deeply concerned that the incoming professor, whoever he might be, should be rigorously orthodox. In a letter written to Archibald, his father said:

If our Directors think there is any other man available as well qualified to fill the position as you, they ought to leave you where you are. But if they are satisfied that you are the best man to keep up the character of this institution for fidelity to our doctrinal standards, I, if a Director, although your father, would vote for your election.26

Dr. W. M. Paxton, who was to join the Princeton faculty in 1883, speaking at the younger Hodge's inauguration, reminded the new professor of the "historic" position in which he stood and asserted that

... the name of this Seminary is known in all the world. Its chief distinction is its Biblical teaching. The ground of its faith is the Bible. Its only question is--"What has God said?" Its only proof is God's Word. Its professors have never reached the point of thinking that they know more than the Bible. This Seminary has always taught that there are but two questions to be considered--(1) Is this the Word of God? and (2), What does it mean? This ascertained, there is nothing left but to believe and adore.27

The Rev. G. A. Salmond, a Scottish student in the

26 Letter of Charles Hodge to A. A. Hodge, February 16, 1877, in A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 573. See Letter of C. Hodge to H. A. Boardman, July 14, 1874, in A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, p. 570. In this letter to Boardman, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Seminary, Hodge, denying that he at the time needed an assistant, recognized the importance of eventually getting a successor who would "secure the fidelity of the Seminary to the type of doctrine taught in it from the beginning."

27 W. M. Paxton, Address at the Inauguration of A. A. Hodge (Philadelphia: 1877), pp. 15-16.
Seminary at this time, said that Hodge's inaugural address, which he heard, "conclusively proved" that the new professor was "a worthy successor of those who had gone before him." It "was directed to showing that dogmatic Christianity is the essential ground of practical theology."28 This estimate, which suggests Archibald Alexander's interest in the practical as well as the sheerly intellectual side of theology, was amply justified by the professor's subsequent career and partly explains his cordial interest in the theology of Henry B. Smith of Union Seminary, a New School theologian,29 and Edwards A. Park of Andover Seminary, with both of whom Charles Hodge had many sharp differences. Professor Park's interest in a theology of the "feelings" as well as a theology of the "intellect" appealed to the younger Hodge, whereas the elder Hodge regarded Park's excursions into the empirical side of theology as a dangerous departure from orthodoxy.30


Hodge the younger devoted a major section of his inaugural address to the "plenary" inspiration and consequent infallible authority of the Bible, a doctrine on which he was as rigorously orthodox as his predecessors had been. It is nevertheless true that he was less a Biblicist in actual practice than his father or Archibald Alexander.

He was also less interested than his predecessors in the sheerly systematic side of theology. "We concede," he said, "that one of the sins most easily besetting theologians has been a tendency to over-refinement in speculation, over-formality of definition, and an excess of rigidity of system." 31

The new professor spoke of

... that ancient and coherent mass of knowledge which roots itself in the profoundest depths of human nature and in all human history, which has verified itself to reason and every phase of experience for two-thousand years. 32

He was as opposed as his father had been to efforts to recast


Referring to Hodge the younger, Patton wrote: "There was a hot controversy in the old days between Charles Hodge and Dr. Park but in his late debate Dr. Park has had no greater admirer than he of whom we speak."


Christianity to coincide with current intellectual fashions but was somewhat more open minded toward the whole scientific quest than his eminent predecessor had been. In his opening address, he stated: "We claim to be sincere advocates of free investigation, in the true sense of that word, in every direction open to man." This claim to open mindedness, however, was not actually realized in practice. The alleged "free investigation" of which he spoke was qualified by "the supernatural revelation contained in God's Word." 33 This meant that Hodge assumed the existence of a body of knowledge in the Bible of a historical and scientific as well as religious character which was absolutely impervious to any conceivable criticism. It was this assumption which led him to speak of the Bible as a "supernatural revelation" containing truths that were "adequately established," to which "all new truth substantiated by equal evidence" should be added. He cautioned against the "varient and transient speculations which claim to speak in the venerable name of science" and

33 Ibid., p. 21. See A. A. Hodge, Outlines, p. 66. He said that "plenary inspiration" secured the "perfect infallibility of the Scriptures in every part, as a record of fact and doctrine both in thought and verbal expression." See A. A. Hodge and B. B. Warfield, "Inspiration," Presbyterian Review, II (April, 1881), 225-260. The effort in this article to reconcile the theory of "plenary" inspiration with the probably mistaken ascription of a quotation from Zechariah 11:13 in Matthew 27:9-10 to Jeremiah shows the lengths to which the Princeton school was sometimes forced to go in defense of its a priori theory of Biblical infallibility. See especially ibid., pp. 258-260.
voiced explicit confidence in the "established knowledge" embodied in Princeton Calvinism. His scientific training at the College of New Jersey under Professor Joseph Henry rendered him respectful concerning the painstaking and objective method required in the sciences, but he never pressed the viewpoint of science beyond the investigation of the realm of nature and, with his orthodox contemporaries, refused to raise the historico-critical questions about the Bible which were emerging, especially in Germany, as result of scientific studies of ancient writing. For him, as for his predecessors, the Bible was a divine oracle entirely removed from the relativities of the cultures in whose cross currents it was composed.

The inaugural address was concluded with remarks directed to the Board of Directors, to whom he voiced the conviction of a Divine call to the "historical" chair, occupied previously only by Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge. This address disclosed a man of broader general interests than his predecessor but left no doubt that the

34 A. A. Hodge, Inaugural Address, pp. 32-34.

35 A. A. Hodge, Evangelical Theology, a Course of Popular Lectures (London: 1890), p. 82. He believed that there were no discrepancies in the "original text of Scripture." It is not clear how "infallibility" could be predicated of any historical document, much less one not extant. His, however, was a safe position, which, if not capable of being proved, could not be disproved either. See Leonard W. Bacon, A History of American Christianity (London: 1899), pp. 380-381.
Princeton theology would be perpetuated without significant modification. The continuity which persisted in this change of theological chairs has been expressed by a student who sat in the classes of both men. The student wrote:

The two were alike yet different. Alike in their strength of conviction; alike in their loyalty to the Word of God; alike in their sobriety of thinking which was careful to hold the speculative faculty controlled by reason, and to rein the imagination to common sense.36

The new element which appeared in the teachings of the younger Hodge was described by the same student as follows:

With a regard for his father, which very literally was a part of his piety, the younger Hodge, in holding by the same theology, had independence enough to think out for himself every topic that came up for treatment, and to state to others his views upon it with unmistakable freshness and individuality of expression.37

The younger Hodge quickly won for himself a place of his own on the Princeton faculty. Salmond, the student who knew him and his father personally, registered the opinion that he

... not only sustained from a theological point of view the old renown of the chair he filled but also conquered for himself a place in the affection and esteem of his students and brother professors akin to that which his father had held before him.38

The classroom procedure followed by the younger Hodge

36 Salmond, Princetoniana, p. 89.
37 Loc. cit.
38 Ibid., p. 96.
was more informal than his predecessor's had been. He forsook the formal lecture for the interplay of question and answer between professor and pupils on the basis of his father's Systematic Theology. "Sometimes," said one of his students

it was a marvelous, original, bold, illustration which clinched the doctrine in our minds; sometimes he would run back to a doctrine discussed some weeks before and would give us a bird's eye view of all the connections of the system, carrying us up the great watersheds of truth and showing us the country as it stretched out on either side. . . . Our theology, thanks to that method, was inwrought into the warp and woof of our thinking.39

II. THEOLOGIAN

Dependence upon his father. The most complete account of A. A. Hodge's theological views appeared in the revised and enlarged edition of his Outlines of Theology, published in 1878. The first edition had met "a public need" in America and Britain and had been translated into Welsh and modern Greek and used in "several" theological training schools. The second edition, twice the size of the first, incorporated the "knowledge and experience" of fourteen years

39 Anonymous student, cited by Patton, "A. A. Hodge," Presbyterian Review, VIII (January, 1887), 129. See Nichols "A. A. Hodge," Dictionary of American Biography, IX, 98. "His teaching had a peculiar freedom and quickening power. His most memorable quality, however, was his extraordinary gift of illustration, bringing into play his wealth of mind and nature."
as a Seminary professor. \(^{40}\) Nichols describes the *Outlines of Theology* as "a dry precise statement of the elder Hodge's doctrine, clearly analytical and dogmatically positive." \(^{41}\)

The singularly striking feature of this book is the slavish way in which it follows Charles Hodge's *Systematic Theology* both as to organization and content. For example, in dealing with the attributes of God, the younger Hodge followed exactly the anthropomorphic speculations of his father. He wrote: "We attribute to God every excellence that we have any experience or conception of, in an infinite degree, and in absolute perfection." \(^{42}\) "The didactic statements of Scripture" concerning the Divine attributes provided a knowledge of God similar to but more precise than the description of Deity derived from idealizing the attributes of human nature. As for his two predecessors, revealed theology was for him the completion of insights available in natural theology. He held that both these methods of reaching a knowledge of Deity, inferences from nature and the Bible, "agree and mutually supplement and limit each other." \(^{43}\) Like his father's *Systematic Theology*, the son's

---


\(^{42}\) Ibid., p. 129.

\(^{43}\) Loc. cit.
Outlines of Theology sought to synthesize natural and revealed theology when dealing with the Divine attributes. The so-called "theistic proofs" for God's existence and nature were treated at the beginning of the treatise and followed by a systematic exposition of passages in the Bible which had a bearing upon the subject. Actually, the alleged synthesis between the two approaches to God are deceptive because after the initial excursion into natural theology he relied exclusively upon the Bible.

Father and son: similarities and differences. The younger Hodge expounded the same general view of the Trinity given by his father. His insistence upon the "Holy Ghost as a distinct person" and the implications of this view were derived from the elder Hodge's exposition of this doctrine. Both views perpetuated a needless theological complexity and were logically tritheistic. The two men differed concerning the doctrine of "the eternal generation of the Son." The elder Hodge believed the doctrine involved speculations unsupported by Scripture, whereas the younger Hodge believed

44 Ibid., p. 167. See A. A. Hodge, "Dorner's System of Christian Doctrine," Presbyterian Review, III (October, 1882), 785. Here Hodge stated that "upon the throne of the universe are three eternal, unchangeable Persons. . . ."

45 Supra, pp. 239-246.

46 Supra, pp. 244-245.
there was "nothing in it inconsistent with revealed truth" and regarded it as "a rational explanation of revealed facts rather than a revealed fact itself."[47] The elder Hodge admitted that the relation of the second person to the first in the Godhead was that of "sonship or filiation—but what is meant by the term," he said, "neither the Bible nor the ancient creeds explain." However, he continued, the Nicene Fathers, whom he accused of groundless speculation, undertook to explain "what is meant by sonship and teach that it means derivation of essence."[48] The younger Hodge accepted both the Scriptural doctrine of the Sonship of Christ, to which his father assented, and also accepted the speculations of the Fathers who sought to define the meaning of Christ's Sonship in terms of a "derivation of essence,"[49] which his father rejected.

The younger Hodge, more conversant with science than his father had been, was also more open minded about scientific speculations concerning the antiquity of man and the evolutionary theory:

(1) The elder Hodge admitted "the extreme uncertainty attending all attempts to determine the chronology of the

Bible" and conceded that even if scientists "should ultimately make it necessary to admit that eight or ten thousand years have elapsed since the creation of man, there is nothing in the Bible in the way of such a concession"\textsuperscript{50} but was obviously unwilling to concede the plausibility of a theory of human antiquity which extended back "for a period of ten thousand centuries,"\textsuperscript{51} for example, and marshalled evidence from every possible quarter to prove that man's antiquity could be reconciled with the Biblical account of the descent of the race from Adam and Eve. The younger Hodge also, of course, accepted the historicity of Adam and Eve and was, therefore, forced to think of man's antiquity within the same general chronological framework as his father, though he was more impressed than his predecessor by scientific claims to man's antiquity. For example, he wrote: "Modern research has developed a vast and constantly increasing account of evidence that the human race has existed upon the earth many centuries longer than is allowed for even by the chronology

\textsuperscript{50} C. Hodge, \textit{Systematic Theology}, II, 41. See A. A. Hodge, \textit{Evangelical Theology}, p. 150. "In a note to his Dr. W. H. Green's book on the Pentateuch, he says, 'The time between the creation of Adam and ourselves might have been, from all we know from the Bible to the contrary, much longer than it seems.' I can well remember," the younger Hodge continued, "my father walking up and down his study when he heard this, and saying, 'What a relief it is to me that he should have said that!"

\textsuperscript{51} C. Hodge, \textit{Systematic Theology}, II, 41.
of the Septuagint." It was, the Hodges held, not the Bible itself which was irreconcilable with "modern research"—as it a priori could not possibly be—but only that chronological constructions of Biblical history had gone awry. It was simply inconceivable to them that any actual conflict might exist between the valid conclusions of science and the Bible. Whatever difficulties were confronted at this point were solved either by discounting the new knowledge which produced the conflict or by reinterpreting the Bible to fit the new knowledge. In both cases the infallibility of Scripture was maintained. It was inevitable that this rather artificial technique of denial and adaptation by which the authority of Scripture was retained in the face of knew knowledge would sooner or later produce tensions that could not be assimilated, and thereby result in a re-definition of the nature of Biblical authority. The Hodges never felt the force of this situation, which lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

In dealing with human antiquity both father and son continued to think within the traditional framework of Princeton orthodoxy; the only difference between the two men was that the younger Hodge was willing to ascribe greater antiquity to man than his father would admit or the Bible

seemed to warrant. Sometimes the younger man was given to bold overstatement in seeking to reconcile the Biblical account with scientific tendencies. An example of this is the assertion that "the older the human family can be proved to be, the more possible and probable it is that it has descended from a single pair." Actually, Hodge and his father agreed that the Biblical account of man's origin and history could be reconciled with all trustworthy scientific conclusions bearing on the matter. The only difference between them was the younger Hodge's willingness to ascribe greater antiquity to man than his father. They agreed that the human race had descended from Adam and Eve, which necessarily implied that they both ascribed relatively recent points in time prior to which human life could not possibly have existed on this planet. Thus a purely archaeological and historical problem was approached with a conception of Biblical infallibility and, therefore, with certain theological presuppositions which controlled the conclusions reached. This is not in any way surprising, however, because the claim of the historicity of Adam and Eve, which was

53 Ibid., p. 298.

54 Ibid., pp. 298-299. "The absolute unity of the race by descent from one pair is essentially implied in the propagation by imputation and by descent of guilt and corruption from Adam, and of the representative headship and vicarious obedience and suffering of Jesus Christ."
part and parcel of nineteenth century orthodoxy, blocked any genuinely historical approach to the problem of human antiquity.

(2) The younger Hodge was more favorably disposed than his father toward speculation about the theory of evolution, which followed the appearance of Darwin's Origin of the Species, in 1859. Charles Hodge held unequivocally that the entire evolutionary hypothesis was "anti-scriptural" and consequently erroneous.55 His son equivocated and wrote ambiguously about evolution. Hodge the younger had manifested peculiar interest in scientific studies during his college days, when he was science Professor David Henry's "favorite pupil,"56 and must have been impressed with the claim of President James McCosh of the College of New Jersey, who was his contemporary, that it was possible to reconcile the evolutionary and Biblical accounts of the world. In 1878, A. A. Hodge wrote that he had "only the most friendly interest" in the theory of evolution which retained a teleological and, therefore, a theistic view of the world.57 He firmly opposed "purely natural evolution" but conceded the

55 Supra, pp. 247-250.
56 Patton, "A. A. Hodge," Presbyterian Review, VIII (January, 1887), 126. "Dr. Hodge was Professor Henry's favorite pupil, and from him he acquired the taste for physical science which he carried with him through life."
57 A. A. Hodge, Outlines, p. 39.
possibility of eventual proof of "continuous evolution,"\(^{58}\) i.e., the descent of man's purely physical organism from the sub-human level, which he believed would not necessarily discount the Biblical view. The elder Hodge did not accept this "possibility" and asserted that "man's body was formed by the immediate intervention of God. . . . It was not produced by any process of development."\(^{59}\) The younger Hodge stated that "the human race \(\text{i.e., Adam and Eve as 'persons'}\) was originated by an immediate creation of God"\(^{60}\) but he never allowed himself to specify that man's "body" was a special creation, though he implied it, and rather stressed "man's higher nature" as a specific divine endowment, different in kind and not merely in degree from the highest order of animal life. The difference between the two views was that the elder Hodge maintained without any qualification that both the body and the soul of Adam were instantaneously created by God after the creation of the physical world and all forms of plant and animal life, whereas Hodge the younger toyed with the possibility that, though man's soul was a direct divine creation, his body was merely an animal organism, already in existence as result of the process of evolution. According to this theory, a purely

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 40.

\(^{59}\) C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, 3.

\(^{60}\) A. A. Hodge, Outlines, p. 296.
animal organism produced by the natural process became man in consequence of a divine act of creativity. In other words, what was an animal organism was endowed with the divine image by an act of God.

Reviewing Asa Gray's *Natural Science and Religion*, in 1880, A. A. Hodge admitted that the author was both a "Darwinian" and also "a thoroughly loyal theist and Christian." Such a view cut straight across Charles Hodge's position, in which Darwinism and theism were mutually exclusive. Hodge the younger, however, admired Gray, who, he said, was

... able to see somewhat on both sides of the question, and sympathize with the views and feelings of parties who are for the most part blindly assaulting each other across an apparently impassible gulf.

This was followed by a remark which set him clearly against his father's view, which claimed that evolution nullified teleology and, therefore, necessarily implied atheism. "We have no sympathy with those who maintain," wrote the younger Hodge, "that scientific theories of evolution are necessarily atheistic. No man has proved this..."61 This was an explicit repudiation of his father's thesis in *What is Darwinism?*, in which precisely this—evolution equals atheism—had been asserted. After castigating the "presumptuous assertion" that evolution implied atheism, Hodge the younger

---

allied himself with the view that

... it is not beyond the power of the creator, nor incongruous with what appear to be His methods on the whole, for Him to engrat, by a direct act of His will, new and higher powers upon an organism produced by natural processes originated in a previous creation. 62 He accordingly declared the possibility of a theistic evolution which would be congruous with the Biblical account of beginnings. He was doubtless aware of the danger of a position which tied the Bible inextricably to an anti-evolutionary theory and which would logically imply the Scriptures to be false if evolution should be true. 63 He was seeking to protect Princeton from an obscurantist tendency, defended by his father, which had identified Calvinism with pre-scientific cosmological and anthropological speculations. A more cautious but substantially similar statement about evolutionary theory was made shortly before his death. 64

Popularizer of Calvinism. A. A. Hodge followed his father's views so closely on the doctrines of anthropology, soteriology, and eschatology that an examination of them would

62 Ibid., p. 588.

63 See Andrew D. White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (New York: 1897), pp. 79-80. President McCosh of the College of New Jersey told White in a personal conference that "the most dangerous thing which could be done to Christianity at the college was to reiterate in the pulpit week after week to students solemn declarations that if evolution by natural selection, or indeed evolution at all, be true, the Scriptures are false. He tells us that he saw that this was the certain way to make the students unbelievers."

64 A. A. Hodge, Evangelical Theology, pp. 145-150.
involve an almost exact repetition of what has already been covered in the study of Charles Hodge. The son was less dogmatic than his father with reference to doctrinal details, such as the precise way in which responsibility for original sin was transmitted to the race, but there was no difference at all between the two men concerning basic Christian doctrine. The difference was largely a matter of emphasis and temperament. The younger Hodge was more interested in science \textit{per se} than his father, had a more curious, though less disciplined, mind, and was more imaginative in his exposition of Christian doctrine, as evidenced by his greater popular appeal. Nichols has said that A. A. Hodge was

\begin{quote}
... less learned than his father but was broader because of more varied experience, wider reading, and richer human sympathies. In his theological discussions there was considerable speculative originality, with flashes of mystical insight, the issue of his fervid personal religion.\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}

Concerning the younger Hodge, W. G. T. Shedd said,

\begin{quote}
I was struck with his great directness and sincerity, intellectually as well as morally. His mind, like his heart, worked without ambiguity or drawback. Hence his energy in the perception and statement of truth—a quality that showed itself in his uncommon ability to popularize scientific theology.\textsuperscript{67}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{65} Patton, A. A. Hodge, pp. 32-33.


\textsuperscript{67} W. G. T. Shedd, "Remarks in Memory of A. A. Hodge," cited by Patton, A. A. Hodge, p. 49.
Francis L. Patton, who succeeded James McCosh as President of the College of New Jersey and was later a professor in the Seminary, gave the same estimate in almost the same words used by Shedd when he wrote: "Dr. A. A. Hodge was pre-eminently a popularizer of scientific theology." 68 Again he wrote: "He had a rare gift of illustration, remarkable fluency, an easy command of the whole dogmatic area, and great fervor." 69 He resembled Archibald Alexander and was superior to his father in the facility and fluency he commanded in public discourse. 70 A series of popular lectures covering the entire field of Christian theology was given to a large and miscellaneous audience in Philadelphia shortly before his untimely death in 1886 and was posthumously incorporated into his last book. 71 This final treatise preserves a specimen of what a friendly critic has called "a popular yet scientific presentation of the Princeton position," 72 a phrase which succinctly summarizes

68 Patton, A. A. Hodge, p. 49.
70 Patton, A. A. Hodge, p. 36.
71 A. A. Hodge, Evangelical Theology.
72 C. A. Salmond, "Preface to A. A. Hodge's Evangelical Theology," Evangelical Theology, p. vi. See Patton, A. A. Hodge, p. 51. Hodge "was lecturing to large audiences in Orange, New Jersey, when taken ill for the last time and inquiries were already afoot respecting the possibility of having these lectures delivered in other cities."
his consummate contribution to nineteenth century American theology.

III. THEOLOGICAL TRANSITION

Critique of "progressive" theology. Hodge the younger was a more irenic spirit than his father but was nevertheless thoroughly capable of sharp controversy. He strove for "peace and love" but also for "purity and truth," as he put it in the preface to his work on the atonement. "I would pray and labor," he wrote, "that in gaining breadth we may not lose height, and in gaining peace and love we may not lose purity and truth." 73 The statement expresses a worthy hope and is innocent enough but it contains a condition which made the Princeton school a divisive factor in American theology. Obviously, Hodge identified "purity and truth" with Princeton Calvinism and made conformity to it the price of theological peace. The Princeton school constantly inclined to universalize its own provincial view of truth into absolutes supported by alleged divine sanctions. The defense of the "truth" for which Princeton stood was rather uncritically identified with "divine truth"--for had not God revealed it in the Bible and did not the Seminary stand for the Bible without fear or favor?

73 A. A. Hodge, Atonement, p. vi.
It is clear that the Princeton polemic would have been more effective if it had evinced more humility and tolerance in declaring its opposition to other schools. A. A. Hodge's review of a book by Dean Stanley entitled *Christian Institutions*, 74 which appeared in the *Catholic Presbyterian* of March, 1882, illustrates the extreme polemical thrusts of which the Princeton school was sometimes capable. Hodge felt that Dean Stanley's treatise was "subversive of all that is vital in our Christian religion." 75 He, therefore, castigated the book, in which he alleged

... all the characteristic and distinguishing elements of the religion of Jesus are quietly eliminated, and the residuum barely comes up, either in content or in spirit, to the baldest historical Socinianism.

Reminiscent of his father, whom he was apparently trying to imitate, he concluded confidently: "All this is something essentially different from Christianity." But the final blow was yet to fall. "Dean Stanley finished his life," wrote Hodge,

by deliberately substituting the essence of natural deism into the place, and disguising it under the sacred name and symbols, of the historical religion of Jesus Christ. Claiming that the essence of Christianity is morality, he did the immoral thing. 76

---


76 Loc. cit., cited by *ibid.*, pp. 93-94.
Dr. Stanley had been Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Oxford before becoming Dean of Westminster, in 1863, and was an acute and independent, if somewhat eccentric, historian. The book to which Hodge took such violent exception was a historical treatise on "ecclesiastical subjects," which dealt only indirectly with theological matters. Of course, the Dean was latitudinarian in theological outlook and a member of the Broad Church party in the Church of England. He was a warm friend of F. D. Maurice. There was thus a sharp theological cleavage between Hodge and Stanley and the attack of the Princeton professor on the Dean's book is not surprising. It was inevitable that the rising tide of unconventional theological reconstruction, born to some extent of critical historical studies of the rise and development of Christianity, of which Stanley's treatise was an example, should collide headlong with the dogmatic, unhistorical conception of the Christian faith held by the Princeton school.

With the decline of the New England theology, against which Charles Hodge poured a perennial polemic for fifty years, there appeared in America a "progressive" theology which had grown impatient of dogmatic Calvinism and sought


78 See John Wright Buckham, Progressive Religious Thought in America (New York: 1919), especially pp. 3-52.
to incorporate a genuine historical spirit into the formulation of Christian belief. It was this "liberal" thought, of which Stanley was an English exponent, that drew the younger Hodge's fire near the end of his career and was increasingly to be of concern to Princeton conservatism. This review by Hodge which appeared in 1882 marked a transition by the Princeton school from an anti-New England to an anti-liberal polemic.

Response to theological change. The most striking difference between the elder and younger Hodge was occasioned by the rapidly changed theological situation with which the son sought to cope in the last years of his life. No longer was American theology neatly divided into two major contending schools—the Princeton and the New England. A new theological ferment appeared. Various sources commingled to produce a single movement of life and thought which challenged the conventional theologies. Views which were not new but which had been banned as heretical when they first were raised against the dominant theological schools began to appear in the writing, preaching, and teaching of influential and respected Christian leaders in America. Calvinistic pessimism concerning human nature was increasingly on the defensive against the optimistic view of man expounded by Horace Bushnell and his school. The benevolent Fatherhood

79 See Horace Bushnell, Christian Nurture (New York:
rather than the austere sovereignty of God was emphasized. The hard rigor of the penal and governmental views of the atonement was replaced by more humane interpretations.

The intellectual drift away from the older theologies was accelerated by a growing optimism in American life. History seemed to justify the new theology. The doctrines of man and history in the Princeton and New England schools were curiously incongruous in the new world coming to birth. Man appeared to be mastering not only nature but himself and the historical process by the application of the techniques of science. The theory of biological evolution was transformed into a philosophy of history which seemed to guarantee inevitable progress. Thus the theological and cultural situation in America underwent radical changes in the eighteen-eighties. It was to this new situation that A. A. Hodge sought to relate the Princeton position. His approach was in the form of a popular apologetic; many media were used—public platform, pulpit, classroom, magazine articles. The last article from his pen appeared posthumously in the January, 1887, issue of the Presbyterian Review, of which he was one of the founders, in 1880, and senior editor for four

years. Entitled "The Relation of God to the World," it was a typical specimen of his well-written and popular apologetic, in which he claimed to "reconcile the practical faith of Christians with the highest science" and to

... provide a rational basis alike for the natural and the supernatural; for the reign of law and for special miracle; for science and for practical religion.80

The substance of the Princeton theology remained largely the same in the new theological situation but the form in which the younger Hodge was seeking to cast it at the time of his death differed somewhat from the formulation of his father. The last writings of A. A. Hodge are sprinkled with popular phrases designed to show the essential "reasonableness" of Princeton Calvinism and are characterized by a spirit of conciliation toward the same New England theology to which the elder Hodge had shown such inveterate hostility. There are countless allusions to scientific and philosophical "theories" in relation to which Calvinism was interpreted and defended. Biblical "critics" were duly denounced and the people were assured that the Scriptures were inerrant and infallible.

The tide of theological thought was just beginning to run heavily against Protestant orthodoxy in America when

A. A. Hodge was stricken in 1886. The advancing pervasion of the two strongest intellectual forces of the century—the scientific movement and the historical movement—worked a steady and progressive corrosion upon both the Princeton and New England schools of theology. It became increasingly clear that Christian theology could no longer be isolated from contemporary thought and must come to terms with modern science, both as to method and specific findings concerning the world and man. It was also evident to an increasing number of Christian thinkers that theology must face the implications of the historical spirit, both as to method and specific conclusions. How far these developments spelled the doom of the old theology, how far the latter fell through internal atrophy, is uncertain. It is clear that Hodge the younger resisted the scientific and historical movements to the very end and believed firmly that Princeton orthodoxy was a final faith, impervious to any conceivable criticism.
CHAPTER V

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRINCETON SCHOOL
OF THEOLOGY DISPLAYED

The first impression which appears after a study of the Princeton school of theology is its fundamental unity. From beginning to end it is that particular version of Calvinism which Archibald Alexander established, Charles Hodge systematically developed, and Archibald Hodge popularized. These three contributions, of course, overlap but seem to be correct designations of three major emphases in the same school of thought. Whatever differences appeared in the writings of these three exponents of the single theological continuum with which this thesis is concerned, there is a continuity on the main Christian doctrines.

An important reason for this continuity is the idea of authority underlying the Princeton school. The "plenary" inspiration and consequent verbal infallibility of the autographs of the Old and New Testaments were maintained unequivocally by the Princeton theologians. This produced a propositional view of revelation as the disclosure of Divine truths, the communication of knowledge otherwise unobtainable on the condition of a faith which was little more than intellectual assent. Theology was considered a "science" which undertook to determine and exhibit the
"inner relations" of the truths revealed. Christian truth was something "given," as objective as the phenomena observed in the natural sciences. There were two steps in the process of theologizing: the first was an exegetical determination of the meaning of Scripture, and the second was a systematic arrangement of the "truths" thus derived from the Bible. Precision in theology akin to the exactness of the natural sciences was thought to be possible. At the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that the Bible allegedly contained an objective body of related truths, analogous to the world of nature with which science is concerned. Theology was accordingly an exact science which elucidated the propositions contained in Scripture. In this sense, Princeton theology was rigorously rationalistic.

The strict reliance which theology made upon exegesis resulted in theological rather than historical interpretation of the Bible. There was, therefore, a common failure in this school to distinguish between historical and dogmatic exegesis, which were really identified. Perhaps a clearer way of stating this would be to say that the Princeton professors were inclined to regard dogmatic exegesis as historical, i.e., they regarded the dogmatic meaning they derived from Scripture as the genuinely historical meaning. Since Augustine, Calvin, the Westminster divines, Turretin, and their scholastic successors were considered authoritative
interpreters of the infallible Word of God, the Princeton school tended to identify Biblical truth with the Augustinian tradition, which, in turn, was identified with the outlook of the Princeton school. There was a constant failure to distinguish between Biblical theology and the dogmatic theology which developed in the history of the Christian movement, especially the theological side of the Augustinian phase of that development. None of the exponents of the Princeton theology was ever aware, apparently, of a distinction between the historical meaning of Scripture and the theological superstructure reared upon Scripture by the dogmaticians who were the indirect architects of Princeton orthodoxy.

The three Princeton professors with whom this thesis is concerned were not really capable of entering into the minds of other men. They tended to attribute their own opinions to others with whom they shared a similar theological outlook and to separate themselves entirely from those who disagreed with them on any major theological point. The Hodges especially were inclined to attribute their own opinions to Augustine, Calvin, Turretin, and other authorities whom they often cited. Their opinions were often identified with the view of "the whole church." Their erudition wanted what is rightly expected of superior minds—that they should enter into the spirit of the things they
know, not know them merely in their details. It does not seem too harsh a criticism to say that the Princeton men were inclined to study the figures in theological history upon whom they depended or criticized largely from the outside. There minds were not really thrown into the manner of thought exhibited by theologians whom they found to be generally congenial or uncongenial. The field of theological speculation was not surveyed from the viewpoint of the individual thinker who was being utilized or criticized but from the viewpoint of the Princeton men themselves. The opinion of an author stands as largely an isolated fact in the pages of the Princeton theologians, often without foundation in the author’s individuality or connection with his other doctrines. For want of this elucidation one by another, these isolated opinions are liable to be misunderstood.

The tendency to project their opinions into the scholastic theological tradition which they elucidated, thus providing themselves with an impressive body of apparently integrated theological opinion with which to work, was an important factor in forming the ideal of an exact theology accepted by the Princeton men. This concern for correct theological beliefs was also a result of the idea of the theological task held by Alexander and the Hodges. Exegesis
of the infallible Word made precision of belief possible. Thus the ending of a Greek verb might be fraught with grave theological significance. This passion for precision pervades the entire Princeton position. It was considered important not only to believe in the imputation of sin to the human race through the primal sin of Adam but also to hold the "representative" rather than the "realistic" theory of that imputation. Dissent from that view of the atonement which found its necessity in the punishment of sin required by distributive justice, its efficacy in the satisfaction of that justice by the perfect substitute and its design exclusively for the elect was considered heretical.

The preoccupation with theological precision and the corresponding crucial importance of adopting the beliefs thus precisely defined made Princeton Seminary a center of theological conservatism and an arch and outspoken opponent of all views which differed from Princeton orthodoxy. The Princeton Review was the chief channel of the polemical thrusts of the Princeton theologians. The attitude of precision and finality which marked the minds of the Princeton men produced an inflexible theology that was increasingly isolated from the intellectual and cultural developments of the nineteenth century. The inability of the Princeton school to relate itself to "the scientific movement and historical movement," which have been called
"the two greatest intellectual forces of the nineteenth century," forced the Princeton position into a theological obscurantism and resulted ultimately in its collapse. The historical criticism of the Bible could not be permanently treated by intelligent men as a kind of immoral plot on the part of skeptical scholars who were determined to undermine Christianity. The legitimate claims of science to speak unfettered about the natural aspects of human life and history, such as biological evolution and natural law, could not be constantly regarded as hoaxes perpetrated by evil men. The effort to bring a historical approach into the understanding of the Christian revelation could not be permanently viewed as a surreptitious plan by infidels to destroy the Bible. This thesis does not carry the story of the Princeton school into the twentieth century, when its theological intransigence was surrendered and a critical orthodoxy supplanted it. But a brief statement should be made about its fate. It is, of course, true that orthodox Calvinism has been perpetuated in America by conservative groups who doggedly reaffirm the old formulae but the


Princeton school of theology came to an end with the death of Benjamin B. Warfield, A. A. Hodge's successor, in 1921, and with the resignation of J. G. Machen from the Seminary faculty in 1928.

The supreme confidence with which Princeton Calvinism was held produced a polemic that was severely critical of alternative views and uncritical of itself. It was aware of the relativity of every viewpoint except its own. It regarded the highly scholastic seventeenth century Calvinism it espoused as an ultimate center of truth and was never aware that this point of reference from which the theological problem was viewed was itself a particular locus produced by the relativities of its own historical milieu. The march of modern knowledge increasingly revealed the invalidity of an authoritarianism which had been forged, for understandable reasons, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Princeton orthodoxy, setting itself strongly against the New England theology developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was inclined to regard seventeenth century Protestant scholasticism as normative, especially the writings of Francis Turretin and John Owen. The Princeton school of the nineteenth century was not self-critical, for understandable reasons related to its scholastic and strict Scottish heritage, and became increasingly anachronistic in the twentieth.
The extreme conservatism of the Princeton school was partly produced by the Scotch-Irish-Scottish Calvinism from which the Seminary drew not only the bulk of its students but its theological perspective as well, especially in the early years of its history. This is undoubtedly the reason for Princeton's slavish loyalty to the Westminster Confession of Faith, which was highly revered by the emigrants from Scotland and Ireland. Likewise the stress upon the final authority of the General Assembly over the lower courts of the Church in legislative as well as judicial action is a heritage from Scottish Calvinism. In Scotland, the General Assembly existed before there were either presbyteries or synods and power in the Church, therefore, descended from that body; but not so in America, where presbyteries first existed, of which the higher judicatories were formed. The Presbyterianism which was derived primarily from the traditions and thought forms of the Reformation in Scotland was interpreted in terms of seventeenth century Protestant scholasticism. It was the combination of these two theological strands, bringing Scottish theology and Turretin's scholasticism together, which accounts for much of the groundwork of the Princeton theology. An integral part of the resulting theological configuration upon which Princeton orthodoxy was reared was a rigorous Biblicism. Perhaps it is repetitious to point this out again but it must be
emphasized. The theological polemics of the Princeton apologists were based upon a Biblical authoritarianism which, following particularly Turretin and the Confession, utilized proof-texts from Scripture, without consistent reference to their contexts, as the final Word of God. Surely there is something vastly unhistorical and, therefore, suspect about the perennial dependence upon isolated texts drawn together by dogmatic formulae as the basis of a theological position. A. A. Hodge's Outlines of Theology is a case in point. Opening the book at random at page four-hundred and ten, where the topic happens to be the doctrine of the atonement, one discovers forty separate proof-texts from thirteen different books of the Bible.

The strongest positive influences resulting in Princeton orthodoxy were, then, the theological tradition which grew out of the Scottish Reformation mediated through emigrants from Scotland and Ireland to America and the scholastic Calvinism of Francis Turretin and his school. The strongest negative factor in the formation of the Princeton school was the New England theology, against which a constant polemic was carried on by Alexander and the Hodges. Archibald Hodge became somewhat conciliatory toward the New England movement only in his last years. Charles Hodge always treated the New England theology as an enemy of the truth. The word "enemy" is not too strong in view
of the caustic criticisms he constantly hurled at all things New England. It is not surprising, therefore, that the elder Hodge defined his doctrine of human "inability" against the Edwardean idea of "natural ability"; his judicial doctrine of the atonement against the largely Grotian theory espoused by the New England theologians; his doctrine of the sovereignty of God in opposition to the quasi-anthropocentrism of the Edwardean doctrine of "disinterested benevolence" to being in general--especially as it was developed by the successors of the elder Edwards--; his doctrine of sin, involving a perennial blemish upon all levels of moral achievement, as a check upon Oberlin perfectionism, which grew out of the "revivalistic" theology of New England; his doctrine of the imputation of the primal sin against the "anti-imputationism" of Nathaniel W. Taylor of Yale especially; his doctrine of the Divine certainty of all future free choices against the doctrine of "the power of contrary choice," also taught by Taylor; and his doctrine of the endless punishment of the wicked in hell in opposition to the theory of "second probation" taught at Andover Seminary. The basic doctrine in Hodge's system, the sovereignty of God, was fashioned to counteract the growing Pelagianism of the New England school, especially the teachings of Taylor. The "new theology" of Taylor, a half-way position between the New England theology and the "progressive"
position occupied by men like George A. Gordon, taught, for example, that God punished sin not merely in order to preserve the general justice of the world but also to deter further sin. Taylor also taught that guilt for sin could be predicated only in the degree to which the individual was personally responsible for his wrongdoing. Against Hodge, Taylor denied both "original sin" and "original righteousness." Against Taylor, Hodge condemned moralistic theology as subversive of the major Christian doctrines.

This emphasis upon the sovereignty of God in the Princeton school and the corresponding stress upon man's "total inability" tended to produce an attitude of heroic resignation—but resignation nevertheless—toward the injustices of life, both personal and social. There was, therefore, neither a theodicy nor a social ethic in Princeton orthodoxy. The status quo was sanctified. The social and economic structure of America, especially in the ante bellum period, in which Princeton orthodoxy was forged, was accepted with little criticism. In spite of sin, it was what God had ordained. Were not the apparent injustices of life the decrees of an inscrutable providence? Suffering was seen as punishment for the wicked and chastisement for the righteous. Whatever happened could be snugly fitted into God's purpose either to punish or discipline His creatures. Especially the theology of the Hodges was an
"aristocratic" theology, to which the old Calvinism with its clear levels of ecclesiastical and theological authority was admirably fitted. Democratic tendencies in both church government and doctrinal formulation were constantly and often bitterly resisted. Charles Hodge defended slavery on an explicitly Biblical basis but his apologia was also the implicit outcome of a social conservatism born of his seventeenth century scholastic Calvinism with its extreme emphasis upon the Divine sovereignty and human depravity. Francis Patton spoke of A. A. Hodge's "aristocratic sympathies" and "extreme avowal of Toryism" as if they were "hereditary" but actually they were probably much more the outcome of his father's and his own theological presuppositions.

Is it too speculative to connect the decline of the nineteenth century Princeton school of theology with the collapse of the largely agrarian and aristocratic social system of which it was an integral part? The democratizing tendencies released by the Civil War, the destruction of the southern aristocracy, the rise of a dynamic industrial economy, supplanting the agrarian one in the North, the economic dependence and weakness of the South, and the growing impact of science resulted in tremendous social and economic changes in America. The scholastic and static Princeton school, which catered to aristocratic ideas in
both theology and social organization and which was wedded to a pre-scientific past, succumbed in the more democratic and scientific culture that followed the Civil War.

The Princeton school was characterized by an unwavering confidence in the finality of its theological position. God had seen fit to bestow the secret of truth, which many wise men knew not, upon those who believed in the infallibility of His written Word. No scientific or philosophical skepticism, no new knowledge could possibly disturb the supreme confidence of the Princeton theologians in the unqualified truth of what they believed. They were, therefore, rugged and intolerant men. What often appeared to those on the outside, whether skeptics, New England men, or critics in general, as a petulant theologian intransigence in the Princeton school was to Alexander and the Hodges simply a God-given assurance of truth. If they were bold, their firm faith demanded it. They rejected accusations hurled at them by opponents that their dogmatism sometimes became bigotry or that their certainties grew out of an egotistic self-confidence. How, they asked, could it be bigotry or egotism simply to stand for the truth? Charles Hodge disclaimed "a self-confident and dogmatic spirit" and attributed his untroubled sense of assurance to his belief in "the truth of the infallible Word of God."³

Since the Princeton school was deeply conditioned by the controversies in the midst of which it was fashioned and failed to assimilate the historical and scientific movements, it hardly serves as a live option in the present theological situation. It is, therefore, not surprising that this theology no longer persists as a specific school attached to Princeton Seminary and the Presbyterian Church. The "Biblical realism" now in vogue has some elements in common with Princeton Calvinism but these similarities should not be taken as evidence of a revival of the Princeton theology, whose presuppositions were in many instances quite different from those of the current "realistic theology." The Princeton school is, nevertheless, a significant aspect of the intellectual history of nineteenth century America and an important movement in American church history. Furthermore, the theological position it exhibited still survives in varying degrees in "conservative" American Protestant theology. An understanding of the Princeton school of theology is required, therefore, both for a proper estimate of nineteenth century American thought and for an adequate appraisal of the theological situation in America today.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

A Brief History of the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church at Princeton, New Jersey (Princeton, New Jersey: 1838).


———, The Canon of the Old and New Testaments Ascertained, or the Bible Complete Without the Apocrypha and Unwritten Traditions (Philadelphia: 1851).


Barnes, Albert, Notes, Explanatory and Practical on the Epistle to the Romans, Designed for Bible-Classes and Sunday Schools (New York: 1834).

Beaman, Nathan S. S., Christ, the Only Sacrifice, or the Atonement in its Relation to God and Man (second edition; New York: 1844).


Briggs, Charles Augustus, American Presbyterianism (New York: 1885).

Buckham, John Wright, Progressive Religious Thought in America (New York: 1919).


Calvin, John, Institutes of the Christian Religion, translated by Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh: 1845), Volume III.


Dexter, Henry M., The Congregationalism of the Last Three Hundred Years (Boston: 1880).


Foster, Frank Hugh, A Genetic History of the New England Theology (Chicago: 1907).


Gillett, E. H., History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (revised edition; Philadelphia: 1873), Volume II.


Hammar, George, Christian Realism in Contemporary American Theology (Uppsala: 1940).


———, *Evangelical Theology, a Course of Popular Lectures* (London: 1890).


———, *Inaugural Address, Western Theological Seminary* (Pittsburgh: 1864).

———, *Memorial to Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater* (New York: 1833).

———, *Outlines of Theology* (London: 1863).


———, *Essays and Reviews* (New York: 1857).


———, *Systematic Theology* (London: 1884), three volumes.


———, *The Orthodox Doctrine Regarding the Extent of the Atonement Vindicated* (Edinburgh: 1846).


____, *Presbyterianism, the Truly Primitive and Apostolical Constitution of the Church of Christ* (Philadelphia: 1840).


Plan for the Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (Princeton, New Jersey: 1838).


_, *Dogmatic Theology* (New York: 1891), Volume II.


B. PERIODICAL ARTICLES


_____, "Doctrine of Original Sin," Biblical Repertory, II (October, 1830).


"Professor Stuart's Postcript to his Letter to the Editors of the Biblical Repertory," Biblical Repertory, II (January, 1830).


"Regeneration," Biblical Repertory, II (April, 1830).


"The Relation of Adam's First Sin to the Fall of the Race," Princeton Review, XLII (April, 1870).


"Union of the Old and New Schools," Princeton Review, XXXVIII (July, 1866).


———, "Unity and Diversities of Belief," The Bibliotheca Sacra, VIII (July, 1851).


Pond, Enoch, "Beaman on the Atonement," The Bibliotheca Sacra, XIX (October, 1862).

———, "Dr. Hodge and the New England Theology," The Bibliotheca Sacra, XXX (April, 1873).


Staiger, C. Bruce, "Abolitionism and the Presbyterian Schism of 1837-1838," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXVI (December, 1949).


Warfield, Benjamin B., "Inspiration," Presbyterian Review, II (April, 1881).


C. LETTERS


Andrews, Jedediah, to Dr. Coleman of Boston, April 7, 1729, in Charles Hodge, Constitutional History (Philadelphia: 1851).

Barnard, William, to the New College Missionary Association of Edinburgh, Scotland, September 26, 1845.


Dickinson, Jonathan, to John Thompson, April 10, 1729, in Charles A. Briggs, American Presbyterianism (New York: 1885).

Gapp, Kenneth S., to Penrose St. Amant, October 5, 1950.


Kollock, Henry, to Bishop Hobart, 1803, in E. H. Gillett, History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (revised edition; Philadelphia: 1873), Volume II.

Miller, Samuel, Jr., to the New College Missionary Association, September 30, 1843.


Trustees of the College of New Jersey to the Presbyteries, 1806, in E. H. Gillett, History of the Presbyterian Church in America (revised edition; Philadelphia: 1873), Volume II.

D. MINUTES


"Resolution to the General Assembly," 1836, cited by E. H. Gillett, History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (Philadelphia: 1873), Volume II.


E. REFERENCE WORKS


F. PARTS OF A SERIES


G. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS


Hodge, Charles, "Commentary on Turretin's *Institutio Theologica Eleneticae*" (Unpublished manuscript, Princeton Theological Seminary, n. d.).

------, "History of the Septuagint," and "The Sacred Criticism of the New Testament" (Unpublished notes, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1822), file D.

------, "Introductory Lecture" (Unpublished notes, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1822), file D.


H. NEWSPAPERS

Cincinnati Journal, June 6, 1837.

New York Observer, July 15, 1837.