THE IMAGO DEI:
AN HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL EXAMINATION

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The attempt to write a fore-word is a humbling experience; one is confronted with the realization - not for the first time, but perhaps more vividly - of his absolute inter-relatedness, and consequently, his utter dependence upon the multitudes of persons and events that have shaped him. The thesis itself is an attempt to articulate the authenticity, the value of those factors. More specifically, it is my attempt to express theologically what has been expressed to me primarily in non-theological terms, e.g., being loved, a sense of dignity, and the importance of "being". Often those expressions were not merely non-theological, but contradictory to traditional theological formulation and doctrine. And although much of the polemic tone has been sublimated for the sake of academic suitability, hopefully some of the "passion" remains. For, it was a reactionary passion that prompted the pursuit of this writing.

Canon Roland C. Walls, in his amazing patience and insight, introduced me to a rather obscure Father of the Church, St. Irenaeus, realizing that in him I might discover an alternate structure of the relation between God and the world. For that introduction and for his many hours of care-ful conversation, I express my gratitude. Rev. D.W.D. Shaw, who served as my second advisor, is the one to whom credit is due for whatever stylistic precision and organizational value there is. That the thesis is only an approximation of Wall's hopes, and Shaw's concern for exactitude is due to my own limitations.

Finally, to my wife, Mary, belongs the major credit. Apart from her patient impatience I might never have completed the work.
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INTRODUCTION

THE IMAGO DEI - A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

a. Marking the Way

The so-called theologies of hope tender a strange and unsettling sound; they suggest that in spite of what has been said to the contrary the primary orientation of the Christian faith is forward. ¹ This new sound understandably threatens the comfort and malaise of the multitudes of quiet, yet disheartened and disenchanted Christians - those who seem inclined to capitulate in the face of worldly, secular nihilism. Carl Braaten articulates the theme of hope thus: "The essence of a thing is neither in its past nor in its present but in its future. Man is an experiment in the laboratory of a history whose goal, according to the Christian hope, is new life in a new world."² But, are there warrants for such hope? Is the traditional theology of the church, especially in respect to man, compatible with "hope" which takes historical creaturely existence so seriously? This is the subjective concern of this thesis in respect to which the imago Dei will be studied.

This thesis is not a theology of hope; neither is it a defence of that theological motif. Yet, it presupposes the validity of the "sound", believing that it is consonant with the central theme of Scripture, i.e. God's gracious relationship with man. Our major and unifying theme will be that of the

¹It should be pointed out that the future of which we speak is not the future of heaven; hope's future connotes more concrete historical implicates.
imago Dei. Man was created in the image of God; the image in which man was created is the God who said both: "I am the Alpha" and also "I am the Omega". (Rev. 1:8)¹ The separation of the verse is to indicate that whereas theology has generally affirmed man's creation into the image of Him who is the Alpha, concentrating on the creation of man in the beginning, theology has been reticent, especially in the West, to speak of man in the image of Him who is the Omega. This reticence seems to be a necessary and logical concomitant of Western theology's concept of creation and fall. The major proposition of this thesis is that an adequate (i.e., personal and eschatological) interpretation of the imago Dei concept is the proper perspective from which to develop a particular theology-anthropology (Karl Barth's "The-anthropology").² Conversely, a particular concept of Paradise and of the subsequent incursion of sin seems to necessitate and predetermine one's understanding of the imago Dei, and of course, also one's Christology. If the major theme and problem is sin, the "solution" can only be applicable on that basis, and in those terms. Therefore sin becomes the center around which theology gravitates. God is required, in order to conform to the problem, to be of a certain nature, and Christology is similarly predetermmed.

There appear to be two variants relative to the interpretation of the image of God in man, and they relate generally to the two major portions or families within the Christian Church: Western-Augustinian, and Eastern-Irenaean. The alternative pre-suppositions appear to be responsible for the consequent differences related to Christology, anthropology, eschatology and history. Somewhat oversimplified, it may be said that the Western family has

¹All Scripture references are from the Jerusalem Bible, except those in quotations, or where otherwise indicated.

tended to concentrate on the majesty of God and a minimization of man, while the Eastern segment has emphasized God's anthropological orientation. It is not implied, however, that either consideration necessarily excludes the other. A comprehensive treatment of the two "models" will be given in Chapters I and II.

A consideration of the image of God concept will provide a focus in this thesis around which several representative theologians will be evaluated. Further, we will attempt to indicate wherein particular and apparently pre-determined interpretations of the God-man structure of relation presupposed the conclusion.

An underlying question of the thesis is this: is man in God's image to be understood primarily from the perspective of sin? Or conversely, is sin, as a related but secondary factor, to be understood in relation to man in God's image? What, in other words, is the primary point of reference? If theology begins with conclusions already established about that which is common to man, and if that factor is the "wrongness" of man, then obviously the "religious" question will be centered about God's response to man's problem. If, on the other hand, God is understood as the One who is always creating man - with a view toward his future - the primary focus will not be sin but rather the activity of God and His work on man's behalf. The first structure tends to minimize the role of man; indeed, man has, in that system, abrogated any role whatever. He is primarily the passive object in the hands of the omnipotent God who works in the world as often in spite of man as in conjunction with him. If the first minimizes man's responsibility, the second admittedly maximizes man's involvement and participation in becoming what God, from eternity, intended for man to become.
Attendant upon the above question is the interpretation of the biblical creation narrative. Contemporary theology nearly unanimously agrees that Paradise is mythological and does not require or allow a literal-historical interpretation. However, one might reasonably expect that such agreement would necessitate a shift both in terminology and conclusions. That such a shift is strikingly absent will be illustrated. Such illustration will further support the proposition that contemporary Western theology continues to interpret the image concept in terms of a particular (and erroneous?) understanding of evil which predetermines its theological conclusions, its attitude toward the image concept, its soteriology and anthropology, none of which seem consonant with a teleological interpretation of Scripture or history. It does not appear self-evident that God has finalized His creation. Consequently, it may be asserted that every instance of His activity in the world is historically serious and purposive, that His concern for man is reflected within the life of man within the structures of creaturely historical existence, and finally, that whatever form or expression God's activity assumes it never excludes man. Suggestions that God works in ways, though often beyond the understanding of man, which exclude man are to be challenged. Theories that assert that the "fall" of man deprived him of participation in God's process of completion are disputable.

If, as Braaten says, "man is an experiment in the laboratory of history ...," let it be understood that man is not simply and entirely God's experiment as though with dumb clay; man may be an experiment, but he is also co-worker with God. It may even be possible to suggest that God is himself the willing co-object, i.e., that He so willingly and completely participates in the present and future of man that He incorporates Himself into the experiment which is the creation of the world.
If it is necessary to conduct theology from the perspective of sin and evil, then one might expect nearly universal agreement among theologians concerning the Old Testament narratives of creation and fall. A necessary prerequisite for a catastrophic incursion of sin would seem to be an elaborate narrative regarding the beatific bliss of Eden. One might also expect the creation narratives to offer grandiose descriptions of the pre-fallen inhabitants of the Garden. If the writers of the Old Testament were impressed with God's completion of a perfect world, it seems curious that the subject assumes such insignificant treatment in the literature. That the writers seem not to have been greatly impressed may be worthy of consideration. The post-exilic narrative, so profound, is apparently the product of a mentality that was oblivious to such expectations. What is so obviously paramount to the author is the absolute supremacy of the God of Israel. The intention of the narrative is to re-affirm Israel's faith and trust in a God whose lordship preceded creation itself. The narrative is more theological than cosmological. However, we need not therefore conclude that whatever cosmological implications and references there are are to be minimized or ignored; rather, they are to be appreciated within the context of an affirmation of faith. Creation is doxological.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the creation narrative stands as it does at the beginning of the Scripture. Implicit in its location is the suggestion that creation and fall are the necessary prerequisites for an understanding of God's relationship to man. Rather, as we shall see, it was His loving and saving relationship with His people that served as a foundation for the understanding of creation and fall.

One other series of questions remains to be raised before we turn to a brief treatment of the creation-fall material from the perspective of Old Testament theology. The questions themselves emanate from a definite series
of presuppositions which are not always adequately articulated. If, for
instance, 'God is ascribed the attributes of omnipotence and goodness the
question or challenge ordinarily proceeds thus: why, then, has He created
a world in which there is evil? But, omnipotence and goodness by themselves
do not constitute a sufficient foundation upon which to debate theodicy.
Assumed, but not articulated, is the assumption that God desired to create
something better than we now experience; that does not necessarily follow
from those two attributes. That which we call evil is not necessarily and
obviously incompatible with a belief in, or the existence of, an all-powerful
and good God.

The subject of theodicy will be an important theme of this thesis,
though with a somewhat different series of questions, and upon the basis of
several re-evaluated attributes of God. Underlying this subject will be the
conviction that God is loving, that God in love created the world and the
world for man, and that He has committed Himself to the successful completion
of this world's and man's history. Further, our conviction is that such con-
clusion and completion is effected not in any way apart from, or in contradic-
tion to man whom He has created. This subject is inherently related to our
use of the concept: *imago Dei.*

b. The Creation Narrative: Its Function

Consistent with the doxological flavor of the creation account of
Genesis 1 is the apologetic note and function. Israel, from the earliest
days of her occupation of the land, was aware that she was living in the
closest proximity with inhabitants whose religious allegiance was totally in-
compatible to her own developing monotheism. The carefully articulated cre-
ation narrative served as a written expression that from the moment of creation
there was no possibility of accommodation. Jahweh was Creator. Jahweh was
Lord. There could be no other beside Him. By His "word" alone were all
things brought into being:
... the God of Genesis 1 is not one of the forces of nature, such as the power of fertility. He is not to be equated with anything in the realm of nature. He is transcendent, standing over against the world, source of all life within it, and yet sharply distinguished from the world. It was only by some such doctrine of creation which would effectively relate God to the world, to the seasons and the crops, yet at the same time avoid any thought of the deification of Nature, that Hebrew faith could effectively answer the challenge which the settlement in Canaan brought to the exclusiveness of Jahweh.

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1Robert Davidson, The Old Testament, Knowing Christianity, ed. William Neil, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1964), pp. 52-53. And cf. Th. C. Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology, trans. n.n., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 187: "Israel's belief in God itself did not ... originate in these creation narratives/ reflections, but it preceded them, for it was born from the spiritual experience of God's activity directed towards the people and the individual; Israel met its God as a Living God, who revealed Himself in the history of the people and in the life of the individual; Israel came to know God as the Saviour and the Leader, the Redeeming God." And cf. Ibid., p. 143: "A correct understanding of the doctrine of the Creation, a doctrine which figures especially in the Priestly Code, can only be attained on the basis of the Old Testament belief in Jahweh, the Saviour-God, who stands in a Covenant-relationship with His people. For God, the Creator, is the same God whom Israel has come to know in its history as the Saviour and the God of the Covenant. This element also dominates the conception of the relationship between God and man at the Creation." Accepting that this creation narrative is established within and upon the Covenant faith, we ought to be especially dubious about assuming that the subsequent "fall" story of Gen. 3 was intended to assert a new and different doctrine, i.e., the so-called "brokenness". We will have to discover another way of utilizing Gen. 3; as traditionally interpreted in the West its function has been to speak of an historical distortion to which God subsequently addressed Himself. This is doing theology vis-a-vis sin, and it is similarly the orientation of the church's anthropology.

Because it is so critical to understand the creation and fall narratives within their soteriological context, we also include the following material from Evode Beaucamp, The Bible and the Universe, trans. David Balhatchet, (London: Burns & Oates, 1963) p. 86: "... Wherever the fact of the creation is evoked in the Bible, it is always placed in relation with one aspect or other of the drama of salvation. It is not as if there were the creation on one side and the redemption on the other; one and the same purpose animates the universe and with it, history, which takes root ab initio: 'Who hath wrought and done these things, calling the generations from the beginning?' (Is. 41:4) 'In the beginning was the Word ... All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made. In him was life: and the life was the life of men' (John 1:1-4). However, all that Israel was conscious of in the first instance, was its election, and the idea of creation was merely an extension of it into the most remote past." And cf. Ibid., passim pp. 99-114.
It seems advisable at this point to consider "word" creation as interpreted by Old Testament theology. We will not be concerned at this juncture with deriving any scientific explanations relative to the creation of the universe; we will concentrate exclusively upon the doxological-theological signification of "word" creation. The propriety of this approach is affirmed by Von Rad: "These sentences [referring to Gen. 1] cannot be easily overinterpreted theologically!" Therefore we will consider "word" creation as a suitable environment established for the subsequent creation of man in the imago Dei.

Creation by the "word" will, by implication, introduce the subject of God's "otherness" versus His "relatedness". The otherness of God is an issue which will be discussed insofar as it impinges upon the treatment of the image and likeness of man's creation. It seems appropriate at this point to comment briefly on the subject before treating it specifically in the context of "word" creation. We are inclined to suggest that anyone, whether God or other, who is purported to be totally, absolutely, and radically other must necessarily be unknown and unknowable. If, however, that which is "other" chooses to reveal itself it no longer remains radically, but only relatively other. Then, having asserted its former degree of otherness becomes at best purely academic. Alternately, to insist on radical similarity might suggest exact and complete identification; this, in reference to the God-man relationship, would be preposterous, at least outside Christological formulations related to the incarnation. As it is possible to assert the relative otherness and similarity between man and man, so also it would seem possible to assert the same between man and God. However, this equation is

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only approximate, and is not to be understood as an exact parallel. We do not wish to imply that the structures of similarity and otherness that apply within the human situation are exactly applicable to the relationship between the Creator and the creature. That relationship will demand and receive its own appropriate fabric. We will attempt to illustrate that such a fabric of relationship is a primary intention of the creation narrative. It appears somewhat pointless and even pernicious to defend and circumscribe the otherness of God in the face of God's intention and activity to demonstrate to man his loving presence in the world.

Returning to the subject of creation by the "word", we note Von Rad's comment in his Genesis that: "The idea of creation by the word preserves first of all the most radical essential difference between Creator and creature."

However, even this "radical essential difference" is almost immediately qualified. What Von Rad is emphasizing at this point is the difference between the doctrine of Priestly narrative and the current and popular pagan creation myths. P, employing the term "word", makes it clear that God is not creator by fiat, nor by a creative process of emanation; He is creator by the "word". Von Rad establishes the same point in his Old Testament Theology:

... if the world is the product of the creative word, it is therefore, for one thing, sharply separated in its nature from God himself - it is neither an emanation nor a mythically understood manifestation of the divine nature and its power. The only continuity between God and his work is his word. Still, it would be quite wrong to take this important concept in the main negatively, that is as a delimiting definition. If the world was called into being by the free will of God, then it is his very own possession, and he is its Lord.

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1Von Rad, Genesis, pp. 49-50.

The nature of the world and the nature of God are separate and distinct; there is no equation of essence or substance. However, while creation by the "word" serves to highlight the dissimilarity, there is no inherent suggestion that this tends toward, requires, or allows an inclination toward antagonism in the relationship between creator and creation.

Vriezen discusses the same subject and has some instructive material to offer. Regarding the debate concerning relatedness and otherness he suggests that this is what may be called a "critical-theological" idea, involving the imago Dei concept as a symbol of relationship. Yet he insists upon the essential inequality of the partners of the relationship. While this is not a critical facet of our thesis, it seems proper to express our own position. Juxtaposing two sentences from Vriezen will highlight the antinomy: first, on the one side, "... The Old Testament message is founded upon the certainty of the relationship between the holy God and man."¹ And: "... Communion between the Holy One and man is the essential root-idea of the Old Testament message concerning God, ..."² Second, on the other side, "In the Bible God and man are fundamentally and absolutely distinct, because God essentially precedes nature and is superior to it, however much He may reveal His power in nature."³ Are these two constructs logically and necessarily contradictory? Indeed, there is the temptation to claim the discovery of another paradox.

Even though Vriezen did not articulate the same problem, nor apparently recognize the issue from this particular point of view, nevertheless he does not avoid the subject. While he continues to insist that there is no equality between the "partners", (nor would we) he also says,

²Ibid., p. 134.
³Ibid., p. 144.
The Old Testament is by no means behind naturalism in its spiritual appreciation of man and especially in acknowledging the communion between God and man; on the contrary, it is especially in this latter aspect that the Old Testament reveals its peculiar nature by taking absolutely seriously this communion between God and man as well as the absolute divinity of God.\(^1\)

Earlier in the same work Vriezen had stated that the communion or relationship between man and God in fact exists "... as the gift of God's work of revelation, only as the grace of God...".\(^2\) Unless it could be demonstrated that such grace and intention of God has been withdrawn or excised from the world and man, this critical doctrine deserves a place of distinction.

The most apparent antagonism inherent in the creation narrative is that which exists between creation and chaos, God and nothingness. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (Gen. 1:1). Yet, if we adopt an entirely chronological reading of the text, we are confronted in the very next verse ("the earth was a formless void") with the existence of that which is certainly contrary to the ascription "good". One may realize here that the purpose of the narrative transcends a purely chronological presentation of cosmogenesis; it is, as already mentioned, a theo-doxological material.

When that standard is applied as an interpretive key the conjunction of the first two verses offers an edifying insight. The suggestion that the narrative's intention is to provide a foundation and framework within which to discern the God-man relationship is further corroborated. The chaos as that against which God waged war was a central doctrine of the Manicheans, and before them the Platonists. But at the time of this writing there was a tendency, however inchoate, to recognize God as the creator \textit{ex nihilo}. Gen. 1:2

\(^1\)Vriezen, \textit{Outline O.T. Theology}, p. 144.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 134.
teaches one to understand the marvel of creation ... from the viewpoint of its negation; thus it speaks first of the formless and the abysmal out of which God's will lifted creation and above which it holds it unceasingly. For the cosmos stands permanently in need of this supporting Creator's will. We see here that the theological thought of ch. 1 moves not so much between the poles of nothingness and creation as between the poles of chaos and cosmos. It would be false to say, however, that the idea of creatio ex nihilo was not present here at all (v. 1 stands with good reason before v. 2!), but the actual concern of this entire report of creation is to give prominence, form, and order to the creation out of chaos.¹

The material above further substantiates the proposition that the intent of the narrative is primarily directed toward the articulation of a God-man structure of relation. Conversely, much theology has maintained that the function of the creation narrative is to serve as a foundation for the fall. Often the "fall" has been painted so large that it becomes effectively impossible to recognize the splendour, the intention, and most importantly, the continuous (and unbroken?) relationship that God has effected with men.

Another related subject will be seriously considered, even though without elaboration at this point it may appear either indefensible or obvious, depending on one's presuppositions. It is this: the "fall" does not represent an historical event. Explicit, therefore is the rejection of an actual and historical Paradise. Whether there is, in fact, another perspective compatible with church doctrine and Scripture will be a primary question underlying this thesis.

¹Von Rad, Genesis, p. 49. And cf.: "Because of vs. 1 which precedes the mention of chaos, we cannot say that it was uncreated, that is, that it was found by God as pre-existent. On the other hand, it is hardly possible to conceive of the idea of a created chaos, for what is created is not chaotic. Still, the theological function of vs. 2 in the total picture is of particular importance, for chaos is the great menace to Creation - it is indeed a primeval experience of man, and every statement of the Creation belief has continually to prove itself over against it." Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, p. 144.
c. **The Shape and Scope of Imago Dei**

If it could be asserted that Gen. 1 and 2 primarily reflect a future and eschatological orientation, one might on that basis be permitted to suggest that the *imago Dei* theme similarly denotes a proleptic intention. This would free the concept from its accustomed negative connotations, allowing it to resume its place as a term of honor, dignity, intention, and goal, commensurate with the "crown of God's creation." Von Rad states that not only does "word" creation specify difference and distance between Creator and creature, as previously indicated, but also that creation by the "word", i.e., "and God said" (in vss. 1, 3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 20, and 26) "... gives the world a susceptibility to God's word, which will have eschatological significance."¹

The paramount function of the narrative, it seems, is that of encouragement, hope, confidence. Soteriology was a cornerstone of Israel's faith, and it was not until a creation doctrine could be formulated which was compatible and supportive of that key doctrine that she was inclined to produce one.²

An earlier creation formulation, or series of formulations, namely those of Deutero-Isaiah, affirm this orientation. Especially instructive are: Isaiah 42:5; 43:1; 44:24b-28; and 54:5 which reads "For now your creator will be your husband, his name, Jahweh Sabaoth; your redeemer will be the Holy One of Israel, he is called the God of the whole earth." God who was known as the

¹Von Rad, *Genesis*, p. 50. Cf. Von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, I, p. 136: "Probably the sole reason for the lateness of the emergence of a doctrine of creation was that it took Israel a fairly long time to bring the older beliefs which she actually already possessed about it into proper theological relationship with the tradition which was her very own, that is, with what she believed about the saving acts done by Jahweh in history. ... Israel only discovered the correct theological relationship of the two [creation and soteriology] when she learned to see Creation too as connected theologically with the saving history."

one who saved His people also came to be known as He who had created. Creation enhanced salvation; salvation was not predicated upon creation, or "fall". Referring again to Von Rad:

... It is extremely likely that this soteriological understanding of Creation also lies at the basis of the creation stories of J and P. In neither of these documents of course is Jahweh's work in Creation considered for its own sake; instead it is incorporated within a course of history leading to the call of Abraham and ending with Israel's entry into Palestine.¹

Salvation, soteriology - what is signified? What, for Israel, was the direction and focus implied, and the content of salvation? The orientation, focus, direction, and instrumentation are concerns attendant upon our treatment of the image Dei theme. If Israel's understanding is similar to what seems characteristic of Western theology's perspective, namely, a restoration and return to that primal bliss of Eden, then of course it would be inappropriate and ultimately illegitimate to appeal there for encouragement and substantiation.

Israel's entry into Palestine, mentioned above, is not atypical of the primary focus of Old Testament soteriology; salvation predominantly signified a land and people conformation, and the history of that land and those people was regarded to be the sphere within which God was at work, revealing Himself as one whose very presence was a saving presence. Sigmund Mowinckel's statement is pertinent: "To say ... that God reveals himself really means, according to the Bible, that he gives himself. ... He gives himself in and by his creative and saving (re-creative) work."²

¹Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, p.138. And cf. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 99: "... the theological consequences of the creation-fall story ... have eschatological meaning, even though not according to their obvious meaning to the Jahwist. It is not accidental that the primeval history so earnestly considers the themes of eschatology and apocalyptic (Paradise, primeval man, peace among the animals, abundance of water, etc.). In any case, beyond both Old Testament protology and eschatology is Jahweh's revelation, Yahweh the God of Israel."

However much the Christian church is justified in "spiritualizing" and adding "heavenly" eschatological dimension to the sometimes-considered primitive and undeveloped theology of the Old Testament, it would seem ill-advised to sacrifice or surrender this coloration of eschatology. Again, to refer to Mowinckel who has emphasized the word of God being an historical event, we quote:

All this also implies that the history of revelation in reality is also history of salvation. The plan of God is ultimately His plan of salvation; the intent of creation is salvation, the full realization of God's goal; 'all things were created through him and for him.' (Col. 1:16).

Although a thorough treatment of the subject has not been offered what has been included will hopefully suffice to substantiate this "trend" or perspective as regards the Old Testament soteriological orientation.

What has been maintained is that the direction of Israel's attitude toward the God-nation relationship is future and hope oriented. And this relationship, while not always what it should and could have been, was one in which Israel could comfortably and conscientiously stand. And furthermore it was of such a nature that the nation could assume an attitude of dignity and pride, appreciating that she was privileged to participate with God in a history in which her actions and decisions were not disregarded or despised. Israel, at the Old Testament. It is significant that the Old Testament ties its ideas concerning the origin of the sacred places and the sacred acts to historical persons, or at least to persons whom ancient Israel held to be historical. By this they mean: It is in the real, daily world that God shows himself and is active, not in the misty world of myth and prehistoric time... It is history that is the miracle, the miracle that reveals Yahweh - at the same time that which is his work and that which 'unveils', 'reveals' his essence, plan, and will."

1Mowinckel, The Old Testament as Word of God, p. 40. And cf. pp. 37-38: "Eschatology, the ideas concerning the 'last things' is also an expression of the same belief: that God has a purpose, that he has a plan to be realized, a goal to be reached, and that all the occurrences in history point toward this. Even if the goal is realized through a divine miracle, the historic realities are the means of the miracle. In harmony with this view faith for the Old Testament is the ability to see the creative work of God in history."
least in her most faithful moments, was cognizant that as a nation she was the subordinate participant; but Israel nonetheless was a participant. The creator God, as history’s lord, directed and controlled history, but not in a manipulative sense; He, to use a word from Mowinckel, "interfered", which is simply another way of saying "acted".

... faith must use the word 'interfere'. This, too, mythically expresses God’s sovereign relationship to his work. It also expresses something else: namely, that my sin cannot destroy God’s goal or frustrate his achievement of it. Even if my sin crosses and hinders his plan, he is, figuratively speaking, man enough to 'relink the chain of events,' to make the situation created by my sin into a new starting point, to give it a positive meaning. This is what we mean when we say that God interfered in my life.¹

If it will be granted that creation's focus is not only but also being historically actualized according to the interpretation developed above,² a significant and essential foundation for a re-evaluation of the imago Dei theme has emerged. One would be inclined to anticipate a more favorable and optimistic treatment than is usually afforded. At least the question might be entertained: will the allusions to Paradise, perfection, harmony, bliss, and tranquility permit a futurist interpretation? Can one assert that Eden never "was" in the realized historical sense of the term? And if not, what is meant by primal or original perfection, not only of the world, but especially of man? Similarly, what is the signification of imago Dei in Gen. 1:27 in respect to the fall? One wonders why so much theological argumentation has centered on the "lost", "injured", or "depraved" image if the image never was other than it is now, at least not other in the sense of enjoying an original quality of perfection, subsequently lost? Even more important, perhaps, is the entire scope of the treatment of sin and evil, a scope which assumes a

¹Mowinckel, Old Testament as Word of God, p. 51.
different configuration depending on the nature of answers given to the above questions. Might the much-debated, practically pernicious "doctrine" of original sin mean simply the sin associated with man's origin? What is the relationship of the image of God in man to the reality of evil, its source and origin, its function and future? These questions characterize the scope of the thesis.

Before returning to the more specific treatment of creation and image from within the Old Testament framework, another facet of the subject merits comment, i.e., creatio continua. Recalling what Mowinckel has already said on the subject of revelation being the work and presence of God himself in history, it is interesting to note how he associates revelation and creation:

Creation and revelation are correlative terms, or rather: realities. Creation in the Bible is not a once terminated act. For the old Israel, God's coming in the cultus of the festival was a repetition and a continuance of creation just as it also repeated history: 'My Father is working still,' Jesus says. As God unveiled himself and his plan in Creation, so he continues to reveal himself in history.¹

Von Rad apparently disagrees with Mowinckel respecting the "completion" or "continuation" of creation,² but it may be that the disagreement is more apparent than actual. Von Rad's concern in the context of his discussion was to affirm and emphasize God's powerful and intimate involvement in creation

¹Mowinckel, Old Testament as Word of God, p. 40. But cf. Von Rad, Genesis, p. 61 for material illustrative of contrary opinion: Regarding Gen. 2:1-3, the rest "... testifies negatively first of all ... that the world is no longer in process of being created. It was not and is not incomplete but it has been 'completed' by God. Even more, that God has 'blessed', 'sanctified' ('to sanctify' means to separate exclusively for God), this rest, means that P does not consider it as something for God alone but as a concern of the world. The way is being prepared, therefore, for an exalted good, actually the final, saving good." ... "thus at creation God prepared what will benefit man in this life, what in fact will be necessary for him, yes, that which one day will receive him eschatologically in eternity." The Sabbath rest "... is as tangibly 'existent' protologically as it is expected eschatologically in Hebrews (Heb., ch. 4)." (Ital. mine).

²Cf. supra, n. 1.
itself; he was not discussing creation in reference to its history, or history as the stage of man's activity in the created order, which was one of the intentions of Mowinckel. That Von Rad placed "completed" within quotation marks in the phrase, creation "has been 'completed' by God", is at least an indication that he intended to indicate something other or more than what a simple meaning of the word would suggest. That "other" or "more" may be that which Mowinckel asserts, namely, that creation as a continuing event demands real and actual change and transformation under the hand of God.

Von Rad, in spite of somewhat ambiguous terminology, i.e., that the Sabbath rest is "'existent' protologically" and "expected eschatologically", seems to deny the initial interpretation of "completed" creation. It would certainly be more in consort with a dynamically oriented interpretation of the narrative than one which is statically fixed and finished. One might accept the validity, though not necessarily the advisability, of the terminology of completion and perfection if what is intended and implied is that God's creation is not devoid or deprived of that which is necessary to accomplish His purpose. That is to say, that creation is perfect in respect to its created capacity to respond to God. We appreciate Von Rad's statement that the goodness ascribed to creation is "less an aesthetic judgement than the designation of purpose, correspondence."¹

The so-called perfection of creation, therefore, seems to apply to its purpose and function; it is perfect in respect to its created ability to increasingly apprehend its creator, and also in respect to its conformability

¹Von Rad, Genesis, p. 50. And cf. also p. 59: "When faith speaks of creation, and in so doing directs its eye toward God, then it can only say that God created the world perfect. The statement itself, however, is not judicious at all; the cosmos in its created splendour would then have to be thoroughly and clear as crystal to men. The question of its riddles and troubles is now answered, after the redactor's theological coupling of the documentary sources, by the Yahwistic chapter of the Fall, with its strong aetiological orientation."
subject to the impulses of its God. Such a view of creation emphatically implies movement; the world is destined; it is going somewhere. Man, in God's image, assumes a critical significance in this moving sphere. And the *imago Dei* is, in a sense, a clue to the conclusion.

The subject of *creatio continua* raises the question of evolution, and it appears that contemporary theologians have adopted one of more of the variations of that theory. But on the other hand it also seems that evolution presents a subtle embarrassment to the Christian whose desire it is to retain his theories and doctrines of *creatio ex nihilo*, Paradise and fall. That is to say, there seems to be intellectual affirmation of the first theory (evolution) but a "faith" affirmation of the second (Paradise and fall), and that the two are often treated in such a way as to seem to be mutually contradictory.

The question is this - will the biblical doctrine of creation allow some form of evolution? Are they potentially compatible? If evolution may tentatively be defined as a God-initiated, man-participative, purposive movement toward a God-determined goal, both questions will apparently allow an affirmative answer. On the other hand, those who deny any significance of man's participation will reject both the definition and the affirmative answer. Nevertheless, that will be our operating definition of evolution, and we will presuppose the compatibility of biblical creation and evolution.¹

¹However relatively insignificant a theme evolution will be in this thesis, it should be noted that one eminent Old Testament scholar substantiates this thrust: "This word [evolution] in Christian circles has often been felt to be the very opposite of a history of revelation and salvation directed by God. But this is incorrect. The word itself does not indicate that what takes place is through immanent powers; the word merely signifies continuous direction toward a goal. If it is true that history is movement, direction, and destination toward a goal, something dynamic and not static, then it presupposes evolution. In fact, it is impossible to conceive of an orderly coherence in that which takes place without using the idea of evolution.... Evolution means organic coherence, linear movement, in that which takes place. The idea of evolution, therefore, finds full positive content only through
Consequently, we are inclined to question the propriety of doctrines which maintain that God's goal for creation was either: one, once actually and concretely realized in Paradise, or two, that the intended goal in the mind of God will in any way be accomplished in the future in a manner which tends to disregard the participation and responsibility of man who is in the *imago Dei*. Vriezen states the point succinctly:

God is not only the God of history, who acts with and on behalf of man, but He is also the God who allows the man whom He has called to share in His activity by His Spirit or Word. God performs nothing without revealing His decree to His servants, the prophets (Amos 3:7), the prophet is allowed to be a witness of God's work in history. It is even possible to speak of a 'pathetic' theology.\(^1\)

It has previously been stated that the creation narrative, and indeed the entire first eleven chapters of Genesis, are most properly interpreted within the context of soteriology. It has also been indicated that Israel's understanding of salvation was a necessary prerequisite to the development of her doctrine of creation, and specifically the creation of man in the *imago Dei*. If it will be granted, therefore, that a prior understanding of salvation pre-conditioned Israel's understanding of creation, it may be possible to re-evaluate the function and scope of the image concept within both creation and fall accounts.\(^2\)

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the idea of teleology - in the idea that the line points toward a goal. Such an idea is not at all contradictory to Christian faith in God; on the contrary, it is demanded by faith in God. That which faith must demand is that the goal and direction be willed, wrought, and guided by God, that the 'coherences' and 'natural' relationships be the means by which God effects his goal, even though in most instances it is impossible to indicate exactly how they fit into the plan of divine guidance or what God's plan is with just these things." Mowinckel, *Old Testament as Word of God*, pp. 49-50.

\(^1\)Vriezen, *Outline O.T. Theology*, p. 137.

\(^2\)Cf. Evode Beaucamp, *The Bible and the Universe*, p. 84: "The mere placing of the priestly account of the creation at the beginning of the Bible would be sufficient evidence to warrant the supposition that it is
Basically, the creation narratives served to reinforce Israel's ever-growing confidence that her God, Jahweh, was not only her tribal god, but the God of all gods, Lord of all lords. And it was within this faith that she endeavored to establish a theological foundation upon which to understand man. It seems extremely unlikely that Israel, at this time or at any other, entertained the questions which have since fascinated more philosophically oriented thinkers regarding the creation of the world ex nihilo. Nevertheless, her creation narrative is far from primitive and naive. 

meant as an introduction to the drama of salvation. But there is more to it than this: in its very purport, it is bound up with history as P sees it. In the latter, God's plan develops in successive, irreversible stages, from Adam to the flood, from Noe to Abraham, to finish with the time of Israel's election. From one period to the next, the sin of mankind can be seen increasing in prevalence, at the same time as God confirms his plan of salvation and strengthens his covenant with the chosen portion of humanity. ... The episode is not finally rounded off, for whereas the work of the first six days ends with a reference to the coming of evening and of morning, no such mention occurs after the seventh day. On the other hand, the initial work is not to be done afresh; it points the way up a pyramid, the summit of which is man, and it concludes with the Creator resting, his work achieved." 

1Creadio ex nihilo as a theme will be treated in this paper only insofar as it is introduced by the sources. While it has intrigued and perplexed theologians since Irenaeus it does not for the reason of its extensive discussion become a theological issue; it will not be considered in this paper other than from within the philosophical and metaphysical perspectives, and then only by way of commentary. It is entirely beyond the scope and intention of this thesis to comprehensively treat it, and even if considered it would contribute little to the subject of the imago Dei and the theological-doxological emphasis which we will try to sustain. Norman Pittenger's remark is appropriate here: "... the creation stories in Genesis are a way of saying that at the back of everything, there is God's continuing activity. In that sense he is the beginning; and the old doctrine of creatio ex nihilo can be interpreted in that sense or in no meaningful sense at all." Norman Pittenger, God's Way With Men, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), p. 43. Or again when he says: "Creation as a theological doctrine has to do with the dependence of all that is not God upon God's activity, not with a particular moment in the past." Ibid., p. 43.
Old Testament theologians call specific attention to the careful selection of the words of the narratives. The importance attached to the choice of "word" as related to creation has been noted. Gerhard Von Rad also emphasizes the significance and importance which should be recognized in the narrator's choice of the verb "to create", bara. He points out that except for its use in verse 1 of Genesis 1, which is a summary introduction, it is reserved for the creation of man as distinct from other forms of life.\(^1\) That point is significant inasmuch as it seems consistent with our discussion of the significance of "word" creation. Certainly, unless the narrator had intended to relate something specific about the creation of man, the normal construction would have sufficed, namely, "God spoke ...". There is consequently a man-world distinction implied in bara, and there is a uniqueness attributed to the creature so created.\(^2\) Whatever else may have been implied by the author's choice of bara, this much seems quite clear: there is a closeness and kinship established between man and God implicit as a consequence of bara which far surpasses God's relationship with any other form of creation.

\(^1\)It is not implied however that the use of אָדָם is restricted exclusively to the creation narrative, nor even to the creation of man. Cf. William Gesenius, Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon To The Old Testament Scriptures, trans. Samuel P. Tregelles, (London: Samuel Bagster & Sons, 1885), where it is noted that אָדָם is also used in reference to the creation of Israel, Is. 43:1, 15; Jer. 31:22, in addition to its derivations which are not specifically related even to creation.

\(^2\)I appreciate this particular emphasis of Von Rad; it serves to protect the imago Dei from attempts to denigrate its importance. The imago Dei, within this context of unique relationship, ascribes a share of the weight and responsibility to God in whose image man is created. Von Rad also says: "Compared with creation by word, bara, ('create') points without doubt to a direct relationship between creature and creator. Life came into being not only by a word of command, but it derives from a more direct creative act of God. Moreover, this newly created life is the object of the divine blessing, i.e., these living creatures are the recipients of a life-giving, divine power by virtue of which they themselves are capable of passing on the life they have received by means of their own procreation." Von Rad, Genesis, p. 54.
It may of course be objected at this point that P's explicit intention was to glorify the intimacy of the God-man relationship in the "beginning" specifically to illustrate the heinousness of that crime which destroyed the primal bliss. And if it could be shown that this was in fact his intention then it would follow that sin is indeed the valid interpretive principle, and that Western-Augustinian theology has rightly insisted upon that particular orientation. Furthermore, if P is, as it were, preparing the stage for the "fall", he has chosen a very effective technique. However, while concrete imagery was a frequent vehicle for the Hebrew to express abstract concepts, it would not be reasonable for the Hebrew to tread so dangerously near the brink of that which could so effectively destroy the anthropological factor of his theology. The people, the land, the nation, history itself, - all this was essential to the Hebrew understanding of the God-man relationship. If sin and not salvation, if rebellion and not restoration, if lost Paradise and not promised land were the real themes of the narrative, the author has inadvertently destroyed the foundation of his hope and faith. 1

The very terms employed by P in reference to man's creation in God's image exemplify the highly exalted position of man within the order of creation and at the same time his closest possible relationship with God. According to Von Rad the two words:

... "image", 'statue', 'a work of plastic art', and ΕΙΣΩΣ "likeness", 'something like' - the second interprets the first by underlining the idea of correspondence and similarity - refer to the whole of man and do not relate solely to his spiritual and intellectual being: they relate equally, if not first and foremost, to the splendour of his bodily form... 2

1It is acknowledged that "salvation" and "restoration" do indeed ordinarily denote a "from-what-to-what" construct, and it is not implied that Israel was not also keenly aware of that-from-which she was saved. But nevertheless, as explicated above (pp.14-16) the predominant orientation of Israel was salvation for, toward the future to which God had elected her.

2Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, pp. 144-45. In that section we also note these sentences: "Actually, Israel conceived even Jahweh himself as having human form. But the way of putting it which we use runs in precisely
One might infer that this reflects a somewhat naive and primitive level of P's theological insight, but beyond that, and more importantly, it is apparent that within the narrative itself there is no foundation to suggest that man in the *imago Dei* was either then or subsequently to become other than God had intended in terms of the "shape" of his relationship with God. By "shape" is meant structure and form; the Hebrew holistic understanding of man did not allow for a compartmentalized relationship. The Hebrew knew well of sin and its ramifications, but he did not conclude that sin had transformed the "shape" of communion. More will be said about sin and the "fall" very shortly, but it remains for us to discuss the *imago Dei* from a functional and essential point of view.

Apart from recognizing the distance between creature and creator in the narrative, it would be difficult to read Genesis 1 without recognizing another distance: the disequality between man and the rest of creation. Man's creation in God's image indicates this bi-polar distinction. David Cairns calls it a "stereoscopic concept", saying that nature, man, and God "... are now revealed in the light of a new dimension of depth. God is far above nature and man, but man, in his own lesser degree, has been lifted out of the plane of nature by virtue of his special relationship to God."¹ It should be noted that it is man's special relationship to and with God that sets him apart, and conversely that it is not his elevation within creation that makes him distinct and unique. Functionally speaking, man does not assume or achieve his communion with God by means of his lordship or dominion over the natural

order, but his dominion derives from his God-likeness which is a gift of creation. Whatever dominion man realizes derives from the peculiarity of his creation. The dipolar distinction of man's relationship to God and creation also implies a dipolar function of the *imago Dei*. Adam's "image" places him under God, and sets him therefore over the world. But his being set over the world is secondary; it is not the essence of the *image*, but simply the consequence. The essence is more than that.

It is this "more than" that is the essential characteristic of the *imago Dei*, and both here and subsequently we will bear in mind the distinction between the essence of the image and its function, which is derivative. The essence is personal relationship which is fashioned into the nature of man as that which is essential for communion with the personal God. David Cairns states it well: "In my view, the essential thing about the image in 'P' is

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1 This functional motif is clearly seen in the following: "Man in the image of God is set over the animal world. This does not mean that man's being in God's image only means that he rules the animal world, the latter is, in fact, the important consequence of the former: because man stands in a special relationship to God he is entrusted by God with dominion over the world." Vriezen, Outline O.T. Theology, p. 206. A slightly different emphasis is seen in Von Rad: "P only becomes clear and explicit when it speaks about the purpose of the image of God in man, that is, the function committed to man in virtue of it, namely his status as lord in the world. ... God set man in the world as the sign of his own sovereign authority, in order that man should uphold and enforce his - God's - claims as lord. Earthly monarchs too have the habit of setting up images of themselves in their kingdom as signs of their sovereign authority - it was in that sense that Israel thought of man as the representative of God. ... What is crucial about man's image is his function in the non-human world. Thus, through the image of God in man Creation, in addition to coming from God, receives a particular ordering towards God." Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, pp. 146-47. And cf. Von Rad: dominion "... is not considered as belonging to the definition of God's image; but it is its consequence, i.e., that for which man is capable because of it." Von Rad, Genesis, p. 57.
man's personal nature, his link with God, his dignity above the other creatures, ...".\(^1\) Throughout this thesis the link relationship, this personal communion theme will occupy a central position of importance.

It has been shown that the *imago Dei* concept was employed by P primarily to indicate the unsurpassable and indelible kinship that exists between God and man. However, the words kinship, relationship, communion, fellowship, by which one may attempt to express the God-man relationship seem inadequate to convey both the sense of indestructibility and intimacy which seems to be inherent in the image concept. They are fragile words and tend toward sentimentality which is inappropriate and inadequate. A strong word is required, one which will denote inseparable relationship. The significance of the word *bara* (*supra*, pp. 22f) which implies intimacy of relationship, is a foundation on which it may be allowable to suggest that the essence (not with "substance" connotations) of the *imago Dei* constitutes a relationship of co-inherence. The use of co-inherence in this context does not imply any affinity with perichoresis, or inter-penetration or the cognates which have been employed within Trinitarian doctrinal formulations. To "inhere" means "to exist, abide, or have its being, as an attribute, quality, etc., in a subject or thing."\(^2\) To "co-" inhere, therefore, denotes: to exist with, abide with, or have its being with, as an attribute, quality, etc., in a subject or thing.

\(^1\) Cairns, *Image*, p. 23. And cf. p. 21: "We can agree with Von Rad, when he says that 'P' is trying to express the mystery that man is like God, and that he is to be described as a creature whose being came, not from below, but in its origin points to the upper region." However, the use of words like "from below" and "upper region" may not be well-chosen. The quotation from Cairns in the text is an interesting expression when one remembers his close affiliation with the theology of Emil Brunner who would agree with the statement, but hurriedly minimize its significance in the light of man's fall from his "link with God".

Some may object to the choice and use of this word and insist that it suggests too much, especially insofar as it may be implied that man exists with God as an attribute or quality. However, it may be appropriate to consider the possibility that the imago Dei very nearly approximates even that degree of intimacy. God's relatedness with the world and specifically with man is of critical interest and importance, and in that context the word "co-inherence" will be employed.

d. The Thesis: Its Course and Concern

While as Vriezen points out, Israel was cautious about using father-child terminology to describe the relationship between God and man because of the pagan connotation,

Yet, he says7 the expression 'the image of God' is intended to depict the same intimate relationship as between father and child, as becomes evident in Gen. 5:3, where Adam's son is said to be in the likeness and after the image of his father.1

This is the theme of intimacy which we would hope to maintain in the face of anything within the history and experience of man which might tend to minimize its theological centrality. It will be indicated in Chapter I that it was this theme that St. Irenaeus endeavored to maintain, partly by means of his concept of recapitulation. In that sense there is an affinity between his position and that which has been expressed in the foregoing material.

On the other hand it will become clear that the emphasis of St. Augustine and his orientation is significantly different. He proceeds from the conviction that the "original" harmony, which he accepts as historical and actual, was radically disturbed by man's freely chosen rebellion. It will be shown that in his theology the primary residual goodness of man after the "fall" was more a metaphysical than a relational quality; Augustine maintained

1Vriezen, Old Testament Theology, I, p. 146.
that whatever "was" was good, i.e., that as long as anything existed it participated in being and consequently was good. This metaphysical goodness however, seems a poor shadow when compared with the intention of P's image concept, Irenaeus' recapitulation, or finally what is indicated in the term "co-inherence". Augustine will be criticized in respect to what seems to be a misinterpretation of the so-called "original" intention of the creation narrative. It would be unjustified to evaluate Augustine in respect to what he must necessarily have believed about the creation of the world, or again, in respect to his "biblicism". Yet, criticism seems appropriate regarding one of his primary theological presuppositions, namely, that sin is the appropriate criterion against which to characterize the God-man structure of relation.

In conclusion it may be asked whether or not the image survived the "fall" insofar as Old Testament theologians are concerned. That it did, of course, has already been strongly suggested. It is unnecessary to thoroughly review what has been described as the soteriological context of the creation-fall narrative; it will suffice to say again that Israel was absolutely and firmly convinced that Jahweh was her Saviour-God. It would be difficult to understand why Israel may have written or retained an account of her beginnings which so obviously focused on the image as a symbol of co-inherence (our term) if the subsequent intention had been to jettison the theme. Von Rad directs attention to Gen. 5:3, the birth of Adam's son in his father's image and likeness, and draws this conclusion:

This means that God authorised man to transmit this, his supreme dignity, along the way of continuing procreation of the generations. So it cannot be said that the image of God is lost - all the less as its existence still comes into account in the days of Noah (Gen.9:6b).1

1 Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I., p. 147. This quotation continues: "... Certainly, the story of the Fall tells of grave disturbances in the creaturely nature of man. But as to the way in which these affected
But whereas the image is not said to have been lost or destroyed, the narrator of the creation-fall story surely intended to relate something of its status by means of the images of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, of the shame of nakedness, the angelic gate-keepers at Eden, and God's game of hide-and-seek. What, in fact, is the intention of these negative images? It seems apparent that we will never completely exhaust the possible implications of the stories, and perhaps the fact that there are so many variant theories competing with and against each other for common acceptance should at least make us a bit more modest than heretofore has been the case. History of doctrine seems overflowing with conflicting interpretations apparently having only this in common: competition to surpass each other in multiplying the implications of man's first rebellious and pernicious choice.

One gets the impression that the intention has been to glorify and magnify God by means of the denigration of man. Von Rad is illustrative in his comment that the "tree" symbolizes not only the moral factor of man's decision, but refers to all things. The choice confronting man therefore, had cosmic implications. And, says Von Rad, "by wanting to be like God, man stepped out from the simplicity of obedience to God."  

the image of God in man, the Old Testament has nothing explicit to say." Perhaps not too much should be argued from silence, but nevertheless such a critical concept as the God-man nexus which the *imago Dei* suggests would very likely have been explicitly rejected had Israel subsequently reformulated her understanding. That the Old Testament "has nothing explicit to say" I interpret to mean that the image concept was retained, even though we grant that the phrase itself did not enjoy great prestige.

1 Von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, I, p. 155. The complete context of the quotation is: "With a father's disposition God had purposed every conceivable kindness for man; but his will was that in the realm of knowledge a limit should remain set between himself and mankind." Knowledge of good and evil "... signifies at one and the same time knowledge of all things and the attainment of mastery over all things and secrets, for here good and evil is not to be understood one-sidedly in a moral sense, but as meaning 'all things'. By endeavoring to enlarge his being on the godward side, and seeking
Perhaps by stating it another way one could avoid some unnecessary errors and misleading conclusions. It may better be expressed: by always and continually depreciating the value and intention of God's co-inherence, man has never experienced "the simplicity of obedience to God." "Wanting to be like God" and other similar phrases that suggest that man's chief sin is a conscious attempt to usurp that which properly belongs only to God will be considered beginning with the Augustine material. The past tense is inapt to articulate man's less-than-paradisial condition. Unless there was in fact an historic Paradise it seems improper and misleading to say that "man stepped out". One cannot step out of something that does not exist, and to suggest that man did step out from something that has been described in such sublimely splendid terminology unjustifiably and unnecessarily accuses man of colossal perversion. However, in spite of these objections, we appreciate Von Rad's statement that Adam's choice has more-than-moral implications: Adam's sin impinges upon the totality of life. It is that totality which should be specified in the interpretations of the creation-fall narratives; it is that all-inclusiveness which allows for the fullest and most complete utilization of the imago Dei theme as a symbol of the God-man co-inherence. Conversely, a Godlike intensification of his life beyond his creaturely limitations, that is, by wanting to be like God, man stepped out from the simplicity of obedience to God. He thereby forfeited life in the pleasant garden and close to God." While we appreciate Von Rad's insight we cannot appreciate the tone of this interpretation dependent as it is upon the retention of the mythological framework. The specific objection is the obvious implication that all this is presented as an historical happening: a man living in simplicity, God with a father's disposition creating a situation (tree) to illustrate the differentiation between Creator and creature, and finally man stepping out from simplicity, the garden, and closeness to God. This quality of interpretation seems both uninformative and misleading. It is this kind of exegesis that allows Wingren to say: "Man stands in the middle of the line of conflict as the cause of the conflict between God and the Devil." - Gustav Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, trans. Ross Mackenzie, (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), p. 40. Ital. mine. Less speculatively and avoiding devils, the Von Rad style of interpretation leads David Cairns to write: "Man has not lost a supernature through sin, but his divinely-given nature has become unnatural and inhuman." Cairns, Image, p. 82. Cairns' statement is itself a quotation from Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939) p. 94.
however, the historicizing of the narrative tends not only toward naive and inadequate conclusions, but also, treating the narrative as actual event reverses the soteriological perspective from that of hope and promise to that of sin and despair. Carl Braaten aptly concludes:

The myth of the fall of Adam has misshaped the structure of Christian theology, not primarily because it was for so long taken as real history, but for two other reasons: first, because it was taken as an explanation of the origin of evil in the human race, and second, it was viewed as a 'fall' from an originally perfect condition. Mankind is struggling in history to catch up where it once stood in the figure of Adam. Eden is a paradise of archetypes; everything that happens later, so far as it is true, good, and beautiful, is an imitation and repetition of the original state of mankind.¹

The implications of the creation fall narrative are nearly as extensive as theology itself; consequently we have attempted to define the limits, stating those themes which will be considered as well as those omitted. The brevity of this introduction makes it unnecessary to repeat material already discussed, but a summary may be beneficial.

The imago Dei has become for Western theology primarily a symbol of either melancholy or disdain. For the Hebrew it was a symbol of the most intimate God-man relationship which we have called co-inherence. For most of the church Paradise lies behind, and our thoughts of it are tinged with memories of shame; for Israel Paradise was ahead, and she looked forward in hope.

Our brief analysis has supported the proposition, stated as simply as possible, that man is destined by God for a good end. Hope itself appears to be a universal symbol of this very attitude. The imago Dei, in our opinion, is that symbol's theological counterpart. But the imago theme, in order to clarify and enlarge upon so-called secular hope, needs to be reinterpreted;

it needs to be freed from opinions which remain from the theological season when creation and fall were treated as literal history.

Our theme is: "The Imago Dei: An Historical and Critical Examination". The major characteristics of our own interpretation of the *Imago Dei* theme have been articulated above; our final chapter will be an attempt to construct and present what we believe to be a dogmatically sound and systematically justifiable re-interpretation of the theme. This will not be done de novo; rather it will evolve from a critical evaluation of the historical interpretations of the image motif.

The word "Historical" is chosen to indicate that our method will be to select and evaluate theological systems of various historical epochs, i.e., Patristic, Scholastic, Reformation and Contemporary. The word "Critical" requires explanation. We do not wish to imply that our explication will be negative in the main, or that we have presupposed the conclusion. Rather, we will endeavor to allow each theologian to speak for himself, reserving, as much as is possible, our own presuppositions, i.e., those noted above. Our intention, therefore, is primarily to pose the question: what does, e.g., Augustine teach in respect to the *Imago Dei*? Necessarily, the question itself will require an explication of various related themes and doctrines, e.g., creation, fall, sin, etc., which seem to impinge rather directly on the *Imago Dei* theme. Therefore, although we will include doctrines other than the *Imago Dei* specifically, it should be noted that we will not presume to study any such peripherally related themes exhaustively.

Further, it should be realized that our method will not require a comparison and contrast of the systems under consideration. Whatever comparative conclusions mentioned are for the purpose of clarification and understanding; they are not for the purpose of ascertaining relative value. Quite
obviously, and admittedly, our own tentative presuppositions will "control" and circumscribe first the body of material selected for study, and finally even the conclusions derived. Whether the questions themselves are the "real" questions, i.e., the authentic questions of theology; whether they are formulated properly; whether they sufficiently lead us into the respective systems; - these are the primary considerations upon which the reader is invited to make his assessment. The secondary consideration - yet, nearer to the writer's personal objective - is ultimately to lay a foundation for hope in terms of the *imago Dei*. This requires: a. that we should carefully study and consider our own doctrinal substructure; b. that we remain judiciously, yet courageously susceptible to the possibility of either major or minor revision; and c. that we learn that all theological formulation is penultimate. "No definitions made by the Church *in via* are in themselves final or irreformable, however faithfully they serve to mediate to mankind the final authority of God for practical purposes."¹

CHAPTER I

ST. IRENAEUS - A CRITIQUE BASED ON THE IMAGO DEI

God has created and destined this world for a good purpose and end, and the imago Dei is a symbol which may imply God's co-inherence with creation, and specifically with man in the accomplishment of His aim - these are the presuppositions indicated and preliminarily established in the Introduction. A consideration of the theological insights of St. Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, (c. 130 - c. 202) will serve to further clarify and also to expand upon the stated presuppositions. An examination of St. Irenaeus' treatment of the imago Dei will be the organizing and limiting motif; only those portions of his work that bear a close relationship to man and his relationship to God in whose image he is created will be explored. The material available for study is relatively sparse, consisting of Irenaeus' five-volume work entitled Five Books of S. Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, Against Heresies,1 some Fragments in that same volume, and a short work entitled Proof of the Apostolic Preaching.2

It becomes immediately apparent in the reading of St. Irenaeus that he was not a systematic theologian. Consequently, the attempt to explicate his doctrine of man, for instance, must necessarily be accomplished by a process of separation and extraction. This, on the other hand, illustrates the relationships which are intrinsic, i.e., God and


creation, creation and man, and especially man in the *imago Dei*. The interpretative "problem", therefore, becomes at the same time a principle of interpretation. The material will be approached thematically, with careful appreciation of the contextual setting, and will include Irenaeus' concepts of God, His initial creation, the creation of man, his involvement in and with sin, man's growth and development, and finally, recapitulation. These are the major concepts which will be considered apart from which it is impossible to fully appreciate Irenaeus' profound contribution to the *imago Dei* theme.

a. God

a.1. Creator *ex nihilo*

Irenaeus' statements of God's creation of the world out of nothing are not many, but they are explicit, emphatic, and of sufficient quality to reveal his interpretation and its function. One of the critical doctrines of the Gnostics against whom Irenaeus was writing was the dualist theory that matter was in and of itself evil, and consequently that God could not have produced or created it. The relative paucity of explicit references in Irenaeus to *creatio ex nihilo* which St. Augustine¹, for instance, utilizes as a major category in the refutation of dualism, may in part be explained by the recognition that Irenaeus appears almost impatient to shift the debate from metaphysical and philosophical categories into the more personal and religious ones of the Creator's relationship to that which He has created. Perhaps the clearest expression of Irenaeus' affirmation of *creatio ex nihilo*, yet one that is devoid of the more customary expressions of relational terms is this:

¹*cf. Infra, Chapter II.*
...creatures must have the origin of their being from some great cause; and the Origin of all is God, since It itself was not made by anyone, but by It were made all things whatsoever. Therefore, first one must believe that there is one God, the Father, who made and fashioned everything, and brought being out of nothing, and while holding all things, is alone beyond grasp. But in 'all things' is included this world of ours, with man in it; so this world too was created by God. ¹

Actually, even here is noted the presence of what may be called "relational" terminology. It is not emphatic, but the words, "holding all things" are significant. God's preservation of His creation, implied by "holding", is closely associated with his concept of the work of His "Hands" and will be discussed later. Irenaeus recognized that creatio ex nihilo was a doctrine that specified difference, ² specifically that between Creator and creature. The "difference" (altera), he asserts, between those things "... which were made, from Him Who established them ..." is that the latter is "... unmade, and without beginning, and without end, and wanting nothing, ...sufficient unto Himself, ... bestowing on all other things the very gift of existence: ... ." On the other hand, he continues, that which has been made by Him has a beginning, is liable to dissolution, is subject to and dependent upon its Creator, and endowed with the sense to realize the difference between Creator and creature. ³

¹Proof., 4.

²The signification of the terms distinction and difference may in other contexts be quite irrelevant. But, because our intention is to establish with some precision the structure of the God-man relationship we will differentiate the terms thus: "distinction" conveys implications of disjunction, division, partition; it would be appropriately employed to specify the relation between, perhaps, natural and supernatural. Difference, on the other hand, will be used to denote otherness, being not the same, particularity, e.g., the relation between "I" and "Thou".

³A.H., III, viii, 3.
The "difference" is also noted in terms of power: "... although men have not power to make anything out of nothing \( \text{De nihilo} \), ...; God on the contrary excels men in this first of all, that Himself devised the material of His work, which did not exist before."¹ The "power" motif is not a much-emphasized one in Irenaeus, apparently because it tends toward impersonal constructions which he seems to find unsatisfactory. This is not to suggest that Irenaeus ignores the Creator - creature differential, but it is to assert that his inclination is far more directed to speaking of their interaction, and God's co-relation to, or co-inherence² with man, than it is to specify their disjunction.

Power, inherent in God, created in man, is related to the difference between that which is originate and that which is unoriginate. Men are created, says Irenaeus, by the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God, and these inhere in the Glory of God. However, even the Glory of God is understood by Irenaeus as that for which man is first created, and continually being prepared. A critical facet of "power" is that of continuance; by the grace of God man is granted "everlasting continuance", and this in turn is related to the power of the Unoriginate which man receives from God. Subjection is therefore appropriate for man, and it is that, at least in part, by which man reflects his proper stance before God.³

¹A.H., II, x,4.
²The word co-inherence has a critical function in this thesis; cf. Introduction, pp. 26f.
³Cf. A.H., IV, xxxviii,3: By God's Power, Wisdom and Goodness men are created who "... by His exceeding goodness obtaining increase, and enduring longer, shall receive the glory of the Uncreated One, God ungrudgingly vouchsafing that which is good. While in respect of their
Creatio ex nihilo is for Irenaeus not primarily therefore a philosophical concept, or a doctrine which is employed to define the distance between God and man; creatio ex nihilo in his system is a doctrine that is intended to encourage dependence upon God and faith toward Him. He says: "Well therefore spake the Scripture which saith, First of all believe that there is One God, Who created \textit{constituit} and perfected all things, and caused all to come out of non-existence \textit{ex eo} into existence: comprehending all, and comprehended by none."\footnote{A.H., IV, xx, 2 (Quotation from Shepherd of Hermas, 2:1).} God who has created all things out of nothing is to be praised for His almighty power. It is not for us to conjecture as to the means by which God created all things, for as Irenaeus reminds us, "... neither hath any Scripture set forth, ..." His method of creation.\footnote{A.H., II, xxviii, 7.} What is to be continually realized is the "tension" between the inherent inferiority of createdness in respect to the intended and established compatibility between God and His creation.

Irenaeus readily affirms both poles of the tension. He can emphatically affirm first that:

... God alone is without beginning and without end, really and evermore the same, and alike disposed, He Who is Lord of all. But all things beneath Him, as many as have been and are made, admit of a beginning to their production, and are inferior \textit{inferiora} to their Maker \textit{ingenita}; ... \footnote{A.H., II, xxxiv, 2.} production, they are not unoriginate, yet in respect of their enduring through long ages, they will receive the power of the Unoriginate, God freely bestowing upon them everlasting continuance. And so God for His part is first in all things, Who is alone Unoriginate, and first of all, and to all the cause of their being: while all other things remain in subjection to God. Now subjection to God is incorruption, and the continuance of incorruption is the glory of the Unoriginate."
Creation is "beneath" and "inferior" to God because of its "beginning". This is the first pole of the tension. The other is equally affirmed:

And the Father is called by the Spirit Most High, and Almighty, and Lord of Hosts, that we may learn that God is indeed such, that is, creator of heaven and earth and the whole world, and maker of angels and men, and Lord of all, who upholds all things, and by whom everything is sustained; merciful, compassionate and most tender, good, just, God of all, both of Jews and of Gentiles and of the faithful.1

It would be premature to attempt to reconcile the tension at this point, but the possibility should be considered that a reconciliation of some sort was Irenaeus' intention. A study of that endeavour, in fact, impinges upon the interpretation of Irenaeus' doctrine of the imago Dei. However, while the majority of material will be illustrative of the tension's resolution, it should not be supposed that the difference between God and His creation is to be finally and absolutely obliterated. Nevertheless, it is apparent that according to Irenaeus the difference was not absolute i.e., one that presupposed an intrinsic or inherent antipathy or contrariety between God and creation.

a.2. His Nature and Person

... He did of Himself and by His own power freely make, ordain, and accomplish all, ...: He is found to be the only God, Who made all: ... Himself the Framer, Himself the Founder, Himself the Inventor, the Maker, the Lord of all: and there is not beside Him, nor above Him, ...: He is Father, He God, He Founder, He Maker, He Framer, Who made them by Himself, i.e., by His Word and His Wisdom, ... 2

The attributes of the trinitarian God are for Irenaeus economic attributes. That is to say, his reference to God, Father, Son, and Spirit concentrate on the activities of God, and primarily those activities that are directed toward man. Irenaeus may be charged with

1Proof, 8.  2A.H., II, xxx, 9.
a certain lack of specificity in his doctrine of the Trinity; his writings are not notable for a clear and concise delineation of the various and separate natures and functions of each of the persons of the Godhead. What is pertinent, however, is his affirmation of God's orientation toward man. Trinitarian structures are seemingly as applicable to each of the persons of the Trinity in terms of their work as they are to each of the persons within the Godhead, the intra-trinitarian relations. Jesus is referred to as "Salvation", "Saviour", and "Saving Might",

For He is, in the first place, the Saviour, in that He is the Son and Word of God, next He is Saving Might in that He is Spirit: 'For the Spirit of our face,' it saith, 'is Christ the Lord.' (Lam. 4:20). Lastly, He is Salvation, in that He is Flesh: 'For the Word was made Flesh, and dwelt among us.' (John 1:14). Another trinitarian structure is applied to God:

And this is the Creator, Who in love is our Father, in power our Lord, in wisdom our Maker and Framer: ...

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1Ireneaus' doctrine of the Trinity, and its precision or lack of it, is of little concern or relevence to our consideration of the imago Dei. F.R.M. Hitchcock has an excellent chapter entitled "The Doctrine of the Trinity" wherein he evaluates St. Ireneaus' trinitarian formulation, and concludes that "... the Divine Persons have interest for him chiefly as they effect the regeneration and salvation of men, ... ." He also offers a thorough and helpful evaluation of Ireneaus' doctrine of the relation of the persons of the Trinity to one another. F.R. Montgomery Hitchcock, Ireneaus of Lugdunum, A Study of His Teaching, (Cambridge: University Press, 1914) pp. 124-25, and passim. Hereafter: Iren. Lugdunum.

2A.H., III,x,3. All Scripture quotations have been italicized by the translators in the Irenaean text. In preference to underlining, however, these internal quotes will be indicated by use of single inverted commas, the reference inserted within parenthesis.

3A.H., V,xvii,1.
And still another illustration of the Trinity refers to the Spirit, but also incorporates the Father and the Son:

For in the Name of Christ is understood, He who did anoint, and He who was anointed, and the Unction itself wherewith He was anointed. And as the Father did anoint, so the Son was anointed, with the Spirit, which is the anointing: as speaketh the Word by Esaias; 'The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me, because He hath anointed Me:' (Is. 61:1) signifying both the anointing Father and the anointed Son, and the anointing which is the Spirit.¹

Not all of Irenaeus' discussion of the Trinity bears this apparent inexactness of terminology, and it should not be inferred that his doctrine was a naive or an undeveloped one. The following is illustrative of a very clear trinitarian formulation:

For the Father underlying both the creation and the Word, and the Word upholden of the Father, impart the Spirit unto all, at the Father's good pleasure: ... . Above all, first, is the Father; and He is the Head of Christ: then, through all is the Word, and He is Head of the Church: in us all, again, is the Spirit, and He is the Living Water, which the Lord imparts to all that rightly believe in Him, and love Him, and know that there is One Father Who is above all, and through all, and in you all.²

Irenaeus repeatedly affirms this quality or attribute of God - His being always for and toward man. The man toward whom God directs Himself, and the means of the accomplishment of His purpose for man, is the subject of a later section; for the moment we concentrate on Irenaeus' expressions which relate specifically to God. It will be discovered, however, that nearly without exception, those references that pertain to God, (theological, per se,) are simultaneously articulated within the God-man construct (The-anthropological).³ He states: "... as the

¹ A.H., III,xviii,3.
² A.H., V,xviii,2.
Glory of Man is God, so the aim of the works of God, and the recipient of all His Wisdom and Power, is Man. As the physician is proved in such as are sick, so is God made manifest in men. Only slightly altered in a later reference he says, "... the glory of God is a living Man, and the life of man is to see God." God's glory is manifest in creation. That is not, however, to assert that the beauty and majesty of creation itself is a sign which points away from itself to the glory of its Creator. That would imply a greater difference between Creator and creation than Irenaeus had intended.

There may seem to be a subtle tendency toward pantheism in Irenaeus' assertion of the immanence of God. And, one recognizes that his tendency to articulate God's closeness, friendliness, and concern for the perfection of man may suggest a loss of the "otherness" of God. Of this Hitchcock says,

It was the merit of Irenaeus to see that the secret of life and thought and spirit lay in the reconciliation of these two ideas, the transcendence and immanence of God as He is above and as He is within the human personality, and that this reconciliation was made by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

God's "otherness" and difference from man is not forcefully articulated by Irenaeus; that was not his intention. It would be erroneous, however, to assume that he was either oblivious to the difference or that he consciously attempted to minimize it. That God makes and that man is made articulates a differentiation that cannot be minimized or destroyed. God therefore is Giver, man the recipient; God is always the Same, man is always in process of growth. Man is framed, chosen, formed, and

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1 A.H., III,xxx,2.  
2 A.H., IV,xx,7.  
3 Iren. Lugdunum, p. 106.  
4 Cf. A.H., IV,xii.2.
taught. 1 "In respect indeed of His greatness He is unknown to all them that were made by Him ... but in respect of His Love He is known ... ." 2 God is " ... longsuffering in the revolt of man, ... ." 3 God has no need of man, but man is formed "that He might have one on whom to bestow His favours." 4 It was the unconditional goodness and bounty of God that motivated Him to create. And not only did God stand in no need of man, neither did He need any assistance in His work of creation. His intention, motivated solely by His love, was to create one in His own image and likeness, and this was accomplished by "His Hands."

Angels therefore did not make us, nor form us, neither could Angels make an image of God: nor any other but the Word of the Lord, ... . For neither did God stand in need of these, to do the things which He had in Himself determined before to do, as though He had no Hands manus of His own: since to Him is ever present His Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, by whom and in whom He made all things freely and voluntarily: to whom also He speaks, saying, 'Let us make man after our Image and Likeness': (Gen.1:26) Himself receiving from Himself the being of His creatures semetipso substantium creaturam, and the pattern of His works, and the form fi.guram of the things wherewith the world is furnished. 5

A more complete consideration of the "image and likeness" in relation to the "Hands of God" will be offered in a subsequent section, but it should be noted here that it is "from Himself", by means of the Son and the Spirit, that man is created. Such terminology makes it extremely difficult to speak of God's radical distinction from man. On the other hand, Irenaeus' terminology makes possible the articulation of God's

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1 Cf. A.H., IV,xiv,2. 2 A.H. IV,xx,4. 3 A.H., IV,xxxvii,7. 4 A.H., IV,xiv,1, cf. V,ii,1. 5 A.H., IV,xx,1.
relationship to man in what may be called both dynamic and personal categories.

The phrase noted in the last quotation, that man was made by God in His image and likeness, "...Himself receiving from Himself the being of His creatures, ...," may suggest that creation itself, and specifically man, was produced by some process of emanation. However, it has been noted first, that Irenaeus will not enter the field of speculation and conjecture as to how God may have fashioned the world and man (supra p.38, and n.2), and secondly that he has indeed been careful to articulate the difference between God and man, and the consequent inferiority of all creation. Nevertheless, the above phrase should not be minimized by the suggestion that it is simply an unjudicious choice of words. That man does somehow participate in the being of God is one of the central affirmations of St. Irenaeus. In order to sustain that suggestion, however, both the being of God and the being of man require a certain redefinition. Without answering the question at this point, it would be well, at least, to pose it: what are the structures, inherent in God, created in man, that will make it possible to speak of God's co-inherence in man, and man's co-inherence in God? And at the same time, what structures appropriate respectively to God and man need to be articulated in order to preserve a necessary and essential difference between the two? The question was raised by Irenaeus in only a slightly altered form: "... how shall man pass into God, if God had not been caused to pass into man?" 1

a.3. His "Hands"

It should already be apparent that to extract any "pure" theology

1A.H., IV,xxxiii,4.
from Irenaeus is extremely difficult; Irenaeus' theology is integrally related to his anthropology. Nevertheless, for the sake of organization it seems advisable to continue the attempt in this final theological section regarding the "Hands" of God, i.e., Christ and the Spirit. While much more could be said about the Spirit, the relative paucity of references, as compared with those about Christ, is entirely a result of a closer affinity between man (created in the imago Dei) and Christ (who is, according to Irenaeus, the express image and likeness of God)\(^1\) than that which exists between man and the Spirit. The limited number of references, therefore, is not an indication that a consequent minimization of the work of the Spirit is intended by Irenaeus.

The Father speaks to His "Hands", (as noted in the reference p. 43, n. 5), and by them is man created after the image and likeness of God. Even more explicitly we note a similar reference:

... at no time did Adam escape from under the Hands of God, to which Hands the Father was speaking when He said, 'Let us make man after our image and likeness.' (Gen. 1:26). And therefore in the end, 'not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man' (Jn. 1:13) but of the good pleasure of the Father, did His Hands work out a Living Man, to be an Adam, after the Image and Likeness of God.\(^2\)

The subordination implied, in that the Father speaks to His Hands who then carry out His will, is that to which Hitchcock refers saying:

... Irenaeus' doctrine of the Trinity may be summed up as a belief in One and the Same God, manifested to men in a three-fold Personality, Absolute, Eternal, coordinated essentially as touching the Divine Nature, but admitting of historical subordination as touching the Divine Office.\(^3\)

\(^1\)The term "express image" is not from Irenaeus; it is the King James translation of Heb. 1:3, \(\varepsilon\iota\rho\iota\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\gamma\alpha\iota\varsigma\)\(\nu\). Nevertheless, it is one which coincides with Irenaeus' understanding, i.e., that Christ is the image of God, cf. A.H., V,xvi,2.

\(^2\)A.H., V,i,3.

\(^3\)Iren. Lugdum., p. 125.
What is obviously more intrinsic to this study than the intra-trinitarian relations is the bold assertion that from the beginning, at the will and according to the intention of God, His Hands have been at work effecting that which God intends. In that respect they are "subordinate" to the Father. Co-operation, specifying both co-eternity and co-equality of intention would seem a more appropriate attribute of God's Hands than that of subordination; and it may be that which is implied by Hitchcock's phrase, "historical subordination."¹

Irenaeus asserts a belief in the progressive manifestation of the Spirit, implying that it was necessary for the Son's incarnation to have occurred before He (the Spirit) could fully and completely reside with man. It was, states Irenaeus, (basing his conclusions on Isaiah 11:2; 61:1; Mat. 10:20, and 28:19), in Christ's incarnation that the Spirit dwelled, "... using Himself to dwell with Him in mankind and to rest among men, and to reside in the work of God's Hands, ... ".² It can be concluded, therefore, that the Son and the Spirit share a mutuality of labor, both working together to effect that which God ordains.

The Son only, without mention of the Spirit, is He who manifests God's love (His "greatness kept unknown") and is He "... through whom He created all things."³ And the Son, the Word "... which was in the beginning with God," is the same Son who "... also was ever present with

¹Cf. John Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus, (London: Epworth Press, 1946) Hereafter: Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 127: "The doctrine of The Two Hands of God represents immediate action by the whole Godhead, and consequently equality between the Son and Spirit. However, when loosely stated this doctrine may look like subordination of function, where none is intended. These two opposite arrangements of Son and Spirit in Revelation indicate essentially nothing other than that S. Irenaeus thinks of the two as equal and interchangeable in function."

²A.H., III,xvii,1. ³A.H., IV,xx,4.
A.H., III,xviii,1.

2Cf. A.H., III,xxii,3: "... by Paul the same Adam is called 'the figure of Him which is to come': (Rom. 5:14) as though the Word, Who framed all things, had formed before hand with a view to Himself that Economy of Mankind, which was to centre in the Son of God; God forming first of all the natural man, to the end that he might be saved by the spiritual. For whereas He who saves existed before, there must needs be something made that should be saved, lest He that saveth prove a superfluous thing."

3A.H., IV,vi,7.  

4A.H.,III,x,3.

5A.H., III,xviii,3.
On the other hand it should be noted that there is not a uniformity or sameness in the Son's work of revelation; Irenaeus does not suggest that because the Word co-exists with both God and men that there are no variations in His manner or mode of manifestation. In a sense, it would appear, neither could man tolerate a "complete" manifestation of the Father, nor would the Father allow it lest man should suffer.¹

Whereas the Son is always the same in relation to His Father, and remains always at work revealing the Father to man, His incarnation introduced a new mode of being. "For now," says Irenaeus, "were at hand all things new, the Word after a new manner ordaining for Himself an Advent in the flesh, that He might enroll as God's own that man who had departed far out of God."² It has been noted that it was the pre-existent Christ who was Jesus, that it was no docetic Christ which men know in Him, and yet Irenaeus had to consider the problem of an incarnate Word who, in spite of His power, suffered. The solution suggested by Irenaeus is:

For as He was Man, that He might be tempted, so was He also the Word, that He might be glorified: the Word remaining inactive in His temptation and dishonour and crucifixion and death, but going along with the Man in His victory and endurance, and works of goodness, and resurrection and ascension.³

The Word willingly lays aside His power in order to fully and completely identify Himself with man, for only as Man could He truly and necessarily be tempted. Both natures of Jesus Christ were necessary according to

¹Cf. A.H., IV,xx,7: "...as He guards the invisibility of the Father, lest at any time man should become a despiser of God, ... so on the other hand in many and manifold ways He reveals God unto men, lest men altogether falling away from God should cease to be at all."

²A.H., III,x,3.

³A.H., III,xix,3. The division of the human and divine nature of Christ is recognized.
Irenaeus, and without the presence and activity of both, the work of this "Hand" of God could not have been accomplished.\(^1\)

It will not be necessary or advisable to further consider the relationship of the human and divine natures of Jesus;\(^2\) having discussed the subject of God, a consideration of those subjects more directly applicable to the creation of man in the \textit{imago Dei} is in order.

\textbf{b. Man and his Creation}

The concern of this entire section (\textit{b.}) is the initial situation (as described by Irenaeus), related to God's intention for man. Unless it can be clearly articulated what God intended, it will be difficult to assess both the effect of man's sin on God's intention, and equally as difficult to specify the work of God, through Christ and the Spirit, in the attainment of His purpose. The first sub-section, therefore, while presenting Irenaeus' doctrine and understanding of the initial situation, will not include interpretation of the actual and historical situation in which man subsequently finds himself.

\textbf{b.1. God's Initial Intention: Perfection and Growth}

And so fair and goodly was the Garden, the Word of God was constantly walking in it; He would walk round and talk with the man, prefiguring what was to come to pass in the future, how

\(^1\)Cf. \textit{A.H.}, V,xvii,3: "For if no man can forgive sins but God only, and if our Lord did forgive them, and heal men; plain it is, that He was the very Word of God, made Son of Man, receiving from the Father the power of remitting sins, in that He is Man, and in that He is God: so that even as being Man, He sympathized with us, so being God He may have mercy on us, and forgive us our debts, which we owe to God our Creator." And of, \textit{A.H.}, III,xviii,1: "... He in the last times according to the time ordained by the Father, was united to His own creation and made a Man capable of suffering: ... ." And cf. \textit{A.H.}, IV,xx,4: "And this is His Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, Who in the last times was made a man among men, ... ."

\(^2\)It may also be pointed out that Irenaeus himself devoted relatively little attention to the two nature question.
He would become man's fellow, and talk with him, and come among mankind, teaching them justice.\(^1\)

Even though the Word's prefigurative relationship to "original" man in the Garden does not emphatically specify a disparity between that which was and that which was yet to be, nevertheless that such a difference is there should not be overlooked. The Garden, according to Irenaeus, was "fair and goodly", a suitable place for the Word of God to be present. Even so, His presence, suggests Irenaeus, was precursory; His being with man there was sometime in the future to be even more direct.\(^2\)

The human race as a whole, according to Irenaeus, proceeds through five separate stages of development: "... one is first an infant, then a boy, a youth, a young man, and lastly an elder."\(^3\) God's intention therefore is that man should continually grow toward that final stage, and that he should attain various levels of maturity along the way of his development. As was indicated in the first section, man by the fact of his being created, is inferior to his Creator. But, says Irenaeus, God's intention is that they should not remain at the same

\(^1\)Proof, 12.

\(^2\)Having said that the Word was walking in the Garden with man, but in a prefigurative sense, we should note also another reference related to the time, or sequence question: "For in no other way could we learn the things of God, except our Master, being the Word, had been made Man. Because no other but His own Word could declare unto us the things of the Father." - A.H., V,i,1. This is a further illustration that Irenaeus' doctrine of Creation and understanding of God's intention for it, were futurist; the Word had first to become incarnate before God's purpose was complete.

\(^3\)A.H., II,xxiv,4. Though the text may imply growth of either individual or race we would, with Hitchcock, be inclined to interpret it in reference to the latter, i.e., the race. Cf. Iren. Lugdunum, pp. 62-63.
level of inferiority, but "...that they should continue and ... be drawn out into length of ages, ... : I mean that they are so framed at the beginning, and that He afterwards gives them their being." Their creation looked forward in anticipation of their completion, "their being". The same thought is reiterated, and is stated even more explicitly in the following:

... this alone is truly God and Father, Who both created this world, and formed Man, and bestowed upon His Creation the gift of increase, and calleth it from its lower conditions to the greater things which are with Him; even as He both brings out the infant, conceived in the womb, into the sun's light, and lays up the wheat in the garner, when He hath strengthened it in the stalk.2

It would be unwarranted to suggest that the "increase" that Irenaeus mentions refers to numerical growth (e.g., "Be fruitful and multiply") in the light of the two analogies he offers, those having to do with the maturation of the foetus toward the time of its birth, and also the ripening of the wheat on the stalk. Therefore, the "increase" to which he refers relates to the intention of God for man's growth and development, i.e., to participate in the "...greater things which are with Him; ..." The precise nature and content of those "greater things" is partially understood as referring to man, "... ripening as he is by so great means for the sight and comprehension of God."3 The relationship between the "sight and comprehension of God" and the deification of man is becoming increasingly apparent. It is that

1Cf. A.H., II,xxxiv,2.
2A.H., II,xxviii,1.
3A.H., IV, xxxvii,7.
toward which and for which man is destined. Man who was made (Adam) is also man who is being made.

Finally, Irenaeus suggests that even the experience of man in the Garden was the initiation of his training for perfection. If that is so, one would expect to discover a view of Paradise that is considerably different from doctrines ordinarily received in the Church. And, because Irenaeus relates sin and evil to man's "training program" one would also expect to find a somewhat unfamiliar doctrine of sin. By way of anticipation of Irenaeus' doctrine of sin and evil, and at the same time to see its function within God's intention for man, the following is significant:

... man knew both the good of obedience, and the evil of disobedience: that the mind's eye receiving trial of both, might with judgment make its choice of the better, and might never become slothful, nor negligent of God's command: and as to that which deprives it of life, i.e., disobedience to God, - learning by experiment how evil it is, one might never even so much as try it: while as to obeying God, which is the preservative of his life, knowing how good it is, he may diligently keep it with all earnestness. And to this end he had also double sense, having the cognizance of both kinds: that with discipline ... he might make choice of the best. But how could he have had a training for good, knowing not what is contrary thereto?  

1Cf. A.H. IV,xxxix,2 which is perhaps the most complete reference related to the intention and growth of man: "How then shall he be God, who is not yet made man? how made perfect, who is but just made at all? how immortal, who in mortal nature was not obedient to his Maker? Nay, thou must first guard well thy position as man, and then at length partake of the glory of God. For thou makest not God, but God maketh thee. If then thou art God's handywork, stay for the hand of thine artificer, which doeth all things in season; and when I say 'in season', I mean as to thee who are in making ... But by guarding the assigned structure, thou wilt mount up to perfection: for by the workmanship of God the clay which is in thee disappears. ... But if they, speedily hardened, reject His skill, and prove ungrateful to Him, because thou art made (but) a man, by thus becoming unthankful to God, thou hast lost both His skill, and thine own life together. For to make, is proper to God's benignity: and to be made, is proper to man's nature rhominis naturae."

2A.H., IV,xxxix,1.
Now, as to whether or not man "knew both the good of obedience, and the evil of disobedience" by actual experience or if on the other hand it was rather a constitutive factor of his creation, i.e., a mental capacity or gift, the above reference does not unambiguously state. "The mind's eye receiving trial of both," would suggest a mental capacity without actual experience, and hence one could conclude that the experience of sin was an alien factor, having no valid function within the initial creation and intention of God. On the other hand, however, there are Irenaeus' words, "learning by experiment how evil it is", (i.e., disobedience), which suggests that the knowledge of sin, and man's participation in it, was somehow included within the initial intention of God. Further discussion will have to be postponed, and we conclude with Hitchcock's commentary: Irenaeus "... seems to regard man's experience in the garden of innocence as an awakening of his conscience, and the knowledge of evil as necessary to the education and training of man."¹

¹Iren. Lugdunum, pp. 165-66. Stated even more to the point Hitchcock also says, on p. 166: "... the original destiny of man was in no wise hindered by the Fall. The fact was that the Fall became the means of leading men to attain the perfection for which they were destined."

The ambiguity with which we are dealing is noted again at the conclusion of A.H., IV,xxxviii,4 and the beginning of IV,xxxix,1: "Now it was necessary that first nature should be manifested, then afterwards that the mortal should be overcome and absorbed by immortality, 1 Cor. 15:52 and the corruptible by incorruption, and that man should be made in the image and likeness of God, receiving the knowledge of good and evil.

And man did receive the knowledge of good and evil, how it is good to obey God, and to believe Him and to keep His Commandment; and this is the life of man: even as not to obey God, is bad; and this is man's death."
b.2. The Initial State of Man

The question regarding the created nature of Adam, his perfection or imperfection, and subsequently his relationship to sin, stands at the heart and center of St. Irenaeus' doctrine of the *imago Dei*. If it could be shown, for instance, that Irenaeus maintained a doctrine of man (Adam) that unequivocally asserted a created non-perfection, then it would appropriately follow that his involvement with and experience of sin was not of paramount significance, i.e., the *ultimate* issue. That is, sin would be relegated to the periphery of the nature of man, and would not be the primary interpretive principle of man's relationship in respect to God. Material will be offered which will tend to support that position.

On the other hand, some of Irenaeus' writing would seem to suggest that man (Adam) in the beginning, even though just a "Child", was adequately equipped to recognize the nature of sin, and at the same time to abstain from it. If this latter is Irenaeus' main intention and teaching, then sin will assume a greater significance, and will be not only one of the factors, but the primary factor, constitutive of the God-man relation.

b.2.a. Man's Moral Perfection

The first indication to consider relative to man's initial perfection is that which Irenaeus calls "Primal Innocence". Commenting on the life of Adam and Eve in the Garden, he says:

And Adam and Eve ... were naked and were not ashamed, for their thoughts were innocent and childlike, and they had no conception or imagination of the sort that is engendered in the soul by evil, through concupiscence, and by lust.\(^1\)

Here is a clear indication of a before-and-after situation, wherein

\(^1\) *Proof*, 14.
Irenaeus asserts, on the basis of Gen. 3:7, that in the created state nakedness was not an occasion for embarrassment or shame. Whereas, after the introduction of evil, as something with which there was no prior experience, naked exposure was associated with concupiscence and lust. Therefore, as related to inter-personal relationships, a quality of "perfection" pertains from the beginning, and is transformed by the experience of sin.

Secondly, in that "... 'God formed man, taking clay of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life'," (Gen. 2:7) it is first of all doubtful that any suggestion of the non-perfection of that which God created should be seriously entertained. Elaborating on the text, Irenaeus goes further and says that by God's own Hands he created man, "... receiving from Himself the being of His creatures, and the pattern of His works, and the form of the things wherewith the world is furnished." ¹ Secondly, it would seem likely that that which is from God is certainly good, and perfect in some sense of the word "perfect". This implication is further substantiated in Irenaeus' *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching:*

But man He fashioned with His own hands, taking of the purest and finest of earth, in measured wise mingling with the earth His own power; for He gave his frame the outline of His own form, that the visible form too should be godlike - for it was an image of God that man was fashioned and set on earth - and that he might come to life, He breathed into his face the breath of life, so that the man became like God in inspiration as well as in frame.²

Even though that "perfection" is not one that approaches the ultimate perfection which is an exclusive quality of God, nonetheless, as relates to the perfection which may be attributable to man, these Irenaean texts seem quite unambiguous. That Adam "... did receive the knowledge

¹ *A.H.* IV, xx, 1. ² *Proof*, 11.
of good and evil, how it is good to obey God, and to believe Him and to keep His Commandment: ...\(^1\) seems to contradict the implication of an initial non-perfection. Creation of man with moral perfection necessarily involves knowledge of the distinction between good and evil (granted the possibility of evil), and with this knowledge it would appear man was created.

There is, however, another reference related to this knowledge of good and evil which seems to introduce a sort of "neutrality" into the discussion. Irenaeus states that in order that Adam might appreciate that he, even though granted dominion over all creation, "... had for lord the Lord of all", certain conditions were given him, which were also to encourage his humility. The picture of Adam is that he was as though, in the beginning, one facing all possibilities for the first time, unencumbered by any liability. Nothing had been "tried"; therefore, nothing had failed, and consequently it was "perfect". And, says Irenaeus, if Adam had observed that commandment, he would have retained that life with which he had been created, and would have remained immortal.\(^2\)

The words which Irenaeus puts in the mouth of Adam after the first transgression, "... the robe of holiness /sanctitatis stolam/, which

\(^1\) A.H., IV,xxxix,1. It does not, however, seem possible to state unqualifiedly that Irenaeus is referring specifically to Adam; he may, indeed, be referring to man already acquainted with the experience of sin, in which case the implication is that a certain moral imperfection does not necessarily fracture man's relationship with God.

\(^2\) Cf. Proof, 15. The text reads thus: "But so that the man should have no thoughts of grandeur, and become lifted up, as if he had no lord, because of the dominion that had been given to him, ... a law was given him by God, that he might know that he had for Lord the Lord of all. And He laid down for him certain conditions: so that, if he kept the command of God, then he would always remain as he was, that is, immortal: but if he did not, he would become mortal, melting into earth, whence his frame had been taken". Cf. A.H, III,xxiii,7.
I had from the Spirit, I have lost by disobedience, ..."¹, appear to be another indication of the created perfection of Adam. The Spirit was definitely associated with the holiness of man, and man therefore, was holy, wearing the "robe" "from the Spirit". Of this, however, Lawson says that the robe, stola, is "... a most apt expression to denote the conception of a donum superadditum. Here is a relative perfection in Adam, which is not of the nature of Adam."² It would appear, nevertheless, that until such time as the "robe" was removed, the holiness to which the "robe" referred was indeed a quality which inhere in Adam, though not belonging to him.

Some of the material that speaks of the freedom of man, and of his will, also tends to support the assertion of man's initial perfection. In saying, for instance, that "... liberty and freewill ... always was in man, ..."³ Irenaeus suggests the possibility of man's initial perfection. The effects of sin on the freedom and will of man will be discussed later, but at this point, and on the basis of this reference, it would seem that man as initially created was fashioned with freedom. And, freedom is a characteristic which we are accustomed to ascribe primarily to perfect men, at least, that is, of the quality of freedom of which Irenaeus here speaks. This subject is considered more explicitly in Irenaeus' interpretation of Mat. 23:37:

¹A.H., III,xxiii,5.

²Bib. Theol. Iren., pp. 202-03. The substance/accident distinction utilized by Lawson will not be a special consideration of this thesis. However, the suggestion that the "robe" may have implied a holiness not possessed by Adam, yet contingent upon his relationship to God's Spirit, may be a valid point.

³A.H., IV,xv,2.
And in that He saith, 'How often would I have gathered thy children and thou wouldest not:' He declared the ancient law of man's liberty: how that God made him free from the beginning, having power of himself, and he had a soul of his own, to act upon God's decree voluntarily, and not upon compulsion from God. ... While He gives good counsel to all, He hath set in man the power of choice, ...

Man had, from the beginning, according to these references, ability to discern between right and wrong, good and evil, and was also given freedom and power to effect his decision without external compulsion. This ability and freedom is placed within another context which might suggest an even stronger element of man's initial perfection. Irenaeus says that man's freedom and power are those which have been given by God, and are therefore good. But, this is a sort of a "good" that requires to be exercised, or as Irenaeus puts it: "... and such as work it shall receive glory and honour, for working good, when they might have declined working it: ... ."²

The Irenaean material which has been considered seems to substantiate the position which asserts the original perfection of man. We have seen that Adam and Eve enjoyed a "primal innocence" in the Garden before the incursion of sin which caused them to become ashamed of their nakedness. Second, there was the tacit implication of man's perfection due to his having been created by God. Because Irenaeus was refuting the Gnostics among whom it was taught that the God who created and the God who redeemed were not the same, Irenaeus' refutation of them would

¹A.H., IV, xxxvii, 1.

²A.H., IV, xxxvii, 1, and cf. A.H., IV, xxxvii, 2: "... because they are all of the same nature, and able to retain and do what is good, and able on the contrary to reject it and do it not: justly even among men who are well governed, and much more with God, are the one praised, and meet witness borne unto them, of their general choice of what is good, and perseverance in it; ... ." And cf. A.H., IV, iv, 3 regarding rationality and created free will and power.
have been seriously weakened had he emphatically and explicitly propounded a doctrine of created imperfection. He stated, to the contrary, that the very being of the creatures was in fact from God Himself.

Thirdly, Irenaeus has asserted that man, initially created, was afforded all things necessary for moral integrity, i.e., knowledge of good and evil (whether experiential or intuitive has not yet been determined) and power to retain his immortality. The "robe of holiness" which Adam wore is another constituent of perfection closely related to moral integrity. But, we have noted that according to Lawson the stola may have indicated a donum suppradditum, and therefore not of the essence of Adam.

Fourth, and finally, the freedom in which Adam was created, a freedom which is of the very distinctiveness of Adam, setting him apart from and over the other forms of creation not so endowed, is a critical symbol of perfection. Only the response of obedience of a truly free man qualifies as obedience; an obedience of compulsion is not obedience, per se, but rather one of inflexible nature. Adam's freedom points to a superiority among creation, and also to an initial perfection, not however, without ambiguity.

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2 Cf. A.H., IV,xxxvii,6: "Because they were made reasonable with faculties to examine and to judge, and not — (like irrational or inanimate things, which can do nought of their own will, but are drawn towards good by necessity and force; who have one only thought, and one only way) — these are not, I say, made unchangeable, and without judgment, so as to be capable of being anything but what they were made. And so to them neither would that which is good be pleasant, nor the communion of God precious, nor good greatly desirable, seeing that it grew up to them without any movement, care, or study of their
A precise definition of Irenaeus' teaching and position relative to man's initial status requires the consideration of those references which appear to assert man's initial "imperfection". This is the subject of the created childishness of Adam, and a consequent limitation which mitigates not only Adam's transgression, but also qualifies the subsequent history of God's relationship to and with man.

b.2.b. His Imperfection

Having stated in A.H., IV,xxxvii,7 that God was longsuffering in the revolt of man, perpetually leading man toward the perfection of the Image, i.e., the Son, Irenaeus continues the argument:

But if a man say 'How is this?' Could not God render man perfect from the beginning? let him know, that although unto God, who is always just the same, and Unoriginated, in respect of Himself all things are possible; yet the things which were made by Him, so far as that, coming afterwards, they have each its own beginning of generation, so far they must also fall short of Him who made them; for the things just brought into being could not be unoriginated; and so far as they are not unoriginated, so far also they fall short of Perfection.1

It is readily apparent that whenever man is compared with God, the adjectives perfect and imperfect assume a particular connotation.

And it is within that context that Irenaeus begins to answer the question, "Could not God render man perfect from the beginning?" If it is suggested that the criterion is God, then quite obviously the answer is No; that which is originate is, in relation to what which is Unoriginate,

own, yea, as a spontaneous and untended plant. Thus there would be no energy in their goodness; they being what they are rather by nature than by will, and having good of itself, not by choice, and consequently not realizing so much as this, That what is good, is fair, and not enjoying it. For what enjoyment is there of Good in those who know it not? And what glory to those who have not exerted themselves for it? And what crown to those who have not won the same as conquerors in a struggle?"

1A.H., IV, xxxvii,1, Ital. mine.
imperfect. But beyond this primary reference, i.e., God vis-a-vis man, the adjectives, perfect/imperfect are applicable as related to man's initial creation. Therefore, Irenaeus continues:

And in respect that they are younger, they are also childish, and in the same respect also unpracticed, and unexercised for the perfect training. ... God also was indeed able Himself to bestow on man perfection from the beginning, but man was incapable of receiving it: for he was a babe \textit{Infans}.\footnote{Cf. A.H., II,xxxiv,2 regarding imperfection in respect to the perfection of the Unoriginate.}

There is a broader configuration to which perfection applies than was initially noted. For, also in respect to man's origin and his subsequent history and development the adjectives perfection/imperfection pertain. Irenaeus states that insofar as man was a "babe" he was incapable of receiving perfection. That is, he was incapable insofar as perfection would have been incommensurate with his having begun-to-be; perfection comes properly in time.\footnote{A.H. IV,xxxviii,1 (Ital. mine), and cf. IV,xxxviii,2.} There is, it should be noted, no specific reference to the "babe's" involvement in sin; the only tentative indication offered in regard to that possibility is Irenaeus' statement that he was initially "...unexercised for the perfect training". Whether or not that training included the experience of sin remains to be seen.

The distinction between man's initial imperfection in relation to his future perfection is more emphatically defined within the context of man's created nature. Irenaeus states:

For while according to His own benignity He bestowed good in good measure, and made men, like Himself, endowed with free-will; yet in His foreknowledge He was aware of man's infirmity \textit{Infirmitatem},

\footnote{Cf. Hitchcock, \textit{Iren. Lugdunum}, p. 82: "There is ... scope for development of evolution. But it is a God-directed development; ... ".}
and of what would come thereof; and in His love and might He will overcome that which we are by our created nature.¹

The "infirmity" to which Irenaeus refers, and of which he says God was aware, is apparently closely related to that infirmity or inequality above, i.e., the difference between the Unoriginate and the originate which has just begun-to-be. What can it mean that God, in His foreknowledge, was aware of what man would become because of his infirmity? One would not attempt to maximize the significance of this initial infirmity toward the end that God should be accused of creating poorly; neither, however, should the factor of initial infirmity be minimized, excusing Irenaeus of an apparently careless conclusion. There is, according to Irenaeus, a significant difference between what man was in the "beginning" and what he is intended to become at a future time. And for the moment the word imperfection is used to distinguish between the former and latter states of man.

The question relating to man's initial imperfection is closely dependent upon what St. Irenaeus says about man's created nature. He has stated that God, in His love and might, "... will overcome that which we are by our created nature, ..."²; clearly, this assertion strikes some very unfamiliar chords. Ordinarily (i.e., in the West) the created situation is considered to have been full and finalized, and only

¹A.H., IV,xxxviii,4. And cf. Proof, 12 wherein Irenaeus associates the Garden with the growing man: "... having made man lord of the earth and everything in it, He made him in secret lord also of the servants [Angels, cf. Proof, 17] in it. They, however, were in their full development, while the Lord, that is, the man, was a little one; for he was a child and had need to grow so as to come to his full perfection. And so that he might have nourishment and grow up in luxury, a place was prepared for him better than this world, well-favoured in climate, ... [etc.]; and its name is the Garden." (Ital., mine).

²A.H., IV,xxxviii,4.
subsequently disturbed by the "fall"; this does not appear to be Irenaeus' orientation. He elaborates upon the "created nature" motif, relating it to a distinction between inbreathing and Spirit. He says that the old life (apparently referring to all of life prior to the Incarnation) is overcome because it had been given by "inbreathing" and not by the Spirit. There is a basic distinction between the natural and the spiritual man; both are fashioned or created by God, but the first is simply by inbreathing, the second, and more perfect, is by the Spirit Himself. The inbreathing is common to all men; the Spirit, on the other hand, according to Irenaeus' interpretation of Isaiah 43:5, is given more restrictively. Inbreathing, which is a lower gift, is apparently a temporal arrangement, whereas the Spirit is an eternal one. What seems most critical is that Irenaeus should so unambiguously assert that the temporality of the inbreathing (life) was entirely within the intention of God.¹

¹Cf. A.H., V, xii, 1 and 2. Both sections are instructive, but only a portion of the latter needs to be given; commenting on Isaiah 57:16, Irenaeus says, "... wherein he set down the word 'spirit' with especial reference to God, Who poureth it out on mankind in the last times by the adoption of sons: but the word Breath in a general sense with reference to the creature, which also he termed a thing made. But that which is made is different from the maker. The breath therefore is for a time, but the Spirit is eternal. And the breath indeed having for a short space been at its height, and having remained for a time, afterwards departeth, leaving that breathless, to which before it had appertained: but the other, encompassing the man from within and from without, as being apt always to abide, never forsaketh him. 'But not first cometh that which is spiritual,' saith the Apostle, (I Cor. 15:46) (uttering this as to us men,) 'but first that which is animal, then that which is spiritual;' according to reason. For it was meet that men should first be formed, and being formed should receive a soul, and so afterwards receive the Communion of the Spirit. Wherefore also 'the first Adam was made' by the Lord 'a living soul, the second Adam a quickening spirit.' (I Cor. 15:45). As therefore he who was made a living soul, lost his life, casting it away to the worse: so on the other hand that same person, on returning to the better part, and acquiring the quickening Spirit, will attain life."
The temporal life which comes by "inbreathing" is commensurate with what has been tentatively called created imperfection. And it in turn is positively related to that to which reference has been made (supra, p. 47), i.e., that the Incarnation is integral to creation. Therefore, it was according to the economy of God that there should first be formed the natural man, who in turn should be saved (completed) by the spiritual. It is not yet possible to state conclusively whether a doctrine of initial perfection or imperfection is Irenaeus' primary intention. But according to the material which has been studied, it would appear that the configuration of creation is quite compatible with a doctrine of on-going and future completion (perfection).

Whatever the final conclusion as regards Irenaeus' intention in respect to man's initial perfection/imperfection, it will be difficult to underestimate the value of his theories of man's "childlikeness", some of which have already been considered. One additional reference will illustrate how his "child" concept functions within the situation of temptation and sin. It seems evident that Irenaeus' primary intention is to protect Adam, as it were, from those who might be inclined to ascribe more blame than he rightfully deserves.

For the Lord for His part sowed good seed in His own field. (Now the field is the world). 'But while men slept, the enemy came, and sowed tares among the wheat, and departed.' (Mat. 13:25). Because from that time forward this Angel is an Apostate and an


2Supra, especially pp. 60f., and cf. Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 212: "It is clear that S. Irenaeus is powerfully prompted to speak of salvation as the restoration of something lost in the Fall. ... However, it is no less clear that when he expressly turns his mind to the doctrine of man he tends to speak of 'the childhood of Adam'.
Enemy, ... Wherefore also God's way with him who secretly sowed the crop of tares, i.e., brought in the transgression, was to separate him from partaking of Himself: but him who in thoughtlessness, however, wrongly, admitted the disobedience, even the man, He pitied. And He converted against the said (Serpent) the enmity whereby he had made us enemies: in that He repelled from Himself our enmity against Him and retorted it, and aimed it back at the serpent.

It may be objected, because the parable to which Irenaeus refers has to do, not with creation and fall, but with the Kingdom of God and tares growing among the wheat, that therefore his interpretation is to be rejected. Nevertheless, having transposed the content from the Kingdom to Creation, the important aspect of his interpretation remains, that is, that whether Kingdom or Creation, the sower of the tares is the primarily guilty one, and the sleeper is pitied. In either context the question may properly be asked, how "perfect" is a sleeping man? And consequently, what measure of responsibility might properly accrue to one who is not chastised for sleeping, but only for thoughtlessness? It is apparent that Irenaeus is not inclined to ascribe full and entire responsibility to man, but rather to direct it back upon the Serpent. Sleep and thoughtlessness are, one might want to say, acceptable attributes of an imperfect being – imperfect in respect to God, to the immediate fulfillment of his destiny, and in respect to Him who is the express imago, Jesus Christ.

Having presented, without extensive commentary, the Irenaean material related to the initial state of man (section b) it remains to further develop his concept of the imago Dei from the perspective of its historical configuration.

c. Man and His Historical Creaturely Existence

Whether a doctrine of sin is most properly established at the

1A.H., IV,xi,3.
periphery or at the center of a theological system may be debatable. Undebatable however is the assertion that the subject of sin must be clearly defined, that its significance be fully appreciated, and that no attempt be made to deny its reality, or to minimize its effect within the God-man relationship. It is a precarious path to walk, and it may be true that in respect to its doctrine of sin, the church has vacillated more extensively than upon any other. We will have to be especially careful and conscientious in our examination of Irenaeus' doctrine of sin; especially so because his concepts of creation, intentionality, and perfection/imperfection are, as we have seen, amenable to a minimization of the dimensions of sin.¹ That this was neither his intention nor conclusion will hopefully be made manifest; at the same time, that his concept or doctrine of sin is admittedly different from that which is well-known to us in the West will be strikingly apparent.

1. Man and Sin

Even as, according to Irenaeus, the method of creatio ex nihilo is inexplicable,

So again the reason also, why, all things being created of God, some transgressed and departed from obedience to God, ... the cause itself of the nature of the transgressors, neither hath any Scripture related, nor Apostle said, nor hath the Lord taught.²


²A.H., II,xxviii,7.
Neither here nor elsewhere does Irenaeus attempt to explicate the origin of sin; its reality, presence, and consequences are his interest and concern, and he does not become involved in speculative assumptions. His perspective is primarily from the "giveness" of sin together with its impact and influence on man's history - history being, contiguously (co-inherently?) associated with God and the work of His "Hands".

The first area of consideration, and apparently of prime importance within the Irenaean doctrine, is sin's relationship to death. Death's antithesis is, for Irenaeus, life; but life is not simply to be understood as that which could be ascertained from a clinical point of view. It signifies not breathing and blood-flow but rather an association or relation with God - of a particular quality. It is explicitly stated thus:

And whatever beings keep their love towards God, to them He affords communion with Himself. Now Communion with God is life and light, and enjoyment of the good things which are from Him. But whosoever in their purpose withdraw from God, upon them He bringeth separation from Himself. Now separation from God is Death; and separation from light is darkness, and separation from God is casting away all the good things which come from Him. Those then, who by rebellion have cast away the things aforesaid, as being deprived of all good things, come to be in all manner of punishment. For though God punish them not by express dispensation, yet that punishment followeth after them, because they are deprived of all good things from God being eternal and endless, the privation of them also is of course eternal and endless.1

Life is communion with God; withdrawal is death. This is not a spatial separation, but as Irenaeus states, a separation which is a "...casting away of all the good things which come from Him." The word "rebellion" is employed here, but it is apparently not the sort of

1 A.H., V,xxvii,2.
rebellion which is violent and forceful, but moreso a rejection of the
"good" which God offers. It is not, at least here, a conscious grappling
with authority or a proud demand for equality;¹ rather, one is impressed
by man's incredible foolishness.

It should also be seen and appreciated that "separation from
God", being not a spatial or metaphysical separation, is rather cast in
terminology which is compatible with personal relation and being. Irenaeus
specifically and significantly uses the word "love", saying "... whatever
beings keep their love towards God, to them He affords communion with
Himself." (supra). And the communion of which he speaks is life. That
they should "keep" their love suggests that man was cast initially into,
what might be called, a love construct. It was the realization that God
loves and that the proper response of man was to retain His love that,
for Irenaeus, characterized the ideal God-man relationship.

The element of mortality is firmly associated with man's recogni-
tion of the creature-Creator relation, and the saying that it was cast
within a love construct is not to imply that man would be allowed to
despise difference without experiencing the negative implications.
However much one might be impressed with Irenaeus' emphasis on man's
union with God, he is nevertheless careful not to eradicate their
differentiation.

Immortality is contingent upon the perpetuation of a proper
stance toward God; it is not a natural endowment, if by that is meant
an attribute which pertains to man apart from a God-relation. In his

¹The element of pride in the content of sin which is quite dominant
in later theology, is not a major theme of Irenaeus, but it is noted, e.g.,
in A.H., III,xxiii,1.
Proof St. Irenaeus clearly articulated the proper God-man relation and its various effects upon man's life; there was a tendency, Irenaeus recognized, that man might be inclined to think over-much of himself and transgress his proper bounds (discussed, supra p. 56). If the word "love" were chosen to adequately summarize the intent of the first reference (pp. 67f.) in respect to the prospect of man's immortality, we should have to select the word "obedience" in this second:

... He laid down for him certain conditions: so that, if he kept the command of God, then he would always remain as he was, that is, immortal; but if he did not, he would become mortal, melting into earth, whence his frame had been taken.1

The "conditions" were established for man as a reminder of his creatureliness, and more importantly, it seems as a way to keep him within the proper love construct. That which Irenaeus says about the effects of man's disobedience seem to indicate that we are perhaps being confronted by a very particular use of the word2 which will subsequently relate to his doctrine of the imago Dei. Indeed, Irenaeus does emphatically relate death to disobedience, as we note:

But that God was true, and the serpent a liar, was shewn by the event, when death followed close upon those who had eaten. For together with the food they made death also their own, since they ate in disobedience, and disobedience to God bringeth death

\[
\text{Finobedientia autem Dei mortem infert.} \]

Death, however, is not considered primarily in its association

1Proof, 15. And cf. A.H., IV,xxxix,1.

2The attitude to which Irenaeus is being compared and contrasted is that in which, regarding the word disobedience, the atmosphere is volatile; man is completely at fault; God's retribution is swift; and man is punished by death.

3A.H., V,xxiii, 1.
with punishment, or as an evidence of God's rejection of man. It is rather included by Irenaeus within that which we have called the love construct. And while it remains true that mortality represents the failure of man to retain his stance within that construct, death intervenes, according to Irenaeus, as God's device to protect man. This is unambiguously stated in his comment on Adam's departure from Paradise:

"... He cast him out of Paradise, and moved him to a distance from the Tree of Life: not grudging him the Tree of Life, as some dare to say, but in pity to him, that he might not last for ever as a sinner; and that the sin which was in him might not be immortal, and an infinite and incurable evil. But He forbade him to transgress, bringing in death as a check, and causing sin to cease, in that He put an end to it by the dissolution of the flesh which should take place on earth: that man, ceasing some day to live unto sin, and dying thereunto, might begin to live unto God."  

1Cf. Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 216: "It is worthy of note that when Irenaeus wishes to denote man's disabled condition he speaks of liability to death far more than of bondage to sin. The predominance of this Greek usage is perhaps largely due to the associations of the Fall story, with its doom, 'in the day thou eatest thou shalt surely die'.

S. Irenaeus did not therefore believe in Original Sin in the proper sense of the word. The inherited defect of the human race is represented as a grievous disability, but not as involving man in guilt or constituting him the object of God's wrath."

2A.H., III,xxiii,6. There is an implicit dualism in this text in relating the cessation of sin to the dissolution of the flesh, but as Lawson points out, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 223, the context is one in which Irenaeus is arguing for the salvation of Adam against Tatian, and he says, "The real intention ... is no more than that the exclusion from Paradise was not a mark of God's anger." And cf. Proof, 16, where referring to the commandment not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he says: "This commandment the man did not keep, but disobeyed God, being misled by the angel, who, becoming jealous of the man and looking on him with envy because of God's many favours which He had bestowed on the man, both ruined himself and made man a sinner, persuading him to disobey God's command. So the angel, having become by falsehood the head and fount of sin, both was himself stricken, having offended against God, and caused the man to be cast forth out of Paradise. And because, at the prompting of his nature, he had rebelled and fallen away from God, he was called in Hebrew Satan, that is, rebel; ... . So God rebuked the serpent, who had been the bearer of the slanderer, and this curse fell upon both the animal itself, and the angel ...; and the man He put away from His face, and sent away to dwell by the road into the
Mortality, the effect of man's disobedience, and which by his sin affects the entire race of man, is set within the control and purpose of God. Worse than the experience of death, according to Irenaeus, would have been the continuation of an existence which was opposed to God. And in "pity" therefore for the man who had been maliciously misled by the Devil, death was allowed until such time as man might begin again to "live unto God." Recalling the discussion of the life/love relationship (supra, pp. 67-68) it should also be realized that not only does death follow disobedience, but that disobedience, being a moral separation from God, is death.

The major emphasis of Irenaeus regarding the subject of that which is ordinarily termed the "fall" is firmly established within the context of death - death being the result, more than the punishment, of man's departure or separation from God. We have also noted that Adam

Garden, since the Garden does not admit a sinner." And cf. A.H., III, xxiii,3 regarding the reaction of God to Adam's sin: "For which cause also in the beginning of Adam's transgression, as Scripture related, He cursed not Adam himself, but the ground in his works: as one of the Ancients saith, 'God for His part transferred the curse unto the earth, that it might not continue in the man.' ... But the whole curse discharged itself on the Serpent who had beguiled them." And cf. A.H. III,xxiii,5.

1Cf. A.H., III,xxi,10.

2Even though Irenaeus' concept of the Devil, per se, will not ultimately be maintained as a necessary and integral factor in our subsequently-developed use of the imago Dei, as a symbol of co-inherence, it may be beneficial to note his own beliefs. The Devil is, he says, "... a strong man, not altogether, but as compared with us." - (III, viii,2). And because of his superior strength, he was able to capture the weaker man, and hold him in his power (cf. V,xxi,3). He conquered us and "... thrust us out of proper relation by disobedience" (III, xvii,2). He ruled over man from the beginning, and is the enemy of God (V,xxi,1).
received less harsh judgement than did the Devil; man He "pitied" the Devil He cursed. 1

c.2. **Imago, Similitudo, and the Structure of Man**

In order for the task of this section to be properly and adequately accomplished it will be essential to recall two critical conclusions formerly developed. The first, which was the subject especially of section a.1, was the definition of the difference between God and His creation. Irenaeus' occasional reference to "man becoming God" may tend to minimize the difference, but if this tendency were actualized in toto, his categories of Image and Likeness would be meaningless. The words image and likeness require that there would be that to which something can be like,2 and that to which something may be an image or likeness must necessarily be different, "other". Saying therefore, that man is created in the image and likeness is *not* at all to say that he *is* the image and likeness.

The second factor to be related to this present consideration is the concept of man's perfection/imperfection which was discussed in Section b. The question was raised there as to whether man, as he was initially created, was created "perfect". Now, it may be possible to

1But, cf. *A.H.*, V,xvii,1: "... whose commandment disobeying we have become enemies to Him."

2Cf. Gustaf Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation*, trans. Ross Mackenzie, (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959) p. 21: "The affinity between the Son and man and the distinction between them are part of the same reality, and both the distance between them and the bond which unites them are expressed by saying that man is created in the *imago* and *similitudo* of the Son; but it is a better definition simply to say that the Son *is* the *imago* and *similitudo* of God, and that man is *created in* God's *imago* and *similitudo.*"
resolve the question by subsuming it beneath the concept of man's potential and destiny to grow.¹

The distinction which was noted in Section b. regarding the perfection or imperfection of Adam was necessarily irreconcilable apart from a core or centering motif. For instance, it seemed inappropriate to state on the one hand that that which had been created by God could be anything less than perfect. Adam was "innocent," (Proof 14); he received from God his very being, (A.H., IV,xx,1); he wore the "robe of holiness," (A.H., III,xxiii,5); he was free and had power of discernment, (A.H., IV,xxxvii,1). But, as over against this "perfection" there was noted material which seemed to speak of something less: "Could not God render man perfect from the beginning?" (A.H., IV,xxxviii,1); God "was aware of man's infirmity," (A.H., IV,xxxviii,4); there was the distinction between the lesser gift of "inbreathing" and the greater gift of "spirit," (A.H., V,xii,1 and 2). The core motif by which the apparent contradiction between perfection/imperfection may be reconciled is Irenaeus' concept of the child, and the provision for the child's growth. That reconciliation will, in turn, provide the means by which to interpret his doctrine of the imago and the similitudo toward, in, or for which man is created.

On the subject of the future toward which man was created, Irenaeus says:

¹Cf. Gustaf Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, pp. 26-38, and Lawson, Bib. TheoL. Iren., especially p. 213 where he states: "This vital distinction i.e., between the perfection of the infant and that of the saint is, ... not far from being implied by what is said of Adam as on the one hand perfect, and on the other hand possessed only of the destiny and equipment to perfection. This distinction, if brought to the study of Irenaeus, certainly lights up his work."
... by Paul ... Adam is called 'the figure of Him which is to come:' (Rom. 5:14) as though the Word, Who framed all things, had formed before hand with a view to Himself that Economy of Mankind, which was to centre in the Son of God; God forming first of all the natural man \( \text{animale hominis} \) to the end that he might by saved by the spiritual \( \text{spiritualis} \).

The assertion that from the very beginning of the formation of man there was that toward which he was oriented is unmistakable. The Son of Man is the "spiritual" man toward which man is being created, and according to which he is related as the natural man. According to a later reference, the mortal's (natural man's) transformation into the immortal (perfect man) is by means of absorption, the conclusion of which is that "... man should be made in the image and likeness of God."\(^2\) Irenaeus's juxtaposition of God's intention and man's tribulation, i.e., the process toward that which God intends, is reflected in the following:

And for this cause in all time, Man who was framed in the beginning by the hands of God, i.e., of the Son and Spirit, is being made \( \text{fit} \) after the Image and Similitude of God, by the casting away of the chaff, that is the Apostasy \( \text{apostasia} \), and by the gathering into the garner of the Wheat, that is of such as by faith bear fruit unto God. And therefore is tribulation necessary \( \text{necessaria} \) for such as are saved, that being in a manner bruised, and beaten small, and by patience kneaded up with the Word of God, and put into the fire, they may be meet for the King's Banquet: ... \(^3\)

The source or origin of that "chaff", the Apostasy of man, is not the question here; but we have previously been informed that it relates to man's participation in the rebellion from God which was introduced by the Devil, and for which the Devil more than man was cursed.

\(^1\)A.H. III,xxii,3.
\(^2\)A.H., IV,xxxviii,5, (Ital. mine) and cf. A.H., IV,xxxix,2, quoted p. 52, n. 1.
\(^3\)A.H., V,xxvii,4,(Ital. mine).
That is, however, only a secondary question at this time; the primary concern is to note how firmly Irenaeus asserts that the Apostasy has not "fractured" or destroyed the process by which man is being made after God’s Image and Likeness. Tribulation within the process of growth is, according to Irenaeus, "necessary". However, its "necessity" is the result of rebellion, not creation.¹ Subsequent to man's departure from God, and the introduction of mortality, one notes the fact that God does not so much punish by means of tribulation, but rather and more so utilizes it to effect His purpose, i.e., making man in His image and likeness.

As compared with that man who struggles amidst tribulation toward his intended completion, Irenaeus speaks of the perfect man:

... from the beginning of our formation in Adam, the inspiration of life which was of God, being united to that which He had moulded animated man, and exhibited him a rational animal; so in the end the Word of the Father, and the Spirit of God, being united to the old substance of Adam's formation, wrought out a living and perfect Man, ... For at no time did Adam escape from under the Hands of God, ... ²

The "inspiration of life" to which Irenaeus here refers is the "breath of life" which God "breathed into his face."³ "For", says Irenaeus, "the breath of life, the result of which is the natural man, is one thing, and the quickening Spirit, which makes him also spiritual, is another thing."⁴ As men we all consist, says Irenaeus, of a "... body received of the earth, and of a soul receiving breath from God, ..."⁵ But, the union of the body and soul, the flesh and the

¹Cf. Proof, 15, and A.H., IV,xxxix,1.
²A.H., V,i,3. ³Proof, 11.
⁴A.H., V,xii,1, and cf. supra, pp. 63f.
⁵A.H., III,xii,1.
"inbreathing", do not make the perfect man.\(^1\)

... God will be glorified in His own creature, moulding it in conformity and correspondence with His own Son. For by the Hands of the Father, i.e., by the Son and the Spirit, Man is made after the Image of God: man, not a part of man. Now the Soul and Spirit may be part of man, but man they cannot be: the Perfect Man being a certain mingling and uniting of the soul, receiving the Spirit of the Father: which mixture is blended also with that flesh, which is moulded according to the Image of God.\(^2\)

If it could be shown that Irenaeus propounded a doctrine in which man was originally, initially, created as the image and likeness of God, it would be apparent that subsequent formulations, i.e., regarding sin ("fall") and salvation would have to proceed on that basis; anthropology would have to reconcile itself to that particular conformation or configuration. Irenaeus does in fact specifically state that Christ's incarnation was in order "... that what we had lost in Adam, i.e., our being in the image and likeness of God, that we might recover in Christ Jesus."\(^3\) And again the Lord's coming was to the "lost sheep" "... who had been made in His image and likeness, ... ."\(^4\)

In reference to this pole in Irenaeus' thought, i.e., the original endowment of the image and likeness, Lawson says, "It is clear that S. Irenaeus is powerfully prompted to speak of salvation as the restoration of something lost in

\(^1\)Cf. A.H., V,vi,1: "For neither is the formation of the flesh itself by itself a perfect man, but it is the body of man, and a part of man: - even as the soul for its part is not the man, itself by itself, but it is the soul of man, and a part of man: - nor is the spirit the man, for it is called spirit, and not man: - but the blending and union of all these makes out the perfect Man."

\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)A.H., III,xviii,1,(Ital. mine).

\(^4\)A.H., III,xxiii,1,(Ital. mine).
the Fall." However, that this is the major or principal pole is
doubtful; it appears that within the context of soteriology Irenaeus
deviates from his own model of the Adamic child concept in order to
emphasize the critical centrality of the Incarnation as the saving
event.  

These explicit references to lost-ness represent one facet of
Irenaeus' system. Alternately, however, Irenaeus' consistently asserted
concept of man's creation toward the image and likeness, from childhood
to manhood, serves admirably and adequately to reconcile whatever
apparent tensions and contradictions there may seem to be between never-
having-had on the one hand, and having-lost on the other.  

It now seems apparent that Irenaeus' characterization of man's
trichotomous nature is primarily for the purpose of articulating man's
growth-toward-Image, and only secondarily is it employed within the
creation/fall construct. Having concluded that the former (i.e., never-
having-had) is his major orientation, it becomes less critical to attempt
to establish precisely the relation of the Spirit to the flesh and soul,
or the relation of the Spirit to inbreathing. That is to say, if having-
had and subsequent having-lost is not the constitutive motif, then the
specificity of body-soul-Spirit relation is proportionately diminished.  

1Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 212. Cited in longer form, supra,
p. 64, n. 2.  

2Because soteriology is not the subject of this thesis it will not
be necessary to comment on the question whether or not soteriology is
dependent upon a doctrine of catastrophic fall, that is, whether or not
something has to have been lost in order to articulate salvation. We
simply note that this was a technique employed by Irenaeus, though it was
neither the only nor the major one.  

Ltd, 1953), Hereafter: The Image, p. 75 wherein he asserts Irenaeus'
compatibility to traditional Western theological interpretation of "lost"
That is not, however, to imply that the issue becomes totally irrelevant. David Cairns concludes that of the main Irenaean texts dealing with the distinction between Image and Likeness and their respective history in terms of the Fall, it remains impossible to draw an unambiguous conclusion. "... five of the six passages", says Cairns, "neither support nor contradict the view usually assigned to Irenaeus, that the likeness was lost at the Fall, while the image remains." It might be suggested and "fall", and also Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 209, who says that Irenaeus can "... on occasion give the appearance of denying his doctrine of 'the childhood of Adam'." And Ibid., p. 203: "The _Similitudo Dei, in original man was... an accident, i.e., not an element necessary to human nature, but that which could be lost. It is this divine quality which the Logos restores."

It would appear that of the three terms, (i.e., body(flesh), soul, and spirit), only the first has not been subject to disparate interpretation by Irenaeus scholars. Irenaeus has indeed invited disagreement as regards the precise meaning of the latter two, and their relationship both to each other, and also their association with the terms image and likeness. In A_H., V, xii, Irenaeus stated that the "old life" "... had been given, not by the Spirit, but by the inbreathing." And in the following paragraph, (V,xii,2) he asserted that "... it was meet that men should first be formed, the flesh7 and being formed should receive a soul, and so afterwards receive the Communion of the Spirit. Wherefore also 'the first Adam was made' by the Lord 'a living soul, the second Adam a quickening spirit.'" (I Cor. 15:45). He had already stated, however, in V,vi,1 that "If on the other hand the spirit is wanting to the soul, such an one is truly an Animal Man, and as being left carnal, will be imperfect; having indeed the Image in his form, but not assuming the Likeness by the Spirit." Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., pp. 204-05) enters the debate regarding the distinction of Image and Likeness and, while agreeing that the Hebrew construction implies a parallelism, he aligns himself with Brunner of whom he says in respect to the latter's application of the differentiated terms: "Here is a simple and brilliant solution of the central problem of anthropology." (p. 205) That may be true, but whether this was the intention of Irenaeus seems debatable.

The five passages which he cites in the note are: A_H., III,xxiii,1; III,xxiii,2; IV,xxxviii,3; IV,xxxviii,4; and V,1,3. The sixth passage to which he refers is III, xviii,1, and the pertinent portion reads: "... He summed up in Himself the long explanations of men, in one brief work achieving salvation for us; that what we had lost in Adam, i.e., our being in the image and likeness of God, that we might recover in Christ Jesus." Another text
again, therefore, that even if Irenaeus' principle of childhood and
growth is allowed to serve as the core concept, it will be difficult to
assert either conclusion unambiguously. Nevertheless, because his use
especially of the term, likeness, is more relational and dynamic than
substantialist and static, one could reasonably incline toward the
unification of the two terms.¹

which would seem to be critical to the discussion is A.H., V,xvi,2;
Cairns does cite it, (pp. 76-77) but in another context, i.e., in relation
to the visible, tangible, human nature of Christ's incarnation. As
it relates, however, also to our consideration of Image and Likeness
it should be noted that Irenaeus there says: "... in the former times
it was said indeed that Man was made in the Image of God, but it was
not revealed. For the Word was yet invisible, after Whose Image Man
had been made. And for this cause, you see, he easily cast off also
the resemblance of Him. But when the Word of God became flesh,
He made both good. For He both truly revealed the Image, Himself having
become that very Thing, which the Image of Him was: and He firmly es-
established the resemblance, by causing man to partake of His own com-
plete likeness to the Invisible Father, through the Visible Word." What
is so strongly implied here is that first, Christ is both the
Image and Likeness and second, that man is after the Image and Like-
ness. Neither Image nor Likeness, it may finally have to be stated,
belonged to man as a possession. Likeness, especially, is a relational
term, not a substantialist one. And cf. A.H., V,i,1 as a supportive refer-
cence.

¹Cf. G. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, p. 157: "As soon
as we make the distinction between natural and supernatural the basis
of our thinking, human and divine will be sharply divided, and the
somewhat naive transitions from body to Spirit, which are characteristic
of Irenaeus, will be lost. We can see a typical illustration of such
a misrepresentation of Irenaeus in the dogmatic historians who refuse
to see imago and similitudo as constituting a unity, and instead
attempt to give the term imago one meaning and similitudo another.
Irenaeus speaks of 'imago et similitudo' in an overwhelming number of
expressions as constituting a unity. Were there not a scholastic
tradition of medieval origin which separated imago and similitudo
into two distinct concepts, no theologian today would have thought
of separating these two terms in Irenaeus." Nevertheless, Brunner
who otherwise speaks favorably of Irenaeus' system asserts that the
imago similitudo distinction first occurs in Irenaeus - Brunner,
Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939),
pp. 504 ff.
c.3. Man's Growth Toward Perfection

The concept of man's growth from childhood to perfection has been introduced (supra, section b.1., where the perspective was primarily that of growth as intentionality). But now, in a more precise way, it is possible to articulate growth in relation to the Image and Likeness in or after which man is created from the perspective of its actuality. It will become increasingly apparent because of Irenaeus' child concept, the question regarding the fate of the image and likeness at the Fall assumes a particular connotation which is unfamilial and somewhat alien in the West. Because his concepts of man's growth are integrally related to the child construct of growth-toward-image, a study of Irenaeus' interpretation of man and his growth will cast additional light on his interpretation of the *imago Dei.*¹

Growth, for Irenaeus, is cast firmly within the context of grace; his was emphatically not a theory of the innate potential toward man's progress which characterized the Age of Enlightenment; nor, on the other hand, would Irenaeus' theology be compatible with, i.e., the Augustinian concept of grace as a *donum superadditum.* The dynamic and relational constitution of grace toward growth is clearly articulated thus:

... since both the Hand of God is truly and plainly exhibited, whereby Adam first and afterwards we are framed; there being also but one and the same Father, Whose Voice from the beginning to the end is present with His Creature; and the substance of our frame being clearly indicated by the Gospel: we are not now to seek for any other Father than This; ...: nor any other Hand of God, but this, which from beginning to end fashions and frames us unto life,

¹Unless specifically stated otherwise, the subsequent use of the term *imago Dei* will include both image and likeness, and similarly so will the word image, and the phrase, image of God.
and is present with Its own creature, and completes it after the Image and Likeness of God.¹

The Hand, or Hands of God, are creatively active from the beginning, fashioning and framing man unto life; this is God's dynamic presence of grace, completing His creation after the Image and Likeness. It would seem apparent that a concept of growth is meaningful only on the presupposition that there is something as yet incomplete. It would also seem apparent that of the various possibilities available to articulate the means by which completion is effected, Irenaeus associates himself strongly on the side of the operation of grace. "... the entire grace of the Spirit, ..." says Irenaeus, "... will render us like unto Him similes nos ei efficiet², and perfect us, by the will of the Father: for it will make man to be after the image and likeness of God."² Like unto Him; this is the center. This is the intention and potential of the imago Dei - to be like God.

But man is always, in a sense, "on the way". And the conclusion of his becoming, the consummation of his goal is not so much to be discovered in terms of what man is to be, but rather the process of his becoming. It is in respect to that latter referent that one recognizes the centrality of Irenaeus' relational constructs, i.e., image and likeness. Although Irenaeus may occasionally use terminology of substance, e.g., "structure", "clay", and "being made", his categories are primarily dynamic and relational.³ For, as Irenaeus states: "If therefore thou present unto Him what is thine, i.e., faith towards Him and allegiance; thou wilt receive His skill, and wilt be a perfect work

¹A.H., V,xvi,1. ²A.H., V,viii,1. ³Cf. supra, pp. 51f., especially p. 52, n.1.
of God. It would seem fair to conclude that to be a "perfect work of God" is primarily the specification of the process of man's becoming, and not the specification of his being. That is to say, Irenaeus' terminology and interpretations are amenable to relational and dynamic structures, and conversely, they do not readily conform to language which signifies man's substance.

According to Irenaeus man's growth toward perfection requires man's participation by struggle; that which God has for man by way of His intention is not simply bestowed upon him. Man's sense of appreciation is enhanced by what he calls "anxious toil". Even our love for God, he says, "... the Lord taught us to obtain ... with labour, and the Apostle handed on the lesson." But what, it might be asked, is man's experience and struggle intended to teach and produce? Irenaeus' commentary on I Cor. 1:29 provides an answer, concentrating on the values of humility, gratitude and dependence:

So may he always continue glorifying God, and incessantly giving thanks for the salvation which he hath obtained from Him: 'That no flesh may glory before' (I Cor. 1:29) the Lord, nor man ever entertain the thought concerning God, so as to account the incorruption which he has to be his own by nature, and to be tossed about by empty arrogance, not holding the truth, - as though he by nature resembled God. For this, rather making him ungrateful to his Maker, did both obscure the love which God had towards man and blind his understanding that he might not think worthily of God; comparing and judging himself equal to God.

This therefore was God's long suffering, in order that Man passing through all things, and acquiring moral knowledge, and so coming to the resurrection from the dead, and learning by actual assay what he was delivered from, might ever be grateful to the Lord: having won of Him the gift of incorruption, that he might love Him more; ... that he might know himself, his mortality and weakness, and might understand concerning God, how that

1 A.H., IV,xxxix,2.

2 A.H., IV,xxxvii,7. The reference to the Apostle's lesson is I Cor. 9:24-27.
He is in such sort immortal and powerful, as to give both immortality to the mortal being, and to the temporal eternity: ... 

The immortality of which Irenaeus speaks pertains specifically to categories of relation, and apparently has no proper reference to "nature" i.e., that which belongs to man as a substance. It was, Irenaeus says, that specious assumption that engendered man's ingratitude, obscured God's love, and blinded his understanding. Our question's answer, therefore, is discovered within the proper understanding of immortality: it is that for which man struggles; it is the intended goal of God for His creation; it is the form of the imago Dei. 2 The labor and struggle of man toward his goal, including apparently all dimensions of his toil, are inherently and integrally related to this proper consummation. "... there is one salvation and one God:" says Irenaeus, "but the precepts which form man are many, and the steps not few, which lead man unto God." 3

Toil, struggle, labor - these are themselves indications of two realities: one, that man's life is not unambiguous or uni-form, and indications to the contrary are at best only relative; two, they are symptomatic of man's historical dissatisfaction, his insatiable longing for the "absolute" - whatever form the absolute may assume for each. Although it was not Irenaeus' intention to imply that man's struggle, as man, would eventually merit the prize of immortality, nevertheless man's historical dissatisfaction represents a theological component. It is

1 A.H., III,xx,1 and 2.

2 In this construction, Jesus is understood as the personification of personal relation, which relation in turn is immortality, an eternal participation in Him who is Eternity.

3 A.H., IV,i,3.
doubtful, in fact, that one could derive from Irenaeus a doctrine of man, as man, if that implies the possibility of presenting and interpreting an absolutely, totally self-centered man. According to Irenaeus, God relates Himself to man and it is this relation of God that is the sine qua non of man- hood. The following reference is illustrative:

And herein God differs from man, that God indeed maketh, but man is made: and while He that maketh is always the Same, that which is made must be capable of a beginning and of a middle, of addition and growth. ... And whereas God is perfect in all things, Himself equal and like unto Himself, ...: man on the other hand receives improvement and growth towards God. For just as God is always the Same, so man also, being found in God, will continually get on towards God: since neither doth God ever grow slack in benefitting and enriching man, nor doth man cease to receive the benefit and to be enriched by God.¹

Of this reference Hitchcock says: "This essential difference between man and God lies at the root of the gradual method of the Divine education of man, and is the source of man's perpetual aspiration after perfection and God."² It is the "difference" that creates the possibility of "likeness". Man is, obviously, different from God; therefore, able to be an image of God. But, being different from God is not being contrary to God. There is neither identification (pantheism) nor absolute distinction (Deism), and any doctrine that inclines toward either extreme represents a misunderstanding of the imago Dei as interpreted by Irenaeus.

It is absolutely essential that the difference between God and man remain, at least within that which we call historical existence. The difference perpetuates man's impetus toward growth. An eradication of the difference (which is impossible) would simultaneously result in the elimination of that toward which man is challenged to grow;

¹A.H., IV,xi,2. ²Iren. Lugdunum, pp. 52-3.
consequently, man would then cease to be man. And that would be an annihilation of the \textit{imago Dei}.\footnote{Cf. A.H., IV,xx,7: the Word "... guards the invisibility of the Father, lest at any time man should become a despiser of God, and that he might always have something to grow towards, ... "}

c.4. The \textit{Image} and \textit{Recapitulation}

One facet of Irenaean theology remains to be considered in order to complete our consideration of the image concept, i.e., Irenaeus' doctrine of recapitulation.\footnote{Cf. Lawson's summary of Molwitz's \textit{De ANAEBEMAAGENIS in Irenaei Theologia Potestate}, (Dresden, 1874), which reads: "\textit{κηφόλων} is that in which the parts of a thing have unity, the whole containing the parts. \textit{κηφόλων} expresses the action by which anything comes to its \textit{κηφόλων}. In the verb \textit{ἀνακηφολισθε} the preposition \textit{ον} has not the proper sense of \textit{sursum}, 'upwards', but of the Latin \textit{re}. \textit{ἀνακηφολισθε} means, 'to collect together again'."- \textit{Bib. Theol. Iren.}, p. 140. However, we have suggested that Irenaeus' use means more than that - more than a re-collection. His interpretation of Christ's work of completion suggests the factor of \textit{sursum}.} Although certain references which will be introduced may impinge on the previously considered question of man's "original" nature, and what may or may not have been "lost", that debate will not be continued. Rather, the resolution of the question will be presupposed on the basis of Irenaeus' child-in-growth-toward-Image concept. The concept of recapitulation for Irenaeus was established primarily within a Christological orientation; our endeavor however will be primarily directed toward a greater understanding of the \textit{imago Dei} from an anthropological perspective. That is to say, Irenaeus might have approached the question thus: who is it that recapitulates? That question may be altered thus: who is it that is recapitulated? Noting that shift in perspective will hopefully justify the omission of otherwise essential comment and criticism, i.e., the relation of the human and divine natures of Christ.
The creation of man is imbued with a future perspective, according to Irenaeus. It therefore seems entirely consistent that sin should be interpreted in the light of the greater reality of recapitulation. Redemption, it would appear, is a necessary implicate of creation,¹ and not merely that by which God manages to rectify and re-order that which has been destroyed by the "fall". Irenaeus states it thus:

... the Lord, taking clay out of the earth, formed man: and for his sake was the whole arrangement about the Lord's coming. He therefore had Himself also Flesh and Blood: gathering up as He was in Himself not some other creation, but that original one of the Father: seeking out that which had perished.²

Christ gathered up (recapitulated) in Himself flesh and blood by Himself becoming that which God had formed in the beginning. The manifest implication is that there is no absolute incompatibility inherent between that which man was (can we also say, is?) and that which Christ gathered into Himself. It was for man's sake, and it was as man that Christ effected the recapitulation, although indeed it was as man who was the Image, and therefore somehow different from man who was recapitulated.³ That very "difference" however may too readily be interpreted as "distinction"; this is not Irenaeus' clear intention.⁴

¹Cf. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, p. 84: "Irenaeus holds Creation and the Incarnation together."
²Α.Η., V,xiv,2.
⁴Cf. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, pp. 122-32, and especially p. 126 where he offers significant support for the assertion above: "If we conceive of man as being static and unmoved, perfectly developed and good, complete in every respect at the beginning of Creation, but having suffered some sort of loss at the Fall, then man's recapitulation in the Incarnation means that the same perfect substance is again present in Creation. ... In actual fact Irenaeus is continually thinking in terms of action and function. Man in Creation is in the process of development
It would not seem unjustified to interpret his words, "seeking out that which had perished", (supra) as meaning not that some substance initially inherent in creation had perished and was now being sought out, or re-created, but rather that Adam's initial growth-toward-image had been arrested in his childhood, and was now restored to him in Christ.¹

... that we consist of a body received of the earth, and of a soul receiving breath from God, every person whatever will confess. This therefore the Word of God was made, gathering up the work of His own Hands unto Himself: ...²

Recapitulation which was the work of God's Word is a universal work; man is the work of God's Hands and we have not noted that Irenaeus attempts to specify certain sorts or classifications of men for salvation to the exclusion of others.³ Adam assumes the proportions of a universal archetype.⁴ However, the universality of man's growth-toward-image has

- he is a growing child with a destiny towards which he is moving. Man's recapitulation is renewed growth. The function of Creation reappears."

And cf. Man and the Incarnation, p. 106: "Divine nature is the antithesis of human nature only when we have conceived of a deistic, transcendent, and static God to whom the Incarnation is something alien."

¹Cf. Wingren who in many sections develops the "child" concept in respect to the Image, and note especially: "Man, like every other thing, is created in the Son and the Spirit, i.e., he has been formed by God's own hands, but he is different from the rest of Creation in that in addition he was created in order to become like God - to become the very image of God. This is his destiny. Irenaeus does not say that he is this image, nor was this destiny wholly realised in Creation before sin entered into the world, because man was a child. This means, in part, that man has not arrived at his appointed destiny in Creation, but it also means that, if he grew up to maturity without being confused by his adversary, he would reach the end which has been ordained for him by God." Man and the Incarnation, p. 20.

²A.H., III,xxi,1.


⁴Cf. A.H., III,xxiii,2: "Now upon the salvation of man it follows that the first-formed man should be saved. It being too absurd to say that he who was grievously hurt by the enemy, and first suffered captivity
suffered a fragmentation; image specifies one-ness and community or communion, and these in turn relate to Irenaeus' understanding of immortality. Death, however, has intervened and disrupted the intended progression toward Image (immortal communion). The purpose and function of recapitulation in respect to this universal convolution, the perverse distortion of the circle of communion, is to re-unite and re-establish the structures of growth-toward-image.¹ The Spirit is spoken of as one ... bringing back distant tribes into unity, and offering to the Father the first-fruits of all nations. Wherefore also the Lord promised to send the Paraclete, to unite us to God. For as out of dry wheat one mass or one loaf cannot be made without moisture; so neither could we many be made one in Christ Jesus, without the water which is from Heaven. And as dry earth, except it receive moisture, bears no fruit; so we also, being in the first place a dry tree, could never have become fruitful of life, without the spontaneous rain from above. For our bodies by the Laver received that Unity which leads to incorruption, but our souls by the Spirit. And so both are necessary, since both are profitable for the life of God:...²

Man, the recipient of recapitulation, is the "distant tribe," the "dry wheat" who, in his sin, has attentuated his own movement toward becoming, and remains, it would appear, the raw material with and for which the Hands of God work. However, it is with such tribes and such wheat that the hands do work; it is not as though it were necessary for

¹Words chosen to articulate the "problem", i.e., what is normally meant by "fall", will hopefully not imply that the "distortion" is absolute, i.e., that sin has destroyed the structures of communion. Irenaeus surely intended to preserve and maintain his child-toward-growth concept which the "injury" did not annihilate.

²AH., III,xvii,2.
there to be some new and qualitatively different creation. Who would want to say, for instance, that the dry tree could "become fruitful of life"? But then, on the other hand, who would venture to suggest that the fruit of life could be produced without the tree? Irenaeus prefers images that imply lack, incompleteness— not those that intend re-creation.¹ We recall the reference which states: "... at no time did Adam escape from under the Hands of God, ... . And therefore in the end, ... did His Hands work out a Living Man, to be an Adam, after the Image and Likeness of God."² Christ, the recapitulator, "... the Word which was in the beginning with God, ... , Who also was ever present with mankind; ..."³ did not reject man whom He found, nor initiate some other creation. He incorporated humanity into Himself, and in so doing effected the completion of the imago Dei with and for man.⁴

Christ's "... connexion with either side, to gather both into friendship and concord: ..."⁵ refers specifically to both sides, God and man, and their unification in Christ is, according to Irenaeus, an indication of the basic complementariness of both.⁶ At least this may

¹By re-creation is implied that which might approach another creatio ex nihilo wherein God is considered to have in effect, if not in fact, abandoned that first creation because of its failure.

²A.H., V, i, 3. ³A.H., III, xviii, 1.

⁴Cf. Hans Von Campenhausen, The Fathers of the Greek Church, trans. and revised, L.A. Garrard, (London: A. and C. Black, 1963) p. 21: "Redemption does not cancel out, but leads transcendently beyond, Creation. Irenaeus is not urging a cheap belief in progress. Everything in his thought is concerned with the new relationship of sonship which Christ has established. But it is one and the same God who in his triune power fulfils all things and leads the world and mankind to eternal perfection, ... ."

⁵A.H., III, xviii, 7.

⁶Cf. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, p. xiii: "... the connexion between man and Christ which Irenaeus makes excludes any conception of God and man being in opposition to one another."
be ascertained when one departs from a substantialist mode of thought. For on relational presuppositions there appears to be no basic incompatibility between the two parties. The *imago Dei* is the foundational structure within which man has been created, and it is that structure which is the precondition of the eventual incarnation of the image. "For how could we", Irenaeus asks, "be partakers of His 'adoption of sons', (Gal. 4:5) had we not received from Him by the Son, the Communion which is with Him: - had not His Word made Flesh, come into Communion with us?"¹

Recapitulation from the anthropological perspective is becoming increasingly comprehensive. His coming into communion with us, mentioned above, is not to be minimized, but taken as an affirmation that man is potentially conformable to God by means of the image structure.²

A full and complete consideration of Irenaeus' interpretation of the historical existence of the recapitulated man would carry us into the field of ecclesiology and soteriology, which is beyond the scope of our thesis. Still, a brief comment on that subject will suffice to illustrate the "shape" of that existence and life. What Irenaeus asserts about the life of the recapitulated man appears to grow logically and consistently from the presuppositions with which he has operated thus far. That is to say, one notes no radical disjunction between the basic structures of existence; the *imago Dei*, now complete in Jesus Christ, bears the same ontological structure as is reflected in man before the

¹A.H., III,xviii,7.

²Cf. A.H., III,xix,1 where we note a further elaboration on the same subject of adoption and union, including both man and God: "... the Word of God was made man, ..., that man blended with God's Word, and receiving the adoption, might become the Son of God." Or, "... how could we be united to incorruption and immortality, without Incorruption and Immortality being first made that which we are?"
incarnation. Because the devil, says Irenaeus, at first persuaded man to break the precept of his Maker, he had him accordingly in his own Power: which Power is transgression and Apostasy, and by these he bound the Man -- it was also meet that he on the contrary should through Man be overcome and bound with the same chains, wherewith he bound the man: that Man, being loosed, might return unto the Lord, leaving to him the chains wherewith he had been himself bound, i.e., transgression ... And while he was justly led captive, who had led man captive unjustly; man, who had before been led captive, was withdrawn from his possessor's power, by the Mercy of God the Father: who pitied His own handy work [sic?] and gave it salvation, renewing it by the Word, i.e., by Christ: that man might learn by actual trial, how that not of himself but by free gift of God he receiveth incorruption.¹

Transgression and apostasy, which are mentioned by Irenaeus, are apparently to be considered extrinsic to the essence of man; however, they are on that basis no less formidable, for "Power" effectively conquers and captivates man. And yet Irenaeus does not infer that such power inverts the center of man's ontological structure of relationship, i.e. imago Dei. We note, consequently, that Irenaeus consistently includes terminology which affirms Christ's Man- hood in reference to His saving work: it was proper that the devil "... should through Man be overcome and bound ...;" (supra).²

d. Summary, Appraisal, and Implications³

Our methodological procedure, stated on the first page, i.e., to examine "... St. Irenaeus' treatment of the imago Dei ..." as it relates to the principle of co-inherence (explicated in the Introduction), was constructed and utilized toward the achievement of two purposes:

¹A. H., V,xxi,3. ²And cf. A. H., V,xxi,1; IV,xx,4; III,xix,1.
³We wish to point out that inasmuch as Irenaean theology is, in our estimation, more compatible with tendencies indicated in the introduction, more emphasis will be placed on implications derived than may normally be allowable. That is, we will take the liberty of being more subjective in this final section than, e.g., in our summary of St. Augustine.
first, to establish workable limits of responsibility. Our second objective was, having discovered an interpretive principle, to develop a reasonably concise working definition of the *imago Dei*. Establishing limits (and assuming that those limits were not unfairly arbitrary) has made it possible to ascertain Irenaeus' interpretation of the image of God, without in the process professing a thorough, complete, interpretation of Irenaean theology. Preliminarily stated, it would appear that the relationship between the super-imposed principle of co-inherence and the internal Irenaean concept of the *imago Dei* are quite consonant.

Our presuppositions have admittedly circumscribed the dimensions of this chapter, but no less is that true of the very nature of Irenaeus' own theological perspective. His primary category appears to be God and Creation-toward-recapitulation. That is somewhat more extensive than the narrower *imago Dei* as a symbol of the God-man co-inherence, but nevertheless in all primary respects compatible. The conjunction of the two categories has suggested the consideration of the various related themes, i.e., *creatio ex nihilo*, the nature and person of God and His relation with man, man as understood in respect to God's intention, and attendantly, perfection/imperfection and the *imago Dei* in relation to sin, growth and recapitulation. Because these are the themes and concepts around which this thesis will develop, it seems in order to begin to draw out and amplify some of their implications. However, what is offered here will only be the beginning; reduction of some, expansion of other will be appropriate in subsequent sections of the thesis.

Irenaeus, in his refutation of Gnostic dualism, emphatically affirmed the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, and in his utilization of the doctrine clearly enunciated two critical themes; one, the "difference"
between Creator and creation, and two, creation's dependence upon the Creator. Because, however, creatio ex nihilo was understood by St. Irenaeus as primarily that which specified the solitary sovereignty of God, and not a metaphysical-philosophical construction, he was able to utilize the doctrine toward his understanding of the closest possible relation of the two, God and man. This does not destroy difference; indeed, the difference between the two parties becomes a critical integer in the subsequent development of his doctrine of recapitulation. The difference between a God who creates ex nihilo and that which is created is maintained by Irenaeus, but not in such fashion that the difference becomes "distinction". Creation out of nothing is a creation which is "beneath", and "inferior". (cf. supra, pp. 38f.). These adjectives of subordination specify exclusively a creation-God construct, and not some other referent, i.e., the present created order as opposed to an original paradisial existence.

Following the section on Creatio ex nihilo we introduced Irenaeus' interpretation of the Trinity. Our concern was not an inclusive one, that is, to fully develop his trinitarian theology which would have been superfluous to this thesis. Rather, our intention was primarily to discover the point of contact, that by which his doctrine of the Trinity might impinge on his development of the imago Dei theme. And we noted that even though his was not a systematic presentation of the intra-trinitarian structure and therefore lacked the precision that is mandatory for the accomplishment of that endeavour, he nevertheless offered some significant material related to the development of our theme.

The subsection a.3., "His 'Hands'", was a discussion of the Trinity from the perspective of its orientation toward creation. While
intra-trinitarian structures and relations are not within the scope of this thesis, the Trinity's activity and association with man is central. And Irenaeus' concept of the Spirit and the Son as the ever-working and present Hands of God becomes a convenient concept toward the accomplishment of two ends: one, to speak of the trinitarian nature of God as specifically and uniformly orientated toward creation, especially man, and two, to further explicate the *imago Dei* as the center of man upon and within which the Hands are eternally operative. Irenaeus' development of the "Hands" theme enabled Hitchcock to deduce that his was a doctrine that explicated on the one hand the co-equality of the three-fold Personality, but on the other as "... admitting of historical subordination as touching the Divine Office."¹ The divine office may be considered as the divine economy, for this is the context within which Irenaeus' contribution is most significant and most instructive toward the understanding of the inherency of God with man.

The second factor noted above, i.e., the explication of the *imago Dei* as the locus of the Hand's operation, or sphere of influence, is integrally related to Irenaeus' concept of man's childhood. The suitability of the "Hands" metaphor should be discussed before we return to the theme of man's "childhood". One could conclude that his term "Hand" connotes or implies inferences of manipulation, and that therefore the term will not serve satisfactorily in a further development of the image of God theme. Apparently, at one time (e.g. for Irenaeus) the term was quite readily understood metaphorically, and as a literary device, whereas the same term for us may convey crass anthropomorphic

connotations. Nevertheless, that which is implied by Irenaeus is well worth preserving, namely, that the being of man is circumscribed by the presence and operation of God Himself. It may subsequently be appropriate to propose an alternative term for "Hands", one which will be unencumbered by substantialist and anthropomorphic overtones. But, at the same time, it would seem advisable to retain, and even enlarge upon the interrelatedness denoted by the term.

Any term which may be proposed will have to reflect not only the Irenaean conceptualization of the "difference" and otherness between God and man which is a necessary implicate of creatio ex nihilo, but also the Scriptural witness in respect of that relation, i.e., Job's lamentation within the context of his recognition of that difference. Moreover, an alternative term should ideally be compatible with categories of personal relation. That criterion simultaneously requires specification of both difference and similarity; difference detached from similarity tends toward asymmetry, whereas similarity irrespective of difference approaches identification - neither is acceptable, for both ultimately destroy relation. Irenaeus' term, "Hand", specifies the intimacy of

1Cf. Job, chapters 9 and 10, and especially the following verses: Ch. 9: (2) "how can man be in the right against God?" (5) "He moves the mountains, though they do not know it; he throws them down when he is angry". (14,15) "How dare I plead my cause, then, or choose arguments against him? For he whom I must sue is judge as well". (32, 33) "Yes, I am man, and he is not; and so no argument, no suit between the two of us is possible. There is no arbiter between us, to lay his hand on both," Ch. 10: (3-5) "Is it right for you to injure me, cheapening the work of your hands and abetting the schemes of the wicked? Have you got human eyes, do you see as mankind sees? Is your life mortal like man's, do your years pass as men's days pass?" (9) "You modelled me, remember, as clay is modelled, and would you reduce me now to dust?" (18) "Why did you bring me out of the womb?"
God's direct involvement in the formation and preservation of man.¹ A different term, however, might serve more adequately.

It would seem that the suggested term, co-inherence,² might be an advance, an improvement; it conveys the indispensable quality of intimacy and even though it, in itself, is devoid of personal connotations, it is not basically incompatible with them. Insofar, however, as it may incline toward the dissolution of the essential difference between God and man, it will have to carefully be qualified. That task would not appear to be unreasonably difficult.

Continuing the introduction of the term co-inherence, we acknowledge that it is not, per se, a biblical term. Perhaps the nearest approximation would be that in Acts 17:28 where we read: "... it is in him that we live, and move, and exist, ..." (R.S.V. renders "exist" as "have our being"). Paul's familiar conviction of life in Christ is another case in point: "... and I live now not with my own life but with the life of Christ who lives in me". (Gal. 2:20). "I am the vine, you are the branches. Whoever remains in me, with me in him, bears fruit in plenty," (Jn. 15:5, Ital. mine) is another explicit instance of the quality of inter-relation which may be expressed by co-inherence. Without compounding references at this stage, it would seem that this implication of Scripture might not only warrant, but moreover might even encourage the utilization of the term co-inherence as an attempt to concisely articulate this particular aspect of God's relation with man. We will

¹It should be noted that the Scripture's use of the term, with specific reference to God, is diverse; the metaphor is employed for instance to suggest: power and fear (I Sam. 5:11); inspiration (II Chron. 30:12); blessing (Ezra 8:22, also 7:9 and Neh. 2:8 - where the Jerusalem Bible renders "hand of God" as "kindly favour"); and possession (Ps. 95:4) et al.

return to this topic in the consideration of recapitulation.

The words from Proof, 12 (quoted supra, p. 49) which say: "He would walk round and talk with the man, prefiguring what was to come to pass in the future, ...", (Ital. mine) epitomize an interpretation which will be operative throughout the remainder of this thesis. The implication is clearly that even in the "Garden" there was the anticipation of a future - a future of and for which Paradise was a parable. That is not to say that this was necessarily St. Irenaeus' intention. While his references to and utilization of an interpretation of Paradise are minimal, it has certainly appeared that he did not radically depart from a somewhat historical interpretation of the myth. Consequently, it should not be suggested that his written material dictates a radical de-mythologization, or that a parablic interpretation is entirely compatible with other related material, e.g., the subsequent-to-fall curse of the Serpent.

Irenaeus offers sufficient incentive (cf. supra, b.1.) and support toward the utilization and later elaboration of his child-toward-perfection concept. We noted that the formation and utilization of that theme permitted him optimistically to articulate a dynamic process which was constitutive of the very being of man and which at the same time was a process in which God was integrally and inseparably related. It also became apparent that Irenaeus' utilization of that construct enabled him to develop a theology and an anthropology (The-anthropology) on a foundation firmly established on the principle of God's co-relation with man. Stated negatively, we have suggested that Irenaeus was not committed first to a particular and highly-developed doctrine of sin (fall) upon which, and in reference to, he would subsequently be compelled
to articulate the relation between God and man.

Irenaeus' child-toward-perfection theme also impinges upon the somewhat enigmatic consideration of man's original nature, his primal relation to God, his initial stance in respect to sin/evil - these are questions and considerations that have historically perplexed theology. And they are, in and of themselves, important ones. That is not to say, however, that the currency and prestige which they have enjoyed has been appropriate. As over against an interpretation of man's paradisial perfection, Irenaeus' motif of the childhood of Adam relativizes the significance of the beginning, asserting that that-toward-which man was created to grow represents more fairly (we might say also more Scripturally and reasonably) the locus of man's true being, than for example that from which man has come. ¹ We might simply pose, and leave temporarily unanswered, these two questions: one, is it essential for the theological enterprise that any theory or doctrine of the original status of man be maintained, i.e., that Adam (individual or generic) was or was not morally perfect? Two, if the first is answered in the affirmative, then does Scripture intend, first of all to provide such a doctrine, and secondly, does it accomplish that intention?

The considerations of Adam's perfection/imperfection were explored (supra, b.2., a. & b.) specifically in order to explicate the proper conformation of the man-and-sin environment. Ultimately, what

¹Cf. Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 213: "Irenaeus does not explicitly say that there is one perfection of the infant, innocent, and complete in every faculty appropriate to infancy, and another perfection, which is the crown of the saint who has contended with sin and triumphed. This vital distinction is, however, not far from being implied by what is said of Adam as on the one hand perfect, and on the other hand, as possessed only of the destiny and equipment to perfection."
we want to determine and establish is an adequate (i.e., Scriptural reasonable, and experientially consistent) conceptualization and ordering of the realities: God, man, and sin. Irenaean references have been presented and discussed which explicitly indicated that he did, in fact, maintain a concept of time sequence in the original situation, i.e., an historic "primal innocence" (cf. supra, pp. 54-55) and subsequent fall. However, we also recognized that he exercised reserve in his development and elaboration of that particular doctrine. Because, it would seem, the fall is not the central, the constitutive theme, therefore that which "preceded" was proportionately de-emphasized. Neither the Irenaean nor biblical specification of the goodness of God's creation (in the beginning) should be ignored, but it may be that "good" has more validity in respect to that toward which man grows, i.e., the imago Dei, than as a description of an historic beginning.

Similarly, fruitless theological speculation as regards the entire question of Adam's initial exposure to and experience of sin is to be avoided. Unless there had been or could be developed an unambiguous and compelling theological doctrine relative to the method and nature of the world's origin, and specifically the origin of man, it does not appear either incumbent or appropriate that we should pre-suppose a conclusion based on an assumption that there was an historical and actual condition from which man departed. And therefore, if it is not possible for us to

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1 Cf. Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 219: "We may candidly agree that S. Irenaeus tended to stress those elements in the story [the fall] which serve to extenuate Adam's sin, while the bulk of traditional theologians have strongly emphasized those which condemn. They have blackened the Fall into a crime of such inconceivable heinousness as to merit and justify the conceivably severe punishment of the damnation of the race. However, in the doctrine of 'the childhood of Adam' Irenaeus was far closer to the spirit of the story than was an Augustine or a Calvin".
define and describe the world's and man's origin, neither would it seem possible, nor proper, to speculate upon man's initial confrontation with sin.¹

Consequently, the biblical myth of the fall may aptly remain a myth without concrete, actual, historical referents, and may therefore be released from its captivity to serve again its proper function.² As a further consequence, St. Irenaeus' very seriously constructed scheme descriptive of man's first experience of sin, as well as the attendant consideration of the effects of sin on either the dichotomous or trichotomous nature of man, will be more or less neglected.

The subject of immortality, per se, which according to Irenaeus was offered, lost, and still remains an aspect of man's future completion, will not constitute an explicit and well-defined motif of this thesis. However, a derivative aspect of the subject will be utilized within the development of the concept of man's inherent and intrinsic propensity

¹Professor John Macquarrie's conclusion regarding the consideration of the world's beginning in time is one which seems reasonable and applicable to our question, i.e., that it is "an illustration of the kind of problem that nowadays must be turned over to scientific cosmology". *Principles of Christian Theology*, Study edition, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1966), p. 199. Admittedly, Professor Macquarrie's statement applies specifically to the question of cosmological origins, while our question is that of man's initial confrontation with sin, but we are inclined to say that the two are related insofar as both concepts are beyond the proper sphere of dogmatic theology.

²The "proper" function of the myth is admittedly a subject of widely disparate opinion. And, by "proper" we will not claim, nor hopefully imply, that ours in the only interpretation worth consideration. However, we are suggesting that the propriety of the fall myth is to be determined by its dependent relation to a particular interpretation of the imago Dei. That is to say, the imago Dei will be interpreted primarily as a symbol of co-inherence, and subordinately related to that development the myth of the fall of man may become more intelligible.
for continuation, completion, and satisfaction. These positive implicates of the *imago Dei*, as well as the negative ones (e.g., man's aversion to death, his sense of futility and frustration) seem to deserve further consideration.

The utilization of the Irenaean concept of the childhood of Adam comes particularly to the fore in the consideration of the initial imperfection of Adam, and we noted that certain characteristics of imperfection were entirely commensurate with created man. First, there is the inevitable difference between that which is originate (man) and the unoriginate (God). That difference requires no elaboration. Second, and considerably more to our point, is the assertion that perfection is incompatible with one who has just begun to be (*supra*, section b.1.). If "perfection" implies all things necessary in order that man might one day become that which God intended for him, then "perfection" would seem appropriately ascribed. If, however, the adjective necessarily refers to an initial state of moral pre-eminence, its suitability is questionable.¹ Should it be asserted, for instance, that man in the beginning had the possibility of complete abstainence from sin (moral perfection) which, as non-actualized, required the incarnation as a counter-measure, a remedy for man's failure? It may rather be suggested that the incarnation is more related to completion than to cure, inasmuch as an initial state of moral imperfection seems entirely commensurate with a future oriented

¹Cf. Lawson, *Bib. Theol. Iren.*, p. 213: "The general impression one gets is that S. Irenaeus looked upon Adam and Eve as entirely clean and wholesome, filled with every spiritual promise, and worthy of the God who had created them. They were in a state of salvation, and we can hardly imagine Irenaeus denying that the Holy Spirit rested upon them. In this sense they were 'perfect'. ... At the same time, the first pair were emphatically not the Adam and Eve of much traditional theology. S.
goal. This would, among other things, provide a rationale for time as a construct of development. More importantly perhaps, it would serve as an alternative structure toward an explication of man's relation to Christ. He (Christ) may be more recognizable as one who is Himself the express completion of God's intention, as a representative in whom we are incorporated, than alternately as one who restores man to his lost beginning by becoming our substitute.¹ To understand and to take seriously the purpose for which Adam was created, i.e., to grow into the image of God, is to apprehend the connection, not the disjunction between, Christ and Adam.²

As one proceeds into a consideration of the reality of sin in relation to man in the imago Dei, it should be appreciated that an articulation of a doctrine of sin, though subordinate to the primary category of co-inherence, must not imply its relative insignificance. On the other hand, because the subject of sin is secondary to our development of the imago Dei, and not therefore the main subject of this thesis, we will not attempt to present either a thorough survey, nor a radical departure. However, subordinating sin will necessarily require some degree of re-structuring. Hitchcock's statement is instructive:

Irenaeus did not regard them as possessed of all fullness of intellectual insight and moral experience. These things could only be attained by gradual and, as it actually turned out, by painful growth".

¹Cf. Col. 3:10 - "... you have put on a new self which will progress towards true knowledge the more it is renewed in the image of its creator; ..."); and John 14:20: "... you will understand that I am in my Father and you in me and I in you". But cf. as illustrative of substitution, Is. 53, and I Pet. 2:24-25. Dorothee Sölle's development of the representative concept (Christ the Representative, trans. David Lewis, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967) will be introduced in a subsequent section.

²Cf. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, p. 17.
It was St. Paul's intense sense of his own crime against Christ before his conversion, and his rabbinical training, that gave motive and form respectively to his doctrine of sin. Augustine, in his burning consciousness of his own guilt and of the purity of Christ, and in his speculative transcendentalism, is the follower of St. Paul. But Irenaeus is of the school of S. John. He did not approach the subject from the same standpoint, or with the same depth of feeling and passionate intensity as Augustine, because he had not passed through the terrible experience.¹

The question arises: without the "same depth of feeling" and "passionate intensity" is Irenaeus' doctrine of sin adequate? That is, does it fairly, objectively, and suitably reflect the teaching and intention of Scripture and experience?² Irenaeus speaks of sin within the context of immortality (supra, pp. 67f.) which, as contingent upon the continuation of his "proper" relation with God, was not enjoyed because of man's participation in sin. He also sets sin in relation to obedience; the intention of the conditions placed upon man, and to which he was to remain obedient, was that he continue his life in a particular quality, i.e., love (supra, p. 68). However, it became clear that sin was defined primarily in terminology of injury and disability, and not that of punishment, guilt, and destruction. The so-called adequacy of Irenaeus' doctrine of sin will be determined in respect to that conclusion, and will necessarily be expanded throughout the remainder of this thesis.

The hostile and alien factor which perplexes man (sin) is discernible and interpretable, according to Irenaeus, as it is recognized

¹Hitchcock Iren. Lugdunum, p. 151, and similarly cf. Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., pp. 218-19: "The poetical and intellectual magnificence of Paradise Lost is a lasting monument to the spaciousness of that system of thought which has so often been erected by Christian theologians upon the foundation of the Genesis Fall-story. However, it is clear that the system has actually been an erection upon, and by no means a growth out of, the Bible. It is a momentous example of something read into Scripture."

²We intend no precise equation of Scripture with experience; Scripture is pre-eminent. However, in respect to this particular issue or doctrine we doubt that there is intended a sacrificium intellectus, or contradiction of experience.
in its opposition to God's intention for man, (supra, pp. 73-75). It would appear that we might reasonably conclude from Irenaeus' system that one, Christ, is the image of God; two, man is created to participate in and conform to Him who is the image; three, sin is that which hinders the attainment of God's intention. Clearly, this suggests implications not only for a doctrine of sin, but also for a further understanding of the imago Dei which is our primary concern.

We do not find Irenaeus' treatment of the good effect of sin, i.e., that which by means of tribulation man is prepared for the King's Banquet (supra, p. 74, A.H., V,xxviii,4), especially advantageous as a method of explicating the doctrine. However, that he does not emphatically assert that sin is that which destroys God's relation to man (and can we also say, Man's relation to God?) we find encouraging. One realizes that his The-anthropology affords the latitude which will facilitate an attempt toward a clearer interpretation of man's relation to sin.

It was indicated that Irenaean theology was relatively free of substance ontology, and that categories of relation were his predominant interpretive technique. This enabled him to explicate man's dependent relation upon God while simultaneously retaining what we consider to be essential characteristics of personal responsibility (supra, pp. 83ff.; cf. A.H., III,xx,1&2). Categories of relation, as opposed to substantialist ones, seems amenable to the inclusion of all facets of man's life. And the imago Dei, as that which is constitutive of both the becoming, being, and goal of man, becomes an all-inclusive symbol. The imago Dei, rather than referring specifically to man's "religious" dimension, itself suggests God's co-inherence in all that is man. Because co-inherence includes the difference between God and man and because man is he who is toward God,
the *imago Dei* becomes a symbol of all of man's struggle and aspiration.¹

The subject of recapitulation, with which the study was concluded, is of concern to us primarily inasmuch as it illustrates an additional dimension of the *imago Dei*. Because Christ, who is the image, became man, we are able to apprehend a dimension of the *imago Dei* which may be called compatibility. That is not a term to be used in addition to the term co-inherence, but merely as an expression of it. That which is man is not alien to that which is God, and therefore Christ could take unto Himself man; there is a fundamental compatibility. Indeed, man is he who included within himself and his experience that which is incompatible; but that is not to say that those alien factors render his being or person hostile, something which must be overcome or eliminated before Christ deigns to dwell with us, as man.

¹War and other forms of violence may at first threaten to nullify that statement. But might it be possible to suggest that such "in-humanity" is evidence of man's agonizing frustration born of failure to recognize and utilize his divine dimension, that is, his being-toward-God?
CHAPTER II

ST. AUGUSTINE - A CRITIQUE BASED ON

THE IMAGO DEI

Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, was born A.D. 354 and died A.D. 430.

The figure of Augustine, probably the greatest man, next to St. Paul, ... stands like a Colossus upon a mountain crest, marking the watershed between the ancient and the modern worlds, and casting its shadow far along the road by which the Fall-doctrine was destined to travel.¹

It was he who in the fourth century gave to Western civilization the formative ideas which have guided it for centuries. ... Theology in Western Christianity has been a series of footnotes to Augustine.²

It is doubtful that anything truly significant could be added to the wealth of tributes already ascribed to Augustine; it is enough that they are known and acknowledged. Because of his remarkable academic and popular stature, one would be ill-advised to criticize him from any perspective without extremely judicious reserve. Moreover, criticism that entirely ignores St. Augustine's theological-philosophical Sitz im Leben is suspect from the beginning.³ Therefore, this somewhat critical approach to a specific area of St. Augustine's material will be tempered by the recognition of his times conditioning. For example, we will not criticize Augustine's cosmology, per se, but will on the


³Of the many introductions to Augustine and his thought these three are especially helpful: Battenhouse, Study of Augustine; Williams, Fall and Original Sin; and Eugene Portalie, A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine, (London: Burns & Oates, 1960). Hereafter: Guide to Augustine.
other hand offer criticism of certain theological conclusions which are influenced by his cosmological theories.

We acknowledge both our appreciation of and debt to Professor John Hick, especially his book, *Evil and the God of Love.* ¹ It should be noted at the outset, however, that while Hick's intention was to evaluate and criticize St. Augustine from the perspective of theodicy, the stated intention of this thesis is not that having to do with theodicy, but rather a study of the relation and the structures of relation between God and man (The-anthropology),² with *imago Dei* as the central perspective.

It is the intention of this chapter to present material from the works of St. Augustine that directly impinges upon the *imago Dei* theme as characterized in the Introduction. The relation of the Creator God to creation/sin would succinctly mark the chapter's boundaries. The critical question will be: given certain attributes of God, and a particular understanding of the nature of man in the *imago Dei*, what then is the situation which faces God and man in terms of the attainment of His goal for creation, and man's participation in it? Only material that relates to that concern will be introduced, and it will not therefore be necessary to comment extensively on issues that properly relate to patristic studies, i.e., translation, etymology, or philology. That is not to suggest however, that one is relieved from recognizing that certain words, even in translation, bear


²We appreciate that the use of such hyphenated constructions as "The-anthropology" should be regularly avoided. However, because of the frequent mention of the relation and structures of relation to which The-anthropology refers, and because of the cumbersomeness of the construction we feel justified in the employment of Barth's term. Cf. supra, p. 2.
a particular significance within the literature that may be different from that commonly understood today. We realize, for instance, that Augustine's use of the word "existence"/esse/ bears a very special and specific connotation, and that it properly belongs, or is ascribed, only to God. Creaturely existence is always derivative, and "exists" insofar as it exists at all, only and entirely in relation to God. That which is totally and absolutely apart from God cannot even be said to be. Such usages of language will of course be noted whenever they bear importance relative to the image theme.

a. God and Creation

It would be difficult, if not altogether impossible, to surpass St. Augustine's unquestioning conviction regarding the absolute omnipotence and omniscience of God. Although Augustine's doctrine of God is of interest only insofar as it relates to the imago Dei, one realizes, however, that the tendencies noted and developed in the Introduction, i.e., personal constructs of co-inherence, appear quite incompatible with Augustinian theology. According to Augustine, because of who God is, and how He may and must be described, there is minimal inclination to speak of men in complimentary terms.¹ Man's primary dignity seems to be that he may be the object of God's saving election.

The attributes, omnipotence and omniscience, are closely related to that of immutability. It may perhaps be fair to suggest that immutability takes precedence over the other two. It is in terms of God's immutability that "existence" /esse/ is most properly considered, and is stated concisely in the following:

¹This tendency, i.e., the language of pessimism, is more discernible in respect to the scope of this chapter, imago Dei and sin, than it is, for instance, in relation to Augustine's doctrine of salvation, or again in respect to his material on the beata vita. The latter was a considerable factor in the whole of Augustine's theology and we note his saying, "Away with all else; let us abandon all these futilities and devote ourselves to the search for truth alone. ... Why do we hesitate to give up all worldly ambition and devote ourselves wholly to the search for God and the happy life?" Confessions, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, XIV, ed. Marcus Dods, trans., J.G. Finkington, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1886), VI,x,i,19.
For that exists in the highest sense of the word which continues always the same, which is throughout like itself, which cannot in any part be corrupted or changed, which is not subject to time, which admits of no variation in its present as compared with its former condition. This is existence in its true sense: "id enim est quod esse verisime dicitur." For in this signification of the word existence there is implied a nature which is self-contained, and which continues immutably. Such things can be said only of God, to whom there is nothing contrary in the strict sense of the word. For the contrary of existence is non-existence. There is therefore no nature contrary to God.\(^1\)

This distinction between existence and non-existence is one of the most often-reasserted affirmations found throughout Augustine's writings. Existence and immutability may indeed be called the foundational doctrines of his theology; upon those two convictions and truths the entire system would seem to depend. As pure existence (one could say pure Being) God is absolutely unlimited in any enterprise that may be desired or attempted. On the other hand, whatever is not God enjoys only derivative, created existence which is always subordinate to that by which it was created. The use of "derivative" must be carefully understood so as not to imply emanation; it may be employed however to indicate that whatever exists which is not God exists in a subordinate and participative sense. Its being or existence depends for its continuation on its affinity to Existence. Augustine's statement (supra, Mor. Manich. I,1), that there is "... no nature contrary to God" is illustrative of that which we would be inclined to emphasize - that there is that in which both God and man participate and have their being. However, the context from which this conclusion derives is clearly that of substance ontology, and therefore a structure of relation that we will find inadequate.

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Closely related to the specification of the attributes of God which are ordinarily preceded by the prefix "omni" are the concrete expressions of His power in relation to the created order. Foreknowing everything, God might be confronted with situations which were not according to His will, in the sense of desire, but nothing could arise which was beyond His anticipation or control. Conjecture might suggest that Adam and Eve would have been, save for their tragic fall, the first of the human citizens of Augustine's "holy city", (the first being angels) and it might further be conjectured that their recalcitrance would have somehow thwarted His intention. In spite of the earlier suggestion that Augustine was not much concerned about any sort of personal God-man relationship, it should not be concluded that he was disinterested at every level. The level upon which he was very much interested was that having to do with the study of God's accomplishment of His aim, however impersonal the method of its attainment might sometimes appear. This was God's underlying purpose at creation: to surround Himself in His heavenly domain with souls who would worship Him eternally.

1 Cf. Augustine, The City of God, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, I, II, ed. and trans. Marcus Dods, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871), II: XIV, 11. Hereafter: Cit. God: "... because God foresew all things, and was therefore not ignorant that man also would fall, we ought to consider this holy city in connection with what God foresew and ordained, and not according to our own ideas, which do not embrace God's ordination. For man, by his sin, could not disturb the divine counsel, nor compel God to change what He had decreed; for God's foreknowledge had anticipated both, - that is to say, both how evil the man whom He had created good should become, and what good He Himself should even thus derive from him ...".

2 Ibid., II:XIV, 26: "... Almighty God, ... was not destitute of a plan by which He might people His city with the fixed number of citizens which His wisdom had foreordained even out of the condemned human race, discriminating them not now by merits, since the whole mass was condemned as if in a vitiated root, but by grace, and showing not only in the case of the redeemed, but also in those who were not delivered, how much grace He has bestowed upon them." But cf. Cit. God, I:X, 24: "... by the words, 'God saw that it was good,' it is sufficiently intimated that God made what was made not from any necessity, not for the sake of supplying any want, but solely from His own goodness, i.e., because it was good."
Yet another reference should be noted to further illustrate Augustine's conviction of the supreme sovereignty of God, and the relative insignificance of man's decision:

... who will be so foolish and blasphemous as to say that God cannot change the evil wills of men, whichever, whenever, and wheresoever He chooses, and direct them to what is good? But when He does this, He does it of mercy; when He does it not, it is of justice that He does it not; ... ."¹

He considered the text of I Tim. 2:4, "who will have all men to be saved," on the already firmly established conviction that first, God's will was irrefutable, and second that certainly not all men are saved ("... we know well that all men are not saved, ... "). What is meant by the text, according to Augustine, is that the "all" refers to all sorts and conditions of men.²

That exegesis is illustrative of the depth and strength of Augustine's conviction that everything was within the power of God, as compared with the relative impotence of man.

Quite a long discussion will be offered on the material which relates to the will of man, its initial freedom and subsequent captivity. However, by way of anticipation, and to further illustrate the wide scope of God's supreme power, we note the following:

... when the intelligent creation, both angelic and human, sinned, doing not His will but their own, He used the very will of the creature which was working in opposition to the Creator's will as an instrument for carrying out His will, the supremely Good thus turning to good account even what is evil, to the condemnation of those whom in His justice He has predestined to punishment, and to the salvation of those whom in His mercy He has predestined to grace.³

² Ibid., CIII.
³ Ibid., C.
Here is one of the clearest expressions of another of St. Augustine's central doctrines: predestination. It is a doctrine which attains special prominence in the discussion of theodicy but for our purpose, predestination is of interest only as it contributes to our understanding of God in relation to man who was created in His image.¹ Its relation to the imago concept may best be approached in the form of several related questions: What is the nature and "shape" of the relationship between the Creator who is existence, and the creature whose mutable existence is subject to diminution? What is the relationship between evil and good? What has "happened" between God and man as a result of the fall? What is the fall? How is sin communicated from one generation to another? What is the will's relationship to sin? What can it mean that man is created in the image of God?

Augustine seldom becomes involved in the questions related to the distinctive place or position of man; his point of orientation is always God, and from that point everything else that exists has whatever meaning or significance it has only within the eternal and immutable plan of God. It may on occasion, however, appear otherwise; it may seem that creation and specifically man is given an integral position of importance in the created order. But we suggest that while man and creation itself often seem to be the subject

¹The debate concerning the nature of predestination, whether single or double, has primarily been related to the area of grace and salvation. Because our interest in soteriology is specifically related to the nature of man who is the object of salvation, the predestination controversy is not our concern. The confusion and complexities which have surrounded the subject are well and thoroughly considered in Portalie, Guide to Augustine, p. 217. He states that Augustine's is a "predestination which forces one to say that neither God nor Jesus Christ had the absolute will to save all men. God could if He had willed, have chosen a world where all souls would be saved. 'He could have saved Judas', says Augustine, 'but He did not will to.' /De nature boni contra Manichaeos, 7,8/ 'He certainly could have converted the wicked. Why did He not do it? Because He did not will to. Why did He not will to? That is His own mystery.' /De Genesi ad litteram libri XII, XI, 10,13/.
under consideration, the primary subject is God; the major consideration is the completion of His intention.\footnote{The implications and significance of that assertion will be developed. However, it should be stated here, for the purpose of clarification, that it is not my intention to establish man in God's place as the primary subject, nor to infer that the completion of God's intention is of lesser significance than as developed by Augustine. It is, rather, the nature of man as developed and explicated by Augustine, and the consequent shape of God's accomplishment of His intention that becomes the issue of contention.}

All this relates to God's power and foreknowledge. Being able to foreknow not only the entire course of events, but each individual occurrence, God is able to incorporate each happening into an eternal plan. Even God's vindication is pre-ordained; it is not something that is occasioned exclusively by events outside God, for that would be to suggest that God could be acted upon, or affected by that which is external to Himself. Thus Augustine states in reference to creation and Paradise, "... the Commandment, which they were not to keep, He yet preferred to give them, in order that they might be without excuse when He should begin to vindicate Himself against them."\footnote{Augustine, Treatise on the Catechising of the Uninstructed, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, IX, ed., Marcus Dods, trans., S.D. Salmond, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1873), XVIII,30. Hereafter: Catech. And cf. Cit. God. II: XXII,1: "It is He who gave to this intellectual nature \textit{[angels]} free-will of such a kind, that if he wished to forsake God his blessedness, misery should forthwith result. It is He who, when He foreknew that certain angels would in their pride desire to suffice for their own blessedness, and would forsake their great good, did not deprive them of their power, deeming it to be more befitting His power and goodness to bring good out of evil than to prevent the evil from coming into existence. It is He who, when He foreknew that man would in turn sin by abandoning God and breaking His law, did not deprive him of the power of free-will, because He at the same time foresaw what good He Himself would bring out of the evil, and how from this mortal race, deservedly and justly condemned, He would by His grace collect, as now He does, a people so numerous, that He thus fills up and repairs the blank made by the fallen angels... ."}
It becomes increasingly clear that an appraisal of Augustine's work will not offer conclusions which tend toward what may be termed a dignified or exalted opinion of man. From Augustine's theocentric orientation, however, it is possible to derive his anthropology in respect to the image of God, and it is that which is our primary concern. An evaluation of some of the material on creation itself will clarify his interpretation of man in the *Imago Dei*. Augustine's choice of language and terminology is careful and precise on the subject of creation, and it is so because of the Manichaean influence that threatened the doctrine of God's absolute supremacy. Theirs was a theory that suggested that there was a pre-created "something" with which God worked, and because of its already being present before creation, it might be implied that God has to share existence. That implication attacked the very linch-pin of Augustinian theology. Augustine's doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* effectively refuted the Manichaean heresy. Perhaps the clearest articulation is found in Augustine's *Confessions*:

Thou, therefore, O Lord, ... didst in the beginning, which is of Thee, in Thy Wisdom, which was born of Thy Substance, create something, and that out of nothing. For Thou didst create heaven and earth, not out of Thyself, for then they would be equal to Thine Only-begotten, and thereby even to Thee; ... And aught else except Thee there was not whence Thou mightest create these things, O God ... and, therefore, out of nothing didst Thou create heaven and earth, - a great thing and a small, - because Thou art Almighty and Good, to make all things good, even the great heaven and the small earth; two such things, one near unto Thee, the other near to nothing, - one to which Thou shouldst be superior, the other to which nothing should be inferior.¹

¹*Conf.*, XII, vii, 7. Cf. *Ibid.*, XI, v, 7 and note that not even the existence of a place within which to create was available for God: "How, O God, didst Thou make heaven and earth? Truly, neither in the air, nor in the waters, since these also belong to the heaven and the earth; ... because there was no place wherein it could be made before it was made ...; nor didst Thou hold anything in Thy hand wherewith to make heaven and earth. For whence couldst Thou have what Thou hast not made, whereof to make anything? For what is, save because Thou art? Therefore Thou didst speak and they were made, and in Thy Word Thou madest these things."
St. Augustine obviously considered it imperative to safeguard God's absolute supremacy over all created things, and this he effectually accomplished by means of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. It is not implied that Augustine originated the doctrine, but his use of it was certainly more explicit and precise than it had been previously. As employed by him, creatio ex nihilo served to insure the absolute distinction between Creator and creation; in fact, the distinction becomes so absolute that it seems impossible to speak of the God-creation relationship in any but the most impersonal terms. That which has been created out of nothing has no right to claim anything for or of itself; its mode of creation establishes for all time its absolute and complete dependence upon its Creator. Its relationship to anything other than the Creator is a relationship to nothing, while its relationship to Him is its exclusive source of blessedness. The nature of this blessedness will be discussed later, but at this point it is important to understand blessedness in reference to the absolute distinction between God and creation which is ex nihilo.

... we say that there is no unchangeable good but the one, true, blessed God; that the things which He made are indeed good because from Him, yet mutable because made not out of Him, but out of nothing... ... in this nature which has been created so excellent,

1"... creatio ex nihilo was emphasized as early as the middle of the 2nd century, as in the confession of faith in Hermas (Mand., 1.1; Vis., 1:6), which is often cited. It was stated polemically against Gnostic dualism, and in apologetics to counter the philosophical view that matter was eternal." We also read: "The opposition to dualism and to the eternal matter of Greek philosophy soon made cosmology and protology the chief interests in the Church's doctrine of creation.... The view of Irenaeus, centred in the history of salvation, found little echo." Sacramentum Mundi, Vol. II, ed. Karl Rahner, (London: Burns & Oates, 1968), p. 26. Creatio ex nihilo is noted in II Mac. 7:28: "observe heaven and earth, consider all that is in them and acknowledge that God made them out of what did not exist, ...".
that though it be mutable itself, it can yet secure its blessedness by adhering to the immutable good, the supreme God; and since it is not satisfied unless it be perfectly blessed, and cannot be thus blessed save in God, — in this nature, I say, not to adhere to God, is manifestly a fault.\footnote{\textit{Cit. God.}, I:XII,1. And cf. \textit{Ibid.}, "... though it is not every creature that can be blessed ... yet that creature which has the capacity cannot be blessed of itself, since it is created out of nothing, but only by Him by whom it has been created. For it is blessed by the possession of that whose loss makes it miserable."}

The terms which most nearly summarize the distinction between God and creation, including the distinction relative to God and man are immutable/mutable. Not even man's affinity with earth, having been formed from it, is one of substantial relationship. For, "... though God formed man of the dust of the earth, yet the earth itself, and every earthly material, is absolutely created out of nothing; and man's soul, too, God created out of nothing, and joined to the body, when He made man."\footnote{Augustine, \textit{On The Trinity}, \textit{The Works of Aurelius Augustine}, VII, ed., Marcus Dods, trans., Arthur West Haddan, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1873) XIV,11. Hereafter: \textit{Trin.}} 

Therefore, we conclude, man has his "existence" only and entirely in God, and any tendency on his part to form significant relationships apart from God, forming them in the sense of expressing his being, or developing his potential, are ultimately destructive rather than constitutive of his person.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Cit. God.}, II:XIV,13: "... nature \textit{natura} could not have been deprived by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Consequently, that it is a nature, this is because it is made by God; that it falls away from Him, this is because it is made out of nothing; but being turned towards himself, his being became more contracted than it was when he cleave to Him who supremely is. Accordingly, to exist in himself, that is, to be his own satisfaction after abandoning God, is not quite to become a nonentity, but to approximate to that." And cf. \textit{Ibid.}, I:XII,1: "... the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely is. And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence." In this context Augustine's statements regarding angels may equally have been asserted of man.} Dependence upon the Author of being is so
thoroughly primary that it is difficult to articulate the importance of any external relationship which implies inter-dependence. There is the Creator-creature relation of primacy beneath which Augustine subsumes the significance of man-man and man-creation constructs.

b. **Existence**

He who supremely **is** is God. That which is made by Him is therefore also related to Him, and because of the relationship of being created, it is good. That which **is**, is good. That which **is not**, is nothing. Nothing, however, does not exist, but may be spoken of as existing in order that its "presence" may be expressed; that which does not exist as it was intended to exist may be called evil. Its relationship to existence is as a shadow of the thing itself. Strictly speaking, in spite of its pernicious influence, it has no independent reality.

The terms "order" and "harmony" serve an important function in the understanding of Augustine's concept of existence. He appreciated that the problems of confusion, chaos, evil, disharmony, and strife were "realities" which confronted people, and that the treatment of these issues was required of theology. He was able to address himself to these concerns by means of his understanding of existence (God as the prime illustration) and its relation to non-existence.

Now all things by corruption fall away from what they were, and are brought to non-continuance; for existence implies continuance. ... Now things which tend towards existence tend towards order *ordinem*; and in attaining order they attain existence, as far as that is possible to a creature. For order reduces to a certain uniformity that which it arranges; and existence is nothing else than being one. Thus, so far as anything acquires unity *unitatem*, so far it exists. For uniformity and harmony *concordia* are the effects of unity, and by these compound things exist as far as they have existence. ... Whatever is corrupted tends to non-existence.¹

¹Mor. Manich., VI, 8.
Whatever remnants of existence are retained qualify the whole, and it is called good. Moreover, whatever He has created, so long as it remains at all, remains good, for there is not anything outside (nihilo) that could possibly destroy it.¹

There is a certain hierarchy of values, or gradation of being, which is another integral part of Augustine's concept of existence, i.e., Augustine's concept regarding the nature of existence and its relation to evil. Existence is established on a descending scale of value, but the value is relative only to the supreme value who is God. That which exists, and which is not God, may fluctuate between greater or lesser value according to its intended purpose. More precisely speaking, this is true only of man and angels, for only they have the created ability to become other than they were created to be. A rock or a horse, for instance, retains its value or quality as a rock or horse, and there is no possibility of its becoming either more or less, as long as it remains. Men and angels, however, exercising that which is peculiar to them, namely, a "will", may ascend or descend from that which they were created to be.² This is not to suggest that either angels or men may become other than either angels or men, but what is implied is that as they ascend the scale of value, they approach nearer to God, and finally attain (not of themselves) a permanent position in His presence. It is stated thus:

¹Cf. Conf., VII,xiii,19 where we read: "And to Thee is there nothing at all evil, and not only to Thee, but to Thy whole creation; because there is nothing without which can break in, and mar that order which Thou hast appointed it. But in the parts thereof, some things, because they harmonize not with others, are considered evil; whereas those very things harmonize with others, and are good, and in themselves are good."

²Cf. Ench. XII.
All things that exist, therefore, seeing that the Creator of them all is supremely good, are themselves good. But because they are not, like their Creator, supremely and unchangeably good, their good may be diminished and increased. But for good to be diminished is an evil, although, however much it may be diminished, it is necessary, if the being is to continue, that some good should remain to constitute the being. For however small or of whatever kind the being may be, the good which makes it a being cannot be destroyed without destroying the being itself.¹

We are being drawn toward the conclusion that evil "exists" only in a reflective sense. That is to say, that there is good, and that good is in an exclusive sense, makes it impossible and non-sensical to say alternatively that evil is. Augustine was himself aware of the necessity of recognizing evil's presence on the one hand and of denying its "existence" on the other. To deny evil as a factor within the experience of man would suggest either blindness, dishonesty, or imperceptivity. On the other hand to speak of evil as a something which "exists" would lend credence to the Manichaean theory of the reality of an evil matter. By refusing to ascribe evil an independent "existence", Augustine avoided dualism, but at the cost of an inadequate treatment of God's personal relationship to man in relation to evil and sin. He struggled with this problem and concluded that there was perhaps no satisfactory answer.²

Augustine's principle of the hierarchy of value enabled him to include evil within his theological system. Realizing that evil could not honestly be ignored, that it demanded some rationale within the structure, Augustine

¹Ench., XII.

²Cf. Conf., VII,v,7. "Where, then, is evil, and whence, and how crept it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed? Or hath it no being at all? Why, then, do we fear and shun that which hath no being? Or if we fear it needlessly, then surely is that fear evil whereby the heart is unnecessarily pricked and tormented, ... ... Or was there some evil matter of which He made and formed and ordered it, but left something in it which He did not convert into good? ... Was He powerless to change the whole lump, so that no evil should remain in it, seeing that He is omnipotent? ... Such like things did I revolve in my miserable breast, overwhelmed with most gnawing cares lest I should die ere I discovered the truth; ... ."
very adeptly subsumed it beneath the higher principle of plenitude. Not all things are equal; "... there are some things better than others; and for this purpose are they unequal, in order that they might all exist."¹

Here is noted another facet of Augustine's key doctrine: God creates whatever exists; He could not create (being good) anything other than good; that which is not Him is imperfect (but still good); absolute equality of existence would not be aesthetic; therefore, inequality is necessary as an attribute of existence other than God, enabling all things to exist. At the same time, however, evil is only describable in relation to good.

... although no one can doubt that good and evil are contraries, not only can they exist at the same time, but evil cannot exist without good, or in anything that is not good. Good, however, can exist without evil... ... nothing can be wicked except a man or an angel; and so far as he is a man or an angel, he is good; so far as he is wicked, he is an evil. And these two contraries are so far co-existent, that if good did not exist in what is evil, neither could evil exist; because corruption could not have either a place to dwell in, or a source to spring from, if there were nothing that could be corrupted; and nothing can be corrupted except what is good, for corruption is nothing else but the destruction of good. From what is good, then, evils arose, and except in what is good they do not exist; nor was there any other source from which any evil nature could arise. For if there were, then, in so far as this was a being, it was certainly good... .²

It may be agreed that, as Augustine says, evil is only recognizable in relation to good, and that the elimination of good would consequently also be the elimination of evil. But, that is not the answer to the question why evil should exist at all. Good, after all, can exist without evil, so they do not bear the same structure of relation. Good is not dependent upon evil, either for its recognition or articulation. The validity of evil is related to its function, as Augustine says:

²Ench., XIV, and cf. Trin. XIV,11.
... those evils which the faithful endure piously, are of profit either for the correction of sins, or for the exercising and proving of righteousness, or to manifest the misery of this life, that the life where will be that true and perpetual blessedness may be desired more ardently, and sought out more earnestly. But it is on their account that these evils are still kept in being, ... 1

The first two, correction of sins, and exercising and proving of righteousness, may be combined for our purpose; evil is maintained (assuming that God could, if He wished, eliminate it) in order that the faithful may be challenged. Without evil's presence there may be a tendency on the part of the faithful either to assume the battle over, and consequently to "drop their guard", or to presume that they had won the battle, which would very possibly make them proud and liable again to fall.

The third factor, "to manifest the misery of this life", is of special interest; it is a clear expression of a world-denying attitude. Evil's function, not necessarily its first and foremost one, is to serve as a constant reminder of the fact that blessedness is not "of the earth", but the anticipated glory of heaven. It is that heavenly blessedness that is to be earnestly sought. Evil's relation to good (in the case of the faithful) is that of patterned contribution. We do not imply that evil willingly serves good, but that it does indeed serve is certain, 2 else it would not continue.

We have summarized St. Augustine's doctrines of God, creation, and existence, and noted that God is primarily defined in categories and concepts suggestive of "distance". Creatio ex nihilo, more fully developed in St. Augustine than his predecessors, is a doctrine which on the one hand refutes Manichaean dualism, but on the other hand effectually maximizes the separation between God and what God creates. It is apparent that Augustine's interpretation and articulation of the God-man relationship was not dependent upon the

1Trin., XIII,xvi,20.

use of terms of nearness, intimacy, or co-relation. His intended task was to establish a doctrine of God's being over against the world, both in respect to God's being (esse) over-against, and that of His being over-against. This appears to have been his rationale in the employment of the philosophical categories of existence/non-existence which were aptly suited for his purpose.¹

Created existence, including man, is by nature good, and its retention of goodness is not as much a consideration of responsibility as it is one of a more philosophical category of the signification of existence. Responsibility of "angels and men" is not completely ignored, but in Augustine's theology responsibility assumes a different coloration from that of, e.g., Emil Brunner's use of the term.² Unity and the right order of created existence are the Augustinian terms which specify the desired status of creation wherein each form assumes "... its appropriate place in the hierarchy of being."³ It is

¹Explicitly illustrative of this assertion is the following from John H.S. Burleigh, The City of God, A Study of St. Augustine's Philosophy, (London: Nisbet & Co., 1949), Hereafter: Augustine's Philosophy, p. 130: "... by Amor (or Dilectio or Caritas) Dei St. Augustine regularly means man's love for God. Indeed he is perplexed to find that Scripture frequently refers to God's love for man. No sane man will says 1516 that He needs anything from us. Perhaps He makes use of us. 'Otherwise I am at a loss to discover in what way He can love us.' De Doct. Christ. 1,34. Curiously enough in his verse-by-verse commentary on St. John's Gospel he simply skips chapter 3 verse 16; God so loved the world. On I John 4,8ff., God is Love, he has little to the point. The harshness of his doctrine of grace, so offensive to modern sentiment is due to the fact that he grounds it in the arbitrary will rather than in the loving Nature of God."

²Cf. Infra, CHAPTER V, Sec. a.2.

³Hick, Evil and God, p. 50. But cf. John Burnaby, Amor Dei, A Study of The Religion of St. Augustine, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938, Reprinted 1960), Hereafter: Religion of Augustine, Chapt. VI, and especially this characterization of Augustinian theology, p. 141: "To be joined to God is the supreme good for man, because there is no human goodness that is not the fruit of the marriage between the human spirit and the divine." And cf. Cit. God, X,3: "Being attached to Him, or rather let me say, re-attached, - for we had detached ourselves and lost hold of Him, - being, I say, re-attached to Him, we tend towards Him by love, that we may rest in Him, and find our blessedness by attaining that end. For our good, about which philosophers have so keenly contended, is nothing else than to be united to God."
within such a creation and in relation to such a God that we describe Augustine's concept of the *imago Dei*. Consideration of creation, God, and existence, determined what Augustine was prepared to say about man, and similarly will enable us to describe and evaluate his concept of the *imago Dei* from an anthropological perspective. Three other concepts must be considered, however, before the precise signification of the "image" emerges.

The first is:

**c. Evil**

The explicit distinction between evil and sin in St. Augustine's thought must be appreciated. Sin, as we will discuss shortly, is that which relates to the moral decisions of men (and angels); evil, on the other hand, is a metaphysical construct by which is articulated the distinction between what created existence is intended to be, and that which it often actually is. We have already noted that whatever *is* is good. Therefore we will expect that evil will not be granted an independent existence. For, whatever exists is good, and it would be inappropriate to assert that evil is good. Nevertheless, we will see that Augustine approaches precariously near to saying just that. Because God is pure existence, and creates subordinate existence having a specific value, any "declension" from God is a movement toward that which is of lesser value. That "movement" may be called evil. But, states Augustine:

> Now this decline does not initiate some other nature in a corrupt state, but it vitiates that which has been already created good. When this vitiation, however, has been healed, no evil remains; for although there was no doubt a *vitium naturae*, (since nature has received an injury), yet it was not *vitium natura*, (for nature was not itself essentially wrong)."

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Nature is and remains nature, and cannot, even in its association with evil, become other than nature. This is not to say, however, that in respect to a nature's particular relationship to God it remains constant; it may diminish or increase commensurate with its adherence to or declension from Him.\(^1\)

Creation, being not God who is immutable, but being mutable, is consequently liable to exercise its possibility of change. Evil is therefore the diminution of created existence; still, it must be remembered that that which is so diminished does not become evil, for whatever remains, remains good. Therefore, evil is a word descriptive of negation or loss.\(^2\)

In response to those who might prematurely conclude that Augustine's theology entirely eliminated evil, not only as an existence, but also as a "reality" which confronted creation, specifically man, let it be clearly understood that this was not Augustine's intention or conclusion. There is indeed that which is hostile to nature and to substance, and even though it cannot properly be ascribed the "dignity" of the term existence, it nevertheless describes the movement or impulse to non-existence. In a sense, then, evil can best be described from the direction of its conclusion; in so far as evil leads to non-existence it is recognizable, even though it never has its own independent reality or being.\(^3\)

What implications for the *imago Dei* this concept of evil may have remains to be articulated. What is already established however is the essential and necessary declaration that it is impossible to conceive of man's

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\(^1\)By "nature" is meant all that exists other than God; its use does not distinguish between animate-inanimate, or organic-inorganic creation.


creation into existence which was subject to contrary powers. There is only one power, and He is God. This may suggest the creation of evil ex nihilo which is of particular interest in the question of theodicy, but for our purpose it is sufficient simply to note the tendency. The elimination of the existence of evil in substantialist terms will help clarify and sharpen the subsequent discussion of man and his involvement with sin. One might also anticipate that the relationship between God and man will be expressed primarily in impersonal terminology.¹

From Professor Hick's point of view Augustine's doctrine of evil as privatio boni is a salutary one, preventing the conclusion of either evil's co-existence with God or God's creation of it, and that its "... status within His universe is secondary and parasitic rather than primary and essential."² Indeed, from the metaphysical perspective it is mandatory that evil should be considered parasitic, not co-substantial; but, from the perspective of the imago Dei we will be confronted with sin (sin being related morally to metaphysical evil) which may be technically secondary but which is practically speaking primary in its effect on the God-man relationship.

d. Man and His Will

The first and essential requisite toward an understanding of St. Augustine's total anthropology is that one be aware of his doctrine of the initial creation of both men and angels. Augustine's entire system proceeds from a theocentric analysis of all things, with the metaphysical overtones which have been considered. For him the next logical step in his attempt to understand and articulate the significance of man's present was to articulate his "beginning". We will not be surprised that St. Augustine, like his

¹Having previously introduced the adjective "personal" and now "imper-sonal" into the context of the God-man relationship, it should be noted that by personal is meant at least what is minimally implied: that applicable to both God and man are such terms as care, love, joy, integrity, responsibility, and relative freedom.

²Hick, Evil and God., p. 61.
predecessors and contemporaries, was literalistic in his interpretation of the creation/fall narratives. There was general agreement that man at creation was somehow "different" than he was subsequent to the fall. We are not concerned in this thesis to illustrate comparisons and contradictions among the Fathers of the Church, but to explicate specifically St. Augustine's treatment of the material. Our intention is to note his particular contributions and conclusions which were developed in respect to his doctrines of creation, Paradise, and fall.

What St. Augustine asserted about angels is closely related to that which he says about man at the time of his initial creation. That God initially intended to surround Himself with a worshipping congregation is a stated premise of the City of God, and that a "blank" was left in that congregation as a result of certain angel's disobedience has already been mentioned. We will be concerned as to the reason for their disobedience only as it impinges on a similar defection by Adam. And, granting for the present, their created perfection and their participation in what Augustine calls the "blessed life", we may inquire as to the reason or motivation of their fall. According to Augustine, there are two components of an intelligent being's "blessedness": "... that it uninterruptedly enjoy the unchangeable good, which is God; and that it be delivered from all dubiety, and know certainly that it shall eternally abide in the same enjoyment." It is quite apparent, according to Augustine, that not all angels retained their initial bliss, and one might ask, was the cause related to enjoyment or dubiety? If it were the first it could

1Information of this type is available in such books as Williams, Fall and Original Sin.

2Cf. supra, pp. 112f, especially p. 113, n.2. Indeed, this motive or intention of God in creation is significantly qualified by references such as: "... by the words, 'God saw that it was good' it is sufficiently intimated that God made what was made not from any necessity, nor for the sake of supplying any want, but solely from His own goodness, i.e., because it was good." Cit. God, I:XI, 24.

reasonably be concluded that there was in fact a built-in "failure factor", i.e., that their disparate creation was, at least in part, responsible for their defection. This would appear to make God co-responsible.

On the other hand, reasons Augustine, to conclude that there was in fact an initial disparity between them in respect to their certainty of eternal enjoyment does not lead to the same conclusion. God cannot be accused of complicity. Especially significant is the conclusion that God's created, intelligent beings, whether men or angels, bear full, complete and total responsibility for their defection from an absolutely perfect created existence.

St. Augustine's thought occasionally approaches the point where he might logically ascribe some degree of responsibility for sin to God; he may have been so inclined. But, preservation of the absolute supremacy of God's existence and its immutability necessarily would have prevented him from even the most guarded suggestion that God may be related to His creation at that level. He did assert that there was a difference in their (angel's and men's) "wills and desires" but definitely not in their natures. We have seen that nature is, because created by God, good, and that prior to any defection from its created goodness it was uniformly good, even though mutable.

So, speaking of angels and their decisions, Augustine says:

While some stedfastly continued in that which was the common good of all, namely, in God Himself...; others, being enamoured rather of their own power, as if they could be their own good, lapsed to this private good of their own... and, bartering the lofty dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, ... they became proud, deceived, envious.1

The perilous position of suggesting God's co-responsibility is somewhat diminished when one understands that "to stedfastly continue" and to "enjoy the unchangeable good" implies that to and for which angels were created; that was their blessing.

1 Cit. God., I:XII,1.
This qualification, as it were, is more clearly stated in another place in which Augustine asks, "But who can determine to what extent they were partakers of that wisdom before they fell?" The wisdom to which he refers is that of the realization of the blessedness into which they had been created. The most significant word in the reference is "partaker", /participes/; soon thereafter he also used the word "participated" /participations/. The wisdom was there, the blessedness surrounded them; they did not take advantage of their proper blessing, but reached for more.

While this may remove the "peril" of God's complicity from one perspective it does not offer protection from another. Augustine did not pursue his line of reasoning to its conclusion. If the angels did not equally "participate", and granting they were created equal by God, the next logical question is: why did they not equally participate? To answer - that obviously they chose not to do so is simply to beg the question and drive it further ad infinitum. We will leave the matter at this point, and resume a similar line of thought within our discussion of the fall of man, and the evil will. But introducing the subject of evil's cause, by way of expansion of the discussion of evil in the present section, facilitates a more thorough evaluation.

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1 Cit. God., I:XI,11, and the reference continues: "For if they had equally participated in this true knowledge, then the evil angels would have remained eternally blessed equally with the good, because they were equally expectant of it."

2 Cf. Hick, Evil and God, p. 69, the following objection: "If the angels are finitely perfect, then even though they are in some important sense free to sin they will never in fact do so. If they do sin we can only infer that they were not flawless - ... ."
The Cause of the Evil Will

It has been stated that Augustine's doctrine of evil involves a metaphysical construct of existence and non-existence. Created existence, because created by God, is in itself good, and remains good as long as it remains at all. Evil is essentially a defection from existence, a tendency toward non-existence, and is a particular inclination of men and angels who are by creation, by an exercise of the will, mutable. But, the cause of the evil will is a question with which Augustine struggled. Though Augustine does not specifically assert that the will is created, it might reasonably be inferred that it, like everything which is, was created by God, and bears the mark of God's creation. That the will is not self-created may be granted; but can the same be granted in respect to the evil will? Evil does not "exist"; the will does exist. Therefore, an evil will "exists" in respect to that by which one decides to "decline" from his initial level of existence.¹ But, what is its cause? Whence its origin? Augustine's theory proceeded thus:

Let no one ... look for an efficient cause of the evil will [efficientem causam malae voluntatis]; for it is not efficient [efficiens], but deficient, as the will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is, to that which has less of being, - that is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek to discover the causes of these defections, - causes, as I have said, not efficient, but deficient, - is as if some one sought to see darkness, or hear silence ... . For those things which are known not by their actuality, but by their want of it, are known, if our expression may be allowed and understood, by not knowing them, that by knowing them they may not be known... ²

¹This particular argument is not one which I have chosen to introduce; it is rather "internal" to the theology of Augustine, and is debated here only to illustrate what I consider to be the inherent inadequacies of his conclusions based on his theological presuppositions and doctrines of "existence" and Paradise.

²Cit. God., I:XII,7. And cf. Ibid., I:XII,9: "... the will is made evil by nothing else than defection from God, - a defection of which the cause, too, is certainly deficient."
First, we need to consider his statement that the "will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect." This is an a-typical assertion regarding the will, at least in respect to its created potential. It is not likely that the will to which Augustine here refers is the will at its initial creation, but rather the will which has already become involved in evil. Because of the relationship of all created existence to non-existence, having been created ex nihilo, there exists the possibility of the will's voluntary defection from its created existence.\(^1\) Therefore, speaking practically and from within the situation of man, post-fall, the will by its misuse has not \textit{affected} anything (it has \textit{defected}) and that which has resulted from its choice is not any new existence, \textit{per se}, but only a diminished existence. It is likely that this is what Augustine was implying by that apparently imprecise statement.

Secondly, we need to interpret the subtleties of efficient/deficient causes. Augustine would apparently rest his case regarding the question of the will's cause on this distinction. It may have to be granted that of itself a defection defies definition, and that it requires something over against which it may be compared. The "not knowing" is our only indication that it (deficiency) is present.

But it appears that St. Augustine has altered the original quest from that of determining the cause of the evil will to an analysis of the nature of deficiency. To say, therefore, that "deficiency" is inexplicable (and we will have to agree) is not to consider the first question raised, namely, the \textit{cause} of such deficiency. Augustine insists that the "cause", whatever

\(^1\)Cf. Augustine, \textit{On Marriage and Concupiscence}, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, XII, ed., Marcus Dods, trans., Peter Holmes, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1874), II,48. Hereafter: \textit{Mar. and Concup.}. Note especially: "... the evil will could not arise out of good, in the sense that good was made by the good God, but because it was created out of nothing - not out of God."
it is, is necessarily voluntary and that consequently it is impossible to
ascribe the fault to either nature (good) or God.\(^1\) The cause does not
become an unidentifiable "nothing" on the basis that its result is a defici-
ency; indeed, the "cause" which is able to produce an evil will would seem
of necessity to have both its "existence" and its "cause", which for the
present we will leave undetermined.

It would seem that St. Augustine's foundational doctrine regarding
the nature of God, specifically His absolute existence and consequent dis-
tinction from mutable existence, and of course his understanding of *creatio
ex nihilo*, effectually prevented him from even entertaining the possibility
that God's initial relationship with His creation (specifically man and
angels) included any imperfection. That is to say, because of both the
nature of God and creation, no possibility existed that all was not perfect.
The incursion of imperfection (the evil will) could not be from God; it
could not be from nature.\(^2\) Men are punished because of it; therefore,
man is its source. But, man as created is "perfect". The enigma seems
apparent.\(^3\)

\(^1\)Cf. *Cit. God.*, I:XII,8: "... the will could not become evil were it
unwilling to become so; and therefore its failings are justly punished being
not necessary, but voluntary. For its defections are not to evil things
*mala*\(^7\) but are themselves evil *mala*\(^7*; that is to say, are not towards things
that are naturally and in themselves evil, but the defection of the will is
evil, because it is contrary to the order of nature, and an abandonment of
that which has supreme being for that which has less." And cf. Augustine,
The Problem of Free Choice, Ancient Christian Writers, XXII, eds., Johannes
Quasten, Joseph C. Pluhme, trans., Dom Mark Pontifex, (London: Longmans,
See especially: I,1; III,17,48,49.


\(^3\)So it seems also to Hick. Cf. *Evil and God*, pp. 66-67: "... what
Augustine's doctrine really amounts to is, I think, clear enough: evil willing
is a self-originating act, and is as such not explicable in terms of causes
that are distinguishable from the agent himself. Thus the origin of evil lies
for ever hidden within the mystery of finite freedom; ... ."
Our concern is not to debate the internal enigma of St. Augustine's formulations, but primarily to explicate those areas of his thought which impinge on his understanding of the *imago Dei*. It is apparent from the foregoing argument that for him, God's creation (men and angels) is the source of its own defection, but as to the motivation or cause of its becoming involved in evil, we are left with a riddle. However, the so-called riddle which we discover, and which Augustine thoroughly appreciated, was not "neutral"; it was not consigned to a filing place for paradoxes, but rather hung suspended like a Damoclean sword over all of St. Augustine's theology, especially that having to do with his doctrine of sin and anthropology. Inexplicable as was the cause of the evil will, Augustine did not hesitate to ascribe its origin to the free decision of angels first, and then to man. And it was that ascription that exercised such profound influence in the development of the doctrine of original sin. It is to that development and the attendant issues that we now turn.

d.2. Adam: Before the Fall

Now it was expedient *portebat* that man should be at first so created, as to have it in his power both to will what was right and to will what was wrong; not without reward if he willed the former, and not without punishment if he willed the latter.¹

Augustine's choice of the word "expedient" may well occasion a question: for whom was it expedient that man should be created with this double freedom, having both power to will right and wrong? If one should say, expedient for God, we immediately recall that this might imply that one thing was better for God than another, and that He might be affected by particular alternatives. But, the immutability of God renders the considerations "better" and "worse" quite irrelevant. Therefore the question of

¹ *Ench.*, CV.
expedience cannot apply to God, and we turn to the question of its applicability to man.

The initial reaction might be emphatically to reject the suggestion that such "power" was at all expedient for man, considering what has become the nature of post-fallen Adam as a result of the tragic use of that power. But, we do need to press the possibility further, and place it within the context of Augustine's speculations in regard to pre-fallen man. What has been said regarding the condition of angels (supra, pp.126ff) and their defection is appropriate here. It was noted that there was a created "difference" between those who remained in their created relationship and those who defected; the difference was that of their created wills and desires. That much had to be asserted in order to interpret the assertion that there are blessed angels as well as condemned ones.

The situation regarding man, pre- and post-fallen, is somewhat different in so far as that while there are now angels enjoying eternal blessedness, there are no men of like blessedness; those whom God ordains wait until the resurrection. But, that difference is not critical for our purpose. One may evaluate St. Augustine's speculation relative to man as he was in the beginning, keeping in mind the raised and unanswered question about the expedience of man's created powers of decision.

There are strong hints that the continuation of man's blessedness was contingent upon the realization of his dependence on God.

... by that precept He gave, God commended obedience, which is, in a sort, the mother and guardian of all the virtues in the reasonable creature, which was so created that submission is advantageous to it, while the fulfilment of its own will in preference to the Creator's is destruction.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Cit. God., II:XIV,12.
Obedience, if it is to express any measure of significance, necessitates at least the opportunity for alternate decisions. One might agree that if the created situation were as it was described by Augustine, the "free choice situation" (i.e., bi-polar power, and the advantage of submission) would also seem appropriate and consistent. However, Augustine's characterization of pre-fallen existence is questionable (we would say, fallacious).

What Augustine asserts according to the above reference is that God presented man with a decision situation (the tree) and that obedience was a more blessed state than disobedience. But that man was in fact equipped with power to decide is certain, at least according to Augustine.

Augustine continues the obedience theme a step further when he states that God,

... in order to make a wholesome obedience easy to him, had given him a single very brief and very light precept by which He reminded that creature whose service was to be free that He was Lord, ... .

It is stated that the purpose of the commandment was that man might be reminded that he (man) was not Lord, but rather that God was. There is an implication, however subtle, that man who had been so perfectly created, and who enjoyed the fullest possible communion with God, might possibly "forget" his position, and attempt to assert himself above his created status. Interestingly, St. Augustine makes statements which precipitate such conclusions but never, as far as we can determine, substantiates his presuppositions. He rests the case on the, for him, reasonable assumption that freedom implies possibility of decision; both Scripture and experience predicate a "fall";

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1 An excellent discussion of this topic is included in Antony Flew and Alasdair Macintyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical Theology, in the Library of Philosophy and Theology, (London: SCM Press, 1955) Chapter VIII.

2 Cit. God., II:XIV,15.
God is in no way responsible; man is; therefore, man asserted himself, and that is evil. So, at least, proceeds the argument according to Augustine.

When we inquire further into the precise nature of that will by which the decision was made, the fall effected, we are reminded of the enigma which was encountered in respect to the consideration of the angel's created disparity (cf. supra, pp. 126ff.). There was, it was seen, a created distinction of their desire and will; in respect to man, the distinction is rather in relation to grace (aid). The distinction is not as obvious as it might be, perhaps because of the complexity of thought. What we will seek to discover and articulate is the exact difference between first, man at creation (pre-fallen), second, man as Augustine subsequently defined him (post-fall) and, third, man as Augustine thought he might be at the consummation (heaven).

The first man had not that grace by which he should never will to be evil; but assuredly he had that in which if he willed to abide he would never be evil, and without which, moreover, he could not of free choice be good, but which, nevertheless, by free choice he would forsake. God, therefore, did not will even him to be without His grace, which He left in his free choice; because free-will is sufficient for evil, but is of little avail for good, unless it is aided by Omnipotent Good.1

According to Augustine, Adam in Paradise had as a "potential" that grace or aid of God which was necessary for the perpetuation of his blessedness. But, it is imperative that we recognize that such grace was potential; it was not an inherent quality of man, as, i.e., his foot or intellect. Its relation, therefore, to man's decision-making ability was

1Augustine, A Treatise on Rebuke and Grace, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, XV, ed., Marcus Dods, trans., Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1876), 31. Hereafter: Rebuke. The quotation continues: "And if that man had not forsaken that assistance of his free-will, he would always have been good; but he forsook it, and he was forsaken. Because such was the nature of the aid, that he could forsake it when he would, and that he could continue in it when he would; but not such that he could be made to will his continuance."
as a gift being offered, available for the taking, but not forced upon him. The first sentence of the above reference can be clearly understood as affirming that man did not have the power to remain in blessedness; it was potentially there, but man had to exercise discretion in order to utilize it. As Augustine continues, God wanted man to utilize His aid, but allowed Adam to decide even that.

Immortality, such as the good angels enjoy, was the unachieved potential of pre-fallen Adam, a potential that he relinquished by the assertion of his will in an evil manner. Augustine does not suggest that Adam was fully aware of the implications of his choice; perhaps the dubiety which was noted in reference to the discussion of the angels would apply here also (cf. supra, pp.126ff.). But, that immortality was within Adam's range of possibilities, there is no doubt. We are not, however, given to understand that Adam's promised immortality would have been his by way of achievement; it, like the immortality which is promised the elect, would similarly have been by grace. And, there was no deficiency of God's grace; rather, there was the refusal on Adam's part to utilize it.¹

If our question were that of theodicy, we might recognize that it is at this point that the foundations tremble. The question must arise, how is it possible to maintain belief in God's creation of a perfectly good man, who would so foolishly ignore that which was necessary for his survival? That it is inconceivable seems apparent, and the theodicy fails. As interesting as is the question of theodicy, however, our interest is in the image

¹Cf. Ench., CVI, where we read: "The former immortality man lost through the exercise of his free-will; the latter he shall obtain through grace, whereas, if he had not sinned, he should have obtained it by desert. Even in that case, however, there could have been no merit without grace; because, although the mere exercise of man's free-will was sufficient to bring in sin, his free-will would not have sufficed for his maintenance in righteousness, unless God had assisted it by imparting a portion of His unchangeable goodness... ."
But the context is not unrelated; the emphasis is transferred from God to man and it proceeds thus: how is it conceivable that such a perfectly created being would despise or ignore so great a grace? That it is inconceivable would suggest that perhaps one should modify his interpretation regarding man's original condition. But Augustine asserts, "... that he willed not to continue is absolutely the fault of him whose merit it would have been if he had willed to continue; ... "¹ That Augustine's inclination was to "blame" man to sustain his concept of God seems quite evident, and that his inclination proceeds from the theological position which was described in section one, coupled with a literal interpretation of the creation-fall narratives is becoming increasingly manifest.

As far as we were able to determine, there is but one reference in Augustine that might be considered an "extenuating circumstance" for Adam's first tragic decision. The Devil who is a fallen angel, being superior to the serpent, was able to use him (the serpent) for his evil purpose, and assaulted the "weaker part of the alliance", not believing that he would succeed with man who was the stronger of the two. Augustine concludes that the prompting of Eve, the weaker one, indicates that Adam was not deceived by either the Devil or his wife, but that "... he by the drawings of kindred yielded to the woman ... [because he] could not bear to be severed from his only companion."²

Even though this does appear to be an attempt to provide some measure of mitigation, we soon realize that St. Augustine's minimal acknowledgement of a possible "rationale" of Adam's fall is compensated by maximal attention and effort directed toward the condemnation of man.

¹Rebuke, 32. The quotation continues: "If, however, this help had been wanting ... they certainly would not have fallen by their own fault, because the help would have been wanting without which they could not continue."

²Cit. God., II:XIV,11.
Our first parents fell into disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? ... The wicked deed, then, - that is to say, the transgression of eating the forbidden fruit, - was committed by persons who were already wicked. ... The devil, ... would not have ensnared man in the open and manifest sin of doing what God had forbidden had man not already begun to live for himself.¹

The locus of man's self-perversion is not external to man himself, Augustine would assert. But, he does not articulate the rationale of man's self-exaltation, nor does he attempt to define its origin. We are not told why man as he was created should have attempted the impossible (and incomprehensible) feat of achieving parity with God; we are simply informed, a posteriori, that Adam (and Eve) consciously and intentionally essayed such incredible lunacy. That man had "already begun to live for himself" before the "actual" sin of eating the forbidden fruit is a fundamental theory in Augustine's doctrine of creation and fall, - fundamental because it was imperative that blame should be ascribed to man, and to man alone. For if blame were not so precisely located, questions could conceivably remain regarding the perfection of the creation ex nihilo, which in turn would cast doubt on the doctrine of God's omnipotence, and His exclusive, unchallengeable sovereignty. The awareness of disharmony, disorder, enmity, suffering, and all such "symptoms" of sin required a locus; the locus was, at least for Augustine, none other than man's primal self-assertion.

It will not be profitable for us to return to the question that occupied us in the preceding section regarding the cause of the evil will, but it is instructive to note again how Augustine utilized those conclusions. On the basis of an inexplicably perverse use of a free will, man, by succumbing to his equally inexplicable pride, asserted himself and elicited eternal consequences, which we will consider in the following.

¹Cit. God., II:XIV,13.
d.3. Adam: After the Fall

By what means is it brought about that man exists with sin? Is it through the necessity of his nature, or through the choice of his will /per naturae necessitatem, an per arbitrii libertatem/? If it is through the necessity of his nature, he is blameless; if through his own will, then the question arises, from whom has he received this freedom of will? No doubt from God. Well, but that which God bestows is certainly good. This cannot be gainsaid. On what principle, then, is a thing proved to be good, if it is more prone to evil than to good? For there is greater proneness to evil than to good in an arrangement which renders it impossible for a man to live without sin. The answer is this: It came to pass by the exercise of free will that man associated himself with sin; but a penal viciousness closely followed thereon, and out of the liberty produced necessity ... Because the will turned to sinning, the hard necessity of possessing sin pursued the sinner.¹

We will not have to consider again the discussion regarding the origin of man’s evil will, or the perfect goodness of man’s primal condition. Augustine’s position has been clearly articulated. What concerns us at this time is man who “exists with sin”. Something new has been introduced into the life style of man, an alien factor has been established. We are not permitted, because of what St. Augustine has taught about the goodness of all things that “exist”, to assume that the sin with which man exists has a being, per se. It, like evil itself, will have to be regarded as a defection, a diminution. Perhaps more properly speaking, sin should be spoken of and understood as the effect of the diminution which is evil.

Nevertheless, man now lives in and with sin, and the question inevitably arises as to its necessity /necessitas/. If it could be shown that necessity is properly ascribed to man’s initially created nature, then indeed God would either bear or share responsibility with man for the fall. If on the other hand, as has already been determined, the introduction of evil/sin is due, not to nature, but to a voluntary defection from nature, then man is

completely and entirely self-responsible. Initially man was neither more prone to evil than to good; else God would share co-responsibility. There was apparently in man's original state, a co-equality of option, toward either good or evil, and man had to decide for one or the other. But whereas that co-equality was a primal possibility, Augustine contends that man's post-fallen inheritance is that of necessity. It is clearly understood, however, that for this necessity God bears no responsibility; it is the logical and necessary result of man's defection. He now finds it impossible to live without sin.

It may be objected that this necessity is not of a logical sort or nature, and that it should not therefore be concluded that there is an inherent causal relationship between fall and necessity. Augustine did indeed acknowledge that "God in His justice abandoned him to himself, ...", and this infers a God-response context. But God's direct and personal response is not a factor to which Augustine devoted considerable attention - on this particular and specific subject. His conceptualization of the physical complexion of existence (Creator and creature) and terminology which might suggest a more social structure of the God-man relation are uncongenial.

It is further to be noted that that to which God abandoned man was not precisely "to himself", but to "... live dissatisfied with himself in a hard and miserable bondage to him to whom by sinning he had yielded himself, ... ."

1 Cit. God., II:XIV,15.

2 But cf. Burnaby, Religion of Augustine, pp. 168-72, and his comments on Augustinian interpretation of redemption, and specifically p. 169: "... what is always uppermost in his mind when he speaks of Christ's Incarnation and Death - ... - is the love of God shown forth therein."

3 Cit. God., II:XIV,15.
At the risk of repetition, it should be recalled that because of the good "nature" of all that exists, the bondage under which man falls is more characteristic of the imagination than reality. It has been concluded (Supra, section b.) that in so far as even the devil exists, he is "good", and consequently, man is not under the lordship of a totally alien power. Whatever power inheres in the devil is a power given and allowed by God. It is not to be understood as if there were an actually and independently existing person (angel) under whose direct dominion man now lives and serves.

That man, however, has descended from his primal state having the freedom to will either good or evil is made manifest by his impotence. And this is man's misery, according to Augustine. It is man's incapacity to effect those things he desires, and his apparent inability to rectify the situation that is the clearest illustration of the fall. Granted, says Augustine, he was not omnipotent in his original created status - he was not God - but his relative power was sufficient; he could do whatever he willed to do. Therefore, "... in consequence of his not being willing to do what he could do, he now wills to do what he cannot." ¹

We should not conclude, however, that man's post-fallen will is totally incapacitated; man has not become completely impotent, only relatively so. And it is this relative incapacity that is painful to man, reminding him of his once-perfect original life. "For he who laments the peace his nature has lost is stirred to do so by some relics of peace which makes his nature friendly to itself." ² This is one of the clearest expressions of the painful consequences of the fall; man's will, broken, embondaged, and impotent, is not

¹Cf. God., II:XIV,15.
²Ibid., II:XIX,13.
yet destroyed. And its weakness is a constant remainder of its primal blessedness and present curse.¹

Assistance, aid, or grace of a nature different from that available to pre-fallen Adam is now required. As he had the grace whereby he could choose the good if he would, he had not the aid to will, (supra, especially p.135) but only the potential. But now, after the fall ...

... we have that help without which we cannot continue even if we will, /so it was with Adam/ but, moreover, we have so great and such a help as (to cause us) to will. Because by this grace of God there is caused in us, in the reception of good and in the persevering hold of it, not only to be able to do what we will, but even to will to do what we are able.²

There is a possibility of misinterpreting Augustine at this point; he is not asserting that in the present there are any who are completely and entirely both aware of the good and at the same time entirely able to effect the good. Man in the present is, as we have seen, subject to the ambivalence of relative impotence. There is, however, a distinction between those who are elect and those eternally condemned; the former have been granted by grace the ability to do something of what they are willing to do, and also to will as much as they are able, whereas the latter suffer deficiency both in will and ability. Likewise, when Augustine states that the "... will itself had to be freed from bondage in which it was held by sin and death, ...",³ he is implying not a complete freedom which would in effect be an anticipation of heavenly blessedness, but a relative one. It must always be remembered, however, that whatever measure of freedom is restored to man is entirely of grace; Augustine

¹Cf. Conf., VIII,ix,21: "The mind commands the mind to will, and yet, though it be itself, it obeyeth not. Whence this monstrous thing? and why is it? I repeat, it commands itself to will, and would not give the command unless it willed; yet is not that done which it commandeth. But it willeth not entirely; therefore it commandeth not entirely. For so far forth it commandeth, as it willeth; and so far forth is the thing commanded not done, as it willeth not."

²Rebuke, 32.

³Ench., CVI.
entertains no notions of residual power in terms of man's freedom to will.

"For it was by the evil use of his free-will that man destroyed both it and himself. For, as a man who kills himself ... cannot restore himself to life; so, when man by his own free-will sinned, then sin being victorious over him, the freedom of his will was lost."¹

We are given no reason to minimize the finality and seriousness of the terms Augustine employs. Man's self-assertion was a suicide; his free-will is lost. But, by grace, says Augustine, man is made alive again, and free-will is restored.

4. The New Adam: Heaven

Augustine's interest in the freedom of man's will was indeed directed to its involvement in life situations, i.e., in the matter of ethics, or how a man makes up his mind as a Christian, but his bi-polar orientation was predominantly directed to what we might call a pre- and post-history, Paradise and the beata vita.² And his vision of perfect freedom, more perfect certainly than that of Paradise, was that of the heavenly life. Speaking of man, freedom, and heaven, he says:

... in the future life it shall not be in his power to will evil; and yet this will constitute no restriction on the freedom of his will. On the contrary, his will shall be much freer when it shall be wholly impossible for him to be the slave of sin.³

¹Ench., XXX.

²This statement must be qualified by the acknowledgement of the strong ethical overtones that are in fact present in Augustine. We read in the chapter written by Thomas J. Bigham and Albert T. Mollegan in Battenhouse, Study of Augustine, p. 371: "The Augustinian theological ethic is a real synthesis of Neoplatonism and the New Testament. Its influence in the history of the West and of Western Christianity can hardly be overestimated; ... ."

³Ench., CV. The continuation of the reference enlarges the same thought and also includes a comment on the first and second immortality: "... God's arrangement was not to be broken, according to which He willed to show how good is a rational being who is able even to refrain from sin, and yet how much better is one who cannot sin at all; just as that was an inferior sort of
That there should be no misunderstanding of the reference, it should be noted that properly speaking the elect while still on earth are not slaves of sin, in that they do not serve sin both completely and willingly, for they are recipients of God's grace to will and do the good, albeit imperfectly. The consummate re-creation of man's freedom is to be effected not on earth, in life, but after death, in heaven. And, the completest freedom which Augustine envisages is that freedom for which it shall be impossible for man to will evil, "to be the slave of sin". To be free only to will and do the good is an Augustinian ideal, although it may be questioned whether or not such a use of the word "free" is meaningful.

It could be suggested with some justification that Augustine over-develops his "case" against man in order, it would appear, to assert the magnificence of God and the future glory of heaven. The litigation is firmly established on the basis of certain well-defined (but debatable) attributes of immortality, and yet it was immortality, when it was possible for man to avoid death, although there is reserved for the future a more perfect immortality, when it shall be impossible for man to die." We note here, in the first part of the reference beginning with "God's arrangement ... He willed ... and how much better ..." an atypical imprecision of language. It is possible to conclude from the text that God in fact willed not only to illustrate the goodness of man who is able to refrain from sin (that would be pre-fallen Adam) but also, and still according to God's intention, how much better is a man who is incapable of sin (that would have to be the fallen-and-restored, heavenly man.) This could be interpreted to mean that Adam was a poor and expendable means to a better and permanent end, in which case one could conclude that God prepared man to fall. This certainly was not Augustine's intention.

1Cf. Ench., XXVII which offers one of the clearest expressions of Augustine's denunciations of man: "... would it not have been quite just, that the being who rebelled against God, who in the abuse of his freedom spurned and transgressed the command of his Creator when he could so easily have kept it, who defaced in himself the image of his Creator by stubbornly turning away from His light, who by an evil use of his free-will broke away from his wholesome bondage to the Creator's laws, - would it not have been just that such a being should have been wholly and to all eternity deserted by God, and left to suffer everlasting punishment he had so richly earned?"
God and an altogether perfect primal creation of man. Granting both of those elements, man does properly and justifiably deserve the severest sentence of condemnation and to be eternally abandoned by God. God cannot be held accountable.¹

Heaven is the exercise of a will that cannot sin by a man who cannot die; this is a fundamental principle which emerges from Augustine's theology. One perceives again the necessity of his initial premises: that perfect existence (God) is perfectly good and immutable; that created existence is good, but mutable, and perfect until the only creation with free-will maliciously exercised that will self-assertively, and occasioned, by declension, swift retribution, the condemnation of God. Heaven will not be a restoration of creation, but a re-creation. Free-will will then be so "free" as not to be able to sin, and immortality will be more perfect than originally inasmuch as it will not be a potential immortality, and liable to loss, but an actual one, impossible to lose.

e. Sin: Its Presence and Transmission

It would be advantageous, if it were possible, to finally and absolutely distinguish between sin and evil as the terms are employed by Augustine. Even though he uses the word "evil" to denote metaphysical imperfection, i.e. the declension from existence, it is not thereby completely devoid of moral connotations customarily associated with sin. Sin, he says, is "... the des-

¹Cf. Cit. God., I:XII,21: "... Man ... whose nature was to be a mean between the angelic and bestial, He created in such a sort, that if he remained in subjection to his Creator as his rightful Lord, and piously kept His commandments, he should pass into the company of angels, and obtain, without the intervention of death, a blessed and endless immortality; but if he offended the Lord his God by a proud and disobedient use of his free will, he would become subject to death, and live as the beasts do, - the slave of appetite, and doomed to eternal punishment after death." And, cf. Ibid., I:XIII,1.
pising of the will of God, ..."¹ but similarly, "... evil had never been, had not the mutable nature - ... - brought evil upon itself by sin."² In a universe so thoroughly theocentric as Augustine conceived it, there is no possibility of establishing a precise distinction between the two terms, evil and sin.³ Only for the sake of organization, therefore, will a distinction be made; evil will denote the metaphysical construct, existence/non-existence, while sin will denote evil from the perspective of the will's evil intention and results.

Sin, with which we are presently concerned, is to be distinguished from the use of the word in the plural, sins.⁴ It is the inherited condition of all men, from which condition the acts of sin inevitably proceed. The term, original sin, will be employed in the Augustinian sense of that which denotes the sin descriptive of man's (Adam's) first declension from God.⁵ Sin's presence is realized, according to Augustine, by the on-going presence and

¹Cf. God., II:XIV,15.
²Ibid., II:XXII,1.
³Cf. Marion Le Roy Burton, The Problem of Evil, (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1909), pp. 21-26. And in Trin., XIII,xvi,20 we read: "... all the evils of this world, and the griefs and labours of men, although they come from the deserts of sins, and especially of original sin, whence life itself too became bound by the bond of death, yet have fitly remained, even when sin is forgiven; ... ."

⁴Cf. Free Choice, III,54: Wrong actions done, right actions not done are "... called sins because they draw their origin from the first sin which was committed freely, and which brought about these effects as a due consequence."

⁵Cf. Mar. and Concup., II,57,: "Whence it came to pass, that our nature /nature/ having then and there been deteriorated by that vast sin of the first man, not only became actively sinful, but also generates sinners; and yet the very weakness, under which the virtue of a holy life has drooped and died, is not really nature, but a vitiated state thereof; ... ."
reality of death. Immortality, as we have noted (supra, p.136), was the gift (potential) which would have been granted to Adam had he remained willingly subject to his Creator, but which was lost as a consequence of his self-assertion.

We should not expect lengthy consideration of what might be called the personal instrumentation of sin's punishment. That is to say, Augustine devotes little attention to the question regarding how, for instance, God (or the devil) punished man; the practice of evil conveys its misery in a most impersonal, cause and effect relationship. For mutable existence (man) to decline from Existence (God) is automatically to reap the reward of death. That the devil is mentioned as he who inflicted the sinful "wound" "... at that fatal moment of the fall ..."¹ is more a homiletic device than a careful statement of the actual process. That the devil's power is allowed by God, and within His control, makes it evident that properly speaking it was not the devil, but God Himself, who inflicted the wound. Even more exactly speaking, however, the wound was the logical concommitant of man's own rebellion, and requires no direct, personal reaction.

But, whereas no personal instrumentation is required to explicate the method of sin's effect, St. Augustine does specify the "form" of communicability:

By the justice of God in some sense, the human race was delivered into the power of the devil; the sin of the first man passing over originally into all of both sexes in their birth through conjugal union, and the debt of our first parents binding their whole posterity.²

God's justice is re-affirmed in this context to illustrate again that God shares no complicity in the fall which belongs entirely and exclusively to

¹Mar. and Concup. II,57.
²Trin., XIII,xii,16.
man. He, God, is not at all accountable, nor properly speaking is the devil, who is, so to speak, a device by which the movement or drama of the fall may be articulated. To infer that the devil had sufficient and independent power (not controlled by God) would tend to minimize man's singular responsibility. It could then have been argued that man was indeed a victim, and unprepared by either power or experience to withstand the temptation.

The closest possible unity between Adam and all of mankind is articulated by Augustine. It is, however, not a unity of promise, purpose, or dignity, but one of depravity and condemnation due to original sin. Vitiated nature, through conjugal union and procreation, was unable to pass on either more or less of nature than it had itself. In Adam

... the seminal nature \textit{natura seminalis} was there from which we were to be propagated; and this being vitiating by sin, and bound by the chain of death, and justly condemned, man could not be born of man in any other state.\footnote{Ibid., I:XIII,14. The reference continues: "And thus, from the bad use of free will, there originated the whole train of evil, which, with its concatenation of miseries, conveys the whole human race from its depraved origin, ..., to the destruction of the second death, which has no end, ... ." Cf. \textit{Ibid.}, I:XII,22; I:XIII,3; \textit{Ench.}, XXVI.}

We conclude from the foregoing that the entire race of man was, according to Augustine, seminally present in Adam. In respect to man's relation to God, therefore, we will not expect any appreciable variation in his status, apart from a direct intervention by God. In so far as Adam was guilty, so also are we; there is no distinction.

It should not be concluded, however, that there is anything innately evil in conjugal union, \textit{per se}; though nature is vitiating, it is not therefore evil. To infer that flesh, nature, is intrinsically evil would be to

\footnote{Cf. \textit{Cit. God.}, II:XIV,13: "The devil, ..., would not have ensnared men in the open and manifest sin of doing what God had forbidden, had not man already begun to live for himself." Previously cited, p. 139.}
destroy Augustine's entire theory of the created goodness of all creation. The term flesh is not to be misunderstood as denoting the source of sin; this would be a major concession to the Manichaeans. Augustine is explicit:

... the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul, is not the cause but the punishment of the first sin; and it was not corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible ... [the apostle says], ... 'hatred, variance, emulations, strife, envying' are the works of the flesh; and of all these evils pride is the origin and head, and it rules in the devil though he has no flesh ... . And since he exhibits all these works, though he has no flesh, how are they works of the flesh, unless because they are the works of man, who is, as I said, spoken of under the name of flesh? For it is not by having flesh, which the devil has not, but by living according to himself, — that is, according to man, — that man became like the devil.1

Man's likeness to the devil is the likeness of pride, his living unto and for himself. This, says Augustine, is sin. The flesh of man is the instrument of sin; therefore it may be said that the works of the devil are the works of the flesh. But, this in no way means that flesh is innately sinful or evil.

The will of man falls under the same sentence of punishment as the nature of man. His nature, now associated with non-existence, participates in death; likewise, the will having exercised its freedom maliciously no longer lives free; it too is "dead" inasmuch as it is bound.

It is not surprising that man, through his ignorance, does not have free choice of will to determine what he ought to do; or that, through the resistance of carnal habits, which have become second nature as a result of the element of unrestraint handed on in human heredity, he sees what he ought to do and wills it, but cannot accomplish it. It is an absolutely just punishment for sin that a man should lose what he refuses to use rightly, when he could do so without any difficulty if he wishes. ... When we speak of a will free to act rightly, we speak of the will with which man was created.2

1Cit. God., II:XIV,3, and cf. Trin., XIII,xii,16.

2Free Choice., III,52.
The "restraint" which Augustine suggests was given to and subsequently lost by Adam, has become an inherited "unrestraint", affecting all of Adam's posterity. Man, in the present post-fallen world, faces even greater foes than those encountered by Adam. He is confronted by those things which Augustine called "carnal habits". There is, in addition to pride (that uncreated and inexplicable cause of evil), also an alien and evil environment which compounds the plight of man, making it impossible for man to accomplish even as much as he intends. And, added to that hostile environment is "ignorance" of that which man should will, for having once lost the paradisial fellowship with God, man no longer is aware of his responsibility. St. Augustine has eliminated any insinuation that the natural (post-fallen) man contributes anything at all to his salvation.

Even regeneration restores the vitiated nature, for what has been once vitiated cannot be replaced. Regeneration, unlike sin, is not transmitted by conjugal union. Its effect on the relation between man and God is purely and entirely individual. The derangement is communicable; the re-arrangement is not. Each and every man depends upon his own "... second and spiritual birth."²

f. The Imago Dei

That the term "imago Dei" has not been specifically considered until this point in the development of Augustinian theology should not be interpreted to mean that the imago Dei is either irrelevant to the whole of Augustine's thought, or that an attempt to articulate Augustine's interpretation

¹The subject of regeneration is beyond the scope of this thesis, and its reference above is included only to illustrate its non-communicability in contrast to the transmission of sin.

²Mar. and Concup., II,58.
of the image is futile. In response to the latter possibility it should be stated that what hopefully has been developed is a theological environment within which to understand man, even though the word "image" has not frequently appeared. In respect to the former possibility (that it may be irrelevant) it should be appreciated that a development of theology is itself one half of the phrase, image of God, and that a treatment of the nature of man is the other half: the image of God in man. What is claimed, therefore, is a larger "field" within which to evaluate a doctrine of *imago Dei*, a field which has included God, existence, evil, man, his will, fall, and future.¹

The inclusion of an enlarged field does not imply, however, that specific references to the *imago Dei* are entirely lacking in St. Augustine. His *On the Trinity* is devoted almost entirely to a consideration of the image of God. His intention in that volume is to establish a relationship between that which man is in order to articulate the trinitarian structure of God. Augustine's interest there, as elsewhere, is characteristically theological, not anthropological. Therefore, its contribution is of minimal value as relates to the intent of this thesis which is neither theocentric nor anthropocentric, but The-anthropological. Augustine says:

We have reasoned ... from the creature which God made, and, as far as we could, have warned those who demand a reason on such subjects to behold and understand His invisible things, so far as they could, by the rational or intellectual creature which is made after the image of God; through which glass, so to say, they might discern as far as they could, if they could, the Trinity which is God, in our own memory, understanding, will [memoria, intelligentia, voluntate]. ... But I have warned him, so far as seemed sufficient, that he must not so compare this image thus wrought by That Trinity, and by his own fault changed for the worse, to that same Trinity as to think it in all points like to it, but rather that he should discern in that likeness, of whatever sort it be, a great unlikeness also.²

¹There is admittedly an organizational, methodological problem, and it will occur in each of the subsequent chapters. We maintain, nevertheless, that an adequate articulation of a doctrine of the *imago Dei* requires the preliminary inclusion of the "field". Specific discussion of the *imago Dei* unavoidably, therefore, appears late in each chapter.

²*Trin.*, XV,xx,39.
The "glass" through which Augustine attempts to peer in order to better understand the mystery of the Trinity is so darkened by his estimation of post-fallen man (supra, sections d.1-3, & e.) that one should not presume to discover much material of a commendatory nature as related to man. His development in Books IX through XV of On the Trinity is a somewhat complex assortment of various trinitarian models ranging from love (myself, that which I love, and love itself)\(^1\) to memory, understanding, and will, and variations thereof.\(^2\)

The single most edifying para-image which Augustine has developed is that of the Mind, and of it he says:

This trinity, then, of the mind \(\textit{mens}7\) is not therefore the image of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. ... Let it then remember its God, after whose image it is made, and let it understand and love Him.\(^3\)

The value of such material is that it serves to "locate" the image, identifying it in reference to its function. One notes that Augustine's perspective is toward the reason, mind, intellect of man; it is there that we are to recognize a God-likeness. And, it is due to such a location that Augustine escapes the temptation to speak as though the fall of man effectively destroyed the image. Whatever and however much man is said to have lost at the fall, he has not lost his rational power, diminished though it may be.

A further, and even more significant, value is conferred by Augustine in so locating the image within man's mind. His emphasis is not on the mind's ability to manage itself, planning its present and future, nor in its ability to create structures, either social or political, nor again in its

\(^1\)Trin., IX,ii,2.

\(^2\)Ibid., X,xi,18; XII,vi,6; XII,xi,16; XII,xiii,22.

\(^3\)Ibid., XIV,xi,15.
potential for science and technology. For him the mind, with its tripartite potential, remembering God, understanding, and loving Him, was the residual image of God which remained in man in spite of the catastrophic fall. For Augustine there was nothing with which man was endowed greater than the mind itself, and the mind was for him the clearest reflection (image) of the reflection's source who is God.

... although the human mind /mens humana/ is not of the same nature with God, yet the image of that nature than which none is better, is to be sought and found in us, in that than which our nature also has nothing better. ... For it is His image in this very point, that it is capable /capax est/ of Him, and can be partaker /esse particeps potest/ of Him; which so great good is only made possible by its being His image. Well, then, the mind remembers, understands, loves itself; if we discern this, we discern a trinity, not yet indeed God, but now at last an image of God.¹

Inasmuch as this formulation is located in the penultimate section of the book, and that he does not subsequently reject its assertion, it would appear that this is the essence of Augustine's concept of the imago Dei. Man truly is, he asserts, capable of communion with God, he can partake of Him, because the mind of man, fashioned by God, is fashioned in such a way that it can perceive and love Him. Prior to the above reference Augustine had associated the mind with the soul, a concept that will not specifically interest us; yet the quality of immortality which relates to the soul is informative.² The soul /anima/ is not the mind /mens/, but in a sense is the


²Cf. Ibid., XIV,iv,6: "... neither is that trinity an image of God, which is not now, nor is that other an image of God, which then will not be; but we must find in the soul of man, i.e. the rational or intellectual soul, that image of the Creator which is immortally implanted in its immortality. For as the immortality itself of the soul is spoken with a qualification; since the soul too has its proper death, when it lacks a blessed life, which is to be called the true life of the soul; but it is therefore called immortal, because it never ceases to live with some life or other, even when it is most miserable; so, although reason or intellect is at one time torpid in it, at another appears small, and at another great, yet the human soul is never anything save rational or intellectual; and hence, if it is made after the
"residence" of the mind. Immortality which belongs to the soul, is also applicable to man's mind; there is in man, therefore - indeed, the most significant and imperishable quality of man - his created potentiality to relate to his God.

What may be called a secondary function of the mind, i.e., dominion, receives only minimal attention in Augustine's writing. Whenever it is mentioned, dominion is not depicted as an innate quality, a created and given superiority, but an attendant and derivative characteristic associated with man's intelligence (mind). Man has dominion over the lower forms of creation by virtue of his likeness (image) to God, and although Augustine does not himself elaborate on the effects of the fall on the intellect, we have already learned that there is a quality of immortality, a permanence, which remains in the mind, apart from which man would cease to be man at all.

There is, it should be realized, a disequality between the image and that which the image reflects, i.e., man and God, or mind and Mind. The likeness is not equal to that to which it is like. St. Augustine uses the word "after" in order to illustrate that inherent dissimilarity, but "after" is a word which must be properly understood lest one conclude that image of God in respect to this, that it is able to use reason and intellect in order to understand and behold God, then from the moment when that nature so marvellous and so great began to be, ... certainly it always is."

A full commentary and criticism of Augustine's concept of the soul's immortality, considering its extra-biblical and especially its Platonic overtones, is unnecessary and irrelevant within this thesis. The assertion that there is that within man which is so fashioned so as to commune with God is all that concerns us at this point.

Cf. Cit. God., I:XII,23: "God, then, made man in His own image. For He created for him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that he might excel all the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which were not so gifted." Cf. Catech., XVIII,29: God "... - made also man after His own image, in order that, as He Himself, ..., presides over universal creation, so man, in virtue of that intelligence of his by which he comes to know even his Creator and worships Him, might preside over all the living creatures of earth ... ."
what is inferred is too great a dissimilarity; He does not want to suggest that man is not the image. Nor again, will he allow the suggestion that the Son is the image, and that man is the image of the Son alone. Man is the image of the triune God.¹

"... approach to God is not by intervals of place, but by likeness, and withdrawal from Him is by unlikeness." (cf. infra, n.1) Adam's pre-fallen God-likeness was due, not to "place", i.e., Paradise, but by "likeness". Although St. Augustine does not in this context elaborate on the nature of that "likeness", we can justifiably infer on the basis of our consideration of the centrality of Augustine's understanding of "existence and non-existence" that here the "likeness" implies an analogue of existence. Similarly, "withdrawal" from God (declension toward non-existence) is not a spatial category, nor yet a relational one. It is upon this realization that the following should be understood.

... those who, by being reminded, are turned to the Lord from that deformedness whereby they were through worldly lusts conformed to this world, are formed anew from the world, when they hearken to the apostle saying, 'Be not conformed \textit{nolite conformari} to this world, but be ye formed again in the renewing of your mind \textit{reformamini in nouitate mentis \&\ strae}\textsuperscript{2};' that the image may begin to be formed again by Him by whom it had been formed at first. He says again elsewhere: 'Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind; and put ye on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness.' That which

¹Cf. \textit{Trin.}, VII,vi,12: "But because that image of God was not made altogether equal to Him, as being not born of Him, but created by Him; in order to signify this, he is in such way the image as that he is 'after the image,' that is, he is not made equal by parity, but approaches to Him by a sort of likeness \textit{similitudine}. For approach to God is not by intervals of place, but by likeness, and withdrawal from Him is by unlikeness. For there are some who draw this distinction, that they will have the Son to be the image, but man not to be the image, but 'after the image.' But the apostle refutes them, saying, 'For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God.' He did not say after the image, but the image. And this image, since it is elsewhere spoken of as after the image, is not as if it were said relatively to the Son, who is the image equal to the Father; otherwise he would not say after our image. For how \textit{our}, when the Son is the image of the Father alone? But man is said to be 'after the image,' on account, as we have said, of the inequality of the likeness; ... ."
is meant by 'Created after God,' is expressed in another place by 'After the image of God.' But it lost righteousness and true holiness by sinning, through which that image became defaced and tarnished; and this it recovers again when it is formed again and renewed.¹

Remembering that according to Augustine the world, having been created by God, was good, we are not inclined to read dualistic overtones into the above; it was not that man's turning toward the world was in itself a turning to evil, but the turning itself was evil insofar as it was a movement toward that of lesser existence. Righteousness and holiness likewise are not primarily relational terms, implying personal integrity and devotion, though they seem to assume such significance here.

Those aspects of "relational" connotation noted above in respect to the mind and its potential for partaking of God, communion with Him, and love for Him are not to be casually ignored. What seems apparent is a desire to speak "relationally" on the one hand, and an inability or reluctance to do so because of a particular metaphysical, non-relational frame-work upon which the entire system depends. It is not, however, essential that one eliminate one emphasis to the exclusion of the other; neither, however, would it be appropriate to consider both the relational signification and the philosophical structure of Augustine's theology as co-equal. But, it should be apparent that the latter takes precedence over the former, and qualifies it.

Finally, and in respect to the renewal and re-formation of the tarnished and defaced *imago Dei*, Augustine asserts that unlike the instantaneous renewal which occurs in baptism, the renewal of the image of God is a progressive movement. It proceeds on its growth, energized by the grace of God, and marks its progress by an increasing renunciation of things temporal (mutable,

¹ *Trin.*, XIV,xvi,22.
visible, carnal) toward those things which are nearer to God. The final and complete re-formation of God's image in man will be its restoration to the full and unimpeded "sight of God". This, for Augustine, is the completion of the circle: man's re-creation by grace to unhindered participation in that which is God, more wonderful, however, than Paradise, for then there will be no possibility of falling away.

g. Summation and Appraisal

A super-imposed category, i.e., *imago Dei*, has led us into the preceding study of those portions of Augustine's theology which bear a fairly direct relationship to the image theme. His presuppositions are often dissimilar from those explicated in our Introduction and as we might therefore expect, so are his conclusions. To ignore that would be to suggest that our criticism of Augustine is entirely intrinsic; it obviously is not.

However, to posit basic theological and anthropological questions, i.e., who is God, and what is His relationship to man? who is man, and what is signified by asserting that he was created in the image of God? - to posit such questions as these, because they are so basic, is certainly not unjustifiably to super-impose alien criteria. Whether one says "the image of God in man" or "man created in God's image" there is specific mention of both God and man. The integration of the phrase seems to necessitate a co-incidental consideration of both God and man, even though major emphasis may vary between the theological and anthropological perspectives.

The *imago Dei*, as a symbol of relationship, has been applied to the theology of St. Augustine, and the purpose of the study has been to describe

\[^1\text{Cf. Trin., XIV,xvii,23.}\]

\[^2\text{Cf. Ibid., XIV,xviii,24.}\]
his analysis of the "field" between God and man.  

The question arises: is the "field" so attenuated as a result of creation and subsequent catastrophic fall that there is no residual and inherent positive God-man relation, or is the "field" one within which both God and man struggle toward a glorious consummation? It is that question that qualifies our discussion, the results of which will circumscribe the dimensions of our final chapter.

The establishment and articulation of a "dependence factor" was noted in the Introduction as that which relates to "word" creation. And the creation of man was further set within a dependency context by the narrator's specific choice of the word bara. Neither "word" (dabar) nor bara, in and of themselves, exhaustively define the "shape" of relationship between man and God. However, they do indicate not only a "method" of creation, but more importantly a structure of relation between man and God which seems most properly characterized as personal and inseparable.

Conversely, it has been suggested that the "shape" of relation articulated by Augustine is established on the philosophical theme of existence. God is uncreated and immutable existence, and He creates existence which, because not of Him, is temporal and mutable. Therefore, created existence owes its entire being and continuation exclusively to God. It is doubtful that any "shape" of relationship could be articulated that offered a greater degree of dependence. Continuation of existence is contingent upon the continuance of creation's relationship to God. Declension from that relationship is tendency toward non-existence.

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1By "field" is meant the structures of relationship, i.e., mind, will, sin, creation, fall, etc., all those concepts which impinge on God's "co-inherence" with man.

2Cf. supra, p. 22 and passim.
That quality of relationship, however, makes personal structures, i.e., freedom and responsibility, somewhat gratuitous. Indeed, the concepts of realized freedom and responsibility which St. Augustine introduces are most conveniently set within the context of a pre-historical Paradise. The structure of freedom and responsibility has been radically inverted, according to Augustine, subsequent to an historic fall. It is perhaps impossible to determine whether Augustine's philosophical structures of existence preceded (and so supported) his historicizing of creation-fall interpretations, or if his understanding of creation-fall required a system which would be consistent with it.\(^1\) It would appear, however, that his philosophical system takes precedence and is pre-eminent over the more theological doctrines. This is not to suggest that he was more philosopher than theologian, but it is to suggest that certain of his philosophical structures, i.e., \textit{creatio ex nihilo}, (not \textit{per se} a philosophical concept, but becoming increasingly so as employed by Augustine), somewhat pre-determined his more specifically theological conclusions.\(^2\)

Whether philosophy or theology is pre-eminent is debatable; what is certain is that from either perspective, St. Augustine's understanding of that pre-historical Paradise, the blessed home of Adam and Eve, has far-reaching implications for his doctrine of man, and specifically, his speculative treatment of angelology, by which Augustine apparently hoped to elucidate, by comparison, the parallel history of man. It is not so much that

\(^1\)It would be erroneous to imply that Augustine originated the concept of an historical creation-fall; but on the other hand it is apparent that his predecessors had not deduced nearly as emphatic conclusions based on an historic fall, nor consequently did they develop such elaborate philosophical and soteriological structures as did Augustine. For a very thorough history of the development, see Williams, \textit{Fall and Original Sin}, especially chapters IV and V.

\(^2\)Immutability for example, as an attribute of God, appears more consistent within a philosophical system, and more critical to it, than it seems to relate to theology.
there is a reluctance to allow any similarity, but more so that whatever likeness there is supposed to be concentrates on beatific visions of bliss which are inexplicably eliminated and destroyed by a perverted use of free will.

Augustine's doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, his theories of existence and declension from existence, his historicizing of Paradise and fall—these are factors which make it extremely difficult for him to consistently articulate the relationship between God and man in any but the most impersonal terms and categories.\(^1\) *Creatio ex nihilo*, taken by itself, and as a theological doctrine which encourages a response of worship, is entirely compatible with an attendant doctrine that articulates the relationship between the Creator and His creatures on the basis of compatibility (co-inherence). Nor does this "compatibility" necessarily negate the valid distinction between Creator and creature. But, *creatio ex nihilo*, as interpreted by Augustine, creates such a seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the two, that a "fall" of whatever magnitude fractures the already fragile bond of unity. And unity, as we should like to understand it, specifies more than a metaphysical similarity of existence; it points to a factor which has been created by God in man by which God and man can communicate.

Furthermore, that Augustine considers evil within a metaphysical framework compounds the already developed sense of man's alienation and despair. Unless man could be taught to comprehend his experience of evil, his fear of and attraction to it, in terms which were quite unrelated to his "heart",

\(^1\)That Augustine did in fact utilize the terminology appropriate to personal relation has already been indicated. However, that his philosophical structures of existence have tended to transform and depersonalize the "shape" of the *imago Dei* has hopefully also been established.
his feelings and emotions, it would seem either absurd or futile to attempt
to speak in terms of declension from existence, or diminution of being.
There is no need to quarrel with the philosophical correctness of Augustine's
doctrine of evil and sin; even "correct" it would seem from a faith point of
view to be unsatisfactory.

Turning to Augustine's highly-developed theories of the origin of
evil, and its association with the first conscious and intentional aversio
a Deo, conversio ad creaturas, two factors emerge. First, that its "cause",
not efficient but deficient, is attributed entirely to the pride of man.
The second factor is that the exercise of such pride is that for which man
is totally responsible, and by which not only Adam suffers, but also each and
every individual who descends from him, i.e., humanity. Reacting to the
first, it should be said that we do not reject the validity of the terms,
"efficient" and "deficient"; they are not especially helpful, but neither
are they, per se, obtrusive. What seems objectionable, however, is Augus-
tine's insistence that evil originates from the depths of man's pride. While
this section of the thesis should not properly attempt to formulate possible
alternatives to Augustine, it would be appropriate to quote the words of
John Hick who has formulated an objection pertinent to the issue under con-
sideration:

To say that an unqualifiedly good (though finite) being gratuit-
tously sins is to say that he was not unqualifiedly good in the
first place; and to infer that he was created as a morally imper-
fect being is to suggest that God, who gave him this imperfect
nature, should not blame him too severely when further evidences
of imperfection flow from it.\(^1\)

Unless one adopts a completely radical alternative to the doctrine
of creation by God, choosing rather to believe that God was in no way involved

\(^1\) Hick, Evil and God, p. 180.
at all, it would seem that we will have to reject either Augustine's doctrine of the absolute perfection of man (including his pride) at an historic moment, or we will have to deny that man's pride is the origin of evil. Belief in absolute perfection of the world's primal status demands an answer to the question, whence evil/sin? And that demand will not be satisfactorily silenced by claiming "mystery".

The mystery to which Augustine flee's when pressed regarding the seat of evil's origin in pride is made necessary not primarily because of any theological doctrines, but result from his philosophical categories. That is not to say, however, that man's responsibility for sin is not a theological issue, or further, that sin/evil is irrelevant as relates to the God-man relationship. It is to say, however, that ascribing the origin of evil to man's pride unnecessarily and non-theologically attempts to localize the "fault" where it does not obviously and inevitably belong.

And secondly, Augustine's assertion of the communicability of sin (original) through conjugal union, the loins of Adam, introduces a further and unnecessary implication of the historic "fall". What the narrative may have been attempting to articulate by the fall account of Genesis 3 remains to be considered later in the thesis; what should be clearly stated here is that the fall from a perfect state which occasions punishment communicable to all men introduces an interpretation that is more compatible within static categories of existence and non-existence, i.e., substance ontology, than within a relationship of dynamic inter-relation, i.e., co-inherence. The meaning of "original" as it applies to sin will have to be considered at a later point, and it will be developed somewhat along the conclusion of John Hick who says: "The story of the fall does not describe genetically how our situation came to be as it is, but analyses that situation as it has always been."¹

¹Hick, Evil and God., p. 181.
Augustinian theology, presupposing a Paradise and catastrophic fall, asserts that the function and significance of the will has been radically transformed. The "original" will, created with power to do the good, and with potential to remain steadfast, has now become impotent and bound. This transformation has thoroughly and completely restructured the drama, and consequently, the will of the natural man no longer performs any vital and relational function. Indeed, Augustine does make provision for man's salvation in spite of the fall, but the "provision" seems more to have been "created" in response to a problem than it appears to flow from the eternal love of God for His creation.¹ The catastrophic fall with its universal implications makes it imperative that God should encounter His now-fallen creation in a new way. This in itself does not contradict the idea of God's eternal love, but because of the degradation of man, the expression of that love, its "shape", is almost totally unrelated to the structures of personal relation. Apart from the Augustinian fall interpretation which denigrates man, it is doubtful that there would have been the necessity to create a scheme of salvation which is so theocentric that the place of man, his will, and the created structures of dynamic relationship are virtually non-existent.²

¹But cf. Trin., IV,i,2: "And first we have had to be persuaded how much God loved us, lest from despair we should not dare to be lifted up to Him." And Ibid., IV,xiii,13: "Therein is our true peace and firm bond of union with our Creator, that we should be purified and reconciled through the Mediator of life, as we had been polluted and alienated, and so had departed from Him, through the mediator of death."

²Augustinian soteriology is not a constituent part of this thesis; our concern is with man with and for whom God works, man in the imago Dei. Chapter XII of Portalie's A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine offers a fairly thorough treatment of soteriology. However, one might wonder if he has minimized the import of the bondage and impotence of the will which were discussed in Section d., supra.
The image of God concept was employed by Augustine primarily as a speculative instrument to articulate the nature of God, from which it was possible to deduce some illustrative material in respect to man. The location of the image in the mind does serve first to express the indestructibility of the "shape" of relationship, and secondly to qualify that "shape". In spite of his normal and customary denunciations of man, Augustine was inclined to speak favorably and complimentarily about the image; he was impressed with man's mind by which he could remember, understand, and love God. And, apparently, the mind of man is that to which Augustine looks and appeals when he intends to speak of some sort of continuing God-man relationship.

We will not need to be further involved in the discussion of the soul's immortality, but will take the concept of the mind's derived immortality as an indication that Augustine was inclined to consider that some remnant of man's dignity remained after the fall. And, most importantly, the "shape" of communication which follows from a mind orientation (remembrance, understanding, and love) will be noted as a very significant contribution of St. Augustine.

The question, or problem, posed in the Introduction (p.3) stands at the center of our entire consideration: is man in God's image to be understood from the perspective of sin? Or conversely, is sin to be understood in relation to man in God's image? In respect to St. Augustine, how shall this question be answered? Because specific references to the *imago Dei* are not extensive in Augustine's work, it has been necessary to enlarge the context to discern his "picture" of man; but the question remains essentially the same: does a concept of sin precondition the picture of man, or does a picture of man as he is related to God condition our understanding of sin?

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1That is to say, specific references are not numerous apart from their treatment in *De Trinitate*. Cf. *supra*, section f.
The general impression is that Augustine's methodology has been inclined toward the former; his concept of sin determines his understanding of the status of both pre- and post-fallen man, though it is with the latter only that we are concerned. It may be unfair to assert that Augustine's conscious intention was in fact to "do his theology" from the perspective of a particular concept of sin; his intention will perhaps have to remain a supposition. But, that his theological product reflects this orientation is our conclusion, and toward the support of that conclusion the foregoing material has been included.

In summary the following themes, relative to that orientation, could be deduced:

One, a rigid and radical historicized interpretation or paradisial bliss;

Two, an equally radical and historicized interpretation of the fall;

Three, Augustine's metaphysical concepts of existence/non-existence, and the immutability of God;

Four, absolute bondage of the will;

Five, creatio ex nihilo, as a philosophical concept, illustrating the distinction between Creator and creature;

Six, man's total responsibility for the perverse exercise of pride;

Seven, communicability of sin via conjugal union;

Eight, the anticipation of heaven where will be man's non posse peccare.

On the other hand, there are some themes which we will find to be quite compatible with an alternate theological method, i.e., conducting theology from the perspective of the God-man relationship, and seeing sin as no less serious, but nevertheless as a secondary issue. Those more congenial themes are as follows:
One, locating the *imago Dei* in the mind, and specifically its function of memory, understanding, and love;

Two, the strong emphasis on the unity of man, noted from two perspectives: one, the metaphysical relationship of all existence, and two, the inseparability of all men in the commonality of sin.
CHAPTER III

SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE IMAGO DEI THEME

A. Scholastic Interpretation of the Imago Dei

a. Foundations for St. Thomas

The scope of the foregoing chapters has intentionally been broader than one might first deem necessary for the explication of the doctrine of the imago Dei. We extended the field of inquiry to include and involve, in our study of both St. Irenaeus and Augustine, their respective doctrines of sin, evil, creation, anthropology, and some philosophical themes. Our somewhat panoramic presentation was considered advisable in order to comprehend the intricacies of their doctrines of the image. For instance, we suggest that apart from a clear understanding and appreciation of St. Irenaeus' concept of growth and childhood vis-a-vis Adam conclusions related to his doctrine of the image of God would at best be partial, and perhaps erroneous. So also with the material of St. Augustine; his understanding of existence and being as over against non-existence and declension from being seemed to be inextricably related to his development of the image theme. Similar to our method in the preceding chapters, we will again extend the field of inquiry beyond specific reference to the imago Dei.

Two things need to be articulated at this point in our development of the thesis. First, that even though our primary intention is not exhaustively to present the history of the doctrine, nevertheless it seems proper that we should be aware of the most significant portions of the historical development of the theme. Secondly, therefore, is
the determination of the most suitable procedure. An inclusive consideration of the great number of theologians who have contributed to our theme would either over-extend the scope of the thesis, or would result in superficiality as the cost of abbreviation. Therefore, in order to transport our question from the fourth to the twentieth century, we shall concentrate on what we consider to be the most significant and representative theologians.

There appear to be only minor variations of the well-established Augustinian trinitarian structure of the *imago Dei* noted in the main corpus of theological thought until at least the time of St. Thomas. Even then there is as much simple variation as significant modification.

John Sullivan expresses it thus:

> At the dawn of the Middle Ages the writers in the West either briefly repeat something of the teaching of St. Augustine about the trinitarian image, as St. Fulgentius and, to a less degree, Cassiodorus and St. Isidore, or at the least intend to take St. Augustine as their principal guide in theological matters, as St. Prosper of Aquitaine, St. Gregory the Great, Venerable Bede, and even Boethius. In conformity with this established pattern the Carolingian Renaissance of the ninth century will be dominated by the thought of St. Augustine.¹

> St. Anselm in the last quarter of the eleventh century, stated in pure Augustinian terminology:

> I acknowledge, O Lord, with thanksgiving, that thou hast created this thy image in me, so that, remembering thee, I may think of thee, may love thee. But this image is so effaced and worn away by my faults, it is so obscured by the smoke of my sins, that it cannot do what it was made to do, unless thou renew and reform it.²

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Anselm of Canterbury, who has been called the "founder of scholastic theology", is credited with preparing the way for what Sullivan calls "the golden age of theology". However, until the culmination of that age, i.e., in the person and writing of St. Thomas, there are other contributions to our theme, notably that of Peter Abelard, whose interpretation of the *imago Dei* in trinitarian formulation varies only slightly from that of St. Augustine.

Like St. Augustine, Abelard established the locus of the image in the mind of man, in his powers of reason, "since it is through his reason that he is like God". According to Weingart's estimation of Abelard's doctrine, the reason of man enjoys a transcendent quality, most properly exercising itself beyond the level of simple sense perception to inquire into the nature of divinity. Abelard's trinitarian structure is clearly articulated in the following:

> If any one wishes to consider more carefully and perfectly this image and likeness of God in which man is said to have been created according to the distinction of the Persons of the Trinity, he will see that man obtained in his creation the greatest likeness to both the Father and the Son or Holy Spirit. Certainly it is evident that what pertains especially to divine power is to be ascribed to God the Father, who has his being from himself and not from another; just as what pertains to wisdom is ascribed to the Son, who is called the Father's Wisdom; and to the Holy Spirit, who is called the Love of the two and also Love in his own right, is ascribed what pertains to the goodness of divine grace. Therefore, as was said, man was made, according to the dignity of the soul, in the likeness of each Person, since he is

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made similar to God, excelling other animals in power, wisdom, and love.\textsuperscript{1}

It would not seem entirely justified to assert that Peter Abelard's understanding of the \textit{imago Dei} was primarily or purely rationalistic. Indeed, that particular emphasis is present, but reason is infused with the quality of love and thus issues in commitment to God beyond the solitary sphere of rationality.\textsuperscript{2}

Summarizing Abelard, Weingart says, "The divine-human relationship is thus characterized by love: God lovingly created man in his own image and provides the optimum conditions for his existence, and man lives in the responsive love of free obedience".\textsuperscript{3} Such a statement would seem most applicable to the status of man either before the "fall" or subsequent to the parousia. For, continues Weingart's appraisal of Abelard, "Mankind has lost his innocence and original status. The \textit{imago Dei} is not obliterated, but pristine fellowship with the Creator is broken. ... Man's personal structure is vitiated; his human faculties are impaired".\textsuperscript{4} The concept of pristine fellowship (centered in love) is at the very heart of Abelard's understanding of the \textit{imago Dei}, and consequently there is less emphasis on the quality of rationality than there is regarding the quality of love. In his synopsis of Chapter II Weingart says:

Because love constitutes the logic of creation, love is the chief mark of the \textit{imago Dei} in which man is created; man is made for fellowship with God, that is, to respond to his Creator in love through perfect obedience.

Second, in the structure of man's personhood the soul is the controlling agent. It especially bears the mark of the \textit{imago Dei}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Abelard, \textit{Exp. in Hexaem.} 763d., cited in Weingart, \textit{Logic of Love}, p. 36.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Cf. Abelard, \textit{Exp. in Hexaem.}, 765a., cited in Weingart, \textit{Logic of Love}, p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Weingart, \textit{Logic of Love}, p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 49.
\end{itemize}
Dei, the insignia of man's spiritual relationship with God. ... The third conclusion is that sin is a rupture in man's spiritual fellowship with God for which man is culpable.¹

It should be noted, however, that Abelard's estimation of man's culpability for sin is inextricably related to man's own personal accountability, and therefore there is less emphasis on the inherited penalty or effect of Adam's sin than e.g., in the theology of Augustine.² The relative insignificance of the imago Dei as a theological theme during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, and the consequent paucity of references during this period of church history suggest that it may be appropriate to continue our survey with a study of the most eminent of the scholastic theologians, St. Thomas Aquinas.

Important for an understanding of Thomas' concept of the imago Dei is an awareness of a theological development in the ninth century, that of Gottshalk and the predestination controversy. His formulation was Augustinianism carried to its logical conclusion. Although Gottshalk's extreme formulations were not widely accepted, nevertheless the tension between grace and human responsibility had been established, and was to play a prominent role in all subsequent theology. According to Robinson, Aquinas' procedure in the attempt to reconcile grace and freedom/responsibility was to "... give emphatic expression to the doctrine of predestinating grace, and then, when the ground is cleared by this recognition, to deal with the secondary causation of the human will as a sufficient basis for freedom and the resultant merit".³ This synthesis Robinson critically

¹Weingart, Logic of Love, p. 64. ²Cf. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
calls "... psychological freedom combined with metaphysical determination..."). More positively, Sullivan refers to Aquinas' work thus: "... the genius of St. Thomas will place the augustinian teaching on more sure, more secure scientific and aristotelian foundations". But later Sullivan also states that "... the mature thomistic understanding of likeness is more dependent ultimately on aristotelian static principles than on any augustinian insight, related as the latter is to the more dynamic and plotinian view of an image".

There are two discernible evidences of the existence of the image in man, according to Sullivan's understanding of Aquinas - the first being related to a quantitative distinction; those creatures who are more able than others to imitate and represent God are properly said to image God because of their nobility. The second indication, noted especially in Thomas' *Summa Theologica*, is that whereas all creatures bear an analogical likeness to God, derived from Him as "... efficient and exemplary cause", man's relationship is via a "quasi-species". An adequate understanding of this factor of Thomas' system, as the context within which to comprehend the *imago Dei*, requires a consideration of his interpretation of the order of creation.

b. St. Thomas on Creation and Existence

Of the act of creation, and creation's relation to the Creator, Thomas says in the Summa:

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3Ibid., p. 223.

4Ibid., p. 224, where he also states: "With respect to God obviously there can be no question of a species, for he is above all genera and species; so it will be a matter of a quasi-species only".
Creation is ascribed to God because of his existence \( \text{esse} \), which is identical with his essence \( \text{essentia} \) and common to all three Persons, and is, therefore, an activity of the whole Trinity, not peculiar to one Person. Nevertheless, origins within the Godhead have a causal bearing on creation. God is an artist, and the universe is his work of art. An artist sets to work through an exemplar in his mind and love in his will. God the Father makes creatures through his Word, who is his Son, and through his Love, who is the Holy Ghost. In this sense then, as implying the essential attributes of intelligency and will, the precessions of the divine Persons account for the production of the creatures.\(^1\)

St. Thomas' conceptualization of God's relation to creation, viz., cause to effect, artist to work of art, essential existence to created existence out of non-existence - these are the foundations upon which we will attempt to discover his concept of the \textit{imago Dei} and the nature of man in relation to God.

Literally everything that exists, all things that have being, are intrinsically related to God, for He is Existence and the exemplar of all other existents. Therefore nothing exists independently of God.\(^2\) The pluriformity and variety within the trinitarian relation manifests itself in the created world with its rich variety and distinctions. And the reason for the existence of such abundance and variegation is "... that his goodness may be communicated and manifested. One solitary creature would not suffice. Therefore he makes creatures many and diverse, that what is wanting in one may be supplied by another".\(^3\)

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\(^1\)Thomas Gilby, \textit{St. Thomas Aquinas, Theological Texts}, selected and trans., Thomas Gilby, (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1955), 141. Hereafter: Texts, followed by his division number, e.g., Texts, 141. The text from which the selection is taken will be indicated in the footnote, according to Gilby's method except that references to the \textit{Summa} will follow our method, see p. 175, n. 3. This exception is for the sake of uniformity.

\(^2\)Cf. \textit{Summa}, I Q. VI 4; III Contra Gentes, 7; III Contra Gentes, 47 cited in Gilby, Texts, 143, 155, 165, respectively.

\(^3\)\textit{Summa}, I Q.X.VII 1, cited in Gilby, Texts, 152.
We shall have more to say of the significance of evil in a latter section, but a brief comment at this place will further elucidate St. Thomas' understanding of creation. That God permits evil is to be assumed; its presence in no way detracts from His goodness, for it is because of His goodness that He does not transform the nature of things that exist. There is a higher principle operative than the less significant one of the problematic presence of evil in a good world - the principle of perfection. Aquinas states:

The perfection of the universe requires that some should be indefectible, while others should suffer changes according to their natures. Were evil swept away entirely, divine Providence could not regenerate and restore the integrity of things, and this would be a greater evil than the particular ills they suffer.¹

He continues to explicate the presence of evil by saying first that it serves as that by which growth is possible, e.g., "... the patience of the just supposes the persecution from the unjust". Furthermore, evil serves to make apparent the good, as shade intensifies the brightness of color.² That which is a direct effect of good (God) is necessarily also good, and since "... evil cannot be the direct effect of good, no being as such can be evil: every creature of God is good". (I Tim. 4:4).³

Creation, including the creation of man, is defined from the beginning by God's intentionality. It has been noted that all created forms are created for a purpose and function; now we note more explicitly the purpose and function for which man was created. "Happiness", says

¹Aquinas, Compendium Theologiae, 142, cited in Gilby Texts, 162. Note the similarity to Augustine's doctrine of evil, cf. supra, CHAPTER II, Section c.

²Cf. Ibid. ³Aquinas, III Contra Gentes, cited in Gilby, Texts, 155.
Aquinas, "is the ultimate achievement of rational nature. A thing is finally complete when it attains its original purpose, and without being forced".\(^1\) He continues to specify the means by which man attains to God, viz., by likeness and activity, the first indicating a particular creature's relationship of similarity, the second a rational creature's specific activity of knowing and loving God. "Man's soul comes directly from God, and therefore finds its happiness by returning direct to God."\(^2\)

Two references from the *Summa* suffice to define Thomas' understanding of man's original, primal status in Paradise in respect to God. He states:

> Man was happy in Paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with a life of happiness in a certain measure, as Augustine says ... /Gen. ad lit., xi/\(^7\) so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.\(^3\)

We note especially the explicit inference that there was a created incompleteness, that even the primal state was characterized by unfulfilled intention. It would appear that the "happiness" for and toward which man was created was not to be realized within the physical or historical dimension of creation, but beyond it.


\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I Q.XCIV 1, Rep. Ob. 1. Quotations from the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas, unless otherwise noted, are from the series entitled: *The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 20 vols., trans., Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (London: R. & T. Washbourne, 1914-1925). Hereafter: *Summa*. Subsequent citations will include Part Number, Question Number, Article Number in that order, e.g., I Q.VI 1. In the case of Part II where there is a further division and re-numbering of questions the citation will be: II-I, or II-II, the first numeral indicating the major division, the second specifying the internal division.
The second text further specifies the incompleteness of man's primal state regarding the beatific vision. Thomas argues, a priori, from the fact of man's fall to the impossibility of his original enjoyment of perfect beatitude:

...The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; ... The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns misery. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which means to sin. So all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence.\(^1\)

Were it not for the already-noted affirmation that all that exists is good, and that all activity is the effect of the divine and first mover, God, one might be inclined to ascribe positive (real) power to the forces of evil as an explanation for the "fall". However, that is not at all the explication which Aquinas offers. At this point we simply note the notion of created incompleteness, implicit in man's turning away from beatitude - rather, his turning away from the opportunity - and will discover further elaboration of the means by which God achieves His ordained purpose.\(^2\)

c. The Imago Dei in the Thought of St. Thomas

c.1. The Essence of the Image and Likeness in Man

The following material will hopefully make unmistakably clear that precisely speaking the "essence" of the image, that is, the object

\(^1\)Summa, I Q.XCIV 1. Ital. mine.

\(^2\)Cf. Appendix A, Article 4.1.1., and passim.
of the *imago* is God. However, a presentation of St. Thomas' doctrine of God would far exceed the limits and responsibility of this thesis. Our task and question remains that of seeking to determine what may be the implications of the association of the phrase with man. We simply grant, therefore, that the object and specific locus of God's image is God Himself in our consideration of Thomas' work.

There is, according to Thomas, no absolute distinction between image and likeness; however, there is a relative difference inasmuch as an image implies that which is more proximate to the object than likeness. The difference between the terms exists insofar as "... any *likeness* /similitudo/ falls short of *image* /imaginis/, or, again, as it perfects the idea of *image*." This is a relatively unimportant distinction within Thomas' thought; what is critical for our purpose is that the distinction between the object and subject of both image and likeness be fully appreciated. "An image", he says, "is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; ..." There is in man, or in some aspect of man, an imitative quality, gift, or

1Even more precisely, the essence of God is incorrectly termed "image" except insofar as the Persons imitate one another. Cf. *Summa* I Q.XCIII 5, Rep. Ob. 4.

2*Summa*, I Q.XCIII 9, Rep. Ob. 1. But cf. Sullivan, *Image*, pp. 222-23, especially: "Likeness now is seen to be not only a deficient representation in comparison to image, but also can be considered, from another point of view, as perfective of the image." Sullivan continues to suggest that this interpretation of Aquinas' "... is in complete accord with the total understanding of the term of likeness from the writings of Augustine. In the view of the latter likeness is also necessarily included in the concept of image, and it can be considered as a deficient representation in comparison to an image or as the dynamic term of the gradual perfecting of the divine image in man. Yet the mature thomistic understanding of likeness is more dependent ultimately on aristotelian static principles than on any augustinian insight, related as the latter is to the more dynamic and plotinian view of an image."

3*Summa*, I Q.XCIII 1.
ability which is signified by the term, \textit{imago Dei}. But imitation is not equality:

\[ \text{...equality of equalitas does not belong to the essence of an image; for, as Augustine says, Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality, as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. ... Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; ... . And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made to \textit{ad} God's likeness; for the preposition \textit{to} signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.}^{1} \]

It should be noted that St. Thomas' first assertion, i.e., that equality does not apply to the essence of the image, is a proper qualification only in respect to man. In this context the word essence does not mean God. St. Thomas' concern here is to specify the dis-equality between the proper object of the image and man who bears or reflects the likeness of that image. What we are attempting to determine is the precise nature, quality, and content of that which he implies by "some likeness to God, copied ... as from an exemplar".

The likeness of absolute equality is, says Thomas, beyond both the capability and conceivability of man, and was not the equality that was inordinately desired even by our first parents. On the other hand, there is a secondary likeness, that of imitation, "... as is possible for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates somewhat in God's likeness according to its measure".\(^2\) At this point we simply note the two referents, imitation and participation, but as yet are not in position to further qualify their subjects. The following will contribute toward that understanding:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Summa, I Q.XCIII 1. Cf. infra. Section c.2., for a more thorough consideration of the preposition ad.}\(^{1}\)
  \item \textit{Summa, II-II Q.CIXIII 2.}\(^{2}\)
\end{itemize}
The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways: in one way it is found in something of the same specific nature \( \textit{naturae secundum speciem} \); as the image of the King is found in his son; in another way it is found in something of a different nature, as the King's image on the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the second sense man is called the image of God; and therefore in order to express the imperfect character of the Divine image in man, man is not simply called the image, but according to the image (\textit{ad imaginem}), whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said that the Son of God is according to the image, because He is the perfect Image of the Father.  

The dis-equality, already noted, is our present concern. Because of the disparity of constitution in respect to the relation between God and man there can be no simple relation of proportionality - that is reserved for essences which share the same nature, i.e., the Father and the Son. Man's participation in the divine Image is further restricted because of the disparity of constitution (being). Man therefore bears a likeness comparable to the relation between the object and the object's representation, e.g., a man and a picture which represents the man.  

There is a resemblance, an approximate likeness, but there can be no absolute co-relation between the two; they have their being in separate and distinct species. This distinction, dis-equality, is absolutely appropriate between God and man, for here the agent, God, is beyond any genus and therefore whatever relation the primary Image (God) bears to the derived image (man) must be one of simple analogy.  

"In this way all created things", states St. Thomas, "so far as they exist, are like

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3 Cf. \textit{Summa}, I Q.IV 3, Rep. Ob. 4, cited in Gilby, \textit{Texts}, 12: "Two things enclosed within the same order may reflect one another's likeness, but the likeness between cause and effect is not thus mutual: we can say that a copy is like the original, but not conversely. We can speak of the creature resembling God in some way, but not of God resembling the creature."
God as the First and universal principle of all being."¹ This we will call the analogical likeness of existence.

Broadly speaking all of creation participates in the above analogical likeness of existence, but more specifically understood, regarding man and considering the above analogy as a "spiritual good" of nature, this serves as the first of three implications which Thomas derives from the word, likeness. The second implicate is that of knowledge which according to Thomas was bestowed on the angel at creation, not yet actually on the man, but only in potentiality. The third implicate of likeness is the "power of operation" which neither angel nor man was given "... because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness."² Again we note that which was indicated earlier, viz., that there was a created incompleteness and unfulfilled intention which we suggested might imply creation's (nature's) necessary conclusion beyond itself.³

However, as has been briefly introduced (supra, p. 178, text n. 2.), likeness between man and God is an imitative likeness. St. Thomas, citing Dionysius in support of his first qualification pertaining to man's imitative ability states:

'The same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him as far as He can be imitated, Who is not perfectly imitable; unlike according as they fall short of their cause,' not merely in intensity and degree, but only qualitatively and quantitatively ...; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically /nec secundum speciem ... genus/.⁴

God is related, Thomas continues, as one who"...transcends every genus; and as the principle of all genera."¹ Further, likeness can be articulated by means of an analogy, viz., "...inasmuch as God exists of His own Essence, and others in dependence upon Him."² And finally, the likeness of which we speak if qualified by Thomas' statement that while we may assert that creatures may bear some similarity to God, the statement is not transposable or reciprocal, i.e.,:

...it must in no wise be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius says: A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order: but not between a cause and that which is caused.³ We say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; ...

In spite of what may appear to be an overwhelming delimitation in respect to man's likeness to God, the inimitable One, nevertheless there are ways in which it can be asserted that there does exist an image, a likeness. Allowing for each of the qualifications imposed on the analogy of existence concept, Thomas says that beyond the oneness of number, species, or genus - all of which are inapplicable in respect to God's relation to man - there does exist a significant oneness: ";... according to a certain analogy of proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him:..."⁴ We shall attempt to locate that likeness in terms of the imago Dei. John Sullivan's synthesis of the concepts exemplar and species is instructive; he states that Aquinas' most complete argument for the existence of the image of God in man

¹Summa, I Q.IV 3, Rep. Ob. 2. ²Ibid., Rep. Ob. 3. ³Ibid., Rep. Ob. 4. ⁴Summa, I Q.XCIII, 1, Ital. mine. Here, St. Thomas is referring to humanity under the broader term creation. The complexities of Aquinas' concept of proportionality will not have to be considered in this thesis. However, for a thorough evaluation see: Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, trans. Axel Poignant, (Uppsala: Lundequistka Bokhandeln, 1953), passim and especially Chapter VI.
presupposes that "God is the exemplary as well as the efficient cause of creatures; the likeness to God in any creature is analogical only." ¹

Granting that this is a fair and adequate statement of Aquinas' intention, there remains a problem regarding the specific intention of such a statement. There may indeed be an analogical likeness between cause and effect, exemplar and image. However, one wonders in what specific sense an argument may be proposed which affirms the "existence of the image of God in man". Would it be appropriate to suggest that the existence of an analogy significantly characterizes the being of man? According to the above phrase, i.e., "the likeness to God in any creature is analogical only", it would appear rather that the utilization of the phrase "existence of the image of God in man" is a misleadingly imprecise one, and one with which St. Thomas would disagree.

In light of the above objection, Sullivan's insight is constructive, as we note in the following:

In the view of Thomas an image must bear a likeness which somehow pertains to the species of the exemplar. With respect to God obviously there can be no question of a species, for he is above all genera and species; so it will be a matter of a quasi-species only. The image of God among creatures must have a likeness pertaining to that which can be considered the quasi-species of God.²

¹Sullivan, Image, p. 224.

²Ibid., a portion of which has previously been quoted, supra, p. 172, n. 4. The reference continues, extending to p. 225: "Though existence, life, and intelligence are all really identified in God, nevertheless we can conceive of intellectuality as being something like the species of God in our way of understanding the divine nature. For intellectuality is the ultimate grade of being proceeding from God, and so the ultimate grade of perfection which can be known about the divine nature. Among creatures, who participate in being, intelligence, life, and existence are not identical, nor to be found in every creature. When intellectuality is found in a creature it is always found in conjunction with life and existence, and presupposes life and existence. Therefore, intellectuality is ultimate, the ultimate procession of perfection from God. As ultimate it can be considered as being the specific difference of the processions of beings from
That which was first termed the analogical likeness of existence (supra, p. 180) has now been further refined into what may be identified broadly as an analogy of quasi-species of intellectuality (supra, pp. 182-183, text of n. 2). This, we are inclined to suggest, simultaneously specifies the absolute distance between God and man on the one hand seeks to specify that by which both are related. It is, of course, the quality and term of relation with which we are primarily interested, and we recognize that here, as in the following, the cognitive power of man is that by which, according to Aquinas, he is most similar to God. He states: "Man is called the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin in an image of the king, as having the image of the king." ¹

Obviously these are not substantival terms; a king's facsimile may be impressed on the metal coin, but certainly the image of God (properly a quasi-image) cannot similarly be impressed on mind. Nevertheless St. Thomas apparently wants to employ image categories when attempting to articulate the factor of likeness between God and man, and consequently designates the factor of similitude. However, pursuing the analogy offered, the relation between the king and his coined image is in no significant sense reciprocal, and we would conclude that similarly there is no reciprocity between the cognitive qualities of God and man. Nor, of course, would St. Thomas have attempted to articulate any such

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reciprocity. If therefore, the analogical quasi-species of intellectuality is non-substantial and non-reciprocal our question remains: precisely what is implied by saying that man was/is in or to the image of God?

c.2. The preposition _Ad_.

We have passed over, without sufficient comment, the significance of Aquinas' specific use and understanding of the preposition _ad_, to. We have called attention to the disjunctive dimensions implied by the preposition, but a more careful consideration may be constructive. Of _ad_ as it effects the elucidation of the _imago Dei_ St. Thomas says:

...when it is written that God _made_ man to His _image_, this can be understood in two ways, as meaning, first, that this preposition _to_ points to the term of the making, so that the sense is, _Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him_; or, secondly, this preposition _to_ may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, _This book is made to (the likeness of) that other one_. Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called image because thereby one Person imitates another.¹

We do not conclude that the alternatives are mutually exclusive; rather it would appear that there is an unavoidable difficulty in stating precisely the essence of the image. The preposition serves to illustrate both that difficulty and at the same time to offer tentative implications.

Understood in the first sense, i.e., that image specifies the term of the making, two points are introduced. First, we recognize the disjunction between the cause and the effect; the image to which man is created does not become an intrinsic attribute of man - it is not an ontological factor of his essence.² Secondly, inasmuch as there is


²But cf. Summa, I Q.VI 4, cited in Gilby, Texte, 143: "By the first essential existent and good each and every other thing exists and is good, partaking of God, and made like him, though distantly and
nevertheless a relation between cause and effect, between intention and actualization or realization, the term imago Dei does certainly qualify the being of man; apart from the image man would indeed be other than man whose being "includes" the image.

Regarding the first, i.e., that there is an absolute disparity between the Image and that which is imaged, which is at the same time to specify the non-ontological qualification, we may proceed to note and appreciate the significance of a phrase from a prior reference, p. 179, n. 1: "... man is not simply called the image, but according to the image (ad imaginem), whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection." Ad imaginem articulates not only the potentiality of similitude, but also the distance between God and man.2 The perfection

deficiently. Everything is called good by the divine goodness, as by its first principle, which is the exemplar, efficient, and final cause of all goodness. Nevertheless, the likeness of divine goodness is intrinsic to each, and this formally is its own denoting goodness. Hence - one goodness throughout the world, yet also many goodesses." The "likeness of divine goodness ... intrinsic to each" is apparently the goodness attributable on the basis of existence itself, and does not infer the minimization or indeed the elimination of either the distance or deficiency which characterizes created existence. Therefore we have suggested that the image to and toward which man is created, according to St. Thomas, is not an ontological factor of his essence.

1 The Latin text is: "homo non solum dicitur imago, sed ad imaginem, per quod motus quidem tendentis in perfectionem designatur." Remembering that this qualification, and this precise use of the preposition is employed "... in order to express the imperfect character of the Divine image in man, ...", it would appear that the so-called "movement of tendency to perfection" is tantamount to saying that the imago Dei primarily specifies the negativities of imperfection. For surely the "perfection" toward which there is a "movement of tendency" is entirely and recognizably unattainable, granting the validity of Thomas' specification of the imimitability of God, and the disjunctive characteristics of cause and effect.

2 Cf. Summa, I Q. XCIII 1: "... there is in man a likeness to God; ... for the preposition to signifies a certain approach, as if of something at a distance." Ital. mine.
of which St. Thomas speaks presupposes an imperfection, an un-likeness, and he apparently wishes to hold both perfection and imperfection simultaneously in tension in his utilization of the term image. He states this explicitly saying that "... man is said to be both image by reason of the likeness; and to the image by reason of the imperfect likeness."¹

As to the second point noted above, i.e., that the image of God does indeed qualify the being of man, we are introduced to the realm of St. Thomas' conceptualization of the intellect of which something has already been said (especially p. 182). This is indeed a critical emphasis in the thought of St. Thomas, and it would appear that beyond both the simple likeness of existence, and the narrower likeness of life which increases likeness to God, there is the more particular likeness which accrues to rational beings. "... and these last, as Augustine says (Qq. 83), approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him."² It follows that the capacity for cognition is that which qualifies the being of man, and therefore is that which simultaneously specifies the likeness of man to the exemplar. This is not to suggest, however, that by means of man's cognitive ability and powers there subsists in him an intrinsic similitude to God. To be sure, deprived of intellectuality, man forfeits relation to the image; however, the possession of intellectual capacity does not exhaust the implications of the *imago Dei*. That is to say, man with full cognitive powers is not thereby *ipso facto* in "possession" of the full measure of the image.³

¹ *Summa*, I Q.XCIII 1.  
² Ibid., I Q.XCIII 2.  
³ Cf. Appendix A, especially Articles 1.3, 2.4.
Reflecting the terminology of St. Thomas this intellectual capacity may be called man's cognitive aptitude; it is given in common to all sentient beings.  

But there are two additional qualifications to be recognized; there is the image whereby man

... actually or habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; which kind of image is by the conformity of grace: thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; which is from the likeness and conformity of glory. Wherefore on the words, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us (Ps. iv.7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image, of creation, of re-creation, and of likeness. The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.

d. Summary and Conclusion

Significant modifications in respect to the doctrine of the imago Dei seem to have been precluded by the retention of the structures of relation between God and man as explicated most systematically by Augustine in the later fourth and early fifth centuries. Those structures enunciated the distinction between God and man, both in respect to the relation as it pertained in Paradise and even more emphatically apropos the fall. Peter Abelard, in the eleventh century, in his particular emphasis of the factor of love in relation to the imago Dei, indicated a tendency toward the explication of the image in terms of personal relation. However, we noted again that the pristine fellowship was destroyed, and that therefore the imago Dei theme was not subsequently used by Abelard to characterize the dimensions of the God/man relation in respect to man's post-fallen condition.

1 Cf. Summa, I Q.III 1, Rep, Ob. 2: "Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, it is added, And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea (Gen. 1,26). Man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence. Hence it is according to his intelligence and reason (which are incorporeal), that man is said to be according to the image of God."

2 Summa, I Q.XCIII 4. The redemptive and soteriological concerns exceed the scope of this thesis.
Seeking to survey the centuries for material in respect to our theme and simultaneously striving to avoid superficiality, we narrowed our field of consideration and devoted special attention to a consideration of the theology of St. Thomas. His thought exemplifies the highest development of those structures which were articulated by St. Augustine, but also incorporates the static categories of Aristotle. And in the theology of St. Thomas we are exposed to the clearest possible delineation of the two spheres of reality, i.e., God and creation.

The principle of "existence" serves an important function in Thomas' theology, for God, as the exemplar of all existence, is the sine qua non of all reality. It is Thomas' conceptualization of existence that leads to a fuller understanding of the variegation of creation, of the principle of perfection, and even the rationale of evil. As the highest of all created forms man is fashioned with potentiality which transcends his natural created being, i.e., toward the beatific vision. And it is in relation to that wherein we began to articulate Thomas' doctrine of the imago Dei, per se.

We want to avoid repetition in this conclusion and therefore do not consider it advisable to reconstruct at length the arguments which have heretofore been considered. However, certain elements of St. Thomas' system deserve special comment. We noted (supra, pp. 175f) that in spite of a doctrine which included an historical Paradise that experience or existence was not commensurate with the life for which man was destined by God; there was a greater dimension toward which man was created, i.e., a vision of the Divine Essence. It is in respect to that dimension that

\[1\text{Cf. supra, p. 172.}\]
the image of God serves as a functional constituent.¹

According to Thomas the Divine Essence is itself the Image - the very Being of God is that which is to be derivatively imaged in and by man. Then followed a series of qualifications in respect to man's, may we say, "image-ability". That is to say, St. Thomas carefully guards and protects the primary Essentiality of God while at the same time attempting to enunciate man's potentiality to truly reflect the being of God Himself. It was noted (p. 178) that the term equality is inappropriate in respect to the God-man relation. However, imitation and participation are applicable (pp. 178f), and hence there is an "analogical likeness of existence" (pp. 179f).

Second, there is no appropriate generic equation between God and man because God transcends all genus, nor is there a simple equation between cause and effect. Here the analogy of proportion was introduced, and also John Sullivan's term, "quasi-species", by which he attempts to specify the foundation or dimension of the God-man relation. Thirdly, we considered the dimension of intellectuality as a factor of the imago Dei (supra, especially pp. 183ff).

Fourth was our discussion of the significance of St. Thomas' use of the preposition ad by which he clearly enunciated the distance between God and creation, specifically man, while simultaneously articulating the factor of man's movement toward perfection for which God created him. Ad imaginem suggest both poles of the tension of relation, (cf. p. 186), where again the factor of intellectuality was interjected. And it was suggested that although man's primal cognitive potentiality was

¹We acknowledge that no specific mention has been made to the "fall". However, although the term itself is not frequently used by Thomas, the event to which it refers is a significant element in his system. Cf. Appendix A, Articles 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 3; 3.1.
not tantamount to his "possession" of the image, there was nevertheless implicit an "aptitude" apart from which man is indefinable. It appears to us that this last factor of the image theme is perhaps the clearest articulation and summarization of that which St. Thomas wished to express in regard to the *imago Dei*. The cognitive aptitude is that which remains the distinctive characteristic of man in relation to all other forms of creation, and it is in respect to that facet that re-creation occurs, and ultimately the consummate likeness which God intends (cf. *supra* pp. 186-87).
B. Post-scholastic Doctrine of the *Imago Dei*

Duns Scotus, in the thirteenth century, introduced an alternative to the Thomistic structure of nature and grace. And, along with a re-introduction and amplification of older semi-Pelagian elements, there was an attendant revival and re-evaluation of the concept of the will. However, in spite of the fact that the will was certainly one of the recognized constituent factors of the *imago Dei*, there was a conspicuous absence of any new or altered doctrine of the image of God. Explanations for this absence are not of great importance insofar as this thesis is concerned, but we may suggest that because the two-story structure of nature/grace, so eloquently and elaborately articulated by St. Thomas, continued unchallenged, therefore his contribution to the *imago Dei* theme similarly enjoyed a period of peace. That is to say, by way of suggestion, that so long as alternatives to the basic structures operative between God and man (e.g., nature/super-nature) were not pursued, that which had been asserted relative to the image of God accordingly continued unquestioned. And in spite of certain semi-Pelagian assertions of Duns Scotus relative to the will of man, the basic, foundational structures remained more or less inviolate.¹

It is somewhat remarkable that two centuries later than Scotus, in the great free-will debate between Erasmus and Luther, that the image of God theme played such an insignificant role in the dialogue. One might have expected that in such a thorough-going re-appraisal and reformulation between God and man that similarly the image of God theme might have been

extensively utilized and reconstructed. One needs, however, to examine other works of Luther to discover specific reference to the theme in which we are interested. It was almost inevitable, however, that in conjunction with so radical a reassessment of the structure of relation between God and man as was articulated during the period after St. Thomas and Duns Scotus, that there would eventually be an equally radical re-statement of the doctrine of the image of God. What therefore appears rudimentary in Luther achieves a certain refinement in Calvin; the lack of systematization of the *imago Dei* theme in Luther is both systematized and enlarged by the latter. We turn, therefore, to those two great figures of the Reformation to discern their contribution to the theme at hand.

a. **Martin Luther on the *Imago Dei***

a.1. The seat and focus of the image.

It may be well to note at the outset that there is an inherent dualism (not appreciably unlike that of St. Thomas' nature/supernature) in Luther's theology expressed by the terms animal/spiritual (mortal/immortal). The image of God specifies a life which Luther asserts is "... different from and far above a mere animal life."¹ The animal life with which Adam was endowed is conjoined with, but separable from, the immortal life which, says Luther, was not as unambiguously manifest; it was held in hope. The loss of this dimension of Adam's primal existence had serious repercussions, affecting every facet of his

Luther was well acquainted with the Augustinian theory of the trinitarian structure of the image, but expressed reservations relative to its propriety. The inherent danger which Luther recognized centered primarily around the issue of the power of the will. Proponents of a modified theory (notably Erasmus) amplified the Augustinian formula of memory, understanding, and will, and reasoned that as God is free, similarly must man, created in His image, be endowed with freedom. As we shall note shortly, Luther employed a doctrine of the fall in order to denounce any theory of man's continuing utilization of free-will, but his express reservation in respect to the trinitarian formulation was related to his denial of man's participation "... with the grace and work of God, as a preceding and efficient cause of salvation."\(^2\)

Furthermore, Luther emphatically expressed his reluctance to locate the image in memory, understanding, and will as natural endowments of man. We do indeed possess them, but "wholly corrupted, most miserably weakened: nay, that I may speak with greater plainness, utterly leprous and unclean. If these natural endowments therefore constitute the image of God it will inevitably follow that Satan also was created in the image of God; ... ."\(^3\)

Luther, in spite of the above noted reservations, continued to associate the \textit{imago Dei} with those very endowments in terms of which he

\(^1\)Gen. 1:26a, p. 209.

\(^2\)Gen. 1:26a, p. 114. \textit{We note also an implicit denial of the Thomistic structure of nature/grace.}

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 115. \textit{We question the logic of his argument; Satan's "inevitable" similarity of endowment does not appear at all self-evident.}
is apprehensive about locating the image. But there is a very subtle transition of locus implied in the following:

... that the image of God created in Adam was a workmanship the most beautiful, the most excellent and the most noble, while as yet no leprosy of sin adhered either to his reason or to his will. Then all his senses, both internal and external, were the most perfect and pure. His intellect was most clear, his memory most complete and his will the most sincere, accompanied with the most charming security, without any fear of death and without any care or anxiety whatever.¹

To be sure, the endowments of memory, understanding, and will - their implicates of reason and intellect - retain their appropriate place vis-a-vis the *imago Dei*; they are not rejected. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that Luther ascribes those attributes entirely to the nature of man, and that they have a history correlative with man's. They are factors of the image, implications, but they are not its essence. It would appear that the surest evidence of the *imago Dei*, that in which the image manifest itself, is to be noted in the words: "... most charming security, without any fear of death and without any care or anxiety whatever." (supra). His stated conclusion is concise: "... that the image of God, in which Adam was created, was excellent above all things, in which was included eternal life, eternal security and all good."²

Life, security, and good are, in the theology of Luther, terms of relation; as they relate therefore to the *imago Dei*, so also does the image of God become something other than that which implies structures of metaphysical relation, e.g., nature/supernature (Aquinas), or existence/non-existence ( Augustine). Rather, the terms qualify personal relation. This is articulated by Luther thus:

¹Gen. 1:26a., p. 116. ²Ibid., p. 120.
I for my part understand the image of God to be this: that Adam possessed it in its moral substance or nature; that he not only knew God and believed him to be good, but that he lived also a life truly divine; that is, free from the fear of death and of all dangers and happy in the face of God.\footnote{Gen. 1:26a., p. 116.}

The image of God pertains to the moral life of man; it has implications related to a personal structure of relation. Further, inasmuch as Adam originally possessed the image he lived a "divine" life, that is, secure in the certain knowledge of God's providential will. It is, Luther states in the same connection, as if God had said: "... 'Adam and Eve, ye now live in all security. Ye neither see nor fear death. This is my image in which ye now live. Ye live as God lives.'"\footnote{Gen., 1:26a., p. 117.}

Luther, like St. Thomas before him, locates the image outside the nature and being of man, though that is not to say beyond the range of effect. Original security which was the experience of the couple in Paradise was the concomitant of their created and unchallenged structure of relation. We are speaking of the moment in time (according to Luther) to which he refers as "... Adam's primitive, creative innocence ...", and which he calls:

... the childhood of glorious innocence, because Adam, ..., was in a middle state, or state of neutrality or liability; in a state where he could be deceived by Satan; and could fall into that awful calamity into which he did fall. But such a peril of falling will not exist in that state of perfect manhood

1Gen. 1:26a., p. 116.

2Gen., 1:26a., p. 117. In the same place the converse is also expressed: "... we see and feel the mighty perils in which we now live; how many forms and threatenings of death this miserable nature of ours is doomed to experience and endure, in addition to that unclean concupiscence and those other ragings of sin and those inordinate emotions and affections, which are engendered in the minds of all men. We are never confident and happy in God, fear and dread in the highest are perpetually trying us. These and like evils are the image of the devil, who has impressed that image upon us. But Adam lived in the highest pleasure and in the most peaceful security."
of glorified innocency, which we shall enjoy in the future and spiritual life.¹

This primal period of "glorious innocency" was further characterized by the quality of original righteousness which Luther insists was an "... essential part of created nature, ... [not] only a certain superfluous and superadded gift or ornament."² Unlike the scholastics before him, Luther associated original righteousness (rectitude in Thomas) with the moral structures of personal relation. He speaks of Adam in Paradise as "... righteous, true and upright; ... because he acknowledged God; because he obeyed him with the utmost pleasure; because he understood the works of God without any instruction concerning them."³ So comprehended, original righteousness is the prime term of the imago Dei;⁴ original righteousness epitomizes and includes all other implicates.

¹ Gen., 2:17b, p. 183. We note the Augustinian themes: posse non peccare and non posse peccare.

² Ibid., 3:7, p. 259. In the forefront is the factor of sin, an element by which, in our opinion, Western theology has been circumscribed. Illustrative of our point we continue with the next line of the reference: "If you lay it down as a fact, that original righteousness was not an essential quality of the nature of man, it must inevitably follow that the sin, which followed original righteousness, was also not an essential quality of the nature of man. And if so, was it not an utterly vain thing that Christ should be sent into the world as the Redeemer of man, if it was man's original righteousness only, which was merely a foreign and separate addition to his nature, that was lost; and if that loss still left the faculties and qualities of his original nature sound and perfect?"

³ Ibid., 2:17b, p. 186, Ital. mine. The reference continues: "This last faculty of Adam is wonderfully exemplified by the fact, that when he had been in a profound sleep and God had formed Eve out of one of his ribs, the moment he awoke he recognized Eve as the work of God, saying 'This is now bone of my bones.' Was not this a marvelous proof of intellect, thus at the first sight to know and comprehend the work of God?"

⁴ Cf. Ibid., 1:27b, pp. 124-25, especially the statement that Eve was "... like unto Adam in reference to the image of God, that is, with respect to righteousness, wisdom and salvation, ... ."
a.2. The Image Impending

Luther's comments relative to the imago Dei in his Commentary on Genesis, are somewhat ambiguous in respect to the alternative whether Adam possessed or anticipated participation in the image of God. Commenting on Gen. 2:17b he asserts that Adam had "... a most upright will, yet not a perfect will; for perfection itself was deferred from the state of the animal life to that of the spiritual and eternal life."¹ It appears that the perfection of which Luther speaks is that of glory, when it shall be impossible for man to sin. This was not an endowment of pre-fallen man, (supra, p. 196, text n. 1). Therefore it would seem that full participation in the image of God was reserved - a future experience.

On the other hand, however, addressing himself to the question of the restoration of our spiritual life, Luther says:

... well indeed may we wonder and render thanks unto God, ... that we, ... should be enabled through the merits and benefits of Christ to look with assurance for that same glory of a spiritual life, which Adam might also have looked for with all assurance, without the dying merits of Christ if he had remained unfallen in that animal life which possessed the image of God.²

The "spiritual life" is that to which both Adam (in Paradise) and we (as Christians) look forward. The difference, however, is that whereas even though not already "perfect" Adam did possess the image, i.e., in terms of original righteousness. On the other hand perfection after the fall requires the "dying merits of Christ". The initial appearance of an inconsistency is resolved, but only at the expense of a radical

¹Gen. 2:17b, p. 188. Irenaeus also utilizes this theme, alluding to I Cor. 15:45. Cf. CHAPTER I, p. 60, and passim.

disjunction between the structures of Adam's and post-fallen man's anticipation of perfection. That is to say, the future toward which Adam may have grown (without the death of Christ), possessing the image of God, post-fallen man who has "lost" the image does not grow toward; a new structure of relation is required. For both pre- and post-fallen man, the perfection of spiritual life is prospective, although the means of attainment are dissimilar. Luther asserts that inasmuch as pre-fallen man possessed the image his attainment of perfection may have come through a gradual process; for post-fallen man, however, who has lost the image, perfection is "... through the merits and benefits of Christ." (supra).

Was the image which Adam possessed the same image to which we now look forward, or may it be said that the implications of the imago Dei in respect to Adam did not exhaust the image? That is to say, what, if any, is the difference between the image possessed and lost and the image hoped-for? According to Luther the image which Adam initially possessed was somehow incomplete, less perfect than the image to which man in faith now looks forward. In that primal state of "glorious innocence" there was an incompleted intention for man. It is this of which Luther says:

The divine object of the gospel is that we might be restored to that original and indeed better and higher image; an image, in which we are born again unto eternal life, or rather unto the hope of eternal life by faith, in order that we might live in God and with God and might be 'one' with him as Christ so beautifully and largely sets it forth in the seventeenth chapter of St. John.¹

The image which is now anticipated is a greater image than that image possessed by Adam. The restoration of the image, consequently, is not simply a return to Paradise but an experience of greater dimension, achieved on our behalf by Christ's merit, and marked by a certain fixed and established security.

a.3. The Image and Sin

We have previously concluded that the imago Dei signifies a term of moral relation, the prime implicates of which are structures of dependence which issue in security. One expects sin, therefore, to be understood and articulated within a similar structure; and indeed, it would be difficult to formulate any clearer or more concise statement than this:

... the serpent attacked the good will of God itself, and endeavored to prove by this very prohibition from the tree of life that the will of God towards man was not good. The serpent therefore attacks the image of God itself. He assails those highest and most perfect powers, which in the newly-created nature of Adam and Eve were as yet uncorrupted. He aims at overturning that highest worship of God, which God himself had just ordained.

The "highest and most perfect powers" are most properly directed toward "worship of God" and therefore are the primary target of the serpent. A structure of relation established on the foundation of worship (which here implicits trust, dependence, and love) is liable to destruction only on the same terms.

Luther states: "The sum of the whole temptation and her Eve's fall by it was that she listened to another word and departed from that WORD which God had spoken to her, ..." The "word" is the address

1Cf. Gen. 1:26a, p. 119, where Luther says that when the image is "... perfected in the kingdom of the Father, then our will will be truly free and good, our mind truly illuminated and our memory constant and perfect. Then will it come to pass also that all creatures shall be more subject unto us than ever they were unto Adam in paradise."

2Gen. 3:1b, p. 231. 3Ibid., p. 233.
of personal communication; departure from the "word" is therefore departure from personal relation. Shortly after Luther puts it thus: "... Adam by his sin dashed against the very person of Christ, who is the very image of God." 2

... when we now attempt to speak of that image we speak of a thing unknown, an image which we not only have never experienced, but the contrary to which we have experienced all our lives and experience still. Of this image therefore all we now possess are the mere terms, 'the image of God!' These naked words are all we now hear and all we know. 3

Thus does Luther introduce into the imago Dei doctrine a dimension around which the debate still continues. We have noted the implications of stating that Adam possessed the image, and we have considered the impact of sin upon it. But, is it possible to assert without qualification that the image is "lost"? If so, what are the human implications? Luther vacillates between bold statements of its having been totally lost, and more guarded assertions of its corruption. Both positions are expressed in his commentary on the one verse, Gen. 1:26.

In the context of original sin he states:

Is it not most mighty, both in concupiscence and in disgust? And what shall we further say of hatred toward God and blasphemies of all kinds? These are sad evidences of the fall, which do indeed prove that the image of God in us is lost. 4

Luther's estimation of sin is unequivocal; it is a radical disease which totally effects the total nature of man. And commensurate with his doctrine of sin, it would appear that the image is "lost". If we recall that the image is a term of righteous relation, we would not

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1 It is not implied that Luther himself employed the word "personal" to express this structure of relation. Nevertheless, there is a similarity between his expression and our use of the term.

2 Gen. 3:22, p. 341. 3 Ibid., 1:26a, p. 117.

4 Gen. 1:26a, p. 122, Ital. mine.
expect Luther to equivocate by suggesting that the effect of sin was less than total.

But on the other hand, Luther is inclined to "protect" the dignity of man in respect to lower animals, and because the *imago Dei* bears implicates of reason and a specific quality of relation to God, he tends to qualify the term "lost". He says:

> Although therefore this image of God be *almost* wholly lost, there is nevertheless still remaining a mighty difference between man and all other animals of God's creation. But originally, before the sin of the fall, the difference was far greater and far more illustrious; ... ¹

The latter difference to which he refers is that between man's pre- and post-fallen knowledge and understanding of God; it is that difference which specifies man's superiority. Quite apparently, were Luther to have interjected an interpretation of the unqualified lostness of the *imago Dei*, so also would the difference between man and other animals have been destroyed. On the contrary, he says:

> As to us in our present state we still possess indeed some certain dull and as it were dead remnants of this knowledge. But all animals besides are altogether void of such understanding. They know not their Creator nor their origin nor their end; nor whence nor why they were created. No other animals therefore possess anything whatever of this similitude of God.²

Luther is careful to protect the dignity of man and his superiority in respect to lower animals, and within that context speaks of a less-than-total destruction of the *imago Dei*. But on the other

¹Gen. 1:26a, p. 122, Ital. mine.

²Gen. 1:26b, p. 122. We would suggest that this apparently irreconcilable tension, i.e., either total or partial loss of the image, is inevitable granting, first the historic perfection of Paradise and subsequent catastrophic fall, and second the shape and structure of the *imago Dei* as portrayed by Luther. Neither tenet, we would suggest, is self-evident, nor necessarily required by Scripture.
hand, in respect to the factor of the image of God which signifies man's primal righteous relation with God, he employs terminology of totality, i.e., lost and corrupt.\(^1\)

a.4. Conclusion

In spite of significant variations in post-Thomistic theology, notably in that of Duns Scotus, the relative constancy of the "shape" of relation between God and man produced no truly significant reformation of the doctrine of the \textit{imago Dei}. Therefore, we chose to pursue our consideration in the theology of Martin Luther, in which appears to be the first serious and creative alternative in respect to our theme.

Even though structures of dualism, i.e., categories which specify the distinction between God and man, remained operative in Luther's theology, the means by which the so-called distinction was transcended was via categories of personal relation as opposed to metaphysical structures operative generally from Augustine through St. Thomas. Consequently, both the paradisial structure of relation and the subsequent dissolution of relation (fall) assume a different dimension. While Luther retained some of the terminology apropos the \textit{imago Dei}, i.e., knowledge, understanding, and will, the constructs of personal relation required a modification in respect to their primal and post-fallen function.

That the image of God is presented as a term which articulates a created quality of personal and righteous relation maximizes the

\(^1\text{Cf. Gen. 2:17b, p. 187: "Thus it is evident that original sin is the essential and entire loss and deprivation and absence of original righteousness; just as blindness is the privation or absence of sight."}
radical dissimilarity in respect to pre- and post-fallen man. The *imago Dei*, in the theology of Luther, was possessed by Adam in his primal state, and as we noted (supra, p. 195) he possessed it in its "moral substance or nature." Implications thereof are those qualities or dimensions of his life which are compatible with participation in divinity, e.g., absolute security. That Adam "possessed" the image of God does not, however, imply that his possession exhausted its dimensions. We concluded that essentially the *imago Dei* specified righteous relation. That relation, of course, was liable to destruction. But destruction of the relation insofar as Adam was concerned, did not concomitantly destroy the reality which transcended it, namely, the indestructible intention of God, first that the *imago Dei* should be the critical characterization of man, and second that subsequent to its "destruction" it should be re-created. However, the structure and shape of relation, and man's association with the image of God, assumed a different dimension subsequent to the fall, for then the dying merits of Christ were necessary, whereas in Paradise, according to Luther, they were not.

We have consistently, from the beginning of this work, either implicitly or explicitly expressed our reluctance to articulate the relation between God and man on the presupposition of an entirely and completely perfect paradisial existence and a subsequent and catastrophic fall. Consequently, we will not consider it either necessary or advisable to criticize the validity of those of Luther's conclusions which both presuppose that structure and also emanate from those presuppositions. However, Luther's conceptualization of the relation between God and man based primarily on personal categories we feel to be scripturally consistent and constructive.
Similarly, Luther's characterization of sin in his *Commentary on Genesis* conforms consistently with the categories of personal relation; the serpent attacks "... the image of God itself," (supra, p. 199, text n. 2), which may, in this instance, be called man's "worship center." Satan challenges the goodness of God's intention toward man, and man allows himself to be deluded and deceived. One wonders what the shape of the God/man relation would have been had Luther not begun with so firmly an established doctrine of the perfection of Paradise, and emphasized personal relational structures, and the *imago Dei* as righteous relation. Obviously, the last phrase, "righteous relation", would have had to have been modified; "righteous" would not appear to be a term which would appropriately be ascribed to a less-than-perfect relation between God and man. Nevertheless, an approximation of that which is implied by the term might have been feasible apart from a concept of perfect Paradise. For instance, we recall Irenaeus' concept of Adam's childhood in the Garden with its implication of an affinity between himself and God apart from perfect and mature righteousness. Is there an unexpressed reluctance on the part of Luther to see not only the possibility of the Incarnation implicit in creation, but also its conformability? That is to say, is not he (and Western theology in general) averse to considering the possibility that inherent and implicit in the Incarnation itself there may be elements of the perfection of an initial imperfection, e.g., the perfect righteousness of man whose very createdness implies only an approximation of righteousness? These and related questions have guided our work, and will also shape our final conclusion.

As Luther's doctrine of sin conforms to a configuration of personal relation, and as the *imago Dei* similarly conforms, Luther is inclined to
suggest that the totality of sin's dimensions similarly adversely affected the imago Dei, i.e., destroyed it. On the other hand there is implicit in the imago Dei, according to Luther, the specification of the differentiation between man and other animals which he seeks to maintain, and therefore he seems reluctant to assert unqualifiedly that the image is lost. This dilemma introduced the terminology of "image remnants," though from a slightly different perspective from that of St. Augustine's "vestigial image". ¹

Apart from proceeding from a presupposition of an historic Paradise, the term "remnant" and all associated terminology would appear to be quite irrelevant. Because we do not subscribe to those particular presuppositions, we will attempt to reconcile the problem implied, i.e., having-had, having-lost, and gradations thereof in a different way using different presuppositions. It would, of course, be naive and misleading to suggest that simply rejecting a set of presuppositions would lead toward a completely satisfactory alternative, that is, in terms of that which have been outlined in the Introduction. There is latitude for many variations which purport to proceed from other presuppositions, e.g., the treatment offered by Karl Barth. But, in addition to one's interpretation of the original structure of creation, there is the equally important interpretation of the structure of the relation between God and man in respect to sin, which is, in a sense, another variable which is determinative. It is that which we see exemplified in the theology of John Calvin.

¹As "remnant" presupposes a proportion of "lostness" one would conclude that utilization of such terminology would also presuppose an historic "possession". Interestingly, this structure is operative in both David Cairns' The Image of God in Man, and even more explicitly in G.C. Berkouwer's Man: The Image of God, trans. Dirk W. Jellema, (Grand Rapids: Erdmans, 1962).
b. Calvin's concept of the Imago Dei

It was suggested in our consideration of Luther's analysis of the *imago Dei* that whereas Luther's doctrine of the image was rudimentary and somewhat unsystematic, John Calvin's was well-defined. Indeed, one discovers that the *imago Dei* is a foundational theme employed by Calvin to articulate both the actual and the intended relation between God and man. As noted in our consideration of Luther, so also is John Calvin's utilization of the image of God theme directed primarily toward a fuller understanding of the God/man relation; it is a relational term.

The following quotation from Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion* enunciates several aspects of the image of God which are particularly significant, namely nature/supernature, the pre- and post-fallen characteristics of man, and grace. Our discussion of these and other topics that impinge on the *imago Dei*, e.g., the soul, gratitude, and the subjective and objective aspects of the image, illustrate the dualistic structures upon which John Calvin operated. Of man and his natural and supernatural gifts, Calvin says:

I feel pleased with the well-known saying which has been borrowed from the writings of Augustine, that man's natural gifts were corrupted by sin, and his supernatural gifts withdrawn; meaning by supernatural gifts the light of faith and righteousness, which would have been sufficient for the attainment of life and everlasting felicity. Man, when he withdrew his allegiance to God, was deprived of the spiritual gifts by which he had been raised to the hope of eternal salvation. Hence it follows, that he is now an exile from the kingdom of God, so that all things which pertain to the blessed life of the soul are extinguished in him until he recover them by the grace of regeneration. Among them are faith, love to God, charity towards our neighbour, the study of righteousness and holiness. All these, when restored to us by Christ, are to be regarded as adventitious and above nature. If so, we infer that they were previously abolished. On the other hand, soundness of mind and integrity of heart were, at the same time, withdrawn, and it is this which
constitutes the corruption of natural gifts.¹

Presupposed, as in other Western theology which has been studied, is the historicity of both the paradisial life and the fall. In Calvin's theology, no less than in respect to others examined, this presupposition shapes and in a sense determines the entire system. It incorporates not only the characteristics of fallen man and his relation to God, but also the nature and effect of sin and the redemption by Christ. Moreover, it becomes somewhat mandatory to engage in conjecture regarding the characteristics of pre-fallen man, his attributes, powers, potential, and the God/man relationship as it prevailed in Eden.²

b.1. The Original Imago Dei:

Its Essence and Dimensions

Stated generally, according to Calvin the image of God is the reflected glory of God, and the consequent or derivative superiority of man. It is recognized immediately that the image is not primarily that which inheres in Adam. It is rather that originally he adequately

¹John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 3 vols., trans., Henry Beveridge, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Printing Co., 1845-1846), 2.1.12; 1.15.4 Following common custom, the numbers indicate Book, Chapter, and Section, respectively.

²But, cf. Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine of Man, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949), pp. 84-85: "... when Calvin approaches the facts of man's fallen and depraved nature, he refuses to enunciate a doctrine in abstraction from the new creation in Christ where man is placed in the light of his original truth which is still the truth about man, no matter how much he has perverted it and himself. That is the Word of grace by which he was made, and to which he is called to conform, toward which his life is destined, and so the imago Dei in which and unto which man is created we see at last in Christ, who is identical with God's gracious action toward man." And cf. On Eph., 4:24; Inst. 1.15.4. We do not wish to imply either that Calvin's constitutive motif in respect to his doctrine of the imago Dei was other than Christ, or that our own orientation would challenge that order. However, this reservation seems valid, viz., that there is some degree of reciprocity between "situation" and "solution". That is to say, the predetermination of the shape of
reflected the glory of God inasmuch as there was a primal similitude between himself and Christ. ¹ Being united to God, which is one of the dimensions of the image, is what Calvin calls "... the true and highest perfection of dignity ... ".² We will attempt to determine Calvin's meaning of the term "united", for as a term of relation it partially characterizes Calvin's doctrine of the \textit{imago Dei}.

Professor Torrance's conclusion in respect to the essence of the image in Calvin's theology states concisely:

There is no doubt that Calvin always thinks of the \textit{imago} in terms of a \textit{mirror}. Only while the mirror actually reflects an object does it have the image of that object. There is no such thing in Calvin's thought as an \textit{imago} dissociated from the act of reflecting.³

Granting the above, which of course does not exhaust Calvin's contribution to the image theme, we will need to further explore the precise meaning and significance of the assertion that the image relates to this ability or potential of man, i.e., to reflect the "object", God himself. This potentiality of primal man is what Torrance refers to as the subjective aspect of the image. But first and foremost one should appreciate that the subjective dimension of the image is entirely dependent on its objective foundation. There is no image \textit{in man, per se}; the image is rather reflected \textit{by man}. "God looks upon Himself, so to speak, and post-fallen man's relation to God to some extent shapes one's Christology, and conversely, one's Christology prescribes one's anthropology.

¹Calvin emphatically asserts that it is the pre-existent Christ to whom Adam is related; it is not a relation to the future incarnate Christ, which idea he calls "silly and distorted". Cf. \textit{Inst. 2.12.6}.

²\textit{Inst. 2.12.6}.

³\textit{Calvin's Doctrine of Man}, p. 36, and cf. \textit{Ibid...}, p. 39: "Primarily, it is \textit{God Himself} who beholds His own glory in the works of His hand, or rather who images Himself in these works."
beholds Himself in man as in a mirror."¹ This primary factor qualifies Calvin's entire contribution to the image doctrine. Beyond the purely objective characteristics of the imago Dei, our study especially involves the subjective aspects; i.e., those factors which impinge more directly on the nature of man. In this sense, states Calvin, the image

... extends to everything in which the nature of man surpasses that of all other species of animals. Accordingly, by this term is denoted the integrity with which Adam was endowed when his intellect was clear, his affections subordinated to reason, all his senses duly regulated, and when he truly ascribed all his excellence to the admirable gifts of his Maker.²

The potentiality and primal actuality of Adam's reflection of the glory of God carries with it those characteristics of man which have variously been termed "original rectitude" (Aquinas) and "original righteousness" (Luther) and which Calvin designates as "integrity".³ A primary constituent of such integrity is man's initial cognitive and intellectual capacity, however not in a purely rationalistic dimension, as we note:

... as God at first formed us in his own image, that he might elevate our minds to the pursuit of virtue, and the contemplation of eternal life, so to prevent us from heartlessly burying those qualities which distinguish us from the lower animals, it is of importance to know that we were endowed with reason and intelligence, in order that we might cultivate a holy and honourable life, and regard a blessed immortality as our destined aim.⁴

Recalling the conclusion that the image refers to man's reflective potential, and that Adam's cognitive capacity was oriented primarily toward the pursuit of virtue, that is, the cultivation of a "holy and honourable life", it may be assumed that initially there was an intrinsic

¹ Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 74. And cf. Serm. on Job 10:7f.
² Inst. 1.15.3., and cf. Brief Confession of Faith, p. 131, cited by Torrance, Ibid., p. 39.
³ Cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 39, n. 4. ⁴ Inst. 2.1.1.
relation between the objective constituent of the image, i.e., God, and man's apprehension of a particular mode of relation between himself and God.  

Professor Torrance, citing Inst. 1.6.2. and 1.15.6., asserts that according to Calvin "... man had a primeval revelation which enabled him to live in communion with the Creator of the world, ... " To live "in communion with the Creator" is at one and the same time the end (intention) of the image, and constitutive of true, essential manhood. Such communion, according to Calvin, was a blessing operative in Paradise, the continuation of which was contingent upon Adam's proper response of obedience and gratitude. He states:

For a man to be ungrateful in refusal to acknowledge the grace of God is to deface the image of God in him, to un-man himself, and to become a beast or a creature without light in his understanding.

God's intention to reflect Himself in His creation, pre-eminently in man, joined with a particular function of rationality, i.e., perception, gratitude, and obedience, would seem to be the heart of Calvin's doctrine

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1 Cf. Comm. on I Pet. 1:25: "There is no true life but in God, and this is communicated to us by His Word." - cited by Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 59. And cf. Torrance, Ibid., p. 31: "... man's true life consists in the light of his understanding is so far as that is reflexive of the glory of God revealed through His Word. It is thus that men resemble God."

2 Torrance, Ibid., p. 33.


4 Cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 70: "On the subjective side, the Imago Dei may be defined as man's humble and adoring gratitude to God for His wonderful grace, in which motion of thankfulness man most truly reflects or images the glory of the Father so as to be himself a true child of the Father. It is grateful sonship."

5 Ibid., p. 34.
of the *imago Dei*. It ought, perhaps, to be re-emphasized that the primary orientation of man's intellectual capacity exceeded the management of mundane affairs; it was primarily directed toward the exercise of communion with the Divine. According to Calvin:

Men excelled in these noble endowments, i.e., intellect and will in his primitive condition, when reason, intelligence, prudence, and judgment, not only sufficed for the government of his earthly life, but also enabled him to rise up to God and eternal happiness.1

It may be suggested that the *imago Dei*, as portrayed by Calvin, is liable to dissolution from either one of two directions. Because the image is pre-eminently the reflection of God in terms of His will and Word2, God could withdraw Himself entirely, thereby depriving the reflective potential of man of its object. The actualization of that possibility, i.e., the total retraction of God's grace, has *not* been realized.3 On the other hand, the dissolution of the *imago Dei* has been effected by means of man's misuse of his powers of intellect and will as Calvin makes clear:

At first every part of the soul was formed to rectitude. There was soundness of mind and freedom of will to choose the good. If any one objects that it was placed, as it were, in a slippery position, because its power was weak, I answer, that the degree conferred was sufficient to take away every excuse. ... Man had received the power, if he had the will, but he had not the will which would have given the power; for this will would have been followed by perseverance. Still, after he had received so much, there is no excuse for his having spontaneously brought death upon himself. No necessity was laid upon God to

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1Inst. 1.15.8. And cf. Ibid., 1.15.7. wherein Calvin says: "... the office of the intellect ... to distinguish between objects, according as they seem deserving of being approved or disapproved; and the office of the will, to choose and follow what the intellect declares to be good, to reject and shun what it declares to be bad, ... ."

2Cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 64.

3Cf. Inst., 2.2.16.
give him more than that intermediate and even transient will, that out of man's fall he might extract materials for his own glory.\(^1\)

Apart from the issue of theodicy, the consideration of which is outside our field of responsibility, the above reference raises a question in respect to Calvin's doctrine of the *imago Dei*, i.e., were "soundness of mind and freedom of will", (which are constitutive of the *imago Dei*), in fact sufficient to take "away every excuse"? According to Calvin they failed to perpetuate the image. Adam's primal power was "sufficient", but for reasons which are inexplicable, the *will* was defective. This is essentially the rationale employed by St. Augustine,\(^2\) and if one grants the historicity of a completed and perfect Paradise, the explication offered may in fact be the only one possible.

However, there is another contention which presents itself, i.e., the assertion that Christ was pre-eminently the image of God, and that

... whatever excellence was engraved on Adam had its origin in this, that by means of the only begotten Son he approximated to the glory of his Maker. Man, therefore, was created in the image of God, (Gen. i.27), and in him the Creator was pleased to behold, as in a mirror, his own glory. To this degree of honour he was exalted by the kindness of the only begotten Son.\(^3\)

It is clearly stated that the excellence of man was "engraven" which, except for the "mirror" theme, might imply (erroneously) that such excellence was of man's nature, his being, that is, something which was a "given" property of man.\(^4\) But the "mirror" theme and the added qualification that the image was a Christ-property make that conclusion doubtful. Therefore, it seems inappropriate and illegitimate to expect from Adam

\(^{1}\)Inst., 1.15.8. \(^{2}\)Cf. Chapter II, pp. 132-33.

\(^{3}\)Inst. 2.12.6.

the "perfection" which is only properly accomplished by the Son. Adam is nonetheless held culpable, in spite of his "slippery position" and his "intermediate and even transient will" (supra, p. 211.). This seems unjustified, even from within Calvin's own system. He seems to have ignored the essential difference between the Son and Adam and their respective relation to the imago Dei.

b.2. The Image: of Nature or Supernature?

Calvin's anthropology is primarily of the dichotomist order; he states: "... there can be no question that man consists of a body and a soul; meaning by soul, an immortal though created essence, which is his nobler part."¹ Because man is "... called the image of God in respect of the soul; ...",² and also, as we have seen, because the soul is "... the proper seat of the image",³ we will concentrate on that dimension of man's being. In reference both to the last quotation, and to Calvin's Commentary on Ezekiel 18:32, Professor Torrance introduces the following clarification:

It seems quite clear ... that when Calvin says that the proper seat of the image is in the soul, he does not mean that the imago Dei is the soul, or any natural property of the soul, but that the soul is the mirror which reflects in it or ought to reflect in it the image of God. In this way Calvin can say, on the one hand, that the imago Dei is a bonum adventitium.

On the other hand, however, Professor Torrance cites Calvin's Institutes 1.15.4. to assert that the imago Dei is also a bonum internum inasmuch as the soul possesses it "... by way of spiritual ornaments such as wisdom, virtue, justice, truth, and holiness."⁵ This so-called bonum

¹Inst. 1.15.2. ²Ibid., 1.15.3.
³Ibid., and supra, especially pp. 206f.
⁴Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 53.
⁵Ibid.
internum pertains to the soul, affects the soul, but is not possessed by
the soul in terms of a soul-property, as we have noted.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Inst.} 2.2.1.: "At the time when he was raised to the
highest pinnacle of honour, all which Scripture attributes to him is,
that he was created in the image of God, thereby intimating that the
blessings in which his happiness consisted were not his own, but derived
by divine communication." Ital. mine.} A more careful
examination of nature/supernature may clarify this apparent ambiguity,
i.e., the \textit{bonum adventitium/internum}, in respect to the \textit{imago Dei}. Calvin
says that "... the image of God constitutes the entire excellency of human
nature, as it shone in Adam before his fall, ..."\footnote{\textit{Inst.} 1.15.4.} But that which is
thus constitutive does not as much constitute human \textit{nature} as a certain
quality of nature's \textit{ornaments}, e.g., integrity.

"... man's natural gifts were corrupted by sin, and his superna
atural gifts ... withdrawn; meaning by supernatural gifts the
light of faith and righteousness, ..."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 2.2.12.} The \textit{imago Dei} is a factor of
supernature, and its relation to the nature of man would seem to be that
of association, somewhat extrinsic and separable. It is to be "... regarded
as above the common order of nature and as consisting in supernatural
gifts",\footnote{Torrance, \textit{Calvin's Doctrine}, p. 69.} "... a spiritual possession, and therefore above nature and
the world."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 54, Ital. mine. And cf. Calvin, \textit{The Catechism of
the Church of Geneva}, p. 45, cited by Torrance, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 45: That
we are sons of God we have not from nature, but from adoption and
grace only."} It is clear that Calvin's doctrine of the \textit{imago Dei} is
contingent upon his understanding of these two spheres of reality, nature
and supernature, and that the image pre-eminently pertains to the latter.
b.3. The *Imago Dei* - Post Fall

Having enunciated in the first sections of Calvin's doctrine of the *imago Dei* as related to Adam prior to the fall, this section will consider the image as it is, that is, relative to man post-fall. However, it may not be possible to say the image "is" in the sense of an existing reality. "Is" is used therefore to signify only the post-fallen characteristics of the image, and to ascertain whether or not, according to Calvin, the image of God is still applicable as a present constitutive factor of man. We shall also attempt to discern the implications of the fall relative to man's natural and supernatural endowments.

The realization or actualization of the *imago Dei* in respect to paradisial man requires the proper configuration of grace and gratitude. Therefore, we would expect the dissolution of the original actualization to occur within that structure. We have already noted (*supra*, pp. 211-12) that grace, the intention of God, is constant; therefore, the tragic variable would seem to be centered in the latter, i.e., man's response of gratitude, and its implicates. This is precisely asserted by Calvin: "... his ingratitude has thrust him down from the highest glory to extreme ignominy."¹ Certainly, a prime implicate of Adam's gratitude was his

¹*Inst.*, 2.2.1., and cf. *supra*, p. 210, n. 4. But, cf. A. Mitchell Hunter, *The Teaching of Calvin*, (London: James Clark & Co., second ed., 1950) wherein we read, pp. 118-19: "Calvin consistently assigns repro- bation to two causes, the will of God and the sin of man. The sin of man, however, was not the ultimate reason of his rejection, but its justi- fication. Rejection preceded actual sin; it was an eternal decree of God." Here the culpability of Adam is subordinated to divine predestin- ation. Undoubtedly, an explication of Calvin's doctrine of predestination would contribute to our understanding of his doctrine of man - though it is doubtful that anything significant would be added apropos the *imago Dei*, per se. Furthermore, apart from a very thorough study, the dimensions of which would exceed the limits of our chapter, half - truths and misconceptions would seem inevitable. There is no apparent
primeval recognition first of the reality of the two spheres, i.e., nature and supernature, and secondly that he was, as a creature of nature, entirely dependent upon the supernatural (spiritual) not only for his existence, but primarily for the shape and quality of his existence in relation to God. The rationale and shape of the "fall" therefore is this, that:

... though he was formed after the image of God to have understanding of all things that pertained to him in such wise that he could wish for nothing more ... he was not content to be so far enlightened in the knowledge of things by God's Spirit as was expedient for his welfare, but would needs become like unto God.¹

That Adam despised his dependence and desired equality is Calvin's analysis of ingratitude, from which he proceeds to explore its implications. Calvin says:

After the heavenly image in man was effaced, he not only was himself punished by a withdrawal of the ornaments in which he had been arrayed, viz., wisdom, virtue, justice, truth, and holiness, and by the substitution in their place of those dire pests, blindness, impotence, vanity, impurity, and unrighteousness, but he involved his posterity also, and plunged them in the same wretchedness.²

¹Serm. on Job 28:10f, cited by Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, pp. 55-56.
²Inst. 2.1.5. The reference continues: "This is the hereditary corruption to which early Christian writers gave the name of Original Sin, meaning by the term the depravation of nature formerly good and pure." We do not consider it necessary to thoroughly explicate Calvin's doctrine of original sin; nevertheless, we will include a cursory summary. Again, Calvin maintains the duality of nature/supernature, and asserts "... that man is corrupted by a natural viciousness, but not by one which proceeded from nature. In saying that it proceeded not from nature, we mean that it was rather an adventitious event which befell man, than a substantial property assigned to him from the beginning." Here follows a note which says: "we deny that it is of nature, in order to show that it is rather a quality super-added to man than a property of his substance, which has been from the beginning rooted in him." The text then continues: "We, however, call it natural to prevent any one from supposing that each
The significance of the "withdrawal of the ornaments in which he [Adam] had been arrayed" poses a question: is the punishment incurred exhaustively explained in terms of withdrawal, i.e., deprivation? If so, do the antithetical "pests", i.e., blindness, impotence, etc., follow logically as e.g., emptiness logically follows the draining of a cup? Or are we to infer that the "pests" that plague fallen man subsist in the same order of reality as do the "ornaments" and that therefore they follow not logically, but punitively? Inasmuch as Calvin asserts that both the "ornaments" and the "pests" are similarly adventitious, and that both are "superadded to man" (supra, p. 216, n. 2), it would appear that: (1) Adam's punishment is not simply via privation; (2) punishment is not merely of a "logical" order; (3) Adam's bane and blessing are alike adventitious, and therefore subsist as spiritual realities.1

individual contracts it by depraved habit, whereas all receive it by a hereditary law." Eph. 2:3 is cited as his support. Inst. 2.1.11. Therefore, says Calvin, "Man, since he was corrupted by the fall, sins not forced or unwilling, but voluntarily, by a most forward bias of the mind; not by violent compulsion, or external force, but by the movement of his own passion; and yet such is the depravity of his nature, that he cannot move and act except in the direction of evil. If this is true, the thing not obscurely expressed is, that he is under a necessity of sinning." Inst. 2.3.5.

Inasmuch as the image relationship is adventitious, so also, says Calvin, is that "viciousness" which destroys it. It is called natural to emphasize its hereditary communication, but it is not of his nature which, because from God, can only be good. The viciousness of nature engenders no ontological break with God, for that would imply man's total annihilation. Cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 92. Nature is corruptible, but not destructable. Cf. Inst. 2.2.12.

1 Whereas these conclusions are admittedly relevant primarily within the context of soteriology inasmuch as they determine the shape of salvation, nevertheless they also contribute to our understanding of the imago Dei insofar as they contribute to our understanding of the man who was made in God's image. Note the significantly different explication proposed by Augustine (supra, especially pp. 123f.) which was essentially privative. Irenaeus' interpretation is even more dissimilar; his concept of man's growth makes sin and evil relative to the goal toward which man is expected to struggle, cf. supra pp. 60-62, 101f.
On the basis of the foregoing we conclude that corruption, of which Calvin speaks so much, is to be considered more as a positive constituent of fallen man than simply as a negation of his paradisial ornamens. That is to say, man's corruption is not essentially privative. Therefore, Calvin speaks in what Professor Torrance calls "total" terms. An illustration, relevant to post-fallen man, is the "total" antithesis between flesh and Spirit of which Calvin states:

In the contrast between the Spirit and the flesh, there is nothing left of an intermediate nature. In this way, everything in man, which is not spiritual, falls under the denomination of carnal. But we have nothing of the Spirit except through regeneration.

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1Cf. Inst. 2.1.9.: "... the part in which the dignity and excellence of the soul are most conspicuous, i.e., the mind has not only been wounded, but so corrupted, that mere cure is not sufficient."

2Cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 85: "It is because faith must speak of salvation and forgiveness in total terms that it must also speak of sin and depravity in total terms. It is only within this context of grace, and only on the ground of this grace, that we have any right to make such a total judgment upon man as he is, ...". (Ital. mine.) And cf. Ibid., p. 88: "Because grace implies a total judgment on man, it also implies a total judgment on his possession of the imago dei. It is an inescapable inference from the revelation of grace that Christ is our righteousness, and wisdom, and imago dei, that fallen man is quite bereft of the image of God." (Ital. mine.) And cf. Ibid., p. 19: "... from a dogmatic point of view, Calvin's doctrine of the fall of man and of sin is a corollary of the doctrine of grace in forgiveness and salvation. Justification by grace alone carries with it the doctrine that the justitia originalis has been wholly and irrevocably lost."

Christology and soteriology exceed the scope of this chapter, but we suggest that apart from the configuration of Paradise operative in Calvin's system (and also Torrance's, e.g., justitia originalis) both Christology and soteriology may have developed along somewhat different lines. Cf. supra, p. 207, n. 2.

3Inst. 2.3.1., and infra where, citing John 3:6 and Rom. 8:8 Calvin asks: "Is it true that the flesh is so perverse, that it is perpetually striving with all its might against God: that it cannot accord with the righteousness of the divine law? that, in short, it can beget nothing but the materials of death? Grant that there is nothing in human nature but flesh, and then extract something good out of it if you can."
Thus Calvin portrays post-fallen and pre-regenerate man. And recalling that the image is a spiritual factor of man, there appears to be little doubt that the image is incompatible with "flesh". Although man's natural gifts which come from God are not, per se, subject to pollution, nevertheless in regard to fallen man they have ceased to be pure. Therefore the mind which is a natural gift and hence indestructable (though corruptible) becomes no more than a shapeless ruin. The material presented above (section b.3.) leads to an unambiguous conclusion regarding Calvin's doctrine of man in the image of God (or shall we say, post-imago Dei?). It asserts a doctrine which is thoroughly negative and totally pessimistic.

There is, however, another doctrinal strain woven into his system to which we now turn our attention.

Should anyone object that this divine image has been obliterated, the solution is easy. First there still exists some remnant of it, so that man is possessed of no small dignity; and secondly, the Celestial Creator Himself, however corrupted man may be, still keeps in view the end of his original creation; and according to His example, we ought to consider for what end He created men, and what excellence He was bestowed upon them above the rest of living beings.

That God retains the memory of His original purpose and intention for His creation, specifically man, implies to Calvin the terminology of "remnant". 

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1 Cf. Inst., 2.2.17.
2 Cf. Ibid., 2.2.12; 1.15.4., and cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, pp. 34 and 78 wherein Professor Torrance cites Calvin's references to the "bestiality" of fallen man in his Sermon(s) on Dt. 28:46f; and Job 15:17f and 32:4f; and 33:29f.
4 Cf. supra, pp. 200ff., for Luther's interpretation. His understanding of the "remnant" relates to man's mind. Calvin's emphasis on the factor of God's "intention" as the image remnant is more constructive.
Professor Torrance suggests that this second dimension of Calvin's system is actually intrinsic and consistent inasmuch as he is speaking not of a static, substantival relation, but of a dynamic and spiritual one. In that dynamic, spiritual sense, God "... still keeps us in existence, even when we are sinners, with natural gifts from His hand." Torrance also adds that

... the mirror remains, though grievously impaired, and we may see God's workmanship in it, especially in his \( \text{man's} \) creation as a rational and conscious creature, and in that sense it reflects God's image.

We will not ignore the conspicuous presence of either of these two apparently contradictory assertions, i.e., total depravity and remnant, nor will we assume the position of arbiter, attempting to determine which is the pre-eminent thrust. Rather, both will be maintained, as Calvin himself apparently intended, in spite of the consequent (and we would suggest, unnecessary) confusion. In a sense, Calvin's system or doctrine is contextually determined: regarding grace, on the one hand, there must indeed be the recognition of corruption, but the strength of God's gracious intention, i.e., that man's destiny is still circumscribed by conformation to the divine image, qualifies and palliates the fall's dimensions so as to accommodate the concept of "remnant" and its implicates. Within the context of post-fallen corruption, on the other hand, Calvin emphatically enunciates the terminology of totality and despair.

1 Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, pp. 56, 107.
2 Ibid., p. 92, and cf. Inst. 2.2.17.
3 Torrance, Ibid., p. 97.
4 We might also say that in respect to man's relation to God, total corruption applies; but, in respect to lower forms of creation, a "remnant" remains to signify man's superiority.
b.4. Conclusion

It seems apparent on the basis of our consideration of John Calvin's doctrine of the *imago Dei* that the dualistic structure of nature/supernature circumscribes the dimensions and "shape" of the image. Indeed, as we indicated at the outset, Calvin's doctrine, like that of Luther before him, was relationally oriented. However, in Calvin's system, the primacy of the sphere of supernature effectually delimits that which may conceivably be ascribed to man. Consequently, the *imago Dei* is pre-eminently God's own image - He is its object.

That which subsequently relates to man, therefore, is his potentiality to "mirror" the object of the image. One factor of man's "mirroring" potential, and perhaps the most important one, is that man was initially (in Paradise) endowed with communion with the Creator. We are careful to point out, however, that the initial communion, characterized by Calvin, is essentially of a responsory nature; consistent with the "mirror" theme, man most faithfully communes with God by means of a response of gratitude. This, in turn, is refracted into the sphere of the mundane which, though not at all insignificant, is of secondary value. The precision, clarity, and indeed, the "religious" value of Calvin's doctrine, thus far considered, is admirable. But, as we have pointed out (nearly to the point of redundancy) the *sine qua non* of the system is the truth and credibility of perfect Paradise and catastrophic fall. Furthermore the structures of nature/supernature, as supportive of the system, are indispensable.

In respect to a possible explication of the relation between God and man via the *imago Dei*, we note the utilization of categories which in fact tend toward disjunction. It seems that Calvin is over-
solicitous to preserve and protect the "otherness" and sovereignty of God, which may be the concomitant of his particular characterization of the grace of God (though his specific motive is not our concern). A consequence, however, of his solicitude is the attempt to distinguish between bonum adventitium and bonum internum in respect to the ornaments with which man is initially endowed. On the one hand, the endowments constitutive of man's primal dignity pertain to man inasmuch as they are constitutive of his original relation to God. On the other hand, however, they are not of his nature, for they can (and Calvin says, have been) be withdrawn. The implications are first, the man no longer reflects God's glory, and second, that he is no longer truly human. We must conclude therefore that to be truly human is a quality or dimension of supernature, attendant but subordinate consequences of which are the dimensions of intra-personal being and inter-personal relation.

The radical and total disparity between the spheres of nature/supernature which was temporarily overcome in Paradise, has again asserted itself via the "fall". The ramifications of that contra-distinction are in no sense neutral or passive; rather, the disjunction issues in open and active hostility. Man, bereft of his former supernatural endowments, is not merely natural man; his privation is accompanied by "dire pests", namely, blindness, impotence, vanity, impurity, and unrighteousness which subsist in a sphere of reality similar to the adventitious gifts which formerly contributed to proper relation. For man, therefore, to be "natural" is not to be neutral; the deprivation of man's supernatural endowments issues in a certain bestiality to which Calvin ascribes the terms carnal and total depravity.

We noted, however, another and somewhat contradictory strain
or element in Calvin's doctrine of the *imago Dei*, i.e., the ascription of "remnant". This, and its implicates of residual rationality and relative superiority of man over lower forms of nature, is a theme apparently required to explicate another factor of the image, i.e., the intentionality of God to restore some by means of the redemptive work of Christ.

Our conclusion and summary of Calvin's doctrine of the *imago Dei* make it apparent that if the image of God is as explicated by Calvin, i.e., a spiritual relation reflective of God's supernatural glory, we shall not expect to make significant utilization of his categories in respect to a doctrine which includes implicates of co-inherence. We can, indeed, appreciate the characterization from the perspective of a God-man relationship, and moreover, that God does endow man with potentiality. We can further affirm the association of the *imago Dei* with Christ. However, even these possible points of agreement become negligible inasmuch as Calvin surrounds them with the presuppositions of a perfect Paradise, and more significantly, a post-fallen antipathy between nature and grace, the implicates of which are that God must unilaterally overcome the opposition which pertains between God and man.
CHAPTER IV
SIGNIFICANT CONTEMPORARY CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE IMAGO DEI THEME
-PART ONE-

The Imago Dei in the Theology
of Karl Barth

A resurgence of theological interest in the imago Dei theme has occurred in this century. This re-awakening of interest has produced some of the most creative, realistic, progressive, and biblically sound material which the church has offered. Perhaps most notably in the theology of Karl Barth one recognizes the emergence of a theology which transcends both the theological liberalism of the nineteenth century (anthropocentrism) and the tendency toward rigid conservatism of the early twentieth (theocentrism).\(^1\) Indicative of the century's mood is this assessment of Barth: "... he forces God and man, heaven and earth, creator and creature asunder, by exalting the superiority of God and deepening the inferiority of man to their ultimate degree."\(^2\) The same man, however, addressing the Swiss Reformed Minister's Association in Arau in 1956 said this:

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But did it not appear to escape us by quite a distance that the deity of the living God - and we certainly wanted to deal with Him - found its meaning and its power only in the context of His history and His dialogue with man, and thus in His togetherness with man? ... Who God is and what He is in His deity He proves and reveals not in a vacuum as a divine being-for-Himself, but precisely and authentically in the fact that He exists, speaks, and acts as the partner of man, though of course as the absolutely superior partner.1

Barth's unquestioned leadership and influence in the calling of theology back to its center, and on the other hand, his insistence that theology has necessarily to do with God's "togetherness" with man, are qualifications that suggest our consideration. Furthermore, and of greatest importance as regards our consideration of Barth, is the fact that he offers us an especially creative interpretation of the imago Dei theme.

Our question has to do with man created by God, in His image. And because Barth so explicitly develops a doctrine of the Creator-God with implications in respect to man, it is appropriate to begin our discussion with that subject.

a. God: The Creator

From Barth's point of view, the attempt to explicate the meaning and significance of creation requires that one look first to Him who is worshipped as Creator. He is the inner logic, the rationale of creation itself. Even more explicitly stated, to comprehend creation necessitates an understanding of the trinitarian structure of God, and the relation between the Persons of the Trinity.2 Barth expresses it thus:


... what God does as the Creator can in the Christian sense only be seen and understood as a reflection, as a shadowing forth of this inner divine relationship between the Father and the Son.\(^1\)

An understanding of this factor of divine inter-relation is essential for an understanding of Barth's interpretation of the \textit{imago Dei}. In other words, it is obviously inappropriate to attempt to abstract creation or any portion thereof from the doctrine of God in order thereby to comprehend it. Furthermore, one is well-advised to constantly retain this foundational doctrine in further consideration of related subjects.

The word "creation" may signify the divine act by which God brings into being that which did not exist before. Or, on the other hand, "creation" may refer to that which exists, i.e., man, nature, and history. It is important to note that both senses are, according to Barth, included in the covenant intention of God - the intention by which, in its actualization, creation itself occurs. There is an internal basis of the covenant, namely, that which may be called the intra-trinitarian experience of joyous communion. The extension of that relation, and the ultimate re-creation or re-enactment of that experience, become the rationale for the creative act of God.\(^2\) The love of God, according to Barth, could not remain satisfied with the intra-trinitarian expression of the covenant. Therefore, it "... made itself this external ground of the covenant, i.e., it made necessary the existence and being of the creature and therefore of creation."\(^3\)


\(^2\)Cf. \textit{C.D.}, III/1, p. 98: "The goal of creation, and at the same time the beginning of all that follows, is the event of God's Sabbath freedom, Sabbath rest and Sabbath joy, in which man, too, has been summoned to participate."

\(^3\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 97.
But, that which is thus created remains inseparably related to the covenant intention of God, and derives its reality and purpose from that perspective. Barth says,

Creation is one long preparation, and therefore the being and existence of the creature one long readiness, for what God will intend and do with it in the history of the covenant. Its nature is simply its equipment for grace. Its creatureliness is pure promise, expectation and prophecy of that which in His grace, in the execution of His eternal love, and finally and supremely in the consummation of the giving of His Son, God plans for man and will not delay to accomplish for his benefit. In this way creation is the road to the covenant ...

"The existence of the creature" and the nature of that creature in the imago Dei, specifically man, is the concern of this thesis. And, at this point the following questions arise. What really is the significance of creaturely, historical existence if, as we have been informed, it is essentially a reproduction of a pre-existent relation between the Father and the Son? A related question is this: how will the relation between God's "intention" and its actualization finally be expressed? Will the pre-eminence of the eternal covenant minimize the significance of man's creaturely existence?

It is evident that Barth intends to make certain that creation is not to be considered as an independent sphere of reality. Rather, to comprehend creation one must recognize the Creator, and creation's relation to His covenant. Barth suggests that the word from Genesis in reference to creation being "good" means "... that it was adapted to the purpose which God had in view; adapted to be the external basis of His covenant of grace." Further elucidating the priority of the covenant and its relation to Christ, Barth says:

1C.D. III/1, p. 231.
2Ibid., p. 213.
... by covenant we mean Jesus Christ. But it is not the case that the covenant between God and man is so to speak a second fact, something additional, but the covenant is as old as creation itself. When the existence of creation begins, God's dealing with man also begins. For all that exists points towards man, in so far as it makes God's purpose visible, moving towards His revealed and effective action in the covenant with Jesus Christ. The covenant is not only quite as old as creation; it is older than it. Before the world was, before heaven and earth were, the resolve or decree of God exists in view of this event in which God willed to hold communion with man, as it became inconceivably true and real in Jesus Christ. And when we ask about the meaning of existence and creation, about their ground and goal, we have to think of this covenant between God and man.1

The effect of the above is clearly to locate the origin of the entire purpose and plan of God within the sphere of pre-creation. The covenant is not, as Barth says, simply as old as creation; in no way does it have its origin, for instance, with the call to Abraham, nor even with earlier men. We may conclude, therefore, that the manifestation of the covenant - primarily in Jesus Christ - is simply the manifestation of that which existed before creation itself. What therefore, may we say of man in relation to the covenant? Barth says that he is

... a being determined by God for life with God and existing for the history of the covenant which God has established with him. ... It is as he is not divine but cosmic, and therefore from God's standpoint below, ... that he is determined by God and for life with God.2

Man, as a creaturely being, is determined by God as God's covenant partner - at least in respect to Barth's estimation of man as a theological being. The qualifications imposed on man's theological "being" are yet to be considered. What has been realized in this section is that both the act of God which is called creation, and also the creaturely existence

1 Dog. Outline, pp. 63-64.

2 G.D., III/2, p. 204.
itself, are comprehensible only as they reflect and potentially re-enact
the relation between the Father and the Son.\(^1\) Further, we have noted
that the covenant which pre-existed between the Father and the Son becomes
the rationale of creation itself, and creation becomes the manifestation of
that covenant. We turn now to a consideration of the created order, realizing
that in reference to Barth's system such an attempt is theological, not cosmological.

b. God and Creation

Having determined that God's creation is the expression of His inter-
ternal covenant we now seek to comprehend the nature of that which Barth
terms a "reality distinct from God".\(^2\) That phrase is a significant one,
implying more than simply - what is not-God is distinct from God. Rather,
Barth maintains, what God has created to be distinct from Him is in fact
that which is required by Him in order to effect the being of a creaturely
covention partner. That which is created "distinct" is properly termed
reality; nothingness is not thus characterized. As Barth states:

Creaturely reality means reality on the basis of a creatio ex
nihilo, a creation out of nothing. Where nothing exists - and
not a kind of primal matter - there through God there has come
into existence that which is distinct from Him.\(^3\)

There is also to be noted in Barth's system the factor of on-going
creation, with the implication that the continuation of the created sphere
is also properly termed creation. Both the preservation and government of

\(^1\)Cf. Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 113, and his severe criticism of this
element in Barth's system: "Reduced to a formula, we might say that the
divine Trinity devised a drama in eternity, and gave its first performance within
itself, played by the three persons. Now this drama is to be re-enacted
on earth, as it has been in heaven. To this end the world is created as
the stage, and man as the spectator."


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 55. The German text is: "Geschöpfliche Wirklichkeit, das
bedeutet Wirklichkeit auf Grund einer creatio ex nihilo, einer Schöpfung aus
dem Nichts. Da wo nichts ist - auch nicht etwa eine Art Urstoff! - da würde
durch Gott das, was nun verschieden von ihm ist." Nothingness is further
discussed below, Sec. b.1., and Appendix B.
man, sometimes called providence, are included in what Barth calls creatio continua.\(^1\) However, this is not to suggest that there are no terminal points, or that the existence of the created order is a timeless one. History, states Barth, "... begins with creation; ... creation itself has as such a historical character and is an event fulfilling time."\(^2\)

The complexity and profundity of Barth's concepts of history and time – though we do not intend to thoroughly discuss them – are illustrated in the following:

The termination of creation is not its completion /Der Abschluß der Schöpfung ist noch nicht ihre Vollendung/. That is to say, it is not completed because it is concluded, but because of the presupposition of this conclusion God rested on the seventh day. The completion of creation is the joyful readiness in which the Creator and creature, the Master and the work which He has set before Him, are now conjoined, and together anticipate the common history which now commences.\(^3\)

This is only one perspective relative to creation and history, i.e., that creation's conclusion is not yet accomplished. Yet, in anticipation, and with assurance of its proper consummation, God has already celebrated the Sabbath rest. There is, however, one very significant point that demands clarification; something has occurred to alter the shape of the "common history which now commences." Surely the "joyful readiness" in which God and man are conjoined has become other than purely joyful. In response to that query Barth says,

It is only under the very different order of the being of the creature which follows creation and is under passive or active threat, only in the sphere of history which will become that of the intervening incident of the fall /Sündenfalls/, that things will turn out differently, and an order of creaturely relationship will be set up which will be commensurate with the breach of peace between God and man, which will have regard to this breach, ... \(^4\)

\(^1\)Cf. C.D., III/1, p. 60.
\(^2\)Ibid.
\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 176-177.
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 209.
History has been, according to Barth, radically affected by the "incident of the fall". That "event" as it relates to man himself will be discussed below (Secs. d.1-3.). At this point however, we note that in spite of the fact that Barth rejects the notion of an historic Paradise and subsequent fall, he nevertheless continues to employ those concepts. One wonders how both statements can be asserted - on the one hand that God and man "together anticipate the common history which now commences" and, on the other hand that "... history for its part begins with creation;... "

For Barth asserts that history involves the "different order of being" - post-fall - whereas his suggestion that God and man "together anticipate the common history" would seem to imply either that the "fall" in fact had no significant (i.e. actual and historical) detrimental effect, or that creation's "completion" so overwhelmed the time of anticipation (history) that its "fall" paled in that glory. The following consideration of the positive and negative poles of creation will contribute toward a resolution of this problem. And, at the same time, it will provide a broader definition of the environment of man's creation in the imago Dei.

b.l. Creation: Its Positive and Negative Poles

God created man to lift him in His own Son into fellowship with Him. This is the positive meaning of human existence /Dasein/ and all existence. But this elevation presupposes a wretchedness /Niedrigkeit/ of human and all existence which His own Son will share and bear. This is the negative meaning of creation. Since everything is created for Jesus Christ and His death and resurrection, from the very outset everything must stand under this twofold and contradictory determination. It is not nothing but something; yet it is something on the edge of nothing, bordering it and menaced by it, and having no power of itself to overcome the danger.

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1 C.D., III/1, p. 60.

2 Ibid., p. 376. The German text of the last line is: "... es ist nicht Nichts sondern Etwas, aber Etwas am Rande des Nichts, ein dem Nichts benachbartes und von ihm bedrohtes und aus und durch sich selbst dieser Bedrohung nicht gewachsenes Etwas".
The portrait of creation presented above has the effect of driving the problem of man's rebellion (fall) into the realm of pre-history. Creation's positive meaning inheres therefore not in that which is created, but in the Son who is ordained to lift it, elevate it from the wretchedness of its condition. Thus, the negative pole of creation is the wretchedness which was somehow introduced into God's creation which was good.

What is of principal concern to us is the negative pole's relation to "nothing" - a "nothing" which is still something. It should not be assumed that the negative aspect of creation is totally alien, nor indeed, totally detrimental to the entire being of man. Furthermore, it must be clearly understood that although the negativity of creation is closely related to "nothingness", it is not synonymous. Barth suggests that the reference in the creation narrative to the distinction and opposition of day and night, land and water, unmistakably indicates the two-fold character of creaturely existence, i.e., the positive and negative aspects. Then he states:

Viewed from its negative aspect, creation is as it were on the frontier of nothingness and orientated towards it. Creation is continually confronted by this menace. It is continually reminded that as God's creation it has not only a positive but also a negative side. Yet this negative side is not to be identified with nothingness, nor must it be postulated that the latter belongs to the essence of creaturely nature and may somehow be understood and interpreted as a mark of its character and perfection.1

Nothingness is not of the essence of creation, not even of creation's negativity. However, it must be asserted, says Barth, that nothingness is the border of creation, and therefore related to it. Nothingness threatens to overwhelm creation; it is destructive. But

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1C.D., III/3, pp. 295-96.
on the other hand, the negative pole of creation contributes to creation's wholeness and is, says Barth, "... a mark of its perfection, ... ."

Stated another way, according to Barth, this negative aspect is that which is creation's dependence factor, as opposed to the positive pole which specifies creation's worthiness,¹ or in another place its "individual distinctiveness".²

The negative pole is the "not" which points to the distinction between Creator and creature, a distinction which must be maintained, (discussed supra, pp. 227-28). There it was asserted that God's love required the being of another distinct from Himself with whom He could enter covenant relation. The "not" is therefore, in Barth's system, a positive value; it limits the creature, but does not demean it.³ Employing the terminology of non-being, at one point Barth suggests that even before the existence of the race of man, there was "... somewhere a non-being [Nichtsein] from which the individual and the race ... " have sprung, and to which they also proceed.⁴ If it is true to say that this so-called "non-being" is of the same form as the "non-real", one will also be inclined to say that it is not good.⁵ But, one wonders how both assertions may be related, i.e., that the non-real is in fact recognizable by the fact that it is not created, and therefore not "good", and second, that this "kingdom of the non-real" is that from which our race has sprung? There

³Cf. Ibid., p. 350. "What we have called the 'shadow side' of creation is constituted by the 'not' which in this twofold respect, as its distinction from God and its individual distinctiveness, pertains to creaturely nature. On this shadow side the creature is contiguous to nothingness, for this 'not' is at once the expression and frontier of the positive will, election and activity of God."
⁴Cf. Ibid., III/2, p. 574. ⁵Cf. Ibid., III/1, p. 331.
appears to be a reification of the *nihilo* out of which God created. This, at least, is the impression that Barth gives, and it is intensified by Barth's treatment of "nothingness".  

Material is cited in Appendix B which substantiates the suggestion above, i.e., that there does exist a sphere of reality, the non-real, nothingness, which is in active opposition to the creaturely realm. Further, there are references which assert that the primary antagonists are God and nothingness (cf. especially Appendix B, Article 3.4.). Although the responsibility of the creature is not specifically excluded, neither is it included as an active constituent in the struggle against non-existence. Does that imply, it may be asked, that the creature's (i.e. man's) position is thereby located at the periphery of the struggle for existence?  

To conclude this section, a word should be said in specific reference to the subject of evil (cf. Appendix B, Article 3.1.) and its relation to nothingness.  

That relation is specifically stated by Barth:  

... if there is a reality of evil, it can only be the reality of this excluded and repudiated thing, the reality behind God's back, which He passed over, when He made the world and made it good. ... What is not good God did not make; it has no creaturely existence. But if being is to be ascribed to it at all, and we would rather not say that it is non-existent, then it is only the power of the being which arises out of the weight of the divine 'No'.

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1Cf. Appendix B, *infra*.  

2Dog. Outline, p. 57. And cf. this on the same page: "... the whole realm that we term evil - death, sin, the Devil and hell - is not God's creation, but rather what was excluded by God's creation, that to which God has said 'No'." Cf. also *infra*, Appendix B, Article 3.3.
Barth is clearly struggling with a critical dilemma of theology, i.e., either to ascribe reality to evil and thereby accord it a degree of creaturely status, or to deny its reality and existence and thereby reject it as an authentic factor of man's historical existence and religious experience. The first option leads inevitably toward a position which on the one hand assigns the responsibility for the existence of evil to God, and which on the other hand tends to minimize man's complicity. The alternate option tends to minimize evil itself, making it appear as simply a vain and unreal figment of the imagination, with which man, of course, cannot actually be associated. Barth, with reservations, seems inclined toward the first option, i.e., to grant evil its existence. And thereby he accepts the attendant problems inherent in that decision - problems which will affect other significant doctrines, not least the Christian understanding of man in the imago Dei.

It is interesting to note in a preliminary sense that because of the structure of reality which primarily includes God and nothingness, it becomes difficult to define the role and function of man. In response to the question - what does man offer? - Barth states: "All that we were and achieved will be subject to the judgement that it was sin. And sin means transgression, deviation."\(^1\) It would appear that historical creaturely existence, i.e., man's historical being and life, is primarily related to the sphere of nothingness, for sin is an expression, an outflow, of nothingness. And Barth states that all we were and all we achieved was sin. However, the final estimation of this critical point will have to be deferred; we need first to direct attention to another key subject. A brief consideration of Barth's Christology will further characterize the "theological environment" within which to interpret man in the imago Dei.

\(^1\)Dog. Outline, p. 150.
c. **Christ and Anthropology**

It is indisputable that Barth's theological system is thoroughly Christocentric. Christology permeates and dominates all of his work. Although it is not necessary within the scope of the thesis to conduct a thorough study of Barth's Christology, it is important to indicate the salient features of that doctrine as they relate to and affect our work.

Essentially, our objective is to explicate the structure of the relation between Christ and man in specific reference to the *imago Dei*. That is to say, inasmuch as the *imago Dei* theme circumscribes and dictates the dimensions of our study, Christ's relation to the *imago Dei*, and attendant man's relation to Christ are our concerns.

Barth's contribution is succinctly set forth in his treatise, "Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5". And we cite the following from that work:

> The meaning of the famous parallel (so called) between 'Adam and Christ', ..., is not that the relationship between Adam and us is the expression of our true [*eigentlichen* and original nature [*ursprünglichen Wesens*], so that we would have to recognize in Adam the fundamental truth of anthropology to which the subsequent relationship between Christ and us would have to fit and adapt itself.¹

The effect of Barth's assertion is to establish the locus of man's "original nature" beyond the time of creation. One discovers the truth of anthropology neither in man as he is today, nor in the mythological figure of Adam. Rather, the truth of anthropology inheres in the structure of relation between Christ and ourselves; it is not *via* Adam.²

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²The traditional theological utilization of the Adam myth has been primarily to specify the reality and universality of sin. Consequently, as we have frequently indicated throughout, the fundamental truth of man has been his sinful nature. The reference from Barth however, seems to
therefore, does not pre-determine the shape of soteriology; nor does it (i.e., the Adamic myth) reveal to us what is fundamentally "man".

However, Barth continues, our relation to Adam is not altogether devoid of anthropological implications. He says:

The relationship between Adam and us reveals not the primary but only the secondary anthropological truth and ordering principle. The primary anthropological truth and ordering principle, which only mirrors itself in that relationship, is made clear only through the relationship between Christ and us. Adam is, as is said in v. 14 [14:5] τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τυπόν τοῦ μετάλλοντος the type of Him who was to come. Man's essential and original nature is to be found, therefore, not in Adam but in Christ. In Adam we can only find it prefigured. Adam can therefore be interpreted only in the light of Christ and not the other way round.

The Adamic myth reflects a secondary truth and ordering principle; the primary principle is reflected in the "original" relationship between Christ and us. Our relation to Adam, therefore, our association in the truth that he reveals about man, is typological, and so points to a dimension of the truth of man that surpasses that which can be asserted apart from Christ. That man's nature is only prefigured in Adam points to or implies that there is a dimension of humanity which cannot be articulated apart from the recognition of an intrinsic relation to Christ.

overturn that structure; if Adam is not the truth of anthropology then, we ask, will sin remain the dominant motif? If it does remain so, from whence will arise its reality? If another motif is introduced, what will it be, and what will be the implications, not only in relation to anthropology, but in relation to other doctrines, e.g., Christology, soteriology, etc.? We will return to those questions, but at this point we suggest that Barth has offered a suggestion that promises to be of special significance in respect to our theme, the imago Dei.

1"Christ and Adam", p. 6.
We take special note of Barth's statement that our "... essential and original nature ... is to be found, ..., in Christ." And we are not led subsequently to believe that it has ever been otherwise. That is to say, Barth does not suggest that once (e.g., in Paradise) man's essential nature was to be found in Adam, then subsequently lost. This appears to be a fairly radical departure from traditional formulations regarding man's nature. It is, in fact, an assertion which we have not noted in any of the theologians thus far considered. The implication of Barth's statement is that man has never realized his essential nature apart from Christ; Christ is man's essential nature.

Our relationship with Adam, which qualifies human existence, is that to which Barth refers as "our unhappy past" when we were "weak, sinners, godless, enemies". He then continues to say that it

... has no independent reality, status, or importance of its own. It is only an indirect witness to the reality of Jesus Christ and to the original and essential human existence /ursprünglichen ... eigentlichen Menschheitsgeschichte/7 that He inaugurates and reveals. The righteous decision of God has fallen upon men not in Adam but in Christ.2

Quite obviously Barth differentiates between man's essential nature (who is Christ) and human existence which is qualified by our relationship with Adam. It would be erroneous to infer that the phrase "our unhappy past" refers to a point in time which followed upon another historical moment when man did in fact enjoy his "essential nature", (e.g. Paradise); Barth will not allow that implication. Rather, he clearly asserts that

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1We concluded, in Chapter I, that Irenaeus' conception of man's original nature was different from, e.g., that of St. Augustine, and similarly those Western theologians we considered. However, different though it is, it is not the difference which Barth suggests.

2"Christ and Adam", p. 7.
the essential nature of humanity has always been that of Christ.\(^1\) The "unhappy past" would seem therefore, to refer to the time following creation, (i.e., all of historical existence), and before Christ's incarnation; therein was the inauguration and revelation of full and essential humanity.\(^2\)

That conviction leads reasonably to another assertion in respect to the relation between Christ and man. Barth comments on the particularist tendency in Romans 5:1-11, where faith is a limiting factor in the extension of relation. But then follows his comment on vs. 12-21 where he notes a more inclusive dimension of that relation. He states:

The nature of Christ objectively conditions human nature and the work of Christ makes an objective difference \(\text{Infra Voraussetzungen}\) to the life and destiny of all men. ... In short, 'grace rules', as it is put in v.21.\(^3\)

\(^1\)This assertion bears an interesting affinity to St. Irenaeus' concept of the childhood and growth of Adam. Therein we noted his (Irenaeus') suggestion that the fullness of humanity, the culmination of its development, coincided with the Incarnation of the Son. Cf. C.D., III/2, p. 459; there Barth, in his comment on Gal.4:1f says: "With the mission of the Son, with His entry into the time process, a new era of time has dawned, so far-reaching in its consequences that it may justly be called the fullness of time. Man has now reached maturity. He has become God's son and heir, the 'Lord of all'. He has become a free man." It should be noted, however, that whereas Irenaeus's system includes a factor of historical continuity between Adam and Christ, Barth emphasizes the discontinuity between them. Cf. infra, especially Sec. d.3.

\(^2\)This, it would appear, implies a certain disregard for the importance of the being and existence of humanity as it appears in Adam, and in us. It raises the question, for instance, as to what may in fact be the significance of human existence at all. Cf. Dorothee Solle's critical remarks: "Barth's tendency is to objectify representation, to regard it as a fact which is independent of the assent or will of those represented, ... The terms employed by Barth in formulating this radical view accordingly fail to indicate any distinction between representation and substitution. Christ the Representative, An Essay in Theology after the 'Death of God', trans. David Lewis, (Alva, Scotland: SCM Press, 1967), p. 89.

\(^3\)"Christ and Adam", p. 42. And cf. Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. from Sixth Edition by Edwyn C. Hoskyns, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1933), pp. 176-78. Hereafter: Romans. It is realized that Barth's over-all interpretation of the imago Dei reflected in Romans was subsequently rejected. However, the reference above appears consistent with his later position. Cf. Hirschwald, "The Teaching of Karl Barth on the Doctrine of the 'Imago Dei'", pp. 4-5.
It might be inferred from the above that the work of the incarnated Christ indicates a dividing point between a time when grace did not rule (before the incarnation) and the time following. However, on the basis of material already considered (supra, pp.237f.) that inference must at least be qualified. Christ has always been essential manhood, true humanity. Therefore, says Barth, in respect to the time before the incarnation, "...we may recognize the ordering principle of the Kingdom of Christ even in the ordering principle of the world of Adam. ... Though we were travelling in a very different direction, the rule of the road strikingly resembled - was indeed the same as - the one we know now."¹

What, then is the "difference" - the concrete alteration in the structure of relation between God and man which Christ effects? The question leads into the material which speaks of Christ in terms of the imago Dei. Barth says,

He who is already glorified by the Father in His relationship to Him is again glorified in them, in His relationship to man. Thus the divine original [Göttliche Urbild] creates for itself a copy [Gegenbild] in the creaturely world. The Father and the Son are reflected in the man Jesus. There could be no plainer reference to the analogia relationis and therefore the imago Dei in the most central, i.e., the christological sense of the term.²

The pre-existent Christ, glorified in that relation to the Father, becomes glorified again, Barth says, in his relationship to man. But, the weight, the stress, seems to remain at the divine level with a resultant minimization of humanity. However, our question regarding the "concrete difference" at the level of humanity has not been answered. While the priority of God's action on behalf of man is an indispensable

¹"Christ and Adam", p. 5.
²C.D., III/2, p. 221, and cf. p. 220.
doctrine, it does not seem self-evident that such priority entirely precludes man's active participation. The latter, however, is difficult to locate in Barth's system.¹

When Barth speaks of the function of humanity in relation to Christ, and when it would seem that a positive value might be ascribed to humanity, there occurs an additional qualification. Barth asserts:

The humanity of Jesus is not merely the repetition and reflection of His divinity, or of God's controlling will; it is the repetition and reflection of God Himself, no more and no less. It is the image of God, the imago Dei.²

¹But cf. Humanity of God, p. 11: "'Theology,' in the literal sense, means the science and doctrine of God. A very precise definition of the Christian endeavour in this respect would really require the more complex term 'The-anthropology.' For an abstract doctrine of God has no place in the Christian realm, only a 'doctrine of God and of man,' a doctrine of the commerce and communion between God and man." And cf. ibid., pp. 69-70: "I, too, have heard the news that we can speak about God only by speaking about man. I do not contest this claim. Rightly interpreted, it may be an expression of the true insight that God is not without man. This means in our particular context that God's own freedom must be recognised as freedom to be a partisan for man."

²C.D., III/2, p. 219. And cf. p. 222: "Jesus is man for His fellows, and therefore the image of God, in a way which others cannot even approach, just as they cannot be for God in the sense that He is. He alone is the Son of God, and therefore His humanity alone can be described as the being of an I which is wholly from and to the fellow-human Thou, and therefore a genuine I. In this respect we do not even have to take into account the fact that all other men are sinners and have turned aside from God. This means, of course, that their humanity (in more or less complete antithesis to this description) actually develops from their contradiction of the Thou to fresh opposition, and cannot therefore be a genuine I. But let us assume that there is in every man at least a serious even if hopeless striving in the other direction. The difference between Jesus and ourselves is still indissoluble. It is quite fundamental. ... We are the victims of idealistic illusions if we deck out the humanity of man generally with features exclusive to that of the man Jesus." Then follows (pp. 223ff.) Barth's attempt to articulate that quality in or of man which indicates a compatibility of humanity, Christ's and ours, which makes possible a relation. And he states on p. 224: "We do not ask, ..., concerning a capacity to enter into covenant which man himself has to actualise, but concerning that which makes him as the work of His Creator possible, serviceable, adapted and well-pleasing as His covenant-partner before all other creatures, and to that extent capable of entering into covenant."
This statement, i.e., that the humanity of Jesus is in fact the repetition and reflection of God Himself, suggests that we have to deal with the humanity of God. Barth, in his essay bearing that title, speaks of that subject, and says,

The humanity of God! Rightly understood that is bound to mean God's relation to and turning towards man. ... It represents God's existence, intercession, and activity for man, the intercourse God holds with him, and the free grace in which He wills to be and is nothing other than the God of man.¹

Christ's humanity, consequently, because it is essentially a repetition of God's own humanity, must be considered something entirely other than what we normally mean by humanity, i.e., the race of man. Surely, humanity as "God's existence, intercession, and activity for man" is an unfamiliar use of the term. Yet, it is consistent with Barth's own system in which all things are a repetition of the primary intra-trinitarian activity (cf. supra, Sec. b). It does not seem unjustified therefore, to

¹Humanity of God, p. 37. The correspondence/distinction problem inherent in the above may illustrate one of the "stages" of Barth's development. Stewart C. Zabriskie suggests that Barth's essay, The Humanity of God represents a "third stage" and that therefore that which has preceded is qualified. Although Zabriskie's discussion pertains to "Christ and Adam" (not C.D.) his comments are apt: "There is a definite ambiguity here about the correspondence to and the distinction from Christ as regards man in his humanity. The problem ... becomes one of Christ's relationship to man in his humanity - man who is the image of him who is the image of the invisible God. The imago Dei has become involved in the confusion surrounding a Christological problem; and this confusion seems to win the day in the 'third stage' - ... ." "A Critical View of Karl Barth's Approach to the Christian Doctrine of The Imago Dei", Anglican Theological Review, XLVII (Oct., 1965), pp. 365-366. Hereafter: "Critical View of Barth's Doctrine".

There may be, as Zabriskie says, a third "stage" represented in Barth's "Humanity of God". We are reluctant, however, to assume that Barth's intention therein was to disavow all preceding contribution to the theme. It would seem entirely unjustifiable to conclude that there is no continuity between "stages"; therefore, a modification seems more accurately to describe the variation than does transformation.
suggest that as the humanity of Jesus is itself the reflection of God, so also is God's relation and turning toward man essentially God's turning toward Himself. That is, unless by "man" is meant something other than humanity. On the other hand, Barth says that "If the humanity of Jesus is the image of God, this means that it is only indirectly and not directly identical with God. It belongs intrinsically to the creaturely world, to the cosmos."\(^1\)

The question with which we began regarding the "difference" that Christ makes, (supra, p. 240 ) may better be re-phrased thus: not what, but is there a difference notable on the concrete and historical level of humanity which Christ effects? The following suggests a negative response:

God Himself has in Jesus Christ stepped into man's place. We think once more of our assertion that the reconciliation is an exchange. God now takes over the responsibility for us.\(^2\)

The picture is clearly one in which an exchange has occurred above the level of historical humanity; it is a divine transaction. Though significantly qualified, a similar concept of "exchange" is implied in the following:

This is not to say, however, that man is confined to the role of an approving spectator. The gift of freedom becomes operative at this critical point. Man's freedom always remains human freedom and is not to be confused with the divine freedom whereby God in Jesus Christ took man's part.\(^3\)

The subject of freedom will be more thoroughly considered in a later section; at this point we call attention to the indication that although Barth refuses

\(^1\)C.D., III/2, p. 219.


\(^3\)Humanity of God, pp. 81-82.
to consign man to the role of spectator, nevertheless, "God in Jesus took
man's part". The role of Christ is a dual role; He represents both God
and man.1 This is explicitly stated by Barth.2 However, in the same
book in which was noted the duality of Christ's function, we note this
affirmation: man "... is the being whom God has loved, loves, and will love,
because He has substituted Himself in Jesus Christ and has made Himself the
guarantee."3 Again, therefore, the structure of relation has become prim-
arily established within the divine sphere.

We conclude this section, "Christ and Anthropology" with an especi-
ally representative quotation from Barth, and a critical comment in res-
ponse. Barth states:

1 "We appreciate that we have entered the discussion relative to the
two natures of Christ and their relation in Jesus. We will not presume
either to explicate our own view or will the dimensions of our thesis allow
or demand a full consideration of Barth's position. Our own sensitivity to
the critical difference between Christ as "substitute" and Christ as "repre-
sentative" is due to an appreciative reading of Dorothee Sölle's Christ the
Representative.

2 Cf. Humanity of God, p. 47: Christ "... comes forward to man on
behalf of God calling for and awakening faith, love, and hope, and to God
on behalf of man, representing man, making satisfaction and interceding."

3 Ibid., p. 60, and cf. p. 51: "His free affirmation of man, His
free concern for him, His free substitution for him - this is God's humanity." As
compared with the motivation for God's love in the above, cf. that of
John 3:16.

4 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
The 'No' addressed to man in his transgression is the 'No' to man's relation to Adam (cf. supra, p. 236). For, Adam represents man's secondary and hostile constitution. The primary ordering principle is that which originally exists between Christ and us. Therefore, to close the abyss between God and man necessitated the incarnation of the true and essential man, Jesus Christ; He assumes full responsibility for the victory over the 'No', over evil. It is the victory of grace. However, one wonders what may be the implications of this structure of grace in respect to man's historical existence and being. Even more specifically, what are the conditions imposed on the development of a doctrine of the imago Dei as it relates to creaturely historical existence, i.e., post-fallen man?

d. Implications of the "Fall"

d.l. Anthropological Implications

Man in respect to the "fall" is the first subject of consideration, and one is immediately aware that in the theology of Barth the "fall" assumes an interpretation which has not been previously noted in the mainstream of Western theology. While Barth does not explicate the paradisial existence of Adam in any historic sense, yet the concept of the "fall" is included in his system as an event of pre-history. His utilization of the concept (i.e., the fall) enables him to characterize the fallen state of man.

1Cf. Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 115: "The priority of grace takes away from evil and may we suggest also, man's real historical significance. But in proportion as evil loses its historical reality, the redeeming act of Christ also diminishes in historical reality. If Jesus Christ precedes everything, then he also precedes sin. But if this is so, then his cross is 'not really brought about by sin, but only by his self-sacrifice, decreed from eternity', and the fall is therefore merely an act necessarily created as a framework for this. Even the cross becomes ultimately only a monologue of God the Father with himself as God the Son, and therefore 'a ghostly apparition without reality'." (internal quotations from Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Barth, Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie, (Cologne, 1961) pp. 225f, and 380). The essence of Zahrnt's criticism is apt; however, the argument he proposes in the following sentences is specious.
in considerably more radical terms than discussed heretofore; Barth's reinterpretation of the fall story does not minimize its implications.

Having referred to Michelangelo's "Creation of Adam" which depicts unobstructed communion between God and man, Barth says,

Out of this relationship, which never has been, and never will be an event in history, we issue, and towards it we move. Nor can sin destroy this primal union /Beziehung/, for it is the act and work of God alone.¹

If the relationship (normally attributed to Paradise) never has been, nor ever will be an historical phenomena, what may be said of its significance? It is obvious that even though non-historical, it loses none of its value, its essential import. Indeed, it may be that because of its non-historicity it assumes even greater implications as interpreted by Barth. There is, says Barth, an indestructible primal union which is the act of God. The concept of this "primal union" therefore replaces, in a sense, that which the older formulations tried to assert, viz., Paradise.

Barth relates the history of Israel to the theme of Paradise, and in that relation discovers a new dimension of the former. He says, the Old Testament "... represents Israel as a people that is completely perverted and lost, ... ."² Similarly, Paradise illustrates the same conclusion. For, says Barth, even though God's grace was manifest in Israel's history in a unique manner, that relation serves only to confirm

... what was already clear in Paradise, that man is neither capable nor worthy /nicht fähig ... würdig/ of the fellowship with God for which he was created, that he is radically separated from God's grace. Because of his guilt, there can be no positive relationship /Positive Beziehung/ between him and God.³

¹Romans, p. 249.
²"Christ and Adam", p. 26. Our concern at this point is primarily to discover Barth's interpretation of Paradise. Therefore we will not become involved in a discussion regarding the validity of the above statement, though we may indicate our reservation. Cf. G.L., III/1, p. 275: "What the history of Paradise indicates acquires its form in the history of Israel, but only in its provisional form."
³Ibid., p. 29.
Two themes are present in the above; first, that both Paradise and Israel exemplify man's incapacity and unworthiness for fellowship with God. Second is the futurist dimension implied in the words, "... for which he was created," although it would be presumptuous to draw any firm conclusion based on this single reference. Nevertheless inasmuch as true and essential humanity has eternally been represented by the Son (supra, Sec. c.) there may be a parallel interpretation here. The question occurs - has man ever, in historical existence, experienced such fellowship with God? If not, what are the implications? Are we to deduce from Barth's system the conclusion that man, as created, initially lacked the capacity for that fellowship? Or, will it be discovered that, similar to traditional interpretations, man rejected that capacity - that is, he renounced his pre-fallen communion with the Father?

In reference to the first question, i.e., has man ever experienced, in historical existence, true fellowship with God? Barth states:

The sin which entered the world through Adam is, like the righteousness manifested to the world in Christ, timeless and transcendental.¹

Barth is not suggesting that sin and righteousness have no historical implications; rather, he is suggesting that they are realities which are not exhaustively contained within historical perspective. There is also the implication in the above that Adam becomes an instrument of sin, as though sin were an existing reality apart from the activity of man. This implication becomes quite explicit in the following statement from Barth:

¹Romans, p. 171.
Sin is the characteristic mark of human nature as such; ... it is the Fall which occurred with the emergence of human life. Sin occurs before it has taken concrete form consciously or unconsciously in this or that man, and it is powerful before it takes control of his will or disposition.¹

Not only, says Barth, does sin precede its concrete form or expression, i.e., by means of a human decision, but it is the characteristic of human nature. What, then, is implied in respect to man's initial capacity?

Considering the same subject in the *Dogmatics* Barth states that history itself begins "... with the great episode in which the peace between God and itself [the creature] is broken by man."² A peace which is broken by man would seem to imply the historical existence of such peace. As a consequence or corollary, therefore, one might be inclined to infer that man did in fact experience the capacity to maintain it.

An earlier statement from the *Dogmatics* affirms that implication:

... the revelation of God does not show us man as we wish to see him, in the wholeness of his created being, but in its perversion and corruption. The truth of man's being as revealed in the Word of God and attested generally by Holy Scripture shows us man as a betrayer of himself and a sinner against his creaturely existence /*erstehörliches Wesen*. It accuses him of standing in contradiction to God his Creator, but also to himself and the end for which he was created. It presents him as the corrupter of his own nature. ... What is sinful and strives against God and himself is not just something in him, qualities or achievements or defects, but his very being.³

It is apparent that Barth assigns the culpability for man's perversion and corruption entirely to man. The "creaturely existence" which man betrays and against which he sins would seem to indicate the actuality of

¹ *Romans*, p. 173. And cf. our discussion of "nothingness", supra, Sec. b.1., and Appendix B, infra.
² *C.D.*, III/4, p. 353.
a form of existence unbroken, and unbetrayed. Barth refers to that 
fracture of relationship as "... the very moment when God acts with the 
greatest faithfulness towards man ..." and in which "... man in supreme 
unfaithfulness takes sides against God his Creator."¹

It is in reference to the above that the centrality of Barth's 
Christocentrism becomes critical. One simply cannot, he would assert, 
explicate the significance of man's unbroken, unbetrayed existence by 
means of an examination of historical creaturely existence. "Sin is 
... meaningless and incomprehensible except as the negation of the right-
eousness which is in Christ, and apart from its being surmounted by 
the 'Yes' of that righteousness."² The righteousness of Christ becomes 
the essential and indispensable interpretive principle in reference to 
the question of the nature of man's unbroken creaturely existence. The 
significance and implication of that principle are manifest in the 
following:

What Adam was before he became mortal and what Christ is after 
He ceased to be mortal - in other words, the operation of the 
emergence of death from Life and Life from death - is ... 
by definition non-historical /Unhistorische/. It follows then of 
necessity that the entrance of sin into the world through Adam 
is in no strict sense an historical or psychological happening. 
The doctrine of Original Sin, as it has been generally understood 
in the West, would not have been to Paul an 'attractive hypothesis' 
(Lietzmann) ... .³

The situation, therefore, is that of attempting to speak of the 
creature's initial status and involvement in sin within the categories of 
history. The attempt is fruitless; we have to do here with primal 

²Romans, p. 171.  
³Ibid., Ital. mine.
pre-history and creaturely existence which only becomes historical existence simultaneous with the "fall". The only creaturely existence is fallen existence.\(^1\) Barth is thus able to avoid many of the problems entertained by his predecessors in respect to an "historical fall" doctrine. Other problems and questions arise, however, regarding the structure of relation between God and man.

d.2. God and Fallen Man

It is important to realize that in Barth's thought creaturely existence is fallen existence, and that fallen existence does not reveal the truth about man. Barth states that "... what we recognize to be human nature is nothing other than the disgrace which covers his nature; his inhumanity, perversion and corruption."\(^2\) It is equally important to note that the being of man, which may be distorted and corrupted, is nevertheless indestructible.\(^3\) However, the indestructibility is not due

\(^1\)Cf. the following from Romans: (pp.248-49) - Commenting on Romans 7:9, Barth says, "The words I was alive can no more refer to the historical past than can the words we shall live (6:2, etc.) to some historical future; the reference is to that life which is primal and non-historical, ... . There is no question here of contrasting a particular epoch in the life of a single individual, or of a group, or indeed of all mankind, with some other epoch, past or future. The passage refers to that timeless age to which all men belong." And p. 181 - The "... fallen state is the consequence of no single historical act: it is the unavoidable pre-supposition of all human history, and, in the last analysis, proceeds from the secret of the divine displeasure and divine rejection." Of that displeasure and rejection Barth states on p. 172: "The Fall is not occasioned by the transgression of Adam; but the transgression was presumably its first manifest operation. In this context the venerable Reformation doctrine of 'Supralapsarianism' becomes intelligible. According to it, predestination into rejection precedes the 'historical' fall. Only in so far as Adam did what we all do, is it legitimate for us to call and define by his name the shadow in which we all stand."

\(^2\)C.D., III/2, p. 27

\(^3\)Cf. Ibid.: Even granting the perversion of man's nature, it "... is not effaced, and he cannot succeed in destroying it and making himself unreal. The distortion or corruption of his being is not the same thing as its annihilation /Verkenhrung und Verderbnis heis\(d\) doch nicht Vernichtung seines Wesens/."
to an intrinsic, inherent quality of creaturely existence - it is not something possessed; rather, it is a characteristic of creaturehood which has its origin and source from outside itself, i.e., in the eternal covenant intention and claim of God. The truth about man is discernible, not on the plane of historical existence, but only in the sphere of the divine.\(^1\)

An intrinsic characteristic of creaturely existence is sin. And because sin is totally inexplicable apart from a theological orientation, creaturely existence is explicable only in relation to God.\(^2\) Therefore, in answer to the question, what is the structure of the God-man relation reflected in Adam?, Barth states:

Clearly - and this lies already in the word 'Fall' - God is here deserted and denied by men; He suffers and is robbed. Sin is, essentially, robbing God of what is His; and because it is robbing of God, sin is essentially the appearance in the world of a power - like God (5:12). Sin is an invisible negative occurrence \(\text{unanschaulich negatives Geschehen}\) encountered by God and in Him.\(^3\)

In spite of creaturely existence's relation to sin, it would seem that the essential relation is between sin and God; it is, says Barth, "... encountered by God and in Him." This characterization of the principle opponents is discussed at length in Appendix B, especially Articles 3.1 - 3.4.

In conjunction with the God-man-sin relation the question of freedom occurs. Freedom to decide for or against the covenant relation is one of the constituent characteristics of humanity, and one which Barth emphasizes in this particular consideration. Man can break his covenant relation - in

\(^1\)Cf. supra, Sec. c.

\(^2\)Cf. Humanity of God, p. 80: "God wants man free together with his fellow men in the greatness and anxiety, in the richness and the poverty of his humanity. True enough, man no longer knows what it means to be truly human. Alienated from God, he is alienated from himself and from his true nature. But God does not cease to call and to claim this estranged creature for His own."

\(^3\)Romans, p. 177.
fact, the brokenness of that relation, as we have seen, is an integral factor of historical existence. "This ability [i.e. to deny his reality by sin] for which there is no reason," says Barth, "the mad and incomprehensible possibility of sin, is a sorry fact." But, according to Barth, the freedom to decide which was given to man, is not, as one might expect, freedom to decide between two possibilities. He says,

Freedom to decide [Entscheidungsfreiheit] means freedom to decide towards the Only One for whom God's creature can decide, for the affirmation of Him who has created it... But we have to do with freedom to decide. ... Should it happen that the creature makes a different use of his freedom than the only possible one, (ital. mine) should he want to sin - that is, to 'sunder' himself from God and from himself - what else can happen than that, entered into contradiction to God's will, he is bound to fall by his disobedience, into the possibility not foreseen in creation? ... There must now take place the fall into nihil.2

The above is intelligible only on the prior understanding of the dimension or categories of God and nothingness (cf. infra, Appendix B).

Barth does not imply that contrary decisions are not in fact made; rather, he asserts that the contradictory decision (sin), though a fact, is so contrary to our humanity that it falls into the category of ontological impossibility.3 This does not mean that sin, as an ontological impossibility, is non-existent; it would seem to "exist" in the same way as nothingness is said to exist. Sin therefore, is an impossibility inasmuch as it is entirely inimical to our humanity - though apparently not to our historical

1C.D., III/2, p. 205.

2Dog. Outline, pp. 56-57.

3Cf. C.D., III/2, p. 136 "Godlessness is not ... a possibility but an ontological impossibility for man/Gottlosigkeit ist infolgedessen keine Möglichkeit, sondern die ontologische Unmöglichkeit des Menschseins/. Man is not without, but with God. This is not to say, of course that godless men do not exist. Sin is undoubtedly committed and exists. Yet sin is not a possibility but an ontological impossibility for man. ... To be in sin, in godlessness, is a mode of being contrary to our humanity."
creaturely existence. If that is true, it would follow that humanity is not synonymous with historical existence. Indeed, that seems to be Barth's thesis.

Man, he says,

... has not to choose between two possibilities, but between his one and only possibility, and thus between his being and his non-being, between the reality and unreality of his freedom. To choose freely is to choose oneself in one's possibility, being and freedom /Frei wählen heißt: sich selbst in seiner Möglichkeit, sich selbst in seinem Sein, sich selbst in seiner Freiheit wählen./

The above might suggest that man, in his historical existence, retains his faculty for "free choice" - that there remains for him the possibility of choosing between his being (his possibility) and non-being (his impossibility). That suggestion, however, could only be maintained at the expense of a rejection of a fundamental doctrine in Barth's system, i.e., the universal brokenness of creaturely existence (cf. supra, Sec. d.1.) Therefore, because "freedom" is an intrinsic constituent of humanity, and because creaturely existence is not "free", humanity and creaturely existence are essentially dissimilar.²


² The same subject, i.e., the dissimilarity between God and man, has been previously discussed, but from a somewhat different perspective, cf. supra, Chapter III, Part A, especially Sec. c.1. It was noted that St. Thomas proposed various possibilities to express both the relatedness and unrelatedness of God and man, involving the terms quasi-species and the analogical likeness of existence. Whereas Barth does not utilize any of St. Thomas' terminology, at this point he is nevertheless confronted with a similar problem. And one notes the utilization of similar structures of relation employed by both Barth and St. Thomas, i.e., being and non-being. But cf. Humanity of God, p. 80: "The gift of freedom makes man free to be not more and not less than human. Whatever God's other intentions for man may be, they will always be a confirmation of his nature as a creature of God. And whatever man may choose to do with his God-given freedom, it always will have to be carried out within the framework of human possibilities. If he cannot boast of his human condition and achievement because they are a gift of God, he need not be ashamed of them either."
Barth says,

... man does not live up to this freedom. Even worse, he fails in every respect. It is true enough that he does not know any longer the natural freedom which was bestowed upon him in creation; he does not know as yet the ultimate freedom in store for him at the completion of his journey, in the ultimate fulfilment of his existence.¹

Man stands in his historical creaturely existence between the boundaries of natural freedom (lost) and ultimate freedom (not yet realized).² If freedom, which is constitutive of humanity, is renounced and not yet renewed or restored, what will be appropriate to assert about the nature of man's humanity in the interim? Western theology has perenially debated this same question and has developed variant interpretations which have been discussed in the preceding chapters. And even though Barth's system proceeds from a dissimilar structure, i.e., other than Paradise and subsequent catastrophic fall, nevertheless the question has neither become irrelevant, nor answered, at least to this point in our discussion. It is to that question that we now address ourselves, employing Barth's categories of the Adam-Christ typology and the imago Dei.

d.3. Christ and Fallen Man

Barth's contribution to the Christ-Adam structure of relation discussed above, is the foundation on which to determine his understanding of the same structure from the perspective of post-fallen man. Barth, in reference to I Corinthians 15:47, maintains that there is a significant area of confusion regarding the "really first" and the "really second", i.e., between Adam and Christ.³ The confusion becomes apparent, he suggests, in reference to Colossians 3:9f, where we are told to

¹Humanity of God, p. 78.
²Cf. C.D., III/4, p. 353. "Creation and consummation are the boundaries of history, and therefore of this interim period."
³Cf. Ibid., III/2, p. 205.
put off the old and put on the new, \[\text{for then}\] we have to remember that what is here called the old is really the new which has illegitimately obtruded itself and which we ought never to have put on, whereas the new is really true and proper man, and to that extent the old and original man which could be put off only in the reckless folly of sin.\(^1\)

Considering the seeming inevitability of man's encounter with sin (cf. \textit{supra}, Sec. b.l.), Barth's dictum that it should never have been put on seems rather extraneous.\(^2\) Apart from that, however, his attempt to re-establish the priorities is constructive. His system requires that Christ, and not Adam, should be regarded as the eternally true and proper man. Adam, therefore, in the creaturely existence which he typifies, is not to be regarded as the perfection of human existence subsequently lost. Christ's priority is more, therefore, than the priority of time; His is the priority, the pre-eminence, of value - He is true and essential man.

However, Barth's statement that "... the old is really the new which has illegitimately obtruded itself ..." seems to require some actual structure of relationship between God and man which man did in fact destroy. But, the "new" is, as we have seen, the historical concretion of an original - a pre-historical - relation, which in its becoming historical assumed characteristics which are dissimilar from the prototype (cf. Sec. d.l.). Therefore, Barth is able to assert the following:

\[\text{... Christ who seems to come second, really comes first, and Adam who seems to come first really comes second. In Christ the relationship between the one and many is original, in Adam it is only a copy \}/og\og\og Zeugnischarakter\} of that original. Our relationship to Adam depends for its reality on our relationship to Christ. And that means, in practice, that to find the true and essential \}eigentlich \}ursprünglich\} nature of man we have to look not to Adam the fallen man, but to Christ in whom what is fallen has been cancelled and what was original has been restored.\(^3\)\]

\(^1\)C.D., III/2, p. 205.

\(^2\)Cf. \textit{supra}, Sec. b.l., and \textit{infra}, Appendix B.

\(^3\)"Christ and Adam", p. 24. (Ital. mine) And cf. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 10: "We are real men \}Wahrer Mensch\} in our relationship to Adam, only because Adam is not our head and we are not his members, because above Adam and before Adam is Christ." And cf. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 7.
In calling attention to the questionable "appearances", i.e., the "seeming" nature of priority, Barth has undoubtedly asserted a significant theological qualification. On the basis of his re-ordering, Barth sustains the centrality of the Christ-man relation, where other systems have failed. That is to say, other soteriological structures require the model of a once-perfect and fallen man to which Christ relates as the one who restores him to that pristine condition. The concept of the eternal priority of Christ, in Barth's system, alters that structure.¹

There are basically two characteristics which Barth includes in his analysis of the Christ-man relation. One suggests the element of dissimilarity, difference; the other specifies the correspondence between Christ and Adam. It may at first appear that these are contradictory, but, as we shall see, they are closely inter-related by Barth. Both characteristics are discernible in the following:

... our relationship to Adam is only the type, the likeness, the preliminary shadow /Gegenbild ... Gleichnis ... voranlaufende Schatten/ of our relationship to Christ. The same human nature appears in both but the humanity of Adam is only real and genuine in so far as it reflects and corresponds to the humanity of Christ.²

The dissimilarity evident in the above is indicated by the terms type, likeness, preliminary shadow. The correspondence issues from the assertion that both Christ and Adam participate in the same human nature. It is apparent, however, that the former, i.e., the real and genuine

¹Indeed, Barth does use the words, "... what is fallen has been cancelled and what was original has been restored." Supra, p. 255. The cancellation and restoration, however, do not refer to a repristination of some historical existence; they relate to the consummation of God's covenant intention. Our reservations in respect to Barth's particular re-structuring have been stated, supra, Sec. c., et passim.

²"Christ and Adam", p. 9.
humanity of Christ, qualifies the latter. This is clearly and concisely stated by Barth:

Man's nature in Adam is not, as is usually assumed, his true and original nature; it is only truly human at all in so far as it reflects and corresponds to the essential human nature as it is found in Christ.\(^1\)

It seems evident that Barth is attempting to establish the foundation for correspondence while at the same time maintaining the difference. Essential humanity inheres in Christ; Adam (man) is therefore human insofar as his humanity reflects Christ's. Will it be possible, we ask, for Barth to meaningfully relate the two? Are there, in fact, two human natures to be related?\(^2\) It would seem, on the one hand, that when speaking of human nature, Barth is specifying essential or real human nature which is a Christ property. On the other hand, as was noted in the text of note 2, p. 256, he also attempts to speak of human nature in both Adam and Christ. It may be a fair conclusion to suggest that the human nature of Adam (i.e., creaturely historical existence) indicates only and entirely man's reflective potential.\(^3\)

Commenting on Romans 5:13-14, and 20, Barth asserts that the

... formal correspondence \(\sqrt{\text{formalen Korrespondenz}}\) and identity \(\sqrt{\text{gleichheit}}\) between Adam and Christ is based upon their material disparity \(\sqrt{\text{sachliche Ungleichheit}}\). In the encounter between

\(^1\)"Christ and Adam", p. 43.

\(^2\)Cf. Zabriskie's criticism: "Within Barth's re-definition of 'humanity', he still maintains a definite distinction between man and God, for the humanity of God is a perfect humanity. But this concept confuses the doctrine of the imago Dei." "Critical View of Barth's Doctrine", p. 368.

\(^3\)This theme in Barth bears a marked similarity to the theology of Calvin, specifically Calvin's utilization of the term "mirror" - cf. supra, Chapter III, Sec. b.i. beginning p. 207. Our reservations are similar, and will not need to be repeated.
them Christ has more right and power, and Adam less. It is only in this disparity of status and in this disproportion that they can be compared.1

This is the clearest expression thus far regarding the locus of the God-man relation in Barth's system. It is apparent that in the attempt to explicate the correspondence between Christ and man, only an understanding of the humanity of Christ will reveal the essence of that relation. On the other hand, an analysis of creaturely human existence only portrays the disparity, the dissimilarity. If this is correct - that is, a fair appraisal of Barth's system - then it would appear that the resultant structure of relation between God and man is not essentially unlike classical Augustinianism which has dominated in the West.2

The *imago Dei* theme has served throughout as the principle by which we have attempted to elucidate the structure of the God-man relation. Our premise has been that the *imago Dei* is a biblical motif which signifies the nature of man in relation to God, and conversely, God in relation to man. The method by which we have examined and criticized Barth's system has both a positive and a negative character. The positive value is that it creates a broad environment for a specific discussion of the *imago Dei, per se*. On

1"Christ and Adam", p. 44. And cf. *Ibid.*, p. 16: The "how much more" of Romans 5:15-17 joins, or relates in another way Adam and Christ "... and points to an ordering principle that can connect even such opposites (ital. mine) as these." And cf. also *Ibid.*, p. 45: "In the unity of the one and the many Adam is the type and likeness [Vorbild ... Gleichnis] of Christ, although formally he differs from Christ because he is not lord and head in this unity, and materially he differs from Him because his nature is perverted by sin. But this unity, as such, belongs not to the perversion of his nature but to its original constitution."

2Indeed, it could be countered that the Augustinian structure proceeded from the presupposition of an historic Paradise in which man was endowed with factors of union, and that man subsequently lost what he once possessed. Barth's system does not proceed along these lines. The affinity of his system results from a "theory" of a pre-historical humanity (in Christ) which man, in historical existence has never possessed, but apart from which he is not fully human. Therefore, we suggest a basic similarity, and essential Augustinianism, in spite of certain differences.
the other hand, our method is liable to the criticism of unnecessary delay. It will hopefully be realized that the material considered thus far is inextricably related to Barth's interpretation of the imago Dei. What has been more or less implicit may now become explicit.

e. Man and the Imago Dei

The man with whom we have to deal in this section is the being created by God to fulfil His covenant intention (cf. supra, Sec. a.). He is also the form of creaturely existence whose essential, true, and original nature inheres not in himself, but in Christ who is man's archetype (cf. supra, Sec. c.). Furthermore, his historical existence, indeed history itself, coincides with the intrusion of and man's relation to the existence of nothingness, e.g. sin (supra, Secs. b.1., and all of Sec. d.)

Of the "man" with whom we are concerned in this section Barth says:

God wills and creates man when He wills and creates the being between which and Himself there exists this tertium comparationis, this analogy; the analogy of free differentiation and relation /freien Unterscheidung und Beziehung/.

Barth's contribution to the imago Dei theme is summarized in these few words. The tertium comparationis is an analogy of relation which has its origin in the being of God, and its reflection in man. And in neither, it should be clearly understood, could it be destroyed without thus destroying the very being of both. It is in relation to this conviction and doctrine that Barth explicitly employs the biblical phrase, the imago Dei, for here he locates the essence of the relation between God and man. The source and the indestructibility of the relation is expressed by Barth in the following:

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1Cf. C.D., III/2, p. 319: "Man is oriented toward that for which he is determined. ... Even as a sinner he remains the creature of God and therefore the being whose orientation is to be the covenant partner of God. He can give himself up for lost. But he cannot escape God, or lose his being as a creature of God, or the nature of his being."

2Ibid., III/1, p. 185.

3 Cf. Ibid.
'In our image' means to be created as a being which has its ground and possibility in the fact that in 'us', i.e., in God's own sphere of being, there exists a divine and therefore self-grounded prototype /in sich selbst begründetes Urbild/ to which this being can correspond; which can therefore legitimate it for all that it is a heterogeneous imitation; which can justify its existence; and by which, when existence is given to it, it will in fact be legitimated and justified.1

The creature's legitimization and justification derive from these two inter-related poles: first, that its very existence is a "given" i.e., it is from beyond man, proceeding from the intention of God; second, the creature is endowed with a correspondence factor. However, Barth will not permit the inference that man, so endowed, possesses either his justification or ability of correspondence in himself.2 It derives from his very createdness in the image of God. "He would not be man", Barth says, "if he were not the image of God. He is the image of God in the fact that he is man."3 That is to say, man's being as man in the image, i.e., in correspondence to God, is constitutive of his being; man is the form of

1C.D., III/1, p. 183.

2Cf. Ibid., p. 197: "Man is not created to be the image of God but ... - he is created in correspondence (ital. mine) with the image of God. His divine likeness is never his possession, but consists wholly in the intention and deed of his Creator, whose will concerning him is this correspondence /Entsprechung/.

3Ibid., p. 184, where we also note: God-likeness is "... not a quality of man. ... It does not consist in anything that man is or does. It consists as man himself consists as the creature of God." From this it would seem apparent that the "likeness" and similarly the "image" are factors of man's being which derive entirely from the actualized intention of God. Therefore, Barth will not need to consider the possibility of its loss (a departure from traditional Augustinian formulation) nor, we would assume, will his system reflect a highly developed ethical structure.

It may be appropriate to include a word regarding the relation between "image" and "likeness". Barth does not consider the terms as distinct from one another; neither, however, are they exactly synonymous, as we note in the following: "The phrase 'in our image' is obviously the decisive insight of the saga, for it is repeated twice. The other phrase: 'In our likeness', means to be created as a being whose nature is decisively characterised by the fact that although it is created by God it is not a
creaturely existence irrefragably God-oriented. Consequently, an attempt to speak of man apart from a theological orientation is both inadequate and ultimately absurd according to Barth's theology.\(^1\)

The confrontation, the communion between the Father and the Son is, according to Barth, the primary locus of the \textit{imago Dei}. The "... inner divine relationship between the Father and the Son,"\(^2\) is therefore, that to which man is created to correspond. It would appear that the creaturely correspondence of which Barth speaks includes two dimensions; one, the relation between man and God, and two, the relation between man and fellow man. The first dimension has been surveyed in the context of essential and original humanity, cf. \textit{supra}, section c, \textit{et passim}. It was concluded there that essential humanity is not that which pertains especially to historical creaturely existence, but primarily to the humanity which is in Christ. Both poles of the correspondence are included in the following:

As man generally is modelled on the man Jesus and His being for others, and as the man Jesus is modelled on God, it has to be said of man generally that he is created in the image of God. He is in his humanity, and therefore in his fellow-humanity \(/\text{Mitmenschlichkeit}/\). God created him in His own image in the fact that He did not create him alone but in this connexion and fellowship.\(^3\)

new nature to the extent that it has a pattern in the nature of God himself; to the extent that it is created as a likeness of this divine image, i.e., in the likeness of this image. The being created in the likeness of this image is man." – C.D., III/1, pp. 183-84. And for a similar statement, cf. "Christ and Adam", p. 11: "Even under the lordship of sin and death his \(/\text{man's}/\) nature is still human nature and so is the image and likeness of what it will be under the lordship of grace and life." For a more complete discussion of \textit{demuth} and \textit{tselem} cf., C.D. III/1 pp. 197 ff. Our impression is that Barth, while recognizing the delicate difference between the terms, consistently interprets them as Hebrew parallelism.

\(^1\) Cf. text of note 1, \textit{supra}, p. 259.

\(^2\) Dog. Outline, p. 52.

\(^3\) C.D., III/2, p. 324.
It would seem that the phrase "as the man Jesus is modelled on God" refers essentially to the same relation as that "inner divine relationship between the Father and the Son" to which reference was made above. Therefore, one could conclude that the dimension of "being for others" is a quality of Christ's being exercised both in His relation to God and to man. Consequently, it may be appropriate to suggest that the being of man inheres in the same dipolar relation, i.e., in reference both to God and fellow-man. However, the question arises whether man's fellow-humanity, i.e., the exercise of his being-for-others, is tantamount to man's relation to God. That is to say, what is the correlation between man's relation to his fellow-man and his relation to God? The quotation above (p.261, n.3.) seems to indicate a degree of proportionality.¹

That correspondence is further illustrated in the following citation:

... by the Word and word of God man really became the being which, as male and female, exists in correspondence with the divine original Vorbild7 and prototype Urbild7, ... to which there has finally been granted the possibility of life corresponding to its creaturely necessity Kreatürlichen Bedürftigkeit7.²

¹If Barth's system leads to, or even allows, that conclusion, we may have discovered a theme compatible with our own theme of "co-inherence" Cf. Introduction, pp. 26-27. But cf. C.D., III/2, p. 219: "Between God and God, the Father and the Son and the Son and the Father, there is unity of essence, the perfect satisfaction of self-grounded reality, and a blessedness eternally self-originated and self-renewed. But there can be no question of this between God and man, and it cannot therefore find expression in the humanity of Jesus, in His fellow-humanity as the image of God. In this case we have a complete disparity between the two aspects." In the light of this statement we may have to suggest that the fellow-humanity of Jesus' life is a factor which has no counterpart in His pre-Incarnational relation with the Father. And consequently, the theme of co-inherence and the structure of dipolarity are invalidated. Cf. also supra, pp. 244ff. for further qualification.

²C.D., III/1, p. 212, and cf. Ibid., p. 186: "... as God is One, and He alone is God, so man is one and alone, and two only in the duality of his kind, i.e., in the duality of man and woman. In this way he is a copy Abbild7 and imitation Nachbild7 of God. In this way he repeats in his confrontation of God and himself the confrontation in God."
It is, Barth asserts, as man exists "as male and female" that he is the reproduction, the correspondence, of the essential prototypal relation, i.e., between Father and Son. It would, however, be erroneous to suggest that man's inter-human relationships exhaust, without remainder, the dimensions of his being. There is a more significant and fundamental focus of man's being which Barth says is oriented toward the "... hope of the being and action of the One who is his original in this relationship."\(^1\)

The context of this statement makes it clear that both foci of the relation are included; Barth does not imply that man's relationships may be either with God or with fellow-man. The inter-human dimensions of man's relationships impinge inevitably on his relation to God.

Barth asserts that the phrase from the first creation account, "male and female", signifies more than the simple duality of sexes. The implicates extend even beyond the expression of the capacity for inter-human relations. There is a related implicate inherent in the phrase, "male and female", which Barth indicates in the following:

... man is the first and only one to be created in genuine confrontation with God and as a genuine counterpart of his fellows, it is he first and alone who is created 'in the image' and 'after the likeness' of God.\(^2\)

Asserted again is the inseparability of these dimensions implicit in the "male-female" designation. And whereas the male-female structure bears no independent value of its own, it nevertheless is for Barth central in his elucidation of the *imago Dei* motif. To say that the male-female structure bears no independent value of its own does not, according to Barth minimize the value of man; rather, by specifying the inseparability

\(^1\)C.D., III/2, p. 324.

\(^2\)Ibid., III/1, p. 134.
of the two dimensions of relation (God-man, and man-man) the value of being man is asserted. Man is irrefragably, indestructibly man-in-relation. It is this factor of his creation, Barth says, which provides the "... internal basis of the covenant."\(^1\)

The futility of the attempt to speak of man apart from his theological orientation has been noted (pp. 260-62 ). The question which occurs in that context is the significance of man's participation in that orientation. If, as we have said, man's being in relation (as male and female) is simultaneously the expression of his relation to God, can it then be suggested that man's inter-human relations constitute his relation to God? If, on the other hand, his inter-human relationships merely reflect the primary relation (i.e., that which God constitutes as a reflection of His trinitarian relation) then, we ask, of what value are man's inter-personal relations? Does "... the hope of the being and action of the One who is his original in this relationship" (supra, p. 263, n.1) require an active and responsible participation on the part of man?

Toward a response to these questions we cite Barth's statement from his discussion of Christ's virgin birth:

\(^1\)Cf., C.D., III/1, p. 186. Apart from the specific reference to the creation of man as male and female, according to Barth we could not say that creation was "good", because "... solitary man would not be created in the image of God, who Himself is not solitary." - Ibid., p. 290. And cf. Ibid., III/4, p. 117. We do not find it necessary to discuss extensively the differentiation and relation implicit in the male-female structure. The fundamental importance of the creation of the two sexes is readily granted, but an explication of Barth's entire utilization of that concept, we believe, would not add anything significant to our study. As far as we are able to discern, Barth himself does not discuss the human male-female relationship apart from its theological dimension, e.g., as the created capacity for man to reproduce the fellowship between the Father and the Son.

\(^2\)Ibid., III/1, p. 290, and cf. supra, Sec. b.
God did not choose man in his pride \(\text{Stolz}\) and in his defiance \(\text{Trotz}\) but man in his weakness and humility \(\text{Schwachheit ... Demut}\), not man in his historical role, but man in the weakness of his nature as represented by the woman, the human creature who can confront God only with the words, 'Behold, the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto me according as Thou hast said'. Such is human co-operation \(\text{Mitwirkung}\) in this matter, that and only that! We must not think of making a merit of this handmaid existence, nor attempt once more to ascribe a potency to the creature.\(^1\)

It would be inappropriate to suggest on the basis of the above that Barth is totally depreciating the value of creaturely existence. At the very least it must be recognized that the value of "this handmaid existence" is that apart from which there would be no "external basis of the covenant". Creaturely existence is required for the completion of God's intention. One wonders however, if Barth's characterization of "handmaid existence" does full justice to man whom God has created in terms of man's responsibility, and indeed, his historical activity.

Barth delimits the value of man's historical role in the following: Christ, says Barth,

... steps into Adam's place and into our place with the claim, the right, and the power, to make our sin and our death His responsibility \(\text{Sache}\)... \(^2\)

In addition to Christ's being the essential and prototypal humanity (the positive pole) He is also the One who assumes our place in terms of sin and death (the negative pole). We are reminded of a statement which has been cited (p.238) and which bears repeating:

Human existence, as constituted by our relationship with Adam in our unhappy past as weak, sinners, godless, enemies, has no independent reality, status, or importance of its own. It is only an indirect witness \(\text{Indiretes Zeugnis}\) to the reality of Jesus Christ and to the original and essential human existence that He inaugurates and reveals. The righteous decision of God has fallen upon men not in Adam but in Christ.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Dog. Outline, p. 99.

\(^2\) "Christ and Adam", p. 18.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 7.
We would like to be able to say something of more positive significance in respect to the value of human existence than that it "... is only an indirect witness to the reality of Jesus Christ". Indeed, that human existence is the internal basis of the covenant, and that the male-female structure re-enacts the relation between the Father and the Son - these are significant. However, the qualifications with which Barth surrounds them, render them of limited historical value.¹ We may have to conclude that Barth did not entertain the question of man's active, responsible participation in the manner we might have wished. On the other hand his system does not entirely preclude the possibility of asserting more positive values - not in spite of - but on the basis of certain aspects of his system. Some illustration of that will be indicated in the conclusion which follows, and also in the final chapter.

f. Summary and Conclusion

We noted at the outset of the chapter the centrality of God throughout Barth's system. It may be suggested that all theology would claim the same. However, it seems doubtful that there exists another system in which that method is so clearly defined, and so assiduously maintained.

¹But, cf. Humanity of God, p. 54, where this statement is notable especially because of its unique and uncharacteristic content: "What is culture in itself except the attempt of man to be man and thus to hold the good gift of his humanity in honour and to put it to work? That in this attempt he ever and again runs aground and even accomplishes the opposite is a problem in itself, but one which in no way alters the fact that this attempt is inevitable. Above all, the fact remains that the man who, either as the creator or as the beneficiary, somehow participates (Ital. mine) in this attempt is the being who interests God." This is not typical of the anthropology noted thus far. It is not, however, a contradiction in the light of the qualifications with which Barth has surrounded the adjective "somehow" before "participates". It should also be said that in Barth's ever-developing interpretation, the element of "partnership" - less qualified - may one day have emerged.
Following the brief introduction related to the externalization of the intra-trinitarian relation, the significance of the covenant intention of God was considered. It was noted in Sec. a. that the covenant is the recreation of an intra-trinitarian communion on the plane of creaturely existence; covenant and creation are inseparably interrelated. But God is known as Creator primarily through His work of reconciliation. Barth states: "... when the Creator has Himself become a creature, God become man, ..., then the mystery of the Creator and His work and the mystery of His creation are open to us in Jesus Christ, ..."\(^1\)

Creation, from that perspective, is the actualization of the covenant intention, and simultaneously the "stage" for the accomplishment of His purpose (cf. supra, pp.226-229).

Barth's creative interpretation and utilization of the covenant theme is constructive from several points of view. Stated negatively, it avoids the necessity of seeking to explicate the God-man relation primarily from the perspective of sin. To be sure, that factor is not thereby ignored, but neither does it remain the constitutive motif, which we suggested had been true since Augustine. Positively expressed, the configuration of the covenant relation and intention established the God-man relation essentially on the foundation of Christology - but, with a difference. Christ, as essential man, from before the creation of the world, assumes a fundamental priority in terms of the fulfillment of God's original intention. Christ's function remains that of Redeemer, but more significantly, His redemptive

\(^1\)Dog. Outline, p. 53. And cf. C.D., III/2, p. 319: "God acknowledges and confesses Himself the Creator by reconciling the world to Himself in Christ, in the One for whom and with a view to whom He created it." For a critical note cf. Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 105: "Barth's error, ..., lies in over-stressing his christological lever. The consequence is that he does not leave sufficient breathing space between the creation and the redemption, so that the reality of the redemption overwhelms the reality of creation - nature, history, the world and man - like a tidal wave, sweeping away any independent foothold it possesses."
work coincides with His role as the historical completion of God's eternal intention. This emphasis makes possible the explication of the Christ-man relation upon an essentially positive plane—though, in our estimation Barth failed to do so.

The idea of creatio continua was discussed in Sec. b. The consummation which the sovereign God had already anticipated is that toward which the completed creation will be transformed in and by Christ. Creation, according to Barth, does not possess its interpretation within itself; its reality is not disclosed from within but properly derives from beyond itself, i.e., from the reality of God. The problems which arise from that theme were noted, e.g., the relation between the "joyful readiness" and the "incident of the fall" (supra, pp.230-31). Although Barth radically re-interprets the "fall" event, it retains a central place in his theological system (cf. Sec. d.). The "fall" remains that which has effected a radical reorientation in the relation between God and man. The re-interpretation which Barth proposes, based on a "timeless and transcendental" dimension, seems to require a commensurate re-interpretation of the God-man relation on the plane of creaturely historical existence.

Our rather extended discussion of creation's negative and positive poles, and the association they have with nothingness, defined the framework upon which Barth articulated man's relation to evil and sin (supra, Sec. b.1. and infra, Appendix B). Barth's interpretation has both a positive and negative effect. On the one hand, his development of the theme is one which articulates man's relation to sin/evil as a secondary constituent of his being. On the other hand, Barth's structure makes it difficult to explicate man's relation to sin/evil in terms which are adequate. That is to say, in Barth's system man is culpable, but not responsible (cf. supra, p.235; infra, Appendix B, Articles 3.3 & 3.4.).
The re-orientation in respect to our "true and original nature" was indicated at the beginning of Sec. e. Barth unambiguously asserted that Christ, not Adam, is the true, original, and essential man. Consequently, the relation between Christ and humanity is the prior and fundamental one, while the man/Adam relation is secondary. Adam, and derivatively man, is the pre-figuration, the type of "man" who was yet to come (cf. supra, pp. 236ff). The centrality of Christ which Barth maintains, and the implications which that centrality implies in respect to the understanding of man are constructive. Adam is accorded a critical function in terms of interpreting the reality of man; but his (Adam's) is not the pre-eminent principle. That appropriately accrues to Christ.

However, on the basis of Barth's system certain questions occur: if Christ is original and essential man, what is our relation to Him? Are there any, and if so what, points of similarity between Christ and man, viz., in his creaturely historical existence? What is the significance of that creaturely existence in respect to Christ's pre-historical and incarnate humanity? It was stated that Christ's work effects an objective difference in the realm of creaturely existence (supra, p. 239). Our question is this: is it possible to suggest that man from "below" also makes a "difference" to Christ? Or, is the weight of the fore-ordained conclusion sufficient to render that "difference" either impossible or irrelevant (cf. supra, pp. 239-41)? Barth clearly asserts that there is intended no disregard for man; the "humanity of God" is precisely His relation to and turning toward man. God is the God of man. Nevertheless, our conclusion is that although Barth's re-structuring of the priorities is creative, his utilization of the structure severely (and inappropriately) depreciates the significance of creaturely existence (cf. supra, pp. 241-44).
Barth's utilization of the concept of the "primal union" makes it unmistakably clear that he is not speaking of it in any "historical" sense, i.e. as that which pertains primarily to creaturely historical existence (cf. supra, Sec. d.1.). The "primal union" refers to a positive relation between God and man; creaturely historical existence is (and has always been) "radically separated from God" (supra, pp. 246ff.). In response to the question whether or not Adam (man) did, in time, experience the joy of "primal union", Barth prefers a negative conclusion.

As Barth transfers the locus of the truth about man's being to the sphere of the non-historical, so also does man's involvement in creaturely existence impinge upon the non-historical, (supra, Sec. d.2.). Creaturely existence is existence in sin, but sin is a dimension of "nothingness" which primarily God, not man, meets in combat. And, as seen in the following, creaturely existence is confronted by an already defeated foe:

Until the hour strikes when its destruction in the victory of Jesus Christ will be finally revealed, He thus permits nothingness to retain its semblance of significance /Scheingeltung/ and still to manifest its already fragmentary existence. ... He thinks it good that we should exist 'as if' He had not yet mastered it for us - ... ¹

The above presents a fair summary of the "un-reality" of creaturely historical existence. For, it would seem to us that if Christ is the truth, the reality, of humanity on the one hand, and if the characteristic mark of creaturely existence is sin for which sole responsibility is assumed by God on the other hand, creaturely existence is rendered somewhat "un-real". That is to say, creaturely existence is ontologically irrelevant - cf. supra, p. 252, n.2.²


²We are not ignoring that which Barth suggests as the alternative structure of reality - that is, the essential significance of creaturely existence which derives from its relation to Christ. We are merely
Our earlier discussion (Sec. c.) of the central significance of Christology was enlarged in Sec. d.3. The qualitative difference between essential humanity (Christ) and creaturely existence (Adam) was further examined. We noted that the difference was not absolute; an absolute difference would render relation impossible. However, because of the nature of creaturely existence, the relation between it and Christ is established on the basis of its "material disparity" - supra, pp. 257-58. The barrier between a Christocentric relation and Christomonism has been breached with a resultant depreciation of creaturely existence.¹

Specific consideration of Barth's utilization of the imago Dei theme revealed that the imago was essentially a factor of correspondence (Sec. e.). The phrase, imago Dei, does not in itself specify that which inheres in man's being; it rather points to a tertium comparationis, (supra, p. 259). The analogy of "free differentiation and relation" is that quality of God to which man is created to correspond. And, to express that intention of creation Barth uses the phrase, imago Dei.

1Cf. Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 106: "No theologian ... will disagree with Barth when he asserts that the history of salvation is the 'centre' and that the history of the world is the 'circumference' around it. But every theologian who has studied the Bible will disagree with Barth when he considers the history of the world as devoid of any meaning or value of its own, serving only as the analogy, image, sign, correspondence and adumbration of the history of salvation, and that this is so from all eternity. The same Barth who in his struggle with natural theology, with its general concept of the divine, emphasises too strongly the concrete and historical figure of Jesus Christ, makes use of Jesus Christ in his analogical thought as a universal and supra-temporal principle which can reveal to him the reality of the whole universe - with the result that the reality of the universe evaporates."
Barth carefully qualifies his statements regarding the image and its relation to man. The *imago Dei* is constitutive of man's being, but the essence of the image inhere in God, not in man, cf. supra, p. 260. The legitimization and justification of man occurs not from within himself, but from beyond, i.e., from God. The *imago Dei*, in Barth's system, is a term which points to relation. That man is the image of God specifies his created orientation toward God. It is the *imago Dei* which depicts the dimension of communion apart from which man would not be man.

In Barth's system there are two dimensions of the *imago Dei*. The first, and pre-eminent one, is the dimension of Christ's relation to the Father. The second dimension is that of creaturely inter-personal relations wherein Barth speaks of the indispensability of the male-female order. A question was raised at this point as to the significance of the relation between the two dimensions. Does man's creation in the image of God suggest that as the Son is in relation to the Father, so also is man in relation to man? Barth's answer is affirmative - with qualifications.

Because of Christ's relation to man, therefore, might we suggest that inter-human relations imply dimensions which transcend the human? Again, an affirmative response seemed justified, but with the qualification that inter-personal relations do not exhaust the dimensions of the *imago Dei*.

The implicates of the male-female order signify the essentiality of relation - whether between the Father and the Son, or on the level of humanity. However, while there is an analogy between the two orders of relation, the relation is not ontological. That is to say - because of the "complete disparity" of essences (i.e., between God and man) the analogy of relation does not signify even an approximation of co-relation between God and man. The disparity, the distinction, between the two appears to
be absolute.¹

The end toward which the male-female order is oriented is not totally realized on the plane of inter-personal relations; its true focus is what Barth describes as the "internal basis of the covenant", cf. supra, pp. 263-64. It was at that point, and on the basis of that assertion, that the question was repeated regarding the probability of man's historical participation. Barth emphatically denies the possibility (cf. supra, pp. 264-65). Barth's Christology makes gratuitous, if not impossible, the attempt to authentically involve man (creaturely existence) in the God-man relation; Christ as essential man fulfills all the requirements for man.²

This section of the thesis is not an appropriate place to suggest alternatives to Barth, nor even to formulate minor variations based on his system. It may be permissible, however, to conclude this portion of the chapter with one preliminary idea. If Barth's concept of the centrality of Christ as "essential" man were freed from its delimiting implications (e.g. the un-reality of man) it could be utilized as a theme of the concrete, historical completion of God's eternal intention.³ This would necessitate

¹Cf. supra, p. 262 and especially the text of n. 1. This factor of Barth's theology is reminiscent of St. Thomas' differentiation between the Image and that which is imaged - see pp. 176-187 of Chapter III.

²Cf. Zahrnt, Question of God: p. 113: No one will object to the way Barth draws together the beginning and the end of the whole historical process in Jesus Christ. But the question is whether in Barth it is still a matter of an historical process: does he present anything in history as still happening? ... The basing of the event of salvation upon a timeless event in the perfect tense results for Barth in an irreparable loss of concrete historical reality."

³For example, see Gordon D. Kaufman, Systematic Theology: An Histori- cist Perspective, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), Kaufman maintains that the imago Dei should be interpreted as man's "historicalness, his historicity." - p. 330. Shortly thereafter he states "What, now, does it
a more historically related and dynamic Christology than his system generally implies. However, his essay, *The Humanity of God*, illustrates a certain tendency toward that direction. There are some interesting and constructive affinities between Barth's concept (modified) and Irenaeus' interpretation of man's growth-toward-image. The articulation of the *imago Dei* as a symbol of God's historical co-inherence with man characterizes our task and hope.

Mean to say that man's defining characteristic is his historicity? Man is preeminently a historical being because he is both made by his history and he himself makes history: thus man makes and remakes himself. All of nature is created in the historical process; man alone takes an active part in his own creation in history. - p. 333.
CHAPTER V

SIGNIFICANT CONTEMPORARY CONTRIBUTIONS

TO THE IMAGO DEI THEME

-PART TWO-

The Imago Dei in the Theology
of Emil Brunner

David Cairns has suggested that Brunner's contribution to the doctrine of the *imago Dei* "... has perhaps made the most impact on the thought of our time."¹ Brunner's recognized theological contribution and stature, Cairns' estimation, and our appreciation of Brunner's creative work - these are the factors which recommend an examination of his system, especially in respect to the *imago Dei*.

Brunner's elucidation of the *imago Dei* theme is more conspicuously anthropological than those heretofore considered. That is to say, his characterization of man, in his historical creaturely existence is plainly and explicitly about *man*. At the very heart of his system is his interpretation of the *imago Dei*, from which he draws implicates which impinge on the totality of man's being. On the other hand, Brunner occasionally uses terminology and forms of expression which imply that man within historical existence is other than man in his origin. The outline in this chapter may inadvertently imply that Brunner's anthropology

is essentially of the "before-and-after" variety. Nevertheless, his characterization of the origin of man, because of its importance within the system, requires a section of its own.

a. The Shape of Original Man

a.1. His Origin

Even though Brunner does not repeatedly press the point, one is aware that his anthropology is dependent upon his Christology. Christ's relation to man, according to Brunner, is the Word's relation to the creature called into being by the Word. And, says Brunner:

The revelation of Christ points back to the revelation in Creation, to the Word 'in whom all things cohere', Col. 1:12, in whom also, in a very special way, man has the ground of his being, as man. His responsible being is based upon the Word of the Origin: ... 2

Especially significant is the note of continuity indicated, the link which joins all times, i.e., Christ, the Word. That man's being is established on the foundation of the Word is a basic and fundamental constituent of his being. 3 Man is, foremost and fundamentally, the being created by God for relation. The phrase, imago Dei, bears implicates of that relation, which are evident in the following:

Man, in contrast from all the rest of creation, has not merely been created by God and through God, but in and for God. ... Just as it is said of no other creatures, 'let us make', so

1 Cf. infra, Sec. b.3.a, for a discussion of Brunner's Christological presuppositions and their utilization.


3 Cf. M.I.R., p. 71: "Man is man by the fact that he is a creature who stands in a special relation to the Word of God, a relation of being grounded in and upheld by the Word." And cf. Ibid.: "Just as the new man is generated by the Word of God, so also the original man in the divine original act of Creation was generated by the Word of God."
also it is said of no other that it has been created 'after His likeness' or 'in His image'. The whole Christian doctrine of man hangs upon the interpretation of this expression - but on the interpretation which is drawn from the New Testament, from the point of view of Jesus Christ. ¹

In addition to the Christocentric element indicated, Brunner emphasizes the importance of the phrases "after His likeness" and "in His image". These phrases specify the uniqueness of man, as compared with other forms of creation. The imago Dei indicates the particularity of man who alone is created "in and for God". This is the heart of Brunner's interpretation of the imago theme.

It may be well to indicate at this point in the development of the chapter Brunner's conceptualization of the essential difference between God and man. It will become increasingly clear that Brunner's interpretation is oriented toward the articulation of the nearest possible relation between God and man: it is not to magnify the distinction between the two. There is no confusion of the natures of God and man; man is a "... product of His will, he is a creature."² Difference is required in order to permit true relation. What appears almost as an overstatement, Brunner says:

The original Biblical word 'Creation' means first of all, that there is an impassable gulf between the Creator and the creature,

¹M.I.R., p. 92. And cf. Ibid., pp. 70-71: The doctrine of Creation is the fundamental doctrine of the Christian faith, asserting "... that all being is either of God or has been created and established by Him. But the Biblical ontology is not content with this. It states that God has created all that is outside Himself through His Word. The Word of God therefore, ... is the ground of being of all created existence, not merely in the sense that all created being has its origin in the Word of God, but in the sense that in the Word 'all things cohere', that all that God has created He upholds 'by the Word of His power.'"

²Cf. Ibid., p. 77.
There is no greater sense of distance than that which lies in the words Creator - Creation."\textsuperscript{1}

It becomes apparent in the light of the following paragraphs of Brunner's text that the above quotation is applicable only within the context of God's "... inescapable, operative presence ..."\textsuperscript{2} The "impassable gulf" \textit{[the unüberbrückbare Distanz]} specifies the basic, fundamental, and eternal distance in the face of man's attempt to either deny or bridge it for himself. But from God's perspective the distance is not insuperable. Brunner does, however, make it unmistakably clear that creation can assert no valid claim upon the Creator on the basis of its created compatibility or relative superiority.

Even the very phrase which signifies the relation between God and man, i.e., the \textit{imago Dei}, expresses their essential difference. Brunner's very carefully worded explication both of that fact, and also of God's nature is stated:

Man is in the Image of God, his personality derives from God's, yet just because it is from God his person is different from God's. God - the God known to us in His Word - is the unconditioned, the underived, and, save from Himself, by naught determined, absolute and, to Himself, absolutely transcendent Spirit. Yet this designation 'absolute Spirit' would forthwith land us in the bottomless and impersonal could we not at once add a second: He is to Himself self-related, one knowing and willing Himself in love, the Triune God. Wherefore, only the Triune God is genuinely personal, for He is within Himself self-related, willing, knowing, loving Himself.\textsuperscript{3}

The "gulf", the disparity perceived between God and man derives primarily from the fact of the difference of their being. That is to say, God is the absolutely self-sufficient and independent One; man is the absolutely

\textsuperscript{1}M.I.R., p. 90. And on the same page we read: "Man, although he has been created out of love, in love and for love, is not of divine nature, as though he had a share in the being of God; but he is a product of His will, he is a creature."

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 91.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., pp. 218-219.
derived and dependent one. However, Brunner's purpose is not primarily to specify and clarify their relative distinction, but to assert that by which they are related. Of the above characterization of God he asserts: "This Triune personal being of God is the original image according to which and for which man has been created."\(^1\) It is precisely the interpretation of the structure of that relation which is our concern. Whatever may be said of the gulf which exists between God and man is asserted in the light of God's endeavor to overcome it.\(^2\) And the means by which God operates toward that end is itself constitutive of the being of man.

The being of man, Brunner says, is created in such a way "... that man knows that he is determined and conditioned by God, and in this fact is truly human."\(^3\) This being "determined and conditioned by God" is not to suggest Brunner's attempt to assert a doctrine of determinism; rather, it is his attempt to specify a positive constituent of man. God has, according to Brunner, created man - determined and conditioned him - for relation. However, the dimensions of that relation are established by God, and therefore any subsequent and positive relation must conform to the structures which God has established. The nature and capacities of man do not enable him to create the structures; his nature "... -is nothing in itself, and ... it is not intelligible from itself, ... its ground of existence and of knowledge is in God."\(^4\) Brunner maintains that

\(^1\) M.I.R., p. 219.

\(^2\) Cf. Ibid., p. 9, where Brunner asserts that the message of the Bible is "... not concerned with 'God in Himself,' but with 'God for us,' the God who manifests His nature and His will in the Son of Man, in order that in man this centre may once more become the true centre."

\(^3\) M.I.R., p. 97.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 96.
the term, *imago Dei*, includes within itself the dimensions of that order and structure of relation.\(^1\)

It is at this point, however, that Brunner's articulation of the difference between the Old and New Testament interpretation becomes critical. Although the subject of the fall and sin and their effect on man created in the *imago Dei* have not been introduced, it seems advisable to anticipate that subject very briefly at this point in order to present Brunner's interpretation. Basically, the Old Testament interpretation of the *imago Dei* is what Brunner calls the formal aspect; it is that which signifies man's being as subject, including his freedom.\(^2\)

The New Testament image (material image) on the other hand derives from the fact that, as Brunner says,

... God created man good and that man is now evil: these two statements are the presupposition of the message of the New Testament, a presupposition which can never be removed from New Testament thought, and one which is always operative.\(^3\)

In respect, therefore, to the New Testament interpretation of the *imago Dei*, the concept of a created and lost quality of life must be maintained. The New Testament builds upon the restoration of that lost quality. Brunner states that "... the whole work of Jesus Christ in reconciliation and redemption may be summed up in this central conception of the renewal and consummation of the Divine Image in man."\(^4\)

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1Cf. *M.I.R.*, p. 83: "The phrase with which the Christian doctrine describes the origin of man, and in so doing the ground, the character, and the limits of that higher element, is the parabolic expression of the Creation narrative: Namely that man has been created 'In the image of God.'"


3*M.I.R.*, p. 499

relation between the Old and New Testament interpretations is a complementary one, i.e., the latter completing the former. The Old Testament contribution which asserts the responsible subjectivity of man's being is not, in Brunner's interpretation, replaced; it remains as an essential description of man's being. The New Testament contribution to the theme, however, completes the picture—a completion apart from which one cannot present a theological anthropology.1

Man's destiny, the intent of the Old Testament perspective, is to

... 'repeat' the original Divine Word—he must not make a word of his own, but of his own accord he must give it back saying: 'Yes, I am Thine.' ... We are concerned not with an 'image' and a 'reflection' but with a 'word' and an 'answer'; this is the exposition which the New Testament gives of the Old Testament story of Creation, the idea of the Imago Dei.2

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1For Cairns' comments on the subject of the "formal" and "material" image, and their relation, cf. Kegley, Theol. of Brunner, pp. 82-84, and cf. also Cairns, Image, pp. 156-59, especially this from p. 157: In respect to the relation between the two pictures, according to Brunner, "It is impossible to make a simple appeal to the Bible, and ask what it teaches, for it is clear that both doctrines lie together in it, even in the teaching of St. Paul, and that no attempt is made either to reconcile or relate them. Such a relation of the concepts to each other is, Brunner believes, a necessary and important task of systematic theology."

The importance which Brunner attaches to the relation is clear in the following (Dog. II, p. 59): "It is evident that our thought will become terribly muddled if the two ideas of the Imago Dei—the 'formal' and 'structural' one of the Old Testament, and the 'material' one of the New Testament—are either confused with one another, or treated as identical. The result will be: either that we must deny that the sinner possesses the quality of humanity at all; or, that which makes him a human being must be severed from the Imago Dei; or, the loss of the Imago in the material sense must be regarded merely as an obscuring, a partial corruption of the Image, which lessens the heinousness of sin. All these three false solutions disappear once the distinction is rightly made."

2M.I.R., pp. 98-99. Cf. Emil Brunner, The Word of God and Modern Man, trans. David Cairns, (London: Epworth Press, 1965). Hereafter: Word of God, p. 38: "In being created in the image of God, man is created to make this decision. I.e., to say either 'Yes' or 'No' to the fulfilling of the destiny of his creation. Brunner's statement, "... not with an 'image' and a 'reflection' ... is a significant departure from the systems
The affinity between the Old and New Testament pictures in Brunner's exposition is notable. The affinity factor is man's call to respond - a call which is of the very essence of man's being. It is to that factor of "The Shape of Original Man" that we now direct our attention.

We have attempted to outline the basis upon which Brunner builds his doctrine of the *imago Dei*. Certainly, the most critical element of his system is the centrality of the Word. Christ, as God's Word, is on the one hand the link of continuity between Creation and Redemption; on the other hand, He is the one through whom and in whom man is created. Man's being, therefore, in the *imago Dei*, is a being-in-relation to the Word. Indeed, we noted the difference between God and man (pp. 277-79) but, we suggested that Brunner's intention in articulating that difference was to establish the proper foundation for relation. It appears that Brunner's emphasis is to articulate the difference in order to maintain the necessary priority or pre-eminence; God determines the structures within which man is created to relate. Finally, we briefly noted the importance which Brunner attaches to the differentiation between the Old and New Testament interpretations of the *Imago Dei*. There we concluded that both interpretations are essential; each interpretation, from a slightly different perspective, offers its own contribution to the development of a theological anthropology.

There is another related aspect of Brunner's system that requires comment, i.e., the historicity or non-historicity of the origin of man. That is to say, when Brunner says, e.g. that "... God created man good

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1Cf. *M.I.R.* pp. 103-04: "Being according to the *Imago Dei* is a divine gift, it is communicated life, not merely an aim."
and that man is now evil: ... "(supra, p. 280) is he referring to two estates of man in an actual, historical sense, or is only one historical? This important subject may conveniently be studied in an Appendix to avoid unnecessarily complicating the main text. Cf. Appendix C, infra.

a.2. Responsible Relation.

We presented, in the first section, a brief picture of the origin of man. Primarily noted were the structures to which man is created to conform. Attention is now directed to the discovery of man's fundamental or essential being. Admittedly, what will here be considered may be a somewhat idealized picture; until the implications of the fall and sin are included we will not be speaking of man in the totality of his actual and historical existence. The present subject is man as he is intended to be, which is not necessarily, says Brunner, what man is.

There are two themes which are integrally related in Brunner's interpretation of man in responsible existence. The first is that man's very being is determined for relation to God; the second is the factor of inter-human relations. The two themes will be examined separately - though they are intrinsically inseparable - and subsequently their relationship to each other will be defined.

Part of the uniqueness of man, and at the same time Brunner's interpretative key, is that man is the being who is called into existence. From God's point of view, according to Brunner, the essence of man is that of "call"/Anruf/; from man's perspective it is "answer"/Antwort/. "Thus", says Brunner, "the heart of man's being is seen to be: responsible existence/verantwortliches Sein."¹ Brunner locates the essence of man in terms of

¹M.I.R., p. 97. Brunner's use of verantworten and its cognates is derived from the noun, Antwort. Therefore the element of an answer, or reply is pre-eminent. It does not especially signify, as our use of the
his responsibility; stated thus:

In all that man is, does, says, and thinks, he gives an answer to the word of creation, the word of destiny; indeed, he not only gives an answer, he himself is an answer (Ital. mine). Human existence, in contrast to every other form of existence, is responsive existence /antwortendes Sein/, that is, existence which must and can answer, and in so doing is free and yet bound.\(^1\)

However, the "answer" which man is – his essence – necessarily points away from itself. Indeed, it properly points also beyond his intra-human relationships. That man is responsible existence is not to imply that he carries his being independently. Brunner asserts that man's answer, his being

... is not intelligible in the light of his own nature, but only in that which precedes it – a primal truth. ... it is only in the light of this primal origin that we can comprehend the end for which he has been created; it is only in this light that we can understand the aim of man's existence and the meaning of his failure to attain this aim.\(^2\)

Were it possible, therefore, to ascertain the total dimensions of man's responsibility, one would know both his relation to the "primal truth" and also the "end", the goal of his existence. However, we are dealing with an "ideal", and not yet an actual form of human existence. Nevertheless, the importance which Brunner attaches to locating man's being outside, or beyond man, is conspicuous.

\(^1\)M.I.R., p. 65. And cf. Ibid., p. 50: "Responsibility /Verantwortlichkeit/ is not an attribute, it is the 'substance' /Substanz/ of human existence. It contains everything: freedom and bondage, the independence of the individual and our relation to one another and the fact of community, our relation to God, to our fellow-creatures and to the world, that which distinguishes man from all other creatures, and that which binds him to all other creatures."

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 65.
Viewed from a slightly different perspective, Brunner interprets the responsibility of man in terms of knowledge and determination. He says that whereas other forms of creation are finished, complete, man is to be understood in a dynamic, moving sense. In the primary sense, man is known and determined; Brunner's reference is to the action of God toward man. Derivatively, and in a secondary sense, man "... is a being-in-self-knowledge /Sein-in-Selbsterkenntnis/ and a being-in-self-determination /Sein-in-Selbstbestimmung/,... ."¹ This asserts the critical importance of man's decision-making ability. Brunner insists, however, that man does not make decisions independently, but only within the limits of "Divine determination" / göttlichen Bestimmung/. This does not minimize the importance of the exercise of that ability; Brunner states: "The necessity for decision /Entscheidungsnotwendigkeit/, an obligation which he can never evade, is the distinguishing feature /Wesenmerkmal/ of man."²

The third facet of the same quality, i.e. responsibility, is that of the I-Self and its relation to love. The following quotation aptly states Brunner's salient point:

Since God has created man in His image He has created him as a person. It is not the mind, nor the soul but the psycho-physical whole, the person 'man' whom God has created in His own image. The unity of man is the unity of his personal being /Persenseins/. But we can only perceive his personal being through faith, in the light of the Word of God, namely as a creature which has been called to communion with God, and thus to responsibility-in-love /Verantwortung-in-Liebe/. That is the Scriptural basis of the understanding of the 'I-Self.'³

In addition to the significant insight which Brunner reveals as his "theology of the person", a point to which we wish to call attention is the factor of faith.\(^1\) It is faith alone, Brunner asserts, that reveals the irrefrangible bond of communion between God and man.\(^2\) Inasmuch as man is the being called to communion, so also does that signify his "responsibility-in-love." And it is the total being of man that is thus characterized.\(^3\)

The essence of man, i.e., being-for-love,\(^4\) implies at the same time man's being-in-God. According to Brunner, man is created by God as the creature who finds the source and goal of his love outside himself,


\(^2\) It should be realized that in Brunner's system it is only from God's point of view that the relation is irrefrangible; man's breaking of the relation will be considered in a subsequent section. Cf. Brunner, Dog. II, pp. 60-61: "We must note, however, that necessary as it is for us to think of the Imago Dei with this distinction between the formal and material sense, from the point of view of the divine Creation it does not exist. God calls man into existence in order that he may respond to Him aright - not in order that he may respond wrongly or rightly. Man is not destined to choose between faith and unbelief, obedience and disobedience; God has made man in such a way that he can respond as God wills him to do. A certain freedom of choice, which makes this response possible, only becomes visible when the wrong response has been made." We cite Cairns' objection to Brunner's analysis: "... if the distinction between formal and material freedom from the standpoint of God does not exist, how can God, as Dr. Brunner suggests, have so seriously taken into account the possibility of man's sin that He actually created His world 'With such a character as would correspond to a sinful humanity'?" - Kegley, Theol. of Brunner, p. 91, citing Brunner, Dog. II, p. 131.

\(^3\) Cf. M.I.R., p. 99: "The intrinsic worth of man's being lies in the Word of God, hence his nature is: responsibility from love, in love, for love \(\text{aus Liebe, in Liebe, zu Liebe}\)."

\(^4\) Cf. M.I.R., p. 74: "Being-for-love \(\text{Sein-zur-Liebe}\) is not one attribute of human existence among others, but it is human existence itself. Man is man to the exact extent in which he lives in love."
unlike God who is self-existent, self-sufficing love.\textsuperscript{1} It would be incorrect to suggest that the expression of man's responsibility-in-love \(\text{Verantwortung-in-Liebe}\) represents an option; it is not as though man can or can not, according to his choice, live from and for love. Responsibility-in-love is an expression of created reality - the way things are. Brunner states it thus:

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Finally, the dimensions of man's constitution in and from the being of God is manifest in the terms 'I' and 'Self'. Inasmuch as man is able to use the personal pronoun 'I' in reference to himself, he resembles God. However, Brunner makes it unmistakably clear that the dimensions of the 'I' aware of itself, is not the philosophical, \textit{cogito ergo sum}. That, he says, was an attempt to understand man severed from God. Rather, the 'I' of which Brunner speaks, is the 'I' who is aware of himself as a "theological being". Therefore, "... as soon as he

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. \textit{M.I.R.}, p. 219: "God, the Primal Word, is creative, self-existent, and self-sufficing love; man has been created by God as a responsive, reflexive love, that is, a love whose content is outside itself. With God, the 'I' of man has its 'Self' in the Word of God. In Himself God is love, but man can only be love from God and unto God."

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{M.I.R.}, p. 98. May it be, therefore, that the alteration incurred by the fall and sin, which we will consider shortly, is only the "appearance" of an alteration?
truly desires to say 'I myself,' he must immediately refer himself to God as the ground of his selfhood, to whom he must be responsible; ..." ¹

This understanding of the 'I' is the only adequate expression of man's responsibility-in-love; it relates itself to love which "... is the unity of willing, knowing and feeling, the sole total act of the person."²

Other attempts to define the 'I' are inevitably partial, and therefore erroneous.

Having explored the implications of responsibility especially from the God-man perspective, we now examine the inter-human implications. It should be remembered that the perspective remains primarily that of the "ideal" situation.

Brunner's concept of the person-in-relation is not a peripheral facet of his characterization of the person; it is fundamental. There is one curious reference from Brunner that seems to imply that as God is in relation to Himself, so also can man be understood as one in relation to himself "... based on his relation to God."³ That which we find curious is the suggestion that man is able to realize his being as an 'I'-'Self', based on his relation to God apart from inter-human relationships. Apparently what Brunner wants to assert is not that possibility (which he, in fact, denies)⁴ but the centrality of the God-man dimension. However, it is a centrality and not an alternative which he has in mind. The centrality of that structure of relation requires, as it were, a parallel structure, i.e., the inter-human structure of relation.

¹M.I.R., p. 220. ²Ibid.

³M.I.R., p. 221: "To be a person is to be in relation to someone: the Divine Being is in relation to Himself; man's being is a relation to himself based on his relation to God."

⁴But, cf. Ibid., p. 290: "Existence in God, ..., as existence in the love of God, is also necessarily existence in love to the whole creation."
The essence of man as responsibility-in-love (supra, pp. 286-87) requires inter-human dimensions for the expression of its reality.¹ That is to say, in the words of Brunner:

Human life is characterized as human ... by the union of human beings in love. That is the content of human existence, which is in accordance with man's original divine destiny (göttlichen Urbestimmung), and is an earthly reflection of the divine nature itself.²

Man's destiny has been determined to be a reflection of intra-Trinitarian love; it is the formal, Old Testament interpretation of the imago Dei.³ That reflection necessitates the presence of the "other". Man, Brunner asserts, "... does not occur as an individual, ... ".⁴ God has created man as a reflection; as there is an I-Thou relation within the Trinity, therefore, in order to create the possibility for reflection, God has created man in confrontation with a human Thou.⁵ The human Thou who confronts an other does not merely add, as an accident, a qualitative dimension to the 'I'; it is that apart from which the 'I' cannot exist.⁶


²Ibid., p. 106. The similarity to Barth's concept of the male-female relation is apparent. However, Brunner places more emphasis on the quality of relation, i.e., being-for-love, and also asserts a more direct God-man relation than noted in Barth's analogia relationis.

³Cf. Dog. II, p. 56: "... it is of the essence of this responsible freedom that its purpose may or may not be fulfilled. This open question is the consequence of freedom. Thus it is part of the divinely created nature of man that it should have both a formal and a material aspect. The fact that man must respond, that he is responsible, is fixed; ... ". For Brunner's qualification of the term "reflection" cf. supra, pp. 280-81.

⁴Ibid., p. 23.

⁵Cf. Ibid., p. 106: "... the fact of the Divine 'Thou' means that the human 'Thou' is also given to man as the possibility of his selfhood. Man cannot be man 'by himself'; he can only be man in community."

⁶Cf. Ibid.: "The human 'Thou' is not an accident of human existence, something which gives to his present human existence a new content and richness; but it is that which conditions his human existence."
The necessity of inter-human relations is further emphasized in respect to an understanding of the human 'I' and its relation to God. The importance of realizing the centrality of the God-man relation as a parallel to inter-human relations was indicated (p. 288). Now in reference to the essence of the 'I', Brunner asserts that God relates himself not to single and solitary individuals, but to the individual in community. Brunner says that the community is

... the concrete limitation \( \text{[Begrenzung]} \) of the 'I'. The Divine 'Thou' is not confronted by a single human 'I' - for if this were so, such a self would not be responsible, a being with genuine ties - but by a number of selves who recognize that the bond which unites them with God also unites them with one another. As the Creator gives to man the humanity of his life in community in love, so also He assigns to him his limitations \( \text{[Grenze]} \) in his connexion with others. From the outset the human 'I' is limited by a concrete 'Thou', and only so does it become a concretely responsible Self.1

The 'I' is neither self-creative, nor self-sustaining; it is created by God for relation. The relation for which it is created is characterized in terms of responsibility, and it is that factor that implies the limitations necessary for its being. In other words, the "I" as interpreted by Brunner can only be a responsible "I"; there can be no structure of responsibility apart from the limitation \( \text{[Grenze]} \) provided by the presence of another "I".

The limitation, however, is not to be thought of exclusively in boundary terms, i.e., as structures which confine or restrict the expression of one's individuality. There is that factor present, but equally as important is what may be called the necessity of openness.

1M.I.E., p. 107.
Brunner speaks of that necessity in the following:

God has created the self for self-existence in community, as a non-self-sufficient self \(\text{nicht-autarkes Selbst}\), which ought not to exist for itself, and cannot exist for itself. This is why God gives us such individuality which forces us to depend upon one another that we may complement each other. The most important instance of this is sex-individuality, man and woman.

The individuality, the uniqueness of the "Self", is intended to prevent the "Self" from existing in and for itself, and to force the "Self" out of itself to find its completion in the "other".

In an assessment of Brunner's system regarding the self in community, one would be difficult to overstate the factor of co-relation. Indeed, one discovers that the solitary "Self" does not exist. A solitary "Self" could not be responsible, and according to Brunner responsible existence is the very essence of man. Each human being has his origin, his creation in the imago Dei. And, says Brunner, "... upon this origin is based both our human unity as well as our solidarity. ... Essentially we are one, in spite of the fact that as individuals we possess and express this essential element in different ways."\(^2\)

It was stated at the outset of this Section (a.2.) that apart from the factors of the fall and sin a characterization of man would be

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\(^1\)M.I.R., p. 323. Brunner's utilization of the male-female theme is more historically creature-oriented than Barth's (the popularizer of the theme). The non-self-sufficiency and interdependence factors in Brunner's system signify authentic human and divine implicates which transcend Barth's analogia relationis. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, Sec. e.

\(^2\)Cf. The Mediator, trans. Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1934), pp. 144-145. The quotation is from p. 145. We acknowledge the fact that a comprehensive treatment of Brunner's doctrine of the imago Dei would require a fuller treatment of the concept of the "Self" than we have offered. Nevertheless, we have limited ourselves for the sake of brevity, hoping that our brief explication of the "Self" is sufficient to indicate the main outline of his thought. Chapter XII of Brunner's Man in Revolt offers an extensive treatment of the subject.
somewhat idealized. It may be necessary to revise, or at least qualify, that suggestion. The mood (in the grammatical sense) of Brunner's verb forms have been indicative without exception. In respect of God's call /Anruf/, man is an answer /Antwort/. Brunner never implies that man ought to be an answer; the heart of his being is responsible existence /verantwortliches Sein/. 

The inter-human dimensions of Brunner's structure of responsible existence are similarly indicative. Man is responsibility-in-love /Verantwortung-in-Liebe/. This truth, and its implicates of the "self" in community, are factors of creation; the primal truth precedes empirical observation. We suggest, in a preliminary sense, that Brunner's picture of man, i.e., a primal one, involves anthropological implications not appreciably unlike those derived from a theory of an historic Paradise and subsequent fall. This is, of course, only a tentative conclusion. One question which emerges is the relation between the formal essence of man in respect to the material essence. Do they co-exist - equal but separate? Brunner articulates the problem and simultaneously introduces the next section thus:

The individual becomes what he is in community and through others, and what he is also has its effect upon others. This - if I may put it so - formal structure of creation of man's being has remained as well as formal responsibility. Indeed, at bottom both are one, since community is simply responsibility in its concrete form. But: the quality of community, the love content of this community-existence has been destroyed.

1 We do not wish to imply that this inclination to qualify has only emerged at this point in our development. Brunner's interpretation of the formal imago Dei and our consideration thereof (supra, pp. 280-81) and also the material presented in Appendix C, infra, are factors which are related to the ideal actual structure of man's existence.

2 Man's being, thus characterized, is discernible on the basis of his knowledge of his primal origin - through faith. Cf. supra, p. 285, n. 3, and p. 287, n. 1.

b. The Shape of Fallen Man

Fallen man is man in his historical existence. Our division is not meant to imply that Brunner proposes, in any sense, that there did exist an original pre-fallen man on the plane of historical reality (cf. Appendix C). The elucidation of the shape of fallen man, in contrast to his origin, is only for the sake of clarity. A consideration of the dimensions of sin and the fall, together with section a., will complete our interpretation of Brunner's doctrine of the *imago Dei*.

b.1. Preconditions of the Fall.

Brunner's clear and creative utilization of the "formal" elements of the *imago Dei*, especially that which specifies the indestructibility of man's call and responsibility, prepares the way for his interpretation of the fall. It has been ascertained that the origin of man and his life in harmony with the primal truth are supra-temporal realities. Similarly, Brunner asserts, the fall is supra-temporal; that is to say, it is an "event" that transcends creaturely historical existence, though it impinges upon it. The fall, says Brunner,

... is not an event in the story of the growth of humanity; it is no more an empirical event than the Creation; it lies behind or above the empirical plane. The antithesis between 'created good - fallen' has nothing to do with the difference between 'earlier (in the empirical time-series) or later'.

One would, however, be seriously mistaken were he to conclude that Brunner's system disregards or minimizes the importance of history, or more specifically, the significance of creaturely historical existence. Neither of the supra-temporal states, i.e. the creation and the contradiction /Widerspruch/, are properties of historical existence. Nevertheless, says Brunner, "... through the genuinely historical they impinge upon it, and manifest themselves within it."

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1M.I.R., p. 399. 2Ibid., p. 401.
One looks to man, created in the imago Dei, to discern both states of man's existence. One does not, according to Brunner, look exclusively beyond man to perceive the magnificence of his origin; nor does an evaluation of man reveal only the depravity of his fallen existence. 1 His magnificence, and also his depravity, coincide in the parabolic expression: imago Dei. Brunner most clearly expresses it thus:

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Single out any part of human life that you may choose, whatever you examine will always be a product of the original perversion, of the primal sin! But when you see sin you also see the image of God. Only where there is the Imago Dei is there also peccatum; sin itself is a testimony to the divine origin of man. 2
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The primal sin, in Brunner's terminology, is the sin of self-deification Selbstvergottung 7. This arises, however, precisely from the fact that man's created position is superior in respect to all other forms of creation. Man's misunderstanding and misuse of his position is the primal sin. 3 Brunner also refers to this as "... sinful confusion, by which the copy makes itself the original,  

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[which is only possible because it is a copy]. 4 The inseparable inter-relation of man's power and pathos is fundamental in Brunner's system. That man not only is able to commit the sin of self-deification, but moreover "that he feels
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1 The element of Brunner's interpretation that both man's dignity and depravity inhere in the imago Dei differs notably from Barth's thorough-going Christocentric interpretation. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, Sec. e.3. et. passim.


3 Cf. M.I.R., p. 173. And cf. p. 181: "There is no stronger proof of the actuality and depth of that contradiction, which we called 'primal sin', than the self-deification of man."

4 Ibid., p. 173. The German reads: "Diese sündige Verwechslung, durch die sich das Abbild zum Urbild macht, ist nur darum möglich, weil es Abbild ist."
impelled to do so, he derives from God."¹ Brunner's system does not require (nor will it allow for) the presence and operation of diabolical forces, e.g., Satan in the older systems, "nothingness" in Barth's. The implicates of creation in the imago Dei provide a basis for understanding, though not for complete explication,² of the sin of self-deification.

The fall of man, one might conclude, is the supra-historical self-deification of man that generates, on the plane of history, man in conflict with himself and with God. "Man must be understood", says Brunner, "in terms of the contradiction between the divine image and sin, in terms of the contradiction between origin and fall. Precisely this, this contradiction between truth and falsehood in him, is the hallmark of the real man."³

It would appear that Brunner (like Barth) implies the existence of a supra-natural stage whereon creation and fall occur to be re-produced on the plane of historical existence.⁴ Brunner's system, apart from that inference, (which we challenge), evolves from a serious study of man in his historical existence. There are theological as well as anthropological implications; it is to these that we now direct our attention.

¹M.I.R., p. 187.

²Cf. The Mediator, p. 144: "The more anyone knows what evil is the more inexplicable does it become. The doctrine of the Fall is not a theory which is intended to explain the existence of evil; on the contrary, it is the idea in which the inexplicable character of evil finds its clearest expression." We suggest, however, that though evil there finds its clearest expression, the interpretation of that expression remains, nevertheless, a subject of debate.

³Word of God, p. 45.

⁴Cf. supra, Chapter IV, Secs. a. & b. To be sure, Brunner rejects a theory of a two-stage level of existence such as we have characterized above. Nevertheless, his utilization of the terms of the myth, e.g., origin, primal truth, and fall, seem to imply the actual existence of those realities. Cf. infra, Appendix C, where this issue is more thoroughly considered. Cf.
b.2. Theological Dimensions

In relation to man's original relation to God, which was existence in responsibility /Verantwortlichkeit/ and love /Liebe/ (cf. supra, Sec. a.2.), Brunner characterizes fallen man's relation in terms of perversion. An integral facet of Brunner's system is that relation determines being; therefore, man's relation to God, whether proper or perverted, determines the nature of his being. Although the fall does not destroy man's being, Brunner asserts that

... it has been perverted. Man does not cease to be the being who is responsible to God, but his responsibility has been altered from a state of being-in-love /Sein-in-der-Liebe/ to a state of being-under-the-law /Sein-unter-dem-Gesetz/, a life under the wrath /Zorn/ of God.

The original being of man, according to Brunner, is that form of existence circumscribed by existence in love. Sin does not remove man from the sphere of responsibility, i.e., man does not become free and independent from God. Rather, ... "the reversal of the relation must be ... the perversion /Wesensverkehrung/ of the being." This so called perversion has obvious anthropological implications, e.g., in respect to love, to be examined in the next section. But the theological implications do not appear to be quite so obvious. That is to say, granting the perversion of the being of man, does it then follow that a change (we will not want to say perversion) also occurs in God, and in His relation to man? Does man's self-perversion create a real, that is objectively different structure of relation from God's point of view?

also, M.I.R., p. 300: "Both the Divine image which has been imprinted upon man by the Creator, and its destruction by sin, together constitute - without ceasing to be 'act' - the primal act which determines all that follows and the primal imprint of man's nature."

1 M.I.R., p. 105. 2 Cf. Ibid., p. 133.
Brunner proposes an affirmative answer; he says,

... the most appalling thing about sin is this: that through it the original personal relation between the Creator and the creature has been distorted. Guilt now lies between man and God. God can no longer admit man to His Presence. ... Guilt is something objective, not something subjective, just as truly as the relation to God is objective and not merely subjective. But guilt expressed in positive terms means the wrath of God. This is the new attitude of God towards man, that He is angry with him on account of his sin.1

Guilt, the objectified result of sin, is that which constitutes the barrier of separation between God and man. It is clearly stated in the above that this objective reality does indeed transform God's love into His wrath; He is an angry God. And it should not be assumed, according to Brunner, that this is only the "appearance" or transformation.2 Even though Brunner speaks of God's wrath as His "altered Face" _verstelltem Angesicht_ and a "misunderstanding" _Verständnis_, yet, "... just as this misunderstanding is an objective reality, the perversion of human nature, so also its correlate, the wrath of God, is an objective reality. This is the God of the man who is in sin; he cannot and must not have any other."3

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2 But cf. Brunner, _M.I.R._, p. 187, wherein Brunner seems to imply a more subjective reality: "The wrath of God under which the idolatrous, sinfully perverted man stands is simply the divine love, which has become a force opposed to him who has turned against God. The wrath of God is the love of God, in the form in which the man who has turned away from God, experiences it, as indeed, thanks to the holiness of God, he must and ought to experience it." As we understand it, Brunner's statement - that love has become a force opposed - suggests an objective change; on the other hand, his saying that the wrath of God is God's love erroneously _experienced_ suggests a more subjective one. The same ambiguity is also present in the following from _Ibid._, p. 169: Man does "... not cease to be in the Word of God, called by God and summoned to responsibility. But through the contradiction of his attitude (Ital. mine)_/Stellung_ to the God who calls him is perverted; hence also the call itself has been transformed (Ital. mine) from a call of generous love into that of a demanding and accusing law."

3 _M.I.R._, p. 163.
The existence of man is constituted in terms of relation. And it would be entirely fallacious to suppose that God's wrath is a term of relation that implies man's independence; he does not escape God. Whereas God's original relation to man was constituted in love, now the relation is maintained by law. Drawing on the theme of "protective custody" in Gal. 3:23, Brunner states that the law has replaced love, and that in the fallen state the law "... preserves for man's existence a vestige of humanity/Rest von Menschlichkeit/. ¹

Whether or not the fall of man creates a consequent transformation in God according to Brunner's interpretation may have to remain undetermined. Our primary concern is not, after all, to explicate Brunner's doctrine of God; rather it is to discover his doctrine of the imago Dei. What has been determined, in spite of the problem above, is that fallen man lives in relation to the wrath of God. The implications in respect to the imago Dei are stated by Brunner thus: man

... precisely in his legalism ... is one who lives in conflict with God and with himself. But in this very conflict he is to be understood only in the light of his origin and his original nature, that is, of the Imago Dei. That he can be a sinner is due to his origin; that he must be a sinner is due to his falling away from his origin.²

Brunner's reference to the imago Dei in respect to man's origin has been discussed above (section a.1.). Basically, he is referring to the fact that man not only gives an answer, but he is an answer.³ That factor of his constitution, together with the created potential for self-deification (cf. supra, b.1.) are constituents of man's being apart from which man's essence is inexplicable. His origin is a factor of the

³Cf. Ibid., p. 65, and supra, p. 284.
Therefore, man in conflict with his origin, i.e., fallen man under the law and in the face of God's wrath, necessitates the "presence" of that origin. Fallen man is responsible Verantwortlichkeit before God.

The fall occasions more specifically anthropological implications than have thus far been considered. They emerge, in a sense, from the disorientation created by the fall. We say "in a sense" because there is no strictly chronological order implied. That is to say, it is not first that man breaks relation with God, and second that there are inter-human manifestations thereof. We remember that both man's origin and fall are supra-historical. Furthermore, man's existence-in-relation is simultaneously his relation with God and with fellow man.

b.3. Anthropological Dimensions

(And Christological Implications)¹

b.3.a. Methodology and Presuppositions.

In this and subsequent sections we will be considering Brunner's material which is specifically oriented toward man; however, Brunner's anthropology is explicitly Christocentric, and that factor circumscribes his anthropology. He expresses his aim and method thus:

We shall, ... start from the centre, from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, and ask ourselves in what light man is there revealed. Only then shall we take the various anthropological

¹Neither the scope of the thesis, nor the restricted treatment of Brunner, requires a full consideration of Christology. However, there are inevitably many Christological/soteriological themes that impinge directly and indirectly upon our subject. The study of a consistent soteriological system, for example, would conceivably produce a fairly comprehensive understanding of the object of salvation, i.e., man.

A portion of Brunner's doctrine of Christology will be included, primarily in footnotes. It is hoped thereby to achieve a greater understanding of our main pursuit, i.e., man in the imago Dei.
utterances of the Old and New Testaments, interpreting them in the light of this central knowledge, and adducing them to complete and confirm our conclusions.¹

Even though he claims a Christocentric approach, it is of a significantly different order than, e.g., Barth's, inasmuch as it evolves from within the context of another presupposition.² In his Man in Revolt, for instance, he states "... all that we intended to do in this book was to deal with a definite section of Christian doctrine, the subject of which is the presupposition for the Message itself."³ The presupposition there, as well as in The Mediator, is the factor of the separation between God and man. Brunner says:

We can only really understand what the Bible means by the coming of God, and this unique event, when we interpret it from the point of view of the presupposition of the Bible itself. The presupposition of this movement is the gulf between God and man, the abyss which lies between the holy God and the sinful creature. The Incarnation of the Son of God is determined by Sin. God comes. He must 'come'. He will come, because the creature has turned away from Him.⁴

According to Brunner, this presupposition is not developed in the Old Testament specifically in respect to the imago Dei doctrine.⁵ The New Testament...

¹Kegley, Theol. of Brunner, p. 80. The reference is David Cairn's translation of the text of Brunner's Dog. II, p. 53. It is used here because it seems clearer than Olive Wyon's translation.

²We are suggesting that Barth's system does not similarly include other presuppositions, nor is our concern to compare and contrast the two approaches. We merely intend to indicate that our impression is that Brunner more openly acknowledges sources which are not exclusively Christological. He neither claims nor implies a "pure" Christology. Beyond this difference, however, their respective systems manifest a basic similarity; "sin" predetermines their doctrine of the imago Dei.

³M.I.R., p. 479.

⁴The Mediator, p. 291. Ital mine. We wonder if perhaps the presupposition of God's eternal love (cf. John 3:16) may not qualify as a presupposition as well as the gulf of separation. We will endeavour in the last chapter of this thesis to elaborate on that possibility.

Testament, however, adds another dimension to the doctrine. What matters to the Apostles, asserts Brunner, is the

... 'material' realization of this God-given quality; that is, that man should really give the answer which the Creator intends, the response in which God is honoured, and in which He fully imparts Himself, the response of reverent, grateful love, given not only in words, but in his whole life. The New Testament, in its doctrine of the *Imago Dei*, tells us that this right answer has not been given; that a quite different one has been given instead, in which the glory is not given to God, but to men and to creatures, in which man does not live in the love of God, but seeks himself. Secondly, the New Testament is the proclamation of what God has done in order that He may turn this false answer into the true one.¹

The God-given quality, i.e., that the nature of man is his creation in the *imago Dei*, implies his responsibility *Verantwortlichkeit*. Brunner's differentiation between the Old and New Testament interpretations of the *imago Dei* has been discussed (pp. 280-81). Inasmuch as the two Testaments utilize the doctrine differently, one might infer that, at least in respect to the *imago Dei*, the presuppositions were also different. We have not, however, noted that Brunner comments on the validity of the New Testament utilization of the doctrine in its relation to a different presupposition. It appears that he allows the "material" interpretation of the New Testament, with its implicates of separation, loss, and fall, to reduce the Old Testament interpretation to *mere* formality.

Finally, we take note of the relation between revelation and experience in Brunner's system relative to the Christian doctrine of man. He maintains that the truths given through revelation "... are not accessible to experience, ..."², by which he apparently means they are not derived

¹Dog. II, pp. 57-8.

²M.I.R., p. 61. If the translation were unambiguous at this point, we would challenge the propriety of saying that revelation is not accessible to experience - if that implies that it is received entirely other than through such human faculties. The German, however, does not specify the
from experience. Brunner does not suggest a contradiction between revelation and experience, but a superiority of the former. Doctrine can, and does, incorporate into its conclusions the knowledge gained from experience. "At this point," says Brunner, "as at all others, the Christian truth includes 'natural' knowledge; this means, all that man can know from observation and thought apart from faith." In respect to the tension between the two spheres of knowledge, "The only possible attitude is a dialectical one, which - if we may say so - takes into account, from the very outset, the theological nature of man."2

Having offered this brief presentation of Brunner's presuppositions in respect to the imago Dei, especially in respect to the material interpretation, we are prepared to consider more deeply the implications of the fall, i.e., man's turning away from God.

b.3.b. The Contradiction.

The above heading, similar to Brunner's own term, Conflict /Widerspruch/, is a comprehensive title; beneath it are subsumed the various implications of the fallen nature of man. We have considered the dimensions of responsibility and relation primarily from the perspective of their origin (supra, Sec. a.2., pp.283ff). Here, however, we will explicate Brunner's interpretation from within the contradiction.

b.3.b.1.In Terms of the Knowledge of Responsibility and Being

It is not only that all men are responsible that specifies their humanity; according to Brunner, it is also the "... knowledge of responsibility /Das Wissen um die Verantwortlichkeit/ that makes every human being a

preposition precisely. The text is: "... obwohl sie den Menschen von den keiner Erfahrung zugänglichen Wahrheiten der Offenbarung her versteht, damit in keiner Weise den, was man erfahrungsgemäß vom Menschen wissen kann, ..."

1M.I.R., p. 61. 2Ibid., p. 62.
There is a difference between one who simply is responsible by virtue of his being human, and one who knows of his responsibility. Knowledge is a critical element of the Christian faith.\textsuperscript{2}

In respect to knowledge and understanding, fallen man is characterized by Brunner as one who has lost the Word. The consequence of that loss is the forfeiture of true humanity with its special connotations of meaning and origin, and the nature and content of human existence as responsibility.\textsuperscript{3}

Read in isolation from the system, the following statement from Brunner may misleadingly imply that the Christian faith is primarily a new dimension of cognitive awareness; he says, "The Christian faith is so utterly simple; it is nothing less than the renewed understanding of the meaning of responsibility."\textsuperscript{4} However, an awareness of the inextricable inter-relation between knowledge and being in Brunner's system will prevent that misunderstanding. Because the Word which comes is not only a matter of cognition, but is also creative, Brunner asserts that "... the knowledge of true human existence is no mere matter of knowledge, it is at the same time a new being."\textsuperscript{5} It "... is both existence and knowledge."\textsuperscript{6} The critical and creative truth is no mere matter of \textit{anamnesis}, as Brunner says, but the truth of existence is disclosed only by an

\textit{... anagenesis} which is based upon faith in the Incarnate Word of God; thus it is only an act of knowledge which is at the same time an act of life ... . This new knowledge is at the same time a new being, the true being of man.\textsuperscript{7}

The expanding characterization of fallen man suggests the following

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{M.I.R.}, p. 61. \textsuperscript{2}\textit{Cf. Ibid.}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Cf. M.I.R}., pp. 51-52, where the converse is expressed in terms of the revelation, the disclosure of true humanity in Christ.
\textsuperscript{4}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 52. \textsuperscript{5}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{6}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 52. \textsuperscript{7}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 66.
conclusions: first, all humanity is responsible, but fallen humanity apart from Christ is ignorant of the origin and meaning of responsibility. Fallen existence is therefore less than authentic. Second, fallen existence, in respect to knowledge and being, is sufficiently perverted so as to require a re-creation, anagenesis. Third, the contradiction within man's understanding of responsibility and being is radical enough to preclude the possibility of his re-creation from within himself. It comes entirely from beyond himself, creating a new being commensurate with his origin.

Perversion of the knowledge of responsibility is simultaneously the perversion of being in Brunner's system. Therefore, he is able to assert that "... man does not only do wrong, he does not only commit

1 Cf. M.I.R., p. 94: "The fact that man is determined by God /Gothestimmtheit/ is the original real nature of man /ursprüngliche, eigentliche/; and what we now know in man as his 'nature' is de-natured nature /denaturierte Natur/, it is only a meagre relic /Ermerlicher Rest/ of his original human nature. Through sin man has lost not a 'super-nature' but his God-given nature, and has become unnatural, inhuman."

2 Cf. Ibid., pp. 82-83: The Word "... descends to us from the heights of God, and lays hold of us from beyond ourselves, from beyond the contradiction to which we have fallen a prey, in order to show us what we have lost through the contradiction." It is, however, not only a matter of His showing us, an anamnesis, but "... man allows himself to be told his real state, he goes back to his Origin, in the 'recapitulation,' in the objective 'anamnesis' /Objectiven 'Anamnese/' of this past, in the Cross of Christ." - M.I.R., p. 483. The anamnesis motif, according to Brunner's use, is obviously more than a matter of human remembering; and "objective anamnesis" is apparently his way of asserting that Christ assumes responsibility on our behalf to re-create our existence in conformity to the origin.

It seems apparent that Brunner's use of "objective anamnesis" and anagenesis (supra, p. 303, n.7) clearly implies a movement from the present to the past, a regression. It is not a bringing of the past forward into the present, nor a new creation in time, but a matter of transporting the present backward, and creating over again. This inclination is noted in his interpretation of Irenaeus, cf. The Mediator, p. 291, n. 1: Irenaeus' "... doctrine of 'recapitulation' is indeed unique in theology in the way in which it reveals the connection between Creation, the Fall, revelation, and redemption as a divine movement which is regressive." (Ital. mine)

But, cf. supra, Chapter I, Sec. c.4. The interpretation of recapitulation
sinful acts, but he is bad, he is a sinner."¹ Sin is descriptive of the essence of fallen man. That is to say, in addition to the assertion that it is of man's essence that he has been created by God, so also in respect to fallen man is sin an essential element of his nature.² The essence of which Brunner speaks i.e. that man as a sinner, is a dynamic essence, not a static substance. The relation between this matter and the doctrine of original sin is the context within which Brunner makes the following statements:

Man 'is' a sinner; but this 'is', because it refers to man, must not be confused with any other 'is'. Man's 'being' never ceases to be a 'being-in-decision' /Sein-in-Entscheidung/. Even as sinner man is not a soul- or reason-entity of some kind. ... The whole problem of human existence is contained in the copula of this predicate, in the 'is', while the philosophers and theologians usually seek it in the predicate. To be a sinner means: to be engaged in rebellion against God. Sin never becomes a quality or even a substance. Sin is and remains an act.³

The dynamic essence of man as being-in-decision is surely a pivotal factor in Brunner's system. It relates consistently and conspicuously to all the other dimensions of the system we have thus far noted, e.g., the imago Dei in relation to divine determination, being-in-relation, and being-in-love. These, and others which have been noted, are comprehensible only in a dynamic orientation. Not least, of course, does it elucidate Brunner's interpretation of man's essence in respect to his falleness, specifying, in dynamic terms, the perversion of man's origin. The perversion is not indicative of a substantial (substance) alteration, but a dynamic process. As Brunner says,

... the fatality of the Fall consists ... in the fact that every human being, in his own person, and in union with the rest of humanity, every day renews this Fall afresh, that he is in process of falling and cannot escape from it, that he cannot get back to his origin. 

A secondary insight derived from the above pertains to the nature of the origin. Our previous consideration of the origin (supra, Sec. a.1) is substantiated. The origin is a state of being, not in the substantialist sense, but in an active, dynamic dimension. The origin is man's being-in-decision in harmony with his Creator's intention. Conversely, the Fall is man's being-in-decision-in-contradiction.

b.3.b.2. In terms of Personal Disintegration

According to Brunner, the substance/accident categories, operative in the church since Augustine and through the Reformation, are not adequate to articulate the centrality of personal being. The importance which Brunner attaches to this motif is indicated thus:—

God's action in man is not causal, and the being of man is not substantial. If, however, that is understood we shall then again return to the personal type of doctrine of the Bible — which seems so paradoxical to abstract thought — which simply places these two thoughts side by side: God alone must do it, but man must 'work out his own salvation with fear and trembling.' Faith comes from God alone, but if faith does not come into being man alone is to blame. God gives faith freely, from pure mercy, yet faith does not come into being save through the obedience of man. Every attempt to go beyond this dualism, which yet plainly expresses the priority of God, and to reach a unified formula, destroys the personal understanding of the relation between God and man and changes it into something material. The relation between God and man cannot be described by the formula of the sole causality of God, or of the sole operation of God, because God's creation of man has from the outset created the relation of 'over-againstness.'

¹M.I.R., p. 172.
Gegenüberseins\textsuperscript{7} which - this is God's will - has the result that even the divine action in man always respects the fact that man is subject.\textsuperscript{1}

The integrity and responsibility of both God and man are explicated by Brunner, and the descriptive term is personal being. It is clear that Brunner is struggling with the matter of the God-man relation. He maintains that the preservation of the dualism \textit{Duplizität}, i.e., the "over-againstness" of God and man, is indispensable; to negate the duality is both to destroy the concept of personal being and to create a material structure of relation.\textsuperscript{2}

Personal disintegration, therefore,

\textsuperscript{1}M.I.R., p. 541. This category of personal being is carried into soteriology thus: "The Incarnation takes place - not only but also - in order to restore the picture which has been destroyed; the Divine Incarnation - not only, but also, and necessarily - is the renewal of that which took place in the creation of man in the image of God. Human personal being alone is a suitable means of revealing the personal Being of God. The revelation of the Divine person in the God-Man is at the same time the revelation of the originally true, personal being of man." - M.I.R., p. 416. And cf. Word of God, p. 53: "Only in a human person can God perfectly reveal himself, for only man is created in the image of God. Only with a human person can we really have fellowship - ... . We cannot really have fellowship with the God who does not reveal himself to us in a human person, because he does not really encounter us. He remains at a distance, in a transcendence, which excludes real fellowship."

Quite obviously Brunner's latter statement has serious implications regarding the form of relation which God had with, e.g., Israel before the Incarnation. Brunner makes it clear, in the same reference, that he is speaking quantitatively; cf. his use of "really" above. He also makes it clear that the Incarnation manifests the severity of sin to a degree unknown to Israel, for which a satisfaction model of the atonement is required.

We wonder (again) if perhaps more of the structure of relation operative in Israel, and less of the "obstacle" structure of the Epistles, may not have produced a more biblical Christology. Further, is it possible to develop a more positive anthropology in terms of a biblical interpretation of the \textit{imago Dei}, rather than the almost complete pessimism of the Western Church? We will return to these questions in the final chapter.

\textsuperscript{2}Brunner's articulation of the essential duality of personal being, and our preliminary attempt to specify a factor of immanence in the \textit{imago Dei} motif (cf. supra, Introduction, pp. 25 ff, and passim), i.e., in our word, "co-inherence", appear to be mutually contradictory. Whether they are, in fact, will have to be considered at a later point. Certainly,
is not tantamount to total destruction; one cannot imply complete disintegration (if that signifies the destruction of the duality) and continue to speak of relation.¹ Less than complete destruction, however, ought not to suggest only peripheral or minimal implications. Brunner states:

Just as personality is constituted at the centre, so also the disintegration of the unity of personality /Desintegration der Persönlichkeit/ starts from the centre. Through the Fall man loses the content of his personal being, existence in the love of God.²

Although the formal structure of responsibility remains, the content /Inhalt/, i.e., existence in love, is lost.³ This, as we have noted already, implies a radical reorientation in the God-man relation - an existence in the wrath of God. Inasmuch as for Brunner responsibility /Verantwortlichkeit/ defines the very essence of human existence (cf. supra, Sec. a.2.), similarly does love qualify that essence, as Brunner states:

The meaning of all responsibility is love; for love is the fulfilling of all law. Hence man can be understood as issuing from love and made for love. Love is both the source and meaning of his life. ... [Fallen man] is aware of this to some extent, even if only dimly; but what he cannot know for himself

however, we will not attempt to abrogate the duality entirely, nor ignore the positive contribution of Brunner's theme of personal being. But, we believe it is possible to articulate the co-inherence of the God-man relation without changing it into "something material", as Brunner predicts must happen.

¹Brunner's differentiation between the Old Testament (formal) and New Testament (material) interpretations of the imago Dei is apt at this point. Cf. supra, pp. 280ff.


is why this is so, and what the real content and meaning of love is.¹

Fallen man may indeed be ignorant of his life's center; he does not perceive the meaning of responsibility, or understand the lingering awareness of his existence in love. For, according to Brunner, "Genuine humanity has been taken away from our life. ... Responsibility and love, which were formally a unity, have been turned into a contradiction."²

Nevertheless, on the basis of the immutability of his formal structure, he remains man. The disintegration of personality pertains to the distinctive content thereof, i.e., existence in love.³

¹M.I.R., pp. 73-74. The soteriological implication is stated as the reference continues, p. 74: "This is indeed the content of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Only in this revelation is the meaning of the word 'love' rightly 'defined' for us by the Divine action; and in it alone is this love revealed to us as the ground and the end of our life. In it we perceive why, to whom, and for what purpose we are responsible."

²Ibid., p. 52.

³cf. Ibid., p. 229. The distinctive content is the same as the material, New Testament image. Disintegration at that level implies characteristics of a "past" which requires an act of reconciliation by Christ. This is how Brunner articulates that reconciliation: "God's primal word of love Ῥwrt der Liebe comes to me as a new event, by means of which God wipes out my past Ῥergangenheit as though it had never happened, through His act of reconciliation. It is not I who go all the way back to God; He takes the whole consequence of my falling away upon Himself. God comes, so to speak, towards me, through all my apostasy, laden with the whole burden of my falling away, suffering from the whole curse which my fall has caused as an objective fact. My faith, therefore, can only go back the whole way because God's Word comes to me in this way: in Jesus Christ the Crucified, in God's act of atonement which blows out my past, my guilt. Hence faith is now no longer the simple childlike acceptance of the 'man made in the divine Image,' but it is first of all a painful process, in which I have to say 'No' before I can say 'Yes' that is, I must acknowledge my guilt and my sin, and I must admit the necessity for the Divine Atonement. We can only perceive in this Divine light what we really are; it is only in the Word of the Cross, which actually brings out our contradiction to our Origin - just as the Origin is actually present within it - that we see ourselves in our true light." - M.I.R., pp. 481-82. An indication of Brunner's exclusive claims for Christianity, in respect to the ability of fallen man to see the dimensions of his contradiction is seen here: "He shows this however only to him who
The final facet of personal disintegration to be discussed is Brunner's concept of the self. Broadly speaking, of course, the concept of the self points us to the I-Self under which, as we have seen,1 Brunner's entire characterization of man in the imago Dei could have been included. It is the self primarily in respect to dependence that we study here—especially in reference to its perversion.

The "I" of man only properly finds its true "self" in the "Thou" of both God and fellowman. Thus, there is a created primal unity which manifests itself as a self-consciousness with an awareness of its being in the world, and simultaneously more than the world. The real problem of man is the disintegration of these two foci of the unity; that which was "...- given by the Creation—has been lost, and that instead of complementing and aiding one another, they are in conflict with one another."2 Fallen man does not perceive that the fulness of his being is the living expression of both foci, i.e., both his being in the world, yet more than the world. The disintegrity of his falleness is his self-deification, his self-centeredness, by which he loses the perspective of the divine dimension, i.e., his "self" in God. Man continues, however, to remain man in terms of this dipolar dimension; he remains homo religiousus. As Brunner says, "The dimension of eternity remains never unoccupied, even if only by the sense of insecurity and the anxiety which is 'in Him', to him who in faith accepts this Word of God and in so doing allows himself to be lifted to this higher plane, and thus attains that elevation above himself from which he can henceforth perceive himself both in his origin and in his contradiction."—M.I.R., p. 83.

1 Cf. supra, Sec. a.2., especially pp. 287ff.

2 M.I.R., p. 168.
accompanies it.\textsuperscript{1}

That man has his "self" in God means, as Brunner asserts, that "Only in communion with God can man realize \textit{realizieren} his independence \textit{Selbständigkeit}, his self, for indeed he has his self in God. Thus the realization \textit{Realisierung} of the self is identical with complete dependence \textit{Völligen Abhängigkeit} upon God."\textsuperscript{2} Genuine independence, according to Brunner's interpretation, is simultaneously his dependence.

The "realization" of the self in God is, in Brunner's terminology, a relational term; it specifies a concrete actualization, more than a cognitive perception. Created by God in the imago Dei means, among other

\textsuperscript{1}M.I.R., p. 26. The partial, fragmentary awareness of eternity cannot, however, reconstruct the unity of the origin, nor is it sufficient to reveal the depth of the contradiction itself. Brunner says (M.I.R., p. 478) that the contradiction can only be understood "... from the standpoint of faith; that is, that in order to look into these depths we must take up that position above man which would be impossible to us in our own strength, namely, in the Word of God. This position is given to us by the Incarnation of the Son of God and by the Spirit of God; to take up this position means to believe. From the point of view of faith we can see him as he really is, namely, as one who stands between the creation in the image of God, the original union with God, and sin, the false independence of man." On the next page (479) Brunner asserts that the "... truth of the actual man \textit{Die Erkenntnis des wirklichen Menschen}, ..., is not one which offers a picture which speaks for itself, but it is to the highest extent subjective, that is, it is one which can only be gained in the existential decision of faith \textit{Existenzentscheidung des Glaubens}.

The residual dimension of eternity in the form of insecurity and anxiety is an especially familiar theme. Augustine's and Aquinas' beata vita, restoration of original righteousness (Luther), integrity (Calvin), and primal union (Barth) - these are variations of a similar theme, viz., creaturely dissatisfaction. In each of the above, however, such dissatisfaction represents an inappropriate, illegitimate, human constituent. Irenaeus developed an alternative interpretation; creaturely dissatisfaction is proper for creatures - a constitutive mark of man's intended growth. The idea of self-deification (the epitome of dissatisfaction's expression) was not one that Irenaeus would have entertained.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 290.
things, to belong to God, i.e., that one's "self" is in God. In the perfect actualization \textit{realizieren} of that created reality the idea of self-will is entirely inappropriate; the two are contradictory.\footnote{But, cf. \textit{M.I.R.}, p. 267. There, in respect to the self-will and fallen man, and its being overcome, Brunner says: "The highest discipline is that of belonging to God. Here all self-will \textit{aller Eigenwillen} is taken away from man, and in this alone does he become truly spiritual \textit{wahrhaft geistig}, genuine personality \textit{wahrhafte Persönlichkeit}. This is the kind of freedom which God gives to man; in this alone does He make him really human \textit{eigentlichen Menschen}." We challenge Brunner's assertion as being an indefensible overstatement. To whom (apart from Christ) may it be applicable, except as an approximation? Even in respect to Christ, it does not appear self-evident that "self-will is taken away", but rather that there is a coincidence, a concurrence of wills. However, we recognize that for Brunner self-will is self-deification; he does not use the term as a potentially positive constituent of man.} Yet man lives precisely in that contradiction; his "self" is not actualized in God. Brunner states it thus:

\begin{quote}
Man as sinner is in permanent revolt \textit{auflehnung}, in a rebellion \textit{aufruhe} (which he cannot now renounce by his own efforts) against his divine determination \textit{Schöpfungbestimmung} and thus against the nature given him by God. The divine Creation still exists in man, not in the shape of 'relics,' but as the primal element in human nature, inevitably but continually being denied afresh. \textit{Aber unvermeidlich verneinte Erst}.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 169.}
\end{quote}

There does remain, however, a genuine human independence which has to do with freedom. For, as we noted above, man is responsible existence \textit{verantwortliches Sein}, i.e., a being-in-decision (Sec. a.2.). To lose one's self created in the \textit{image Dei} is simultaneously to lose one's true independence \textit{wahre Selbständigkeit}.\footnote{Cf., \textit{Ibid.}, p. 288.} Brunner makes it clear, however, that he is not implying that the loss of true independence is tantamount to the loss of humanity.

\begin{quote}
\footnotetext[1]{But, cf. \textit{M.I.R.}, p. 267. There, in respect to the self-will and fallen man, and its being overcome, Brunner says: "The highest discipline is that of belonging to God. Here all self-will \textit{aller Eigenwillen} is taken away from man, and in this alone does he become truly spiritual \textit{wahrhaft geistig}, genuine personality \textit{wahrhafte Persönlichkeit}. This is the kind of freedom which God gives to man; in this alone does He make him really human \textit{eigentlichen Menschen}." We challenge Brunner's assertion as being an indefensible overstatement. To whom (apart from Christ) may it be applicable, except as an approximation? Even in respect to Christ, it does not appear self-evident that "self-will is taken away", but rather that there is a coincidence, a concurrence of wills. However, we recognize that for Brunner self-will is self-deification; he does not use the term as a potentially positive constituent of man.
\footnotetext[2]{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 169.}
\footnotetext[3]{Cf., \textit{Ibid.}, p. 288.}
\end{quote}
... the un-freedom, into which man falls through sin, is un-freedom in freedom /Unfreiheit in der Freiheit/. ... Even the sinner is a human being, not an animal, not a thing; the form of his divinely-created existence /gottgeschaffenen Existenz/, existence-in-decision /Sein-in-Entscheidung/, has not been destroyed. It is not sufficient to speak of mere desire as the Reformers do, we must speak absolutely of free will.¹

Brunner's intention in the above is to refute what he calls the "Beelzeboul of determinism". Only when that has been accomplished is it appropriate to introduce a negative qualification. Indeed, man is and remains man, including his being-in-decision. Freedom to decide, therefore, is appropriately ascribed to him. Nevertheless, the following qualification is required:

We no longer say: every kind of freedom is left to man save one ...
... but we now say: man has lost his real freedom /eigentliche Freiheit/. The very fact that he is still a human being qualifies this negation, it is freedom to sin, it is freedom for eternal death.²

The qualification of the assertion that "we must speak absolutely of free will" in no way destroys that freedom. Rather it defines that freedom as a total perversion for which man remains responsible. In this way Brunner is able to maintain the formal structures of the imago Dei and at the same time to articulate its material perversion - a perversion which man is entirely unable to rectify.³

¹M.I.R., pp. 267-68. ²Ibid., p. 271.
³Cf. The Mediator, pp. 130-131: "... the recognition of evil as guilt and sin means such a contradiction within existence that nothing within the sphere of history is capable of dealing with it. If evil is actual separation from God - and that is what we mean when we speak of sin and guilt - then that continuity with the divine has been broken, and there is no continuous process, not even that of mystical graces, to lead man back to his origin." And cf. Ibid., p. 291, where Brunner insists that the Incarnation "... does not mean the perfecting of the Creation - this indeed would be movement within continuity - but the restoration of a fallen Creation."

We have not discussed the continuity/discontinuity structure inasmuch as it pertains especially to the field of soteriology, and thus exceeds
The assertion that to lose one's "self" and genuine independence may suggest images of an actual and historical, (or even an actual, non-historical) analogue.¹ But the recognition of Brunner's concept of creation's goal, closely related to creation's supra-historical redemption, discredits that assumption.² Brunner states the matter the limits of our thesis. Nevertheless, because there are peripheral implications in respect to fallen man, we will include a brief discussion. Brunner, in the above reference, articulates creation's incapacity for self-renewal in two ways. First, the contradiction between man's creation and its perversion precludes the possibility that there might arise a force from within the perversion itself to alter the structure. Second, he points to the necessity of going back, i.e., that man who has separated himself from his origin must return (cf. Sec. a.1.) to the source and foundation of his origin. But, the break within history cannot be healed from within history; a supra-historical event is required. Brunner says: "The good Creation lies beyond this visible world. The whole of history has been infected with the poison of sin. In the world of historical process there are no pure and sinless origins. It is not the empirical origin within time which is good, but Creation. The beginning within time, however, is for each individual an historical fact, and it is also connected with the whole of sinful history. This is the meaning of the doctrine of Original Sin." - The Mediator, p. 146.

Another dimension of the same perversion is stated thus: "The past lies like a block of stone in the way between God and me. I could not go back, even if I wanted to, unless this block were removed out of the way. My past is so closely connected with me that there is no new present and no new future for me unless this past is annulled." - M.I.R., p. 481. But, says Brunner, "The Word is now here in another form, not in the form of the Word of creation but in that of the Word of historical reconciliation and redemption; that is, of the Word that brings back the lost beginning and restores the broken connection. It is now there in a form which at one and the same time restores the original beginning and indicates what has happened in the interval." - Word of God, pp. 22-23.

¹Cf. infra, Appendix C, and also supra, n. 3.

²Part of the problem arises from misleading terminology. On the one hand, Brunner characterizes one of man's problems as his inability to "go back". - cf. p.313, note 3, par. 3. On the other hand, and in our impression more consistent with Brunner's intention, is the statement that Christ "brings back the lost beginning". -cf. Ibid. The difference between carrying fallen creation back to the beginning (a repristination) and that of bringing creation forward (completion) is, in our estimation, critical.
clearly in this way:

The loss of man's true being through sin does not cancel the
divine plan for the creation of a humanity founded on and unified
in Christ. Each human being has been created for this *humanitas*;
this ground of creation */Schöpfungsgrund/*, which is at the same
time the goal of creation */Schöpfungsziel/*, defines every human
being the *humans*, even in the midst of the contradiction of sin,
and mankind as a whole, in spite of all its conflicts, as the
one *humanitas*.

Here the ground */Grund/* is at the same time the goal */Ziel/*;
they coincide in Christ. He is the pre-creational and historically
actualized completion of God's eternal intention. The divine plan is that
which is before and ahead of man, rather than that from which man has
departed. That, at least, is implied in the above, and also in the
following:

In Jesus Christ we see not only the picture of the true (ideal)
*/wahren/* man, but also the origin */Ursprung/* and the goal */Ziel/*
of the humanity created by God, and destined by Him for communion
with Him and with one another. The revelation of true divinity
is both the revelation and the basis of true humanity, of man's
true being and of true mankind.

Our subsequent attempt toward a restructured interpretation
between origin and end, in reference to man, derives a measure of support
from the above. That is, if Jesus is the first (and only) historical
actualization of the goal, then the falleness of man becomes descriptive
of created existence, and not indicative of an actual origin from which
he has fallen. But Brunner is less univocal than this present character-
ization portrays. The ambiguity is discernible in the following:


2Cf. Ibid., p. 360: "Even the divinely good origin, the divine
Creation, is not the divine and blessed End. All that is gradually being
prepared here, within the sphere of history, for the final End, shall there
be perfected." And, cf. supra, p. 284.

3Ibid., p. 329.
... in the present sinful and godless condition of man, man must never be understood merely in the light of his being, but also in the light of what he ought to be. This sense of obligation is a fragmentary trace of the original aim of life for man.1

Of course, a "trace" of an "aim" does not necessarily refer to a residual fragment of an actuality; we may, in fact, be pressing our own concern beyond the limits of Brunner's intention, and thereby reading conclusion into his system. On the other hand, Brunner does say

The goal which has been shown to us in Jesus Christ is indeed also and in the first place the restoration of that which was at the beginning, but it is more than that; it is the eternal consummation which goes far beyond the Creation.2

It is apparent that Brunner neither attempts nor desires to overcome the tension between the two themes. On the one hand his perpetuation of the dialectic may derive from his interpretation (and, the traditional one) of the redemptive work of Christ.3 On the other hand his conclusion in respect to the incapacity (and non-involvement, might we say?) of fallen creation further sustains the dialectic.4

Brunner's interpretation of a Christocentric origin and end, in association with the subject of this section, i.e., personal disintegration quite effectively characterizes a structure in which creaturely historical

1M.I.R., p. 80.

2Ibid., p. 79. Ital. mine. There is a notable similarity between Brunner's doctrine in respect to origin and goal (Christ), and Barth's statement: "Man's essential and original nature is to be found, ..., not in Adam but in Christ."- "Christ and Adam", p. 6. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, p. 237. In Brunner, however, the "origin and goal" are more perceptibly historicized.

3As stated in the Introduction, and implied throughout, we question the propriety of a theology that evolves from a doctrine of falleness to which redemption must conform. We realize, at the same time, the importance of the New Testament doctrine of Christ's redemptive work - and its apparent retrospective orientation (i.e., Romans 5; but cf. our discussion of Barth's interpretation, Chapt. IV, Sec. c.).

4Cf. infra, Appendix C, Secs. 2.1 & 2; 3.1.
existence is of negligible value. This is perhaps the reasonable conclusion of a too radical disjunction between Old and New Testament (formal-material) interpretations of the imago Dei.\(^1\) We noted (p. 306) the centrality of personal being, but discovered that only Christ manifests that quality, for in man it has been destroyed (cf. pp. 307ff). Existence-in-love, in its perversion, becomes existence in God's wrath. The true "self" of man is in God; but man has also perverted that relation. It remains, however, even though only in a "sense of insecurity and anxiety" (supra, p. 310). With the perversion of the self occurs a total perversion of freedom - freedom remains only in terms of man's capacity to sin. The material and discussion of this section, seen in the light of the relation between origin and end (cf. supra, p. 315), illustrates what, in our opinion, is essentially an Augustinian (Western) system. We say "essentially" inasmuch as there are obvious differences. But, insofar as the articulation of the "problem" of anthropology is defined basically in terms of "lostness", it conforms in all significant respects with traditional formulations.

c.  **Summary and Appraisal**

The imago Dei, in Brunner's system, is a term of relation between God and man. However, the relation is one which exemplifies the essential difference between Creator and creature. That is to say, God establishes the structures by which He can and will be related to that which He has created. Brunner draws upon the difference between the Old and New Testament interpretations of the imago Dei to clarify further the created structures of relation. According to him the Old Testament utilization of the term articulates a fundamental and indestructible responsible

\(^1\)Cf. supra, p. 300.
subjectivity. The New Testament, on the other hand, complements that interpretation but includes the factor of "lostness". This, in turn, is the Christological presupposition.

It is at this point that the function of the Incarnation becomes a central question. Whereas we are inclined to speak of that function not only, but also, in terms of an historical completion of a previously unaccomplished intention, Brunner adopts the more traditional redemptive model. On the one hand, Brunner emphatically denies the actualized existence of a pre-fallen, perfect human being; on the other hand, he retains the mythological value of the creation/fall accounts, giving them a degree of importance that jeopardises his entire system.

The next major area of consideration was Brunner's concept of man in terms of responsible relation (Sec. a.2.). God is the one who calls; man is the one who answers. The implications of that seemingly simple characterization are both broad and profound. The call/answer motif first specifies the dependence of man, as a constituent of his being; secondly, it points to the dimension of inter-human relations. As a dependent being, man enjoys only limited (boundaried) freedom; it is circumscribed first by God who determines his limits, and secondly by the human "other". Dependence is not determinism; rather, it is that which requires decision, again both in respect to God and fellow-man. Properly actualized, this is what Brunner calls responsibility-in-love.

The entirety of Section b. is an interpretation of Brunner's picture of fallen existence. Again the question arose regarding the historicity/non-historicity implicates of his system. Brunner asserts that neither creation nor fall is an event within the time sequence. However, each impinges upon it (cf. supra, p. 293). The
question occurred again (and no answer was proposed) in what sense the supra-temporal realities exist.

Brunner is the first theologian (in our knowledge) who so directly associates sin with the *imago Dei* (cf. pp. 294-95). The primal sin, self-deification, emerges as an implicate of the image. Self-deification of the copy is possible only because it is a copy (cf. *supra*, pp. 295f).

This is another point which we wish Brunner had developed in a somewhat different manner. For instance, he may have utilized that truth to articulate a dilemma intrinsic to creaturely existence (which he does) moving with God toward an "end" or "goal" which is always ahead of him (which Brunner does not do, at least consistently). Brunner associates man's existence in conflict, not with an existence always yet to come, but rather with an existence which God planned and from which he has departed.

The first implicate of man's perverted existence studied was the theological one. Brunner maintains that the perversion of man's existence has two principle effects. First, there results an objective barrier between man and God; second, man's primal existence in the love of God has similarly been transformed into existence in God's wrath.

This apparent objectification of terms (cf. *supra*, pp. 297-98) may be consonant with, e.g., Romans 1-3, but it ignores the general Biblical theme of God's long-suffering love, e.g., Rom. 11; Jn. 17. Brunner's own theme of "personal relation" severely qualifies such "objective" terminology.

In respect to the specifically anthropological dimensions of fallen existence, Brunner's major presupposition is the gulf which separates God and man. Man, he says, (p. 301), has not given the proper
answer to God's call. Indeed, though man is created as responsible, and even though that constituent of his being remains, Brunner asserts that man does not (and cannot) know either that reality or its meaning. Having lost the Word, man has lost true humanity. His perverted existence is further characterized as one which can not re-orient itself from within, but must be re-created. The essence of fallen man is his existence as sinner; that means, according to Brunner, that man actively engages in rebellion against his origin. The dynamic interpretation of man's essence, both in respect to sin and to his origin, is a significant contribution. However, his attempt to isolate and differentiate the positive and negative factors of man's being, is unfortunate. Had he portrayed both factors as inherent constituents ofCreaturely existence, without speculating on a pre-fallen and post-fallen state of being, his dynamic interpretation would have been far more consistent and constructive.

Our final consideration was the disintegration of personal being in terms of love and the self. God, asserts Brunner, always addresses man as a subject, respecting his personhood. However, we called into question the propriety of his interpretation of the dimensions of the fall, inasmuch as they seem to require an Incarnational model which replaces man. Nevertheless, his concepts of the Old and New Testament interpretation of the imago Dei make somewhat possible the retention of personal categories - this, in spite of a radical perversion (supra, pp. 306-09). We are not convinced that one can properly speak of a more-or-less permanent formal structure while simultaneously asserting the perversion of its content (i.e., the material structure). But Brunner maintains that the real content of personal being, existence in the love of God, has in fact been lost. Fallen man lives under God's wrath (supra, p. 307 and cf. pp. 287ff).
Perversion of being also radically affects man's existence in terms of the "I-Self". The loss of the self, which results from the self-deification of the "I" turns man in upon himself; he loses the perspective of his completion in God, and also human "others". As a consequence, his understanding of dependence and independence is perverted. This is another factor of Brunner's system that we find creative, apart from its relation to the primal/fallen dichotomy, and its implicate of freedom only to sin, freedom for eternal death (supra, p. 313).

Perversion of man's being in reference to Christ as creation's Ground and Goal does not require the presupposition of an actualized state of being from which man has fallen. That is, man's perversion may indicate the intrinsic contradiction of createdness - a contradiction within which God is constantly operative in Christ, as the Ground and Goal of an eventual consummation. That theme, however, is incompatible with the traditional articulation of the God/man relation, i.e., circumscribed by sin. Brunner's utilization of those creative possibilities is restricted by his adherence to Western tradition; the same is true of Barth.

Brunner's doctrine of the imago Dei expresses several creative possibilities. Those we recognize as most significant in themselves and also in respect to the development of a reconstructed interpretation of the imago Dei theme are the following:

One: his system has primarily to do with actual existence, i.e., it is relatively free from theoretical speculation.

Two: a Christology which articulates a factor of completion, i.e., not only re-recreation.

Three: a reasonable articulation of the essential difference between God and man.

Four: the structure of being determined, both in relation to God and fellow-man, and its implicates of personal being.
Five: man's essential responsibility [Verantwortlichkeit].

Six: man as a being-in-decision, and a being-for-love, both in relation to God and fellow-man.

Seven: the location of human contradiction precisely within the imago Dei (with qualification).

Eight: the centrality of knowing the source and goal of human existence.

Nine: the compatibility of experience and revelation.

There are, on the other hand, several facets of Brunner's system with which we disagree. Those which relate most clearly to the heart of the imago Dei doctrine, are these:

One: implications - implicit and explicit - of a state of being from which man has fallen.

Two: the objectification of both God's wrath and the barrier created by the fall.

Three: an unreconstructed differentiation between the Old and New Testament interpretations of the imago Dei.

Four: the element of discontinuity, first, in respect to Christ's relation to man; second, in respect to man's participation with God - i.e., its impossibility; third, between the Old and New Testaments.

Five: sin primarily as self-deification.

Six: sin as the primary presupposition descriptive of God's relation to man.

Seven: the rigid soteriological procedure, i.e., that first one is convicted of sin, then one perceives the God of love.

Eight: the primarily retrospective orientation of salvation.
A "reconstructed" interpretation of the *imago Dei* may suggest a fairly comprehensive rejection of other interpretations of the theme. The writer's intention is not totally to reject all other interpretations, nor does he deny the validity of all facets of any. The intention of this final chapter is to select, from a broad range of themes related to the *imago Dei*, what appear to be the most critical facets of the doctrine. Summarily stated, it will have been seen that the following three pairs of terms characterize the writer's perspective: (1) relation/substance; (2) personal/impersonal; (3) future/past, although these terms, *per se*, have not been employed explicitly. The first term of each pair (i.e., relation, personal, and future) illustrates the general interpretative tendency of this chapter.

That the biblical phrase, *imago Dei*, signifies not merely a quality or characteristic of either God or man, but especially the structure of relation between them is the writer's presupposition.¹ It has become clear that this is not the hermeneutic presupposition of traditional theology (excepting Irenaeus); generally, the image theme has implied man's capacity, endowment, potential, or destination. The Irenaean system is distinctive in its utilization of the theme as illustrative of the dynamic relation between God and man. The superimposition of the Irenaean type or

¹The presupposition has been stated and amplified in the Introduction, pp. 24-26.
"model" on the other systems studied (i.e., Chapters II-V) has had two effects; one, it has provided the method of evaluation in terms of questions posed. Secondly, it has made necessary the consideration of otherwise secondary issues, i.e., existence/non-existence, nature/grace - the various dualisms so characteristic of Western Christianity.

The term co-inherence (cf. supra, pp. 26f, 104) expresses what we believe to be the personal, relational and forward or future perspectives implied in the biblical phrase, *imago Dei,* as process and goal. The task of this chapter will be to explore the possibilities inherent in the phrase, and to recognize the God-man structure of relation which it implies.

The following questions are most relevantly associated with the study of the *imago Dei* as a symbol of the relation between God and man: ¹

1. what is the function of the creation narrative(s) in respect to the God-man relation implied in the phrase, *imago Dei?*  
2. what is the intention of the "fall" account as related to the first question? attendant-ly, does the "fall" signify a change in the structure?  
3. what is Christ's relation to the dimensions of questions (1) and (2)? i.e., does He more directly correspond to the structures of creation or fall (if they are separable)?  
4. finally, and in association with questions (1) - (3), what may be asserted regarding the significance of man in respect to the *imago Dei* symbol? These questions circumscribe the scope of the present chapter, and closely related material from preceding chapters will be utilized, both positively and negatively. For the purpose of the thesis, however, it will suffice to utilize the foregoing illustratively; a specific assessment of each respective theological system and its comparison with others exceeds our objective.

¹God's relation to other forms of creation will not be discussed; the *imago Dei* theme requires only the consideration of His relation to humanity. Subsequent use of the phrase, creaturely historical existence, refers only to man, and then especially to his temporal life.
The four questions posed above, the interpretation which they will subsequently receive, and the answers proposed, will make sufficiently clear the presupposition(s) of the writer. To say that he has some, and that they affect his work, is superfluous. To thoroughly articulate them is entirely beyond both his ability and the dimensions of the thesis. The second function of the questions is to provide a method by which to proceed. Questions (1) - (3) will serve as our major outline, while question (4) (the significance of man) underlies each of them.

a. Creation

a.1. Continuity vs. Discontinuity

Barth emphatically asserts, and rightly so, that creation, per se, is not revelatory. That is, one must first come to some degree of understanding of the God who creates before creation (as act and existence) assumes its proper religious significance. On the basis of one's relation to the Creator (i.e., faith) one is enabled to apprehend the significance of both the act - creation, and of the result of that act - existence.

Realizing that the creation narratives are not at all the first expression of Hebrew literature, that they are relatively late, highlights the significance of the faith expressed. The narratives accomplished their intention, i.e., to further enunciate the magnificence of the Hebrew's God who was already acknowledged as Lord of the nation. Their history was itself the history of God's activity and presence among them.

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Presuppositions are a composite of both conscious and unconscious factors which emerge out of one's entire history and being, and are shaped by his present no less than his aspirations in respect to the future. In this sense one's presuppositions are akin to his world-view, his Weltanschauung. Our own compressed version is that it is right for man to hope; i.e., it is faithful, reasonable, and constructive. Hope in this context includes implicates of the past, present, and future. Cf. Barth, Dog. Outline, pp. 50-52 for his discussion of Christian presuppositions.
Their history was that of the covenant relation with God. It was God who had formed the nation; it was He who had promised and given the land. He had led them from their bondage in Egypt. It was out of their faith and their experience that the creation narrative emerged.\(^1\) The significance of this understanding is the realization that the narrative has always been doxological.\(^2\) We emphasize that point in order to express two related conclusions: one, inasmuch as for the Hebrew the narrative is doxological, subsequent utilization of the texts for the purpose of articulating the structure of primal relation is questionable.\(^3\) The second conclusion is more difficult to express; it regards the proper function of Christology in respect to creation. The factor of discontinuity predominates in Western systems. That is to say, the figure of Christ tends (in our estimation) to overwhelm the significance of God's saving work and relation prior to the Incarnation. Augustine, for instance, replaces the doxological motif with the beata vita theme which is exclusively related to the redemptive work of Christ. The nature/grace dualism in Aquinas' system exemplifies the radical disjunction between creation and Christ. More specifically in terms of the imago Dei, Luther's interpretation employs the factor of original righteousness which characterized created nature; in his doctrine, Christ becomes the Image of God to rectify the destruction caused by the fall—a radical disjunction. Calvin's utilization of the categories of nature/

\(^1\) Cf. supra, pp. 7, 14-15, where the narrative's relation to Israel's faith is more fully explicated.

\(^2\) Cf. supra, p. 5.

\(^3\) This reservation applies to the theological systems which articulate a doctrine of an historic creation/fall. It applies equally to later theologies, (e.g. Barth and Brunner) which replace an historic interpretation with conjecture in respect to primal pre-history (Barth) and primal origin (Brunner).
supernature (not unlike Aquinas' nature/grace dualism at this point) similarly minimizes the significance of creation's doxological character. Finally, Barth and Brunner in their respective ways also depreciate the genius of the creation accounts by means of their Christocentric interpretation.

The disjunction in Barth's interpretation arises from an over-emphasis of Christ's revelatory function: that Christ, according to Barth, manifests the meaning of creation and that creation is a re-creation of intra-trinitarian relations (supra, pp. 225-26) strongly implies that the revelation apprehended by the Hebrew people was not only incomplete, but quite insignificant. His assertion that both Paradise and Israel illustrate the incapability and unworthiness of man for fellowship with God (supra, pp. 246-47) surely ignores a considerable portion of the Old Testament, e.g., the many Psalms of praise and confidence (Pss. 23, 121), the response of Abram (Gen. 12), and the indestructible faith of Job. Brunner is somewhat less guilty of this apparent theological distortion than his predecessors; yet, his de-historicizing of the creation narrative simultaneously results in a de-emphasis of the reality and historicity of God's relation with Israel, which was so eloquently articulated in her creation account.1

Irenaeus alone managed to formulate a structure of relation between Creation and Christ that manifests a strong factor of continuity,2 thus recognizing the value and import of the Hebrew narrative. His system may be naive, and it is certainly less sophisticated than e.g., Aquinas'. Nevertheless, it contains elements that recommend it for further consideration.

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1Cf. supra, CHAPTER V, pp. 295ff.

2It should be pointed out that Barth and Brunner also assert a continuity, but it occurs beyond the sphere of creaturely existence, i.e., supra-historically.
Particularly germane in the present context (i.e., the factor of continuity between Christ and Creation) is Irenaeus' doctrine of recapitulation.\(^1\)

According to Irenaeus creation itself is dynamic; it points beyond itself toward a completion to be finally attained in Christ. The futurist element of the narrative culminates in redemption; but, it is a redemption inherent in creation, and conforms essentially to the same structure of relation. As Irenaeus stated: Christ gathered up "... not some other creation, but that original one of the Father; ... ".\(^2\)

Irenaeus's statement is perhaps more relevant to Christology than to this study of creation, but it also suggests implications in respect to the latter. Primarily, it asserts that the creation to which Christ came was not entirely inimical, or alien. In a sense, He assumed flesh which was not dissimilar from that of creation.\(^3\) We believe it is important to state that factor without equivocation, especially inasmuch as our Western tradition (especially post-scholastic)\(^4\) severely minimizes its importance. For example, Luther's doctrine of the loss of original righteousness as a natural endowment (not a donum superadditum) implies the necessity of a re-creation.\(^5\) Calvin is more explicit in respect to the rejection of continuity; he asserts that the suggestion that Adam was related to the incarnate Christ

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\(^1\)Cf. CHAPTER I, Sec. c.3.

\(^2\)Irenaeus, A.H., V, xiv, 2. Cf. supra, p. 86, and cf. also our reference to Wingren, supra, pp. 86f., n.4.

\(^3\)Cf. supra, pp. 86-89 for illustrative material and our discussion.

\(^4\)Somewhat surprisingly the philosophical theories of Augustine and Aquinas managed to sustain a degree of continuity; their systems presupposed an irrefragable bond between God and created existence, though not of the personal quality which we recognize.

\(^5\)Cf. CHAPTER III, p. 198.
is "silly and distorted." Finally, Brunner's assertion illustrates the epitome of diremption: The Incarnation "... does not mean the perfecting of the Creation - this indeed would be movement within continuity - but the restoration of a fallen Creation."  

The discussion thus far has been limited to the subject of creation in general, i.e., not yet including the subject of man, for methodological reasons. Essentially, we want to re-affirm the dignity and propriety of Israel's faith, exhibited in the creation narrative. We find it both unnecessary and erroneous to disparage her pre-Christian confession, or the penultimate (pre-Incarnational) stage of revelation. St. Paul, whose Christology was in no sense "low" or undeveloped, confidently referred to Abraham as a model of Christian faith (Rom. 4.). Further, in reference to his own people, he said: "They were adopted as sons, they were given the glory and the covenants; the Law and the ritual were drawn up for them, and the promises were made to them. They are descended from the patriarchs and from their flesh and blood came Christ ... ." (Rom. 9:4-5).  

Apparently St. Paul was not aware of the disjunction recognized by later expositors. Of course, it is true that we have cited texts which refer to a covenant people and have not confined our remarks specifically to the Creation/Christ theme; nevertheless, even St. Paul's own utilization of the Adam story (Ro. 5) does not attempt to articulate the disjunction so prevalent in Western theology.  

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1 Cf. CHAPTER III, p. 208.


3 And cf. Ro. 11:25-32. It will hopefully be realized that our use of biblical texts is not meant to suggest "proof", but only additional warrant for the points under consideration. Cf. C.H. Dodd who says, "The new community is still Israel; there is continuity through the discontinuity. It is not a matter of replacement but of resurrection." - The Founder of Christianity, (London: Collins, 1971), p. 90.

4 E.g., Barth's interpretation, supra, Chap. IV, Sec. d.3.
There is another factor closely related to the subject under
discussion; and, it is yet another with which we disagree in respect to its
traditional interpretation. It was previously stated that the theme of
\textit{creatio ex nihilo} would not be a constituent factor of a reconstructed
interpretation, nor indeed of the thesis itself.\(^1\) However, its treatment
(exploitation?) in Western theology warrants some comment.

\textbf{a.2. \textit{Creatio ex nihilo}}

Summarily stated, the statement in Gen. 1:2 is a theological
confession of God's sovereignty, His possession of all that \textit{is}. In the
context of Israel's religious/historical experience it symbolized the
singularity of His Lordship - even if there were other "gods", to Jahweh
alone was worship properly ascribed. However, the narrative emerged \textit{from}
faith; Jahweh had previously revealed Himself as the nation's Lord through
election and exodus. \textit{Creatio ex nihilo} was for Israel a confession of
faith; it was not a theory of cosmogenesis, nor yet an articulation of
the God/world structure of relation.\(^2\)

As \textit{creatio ex nihilo} (only marginally asserted in the creation account)
\textit{expressed} Israel's prior faith, so also may the doctrine be meaningfully
employed today. Contemporary theology has finally deferred the question
of cosmogenesis to science; neither the act of creation, nor the \textit{nihilo}
which preceded are "burning issues" of the Gospel proclamation. Therefore
the doctrine serves an elaborative function. That is, a precedent awareness
of a "friendly" God with whom relation is recognized may be enhanced by the
knowledge both of His eternal priority and His sovereignty as an implicate

\(^1\)Cf. Introduction, p. 21, n.1.

\(^2\)A thorough re-evaluation of the traditional interpretations of the
theme is unnecessary. It seems evident, however, that the utilization of
the concept to refute dualistic theories (successfully) simultaneously
minimized its profound simplicity. Cf. supra, Chaps.II, Secs. a \& b; III-A,
Sec. b.; IV, Secs. a. \& b. Each system respectively asserts the irrefraga-
bility factor, but loses the element of relation and faith.
of His act of creation. Barth's utilization of the theme, for example, stresses the priority of the Christian faith, viz., that Christ reveals the truth of creation. But then follows his theoretical speculation on the existence of the nothingness from which God created, and its subsequent effect upon it. The faith and personal relation-values of the doctrine are lost in the process of fanciful speculation.

Creatio ex nihilo is a testimony to the power of God - but it is loving power. It expresses the assurance that coincides with St. Paul's confession in Romans 8:38-39. It supports and enlarges upon the security of one's faith relation; it asserts that He who loves in Christ has no opponent. Both the act of creation and creation itself belong to Him for prior to that act and its result there was nothing. Therefore, although the doctrine of itself is somewhat neutral, in the context of faith it signifies a proper factor of dependence between God and creation.

This was, as we noted, Irenaeus' interpretation of the phrase; for him it articulated the critical difference between the Unoriginate and the originate. Irenaeus, however, devoted little attention to the specification of the relative difference; difference expressed the structure of relation. "... God is first in all things, ... alone Unoriginate ...: while all other things remain in subjection to God. Now subjection to God is incorruption, and the continuance of incorruption is the glory of the Unoriginate." Further, the Creator ex nihilo is simultaneously the one "... by whom everything is sustained; merciful, compassionate and most tender, good, just, God

1 Cf. supra, Chap. IV, Sec. a.

2 This is not Barth's Das Nichtige ist nicht das Nichts; and his "third way of knowing" is admittedly beyond our comprehension. Perhaps it would be more precise to say, nothing was, rather than, there was nothing - or simply to say nothing. Barth's theory is discussed in Appendix B.

3 Irenaeus, A.H., IV,xxxviii,3 - quoted in full supra, p. 37. Irenaeus, unlike others we have discussed, did not qualify the above assertion with a doctrine of fall and corruption.
of all, ... ."¹ This emphasis is most consonant with the doctrine's function in the creation narrative. Of course, its validity is contingent upon one's interpretation of the fall, sin as self-deification, and the so-called inversion of the structure of the God-man relation - issues yet to be discussed.

The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo emanates from Israel's faith, signifying God's sovereignty and Lordship. It elaborates and enlarges upon Israel's conception of His power, signifying creation's dependence upon Him who is dependable. This emphasis is essentially the interpretation adopted by Irenaeus, though not by Western systems. The doctrine serves an important, but peripheral function in this attempted re-construction. It indicates, however, first, that there is a viable alternative to traditional interpretations, and second, that the God-man relation is more uniform than sin-oriented systems infer. There are definite implications in respect to the imago Dei, e.g., the factor of difference and dependence, but these will be more appropriately discussed at a later point. The next subject, subordinately related to the above, is a discussion of creatio continua.

a.3. Creatio continua

Creatio ex nihilo precedes a consideration of creatio continua inasmuch as the latter is irrelevant apart from an understanding of the former. This is true, of course, only in reference to theology; there is considerable speculation regarding the processes of creation, its dynamic evolution, change, decay, and growth outside and apart from theological consideration. Nevertheless, from the perspective of theology a doctrine of creation out of nothing precedes an understanding of the theological implications of its

¹Irenaeus, Proof, 8, quoted supra, p. 39.
continuing process. Alternately, however, creatio continua is considerably more relevant not only in regard to the imago Dei, but also in respect to our contemporary social, psychological, historical and scientific climate. Obviously, we will not attempt to relate the doctrine specifically to each of them, but a recognition of their insights will qualify the following consideration.

a.3.a. As Historical Occurrence

Essentially, creatio continua is an historical concern. It relates to the questions: is something happening? if so, what? why - that is, is there a reason, purpose, or goal? Beyond the purely historical dimension (with its scientific orientation) emerges the theological one, which is no less historical. The same questions are asked but from a slightly different perspective; to the questions, is, what, and why, is added another - who? The answer - at least the beginning of an answer - is: He who created ex nihilo. Yet another question has been introduced by the Church; it is the question, where?

If one believes that something is truly happening, and that its happening is significant, and if one takes seriously the traditional interpretations, it would appear that the truly significant "happening" is not occurring on the level of creaturely historical existence. Although that conceptualization of creatio continua is, in our estimation, an illegitimate one, its introduction into theology requires its consideration. Although the propriety and rationale of traditional interpretations will be considered in a section devoted to the fall and fallenness, some of the conclusions will be presupposed here.

1It is cumbersome continually to repeat qualifications to specify the distinction between my own, Irenaean, and Western interpretations. Therefore, generalizations will refer to those systems we have studied in Chaps. II-V; "Church", traditional, popular, are terms which will describe those systems. Irenaean, and my own, will be more exactly specified. Therefore, the generalized terms, Church, traditional, and popular, will be used to specify the systems studied in Chaps. II-V.
The creation narratives are replete with implications in respect to creatio continua. The abundance of created forms, the elaborate provision for life and its perpetuation, the procreative ability of all life forms—perhaps even God's sense of satisfaction ("it was good") implied its continuation. If one concluded nothing more, at least it would seem apparent that creation is dynamic, bursting with motion, struggle and pain (unless one subscribes to a theory of paradisial non-mortality). While it may be difficult to reconcile the possibility of struggle—success and failure—with a notion of creation's perfection, there is nothing in the accounts to suggest that primal history was devoid of the pathos of growth. Rather, it would seem necessarily inevitable.

That it has seemed neither necessary nor inevitable to traditional interpretation, however, has been made obvious. A doctrine of creatio continua has indeed been maintained in various ways ranging from the Augustinian method of an other-worldly "harmony" to a Barthian "primal union" and Brunner's "primal origin". Each has this in common: a supra-temporal, supra-historical plateau of "happening" only tangentially related to the plane of creaturely historical existence.1

1Previous discussion of creatio continua or closely related implicates are as follows: Augustine: blessedness is to adhere to God (pp. 115-116), but even initially though man had a certain capacity to adhere, finally it will be impossible to fall away (pp. 143-44). Aquinas: man is created for the beata vita (p. 175) which was never fully possessed (p. 176) but which, through a donum supraradditum will be accomplished by God (Appendix A, Art. 4.1.1. et passim). Luther: original righteousness was the primal gift that permitted a life in harmony with God (pp.195-96), whereas its loss (p. 196) requires a different structure of God-man relation (pp. 197-98). Calvin: man was created for the pursuit of virtue, the contemplation of eternal life, whereas his failure has un-manned him (p.210). Barth: creation's completion is not its conclusion, i.e., there is creatio continua toward an already anticipated and divinely actualized consummation (pp. 230-31), but creation's participation is a mere interim existence (p. 254, and Chap. IV, Sec. e.3.). Brunner: man's participation in dynamic creation is the contradiction of his being which is overcome by and in Christ (pp. 295-96 & pp. 300f.).

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That something is happening is obvious; things are not as they were yesterday in spite of many similarities. History does not repeat itself. That is not to say, of course, that historical variation, change, and movement necessarily imply progress, that is, improvement. The unavailability of complete data, arbitrary criteria, and subjective interpretation make such judgement entirely impossible. Nevertheless, it does not therefore and necessarily follow that the problems of data, criteria, and judgement require a static concept of history, or a theory of its imaginary, insignificant, or vacuous quality. But, mere happening, if that much is granted, does not answer the question, what?

a.3.b. As Authentic Occurrence

In response to that question one could say, minimally, something - with no further elaboration. Even that is important - that something is occurring and that one perceives it indicates at least that there is life. And although it may not be true to say that where there is life there is hope, at least one can assert the contrary (disregarding for the moment the Christian doctrine of resurrected life). Is it possible, however, to assert more - more, that is, than simply "something" is happening? Is there, in other words, a significance, a meaning inherent within historical process? Beyond the considerations of a theological dimension,¹ one would still have to recognize the import of life itself. The ambiguity of human response to need or tragedy does not negate that affirmation. A nation's

¹"Beyond consideration of a theological dimension" means beyond specific consideration, i.e., doctrinal factors. It is doubtful that there is any segment of life or history toward which God is neutral, i.e., a passive and detached observer. Consequently, there is no dimension of life which may be appropriately described as apart from a theological dimension. Cf. e.g., Ps. 104, Acts 17:24-28.
internal social perversity and apathy does not entirely impugn the authenticity of its humanitarian response at a different level, or in another culture. This illustrates the general recognition of the basic and minimal right to life, a recognition apart from which social response itself is incomprehensible.

That something is now that was not before is the simplest indication of creatio continua, and on the basis of that indication it seems fair to suggest that creation itself participates in the process of historical occurrence. What then are the implications of that participation? There is, to be sure, the ineluctable movement of time itself with its implicates of aging, dying. But more, there is the creative drive to utilize the moments of time toward the fulfillment of one's purpose, the completion of one's desires, the attainment of one's hope, the preservation of one's being. Even apart from a clearly definable goal or purpose exceeding one's own conception, creatio continua seems to be a self-evident definition of the way things are.

Are those implicates compatible with the Christian faith? Having asserted first that something is occurring, and second that humanity participates in that historical process - does it in fact follow that the participation of historical existence has a legitimate place and function which is somehow conformable to the purpose of God? It is at this point that the final two questions, i.e., why and who, merge; they are inseparably related. That statement is liable to serious qualification; it is not a universally agreed-upon assertion. That traditional theology has effectually separated the two is a conclusion derivable from the structure of God's relation to historical existence noted above, p. 334, n.1. The questions, why and who, were joined, but on a plane which totally transcended the
relatively impotent level of historical existence. That is not the
dimension of inseparability to which we refer; rather, the indivisibility
of purpose (why) and agent (who) must pertain to historical humanity lest the
first two questions, (is and what), become religiously irrelevant in spite of
their reality. For instance, to suggest that authentic history is occurring
beyond and in spite of humanity is not only to depreciate the significance of
humanity's struggling existence, but also to assert that God does not
authentically participate in that struggle.

The abstraction of God from historical struggle is the concomitant
of a theology whose major orientation is sin, an orientation against which
the factors of continuity, creatio ex nihilo, and creatio continua stand in
opposition.1 At this point Augustine's concept of existence/non-existence
(though, not necessarily his application) is valuable. It asserts that
there is no existence apart from Existence i.e., God. Similarly, there
is no creation (as process) apart from God, but that simultaneously implies
His authentic (co-inherent) participation. The word, co-inherent, proposed
in the Introduction (pp. 26-27),2 does not seem unwarranted or presumptuous
in the light of material considered thus far. However, the "fall" has not
been considered, the "event" which customarily inverts the initial order of
relation.

1This theme was introduced and discussed supra, p. 3, et passim.
That sin is the hermeneutic principle operative in the West has been
illustrated in Chaps. II-V. Interestingly, as the systems evolved and more
closely approached the consideration of personal relation, they magnified
the "distance" between God and creation, abstracting Him from its process.
For instance, there was a greater association (though metaphysical and im-
personal) in Augustine's existence/non-existence categories than in Barth's
supra-historical "primal union", or in Brunner's conceptualization of
"objective guilt". Luther should perhaps be at least partially excepted;
his system included provision for an authentic suffering of God in Christ's
life and death.

2We are not concerned to defend the propriety of the word co-inherent.
However, it may profitably serve to express a structure of relation which has
been practically ignored by traditional theology - that is, apart from its
Christological function. Obviously, it is applicable in that context; it
is similarly applicable, however, in the broader Creator/creation context.
a.3.c. As Purposive Occurrence

The two questions, why and who, with which we began cannot exhaustively be examined either in this particular section, nor within the scope of this chapter. The second has been partially considered, while the first has been neglected. In respect to creatio continua, the question of purpose assumes a very definite theological connotation. But, that is not to minimize the knowledge of purpose which, if not explicit in creation, is at least discernible within it. ¹

We have been using the term, struggle, to define the quality of historical occurrence. It may be well to qualify the term, using the word hope. It was suggested in the Introduction (p. 31) that hope is a secular symbol of humanity's intuition of a favorable end. Hope, in this sense, does not cause but merely explains the motivation for continued struggle. Certainly, fear is also a strong motivational force but it is to be considered as secondarily related, not as hope's alternative.

Returning to the question - the purpose or goal of hope's struggle - we want to assert two things: one, between secular and sacred hope there is more proportion than disproportion including the tentative implications of universality; two, creation's struggle is at least partially explicable within itself. The disproportion factor in respect to sacred/secular hope is a familiar theme of Western Christianity, reaching its zenith in the doctrine of double predestination. The evidence in favor of disproportion is significant, although not altogether unambiguous. The inclination to isolate a single constitutive factor of the imago Dei, e.g., the will, ¹

¹This is closely related to the subject of natural versus revealed theology. We do not challenge the pre-eminence and indispensability of revelation, nor will it be necessary to articulate the complexities of that debate.
rationality, righteousness, rectitude, *analogia relationis*, or responsibility, created the climate within which it seemed more reasonable (with some Scriptural warrant) to assert difference more than similarity. Depravity was natural, historical, and universal; conversely, regeneration was supra-natural, non-historical and individualistic.¹

Of the several systems evaluated in the preceding chapters, that of Irenaeus alone unequivocally articulates the dimension of proportion. According to him historical creation itself implied a redemptive function, more properly, a recapitulative function. Creation's hope and purpose, he maintained, were synonymous; the synonymity derived from the recognition that the factor of proportionality was God, an immanent God. Man was created in the *imago Dei*, God "... receiving from Himself the being of His creatures, ..."² Even more specifically related to our subject is Irenaeus' conceptualization of historical existence - it was characterized as preparatory for man's ultimate perfection, the attainment of maturity. For the purpose of illustrating an Irenaean theme which is more comprehensive than would be appropriate to discuss here, we cite an especially representative text:

... the Hand of God is truly and plainly exhibited, whereby Adam first and afterwards we are framed; there being also but one and the same Father, Whose Voice from the beginning to the end is present with His Creature; and the substance of our frame being clearly indicated by the Gospel: we are not now to seek for any other Father than This; ...: nor any other Hand of God, but this, which from beginning to end fashions and frames us unto life, and is present with its own creature, and completes it after the Image and Likeness of God.³

¹Cf. e.g., Augustine's interpretation, *supra*, pp. 149-50. We do not suggest that there are no variations or qualifications, for instance, those noted in Barth's *Humanity of God*.

²Irenaeus, A.H., IV,xx,1, quoted supra, p. 43, and cf. p. 44.

³Ibid., V,xvi,1, cf. supra, pp. 80-81.
Indeed, Irenaeus does not specifically mention hope, either here or elsewhere, nor does he consider the possibility of a disparity between the sacred and the secular. On the one hand that may derive from a particularly naive assessment of creation; it seems more likely, however, that the factor of proportionality derives from a recognition that there is only one world, one creation, and one Lord who effectively works to accomplish His purpose.

The recognition of proportionality, i.e., between sacred and secular hope and its struggle is critical - the reason for its inclusion here - from two points of view. First, its assertion may allow the church to be more qualified in its doctrine, and simultaneously more perceptively aware of the authentic importance of historical existence, (we may dare even to suggest that it is right to be human). Second, the kerygma will be (or may be) freed from its supra-natural, other-worldly orientation to become more recognizably an event of historical significance.

The second facet of hope's struggle, i.e., that it is at least partially explicable within itself, requires less elaboration. Basically, what is implied is that hope's focus is at least to some extent relevant to historical existence. Negatively expressed, it asserts that creation's consummation is not exclusively oriented beyond itself (e.g., heaven). Positively expressed, it asserts that the exercise of hope and its historical fulfillment are justifiably temporal, i.e., their validation is at least partially within time. The problematic of duality - temporal/eternal, heaven and earth - is a real problem, and one which is inherent in respect to this consideration. The problematic, however, has been asymmetrically distorted by traditional theological systems which have rigidly compartmentalized
divinity and humanity. A thorough analysis of the materials obviously exceeds the limits of this chapter; but perhaps a question will suffice to indicate the writer's inclination. In the light of the Incarnation, the covenant, John 17, Mt. 25, etc., is it either legitimate or reasonable to accentuate the God/man distinction? Perhaps it would be well for theology rather to risk error toward an emphasis of the God/man co-relation.

That which is to be maintained in respect to either extreme is an essential relation. Unless, however, God becomes "lost" toward one or the other, (which He is not likely to allow), the task is toward the attainment of a balance, a coherence. That is to say, neither the sole causality of God, nor the complete passivity of man represents a viable alternative. Rather, what is to be attempted is the articulation of a structure that recognizes the inseparability of the divine and human. This is the recognition that historical existence cannot attain its purpose apart from God (if indeed, there is a purpose without Him), but neither can God attain His purpose without creation (insofar as creation is His purpose).

If that is granted, then the assertion that hope's struggle is partially self-authenticating is affirmed. A new problem immediately occurs, however, i.e., the determination and the attainment of a "proper

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1 The 1972 meeting of The Society for the Study of Theology at Oriel College, Oxford, devoted itself to a discussion of such dualism. One of the most creative papers at that meeting was prepared and delivered by John Zizioulas from New College, The University of Edinburgh. By means of the terms, "capacity/incapacity" he was able to articulate an ontological structure of being, both human and divine. The two realities, i.e., God and the world, are not merged, but they are inseparably related.

balance". First, it should be acknowledged that a perfect coherence is incompatible with creaturely historical existence; creaturely imperfection should not, therefore, be maximized. Second, related to the first, is that such a balance assumes a form commensurate to the total personality of each individual. Christ is indeed the exemplar of perfect coherence, illustrated not only in His orientation toward God, but equally in his orientation toward humanity. The greatest commandment, He said, is: "You must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul and with all your mind." And, "The second resembles it: You must love your neighbour as yourself." (Mt. 22:37-40). This is the ideal toward which man is to strive. An approximation of success is totally impossible and unattainable in reference to systems which radically depreciate hope's human orientation.

The major biblical references to the imago Dei (those other than Christ-as-image) reflect the latter orientation. This is surprising in the light of the divine perspective proposed by traditional theology. Brunner's categories of responsible relation is the clearest exception to that judgment, at least apart from its contradiction /Widerspruch/. Barth's system gives the impression of a creaturely perspective (i.e., the male-female conceptualization) until that category is obscured by his complementary theories of nature's relation to nothingness (cf. p. 235 et passim) and primal pre-history (cf. Secs. e.2. & 3.).

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1Irenaeus' concept of growth-toward-image is relevant here, as is the ambivalence of existence noted in Romans 7:14-25.

2The various textual themes are: murder (Gen.9:6); lying and immoral behavior (Col. 3:9-10); head covering (I Cor.11:7); cursing men created in God's image (Jas. 3:9).

3In spite of Aquinas' otherwise static constructs, his utilization of the dynamic implications of the preposition ad illustrates the importance of historical process. Cf. Chap. III, Part A, Sec. c.2. We questioned
The articulation of balance remains a legitimate task of theology, a task which requires profound appreciation of individual variation and capacity. The question itself however, i.e., the possibility of hope's struggle to be self-authenticated must be revised. On the basis of a co-inherent God-world relation (if that is granted) there is no self-actualization. Neither God nor man can be abstracted from historical process and achievement. Hartshorne expresses a similar thought thus: God will promote the highest cosmic good, come what may. But it does not in the least follow that what God will do to promote the cosmic good will be uninfluenced by our actions and fortunes, or that how he will think and feel about the world will in no way reflect what is going on in the world.¹

God will accomplish His purpose, His intention for creation and man "come what may". The last phrase alludes to a theme that has been conspicuously absent from this first major section, viz., that history has not been a thoroughly harmonious co-operative venture, an uncomplicated and unconfused association of God and man toward the attainment of history's final consummation.² The implicates of disharmony, complication, incoherence and confusion - the negativities of historical existence commonly called sin - are inextricably and appropriately associated with a study of the God-man relation implied in the imago Dei theme. And although traditional theology has inappropriately made sin the constitutive issue, its interpretative principle, nevertheless a reactionary subordination of the theme is equally illegitimate. We will attempt in the following section to create at least an outline of a modification.

the validity of his specification of the term's non-ontological implicate (p. 185), but appreciated the note of historical movement which he also expressed (pp. 186ff).


²A "final consummation" which transcends history's boundaries will be assumed, without explicit elaboration. Cf. I Cor. 15:50-58.
b. **The Imago Dei and the Problematic of Creaturely Incoherence**

The presence of *imago Dei* in the title asserts that we are dealing with a situation in which both God and man are inextricably involved. "Problematic" signifies not only the imperspicuity of the issue, but also the tentativity of its interpretation, while the word "Incoherence" indicates the relation between creaturely incoherence and divine intention. It may be objected that "creaturely incoherence" is too neutral, too passive a term to express the depth of human depravity, the heinousness of sin. Indeed, it is. But, it does not appear self-evident that the proper task of theology is either to explore the dimensions of depravity or to maximize its proportions. The characters of the church's preoccupation with sin are justified inasmuch as there has been an inordinate amount of attention devoted to the subject, in addition to the highly questionable articulation of the consequent structure of God's relation to the world and man.

What then may be proposed in terms of a reconstruction? What are the criteria appropriate to the development and understanding of a doctrine of creaturely discontinuity (i.e., sin)? Basically, fundamentally, it must conform to the God-world, God-man structure of relation implied in the *imago Dei*, and explored in the preceding section. Secondly, and this factor has not yet been specifically introduced, a reconstruction (in the Christian sense) must reflect an awareness of the centrality of Christ. That is not to say however, that Christology aptly corresponds to a pre-established doctrine.

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1The word "incoherence" also illustrates, by contrast, the dower of co-inherence.

2The priority operative in this section is e.g., Isaiah's "What a wretched state that I am in! I am lost" - *after* he had seen the King, Jahweh Sabaoth (Is.6:5); or, Peter's "Leave me, Lord; I am a sinful man" - *after* he had witnessed Jesus' power, and was afraid. One's perception of God - as purpose, providence, love, goodness, power - is the pre-eminent foundation for an understanding of creaturely dependence, and its aberration.
of sin; neither, however, does it infer that Christology is more relevant to creation's discontinuity than He is to the dimensions of its continuity.¹

The following inter-related assertions will make our objective clear:

(1) God creates the world for and toward unobstructed personal communion;
(2) human historical existence, its continuity and discontinuity, represent the process toward that end; and (3) human activity is ambivalent, i.e., constructive/destructive. It is the factor of ambivalence, especially in respect to human discontinuity and destructive inclinations that is our present concern. This indicates therefore the scope of the attempted reconstruction; sin primarily understood in reference to discontinuity within a co-inherent historical process does not imply a thorough-going reconstruction of the doctrine. Only the most directly relevant themes will be examined, i.e., those that clearly relate to the dynamics of historical existence. The word "sin" will be used to specify humanity's negative thrust, more in terms of its relational (co-inherent) connotations than in respect to its ethical overtones.

b.l. Its Origin

Obviously, one of the most perplexing problems of theology has been its attempt to understand the relation between "good" creation and its historical contradiction. The dilemma is at least partly to be understood as an implicate of theology's own misinterpretation of the creation/fall narratives in Genesis, i.e., the historicity of both creation and fall, and

¹Similarly, Zizioulas states: "... Christology should not be confined to redemption from sin but reaches beyond that, to man's destiny as the image of God in creation. There are, therefore, two aspects in Christology, one negative (redemption from the fallen state) and another positive (fulfilment of man's full communion with God; what the Greek Fathers have called theosis). Only if the two are taken together, can Christology reveal human destiny in its fullness." From John D. Zizioulas, "Human Capacity and Incapacity", p. 16, an unpublished manuscript delivered to the Society for the Study of Theology, Oriel College, Oxford, April, 1972.
the time which separates them. The etiology of this theological misinterpretation is at least three-fold: (1) it provided a systematic structure for Christology/soteriology; (2) it preserved the doctrine of God's sovereign goodness; and (3) it ascribed culpability to creation (man). Concomitantly, there evolved (or were expanded) a substitutionary Christology, a God-creation disjunction, an exaggerated depreciation of man, and world, and creation, theories of double predestination, and a predominantly other-worldly perspective of faith. Paul Ricoeur expresses the problem thus:

... the myth prepares the way for speculation by exploring the point of rupture between the ontological and the historical. ... It is the holiness of God that reveals the abyss of sin in man; but, on the other hand, if the root of sin is in the 'nature', in the 'being' of man, then the sin revealed by the holiness of God returns upon Him and accuses the Creator of having made man evil. If I repent of my being, I accuse God in the same moment in which he accuses me, and the spirit of repentance explodes under the pressure of that paradox. Thus, the myth appears at a high point of the tension in the penitential experience; its function is to posit a 'beginning' of evil distinct from the 'beginning' of creation, to posit an event by which sin entered the world and, by sin, death. The myth of the fall is thus the myth of the first appearance of evil in a creation already completed and good.

The theme of penitence is not our immediate concern. What is especially valuable in Ricoeur's statement is the lucid articulation of the problem. That there is a "rupture between the ontological and the

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1 This so-called misinterpretation is clearly articulated in the systems of Augustine through the Reformation. And although Barth and Brunner reject the historical factor, they utilize a similar rationale. For Barth the "good" creation is and has always been supra-historical. Brunner is more historically oriented, but existentializes the moments of creation/fall, and is therefore able to retain the element of historical disreption.

historical" is assumed; but what then of sin's origin? If it is associated with man's nature and being, God is implicated. But, what happens if no rupture is granted, at least in terms of creation and fall? What emerges if one rather assumes a dynamic ontology somewhat consistent with historical process, i.e., creatio continua? What occurs in respect to creation/fall if the imago Dei does symbolize the "becoming" of man in a co-inherent relation with the Creator? Is God, in short, authentically, historically, ontologically implicated in creaturely contradiction? The material in Section a. has anticipated an affirmative answer; God is ontologically implicated.

The most critical effect of that assertion is the recognition that sin is neither the problem of man (Augustinianism) nor the problem of God (Barth), but an historical problem of God and man simultaneously. The question of sin's origin, therefore, assumes a somewhat different orientation. Rather than locating the origin within a paradisial setting, its origin becomes co-terminus and co-existent with creaturely existence. Augustine's interpretation of existence and non-existence (apart from his metaphysical, static, and impersonal constructs) is relevant and constructive at this point. The very createdness of creation signifies its association with non-existence; createdness is mutability, implying creation's tendency (evil) to decline from existence (God). Sin and evil are nature's vitiation (vitium naturae) but do not vitiate nature (vitium naturae).\(^1\) In a more dynamic context, non-existence represents humanity's perverse inclination toward regression by its tendency to idolize its past, paralyze its present, and no less importantly, by its presumptuous endeavor to create its future out

\(^1\)Cf. supra, Chap. II, pp. 123-24, et passim.
of itself. As Augustine maintained however, so long as a thing remains, is, it is good.\(^1\) Slightly altered, we would say that so long as anything remains, it is becoming, it is in process, and that so long as God remains co-inherently related to creation it is constantly becoming. This does not preclude creaturely incoherence, i.e., the negative potential of creation to pervert the process,\(^2\) though never entirely either collectively or individually.\(^3\)

We would say with John Hick that "The story of the fall does not describe genetically how our situation came to be as it is, but analyses that situation as it has always been."\(^4\) The "fall" is an anthropological/theological picture of falledness, which may more adequately be expressed as creaturely ambiguity.\(^5\) The terms "fall" and falledness logically imply that from which something has fallen, and that implication invites error and misinterpretation as evident in the preceding study. Nevertheless, to suggest a modification of the fall doctrine in terms of original and

\(^1\) Cf. supra, Chap. II, pp. 115-16.

\(^2\) The dynamic struggle toward becoming is expressed in Ro. 8:22: "From the beginning till now the entire creation, as we know, has been groaning in one great act of giving birth." The "entire" creation, according to Paul, participates.

\(^3\) Absolute perversion of either historical process or oneself means not only that one totally rejects God, but also that God totally rejects an individual - eventualities yet to be discussed.

\(^4\) Hick, Evil and God, p. 181.

\(^5\) Irenaeus' interpretation is not entirely unambiguous in respect to this question. Cf. the relation between perfection/imperfection discussed in Chap. I, Secs. b.2.a & b.2.b. In the light of his "child" theme, however, we concluded that he recognized a "valid" creaturely non-perfection. He said, for instance, "... He will overcome that which we are by our created nature." - A.H., IV,xxxviii,4. There was also the differentiation between inbreathing and the giving of the Spirit in his system, and his casting blame on the serpent, which indicate his understanding of the ambiguities of createdness. - cf. supra, pp. 61-65.
historical ambiguity is not simultaneously to interpret the problematic of sin; it merely qualifies it and changes its locus. Neither, moreover, does the modification which includes God in the ambiguous process solve the dilemma. It is to that problematic and dilemma that we now turn.

b.2. Its Historical Manifestations and Implications

If the *imago Dei* is a symbol of a God-man structure of dynamic relation, oriented toward a divinely determined goal but including historical process, then it follows that the manifestations of sin and its historical implications similarly relate to the *imago Dei*. The major Augustinian tradition has described that relation in terms of loss, either partial or total. Barth and Brunner represent alternatives to the tradition, but not entirely successful ones. Barth simply divorces the *imago Dei* from an historical connotation, except for an innocuous male-female *analogia relationis*. Brunner's too-radical differentiation between Old and New Testament interpretations qualifies his otherwise valuable and constructive "responsibility" theme. Beyond that qualification however, *Verantwortlichkeit* expresses the dimensions of historical process against which to interpret the ambiguities (intentionally less radical than Brunner's *Widerspruch*) of creaturely existence.

The dimensions of historical process and its ambiguity (i.e., sin) implicit in the *imago Dei* theme are manifest in various ways in each of the systems previously studied. Irenaeus presents an interpretation which is most consonant with a dynamic interpretation of history and of the *imago Dei*. Consequently, his articulation of sin in reference to the image theme is similarly compatible. A positive relation of unobstructed communion between God and man is the end, the intention toward which God creates man; conversely, to sin, to choose the negative pole of creaturely ambiguity, is to cast "... away all the good things which come from Him."¹ Disobedience, i.e.,

departure from the terms and conditions of relation, brings death; but according to Irenaeus it is not a death illustrative of God's punitive reaction or His rejection of man. Rather, "out of pity" for the man, and to make sin itself mortal, God allowed death to intervene so that man, "... ceasing some day to live unto sin, and dying thereunto, might begin to live unto God." \(^1\) Irenaeus also utilizes the theme of human arrogance to articulate historical ambiguity. Failing to recognize and appreciate the love with which God encounters him, man is inclined simultaneously to depreciate the value of his created dependence and disproportionately to maximize his own powers and potential. \(^2\) In this context, sin is despising the essentiality of the proper coherence, i.e., the indivisibility of the God-man structure of relation. It is, in other words, man's rejection of the way things are, a stepping out of relation into the void - but both are relative movements, i.e., neither is total, nor final. \(^3\)

In Irenaeus' system, as illustrated above, the focus of sin is conspicuously associated with the \textit{imago Dei}, which in turn expresses the relation between God and man directed toward the perfection of man's participation in the image. Sin in that context is the human inclination and attempt to step out of the relation (i.e., to deny the image factor) resulting in death and arrogance. Is it correct, however, to say that sin is an attempt to step out of a relation? Further, can it be said that the creaturely inclination precedes arrogance inasmuch as traditional interpretations are agreed that arrogance (pride) precedes, is the foundation for, the distorted relation?

\(^{1}\)Irenaeus, \textit{A.H.}, III,xxiii,6, and cf. \textit{supra}, pp. 70-71.

\(^{2}\)Cf. \textit{supra}, pp. 82-83.

\(^{3}\)Cf. \textit{supra}, p. 91.
In respect to these questions it would seem more accurate to assert that sin is the historical manifestation of a distorted awareness or recognition of the image of God relation. Having previously maintained that sin's origin is co-terminus with createdness, it is impossible to presuppose man's full, complete, and perfect awareness of his proper relation to and with God - an awareness in spite of which he arrogantly separates himself. This is Irenaeus' thrust, i.e., that sin emanates from the "child's" incredible foolishness.¹ The perfect awareness of an ontological and co-inherent structure of relation, and hence, the perfect actualization of the *imago Dei* is that which lies before, ahead of man: "now we are seeing a dim reflection in a mirror; but then we shall be seeing face to face. The knowledge that I have now is imperfect; but then I shall know as fully as I am known." (I Cor. 13:12-13).

Rather than sin being a human and self-assertive attempt to step out of relation, it is more an historical manifestation of human dimness and imperfection. That is definitely not to suggest, however, that dimness and imperfection thoroughly define human, historical existence; neither do the terms imply a rationale for irresponsibility. What is implied, however, is that the focus of human culpability is properly defined in terms of historical process. Man's awareness of his dimness and imperfection, his impotence and temporality - these and related implicates of createdness in association with the dynamic structure of historical existence express the symptoms of human ambiguity. Nevertheless, although the symptoms may define human existence from one perspective - primarily a static one - they inadequately define it from another, i.e., the dynamic perspective. A man is not condemned, or held accountable for what he seems to be or is, but for what he does, not

¹Cf. *supra*, pp. 64-68.
only out of recognition of his createdness, but especially out of an awareness of what he is called to become. This is the heinousness of sin, the rejection or refusal to participate in the forward-moving historical process, the seemingly inveterate tendency to idolize historical structures, to worship and serve "creatures instead of the creator" (Ro.1:25).

That this tendency is borne of dimness and imperfect awareness does not therefore mitigate human responsibility, that is unless one believes that God is not inseparably involved in historical process. God's involvement, His active, personal and powerful presence is that which legitimizes the sentence of condemnation. Cain's act of murder is despicable not only because of the act itself, but also that it represented Cain's attempt to eliminate the challenge of competition in order that he might continue to offer God less than the best. Zechariah was struck dumb, speechless, because he doubted God's ability to effect what He promised (Luke 1). The sin of Israel's Golden Calf was her eagerness to create a tangible god. These illustrations have one element in common - they represent a human tendency to circumscribe the dynamic dimensions of time and history, at the cost of sacrificing human responsibility and dignity.¹

Sin is, in some respects therefore, a self-surrender; it is, however, surrender to the forces and factors of human creation which assume proportions which suggest that they both exist independently, and that they are more powerful than their human creators. In one respect they do, in fact, exist independently. Inasmuch as sin has historical and social implications, as soon as it has assumed concrete form (i.e., murder committed, a lie told, a failure to speak a necessary word of love) the effects are historically

¹This tendency is what Cox describes as acedia; cf. Harvey G. Cox, On Not Leaving It To The Snake, (London: SCM Press, 1968).
unretractable. In that sense the manifestations of sin exist independently. And inasmuch as the repercussions of sin often transcend the intention of the agent, they do become more powerful than their human creators. For this man is responsible.

It has traditionally been asserted that man's responsibility and culpability for sin exercised a maleficent effect on the *imago Dei*. None of the systems reviewed, however, exceeds Brunner's analysis of the disastrous effects incurred. Having asserted that sin is possible only because man is created in the *imago Dei*, he proceeded to state that man's sin effectively perverted the structure of his relation to God. It is not merely a subjective impression of perversion; it is an objective fact. "This is the new attitude of God towards man, that He is angry with him on account of his sin."² There is a "... gulf between God and man, ... "⁷ abyss which lies between the holy God and the sinful creature."³

The writer's reaction to such a conceptualization of human responsibility has been made clear. Basically, the problem and error is that responsibility survives only in terms of total guilt, a position from which man is not only impotent to extract himself, but within which he is no longer dynamically and historically accountable. But man, understood as the being within whom God is constantly at work, and apart from whom there is no historical process, is far more responsible than in Brunner's system. He is responsible because God has chosen to work in, with, and through him. That God "counts on man" is that which makes him accountable and responsible;


conversely, one from whom another expects nothing cannot be blamed for his failure. Of course, that God "counts on man" is neither self-evident, nor is it a conspicuous theme of traditional theology. But, it is an apparently indispensable constituent of a dynamic interpretation of the *imago Dei*.

The intention of the thesis has been accomplished according to its primary objective. The examination and survey of various systems in respect to the *imago Dei* was the subject of Chapters I through V, and this chapter has concentrated on a tentative reconstruction of the image theme. We have suggested that the *imago Dei* is a symbol of the co-inherent structure of relation between God and man. In our reconstruction, the theme has assumed dynamic historically oriented connotations unlike the interpretations previously examined. The category of sin which dominated the other interpretations, (apart from Irenaeus') has been studied, and its origin and implications evaluated.

It could legitimately be asserted that the *imago Dei* is not primarily a Christological theme, in spite of the realization that the traditional interpretations (including Irenaeus', with qualifications) have concentrated upon its Christological implications. A thorough-going Christocentric interpretation of the *imago Dei* inappropriately minimizes God's relation to humanity, e.g., Israel, and inordinately maximizes

The writer is not anxious to be drawn into the debate regarding the intention and efficacy, the inclusiveness/exclusiveness, of God's love, especially in Christ. He is content to leave that final judgement to the Father. It does seem incomprehensible and incredible, however, that God should have managed to "salvage" so pitifully few out of the multitudes of the world's entire population. Even assuming (which no one does) that all Israelites and all Christians of all times represent the total number of the saved, the number is quite insignificant in relation to all men of all time. Furthermore, the apparently popular notion that only true Christians will ultimately be saved suffers not only in respect to the same charge of incredibility, but also from its own inability categorically to define the true Christian. It would seem both possible and proper that one should first confess humble ignorance and then lean slightly toward universalism.

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the factor of sin, viz., as that which requires a particular model of Christology. A thorough consideration of Christ's relation to the *imago Dei* motif, broadly defined, exceeds both the objectives and the limits of the thesis. Nevertheless, there are some especially relevant and compatible Christological concepts which ought to be considered in our reconstruction.

c. The *imago Dei* and Christ

The writer is uncomfortably aware that the structure of this thesis, of this final chapter, and the remarks above in respect to the "place" of Christology in the system, may imply a depreciation of Christ. That is, one might infer that the system prescribes the structure to which Christ must conform. It is the question of presuppositions, i.e., mental attitudes and thought-forms which are powerfully and inevitably operative in the process of interpretation and articulation. There is a system, of course, a structure to which Christ must and does conform. He does not appear in time as radically unrelated to time; even His uniqueness is to some extent at least recognizably human, i.e., it does not infinitely transcend the structures of historical existence, and its factors of continuity.

The so-called Christocentric interpretations of Barth and Brunner for instance, manifest a peculiar disdain for those structures (i.e., human and historical), the consequence of which is the observe of their intention.¹ The proper order of relation is most profoundly

expressed in Gal. 4:1-11; the factors of continuity (e.g., child to heir, adoption, ignorance to knowledge) are conspicuous. "When the appointed time came, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born a subject of the Law, to redeem the subjects of the Law and to enable us to be adopted as sons." (vss. 4,5).¹

The issue as to whether a system is Christocentric is decided on the basis of the central significance He assumes in a given system; the propriety of any given characterization of that centrality, i.e., its authenticity, is the relation it bears to one's perception of the whole. On that basis therefore Christology is a study which is relative to all other manifestations of God's relation to the world. That does not imply a subordination of Christ; neither does it permit, however, that Christ should be understood as one who illustrates God's radical departure from structures of relation operative from the beginning.²

Our task is not to challenge all other Christological formulations; it is merely to explore some of the Christological implications which seem to emerge from a dynamic interpretation of the imago Dei. One of the operative presuppositions will be that Christ, His work and being, are

¹The Son's relation to human and historical structures is clear; He is born of a woman, under the Law. The "appointed time", Προέρχονται ὁ θάνατος, indicates God's appreciation of temporality. That is, time is neither inimical nor insignificantly related to the accomplishment of His purpose. Cf. Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, p. 390. But cf. Barth's disjunctive interpretation, supra, p. 239, n. 1. To "redeem" (ἐξαίωσεν) the subjects of the Law should not be interpreted to imply that subjectation to the Law was in fact an objective state of affairs, as e.g., asserted by Brunner (cf. supra, pp. 297-98). A perverted understanding of one's relation to the structures of historical existence does not create structures commensurate to the perversion. To redeem therefore, is not literally to "buy back", but rather expresses the idea of deliverance, release.

²Cf. supra, Sec. a.3.
more coherent to than incoherent from historical process.¹ Toward the accomplishment of the task, and in the light of the presupposition, these two topics require consideration: Christ's person and work, and His presence.

c.1. His Person and Work

In a thoroughly dynamic assessment it is impossible concisely to differentiate between one's person (being) and work (act).² An approximate differentiation is possible, of course, taking into consideration that at a given moment a man is both more and less than he seems to be. That is to say, he is more than he seems to be in the light of the fact that he is "becoming"; on the other hand he is from that perspective, less than he will be. Nevertheless the Scriptural witness to the person and work of Jesus manifests a degree of coherence that makes a differentiation even more arbitrary. The implications of that realization in respect to the imago Dei are profound. Jesus is the one in whom being and act consistently coincide; there is no distortion or disjunction between who He is and what He does.³ This is illustrated in Jesus' response to John's question: "Are you the one who is to come, or have we got to wait for someone else?"

¹The words "coherent" and "incoherent" are chosen because of their relation to the word "co-inherent" which we have used to define the God/man structure of relation. All three words include the idea of relation, connection.

²The philosophic implications of the terms, act and being, will not be explored for two reasons: one, we have chosen from the beginning to avoid discussion of philosophy, and its introduction at this point would be inconsistent; two, we believe it is possible to restrict the scope of the thesis, concentrating specifically on theological issues, without sacrificing quality.

³The use of present tense verbs, e.g., He is, He does, in respect to Jesus is simply to postpone the question of His living presence until Sec. c.2., infra.
Jesus' response was: "Go back and tell John what you hear and see; the blind see again, and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised to life and the Good News is proclaimed to the poor;" (Mt. 11:3-5). His work indicated, at least to some, who He was. The answer was appropriate at that time, in that situation.

But in another context and setting, Jesus blessed Peter for his confession: "You are the Christ ... the Son of the Living God"; Jesus realized that Peter's recognition was not the conclusion of empirical evidence ("flesh and blood") but a revelation from the Father (Mt. 16:16-17). Whatever else may be possible to conclude from Peter's recognition, this much seems certain: his assertion that Jesus was for him the Christ, the Son of the Living God, did not imply that Jesus was no longer a man among men. Being "Christ" represented His difference within the structures of relation, coherence – not Christ's distinction from them.

We have said that the *imago Dei* is a symbol of the dynamic structure of God's co-inherence with man, and that the dynamic implies movement toward a goal or consummation, including historical activity. In reference to that definition, it could be said that Jesus is the perfect and complete concrete actualization of that co-inherent structure and of the goal. Christ's miracles indicate His orientation toward humanity; His recognition of the Father's revelation to Peter illustrates His orientation toward God. There is a perfect balance and coherence manifest in the person and work of Christ, a perfect attainment of the intent of the *imago Dei*. His orientation toward the Father indeed preceded His orientation toward the earth, but the former required the latter. That is to say, as the complete actualization of the *imago Dei*, there was a uniformity, a coherence in Christ's love; neither orientation precluded the other.
D.D. Williams expresses much the same conclusion, saying:

... the imago dei should not be conceived as a special quality, but as the relationship for which man is created with his neighbour before God. The image of God is reflected in every aspect of man's being, not as a special entity but as the meaning of the life of man in its essential integrity. But surely this can be most clearly grasped if we say that love is the meaning of the imago dei.¹

Love is not the meaning of the imago Dei, but rather its expression.² Beyond that however, William's brief articulation is significant. He describes the primarily human perspective of the phrase, imago Dei, its essentially dynamic thrust, its all-inclusiveness, and the factor of integrity (coherence). The person and work of Christ conforms to each of the above factors, apart from the first, i.e., the primarily human perspective. It may be advisable to qualify that definition of perspective.

To say that the imago Dei is essentially an anthropological term is appropriate only when one intends to include the ambiguities of human existence, i.e., creaturely incoherence, sin. But in respect to the Christological implicates of the term there are no ambiguities; consequently, it is gratuitous to articulate priorities. Indeed, it may also be misleading to state, as we did above, that Jesus' orientation toward the Father preceded his orientation toward the earth, i.e., man. The term priority seems relevant only in respect to His rejection of inauthentic factors of human existence, e.g., greed, hypocrisy, usury,


²Our saying that love is the expression and not the meaning of the imago Dei may be a pedantic distinction. But the word love is inadequate because of its over-use and misuse.
lust, etc. This realization therefore adds a dimension to our understanding of the term. Jesus, as the complete actualization of the dynamic thrust, reveals the indivisibility of the human/divine relation, and simultaneously exposes creaturely incoherence, sin. We attempted in the preceding section to define sin in reference to the *imago Dei*, especially in terms of its perversion of historical process. Now, in reference to the person and work of Christ, another dimension has been added, both in terms of a "model" of perfection, and also in respect to that which is traditionally described as salvation.

This is perhaps the most critical topic of the chapter, for salvation is the key to the Christian faith. Unfortunately, however, the broad focus of salvation has been delimited by Western theology, and circumscribed by its boundaries to the extent that it no longer expresses a dynamic movement or relates to the *imago Dei* except as its replacement. Mowinckel stated that

... the history of revelation in reality is also history of salvation. The plan of God is ultimately his plan of salvation; the intent of creation is salvation, the full realization of God's goal; 'all things were created through him and for him' (Col. 1:16). For salvation in its full biblical meaning is not only salvation from, but also salvation to something. It is the realization of the kingdom of God.¹

We do not want to suggest that the interpretation of salvation offered by Mowinckel, or that salvation similarly defined in respect to the *imago Dei* represents the exclusively correct and complete ones.²


What is intended, however, is that a more dynamic interpretation which takes seriously the factors of historical coherence should assume its place beside the others, to complement and perhaps to qualify them. The alternatives are not of the either-or variety, i.e., one does not have to choose to interpret salvation either as release or as fulfillment and wholeness. The latter is the focus of the imago Dei and therefore is that which we want to examine.

Explicit and specific references to the imago Dei are few in the New Testament; even fewer are those that relate specifically to its soteriological function. Implications of completion and fulfillment are evident in the two references in Colossians (1:1-20; 3:9,10). The first reference identifies Jesus as the image, while the second associates the image with the creator. The themes of Christ's perfection and centrality expressed in Col. 1 are similar to those which we have previously described. In addition, however, there is the clear statement of creation's participation with him, not of its cooperation, but rather in its consummation. "He is the Beginning" and the "first to be born from the dead, so that he should be first in every way; because God wanted all perfection to be found in him" (1:18-19).

Colossians 3 conveys the theme of renewal and unity. Having enumerated the vices of unrenewed life the author says: "You have stripped off your old behaviour with your old self, and you have put on a new self which will progress towards true knowledge the more it is renewed in the image of its creator; and in that image there is no room for distinction between Greek and Jew," etc. (3:9-11).

Consummation, renewal, unity - these are familiar themes, and their relation to the imago Dei has been made apparent. What remains to be articulated is their soteriological import. One should not
overlook the verb tenses in the references above; they are predominantly present and future. Of course one would not want to make overmuch of that fact, but that realization considered in the total context of the dynamic intent of the *imago Dei* becomes a critical awareness. It implies that soteriology is a present event, inseparably related to the consideration of the presence of Christ.¹

c.2. His Presence

The question regarding the death and decay of Jesus' body becomes relatively insignificant in respect to the greater issue of His saving presence. It may indeed be a valid subject for debate as to whether or not, and in what sense He is present unless He actually and historically and verifiably rose bodily from the grave; we do not imply a minimization of the question's significance, but we will not comment except insofar as there are implications in respect to the *imago Dei*.

We have maintained that the *imago Dei* symbolizes God's co-inherent presence in historical existence, and further that His presence has always been in process of historical actualization, i.e., assuming concrete form through and within historical creaturely existence. The

¹This topic impinges upon the resurrection theme. Without becoming involved in the various interpretative techniques, i.e., the resurrection as history, as myth, as kerygma, the writer's own understanding in respect to the *imago Dei* implicates of the resurrection is that Jesus, as the perfect actualization of the Father's intention for man, is alive.

Of, the insight of a sociologist/theologian, Peter L. Berger, *A Rumour of Angels*, (London: Penguin Press, 1970), and especially this from p. 114: "The discovery of Christ implies the discovery of the redeeming presence of God within the anguish of human experience. Now God is perceived not only in terrible confrontation with the world of man, but present within it as suffering love. This presence makes possible the ultimate vindication of the creation, and thus the reconciliation between the power and the goodness of the creator. By the same token, it vindicates the hope that human suffering has redeeming significance."
expression or actualization of His presence, however, has been subject to the ambiguities, the incoherences of creaturely existence. Therefore His presence has been imperfectly perceived; in a sense He has accommodated Himself to the limits of createdness, both in terms of His self-expression, and also in respect to human perceptual limitations.¹

The perfect actualization of God's presence is, at least from the perspective of the imago Dei, the unambiguous expression and manifestation of unobstructed communion. That is to say, if the imago bears implicates of co-inherent relation, than a perfect historical manifestation of that relation will simultaneously require a "mode" through and within which there occurs the event of human-divine communion. Perfectly actualized, the event is a thoroughly reciprocal event; it is a dynamic encounter between God and man, an encounter through which both humanity and divinity (man and God) participate.² A reciprocal event is one in which the inappropriate dualities disappear, i.e., creaturely ambiguities and incoherences. This does not imply that the authentic differences between human and divine are obliterated, but it does infer that there are no radical distinctions.³

One may be quite prepared to agree that God's presence was once perfectly actualized in history, and that its actualization in Jesus

¹Cf. the Irenaean theme: "God ..., was indeed able - Himself to bestow on man perfection from the beginning, but man was incapable of receiving it: for he was a babe." - A.H. IV,xxxvii,1, cited supra, p. 61. And cf. Heb. 1:1-4.

²This is a notable theme of Barth's Humanity of God, but not his major interpretation.

³Against Barth, cf. supra, Chap. IV, Sec. c., pp. 236ff. For the differentiation between distinction/difference cf. supra, p. 36, especially n. 2.
Christ revealed a co-inherent relation between the human and divine.
One may even recognize an inseparable dipolarity of orientation manifest in
Christ, e.g., Jn. 6:34: "My food is to do the will of the one who sent
me, and to complete his work," and that the authentic sphere of His
activity was with man. How therefore, may one articulate the reality
of that same on-going saving presence? Is it, in fact a "saving presence"?
Traditional interpretations of the imago Dei have derived considerable
soteriological insight from the theme, but always based on the presupposition
of a disjunction. The imago Dei has been fractured, with the result that
in respect to historical existence and soteriology there are in a sense
two images, the one defaced, lost, depraved (human), the other full,
complete, supra-historical (divine). Brunner's delineation between Old
and New Testament interpretations is the clearest expression of the so-
called fracture.

Irenaeus, surely more than any other, recognized the factor of
soteriological presence implicit in the image theme. His utilization of
the recapitulation motif is a creative and constructive expression of the
dynamic, eternal and eternally related saving presence of God in and
through the creative process and historical existence. Christ, in
Irenaeus' system, stands as the perfect completion of the imago Dei, a
completion which is simultaneously particular (i.e., Jesus of Nazareth)
and universal (i.e., trans-historical salvation). Recapitulation
recognizes the incoherences of creaturely existence, and the consequent
necessity of its (i.e., humanity's) completion from beyond itself; but

1Cf. Jn. 17:4; Mt. 25:35-46 (the "in so far as ... you did it to
me" passage); and Mk. 2:23-28. Cf. also our discussion of the subject in
261-63.
at the same time recapitulation recognizes the inclusion of historical existence. That is to say, Christ's recapitulative work was from "beyond" in as much as He transcended the liabilities inherent in creaturely existence (i.e., sin); yet, His work was as Man, within and intrinsically related to the structures of historical existence.¹

The articulation of Christ's on-going saving presence is partially accomplished by means of the New Testament (indeed, Biblical) emphasis on adoption and incorporation; that particular emphasis is directly related to the imago Dei concept as developed most explicitly in Colossians. "All things were created through him and for him" (1:16); "he holds all things in unity" (1:17). "In his body lives the fullness of divinity, and in him you too find your own fulfilment" (2:10). "You have been buried with him, when you were baptised; and by baptism, too, you have been raised up with him through your belief in the power of God" (2.12).²

The presence of Christ was an "incorporating presence" (cf. Jn. 17:26 et passim). Its relation to the imago Dei theme indicates its universal perspective and its corollary, His present, i.e., concrete and historical presence. The writer's intention has been primarily to explicate the cosmic scope of the image theme, without particular emphasis on the more restrictive, exclusivistic implicates of the Christian faith and message; this latter theme has been sufficiently explicated in

¹Cf. supra, Chapter I, Sec. c.4. The Church's struggle to articulate the relation between the humanity and divinity of Christ is less problematic for Irenaeus in as much as nature and super-nature are more coherent than disjunctive.

²There are many parallel texts which express the broad perspective of this theme, and which elaborate upon it. Many of them are considered in the context of Baptism and the Lord's Supper in Hans Küng, The Church, trans. Ray and Rosaleen Ockenden, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), pp. 203-241.
traditional doctrine. The two emphases are not inherently contradictory, of course, but stand in a complementary relation. The critical contribution of the *imago Dei* motif is to assert that although Christ was the first and only concrete, perfect actualization of the image, His saving, incorporating, forgiving, and empowering presence remains within historical creaturely existence. The *imago Dei* theme stands as a symbol of God’s relation to the world – in the world – reminding the world that its goal and completion is not exclusively from within itself (as a closed whole) but that its very existence and goal are permeated by the incarnate presence of the divine.  

The distinctive quality of Christianity in reference to the cosmic scope of the *imago Dei*, is at least in part, its awareness of the co-inherence of God, and the centrality of Christ. That awareness opens the horizon of historical existence, completing (subject to human factors of incoherence) the circle of communion between Creator and creation. It manifests the doxological import of *creatio ex nihilo*, and coincides with a dynamic interpretation of creative process, i.e., *creatio continua*. One’s recognition of God’s dynamic, loving, and saving presence also humbles creation in the face of its own perversion, a perversion from which humanity is powerless to extricate or heal itself. The depth of that perversion acquired its most unmistakable expression in its futile attempt

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1 This is properly a related, but separate field of study. It has been explored by several theologians, e.g. Ronald Gregor Smith, John Knox (The Church and the Reality of Christ), Johannes B. Metz, (Theology of the World), Dietrich Ritschl, (Memory and Hope), and Joseph Haroutunian (God With Us). The most recent, and perhaps the most creative study is that of Ray S. Anderson, "Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God", (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1972).
to reject the only historically actualized perfection of its goal, viz.,
the crucifixion of the Incarnate Christ. The futility of the attempt,
and simultaneously the symbol of God's indestructible and on-going
purposive relation, is manifest in the resurrection.

Christians, therefore, are conscious of their dependence, a
consciousness which is celebrated through its acts of worship, its sacra-
ments, prayers, and devotion to the Word. The Church's consciousness,
however, is not one of introversion; rather, it remains faithfully
attentive to the multiform signs of the imago Dei. It waits expectantly,
interprets hopefully, serves and is served, speaks and is spoken to -
in all things simultaneously subject to historical existence, yet knowing
that its goal is beyond. It exists as God's witness in the world that
man's hope - even including his so-called secular aspirations - is valid,
though not complete within itself. The church opens the horizons of
history with its proclamation that hope has been (in Christ), is being (in
Christ) and finally will be eternally authenticated (in Christ). "We
are God's work of art, created in Christ Jesus to live the good life as
from the beginning he had meant us to live it" (Eph. 2:10).
APPENDIX A

The Thomistic conceptualization of nature and grace, their respective essence and relation, is more than peripherally related to Thomas' doctrine of the imago Dei; therefore a careful consideration of those themes as they impinge on our understanding of the image of God would seem appropriate. On the other hand a thorough explication of nature-grace would inevitably draw us further from our central concern than seems advisable. Therefore, in order to present the essential material apropos nature-grace as it relates to the imago Dei we will consider some of the technical material relevant to the subject.

Our intention is to discern the specific being or essence of both nature and grace, not however as an independent study, but expressly in order that the imago Dei, and its relation to each, might be more fully appreciated. Our questions, for instance, - what is nature, and "natural" to man? what relation to image does nature bear? is the image of God of nature or grace? - these questions underlie all of the following material.

On Nature and Grace

1.1. In the Summa St. Thomas offers a three-fold definition of human nature. First, he states, "... there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth."\(^1\) We have seen that among the powers of the soul, that of intellectuality is of greatest import to our study; we have called this man's cognitive aptitude (supra, p. 188). St. Thomas asserts that this quality of nature has "... been neither destroyed nor diminished by sin."\(^2\)

\(^1\) *Summa*, II-I Q.LXXXV 1.

\(^2\) *Summa*, II-I Q. LXXXV 1. The rationale for this assertion is stated thus: "... sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin." *Ibid.*, Q. LXXXV 2.
1.2. That the aptitude of man is not necessarily synonymous with its actuality; and, that potentiality is primarily preparatory, we note in this statement: "Man is made to the image of God, because he is created with an intelligence. Only intelligent beings are said to be made to his image; they only can be called his sons, and can be adopted through grace."\(^1\)

1.3. Is such potentiality a quality of the nature of man, and if so, is man thereby enabled to achieve his end, i.e., the beatific vision? The answer to the first will have to be affirmative — man's intellectual capacity is constitutive of his being. On the other hand, it would not be true to suggest that the utilization of such potentiality will of itself warrant the accomplishment of man's end. John Sullivan's summary statement is instructive:

Man is naturally capable of grace, and of the knowledge and vision of God because he is made to the image of God: this is the constant refrain of Thomas. However, this potency of the natural divine image for the gifts of grace is of a very special nature. 'The beatific vision and knowledge are to some extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable by nature, having been made in the image of God ...'.\(^2\)

1.4. Summary: Intellectuality, the central factor of the _imago Dei_, is an abiding quality of man's nature, not affected by sin.\(^3\) Its primary focus, however, is beyond the management of mundane affairs; its fullest potentiality is directed toward adoption by God, the beatific vision. Nature is not sufficient to attain the divine goal, but serves as the necessary preliminary for that attainment.

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\(^1\) Aquinas, III Sentences x.ii.2.iii, cited in Gilby, Texts, 292. Cf. Sullivan, _Image_, p. 234: "Man precisely as he is a natural image of God, that is by reason of his intellectuality and its powers, is _capax Dei_, capable of knowing and loving God as he is in himself, but supernatural revelation is required for the activation of this divine capacity."


\(^3\) That conclusion is subject to challenge; it will be modified shortly.
2.1. The second factor which Thomas offers as definitive of human nature is an "... inclination to virtue, ..."¹ St. Thomas enlarges upon this theme in Article 2 and says that it is by means of his rational nature that a man may be said to act in accord with reason, and this is to act virtuously.² The major emphasis is related to the structures of order rather than to categories of personal relation.

2.2. It may be edifying to note references regarding the distinction between perfect and corrupt nature as it relates to this theme of virtue. St. Thomas states:

... man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift [superadditione gratuiti doni], though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above all this is natural [coni-naturale] to man and to every nature, ... And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since all things act according as they are naturally fit as stated in Phys. ii. ... Hence in the state of perfect nature [naturae integrae] man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature [naturae corruptae] man falls short of this appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God's grace, follows its private

¹Summa, II-I Q.LXXXV 1. Of the several forms of virtue the one that concerns us is that of man's love for God, which is the foundation for all other virtues. St. Thomas cites Augustine in his definition of virtue, saying, "Augustine defines virtue as a good quality of mind, whereby life is lived aright, which no one uses ill, and which God works in us apart from sin."² This definition is complete, even leaving out the last clause, and applied to every human virtue. Virtue brings an active faculty to its full activity." Aquinas, Disputationes, de Virtutibus in commun. 2, cited in Gilby, Texts, 217.

²"The definition was composed by Peter Lombard from phrases of St. Augustine, Cr. Sentences, II. xxvii.5."

Note also that sin and vice are posed as virtue's antithesis: "Sin, the direct opposite of an act of virtue, is a disordered activity; vice, the direct opposite of virtue, is the condition of a thing out of its proper bearings." Summa, II-I Q.LXXI 1, cited in Gilby, Texts, 233. Sin is here seen as the manifestation of disorder, while vice is the precedent disordered condition from which sin emanates. Conversely therefore, virtue is the proper order from which ordinate activity emanates, i.e., love for God. And cf. Summa, II-I Q.LXXI 2.

²Cf. Summa, II-I Q.LXXXV 2.
good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature.1

According to the above, properly ordered nature inclines itself (by nature) to the love of God above all things, and conversely, an inordinate or disordered nature is diverted from the primary focus, the love of God, to its private end and good.

2.3. The concept of proportionality is of critical importance regarding this theme, i.e., man's inclination to virtue, and is introduced by St. Thomas thus:

...in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate /proportionatum/ to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue /virtutis acquisitae/; but not surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue /virtutis infusae/. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfill it by his own natural powers.2

Man, as he lives in his corrupt nature, is a qualitatively different being from man who lived in the perfect state; the former retains a proportional capacity for acquired virtue, but significantly diminished vis-a-vis his perfect archetype. The original sufficiency of man's operative power has now become a relative (not absolute) insufficiency whereby man is apparently unable even to accomplish ends commensurate with his nature. It is difficult to ascertain whether "nature" itself has been transformed or simply that a disordering limitation has intervened which renders his natural capacity for virtue less potent; however, the evidence seems to favor the latter.3

1Summa, II-I Q.CIX 3. The question of nature's primal need for grace will be considered shortly. However it should be stated at this point that the statement that man, in his perfect nature, did not need grace in order that he might love God sublimely and naturally is not paramount to saying that by nature man can achieve his perfect end. Cf. supra, Article 1.2., and Summa, II-I Q.II 3: "... the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness."

2Summa, II-I Q.CIX 2, Ital. mine.

3Cf. Aquinas, Contra Impugnantes Dei, 6, cited in Gilby, Texts, 291.
2.4. Regarding the question as to the dependence of nature on grace, we note the explicit statement:

Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own proper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a superadded form. And thus the human understanding has a form, viz., intelligible light, which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, viz., those we can come to know through the senses. Higher intelligible things the human intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz., the light of faith or prophecy which is called the light of grace, inasmuch as it is added to nature.

The natural endowments of intellectuality are not sufficient to apprehend those realities which transcend the capability of sense. If therefore, it be granted that the beatific vision belongs to the category of "higher intelligible things" it must be concluded that both pre- and post-fallen man were dependent upon superadded grace. However, according to Thomas, man's propensity or inclination toward virtue, though diminished by sin, continues to remain as a constituent element in the nature of man. Indeed, that inclination is, and always has been, dependent upon the donum superadditum of grace for the attainment of the beatific vision, though the inclination, per se, even apart from grace, remains.

3. The third and final good of human nature is "... the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole human nature in the person of the first man, ..." Original justice, original rectitude, is of a different quality from that of either the principles and properties, i.e., the powers of the soul (cf. supra, Article 1) or that of man's

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1 *Summa, II-I Q.CIX 1*, and cf. *Ibid., I Q.XCIII 8*: "The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q. XII., A.12: Q. LVI., A.3; Q.IX., A.5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; whether this image of God be so obsolete, as it were clouded, as almost to amount to nothing, as in those who have not the use of reason; or obscured and disfigured, as in sinners; or clear and beautiful, as in the just; ..." And cf. also *Summa, II-I Q.II 3*, Rep. Ob. 1, and II-I Q.CXIV 2: "... no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added a supernatural gift, which we call grace." Ital. mine.

2 *Summa, II-I Q.LXXXV 1.*
inclination to virtue which we have just discussed. These latter continue in man and qualify his being; the former, original rectitude, "... was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. ..." 1

3.1. Because there is a clear relationship between rectitude and rationality, impinging on the *imago Dei*, the implications of original rectitude need now to be considered. That relationship is explored by St. Thomas in the following:

... the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. vii. 20, God made man right. For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; ... Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; ... So it is clear also that the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but was a supernatural endowment of grace; ... 2

There is an apparent contradiction between the relation of rectitude and rationality discussed above and that discussed in Article 1 where it was asserted that the properties and powers of the soul, e.g., intellectuality, were undiminished by sin. Above, however, it is stated that the subjection implicit in rectitude is the cause of first, the lower power's subjection to reason, and second, the body's subjection to the soul. If therefore rectitude is not of the nature of man, but a property of grace which is superadded initially and subsequently lost, so also would we conclude that the secondary and tertiary subjections would have been adversely affected. Furthermore, it is explicitly stated that the subjection of "... the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature." (Ital. mine).

3.2. Toward a resolution of this apparent discrepancy we note Aquinas' amplification in terms of "accidents":

... original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the specie, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. 3

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1 *Summa*, II-I Q.LXXXV 1.  
2 *Summa*, I Q.XCV 1.  
3 *Summa*, I Q.C 1, Ital. mine. And cf. *Summa*, I Q.XCVII 1: "... a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. ... For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigour of
Therefore, the accident of original righteousness (rectitude) is not of the substance (nature) of man; it merely pertains to him.

3.2.1. Further, regarding the quality of an accident and its relation to being and grace we note:

As Boethius (pseudo-Beda) says (Sentent. Philosoph. ex Aristol.), the being of an accident is to inhere (accidentis esse est inesse). Hence no accident is called being as if it had being, but because by it something is; hence it is said to belong to a being rather than to be a being (Metaph. vii.). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking no accident comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus grace is also said to be created inasmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e., are given a new being out of nothing, i.e., not from merits, according to Eph. ii.10, ... .

Our conclusion is that the nature of man, and the powers of reason and of the soul, remain proportional to nature even granting the loss of the supernatural gift of rectitude. The appreciation of the clear dualism between nature and grace in the thought of St. Thomas affords a systematically acceptable resolution of the apparent contradiction introduced above in Article 3.1. Apart from dualistic presuppositions however, one may protest, not perhaps the systematic consistency, but surely the validity of the superimposed extra-biblical philosophical structures.

4. We have attempted to illustrate the dissimilarity between grace and nature, and yet to explicate the relation between them. Having explored the constitution of nature and its relation to grace, we shall reverse the perspective and elucidate the relation of grace to nature.

4.1. As St. Thomas presented a three-fold definition of nature, so also does he propose a tripartite characterization of grace in his "Treatise on Grace" entitled "Of the Grace of God as Regards its Essence". He states:

immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God." Then in Rep. Ob. 3 he states: "This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, ... ." And cf. Summa, I Q. C 1.

1 Summa, II-I Q.CX 2, Rep. Ob. 3.
According to the common manner of speech, grace is usually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king, i.e., the king looks on him with favour. Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely bestowed, ..., Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given gratis, inasmuch as we are said to be grateful for benefits. Of these three the second depends on the first, since one bestows something on another gratis from the love wherewith he receives him into his good graces. And from the second proceeds the third, since from the benefits bestowed gratis arises gratitude. Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something in him (Ital. mine) who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the acknowledgement of the gift. But as regards the first, a difference must be noted between the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the creature's good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in things: and hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good cause in the creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love. And according to this difference of good the love of God to the creature is looked at differently. For one is common, whereby He loves all things that are (Wis. xi. 25), and thereby gives things their natural being. But the second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of the Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature.1

Divine grace, in the first sense, is a benevolent disposition of God toward man, which in its expression seems to become reified, i.e., "... grace implies something in him who receives grace." (supra). As a consequence there is an existent good both recognizable and lovable which precipitates one's love for another; conversely, God is considered to depend on no such good of the creature, but upon Himself to create the good by His act of grace.2 The dualism between nature and grace is sustained,

1Summa, II-I Q.CX 1.

2Cf. Summa, II-I Q.CX 1: "... when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is signified something bestowed on man by God." And cf. Ibid., Rep. Ob. 1: "... what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in man is caused by the Divine love, ... ."
but at what cost, we may ask, to nature?

4.1.1. St. Thomas addresses himself generally to that question speaking of the difference between operating and co-operating grace. In respect to operating grace God is spoken of as sole mover; but from another perspective the mind which is moved also moves, which movement is attributed to the soul; this is designated as co-operating grace. The interior act of the will of which God is prime mover is operating grace, whereas the exterior act, commanded by the will, and attributed to the will is co-operating grace. Of this Thomas says, "... because God assists us in this act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of co-operating grace." 1 It would appear that the will's ability to co-operate is entirely and completely dependent upon operating grace; co-operating grace better specifies a semantic distinction than what the phrase would suggest to us, i.e., an actual occurrence of co-labor or co-activity in which both God and man significantly participate.

4.1.2. The limitation of nature is further specified in Summa, Q.CXIV where Aquinas affirms the divine ordination of human nature (at least insofar as its capability is concerned) to eternal life, but only "... by the help of grace; and in this way its act can be meritorious of eternal life." 2

4.1.3. "Meritorious of eternal life" is a phrase that may imply the structures or relation of co-labor and co-activity which we, in Article 4.1.1., suggested were conspicuously absent. The constitution of merit vis-a-vis grace is definitively articulated by St. Thomas in a later question. He suggests that meritorious work is to be understood either as it proceeds from free-will, or from grace. The distinction of origin requires the further elaboration:

If it [meritorious work] is considered as regards the substance of the word, and inasmuch as it springs from free-will, there can be no congruity because of the very great inequality. But there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion:

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1 Summa, II-I Q.CXI 2, and cf. Summa, II-I Q.CX 2, Rep. Ob. 2: "Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just."

for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him according to the excellence of his power. If, however, we speak of a meritorious work (opera meritoria), inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting according to John iv. 14: ...?1

The merit of free-will is congruous or commensurate only on the basis of its proportionality which is applicable exclusively within the sphere of nature, and which does not attain to the supernatural sphere of eternity. Alternately, the work which springs from the gift of super-added grace exceeds the proportionality of nature and therefore worthily conforms to the structures of the eternal. However, inasmuch as there is a congruity on the basis of proportion, it should not be suggested that there is a basic incompatibility between the two spheres of reality, nature and grace, even though nature's function may appear to be entirely passive.2

4.2. Summary. That which at first appeared to be a reification of grace (4.1.) is now seen, on the basis of further evaluation, to be an unjustified deduction. It is seen that grace is first a disposition of God toward man, and secondly on the basis of the material in Article 4.1.1., grace is the activity of God toward man by which He moves man toward Himself. This would seem entirely compatible with what was said about the imago Dei as being nature's capax Dei. Man's capacity for God is a potentiality for relation which is conditioned by God. It does not seem possible however, because of Aquinas' clear delineation of operating and co-operating grace, to speak of man's capax Dei (apropos the image) as a property which inheres in man; the capacity would appear to be more a naked potentiality. Aquinas says, "Rational natures are poised between alterna-

1Summa, II-I Q.CXIV 3.

2Cf. Summa, II-I Q.II 3. Not all of nature attains to the universal, asserts Aquinas; only the rational nature "... in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being." And cf. Summa, II-I Q.CIX 5, cited in Gilby, Texta, 297: "Since deeds of natural power are not deserving of eternal life, because they are not proportioned to it, the higher power of grace is necessary."
tives. God moves the human spirit to good; nevertheless it could resist. It is God's doing, then, that a man prepares himself to receive grace.\(^1\)

The alternative between which man is poised is to receive or reject grace; the former man can do only by the help of grace and therefore his acceptance is not the product of an inherent property or, it would also appear, the independent exercise of a capacity. Man's capacity for God, according to St. Thomas, is primarily a neutral and passive constituent of his being by which he can recognize (by grace) God when He presents Himself, or reject (by himself) Him if he so desires.\(^2\)

The principle of merit further clarifies the disjunction between nature and grace, as was indicated in Article 4.1.4. Nature and grace specify two separate and distinct spheres of reality, though the distinction is not, from God's point of view, absolute. That is to say, the disposition of God for the ultimate good of man can be "naturalized" and continue to retain its proper proportionality. On the other hand the highest tendency of nature cannot of itself transcend its natural bounds; there is congruity but not condignity.\(^3\)

5. Conclusion. Nature, we have seen, is the created sphere of reality which stands apart and distinct, yet dependent upon the other sphere of reality which is God, and which we have discussed from the perspective of grace. Within the sphere of nature, our primary interest has been oriented toward man, the highest in the order because of the quality of intellectuality. As regards the imago Dei, intellectuality is the criterion which specifies man's potentiality for relation (supra, Article 1.2). Intellectual potentiality is therefore constitutive of man, but not therefore inevitably productive of his chief end, the beatific vision.

Our consideration of virtue suggested that insofar as the imago Dei is concerned, at the time of man's original perfection he was capable of loving God above all things because as yet his capacity for knowing Him was

\(^1\)Aquinas, I Quodlibets, iv,7, c&\textsuperscript{ad} 1,2, cited in Gilby, Texts, 300, and cf. Ibid.: "That men can freely prepare themselves does not dispense with the need for divine help, any more than the fact that fire burns makes an originating thermal principle redundant. God moves all things according to their proper modes of operation, and so, by sharing in the divine motion, some things act from necessity, but others from liberty."

\(^2\)Aquinas, Exposition, de Trinitate, ii.3, cited in Gilby, Texts, 11.

\(^3\)Cf. Summa, II-I Q.CIX 9.
unencumbered by the disorder of sin (supra, Article 2.2.). The conceptualization of proportionality impinges upon this consideration in that St. Thomas delimits the possibilities of man's capability; meritorious knowledge is the donum superadditum of grace - it exceeds the proper proportionality of nature (cf. Articles 2.3., and 2.4.).

The gift of original rectitude in which man was created, and by means of which the entire life of man was properly ordered (i.e., subjection to God and consequent subjection of lower powers to the power of rationality) was noted to be not of nature but of grace. Therefore it is possible to conclude that the addition or retraction of grace does not transform nature, although this is not to suggest that nature is unaffected. Superadded grace permits, in a sense, the higher capability of man, i.e., his intellectualty, to transcend the limits of nature (supra, Articles 3.1., 3.2., 3.2.1.).

Finally we explored the relation of grace to nature (Article 4.) and were further impressed by St. Thomas' careful delineation of the constitution and relation of the two realities. In Article 4.1.1. where the issue of operating grace as over-against co-operating grace was studied, we suggested that in respect to the co-operative potentiality of man, the precedent power of operating grace effectively eliminates the possibility of co-labor and co-activity. The relation between the two is clearly that of absolute dependence and subordination. The merit which may result from the activity of man is not proportional to the quality of merit which is determinate of man's eternal life, the beatific vision (cf. Article 4.1.3.).

1Cf. Aquinas, Disputations, II de Malo, 11, cited in Gilby, Texts, 266: "As daylight from the sun is diffused into the room, so the light of grace is infused into the soul by God. Although grace is beyond the nature of the soul, there is, nevertheless, in every rational creature the readiness to receive grace, and from grace the vigour to act accordingly. Sin is like an obstacle interposed between the soul and God: your iniquities have separated between you and God." [Isa. lix. 2]. Later in the same reference Thomas elaborates on the relation between sin and grace: "Since the aptness for grace is part of human nature's good estate, we can now appreciate how sin diminishes nature. And because grace perfects nature, heightening mind and will and the sensitive parts which serve reason, we can appreciate also how sin, by depriving us of grace and clogging our natural abilities, also hurts nature."
The *imago Dei* as constituted by the grace of God is an accident (cf. Articles 3.2., 3.2.1.) of nature, i.e., it has no being *per se*, and therefore it could not be suggested that the image of God is a quality which inheres in man. Therefore we have suggested that in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas the *imago Dei* is a "naked potentiality" - we might also say, a latent affinity - which defines the quality of man's intellectual capacity to apprehend and utilize the superadded gift of grace. The effect of grace, and its focus, is therefore beyond and above nature; the relation between God and man occurs primarily in the higher sphere of reality, the sphere of the divine.
APPENDIX B

Barth's Concept of Nothingness

1. Barth asks the question in C.D., III/3, p. 349: "What is real nothingness Nichtige? In this question objection may well be taken to the word 'is'. Only God and His creature really and properly are. But nothingness is neither God nor His creature. Thus it can have nothing in common with God and His creatures. But it would be foolhardy to rush to the conclusion that it is therefore nothing, i.e., that it does not exist."

1.1. At this point Barth offers one of several attempted justifications for the assertion that nothingness "is", though each attempt revolves around a single theme, namely, that because God has taken account of it, therefore it is. The same reference continues: "God takes it into account. He is concerned with it. He strives against it, resists and overcomes it. ... In the light of God's relationship to it we must accept the fact that in a third way of its own nothingness 'is'. All conceptions or doctrine which would deny or diminish or minimise this 'is' are untenable from the Christian standpoint. Nothingness is not nothing. /Das Nichtige ist nicht das Nichts/.

1.2. The penultimate sentence is formidable. One wonders how to comprehend the so-called "third way" of existence to which Barth appeals. He offers no Scriptural warrant in this section, which seems to be a conspicuous omission if, in fact, belief in the existence of nothingness is a fundamental Christian tenet.

2. Barth continues his explication of nothingness, further substantiating its existence and place in Christian doctrine. In C.D., III/3, pp. 351-52, he says: "God is ... holy, and this means that His being and activity take place in a definite opposition, in a real negation, both defensive and aggressive. Nothingness is that from which God separates Himself and in face of which He asserts Himself and exerts His positive will. Nothingness has no existence and cannot be known except as the object of God's activity as always a holy activity. The biblical conception, as we now recall it, is as follows. God elects, and therefore rejects what He does
not elect. God wills, and therefore opposes what He does not will. He says Yes, and therefore says No to that which He has not said Yes. ... It is only on this basis that nothingness 'is', but on this basis it really 'is'. ... It has no power save that which it is allowed by God. It, too, belongs to God. ... It 'is', not as God and His creation are, but only in its own improper way, as inherent contradiction, as impossible possibility. ... That which God renounces and abandons in virtue of His decision is not merely nothing. It is nothingness, and has as such its own being, albeit malignant and perverse. A real dimension is disclosed, and existence and form are given to a reality sui generis, in the fact that God is wholly and utterly not the Creator in this respect. Nothingness is that which God does not will. It lives only by the fact that it is that which God does not will. But it lives by this fact. For not only what God wills, but what He does not will, is potent, and must have a real correspondence. What really corresponds to that which God does not will is nothingness."

2.1. The problematic in the above seems evident. On the one hand Barth must assert that nothingness has no existence, at least in the manner in which, e.g., God and creation exist. Barth would not want to imply either that nothingness shared an existence, prior to creation, of the same order as God's, or that nothingness is a creation of man. What does evolve, however, is the positing of an existence which occurs as a result of God's creative decision. That is to say, when God chooses to create something, that which He chooses not to create assumes an existence. But, we seriously question the validity and wisdom of ascribing the term existence to that which God has chosen not to create. Cf. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (London: Collins, Fontana Library, 1968), pp. 141-142, and especially this on p. 142: "When a human being makes a choice it is presupposed that the alternatives between which he chooses exist as facts or as possibilities independently of himself. Thus, in choosing good we must reject evil. But it is far from clear that this necessity applies to God, creating ex nihilo and in absolute freedom." Even Hick's criticism, i.e., that human choices involve existing alternatives, is not self-evident. However, we would agree with the specific point of his criticism - that God, creating ex nihilo, is bound by no existing alternatives. Furthermore, we doubt that that which in fact is created, by God's choice, necessarily results in the coincident existence of the antithesis.
3. Of primary concern is the effect which nothingness is considered to exert on creation. And for the sake of presentation, we simply grant the validity of its existence. In *Dogmatics in Outline*, p. 55, Barth asserts that "Everything outside God is held constantly by God over nothingness." If we were to criticize that assertion, we might question the "location" of nothingness. If we assume that nothingness is "outside God", then it too must be held over nothingness. But, perhaps we are being too pedantic. Let it be assumed that the "everything" is creation, and that it is held "by God over nothingness", which is not creation. Then we need to inquire what effect it may have on creation. Barth's opinion is expressed in *C.D.*, III/3, p. 354:

3.1. "The grace of God is the basis and norm of all being, the source and criterion of all good. Measured by this standard, as the negation of God's grace, nothingness is intrinsically evil. It is both perverting and perverted. In this capacity it does not confront either God or the creature neutrally. It is not merely a third factor. It opposes both as an enemy, offending God and threatening His creature. ... By reason of this character, whether in the form of sin, evil, or death, it is inexplicable as a natural process or condition. It is altogether inexplicable. The explicable is subject to a norm and occurs within a standard. But nothingness is absolutely without norm or standard. The explicable conforms to a law, nothingness to none. It is simply aberration, transgression, evil. For this reason it is inexplicable, and can be affirmed only as that which is inherently inimical. ... The controversy with nothingness, its conquest, removal and abolition, are primarily and properly God's own affair."

3.2. On the basis of the above it is apparent that nothingness is the antithesis of grace, and that it assumes modes of existence which we know as evil, sin, and death. Yet, Barth says, it is totally inexplicable; it defies norms and standards. Does it not seem, however, that Barth has attempted to explicate, to define, that which he says is inexplicable? As to its relation to creation, nothingness approaches that which God has created as an active and powerful foe; it perverts that which it touches. And finally, it exists as that against which creation stands helpless and defenseless; the proper combatant, indeed the only one, is God. Man's vulnerability to nothingness, and his culpability in reference to it, e.g., evil, remain our underlying questions.
3.3. The vulnerability of creation (man) to nothingness is defined in the following: "The creature is threatened by the possibility of nothingness and destruction, which is excluded by God - and only by God. If a creature exists, it is only maintained in its mode of existence if God so wills. If He did not so will, nothingness would inevitably break in from all sides." Dog. Outline, p. 56. Again is noted the assertion that the two principle combatants in the arena of existence are God and nothingness. And cf. C.D., III/1, p. 110: "Creation means the irruption and revelation of the divine compassion. Once and for all the Word of God went out against the rejected and vanished reality of an alien and hostile creature." John Hick suggests that herein Barth associates himself with a questionable philosophical school of thought. Cf. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, pp. 185-193, and especially this from p. 192: "From the point of view of twentieth-century logic, the notion of meontic non-being is an example of the inveterate tendency of the human mind to hypostatize or reify language." On the following page he says, "By postulating a previously existing situation within which God acts, and of whose character He must in acting take account, Barth is halfway towards a Manichaean dualism." The propriety or impropriety of Barth's philosophical tendencies exceed the scope of our thesis. Nevertheless, Hick's criticism impinges on the theological issue under discussion. Barth's system clearly articulates creation's vulnerability to evil (nothingness) - but, in such a manner as to make its (i.e., man's) responsibility incomprehensible.

3.4. Finally, we cite one reference which anticipates a further discussion of man's culpability in the face of nothingness. Barth states: "When the creature crosses the frontier i.e., "the positive will, election and activity of God" - quoted in context above p. 233, n.27 from the one side, and it is invaded from the other, nothingness achieves actuality in the creaturely world." - C.D., III/3, p. 350. We recognize only an inference of man's role in the struggle - i.e., when "the creature crosses the frontier". However, there is no specific and unambiguous determination regarding man's active or passive participation. One statement, however, seems to indicate a passive participation: "Nothingness is the past, the ancient menace, danger and destruction, the ancient non-being which obscured and defaced the divine creation of God but which is consigned to the past in Jesus Christ, in whose
death it has received its deserts, being destroyed with this consummation of the positive will of God which is as such the end of His non-willing. Because Jesus is Victor, nothingness is routed and extirpated." - C.D., III/3, p. 363. Again, the struggle occurs above the level of humanity; the pre-existent Christ assumes entire responsibility for the extirpation of nothingness.
APPENDIX C

Primal Existence:

Historical or Non-historical

1. A fully comprehensive examination of the historicity/non-historicity of primal existence would exceed the requirements of the thesis. The inclusion of only a few references will suffice to illustrate Brunner's thought on the subject. Brunner's rejection of an historic Paradise, and also of a "perfect" primal human being, conforms with the conclusions of science. - Cf. M.I.R., pp. 393-94. "It is not", states Brunner, "that we think that a 'first man' of this type /i.e., justitia originalis/ ever lived anywhere at any time - this idea is merely the historical husk concealing the kernel of the Biblical message - but this original righteousness - being in the love of God who gives and who loves us first - is that for which God creates man." - M.I.R., p. 104. The "kernel", it would appear, has to do both with an original righteousness and with a certain dimension of love. Original righteousness is not original in the sense of its belonging to a preceding period of historical time; rather, it refers to a "being in the love of God" - for which man was created.

2. In respect to the historical occurrence of man's "being in love", the following statement is instructive: "It is not some human being who happened to live in the far-off and dim ages of pre-history who is the Adam created in the Image of God; it is you, and me, and everybody. The Primitive State is not an historical period, but an historical moment, the moment of the Divinely created origin, which we only know in its connexion with its contrast, with sin." - M.I.R., p. 111. Inasmuch as the "origin" refers to a non-historically actualized existence, so also does Adam imply a non-historical figure; he becomes, as it were, historical in the life of every man. The "moment" of the origin is repeated for each historical individual. It is an existential moment.
2.1. On the other hand, Brunner sometimes speaks in a contradictory manner. He says, for instance, "Seen from a negative point of view; that from which sin turns away is not merely a demand, but a God-given being. The life originally given to man is being in the love of God. This gift, not merely a divine task, is prior to our empirical sinful existence." - M.I.R., p. 104. It is not a demand; it is not a task. Still, it is not an historical actuality. One wonders what it may be. Cairns raises similar questions, and says: "It does seem to me that we are faced by a clear alternative. Either we regard our original existence as a divine intention for us, not cancelled by sin, but temporarily balked by it. So doing we would equate it with the material image. Or else, if we insist on regarding it as an actual gift, we think of it as consisting in our endowments, still possessed under sin, and in particular that existence in personal relation with God which even God continues to give us under sin." Cairns continues:

2.2. "Brunner claims that his view preserves the essential truth that 'is hidden under the mythical conception of a primitive state of integrity in Paradise.' If, however, the content be reduced to the material contained under the above alternatives, it may well be asked whether the truth stated here could not be expressed without using the concepts of 'integrity' or 'original humanity' at all." - Kegley, Theol. of Brunner, p. 90. The internal quote from Brunner is from Dog. II, p. 74. It appears to us that Cairns' objections, though valid, do not go far enough. In addition to the unnecessary confusion which the use of such semi-historical terms (e.g. original, primal) must inevitably produce, more importantly the actual historical existence of man is threatened. Further, it would seem that man's religious experience is relegated to supra-human realms. At least, the question of the relation between man's historical existence and his relation to God appears to require the creation of a new structure of relation.

3. Brunner's comment in respect to the above problem asserts that if the Church had approached the *imago Dei* concept through the understanding of the New Testament "... it would have been preserved from teaching that the original existence of man was an actual state which could be described, in the sense of a *status integritatis*." The issue, according to Brunner, is not so much that the church taught the concept of an "actual state", but that
the actual state was one of integritatis. Later Brunner says, "It was not the distinction between these 'perfect' beings and Primitive man which created difficulties, but the distinction between them and those redeemed by Christ, because the starting-point of the former was already so high." - M.I.R., pp. 84-85. There is an even more important objection to this doctrine; the problem is not only one of degree - not, that is, that the "former were so high" - but moreso the implication that man was created for restoration. Our own impression is that man was created for completion. The word "restoration", by definition, is the act of restoring to a former state or position. It requires, therefore, a theory of that former state to which something is restored. In the light of the fact that Brunner rejects an historic Paradise (supra, Arts. 1., 2.) the use of "restoration" and its synonyms is not only grammatically inaccurate, but deceptive as well. The word "completion" is not offered as a completely satisfactory alternative; its introduction is merely to illustrate the "problem", and also to indicate the emphasis we intend to pursue in the following chapter.

3.1. That suggestion is, in fact, implied by Brunner when he says, "... freedom to be able to say 'Yes' or 'No', points to an imperfection in the Primitive State in contrast to the perfection of the End. The freedom peculiar to the Primitive State was - according to Augustine's profound distinction - the freedom of the non-peccare posse; the freedom which belongs to the final state of eternal bliss is the freedom of the non-posse peccare; it shares in the divine freedom itself." - M.I.R., p. 264. Cf. supra, Chapter II, Sec. d.2.

4. We have not been able to state unambiguously Brunner's position in respect to the question of the historical/non-historical dimensions of man's origin. Nevertheless, it is evident that Brunner emphatically denies the doctrine of an initial (original), totally perfect, existence of man within the dimensions of history. He continues to employ the terms which suggest the contrary, but he re-interprets them in an existential sense. In our estimation, that is not entirely satisfactory. We will be returning to this issue in our final chapter.


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