THE UNDERSTANDING OF TRUTH
IN THE THOUGHT OF ROBERT GROSSETESSTE

by
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If, therefore, we must ask after truth, then an answer is demanded to the question: "Where do we stand to-day?" We want to know what our position is. We call for the goal which shall be set for man, both in his history and for his history. We want the real "truth". Well, truth then! But in calling for real "truth" we must already know what in fact is meant by truth. Or do we only know by "feeling" and in a "general" sort of way? Yet is not this vague "knowing" and this indifference to the vagueness of it even more wretched than plain ignorance of the nature of truth?!

Robert Grosseteste was certain as to where he stood with respect to the question concerning truth. He begins his De Veritate treatise with the words of John 14:6: "Ergo sum via veritas et vita". Hic ipsa Veritas dicit se esse veritatem."}

The immediate purpose of this thesis is to examine Robert Grosseteste's understanding of the nature of truth. St. Augustine's and St. Anselm's doctrines of truth are also briefly examined in view of their profound impact on Grosseteste's thought. However, it cannot be said that Grosseteste's doctrine of truth is nothing more than a simple restatement of these

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2 De Ver.; BW 130.
conceptions of truth which most influenced him. In the third chapter some attention will be given to certain other principal factors which contributed to the shaping of Grosseteste's thought and method. His thought and endeavors have their own unique character and the latter is in part determined by the temperament and character of the man himself. However, it should also be pointed out that Grosseteste's thought and writing, which manifest a wide range of interests and breadth of scholarship, are marked by a spirit of humility which arises out of his wonderment in the face of the ineffable supreme Truth and the truth which the latter has created. We shall see that Grosseteste even manifests a certain propensity in the direction of a mystical silence. He is overwhelmed by the Truth in all his grandeur and declares his own indigency in trying to speak of this Truth. In his declaration of the ineffable character of the Truth Grosseteste clearly echoes the sentiment of both St. Augustine and St. Anselm.

There was a deliberate reason for stating above that the immediate purpose in this thesis is to examine Grosseteste's doctrine of truth. This study of Grosseteste's conception of truth does not arise out of sheer historical curiosity concerning certain mediaeval phenomena, viz, certain notions entertained by certain mediaeval thinkers concerning the nature of truth. Although an attempt will be made to offer an exposition of Grosseteste's and certain other doctrines of truth it should be pointed out that this writer is interested in more than a sheer phenom-
enological and analytical examination of these doctrines. The purpose of this thesis extends beyond an attempt to ascertain the ways in which 'veritas', 'verum', and related words are used by Grosseteste, St. Anselm, St. Augustine, and others. This writer believes that we still have much to learn from the conceptions of truth held by such as Robert Grosseteste and St. Anselm.

The intention in the first chapter is in part to discuss briefly particular problematical developments in certain modern and more recent correspondence and coherence notions of truth. It is believed that certain of these developments have arisen in part because of forgotten or rejected emphases and motifs present in the mediaeval conceptions of truth to be considered. For this reason it is also believed that we would do well to recall and retrieve some of these emphases and motifs which were key components of these mediaeval doctrines of truth. However, as will become apparent, there are facets of the doctrines to be discussed which are themselves problematical in character and which must be brought into view. Some of these problematical facets are also noted and discussed. Reasons for incorporating a brief discussion of M. Heidegger's thought concerning truth are brought together at the end of the first chapter.

A brief explanatory note is in order with respect to the use of single and double quotation marks. Single quotation marks, except in such cases as where we have a quotation within a quotation, are generally used to indicate that the word or expression itself is being discussed and considered. Single
quotation marks are also used on occasion to indicate that the sense or meaning of the words enclosed by the marks is rather ambiguous and indeterminate. Single quotation marks may indicate that the word or words involve a problematical sense or reference. The manner in which single quotation marks are being used in a given instance is usually indicated by the context in which they appear. Double quotation marks are used to indicate that the words enclosed constitute a citation from an author or thinker discussed. Here and there one will find single words and phrases enclosed in double quotation marks. This is done for the purpose of showing that the words and expressions so designated are not mine. In certain instances where double quotation marks are used it may also be that the enclosed word or words are themselves being considered and discussed. Again, the context should help to make this clear.

The chapters are divided in accordance with the context and material being discussed. The amount of space and discussion given to a specific topic or theme often indicates the significance of the material itself and its place within the whole of the thesis. On the basis of the divisions found within a particular chapter it is possible to make reference to a specific section. Reference to specific sections are to be found especially in the final chapter.
I should like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my faculty advisors, Professor Thomas F. Torrance and Professor John McIntyre, presently Principal and Dean of the Faculty of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh. I am indebted to Professor Torrance for suggesting the topic of this thesis and above all for the encouragement and guidance which he has given me. I thank Principal McIntyre for his most helpful comments and suggestions. I also take this opportunity to express my thanks to the other members of the Faculty and Staff of New College who have assisted me. I am grateful to Miss E. R. Leslie and Miss E. Joan Morris for their cooperation and assistance.

My thanks is also due to the Librarians and Staffs of the following libraries— the New College, the Old College, and the Haldane Libraries in the University of Edinburgh; the National Library of Scotland; the Bodleian Library and Mansfield College Library in Oxford; the Beardslee Library of Western Theological Seminary in Holland, Michigan; and the Van Zoeren Library of Hope College in Holland, Michigan. I thank Principal J. Marsh and Mansfield College for the courtesy shown me while associating with Mansfield College during the Trinity term in 1965. I also thank R. W. Hunt and B. Smalley for the counsel which they have given me. There are others not named here to whom I am also indebted. One of these is Ludwig Baur whose edition of a number of Grosseteste's treatises has made this research possible. Those responsible for other editions of Grosseteste's treatises have been cited in the thesis itself.
I am grateful to Mrs. John Whittle for her diligence and patience in the typing and proofreading of the thesis. My wife has offered valuable assistance in many different ways. I cannot adequately express the gratitude due her and the other members of my family for the contribution and sacrifices which they have made. I shall always remember my parents as those who first introduced me to the Truth which sets men free.

Jesus said, 'If you dwell within the revelation I have brought, you are indeed my disciples; you shall know the truth, and the truth will set you free.'

John 8:31,32 (NEB)
CHAPTER I

THE LOCUS OF TRUTH AND RELATED PROBLEMS

Before proceeding to deal directly with Robert Grosseteste's understanding of the nature of truth we shall consider certain related topics and questions involving a number of doctrines of truth. In this first chapter we shall examine some of the difficulties that have arisen in connexion with the use of the words 'truth' and 'true'. We shall also examine some of the assumptions, criteria, definitions, and methods utilized in different doctrines of truth. Reference will also be made to certain problematical developments that have arisen during the course of the history of these doctrines. Further explanation and the rationale of this chapter will be given below. In the second chapter we shall examine St. Augustine's and St. Anselm's doctrines of truth as background to Grosseteste's doctrine of truth. In the third chapter Grosseteste's doctrine of truth will be discussed, especially as it is set forth in his De Veritate treatise. In the fourth chapter we shall deal with Grosseteste's doctrine of the knowledge of truth and examine cardinal facets of his epistemology, methodology, and method. In the fifth chapter we shall formulate a brief analysis and critique of
notions discussed in the preceding chapters, Grosseteste's notions in particular.

1. Preliminary considerations

(1.1) Explanation of procedure and subject matter in this chapter.

The plan in this chapter is not to present an historical outline or sketch of doctrines of truth as they have been developed and formulated in particular theological and philosophical systems. We shall deal rather with epistemological, methodological, and logical problems and questions that have arisen in connexion with various doctrines of truth. In dealing with these problems and questions we must, of course, take into consideration specific doctrines of truth and the systems of thought in which they are situated. However, in this present chapter we shall not be able, nor is it our intention, to explore fully and in depth all of the doctrines of truth that will be cited. We shall examine briefly some of the historical, psychological, and ontological factors that have played a determinative role in the formulation of different conceptions of 'truth'. Gordon K. Kaufman speaks of the different formulations of 'truth' and the problem which arises from this fact:

The very existence of diverse positions, each claiming to portray Reality, is clear evidence that philosophies are not derived simply from direct contemplation of the Real. The epistemological problem which this historical fact raises is the question of the relation of 'Truth Itself' to the different formulations of 'truth' which arise in the course of human history.1

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We shall be especially interested in the divergent ways in which the word 'truth' is understood and used. The manner in which 'truth' is used and understood has far-reaching implications for an entire system of thought. The usage and the range of application of the words 'truth' and 'true' are also a clue to the character of the system of thought in which they are used. Oftentimes the words 'truth' and 'true', along with 'meaning', 'reason', 'logic', and a host of others, are used uncritically and out of sheer force of habit. We shall attempt to delineate some of the uncalled-for confusion and difficulty that emerges when such words are employed as though they designated a priori concepts with determinate changeless senses, or as names denoting certain specific things that we could run up against. Adherents of doctrines of logical grammar and rules-of-usage theories have tended to treat words in this manner without due regard for actual usage. L. Jonathan Cohen says: "The most obvious fault in the doctrine of logical grammar is that it suggests the conceptual study of meanings to be concerned with something that is timeless and unchanging."¹

We shall consider the need to investigate extra-linguistic factors in dealing with questions of language and logic. Heidegger emphasizes the fact that talk about the 'true statement' immediately calls forth an inquiry as to the nature and possibility

of the 'true statement'. An effort shall also be made to make inquiry into topics closely allied to that of 'truth', such as the issues of certainty, verification and validation. The consequences that result from the different doctrines of truth, especially in connection with the relation of thought and/or language to that which is signified, must be discussed. We also plan to cite significant medieaval conceptions and formulations of 'truth' in connexion with certain modern notions of 'truth'. Heidegger's doctrine of truth will be discussed for reasons to be given later in this chapter.

(1.2) Reasons for this preliminary inquiry and analysis

Our present intention is to set forth briefly some of the major reasons for pursuing this preliminary inquiry and analysis. In other words, some explanation is in order as to why we plan to deal with the topics cited above before proceeding to the medieaval doctrines of truth cited. One may want to question why these issues and problems are considered at the beginning rather than at the end of the thesis. We probably should reiterate that some critical evaluation and commentary will also be offered at the end of the thesis.

(1.2.1) We engage at the outset in the analysis of 'truth' and related terms in order to bring together some of the principal senses signified by these words as used in particular doctrines of truth. We shall not pursue a dogmatic and critical analysis carried on in accordance with strict criteria for the purpose of
passing judgement on all the different types of usage. We have in mind a form of analysis similar to that suggested by J. O. Urmson:

Language has many tasks and many levels; we may or may not be trying to describe the world, and when we do we may do it in radically different ways not reducible to each other. We must on each occasion find what language is being used for without preconceived ideas, especially without the preconception that logically different types of statement will be reducible to one another, and that one type is specially proper or basic.¹

The purpose of the brief linguistic analysis offered below is to take note of the manifold and diverse ways in which a word like 'truth' is used and also to achieve a degree of critical awareness of some of the problems attending its usage. We do well to have in mind certain significant distinctions and a degree of clarification regarding the different uses of 'truth' and related terms before examining Grosseteste's and other mediaeval doctrines of truth. By dealing at the outset with some of the problems that have attended the use of such terms as the 'transcendentales' we shall be able to approach the above mediaeval doctrines with something of a critical framework in hand. However, it should be pointed out that our primary purpose will be to attempt to understand and set forth the above mediaeval notions of truth and not to assess critically their validity. Nevertheless, there will be some critical evaluation and something of a critique.

(1.2.2) We shall also take a look at some of the special problems or difficulties that have fostered in large part certain modern and recent coherence and correspondence theories of truth. For example, the demand and quest for radical certainty and certitude, coupled with varying degrees of doubt and scepticism, have been determinative in Descartes' formulation of radical coherence and indubitable truths. Heidegger, in discussing Descartes' point of departure and access to res extensae constituting the world, says:

The only genuine access to them lies in knowing [Erkennen], intellectio, in the sense of the kind of knowledge [Erkenntnis] we get in mathematics and physics. Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being had been securely grasped.\(^1\)

The dualism of mind and matter and doubt concerning the existence of the eternal material world have also contributed to the formulation of strict coherence. We shall also examine H.H. Joachim's coherence theory as another response to some of the above problems.

Another position that has been taken with respect to the issues of truth and certainty is that of logical positivism and the "Verification Principle." Regarding this Principle J. Wisdom states:

The Verification Principle is the generalization of a very large class of metaphysical theories, namely all naturalistic,

empirical, positivistic theories. While its opposite, which I venture to call the Idiosyncracy Platitude, is the generalization of all common-sense, realist, transcendental theories. ¹

This "Verification Principle" allows for truth as correspondence but such truth is restricted to empirically verifiable statements. We shall examine L. Wittgenstein's theory of isomorphic picturing and some of the problems that it entails. His theory of picturing could be considered a theory of very strict correspondence. In his *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein of course speaks out against this strict correspondence and his logical atomism set forth in his *Tractatus*.

We shall make reference not only to specific radical attempts to achieve certainty or known conformity and correspondence but also to the preoccupation with cognitive or logical truth that has been especially prevalent in a number of modern theories of truth. Erich Frank emphatically stresses the latter point in what may be considered to be something of an overstatement:

47. Modern philosophers recognize only cognitive (or subjective) truth. In so doing they can hardly claim for themselves the authority of Aristotle. He clearly distinguishes cognitive and existential truth and restricts logical truth to the sphere of the logos, . . . ²

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By placing such great emphasis on cognitive and logical truth there seems to be a greater tendency to make reality conform to understanding and statement rather than making thought and statement congruent with reality. Other acute problems have arisen regarding the possibility, ground, and nature of cognitive or logical truth. It cannot be said, however, that the tendency for thought, statements, and words to shape and structure reality or being is strictly a modern tendency and phenomenon. As Heidegger states: "This secession of the logos which started logos on its way to becoming a court of justice over being occurred in Greek philosophy itself."¹

None the less, this development has in a sense reached its peak where in the midst of radical doubt, especially doubt regarding the external world or object, there has been a demand for radical certainty or known conformity of statement with what is the case. In this kind of situation the desire for certainty may involve the abandonment of material truth and truth as correspondence in favor of formal truth and truth as strict coherence. These are the kinds of theories and problems that will be briefly discussed in this chapter.

(1.2.3) It should be pointed out at this juncture that our primary reason for discussing the above theories and related problems or difficulties is to view them in relation to and in

anticipation of the mediaeval doctrines of truth to be examined. We do not intend to examine these modern theories and problems simply for their own sake. One thesis that will be advanced is that some of the modern theories and problems cited above have their roots, in part at least, in particular facets of mediaeval doctrine. We have in mind, for example, the intelligible-sensible dichotomy as a kind of precursor of the modern mind-matter dualism, and the corresponding aspects of mediaeval theories of perception which seem to foreshadow modern theories of representative perception. We also plan to take note of the growing emphasis in the mediaeval period on cognitive and logical truth. A related thesis that will be advanced is that certain of the above modern theories and problems have arisen in part because of the rejection, neglect, or forgetting of significant emphases and beliefs which were held by Grosseteste, St. Anselm, and St. Augustine among others. We have in mind such doctrines and emphases as their doctrines of faith, their doctrines of truth, particularly their emphasis on truth as being, and their epistemological realism. With respect to St. Anselm's belief that the mind knows res themselves J.V.L. Casserley says: "Anselm was in fact contradicting beforehand philosophical doctrines, not yet propounded in his time, which we now know as the representative theory of perception and the correspondence theory of truth."¹

In a somewhat similar view M. Polanyi states the following concerning modern critical thought:

But its incandescence had fed on the combustion of the Christian heritage in the oxygen of Greek rationalism, and when this fuel was exhausted the critical framework itself burnt away. Modern man is unprecedented; yet we must now go back to St. Augustine to restore the balance of our cognitive powers. In the fourth century A.D., St. Augustine brought the history of Greek philosophy to a close by inaugurating for the first time a post-critical philosophy. He taught that all knowledge was a gift of grace, for which we must strive under the guidance of antecedent belief; nisi credideritis, non intelligitis. His doctrine ruled the minds of Christian scholars for a thousand years. Then faith declined and demonstrable knowledge gained superiority over it.1

In the above mediaeval doctrines of truth factors like faith, epistemological realism, and intelligibility constituted the ground on the basis of which cognitive and logical truth were considered to be possible and actually realized.

Part of the purpose, then, for engaging in these preliminary considerations is to attempt to make somewhat explicit some of the reasons for our examination of Grosseteste's doctrine of truth and those doctrines from which he draws most heavily. Our investigation of the latter is not a matter of sheer historical curiosity or interest. It is partly in view of certain modern and recent theories and related difficulties that we wish to recall notions and emphases which prevailed in earlier, less critical, and more realist doctrines of truth, viz., the mediaeval

theories cited above. We propose that the recall and retrieval of these doctrines and their underlying assumptions will help us in our attempt to cope with some of the radical problems and difficulties that will be discussed below. Part of the reason for dealing with Heidegger's conception of truth is that he has attempted to recall or retrieve certain primordial notions and emphases in the understanding of truth.

(1.2.4) One other reason for pursuing these preliminary considerations is to expose some of the implicit and often hidden assumptions which underlie certain modern doctrines of truth and involve a rejection or an abandonment of beliefs underlying mediaeval doctrines of truth. One of these modern beliefs or assumptions is that we cannot, and therefore do not, know things themselves but only data or signs representing things. Another belief or assumption, that is often accepted uncritically, is that we can and must prove that the extra-mental external world exists. Regarding such a proof Heidegger states: "The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again."¹

There are, of course, also assumptions and beliefs underlying the mediaeval doctrines of truth. It is not a matter of no beliefs or assumptions in one case versus beliefs and assumptions in the other. What is essential is that beliefs be uncovered, examined, and seen for what they are. Part of our purpose is also to show

¹Heidegger, *Being and Time*, H. 205.
that doctrines of truth involve or include a number of ontological and logical beliefs and assumptions. In raising linguistic and logical questions one must of necessity also raise ontological questions.

2. 'Truth': signification and usage

An analytical inquiry into the formally and materially diverse usages of the words 'truth' and 'true' is certainly required if we are to achieve any degree of critical acumen and insight into the different theories of truth. At this point linguistic analysis and phenomenology can offer valuable assistance, although oftentimes such methods prove most inadequate because of a failure to give full enough attention to the denotive, symbolic, and revelatory functions of language. Moreover, as noted above, linguistic analysis may be no more then sheer linguistic phenomenalism resulting from radical sceptical and solipsistic attitudes. Analysis of linguistic data can then be seen as an abandonment of truth claims. A similar observation was made recently in an editorial essay on contemporary philosophy with particular reference to language, analysis, and existentialism.

Thus, for both movements, a question such as 'What is truth?' becomes impossible to answer. The logical positivist would say that a particular statement of fact can be declared true or false by empirical evidence; anything else is meaningless. A language philosopher would content himself with analyzing all the ways the word true can be used. The existentialist would emphasize what is true for a person in a particular situation.¹

¹"What (If Anything) to Expect from Today's Philosophers," Time, January 7, 1966, p. 25.
Irrespective of the accuracy or currency of this evaluation, it cannot be gainsaid that failure to pose questions regarding the sense as well as the truth or falsity of the whole range of propositions will produce an incomplete and one-sided analysis and investigation of linguistic data. Linguistic analysis, properly utilized, can be of considerable assistance as a method or a tool whereby our usage of words can be clarified, pseudo-problems, rooted in misunderstood words and grammar, eliminated, and the logically diverse tasks of language delineated. It has been suggested that something like a language of meaning or an ideal or perfect language or symbolism ought to be developed like that used in mathematics and symbolic logic. Such a view fails to give due consideration to the diverse functions and usages of language. Rules-of-use theory and canons of symbolism have been proposed, the latter by such as C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards in *The Meaning of Meaning*. We note the attempt by Russell to provide the mathematical skeleton of a perfect language in *Principia Mathematica*, and Wittgenstein's attempt to define the isomorphic character of the logically perfect language in the *Tractatus*. Urmson says: "The aim of analysis thus was to make every statement an adequate picture of the reality it referred to, and the perfect language was the tool which could make the undertaking capable of complete realization."¹ The type

¹Urmson, op. cit., p. 21
of analysis, however, which is of present interest to us, is neither the attempt to find the adequate picture nor reductive analysis, whether new-level or same-level. The immediate aim is to reflect on the different senses found in the use of the words 'truth' and 'true'.

(2.1) Such words as 'verum' and 'veritas', 'ἀλήθεια' and 'ἀλήθες', and others of like nature, for example, what have been called the transcendental predicates, are problematical and extraordinary words. The semasiologist will be hard put to ascertain a determinate sense. If 'veritas' could be assumed to have a generally accepted sense or could be used as a proper name or common name, an argument could ensue as to the character and nature of that named and designated. Like other such words, 'veritas' has often been used in a most uncritical and indeterminate manner on the assumption that it had a generally accepted sense and signified something that one could easily run up against. The usage of the word is in many cases rooted in nothing other than sheer habit. A multitude of instances of the uncritical employment of 'truth' could be easily assembled, as Ogden and Richards have done with the word 'meaning'. Regarding the usage of 'meaning' they say: "Some quotations, however, do tell their own tale, but even where no actual absurdity transpires, the resort to such a term in serious argument, as though it had some accepted use, or as though the author's use were at
once obvious, is a practice to be discredited. So it has been with the word 'truth' and many others such as 'beauty', 'goodness', and 'being'. If such words could be assumed to possess unchanging senses that could be perceived, such as universals or ideas which would be directly accessible to the knower, then the difficulties would be considerably less. Or if it were believed that the sense of words could be ascertained by way of simple and infallible apprehension, as in the sensing of a sense datum, then agreement and understanding could be reached. The infallible apprehension of the sense of terms is affirmed by Aristotle in his Metaphysics and De Interpretatione and in the apprehensio simplex of later logic. It must not be forgotten, however, that for Aristotle the 'concept' or affection of the soul took its rise from knowledge of the primary substance. Whether 'universals' or 'concepts' are thought to have independent existence or existence only in the members of a species, the difficulty in determining their nature persists, assuming that they are.

J.L. Austin says in a discussion regarding a priori concepts:

> But on the whole there is remarkably little to be said in favour of 'universals', even as an admitted logical construction; the plain man did not use it until he acquired the habit from philosophers, and the errors into which that habit leads are very common and numerous. . . . Or again, and this most concerns us, we think of the 'abstracted' universal as a solid piece of property of ours, and inquire into its 'origin'.

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If 'truth' is taken to designate a concept, we then are involved in the further difficulty of trying to determine the nature of a concept. Regarding the 'concept', C. I. Lewis gives a number of different senses of the word, for example, "The concept is a definitive structure of meanings, which is what would verify completely the coincidence of two minds when they understand each other by the use of language."¹ 'Truth' is one of an extremely large category of words which do not signify a definite structure of meanings. A cursory survey of the usage of such words as 'truth' or 'true' should make it apparent that the various uses extend even beyond the bounds of likeness and analogy. The formal and material diversity of the usage of the words 'truth' and 'true' does not permit facile delimitation. Furthermore, we cannot deal solely with the words themselves with the hopeful intention of discovering what is the meaning of the word. A multitude of linguistic, semantic, and even metaphysical problems have emerged on the basis of ordinary usage when the same identical word, as used in different situations by different users, is assumed to have always the same sense. On the assumption that the word must function as a name, specifying in each instance the same object, sense datum, or substance, it has been concluded that there must be present in every referent to which the word is applied that one identical

object or 'universal'. Austin criticizes one of the arguments that is used to make necessary the 'universal':

Clearly it depends on a suppressed premise which there is no reason whatever to accept, namely, that words are essentially 'proper names', unum nomen unum nominatum. But why, if 'one identical' word is used, must there be 'one identical' object present which it denotes? Why should it not be the whole function of a word to denote many things?¹

However, if one and the same particular word is simply used to denote many things it may be asked whether we have anything more than a series of proper names denoting a series of things. We still seem to have unum nomen unum nominatum although there is this significant difference, that each time one and the same word is used it is not taken to be one and the same name naming 'one identical' object. Austin, has, of course, stressed denotation and words as names, however, there are also words which do not name and do not have referents but do have signification. Moreover, one and the same word may in one instance or usage name some referent and in another instance simply signify or symbolize a sense, viz., other words.

It would be most misleading to suppose that in each particular application of the same word or sign there must necessarily be an overlap of meaning with every other usage, thereby ensuring a modicum of univocity and a degree of analogy. If the sense or meaning of such words as 'verum' or 'bonum' is to be ascertained, it is necessary to consider each instance of usage. For instance,

¹J. L. Austin, op. cit., p. 7.
for St. Thomas 'verum' is one of the 'transcendentales', whereas for those who hold the no-truth theory it is only a mark of assertion. If 'truth' were a concept in the sense that is connoted a "definitive structure of meanings," then it would be possible in accordance with such a rule or guideline to complete the blank spaces with the definitive structures, when the word 'truth' or 'true' appears in a particular context. But such does not appear to be the case. We do well to take into consideration what such as Wittgenstein, in *The Blue and Brown Books* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, and the school of ordinary functional language analysis have to say, particularly with respect to the question about the meaning of a 'general term' or a 'concept'. The point to be made is that we should not be misled into thinking that a certain word designates an a priori concept which can be perceived, thereby making possible a general consensus concerning usage which rejects any other usage as catastrophes. Wittgenstein makes the point repeatedly that if one would like to know the meaning of a word one must investigate the specific instances of use of that word. In other words, the boundary of the meaning of a word cannot be arbitrarily delineated, but there must be an attempt to find out what the word does in fact mean in usage. Wittgenstein says in *The Blue Book*:

If on the other hand you wish to give a definition of wishing, i.e., to draw a sharp boundary, then you are free to draw it as you like; and this boundary will never
entirely coincide with the actual usage, as this usage has no sharp boundary.¹

For remember that in general we don't use language according to strict rules—it hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules, either. We, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules.²

Or else we might, by the explanation of a word, mean the explanation which, on being asked, we are ready to give. That is, if we are ready to give any explanation; in most cases we aren't. Many words in this sense then don't have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.³

Or, as Wittgenstein explains in the Philosophical Investigations:

68: For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits in this way, that is, use the word 'number' for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier. And this is how we do use the word 'game'.⁴

77. . . In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples? In what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.⁵

79. . . And this can be expressed like this: I use the name "N" without a fixed meaning. (But that detracts as little from its usefulness, as it detracts from that of a table that it stands on four legs instead of three and so sometimes wobbles.)⁶

²Ibid., p. 25. ³Ibid., p. 27
⁵Ibid., p. 36e. ⁶Ibid., p. 37e.
Grammatical and lexical forms and structures themselves have been the source of considerable difficulty and complication, especially when they have been taken as certain indications of sense and logical form. It then happens that grammatical similarity is taken to imply logical and even factual similarity. For that reason, a word that is a general term or logical construction may be thought to function in much the same manner as does a proper name. For this reason, in part, disputants concerning the nature of 'truth', 'being', 'meaning', 'love', 'beauty', and so on, have often treated these words and others like them as though they were proper names. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that they may be so used. However, even with proper names one cannot simply trace the boundary of what the name means. It may be possible, however, to point out the referent. Wittgenstein stresses the deceptive nature of what he calls 'surface grammar':

664. In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use— one might say— that can be taken in by the ear. And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word 'to mean', with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about.¹

To use words, particularly words like 'truth', 'reality', 'being', and 'meaning', as though they had a generally understood and accepted use or even possessed a univocal sense, can

¹Ibid., p. 168e.
result in a failure to say anything, or to make any sense, in which case the words are not working, or it can deceive the users of language into thinking that all words generally function in much the same manner. Consequently, such questions as 'How is it used?', 'What does it say?', and 'What is the framework?', must be asked concerning specific uses of such a word as 'truth' in order that a degree of clarification may be achieved. This means that one must do much more than look at the word and explore its etymological roots. The word 'truth' must be considered in view of the particular linguistic and extra-linguistic context in which it is found, including the whole perspective and its underlying beliefs. D.D. Williams, from the viewpoint of a perspectivist analysis, deals with the question concerning the different senses in which 'truth' is used:

The thesis I suggest is: The meaning of the term 'truth' in any and all of its senses cannot be stated except with reference to the presuppositions of the perspective in which it appears.¹

(2.2) Having already cited certain formal problems pertaining to such a word as 'truth', including its problematical character, problems involved in uncritical and habitual usage, the problem of ambiguity and equivocation surrounding such words, the need for contextual consideration, and deception of grammatical similarity, it is necessary now to specify some distinctions that are found in actual usage. Subsequent to this

we are to consider certain of the presuppositions, consequences, and implications involved in a particular usage.

(2.2.1) In the first place, then, 'truth' has often been employed to refer to 'being' or what has been called 'substance', either absolute or conditional. J.L. Austin, although he too simply and quickly characterizes 'truth' as a logical construction, does make particular helpful distinctions:

1. 'What is truth?' said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Pilate was in advance of his time. For 'truth' itself is an abstract noun, a camel, that is, of a logical construction, which cannot get past the eye even of a grammarian. We approach it cap and categories in hand: we ask ourselves whether Truth is a substance (the Truth, the Body of Knowledge), or a quality (something like the colour red, inhering in truths), or a relation ('correspondence').

But philosophers should take something more nearly their own size to strain at. What needs discussing rather is the use, or certain uses, of the word 'true'. In vino, possibly, 'veritas', but in a sober symposium 'verum'.

Austin, then, does touch upon the different ways in which 'truth' has been applied, but he too readily dismisses 'truth' as a logical construction thereby failing to take seriously just what the specific uses of 'truth' entail. We consider 'truth' then not in the first instance as a substantive derived from the adjective 'true' as applied to statements, which is a generally accepted usage, but as equivalent to 'being', 'the real', 'that which is', irrespective of how the latter may be interpreted. 'Being', of course, has been understood in terms either of 'essence', 'existence', 'process', 'encounter', or 'thought'.

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1J. L. Austin, op. cit., p. 85.
Whatever the meaning of 'being' in any specific instance, 'truth' has been used almost interchangeably with 'being'. 'Truth' often carries with it the sense of the 'absolute' such as we find in what is called 'objective idealism', where it is used with reference to 'absolute knowledge', 'absolute mind', or 'eternal ideas'. There is the attempt by Heidegger to recover what he calls the primordial sense of 'truth', which is a more literal rendering of \( \lambda \rho \tau \alpha \), viz., "revealedness (Entborgenheit)" "revelation (Entbergung)", and an "uncovering" of "what-is." 'Truth' may be found to refer not only to 'being' or 'the absolute' in any one of the number of senses in which they have been used, but to "the very entity of any thing" or "the incomplex truth" as set forth in the Summa Philosophiae of the pseudo-Grosseteste. The latter usage refers to the particular 'being'. Augustine uses 'truth' in a similar fashion in saying that "the truth is that which is" (verum est id quod est). The question regarding 'being', however, must also be raised with respect to the last two mentioned uses of 'truth'. 'Truth' appears to be used, therefore, both as an equivalent for such words as 'being', 'the real', 'the absolute', 'the uncov- ering of what-is', and on the other hand, for such words as 'entity', 'thing', 'state of affairs', 'such as is the case', and the like. 'Falsehood' and 'errancy' must function according to their positive counterpart. It should also be said at this point that 'truth' and particularly 'true' are applied to whatever happens to be congruous with and in a correct relation to
the absolute referents cited above, or in some way shares or participates in the same.

(2.2.2) Another major kind or type of usage of the word 'truth' has been with reference to knowledge or thought. This usage of the word 'truth' has its place in Greek philosophy, in Plato, and to a greater extent in Aristotle. This usage also prevailed especially in later mediaeval scholasticism, and starting with Descartes, modern philosophy has been almost preoccupied with this usage, with significant exceptions however. Here 'truth' is used with reference to a body of knowledge or understanding, either by virtue of its relation to or position over against the subject or object known, or as an expression of self-awareness, or as an internal consistency of thought. Here 'truth' is used to signify a body of knowledge or series of true assertions. However, by reason of such usage itself, which in fact is meant to stress the factor of relationship or the relative nature of a body of knowledge, knowledge may acquire the character of equality or near identity with the state of affairs known. The consequences and implications ensuing from this usage of 'truth' are very extensive. When 'truth' is used in a cognitive sense there is a great number of material distinctions within the formal categories of usage, viz., 'truth' as 'being' or 'knowledge'. First, there is the question as to the sense of 'truth' when the reference is to 'knowledge' in general.
Not only is there a wide range of application of 'truth' as 'knowledge' in terms of subject and method, for example, theological 'truth', physical 'truth', historical 'truth', mathematical 'truth', but in each case 'truth' is to be taken differently because of different subject matter, structures, criteria and methods whereby each kind of 'truth' is realized and validated. 'Truth', then, cannot be used in each instance in the same sense because the subject, the criteria, and the ground of the possibility of 'truth' or 'knowledge' differ in each specific case. To complicate matters still further, the sense of 'truth' can change even as it is used within a particular discipline. Whether it be philosophy, theology, history, physics, at one time the sense of 'truth' may be that of a 'body of knowledge' as a composite of true judgements or statements and on another occasion 'truth' may signify 'that which is' or the 'actual state of affairs.' It is much like the problem that we confront with the word 'fact'. 'Fact' in one context is understood as an actual situation or occurrence and in another as 'a truth', in other words, a true statement, a factual statement.

In metaphysics, ethics, and theology, 'truth' may be used with reference either to 'a body of truths', or 'an actual state of affairs' or 'an ideal or future state of affairs', or with reference to 'being', 'the real', a certain kind of 'existence'. Within a given structure of thought, such as idealism and existentialism, there can be shifts in meaning from one usage to another which are not made explicit. This is not as likely
to happen where there is a rigorous restriction placed upon the usage of 'truth', for example, when 'true' is limited to certain kinds of assertions or statements or when 'truth' is discussed in some detail by such as B. Russell, M. Heidegger, and E. Brunner. Considerable misunderstanding is created where 'truth' used for 'a body of knowledge or beliefs' is not clearly distinguished from 'truth' used for an 'actual state of affairs' or 'the real'. This introduces the whole problem of 'knowledge' and 'being' and their interrelationships. First, however, some of the implications and consequences relating to the usage of 'truth' as a 'body of knowledge or thought' must be considered.

Just what is meant then when 'truth' is taken as 'a body of knowledge', 'a collection of truths'? This immediately raises the problem regarding how the one word 'truth' can be made to apply to a vast sum of knowledge. Putting aside for the present an inquiry into the problem of the nature and validity of knowledge, although fundamental to every aspect of the problem that we are discussing, the usage of 'truth' as 'knowledge' in its most general sense has to be investigated.

In this area of application, J.L. Austin mentioned three possible senses: a substance, a quality or property, or a relation such as correspondence. If we take 'knowledge' as a sum or a whole, there is always the possibility of failure to differentiate within the whole, and it is immediately apparent that there is a wide diversity within 'truth' as the whole of knowledge. Where 'truth' has been used as equivalent to
'substance', with 'substance' being the sum of knowledge, there is apt to be inadequate recognition of the complex, extensional or intensional, dialectical or paradoxical connections or relationships both among the parts of the whole and between each part and its extra-linguistic referent, where there is such. Considering the scope of what is designated as 'truth' or 'knowledge', from the tautology of formal and symbolic logic to a predication about 'being' which itself could be called 'truth', it is difficult to see what the sense of 'truth' is in such a wide application, whether one thinks of such a 'substance' as a single whole or as a collection of particulars. It is difficult to see just what the referent is in such a usage because the very problem that the philosopher faces is to relate the parts which in the above usage are taken to constitute a substance or a sum of particulars. Could it be that it is only possible to speak of this or that 'true' statement. John Wisdom says: "The philosopher's purpose is to gain a grasp of the relations between different categories of being, between expressions used in different manners. . . . Philosophical progress has two aspects, provocation and pacification."

1 Assuming such a substance or body of knowledge that could be referred to as 'the truth', it is questionable whether it would do more than function as a lexical equivalent, another name for 'knowledge'.

1J. Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity," op. cit., p. 42.
If 'truth' is taken to be a quality that can be attributed to, or inhere in statements or judgements that then are considered to be 'true', or as a logical construction that can be reduced to an x number of statements- 'p is true', the meaning of 'true' must still be made clear in the particular instances. The question could possibly be raised whether the word 'verum' is even predicated analogically of all statements. One thing is clear, viz., that we must examine instances of actual usage.

(2.2.3) In addition to this, the words 'truth' and 'true' are used within the contexts of varying theories of truth, ranging from the so-called 'no-truth theory' to the 'coherence notion of truth'. It is important, therefore, that the analyst inquiring into the sense of 'truth' or 'true' realizes that one cannot decree or judge usage on the basis of a priori rules, and also, that differences of usage do not necessarily imply opposing positions. However, it must also be emphasized that when semantical misunderstanding has been dissolved to the greatest possible degree, fundamental disagreements do still prevail by reason of different faiths, points of view, metaphysical assumptions, and diverse orientation to the reality that is the object of knowledge. D.D. Williams touches upon this matter in the article cited above, "Truth in the Theological Perspective":

However, I have not argued this point in order to show that semantics can solve the problem of truth. The perspectivist view does not permit that conclusion. The fundamental problem of the meaning of "truth" for different perspectives
remains. What does emerge from this analysis is that our theory of the relation between language and reality, and our theory of how that relationship can be made adequate, are functions of what we conceive the real to be.  

It cannot be denied that a great deal of difficulty and confusion arises because of 'rules of usage' or 'theory of logical grammar' presuppositions in which case an apparent factual disagreement is actually little more than the putting forth of opposing rules and verbal definitions. However, it can be said that a difference in usage may be indicative of underlying diversity. In any event, it is necessary to appeal beyond linguistic and grammatical form in order to ascertain the sense and to determine to what extent linguistic diversity is indicative of further difference. Even the linguistic phenomenologist can only pretend to restrict himself to linguistic data. Polanyi says:

Correspondingly, disagreements on the nature of things cannot be expressed as disagreements about the existing use of words. . . . These controversial questions can be attended to only if we use language as it exists to direct our attention to our use of language. 'Grammar' is precisely the total of linguistic rules which can be observed by using a language without attending to the things referred to. The purpose of the philosophical pretence of being merely concerned with grammar is to contemplate and analyse reality, while denying the act of doing so.  

By way of summary, it should be stated that the words 'truth' and 'true' are problematical. 'Truth', moreover, does

1D. D. Williams, loc. cit., p. 246.

2M. Polanyi, op. cit., p. 114.
not function as a name ostensibly designating a 'universal' that can be intuited, whereby argument over the meaning of the word is a possibility. 'Truth' in fact has a wide range of usage and application and the factors that are accountable for this great diversity must be recognized and taken into consideration. Some of these aspects have been cited, such as the diverse applications of 'truth' to 'being', 'the real', 'the absolute', 'knowledge' - both absolute and conditional, 'thought', and 'statement'. Within the sphere of usage of 'truth' as knowledge there are a great number of distinctions to be made, and these depend on such factors as the subject known, assumptions or beliefs regarding 'the real', and the conception held concerning the relationship of the 'true' statement or the 'truth' to the 'real' or the 'state of affairs'. The latter introduces the crucial topic of theories of 'truth' or criteria which in fact enable us to grasp the sense of the word 'truth' when it has been applied to an entity or statement within a particular context. This is the subject to be discussed in the next section where the aim is to consider what is presupposed and implied in saying 'This is the truth', or 'This is true', whether what is intended is being, a state of affairs, knowledge, a statement, a quality, or a relation.

3. Theories and criteria of 'truth': implications and consequences

As has already been noted, there is a considerable diversity of usage of the words 'truth' and 'true' which is grounded in another diversity, viz., different metaphysical beliefs and
epistemological or logical theories. There is usually a subtle interaction, interdependence, and inter-reinforcement between metaphysical or ontological doctrine, epistemological theory, methodology, ethical doctrine, language with its syntax, logical doctrine, psychological and existential factors. Certainly one of the tasks of the analyst is to inspect, sort out, and scrutinize critically the ways in which these several elements or areas have interacted upon and interpenetrated one another. This implies radical questioning and analysis both of each area and the interrelationships. Classical and mediaeval philosophy for the most part was indigent particularly in terms of employing a critical and analytical method or procedure with respect to its own doctrine, method, and language. In contrast to modern empiricism and atomism, knowledge of the singular instance, the accidental, the sensible, the contingent and mutable, was disparaged and quickly passed over in the movement from opinion to knowledge. In this instance we see how on the basis of metaphysical and logical doctrine, epistemological method and the nature of knowledge are determined. Although Plato in The Cratylus, and Aristotle in the Categories and De Interpretatione, attempt an analysis of language, it is not critical enough to keep language and grammar from exercising a determinative and decisive role in the development of the Platonic Ideas and Aristotle's Categories and his logic in general. Moreover, the Platonic ontology involves a theory of truth, as Heidegger has shown. In Plato, 'Being' is the what-ness (Idea) of beings, and 'Truth' or
'Being' as the non-concealment of the essence of beings, by reason of the visibleness of the Idea, subtly becomes 'truth' as correctness of view, conformity with the Ideas.

(3.1) It suffices here to point out that the development of a particular theory of truth is seen to be dependent on a number of ontological and epistemological doctrines interacting upon one another. These, in turn, may have been formulated under the impact of language and grammar which have assumed a normative role, due in part to uncritical usage. In Plato, then, 'truth' is closely allied with Being or the quidditas of beings, in other words, the what-ness of the beings which participate in their respective Ideas. The Being of beings therefore is visible in the Idea which is viewed and this 'real' is truth. However, there is a gradual shift in the sense of truth from the viewed Idea to the viewing and its conformity to the viewed. It is in the speaking of 'truth' in terms of conformity, correspondence, and relationship that the question of criteria arises in virtue of which truth claims are made. If 'truth' has reference to 'being' or the 'real' or the 'absolute', then one may be speaking of the criteria themselves insofar as 'truth', thus understood, functions as the measure or criteria of the conformed. As soon as one speaks of 'truth' as the correctness or rightness of viewing, knowledge, and statement, then appeal is made in behalf of the latter to criteria more primordial or transcendental. When ἰήθος is understood in its more literal and presocratic
sense where it has such a very close affinity with such words as 'φύσις', 'οὐσία', 'τὸ ὄν', the emphasis falls not on understanding or judgements as 'truth' but on 'beings' and 'being' itself. For this reason, therefore, and in view of the belief in the close proximity or even identity of 'being' and 'knowing', 'beings' and 'names', the 'λόγος' and 'human speech', there were not present the epistemological and logical difficulties that arise later in theories of logical and cognitive truth. As we shall see, in the traditional logical conception of 'truth' as correspondence between proposition and the thing or fact there arises the problem of relating or joining statement or understanding and the reality, plus explaining how it is that the proposition or verbum corresponds with the res. This problem becomes particularly acute in modern rationalism, scepticism, empiricism, and atomism with the divorce of 'object' and 'thing', sense data and physical object. The problem in the earlier Greek doctrine of truth was that which resulted from a more or less immediate and direct access to or viewing of the 'truth' or 'being' or 'beings'. 'Truth' understood as ideality prepares the way for the absolutization of knowledge. Such a development is furthered insofar as 'being' is understood as 'what-ness' or quidditas. 'Truth' as 'being' is then the ideal or the intelligible. This development appears to culminate in Hegel's absolute and unconditioned knowing.

The appropriate question to be asked at this point concerns ontological, metaphysical, and religious beliefs, and these are
determined by a number of contextual factors. When \( \delta \lambda \theta \epsilon \alpha \) and 'veritas' have by reason of usage a very close affinity or even identity with \( \phi \iota \iota \varsigma \), \( \lambda \omega \iota \iota \alpha \), \( \tau \delta \omicron \upsilon \iota \), and the like, then the appropriate method is to seek to lay bare the sense of the latter in both a negative and positive fashion. After a certain amount of such clarification it becomes possible to talk meaningfully about criteria, validation, verification, and related logical problems. The latter come to the foreground in discussing correspondence, coherence, pragmatist, and verificationist or positivist theories of truth. The question of criteria applies as well to ontic or objective truth which involves talk about 'true' or 'false' sensible entities which are so by reason of participation in the ideal world of the eternal forms. The inquiry, however, takes on a different form when one considers such as Heraclitus, Plato, Augustine, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and their usage of the words 'truth' and 'true' with reference to 'being', 'nature', 'existence', 'God', 'absolute'. This sense or reference would also apply to Heidegger's understanding of 'truth' as "unconcealment" or "revealment."

(3.2) Those theories of truth that refer primarily or even solely to the understanding and statements, such as certain correspondence and coherence theories of truth, have been critical of the usage of 'truth' discussed above. Aristotle in De Interpretatione and the Metaphysica formulates a theory of truth in which the locus of truth is primarily the thought or judgement and its correspondence or conformity with reality. Aristotle
does speak of 'true' perception or 'true' things but this a secondary and extended usage. The impact of this theory of truth is very marked in scholastic thought although there are differing adaptations of it depending in part on the nature of the synthesis or equilibrium achieved between the Augustinian tradition and the Aristotelian corpus. Throughout mediaeval thought we observe a gradual development in the understanding of 'truth' in the direction of a correspondence theory of truth partly by reason of the increasing impact of Aristotle's understanding of truth upon the Augustinian tradition. Augustine's understanding of 'truth' as "... verum mihi videtur esse id quod est," which of course must be understood in an ontological sense and not simply as factuality, and the understanding of the truth as "adaequatio intellectus et rei" are two fundamental formulations of truth which R. Grosseteste, pseudo-Grosseteste, and St. Thomas among others, had to interpret and relate to each other. Truth as "adequation of the understanding and the thing," a notion which could be said to be prefigured in Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth, especially emphasizes the factor of relationship, viz., a certain conformity between understanding and things. The important factor to note is that this adequation theory of truth, which is of classical derivation and a correspondence type theory of truth, became predominant in mediaeval

\[ ^1 \text{Solilo. II.5.8; PL 32:889.} \]
thought and remained so in modern thought. This tended to force out of the picture the application of 'truth' to 'being' or 'things that are'.

(3.2.1) We do well, therefore, to look briefly at Aristotelian correspondence and 'representative' knowledge or thought wherein 'concepts' or 'likenesses of things' are compounded or divided in accordance with reality. The correspondence theory of truth, in its manifold modes and types, has been accompanied by a number of difficulties and complications which have become particularly acute in the modern versions of the theory. These problems did not achieve critical proportions in Aristotle and mediaeval thought because of such factors as 'fides', ontological and epistemological realism, conceptualism, intelligibility, and a less sophisticated view of correspondence. There are other factors, as well, that made the correspondence theory as formulated in Aristotle and in mediaeval thought possible and workable. Classical and mediaeval doctrines of perception and apprehension contained guarantees and safeguards that appeared sufficient to ensure the truth of understanding and judgement in terms of correspondence. Thought or knowledge as representation, however, contained the seeds of later radical problems in modern correspondence theory. The problems that have accompanied modern correspondence theory, in such forms as atomic picturing and also less stringent correlation, have arisen partly because of representative perception, 1:1 isomorphy, scepticism, and the demand for certainty or known conformity of thought and
and statement with reality. These elements were latent and partly actualized already in ancient and mediaeval correspondence theory. These developments in modern correspondence theory have contributed to the emphasis on formal truth, phenomenalism, and the abandonment of truth claims except possibly for empirical verification in terms of sense data.

In addition to the factors already mentioned, Aristotle's representative theory of knowledge and correspondence theory did not prove to be as problematic as modern formulations of the theory because of his infallible apprehension of the meaning of terms, a doctrine of knowledge in which the passive reason has an immediate relation with its object by way of affections or concepts of the soul which are "likenesses of things themselves," and the activity of what has been termed the "active reason," which, among other things, acts on the passive reason impressing upon it the forms of knowable objects. Then there is also the "intuitive reason" whereby one can pass from particulars to the universal. Heidegger in Sein und Zeit cites Aristotle's explanation of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \) as \( \delta \omicron \lambda \omicron \nu \), or \( \alpha \pi \omicron \omicron \alpha \omicron \nu \). This understanding of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \) further indicates the noetic realism that inheres in Aristotle's doctrine of knowledge whereby 'truth' was possible. Heidegger, however, in a seminar of 1940 entitled "Vom Wesen und Begriff der \( \phi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \), Aristoteles Physik B I" refers to the transformation of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \) whereby the sense is not 'to show forth that which is' but \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \) becomes a judgement or expression which is in conformity with the judged. At this
point already we note a move in the development of correspondence theory where the emphasis moves from that about which the judgement is made to the judgement itself and its relation to reality. This understanding of the 'true' judgement or understanding in terms of a ἀληθεύωσι between the judgement and the judged further emphasizes the representative character of knowledge. Concept and thought come to stand between the cognitive subject and the singular entity and even the genus. When veritas therefore appears in the mediaeval context as 'adequatio intellectus et rei' it is clear that ἀληθεύω has lost its etymologically more correct and literal sense as "revealment" and its close affinity with 'being', whether it is understood as φύσις, ἔσεσθαι, ἀναλαμβάνειν or ἀληθές. When 'truth' therefore ceases to be so used and has reference to the correspondence or adequation of the intellect or judgement with the thing known, a number of questions must be posed pertaining to such cognitive or logical truth. The nature, the possibility, the validity, the criteria, and the underlying assumptions of the correspondence theory of truth have to be examined.

(3.2.2) In the mediaeval period the correspondence theory plays an important role in the formulation of theological and philosophical doctrine. The use and application of the theory varies and is restated in different ways depending on the way in which the Augustinian theology or wisdom and the Aristotelian theories are juxtaposed. Traditional Augustinians understood
'truth' primarily in terms of 'being' or 'that which is'. They also speak of the truth of created things which is made possible by the rectitudo or adaequatio of the thing, whatever it may be, with its ἴδεα in the supreme Truth or intellectus divinus. Knowledge of such truth presupposes a knowledge of both the object or thing and the understanding or idea of the thing in the divine intellectus. This truth of things can be formulated as the 'adaequatio rei creatae ad intellectum divinum'. In the Augustinian tradition, then, the supreme Truth or divine understanding is the ground and possibility of the truth of the thing and understanding. For the present, however, in view of the correspondence theory of truth, our interest is in the mediaeval formulation 'veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus' as conformity of the human understanding or judgement with the object. This formulation of correspondence was widely held in mediaeval thought although there were, as already noted, significant differences in emphasis in understanding truth, depending in part on the major influences, e.g., Neoplatonic or Aristotelian. Therefore, on the one hand, major emphasis is placed on the immutable rationes ('Speech of the Father,' Grosseteste, De Veritate) of things in the mind of God and the created things which are true because of their likeness to the divine speaking or understanding, and on the other hand, as in St. Thomas, 'truth' is primarily in the human intellectus and signifies the adaequatio of the understanding and the thing. It will become
apparent just how crucial is the interpretation given to the formula - *'adaequatio intellectus et rei'* and the character of the conformity or congruence, as well as the nature of the *intellectus* and the *res*.

(3.3) The *adaequatio* formula of truth, depending of course on the manner in which it is understood and used, and the ontological and epistemological context in which it finds expression, has at times been abandoned in favor of coherence theories of truth. Given a strict interpretation, while at the same time abstracted from its primitive setting, correspondence theory can become highly problematical and an alternative theory has to be propounded to achieve certitude. Correspondence theory then gives way to coherence theory such as we find in modern rationalism and idealism. Coherence theory has assumed a number of different forms in different systems of thought. Descartes' notion and use of coherence must certainly be distinguished from that of Bradley and H.H. Joachim.

(3.3.1) The demand for certitude and validity has played a most determinative role in the formation of theories of cognitive truth. The demand for certitude, which to a considerable extent may be grounded in either anxiety or intellectual demand, coupled with a placing of *veritas* primarily in the *intellectus* or *pronuntiatum*, places the task of establishing certainty or a known conformity on the cognitive subject. Certain schools of thought, such as logical positivism, have stressed exclusively empirical verification based on sense data or physical objects.
Moreover, problems pertaining to perception, logic, language, and certitude have led to the abandonment of material truth in favor of formal truth or linguistic analysis. In the mediaeval context we note beliefs or doctrines indicative of the striving for verification and certitude. The doctrines included such as idealist assumptions involving knowledge of the quidditas of things, the disparagement of the contingent and the sensible, which spelled flux and uncertainty, in favor of the necessary, the immutable and the immaterial, and the doctrines of fides and authority. The attempt to achieve certitude included the appeal to necessary 'truth' or arguments of a formal, analytic, deductive character and a subjectivistic introspection of one's own mind and consciousness. Augustine held that the mind could know immutable and transcendent truth under the ideas of things and by means of divine illumination while Aquinas believed that things could be known and grasped through the intellectus turning to abstracted forms. As with Aristotle, a great deal of epistemological and metaphysical doctrine not only explained or described but also established grounds for certitude or known conformity between understanding and reality. Formal and intrinsic coherence within conceptual structures and between judgements was also thought to insure the conformity between the understanding and the thing, and this could be valid only if reality itself were looked upon as a necessary and coherent ideality.

(3.3.2) Attempts to achieve certitude reached their culmination in modern philosophy in figures like Descartes and Hegel.
Such a radical culmination in these two directions was inevitable once many of the factors contributing to the certainty of truth in mediaeval theology and philosophy were repudiated, such as faith, revelation, illumination, authority, immutable rationes, and tradition. For when 'truth' is placed in the understanding or in the judgement, is conceived of in terms of rational certitude, and is coupled with a rejection of the traditional grounds of certitude, the cognitive subject is abandoned to itself and there emerges the rational autonomous subject. Moreover, in modern thought beginning with Descartes there is the employment of a critical method rooted in doubt and scepticism, which was to have momentous consequences both for philosophical method and theory. The only recourse for thinkers who doubted radically the existence of the res externa, God, and the existent self, and who at the same time desired a high degree of rational certainty, was to formulate coherence theory of various types. Descartes sought a necessary or mathematical certainty with his intuited indubitable self-evident 'truths' and those deduced therefrom, but in the process 'truth' was reduced to just such 'truths' and the external extended world had to conform accordingly. This meant that 'truth' as understanding, idea, or judgement, intended to be representative of the world-to-be-known, became an intrinsically logically coherent system of necessary truths. Demonstration follows from the self-evident indubitable truths.

Heidegger states that this subjectivism and truth-as-certitude
finds its culmination in Hegel. In Hegel truth as certitude is granted absolute ontological status. Knower and known become one in the absolute's self-awareness. The knowledge or judgement of the finite knower is not the 'truth' primarily in terms of correspondence to reality or because of its place in a logically deductive system, but because of its ontological status as a fragment of an ontological absolute whole which is the "Ideal Truth." Here we see that truth-as-certitude is made absolute, it is the 'real' or 'being'. Thus, for the Hegelian to say that a particular judgement or understanding is 'true' does not finally mean that it conforms to a known state of affairs or that it logically coheres with other judgements, although such may be presupposed and indicated, but that such a fragment of understanding is a finite part of a whole, the absolute and ideal experience. As the Hegelian H. H. Joachim asserts regarding correspondence theory:

That notion, so far, as we have studied it at present, appears to give us at best the mere externals of what constitutes truth. Correspondence, perhaps we may say, is a symptom of truth. We do not yet know whether there may be truth without correspondence; but at least there may be correspondence without truth, or with truth so trifling that serious falsehood is involved in it.¹

Joachim says further of his coherence notion of truth:

In the above formulation I have endeavoured to express the coherence-notion so as to emphasize the concreteness of the coherence which is truth, as against the view which found truth in formal consistency; and I have insisted upon the

conception of truth as a living and moving whole, as against the Cartesian view of fixed truths on which the structure of knowledge is built.¹

In Joachim's idealist coherence 'truth' has reference to "the Absolute," viz., the "Ideal Experience." 'Truth' is applicable to a 'true' judgement inasmuch as it is a fragmentary actuality of the "Whole." A judgement is not 'true' in its primary sense because it represents a part of reality or has achieved a certain conformity or congruity with the part, but it is 'truth' as a part of reality. 'Truth' is not knowledge or judgements that correspond with the object known for the object has in fact become the subject. Absolute or unconditioned knowledge, therefore, is not dependent on an object because such knowledge is grounded in the absolute's self-awareness. As in Descartes 'truth' is thought of in terms of certitude which is grounded in the cognitive subject's awareness of its own knowledge, so in Hegel 'truth' becomes absolute certitude which is grounded in absolute self-awareness. Coherence in Hegelian idealism is identified with the 'real' itself. Absolute certitude is found in the absolute's self-awareness which is realized and expressed through finite understanding. Descartes achieved certainty by his cogito ergo sum, the creature-consciousness whereby he argued for the existence of God who served to help establish our knowledge of the external world, the rationally intuited indubitable truths, and the system of demonstrated truth

¹Ibid., p. 77.
deduced from these principles. Truth as certainty, however, reaches its culmination in Hegel. For in Hegel certainty is ultimate because the problem of relating to the object is dissolved for absolute knowledge in its unconditioned self-awareness.

(3.3.3) The purpose of this brief digression is to indicate how the understanding of 'truth' and the grounds of 'truth' which prevailed throughout mediaeval thought gave way in modern thought to radical forms of coherence theory of truth. Rationalist and idealist subjectivism can be considered partly as attempts to compensate for the rejection and loss of mediaeval criteria and safeguards of truth. As we have already observed, in the mediaeval period 'truth' came more and more to have its locus in the understanding. Certain grounds and criteria which rendered 'truth' possible kept the human 'ratio' and 'intellectus' from playing a more absolute and determinative role than it did. However, in mediaeval thought, even with authority, revelation, faith, an intelligible creation, and exemplarism, the rational or cognitive subject tended to exercise a formative and normative function in cognition partly because of the perennial problem offered by the sensible-intelligible dichotomy and consequent abstraction and introspection. As we have attempted to indicate, this mediaeval legacy, which was bequeathed to modern thought, was bound to have far-reaching repercussions, particularly when the factors which before had helped to restrict the activity of the intellect were largely ignored or rejected. This helps to
explain in part the modern theories of coherence to which we have alluded. What modern rationalism and idealism had accepted from mediaeval thought, and developed to radical proportions, was reintroduced into theological thought and resulted in rationalist and idealist theology. Underlying these developments we must recognize the coherence theory of truth as it came to be formulated in such as Descartes and Hegel. Underneath this coherence theory we must notice the very problematical certainty which was to be resolved in the knowing subject, whether absolute or conditional. Still more foundational or rudimentary is the understanding of 'truth' which made the matter of certitude a central issue.

Although Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* takes for granted 'truth' as agreement of knowledge with its object, in formulating his epistemological theory in terms of the rational a priori categories, transcendental subject and the phenomenal-noumenal dichotomy, it happens that 'truth' as 'agreement' becomes 'truth' as a type of intrinsic coherence grounded in the rational categories which serve as forms for the structuring and interpreting of phenomena. Heidegger points out how the mediaeval *adaequatio* would be interpreted by Kant:

Veritas as *adaequatio rei ad intellectum* does not imply the later, transcendental conception of Kant- possible only on the basis of man's subjectivity- that "objects conform to (sich richten nach) our perception", but rather the Christian theological belief that things are only what they are, if they are, to the extent that they, as created things (*ens creatum*) correspond to an idea preconceived in the *intellectus divinus*, that is to say, in the mind of God, and thus conform
to the idea (are right) and are in this sense "true".¹ Kant, in placing 'truth' in the judgement and denying access to any world except that which is structured by the knower's reason, is obliged to formulate truth in terms of rational coherence. Cassirer speaks of Kant's understanding of truth as an escape from the impasse produced by the sceptical attitude toward language and knowledge of the nature of things:

Against this self-dissolution of the spirit there is only one remedy: to accept in all seriousness what Kant calls his 'Copernican revolution'. Instead of measuring the content, meaning, and truth of intellectual forms by something extraneous which is supposed to be reproduced in them, we must find in these forms themselves the measure and criterion for their truth and intrinsic meaning . . . The question as to what reality is apart from these forms, and what are its independent attributes, becomes irrelevant here.²

(3.3.4) Coherence theories of truth, correspondence theories of truth, and even pragmatist theories of truth, all teach in varying degrees that judgements or knowledge are at least 'true' in terms of a certain correspondence. However, the majority of these theories do go much further to extended conceptions of 'truth'. For instance, in idealist coherence theory finite judgement and knowledge are more than 'truth' understood simply in terms of correspondence inasmuch as they are granted an ontological status as parts of a rational or intelligible whole. In


such a view, wherein truth as coherence is thought of in terms of ideal or absolute understanding so that the severance between knower and known is thought to be overcome through self-awareness, there remains a number of unsolved problems pertaining to finite knowledge and understanding. Although such a theory asserts of a 'true' statement that it is only symptomatic of truth or only involves some truth, there still is an indispensable minimal place that must be given to the duality of knower and known and a certain kind of correspondence or congruity between them, the lack of which can be described as falsehood or error. It seems reasonable to assert that every theory of truth must to some degree allow for a conception of true judgement or statement in terms of a more or less satisfactory relation with a particular state of affairs, even though this may merely be a simple and elementary part of a developed system. This has been acknowledged by such as Kant, William James, F. H. Bradley, and H. H. Joachim. In each case there is presupposed a 'true' judgement or statement which in some way corresponds to a state of affairs. Radical divergence occurs when elementary judgements are utilized, assimilated, and structured within different systems of thought. However, even in the formulation of metaphysical, ethical, epistemological doctrine, these 'true' statements must remain 'true' in this basic sense if an aggregate is to be kept from dissolving into mere intrinsic and formal coherence. In modern idealist coherence theory, the degree of 'truth' in a judgement increases
as the judgement expands in meaning by being placed within a system of judgements. Here it appears that the 'truth' of a category of judgements is less its correlation with its subject matter and more its being a part of the whole which is "Absolute Truth," a self-fulfilling and self-sustaining unity. Apart from the highly speculative character of the coherence notion of truth developed under the impact of Hegel by such as Bradley and Joachim, it is difficult to see what criteria can serve the finite understanding as it seeks to approximate to the "Absolute Truth" which struggles for self-fulfillment in finite understanding. Without knowledge of the real nature of this "systematic whole" this unity, it is extremely difficult to see how the finite knower can relate to the Ideal. Even if it is allowed for the sake of argument that the metaphysical beliefs of this coherence theory of truth are valid, there are required the criteria and standards according to which coherence is judged. The question that remains pertains to the nature of such coherence and its basis, whether coherence is provided by the knower himself on the basis of his self-consciousness or self-awareness, or by a priori rational categories, or whether it is provided by the content of knowledge itself and results without deliberate effort. While idealist coherence theory has rejected coherence as formal consistency, it has sought coherence in "conceivability" and "intelligibility." As W.M. Urban says: "Truth, then, in the last analysis, is immanent in discourse-
the sum-total of intelligible discourse is the truth. *Veritas in dicto, non in re consistit.*¹ And Joachim says: "Conceivability is the essential nature of truth... To 'conceive' means for us to think out clearly and logically, to hold many elements together in a connexion necessitated by their several contents. And to be 'conceivable' means to be a 'significant whole', or a whole possessed of meaning for thought."² Although such theories of truth demand more than mere logical or formal consistency it is manifest that they do in fact rely greatly on such consistency to help hold together the conceivable or intelligible whole. Although such theories of truth are certainly grounded in more than intensionality, the latter is certainly fundamental and determinative in their formulation.

Coherence can, however, be taken in another sense than that found in idealist metaphysics. In this other sense it has no intention of going beyond finite thought and understanding as representational and relative. The duality of knower and known is not something that renders questionable the possibility of knowledge. Where coherence has been employed to overcome a problematical severance between subject and object, and to attain certainty by making finite knowledge a part of an absolute knowledge, it has either had to fall back on formal consistency or


the rational categories of the self-consciousness. However, rational coherence and formal consistency are not in themselves proof of validation of the truth, understood in terms of correspondence, of the system of thought or doctrine that is in question. In other words, the formal consistency or systematic coherence, mentioned above, can not of itself certify or validate a system of thought unless it is believed that reality itself is of such a character, but then the method is no longer demonstrative but simply indicative. M. Polanyi makes reference to coherence as a "criterion of stability":

I conclude that what earlier philosophers have alluded to by speaking of coherence as the criterion of truth is only a criterion of stability. It may equally stabilize an erroneous or a true view of the universe. The attribution of truth to any particular stable alternative is a fiduciary act which cannot be analysed in non-committal terms.¹

(3.3.5) This leads us then to this other understanding of 'coherence'. 'Coherence', although still indicative of stability and a kind of interconnectedness, may be placed outside the context of certification and validation. 'Coherence' can then be taken to refer to a naturally developing pattern or structure within a particular area of knowledge which bears an analogical relationship to the known. 'Coherence' here is taken in no strict and formal sense for its nature is determined by the subject or object known. In such a view 'coherence' is not an

¹M. Polanyi, op. cit., p. 294.
issue or a **desideratum** that has to be achieved. This is not to presuppose that a particular type of 'coherence' will necessarily have to appear if certainty and truth are to be achieved. The evolving construct may be either paradoxical, dialogical, or dialectical. Max Black has something similar to such coherence in mind when he talks about "analogue models": "Analogue models furnish plausible hypotheses, not proofs."¹ Black's "analogue model" is a faithful-as-possible reproduction in some new medium of the web of relationships in an original. However, he emphasizes that such models can not function as proofs or as isomorphic pictures, however else they may function. It may be helpful to formulate a certain kind of coherence as an hypothesis, but a hypothetical coherence can hardly be assumed to be true or certain on the basis of its coherence. If it does correspond to the original, it will be on the basis of a relation to the web of relationships in the original. Any coherence, therefore, that may evolve and manifest itself within a given discipline will be valid insofar as it is analogous to a real coherence in the subject, whatever the nature of the coherence. Even where a certain coherence or pattern does appear within a particular scope of knowledge which is analogous to that in the original, one can still speak of a type of correspondence between the original as one coherent whole and the "analogue model" or pattern as another coherent whole which is analogous to the original.

We have discussed these different types of coherence theory in order to show that much of modern coherence theory has been formulated in part in response to critical problems concerning validation and certainty. There are exceptions, of course, as in the case of Black's models cited above. The mediaeval period both increasingly prepared the way for the crisis regarding truth and certainty in modern thought and at the same time postponed its emergence by the presence of factors already mentioned. As we shall have occasion to notice later, the utilization of formal or rational coherence in the mediaeval understanding of truth differs in certain significant aspects from nominally similar coherence in modern thought, both with respect to presuppositions and method.

(3.4) We have already alluded to the course that the correspondence theory of truth has taken in modern empiricism, logical atomism and positivism. A number of elements have been responsible for the development of the correspondence theory that led to phenomenalism. Some of the difficulty has arisen from the attempt to present a too precise and sophisticated account of the nature of the congruence or conformity between the statement or judgement and the fact or state of affairs. Ledger Wood speaks of the correspondence theory in terms of congruence:

Truth may be defined as the correspondence - or as I shall prefer to designate it, the congruence - between the meaning of a proposition and a factual situation. Congruence, the crucial conception in the definition, is an unique
harmony or accord between meaning and fact which eludes precise definition and description.¹

Leibniz, Russell, and Wittgenstein, among others, have sought to achieve just such a precise description, viz., in the 1:1 relation between the parts of two aggregates. On the one side there were the logical, linguistic, or psychical elements or particulars and on the other the sense objects or physical particulars. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein asserts that in a logical picture each element must serve as a representative or name of an object. We are reminded here of Aristotle's affections of the soul or concepts which are joined or separated to correspond with connexions in reality and also of the elements of Leibniz's Monads. One of the problems in such theory was to make explicit the nature of these elements or particulars so that the theory could be made intelligible. How could these atomic elements and particulars be identified and then on what grounds and in what manner are they related? Other problems have arisen where correspondence theory has been combined with a theory of representative perception. Wood makes reference to this problem.

The conventional criticism of the correspondence theory is that if truth is a relation between ideas or sense-data as immediately given and an extramental object, the correspondence could never be confirmed, since its confirmation would

require the direct comparison of the idea with its object—a comparison which is precluded by the inaccessibility of the object to direct inspection.¹

The failure to realize confirmation has been the inevitable outcome where a correspondence theory of truth has been accompanied by a scepticism which doubts the existence of an extra-mental world, other minds, and the existence or identity of the self. It is not difficult to see how such problems have forced those who have introduced them to retreat to formal logic and to different types of phenomenalism. One can imagine similar problems in St. Augustine's and in St. Thomas' epistemology if there had been absent the contact or connection between the intellect and things via intelligibility, which compensated for their theories which in turn foreshadowed in certain respects representative perception. E. Gilson says: "In any event there could be no intellection unless the sensible object known were endowed with its own proper intelligibility."²

(3.4.1) Modern correspondence theory has found itself in an extremely difficult position when holding to theories of representation in perception and cognition generally, while at the same time not being able to posit an intelligible extra-mental world. Mediaeval thought was able to overcome its problematic of a mutable fleeting sensible world through appeal to the

¹Ibid., p. 224.
intelligible. The empiricist denies himself this appeal. Even when the empiricist, as a kind of realist, believes that there are particular minds in the midst of a real and extra-mental external world, problems regarding the accessibility of this world and the possibility of knowledge may prove insuperable. The possibility of knowledge of things is considered questionable on the basis of such doctrines as the dualism of sense-data and physical objects or things and the dualism of ideas or thought and a material world. Those holding such doctrines are forced in the direction of the abandonment of truth claims. G.R.G. Mure says of the empiricist:

But it gradually dawns on him that to talk about the appearance of a totally unknown reality is still question-begging, and he is forced to retreat further and confess that the sensuous imagery which arises in us (or, indeed, the speech which we find ourselves uttering) is not the appearance of any ulterior reality but just-appearance. He becomes a fully fledged (or fully plucked) phenomenalist.1

In this connection A. C. Ewing says of the correspondence theory:

The theory must not be worded in such a way as to imply that we are never aware of the real but only of our judgements or propositions. If that were the case, we could never know that they did correspond. You cannot tell by inspecting a photograph whether it is a good likeness of a person you have never seen.2

It can be said that the presupposition of a problematical dualism determines to a considerable degree metaphysical or

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epistemological views which are offered as solutions to assumed problems. It is important to observe regarding the understanding of truth in the mediaeval period that certain prior metaphysical and epistemological beliefs prevented or precluded the occurrence of problems that have been determinative in the formulation of a considerable amount of theory in modern thought. However, it must be said that those mediaeval doctrines that precluded certain problems which have appeared in modern thought were often themselves responses to other prior assumed difficulties. But it must be kept in mind that a considerable number of mediaeval realist and idealist epistemological doctrines were grounded not in a presupposed problem but in prior less critical and more belief-ful conceptions regarding things, the real, and their knowability. One such doctrine is that of the adaequatio between the understanding and the thing. These more optimistic beliefs stand in contrast to the more pessimistic and critical modern theories that question or reject the possibility of adaequatio and other realist beliefs. Such modern critical theories may generate special difficulties by having presupposed, from the beginning, a highly questionable and problematical relation of self over against the world and extra-mental reality. St. Augustine's intelligible-sensible dichotomy could be considered a harbinger of such dualisms as mind-matter and psychical elements-sensible particulars. Further difficulty arises where there is an attempt, as in Wittgenstein's
logical atomism, to formulate or to understand correspondence in terms of strict isomorphic picturing.

(3.4.2) L. Wittgenstein, in a radical and unrelenting fashion, faces up to certain of the consequences of his picture theory formulated in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein feels compelled to move beyond the solipsism of subjective idealism and linguistic solipsism to the shrinkage of the self of solipsism in an extensionless point and the 'absolutizing' and 'objectification' of "my world." He says:

Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.¹

There are adherents of correspondence theory who reject what they consider to be a naive realism but who at the same time do not follow through to the final consequences of their position. Wittgenstein says further: "I am my world. (The microcosm.)"² Then later he adds: "As in death, too, the world does not change, but ceases."³ Wittgenstein would do away with the self of solipsism and be left with the reality coordinated with it. This is his "pure realism." This "realism" however must be understood in the context of the self of solipsism and its world. The

²Ibid. 5.63, p. 151.
³Ibid. 6.431, p. 185.
MEDIAEVAL INTELLIGIBLE WORLD WAS WHOLLY DIFFERENT FROM THIS WORLD. DAVID FAVRHOLT, WHO IN *AN INTERPRETATION AND CRITIQUE OF WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS* PRESENTS WITTGENSTEIN'S LOGICAL PICTURE OF A FACT AS A "THOUGHT" IN CONTRAST TO STENIUS' INTERPRETATION OF THE PICTURE AS A "PROPOSITION," DISCUSSES WITTGENSTEIN'S SOLIPSISM AND SPEAKS OF TWO LINES LEADING TO HIS SOLIPSISM:

The first one begins with the fact that only one language can exist. This language is *MY* language and it has limits. Because it has limits, the logical space and consequently the world have limits too. From this, however, it does not follow, as Wittgenstein thought, that the world is *MY* world. This assertion is not well-founded unless we take the second line leading to solipsism into consideration. This line begins in a type of realism from which by means of Berkeleyan arguments one is led to idealism and solipsism which in this case is an epistemological solipsism as Wittgenstein distinguished between the subject and the world. Even the statement "I AM MY WORLD" does not wipe out this distinction.¹

IN ACCORDANCE WITH WITTGENSTEIN'S SOLIPSISM A QUESTION PERTAINING TO 'THE WORLD IN ITSELF' IS NONSENSICAL BECAUSE THE EXPRESSION ITSELF IS NONSENSICAL. WITTGENSTEIN'S PROBLEM IN HIS SOLIPSISM IS GROUNDED IN A "GNOSEOLOGICAL DUALISM," WHICH IS INTRINSIC TO THE PICTURE THEORY, AND WHAT HE CALLS "MY WORLD." WITTGENSTEIN THEREFORE FACES WHAT IS CALLED "THE EGOCENTRIC PREDICAMENT," FROM WHICH ONE ESCAPES ONLY BY WAY OF A VIOLATION OF THE PROFESSED SOLIPSISM. TO GIVE EXPRESSION TO HIS SOLIPSISM,

the solipsist must take up a perspective outside "his world" and he thereby contradicts his own theory. A. Maslow, according to Favrholdt, in *A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus* has brought this fallacy to light. This means that thorough-going solipsism may be believed but cannot be validated.

In order to keep his picture theory intact and remain consistent with his logical theory Wittgenstein posits his metaphysical subject—the philosophical self. The metaphysical subject, which is other than the empirical ego, does not think or speak but only "sees." For if the metaphysical subject could put into words the relationship of the picture and the fact, which relationship is determinative for the truth claim, we would be involved in an infinite regress. Favrholdt says of Wittgenstein's "metaphysical subject":

> Even if he had not introduced this concept in the *Tractatus* we would arrive at it as a consequence of the thesis of extensionality and the picture theory. For if we presuppose that propositions are either true of *[sic]* false and in addition to this deny the possibility of intensional relations between propositions, we are compelled to accept that the truth-value of a proposition can only be fixed by a proposition and a fact. Hence there must be a kind of knowledge which cannot be said or thought and therefore cannot be related to the empirical ego.¹

Our present concern, however, is not with the functioning of the "metaphysical subject" as much as with the need for positing the "metaphysical subject" and the implicit refutation of a consistent solipsism. Wittgenstein's solipsism is ineffable and no

sensible formulation of it can even be given because of his theory of picturing and his theory of logic and meaning. We direct our attention to Wittgenstein's picturing theory or logical theory only to show that in order to make truth claims possible it is necessary for him to posit the "metaphysical subject," thereby rendering inconsistent his solipsism. The inevitability of some kind of solipsism seems to be determined already in the early stages of the formulation of the picture theory. It would seem that the attempt to formulate a 1:1 relationship between a logical picture and a fact so restricts that which is pictured that correspondence with certain facets of reality is precluded. Favrholdt says: "Hence, Wittgenstein's picture theory apparently rejects all talk of physical continuity, indivisibility, time and space." An atomistic view of the world complicates matters still further, and this, coupled with all the difficulties involved in the attempt to structure the "world" in terms of "logical space," promotes scepticism and the abandonment of truth understood as correspondence.

(3.4.3) If a correspondence theory of truth is to keep from developing into sheer phenomenalism and solipsism one must hold certain beliefs regarding the possibility of ascertaining truth and making truth claims. Beliefs that make truth claims problematical must be examined. For instance, it must be pointed out that consistent ontological and epistemological solipsism

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1Ibid., p. 69.
can hardly be formulated without serious inconsistency. It would seem that solipsistic affirmations have to presuppose non-solipsistic, even realist moments. To believe that the self is acquainted only with its own ideas and sensations is a sure way of undercutting the notion of cognitive or logical truth understood in terms of correspondence. Of course, to believe that only the self exists precludes truth understood as correspondence. However, as already intimated, if one is to demonstrate and to know with certainty that the self only knows its own ideas and that only the self exists one must know more than his own thoughts and sensations. This is impossible. On the other hand, a naive type of realism assumes that the cognitive subject can know the thing itself even though media may be involved. A 'realist' epistemology which affirms that human knowledge, thought, and experience deal directly with things to be known and experienced, while at the same time teaching that such knowledge is not a copy of the thing or a 1:1 correspondence with the state of affairs, appears as an alternative to those theories of coherence and correspondence discussed above.

(3.4.4) In mediaeval realism, as we shall have ample opportunity to note, a great deal of effort is spent in formulating and describing the fundamental ontological context which makes it possible for the intellect or understanding itself to enter into a right relation with the being of things. Mediaeval epistemology as a whole is considered by the modern critical analytical mind to be naive and uncritical in believing that the
intellect is present in the midst of an intelligible world, and that the mind and things exist in a state of potential readiness for one another. It must also be stressed that in mediaeval thought the critique of knowledge, truth, and questions of methodology were looked upon as very much reflexive and secondary, posterior to the act of knowing things which is primary and the foundation of a critique. The possibility therefore of the truth of a thought or proposition or judgement is something that is believed and accepted on the basis of a real connexion between the knowing subject and reality. It was believed and taken for granted that there was a real adequation of the mind and things themselves. There is not present here the urgent need to introduce a Wittgensteinian "metaphysical subject" or "philosophical self," a Cartesian absolutely good Being who substantiates our sensible experience, the angelic viewpoint, or an absolute self-awareness, for it is believed that ontologically prior to the comparing of a statement or proposition with an actual state of affairs, and the recognition of its truth or falsity, there is the existent and cognitive subject which is open to and in touch with the intelligible order.

4. M. Heidegger's understanding of 'truth'

(4.1) Heidegger touches upon questions pertaining to 'truth' and 'being' throughout his works. For our present purpose, however, we refer primarily to Being and Time and his essay "On the Essence of Truth." We shall make allusions to other works as discussed in W. J. Richardson's study of Heidegger. Reference
is made at this juncture to Heidegger's understanding of truth and related questions of being and logic not primarily for its own sake, but as an aid in constructing a critical framework which can serve as a context in which the really significant problems can be brought into the open. It is also helpful to see Heidegger's treatment of truth in comparison to those discussed above, thereby noting the contrasts and also the points of intersection. We hope to see why Heidegger does not seem to be beset by all the noetic and logical difficulties discussed above, at least not to the same degree. It should become evident that this is due in part to Heidegger's point of departure and his critique of certain metaphysical assumptions that have come to be accepted without question.

Heidegger is an ontologist who has utilized the methods and materials of phenomenalism and existentialism. According to Heidegger's own clarification of terms and definitions in Being and Time, he is concerned with something beyond 'existence' itself and therefore one cannot simply categorize him with 'existentialists' in general. As he says:

The question of existence is one of Dasein's ontical 'affairs'. This does not require that the ontological structure of existence should be theoretically transparent. The question about that structure aims at the analysis [Auseinanderlegung] of what constitutes existence. The context [Zusammenhang] of such structures we call "existentiality." Its analytic has the character of an understanding which is not existentiell, but rather existential.¹

¹Heidegger, Being and Time, H. 12.
Heidegger therefore directs his attention to existence only to go beyond it. Heidegger, under the impact of Husserl, employs a 'phenomenological' method of investigation. This method is based on an understanding of Phänomen as that which shows-itself-in-itself. As Heidegger says: "Thus the term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'To the things themselves'."¹ Heidegger says further: "Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis."² In emphasizing the basic theme of philosophy he says:

Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object.³

Heidegger's concern from the beginning is to seek to discern the meaning of 'Being' and he proposes to do this by way of a phenomenological analytic of Dasein. We cannot begin to deal here the nature and validity of his method of phenomenological analysis of Dasein as the via to fundamental ontology. Neither is our present interest to investigate Heidegger's conclusions regarding the Being of Dasein as Care rooted in temporality, except insofar as it involves disclosedness and truth. Heidegger makes explicit that his intention is to proceed phenomenologically by way of the Being of Dasein to fundamental ontology and beyond that to the sense of Being itself. Heidegger's program is to be distinguished from Kant's inasmuch as Kant was interested in the

¹Ibid., H. 28. ²Ibid., H. 38. ³Ibid.
ontological structure of the reason in the form of the Critique of Pure Reason, whereby cognition is rendered possible and achieved. Heidegger begins, however, with an analysis and investigation not of man's reason but of Dasein as Being-in-the-world or man in his totality and this is the point of departure for a fundamental ontology and the exploration of Being. As Richardson says:

For Kant, what are the conditions which render possible the ontological synthesis (transcendence) of finite reason? For Heidegger, what is the relation between the radical finitude of man and the comprehension of Being as such? Heidegger, therefore, has in mind the question of Being throughout his ontological analysis of Dasein, which achieves "authentic self-Being" and "Being-authentically-in-the-world" through "resolve." Heidegger's phenomenological study of Dasein, whose essence lies in its existence, is therefore not undertaken for its own sake but by reason of its existential priority and its constitutive propensity for metaphysics. As Werner Brock says: "But Dasein is envisaged in the light of 'Being' and not primarily as a theme and 'transcendental object' of human consciousness and 'subjectivity'." This is just what Heidegger affirms at the close of Being and Time (2nd section):

Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of

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Dasein's Being remains only one way which we may take. Our aim is to work out the question of Being in general. The thematic analytic of existence, however, first needs the light of the idea of Being in general, which must be clarified beforehand.¹

Although much influenced by Kant, Heidegger makes clear, in speaking of Kant's failure with respect to the problematic of Temporality, that he is to be set apart from Kant:

There were two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem of Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject.²

It is important to note at this point that having completed the first two sections of Part One of Being and Time, Heidegger did not complete the third which was to have been entitled "Time and Being" and in which temporality or primordial time was to have been investigated as a way to the meaning of Being. Hereafter we have what is called the 'reversal' in Heidegger's thought. After having analyzed Dasein as a way to the sense or meaning of Being in which the Being Dasein was seen as Being-in-the-world, as Care grounded in Temporality, and Being-authentically-in-the-world in terms of Resoluteness, Heidegger against this background focused on Being itself, in other words, a Being-centered problematic for which preparation had been made in Sein und Zeit, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, and Vom Wesen des Grundes. In Was ist Metaphysik? Heidegger systematically raises

¹Heidegger, Being and Time, H. 436. ²Ibid., H. 24.
the question about "Das Nichts" and the ontological difference between Non-being and beings. The question about Non-being, which becomes manifest in and through anxiety, and the attempt to answer, provides a strangeness of beings and is therefore the beginning of a finite attempt to ponder Being in its truth.

Throughout the above mentioned works Being comes to be thought of as Truth or as unveiledness of the Being of beings. However, according to Richardson, in Being and Time, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, and The Essence of Ground the focus of attention is still upon Dasein, that transcendence which makes possible access to Being. In What is Metaphysics? the question of Non-being calls for the Being of beings. In Vom Wesen der Wahrheit Heidegger makes more explicit that Being is to be thought of in terms of truth as uncovering, of das Seiende. Heidegger states in An Introduction to Metaphysics: "In showing itself, the unconcealed as such comes to stand. Truth as un-concealment is not an appendage to being. Truth is inherent in the essence of being."1

Heidegger proceeds then in the direction of what has been called "foundational thought" or There-being's meditation on Being as the process of truth. We shall inquire further into the exposition of such thought in the essay "On the Essence of Truth" to note how he proceeds to ground thought and logical

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1Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 102.
truth by exploring primordial truth. In giving our attention to this process of thought we shall be availing ourselves of a specific instance of the grounding of 'truth' which can serve to recall and retrieve forgotten emphases in past doctrines of truth and being. This discussion should also provide a preparatory framework which will facilitate the acquiring of an awareness of the subtle progression and movement in the understanding of 'truth' as it is applied to being, to beings, to thought, and to statements.

(4.2) In his essay "On the Essence of Truth" Heidegger goes beyond the understanding of truth that we find in Being and Time. In the latter Heidegger does set forth the derivative character of truth understood in terms of adaequatio and convenientia but he does not really go further than grounding it primordially in Dasein. 'Truth' is defined as "uncoveredness," "Being-uncovering," "disclosedness," and such belongs to the very constitution of Dasein. As Heidegger says:

"Being-true as Being-uncovering*, is a way of Being for Dasein. . . . But disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is its "there".1

Truth, understood in the most primordial sense, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. The term signifies an existentiale.2

In the essay on truth Heidegger, however, goes on to describe the nature of truth as freedom, which is not a property that man has, but instead, "freedom, or ex-sistent, revelatory Da-sein

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1Heidegger, Being and Time, H. 220. 2Ibid., H. 226.
possesses man and moreover in so original a manner that it alone confers upon him that relationship with what-is-in-totality which is the basis and distinctive characteristic of his history."¹ Freedom therefore is not "the random ability to do as we please" or "licence." This ex-sistent freedom in turn springs from the "original essence of truth, from the reign of mystery in error."²

Richardson gives the following résumé:

The essence of truth as conformity lies in ex-sistent freedom as the pre-predicative disclosure of the Open in which judge and that-which-is-judged may meet. But ex-sistent freedom, in turn, resides in the originating truth of this Open itself which comports its own negativity (mystery, errance).³

It is from such a position that Heidegger considers the so-called conventional understanding of truth. He has in mind the correspondence theory of truth which was formulated in the mediæval period as adaequatio rei et intellectus. Heidegger makes reference to its twofold signification, i.e., the correspondence of a thing with its idea and the correspondence of that which is intended by the statement with the thing itself. Untruth then is a failure to agree in either case. It can be said at this point that Heidegger's critique regarding the "traditional conception of truth" is more applicable to this conception of truth in certain of its formulations and contexts than in others.

²Ibid., p. 347. ³Richardson, op. cit., p. 254.
While Heidegger does allow for the application of 'truth' and 'falseness' to the statement or proposition, he neither believes that the proposition is the sole or even the essential or original place of 'truth' nor does he accept the traditional conception of truth without providing his own qualifications.

"Thus the traditional practice of attributing truth exclusively to the statement as its sole and essential place of origin, falls to the ground. Truth does not possess its original seat in the proposition."¹ In the chapter on untruth and error he says:

"What we ordinarily understand by 'wrong' and moreover, according to the teachings of philosophy—namely the wrongness (Unrichtigkeit) of a judgement and the falseness of a perception, is only one, and that the most superficial, way of erring."²

Heidegger really chooses the traditional conception of truth, as set forth in the mediaeval adaequatio, as a point of departure from which he proceeds to his formulation of truth as Being—the negated das Offene. Heidegger speaks of the old traditional conception of propositional truth "according to which truth is the likeness or agreement (Uebereinstimmung: δόμως) of a statement (λόγοι) to or with a given thing (πραγμα)."³ Heidegger doesn't give much attention to the ontological ground of the mediaeval understanding of truth although he does make reference to "objective truth!" "Admittedly

²Ibid., pp. 345-346.  
³Ibid., p. 326.
the above definition is usually employed only in the formula: \textit{veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem}. Yet truth so understood, i.e., \textit{propositional} truth, is only possible on the basis of \textit{objective} truth, the \textit{adaequatio rei ad intellectum}.

Heidegger is eager to move on to propositional truth and its "agreement" and "likeness" which he will analyze and critically evaluate in anticipation of his own formulation of truth. Heidegger does make reference, as manifest in the quotation above, to 'objective' 'truth', i.e., the "approximation" of the thing to its idea in the divine \textit{intellectus} and the approximation of thought to thing. This he speaks of as a "\textit{sich richten nach}" of the statement with the thing and of the thing with its idea. Heidegger says of the approximation of thought to thing and the thing to its idea in the divine understanding:

"Both conceptions of the nature of \textit{veritas} always imply 'putting oneself right by' (\textit{sich richten nach}) something and thus conceive truth as \textit{rightness} (\textit{Richtigkeit})." \textsuperscript{2} In connection with \textit{Richtigkeit} Heidegger doesn't name St. Anselm.

Although Heidegger does therefore make limited reference to the ground or possibility of the cognitive and logical truth stipulated in the mediaeval formula, he is particularly interested in the logical elements of propositional \textit{Richtigkeit} or \textit{Uebereinstimmung} and seeks to show what they can not mean and what they can mean. Because of a great number of foundational and trans-

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 322-323. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 323.
cendental factors, propositional or logical truth does not reach the problematical dimensions in the thought of St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Heidegger, that it has in much of modern correspondence theory. This formal likeness must not be taken to minimize the considerable material difference between the following juxtaposed terms as used by Heidegger and the mediaevals respectively, 'substantia' and 'Dasein', 'α λ η θεός' and 'veritas', 'ex-sistere' and 'esse', 'φύσις' and 'natura', 'das Seiende im Ganzen' and 'res' or 'ens', Heidegger's 'Sein' and the 'Deus' of mediaeval thought. Mediaeval theologians found such terms as 'adaequatio', 'conveniens', and 'rectitudo' workable and suitable for the explanation of both objective, cognitive, and logical truth because of res intelligibles, both transcendent and immanent, and because of the fact that "veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis."¹ Mediaeval epistemology did not have to cope with all the problematics that Heidegger cites for propositional truth simply because propositional truth was grounded in adaequatio, conformitas, or similitudo between mens or intellectus and res, which was possible on the basis of species intelligibilis.² E. Gilson gives a brief statement of this facet of Thomist epistemology:

In short, the adequation between thing and intellect set up by the judgement, always presupposes a prior adequation between concept and thing, and this, in its turn, is based

¹St. Anselm, De Veritate 11; A0(Schmitt) I:191.
²Cf. St. Thomas, De Veritate 1.1,2.
upon a real adequation of the intellect and the object informing it.\footnote{1}

Gilson speaks further regarding the grounding of logical truth or of the judgement: "And that is why, being founded on a real relation, it has no need to ask how it shall rejoin reality."\footnote{2}

Heidegger makes reference to some of the more obvious dissimilarities between a statement and a thing, namely, material, structural, formal, and the functional unlikenesses like that between a coin and the statement "this coin is round." This is helpful as a via negativa. Heidegger raises the following questions in charting a positive course.

What else is tacitly posited in this relational totality of the adaequatio intellectus et rei? And what ontological character does that which is thus posited have itself?\footnote{3}

Heidegger rightfully asserts that as long as this 'relationship' is left indeterminate it is difficult to discuss and assess it further. It appears that the use of such words as 'agreement', 'likeness', and 'approximation' for the relation between statement and thing may further complicate the problem and mislead. Heidegger makes manifest his clear preference for other words such as 'Richtigkeit', 'Erschlossenheit', Entdeckung', 'Sehenlassen', 'Vorstellung', and later 'Freiheit' and 'das Offene'.

Already in the "Introduction" of Being and Time Heidegger made clear his notion of what the primary sense of 'truth' is not:

\footnote{1E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 237.}
\footnote{2Ibid., p. 238.}
\footnote{3Heidegger, Being and Time, H. 215.}
Furthermore, because the λόγος is a letting-something-be seen, it can therefore be true or false. But here everything depends on our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of 'agreement'. This idea is by no means the primary one in the concept of Heidegger makes amply clear the course that he intends to pursue. He intends to expose the ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth by exploring the primordial phenomenon of truth. The derivative character of logical truth is not always clearly recognized and propositional truth becomes, therefore, more and more determinative. This is the development that Heidegger would reverse in the direction of being.

Heidegger sees the "traditional conception of truth" as a derivation from interpretation and its structure, which is dependent upon understanding, and this in turn is dependent upon Dasein's disclosedness. "Thus the roots of the truth of assertion reach back to the disclosedness of the understanding."² To Dasein's disclosedness discourse is essential and Dasein as a Being-towards entities expresses itself in assertions about beings that have been uncovered. The uncoveredness of the entity is therefore preserved and is something that is zuhanden. Thereafter one can appropriate the uncoveredness without one's own uncovering. Both assertion and the entities uncovered then are ready-at-hand or present-at-hand. The relation between assertion and

¹Ibid., H. 33. ²Ibid., H. 223.
entity is itself present-at-hand. The relation comes forward because there is in the assertion the preserved uncoveredness and the entity uncovered. But the uncoveredness itself becomes the present-at-hand conformity of assertion to entity.¹ Uncoveredness (Entdecktheit) of the entity becomes, therefore, a relationship present-at-hand between intellectus and res or assertion and the entity.

Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities—a Being which itself uncovers—has become truth as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world. And thus we have pointed out the ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth.² Heidegger accounts for the predominance of the "traditional conception of truth" by reason of the fact that Dasein naturally tends to understand itself in terms of that which is ontically proximate and so encountered within-the-world while that which is ontologically prior remains hidden. Uncoveredness is encountered in the first instance in the expression or assertion as that which is present-at-hand, just as our understanding of Being is that of presence-at-hand, so the question whether this kind of Being of truth is a primordial one cannot even arise.

The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein's very understanding of Being—that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle.³

Truth, then, is encountered in the first instance in that which is actually nearest us and when considered ontologically in the

¹Ibid., H. 224. ²Ibid., H. 225. ³Ibid.
manner closest to us it comes to be thought of as an assertion about something or an uncoveredness of something. Heidegger affirms that the primordial understanding of truth was present among the Greeks, including Aristotle, even though they developed a branch of knowledge in which Being came to be understood in the way closest to us, viz., as Vorhandenheit, presence-at-hand. Thus it became extremely difficult to uncover or recover the primordial understanding of truth.

How does Heidegger propose to get back to the primordial phenomenon of truth? In accordance with his phenomenological method pursued in Being and Time, Heidegger starts with that which is present-at-hand. In this case there is need for a clarification of the kind of being which belongs to knowledge itself. In such an analysis the phenomenon of truth must be considered as a characteristic of knowledge. Heidegger believes that truth will be made phenomenally explicit in the demonstration of knowledge as truth. In order, however, for the question regarding truth to be asked some understanding is presupposed. Heidegger notes this at the beginning of his essay on the essence of truth: "But in calling for real 'truth' we must already know what in fact is meant by truth. Or do we only know by 'feeling' and in a 'general' sort of way?"  

Heidegger makes reference to the problematic of the subject-Object relation, the ideal content-Real thing, and the ideal

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content—Real act of judgement relations, and questions the validity of even posing such ontologically unclarified separations. Heidegger, by way of finite transcendence which is for him the basic state of *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world, seeks in an ontological fashion to reach a pre-subject-object comportment. "Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand."¹ This helps to explain Heidegger's critique of the above dichotomies in seeking to clarify the kind of being that belongs to knowledge and the relationship of agreement between assertion and entity. Heidegger says regarding a true assertion that it refers to the Thing itself and not a psychological "representation (Vorstellung)." In the essay on the essence of truth Heidegger states that "the representative statement has its say about the thing represented, stating it to be such as it is. This 'such-as' (so-wie) applies to the representation and what it represents."² In *Being and Time* it is put thus: "Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is."³ It is most evident therefore that the statement or assertion represents or presents (Vorstellen) the object itself so that as an object it assumes a position over against us. What then can the demonstration of

the true assertion teach us about the relationship of "agreement?"

Nothing else than that this Thing is the very entity which one has in mind in one's assertion . . . . What gets demonstrated is the Being-uncovering of the assertion . . . . The entity itself which one has in mind shows itself just as it is in itself; that is to say, it shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being—just as it gets uncovered as being.

Heidegger states:

The Being-true(truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering.* Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the Object).  

The true assertion therefore is one that uncovers, presents, or represents the entity, and what is demonstrated is the Entdecktsein of the entity itself as pointed out in the assertion. The "Being-uncovering" in turn is grounded ontologically in Dasein in its basic state of "Being-in-the-world." We have traced the transition from the conception of truth as "agreement" to truth as "Being-uncovered," "Being-uncovering," and the Entborgenheit and Entbergung of what-is. Let us observe how Heidegger probes deeper into the "existential-ontological foundations of uncovering."

(4.3) The understanding of truth as "revealment" and "non-concealment" marks Heidegger's whole discussion of truth, from the truth of the assertion to the "Being-uncovering" of Dasein

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1Ibid. 2Ibid., H. 218-219.
and further to Sein. "Truth is the manifestness of the essent."¹

"Truth as un-concealment is not an appendage to being. Truth is inherent in the essence of being."² Heidegger, however, becomes more and more preoccupied with Being itself in terms of the question as to 'truth', but there are intermediate steps to be considered which are already set forth in the analytic of Dasein. Without dealing with all the particulars of the analysis we shall try to sketch the progression of thought from propositional truth to truth as ontological ground itself. We have already seen that Heidegger stresses the ontologically derivative character of the present-at-hand conformity between the present-at-hand assertion and the present-at-hand entity. Ontologically prior is Being-uncovering which is a way of Being for Dasein and this is the uncovering of entities. Heidegger says of the uncovered entities:

They are 'true' in a second sense. What is primarily 'true' — that is, uncovering—is Dasein. "Truth" in the second sense does not mean Being-uncovering* (uncovering), but Being-uncovered (uncoveredness).³

From predicative truth we bring our attention to the uncovered entities themselves which are what in fact are presented and manifested in the predication made. However, what is primarily 'true' is Dasein in its mode of Being-uncovering. One must be careful to note shifts in sense in Heidegger's rather unconventional and somewhat strange word usage as he seeks to

¹Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 21.
²Ibid., p. 102. ³Heidegger, Being and Time, H. 220.
lay bare ontological foundations. When 'true' is applied to Dasein, therefore, 'true' denotes certain ways in which Dasein comports itself with respect to entities and objects, whereby the thing itself becomes manifest and assertion or representation is made possible. One must keep in mind that for Heidegger 'truth' is used primarily with the sense of "revealment," which is of the essence of Being or Being itself. Heidegger's thought is misinterpreted if one continues to consider the primary sense of 'truth' to be that of agreement or conformity, whether between thought and object, statement and entity, or entity and its intelligible idea. Neither does 'truth' refer to beings as beings, mere state of affairs or things that are present-at-hand (Vorhandenes). If 'truth' is applied to entities within-the-world, it has reference to such beings in their "uncoveredness." 'Truth' therefore is said to be used in a more primordial sense when applied to Dasein as Being-uncovering which is a way of Being for Dasein. But one has still to go further, as Heidegger says: "The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering."

This most primordial phenomenon is disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)," which belongs to Dasein essentially and not by reason of Dasein's choice or discretion. Heidegger states: "But disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to

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1Ibid.
which it is its 'there'. Disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self."¹ He develops this further by saying: "In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true'. Dasein is 'in the truth'."² This very disclosedness of Dasein lies hidden in the structure of care. What is being affirmed here is that uncoveredness of entities within the world is certainly more primordial than the truth of assertion or statement, but the uncoveredness itself is grounded in the disclosedness of the World which is the Da or Dasein, i.e., of the very constitution of Dasein. "This identity of the disclosedness of the World and the There (luminosity) of There-being is precisely what constitutes There-being's in-being in the world."³ We cannot here explore all that is involved in such disclosedness or In-Sein, but this is what enables Heidegger to talk about Dasein being essentially and equiprimordially in the truth and in untruth, the latter due to the falling which belongs as well to Dasein's state of Being. This means then that both uncovering and covering belong essentially to Dasein in its disclosedness. On the basis of such an understanding Heidegger can say that "There is' truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is."⁴

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., H. 221. ³Richardson, op. cit., p. 59. ⁴Heidegger, Being and Time, H. 226.
Therefore, according to Heidegger, it can be said that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, which is not to say that before him there were no such entities as uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Entities uncovered show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were. "Such uncovering is the kind of Being which belongs to 'truth'."¹ This enables Heidegger to say that truth is relative to Dasein's Being, without at the same time saying that truth is at the mercy or at the discretion of the human subject. Heidegger clearly states his intention:

For uncovering, in the sense which is most its own, takes asserting out of the province of 'subjective' discretion, and brings the uncovering Dasein face to face with the entities themselves.²

Although there is no Being-uncovering apart from Dasein, it is the very interpretation of truth as uncovering which functions as a polemic against a subjectivist theory of truth wherein the locus of truth is the judgment or the thought of a "worldless subject." The all important factor is that truth as uncovering is relative to Dasein, whose transcendence precedes ontologically any encounter with beings such as we have in cognition. Subjectivism in which the cognitive subject dominates the object is rejected here even though truth is said to be relative to Dasein. It is Dasein and its disclosedness which is prior and makes possible the subject-object relation.

¹Ibid., H. 227. ²Ibid.
As Richardson states:

There-being is not a subject in relation to an object but it is this relation itself, sc. that which is 'between' subject and object. This 'between' is not derived from, and therefore subsequent to, the juxtaposition of subject and object, but is prior to the emergence of this relation, rendering it possible. ¹

Therefore, only on the basis of Dasein can there be a subject and object juxtaposed. We shall investigate in subsequent chapters the ontological ground or framework in mediaeval contexts within which and on the basis of which the subject-object relation has its existence.

(4.4) It is in the essay "On the Essence of Truth" that Heidegger firmly and explicitly grounds the inner possibility of truth or rightness in freedom as the essence of truth or possibility of truth. The reference to truth as Richtigkeit is reminiscent of St. Anselm's rectitudo, but they are situated in different contexts. Furthermore, the ground for rightness is different in each case, for Anselm such rightness is founded in God and for Heidegger it is grounded in freedom and das Offene. There is a difference between the development of the existential-ontological ground of truth in Being and Time and that in the essay on truth. In Being and Time truth as uncovering was situated in Dasein's disclosedness which involved being in truth and untruth equiprimordially. In the essay on truth Heidegger begins with the truth of the representative statement both as Uebereinstimmung and Richtigkeit, with the

¹Richardson, op. cit., p. 101.
latter of the two terms leading to the inner possibility of rightness and its basis in freedom. In the essay Heidegger follows through in the grounding of truth as rightness or agreement beyond Dasein and its disclosedness to ex-sistent revelatory Dasein which in turn is situated in the negatived Open itself or Being. As in Being and Time, so in the essay on the essence of truth there is a going beyond the truth of judgement to a pre-predicative truth. However, in his earlier treatment of truth Heidegger saw truth grounded in Dasein's disclosedness which belonged essentially to Dasein. Truth in its most primordial sense was placed in this disclosedness. In Vom Wesen der Wahrheit Heidegger is preoccupied with the possibility and basis of truth in its essence and truth for its own sake as Being. One respect in which this is seen is that we have talk here of authentic untruth in terms of "mystery," which is ontologically prior to "revealment" itself and therefore prior to Dasein's being in truth and untruth. Whereas in Being and Time the inquiry as to 'truth' and 'untruth' was bound to the analytic of Dasein, in the essay 'truth' is closely bound to das Seiende im Ganzen and to the sense of Sein itself. In the essay we have a further polemic ungainst that subjectivism which arises from errance as forgetfulness of authentic untruth or mystery which is the Un-wesen of truth. This forgetfulness of mystery is errance which is das wesentlicht Gegenwesen of the original essence of truth. Of the man who forgets he says: "He is the more mistaken the more exclusively he takes himself as the measure of all
things."¹ The dominating sense of 'truth' throughout the essay continues to be that of "non-concealment" or "revealment" but more with a view to Being than to beings uncovered. Heidegger raises the "still unmastered question" regarding das Sein des Seinden and leaves it open. With respect to Sein, hearing (Hören) is considered the appropriate response.

We cannot here deal with the manifold issues and problems found in the essay which would take us too far in many directions. Our present purpose is served if we consider the basic method and movement of the thought itself. We have already noted that Heidegger begins with the question as to the nature, the possibility, and the basis of the possibility of the truth of statement as "agreement" or "rightness." The statement is thought of as a "representation" of the thing itself. To reiterate a reference cited earlier: "The representative statement has its say about the thing represented, stating it to be such as it is. This 'such-as' (so-wie) applies to the representation and what it represents."² This is also formally analogous to what St. Anselm says in his treatise on truth concerning the true statement: "Vere et recta et vera est, cum significat esse quod est."³

In either case the true statement presents or represents the object. Heidegger speaks of the representation as "letting some-

²Ibid., p. 327. ³St. Anselm, De Veritate 2; AO I:178.
thing take up a position opposite to us, as an object.¹ Anselm's ground for the possibility of the right or true statement shall be seen to be situated in the "Supreme Truth" and created res, which make possible what for Heidegger is "attunement" (Gestimmtheit). For Heidegger the possibility of such rightness is rooted in what he calls the "Open" or "Overt" (das Offene) wherein freedom is operative and Gestimmtheit is achieved. The connection between Dasein's Erschlossenheit and the Open is not made decisively explicit. The character of the "Open" is however described as that area or sphere through which the thing opposite us carries itself across to us and manifests itself to us as a constant. The "open-ness" of the "Open" is not created by the representative statement but such a statement serves to implement a prior comportment realizable because of the "Open." Dasein as Being-discovering and das Seiende that is manifest are found in the "Open." It is in the "Open," that sphere or matrix of potential relationships, that "something-that-is-open" can appear as the object of knowledge. It is important to note how Heidegger sets his method over against Kant's transcendental method and conceptual categories. Das Offene is a positive way of rejecting certain preconceptions regarding consciousness and knowledge. Heidegger disregards those theories of consciousness, perception, and reality that would make any such traversing across such an "Open" highly problematical and

questionable. Heidegger's method involves neither a critical questioning as to the possibility of truth nor an attempt to prove such a possibility. He proceeds by way of clarification and analysis on the basis of a number of assumptions. Heidegger posits that "overt behavior" whereby the being that is manifest to There-being can become a criterion for the "representative statement." The true judgement is to be placed in this context. "The statement derives its rightness from the overtness of behavior, for it is only through this that anything manifest can become the criterion for the approximation implicit in the representative statement."¹ Heidegger's formulation makes it certain that the truth of rightness of the statement can be ascertained, for the judgement itself is dependent on the openness of the Open across which das Seiende comes to us. Heidegger does not find it necessary in such a context to wrestle with problems of logical form and the exact character of correspondence because of his understanding of truth which underlies the whole discussion, and his founding of the representative statement and its rightness in the comportment of Dasein to "(ein Offenbares als ein solches)."²

The further question has to do with the basis on which such a comportment with a being that is manifest is founded. For such a comportment is necessary if there is to be a criterion or measure according to which judgements can be checked in order to

¹Ibid., p. 329. ²Ibid., p. 328.
determine their truth or rightness. Heidegger is interested in inquiring deeper into that which makes possible the uncovering and unveiling of what-is. It is clear that he is directing his thought to truth as the revealment of beings—in-their-totality and the Being of beings. However, there are stages on the way. The basis of this inner possibility of rightness is "freedom." "The essence of truth is freedom." This "freedom" does not abandon truth to the caprice of man for it is not the random ability to do as we please nor is it licence. Heidegger makes explicit just what this freedom is:

Freedom was initially defined as freedom for the revelation of something already overt... The freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever "is" at the moment be what it is. Freedom reveals itself as the "letting-be" of what-is. This Seinlassen is not disregard or indifference but it is to be able to be open or overt, to accept a being as it is even as it is unveiled and open. This freedom then is far from the freedom to shape and to plan and to do with beings as one pleases. To be free is to be placed in the midst of the opened, Ψαλμοθεο, the Unconcealed. Such freedom, then, is to be seen as originating from Ζ’λθεια, the revealedness and revelation of what-is.

The nature of freedom, seen from the point of view of the nature of truth, now shows itself as an "exposition" into the revealed nature of what-is.

Just as freedom, being the essence of truth, is the ground for being in the truth, so too untruth must derive in the first

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1Ibid., p. 330. 2Ibid., p. 333. 3Ibid., p. 334.
place from the essence of truth and not simply from the finitude of man. Note here the change in emphasis from the Da to Sein in Dasein. Heidegger states:

On the contrary, untruth must derive from the essence of truth. Only because truth and untruth are not in essence indifferent to one another, can a true proposition contrast so sharply with its correspondingly untrue proposition.¹

The essence of truth being freedom which means participation in the revealment of what-is-in-totality, the dis-essence or non-essence of truth is the concealment of what-is-in-totality. It is in the particular "letting-be" or comportment itself that das Seiende im Ganzen is concealed. "In the ex-sistent freedom of Da-sein there is accomplished a dissimulation of what-is in totality and therein lies the concealment (Verborgenheit)."²

The very exposition into uncovering or emergence into non-concealment of beings-as-such-in-the-whole entails concealment both of beings-in-the-totality and Being, and forgetfulness of mystery, which is the primary mode of human erring. Just as truth in its most primordial sense is not a particular comportment wherein there may be manifest the quiddity of the singular, so the wrongness of a judgement is the most superficial way of erring. What then is this mystery or authentic untruth that pervades the whole of man's Da-sein? First, it is a concealment which is anterior to all revelation of this or that actuality and anterior to the Seinlassen which establishes the dissimulation or concealment. This is the concealment or hidden-ness of the

¹Ibid., pp. 337-338. ²Ibid., p. 340.
mystery or the concealed. This is authentic untruth, viz., that not even the concealed (Verborgen) is recognized but is concealed. This is ontologically prior to Dasein's letting-be. Dasein, by ex-sisting, reaffirms the most extreme non-revelation of all, authentic untruth, dis-essence or non-essence of truth, the mystery. Therefore in letting things be in totality the concealment itself appears as the initial thing concealed. The mystery, the authentic non-essence of truth, points into or denotes the yet unexplored region of the truth of Being (Sein) as well as the truth of das Seiende. Dasein in letting-things-be soon forgets the mystery and Dasein consequently ceases letting-be and dominates beings while at the same time being dominated by the forgotten mystery which has slipped back into concealment. This oblivion of the mystery, the failure to attend to the Being of beings-in-their-totality is human errance of the first order. The other types of error that consequently follow are confinement to immediate actualities, the covering of things as man makes himself the measure, and the wrongness (Unrichtigkeit) of judgment which is a most superficial way of erring. Dasein therefore is in-sistent as well as ex-sistent. "In-sisting, man is turned to the most readily accessible part of what-is."

1Dasein, however, can experience its errance and the forgotten-ness of the mystery and therefore recollect the mystery. The freedom which is the basis of propositional right-

1Ibid., p. 344.
ness arises from the original essence of truth, from the reign of mystery in error. To recognize errance, thereby becoming open to the mystery, is really to begin to inquire as to the essential nature of truth.

Gazing out of error into the mystery is a questioning in the sense of the only question that exists: What is that which is as such in totality? This question meditates the essentially confusing and, because of its multifarious aspects, still unmastered question regarding the Being of what-is (das Sein des Seienden).¹

In the concluding section of the essay Heidegger states explicitly the project for thought which he has had in mind from the beginning, even when dealing with the understanding of truth as conformity of statement to thing. In the essay Heidegger has stressed the non-essence (Unwesen) of truth composed of mystery, authentic untruth, and errance as forgottenness of the same. This was the concealment of beings-in-their-totality or concealment of the truth of das Sein des Seienden. Philosophy as the quest for the complete essence of truth, which includes also its non-essence, has a two-fold nature:

Its meditations have the calm dignity of gentleness, not denying the dissimulation of what-is in totality. At the same time they have the "open resolve" of hardness, which, while not shattering the dissimulation, forces its essence whole and intact into the open, into our understanding, and so to reveal its own truth.²

Recollection of the forgotten mystery therefore is the beginning of the quest for the manifest character or sense of the Being of what-is. The constantly recurring dominating theme throughout

¹Ibid., p. 347. ²Ibid., p. 348.
the essay, from statement to Being, is truth whose essence is nonconcealment or revelation and whose non-essence is concealment. Truth is, moreover, held in close proximity to Being.

As Werner Brock says:

The essay is kept in the utmost possible "nearness to Being". It is moving in the direction towards it as its goal, as the end of the Sections 7 and 8 show as clearly as does the concluding note. But no premature statement is made about the truth of Being.1

It appears that as we go from Dasein to Sein we also move from the former's Being-uncovering to its role of attending and being open to the mystery, which is to pose the Being-question itself.

As Heidegger himself asserts:

The present essay leads the question concerning the nature of truth beyond the accustomed confines of our fundamental ideas and helps us to consider whether this question of the essence of truth is not at the same time necessarily the question of the truth of essence. Philosophy, however, conceives "essence" as Being.2

All that has gone before must be considered in this light.

(4.5) It is necessary at this point to draw certain implications and inferences from the foregoing which will assist us in our further investigation. Our present concern is not to attempt to outline Heidegger's conclusions nor to attempt to evaluate his methodology and basic formulations, but to make those observations whereby we shall be better able to know just what factors are most crucial in a theory of truth.

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Throughout his discussion of truth Heidegger makes it abundantly clear that in order to deal adequately with a particular theory of truth one must explore the entire philosophical or theological system in which the theory is situated and examine the underlying beliefs and assumptions which are foundational and rudimentary. As Heidegger says in *Being and Time* where he briefly discusses the traditional conception of truth in reference to its primordial basis: "Here it is not our aim to provide a history of the concept of truth, which could be presented only on the basis of a history of ontology." In the first section of the essay on truth Heidegger does trace the accepted formula for the conventional concept of truth back to its "immediate (i.e. mediaeval) origins." The conventional concept is here understood as the approximation or agreement of statement or perception with the object and the correspondence of the thing or object with its exemplary idea. Although Heidegger's treatment of the formula- *'veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus'* is quite cursory, he does provide some of the framework and structure in which the mediaeval formula is to be studied. He indicates aspects of the substratum on which the *adaequatio* formula was grounded and made to rest. Hereby our attention is directed to the very necessary procedure of taking what is most apparent and proximate, for example, a particular statement or a common usage, and then clarifying it by tracing

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it back to its more primordial existential and ontological ground. By such a method it may be possible not only to uncover what is consciously and deliberately presupposed, but also to formulate a critique in which implicit and even acknowledged assumptions are brought to light. Heidegger pursues this method with respect to truth as propositional rightness by taking note of its derivative character and its realization on the basis of the "overt character of behavior," which is grounded in ex-sistent freedom and in the essence of Being. W. Brock speaks of Heidegger's tracing back of the traditional formula cited above:

The reason for this reference to the more comprehensive setting of the problem of truth would appear to be that Heidegger is convinced that the conception of truth is always essentially related to the interpretation of the nature of all that exists, attempted in any age or in any greater historic era. . . . In other words, the reference to the historic setting is the first, if implicit, refutation of the theory that the seat of truth is in the proposition and its agreement with a fact or a thing. —The reference shows, too, that Heidegger's apparently purely systematic expositions are accompanied by an acute historical consciousness; in this case it is also to prepare for the greater historic perspective which is to open up later in the essay.1

It is not possible to deal successfully with problems pertaining to 'truth', logic, and the meaning of language without delving into ontological, extra-linguistic, and extra-logical factors constituting the basis and context for the former. As Samuel Thompson says:

Every truth claim has logical supposition, that is, it refers

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1W. Brock, "An Account of 'The Four Essays'," pp. 151-152.
to being in some of its modes. We can examine a truth claim only if we know what order of being it refers to, and this involves us in ontology.¹

Much of the difficulty that has arisen in connexion with the formulation of theories of truth and the evaluation of the same, and in the determination of the nature of truth claims and the possibility of verification, can be attributed to such factors as unclarified and uncritically accepted assumptions, and a neglect or disregard of the complex, variegated, and determinative environmental 'whole' or 'world' in which the existing cognitive subject is situated. The 'whole' is, and the existing subject is situated therein, irrespective of the response to and the interpretation of the 'whole'.

(4.5.2) Heidegger also prompts a more open and positive treatment of the question of 'truth' by means of a number of steps that he has followed. Firstly, Heidegger does not wish to restrict the understanding of 'truth' to Uebereinstimmung or adaequatio. He introduces more primordial conceptions of truth while at the same time rejecting the judgement as the primary locus of truth. His view of the statement as a "re-presentation (vor-stellen)" of the thing immediately directs us beyond the statement to res and Dasein. Logical and linguistic analysis consequently demand an examination of the ontological and existential setting or context in which logical truth is situated.

Secondly, by seeking to retrieve the understanding of "\text{\textalpha\textlambda\texteta\textomicron}\text{\textepsilon\textomicron}\text{\textalpha}\" as "revealment" or act of revealing he makes it possible to avoid some of the problems present in correspondence theory where the predominant notion is "agreement" or "likeness" or "approximation." Heidegger, therefore, focuses our attention upon Dasein, the object, ex-sistence, i.e., those elements which provide the basis or context in which the true statement can come to be and reveal or conceal. Thirdly, by using such words as 'truth', 'freedom', 'essence', and numerous others in unexpected and extraordinary ways, Heidegger is able to question generally accepted usage which in itself often gives rise to unnecessary and false problems. He stresses greater flexibility in usage thereby avoiding problems that are to a large degree founded in customary usage. Fourthly, by discussing truth in terms of ontology and by speaking of the truth of Being or Essence he raises the question regarding the primordial ground of every kind of truth.

(4.5.3) Heidegger, then, in a number of ways assists us in our attempt to relate logical truth or truth as representative statement to a number of factors that are ontologically prior and which must be interpreted and understood if logical truth is to be adequately grounded. It is also important to note that what is first encountered and nearest us may in fact be ontologically last in order, and that which is first known and experienced may become an insurmountable barrier to the unveiling of that which is foundational for all experience and cognition.
This is what Heidegger has in mind with "errance (Irre)," the *Gegenwesen* of the original essence of truth, which is a forgetfulness of the mystery, the concealment of the concealed, authentic untruth. Failure to bear in mind that what is immediate and nearest us, whether it happens to be a statement, sensation, or consciousness, is not necessarily prior in being has resulted in false questions and problems, such as have prevailed in theories of representative perception, and in addition has caused or permitted that which is to be measured to dominate the measure and to function as criteria themselves. This development reaches its radical and fully realized proportions particularly when statements and ideas, having achieved the status of copies or pictures of reality, are absolutized insofar as their mode of being is not clarified. They then are no longer measured by their referents because they have been identified with them and become criteria themselves. Heidegger has pointed out how a transition in the understanding of both 'ἐλεύθερον' and 'λόγος' has fostered this.

(4.5.4) In introducing some of the different senses that have been attributed to 'truth' and analyzing the notion of correspondence Heidegger points up the need for more careful definition. Although an interpretation or conception of 'truth' may initially be formulated consciously, deliberately, and even critically, through subsequent usage such a conception or formulation is taken up as something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand and is no longer considered in relation to its source and
the context in which it was formulated. This involves us in an uncritical and naive usage of a term in that its sense is assumed to be absolutely fixed and the term itself becomes determinative and normative. Such can also be the case with the conception of 'truth' that Heidegger seeks to recover from its hiddenness, if truth as "revealment" is allowed to become a fixed and wholly determinate concept which is then used strictly in accordance with the rules of a logical grammar. What is most dangerous is the employment of 'truth' without any really clear or explicit sense so that 'truth' merely prompts a vague feeling. Heidegger poses the question concerning 'truth':

If, therefore, we must ask after truth, then an answer is demanded to the question: "Where do we stand to-day?" We want to know what our position is. We call for the goal which shall be set for man, both in his history and for his history. We want the real "truth". Well, truth then! ... But in calling for real "truth" we must already know what in fact is meant by truth. Or do we only know by "feeling" and in a "general" sort of way? Yet is not this vague "knowing" and this indifference to the vagueness of it even more wretched than plain ignorance of the nature of truth?

Part of our purpose in the following pages is to ascertain and to set forth the different senses that 'truth' and 'true' have in the thought of Robert Grosseteste, and in the thought of St. Augustine and St. Anselm as background to Grosseteste. It will become apparent that all three use these words with more than a single sense or meaning. For example, although St. Anselm defines 'truth' as 'rectitudo', the latter does not have the exact same

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sense in each instance of use. Moreover, in one specific usage more than one sense may be included and intended.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND TO GROSSETESTE'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH IN ST.

AUGUSTINE'S AND ST. ANSELM'S DOCTRINES OF TRUTH

It would be both presumptuous and unrealistic to suppose that one could in a single chapter treat fully and adequately St. Augustine's and St. Anselm's notions of truth, especially when one considers that whole works have been devoted to these subjects. In addition to these, a number of general works and articles on their thought could be cited in which their doctrines of truth are discussed. It should also be noted that in dealing with their doctrines of truth one is also dealing with certain of their other doctrines including ontological and epistemological notions. As Rudolf Schneider states: "Ebenso ist bei Augustin eine Trennung von Theologie und Ontologie unmöglich. Die Seinsbegriffe durchziehen seine gesamte Theologie." In view of these observations it is mandatory that

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1 C. Boyer, L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de s. Augustin; G.S. Heyer Jr., "Rectitudo in the Theology of St. Anselm" (thesis); R. Pouchet, La rectitudo chez saint Anselme.

2 R. Schneider, Seele and Sein (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1957), p. 27.
our present inquiry be selective, concise, and confined to key themes directly bound up with their doctrines of truth. In spite of the difficulty of dealing with such major topics within a relatively brief space it is essential that these primary sources of Grosseteste's doctrine of truth be examined.

In the third and fourth chapters we shall see that there are a number of significant sources from which Grosseteste draws, although in the formulation of his doctrine of truth he is primarily indebted to St. Anselm and St. Augustine. It is in the area of cognitive and propositional truth that Grosseteste also makes use of another tradition which is expressed in the phrase 'adaequatio rei et intellectus'. In his De Veritate treatise Grosseteste refers to all of the above notions of truth. However, as we shall observe, even though Grosseteste does draw from the above sources in constructing his doctrine of truth the latter is no mere synthesis of the former. Grosseteste's doctrine has its own distinctive and unique character and is no mere eclectic system.

This inquiry into Augustine's and Anselm's doctrine of truth should also make apparent some of the development that occurs within the Augustinian tradition. Both Anselm and Grosseteste show a greater interest in the truth of created res lying outside the rational soul than does Augustine. Augustine
was particularly preoccupied with the itinerary of the soul seeking God. In conjunction with this Augustine focused a great deal of attention upon truth as it resides in the mind. This preoccupation is due in part to a negative attitude to the sensible corporeal world which attitude is not present to the same degree in Anselm and Grosseteste. Augustine's exposure to Manichaeism, Scepticism, Neoplatonism, and the crises of his age contributed greatly to this negative attitude. Anselm's and Grosseteste's personal histories are markedly different from that of Augustine. For example, Augustine's agonizing struggle for certainty is not shared by Anselm or Grosseteste. R. W. Southern goes so far as to say that "Anselm followed Augustine in his conception of the relations between Faith and Reason, but so far as he allows us to see he had never known doubt."¹ One may want to question the categorical nature of this judgement but it certainly is true that Anselm displays a confidence and deliberate procedure not found in Augustine. At the same time one must remember Anselm's and Grosseteste's avowed indebtedness to Augustine and Anselm's claim to be consistent with his doctrine.² Both the differences and the fundamental areas of consensus must be kept in view.


²Monologion, Prologus; AO I:8.
PART A. ST. AUGUSTINE’S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH

One of the difficulties that one faces in the study of a particular facet of Augustine’s doctrine is that his thought on a specific subject is often dispersed throughout a number of his works. There are of course many works such as De Trinitate, De Mendacio, De Libero Arbitrio, and De Quantitate Animae which deal with specified subjects, but even in such works a considerable number of subjects are discussed. For example, in his De Trinitate there is also teaching on the soul, faith, knowledge, and truth; and in De Libero Arbitrio we find a demonstration of the existence of God as well as teaching on truth and epistemological doctrine. In the Soliloquia there is theological doctrine and an argument for the immortality of the soul presented in connection with the major theme dealing with the soul’s quest for the truth and God. It is in the Confessiones that we find significant teaching on time, creation, the nature and presence of God. One reason for the absence of a deliberate order and system in the writing of Augustine is that his literary production arose out of and corresponds to his own intellectual and spiritual pilgrimage. The course of his writing reflects his own personal history and life’s experiences rather than a systematic prearranged plan. The recurrence of such subjects as God, grace, truth, soul, faith, wisdom, and understanding reflects Augustine’s unceasing interest in the same. Augustine’s coherent and integrated view of the Creator and creation also helps to
account for the convergence of a number of different topics within a single work. For Augustine God is the point of convergence and the subject in which all the other subjects finally cohere. All created entities are related and cohere ultimately in God, the *summa veritas*. The continuity and coherence of Augustine's thought is due in large part to the following desire: "Deum et animam scire cupio." This desire must be kept in mind if one is to understand Augustine's mind and philosophy. G. Nygren rightly says that "Augustine's theology constitutes an articulated whole with a definitely determined ideational structure, which does not allow an element to be considered apart from its relationship with the others." If this is clearly understood one is less apt to be misled by the diffuse and fragmentary form of much of Augustine's writing. Only in understanding Augustine's doctrine of truth and its central position can one begin to appreciate the coherent structure and interrelated facets of his thought.

1. Introduction to St. Augustine's doctrine of truth

(1.1) The development of Augustine's doctrine of truth and its central place in his thought

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1 De Lib. Arb. II. 13. 36-37; 15.39; De Util. Cred. 15.33; Conf. I. 5.6; Solil. I. 1. 3; De Trin VIII. 2.3; De Civ. Dei XI.18.

2 Solil. I.2.7; PL 32: 872.

An important question concerning Augustine's doctrine in general, and his doctrine of truth in particular, is whether there were any major changes in his thought in the period after 386, that is, during the period after his conversion. There have been opposing views as to whether there were any radical alterations in the basic doctrine of Augustine with the likes of Gilson taking the negative side and Rottmanner the affirmative.\(^1\) Although one can readily assert that there is development in Augustine's thought after his conversion to Christianity in 386, a number of basic beliefs were firmly fixed at the beginning, some already at Cassiciacum and some even prior to this period. In support of the continuity of such beliefs one notes in his review of the *Soliloquia* in the *Retractions* (I.4) no major corrections except where he repudiates the reference to reminiscence and puts divine illumination in its place. He states that he had already argued against reminiscence in *De Trinitate* (XII). Although the majority of Augustine's works made their appearance after he became priest at Hippo, even before his conversion he had developed notions concerning being, truth, wisdom, and the like which were normative throughout his life. These notions certainly underwent modification under the impact of his Christian experience, but the same notions continued to

be determinative and part of the very fabric of his thought.

A number of these notions were derived from and inspired by Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism provided the setting within which Augustine encountered and interpreted the Christian Faith. It is an oversimplification to say that Augustine utilized the Neoplatonic doctrine that was consistent with his faith and revised what was contrary to his faith.¹ My reason for saying this is that Augustine utilized Neoplatonic concepts and categories in the very formulation of his theological doctrine and to a great extent understood his faith in terms of Neoplatonic doctrine. The above oversimplification tends to give the impression that Augustine approached Neoplatonism as a critical detached inquirer whereas he in fact approached the Christian Faith and the Scriptures from within the Neoplatonic tradition. This sheds some light on the much disputed question as to whether Augustine was really a Christian or a Neoplatonist at Cassiciacum. Portalie argues that Augustine was indeed a Christian at Cassiciacum and says of this period: "There are not two truths for Augustine; there is only the one which he has found in the Gospel. He is now seeking reasons for it in philosophy."² Portalie's remarks seem to suggest that Augustine first held the truth "found in the Gospel" and then carefully and deliberately selected philosophical notions in support of this truth. While

¹Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I. 84. 5.

keeping in mind the profound differences which exist between the doctrine of Augustine and Neoplatonism,¹ it must be said that Augustine's theology and understanding and formulation of the Christian Faith were affected and influenced considerably by Neoplatonic tenets.

This can be illustrated, in particular, in the case of Augustine's understanding of the nature of truth and its central importance. When Augustine comes to that point where he believes that 'truth' must be applied above all to the God of Scripture he comes to understand the nature of God in large part in terms of the previously established sense of the word 'truth'. Emile Cailliet states: "The ultimate confusion is found at the point where Augustine, having found the true God of Scripture, still strives to explain him and relate himself to him in terms of an ontology of Platonic inspiration."² One of the consequences of understanding and conceiving of the nature of God in terms of these doctrines of truth and being is that some of the Biblical content and meaning is liable to be blocked out and kept from coming into view.

However, when Augustine began to use 'truth' of the God of Scripture³ the term acquired a new significance. This did not

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¹E.g. Doctrines of God, Trinity, Creation, Sin, Grace, and History.
³Cf. p. 105, n. 1.
come about so much through a repudiation of the prior sense of the term as by reason of the new referent and what this meant to Augustine. Nothing in the Plotinian hierarchy, including the One, could compare with the triune God whom Augustine encounters. This is borne out by Augustine's own words\(^1\) even though he himself professes to find in the *Enneads* the "idem omnino" that is found in the prologue of John's Gospel.\(^2\) The surface similarities between certain doctrines of Plotinus and Augustine do not cancel out the profound differences that exist. This is clearly evident when one sets his doctrine of the Trinity over against the Neoplatonic triad. It appears that Augustine himself did not fully realize or appreciate the magnitude of the gulf or chasm that stood between his Christian beliefs and Neoplatonism. What is clear is that the meaning of the word 'truth' could not remain altogether unchanged once Augustine used it to signify primarily the God of the Scriptures.

In connexion with the above it can also be said that truth was a central concern for Augustine even before his conversion in 386. Neoplatonism called man to contemplation of the truth, the eternal and intelligible Ideas. Gilson says of the doctrine of Plato and Plotinus: "When a man philosophizes and, discarding his body, focuses his mind upon intelligible truth, he simply

\(^1\) Solil. I.1,2,3,4; Conf. I.4.4; VII.10.16; XIII.16.19; *De Trin.* IV. 1.3; et passim.

\(^2\) Conf. VII.9.13.
behaves like a god who remembers to be a god."¹ Augustine long believed that man's calling was to seek truth and wisdom and the contemplation of the same. This belief was deepened and reinforced when Augustine embraced the Christian faith.

Truth also occupies a strategic position in the thought of Augustine by reason of the fact that one can only achieve beatitudo through knowledge and love of the Truth which is God. "Nemo enim beatus est, nisi summo bono, quod in ea veritate, quam sapientiam vocamus, cernit et tenetur."² Augustine states that the Truth is "non solum bonum, sed etiam summum bonum, et beatificum esse conceded."³ The mind "beatus ergo erit, si nulla interpellante molestia de ipsa, per quam uera sunt omnia, sola ueritate gaudebit."⁴ Truth is central both as a prerequisite to beatitudo and as the foundation of all true things. Inasmuch as the vision of the veritas and beatitudo is not a necessary concomitant of human existence it is the object of a serious and diligent quest. It is divine grace which enables man to attain knowledge of the truth and subsequent beatitudo. "Sed quoniam non sicut homo sponte cecidit, ita etiam sponte surgere

¹E. Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 56.

²De Lib. Arb. II. 9. 26; PL 32: 1254; cf. also De Lib. Arb. II. 13.35; 15.39; 19.52; De Beata Vita 2.14; 4.34,35; De Mor. Eccl. I.6.10; I.11.18; De Quant. Animae 33. 76.

³De Lib. Arb. II. 15. 39; PL 32: 1262.

potest, porrectam nobis desuper dexteram Dei, id est Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum...

Augustine repeatedly emphasizes, particularly in his later works, man's need of sanctifying grace whereby he becomes an adopted son of God. The creation of man is itself grounded in divine grace.

This stands in marked contrast to the Platonic and Neoplatonic man who has access to truth by reason of his own divinity. As Gilson states: "A god may eventually forget himself but he cannot possibly stand in need of being saved." Augustine held that man was in dire need of that salvation which could only be achieved through knowledge of the Truth made possible through grace. Such knowledge, of course, is considerably more than sheer intellectual apprehension.

We may have occasion later to look at the religious and moral character of this human knowledge and wisdom. Augustine says: "Hominis autem sapientia pietas est... Sed nihil est commodius illo nomine, quo evidenter Dei cultus expressus est, cum quid esset homini sapientia diceretur."

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1De Lib. Arb. II.20. 54; PL 32:1270.

2Serm. 26.8.9; 26.6.7; De Gen. ad Litt. VI.25.36; De Civitate Dei XIII.20.

3E. Gilson, God and Philosophy, p. 57.


5Enchir. 1.2; BA, Ire Série, 9:102.
The nature and centrality of this Truth is what governs Augustine's conception of philosophy.

(1.2) Truth and philosophy

Augustine speaks of the nature of philosophy in making reference to the impact that Cicero's Hortensius once had upon him: "apud te est enim sapientia. amor autem sapientiae nomen graecum habet philosophiam, quo me accendebant illae litterae."¹ Insofar as God is himself wisdom,² as is his Son,³ it follows that philosophy is the love of God and the philosopher is therefore truly the lover of God.⁴ Philosophy is therefore even more than a way of life, it is the way of salvation. This is what makes the quest for truth and wisdom so urgent. "Quando quidem nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit; quod autem beatum facit, ipse est finis boni; nulla est igitur causa philosophandi, nisi finis boni . . . ."⁵ I do not believe that Grabowski puts it strongly enough where he states that for Augustine "wisdom or philosophy practically means a conduct of life which is in harmony with Christian ideals:

¹Conf. III.4.8; EA 13:374.
²De Civ. Dei VIII.1; De Trinitate XIV.1.1.
³De Lib. Arb. II.15.39; De Vera Relig. 55.110; In Joan. Evang. 38.11.
⁴De Civ. Dei VIII.1.
⁵De Civ. Dei XVIII.1; CSEL 40,2:366.
philosophy is Christian living."¹ For Augustine, philosophy is a religious way as well as a moral way. "Deus ergo ipse summa sapientia, cultus autem Dei sapientia est hominis, de qua nunc loquimur."² Philosophy and religion must not be divorced: "Sic enim creditur et docetur, quod est humanae salutis caput, non aliam esse philosophiam, id est sapientiae studium, et aliam religionem, cum hi, quorum doctrinam non approbamus, nec sacramenta nobiscum communicant."³ In accordance with his conception of philosophy Augustine says that the Christian man, although ignorant of the philosophers, is to be preferred because he knows God. The philosophers expend themselves in seeking to know God who is the "causa constitutae uniuersitatis et lux percipiendae ueritatis et fons bibendae felicitatis."⁴ 'Philosophers' who hold these beliefs are in agreement with Christians.

It is not surprising therefore that Augustine prefers the Socratic philosophy to that of the physicists. "Socrates ergo primus uniuersam philosophiam ad corrigendos componendosque mores flexisse memoratur. . . ."⁵ He speaks of Plato's synthesis

¹S.J. Grabowski, The All-Present God (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1954), p. 274.
²De Trin. XIV.1.1; PL 42:1037.
³De Vera Relig. 5.8; CCSL 32:193.
⁴De Civ. Dei VIII.8; CSEL 40,1:371.
⁵Ibid. VIII.3; CSEL 40,1.356.
of Pythagoras' interest in contemplation with Socrates' ethical and practical concern, and Plato's subsequent division of philosophy into moral, natural, and rational philosophy. As the basis of all three one is to seek the "unum uerum optimum Deum, sine quo nulla natura subsistit, nulla doctrina instruit, nullus usus expedit: ipse quaeatur, ubi nobis seria sunt omnia; ipse cernatur, ubi nobis certa sunt omnia; ipse diligatur, ubi nobis recta sunt omnia." Here again Augustine's theocentric perspective is most apparent. Although he recognizes this threefold division he does not devote himself to any one area for its own sake. For example, although he considers logic to be a prerequisite to both moral and natural philosophy and states that he knows more about dialectics than any other part of philosophy, dialectics is to be used simply as a means in seeking a vision of the Truth. Dialectic is used in the Soliloquia in an attempt to prove the immortality of the soul and in the treatise De Libero Arbitrio to prove the existence of God. He speaks of the "ratio disputandi" as that discipline whereby the other disciplines are true. Nevertheless, Augustine is not primarily interested in grammar, rhetoric, logic, or any other specific discipline. He regrets that time when he was too much interested in

\[1\text{Ibid. VIII.4; CSEL 40,1:360.}\]
\[2\text{Ibid. VIII.4.}\]
\[3\text{Contra Acad. III.13.29.}\]
\[4\text{Soliloquia II.11.21; PL 32:895.}\]
grammar and rhetoric rather than in the commandments of God.¹ He refers to those lovely things which once kept him from God who is Beauty itself.² According to Augustine philosophy is the way one takes in seeking God who is the summa veritas. His understanding of philosophy is truly determined by his doctrine of truth. Portalie says: "Clearly, then, there is a philosophy of St. Augustine, but so intimately is it linked with his theology that the two cannot be separated."³ "His starting-point was not the philosophical calm of contemplation, as with the Neoplatonist, but the Christian's desire to reach his maker."⁴ Augustine describes his course as follows: "Hac Dei gratia, qua in nos ostendit magnum miserericordiam suam, et in hac uta per fidem regimur, et post hanc utam per ipsam speciem incommutabilis veritatis ad perfectionem plenissimam perducemur."⁵ The true philosopher strives after this immutable Truth

(1.3) Factors determinative of Augustine's notion of truth

(1.3.1) It is outside the range of our immediate interest to explore fully Augustine's teaching concerning doubt and certainty as related to faith, knowledge, reason, and authority. Our present intention is simply to note that there is an immedi-

¹Conf. I.18.28. ²Conf. X.27.38.
³E. Portalie, op. cit., p. 90.
⁵De Civ. Dei X.22; CSEL 40,1:483,484.
ate and mutually determinative relationship between Augustine's notion of truth and his conception of and concern for certainty. This is not to say that either conception, in and by itself, wholly determines the other. It is only proposed that his doctrine of truth and his quest for certainty affect and tend to reinforce each other.

Although Augustine only embraced the Scepticism of the Academics for a short time prior to his conversion, he continued after 386 to struggle with doubt and to strive after certitude. This struggle had a pronounced impact on his thought. In the De Vera Religione Augustine utilizes the fact of doubt itself as evidence.¹ He argues that if one doubts he is certain of one truth at least, viz., that he doubts: "Omnis ergo, qui utrum sit ueritas dubitat, in se ipso habet uerum, unde non dubitet, nec illum uerum nisi ueritate uerum est."² In a single stroke Augustine sought both to refute that scepticism which blocked the path to knowledge of the truth and to find reasons for that which he believed. Even after he saw that faith was essential he continued to seek that certainty which could not be founded on authority or sense perception.³

Augustine's anxiety over certainty was much more than an intellectual problem. "To find a positive basis for knowledge

³De Lib. Arb. II.2.5,6; II.15.39; Enchir.1.4,5; De Vera Relig. 8.14; Contra Acad. III.20.43; De Trin. VII.6.12; XV.1.1; De Civ. Dei XVII.17; In Joan Evang. XXIX.6.
was for the young Augustine a task not of playful dialectics but of anxious moral concern."¹ In his desire for certitude Augustine was drawn to Manichaeism for no other reason "nisi quod se dicebant terribili auctoritate separata mera et simplici ratione eos, qui se audire vellent, introducturos ad deum et errore omni liberaturos."² He discovered no ground for certitude in Manichaean materialism and its appeal to the sensible. Truth is distant from the minds of those vain men "qui nimis in haec corporalia progressi atque lapsi nihil aliud putant esse quam quod istis quinque notissimis nuntiis corporis sentiunt..."³ That which is mutable and corporeal can hardly serve as a basis for knowledge and certitude.⁴ Even corporeal figures only imitate the truth, viz., geometrical figures.⁵ If certainty is to be attained one must appeal to the realm of the intelligible where the immutable is to be found.

Augustine sought more than mere proof or evidence. He desired a necessary and self-evident certainty. He refers to his stay in Milan prior to his conversion at which time he was struggling to believe. He writes: "uolebam enim eorum quae non

²De Util. Cred. 1.2; CSEL 25.7. ³Ibid. 1.1; CSEL 25:7.
⁵Solil. II.18.32.
Although he came to recognize the utility of faith in a number of areas, the necessary statement or truth continued to serve as the sign and model of true certainty. In seeking to refute the scepticism of the Academicians he utilizes self-evident disjunctive propositions. He also uses necessary truths in his argument for the existence of Truth, viz., God. In the second book of his Soliloquies Augustine argues for the immortality of the soul on the basis of the immortal and immutable truths of dialectic and geometry.

In such necessary truths Augustine discovers the greatest possible certainty or certitude. It is clear that truth as correspondence and certainty as known correspondence are not primary here. If there is correspondence it is that which lies between these necessary truths and the eternal rationes which the former reflect.

These necessary truths do not have to be verified through an appeal to authority, sense experience, or the mutable human mind. The mind comes to know these truths through divine illumination. These immutable truths are not perceived by the senses

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1Conf. VI.4.6; BA 13:528. 2Contra Acad. III.10.23.


4Solil. II.11.19-21; II.19.33-20.35.

5De Vera Relig. 55.113; Retract. I.4.4; Solil. I.1.3; I.6.12; I.8.15; Conf. X.26.37; De Trin. XII.15.24,25; XIV.15.21; XV.27.50.
and are not situated in the sensible world. He says: "Unum vero quisquis verissime cogitat, prophetc invent corporis sensibus non posse sentiri."\(^1\) Geometrical figures or truths are not known through the senses\(^2\) and are not to be found in corporeal objects.\(^3\) These immutable truths and figures are situated in the mind, therefore "per hoc in nostro animo etiam veritas esse cogitur."\(^4\) The source of these truths is in the Truth itself. Augustine states that such truths as 'equals must be compared with equals' and 'the uncorrupted thing is better than the corrupted thing' are contemplated by those "qui haec valent sua quisque ratione ac mente conspicere. . . ."\(^5\) Augustine points out that these truths understood by the mind are not taught by some teacher outside us. It is the interior truth and teacher which must be listened to and consulted.\(^6\) To achieve certainty one must turn from the mutable and sensible world. He describes certain knowledge as follows: "Quid enim appetit curiositas nisi cognitionem, quae certa esse non potest nisi rerum aeternum et eodem modo se semper habentium?\(^7\)

\(^1\)De Lib. Arb. II.8.22; PL 32:1252.
\(^2\)Solil. I.4.9,10; II.20.35. \(^3\)Solil. II.18.32; II.19.33.
\(^4\)Solil. II.19.33; PL 32:901.
\(^5\)De Lib. Arb. II.10.29; PL 32:1256.
\(^6\)De Magistro 11.38-12.40.
\(^7\)De Vera Relig. 52.101; CCSL 32:252.
Truth is not subject to the limitations and variations of space and time for "omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna; nullo loco est, nusquam deest. . . ."\(^1\)

Augustine also sought certainty by doing away with such intermediaries as authority, the spoken and written word, the senses, and even the reasoning process. He desired direct and immediate intuition of immutable Truth. As he states: "Religet ergo nos religio uni omnipotenti deo, quia inter mentem nostram, qua illum intellegimus, patrem et veritatem, id est lucem interiorem, per quam illum intellegimus, nulla interposita creatura est."\(^2\) We note here that the Truth is referred to as the "interior light." The mind has immediate contact with this light. Reference has already been made to that certainty which is grounded in a reflexive act of the mind. This is the first of the certitudes even though it pertains to a mutable thinking, doubting, or erring subject.\(^3\) The mind knows itself directly without having to appeal to some intermediary. "Sed cum dicitur menti, Cognosce te ipsam, eo ictu quo intelligit quod dictum est, Te ipsam, cognoscit se ipsam; nec ob aliud, quam eo quod sibi praesens est."\(^4\) Every mind is conscious of its own understanding, doubting, being, and life.\(^5\) The existence of the knowing and thinking


\(^{2}\text{De Vera Relig. 55.113; CCSL 32:259-260.}\)

\(^{3}\text{Enchir. 7.20; De Lib. Arb. II.3.7; Solil. II.1.1; De Civ. Dei XI.26.}\)

\(^{4}\text{De Trin. X.9.12; PL 42:980.}\)

\(^{5}\text{De Trin. X.10.13,14; XV.12.21.}\)
self is demonstrated on the basis of the mind’s direct consciousness of its own activity. One is to look for truth and certainty within one’s own mind. Ratio therefore says: "Avertere ab umbra tua, revertere in te . . . ."¹ One can readily see why Augustine placed such a high value on that intelligible and immutable truth which man can discover within his own mind.

(1.3.2) Augustine’s doctrine of truth was also shaped and influenced by a number of other very significant factors. The Platonic and Neoplatonic legacy, with its notion of what constitutes reality, was a cardinal determinant in the formation of Augustine’s doctrine. In his refutation of scepticism Augustine made considerable use of this ontology, especially the sensible-intelligible dichotomy. In answering the Academicians Augustine appealed to Plato’s intelligible world.²

(1.3.3) Augustine’s understanding of truth was also determined by his notion of perfection. According to Augustine supreme perfection must include ontological and moral immutability. The mutable entity is not supremely perfect since it may lose some of its being, goodness, and truth. Consequently, only immutable truth and being can be called supremely perfect and serve as the basis for certain knowledge. Change and even the possibility of change belong to lesser or subordinate goods.

¹Solil. II.19.33; PL 32:901.
²Contra Acad. III.11.26; III.17.37.
The supreme Good is the eternal and immutable Good. Concerning mutable goods Augustine has this to say:

Thus it comes to pass that neither are the good things striven for by sinners in any way bad, nor is free will itself, which we are told should be counted as holding a middle place among good things; but that evil is the turning away of the will from the immutable good, and the turning towards mutable goods.¹

One reason why Augustine will not permit the introduction of any mutability or change into supreme perfection or being is that he has a restricted notion of mutability and change. Augustine believes that mutability can only signify and must always entail the possibility of the loss of being or absence of being. Where there is mutability there must also be possible a loss of being. He does not allow for a mutability or process of change which is at the same time exempt from the possibility of loss of being and truth, in other words, a possible or actual change without the possibility of evil.

of the Platonic or Neoplatonic meaning are retained. This may help to explain how Augustine is able to find certain basic affinities between Biblical or Christian teaching and Neoplatonic tenets. As noted above, Augustine finds such an affinity between the prologue to John's Gospel and the teaching of the Enneads. It could be argued that he simply misread the Enneads. However, this could be only a partial explanation. Could it not also be argued that Augustine had introduced Neoplatonic content and doctrine into the prologue to the Gospel? However, upon examination of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity and his commentary on the prologue to John's Gospel it becomes evident that the declared affinity is basically superficial, and in this instance results in large part from a misreading of the Neoplatonic sources. That such is the case is indicated in the commentary on the prologue where Augustine states that the philosophers also teach "that by the Word of God all things were made .... and that God has an only-begotten Son, by whom are all things." Notwithstanding, Augustine's use of Neoplatonic

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2 De Trinitate IV;V;VI;VII;VIII.

3 In Joan Evang. I;II;—covering John 1.1-14.

concepts and motifs$^1$ accounts in part for the positing of these congruities.

The impact of extrabiblical doctrines, such as the Platonic inspired ontology and exemplarism, is manifest in Augustine's exegesis of Scripture. These doctrines not only affected his interpretation of Scripture, they could also cause unnecessary difficulty in the exposition of a particular text. One such text is John 8:26: "I have much to say about you and much to judge; but he who sent me is true [ἀληθής, verax], and I declare to the world what I have heard from him."$^2$ In his exposition of this text$^3$ Augustine finds the expression "he who sent me is true" to be problematical. According to the theory of exemplarism and the doctrine of universals it would appear that God the Father is subordinate to the Son who is the Truth. Augustine declares that piety is greater than he who is pious by virtue of participation in piety, and goodness is greater than the soul that is good through participation in goodness. So it is with that which is true in relation to the Truth. God the Father, however, is not subordinate to God the Son. Augustine seeks to resolve the difficulty by saying:

But the true Father is true of Himself, for he begat the Truth. It is one thing to say, That man is true, for he has taken in the truth: it is another, God is true, for

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$^1$In Joan. Evang. I.16.  
$^2$Revised Standard Version.  
$^3$In Joan Evang. XXXIX.7,8; trans. Gibb and Innes, op. cit., p. 224.
He begat the Truth. See then how God is true, — not by participating in, but by generating the Truth.¹

The consequences are at least twofold: presupposed notions already cited have led Augustine to this forced interpretation of 'verax'.

1.4 Truth as a determinative factor

Just as Augustine's conception of truth was determined and dictated in large measure by the factors cited above so did his conception of truth affect his epistemological beliefs and reinforce his view of certainty. In other words, on the basis of his conception of the nature of truth he had to have an epistemology and the kind of certainty that would be commensurate with his notion of truth. If truth is incorporeal, intelligible, and immutable, then it can only be perceived by the mind and its character as truth must be self-evident to the mind. In the demonstration of such truth appeal must be made to mental facts and experience. Such a demonstration is not achieved through empirical verification and the bodily senses. One must flee from the corporeal and mutable world and seek within the mind and especially above the mind the immutable and eternal Truth.

2. The nature of truth and the true according to St. Augustine

In examining Augustine's doctrine of truth one is also engaged in a consideration of Augustine's doctrine of God, his doctrine of being, and other closely related doctrines. This is to

¹In Joan Evang. XXXIX. 8; trans. Gibb and Innes, op. cit., p. 224.
be expected in view of the usage of 'veritas' adopted by Augustine. The situation would be quite different if Augustine had confined the application of 'veritas' and 'verus' simply to the proposition or to thought. However, his usage of these words is more extensive than that. We do well, therefore, to consider first of all the meaning and usage of 'veritas', 'verus', and related terms.

(2.1) The signification of 'veritas', 'verus', and related signs

(2.1.1) To know what Augustine intends when using 'veritas' one must be familiar with his notion of 'ipsum esse'.1 'Ipsum esse' is truly reserved for God alone who is "incommutabilis substantia vel essentia."2 'Ipsum esse' is used to designate and to set apart the supreme esse of God. 'Veritas' signifies 'ipsum esse' but its sense is not strictly coterminous with that of 'ipsum esse' or the expression that God "vere summeque est."3

(2.1.2) 'Veritas' also signifies 'relations' both within the being of God and between the eternal Word or Wisdom and the creation. 'Veritas' signifies 'similitudo' understood both as a 'relation' and 'the thing that is similar'. The eternal Word of God is the perfect similitudo: "Haec autem ipsa eius similitudo et ideo ueritas. [reference is to Word itself] Ut enim

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1De Trin. V.2.3.  2Ibid.  
ueritate sunt uera quae uera sunt, ita similitudine similia sunt quaecumque similia."\(^1\) Such a Word "summa similitudo principii et ueritas est, quia sine uilla dissimilitudine est."\(^2\)

'Veritas' here signifies a perfect similitude and also being. The eternal Son as the perfect and express Image of the Father is Truth.\(^3\)

(2.1.3) 'Veritas' also refers to the divine esse and eternal Word as ground and norm of all mutable and created truth. Augustine speaks of the sole Truth according to which all things are true.\(^4\) God is the "fontem ueritatis . . . ."\(^5\) Augustine states: "Nam omne uerum ab illo est, qui ait: Ego sum ueritas."\(^6\) Augustine is certain that it is according to the Truth itself that the disciplinae are true.\(^7\) He prays: "Te invoco, Deus veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt, quae vera sunt omnia."\(^8\) 'Veritas' signifies the supreme measure which measures all other entities and serves as the norm to which entities must conform in order to be and to be true.

But truth, in order that it may be, comes into being through

\(^1\)De Vera Relig. 36.66; CCSL 32:231.
\(^2\)Ibid.; also De Vera Relig. 55.113; De Trin. VI.10.11; VII.1.1;3.4.
\(^3\)De Trin. VII.6.12. \(^4\)Conf. X.23.34.
\(^5\)Conf. XII.30.41; BA 14:418.
\(^6\)De Doc. Chr. Prooemium 8; CCSL 32:5.
\(^7\)Solil. II.11.21. \(^8\)Solil. I.1.3; PL 32:870
some supreme measure, whence it proceeds and whither it returns when perfected. But on this supreme measure no other measure is imposed, for if the supreme measure is the measure according to the supreme measure, it is the measure according to itself. Moreover the supreme measure must necessarily also be the true measure, so true measure is recognized by truth.1

(2.1.4) Augustine speaks of God in whom we find the first life, essence, and wisdom: "Nam haec est illa incommutabilis veritas, quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur et ars omnipotentis artificis."2 In connection with this usage 'veritas' refers also to the eternal immutable rationes or regulae situated in the divine Being or eternal Word. "Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur."3 Augustine says: "In Thy presence do stand the causes of all things that are unstable and even of all things that are changeable — the unchangeable roots remain with Thee, and the eternal reasons of things which are temporal and irrational do live."4 In discussing the creation of the world Augustine touches upon his exemplarism: "Neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti quidem eique finiti thensaui

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1De Beata Vita 4.33,34; PA 35.
2De Vera Relig. 31.57; CCSL 32:224.
4Conf. I.6.9; PA p. 123; cf. also Conf. X.12.19.
rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes inuisibiles adque incommutabiles rationes rerum etiam uisibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt."\(^1\) Augustine states that we do not learn the nature of the human mind through generalization or induction "sed intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit uniuscujusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat."\(^2\) The archetypes of necessary truth and of the many created species are called truth both because of their immutable being and their determinative and regulatory function in relation to created being. Augustine makes an appeal to such truth in his attempt to demonstrate the existence of God: "Quapropter nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnia quae incommutabiliter vera sunt continentem. . . ."\(^3\) Augustine speaks of the Son as the perfect Word of the Father and the "ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium. . . ."\(^4\) All true judgments and statements regarding created truth are made in the light of these rationes.

(2.1.5) 'Veritas' and 'verus' in particular are also used of entities within the created order as seen in relation to the supreme Truth. The adjective 'verus' is more readily and freely

\(^1\)De Civ. Dei. XI.10; CSEL 40:528; cf. also XI.29.

\(^2\)De Trin. IX.6.9.; PL 42:966.

\(^3\)De Lib. Arb. II.12.33; PL 32:1259.

\(^4\)De Trin. VI.10.11; PL 42:931.
applied to created entities than it is to God. We noted earlier that Augustine had difficulty in interpreting John 8:26 where it is said that God is *verax*. This difficulty arose largely because of Augustine's exemplarism and the notion that to be true is to be subordinate to the truth. God, however, is subordinate to no thing. Created beings are subordinate to the eternal rationes to which they correspond. By virtue of such correspondence created things are said to be true.

(2.1.6) 'Veritas' may signify all that exists or simply a particular truth such as a true statement. The word 'verum' is used as a general or generic term where Augustine says that "verum mihi videtur esse id quod est." This appears to be the broadest possible application of 'verum'. The totality of esse is signified without a distinct reference to any particular facet or constituent of id quod est. Augustine furthermore states that "omnia uera sunt, in quantum sunt..." He is asserting that all things are true or conform to the truth, by which they are measured, insofar as they are. However, the extent to which a thing conforms to the supreme measure determines its degree of being. This notion is expressed more explicitly in the following: "Cetera illius unius similia dici possunt, in quantum sunt, in tantum enim et uera sunt..."

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1Cf. (1.3) p. 124, nn. 2,3; p. 125, n. 1.
2Solil. II.5.8; PL 32:889. 3Conf. VII.15.21; BA 13.624.
The word 'verus' signifies similitudo while at the same time signifying esse. Augustine asserts that the esse and nonesse of creatures depend on likeness and unlikeness to God.2

(2.1.7) In his Soliloquia Augustine offers a definition of 'verum' based on the appearance of a thing in relation to what it is in fact. "Verum est quod ista [sic] se habet ut cognitori videtur, si velit possitque cognoscere."3 This leads to the problematical conclusion that "in veri similitudine habitare falsitatem."4 Ratio then asks: "... nonne similitudinem veritatis matrem, et dissimilitudinem falsitatis esse fatendum est?"5 The man in a dream is said to be false because of the dissimilarity to a true man. It is evident in this instance that the criterion of judgement is dictated by the appearance of an entity rather than its nature. Elsewhere, as intimated above,6 judgement concerning the similitude or truth of an entity is based upon the eternal ratio of the thing and not its appearance. This is more in accord with Augustine's exemplarism. In agreement with this exemplarism, only a man can be a 'true' man or a 'false' man.

(2.1.8) Augustine uses 'veritas' and 'verum' not only to

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1De Vera Relig. 36.66; CCSL 32:231. 2Conf. VII.11.17.
3Solil. II.5.8; PL 32:888. 4Solil. II.6.12; PL 32:890.
5Ibid. II.7.13; PL 32:891. 6Cf. pp. 130-131, nn. 3, 1, 2.
indicate esse and similitudo but also that which reveals or discloses that which is. "Sed cui saltem illud manifestum est falsitatem esse, qua id putatur esse, quod non est, intellegit eam esse veritatem, quae ostendit id quod est."\(^1\) The referent intended by "quae ostendit" is what has to be ascertained. From the context it would seem that the referent is nothing less than the supreme Truth or eternal Word which shows forth perfectly the being of God as well as the truth or being of creatures.

In commenting upon the above statement of Augustine Grosseteste offers this interpretation: "Quod autem lux summae veritatis et non aliud ostendit mentis oculo id quod est, videtur ex auctoritatibus Augustini diligentius inspectis."\(^2\) Grosseteste then quotes a number of texts in support of his position.\(^3\) The doctrine of divine illumination itself is sufficient grounds for holding such a view. Augustine speaks of the mind which perceives many immutable true things and then "dirigit se in ipsam veritatem, qua cuncta monstrantur. . . ."\(^4\) It is "God, the intelligible Light, in whom and by whom and through whom those things intelligibly shine which anywhere intelligibly shine."\(^5\) "Nempe ergo multa vera vidisti, eaque discruevisti ab illa luce

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\(^1\)De Vera Relig. 36.66; CCSL 32:230. 
\(^2\)De Ver.; BW 133.

\(^3\)Retract. I.4.4; De Lib. Arb. II.13.36; Conf. XII.25.35; De Trin. XII.14.23; Tract. in Joh. XIV.8.


\(^5\)Solil. I.1.3; PA 131.
qua tibi lucente vidisti: attolle oculos in ipsam lucem, et eos in eam fige, si potes."\(^1\) On the basis of these and other texts it is clear that the divine Truth or Light shows forth id quod est. However, it could also be said that 'veritas' signifies thoughts or statements which show forth id quod est. He says elsewhere that propositions can be considered as truth in their own genus of things.\(^2\) In the statement under consideration\(^3\) falsitas is placed in the realm of thought or affirmation. If the second part of the statement, which describes truth, is coordinate with the first part on falsehood, it could be argued that 'veritas' in this instance specifies thought which manifests id quod est. The divine Word as the perfect likeness of God shows forth the being of God. In his \textit{Confessiones} Augustine describes the ecstatic vision in which one moves from changeable objects to id quod est.\(^4\)

(2.1.9) Within the created world or order, 'veritas' signifies above all what is to be found in the rational soul of man as well as the rational soul itself. The \textit{mens}, which is the superior part of the rational soul,\(^5\) is "constituta tamen inter incommutabilem supra se ueritatem et mutabilia infra se

\(^1\)De Trin. XV.27.50; PL 42:1097.
\(^2\)De Mendacio 20.41; CSEL 41:461-462.
\(^3\)De Vera Relig. 36.66. \(^4\)Conf. VII.17.23.
\(^5\)De Trin. IX.2.2; XII; XIV.16.22; XV.7.11; cf. Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine}, p. 269, n. 1; p. 354, n. 10.
cetera. . . ."¹ Although the mind is mutable,² in its noblest part, the intellectus or intelligentia,³ we find that similitudo or imago of God in which man was created. Augustine finds a number of resemblances or analogies to the Trinity throughout the created order, however, only in the human mens do we find the imago Dei. He says that in the upper reason, which contemplates the eternal realities, we have "non solum trinitas, sed etiam imago Dei...."⁴ This imago is most truly and fully present in the following manner: "Trinitas in mente eo est imago Dei, qua meminit, intelligit et diligit Deum, quod est sapien-tia."⁵ This similitudo does not denote equality with the triune God as the Son, the express image of the Father, is equal to the Father. This imago Dei in man "non aequatur parilitate, sed quadram similitudine accedit."⁶ "For not in the body but in the mind was man made in the image of God. In his own similitude let us seek God: in his own image recognize the Creator."⁷

¹De Doc. Chr. II.38.57; CCSL 32:72.
²Conf. X.25.36; VII.17.23; De Doc. Chr. II.38.57; De Mendacio VII. 10; Ep. XVIII.2, PA 40; De Vera Relig. 39.72.
³Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, p. 269. n. 1 c.
⁴De Trin. XII.4.4; PL 42:1000.
⁵De Trin. XIV.12.15; PL 42:1048.
⁶De Trin. VII.6.12; PL 42:946; De Vera Relig. 43.81; 44.82.
⁷In Joan Evang. XXIII.10; PA 18.
(2.1.10) *Veritas* also signifies the interior light and those regulae, leges, or rationes which are present in the human mind. These are not acquired through sense perception, but are bestowed upon the mind by the Truth which is above the mind. We understand "de universis" not by listening to external speech "sed intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus veritatem..."2 "Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiure homine habitare dictus est Christus (Ephes. 111 16,17), id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapientia...."3 Within the created order the mind is the foremost locus of truth. "Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi. In interiure homine habitat veritas."4 In his Soliloquie Augustine attempts to demonstrate the immortality of the soul by declaring that truth, such as the rules of dialectic and geometrical figures, is eternal and abides in the mind or soul.5 "Sive enim figurae geometricae in veritate, sive in eis veritas sit, anima nostra, id est intelligentia nostra, contineri nemo ambigit...."6 This immutable truth in the mind is not established through correspondence with contingent corporeal reality but is the reflection of the transcen-

1Conf. X.12.19. 2De Magistro 11.38; PL 32:1216.
3De Magistro 11.38; PL 32:1216.
4De Vera Relig. 39.72; CCSL 32:234.
5Solil. II.11-13; 15; II.19.33.
6Solil. II.19.33; PL 32:901.
dent eternal rationes. Augustine teaches that through divine initiative, divine illumination in particular, the human mind had contact with the immutable truth or rationes through which true judgements can be made concerning contingent corporeal entities. "Et judicamus haec corporeal entities secundum illas interiores regulas veritatis, quas communiter cernimus: de ipsis vero nullo modo quis judicat." These interior rules constitute the truth whereby created things may be judged to be true or false. These intelligible and "numerorum dimensionumque rationes et leges innumerabiles," although not derived through abstraction or generalization, are somewhat similar to what could be called concepts, or better, intelligible images or mental percepts. Augustine uses the word 'notitia':

In illa igitur aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione ali- quid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus: atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam, tanquam verbum apud nos habemus, et dicendo intus gignimus; nec a nobis nascendo discedit.

In the light of the eternal formae true notitiae of created entities can be realized. The notitia in the human mind has a two-fold reference or correspondence. It must rightly correspond to

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1De Trin. VI.10.11; VIII.9.13; IX.6.9,11; IX.7.12; XII.14.23; XIV.15.21; De Vera Relig. 24.25; 30.56; 31.57; De Lib. Arb. II.12.34; II.16.42-44; Conf. VII.17.23; X.12.19; XI.5.7; XI.8.10.


3Conf. X.12.19; BA 14:174. 4De Trin. IX.6.9.

5De Trin. IX.7.12; PL 42:9671 IX.6.9.
the eternal *forma* as well as to the degree of truth present in the thing. Augustine concludes that he could make correct judgements because he had discovered "inconmutabilem et ueram ueritatis aeternitatem supra mentem meam conmutabilem."¹

(2.2) The nature of truth as being

As indicated above, to consider Augustine's doctrine of truth is to consider his doctrine of being. It was noted earlier that the word 'veritas' is used to refer to 'insum esse' and 'id quod est'. It should be pointed out at the outset that although Augustine was not interested in the question of being *qua* being and did not seek to answer the question in the form of a general systematic ontology, he did hold some rather definite notions concerning being. However, throughout all his intellectual activity, God, the soul, and its salvation are his major preoccupations.² It is in the course of this activity that his views regarding being come to light. One finds these notions woven into the very fabric of his thought and they are part and parcel of his philosophy or theology.³ A brief examination of his ontological beliefs is therefore warranted.

(2.2.1) Augustine: 'essentialist' or 'existentialist'?

Augustine has been called both an 'existentialist' and an

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¹Conf. VII.17.23; BA 13:628. ²Cf. sections (1.1), (1.2). ³Cf. p. 101, n. 2; R. Schneider, *Seele and Sein*. 


'essentialist'. Joseph Mihalich states: "In its broader aspects, the evolution of existentialism involves such figures as the 17th century semi-mystic Pascal and the 'first existentialist' — St. Augustine."¹ Grabowski asserts: "The ontology of St. Augustine is not 'existential' — it does not reach to the very act of existence (the esse) — but is 'essential' — it encompasses the essence, the ens."² E. Gilson would agree with the latter view.³ Any attempt to pigeonhole Augustine's notions concerning being is beset by a number of difficulties. In the first place one faces the task of trying to ascertain the senses of the labels themselves. This in itself is no simple undertaking. Moreover, even after 'essentialist' and 'existentialist' have been defined, it is still doubtful whether they can be applied to specific doctrines of being without further qualification. Another difficulty that arises with respect to Augustine's ontological beliefs is that he does not offer us a clear and worked out ontology. We shall avoid labeling his thought in this area and simply seek to examine his formulations concerning 'esse', 'esse ipsum', 'substantia', and 'essentia'.

(2.2.2) 'Essentia' and 'esse'

Augustine speaks of being both in terms of 'essentia' and

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'esse'. Although Augustine uses both of these words he does not appear to make a clear and explicit demarcation between the essence and the existence of particular entities. Augustine manifests a degree of awareness of such a distinction but he makes no precise delineation. 'Essentia' and 'esse' are not used to make distinct and definite ontological distinctions. In Augustine's thought these ontological categories or notions appear to merge or at least flow over into each other. He does not follow through with any kind of precise elaboration or development of either category.

'Essentia' is very closely related to 'esse'. Augustine states that "ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia. . . et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est, maxime ac verissime competit."¹ 'Essentia' in this instance signifies more than the nature, form, or essence of an existing subject. 'Essentia' designates the whole particular being. In the above quotation 'essentia' is used of God himself as esse ipsum. Elsewhere Augustine states that the "summa essentia esse facit omne quod est, unde et essentia dicitur."² Again essentia is closely bound up with esse. This does not mean that 'essentia' is to be regarded simply as a nominal form of 'esse'. 'Essentia' connotes more than sheer esse, it includes the whole being, both nature and existence, of that entity so designated.

¹De Trin. V.2.3; PL 42:912; cf. also De Civitate Dei XII.2.
²De Vera Relig. 11.22; CCSL 32:201.
One reason why Augustine was able to speak both of an immutable *essentia* and mutable *substantiae* or *essentiae* is that he did not think of *essentia* simply and strictly as a fixed nature or essence to be expressed in the form of a concept. Augustine uses *natura*, *substantia*, and *essentia* as equivalent terms. Augustine argues that "intellegitur nullam naturam uel, si melius ita dicitur, nullam substantiam siue essentiam malum esse."\(^1\) In this statement and its context Augustine makes no attempt to distinguish between the essence and existence of beings. It is evident that Augustine has particular beings in mind, the rational soul or substance in particular in relation to sin and evil. As intimated above, it is in speaking of the eternal rationes and *formae* situated in the divine mind that Augustine has in mind what could possibly be termed the immutable natures and essences of created beings or *essentiae*. Because *essentia* and *natura* are used to signify a particular being in its entirety, Augustine is able to speak of mutable natures and essences. He speaks of that word generated within us "quod verbum amore concipitur, sive creaturae, sive Creatoris, id est, aut naturae mutabilis, aut incommutabilis veritatis."\(^2\) That Augustine's *natura* entails the whole being of a particular entity is indicated by the following statement: "Sola ergo bona alicubi esse possunt, sola mala nusquam; quoniam naturae etiam illae, quae ex malae uoluntatis

\(^1\) De Vera Relig. 23.44; CCSL 32:215.

\(^2\) De Trin. IX.7.13; PL 42:967; De Civ. Dei VIII.6.
initio uitatae sunt, in quantum uitiosae sunt, mala sunt, in quantum autem naturae sunt, bona sunt.¹ Such a *natura* is clearly not the immutable essence of a particular species or entity. The immutable essence as such is the eternal *forma* or *ratio* of created *essentiae* or *naturae*. It goes without saying that an *essentia* or *natura* exists and conforms to some degree to its eternal *forma*. The application of 'essentia' to particular beings is also manifest in the following statement: "Et propterea Deo, id est summae essentiae et auctori omnium qualiumcumque essentiarum, essentia nulla contraria est."² It must also be kept in mind, however, that for Augustine evil is a privation of being.

(2.2.3) The order of beings and modes of being

The order of being or truth extends all the way from the *summa essentia* down to formless matter. The ordering of beings is determined by such factors as immutability and mutability, necessity and contingency. Furthermore, the ranking of created entities depends both on the order of the *rationes* in the Word of God as well as the manner in which particular beings exist.

(2.2.3.1) The *summa essentia*

God is the *summa essentia*. Augustine states: "Cum enim Deus

¹ *De Civ. Dei* XII.3; CSEL 40:570; also *De Civ. Dei* XII.2; XVIII.13.
² *De Civ. Dei* XII.2; CSEL 40:569.
summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo inmutabilis sit: rebus, quas ex nihilo creauit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut est ipse. ..."¹ The supreme Being, God, exists in the highest degree, Supreme esse is immutable esse. Augustine states that the mutable thing "non esse posse nisi ab illo, qui uere est, quia incommutabiliter est."² In speaking of creatures which have both esse and nonesse Augustine states that "id enim uere est, quod incommutabiliter manet."³ He asserts that "ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est, maxime ac verissime competit."⁴ The summa essentia is immutable in every respect. "Nam sicut omnino tu es, tu scis solus, qui es incommutabiliter et scis incommutabiliter et uis incommutabiliter. . . ."⁵ "God always is, nor has He been and is not, nor is but has not been, but as He never will not be; so He never was not."⁶ God is immutable both respect to space and time.⁷ The immutability of God is bound up with his eternity.⁸ "Quomodo ergo obtinebimus nec ipsa relativa esse accidentia, quoniam nihil accidit Deo temporaliter, quia non est mutabilis, sicut in exordio hujus dis-

¹De Civ. Dei XII.2; CSEL 40,1:568-569.
²De Civ. Dei VIII.6; CSEL 40,1:364.
³Conf. VII.11.17; BA 13:618. ⁴De Trin. V.2.3; PL 42:912.
⁵Conf. XIII.16.19; BA 14:458. ⁶De Trin. XIV.15.21; PA 97.
⁷Ep. XVIII.2; PA 40. ⁸Conf. XII.15.18; De Trin. XV.5.7.
There are no accidents in God who is above time. Augustine believes that these are the notions concerning the divine esse which are intended in Exodus 3:14: "What does 'I AM WHO AM' (Exod. iii, 14) mean but 'I am Eternal?' What does 'I AM WHO AM' mean but 'I cannot be changed?'" Concerning the 'I AM WHO AM' of Exodus 3:14 Augustine further states: "Cum enim esse aliquo modo dicatur et corpus et animus, nisi proprio quodam modo vellet intelligi, non id utique diceret."

Augustine would not have 'esse ipsum' mean or imply that the summa essentia is in any way the sum of all being. Augustine makes it abundantly clear that no created being is in any way a constituent part of the divine Being. "For all substance that is not a created thing is God, and all that is not created is God." 'Esse ipsum' signifies the transcendent character of the divine esse as described above. God is esse ipsum for "vere summeque est."

Augustine also asserts that God is goodness, greatness, eternity, and being, and not simply that he is good, great, eternal, and has being. Augustine makes this point in order to indicate that these predications concerning God are grounded on his own being and not in a participation in some other being or nature. Such participation would be impossible simply because

1 De Trin. V.16.17; PL 42:922. 2 Serm. vii.7; PA 95.
3 De Trin. I.1.2; PL 42:821; Conf. XII.11.11.
4 De Trin. I.6.9; PA 97; De Civ. Dei XII.2; Conf. X.25.36; XII.28.38.
5 De Lib. Arb. II.15.29; PL 32:1262. 6 De Trin. V.10.11.
the *summa essentia* transcends all other entities. Furthermore, the utter simplicity of the divine Being precludes such participation and demands that God *is* what he is said to have.  

Augustine also holds and seeks to demonstrate that God is a necessary *essentia*. By reason of his utter simplicity and immutability God is a necessary *essentia*. That God is a necessary being is a corollary of Augustine's argument for the existence of immutable Truth on the basis of immutable truths perceived by the mind. In his *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine seeks to demonstrate the necessary *esse* of God through an appeal to such immutable truth as the truth of number.  

"Quapropter nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnia quae incommutabiliter vera sunt continentem..."  

In the *Soliloquia* it is also argued that truth is necessary: "R. Videturne tibi verum aliquid esse posse, ut veritas non sit? A. nullo modo. R. Erit igitur veritas, etiamsi mundus interest." It is also argued that the existence of Truth is established by the very negation of it.

Although this is not the place to set forth a full critique of Augustine's arguments, the following observations may be in order. There appears to be some confusion between the categories

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1 *De Trin.* VI.6.8; VI.7.8; PA 97-98; *In Joan Evang.* XCIX,4; PA p. 99; *De Civ. Dei* XI.10.1-3; PA 100; VIII.6.  
2 *De Trin.* VI.4.6; PA 100.  
3 *op cit.* II.8.21; II.10.28,29.  
5 *Solil.* II.2.2; PL 32:886.  
6 *Solil.* II.2.2; II.15.28.
of factual necessity and logical necessity in which the former is deduced from the latter. It is assumed that the existence of necessary logical truths demonstrates that there is a necessary being. It is also assumed that there is someone who asserts these necessary truths or who denies that there is any truth. Furthermore, if there is no truth whatsoever, it follows that no true statement is even possible. However, it should be pointed out that Augustine did not of course view necessary truths as analytic statements. Necessary logical truths were such by virtue of their relation to or participation in the eternal and immutable Truth in which are situated the immutable regulae and rationes. These truths exist independently of the human minds which discover them. Augustine's arguments rest on his exemplarism and doctrine of rationes or formae.

It could rightly be said that Augustine's understanding of the nature of God was determined in large part by his notion of what constitutes supreme esse. This latter notion was in turn determined very much by his idea of perfection, his anxious quest for certainty in a mutable world, and the necessary premises of his argument for the eternal existence of truth. Since God is the supreme Being and the highest essentia it necessarily follows

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that he exists truly and supremely, in other words, in the manner prescribed above and which befits such a being.

In the above argument that is set forth in De Libero Arbitrio the following premise is taken for granted: "Hunc plane fatebor Deum, quo nihil superius esse constiterit." At the outset Augustine proceeds on the assumption that that which is eternal and immutable is higher than the human ratio and all other mutable entities. In attempting to demonstrate the existence of God Augustine assumes that it is the eternal and immutable Truth that is supreme and whose existence must be demonstrated. Although Augustine does not believe that there is anything more excellent than the immutable and eternal Truth he does state the following near the close of the argument: "Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est: si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est."2

(2.2.3.2) The order of created beings

The order of created entities and goods is, of course, fixed before creation by the hierarchy of formae and rationes in the supreme Truth.3 Gilson speaks of this order as follows:

The sum-total of all the eternal essences and of the temporal things participating in these essences forms a

2De Lib. Arb. II.15.39; PL 32:1262.
3Cf. (2.1); De Div. Quaest. 83,46.1-2; De Civ. Dei XI.10; XI.29; De Trin. IX.6.9.
hierarchy of higher and lower realities, and the relationships born of this hierarchy constitute what is called order.\(^1\)

Both the classes or species of created \textit{essentiae} and their attendant modes of existence are predetermined by the eternal \textit{Verbum}. Augustine says that when created beings in general are compared with God "nec pulchra sunt nec bona sunt nec sunt."\(^2\) Augustine states that the "mutabilis mundus constat et non constat. . . ."\(^3\) Such radical statements are intended to show forth the vastly inferior character of created being in comparison with the divine Being. All of created being differs radically from the supreme \textit{essentia} in several respects. "Causa itaque rerum, quae facit nec fit, Deus est; aliae uero causae et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales."\(^4\) Furthermore, the created order has been brought into being \textit{ex nihilo}.\(^5\) All created \textit{essentiae}, including the mind of man,\(^6\) are mutable,\(^7\) whereas the \textit{summa essentia} is immutable and eternal.\(^8\) Created \textit{essentiae} are also radically contingent upon the supreme Being. Augustine


\(^{2}\)Conf. XI.4.6; BA 14:280. \(^{3}\)Conf. XII.6.8; BA 14:356.

\(^{4}\)De Civ. Dei V.9; CSEL 40,1:227.

\(^{5}\)Conf. XII.7.7; XII.28.38; De Vera Relig. 18.36; De Civ. Dei XII.1.

\(^{6}\)De Doc. Chr. II.38.57; De Vera Relig. 39.72; De Mendacio VII.10.

\(^{7}\)Enchir. 8.23; Conf. XII.8.8;IV.12.18; De Trin. IX.7.13; De Lib. Arb. II.16.44; De Civ. Dei VIII.6.

\(^{8}\)Cf. supra, (2.2.3.1)
poses the rhetorical question: "non ergo essem, deus meus, non omnino essem, nisi esses in me. an potius non essem, nisi essem in te, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia?"\(^1\) He speaks of the dependence of the creation on the Creator: "Ille enim fecit, haec facta sunt, adque ut sint et bene se habeant, eius indigent, a quo facta sunt."\(^2\) He says that "nisi faciente illo non tale uel tale esset, sed prorsus esse non posset."\(^3\)

There are also diverse modes of *esse* within the created order itself.\(^4\) The modes of being correspond with the order of the *rationes* discussed above. Position in the scale of *esse* is determined in large measure by the degree of mutability and the degree of involvement in the corporeal world. The less mutable something is the more firmly it is fixed in *esse*. To be immutable is to be necessary and eternal. "Nom enim proprie vocatur aeternum, quod aliqua ex parte mutatur. In quantum igitur mutabiles sumus, in tantum ab aeternitate distamus."\(^5\)

Augustine has this to say concerning truth and eternity: "Veritas quippe immortalis, incorrupta, incommutabilis permanet. Vera autem immortalitas, vera incorruptibilitas, vera incommutabilitas, ipsa est aeternitas."\(^6\) It would be wrong to conclude on this basis that the immutable *leges* or *regulae* found in the mind of

man rank highest in the order of created *essentiae*. As indicated above, these *leges* or *regulae* are not really created *essentiae* at all, but rather the result of illumination from the divine light which transcends the mind. Every created entity is a mutable good. Augustine explains why this is so: "Dicit mus itaque incommutabile bonum non esse nisi unum uerum beatum Deum; ea uero, quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo, uerum tamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed nihilo facta sunt." In the order of created being the rational soul of man is superior to all other earthly beings. It is in the human *mens* that the image of God is situated. The human mind is fixed between the eternal reasons of things and the corporeal things which it judges: "Sed sublimioris rationis est judicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas...." Whereas the body is mutable both with respect to time and space the soul is mutable only in terms of time, not space. God rules the soul but the soul rules the body. Augustine states that as the mind is to be preferred to the body, so

1Cf. supra.

2Solil. I.8.15; Conf. X.26.37; De Trin. XII.15.24; XV.27.50.

3De Civ. Dei XII.1; CSEL 40,1:567; also Conf. XII.7.7.

4Note discussion above on image of God in man.

5De Trin. XII.2.2; PL 42:999; De Doc Chr. II.38.57.

6Ep. XVIII.2; PA 40. 7De Civ. Dei XVIII.27.
truth must be preferred to the mind itself.¹ The rational soul is also superior to other earthly beings by virtue of its immortality.²

Augustine speaks of the heaven of heavens, the domus³ of God, which differs from God in essence and is not eternal but where there is no change or variation even though there is the possibility of change.⁴ In this heaven of heavens mutable spiritual beings attain a state of changelessness. In this heaven knowledge without change is realized, "ubi est intellectus nosse simul, non ex parte, non in aenigmate, non per speculum, sed ex toto, in manifestione, facie ad faciem..."⁵ This heaven of heavens is not coeternal with God but neither is it situated in time or days wherein there is mutation.⁶ Before the creation of this heaven of heavens and all other creatures God created that wisdom which is the "mens rationalis et intellectualis castae ciuitatis tuae, matris nostrae..."⁷

Formless or unformed matter is most remote from God in the order of esse. This matter was made out of nothing and "dei beneficio formabile est."⁸ Although this unformed matter is not

¹De Mendacio 7.10.
²Solil. II; II.1.1.; II.19.33; De Immor. Animae.
³Conf. XII.11.11. ⁴Conf. XII.15.21.
⁵Conf. XII.13.16; BA 14:366. ⁶Conf. XII.12.15; XII.13.16.
⁷Conf. XII.15.20; BA 14:372.
⁸De Vera Relig. 18.36; CCSL 32:209.
absolutely nothing, it is close to nonesse.\(^1\) Regarding this formless abyss "non sunt utique dies nec uicissitudo spatiorum temporalium."\(^2\) This matter was not made within the intervals of time and could not change from one form to another.\(^3\) Augustine points out that formless matter is by nature prior to formed matter "sine ulla temporis interpositione" between them.\(^4\)

In addition to the different levels or modes of being which belong to the various created species, there are differences, with respect to being, amongst the members of a particular species. The position or rank of an entity within its species is determined by the manner in which it exists. This manner or mode of being is equivalent to the extent to which an entity conforms to its ideal ratio. With respect to man it is his will, or better, the character of his willing which is determinative. Created entities are not created immutably, equally, supremely good "sed tamen bona etiam singula; simul vero universa valde (Gen. I, 31); quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulchritudo."\(^5\)

As part of the good creation the human free will is also good.\(^6\) It is the manner in which the will is used which determines whether a man is a good or true man or an evil or false man.

\(^1\)Conf. XII.3.3; XII.6.6. \(^2\)Conf. XII.9.9; BA 14:356. 
\(^3\)Conf. XII.12.15. \(^4\)Conf. XIII.33.48; BA 14:516. 
\(^5\)Enchir. 3.10; BA 9:118; 4.12; De Vera Relig. 23.44; De Civ. Dei XI.9; XI.24. 
\(^6\)De Lib. Arb. II.1.3; II.2.4; II.19.50-53; III.1.1.
It is a question of willing rightly or wrongly. Augustine speaks of right wills: "Rectae autem sunt voluntates et omnes sibimet religatae, si bona est illa quo cunctae referuntur: si autem prava est, pravae sunt omnes."\(^1\) That will wills wrongly which substitutes mutable and lesser goods for the unchangeable supreme good.\(^2\) Creatures as such are not evil but are corrupted by the evil will: ". . . quoniam naturae etiam illae, quae ex malae voluntatis initio uitatae sunt, in quantum uitiosae sunt, malae sunt, in quantum autem naturae sunt, bonae sunt."\(^3\) The misery of the wicked angels must also be attributed to their own evil willing.\(^4\)

To the extent that a man wills rightly he is and is true or conforms to his eternal ratio. In other words, one is and is true to this ratio insofar as he exists or wills as he ought to exist or will. As noted above, Augustine states that "uera in tantum uera sunt, in quantum sunt, in tantum autem sunt, in quantum principalis unius similia sunt. . . ."\(^5\) To say that one member of a species is more than another is to say that it conforms to a greater degree to its ideal ratio and that it exists accordingly. Furthermore, as one wills rightly and is conformed

\(^1\)De Trin. XI.6.10; PL 42:922.
\(^2\)De Lib. Arb. II.19.52, 53; II.16.43; III.1.1; Enchir. 8.23.
\(^3\)De Civ. Dei XII.3; CSEL 40,1:570. \(^4\)De Civ. Dei XII.6.
\(^5\)De Vera Relig. 36.66; CCSL 32:231.
more and more to the eternal form or exemplar one advances to higher levels of being and finally arrives at that highest level of unchanging perfect being. The soul is to the degree that it has advanced in its ascent to God. Although every rational soul, by virtue of its immortality, has its existence assured, it does not achieve its highest degree of being until it attains the beautific contemplation of the supreme Truth. This is the highest mode of being that the human soul can enjoy. Augustine speaks as follows of the renewal of the image of God in man: "In agnitio Dei, justitiaque et sanctitate veritatis, qui de die in diem proficiendo renovatur, transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a visibilibus ad intelligibilia, a carnalibus ad spiritualia..."3

This moral and ontological ascent of the soul can also be described epistemologically in terms of opinion, faith, knowledge, and wisdom. "Hoc est nimirum quod requiris, quid primum, quid ultimum teneatur: inchoari fidei, perfici specie."5 With respect to the mind's vision of the truth Augustine states that "ita quippe erit integior et castior, cum eius [truth] pot-

1Conf. XII.13.16; De Civ. Dei X.22; De Quant. Anima 33.70-76; PA 24-28; De Magistro XI.38.

2De Util. Cred. 11.25; Retract. I.14.2; De Trin. XV.25.45.

3De Trin. XIV.17.23; PL 42:1054.

4De Util. Cred. 11.25; De Quant. Anima 33.70-76; Conf. XIII.18.23; De Trin. XII.1.1;2.2;3.3; XII.1.2.3; 19.24; Solil. I.6.12,13.

5Enchir. 1.5; PA 9:108.
ius inmutabilitate quam sua mutabilitate perfruetur."¹ As the soul advances to higher levels of being it becomes more holy and complete. Truth, being, and holiness are inseparably bound up together and must be considered accordingly. Insofar as a soul is true, it is and is holy. In Augustine's doctrine, the ontological, epistemological, and moral categories or dimensions of human life are interdependent and interrelated.

3. Consequential dichotomies in St. Augustine's doctrine of truth

(3.1) Certain major dichotomies

(3.1.1) The whole of Augustine's thought is permeated by a number of dichotomies of considerably consequence. These include the intelligible-sensible, immutable-mutable, eternity-time, and necessary-contingent bifurcations. Although Augustine himself had to contend with certain problematical consequences resulting from these dichotomies, those who inherited his doctrine came to reap the full harvest. The shock wave arising from by these divisions spans both mediaeval and modern thought. One must bear in mind, however, that these dichotomies undergo alteration and revision in the periods cited.

(3.1.2) We have already drawn attention to some of the factors which played a decisive role in the formation of Augustine's doctrine of truth,² a number of which helped to foster these dichotomies. It can rightly be said that there is a sense

¹De Mendacio 7.10; CSEL 41:429. ²Cf. (1.3).
in which Augustine uses 'truth' so as to include both sides of the above divisions. Such may be the case when 'veritas' is used in a generic and broad sense to signify id quod est. Used in this sense 'veritas' includes both mutable and sensible entities since these also have being. As indicated above, every created thing, including the mutable and the corporeal, is to the degree that it is true, and is true insofar as it is. All true things are true in and through God, the Truth. Augustine distinguishes between that which is true and truth: "... ita credo aliud esse veritatem, et aliud quod verum dicitur." In connection with this, Ratio states that "ergo cum interit ali¬quid quod verum est, non interit veritas." The example given is that of the true tree which perishes while truth remains. Truth is not subject to such a vicissitude. With respect to the corporeal, Ratio asks: "Quare jam allud ultimum videamus, utrum corpus non sit vere verum, id est non in eo sit veritas, sed quasi quaedam imago veritatis." With reference to geometrical figures Augustine asks who would be so blind as not to see "istas quae in geometrica docentur, habitare in ipsa veritate, aut in his etiam veritatem; illas vero corporis figuras, siquidem quasi ad istas tendere videntur, habere nescio quam imitationem veritatis, et ideo falsas esse?" In other words, the question is

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1Solil. II.5.8. 2Conf. VII.15.21; De Vera Relig. 36.66. 3Solil. I.1.3. 4Solil. I.15.27; PL 32:883; also II.15.29. 5Solil. I.15.28; PL 32:884. 6Solil. II.18.32; PL 32:901. 7Solil. II.18.32; PL 32:901.
whether bodies or corporeal figures can even be said to be true. However, corporeal entities do have being and therefore deserve to be termed true to the extent that they exist.

(3.1.3) It would be correct to say, however, that Augustine consistently uses 'veritas' to signify that which is incorporeal, intelligible, immutable, and eternal. 'Veritas' signifies that which vere est. Truth is incorporeal and consequently it cannot be perceived by the senses.¹ Truth is less like things we touch, taste, and smell and more like things we hear and see, although it also differs very much from the latter inasmuch as truth does not vary according to either time or place.² "At illa veritatis et sapientiae pulchritudo... nec sensibus corporis subjacet."³ Augustine says that the truth is distant from the minds of those vain men "Qui nimis in haec corporalia progressi atque lapsi nihil aliud putant esse quam quod istis quinque notissimis nuntiis corporis sentiunt..."⁴ Augustine teaches that truth transcends both the body and the mind: "... ut autem animus corpori, ita veritas etiam ipsi animo praeponenda est, ut eam non solum magis quam corpus, sed etiam magis quam se ipsum adpetat animus."⁵

(3.1.4) Not only is truth incorporeal, it is also immutable. It transcends both time and space. With respect to the

¹Solil. II.17.31. ²De Lib. Arb. II.14.38.
⁴De Util. Cred. 1.1; CSEL 25:7. ⁵De Mendacio 7.10; CSEL 41:429.
immutability and eternity of truth a number of texts have already been cited.¹ In these instances 'veritas' signifies that which truly is rather than simply correspondence or coherence. We noted above that that which is immutable and eternal truly is.² God as the immutable Truth is "sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiterum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem, nihilque patientem."³

(3.1.5) It is clearly evident that the corporeal entity, although a created good, occupies a very low position in the order of being. The realm of the sensible is certainly not the primary or most proper locus of truth. In order to achieve wisdom the following is prescribed: "R. Penitus esse ista sensibilia fugienda. . . ."⁴ In his Retractiones Augustine offers a clarification concerning the above statement: "...Non autem dixi ego, Omnia sensibilia; sed, ista, hoc est, corruptibilia . . . ."⁵ He goes on to say that corruptible sensible things will not exist in the new heaven and the new earth. The corporeal entity is not inherently evil⁶ but rather an inferior mutable

¹Conf. VII.17.23; De Vera Relig. 31.57; 55.113; De Lib. Arb. II.12.33; II.14.38; De Doc. Chr. II.38.56-39.58; De Civ. Dei X.22; XI.10; De Trin. IV.18.24.
²Cf. (2.1); (2.2.3.1). ³De Trin. V.1.2; PL 42:912.
⁶De Civ. Dei XI.9; XI.23; XII.3; XIII.2.
good. Augustine states that "cum caro sit ipsa substantia, pro-
flecto aliquod bonum cui accident ista mala, id est privationes
ejus boni quod dicitur sanitas..."¹ Nevertheless, because of
his conception of immutable truth and being Augustine tends to
disparage the material world. In addition to the statements
cited above this is manifest where it is said that philosophy
"vere docet nihil omnino colendum esse totumque contenmi opor-
tere, quidquid mortalibus oculis cernitur, quidquid ullus sen-
sus attingit."² That man is renewed in the knowledge of God,
in the righteousness and sanctity of truth, who transfers his
love from temporal things to eternal things, from the visible
to the intelligible, and from the carnal to the spiritual.³
Augustine states that one must even reject the incorporeal like-
nesses of corporeal things in seeking an understanding of the
truth.⁴ Correct doctrine elevates the people of God from the
temporal to the eternal and from the visible to the invisible⁵
Augustine states:

... ecce vide, si potes: Deus Veritas est (Sap. IX, 15)
Hoc enim scriptum est, Quoniam Deus lux est (I Joan. 1,6):
non quomodo isti oculi vident, sed quomodo videt cor, cum
audis, Veritas est. Noli quaerere quid sit veritas; statim
enim se opponent caligines imaginum corporalium et nubila
phantasmatum, et perturbabunt serenitatem, quae primo ictu
diluxit tibi, cum dicerem, Veritas.⁶

¹Enchir. 3.11; BA 9:120. ²Contra Acad. I.1.3; CSEL 63:5.
³De Trin. XIV.17.23. ⁴De Trin. XV.27.50.
⁵De Civ. Dei X.14. ⁶De Trin. VIII.2.3; PL 42:949.
Specific consequences resulting from these dichotomies

The above dichotomy, which involves a negative attitude towards the realm of corporeal being, affected greatly Augustine's doctrine of knowledge, his notions concerning written and spoken statements, and consequently his view of the Scriptures. The corporeal or sensible world, whether sensible word, a body, or an historical event, is at best the visible form of invisible and immutable Truth. True or correct statements constitute part of this visible form. Augustine concludes that he was able to make correct judgments concerning mutable entities because of the eternal and immutable Truth. Augustine distinguishes between the statement that involves a per se connexion and that which involves an accidental connexion. However, both types of statement are sensible signs of incorporeal thoughts or words situated within the mind. This is what the heart or mind is said to see. In thinking the truth the mind must be free of everything that is corporeal.

The words or statements that primarily interest Augustine are those which direct the mind to the eternal immutable Truth. Such are the words of the Scriptures, the words of the Gospel. They are the visible form of the eternal Truth. The Gospel that

\[1\text{Conf. VII.17.23. } 2\text{Solil. II.12.22; De Doc. Chr. II.35.53.} 3\text{De Civ. Dei X.13; De Trin. XV.10.19; XV.11.20; XV.27.50; Conf. XIII.23,34.} 4\text{De Trin. VIII.2.3.}\]
is spoken through the flesh sounds in the outward ears "ut crederetur et intus quaereretur et inueniretur in aeterna ueritate...." The words of the sacred text serve as a sign which prompts the mind to behold the Truth which lies above the text and the mind. Augustine believes that one must interpret the text in an allegorical fashion if one is to acquire knowledge of this Truth. He says, for example, that there are many truths to be discovered in the words of Moses in Genesis 1:1 and 1:6. He says that if he does not ascertain altogether what Moses had in mind in the text "id tamen dicam, quod mihi per eius uerba tua ueritas dicere uoluerit, quae illi quoque dixit quod uoluit." The sensible-intelligible dichotomy is apparent in Augustine's allegorical interpretation of Scripture. He states in another place: "Ergo ipsis carnalibus formis, quibus detinemur, niten-dum est ad eas cognoscendas, quas caro non nuntiat." From the perception of the corporeal object one must advance to "sapien-tiam ubi contemplatio est aeternorum." (3.2.2) Augustine's understanding of truth as intelligible and eternal also affected considerably his understanding of historical events. The historical event, by reason of its temporal

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1 Conf. XI.8.10; BA 14:288.  
2 Conf. XIII.24.37.  
3 Conf. XII.18.27; XII.27.37; De Util. Cred. 3.5.  
4 Conf. XII.25.35.  
5 Conf. XII.32.43; BA 14:422.  
6 De Vera Relig. 24.45; CCSL 32:215.  
7 De Trin. XV.3.5; PL 42:1061.
and corporeal character, is very subordinate to that Truth which is eternal and intelligible. Two such events are the Incarnation and Resurrection. Although such events are not readily integrated into his system of truth, Augustine nevertheless clearly affirms both the Incarnation and the corporeal Resurrection of Christ. Augustine argues that the mediator between God and men must be a blessed mortal since God is blessed and immortal and man is a miserable mortal. In speaking of the spiritual body Augustine says that it is subservient to the spirit but that it is not spiritualized. The spiritual body has the power of eating and drinking but not the need. Augustine makes reference to I John 3:2 and states that our image, which will be like that of the Son of God, will include the body since Jesus has assumed a body. The flesh itself is not evil even though sin is caused by the flesh. The corruptible body is the punishment and burden resulting from sin. Those of the earthly city live after the flesh and those of the heavenly city live according to the spirit. Augustine does not wish to repudiate the body as such. He emphasizes that the spiritual body of Christ must be kept intact and not reduced to spirit.

1De Civ. Dei XIII.14; VIII.15; XIII.20-23; XVII.16-19; Contra Acad. III.19.42; De Doc. Chr. I.12.13; De Trin. XIII.14.18; XIII.19.24; XIV.18.24.
2De Civ. Dei VIII.14,15. 3Ibid. XIII.19,20.
4Ibid. XIII.22,23. 5De Trin. XIV.18.24.
6De Civ. Dei XIII.1-5. 7Ibid.
The major difficulty arises from the union of the eternal Word, the immutable and eternal Truth, with the mutable corporeal human nature, and the question as to how they are united and interrelated. The difficulty is manifest in the following statement: "In rebus enim per tempus ortis, illa summa gratia est, quod homo in unitate personae conjunctus est Deo: in rebus vero aeternis summa veritas recte tribuitur Dei Verbo."\(^1\) While grace is situated within the temporal order, truth exists in the realm of the eternal. The personal union of God and man is the supreme grace in the order of time but is excluded from that order in which the eternal Word is the supreme Truth.

(3.2.3) This bifurcation has an epistemological parallel. The Word made flesh belongs to the sphere of knowledge while the Word coeternal with the Father belongs to the sphere of wisdom.\(^2\) Knowledge is of that which is situated in time while wisdom has to do with eternal immutable Truth. Inasmuch as man is called to seek wisdom he must advance beyond the Word in the flesh to the eternal Word apart from the flesh. It is said of Christ: "Ipse nobis fidem de rebus temporalibus inserit, ipse de sempiternis exhibet veritatem. Per ipsum \([\text{Christ}]\) pergimus ad ipsum \([\text{Christ}]\), tendimus per scientiam ad sapientiam. . . ."\(^3\)

It appears as though the human nature assumed by the Word

\(^1\) *De Trin.* XIII.19.24; *PL* 42:1033. \(^2\) *Ibid.*

\(^3\) *Ibid*; *PL* 42:1034.
functions much like the sensible words which direct the mind to
the incorporeal Truth. There are, however, some significant
differences. For example, according to Augustine the eternal
Word retains a human body in the form of a spiritual body. It
must also be said that the human nature was not assumed in
order to serve simply as a sign.¹ At the same time it can be
said that for Augustine the immediate purpose of the Incarna-
tion is largely didactic, significative, and revelatory. In
speaking of the intelligible world Augustine says:

... cui [intelligible world] animas multiformibus erroris
tenebris caecatus et altissimis a corpore sordibus oblias
numquam ista ratio subtilissima revocaret, nisi summus deus
populari quadam clementia divini intellectus auctoritate
usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret atque summitteret,
cuius non solum praeceptis sed etiam factis excitaetae animae
redire in semet ipsas et resipiscere patriam etiam sine dis-
putationum concertatione potuissent.²

It is true that this statement is taken from one of Augus-
tine's early treatises, those written at Cassiciacum; however,
the same notion recurs in later major treatises. The sensible-
intelligible and mutable-immutable themes are very much in
evidence throughout his De Trinitate. In his De Doctrina Christ-
tiana Augustine speaks of the Word becoming flesh so that thought
may be communicated by means of sensible sound or speech.³ In
his De Civitate Dei Augustine cites the need for faith for the

¹De Trin. XIII.14.18; XIII.15.19; XIII.17.22; De Civ. Dei
VIII.14,15.

²Contra Acad. III.19.42; CSEL 63:79.

renewal and purification of the mind so that the mind may come to know the Truth. The Son of God establishes this faith in the Incarnation which is revelation: "In qua ut fidentius ambularet ad ueritatem, ipsa veritas, deus dei filius, homine assumto, non Deo consumto, eandem constituit et fundauit fidem, ut ad hominis Deum iter esset homini per hominem Deum."¹

(3.2.4) Augustine believes that the ceremony, the mandates of the Law, and the history given in the Old Testament, when taken literally, constitute a veil covering the mysteries and secret truths.² When understood figuratively or allegorically they help to convey the mysteries. With the coming of Christ the veil is taken away but not the truths or mysteries. "Non igitur per domini gratiam, tamquam inutilia ibi tegerentur, ablata sunt, sed tegmen optium, quo utilia tegebantur."³ Through Christ the Old Testament figures can be understood. Augustine does not really view the historical events reported in the Old Testament as events which are intrinsically redemptive and significant in terms of their historical character and as historical events. They are taken more as sensible symbols of intelligible truth and mysteries or as types of New Testament antitypes.⁴ Augustine does say that the Old Testament record of history is

¹De Civ. Dei XI.2; CSEL 40,1:513.
²De Util. Cred. 3.8; 3.9; 6.13.
³De Util. Cred. 3.9; CSEL 25:13.
⁴E.g. De Civ. Dei XVI; XVII.
not to be treated as a mere factual record nor must the whole sense or content be thought to lie in the allegorical significance.¹ However, in the final analysis it must be said that Augustine does not fully realize or appreciate the place and significance of historical events as such. It appears that this is to a considerable extent due to his notions concerning truth and being.

(3.3) Later developments fostered in part by these dichotomies

(3.3.1) In concluding this brief treatment of Augustine’s doctrine of truth I would simply cite some later developments which were foreshadowed by and which were in certain respects already incipient in Augustine’s doctrine of truth and its inherent dichotomies. In teaching that truth is to be sought within one’s own mind and the inner man² Augustine paves the way for that modern subjective idealism which holds that the mind can know only its own content or ideas and consequently can only turn in upon itself. It should be pointed out, however, that Augustine believed that through divine illumination the mind had access to the eternal transcendent Truth. He also held that the mind could know the being and truth of created entities. Nevertheless, Augustine helped to prepare the way for subjective idealism. He did so by teaching that the mind has not that direct and immediate contact with created entities such as it has with the

¹De Civ. Dei XVII.3. ²De Vera Relig. 39.72; 39.73.
truth within and above itself. In knowing the truth which resides within itself the mind can achieve utmost certainty since it does not have to contend with the senses and the mutable world. Augustine teaches that the mind perceives directly the truth within itself.

(3.3.2) Although Augustine could be termed a type of epistemological realist insofar as he holds that there are entities independent of the mind whose truth the mind can know, largely because of his intelligible-sensible dichotomy and doctrine of the soul in relation to the body, he introduces a type of representational perception and representative realism into his epistemology.¹ In the first place, the body and the corporeal senses are inferior to the soul² and therefore cannot act upon the soul. Furthermore, only the senses of the body are in direct contact with corporeal objects. However, sensation is a function of the soul alone: "Ergo conclusimus non sentire posse nisi animam."³ Although the soul engages in sensation it has no immediate contact with the corporeal object but only with an image of the object.⁴ The question is, how can complete scepticism regarding knowledge of corporeal objects be avoided? Augustine holds that it is the human will which unites the corporeal object with the

¹De Musica VI; De Trin. XI; XII.
²De Civ. Dei XVIII.27. ³Solil. II.4.6; PL 32:888.
image impressed upon the bodily sense.\textsuperscript{1} The will also unites the image of the corporeal object situated in the memory and the impression formed when the mind is turned to it. As one advances toward \textit{intellectus} he moves even farther away from the corporeal object. Concerning the isolation of the mind from its objects Carre\' says: "This separation foreshadows the representative or indirect theory of perception, which in a scientific setting formed the basis of theories of knowledge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."\textsuperscript{2} Augustine's problem, however, pertained more to the connexion of the soul and the spiritual image, formed in sensation, with the physical image and object, than the connexion of sense data with physical entities. The latter connexion proved to be a major problem especially in theories of representative perception.

(3.3.3) Finally, I should like to mention that although Augustine placed considerable emphasis on ontological truth or truth as being, he helped to prepare the way for doctrines of truth which emphasized primarily intellectual or logical truth. This development was fostered in part by Augustine's scepticism concerning knowledge of the sensible world, his preoccupation with the truth which resides within the soul, and his emphasis on necessary truth. Augustine's quest for self-evident necessary truths follows both from his desire for certainty and his under-

\textsuperscript{1}De \textit{Trin.} XI. 2.3.

standing of being as being immutable and intelligible. The con-
sequence is that truth tends to be divorced from the world of
mutable beings, the spatial temporal order. It is not surpris-
ing therefore that Augustine urges us to seek that truth which
is within the self, the inner man, and particularly above the
mind. It should also be pointed out, however, that Augustine's
adherence to faith, authority, divine illumination, and exem-
plarism made it possible for him to hold that truths in the
mind originate from without the mind. It is when Augustine's
doctrines of faith, divine illumination, and the like are aban-
donned that the dichotomies already discussed become especially
problematical and critical. When the mind's contents and ideas
are wholly abstracted from res without the mind it may be that
'truth' finally signifies no more than strict coherence, viz.,
immutable and necessary truths held in the mind.

1 De Vera Relig. 39.72; 49.94; De Lib. Arb. II.10.28,29;
Solil. II.19.33; De Magistro 11.38; 12.39; 13.41; 14.46.
PART B. ST. ANSELM'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH

We have already indicated some of the reasons why Anselm's doctrine of truth should be examined. Although we cannot give full consideration to the manifold facets of his doctrine of truth we do hope to consider some of the chief features of this doctrine, especially those which reappear in Grosseteste's doctrine. While keeping in mind Anselm's avowed fidelity to Augustine\(^1\) we must take note of his unique contribution to the understanding of truth within the Augustinian tradition. We are especially interested in those factors which constitute this uniqueness.

1. Cardinal facets of St. Anselm's doctrine of truth

Without attempting to cover the whole range of Anselm's thought it is possible to achieve a fairly satisfactory insight into his doctrine through a careful inspection of some of his dominant motifs. This can be achieved in part because of Anselm's deliberate and careful choice of terms and concepts and his consistent usage of the same. D. P. Henry amply substantiates this in his thorough study of Anselm's logic.\(^2\) Furthermore, Anselm's method, the structure of individual treatises, and the thematic ordering of his works emerge out of a consistent and coherent focusing of his mind upon a divinely instituted order and the

\(^1\)Monologion, Prologos; \(AO\) I:8.

"veritatis ratio." One must be cognizant of this fact if he hopes to achieve some understanding of the particular formulations, analyses, arguments, and motifs in which this unified vision of Anselm finds expression. One possible way of acquiring a degree of insight into Anselm's doctrine is to direct one's attention to certain cardinal notions that recur again and again and serve to integrate his thought. Included are such notions as rectitudo, iustitia, ratio, bonum, fides, intellectus, libertas, necessitas (praecedens et sequens), possibilitas, gratia, debitum, essentia, and the like. In examining Anselm's doctrine of rectitudo one finds oneself also engaged in the examination of a number of the above related notions.

(1.1) Truth as a central and integrative factor

Anselm's doctrine of truth has a central and key place in his thought for some of the same reasons cited in connexion with Augustine. God is the summa veritas and rectitudo. This belief is at the very center of Anselm's doctrine. 'Truth' also signifies being although Anselm does not state this as explicitly as does Augustine. That 'truth' signifies being is most evident

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1 Cur Deus Homo, Commendatio Operis ad Urbanum Papam II; AO II:40 (AO designates S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1946); followed by volume and page number.)

2 De Ver. 1,7,10,13; Pros. 14; Mon. 16, 18, 22, 31, 47; Cur Deus Homo II:17.

3 De Ver. 10,13. 4 Cf. Part A, (2.1).
when one considers Anselm's whole doctrine of truth and being. In speaking of the truth of things Anselm states: "M. Est igitur veritas in omnium quae sunt essentia, quia hoc sunt quod in summa veritate sunt."¹ Truth also has such an important place in Anselm's thought because of his conception of truth as "rectitudo mente sola perceptibilis."² Everything that is has a certain rectitudo, which means that every single thing is part of an integrated complex of relationships. This is the basis for the vision of which G. S. Heyer speaks: "One indeed discerns amid the diverse works of the saint a consistent core, a pivot on which his thought steadily turns. We may call it a special vision of 'right order' or rectitudo."³

The coherence of Anselm's doctrine is a corollary of that rectus ordo⁴ grounded in the supreme Truth and expressed in the created order. In speaking of God's response to human perversity Anselm states: "Quas si divina sapientia, ubi perversitas rectum ordinem perturbare nititur, non adderet, fieret in ipsa universitate quam debet ordinare, quaedam ex violata ordinis pulchritudine deformitas, et Deus in sua dispositione videtur dicere."⁵ Truth is this right or true order which man disturbs

¹De Ver. 7; AO I:185; cf. also De Ver. 13; De Casu Diaboli 19.
²De Ver. 11; AO I:191.
⁴Mon. 7; Cur Deus Homo I. 1,12,13 and especially I.15.
⁵Cur Deus Homo I.15; AO II:73.
and which God restores. Anselm seeks to order his thought in accordance with this truth and right order. In discussing Anselm's method, R. W. Southern states: "The inquiry was scarcely distinguishable from the prayer, since the aim of both was to shake off the torpor of the mind and see things as they are in their essential being."¹ The component parts of Anselm's teaching are interrelated and cohere by virtue of their relationship to that ratio veritatis which is also the ratio fidei.² If one is not clearly aware of this ratio such expressions as "sola ratione"³ and "rationibus necessariis"⁴ will be misinterpreted.⁵ Karl Barth says that in Anselm's doctrine there are the ratio of the supreme Nature, the ontic ratio, and the ratio which is a human faculty.⁶ These three rationes parallel the supreme rectitudo, the rectitudo of things, and the rectitudo of thought as set forth in Anselm's doctrine of truth.⁷ At the end of his treatise on truth Anselm concludes that "una igitur est in illis

²Proslogion, Proemium; Cur Deus Homo, Commendatio, I.1; II.15.
³Mon. 1; AO I:13; Cur Deus Homo II.22; AO II:133.
⁴Cur Deus Homo, Praefatio; AO II:42.
⁷De Ver. 3,7,10.
omnibus veritas."\(^1\) Grosseteste wrestles with this statement and its implications, both at the beginning and end of his treatise on truth. The meaning of Anselm's statement should become apparent as we proceed.

(1.2) The multiple signification of 'rectitudo'

The multiple uses of 'rectitudo' have already been suggested in the discussion above. The pivotal term 'rectitudo' signifies that which is, right or true relations, and a debitum\(^2\) which is fulfilled. Anselm, however, states very emphatically that the supreme rectitudo is radically different from any creaturely rectitudo. With respect to the supreme Truth he asks: "M. Vides etiam quomodo ista rectitudo causa sit omnium aliarum veritatum et rectitudinum, et nihil sit causa illius?\(^3\) The aseitas of God is a key facet of Anselm's doctrine of God. Because of this aseitas alone no term can be predicated univocally of God and created entities. God exists a se. Anselm cites the difficulty that man faces in trying to speak of God:

Sed ad illud quid responderi poterit, quod iam supra in hac ipsa disputatione constitit: quia sic est summa essentia supra et extra omnem aliam naturam, ut si quando de illa dicitur aliquid verbis, quae communia sunt alii naturis, sensus nullatenus sit communis?\(^4\)

\(^1\)De Ver. 13; AO I:199.

\(^2\)The verb 'debere' is used repeatedly by Anselm, especially in his discussion of truth. He also speaks of the various ways, proper and improper, in which the verb is used; cf. De Ver. 8; Cur Deus Homo II.18.

\(^3\)De Ver. 10; AO I:190.

\(^4\)Mon. 65; AO I:76.
Nevertheless, Anselm does predicate 'rectitudo' of Creator and creature, but not without ample qualification.

It is evident that Anselm is saying a number of things about every creaturely entity or act that is termed right or true. For example, to assert that an enuntiatio has both the first and second truth of signification\(^1\) is to indicate its ontological status. At the same time one declares its relation to a given state of affairs. Such a proposition is also said to have a natural\(^2\) truth and a truth that is not intrinsic to it.\(^3\) Furthermore, the proposition is said to be fulfilling its debitum or doing what it ought to do. It both signifies, and signifies what is the case. Although not every entity possesses this degree of rectitudo it can rightly be said that every existent has a certain rectitudo. Because of his belief that evil is nihil, non-aliquid, or absentia boni,\(^4\) Anselm is able to assert that "omne quod est, recte est."\(^5\) The 'nihil' just cited is to be distinguished from the 'nihil' discussed by Anselm in connection with the creation from nothing.\(^6\) I do not wish to oversimplify Anselm's conception of evil.\(^7\)

\(^1\)De Ver. 2,5,13. \(^2\)De Ver. 5.

\(^3\)It should be noted that some propositions necessarily have both; cf. De Ver. 2.

\(^4\)De Casu Diaboli 11. \(^5\)De Ver. 7; AO I:185. \(^6\)Mon. 7,8,9.

\(^7\)Cf. De Casu Diaboli 1,9,10,26; in chapter 26 the evil that is something and the evil that is nothing are distinguished.
A striking feature of Anselm's notion of rectitudo as fulfilled debitum is that every creaturely thing, even though it has no will, appears to be under a divine imperative. Every thing stands under a demand or obligation which is finally nothing less than the divine locutio rerum. "Illa autem rerum forma, quae in eius ratione res creandas praecedebat: quid aliud est quam rerum quaedam in ipsa ratione locutio, . . . " In speaking of the divine Word Anselm states: "Satis itaque manifestum est in verbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, non esse ipsorum similitudinem, sed veram simplicemque essentiam; . . . . " In the eternal Word are the models or archetypes which continually impose a debitum upon created entities. This must be kept in mind if one is to understand Anselm's De Veritate treatise, chapter thirteen in particular. In this treatise he repeatedly says that whenever a certain thing does what it ought [debere] to do, then it is right or true. This holds for propositions, thoughts, wills, natural actions, the senses, signs, and beings in general. Although Anselm is well aware of characteristics that are peculiar to a particular category of entities, he wishes to emphasize that each thing stands under its respective debitum. Man, for instance, is obliged to will rightly, to think rightly, to speak rightly, and to act rightly in all that he does. To do

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1 *Mon.* 10. 2 *Mon.* 10; *A0 I:* 24. 3 *Mon.* 31; *A0 I:* 50. 4 *De Ver.* 2-7, 9. 5 *De Ver.* 5, 6.
the right is to do the truth. "Unde sequitur quia rectitudinem facere est facere veritatem."¹

That not all rectitudines have the exact same character is apparent in Anselm's discussion of the truth of natural and non-natural actions. "Ex necessitate namque ignis facit rectitudinem et veritatem, cum caelefact; et non ex necessitate facit homo rectitudinem et veritatem, cum bene facit."² The one rectitudo results from a certain physical necessity and the other from the free will. The language that Anselm uses in describing the rectitudo of the will, both of men and angels, also shows that this particular rectitudo has its own unique character. Like every other thing the will is to be termed right or true when it does what it ought to do, however, the will that wills rightly is most appropriately described as being just. In his closely reasoned explication of iustitia Anselm states that "ergo non est ista iustitia rectitudo scientiae aut rectitudo actionis, sed rectitudo voluntatis,"³ and furthermore, that this "iustitia igitur est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata."⁴ I have cited Anselm's conception of justice primarily to illustrate how one particular rightness may differ from others. Nevertheless, every creaturely thing is termed 'right' or 'true' because

¹De Ver. 5; AO I:181. ²De Ver. 5; AO I:182.
³De Ver. 12; AO I:193; cf. also De Libertate Arbitrii 3; De Casu Diaboli 4,9,16.
⁴De Ver. 12; AO I:194.
it is to some degree rightly related to the divine locutio, and because it is doing what it is supposed to do, in one respect at least.¹

In connection with the above, one or two further observations may be in order. In a particular instance of truth there may be a number of rightnesses present, for example, when a man asserts what is actually the case. The proposition expressed has the two rightnesses that a proposition ought to have. At the same time there must be some degree of rightness of the will because of the very act of willing. "Unde sequitur nullam voluntatem esse malum sed esse bonum inquantum est, quia opus dei est; nec nisi inquantum est iniusta malam esse."² Furthermore, it is possible that he who signifies what is indeed the case wills justly and wills rightness for its own sake.³ He can then be said to have the rightness of the will which is justice. In addition, there is here also that rightness which is present when man does what he was created to do, which in this instance is the act of signifying and signifying correctly. Because of this plurality of possible rightnesses,⁴ or at least two possible rightnesses, Anselm can say of a particular entity

¹De Ver. 2,8; De Casu Diaboli 19,20; Cur Deus Homo II.18.
²De Casu Diaboli 19; AO I:264; also 28.
³De Ver. 12; De Concordia I.6.
⁴One must, however, keep in mind the sense in which Anselm wishes to speak of a single rightness in all things; cf. De Ver.13.
or act that it both ought to be and ought not to be. "Multis
enim modis eadem res suscipit diversis considerationibus con-
traria."¹ Because the same thing can be right or true in one
respect, and be wrong or false in another respect, Anselm finds
it necessary to specify just what is intended when speaking of
the rightness or propriety of a particular thing. Anselm does
just this when meditating upon the suffering and death of
Christ.² He cites in what sense he ought to have suffered death
and in what sense he ought not to have suffered death.³

At the beginning of this section⁴ I intimated that 'recti-
tudo' has a very special and unique sense when it is used to
signify the Creator, the supreme Truth. At this juncture I would
like to add a few comments to what was said above. "Et quidem
credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit."⁵
This cardinal belief, which in the Proslogion serves as a founda-
tion stone of Anselm's argument for the existence of God, is
reason enough to believe that God is a rectitudo that is pro-
foundly different from every creaturely rectitudo. On the basis
of the above belief and definition it certainly follows that God
is not measured by nor dependent upon anything else. Only if
there were a being still greater than God, which is an impossibility,

¹De Ver. 8; AO I:187.  ²De Ver. 8: Cur Deus Homo II.18.
³Ibid.  ⁴Cf. (1.2)
⁵Pros. 2; AO I:101. cf. Augustine's De Lib. Arb. II.6 where
we find a certain foreshadowing of this belief.
could God be measured and dependent on another being for his existence.

That the supreme Rightness differs radically from every created rightness is most apparent from Anselm's beliefs concerning God. He says of the supreme Nature that "est per seipsam, alia vero per aliiud: ita omnia quae sunt sint ex eadem summa natura, et idcirco sit illa ex seipsa, alia autem ex alio." He states in another place that "ita summa veritas per se subsistens nullius rei est; sed cum aliquid secundum illam est, tunc eius dicitur veritas vel rectitudo." God not only exists in and through himself, he also is whatever he is solely in and through himself: "Sed certe quidquid es, non per aliud es quam per teipsum. Tu es igitur ipsa vita qua vivis, et sapientia qua sapis, et bonitas ipsa qua bonis et malis bonus es; et ita de similibus." The supreme Truth has no beginning or end. He is immutable. The supreme Nature is also perfect simplicity.

When Anselm speaks of the supreme Truth or Rightness he also has in mind a relationship that involves a perfect similitude. Following Augustine, Anselm says that "utique verbum quo se dicit summa sapientia, convenientissime dici potest verbum eius secundum superiorem rationem, quia eius perfectam tenet

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1Mon. 5; AO I:18. 2De Ver. 13; AO I:199. 3Pros. 12; AO I:110; Mon. 16. 4Mon. 18; De Ver. 10. 5Mon. 16, 21,24,25,31; Cur Deus Homo II.16,17.
Similitudinem.\textsuperscript{1} Anselm states in the \textit{Proslogion}:

\begin{quote}
Etenim non potest aliud quam quod es, aut aliquid maius vel minus te esse in verbo quo te ipsum dicis; quoniam verbum tuum sic est verum quomodo tu verax, et idcirco est ipsa veritas sicut tu, non alia quam tu; et sic es tu, simplex, ut de te non possit nasci aliud quam quod tu es.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

The eternal Son is the Truth of Truth.\textsuperscript{3} Anselm wishes to make it clear that the eternal Word, which expresses perfectly the supreme Nature, must not be considered to be truth in the sense that it corresponds rightly with the created world.\textsuperscript{4} The supreme Truth "nullum augmentum vel detrimentum sentiet secundum hoc quod magis vel minus creaturis sit simile; sed potius necesse erit omne quod creatum est tanto magis esse et tanto esse praestantius, quanto similius est illi quod summe est et summe magnum est."\textsuperscript{5}

We noted above that the eternal Word is the true and simple essence of created things rather than their similitude.\textsuperscript{6}

When Anselm speaks of God as the supreme Truth he obviously does not intend to signify that God has fulfilled a certain \textit{debitum} that has been imposed upon him. A cardinal aspect of Anselm's doctrine of God is that God is free from any external compulsion, restraint, necessity or impossibility, or \textit{debitum}.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{1}Mon. 33; AO I:52; this theme is explored at length throughout Mon. 29-48.  
\textsuperscript{2}Pros. 23; AO I:117.  
\textsuperscript{3}Mon. 47.  
\textsuperscript{4}Mon. 31,33.  
\textsuperscript{5}Mon. 31; AO I:49.  
\textsuperscript{6}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{7}Cf. De Concordia I.2,3; Pros. 7; Cur Deus Homo I.10; II.5,10,16,17,18; De Ver. 10.
Anselm states that "deus nullius legi subiacet"\(^1\) and that "Deus quoque dicitur omnibus debere praesse, non quia ille in hoc aliquo modo sit debitor, sed quoniam omnia debent illi subesse; et debere facere quod vult, quoniam quod vult debet esse."\(^2\) "Nam id solum iustum est quod vis, et non iustum quod non vis."\(^3\) Anselm stressed elsewhere that the "summa veritas non ideo est rectitudo quia debet aliquid. Omnia enim illi debet, ipsa vero nulli quicquam debet; nec ulla ratione est quod est, nisi quia est."\(^4\) The same can hardly be said of created rightnesses, including the wills of men and of angels. On the basis of the above observations it should be obvious that 'rectitudo' is not and can not be applied to Creator and creature in a univocal fashion.

(1.3) The incomprehensibility and ineffability of the supreme Truth

(1.3.1) In discussing Anselm's doctrine of truth we would do well to consider briefly his belief in the incomprehensible and ineffable character of the supreme Truth. One must be aware of this belief if Anselm's method and necessariae rationes or rational necessity are to be interpreted correctly. The necessary reasons, which also serve as the premises and grounds of demon-

\(^1\) Cur Deus Homo I. 12; AO II:69.
\(^2\) Cur Deus Homo II.18; AO II:129.
\(^3\) Pros. 11; AO I:109. \(^4\) De Ver. 10; AO I:190.
strated beliefs, signify facets of the exalted Truth and Mystery which remain beyond the grasp of the human intellect. Because of the sublime nature of the Truth and the inadequacy and perversity of the human reason, Anselm believed that he could at best do no more than direct us to the Truth and intimate something of its own interior ratio. He certainly did not expect or attempt to unravel the mysteries inherent in the Truth. "Non tento, domine, penetrare altitudinem tuam, quia nullatenus comparo illi intellectum meum; sed desidero aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam, quam credit et amat cor meum."¹ Having meditated on the mystery of the Trinity Anselm makes a statement that both points up the incomprehensibility of his subject and suggests his general method:

Videtur mihi huius tam sublimis rei secretum transcendere omnem intellectus aciem humani, et idcirco conatum explicandi qualiter hoc sit continendum puto. Sufficere namque debere existimo rem incomprehensibilem indaganti, si ad hoc ratiocinando pervenerit ut eam certissime esse cognoscat, etiam si penetrare nequeat intellectu quomodo ita sit; . . . .²

Even E. Gilson, who portrays Anselm very much as a Christian 'rationalist', states that "however strongly he might trust the power of reason, Saint Anselm never imagined that it would succeed in understanding mystery. . . . To understand a mystery would be much more than to understand its necessity."³ The above

¹Pros. 1; AO I:100. ²Mon. 64; AO I:74-75. ³E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 130.
statements taken from the Monologion, as well as Gilson's comments, clearly indicate that to demonstrate that a certain truth exists is not yet to comprehend it. "Denique ad te videndum factus sum, et nondum feci propter quod factus sum."¹ Throughout his writing Anselm constantly refers to his inability to understand or grasp the truth. Such truth includes created entities as well:

Cum ergo et hoc constet, quia omnis creati substansia tanto verius est in verbo, id est in intelligentia creatoris, quam in se ipsa, quanto verius existit creatris quam creati essentia; quomodo comprehendat humana mens cuiusmodi sit illud dicere, et illa scientia, quae sic longe superior et verior est creatis substantiis, si nostra scientia tam longe superatur ab illis, quantum earum similitudo distat ab earum essentia?²

Anselm's ordo essendi and ordo veritatis are also apparent in this citation from the Monologion. The position of human knowledge is rather clearly indicated.

(1.3.2) The ineffability of the Truth is rooted in its incomprehensible character. Anselm confesses repeatedly that he cannot adequately express the supreme Nature. Regarding the supreme Word Anselm states that "licet de re tam singulariter eminenti proprie aliquid satis convenienter dici non possit, non tamen inconvenienter sicut similitudo ita et imago et figura et caracter eius dici potest."³ In setting forth the nature of justice Anselm asks the question: "M. Videtur tibi quod ista definitio possit aptari summæ iustitiae, secundum quod de re

¹Pros. 1; AO I:98. ²Mon. 36; AO I:55. ³Mon. 33; AO I:53.
loqui possumus de qua nihil aut vix aliquid proprie potest dici?"¹ Anselm believes that the terms 'sapientia' and 'essentia' do not adequately express or disclose him who is so far above all things. This does not mean that everything expressed concerning God must be false: "Sic igitur illa natura et ineffabilis est, quia per verba sicuti est nullatenus valet intimari; et falsum non est, si quid de illa ratione docente per aliud velut in aenigmate potest aestimari."² Man must speak of God per aliud, as in a riddle or enigma. Anselm is aware of the difficulties involved in taking words from everyday common usage and then applying them to God. It is only after making clear how the supreme Being differs from all other substances that Anselm asserts that "profecto si quid dignae potest, non prohibetur dici substantia."³ Or as he states earlier: "Unde si quando illi est cum aliis nominis alicuius communio, valde procul dubio intelligenda est diversa significatio."⁴

(1.3.3) Anselm does not speak of created truth as being ineffable, even though, as noted above,⁵ it too surpasses human knowledge. He points out that our knowledge is but a likeness of created substances: "Nam nulli dubium creatas substantias multo aliter esse in seipsis quam in nostra scientia. In seipsis namque sunt per ipsam suam essentiam; in nostra vero scientia

¹De Ver. 12; AO: 195. ²Mon. 65; AO I:77. ³Mon. 27; AO I:45; cf. also Mon. 79. ⁴Mon. 26; AO I:44. ⁵Cf. p. 183, n. 2.
non sunt earum essentiae, sed earum similitudines."¹ One can
reasily see how far the divine locutio transcends "omnia huius-
modi verba quibus res quaslibet mente dicimus, id est cogitamus:.
... "² Every work spoken in the human mind is more or less
ture, depending on the extent to which it approximates the thing
to which it refers. In view of Anselm's repeated declaration of
the incomprehensible and ineffable character of truth I find the
following judgement of J. Pieper most unacceptable: "In the ab-
stract he could recognize reason's necessary inadequacy to cope
with mystery; he acknowledged that inadequacy rationally. But
he was unable to grasp it in any real sense, that is existen-
tially."³

2. Critical survey of major motifs in St. Anselm's doctrine
of truth

Our present purpose is to examine rather critically certain
key factors found in Anselm's understanding of truth. We are
especially interested in the manner in which certain major themes
in his doctrine of truth are interrelated. Some of these motifs
have a direct bearing on Anselm's arguments for the existence of
a supreme Nature.

(2.1) Correspondence, coherence, participation, and their role
in Anselm's arguments for the existence and eternity of Truth

In examining Augustine's doctrine of truth we observed that

¹Mon. 36; AO I:54-55. ²Mon. 31; AO I:48.
³Scholasticism, p. 64.
correspondence, understood usually as *similitudo*, was an important component of his doctrine. It was evident, however, that in the quest for certitude coherence was a key factor.¹ Augustine’s doctrine of truth was seen to include also an exemplarism and a theory of participation. Although these themes are to be found in the teaching of Anselm and Grosseteste, there are some significant differences that should become apparent as we proceed.

(2.1.1) As already intimated, the whole of Anselm’s conception of truth is permeated by the theme of right relations and right order. He not only took over Augustine’s notion of *similitudo*, but in utilizing the notion of *rectitudo* he goes further than Augustine in emphasizing truth as right relation or correspondence. Only if the dominant motif of right relations is constantly kept in mind will coherence and participation in Anselm’s doctrine of truth be interpreted correctly. Such notions as participation and coherence must be considered in the light and context of *rectitudo*. For example, every instance of coherence within the created order is a complex of intrinsic right relations which has arisen out of a series of extrinsic right relations. There are of course different types of coherence within the created order, all of which differ radically from the supreme Truth. The character of a particular coherent pattern or complex will be largely determined by the nature of the constituent

¹Cf. Part A. (1.3).
factors involved and the manner in which they are interrelated. For example, one set of propositions may be simply a complementary series; another, a series of true statements which together serve as the premises of a demonstration; and another, a set in which each statement follows necessarily from the statement preceding it. When Anselm engages in the demonstration of a particular belief he is interested in a coherence involving a necessary connexion between premises and the conclusion. This does not mean that in every demonstration the conclusion follows necessarily from each premise taken individually, but that the belief to be demonstrated follows from the premises taken together. This type of coherence is exemplified in Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*. Although the content and character of the premises and the order of the demonstrations differ,¹ a similar coherence is evident in the arguments for the existence of God which are set forth in the *Monologion*. In each case, however, the statements cohere as they do because of their *rectitudo* or correspondence to factors that cohere in re. Coherence in Anselm's thought and arguments is much more than sheer logical consistency. Coherence arises out of Anselm's method, in which he seeks to search out or trace out the actual connexions found in reality itself. The connexions may involve antecedent necessity, as in the case of an effect and its cause. This does not mean that all the circumstances or

entities, represented by the statements or reasons making up the coherent demonstration, are subject to some antecedent necessity and therefore compelled to be. In fact, the logical order of the argument itself, in which the premises are seen to effect the conclusion, does not always truly indicate the actual order of the things represented. This is the case, for example, in the *Monologion*, where Anselm seeks to demonstrate the existence of a supreme Nature on the basis of created effects. We shall note later on that Anselm was very much aware that linguistic and logical form may at times mislead us if we fail to penetrate beneath the form itself. None the less, Anselm believed that a doctrine or belief could be shown and seen to be true by showing that it follows from and coheres with other truths. Logical coherence is considered to be indicative of right relations between statements and *res*.

(2.1.2) I wish to compare briefly coherence in Augustine's doctrine with that of Anselm. In his anxious quest for certitude, Augustine appeals again and again to self-evident immutable truths\(^1\) as proof of the existence of the eternal and supreme Truth. For the sake of comparison I wish to speak, as in the first chapter, of such truths as instances of strict or narrow coherence. Augustine, of course, did not consider these immutable truths to be simply cases of formal or logical coherence. He clearly did not view these truths as analytic statements or

\(^1\) Cf. Part A; (1.3), (2.1), (2.2.3.1).
tautologies. These immutable truths in the mutable mind were assumed to be reflections of extra-mental immutable being.\textsuperscript{1} The mutable mind could hardly be their source or referent. Furthermore, and this is the point that really interests us presently, their immutable truth does not have to be demonstrated but is immediately self-evident. Without any investigation or rational argument one is able to see that they are necessarily true and signify what has to be the case. Moreover, on the basis of his doctrine of formae and his theory of participation Augustine argued that there must be an immutable Truth which contains these immutable truths.\textsuperscript{2} On the basis of his assumptions Augustine held that the presence of these immutable regulae is clear proof that the eternal immutable Truth necessarily exists.

Concerning the matter of coherence Anselm is certainly no simple Augustinus minor. While keeping in mind such as Anselm's arguments for the eternity of truth as well as his ontological argument,\textsuperscript{3} it can be said that Anselm is generally more interested in a 'broad' coherence rather than the narrow coherence of Augustine's immutable truths. The coherence qualified as being 'broad' is that which marks a series of interrelated truths making up a consistent whole. Anselm, unlike Augustine, did not

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. Part A; (1.3), (2.1). \textsuperscript{2}De Lib. Arb. II. 12.33. \textsuperscript{3}Cf. Mon. 18; De Ver. 1.10; Pros. 2.
feel the same compelling need to utilize strict or narrow coherence. Augustine's anxious quest for certitude partly accounts for this difference. Differences in historical milieu, personal temperaments, and personal histories should also be mentioned. Above all, mention should also be made of Anselm's notion of rectitudo. Although 'rectitudo' signifies what may be termed right relations ad intra, for example, the relations subsisting among the various components of a cogent argument or the elements of a body of doctrine, 'rectitudo' signifies, above all, right relations ad extra. I use the latter expression to indicate those various rightnesses which Anselm describes in his De Veritate treatise. In speaking of the rightness of a proposition Anselm has in mind the proposition's right relations ad extra, to its cause and ground. Creatures only exist by virtue of their right relations ad extra. God, however, exists a se and not by virtue of a right relation ad extra. In reflecting on those perfect relations within the Trinity Anselm is obviously interested in relations ad intra. However, within the created order all coherent wholes, with their right relations ad intra, are contingent on and grounded in right relations ad extra.

(2.1.3) It is also essential that Anselm's exemplarism or

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1 Cf. D. P. Henry, op cit., pp. 18, 240; De Grammatico 3, 4.
2 De Ver. 10. 3 Mon. 29-63.
doctrine of formae and theory of participation be considered in conjunction with his understanding of truth or rectitudo. There are passages in the treatises of Anselm under consideration which would almost seem to suggest a type of monism plus an analogy of inequality or generic predication.\(^1\) However, in view of Anselm's repeated declaration of the radical ontological discontinuity between Creator and creature, it is clearly apparent that he does not teach either of the above, nor could he.\(^2\)

Although in his *Monologion* Anselm clearly utilizes a doctrine akin to that of the Platonic Ideas, he does not apply the doctrine strictly nor does the doctrine constitute the whole of the arguments set forth. That such a doctrine cannot be used in a strict fashion is evident at the outset, where Anselm attempts to demonstrate the existence of the supreme Good on the basis of many good things. After presenting most of the argument, he states: "Illud igitur est bonum per seipsum, quoniam omne bonum est per ipsum. Ergo consequitur, ut omnia alia bona sint per aliquid quam quod ipsa sunt, et ipsum solum per seipsum."\(^3\) Because of this professed radical discontinuity between that which is to be demonstrated and the many good things, an argument that requires strict participation is inappropriate and inapplicable. The latter argument would only be applicable where the particulars

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\(^{1}\) E.g. *Mon.* 1-7, 16; *De Ver.* 1,2,7,13.  
\(^{2}\) Cf. above (1,2).  
\(^{3}\) *Mon.* 1; *AO* I:15; cf. also *Mon.* 7,27; *Pros.* 24.
share in the essence of the universal form to be demonstrated.

Although Anselm does teach an exemplarism, his exemplarism allows for the radical discontinuity cited above. The exemplars of created entities are divine since they are the divine "locutio." The creatures which are patterned after them are not divine. It is clear that the relation between a creaturely being and its divine exemplar is quite different from that relation which exists between a particular and its universal form or essence. Assuming that Anselm has the latter relation in mind in the above argument based on good things, the argument would at the very most only demonstrate that there is a universal essence or form, viz., goodness, in which good things participate. This is to assume of course that the argument itself and the theories on which it rests are valid. Anselm's intention, however, is to demonstrate the existence of the supreme and absolute Good, viz., God. This is what is intended even though the word 'Deus' is not used in the above argument. The radical ontological discontinuity between creaturely good things and God makes the argument based on the participation of particulars in a universal form inapplicable and inconclusive.

Near the end of the above argument Anselm simply argues that because there are these many contingent goods there must be an absolute good which is the basis and ground of their existence. The argument at this point does not seem to rest on the notion of strict participation on or an exemplarism. Contingent entities are good *per aliud*, in other words, they are good because of their
relations to that which is good *per seipsum*. The relations themselves are not clearly spelled out, however. A difficulty lingers because of Anselm's earlier insistence that the good in different good things in one and the same.

The issue is somewhat clearer in chapters three and four of the *Monologion* where Anselm seeks to demonstrate the existence of a supreme Being on the basis of contingent beings and degrees of perfection amongst beings. These arguments seem to anticipate St. Thomas' *Quinque Viae*, the third and fourth ways in particular. The type of relationship assumed in the argument in chapter three of the *Monologion* is that which prevails between contingent beings and an absolute or necessary being. Here a radical ontological gap is clearly evident. The type of relationship basic to the argument grounded on degrees of perfection is not that of particulars participating in varying degrees in one and the same entity or quality, but simply that which prevails between a lesser or inferior entity and a greater or superior entity. A man has a nature that is superior to that of a horse, as a horse has a nature that is superior to wood.\(^1\) Anselm argues that beings are finite in number. He realizes that the argument would be invalid if this were not the case. In the argument based on contingent beings a finite number of beings is also assumed.

In concluding our brief discussion of these arguments we should note two other specific instances where Anselm clearly

\(^1\)Pros. 4.
utilizes a theory of strict participation in a universal form. In both of the arguments he employs such a theory in order to refute the contention of the opponent who would maintain that there can be a number of beings existing per se, or a number of beings superior to all other things but equal among themselves. Anselm argues that if there were a plurality of these beings, then there would still be a single entity or nature superior to them. Anselm bases his argument on the theory of particulars participating in the same nature of universal form. However, even if one were to concede that the argument and the theory on which it is based are valid, the argument itself does not really demonstrate what Anselm is seeking to demonstrate. For the argument to be valid Anselm must grant that there is a plurality of beings who share in the same nature, but Anselm's intention is to demonstrate a unique supreme Being whose nature cannot be shared or distributed. It appears that Anselm has utilized rather uncritically a doctrine of universal forms and strict participation. It would be wrong to say, however, that the above arguments rest in their entirety on this doctrine.

(2.1.4) In the De Veritate treatise the disciple speaks of the true thing participating in the truth: "D. Quia nihil est verum nisi participando veritatem; et ideo veri veritas in ipso vero est, res enuntiata non est in enun- tione vera. Unde non eius veritas, sed causa veritatis eius dicenda est."¹ This is the only point in the treatise where participation is cited

¹De Ver. 2; A0 I:177.
explicitly and even here it is carefully circumscribed. Here Anselm makes a key distinction between a thing's own truth, which is founded on a right relation with another entity or fact, and that which is the cause of its truth. Just as the cause of a true proposition is not in the true proposition itself, so too a true proposition does not participate in its cause. This must be kept in mind if one is to interpret correctly chapter thirteen of De Veritate where Anselm inquires "an sit una sola veritas in omnibus illis in quibus veritatem dicimus esse, an ita sint veritates plures, sicut plura sunt in quibus constat esse veritatem."¹

In concluding that there is finally only one truth in all those things declared to be right or true Anselm does not wish to suggest that the host of created particulars all share in a single supreme Nature. If Anselm were to teach that creatures share in the supreme Nature he would wholly contradict his doctrine of God and his belief in a contingent created order.² Moreover, at the very end of the treatise on truth Anselm states: "ita summa veritas per se subsistens nullius rei est; sed cum aliquid secundum illam est, tunc eius dicitur veritas vel rectitudo."³ The supreme Truth is not predicated of any created entity, but whenever some thing is rightly related to the supreme Truth,

¹De Ver. 13; AO I:197. ²Cf. Mon. 7-13. ³De Ver. 13; AO I:199.
then we speak of the truth of that thing. In chapter thirteen of his *De Veritate* Anselm is especially interested in showing how the *summa veritas* is the ultimate ground of all creaturely truths. This Truth, subsisting in and through itself, remains the immutable *debitum* even while creaturely beings fluctuate or even cease to be. It is in this sense that the following has to be understood: "D. Omnino video hac ipsa ratione probari, quoquo modo ipsa sint, rectitudinem immutabilem permanere."¹

It is sometimes difficult to ascertain just what Anselm has in mind when speaks of the *rectitudo* of a particular thing. In general, when speaking of 'the rightness or this or that thing' Anselm seems to have in mind a particular quality of the thing. It possesses this quality to the degree that it is rightly related to a certain measure, standard, or state of affairs. However, in chapter thirteen of *De Veritate*, where Anselm is preoccupied with the supreme Measure or Rightness, he states that it is improper to speak of 'the truth of this or that thing'. He makes this point because he does not want anyone to think that the supreme Truth is the truth of a particular thing. The supreme Truth has its own independent and absolute existence and is not situated in created things.

Anselm's doctrine of truth, his use of *rectitudo*, and his talk of the true thing participating in the truth will be misinterpreted if it is thought that *rectitudo* functions much like

¹*De Ver.* 13; *AO* I:198.
a proper name naming one and the same thing in each instance of use. When Anselm defines 'truth' as an intelligible rectitudo the latter does not as such yet designate a particular entity, quality, or set of circumstances. It is in instances of actual usage that 'rectitudo' takes on a more precise signification. For example, in some instances 'rectitudo' clearly signifies and names the supreme Being as Cause of all other rightnesses. In such instances 'rectitudo' can hardly be said to designate a universal essence or quality in which all entities participate. As already indicated, 'rectitudo' in certain instances of use seems to signify and name an eternal exemplar which serves as a debitum to which creaturely entities ought to conform. This is no doubt what is intended when Anselm speaks of that rightness or debitum which does not change or perish even though a proposition does not signify as it ought. There are also places where 'rectitudo' simply signifies a quality, viz., 'being right' or 'having rightness'. This does not mean that 'rectitudo' necessarily names a created universal quality that is shared by particulars. However, Anselm does use 'rectitudo' repeatedly to signify and name a particular quality, viz., 'being right', belonging to a particular entity. In this last mentioned usage there is obviously also implied a state of affairs or set of circumstances involving a right relation or a number of right relations. In fact, it could be said that throughout the above usages 'rectitudo' connotes right relations. When used of God 'rectitudo' signifies the absolute and supreme Cause and final Ground of all right
or true relations. The above usages of 'rectitudo' are manifest throughout Anselm's De Veritate. They are more or less juxtaposed in chapter thirteen of the treatise.

Having examined the thesis of chapter thirteen of the De Veritate, Hopkins and/or Richardson make the following conclusion, which to me is incorrect in certain respects and certainly in need of further qualification:

Anselm has attempted to give an argument for the Platonic thesis that if truth is a universal, then it must exist independently of the things it is in. He has done this by combining the Platonic notion of participation with the Aristotelian notion of correspondence. He wishes to affirm that when a proposition has truth of reference (right correspondence), it participates in the Rightness of all things. When a proposition has a truth of reference, it has a double participation in truth. This theory of double participation is Anselm's way of conflating two philosophical traditions. His insistence that if there are truths there must be Truth is reminiscent of Augustine's argument in De Libero Arbitrio.1

Although the impact of the "Platonic notion of participation" and the "Aristotelian notion of correspondence" is clearly evident in Anselm's treatise on truth, it can hardly be said that he simply combines or fuses together these "two philosophical traditions." Anselm's doctrine differs sharply from these notions at several key points. Anselm's doctrines of God and creation, his exemplarism, and his understanding of truth as rectitudo, neither include nor do they leave room for any strict Platonic participation or sheer Aristotelian correspondence. We have already noted

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some significant points of departure between Anselm’s doctrine and parallel facets of Platonic doctrine. After a mere cursory examination of Anselm’s conception of logical or propositional truth, and its place within the whole construct of rectitudo and right relations, it soon becomes apparent how his conception differs from Aristotle’s notion of logical truth. However, I do not wish to deny that one may find formal similarities between Aristotelian correspondence and Anselm’s notion of logical truth, particularly when the latter is abstracted from the rest of Anselm’s doctrine.

I would not want to assert unqualifiedly that Anselm’s "insistence that if there are truths there must be Truth is reminiscent of Augustine’s argument in De Libero Arbitrio. This should not be asserted without taking note of significant differences between Anselm’s truths and Augustine’s truths, and their reasons for introducing them into the texts cited. In the first place, Anselm’s stated purpose in De Veritate is to inquire "quid scilicet sit veritas, et in quibus rebus soleat dici; et quid sit iustitia"¹ and to find out "per rerum diversitates in quibus veritatem dicimus esse, quid sit veritas."² Moreover, it is not really in his De Veritate but rather in his Monologion and Proslogion that we find Anselm’s major arguments for the existence of God, arguments that differ in important respects from Augustine’s argument in his De Libero Arbitrio. Some of these differences

¹De Ver., Praefatio; AO I:173. ²De Ver. I; AO I:177.
should be apparent on the basis of our earlier discussion of these arguments. In his *De Veritate* Anselm does not really seek to demonstrate the sheer existence of God but rather, in chapters one and ten, to demonstrate that the *summa veritas* has no beginning or end.¹ These arguments are actually more reminiscent of Augustine's argument for the imperishability of the truth, which is set forth in his *Soliloquia*,² than the argument for the existence of God, which is found in his *De Libero Arbitrio*.

However, even the last mentioned arguments differ in certain respects. Anselm's argument is more elaborate than Augustine's. One way in which this is so is that Anselm also uses such truths as "futurum erat aliquid" and "praeteritum erit aliquid."³ Furthermore, and this is a more significant factor, in chapter ten of his *De Veritate* Anselm traces out the actual connexion between these truths just cited and that Truth which is their supreme Cause. The statements are said to be true because they refer to what indeed will be or what has been. Moreover, that which will be, or has been, is in turn grounded in the supreme Truth, which is in this way the first and supreme Cause of the true statement. In the argument it is really assumed that even though the immediate cause⁴ of the truth of the proposition is

¹ *De Ver.* 1,10. ² *Solil.* II.2.2; II.15.27,28. ³ *De Ver.* 1; *AO* I:176; cf. also *De Ver.* 10 and *Mon.* 18. ⁴ Cf. *De Ver.* 2.
temporal and perishable, the supreme and more remote first Cause is eternal and immutable. This seems to be the case where Anselm states that "neque aliquid est futurum, si non est in summa veritate", and "ideo est aliquid praeteritum, quia sic est in summa veritate."\(^1\)

The cogency and force of this argument of Anselm rests in part on his identification of the proposition with the sentence.\(^2\) He therefore selects one sentence or proposition which would have been true without beginning, and another which would always be true after the fact. For Anselm, one and the same proposition (sentence) may fluctuate in terms of its truth value. On one occasion it may signify what is the case and on another occasion it may lack this truth. Anselm introduces a conditional or hypothetical element into the above argument where he says "si oratio ista esset" and "si [oratio] facta fuerit."\(^3\) Anselm is right in recognizing this fact even though his argument is weakened by the recognition of this fact. Augustine does not make this admission in his arguments for truth.

In arguing that truth has no beginning or end Anselm does

\(^1\)\textit{De Ver.} 10; \textit{AO} I:190.

\(^2\)Such a confusion is also evident in passages dealing with the two truths of the proposition; e.g. \textit{De Ver.} 2, 13; here Anselm states that a proposition (oratio, enuntiatio) may at one time have accidental or extrinsic rightness and may lack it at another time. Of course, there are propositions which always have both rightnesses of signification.

\(^3\)\textit{De Ver.} 10; \textit{AO} I:190.
at one point in particular follow Augustine quite closely.\(^1\) This is where he argues that if truth had a beginning, or if it will have an end, then even before truth existed it would be true that there is no truth and after truth had come to an end it would be true that truth doesn't exist. However, if there is something true there must be truth. The criticism directed against Augustine's argument of the same nature would also be applicable in this instance.\(^2\) Before proceeding to another topic, I would simply like to point out that neither in his \textit{De Veritate} nor elsewhere is Anselm especially interested in those immutable truths with which Augustine is preoccupied in his attempt to demonstrate the existence of God.\(^3\) As indicated above, Anselm's major concern in his \textit{De Veritate} is to achieve an understanding of the nature of truth. He seeks to achieve this understanding by examining several categories of truths and by viewing them in relation to the supreme Truth itself. The category of logical truths is only one among several categories.

(2.2) 'Realism' and '\textit{res}' in Anselm's doctrine

It is not Anselm's position with respect to the question of

\(^1\)\textit{Mon.} 18; \textit{De Ver.} 1; here Anselm presents an argument like that found in Augustine's \textit{Solil.} II.2.2; II.15.28.

\(^2\)Cf. Part A, (2.2.3.1) for critical assessment of Augustine's arguments in \textit{Solil.} II.2.2; II.15.28; and in \textit{De Libero Arbitrio} II.

universals that is of primary concern at this point. Oblique reference has already been made to this question on which Henry has presented some very helpful commentary.\(^1\) What is presently intended in speaking of 'realism' in Anselm's doctrine of truth should become apparent as we proceed.

(2.2.1) Anselm manifests a steady preoccupation with res and with actuality. As already noted above, Anselm's expressed desire in his De Veritate is to examine the many res in which truth is said to be in order that the nature of truth may be known. He doesn't discuss truth in the abstract but in direct connexion with different categories of things. Moreover, he is constantly engaged in probing in and through effects to their causes so that the effects may be more fully understood in terms of their causes.\(^2\) Therefore, although he begins with the truth of signification "ut te a notioribus ad ignotiora perducerem,"\(^3\) he concludes his treatise on truth discussing the supreme Truth. He also says in chapter nine: "Omnes enim de veritate significations loquuntur; veritatem vero quae est in rerum essentia, pauci considerant.\(^4\) Anselm holds that true thought and propositions are the effects of other truth, viz., truth in the existence of things and finally the supreme Truth. Proposition and thought are not the causes of any other truth.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) D. P. Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm, pp. 98-107.

\(^2\) A method exemplified, for example, in the Cur Deus Homo, the De Veritate, and the De Libertate Arbitrii.

\(^3\) De Ver. 9; AO I:188. \(^4\) Ibid. \(^5\) De Ver. 10.
Although Anselm's intention is clear, it would seem that a less restricted notion or use of cause would permit one to speak of certain thought and propositions as causing in part other true thoughts, statements, and true actions. However, such causal thoughts and propositions would have to be distinguished from such as the "res vero enuntiata," \(^1\) which Anselm considers to be the cause of the truth of a proposition. Such causal thoughts and propositions would belong in the same category of causes along with those who think true thoughts and utter true statements. Furthermore, the "res vero enuntiata" and the enuntiants may on occasion be one and the same subject. This is certainly the case when God, or someone else, expresses true statements concerning himself. Anselm constantly strives to lay bare the causes and rationes of things. Anselm is also sensitive to the different ways in which things can be said to be willed or caused.\(^2\)

(2.2.2) Anselm's radical interest in sheer actuality is also manifest in his notion of 'necessitas sequens.'\(^3\) This necessity is a necessary concomitant of everything that has existed, that presently exists, and that will exist. This notion

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\(^1\) De Ver. 2; AO I:177.

\(^2\) Cf. De Concordia III:11 prior recensio; AO II:282 n; De Casu Diaboli 1,12,20,28; Cur Deus Homo I. 9,10; cf. D. P. Henry, op. cit., pp. 117-133 (deals with text of Ein neues unvollendetes Werk . . . .), pp. 201-206; also Hopkins & Richardson, op. cit., pp. 45-48.

\(^3\) Ibid.
of consequent necessity is one that Grosseteste also adopts.\textsuperscript{1} This necessity marks both that which has come to be through an antecedent necessity as well as that which is under no compulsion or constraint. Anselm states that this "necessitas nec cogit nec prohibit aliquid esse aut non esse. \ldots Non enim aliud significat haec necessitas, nisi quia quod erit non poterit simul non esse."\textsuperscript{2} Such a necessity also characterizes both divine and human willing. Anselm introduces this type of necessity into his discussion of Christ and his free choice or desire to suffer and die. In this connexion there is a passage that should be cited in its entirety:

\begin{quote}
Hac sequenti et nihil efficienti necessitate, quoniam vera fuit fides vel prophetaia de Christo, quia ex voluntate non ex necessitate moriturus erat, necesse fuit ut sic esset. Hac homo factus est; hac fecit et passus est quidquid fecit et passus est; hac voluit quaecumque voluit. Ideo enim necessitate fuerunt, quia futura erant; et futura erant, quid fuerunt; et fuerunt, quia fuerunt. Et si vis omnium quae fecit et quae passus est verum scire necessitatem, scito omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit. Voluntatem vero eius nulla praeecessit necessitatis.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

In asserting that "fuerunt, quia fuerunt" Anselm clearly indicates that he is content with the sheer actuality of Christ's willing, and that he is much more interested in how Christ has willed rather than how he might or might not have willed. Where Anselm does entertain the question whether or not Christ could

\textsuperscript{1}De Scientia Dei; De Libero Arbitrio, recensio, 3.
\textsuperscript{2}De Concordia I.2; AO II:249.
\textsuperscript{3}Cur Deus Homo II.17; AO II:125.
have willed or acted other than he has, Anselm again directs us back to the actual willing and nature of Christ.\(^1\) When Boso puts before Anselm the questions of infidels who ask why God has redeemed man through such suffering and death, and whether he could not have saved man through another way, Anselm brings him up before God's actual willing: "A. Sufficere nobis debet ad rationem voluntas dei cum aliquid facit, licet non videamus cur velit. Voluntas namque dei numquam est irrationabilis."\(^2\) The will of God is rational in terms of its own coherence and radical consistency with his immutable Nature, not because his will has conformed with some external absolute rational principle. As Anselm states elsewhere: "Ommia enim illi [summa veritas] debent, ipsa vero nulli quicquam debet; nec ulla ratione est quod est, nisi quia est."\(^3\) Anselm again brings us up against the sheer actuality of God. God's constantia\(^4\) and willing cannot be inferred from, nor determined by, any necessity or power antecedent to himself, for God himself is the ultimate antecedent. The application of consequent necessity to God points up the fact that we must come to terms with the sheer actuality of God's being and willing.

In his notion of consequent necessity Anselm appears to have in mind things themselves in their actuality, whether any

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\(^1\)Cur Deus Homo II.10,16,17. \(^2\)Cur Deus Homo I.8; AO II:59.  
\(^3\)De Ver. 10; AO I:190.  
\(^4\)Cur Deus Homo II.17; AO II:124.
coactio is present or not. Henry states that this consequent necessity "is susceptible of being interpreted as the counterpart of the moderns' 'logical' or 'analytic' necessity."¹ Henry later offers an interpretation of Anselm's consequent necessity in support of this statement.² However, as Henry himself indicates, Anselm's consequent necessity and the modern logicians' 'analytic' necessity are certainly not identical, even though the logical form of the former has an affinity with the latter. In a somewhat parallel case Kneale points out that Aristotle's 'necessary' proposition must be differentiated from the modern logicians' 'analytic' statement.³ Aristotle's 'necessary' truths, as well as the logical truths in which Anselm's consequent necessity finds expression, were considered to refer to and to be bound up with actual circumstances and particular states of affairs. These truths differ from those modern 'analytic' truths which have their foundation in logical or linguistic form and convention.⁴

(2.2.3) Anselm's strong interest in that which is the case is also manifest in his interpretation of 'posse', 'potestas', and 'libertas'. He does not conceive of possibility ('posse')

¹ The Logic of Saint Anselm, p. 173; cf. pp. 172-180 where both antecedent and consequent necessity are discussed.

² Ibid., p. 179.


⁴ Ibid.
as sheer contingency. Although Anselm clearly recognizes contingent or possible logical truths and the possible or contingent facts that they presuppose, he thinks of possibility in terms of actual capacities and the actual effects realized thereby. Henry puts it well: "Now it is quite true, thanks to his equation of possibility with power (5.4), that Anselm tends to treat modal questions as part of the theory of physical dispositions and capacities." Therefore, instead of saying that non-existent X may or may not be, i.e., is possible, Anselm states that one must speak of an actual or present capacity (potestas) which is able to cause it to exist. In view of Anselm's interpretation of 'posse' as 'potestas', it is clearly apparent why 'posse' can only be rightly applied to that which already exists.

Anselm's conception of possibility is also manifest in his De Libertate Arbitrii where the student refers to Anselm's definition that "libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem: ...". 'Libertas' is clearly circumscribed by and defined in terms of a definite capacity granted by God. "Est enim 'potestas' libertatis genus."

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1De Ver. 2,5,13.


3Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm, p. 173; also pp. 134-171 where we find an extended treatment of Anselm's modal logic.

4De Lib. Arb. 13; AO I:225. 5Ibid.
Anselm further states that "potestas ergo peccandi, quae addita voluntati minuit eius libertatem et si dematur auget, nec libertas est nec pars libertatis."¹ Not only has Anselm interpreted this freedom in terms of actual capacity or power, but he has even fixed on a particular power in the exercise of which the will is truly free. As he says: "M. Cernis itaque nihil liberius recta voluntate, cui nulla vis aliena potest auferre suam rectitudinem."² Although Anselm's interpretation of 'posse' may preclude an adequate treatment of simple possibility and contingency, his stress on actual capacities does steer us away from vain speculation concerning sheer contingency or possibility.

Since 'posse' is taken to signify a definite capability, it must be used accordingly. Anselm emphasizes that one's mode of expression, if it is to be logically precise and correct, must reflect this sense of 'posse' and clearly indicate wherein lies the capacity. One should not say that a given subject is able to do this or that when an actual impotency on the part of the subject is what should be expressed.³ Depending on course on the speaker, either a capacity or liability may be what is actually intended. Neither is it correct to say that a given subject cannot accomplish this or that when a capacity in the same subject

¹Ibid. 1; A0 I:209. ²Ibid. 9; A0 I:221.
³This subject is discussed by Anselm in the following places: De Ver. 8; De Casu Diaboli 12; Pros. 7; Cur Deus Homo II.17; cf. Henry, op. cit., pp. 158-161 where he cites portions from De Potestate dealing with this same topic.
is what really should be expressed, and the incapacity is really situated elsewhere. This is a point that Anselm makes in connexion with such statements as 'God is not able to lie', 'God cannot make the true to be false', and 'God cannot make a past event not to be a past event'.\footnote{Pros. 7; Cur Deus Homo II.17.} Anselm introduces these statements in connexion with the following question: "Sed et omnipotens quomodo es, si omnia non potes?"\footnote{Pros. 7; AO I:105.} From what Anselm proceeds to say in the same chapter of the Proslogion it is clear that he does not consider divine omnipotence and power in abstraction from God's actual nature and willing. Moreover, Anselm, both in this chapter and in Cur Deus Homo (II. 10,16,17), examines more closely those things which are said to lie beyond God's capability and he finds that they are altogether at variance with God's nature and willing. After considering the nature of God, what seemed \textit{prima facie} to be a divine incapacity is upon closer examination seen to be a divine capacity. Furthermore, when the statement which seemed to attribute an impotency to God is transposed into proper logical form it becomes obvious that no impotency is predicated of God. As Anselm states:

\begin{quote}
Quotiens namque dicitur deus non posse, nulla negatur in illo potestas, sed insuperabilis significatur potentia et fortitud. Non enim aliud intelligitur, nisi quia nulla res potest efficere, ut ille agat quod negatur posse.\ldots Nam cum dicimus quia necesse est deum semper verum dicere, et necesse est eum numquam mentiri, non dicitur aliud nisi quia tanta est in illo constantia servandi veritatem, ut necesse sit nullam rem facere posse, ut verum non dicat aut ut mentiatur.\footnote{Cur Deus Homo II.17; AO II:123-24.}
\end{quote}
The logical impropriety in saying 'God is able to lie' and 'God is not able to lie' is similar to the impropriety in saying that "Hector potuit vinci ab Achille, et Achilles non potuit vinci ab Hectore."\(^1\) However, there is a crucial difference. With respect to the second pair of statements only the mode of speaking has to be altered, and then it will be clear that the ability truly belongs to Achilles and the inability to Hector. However, with respect to the pair of statements concerning God, once they are transposed into their proper logical form it will be made clearer than ever that the first statement is indeed false, and that the second is both true and properly expressed.

Genuine capacity is determined and measured by the nature of the subject being considered. That God is omnipotent means that he is able to maintain himself in his immutable truth, goodness, and steadfast will, and that no power can prevent him from being and doing the same. Anselm, in addressing God, says "ergo domine deus, inde verius es omnipotens,quia nihil potes per impotentiam, et nihil potest contra te."\(^2\)

In accordance with man's nature and situation, Anselm attributes to him the ability to give himself freely and voluntarily over to the servitude of sin.\(^3\) We noted earlier that this capacity is to be distinguished from that capacity to serve rectitudo in the exercise of which is found true freedom. Clearly the

\(^1\)De Ver. 8; A0 I:188. \(^2\)Pros. 7; A0 I:105-106. 
\(^3\)De Lib. Arb. 2,5-7,9.
latter capacity ranks considerably higher than the former. For in the utilization of this capacity to serve rectitude, God's intention for man, expressed eternally in his Word, is being fulfilled.

Here we are again brought back to the determinative and normative Word of God. Anselm is especially interested in the actual eternal expression of God in his Word, what God has willed and what God has accomplished. This is for Anselm the final arbiter and ultimate court of appeal. Furthermore, Anselm considers God's willing and acting to be rooted in his own immutable Nature. God is perfectly right with himself and acts in perfect consistency with his own nature. There is no force or power which can constrain God to act differently. He is omnipotent and everything else is subject to him. In connexion with the hypothetical statement that the divine compassion simply remits the sinner's debt and punishment, Anselm says: "Verum huiusmodi misericordia dei nimis est contraria iustitiae illius, quae non nisi poenam permittit reddi propter peccatum. Quapropter que-madmodum deum sibi esse contrarium, ita hoc modo illum esse misericordem impossibile est." Near the end of his Cur Deus Homo Anselm states that God was not in need of doing what he has done,

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1Cf. Mon. 9-14,31-37.
2Cur Deus Homo I.10,12,24; II.5,10,16,17; De Ver. 8,10,13; Mon. 29,30,32,33; Pros. 7,17,22,23.
3Cur Deus Homo I.24; A0 II:93.
nor was he in need of descending from heaven in order to conquer the devil and free mankind, but that "veritas immutabilis exigebat" and "ab homine deus exigebat ut diabolum vinceret, et qui per peccatum deum offenderat, per iustitiam satisfaceret."¹ God was not coerced to act as he has, either by the devil or by any other alien power. Anselm has again brought us face to face with the utter reality of the divine Nature, volitions, and demands.

(2.2.4) Anselm's intense interest in res themselves is also manifest in his use of such expressions as 'locutio rerum' and 'cogitatio rerum'.² In discussing the eternal speaking (locutio) of things in the Word of God, Anselm states: "Mentis autem sive rationis locutionem hic intelligo, non cum voces rerum significativa cogitantur, sed cum res ipsae vel futurae vel iam existentes acie cogitationis in mente conspiciuntur."³ In speaking of different kinds of words and expressions, and the manner in which they are related to things, Anselm says that those words "possunt etiam non absurde dici tanto veriora, quanto magis rebus quarum sunt verba similia sunt et expressius signant."⁴ Furthermore, apart from exceptions cited, "nullum aliud verbum sic videtur rei simile cuius est verbum, aut sic eam exprimit, quomodo illa similitudo, quae in acie mentis rem ipsam cogitantis exprimitur."⁵ When the mind most truly views something it views its

¹Ibid. II.19; AO II:131. ²Mon. 10,11,29,31,62; Pros. 4. ³Mon. 10; AO I:24. ⁴Mon. 10; AO I:25. ⁵Ibid.
universalis essentia. This ties in with the notion that "veritas est rectitudo mente sola perceptibilis."¹

In the Proslogion Anselm asks how it is possible for the fool to conceive (cogitare) or to say (dicere) in his heart, which are one and the same, that God does not exist, since God's existence is such that he cannot be conceived not to exist.² If the nonexistence of God is unthinkable, since God exists so truly, the question arises as to how or in what manner the fool can conceive or think the unthinkable. Anselm's answer is that there is more than one way in which a thing may be conceived:

"\textquote{aliter enim cogitatur res cum vox eam significans cogitatur, aliter cum id ipsum quod res est intelligitur.}"³ In the first-mentioned manner God can be conceived not to exist, whereas in the latter instance God cannot be conceived not to exist. In other words, the clear implication is that the fool lacks this understanding ('bene intelligere')⁴ and consequently has failed to see that God cannot even be thought not to exist.

What is of particular interest at this point is Anselm's distinction between thinking of the word or expression (vox) which signifies a thing, and thinking of the very res itself. Only in the latter instance can it be said that one truly under-

¹ \textit{De Ver.} 11: \textit{AO} I:191


³ \textit{Pros.} 4; \textit{AO} I:103.

⁴ \textit{Ibid.}; \textit{AO} I:104.
stands a thing. Anselm appears to give an example of such understanding in the following: "Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique intelligit id ipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non esse."¹ It is on the basis of this kind of understanding that God cannot even be thought not to exist. Concerning the expression 'bene intelligere', Henry thinks "that there is ample material in De Grammatico, as well as in the Responsio, to show that by 'understanding well' Anselm wishes to indicate the full carrying through of linguistic and conceptual analysis, . . ."²

(2.2.5) Anselm's analysis of language and beliefs includes a number of significant distinctions which manifest an awareness of the different ways in which words may function, the manner in which words are interrelated, and the fact that words must be considered both in terms of their signification and the things which they may name.³

In seeking understanding Anselm stresses the need for an in

¹Ibid. ²Henry, op. cit., p. 149.
³E.g., per se and per aliusd signification, De Gram. 12, 15, 17,18; Henry (op cit. pp. 20-21) considers signifying proprie and non proprie as "alternative expression" of per se/per aliusd distinction; de voce/de re distinction; De Gram. 18, or secundum formam/secundum rem, De Casu Diaboli 11; whole distinction between misleading ordinary usage and the proper logical expression, e.g. De Ver. 8,13; Pros. 7; De Casu Diaboli 1,11,12; De Gram. passim; cf. Henry's discussion of such distinctions - op. cit.; cf. also Henry's The De Grammatico of St. Anselm (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964).
depth analysis of ordinary language and usage. We have already
cited a number of texts of Anselm where he shows that the grammati-
cal form and common expression are not logically correct, so
that analysis is required in order to determine the proper sense
and logical form. After a piece of such analysis Anselm's stu-
dent remarks: "Quippe utile multum puto ad intelligendam veritatem
in multis occultam exercere mentem in huiusmodi considerationum
subtilitate."¹

Anselm remarks that 'nihil' and 'malum' are often used as
if they actually signified something: "Multa quoque alia simili-
ter dicuntur aliquid secundum formam loquendi, quae non sunt ali-
quid, quoniam sic loquimur de illis sicut de rebus existentibus."²
In striving to speak secundum rem Anselm states that "nihil enim
non aliud significat quam non-aliquid, aut absentiam eorum quae
sunt aliquid."³ In discussing Anselm's position with respect
to signification per se in distinction from usus loquendi, Henry
says:

His position in relation to the discussions outlined involves
the recognition that the ordinary grammatical characteriza-
tion of recurrent speech patterns (forma loquendi), even out-
side the instances commonly recognized and described above,
can be positively misleading, and should not be taken as a
guide to the structure of things as they really are (secundum
rem): . . . .⁴

¹De Ver. 8; prior recensio; AO I:188 n.; cited by Henry,
op. cit., p. 14; cf. also De Casu Diaboli 1.
⁴Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm, p. 17.
Anselm speaks of this "grammatical characterization" where he defends logicians' efforts to speak of the signification of words:

\[\text{M. Ita est. Non enim movere nos debet quod dialectici aliter scribunt de vocibus secundum quod sunt significativae, aliter eis utuntur loquendo secundum quod sunt appellativae, si et grammatici aliiud dicunt secundum formam vocum, aliiud secundum rerum naturam.}^1\]

Here Anselm refers not only to the difference between \textit{per se} and \textit{per aliiud} signification\(^2\) but also to the difference between speaking \textit{de voce} and speaking \textit{de re}.

This \textit{de voce} / \textit{de re} distinction is also present in the following statement made by Anselm in connexion with Aristotle's principal intention in his \textit{Categoricae}: "Sed quoniam voces non significant nisi res: dicendo quid sit quod voces significant, necesse fuit dicere quid sint res."\(^3\) In discussing Anselm's appeal to this \textit{de voce} / \textit{de re} differentiation Henry states that "It is apparent that for him [Anselm], as also for Ontology, a word like 'thing' is not univocal, but is to be correlated with the sense of \textit{ens} which happens to be in question."\(^4\) In his translation of \textit{De Grammatico} Henry translates 'res' as 'circumstance' in view of "the modern tendency to attribute a univocal sense to 'thing'..."\(^5\) The text of \textit{De Grammatico} clearly shows why 'res' cannot be interpreted univocally. Such statements as

\(^1\)\textit{De Gram. 18; AO I:164.}\quad \(^2\)\textit{De Gram. 12,15.}\quad \(^3\)\textit{De Gram. 17; AO I:162.}\quad \(^4\)\textit{Henry, The De Grammatico of St. Anselm, p. 137.}\quad \(^5\)\textit{Ibid.}\
"grammaticus est grammatica"¹ and "grammaticus est qualitas,"² and the manner in which Anselm interprets them, show why 'res' cannot be interpreted univocally. The sense of 'res' must be determined by the context in which it is used.

It is evident that in his attempt to achieve understanding, which is among other things to see things as they are and to know secundum rem, Anselm does not take his cue from the form itself of ordinary discourse, nor from the de voce statements of the grammarians. In his quest for understanding Anselm analyzes language in terms of its proper signification, and always in view of the 'res' themselves which are named or signified. The fool thought only of the words and consequently uttered 'there is no God'.³ Anselm asks why the fool said in his heart 'there is no God': "Cur, nisi quia stultus et insipiens?"⁴

Through analysis of words, concepts, and notions, through prayerful meditation on his beliefs, and through a searching out of the coherent ratio of the Truth, Anselm sought understanding, both to perceive and to speak de re or secundum rem. He was prompted to do this by the challenges and objections of infidels, the requests of brethren who wished both to understand what they believed and to answer those who inquired as to their hope, and Anselm's own desire to see into (intellegere) that which he

¹De Gram. 12; AO I:157; et al.
²De Gram. 9; AO I:154; et al.
³Pros. 3, 4. ⁴Pros. 3; AO I:103.
believed, to see it to be true. There was also the need to refute heresies. In the very process of answering infidels and refuting heretics Anselm was compelled to examine more closely and deeply his own beliefs, and to formulate the latter ever more precisely and in depth.

3. Falsehood and error in relation to truth and knowledge

Anselm's understanding of evil and falsehood must be examined against the background of his doctrine of truth and being. Moreover, his conception of ignorance and error must be considered in connexion with his notion of cogitatio and his notion of intellectus in particular. It should also be obvious that an understanding of Anselm's notion of rectitudo is a prerequisite to understanding his notion of falsehood and error. 'Malum', 'injustitia', and 'falsitas' are terms that Anselm uses of deviations and departures from truth or rectitudo. All created things are finally measured and judged in the light of their respective exemplars in the eternal Word.

(3.1) Anselm believes that all entities and acts that stand in a right relation to their eternal forma also signify as they should. Every right or true thing, deed as well as proposition, also signifies rightly its transcendent debitum or exemplar.

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1 E.g., Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi.

2 Cf. especially Pros. 2-4; Quid ad haec respondeat editor insium libelli (abbr., Responsio Editoris) 4, 6-9; Cur Deus Homo, Commendatio; Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi 1.
This is what Anselm has in mind when he states that "non solum in iis quae signa solemus dicere, sed et in aliis omnibus quae diximus est significatio vera vel falsa." Anselm believes that there is either true or false signification in all actions and "in rerum quoque existentia," which by virtue of their being indicate that they ought to be. In other words, a just deed is not merely right or true as a deed corresponding to its forma, but it is also a true signification since it signifies a debitum that man ought to fulfil.

Granted that some actions may be intended to exemplify or are performed with a didactic purpose in mind, a purpose that may have to be made explicit through propositional or verbal signification, it can hardly be said that all acts are meant to be or are to be understood to be acts signifying something. In his extended application of the truth of signification to all actions and entities Anselm has not given adequate consideration to the factor of intention involved in significative acts. Anselm asserts: "Quod si debet facere quod facit, verum dicit. Si autem non debet, mentitur." If the verb 'mentiri' is translated 'to lie' there appears to be a further difficulty, assuming that 'lying' involves the intent to deceive. For should a person intend to signify the truth by performing an act which he believes

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1 *De Ver.* 9; *AO* I:189; cf. Henry, *The Logic of Saint Anselm*, pp. 230-239, where this notion of Anselm is compared with W. Wollaston's ethical doctrine.

to be right and just, even though the act is in fact wrong he cannot be termed a liar. Strictly speaking, that person lies who intends to signify through statement or action what he knows is not the case. Even if one does the opposite of what he knows he ought to do, he can be said to lie only if his intention is to signify that he ought to do this deed. Anselm should have offered further clarification on his use of 'mentiri'. It should be added, however, that Anselm discusses signification primarily in connexion with propositions.

(3.2) Just as "malum non est aliud quam non-bonum, aut absentia boni ubi debet aut expedit esse bonum" and just as "iniustitiam non aliud esse asserimus quam privationem iustitiae," likewise falsehood is the absence of rectitudo. To speak, however, of a false statement, a false thought, or a false thing, is not to speak of no statement, thought, or thing, but of the lack of truth where truth ought to be. It is clear that only where there is created truth can there 'be' falsehood. The ontological status of falsehood, if we may speak of its ontological status, is evident in the following statement: "D. Video ita ibi esse veritatem, ut nulla ibi possit esse falsitas; quoniam quod falso est, non est." Anselm answers "bene dicis." However, Anselm clearly holds that the consequences or "multa

1 De Casu Diaboli 11; AO I:251.  
2 Ibid. 9; AO I:246.  
3 De Ver. 7; AO I:185.  
4 Ibid.
incommoda," which result from the absence of goodness and truth, are certainly something. It must also be said that propositions, thoughts, and things in general are clearly something even though they may be marked by certain privations. A proposition which lacks what may be called extrinsic or accidental rectitudo "significat esse quod non est, ..." Similarly, a thought (cogitatio) is said to be "veram, cum est quod aut ratione aut aliquo modo putamus esse; et falsam, cum non est." 'Falsitas' signifies a certain discrepancy or the absence of a right relation between the proposition or thought and the actual res or what is actually the case.

(3.3) In view of Anselm's 'realism' discussed in the previous section (2.2), and the negative status of that which is termed evil or falsehood, the possibility and character of falsehood and error must be examined further. Moreover, these topics can only be properly discussed in close relation to Anselm's theory of rectitudo and his notion of correspondence. We have already cited some of Anselm's statements pertaining to falsehood, error, and their causes. These causes include man's lack of faith, his folly, his unjust will, the corrupted image of God in man, reason's entanglement in corporeal images, an erring inner sense, and misleading linguistic form. In addition to

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1De Casu Diaboli 26; AO I:274. 2Cf. De Ver. 2,3,7.
3De Ver. 2; AO I:178. 4Ibid. 3; AO I:180.
5Cf. e.g. Pros. 1,3,4,7; Responsio Editoris 4,6; Mon. 36,64,65; Cur Deus Homo II. 5,10,16,17; De Ver. 6,8-prior recensio; Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi 1; De Casu Diaboli 1,9,11,26.
his own liability and perversity man faces the ineffable and incomprehensible supreme Truth. Anselm asks: how can man's mind comprehend that divine knowledge "quae sic longe superior et verior est creatis substantiis, si nostra scientia tam longe superatur ab illis, quantum earum similitudo distat ab earum essentia?" Even created entities surpass man's knowledge.

(3.3.1) The above factors must be kept in mind if we are to interpret Anselm correctly where he speaks of the mind viewing and understanding res themselves, and the mind perceiving rectitudo. Anselm does not hold the naive view that the mind of the knower simply surveys the field of knowable and perceptible res externae, after which it simply fixes on and views infallibly a thing just as it is. Such viewing would be something like an infallible sensation or sense perception, or possibly B. Russell's knowledge by acquaintance, where there is no error. Anselm would grant, however, that the human mind may achieve a direct acquaintance with intelligible truths. He states that man was created to see (videre) even God. However, Anselm does not teach that the mind's acies or intuitus of things directly parallels the experience of the sensus exterior. The truth of the

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1Cf. above (1.3). 2Mon. 36; A0 I:55. 3Cf. (2.2), esp. (2.2.4). 4De Ver. 11. 5B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), esp. chapters 5,13. 6Pros. 1; A0 I:98. 7Pros., proemium; Mon. 10,62-63,66. 8De Ver. 6.
exterior sense is natural and necessary. The exterior sense belongs in a class with other natural actions which are true of necessity.\(^1\) Mistakes in sense perception are not to be attributed to sight or the other senses "sed iudicio animae imputandum est, quod non bene discernit quid illi [exterior senses] possint aut quid debeant."\(^2\) As is the case with all other created beings the mind also always has a measure of truth by virtue of its own being and functioning. However, the mind can hardly be said to have necessarily true thoughts and true images of things.

The question remains as to how it is that man entertains false thoughts and expresses false statements seeing that the mind can view and know things themselves. How can the human mind be in error if it knows res themselves and has direct access to truths and res? Since Anselm does teach that the mind errs and entertains false thoughts, we do well to examine more closely those aspects of his epistemological theory related to the above question. Anselm's whole method of seeking intellectus through assiduous analysis would alone suggest that the mind's understanding and viewing of truth is no facile accomplishment. This is the case even though there are statements passim that may seem to indicate the opposite. I have in mind those statements which refer to the mind's acies, intuitus, and cogitatio of things, as well as sola ratio, necessariae rationes, unum argu-

\(^1\)Cf. De Ver. 5.

\(^2\)De Ver. 6; AO I:184.
men, rationalis mens, and immutabilis ratio. However, as noted early in our discussion of Anselm's doctrine, these factors must be interpreted in context and in direct connexion with Anselm's own admission of the ineffable character of Truth, human indigence, and his prayer for divine grace and guidance. Prevenient grace, faith, and divine illumination are also required in coming to know the Truth.

(3.3.2) Much error results from the fact that the mind must often utilize and depend on media. Anselm's method itself is indicative of the fact that the mind must contend with such media as words, propositions, analogies, and corporeal images. Only as thorough understanding and a clear acies or intuitus are achieved do we have real immediacy. The rational soul does know and experience directly or immediately its own activity and thoughts. Anselm states: "Nam nulla ratione negari potest, cum mens rationalis seipsam cogitando intelligit, imaginem ipsius nasci in sua cogitatione; . . ." The mind also intuits certain truths directly. Anselm would say that these truths are known through that medium which is divine illumination: "Quanta namque est lux illa, de qua micat omne verum quod rationali menti lucet!" This medium infallibly shows forth immutable truth. However, the

1 Cf. Pros., prooemium; Mon., prologus, 1,10,33,62,63,66; Cur Deus Homo, praefatio. II.21.

2 Cf. Pros., prooemium, 1,4,14,16; Cur Deus Homo I.1; De Concordia III.4; cf. Hopkins & Richardson, op. cit., pp. 42-44.

3 Mon. 33; AO I:52. 4 Pros. 14; AO I:112.
human mind is often in no condition to receive it. Other media, because of their false character and/or lack of clarity, often conceal the truth. The human mind falls into error when it gives its assent to a proposition or doctrine which is in fact false. Such a proposition conceals instead of showing forth what is the case.

(3.3.3) Anselm often seeks to ascertain whether a proposition is true or false by subjecting it to analysis. Through an analysis of a statement, which may have an improper logical form, Anselm draws out the latent exact sense which may itself suffice to show that the statement is true or false. It could be said that this is in part what Anselm is doing when he utilizes the reductio ad absurdum argument, and through restatement and the explication of what is implied seeks to disprove the statement in question. Anselm would want to argue that the statement 'God is able to lie', which for one thing involves an improper use of 'is able', could be restated 'God is not God' or 'God is impotent', thereby disproving the initial statement.

Henry has drawn my attention to Anselm's use in De Grammatico of an argument whose general form is that of the hypothetical

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1Pros. 1,14,16. 2Cf. above (2.2.5).

3Cf. e.g., Pros. 2,3; De Ver. 1 - where Anselm argues that if truth had a beginning there was truth before there was truth, which is a most unsuitable conclusion; Mon. 18.

4Cf. Cur Deus Homo II.17.
modus tollendo tollens, and his use of an argument in De Grammatico which involves an exclusive disjunction. By disproving one of the alternatives one proves the other alternative, and by proving one the other is disproved.

In seeking the verification or confirmation of propositions Anselm often uses coherence as the test of truth and seeks to display such coherence through the formulation of equipollent propositions. By setting forth a series of intermediate equipollent propositions a coherence may be displayed and a certain clarification achieved. What Anselm desires above all is to gain a clearer and fuller view (acies, inspectio, intuitus) of the res themselves and a greater degree of immediacy. As one approaches through media a clearer vision of the res themselves the need for media is diminished and the media themselves are better understood. It should be pointed out that a word like 'nihil' can be understood even though it has no referent or counterpart in reality.

(3.3.4) As we have already observed in connexion with sense perception and divine illumination, the cause of error is often not the media but the mind itself. Anselm would hold that in sense perception things themselves are indeed perceived, but the judicio animae or sensus interior may misinterpret what is

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1 Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm, pp. 242, 243.
rightly reported by the senses.¹ Anselm believes that the res
themselves are perceived even when they are not wholly or
rightly perceived. In divine illumination the divine light is
never indigent but the soul "videt se non plus posse videre
propter tenebras suas."² Just before this Anselm had said that
there is no darkness in God. In addressing God Anselm says
"ubique es tota praesens, et non te video."³ The soul is at
fault. In the following question Anselm plainly indicates that
although he sees God only in part, yet it is God whom he sees
in part: "An et veritas et lux est quod vidit, et nondum te vidit,
quia vidit te aliquatenus, sed non vidit te sicuti es?"⁴ Although
the mind has only a partial and imperfect view of God Anselm
believes that it is God who is partially understood and not
simply the per aliud expressions, aenigmata, and analogies which
must be used in speaking of God.⁵ We saw earlier that it is one
thing to conceive (cogitare) a thing by thinking only of the vox
signifying it, and quite another thing "cum id ipsum quod res
est intelligitur."⁶ The fool could think 'There is no God' be-
cause he was only thinking the voces.⁷ In the following state-
ments we see the danger and the possibility of error involved in
speaking of God per aliud:

¹Cf. De Ver. 6. ²Pros. 14; AO I:111-112.
³Ibid. 16; AO I:113. ⁴Ibid. 14; AO I:111.
⁵Cf. Mon. 65 where per aliud expressions and aenigmata are
discussed.
⁶Pros. 4; AO I:103; cf. also (2.2.4). ⁷Ibid.
Nam quaecumque nomina de illa natura dici posse videntur: non tam mihi eam ostendunt per proprietatem, quam per aliquid innuunt similitudinem. Etenim cum earundem vocum significaciones cogito, familiarius concipio mente quod in rebus factis conspicio, quam id quod omnem humanum intellectum transcendere intelligo.1

However, man must speak in this fashion when dealing with the ineffable. This particular difficulty is not encountered when dealing with created entities. None the less, in the case of the latter as well there is always the possibility of conceiving or expressing what is not the case. For the mind may be dull, it may misconstrue what is presented to it, media may conceal or obscure, or the mind may confine its attention to words spoken and written. Anselm states that where the mind does not have either a view of the image of an object or a view of its universal essence "nullum aliud [verbum] est utile ad rem ostendendam."2 On the other hand, no other word appears so similar to the thing as "illa similitudo quae in acie mentis rem ipsam cogitantis exprimitur."3 The latter word is "maxime proprium et principale rei verbum."4 Anselm gives us no reason to believe, however, that any such image or similitudo in the mind is a type of isomorphic picture of the thing. He simply says that such a similitudo "tanto magis vel minus est vera, quanto magis vel minus imitatur rem cuius est similitudo."5

(3.4) In the following statement it is evident that while

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1Mon. 65; AO I:76. 2Mon. 10; AO I:25. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5Mon. 31; AO I:48.
both true thoughts and false thoughts are possible, the means whereby a certain correspondence is achieved cannot be fully and categorically delineated: "N. Cognitionem quoque dicimus veram, cum est quod aut ratione aut aliquo modo putamus esse; et falsam, cum non est." Although Anselm does indeed specify certain means whereby correspondence is achieved, for him there remains an impenetrable mystery which envelops the realization of correspondence between our minds and things perceived. Anselm's belief in the possibility and actuality of true thoughts and statements is based on a prior belief, viz., that the mind has access to res, not understood univocally, even though media may be involved. Of course, the mind may fail to take full advantage of the available access and means. This is the case, for example, where media are treated as termini or where the mind conceives falsely or contrary to what is the case. However, even when the mind thinks or views the things or circumstances themselves it may be in error or ignorance. It may experience only partial vision, which is in certain instances due in part to the ineffability of the object, or it may misinterpret what it perceives. In any case, Anselm believes that a right relation between mind and actual circumstances is attainable because the mind does have access to things themselves and it is possible for the mind to perceive truth.

1De Ver. 3; AO I:180. 2Cf. above (2.2.5).
3Cf. Mon. 62.
There are, of course, several questions that could be raised in connexion with the mind’s intuitus or acies of things. They are questions somewhat similar to those which could be asked of B. Russell’s ‘knowledge by acquaintance’. For example, how can one know for certain that his mind really intuits (intueri) some thing? For Anselm believes that the mind can conceive what is not the case. How can one know when he is in fact viewing an actual extra-mental res or state of affairs and when he is not? How does the mind determine which of its conceptions or thoughts are altogether false and which are but partial glimpses of extra-mental reality? Assuming that a measure of faith is required, when does one believe that what he thinks is the case is indeed the case? Once it is granted that ignorance, falsehood, and error are possible, these kinds of questions arise.

That Anselm is aware of these kinds of questions and the problems with which they deal is evident in the aspects of his method already discussed. We noted that his method of ascertaining truth includes the analysis of thoughts and statements as well as the use of coherence and equipollent statements. Much like the manner in which necessary truths are recognized to be true, Anselm believes that as one achieves a deeper and more penetrating intuitus of the truth the latter will more and more

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1Cf. Pros., prooemium; Mon. 10,33,62-64,66.

2Cf. Responsio Editoris 4,6.
be seen to be true. On the other hand, if the mind is in fact entertaining a false conception the false character of this conception is expected to become increasingly apparent. Of course, at the rudimentary level of intuitus or immediate experience one must finally believe or disbelieve that he is actually dealing with extra-mental reality.

(3.4.2) Assuming that one is in fact in contact with extra-mental entities, it may still be asked whether or not he can know the actual character of his viewing of the object. Anselm clearly declares that he has only a partial vision of God and the truth.\(^1\) He also states that "creatas substantias multo aliter esse in seipsis quam in nostra scientia."\(^2\) Can Anselm make such statements without standing outside of himself or without assuming an extra-worldly stance? It appears that the above statements of Anselm are made possible in large measure because of his beliefs concerning the nature of God, the nature of created things in general, and the nature of the human mind. The lack of coherence also tells us that our perception is partial. Furthermore, although Anselm clearly recognizes obvious differences between mental perception or sight and corporeal sight,\(^3\) he does consider mental perception to be somewhat analogous to sense perception.\(^4\) Anselm states that "saepe videmus

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\(^1\)Cf. Pros. 1,14; Mon. 65. \(^2\)Mon. 36; AO I:54. \\
\(^3\)Cf. De Ver. 11, where corporeal and intelligible right¬nesses are contrasted. \\
\(^4\)Cf. Pros. 14,16.
aliquid non proprie, quemadmodum res ipsa est, sed per aliquam similitudinem aut imaginem; ut cum vultum alicuius consideramus in speculo.\(^1\) He goes on to say that in this way we both see and do not see one and the same thing. Anselm believes that even while the mind perceives partially and confusedly it can be aware of this fact. This awareness is achieved on the basis of beliefs concerning that which is not yet perceived as well as on the basis of what has been and is perceived. Anselm says of the eye of the soul: "Sed certe et tenebratur in se, et reverberatur a te. Utique et obscuratur sua brevitate, et obruitur tua immensitate."\(^2\) Even though his mental vision is blurred and partial because of these and other factors, Anselm none the less believes that he does perceive something of such a sublime Mystery.\(^3\)

However, the question that persists is whether one can perceive or show in some way that one truly perceives the entity itself, and in what manner, without assuming the impossible stance of standing without oneself. Furthermore, it would seem that certain beliefs and assumptions would be required even if the latter stance were possible. Anselm does not express the need for assuming this stance since he believes that he does in fact intuit things themselves. He holds that the latter is the case even when the object itself is not immediately present to the intuitus of one's thought.\(^4\) The mind thinks and knows things

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\(^1\)Mon. 65; AO I:76.  
\(^2\)Pros. 14; AO I:112.  
\(^3\)Mon. 64-67.  
\(^4\)Mon. 62.
even where this can only be realized through their similitudes and images.\(^1\) Anselm does not teach that the mind only knows the likenesses and images of things. Of course, even to know that one knows only media requires knowledge of more than media. Anselm believes that he certainly knows more than media and consequently finds that he can speak as he does concerning media.

\(^{3.4.3}\) Another significant question, related to the above questions, concerns the sense of 'rectitudo' when the latter is used in connexion with a state of affairs or set of circumstances in which one entity is rightly related to another entity. What exactly does Anselm have in mind when he states that a created res, for example, man, is rightly related to its eternal exemplar? What is the exact character of that 'correspondence' between a true proposition and that res or set of circumstances which it signifies? We have already examined Anselm's terminology and the different situations in which we find right 'relations'. Our intention here is not to cover that ground again.

The word 'relation' does not name a referent to which direct appeal can be made in seeking to ascertain the character of correspondence or the exact character of a state of affairs involving a right relationship. Although Anselm spends a great deal of time discussing 'rectitudo' he nowhere attempts to state precisely or to picture for us the exact manner in which one entity is rightly related to another. We saw that he uses the word 'similitudo'\(^1\)\

\(^{1}\)Ibid.
but he does not attempt to articulate the exact character of this similitude. I believe that he does not attempt this in part because he himself realized that he could not do so. However, Anselm does clearly teach that one can intuit or see that a thing does fit or is rightly related. He left indeterminate the exact character of a right 'relation'. He prefers to say simply that an entity is right or true when it exists as it ought to exist or when it does what it ought to do. Although one can recognize and perceive that an entity exists rightly he cannot describe exactly or picture the character of the right 'relation' or 'relations' involved.

It is worth noting that Anselm does not use the term 'adaequatio' in his teaching regarding truth. 'Adaequatio' is a term which suggests correspondence in terms of physical proportions or spatial commensuration. 'Adaequatio' appears to be more definitive and more restrictive than the term 'rectitudo'. Consequently, the former term tends to have a more restricted usage than the latter. 'Rectitudo' appears to be more open-ended. 'Adaequatio' is derived from the verb 'ad-aequare' which means 'to make equal to', 'to equalize', or 'to level with'.

The terms 'rectus' and 'rectitudo', on the other hand, offer a wider range of possible interpretations and consequently a wider range of application. Unlike 'adaequatio', 'rectus' and 'rectitudo'

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are less apt to imply or suggest quantitative, spatial, or physical commensuration. This is partly the reason why Anselm was able to apply these terms to quite diverse entities and actions.\textsuperscript{1} 'Rectitude' is therefore applied to actions, the senses, thoughts, and even God himself. Although rectitude is finally ineffable it is "mente sola perceptibilis."\textsuperscript{2} If truth can only be perceived and intuited in part, how could Anselm or anyone else expect to describe or express it adequately and properly?

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. Anselm's \textit{De Veritate}.

\textsuperscript{2}De Ver. 11; AO I:191.
CHAPTER III

ROBERT GROSSETESTE'S UNDERSTANDING
OF THE NATURE OF TRUTH

With this chapter we come to the main body and primary portion of our inquiry, viz., Robert Grosseteste's doctrine of truth, in which doctrine truth is set forth in its manifold character in accordance with the supreme Truth and the various categories of creaturely entities.

In the first chapter it was noted that there are a number of basic questions that have to be asked regarding the locus of truth, the application and usage of such words as 'truth' and 'true', and theories of truth which involve a number of implications and consequences. The attendant problems pertaining to certitude and validity were also considered. Special attention was paid to Heidegger's examination of truth in view of the profound questions he raises regarding logical and intellectual truth in relation to more primordial truth. Appeal was also made to Heidegger's thought regarding truth because of his commentary on the traditional correspondence theory of truth as formulated within the mediaeval setting. Heidegger was seen to
be concerned with the recovery of that which is foundational for that truth which is understood as correspondence. The purpose of the first chapter was to provide a kind of critical apparatus or framework in terms of which subsequent inquiry could be more profitably pursued. The first chapter was also intended to indicate that recent and contemporary debate and theory concerning the nature and locus of 'truth' have a significant and relevant precedent in mediaeval discussion and doctrines on the nature of truth. The underlying assumption, moreover, was that certain lacunae and impasses in the present discussion derive in part from the failure to consider seriously earlier doctrines of truth and mediaeval doctrines in particular. One of such difficulties is the problem as to how the proposition or assertion is to be connected or joined to the res or state of affairs signified. Etienne Gilson states why this was not a critical problem for St. Thomas in his understanding of truth:

"And that is why, being founded on a real relation, it [knowledge in terms of the judgement] has no need to ask how it shall rejoin reality."

1 Another basic presupposition underlying the first chapter, and the entire thesis as well, is that to follow a purely detached phenomenological and analytical examination of the doctrines of truth under consideration is to fail to respond to the mandate implicit in the subject of the thesis itself. Part of the reason, then, for incorporating the first chapter was to set

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1E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 238.
forth a declaration of intent and to indicate why the inquiry was undertaken at all.

In the preceding chapter a cursory study of St. Augustine's and St. Anselm's doctrines of truth was conducted in anticipation of this present chapter which constitutes the focal point of the dissertation. The investigation into Augustine's and Anselm's notions concerning truth was essential not only by reason of their own intrinsic significance but also because of their determinative influence on Grosseteste's own thought. At the same time it is essential that one be aware of several factors that helped to shape the thought of Grosseteste which had little or no impact at all on the minds of Augustine and Anselm. These would include such as the *logica nova* along with the major portion of the Aristotelian corpus, the Pseudo-Dionysian treatises, the school of Chartres, and the Greek and Arabic scientific treatises. Some of these factors obviously could not have influenced Augustine or Anselm because they were either written or recovered after they lived. Although such as the Pseudo-Dionysian writings antedate Anselm by centuries and were available to him, they appear to have had little impact on his thought. Josef Pieper points out that Dionysius is mentioned just once in Anselm's writings. Pieper goes so far as to assert that "if there was any philosophical and theological thinker of importance during the Middle Ages who remained untouched by the spirit of Dionysius the Areopagite, he was Anselm of Canterbury."¹

Grosseteste, however, both translated and wrote commentaries on the Angelical Hierarchy, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the Divine Names, and the Mystical Theology. One may want to question whether Anselm was altogether "untouched by the spirit of Dionysius" but it is certainly true that the latter had a greater impact on Grosseteste than on Anselm.

Grosseteste's metaphysics of light manifests the influence of the Neoplatonic tradition but Grosseteste radically alters what he does receive from that tradition and rejects what is incompatible with his faith. Grosseteste's encounter with the Aristotelian corpus in itself partly accounts for his wide range of interests and intellectual pursuits in contrast with Augustine's and Anselm's more strictly theological writing. The school of Chartres also influenced Grosseteste in the direction of focusing more attention on the created natural order although he did not share their zeal for Platonism, humane letters, and metaphysical speculation. It is clear that Grosseteste's interest and investigations in the realm of physics constitute a point of difference between him and Augustine or Anselm. However, the great affinity among the three far outweighs the points of difference that exist. That Anselm and Grosseteste are deeply rooted in the Augustinian tradition is amply evident from their works. At the same time it must be stated that they did not simply recapture or reiterate the teaching of Augustine. Anselm, Grosseteste, and many other Augustinians left their own unmistakeable imprint on the body of doctrine which they inherited from Augustine and
other sources. One must not overlook the considerable degree of variation that exists in this Augustinian tradition. As Leff says:

We are now in a position to identify that complex of thought which goes by the name of Augustinianism. In doing so, it must be emphasized, firstly, that this does not imply a compact body of doctrine or thinkers in any way approximating to an organized party; and secondly, that the term must not be taken to mean the rejection or disavowal of everything connected with Aristotle.¹

Grosseteste certainly does not reject "everything connected with Aristotle," but at the same time it must be said that he is quite critical and selective in his study and use of Aristotle. This fact along with Grosseteste's stance within the Augustinian tradition will become apparent throughout this chapter and chapter four. It will be seen that Grosseteste occupies a strategic position because he is one of the first in the Augustinian tradition to encounter and deal with the new influx of Aristotle's writings. In addition to these works there were a number of other sources introduced in the twelfth century Renaissance with which the figures of that century and succeeding centuries had to cope.

Before examining the terminology used by Grosseteste in formulating his doctrine of truth we shall consider a number of introductory matters including facets of the historical and intellectual situation at the time of Grosseteste, his position in relation to certain significant developments, and cardinal motifs in

his own thought. This will enable us to understand better and to appreciate more that which follows.

1. Introduction and background to Robert Grosseteste's doctrine of truth

"The central figure in England in the intellectual movement of the first half of the thirteenth century was undoubtedly Robert Grosseteste."¹ Such is the judgement of Daniel Callus who has devoted considerable attention to Grosseteste. Grosseteste was born around 1170 in the county of Suffolk. He probably received his first schooling at Lincoln and then studied the arts at Oxford. Prior to 1198 he was in the household of William de Vere, Bishop of Hereford, and at this time is declared to be well versed in the liberal arts, to be proficient in the practice of medicine and the determination of causes, which may be construed as a knowledge of law. This is what is to be learned from a letter of Giraldus Cambrensis. Callus believes that by 1199 at the latest Grosseteste was a master in the arts. Thereafter he probably taught the arts at Oxford and pursued his scientific studies until 1209. It is presumed that after the suspendium clericorum in 1209 Grosseteste left for Paris to study theology and that in 1214 at the earliest he was chosen to be the chancellor of Oxford. Grosseteste also served as archdeacon of Chester,

Northampton, and Leicester during this period ending in 1232. Russell believes that "the evidence of the manuscripts shows that Grosseteste's interests were mainly scientific in the first quarter of the thirteenth century."¹ Stevenson has this to say of the period from 1200-1232: "The most salient feature, however, of the thirty-two years is that they constitute the period of Grosseteste's greatest intellectual activity, to which the majority of his writing are probably to be assigned."² In 1224 the Franciscans arrived in Oxford and Grosseteste served them as their first lecturer from 1229-1235. He was elected bishop of Lincoln in 1235. From that time until his death in 1253 he was active in administration, pastoral care of souls, promoting preaching and better education of the clergy, and translating or supervising translations of Greek sources into Latin.

These biographical notes indicate something of the range of Grosseteste's proficiency and interest. In an age when many masters in theology were beginning to confine their attention to the trivium and dialectic in particular, to the quaestio and commentary on the Sentences, and to scholastic disputation, Grosseteste directed his energy to the study of the Posterior Analytics, Physics, and other works of Aristotle, the investiga-


tion of causes of natural phenomena, the **quadrivium** and its place in relation to other disciplines, glosses on the Holy Scriptures and the **Sentences**, and the writing of theological and metaphysical treatises. It is interesting to note that his investigations and study in the different areas are concurrent. Grosseteste's writing of theological treatises and treatises in natural philosophy extends throughout his teaching career. Richard D. Dales has sought to date Grosseteste's commentary on Aristotle's **Physics**. Dales believes that what we have in the 'commentary' are notes written over a period of years. Dales states: "The extreme limits, then, of the period during which these notes were written would be 1220 to ca. 1240. The evidence indicates, however, that the bulk of them was written between 1228 and 1232."¹ Callus states that "the glosses on the **Physics**, as we have seen, and the majority of his [[Grosseteste's]] scientific treatises were all written after 1230."² Although specific areas of study received special attention at stated periods during his life, his interest in a number of areas, physics included, persisted even when he was teaching theology, engaged in pastoral and administrative duties, and serving as the bishop of Lincoln. We shall inquire

²Callus, *loc. cit.*, p. 28.
later into the reasons for this continued breath of activity and interest on the part of Grosseteste. He was not motivated out of sheer intellectual curiosity or force of habit. There is a rationale and clear purpose behind his rather diverse activities.

Grosseteste appeared on the scene at a time when a number of momentous changes and developments were taking place. Classical sources and materials were being recovered and utilized in distinct ways. Platonism and Aristotelianism were being introduced by way of Moslem philosophy and Jewish philosophy. In the thought of these philosophers we find the intermixture of Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism, plus Islamic faith or Jewish faith. Averroes (1126-1176), however, sought to separate the Aristotelian doctrine from the Neoplatonic elements that Avicenna had mixed with it. In the twelfth century we also note the influx of a host of Arabic and Greek scientific treatises. Many of these sources were available in Latin in the west by the end of the twelfth century and in the early part of the thirteenth. Our immediate concern, however, is to examine significant developments which contributed to the shaping of twelfth century thought and scientific method and which influenced Grosseteste. We shall note how Grosseteste responded to these different developments.

(1.1) The role and use of dialectic, reason, and authority in relation to the scholastic method and the quest for truth
(1.1.1) It is hardly possible at this juncture to conduct a thorough examination of the place of reason or dialectic during the mediaeval period but the examination of certain trends and issues should prove helpful. This preliminary study is warranted in part by the increased preoccupation with dialectic during the twelfth century as evidenced in the universals controversy, the thought of such as Abelard and Alan of Lille, Lombard's *Sentences*, and in the method of *disputatio*. Logic or dialectic soon dominated the arts curriculum and became increasingly normative. In the schools dialectic became principally the form or mode of disputation. This resulted in the dialectical excesses against which John of Salisbury speaks in his *Metalogicon*. Such dialectic severely restricted and limited the operation and function of the reason. This dialectic is to be distinguished from that rational method in which the mind or reason applies itself to articles of faith accepted on the basis of authority. A. J. MacDonald\(^1\) states that reason, tradition, and authority can be spoken of in terms of their broad and narrow significance and sense. The *ratio* understood in the broad sense is the human intelligence reflecting upon and pondering man, the world, human opinion, revelation etc. Ratio as understood in the narrower sense entails the exercise of the rational faculties bound by the methods of the schools, in other words, the

rules of dialectics. It is the latter which along with grammar and rhetoric constitutes the trivium. MacDonald states the following concerning the development of dialectics or logic:

Dialectics or logic became almost entirely syllogistic, and rational attempts at the interpretation of doctrine or revelation sank into disrepute, until a few stronger minds wrested the activity of reason from the normal exercise of the schools, and attempted to secure for reason not only greater freedom, but to apply it to the practical development and application of dogma.¹

The apparent threat to authority and faith posed by dialectic provoked varying degrees of reaction against dialectic. In Peter Damian, Manegold of Lautenback, Otloh of St. Emmeran and Walter of St. Victor we find a great deal of suspicion regarding dialectic and profane or secular learning in general. Damian was one of the most forceful in repudiating the study of such as the arts. St. Bernard of Clairvaux held a more moderate position and although he did not actually reject profane scholarship he stressed its subordinate position in relation to simple faith and piety in Christ. Lanfranc represents a moderate view determined to a considerable extent by his controversy with Berengarius on the Eucharist. Leff says of Lanfranc: "Lanfranc therefore tried to establish the meeting-place of dialectic and theology, at a time when one was being upheld to the exclusion of the other."²

The real issue revolved about the extent to which dialectics, which was basically the logica vetus plus Boethius' contribution to logic, was to be utilized and how determinative a role it was

¹Ibid. p. 9. ²G. Leff, op. cit., p. 97.
to play. The still larger question pertained to the role and function of the reason in relation to authority and faith. So long as the character of this interrelationship was not established and thought through, the alternatives were pretty much restricted to sheer acceptance of authority and tradition or formal dialectical disputation concerning doctrine received and accepted. Other possibilities included the setting up of a more determinative and normative dialectics or an autonomous and regulatory ratio.

However, any student of mediaeval thought soon becomes aware of other types of rational activity and uses of reason in relation to authority and faith. Positions pertaining to the place and function of the reason range from that of John the Scot, St. Anselm, Gilbert de la Porrée of the school of Chartres to St. Thomas. Moreover, it should also be noted that it is misleading simply to speak of mediaeval 'rationalism' or of mediaeval 'rational theology' without further explication and qualification. One reason for this is that the word 'reason' as such does not express the sense of 'ratio' in its manifold usage in mediaeval texts. One only has to consult a standard Latin Dictionary to note the many difference senses which 'ratio' can have. R. McKeon speaks of the difficulty in finding substitutes for 'ratio' in translation. He cites some of the possible senses

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that 'ratio' can have including such as a faculty of the human mind, relations in things or related elements, a principle of being, and a principle of knowing. One faces a similar problem regarding the words 'auctoritas' and 'traditio'. A. J. MacDonald states that John the Scot is often misinterpreted because 'auctoritas' as used by John is not understood correctly:

But it cannot be too sharply emphasized, since it is a point which interpreters of John the Scot have missed, that reason is here contrasted with written authority, with the writings of Scripture or of the Fathers, not with the authority of revelation or illumination, either in Scripture or in that region of the soul which is superior to reason.1 Nevertheless, it can be said that 'auctoritas' is generally used to refer to the Sacred Scriptures in the first place and then the testimony of the fathers.

We shall see that Grosseteste places great stress on auctoritas and seeks to substantiate his theological and metaphysical formulations by frequently appealing to auctoritates. In this respect it will become apparent that Grosseteste's method is closer to Augustine's method than to Anselm's. Although all three seek a deeper understanding of the content of the Faith and a greater certitude and certainty, Anselm's method involves a 'rational' explication and demonstration of the content of the Faith without appealing to auctoritas. They all speak of the mind seeking after intellectus and a clear vision of the Truth. However, without citing and making an appeal to auctoritates Anselm strives to see and to show the contents of the

1A. J. MacDonald, op. cit., p. 47.
Faith to be true. What should be pointed out at this juncture is that Augustine, Anselm, and Grosseteste all utilize and proceed on the basis of certain generally accepted notions and metaphysical structures which are taken for granted. However, whereas they use these notions and structures in a rather critical fashion in the formulation of their doctrine, in certain other mediaeval theological systems these notions are radically determinative. As Leff states: "Just as St. Augustine gave Neoplatonism a Christian foundation, so John [the Scot] endeavoured to set Christianity upon a Neoplatonic base." Other examples of this degree of adaptation of the doctrines accepted by faith are found in members of the school of Chartres, for instance, Thierry of Chartres. The question as to how reason and dialectic are to be employed and juxtaposed over against the content of faith raises the whole issue of the scholastic method.

(1.1.2) There are a number of problems involved in seeking to clarify and determine the basic character of 'the scholastic method'. One of these difficulties arises from the different interpretations offered regarding the nature of the method. A considerable number of these have been brought together by Martin Grabmann in his history of the scholastic method. Grabmann cites such as Friedrich Paulsen, Wilhelm Dilthey, Reinhold Seeberg, and August Sabatier as those who see in the scholastic a rationalistic or at least semi-rationalistic propensity, whereas in such as

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1G. Leff, op. cit., pp. 71-72.
Karl Girgensohn "tritt in den Augen dieses Theologen bei den Scholastikern die Vernunft gänzlich hinter Autorität and Glauben zurück." 1 The definition given is determined by such factors as the bias of the definer and the mediaeval figures selected as most representative of what a scholastic should be. The expression 'scholastic method' is also quite inadequate as a generalization insofar as it is then expected to cover a number of methods which have their own distinctive aspects. Etienne Gilson sets forth one of the ways in which we can speak of 'scholasticism':

Scholasticism is the common denomination for the "scholastic philosophy" of the Faculty of Arts and for the "scholastic theology" of the Faculty of Theology. There is no harm in attempting to define the "essence" of scholasticism, supposing it has one, but to do so is beyond the proper capacity of a historian.

Grabmann, however, in his historical study of the scholastic method does set forth some definite ideas on the nature of the method. He states the following regarding the method:

Es sei vor allem auf das 'fides quaeens intellectum' und das 'credo, ut intelligam' des hl. Anselm von Canterbury hingewiesen. Unsere geschichtliche Darstellung wird den Nachweis erbringen, dass hier das grossartige wissenschaftliche Arbeitsprogramm des Vaters der Scholastik ausgesprochen ist, und dass dieses Arbeitsprogramm zugleich das Echo der Patristik, besonders Augustins, und auch das wirksame Vorbild für die folgende Scholastik gewesen. Der Sinn und die Tragweite dieses Arbeitsprogramms Anselms ist das Erstreben eines Verständnisses der Glaubenswahrheit, einer ration-

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This citation clearly indicates what Grabmann takes to be the spirit and form of the scholastic method. He holds that the scholastics continued what the patristics had been doing, in other words, discreetly using Greek philosophy with no transformation of biblical Christianity. In like manner, "der Scholastizismus bedeutet keine inhaltliche Umprägung und Entstellung des Urchristentums." Grabmann’s description of the method appears too neat and precise. The question arises whether he has not oversimplified the matter. One could ask whether he has reckoned sufficiently with the determinative and normative role and influence that reason and philosophy have often exercised when utilized by the fathers and the mediaeval scholastics. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Grabmann’s rather compact description of the scholastic method and its central aims is quite general in character and must be appropriately qualified and more precisely delineated when setting forth the particular method of this or that mediaeval theologian. Grabmann also offers this general formal definition of the scholastic method:

Die scholastische Methode will durch Anwendung der Vernunft, der Philosophie auf die Offenbarungswahrheiten möglichst Einsicht in den Glaubensinhalt gewinnen, um die übernatürliche Wahrheit dem denkenden Menschengeiste inhaltlich näher zu bringen, organisch zusammenfassende Gesamtdarstellung der Heilswahrheit zu ermöglichen und die gegen den Offenbarungsinhalt vom Vernunftstandpunkte aus erhobenen Einwände.  

1Grabmann, op. cit., p. 33.  2Ibid., p. 75.  
3Ibid., pp. 36-37.
Such a definition has a certain utility if at the same time one keeps in mind the differences in procedure, form, and method present in 'scholasticism'. It could be said that commentary or exposition, collation sheer compilation, *disputatio*, monographic studies, and the *Summae* are all attempts to gain insight into the contents of what is believed. Differentiation arises from and involves methods used, the character of the rational activity, and the place given to dialectic and philosophy in relation to authority and faith. The understanding of 'ratio' and its proper function also appears to be very determinative. One must therefore know for certain just what is intended speaking of mediaeval 'rationalism'. Leff has this to say concerning scholasticism:

Scholasticism has long been a subject for controversy. By some it has been seen as an attitude or state of belief which takes Christian revelation for its subject; to others it is a method of disputation, and this has been its distinguishing trait; while others have regarded it as the rational aspect of belief, a philosophy in its own right. While none of these is necessarily self-exclusive, in my view scholasticism was essentially the application of reason to revelation. It was an outlook in which rational enquiry was governed by the assumptions of faith, and faith was supported by the powers of reason.¹

(1.1.3) The question remains as to how Grosseteste stands in relation to the factors discussed above. It must be first pointed out that Grosseteste does not oppose but rather advocates profane learning such as the study of the liberal arts. Grosseteste's own study and teaching in the liberal arts, his treatise

¹Leff, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
on the liberal arts, his numerous treatises in physics, and his translations of and commentaries on a number of Aristotle's works amply testify to the breadth of his scholarship. As Ludwig Baur says:

Grosseteste gehörte nicht zu jener allzukonservativen augustinischen Richtung, welcher Philosophie und Profanwissenschaften ein Greuel waren; mit freiem Blicke tritt er der neuen Gedankenwelt näher, gibt aber aller Wissenschaftspflege eine Richtung auf die Theologie.1

In his treatise on the liberal arts Grosseteste speaks of a three-fold cause of error and imperfection. Such error arises from the mind that is darkened by ignorance, from affections that fall short or lack moderation, and on account of the motive powers of the body that have been weakened by the corruption of the flesh. Grosseteste speaks of the function of the seven arts in overcoming such error and imperfection:

In humanis vero operibus erroris purgationes et ad perfectionem deductiones sunt artes septenae, quae solae inter partes philosophiae ideo consentur artis nomine, quia earum est tantum effectus operationes humanas corrigendo ad perfectionem ducere.2

Concerning the trivium Grosseteste says "mentis ergo

1L. Baur, "Das philosophische Lebenswerk des Robert Grosseteste Bischofs von Lincoln" (Gorres-Ges., Vereineschr., f. 1910; bound in 15 Diss. & C.on Scholastic Philosophy, 1901-1919) p. 82.

aspectum et affectum hae tres virtutes rectificant et ad perfectionem perducunt." Grosseteste states that "hae septe naturalis et moralis sunt ministrae: nam grammatica et logica sum habeant sermonem rectum, habent probationem rectam: manifestum est, quod probationem veram ministrant." It is interesting to note that the arts are servants or attendants of natural and moral philosophy. Grammar and logic provide true or right reasoning and demonstration on behalf of other disciplines. Grosseteste is interested in the services that the trivium can provide but not in the trivium for its own sake. These attendants must always remain subordinate to such disciplines as physics, ethics, and theology which they may serve. Rhetoric has a service to perform on behalf of "moralis scientia." He states that "moralis scientia cum ornatu rhetorico vult doceri et sciri, ut proveniat morum informatio." Other sciences "ornatum repudiant, in quibus quaeritur sola veritatis ordinatio." Music and astronomy receive a great deal of attention in De Artibus Liberalibus. Grosseteste stresses the importance of the study of music in seeking to understand movement, celestial and non-celestial harmony, things composed of the four elements, and the elements themselves. Music is also useful in medicine as it helps to restore harmony among the elements of the body and concord of body and soul. Natural philosophy needs the service of astronomy more than that of the other arts. There is hardly an operation within the realm of nature or human activity which can do without

1Ibid.; BW 2. 2Ibid.; BW 4. 3Ibid. 4Ibid.
the service of astronomy. Such operations include the planting of vegetables, transmutation of metals, and the curing of diseases. Arithmetic and geometry receive little attention in this treatise but have an important place in Grosseteste's scientific method.

In this present context it is the place of logic or dialectic in Grosseteste's thought and methodology that is of special interest. It has already been noted that logic helps in providing true reasoning or demonstration. The function of grammar is to understand rightly and then to communicate properly what is understood. Logic then fulfils its function as follows: "Recte informatum quale sit logica sine errore dijudicat." Logic must pass judgement as to the truth of that which is rightly understood. "Officium vero logicae est, quod recte formatum est in intellectu, secundum tripartitam rationem sui quale sit judicare et discutare." As we proceed it will become apparent that Grosseteste does not repudiate the use of logic, however, he is not preoccupied with logic or dialectic. In De Libero Arbitrio, De Scientia Dei, and De Veritate Propositionis he deals in part with problems pertaining to the modality of propositions in connection with factual necessity and contingency. F. S. Stevenson believes that in his De Veritate Propositionis Grosseteste manifests some acquaintance with Byzant-

\[1^{\text{Ibid.}};\; 2^{\text{Ibid.}}.\]

\[3^{\text{Stevenson, op. cit., p. 42, n. 1.}}\]
tine logic. In his De Veritate treatise Grosseteste argues that truth is indestructible. The argument used is akin to theorem 17 of Stoic logic. However, it must be said that he is much more interested in understanding the nature of the supreme Truth and the truth of things than logical or propositional truth. The latter is recognized and examined but viewed as being strictly subordinate to the former. Aristotle's logic, the Posterior Analytics in particular, is of interest to Grosseteste primarily for what it has to offer in the formulation of a scientific method in physics. A. C. Crombie cites two types of argument used by Grosseteste: "The modes of argument used by Grosseteste in his method of experimental verification and falsification are called respectively, the modus nonendo nonens and the modus tollendo tollens."¹ Crombie believes that both these modes of argument are to be found in the treatise De Calore Solis. There is also a gloss on the Sophistici Elenchi that is attributed to Grosseteste. In his Quaestiones Theologicae he labels an argument "paralogismus accidentis."² "Theology, so he said in one of his Dicta (no. 118), turns the syllogism to spiritual uses and catches


in its net spiritual fish who are readily caught."¹ It is evident that Grosseteste is hardly averse to all use of logic and argumentation. At the same time he carefully limits his use of logic and dialectical disputation and manifests a decided preference for authority, experience, and observation in ascertaining the truth. Regarding Grosseteste's proposed solution of the Jerome-Augustinian controversy on the incident between Peter and Paul in Antioch, Beryl Smalley has this to say: "Nevertheless his attempt to use history rather than dialectic by way of explanation throws light on his own mental processes . . . . The interesting point is Grosseteste's preference for scholarship to dialectic."² Let us examine further Grosseteste's use of dialectic and ratio in particular types of treatises and forms of writing.

Grosseteste's theological writing consists for the most part of moralistic commentary on some of the books of Scripture, a small number of biblical treatises, fragmentary comments on the Sentences, monographs such as De Libero Arbitrio, De Unica Forma Omnium and De Veritate, commentary on the Pseudo-Dionysius, dicta, and sermons. Those who have studied his biblical commentaries and biblical treatises are impressed by the absence of dialectic and scholastic disputation and the presence of spiritual interpretation and moral exhortation. Beryl Smalley, who has studied

¹Sir M. Powicke, "Introduction," RG, p. xviii.
these commentaries and treatises, comments on his Bible study:

Grosseteste was behind the times in his attitude to Bible study. He believes, as his masters must have believed, in associating theology and exegesis very closely. Doctrine and theological speculation, on this view, ought to be kept within a scriptural framework; they should be taught in lectures on the Bible. Grosseteste sponsored the older view of an all-embracing study of Scripture. He gave high priority in this study to the spiritual exposition. It was part and parcel of his view of life.

His spiritual exposition was directed towards preaching and edification. Grosseteste was well versed in the Scriptures and emphasized the need of using the Bible as the text in teaching theology. In a letter to the regent-masters in theology at Oxford he urged that only the Bible be used as the text in teaching theology. With respect to Grosseteste’s commentary on Galatians and his Moralitates in Evangelia Callus states that "there is hardly any trace of dialectic subtleties or scholastic discussions; but an abundance of practical instruction, spiritual advice, virtues to follow, vices and sins to avoid, all illustrated by appropriate and copious exemplar." Stevenson shares the sentiment expressed above:

In spite of the extraordinary proficiency to which he attained both in theology and in dialectics, his mental bias was in favour of keeping those studies as far as possible distinct from one another, and not intermingling

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1Ibid., pp. 84-85.


them in the manner which had become fashionable during the twelfth century.  

Grosseteste's biblical and theological writing is marked by constant appeal to auctoritas, that is, the Scriptures and the fathers. Stevenson says of Grosseteste's Dicta Theologica: "One of their most noteworthy characteristics is to be found in their constant appeal to the authority of Scripture, and in the writer's extraordinary familiarity with its contents."  

Callus states that his exegesis involved exposition of the Biblical text with the use of the patristic and mediaeval tradition: "His chief biblical writings, the exposition on the Pauline Epistles and on the Psalter, were written in the margin of his copy of the Gloss, are based on the Gloss, and teem with patristic and mediaeval citations."  

It can be said that much of the commentary that we have from the hand of Grosseteste derives from his interlinear and marginal jottings placed in the texts that he studied. His commentaries and treatises originated in part also from his lectures given during his teaching period and questions discussed in the schools. Grosseteste's dependence on authority and tradition is very much in evidence in such works as his De Libero Arbitrio and his Hexaemeron. In the latter especially, there is little that is original to Grosseteste. The Hexaemeron, an extended commentary on the Genesis account of

1Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 18.  
2Ibid., p. 33.  
the six days of creation, abounds with citations from both the Latin and Greek fathers. Throughout his writing Grosseteste shows a high respect and reverence for his fathers in the faith. Smalley indicates that this raised certain difficulties for Grosseteste: "Difference of opinion in Greek and Latin tradition, principally in St. Basil as opposed to St. Augustine, imposed comparison and discussion. He had strong views of his own on certain questions and had to reconcile them with his authorities."¹ However, it can hardly be said that Grosseteste's theological effort amounts to no more than the writing of commentary on the Scriptures and other auctoritates along with the compilation and correlation of the same. In fact, as we shall have occasion to note, often in the course of writing commentary on a particular text Grosseteste presents his own theological and metaphysical views. However, it is not in his commentaries or in his devotional and moralistic writings that we should expect to find his more structured and systematically ordered and reasoned theological and metaphysical formulations.

We find Grosseteste pursuing a more deliberate method and engaging in more systematic and reasoned theological formulation in a number of his compact opuscula, his Quaestiones Theologicae, his De Libero Arbitrio, certain of the Dicta, and in segments of his Hexaemeron. Callus argues that a number of the opuscula along with the Quaestiones Theologicae and De Libero Arbitrio are parts of a Summa Theologiae or Summa Sententiarum that Grosseteste

¹Smalley, loc. cit., p. 79.
planned to write after the pattern of Lombard's *Sentences.* The method that Grosseteste pursues in these treatises should become rather apparent as we examine his doctrine of truth. Grosseteste's method includes the frequent citing of auctoritates and the use of such logical arguments as cited above. Grosseteste is very much interested in seeing how the various doctrines and beliefs which he adheres to on the basis of auctoritas cohere and are interrelated. Grosseteste pursues a method in the above treatises which could be termed a 'scholastic method' as the latter is broadly defined and described by Grabmann in his text on the history of the method.

The *opuscula* of Grosseteste mentioned above include *De Unica Forma Omnium, De Ordine Emanandi Causatorum a Deo, De Scientia Dei, De Veritate, De Veritate Propositionis, and De Intelligentiis.* Callus says of such treatises: "It is evident from the treatment of their subject matter that they are theological rather than philosophical. Even a cursory inspection shows that these are not complete treatises, but rather mere fragments, or sections of a larger work." Although they are possibly part of a larger work, in the form in which they are extant they could be considered monographs to the extent that each *opusculum* deals with a specific topic or subject. Regarding these treatises of Grosseteste Callus offers the following:

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The form in which they came down to us suggests a technique rather of a treatise, or of questions attached to the lectio, than of a quaestio disputata. Yet, the structure of the arguments against and in favour of the thesis, and certain phrases scattered here and there, which are easily traced, may possibly hint as disputation. I am inclined to think that these opuscules were questions raised or disputed originally in the course of his theological teaching which Grosseteste later arranged and set into a definite shape.¹

According to Callus the above observation also applies to the De Libero Arbitrio and the Quaestiones Theologicae. This observation was made in 1945. It is in the essay entitled "The Summa Theologiae of Robert Grosseteste", which introduces Callus' edition of the Quaestiones and which was published in 1948, that Callus argues that these treatises are parts of a Summa Sententiarum or Summa Theologiae.

However, irrespective of the actual origin or initial form of the above treatises, the subject matter or content is theological in character and the method is that of seeking to understand what is held to be true. This method involves the frequent citing of authorities, which includes the Scriptures, and the fathers, plus reasoning based on the ratio or nature of the subject itself. In De Libero Arbitrio Grosseteste argues that it is certain that God knows singulars because "Deus est maius, quam quod possit ex-cogitari."² In the same work he also cites such authorities as Seneca and Cicero in order to refute the heathen who put little stock in the Scriptures. We shall see that Grosseteste's method

²De Lib. Arb. 2; BW 157.
involves not only an explication of the truth itself but also the drawing of implications and deductions which rightly follow from the nature of the truth. He repudiates those doctrines and positions which are not in agreement with the nature of the truth. In chapter four reference shall be made to Grosseteste's use of reductio ad impossibile in the process of falsification. In arguing that God knows singulars he also states that "si Deus nesciret singularia, tu multa scires, quae Deus ignoraret. Hoc autem absurdum est dicere." Grosseteste uses this type of reasoning both in his theology and in his physics. Such reasoning, however, is accompanied by auctoritas and experimentum. As Ludwig Baur states: "Während die Methode der anderen Scholastiker durch die auctoritas et ratio bestimmt ist, ist es bei Grosseteste experimentum, ratio and auctoritas, worauf er sich beruft." Grosseteste is not at home in the realm of purely formal logical categories. From time to time he will use a more formal argument but it is not long and we see him again citing authority, making an appeal to experience, and seeking a fuller explication and vision of the truth. In De Libero Arbitrio the point is clearly made that the divine Nature is not to be considered absolute nor the divine action simply in terms of potentia. Grosseteste remarks that such procedures lead to unacceptable predications regarding

1Ibid.; BW 156.
the divine Nature and activity. He does not want to expound upon the latter from the viewpoint of sheer logical or formal necessity but rather on the basis of what has been accomplished and ordered by God and the attendant consequent necessity. These categories will be explored more fully further on. Grosseteste's intention throughout his intellectual activity is to arrive at a visio or aspectus of the truth. In this quest the mystical side of his character is clearly apparent. The latter is also evident from Grosseteste's preoccupation with both spiritual and corporeal light.

Grosseteste offers us no grand and comprehensive intellectual system or synthesis. In the first place it could be said that such a system does not seem to be altogether in keeping with Grosseteste's temperament, method, and intellectual posture. The writings of Grosseteste do not lead one to believe that he was particularly interested in the development of a unified comprehensive theological or metaphysical system. This is not to say that he has not given us any systematic treatises. His monographs in the fields of theology, metaphysics, and physics do deal with specific motifs in an ordered and integrated fashion. Such treatises as De Artibus Liberalibus, De Veritate, De Luce, De Unica Forma Omnium, and De Libero Arbitrio could be included in such a category. It is also said of the Hexaemeron that "it is a systematic and elaborate commentary on the Six Days of Creation, not a set of notes or marginal jottings."1 In the realm of

physics and astronomy such treatises as *De Cometis*, *De Calore Solis*, *De Colore*, and *De Generatione Sonorum* are pretty much restricted to an orderly discussion of the designated subjects. Grosseteste's commentaries, however, are more diffuse, extensive, and less compact. This includes his commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. In this commentary there is not only the setting forth of methodological principles such as the mode of acquiring the experimental universal and demonstration, but also discussion of general epistemological questions, the ordering of the sciences, light metaphysics, and natural or physical phenomena.

The multifarious and fragmentary character of Grosseteste's literary output could possibly mislead one into assuming that he consequently must have held a fragmentary and disjointed view of reality and the cosmos. The closely knit treatise *De Luce* in itself is clear evidence that such is not the case. Upon examination of a number of Grosseteste's writings one can discern behind them something in the nature of a *Weltanschauung*. The commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* plainly shows that Grosseteste does not consider one particular subject or facet of reality in isolation from the rest. At the same time he stresses the need for modes of cognition appropriate to different levels and facets of reality. Such is particularly needful because of man's present predicament which does not permit a clear and unobstructed view of the totality of the truth. Hence the need of sense experience as an important step in acquiring knowledge of incorporeal truth. Multiple sources and modes of knowledge
do not, however, preclude the possibility of a single unified vision of the truth. One may therefore raise the question as to why he does not delineate such a vision in the form of a complete rational system.

Although Grosseteste is certainly no metaphysical monist, a position precluded at the outset by his strong belief in creation, there is an adequate foundation in his conceptions of God, truth, and the cosmos to provide for the formulation of a comprehensive intellectual system. Such conceptions include his belief in the radical oneness and utter simplicity of God, divine creation, the manifold relations between the supreme Truth and created truth, and the unity of the natural order founded upon light as the first corporeal form. Baur speaks of the place of corporeal light in Grosseteste's natural philosophy: "Es ist das Prinzip der Einheit der Natur."¹

There appears to be a number of factors which could be used to account for the absence of such a system. It could be argued that the press of manifold duties and varied scholarly pursuits did not allow sufficient time for the formulation of such a system. It can rightly be asserted that Grosseteste was more of an encyclopaedic scholar than a systematic thinker. As Stevenson says: "In the domain of intellectual activity Grosseteste must,

as will be shown, be regarded as the founder and inspirer of what may be termed the encyclopaedic school of the thirteenth century. . . ."¹ It may also be said that the vast amount of new sources and material introduced in the twelfth century had to be assimilated and digested before constructive synthesis and systematization could be effected. It is true that Grosseteste devoted much of his energy and time to the translation and interpretation of such material. However, in view of Grosseteste's doctrinal stance and teaching it seems unlikely that he would have had to await the completion of such assimilation before initiating the formulation of a comprehensive system. His thought indicates that he was selective and quite critical in his reception of the new material. This is clearly evident in his attitude to a great bulk of the Aristotelian corpus. Grosseteste was clearly a conservative Augustinian in this respect.

In addition to the possible reasons cited above, I believe that Grosseteste did not feel greatly compelled towards developing and articulating a system because of his doctrine of truth which lessened or reduced both the need and the possibility of a comprehensive intellectual system. Grosseteste, in the first place, believed that the basic and primary referent of 'truth' was the being of God and the being of created entities. Intellectual and logical or propositional truth also had their own particular degree of being but were altogether subordinate and

¹Stevenson, op. cit., p. 23.
inferior to the prior truth of God and res. Coherent and intelligible structures of being were present and existent in God and the created order, and between God and the created order by virtue of creation and exemplarism. Grosseteste believed that there was a radical coherence and symmetry deeply imbedded within the created order. This order was grounded in the eternal rationes spoken by God.

It appears that Grosseteste would have felt a greater compulsion and need to formulate a comprehensive intellectual system if he had understood truth to be primarily intellectual or logical. St. Thomas, who also thought of truth as the being of God and the created order and who also taught an exemplarism, believed that truth was primarily that which resides in the intellect. Gilson says that for St. Thomas "truth, in the full and proper sense of the term, is found in thought alone; for truth lies in the adequation of thing and intellect." Consequently, it would seem reasonable to conclude that for St. Thomas it was highly imperative that an intellectual synthesis and coherent intellectual system be constructed. Coherence had to be realized on the level of human intellection and therefore on the level of propositional truth as well. There were, of course, other factors which motivated St. Thomas, one of which was the challenge presented by the 'purist' philosophers in the arts faculty at Paris.

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1Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 235.
Grosseteste, although he too would admit that human intellectual truth should mirror the ratio and coherence of ontological truth, did not share with St. Thomas this sense of urgency in constructing a coherent system. It seems therefore that Grosseteste was more free to be diffuse and fragmentary in his approach to ontological truth and to be less concerned about tying the loose ends together on the intellectual and propositional levels. Grosseteste's intellectual stance and doctrine of truth granted him the freedom to engage in varied and penetrating probes into a rather wide range of subjects.

Nevertheless, on the basis of Grosseteste's doctrine of truth a symmetry and a coherence in the areas of thought and logical formulation could be expected to emerge. Although a coherent vision or view of reality is discernible within the varied and extensive literary production of Grosseteste, there is no pronounced and deliberate effort to construct an elaborate system in the form of something comparable to a *magnus opus*. Assuming that for Grosseteste there is no pressing need for the formulation of such a system, the question yet to be answered is whether such would even be possible.

It is certainly clear from Grosseteste's thought that such a task or project is beset by a number of difficulties. We can only briefly cite some of the obstacles which block the path to such a system. They pertain both to the very nature of the truth and the condition of the human being as a knowing subject. The ineffable grandeur of the supreme Truth does not permit an easy
and ready formulation. The perfection, absolute simplicity, and eternity of the supreme Truth will be viewed by the purified human soul in heaven, but it can not be perceived by the unpurified human soul and much less expressed by such in terms of a system. God is that supreme Light which lies beyond human comprehension and expression. Man must therefore begin with faith in or assent to the teachings of the Holy Scripture if there is to follow the visio of the Creator and Redeemer which is eternal life and true blessedness. In addition to the greatness of God there is the impurity of the human soul and the feeble character of human speech. With respect to human speech about God, Grosseteste states: "De re enim tanta nihil verum potest esse parvum, licet parvitate dicentis possit esse non granditer dictum et pro parvitate nostri dicentis non possit esse granditer elocutum."¹ He also makes it clear that we cannot use language in a univocal fashion when applying the same words to both God and his creatures. Even created truth, which is also intelligible, is often beyond the grasp of the human intellect because the latter is so bound up with corporeal phantasms and cannot proceed beyond the sensible to the intelligible. Grosseteste also teaches that the "mentis aspectus" is not able "superius ascendere quam ascendat eius affectus vel appetitus."² This is the affectus-aspectus doctrine and it occupies an important place in his epistemology.

¹De Unica Forma Omnium; BW 106.
²Comm. Phys. VIII; Dales 147.
The mind and the will cannot function independently of each other but are closely interrelated. This has particular significance in connection with knowledge of the supreme Truth. Reference was made above to the three causes of error cited by Grosseteste in his treatise on the liberal arts. One of these is the *mentis affectus* that is not rightly ordered. In his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* Grosseteste asserts that errors can arise from confusing different sciences and directing questions to a science that are inappropriate. In the same commentary Grosseteste states that when the senses are deficient, cognition of the universal is also adversely affected. It is because of such difficulties that a clear and complete vision of the truth is not readily achieved. However, it should also be added that the full and clear vision of the truth belongs only to the purified soul in heaven. Supposing that such a vision of the totality of truth were a present reality, it still is difficult to imagine how it could be expressed or formulated in terms of a comprehensive rational system.

(1.2) The development of natural philosophy or physics in relation to theology and metaphysics

In the twelfth century we observe a growing interest in physics or natural philosophy, exemplified by the school of Chartres and later by Oxford. One should really speak of the growth of metaphysics at Chartres, partly because of the areas of special interest, cosmogony and cosmology, and also because of the spec-
ulative and rational methods employed. This school was strongly influenced by Platonism and the *Timaeus* was utilized to a great extent in their cosmological speculation. Rather than the juxtaposition of a physical or natural science over against the Genesis record of creation we find a Platonist influenced speculative or metaphysical cosmogony and cosmology. Leff says of the work of Bernard of Silvestris entitled *De mundi universitate sive macrocosmos et microcosmus*: "This is so much the product of Plato's *Timaeus* that it is hard to see its immediate bearing upon Christianity."¹ What is of special interest at this juncture is not this speculative metaphysics but the new posture assumed by members of this school in relation to both the divine act of creation and the created natural or physical order. Their purpose was to set forth rational and physical explanations of the divine act of creation and the nature and causes of created physical entities. Members of the school were turning their attention to secondary causes and principles that were immanent in the created natural order. Prior to this time mediaeval religious thinkers followed by and large the precedent set by St. Augustine in his desire to know God and the soul, with little attention being given to the created natural or physical order. However, it would certainly be wrong to say that the material creation was without value in the eyes of St. Augustine. The entire created order was valuable just by virtue of the fact that it was created by God. This order

¹Leff, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
also had revelatory significance as a symbol and reflection of the eternal immutable Truth. As A. C. Crombie says:

The encouragement of a rational inquiry into the nature of things had been implicit in St. Augustine's rational theology, which had long predisposed Western Christendom to value the natural world as sacramental and symbolic of spiritual truths.¹

The human soul occupied the pre-eminent place within this sacramental created order, for within the soul we have the reflection of the Trinity. What was lacking was an investigation into the material world for the purpose of better understanding that world in its own right.

While it certainly would be wrong to assert categorically that it was simply Greek philosophy, particularly Platonism, which hindered the growth of natural philosophy in the early mediaeval period, Platonism in the form of Neoplatonism contributed greatly to the notion that the primary value of the material world was that it symbolized eternal and spiritual truths and ideas. There were, of course, also religious and historical factors which inhibited the growth of natural science, such as the concern and preoccupation with the salvation of souls and with the preservation of the Christian faith and tradition. Kneale is therefore partially right in asserting:

The chief obstacle to steady scientific progress was not the influence of Aristotelian logic or anything else derived

from Greece, but a lack of sustained curiosity about things which were not mentioned by ancient authors and did not appear to contribute in any way to salvation.\footnote{W. and M. Kneale, \textit{The Development of Logic}, p. 241.}

This lack of curiosity, however, must be attributed in part to the impact and influence of the Greek conception of the sensible material world in which the material world was considered to be most inferior to the spiritual or ideal world and to a certain extent unreal. On the other hand, the degree of value that was attributed to this world was in large part due to the Christian doctrine of creation. Moreover, the conception of the created order as symbolic of spiritual truth did have a positive affect on the growth of natural science in that it directed men's minds to seek to know God in and through created things. This can rightly be considered one of the prime factors motivating those within the Augustinian tradition, such as those at Chartres, to investigate more fully both the nature of the act of creation and created entities themselves. Concerning this, R. McKeon states:

\textit{Significantly, too, the interest in mathematics and the beginnings of science at Chartres and Oxford were connected with augustinianism, for mathematics shows forth the eternal structure of things, and the knowledge of things conceived in their changeless natures must further the knowledge of God.}\footnote{McKeon, \textit{op. cit.}, p. xi.}

The Platonist stress on mathematics in coming to know such natures was a most significant methodological contribution to
the growth of natural science. The pursuit of such science was also motivated by practical, mechanical, and technical problems faced in the twelfth century which up to this time had been dealt with in a trial and error fashion. Crombie asserts that "in the Middle Ages there is much evidence to show that by the time of Robert Grosseteste, in the early thirteenth century, scholars had long been interested in practical scientific problems." The Greek and Arabic scientific treatises which were in process of translation in the twelfth century also prompted further inquiry in the realm of physics or natural philosophy. However, what was required if there was to be further progress in this area was a clarification of the different categories of causes and the development of a method whereby efficient and material causes could be ascertained. An experimental method had to be developed so that proposed theories and hypotheses could be tested. We shall take note of Grosseteste's contribution to the development of such a method. There was also the need to utilize properly both induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis. Furthermore, there had to be a more critical delineation of the different disciplines and sciences and the ways in which they are interrelated.

At this juncture, we can do no more than cite some of the developments that contributed to the growth of natural science and a scientific method in particular. The introduction of the

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1Crombie, Robert Grosseteste, p. 18.
new Aristotle, especially the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Physics*, provided substantial impetus in the development of a scientific methodology. These treatises stressed the need for knowing the cause of the observed fact and the need for the clarification of causes. It does seem, however, that too much was expected from the formal cause and knowledge of the same. One of Grosseteste's contributions in this area was to stress the importance of knowing efficient and material causes. He gave minimal attention in his physical science to final causes. He relied more on other *viae cognoscendi* for knowledge of the final causes, particularly with respect to the final causes of physical entities made by the supreme Truth. Final causes of human artifacts were to be found in the artisan and in the manifest function of the object made. Grosseteste did not believe that the composite creaturely *res* was the most productive source of knowledge of the second plentitude of being or final cause.

Part of the deficiency of Greek physical science was due to the inordinate stress on deductive demonstrations founded on geometry as the determinative model science. Aristotle's overriding preoccupation with the syllogistic form of reasoning and the logic of terms can be said to have hindered somewhat the development of a truly scientific methodology. The extensive application of syllogistic reasoning in natural science tended to blur the distinction between formal or logical necessity and material or real necessity. It could be asserted that natural regularity was therefore transformed into the category of logical
necessity except that logical necessity was itself grounded upon a real or material necessity and necessary definitions. The demonstrative syllogism also tended to give the impression that a greater certainty and actual proof had been achieved whereas it was simply drawing out what was already implicit and intended in the major premise. Some confusion also arises where Aristotle speaks of the cause of a particular effect or attribute as a middle term. He is really after the formal cause which would account for the inherence of an attribute in a particular substance. In spite of these restrictions and difficulties the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle did provide needed impetus by stressing the need for ascertaining causes and the propter quid of that which is observed as fact. What was required was greater emphasis on modal logic, the logic of propositions as set forth in Stoic logic, and the fact of contingency. Grosse-teste's use of the modus ponendo ponens and modus tollendo tollens modes of argument is an example of the use of non-syllogistic modes of reasoning. Kneale points out that these arguments were set forth by Aristotle in his Prior Analytics but "he did not, so far as we know, succeed in giving a formal analysis of any of them."¹ Neither does Aristotle use the nomenclature by which they were later known. In speaking of the contribution of Greek science it is important to keep in mind both the negative and positive effects, both its assets and liabilities.

¹Kneale, op. cit., p. 99.
A. C. Crombie remarks that "Greek science, in fact, was and remained rather a science of demonstrative proof than a science of inductive and experimental investigation."¹

In addition to those already mentioned, there were other factors which contributed to the growth of physical science during the time of Grosseteste. There was increased emphasis on the quadrivium and the role of mathematics in ascertaining physical causes. In connection with this point R. McKeon makes this significant observation:

And whereas philosophers in the earlier Augustinian tradition found philosophy almost entire in the discovery of God at the center of all things. Grosseteste seeking to develop the consequences of that philosophy hit upon mathematics as the perfect dialectical instrument for its development; the effect of the application of mathematics was so to turn the search for God in things to the elucidation of things, that the inquiry for God was to inspire the first systematic experimental investigation of things.²

This brings to mind another significant development in this period which contributed to the growth of physical science, namely, the increased interest in the classification of knowledge and the ordering of the various disciplines or sciences. What is of special significance is that this classification was conducted not only on the basis of subject matter and aims but more and more on the basis of the different methods of study and investigation used. There was also increased interest in the

¹Crombie, Robert Grosseteste, pp. 6-7.
²McKeon, op. cit., p. 262.
manner in which the various sciences and disciplines are interrelated. In the twelfth century, the emphasis was initially upon the liberal arts, how they are to be studied and their purpose. Two representative works devoted to this were Thierry of Chartres' *Heptateuchon* and Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalion*. Later the emphasis shifted to the mapping out of the different areas of philosophy and the relating of these areas to such disciplines as mathematica and theology. The *De Divisione Philosophiae* of Dominic Gundisalvi is a representative work on such a classification. The real problem was in finding the rubric or guiding principle in terms of which the ordering of the sciences could be achieved. The traditional Aristotelian classification into theoretical, practical, and productive sciences is based on their respective aims or purposes. The theoretical sciences are subdivided in a somewhat confused fashion on the basis of change or movement, modes of existence, and whether they deal with the sensible or insensible, matter or form. The demarcation is not always clear. As David Ross says: "It cannot be said that in practice the distinction between physics and metaphysics is well maintained by Aristotle, and it may be noted that the bulk of the *Physics* is what we should call metaphysics."\(^1\) What was lacking was the development and delineation of different methods or approaches derived from and based on a critical division of the entities and phenomena to be examined and investigated. What was needed was a less formal and abstract classifi-

cation with greater attention being directed to the nature of that which is studied and the method whereby it should be investigated. Crombie speaks of the Greek lack of sensitivity respecting method:

Perhaps because for the Greeks this distinction between science and metaphysics was one between two worlds or two kinds of subject matter, they did not adequately consider some fundamental methodological problems involved in the method of experimental verification on which the distinction was by implication based.¹

It cannot be said, however, that the Greeks had no concern for method and approached each and every subject in the very same way. For example, the sensible and intelligible could not be perceived in one and the same manner. Nevertheless, a lack of methodological sensitivity is apparent in the widespread and almost indiscriminate application of a priori arguments and geometrical proof in scientific demonstration. This is evident where Aristotle states that geometry can provide the causes and reasons for facts observed in the field of optics.²

Although Grosseteste did not undertake a systematic ordering of the sciences and the parts of philosophy, he is concerned throughout his varied activity with the manner in which one is to proceed in particular disciplines and how the latter are interrelated. Let us consider briefly how Grosseteste views these interrelationships.

¹Crombie, Robert Grosseteste, p. 6.
²Posterior Analytics I.13.
(1.3) Grosseteste’s teaching on the manner in which the various sciences and disciplines are interrelated

On the basis of his theology and doctrine of truth one would have every reason to suspect that Grosseteste would be concerned about the connexions between the different areas of knowledge. At the same time, it should be pointed out that he was very much cognizant of the profound differences present in the structure of truth. There was the immense gulf between Creator and creation and a hierarchy of being and truth within the created order. Because of such differences and the condition of the human soul one had to pursue different courses in the acquisition of different kinds of knowledge. This did not mean, however, that a particular science could be explored in isolation from the rest. To the contrary, theology could be of service to natural science and vice versa. On the basis of his doctrine of light Grosseteste stressed the fundamental role of optics in the realm of natural science. Concerning astronomy Grosseteste states that "astronomiae ministerio plus ceteris eget philosophia naturalis."¹

We noted above that the seven liberal arts are attendants or servants of natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and theology. Grosseteste says of geometry in particular: "His igitur regulis et radicibus et fundamentis datis ex potestate geometriae, diligens inspector in rebus naturalibus potest dare causas omnium effectuum naturalium per hanc viam."² Grosseteste, however,

¹De Art. Lib.; BW 5. ²De Natura Locorum; BW 65-66.
takes care to point out that geometry cannot provide the actual physical cause of the reflection of light and the equality of the angle of incidence and reflection. Geometry helps us in the formal description of such phenomena. In discussing subalternating and subaltern sciences, which is the relationship that prevails between metaphysics and physics, geometry in relation to optics, and astronomy in relation to mathematical astronomy, Grosseteste points out that in the subaltern sciences are to be found conditions or circumstances which are not accounted for by the subalternating science. It is for this reason that the subalternating science cannot of itself demonstrate and provide the actual natural causes of phenomena belonging to the subaltern science. He says of metaphysics in relation to physics: "Similiter a natura entis quod est subjectum metaphysicae non exit totaliter quod dico corpus mobile quod est subjectum physicae. . . ." Sciences may share in common principles from which demonstration proceeds but this does not mean that they share in common subject and attributes to be demonstrated. It

1 Comm. Post. I.8 (Venetiis, 1552), f. 9. Reference is here made to book and chapter of Grosseteste's commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. As indicated, the 1552 Venice edition, an early printed edition, is being used. The above and subsequent folio numbers refer to this edition. At the beginning of Liber Primus of Grosseteste's commentary we find the following: Divi Roberti Linconiensis Archiepiscopi Parisiensis, in Aristotelis Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros, Elegantissima commentaria Feliciter incipitur. The text that I have read and examined is in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

2 Ibid. I.18; f. 24.
is stated that "non enim est subiectum musicae numerus cui accidit relatio, sed compositum ex numero et relatione, et de hoc composito quia non praedicatur numerus par non praedicatur de suo toto."¹ This is an important methodological distinction. This is a qualification that must be kept in mind when speaking of Grosseteste's use of arithmetic and geometry in natural philosophy.

Three areas of special interest to Grosseteste were the study of the Sacred Scriptures, natural sciences, and languages. Russell states that "by the end of his career Grosseteste had become famous for emphasizing the importance of the study of three subjects as a part of theological training: the Bible, the language in which the Bible was written (Greek, Hebrew), and the sciences."² The emphasis on language study follows from Grosseteste's concern to get back to the sources. While bishop of Lincoln he was engaged in the translation of a number of Greek sources into Latin. The study of the natural sciences was an important prerequisite to theology and the study of the Scriptures in that it enabled the student of the Scriptures to understand the many allusions made in Scripture to natural phenomena. In a scientific homily on Ecclesiasticus XLIII: 1-5 entitles De Operacionibus Solis Grosseteste utilizes metaphysical and physical theory in explicating the text. Grosseteste attempts to give a type of scientific explanation to a rather poetic description of the sun. He takes that part which states that "a man

¹Ibid. I.12; f. 15. ²Russell, loc. cit., p. 94.
blowing a furnace is in works of heat, but the sun burneth the
mountains three times more. . .^1 He then goes on to say that
the earth is like a furnace because of the eruptions from within.
He seeks to give a quasi scientific explanation of why it is
that the sun burns the mountains three times more than the rest
of the terrain. He takes literally and at face value what is
intended to be figurative expression. The text is also being
used as a basis for physical theory. He also explains how
mountains are formed by the sun heating vapors within the earth.
Grosseteste teaches that in understanding and observing the sun
we see how great is the Creator of the sun. D. A. Callus cites
Grosseteste's reason for including two chapters pertaining to
the seas and the winds in his recension of John of Dasmascus'
De Fide Orthodoxa:

They were omitted [he says] because some might, perhaps,
have thought that such questions on seas and winds were not
matters of great relevance for theology. Nevertheless,
truly wise men know for certain that every glimpse of truth
is useful for the interpretation and understanding of
theology.^2

These chapters were interpolated into the text at a later date
but Grosseteste's reason for including them clearly indicates
the importance that he attached to the knowledge of physical
phenomena in connection with theology. It appears that Grosse-

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^1Ecclesiasticus 43:4.

^2Mss. Pembroke College, fol. 8^rb; Ashmole, fol. 135^Va; Royal
5 C. iv, fol. 93^vb; cited by Callus, "Robert Grosseteste as
Scholar," p. 50.
testes stresses the study of physical science not for the purpose of constructing a natural theology but more for the purpose of extolling the greatness of God through an understanding of the works of creation. Richard C. Dales says:

Robert always insisted that before one could understand adequately the meaning of scripture, he must first have a correct knowledge of the things of which scripture speaks. The study of nature is the study of God's creation and is therefore worthwhile. While physics and theology are two distinct sciences, nevertheless theological points are often illuminated by a correct knowledge of the natural world, and our ability to attain a correct knowledge of the natural world is dependent on our theological views.¹

It must also be kept in mind, however, that behind GROSSETESTE'S interest in physical science lies his doctrine of exemplarism and the notion that the created order reflects or mirrors divine Truth. Grosseteste believed that an understanding of natural phenomena could only serve our understanding of the nature of God. Grosseteste's preoccupation with light as the first corporeal form, as a connecting link between the human and body, as a principle of knowledge, and as a ground of the being and the beauty of corporeal entities, must be seen in relation to his emphasis on spiritual light, illumination, and the first light which is God. It is not difficult to understand why Grosseteste was so interested in optics and considered it to be a fundamental physical science. Baur states that "das licht ist ihm gleichsam der Schlüssel, mit dem er alle Rätsel der Natur zu enthüllen hofft, das durchgreifende Seins- und Erklärungsprinzip für alle

¹Dales, "Introduction," op. cit., p. xx.
Erscheinungen der Natur." In his light metaphysic Grosseteste clearly manifests his mystical bent. It must be pointed out, however, that only through divine illumination and grace can man view that Truth which is above and in which the eternal rationes of created things exist.

On the basis of those facets of Grosseteste's thought cited above, a number of which will be explored more fully in this chapter and chapter four, it is evident that he was not only interested in a considerable number of disciplines and sciences but also in the different ways in which they are interrelated. Near the beginning of this chapter we noted that Grosseteste was simultaneously interested in a number of subjects and branches of study. We cited Grosseteste's treatise on the seven arts in which he states that they are servants of such major disciplines as moral and natural philosophy. Furthermore, there is also the distinction between the subalternating sciences and the subaltern sciences. Grosseteste generally considered and pursued a particular discipline in view of and in relation to other disciplines. He believed that different sciences and disciplines, for example, physics and theology, could reciprocate and be of mutual service. Grosseteste's doctrine of truth is to a considerable extent mirrored in his ordering of the various disciplines and sciences. We shall therefore be in a better position to

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understand this ordering after having examined his doctrine of truth. Throughout all of his intellectual activity Grosseteste's ultimate goal is to achieve a *visio* of his Creator and Redeemer.

Another factor merely intimated in this introduction, one that will be examined further later on, is that Grosseteste did not utilize one and the same method throughout all of his intellectual pursuits. In the formulation of his theological notions he relied heavily on *auctoritas* and used rational or logical arguments where he considered them to be appropriate. When dealing with historical issues and questions he investigated the pertinent sources and texts. Although Grosseteste did cite and utilize *auctoritates* in pursuing physics and natural philosophy, he places considerable stress on logical arguments, both inductive and deductive, on deliberate observation, and on *experimentum*. Whereas in his theological treatises and formulations Grosseteste is generally content and willing to buttress his position and rest his case on certain *auctoritates* cited, plus an argument here and there, in his formulation of physical theory and a scientific methodology he takes a more independent course and stresses observation and *experimentum*. Although Grosseteste derives a great deal from Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* in seeking to develop his own method, at certain points in his physical theory and method Grosseteste strongly disagrees with Aristotle's views. In such instances Grosseteste will be seen to base his case on one or more, usually more than one, of
the following: auctoritates, logical arguments, his own observations, and experimentum.

2. Analysis of terminology used by Grosseteste in his doctrine of truth

In the first section of this chapter we have considered some of the historical, biographical, intellectual, and methodological factors that contributed to the shaping of Grosseteste's thought and his doctrine of truth in particular. The intention was not to trace out all of the numerous sources upon which Grosseteste draws in formulating his own thought. Our purpose was less ambitious than that. The intention was to cite some of the major trends, motifs, and developments transpiring before and during Grosseteste's time, and especially to note where Grosseteste stood in relation to the former. As we proceed, Grosseteste's intellectual and spiritual stance or posture should become more apparent. It should become evident which factors had the most determinative and formative impact on Grosseteste. However, it should be pointed out that our primary concern is not to trace out and detect Grosseteste's sources but to examine Grosseteste's own formulations, notions, and emphases. Although Grosseteste stands squarely within the Augustinian tradition his thought has its own uniqueness and special qualities. Some of these qualities should become apparent.

In this chapter we shall be examining the various component parts of Grosseteste's doctrine of truth. This means that we
shall be dealing with his doctrine of God, his conception of being, his view of created res, and his ideas concerning logical truth. This means that we must also explore his beliefs regarding necessity, contingency, mutability, causality, etc. It must also be kept in mind that for Grosseteste all of these topics or themes are interrelated. Moreover, oftentimes one particular topic or issue is discussed in a number of different places. Therefore, we have had to examine a number of treatises besides his De Veritate treatise. Before we consider Grosseteste's doctrine of God, the supreme Truth, we shall conduct a kind of formal analysis of the terminology that he uses. Such as analysis, although hardly adequate in itself, will tell us a great deal about the fundamental character of Grosseteste's understanding of truth.

(2.1) 'Veritas': equivalents, cognate terms, and signification

Formal equivalents used by Grosseteste in place of 'veritas' gather around a few key terms or phrases. These words used by Grosseteste are certainly not new with him but he does bring them together into a structured and coherent treatment. Borrowing from Augustine, we find Grosseteste speaking of 'veritas' as "id quod est!"¹ This is the equivalent that Augustine employs in Soliloquia II.5.6 and in other places as noted in the chapter above. 'Id quod est' raises immediately the whole question of

¹De Ver.; BW 130.
being and the relation of being to truth. This shall be discussed later but it can be said at this point that in Grosseteste this is no univocal phrase and no ontologism is implied. On the other hand, 'id quod est' has reference to something beyond a Wittgensteinian "states of affairs" (Tractatus, 2.11), or what Heidegger would call Vorhandenheit. We shall see that there is an extended range of application of 'id quod est' which can at no point be considered apart from the other equivalents of 'veritas'. In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics Grosseteste uses the same equivalent: "Cum autem veritas sit illud quod est, & [sic] comprehensio veritatis sit comprehensio eius quod est, ..."¹ Here we notice then a very close alliance between 'being' and 'truth'. Grosseteste will emphasize that 'ens' and 'veritas' cannot be applied to particulars without diversity in 'intentio'. He is also concerned to guard against equivocation and sheer ambiguity. Not only is 'veritas' understood as 'illud quod est' but Grosseteste draws from Augustine the sense that truth is that "quae ostendit id quod est."² Here 'veritas' signifies a being or entity in terms of its disclosing or showing forth its being and possibly also the being of other entities. This means that 'id quod est' shows itself as such and can be seen to be such. Such truth, as a

¹Comm. Post. I.2; f. 3.
²De Vera Relig. 36.66; CCSL 32:230.
kind of bringing into view, varies of course, depending on the
particular application.

In this area of usage Grosseteste also speaks of 'veritas'
as "rei entitas."¹ Here Grosseteste has in mind the entity it-
self, the very being of the thing itself. The 'rei entitas' in-
volves within itself the notions of 'esse', 'essentia', 'verum',
'ratio', and the like. In De Libero Arbitrio Grosseteste says
that "idem veritas et entitas;" ² Although they are used inter-
changeably, 'veritas', when applied to a being, stresses rela-
tions and emphases not so explicit in 'entitas'. It must be
said at this point that neither Augustine nor Grosseteste is
interested in 'being' per se and therefore is not to be considered
as an ontologist in that sense. Because we are employing a for-
mal analysis of the words themselves used by Grosseteste, it must
not be thought that he used such a method. Other equivalents
allied to the above are such as "rationes aeternas rerum"³ and
"rationes rerum increatas."⁴ "Ratio rei aeterna"⁵ is also used
closely in conjunction with 'veritas' and 'verum' and serves to
show how these terms are bound up with 'rei entitas'. Here
'ratio' signifies the ultimate ground of created res, viz., the
eternal exemplars spoken by God. The sense of 'ratio' here is
similar to what Anselm intended when he said in the Commendatio

¹ De Ver.; BW 130. ² De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 188.
⁵ De Ver.; BW 137.
of the Cur Deus Homo that "veritatis ratio tam ampla tamque profunda est, ut a mortalibus nequeat exauriri; . . . ."\(^1\) As Earth has indicated in his study of Anselm, this is the key 'ratio' for Anselm, although Anselm does use 'ratio' in other ways. So also in Grosseteste, the primary sense of 'ratio' is that mentioned above and it transcends the human intellectus. In Grosseteste's thought, then, it is the 'rationes aeternae' which are pre-eminent although it must be said at the same time that he speaks of knowing such as the essence of color "non solum ratione, verum etiam experimento manifestum est his. . . ."\(^2\) However, this latter 'ratio' is very dependent on the former. 'Veritas', in reference to created res, has also "plenum esse primum" and "essendi plenitudo"\(^3\) as equivalents. Here again we note the proximity of 'veritas' to 'esse'. These above words and phrases are not to be considered apart from those to be given below inasmuch as they are all closely interrelated. The above terms, however, give us an idea of some of the major senses of 'veritas' in Grosseteste's thought.

Another word that appears repeatedly in the De Veritate treatise as an equivalent for 'veritas' is the term "adaequatio."\(^4\) This term of course is found in the traditional definition of truth as 'adaequatio rei et intellectus', which St. Thomas wrongly attributed to the Definitionibus of Isaac Israeli.

\(^1\)Cur Deus Homo, Commendatio; AO II:40. \(^2\)De Colore; BW 79. 
\(^3\)De Ver.; BW 135. \(^4\)Ibid.; BW 130,134.
J. Maritain cites the work of P. Muckle which indicates that
the definition does not come from Isaac Israeli. "Transmitted
by some compiler or other, it must be regarded as being much
older and was in any case prepared for by Aristotle." It will
become apparent, however, that Grosseteste doesn't simply use
this most significant word *adaequatio* in the customary fashion.
It will be adapted to fit into his theological framework.
Richard McKeon gives the following definition of *adaequatio*:

*Adaequatio, adequation, commensuration*, the identity of two
quantities or the motion and approach to identity of quan-
tity, as the commensuration of space and the thing in space;
thence any approach to equality, as opposed to assimilation
or approach to likeness; thus truth is the adequation of
thing and understanding."

Grosseteste's usage of *'adaequatio'* will be seen not to be in
terms of such "identity of quantity" but as conformity between
sermo and res. The words we are now citing signify 'relationships'
and related qualities' rather than just *esse* and *entitas*. Another word very much like *'adaequatio'* that is used by Grosse-
teste is *"coequatio"*, which is more expressive yet than *'adae-
quatio'*. "Nunc autem supponamus quod veritas est coequatio re-
rum et intellectuum." 

Other words that also stress the idea of relationship and

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1 J. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge* (London: Geoffrey


3 *Quaest. Theol. [II]*; Callus 203.

4 Ibid.
correspondence are "conformitas" and the adjective "conformis."\(^1\) Similar in terms of sense are the words "similitudo" and "similis," which again stress the element of relation.\(^2\) These notions of likeness and similitude not only characterize the sense of veritas in the thought of Grosseteste, but they are also indicative of the nature of his mundus and man's place within it and the whole in relation to the supreme Truth. The title of a brief opusculum clearly gives evidence of this, Quod homo sit minor mundus. Here is an attempt to think of similitude spatially and in terms of the elements.

Another equivalent of 'veritas' that is of considerable interest is one that Grosseteste derives from Anselm, viz. 'rectitudo'. Although Grosseteste does not at all use and apply the term to the extent that Anselm does, we can readily see the marked influence of this central theme of Anselm in his understanding of truth. In De Libero Arbitrio Grosseteste speaks of the "rectitudinem voluntatis,"\(^3\) He speaks also of "rectitudo rectificans" and "rectitudines rectificatae."\(^4\) As was evident in Anselm's use of 'rectitudo', this understanding of truth incorporates into one word both the relation between the rectificans and the rectificatus, the quality belonging to "res rectae,"\(^5\) and that rectitudo in terms of which things can be right. 'Rectitudo' is a term that stresses not only the factor of relationship but the

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\(^1\)De Ver.; BW 134,137. \(^2\)Ibid.; BW 136,142.
\(^3\)De Lib. Arb. 17; BW 221. \(^4\)De Ver.; BW 135.
\(^5\)De Lib. Arb. 17; BW 224.
oughtness and the *debitum* which created beings should fulfil. We have seen in the second chapter how Anselm's understanding of *veritas* as *rectitudo* functions as a principle or central motif that is used to structure or integrate his whole theological system. Anselm saw right thinking in terms of the rightness of thought and statement in relation to the *ratio* and *rectitudo* of the *summa veritas* and created entities. Although Grosseteste uses *rectitudo* only on a few occasions, the sense of it none the less is apparent throughout his discussion of truth.

The lexical equivalents that Grosseteste uses for *veritas* show in themselves that cognitive and propositional truth will not receive primary consideration but will assume a place subordinate to the supreme Truth and the truth of created entities. Epistemological issues and the *ordo cognoscendi* are completely bound up with the *ordo essendi*. Grosseteste considers human knowledge and propositional truth in terms of their ontological status and in relation to the supreme Truth and the whole created structure. The ontological status of human knowledge has not always received adequate consideration. Erich Frank draws our attention to this point:

> In spite of their general sceptical tendency, modern philosophers often consider human knowledge as something completely different from its object, from existence, as something that has, so to speak, no existence of its own. Thus, however, they make knowledge (consciousness) absolute. But knowledge is itself existent just as, on the other hand, its object is knowable. Hence the opposition between Knowledge and Being is not absolute but dialectical.1

Grosseteste's very terminology which we have cited above shows that truth involves him in the question of the being of truth, the knowledge that is determinative of that which is, the knowledge of being, and the being of knowledge. Having considered the terminology in a somewhat formal manner let us now look at the actual application of the terms.

(2.2) The application of the above terms

Deus, of course, is the summa veritas. Therefore each term applied to him receives its most proper application and sense when used of him. Although, as we shall see, the intentio of the terms used of God may in some cases be analogous to the intentio of the same when applied to created res, the sense of words as they are used of the summa veritas is not determined by or derived from the sense of the words as they are found in ordinary usage when predicated of created res. To the contrary, if a word used of the summa veritas is also applied to a created res, the sense in the latter case is said to bear only a similitude to the former. For it is the created res that is 'conformis' and 'similis'. However, if one cannot proceed analogically from a knowledge of the created res to the supreme Truth then there must be some other way, if one is to have knowledge of God. Grosseteste attributed such knowledge to illumination from the Truth above. The meaning of terms therefore that are applied to the summa veritas must be intuited and perceived in the summa veritas himself. Grosseteste says: "Cum audis, 'Deus est
forma vel formositas, sicut et veritas', noli quaeere, quid sit formositas, sicut nec quid sit veritas."¹ Here we are told not to engage in a rational interrogation thereby hoping to discover the meaning of 'formositas' and 'veritas' when predicated of God. This means then that we can intuit directly the sense of the sign in the signified when the term is applied. Grosseteste's admonition is to refrain from inquiring after a general notion of truth after having heard that God is truth. For this would be to presume that one could arrive at a universal, a general or generic term which could then be predicated of God. Grosseteste is not speaking out against a nominal definition. Neither is he opposed to the question of the inquirer after the nature of God. His real concern is that one does not construe a general notion of the nature of truth which notion is then applied to the summa veritas. His basic point is that a "dictum vero de Deo sub nullo genere praedicamentali contineetur."² Later on we shall deal more fully with the matter of univocity.

Having noted that 'veritas' and its equivalents are not used univocally, we look further at the actual application of the words. Because of his belief in the utter simplicity, immutability, and eternity of God, and because of his belief in the exis-

¹De Unica Forma Omnium; BW 108. (Hereafter cited simply as De Unica.)

²De Lib. Arb. 16; BW 217.
tence of universals and substantial forms on different levels, Grosseteste is led to maintain that God does not simply have his attributes but that he is his attributes. In a discussion on the four causes enumerated by Aristotle Grosseteste says: "Sed in causa prima, cum ipsa sit substantia simplicissima, idem est in ea quod efficit et quo efficit." If God were not in his very own "essentia" those attributes which are predicated of him the way would be open for God to be subsumed under a "genere praedicamentali" and the "substantia simplicissima" would be in jeopardy. Grosseteste says: "Item: si univocaretur Deus cum aliquo dicto non secundum relationem, oportet Deum esse compositum et non simplicem, vel ipsum esse partem alterius substantiae vel qualitatem vel quantitatem alterius." If Grosseteste had not been dealing with predicates against a background of universals, forms, and exemplars, it would not have been necessary to affirm so emphatically that God is what is attributed to him. Grosseteste, however, feels compelled to assert the following:

Ergo ipse et species est, cum nihil sit in ipso, quod ipse non sit, sicut cum sit iustus ipse, est iustitia ipsa, quae iustus est. Sic, cum sit formosus et speciosus ipse, est forma et species, qua formosus et qua speciosus est, immo ipsa formositas et speciositas.

Irrespective of the question as to whether this kind of formulation is in fact necessary and whether the presuppositions

\[\text{1}^{\text{De Statu Causarum; BW 122.}}\]
\[\text{2}^{\text{De Lib. Arb. 16; BW 217.}}\]
\[\text{3}^{\text{De Unica; BW 108.}}\]
that require such are valid, it does have the merit of emphatically affirming that God is not to be judged and assessed in accordance with that which is extrinsic to himself. This of course has significant implications for the understanding of truth and will require that everything else, i.e., all created res, be considered in relation to the summa veritas. For God is veritas, esse, rectitudo, iustitia, etc. This means that when the adjectival forms of these words, viz., 'verus', 'rectus', are applied to created res, the latter will be so qualified not because they participate in the summa veritas but because they stand in a right relation to the same, and more particularly, to their ratio aeterna in mente divina. The above use of words also forces the words away from univocity toward analogous senses. For instance, a created entity that is judged to be verus or rectus is so called not because it shares in the divine Nature, which is an impossibility, but by reason of its agreement with its exemplar, which means that it has the fullness of second being. The latter will be discussed below.

Grosseteste makes it very clear that the creature cannot share in the essentia of the Creator: "Item: in nullo communicant creator et creatura. Univoca autem in aliquo communicant. Ergo creator et creatura in nullo univocantur."¹

'Veritas' will be applied by Grosseteste to the divine Verbum, Sapientia, and Sermo. The meaning of 'veritas' will be the

¹De Lib. Arb. 16; BW 217.
same in each case. We shall see that it is in this Verbum that we have the eternal speaking and reasons of created res. These are considered to be the exemplars and existing ante rem. There are no eternal essences existing alongside the "substantia simplicissima." This would be an impossibility. Grosseteste clearly affirms that no substance or essence other than the divine Essence dwells in the simplicity of eternity. Grosseteste stresses that although we speak of the "notiones aeternae" and the "rationes innumerabiles," there is only the one undivided simple eternal Essence:

Et ideo non ponetur ex vi talis sermonis aliqua pluralitas entium, aut est pluritas relationum vel rationum aeternarum in Deo, ubi non est nisi unica et indivisa essentia.  

It is to this one eternal Essence that 'veritas' is first and most properly applied. We therefore see that the first and primary signification of 'veritas' is the "unica et indivisa essentia," the one eternal God. Within the divine Essence we do have an interior "similitudo secundum paritatem," but no correspondence extra is here implied. God exists by and through himself, not by virtue of a right relation to something existing without himself. When 'rectitudo' is applied to the supreme

1Ibid. 8; BW 195.

Being it signifies that "quae secundum se recta est." On the other hand, when we begin to use 'verus' and 'veritas' of created res these words cannot have simply the sense of 'esse' and 'essentialia', but we must also include the notions of similitudo and conformitas extra whereby the created res is held in being. On the basis of the above discussion it is already apparent that Grosseteste does not use 'veritas' and related terms in a univocal fashion.

When words like 'rectus' and 'verus' are applied to created entities they signify not only the esse of these entities, but also the fact that the latter exist rightly and conform to their respective regulae and rationes, at least to some degree. In contrast to our speaking of God as the veritas, whenever we speak of the veritas of creaturely entities we are involved in speaking of right relations ad extra. The supreme Being, on the other hand, is not dependent on any right relations ad extra in order to be. Both Anselm and Grosseteste hold that a thing is or exists only to the extent that it is true or right, i.e., rightly related to its ground of being in the eternal Word. We shall see that Grosseteste speaks of the truth of all creaturely entities in terms of the fulness of first being and the fulness of second being. This latter distinction is not to be confused with Aristotle's distinction between primary substances and secondary substances. The differences between the two distinctions

\(^1\text{De Ver.}; \text{BW 137.}\)
should become apparent when we examine more closely Grosseteste's first being and second being.

Grosseteste believes that all true res within the created order are such by reason of their conformity or right relation to their eternal exemplars. This also holds for 'necessary truths'. The latter are also considered to be 'true' in terms of their right relation or correspondence to a sermo interior in the divine Word. This kind of true statement, viz., the necessary statement, is viewed by Grosseteste as an effect of an eternal truth in the divine Word and it therefore is made to function as a basis for an 'inductive' argument for the existence of that eternal Truth which is the supreme Truth. In order to understand properly how these statements appeared to Grosseteste one must avoid looking at them as the analytical statements of modern logic. This significant point is stressed by the Kneales (The Development of Logic) regarding Aristotle's necessary truth. For Grosseteste and Augustine they were certainly not immutable and eternal by virtue of sheer linguistic convention. For Grosseteste the notion of conformity of one kind or another is operative in all our true statements. Only in the summa veritas is there no need to conform or to accommodate itself to something else. Grosseteste states:

Deus autem nullo est falsum aliquid, eo quod similitudo omnis est paris ad parem, aut inferioris ad superiorem, Deus autem nec parem habet nec superiorem, ad cuius similitudinem accommodetur. \(^1\)

\(^1\)Ibid.; BW 136.
On the basis of the above examination of Grosseteste's terminology it should already be evident that if one is to deal adequately with his doctrine of truth he must be prepared to explore Grosseteste's thought in a number of areas. However, before attempting to do the latter we should consider a special problem with which Grosseteste wrestles.

(2.3) Truth: single or multiplex

Grosseteste raises and directs his attention to the question whether truth is unica or whether it is multiplex. He deals with the question in a number of places. He deals with it at the very beginning of the treatise on truth, quite extensively, then in the middle of the treatise, and finally at the end of the treatise. The question seems to be tied up with the whole matter of the "pluralitatem et distributionem"¹ of the name of truth. It would be helpful first of all to determine what is not part of the problem. It is not a question as to whether there is something outside the essence of the Creator that participates in the divine Nature and consequently in both true and divine. Grosseteste faces up to this already in the second paragraph of the treatise where he states: "Si non est alia veritas, quam Deus, esse verum est esse divinum, et hoc est vera arbor, quod divina arbor, et vera propositio, quod divina propositio, et ita de ceteris."² Grosseteste, of course, will

¹Ibid.; BW 138. ²Ibid.; BW 130.
not permit the attribution of divinity to the creature and consequently this is not the issue. Neither is there any question as to whether 'veritas' is most properly and fittingly applied to God, nor is there any doubt regarding the unity and simplicity of God. It is most certain that the divine Nature is not composite and that it will not permit any kind of distribution of itself. Neither is Grosseteste calling into question man's role as image-bearer and the likeness that man has to God through creation, nor the likeness of the created res to its exemplar in the mind of God. Grosseteste firmly professes both throughout his writing. He is not in doubt concerning the single Rightness that is right according to itself and according to which everything created is to be measured and judged. There is finally only one ultimate criterion for all created things. What then is the problem?

On the basis of a contemporary linguistic perspective one could all too easily dismiss the problem as one rooted in semantical and linguistc misunderstanding and confusion and in a failure to distinguish adequately tokens, signs, and terms. Or one may say that the problem lies in lack of insight into a theory of distribution and the differences between univocal and analogical expression. The problem of universals may also be cited. All of this, however, is only partly true and it would be wholly misleading if we were to think that it directed us to the central point with which Anselm and Grosseteste were preoccupied. In addition, it would be false to say that they had
achieved little or no degree of critical acumen regarding language and meaning. The *De Veritate* treatises under consideration and Anselm's *De Grammatico* alone would indicate a fair degree of critical sense. Anselm's and Grosseteste's discussion of free will or liberty of the will also show an awareness of problems of language and meaning. However, we find in both Anselm and Grosseteste that their preoccupation and foremost concern is not with words but with the things that are signified by words.

A cardinal point that the *De Veritate* treatise of Anselm, particularly chapter thirteen entitled "Quod una sit veritas in omnibus veris," forced upon Grosseteste is that the *summa veritas* is not the truth of a particular thing but when something is in accordance with the *summa veritas* then rightness or truth can be predicated of that thing: "ita summa veritas per se subsistens nullius rei est; sed cum aliquid secundum illam est, tunc eius dicitur veritas vel rectitudo."¹ As noted in chapter two, Anselm wishes to emphasize that there is a supreme Truth which is in no way derived from nor contingent upon any other entity. This Truth is the supreme Measure and does not change or perish even though that which is measured may perish. Anselm wants this clearly understood before we proceed to speak of the truth of this or that creaturely entity. Anselm has the *summa veritas* in mind when he stresses that truth is one and unchangeable.

¹*De Ver.* 13; *AO* I:199.
These beliefs are shared by Grosseteste who also emphasizes that every true thing is only seen to be true in the light of the *summa veritas*.

At the beginning of the *De Veritate* Grosseteste seeks to establish the legitimacy of applying 'truth' to a number of things rather than only to the *summa veritas*. It is only after appeal to authoritative texts, viz., the Scriptures and Augustine, and by a consideration of things called 'true', that he considers manifold application in order. However, after this accumulation of evidence substantiating such usage, he then draws together a number of statements from Anselm, Augustine, and one Scripture text which appear to say that there is no truth other than the *summa veritas*. It is because of "hae nebulae caliginosae contrariarum opinionum" that he says: "Unde parumper intendendum est ut, quid sit veritas, agnoscatur."\(^1\) He then seeks to determine just what is meant when we speak of the truth of proposition and the truth of created things. However, after having considered these truths and having said: "Putamus etiam, sicut in-nuit Augustinus in libro de mendacio, multiplicem esse rerum veritatem,"\(^2\) he still feels that in some way every usage of 'veritas' signifies the *summa veritas*:

\[
\text{Sed forte nusquam ponitur nomen veritatis, quin significet ut formam nominis aliquo modo saltem adiacenter vel oblique veritatem summan. Sicut enim veritas rei nec intelligi potest nisi in luce veritatis summæ, sic forte nec supponitur}
\]

\(^1\) *De Ver.*; BW 134.  \(^2\) *Ibid.*; BW 138.
per nomen veritatis nisi cum significatione veritatis summae.¹

Grosseteste here suggests that perhaps the truth of a thing ought not "to be hypostasized through the name of truth except when it bears the signification of the supreme truth."² He is wrestling with the question as to how truth is both single and multiplex. His discussion of the question reflects somewhat and is reminiscent of Anselm's treatment of the same issue as set forth in the thirteenth chapter of his De Veritate. However, as noted above, Anselm's discussion centers in the fact that there is a single Rectitudo which is in no way dependent on other beings but rather is the basis of all creaturely rectitudines. Grosseteste's discussion, on the other hand, is centered especially in the distribution of 'veritas' taken as a universal sign. Grosseteste senses that a difficulty ensues in asserting both that truth is single and that the name, viz., 'veritas', signifying it is distributed. Just what is intended then when speaking of the truth of this or that creaturely thing? At this juncture Grosseteste offers the following rather unsatisfactory conclusion:

Unica est ergo veritas ubique significata et praedicata per hoc homen veritas, sicut vult Anselmus, scilicet veritas summa. Sed in multis veritatibus rerum dicitur illa una veritas multae veritates.³

¹Ibid.; EW 139.
³Ibid.; EW 139.
However, one would be ill-advised and remiss if one were to hold and to view these statements in isolation from the rest of Grosseteste's teaching concerning truth. Certain problems arise in the passage under consideration largely because Grosseteste is stressing the singularity of truth and is utilizing the notion of the distributed universal sign. His general usage of 'veritas' is less restricted than the above statements and discussion would seem to suggest. In surveying Grosseteste's doctrine concerning truth and being it becomes clearly evident that words like 'veritas' and 'ens' do not and can not have a univocal sense. At one point Grosseteste asserts the following concerning 'ens': "Nec tamen ista propter talem comparationem ad invicem sub hoc nomine 'ens' univocantur, nec etiam penitus aequivocantur." \(^1\)

At the end of the treatise on truth Grosseteste speaks of the manifold application to single things of the definitions of truth offered throughout the treatise. There is a common element and an element of diversification:

Supradictae autem definitiones veritatis communes sunt omnibus veris. Sed si descendatur ad singula, invenietur uniuscuiusque veri ratio diversificata. \(^2\)

In contrast to the Aristotelian 'particular', we shall observe in Grosseteste a greater appreciation of the 'singular' which can be directly traced to the divine knowledge of singula. On the other hand, in his striving for scientia and intellectus we shall see that Grosseteste is intent on fixing on the 'universal'.

\(^1\)De Lib. Arb. 16; BW 218. \(^2\)De Ver.; BW 142.
However, with respect to the definitions mentioned above we note both the common factor and the element of diversity which arises because of a different ratio for each single thing. There seems to be a kind of admixture both of univocity and equivocity which enables us to speak of one true thing being like another true thing by reason of the formal definitions, while at the same time diverse by reason of different rationes. In view of the latter the definition of the truth of each true thing is different from the other:

Quapropter intentio veritatis, sicut intentio entis ambigua est: ex parte aliqua est una in omnibus veris et tamen per appropriationem diversificata in singulis.¹

Grosseteste does not want the general definitions of 'veritas' to be held and considered in abstraction from the actual appropriation of the same. Although these general definitions and senses are operative and are retained throughout the range of specific and actual usage, the former must be qualified and amplified in accordance with actual usage. To illustrate his point Grosseteste cites a specific class of truths, viz., propositiones both in terms of their first being or truth and their second being or truth. The second truth of the proposition must be distinguished from the second truth of other kinds of entities. Diversity in the meaning of 'veritas' arises both from the different general definitions and the application of 'veritas',

¹Ibid.; BW 143.
having been defined in a number of ways, to different kinds of entities.

3. The supreme Truth: his nature and relation to created truth

(3.1) Introduction to Grosseteste's doctrine of the supreme Truth

(3.1.1) As we have already noted, Grosseteste follows Augustine in affirming that *veritas* is *id quod est*. This represents a primary usage and sense of 'veritas' but is very formal as it stands. If further qualifications and distinctions were not added to this definition it could be taken to be the beginning of a general ontological inquiry. However, even for these words to prompt such an investigation they would have to possess at least a modicum of sense. This is the point that Heidegger made regarding 'truth' in the introduction of his essay on the essence of truth:

> We want the real 'truth'. Well, truth then! But in calling for real 'truth' we must already know what in fact is meant by truth. Or do we only know by 'feeling' and in a general sort of way?\(^1\)

As was evident in our exploration of certain ontological problems in the second chapter in connection with Augustine's understanding of truth, the 'id quod est' phrase did not function as a type of *quaestio disputata* inviting speculation and conjecture. The 'id quod est' did not have reference to being in

general or bare esse. The esse-essentia and the ens-res dichotomies, to which such as Avicenna, St. Thomas, and others gave their attention, are more likely to foster talk about sheer esse. Augustine in his De Trinitate (V.2.3), in speaking of God as the unchangeable Essence, recognizes the derivation of 'essentia' from 'esse', but throughout his thought there is no mental or extra-mental cleavage. We have noted the gradation of beings extending from God to formless matter, but no question is put concerning being as being. Grosseteste, like Augustine, does not pursue or engage in a general ontological inquiry. Grosseteste is interested in particular beings or essentiae. He does not attempt to formulate a general theory or doctrine of being. We shall see, however, that a number of ontological questions and issues arise during the course of Grosseteste's investigations and formulations. Rather than simply speak of Grosseteste's theory or doctrine of being it would be better and closer to the truth to speak of his doctrine of God, creation, this or that creature, etc. Likewise, in dealing with his teaching concerning truth one must examine his doctrine of God, his formulations pertaining to God's relation to his creation, and doctrine regarding created beings.

Grosseteste agrees with Anselm that truth or rightness is perceptible to the mind alone. Grosseteste, as will become apparent, does not teach that the mind perceives a kind of universal being or truth. He does teach that particular entities are perceived to be right or true in relation to the supreme
Truth and in the light of this Truth. Grosseteste believes that in knowing the truth of some thing we know the very *entitas* and *ratio* of the thing. He states:

\[
\text{Cum autem veritas sit illud quod est, & comprehensio veritatis sit comprehensio eius quod est, esse autem eius quod dependet ab aliquo non cognoscitur nisi per illud esse a quo dependet.}^1
\]

In this statement Grosseteste declares that if one is to know the truth and being of a contingent entity he must know its source and that on which it depends. This matter will be discussed more fully as we proceed.

(3.1.2) In formulating his doctrine of God Grosseteste is primarily indebted to Augustine although he borrows also from a number of other sources including the Greek fathers. Furthermore, the influence of Aristotle is evident in such treatises as *De Unica Forma Omnium* and *De Statu Causarum*, among others. However, Grosseteste's understanding of the *summa veritas* is essentially derived from Augustine. The impact of Aristotle is more pronounced in Grosseteste's epistemology and scientific method. The nature of the supreme Truth is now to be considered, as well as its knowledge, will, wisdom, and speaking. The latter of course is the eternal Word of the Father. This is the basis for there being any created truth. The intention is not to discuss in great detail the facets in Grosseteste's understanding of the *summa veritas* which have been taken over from Augustine. We are primarily interested in elements involved in the creator-creation relationship. Consideration of the latter is a prerequisite to

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1 Comm. Post. I.2; f. 3.
our later discussion of Grosseteste's epistemology and problems concerning necessity, contingency, causality, and the like.

(3.1.3) Before dealing directly with Grosseteste's doctrine of God we should touch on the relation between the *ordo essendi* and the *ordo cognoscendi*. We shall also consider briefly some of the difficulties involved in making affirmations and predications concerning God. Grosseteste believes that it is not merely possible for the *ordo cognoscendi* to follow the *ordo essendi*, but necessary, if we are to perceive created truth and make true judgements. As Grosseteste himself says: "Nemo est igitur, qui verum aliquid novit, qui non aut scienter aut ignoranter etiam ipsam summam veritatem aliquo modo novit."¹ Grosseteste here seems to make explicit what is more implicit in Augustine's own formulations and doctrine of illumination. Grosseteste affirms that any knowledge of created truth presupposes knowledge after some manner of the supreme Truth itself. This is so whether one is aware of it or not. We see here how this *ordo cognoscendi* is necessarily grounded in the *ordo essendi*. This does not imply an ontologism which teaches that in knowing these eternal and necessary truths one therefore sees the divine Mind, the simple supreme Truth. Grosseteste is not affirming this in the above statement. He is saying that anyone who knows some truth knows something about the supreme Truth, whether knowingly or unknowingly.

¹De Ver.; BW 138.
Although Grosseteste's theory of knowledge will be examined later, I have touched upon this epistemological factor in order to contrast it with the ordo cognoscendi which is to be followed if one is to achieve understanding of the supreme Truth. If knowing and recognizing the truth of the created thing are only possible through illumination from the Truth that is transcendent, then the nature of the transcendent supreme Truth itself is to be judged and known only in and through its own Being. Grosseteste does teach that we must begin with fides and the articles of faith as the beginning of the way to "visio Creatoris & Reparatoris," but there is always the imperative to direct our minds to the supreme Truth and away from this or that mutable thing. He says: "Tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum formosum, si potes. Ita Deum videbis non alia forma formosum, sed ipsam formositatem omnis formosi." This same kind of directive is present in the aspectus-affectus motif in Grosseteste's epistemology. In his Comm. Post. (I.14) Grosseteste states that human intelligence would have complete knowledge from the superior light without the help of the senses if it were not weighed down by the mass of the body. We shall see that under the impact of Aristotle Grosseteste introduces sense knowledge

1 Dictum 129; ed. E. Brown, Appendix ad Fasciculum Rerum Expetendarum et Fugiendarum Sive Tomus Secundus (London: Imensis Richardi Chiswell ad insigne Mosae Coronatae in Coemeterio S. Pauli, 1690) p. 281. This source is hereafter simply designated Brown plus page number.

2 De Unica; BW 108.
as an important part of his theory of knowledge but he explains that such is required "in omnibus habentibus mentis oculum mole corporis corrupti occupatum . . . "\textsuperscript{1} Scientia, and especially intellectus, is of the universal, the essence or substance, and sense knowledge is required in order to achieve this. The factor to be emphasized, however, is that knowledge and understanding is of the non-sensible universal or essence. The help of the senses is required because the intelligentia cannot function as it should due to the corrupt body. The sensible-intelligible dichotomy plays a determinative role in Grosseteste's doctrine. However, as will become apparent, Grosseteste manifests a greater appreciation of the sensible and corporeal world than does Augustine. This fact is borne out in part by the considerable number of treatises formulated by Grosseteste in which he deals with physical topics and problems.

Throughout his intellectual activity, but especially in his attempts to speak of God, Grosseteste avows his own indigence and need of illumination from above. The ordo essendi is ever before his mind as he seeks a greater understanding of that which he believes and in some measure has come to know and see. In the fourth chapter we shall cite a number of the major prerequisites whereby knowledge of the truth is made possible.

(3.1.4) Grosseteste states that there are some major difficulties involved in attempting to formulate predications concern-

\textsuperscript{1} Comm. Post. I.14; f. 18.
ing the supreme Truth. Grosseteste attributes these difficulties to a number of factors. In speaking of God as the first Form and the Form of all things Grosseteste states:

*De re enim tanta nihil verum potest esse parvum, licet pro parvitate dicentis possit esse non granditer dictum et pro parvitate nostri dicentis non possit esse granditer elocutum.*

That we should experience difficulty in speaking of God is not surprising in view of the great and incomprehensible nature of God. In an allusion to Anselm's *Proslogion* Grosseteste states: "Deus est maius, quam quod possit excogitari." He who transcends human comprehension and thought can also be expected to transcend man's powers of expression and formulation, especially in view of man's *parvitas dicentis*. In the following statement of Grosseteste we can see further why theological formulation is beset by difficulties:

... quod sicut non communicant in mensura una intelligentia et res temporales, multo magis non communicant in mensura una creator et creatura aliqua.

Grosseteste emphasizes that terms as understood and defined in ordinary usage and discourse cannot as such be simply applied to God. A special difficulty arises, however, in that he does not develop a clear or adequate doctrine of analogy. The situation is further complicated by the presence of the eternity-time, necessity-contingency, and incorporeal-corporeal dichotomies.

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1 *De Unica*; BW 106.  
2 *De Lib. Arb.* 2; BW 157.  
3 *De Ordine Emanandi Causatorum* a Dec; BW 148. This treatise is hereafter cited as *De Ordine*. 
in his thought. At the same time he wishes to make affirmations and predications concerning the Creator. He was acquainted with the works of Pseudo-Dionysius, on which he wrote commentaries, and something of the Pseudo-Dionysian ἀποϕαίκη is apparent in his method. We shall see that although Grosseteste does not pursue consistently and radically a via negativa, he does operate with a terminology which to a considerable extent simply states that God is not this or that. On a number of occasions he offers what could be termed formal positive attributes, which may involve the qualification of a word or expression through the use of superlatives. We have in mind expressions like 'most perfect', 'most simple', 'simple eternity', and 'simple abstract form'. However, the latter expressions also seem to represent a kind of via negativa in which through qualification and abstraction we are directed away from the conceivable and towards the inconceivable. In discussing facets of Grosseteste's psychology and epistemology, D. E. Sharp states: "Strictly speaking, because of the plenitude of His being, God transcends all affirmation; for He is above substance, above ens, above eternity, above wisdom, and so on — cf. Comm. De. Myst. Theol. f. 270r."¹ Sharp refers here to Grosseteste's commentary on the Mystical Theology. In spite of the difficulties involved in speaking of God, Grosseteste does not abandon the attempt to

do so. Grosseteste does anticipate and long for a clear and full intuition and vision of the supreme Truth which will obviate formulations now required.

(3.2) The necessary, immutable, and eternal supreme Truth considered in relation to the categories of time and space

(3.2.1) As with Anselm, the aseity of God is very crucial for Grosseteste. This is deeply implied in the words 'substantia simplicissima'. God is not dependent on nor does he participate in another being. He exists in his own right, per se. In discussing Aristotle's per se connection between a subject and its attribute Grosseteste applies the notion to God as the first Cause: "Dicitur autem per se esse quod per efficientem causam non est, & sic sola causam prima est per se . . . ."¹ Although Grosseteste speaks of God as causa prima we must not read into it Aristotelian content. Regarding Grosseteste's idea of matter and form, potentiality and actuality, D. A. Callus says: "It is obvious that all this is entirely un-Aristotelian; under cover of Aristotelian terminology a doctrine comes to be formulated which is completely foreign to Aristotle."² Grosseteste's causa prima must be seen in the context of all the other predicates applied to God. No other being is per se, for every being other than God has an efficient cause. God simply is.

¹Comm. Post. I.4; f. 4.
²Callus, "Robert Grosseteste as Scholar," RG, p. 25.
Grosseteste also teaches that God is the first Form. On the authority of the great Augustine Grosseteste says that God is "prima forma et forma omnium." Since God is form "necessario est forma prima, quia ante ipsum nihil. Ipse enim est primus et novissimus." Grosseteste argues that reason also shows that God is the first Form and the Form of all. For forma is that by reason of which a thing is what it is and "Deus autem a seipso est id quod est. Seipso enim Deus est, quia deitate deus est et deitas deus est." There is no formal cause or form outside God whereby he is. Again we note that God is absolute and a se. There is nothing on which he depends for his nature and esse but he is the absolute and all things are relative to him.

Although Grosseteste makes mention of the argument for the eternal and necessary Truth on the basis of eternally true statements, which argument is used by Augustine, he is more interested in elaborating upon the nature of the supreme Truth and created truths. He emphatically states that these eternal and unchangeable truths constitute no plurality of eternally existing essences. He denies such a plurality and at the same time affirms the one, simple and undivided Essence which of course is the supreme Truth:

In qua tamen pluralitate non ponitur nisi simplex et indivisa essentia, et tamen nulla persona est alia, nulla notio est alia nulla forte similiter ratio est alia, et tamen haec omnia non sunt nisi una essentia.

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1De Unica; BW 107.  
2Ibid.; BW 108.  
3De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 196.
Here are asserted the simplicity, the indivisibility, and the unity of the Essence which is the supreme Truth. Grosseteste shares the same attitude towards these eternal and unchangeable truths that Augustine manifests in his Soliloquia and De Libert Arbidrio but not the same urgency in utilizing them as an argument for establishing the existence of God. The thrust of the argument is concisely stated by Grosseteste: "Item: quod verum est, veritate verum est et veritate, quae est, et quae alius est." Grosseteste makes reference to Augustine's discussion of mathematical truth in his De Libero Arbitrio (II.8.21) where the latter speaks of the incorruptible truth of number. Grosseteste concludes that "Aeterna est igitur talium veritas ac per hoc summa veritas." Even the truth of number, such as seven and three are ten, is considered to be eternally and unchangeably true not because of linguistic convention or coherence but by reason of its "conformitas ad dictionem suam in aeterno Verbo." This indicates the character of the eternal Word which is the divine speaking. The idea here is not that linguistic or logical form functions as a kind of antecedent necessity forcing the being of the incorruptible truth of number or the being of the eternal supreme Truth. The mathematical formula is certainly not a cause of the supreme Truth but an enuntiatio which is true in conformity to the eternal Word, the summa veritas. This is

1Ibid.; BW 190.  
2De Ver.; BW 132.  
3Ibid.; BW 140.
how Grosseteste understood the necessary nature of eternal and unchanging truth. He says: "Est igitur veritas, quod per se necesse est esse vel saltem necessario consequens ad per se necesse esse."¹ The supreme Truth therefore is necessarily through itself. "Item: cum idem sit Deo esse et essentia, et esse suum ei sit in sua libertate, et ita totum quod est in libertate consistit."² The existence of the supreme Truth is therefore not problematical for Grosseteste. The supreme Truth is necessary in that it exists per se, in accordance with its own nature which is esse and essentia. Closely bound up with this are the factors of immutability and eternity. Involved here are also questions pertaining to posse and perfectio.

(3.2.2) Grosseteste also derives from Augustine the doctrines of the immutability and eternity of God. As E. Gilson puts it: "Eternity and immutability will always remain the two main attributes of God in the doctrine of Saint Augustine."³ The sense pervading both attributes is that of freedom from change, freedom from any defect or deficiency such as posse or potentia not yet realized, and freedom from duration and temporal sequence or succession. Grosseteste does not teach the immutability of God simply for its own sake. There can be no change in God for this would imply lack of plenitude of being.

¹Ibid.; BW 139. ²De Lib. Arb. 17; BW 229.
and lack of utmost perfection. "Deus autem est completio incompletabilis, perfectio imperfectabilis, et ideo forma non formabilis, perfectio imperfectibilis, et ideo forma non formabilis, quia penitus sine defectu et incommutabilis." Grosseteste, then, sees perfection in static form after the fashion of intelligible form. That which is most perfect must be free from movement and change, and time as well, for the latter entails change and the possibility of corruption and imperfection. God, of course, is incorruptible and not liable to any imperfection.

Grosseteste's doctrines of God and creation, among others, were shaped and determined to a considerable degree by his notions of form, matter, potency, act, eternity, and time. The latter, along with his conceptions of necessity, contingency, and causality, influence and structure to a considerable extent the material content of his thought. This at times introduces a kind of inner tension between the above more formal categories and the subject material. Certain problems arise then on account of the presupposed theses applied, rather than out of the particular subject matter itself. Grosseteste is not altogether unaware of the problem. In answer to Aristotle's saying that the first principles of science can be applied similiter to metaphysics, physics, mathematics, and logic, Grosseteste says:

Et non dico similiter, quia in omnibus est aeque certitude, comprehensio enim certitudinis non est solum a natura demonstrationis, sed per naturam rerum super quas erigitur demonstratio.²

¹De Unica; BW 108. ²Comm. Post. II.6; f. 43.
This is a significant methodological observation and taken formally pertains also to the application of metaphysical categories over a broad and diverse range of entities. Grosseteste realizes, although not as critically and as much as he should have, that general metaphysical notions and theories, as well as general axioms such as logical and geometrical axioms, are not equally applicable to all entities or subjects. These theories and axioms must therefore not be utilized indiscriminately and without due qualification. There are, of course, particular theories and principles that are applicable to and fit only a particular category or class of entities. These and related issues will be considered more fully as we proceed.

With respect to the created order Grosseteste operates with doctrines of potency and act, form and matter, a doctrine of the four causes, and a cosmogony of light, in his attempt to account for actualization and the process of becoming. He allows for considerable change, process, and movement within the created and contingent order. However, perfection is understood as stages or the completed state of actualization and therefore tends to be a static category. D. E. Sharp says of Grosseteste's theory of becoming:

Potency, for him, is the mark of every contingent nature, being manifested in participation in existence, in mutability, and in power to seek the good. Only God is, in the sense that He alone can be said to be absolutely; hence all such terms of analysis as potency and act, matter and form, cause and effect, must be regarded as indicating relative being.¹

The supreme Truth is therefore not involved in becoming but is the most perfect *forma* and sheer actuality. Perfection as we understand it of God is consequently without any change, process, or movement. This will have profound repercussions in the understanding of the Creator-creature relationship and the whole understanding of truth. Although there is the process of becoming within the created order, the process is looked upon as corruptible truth. "Item: in futuris et contingentibus videtur esse veritas corruptibilis."¹ We shall see, however, that Grosseteste is none the less intent on showing and maintaining that there is contingency within the created order. But because of categories already mentioned, viz., necessity, immutability, and eternity, in terms of which the supreme Being must be understood, it will be difficult to give adequate place to the elements of contingency, possibility, becoming, and time. Truth is bound up with being, but being becomes the static amid the dynamic becoming. Divine willing, creation with its contingency, and human willing will, however, by their own weight bring pressure to bear upon the aforementioned categories. It should be pointed out that although in both Anselm and in Grosseteste the divine will is of vital significance, it is not divorced from the *ratio* of the supreme Truth.

Grosseteste understands God then as perfect *actus* and *forma*. He says: "Ergo si in Deo est *posse* sine actu, est ipso actu

¹*De Ver.; FW* 130.
perfectibilis. At hoc est impossibile, cum sit perfectissimus.\(^1\) Consequently, there is no change or mutability in God. "Substantia Dei, supra quam cadit ista relatio, est simpliciter invariabilis."\(^2\) God therefore is understood to be most simple, most perfect, and simple eternity.

(3.2.3) Out of the above discussion arises the question concerning the relation of the supreme Truth to time. It is immediately apparent that even if the supreme Truth is spoken of in relation to the category of time, time, however it may be understood, cannot qualify or structure this utterly unchangeable supreme Truth. Grosseteste states that God is in time or absent from no time:

\[\text{Et nota, quod aliter dicitur solem moveri in omni tempore et Deum esse in omni tempore. Deus enim, dicitur esse in tempore quia nulli tempore deest, vel quia est in simplicitate aeternitatis, a qua fluit omne tempus secundum illud: "Qui tempus ab aevō ire iubes."}^{3}\]

The problem that arises here is how it is that he who dwells in the simplicity of eternity, which for Grosseteste involves no temporal connotation such as one would have in sempiternity, can be in every part of time which implies being in a particular part of time even while being in every part. Grosseteste made it most clear in the final part of his commentary on the final book of Aristotle's *Physics*, which circulated as the separate

\(^1\)De Lib Arb. 7; BW 175.  \(^2\)Ibid. 8; BW 177.  

\(^3\)De Scientia Dei; BW 147.
opusculum De Finitate Motus et Temporis, that there is no eternal (unending) movement and time. Grosseteste directs his polemic against the perpetuitas motus et temporis in either direction. He speaks out against future perpetuitas: "Stabit ergo caelum et finietur motus et tempus, cum cassabit hominum generatio."¹ This includes even circular motion, which in comparison to linear motion is of a perfect and simple nature and by terminating in itself copies the nature of form: "quod maxime accedit ad naturam formae et maxime recedit a natura materiae."² Such motion however is a corporeal perfection and is not applicable to the incorporeal. There are many perfections for Grosseteste which is made evident by his talking of God as "perfectio perfectissima." For it must not be thought that the incorruptibility of the heavenly spheres resides in their circular diurnal motion. It is derived from the fifth essence, viz., aether or corpus coeli. This essence is the basis of incorruptibility. Grosseteste states "quod in corpore coelesti non est possibilitas ut corrumpatur, quia non habet contrarium."³ It is on account of this that Grosseteste can say of the celestial spheres: "novem scilicet caelestes, inalterabiles, inaumentabiles, ingenerabiles et incorruptibiles, utpote completae, ... ."⁴ Grosseteste

¹De Finitate Motus et Temporis; BW 106. This treatise is hereafter cited as De Finitate.
²De Motu Supervaelestium; BW 92. Hereafter cited as De Motu.
³De Motu; BW 98.
⁴De Luce Seu De Inchoatione Formarum; BW 56. Hereafter cited as De Luce.
posits the perfection of incorruptibility in the face of the corruptibility present in time and movement. This perfection is found in the spheres because of their composition of the fifth essence which is "impermutabilis secundum se, (sed) permutabilis per humiliationem sui ad inferiorem." Apart from such an exception and perfection as has been cited, Grosseteste feels that time entails the possibility of corruption. That which is situated without time is immutable and consequently incorruptible. 

Forma is perfect in that it is immutable and is situated in the simple eternity of the divine Nature. This is so even when forma is present in a creature and therefore in time.

Because motion and time are bound up together, and that which is temporal is caught up in a process of becoming that entails the possibility of corruption, it is obvious that the most perfect supreme Truth must be absolutely removed from any such motion and time. Grosseteste therefore sees God in the absolute simple eternity, or rather, identifies eternity with the immutable essence of God.

Eternitas enim est essencie incommutabilitas sive essencia incommutabilis. Dei autem maxime proprium nomen est essencia. Quicquid enim alio nomine significatum de Deo dixeris, in hoc homine quod est essencia instauratur; propterea in participacione incommutabilitatis essencie est homo maxime pro-pinque Dei imago.2

This notion, falsely attributed to Jerome, removes or abstracts from 'eternitas' any sense of sempiternity or perpetuity and

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1De Cometis; BW 36. 2Hex. VII.7; Muckle 168.
consequently any change or movement. This is further indicated by Grosseteste in De Libero Arbitrio (c. 7) where he argues that in the same instant Socrates can not be both black and white (cf. consequent necessity), and in relation to every indivisible instant eternity is more simple and indivisible. Eternity then is the immutability of God and is understood in terms of an instant more simple and indivisible than we can conceive. "Ergp si Deus in aeternitate scit aliquid, non potest ad eius oppositum."\(^1\) This certainly safeguards immutability whereas sempiternity could pose a threat to immutability. In the light of this indivisible instant it can be said:

Item: In aeternis nihil praecedit aliud natura tempore vel spatio. Sed posse oppositorum naturaliter praecedit utrumque illorum. Ergo in aeternis non est posse respectu oppositorum.\(^2\)

The only kind of priority which Grosseteste will allow within the divine Being is a causal priority between the Father and the Son. In De Finitate Motus et Temporis Grosseteste says that Aristotle's arguments are based on the thinking of "aeternitatem simplicem" under "phantasmati extensionis temporalis" so that there must always be a time before the first time and a time after the last time. Eternity, not time without beginning, measures the "non-esse" of the universe: "Non-esse namque mundi et eorum, quae cum mundo coeperunt, non mensurat tempus sine initio, neque omnino, tempus sed aeternitas."\(^3\) Grosseteste

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\(^1\) De Lib. Arb. 7; BW 174.  \(^2\) Ibid.; BW 175.  
\(^3\) De Finitate; BW 103.
believes that Aristotle and other philosophers have not begun to understand the simplicity of eternity:

Nec moveat aliquem, quod Aristoteles et alii philosophi probant Deum esse incommutabilem et intemporalem et certeralia, ut putet eum vel alios philosophos simplicitatem aeternitatis perspicue intellexisse.¹

Grosseteste therefore does not feel that anyone should wonder why the universe is not older "quam dicit scriptura, et cur non prius incepit quam dicit scriptura, quid non potest intelligi incepisse prius, quam incepit, ab intellectu comprehendente totum tempus praeteritum terminatum".² The interesting point made here is that the universe had an instans primum and consequently there was no endless time before creation and the question cannot arise as to why the universe was not created before it was created. In contrast to Aristotelian causality we notice Grosseteste's stress on the creation of the universe and likewise the creation of movement and time. This focuses the attention on the radical dependence or contingency of the creation on the Creator but at the same time presents no small difficulties when one attempts to relate the simple eternity of God to change, motion, and potency. There is also the problem of relating the immutable and necessary knowledge, willing, and speaking of the supreme Truth to contingent creatures and creaturely events. The area of most concern, however, is not that of natural and physical events but the problem of relating and

¹Ibid.; BW 105. ²De Ordine; BW 150.
juxtaposing human willing and knowing with divine willing and knowing. Grosseteste is preoccupied with this issue in De Libero Arbitrio. In De Veritate Propositionis and De Scientia Dei he is concerned with the traditional problem of the truth of statements regarding future contingent events.

We shall take note of Grosseteste's considerable effort in attempting to explain and show how contingent truths and events can be maintained and preserved in the face of the immutable and necessary divine knowledge and speaking of these truths and events. While the immutable and necessary nature of God's willing and knowledge raises problems concerning creaturely contingency, Grosseteste's rejection of the perpetuitas motus et temporis as the correct understanding of the simplicitas aeternitatis does spare him from some of the added difficulty that would have ensued in connexion with contingent truths and events had he understood the eternity of God as sempiternity or duration without beginning or end. Grosseteste holds that for God all creaturely entities and events are present in an indivisible instant.

(3.2.4) Another aspect of Grosseteste's understanding of the nature of God closely related to the above pertains to the presence of God in relation to space. At this point we are not primarily concerned with Grosseteste's physical theory and explanation regarding space and place which he develops in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics. He says: "Et hec racio vere
convincit infinitum esse sed non infinitum magnitudine.  

Grosseteste also speaks of the finite dimensions of magnitude in his treatise on light metaphysics: "Lux igitur, quae est in se simplex, infinitas multiplicata materiam similiter simplicem in dimensiones finitae magnitudinis necesse est extendere."  

Likewise, one is not able to think the universe to be elsewhere than it is unless he posits space outside the universe:

... sicut non potest intelligi mundum alibi esse, quam sit, ab intellectu, qui comprehendit extra mundum non esse spatium, cum tamen necessarium sit, ipsum posse esse alibi, quam sit, apud imaginationem ponentem spatium extra mundum.

How then is God related to this finite magnitude or universe, in terms of his presence in it? Grosseteste reflects the more mature thought of Augustine on the presence of God as filling the universe with his power and conserving it in being. Augustine, under Manichean influence, could not free himself from thinking of God's presence in terms of material being extended infinitely throughout infinite spaces. Under the influence of Neoplatonism Augustine came to see God as a spiritual Being and the notion of spatial extension subsided. The question that remains, however, pertains to the manner in which God is present in or with the universe that is spatially extended. In his commentary on Aristotle's Physics Grosseteste emphasizes that there could be no place without space. Grosseteste also

1 Comm. Phys. III; Dales 58.
2 De Luce; BW 52.  
3 De Ordine; BW 150.
states that space is the threefold dimension of corporeal extension. He says:

Nichil enim habet trinam dimensionem nisi corpus. Locus tamen semper repletur spacio .... Spacium enim hoc nichil est nisi trina corporis dimensio. Si autem tale spacium esset aliquid et locus et omnis pars rei esset in tali spacio et ita in loco sicud totum cuius est in loco.¹

This understanding of space and place affected considerably Grosseteste's understanding of the divine presence in the world. It should be noted that he also concurs with Aristotle that void does not exist. While mathematicians could think of space as infinite and empty, real space must be considered plenum according to Grosseteste.

In seeking to explain how God is present in this space which he created Grosseteste uses the classic Latin expression, viz., 'ubique totus'. The equivalents are 'everywhere whole' and 'repleitive presence'. Grosseteste says: "Ad quod in primis respondeo, quod solus Deus totus ubique simul est."² In saying that the whole of the divine Being is wholly present in every place simultaneously it is evident that he is not thinking of a corporeal being, extended and diffused throughout space. Grosseteste cites Augustine's classic epistle (187 to Dardanus) dealing with the presence of God. In this epistle Augustine emphasizes that we must not think of God after the fashion of a material mass, in which a part is less than the whole. We should add that

¹Comm. Phys. IV; Dales 78. ²De Intelligentiis; BW 112.
if this were the case, then less of God would be present in a particular place or part of space than in a larger part or in the whole of space. In seeking to illustrate the presence of God Augustine refers to the immortality of the immortal body and the health of the healthy body. He points out that the smaller members of the body are not less immortal and healthy than the larger members. This is an attempt to illustrate how God is totally present everywhere. Augustine wants to steer clear of conceiving of the presence of God in terms of quantity. After making this reference to Augustine, Grosseteste states:

Ex his verbis Augustini, ut supra dixi, aliquatenus iuvatur noster intellectus ad comprehendendum, licet velut de longe in nubilo, quomodo Deus ubique est, quia plene comprehendere, quomodo ipse ubique est, supra viventis hominis capacitatem est.¹

Much of the difficulty arises simply from the fact that Grosseteste is dealing on the one hand with the supreme Being, who is incorporeal, simple, eternal, and nonspatial, and on the other hand with a corporeal, spatial, temporal, and composite created order. Grosseteste's understanding of these latter categories and qualities, along with his understanding of the perfection, simplicity, and transcendence of God, tended to heighten the difficulty of determining and ascertaining how God can be and is related to and present in the created order. If 'space' and 'place' are made to signify and are used consistently in connexion with corporeality with its three dimensions, the

¹Ibid.; BW 114.
question arises as to how an incorporeal Being and spiritual entities can be said to be in 'space' or in this or that 'place'. We shall note momentarily that Grosseteste does extend somewhat his usage and conception of 'space' and 'place'.

In speaking of the ubique totus presence of God in a created finite order a certain difficulty seems to arise in connexion with the immutability and simple eternity of God. Since the created order is not eternal but had a beginning, it appears that the ubique totus presence also had to have a beginning inasmuch as this presence presupposes the created order. The change involved is that of God becoming ubique totus. To my knowledge Grosseteste does not deal with this particular issue. In any case, his response would probably be that this difficulty arises when one posits time before the time created by God. However, Grosseteste does not allow for a time prior to created time. Grosseteste would also possibly respond to this difficulty by saying that we are thinking of God in terms of a mensura inferior whereas we should be thinking of him in terms of the mensura superior that is proper to him. As already intimated, Grosseteste believes that God dwells in his simple eternity and that all entities and events are present to God in his indivisible eternity.

In speaking of God's omnipresence Grosseteste stresses that we must not think of God as we think of places. In other words, it is one thing to say that God is present in a place and quite another thing to say that a given creature is in a place.
saw earlier that a \textit{locus} is always filled by space, that is, "trina corporis dimensio." Grosseteste wants it clearly understood that although God is present in all places, viz., everywhere, he is not contained by these places nor is he supported by them. God exists or endures (\textit{consistere}) in and through himself. The corporeal entities, however, which occupy and fill up places, are contingent and contained in their places. Grosseteste makes clear that certain qualifications must be kept in mind when speaking of God in relation to place:

\begin{quote}
Sed notandum quod comparatur Deus ad hoc nullo modo comparatur locatum ad locum, dicente Augustino: 'Deus est in mundo non inclusus, extra mundum nec exclusus, supra mundum non elevatus, infra mundum non depressus.' Si est ibi aliqua proprietas et comparatio loci ad locatum, eo enim indigent omnia sicut proprio locante, ipse autem nullo indiget.\end{quote}

Grosseteste goes on to say that God is everywhere "potentialiter," "presentaliter," and "essentialiter."\footnote{Quaest. Theol. [IV]; Callus 206.} The second of the three adverbs is included lest God be identified with his power. "Essentialiter" is added lest it be thought that God is only the efficient cause whereas he is "etiam ut causa formalis et vera forma uniuscuiusque."\footnote{Ibid.; Callus 206.} Although Grosseteste here recognizes that certain qualifications are in order when speaking of God being in places, and although he speaks some of the presence of God in terms of its dynamic and functional character, he continues to operate with a rather narrow and restrictive notion of place.

\footnote{Ibid; Callus 207.}
His understanding of place and space is bound up with the notion of three dimensional corporeal extension. The qualifications that he offers above are indicative of the fact that he sticks with this notion of space, viz., corporeal extension. We have in mind notions of place and space which are not so much tied to the factors of spatial magnitude and corporeal extension. Depending on what factors are involved, we could possibly speak of functional place or space, historical place, ontological place, i.e., place in the hierarchy of being, logical place, moral place, etc.

Along with this judgement concerning Grosseteste's conception of space and place we could probably make a similar judgement with respect to his conception of time. If he would have had a less restricted and restrictive conception of time, or better, different conceptions of time or different types of time, he might have been less intent on removing God from time and relegating him to the category and realm of simple eternity. He could then possibly have had room for a certain process and movement that would not have entailed corruptibility and possible loss of being.

There is one point in particular where Grosseteste breaks away from his usual understanding of place. He speaks of the place of angels and equates their place with their ministerium. He asserts that the angel is not ubique totus in the universe for this is God's prerogative alone. Angels perform their service in "corporibus assumptis" but they are not said to have
their place in these bodies. "Sic, ut reor, angelos esse in corporibus assumptis est, ipsos movere et regere ea in usus al-
cuius ministerii."¹ The angels and other created incorporeal spirits are said to have places by virtue of their functions and operations:

Et non est hoc ipsum esse alicubi, quod superficie locali circumscribi aut in situ punctuali figi, ut possit inter ipsum et alia situm habentia certis linearum mensuris distantia seu propinquitas metiri.²

Grosseteste states that the angel is not to be assigned a place in the universe anymore than the soul can be assigned a particular place in the body. An angel may be said to be somewhere by reason of a certain operation, service, or ministry. Its place cannot be measured geometrically or in terms of spatial extention. Here we have what could be called functional or operational place. Grosseteste acknowledges the difficulty of conceiving of this kind of place: "De hoc mallem sapientiam humiliter audire, quam temerarie aliquid definire."³ None the less, it must be said that Grosseteste generally and primarily thinks of space as "trina corporis dimensio." Parallel to this is his conceiving of time in terms of change, movement, becoming, and corruptibility.

Grosseteste's understanding of space, time, perfection, potency, act, and related categories or factors, shaped and determined in large part his doctrine of truth. His understanding

¹De Intelligentiis; BW 116. ²Ibid.; BW 118. ³Ibid.
of the supreme Truth, corruptible contingent truth, history, the Incarnation, and so on, was radically affected and influenced by his understanding of the factors cited above. Truth is primarily eternal, immutable, and incorruptible being, the supreme Being in particular. Therefore, even though it is said that God is present in the world, he is present as the immutable, eternal (nontemporal), and most perfect and simple Truth in the midst of a temporal, changing, finite, and corruptible created order. However, as we shall see, such a dichotomy or division has to be and is qualified or modified to some degree because of such factors as God's presence in the world, the innumerable relations between Creator and creatures, and the fact of the Incarnation itself. We shall now consider the eternal Word of the supreme Truth, who is the perfect similitudo of God the Father and the foundation of created truth.

(3.3) The Word of the supreme Truth

Having considered the necessary, immutable, and eternal nature of the supreme Truth in connexion with the categories of time and space, it is now essential to note the strategic place that the Verbum Dei has as the eternal speaking of the Father, the "Sermo Patris."¹ 'Verbum', in Augustine and likewise in Grosseteste, receives its most fitting and most meaningful application when used of the Filius Dei. The applications of 'verbum'

¹De Ver.; BW 134.
of least significance are those instances where it refers to the written or spoken word. We saw how Anselm in the *Monologion* (c.10) constructed a scale of different senses of "verbūm" ranging from the sensible written or spoken word, to the thinking of the word within the mind, to the thinking of the corporeal image or the thing itself, and finally the *universalis essentia*. The highest form of speaking is the *rerum locutio*, the very speaking of things whereby they come to exist. Grosseteste focuses his attention on this highest form of speaking, although instead of speaking of "summae essentiae locutio" he talks of the "Sermo Patris" and the "verbūm omnipotentis Dei." The words differ but the meaning is the same. This speaking of the Father, which speaking is the *Filius Dei*, is the very source of the being of things which in turn makes possible our speaking. Our speaking must finally be adequated to the *res* not only, but also to the divine speaking itself, if it is to be true. "Verbūm", therefore, is most fittingly used of the divine Being himself, for the Word of God is the very being of God and through this *verbūm* each *res* is created.

It must be remembered, of course, that although we speak of the divine Nature, the divine willing, the divine knowing, the divine mind in which are the innumerable *ideae*, and now of the *Verbum Dei*, these are all to be considered within the one *substantia simplicissima*. In *De Statu Causarum*¹ Grosseteste

¹*De Statu Causarum*; *BW* 122. Hereafter cited as *De Statu*. 
states clearly that the divine substantia or essentia keeps its simplicity intact even though a multiplicity of actuality issues forth from it. This means that for the causa prima, the final cause or the "intentio boni" is not something that is added over and above the contemplation of the essence of the thing. So too, in the Verbum Dei the divine speaking, willing, knowing, creating, and conserving in being are one in the one Verbum Dei. The illumination of created things whereby they can be seen to be, and to be true, is also one with the above in the Verbum Dei. Grosseteste speaks of the unity of causes of created things in the divine substantia: "Et propterea idem est in ea secundum substantiam efficiens, forma et finis."¹ The Verbum spoken eternally in the one simple supreme Truth is the very source and foundation of all created truth and being, including the nature of all created beings and the knowledge of the same. If one would understand the various facets of Grosseteste's conception of truth, his epistemology, and methodology, then one must first know the place that the Verbum Dei has in his thought. This Verbum is to be considered first in relation to the Pater and subsequently in relation to the creation. This is to consider first the nature and being of the eternal Verbum and then its speaking in relation to the creation.

¹Ibid.
(3.3.1) The nature and the being of the Word of God in relation to God the Father

Within the divine substantia itself there is similitudo according to Grosseteste. It has already been noted that this is a central motif running throughout Grosseteste's thought. It doesn't, however, have just one sense or application. He distinguishes between the similitudo that prevails between man and God wherein man is said to be made in the image of God and the lesser similitudo between other creatures and God. We noted earlier that in the "participacione incommutabilitatis essencie est homo maxime propinque Dei imago." In commenting on the words of St. Gregory of Nyssa, Grosseteste contrasts the similitudo found in the image of God in man with the similitudo present between other creatures and God:

Unde etsi in alis creaturis eluceat aliqua Dei similitudo nec tamen elucet in illis Dei imago quia imago est summa et propinquissima similitudo. Naturalis enim capacitas omnium que sunt in Deo per maxime propinquam imitacionem est in homine Dei imago. Cum autem capit ea secundum possibilem sibi imitacionem, tunc est reformata imago.¹

In those created entities without reason there is then "similitudo Dei aliqua" but only in man is the image of God. By reason of the one divine essentia one can also speak of immanent likenesses within the created structure. For instance, as the members of a genus achieve greater similitudo to their common ratio aeterna or exemplar they are more similar to each other. Grosse-

¹Hex. VII.7; Muckle 168.
test even compares man as microcosm to the mundus. We intimated earlier that the individuality of the singular is grounded in God's knowledge of singularia, else such singularity could be lost in the one exemplar, or in the universal immanent in the genus composed of particulars.

In speaking of the similitudo of the Filius to the Pater Grosseteste makes certain that we do not interpret this similitudo in the same sense as the other similitudines of which we have just spoken. There is a passage relating to this which is worth quoting in its entirety:

Similitudo autem est duplex: aut equalitatis vel paritatis, aut imparitatis et imitacionis. Quapropter et imago duplex est: aut summa videlicet similitudo secundum paritatem, aut summa similitudo secundum imitacionem. Secundem primam acceptionem imaginis, solus Filius est imago Dei Patris. Omnia enim que habet Pater, habet equaliter et Filius et quecumque facit Pater hec eadem et similiter facit Filius et sicut habet Pater vitam in semetipso sic dedit et Filio vitam habere in semetipso, vitam, inquam, hoc est, Divinitatis plenam et totam substantiam, non multiplicatam, neque divisam, neque imminutam. Ideoque Patris est similitudo secundum equalitatem. Homo vero similitudo est Dei Trinitatis per imitacionem. Non enim potest creatura factori suo comparari nec cum eo in aliquo univocari; potest tamen per modum aliquem imitari.1

It is most essential that this above distinction be kept in mind, particularly in view of the similitudo motif and the light metaphysic and cosmogony which figure so prominently in the thought of Grosseteste. Grosseteste repeatedly asserts his Creator-creature dualism in which he makes clear that man in no way shares in the divine essentia or substantia. After stating that Anselm

1Hex. VII.1; Muckle 158.
assigns a single ratio to liberum arbitrium, Grosseteste says:

Concedimus reversa, quod nihil univoce dicitur de creatura et creatore; sed tamen creatura rationalis ita propinquum est vestigium et similitudo et imago sui creatoris, quod in his, secundum quod est propinquum et assimilatum vertigium, meretur etiam communicare et nomen, non quidem univoce sed propinqua, imitatoria similitudine.¹

However, it is altogether different with the Son or Word of God in his similitudo to God the Father. The Son is most fully like the Father because he is that which the Father is:

Filius autem, qui similis est Patri plenissime, est id quod Pater. Unde ibi nulla ex parte aliqua falsitas est, sed plena veritas et lux, "et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae".²

This statement is crucial for all that follows. The Son is the full truth and light because there is no falsehood in him in any part. This absence of falsity is most readily explained by the prior statement in which Grosseteste asserts that the Son is that which the Father is. Here there is the "similitudo secundum paritatem" within the divine Being, that is, that relation between the Father and the Son grounded in parity. Here we have an interior likeness within the substantia simplicissima itself. All created things shall be true by reason of their conformity to this Verbum which is most fully like the Father. The created entity is said to have a likeness to God, but only through the Verbum Dei.

Most appropriately does Grosseteste open his treatise on truth by citing a crucial text from the Gospel of John (John 14:6):

¹De Lib. Arb. 16; BW 217. ²De Ver.; BW 136.
"Ego sum via veritas et vita". Hic ipsa Veritas dicit se esse veritatem. Unde dubitari non immerito potest, an sit aliqua alia veritas, an nulla sit alia ab ipsa summa veritate? ¹

This is the heart of the matter for Grosseteste in his notion of truth. Back of this text and these opening statements lies the Verbum Dei. The Truth that says that he himself is the Truth is enabled so to speak because of an eternal uncreated similitudo and that perfect unity in the substantia simplicissima. It is essential therefore to see what Grosseteste has to say concerning the nature and being of the Son in relation to the Father whereby the Son can say: "Ego sum via veritas et vita."

Grosseteste makes reference to Chrysostom (In Joh. Homil. IV [al. III]) where the latter speaks of a priority of the Father in relation to the Son according to cause, not according to time or nature:

Unde Chrysostomus super illus 'In principio erat Verbum': 'Praecedit Pater Verbum non natura, sed causa; praecedit Filius naturaliter omnia alia.' Ergo cum individua essentialia, quae omni simplici est simplicior, omni indivisibili indivisibili, sit prius et post, praediximus, quod in aeternis est prius et post.²

Grosseteste mentions that we have difficulty in grasping this notion of causality within the Trinity for we only think of causality in relation to creatures: "Hoc verbum iterum videtur habere obscuritatem, quia nulla est, ut videtur, in Trinitate processio, nulla causalitas nisi ad creaturas."³ Grosseteste

¹Ibid.; BW 130. ²De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 179.
³Ibid.; BW 186.
also cites St. Athanasius in support of the coeternity and the coequality of the three persons among whom there is no gradation of being or nature and no distinction of time. Grosseteste warns us against imputing our meanings, faults, and errors into the words of Athanasius:

Quapropter si intelligimus in suis verbis aut eis imponimus aliquid falsum et veritati contrarium, haec nostra praesumptio et nostrum vitium, et non est, quod ipse in suis verbis aliquid intellexerit impium.1

Grosseteste denounces strongly the reading into the words of the fathers alien meanings which they did not intend. This happens through failing to see through the language to the Trinity itself, that is, failing to see the words as they are applied. Grosseteste explains further that Chrysostom intends by the words "causalitas" and "processio" nothing other than that what the Father has he gives to the Son so that the same life which the Father has he gives to the Son. In this way the Father causally precedes the Son. Grosseteste proceeds by making reference also to Hilary:

Quod ipsa veritas dicit: 'sicut Pater habet vitam in semetipsa, sic dedit et Filio habere vitam in semetipsa' hoc est, quod Hilarius dicit, Patrem esse maiorem Filio non solum secundum quod Filius est homo, sed secundum quod est Verbum, et tamen Filium Verbum non esse minorem Patre, sed aequalem.2

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1Symbol. Athanasianum; cf. Denzinger, Enchiridion XVIII 136 (ed. 9 Wirceb. 1900) pg. 36s. This source is cited in De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 186.
2De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 186.
3Ibid.; BW 187; Hilarius: De Trin. IX.54,55; Tract. in Ps. 138 n. 17.
Grosseteste then cites the De Trinitate (V.13,14) of Augustine where he says that the Father is the originator or begetter of the Son because he has begotten him. Grosseteste says that Augustine's principiatio, Hilary's majoritas, and Chrysostom's causality et processio share the same intention. There is no idea here of the Son having been created or made by the Father. Grosseteste believes that Chrysostom destroyed the impiety of the deformed intelligence, which wrongly interpreted the words "maiorum Filio," when he added: "Filium non Patre esse minorem." It is clear then that the Son is not less than the Father in essentia. On such a basis Grosseteste can affirm that there is no falsity in the Son, for this is impossible and would be contrary to his very nature.

In De Ordine Emanandi Causatorum a Deo, which has as its other title-De Eternitate Filii in Divinis, Grosseteste emphasizes strongly that the Son did not have esse after non-esse. He cites reasons for the failure to understand that the Son is without beginning when at the same time it is said that the Son proceeds from the Father.

Multum coangustat mentes indissertatas et corporalium phantasmatum mutabilitate plenas, quod audiunt Filium coaeternum Patri et sine initio, cum Pater Filii sit causa et Filius a Patre procedit. The point that Grosseteste repeatedly makes is that the Father and the Son share in the same measure while the Creator and the

1De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 168. 2De Ordine; BW 147.
creature do not:

Sic Filius coaeternus est Patri, cum Fater sit plenum principium Filii, nec possit esse sine Filio, et Filii mensura a mensura Patris non sit diversa.¹

The Father is the full origin or principle of the Son but the Father is not able to be such without the Son and they share in the same measure, power, and capacity. There is no such common measure between God and the creature. The Son must necessarily have a beginning for those who cannot dispel certain ideas from their imaginations and who think only in terms of a measure inferior to the first measure. The being or existence of the Son, however, is in the "mensura prima simplicissima":

Filius vero, cuius esse est in mensura prima simplicissima, licet ab alio sit, non potest habuisse non-esse, quia in mensura simplicissima non potest esse eidem esse et non-esse.²

This statement makes clear that in the first measure, which is most simple, a thing either is or it is not. This, of course, would also hold within the created order. However, in the simplicity of eternity that which has esse cannot have had a prior non-esse and vice versa. For the simplicity of eternity is more indivisible than any indivisible instant that we could ever imagine. Such is the nature of the similitudo of the Son to the Father in the simplicity of eternity. There is no inequality between the Father and the Son either in essentia, natura, or tempus.

¹Ibid.; BW 148. ²Ibid.; BW 149.
In the Hexameron Grosseteste cites a short passage from St. Gregory of Nyssa (De Hominis Opificio) wherein Gregory speaks of the three Persons of the Trinity as mens, verbum, and caritas. Grosseteste says: "mens etenim et verbum est summa Divinitas. . . . Non ergo procul hec a natura humana conspicias; in te namque et verbum et intelligencia, que imitantur verbum mentemque divinam."¹ Insofar as man imitates the divine mens, verbum, and caritas he images each of the three divine Persons. Man is created truth because of his likeness to the triune God. By reason of this similitudo man is said to be in the image of God. The factor to be stressed at this point, however, is that the mens, verbum, and caritas are single in the one most simple essentia. This is the summa veritas, and the Verbum Dei or the Filius has no falsehood in himself because he is most fully like the Father and is in essentia that which the Father is. It is now important to see how the Verbum Dei is related to the created order.

(3.3.2) The Word of God as norm and ground of created truth

As in the case of the divine knowing, so too in the Verbum Dei, the innumerable relations between the one most simple essentia and the multitude of created entities in no ways destroys that simplicity. The consideration of the role of the Verbum Dei given below will make apparent how God is related to the natures of created things through his eternal speaking of their exemplary forms. In connexion with this speaking, the relation-

¹Hex. VII.7; Muckle 168.
ship between the **summa veritas** and created entities must be looked at in terms of the divine knowing, willing, and effecting of created things. Grosseteste would not consider such vantage points to be of his own choosing for they are grounded in the nature of the divine Being, both in himself and in relation to created truth. For example, the divine knowing and willing are closely bound up with the *Sermo Patris*.

The divine willing stresses more the determinative and the causal character of God's relation to the creation. Herein God is seen more as effecting what he has in his *mens*. These effects are both his own deeds and the resultant creaturely entities. In willing, the divine Nature is considered primarily as efficient cause. Such willing must be seen, however, as being directed in terms of the true *bonum* as final cause dwelling in the first *intellectus* or *mens*.

The divine knowing does not stress as much the determinative and causal character of the relation of the divine Nature to the created order even though much knowing is also efficacious. Such efficacy, for instance, does not apply to God's knowledge of the *malum* through the *bonum*. Divine *prescientia* is utilized in seeking to cope with the problematical aspects of *predestinatio*. The qualities of divine knowing stressed by Grosseteste are its immutability and necessity grounded in its eternity. We shall note the crucial distinctions in the divine knowing involving different types of necessity and varying degrees of effecting. Such diversity results from such differences
as God's knowledge of his willing and his knowledge of human willing. The divine knowing which is determinative of the natures of things pertains to the *ideae* of things in the mind of God.

It is in the *Verbum Dei* or *Sermo Patris* that Grosseteste sees the divine Being and the divine effecting in their oneness in the one *essentia*. In the *Verbum Dei* there is *similitudo* in two directions, both between the Son and the Father and between the Son and the created entity. It is in the divine *Verbum* as the *forma* one with the Father and the *forma* of created things that we find also the effecting and the preserving of things. In contrast to the divine willing in accordance with which a created entity is not always or necessarily adequated, depending of course on the sense in which the *voluntas aut beneplacitum Dei* is understood, each created entity is most fully as this *Verbum Dei* says with respect to the first perfection of being and possibly with respect to the second also. Thus it may be said: "Ipse igitur Sermo Patris secundum hanc definitionem veritatis maxime veritas est."\(^1\)

A number of operations of the divine Nature toward the creature are bound up in this single *Verbum Dei*. In accordance with Grosseteste's presupposed framework, we see that the *Verbum* is also looked upon as formal, final, and efficient cause. As already noted, Grosseteste first of all regards the divine *essentia* as formal, final, and efficient cause of the creation, but in

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\(^1\)De *Ver.*; *EW* 134.
the Verbum these operations come most expressly to the foreground and it is in and through this Verbum that the effecting takes place. It is also in conformity with this eternal speaking that a thing is said to be true. It shall become apparent that everything that is, in whatever degree, has to have some such conformity.

Following Augustine, Grosseteste clearly states that man has not been created in the image of the Father or Son alone: "non quasi Pater ad imaginem Filii fecerit hominem aut Filius ad imaginem Patris, sed unus Deus Trinitas ad imaginem sui unius et trini."\(^1\) The negative point to be made here is that man is not made simply in the image of the Son or the Father alone, but in the image of the whole Trinity. It is important to keep this in mind when referring to the eternal speaking of man in the divine Verbum. Another significant qualification to be made is that although the eternal speaking of the created thing is situated within the Verbum Dei or Filius Dei, neither the Son himself alone nor the whole Trinity is to be taken as the eternal exemplar or universal of humanitas and certainly not as the exemplar of any other created species. The exemplar of humanitas is not the Trinity itself inasmuch as the exemplar-humanitas is itself in the image of the Trinity. Other exemplars of created things do not even image the Trinity. We shall see that Grosseteste runs into difficulty in the De Veritate treatise

\(^1\)Hex. VII. 10; Muckle 171.
where these distinctions are not kept clearly in mind. Keeping in mind these negative observations, we now consider in a positive fashion the operations of the *Verbum Dei* in relation to created truth.

(3.3.3) The Word of God and the eternal exemplary forms or reasons

It was observed above that God is his own *forma*: "Deus autem a seipso est id quod est." Because *forma* is that in virtue of which a thing is what it is, God is *forma* and *forma* of his divinity. The sense, however, is not at all similar when we say that God is *forma omnium*. Grosseteste argues from the *ratio formae* itself that God is form: "quia forma est, qua res est id quod est, velut humanitas, qua homo est homo, forma hominis est." It is this latter *forma* that is our present concern. In the *Hexameron* Grosseteste makes reference to that passage in St. Augustine's *De Vera Religione* (43.81) where Augustine under Neoplatonic inspiration discusses the "unum principale" which is the Father of Truth and of Wisdom:

(Sapiencia Patris), que nulla ex parte dissimilis similitudo eius est, dicta est et imago quia de ipso est. Ita eciam Filius recte dicitur ex ipso, cetera per ipsum. Precessit enim forma omnium, summe implens unum de quo est, ut cetera que sunt in quantum sunt uni similia per eam formam fierent.  

The consequence is not that each created thing is in some

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1 *De Unica; BW* 108.  
3 *Hex.* VII.9; Muckle 170.
degree divine, although Neoplatonism may direct one to such a conclusion. All created things are what they are and have being only through the Filius, according to the forma. The created thing is not said to be similar to the Father of Wisdom and Truth because it is in some manner divine. The similarity arises because a particular creature is what he is according as the Father has eternally spoken it. Grosseteste has in mind that exemplar which eternally endures and in terms of which the particular members of a species have their nature:

Itaque homines quidem pereunt, ipsa autem humanitas, ad quam homo effingitur, permanet et hominibus laborantibus et intereuntibus illa nihil patitur.¹

Grosseteste states that the forma that he has in mind in speaking of God as forma creaturarum is not the forma that is joined to matter to make up the completed substance. He illustrates what he has in mind:

Dicitur itaque forma exemplar, ad quod respicit artifex, ut ad eius imitationem et similitudinem formet suum artificium; sic pes ligneus, ad quem respicit auctor, ut secundum ipsum formet soleam, dicitur forma soleae.²

Grosseteste asks us to imagine the form or the similitude of a house to be constructed as the exemplar held in the mind of the architect or builder. He then asks us to imagine the impossible, viz., that by the power of his will the architect applies matter to the form in his mind so that the house is formed. Furthermore, we are to imagine that the matter is fluid,

¹De Lib. Arb. 5; BW 168. ²De Unica; BW 109.
so that if it should be separated from the form in the mind of
the builder it would lose its shape and cease to be a house.
Imagine also that the house remains in esse only as long as the
will of the architect applies the matter of the house to the
form. Grosseteste then applies this illustration to the forma
omnium creaturarum:

Eo itaque modo, quo forma huius in mente huiusmodi archi-
tectoris esset forma domus, est ars, sive sapientia, sive
verbum omnipotentis Dei forma omnium creaturarum. Ipsa
enim simul et exemplar est et efficiens et formans est et
in forma data conservans est, dum ad ipsam applicantur et
revocantur creaturae.¹

Here it is said that the Wisdom or the Word of God is the form
of all creatures. It is not to be understood as though the Ver-
bum Dei itself is applied to a particular entity as the form of
that thing. The Verbum Dei, however, is to be likened to the
mind of the architect or faber in which is held the form of the
thing that is to be effected as the completed substance.

In the statements just quoted we note the manifold opera-
tion of the forma. It is the Verbum Dei as exemplar which
interests us at present. The Verbum Dei as forma efficiens,
formans, and conservans, will be examined later. It is this
transcendant forma in the Verbum Dei which is determinative of
the very nature of the created entity, thereby both making it to
be what it is and consequently holding it in existence, in being.
In contrast to the more immanent Aristotelian forma that effects

¹Ibid.; BW 110.
a greater degree of autonomy for a species and its members, Grosseteste's *forma* is in the first place bound up with the divine *Verbum* which results consequently in a radically contingent created order of things. 'Contingent' here signifies conditional or dependent existence or being. The *Verbum Dei* or *sapientia Dei* is seen by Grosseteste then as *forma*, model exemplar or archetype and the effected entity is made in conformity to and in agreement with the same. Grosseteste further elucidates the meaning of *verbum* and *forma* with another reference to Augustine:

Partim vero elucet haec intentio formae per reliquam autoritatem, quam de libro tertio decimo Confessionum posui, ubi dicitur angelus converti ad verbum Patris ad id, a quo factus est, ut lux fieret et conformis formae aequali Patri id est sapientiae, in qua Pater fecit omnia.¹

This particular facet of the function of the *Verbum* or *Sapientia* of the Father brings to the fore the notion of conformity, similarity, and likeness between the exemplar in the divine *Verbum* and the created entity which is patterned after it. *Veritas* is not now spoken of as *id quod est* or as that *similitudo* that inheres within the divine *essentia* itself, but specifically as that *adaequatio*, *similitudo* or correspondence that prevails and necessarily persists between the divine *Verbum* and the *res*. *Veritas*, thus understood, involves a relationship that necessarily obtains but is subordinate to that *similitudo secundum paritatem* which is found within God himself. With

¹Ibid.
respect to man Grosseteste asserted: "Homo vero similitudo est Dei Trinitatis per imitacionem." Man stands above all other creatures on the earth by virtue of his creation in the imago Dei. These other creatures, nevertheless, bear some similitude to God and this is so because of a certain conformity and similitude to the Verbum Dei as forma. Creatures inferior to man can be said to image their forma which is found in the Verbum Dei.

Before proceeding to a consideration of the Verbum Dei or the Sermo Patris as the actual speaking of things whereby truth as adaequatio is realized, it would be profitable to examine further Grosseteste's thought regarding the eternal divine Word which ante rem constitutes the very ground of created truth both in terms of 'esse' and 'adaequatio'. Grosseteste's position is that there can be no effecting of created truth, whether things, thought or statements, without that ontologically prior Word which is verum per se. The summa veritas in its willing, knowing, and speaking is the very foundation of all other esse and veritas. The primary sense of 'veritas' in this instance is therefore id quod est or esse and not commensuration or correspondence.

We have seen above how the eternal Verbum Dei is understood by Grosseteste as forma and exemplar of the thing to be created. Problems arise, however, concerning the actual character of such

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1Hex. VII.1; Muckle 158.
a Verbum and the implications for the whole theory of truth when thought of in terms of relations. Part of the difficulty arises from the somewhat strange admixture of terms and figures such as 'sapientia', 'sermo', 'regula', 'ratio', 'exemplar', 'verbum', and 'forma'. Some of the terms seem to call more for a visual frame of reference while others demand an auditory frame of reference. Grosseteste stresses the fact that neither ordinary observation nor usual hearing is intended. For in each of the two frameworks and with all the terms used, he realizes that he is dealing with the intelligible and more, viz., the ineffable itself. Insofar as 'verbum' is used to signify the Filius Dei himself, it is apparent that its sense in such a usage is far removed from the common usage when reference is made to the printed word or the customary spoken word. Grosseteste also asserts of the Creator and his speaking: "Suum enim creare est suum dicere et suum scire." When the Verbum Dei is examined in its function of speaking and effecting created entities it will be clearly seen that such a Verbum has a creative and dynamic function.

Grosseteste also speaks of a type of speech or language which differs from the ordinary spoken or written word:

Sed cum verior sit sermo, qui intus silet, quam qui foris sonat, intellectus velidicet conceptus per sermonem vocalem, magis erit veritas adaequatio sermonis interioris et rei, quam exterioris; quod si ipse sermo interior esset

De Lib. Arb. 2; BW 155.
This statement reflects the thinking of Anselm in his Monologion where he discusses different types of words and speaking. The movement here is from the expressed and written word towards the thing spoken of and the ratio and essentia of the thing itself. The trend is away from the notion of hearing and the auditory altogether, and in the direction of sensible and corporeal sight, and beyond that to the intelligible and its corresponding mental or intellectual sight.

The nature of this Verbum and Sermo is further indicated where Grosseteste says: "Sapientia autem et verbum, sive 'Sermo Patris' maxime adequaturo hoc modo adaequationis rei, quam dicit et loquitur." We note here at least three factors which clearly distinguish the speech or language of the Father from written and spoken language as commonly understood. In the first place, 'verbum' and 'sermo' are used conjointly with 'sapientia' and other such words as 'forma' and 'exemplar', which have been cited above. This manifests the exceptional sense of 'verbum' as it coalesces with terms derived from a visual frame of reference. Also, the fact that this Verbum corresponds so completely to res shows that no typical sense can be intended. It is also said that the Verbum speaks or expresses the thing itself. This last mentioned function conveys the creative and sustaining activity of the Verbum.

1De Ver.; BW 134.  
2Ibid.
It is most apparent that Grosseteste here uses 'verbum', 'sermo', 'exemplar', etc., figuratively and not in a strictly literal fashion or manner. That this is the case is also made apparent in his commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. In speaking of predicates that are predicated *simpliciter* of a subject he goes on to say: "... quia licet sint ideae et rationes rerum increate ab aeterno in mente divina ipse ideae nihil pertinent ad ratiocinationem in qua praedicatur aliquid de aliquo."¹ The *ideae* and *rationes* in the divine *mens* really have no connection with those subjects and their predicates which are required for ratiocination. For Grosseteste the uncreated *rationes* and *ideae* are spoken and expressed from eternity in a manner beyond our comprehension. What holds true for the auditory and verbal mode of expression is also true for the notions of *ratio*, *idea*, *forma*, and *exemplar*. Insofar as he is operating in the sphere of the intelligible, the incorporeal, and the corresponding *oculus mentis*, Grosseteste is very much aware of the inadequacy of our empirical categories and of language taken from ordinary sense experience. Therefore, although he will speak of the light of the supreme Truth, man beholding immutable truth, the vision of the essences of contingent things in the divine *mens*, and the *aspectus* motif, Grosseteste would not want this kind of viewing or seeing confused or identified with observation of corporeal entities. In the treatise wherein

¹Comm. Post. I. 15; f. 20.
he repudiates the notion of the eternity of motion, sempiternity, and the eternity of the world, he asserts:

Quare scire debemus, quod multa per discursum rationis convincimus esse vera, quorum essentiam non intelligimus, sicut multi homines sciunt ostendere firma ratione, quod intelligentiae sunt et quod Deus est, non tamen intelligent esse divinam vel incorporeitatem intelligentiarum, sed ea sub phantasmatis corporalibus quasi solam sub nube vident, et si sequantur phantasmata multas proprietates corporales de non corporalibus false affirman..."}

Nevertheless, the use of this kind of terminology does provide far reaching consequences for Grosseteste's thought and method. He does not pretend to be able to explain that which he calls the model, form, and exemplar:

Forma vero, quae simul est exemplar et quo res est, non est coniuncta rei, sed abstracta, simplex et separata. Haece est forma prima, quae qualiter sit forma prima, difficule est explanare.2

We saw how he uses certain analogies and figures in an attempt to provide some understanding of how things are created in agreement with their eternal rationes and regulae in the divine Word. He used the instance of the shoemaker and the wooden foot which serves as the model in fashioning the shoe, the silver image or statue which serves as the form of the wax image, the clay which was the form of the statue, and the forma or similitudo of the house in the mind of the builder. He also says: "Sic etiam vita bonorum, ad quam respicimus, ut ad eius similitudinem mores vitae nostrae formemus, dicitur nobis forma vivendi."3 Such terminology, of course, draws from the sphere

1De Finitate; BW 105. 2De Statu; BW 125. 3De Unica; BW 109.
of the visual and the pictorial and Grosseteste is aware of the inadequacy of such analogies. This disparity is due in part to the great distance that is fixed between the sensible and the intelligible realms and the great gulf fixed between the summa veritas as Creator and the creaturely artist and builder. The latter point is made clear in the following:

Non tamen hanc similitudinem de modo, quo Deus est forma omnium, sicut nec supradicta attuli sicut usqueaque congruam divinae excellentiae, quia sicut creatura eius similitudinem etiam non potest perfecte exprimere, sic nec mens creatae potest aliquid perfecte et ei ex omni parte simile fingere.¹

These models and ideae, which have been eternally held and expressed in the divine Word, function as the ontological ground and the source of created being and truth. Prior to creation itself there is the eternal Truth and the interior relations within the divine essentia in its utter simplicity. Here there can be no dissimilitude whatsoever but only perfect correspondence which is most clearly manifest in the Son's relation to the Father and in the relation between the divine essentia and his eternal speaking of the forms and the reasons of things to be created. Although problematical, herein is perfect likeness and correspondence of models to res not yet created and perfect conformity of divine knowledge to future contingent events. It has also been noted that the eternal ratio of mankind is in the image of the triune God while essentially different from the

¹Ibid.; BW 111.
Son's relation to the Father. As asserted above, this similitude between the *forma* or *ratio* of man and the triune God is a *similitudo secundum imitacionem*. *Humanitas* is found in the true and genuine image of the Trinity. There is no dissimilitude or falsity in this instance because God the Father did not will or intend that man should share in his *essentia*. There would be a lack of correspondence or conformity and consequent falsehood only if the eternal *forma* of man was contrary to what God willed or spoke and this is impossible. The *rationes* and *regulae* of things to be created are as they ought to be not because they correspond to anything outside the divine *essentia*, but simply because they are the divine speaking and willing. It will be noted that created *res* are true only by reason of their conformity to the divine speaking and their eternal *rationes* in the divine mind. As Grosseteste often asserts: "Quae regula non aliiud est, quam ratio rei aeterna in mente divina."¹ Such a *regula* will also be considered truth in the highest degree after the act of creation by virtue of its relation to the created thing, which relation is one of complete adequation or commensuration. However, such a *regula* is truth in the first place simply by reason of what it is and its ontological position. Before the effecting of created entities there is, of course, nothing outside of the most simple divine Being itself. Grosseteste deals with this matter in connection with statements,

¹De Ver.; BW 137.
whether necessary or contingent, that have been true from eternity. He says:

Nec exigit veritas talis sermonis alicuius extra Deum existentiam aut coaeternitatem. Similiter igitur cum dicitur 'hoc verum aeternum est aut enuntiabile aeternum est', suscipitur praedictio haec propter formam correlativam dic tioni in aeterno Verbo; propter quam tamen relationem nihil exigitur extra Deum esse.¹

These eternal truths do not exist outside or apart from the esse of God. The truth of the regula, the enuntiabile or relatio, is in the first instance its very esse as divine speech or knowledge. This is in accordance with the Augustinian notion that veritas est id quod est and that its primary signification is the summa veritas. There obviously cannot be any external principle or norm under which and in relation to which God is found to be the summa veritas. His esse precedes ontologically any adaequatio and serves as the ultimate ground of the latter. The rationes and regulae of created things have no truth or being in and of themselves for they are not independent of God. It is as God's own thought and speaking that they exist and consequently they do not depend on creaturely entities for their truth and being. These eternal reasons of things in the divine mind and speaking are themselves the ontological ground for creaturely being and knowing. Grosseteste strongly insists, however, that such rationes and eternally true enuntiabilia are not essences existing eternally outside the supreme Truth himself.

¹Ibid.; BW 141.
The eternal and immutable rationes and regulae expressed by the divine Word constitute the ultimate ground of all created essentiae. The former determine the latter. Moreover, all creaturely beings and events are measured by these rationes and regulae. Although true propositions concerning created essentiae do, of course, correspond to these essentiae, the ultimate and primary correspondence is that which exists between these propositions and the eternal rationes and formae. While Grosse-teste does teach that these necessary truths or definitions, composed of subjects and per se predicates, are grounded in and do refer to primary substances (subjectum), he does not consider the latter to be the ultimate ground of these necessary truths. He also emphasizes that although we have both subject and predicate in the necessary truth expressed by man, neither in the primary substance nor in the eternal ratio or forma are there subjects and predicates. There is no subject-predicate distinction in the subjectum and exemplary forma. Necessary truths immutably and necessarily signify rightly by virtue of the fact that both subject and predicate have as their ultimate referent the immutable forma in the Word of God. The intrinsic coherence of the necessary truth arises out of an adaequatio ad extra, viz., the correspondence of both subject and predicate to one and the simple ratio or forma. This latter connexion is especially explicit in the case of mathematical truths in which

1Comm. Post. I.15; f. 20.
instance a direct and immediate relation or connexion between
the necessary predication and the immutable *forma* is most appar-
ent.

In the divine Word then, we have the simple and perfect
*ratio* or *forma* which is truth just by virtue of the fact that
it *is* the speaking of the divine Word. The exemplary *forma* is
truth just because of what it is, not primarily because of corres-
dpondence to something outside of the supreme Truth himself.
However, it should be pointed out that the *Sermo Patris*, in view
of its perfect adequation to the entities it expresses, is also
the supreme *adaequatio*. Therefore, the Word of God is the
supreme Truth, both as *esse* and *adaequatio*. Nevertheless, with-
out reference to anything outside the triune God these exemplary
forms are held in being in the divine Word, the *Filius*. "Filius
enim qui est Sapientia genita, que sapientia est rationes omnium
creaturarum . . . ."¹ The exemplary *formae* and *regulae* of things
are right and true as they are because of what they are. Grosse-
teste says of the *regula* that "secundum se recta est."²

Although Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics* (I.11) re-
jects the being of forms or one existing beside the many, he
realizes the necessity of predicating one of the many in order
to save the universal. The universal is required, of course,
if we are to attain scientific or demonstrative knowledge. In

¹*Quaest. Theol.* [III]; Callus 205.
²*De Ver.*; *BW* 137.
his *Metaphysics* and also in his *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle inveighs against the Platonic Forms and the substantiality of universals. He says: "The Forms we can dispense with, for they are mere sound without sense; and even if there are such things, they are not relevant to our discussion, since demonstrations are concerned with predicates such as we have defined."¹ In his commentary on this very point, Grosseteste says:

Unde omne quod praedicatur simpliciter repertum est de subjecto, vel in subjecto, quia formae separate a subjectis quas posuit Plato genera et species et praedicabilia sicut sunt prodigia in natura quae format error intellectus sicut sunt prodigia in natura quae format natura errans, quia licet sint ideae et rationes rerum increate ab aeterno in mente divina ipse ideae nihil pertinent ad ratiocinationem in qua praedicatur aliquid de aliquo. Ipse itaque ideae in se prodigia non sunt, sed cum intellectus vult facere eas praedicables de rebus a quibus sunt divise et separate, in hac ordinatione prodigia sunt... .²

Herein it is made clear that Grosseteste is aware of the thrust of Aristotle's polemic, but at the same time Grosseteste posits that the universal required for demonstration is grounded finally in the simple ideae or rationes found in the divine mind. These ideae will figure prominently in Grosseteste's epistemological theory. Even demonstrated knowledge and syllogistic reasoning will finally rely for their validity on the ideae increateae.

Much else can be known about these eternal formae and ideae by virtue of the fact that such formae also constitute the ground

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² *Comm. Post.* I.15; f. 20.
of such necessary truth as two plus three equals five. With respect to the latter it is apparent that there need be no correspondence or reference to anything outside the supreme Truth. There is, of course, a great deal of divine speaking and knowing that is related to contingent reality. However, there is no need of such an ad extra relationship in the case of the eternal forma spoken by God that is the ground of such a necessary truth as the equation that seven plus three equal ten. Grosseteste is very much interested in the latter necessary truth which is true and has esse without beginning and without end. How does he view the 'necessary' character of such a truth? In knowing this we shall gain a better understanding of how he views these eternal formae. Their necessary character involves more than the fact that they are eternally true for truths concerning contingent events have also been expressed eternally by the divine Word. Such an enuntiabile as two plus three equals five is not for Grosseteste a truth that is necessarily true because it happens to be a tautology or an analytical statement, nor because it is true irrespective of every and any state of affairs. Such an enuntiabile most certainly has a referent in terms of which it is immutably true. It is not true simply by reason of its logical form, neither does the nexus in terms of which it is true fall on that level. It may appear to us that for Grosseteste it is finally no more than a tautology, whereas it is such only insofar as the nexus whereby the terms on each side of the equation are joined is one simple immutable ratio or forma spoken
by God. In the supreme Truth there is the simple identity of both terms. That two plus three equals five is necessarium sim-pliciter is due finally to the immutable divine Word alone.

Having said that these exemplars and forms have been spoken eternally and immutably in the divine Word, the question remains as to whether they could possibly have been spoken differently from all eternity or whether altogether different rationes could have been uttered. This is a most significant question concerning these necessary true statements because they have not been declared to be true simply by virtue of logical form irrespective of every conceivable state of affairs. Grosseteste wants to assert that such statements refer to what could possibly be termed an 'eternal state of affairs', and the question yet outstanding is whether such a state could have been different.

As did Anselm, Grosseteste used rather extensively the notions of antecedent and consequent necessity.\(^1\) He uses these notions in particular in trying to cope with the difficulties relating to true statements concerning future contingent events. Problems pertaining to divine knowledge and speaking of contingent res and events will be dealt with later. Grosseteste clearly adopts Anselm's understanding of antecedent and consequent necessity. Grosseteste states:

*Sed necessitas est duplex: una, quae cogit rem ad esse et*

\(^1\)These notions have already been discussed in connexion with Anselm; cf. Chapter II, Part B, (2.2.2). These notions are also discussed later on, e.g., (3.4).
It is no doubt that consequent necessity applies both to the nature of supreme Truth and its willing. This necessity also characterizes contingent events after their occurrence. That the creation has its antecedent cause in the Creator is not disputed. The question is whether the supreme Truth could have spoken or willed *rationes* and *formae* different from those he has willed. God is not forced to will or act as he has because of some cause antecedent to himself. It could be said parenthetically that Grosseteste does not wish to speculate about naked *posse* with respect to God but is more concerned about the divine actuality. He is particularly interested in what God has spoken and willed and which cannot be otherwise than it is in view of consequent necessity. Once God has spoken some thing or has known some thing it is impossible for him thereafter not to know or not to speak that same thing. God's knowledge is immutable. He does not cease to know what he knows nor does he acquire new knowledge.

In his *De Libero Arbitrio* and its *recensio* Grosseteste is preoccupied with the eternal divine speaking and knowing which are immutable. The stakes are very great in this case insofar

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1 *De Scientia Dei; BW 146.*
as Grosseteste is concerned to preserve intact the human free will in relation to the immutable divine speaking, willing, and knowing. What he has to say in this context pertaining to the free will of man is most relevant to the question relating to the necessary character of the forma exemplaris. Grosseteste speaks against those who would say that God only knows universals and not singulars and that he is able not to know what he now does know. He states: "Sed ex hoc sequitur ipsius [Deus] scientiam esse alterabilem, quod manifeste falsum est et contra omnes sanctos."¹ This applies equally to God's eternal knowing and speaking of the eternal reasons and forms of things to be created. More is involved here than consequent necessity alone for this necessity applies to human knowing and speaking in which something known may be forgotten and something not yet known may be known at a later time. Consequent necessity simply means that what has been can no longer not have been, which is quite different from asserting that a certain thing or event was forced to be by an antecedent necessity. According to Grosseteste God is not subject to any exterior force or antecedent necessity. God has not been forced by any exterior necessity to express immutably the eternal rationes and formae. However, although God is not subject to any exterior necessity, his immutable and eternal expression of these formae is subject to and governed by his own nature. God's knowledge, willing, and speaking are immutable because of his own immutable nature.

¹De Lib. Arb. 2; BW 158-159.
Another question, already cited, is still to be considered. Grosseteste discusses the attempt to preserve the free will and creaturely contingency by asserting that the divine speaking and knowing could have been different. Granted that his knowledge is immutable, the issue is whether his knowledge could not have been eternally and immutably different. This is an attempt to safeguard the free will of man and creaturely contingency through imputing a certain degree of contingency to the divine activity. With respect to the forma of such a truth as "septem et tria esse decem" it would appear that God could not possibly have spoken differently.

As noted above, Grosseteste holds that temporal sequence or priority are not to be found in the simple eternity of God:

Item: Omne posse, quod est sine actu suo, est respectu actus sui ad hoc futuri. Sed in Deo nihil futurum. Ergo nec aliqua possibilitas respectu actus futuri.1

He says further: "Item: In aeternis nihil praecedit alium natura tempore vel spatio."2 Grosseteste questions therefore whether there can be such as a "posse oppositorum" in eternity because such a posse precedes the actuality of one or other of the opposites. There could not have been a period of time then in which God contemplated a number of possibilities after which time he willed or spoke one or several of them. Grosseteste does allow for a causal priority in eternity as in the case of the Father preceding the Son causaliter. It is stated that

1Ibid. 7; BW 174.  
2Ibid.; BW 175.
"rationales potestates" are capable of opposites: "Ergo cum eius [Deus] potestas sit summe rationalis, nulla potestas magis erit oppositorum."¹ This causal priority is further explained:

Haec prioritas causalis insinuatur ex significatione praeteriti per hoc verbum 'potuit', cum dico: 'Deus potuit non scivisse A', et cum dicitur 'Deus posset non scivisse A'. . . .²

The question that persists is whether God, in whom there is only causal priority, might have spoken or willed differently than he has spoken and willed. Grosseteste makes a key distinction at this point between considering the nature of God absolutely in terms of infinite power, or considering the same in terms of works performed and God's relationship to the creation. God is able to will what he has not willed so far as sheer potentia is concerned. Grosseteste, however, goes on to say:

Si autem consideretur non absolute, sed in ratione, qua vult vel scit unum aliquod, non potest eius oppositum scire et velle.³

According to the infinite power of God we could say that God could have created an infinite number of worlds. "Si vero ipsa eadem respiciatur in agendis ordinatissima, impossibile est . . . .⁴ Again, in consideration of the most perfectly ordered divine activity we cannot say that God could have created more worlds or no world. With respect to divine potentia Grosse-

¹De Lib. Arb., recensio, 9; BW 176.
²Ibid.; BW 176. ³De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 181.
⁴De Lib. Arb., recensio, 9; BW 180.
Grosseteste would concur with Augustine that God would have been able to save or liberate mankind in another way. "Sed se consideretur [Deus] omnia agens convenientissime, non potuit aliter liberasse hominem."¹ In the latter sentiment Grosseteste agrees with Anselm (De Concord. Praesc. Grat. et Lib. Arb., 3). So too with respect to the timing of creation Grosseteste states that it would not have been suitable for the world to have been created before it was created, if in every single part being is considered to be divided most suitably. Grosseteste in addition does not allow for what he calls a vain or useless possibility: "Si vero haec possibilitas est impossibilis ad actum suum deduci, cassa est. Sed Deus nullam possibilitatem cassam facit. Praeterea nullo modo dicitur possibilitas, si impossibilis est ad actum deduci."² When we talk about abstract and absolute divine potentia we are speaking of empty and futile possibility because we are not taking into consideration a concrete actuality which renders other possibilities cassus. Against the background given above we acquire some understanding of the necessary character of these eternal reasons of things found in the divine mind.

Ergo cum rationes sint sempiternae, stabiles, immutabiles, vivantque non vita mortali, sed immortali, ipsae rationes sunt necessariae; ex quibus necessario sequuntur res temporales, mutabiles, corruptibiles, contingentes.³

It is the triune God that is causally prior to these exemplary

¹Ibid.   ²Ibid., recensio, 8; BW 173.
³De Lib. Arb. 5; BW 167.
forms which function in a normative capacity in relation to subsequent created entities, statements relating to the same, and such necessary truths as considered above. It is important to realize the different senses that Grosseteste attributes to 'necessitas' and 'necessarium'. The eternal reasons or forms must be further examined in their normative function as the ground of the being of created truth.

It may seem that the exemplary and archetypal forms and reasons of created things spoken in the divine Word preclude any dynamism and process of becoming within the created structure. On the contrary, by detaching the final and formal exemplars and causes of things from the created themselves in relation to which the created entities possess varying degrees of being, Grosseteste's doctrine makes possible a greater degree of becoming within creation. There is also the substantial form that is joined to the thing itself by which the thing is what it is. It will be seen that the actuality of a creature is its agreement with its form and its potency is its dissimilitude to the same. It is not that form which is joined to the thing itself which is the final ground of the being of the thing itself. The exemplary cause and form which is altogether outside the thing is the final ground of its being. The latter is of much more significance than the form that is immanent within creation. The supreme Truth is the "rectitudo rectificans" which makes possible "rectitudines rectificatae." The created entity has

\footnote{De Ver.; BW 135.}
its truth and being by virtue of its relation to the measure by which it is measured, viz., the supreme Truth.

How then do these reasons in the divine Word function as the ground of creaturely being and also allow for movement and becoming in the creaturely realm? These rationes have a twofold character both as final and formal causes and consequently, as such, they serve as the basis for the first and second plenitude of created being. Final and formal cause are not to be looked upon as two distinct exemplars but only as a distinction within the one exemplar spoken with reference to a particular creature to be created. The created being moves within the confines designated by these polarities of the exemplar. A thing must be conformed to the exemplar as formal cause if the thing is to have any being whatsoever. How is the exemplary form a final cause?

In his discussion of Aristotle's four causes Grosseteste speaks as follows concerning the final cause or finis: "Dicitur enim primum bonum intentum in mente agentis et secundo modo dicitur finis quod est ultimum in re operata."¹ The finis or bonum of the thing to be created is in the mind of God the agent. The true good or end exists in the first Intellect. That species of the good existing in the human anima is only a similitude of the true end or purpose existing outside the anima. Grosseteste would also speak of the finis of the thing to be created as the

¹De Statu; BW 125.
ultimate form of the thing which causes its motion: "... et hoc est idem cum ultima forma rei et proprie appellatur terminus sive finis intentus."\(^1\) The exemplary form is certainly no less than the full and perfect form and this includes the finis to be realized and fulfilled by the created thing informed. Grosseteste puts the following rhetorical question: "Item: quid est forma, nisi completio rei sive perfectio?"\(^2\) In commenting on Aristotle's contention that we have scientific knowledge of things in knowing their causes Grosseteste says:

> Manifestum est itaque quod in his quae sunt a natura aut arte semper est causa finalis id quod est secunda perfectio et bonitas eius, sed in rebus fortuitis nihil fit propter aliquid.\(^3\)

The exemplary form as the ultimate form and the finis of the entity to be created brings forward the second perfection and the goodness of the thing. This is the norm, and for the creature to have fulness of esse he must be conformed to the ultimate form. Grosseteste states further: "Finis vero est causa formae et forma est causa materiae, et materia non est nisi occasio formae ut sit, et finis etiam est causa efficientis inquantum efficiens."\(^4\)

Grosseteste speaks of how the efficient, formal and final causes are combined into one:

> Efficiens autem, quod habet in se potentiam et actum, non a potentia, sed ab actu dicitur efficiens, quia actus effici-

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\(^1\)Ibid.; BW 126.  
\(^2\)De Unica; BW 108.  
\(^3\)Comm. Post. II.3; f. 36.  
\(^4\)Ibid.; II.2; f. 34.
Although this is not strictly applicable to the supreme Truth and the exemplary forms, it does shed some light on the relation between final cause and the formal cause. The supreme Truth, in speaking the exemplary reasons of things, perfectly understands and loves that which he speaks. He also effects the creature in accordance with the exemplary form understood and loved. The supreme Truth creates things with a view to their full realization of the **bonum or finis** intended. In contrasting the supreme Truth as efficient cause with created efficient causes as secondary causes, Grosseteste says that in the latter the "**intentio boni**" is added over and above the "**speculationem essentiae**." It is considerably different with the **substantia simplicissima** in which the **intentio boni** is not added over and above the contemplation of the essence of the thing.

Although the eternal reasons of things are certainly nothing less than the perfect and ultimate forms of things, and can be nothing less, they may function also as determinative and normative forms which in a more static fashion distinguish one species from another species. This means that an entity can belong to a particular species and have **plenum esse primum** without having attained perfect conformity to the **ultima forma**. Grosseteste

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1 *De Statu; BW* 121.
has entities corresponding in varying degrees to the finis or ultima forma which is transcendent and primary. The substantial form that is joined to the thing itself is much inferior to the exemplary form in the mind of God. In fact, Grosseteste has a number of levels on which the forms are to be found. The fourth and lowest is the level of the created res. He states: "Quarto modo cognoscitur res in sua causa formali quae est in ipsa a qua ipsa est hoc est . . . ."¹ He speaks further regarding these most disparate forms:

. . . et nihil est creature nisi species duplex, scilicet species aliquo modo genita ex ea, per quam est cognitio incompleta; et species antecedens, scilicet forma eius exemplaris, que est tota causa et verissima individui, et eadem una omnium.²

In this statement we have a clear reference to the form that is to be found in the singular creature itself, setting it apart from other singulars both of its own and other species. Reference is also made to the antecedent form or exemplary form which is the most true and complete cause of the particular. Each individual entity has no less than plenum esse primum whereby it has membership in a particular species, and for this degree of esse it is radically dependent on the forma exemplaris which is its ground of being. Grosseteste says of the exemplary form: "Igitur per eam est verissima cognitio uniuscuisque individui,

¹Comm. Post. I.7; f. 8.
²Quaest. Theol. [I] (i); Callus 195.
sed non est divisa per singula, sed una est omnium et etiam unius tantum."¹ The exemplary form is also the ground of the truest knowledge of any single individual. The exemplary form does not suffer division or multiplicity in relation to singulars which of course possess varying degrees of being. The exemplary form is one and yet it has a particularized relationship to every member of the species of which it is the exemplar. Grosseteste does not spell out precisely the exact character of the immanent forma joined to the created entity and how it compares to the universalia incorruptibilia and the forma exemplaris in the divine mind. This is partially apparent in the following words: "... quia forma est, qua res est id quod est, velut humanitas, qua homo est homo, forma hominis est."² The ambiguity revolves around the intended sense of such a word as 'humanitas' in the different contexts in which such a word is used. The meaning is sufficiently clear where the referent is plainly the forma in the divine Word. Such is not the case where Grosseteste is using such a word as 'humanitas' with regard to the immanent form that is situated in the composite particular. It appears that in the latter case he has in mind that which is similar to Aristotle's universal or which is situated in the members of the infima species. This is apparent where Grosseteste speaks of "verus homo" as the man having first fullness of being: "... verus homo est animal, quod componitur

¹Ibid.; Callus 195-196. ²De Unica; BW 108.
ex corpore et anima rationali.\textsuperscript{1} Grosseteste uses the above definition to illustrate the \textit{plenum esse primum}. It is clear, however, that Grosseteste's understanding of the nature of \textit{humanitas} extends far beyond this definition. Grosseteste's commentary on formal definition offers some light:

Diffinitio autem formalis dicitur ostendere quod quid erat esse, quod forma est vere essentia ipsius rei, et dat esse proprie. Materia autem dat proprie potentiam essendi, sicut supra plenius ex praessum est.\textsuperscript{2}

Regardless of how the immanent \textit{forma} in the composite is understood and defined, the created entity's ground of being lies ultimately within the divine Being itself.

Cognitiones enim rerum causandarum quae fuerunt in causa prima aeternaliter sunt rationes rerum causandarum, et causae formales exemplares et ipse sunt creatrices, et hae sunt quas vocavit Plato ideas et mundum archetypum, et hae sunt secundum ipsum genera et species et principia tam essendi quam cognoscendi, . . . .\textsuperscript{3}

There is also a penultimate ground of being which are the "cognitiones" in the "ipsa mente intelligentiae." An antepenultimate ground of being of terrestrial species is in the powers and lights of celestial bodies which serve as their causal powers. These latter two grounds are created and intermediate grounds of being for terrestrial species. They in turn are dependent on the supreme Truth for their being.

The ground then, of the \textit{rationes sempiternae} is in the divine Word itself. The \textit{ideae creatae} and the \textit{universalia incorr-
ruptibilie, which in their own way serve as grounds of the
being of singular terrestrial entities, derive their actus from
the supreme Truth. They find their potential existence in the
supreme Truth as the efficient cause. Such is also true of the
created composite. Grosseteste realizes that potentia is used
in a number of different senses. There is the potentia of pre-
serving a completed thing in being. He speaks of other senses
as well:

Dicitur enim ens potencia quod presencialiter est, sed in-
completum et imperfectum est, ut materia. Dicitur enim
ens potencia quod non presencialiter est, sed possibile
est esse, ut dies crastina.¹

In speaking of the thing to be created as having potential
existence or existence in potentia Grosseteste does not have in
mind the entity that is "presencialiter" but "incompletum et
imperfectum." He has in mind that which is not "presencialiter"
but which is possible and has esse in potentia. The example
"dies crastina" given above is more illustrative of what Grosse-
teste has in mind when he says that every creature has been in
potency from all eternity inasmuch as its causes have been pre-
sent from eternity in the efficient cause. All immanent and
created causes exist in potentia in the one eternal efficient
cause. For some created thing to be possible and potential
there must be something that is in actus, which may be the su-
preme Truth alone or the same along with created causes. The

¹Comm. Phys. I; Dales 27.
thing that is to be created most certainly exists qua creature only after it has been effected. The eternal rationes of creatures, however, have had complete actuality from all eternity. As D. A. Callus remarks in his essay entitled "Robert Grosseteste as Scholar," 'potentiality' and 'possibility' are often used in a confused fashion by Grosseteste. A degree of confusion arises because the meaning of 'possibilis' is not always made clear and explicit. Grosseteste states: "Omne itaque possible esse, cum adhuc non sit, dico esse in potentia; et omne, quod est in potentia, possibile est esse. — 1 He does clearly state that what lacks a required cause is impossible and consequently cannot be considered to be in potentia. It seems that 'possibilis' in this context does not refer so much to that which is contingent as to the power or capability of effecting and the possibility implied in potentiality. If this is so, then that which is possibilis can be at the same time be necessarius in terms of antecedent necessity. Such is certainly the case with respect to the determination of the natures of created entities by the eternal exemplary forms. Grosseteste's more common and explicit usage of 'potentia' occurs where it is used almost interchangeably with 'materia' in which case it refers to a composite entity that is not yet completely actus. 'Potentia' in this usage refers to that capability or potentiality whereby an incomplete entity may proceed to completion.

1De Potentia et Actu; BW 126.
Such *potentia* signifies incompleteness and also the potentiality or possibility of achieving complete actuality. This is illustrated where he says that the "Embryo intenditur propter hominem et est via in hominem."\(^1\) Actuality is dictated by *forma*. However, what has been of interest to us at this point is the potential existence of created forms grounded in the supreme Truth and its "Verbo, quo aeternaliter dicuntur."\(^2\) It is clear that this *potentia* of future created things involves a considerable degree of antecedent necessity.

(3.3.4) The supreme Truth and exemplary forms as *principium cognoscendi*.

The supreme Truth and the exemplary forms therein also serve as the *principium cognoscendi*. This is not the place for a detailed consideration of Grosseteste's epistemological theory but we do well to note briefly how the divine Word and its exemplary reasons serve as the final ontological ground of all knowledge. This will help to show how Grosseteste's doctrines of being and knowledge are integrated and interrelated.

At the very outset it ought to be observed that *cognitio* is finally possible only because of the *esse* of the supreme truth which is intelligible and knowable *a se*. In the manner in which the supreme Truth is the *principium essendi* of all contingent *esse*, it renders possible knowledge *qua* knowledge in terms of

\(^1\)Ibid.; *BW* 128. \(^2\)De *Ver.*; *BW* 135.
its very existence. Grosseteste acknowledges the contingent character of the very esse of human knowledge regardless of what the particular content happen to be. He recognizes the dialectical character of cognitio wherein it is seen both in terms of its own being and as cognition of entities outside itself. Such teaching does not permit human knowledge to become so easily absolutized as is the case where knowledge qua knowledge is not seen in terms of its own contingent being. Knowledge qua knowledge, just as enuntiatio qua enuntiatio, without consideration of its content, has a degree of esse just by reason of a degree of conformity to the eternal exemplar which is determinative of its peculiar nature as knowledge.

The supreme Truth and its exemplary rationes are responsible for the intelligibility of created things. The supreme Truth and the eternal exemplars are intelligible by reason of their own nature and can be contemplated by the intellectus purus.

Ad hoc dicendum quod universalia sunt principia cognoscendi, et apud intellectum purum et separatum a phantasmatisbus possible est contemplari lucem primam quae est causa prima, et sunt principia cognoscendi rationes rerum increatas existentes ab aeterno in causa prima.1

The uncreated rationes serve the intellectus that is pure and free from corporeal images as the ground of knowledge in a very direct and immediate fashion. The knowledge of the nature of a particular species can be acquired in this manner. Created things are knowable because they have been made in conformity to

1Comm. Post. I.7; f. 8.
these rationes. Levels of created intelligibility correspond to the hierarchy of levels of created being. This ranges from the lux creata which is intelligentia down to the forma or causa formalis which is part of the concrete composite entity itself. As already noted,\(^1\) knowledge derived from the forma present in the thing itself is not altogether complete. Grosseteste speaks of the "intelligibiles" and the "scibiles"\(^2\) which can be apprehended by "visus interior," which is mental vision. The intelligibiles are not visible to the eye of the mind simply by reason of their own essential nature plus the faculty of mental sight. The supreme Truth or first Light plays a continuing and immediate role in all of human knowing. Reference is here made to the great doctrine of illumination which has such a significant place in Augustine's thought.

Attention is here focused upon the doctrine of illumination for the purpose of showing how the supreme Truth or Light and the exemplary rationes serve as principium cognoscendi in terms of illumination. Grosseteste speaks of a lux spiritualis which is contrasted with the lux which is the "prima forma corporalis." Grosseteste says of the lux which is the first corporeal form:

> Lux vero omnibus rebus corporalibus dignioris et nobilioris et excellentioris essentiae est, et magis omnibus corporibus assimilatur formis stantibus separatis, quae sunt intelligentiae.\(^3\)

\(^{1}\)Cf. p. 379, n. 2.  \(^{2}\)Comm. Post. I. 19; f. 27.  
\(^{3}\)De Luce; BW 52.
This light is responsible for corporeal extension and approaches the immaterial forms but it is not to be equated with the lux spiritualis which makes possible the vision of the intelligibles. Concerning the lux spiritualis Grosseteste says:

Dico ergo quod est lux spiritualis quae superfunditur rebus intelligibiles, et oculus mentis quae se habet ad oculum interiorum ad res intelligibiles, sicut se habet sol corporalis ad oculum corporalem et ad res corporales visibles.¹

This spiritual light is shed abroad upon res intelligibiles and the oculus interior so as to illumine their true and essential natures. This light is provided by the lux prima for the mind of every knower, not just for the intellectus purus. Some intelligible things are more visible than others: "Res igitur intelligibiles magis receptibiles huius lucis spiritualis magis visibiles sunt oculo interiori, et magis sunt lucis receptibiles quae naturae huius lucis magis assimilantur."² Grosseteste goes further than this in his theory of illumination and speaks of knowing the truth of things only in the light of the supreme Truth.

Veritas igitur etiam creata ostendit id, quod est, sed non in suo lumine, sed in luce veritatis summae, sicut color ostendit corpus, sed non nisi in luce superfusa . . . . Similiter potentia est lucis summae veritatis, quae sic illustrat veritatem creatam, quod ipsa etiam illustrata ostendit rem veram . . . . Sola igitur lux summae veritatis primo et per se ostendit id, quod est, sicut sola lux ostendit corpora.³

¹Comm. Post. I. 17; f. 21. ²Ibid. ³De Ver.; BW 137.
This more immediate and direct illumination is the more significant ground of knowing from Grosseteste's point of view. Whereas the illumination provided by the created spiritual light makes possible knowledge of intelligible natures, the lux veritatis summae shows forth the very truth and being of the res. Whereas the former is instrumental in acquiring knowledge of immanent essentiae and universalia, the latter illumination enables the knower to achieve knowledge of the very truth of the singular entity which is to know it as it is in actus. Whereas the doctrine of the spiritual light gives to the intellectus a more active role in knowledge, the latter divine illumination is the more immediate activity of the supreme Truth whereby he shows forth or discloses the degree of esse or veritas possessed by a finite singular. Concerning divine illumination in Augustinianism, Gordon Leff says:

More than anything else, it expresses the essentially supernatural, ideal nature of truth and reality, which can only come through God's aid. This illumination differed from Neoplatonism and Arabian determinism in being the direct gift of God; ultimately, therefore, it depended less on intellectual clarity than on the inclination of the soul. Intuition of the truth was, as with St. Augustine, part of a way of life.1

This function of the supreme truth as the ground of the knowledge of created truth clearly shows how dependent the human mens or intellectus is on exterior illumination both of the mind and of the created entity itself. The truth of the thing is seen in

1Leff, Medieval Thought, p. 192.
the thing itself, but not in its own light. The *lux* of the supreme Truth shows forth, exposes to view (*ostendo*), its own being and also the nature and truth of the created *res*. The *principium cognoscendi* lies outside the mind and consequently the mind must be directed outside itself both towards the supreme Truth and towards created truth. Grosseteste's epistemology is to be discussed more fully below.

(3.4) The supreme Truth's knowledge of created truth

Grosseteste also speaks of the supreme Truth and his knowledge of created things and contingent events before creation and *ante rem*. This cognitive truth is perfect and immutable even though it is held in relation to contingent and mutable beings. Herein we have truth as knowledge in which there is perfect *adaequatio* with that which is known. This knowledge, in part, is normative or determinative and descriptive at the same time. However, it is also, in part, simply descriptive but perfectly true nevertheless. Divine knowledge of singulars has special relevance to the matter of the individuation of the singulars of an *infima species*.

God obviously can and does know contingent created entities without recourse to sense. In *De Libero Arbitrio* Grosseteste asserts that the knowledge of God is unchanging and that from all eternity he knows all things in one view. Does God know created things only in the eternal *ratio* that he has spoken, in *universalia*? Grosseteste answers those who would attempt to save creaturely contingency by holding that God does not know this
particular A but only *universalia*. Grosseteste bases his reply on citations from the Scriptures, Seneca, Boethius, Augustine, and on *ratiocinatio*. The arguments are such as the following:

Item: *cum sit singulairum creator, de necessitate cognoscit ipsa.*

Item: *si Deus nesciret singularia, tu multa scires, quae Deus ignoraret. Hoc autem absurdum est dicere.*

Item non amatur, nisi quod cognoscitur. Et Deus, cum non sit ingratus, diligentes se diligit. Ergo et ipsos cognoscit.

Granted that God knows singular *res* in addition to the rationes and *universalia*, the manner in which God knows these things must yet be declared. Partly as an attempt to defend the immutability of the divine knowledge of changing things, past and future, and partly in an effort to set forth the most excellent character of this knowledge, Grosseteste states that God knows according to the immaterial form which is the total and most sufficient cause of the particular substance "et ide per eam [species immaterialis] vere cognoscitur individuum; et hec species est una omnium substantiarum, non sicut forma universalis, sed verissime una." This or that singular created *res* is thus said to be known by God in a most perfect fashion, that is, "in puritate essentiae suae, non concernendo eam cum

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1De Lib. Arb. 2; BW 155.  
2Ibid.; BW 156.  
3Ibid.; BW 157.  
4Quaest. Theol. [I] (i); Callus 195.
accidentibus.\footnote{Comm. Post. I. 14; f. 18.} God knows this singular as this singular in the antecedent exemplary cause of the thing itself. God knows what he has spoken, and in his Word which is responsible for the being of the singular he knows that same singular. God knows such things apart from all the tenses and mutations of time: "Eius enim scientia cadit super ipsas essentias rerum non relatas ad temporum mutationes."\footnote{De Lib. Arb. 2; BW 160.} Such an essentia is not seen either as that which is past or as that which is future but as that which is eternally present. For each created singular thing there is a corresponding singular act of divine knowing in which the \textit{forma exemplaris} is applied to each member of a species. As noted above,\footnote{Cf. p. 379, n. 2; p. 380, n. 1.} the exemplary form is simple and not divided according to singulars, but at the same time it is the form of the one single thing alone. The singular has the \textit{forma} as its own particular \textit{forma} through the divine speaking and knowing which demands particular application.

The divine speaking and knowing of the singular in its essential nature play a determinative role with respect to the individuation and individuality of the various members of a species. In this connexion I wish to cite an observation made by D. E. Sharp.

\begin{quote}
This form as the essence of a thing might lead to the identification of the form and the existent being, and
\end{quote}
certainly Pamphilus Montius Bononiensis, the author of the marginal notes in Grosseteste's Comm. on the Post. An., does say (cf. f. 8r) that form is that which expresses the individuality of a being and concludes that Grosseteste regards form as the principle of individuation; but, in point of fact, the problem of what distinguishes the form as involved in this composite from a like form as involved in any other composite did not occur to Grosseteste, unless he discussed it in the lost Commentary on the Metaphysics.1 Grosseteste may not be as explicit as he could be on the matter of individuation but he does provide a basis for distinguishing the immanent *forma* in one composite from the *forma* in another composite. For Grosseteste, *materia* is clearly not the basis for the individuation of *forma*. In Grosseteste's hylomorphic theory each substance within the species receives its individuality from its own *forma* whereby it is what it is. The *forma* of one member of a species can be distinguished from the *forma* of another member of the same species on the basis of singularity alone. Varying degrees of actuality or being also distinguish one singular from another. The ultimate ground of individuality, however, is not to be found in the created *res* itself but rather in the divine Word where each singular entity is expressed. Singularity and individuation arise out of the divine speaking in which the exemplary forms are expressed individually for each singular entity.

There are, of course, other distinguishing characteristics which are responsible for the differences between one member of a species and another. The primary distinguishing factor is the

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1 Sharp, *op. cit.*, p. 16, n. 3.
degree of being possessed by one singular in contrast to another of the same species. There are also the accidental features which do not differentiate *forma* from *forma* but which are observable to the senses. These other differentiating features are also known by God. It was noted above that God knows created *res* in their antecedent exemplars and in the purity of their essences separated from all accidents.

God, however, is also perfectly cognizant of all beings as contingent entities. This knowledge differs from the normative knowing but is no less eternal and immutable. God knows every contingent particular and every singular just as it is: "Igitur Deus, qui solus per hanc novit tantum se, novit et tamen omnia et etiam singula verissime sicut sunt." 1 This immutable and eternally true divine knowledge proved to be problematical for Grosseteste when discussing the free will. Can the contingent be preserved when the divine knowledge pertaining to it is eternally true? Grosseteste sees a similar problem with respect to the divine speaking that has been eternally and immutably true concerning future contingent events. Grosseteste poses the problem in *De Scientia Dei*:

Si Deus scit antichristum esse vel fuisse vel fore, antichristus est vel fuit vel erit. Sed antecedens est necessarium. Ergo et consequens est necessarium. Si autem antecedens est contingens, accidit permutationem aut deceptionem posse cadere in Deum. Et etiam si consequens fuerit contingens, cum sit convertible cum antecedente, alia

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1 Quaest. Theol. [I] (i); Callus 196.
inconvenientia videntur accidere: si enim antichristum erit, Deus scit illud, aut aliquid latet eum, quod est inconvenientiens.1

Grosseteste is operating with the axiom that the necessary follows necessarily from the necessary. He feels that he must assert what is contrary to the rules of logic and the syllogism: "... non videtur modus evadendi, nisi dicendo ex necessariis sequi contingens."2 Grosseteste's intention is not merely to save contingency in general but he is concerned in particular to protect such as the liberum arbitrium and what it may will, and the contingency of antichristus. He wants to maintain both the necessary and immutable divine knowledge and the contingency within the created order.

In using the syllogistic rule which states that from the necessary antecedens follows the necessary consequens Grosseteste is assuming that the 'necessary' divine knowledge and its relation to the contingent is sufficiently akin to the necessary premise and its causal relation to its conclusion to make the application feasible. This assumption compels him to assert that which is contrary to the logical rule. However, he continues to utilize the causal inference facet of the logical rule while at the same time substituting a contingent consequent.

How then can creaturely contingency be maintained?

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1De Scientia Dei; BW 145.
2De Lib. Arb. 4; BW 166.
In *De Scientia Dei* Grosseteste utilizes the notions of antecedent and consequent necessity in seeking to resolve the above difficulty. He also questions the applicability of the above logical rules when dealing with the simple eternity of God and his necessary knowledge of contingent events. He says that in logic we deal with the contingent, the necessary, and the impossible "quorum una est mensura, verbi gratia, ut necessarii mensura sit tempus secundum suam universalitatem, sicut et contingentis secundum suam partem."¹ This explains why in logic the contingent cannot follow from or after the necessary and the impossible from the contingent. He warns against the attempt to measure the simple eternity of God according to a measure taken from time:

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Cum autem per mensurationem aeternitatis infinitae imaginatur mensuratum a temporis totalitate, accidit nobis ab hac imaginatione deceptio, a qua non possimus absolvi, donec mentis oculus purgatus a temporis compositione ascendat ad contemplationem simplicis aeternitatis.²
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Grosseteste asserts that God knows all things in one view and what is a future event for man is a present reality for God. God knows every entity and event in the indivisible simplicity of eternity. This divine knowledge does not destroy the contingency of that which is known, for necessity in this instance is consequential and not antecedent. God's knowledge of future things is to be compared to my present knowledge of my present sitting. The necessity of such divine knowledge is comparable

¹*De Scientia Dei*; BW 146. ²*Ibid.*
to the necessity of my knowledge that I sat after I sat. That is Grosseteste's method of showing how creaturely contingency remains intact in the face of the eternal and immutable divine knowledge of the same contingency. He has this to say regarding necessitas sequens and consequens:

Hac sequente et nihil efficiente necessitate necessarium est, Deum scire meam sessionem cras futuram et similia. . . . Ergo omni simili modo, quo necesse est, Deum scire res, cum sint vel præterita sint, necesse est, eum scire easdem antequam sint . . . . sic ex necessitate scientiae Dei sequitur futurum contingens.\(^1\)

In this case it is clearly manifest that the necessary knowledge of God is not to be understood as antecedent necessity or efficient cause which forces that which is known into existence. If there is a causal relationship, it is the contingent res which is responsible for the eternal and immutable knowledge of God concerning this res. This is to be distinguished from that divine knowledge which is causal and determinative.

Grosseteste's proposed solution rests, therefore, on two basic notions in particular. One of these is the doctrine of simple aeternitas wherein God has foreknowledge of future contingent things which knowledge is similar to human knowledge of things that presently exist or that have existed. Another basic doctrine sets forth the necessary character of that contingent which is or which has existed. Grosseteste says: "Item secundum Anselmum praeterita non possunt non esse praeterita."\(^2\)

\(^1\)De Lib. Arb., recensio, 3; BW 158.

\(^2\)Ibid., recensio, 5; BW 165.
Grosseteste goes on to say that if someone has spoken a *verum*, it is necessary in that it will always be true and cannot be not true. He says concerning Isaiah's foreknowledge of the captivity: "Isaias scivit hanc captivitatem... Ergo necessarium est scivisse."^1 Grosseteste speaks of the twofold manner in which truth is not susceptible of falsity and how contingency is nevertheless preserved:

\[\text{Duplex enim dicitur permutabile a veritate in falsitatem: aut quia non est susceptibile falsitatis, aut quia secundum hunc ordinem post veritatem non est susceptibile falsitatis. Primo modo est necessarium, sed secundo modo non est necessarium.}\]^2

Whatever has had truth or *esse*, whether it be necessary or contingent, temporal or eternal, will always have had the same.

Truth as divine knowledge of the contingent includes knowledge of *malum* as well. God knows evil things of which he is in no manner the cause.

\[\text{Per formam enim exemplarem boni scit Deus malum, quod non est aliud quam boni privatio. Cum enim non possit cognoscire res nisi per speciem, malum autem non habet speciem nisi bonum cuius est privatio, ipsum non cognoscitur nisi per bonum.}\]^3

The divine knowledge corresponds perfectly to the contingent entity which is lacking in truth and being for God knows the thing according to its eternal exemplary form and he can observe

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^1Ibid.; EW 166.

^2De Veritate Propositionis; EW 145. Hereafter cited as De Ver. Prop.

^3Quaest. Theol. I (ii); Callus 196.
the lack of conformity to the exemplary form and the degree of privation. God can have such knowledge for he knows "per comprehensionem causae immutabilis in essendo et in causando." Before created things come into being and contingent events occur God knows the truth concerning them. This is possible because he swells in simple eternity. God has assumed therefore innumerable relationes to creatures not yet in existence. These relationes are not eternal beings and they have no essences of their own. Only the things to be created will be essentiae. "Et propter hoc nulla sequitur ex talium relationum multitudine essentiarum multitudo." The crucial point to be noted here is that in the relatio there is the extremitas which is not yet created and which has no esse until it is created. It is not altogether clear how there can be the relatio when the one extremity does not yet have esse. In the recensio of De Libero Arbitrio Grosseteste states that for God there have been eternal relations to creatures, and if no creatures then relations to their absences. He asserts unequivocally that in his simple eternity God does have perfect knowledge of all things.

(3.5) The libertas voluntatis of the supreme Truth

This is not the place for a detailed and careful examination of Grosseteste's doctrine of voluntas Dei and liberum

1Comm. Post. I.2; f. 2.
2De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 194.
These notions have been carefully examined by such as Ludwig Baur\(^1\) and Friedrich Vogelsang.\(^2\) What is of special interest in this context is the manner in which the divine willing can also be called 'truth'. With respect to the *liberum arbitrium* Grosseteste proceeds in a rather unusual way. Having established that such exists, he then inquires as to *quid sit*. He wrestles with the problem as to whether such words as *'liberum arbitrium'*; *'libertas'*; *'voluntas'* can be used univocally when applied to God, angels, and mankind. He says that because we are dealing with a diversity of essences and different substances we cannot settle for univocity. There are, however, likenesses between these essences and this makes it possible to use such a word as *'libertas'* in an analogical fashion. It can be so used because of *comparatio* and *similitudo*.

Grosseteste makes inquiry as to the essence of free will. A working or nominal definition and a specific application are presupposed from the start. Such definitions are required if there is to be an investigation into what constitutes true and right willing and choosing. Grosseteste inquires into that *similitudo* between God's willing and man's willing in terms of which such expressions as *'liberum arbitrium'* and *'libertas voluntatis'*

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1. L. Baur, *Die Philosophie des Robert Grosseteste, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Bd. 18, 4-6 (Münster i. W: Aschendorff'sche, 1917).

2. F. Vogelsang, *Der Begriff der Freiheit bei Grosseteste* (Gütersloh, 1915).
may be applied to each. By insisting upon a single *essentia* or univocal core Grosseteste finds himself in considerable difficulty because of the *posse peccare* situated in the human will. Grosseteste has been using 'liberum arbitrium' to signify the "*vertibilitas voluntatis*." However, *posse peccare* and such *vertibilitas* are not to be found in God and consequently such notions cannot belong to the *essentia* of the *liberum arbitrium*. How does one treat the *posse peccare?* Grosseteste suggests the following:

Auctores itaque, qui dicunt potestatem peccandi et non peccandi esse quiditatem et *essentiam liberii arbitrii* per accidens loquuntur. Qui vero hoc abnegant per se loquuntur.2

Having cited *auctoritates* that argue for *posse peccare* as belonging to the essence of the *liberum arbitrium*, Grosseteste says that such *vertibilitas* is the very least of the "*quiditas voluntatis rationalis". He points out that there can be *vertibilitas* without *potestas peccandi*. He mentions the "*potestas volendi utrumque duorum oppositorum"3 which is found in God. There are more than the two opposites or alternatives of good and evil. There may be several good things that may be chosen and there may be many things neither good nor bad that man can will laudably. Grosseteste also remarks that the "*flexibilitas ad bonum et malum in homine non erit de liberii arbitrii eius*
quiditate, quia quandoque erit sine hac vertibilitate."¹ A considerable amount of difficulty might have been avoided had Grosseteste not been so intent upon ascertaining the single common meaning of 'liberum arbitrium'. 'Free will' then could have been defined simply as vertibilitas or as the will not bound by an external antecedent necessity. Qualification could follow with respect to specific usage. A procedure similar to this must eventually be pursued in any case.

'Libertas' is the word that Grosseteste uses to describe the voluntas Dei. At this point Grosseteste borrows to a considerable extent from Anselm. He refers to Anselm's De Libertate Arbitrii where the latter attributes a common meaning to 'libertas arbitrii' as used with respect to God, angels, and man. He takes the following definition from Anselm: "Ergo 'liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem'."² The divine will has perfect libertas for it is the will that always wills rightly.

Item: 'generaliter' dixi propter libertatem voluntatis Dei, quae libera est et ad volendum quod debet, et ad consequendum quod vult. . . . Esse autem unumquodque sicut debet est recte esse. . . . Ergo si est liberum et potens ad velle quod debet, est liberum et potens ad recte velle et ad rectitudinem voluntatis.³

God has the perfect libertas because he is perfectly free to will what he ought to will and free to accomplish what he wills. The debere in this instance is the divine essentia itself and the

¹Ibid.; BW 222. ²Ibid. ³Ibid.; BW 221.
divine willing is in perfect agreement with it. The *voluntas Dei* possesses that complete *rectitudo* which is *veritas*. There must be the *rectitudo voluntatis* if there is to be *recte velle* and *ex contrario*. "Et haec ratio communis liberi arbitrii, quam dat Anselmus." Grosseteste contrasts the rightness of the divine willing with the creature's willing:

In *Deo autem* idem est velle aliquid et velle consonum suae voluntati et ita rectitudini et aequitati. . . . *creaturae voluntas* non sit ipsa rectitudo, nec sit illi essentiale conformem esse voluntati divinae.  

The *rectitudo* of the divine will is the ground of the *rectitudo* of the human will. Although there is a *ratio communis* in the formal definition of *'rectitudo'* and *'libertas arbitrii'*, there are crucial qualifications to be made as the terms are used of the Creator's will and the creature's will. Grosseteste states that the same *nomen* may be used but this does not mean that it has to be used univocally.

*Sic dicitur libertas arbitrii in Deo liberior quam in angelo, et in angelo quam in homine, non quia sunt univoca, sed quia cum hic sit libertas et in angelo libertas, illa alii-cui uni propinquior et haec remotior. Sic igitur patet, quomodo una potest ei assignari ratio et quomodo non.*

Such is the case because we are dealing with a diversity of essences and substances. Grosseteste speaks about the "*commensuratio*" between *esse* and *velle* as we find it in God, angels, and men. Of man it is said: "*In patria autem erit totum esse nostrum bene esse et totum commensuratum nostrae voluntati*
ordinatae et totum esse bene, quod ibi habebimus, habemus in nostra potestate.\textsuperscript{1} Grosseteste qualifies this by saying that it is not entirely within our power, moreover, \textit{esse} and \textit{velle} will not be for us as it is for God. \textit{Esse} and \textit{essentia} are not the same for man as they are for God who perfectly wills "suum bene esse." Although Grosseteste cannot be called a radical or thoroughgoing voluntarist, he does place considerable emphasis upon the divine will where he says: "Igitur suum bene esse, cum hoc sit suum velle, omnino habet in sua potestate propria et voluntate ordinata."\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Libertas} belongs to the very \textit{essentia} or \textit{esse} of God and consequently he is "summe liberum." Grosseteste also states that "esse suum ei sit in sua libertate."\textsuperscript{3} This implies no random or arbitrary willing because he who wills is entirely good and he wills only "res rectae." This he does in a most orderly fashion. The \textit{summa libertas} is described as follows:

\begin{quote}
Sciendum ergo, quod vera et summa libertas est esse bene secundum quod vult, et habere totum esse suum bene commensuratum ordinate voluntati suae in sua propria potestate omni alio circumscripto.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{quote}

In the supreme Truth there is this perfect congruity or commensuration of \textit{esse}, \textit{essentia}, and \textit{velle}, which is a \textit{rectitudo} within the supreme Truth itself. The supreme Truth also wills rightly all created things in perfect agreement with his own nature. In the divine will is found the ground for the \textit{rectitudo}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.; BW 230. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid.; BW 229. \textsuperscript{3}Ibid. \textsuperscript{4}Ibid.
\end{flushright}
of human willing. The dynamism present in the cosmos is rooted ultimately in the dynamic divine willing wherein is true blessedness. Velle has the primacy over apprehendere and aspicere: "Primum igitur esse est velle et maximum esse. In velle enim primo et per se proprie consistit beatitudo, in 'aspicere' autem non."¹ It must not be inferred from this that Grosseteste looks disparagingly upon aspectus. Aspectus figures prominently in his epistemological theory. However, true and right affectus is a prerequisite to true and right aspectus. The importance of the will and its function is clearly displayed in the creation and conditus of created and contingent truth. Created truth is radically dependent upon the supreme Truth who wills and effects it.

(3.6) The supreme Truth's effecting of created truth

Our concern at this point is not to examine Grosseteste's entire cosmogony, which would also call for an explication of his light metaphysics and his doctrine of corporeal light. Questions pertaining to unformed matter and the first corporeal form, which produces space and corporeity, are posterior and subordinate to the questions which now interest us. The questions now asked have to do with the ontological status that is to be attributed to the created order as a whole, with only limited attention given to specific res quae res. This means that the

¹Ibid.; BW 231.
divine *efficiens* and *supportans* must be examined in relation to the question of 'contingency'.

It is clearly manifest that what has been inherited or derived from the Neoplatonic tradition by such as Augustine, and those of the Augustinian tradition, has been radically revised and altered. Even where Neoplatonic terms are utilized, their senses are radically different from what they are in Neoplatonism. The reason for this can readily be observed by taking note of just a few cardinal Christian doctrines. We have already noted the doctrine of a personal God who wills according to his perfect *libertas* and who has his own *vertibilitas* and even wills his own *esse*. It was seen that he exists *a se* and is compelled by no antecedent necessity to act. The doctrine of creation now under consideration also stands in stark contrast to Plotinian necessary generation or emanation with its hierarchy of deities. In speaking of the Christian world of Augustine, E. Gilson writes:

On the one side, God, one in the Trinity of a single, self-existing substance; on the other side, all that which, because it has but a received existence, is not God. Unlike the Plotinian dividing line which we have seen running between the One and all that is begotten by the One, the Christian dividing line runs between God, including his own begotten Word, and all that is created by God. As one among God's creatures, man finds himself therein excluded from the order of the divine. Between "Him who is" and ourselves, there is the infinite metaphysical chasm which separates the complete self-sufficiency of his own existence from the intrinsic lack of necessity of our own existence. Nothing can bridge such a chasm, save a free act of the divine will only.  

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I have included this rather lengthy citation from Gilson because it sets forth rather precisely and explicitly the issue now under consideration in Grosseteste's thought, viz., the contingent and conditional character of all created esse and veritas as contrasted with the transcendant summa veritas. The fact of creation and the resultant created truth also have a far-reaching impact on Grosseteste's theory of knowledge and his methodology in general.

(3.6.1) A great deal of Grosseteste's polemic is directed against Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the World. In De Finitate Motus et Temporis, which is also part of his commentary on the eighth chapter of Aristotle's Physics, he replies to four arguments of Aristotle intended to prove the infinity of time and of the world. Over against those philosophers who find in Aristotle the doctrine that the world had a temporal beginning, Grosseteste contends that Aristotle did teach the eternity of the world. In his Hexameron he produces quotations from Boethius, Augustine, and Ambrose indicating that Aristotle did teach the eternity of the World. He then says:

Ex hiis itaque et multis aliis, quae afferrir possent nisi prohiberet prolixitas, patet evidentem quod plurimi philosophorum simul cum Aristotele asserverant mundum carere temporis principio, quos unius verbi ictu percutit et elidit Moyses, dicens "in principio".1

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Grosseteste continues by saying that expositors who deny that Aristotle teaches such an eternity make the heretical Aristotle a catholic and themselves heretics. On the basis of the teaching of the Scriptures, the traditions of the fathers, the very being of God himself, and the nature of creaturely being, Grosseteste asserts vigorously the temporis principium along with the beginning of the created world.

In his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book One, Grosseteste cites Aristotle's critique of Melissus whose arguments Aristotle considers to be merely contentious and whose premises are false. In fact, the argument of Melissus is gross and palpable and offers no difficulty at all, says Aristotle. The question is whether the principium naturalium is one or many, and if one, is it mobile or immobile. Melissus has said that it is unum and immobile. His assumption is that what has not been made has no principium. That which is without a principium is simplex and unum. It is at this point that Grosseteste follows through the argument as he sees it. If the mundus has been made, then it has received esse and so has tempus, for they are co-equal. Time, however, is "motus simplex qui non est generacio subiecto facta."\(^1\) However, it is impossible to have successively "principium primum iniciacionis," therefore, the mundus has no principium and it is a unum simplex. Grosseteste believes that such philosophers as Melissus and Aristotle have not been able

\(^1\text{Comm. Phys. I; Dales 10.}\)
"attingere simplicitatem eternitatis." Consequently, before every motion and time there must be posited another motion and time. Grosseteste states that according to Melissus' opinio "bene sequitur mundum non fuisse factum sub tempore, sed sine inicio temporis extitisse."\(^1\) He does not think that the reasoning of Aristotle and the Platonists is altogether sound:

Sed secundum Aristotelem et [M121 B] Platonicos non est hec condicio \([\text{contradicio}]\) vera. Si non est factum, non habet principium efficiens; ponunt enim causam mundi Deum. Si eternum et causatum, eternum coequum sua cause, sicut si pes fuisset ab eterno in pulvere, vestigium ab eterno fuis- set. Secundum igitur Aristotelem non sequitur: Si non est factum non habet principium, quia secundum ipsum possibile est ut sit eternum et habeat principium efficiens.\(^2\)

Both Melissus and Aristotle are deceived and speak falsely, says Grosseteste: "Unde Melissus mentitur in eo quod ponit mundum non esse factum, et Aristoteles in eo quod putat non factum posse habere efficiens principium."\(^3\) Grosseteste would of course agree that God is the cause of the mundus although he would prefer to speak of the creator rather than causa. He does speak of God as the efficient cause but for him there is no mundus non factus and no eternal efficiens.

Let us consider further how Grosseteste comes to his position on the basis of the very ratio or essentia of the supreme Truth himself in addition to the appeal to the Scriptures and auctoritates. Although Grosseteste repeatedly cites the Scriptures and the fathers in explicating and validating his theolog-

\(^1\)Ibid.; Dales 11.  \(^2\)Ibid.; Dales 11-12.  \(^3\)Ibid.
ical doctrine, he also pursues Anselm's method whereby he validates his reflection even as he probes more deeply into the nature of the subject under investigation. He draws out implications and equipollent statements congruous with doctrines already stated and accepted. Such is the case with respect to the doctrine of creation as it is developed both in accordance with the Scriptures and other authoritative sources, and with serious attention paid to the nature of God, the nature of grace, and the nature of created beings. For what other reasons, then, can there be no eternal efficience?

Grosseteste has stated repeatedly that there can be no common measure (mensura) which is shared by God and man and for this reason alone we can never use words univocally in speaking of God and man. It is God's prerogative to dwell in simple eternity and his alone. The question is posed as to whether the creature may not be coeternal with God himself, since every cause which lacks nothing towards effecting that which is to be effected does not precede its effect. Grosseteste again alludes to the classic example of the foot in the dust which causes the footprint and which foot in the dust does not precede the caused footprint. Concerning those who think thus Grosseteste says: "In hanc caliginem deciderunt philosophantes et de humana sapientia tumentes, licit ipsi in parte viderint illud, quod huius caliginis tenebras pro magna parte possit purgare."¹ He says

¹De Ordine; BW 147.
that such philosophers, and the author of the *Liber De Causis*
in particular, write that the *prima causa* is before *aeternitas*,
the *intelligentia* is with *aeternitas*, and the *anima* is after
*aeternitas* and *supra tempus*. There is another measure for the
being of *res* which are in time and with time. Although different
*mensurae* are recognized, Grosseteste is quick to respond that
*aeternitas* in the above context is a *res creat*ata. There is a con-
tinuity of *esse* here that is out of order when we are speaking
of the *creator* in relation to the *creatura*. Grosseteste calls
for an ontological break or gap between *creator* and *creatura*
which is not to be found in the monistic hierarchy of being ad-
vanced by Plotinus, Proclus, and others of the same school.

The eternally begotten Son of the Father does share in the
same *mensura* with the Father and is coeternal with the Father,
but the creature does not.

Non tamen creatura, cuius Deus est principium et causa
plena, est coaeterna Deo, quia nec etiam est aeterna, cum
non communicat in mensura cum causa sua. Quapropter etiam
ei non potest in mensura parificari. Quodcunque ergo causa-
tatum non communicat in mensura una cum causa sua, non poterit
causae suae dici coaequaevum, sive parificatum in mensura.\(^1\)

Consequently, the example of the foot in the dust as the cause
of the footprint, which cause does not precede its effect, is
not applicable inasmuch as they share the same measure. Grosse-
teste states most emphatically that there was no eternal creation
but that the Creator existed when there was no creature. "Prae-

\(^1\)Ibid.; BW 148.
cedit igitur creator omnem creaturam et fuit creator quando non fuit creatura, sive ut potius dicatur: est creator quando non est vel fuit creatura."¹ The 'quando' here signifies aeternitas. In the mensura prima simplicissima it is not possible to have had non-esse before esse. The creature, however, has had non-esse before esse. "Et cum cuiuslibet creaturae non-esse fuerit absque initio, et ita fuerit in mensura prima simplici, non potest esse in ea mensura alicuius creaturae esse."²

The notion of an eternal mundus is also objectionable in that God would have materia existing from eternity along with himself. Grosseteste does not at this point clearly distinguish between sempiternitas and aeternitas, for materia could exist in an endless duration without sharing in the simplicitas aeternitatis. However, it is clear that he is also against attributing endless duration to the mundus. God would then be similar to the human artifex who produces entities through an already existing materia. It must be noted that in his cosmogony Grosseteste does have God creating first the unformed matter and then informing such with corporeal light and subsequent forms. In the act of creating the prime matter ex nihilo the divine sovereignty is more clearly revealed than if there had been an eternal efficiens of materia or mundus. We have already noted how often Grosseteste remarks that there can be no

¹Ibid. ²Ibid.; BW 149-150.
substantia or essentia before creation with the obvious exception of the divine essentia himself. He speaks of that which can be in potentia and yet be nothing or no thing.

Materia vero prima et omnis res immaterialis penitus, antequam crearetur, fuit in potentia; et tamen nihil unquam potuit esse materia, nec es aliquo potuit esse materia. Et haec quidem manifesta sunt.¹

The human builder or maker must have the materia, as material cause, available to him if the thing to be made is to be considered in potentia. It is absolutely different with the divine Maker in whom all the things that are to be created and made are in potentia. For the divine Being as causa or creator the quod efficit and the quo efficit are the same. The final, formal, and efficient causes of all creatures are ultimately and eternally bound up in the unica forma omnium who also provides the material cause through creation of materia ex nihilo.

As manifest in the quotation given above, the nihilum is not an aliquid. The very first matter is created from no thing whatever. Grosseteste does have his own doctrine of rationes seminales and also the notion of a more direct or immediate continuous creative activity. This does not jeopardize in any way the ex nihilo notion. He remarks that what can be said about natural things not made ex nihilo is not applicable to that created ex nihilo: "De creacione namque materie et animarum ex nichilo, nichil ad intentionem presentem."² He says of what is foreknown

¹De Potentia et Actu; BW 127; cf. also Hex. f143vB.
²Comm. Phys. I; Dales 27.
by God that "nec attribuitur ei esse ante rerum creationem propter aliquid, quod est alius, ..."\(^1\) The complete omnipotence, freedom, and simplicity of God must be recognized and affirmed. Against the eternity of the world Grosseteste also argues that if time is infinite, either the number of separated souls is infinite, or else all souls are one, or the one soul returns to other bodies, or souls would have to be mortal; however, each of these proposals is impossible.\(^2\)

The mundus, then, has its principium, and the latter is grounded in the will of the divine efficiens causa. As noted above, if one considers the divine power simpliciter, it follows that the divine voluntas could have willed differently than it has willed. Irrespective of whether he would or could have willed otherwise, God did will and create the existing mundus and it is this mundus which is the object of Grosseteste’s inquiry. This world is radically contingent or dependent on an origin or ground outside of itself and is held in esse by this source and is scibilis by reason of the same. God, in his speaking and willing, is the one on whom the creation is radically dependent or contingent both in the realms of being and knowing. The created intellectus in its being and operation is likewise radically contingent. In commenting on being and necessity in mediaeval thought, Gilson says:

\(^1\)De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 194.

\(^2\)Hex. f. 142r\(^b\); cf. D. E. Sharp, op. cit., p. 43.
As soon as the sensible world is regarded as the result of a creative act, which not only gives it existence but conserves it in existence through all successive moments of its duration, it becomes so utterly dependent as to be struck through with contingency down to the very roots of its being.¹

Grosseteste agrees with Aristotle that we know a fact scientifically when we know it in its cause and when we know that the fact cannot be other than it is. However, for Grosseteste the cause is finally the perfectly free will of God, and the fact cannot be other than it is because it has been thus freely willed and subsequently has to be what it is by reason of consequent necessity.

(3.6.2) Another facet of creation relevant to our immediate purpose is the immediacy of the Verbum Dei in creating in the beginning and in subsequent immediate creation. The Verbum Dei is, of course, foundational for the esse of everything that is, whether it follows from the will of man, a seminal reason, through the active potency in matter, or by casus. Even "ista casualia," which happen not according to the foreordaining knowledge of God, are not or are not made "nisi eo efficinte, ipsa tamen sciente non necesse est hoc fieri."² The activity of the creative Verbum is most clearly seen in the eternal be-getting of the Son, in the creating of the intelligentiae, in the effecting of animae, the first matter, corporeal light, and

¹Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 71.
²Quaest. Theol. [I] (ii); Callus 196.
the like. The creation of the human soul is accomplished by the eternal divine Word which is immediately involved in the effecting of the immanent form of man and inferior forms. "Item: ut dictum est, immediatissima causa omnis conditae essentiae est Verbum Dei aeternum."^1 He goes on to say that nothing is more proximate or more closely related to the essence of any produced thing than the eternal wisdom. He speaks of the free will of man as the "bonum indifferens" which is created by God and which reflects to a great degree the divine effecting of things through the divine Word. He says concerning the created essentia: "Item: si est aliquid, Deus aeternaliter illus dixit; et suum dicere est suum agere. Ergo cum a Deo dictum, a Deo actum est."^2 The created essences and forms constitute part of the 'necessary' sector within the created order, necessary in terms of the antecedent determinative Verbum which causes them to be.

Grosseteste says that the Verbum Dei expresses itself and speaks things. God has freely spoken all natures from eternity and speaks them into their contingent existence. His Verbum is normative and they are made as he speaks. Herein is perfect adaequatio. The essence of a created substance is altogether determined by the divine Verbum.

Ita enim est res quaeque plenissime, ut hic sermo dicit; nec in aliquo aliter est, ac dicitur hoc sermone; nec solum adaequatur, sed est ipsa adaequatio [sermo] sui ad res, quae loquitur. . . . Nec potest hic Sermo non loqui, nec

^1De Lib. Arb. 10; BW 201.  ^2Ibid. 21; BW 237.
non adaequari ei, quod dicit. Unde non potest non esse veritas.  

As the Verbum Dei speaks there is further veritas founded, not only in terms of the esse of the things spoken but also in terms of the perfect correspondence or commensuration that is established. The divine Verbum is also active in the conservans and the supportans of created entities. This will be considered below in dealing with created entities themselves.

(3.6.3) Let us also consider briefly the character of the efficiens of created truth in terms of divine motive and purpose. In a treatise of only thirteen lines, Grosseteste says: "Magnus Deus in semetipso ad semetipsum hominem fecit." Grosseteste believes further that all other created beings, even the most perfect celestial bodies, are created for man and his needs. "Stabit ergo caelum et finietur motus et tempus, cum cessabit hominem generationem." It was God's love or desire for the true good or finis of the ratio or exemplar eternally spoken that moved him to create the same. The bonum or finis of the thing is that which is willed or spoken by God in the first place. He says of the "bonum per se":

Quod autem appetitur, est bonum per se. Species autem effecti, in quantum movet efficientem, est in ratione boni. Bonum autem per se finis est; est ergo proprie in ratione finis. ... et non in quantum intelligitur, sed inquantum diligitur hoc est inquantum est bonum et finis.

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1De Ver.; BW 134.  2Quod Homo sit Minor Mundus; BW 102.  
3De Finitate; BW 106.  4De Statu; BW 121.
In touching upon the misericordia and justitia of God, Grosseteste cites Cassiodorus who said that all the works of God are of mercy and justice. "Et huiusmodi est quod dicit Psalmus: 'Omnia opera eius misericordia et veritas.'"¹ Justice is the will restoring to a certain one his due whereas mercy is the will relieving from misery and distress. Grosseteste then goes on to say that the works of the first creation were not of justice because there was no demand or claim. They were not works of justice according to nature because creation was "de nichilo." Neither were they works of mercy insofar as there was no "miseria." He therefore concludes:

Ad hoc dicendum quod opus prime creationis fuit opus iustitie, scilicet promissionis. Promissio nichil aliud est quam expressio voluntatis plene creandi res. Ergo ab eterno promisit, licet non esset creatura cui promitteretur.²

Grosseteste could have said that the first creation was an act of God's grace or compassion if the latter was not thought of strictly in connection with miseria. Grosseteste proceeds by saying that God would have been just to "solvere promissum, licet non esset iustum alicui creature solvi. . . ."³ He finds three facets in the work of fulfilling the promise which correspond to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, viz., "exigens, et promissio et solvens, quia opus talis iustitie non est nisi solvere

¹Quest Theol. [III]; Callus 204; (Cassiodorus — In Psalmum C, 1).
²Ibid.; Callus 205.
³Ibid.
exigenti promissum."¹ This is followed by an elaboration upon the operations of the three persons of the Trinity:

Filius enim qui est Sapientia genita, que sapientia est rationes omnium creaturarum, exigit se rationes omnium exprimi in natura, sicut ars desiderat exprimi. Unde dicitur: 'Delicie mee est esse cum filiis hominum', propter quos est celi et terre creatio, et omnia que in eis sunt. Promissio vero, id est, expressio voluntatis plene, quid aliud quam processio Spiritus Sancti? Ex sua enim ineffabili bonitate, que applicatur Spiritui Sancto, hoc voluit. Solvens autem Pater est a quo omnia. Et sic iustitia prime creationis in Trinitate completur.²

According to Grosseteste, this is the motivating power that lies behind the first creation. Again we see that God was not coerced into creating the world for there was no creature who had a claim upon God or who could make demands of him. God created out of the libertas of his own will for his delight is to be with the sons of men whom he made finally for himself. Having briefly considered Grosseteste's doctrine of creation we now go on to consider created truth in itself and in relation to the supreme Truth.

4. The truth of created res

In dealing with created veritas and esse Grosseteste is not concerned in the first place with a particular species or genus nor with particular individual substances. When he does single out a particular species it is humanitas which receives primary consideration. D. E. Sharp comments on Grosseteste's attitude to the forms of life inferior to man, viz., the vegetative and

¹Ibid. ²Ibid.
sensitive: "But with them Grosseteste is not particularly concerned, for, as Augustine has pointed out, even the superior animal kingdom is incapable of knowledge (scientia), and therefore of merit or demerit."¹

In his De Veritate treatise Grosseteste considers different truths and kinds of truth. The basic bifurcation is of course between the supreme Truth and created truth. Within the realm of created truth man and the statement or proposition are of special interest to Grosseteste. Our procedure is patterned after the character of the treatise itself. It should be rather apparent by this time that for Grosseteste 'veritas' can not be discussed and considered in abstraction from existing entities, viz., the supreme Being and created res. Res createae cannot exist nor can they be known as created things except in relation to and in the light of the supreme Truth. Grosseteste, however, does allow for knowledge of such as mathematical truth, creaturely causes, and immanent forms without the knowledge that their foundation and source is the supreme Truth, and without knowledge of the supreme Truth per se. Nevertheless, Grosseteste would want to say that anyone who knows any truth whatever, has some knowledge of the supreme Truth although he may be unaware of his having such knowledge. He says: "Nemo est igitur, qui verum aliquid novit, qui non aut scienter aut ignocranter etiam ipsam summam veritatem aliquo modo novit."² This clearly indicates how

¹Sharp, op. cit., p. 27. ²De Ver.; BW 138.
radically dependent is all created \textit{veritas} and \textit{esse} upon the supreme Truth.

(4.1) The contingent character of all created truth and being

It must be noted at the outset that '\textit{contingere}' has more than one meaning or sense as it is used and understood by Grosseteste. '\textit{Contingens}' may refer to that thing or phenomenon which may be or may not be and which may occur either through an antecedent necessity or without such a necessity. In other words, that thing or act which is willed is brought into being through an antecedent necessity, but the willing itself could have been otherwise and therefore it was not impossible for the thing not to be. Grosseteste finds this kind of contingency rooted in the divine willing and in human willing.

'\textit{Contingency}' is also applied to the \textit{enuntiatio}. This can mean that a statement may or may not exist. Grosseteste would declare that all statements that are true are contingent upon some \textit{veritas} or \textit{esse} outside of the statement itself. Even the statement that is \textit{necessarium simpliciter} is dependent upon a ratio or essentia external to itself. '\textit{Contingent}' also refers to that statement or statements that may be true or may be false and which do not express a \textit{per se} or essential connexion between a subject and what is predicated of it. In terms of consequent necessity a statement that is true is subsequently necessarily true.

Every creaturely entity, including every proposition, is
finally contingent by reason of the fact that it is dependent on the supreme Truth for its veritas and esse. This is the sense that is of primary importance in the present context. We have already touched upon the question of causal priority and potentia in the divine willing and whether God might or could have willed other than he has. The matter is complicated by the fact that what God has willed he has willed in the most orderly and most suitable manner. Grosseteste, however, is not especially interested in naked potestas or potentia and bare possibility. He is more interested in the actual willing of God and the actuality of created truth and being. It is all of the actual created esse that is so dependent on the supreme Truth for its esse.

It has already been observed that the created order along with time have been brought into being ex nihilo. The created structure does not possess any kind of autonomous or independent existence even after it has been created. There is a perpetual divine speaking and willing which keeps existing entities from falling into non-esse. Grosseteste, in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book One, stresses this point. Aristotle answers those who would affirm that all things are one principle. Aristotle's reply is that such is impossible because such categories as substance, quality, and quantity are distinct and cannot be reduced to any single category. Neither can several substances be reduced to one substance. Aristotle wants to show that 'is' has different senses, even when used as a copula. He then asserts that 'is' also has different senses when used to
indicate existence. Here he refers to the individual substance which alone can exist independently whereas such as quality and quantity cannot exist independently of the primary substance. This distinction between a dependent and an independent existence provides Grosseteste with an opportunity to set forth a more profound division in the realm of existence which also clearly shows that 'ens' or 'esse' cannot be used univocally. His argument runs as follows:

Si ens dicatur univoce de omnibus cum substanzialiter dicatur de primo ente, dicetur de omnibus substanzialiter. Sed de quocumque dicitur substanzialiter ens, ipsum necesse est esse per se. Necesse autem esse per se non potest nisi unum solum simpliciter eternum. Igitur si ens dicitur univoce omnia unum. . . . Sed qui dicunt omnia esse unum decipiuntur per hoc quod credunt ens et unum univoce dici cum utrumque dicatur equivoce.¹

Grosseteste emphatically asserts that if ens is uttered univocally with the sense expressed above, then all things are "unum simplicissimum." Grosseteste is able to make the unum simplicissimum the inevitable conclusion, if 'ens' is used in a univocal fashion, because of the sense that is called for by the one eternal supreme Being which has esse per se. Consequently, each usage of 'ens' could only refer to the unum simplicissimum. Such is not the case because 'ens' is used equivocally. Grosseteste argues further that if 'ens' is used univocally then "non distrahitur in multitudinem nisi per diversas differencias quarum nulla est ens, sicut humanitas non distrahitur in multas humanitates, nisi per multas differencias quarum

¹Comm. Phys. I; Dales 6-7.
nulla est humanitas; ac est impossibile ens distrahi in multitudinem per id quod non est."¹ Grosseteste also argues that "Si enim nichil esset de quo non diceretur ens univoce, cum in intencione entis non differrant entia, non esset reperire in quod diversificarentur entia."² We saw earlier how individuation and the singularity of the individual entity is rooted ultimately in the supreme Truth himself and his speaking and willing. Now it looks as though entia are differentiated as entia. However, for Grosseteste differentiation of entia involves more than the fact that the existence or existing of one created res is distinct and separate from the existence of another res. He sees every singular created res as possessing a degree of esse peculiar to itself, which is quite different from simply seeing this existent over against that existent. If 'ens' is to express the actual degree of conformity of the particular res to its ratio in the divine Word, then 'ens' must be used and understood accordingly.

The contingent nature of created truth is clearly manifest in the following contrast between esse per se and that esse which depends on the same:

Item cum unum solum eternum necesse sit substantialiter esse, omne autem quod incipit esse non substantialiter est. Quicquid incipit esse in tantum est in quantum ab eterno esse substantiali dependet, et res que incipit esse nichil alius est quam ab esse eterno generali dependere vel a verbo ipsius portari; magisque est quod ei propinquius

¹Ibid.; Dales 7. ²Ibid.
adheret, minusque quod minus propinque. Cum ergo esse de
uno tantum dicatur substantialiter, et de aliis secundum
dependenciam ab illo uno, sed prius et posterius, mani-
festum est quod dicitur equivoco.¹

Herein is expressed the great distance that separates the supreme
Being, who has esse substantialiter, from those beings which have
come to be and which depend on the one eternal Being for their
existence. Grosseteste states that these contingent beings are
supported and borne by the Word of the one eternal Being.

Another significant factor in the above quotation is that the
contingent ens which has a greater propinquity to the one supreme
Being is greater, exists to a greater degree, and ranks higher
in being than that ens which has less propinquity to the one
eternal Being. Grosseteste therefore feels himself compelled
to say that 'esse' can only be used equivoco.

In De Veritate Grosseteste further explains how the created
thing is held in being by the divine Word. He uses the example
of the square container which gives this same form to the water
it contains. If the water is left to itself it loses its form.
The form of the liquid is also known through knowledge of the
container that shapes it. "Similiter omnis creatura ex se, si
sibi relinqueretur, sicut est ex nihilo, sic relaberetur in nihii-
lum"² Every creature must be kept from falling into non-esse.
That which holds the ens in being is described as follows: "Hoc
est igitur, ut videtur, alicui creaturae esse, quod ab aeterno

¹Ibid. ²De Ver.; BW 141.
Verbo supportari. De quo Verbo dicit Paulus: 'portansque omnia verbo virtutis suae.'

We have already observed how Grosseteste attributes a number of functions to *forma*. It serves as an exemplar and is active in *efficiens* and *formans*. Furthermore, "in forma data conservans est, dum ad ipsam applicantur et revocantur creaturae." Grosseteste alludes to Augustine's notion that all things are governed by divine providence and that "ipsumque eorum providentiam esse formam incommutabilem, per quam mutabilia omnia subsistunt, ut formarum suarum numeris impleantur et agantur."

The creature, which is grounded in an antecedent necessity, does not exist by virtue of its own *quidditas* and has no *esse substantialiter*. The creature, both in its essence and in its particular existence, is radically dependent upon a source or ground that lies entirely *extra se*. Such a *mundus* is decisively different from a sempiternal necessary universe not founded in a free creative willing. Within the context of such a necessary universe it is more difficult than ever to maintain clear and proper distinctions between categories of logical or formal necessity and categories of existential or real necessity. The 'necessity' that may be expressed by a predicative or copulative 'is' and that 'necessity' which is intended by an existential 'is' are more readily confused in the absence of a clearly defined contingent order. Gilson has this to say about Aristotle's

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1Ibid. 2De Unica; EW 110. 3Ibid.
world: "It is perfectly true that Aristotle's μεταφυσικά is a
Necessity, shut down on itself, a closed system, and that any
attempt to open it up to the divine influence would be altogether
unjustifiable."¹

The doctrines of creation ex nihilo and the radical depend-
dence of the created realm upon the eternal supreme Being have
far-reaching effects on Grosseteste's theory of knowledge and
method of inquiry ranging from theology to physics. In pointing
up the stupendous gulf separating the supreme Being and creatures
Grosseteste sets the stage for his doctrine of the knowledge of
God which is very much grounded in immediate divine activity,
the Scriptures, and the auctoritates of the fathers. In addi-
tion to these Grosseteste also speaks of some other means of
attaining knowledge. Experience, observation, experiment, and
mathematics play crucial roles in gaining knowledge of immanent
efficient and material causes. Nevertheless, the nature of the
supreme Truth, the pronounced contingent character of created
truth, and the condition of finite fallen man necessitate con-
tinual divine assistance in all areas of human knowledge. The
ordo cognoscendi is very much dependent upon the ordo essendi.
Facets of Grosseteste's doctrine of knowledge will be dealt with
in the next chapter. We now go on to consider created truth
in terms of conformity and correspondence.

¹Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 380.
(4.2) Created truth and its correspondence or conformity to the eternal *rationes* in the divine Word

In the above section on the supreme Truth it was observed that 'veritas' signifies in the first place the being of the divine *essentia* apart from any notion of relationship. The one true God is *veritas per se* and not so by reason of his relation to a being outside himself. This is so even though the divine speaking is also truth because of its conformity to that which it speaks. The divine knowledge is truth also by reason of its correspondence to that which is known. One can therefore speak of the divine *veritas* and *esse* both apart from the notion of relationship and in terms of relationship. Such is not the case when referring to created *veritas* insofar as there is no created *veritas* without such *veritas* being at the same time truth as *adaequatio*, *rectitudo*, *conformitas*, and *similitudo*. Created *veritas* is *esse* but it can never be considered as *esse* alone. It is clear that there is little chance of created entities achieving an absolute or independent existence. They can serve as measures but they are always at the same time measured. Being and correspondence are both implied whenever one speaks of created *veritas*. Creation has its own ontological status which is relative through and through and never autonomous. There is a horizontal and immanent relativity which is altogether dependent on a vertical relativity or relation of the world to the transcendent supreme Truth. The created order is composed of a hierarchy of relations in which all truths are 'relative' or 'relational.'
It hardly needs to be said that the 'relativity' which Grosseteste advocates so strongly is not that 'relativity' which characterizes an individual's knowledge as relative to his own social, historical, and psychological environment. Grosseteste does deal with such 'relativity' when he discusses the spiritual and moral condition of the finite knowing subject. His basic concern, however, is with the truth of things in relation to the truth of God and the truth of knowledge or statement in relation to both. He is particularly interested in that matrix of ontological relations in the midst of which the knowing subject can acquire knowledge of the truth as that which is. Especially important is the ordering of relations and the priority of one relation over against another. Veritas is not 'relative' or 'relational' with the implication that there are no norms or criteria to which the knowing subject has access whereby he can validate or verify what he knows.

Grosseteste clearly recognizes the involvement and role of the knower in acquiring knowledge and realizes that the knower is essential to the acquiring of such knowledge. Although the knower is in part responsible for knowledge and the true statement, that which is known is the measure or ground of such conformity or correspondence. He says that veritas as "coequatio non est a re coequata, sed a coequante, quicquid sit illud."¹

¹ Quaest. Theol. [II] ; Callus 203.
The prior ontological relation between the *scibilis* and the *sciens* makes possible *veritas* as knowledge or statement. A still more fundamental relation is that which holds between the *scibilis* and its *ratio* and the *sciens* and its *forma*. These relations constitute the basis for the relation between the *scibilis* and the *sciens*.

What then is the character of this foundational relation? Grosseteste speaks of it by using Anselm's notion of *rectitudo*:

> In rebus autem, quae dicuntur hoc aeterno Sermone, est conformitas ipsi sermoni, quo dicunter. Ipsa quaque conformitas rerum ad hanc aeternum dictionem est earum rectitudo et debitum essendi, quod sunt. Recta enim est res et est ut debit, inquantum est huic Verbo conformis. Sed inquantum est res ut debet, intantum vera est. Igitur veritas rerum est earum esse prout debent esse, et earum rectitudo et conformitas Verbo, quo aeternaliter dicuntur.¹

Every creature must have a relation to the eternal *sermo* and some degree of *rectitudo* if it is to exist at all. Creaturely *rectitudo* presupposes that according to which a thing is true or right and consequently can never be seen in isolation from the *rectitudo* which does the measuring: "Et complectitur haec definitio etiam summam veritatem, quae est rectitudo rectificans simul cum veritatibus rerum, quae sunt rectitudines rectificatae. Rectitudo autem est in nullo a se exitus aut declinatio."² Grosseteste agrees with Anselm that this is an intelligible rightness and not a visible rightness and therefore it can be perceived by the mind alone. If a creature falls short of its

¹*De Ver.*; *BW* 134-135. ²*Ibid.*; *BW* 135.
debitum essendi, to the degree that it fails it is false:

"Item: Omnis res, inquantum deficit ab eo, quod tendit esse, intantum est falsum illud, quod tendit aut fingit esse."\(^1\) We have already considered the *rectitudo voluntatis* set forth in *De Libero Arbitrio*. That *voluntas* that wills rightly for the sake of *rectitudo* itself possesses *libertas*. Consequently, the *quidditas* of the free will involves the "*potestas standi in veritate sive rectitudine, et non decidendi vel deserendi eam, si habita est."\(^2\)

Creaturely being, truth, and goodness are bound up together and to mention one is to mention the others: "Omne namque, quod est, bonum est; et omne quod est, verum est. Unde aut falsum et malum omnino non sunt, aut falsum et malum non sunt nisi in vero et bono."\(^3\) Grosseteste distinguishes between that which appears to be true but in fact is not conformed to its *ratio*:

"Item: quodlibet est verum id, cuius esse conformatur rationi suae in Verbo aeterno; et falsum id, quod fingit esse eiusque rationi in Verbo aeterno non conformatur."\(^4\) Herein lies the primary relation whereby a creature exists and has its own particular degree of *esse*.

It should also be noted that each entity is found to have a multiplicity of relations to beings outside itself. It is related in the first place to the *ratio* above, then to the uni-

\(^1\) Ibid.  \(^2\) *De Lib. Arb.* 17; *BW* 222.  
\(^3\) *De Ver.*; *BW* 136.  \(^4\) Ibid.
versals in the created light and in the mind of the *intelligentia*. Terrestrial species are also related to their causal powers in the powers and lights of the celestial bodies. There is also the relation to the universal in the species and the relations to the other particulars of the species. The entity is also related to the knowledge and statements that conform to it. In varying degrees and spanning diverse levels of being there is *veritas* as conformity or correspondence. There is an order of priority as well. Having noted the relations that are determinative of created *veritas* and *esse*, the precise character of this created *esse* must be examined in the light of its two orders of being.

(4.3) The twofold plenitude of being and the related logical usage of 'true' and 'false'

The twofold plenitude of being is parallel to the formal and final causes of the thing, which causes are one in its *ratio* in the divine Word. If a thing is to exist at all it must have the first plenitude of being. On this level Grosseteste is able to utilize Aristotle's universal affirmative and his notion of the universal form within the species. This first plenitude is intended where Grosseteste speaks of *verus homo* as that animal which is composed of body and rational soul. However, as noted above, this formulation hardly constitutes the whole of Grosseteste's doctrine of man. This is a definition that Grosseteste will allow in order to delimit a species for purposes of syllogistic demonstration and like procedures. He
uses the above definition to illustrate the first plenitude of being. He states: "Rerum autem duplex est esse: primum et secundum; potestque res habere plenum esse primum et carere plenitudine esse secundi. Et propter hoc potest eadem res esse vera et falsa ..." Grosseteste, however, generally uses 'verus' in reference to the creature possessing the second plenitude of being. It seems rather redundant to apply 'verus' simply to man as man.

In connexion with the first level or plenitude of being the question also arises as to what is intended when speaking of a 'false man'. Does this mean 'not man', 'nonexistent man', or 'apparent or illusory man'? Although Grosseteste does not offer us a detailed or complete treatment of this question he does speak of the statue of a man as being a 'false man'. In other words, that which appears to be a man but is not really a man is termed a 'false man'. This judgement is based on appearance. 'False man' on this level implies 'not man'. However, these expressions are not strictly equivalent. For not all entities other than man simulate man. The expression 'not man' does not necessarily imply 'false man'. The question raised here will be discussed further below.

Grosseteste's real concern is to apply 'true' to man on the first level of being in order to contrast it with 'true' and 'false' on the second level of being. The 'true' that is

1Ibid.; BW 135.
used basically for emphasis with respect to the first pleni-
tude drops out when 'true' and 'false' are employed in connexion
with the second plenitude. Grosseteste's real interest lies
with the singular man in relation to the ratio in the divine
Word and the degree to which such an individual approximates
this ratio. This is evident where he cites Augustine: "Idem
quoque Augustinus: 'si mendax est et vitiosus, falsus homo
est.'"¹ Here again is the notion that the false is only found
in the true and the privation of being in that which has being.
Here complete actuality has not been realized. The 'false'
man has privatio and lacks fullness of being. Even a tree can
be spoken of as a 'true' tree:

Quapropter veritas est defectus privatio, sive essendi
plenitudo; tunc enim est vera arbor, cum habet plenitudi-
nem esse arboris caretque defectione esse arboris, et
haec plenitudo essendi quid est nisi conformitas rationi
arboris in Verbo aeterno?²

The imperfect or incomplete thing has within it a certain
dynamic or dialectical tension which finally is resolved when
the entity achieves fullness of being. We observed earlier that
for Grosseteste an ens can be in potentia in either of two
different ways. The entity in potentia may presently exist and
yet be in potentia because it is incompletem or imperfectum.
Within the present context such is the man who is not yet per-
fected and who lacks the second plenitude of being. In the same
man the second plenitude, which does not presently exist but

¹Ibid.  ²Ibid.
which is none the less possible, is also said to be in potentia. As long as a man is in potentia and in the process of becoming he is said to be both a 'true' man and a 'false' man. Potentia lies between nihilum and complete actus. "Et dico potentiam non quod nihil habet actu, sed quod non omnino habet actum."¹ 

Actus can also be spoken of in two ways: "Item dupliciter dicitur ens actu vel quod completum est, ut perfectum per formam, vel quod presencialiter est."² The becoming of which we are now speaking must not be confused with the natural becoming in which the seed grows into a plant. This second plenitude of being in man is not a necessary natural addendum that is found joined to the first order. In this instance the "principium transmutationis" involves the divine willing and human willing. It is a matter of choosing to bring to completion or to desist from the same: "Et in cuius electione est utrumque, dicitur potentia rationalis, quia haec in solis rationabilibus, in quantum huiusmodi sunt, inventur."³ Such willing is not found in subhuman species. Grosseteste also speaks of this second plenitude of being as fulfilment of the operation or function for which purpose an entity has been brought into being: "Dico ergo quod bonitas in unoqueque est completio secundae perfectionis eius et haec est completio operationis ad quam unaqueque res per se apta natus [sic] est, et propter quam nata est."⁴ This is nothing

¹De Statu; BW 123. ²Comm. Phys. I; Dales 28. 
³De Potentia et Actu; BW 129. ⁴Comm. Post. I. 17; f. 22.
less than the final cause situated in the ratio, which ratio is determinative of the debitum essendi. A thing truly exists when it fulfils that finis or terminus for which it has been created.

A thing's departure from rectitudo or debitum essendi involves both a turning from its ratio in the eternal Word and a turning towards a ratio or an entity that is alien to its own nature. Falsity includes both the lack of a conformity that ought to be as well as the presence of a conformity that ought not to be. Grosseteste quotes from Augustine's Soliloquies:¹ "Item idem in eodem: 'Falsum est, quod ad similitudinem alicuius accommodatum est, neque id tamen est, cuius simile apparat. Quapropter quodlibet est verum, quod privatur defec- tione.'"² It is important to note that Grosseteste as a rule does not begin with the appearance of some thing and then judge it to be true or false in accordance with the appearance of the thing. In other words, 'true' and 'false' qualify an entity in terms of its own essence. Aristotle,³ however, speaks of the 'false' thing as that which produces the appearance of something but is not that which it appears to be. Such is a scene-painting or a dream.⁴ One then judges the painting of a man to

1Solil. II.15.29. 2De Ver.; BW 135.
3Metaphysics Δ. 1024b17-26.
be a 'false man'. The problem with such usage is that it is misleading because the qualification is made on the basis of appearance. Grosseteste faces such a problem where he deals with the presence of the false similitudo. He says:

Cum enim falsum sit, quod ad similitudinem alicuius accommodatum est, nec tamen est id, cuius est simile, omnis autem creatura alicuius habet similitudinem, quod tamen ipsa non est, videtur, quod omnis creatura sit falsum aliquid.¹

Judgement is subsequently made in accordance with appearance rather than in terms of the essence of that entity which has departed from its true nature or plenitude of being. The question is then asked: "Quod si [viz., the above statement] verum est, numquid homo, qui est similitudo et imago Dei, nec tamen Deus est, est falsus Deus, sicut statua hominis est falsus homo?"² Grosseteste is now speaking as did Aristotle above. Has Grosseteste not failed to take sufficiently into consideration the essence of man? He does assert here that man has been made in the imago Dei. 'False god' ought to be applied to that creature that strives to be God or to be as God and presumes to be more than a creature. However, even in this latter instance it would probably be more correct and precise to call such a creature this or that false creature. In any case, man's true nature involves bearing the likeness of God. Grosseteste ought to have said that man is a false man who strives to be as God or who fails to reflect faithfully the imago Dei.

¹De Ver.; BW 136. ²Ibid.
One of the reasons why a certain misunderstanding arises is evident where he speaks of the statue of man as a false man. The judgement is again based on appearance. Grosseteste, of course, refuses to call man per se a false god: "Absurdum vide-tur hoc dicere. Et quia ad praesens non occurrit auctoritas, quae istud determinet, interim differatur a nobis huius solutio."\(^1\) Grosseteste's basic and usual procedure is to qualify created things according to their degree of conformity to their own specific nature and eternal ratio. Shortly after the above discussion he repeats what he has said before: "Cum autem, ut praedictum est, veritas cuiuscunque est eius conformitas rationis suae in aeterno Verbo, patet, quod omnis creatae veritas non nisi in lumine veritatis summae conspicitur."\(^2\)

The esse of an entity is shown forth by its truth. "Esse igitur cuiuslibet rei sua monstrat veritas."\(^3\) A particular ens not only shows forth its own existence but the manner in which it exists or its rectitudo. Its degree of being is proportionate to its degree of conformity and rightness. The singular entity discloses its own esse in the light of the supreme Truth. The singular cannot disguise its measure of being through feigning to be that which it is not, whether it pretends to be what it ought to be and is not, or tends or pretends to be that which is contrary to its own nature. The truth and being of the individual shines forth and is directly intuited apart from any process of

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\(^1\)Ibid. \(^2\)Ibid.; BW 137. \(^3\)Ibid.; BW 132-133.
abstraction. There must be some rightness in everything that exists, for total dissimilitude allows for no being whatsoever. That creature that has a more complete similitude to its exemplary form possesses a quality of existence not found in that creature which is quite dissimilar to the same exemplar. This brings us to a consideration of the precise character of the diversity found within the realm of created entities.

(4.4) The nature of created beings and their diversity

It should be said at the outset that Grosseteste does not provide us with a fully developed ontology, unless he might have approximated such in a commentary that he might have written on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. It is questionable whether he ever wrote such a commentary. Such has not been discovered. Grosseteste was not particularly interested in metaphysics as metaphysics. One should not expect to find in his thought the subtle and detailed distinctions and formulations relating to essences and existence which were spelled out by such as St. Thomas. This is not to say that Grosseteste entertained no ontological beliefs. This could hardly be affirmed in view of his thought already examined. Although he does not closely scrutinize *esse qua esse*, he has assumed an ontological stance which underlies his discussion of truth and related topics.

In his ontological beliefs Grosseteste is in basic agreement with Augustine. Grosseteste's beliefs, however, are in certain respects more developed and critical than Augustine's
ontological beliefs. In both Augustine's and Grosseteste's beliefs the influence and impact of Neoplatonic ontological doctrine is evident. However, as already noted, on the most fundamental levels their doctrine and thought differ sharply from basic Neoplatonic tenets. Grosseteste, for example, does not hold to a theory of emanation involving necessary ideas existing per se which by reason of their very nature must issue forth into other particular beings. Over against Greek monism Grosseteste posits a radical dualism in which the divine Being is radically set over against created res and entia. One can be certain that when Grosseteste is speaking about esse he is not thinking about a single all pervasive nature or being. We have already noted that he is very much against using 'esse' or 'ens' univocally. Each singular entity must finally be considered and intuited in terms of its own being.

Esses is not bare existence, for then it would be rather nonsensical for Grosseteste to say that one thing is more than another is. It then would only make sense to say that a thing exists or does not exist. It was noted that Aristotle himself injects a qualitative distinction into the realm of being or existence when he states in his Physics and elsewhere that primary substances alone exist independently while things in other categories exist dependently. Grosseteste introduces the same formal qualitative distinction on a much more sublime level, viz., between Creator and creature. We have already taken note of the necessary esse of God and the radically contingent esse of the creature.
The critic who would say that it is nonsensical to assert that one *res* has more *esse* or is more of an *ens* than another *res* has confined himself to thinking of *esse* in terms of sheer existence as opposed to nonexistence. Such a critic may also be thinking for the most part in terms of quantitative differentiation. When Grosseteste states that one singular thing has more *esse* or is more an *ens* than another singular entity he is in part saying that the former has a type or a mode of existing or existence that the latter does not have. Depending on the entities under consideration, this difference results from one or more other differences. The latter consist of different *rationes* or *formae*, different attributes and qualities, different types of willing and acting, and the two fullnesses of being. Sheer quantitative difference *per se* is not determinative. Grosseteste says that the ten commandments are not to be compared as such with respect to being "quia substantia magis est ens, quam quantitas."\(^1\) Not only are sheer numerical and spatial quantity not determinative of the degree or character of *esse*, but the language of quantity that requires univocal speech also appears to be inapplicable to the *ens* or *esse* which concerns Grosseteste. The exact senses of '*ens*' and '*esse*' are finally determined by actual usage and application. The mind can intuit the being of the singular entity.

\(^1\) *De Lib. Arb.* 16; *BW* 218.
There are, therefore, different levels or grades of being within the created order. The creature that has attained the second plenitude of being has a grade or level of esse that is not found in another creature of the same species which lacks this second fullness. The supreme Truth does not simply impart bare existence but always the being of this or that res or ens. Grosseteste is really distinguishing between essence and existence and res and ens both when he asserts that esse does not belong to creatures substantialiter and when he says that "non est idem nobis esse et essentia . . . ."¹ A particular substantia or essentia exists by virtue of a divine act of bringing into existence in accordance with the ratio that God has eternally spoken and willed. The ratio exists as ratio only as a divine activity. It has no essentia or esse of its own for there is only the one eternal divine essentia. Neither do the great number of relationes that are eternally true constitute a great number of essences existing alongside of the one divine Being. Such a ratio may be looked upon as nothing more than a ratio spoken by God: "Hoc itaque modo respondetur ad supradictas oppositiones, aut cogemur fateri enuntiabilia nihil aliud esse, quam rationes aeternas rerum in mente divina."² He says further of the ratio: "Quae ratio nullam habet ante creationem essentiam subsistentem praeter essentiam divinam."³ The creatures

¹Ibid. 17; BW 230. ²Ibid. 8; BW 191. ³Ibid.; BW 194.
spoken of in such eternally true statements have no **essentia** or **esse** before creation and the propositions themselves only exist as divine utterance, not as particular essences or beings.

Although Grosseteste may be said to conceive of being primarily in terms of **essentia** and **res** rather than **esse** and **ens**, we do not find in his thought any simple reduction of existence into essence or of **ens** into **res**. The latter is precluded by his beliefs concerning the creation and contingency of created beings, the nature of divine existence, and the different levels of creaturely existence. From Grosseteste's viewpoint, one cannot answer the question of what it means for a thing to exist by merely answering that it is to have this nature or essence contrasted with that nature or essence. The moment one begins to explicate the quiddity of the **res** one is involved in describing its manner of existence. To speak of a particular **essentia** is to speak of a particular mode of existence. Furthermore, when dealing with singular created entities one must do more than simply take into consideration their respective natures. In such instances one must take note of the actual being of each singular.

When speaking of a man who only has first fullness of **esse** it could be said that the second fullness of **esse** is accidental. Although he may come to have the latter, without it he is still man and still exists. However, the second fullness of **esse** can not be considered accidental to man as 'true' man, that is, man having both plenitudes of being. In the eternal **rationes** there is invariable and perfect fullness of **esse**.
(4.5) Factors determinative of the types of created beings

There are a number of factors, therefore, that are responsible for determining how an entity comes to be and the manner or mode in which it exists. Creation implies that all res less than the divine Being exist contingently. At this point there is no differentiation in respect of particular essences. On the contrary, their nature as creatures has been determined by the manner in which they have come into being without reference as yet to their diverse essences. The divine efficiens is the ground of all created esse. No creaturely essentia has esse substantialiter.

Levels of being within the created realm are further determined by a hierarchy of essences and natures patterned in accordance with the hierarchy of rationes uttered by the divine Word. At the lowest we have that matter called the elements and their combination into mixtures. These are called material forms and they are situale. There follows an ascending series of forms such as the plurality of forms in man which includes his bodily form, and the forms of the sensitive and intellectual souls. There is the first corporeal form lux which is responsible for spatial extension and corporeity. Of this light Grosseteste says: "Amplius: formam primam corporalem formis omnibus sequentibus digniorem et excellentiorem et nobilioris essentiae et magis assimilatam formis stantibus separatis arbitrantur sapientes."¹

¹ De Luce; BW 52.
A superior class of forms is that of the intelligences or angelic beings who have union with incorporeal bodies and can understand without corporeal faculties. They are called the separated forms. We note here a movement from the material realm to the sphere of the spiritual joined to the material and on to the spiritual separated from the material. There is also a movement from the particular or singular with its material accidents to the universal which is higher. The latter ascending order only holds within the context of a specific class of entities. The order ascends from the variable to the immutable. Grosseteste speaks of the universal that is more incorruptible than the particular:

Et quia incorruptibilius est particulari cum sit magis remotum ab accidentibus materiae variabilis, et magis appropinquans enti primo erit magis ens, non tamen quod-libet universale est magis ens quolibet particulari, quia universalia rerum naturalium sunt minus entia quam singularia intelligentiarum.\(^1\)

It is evident that corporeality and mutability are characteristics of those things which are more corruptible and whose esse is less stable. The elements, for example, are incompletely actualized and undergo the vertical motion of rarefaction and condensation, while the superior celestial spheres are completely actualized and pursue the perfect circular motion. Those beings which exist on the superior levels of existence are less subject to corruption and further removed from non-esse. The

\(^1\)Comm. Post. I. 17; f. 22. \(^2\)De Luce; BW 57-58.
essences of things and their propinquity to the supreme Being are determinative of their state of being. It is the divine Word which has determined the natures of things and their consequent status in the created hierarchy of being. Those things that suffer the greatest mutation are most susceptible to destruction and have the most fragile esse. There are various levels of contingency and dependency within the created order while at the same time all things depend radically on the supreme Truth for their existence. In the mind of the intelligentia are also the formae exemplares and rationes causales of things to be made. There are penultimate grounds of being within creation itself.

The above ordering is of course altogether fixed by the divine will and modes of esse are granted through the divine act of effecting beings. Human willing also has its own role to perform both with respect to what it makes and human esse as well. Angelic willing has been determinative in their sphere of operation but this is beyond our present interest. Every man exists as man but not every man exists in strict conformity to the debitum essendi, for man does not always will as he ought to will. The individual who wills rightly and whose being is commensurate to his willing is truly free and truly exists. This bene esse is accidental to man qua man existing as such in the first order of being. The bene esse is obviously not accidental to the true or authentic existence of man. The norm or standard for this true being is the final cause or purpose found in that
perfect ratio in the divine Being. Unlike God, esse and velle are not for man necessarily one with his essentia "unde licet totum esse nostrum futurum sit ut volemus, non tamen totum quod sumus, sic erit nobis liberum et voluntarium ut Deo. Velle enim propinquissime cadit super esse."¹ Human velle consequently falls ahead of human esse. The bene esse follows then upon willing recte. We find in man a kind of existential fall from his essentia as determined by the second fullness of being. This appears to be somewhat akin to what has been asserted in our time by Paul Tillich and others. The second order of esse is that existence in which there is true liberty: "Commensuratio itaque eiusmod est bene esse ad potestatem et voluntatem propriam ordinatam vera libertas est."²

God is entirely free and is completely as he wills "cum sit ei idem esse et velle et bene esse et ordinate velle."³ Perpetual beatitude follows from true libertas wherein there is no posse peccare. "Ex his iam patet, quod tanto aliquid beatius et melius, tanto liberius, quia esse suum habet sua voluntati commensuratur . . . ."⁴ Blessedness and felicity consist finally in willing rather than in thought. A man's will cannot be altered through force but only by his own volition. Man's "bene esse" is not realized, however, through a bare autonomous human will. Grosseteste wonders whether the human will images the will

³Ibid. ⁴Ibid.; BW 230.
of God who creates all things by his word without the help of others. No definitive answer is given. It is certain that God has no part in the willing of evil although the voluntas itself is from God. It is clearly stated that the liberum arbitrium in and of itself is not able to will the bonum meritorium. Our faith compels us to speak thus. Arguments are also presented to substantiate and explicate what faith teaches. That which brings about goodness must be better or greater than that which is caused to be good. If the evil person is able to make himself good, then the evil one is better than the good itself and this is impossible. Another argument is that making good being is greater than simply making being. If a creature could create good being and God could create only being, it follows that man would be greater than God and this is impossible. Such arguments are derived from St. Augustine and St. Bernard.

Grosseteste then inquires into the manner in which help from above is granted:

Hoc viso quaerí posset, cum ita sit, quod velle bonum gratuitum non potest quis nisi a gratia, et gratia nihil aliud est, quam Dei velle, ut scilicet velis rectum, cum prius noluisti: aut ergo hoc vult simpliciter, aut cum conditione.¹

If simpliciter, then man does not will in a voluntary and free fashion for it necessarily comes to be if willed by God unconditionally. "Si simpliciter, tunc ut prius non esset illud meritorium; si sub conditione, ut prius erit processus in

¹Ibid. 21; BW 239.
infinitum."¹ Grosseteste does not fully resolve the difficulty. He pursues another line of thought in which he would have us imagine a line extended to infinity. Imagine also a point on the line which can only remain fixed or can only descend. If, however, a digitum is added to the point, it will then be able to ascend if it so wills.

Sic dici potest de libero arbitrio, quod de se descendere potest, ascendere autem ad bonum gratium non nisi per appositionem gratiae, quae apposito ei necessitatem ascendendi non imponit; sicut nec digitus puncto moto in linea. Si tamen ad primam gratiae appositionem ascendere velit, potest hoc. Ergo forte est conditio, qua vult aliquem velle bonum gratium, scilicet si ipsa libertas arbitrii eius primam gratiae appositionem non refutet. Utrum tamen ita sit vel non, non dico.²

Grace is absolutely essential to willing recte and to existing in the second plenitude of being. Grace, however, does not force man to so will: "Et dicit Augustinus quod homo non habet gratiam, non ideo quia Deus non dat, sed quia homo non vult accipere; et tamen non habet gratiam quia vult, sed ipsa gratia est eam volendi recte."³ Grace makes man free for willing in accordance with the debitum essendi wherein lies his rectitudo. Esse bene follows upon such willing. The finis for which man has been created is thereby fulfilled. These are some of the factors that are determinative of the esse of all creatures generally and of man in particular. We observe a certain primacy of essentia but it is not held or considered in abstraction from

¹Ibid.; EW 240.  ²Ibid.  ³Quaest. Theol. [I] (ii); Callus 198.
existentia or ens. Because a particular res or essentia has its own mode of esse that is peculiar to itself, to speak of a certain res is to speak of a specific ens. When one is dealing with a particular ens one also is dealing with a res or an essentia. The essentia and the peculiar esse of the singular can only be immediately perceived or known and only the singular itself can demonstrate the same.

A formal definition can hardly express the particular esse of the individual entity. Neither the copulative or predicative 'is' nor even the existential 'is' can begin to communicate the character of the esse of the individual. Even the universal, which species can be perceived in and through the singular, is never considered simply as a logical abstraction held in the mind but always as that which has its own kind of esse either as the forma of the individual, a created causal ratio, or as the exemplary ratio spoken by God. The general definition and predicables pertaining to the essence of the subject are not permitted to obstruct his view of the res itself or the ratio of the thing. The singular composite entity is so significant because of its own unique degree of conformity to its ratio spoken by the supreme Truth. Herein lies the truth of the created res. Rightness and conformity constitute the truth and the singularity of the created entity and give it its own peculiar significance as a member of a particular species. Each species has its own rank in the order of being as well. However, differentiation according to the first and second plenitudes of being and truth
lies within the realm of singulars. The singular entity would not receive such consideration if the emphasis fell simply on the form shared by the particulars of the class. It is the latter which is required in syllogistic reasoning wherein the singular with its uniqueness gives way to the universal and its corresponding particulars.

5. Cognitive and propositional truth

We now come to the usage of 'veritas' which is of lesser import for Grosseteste. Intellectual or propositional truth is dependent both on the truth of created entities and the supreme Truth. The truth of knowledge and statement could be included in the above category of created res inasmuch as they are certainly part of the created order. There are reasons, however, which justify this separate treatment. Grosseteste himself singles out such truth for particular consideration. This is not to say that he subjects such truth to intensive examination. Cognition is basically a matter of intellectual viewing rather than a laborious process of mental sifting and conceptualization. The relation of the proposition to the reality signified is somewhat simplified in terms of an adaequatio or conformitas of the former to the latter. Another ground for the separate treatment of logical truth lies in its unique place in the order of truth and being. Although it has its own ontological status and its own existence, which, moreover, keeps it from becoming absolute, as only an effect it is last in the order of truth. It is not determinative
of the other spheres of truth but is itself altogether determined. What Frederick Copleston has to say about Anselm's doctrine of truth can also be applied to Grosseteste's theory:

"The eternal truth is only cause and the truth of the judgement is only effect, while the ontological truth of things is at once effect (of eternal Truth) and cause (of truth in the judgement.) Logical truth is found at the end of the series and reflects prior truth. Such truth, particularly that which is necessarium simpliciter, is taken to be indicative of other truth and finally the supreme Truth itself. Cognitive and logical truth have a twofold reference. They are true both in relation to the divine Truth and its speaking and in relation to that res which is spoken. There may be reference to the supreme Truth alone, depending of course on the content of the knowledge or statement. There can be no reference to the truth of created things without either explicit or implicit reference to the supreme Truth.

Cognitive and logical truth are also contingent on a considerable number of factors. The human mind has its own role to play in the formulation of such truth. We observed above how human willing is operative and instrumental in the development of created truth both through the begetting and making of entities and in the willing that is partially responsible for true human existence. Man's intellectus and velle are also active in the

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formulation of logical truth insofar as they offer propositions conformable to that which is. The human will determines to make a statement and subsequently formulates the same, but the measure of its truth is not located in the intellect or in the will. The knowing subject is responsible for making the true judgement but the ultimate ground of such conformable judgements resides in that which is signified. Although the human subject is active in the efficiens of propositional truth and in this manner is a ground of conformability, the prior ground is that truth which makes such conformity a possibility.

(5.1) Cognitive or intellectual truth

Grosseteste’s epistemological theory will be examined more fully in the next chapter. It is the ontological status of human cognition and the notions resulting therefrom, and their character as truth that interest us at present. Grosseteste asserts that the intellectus is not determinative of the principles of being:

Non est enim intellectus effectivus principiorum, nisi forte dicatur quod efficit ea quae sunt principia esse principia cognoscendi conclusiones cum ordinat ea ad conclusiones. In se autem sine nostra ordinatione sunt principia essendi.¹

Here it is stated that the human intellect can only arrange premises, axioms, and principles, which themselves are founded upon beings, so that demonstrated conclusions may be effected.

¹Comm. Post. II. 6; f. 43.
The universals and the *rationes* which serve as principles of being can in no way be brought about by the intellect of man. The latter can only order the notions and knowledge which it has acquired. The possession of such knowledge manifests that the human intellect is able to achieve a certain rapport with things outside itself. As already indicated, this rapport is viewed as a certain *adaequatio* or *conformitas*. Propositional or logical truth presupposes this *adaequatio* of the mind and things existing independent of and without the mind.

Cognitive or intellectual truth is achieved through mental vision. The created entity shows forth its own truth and being, and the mind is capable of viewing this truth. This shining of the truth of things into the eye of the mind sets up a type of correspondence between these things and the mind. Such knowing is hardly an autonomous achievement on man's part. Man has been granted an *intellectus* with the capability of such viewing. Created things have also been made intelligible and knowable. The light of the supreme Truth makes the truth and being of entities visible to intellectual sight. On this basis there is possible that truth which is "*coequatio rerum et intellectuum*."\(^1\) Grosseteste speaks in the same breath of the *adaequatio* of discourse and thing and of understanding and thing: "Et hoc est, quod aliqui dicunt veritatem esse 'adaequationem sermonis et rei' et 'adaequationem rei ad intellectum'."\(^2\)

\(^1\) *Quaest. Theol. [II]*; Callus 203.  
\(^2\) *De Ver.*; *BW* 134.
difficulty centers about the exact nature of this *adaequatio*. We shall not examine again the meaning of the term itself except to state that it signifies a type of commensuration and not an identity or an assimilation. This *adaequatio rei et intellectus* involves the intelligible thing and an interior or mental speaking. The *intellectus* is not adequated through the reflection in itself of corporeal images of things known. The *essentia* and *rectitudo* of a thing is perceptible to the mind alone. There is no picturing here after the manner in which the corporeal eye may be said to image or reflect a sensible object. Cognitive truth involves a picturing or commensuration between the intelligible object and the *intellectus*. Intellectual truth is taken to be that interior speech which corresponds to the *res*: "Sed cum verior sit sermo qui intus silet, quam qui foris sonat, intellectus videlicet conceptus per sermonem vocalem, magis erit veritas adaequatio sermonis interioris et rei, quam exterioris. . . ."\(^{1}\) Such speech is an intelligible picturing which corresponds to the intelligible *rectitudo* and *esse* of the thing that is known. The written or spoken word or statement is not thought to have the same degree of conformity or truth as the speaking in the *intellectus*.

It must also be noted that cognitive truth is understood to be truth not simply in terms of its correspondence or conformity to the truth and being of things but also in terms of

\(^{1}\text{Ibid.}\)
its own being. On the basis of its conformity to its ratio in the supreme Truth intellectual truth has its own status in being. However, it is far from having an absolute or independent existence. It is radically contingent and arises out of a multiple conformity. Intellectual truth does not possess its truth or being by virtue of its own intrinsic or internal coherence or validity. Cognitive truth has its own debitum essendi to which it must be conformed. It is quite clear what this debitum essendi consists of in this instance. The intellect lacking in cognitive truth fails to be a true intellect. The nature of intellectual truth will become more apparent when Grosseteste's epistemology is more carefully examined.

(5.2) Logical or propositional truth

Several references have already been made to propositional truth, but our present intention is to examine more systematically Grosseteste's view of such truth. Grosseteste does not attempt to spell out the precise manner in which the true proposition and what it signifies to be the case are related. It is clear, however, that he holds to no theory calling for a strict isomorphic imaging or correspondence. Such may be approximated in other spheres of truth but certainly not in the sphere of propositional truth. The proposition (propositio, enuntiatio) has its own type of relation to things signified and this relation is based upon the prior relation which the intellectus has assumed with respect to such things.
The nature of propositional truth

Grosseteste is very much aware of the Aristotelian stress on intellectual and logical truth. He says: "Consuevimus autem usitatius dicere veritatem orationis enuntiativae. Et haec veritas, sicut dicit philosophus, non est aliud, quam ita esse in re signata, sicut dicit sermo."\(^1\) Here is a concise explanation of the nature of this truth. There is a certain conformity between the *sermo* and the *res* inasmuch as the *sermo* fits or is agreeable to a given situation or real state of affairs. Elsewhere he says:

Item: veritas propositionis est adaequatio sermonis et rei Deus autem non est haec adaequatio, quia non erat haec adaequatio, antequam esset sermo et res; cum Deus et veritas summa et sermonem et res creatas sermonem et res signata significatas praecesserit. Est ergo aliqua veritas, quae non est summa veritas.\(^2\)

Propositional truth is situated in that *sermo* which signifies what is actually the case. It is worthwhile to note that the *sermo* signifies or points out created *res*. *Sermo* is made to refer to the thing itself in its *essentia* and its *ens*. It may be questioned whether this *sermo exterior* does indeed refer directly to the *res* or possibly to such as a natural sign or copy of the *res* in the soul or the *sermo interior* mentioned above. In either case there is no doubt that the *sermo exterior* has a clear signification and that its truth or validity can be ascertained. Logical or propositional truth is really another form

\(^1\)Ibid. \(^2\)Ibid.; *BW* 130.
of the *sermo* that is silent within the mind even though the latter "magis erit veritas." Although the written or uttered true statement does not attain to the same degree of *adaequatio* as does the interior speech, nevertheless, it does signify the *res* itself in accordance with which the proposition is termed true.

In seeking to show that there is other truth in addition to the supreme Truth, Grosseteste quotes from Augustine's *De Mendacio* where the latter asserts that truth is twofold, one being the supreme Truth which is contemplated and which is to be preferred above the mind itself. The other truth is propositional truth: "Postea veritatem, quae est in enuntiando, non audet [Augustine] praeferre animo, sed innuit eam temporalibus omni-bus praeferendam sic inquiens. . . ."¹ The truth of proposition must be preferred above all things temporal but Augustine dares not prefer it above the mind itself. Grosseteste accepts this as rightly indicating the *locus* of logical truth. Along with the truth of *sermo* he speaks also of the truth of *opinio*:

> Veritas enim sermonis vel opinionis est adaequatio sermonis vel opinionis et rei. Haec autem adaequatio nihil aliud est, quam ita esse in re, sicut sermo vel opinio dicit, et hoc est in futuris rem esse in futuro, sicut sermo vel opinio asserit eam futuram.²

Even *opinio* can be true by virtue of its relation to its object. *Opinio* is considered to be inferior to *scientia* and *intellectus*.

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(5.2.2) Necessary and contingent logical truth

Grosseteste also speaks of that kind of true statement which involves an essential or *per se* predication and whose truth is known accordingly: "Cognoscitur autem veritas propositionis, cum videtur identitas in substantia praedicati et subiecti."¹ Here it is plainly evident that such a true proposition is necessarily true because it refers to an *identitas* in the thing itself. It is not seen to be true simply because of its logical or verbal form but because both subject and predicate signify a single *ratio* or *essentia*. Such truths are required for demonstration: "... demonstrationes enim et ratiocinationes fiunt de simpliciter praedicabilibus in quibus subjectum et praedicatum sunt idem numero in subjecto, et non sunt res divise."² Such truths are considered to be necessary truths because they signify an unchanging universal or essence. In such essential or *per se* predications the question regarding existential import arises. Although an affirmation of existence is not clear or explicit in these predications, Grosseteste certainly considers them to have existential import. He believes that the terms involved in these propositions do have referents and that they name these referents. Even the terms of a mathematical equation direct us to an eternal referent, viz., an eternal *ratio*. Such truth is necessary because of the referent which is an immutable perpetual nexus to which both terms refer. On this basis the pro-

position or equation that is termed *necessarium simpliciter* demonstrates such a nexus. Consequently, even the proposition that is *necessarium simpliciter* is said to be 'true' by reason of an extrinsic correspondence. 'True' is not applied to such a statement simply to indicate an internal or intrinsic consistency or coherence. This of course does not preclude or exclude intrinsic coherence within the statement, on the contrary, the external *ad equatio* causes such coherence. In the referent is found the real or factual coherence which is the *identitas* spoken of above. The eternal immutable connexion is finally fixed within the eternal *ratio* spoken by the divine Word. Consequently, a necessary connexion is also present in the creature itself because of its conformity to this *ratio*.

That necessary true propositions depend on a certain correspondence is clearly manifest in the following statements:

Non enim est eadem veritas huius dicti 'aliquid fuisse futurum' et huiusmodi 'septem et tria esse decem'. Altera est enim conformitas huius ad suam dictionem in aeterno Verbo et altera illius. Sunt igitur plura immo innumerabilia sine initio et erunt sine fine.¹

It is not to be supposed that these *enuntiationes* themselves have existed eternally alongside God. Nothing but the divine Being and his activity have existed eternally. Grosseteste therefore feels compelled to confess that these "enuntiabilia nihil aliud esse, quam rationes aeternas rerum in mente divina."² The necessary truth is not only always true but it is always true.

¹De Ver.; BW 140. ²Ibid.; BW 141.
necessarily. Wherever the one term or the subject is to be found, there the other term or predicate is also to be found, and such is the case essentialiter or simpliciter.

Grosseteste clearly does not consider necessary propositions as being sheer formal or analytic truths. More is involved than linguistic or logical form. The impossibility of falsification of necessary truth is not finally grounded in linguistic or logical form but in a real identity which in turn owes its perpetuity to divine immutability. There is always a conformitas and a referent. The latter is always determinative of the mood and character of the proposition relating to it. We shall not treat here questions pertaining to the verification of such propositional truth except to cite the following statement concerning definition: "... unde intellectus diffinitionis non est nisi sicut apprehensio simplex quemadmodum visus et auditus." Grosseteste also speaks of the truth of logical form which is to be distinguished both from the truth spoken of above and strictly formal truth.

There is also another class of propositions that have been eternally true. Such propositions pertain to the divine speaking and knowing of contingent facts. Grosseteste sets forth a number of such statements that refer to contingent realities. They run as follows: 'Deus scit A', 'Caesar laudatur', 'Socrates scitus a Deo', 'aliquid fuisset futurum', 'Petrum fuisset futurum',

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1Comm. Post. I.9; f. 10.
such have been true *sine initio* not because all the entities signified have existed from eternity, for only God has eternally existed. These statements are, of course, necessarily true insofar as they represent the divine speech itself. They are not necessary in the sense that the subject and predicate refer to a single *identitas* by reason of which the predicate necessarily inheres in the subject. Grosseteste held, however, that the above truths, as well as all other contingent true statements, are necessary in terms of consequent necessity.

In his discussion of propositional truth Grosseteste does not seem to differentiate between proposition and sentence. This is especially evident in the grammatical form of the statements, like those cited in the preceding paragraph, which relate to the divine speaking and knowing of contingent events. The absence of such a differentiation is also manifest where Grosseteste states that the "veritates negationum omnium de creaturarum existentia videntur habuisse veritatem sine initio ante rerum creationem, utpotef 'mundum non esse' verum fuit et sine initio verum ante mundi creationem . . . ."¹ When proposition and type or token sentence are not distinguished we are forced to characterize contingent 'propositions' as being true at certain times or at a certain time. This means that a contingent 'proposition' may be true at one time and then cease to be true. However, by reason of consequent necessity it must be said that if a 'pro-

¹De Ver.; BW 139.
position' is or has been true, it at least will always have been true even though it may not continue to be true. Such is not the case with respect to necessary propositions. Grosseteste states that the latter truths are without beginning and without end.

The special difficulty that Grosseteste faces in dealing with the eternal divine speaking and knowing of contingent events is to find appropriate statements (sentences) that are indeed contingent and at the same time express the perpetually true divine dictio. In our statements we only approximate the divine dictio. Grosseteste states that such a praedicatio as "hoc verum aeternum est aut enuntiabile aeternum est" is a "formam correlativam dictioni in aeterno Verbo; propter quam tamen relationem nihil exigitur extra Deum esse."\(^1\) The verum here intended is such as 'Socrates scitus a Deo' or 'Plato scitus a Deo'. Considerable difficulty arises from the fact that man's knowledge and predications concerning contingent events are marked by time and tense while for God all things are present to him in his indivisible eternity. For God, who dwells in his simple eternity, all res are simply present.

Contingent logical truth refers to the whole body of statements or propositions that signify events or states of affairs ranging from those which are frequenter to those which are casu-ale. Such logical truth refers both to that which is brought

\(^{1}\text{Ibid.; BW 141.}\)
directly into being by divine antecedent necessity and that which also lies within the sphere of human willing. Herein the proposition may be true or may be false inasmuch as the referent is no single ratio and involves no necessary essential connexion. Grosseteste says the following concerning the contingent proposition: "Quaelibet igitur talium propositionum 'antichristum erit', 'antichristus est futurus' est vera non necessaria, sed contingens, quia possibile est, quamlibet talem esse falsam."¹ Grosseteste does not say that propositional truth is to be termed contingent only when a proposition refers to the referent that is free from antecedent necessity. 'Contingent' does not refer exclusively to that which is free from antecedent necessity, for such a restricted usage would exclude a vast amount of creaturely phenomena. Insofar as the antecedent necessity or cause might have been different than it was, to that extent the caused might have been different than it was. What truly differentiates necessary propositional truth from contingent propositional truth is that the former signifies an actual essential or per se connexion. The former is therefore perpetually true and is so even as a token or type sentence. Because such necessary truth has existential or material import it is evident that a perpetual ratio or essentia is assumed.

Grosseteste then, does not consider all contingent true propositions to be of the exact same character. In discussing the

¹De Ver. Prop.; BW 144.
contingency of A in such a statement as 'Deus scit A', Grosseteste states:

Nec tamen sunt sic pure contingentia, ut est hoc contingens: Socratem esse album, quia potest in futuro desinere esse albus. Hic enim est omnino contingentia. Sed in hoc 'duo et tria esse quinque' est omnino necessitas.1 Grosseteste wants to say that pure contingent true propositions (sentences) may cease to be true. Necessary propositions undergo no fluctuation in their truth value. Such is evident in definitions and in predicating a property of a subject. The causal definition of a lunar eclipse is also placed in this category even though the eclipse itself is not perpetual and is found in the realm of natural necessity. Grosseteste says of such a definition: "Quaelibet istarum propositionum vera est in omni hora. Et hoc est quod Aristot. intendit dicere."2

Grosseteste and Aristotle find the category of intermittent natural phenomena particularly troublesome. The difficulty arises not from the intermittent natural phenomenon itself and the sphere of natural necessity as such. For example, the lunar eclipse is not perpetual and the reason for this is clear. The phenomenon of eclipse is not something that belongs to the essence of the moon. This is clearly understood. The "propter quid" of the eclipse of the moon is also plainly set forth. The difficulty arises out of the juxtaposing of the intermittent lunar eclipse with the logical truth relating to it. The "syllogismus

1De Lib. Arb. 6; BW 170. 2Comm. Post. I.8; f. 8.
propter quid" is valid in each moment and so is the causal definition of the eclipse. The referent, however, is not perpetual. Aristotle, in his *Posterior Analytics* (Bk. I, Ch. 8), concludes that demonstration and knowledge of intermittent events are, as such, eternal in terms of their reference to events of a specific kind. They are not commensurate and universal with respect to the particular phenomenon. This leads Grosseteste to assert: "Eclipsis enim simpliciter semper est in rationibus suis causali-bus, nulla tamen eclipsis particularis semper est in ratione sua causali."¹ Grosseteste goes on to explain what Aristotle means and that Aristotle did not say that an eclipse always is: "... sed intendebat dicere quod conclusio in qua demonstratur eclipsis, est proximo habens veritatem in omni hora, sive eclipsis sit, sive non sit."² The source of the difficulty seems to be the logical form of the demonstrative syllogism coupled with the failure to distinguish adequately between the sentence and the proposition. A clearer understanding of and a greater usage of conditionals might have removed some of the difficulty. Another complicating factor is that the logical functioning of categorical and hypothetical propositions is not always sufficiently delineated. Grosseteste says further that the eclipse can not always be because it is not "natura aliqua" but a "privatio naturae." It should also be noted that Aristotle and Grosseteste do of course recognize that the lunar eclipse itself

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¹Ibid. ²Ibid.
is conditional even though this conditionality is not adequately expressed in the language of the logical inference. In discussing whether the *summa veritas* is the only truth and the truth of all true things Grosseteste makes a passing reference to the truth of the conditional:

Sua igitur veritas aeterna est et summa; similiter omnium conditionalium veritas ut: 'si est homo, est animal'. Per hypothesim igitur omnis enuntiabilis veritas est summa veritas.¹

Grosseteste concurs with Aristotle that demonstration is possible with respect to natural phenomena which occur with some frequency: "Sed demonstratio communiter dicta extenditur etiam ad contingentia nata quae frequenter sunt."² There is a category of events which cannot be demonstrated: "Cum igitur ita sit quod causalia [sic], nec semper sint, nec frequenter, demonstratio autem omnis est eorum quae semper sunt, aut frequenter, patet quod causalium [sic] nulla demonstratio est aut scientia."³ This does not mean that true statements cannot be made concerning "contingens erraticum." What is asserted is that such cannot become the matter or subject of demonstrated knowledge. Grosseteste contrasts the *casualis* with the necessary: "Sed res casualis est extra necessitatem simpliciter et extra necessitatem naturelem quae non est necessitas simpliciter, sed cum circumscriptione impedimenti."⁴

It is apparent that the singular event and the fortuituous event create special problems. Consequently, significant singular historical events do not receive their due. This is to be expected in view of the doctrine of immutability, the stress on necessary and essential connexions between subjects and their predicates, the required demonstration of such connexions through a syllogistic middle term, and the accepted method of proceeding from universal premises and prior principles to particular instances or cases. In addition, statements signifying such singular events are considered to have only temporal validity and therefore are thought to lack permanence and to have truth only at a certain time. The timeless truth is the model proposition because it is never invalid or lacking in truth even as a token sentence. It is so because its referent does not change and is always a present reality.

(5.2.3) The twofold being of propositional truth

We have already discussed the two orders of being of created things in general. Grosseteste also speaks of the twofold being of logical truth. He describes the twofold esse as follows:

Singulorum namque veritates sunt definitiones esse eorum primi vel secundi, utpote veritas propositionis, a qua est propositio vera, nihil aliud est, quam enuntiatio alicuius de aliquo vel alicuius ab aliquo; et haec est definitio eius esse primi. — Veritas autem propositionis, a qua est propositio vera, nihil aliud est, quam significatio esse de eo, quod est, vel non esse de eo, quod non est. Et haec est definitio eius esse secundi.¹

¹De Ver.; BW 142-143.
The first being is simply the assertion or the proposition itself irrespective of whether or not what it states to be the case is actually the case. The predication can be true in this first order of being even though it may not be true in the second order of being. Grosseteste makes this point when he presents an example of an enuntiatio that is true according to the first order of being: "Similiter vera propositio est hominem esse asinum, quia habet plenum esse primum enuntiationis; sed falsa est, quia caret plenitudine esse secundi." Here Grosseteste purposefully sets forth a statement that is necessarily false according to the second plenitude of being. He does so in order to emphasize the distinction that he is making. Aside from contradictory statements it is possible for the propositio having the first plenitude of being to have the second plenitude as well. An enuntiatio clearly cannot possess the second fullness of being unless it has the first.

The first fullness of being is simply the predication itself. As stated in the above quotation, it is the positing of something regarding something else or the negation of something concerning something else. To have this first plenitude of being we must have a meaningful assertion or statement. The 'false' statement in this context would not be a propositio. 'True' and 'false' in this order of being indicate the conformity

1Ibid.; BW 135.
or lack of conformity to the exemplary ratio of the proposition. This, of course, is not the usual sense in which 'true' and 'false' are predicated of a statement or proposition. Confusion may result since 'true' and 'false' are also used to indicate that the assertion as such corresponds or fails to correspond with a particular state of affairs. As Kneale has said: "Clearly it is to propositions that the predicated 'true' and 'false' apply fundamentally."¹ This is not the 'true' and 'false' that Grosseteste now has in mind, for the present 'true' and 'false' are used to qualify the enuntiatio qua enuntiatio. The conformity in question is not with that which is signified but with the exemplar of signification itself. Grosseteste appears to use 'propositio' and 'enuntiatio' as equivalents. There is no indication that each has its own peculiar sense or is used to signify something distinct from the other. Neither does it appear within this context that Grosseteste is speaking at any time of the 'enuntiatio' merely as a grammatical unit or a meaningful arrangement of words. The 'propositio' that has the first fullness of being is always subject to evaluation in relation to the second fullness. If Grosseteste were dealing only with the declarative sentence there would be no need to introduce the notion of the second fullness of being. When he speaks of the propositio as the "enuntiatio alicuius de aliquo vel alicuius ab aliquo" he has in mind the act of signifying a particular situation or state

¹W. and M. Kneale, op. cit., p. 50.
of affairs. He is very much of a realist in holding that the proposition must be considered in immediate connection with the actual entities designated. This is manifest from his continual stress on correspondence and his refusal to consider the first perfection of discourse without at the same time examining the second perfection.

Grosseteste describes the second perfection as follows: "Haec enim est secunda perfectio enuntiationis: significare id esse, quod est, et non esse, quod non est." The 'true' proposition signifies, shows, and points out things as they actually are, while the 'false' proposition declares things to be different from what they are in fact. This notion of propositional truth may be judged to be rather naive and over simple. However, the second perfection as delineated above would direct us away from a notion of crude correspondence to a more dynamic theory of signifying. The verb 'significare' has a considerable profundity and depth of meaning as indicated by Lewis and Short: "In gen., to show by signs; to show, point out, express, publish, make known, indicate; to intimate, notify, signify, etc." 'Significare' brings to mind some of the terms used by Heidegger, for example, 'Erschlossenheit', 'Entdeckung', 'Sehenlassen', 'Vorstellung', and the like. One must be careful not to draw too

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1 De Ver.; BW 135-136.

strict an analogy between these German words as used by Heidegger and the Latin 'significare'. This latter term does help in modifying the notions implicit in 'adaequatio' and 'conformitas'. These words, 'adaequatio' and 'conformitas', are more apt to make us think of the relationship between proposition and thing as a strict picturing, isomorphic representation, or radical commensuration. Although the notions of representation and relationship certainly are not absent in 'significare', in the use of the latter our attention is directed away from thinking of the relationship certainly are not absent in 'significare', in the use of the latter our attention is directed away from thinking of the relationship in terms of a problematical identity of quantity or approach to equality. In what way can the propositio and the intellectus be said to be equal to the res? In thinking of quantity one thinks of such as number, size or spatial extension, mass, and weight. However, quantitative approximation of the sermo, the intellectus, or the propositio to the res has been seen to be a kind of intellectual or intelligible picturing or imaging within the sphere of what could be called intellectual or ideal space. Significatio also involves representation, but it is of a different character than that pictorial representation mentioned above. In significatio the relationship between the sermo or propositio and the res is grounded more in the functioning of the propositio as the sign which shows forth a particular res or state of affairs. In significatio the emphasis falls on the showing forth, the pointing
out, the presenting of that quod est or quod non est. Herein the notion of representation is less prominent than when propositional truth is seen in terms of adaequatio and conformitas. It must also be added that representation is not as prominent or crucial in the adaequatio rei et intellectus. It becomes such in the realm of external sermo and the propositio. According to the second perfection of the enuntiatio the proposition is true when it declares or discloses that which is. To assert that the proposition is true is not simply to say that it is conformable to the thing or fact, it is to state also that the proposition is engaged in the act or function of bringing forth into view the thing or state of affairs. The true proposition also shows forth its own twofold plenitude of being and its own truth even as it shows forth the truth of the thing. The following statements of Grosseteste are pertinent at this juncture: "Item dicit Augustinus in libro de vera religione, quod veritas est, quae ostendit id quod est. Esse igitur cuiuslibet rei sua monstrat veritas. Cum enim sit haec veritatis definitio, omni veritati convenit monstrare id quod est."¹ Both adaequatio and significatio must be kept in view when one is speaking of the truth of the proposition.

Grosseteste responds to a possible logical objection to predicking both truth and falsity of a proposition:

Cumque hoc modo dicitur res una simul vera et falsa, non

¹De Ver.; EW 132-133.
The law of excluded middle is not violated and there is no contradiction or inconsistency here. Falsity is true falsity and for a thing to be false it must first be true in order for it to be false. The idea is that there must be some thing if we are going to be able to speak of something that is false.

Grosseteste then asks: "Numquid inest contrarium suo contrario, et fallit in his terminis regula logicorum, sicut secundum Augustinum in bono et male?" He then asks whether there are more contrarieties over and above these two in which the regula logicorum fails or is inapplicable. The contrarieties that he has in mind are those of the true and the false and the good and the evil. The question is then raised concerning the difference of those opposites or contraries in which the rule of logic fails from those in which it does not. Grosseteste then partially resolves the problem as he asks another question: "Numquid in his solis contrarietatibus fallit regula logicorum quarum alterum contrariorum sequitur esse?" To the degree that this can be called an answer Grosseteste seems to be responding that the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle do not hold where one of the opposites or contraries follows after or succeeds esse. The logical axiom is not really declared invalid. It is declared not to be altogether regulatory in the realm of

1Ibid.; BW 136. 2Ibid. 3Ibid.
esse where the false exists only in the true and the evil in the good. Herein the contrary is situated in its contrary. However, Grosseteste's doctrine of the twofold being of created entities is sufficient evidence that he does not violate the logical law of excluded middle even in the sphere of esse. As he himself stated, fullness of being and lack of being are not predicated of the same identical thing in the same manner. Grosseteste fully recognizes the integrity and self-identity of the res or ens, in his view this serves as the ontological ground of the logical axioms mentioned above.

(5.2.4) Problems of propositional truth in relation to the supreme Truth

Although logical or propositional truth may appear to be rather far removed from the supreme Truth, in actuality this is not so. The enuntiatio is radically contingent on the supreme Truth whereby it has its truth and being. Grosseteste states:

Item: verisimile est, quod si unius alicuius enuntiationis veritas, qua enuntiatio vera est de creaturis, sit summa veritas, et omnium enuntiationum et enuntiabilium veritas sit eadem veritas nihil iam caret initio et fine, nisi suprema veritas. ¹

The multiple ways in which the true proposition is dependent on the supreme Truth will not be traced out at this point. From what has already been considered and discussed one can arrive at a rather clear understanding of this multiplex contingency.

¹Ibid.; BW 132.
Grosseteste made the above statement in view of what Anselm concluded in his treatise on truth, viz., that there is no other truth than the supreme Truth and that this same Truth is the one Truth of all truths. Grosseteste argues that there are other truths, otherwise one would have to conclude that whenever truth is predicated of a thing, divinity is also predicated. In the above quotation Grosseteste states that only the supreme Truth is eternal, without beginning and without end. He then goes on to say: "Atqui veritas huius: 'septem et tria sunt decem' caret initio et fine. Ergo haec veritas est summa veritas."\(^1\) We saw how Grosseteste faced this difficulty by saying that such statements are forms correlative to the speaking in the eternal word and that the "enuntiabilia nihil aliud esse, quam rationes aeternas rerum in mente divina."\(^2\) All true propositions, just as all other created things, have their exemplary forms in the divine Word, which does not mean that the former share in the divine Nature. The ultimate ground of propositional truth is alone divine.

In the Quaestiones Theologicae Grosseteste sees a problem arising in view of the fact that everything true derives from truth. God, of course, is Truth. He says: "Sed videtur quod mala fieri sit ex beneplacito Dei. . . ."\(^3\) The underlying argu-

\(^1\)Ibid. \(^2\)Ibid.; BW 141. \(^3\)Quaest. Theol. [II]; Callus 202.
ment runs as follows: *malum fieri* is true; everything true is a Deo; it must be concluded "ergo malum fieri est a Deo."\(^1\)

Unnecessary difficulty is generated at the outset through failure to distinguish clearly and adequately between the true statement concerning *malum* and the *malum* itself. Furthermore, Grosseteste does not offer adequate clarification regarding the different ways in which 'malum fieri' may be said to be true, viz., that it rightly signifies what is or is not the case and that it is rightly related to the twofold *ratio* or criterion of propositional truth. This *ratio* or criterion is situated in the supreme Truth.

Grosseteste refers to a line of reasoning followed by some in response to the difficulty cited above:

> Ad hoc dicunt quidam quod veritas negationis negatio est, et veritas propositionis significantis privationem esse privatio est, et neutra istarum veritatum aliquid est, licet ea aliquid sit verum; unde nec est a Deo. Sed veritas rerum naturalium aliquid est, et hec sola est a Deo. Sed hii non noverunt quid sit veritas.\(^2\)

Grosseteste goes on to say that those who pursue this line of reasoning believe that truth is the *res ipsa*. This belief, he says, is clearly false. He then adds: "Deficiente enim re non deficit veritas."\(^3\) I should also like to add that if 'veritas' is taken to signify *esse*, it must also be said that the above line of reasoning is impossible. For one would then have to state the impossible, viz., that *esse* is a *nepatio* or a *privatio*.

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1 Ibid.; Callus 203.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.
In offering his own brief response to the above argument which concludes that 'malum fieri est a Deo', Grosseteste begins by saying: "Quid autem sit veritas posterius perscrutabitur per Dei gratiam." This would seem to indicate that this is some of Grosseteste's earlier reflection on the nature of truth. He goes on to say that "nunc autem supponamus quod veritas est coequatio rerum et intellectuum." Rather than assert that truth is the res ipsa Grosseteste wants to say that truth is a coequatio of the thing and the understanding. He states further that "coequatio non est a re coequata, sed a coequante, quicquid sit illud." There is a lack of clarity at this point because the res coequata and the coequans are not designated. From what Grosseteste says in his De Veritate it would seem that the coequans is finally the supreme Truth himself.

On the basis of this brief explication of the nature of truth Grosseteste describes the logical fallacy that he finds in the argument which concludes that 'malum fieri est a Deo':

Ergo in illo secundo argumento est paralogismus ac (f. 307r b) cidentis. Album est ex incoruscatione lucis et claro et multitudine in perspicuo puro; sed hoc corpus est album. Ergo hoc corpus est ex incoruscatione lucis etc.

However, even if one were to grant that this fallacy is present in the argument, a certain confusion and difficulty persists so long as it is said that 'malum fieri' is true and it is not made altogether clear just what is intended when making this statement.

\[1\] Ibid. \[2\] Ibid. \[3\] Ibid. \[4\] Ibid.
6. The indestructibility of truth

Grosseteste firmly believes in the indestructible existence of truth. He does not actually utilize a strict formal argument of the type in which one may attempt to demonstrate the existence of truth by using formal definitions or analytical statements as premises. However, propositional truth is clearly assumed in the argument of Grosseteste examined below. For Grosseteste himself there is no question as to the indestructible nature of truth. For in holding to the existence of the *summa veritas* one is at the same time affirming the immutable perpetuity of truth. The *summa veritas* does not even change in his mode of being, much less from being to ceasing to be.

Grosseteste at this juncture is seeking to refute those sceptics who doubt the existence of truth altogether. He uses an argument that is very much like theorem 17 found in Stoic logic, which is described as follows: "If the first then the first; if not the first then the first; therefore the first."¹ It could also be stated as follows: if P, then Q; if not P, then Q; therefore Q in either case. Grosseteste's reasoning proceeds as follows:

Cum autem veritas sequatur ad omnia, etiam ad contrarium suum, quia falsum necessario est verum falsum, et contra regulam logicorum etiam ad omnem negationem sequatur veritatis affirmatio et insuper etiam ad sui ipsius destructionem, quia sequitur: si nulla veritas est, patet quod veritas est, quia veritas est id, quod per se necesse est

esse. Unde enim, nisi quia per se necesse est esse, sequitur ad omnia etiam ad sui ipsius destructionem?

There are definite beliefs or assumptions underlying this argument. One of these is the belief in veritas as esse and esse as veritas. Another is the doctrine of the twofold order of being which serves as a basis for the assertion that a contrary can exist in its contrary. Another belief is that truth by reason of its own nature necessarily exists. The argument states that if there is something that is false, it is only so because there is first something that is true. Veritas is said to follow every negation including the negation of truth itself. It is impossible to negate truth and thereby destroy it. We observe here an argument that is somewhat akin to Augustine's argument in his Soliloquies: If not T, then t; if t, then T; therefore, if not T, then T. In other words, if there is to be anything that is true there must be Truth. This is one of the underlying assumptions. Augustine's argument also presupposes the proposition which denies the existence of truth. Grosseteste does not explain just what he means when he speaks of the destructio of truth. The negation or denial of truth could hardly destroy truth. Even such an attempt is considered to be in itself testimony to the existence of truth. Against the argument, however, one can say that if there were no truth, then neither could there be any true statement. The following

1De Ver.; BW 139.
criticism which is directed against such as Augustine and Descartes is also relevant in this context:

But it is interesting to notice that all these opponents of scepticism overstate their case by claiming that the proposition in which they are interested follows from its own contradictory; in fact the proposition is verified only by the occurrence of an attempt to establish its contradictory.¹

It is clear, however, that Grosseteste has made his case for the being of truth on the basis of the nature of truth itself and not simply on the basis of the attempt to negate truth. He states: "Est igitur veritas, quod per se necesse est esse saltem necessario consequens ad per se necesse esse. Aliter enim non sequeretur ad omnem affirmationem et negationem."² Truth is declared to be consequent to every affirmation and negation. Grosseteste grounds his argument finally in truth itself as esse. Inasmuch as truth is understood in the first instance as the very esse of the supreme Truth it is not difficult to see why it should be indestructible. It is impossible for the supreme Truth to cease to be because it is of the very nature of the immutable divine essentia to exist.

Grosseteste again asks whether the rule of logic fails:

"— Sed numquid hic vere fallit regula logicorum? an super omnis negationis divisionem cadit esse, ex quo esse affirmato de divisione sequitur veritatis affirmatio?"³ He is asking if the law

¹ Kneale, op. cit., p. 174. ² De Ver.; EW 139. ³ Ibid.
of contradiction has to be declared invalid at this point. How can the contradictory follow its contradictory? He is not ready to reject the logical axiom. He would rather propose that esse falls without or that it is situated over and above the divisio of all negation. Two comments are in order here. It must first be stated that Grosseteste considers logical truth to be radically contingent upon higher orders of truth and being. The esse of God and the esse of the created thing are neither supported in esse nor reduced to non-esse by the affirmative and negative statements that we make pertaining to their esse. Grosseteste also is asserting that through the method of division the affirmation of truth follows upon the affirmation of being. The latter, moreover, follows upon esse itself.

Grosseteste really spends little time explicitly arguing for the existence of truth, although in a way his whole explication of the nature of truth could be considered something of an argument for truth. Grosseteste does not share Augustine's concern to demonstrate the existence of the truth through an appeal to necessary truths. In Grosseteste we do not find the anxious quest for certainty and certitude that we find in Augustine. He does not appear to take scepticism as seriously as did Augustine. Grosseteste feels that the presence and existence of truth is everywhere manifest and beyond dispute. He is especially concerned to explicate the nature of truth and to describe the various kinds of truth and their interrelationships. His confident attitude is manifest in the following sentence with which
he concludes his brief discussion on the indestructible nature of truth: "Quomodocunque sit, manifeste inextinguibilis est lux veritatis, quae etiam sui illustrat extinctionem, nec aliquo modo corrumpi potest."\(^1\) It is certain that truth cannot be extinguished, annihilated, or destroyed, even though it may not be altogether clear just how it is to be related to the affirmative and negative statements made concerning it. Grosseteste does not believe for a moment that the being of truth is jeopardized by statements that deny its being. It has been observed that as long as there are statements there is truth. It should be reiterated, however, that Grosseteste is particularly interested in the fact of truth itself. There are true things and above all the supreme Truth himself. Contingent truth endures because that upon which it depends is immutable and not liable to corruption. Grosseteste has arrived at the certainty of this fact through his knowledge of the supreme Truth himself. Grosseteste does not arrive at his position through an elaborate dialectic or argument. It is through an intellectual or mental viewing of the truth itself, effected by illumination from above, that Grosseteste achieves such assurance concerning the imperishable character of truth.

This leads us to consider Grosseteste’s doctrine regarding knowledge of the truth. We have already noted in what way knowledge is spoken of as truth. We would now examine the prerequi-

\(^1\)Ibid.
sites and process of cognition itself in view of that which has been discussed above. The order of knowing finds its place within the matrix of relationships already spelled out. Grosseteste's epistemological doctrine is founded upon what is known and the reality of knowledge itself. Grosseteste's procedure is to trace out the way to the knowledge of truth and to reflect upon the process of knowing as he has experienced it. The doctrine of truth expounded above clearly shows that for Grosseteste knowledge is not merely possible but actual. The actuality of knowledge is not in doubt. With this understood, the character and media of knowledge can be examined and set forth.