The Founding Principles of the Africa Inland Mission

and

Their Interaction with the African Context in Kenya

From 1895 to 1939:

the Study of a Faith Mission

by

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I wish to declare that the whole of this thesis is my own research and writing.

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ABSTRACT

Faith missions have been largely overlooked in scholarly study, and when noted often with varying degrees of misunderstanding. The purpose of this study is to examine the founding principles of a faith mission, the Africa Inland Mission. Because A.I.M. is predominantly an American mission, these principles will be studied in their American, religious context. The development and application of these principles and their interaction with the African context in Kenya is examined. Mission correspondence, documents, articles and memoirs provide the sources for this study.

As a lay mission, A.I.M. thought that education and training were not needed by missionaries to Africa. The qualities that were thought to be needed, particularly Keswick piety and a missionary "call", are examined. After arriving in Kenya, the missionaries discovered that more education was required by the African context than they thought.

As a faith mission, A.I.M. did not believe in soliciting funds, preferring to rely upon God alone, through prayer to supply her needs. The origin of this policy and its relationship to the Mission's Keswick piety are examined along with the change in the Faith Basis introduced by Charles Hurlburt. The tensions produced between the need to rely upon God alone for the Mission's needs, the need of communication with the Mission's constituency, the need to develop adequate administrative structures and the conflicts within the Mission produced by these tensions are examined.

As a field-governed mission, A.I.M. was to be governed by the missionaries on the field. In practice the Mission was first dominated by the charismatic leadership of the founder Peter Cameron Scott, then by a strong General Director, Charles Hurlburt, and finally by the home councils. The tensions that caused these changes and the results of the changes are examined.

As an evangelistic mission, A.I.M.'s theology of mission emphasized
evangelism over education and other social welfare ministries. In this section A.I.M.'s theology and motives for evangelism are examined.

When A.I.M. attempted to put its evangelism into practice in Kenya, she found tensions between her theory of evangelism, her pragmatism in regard to evangelistic methods, and the Kenyan context that lead to conflicts over social welfare ministries. The methods, obstacles, and progress of A.I.M.'s evangelism in Kenya are also examined.

The educational conflict between A.I.M., the Kenyan colonial government, and A.I.M.'s African converts highlighted the interaction between A.I.M.'s missionary principles and the African context in Kenya.

As an ecumenical mission, A.I.M. attempted to maintain positive relationships with other protestant missions. A.I.M.'s cooperation with other missions in Kenya, participation in the Kikuyu church union movement, and the limits of A.I.M.'s ecumenism are examined.

Indigenous church principles were not part of AIM's original principles. Reasons for this are suggested, the introduction of these principles under Charles Hurlburt is noted, and the attempt to implement them is evaluated.

This study gives a clearer understanding of the actions of A.I.M. in Kenya prior to World War II and the reasons for them and contributes to our knowledge of faith missions.
ABBREVIATIONS

Africa Inland Mission ......................... A.I.M.
Africa Inland Mission ......................... the Mission
A I M. Kenya Branch Archives, Box#, File # ................ KBA,#,#
A.I.M. Kenya Branch Archives: File Designation . KBA:
American Home Council of A.I.M. ................ A.H.C.
Bible Churchmen's Missionary Society .............. B.C.M.S.
Billy Graham Center Archives,
Collection 81, Box#, File # .................... BGC,#,#
British Home Council of A.I.M. ................... B.H.C.
Constitution and Policy of the
Africa Inland Mission, date ..................... A.I.M. Constitution, date
Church Missionary Society ..................... C.M.S.
Church of Scotland Mission ..................... C.S.M.
Friends Africa Mission ....................... F.A.M.
Friends Africa Industrial Mission .............. F.A.I.M.
Gospel Furthing Fellowship ..................... G.F.F.
Gospel Missionary Society ..................... G.M.S.
Hearing and Doing ............................. H&D
Heart of Africa Mission ....................... H.A.M.
Inland Africa ................................ IA
Kenya Field Council of A.I.M. .................. K.F.C.
Minutes of the Chicago District
Committee of the Africa Inland Mission ........... Chicago District Committee

v
Minutes of the Los Angeles District Committee of the Africa Inland Mission ... Los Angeles District Committee

Minutes of the Minneapolis District Committee of the Africa Inland Mission ... Minneapolis District Committee

Minutes of the Twin Cities District Committee of the Africa Inland Mission ... Twin Cities District Committee

Pennsylvania Bible Institute .................. P.B.I.

Philadelphia Missionary Council ............. P.M.C.

Rift Valley Academy ......................... R.V.A.

South Africa General Mission ............... S.A.G.M.

Sudan Interior Mission ...................... S.I.M.

Unevangelized Africa Mission ............... U.A.M.

United Methodist Mission ................... U.M.M.

Universities Mission to Central Africa ........ U.M.C.A.
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PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

The interdenominational faith missions were a large and important late nineteenth and twentieth century missionary movement. However, they have been little studied, so their contribution to the evangelization and development of the church in Africa is not well understood. This study will contribute to an understanding of that movement.

The Africa Inland Mission is an interdenominational faith mission. Its missionaries have worked throughout Kenya for a hundred years, especially among the Kamba, Gikuyu, and Kalenjin peoples. They have been pioneers in translation, education, medicine, church union, publishing, and broadcasting. Their efforts have resulted in one of the largest denominations in Kenya, the Africa Inland Church, with congregations found in nearly every corner of the country. An assessment of the impact of A.I.M. upon Christianity in Kenya requires an understanding of the Mission and its missionaries from within their own context. To arrive at such an understanding is the purpose of this study.

1895 was the year when A.I.M. was founded, its missiological principles were first articulated, and its work was begun in Kenya. Until 1909 Kenya was A.I.M.'s only field, and after that it always remained A.I.M.'s largest field. As A.I.M.'s largest field, most of the issues that A.I.M. faced as a mission were faced in Kenya. Furthermore, as one of the largest missionary societies to have worked in Kenya, A.I.M. had a larger impact on the church in Kenya than in its other fields. World War II brought to a close one period of both Kenyan and A.I.M. history and opened another. By 1939 the founders of the Mission had all died; a new generation of missionaries had arrived; radical changes in some principles and policies were
introduced, and new challenges were being faced. This study will focus on this initial period up to 1939, particularly in Kenya.

Drawing on mission correspondence, documents, articles, memoirs, and the author’s twenty-years experience as an A.I.M. missionary in Kenya, we shall examine the founding principles of the Africa Inland Mission, the significant influences that shaped them and modified them, and how they affected the work of the Mission in Kenya during the years 1895 to 1939. This will lead to a better understanding of the nature of A.I.M., its work in Kenya, and impact on Christianity in Kenya, particularly on the Africa Inland Church.

KENYA BEFORE THE MISSIONARIES

At the dawn of the nineteenth century life in the interior of Kenya was continuing much as it had for centuries. It was a stable, Iron Age culture of self-sufficient villages\(^1\), where people cultivated their fields, followed their cattle, traded, fought, worshipped, lived, married and died in the same manner as their forefathers since time immemorial. Peoples moved into or within the region, in the words of Roland Oliver, "like the ebb and flow of tides in the sea" with new groups being absorbed by people already settled there.\(^2\) By the turn of the century, the Highland Nilotic\(^3\) and Plains Nilotic pastoralist occupied the dry, central highland steppe and

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\(^2\) Roland Oliver, "Discernible Developments in the Interior @1500-1884," in *History of East Africa*, vol. 1, p. 171.

\(^3\) The older terms "Hamitic" and "Nilo-Hamitic" have been considered by some to be compromised by the so-called "Hamitic Myth" which is inaccurate when it suggests that all cultural borrowing was from the "Hamites" to other African groups, and is racist when it suggests that the "Hamites" had a superior culture because they are the Africans most similar to Europeans. Hence, it is best to avoid using the terms. See J. E. G. Sutton, "The Settlement of East Africa," in *Zamani: A Survey of East African History*, eds. B. A. Ogot and J. A. Kieran

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the agricultural Bantu occupied the land to the east, south, and west.\textsuperscript{4}

1. The Masai

The greatest power in Kenya\textsuperscript{5} at this time was the Masai. Having emerged from the southern end of Lake Turkana onto the Uasin Gishu plateau in the late sixteenth century, they pushed past the existing Highland Nilotes, over the central highlands, and down the Rift Valley into Tanzania.\textsuperscript{6} From here the Masai raided far and wide spreading terror in their insatiable lust for cattle and war.\textsuperscript{7} They drove the


\textsuperscript{4}Oliver, "Interior @1500-1884," p. 203.

\textsuperscript{5}Of course it is anachronistic to use the terms "Kenya," "Tanzania," and "Uganda" during this time period for they refer to political entities that had not yet come into existence. I am using them merely as a convenient means of referring to the general geographical areas now occupied by the respective modern nations.

\textsuperscript{6}Oliver, "Interior @1500-1884," pp. 200-201. For a slightly different account of the origins of the Masai see Ehret, pp. 168-173.

\textsuperscript{7}This reflects the language used by Low (D. A. Low, "The Northern Interior 1840-1884," in \textit{History of East Africa}, vol. 1, p. 301), but it must be acknowledged that the degree of violence in African warfare is a debated issue. The chief object of Masai raids was to seize cattle, and the degree of violence may have been exaggerated by the attacks that Masai refugees from the Masai civil wars made on the coast and by Arab traders seeking to protect their trade routes from European competition. On the other hand the weakening of the Masai in the late nineteenth century permitted the Gikuyu and the Kamba to expand, and this expansion was accompanied by bitter warfare. It is not unreasonable to suppose that bitter warfare had also accompanied the original Masai expansion that had confined the Gikuyu and Kamba into the hills in the first place. The necessity of the Gikuyu to leave a protective fringe of forest around their homeland, to build stockades around their homesteads and to post lookouts on hills and of the Bugusu to build high mud walls around their villages is evidence of the insecurity and violence of the time. See C. W. Hobley, \textit{Kenya from Chartered Company to Crown Colony: Thirty Years of Exploration and Administration in British East Africa}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1970), pp. 32, 45-46, 59-60; Norman Leys, \textit{Kenya} (London: Leonard and Virginia Woolf, 1924), pp. 88-89, 95; Low, "Northern Interior," pp. 307, 320; D. A. Low, "British East Africa: the Establishment of British Rule 1895-1912", in \textit{History of East Africa}, vol. 2, eds. Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver assisted by Alison Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 3, 33-34; and G. H. Mungam, \textit{British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912: The Establishment of Administration in the East Africa Protectorate} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 5.

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Mijikenda back against the coast, the Orma\textsuperscript{8} north-east across the Tana River, and the other peoples into the fertile highlands. By the middle of the nineteenth century, a state of equilibrium had been reached between the Masai and its neighbors. The Masai then turned inward to fight a series of long, destructive civil wars, which were followed by devastating epidemics that decimated both the people and their cattle. As a result the Masai were greatly weakened, their numbers diminished, the land over which they ranged reduced, and bands of Masai refugees and renegades wreaked havoc of their own.\textsuperscript{9}

2. The Nandi and Gikuyu

The decline of the Masai proved to be a boon to their neighbors and opened the way for the expansion of the Nandi and Gikuyu in particular. In western Kenya, the Kalenjin peoples had been both defending themselves from the Masai to the east and attacking the Bantu and River-Lake Nilotes to the west. With the demise of the Uasin Gishu Masai, the Nandi expanded north onto the Uasin Gishu plateau and quickly became the local power, raiding to the west, north, and east.\textsuperscript{10} The Masai had previously confined the Gikuyu to the fertile, forested hills of central Kenya. The weakening of the Masai enabled the Gikuyu to expand both north to the western side of Mt. Kenya and south into the Dorobo forests toward Ngong.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{8}The Mijikenda were previously known as the Nyika and the Orma as the Galla.


\textsuperscript{10}Low, "Northern Interior," pp. 308-309.

\textsuperscript{11}Low, "Northern Interior," pp. 310-311.

The Europeans arrived at a time when the Gikuyu had been multiplying rapidly and occupying new lands, a fact that not doubt contributed to the later land controversies between the Gikuyu and the Europeans. Evidence for this can be found in the opinion of former colonial officer C. W. Hobley who, writing in 1929, argued that the charge that the Europeans robbed
Among the most hard-pressed peoples in Kenya were the Bantu and the River-Lake Nilotes living on the lowlands along the eastern shore of Lake Victoria. Though under continual pressure from the Highland and Plains Nilotic peoples to the east, they still retained loosely organized political structures and did not restrain their own interminable feuding.\textsuperscript{12}

3. The Coast

One of the most salient features of Kenya's history prior to the nineteenth century was the isolation of the interior from the coast. Over the centuries Arabs settled on the Kenya coast, intermarried with the indigenous peoples and produced the Islamic, Swahili culture. Oriented by trade and culture toward the east, the Swahili city-states had virtually no contact with the peoples of the interior, except to defend themselves from the occasional attack or to purchase ivory and other goods from the Kamba and Mijikenda traders.\textsuperscript{13}

This isolation between the coast and the interior broke down in the nineteenth century. The Kamba were an important link in the system of indirect trade between the interior and the coast. They had many contacts with other societies and lived in an agriculturally marginal area that forced them to supplement their meager harvests with trade. In the early nineteenth century the Kamba used their extensive trading contacts

the Gikuyu of their best land was only "a half truth, as much of the land [near Nairobi] so allocated was a buffer zone between the Masai and the Kikuyu" (Hobley, p. 140). No doubt that with the weakening of the Masai, the Gikuyu had already had their eyes on that "buffer zone" for themselves. Low feels that this was the case of all of the peoples who felt that with the weakening of the Masai and the establishment of the Pax Britannica they could expand into former Masai lands, but found their way blocked by European settlers (Low, "British Rule", p. 51n).

\textsuperscript{12}Low, "Northern Interior," p. 310.

\textsuperscript{13}F. J. Berg, "The Coast from the Portuguese Invasion to the Rise of the Zanzibar Sultanate," in Zamani, pp. 125-129; Neville Chittick, "The Coast Before the Arrival of the Portuguese," in Zamani, pp. 105-113; and Oliver, "Interior @1500-1884," p. 206.

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to develop an extensive network of caravan trading between Mombasa and the interior stretching west to Lake Victoria and north to Lake Baringo. The trade was so successful that it inspired competition by the coastal Arabs who outflanked the Kamba by passing south of Mount Kilimanjaro to Lake Victoria.¹⁴

The reconquest of the coast by the Omani Arabs in the early nineteenth century with the establishment of the plantation economy revitalized the Swahili culture. Slavery and the caravan trade were developed and expanded.¹⁵ However, the most powerful tribes of Kenya, the Masai, Nandi, and Gikuyu, merely tolerated the Arab traders. They kept their lives so precarious that the Arabs were unable to interfere in local politics, develop inland bases, or trade significantly in slaves and guns.¹⁶ So the bulk of the Arab trade was to the south through Tanzania.

In addition to the Arabs, Europeans were also becoming interested in the Kenyan interior. Already a handful of missionaries were living in Kenya and Joseph Thompson had made his trek across Kenya from the coast to Lake Victoria and back, harbingers of things to come.¹⁷

CHRISTIANITY COMES TO KENYA

1. The First Contacts

The first Christian contact with Kenya may have been as early as the fourth century when Ethiopian monks were reported to have visited the East African coast. However, powerful peoples, such as the Orma, prevented the expansion of

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¹⁵Berg, pp. 129-133.


Christianity's next contact with East Africa occurred as part of the Portuguese conquest of the Swahili culture on the coast. The Spanish and Portuguese had just completed the reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Arabs, so Christianity first confronted Islam in Kenya in the context of crusade and jihad. Nevertheless, sufficient peace was established between the foreign Christians and the local Muslims, so the first missionary work in Kenya occurred during the seventeenth century. In 1593 the viceroy of Goa sent six Augustinians to Mombasa, three priests to the Lamu archipelago, and one priest to Zanzibar. Five years later the Augustinians reported 600 converts in Mombasa and a House of Mercy that cared for the sick, disabled, and orphaned. The conversion of Mombasa into a Christian kingdom seemed assured when the Augustinians in Goa raised the orphaned son of the Sultan, Yusuf bin Hassan, as a Christian. Baptized Jeronimo Chingulia, married to a Portuguese noblewoman, and installed as Sultan in 1626, Yusuf showed great zeal in trying to convert his subjects. However, the difficulty of trying to rule his Muslim subjects as a Christian and the racist treatment accorded to him by the Portuguese Captain of Fort Jesus caused Yusuf to return to the Islam of his fathers and rebel against the Portuguese in 1631. He killed the Portuguese garrison and gave the Christians in Mombasa the choice of conversion to Islam or death. Some 300 Christians, half African and half Portuguese died for their faith and 400 Africans chose to be sent to Mecca as slaves rather than submit to the Sultan. Even though the Portuguese reconquered Mombasa, the first attempt to plant Christianity in Kenya was dead.19


2. The C.M.S. and Methodists

The next attempt to bring Christianity to East Africa was not until the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1844 Johann Ludwig Krapf, a German pietist in the employ of the Church Missionary Society, arrived in Mombasa. Krapf had first gone to Ethiopia, where he had been impressed with the power of the Orma and had become convinced that their conversion was the key to the evangelization of eastern Africa. Expelled from Ethiopia in 1843, Krapf came to Mombasa hoping to reach the Orma from there. As his first act of missionary service, Krapf buried his wife and infant daughter. In 1846 Krapf was joined by Johannes Rebmann. Together they moved the mission fifteen miles inland to Rabai to avoid the Muslim influences of Mombasa. Believing that evangelism was the primary task of missionaries, Krapf and Rebmann explored eastern Kenya and northeastern Tanzania, reported the existence of Mounts Kenya and Kilimanjaro, and did pioneer linguistic and translation work, but they made few converts. Coming from shame societies rather than guilt societies and defining morality as conformity to the traditions of their ancestors, the African people could not understand the missionaries' preaching about sin, repentance, and faith in Jesus Christ.20

In 1853 Krapf resigned from the C.M.S. and returned to Britain because of his health. In Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labours in East Africa, published in 1860, he put forth his theory concerning the Orma. Impressed with his book, the United Methodist Free Church agreed to let Krapf lead a new mission to East Africa. Krapf arrived in Mombasa with four U.M.F.C. recruits in 1862, but within the year Krapf and three of the new missionaries had returned home. Left to carry on the Methodist work alone, Thomas Wakefield established Ribe, not far from Rabai, as a


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base from which to reach out to the Orma. For the next five years the U.M.F.C. tried to establish a mission station among the Orma, but other than bringing a few Orma back to Ribe, they were unsuccessful due to the insecurity of the area caused by Masai raiding. The Methodists turned their efforts to converting the Mijikenda and attempting to start a work among the Usambara and Chagga in northern Tanzania. Though several stations were opened up among the Mijikenda, the Methodist evangelism was no more successful than that of the Anglicans. With the help of the Sierra Leonian missionary, W. H. During, and several Orma Christians from Ribe, the U.M.F.C. again turned to the Orma in 1884. Golbanti station was established on the Tana River, but in 1886 a Masai raid destroyed the station, killed the missionaries there, and drove the Orma north of the Tana. The U.M.F.C. continued to try and staff Golbanti and reach the Orma until 1897. By that time, however, the Methodists realized that Krapf had overestimated the importance of the Orma so turned their efforts to evangelizing the more numerous Pokomo who also lived along the Tana.²¹

3. Freed Slave Communities

In the mid-1870s the missionary work in Kenya underwent a major change. During the first ten years mission in Kenya was a relatively unknown backwater. The British efforts in 1822 and 1845 to limit the East African slave trade had no effect on the evangelistic methods of Krapf and Rebmann. However, David Livingstone's return to Britain in 1856 revolutionized missionary strategy, galvanized opinion against the slave trade, and placed East and Central Africa at the forefront of popular imagination. It stimulated a whole new series of missionary efforts and geographical explorations aimed at eradicating the slave trade through Christianity, civilization, and commerce. All of these efforts strengthened the abolitionist and missionary sentiments

in Britain, which received additional boosts by the death of Livingstone in 1873, the Moody revivals in 1874, and the Keswick movement which began in 1875.22

The rise of abolitionist sentiment in Britain induced the government to renewed efforts to end the East African slave trade. Coupled with the effort to end the slave trade was the need to care for the freed slaves. To handle this latter task the government turned to the C.M.S. In 1873 the Bartle Frere, British Governor of Bombay, arrived in Zanzibar to negotiate with the Sultan a treaty to further limit the slave trade and to arrange with the missionaries for the care of the freed slaves. Frere was most unimpressed with the meager evangelistic efforts of the C.M.S., but was pleased with the work of the Holy Ghost fathers at Bagamoyo.23

Roman Catholic interest in East Africa began in 1858 when Jean Fava, the Vicar-General of Reunion, visited the East African coast and was shocked to find no Roman Catholic missions. He appealed to the pope, and in 1860 the Papal Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith established the Apostolic Prefecture of Zanguebar [sic], staffed initially from Fava's own community and then by the Holy Ghost Fathers in 1863. In 1868 the Holy Ghost Fathers moved the mission from Zanzibar to Bagamoyo on the mainland. There they established a well-ordered community of former slaves.24

In 1875 the C.M.S. followed Frere's recommendations and with the assistance of freed slaves trained in Bombay established Freretown, which became the largest freed slave community in East Africa.25 Freretown, Bagamoyo, and the other freed

22W. Anderson, pp. 18-23; and Oliver, Missionary Factor, pp. 1-4, 7-15, 26-44.

23Oliver, Missionary Factor, pp. 18-25.

24W. Anderson, pp. 10-12; Baur, pp. 23-25; and Oliver, Missionary Factor, pp. 18, 21-23.

25Called "Bombay Africans," these freed slaves had been trained at Nasik, the C.M.S. freed slave settlement in Bombay (Rabai to Mumias, pp. 12-13; and Oliver, Missionary

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slave villages sought to provide a humanitarian service to the freed slaves, to evangelize them, and to train the converts to be evangelists to their own people. The former slaves were provided with protection and the means of survival. They were integrated into a society, provided with religious, literary, and industrial training, and given a plot of land to farm. From these communities came the first African churches in East Africa. However, the missionaries ruled the colonies in an authoritarian manner with a strict and sometimes brutal discipline. To make the colonies self-sufficient, the former slaves were required to work for the mission. The missionaries also tended to view the settlements as semi-feudal villages with no social or economic mobility. To many the freed slave colonies appeared to be a new form of slavery. Often conflicts developed over work requirements, wages, and the African desire for social and economic mobility. Finally, the freed slave villages did not become centers of evangelism because they were culturally and socially isolated from the surrounding African communities.26

4. Confrontation between Missionaries and Slave Holders

The missionaries in East Africa had always opposed slavery and the slave trade. In 1850 Krapf had sought to publicize the evils of the slave trade. However, the establishment of Freretown brought the missionaries and their converts into a collision course with the Arabs, whose economy was based on slavery. The mission stations became places of refuge for runaway slaves and centers of anti-slavery propaganda. Runaway slaves began to form their own villages and looked to the missions for protection. These activities incensed the Arabs and brought them into intense

\[\text{Factor, p. 25}\].


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confrontations with the missionaries. The Arabs tried every legal method of redress and intimidation to stop the missions from harboring runaways. In 1883 the Arabs attacked the independent villages of runaways and killed the C.M.S. catechist, David Koi, who was teaching the runaways at Fulldoyo. With the added pressure of German imperialism, and the division of East Africa into British and German spheres, tensions reached a boiling point in 1888 with Arabs and Africans in open revolt in the German sphere. The C.M.S. officially agreed to cease harboring runaways, but some, like the African priest in charge of Rabai, William Jones, refused. Continued violence was avoided when the newly formed Imperial East Africa Company agreed to compensate the slave owners. Tension continued until slavery was finally outlawed in Kenya by the British colonial government in 1907.27

5. The Move Inland

Until the 1880s missionary activity was largely confined to the coast, but gradually the missionaries began to move inland. In 1883 the C.M.S. began work in the Taita Hills and in 1892 at Taveta.28 In the late 1880s two German Lutheran missions established stations: the Neukirchen Mission at Gao on the Tana River among the Pokomo and the Leipzig Mission far inland at Mulango among the Kamba.29 The Holy Ghost Fathers moved inland to the Taita Hills in 1892.30

A.I.M. arrived in Kenya at a critical time. For 50 years missionaries had been working on the coast relating primarily to the Sultan of Zanzibar and local African rulers. That 50 years saw the move from primarily evangelistic ministries to the care

27W. Anderson, pp. 13-16; Nthamburi, pp. 19-26; Oliver, Missionary Factor, pp. 21-23, 50-65; Strayer, pp. 37-40; and Temu, Missions, pp. 19-29.

28Strayer, p. 31.

29W. Anderson, p. 62; and Nthamburi, p. 46.

30Baur, pp. 29-30.
of freed slaves and the resulting confrontation between the missionaries and the Arab slave holders. It also saw the increased imperial involvement in East Africa by the European powers. A.I.M., determined to penetrate inland, arrived in 1895 just as Britain declared its rule over all of present day Kenya and as the other missions were beginning their own moves inland.

HISTORY OF A.I.M.

1. Peter Cameron Scott and the Founding of A.I.M.

The Africa Inland Mission was founded in 1895 by Peter Cameron Scott.31 Scott was born near Glasgow in 1867 to devout Christian parents. In 1879 the Scotts emigrated to the United States, where they settled in Philadelphia and joined the West Park Presbyterian Church.32 This was a time of great religious enthusiasm and ferment in the U.S. with the Moody revivals and the growth of the premillenial, holiness, ecumenical, and missionary movements. In 1889 Scott underwent an experience of "Keswick consecration" and soon felt "called" to be a missionary to Africa. He enrolled in the New York Missionary Training College founded by the Presbyterian evangelist, A. B. Simpson. However, Scott's zeal to evangelize Africa was so strong that he took only one year of the three-year course before he joined Simpson's International Missionary Alliance and sailed with his brother, John Scott, for the mouth of the Congo River. The Scott brothers were in Africa for only a few months before John died of malaria and Peter was placed on a ship for home, more dead than alive.

31 This account of the life of Peter Cameron Scott is mainly drawn from Catherine S. Miller, Peter Cameron Scott: The Unlocked Door (London: Parry Jackman Ltd., 1955), pp. 13-28.

32 *Draft of Mr. Hess' comments concerning the beginning of the A.I.M.* , n.d., p. 1, BGC, 12, 45. Hess' "comments" were drawn largely on conversations with some of the original founders of A.I.M.

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During his time of recuperation in the U.K. and the U.S., Scott studied everything he could about Africa and concluded that the interior of Africa could be evangelized only by European missionaries who lived in the highlands that stretched roughly northwest from Mombasa to Lake Chad and who trained African evangelists who could carry the gospel to the lowlands. This "vision" was confirmed to Scott in a dramatic religious experience at David Livingstone's tomb in Westminster Abbey. Scott also came into contact with the China Inland Mission, which became a model for Scott's own mission.

In the United States, Scott attempted to interest his own denomination, the Presbyterian Church, in his vision, but it did not have the resources to pick up this new challenge. Therefore he gathered about himself a group of missions enthusiasts, who in 1895 formed the Philadelphia Missionary Council that acted as the representative of a number of different religious organizations. One of these was the Africa Inland Mission, which Scott established in the same year to implement his missionary vision. Responding to new thinking in missionary theory, A.I.M. was founded on five principles. It was to be an ecumenical mission and accept as missionaries Christians from any evangelical denomination and cooperate with all evangelical missionary societies on the field. It was to be an evangelistic mission that emphasized methods of direct evangelism in preference to promoting commerce or civilization. A.I.M. would also be a lay mission, seeking to mobilize the vast body of pious, Christian laymen who did not have the opportunity for theological education. It would be a Faith Mission and rely upon God alone through prayer for its finances, rather than upon human fund raising techniques. And finally, it would be a field-

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33Ibid., p. 2.

34H&D (January 1896): 5. In addition to A.I.M. these organizations included the Central American Industrial Mission, a mission to the Navajo Indians, the Pennsylvania Bible Institute, an itinerant Bible teaching ministry in rural Pennsylvania, and a Christian magazine called Hearing and Doing (H&D (January 1896): 6-8; and (July 1899):6-7).

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governed mission, run by the missionaries themselves on the field rather than by a committee in the homeland.35

Scott with the first party of eight missionaries left for the field in August 1895 and reached Mombasa in October.36 The missionaries established themselves among the Kamba, 240 miles from the coast on four stations: Nzawi, Sakai, Kilungu, and Kangundo. A second party of eight more missionaries arrived in August 1896.37 The missionaries immediately settled down to the tasks of pioneer missionary work: exploring, building, farming, language and cultural learning, medicine, and even a simple school.38

Just a year after arriving in Kenya, disaster struck. Scott succumbed to malaria, and the Mission began to disintegrate. Two more missionaries died, and all but one of the others left for one reason or another.39 Willis Hotchkiss carried on alone as eastern Kenya entered a three-year famine.40 During this difficult time, A.I.M. saw its first converts, three Swahili "boys" who worked for the missionaries.41


36H&D (January 1896): 3; and (February 1896): 4-5.

37H&D (April 1896): 5-6; (Supplement to April 1896): 1-11; (May 1896): 4-6; (July 1896): 4-6; (January 1897): 5-8, 9-10; and Margaret Scott, "A Descriptive Sketch," H&D Scott (July-August 1897): 8.

38H&D (June 1896): 5-8; and (January 1897): 10-12.

39H&D (January 1897): 9; (February 1897): 5; (May 1897): 7, 8; (November 1897): 8; (December 1897): 6-7; (April 1898): 7, 8; (May 1898): 5-7; and Johnston to Campbell, 18 September 1928, BGC, 22, 9.

40H&D (September 1898): 8; and (June 1899): 5.

41H&D (June 1898): 6; and (September 1898): 7.
2. Charles Hurlburt and the Expansion of A.I.M.

Upon receiving the news of Scott's death, the P.M.C. adopted a new constitution for A.I.M. and appointed Charles Hurlburt to be the Director. Hurlburt visited the field in 1898 to survey the work and bring a new worker, William Bangert. Hurlburt returned to the United States enthusiastic about the opportunities for Christian witness in Kenya. Hotchkiss and Bangert continued together for another six months administering a modest famine relief program, when Hotchkiss, too, left A.I.M. Bangert hung on alone amidst increasing pressure from the famine until help arrived in 1900 in the form of new missionaries and the rains that broke the drought.

In December 1901 Hurlburt returned with a party of six new missionaries and initiated a period of rapid expansion. The headquarters of the Mission was moved to Kijabe on the border between the Gikuyu and the Masai. This station was not only to be a center for the evangelization of the Gikuyu and the Masai, but also the receiving and orientating center for new missionaries, a place of rest for veterans, a linguistic and translation center, and the educational center of the Mission that would

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42"Excerpts: Minutes First Council of A.I.M., [1895-1901]," compiled 19 October 1942, BGC,12,45.


44H&D (April 1899): 5, 5-6; (May 1899): 4-8; 5-7; and (July 1899): 4.

45See "First Council," BGC,12,45; and H&D (July 1898): 7.

46H&D (August-September 1899): 6-9, 9; (October 1899): 4-8; (November 1899): 5-8; and (January 1900): 2-5;

47H&D (January 1900): 2-5.


49H&D (November 1901): 5-6; and (February 1902): 4.

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include a central school to train African evangelists. A new Home Council was established in Britain, and as increasing numbers of missionaries arrived from the United States and Britain, A.I.M. established mission stations across Kenya, among the Kamba in the east, the Gikuyu and Masai in central Kenya, and the Kalenjin and Luo peoples in the west. By 1915 A.I.M. had sixteen mission stations in Kenya, manned by 66 missionaries.

The missionaries engaged in building, language and culture learning, and Bible translation. On each station the gospel was shared with the African people through preaching, personal conversation, and simple educational and medical work. At

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50Compiled from the "Directory of Missionaries" published in each issue of Hearing and Doing.

51H&D (March-April 1903): 12 describes the concept of the "headquarters station" when it was still thought that the headquarters would remain at Kangundo, but the plan still applied to Kijabe. For the move to Kijabe see: H&D (July-August 1903): 21; (November-December 1903): 12-13; and (January-February 1904): 5, 13.

52In 1896 the Philadelphia Missionary Council had decided to form a "British-Australian Council" ("First Council," BGC, 12, 45). That such a council had existed in Britain in 1908 see Hurlburt to Verner, 28 December 1908, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence.

53See the "Directory of Missionaries" published in each issue of Hearing and Doing; and H&D (July-December 1916): 6.
several stations homes for African girls provided a refuge for girls who had been abused in their homes. At Kijabe the first industrial school in the highlands taught trades to African young men and an advanced school trained African teacher-evangelists.\textsuperscript{55}

In the years prior to World War I the African people were generally unresponsive to the missionaries' message. The Kamba were largely indifferent, seeing no reason to leave their traditional way of life. The Gikuyu were more open to outside influences and the missionaries regularly reported full churches and a growing acceptance of education. The work among the Masai started with great promise. Good relations were developed with the Masai elders and Masai young men with

\textsuperscript{54}Compiled from the "Directory of Missionaries" published in each issue of \textit{Hearing and Doing}.

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{H&D} (July-December 1916): 6-8. The work of the A.I.M. missionaries will be examined in more detail in Chapter 6 below.

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great leadership potential were converted. However, the Masai work proved to be abortive when the First and Masai moves embittered the Masai against Western influences. The work among the Kalenjin and the Luo were just being started.

The pre-war years were also notable for A.I.M.'s ecumenical efforts. A.I.M. tried to provide an organizational umbrella for a variety of small missions working in Kenya. The Mission was also in the forefront of the effort by the mission societies in Kenya to create a united African church.

During World War I the mission stations in Kenya became a refuge for young men seeking to avoid being drafted into the carrier corps of the British army. Manpower shortages towards the end of the war forced the colonial government to draft mission adherents and missionaries who were British subjects. To protect their adherents from the oppression that the carriers suffered in the army and from the moral temptations of military life, the leaders of the missions, including A.I.M., formed the Missionary Volunteer Carrier Corps.

3. Post-War Issues: Education, Nationalism, Leadership

The years after World War I saw a large growth in the number of Mission adherents. The Africans' war experiences had shown them the value of western education, so they pressured the missions to expand their simple systems of education. At the same time the colonial government began to pressure the missions to improve

56This of course is an oversimplification. The trauma of losing one of their leading young men to the Mission and the cultural conservatism of the Masai caused by the powerful social and cultural role of the warriors and the warrior experience in Masai life were two other important reasons for the Masai disillusionment with the Mission and with Western culture. The responses of the African people to the work of A.I.M. will be noted in more detail in Chapter 6 below.

57A.I.M.'s ecumenical efforts will be examined in detail in Chapter 8 below.

58IA (July 1917): 1-2; and (July 1918): 12-14.

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the quality of the education and offered to pay the missions grants-in-aid to enable them to improve their schools. This new situation created strains within A.I.M. and between A.I.M. and its converts as the Mission debated whether or not the demand for education and the offer of grants-in-aid were compatible with its Faith Basis and commitment to evangelism.59

During the inter-war years, A.I.M. also had to face the first stirrings of African nationalism. In 1921 Harry Thuku aroused the Gikuyu in a mass protest against a series of highly oppressive labor and land laws passed during and after World War I. When the missions supported the constitutional form of protest practiced by the Gikuyu chiefs rather than Thuku's direct methods, he included the missions in his attack. The Gikuyu Christians joined Thuku and all work among the Gikuyu was brought to a halt. Only after the government violently suppressed the Thuku movement were relations between A.I.M. and the majority of its Gikuyu converts restored.60

Hurlburt's authoritarian rule of the Mission alienated so many missionaries and Home Council members that he had to resign in a controversy that greatly weakened A.I.M.'s support base in the United States. The increased power of the American Home Council over the field prevented the missionaries from dealing constructively with a number of issues such as African education and ordination, and nearly resulted in a schism between the American and British branches of the Mission.61

4. The Female Circumcision Controversy

The first serious issue to face A.I.M. in the post-Hurlburt years was the 1929

59This debate is detailed below in chapter 7.
61These issues are examined below in Chapter 4.
female circumcision crisis among the Gikuyu.62 From the beginning most of the missionaries working among the Gikuyu opposed female circumcision,63 primarily on medical grounds.64 After initial experiments in Christianizing the rite, the missionaries simply taught and preached against the practice, little knowing its significance in Gikuyu culture.65 At first the missionaries made considerable headway with their teaching. In 1921 A.I.M., in conformity with other missions, made it a matter of church discipline.66 In 1925 the Local Native Councils passed bylaws regulating the practice. However, this opposition to female circumcision brought the missions and their converts into increasing conflict with the more conservative of the non-Christian


63Consistently opposed to female circumcision were the Africa Inland Mission, the Church of Scotland Mission, the Gospel Missionary Society, and the Kabete station of the Church Missionary Society. Holding far more ambivalent attitudes were the rest of the C.M.S., the United Methodist Free Church, and the Roman Catholic Church. See: Davis to Campbell, 4 September 1931, BGC,10,5.


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Gikuyu.

In 1928 the Kikuyu Central Association made the preservation of tribal customs, including female circumcision, an issue in their contest of the elections to the Nyeri Local Native Council. The elections were indecisive and left the council evenly divided between the K.C.A. and the pro-missionary Progressive Kikuyu Party. The issue became a bitter debate throughout all Gikuyuland in 1929 when a controversial court decision gave only a nominal penalty to those accused of forcibly circumcising a Gikuyu girl. Missionaries and a core of Gikuyu Christians, who strongly supported the missionaries, attempted to strengthen church discipline over the issue and to seek legal protection of Gikuyu girls from forced circumcision. However, for most Gikuyu the female circumcision issue became the symbolic, emotional focal point for all of the grievances they had suffered under

67In March 1929 an ecumenical conference of Gikuyu elders was held at Tumutumu to discuss a variety of issues declared that female circumcision was evil and should be a cause for church discipline ("Minutes of a Conference of Kikuyu Church Elders. Held at Tumutumu from March 8th to 12th, 1929," KBA: FC-18). This decision was repeated in a second conference of Gikuyu elders held in October (Minutes of a Conference of Church Elders of the Kikuyu Country Held at Kambui, Oct. 17-20, 1929, KBA: FC-18).

68On A.I.M.'s decision to do this see Stauffacher to Campbell, 19 November 1929; and 11 February 1930, BGC,13,10.

Female circumcision was also condemned in all of the mission schools, and anyone supporting the practice would lose his job as a teacher. For an example of this see Knapp to Downing, 1 April 1929; and 4 April 1929, KBA: FC-18. In December 1929 the Kenya Missionary Council agreed with the government's request that the missions not teach against female circumcision during school hours, though the missions retained the right to include such teaching in their catechism classes ("Minutes of the Executive of the Kenya Missionary Council," 5 December 1929, KBA: FC-18). A.I.M. agreed to abide by this decision (Davis to Campbell, 25 November 1931, BGC,10,5).

69In September the Kenya Missionary Council protested the court ruling in the case of the girl allegedly circumcised by force and asked for legislation to protect freedom of choice in the matter ("Minutes of the Executive of the Kenya Missionary Council," 3 September 1929, KBA: FC-18). Also in September a group of Gikuyu elders from Kiambu prepared a petition to the government expressing their opposition to female circumcision and asking that girls be protected from forced circumcisions ("Kikuyu Female Circumcision: The Opinion of Kyambu Kikuyu Natives on Female Circumcision," 12 September 1929, KBA: FC-18).
colonial rule and rapid social change. The missionaries were accused of trying to destroy Gikuyu culture and steal their land; mission schools were boycotted; and the African opponents of circumcision came under intimidation and persecution. 90% of the Gikuyu Christians left the churches.

The tension came to a climax in January 1930 when A.I.M. missionary, Miss Hulda Stumpf was killed. The rumor spread that she had been forcibly circumcised, and died as a result of the wounds. Dr. Virginia Blakeslee was the first person on the scene once the body was discovered, and her examination found that Miss Stumpf had been strangled, but there was no evidence of sexual assault. Perhaps her assailants had intended to circumcise her, but accidentally strangled her instead. The deed seems to have so deeply shocked both missionaries, their remaining supporters, and the pro-circumcision agitators that both stopped their campaign and peace gradually returned.

The mission and what remained of its church retained its rule against circumcision, while the pro-circumcision party eventually organized itself into two new denominations, The African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa and the

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70 See: F. B. Welbourn, *East African Rebels* (London: SCM Press, 1961), pp.133-143. Neither the government nor the missions understood the dynamics that caused this to happen. However, in handling the controversy the missionaries committed three serious errors that reinforced this association and greatly strengthened the case of the K.C.A. First Dr. Arthur tried to debate the issue publicly with the K.C.A. Second the requirement that church members sign their name, usually with a thumbprint, to a pledge to obey the church rules required them to do an act that the Gikuyu greatly distrusted for their signatures had often found bound them to things that went beyond what they had understood at the time of signing. Furthermore, the thumbprint signatures were closely associated with the hated labor records. Finally, the pledge often carried a repudiation of the K.C.A., which in the eyes of many Gikuyu was their only effective political organization. These acts increased the politicisation of the circumcision issue and drove many, otherwise loyal church members into the arms of the K.C.A. and its anti-missionary campaign. See Macpherson, pp. 112-113; and Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 118.


72 Blakeslee, pp. 192-193.

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African Orthodox Church.\textsuperscript{73} Most AIM missionaries fully approved of the stand that the mission and church took. They believed that not to have forbidden female circumcision would have permitted sin in the church and viewed the exodus of people from the church as God purifying the church of nominal Christians.\textsuperscript{74} However some felt that while female circumcision was an evil that had to be eradicated, it should not be done by church law and excommunication, but by patient teaching. Ironically, nearly a year before her death, Miss Stumpf questioned the mission policy of excommunication and suggested that love and a cultural substitute was needed instead.\textsuperscript{75} John Stauffacher also had his doubts. He believed that it was premature to make female circumcision a matter of church discipline and opposed mission efforts to have the government outlaw the practice.\textsuperscript{76} When nearly all of his Masai Christians left the church, he could not accept the common interpretation that the church was being purified of nominal Christians. He knew these people and knew them to be true Christians, so he came to believe that the Mission had made a grave mistake.\textsuperscript{77} Not only were the missionaries being unloving and impatient, but in making such a rule they were undermining the very doctrine of salvation, justification by grace.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{73}Middleton, pp. 371-373, 390-392; Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 125-135; Sandgren, pp. 267-312; and Welbourn, Rebels, pp.144-161.

\textsuperscript{74}Downing to Keller, 5 December 1929, KBA: FC-18; and Davis to Campbell, 25 November 1931, BGC,10,5.

\textsuperscript{75}Stumpf to Campbell, May 3, 1927, quoted in Gration, pp. 146-147.

\textsuperscript{76}Stauffacher to Campbell, 19 November 1929, BGC,13,10.

\textsuperscript{77}Stauffacher to Campbell, 11 February 1930, BGC,13,10.

\textsuperscript{78}Stauffacher to Campbell, 17 September 1930, BGC,13,10.

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5. The Establishment of the Africa Inland Church

Gradually A.I.M. recovered from the Female Circumcision crisis. Its Gikuyu work, once the largest and most important A.I.M. work in Kenya, was surpassed by its work in Ukambani and in western Kenya among the Kalenjin. Bible schools were established to begin training an African clergy, though the establishment of the Church was delayed until after World War II. During the late 1930s and 1940s A.I.M. experienced renewed pressure for African education that threatened to divide the Mission from its adherents. However, new leadership in the American Home Council and a new generation of missionaries on the field permitted A.I.M. to make major changes. The development of African education was fully embraced, the African church was granted its independence, and the relationship between the Mission and the Church was defined.79 The Africa Inland Church grew rapidly becoming one of the largest denominations in Kenya.

79For a study of this process see Gration, pp. 228-342.

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CHAPTER TWO  
A.I.M. AS A LAY MISSION

A.I.M. was first of all to be a mission of pious laymen. The use of laymen was in keeping with a strong tradition in American Christianity. The entrepreneurial and voluntary nature of America permitted laymen to play powerful roles.\(^1\) Two of the most influential religious leaders of nineteenth century America, the revivalists Charles G. Finney and Dwight L. Moody, were both laymen.\(^2\) A revival in 1857-1858 was dubbed "the businessmen's awakening' because of the prominent role urban merchants played in promoting it.\(^3\) This revival established a pattern of strong involvement by Christian businessmen in urban evangelism and foreign missions.

Now, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, major efforts were being made to mobilize the resources of the laity for foreign missions. The Laymen's Missionary Movement sought to harness the resources of Christian business and professional men to the cause of missions. Many laymen became actively involved as the benefactors, trustees, directors, bureaucrats, and even missionaries of the burgeoning missionary organizations. The men, who became the greatest missionary leaders of the first half of the twentieth century, John R. Mott and Robert E. Speer,

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\(^3\) Noll, pp. 287-288.

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were laymen. 4

In keeping with this movement, A.I.M. hoped to mobilize pious Christian laymen for missionary service and to spearhead its new evangelistic thrust in Africa. The article announcing the creation of A.I.M. declared:

If the world is to be evangelized in this generation there must be a vast increase in the army of messengers, but there cannot be any vast increase save by the enlistment of thousands of lay workers. It is from such that the Africa Inland Mission expects its material to come. 5

A.I.M.'s evangelistic and ecumenical principles influenced its choice to recruit pious laymen as missionaries. To meet the evangelistic challenge in Africa all of the resources of the Church had to be mobilized. Thus laymen as well as clergy had to be used to complete the task. Though A.I.M. was happy to accept the support of Christian businessmen and professionals, the Mission was founded specifically to empower economically and educationally disadvantaged, yet pious, Christians for the evangelization of Africa. In seeking to recruit pious laymen as missionaries, A.I.M. was not antagonistic to either the ordained ministry nor to the existing denominations. 6 Rather, by using Christians who did not meet the high educational requirements for ordained missionaries set by most of the existing denominational mission boards, 7 A.I.M. intended to augment the limited resources the denominational

4For a review and evaluation of the role of laymen in the American missionary movement at this time see Valentin H. Rabe, The Home Base of American China Missions, 1880-1920 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1978), pp. 11-12, 26-36, 49-75, 80. For a review of the layman’s movement and the resulting Bible institute movement see Sandeen, pp. 181-183.

5H&D (January 1896): 4-5.

6Elizabeth Isichei completely misunderstood Faith Missions on this point, when she charged them with being “anti-clerical” (Elizabeth Isichei, A History of Christianity in Africa from Antiquity to the Present (London: SPCK, 1995), p. 89).

7For the educational and training required by most of the denominational mission boards at this time see Rabe, pp. 84-90.

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boards rather than to compete with them for manpower.8

The common perception of the African context also influenced this decision. Since the A.I.M. missionaries would not be going to a literate culture with great literary, philosophical, and religious traditions, broad educational and intellectual qualifications were considered unnecessary. Piety and the ability to live in a harsh environment and confront a culture seen to be repulsive were the only qualifications deemed to be necessary.9 Furthermore, A.I.M. conceived of its task almost exclusively as one of evangelism and denied that educating or "civilizing" Africa was part of that work.10 This being the case, well-educated teachers would not necessarily have to be part of A.I.M.'s missionary force.

In common with virtually all other American missions, "spirituality and the experience of a divine calling"11 were the fundamental qualifications for A.I.M. missionaries. The Mission magazine, *Hearing and Doing*, described the members of the first party of missionaries to go out under A.I.M. as "consecrated, ardent workers, each one conscious of a distinct call to Africa."12

In this chapter, these two fundamental qualifications for missionary service will be examined: A.I.M.'s spirituality, an American form of Keswick piety, and the "call" of God to missionary service. Other qualifications that A.I.M. considered

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8According to Joel Carpenter this was a common pattern of faith missions, which "functioned like auxiliaries, taking up the surplus volunteers who couldn't fit into the denominational programs" (Joel A. Carpenter, "Propagating the Faith Once Delivered: The Fundamentalist Missionary Enterprise, 1920-1945" in *Earthen Vessels*, p. 100).


10See below Chapter 5 pp 214-218.

11These words are Rabe's describing the missionary qualifications considered necessary by nearly all American missionary societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Rabe, pp. 98).

necessary for missionary service in Africa will also be noted. Finally, we will examine the tensions that arose between the qualifications that A.I.M. thought were needed and those that the African context actually demanded.

"KESWICK" PIETY

*Hearing and Doing* described the men and women whom A.I.M. expected to recruit as "men and women whose lives are surrendered to God for his service ... consecrated to God, eager to do his will".13 This is the classic vocabulary of the Keswick movement.

The Keswick movement, taking its name from a resort in England's Lake District, was part of a broad, Anglo-American holiness movement in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In many respects a Calvinistic adaptation of Wesleyan perfectionism, Keswick was a broad movement rather than a specific theological system. It emphasized a deep piety and warm devotion to God, the avoidance of personal sin and sinful influences, and active Christian service. Its most characteristic teaching was that Christians must undergo a second, decisive crisis experience after conversion that would result in inner peace, "victory" over known sin, and "power" in Christian service, especially in evangelism.14

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A number of articles on this subject, probably written by James H. McConkey, appeared in *Hearing and Doing*. Belief among A.I.M. missionaries was not uniform, but as co-editor of *Hearing and Doing*, an officer of the Philadelphia Missionary Council, and a teacher and itinerant preacher for Charles Hurlburt's short-lived Pennsylvania Bible Institute, McConkey well represented the spiritual milieu of A.I.M.

1. The Dual Nature of the Christian

The starting point of all holiness spirituality was frustration with the common religious experience of most Christians. Reflecting this, McConkey wrote:

For long years the hearts of God's true children have longed for the fullest, richest, closest spiritual life attainable in Christ Jesus. That there was such a deeper, higher, broader life in Christ that the lives of many of His children were exemplifying, was admitted by all.\(^{17}\)

According to McConkey, the reason why some Christians experienced only a shallow spirituality, while others had a deep and rich Christian life lay in the theory of

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\(^{15}\)The articles in *Hearing and Doing* are not signed, but *Hearing and Doing* noted that three of McConkey's *Hearing and Doing* series were reprinted in book form: "The Three-Fold Secret of the Holy Spirit", "The Surrendered Life", and "Prayer" (*H&D* (July-September 1907): 22). A fourth series on the "Fuller Life" appeared over McConkey's byline in 1903. The religious language and writing style suggest that the other, unsigned articles were also written by McConkey.

\(^{16}\)*H&D* (January 1896): 7, 8; (February 1896): 2; and (August-September 1897): 15-16. Though he never became a major Keswick teacher, McConkey may have had some small influence within the movement. Four thousand of his *The Three-Fold Secret of the Spirit* were distributed to missionaries around the world, who translated it into Arabic, Bulgarian, Chinese, Korean, and Spanish (*H&D* (April-May 1902): 9.


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the "dual nature" of the believer. This theory was a theological attempt to explain the fact that unchristian values and behaviors did not immediately disappear upon conversion. Rather, a growing number of new values and behaviors were introduced into the Christian's life, and these were often at variance with one another. Building on the Calvinist doctrine of the total depravity of man, some Keswick teachers taught that human depravity and inclination to sin continued to operate in believers as a moral influence often called the "old nature". Opposing this "old nature" was the life of the Holy Spirit, called the "new nature". While every Christian had this "dual nature", many, if not most, continued to live under the primary influence of the old nature rather than in the power of the Spirit. What was needed was an act of the will, a radical turning "by faith" from the old nature and a "yielding" or "surrender" to the authority and power of the Holy Spirit. In instructing his readers "On How to be Holy", McConkey explained the process:

The great fact then in the believer's life is the existence of two natures. ... These two are mortal enemies.... How then shall the believer seek to live a holy life? By giving up all attempts to improve the flesh, and yielding himself wholly to God to walk in the Spirit. An act of full surrender, and a walk of constant faith is his only hope. [Emphasis in original.]

18McQuilkin asserts that there were differences among Keswick teachers on this issue, that it was an "area of marginal ambiguity", and that the doctrine of the dual nature of the Christian was "not the mainline Keswick teaching (McQuilkin, pp. 156-157). Furthermore, John F. Walvoord tries to build his "Augustinian-Dispensational" view as a distinct perspective from the Keswick view by emphasizing this doctrine. In the process he downplays the post-conversion crisis experience and does not mention the distinction between "carnal Christians" and "spiritual Christians" that Lewis Sperry Chafer and most Dispensationalists after him taught (John F. Walvoord, "The Augustinian-Dispensational Perspective," in Five Views on Sanctification, pp. 199-226). In his treatment of the Keswick movement, Marsden identifies prominent dispensationalist leaders like Reuben Torrey, C. I. Scofield, Charles Trumbull, and Lewis Sperry Chafer as "Keswick teachers" (Marsden, pp. 94-99). I think that despite McQuilkin's qualifications, we are more than justified in seeing McConkey's view as falling within the broad category of Keswick piety.


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This experience, which took the form of a crisis experience that resembled a second conversion, was described by McConkey as having two steps: "an act of full surrender" and "a walk of constant faith".

2. The Act of Surrender: an Act of Faith

The first step in ending the internal conflict and being "filled" with the Holy Spirit was the act of surrender, or "yielding" to God.20 This act of surrender was first of all an act of faith. According to McConkey it took great faith to surrender one's whole life, with all its hopes, fears, and desires, to God to do with as He pleased.21 Furthermore, to give up the egocentric life of the old nature was not easy. McConkey described the struggle that Christians were expected to experience:

...how vehemently and desperately the Self life opposes our yielding our life to God in full surrender! ... Then let that man or woman try to make such a surrender. Let them say to God "Here Lord I give up all my plans and purposes, all my desires and hopes, and accept Thy will for my life. ... Immediately how the powers of the Flesh will assail this decision! What clamorous protests! What fierce hostility! What agonizing struggles!22

McConkey urged his readers to believe that if they "yielded" the Holy Spirit would "fill" them regardless of the emotional experience that may or may not accompany their "surrender":

Accept the fact of the Spirit's indwelling exactly as you accepted the fact of the remission of your sins when you believed on Jesus Christ, by evidence a thousand fold more certain and reassuring than your shifting feelings, namely, the eternal, immutable word of God. [Emphasis in original.]23


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In a form of piety in which subjective factors such as "barrenness", peace, and joy played such a prominent role, the "objective" anchoring of experience in the teaching and promises of the Bible became absolutely critical.24

3. The Act of Surrender: an Act of the Will

Surrender was not only an act of faith, it was also an act of the will. Because God loves us, McConkey wrote, He will not force us to yield your lives to Him. He will not violate our human responsibility: "...He leaves it with us to yield or not to yield."25 The responsibility to be "filled with the Spirit" belonged with the believer.26 In making their act of "surrender", McConkey urged his readers that it be a specific event in their lives.27 Their surrender was also to be "comprehensive" and give to God "every interest, plan, power, and possession of your being."28 This was a highly rigorous form of piety in which every aspect of life became charged with moral and spiritual significance. The believer's act of surrender was to be "final", a once and for all time act.29 Finally, the act of surrender was to be "steadfast" and not be shaken by human relationships. Here in a robust individualism, the act of surrender was to be an act of fealty and obedience to God which radically transcended all human relationships.

24A high regard for the authority and integrity of the Bible was, thus, essential. For this reason, A.I.M. missionaries found the higher critical theories, which they perceived to undermine confidence in the authority and trustworthiness of scriptures, to be intolerable and could not remain in a church union where such a high view of scripture seemed open to question. See below Chapter 8, pp. 353-354, 357, 366-368..


28Ibid., p. 2.

29Ibid., 3.

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and loyalties, even the most precious and intimate. McConkey wrote:

Look to it that your dearest friends shake not that steadfastness. ... The wife who would give up all else for the Lord, shrinks with absolute terror from the thought of the possible barrier which her close walk with Him may raise between her and a worldly husband. The husband who would sacrifice all for Christ meets the limit of that all when he faces the thought that the wife of his love will not stand with him in the peculiar place of separation.30

With such an individualistic and radical view of Christian loyalty, it is little wonder that the missionaries both expected and accepted the break-up in family and community relationships that often accompanied the conversion of Africans to Christianity.

4. Abiding in Christ: the Life of Faith

The second step in the solution to the conflict between the "old nature" and the "new nature" was the walk of faith. This simply meant that the act of surrender had to continue as an ongoing process in the believer's life, or he would fall under the control of the old nature again.31 This process McConkey called "abiding in Christ" through a life of faith and obedience.

In the experience of surrender the believer had to have faith that the Holy Spirit would fill his life. Now the believer had to live in the faith that the Holy Spirit was actively working "in" his life bringing his act of surrender to completion by revealing new areas of life that need to be yielded to God.32 The believer was also to have faith that the Holy Spirit was working "through" him in Christian service to

30Ibid., pp. 3-4.


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The A.I.M. missionary, then, believed that his missionary service to God and to the African people was not only his own work, but that it was also the work of God with the Holy Spirit actively working through him to make that service effective.

In broader terms, McConkey described the life of faith as a life of total dependance upon Jesus:

What then is this Faith? *It is that habitual attitude by which one who, in himself is spiritually dead, is constantly looking to, and daily and hourly drawing upon, the life of an other - the fullness of life of Jesus Christ within him. This is the life of faith; this is the walk in the Spirit; this is abiding, on the Faith side of it.* [Emphasis in original]

The believer was no longer to depend on himself, his own resources, wisdom, and abilities. In all of his life, he was now to depend on Jesus Christ, and on Him alone. Perhaps the most visible expression of this principle in A.I.M. was the Faith Basis whereby the missionaries were to depend upon God alone for their finances and material well being. Because the Faith Basis was so rooted in Keswick piety, it assumed a vital importance to the Mission and its missionaries far beyond its significance as mere financial policy.

**4. Abiding in Christ: the Life of Obedience**

"Abiding in Christ" also meant obedience to Jesus Christ. Positively this involved three things: the unquestioned acceptance of the moral principles of Christianity as expressed in the Bible, the patient submission to the events and circumstances that God in His providence brought into the believer's life no matter how difficult or inexplicable, and faithful performance in daily life of God's commands.

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34[McConkey], "Holy Spirit: Abiding," pp. 1-2; and *Three-Fold Secret*, pp. 96-100. Also see [McConkey], "Surrendered Life: Then?" p. 1.

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whether revealed in Scripture or by providence.\textsuperscript{35} Negatively, obedience to Christ meant separation of the believer from sin, not only those sins revealed explicitly in Scripture, but also from anything or anyone that might be sinful, that might lead to sin, or that might not lead the believer towards God. McConkey wrote:

...the same Spirit who reveals sin will lead to detachment from it, and from the things which foster it. Thus it is that the surrendered child of God soon finds himself walking the pathway of separation. Things which were doubtful before are now seen to be sinful. Many aforetime pleasures are relinquished because they no longer bring enjoyment but condemnation. Hosts of so-called innocent gratifications are clearly seen to be wasteful ones.... And, hand-fast with separation from things comes isolation from men. ...companionships change; friends seem to be drifting away.... Part of the price of a persistent determination to climb the highest mountain peaks of separation and fellowship with God, is to lose the comradeship of those who will not climb there with you.\textsuperscript{36}

With such a radical view of separation from sin that leads even in the missionaries' home culture to the separation from "innocent gratifications", from "former favorite pursuits", and even, how-be-it unintentionally, from former companions, it is no wonder that in Kenya the missionaries saw virtually everything in African culture as sinful and expected such a radical the separation of their converts from their indigenous cultures and communities.

In his teaching on the Christian's separation from sin, McConkey's concern went far deeper than specific sins of commission or omission to the desires and motives that stood behind the believer's behavior. The question concerning all desires, motives, and behavior was, "Does it lead me toward or away from God?" McConkey illustrated his point with the desire for wealth:

A man, for example, enters upon a business career. He is cognizant of a strong desire within himself to make money. Now if that desire is born of the Spirit of God; ... if it is exercised for the glory of God; if he makes money for the express purpose, not of accumulation, but of stewardship, using all for the advancement of Christ's kingdom ... then such a man will draw closer and

\textsuperscript{35}[McConkey], "Surrendered Life: Then?" pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., pp. 4-5.
closer to God... But oftener, deep down in the heart of the man, the real motive which is prompting him to money-making is not the love of God and His cause, but the love of money itself. And this is a desire, born not of God, but of the flesh. ... It is bound to lead him away from God. He grows hard, cold, selfish, and barren of all spiritual power.... [Emphasis in original.]37

Such a rigorous view of the Christian's motives and attitudes was bound to come into conflict with traditional African views towards wealth and the role of religion in promoting prosperity. For this reason, the missionaries often had difficulty understanding and appreciating African aspirations for material and social advancement and the demands for education, higher wages, and other things that the Africans perceived as the means and fruit of that advancement.

4. Abiding in Christ: the Life of Service

However, obedience was not exhausted in a legalistic keeping of commands and avoidance of sins. Preeminently, obedience was the love for others. McConkey portrayed the Christian's love for his fellowman as a parallel to his consecration to God. As in his surrender to God, the Christian decides to love others as an act of the will when he "adopts as the deliberate purpose and principle of his life, THE LOVE OF OTHERS INSTEAD OF THE LOVE OF SELF [emphasis in original]."38 As the surrender to God was the relinquishing of an egocentric life for a God-centered life, so the decision to love others was the giving up of self-love for the love of others.39 And as the believer's consecration to God was to be lived out continuously in a life of faith and obedience, so his love for his fellowman was to be a daily characteristic of the


believer's life\textsuperscript{40}

But McConkey did not believe that love was to be mere sentiment or be only expressed in good human relations. The believer was to express his love in service to his fellow man.\textsuperscript{41} The experiences of surrender and the fullness of the Spirit were not granted to the believer for his personal self-gratification. Rather, the greatness of the spiritual and physical needs of the world and the utter inability of the believer to meet those needs should drive him to the crisis of surrender and fullness in the first place, and then issue in a God-inspired and God-empowered service to mankind to meet those needs.\textsuperscript{42}

According to McConkey, God did not have just a general interest in the believer's service. Rather, every believer was created by God for some specific form of service, and after his surrender the Holy Spirit would lead him into that specific service.\textsuperscript{43} McConkey also believed, however, that the ultimate form of service to which all others would contribute was evangelism, for that was humanity's greatest need.\textsuperscript{44}

If the Christian had been created by God and filled with the Holy Spirit for the purpose of service, then it followed that one of the results of surrender and fullness was that the believer received "power" for effective service. One of the most common frustrations that drove late nineteenth century Christians to seek the "higher life" was


\textsuperscript{43} [McConkey], "Surrendered Life: Then?" pp. 5-6.


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the sense of "powerlessness" in service and the desire for "power" in ministry. They desired to be effective in influencing people to convert to Christianity or at helping Christians deal with their moral, emotional, and spiritual problems. As in all other aspects of the surrendered life, the consecrated believer had to "abide" in faith and obedience if he expected to have power in service.

This is clearly illustrated in the crucial ministry of preaching. In order to understand the Bible and to receive from its pages a message from God, the believer had to have faith in the Holy Spirit and depend upon Him to illuminate the scriptures.\footnote{H&D (March 1896): 1.} And, as the believer depended upon the Holy Spirit to understand the Bible, so he had to depend on Him to give his message the power to touch the hearts of his listeners.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 1-2.} A.I.M. did not disparage education or scholarship as such.\footnote{According to George Marsden the part of American Christianity from which A.I.M. drew its constituency was not so much anti-intellectual and anti-scientific as often portrayed, as it was wedded to the earlier Baconian intellectual paradigm and out of step with the Darwinian paradigm that had become the Western norm during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Marsden, pp. 14-17, 55-62, and 109-118),} Rather it saw piety as far more significant and effective at helping people deal with life than education or scholarship alone.\footnote{The editor of Hearing and Doing made this point when he announced that conditions were such in Africa that highly educated missionaries were not needed. What was needed was missionaries with "that wisdom, energy, zeal, devotion, and close walk with God that make great a man that is no scholar, and make greater a man that is" (H&D (January 1896): 4).} Because the power to correctly understand and effectively apply the Scriptures was dependent upon the believer's piety, and thus available to all pious believers to one degree or another, A.I.M. believed that it could confidently depend upon relatively uneducated and theologically untrained missionaries to be its religious teachers in Africa.

\footnote{Chapter Two: Lay Mission, page 39}
THE MISSIONARY CALL

1. Importance of the Missionary Call

Keswick leaders taught that following the act of consecration, God would reveal to each believer the particular life-long work or "ministry" for which he had been created. Seen from a different perspective, this revelation of a Christian's life work was referred to as his "call" to ministry. Nearly every American missionary society considered such a call to missionary work to be an indispensable qualification for missionary service.49 Because the idea of the missionary call was an accepted assumption within A.I.M.'s constituency, *Hearing and Doing* simply described the first A.I.M. missionaries as being "conscious of a distinct call to Africa."50

A.I.M. considered its ability to establish the candidate's clear "call" from God necessary to ensure that potential missionaries were proceeding from legitimate and enduring motives. Candidates who were motivated merely by adventure, romance, popularity,51 sentimentality or duty,52 who were driven by guilt to earn God's favor,53 who were attempting to escape a difficult pastoral ministry54 or who were raised in Africa and simply going "home"55 were unlikely to make effective missionaries.

A.I.M. also saw a conscious sense of divine call as spiritually and emotionally essential for a missionary to function under the uncertain financial policies of a Faith

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49See above p. 28. This is not to say that the concept of "call" was always related to Keswick piety in the other American societies.


52Letter of Reference by G. A. Gary for L. N. Collins, 4 February 1907, BGC,19,21.

53Chicago District Committee, 21 September 1928, BGC,2,87.

54Chicago District Committee, 17 December 1915, BGC,2,87.

55Johnston to Campbell, 4 July 1929, BGC,22,9.

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Mission, a mission that would solicit no money and guaranteed no salary, but expected God to provide its finances in response to prayer alone.56 When explaining the Mission's financial policy, the editor of Hearing and Doing wrote:

No man is expected to go into the field except as clearly led by God, and when such leading has become clear, the worker is to look for God alone to supply the means.... Where God leads, there God feeds. He must be very sure of the former, then he can quietly trust [God] for the latter.57

In like manner, a clear sense of call was expected to sustain the missionary in the rest of the difficulties and hardships of missionary life. In 1900 Elmer Bartholomew advised:

I believe if there is one thing above another that any child of God ought to be clear about, it is the call to the foreign land. ... So when difficulties come, and they will come, in the darkest hour he may not take his eyes from the Lord. If I doubted my call to the field I certainly should long to return home for there were times when everything seemed to be against me.58

But as important as these reasons were, A.I.M. considered it imperative that the missionary be called if he was to be effective in his missionary work. In Keswick piety, obedience to God was a necessary condition to experiencing the blessings of the higher life, including power in service. If the Christian was obedient to this call, as in all other things, then God would bless him and make his ministry spiritually effective. If, however, the believer was disobedient, even if he tried to serve God in another way, he would not be effective for God, and would only experience discouragement and frustration.59 This belief that a Christian must be "called" to his work if it is to be effective lay behind Grimwood's response to the news that the American Home

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56A.I.M.'s financial policy, the "Faith Principle", is the subject of Chapter 3 of this thesis.

57H&D (January 1896): 5.

58H&D (March 1900): 5.

59H&D (January 1896): 2; McConkey, Three-Fold Secret, pp. 17-18, 66-69, 113-123; and [McConkey], "Surrendered Life: Then?" pp. 5-6.

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Council had appointed a "Deputation Worker" to do public relations work for the Mission: "I do hope that the man you have in view for Deputation Work may be called to it. ...a man of God's choice and endowment."60

2. Definition of the Missionary Call

In an article in Hearing and Doing, Presbyterian missionary Norman Russell listed a call as the first qualification of a missionary and attempted to define it:

First, the volunteer must be called; he must be one "to whom the Word of the Lord has come," ... he has the conviction that for this purpose was he born, and that the one absorbing, soul-filling desire to which he can abandon his life is foreign service. [Emphasis in original]61

This concept of the "call" as a strong inner drive or compulsion to serve God in a particular way was reflected in the interviews of missionary candidates by the Chicago District Committee of A.I.M. The committee recorded of Irene Mittlestadt that "if refused for the Field, she is so certain of her call, she will "be lost" (meaning as to God's will for her)."62 Frank Longman "became burdened for the people in Africa and felt that he must go."63

This "call" was expected to be so strong so as to have the highest value in the person's life. It was to be stronger and have a higher value than even that other powerful force, human love and marriage. A.I.M. candidate Earl Dix was "keeping company" with a young lady whose poor health was likely to prevent her from being accepted for missionary service. The committee advised Dix not to marry "lest he be

60Grimwood to Campbell, 15 October 1926, BGC,1,84.
61Russell, p. 3.
62Chicago District Committee, 11 July 1915, BGC,2,87.
63Chicago District Committee, 26 January 1935, BGC,2,87.

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hindered in obeying God's call for Africa. In a subsequent interview, Dix reported that he and the young lady had agreed that if she were not accepted to be a missionary, "that they would not be married and that he would go without her." Nor was this choice between missionary service or marriage only a theoretical choice. Gordon McLachlan told how he had given up young love to serve God as a missionary. Dorothy Potter had to convince the committee that her call did not stem from her desire to marry A.I.M. missionary Harry Miller: "She expressed her desire to go to Africa, not because of her love for Harry, but because she had experienced a call for service eleven years ago when a high school girl of fourteen."

The call to missionary service could not be a general feeling that one should be a missionary. Rather it had to be the conviction that one was chosen, not only to be a missionary, but a missionary to Africa and specifically under the Africa Inland Mission. Harry Giles felt a general call to be a missionary, was willing to serve on any field, and sought God's providential guidance through the decision of the mission agency to accept him or not. The men of the Chicago Committee considered the responsibility of determining where God was calling a missionary to serve to be too grave a responsibility for the committee to carry alone without some internal indication from God within the heart of the candidate himself. Therefore, the committee asked Giles to withdraw his application until he felt a more definite call

64 Chicago District Committee, 11 October 1928, BGC,2,87.

65 Chicago District Committee, 25 January 1929, BGC,2,87. For a similar case see: Chicago District Committee, 23 February 1929, BGC,2,87.

66 Chicago District Committee, 21 June 1929, BGC,2,87.

67 Chicago District Committee, 22 December 1934, BGC,2,87. Also see Chicago District Committee, 11 July 1915, BGC,2,87.

68 Chicago District Committee, 30 November 1928, BGC,2,87.

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from God.69 The committee much preferred candidates like Esther Siegrist, who "believes in the plan of the A I M [sic] and feels led to its field."70 It was expected that a candidate might struggle with his decision, as long as he came out sure of his "call" in the end. Thus it was perfectly acceptable that Charles Skoda "had questioned whether or not he should go out under the Africa Inland Mission or some other mission.... But he was satisfied now that God wanted him to go out under the Africa Inland Mission."71

The "call", however, had to be more than just a subjective conviction or inner feeling, no matter how strong.72 The candidate also had to offer an "objective" basis for his call. This basis was usually found in the biblical commands to evangelize the world and the perceived need for evangelism on the mission field.73 The committee would try to assess the candidates' ability to go by quizzing them concerning their health, family obligations, and outstanding debts.74 Most candidates felt the strong inner drive or compulsion already mentioned. The summary of Lillian Holcomb's call, clearly reflected the entire pattern:

As to her [Miss Holcomb's] call for service, she feels that in as much as she belongs to Christ she should be a witness for Him. She considered the command of Matt.28:19, her ability to go, and the hindering circumstances which were removed. At first she was not willing to go to Africa but prayed that God would search her heart and make her willing to do His will.75

69Chicago District Committee, 25 January 1929, BGC,2,87.

70Chicago District Committee, 19 September 1915, BGC,2,87.

71Chicago District Committee, 25 November 1927, BGC,2,87.

72The theoretical basis of A.I.M.'s practice was explained in J. Hudson Taylor, "Qualifications for Missionary Work," H&D (December 1899): 2-3.

73Chicago District Committee, 18 March 1926; and 1 October 1927, BGC,2,87.

74Chicago District Committee, 21 March 1915; 18 March 1926; and 22 December 1934, BGC,2,87.

75Chicago District Committee, 12 October 1926, BGC,2,87.

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The missionary "call", then, was a strong, moral conviction that God wanted the candidate to be a missionary, based on the commands of scripture, an understanding of the needs of the field, and the availability of the candidate.

3. Confirming the Missionary Call

However, this conviction alone was not enough. The reality of the call had to be tested, and the best way to do this was for the candidate to engage in evangelistic activity in the homeland. So the Chicago Committee examined each candidate's "experience in Christian service". The committee noted that "Mr. Petersen is now teaching a Sunday School class of boys. Has done some personal work, but not lately. Has had very little experience in preaching the Word." If the call was genuine, the Mission expected that the candidate would do all that he could to learn about the living conditions on the field, would pray more for Africa, and find the sense of call strengthening and growing.

The committee also expected that the call in most candidates would be "tested" at some time or another. Often this "testing" referred to the candidate having experience in the "life of faith", that is having seen some of his material needs provided through prayer alone. This was important in a mission that relied on prayer rather than solicitation for its finances. William Wegner testified that he had:

"...been tested along faith lines as a student of Moody Bible Institute and has found God faithful. He was severely tested one week before he came to the"

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76Taylor, p. 3.

77Chicago District Committee, 30 September 1925, BGC,2,87.

78"Personal work" referred to evangelistic activity in which the Christian worker interacted with people individually to influence them to become Christians. This was in contrast to evangelistic meetings of one sort or another.

79Chicago District Committee, 30 September 1925, BGC,2,87.

80Chicago District Committee, 8 November 1929; 6 December 1930, BGC,2,87.

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Institute because of lack of funds but God answered prayer in a remarkable way.\(^{81}\) Commonly this "testing" was seen as some opposition, doubt, or discouragement that the candidate experienced. Since difficult experiences on the mission field would try the faith of the most devout missionary, the Mission wanted to know how the missionary candidate responded to such challenges in the homeland. Charles Skoda was "tested" when he doubted his call to A.I.M. and "questioned whether or not he should go out under the Africa Inland Mission or some other mission."\(^{82}\) Ida Rhodes was "tested" by the opposition of her parents, who "were not willing that she should go under a faith [mission] board."\(^{83}\)

The Mission also expected that God would "give" the candidate "promises" from the Bible to confirm and sustain their call. Favorable circumstances, such as the approval of one's family, were taken to be signs or "tokens" of God's approval.\(^{84}\) The final confirmation of the missionary's call was seen in the receipt of finances, either in the form of gifts or in pledges of ongoing support. The Executive Secretary of the A.H.C. told Laura Collins that God's provision of the funds for her outfit and passage would "be His seal upon your call and upon our approval of your application."\(^{85}\)

OTHER MISSIONARY QUALIFICATIONS

1. Missionary Qualifications Desired in Theory

In describing the pious men and women that A.I.M. expected to recruit as

\(^{81}\)Chicago District Committee, 18 March 1926, BGC,2,87.  
\(^{82}\)Chicago District Committee, 25 November 1927, BGC,2,87.  
\(^{83}\)Chicago District Committee, 8 November 1929, BGC,2,87.  
\(^{84}\)Chicago District Committee, 23 February 1929, BGC,2,87.  
\(^{85}\)Adams to Collins, 8 February 1906. BGC,19,21.

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missionaries, the editor of *Hearing and Doing* alluded to other qualities he expected them to possess in addition to Keswick piety and a missionary call. Subsequent articles explained the spiritual, physical, emotional, and intellectual qualifications that A.I.M. believed were necessary for successful missionary work.

The missionaries' spiritual qualifications first included living a consecrated life and being called by God. But beyond this they were to be "holy men, loving the Word, ... men of prayer, ... men who wished to live for eternity, ... who have the love of God shed abroad in their hearts," and men with a "passion for souls."

As to his physical qualifications, the missionary candidate must be in good health, able "to pass a medical examination, such as would entitle him to retain a large policy in a good assurance company." "Good muscular strength" was needed as well as physical stamina, for endurance was necessary to survive repeated attacks of malaria and to bear the "many hardships" of missionary life. Because of the inevitable change in diet to a reliance on European canned food and local African foods, the missionary must also have a good digestion. Finally, the missionary must

\[\text{86}^* \text{Hearing and Doing expected that A.I.M.'s missionary recruits would be lay men "well versed in the simple fundamental truths of the Word of God" and characterized by "wisdom, energy, zeal, devotion, and close walk with God". They would have been taught by God "in the hard school of suffering and service the discipline and training which are the supreme fitness for hard, persistent, faithful toil in heathen Africa" (H&D (January 1896): 4).}

\[\text{87}^* \text{Russell, pp. 3-4; and Taylor, pp. 2-3.}

\[\text{88}^* \text{Taylor, p. 4.}

\[\text{89}^* \text{Russell, p. 3.}

\[\text{90}^* \text{Thomas Allan, "The Physical Missionary or, the Missionary's Relation to His Body," H&D (July 1898): 2.}

\[\text{91}^* \text{Taylor, p. 3.}

\[\text{92}^* \text{Allan, p. 3.}

\[\text{93}^* \text{Allan, p. 3. Also see Taylor, p. 3.}

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have a high tolerance for pain. Thomas Allan wrote: "Hardships and fever cannot come to a missionary without pain, which many shrink from as they look forward to the mission field. Yet pain has to be suffered, and the fact had better be confronted."94 Because of a residue of asceticism that was still found within some circles of American Protestantism, both Allan and Hudson Taylor had to argue that, while missionaries should not pamper their bodies, they must care for them properly.95

Concerning the emotional qualifications for the mission field, the missionary first of all had to have good mental health. Because of loneliness caused by physical isolation on the mission station, and social isolation due to the language and cultural barriers with the surrounding peoples and the separation from family, friends, and the familiar environment of the homeland, the missionary had to have a cheerful personality with no tendency toward depression.96 The missionary had to be able to handle stress and anxiety well. Though A.I.M.'s missionaries usually did not have great educational opportunities, the need to study and learn was still an important part of missionary life, and language and cultural learning were particularly stressful.97 Furthermore, the missionary could not be prone to anxiety, but had to find strength and consolation in his religion sufficient to deal with the worries of missionary life.98

Beyond good mental health, important personality and character qualifications were required. The missionary needed to be able to get along well with other people and to work with perseverance and endurance.99 Beyond that, Taylor saw the

94Allan, p. 3.
95Allan, p. 1-2; and Taylor, p. 3.
96Allan, p. 3. Also see Taylor, p. 3.
97Allan, p. 3. Also see Taylor, p. 3.
98Allan, p. 4.
99Taylor, p. 3.

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missionary as a charismatic leader. Even before becoming a missionary "his character should have already influenced and impressed others", and on the field "energy - well under control - is needed, and power to influence and to lead." Furthermore, the missionary had to be of such firm spiritual and moral character that his morality would survive in an uncongenial environment without the support of family, friends, church, or community. Significantly, Taylor also argued that the missionary must be totally free of racism and capable of cross-cultural identification.

Finally, the missionary had to have intellectual qualifications. He had to "have an accurate knowledge of the message he is to bear." Furthermore, the demands of language and cultural learning made intelligence and the ability to learn important qualities in a missionary. The missionary must also possess leadership qualities that go beyond Hudson's personal charisma to include both administrative proficiency and flexibility. Such a leader must be competent in all of the Western technical skills that will be used on the mission field. Given the spiritual, physical, emotional, and intellectual qualifications that A.I.M. believed it needed in her missionaries, it is no

100 Ibid.
101 Russell, p. 4.
102 Taylor, p. 3.
103 Russell, p. 3.
104 Ibid.
105 Taylor, p. 3. Allan saw at least some formal education as a necessary "preparation of body and mind" for the difficult tasks of language and cultural learning (Allan, p. 3). Taylor greatly emphasized education or "training". While some forms of education had to be done in the homeland, Taylor thought that it should be kept to the minimum, partly because of the urgency of evangelism and partly because education on the field would be far more useful. In fact, he saw the whole missionary experience as one continuous educational experience (Taylor, p. 4).
106 Russell, pp. 3-4.
107 Ibid., p. 4.
wonder that Russell asserted that "no position in the church at home requires more completely developed men than the mission field."\textsuperscript{108}

2. Assessing Missionary Qualifications

The Chicago Committee also tried to assess the religious, physical, emotional, and intellectual qualifications of its candidates. Occasionally, the candidate was asked in a general way about his physical health,\textsuperscript{109} but usually the committee simply relied on the physician's examination and report to measure the candidates physical qualifications.\textsuperscript{110} Candidates who received a poor report from the doctor were not accepted.\textsuperscript{111}

The committee examined in greater detail the religious,\textsuperscript{112} emotional, and intellectual qualifications of the candidate. It explored the candidate's experience of Christian conversion\textsuperscript{113} and his current piety, usually understood in terms of the

\textsuperscript{108}ibid.

\textsuperscript{109}See: "MChicago District Committee, 21 March 1915; 18 April 1915; 18 March 1926; and 22 December 1934, BGC,2,87.

\textsuperscript{110}Usually it is just not mentioned, though sometimes it was specifically stated that the committee was referring this issue to the medical report or that the candidate was approved pending medical clearance (See: "Chicago District Committee, 30 March 1915; 30 November 1928; 21 June 1928; and 27 October 1934, BGC,2,87).

\textsuperscript{111}Palmer to Birch, 4 November 1916, BGC,26,3.

\textsuperscript{112}For people like A.I.M. missionaries, committee members, candidates, and the religious constituency that held to a Keswick form of piety, all of these qualifications had religious overtones. The separation of those qualifications which related specifically to the religious experiences and piety of the candidate as "religious" qualifications is purely for the convenience of analysis.

\textsuperscript{113}In keeping with the American revivalist tradition, missionary candidates were usually expected to be able to relate a specific time and religious experience of "salvation" when they made their own "personal decision" to "accept Christ". That this was not always the case is illustrated by Mr. Harold Cook, who "did not know of any definite time when he was saved" ("Chicago District Committee, 2 August 1927, BGC,2,87). However, his spiritual state was accepted as satisfactory mainly because he was able to state that "he had an assurance of his salvation" based upon scripture, "mainly upon John 3:36".

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devotional practices of daily Bible reading and prayer\textsuperscript{114} and sometimes as the broader Keswick experience of the "victorious life".\textsuperscript{115} The candidates had to explain their call to Africa and A.I.M., and often their reason for going to the field as well. They were questioned concerning their evangelistic zeal and their practice of evangelism. Finally their experience of the "faith life" was examined. By the "faith life", A.I.M. meant the practice of relying upon God to supply financial and other needs through prayer alone. Since this was the official financial policy of the Mission, it was important that potential missionaries with A.I.M. had some experience of seeing God provide for their material needs in response to their prayers before they committed their whole life in a foreign land to this policy.\textsuperscript{116}

In assessing the personality and emotional qualifications of the candidates the committee probed the candidates' adaptability to "the work and the workers", their "knowledge of conditions on the field" and ability to cope with them, and their willingness to submit to the authority of the mission, including their understanding and acceptance of the Mission constitution and policies. This latter was important because as an interdenominational mission, A.I.M. could not rely on established ecclesiastical identity, traditions, and loyalties to bind the Mission together.

Of particular importance was the effort that the committee made to probe the

\textsuperscript{114}Sometimes it was noted that the candidate was questioned about their "prayer life" (Chicago District Committee, 18 April 1915; 16 May 1915; 18 July 1931; and 22 December 1934, BGC,2,87) and other times about their "habit in daily prayer and Bible reading" (Chicago District Committee, 2 August 1927; and 27 June 1936, BGC,2,87). In the report of the examination of Miss Esther Siegrist, her "spiritual life" was virtually identified with "the time she gives to prayer and the personal reading of God's word (Chicago District Committee, 19 September 1915, BGC,2,87)."

\textsuperscript{115}Chicago District Committee, 11 October 1928, BGC,2,87. It is surprising that generally the candidates were not specifically questioned on the Keswick experience of "consecration". It seems that for missionary candidates, this experience tended to be absorbed into their experience of their missionary "call".

\textsuperscript{116}Chicago District Committee, 21 June 1929, BGC,2,87.

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racial attitudes of the candidates to avoid overt racism.\textsuperscript{117} Sometimes the minutes merely noted that the candidate had been asked about his "interest in colored folk", \textsuperscript{118} "love for the negro", \textsuperscript{119} or "ability to work with colored people".\textsuperscript{120} But more than the professed attitudes of candidates, the committee wanted to know if those attitudes had been tested by prior experience with African-Americans. The record of Esther Siegrist's interview contained this note: "Experience with colored folk: not much; they are not repulsive at all; all folks are alike to her."\textsuperscript{121} More positive was the responses of Ida Rhodes: "She loved to work with colored children, and taught them in the public schools and worked among them in open air meetings on the south side of Chicago."\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{117}Elizabeth Isichei accuses Karl Kumm of the Sudan United Mission, and by implication all Faith Missions of racism (Isichei, p. 89). David Sandgren accuses A.I.M. in particular of racism ("The Kikuyu, Christianity and the Africa Inland Mission," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976), pp. 84-86). Kumm's statements quoted by Isichei are surely ethnocentric and paternalistic, but do not necessarily imply the inherent inferiority of the African peoples. A detailed analysis of Sandgren's charges is not possible here, but suffice it to say that he attempts to make his case by citing some legitimate evidence, misreading other sources, and misrepresenting certain situations from the mid-1970s which he anachronistically reads back into the pre-World War II history of A.I.M. Both authors judge these early to mid-twentieth century missionaries from the stand point of contemporary racial values. An evaluation of them within the context of racial attitudes prevalent in their own day might yield an more generous judgement.

Having said this, however, one must also admit that racism is insidious and can be latent as well as overt. Furthermore, racism, ethnocentrism, and paternalism are not identical, but they overlap and are hard to distinguish. Latent racism, coupled with ethnocentrism and paternalism, probably affected all Europeans working in Africa during most of the colonial period. While all A.I.M. missionaries would have vehemently denied the charge of racism, there can be no doubt that some of their attitudes and policies were racist, though consciously the rationale for the policies were non-racial.

\textsuperscript{118}Chicago District Committee, 18 April 1915, BGC, 2,87.

\textsuperscript{119}Chicago District Committee, 16 May 1915, BGC, 2,87.

\textsuperscript{120}Chicago District Committee, 26 January 1935, BGC, 2,87.

\textsuperscript{121}Chicago District Committee, 19 September 1915, BGC, 2,87.

\textsuperscript{122}Chicago District Committee, 8 November 1929, BGC, 2,87.

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During the course of the interview, the committee tried to gage the emotional temperament, leadership potential, and endurance of the candidates. Henry Groth was rejected in part because of "his temper" and "his erratic temperament". Dorothy Potter was learning to draw on her religious resources to deal with a tendency towards depression. Annie Cowell was seen to be "inclined to be a little timid, allowing others to lead". Growing up on a farm was seen to indicate probable qualities of endurance and hard work.

In evaluating the candidates' intellectual, or "professional" qualifications, the committee looked at their education and training, their business and work experience, and other skills that they might have. The committee was also interested in the candidates' "experience in Christian work". In particular the committee wanted to know if the candidate was already both active and successful in gaining religious converts. The committee saw this as a measure both of the evangelistic zeal of the candidate as well as his skill in evangelism. The committee asked candidates to demonstrate how they would go about leading an interested

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123 Chicago District Committee, 30 September 1925, BGC,2,87.

124 Chicago District Committee, 22 December 1934, BGC,2,87.

125 Chicago District Committee, 18 March 1926, BGC,2,87.

126 Chicago District Committee, 21 September 1928; and 10 May 1930, BGC,2,87.

127 See: "Chicago District Committee, 21 March 1915; 18 April 1915; 18 March 1926; 30 November 1928; 6 December 1930; and 30 March 1935, BGC,2,87.

128 See: Chicago District Committee, 18 April 1915; 19 September 1915; 30 November 1915; 18 March 1926; and 26 January 1935, BGC,2,87.

129 See: Chicago District Committee, 11 July 1915; 30 November 1928; and 26 January 1935, BGC,2,87.

130 Chicago District Committee, 21 June 1929, BGC,2,87. Also see: Chicago District Committee, 21 March 1915; 22 October 1928; 6 December 1930; and 24 April 1937, BGC,2,87.

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African to Christian conversion. The committee looked for both the necessary knowledge and skill on the part of the candidate, and may well have been looking to avoid potential missionaries who in an excess of zeal were insensitive to those they would convert. But their questions also revealed a degree of cultural naivety on the part of the Chicago committee. The minutes noted with disfavor that Lloyd Latta "seemed to question if a native would be saved the first time he heard the gospel." This observation may have stemmed from the old debate over whether or not Africans had to be "civilized" before they were evangelized, but unquestionably reflected a lack of understanding of the difficulties involved in the cross-cultural transmission of religion.

If the ability to make converts was one of the most important intellectual skills that an A.I.M. missionary needed, a knowledge of the Bible was perhaps the most important intellectual information. When the Chicago District Committee spoke of a candidate's "knowledge of the Bible" it referred to the doctrines that A.I.M. and its constituency believed were taught in the scriptures, the content of specific books of the Bible, and the ability of the candidate to quote scripture to support his religious beliefs.

Consecration and call, then, were two indispensable qualifications for A.I.M. missionaries, but they were not the only ones. In both theory and practice, A.I.M. tried to recruit missionaries that it thought would have the physical, emotional, and

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131 Chicago District Committee, 6 December 1930, BGC,2,87. The members of the Chicago District Committee as well as the rest of A.I.M. understood Christian conversion in terms of American revivalism whereby the convert, in response to a sense of moral guilt, made a rational/emotional, religious decision to accept the atonement of Christ to remove that guilt and to now follow the precepts of Christianity. The committee members were asking the candidates how they would lead an interested African to make this decision.

132 Chicago District Committee, 25 April 1936, BGC,2,87.

133 Chicago District Committee, 2 August 1927; and 18 July 1931, BGC,2,87.

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spiritual stamina to endure the rigors of missionary service in Africa. In addition, the Mission looked for men and women who had sufficient religious knowledge and skill to win African converts. Other knowledge and skill might be useful, but by no means was considered necessary.

EFFECTS OF THE "LAY MISSION" POLICY

A.I.M. looked for candidates characterized by Keswick piety, a missionary call, and the other qualities it thought would make them into effective missionaries. The effects of these qualities, however, were mixed both helping and hindering the Mission's work in Kenya.

1. The Effects of A.I.M.'s Keswick Piety

As a broad spiritual movement Keswick piety brought spiritual renewal and greater Christian zeal to countless individual Christians and to many congregations in Britain and America. It also had a strong impact on the missionary movement. Some critics saw Keswick piety as having only a negative influence on the missionary enterprise. Andrew Porter saw the Keswick piety as contributing to a change of late-nineteenth century British attitudes that ultimately accepted the necessity of European colonial rule. Elizabeth Isichei wrote that Keswick piety often promoted legalism

134 Andrew Porter, "Cambridge, Keswick, and Late-Nineteenth Century Attitudes to Africa," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 5 (October 1976): 5-34; and "Evangelical Enthusiasm, Missionary Motivation and West Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century: The Career of G. W. Brooke," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 6 (October 1977): 25-29. Porter's excellent articles are highly nuanced. In the former (pp. 27-28) he argued that where missionaries saw their African converts failing to meet the standards of Keswick piety, such as in Nigeria, they could fall back on racistist explanations. However, where missionaries saw their converts as fulfilling the expectations of Keswick piety, as in Uganda, they used that fact to argue against racistist beliefs. In the latter (pp. 32-33, 35-37, 40-42) he showed that G. W. Brooke's hypercriticism of the Niger Mission stemmed not only from his Keswick piety, but also from the far more radical perfectionism of American revivalist Charles Finney, and that Brooke's critical attitude derived from these two theological sources rather than from racism.
"rather than kindness ... often led to the condemnation of the Other, and an intolerant autocracy ... [and led] to the destruction, rather than the furthering, of African aspirations."

Then, giving no evidence to support her assertion, Isichei proceeded to blame Keswick piety for the refusal of C.M.S. missionaries in Uganda to accept Bishop Tucker's 1898 constitution that would have placed missionary and African priests on a par in the Church of Uganda.136

It is difficult and perhaps impossible to measure the effects of theology, a type of piety, or religion in general, on the personality, character, attitudes, policies, and even actions of people. Rarely do people live up to their religious ideals and often what they are and do is in spite of their theology, not because of it. Furthermore, religious factors never influence an individual in isolation, but would always be among many other personal, cultural, educational, and ideological influences. Therefore, caution must be exercised when trying to evaluate the effect of Keswick piety on the missionary enterprise. Nevertheless, Keswick piety impacted A.I.M.'s work in several ways.

First of all Keswick piety provided a powerful engine for missionary recruitment. Missionary meetings became an integral part of Keswick conferences. Keswick teachers like Charles Trumbull promoted missions, and missions leaders like Charles Hurlburt promoted Keswick piety. The willingness to become a missionary became joined to full surrender both as the logical result of surrender as well as a sign and seal of a person's complete consecration.137 For many A.I.M. missionaries, their experience of consecration and their missionary call were virtually one and the same.

135Isichei, pp. 89, 90-91.

136The irony in Isichei's charge is that Tucker himself was a product of the Keswick Movement (John C. Pollock, The Keswick Story: the Authorized History of the Keswick Convention (Chicago: Moody Press, 1964), p. 80).

137Carpenter, pp. 118-121; Marsden, pp. 96-97; McQuilkin, pp. 154-156; and Pollock, pp. 80-87.

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Secondly, Keswick piety provided a strong rationale for the lay missionary movement. One of the results of surrender was "power for service". This included both the power to understand the Bible as well as the power to preach it effectively. Such power came as a direct result of consecration rather than from education or scholarship. A.I.M. did not denigrate education and scholarship, which were highly esteemed in a "consecrated" Christian. But when a situation, such as A.I.M. supposed existed in Africa, did not call for education and scholarship, the "power for service" that God provided even the humblest Christian who surrendered to God would suffice.

Third, Keswick piety impacted the character of the missionaries who went to the field. It contributed greatly to the commitment, zeal, and self-sacrifice that missionaries needed to endure the hardships and uncertainty of life on the mission field and in a society that did not guarantee their salaries. It also helped to develop qualities in missionaries that enabled them to relate to African people and draw them to Christianity by the example of godly lives.

Fourth, Keswick piety may have undermined A.I.M.'s commitment to limited cultural change. The missionaries denied that it was their intention to destroy African culture. In theory, they only opposed those customs that were incompatible with

138 A highly influential example to A.I.M. and the founders of other faith missions was the great D. L. Moody who "himself had but seven years of education and no theological training" (Robert L. Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya: The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900 to 1939 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 121.).

139 See above pp. 38-39.

140 For A.I.M. the missionary call was an extension of their Keswick piety, and having a call from God was viewed as essential to enduring the hardships of missionary life and the uncertainties of a faith mission. See above pp. 40-41. Also see Carpenter, p. 119.

141 For a treatment of the importance of relationship and example to evangelism see below, Chapter 6, pp.234-235, 272-275.

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Christianity or were unhygienic.\textsuperscript{142} However, the very intensity and zeal for holiness of Keswick piety gave all actions a spiritual and moral significance.\textsuperscript{143} Its rigorous, all inclusive, black-and-white spiritual and moral view of the activities of the missionaries' own culture could only accentuate the Western tendency to find fault and condemn the cultures of African peoples and cause the missionaries to accept as natural the social divisions that their evangelism produced.

Fifth, the self-renunciation inherent in the theology of surrender\textsuperscript{144} motivated missionaries to great lengths of self-sacrifice for their missionary work. This ideal of self-renunciation, however, clashed directly with the African view of religion as that which enhances one's life,\textsuperscript{145} thus contributing to the difficulty that many missionaries had appreciating the legitimate economic aspirations of their converts. The missionaries gloried in the self-sacrifice of their teacher-evangelists, as a sign of great

\textsuperscript{142}H. Virginia Blakeslee, \textit{Beyond the Kikuyu Curtain} (Chicago: Moody Press, 1956), p. 59. Blakeslee wrote this in the mid-1950s describing her work among the Gikuyu from 1911-1954. Though the missionaries in the first half of this century may not have described their approach to African culture precisely in Blakeslee's terms, there is evidence that this is what they were trying to do. Blakeslee was not merely projecting back into the history of the Mission an apologetic response to charge of "cultural imperialism".

A.I.M. missionaries tried to adopt African customs in the establishment of their medical work, and tried to adapt their teaching of western homemaking skills to African culture (see below, Chapter 6, pp. 255-256). When the baptism requirements were formalized in 1909 the candidate was to promise only "to abstain from all customs contrary to the word of God" and certain specific examples were given. A committee was formed to study "those native customs with which a missionary must deal in his work" to determine how the Mission should regard them (\textit{H&\textit{D}} (January-March 1909): 4-5).

An attempt to reach this balance is seen in the Mission rule dealing with bride-wealth. African Christians were not "to sell a sister, daughter, or any woman over whom, in native custom he has authority", and were to encourage only marriages based on "true affection", yet "a moderate marriage dowry" was required to "be paid before the marriage is consummated" ("Rules of the Africa Inland Mission adopted by The [Kenya] Field Council April 1915," KBA: FC-83).

\textsuperscript{143}See above pp. 35-37.

\textsuperscript{144}See above pp. 32, 33-34, 37.

\textsuperscript{145}See below Chapter 6, pp. 243-245, 261-262.

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spiritual dedication. However, when teacher-evangelists demanded remuneration comparable to what other missions were providing, the missionaries criticized their "unspiritual" desires. The greatest conflict between A.I.M. and its adherents was the conflict over education, which was also a clash of differing concepts of the purpose of religion.

Sixth, the tendency to see everything in the spiritual terms of the struggle between the "old" and the "new nature" provided strong motivation for careful Christian living. But the possibility that once dedicated Christians could fall back under the domination of the "old nature" also provided a "spiritual" explanation to conflicts that had other causes. Lack of evangelistic success could sometimes be attributed to the lack of spirituality in the missionary. The missionaries often found it easy to attribute the complaints of their African converts to such a spiritual malaise and overlook their just grievances.

Finally, there is some validity to the charge that Keswick spirituality produced a legalistic and judgmental attitude in some missionaries. Keswick piety held love

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147 For complaints by Machakos teachers see Davis to Campbell, 5 December 1931, BGC,10,5. For complaints by Kijabe teachers and the mission's response see Kevin Ward, "Evangelism or Education? Mission Priorities and Educational Policy in the Africa Inland Mission," (unpublished paper, University of Nairobi, 1974), p. 11. Of course the frustration of A.I.M. missionaries with the inability of the Mission to pay its teachers adequately also affected their attitude.

148 This clash is the subject of chapter 7 of this thesis.

149 See below Chapter 6, p.266.

150 Kevin Ward suggested that A.I.M. missionaries showed this tendency in the education controversy (Ward, p. 15). For evidence that supports Ward's conclusion see: Johnston to Campbell, 5 March 1928, BGC,22,9; E[arl] J. Andersen, "Paper on Relations between Government and Missions" n.d., KBA: FC-1; Blakeslee prayer letter, 5 March 1948, BGC,19,12; and Blakeslee, Kikuyu Curtain, p. 221.
toward others to be one of its highest values,\textsuperscript{151} and disavowed any sense a "holier-than-thou" attitude.\textsuperscript{152} Yet, the rigorous demand for separation from sin could cause some to be very hard on themselves and on those around them.\textsuperscript{153} Furthermore, the very comprehensiveness and finality of the Keswick experience could induce a subtle spiritual pride. Since the act of surrender was also an act of the will, the Christian became morally responsible for his own state of sanctification.\textsuperscript{154} It would be a strong temptation to some who were already "consecrated" to judge other Christians who appeared not have taken this step or to have fallen from it.\textsuperscript{155} Because of such tendencies, A.I.M. General Director Charles Hurlburt warned the A.I.M. missionaries in a circular letter against such spiritual pride.\textsuperscript{156} Sometimes A.I.M. missionaries could behave in harsh and judgmental ways. Missionaries at Githumu and Kijabe were criticized by others in the Mission for their "harsh treatment" of the African people.\textsuperscript{157}

2. The Effects of the Missionary Call

If Keswick piety provided strengths, and drawbacks to A.I.M.'s missionary work, so too did the missionary call. The absolute assurance that God wanted them in

\textsuperscript{151}See above pp. 37-38.

\textsuperscript{152}[McConkey], "Surrendered Life: Then?" p. 5.

\textsuperscript{153}Andrew Porter believed that this had happened among missionaries in Nigeria (Porter, "Keswick," pp. 5-34; and "G. W. Brooke," pp. 25-29).

\textsuperscript{154}See above p. 33.

\textsuperscript{155}Joel Carpenter uses this explanation to explain "how fundamentalist contentiousness could be supported by the sweetly pious, rather quiescent style of the Higher Life movement" (Carpenter, pp. 123-124).

\textsuperscript{156}Hurlburt to "Fellow-Member of the A.I.M.," 1 July 1914, KBA: FC-76.

\textsuperscript{157}Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76; [Downing] to Holland, 28 December 1926, KBA: FC-1; Downing to Davis, 7 January 1926, KBA: FC-1; and Campbell to McKenrick, 2 March 1927, BGC,22,28.
Africa gave the missionaries the spiritual and emotional courage, strength, and stamina to take their religious message to remote and difficult places, and to remain there despite physical hardships, isolation, opposition and difficulties.\textsuperscript{158} People who gave up easily could never have been instruments of the transmission of Christianity to Africa.

On the other hand, the strong sense of call contributed to a sturdy individualism among A.I.M. missionaries which made mission administration difficult.\textsuperscript{159} Missionaries coming from the highly individualistic milieu of American revivalist religion that expected Christians to look directly to God for salvation, sanctification, and to determine "His will for their life", were now expected to drop their individualistic values for the communal value of direction by the Mission authorities. Not surprisingly a tension between individual liberty and organizational authority remained a constant feature of A.I.M. Hurlburt addressed the issue of submission to the Mission authorities in a 1914 circular letter to the mission body. He argued that in exchange for the great "individual liberty" permitted within A.I.M., missionaries should "cheerfully" submit to the "few rules" established "for the greatest

\textsuperscript{158}See above pp. 40-41.

\textsuperscript{159}Compare with Ward, p. 7. Sandgren and, following him, Isichei see the emphasis on the missionary call as producing a contentious mission of "strong-willed individuals prone to schism" (Sandgren, pp. 78-81; and Isichei, p. 90).

On the other hand Ward correctly sees the sensitive nature of the issue of authority in A.I.M. as stemming from more than just the emphasis on the "call" of God in the recruitment of missionaries. He also sees it as the result of the Mission's finances being organized around the support of individual missionaries and the loose organizational structure of the Mission. These issues will be examined in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.

Tignor also sees the issue of authority as stemming from more factors than just "independent personalities", including the nature of revivalistic religion, the wide variety of backgrounds from which the missionaries came, and the problems inherent in attempting to create a new interdenominational mission "slowly evolving an administrative structure and clear lines of authority" (Tignor, pp. 121-122).

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harmony and efficiency" of the work. Twenty-five years later Earl Winsor wrote an article that Inland Africa wisely declined to publish. Winsor asserted that the candidates should be sent out only if the Mission had determined their willingness to submit to the Mission authorities. Furthermore, the candidates should be told that "an important element in determining the Lord's will for them on the field should be the considered judgment of the Field Council." 

The concept of the "call of God" was not limited only to missionaries. In the late 1920s the missionaries in Ukambani applied this concept to the development of an African clergy. Initially, the necessity of demonstrating a clear "call" from God severely limited the number of African pastoral candidates. Presumably the sense of

\[160\text{Hurlburt to "Fellow-Member of the A.I.M.," 1 July 1914, KBA: FC-76. In 1915 new missionaries were told that due to the greater experience and knowledge of the Mission leaders, they should place themselves "in trusting submission to the General Director and Council, knowing they are God's chosen ones for directing the work, rejoicing in what He reveals to them as His will, even though you may have thought otherwise ("Suggestions to New Missionaries," 24 August 1915, BGC,12,46)."

\[161\text{Earl Winsor, "An Important Missionary Qualification," typed manuscript, n.d. [1928?], BGC,10,5.}

\[162\text{In 1935 the problem remained much the same as Fred McKenrick complained "that not one in 25 missionaries came to the field to do God's will: they come with a preconceived idea of what they are to do, and it takes years for them to be willing to obey the [Field] Council's will (Davis to Campbell, 21 May 1935, BGC,19,25). About the same time former A.I.M. missionary George Rhoad founded the Gospel Furthering Fellowship and returned to Kenya causing a minor schism in A.I.M.'s Kamba work. Rhoad justified his refusal to practice comity and willingness to disrupt A.I.M.'s work on the basis that "God has called them to this special ministry and they must in obedience to the call deliver the message He has given them" (Downing to Campbell, 21 October 1936, BGC,20,12).}

\[163\text{This is not necessarily a bad thing. The decision of the Roman Catholic Church to require the same educational qualifications of their priests in every part of the world resulted in severely limiting the number of African priests, though it has also resulted in more highly qualified African leadership in their church than in the Protestant churches. The emphasis on the piety of their pastoral candidates restricted the number of A.I.C. pastors, though whether it has also resulted in a correspondingly higher degree of piety among those pastors as a whole, only God Himself can judge. On the different policies followed by different missions on the development of an African clergy and church see William B. Anderson, The Church in East Africa: 1840-1974 (Nairobi: Uzima

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"call" also strengthened and fortified the African pastors to persevere in their ministries much as it did for the missionaries. While it was unlikely that the African pastoral candidates understood the "call" in exactly the same way as the missionaries, it has nevertheless been adopted by the Africa Inland Church as part of the pastoral qualifications to this day.\(^{164}\)

3. The Effects of Other Missionary Qualifications

The most important issue for the Mission during the first half of the twentieth century was the education and training of the missionaries. It is here that the principle of the lay mission came into most direct conflict with the African context. The problem was very simple. Though Africa south of the Sahara had no great literary tradition, the missionaries soon discovered that it took the best possible minds with the best possible education to learn African languages and cultures and to communicate the gospel and plant a church in a cross-cultural context.

In keeping with A.I.M.'s purpose to provide an opportunity for missionary service to pious, but uneducated laymen, the only training besides either elementary or high school that some 70% of A.I.M.'s missionaries had was some form of Bible institute training.\(^{165}\) Even then, some candidates felt the urgency for evangelism so

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\(^{164}\)One of the qualifications to admittance to Moffat College of Bible, where I teach, is that the applicant be "called of God." The Admissions Committee recognizes the impossibility of it discerning for certain the "genuineness" of an applicant's call, and usually accepts what the applicant has written in his essay relating his life and spiritual experiences. Sometimes he is questioned concerning the call in the application interview, and only once can I remember an applicant being rejected because his "call" was in doubt. It was a case where the committee had the clear impression that the student was applying to Bible College, not because it was his own desire, but merely to please his father.

\(^{165}\)Taken from Robert Tignor's analysis of the biographical information on 48 A.I.M. missionaries sent out between 1900 and 1914 (Tignor, pp. 119-120). This was roughly half the missionaries A.I.M. sent out during that period. Tignor noted that for 34 of these missionaries "Bible Institutes were their only post-secondary schooling." Tignor's only error in Chapter Two: Lay Mission, page 63
strongly that they did not wait to finish their educational programs before leaving for the field. Peter Cameron Scott took only one year of the three-year course at A. B. Simpson's New York Missionary Training College before he left for the Congo.¹⁶⁶ Likewise, John Stauffacher gave up his last year at Northwestern College to join A.I.M.¹⁶⁷

No sooner had the missionaries arrived in Kenya, however, than they saw that piety was not enough and were crying for missionaries with specific skills. Margaret Scott saw the need for missionaries with business skills.¹⁶⁸ Willis Hotchkiss and Elmer Bartholomew pled for trained linguists.¹⁶⁹ By the early years of the new century, even the officers at home were beginning to see the need of uniting piety with education. In 1902 the editor of *Hearing and Doing* wrote that Africa "needs the brightest of our college trained men and women"¹⁷⁰ In 1911, Orson Palmer agreed to accept the post of Director for North America only on a *pro tem* basis because he believes that the position required "a young man with best college training who will take up our work

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¹⁶⁹*H&D* (January 1899): 7; (March 1900): 4-5.


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and bring it to the attention of our best college trained men.\textsuperscript{171}

As time passed, the work of the Mission only became more, not less complex. African conversions brought with it the need to develop church structures, indigenous leadership, and a Christian community that could apply its faith in a rapidly changing society. The cross-cultural complexities inherent in this task required, in addition to piety, the sharpest of intellects and the broadest and most generous statesmanship. Perceptive A.I.M. missionaries could only plead that missionaries embodying some of these characteristics be recruited. As A.I.M. began to experience these pressures for the first time in the post-war years, Charles Johnston argued that A.I.M. needed not just more missionaries, but better missionaries.\textsuperscript{172} Hurlburt issued the same call. When appointing Lee Downing to represent him to the American Home Council, Hurlburt instructed Downing to urge the Council to recruit higher quality missionaries. He was looking for men, not only with sufficient training to make them competent translators and educators, but men of the vision, statesmanship, and selflessness to develop an emerging African church under African leadership.\textsuperscript{173} In the October 1921 edition of \textit{Inland Africa} Hurlburt attempted to refute the notion that only uneducated missionaries were needed for Africa. Rather, he argued, the very lack of a literary tradition required far more highly educated teachers and linguists than in literate cultures. In addition to these, Hurlburt pled for trained medical personnel and

\textsuperscript{171}Hurlburt to General Council, 7 January 1911, KBA: General Council.

\textsuperscript{172}Johnston wrote: "We rejoice in ... the large number of accepted candidates. I do hope, however, that they are of a higher standard than the average has been in the past. I gladly admit that an ignorant man can preach the gospel in the power of the Spirit with very great success, but such an one should remain where conditions give him access to those who can understand him. His place is not in this country. The problems that come up here, there, and everywhere are most complex, and it simply will not do to turn our back on them. They must be solved, and to solve them sanctified brains are needed. (Johnston to Palmer, 4 November 1919, BGC,22.8.)"

\textsuperscript{173}Hurlburt to Downing, 2 November 1920, KBA: FC-76.
In 1925 Roland A. Smith, President of the British Home Council, wrote that in addition to piety, missionary candidates must bring to the field skills in specific areas such as education, medicine, linguistics, or leadership development.

Unfortunately, desiring more highly qualified missionary candidates and receiving them were two different things, for A.I.M.'s pool of potential missionary candidates was not sufficiently educated to meet the growing needs of the Mission. The result was that the work of A.I.M. was hindered in several highly significant areas.

First, in Bible translation A.I.M. missionaries made significant contributions to translating the Bible into Kikamba and Maasai. However, the work on the Kipsigis Bible was seriously flawed because of the lack of training on the part of the missionary who undertook the task. Second, in the area of education A.I.M. failed to establish a teacher training college at Kijabe in 1923 because the Mission had no trained educator to head it. The Mission's inability to recruit qualified teachers remained a frustration to both missionaries and African Christians throughout the

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176 This statement bears further investigation, but it is likely that A.I.M. had difficulty recruiting educated missionaries because most of the potential missionary candidates in A.I.M.'s constituency were relatively uneducated. A variety of factors would have contributed to this: 1) A.I.M. originally targeted the uneducated poor for missionary service; 2) A.I.M. built up its constituency around the Bible institutes which provided low level training to the same uneducated poor; 3) it is likely that the more highly educated candidates were attracted to the denominational missions; 4) as the modernist-fundamentalist controversy developed and faith missions became a conservative alternative to denominational missions A.I.M.'s constituency became alienated from the American educational establishment and it took time to establish alternative institutions and regain confidence in higher education.

177 Davis to Campbell, 21 May 1935, BGC, 19, 25.

178 C. E. Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923. KBA: FC-76.
dispute over education. Third A.I.M. was hindered in the development of the African church. Hurlburt wrote that the Mission could not give proper training to its African agents partly because of "the difficulty of finding in each tribe a missionary sufficiently trained for this work". When Hurlburt had to personally intervene to repair the Mission's relations with its Gikuyu churches following the Harry Thuku protests, he despaired that so few missionaries understood what it meant to develop a African church.

Over the years the concern for education and the educational level of A.I.M.'s constituency gradually improved. First, the urgency to leave for the field immediately moderated and a felt need for better preparation began to grow. In 1915 Mr. and Mrs. Scudder, wanted to wait at least a year until Mr. Scudder graduated from Moody Bible Institute before going to the field, but were willing to go at any time. By 1926 the candidates were not only graduating from Bible school, but asking whether they should not do additional training before proceeding to the field.

Secondly, the educational level of the candidates began to rise. By the mid-1940s a high school diploma and post-secondary Bible College had become the minimum educational requirements of the Mission. In 1915 the Chicago District Committee asked Dr. Jonathan Blanchard, president of Wheaton College, to join the

181 Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.
182 In part the rising educational level in A.I.M.'s constituency reflected the raising educational levels in the United States as a whole.
183 Chicago District Committee, 3 November 1915, BGC,2,87.
184 Chicago District Committee, 18 March 1926, BGC,2,87.
185 Camp to R. Davis, 13 May 1943; and R. Davis to Camp, 18 May 1943, BGC,2,84. R. Davis to Hubbard, 23 October 1944; and R. Davis to Hubbard, 30 January 1945, BGC,6,64.
committee, so A.I.M. would be well represented to the students of the college.\textsuperscript{186} The number of college graduates in the mission increased slowly, with one candidate in 1927 who not only had an undergraduate degree, but was also attending seminary.\textsuperscript{187} This remained the exception. Not until the 1930s did college educations become common among A.I.M. missionaries, and not until nearly 1940 before the Mission began serious efforts recruit seminary graduates.\textsuperscript{188}

The educational level of A.I.M. recruits was not the only thing that hindered the Mission's ability to supply the skills that A.I.M. needed. Another factor was the policy not to accept missionaries over 30 years of age.

This had not always been the case. In 1896, A.I.M. sent out the parents of Peter Cameron Scott in the second party of missionaries.\textsuperscript{189} The age of the elder Scotts was seen to be an advantage as they gave the younger missionaries the benefit of their years of experience.\textsuperscript{190} However, the Scotts found the life of pioneer missionaries too strenuous and left A.I.M. to take up a post with the colonial government.\textsuperscript{191} Yet, the Mission did not set a rigid age limit, for in 1906 Miss Hulda Stumpf was accepted at the age of 40.\textsuperscript{192}

Within the next two years, however, an age limit was established at 30 years old. The Mission now assumed that after that age it would be too difficult for

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{186}Chicago District Committee, 30 March 1915, BGC,2,87.

\textsuperscript{187}Chicago District Committee, 5 May 1927, BGC,2,87.

\textsuperscript{188}R. Davis to Mrs. Campbell, 5 February 1938; and R. Davis to Campbell, 18 February 1938, BGC,20,2.

\textsuperscript{189}H&D (January 1897): 5-6.

\textsuperscript{190}H&D (February 1896): 6.

\textsuperscript{191}H&D (May 1897): 7.

\textsuperscript{192}Stumpf to Sample, 24 October 1906, BGC,24,22.
\end{flushright}

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missionaries to learn the language, making it impossible for them to become effective evangelists. Yet it was not simply a matter of setting an age limit and sticking to it, for tension arose between accepting missionaries under 30 and recruiting missionaries with skills the Mission needed. Up to the early 1920s "over-age" missionary candidates were sometimes accepted if they had particular skills to commend them.

A turning point seems to have been reached with the case of Miss Julia DeMasor, who was 33 when accepted and died in 1922 after only a year on the field. This incident seems to have shaken the Mission particularly hard, because there had been no deaths for a number of years. The effect of this experience was a hardening of the Mission's requirements as to health and age. In 1927, Mr. Robert Wright was rejected because of his age (43) even though his 25 years of printing

193 Hurlburt to Work, 18 May 1908, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence. For expressions of similar concerns see: Barnett to Palmer, 22 October 1912, BGC,19,20; and Fletcher to DeMasor, 15 April 1920, BGC,20,6.

194 The Mission accepted S. M. Work despite being over 30 because it needed him to set up a saw-mill as part of the industrial school at Kijabe (Adams to Work, 22 July 1908, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence).

Leonard Buijse presented a bit of a dilemma for the Mission. He was a carpenter wanting to do "industrial work", but he had as yet no religious training. At 27 years old, he was pushing the age limit. Hurlburt urged that he not wait to take religious training first, but be sent to the field as soon as possible, because "every day till he is thirty will count for a great advantage in getting the language" (Hurlburt to Fletcher, 21 June 1920, BGC,19,18). For the debate on what to do about Buijse see: J. Buijse to L. Buijse, 19 October 1919; L. Buijse to Salter 28 January 1920; L. Buijse to J. Buijse, 19 February 1920; L. Buijse to Salter 3 March 1920; Staub to Fletcher 31 March 1920; Fletcher to Salter 7 April 1920; Fletcher to L. Buijse, 7 April 1920; Staub to L. Buijse, 14 April 1920; Schaffer to Staub, 6 May 1920; and J. Buijse to Hurlburt, 10 June 1920, BGC,19,18.

195 Fletcher to I. DeMasor, 31 March 1922; and Rowland to I. DeMasor, 25 September 1922, BGC,20,6.

In 1920 the Mission was reluctant to accept Miss DeMasor because of her age, 33, and her physical condition (Fletcher to J. DeMasor, 15 April 1920, BGC,20,6. On the nature of her health concerns see: "Africa Inland Mission Medical Examination, 6 January 1920; "Africa Inland Mission Medical Examination, 7 January 1920; Roland to Palmer 11 December 1920; and Fletcher to I. DeMasor, 20 April 1922, BGC,20,6).

196 Fletcher to I. DeMasor, 20 April 1922; and Fletcher to I. DeMasor, 4 July 1922, BGC,20,6.

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experience were desperately needed on the field. Miss Laura Collins argued that the Mission's age limit hindered the effort to recruit experienced educators.

In 1938 the contradiction between the need for maturity and experience and the policy of accepting only young candidates was becoming apparent, even to the Mission leadership in the United States. The General Secretary of the American Home Council, Henry Campbell, confided:

I have long ago made up my mind that many of our young folks graduating from [Bible] institutes go out too young. ... I would rather have candidates from twenty-five to thirty-five. Folk over thirty, if they are strong Christians, have gotten a good deal of experience in work and winning of souls.

Despite such thoughts, it would still take another 30 years and the revolution of air travel before A.I.M. effectively dropped the age barrier.

CONCLUSION

A.I.M. originally thought that because Africa did not have a strong literary culture, well educated missionaries were not needed. Therefore, the Mission could utilize the large number of pious lay men who had not had the opportunity for a complete theological education. Keswick piety and the concept of the missionary call bolstered this conviction.

However, A.I.M. missionaries were not in Kenya for long before they realized that the cross-cultural transmission of Christianity required far more education than the Mission had first supposed. The lack of educated missionaries hurt A.I.M.'s work in the areas of Bible translation, education, and church development. Only gradually

197 See Chicago District Committee, 5 May 1927, BGC,2,87; and the minutes of the meetings for June and July.

198 Miss Edith Peek, whom Collins recommended, was 43 years old, and was rejected because of her age, despite her educational qualifications and experience (Collins to Campbell and Lanning, 16 July 1927; and Campbell to Collins, 21 July 1927, BGC,19,27).

199 Campbell to R. Davis, 15 March 1938, BGC,20,2.
as attitudes changed and educational levels rose within A.I.M.'s constituency was the Mission able to raise its educational standards.
CHAPTER THREE
A.I.M. AS A FAITH MISSION

Of all of the founding principles of A.I.M. the most definitive for A.I.M.'s own self-understanding and self-identity was the one that they called the "Faith Basis" of the Mission. From this Faith Basis, or "Faith Principle," A.I.M. saw itself as part of a whole new movement in missions, known as "Faith Missions". This principle, how it developed and was applied, the reasons for its importance to A.I.M. and A.I.M. missionaries, and the effects that it had on A.I.M. and its work forms the subject of this chapter.

ORIGIN OF THE FAITH BASIS

1. Transition from England to the United States

Out of the religious ferment in Britain during the middle third of the nineteenth century came a new form of piety\(^1\) that was later absorbed into the Keswick movement. This new form of Christian devotion expected the believer to exercise a radical faith that relied completely and totally on God alone for all things. While touching all areas of life, this "faith entailed reliance on God for material as well as spiritual needs,"\(^2\) and produced a new way of financing Christian work. This new movement, which became known as the "Faith Missions" movement, was popularized by George Muller, who established his famous orphanage in 1835, and by Hudson Taylor, who founded the China Inland Mission in 1865.

This form of piety and mission finance was brought to the United States and popularized through writings about the new British works, personal visits by Muller

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\(^2\)Ibid., p. 94.
and Taylor, and especially by Arthur T. Pierson "the foremost American promoter and theoretician of premillennial missions in the late nineteenth century."\(^3\) Pierson was a close friend of both Muller and Taylor, and from them he adopted the new "Faith" piety. While remaining strongly committed to his own Presbyterian missions, Pierson also became a supporter of the new, interdenominational missions that were being formed on Muller and Taylor's "Faith Basis" and was influential in the founding of the Africa Inland Mission in 1895.\(^4\) In 1891 A.I.M. founder, Peter Cameron Scott came into direct contact with the C.I.M. by attending a C.I.M. prayer meeting when recuperating from chronic malaria in London following his first attempt at missionary service.\(^5\)

The widespread religious awakening in the latter half of the nineteenth century in the United States, represented by the Moody revivals and the Keswick and other holiness movements, produced a great surge of missionary interest and activity. At the


Peter Cameron Scott's biographer, Catherine S. Miller seems to be in error in her contention that Pierson was the "chairman" of the Philadelphia Missionary Council, during the years 1895-1898 (Catherine S. Miller, Peter Cameron Scott: The Unlocked Door (London: Parry Jackman Ltd., 1955), pp. 25, 51). Perhaps Pierson "chaired" the initial 1895 meeting that organized the Philadelphia Missionary Council and the Africa Inland Mission, but in every edition of the mission magazine, Hearing and Doing, from 1896 through 1909 Charles Hurlburt is listed in the "Directory" as the "President" of the Philadelphia Missionary Council and Pierson's name does not appear at all. Most likely Pierson's role was that of a close friend, encourager, counselor, and publicist of A.I.M., but had no official connection to the Mission.

\(^5\)Richardson, p. 25.

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same time there began to occur an increasing commercialization and professionalization of missions as the model of big business was applied to mission organization, administration, promotion, and fund raising in an effort to tap the resources of the emerging business class of the "Gilded Age". In his classic study of this trend, Valentin Rabe effectively demonstrated that through these efforts, missions promoters were able to build the American missionary movement to its zenith prior to World War I, only to have it decline rapidly after the war in large measure because the expansion had far outstripped the religious awakening that had started it. The secular business methods that the missions promoters had employed to continue the awakening and exploit it for missions proved to be antithetical to such religious goals.6

It would be too much to say that the Faith Basis promoted by Pierson7 and adopted by Scott for A.I.M. was a protest against this secularization of missionary promotion, for polemics against these trends were absent from the vigorous discussions and debates within A.I.M.8 Though they did not articulate it, A.I.M. and other Faith Missions seem to have sensed intuitively the antithesis between secular


7Rabe cites Pierson as one of the earliest promoters of this trend to model missions on American business methods (Rabe, pp. 3-5). Rabe surely overstates the case. If Pierson optimistically saw in the advances of the technology and wealth of his day the means for the world-wide proclamation of the Christian gospel, he nevertheless would have been equally horrified at the application of secular promotional and advertising techniques to the promotion of Christian missions, for he, himself, had adopted the Faith Basis for his own ministry and, as we have seen, was a ready promotor of the newly forming Faith Missions (Robert, p.39).

8It is possible that such silence is due to the fact that the rejection of such prevailing trends was so universally assumed within A.I.M. as not to merit mention. However, if in the minds of the A.I.M. missionaries, the Faith Basis was in part a protest against these trends, then one would expect this to brought up in the accusations that were occasionally hurled at missionaries or home officials suspected of "violating" the Faith Basis.
methods and religious goals. Thus, the Faith Basis became an alternative way of mission promotion and finance, a religious method that was far more compatible with the Mission's religious goals.

2. An Expression of Keswick Piety

As the Faith Basis developed, it took on near creedal importance for A.I.M., raised in importance far beyond mere financial policy. The reason for this was because the Faith Basis was deeply rooted in Keswick piety, which was normative for A.I.M. and its constituency.9

In discussing the Faith Basis and the issues of faith and prayer upon which it depended, A.I.M. missionaries used the words and concepts of Keswick piety. In a pastoral letter to the Mission body, Charles Hurlburt wrote that for the prayers, upon which the Faith Basis depended, to be heard and answered by God, the missionaries had to be yielded to God in complete surrender.10

The Faith Basis was seen as a living out of the "life of faith" par excellence. Therefore it was essential that the Faith Basis be properly defined so as to eliminate all reliance on men, specifically all solicitation, either direct or indirect, explicit or implicit. Only when the Faith Basis was followed in complete purity would it reflect genuine faith and ensure that God would respond by meeting the needs of the Mission. Thus, in his pastoral letter, Hurlburt asked if the missionaries were exercising "real faith":

Some are tempted to help God out by suggestive letters or addresses. Real faith trusts God alone.... Real faith will bring the full supply of real needs

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9For a more detailed discussion of A.I.M.'s Keswick piety see above Chapter 2, pp. 29-39.


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and to look to men or to try to "help God out" is proof of lack of faith in God.11

This life of faith was no passive thing. Rather the emphasis on active faith was so strong, that sometimes the answer to the missionaries' prayers seemed to depend on the strength of their faith. When time was short for Mr. and Mrs. Andrew Andersen to leave for Kenya a Mission official wrote to them: "If the Lord wants you to go on this steamer, there will be need for you both to lay hold upon His treasures, receive His promises, and by faith come into possession of your needs."12

Sometimes it was considered necessary for the individual to take a "step of faith", that is to take some action in which all known human resources were left behind. Hurlburt believed that all newly appointed missionaries should resign their secular employment during the time when they were preparing to go to the field. Only after they had taken that step of faith would God begin to supply their needs.13 Other times missionaries voluntarily stepped out in faith trusting God to supply when there was no human supply in sight. Thus, the Albert Barnett family set sail for Kenya even though they had enough money to purchase a steamer ticket only as far as England.14 And once in Kenya, they proceeded to a new location intending to establish a new station, even though they did not yet have enough money to build a house.15

This procedure of "stepping out in faith", however, could be a risky business, prompting the Mission to try and distinguish between legitimate "faith" from irresponsible "presumption". While Hurlburt considered it a legitimate act of faith to

11Hurlburt to "Fellow Member of the A.I.M.," 1 July 1914, BGC,19,21; KBA: FC-76.

12Fletcher to Andersen, 22 November 1917, BGC,19,4. For a similar example see: Palmer to Bowyer, 19 September 1912, BGC,19,14.

13Hurlburt to Executive & District Councils, England and America, 2 August 1915, BGC,6,72; BGC,12,46.

14Barnett to Palmer, 5 February 1913, BGC,19,20.

15Barnett to Palmer, 5 August 1913, BGC,19,20.

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leave one's employment while preparing to go to Africa, to leave not fully prepared was irresponsible "presumption." Therefore, A.I.M. required all new missionaries to secure money for their outfit, passage, housing, and support for three months before they could be sent to the field. Such "presumption" could extend to things beyond having insufficient funds to the use of money and the neglect of health. Thus, in his pastoral letter, Hurlburt warned the missionaries that "real faith" was not presumption:

Real faith will not be careless in the use of funds, or care of health. Satan seeks to tempt Faith missionaries especially, to think it heroic and brave to be careless about food, water, mosquito-nets, protection from sun, proper sleep and rest. Such careless[ness] is not heroism but fanaticism. Not courage, but cowardly bravado to gain applause. ... Real faith trusts God alone and values His rich gifts too highly to waste them in needless adventure.  

The Faith Basis was essential to A.I.M., not only because it embodied the Keswick "life of faith", but also because Keswick "obedience" required it. A.I.M. believed that the Faith Basis had been given to the Mission as part of God's plan for it. Obedience to God's plan brought God's blessing. Disobedience or deviation from the plan resulted in the loss of blessing if not the outright displeasure of God. Hurlburt charged Lee Downing to keep the American Home Council faithful to the Faith Basis, which was part of God's fundamental plan for A.I.M.:

...any compromise of the plan God gave us in the beginning such as advertising, suggestions to possible contributors, collections depending on our printed matter or deputation work rather than on united prayer, brings loss to every loyal worker on the battle-front and delays the accomplishment of our God-given purpose.  

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16 Hurlburt to Executive & District Councils, England and America, 2 August 1915, BGC,6,72; BGC,12,46.  
17 Hurlburt to "Fellow Member of the A.I.M.," 1 July 1914, BGC,19,21; KBA: FC-76.  
18 Hurlburt to Downing, 2 November 1920, KBA: FC-76. Also see: H& D (May-December 1910): 13; IA (October 1919): 12; and Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.  

Hurlburt was reported to have cited the Mission falling into debt after the death of Peter Cameron Scott as an example of God expressing His displeasure with A.I.M. for not
Rarely did A.I.M. give any theological justification for the Faith Basis any more sophisticated than this argument of simple moral cause and effect: obedience brings blessing, disobedience brings punishment. However, when counseling a new missionary tempted to violate the Faith Basis, the Tanganyika Field Director W. J. Maynard, attempted to root obedience to the Faith Basis in what he considered to be a covenant relationship between God and A.I.M., a contractual relationship between the missionaries and A.I.M., as well the broader Keswick teaching on obedience:

...I am glad you were willing to write me in the matter, rather than take the line you suggest, as it shows your recognition of the fact of covenant relations existing between our Mission and God, and also an actual contract subscribed to by the individual members of the Mission and incorporated into a constitution....

...I do not see how we may violate them and expect God's blessing upon our lives and service.20

One of the results of this moral cause and effect view of the Faith Basis was the tendency at times to see difficulties on the field as an indication of divine displeasure caused by alleged unfaithfulness to the Faith Basis. George Rhoad wrote during a controversy in 1913 of "many unsupplied needs in the Ukamba work" caused by "our own attitude toward God - who was hindered from doing many mighty works by our subtle unbelief."21 Twenty-seven years later a similar judgement was made by Henry Campbell, the American Home Secretary:

It is wondered why God has not been blessing Kenya richly during recent times, and I wonder if the attitude of some of our missionaries toward the faith basis is not responsible in some measure for lack of blessing.22

properly following the Faith Basis (Campbell to Downey, 19 February 1926, BGC,20,9).

19Bates to Maynard, 6 November 1929, contained in Maynard to Campbell, 8 November 1929, BGC,10,5.

20Maynard to Bates, 7 November 1929, contained in Maynard to Campbell, 8 November 1929, BGC,10,5.

21Rhoad to Palmer, 30 October 1913, BGC,22,8.

22Campbell to Davis, 25 May 1938, BGC,19,25.

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The Faith Basis was important not only because it was God's "plan" for A.I.M., but also because through the operation of the Faith Basis God made his will known to the Mission and the missionaries in the countless decisions and events of everyday life. The supply of funds to send a new missionary to the field was viewed as the final proof that it was God's will for the missionary to go.\(^2^3\) For other missionaries, the provision of their financial needs was taken to indicate when they were to leave for the field.\(^2^4\) The provision of funds could also be interpreted as indicating which projects God wanted the Mission to undertake and when to undertake them. In principle this could help the Mission distinguish which projects were genuinely needed from those that only reflected missionary "empire building." Thus Campbell wrote concerning the Kamba missionaries' desire to build a Bible college in Ukambani: "...if this is a real need, we trust God will supply it in his own time and way.\(^2^5\)

The Faith Basis was also seen as providing a living apologetic to the truth of Keswick piety and to the reality and power of God in an age of growing unbelief in the missionaries' homeland. A Hearing and Doing article stated: "In the midst of much unbelief God seems specially pleased to honor the faith of His children."\(^2^6\)

Missionary Laura Collins, wanting to know how to explain to church people A.I.M.'s policy of not taking up collections to support the work at public meetings, was told:

Tell the people that we desire our work to be more and more a testimony to a living, loving faithful God who loves to answer the prayers of His believing children, and that you desire your testimony to encourage others to trust in

\(^{2^3}\) Palmer to Bowyer 15 August 1912; and Bowyer to Palmer, 11 September 1912, BGC,19,14.

\(^{2^4}\) Adams to Barnett, 26 September 1907, BGC,19,20; and Dinwiddie to Nunn, 12 October 1917, BGC,19,14.

\(^{2^5}\) Campbell to Farnsworth, 6 October 1927, BGC,1,84.

The most extended and self-conscious development of this apologetic was in the unpublished histories written by John Stauffacher. Stauffacher wrote his "History of the Africa Inland Mission" and his "A History of the Africa Inland Mission in the Belgian Congo" to prove that God still acts in the world through faith. Because the Faith Basis was seen to be a living testimony to the power of God and to the effectiveness of Keswick piety, it was imperative that the Faith Basis be maintained inviolate. One of the reasons Hurlburt wrote against those whom he thought were subverting the Faith Basis was because he saw them as undermining this testimony.

For many A.I.M. missionaries, the Faith Basis was simply an expression of their trust in the power of God and of their joy in experiencing His providential care. When Gertrude Bowyer was told to pray that her departure needs would be met, her response was one of simple faith in the goodness and power of God:

"I do love to trust God for everything and always take every little thing to him. Some would tell us that this is a very simple, childish way of living but it does not seem as though I could live otherwise. I believe that our heavenly Father is thoroughly acquainted with everything that concerns us and is interested in every detail of our life. It is in the little things of every day life that we come to know God best, I think. While there may be contrary suggestions and great difficulties which would seem as "giants in the way" yet I have purposed in my heart to preach the gospel in Africa. While we must be yielded and pliable in the Master's hand yet our faith should be active and God delights to have us prove him."

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27 Palmer to Collins, 8 February 1914, BGC,19,21.


29 Hurlburt to Committee of Direction, 12 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

30 Bowyer to Palmer, 24 September 1912, BGC,19,14.

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THE ORIGINAL FAITH BASIS OF A.I.M.: 1895-1900

1. The Original Faith Policy

The Faith Basis was one of the foundational principles of A.I.M. from the very start. At the initial meeting of the missions enthusiasts, who in early 1895 formed the Philadelphia Missionary Council and A.I.M., the Faith Basis was adopted and first worded. According to a later summary of the minutes of that meeting:

It was stated in the articles of organization that, since the silver and gold belonged to God, the Lord's people can depend upon him to supply all their needs and therefore the A.I.M. would trust in God alone for the necessary funds and that, while fully presenting the needs of the whitened harvest fields, men would not be asked for money.31

The Faith Principle was based upon a firm belief in the greatness of God, His sovereign control of all of the resources of the universe, and in His goodness whereby He would supply the needs of His people. A.I.M. would express its trust in the providence and goodness of God by not asking for money. However, recognizing the importance of publicity in the promotion of missionary work, the Mission would feel free to "fully present the needs of the whitened harvest fields." How to "present the needs" without by implication also soliciting for the money to meet those needs was to be the central problem for A.I.M. in applying the Faith Basis. This initial statement was ambiguous, for while it clearly permitted the Mission to publicize the broad needs for evangelism in Africa, it left unsaid whether specific financial needs of the Mission or the personal financial needs of missionaries could also be shared.

The first public statement and explanation of the Faith Basis appeared in the *Hearing and Doing* article that announced the formation of A.I.M. The author first noted that "nearly all of the party now in the field are supported by individuals in this country, who have become interested in their work, and volunteered to assist in

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31"Excerpts: Minutes First Council of A.I.M., [1895-1901]," compiled 19 October 1942, BGC,12,45.

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maintaining it."32 In this way, he informed his readers that A.I.M. had no rich denomination or Christian organization behind it. At the same time he revealed another aspect of A.I.M. individualism.33

The A.I.M. missionaries could go to the field with such a shallow financial base, the author continued, because of their belief in the providential leading of God in their lives:

No man is expected to go into the field except as clearly led by God, and when such leading has become clear, the worker is to look to God alone to supply the means, either through honest labor of his own, or by gift direct from others, as may be his will. Where God leads, there God feeds. He must be very sure of the former, then he can quietly trust for the latter.34

If the missionary had faith that God had called him, he could also have faith that God would provide for him. As yet, the Mission had no preconception or theory about how God would make His provision available to the missionaries, for it might equally be through their own labor as through the donations of God's people.

Following the statement of faith in God's providential care, the author proceeded to A.I.M.'s Faith Basis:

The Home Council has, as yet, no fund on hand with which to outfit or send

32H&D (January 1896): 5.

33Not too much should be made of this individualism, for though most of the early financial support for A.I.M. came from individual Christians and never did support for the Mission extend beyond individual congregations, yet we shall see that for many of the missionaries this money was administered corporately through the "General Fund". Kevin Ward tends to over play somewhat the significance of the individualism in A.I.M.'s support system for it is not entirely accurate to say that "many of the missionaries were financially independent or semi-independent of the mission as such, their funds merely being channelled through the mission which had no control over their use" (Kevin Ward, "Evangelism or Education? Mission Priorities and Educational Policy in the Africa Inland Mission," unpublished paper, (University of Nairobi, 1974), p. 6). In fact among of the areas of tension that occasionally arose between the missionaries and the Mission were the unfulfilled expectations concerning funds that some missionaries thought the Mission should provide, and the control of funds that the Mission did exercise and which was sometimes resented by some missionaries.


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workers. Nor will there be any solicitation for money. Yet they feel perfect freedom in giving the fullest possible information concerning the progress of the work, and needs of the same. We believe the true attitude as to finances is found in this double statement: As to needs, full information; as to funds, non-solicitation.  

This statement of the Faith Principle clarified the issue of publicizing the Mission's needs. Not only would A.I.M. publicize the "progress of the work", which would have included the "needs of the whitened harvest fields" of the earlier statement and what the Mission was doing to meet those needs, but the specific financial needs of the Mission and its missionaries could be publicized as well. The permission to publicize needs was justified from the principle that even for God the supply of needs flows from the knowledge of those needs. Furthermore, such information was necessary if Christian men and women were to act as intelligent stewards of the resources that God has given to them:

...it is plain that as God himself does not give to his children without full knowledge of their needs ("Your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things,") surely men and women cannot give intelligently save as they know the needs of the work.  

The line between the sharing of information and solicitation was not drawn at whether the information included the financial needs, but whether pressure or any other effort was made to influence the response that the hearer would make to the information given:

...it seems clear that when Christian men and women once know clearly the needs of a field, then the question as to how they shall act upon that knowledge is wholly personal between themselves and God without solicitation from others  

35Ibid.


38Ibid.

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The prohibition against pressuring the hearer to give was justified with the language of Keswick piety:

...all giving should be a personal matter between God and the individual. For none should give who is led of men but not led of God to do so, and none should refrain whom God does lead to give, even though men protest. The Africa Inland Mission would rather receive the prayerful, free-will offering of a dime than the prayerless solicited gift of a dollar. There could be no question as to which God would most use.  

Just as the consecrated missionary was to go to the field only in response to God's call, so too the consecrated donor had to be "led of God" in his giving. Just as the effectiveness or power of an individual's service to God was dependent upon his consecration and prayerful, obedient following the leading of God, so the effectiveness of the gift depended on the consecration of the donor and his prayerful, obedient following the leading of God in his giving. Giving for religious purposes had to spring from religious motives.

Though a change in the understanding of the Faith Basis was coming, at this point in A.I.M.'s history, the Faith Basis had not yet become a set ideology. Rather, within the context of Keswick piety, it was a pragmatic response of faith to the situation in which the founders of the Mission found themselves. According to an article written six years after the founding of the Mission, probably by Lester R. Severn, the only member of Peter Cameron Scott's first party still in the Mission, the Faith Basis was a response in faith to the command of Christ to evangelize the world. Neither ideologically opposed publicizing its needs, nor willing to engage in solicitation, the first missionaries perceived its task as simply to obey the divine command.  

Faith was not seen as incompatible with human effort in meeting the financial needs of the Mission, though the missionaries' faith was to be in God not in

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39Ibid.


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those efforts. The existential situation that called forth this response of faith, was the fact that as a new mission, A.I.M. had no organization behind it with the funds to finance the work. Out of its ecumenical concern not to compete with existing denominational mission agencies, A.I.M. could not appeal to the churches in America. Its Keswick piety forbade A.I.M. to appeal to worldly donors, those who were either non-Christians or nominal Christians who exhibited little piety in their lives. The only alternative was for the A.I.M. missionaries to "cry to God", who "heard and answered, supplying the means to obey Him."  

The Faith Principle, and the first policies to implement it, were enshrined in the Mission's first constitution, and these policies changed little down through the years except by way of refinement. The faith of the missionaries in God alone to supply their needs was demonstrated by the fact that they were neither guaranteed a salary by the Mission, nor were they required to secure pledges of support from home donors. The Mission, for its part, would forward to each individual missionary all donations that were received on their behalf, and placed no limit upon the amount that missionaries might receive in this manner.  

To remain practical and care responsibly for its missionaries, A.I.M. agreed to aid any missionary who did not receive enough individual donations to live on. The mission would loan up to $250 from the Mission's "General Fund" to such a missionary to tide him over until his donations arrived. If none came by the end of the year, the debt was forgiven. The provision of this safety net, however, did not remove  

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41 Of course A.I.M. missionaries were not the only ones to feel this way. The 1905 acceptance by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Congregational) of a $100,000 donation from American oil magnate, John D. Rockefeller provoked a storm of criticism across the theological and denominational spectrum (Rabe, pp. 1-7-139). Rockefeller was known far more for his unscrupulous business practices than for his Christian piety.  


43 A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VI, KBA: General Council.

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the element of faith, for the missionary had to have faith that God would supply sufficient money to the General Fund to cover his allowance each month.\textsuperscript{44}

The heart of the faith system, however, was the policy against solicitation: "No debt shall be incurred by this Mission and no direct solicitation of funds be made though the work may be fully presented."\textsuperscript{45} The prohibition against debt was not contained in the earlier statements of the Faith Basis. This addition may have reflected a desire to obey the biblical injunction, "Owe no man any thing."\textsuperscript{46} A.I.M.'s constituency most certainly considered indebtedness to be an evasion if not an outright affront to the faith principle. In 1898 \textit{Hearing and Doing} reported that the Pennsylvania Bible Institute, an institution closely related to A.I.M., had caused consternation among its constituency when it borrowed money to repair its buildings, thus seeming to violate the Faith Basis.\textsuperscript{47} In later years falling into debt was seen as a sign of God's displeasure with A.I.M. for violating the Faith Basis by publicizing needs.\textsuperscript{48}

More significant than the addition of the prohibition against indebtedness, however, was the subtle change in the mission's slogan in which "the work" now rather than "needs" would be publicized. This change reflected a shift in the interpretation of solicitation, away from the original view that the presentation of needs was legitimate and solicitation consisted of trying to influence the hearer's response to those needs, to the view that the very presentation of needs constituted a form of solicitation.

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Romans} 13:8, \textit{Authorized Version.}
\textsuperscript{47}\textit{H&D (April 1898)}: 7-8.
\textsuperscript{48}\textit{Campbell to Downey}, 19 February 1926, BGC,20,9.

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2. The Original Sharing of Needs

The early pages of *Hearing and Doing* demonstrated the Mission's unabashed willingness to share its needs publicly. Early in 1896 Peter Cameron Scott reported quite frankly how the "enormous expense" of transporting goods from the coast made living in the interior of Africa so expensive.49 Three years later *Hearing and Doing* published a proposal by Lester Severn that the Mission purchase metal houses for the missionaries including the details of the costs, prayer that the funds be supplied, and a description of the need of the houses.50

Usually when needs were reported in *Hearing and Doing*, the editors included an appeal to the reader to pray and to give to meet the needs. Often, the piety and heroism of the missionaries was cited in the appeal as a motivation for giving.51 Sometmes the editor appealed to the piety of the donor.52 Usually it was not considered solicitation if the need was given and an appeal was made for the readers to pray that the need be met.53 Sometimes the report of answered prayer was coupled with an appeal for further prayer to provide a strong incentive for the pious to not only pray, but to also give.54

The strongest appeals were made during the three-year famine from 1897-1899. In their desperation to raise funds for famine relief, the missionaries on the field and the editors of *Hearing and Doing* resorted to a variety of very obvious methods to motivate people to give. They appealed to the good the donors could accomplish

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50*H&D* (July 1899): 4-5.
51*H&D* (February 1896): 5.
52*H&D* (March 1896): 5-6.
53*H&D* (December 1897): 6-7.
54*H&D* (October 1898): 7.

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and the suffering they could alleviate. Both missionaries and editors used graphic descriptions of the famine to arouse the compassion and pity of the readers for the temporal suffering of the African people and for their eternal destiny. Added to compassion and pity was guilt and shame as the riches of the homeland was compared with the suffering in Africa, the heroic sacrifices of the missionaries, and the opportunities to be seized in view of the readers' stewardship responsibilities before God. Yet this was all done without there appearing to have been any question of this violating the Faith Principle.

3. Signs of a Change in Policy

Even during these early years when A.I.M. happily shared the needs of the Mission and appealed to people to meet those needs, signs began to appear in *Hearing and Doing* indicating that A.I.M.'s constituency was coming to a new understanding of the Faith Basis. The first sign was the appointment of Charles Hurlburt as General Director of A.I.M. following the death of Peter Cameron Scott in December 1896. Hurlburt was 15 when his father died, leaving him to care for his mother and two younger siblings. At this time Hurlburt saw God supply needs, apparently in answer to prayer alone. One winter the snowbound family ran out of fuel, and his mother simply prayed for more. Next morning the skeptical Charles was astonished to find a pile of firewood by their cottage door left by a neighboring farmer who just "felt" that the widow and her children could use the wood. For Hurlburt this was always more than just a coincidence. No doubt such early experiences in "faith" influenced Hurlburt not only to accept the popular Keswick and Faith piety of his day

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56 *H&D* (April 1899): 6; and (May 1899): 5-6.

57 D. Anderson, p. 30; and Richardson, pp. 44-43.

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but also to develop a stringent interpretation of the faith principle.

The experiences of the Pennsylvania Bible Institute also influenced A.I.M. to adopt a more stringent faith policy. In October 1895, shortly after the founding of the Philadelphia Missionary Council and A.I.M., Hurlburt founded this school to train "earnest Christian young men and women, whose lives are given to distinctively Christian work." P.B.I. and A.I.M. remained closely related, so that the experiences of the former ultimately influenced the policies of the latter.59

The initial financial policy of the P.B.I. was to rely only on voluntary offerings for tuition and development and to charge $140 a term for room and board.60 This policy seems to have worked at first, until the adverse financial conditions of the mid-1890s threatened to depopulate the school, when P.B.I. decided to continue on the Faith Basis.61 The students were asked to pay what they could into a collection box, and, significantly, the needs of the school would not be publicized in any way except in special prayer meetings of students and staff.62 Though sorely tempted to break the policy at times, P.B.I. persevered, and soon reports of God's "miraculous" provision of the school's material needs through prayer alone became common items in the pages of Hearing and Doing.63 Furthermore, the school administration saw the Faith

59 Both A.I.M. and P.B.I. were supported by the Philadelphia Missionary Council, and Hurlburt headed all three organizations simultaneously from 1897 to 1900 (See Hearing and Doing from 1897 through 1900). Also see Stauffacher, "History of A.I.M.,” pp. 3, 9-10; and Thomas Cope, "The Africa Inland Mission in Kenya: Aspects of Its History (1895-1945) (M.Ph. thesis, London Bible College, 1979), pp. 79-81.
60 H&D (January 1896): 7; and (September 1896): 7.
61 H&D (February 1900): 6. Also see H&D 2 (August-September 1897): 15; and (March 1898): 6.
63 See H&D (May 1897): 6-7; (January 1898): 4-5; (March 1898): 6-8; and (June 1898): 7-8.

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Basis as having a tremendous impact on deepening the faith and piety of both the students and staff as they experienced "the reality of God's power and the certainty of His promises."\textsuperscript{64}

Maintaining this policy was not easy. In 1898 the school took out a loan to repair its buildings in Philadelphia and provoked a storm of protest from its supporters for "violating" the Faith Basis.\textsuperscript{65} By February 1900, P.B.I. was again charging for room and board, but still accepted students unable to pay, presumably trusting God to supply the cost of their room and board "by faith."\textsuperscript{66} When Hurlburt resigned as president of P.B.I. to go to Africa, the school abandoned the Faith Basis and began to canvass for funds. According to Hearing and Doing: "The result was more difficulty, financially, than had been experienced in the preceding six years of waiting upon God."\textsuperscript{67} The director resigned and the school returned to the Faith Basis.

The experience of P.B.I. had a great influence on the interpretation of the Faith Basis in A.I.M. Several themes that emerged in A.I.M. discussions of the Faith Basis first made their appearance at P.B.I. These included the unique calling of the organization to follow the Faith Basis and the spiritual benefits that followed from such obedience.\textsuperscript{68} But perhaps the most important theme was the belief that God supplied only in response to prayer, and specifically did not supply when needs were made public, or, as the P.B.I. director put it, "The money came only when we ceased looking to man, and trusted fully in the Lord."\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{64}H&D (August-September 1897): 15. Also see: H&D (February 1900): 6.
\textsuperscript{65}H&D (April 1898): 7-8.
\textsuperscript{66}H&D (February 1900): 6.
\textsuperscript{67}H&D (October-November 1900): 8.
\textsuperscript{68}H&D (January 1898): 4-5.
\textsuperscript{69}H&D (May 1897): 6-7.

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A number of articles in *Hearing and Doing* about needs being met in answer to prayer alone signaled that the more stringent interpretation of the Faith Basis was gaining acceptance. One of the first was an article in 1897 relating three "miraculous" answers to prayer at the West London Mission. In one case the mission staff were praying for £1000. The night before it was due, a woman with no knowledge of the need felt an overwhelming urge to donate £100, the exact amount still needed. Two years later *Hearing and Doing* published a letter from Bangert thanking God "for supplying the medical outfit. ... I had been praying for it, but had not mentioned it to anyone so I know it is a direct answer to prayer." Later the same year appeared an article reporting that more than a year after the death of George Muller, the orphanages he founded in Bristol were still adhering to the principle "NEVER TO DIVULGE TO ANY HUMAN BEING its present financial position. [Emphasis in original]" Antidotes were offered to prove that "dependence upon God" in prayer alone "still worked." The incidents reported in these articles revealed the development of the expected pattern in the new ideology of Faith: the Christian tells no one his need except God alone in prayer. Then by means of a strong, subjective urging, God moves another believer to meet the need.

The final and perhaps most significant sign that the changing attitude toward the Faith Basis would soon reach A.I.M. came in December 1900 when *Hearing and Doing* announced that it too would be placed on the Faith Basis. In their "blindness" the editors had not seen that the magazine should have been on the Faith Basis. Thus, as the ideology grew, all things in the immediate orb of A.I.M. had to succumb.

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71 *H&D* (December 1899): 5-6.
72 *H&D* (December 1900): 5-6.

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THE NEW FAITH BASIS: 1900-1925

1. Hurlburt's New Understanding of the Faith Basis

When Hurlburt became General Director of A.I.M. in 1897, he brought with him a more rigorous interpretation of the Faith Basis. At first, this new understanding had only a slight effect on A.I.M.'s official policy. In the 1897 constitution, the original slogan was changed to permit the publicizing of "the work" rather than of "needs". No change was made to the definition of the Faith Basis in the 1909 constitution, but whereas the original basis affirmed that God could supply the missionary's needs "through honest labor of his own", the new constitution prohibited missionaries from engaging in private economic activities.

Apparently not everyone in A.I.M. understood or readily accepted the new Faith Basis. Therefore it was explicitly written into the 1912 constitution in a way that included both its theological justification and sought to carefully distinguish between legitimate publicity from illegitimate solicitation. Rooted in the belief that God was willing and able to supply the needs of the Mission, and that only the Holy Spirit should guide a Christian's giving, the constitution specified that A.I.M. was to

73From 1897 to 1900 Hurlburt was still in the United States and was concerned primarily with implementing his interpretation of the faith basis at P.B.I., where he was also president. A.I.M., itself, had been reduced to one missionary trying to survive the 1898-1900 famine. When Hurlburt arrived on the field, he probably assumed that his interpretation of the faith basis was the official one. Only gradually did it become apparent that not everyone in A.I.M. shared this assumption.

74A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VI, KBA: General Council.

75A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article IX, Section 5, KBA: General Council.

76In describing the appointment of Hurlburt as General Director and the resulting change in the Faith Basis, Stauffacher wrote: "With the change of leadership the mission remained the same yet there were certain other changes taking place which in the years to come led to quite serious difficulty and finally became one of the reasons for the loss of some of the most valuable men in the ranks of the mission. (Stauffacher, "History of A.I.M.," p. 9.)"
trust "in God alone" and not to "present specific needs nor ask men for money." However, it did permit information to be shared in four different circumstances: 1) providing Christian teaching on the proper use of wealth, 2) providing general publicity on the work of A.I.M. and the need to evangelize Africa, 3) providing sufficient information for A.I.M. supporters to pray effectively for the Mission, and 4) providing to donors sufficient information on the finances of the Mission to enable both the Mission and the donors to conduct their financial relationship in a responsible manner, usually by reporting to individual donors on how their donations had been used and by giving specific answers to specific questions. In this manner A.I.M. tried to balance its need to share information while not using any of these practices to solicit money from donors and potential donors.

Finally, the 1912 constitution raised the Faith Basis to be one of the fundamental beliefs of A.I.M., equal in importance to the belief in the scriptures and the person and work of Christ. In an effort to protect the essential character of the Mission, the constitution declared that any member of the Mission would be expelled who ceased "to be loyal to those principles of the Mission, which concern its faith basis or its belief in the integrity of the Scriptures and in the Deity and Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ." The President of the American Home Council was

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77A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article IV, BGC,11,11; KBA,17,6. The wording of this Article reflected the wording of the Faith Basis adopted at the organizational meeting of A.I.M. in 1895 ("First Council," BGC,12,45).

78This reason for sharing information was only implied in the 1912 Constitution by the statement, "fellowship in prayer is earnestly desired (A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article XI, Section 12, BGC,11,11; KBA,17,6)." That such prayer required information was made explicit in an Inland Africa article (IA (October 1919): 13).

79A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article IV and Article XI, Section 12, BGC,11,11; KBA,17,6.

80Ibid., Article V, Section 1.
responsible to enforce this provision,

A.I.M. attempted to explain these policies to the Christian public through articles in the Mission magazine. They began by explaining why the Faith Basis was so important to A.I.M. First, the Mission believed that God had specifically lead it to adopt the Faith Basis, and that this belief had been confirmed in the life of the Mission. A.I.M. saw its needs fully met only when it fully trusted God and shared them with Him alone in prayer, but not when it looked to men to supply its needs. Secondly, A.I.M. believed that the Faith Basis and the resulting "miraculous" answers to prayer provided a living apologetic to existence and reality of God. Finally the Faith Basis was portrayed as a critical unifying force in the Mission. Creating a cohesive unit without the unifying forces of tradition and denominational loyalty and consisting of individualistic missionaries from independent churches, small denominations, or who had weak denominational loyalty in the first place was no easy task. Thus for A.I.M. one of the most important unifying forces was the Faith Basis. Despite its importance, the Mission disassociated itself from any suggestion that the Faith Basis implied any religious merit or superior piety in the practitioner or that the

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81 Ibid., Article VII, Section 3.
82 Ibid., Article XII.
83 In 1917 the title of the A.I.M. magazine was changed from Hearing and Doing to Inland Africa.
86 IA (October 1919): 12.
Faith Basis was the only legitimate financial basis for religious organizations or that A.I.M.'s interpretation of the Faith Basis was the only valid one.88

Having established the importance of the Faith Basis to A.I.M., the Mission then sought to explain it. A definition published in Inland Africa gave perhaps the clearest view of what was considered to be "solicitation" in both private and public communications under the new interpretation of the Faith Basis:

The workers of the Africa Inland Mission believe that they should depend through prayer upon God alone for the supply of the needs of the Mission and of their individual selves, without hinting or suggesting to men and without making specific needs public.89

The scruple against even hinting at the needs of the Mission or the missionaries extended beyond verbal communication, to include even the possible implication of a missionary's actions. Thus A.I.M. missionaries were not permitted to take up collections in the meetings where they presented the work.90 According to the American Home Director Orsen Palmer, A.I.M. believed "that collections are only another way of soliciting help."91 The Inland Africa article explained the Mission's position in more detail:

88IA (October 1919): 12. Also see: H&D (May-December 1910): 13-14. Apparently some in the faith missions movement either implied or were accused of insinuating that the Faith Basis indicated a greater degree of piety, that all Christian organizations should operate on the Faith Basis and that their own particular interpretation of the Faith Basis was the only valid one.

89IA (October 1919): 12.

90Elizabeth Isichei summarized of the financial policies of Faith Missions in the following manner: "Missionaries did not receive salaries, and depended on offerings for their needs" (Elizabeth Isichei. A History of Christianity in Africa" (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), p. 89). Given that fact that all missions supported their work through offerings of one sort or another this was an odd way to summarize Faith Missions. However, in light of A.I.M.'s policy against the taking of offerings during meetings to publicize the Mission's work, we see that Isichei's summary was not only superficial, but also inaccurate.

91[Palmer] to Collins, 8 February 1914, BGC,19,21.

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A practical application of the principle of the faith basis of the Mission is that its workers avoid either asking or taking collections from audiences in any meeting at the time the work of the Mission is presented. Thus they avoid the apparent inconsistency of seeming to make an indirect appeal. Also, they are spared the temptation to consciously or unconsciously hint at specific needs.\(^{92}\)

After defining the Faith Basis, the author of the *Inland Africa* article continued, explaining the spiritual dynamic that was believed to be in operation in the practice of the Faith Basis:

In the operation of the faith basis of the Mission, workers ... bring their requests before God in earnest prayer. ... God ... hears the prayer and, reaching perhaps across continents and seas, speaks to some steward whose ear is attuned to His voice and inclines him to send the right amount at the right time to meet the need brought before Him.\(^{93}\)

The particular experiences of Hurlburt's mother receiving firewood in answer to prayer and P.B.I. receiving money for the electricity bill, to pay the salaries, and to buy supplies in response to prayer alone received a theological explanation which was now made normative for the provision of all A.I.M., corporate or private.

Since the Faith Basis was conceived of only in terms of communication with God, the communication of the petitioner with God in prayer on the one hand, and the divine communication of God to His "steward" on the other, it could operate only in the context of intense piety and devotion on the part of both. The faith of the petitioner was to be placed solely upon God alone, and not on the human means of communicating the need.\(^{94}\) The petitioner would also know that it was God, Himself,

\(^{92}\)IA (October 1919): 12-13.

\(^{93}\)Ibid., p. 12.

\(^{94}\)Hearing and Doing warned that "there is a great danger that Christian men and women will put their confidence in human organization rather than in God" (H&D (November 1899): 4.) *Inland Africa* explained that missionaries' needs "should be brought to God rather than to the human agent, that the suppliant's faith may not be turned from God to man" (IA (October 1919): 13).
who had heard and answered the prayer. However, great piety was required, not only of the missionary petitioner, but also of the Mission's constituency. For A.I.M.'s Faith Basis to work, it needed enough donors who had sufficient piety that they lived in such communion with God, that God could lead them to give to A.I.M.'s needs without the need for human solicitation. Therefore, A.I.M. needed enough people of sufficient piety that their prayers on the Mission's behalf would be efficacious and its needs met.

As important as divine communication was between petitioner, God, and donor, the Faith Basis was not just mysticism, for human communication between A.I.M. and its constituency was also important. The Inland Africa article repeated the constitutional provisions for the sharing of information and elaborated on two of them. On the need to share information with those who pray, Inland Africa made explicit what was only implicit in the constitution. Those who wished to pray for the Mission had to have information concerning "the opportunities and needs of the Mission" because it was through these prayers that God would make the Mission effective, would supply the needs of the Mission, and would deepen the piety of the intercessors themselves. Inland Africa also elaborated on the need to provide information to donors. Donors had a right to know not only how their money had been used, as the constitution stated, but they also needed to know for what things their money would be used before they donated it. This required the Mission to provide far more detailed information concerning the Mission's needs than she would share with the general public. However, so that this did not become a form of

95Thus when Severn received his medical outfit, having told no one but God, he knew the gift was "a direct answer to prayer" (H&D (July 1899): 4).

96IA (October 1919): 13.

97Ibid.  

98Ibid.

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solicitation, the information could only be given in response to the donor's specific inquiries, and future needs or a reoccurrence of the same need would not be communicated to the donor, unless the donor asked again.99

This carefully nuanced policy attempted to balance the human and the divine in such a way that the missionaries' faith was always directed toward God, but did not become presumption through the neglect of the human responsibilities of the missionaries. Despite the carefully crafted policy, however, such a balance was never fully achieved. Faith and responsibility cannot be "balanced", for they are things that remain in tension in the heart and soul of the devout.

2. Applying the Faith Basis

The Faith Basis, as a pious ideal, was easy to define. But as an institutional policy, A.I.M. found it more difficult to apply.

The most obvious difficulty arose when there was a lack of adequate finances. Some missionaries seemed to be able to come through such times of "testing" with a resilient and cheerful faith that God would provide. W. J. Maynard sought to encourage a new missionary by relating his own experience of trusting God during times of financial hardship:

Our personal needs have always been supplied by our gracious Heavenly Father, often in ways that have given us the joy of seeing His direct intervention on our behalf. Several weeks ago we were entirely out of funds. ... Last week there came to us the notice that a sum ... had been received as a special gift for us, and we rejoice in another token that He will not allow us to be tempted above that we are able to bear.100

Others found it much more difficult to maintain their confidence in the Faith Basis when the money was not coming in. Out of money and out of food, a new

99Ibid.

100Maynard to Bates, 7 November 1929, contained in Maynard to Campbell, 8 November 1929, BGC,10,5.

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missionary wrote to his field director asking permission to violate the Faith Basis: "My larder is empty and I need some money to buy food. Would it be permissible for me to write to my own people for some? I know they would gladly give to me if they knew that I lacked." Even veteran missionaries of long standing could struggle with the discrepancy between theory of the Faith Basis and the reality of their own economic situation. Frederick McKenrick wrote: "We (Mrs. Mack and I) started the term with a debt and with the shortage of gifts and some heavy emergency expenses we are still in debt. How can we square these things with the faith basis?" The Mission leadership was not immune from periods of doubt, especially when the Mission finances were devastated by the Great Depression and prayer seemed to be of no avail. Apologizing for their inability to send out the missionaries' allowances again, Campbell wrote:

I am sorry that we were unable to send out allowances last month. Funds were very low indeed. There has been quite a falling off since the financial depression. I wish we knew what we could do to increase funds.

Less obvious than the difficulty to maintain faith in God's provision through the Faith Basis in the face of economic privation was the difficulty of turning the Faith Basis from an expression of individual piety into an institutional policy. While all of the missionaries and Mission leaders agreed with the Keswick life of faith, they were not agreed on how much that faith should expect God to provide in direct, apparently "supernatural" ways, and to what degree they should expect Him to use normal, human means. Likewise, they were not agreed whether or not the expectation that God would use human means would tempt them to trust in the means rather than in

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101 Bates to Maynard, 6 November 1929, contained in Maynard to Campbell, 8 November 1929, BGC, 10,5.

102 McKenrick to Campbell, 25 March 1931, BGC, 22,28.

103 Campbell to Andersen, 22 October 1930, BGC, 19,5.
God. This tension between belief in the direct intervention of God, or in His use of secondary means, effected three areas of institutional policy: whether or not missionaries could engage in paid employment to help provide for their financial needs, which administrative procedures the Mission could adopt that would be compatible with the Faith Basis, and what sort of communication and publicity the Mission could engage in without violating the Faith Basis.

The original policy of the Mission acknowledged that the missionary's personal, paid employment could be one of the ways that God would use to answer the missionary's prayer and supply his financial needs.104 With Hurlburt's accession to the leadership of A.I.M., this policy was changed so that missionaries could no longer engage in private economic activity.105 Apparently, there was no conflict over this change in policy and the vast majority of missionaries agreed that their financial support should come from donations, for there was no reference to this policy until the late 1920s, when Campbell reminded the missionaries that the American Home Council opposed missionaries engaging in any kind of work "for gain."106 The missionaries, however, seemed to have taken a more lenient interpretation of the policy, for they accepted Andrew Andersen selling bricks, hauling freight for Indian shopkeepers, and supervising the construction of a coffee factory to earn money to support his missionary work at Litein, and defended Andersen's practice before the

104H&D (January 1896): 5.

105A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article IX, Section 5, KBA: General Council. This policy was maintained with no changes in the 1912 and 1922 constitutions (A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article XI, Section 6, BGC,11,11; KBA,17,6; and A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Appendix Article II, Section 8, BGC,11,11). Also see: Blakeslee to the Home Council of the Africa Inland Mission [Form on Marriage and Business], 14 September 1908, BGC,19,12.

106Campbell to Pierson, 23 May 1927, BGC,21,18.

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American Home Secretary. Since Andersen had already died, there was little that Campbell could do except grudgingly accept the Kenya Field Director's argument and reaffirm that missionaries were not to be "engaged in some private enterprise for his own gain to the sacrifice of the best interests of the Mission."108

The second area where faith in God's direct provision was held in tension with human means was in the area of Mission administration. This issue first surfaced in 1910 when Hurlburt returned to the U.S. to establish the home office and its staff on the same Faith Basis as the missionaries and the work on the field.109 The missionaries felt it was not appropriate for a Faith Mission to follow the usual pattern of paying the costs of administration out of the Mission's general income.110 In an opposite move, the Kenya Field Council in 1916 recommended that rather than relying on special gifts to cover the costs of field administration, a special fund be established from Mission receipts to cover those costs.111 Hurlburt's response to this recommendation has not been preserved.

A recurring problem for A.I.M. was raising money to bring missionaries home on furlough. Furlough was often a matter of urgency with the missionary desperately needing rest, medical care, and a change of climate. The only recourse the missionary had was to prayer, and often the answer in the form of donations to his passage home,

107 On the different kinds of work that Andersen engaged in to support his missionary work and the Field Council's acceptance of this practice and their defense of it see: "Report to the Field Council," 2 June 1934; and Downing to Campbell, 13 November 1934, BGC,20,12. V. Andersen to Campbell, 10 November 1934, BGC,19,5.

108 Campbell to Downing, 20 December 1934, BGC,20,12.

109 Riebe to Adams, 22 April 1910; Hurlburt to General Council, 7 January 1911; and Hurlburt to "Brother," 12 January 1911, KBA: General Council.


111 "Abridged Minutes of Field Council Meetings Conference Week," 7, 10 February 1916, BGC,12,46.

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was long in coming. The suggestion that the Mission set aside funds on a regular basis to bring missionaries home was vetoed by Hurlburt\textsuperscript{112} apparently on the basis that true faith would look to God to meet this need directly through the gifts of His people. To establish such a fund might undermine the missionaries' faith, for, instead of praying, they would merely look to this fund for their passage home. After Hurlburt resigned, the Mission again broached the subject of furloughs.\textsuperscript{113} Campbell wanted to find an administrative solution that would not tempt the missionaries to place their faith in the administrative method rather than in God and in His answers to their prayers.\textsuperscript{114} The British Home Secretary suggested such a plan: "One or two of our missionaries, I believe, have set aside a portion of their allowance monthly for furlough, which would not seem to me in any way incompatible with faith."\textsuperscript{115} However, many years still had to pass before the plan could be adopted.

The most difficult tension in the application of the Faith Basis was how to publicize the work of the Mission and provide communication within the Mission and with the Mission's constituency without violating the Faith Principle. Each edition of the Mission constitution recognized the importance of publicity, and in 1912 specifically charged the home councils with this responsibility:

\begin{quote}
Home Councils shall arrange, as the Lord may lead, for the presentation of the Mission's work to the public through printed matter, periodicals, Bible and missionary conferences, deputation work, etc.\textsuperscript{116}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{112}Unsigned letter to McKenrick, 11 April 1921, BGC,22,27.

\textsuperscript{113}Campbell to Johnston, 30 September 1926, BGC,22,9.

\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{115}Grimwood to Campbell, 15 October 1926, BGC,1,84.

Similar to the issue of furloughs was the issue of retirement. Here too missionaries feared that a retirement scheme would violate the faith basis (Davis to Campbell, 21 March 1930, BGC,10,5). However, the retirement issue never achieved the urgency of the furlough issue.

\textsuperscript{116}A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article VIII, Section 4, BGC,11,11; KBA,17,6.

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Providing for publicizing the work of the Mission in the constitution was the easy part. Accomplishing it was more difficult. In 1905, Charles Johnston argued that the American Home Council should be doing more to extend the "interest at home" so that there would be sufficient "support pledged" to cover the allowance of each missionary.\footnote{Johnston to Adams, 16 January 1904, BGC,22,8.} In 1910, the American Home Director J. D. Adams resigned, partly because he refused to do the work of publicizing the Mission, and a man was appointed who would.\footnote{Hurlburt to General Council, 7 January 1911, KBA: General Council.} Hurlburt himself was accused of over-expanding the work on the field and not developing a home constituency capable of supporting that work. Campbell wrote that:

...the maintenance of the work in the fields presents to me today a very real and a very pressing problem. As a matter of fact, we have advanced in the fields beyond our constituency I mean also that which a constituency provides, prayers and funds. I quite understand that God at times and in extraordinary ways makes up deficits and it may be he will make up deficits for us now, since we are praying earnestly to that end. ... The weak point in our work now seems to be the home end. When I look at the work of [deputation worker] Mr. Woodley and see how he has stirred up and even created interest in the Africa Inland Mission, I wish for three more men of his calibre ... great things would be done....\footnote{Campbell to Maynard 8 March 1929, BGC,10,5.}

This statement expressed not only the importance the Mission placed in publicity, seen both in the past neglect and in the hope for the future, but also two different perspectives on the Faith Basis. While Campbell admitted that, as presumably Hurlburt thought, God could provide "in extraordinary ways", he expected that God would normally provide through the human agency of the mission's efforts to publicize its work. Differing expectations about how God would usually act to provide for the Mission's needs lay at the root of much of the controversy about the Faith Basis that the Mission experienced.
While A.I.M. recognized the importance of publicizing the work of the Mission, financial needs were not to be included. This information was to be kept within the Mission family. In 1911, a joint meeting of the General Council and the Kenya Field Council approved a recommendation of the Annual Field Conference that missionaries not state their needs to people outside the Mission, but they keep these needs within the Mission and "with the Councils, lay the needs before God alone." [Emphasis in original].\textsuperscript{120} This action was repeated by the Conference a quarter of a century later. Complaining that the Kenya prayer letter was violating this resolution, Elwood Davis asked:

> Does not the action taken in Annual Conference Business Meeting of last year cover such a subject? We agreed that such needs would be presented to the missionaries for their prayer and help here on the field, thus keeping such direct requests out of the Prayer Letter that goes out so widely over the world.\textsuperscript{121}

Within the Mission itself, the missionaries had perfect freedom to share their financial needs. Albert Barnett wrote the American Home Office:

> No funds have come in for us at this end.... There are quite a few needs at present, moving expenses which are quite heavy, and money for buildings etc. I know you are remembering these needs in your prayers and I believe the dear Lord will supply them in time.\textsuperscript{122}

Sometimes, Mission officials asked for such information. The American Home Director, Orsen Palmer, asked the furloughing Fred McKenricks if they had financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{123} To which McKenrick responded: "We are facing a financial need at present, and if you can spare us some money we shall appreciate it very much."\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{120}"Transcript of Minutes [of Joint Meeting of Kenya Field Committee and General Council]", 6-7 September 1911, KBA: General Council.

\textsuperscript{121}Davis to "Members of the Prayer Committee," 23 March 1938, BGC,19,25.

\textsuperscript{122}Barnett to Palmer, 5 August 1913, BGC,19,20.

\textsuperscript{123}Palmer to McKenrick, 8 December 1913, BGC,22,27.

\textsuperscript{124}McKenrick to Palmer, 12 February 1914, BGC,22,27.

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Palmer then had the Mission send a check.\footnote{Palmer to McKenrick, 16 February 1914, BGC,22,27.} Sharing financial needs in this manner was a regular part of the administrative process of the Mission.\footnote{This fact is mentioned in Maynard to Bates, 7 November 1929, contained in Maynard to Campbell, 8 November 1929, BGC,10,5.}

Sharing needs within the Mission family posed no threat of solicitation and served the purpose of promoting the prayer of the missionaries for one another and was necessary for proper administration of the Mission finances. Sharing such information outside of the Mission, however, was more problematic, but was still permissible and even necessary at times.

First, financial responsibility required that A.I.M. share the financial details concerning projects in which the donors expressed interest and report how their money was spent. Furthermore, the Mission answered direct questions concerning the needs of either the Mission or of individual missionaries. When W. S. Greer asked how much the McKenricks needed to return home, the Mission office responded that \$2,500.00 was needed.\footnote{Greer to Fletcher, 26 February 1924; and Unsigned letter to Greer, 28 February 1924, BGC,22,27.} What the Mission headquarters could do, the individual missionaries were also allowed to do. Thus the American Home Director told W. J. Maynard:

> If \[family or\] friends ask what definite things their money can be best used for you can lay before them definite things and ask them to pray and be free to do just \[as\] the Lord may use them, that your statement is merely to give them intelligent information and not to solicit funds.\footnote{Palmer to Maynard, 15 June 1914, BGC,11,11.}

The concern was that the missionaries not use this liberty as a means to solicit funds. When Laura Collins asked how much she needed for outfit, passage, and support so she could answer a specific enquiry, the American Home Director gave her the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Palmer to McKenrick, 16 February 1914, BGC,22,27.}
\footnote{This fact is mentioned in Maynard to Bates, 7 November 1929, contained in Maynard to Campbell, 8 November 1929, BGC,10,5.}
\footnote{Greer to Fletcher, 26 February 1924; and Unsigned letter to Greer, 28 February 1924, BGC,22,27.}
\footnote{Palmer to Maynard, 15 June 1914, BGC,11,11.}
\end{footnotes}
information, but she was later required to explain why the information was needed.\textsuperscript{129} Perhaps the Home Director suspected that Collins was trying to manipulate the policy to surreptitiously solicit funds from her friends. As long as the initiative for the information lay with the donor, then the enquiries could be viewed as "an answer to prayer and quite contrary to making any solicitation of funds."\textsuperscript{130}

Second, the need for prayer required that A.I.M. share needs with those outside the Mission. For people to pray effectively, they had to acquaint "themselves with the opportunities and needs of the Mission."\textsuperscript{131} This meant that A.I.M. had to take the initiative to share its needs with those who would pray for the Mission, yet without the sharing of information becoming a means of solicitation. One Mission official, writing about those who agreed to pray regularly for AIM, noted: "We shall do our best to keep them informed of needs except of course, those that savor of solicitation of funds."\textsuperscript{132} Another Mission leader explained: "We cannot make any of our needs known ... excepting in a general way of asking prayer from those who are closely identified with the work."\textsuperscript{133}

These people formed a somewhat ambiguous group for A.I.M. On the one hand, because they prayed for A.I.M. and were "closely identified with the work", they were much like those within the Mission, among whom it was permissible to share needs. On the other hand, many of these people were also donors from whom the Mission and missionaries could be tempted to attempt to solicit money in violation to the Faith Basis, even if inadvertently. This ambiguity not only prompted the

\textsuperscript{129}\textsuperscript{129}Collins to "A.I.M.," 1 March 1907; Adams to Collins, 4 March 1907; and Collins to Adams, 27 March 1907, BGC, 19, 21.

\textsuperscript{130}Campbell to Downey, 19 February 1926, BGC, 20, 9.

\textsuperscript{131}IA (October 1919): 13.

\textsuperscript{132}Green to Johnston, 25 September 1923, BGC, 22, 8.

\textsuperscript{133}\textsuperscript{133}Unsigned letter to McKenrick, 11 April 1921, BGC, 22, 27.
admonitions that missionaries not share their needs either publicly or privately, but also permitted Mission officials to take the initiative to share "prayer requests" that quietly pushed the limits of the non-solicitation policy. In 1923, Oliver Fletcher of the American Home Office asked a donor if money sent in for Fred McKenrick could be applied to his furlough passage, and then could not resist adding:

We have placed this money to the credit of Mr. McKenrick and his children either for support or furlough, since word has come that he gravely needs a furlough. We have, in fact, been making special prayer that the way might be opened for his return, but it will mean so much expense because of his having a wife and four children.134

A year and a half, later the Assistant General Secretary of the American Home Council wrote to the McKenricks' family and friends that the McKenricks were on their way home and "only have enough passage money to get them to England but we need to pray the rest in to bring them here from England."135 Earlier, in 1907, Albert Barnett had gone further than just asking people to pray. He actually felt "led" to ask a close friend for support:

The Lord laid it upon my heart to ask this lady if she would not care to have a special interest in me while on the field by giving so much towards my support, and as soon as I mentioned the matter to her, she instantly told me that the Lord had been speaking to her about the matter and laying it upon her heart to do it. She said that she and her husband had talked it over a number of times, and both finally agreed that it was the Lords will for them at present to give this amount towards my support.136

134Fletcher to Crowell, 18 January 1923, BGC,22,27.

135Assistant General Secretary to Greer, 19 June 1924, BGC,22,27. See also Assistant General Secretary to W. Pierson, 19 June 1924; Assistant General Secretary to Crowell, 19 June 1924; Assistant General Secretary to Welch, 19 June 1924; and Assistant General Secretary to A. McKenrick, 19 June 1924, BGC,22,27.

About the same time, Fletcher wrote to the pastor of Gertrude Bowyer to inform the church that the money they had sent for her support had now been exhausted (Fletcher to Mackenzie 25 January 1923, BGC,19,14). After the church sent in $200 more, he wrote again to explain that the amount the church providing no longer covered Miss Bowyer's full support (Mackenzie to Fletcher, 30 January 1923; and Fletcher to Mackenzie, 7 February 1923, BGC,19,14).

136Barnett to Adams, 2 October 1907, BGC,19,20.
This was a clear violation of the Faith Basis although it functioned in a manner similar to the Faith Basis. Such subjective "leadings" by God were expected to be the common experience of those who followed Keswick piety, and were hard to argue against. Perhaps this is why the American Home Director did not rebuke Barnett.\textsuperscript{137}

Finally, the Faith Basis involved a tension between the need to encourage those who wanted to help the Mission while not letting that help circumvent the Faith Basis. Laura Collins found it necessary to defend herself from the appearance of violating the Faith Basis. In response to a friend's direct question, Collins wrote to him telling her exact needs, not knowing that he planned to read her letter publicly in church.\textsuperscript{138} During her next furlough, the people in the churches where Collins lived continually asked her to present her work and offered to take up collections at the meetings or charge admission.\textsuperscript{139} Collins did not want to offend them and found that "many of the people think we do not need money very much if we are so particular about not soliciting. It is all so new to them."\textsuperscript{140} The heart of the dilemma was how to communicate that the Mission did have financial needs and encourage interested parties to help meet those needs without violating the Faith Basis in the process. Palmer tried to resolve the difficulty by suggesting minor ways in which the people could help in the context of trying to leave the initiative mainly between the potential donors and God:

\begin{quote}
Where you are asked to go to speak at different places, and they ask you about charges I would say that we do not ask for collections or offering but leave those matters for the Holy Spirit to lead individuals. That if they feel led
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{137}Adams to Barnett, 11 October 1907; and Adams to Barnett, 15 October 1907, BGC,19,20.

\textsuperscript{138}Collins to Adams, 27 March 1907, BGC,19,21.

\textsuperscript{139}Collins to "AIM, Phila.," 5 February 1914; and Collins to Palmer, 13 March 1914, BGC,19,21.

\textsuperscript{140}Collins to Young, 5 June 1914, BGC,19,21.
\end{footnotes}
to pay your car fare to the place it will be thankfully received, and if individuals or church feel led to make a willing offering to the work, that will also be thankfully received, but that money matters are left entirely as the Lord may lead them. I think an explanation of this kind should be made, otherwise they might think we did not require money to carry on the work or that we did not want to take their money.\[141\]

How much churches, friends, and even Mission leaders should take the initiative to "help" the missionaries and how much should be left to the divine initiative remained a point of tension for A.I.M. Though the missionaries were still not permitted to share their own needs, gradually it became accepted that others could present the missionaries needs on their behalf. By the mid-1940s the members of the Minneapolis District Committee were arranging speaking engagements for candidates,\[142\] and even approaching pastors asking what part their churches would take in supporting particular candidates.\[143\]

3. Conflicts over the Faith Basis

The Hurlburt years (1897-1925) were the years of utmost concern for defining and practicing the Faith Basis in its greatest purity. This concern resulted in tensions within A.I.M. over the application of the Faith Basis. The controversy over Charles Johnston in 1913-1914 illustrated the resentments that differing perceptions of the Faith Basis could produce, and the controversy over Charles Hurlburt in 1925-1926 showed how explosive the issue of the Faith Basis could be.

The root of the Johnston controversy lay in two attitudes that had been

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\[142\] See: Minneapolis District Committee, 12 June 1944; 18 November 1947; 16 December 1947; and 20 January 1948, BGC,7,109.

\[143\] See: Minneapolis District Committee, 22 March 1943; 24 May 1943; 29 June 1943; and 18 May 1945, BGC,7,109.
building within the mission for some time.\textsuperscript{144} The first was the belief that A.I.M. was responsible as a mission to provide financially for its missionaries and their work. The second was the feeling that the Faith Basis was not being applied fairly throughout the Mission.

Though the missionaries were supposed to look to God to meet their financial needs, the financial structure of A.I.M. made the Mission appear to be responsible for the economic welfare of its missionaries. The missionaries were not required to secure promises of financial support before coming to the field. Those who did not have such "personal support" could share in the General Fund.\textsuperscript{145} When undesignated giving was high, the missionaries received their full monthly allowances. But when the giving was low, the missionaries shared what came in.\textsuperscript{146} When undesignated giving was low, some missionaries were all too prone to blame A.I.M. for not doing enough fund raising. Elwood Davis was not on the field long before his illusions of life in a Faith Mission were shattered: "Instead of trusting in God for all their needs, men are criticizing the Mission for not furnishing their support or for not making more efforts to secure money."\textsuperscript{147}

Hurlburt had tried to answer the complaints by arguing that it was not the

\textsuperscript{144}The American Home Director, Orsen Palmer, felt that this controversy with Johnston was not new, but was the result of problems "which have extended over years" (Palmer to Brown, 21 January 1914, BGC,22,8). Again he wrote, "These troubles have existed for a long time.... We had known there was trouble in the work and has been for years...." (Palmer to Brown, 22 January 1914, BGC,22,8).

\textsuperscript{145}For a more detailed explanation of this system see above pp. 85-86.

\textsuperscript{146}Andrew Andersen had this explained to him when he entered A.I.M. from another mission: "As soon as you leave your present position, and actually come into our Mission, you will share equally with others in the distribution of General Funds on a pro rata basis. I think you understand that all funds received for individuals, go directly to those individuals, and that the General Fund is disbursed proportionally among those who are not supported, or but partially supported, through personal offerings (Unsigned letter to Andersen, 6 February 1913, KBA: FC-83).

\textsuperscript{147}Davis to Palmer 6 November 1912, BGC,12,46.
responsibility of the Mission to meet these needs. Rather, the Mission officers were responsible to remain in such a pious and devoted relationship with God that He would answer their prayers and in such a loving relationship with their missionaries that they could help them also to have faith and believe that God would supply.148

Johnston, however, was not easily convinced, and thought that the Mission should play a more active role in providing for the missionaries' financial needs. When on furlough in 1904, he boldly stated his intention to return to the field and, almost arrogantly, announced that he had no money for outfit, passage, or house and stated how much he and his prospective wife would need.149 He also questioned the practice of letting missionaries go to the field without pledges of personal support and letting them draw on the General Fund.150

The controversy broke into the open in 1913. Johnston believed that A.I.M. had failed in its responsibility for the welfare of the missionaries and the work in Ukambani by neglecting that work in favor of Kijabe and work in new fields. For this reason he explored the possibility of his Presbyterian church in Philadelphia taking over A.I.M.'s Kamba work.151 Johnston maintained that a mission that did not provide for its missionaries could hardly be expected to retain their loyalty and obedience.152

To Hurlburt, who denied the validity of Johnston's charges, this was not only

148Hurlburt to Downing and General Council, 19 August 1911, KBA: General Council.

149Johnston to Adams, 8 August 1904, BGC,22,8.

150Johnston to Adams, 16 January 1905, BGC,22,8.

151"Conference between Charles F. Johnston, O. R. Palmer and W. L. DeGroff, over the differences on the Field between the Council and our brother," 18 September 1913; and Hurlburt to Palmer, 3 November 1913, BGC,22,8. That Johnston was not the only one to feel this way see: Rhoad to Palmer, 30 October 1913; Wight to Palmer, 30 December 1913; Waechter to Palmer, n.d. [@January 1914]; and Palmer to Johnston, 3 October 1914, BGC,22,8.

152Hurlburt to Palmer, 3 November 1913; and Wight to Palmer, 30 December 1913, BGC,22,8.

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disloyalty to the Mission, but was disloyalty to the Faith Basis. Hurlburt claimed that Johnston was turning all of the Kamba missionaries against A.I.M. and the Faith Basis.153

Johnston's defense was that he was not opposed the Faith Basis, but followed it most scrupulously in his own life. However, he did criticize how the Faith Basis was being applied within the Mission.154 Johnston, himself, did not specify the ways in which he thought the Faith Basis was being inconsistently applied. However, his friend, William Wight, writing in Johnston's defense, supplied just such a list.155 Wight first complained that other missionaries were not following the Faith Basis. Secondly, he protested that Hurlburt and the Mission leaders were showing favoritism, especially towards Kijabe, in the enforcement of the Faith Basis and distribution of the Mission resources. Hurlburt had let the Mission to go into debt to construct the school for missionaries' children and the Kijabe church.156 Kijabe's acquisition of a telephone system had violated the Faith Basis on two counts being both frivolous and solicited. While Kijabe was being so favored, other missionaries, presumably in Ukambani, were experiencing difficulty getting their designated funds released by the Mission. Revealing the tension between the Faith Basis and administrative procedures, Wight argued the Industrial School, saw mill, and printing press, should have operated on "Faith". The machinery was donated and the Mission

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Hurlburt, Rhoad, Raynor and Hetz to Palmer and Home Council, 24 October 1913; and Hurlburt to Palmer, 3 November 1913, BGC,22,8.

\[154\]
Palmer to Hurlburt, 17 September 1913; Wight to Palmer, 30 December 1913; and Johnston to Palmer, 31 December 1913, BGC,22,8.

\[155\]
Wight to Palmer, 30 December 1913, BGC,22,8.

\[156\]
Hurlburt to Downing and General Council, 19 August 1911, KBA: General Council; and "Conference between Charles F. Johnston, O. R. Palmer and W. L. DeGroff, over the differences on the Field between the Council and our brother," 18 September 1913; Hurlburt to Palmer, 3 November 1913; and Wight to Palmer, 30 December 1913, BGC,22,8.

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should have "trusted God" to provide the money for the salaries of the African workmen and supplies and provided its services to the missionaries free of charge.\textsuperscript{157}

The Mission leadership was able to answer all of these charges,\textsuperscript{158} and Johnston gave up his unreasonable expectations concerning A.I.M.'s ability to provide for her missionaries and their work.\textsuperscript{159} However, the conflict did show how, when under the pressure of economic adversity, different understandings of the Faith Basis mixed with jealousy and self-righteousness was an explosive mix.

Though the "rebellion" of Kamba missionaries was quenched and Johnston was reconciled to A.I.M.,\textsuperscript{160} dissatisfaction with Hurlburt's financial policies remained, and in the 1920s grew to become a major part of widespread discontent with Hurlburt's leadership.\textsuperscript{161} Some missionaries continued to disagree with the belief that any public sharing of needs constituted solicitation. In 1921, McKenrick wrote that the Mission would be better able to bring sick missionaries home for furlough if the

\textsuperscript{157}Johnston undoubtedly shared many, though not necessarily all of these criticisms. He apparently had joined in the criticism of the building of R.V.A. ("Conference over the differences on the Field," 18 September 1913, BGC,22,8), but he vigorously denied refusing to pay for lumber from the industrial department or criticizing the Kijabe telephone system (Johnston to Palmer, 2 February 1914, BGC,22,8).

\textsuperscript{158}Hurlburt to Downing and General Council, 19 August 1911, KBA: General Council; and Palmer to Wight, 6 January 1914, BGC,22,8.

\textsuperscript{159}While Hurlburt and Palmer defended A.I.M.'s administration, Johnston was not required to change his opinion where he disagreed with Mission policy, but did have to change his critical attitude toward the Mission (Palmer to Johnston, 6 January 1914; and Johnston to Palmer, 24 August 1914, BGC,22,8).

\textsuperscript{160}For the reconciliation between Johnston and Hurlburt see: Palmer to Johnston, 3 October 1914; and Johnston to Palmer, 10 February 1915, BGC,22,8. This reconciliation was genuine as can be seen from Hurlburt's praise of Johnston as the only A.I.M. missionary who truly understood indigenous church principles (Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76), and from Johnston's rejoicing that Hurlburt and the A.H.C. appeared to have reconciled during the 1925-1926 Hurlburt controversy (Johnston to Campbell, 11 May 1926; and 26 July 1926, BGC,22,9).

\textsuperscript{161}These issues are discussed below in Chapter 4, pp. 154-156.
home office publicized the need.\textsuperscript{162} In 1925 a missionary candidate wrote to the American Home Secretary to point out that the British Home Council publicized the needs of its missionaries as items of prayer, and suggested that the American council do the same, arguing that the current policy was hampering the work of the Mission and that many missionaries had never really accepted the change in the Faith Basis that Hurlburt had brought.\textsuperscript{163}

Discontent over Hurlburt's leadership continued to build until it culminated in Hurlburt's controversial resignation in mid-1925.\textsuperscript{164} What may have been viewed as merely an unfortunate power struggle, became an explosion when the American Home Council passed a motion that was recorded as:

\begin{quote}
...it was deemed advisable to give the fullest information concerning our needs in the paper, INLAND AFRICA, but that no solicitation of funds be made in any manner that would violate the principles of the faith basis of the Mission.\textsuperscript{165}
\end{quote}

This permitted Hurlburt to avoid the accusations against his leadership and his disagreements with the A.H.C. and enabled him to raise the highly emotional charge that the A.H.C. had departed from the Faith Basis.

Hurlburt charged that the A.H.C. decision violated the Faith Basis, because the presentation of needs in any manner was inherently a form of solicitation:

\begin{quote}
The most artful solicitation is a strong and pathetic statement of need without direct appeal. It may gain money but it leaves out God, and whatever comes is the result not of God's divine action but of man's ingenuity.\textsuperscript{166}
\end{quote}

This was could not be tolerated, Hurlburt argued, first because the Faith Basis had

\begin{footnotes}
\item[162]Unsigned letter to McKenrick, 11 April 1921, BGC,22,27.
\item[163]Bowe to Campbell, 16 September 1925, BGC,11,11.
\item[164]For the details of this controversy see below Chapter 4, pp.157-169.
\item[165]Quoted in Hurlburt to Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.
\item[166]Hurlburt to Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.
\end{footnotes}
been given to A.I.M. by God, who blessed A.I.M. only when she followed the Faith
Basis. Second, the violation of the Faith Basis violated the Mission constitution, and
because of this the action of the A.H.C. was void and those who supported it forfeited
their membership in A.I.M. Third, Hurlburt argued, the A.H.C. had betrayed the
Mission's constituency, which had donated large sums of money to A.I.M. because
A.I.M. followed the Faith Basis, and which would now lose faith in the Mission.
Finally, he maintained that A.I.M.'s financial policies had the support of the broader
Christian community, and that the A.H.C.'s attempt to evade them was dishonest and
would bring upon the Mission the condemnation of the whole Christian community.
Hurlburt proposed that all members of the Mission who could not support the Faith
Basis leave, form their own mission, and divide the field in Africa with A.I.M.167

In its response to Hurlburt's charges, the A.H.C. never attempted to explain
why the Council had passed that resolution in the Annual Meeting but vehemently
denied that it had left the Faith Basis. Campbell explained that there had been no
attempt at the Annual Conference to leave the Faith Basis. Rather, it had been
unanimously reaffirmed.168 The Committee of Direction169 wrote that A.I.M. had not
left the Faith Basis as defined in the constitution. The A.H.C. had never gone beyond
teaching about giving, publicizing the work and general needs of the Mission, and
answering direct questions, all things specifically permitted by the constitution.170
Campbell cabled to the fields that the A.H.C. had not departed from the Faith Basis.

167 See: Hurlburt to Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925; 12 October 1925; and
Hurlburt to [Mission Membership], 12 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

168 Campbell to Trout, 27 January 1926, BGC,21,18.

169 This was a committee of five men appointed by the A.H.C. to assume the powers
and responsibilities of the General Director following Hurlburt's resignation. See below
Chapter 4, pp. 159-160.

170 Committee of Direction to Maclnnis, 27 January 1926, BGC,21,18.

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but was being unjustly attacked. In his denials, Campbell could give as good as he got. He retorted that Hurlburt had published appeals in *Inland Africa* and condemned Hurlburt for acting in an unchristian manner and for treating the Faith Basis as a "shibboleth" and a "fetish."

Hurlburt's attacks bred confusion and consternation among missionaries, home members, and supporters. Initially the Chicago District Committee, the Los Angeles District Committee, and the British Home Council sided with Hurlburt. Barnett reported that one donor:

...was very ready to oppose anything that suggested a departure from the Faith Basis... He also stated that if the mission did not return to the Faith Basis he would withdraw the gift for the Bible school.

Johnston wrote that:

...the British workers in the Belgian Congo Field are very much perturbed over the report that the faith basis is being abandoned. Would it not be possible to assure all the missionaries in the different Fields of the contrary position? As I see it the faith basis is necessary to our very existence.

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171"PIERSON, DOING, REJAF," 4 February 1926; and "DOING, KIJABE," 5 February 1926, BGC,21,18.

172Campbell to Sehmalgemeier, 23 March 1926, BGC,21,18. With a note of malicious glee, Fred McKenrick observed that Hurlburt's son and strongest supporter had mentioned a "need" in an article that he wrote for *Inland Africa*: "We note with satisfaction the item in Inland Africa relative to the need of a school at Aba over the signature of Paul Hurlburt. We believe such mention perfectly legitimate, no matter who is responsible. But how will it stand the test of his father's unreal standard (McKenrick to Campbell, 10 February 1926, BGC,22,27)?"

173Campbell to Barnett, 3 February 1926, BGC,19,20.

174Campbell to Downey, 19 February 1926, BGC,20,9.

175Los Angeles District Committee, 6 October 1925, BGC,6,66; Nicholson to Campbell, 6 October 1925, BGC,1,84; and Campbell to Pierson, 27 October 1925, BGC,21,18.

176Barnett to Campbell, 26 January 1926, BGC,19,20.

177Johnston to Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC,22,9.
Chicago and Britain returned to support the A.H.C.,\textsuperscript{178} and in April of 1926, the Committee of Direction finally managed to arrange a meeting with Hurlburt.\textsuperscript{179} For a time it seemed that the dispute was over, but the animosity lingered.\textsuperscript{180} In 1927 Hurlburt founded a new mission, the Unevangelized Africa Mission, into which his most intractable supporters withdrew.\textsuperscript{181} The result of the whole controversy was to hurt A.I.M.'s constituency in general, and to totally destroy its constituency on the American west coast.\textsuperscript{182}

**THE FAITH BASIS UNDER HENRY CAMPBELL**

Campbell introduced no changes in the application of the Faith Basis. The whole Hurlburt controversy caused him to be extremely cautious about mentioning any kind of need in the Mission publications. Describing himself as "a child with burnt fingers", he told Leroy Farnsworth to delete a reference to the need for a larger

\textsuperscript{178}Chicago District Committee, 30 September 1925, BGC,2,87; Johnston to Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC,22,9; Campbell to Nicholson, 30 November 1925; and Campbell to Grimwood, 8 February 1926, BGC,1,84.

Cope took Hurlburt's charges at face value and portrayed the British Home Council as the champions of the Faith Basis, and the A.H.C. as trying to undermine it (Cope, pp. 78,83-89). This is odd when American missionaries perceived the B.H.C. as following a more liberal policy on sharing needs than the A.H.C. (see above p. 114) and Cope himself reported that the B.H.C. declared that the policy of the A.H.C. did not violate the Faith Basis (Cope, p. 88).

\textsuperscript{179}Campbell to Pierson, 22 April 1926; and Campbell to Maynard, 29 April 1926, BGC,21,18.

\textsuperscript{180}Campbell to Pierson, 3 May 1926; 28 June 1926, 3 January 1927; 23 May 1927; Campbell to Downing, 3 January 1927; and Campbell to Maynard 3 January 1927, BGC,21,18. Campbell to Grimwood, 15 June 1926; and 18 August 1926, BGC,1,84.

\textsuperscript{181}"DOING, REJAF," 31 August 1927; and Campbell to Maynard, 12 September 1927, BGC,21,18. Campbell to Maynard, 26 July 1927; Campbell to Grimwood, 22 November 1927; and 26 January 1928, BGC,1,84.

\textsuperscript{182}Barnett to Campbell, 26 October 1926, BGC,19,20; and Campbell to Maynard, 12 September 1927, BGC,21,18.
church building from Farnsworth's article.\textsuperscript{183} In 1929 he asked the Chicago District Committee to write an article for Inland Africa on special prayer for A.I.M.,\textsuperscript{184} but then refused to publish it because "some reference was made in the article to the financial needs of the Mission."\textsuperscript{185}

Nearly ten years after Hurlburt's attack, the debate over the definition of the Faith Basis had not completely died. Campbell faulted a pamphlet written by Virginia Blakeslee, because in it "a direct appeal is made for a small college to accommodate sixteen [African] girls."\textsuperscript{186} He took the pamphlet and the whole issue of literature distributed privately by missionaries to the American Home Council, which agreed with Campbell and ruled that all literature distributed in the name of A.I.M. had to be approved first by both the Field Council and the A.H.C.\textsuperscript{187} This ruling did not, however, please the Kenya Field Council, which had already examined the pamphlet for itself and did:

...not feel that there is anything objectionable to the statements contained therein. They are not contrary to the faith basis - certainly not to the way Mr. McConkey expressed the basis in the early days of the Mission, which was: "as to needs full information, as to funds no solicitation." Dr. Blakeslee asked for prayer, not directly for funds.\textsuperscript{188}

From time to time Campbell continued to rebuke the missionaries for being too explicit in the needs they included in a public prayer bulletin\textsuperscript{189} or for going into debt

\textsuperscript{183}Campbell to Farnsworth, 23 March 1926, BGC,21,18. 
\textsuperscript{184}Chicago District Committee, 21 June 1929, BGC,2,87. 
\textsuperscript{185}Chicago District Committee, 17 August 1929, BGC,2,87. 
\textsuperscript{186}Campbell to Downing, 25 June 1934, BGC,20,12. 
\textsuperscript{187}Campbell to Downing, 16 August 1934, BGC,20,12. 
\textsuperscript{188}Downing to Campbell, 8 September 1934, BGC,20,12. 
\textsuperscript{189}Davis to "Members of the Prayer Committee," 23 March 1938; and Campbell to Davis, 25 May 1938, BGC,19,25.

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to purchase a rest house and then requesting Campbell to ask a donor to pay for it. Nevertheless, the Faith Basis never again became the continual source of contention that it had been during the Hurlburt years.

Though the Faith Basis itself was no longer a source of contention, it continued to figure into other issues. The Hurlburt controversy had barely begun to settle down when Campbell discovered that the American General Fund had been "unconstitutionally" subsidizing British missionaries. In the ensuing controversy, the Faith Basis was used to argue both for and against "pooling" the American and British General Funds.

However, the most important issue to be impacted by the Faith Basis during the Campbell years was the question whether to accept government grants-in-aid for the Mission's schools. The Mission was divided on whether or not the grants-in-aid violated the Faith Basis. Ironically, it was the scrupulous Charles Hurlburt who believed that A.I.M. could accept them, and Henry Campbell who saw them as a violation of the Faith Basis. Thus, during Campbell's administration, the A.H.C. opposed the acceptance of grants-in-aid and hindered the efforts of the Kenya missionaries who wanted to meet the educational demands of their African Christians.

CONCLUSION

The Faith Basis was never merely a financial policy. Rooted deeply in Keswick piety, the Faith Basis achieved near creedral importance for A.I.M. It provided a religious means of fund raising that was compatible with the Mission's religious goals.

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190 Campbell to Davis, 31 March 1938, BGC, 19, 25.
191 See below Chapter 4, pp. 177-181.
192 Guilding to Campbell, 7 April 1928; and Harris to Campbell, 7 April 1928, BGC, 13, 19.
193 For a detailed discussion of this issue see below Chapter 7, pp. 305-317, 326-327.
With no organized ecclesiastical support, the Faith Basis enabled A.I.M. to develop a religious constituency in the homelands. Finally, the Faith Basis provided a strong unifying factor to bind together a collection of highly individualistic missionaries with no common ecclesiastical traditions.

Ultimately, the Faith Basis was difficult to define and had inherent tensions in its application because it was an attempt to transform personal piety into institutional policy. Personal piety involves the efforts of weak, fallible human beings striving imperfectly towards a spiritual goal, unattainable in this life. Institutional policy, however, attempts to define behavior that all will follow. It is not surprising, therefore, that the attempt to define and implement the Faith Basis within A.I.M. was not always a smooth process and at times produced conflict within the Mission.

Two different concepts of the Faith Basis existed within A.I.M. Perhaps they existed in tension within individual missionaries. These concepts were illustrated by the pragmatic Faith Basis of Peter Cameron Scott and the more ideological Faith Basis of Charles Hurlburt. Both believed in the efficacy of prayer. However, Scott seemed to accept that in answering those prayers, God would often use secondary or natural means, such as normal human communication in the sharing of needs or the "honest labor" of the missionary. For Hurlburt the only valid Faith Basis was one in which an immediate supernaturalism was at work. These differing conceptions of the Faith Basis coupled with the difficulty of frail human piety trying to conform to its ideals set in firm policy was the cause of much of the conflict over the Faith Basis.

The belief in God's providential care to provide for their needs provided a strong motivation for A.I.M. missionaries to go to the field despite great economic uncertainties. However, once in Africa, the Faith Basis hindered their ability to respond effectively to the educational aspirations of their African converts.
CHAPTER FOUR
A.I.M. AS A FIELD-GOVERNED MISSION

The third principle upon which A.I.M. was founded was that of a "field-governed" mission. The government of the Mission was to rest with the missionaries on the field, rather than with a church or board in the homeland.\(^1\) Such a policy was consistent with A.I.M.'s lay mission principles. If the missionaries were drawn from among the most pious in the Church, who had completely surrendered their lives to God and His service, and if they had truly been called by God to serve Him in Africa, then they would be every bit as qualified to conduct the affairs of the Mission as their brethren in the homeland. In fact, they would be more qualified, for it is reasonable that the ones on the scene and intimately involved in Africa and her people would understand far better the needs of the work and the best policies and procedures to follow. Therefore, A.I.M. would be self-governed by the missionaries on the field, and not by any body in the homeland.

However, the Mission remained dependent upon the homeland for finances and new missionaries, and these required both publicity and an administrative structure to pass them on to the field. This would be done for A.I.M. by an entirely separate organization, the Philadelphia Missionary Council.\(^2\) Consistent with the principle of the field-governed mission, the P.M.C. would exercise no control over A.I.M., and true to the Faith Principle, it would make no guarantees concerning either personnel or funds.

As logical as this principle appeared at first glance, it overlooked four important issues. The first regarded the competency of the missionaries to govern their own affairs on the field. Their involvement in the work on the field should give

\(^1\)Hi&D (January 1896): 5.
\(^2\)Ibid.

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the missionaries greater knowledge and superior understanding. Yet without the constraints of salary-paying congregations or supervisory church hierarchies, or even public opinion, the missionaries had only their own dedication and sense of vocation to hold them accountable and ensure that they did not turn aside from their true work or get caught up in self-serving vested interests.

Secondly, the missionaries were dependent upon a constituency in the homeland for finances, personnel, and publicity. With the control of such resources comes power. The two issues of accountability and power come together, for a mission's constituency would give its money and people only if it agreed with the purposes and policies of the mission and was confident that the resources it provided were used for purposes and programs with which it agreed, that is, if the mission was seen to be accountable. If not, the constituency would attempt to influence the mission to change, if necessary withdrawing its resources in the ultimate exercise of power.

Third, even if it were conceded that the missionaries were competent to govern on the field without being held accountable to the homeland, and if home constituencies were willing to forego the power that the control of resources confers, the issue of the governing process remained unresolved. It was unclear whether the missionaries should govern themselves through broadly democratic processes or by following a strong, charismatic leader with a clear vision of God's leading for the Mission.

And finally, no provision was made in the Mission's thinking for the African converts the missionaries expected to make or for a future African church.

Thus the history of the government of A.I.M. revolved around the tensions between the following centers of power: the missionaries themselves who wanted some sort of democratic influence upon the policies and operation of the Mission, strong leaders who saw their vision, policies and leadership as coming from God,

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home constituencies that had their own ideas about the policies and programs that A.I.M. should follow, and African Christians who were not content to follow the missionary lead forever. This chapter will trace out these tensions in the field-governed mission of Peter Cameron Scott, the general director-governed mission of Charles Hurlburt, the crisis that the Mission was plunged into by Hurlburt's controversial resignation in 1925, and the home-governed mission of Henry Campbell. A.I.M.'s attitude toward indigenous church principles will be examined in Chapter 9.

FIELD-GOVERNED MISSION UNDER PETER CAMERON SCOTT

The precise structure of A.I.M. under Peter Cameron Scott is not known for certain. The minutes of the meeting that organized A.I.M. referred to "articles of organization". Unfortunately, these articles have not survived, but something of their content can be inferred. On their way to the field, the first missionary party elected Scott superintendent of the Mission, Frederick Krieger assistant superintendent, Willis Hotchkiss secretary, and Margaret Scott treasurer. This appeared to be a simple, democratic, field-governed structure in keeping with the philosophy of government expounded in *Hearing and Doing*.

However, the Philadelphia Missionary Council, despite its theoretical separateness from A.I.M. was also a center of power. It was instrumental in the founding of A.I.M., controlled the flow of money and personnel, handled the

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3"Excerpts: Minutes First Council of A.I.M. [1895-1901]," compiled 19 October 1942, BGC,12,45.

4*H&D (January 1896): 5, 8.

5"First Council," BGC,12,45.

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Mission's publicity, had a role in the discipline of missionaries, and approved the formation of a "British-Australian" council to represent A.I.M. in those countries. Furthermore, Peter Cameron Scott had planned to return to the United States "to consult with the council", a plan interrupted by his death and carried out by his sister, Margaret. The P.M.C. demonstrated that it would not hesitate to use its power should a mission adopt policies with which it could not agree, when in 1897 it decided to discontinue representing the Central American Industrial Mission. Though the P.M.C. referred to itself as A.I.M.'s "Home Council" and offered its opinion about the life-style of A.I.M. missionaries, it maintained the principle of field-government and does not appear to have attempted to exert its power while Scott was superintendent.

The reason for this was partly because no conflict emerged between the P.M.C. and the Mission during this time, but also because the real power was held by the charismatic leader, Peter Cameron Scott. Scott's dynamic and magnetic personality comes through clearly in the early pages of Hearing and Doing. Right from the beginning, it was the experience and "burden" of the founder that gave

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6H&D 1 (January 1896): 5.

7On 21 January 1897 the P.M.C. unanimously accepted the recommendation from Scott that Willis Hotchkiss not be returned to Africa and not be permitted to represent the Mission in deputation without further authorization from Scott ("First Council," BGC, 12, 45).

8"First Council," BGC, 12, 45.

9H&D (February 1897): 5.

10H&D (March 1897): 11.

11H&D (July 1897): 8. The P.M.C. had formed as similar relationship with the C.A.I.M. as it had established with A.I.M.

12H&D (January 1896): 5; and (March 1896): 5.

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credibility to the new mission.13 As the chief spokesman for the Mission,14 Scott's writings fill the pages of *Hearing and Doing*. With no obvious attempt to magnify his own role, he was portrayed unquestioningly as the leader and hub of mission activity,15 disciplining missionaries16 and representing A.I.M. to African peoples, government officials, the P.M.C., and the Christian public in the United States and Great Britain.17 All of this Scott apparently did entirely upon his own discretion without reference to any other council or governing body of missionaries on the field. In fact, it was likely that some of the missionaries complained to the P.M.C. that they had no part in the decision making process of the Mission, for after Scott's death, the P.M.C. assigned Charles Hurlburt to draw up a constitution for A.I.M. with provision for a Field Council.18

Scott's crucial role in the fledgling mission was demonstrated conclusively by his death in December 1896, which *Hearing and Doing* described as "a bolt from a cloudless sky."19 His life and death were held up as a prime example of Keswick piety and example of self-sacrifice to motivate both the missionaries on the field and the

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14 Of the seventeen letters and articles written by seven different A.I.M. missionaries which appeared in *Hearing and Doing* from January 1896 through February 1897, Scott wrote nine. The others wrote only one or two a piece.

15 *H&D* (February 1896): 4-5; (April 1896): 5-6; (Supplement to April 1896): 1-10; (September 1896): 1-4; and (January 1897): 5.

16 Scott sent Miss Bertha Reckling home for unspecified reasons (*H&D* April 1896): 6; and (January 1897): 9) and recommended that Willis Hotchkiss not be returned to the field or represent A.I.M. in the United States ("First Council," BGC, 12, 45).

17 *H&D* (Supplement to April 1896): 11-12; (May 1896): 4-5; (July 1896): 4-6; (August 1896): 3-4; (January 1897): 6-8; and (February 1897): 5.

18 "First Council," BGC, 12, 45.

19 *H&D* (February 1897): 8.

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Christians at home. Missionary Thomas Allan characterized Scott's death as a crippling attack as the Mission began to disintegrate. During the next 15 months all but one of the remaining 14 missionaries had either died or left the field.

FIELD-GOVERNED MISSION UNDER CHARLES HURLBURT

1. A.I.M. Under the 1897 Constitution

With the death of Scott, the field government of A.I.M. collapsed, and the Philadelphia Missionary Council was all too ready to fill in the gap. Upon hearing of Scott's death, the P.M.C. assigned Charles Hurlburt to draw up a constitution for A.I.M. Ten days later they adopted Hurlburt's draft and appointed him Director of A.I.M. These moves were apparently taken without reference to the missionaries on the field, and this assumption of power by the P.M.C. may have precipitated some of the resignations that the Mission experienced at this time.

20H&D (March 1897): 2-11; and (August-September 1897): 12.

21H&D (August-September 1897): 12.

22H&D (May 1897): 7-8; (November 1897): 8; (December 1897): 6-7; (April 1898): 7; (May 1898): 5-7; (June 1898): 5-7; and (September 1898): 6-7.

No mention was made of Lester Severn, but there was no longer any mention of him after December 1897, and his name dropped out of the AIM directory in April 1898 (H&D (April 1898): 8).

An indication of Scott's dominate position within A.I.M. appeared as a post script to the disaster of his death and the defections that followed it. When the Scott family left A.I.M., they took, with the approval of the donors, the entire Mission treasury with them to use to establish themselves in their new life, leaving A.I.M. $1800 in debt to the traders in Mombasa (H&D (December 1897): 6). Apparently, A.I.M. was so identified with the person of Peter Cameron Scott, that to the donors there was no difference between a gift to A.I.M. as a mission or to Scott personally.

23"First Council," BGC, 12, 45; and H&D (March 1897): 11.

24Given the state of communications at the time, there would have been no time for the P.M.C. to have consulted with the missionaries on the field before they took these actions. Furthermore, Margaret Scott was already on her way home to "consult" with the P.M.C., but the council did not meet with her until after they had taken these actions. A letter that Charles

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Hurlburt's constitution established a simple organizational structure. The Mission was to be governed by four officers, a Director, Superintendent, Corresponding Secretary, and Treasurer. Together, these officers comprised the Field Council.\(^2\)\(^5\) However, despite its simplicity, it contained a number of ambiguities.

Ostensibly it preserved the principle of field-government for it implied that only the missionaries themselves were members of the mission,\(^2\)\(^6\) and it maintained the organizational distinction between A.I.M. and the P.M.C.\(^2\)\(^7\) At the same time it

Johnston wrote years later indicated that the assumption of power by the P.M.C. and Hurlburt were a factor in the resignation of Margaret Scott and Walter Wilson, perhaps others as well. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that Mrs. Whittemore, a wealthy supporter and close friend of the Scotts, also resigned from the P.M.C. at this time ("First Council," BGC,12,45).

\(^2\)\(^5\)A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article V, Section 1, KBA: General Council. An ambiguity existed in the original draft. Section 1 of Article V listed only the four officers mentioned above, but Sections 3-7 of the same article, which describes the duties of the officers, includes a "Recording Secretary" in addition to the other four.

\(^2\)\(^6\)A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article IV, Section 1, KBA: General Council.

\(^2\)\(^7\)Ibid., Article VI.
expanded the powers of the P.M.C. The P.M.C. remain the conduit of funds and personnel, and, as a natural corollary to that, it was to receive regular reports from the field. Of greater significance, the P.M.C. now was given the power to approve missionaries, the appointment of the Mission officers and any changes to the constitution.

Furthermore, the differentiation between the roles of Director and of Superintendent was not clear with overlapping responsibilities. It is uncertain whether the Director was to be the overall supervisor of the work based in United States and travelling occasionally to Africa, while the Superintendent was the normal supervisor in Africa, or whether the Director was expected to reside in Africa with the Superintendent as his assistant to act for him in his absence.

One area that was not ambiguous in Hurlburt's constitution was the source of authority. It was never democratic. The P.M.C. drew it up, approved it, and would amend it when necessary. The P.M.C. appointed the officers to serve under this constitution, and vacancies would be filled by the officers themselves with the approval of the P.M.C. Furthermore, the constitution provided for a strong Director.


30 *Ibid.*, Article IV, Section 1, Article V, Section 1, and, Article VIII.

31 Both were members of the Field Council, and either had the power to act when the Field Council could not meet or decide on a course of action. The Director was given the "general supervision" of all Mission "departments", field administration, representation of A.I.M. in "other lands", and expansion of the work in Africa. "When on the field", he had "immediate supervision of all the work." At the same time the Superintendent was to "outline the work" to stations and missionaries, settle disagreements among missionaries, "be the business agent of the Mission" and take charge of the expansion of the work in Africa. "In the absence of the Director" the Superintendent was to "be Chairman of the Field Council, with authority over the field administration (A.I.M. Constitution), [1897], Article V, Sections 1-4, Article VI, KBA: General Council).

32 A.I.M. Constitution] [1897], Article V, Section 1, KBA: General Council.

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Not only was he responsible for all areas of the Mission work, but he also enjoyed great freedom of action vis-a-vis the Field Council, which nominally conducted the business of the Mission. The missionaries had no say in how they would be governed, in who would govern them, or in the policies or decisions that would be made. The only hint of democracy within the Mission was the right of the missionaries to express their preferences in work assignment with appeal to the Field Council, and the provision that the missionaries could meet "for promotion of spiritual life, and encouragement of the missionaries, and for the unifying of the work."35

Despite the assumption of power by the P.M.C. and Hurlburt's authoritarian constitution, those missionaries who remained with A.I.M. after Scott's death accepted the changes and looked to the P.M.C. and Hurlburt to provide leadership and direction for the Mission. Thomas Allan spoke for them all when he wrote: "We trust that Mr. Hurlburt, or one of the council is coming out soon, as his presence here is absolutely necessary to a true understanding of the work, - this we all feel [is] desirable."36

At first it appeared that Hurlburt would be a Director resident in the United States. In this role of Director, Hurlburt went to Kenya in 1898 for six-month "tour of inspection and organization"37 that would better enable him to represent the work.38 In

33 The Director was able to act when the Council could not meet and decide when the Council was deadlocked. The Council, on the other hand, required a unanimous vote to fill vacancies in its own ranks or take action in the absence of the Director (A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article V, Sections 1-2, KBA: General Council.

34 A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VI, KBA: General Council.

35 Ibid., Article VII.


37 H&D (October 1898): 7.

38 H&D (September 1898): 12.
April 1900 the P.M.C. appointed Lester Severn to serve as Superintendent on the field. No sooner had Severn been appointed than it began to become apparent that the arrangement would not work. By September Hurlburt was already showing doubts in Severn's leadership, and in December Severn resigned. A year later Hurlburt was on the field with his family and a party of new missionaries. This was a highly significant move in the history of A.I.M. for it greatly strengthened both the field-governance of the Mission and the role of the Director, who could now personally supervise the field in detail. Almost immediately Hurlburt had the constitution amended to eliminate the office of Superintendent, and provide some democracy by permitting the missionaries, in their Annual Field Conference, to approve the appointment of officers to the Field Council.

39 "First Council," BGC,12,45.

40 Hurlburt to "Sister," 26 September 1900, BGC,26,3.

41 "First Council," BGC,12,45.

42 H&D (November 1901): 6; and (December 1901): 3-5.

43 This was seen to be a significant move by later missionaries. When I was a new missionary on the field in 1972, I remember old timers chuckling about how clever Hurlburt had been to "hijack" the government of the Mission by moving out to the field away from the oversight of the Home Council, and in this way turning A.I.M. from a home-governed to a field-governed mission. Charles Johnston apparently was not in favor of Hurlburt's move, perhaps because he feared the authoritarian rule of a powerful Director whose supervision was too close, or, more likely, he thought that Hurlburt was better used building a constituency for the Mission in the United States. On Johnston's "opposition" to Hurlburt's move to the field see Hurlburt to Johnston, 19 June 1914, BGC,22,8, and on Johnston's concern for the building of a constituency in the United States see Johnston to Adams, 16 January 1905, BGC,22,8.

44 These changes are penciled into the copy of the 1897 constitution in the A.I.M. Kenya Branch Archives (A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], KBA: General Council). Presumably these are the constitutional revisions that Hurlburt reported at the business meeting of the 1903 Annual Field Conference had been passed in the "previous meeting" [i.e. the business meeting of the 1902 Annual Field Conference] and had been approved by the American Home Council [the P.M.C.] ("Minutes of Annual Business Session [of the Annual Kenya Field Conference]," 11 September [1903], (handwritten), KBA: Conference 1907). These minutes are undated and appear in the folder for the 1907 Annual Field Conference suggesting that they were the
These changes set up four centers of power within the mission: the Director, the Field Council, the Annual Field Conference, and the American Home Council, as the P.M.C. was coming to be called. The relationship between these bodies was not always clear.

The power of the Director was obvious. His writings and actions dominated the pages of Hearing and Doing. He intervened in the candidate process of the A.H.C. and dissolved the British Home Council, reorganizing its work. The Field Council continued to make policy, suggest constitutional amendments, assign work, and evaluate the missionaries' suitability to remain on the field.

The surprising development was the authority that the Annual Field Conference assumed. Here all of the missionaries on the field gathered in the business minutes for the business meeting of the 1907 conference. However, they have undoubtedly been misfiled. The dates of the 1907 conference were 17-22 September with the "Business Session" scheduled for the afternoon of the 21st, so these minutes, dated 11 September, could not have been for a business meeting held during the 1907 conference ("Tentative Program. Missionary Conference at Kijabe, B. E. A., Sept. 17-22, 1907," KBA: Conference 1907). Since Stauffacher was listed in the "Directory" in H&D as the treasurer beginning in 1903, it is likely that these minutes, which record Stauffacher's election to this position, are of the business meeting held during the 1903 conference. Furthermore, the five new missionaries who are recorded to have signed the constitution during the business meeting all came out in 1903 (H&D (October 1903): 24).

45Hurlburt to Work, 18 May 1908, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence.

46Hurlburt to Verner, 18 May 1908, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence.

Perhaps the most telling comment on the influence of the Director was made by John Reibe in the opening of his article on the 1908 Annual Field Conference: "The first missionary conference under the auspices of the Africa Inland Mission without the impress of our honored Director's strong personality, has just closed" (John R. Reibe "Annual Field Conference," H&D (January-March 1909): 3).

47"Field Council Minutes," 17 September 1907, KBA: General Council.

48"Field Council Minutes," 16 September 1907, KBA: General Council.

49Adams to Work, 22 July 1908, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence.

50Ibid.

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meeting to discuss the affairs of the Mission. The Annual Conference appears to have assumed the power to review the decisions of the Field Council. In 1902 it approved certain constitutional revisions, and in 1903 it "approved" the minutes of the Field Council meetings and "elected" John Stauffacher to the Field Council subject to A.H.C. approval. The 1907 conference approved the vacation policy passed by the Field Council and three constitutional amendments proposed by the Field Council. How firm this authority was and the extent to which it included the right to initiate policy is unclear. In 1908 the Conference passed a series of policies governing the baptism of African converts. It is uncertain whether or not these policies also had to be approved by the Field Council, for the same Conference asked the Field Council to permit missionary furloughs after five years instead after eight.

The A.H.C. exercised its powers of approving new missionaries, Mission officers and constitutional amendments. At this time, however, two issues emerged that were to become something of a struggle between home and field. The first concerned the administration of finances and appeared in a letter from the business

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51"Minutes of Annual Business Session [of the Annual Kenya Field Conference]," 11 September [1903], (handwritten), KBA: Conference. Though the secretary wrote that the Conference "approved the Field Council minutes, it is not certain whether he meant that in the sense of a body with greater authority approving the minutes, therefore the actions, of a body with less authority, or if he merely meant that the Conference had "received" the minutes, that is were notified of the actions of another body equal to or greater than themselves. Furthermore the secretary wrote that the Conference "elected" John Stauffacher to the Field Council, implying that the initiative to choose Field Council members had fallen to the Conference, when the Constitution specified that the Field Council filled its own vacancies with the approval of the Annual Conference and Home Council. The relationship between the Annual Conference and the Field Council appears to have become ambiguous because the Annual Conference assumed powers that were not specified in the Constitution. Its decision making power could only be inferred from its power to approve Field Council appointments and the provision for the missionaries to meet "for the unifying of the work" (A.I.M. Constitution, 1897], Article V, Section 1 (pencilled in change), Article VII, KBA: General Council.


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manager of the home office to John Stauffacher, the new field treasurer, expressing frustration over inadequate financial reports.\textsuperscript{54} The second issue concerned the acceptance of missionary candidates. Assuming that the United States would be the only source of missionary recruits, the constitution stated that members of A.I.M. were only those who had been approved by the P.M.C.\textsuperscript{55} However, when a Home Council was establish in Great Britain to accept British missionaries and the possibility existed for accepting missionaries already on the field,\textsuperscript{56} some missionaries began to argue that the constitution should be amended to limit the A.H.C. to the approval of candidates from North America.\textsuperscript{57}

2. A.I.M. Under the 1909 Constitution

Before the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, three developments: the decision to form a British Home Council, the attempt by A.I.M. to absorb into its structure other small missions in Kenya, and the opening of a new field in German East Africa, had conspired to make the 1897 constitution out of date. To meet these new conditions the Mission adopted a new constitution in 1909. A General Council on the field was responsible for the overall work of the Mission and constituted the final authority.\textsuperscript{58} Each country into which A.I.M. entered would

\textsuperscript{54}Ross to Stauffacher, 9 April 1904, KBA: FC-83.

\textsuperscript{55}A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article IV, Section 1, KBA: General Council.

\textsuperscript{56}At first the A.H.C. approved missionaries recruited on the field at the recommendation of the missionaries, whether by the Field Council or Annual Conference is unclear. "Annual Business Session," 11 September [1903], KBA: Conference 1907 reported that the A.H.C. had approved the acceptance of Miss Julia McClary on the field.

\textsuperscript{57}Riebe to Adams, 16 July 1907, KBA: Conference 1907.

\textsuperscript{58}A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article V, Sections 1-11, Article VI, Section 6, KBA: General Council. The General Council was composed of a General Director, Deputy Director, Field Directors, Extension Director, Secretary, Treasurer, Recording Secretary, and two representatives of each Field Committee.
constitute a Field and be divided into Districts. Beneath the General Council and over the missionaries in each country was a Field Committee, which was responsible to administer the work in its territory. The existence of more than one Home Council was recognized by making plural the references to the Home Councils' powers. Non-A.I.M. missions working within A.I.M. on the field were accommodated by recognizing each one as a field "District" with representation on the Field Committee and by providing safeguards concerning their property.

First of all, the new constitution strengthened A.I.M. as a field-governed mission. The power of the General Council to accept missionaries on the field and

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59Ibid., Article VII. The Field Committee was composed of the Field Director and District Superintendents.

60Ibid., Article IV, Section 1, Article V, Sections 1 and 12, Article IX, Section 7, Article XII. The powers of the home councils remained the same as in the 1897 constitution with the addition that the home councils had to approve whatever "additional rules and by-laws the General Council might make" (Article V, Section 12).

61Ibid., Article V, Section 5, Article VII, Section 1.

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dispense Mission money constituted an erosion of the power of the A.H.C.\textsuperscript{62} Furthermore, the A.H.C. had to share its power of appointment with other Home Councils.\textsuperscript{63}

Secondly, the authoritarian structure of A.I.M. was strengthened. Following the pattern of the previous constitution, all of the officers of the Mission, with the exception of the District Superintendents, had to be approved by the Home Councils.\textsuperscript{64} The General Council was the only policy making body on the field,\textsuperscript{65} whereas the elected Field Committees and the Annual Field Conferences each had only administrative and discussion powers respectively. The General Council directly administered policy that involved co-operation with other missions and policy that affected the whole Mission, and closely supervised the work of the Field Committees.\textsuperscript{66} Tremendous power was also concentrated in the hands of the General Director, who was chairman of the General Council and Field Committees, and \textit{ex officio} member of all other committees. His signature was required on all Mission documents, his approval was required for the disposal of all Mission property, and all other officers, including the Home Directors, effectively functioned as his assistants.\textsuperscript{67}

Finally, a small measure of democracy was permitted. The missionaries elected

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., Article IV, Section 1, Article V, Sections 3-11, Article VI, Section 6, Article VII, Section 4.

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., Article V, Section 1.

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{65}The authority relationship between the General Council and the American Home Council was ambiguous because the Mission was still attempting to operate on the assumption that the A.H.C. and A.I.M. were separate organizations, neither exercising authority over the other. In practice they functioned as two branches of the same organization, and the powers and policies of each impinged on the other.

\textsuperscript{66}A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article V, Sections 6, 7, 10, Article VI, Section 6, Article VII, Sections 4, 5, 8, KBA: General Council.

\textsuperscript{67}Ibid., Article VI, Sections 1-8, Article IX, Section 9.
their District Superintendents, who functioned as both their immediate supervisors and as their representatives on the Field Committees.68 The Field Committees elected two representatives each to the General Council.69 The Annual Field Conference business meetings were officially sanctioned,70 but beyond the discussion of proposed Mission rules and by-laws71 the parameters of the business meetings were not enumerated.

This constitution marked the triumph of the field-governed mission concept in A.I.M. If there was any doubt as to where the authority lay within in the Mission, it was dispelled the following year, when the General Council dispatched Charles Hurlburt to the United States with the mandate to reorganize the American Home Council.72 On one level this dispute was about the missionaries' insistence that the home office run on the Faith Basis,73 and the home office complaint that the field administration was incompetent and unresponsive.74 On a deeper level the dispute was about who should run the Mission: the missionaries or the A.H.C.

Initially the A.H.C.'s main concern was to avoid domination by the General Council. At a meeting between Hurlburt and the A.H.C., the Council members argued "that independence of administration - both home and foreign - ... were essential."75

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68Ibid., Article VII, Section 2, Article VIII, Sections 1-2.
69Ibid., Article V, Section 2.
70Ibid., Article XI, Section 3.
71Ibid., Article V, Section 12.
72Riebe to Adams, 22 April 1910, KBA: General Council.
73See above Chapter 3, pp.101-102.
75Ibid.
The defense of the Home Council, however, was only the immediate position. Many of the A.H.C. members really favored a home-governed mission with some expressing the belief that the Home Council should have veto power over the decisions and policies of the field.76

Hurlburt won this round from a reluctant and not fully convinced A.H.C., and he proceeded to appoint new workers for the home office and a new American Home Council.77 A constitution was drawn up for the A.H.C. which attempted to establish A.I.M. and the A.H.C. as two separate but parallel bodies, equal in authority and balanced in power, predicated on the idea that the work of each was distinct but interdependent.78 Skirmishing continued between the General Council and the A.H.C. over details,79 but it looked as if Hurlburt had been successful in establishing A.I.M. as a field-governed mission, supported by a strong, separate though interrelated Home Council in North America.

3. A.I.M. Under the 1912 Constitution

Hurlburt's apparent victory was short-lived. For reasons that are not at all

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76Ibid. While most A.H.C. members were not yet willing to state this opinion openly, their other arguments revealed that they all assumed that the Home Council should have authority over the field. Most agreed that it was not wise to "delegate" the power to appoint Home Councils to the field. Another member argued that the Home Council's control of the flow of funds and personnel gave it the right to self-government, free from interference from the field. Using this argument, it was only a short step from the independence of the Home Council to dominance by the Home Council.

77Hurlburt to General Council, 7 January 1911; and Hurlburt to "Brother", 12 January, 1911, KBA: General Council. These letters spoke of Hurlburt appointing an Executive Council and Advisory Council. At this time these two bodies made up the A.H.C.

78Compare the A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article V, Section 1, Article XII, KBA: General Council with the "Constitution of American Council of Africa Inland Mission," n.d. [1911], Article III, Sections 2, 4, Article VIII, KBA: General Council.

79See Riebe to Hurlburt, 16 June 1911; and Palmer to General Council, 23 August 1911, KBA: General Council.
clear, the field-governed principle was abruptly discarded in 1912, and A.I.M. was converted into a home-governed mission. The proposed constitution for the A.H.C. was never adopted. Instead A.I.M.'s 1909 constitution was replaced by a new constitution, which ended the supposed organizational distinction between A.I.M. and the A.H.C. and united the two.\textsuperscript{80} The General Council was discontinued and the Mission was governed by Home Councils and Field Councils.\textsuperscript{81} The Home Councils\textsuperscript{82} had sole power to accept candidates,\textsuperscript{83} full financial control,\textsuperscript{84} final authority in the discipline of missionaries,\textsuperscript{85} the approval of field officers,\textsuperscript{86} and the right to veto actions of the Field Councils.\textsuperscript{87} The Field Councils were chiefly administrative bodies with limited policy making powers.\textsuperscript{88}

The authority structure continued to be from the top down. The A.H.C. appointed the General Director, who in turn appointed the Field Directors, who in their turn appointed the other Field officers, all subject to Home Council approval.\textsuperscript{89} Power remained concentrated in the hands of the General Director who was the

\textsuperscript{80}A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article V, Section 1, BGC,11,11; KBA,17,6.

\textsuperscript{81}Ibid., Article VI, Section 1.

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., Article VI, Section 2. The Home Councils were composed of Executive Members, which included the General Director and Home Director, and Advisory Members.

\textsuperscript{83}Ibid., Article V, Sections 1, 3, Article VIII, Section 3.

\textsuperscript{84}Ibid., Article VII, Section 5, Article VIII, Sections 2, 9, Article XI, Sections, 10, 11.

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid., Article VIII, Section 6.

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., Article VII, Section 6, Article X, Sections, 2, 4.

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., Article VIII, Section 7, Article IX, Sections 3, 4.

\textsuperscript{88}Ibid., Article IX, Sections 2-4. The Field Councils were composed of the General Director, Field Director, Secretary, Treasurer, District Superintendents, and Assistant District Superintendents.

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid., Article VII, Section 6, Article X, Section 4.

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The General Director was not structurally over the whole Mission, but due to his position on each council, he provided unity and coordination throughout the Mission. The British Home Council supplied personnel and funds, but had no authority over any work on the Field.

executive officer of all the Home and Field Councils responsible for all Mission work at home and on the field. The Home and Field Directors were appointed by him to be his assistants. The constitutional provision for the Annual Field Conference with its business meeting was removed, though the number of elected members of the Field Councils was doubled.

The greatest problem for this constitution was how the work could be directed by several different Home Councils and administered by a number of different Field Councils and not break down under conflicting lines of authority. It attempted to avoid this in three ways. First, the unifying force within A.I.M. was the General Director, who as a member of all Home and Field Councils, could provide communication between them and work for coordination of policy among them.

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Responsible to supervise all A.I.M. work, he was also in a position to coordinate the implementation of that policy. Secondly, the constitution provided that each Field would be supervised by only one Home Council at a time, the one that established the field and maintained the greatest number of missionaries in the field.92 Third, the A.H.C. was given a prominent place over the other Home Councils. The A.H.C. appointed the General Director, with the approval of the other Home Councils, and had "charge of all the central work of the Mission at Kijabe." Most importantly, as the first and largest branch of A.I.M., the A.H.C. initiated the work in most of the territories that the Mission entered and supplied the greatest number of missionaries in each one, thus winning the right to supervise the work on all of A.I.M.'s Fields. In this way the A.H.C. dominated the Mission and kept the other Home Councils93 as little more than conduits of funds and personnel into an American mission with little or no say in the policies and administration of the Mission.

Though not all tensions were resolved,94 the 1912 constitution appears to have achieved sufficient utility and balance of power to enable A.I.M. to function reasonably well for the next ten years, during which time it established a new Home Council in Australia and new Fields in the Belgian Congo and Uganda, and occasional efforts were made to change the balance of power.

4. A.I.M. Under the 1922 Constitution

Hurlburt continued trying to restore power to the field in A.I.M. by diffusing the power of the A.H.C. and by creating centralized field structures. Beginning in

92Ibid., Article XI, Section 16.

93This primarily affected the British, for though at different times A.I.M. had Home Councils in Australia, France, and South Africa, for the most part the only Home Councils of significant size were the American and British Councils.

94We will examine these in more detail when we look at the events leading up to the crisis of Hurlburt's resignation in 1925.

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1911 the A.H.C. had begun to establish District Committees in different American
cities for the purpose of publicizing the work of A.I.M. and recruiting missionary
candidates. Hurlburt seems to have been so pleased with the success of these
committees that in 1917 he proposed that the Pacific Coast Council in Los Angeles be
given additional powers that would make it virtually a Home Council for the western
United States, possibly as a counter balance to the power of the A.H.C., recently
moved from Philadelphia to New York. The A.H.C., however, ignored Hurlburt's
proposal.

In 1920 Hurlburt persuaded the Home Councils to approve the creation of a
Central Executive Committee on the field and to permit him to appoint an Associate
General Director and four Deputy General Directors to act as his personal agents.
These changes corrected a weakness of the 1912 constitution by providing for the
overall coordination of all the work in Africa, and the shifted power back toward the
field. However, they also increased the authoritarian structure of the Mission by

95Between 1911 and 1915 District Committees were established in Los Angeles
(Hurlburt to Downing and General Council, 19 August 1911, KBA: General Council), New
York (Hurlburt to Downing, 30 December 1913, KBA: FC-76), and Chicago (Chicago District
Committee, 29 January 1915, BGC,2,87). For example of the publicity and recruiting work of a
District Committee see: "Report of the Rally of this Mission [A.I.M.]," 6 December 1915,
BGC,2,87.

96Hurlburt to Youngken, 14 June 1917, BGC,12,46. Also see Hurlburt to the
Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

97The Los Angeles District Committee remained loyal to Hurlburt throughout the crisis
that erupted over his resignation in 1925 and during the years that followed.

98IA (November 1917): 15.

99Hurlburt refers to the permission to appoint the Associate and Deputy General
Directors in a letter to Lee Downing that already has the address to the Central Executive
Council in the letterhead (Hurlburt to Downing, 2 November 1920, KBA: FC-76). The
following year missionaries were already appealing to the Central Executive Council (Unsigned
letter to Morris and Hurlburt, 11 August 1921, KBA,4,Hurlburt 1.) Cope sees this change as
having occurred as early as 1918 (Thomas Herbert Cope, "The Africa Inland Mission in Kenya:

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plac[ing an additional administrative layer between the Field Councils and the Home Councils and increasing centralization on the field. Furthermore, the roles and authority of the Associate and Deputy General Directors had the potential of conflicting with that of the Home and Field Directors.

These last changes were incorporated into the 1922 constitution,\textsuperscript{100} which was the final revision of the constitution while Hurlburt was General Director. But this constitution was no more successful than its predecessors in resolving A.I.M.'s three basic tensions: the balance of power between field and home, the balance between vigorous leadership from above and missionary participation from below, and the balance of power among the various Home Councils. These tensions continued to build until they exploded in the Hurlburt controversy of 1925.

\textsuperscript{100}A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Article V, Section I, Article VI, Article IX, Section I, Article X, Sections 1-4, Article XI, Sections 1-5, Article XII, Sections 1-3, Article XIII, Sections 1, 6, Article XIV Sections 1, 4, BGC,11,11.

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THE HURLBURT CONTROVERSY

1. Hurlburt’s Greatness

A constitution is only a skeleton, the structure of an organization. Human leadership is the animating soul. A.I.M.’s constitutional development failed to resolve the basic tensions within the Mission’s organizational structure that resulted in the explosion in 1925. That failure was also the failure of human leadership. Most notably it was the failure of the Mission’s General Director, Charles Hurlburt, and secondarily it was the failure of Henry Campbell, the General Secretary of the American Home Council and the other council members.

Charles Hurlburt was a truly great man. When examining his failure in governing A.I.M., it must be borne in mind that this was the failure of not a small or petty man, but of a great man. When he assumed leadership of A.I.M. from the shambles of Peter Cameron Scott’s death, the Mission had been reduced to one missionary on one station struggling desperately to survive a crippling debt and a devastating famine. Twenty-five years later the Mission Hurlburt led had 150 missionaries on 44 mission stations in three countries, 5 mission hospitals, 4,752 converts in 25 African congregations led over by 452 African religious workers, and 317 schools with 5,666 pupils.101 While accomplishing this, Hurlburt proved himself to be a great missionary statesman, ecumenical pioneer and diplomat.102

Hurlburt was also a Christian of great piety capable of great affection, humility, gentleness, and understanding.103 E. A. Marshall, missions teacher at Moody


102 Some evidence of this is found in the pages of this thesis, but also see Cope, pp. 63-70.

Bible Institute, called Hurlburt "a man of prayer and power", 104 words of high praise among those who adhered to Keswick piety. His success as a missions promoter and recruiter for A.I.M. lay not in an appeal to the novel or sensational, but to the deepest religious motives of his audience. One who had often heard Hurlburt speak left this description:

With eager anticipation we waited to hear of Africa's customs, tribal systems, and be given a statistical survey of the vast areas which Mr. Hurlburt was to represent. Instead we were brought into close touch with the Lord of the Harvest. We heard the beat of His loving heart for the lost; our eyes were uplifted to see "fields white unto harvest" and the appeal was for labourers who counted not their lives dear unto themselves, and who had entered into fellowship with Him Who said, "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold: them also I must bring." 105

Acclaim was heaped on Hurlburt from many diverse and sometimes unlikely sources. Frank Weston, the U.M.C.A. Bishop of Zanzibar who had wrecked the ecumenical hopes of the 1913 Kikuyu Conference, stood in many respects at the opposite end of the ecclesiastical spectrum from Hurlburt. Yet, according to his biographer, at the 1918 Kikuyu Conference Weston found himself more attracted to A.I.M.'s General Director than to his fellow bishops in the C.M.S. 106 Theodore Roosevelt, wealthy patrician, military commander, and former president of the United States, had met most of the world leaders of his day, and on his 1908 African safari, he most certainly met the greatest leaders the continent could offer. Out of them all, Roosevelt said that he "considered Hurlburt to be the greatest man he had met in

see the portrait of Hurlburt portrayed in the pages of John Stauffacher's biographies: Gladys Stauffacher, Faster Beats the Drum (Pearl River, N.Y.: Africa Inland Mission, 1978) and Josephine Hope Westervelt, On Safari for God: An Account of the Life and Labors of John Stauffacher a Pioneer Missionary of the Africa Inland Mission (Publisher not named, n.d.).


105 Quoted in Richardson, p. 448-49.


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The article in *Inland Africa* announcing Hurlburt's death summed up his life:

Missionaries of numerous societies, as well as British officials in East Africa, have found in him a father in God, a wise counsellor, a giant in spiritual things, and one who was always ready to give his whole life to help anyone in need.  

2. Hurlburt's Weakness

Though Hurlburt was a great man, he was also a flawed man, who was unable to resolve the basic tensions within the Mission. To accomplish what Hurlburt accomplished and to forge a diverse group of highly independent and strong-willed individualists into a cohesive organization working towards a common goal, a leader must possess a powerful will and a tremendous sense of the rightness of his own beliefs and decisions. However, these very qualities that enabled Hurlburt to achieve success ultimately lead to his personal failure and nearly to the destruction of the organization he had worked so hard to create.

That Hurlburt was extremely strong-willed was evidenced in his nickname. He was affectionately known as "Bwana", the Kiswahili for "master", by the missionaries. That this nickname was related to his strong will was indicated by the comment a sorrowing friend made concerning Hurlburt's actions at the height of the Hurlburt Controversy: "Poor Bwana and his indomitable will!"

Being strong-willed did not mean that Hurlburt could not be solicitous to the desires of others. Hurlburt asked Andrew Andersen to take charge of the industrial

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107 Cope, p. 70.

108 IA (March-April 1936) quoted in Cope, p. 92. The same could have been said by many African converts as well, though the paternalism and ethnocentrism of the day caused it to be neglected by the writer of the article.

109 Richardson, p. 43.

110 McKenrick to Campbell, 10 February 1926, BGC,22,27.

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school at Kijabe, but when Andersen asked to be released from that work and assigned elsewhere, Hurlburt agreed, despite the great need at the industrial school and Hurlburt's personal belief in its importance.

But Hurlburt could also be authoritarian and domineering. This was seen in some of his actions towards the home councils, bodies that had at least theoretical authority over him. When necessary he abolished home councils and appointed new ones. Something of his attitude was indicated by the tone that Hurlburt used in his letters to the home councils. Reminding the American and British councils that General Funds were to be used to pay missionaries' allowances before sending out new missionaries, Hurlburt wrote: "Recent letters bring to my attention a matter which I had but supposed until now, was clearly understood by you." He concluded in the manner of a supervisor lecturing a very stupid subordinate: "If I have not made these matters perfectly clear, please be good enough to write me fully stating what points you want made clear." A similar attitude was expressed in other letters. Writing to announce Lee Downing's appointment as Deputy General Director, Hurlburt explained that the appointment was solely at his good pleasure, and should Hurlburt suddenly want to strip Downing of the office, Downing should not take it

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111 Dinwiddie to Andersen, 2 March 1917; and Hurlburt to Andersen, 26 June 1917, BGC,19,4.

112 Andersen to Dinwiddie, 24 October 1917; and Dinwiddie to Andersen, 26 December 1917, BGC,19,4.

113 See above pp. 132, 137-139.

114 Hurlburt to Executive & District Councils, England and America, 2 August 1915, BGC,6,72.

115 Ibid. In another letter to the members of the A.H.C. and of the District Committees, Hurlburt strongly outlined the immediate and future financial needs of the Mission, and then, condescendingly quoted to them from Mission documents the relevant passages that established their duty to pray for the needs of the mission (Hurlburt to the Executive, Advisory, District, Councilors of the AIM, 14 August 1917, BGC,12,46).

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personally for "the interests of the Mission must stand above all thought of any personal preferment."116

Hurlburt's domineering style was probably not always authoritarian, i.e. a deliberate exercise of the authority of his office, but often simply the force of his strong personality and considerable powers of persuasion. When a committee had to decide whether to rebuild or renovate the school for the missionaries' children, those who disagreed with Hurlburt sought to discuss the issue with the contractor alone, without Hurlburt's persuasive presence.117 When defending himself from the charge of being "dictatorial", Hurlburt argued that "his influence depended upon his being right and giving information to men which would enable them to see that his position was right."118 By power of persuasion and force of personality, Hurlburt appears to have been able to "enable" the decision making bodies in A.I.M. "to see that his position was right" far more often than anyone else in the Mission.

While his strong will often led Hurlburt to be authoritarian and domineering, his intense sense of right made it difficult for him to accept criticism and sometimes lead to self-justification. When criticized in 1911 for mismanaging the mission finances, Hurlburt did not even assume nominal responsibility. Rather he complained that "there seems a tendency to throw the blame ... wholly upon the General Director," and proceeded in a highly defensive manner upon a long involved explanation to justify himself.119

116Hurlburt to Downing, 2 November 1920, KBA: FC-76. In a another letter to Downing on Kenya Field matters, Hurlburt commented: "We almost need each other ... I need your knowledge of facts in the case and you perhaps would be helped by my big-stick [sic]" (Hurlburt to Downing, 11 March 1918, KBA: FC-76).

117Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

118Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

119Hurlburt to Downing and General Council, 19 August 1911, KBA: General Council. During the Johnston controversy, Johnston complained that Hurlburt had not been
Believing firmly in the rightness of one's policies and actions could lead to the belief that disagreement was disloyalty and that those who criticize were enemies. In a circular letter to the Mission body, Hurlburt equated disagreement with opposition and declared the missionaries who could not agree with the Mission should "withdraw and join some more congenial society."\(^1\)

Beyond issues of personality, Hurlburt's authoritarianism led him to an administrative style with serious flaws. First of all, he found it difficult to delegate

\^1\(Hurlburt\) to "Fellow-Member of the A.I.M.," 1 July 1914, BGC, 12, 46, KBA: FC-76. Ten years later, Hurlburt was openly accused of declaring anyone who disagreed with him as being "disloyal to the mission [sic]" (Rhoad to "Brethren", 5 November 1925, KBA: FC-76).

Such warnings, however, may not always have been manipulative tactics. During the Johnston controversy, Hurlburt may have been right when he accused Johnston, of "opposition to the mission" and of being "an enemy of the work" (Hurlburt to Palmer, 3 November 1913, BGC, 22, 8). Furthermore, Hurlburt's warnings that Johnston could not "remain in a mission with which he was not in sympathy" (Hurlburt to Palmer, 23 January 1914, BGC, 22, 8) may have been necessary to prevent the destruction of the organization from internal division.

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either tasks or authority. Too many decisions had to be made by Hurlburt himself, causing frustration when, as was often the case, he was not present to make them. In 1914 Hurlburt had to make long and arduous journeys to deal with matters in German East African and the Congo. In the mean time he left his secretary, Miss Stumpf, and a Mr. Wallace to do the administrative work, but no one was left in charge with any authority. Hurlburt’s style encouraged micromanagement of local station and field matters by overly centralized and distant authorities. Thus, in 1923 when a woman’s grave at Kijabe needed to be moved to allow for the expansion of the industrial school, it could not be handled locally, but Hurlburt had to attend to it himself all the way from the Congo.

Compounding the problem of over centralized management, Hurlburt had difficulty establishing efficient administrative procedures. As early as 1904 the business manager of the A.H.C. was complaining about the inadequate bookkeeping procedures being used on the field. The A.H.C. complained in 1910 about an inadequate flow of information from the field concerning its finances, needs, and

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121 Hurlburt to Downing, 7 February 1914, KBA: FC-76. Two years later a missionary in Kenya expressed alarm that Hurlburt was planning to travel to the United States and not stop at Kijabe, despite a telegram "urging his coming to Kijabe quickly because of urgent pressing affairs requiring his decision. Poor Mr. Hurlburt, called and needed in so many places!" (Collins to Palmer and Young, 18 February 1916, BGC,19,21).

122 Twigg to Hurlburt, 2 December 1923, KBA: FC-76. In 1918 Hurlburt ruled on whether single male and female missionaries should travel together, and on the kinds of conferences of African Christians that should be permitted (Hurlburt to Downing, 11 March 1918, KBA: FC-76). In a 1923 Hurlburt criticized in detail the station work of several Kenya missionaries and intervened directly on the decision to rebuild or renovate Rift Valley Academy (Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76). That same year the Central Executive Council met in the Belgian Congo to review the complaints by the African teachers at Kangundo and determine which requests would be granted and which denied (C. E. Hurlburt, "Notes," 8 August 1923, KBA: FC-76).

123 Ross to Stauffacher, 9 April 1904, KBA: FC-83.

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progress of the work.\textsuperscript{124} Ten years later the American Home Office still complained that the administrative procedures were not able to ensure accurate communication between field and home offices. The home office often had to assume that requests for money for furloughs or to repair mission stations had been authorized and had to handle them on a first come first served basis since the requests were not prioritized.\textsuperscript{125} Weak administrative procedures continued to strain relations within A.I.M. until the day Hurlburt resigned.\textsuperscript{126}

In trying to evaluate the effectiveness of A.I.M.'s governing structures and Hurlburt's leadership, one is struck by two contradictions, one a contradiction of perception and the other a contradiction of personnel. A.I.M. had a highly authoritarian structure, yet Hurlburt firmly believed that A.I.M. provided more individual freedom to its missionaries than any other missionary society in the world. In his 1914 circular letter to the Mission body, he wrote: "In no other mission is there larger individual liberty."\textsuperscript{127} Ten years later, Hurlburt defended himself against the charge of "dictatorial control":

There is no successful missionary leader anywhere in the world who has advocated or secured for the members of his mission a greater personal freedom, or whose mission is more free from arbitrary control on the part of its chief leaders than the A.I.M. Most of the men who have criticized along this line are those whom I have opposed when they sought for the very power

\textsuperscript{124}Tentative Minutes of recent [American Home] Council Meetings, 20-21 October 1910, KBA: General Council. The next year Hurlburt blamed the old field bookkeeping system for several projects going into debt (Hurlburt to Downing and General Council, 19 August 1911, KBA: General Council).

\textsuperscript{125}Unsigned letter to McKenrick, 11 April 1921, BGC,22,27.

\textsuperscript{126}Late in 1924 Orson Palmer, who had just been dismissed as American Home Director, wrote that "weaknesses ...in the methods of administration" were among the things that had strained relations between himself and Hurlburt (Palmer to North American Home Council, 9 October 1924, KBA,4,Hurlburt 1).

\textsuperscript{127}Hurlburt to "Fellow-Member of the A.I.M.," 1 July 1914, BGC,12,46; KBA: FC-76.
which they falsely charge me with using.128

There is evidence that Hurlburt did try and keep missionaries on one station from trying to dominate the work of missionaries on another station or missionaries in one department from trying to take advantage of missionaries in other departments. In 1918, Hurlburt heard an unconfirmed rumor that Herbert Innis wanted to dominate all of the A.I.M. work among the Luo people and wrote:

If he [Innis] does [want such domination], it is of course absolutely wrong. No power can ever be given by which a man on one station shall control the work on another station....

No worker must ever feel when entering a tribe that he is to be a monarch in that tribe and dominate all its work. Each new station must be free as the old ones are.129

Five years later, in response to complaints that the industrial school was charging too much for its services,130 Hurlburt directed his Deputy General Director for Kenya, Fred McKenrick, ensure that money for building projects was used carefully and all departments acted fairly.131

That still leaves the question of how Hurlburt could weld so much power in an authoritarian structured mission and still believe that it provided great personal freedom to its missionaries. Part of the answer lies in the perception of every benevolent despot who sees his rule as ensuring the freedoms and liberties of his people. Part of it also lies in the manner in which the power is exercised. Hurlburt did yield to missionaries' individual preferences in matters of assignment.132 It is also likely

128Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.
129Hurlburt to Downing, 11 March 1918, KBA: FC-76.
130Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.
131Hurlburt to McKenrick, 20 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.
132See above pp. 147. The consideration of missionaries' preferences for assignment was provided for A.I.M.'s constitution (A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VI, Paragraph 1, KBA: General Council; A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article VII, Section 5, KBA: General Council; A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Appendix Article II, Section 7, BGC,11,11).
that Hurlburt misinterpreted benign neglect for personal liberty, and this caused resentment. The Johnston Controversy showed that Johnston and other Ukamba missionaries most certainly felt that they were being neglected by Hurlburt and the Mission and felt frustrated that they could do nothing about it.133 Such feelings may have been at the root of charges of "favoritism" later leveled against Hurlburt.134

The second contradiction was the contradiction of personnel. A.I.M.'s governing structures were highly centralized and authoritarian, where divine guidance was theoretically mediated through the Mission leaders. Yet A.I.M.'s recruiting philosophy and practice seemed designed to recruit highly individualistic missionaries whose guidance came directly from God and who would broke no opposition in following the divine call. To expect such individualists to suddenly change and now submit to hearing God's voice through the authority of a hierarchial structure was perhaps asking too much.135

3. Growing Resentment Against Hurlburt

There was no question that Hurlburt's administrative style generated resentment against him. This was evident in 1911 when members of the General Council objected to the provision in the proposed A.H.C. constitution that included the General Director in the committee to mediated disagreements between the A.H.C. and the General Council.136 In 1912 Dr. Elwood Davis reported that "some

133See above Chapter 3, pp.112-114.
134Campbell to Barnett, 3 February 1926, BGC,19,20; and Campbell to Pierson, 5 February 1926, BGC,21,18.
135See above Chapter 2, pp. 39-45.
136Riebe to Hurlburt, 16 June 1911, KBA: General Council. At the same time Hurlburt came under attack for the allegedly mismanaging the Mission's finances (Hurlburt to Riebe, 19 August 1911, KBA: General Council).
missionaries] are at daggers points, almost, with our General Director. "137 The 
Johnston controversy erupted a year later and revealed deep personal resentment 
towards Hurlburt.138

The years after World War I saw a number of issues emerge and grow. 
Hurlburt's ecumenical policy brought against him the charge that he was "not loyal to 
the evangelical faith".139 Increasing pressures for extending and improving the 
Mission's educational work divided the missionaries on the field and pitted Hurlburt 
against the A.H.C.140

Hurlburt's financial policies increasingly began to clash with both missionaries 
and members of the A.H.C. From 1909 A.I.M. followed the policy of providing 
advanced training to African teachers and evangelists at central stations "to avoid 
needless and costly duplication."141 In 1923 Hurlburt was following this policy when 
he persuaded a donor, who had been planning to finance a Bible school in Ukambani, 
to build the Bible school at Kijabe, the "central station" instead.142 In the process, 
Hurlburt incurred the wrath of Kamba missionaries.143

In 1915 Hurlburt began to pool into one fund all donations designated for the 
support of African teacher-evangelists and African girls' homes. He believed that the 
money could be distributed more equably that way than if each missionary raised

137Davis to Palmer, 6 November 1912, BGC,12,46.

138See above chapter 3, pp. 112-114.

139Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76. See below Chapter 8, p. 369.

140See below Chapter 7, pp. 305-317.

141A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article IX, Section 2, KBA: General Council; A.I.M. 
Constitution, 1912, Article XI, Section 2, BGC,11,11; and A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, 
Appendix Article II, Section 2, BGC,11,11.

142Hurlburt to McKenrick, 20 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

143Farnsworth to Campbell, 20 March 1926; and 12 April 1928, BGC,10,5.

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funds for his own work. Over the next several years this policy came to be ignored as missionaries promoted the work on their own mission stations and donors became accustomed to designating gifts to specific stations and African workers. By 1921 Hurlburt discovered the laxity and firmly reapplied the policy, much to the displeasure of missionaries who thought they had raised money for their own projects or who had desired to do precisely that.

It had also been A.I.M.'s policy to pool undesignated donations in a General Fund from which missionaries, who did not receive enough money in designated donations, would have their allowances paid. When the Mission became international with the establishment of the B.H.C., Hurlburt began to pool the undesignated funds from all of the Home Councils into one General Fund and subsidize the allowances of all under supported missionaries regardless of

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145According to the secretary to the Kenya Field Director, Hilda Stumpf, Hurlburt discovered the laxity and corrected it in 1921 (Stumpf to Messenger, 22 May 1924, BGC,12,46). However, Cope offers evidence that the policy was being reapplied as early as 1919 (Cope, pg. 75).

146Emily Messenger was horrified to return from furlough and find the Kijabe girls' home in deplorable condition. She accused A.I.M. of misappropriating the money that she had raised for the home (Messenger to Stumpf, 24 April 1924, BGC,12,46). Both the field secretary, Hilda Stumpf (Stumpf to Messenger, 22 May 1924, BGC,12,46), and Hurlburt (Hurlburt to Messenger, 14 July 1924, BGC,12,46) explained to Messenger the Mission's policy and her error in assuming that donors could give specifically to her girl's home. Sandgren used Messenger's letter to cast doubt on A.I.M.'s financial integrity and to argue that the pooling system brought "hardship" to Africans (David Sandgren, "The Kikuyu, Christianity and the Africa Inland Mission," Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976), pp. 76-77). For some reason Sandgren ignores Stumpf's and Hurlburt's explanations that were included in the same folder as Messenger's misunderstanding of the Mission policy, nor does he explain how the Mission's meager resources distributed according to the inherent inequities produced by designated giving would have resulted in less African "hardship".

147See above Chapter 3, pp. 85-86.
By 1919 Hurlburt was administering this fund from the new Mission headquarters at Aba, Belgian Congo. As the number of non-American missionaries grew faster than the receipt of non-American donations, the A.H.C. began to express doubts about the wisdom of American donations subsidizing non-American missionaries, creating tension between the A.H.C. and Hurlburt.

The issue of pooling undesignated funds was related to a broader issue that was building and was to finally break after the Hurlburt Controversy. This was the internationalization of the Mission. The constitution of A.I.M. provided for a Mission directed by multiple Home Councils, but did not provide for any unifying structure besides the person of the General Director and any central administration that he was able to establish on the field. While the constitution provided theoretically for all Home Councils to direct work on the field, in practice only the A.H.C. could satisfy the conditions and the other Home Councils were reduced to sources of personnel and funds, with no authority. Thus, they could not account to their constituencies for the use of either the funds or personnel that they supplied. Hurlburt seems to have understood the problem. He saw the centralized method of handling Mission finances as the only means of holding the Mission together. He wanted to strengthen the

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148It is difficult to know when this "pooling" began. Cope suggests 1916 when the dispersing of the Mission funds was again transferred to the field (Cope, p. 74). However, the constitutional provision for such sharing had already appeared in the 1912 constitution (A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article XI, Section 17, BGC,11,11), and Grimwood, writing in December 1926 says that the policy began "thirteen years ago" (Grimwood to Campbell, 30 December 1926, BGC,1,84). This would place the beginning of the policy in 1913 or 1914.

149Robinson to Hurlburt, 27 March 1919, quoted in Cope, p. 75.

150Smith to British Missionaries of the AIM, 14 February 1923, cited by Cope, p. 77. The bulk of the non-American missionaries were working in Congo, while Kenya was staffed primarily by American missionaries (Hurlburt to Grimwood, 20 September 1921, cited by Cope, p. 76). It is likely that American resentment against subsidizing non-American missionaries was stronger in Kenya and was one of the reasons Kenya contained the greatest number of missionaries hostile to Hurlburt, while the Congo field was most loyal to him.

151Hurlburt to Wadham, 24 August 1927, quoted in Cope, p. 76.
work of the B.H.C., and his proposal of an International Council over the Home and Field Councils led to his final break with the A.H.C.

4. The Hurlburt Controversy

Amid growing tension, Hurlburt returned to the United States in June 1924 once again to reorganize the A.H.C. Apparently he expected to have the same free hand he had in 1911, for he wrote: "All Home Work here was turned over to me yesterday by unanimous vote of the Annual Meeting of the American Home Council." At first things seemed to be going his way. In October Hurlburt forced the resignation of the American Home Director, Orsen Palmer, assumed the position of Acting Home Director, and persuaded the Executive Council to permit the Kenya missionaries to accept the educational grants-in-aid. In December, Hurlburt had Henry Campbell, a former Congo associate of Peter Cameron Scott in

152Hurlburt to Members of the British Home Council, 30 November 1920, quoted in Cope, p. 85.

153See below pp. 158-160.

154For evidence of this see: Hurlburt to Grimwood, 7 July 1924, quoted in Cope, p. 86; Palmer to North American Home Council, 9 October 1924, KBA,4,Hurlburt 1; [Hurlburt] to McKenrick, 24 January 1925, BGC,22,27; and Johnston to Campbell, 30 June 1925, BGC,22,9.

155Cope, p. 85.

156Hurlburt to Grimwood, 26 July 1924, quoted in Cope, p. 86.


158Palmer was listed in the "Directory" published in Inland Africa at least through August 1924. No American Home Director was listed in the October issue, and Hurlburt was listed as "Acting Home Director" in November.

159This took place in October 1924 (Campbell to Kenya Field Council, 6 August 1926, BGC,22,9).

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the Missionary Alliance, appointed General Secretary of the A.H.C. However, if Hurlburt thought that Campbell would do his bidding he was sadly mistaken.

At the meeting of the Executive Council on 2 May 1925 two significant things occurred that were each understood differently by Hurlburt and Campbell and together led to Hurlburt's final downfall. First Hurlburt presented his plan to reorganize the Mission by establishing "three co-equal [home] councils in the United States and one in Canada" with "the administrative control to be vested in an international council". Second, the Committee, for some reason, apparently balked at the ailing Hurlburt's suggestions for the appointment of a new General Director, so Hurlburt resigned to force the issue.

Believing that the Executive Committee had "unanimously approved" the reorganization plan and that his resignation would not take effect until his successor was appointed, Hurlburt with Roland A. Smith, the President of the B.H.C., immediately began to promote among the District Committees the reorganization plan and his plan for a new General Director. Hurlburt, believing that he still had the

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160IA (November 1924): 11; and (January 1925): 8.

161Hurlburt reviewed some of the details of his plan in Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76. Presumably the three proposed councils in the United States would have been an east coast council based in New York, a west coast council based in Los Angeles, and a Midwest council based in Chicago, and the Canadian council would have been based in Toronto.

162Campbell to McKenrick, 19 June 1925; McKenrick to Campbell, 25 June 1925, BGC,22,27; and Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

163Johnston to Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC,22,9.

164McKenrick to Campbell, 25 June 1925, BGC,22,27; and Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76. Hurlburt apparently also expected to be able to work closely with the new General Director advising and guiding him (McKenrick to Campbell, 10 February 1926, BGC,22,27).

165Chicago District Committee, 30 September 1925, BGC,2,87; Campbell to Blakeslee, 23 June 1925, BGC,21,18; Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.
overwhelming influence of previous years, had clearly misjudged the situation. Campbell did not think that the reorganization plan had been approved by the Executive Committee. Rather he thought that it had merely been accorded "favorable consideration" out of deference to Hurlburt.166 As soon as the members of the Committee had time to examine the plan more thoroughly, they came to see that it was "visionary" and "absolutely unworkable".167 It appeared to be nothing more than an elaborate means of enabling Hurlburt to retain supreme power in the Mission.168 Furthermore, Hurlburt's efforts to promote the reorganization plan were considered to be completely "out of order" for someone who had "resigned" his office.169 Therefore, at its next meeting, on 13 June 1925, the Executive Committee formally rejected the reorganization plan,170 and appointed from their own number a three-man "Committee of Direction" to assume the authority and responsibilities of the General Director until a new one could be appointed.171 Much to Hurlburt's consternation, his resignation

166Campbell to Johnston, 29 March 1926, BGC,22,9.

167Campbell to McKenrick, 19 June 1925, BGC,22,27; Campbell to Maynard, 30 June 1925, BGC,21,18; Campbell to Winsor, 2 July 1925, BGC,10,5; Campbell to Johnston, 29 March 1926, BGC,22,9. When one considers that intercontinental travel at that time was by steamship and measured in weeks rather than hours, the Executive Committee's skepticism is understandable.

168Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

169Campbell to Blakeslee, 23 June 1925, BGC,21,18; and Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

170The British Home Council believed that the A.H.C. had "unanimously approved it [i.e. the reorganization plan], and then a month later rescinded that action" (Johnston to Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC,22,9). From Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76 we know that the next meeting of the Executive Committee had been 13 June 1925.

171Campbell to Blakeslee, 23 June 1925; and Campbell to Maynard, 30 June 1925, BGC,21,18. Whether Campbell and the Executive Committee had understood Hurlburt's resignation to have been effective from the time he offered it on 2 May, or not is a moot point. Either way, they were no longer going to continue his efforts to reorganize the mission, so made his resignation effective immediately through their appointment of the Committee of Direction.

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was accepted and ratified by the A.H.C. at its Annual Meeting in August and the Committee of Direction was expanded to five.\textsuperscript{172} Furthermore, the Annual Meeting ended Hurlburt's policy of pooling donations for African workers and institutions, and began a reexamination of educational policies in Kenya,\textsuperscript{173} that resulted in turning back the more liberal policy that Hurlburt had managed to have approved the previous year.\textsuperscript{174}

Hurlburt was able to push through the reorganization of the A.H.C. in 1911, because he had the united support of the missionaries on the field. By 1925, however, he had alienated a large number of the missionaries, particularly in Kenya. His critics on the field and on the A.H.C. were able to unite against him. With a fluid situation created by the resignation of Palmer and the appointment of Campbell, missionaries began to bypass Hurlburt and attempt to establish their own lines of communication and influence with the Home Council and its new General Secretary. Fred McKenrick, Deputy General Director for Kenya, suggested that inner policy making and personnel information be shared directly with the field councils.\textsuperscript{175} Furthermore he argued that field officers, such as himself, and the Kenya Field Director, George Rhoad, should retain their offices while on furlough to enable them to represent the Kenya Field directly to the A.H.C.\textsuperscript{176} This, of course, would have bypassed Hurlburt and the Central Executive Council which had previously controlled the flow of information

\textsuperscript{172}Campbell to Grimwood, 10 August 1925, BGC, I, 84; and Campbell to Pierson, 10 August 1925; Campbell to Acting [Kenya] Field Director, 10 August 1925; Campbell to Marsh, 10 August 1925; and Campbell to Woodley, 10 August 1925, BGC, 21, 18.

\textsuperscript{173}Campbell to Grimwood, 10 August 1925, BGC, I, 84; and Campbell to Pierson, 10 August 1925; Campbell to Acting [Kenya] Field Director, 10 August 1925; Campbell to Marsh, 10 August 1925; and Campbell to Woodley, 10 August 1925, BGC, 21, 18.

\textsuperscript{174}See above pp. 155, 158.

\textsuperscript{175}McKenrick to Campbell, 12 February 1925, BGC, 22, 27.

\textsuperscript{176}McKenrick to Campbell, 3 June 1925, BGC, 22, 27.

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between the home councils and the fields. Campbell, in his turn, was equally anxious to secure the support of the missionaries. He agreed with the need for better communication and saw the seriousness of "demoting" the field officers when they came on furlough, and spoke of letting them attend Home Council meetings. In an unprecedented move, Campbell invited as many missionaries on furlough as possible, to attend the Annual Meeting of the A.H.C. However, seeking the support of the missionaries and giving them an opportunity to express their grievance against Hurlburt did not mean that Campbell wanted the missionaries setting the policies of the Mission. Four months later, Rhoad complained that though he had been asked to give help and information regarding Kenya, he had in fact been given no opportunity to sit with the Council, concluding: "I really hardly know why I am retained as Field Director."  

177 This accusation was leveled against Hurlburt at the A.H.C. Annual Meeting, and Hurlburt both admitted and justified it (Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76).

178 Campbell to McKenrick, 20 February 1925, BGC,22,27.

179 Campbell to McKenrick, 19 June 1925, BGC,22,27.

180 Campbell to Blakeslee, 23 June 1925; and Campbell to Maynard, 30 June 1925, BGC,21,18.

181 In his defense to the A.H.C., Hurlburt listed accusations that missionaries had made against him at the Annual Meeting and gave his answer to each charge (Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76).

182 Rhoad to Woodley, 28 December 1925, KBA: FC-76. Campbell seems to have changed his opinion on the seriousness of "demoting" field officers when they came on furlough and the value of them representing the Field to the A.H.C. and A.I.M.'s constituency. In 1926, while Rhoad was still in America, Campbell congratulated Charles Johnston for his appointment as Kenya Field Director (Campbell to Johnston, 29 March 1926, BGC,22,9). Ernest Grimwood, General Secretary of the British Home Council, also greeted the news of Johnston's appointment with pleasure, calling the Rhoad's retention of that office while on furlough an "anomalous position" (Grimwood to Downing, 23 March 1926, KBA: FC-1).

Campbell's attitude toward field representation to the A.H.C. was further revealed in his report on Rhoad's address to the Annual Meeting of the A.H.C. in 1926: "Mr. George Rhoad was at the meeting by reason of the fact that he had impressed upon some of the
The official reason given for Hurlburt's resignation was his health.\textsuperscript{183} There was most certainly truth in this. For a long time, Hurlburt had been suffering serious health problems.\textsuperscript{184} In the defense that he wrote in 1925, Hurlburt himself claimed to have resigned for health reasons.\textsuperscript{185} After his final break with A.I.M. and the end of his active controversy with the Mission, Hurlburt's health improved dramatically\textsuperscript{186} to the extent that he was able to serve as the Superintendent of the Bible Institute of Los Angeles\textsuperscript{187} and to found a new mission.\textsuperscript{188} Nevertheless, throughout the controversy the Mission leadership continued to believe that Hurlburt was neither physically nor brethren that he had plans and policies which were vital to the welfare of Kenya. I think he is mistaken. There was nothing new in his paper (Campbell to Grimwood, 7 August 1926, BGC,1,84).’’

In November 1925 Fred McKenrick expressed appreciation for being permitted to attend "the meetings", presumably the 1925 Annual Meeting of the A.H.C. (McKenrick to Campbell, 6 November 1925, BGC,22,27). When he was next permitted to meet with the Home Council, it was with the Committee of Direction, and it appeared his own tenure within A.I.M. was in question (McKenrick to Campbell, 4 February 1927; McKenrick to Campbell, 9 December 1927; Campbell to McKenrick, 20 December 1927; McKenrick to Campbell, 23 December 1927; and Campbell to McKenrick, 11 January 1928, BGC,22,28).

\textsuperscript{183}IA (September 1925): 6. Also see Zemmer to Bowe and Trout, n.d. [@June 1925], BGC,12,46; and Nicholson to Campbell, 6 October 1925, BGC,1,84.

\textsuperscript{184}While on a trip to the United States and England in 1908, Hurlburt was already experiencing a very serious “lack of physical strength” (Hurlburt to Verner, 28 December 1908, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence). During his long exploratory safari to German East Africa the following year, Hurlburt became extremely ill (Hurlburt to Waechter, 25 February 1909, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence; and Riebe to Lawrence, 4 September, 1909; Riebe to Marshall, 2 October 1909; and Riebe to Mahy, 2 October 1909, KBA: Riebe General Correspondence), a condition that may have lasted several years (Unsigned letter to Stumpf, 11 April 1911; and Palmer to Stumpf, 1 June 1911, BGC,24,22). His health seems to have remained precarious, for he was reported to have suffered serious illnesses again in 1917 (Dinwiddie to McKenrick, 31 January 1917, BGC,22,27), 1919 and 1920 (Hurlburt to Members of the Home Councils, 7 May 1920, cited by Cope, p. 71).

\textsuperscript{185}Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

\textsuperscript{186}Hurlburt to Grimwood, 10 November 1926, cited by Cope, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{187}Hurlburt to Grimwood, 31 August 1926, cited by Cope, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{188}Hurlburt to Grimwood, 13 September 1927, cited by Cope, p. 89.

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emotionally capable of leading A.I.M., and that his actions in the controversy were the products of "an unbalanced mind."

While Hurlburt's health was a genuine matter of concern, it was not the underlying reason why his resignation was accepted so completely by the A.H.C. and provoked such controversy. According to the minutes of a special meeting of the Executive Committee held on 28 July 1925 "the questions involved are those of policy and administration." The policy issues included the educational policy in Kenya and Hurlburt's policy of pooling donations for African workers and institutions. Hurlburt's policy of expansion into new areas came into question as Hurlburt was blamed for not developing the home constituency in the United States and for expanding the work beyond the Mission's ability to support it. The questions of administration included Hurlburt's controversial reorganization plan, but perhaps more fundamentally Hurlburt's administrative style. Implicitly and explicitly, missionaries complained that

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189 Boggs to Downing, 27 October 1925, KBA: FC-76; and Campbell to Pierson, 22 April 1926, BGC, 21, 18.

190 Campbell to Nicholson, 30 November 1925, BGC, 1, 84. Even his supporters on the B.H.C. were willing to admit a year and a half after the controversy had peaked that "Mr. Hurlburt is not normal at present (Downing to Campbell, 12 November 1927, BGC, 1, 84)."

However, George Rhoad's unfounded speculation that Hurlburt's personality and judgement had been effected by addiction to prescription drugs was such an embarrassment to the A.H.C. that Rhoad himself was forced to resign (McKenrick to Campbell, 10 February 1926; McKenrick to Campbell, 20 February 1926; and Campbell to McKenrick, 25 February 1926, BGC, 22, 2. Campbell to MacNis, 30 January 1926; and Campbell to Farnsworth, 27 February 1926, BGC, 21, 18. Campbell to Downing, 5 January 1926, KBA: FC-1; and Los Angeles District Committee, 9 February 1926, BGC, 6, 66; ).

191 Quoted in Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76. Campbell said that he disagreed with Hurlburt's "unwise policies and, to my mind, rash plans" (Campbell to Pierson, 5 February 1926, BGC, 21, 18).

192 Campbell to Farnsworth, 10 December 1926; and Campbell to Pierson, 16 December 1926, BGC, 10, 5.

193 Campbell to Maynard, 8 March 1929, BGC, 10, 5.

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they had no voice in making Mission policy or way to influence those who did.\textsuperscript{194} The Mission constitution, it was alleged, was too complex and "intended to conceal and camouflage the source of all power and authority, which was really vested in the General Director."\textsuperscript{195} Hurlburt was accused of exercising "arbitrary\textsuperscript{196} and "dictatorial\textsuperscript{197} control of the Mission and practicing "favoritism and paternalism".\textsuperscript{198}

At one point Campbell wrote bitterly:

> If the missionaries had had more consideration and had been regarded [by Hurlburt] not as so many servants but as brethren in Christ, some of the unhappy developments of the last years would never have come about.\textsuperscript{199}

In a more generous moment, Campbell recognized that Hurlburt came from the age when many mission organizations were lead by authoritarian, charismatic leaders, but an age now past.\textsuperscript{200} Another missionary perhaps best summarized this charismatic leadership that was both Hurlburt's great strength and fatal flaw, when he observed that Hurlburt saw "the whole Mission embodied in his individual person".\textsuperscript{201}

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\textsuperscript{194}Zemmer to Bowe and Trout, n.d. [@June 1925], BGC,12,46; Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76; and Andersen to Campbell, 5 June 1928, BGC,19,4.

\textsuperscript{195}Nicholson to Campbell, 6 October 1925, BGC,1,84.

\textsuperscript{196}Hurlburt to Committee of Direction, 12 October 1925, KBA: FC-76; and Downing to Campbell, 12 November 1927, BGC,1,84.

\textsuperscript{197}Campbell to Farnsworth, 27 February 1926, BGC,21,18.

\textsuperscript{198}Campbell to Barnett, 3 February 1926, BGC,19,20; and Campbell to Pierson, 5 February 1926, BGC,21,18.

\textsuperscript{199}Campbell to Grimwood, 26 January 1928, BGC,1,84.

\textsuperscript{200}Campbell to Winsor, 2 July 1925, BGC,10,5. For a fuller expression of this opinion see: Campbell to Grimwood, 12 November 1926, BGC,1,84. Hurlburt, himself, expressed the need for a strong individual to lead the Mission (Hurlburt to Wadham, 4 December 1925, KBA: FC-76).

\textsuperscript{201}Maynard to Campbell, 4 October 1927, BGC,1,84.

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Hurlburt's response was to act as if he had never resigned and to treat the leadership of the A.H.C. as usurpers, refusing to attend the Annual Meeting or to meet with the Executive Committee. Instead he leveled his own charges against the A.H.C. and attempted to rally his own support within the Mission with the intention of regaining control by forcing a split in the Mission.

Hurlburt charged that he was being opposed because of jealousy and was being deliberately forced out by "selfish interests" in the Mission. More seriously, he charged that by abandoning the pooling of donations to African workers and institutions, permitting the publishing of financial needs, and rejecting his leadership style, the A.H.C. was abandoning policies that had been given to the Mission by God. Because there were missionaries, supporters, and Home Council members in the United States and elsewhere who still adhered to the old principles he felt compelled to reorganize the Mission on the basis of the old policies. Those missionaries who agreed with Hurlburt should declare themselves. Those members of A.I.M. who did not wish to follow the original policies should withdraw and form their own mission,

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202For examples of Hurlburt attempting to act as if he were still General Director see Hurlburt to Wadham, 4 December 1925, KBA: FC-76; and Grimwood to Campbell, 26 January 1926, BGC,1,84. Pierson to Campbell, 10 December 1925; and Ball to Maclnnis, 26 January 1926, BGC,21,18.

203Campbell to Pierson, 17 September 1925, BGC,21,18; and Hurlburt to Committee of Direction, 12 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

204Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925; Hurlburt to [the missionaries of A.I.M.], 12 October 1925; Hurlburt to Wadham, 4 December 1925; and Hurlburt to Downing, 7 December 1925, KBA: FC-76. McKenrick to Campbell, 3 March 1926, BGC,22,27. Campbell to Schmalgemeier, 23 March 1926; and McKenrick to Campbell, 4 May 1926, BGC,21,18.

205For the controversy surrounding the Faith Basis see above Chapter 3, pp. 114-118.

206Hurlburt to [Mission Membership], 12 October 1925, KBA: FC-76. Hurlburt spelled this position out in greater detail in Hurlburt to the Committee of Direction, 8 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

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and A.I.M. would divide the field in Africa with them.  

For eight months, in personal contacts, letters, and petitions Hurlburt pressed home his attack with increasing bitterness. With the Los Angeles District Committee as a firm basis of support, Hurlburt's campaign at first appeared to be successful with the Chicago District Committee, British and French Home Councils, and individual missionaries and donors joining the Los Angeles District committee in supporting Hurlburt. On the field, the greatest threat to the Mission was in the Congo where Hurlburt had spent his last years on the field and his son, Paul, was Field Director. Perhaps due to the very vehemence of the attack and intransigence

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207Hurlburt to Committee of Direction, 12 October 1925, KBA: FC-76.

208Campbell to Downing, 5 January 1926; and 2 February 1926, KBA: FC-1. Rhoad to "Brethren," 5 November 1925; and Hurlburt to Downing, 7 December 1925, KBA: FC-76. Campbell to Nicholson, 30 November 1925; and Campbell to Grimwood, 8 February 1926, BGC,1,84. Barnett to Campbell, 26 January 1926, BGC,19.20. Campbell to Pierson 27 October 1925; Campbell to MacInnis, 30 January 1926; Campbell to Farnsworth, 27 February 1926; and Campbell to Maclnnes 23 March 1926, BGC,21,18.

209The Los Angeles District Committee, called the Pacific Coast Council by Hurlburt, remained steadfast in support of Hurlburt throughout this controversy. During the crucial months of September 1925 through March 1926 Hurlburt attended every meeting of the Los Angeles District Committee and his controversy with the A.H.C. dominated the agenda each time. (Los Angeles District Committee, 7 September 1925 to 9 March 1926, BGC,6,66). On 6 October 1925 the Committee passed a resolution supporting Hurlburt and charging the A.H.C. with leaving the Faith Basis (Los Angeles District, 6 October 1925, BGC,6,66). On 9 February 1926 it passed a resolution condemning George Rhoad for "slandering" Hurlburt with his accusation that Hurlburt was addicted to prescription drugs (Los Angeles District Committee, 9 February 1925, BGC,6,66). In other letters the supporters of the A.H.C. complained about the Los Angeles District Committee's continued support of Hurlburt (Campbell to Pierson 27 October 1925, BGC,21,18; and Nicholson to Campbell, 6 October 1925; Campbell to Grimwood, 8 February 1926, BGC,1,84).

210Chicago District Committee, 30 September 1925, BGC,2,87; Campbell to Pierson, 27 October 1925, BGC,21,18; Campbell to McKenrick, 27 January, 1926, BGC,22,27; and Campbell to Downing, 5 January 1926, KBA: FC-1. Nicholson to Campbell, 6 October 1925; and Campbell to Grimwood, 8 February 1926, BGC,1,84.

211Campbell to Downing, 5 January 1926, KBA: FC-1; Johnston to Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC,22,9; and McKenrick to Campbell, 10 February 1926, BGC,22,27. Pierson, to Campbell, 9 June 1926; and Campbell to Pierson, 28 June 1926, BGC,21,18.

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of Hurlburt's position coupled with his inability to prove that the A.H.C. had left Faith
Basis and the intrinsic loyalty of the A.I.M. members, Hurlburt's support outside the
American west coast quickly tapered off.\textsuperscript{212}

Throughout the controversy, the A.H.C. had been trying to arrange a meeting
with Hurlburt for the purpose of reconciling their misunderstandings and restoring
their relationships. At first Hurlburt balked,\textsuperscript{213} but as it became evident that his efforts
at wresting control back from the A.H.C. were not going to succeed, he agreed to
meet with the Committee of Direction on 15 April 1926.\textsuperscript{214} At the end of a twelve-
hour meeting, which, according to Campbell, was "a time of frank dealing and plain
speaking", Hurlburt "expressed himself as satisfied and indicated his desire to
cooperate in the work."\textsuperscript{215} Furthermore, "Mr. Hurlburt acknowledged his error [in
accusing the A.H.C. of leaving the Faith Basis] and promised in the presence of the

\textsuperscript{212}Campbell to Nicholson, 30 November 1925; Grimwood to Campbell, 26 January
1926; and Campbell to Grimwood, 8 February 1926, BGC, 1, 84. Campbell to MacInnis, 30
January 1926; and Campbell to Schmalgemeier, 23 March 1926, BGC, 21, 18. Johnston to
Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC, 22, 9; Campbell to McKenrick, 23 March 1926, BGC, 22, 27;
and Chicago District Committee, 18 March 1926, BGC, 2, 87.

The Kenya and Congo missionaries expressed their loyalty to the A.H.C. at their
annual conferences (Campbell to Pierson, 3 May 1926, BGC, 10, 5). The Tanganyika Field was
never a factor in the Hurlburt Controversy.

Very important to this process was the British Home Council's disillusionment with
Hurlburt (Downing to Campbell, 12 November 1927, BGC, 1, 84). Their final judgement that
his accusation that the A.H.C. had left the Faith Basis was without merit and so their were no
grounds for dividing the Mission may have been the last straw that resulted in Hurlburt's
temporary capitulation (Smith to Hurlburt, 9 April 1926, quoted in Cope, p. 88).

\textsuperscript{213}On early efforts to meet with Hurlburt see Campbell to Pierson, 17 September 1925,
BGC, 21, 18; Hurlburt to Committee of Direction, 12 October 1925, KBA: FC-76; and
Campbell to Grimwood, 7 January 1926, BGC, 1, 84.

\textsuperscript{214}For negotiations on this meeting see: Campbell to Maclnnis, 30 January;
Maclnnis to Ball, 30 January 1926; Boggs to Campbell, 5 March 1926; Boggs to AIM, 9
March, 1926; Campbell to Torrey, 10 March 1926; Unsigned letter to Maclnnis, 13 March
1926; and Campbell to Torrey, 16 March 1926, BGC, 21, 18.

\textsuperscript{215}Campbell to Pierson, 22 April 1926, BGC, 21, 18.

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Council to rectify what he had done." Campbell, on his part, asked Hurlburt if he would represent A.I.M. to the Christian public by speaking "at strategic centers" and editing *Inland Africa*. News of this "reconciliation" brought great rejoicing among the missionaries on the field, and it appeared that the crisis was now over.

Unfortunately, "reconciliation" proved to be too strong a word. Upon returning to California, Hurlburt did not publicly admit his error, as Campbell and the Committee of Direction had expected, but announced that he had "gained his points and that the Mission had returned to the Faith Basis." Not only was the public recantation weaker than expected, so was the cooperation, and Hurlburt appeared to lose interest in A.I.M. as he took the pastorate of a Baptist church. In August, relations began to take a turn for the worse when Hurlburt published two letters in which he engaged in a troublesome justification of his attack on the A.H.C., and which the General Secretary of the B.H.C. called "strange reading". In November Hurlburt asked that he be dropped from A.I.M. and his name be taken off all official

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216 Campbell to Pierson 28 June 1926, BGC,21,18.
217 Campbell to Pierson, 22 April 1926; and Campbell to Maynard, 29 April 1926, BGC,21,18.
218 Johnston to Campbell, 11 May 1926; and 26 July 1926, BGC,22,9.
219 Barnett to Campbell, 9 June 1926; and Campbell to Barnett, 18 June 1926, BGC,19,20.
220 Campbell to Pierson, 3 May 1926, BGC,21,18.
221 Campbell to Johnston, 15 June 1926, BGC,22,9.
222 Campbell to Grimwood, 15 June 1926, BGC,1,84.
223 Campbell to Grimwood, 18 August 1926, BGC,1,84.
224 Grimwood to Campbell, 6 August 1926, BGC,1,84.
225 Campbell to Grimwood, 12 November 1926, BGC,1,84.

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A.I.M. literature,\(^{226}\) and he began criticizing the Mission for not appointing a new General Director,\(^{227}\) charging that the work was "drifting, with no high goals and no constructive plans."\(^{228}\) Hurlburt returned to his strategy of splitting A.I.M. this time not by driving off those with whom he disagreed, but by attracting from A.I.M. a following to become the core of a new mission, and then to negotiate with A.I.M. the turning over of the Congo Field to his new group.\(^{229}\) Hurlburt succeed in attracting a few A.I.M. Congo missionaries and founded the Unevangelized Africa Mission, but failed to persuade A.I.M. to cede any of its Congo Field to them.\(^{230}\)

**THE CAMPBELL ADMINISTRATION**

1. The Committee of Direction

The resignation of Charles Hurlburt and the assumption of the powers of the General Director by the Committee of Direction effected a major change in the structure of the Mission. With the Committee of Direction operating from the American office in New York, the Central Executive Council and other central structures gradually became redundant causing considerable administrative confusion in the process. The Congo Field seemed uncertain how to proceed with the evaluation and discipline of missionaries.\(^{231}\) The dispersal of missionary allowances from the

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\(^{226}\)Campbell to Pierson, 3 January 1927; Campbell to Downing, 3 January 1927; Campbell to Maynard, 3 January 1927, BGC,21,18.

\(^{227}\)Campbell to Grimwood, 12 November 1926, BGC,1,84.

\(^{228}\)Hurlburt to Grimwood, 28 October 1926, quoted in Cope, p. 88. Also see: Campbell to Pierson, 23 May 1927, BGC,21,18.

\(^{229}\)Campbell to Maynard, 26 July 1927, BGC,1,84; and "DOING, REJAF," 31 August 1927; Campbell to Maynard, 12 September 1927, BGC,21,18.

\(^{230}\)Campbell to Grimwood, 22 November 1927; and 26 January 1928, BGC,1,84.

\(^{231}\)Campbell to Pierson 27 October 1925, BGC,21,18. The precise nature and cause of the confusion is not known. Hurlburt, and perhaps the Central Executive Council, probably had

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General Funds became confused when the A.H.C. began sending the money directly to its missionaries, but the B.H.C. continued to send its funds to the Central Executive Council in Aba.\footnote{Campbell to Pierson, 3 May 1926, BGC,10,5; and Campbell to Grimwood, 30 November 1926, BGC,1,84.} When Hurlburt's policy of pooling donations for African workers and institutions was repealed, many missionaries remained confused about whether or not they could raise designated donations specifically for their own work.\footnote{Campbell had to reassure Mrs. Albert Barnett that she could designate a $5.00 donation to a particular missionary's work at Kapsabet (Mrs. Barnett to Campbell, 9 March 1926; and Campbell to Mrs. Barnett, 20 March 1926, BGC,19,20).}

Despite the confusion, the Committee of Direction proceeded to assume the functions of the General Director and Central Executive Council. It set priorities and distributed money.\footnote{Campbell notified the Kenya Field that $500.00 had been released to build a chapel at Githumu ("DOING, KIJABE," 5 February 1926, BGC,21,18), and informed the Ukambani missionaries that he was in favor of a Kamba Bible school, but that building a Bible school at Kijabe had first priority (Campbell to Johnston, 13 April 1927, BGC,22,9).} It assigned missionaries to the different fields,\footnote{Campbell to Downing, 26 February 1931, BGC,1,84; and Downing to Campbell, 13 July 1935; Campbell to Downing, 2 August 1935, BGC,20,12.} ruled on the a hand in the discipline of missionaries previously. This would have brought a consistent standard of discipline across the different fields and home councils. With Hurlburt gone and the Central Executive Council becoming redundant the Congo Field Council was uncertain how to proceed. Of special concern was the discipline of British missionaries, since the A.H.C., through the Committee of Direction had now assumed the powers of the General Director.

The incongruity of a committee of one home council attempting to fulfill an administrative role that affected all fields and home councils was reflected in Campbell's chauvinistic and uncertain advice on how to discipline British missionaries, instructing the Congo Field Council to report to the A.H.C. and "possibly to the British Council."

\footnote{The temporary diversion by the Kenya Field Council of a missionary assigned by the Committee of Direction to the Congo Field to fill an emergency on a Kenya station provoked an}
opening of new mission stations,236 approved new ministry structures,237 required regular reports from the field,238 and regulated relations with other missionary societies.239

2. The New Constitution

The establishment of the Committee of Direction had been an extra constitutional act intended to be a temporary expedient until a new General Director was appointed and the constitution revised.240 The Hurlburt controversy prevented active controversy that lasted four months with resentment continuing to linger for over a year (Campbell to Downing and Buyse, 7 December 1934; Downing to Campbell, 5 December 1934, 12 January 1935, 15 January 1935, 16 March 1935; Campbell to Downing, 17 January 1935, 30 January 1935, 18 March 1935, and 21 March 1935, BGC,20,12. Davis to Campbell, 19 April 1935, 21 May; and Campbell to Davis, 12 July 1935, BGC,19,25).

236Campbell to Grimwood, 1 June 1926, BGC,1,84; and Campbell to Pierson, 23 May 1927, BGC,21,18. Campbell to Johnston, 19 December 1927; and Johnston to Campbell, 5 March 1928, BGC,22,9.

237The Kenya Field Council established a committee to promote the women's ministries in Kenya and appointed Virginia Blakeslee to be the chairman. Campbell felt it necessary to bring this action of the Kenya Field Council to the A.H.C. for approval (Campbell to Johnston, 13 April 1927, BGC,22,9).


239Relations with other societies within a single Field was the responsibility of the Field Director ("Africa Inland Mission Kenya Field By-Laws," 25 January 1936, KBA,17,6). The Committee of Direction dealt with broader the issues that effect the mission as a whole, for example the acceptance of missionaries from the Heart of Africa Mission (Campbell to Grimwood 7 January 1926, BGC,1,84) and the proposed merger of the Unevangelized Africa Mission with A.I.M. (Campbell to Downing, 28 January 1931, 26 February 1931, BGC,1,84; and Campbell to McKenrick, 3 February 1931, BGC,22,28). It also attempted to intervene in the B.H.C.'s joint venture with the South Africa General Mission (see below pp. 192-197).

240Campbell to Nicholson, 30 November 1925, BGC,1,84.

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rapid action on either,241 and after several years the enthusiasm of the A.H.C. waned,242 so ten years passed before a new constitution was written. In the meantime, some missionaries favored greater missionary representation in the government of the Mission.243 Others, surprisingly, rejected the whole concept of the field-governed mission. The Tanganyika Field Director argued that the real power in the Mission should lie with the Home Council: "I never want to see the Field as the dominating force in our Mission, except in purely local matters of administration."244 Far from the original argument that the missionaries on the field were in the best position to set Mission policy, Johnston argued that the missionary on the field was far too personally involved to view the issues objectively.245

In response to missionaries who felt that the appointment of a new General Director was the Mission's highest priority246 and Hurlburt's charge that A.I.M. was not going anywhere without a General Director,247 Campbell argued that mission societies could no longer be run by strong, charismatic leaders, but now had to be

241Campbell to Grimwood, 15 June 1926, 7 August 1926, 31 October 1929, and Campbell to Maynard, 26 July 1927, BGC,1,84. Chicago District Committee, 5 May 1927, BGC,2,87.

242Campbell to Andersen, 11 July 1928, BGC,19,4.

243Andersen to Campbell, 5 June 1928, BGC,19,4; Andersen to Campbell, n.d. [@May 1933]; and Campbell to Andersen, 28 June 1933, BGC,19,5.

244Maynard to Campbell, 9 May 1927, BGC,10,5.

245Johnston to Campbell, 5 March 1928, BGC,22,9. Dr. Davis argued that the medical, climatic, moral, and social conditions on the field often prevented the missionaries from having "the breadth of vision, and the clarity of judgment possible to those here at home" (Davis to Campbell, 1 September 1934, BGC,19,25).

246McKenrick to Campbell, 10 February 1926, BGC,22,27; and Campbell to Johnston, 15 June 1926, BGC,22,9.

247Campbell to Grimwood, 12 November 1926, BGC,1,84.

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governed by strong committees or councils on the field and at home.\footnote{Campbell to Johnston, 15 June 1926, BGC,22,9; and Campbell to Grimwood, 12 November 1926, BGC,1,84.} The B.H.C., however, considered a General Director to be essential, for it was the only structure capable of providing unity to the Mission.\footnote{Smith to Campbell, 17 January 1929, BGC,9,9. Also see Grimwood to Campbell, 4 December 1929, BGC,1,84.} As time went on, even American missionaries who had supported Campbell\footnote{Johnston to Campbell, 26 July 1926, BGC,22,9.} began to argue that one was needed. Johnston wrote that a General Director was "a very pressing need - not because the "Committee of Direction" is not doing well, ... but because of the many very needful things they can not do."\footnote{Johnston to Campbell, 2 October 1934, BGC,22,9. Dr. Elwood Davis had apparently made a similar suggestion (Campbell to Davis, 3 March 1934, BGC,19,25).} Concerned that a General Director would become a dictator,\footnote{Campbell to Davis, 3 March 1934, BGC,19,25.} the most that Campbell was willing to concede was the possible value of a weak "General Traveling Secretary" with no real administrative authority or power and whose role would primarily be one of encouragement and public relations.\footnote{Campbell to Johnston, 10 October 1934, BGC,22,9. For an earlier expression of this same idea see Campbell to Johnston, 30 September 1926, BGC,22,9.}

When the A.I.M. constitution was finally revised and adopted in 1936, the General Director, Central Executive Council, and all other central structures were eliminated and the dominant role of the Committee of Direction was institutionalized.\footnote{A.I.M. Constitution, 1936, Article VI, Article IX, Section 3, KBA,17,6.} The new constitution now clearly established A.I.M. as a home-governed mission and attempted to establish the supremacy of the A.H.C. as the "parent body" with sole authority to create other Home Councils or new Field Councils and "final authority" over all field matters except in territories that it

\footnote{Chapter Four: Field-Governed Mission, page 172}
delegated to another Home Council. Greater missionary participation in local field affairs was permitted by making the Field Councils elected with power to "control" their own fields, and the A.H.C. was too far away to enforce its authority with the same rigor as a resident General Director and central administration.

3. Relations Under the Campbell Administration

The change from Hurlburt's personal rule to the more distant supervision of the Committee of Direction seems to have ended the worst of the turmoil on the field and between the field and the A.H.C. In some areas, such as the development of a regular furlough policy, the new administration was able to make marked progress.

However, the change was by no means a panacea for solving all of the Mission's relational problems. Petty issues continued to create tensions as from time to time the missionaries chaffed against the Home Council control. Often Campbell complained that the A.H.C. was unappreciated and subjected to unjust criticism by

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255Ibid., Article VI, Article VII, Section 1, Article XI, Section 1.

256Ibid., Article XI, Sections 2-4, 6.

257Grimwood to Campbell, 15 October 1926; Campbell to Grimwood, 12 November 1926; and Campbell to McKenrick, 19 October 1926; McKenrick to Campbell, 18 October 1926, BGC, 22, 27;

258Some of the petty disagreements included: acceptance of missionaries on the field (Campbell to Downing, 30 January 1935, 21 March 1935; and Downing to Campbell, 16 March 1935, BGC, 20, 12), the discipline of missionaries, Kenya being slighted at the expense of the Congo and Tanganyika Fields, the Faith Basis not being followed properly (Downing to Campbell, 13 November 1934, BGC, 20, 12), missionaries not receiving full allowances (Davis to Campbell, 19 April 1935; Campbell to Davis, 12 July 1935, BGC, 19, 25; and Campbell to Downing, 13 June 1931, BGC, 10, 5), home office expenses being too high (Campbell to Davis, 7 December 1935, BGC, 19, 26), the failure of the councils to keep each other informed, the failure of missionaries to recognize the authority of the councils, and missionaries not sending accurate financial reports (Davis to Campbell, 21 May 1935, BGC, 19, 25; "Annual Meeting," 26-27 August 1935; Campbell to Downing, Maynard, and Van Dusen, 28 August 1935; and Campbell to Downing, 5 October 1935, BGC, 1, 8).
chronic fault finders in Kenya, a charge that some missionaries admitted.

The changes in structure wrought by Campbell and the A.H.C. had serious consequences in two areas. First by becoming a home-governed mission with final authority over the field, Campbell was able to block the efforts of the Kenya field leadership to expand A.I.M.'s educational program to better meet the demands of their African converts. Second, by attempting to assume the central position of the General Director, the A.H.C. came into direct conflict with the B.H.C.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH COUNCILS IN CONFLICT

Faith Missions were an experiment, not only in ecumenical relations and the application of a new form of piety to mission finance, but in international cooperation. That they would have difficulties in devising effective structures should not come as a surprise. Nor should it come as a surprise that strains would emerge in the relationship between the American and British Councils of A.I.M., after Hurlburt's unifying force was removed.

259Campbell to Downing, 5 January 1926, KBA: FC-1; Campbell to Pierson, 3 May 1926, BGC,10,5; Campbell to Field Councils and Officers, 11 August 1926, BGC,11,11; Campbell to Andersen, 11 July 1928, BGC,19,5; Campbell to Davis, 7 September 1934, 17 January 1935, 12 July 1935; and Campbell to Mrs. Davis, 4 September 1935, BGC,19,25.

260Johnston to Campbell, 21 February 1927, BGC,22,9; and Davis to Campbell, 1 September 1934, 1 August 1935, 18 June 1936, BGC,19,25. Support of the A.H.C. could make a missionary unpopular with his peers in Kenya (Davis to Campbell, 21 April 1936, BGC,19,25).

261See below Chapter 7, pp. 311-317, 323-327.


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These strains had begun even before Hurlburt's resignation.\textsuperscript{263} The subordinate position of the B.H.C. to the A.H.C. prevented the British council from being accountable to their British constituency for funds raised and for the care and discipline of the missionaries that they sent out. This situation was the reason for the proposal of an international council, which the A.H.C. rejected in 1925.\textsuperscript{264}

The Hurlburt controversy compounded those strains. The American Council was concerned that because of the close relationship between Hurlburt and the B.H.C., the British would support Hurlburt.\textsuperscript{265} The British, on the other hand, were hurt that the A.H.C. had rejected the internationalization proposal out of hand with no consultation nor addressing the issues that produced it.\textsuperscript{266} Similarly, they were upset that they were not consulted when the A.H.C. accepted Hurlburt's resignation.\textsuperscript{267} Anglo-American relations managed to weather the Hurlburt controversy itself,\textsuperscript{268} but four subsequent controversies nearly broke A.I.M. in two. Running through these controversies was the issue of authority in the Mission and Campbell's typical attitude

\textsuperscript{263}For some of these strains see Cope, pp. 74-78, 83-85. Cope's argument needs to be handled with care for due to both the limitations of his sources and his own sympathies, he tends to accept Hurlburt's view somewhat uncritically.

\textsuperscript{264}See above pp. 156, 158-160.

\textsuperscript{265}Nicholson to Campbell, 6 October 1925; and Downing to Campbell, 12 November 1927, BGC, 1, 84. Campbell to Blakeslee, 23 June 1925; Campbell to Maynard, 30 June 1925; and Campbell to Pierson 27 October 1925, BGC, 21, 18. Indeed, Hurlburt intended to use the other Home Councils as a base for regaining power from the A.H.C. (Hurlburt to [the missionaries of A.I.M.], 12 October 1925, KBA: FC-76).

\textsuperscript{266}Johnston to Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC, 22, 9.

\textsuperscript{267}McKenrick to Campbell, 3 March 1926, BGC, 22, 27; and Downing to Campbell, 12 November 1927, BGC, 1, 84.

\textsuperscript{268}In March 1926 Grimwood wrote to Downing: "Our correspondence with the American Council now leaves nothing to be desired, and we are indeed grateful that the brethren there have resumed intelligent contact and correspondence which we have missed for so long, to the great disadvantage of the work. (Grimwood to Downing, 23 March 1926, KBA: FC-1)."

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toward the British: indifference, superiority, and hostility. In contrast, the American missionaries who passed through London listened to the concerns of the B.H.C. and pleaded the British point of view to the A.H.C.

1. The Controversy over "Pooling": 1926-1928

The first issue to reopen the strains between the American and British home councils was the question of pooling the undesignated funds from all Home Councils into one General Fund from which all under supported missionaries were paid. This had been Hurlburt's policy from at least the end of the First World War. Campbell opposed this policy, believing that the British merely raised the funds for the outfitting and travel of their missionaries, and then left it to the American General Fund to supply their allowances. This, he argued, was irresponsible of the British, unfair to the Americans, and not only built the work of the B.H.C. on a weak foundation, but called into question its right to be a Home Council. If this form of pooling were to be permitted, then the B.H.C. must "cooperate" by consulting with the A.H.C. to see if funds were available for additional missionaries and by giving the A.H.C. a voice.

269 For example see: Campbell to McKenrick, 5 March 1926, BGC,22,27; and Campbell to Johnston, 29 March 1926, BGC,22,9.

270 Farnsworth to Campbell, 21 May 1927; and Downing to Campbell, 12 November 1927, BGC,1,84. Barnett to Campbell, 12 December 1927, BGC,19,20; and Johnston to Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC,22,9.

271 See above p. 155.

272 Campbell to Johnston, 29 March 1926, BGC,22,9; and Campbell to Pierson, 9 June 1927; Campbell to Maynard, 26 July 1927; 26 August 1927, BGC,1,84. This opinion was shared by some missionaries on the field, though it is not certain if they formed this opinion before or after Campbell told them that such was the case (Zaffke to Campbell, 11 April 1928; Nixon to Campbell, 11 April 1928; and Gruenewald to Campbell, 12 April 1928, BGC,13,19.).

273 Campbell to Maynard, 26 August 1927, BGC,1,84.

274 Campbell to Pierson, 25 August 1927, BGC,1,84.
in their selection.275 With this predilection against pooling the General Funds, it was
no surprise that when beginning to revise the constitution, Campbell found that
A.I.M. had been operating "unconstitutionally" for:

...it seems clear from ... our Constitution ... that each Home Council is
obligated, whenever funds are available, to pay; first, allowances of its
missionaries; second, to provide for furloughs, before drawing on such funds
to make up deficit allowances of missionaries sent out by other Home
Councils.276

The issue was brought up at the Annual Meeting of the A.H.C. the following year,277
and the practice of pooling the various national General Funds was ended.

The B.H.C. was not overly impressed with Campbell's constitutional argument
against pooling.278 Ernest Grimwood, the General Secretary of the B.H.C. admitted
that the constitution "might be interpreted as you [i.e. Campbell] have suggested, but
the controlling thought, I believe, is priority of allocation not of nationality."279 And
even if the "new interpretation" was the correct one, then the constitution should be
amended to permit the pooling of the General Funds.280 Ignoring the issue of financial
responsibility or the possibility of one council taking advantage of another, Grimwood
maintained that the issue was one of Christian charity, unity and equality.281 And with

275Campbell to Farnsworth, 9 June 1927, BGC,1,84.

276Campbell to Grimwood, 30 November 1926, BGC,1,84. Campbell was citing A.I.M.
Constitution, 1922, Appendix Article II, Section 24, BGC,11,11.

277Campbell to Maynard, 26 July 1927, BGC,1,84.

278To the British this argument appeared to be hypocritical and self-serving, for the
A.H.C.'s substitution of the Committee of Direction for the General Director was at best
extraconstitutional. For British observations of this fact, see: Smith to Campbell, 17 January
1929, BGC,9,9; Grimwood to Campbell, 4 December 1929, BGC,1,84. Furthermore, the
A.H.C. reversal of Hurlburt's policy of pooling all donations to African workers was patently
unconstitutional (see: A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Appendix Article II, Section 15, BGC,11,11).

279Grimwood to Campbell, 30 December 1926, BGC,1,84.

280Campbell to Maynard, 26 August 1927, BGC,1,84.

281Grimwood to Campbell, 30 December 1926, BGC,1,84.

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almost prophetic foresight, Grimwood asked what affect this change in policy would have on the unity of the Mission: "If financial independence is carried into effect is it not conceivable that other forms of independence might follow?"\(^2\)\(^{282}\)

Campbell assumed that once they knew of the pooling policy, the American missionaries would overwhelmingly reject it and solidly support the A.H.C.'s stand.\(^2\)\(^{283}\) In this he was mistaken. The Congo Field became known as the "pro-British party"\(^2\)\(^{284}\) for accepting Grimwood's view on the constitutional question and favoring a nationality-blind policy in regards to the recruitment of missionaries, raising of funds, and paying of allowances.\(^2\)\(^{285}\) Responding to rumors that the B.H.C. was on the verge of leaving A.I.M. and withdrawing its missionaries, the Kenya Annual Field Conference in January 1928 unanimously proposed "that it be made constitutional that general funds be pooled, regardless of nationality of origin, and that there be cooperation in sending out missionaries."\(^2\)\(^{286}\)

Campbell responded condescendingly. He questioned the propriety of the Kenya Field's action by pointing out that this was a "constitutional" matter for the A.H.C. He questioned the legitimacy of the vote by suggesting that only those supported by the General Fund should have voted. He concluded by throwing out a red herring, suggesting that if the Kenya Field wanted to pool both designated and

\(^{282}\)Ibid.

\(^{283}\)Campbell to Maynard, 26 July 1927, BGC,1,84.

\(^{284}\)Campbell to Maynard, 21 November 1927, BGC,1,84.

\(^{285}\)Pierson to Campbell, 14 October 1927, BGC,1,84.

\(^{286}\)Teasdale to Campbell, 14 April 1928, BGC,13,19. Teasdale provides a most sober and statesmanlike account of the action of the Annual Conference. Also see Nixon to Campbell, 11 April 1928, BGC,13,19.

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General Funds, it could be an experiment for the rest of the Mission.287 Campbell then went through the motions of asking the Kenya missionaries for their opinions on the pooling controversy, but his letter sufficiently confused the issue as to make the exercise worthless. Some missionaries took a clear stand in favor of pooling the General Funds, arguing that it was fair and equitable, an appropriate application of the Faith Basis, and worth sacrificing for the sake of the unity.288 Others were equally clear in their opposition, arguing that pooling would reduce that amount of support each missionary would receive, that it was contrary to the Faith Basis, and that the B.H.C. had been unjustly taking advantage of the A.H.C.289 A large number so qualified their stand or mixed the issues as to make it unclear where they stood.290 Most agreed that the proposal was passed out of a desire to keep the British missionaries within A.I.M.291 With the general confusion spread by his letter, it was

287Campbell to Missionaries of the Africa Inland Mission in Kenya Colony sent out by the North American Home Council, 17 February 1928, BGC,13,19. The issues raised by Campbell were spurious for, as Charles Teasdale pointed out, the Annual Conference understood that the issue was a constitutional one, so all missionaries should vote, and that it dealt only with the pooling of General Funds, not designated funds (Teasdale to Campbell, 14 April 1928, BGC,13,19).

288M/M Mundy to Campbell, 9 February 1928; Stumpf to Campbell, 6 April 1928; Guilding to Campbell, 7 April 1928; M/M Barnett to Campbell, 9 April 1928; and Teasdale to Campbell, 14 April 1928, BGC,13,19.

289Harris to Campbell, 7 April 1928; Zaffke to Campbell, 11 April 1928, and Mrs. Davis to Campbell, 6 May 1928, BGC,13,19.

290Horton to Campbell, 9 April 1928; M/M Farnsworth to Campbell, 9 April 1928; Felter to Campbell, 10 April 1928; Gruenewald to Campbell, 12 April 1928; Nixon to Campbell, 11 April 1928; M/M Anderson to Campbell, 6 May 1928; and Andersen to Campbell, 8 May 1928, BGC,19,5.

291Sandgren claims that British and American missionaries were unable to work together on the same stations because of life-style differences [i.e. the "American" abstinence from alcohol and tobacco], and the "crisis" this produced was only resolved when the Field was divided and the two kept on separate stations (David, p. 78). Not only have I not found that such a life-style difference exists between American and British missionaries in A.I.M., either now or among older missionaries whose early days go back to the inter-war period, but these letters contain many instances of American and British missionaries working together on the
easy for Campbell to view Kenya's action as just a sympathy vote, and to disregard whatever opinion he might have garnered from the field. 292 Having successfully defused the threat of opposition from Kenya, the practice of each Home Council shouldering the full financial responsibility for its own missionaries became the practice of A.I.M.

2. The Controversy over a "British Sphere": 1928-1933

With the end of pooling, the last unifying structure in the Mission now dismantled, the centrifugal forces of which Grimwood warned began to come into play. In 1928 the B.H.C. proposed that some area be turned over to their administrative control as a "British sphere" of work. 293

This was not the first time that the idea of different Home Councils administering different fields was broached. In 1913 C. T. Studd had wanted the Congo Field to be reserved solely for British missionaries. 294 Ten years later Johnston suggested that the Kenya Field be turned over to the B.H.C. 295 Even Campbell had written "that in the long run it would be better for Britain and for North America to

same stations with tremendous expressions of love for each other and a willingness to sacrifice to enable them to continue to work together.

292 Campbell to Farnsworth, 16 May 1928, BGC,10,5. See also Campbell to Johnston, 14 May 1928, BGC,22,9.

293 The earliest indication we have of this request is a telegram sent from the Kenya Field Council to the A.H.C. on 5 January 1929 opposing the division of the work into two separate spheres (Cablegram from Kijabe to American Council, 5 January 1929, BGC,1,84). Presumably the reference is to dividing Kenya into two spheres, though the geographical area to be separated is not mentioned.

294 Downing to Hurlburt, 28 February 1913, KBA: FC-76. According to Dick Anderson, Studd wanted to use A.I.M. primarily as a vehicle to establish what would have essentially his own independent mission in the Congo (D. Anderson, p. 59).

295 Johnston to Fletcher, 28 June 1923, BGC,22,8.

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have separate spheres of influence. In fact, the principle of each home council supervising its own area on the field was inherent in the concept of a home-governed, international mission, and had been established in the 1912 constitution.

The reason for the B.H.C.'s request was because the subordinate position of the B.H.C. to the A.H.C. had now become intolerable with failure of the internationalization scheme and the assumption of the duties of the General Director by the Committee of Direction. The British constituency of A.I.M. was asking how the B.H.C. could be held accountable for the use, welfare, and supervision of the funds, personnel, and work which they supplied and supported if the B.H.C. had no control or authority over the field. This situation, the B.H.C. argued, was not only preventing the growth of A.I.M.'s constituency in Britain, but risking the decline and death of British A.I.M. To prevent this the B.H.C. had to share with the A.H.C.

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296 Campbell to Johnston, 29 March 1926, BGC,22,9.

297 A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article XI, Section 16, BGC,11,11, KBA,17,6. This provision was carried forward in the 1922 constitution (A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Appendix Article II, Section 12, BGC,11,11). See above p. 141.

298 When Hurlburt had been the General Director, he had not only provided the link between the B.H.C. and the other Home Councils, but he had provided the administrative and supervisory link between the B.H.C. and the field. Now with Hurlburt gone, the B.H.C. felt "too much at the mercy of the Am. [sic] Council" (Johnston to Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC,22,9). Loosing the pooling controversy to the A.H.C. probably drove this point home.

299 Smith to Wadham, 25 January 1930, BGC,9,9.

300 The President of the B.H.C., Roland A. Smith, wrote: "Indeed parents of missionaries and friends in our Constituency hold that such a one-sided method of administration is inadequate and inequitable, and evidence is not lacking of the with-holding of considerable financial support until this state of affairs has been regularized (Smith to Campbell, 8 July 1929 BGC,9,9)."

301 Smith to Campbell, 15 February 1930, BGC,9,9.

302 Smith to Campbell, 13 June 1930, BGC,9,9.

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the authority over the field\textsuperscript{303} by having their own sphere work\textsuperscript{304}.

The B.H.C. suggested that the Eldoret area of western Kenya, including the stations of Kapsabet and Kabartonjo, and the land to the north, be made the British sphere because this area had been assigned to A.I.M. but had not been effectively occupied, and apparently because the British colonial government in Kenya preferred to deal with a British mission.\textsuperscript{305} Campbell initially opposed the British request, citing unspecified constitutional objections\textsuperscript{306} and fearing that a British sphere would be "the first great step toward a permanent separation of the Africa Inland Mission."\textsuperscript{307} The B.H.C. assured Campbell that the creation of a British sphere would not disrupt the work, displace American missionaries already working in the sphere,\textsuperscript{308} or divide the Mission.\textsuperscript{309} At least partially reassured, the A.H.C. accepted the proposal for a British

\textsuperscript{303}Johnston to H. D. Campbell, 15 January 1926, BGC,22,9.

\textsuperscript{304}Smith to Campbell, 17 January 1929; Smith to Wadham, 25 January 1930; and Garwood to Campbell, 21 March 1934, BGC,9,9.

\textsuperscript{305}Smith to Campbell, 8 July 1929 BGC,9,9.

\textsuperscript{306}Campbell probably objected that to give the B.H.C. their own sphere in this manner violated the constitutional provision that granted administrative control to the Home Council that first started the work in a particular field or which had two-thirds of the missionaries on that field (A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Appendix Article II, Section 12, BGC,11,11) and, as we shall see, the provision that all Mission buildings and land was to be owned by A.I.M., interpreted by Campbell to mean the A.H.C. (A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Appendix Article II, Section 14, BGC,11,11). That Campbell raised constitutional objections we know from the B.H.C.'s counter-argument that with the resignation of Hurlburt and the failure of the A.H.C. to appoint a new General Director, the constitution was already "partially inoperative" (Smith to Campbell, 17 January 1929, BGC,9,9; also Grimwood to Campbell, 4 December 1929, BGC,1,84.), and from Campbell's announcement that the A.H.C. would try and meet the B.H.C.'s request "in every way possible without violating the constitution of the Africa Inland Mission" (Campbell to Maynard, Downing, Van Dusen, Boyson, 5 August 1929, BGC,1,84).

\textsuperscript{307}Campbell to Downing, 25 February 1929, BGC,1,84.

\textsuperscript{308}Smith to Campbell, 17 January 1929, BGC,9,9.

\textsuperscript{309}Smith wrote that the B.H.C. they had no desire to separate from A.I.M., in fact it had already rejected the course, "urged" upon them by some, of going to the Kenya colonial government "to secure independent stations and territory in Kenya Colony, apart from [the

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sphere and directed that "Committee of Five", two Americans, two British, and one chosen by the others, be created on the field to work out the details.310

Though the concept of different Home Councils supervising their own fields was not new, A.I.M. had never done it before. So effecting this new organizational arrangement was an uncharted course that raised new issues. To complete the transfer of Kapsabet and Kabartonjo to the British sphere, the B.H.C. offered to reimburse the A.H.C. for the buildings on the stations in exchange for the title deeds to the properties.311 The American missionaries working on those stations, however, became alarmed and thought that either they would be replaced by British missionaries, or if they remained and worked under the administration of the B.H.C., they would not be able to receive their allowances from the A.H.C. Hence, the Kenya Field Director opposed the inclusion of Kapsabet and Kabartonjo in the British sphere unless the B.H.C. was "willing to take over and support the missionaries at present on these stations."312

On the issue of the ownership of the stations, Campbell replied that the A.H.C. could not sell them because neither the A.H.C. nor any other Home Council owned them. Rather they were owned by A.I.M. for everyone.313 If the A.H.C. were to sell them to the B.H.C., this would in fact divide A.I.M. into two separate

American] A.I.M. (Smith to Campbell, 8 July 1929 BGC,9,9)."

310 Campbell to Maynard, Downing, Van Dusen, Boyson, 5 August 1929, BGC,1,84; and Campbell to Smith, 19 September 1929, BGC,9,9.

311 Smith to Campbell, 15 October 1929, BGC,9,9.

312 Downing to Grimwood, 28 November 1929, BGC,9,9.

313 At this point Campbell did not make clear who A.I.M. is apart from the Home Councils, but he was well along on a line of reasoning that ended up identifying A.I.M. with the A.H.C.
missions.\textsuperscript{314} It would appear that Campbell and the A.H.C. saw ownership of property to be related to the issue of final authority in the Mission. For each Home Council to have its own sphere would be permissible provided the A.H.C. held the property and had final authority over it. This was undesirable to Campbell,\textsuperscript{315} but would still be a united mission in his view. However, for each Home Council to have its own sphere, own its own property, and hence be its own final authority was not to have one mission, but the intolerable situation of separate, parallel missions, one for every Home Council.\textsuperscript{316} That it was intolerable for the B.H.C. to be subordinate to the A.H.C. was something that Campbell could never understand. The problem of how to have a home-governed mission with multiple Home Councils and no central authority

\textsuperscript{314}Campbell to Smith, 18 December 1929, BGC,9,9. The constitution was somewhat ambiguous on this point. Under the "Duties of the Home Councils" the constitution said that "no Mission property shall be sold or disposed of in any way without the approval of the Home Council responsible for that field" (A.I.M. Constitution" 1922, Article VIII, Section 5, BGC,11,11). This implied that each Home Council "owned" the Mission land in the fields that it supervised, and would seem to support the B.H.C.'s request. At the same time in the "Policy" section, the constitution stated "that all Mission and real estate of the AFRICA INLAND MISSION was the property of the Mission, to be disposed of only by action of the Home Councils with the approval of the General Director ... and the Central Executive Council" (A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Appendix Article II, Section 14, BGC,11,11). The A.H.C. through its Committee of Direction was claiming to be fulfilling the role of General Director and Central Executive Council, so would have construed this section as support for their own view.

\textsuperscript{315}In Campbell to Smith, 18 December 1929, BGC,9,9 Campbell made it quite clear that he did not approve of the creation of the British sphere, but consented to it only because of the pressure from the B.H.C.

\textsuperscript{316}This was the view of Hurlburt, himself, for when C. T. Studd wanted a "British Section" of A.I.M. that appointed its own officers, handled its own money, and had only its own missionaries, Hurlburt rejected the idea, because it would "practically mean the establishing of a new mission" ("British Home Council Minutes," 3 March 1913 cited in D. Anderson, p. 59).

Also behind Campbell's fear of the B.H.C. developing into a separate mission also lay the specter of Charles Hurlburt and the fear that the B.H.C. would appoint Hurlburt to direct their work in Africa (Campbell to Downing, 16 January 1930, BGC,1,84). Attempting once again to allay the A.H.C.'s fears, Roland Smith pointed out that far from having any intention "to invite Mr. Charles Hurlburt to return to the Mission", the B.H.C. had refused his request that it place missionaries from his Unevangelized Africa Mission on the field (Smith to Wadham, 25 January 1930, BGC,9,9).
had not yet been solved. Rather than risk further alienation by pushing the issue of a British sphere in American-dominated Kenya, the B.H.C. withdrew its request for the Eldoret area, and began seeking for an alternative British sphere. The Azande region of the Congo, the Arua area of Uganda and French Equatorial Africa were considered, but each suggestion was found to be unsuitable by one council or the other.\(^{317}\) Unable to decide on an alternative British sphere, the A.H.C. returned again to the Eldoret area of Kenya, the B.H.C.'s original suggestion.\(^{318}\) The B.H.C. quite readily accepted this new offer, and reassured the American missionaries in Kenya that their work would not be disrupted.\(^{319}\)

The disagreement appeared to be over. The A.H.C. approved the transfer of Eldoret to the B.H.C.\(^{320}\) and the reassignment of the South African missionary, Reg Reynolds, from the A.H.C. to the B.H.C. so he could head up the new British work.\(^{321}\) Campbell overrode Kenya Field objections to the inclusion of Kapsabet and Kabartonjo in the British sphere\(^{322}\) and instructed Kenya Field Council to cooperate

\(^{317}\) Smith to H. D. Campbell, 15 February 1930; Campbell to Smith, 28 March 1930; and Smith to Campbell, 13 June 1930, BGC,9,9.

\(^{318}\) Philpott, Wadham, Steele, Campbell to Smith, 25 July 1930, BGC,9,9.

\(^{319}\) Smith to Campbell, 5 December 1930, BGC,9,9.

\(^{320}\) Campbell to Smith, 14 January 1931, and 28 January 1931, BGC,9,9.

\(^{321}\) Campbell to Grimwood, 25 February 1931; and Campbell to Downing, 26 February 1931, BGC,1,84.

\(^{322}\) At first the Kenya Field Council was pleased that the B.H.C. was taking over the area from Eldoret to the north and that they did not intend to dislodge any missionaries. They merely hoped that the B.H.C. would not want a separate Field Council for their area, but would be content with representation on the Kenya Field Council (Downing to Campbell, 27 February 1931, BGC,1,84). However, the Kenya Field Council opposed including Kapsabet and Kabartonjo in the British sphere. The American missionary in the area did not want to work under the B.H.C., and the other missionaries were Australians, supported by the American General Fund. The Field Council did not know the ramifications for their support if these missionaries were transferred to the British sphere. Furthermore, the Kenya Field Council

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with the B.H.C. and do everything possible to help the British establish their sphere.323

However, in the process of working out the details of this new relationship, tensions arose that once again brought the American and British councils into conflict: disagreement over the continued utility of the Committee of Five,324 resentments over the transfer of missionaries from the American to the British sphere,325 questions concerning which council should support the transferred missionaries,326 and dissension over whether the British sphere should function within the existing field administration or whether it should have its own.327 The issue of land ownership broke out anew, when Campbell learned of the existence of the Africa Inland Trust in London328 by which the B.H.C. was able to own land and thus skirt the exclusive

resented not being consulted on either the transfer of the stations or the transfer of several missionaries from other parts of Kenya to the British sphere. Finally it had heard rumors that some members of the B.H.C. held fanatical holiness doctrines and wanted to change the name, constitution, and doctrine of the Mission (Downing to Campbell, 6 May 1931, BGC,1,84).

323Campbell to McKenrick, 3 February 1931, BGC,22,28; Campbell to Downing, 22 July 1931, BGC,10,5; and Campbell to Smith, 23 July 1931, BGC,9,9. Campbell to Downing, 14 January 1931; and Campbell to Davis, 5 August 1931, BGC,1,84.

324Campbell to Davis, 21 October 1931; Campbell to Downing, 11 November; Campbell to Miller, 21 March 1932, BGC,1,84; [Campbell?] to Garwood, n.d. [@May 1932]; and Campbell to Davis, 3 August 1932, BGC,1,84. Campbell to Garwood, 11 November 1931; and Garwood to Reynolds, 8 April 1932, BGC,9,9;

325Davis to Campbell, 11 September 1931, 13 October 1931; Campbell to Davis, 26 October 1931, BGC,1,84; and Downing, A. Barnett, E. Barnett to Campbell, 16 December 1931, BGC,10,5.

326Campbell to Garwood, 2 August 1932; "Extract from Minutes of the [British Home] Council Meeting, 14 October 1932, BGC,9,9; Davis to Campbell, 27 August 1932, BGC,1,84.

327Campbell to Davis, 28 June 1932, 3 August 1932; and Campbell to Downing, 11 November 1931, BGC,1,84. Garwood to Campbell, 16 October 1931; Campbell to Garwood, 11 November 1931; and Garwood to Reynolds, 8 April 1932, BGC,9,9;

328Campbell asked about the existence of an "Africa Inland Mission Trust" registered in London (Campbell to Garwood, 11 November 1931, BGC,9,9; and Campbell to Downing, 11 November 1931, BGC,1,84) and why Hurlbut had formed the Africa Inland Mission Trust and gave to it Mulango and other Ukamba stations, "which should be held by the parent home council for the whole society" (Campbell to Davis, 3 August 1932, BGC,1,84), instead of

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claims of the A.H.C. The B.H.C. simply informed the A.H.C. that it longer needed
ownership of Kapsabet and Kabartonjo, but would feel free to develop new stations
under its own ownership. The A.H.C. was left to fuss and fume about the necessity
of all Mission property being owned by A.I.M. (i.e. Africa Inland Mission, Inc.
registered in New York) and the inadmissibility of the B.H.C. or anyone else
developing stations on non-A.I.M. (i.e. Africa Inland Mission Trust) land, but
powerless to do anything about it.

3. The Controversy over Canada: 1932-1937

While the controversies over the creation of the British sphere still simmered,
a new dispute developed between the American and British councils over who had the
right to represent A.I.M.'s work in Canada. The A.H.C. had represented A.I.M.'s
work in Canada for years, and had recruited Canadian missionaries and developed a

giving them to the Africa Inland Mission, Inc. in New York ([H. D. Campbell?] to Garwood,
n.d. [@May 1932], BGC,1,84). This explains why Campbell and the A.H.C. were so insistent
that the ownership of A.I.M. property on the field could not be transferred from one Home
Council to other. In their minds the Africa Inland Mission, Inc. was not the same as the A.H.C.,
but was that which constituted A.I.M. as a legal entity, over above and incorporating all of
the different Home and Field Councils, and as such was the only body that could legally own
A.I.M. property. To the British, the Africa Inland Mission, Inc. was merely the name of the
trustees of the A.H.C., whereas the B.H.C.'s trustees were the Africa Inland Mission Trust
which had been formed during World War I to enable A.I.M. to receive ownership of the
Ukamba stations of the Leipzig Mission when the British colonial government would no longer
permit German missions to operate on British soil nor was willing to turn them over to an
American mission. The Africa Inland Mission Trust had been a convenient way of turning
A.I.M. into a "British" mission for the purposes of this land transfer and now became a
convenient way for the B.H.C. to own their own property in the British sphere. (Downing to
Campbell, 24 November 1931; and Davis to Campbell, 27 August 1932, BGC,1,84.)

Garwood to Reynolds, 8 April 1932; and "Extract from Minutes of the [British
Home] Council Meeting, 14 October 1932.;

Campbell to Garwood, 2 August 1932, BGC,9,9; and Campbell to Garwood, 10
August 1933, BGC,1,85.

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constituency of supporters in that country.331 Sometime in the early 1930's the Superintendent of the British Sphere in Kenya, Reg Reynolds, a South African married to a Canadian, visited Canada to interest his wife's family and friends in the new British work. The British Deputation Secretary, Mr. D. M. Miller, also visited Canada to hold a series of meetings to support the work of the Reynolds and a "Council of Reference" was formed to "inspire confidence and promote interest".332

The A.H.C. was alarmed when it learned of the B.H.C.'s actions in Canada and launched a two pronged protest to the B.H.C. Its first argument, which was strongest in its own eyes, but least likely to move the B.H.C., stated that when the final authority in the Mission was transferred from the field to homeland by the 1912 constitution, that authority was transferred solely to the A.H.C. Therefore, as the "parent body" and the "controlling council" only the A.H.C. had the authority to start new councils. The B.H.C., which had no authority outside of the British Isles, had no right to start its own council in Canada.333 The A.H.C.'s second argument was the one that went to the heart of the issue. Given the long years that the A.H.C. had worked in Canada and the constituency it had built up there, the activity of the B.H.C. in Canada was only bound to create confusion among the Mission's supporters and a destructive competition between the two Councils, a competition that Campbell feared would be to the detriment of the A.H.C. in particular.334

The B.H.C. rejected the A.H.C.'s constitutional argument maintaining that

331Campbell to Philpot, 17 August 1932, BGC,1,84; and Campbell to Garwood, 5 February 1935, BGC,9,9.

332Smith to Philpot, 26 July 1932, BGC,1,84; Davis, "Report of an Interview with Mr. D. M. Miller in London," 17 May 1933; and Garwood to Campbell, 21 March 1934, BGC,9,9.

333Campbell to Davis, 28 June 1932; Campbell to Philpot, 17 August 1932, BGC,1,84; and Campbell to Garwood, 21 February 1934, 1 August 1934, 5 February 1935, BGC,9,9.

334Campbell to Philpot, 17 August 1932, BGC,1,84; and Campbell to Garwood, 5 February 1935, BGC,9,9.

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Hurlburt as the General Director had provided the unity in the Mission, but now that there was no General Director "the administration of the Mission has completely altered." The B.H.C. somewhat weakly defended its actions as the natural follow up of the contacts of Reynolds' family and friends and further justified itself on the basis that Canada was British. The significance of the Council of Reference and Miller's meetings were minimized stating that "the Meetings were among friends of the British work who came by invitation" and "that no administrative functions were delegated, - a Council of Reference being only of an advisory character.

The truth was that each council had a "natural" interest in Canada, the A.H.C. by virtue of geography and the B.H.C. by culture. In dealing with Canada the options A.I.M. had were to make it the territory of one or the other home councils, create a Canadian Home Council, or let the American and British councils compete for the Canadian constituency. Without any sort of central authority, there was nothing to prevent the Mission from falling into the last option by default. It would appear that the activity of the B.H.C. did undermine the position of the A.H.C. in Canada, for Campbell wrote:

> From a letter just received from the Secretary of our Canadian Council [i.e. District Committee], I learned that our operations must cease and that the Canadian Committee be removed from our magazine. We are put to shame in

335 Garwood to Campbell, 21 March 1934, BGC,9,9. Also see Smith and Garwood to Campbell, 20 September 1934, BGC,9,9.

336 Smith to Philpot, 26 July 1932, BGC,1,84; Davis, "Report of an Interview with Mr. D. M. Miller in London," 17 May 1933; and Garwood to Campbell, 21 March 1934, BGC,9,9. I say "somewhat weakly", because when Dr. Elwood Davis asked Miller if the B.H.C. expected their work in Canada "to be limited to prayer interest in Mr. Reynolds,... he said 'No'". Furthermore the actions of sending their Deputation Secretary and establishing a Council of Reference would suggest that far more was intended than helping one missionary on deputation.


338 Smith and Garwood to Campbell, 20 September 1934, BGC,9,9.

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the eyes of our Canadian constituency.... It appears that Oswald Smith [pastor of the People's Church in Toronto] met Roland Smith and the British Council in London. Whatever they said to him induced him to call off all work in connection with our Committee....

In any event, the A.H.C.'s sense of grievance over the activity of the B.H.C. continued to be a source of tension between the two councils.

4. The Controversy over the S.A.G.M.: 1933-

The last point of controversy occurred late in 1933 when B.H.C. president, Roland Smith, reported that the Kenya colonial government had offered "one of its former 'Posts' at Kapsowar" to the British sphere of A.I.M., and the B.H.C. concluded an agreement with the South Africa General Mission for a cooperative effort to develop this new station. Perhaps because the B.H.C. had written that the S.A.G.M. "might unite forces with us", the A.H.C. assumed that the B.H.C. was planning a merger of the two missions and hotly declared its opposition to any "organic union with the S.A.G.M."

The B.H.C. objected that no merger or "organic union" was intended, but "an association for the purpose of the prosecution of a

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339 Campbell to Downing, 19 November 1936, BGC,20,12. If this was true, it would have been a public relations disaster for the A.H.C. and a coup for the B.H.C., for the People's Church was one of the largest churches in Toronto, and Oswald Smith one of the most influential figures among the churches in A.I.M.'s Canadian constituency.

Sandgren portrays the conflict between the A.H.C. and the B.H.C. over Canada as being primarily the fault of the A.H.C. for considering the B.H.C. actions "an affront to their pre-eminence in the AIM" (Sandgren, p. 77), but he does not consider that with the previous work of the A.H.C. in Canada, the actions of the B.H.C. would have created the kind of confusion and rivalry that potentially could have destroyed the Mission.


341 Smith to The Council of the Africa Inland Mission, 11 November 1933, BGC,1,85.

342 Campbell to Downing, 8 December 1933; and Campbell to Smith, 18 December 1933, BGC,1,85.
specific work." Refusing to be mollified, the A.H.C. continued to view the B.H.C.'s proposed cooperation with the S.A.G.M. as "a kind of union" and "confederation" and argued that significant differences existed between the S.A.G.M. and A.I.M. made such cooperation unwise. Furthermore, the A.H.C. argued, as a "subsidiary council" to the A.H.C., the B.H.C. had no right to form such a relationship with another mission or at the least should have consulted the A.H.C. first. The response of the B.H.C. was to point out that the cooperative project was immensely popular with its constituency in Britain, and then to proceed with its plans, simply ignoring the A.H.C.

The tension between the A.H.C. and the B.H.C. nearly reached the breaking point in 1934. Oddly enough, Campbell had taken a very cavalier attitude toward the danger of A.H.C.-B.H.C. schism from the beginning. As early as 1930 Campbell had suggested in response to the desire for a British sphere that "it would be far better for

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343 Garwood to Campbell, 15 January 1934, BGC,1,85. Also see: Garwood to Campbell, 21 March 1934, BGC,9,9.

344 Campbell to Downing, 22 January 1934, BGC,20,12.

345 Chicago District Committee, 27 January 1934, BGC,2,87.

346 Campbell to Downing, 8 December 1933, BGC,1,85; and Campbell to Downing, 22 January 1934, BGC,20,12.

347 Campbell to Downing, 22 January 1934, BGC,20,12; and Campbell to Garwood, 21 February 1934, BGC,9,9.

348 Campbell to Downing, 8 December 1933, BGC,1,85; Campbell to Garwood, 1 August 1934, 5 February 1935, BGC,9,9.

349 Smith and Garwood to Campbell, 20 September 1934, BGC,9,9.

350 In March 1934 Lee Downing reported that the B.H.C. and the British branch of the S.A.G.M. were sharing offices in London (Downing to Campbell, 7 March 1934, BGC,20,12). In July, the British Deputation Secretary announced that Dr. Leigh Ashton of the S.A.G.M. was among the new missionaries being sent out by A.I.M. and a missionary conference being held jointly with A.I.M. and S.A.G.M. (D. M. Miller, "Occasional Prayer Letter," July 1934, BGC,1,85).
the British council, if they wish a separation, to separate and enter as a new mission into some needy part of Africa.\textsuperscript{351} Over the next several years he maintained the expectation that the B.H.C. would form a separate mission, and piously insisted that the A.H.C. had done all it could to avoid such a break, so if it came it would be the fault of the B.H.C.\textsuperscript{352}

The proposed "union" between the B.H.C. and the S.A.G.M. was the last straw as far as Campbell was concerned. In a letter carefully drafted to express the opinion of the A.H.C., Campbell reviewed the American council's grievances against the British and concluded with the suggestion that the B.H.C. withdraw from A.I.M.:

We have long prayed and hoped that the misunderstandings and differences between the British Council and the North American Council might be put away, that we might work harmoniously together as brethren... We still desire this, if it can be brought to pass, but if you feel that you cannot work harmoniously with us, would it not be better for you to withdraw from the Africa Inland Mission, taking an entirely different name and go ahead in reaching unevangelized places and we would be interested with and for you and pray for your work as we would for other sister societies.\textsuperscript{353}

The British response was to express shock and dismay at this suggestion:

Lastly, the British Council notes with pained surprise your suggestion that it should sever its connections with the American Council. What your proposal would bring of regrets and possible misunderstandings on the Field, where the Missionaries have for so long worked together with perfect accord, we hesitate to imagine; nor can we believe that you fully understand the contribution which this country has made....\textsuperscript{354}

However, since the A.H.C. put forward the suggestion, the B.H.C. felt that it had to seriously consider it and planned to poll the opinions of its council members and

\textsuperscript{351}Campbell to Downing, 16 January 1930, BGC,1,84.

\textsuperscript{352}Campbell to Downing, 1 December 1931, 24 May 1932, BGC,1,84; and Campbell to Barnett, 9 May 1932, BGC,19,20.

\textsuperscript{353}Campbell to Garwood, 21 February 1934, BGC,9,9. For evidence that this proposal was made in earnest see: Campbell to Downing, 22 January 1934, BGC,20,12; and Chicago District Committee, 24 February 1934, BGC,2,87.

\textsuperscript{354}Garwood to Campbell, 21 March 1934, BGC,9,9.
missionaries.

How far Campbell would have gone in pushing the B.H.C. to leave the Mission if he had not been restrained by forces within the American branch of the A.I.M. is unknown. Shortly before his retirement, he complained that one of the other members of the Committee of Direction, Mr. H. M. Wadham, "hinders me in moves that I would make, ... with the British Council." The missionaries on the field were appalled at the thought of schism. Elwood Davis, usually Campbell's most ardent supporter, asked if the China Inland Mission and the Sudan Interior Mission could function successfully with councils in Britain and the United States, why could not A.I.M.? When hearing of impending schism, Lee Downing, the Kenya Field Director sent to Campbell an urgent message from the Kenya Field Council urging the A.H.C. "to move slowly in pressing for separation of British section," because "the British are in favor with Government here" and there was neither enough American workers nor finances to "provide for the work" without British help.

The American and British sections of Kenya were already cooperating, and at the very time Campbell was pushing for a final breach between the A.H.C. and B.H.C., the American missionaries were suggesting that the southern part of the Kamasia [i.e. Tugen] Reserve be transferred to the British sphere to provide better

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355 Campbell to R. Davis, 14 April 1937, BGC,20,1.

356 Indications of Davis' support of Campbell on the issues with the B.H.C. see: Davis to Campbell, 10 September 1932, 17 September 1932, BGC,1,84; and 8 March 1934, BGC,19,25. Davis's firm support of the A.H.C. on such issues as the dispute with the B.H.C. sometimes strained Davis' relations with other missionaries at Kijabe (Davis to Campbell, 21 April 1936, BGC,19,25).

357 Campbell to Davis, 10 February 1934, BGC,19,25. In this letter Campbell answered the question Davis had raised in a letter written to Campbell on 9 February 1934.

358 Downing to Campbell, 2 March 1934, BGC,20,12.
administration of the Kalenjin region as a whole. Campbell reacted angrily at the suggestion that the A.H.C. "turn over more territory to the British" when the two councils were at the point of separation and the B.H.C. continued to ignore "the rights of this parent body," and forbade the Kenya Field Council to go through with the land transfer. Showing a far more understanding and conciliatory approach to the B.H.C., Downing wrote that unity for the sake of the work should be the A.H.C.'s first priority. This lack of support from the field caused Campbell to backpeddle. He protested that the A.H.C. desired unity and was not pushing for separation, but the actions of the B.H.C. was causing it. He could not understand the "right about face on the part of" the American missionaries. He accused the Kenyan missionaries of being "pro-British", and pled for "loyalty to this [American] Home Council" asking that they do nothing "to embarrass this Home Council in our dealings with the British Council."

The B.H.C. seems to have handled this crisis like all of the others, by simply ignoring the A.H.C. The American missionaries in Kenya generally continued to

359 Downing to Campbell, 2 February 1934, BGC,20,12.

360 Campbell to Davis, 3 March 1934, BGC,19,25.

361 Campbell to Downing, 30 March 1934, and 26 April 1934, BGC,20,12.

362 Downing wrote: "We on the field believe we ought to waive some legitimate rights in order to get the Gospel as soon as possible into unreached places. That we understand, is the purpose of the affiliation of our British section with the S.A.G.M. (Downing to Campbell, 7 March 1934, BGC,20,12.)"

363 Campbell to Downing, 30 March 1934, 15 May 1934, BGC,20,12; and Campbell to Garwood, 1 August 1934, 5 February 1935, BGC,9,9.

364 Campbell to Davis, 28 April 1934, BGC,19,25.

365 Campbell to Downing, 15 May 1934, BGC,20,12.
oppose Campbell’s confrontational approach\textsuperscript{366} and continued determination to take offense at every action of the B.H.C.\textsuperscript{367} The stalemate and bad feelings continued to drag on.\textsuperscript{368} Reconciliation on the part of the A.H.C. was attempted only after Campbell retired and Ralph Davis became the General Secretary of the A.H.C.,\textsuperscript{369} and a structural solution was not finally reached until the 1955 constitution finally established Hurlburt’s international council.\textsuperscript{370}

**CONCLUSION**

A.I.M. was originally founded as a field-governed, democratically ordered mission. This idea, however, was undermined from the beginning by charismatic leadership on the field and dependency upon the homeland. During the short administration of Peter Cameron Scott, A.I.M. was a field-governed mission dominated by Scott’s charismatic leadership.

Charles Hurlburt created a mission centered around an authoritarian General

\textsuperscript{366}For evidence of the American missionaries in Kenya generally blaming the A.H.C. for the continuing bad relations with the B.H.C. see Campbell to Maynard, 23 January 1935, BGC,1,85; and Davis to Campbell, 21 April 1936, BGC,19,25.

\textsuperscript{367}Campbell objected to the transfer of a missionary from the American to the British sphere in Kenya as a violation of the agreement that established the British sphere (Campbell to Downing, 25 June 1936, 19 August 1936, BGC,20,12). Downing on the other hand saw this simply as the leading of God in the hearts of the missionaries involved (Downing to Campbell, 1 August 1936, BGC,20,12).

\textsuperscript{368}As late as 1938 a missionary was still writing that the B.H.C. had started their own, independent mission (Anderson to Tomkinson, 25 January 1938, BGC,20,12).

\textsuperscript{369}For some of the correspondence on the reconciliation efforts between the A.H.C. and the B.H.C. see: R. Davis to British Home Council, 18 July 1940, 15 August 1940, 15 August 1947, 9 April 1948; Henman to North American Home Council, 15 October 1947, BGC,1,85; and Henman to R. Davis, 16 February 1948, BGC,20,2;

\textsuperscript{370}On the agreement on the need to reorganize A.I.M. on an international basis see: Ferrin to Henman, 18 September 1948, BGC,20,2. For the constitutional provisions that established the International Council see: A.I.M. Constitution, 1955, Article VI, Article VII, KBA,17,6. For evidence of reconciliation and unity see: Thornberry to R. Davis, 22 September 1955, BGC,1,85.
Director. There was little democracy in the structure, though considerable freedom was given to the missionaries through considerations of their preferences of assignment and through benign neglect. The major tension during the Hurlburt years was field versus home government. With the opening of new branches of the mission on the field and in homelands, A.I.M. faced the problem of unity and the coordination of the work. The 1909 constitution clearly established A.I.M. as a field-governed mission with the General Director and Central Field Council, both on the field, as the authoritative and unifying structures. The 1912 constitution made A.I.M. a home-governed mission, but with no unifying structures. A degree of field-governance and unity remained in the person of the General Director, who remained the most powerful single force in the mission and resided on the field.

Hurlburt was a great man. He was the most farsighted missionary in A.I.M., capable of adjusting to changing circumstances and developing progressive policies in regard to ecumenism, African education, and the development of the African church. But he was a flawed man. His failure to provide effective leadership frustrated the missionaries and created resentment and turmoil, nearly destroying the Mission in 1925. The failure to implement Hurlburt's progressive policies was a hinderance to the development of the church in Kenya.

The result of the Hurlburt controversy was that A.I.M. was now clearly a home-governed mission with no power base on the field to challenge the power of the A.H.C. With no strong General Director to unify the Mission, A.I.M. nearly divided between its American and British Home Councils. On the field, the more conservative and cautious A.H.C. led by Henry Campbell prevented the Kenya field leadership from developing positive policies on African education and ordination, and thus slowed the development of the African church.

371 See below Chapter 7, pp. 311-317, 323-327, and Chapter 9, pp. 417-418.
CHAPTER FIVE
A.I.M. AS AN EVANGELISTIC MISSION:
PRINCIPLES OF EVANGELISM

A.I.M. was founded especially as an evangelistic mission. The conversion of men and women to faith in God through Jesus Christ was the raison d'être of the Mission. This principle was established in the first issue of *Hearing and Doing*:

> In this Soudan region are sixty millions of human beings who have never heard the name of Christ in praise, prayer, or promise. ... This vast host is to-day practically untouched by the message of Christ. ... They [the Peter Cameron Scott party] purpose to enter and do all that faith, and zeal, and love can do to aid in evangelizing the darkest spot in Africa's continent of darkness.¹

It was also enshrined in its constitution: "The object [of A.I.M.] shall be evangelization in Inland Africa, as God shall direct."² Why A.I.M. adopted this principle and what it meant to her is the subject of this chapter as A.I.M.'s theology of evangelism and motives for evangelism are examined. What happened when A.I.M. tried to apply this principle in Kenya is the subject of the following chapter, where the hindrances to evangelism, African responses, and strains produced within A.I.M. as this policy clashed with the African context are examined.

THEOLOGY OF EVANGELISM

A.I.M. espoused a soteriology that was common to late nineteenth century evangelicals in America, and could be summed up in the words of the immensely influential D. L. Moody as the "Three R's" of the gospel: "Ruin by sin, Redemption by

¹ *H&G* (January 1896): 4.

² A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article II, KBA: General Council. This remained the object of A.I.M. in every constitution throughout this period. The only alteration was to drop the word "Inland" in the 1912 revision.
In addition to these, a fourth "R", "Responsibility of the believer" would have expressed an additional Moody emphasis. This "responsibility" could be seen in two parts. One was the responsibility of the believer for his own moral and spiritual welfare found in the new Keswick piety which taught that the believer should live a life of "victory" over sin. The second part was the believer's responsibility for the moral and spiritual welfare of his neighbor, that is his responsibility for evangelism. Ever since the eighteenth century revivals, evangelicals had been concerned with both evangelism and social welfare, but in a manner that evangelism took precedence. However, during the years after the American Civil War a combination of social and theological conditions altered this balance to make evangelism virtually the sole activity of the church.

1. A.I.M.'s Doctrinal Statement

This soteriology came to be most completely expressed in the Doctrinal Statement in A.I.M.'s 1922 constitution. The reason for salvation was found in "the

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Sinfulness of Man, that all human beings are born with a sinful nature and those that reach moral accountability become sinners in thought, word and deed.\(^6\) The basis of salvation was the substitutionary atonement, "that the Lord Jesus Christ was the sinner's substitute before God."\(^7\) The means of acquiring salvation was only by the "grace [of God] through faith [in Jesus Christ], not of works."\(^8\) Salvation was to be experienced through a morally regenerating conversion that not only would enable the believer to enter an otherworldly heaven in the afterlife, but would change him to live a morally renewed life on earth.\(^9\) The results of salvation in this life would be a subjective sense of assurance that God had indeed saved the believer, and the outward working out of his new life by "the maintenance of Good Works."\(^10\) The importance of this salvation was of cosmic proportions for A.I.M. believed in "the Everlasting Blessedness of the saved and the Everlasting Punishment of the lost."\(^11\) Therefore, nothing then could be more important than "the evangelization of the World," and "the supreme mission of the people of God in this age is to preach the Gospel to every creature."\(^12\)

In order to be accepted by A.I.M., missionary candidates had to show at least a rudimentary knowledge of A.I.M.'s soteriology, though they rarely articulated it with this degree of formality. Typical was Miss Mabel Olsen's succinct statement of

\(^{6}\text{A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Article III, BGC,11,11.}\)

\(^{7}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{8}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{9}\text{This item stated that A.I.M. members believed in "the Necessity of the New Birth, that a man must be born again in order to enter the kingdom of God, and will show his regenerate life by His Christian walk" (A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Article III, BGC,11,11).}\)

\(^{10}\text{A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Article III, BGC,11,11.}\)

\(^{11}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{12}\text{Ibid.}\)
her understanding of the gospel:

She [Miss Olsen] said that her going to Africa was for the purpose of winning the lost to Christ. She would proceed to tell them of their need of a Savior. Then she would present to them the love of God for them by His sending His Son to die for them to save them from their sins. She believes that the heathen are lost without Christ.13

2. The Lost Condition of Humanity

These same themes, particularly the sinful and lost condition of humanity and the necessity of knowing Christ, were repeated over and over again by A.I.M. missionaries. In one of the most graphic descriptions of Africa's need, as the missionaries saw it, Thomas Allan included several aspects of A.I.M.'s view of Africa's lost condition:

The more we know of the Wakamba, the more vile, naturally, do they appear to us. Their degradation is something awful and appalling in the extreme. ... Surely they are under Satan's dominion and power - utterly depraved and unlovely. Yet these are souls for whom Christ died - and how precious they must be in His sight, as He looks forward to seeing some of them quickened by His risen life. Their very sinfulness and indifference cries out to us, a need and a cry that is stronger than words can express. ...

When all their sin and its sad consequences so manifest in their bodies, - stunted and full of disease, - they seem to have no realization of the enormity of sin,... Truly, they are altogether dead in their sins, almost past feeling. Yet so were we in time past. ... Their ideas concerning the future life are very hazy, nor do they have any hope of the resurrection of the body, like all heathen people, for they know no risen Christ. Therefore, few corpses are buried,... Even their songs, beautiful as they are in some respects, have a sad and minor strain to them, - no real joy or true peace. It is the echo of a need that they are not aware of; they do not seek God, but, oh, how great is their need of Him and of His blessed Son [emphasis in original].14

The first was the moral aspect. The African was "vile" and "sinful", "indifferent" to his sin. He was "depraved" and living in "degradation", implying that he had fallen from a higher cultural state.

13 Minneapolis District Committee" 26 July 1937, BGC,7,109.

14 "H&D (October 1897): 2-3. This view was not unique to A.I.M. and was shared by most missionaries of the day (Bosch, pp. 289-290).

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Second was the eschatological aspect. Africans had no "hope of the resurrection." Objectively speaking, they had no hope because their sin has made them guilty before God, so upon death they faced eternal judgement.

The third aspect of the "lostness" of Africa was the existential. The lost condition of the African was not limited to his "spiritual" state (i.e. religious questions of morality and the afterlife), but extended to his existence in the here and now. From observing Kamba songs and death customs, Allan concluded that because they knew nothing of the afterlife, Africans lived their lives without the subjective experience of hope, joy or peace. But the existential aspect of the lostness of Africa referred to more than just such "religious" emotions. Allan saw the health problems of the people as stemming from their fallen condition. Other things that A.I.M. missionaries attributed to the fallen condition of Africa were war, famine, and plague.

The missionaries' mentioned this final aspect of the lostness of Africa less, but it was still important. They viewed Africa as sinned against as much as sinner, victim as much as perpetrator, oppressed as much as oppressor. Sometimes the missionaries had specific instances of physical, economic, or cultural oppression in mind, but often, they "spiritualized" the issue, placing it in the cosmic battle between Good and

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15 The editor of Hearing and Doing put it this way: "They die without hope because they die without Christ" (H&D (April-May 1902): 2).

16 H&D (Supplement to April 1896): 9.

17 H&D (May 1899): 6; (June 1899): 5; and (July 1899): 5.

18 H&D 6 (July-August 1902): 5-6.

19 For example Peter Cameron Scott and Walter Wilson each condemned the inhumane way porters were commonly treated on caravans (H&D (Supplement of April 1896): 6; and (December 1896):6). Charles Hurlburt condemned the sexual exploitation of the African women by the soldiers and traders moving into Kikuyuland (H&D (May-June 1903): 11-12).
Evil in the universe. Allan saw the Kamba "under Satan's dominion and power". The editor of Hearing and Doing wrote: "For centuries the 'god of this world' [i.e. Satan] has blinded the minds of these people,..."21

When looking at the A.I.M.'s belief that Africans were "lost", it is important to keep two things in mind. The first is that though the language used was often harsh, their writings were full of biblical allusions, and not to be taken with complete literalness. For example the quote immediately above is an illusion to II Corinthians 4:4. When Allan wrote that the people were "altogether dead in their sins", he was using the language of Ephesians 2:1.22

Secondly, it is important to recognize that for A.I.M. missionaries, this was not a racist doctrine, but was an application of a belief concerning the universal condition of mankind to the specific people among whom they were working. The

20The American Civil War and humanitarian efforts to help the freed slaves during reconstruction would have gone a long way assuaging feelings of guilt over slavery that had provided a strong missionary motive in years past.


22Willis Hotchkiss complained about "the half-hearted efforts made in these days to; carry the light to those who sit in darkness" in an obvious illusion to Isaiah 9:1-2 H&D (June 1897): 5). On another occasion he exclaimed, "Oh, as I stand on some of these hills and look down upon these teeming millions having no hope and without God in the world my heart aches for them", using the words of Ephesians 2:12 rather than making an anthropological statement about African religion (H&D (February 1897): 5).

David Sandgren misinterpreted an allusion to Ephesians 6:12 and the use of the imagery of spiritual battle in a letter from Charles Youngken as a condemnation "of all African society as evil" (David P. Sandgren, "The Kikuyu, Christianity and the Africa Inland Mission," Ph.D. thesis (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976), pp. 83-84). Youngken was not referring to African culture and society, but was using these images to describe in general terms the missionaries' frustrations in their work. In the same letter Youngken presented a very sympathetic portrayal of an African chief and mentions numerous African customs, some contrary to traditional Christian morality without offering a word of criticism (Charles Youngken to "Fishermen Fellows," 8 October 1915, BGC,12,46).

23I am not arguing that A.I.M. missionaries did not have racist attitudes or beliefs, nor that they did not act in a racist manner at times, nor that they may not have applied the doctrine of human depravity in a racist manner at times.

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A.I.M. "Doctrinal Basis" stated that "all human beings are born with a sinful nature...[emphasis added]."²⁴ Peter Cameron Scott wrote: "He [Christ] saw, with a pitying eye of love ... a world lying in darkness, a world filled with anguish and woe [emphasis added]."²⁵ Neither was this doctrine merely a condemnation of the "Other",²⁶ for in the midst of his description of African depravity, Allan could write: "Yet so were we in time past." Africans were not "lost" in all these different ways because they were African, but because they were human.

3. The Love of God

While the emphasis on the lostness of Africa stood out the strongest, it was only one side of the coin. The other side was the love and mercy of God. Allan stated above that despite their sin, Africans "are souls for whom Christ died - and how precious they must be in His sight,... He [God] loves them as He does Europeans and Americans."²⁷ The love of God prevented the emphasis on the lostness of the "heathen" from dehumanizing them. Norman Russell argued that though the "heathen" are lost without Christ, missionaries must never lose sight of their humanity:

To him [the missionary] the millions of non-Christian lands cannot be mere atoms of uninteresting humanity, but men of like passions with ourselves, and with the same capacities for joy and suffering and the same reachings out

²⁴See above pg. 199.
²⁵H&D (January 1897): 12.
²⁶This is Elizabeth Isichei's term (Elizabeth Isichei, A History of Christianity in Africa: From Antiquity to the Present (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1995), pg. 90).
²⁷H&D (October 1897): 2-3. Scott also wrote: "Oh, for the gift of tongues that we might make known the matchless love of God, revealed in Christ Jesus!" H&D (Supplement to April 1896): 10). And Hurlburt wrote: "The opportunity is now presented to the Christian world of bringing the knowledge of the infinite grace of God as manifested in Christ Jesus to them [the Wakamba]" (H&D (March 1899): 6).

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4. A.I.M.'s Apologetic

Not everyone, of course, took such a dim view of the religious condition of the non-Christian peoples of the world. Consequently A.I.M. felt constrained to defend their position. In 1900 *Hearing and Doing* reprinted an article entitled "Are the Heathen Lost?" written by James Gray, future president of Moody Bible Institute. Dr. Gray began by framing the issue.

The argument presented is something like this: - There are hundreds of millions of heathen who do not know the gospel and have never heard of Jesus Christ, but it is not their fault that this is the case, and God who is just and loving will not punish them for that for which they are not to blame.29

He attempted to answer this with a four-point argument. First, "the heathen are not lost because they do not know the gospel ... but because they are sinners like all the rest of the world." Second, "the heathen are not only sinners, but accountable for their sin." Rom.1:18-25 and evidence that non-Christians have consciences and believe in a "Supreme God" proved that the "heathen" once had the revelation of God, but corrupted it, so are without excuse. Third, Dr. Gray argued, the heathen were not part of an evolution of religious progress. Rather the Bible, history and the testimony of missionaries showed that the reverse was true. And finally, "we have no right to believe ... that the heathen will have another chance after death." Apart from the preaching of the gospel, Dr. Gray could hold out only this slim hope:

If any individual heathen is now living up to the light he already has, and we may hope that there are such, God in mercy and love will undoubtedly give him more light. ... That is, some way or some how that man will be brought to

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Therefore, Dr. Gray concluded, it was the Christians’ duty to take the gospel to the heathen.

Whether Dr. Gray’s argument convinced any true skeptic is doubtful, but A.I.M. missionaries took up this apologetic, and it contributed to their missionary motivation. With the coming of the rains to Ukambani, a number of Thomas Allan’s African neighbors became sick and died. After describing these deaths and the burial customs of the Kamba, Allan wrote:

Into what blackness of darkness do these poor people enter at death, we know not. Some people at home, and here too, would have us believe that there is hope beyond for such as these; but, alas! they themselves know but too well, that with all their load of willful and daily sins upon them, there is no hope, nothing but dark despair, for only the pure in heart can or shall see God. They may, and doubtless will, receive a lesser degree of punishment than the unregenerate in Christian lands, but they are none the less sinners, and sadly aware of it, and to be consciously shut out of God’s presence is enough.

[emphasis in original].

The morning rituals and other death customs were seen by Allan to indicate that the Kamba faced death knowing that they were cut off from God by their sin. Interestingly enough, Allan considered that due to their ignorance, Africans were less culpable for their sin than those from "Christian" lands. Hence Africans would be judged less severely. Their punishment would be more the denial of blessing than the infliction of misery.

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30 Ibid., p. 2.
32 In the long passage quoted above (p. 200), Allan saw the Africans’ lost condition to be due to ignorance, and something to be pitied rather than condemned. To prove his case, Gray had appealed to both scripture and missionaries’ observations of non-Christian cultures. Allan appealed to his observation of Kamba culture. Willis Hotchkiss used Gray’s arguments from scripture and came to a more stark conclusion than Allan (H& D (June 1897): 5). Both Allan and Hotchkiss used their arguments for the lost condition of non-Christian peoples as a strong motivation for missionary service.

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With this view of the lost estate of humanity, of the absolute necessity of the
gospel of Jesus Christ, and with eternity hanging in the balance, it is no wonder that
A.I.M. saw evangelism as the first priority of every Christian. It was most certainly,
the first priority of A.I.M.

MISSIONARY MOTIVATION

Examining motivation is a tricky business. Rarely, if ever, do people act from
"pure" motives. Very often their motives are a mixture of the noble and the ignoble.33
This then raises the danger of becoming sanctimonious in one's analysis. Nevertheless,
in order to understand A.I.M. as an evangelistic mission, what motivated its
missionaries must be examined, even if briefly.

1. Need

A.I.M.'s theology of evangelism largely determined what drove A.I.M.
missionaries. Therefore, the greatest motive for missionary work to which A.I.M.
missionaries appealed was the great "need" in Africa. This motivation followed
naturally from a theology that placed such a strong emphasis on the "lostness" of
people without Christ.

To win the "lost" was the most common reason given by candidates as to why they wanted to go to Africa. Miss Dorothy Lehman felt "called to service in Africa,
first, because of the condition of lost souls as described in 2 Cor. 4:3,4."34 The greater
"need" of the peoples inland caused the first missionaries to decide not to settle within

33See Bosch's analysis (Bosch, pp. 286-291) of how "Jesus' love" as a motive for
mission could produce not only commitment, dedication, and a genuine concern for others, but
also pity, condescension, and patronizing charity.

34Chicago District Committee, 27 February 1937, BGC,3,1. Miss Blanche Westgate's
"main purpose in going to Africa is to win the lost for Christ" (Minneapolis District Committee,
19 December 1938, BGC,7,109).

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a hundred miles of the coast.\textsuperscript{35}

This "need" included the physical and social problems of Africa. When Charles Hurlburt was passing through Nairobi, he observed the burning of Asian shops and homes to get rid of the plague, causing him to lament: "Poor, poor cursed Africa. It seems as though the fiercest of the devil's fires is burning here continually. When shall she be evangelized and all this changed?"\textsuperscript{36} Physical suffering was doubly tragic for it had eternal as well as temporal consequences. Therefore, it could serve to intensify the urgency to evangelize. Ruth Collins, a nurse at Kijabe hospital, wrote:

The tendency often is, in emergency cases brought in by the people themselves, for the arrival to be too late to enable anything to be done. These cases form ample illustration of the need for urgency in the preaching of the Gospel, that men and women may accept life at God's hand before it is too late.\textsuperscript{37}

Though the missionaries were well aware of the temporal needs of the African people, and were moved by them, their "spiritual" needs still moved the missionaries the most, as illustrated by this rather blunt appeal:

...the great bulk of the human family has perished, and will, in this century, continue to perish, not unsaved only but unwarned! For such a state of things, no adequate apology or excuse [for not evangelizing the world] is possible.\textsuperscript{38}

2. Burden

This emphasis on Africa's great "need" often produced a complex of overlapping responses. The Mission expected every missionary to have a "burden" for Africa, a strong, subjective sense of responsibility for meeting the "need". It is said

\textsuperscript{35}H&D (January 1897): 8-9.

\textsuperscript{36}H&D (July-August 1902): 6. During their first journey inland, Scott and his party heard the news of the destruction of a trading caravan by the Masai in the Kedong Valley causing him to exclaim: "Will poor Africa never be at rest?" (H&D (Supplement to April 1896): 9-10).

\textsuperscript{37}R. and T. Collins to Friends, 8 April 1945, BGC,19,22.

\textsuperscript{38}H&D (July-August 1902): 14.

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that before founding A.I.M., Scott used to pace the floor saying, "I must go. I must go. They are perishing." Russell argued that every missionary must have a "burden for souls". This he defined as a sense of identity with the humanity of non-Christian peoples, a conviction of their lostness without Christ, and a love for them even as they are now.

3. Love

Love, therefore, was another response that was to be called forth by the need and become a motivation for evangelism. In answer to the question, "What is your purpose in going to Africa?" missionary candidate, Mae Forseth, replied, "The love of Christ constraineth me." By this Miss Forseth may have been saying that her love for Christ was her motivation. A Hearing and Doing article reviewed several different motivations for mission to conclude: "the believer's affection for the person of Christ will ever remain, next to the Lord's love to him, his strongest motive to go and preach." On the other hand, Miss Forseth may have been saying that it was her experience of the love of Christ and her knowledge that He loved all men that impelled her to tell others of that love. Scott declared his burning desire to "make

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39Draft of Mr. Hess' Comments Concerning the Beginnings of the A.I.M." n.d., BGC, 12,45. Thomas Allan also expressed a strong "burden" for the lost: "The Lord is laying heavily upon my heart these days, the burden of an intense desire for the salvation of not only these Wakamba around us, but also for the vast multitudes in these inland provinces near us, and I have no rest in my spirit, night and day, and often am awake nearly all the night long. I can find some relief only in pouring out my heart to the Lord of the harvest, praying for workers for each of these great sections, and then on towards the Soudan, fully a thousand miles away, and not a witness for Christ (H&D (January 1898): 6).

40Russell, p. 3.

41Minneapolis District Committee, 18 December 1939, BGC, 7,109.

42H&D (July 1899): 2.

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known the matchless love of God, revealed in Christ Jesus!" Allan saw God's love giving the African people infinite value, and this motivated him to evangelism. A.I.M. missionaries were motivated themselves by love for the African people. Hearing and Doing declared that the missionaries would "do all that faith, and zeal, and love can do to aid in evangelizing" Africa. Referring to the African people around him, Willis Hotchkiss declared, "My heart aches for them." Again Hotchkiss wrote that he was "moved with compassion" for them. Ideally, missionary motivation was not a choice between these different "loves", but a combination of them all. Russell argued that the missionary must recognize that the lost were "precious" to God and love them too. Hotchkiss found great comfort in the knowledge of God's love and hoped that he would be able to reflect that love to the African people around him.

4. Faith

In face of the greatness of the "need", it would be easy for would-be missionaries to dismiss the task as impossible. Therefore, the missionaries also had to be motivated by a strong faith in the providence and power of God. Scott found it hard to live among the Kamba and be unable to tell them the gospel because he did not yet know their language. However, his faith in the providence of God prevented
him from becoming discouraged.\textsuperscript{50} When Hotchkiss was tempted to discouragement, he reflected on the power of God.\textsuperscript{51} To him, discouragement was the great enemy of missionary work, which must be countered by a firm belief that world evangelism was possible.\textsuperscript{52}

5. Duty

If the "need" was the first motive that drew the missionaries to Africa, "duty" was the motive that drove them there.\textsuperscript{53} This "duty" was conceived to be obedience to the "last command" of Jesus Christ, often referred to as the "Great Commission". Though Matthew 28:18-20, Luke 24:46-49, and Acts 1:8 were all considered to be expressions of this "commission", A.I.M. seemed to have preferred the form found in Mark 16:15. At the end of his first year in Africa, Scott used this verse to challenge the folks back home:

Ever since that memorable day when the power of God lifted our Lord into the Glory, there has come thundering through the ages, that last command to the church: "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature."

Hast thou gone? If not; why?\textsuperscript{54}

This command was viewed as having a single focus, evangelization of the lost, and to be the most basic of all missionary motivation. One author in \textit{Hearing and Doing} reduced the church's entire mission to preaching, leaving the results to God:

The command to publish the gospel to all nations was given to God's

\textsuperscript{50}\textit{H&D} (May 1896): 4.

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{H&D} (April 1897): 6.


\textsuperscript{53}Reviewing the origins of A.I.M., \textit{Hearing and Doing} noted: "...with the great need before them and the divine commission behind them, the Africa Inland Mission began its work,..." \textit{(H&D} (January-February 1901): 8)."

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{H&D} (January 1897): 12.
people.... Both the substance and the method are comprehended in His simple command—Go! Preach! He nowhere commanded them to regenerate the world. The church is not made primarily responsible for its conversion. Not a word is said about civilizing. Education is not mentioned. It is simply Go, Preach. ... The primary motive in all missionary work must ever be the spirit of obedience to the Lord's command.55

This author saw obedience as the "primary motive" to missions. A later writer, however, saw obedience as the only motivation a missionary needed:

The spirit of Missions is the spirit of Obedience. There is no justification for missions that is either possible or needful, except the plain, explicit, repeated command of Christ. We have our "marching orders;" that is enough. (Mark 16:15).56

6. Premillenialism

Other motives for evangelism arose from premillennialism. Premillennialists believed that the return of Jesus Christ was imminent. Many also believed that "the only thing standing in the way of Christ's return was that not every person in the world had heard the Good News and had chosen whether to accept or to reject it."57 In light of this one may wonder why premillennialism was not included as part of A.I.M.'s theology of evangelism. It was omitted for two reasons. First, A.I.M. did not seem to hold this theological connection between the parousia and world evangelism.58 And secondly, premillennialism does not seem to be as important to A.I.M. as is sometimes thought.59 Instead of seeing world evangelism as the necessary

56 H&D (July-August 1902): 14.
57 Robert, pp. 37; also see pp. 40-41 and Bosch, pp. 316-317.
58 I did not find this view expressed either in the pages of the Mission magazine or in the letters of the missionaries.
59 Part of the purpose of Hearing and Doing was to propagate A.I.M.'s views. During 1896-1900 Hearing and Doing published 34 articles on Keswick piety and only six on premillennialism. The years following saw no increase in articles on premillennialism. The missionaries mentioned the second coming occasionally in their letters, but not very often. In

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prerequisite to Christ's return, A.I.M. saw it first as a hope and comfort in times of adversity, second as a stimulus to evangelism and holy living for the time was short, third as an expression of love for Christ, and finally as a reminder that even Christians would have to give an account for the work they have done in this life.

In the dark days after the death of Scott, Thomas Allan found great comfort in the hope of the Second Coming:

Our God in His grace has been preparing the mission for greater work, we believe, by ... bringing the coming of His Son very near and real to us. Surely the dawn is not very far distant. When we rise in the morning we say, "Will He come to-day?" And as we retire we ask, "Will it be to-night?"

Premillennialism added urgency to the need for evangelism, because the Second Coming was expected to be the time of ultimate judgement: eternal life for the saved and everlasting punishment for the lost. Allan picked up this theme in his next letter and concluded: "Therefore, how earnest we should be in winning souls, and

1922 premillennialism was dropped from the A.I.M. "Doctrinal Basis" altogether (A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Article III, BGC,11,11).

The impression that premillennialism was central to A.I.M. may have come from John Mbiti's New Testament Eschatology in an African Background: A Study of the Encounter between New Testament Theology and African Traditional Concepts (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) in which Mbiti used the premillennialism of A.I.M. and the Africa Inland Church as practiced by Kamba believers as a foil against which to compare his own version of realized eschatology. As a source for understanding the A.I.M./A.I.C. Mbiti must be used with caution. First, his primary interest was in putting forth his own view of eschatology. Second, Mbiti and A.I.M./A.I.C. conceived of eschatology as covering different areas of theology. Mbiti viewed eschatology as dealing with matters of Christian living and relationship with Christ now, in this life, as well as in a future "consummation". A.I.M./A.I.C. considered that issues of Christian living and relationship with Christ in this life to be under the doctrine of sanctification. Under the doctrine of eschatology, A.I.M./A.I.C. placed only matters of the ultimate consummation. When Mbiti did not find matters of this life in A.I.M./A.I.C.'s eschatology, it was not because they were not concerned about these issues, but Mbiti was looking for them in the wrong place. Finally, Mbiti's study is now over a quarter of a century old. Whether premillennialism dominated the A.I.C. Kamba in the 1950s and 1960s to the extent that Mbiti claimed or whether they interpreted it with the degree of wooden literalism that Mbiti described, I cannot judge. I can only say that Kamba students coming to the A.I.C. Bible college where I teach do not express any particular interest in matters of futurist eschatology. Their primary concern is the practical application of theology to daily life here and now.


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especially we should be warning our unsaved friends and loved ones, who may be eternally separated from us, should they delay until too late.\textsuperscript{61} Other missionaries gave this as one of the reasons why they became missionaries.\textsuperscript{62}

A 1899 \textit{Hearing and Doing} article portrayed premillennialism as an expression of the missionary's deep love for Christ and longing to be with Him. This "love for the person of Christ" was viewed as one of the strongest motivations to missionary service.\textsuperscript{63}

This same article also saw premillennialism providing motivation to evangelism because it reminded the missionary that he was accountable to God for his faithful service because Christ was returning "for a reckoning".\textsuperscript{64} Andrew Andersen felt this urgency. After reviewing the work among the Kalenjin, he concluded: "It looks to me as if God is at last giving us a chance of preaching the Gospel everywhere so we can have no excuse when we appear before Him. May God help us for I believe our work in this earth is about finished."\textsuperscript{65}

In addition to these, other motives were occasionally mentioned: love for the

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{H&D} (October 1897): 2.

\textsuperscript{62}Hulda Stumpf combined her belief in the Second Coming with the "need" in Africa to explain her reason for becoming a missionary ("Application to the Home Council of the Africa Inland Mission," 7 December 1906, BGC,24,22).

Dr. Elwood Davis gave as his reasons for becoming a missionary: duty, the Second Coming, and the need: "Realizing the greatness of our commission and the nearness of the return of our Lord, seeing the shortage of workers existing at our various stations and the conditions that handicap their fullest efficiency, and having a great desire to see these souls saved for Christ, their Redeemer, I want to do all in my power to help in carrying the Gospel to all the world (Davis to Palmer, 6 November 1912, BGC,12,46)."

\textsuperscript{63}\textit{H&D} (July, 1899): 1-2.

\textsuperscript{64}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{65}Andersen to Fletcher, 11 June 1918, BGC,19,4.

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work, the need to stop the spread of Islam, and even engagement to a missionary candidate. However, the perception of a great "need" in Africa, a "burden" to meet that need, love of God and of the "lost", hope in the power and providence of God, and a sense that the time is short because Christ's return was near, these provided the primary motivation. No doubt the "need" was exaggerated, or not even an African "need" at all, but a missionary need, "nurtured in their own culture." No doubt the missionaries' "burden" and "love" too often became pity, condescension, patronizing charity, and paternalism. However, our object is not to judge the motives of the missionaries, but to make one simple point. Given the theology and motives that drove the A.I.M. missionaries, it is no wonder that they considered evangelism to be their primary task.

**PRIORITY OF EVANGELISM**

1. In Policy

   During the second half of the nineteenth century, mission enthusiasts became disillusioned with the practice of linking evangelism with commerce and civilization. Vast sums of money had been spent and few converts were made, and many of these

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68 Chicago District Committee, 27 February 1937, BGC, 3, 1. However, it must be noted that generally care was taken that this not be a candidate's primary reason for wanting to be a missionary. See above Chapter 2, pp. 42-43.

69 See Bosch, p. 290.


71 See Bosch, pp. 288-290.

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seemed more interested in the commerce than in Christianity. The missionaries and missionary societies themselves seemed to have become so preoccupied with administration, that little was time left for evangelism. 72 Given the immensity and urgency of the evangelistic task, limited resources could no longer be diverted from evangelism to social welfare programs, good in and of themselves, but ultimately of secondary importance. 73

Reflecting this new thinking in missionary strategy, the priority of evangelism over all mission activities was established in A.I.M. from its inception. The organizational meeting that established A.I.M. adopted the position that "in view of the many untouched millions, we feel called to do a thorough evangelistic work, rather than to build up strong educational centers." 74 The priority of evangelism was not stated explicitly in the Mission's first constitution, but was implied in the Mission objective: "The object shall be evangelization in Inland Africa, as God shall direct." 75 What was implicit in the first constitution was made explicit in later revisions. In 1912 a "Preamble" was added to the constitution which stated explicitly A.I.M.'s belief in the priority of evangelism: "the speedy evangelization of the world is the first duty of the Church." 76 This was made part of the A.I.M. doctrinal statement in 1922. 77

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74 Excerpts: Minutes First Council of A.I.M. [1895-1901], compiled 19 October 1942, BGC,12,45.

75 A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article II, KBA: General Council.

76 A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Preamble, BGC,11,11.

77 A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Article III, BGC,11,11.

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2. In Missionary Recruitment

The Mission carefully examined candidates on their reasons for wanting to be a missionary, and the only "correct" answer was that they wanted to engage in evangelism, usually expressed by the desire to "win souls" or to "win the lost". Care was also taken to determine that evangelism was the principle reason for going. Thus Miss Elizabeth Russ, a nurse with considerable business experience made it clear that she was going to African for evangelism. Evangelism was more important than the education of the missionaries' own children. Miss Whitlock applied to teach at Rift Valley Academy, but she made it clear that "her main purpose of going to Africa would be the salvation of souls." Evangelism was to have priority even over other forms of religious work. Hubel Lemley "felt especially called to a Bible teaching ministry" but had to also emphasize that "he recognized the need of giving the natives

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78For examples see: Chicago District Committee, 30 March 1935, 27 April 1935, 28 November 1936, 27 February 1937, 27 November 1937, 29 October 1938, BGC,2,87; and "Minneapolis District Committee, 26 July 1937, 18 December 1938, BGC,7,109). These may reflect stock phrases that the secretaries used in taking the minutes, but the phrases were also common enough to have been the stock answers given by the candidates themselves.

Negatively, when one candidate was asked to tell what qualifications he thought a missionary should have, it was noted that "he did not mention a passion for souls", though he seems to have redeemed himself because "afterward he mentioned the need of preaching the gospel" (Chicago District Committee, 25 April 1936, BGC,2,87).

79Chicago District Committee, 27 April 1935, BGC,2,87. Miss Eugene Brown had applied to another missionary society but withdrew her application because it "seemed to emphasize education rather than spiritual work" (Chicago District Committee, 28 March 1936, BGC,2,87). The Chicago District Committee strongly admonished a single man and a couple on the importance of evangelism over education (Chicago District Committee, 27 April 1935, 26 October 1935, BGC,2,87).

80Chicago District Committee, 29 April 1939, BGC,2,87. Sandgren accuses A.I.M. of hypocrisy for providing education for its own children while opposing African education, an accusation repeated by Isichei (Sandgren, pp. 157-158; Isichei, p. 90). Not only does this accusation beg many questions, it is inaccurate that A.I.M. recruited trained teachers for R.V.A. Throughout this period A.I.M. opposed the recruitment of specialist missionaries to teach their own children at Rift Valley Academy (Davis to Nixon, 18 April 1938; and Campbell to Davis, 25 May 1938, BGC,19,25). Rather the school was staffed by general missionaries, some of whom were assigned there by necessity, not by choice.

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the gospel first." The Chicago District Committee, 28 September 1935, BGC, 2, 87.

82 Chicago District Committee, 30 November 1928, BGC, 2, 87.

83 Minneapolis District Committee, 26 July 1937, BGC, 7, 109.

84 Chicago District Committee, 17 July 1937; and 25 September 1937, BGC, 2, 87.

85 Chicago District Committee, 20 October 1938, BGC, 2, 87.

86 Chicago District Committee, 29 October 1938, BGC, 2, 87.

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that A.I.M. would emphasize missionary methods aimed at direct evangelism. A Hearing and Doing article reviewing the history and nature of the Mission described the methods that A.I.M. would use. First, A.I.M. would not settle in areas already being evangelized by other missions, but would go "where He was not known" and pioneer evangelism in new areas. Second, methods of direct evangelism would be used, "such methods as would most quickly and clearly make Christ known to all." Third, "civilizing and purely humanitarian work" was not ruled out, but it was to be held "subordinate to and as an incident or result of EVANGELIZATION [Emphasis in original]". Finding the proper "balance" between the "evangelizing" work of the Mission and its "humanitarian" work would prove to be a major tension within A.I.M. Finally, it was anticipated that Africans themselves, "native evangelists", would be the primary instruments of spreading the gospel throughout Africa.

CONCLUSION

A.I.M. missionaries viewed religion primarily in moral and ultimate terms. They believed that all mankind were sinners before God, that salvation from sin could only be found in faith in Jesus Christ, and that the consequences of this decision effected one's eternal destiny. One of the consequences of this belief was to emphasize the moral, eschatological, and existential "lostness" Africa. Another consequence was that A.I.M. missionaries could not see any redemptive value in the traditional African religions.

A.I.M. missionaries, then, were drawn first by what they perceived to be Africa's great "need", a need that was perceived as physical, social, but above all spiritual. This need evoked a great sense of responsibility or "burden" to go to Africa.

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97 H&D (January-February 1901): 9. John Stauffacher believed that few missionaries were needed and that they should not remain in one place for a long time. Rather they should quickly train African evangelists and then move on to new areas (Stauffacher, "Side Tracked," pp. 3-6).

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to meet the need and a love for the African people, and required faith in the providence and power of God. Obedience to the divine commission to evangelize compelled the missionaries to go. Premillenialism served the missionaries as a comfort, an expression of their love for Christ, and lent urgency and a sense of accountability to the task.

In light of the ultimate consequences of evangelism and the urgent need for evangelism in Africa, it was natural that evangelism would receive the highest priority among the Mission's activities. This was embedded in the A.I.M. constitution and reflected in its recruiting practices. In A.I.M.'s missionary strategy, methods of direct evangelism, including the use of African evangelists, were to take precedence over "civilizing and humanitarian" work. In principle this missionary strategy could have resulted in the transmission of Christianity to Africa with the least amount of cultural change. However, A.I.M. found it far easier to formulate these principles in the homeland than to actually put them in practice on the field.
CHAPTER SIX
A.I.M. AS AN EVANGELISTIC MISSION:
PRACTICE OF EVANGELISM

The principle of giving priority to evangelism and not to get extensively involved in "civilizing and purely humanitarian work" seemed simple enough at home. But when A.I.M. became established in Kenya, it found inherent tensions between the two. First there was a tension within A.I.M.'s basic beliefs. A.I.M.'s conception of Christianity as religion of the Book required that the Mission become involved in sufficient educational work to enable its converts to read and follow the Bible. A.I.M.'s genuine concern for Africans as human beings also led the Mission beyond simple evangelism into humanitarian ministries. Second there were tensions between the principle of evangelism and the very methods used. A.I.M.'s intention to use "native evangelists" in her evangelistic strategy pushed the Mission further into African education. Furthermore, A.I.M.'s pragmatism in regard to evangelistic methods meant that when the Mission's social welfare work began to produce converts, the line between evangelism and humanitarianism became blurred. Finally there developed tensions between A.I.M.'s principles and the African context. A.I.M.'s evangelism only policy came into conflict with the demands for education by the Kenya colonial government and the African people, and A.I.M.'s commitment to outreach into new, unevangelized regions conflicted with the need to develop the church in evangelized areas. Managing these tensions proved to be a major part of the A.I.M. story.

METHODS OF EVANGELISM UNDER PETER CAMERON SCOTT

1. Establishing Mission Stations

A.I.M. began to experience these tensions the moment Peter Cameron Scott and his party arrived in Mombasa. True to their evangelistic calling, one of the first
things that they did was to preach to the Muslim crowds, which responded with indifference and hostility.\(^1\) Here the evangelistic imperative came face to face with the African context. While Scott correctly attributed the lack of response to the people's commitment to Islam, it never dawned on him that evangelistic methods that worked well in New York City might not be effective in Mombasa.

The African context at this time included the British colonial administration. Permission to settle inland and advice on where to settle had to be sought from the Vice Consul, John Piggott.\(^2\) Furthermore, Piggott forbade the ladies in the party to journey inland and insisted that the men travel with a British military escort,\(^3\) because of danger from the Mazrui Arabs who were in rebellion against the imposition of British rule.\(^4\) From the beginning both British colonial authority and the African responses to it affected A.I.M.'s attempts to evangelize Kenya.

The safari inland demonstrated how A.I.M. tried to turn every activity into an evangelistic method. Scott held religious services for his fellow missionaries and the Christian porters loaned to him by the C.M.S. missionary at Rabai.\(^5\) He also attempted to tell the story of Jesus to his personal attendant, Faraja.\(^6\) On the trek Scott faced

\(^1\)\textit{H&D} (February 1896): 5.


\(^3\)\textit{H&D} (February 1896): 4-5.


\(^5\)\textit{H&D} (Supplement of April 1896): 2-6.

\(^6\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.

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another aspect of the African context, when the porters fell sick. Scott's response was twofold. He tended their illnesses medically as best he could, and he complained about failure of the transport companies to provide facilities for the porters. This incident revealed several things about A.I.M. missionaries. First was their compassion for the physical needs of the African people. Second was their feeling of helplessness in the face of structural sin. Scott saw that the callousness of the trading companies was wrong, but he felt powerless to do anything about it. And third was their ambivalence toward Western civilization. On the one hand Scott saw that it could offer benefits to Africa, such as a railroad, but on the other hand it would also bring problems, what he called, "the vices of civilization".

On 14 December 1895, 250 miles from Mombasa, Scott and his party reached the Nzawi Peak, among the Kamba people. Here they established the first A.I.M. mission station. During the next year they were reinforced by a second party of missionaries and established three more stations: Sakai, Kilungu, and Kangundo.7

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7Ibid., pp. 4-5.

8Ibid., p. 6. Wilson described their fruitless efforts to save a dying porter whom they came across on another trip, and condemned this practice, calling it a "crime" and explaining the economic motives behind it ("Extract from Letter of Mr. Wilson," H&D 1 (December 1896): 6).

9It is easy to argue that missionaries should have done more to fight the political and economic exploitation of the people among whom they worked. While this is no doubt true, it must also be kept in mind that missionaries from "faith missions" like A.I.M. usually came from the poorer, lower middle and working classes and had little political or economic experience or influence in their homelands. As an American mission in a British colony, A.I.M. was in an even more vulnerable position as described by M. P. K. Sorrenson in Origins of European Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 260-263. Even though A.I.M. was gradually able to earn the confidence of the colonial government as a "responsible society", in 1934 A.I.M. still felt heavily dependent on its own British missionaries for maintaining good relations with the colonial government (L. H. Downing to H. D. Campbell, 2 March 1934, BGC,20,12).

10Sakai, 23 miles northwest of Nzawi, was established in March 1896, Kilungu, 12 miles to the north, was established in April, and Kangundo some 70-75 miles north of Nzawi in October (H&D (January 1897): 9-10; and Scott, "Sketch," pp. 8).

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The Kamba, however, were not happy to have the missionaries in their midst. The arrival of the missionaries initially caused a sensation, but when Scott sought to settle at Nzawi, the Kamba elders used a variety of excuses to discourage him, hoping he would go away. Not realizing that the Kamba, like most East African societies, were governed by ad hoc councils of elders, Scott asked to negotiate with their "king". Hoping that the strange white men would just go away, the Kamba elders made excuses as to why the non-existent "king" could not come. Scott waited another day and then ordered his men to start gathering building materials. This set the elders to serious discussions with the white man. They asked him not to settle on that hill, because it contained a powerful rain charm. When Scott's alternative religious explanation of the production of rain did not budge the elders, he agreed to move if the elders could provide him with a place just as desirable, near both water and the people. Finally realizing that Scott and the other the white men were not going to go away, the elders gave their "consent" and, deciding to make the best of a bad situation, agreed to sell them food.

At Sakai, Scott encountered more determined opposition. At first the people tried to avoid a confrontation by passing the white man on from homestead to

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11 "Diary of P. Cameron Scott, Supt.," H&D I (Supplement to April 1896): 11.


13 H&D (Supplement to April 1896): 11.
homestead until Scott "settling down in one place, refused to move."\textsuperscript{14} Defeated this way, the people next tried intimidation, and the warriors threatened to attack him. Scott ignored them at first and then tried to win their friendship with humor:

I began giving them an exhibition of juggling, tumbling, balancing sticks and axes and knives in different ways, and I soon had them all howling with laughter. They seemed to enjoy the exhibition thoroughly, and the handspring especially evoked much praise and admiration.\textsuperscript{15}

Scott's performance won him gifts of milk, eggs, bananas, chickens, and, he thought, acceptance. But the next day the people again asked him to leave. When he refused the elders ordered an economic boycott of the white man and continued their hostility when Willis Hotchkiss came and occupied the station.\textsuperscript{16} Despite the "official" opposition, some Africans took pity on the white man. An old woman secretly violated the boycott by letting a cassava root drop from her basket as she passed his house.\textsuperscript{17} When the Kamba saw that they could not drive the whiteman away, they accepted his presence and sought to build alliances with him instead. After a month, Hotchkiss reported: "[I] am happy to say the opposition has ceased and now they are coming in with all needed supplies,..."\textsuperscript{18} The same pattern of opposition and acceptance repeated itself at Kilungu.\textsuperscript{19}

The missionaries benefited from the fact that the British had just established their administration in Ukambani. Connecting the missionaries with the new colonial

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\textsuperscript{14}H\&D (May 1896): 5.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16}H\&D (September 1896): 4.


\textsuperscript{18}H\&D (September 1896): 4.

\textsuperscript{19}H\&D (December 1896): 5-6.
power had restrained the Kamba from any rash acts in their confrontations with the missionaries and led them to decide that an alliance would be more profitable than continued opposition.\footnote{Hotchkiss reported that the Kamba had assumed that he was a government official, and fear of British reprisals restrained them from carrying through on their threats to kill him (Hotchkiss, Sketches, p. 51; cited in B. and G. Fish, pp. 15-16).} This was seen most clearly at Kangundo. There the colonial administration had already defeated the armed opposition of Mwana Muka. With the "revolt" now over, the Sub-Commissioner, John Ainsworth, offered the former army barracks to Scott for an A.I.M. mission station. When Scott arrived to establish the new station, the former "rebel chief" was quick to cultivate the friendship of the new white men.\footnote{H&D (January 1897): 6-7, 10.} 

2. Building and Gardening

In spite of the opposition, the missionaries set down to work. Less than a month after their arrival at Nzawi, Walter Wilson reported that the missionaries were involved in building, farming, medicine, and language and cultural learning.\footnote{H&D (June 1896): 5-8.} In his annual report, Scott reported the same activities and added exploration and education as other activities.\footnote{H&D (January 1897): 10-2.}

Building and farming were two activities thrust upon the missionaries by the African context. At each station the missionaries first built temporary houses of mud and wattle and then gradually replaced them with permanent houses built of sun-dried brick on stone foundations. The new technology made a big impression on the Africa
people.\textsuperscript{24} Gardens were also planted and livestock kept because the fresh food would improve the health of the missionaries,\textsuperscript{25} and because Scott wanted as far as possible to make A.I.M. self-supporting.\textsuperscript{26}

These activities were necessary for the survival of the missionaries, and illustrate how they attempted to turn every activity into a method of evangelism. Their building and farming required the labor of African labor and these workmen became the missionaries' first congregation as they attempted to preach to them in Kiswahili.\textsuperscript{27} Thomas Allan tried to interest them in the Christian gospel by talking to them individually. However, because these men were mostly Muslims who had come up with the missionaries from the coast, Allan's best efforts fell on deaf ears.\textsuperscript{28}

The Mission also experienced the tension between farming as a necessary activity for survival and farming as a method of evangelism. Farming was necessary for the health of the missionaries, but Scott was quick to point out that he did not want "to take up too much of our time in this kind of work, as our chief purpose in coming here is the preaching of the gospel of Christ to those who are lost."\textsuperscript{29} Disagreement over the potential use of farming as a evangelistic method proved to be

\begin{itemize}
\item Wilson described the process at Nzawi, including the "astonishment" of the Africans (\textit{H&D} (June 1896): 5-6, 8). Each time Scott established a new station, he stayed long enough to build a temporary house for the missionary who would occupy the station. It was then the responsibility of that missionary to build permanent buildings. See: \textit{H&D} (May 1896): 5-6; (July 1896): 6; (January 1897): 10; and (September 1898): 7. Even today Africans look back to these missionaries as the ones who "built the first house of baked bricks" ("Historia ya Kanisa Mkoa wa Northern Machakos Region," unpublished MSS (Typewritten), MCB. Translation by the author.\textsuperscript{26}

\item Scott, "Sketch," pp. 9-10.

\item \textit{H&D} (January 1897): 10.

\item \textit{H&D} (August-September 1897): 12.

\item \textit{H&D} (February 1898): 5.

\item \textit{H&D} (August 1896): 3.
\end{itemize}

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the first conflict within A.I.M.

3. Language and Cultural Learning

Another major activity of the missionaries was learning the indigenous language, *Kikamba*. It was a difficult and frustrating task for missionaries, untrained in linguistics, to learn the vocabulary, work out the grammar, and reduce to writing the language of these preliterate people.\(^{30}\) They especially found it difficult to find suitable *Kikamba* words to express religious ideas.\(^{31}\) It was not that such words did not exist in *Kikamba*, but the missionaries had difficulty discovering them. Hotchkiss discovered the words for "savior" and "salvation" when he listened to one of their workers describe how he had saved Frederick Krieger from a lion.\(^{32}\) But learning the vocabulary was only one of the missionaries' problems. Margaret Scott noted that it was difficult for the missionaries to determine the correct pronunciation of Kamba words because the Kamba filed their teeth and the variations in the filling affected the way different individuals pronounced the words.\(^{33}\)

Closely related to language learning was learning the culture of the Kamba. The pages of *Hearing and Doing* were filled with descriptions of various aspects of Kamba culture that the missionaries observed.\(^{34}\) Of course these descriptions were ethnocentric, often negative, and filled with the inaccuracies and stereotypes common


\(^{31}\) *H&D* (April 1897): 6; and (April 1898): 5.


\(^{33}\) Scott, "Sketch," p. 16.

\(^{34}\) Some of the more extensive descriptions appeared in: *H&D* (June 1896): 6-7; (January 1897): 11-2; (May 1897): 4-6; (January 1898): 6-8; and Scott, "Sketch," pp. 9-11;
to Europeans of the day.\textsuperscript{35} Coming from a background of very definite religious and moral ideas and working without the tools of modern anthropology, these A.I.M. missionaries were struggling to understand a culture very different from their own and tried to be fair in evaluating their experiences. Hotchkiss expressed his perplexity when he first experienced the traditional Kamba "blessing":

An old man came to see me a short time ago. He is usually very demonstrative, but this time he went beyond all previous records. He first shook both of my wrists - not hands - alternately several times then requested me to do the same by him. This done to his apparent satisfaction, he capped the climax by calmly spitting in my face. All this, not in anger, but in some way expressive of his good will, though I confess I could not quite grasp the philosophy of it.\textsuperscript{36}

In Hotchkiss' culture, this act would not have been an act of blessing, but an act of hostility and contempt. Yet from the context, it was obvious to Hotchkiss that the old man was expressing pleasure and affection, so Hotchkiss did not take offense and accepted the act even though he did not understand it.

Scott even tried to answer some Western objections to African culture. Westerners were commonly shocked by African styles of dress, but in describing Kamba clothing, Scott gave an objective description. Then he commented:

Some may be surprised, and perhaps shocked, at my description of the native dress and fashions, and wonder what effect it has upon the mind of the missionary to live among a people who run about almost nude. ... Almost at once one becomes so accustomed to this condition of things, that if the question were asked what anyone had on, it would be impossible to tell whether they were decently attired, according to our customs or whether they had anything on at all. The fact of the matter is, there is far more staring in the church at home, at some of the hideous fashions of the latter decades of the nineteenth century, than there could possibly be out here among these sons of

\textsuperscript{35}This is so obvious, not only for A.I.M. but for virtually all Europeans of the day that it scarcely needs further illustration or proof. For further details concerning the cultural biases and errors of early A.I.M. missionaries see Philip K. Muinde, "Missionary Attitudes and Assumptions Regarding Tribal Societies: A Study of the Africa Inland Mission Pioneers in Ukambani (1895-1900)," M.Ltt. thesis (University of Aberdeen, 1976).

\textsuperscript{36}H&D (February 1897): 5.
Sometimes their own observations contradicted the prejudices that they had been taught in the West. Krieger found that his ideas about the absence of African honor had been wrong:

...I was called by one of the Elders telling me he had about a half bushel of beans for me; it meant much, as they were a gift. This man is a marvel; never did I expect to find such honor among ignorant savages. Several times he had kept his word with me to his own hurt; has supplied me with milk for three months, and the other day I learned he had only one cow and I had been getting all the milk, and sometimes he borrowed it when I was sick and needed more. Nearly every day he sends something and expects nothing in return.\textsuperscript{38}

Allan discovered that people in the West were mistaken about African families, which some times put the West to shame:

The Wakamba have feelings of family affection, - they love their wives and children, though some people in the home lands do not think so. One thing certain, - a Wakamba mother will not run off to enjoy herself in pleasure, and leave her sick child to another’s care.\textsuperscript{39}

As the last examples show, the missionaries sometimes found that in some instances African culture was not only no worse that Western culture, but was even better. Margaret Scott not only saw good in Kamba society, but thought that the West could profitably learn from it:

They are a thoroughly democratic people, and their own tribal law calls for a council of elders or chief men of the district. They have a code of laws which no doubt are carried out much as they are in civilized land - when it is convenient.

One of their laws I think could be copied in part by the whole of Christendom, and that is the one regarding murder. If a person has been found guilty of this act, for the first offense he may have the option of paying for the life to the relatives of the dead. If caught in a second offense, he is stoned to death. If the man has been intoxicated at the time of the deed, the person who sold the liquor to him is held \textit{equally responsible}. And this is, I believe, as it

\textsuperscript{37}H\&D (January 1897): 11-2.

\textsuperscript{38}H\&D (December 1896): 5-6.

\textsuperscript{39}H\&D (May 1897): 5.
should be.\footnote{Scott, "Sketch," p. 11.}

If pressed, most of the missionaries would have agreed with Miss Scott when she admitted that she did not know all aspects of Kamba culture, so could be mistaken in her understanding.\footnote{Ibid.} Therefore, she argued that the missionaries should have patience and learn the language and culture well before rushing to teach the gospel and make needless mistakes in the process.\footnote{Ibid. Allan agreed with Miss Scott that though it was not exciting work, faithfully learning the culture and language of the people was the essential, preparatory work for the missionary (H\&D (January 1898): 6).}

4. Medicine

The things mentioned so far have been primarily of a survival and preparatory nature. Yet the missionaries still wanted to do something that would be of immediate help to the Kamba. Though not trained doctors, they attempted to treat some of the simple medical problems that the Kamba had not been able to cure themselves and hoped that this activity, too, would become a means of evangelism. Allan wrote:

> The Wakamba are much troubled with colds, pains, and especially sores, for which they come to us for treatment. This is readily given, if within our power, and usually benefits them, for which they are grateful. ... In this way ... we would have a good entrance into the hearts of the older people, whom we are learning daily to love more and more, and desire to win for the Master.\footnote{\textit{H\&D} (May 1897): 5. Also see: \textit{H\&D} (June 1896): 6; (August 1896): 4; and (January 1897): 11.}

5. Political Intervention

Concern for the physical well being of their Wakamba neighbors even led the missionaries to intervene politically. When a dispute over marriage dowry erupted into
fighting between two families, Scott and Lester Severn broke up the fight, seized the "ringleaders" and "restored order."44

6. Education

Despite Mission claims to the contrary,45 some sort of education was a part of A.I.M.'s evangelistic strategy from the very beginning. After nearly dying of malaria in the Congo, Scott came to the conclusion that white missionaries could only live in the highlands but could still evangelize Africa by training African evangelists who could survive in the lowlands and were better suited culturally to transmit the gospel.46 Scott's experience in Kenya reinforced this conviction, but for a different reason. As he surveyed the area, Scott noticed that the people lived on scattered homesteads among the hills and concluded "that these people will never be reached by European missionaries ... the work must be done by native evangelists."47

Since all activities could be turned to evangelistic advantage, it was not long before a new element was added to the A.I.M. thinking concerning educational work. The missionaries saw that education could be used not only to train African converts to be evangelists, but as an agency to win converts in the first place. Allan described what they hoped to do:

We firmly believe that if we can win the children to Christ, they will become the best propagators of the Gospel among their own people. ... Our hope is first to get the boys and girls to come to the station for about two hours daily for a time, to receive instruction in reading and writing their own language, and memorizing Scripture verses. Then, afterwards, we will endeavor to gain the father's consent to some of the children, the young people, especially.


45See above Chapter 5, p. 215.

46"Draft of Mr. Hess' comments concerning the beginnings of the A.I.M.," n.d., BGC,12,45, p. 2.

47H&D (July 1896): 5.

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remaining with us and living on the station, being prepared by teaching, to go out and tell the blessed evangel to their friends in heathen darkness and superstition.\textsuperscript{48}

Allan assumed that some, if not all, of the children would experience Christian conversion in the course of their education. But more than that, he hoped that through the children, the missionaries would be able to win their parents.\textsuperscript{49}

Margaret Scott started a small school in March 1896.\textsuperscript{50} It was probably among the porters that had decided to stay and work for the missionaries, for most of the scholars were not local Kamba, but had come from a wide area of eastern Kenya. No doubt the instruction was in Kiswahili, since Miss Scott had begun to learn Kiswahili in Mombasa but would not yet have learned Kikamba.

While the Kamba had readily received the medical work, the value of Western education was far less evident to them. Furthermore, it never crossed the missionaries' minds that education could be accomplished in any way different from what they were used to in their homeland.\textsuperscript{51} As a result the missionaries experienced great difficulty both in getting Kamba students and in persuading those students to stay in the school for very long.\textsuperscript{52} With the boys needed for herding the sheep and goats, and the girls married at very young ages, there was little room for European-style education in

\textsuperscript{48}H&D (July 1897): 7.

\textsuperscript{49}H&D (May 1897): 5.

\textsuperscript{50}H&D (January 1897): 10-11.

\textsuperscript{51}This is why Allan mistakenly thought that the Kamba youth received no education or "mental training" in their own culture (H&D (January 1898): 8). Also see John Anderson, The Struggle for the School: The Interaction of Missionary, Colonial Government and Nationalist Enterprise in the Development of Formal Education in Kenya, (Nairobi: Longman, 1970), pp. 1, 6, 10; Kenyatta, pp. 98-129; and James R. Sheffield, Education in Kenya: An Historical Study (London: Teachers College Press, 1973), pp. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{52}H&D (January 1898): 8.
Kamba society.53

7. Response to Evangelism

As they mastered the language, the missionaries tried to share the gospel with the people, but were largely met with indifference. Content with their way of life, the Kamba saw no reason to change. Wilson detected this soon after he arrived at Nzawi: "The people are easy going and peaceable. Increased in cattle and goods, they probably think, as human nature is prone to do in such circumstances, that they have need of nothing."54 A year later Allan found the same thing, when the Kamba proved happy to trade with the missionaries, but were uninterested in following their ways.55

CRISIS IN A.I.M.

In little more than a year after arriving in Kenya, A.I.M. experienced a series of crises that almost ended this missionary initiative for good. In December 1896 Peter Cameron Scott died of malaria,56 and the Mission began to disintegrate. During the next year nine of the remaining fourteen missionaries left A.I.M. for one reason or


54H&D (June 1896): 6.


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another. In February 1898, Jacob Toole died, followed by Allan on 4 March. Ill health forced Mrs. Allan and Minnie Lindberg to return home, leaving Hotchkiss as the only A.I.M. missionary remaining on the field.

1. Relationships as a Method of Evangelism

The death of Allan highlighted what was perhaps the most important evangelistic "method" of all. Death and sorrow were human experiences to which the Kamba could well relate. Sharing such common ground both revealed the relationships that the Allans were able to build with the Kamba and served to strengthen them as some of the people came to comfort Mrs. Allan, who wrote:

I was much touched at what one of the old men said to me on last Tuesday. The mail had just come in and as I looked over it I could not keep back the tears. He put his dear old black hands upon my head and told me I should not cry for my husband, "God had taken him to Himself and it was no business of mine." It struck a very tender spot in my heart.... Many little presents the dear people brought in to me to show their love for my departed husband and myself. Many of them attended the funeral, staying until all the services were over.

Allan's death also resulted in A.I.M.'s first conversions, three Swahili "boys," who worked for the missionaries. One young man, Hamisi, seems to have been influenced by the strong relationship that had developed between him and Mr. Allan:

On Thursday morning, after my husband's death, one of our boys came to me with such a bright face, and said to me, "Bibe, I want to go and see Bwana's mother. Is she like him? I loved him so much." I looked him squarely in the face, and as my heart was going up to God for the salvation of his soul, I asked him if he loved Jesus. The answer came so quickly and with such open frankness, that it startled me, "Yes, I love Him. Pray for me."

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57 H&D (May 1897): 7, 8; (November 1897): 8; (December 1897): 6-7; and "Excerpts: Minutes First Council of A.I.M. [1895-1901]," compiled 19 October 1942, BGC, 12.45.

58 H&D (April 1898): 7; (May 1898): 5-6; and (September 1898): 6-7.

59 H&D (June 1898): 6.

60 Ibid.

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Hotchkiss assumed the responsibility for the religious instruction of these young men. Not wanting converts who came from "false" motives, he tested their sincerity by emphasizing the difficulties that they would face.\(^{61}\) Hotchkiss continued carefully teaching them the Bible, proud of the exemplary "Christian" lives they were now living.\(^{62}\)

2. Evangelism and Humanitarianism

If the death of Allan highlighted the role of relationships in evangelism, the famine that now struck Ukambani highlighted the relationship between evangelism and humanitarianism in the eyes of A.I.M. The failure of the rains had already produced hunger in Ukambani.\(^{63}\) Now at the very time that Allan was buried and his wife and Miss Lindberg placed on a ship for home, rinderpest ravaged the cattle around Nzawi.\(^{64}\) Hotchkiss took his African employees and moved to Kangundo, which at a higher elevation had greater rainfall and less incidence of malaria. Here, Hotchkiss hoped to grow his own food and survive the famine.\(^{65}\) However, the famine grew in intensity and scope, driving hungry people into the area. The Kamba, who had been disdainful of the Mission's earlier offers of employment, now came in increasing numbers.

\(^{61}\) *H\&D* (September 1898): 8.

\(^{62}\) *H\&D* (June 1898): 7.

\(^{63}\) The editors of *Hearing and Doing* in June 1899 referred to "the sore famine which has prevailed in Eastern Africa [for] three years" (*H\&D* (June 1899): 5). It is safe to assume that the famine was caused by the failure of the long rains, which usually fall in Kenya somewhere between March and June. If we count June 1899 as the beginning of the third year of the famine (i.e. the third long rains in a row to have failed), and we count back two more years, we can the famine must have begun with the failure of the long rains in 1897, though the full effects were not felt until the next year. Compare with Low, "British Rule", pp. 14, 16; Mungeam, pp. 35-36, 38; and Sorrenson, pp. 21, 28.

\(^{64}\) *H\&D* (September 1898): 8.


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numbers asking to work for food. Though the food supplies on the station were running very low, no one had actually starved to death at Kangundo yet, so at this early stage, Hotchkiss was able to take an optimistic view of the famine, believing that it might be God's way of moving the Kamba to accept Christianity. This hope that God was using the famine to open the Kamba to the Christian message should not be seen as a callous disregard for the physical welfare of the Kamba in sole pursuit of conversions. Nor did Hotchkiss view the famine and suffering that the Kamba were experiencing to be a good thing. Rather, this was an attempt to understand and explain the calamity theologically. It was an understanding in which the hope of evangelism remained central. Yet, for all that Hotchkiss still did all that he could to combat the cattle plague and to provide relief to those suffering from the famine. The priority of evangelism did not preclude humanitarian work.

In November 1898, William Bangert joined Hotchkiss. The two men continued their normal activities of building, gardening, holding religious services with the station workers, and treating the medical needs of the people. Bangert, in particular, saw great potential in Western medicine for meeting physical needs and for evangelism. He thought that all missionaries should be given medical training, because "it is through healing the sores and sickness of the natives that you most easily gain their confidence and are thus enabled to present the gospel medicine for..."

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66For descriptions of the famine at this stage see H&D (October 1898): 5-7; (November 1898): 5-6; and (January 1899): 7.

67H&D (November 1898): 5.

68Bangert was brought out to Kenya by Charles Hurlburt, the new General Director of A.I.M., who had come out to inspect and evaluate the work (H&D (January 1899): 5; and (February 1899): 5-7).

69H&D (April 1899): 5, 5-6; and (May 1899): 4-8.

their deeper disease." This manifestation of the desire to use all things as methods of evangelism was not a cynical manipulation of people's physical distress for the sake of conversions. Rather it was a genuine concern for their physical needs, with the desire not to stop there, but minister to the whole person, spirit as well as body.

As the famine moved into its third year, Hotchkiss and Bangert began to feel its effects with increasing severity causing them to adopt a less sanguine attitude than previously. At first their main problem was refugees fleeing the famine and seeking food. So, they devised a famine relief plan and appealed to the Mission supporters for financial help. The Philadelphia Missionary Council took up the challenge and appealed for donors. The editor of Hearing and Doing was concerned about the ignorance of Africa among the Christian public. He was concerned about the spiritual need of the African people "who go into a Christless eternity unwarned", but greater for the moment was the immediate concern for their physical welfare. And finally he criticized his own Christian culture for its materialism and lack of compassion.

As refugees in desperate straits came to the station, food became increasingly scarce, and starvation came to Kangundo, the distinction between evangelism and social welfare work blurred. Hotchkiss appealed for more famine relief money virtually equating famine relief with preaching the gospel. At the very least, humanitarian aid was the indispensable prerequisite to evangelism. In graphic terms Hotchkiss described the starvation that had come to Kangundo and then asked:

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72 For descriptions of this stage of the famine see: *H&D* (April 1899): 5, 5-6; (May 1899): 4-8; and (June 1899): 5-7.

73 *H&D* (April 1899): 5

74 Ibid., p. 6.


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Tell me what is the use of preaching the gospel to people who are gripped with the awful pain of hunger? How can they grasp it? How can the poor deluded minds take it in? They want bread, and a fearful account will be laid to the charge of a self-satisfied church, unless this pitiful cry of heathendom is heeded.76

Hotchkiss, Bangert, and the Philadelphia Missionary Council had a genuine desire to alleviate the terrible physical suffering of the Kamba. But as with all things, even this was viewed as a "means of evangelism", not in the sense that they practiced any religious discrimination in their administration of the famine relief program or attempted to buy conversions with food. Rather it was their hope that evangelism by deed would open opportunities for evangelism by word. Bangert hoped that the feeding of famine refugees would result in the gospel story being spread all over Ukambani as people returned to their homes and related their experiences at Kangundo.77 The editor of Hearing and Doing hoped that as a result of its famine relief work the Kamba would be more willing to hear and accept A.I.M.'s religious message, and that this would "lead the people to the ability of providing more carefully for their temporal needs."78 Evangelism was not conceived in purely otherworldly terms, for the results of evangelism were expected to affect man's lot in this world as well as in the next. Rooted in the Victorian view of poverty as the result of personal rather than structural sin, it had long been the conviction of American revivalism that true personal and social reform could only be achieved as individuals were morally transformed by evangelism, which would result in their social and economic improvement.79 The African context challenged this simple scheme, for in

76H&D (June 1899): 5.

77H&D (May 1899): 7.

78H&D (June 1899): 5.


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the face of such an overwhelming disaster as the famine in Ukambani the order was reversed. Social welfare work became the prerequisite to evangelism, which was still expected to complete the circle by producing a social welfare result.

3. Evangelism and "Industrial Missions"

The tension between evangelism and social welfare was further seen in the resignation of Willis Hotchkiss. An irreconcilable disagreement had developed between Hotchkiss and the leaders of A.I.M. right from the earliest days of the Mission's work. This was confirmed by the visit to the field of the new General Director, Charles Hurlburt, in late 1898 and early 1899. The disagreement appears to have been over the role of agriculture and industrial training in A.I.M.'s evangelistic strategy.

Hotchkiss was committed to the priority of evangelism, but he also believed that A.I.M. should also establish an "industrial mission". Such a mission would be economically self-sufficient on the field. It would seek to win converts, but then to provide them with better agricultural methods, technological skills, and education to help them build a new, self-sustaining Christian culture.

At first A.I.M. appeared to be open to this approach. Its original financial policy permitted A.I.M. missionaries to provide for their needs through their own

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80 Shortly before his death, Peter Cameron Scott had written to the Philadelphia Missionary Council that Hotchkiss not be returned to Africa, and that he not be permitted to represent AIM to the churches in America. In their meeting of 21 January 1897, the Council accepted Scott's recommendation ("First Council," BGC, 12, 45).

81 This is the suggestion of Dick Anderson, p. 27.

82 Hotchkiss, pp. 147-148, 153, quoted in B. and G. Fish, p. 25.


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labor. The P.M.C. also acted as the American representative of the Central American Industrial Mission. But in 1896 the attitude of both A.I.M. and the P.M.C. began to change. The A.I.M. missionaries began to feel that the work involved in an industrial mission would absorb all of their time leaving no time for evangelism. The P.M.C. had moved in the same direction, and in July 1897 dropped its agreement to represent the Central America Industrial Mission. Three years later the editors of Hearing and Doing specifically repudiated the suggestion that A.I.M. might be an industrial mission and carefully explained that the gardens were only kept for health and financial reasons.

In addition to this practical concern, Charles Hurlburt brought a new, "spiritual" objection to industrial missions. As superintendent of the Pennsylvania Bible Institute, Hurlburt had experienced God meeting its needs in response to prayer alone. This led Hurlburt to conclude that A.I.M., too, should rely prayer alone to meet its financial needs through the gifts of people that God, Himself, moved to give, rather than on farming, solicitation, or by publishing the Mission's needs.

Hotchkiss' experience had been exactly the opposite. When the Scott family left A.I.M. in 1897, they retained virtually all the mission funds for their own use,

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84 H&D (January 1896): 5.
85 Ibid., 6-7.
86 For Scott's defense of the Mission gardens see above p. 226. Allan thought that agriculture was too hard in Africa to make industrial missions practical (H&D (October 1897): 3).
87 H&D (July 1897): 8.
88 H&D (July 1900): 6. The very fact that the editor of Hearing and Doing felt it necessary to make this disavowal would indicate that there was strong pressure against industrial missions in A.I.M.'s American constituency.
89 See above Chapter 3, pp. 89-91.

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leaving A.I.M. $800 in debt.\textsuperscript{90} Money that might have been used to support the missionaries had to go to pay off the debt instead. When Allan died, Hotchkiss was left alone on the field and crippled by debt. He felt destitute and utterly abandoned by the mission.\textsuperscript{91} The experience had such a profound effect on Hotchkiss,\textsuperscript{92} that he determined the mission on the field should be largely self-supporting. Thus Hotchkiss' experience reinforced his belief in industrial missions.

When he returned to the United States in September 1899, Hotchkiss was not able to reconcile his differences with the P.M.C., so he left A.I.M.\textsuperscript{93} In 1901 he returned to Kenya with a party of missionaries to establish the Friends Africa Industrial Mission at Kaimosi in western Kenya and the Lumbwa Industrial Mission among the Kipsigis in 1904. The latter became part of the Africa Gospel Church in 1935.\textsuperscript{94}

\section*{METHODS OF EVANGELISM UNDER CHARLES HURLBURT}

Bangert carried on alone through the next four months that saw the worst of the famine suffering.\textsuperscript{95} He was finally relieved when Charles Johnston and Elmer

\textsuperscript{90}H\&D (December 1897): 6. At this time A.I.M. as a mission was so identified with the person of Peter Cameron Scott that in the eyes of most donors, a gift to the one was a gift to the other. Consequently the donors saw nothing wrong with the Scott family retaining money they had donated to A.I.M. to finance their own relocation in Kenya.


\textsuperscript{92}H\&D (July 1898): 7.

\textsuperscript{93}"First Council," BGC, 12, 45; and H\&D (August-September 1899): 6.

\textsuperscript{94}B. and G. Fish, pp. 22-43, 98-103.

\textsuperscript{95}For descriptions of the final stage of the famine see: H\&D (August-September 1899): 6-9, 9; (October 1899): 4-8; (November 1899): 5-8; and L. R. Severn, "Annual Report of Field Superintendent," H\&D (January-February 1901): 5.

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Bartholomew joined him in October 1899 and the short rains broke the drought in November.

1. Mission Work Reestablished at Kangundo

With the ending of the famine, life gradually returned to normal at Kangundo. Gardening, building, language study, and simple medical work occupied the missionaries' time.

Though the famine was over, it continued to influence A.I.M.'s work. Their meager famine relief program had earned the missionaries good relations with the local people. They distributed seed and continued to care for Africans who did not yet have gardens of their own. In a reversal of their famine relief program, the missionaries traded blankets and cloth for food which the missionaries stored against a return of the famine.

The famine had created a large number of homeless orphans, and here the missionaries saw an opportunity for both humanitarian care and evangelism. The colonial government entrusted 27 orphans to A.I.M. This enabled the missionaries to start a school. Two worship services were held daily for the orphans, station employees, and anyone else who might come, and several children accepted

\[96^{96}H&D\ (December\ 1899):\ 7;\ and\ (January\ 1900):\ 2-5.\]
\[97^{97}\text{For descriptions of the tapering off and end of the famine see: } H&D\ (January\ 1900):\ 6;\ (February\ 1900):\ 6;\ (March\ 1900):\ 3-4;\ (April\ 1900):\ 6;\ (October-November\ 1900):\ 8;\ (December\ 1900):\ 2;\ and\ Severn, "Annual Report," p. 5.\]
\[98^{98}H&D\ (March\ 1900):\ 5-6;\ (May\ 1900):\ 5;\ (June\ 1900):\ 5-6;\ (October-November\ 1900):\ 8;\ and\ Severn, "Annual Report," pp. 5-6.\]
\[99^{99}H&D\ (June\ 1900):\ 6.\]
\[100^{100}H&D\ (March\ 1900):\ 3-6;\ and\ (April\ 1900):\ 5-6.\]
\[101^{101}H&D\ (April\ 1900):\ 5-6.\]

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Christianity with what the missionaries considered to be dramatic changes in their lives.\textsuperscript{102}

In the area of language learning, the A.I.M. began to move into translation. Lester Severn, one of Scott’s original companions, returned in early 1900. He finished working out the grammar of \textit{Kikamba} and reducing it to writing then began translating hymns. Surprisingly this foreign music proved to be very popular, and people were soon heard singing it, not only in church, but as they went about their daily business.\textsuperscript{103}

2. Exploration and the Establishment of Mission Stations

The arrival of Charles Hurlburt back on the field in December 1901 marked the beginning of a period of rapid expansion for A.I.M. Until Kijabe was established in 1903, Kangundo was the headquarters station. New missionaries were to be received and orientated here. It was to be the linguistic center of the mission, where missionaries learned the language and did translation work, and it was to be the educational center. African orphans would be sent to school here, and African evangelists trained here.\textsuperscript{104} In addition to the orphanage, Hurlburt planned to build two hospitals, at Kangundo and another for their new work among the Gikuyu.\textsuperscript{105}

Hurlburt spent a lot of time exploring to determine where A.I.M. should open new work. On these trips he and his companions preached the gospel to the people.

\textsuperscript{102}H&D (May 1900): 5; (December 1900): 2; (March-May 1901): 5-6; (March 1902): 4-5; Severn, "Annual," pp. 5-6; and John Stauffacher, "History of the Africa Inland Mission," unpublished mss (typewritten), n.d. [@1913], BGC, 12, 45.

\textsuperscript{103}H&D (July 1900): 5-6; (October-November 1900): 8; (December 1900): 3; (January-February 1901): 9-10; (March-May 1901): 5-6; (March 1902): 4-5; and Severn, "Annual Report," p. 6

\textsuperscript{104}H&D (March-April 1903): 12.

\textsuperscript{105}H&D (April-May 1902): 3-4.
they found and received invitations to establish mission stations.\textsuperscript{106} Though they tended to assume that these invitations showed that the Africans were ready to receive the missionaries' message,\textsuperscript{107} the missionaries were not completely naive. Hurlburt wondered if a request for missionaries from Kilungu was sincere.\textsuperscript{108} On a trip through Kikuyuland, he tried to make it clear that the missionaries had come neither to get nor to give money, but to teach "the words of God".\textsuperscript{109}

The Africans were concerned with how the missionary presence could enhance their lives now. Many Gikuyu had contact with Krieger during the famine and were very impressed with the white man's guns and skill in medicine and agriculture. As news of these new wonders spread, many decided it might be advantageous to have a white man live nearby to teach them these marvels\textsuperscript{110} and to act as a buffer between them and the colonial government.\textsuperscript{111}

However, neither the missionaries nor the Africans fully understood that their conflicting understandings of the purpose of religion had them working at cross purposes. The missionaries tried to make it clear that they had come with a religious message that was primarily moral and otherworldly. At each place the elders agreed

\textsuperscript{106}H&D (June 1902): 4-6; (July-August 1902): 4-5; (May-June 1903): 7-10; (July-October 1906): 15; and (July-September 1907): 8-13. For a description of the evangelism carried out on a month-long trip through the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, and Rendilli areas of northern Kenya see Gladys Staufacher, Faster Beats the Drum (Pearl River, New York: Africa Inland Mission, 1978), pp. 50-62.

\textsuperscript{107}H&D (June 1902): 6.

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., p. 3.

\textsuperscript{109}H&D (May-June 1903): 9-10.


\textsuperscript{111}H&D (May-June 1903): 7-8.

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that this is what they wanted, but in their view religion was for enhancing this life and securing the very benefits they expected to receive from the missionaries. The missionaries' explanation of why they wanted to settle among the Africans often mixed earthly and heavenly benefits in such a way, that left the opposite impression from the one intended. When negotiating for Kambui station, William Knapp explained as carefully as he could that though he would try to heal the sick, bring more healthful ways of living, and teach reading and writing, his main purpose was to build a house where the Gikuyu could worship God and have their sins forgiven so they could go to heaven. Not understanding the business of a house for God, forgiveness of sin, or heaven, the Gikuyu mostly certainly could understand how religion could cure diseases and improve health. This difference between the missionaries who offered heavenly rewards and the Africans who expected earthly benefits often resulted in tension between the two.

3. Gardening and Building

Much of the work at this time was literally laying the foundations. Houses had to be built and gardens dug to enable the missionaries to live on the new stations.

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112 *H&D* (May-June 1903): 7-10.


115 Wanyoike, p. 21.

Store houses, school buildings, and clinics were built at some places, but chapels were built on every station and their opening was usually a cause for celebration, excitement, and an opportunity for evangelism.117

Hiring people to build buildings, work in their homes, or to do other jobs around the station, was an important way that the missionaries made contacts with the people and were able to introduce them to Christianity. New missionaries were advised to hire a personal servant to help them learn the language, to do menial household chores, and interestingly enough, for personal companionship.118 It was expected that the missionary would work and pray for the conversion of his household workers, and according to Mr. Scouten this was generally successful.119

4. Language and Translation

Hurlburt also saw language learning and working with the people in building the mission station as important ways to know the people and to learn their culture.120 With so many new missionaries continually arriving, language learning was continuous.121 After Kijabe was established as the new headquarters station, every new missionary had to spend six-months in language study at Kijabe before they were assigned to their station122 and were required to pass language examinations before

117 Mr. Hurlburt wrote that the 3 December 1903 dedication of the new chapel at Kambui drew the largest meeting of Africans he had seen in the country (H&D (January-February 1904): 7). In 1906, he wrote that the completion of the new, stone chapel at Kijabe had sparked great interest in Christianity among the people (H&D (July-October 1906): 6).

118 "Suggestions to New Missionaries," 24 August 1915, BGC, 12, 46.

119 H&D (April-June 1906): 5.

120 H&D (November-December 1902): 8.

121 H&D (June 1902): 3; and (November-December 1903): 13.


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becoming full members or marrying.\textsuperscript{123} However, even some of the now "veteran" missionaries still struggled. After two and a half years on the field, Johnston still complained, "...I am only just beginning to get a little grasp of the intricacies of their complicated language."\textsuperscript{124}

In the early years most of the missionaries efforts were directed toward simply discovering the grammar and vocabularies of these previously unwritten languages. By 1907 grammars and vocabularies had been written for Kikamba, Kikuyu, and Masai, but the process had to be repeated for the languages spoken in the areas of the Rift Valley that the mission was entering. In all the languages, biblical and educational materials had to be translated,\textsuperscript{125} and by 1913 the Bible was being translated into Kikamba, Kikuyu, Masai, and Dholuo.\textsuperscript{126}

5. Education

On each station the missionaries started a school and tried to gather children together to teach them reading and the Bible. Not being trained teachers, and trying to teach a language that they did not yet know well themselves, they struggled. Johnston described how he fashioned crude teaching aids and stumbled upon his teaching methods by trial and error.\textsuperscript{127} The missionaries were disappointed that the Africans

\textsuperscript{123}A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article IX, Section 4, and Rules, KBA: General Council. By 1922 missionaries were being graded as "probationers", "junior missionaries", and "senior missionaries" according to their language ability (A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Appendix, Article II, Section 6).

\textsuperscript{124}H\&D (June 1902): 9.

\textsuperscript{125}H\&D (January-March 1907): 8-9; and (April-June 1907): 21.

\textsuperscript{126}H\&D (April-June 1914): 5.

\textsuperscript{127}H\&D (August 1901): 5-6.

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were still uninterested in the white man's education. Often boys came asking for education, but they only wanted to avoid watching their fathers' goats or hoped to get clothes and money from the white man, so wandered off again. So general was the demand to be paid for studying, that the missionaries seriously debated whether or not to pay for students. Even when they could get children, the missionaries, who had to finance the schools out of their own personal allowances, were frustrated by the

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131 John Stauffacher argued that the Africans could not comprehend working and not getting paid, and they saw no difference between working in the garden and working in the classroom (H&D (July-October 1906): 12; and (April-June 1907): 13). George Rhoad refused to pay students to come to school, because he wanted them to learn from the beginning that "this way of godliness is not a way of [financial] gain" (H&D (April-June 1907): 14).

Yet despite all the discouragements, the schools gradually grew until A.I.M. was able to report 640 pupils in school in 1913. African young people, a few at a time, were taught to read and write, and by the end of this period were setting out to start their own schools. Through it all the foundations for an African educational system were being laid. At the Annual Field Conference in 1908, A.I.M. agreed to form a joint committee on education with other missions in Kenya, which led to the adoption of a uniform educational code. Unfortunately A.I.M. was always greatly hampered in the implementation of these policies by a severe lack of both human and

133 Mr. Edwin Harris reported from Kangundo: "We have nine or ten [students], that's four more than we have slates for and five or six more than we have seats for" (H&D (July-September 1909): 11).

134 H&D (April-June 1914): 6. This figure is for all AIM fields, but the work in Tanganyka and Congo was so new that it would have had no significant effect on this number. This figure also did not count some stations that had not reported, nor the "outschools" that had sprung up.


136 Though contemporary educators are justly critical of much early missionary education, they commonly come to the same conclusion: J. Anderson, p. 30; Bogonko, p. 22; and Sheffield, p. 12.

137 H&D (January-March 1909): 5. Discussions on uniformity of school courses began during the 1907 Annual Conference (Riebe to Innis, 30 July 1907; and Riebe to Stauffacher, 30 July 1907, KBA: Conference 1907).


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physical resources.\textsuperscript{139}

The A.I.M. missionaries still viewed education as a means of evangelism and training African evangelists, and were pleased that through their schools Africans were accepting Christianity, being established in their new faith, and beginning to take the gospel to their own people.\textsuperscript{140} The African people were coming to identify Christianity and the white man's education as virtually synonymous,\textsuperscript{141} and the missionaries were also coming to associate literacy closely with conversion. When reporting that they had restarted a literacy class for older men Knapp explained: "One could almost count this as one test of Christianity, for in every case here when they become converted there comes a desire to read God's Word for themselves."\textsuperscript{142} Ironically, A.I.M. which quite pointedly rejected education as the primary work of the Mission, now found that its schools had become indispensable for achieving the religious objectives of the Mission.\textsuperscript{143} This paradox was to produce tremendous tensions in the Mission in the years to come.

6. Education at Kijabe

The educational work was clearly strongest at Kijabe. The school was started

\textsuperscript{139}H&D (April-June 1914): 6. At Kijabe the teachers complained of overcrowding and the lack of materials (H&D (July-September 1907): 16-17; and Stumpf to Hurlburt, 22 March 1911, BGC,24,22). At the same time that Hurlburt announced the adoption of the uniform educational code, he also noted that educational materials and teachers were hard to get (H&D (April-June 1914): 6). In 1915 seven out of eleven mission stations that reported their needs listed the need for a school building (Hurlburt to Palmer, 26 August 1915, BGC,14,5).

\textsuperscript{140}H&D (April-June 1906): 5-7; (April-June 1907): 16-17; and (July-September 1909): 11.


\textsuperscript{142}H&D (July-September 1907): 15.

\textsuperscript{143}H&D (January-March 1913): 6.

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in 1903\textsuperscript{144} when the orphanage was moved from Kangundo to Kijabe.\textsuperscript{145} Gradually the orphanage became an African day school with boarding facilities for "small boys"\textsuperscript{146} and grew from 13 pupils in 1903\textsuperscript{147} to 138 students in 1912, making it the largest school in the Mission.\textsuperscript{148}

A "central school" was also established at Kijabe to give advanced training to the most promising students from among A.I.M.'s stations. These students were trained to be teachers and evangelists and sent out to start their own schools that became new centers of evangelism and literacy.\textsuperscript{149} By 1909 the first Kijabe-trained, African teacher-evangelists were sent out to help with the work on other mission stations, and the missionaries received them enthusiastically.\textsuperscript{150} By 1913 A.I.M. had trained and employed about 50 teacher-evangelists.\textsuperscript{151}

In 1906 three other educational ministries were begun at Kijabe. The day nursery arose from a lack of understanding of African child-rearing practices on the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item H&D (July-October 1903): 21; (November-December 1903): 12-13; (January 1904): 5-6; and Westervelt, p. 36.
\item H&D (January 1904): 10.
\item References to the orphanage die out after the move to Kijabe. Later we find references to "the Home for small boys" (H&D (January-March 1911): 12), "home for the native boys", "boarding school and training home for the boys" (H&D (April-June 1915): 8), and "children in the Home" (H&D (April-June 1915): 12).
\item Westervelt, p. 36.
\item H&D (January-March 1913): 6.
\item George Rhoad wrote: "No one can overestimate the value of these boys who are trained at Kijabe, and finally sent out with different missionaries as evangelists among their own people. They are faithful in doing personal work, and can reach the hearts of the natives much easier than the missionary (H&D (April-June 1909): 13)."
\item H&D (April-June 1914): 6. The report, which says "more than fifty", is for all A.I.M. fields, but at this time the vast majority would have been in Kenya.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}

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part of the missionaries. Mistaking the unstructured care and education of small children for neglect,\textsuperscript{152} missionary ladies persuaded some Gikuyu mothers to send their babies and small children to the mission station, where they were washed, dressed in western clothes, given western toys, and cared for during the day. The missionaries had great hopes, that by teaching these children about Christianity from their earliest days, they would become Christians and could be trained as evangelists.\textsuperscript{153} The day nursery lasted only a short time and died out due to the lack of personnel and facilities. However, the desire remained to restart it as a means of teaching African girls living on the station how to care for children, and to provide child care for African mothers while they were working in the fields.\textsuperscript{154} This latter reason was accepted by African women when it became more common for African children to attend school.

The other two programs were much more significant. The first, the establishment of an industrial school demonstrated how the African context significantly challenged A.I.M.'s philosophy of mission. Despite A.I.M.'s emphasis on evangelism and hostility to industrial missions, some missionaries always held that A.I.M. should look beyond evangelism. In 1900, when Ukambani and A.I.M. were both still recovering from the famine, Elmer Bartholomew wondered if evangelism would be enough: "These people do need Jesus Christ, what they will need after they have received Him, is a problem that must be then solved."\textsuperscript{155} With a probable reference to his disagreement with Hotchkiss, Hurlbut described how he, too, came to the conclusion that the Mission's work could not stop at evangelism:

\textsuperscript{152}On missionary misunderstanding of African education see p. 232 above.

\textsuperscript{153}\textit{H&D} (November-December 1906): 3; and (October-December 1907): 12-14.

\textsuperscript{154}\textit{H&D} (January-March 1909): 8; and Hurlbut to Palmer, 26 August 1915, BGC,14,5.

\textsuperscript{155}\textit{H&D} (June 1900): 5.

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When first in Africa, in the latter part of 1898, the need of an industrial school for the training of native young men and women was laid heavily upon my heart. At the time I felt somewhat critical concerning school work on the mission field, when the need of evangelism is so great. ... I am now more than ever convinced that we owe an obligation to this child-people which cannot be discharged in any other way than by teaching them a trade. ... it is a great wrong to take this child-people, who unless we teach them some trade, must live in the physical, mental and moral uncleanness of their home surroundings, and simply tell them the story of redemption without teaching them how to live.156

Despite the paternalism and ethnocentrism expressed in this statement, the truth of the matter was that it was difficult for African converts to remain in their original communities and practice the kind of Christianity being brought into Kenya. Not only did the missionaries encourage their converts to live on the mission station, but many converts were cast out of their communities.157 Faced with this situation, Hurlburt felt that A.I.M. had a moral obligation to teach their converts the means of earning a living.158

By 1913 the school enrolled 44 students learning stone work, wood work, metal work, saw and shingle milling, printing, typewriting, tailoring, medical work, and ox-driving. By teaching the latter, it was hoped that the Gikuyu would begin to use oxen as beasts of burden instead of their wives and that this would help to raise the status of women in the society.159 The benefits of the school turned out to be more than just occupational training. It provided valuable technical services to the mission, and occasionally generated income that could be used to help pay for necessary mission expenses.160 By filling the students lives with meaningful activity and

providing a context for practical, down-to-earth applications of Christian principles, the industrial school proved to be a surprisingly effective means of making contact with non-Christian youth, converting them to Christianity, establishing them in the new Christian life, and turning them into evangelists.\textsuperscript{161} Despite this initial success, A.I.M. found it difficult to maintain the Industrial School. It was expensive to operate and difficult to staff. As a result its existence always tended to be somewhat precarious.\textsuperscript{162}

In 1906 A.I.M. also started a Girls' Home at Kijabe. Most Gikuyu homes were caring and respected a girl's wishes in regard to marriage, but, as in every society, a few were abusive. In such cases she could run back to her parents' home, if she were fleeing an abusive husband, to other relatives, or to another part of Kikuyuland. In extreme cases, the girl might commit suicide. Such cases always created conflict and tensions among the families involved, but community solidarity and the people's traditions were able to contain these conflicts and governed what was to be done in each case. When the missionaries came and established their mission stations, this opened up another place of refuge for such girls.\textsuperscript{163}

the contribution in both finances and technical services. However, it also notes that the Industrial School was usually a severe financial drain on the Mission's resources.

\textsuperscript{161}\textit{H&D} (January-March 1911): 13; and (January-March 1913): 6-7. The complaint that "idleness" was "one of the greatest hindrances to Christian living among the people" may not have been just European misunderstanding of African culture. It may well have been a genuine problem among these people cut off from their normal community activities and responsibilities. Hence the combination of work and religious activities that the school promoted may have filled a real void.

\textsuperscript{162}\textit{H&D} (April-June 1911): 15 speaks of "many discouraging circumstances" and notes the need of teachers. Hurlburt, "Another Year," p. 9 explains some of the problems that almost lead to the closure of the Industrial School. The Mission leadership tried to persuade Andrew Andersen to assume management of the Industrial School because of its many problems (Dinwiddie to Andersen, 2 March 1917; Hurlburt to Andersen, 26 June 1917; and Andersen to Dinwiddie, 24 October 1917, BGC, 19,4).

\textsuperscript{163}Kenyatta, pp. 163-174, 183-185; and \textit{H&D} (January-March 1909): 7. Sandgren charges that the A.I.M. Girls' Homes violated the rights of Gikuyu parents, but makes no
A number of Gikuyu girls began coming to Kijabe, seeking refuge for one reason or another. Some were orphans, some were physically deformed, some were fleeing abusive fathers or husbands, some wanted to avoid undesirable marriages, and some were simply rebellious. Christian young men also began to bring their brides or intended brides to be taught how to be "Christian" wives. Efforts were made to contact the parents of these girls or to find care for them in the community. When these efforts failed, the missionaries accepted them into their households. As the numbers increased this solution became impractical. Furthermore, the missionaries did not want to keep these girls simply as domestic servants for this would introduce them to cultural changes that would make it difficult for them to continue to live as Africans. Therefore the missionaris established the Girls' Home, where they could be cared for, educated, and taught a western-style homemaking that the missionaries thought had been appropriately adapted to African culture.

It was not long before more girls were seeking admission into the Home than could be handled at Kijabe, so a second home was opened among the Gikuyu, one at Moboni for the Kamba, and one at Eldama Ravine for the Kalenjin. These homes became the Mission's most important means of evangelism among African women as these girls accepted Christianity and became evangelists themselves. Initially they were the most important source of Christian wives for the young men coming to maturity in the A.I.M. schools, providing the foundation for Christian homes in the

Acknowledgement that abusive parents could exist in any culture (Sandgren, pp. 150-151, 361).


165 H&D (April-June 1907): 7-12; (January-March 1909): 8-9. Sandgren charged that A.I.M. female education was designed only to train Gikuyu girls to be the missionaries' house servants (Sandgren, p. 85). This the missionaries had explicitly denied (H&D (January-March 1909): 8).

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7. Medicine

In addition to schools, all of the mission stations did medical work, in which they offered simple cures for things like ulcers, sores, and toothaches. At first Dr. John Henderson was the only qualified doctor in the mission, but as time went on he was joined by others. Yet, even the simple medical ministry was an important means of bringing the missionaries into contact with the African people.

Trying to apply western medicine to people who did not understand it was not easy. The doctors were frustrated by the needs for cleanliness and regular treatment and the customs of the people which sometimes interfered with the treatment. Henderson was willing to try to adapt to the culture of his Gikuyu patients. He observed African medical practices and built his clinic of traditional, Gikuyu huts. He even tried to persuade the local Gikuyu to build the clinic for him so that he did not undermine their independence.

166 H&D (March-April 1914): 7; (April-June 1916): 7-9; and Hurlburt, "Another Year," p. 9.

167 These included Dr. Florence Newberry (1908), Dr. Elwood Davis (1910), Dr. Virginia Blakeslee (1912), and Dr. Kenneth Allen (1915). See: H&D (November 1901): 6; (January-March 1909): 6; (May-December 1910): 16; (January-March 1912): 16; and (April-June 1915): 20. For some strange reason Sandgren accuses A.I.M. of "neglect" of medicine (Sandgren, pp. 81-82), yet he ignores the fact that A.I.M. had a dispensary on almost every station, established three hospitals in its small part of Kikuyuland and that of the various complaints that African people brought against A.I.M., this was never one of them.

168 H&D (January-February 1904): 5-6, 10; (July-September 1909): 9-10; (January-March 1912): 9-10; and Westervelt, pp. 32-33.

169 H&D (July-August 1902): 7-8; and (July-October 1909): 9-10.

170 H&D (July-August 1902): 7-8.

171 H&D (June 1902): 8; and (March-April 1903): 10. Henderson wanted the Gikuyu to be able to continue rely on themselves their own resources and not become dependent on the western missionary.

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Hurlburt tried the same thing at Kangundo. He noticed that when the Kamba wanted to build a new house, they gathered the people in the community together, built the house, and then enjoyed a feast together. He thought he would apply the same principle to the construction of a hospital building, but found that the Kamba would not work for him as they did for one another. The people saw the benefit in helping each other build their houses, but they could not see the benefit in helping the white man. Furthermore, Hurlburt was not part of the community, hence was outside of the system of relationships and reciprocal obligations that motivated the Africans to work so willingly for one another.

8. Political Intervention

As Scott and Severn had done before them, the concern of the missionaries for the physical welfare of the people sometimes moved them to political intervention. When a dispute between two Kangundo families over a marriage that had been improperly arranged during the famine threatened to turn into warfare, Hurlburt and Bartholomew intervened and helped settle the dispute without bloodshed. As a result, other disputes were brought to them and they were able to help bring the sides together to be settled by the elders or to convince them to submit the cases to the colonial authorities. Though these cases took much time and energy, Hurlburt felt that they were worth it, because involvement in the lives of the people was essential if the missionary hoped to win any converts.

Other missionaries also intervened in these "civil" affairs. Henderson tried to

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172 H&d (June 1902): 3.
173 See above p. 230.
175 Ibid., p. 11.
get the colonial government to reserve more land for the Gikuyu. At Mboni, George Rhoad turned hostility to the mission into support by bringing injustices committed by the government soldiers and chiefs to the attention of the colonial government.

At Kijabe, people fled to the mission station to escape from oppressive chiefs.

9. Religious Meetings

The principal means the missionaries used to share the gospel and teach new believers was through church meetings. Johnston felt ambivalent toward education, but was confident about the evangelistic effectiveness of religious meetings. When Lawrence Haig presented a paper on "Station Evangelism" to the 1907 Annual Field Conference, chapel meetings were the central point.

The first meetings that the missionaries held were worship services on Sundays. When the missionaries were just establishing Kijabe, they were so anxious to hold Sunday worship services that they didn't wait to learn proper Kikuyu, but

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177 H&D (October 1909 - January 1910): 12-13. Also instrumental in winning the favor of the people of Mboni was the road building program that Rhoad initiated (H&D (January-March 1909): 10-11).


179 H&D (March-April 1903): 9. Johnston felt that a chapel should be built not only on the mission station, but also near the market place in Machakos town, "where the gospel could be told to great numbers, who otherwise would be hard to reach" H&D (September-October 1902): 6).

180 Riebe to Haig, 29 July 1907, KBA: Conference 1907.

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preached to the people in broken Kikuyu that they developed from Kikamba.181

Sundays could be very busy days for the missionaries and African believers. In 1909 the Harrisons reported the following Sunday schedule at Kangundo:

10:00 - Regular *Kikamba* service
2:00 - Sunday School
4:00 - English service
5:00 - Evening *Kikamba* service
7:00 - Evening song service182

The missionaries did not limit their meetings to Sundays, but held services every day of the week. On each station services were held at least once a day with the workers, students and anyone else who might come. At Kangundo they held two meetings every day,183 one for the men and the other for the women.184 Kijabe held one daily meeting for the older Africans and another for the children.185 At Muinga the Rhoads held morning and evening prayers for the students, and a general evangelistic meeting at noon, when people came to sell food and conduct other business.186

The school sessions opened with hymns and personal prayers by the

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182*H&D* (July-September 1909): 11. Sandgren accused A.I.M. of having "separate worship services for missionaries and African Christians" and cites this as evidence that A.I.M. "practiced the color bar" (Sandgren, pp. 85, 158). What he did not understand is that these services represented an attempt to meet the differing spiritual needs of both Africans and missionaries, not a policy of racial segregation. Isichei repeated the accusation with no greater understanding than Sandgren (Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of Christianity in Africa: From Antiquity to the Present* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1995), p. 90).

183*H&D* (December 1900): 2; and (March-May 1901): 5.

184*H&D* (July-September 1909): 11.


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students. \footnote{187} Prayer meetings, women's meetings, and Bible classes were held in the evenings. \footnote{188} On some stations, religious meetings, particularly singing the newly translated hymns, \footnote{189} became a major recreational activity. \footnote{190} Usually the missionaries finished each day with a short devotional time with the young people on their station. \footnote{191}

Though the missionaries' time was filled with meetings and classes on the mission stations, they did not stay there waiting for people to come. As soon as their stations were established, they began to go out and meet with the people in the surrounding "villages". \footnote{192} Usually these were the homesteads in the immediate vicinity of the mission station, though time was set aside to visit those further off. \footnote{193} The largest numbers of people could be contacted during the school holidays, when the Mission required the missionaries to undertake more extended evangelistic safaris. \footnote{194}

\footnote{187}H&D (December 1900): 2-3; and (July-September 1907): 17.

\footnote{188}H&D (December 1900): 2-3; (November-December 1903): 13; (April-June 1906): 6; (January-March 1907): 16; (July-September 1907): 13-14; and (July-September 1911): 15-16.

\footnote{189}H&D (January-February 1901): 9-10; (March-May 1901): 4-5; and (January-February 1903): 6.

\footnote{190}H&D (January-March 1907): 11; and (July-September 1909): 11.

\footnote{191}H&D (April-June 1906): 5.

\footnote{192}H&D (April-May 1902): 5-6; (January-February 1904): 5-6; (April-June 1907): 17-18. Mrs. Barnett to Young, 25 February 1914, BGC, 19, 20. By the term "villages" we do not mean "territorially compact groups" in the Western sense of a small town, but family homesteads. The missionaries called them "villages" from ignorance and for the lack to a better term. See Middleton and Kershaw, pp. 28-30, 75.

\footnote{193}H&D (November 1905): 11.

\footnote{194}"Rules of the Africa Inland Mission adopted by The [Kenya] Field Council April 1915," rule number 8, KBA: FC-83. Mr. Rampley from Kangundo reported that "on a recent itinerating trip they were able to speak to about a thousand people and to give medical aid to some three hundred (H&D (April-June 1916): 17), and Laura Collins described a two-week tour from Kinyona when she and Dr. Blakeslee spoke to 3,180 people (H&D (April-June 1916): 11).
These tours were not only attempts by the missionaries to evangelize more widely but became opportunities to involve the new African converts in evangelizing their own people.195

OBSTACLES TO EVANGELISM

1. Cultural Misunderstandings

Despite attempting to turn every activity into a method of evangelism, many obstacles stood in the way of the missionaries winning converts. Many of these were misconceptions that the missionaries had about African culture and were illustrated in a letter by Charles Johnston. First of all Johnston saw the Kamba as "creatures of appetite" and was frustrated when after telling them "of the [spiritual] riches which God has provided" they asked for a sample of those "riches" in the form of "a blanket or loin cloth."196 He was unaware that the primary function of African religion was the preservation and enhancement of this life, rather than the moral preparation for the life to come.197 This misunderstanding was also rooted in two contrasting attitudes towards wealth. While the Kamba viewed wealth as a good thing to be sought, A.I.M. condemned in their own culture the acquisition of material goods as an end in itself.198

195 Miss Collins and Dr. Blakeslee took young men with them, one a station worker and the other a student. Emil Swulka built up the church at Matara by organizing the boys and young men from the station to visit certain homesteads twice a week, teach them a Bible verse and bring the people to church, where they would recite their verses (H&D 14 (April-June 1909): 18). At Mulango, the "visitation work" was done by two African teachers (H&D (April-June 1916): 14).

196 H&D (November 1901): 4. George Rhoad also noted that the Kamba sought God for their material well being, rather than to overcome moral failure: "They want the good will of the white man and the favor of God in that He give them rain, cattle, women, etc., - all their lustful, covetous hearts desire. But of sin there is no poignant consciousness, and they realize no need of pardon of a Savior (H&D (April-June 1907): 15)."

197 See above p. 245.


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and tended to glorify the giving up of material advantages for the purpose of "serving God." This made it difficult for A.I.M. to appreciate the legitimate economic ambitions of their own converts.

Johnston was also annoyed that whenever he began to form a relationship with an African, the African would start "begging for this and that." Johnston did not understand the depth and subtly of the differences in cultural norms between Europeans (especially Americans) and Africans governing generosity and the asking for and receiving things. He did not realize that in the communal values of Africa, there was no shame in asking for things, especially if a relationship had been established. However, such behavior was offensive to individualistic Westerners and particularly to members of a "faith mission" that objected to "solicitation" on principle.

Johnston also complained that the Kamba "say that our words were good ... that they were going to turn from their past evil ways," and then make no change at all. This apparent contradiction between what the people said and what they did made some missionaries, such as Clara Fowler, to think them "unreliable." Others, like Hurlburt, thought them unstable, "easily swept by the impressions of the hour." What these missionaries did not understand was that in the African system of values,

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199 Hurlburt was able to say, with perhaps a touch of pride, "Our workers are, I presume, the lowest salaried missionaries on the Continent of Africa...." (Hurlburt to Whiteside, 24 May 1910, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence). Some A.I.M. missionaries, motivated by the romantic ideal of the "suffering missionary," criticized the lifestyle of Kijabe as being too comfortable (Hurlburt to Downing, 30 December 1913, KBA: FC-76).


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interpersonal relationships were far more important than propositional truth, so African courtesy often required that they agree with the missionaries simply to be polite.204 Furthermore, the Africans were following the common practice of those without power simply telling the more powerful what they want to hear.205

Not only was Johnston's lack of cultural understanding an obstacle to evangelism, but so too was the revulsion that he felt for Kamba culture.206 Apparently other A.I.M. missionaries also had this problem, so were advised: "If they [African people] seem extremely repulsive to you pray God to help you to see the soul behind the filth, and not to hold aloof."207

In addition to the cultural misunderstandings and the ethnocentrism, Johnston was frustrated at the African indifference to his message and wrote, "how wedded they are to their heathenish ways."208 Content in their way of life, the Kamba saw no reason to change and adopt the white man's religion.209 To Emily Messenger the physical and social condition of the Kamba women was so obviously appalling, that

*I have observed and experienced this cultural tension many times in Kenya, from a printing job being promised by the press on a desired date, when the order clerk knew full well it to be impossible, to asking directions, and being told my destination was "not far," it was "just there," when my informant knew full well that it was miles away. He wanted to encourage me to continue on, so did not tell me the full "truth".


207"Suggestions to New Missionaries," 24 August 1915, BGC,12,46. A.I.M. missionaries were not they only ones to struggle with a feeling of revulsion for their host culture. Norman Russell was a Presbyterian missionary to India who wrote that the missionary must love the people despite the revulsion they would feel for their lifestyle (Norman H. Russell, "The Kind of Volunteers Wanted at the Front," H&D (April 1899): 3).


209Charles Youngken noted the same thing of the Gikuyu (Youngken to "Fishermen Fellows", 8 October 1915, BGC,12,46).
she could not understand why the women were so content.210 Not understanding African religion, the missionaries thought that the African people were concerned only about the things of this life with no desire for the things of God, no sense of the holiness of God, no sense of sin, and no desire for eternal life.211

The lack of African response to the missionaries' message was often due to the fact that the missionaries were trying to tell them things that were simply outside of their cultural experience. Both George Rhoad and Clara Fowler found that the people could not understand what the missionaries were trying to tell them about sin, a savior, and a change of heart.212 Miss Messenger wrote: "Again and again one must tell them who Jesus is, what he has done, and what he wants to do for them; and again and again they will answer: 'I do not understand.'"213

2. Difficulty with the Language

Johnston admitted that one of the problems with the missionaries was, "We do need a much better acquaintance with the language."214 After more than two years on the field, he still had to admit: "I am only just beginning to get a little grasp of the intricacies of their complicated language."215 After two years among the Gikuyu,


212H&D (November-December 1903): 12; and (April-June 1907): 15.

213H&D (November-December 1902): 12. Hurlburt experienced the same thing: "Many times when pressing upon them the truths of the Gospel, several would interrupt at once saying, 'Wait a little, we never heard those words before. We know much about devils but we never heard about God and His Son before' (H&D (January-February 1904): 6)." The "devils" to which Hurlburt referred were probably his misunderstanding of the ngoma, Gikuyu ancestral spirits (see Kenyatta, pp. 232-233).


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George Youngken lamented: "We felt our utter helplessness. You have no idea how little we know of the language and customs of these people."216

Miss Alma Doering noted that the missionary needed to learn the Africans' "inner longings, the customs of the natives, their ideas of God and their opinions of the missionary," because "the secret of success in dealing with souls is ... that of eliciting from the person ... a knowledge of his actual needs."217 However, Miss Doering continued, the missionaries were often hindered from gaining this knowledge by their methods of language acquisition which forced them "to do more talking than listening."218

3. Theological Obstacles

Johnston concluded his letter with two theological issues that could be obstacles to evangelism because they provided explanations for the lack of evangelistic success that clouded the extent of the cultural barriers that the missionaries had to overcome. Johnston wrote that what the missionaries needed "most of all" was "an endowment [sic] of power from on high."219 In part this was an application of A.I.M.'s Keswick piety that all spiritual work needed the power of God to be effective.220 In part it was a recognition of the cultural distance between the missionary and the African which only the power of God could overcome.221

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216 Youngken to "Fishermen Fellows", 8 October 1915, BGC,12,46.


218 Ibid.


220 See above Chapter 2, pp. 38-39.

221 John Henderson's understanding of Gikuyu religion was inaccurate, but he realized that the cultural gap could only be bridged by God, Himself: "Righteousness, faith, conscience, the voice of God, and almost all religious forms and thought are unknown [to the Gikuyu] and

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belief could be a source of encouragement to the missionary, but it could also be used by some missionaries to justify blundering ahead without sufficient linguistic and cultural understanding.222

The lack of evangelistic results was often interpreted to be an indication of a "lack of power" in the ministry of the missionary and usually called for more fervent prayer. In an uncharacteristic touch of discouragement, Charles Hurlburt cried: "My heaviest losses have not been in the tearing off the roof of my house [by a high wind], but in the ministry of God's Word without the power of the Spirit. Be much in prayer for us here."223 Sin or a lack of piety in the missionary was thought to "hinder" the working or release of God's power;224 and was sometimes seen to be the cause of the lack of evangelistic success.225

The second theological obstacle, or potential obstacle, was A.I.M.'s emphasis on human sinfulness. As already noted, A.I.M. conceived of salvation as the removal of an individual's moral guilt caused by his sin.226 It followed then that men and

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222Thus Johnston believed that the power of God would make his proclamation of the gospel effective despite his insufficient grasp of Kikamba ("H&D (April-May 1902): 6)."

223"H&D (January-February 1903): 10. Elmer Bartholomew was specific about the relationship between "power with God" and evangelistic effectiveness: "I am out nearly every day in the villages working, with seemingly few results.... I so often say to my wife, 'If I had more power with God, many more might come out for Him [i.e. convert to Christianity] (H&D (November-December 1903): 11)."

224"In a pastoral letter to the missionaries, Hurlburt asked the missionaries to examine themselves to be sure that no sin was hindering the working of God's power in their lives (Hurlburt to Fellow Members of the A. I. M., 1 July 1914, KBA: FC-76)."

225Thus during the dispute with Johnston in 1913, Hurlburt saw the lack of evangelistic results in the Kamba work as proof of sin and a lack of piety in Johnston's life (Hurlburt to Palmer, 3 November 1913, BGC,22,8). On the Johnston controversy see above Chapter 3, pp. 110-114. This connection between piety and evangelistic effectiveness was a theological way of recognizing the importance of the missionary's character in the propagation of his message.

226See above Chapter 5, pp. 198-199.

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women would accept this salvation only when they first came to understand their sinful condition before God. Thus Johnston wrote that the missionaries needed the power of God to produce in his hearers "a conviction of sin and a real desire to turn from it." The danger was that the lack of evangelistic results could be attributed to the sinfulness of the people rather than to the cultural barriers to their understanding and acceptance of the gospel.

4. The Cultural Trauma of Conversion

The difficulty of cross-cultural communication was not the only cultural barrier to evangelism. The degree of cultural change required by conversion to Christianity was another a major barrier. Many Africans did not find the strange culture of the white men to be particularly attractive. This was implicit in the African "indifference" to the missionaries' message.

The missionaries never seriously considered following the example of Hudson Taylor and adopting the dress and life-style of the African peoples. For one thing such a life-style was considered too unhealthful and immodest for Europeans. In 1897 Allan attributed the illness of a Salvation Army missionary to her adoption of the clothing and lifestyle of the Swahili, and then concluded: "It would not do for her to adopt the Wakamba habits of living, as no white person could safely do so, especially their costume, which is usually very scanty, to say the least." From the beginning,

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227 *H&D* (November 1901): 4. Mrs. Albert Barnett wanted the Kalenjin people in western Kenya to know her love and God's love for them, but believed that they had to understand that they were sinners first (Mrs. Barnett to Young, 25 February 1914, BGC, 19, 20).

228 See above pp. 233, 263. Sometimes the Africans were explicit as in the Masai distaste for the white man's clothing and forms of hygiene (*H&D* (January-June 1908): 6).

229 *H&D* (October 1897): 1. In a *Hearing and Doing* article Allan gave health advice that was far removed from the African way of living, and he again argued that missionary attempts to adopt African lifestyles had "been the means, again and again, of sacrificing

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A.I.M. considered "a comfortable home, ample and wholesome food, and comfortable clothing" to be essential to missionary service.  

The missionaries also did not adopt an African lifestyle because they saw the need to "raise" the African up to a better, more "civilized" way of life. This belief was implicit in the missionaries' complaints about African indifference to their efforts to "help" them. When Hurlburt first arrived in Kenya, he expressed the belief that Western culture could bring many blessings to Africa. So he advocated the sending of artisans, medical personnel, linguists, and teachers to improve the African standard of living and heartily approved when African converts began to copy the missionaries' ways. The industrial school, nursery school, and girls' home were all designed to encourage this process. However, A.I.M.'s encouragement of Western culture was limited by their belief in the priority of evangelism over education and other "civilizing" activities and by the fact that A.I.M. was aware of the need to adapt Western customs to fit African culture.

Becoming a Christian convert was often a wrenching experience for both the valuable lives, or, at least of entirely breaking down the health (Thomas Allan, "The Physical Missionary: or, The Missionary's Relation to His Body," H&D (July 1898): 4-5)."  

230 H&D (March 1896): 6. Some years later, some missionaries criticized the lifestyle of Kijabe as being too comfortable, but this seemed to have been more from the romantic ideal of the "suffering missionary" than from any conscious strategy to adopt an African lifestyle (Hurlburt to Downing, 30 December 1913, KBA: FC-76). One does need to be a little cautious at accepting this description of the criticism at face value, for it is the point of view of the one being criticized.

231 H&D (December 1901): 3-5.

232 Hurlburt wrote: "Kikuvi is building a mud-brick house with high door, openings for windows, and some effort toward cleanliness in his surroundings. This is the first real step in that direction and will we trust be followed by many others" (H&D (September-October 1902): 5). Also see H&D (January-June 1908): 17.

233 See above pp. 252-256.


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convert and for his family and community. Would-be converts often had to struggle long and hard to decide whether he wanted to make the cultural changes that were involved in becoming a Christian. A young man at Kijabe, caught between his new religion with its demand for monogamy and his decision to take a second wife, poignantly expressed the pathos of being nearly torn in two by the attraction of the new and the pull of the old:

I am going away, not in hate, but in sorrow. It is my sin [the polygamy?] alone which is driving me away. You have loved me and have given me good words. I want the words of God, but I feel a strong cord, like the largest rope or chain I ever saw, pulling my heart towards this sin. I cannot resist it, nor do I want to. I shall leave you to-morrow, hoping that somehow God may help me later to hate the sin and come back to you and to God. I shall love you all my days, and my heart will be full of sorrow until I come back, but I cannot resist the drawing of this sin.235

The struggle within the new converts was intensified because conversion often placed them in conflict with their family and community. Two men aroused the wrath of a wide community of Gikuyu around Kijabe for not going through with their plans to take second wives.236 At Kangundo, a young Kamba convert found that the A.I.M. stand against alcoholic beverages237 brought him into direct conflict with his filial

235H&D (July-October 1906): 6. At Kambui a young man settled on the station and began to show great a interest in Christianity. When he had gained a bit of wealth, he took a second wife and had to move off of the station. However, the young man established his new home right on the border of the station and continued to attend the mission services (H&D (April-June 1906): 6-7). It would appear that this would-be convert not only found himself caught between Gikuyu polygyny and Christian monogamy, but also could not discover an acceptable African way to be a wealthy man in the Christian context. Though his desire for Christianity remained, he had to move off to the periphery of the emerging Christian culture.


237When Africans became Christians they were "to have nothing to do with making or drinking Tembo [beer], the greatest curse we have to fight here" (H&D (July-October 1903): 19). This position was not just a legalistic peculiarity of A.I.M., but was part of a campaign for the moral reform of American society that united almost all American churches of every theological belief in a movement that culminated in the 1919 passing of the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibiting "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors" in the United States (see Mark A. Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992), pp. 295-299).

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duties.238 When he persistently refused to brew beer for his father, his father expelled him from the family homestead in disgrace, cursed him, and persuaded his young wife to leave him.239 So inevitable was the family conflict, that parents became upset as soon as one of their children became a Christian. Thus when Sila became a Christian at Kangundo, his father became bitter and cursed the missionaries and Christians on the station.240

The missionaries did not encourage their converts to leave their home villages and live on the mission stations, except for the purpose of schooling, until it became apparent that the converts could not live the new life in their home communities.241 So complete was the break, that the decision of whether to stay with the missionaries or return to their families became a matter of great anguish for both the converts and their families. At Kijabe Wanguhu was torn as his mother and community did all they could to pressure him into returning with them:

The people have pressed him to leave the Mission; his father is not living, and his mother, upon whom all the peculiar reverence of the people is bestowed, sat nearly all of one night, near enough for him to hear but without looking at him, and complained that her people cared nothing for her, that she might die of starvation for all her son cared, since he was leaving her to go off to the Mission, and so on; all meant to try his heart to the uttermost and compel him to leave the Mission. They have refused to care for his sheep, and have in every conceivable way tested him to the uttermost. ... For many days he was in great distress, saying "I have no light; I walk in darkness, but will wait for the words of God."242

No wonder the elders cursed the Mission and did all they could to discourage their

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238Kenyatta mentions the great importance of filial respect among the Gikuyu (Kenyatta, p. 264).

239H&D (July 1905): 2-3. Another Kangundo convert came into conflict with his family when he refused to join in family religious rituals (H&D (July-September 1909): 11).

240H&D (July-September 1909): 11-12.


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young people from coming to the mission stations.243

The trauma for the converts did not end with the break with their families and communities. One Kamba convert had to live with the stigma and disgrace of one who was disobedient to his father.244 And the Masai convert, Mulungit had to "bear the name of 'Olashumba,' which means a Swahili, or to their minds, everything foreign to their tribe, and that which is much despised by them."245 He also had to bear the rumors that he was anti-social, always angry, and had gained much wealth from the white men, marrying one of their women.246

5. The Missionary Role

The authority role that missionaries had to assume and the impersonal evangelistic methods that they often used worked against developing the close personal relationships that were so important in evangelism.

Whether intended or not, the missionaries found themselves as authority figures. One of their first roles was often that of employers.247 Though the missionaries tried, with some success, to win their employees to Christianity, no doubt there were times when the employer-employee relationship was a barrier to evangelism. Sometimes the missionaries also played the role of minor government officials.248 At times such political intervention helped to build relationships and

\[243^{243}H&D \ (July \ 1905): \ 7-8; \ (January-\March \ 1909): \ 9-10; \ and \ (February-\April \ 1910): \ 9.\]

\[244^{244}H&D \ (July \ 1905): \ 3.\]

\[245^{245}H&D \ (January-June \ 1908): \ 6.\]

\[246^{246}Ibid., \ pp. \ 6-7.\]

\[247^{247}\text{See above pp. } 226, 236, 246. \text{ Occasionally missionaries vented their frustrations with their African employees (H&D February 1898): 5-6; and (February 1900): 4. One can be sure that those same employees had complaints about their missionary employers.}\]

\[248^{248}\text{See above pp. } 230, 257-258.\]
helped to make evangelism possible. At other times continual, petty interference in community affairs alienated people and made evangelism impossible.\textsuperscript{249} Finally the missionary was responsible for enforcing station rules\textsuperscript{250} and for supervising the work of the African Christians.\textsuperscript{251} Occasionally even the best converts, like Mulungit, could find it difficult to submit to the "discipline" of the mission station.\textsuperscript{252}

The other thing that militated against the development of close, personal relationships, was the missionaries' reliance on less personal forms of evangelism: preaching, meetings, and institutions. Rhoad discovered the ineffectiveness of itinerant preaching in the villages around Machakos compared to building relationships with those with whom he was in daily contact:

Messages given through itinerant work, were half understood, less believed, and almost wholly forgotten before the missionary could get back to the field again... It was found that only those who were living at the station and were in constant contact with the missionaries had really grasped the meaning of the Gospel message.\textsuperscript{253}

Hurlburt challenged the missionaries not to be so taken up by mission administration and impersonal forms of evangelism and lose their zeal for more personal and relational forms.\textsuperscript{254}

\textsuperscript{249}By 1911 the Harrisons had so alienated the people of Kangundo that they faced a complete economic and social boycott, cutting them off from almost all contact with the African community (Riebe to Hurlburt, 16 June 1911, KBA: General Council). Tignor attributes this to Mr. Harrison's continual interference in Kangundo community affairs (Tignor, p. 136).

\textsuperscript{250}During this time period we have examples of missionaries enforcing the rule on monogamy (\textit{H&D} (July 1905): 10-11; and (April-June 1906): 6) and a ban on dancing (\textit{H&D} (January-June 1908): 17; and (January-March 1913): 8).

\textsuperscript{251}\textit{A.I.M. Constitution}, 1912, Article XI, Section 1.

\textsuperscript{252}\textit{H&D} (January-June 1908): 5.

\textsuperscript{253}\textit{H&D} (July 1905): 2-4. Bartholomew discovered the same thing at Kangundo (\textit{H&D} (November 1905): 11).

\textsuperscript{254}Hurlburt to Fellow-Member of A.I.M., 1 July 1914, KBA: FC-76. New missionaries were also warned not to "become so entangled with the machinery of the work that soul saving, - the main object of the work, is forgotten" ("Suggestions to New Missionaries," 24 August

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6. The Importance of Relationships in Evangelism

Sensing something of the importance of relationships in evangelism, the missionaries did all that they could to "win the confidence" of the people.\(^{255}\) Andrew Andersen found opposition to his work spreading among the Kipsigis in western Kenya.\(^{256}\) Whether by accident or by design, he used an African method to build and maintain relationships by inviting all the "chiefs" for a two-week visit and series of feasts "in order to get better acquainted with them."\(^{257}\) To win the approval of the parents who objected to their children coming to his school, Andersen "gave them a large feast at Christmas time" and gifts of "rice and sugar."\(^{258}\) Andersen earned the African name, "Bwana Fundi" ["Mr. Expert," "Mr. Craftsman"], because of his practice of visiting the Kipsigis where they were working, helping them, and making practical suggestions on how they could improve on what they were doing.\(^{259}\) In these very practical ways, Andersen was able to build relationships with the Kipsigis people around him, gain a hearing for his message, and win converts.

Sometimes common human experiences like births and deaths broke the barriers allowing missionaries and Africans to glimpse their common humanity. This

\(^{255}\) A.I.M.'s famine relief program overcame the suspicion of the Kamba around Kangundo (See above p. 242). While waiting for permission to open the station at Machakos, Johnston spent his time "going from village to village around this place telling the simple gospel story," hoping to establish relationships with the people so it would not be so hard to evangelize them once the station was built (H&D (September-October 1902): 6).

\(^{256}\) Andersen to Campbell, 7 December 1932, BGC,19,5.


\(^{258}\) "Meeting with Leaders and Elders of Bureti Regional Church Council [and] Belgut Regional Church Council," Litein, Kenya, 5 October 1993, in the author's possession.

\(^{259}\) Ibid.
occurred when the Kamba elder comforted Mrs. Allan when her husband died. The birth of a child provided a point of common identity between Mrs. Rhoad and the women of Muinga.

Sharing hardship or danger could contribute to forming of powerful relationships. During a journey through Kikuyuland, Hurlburt's party could not find a cave to sleep in, so camped beside a large rock with animals "howling" all about. Hurlburt reported:

At five we awakened, and found Kikuvi sitting with one hand on the gun and the other replenishing the fire. He had not slept but had chosen voluntarily to watch all night for our greater safety. While I supposed him asleep he guarded me all night. Could one help loving such a man.

The missionaries also hoped that the example of their character might contribute to the effectiveness of their evangelism. Miss Emily Messenger asked for prayer that the African people might see love in the lives of the missionaries. New missionaries were urged to be examples of spiritual qualities that the missionaries thought the Africans lacked. Sometimes converts were won through the example of a missionary, as reported by Richard Starr at Kijabe:

One of the men who was converted recently was won through watching the life of the man in charge of the boys on the station. It seems that he saw Brother McKenrick getting up every morning to prepare the boys' breakfast and seeing him do it day after day without any compensation, he decided that there must be something in it and now, Brother Hurlburt says, he is one of the most hopeful converts.

As relationships were built, the missionaries were able to join the Africans in

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260See above p. 234.
262H&D (July-August 1902): 7.
264"Suggestions to New Missionaries," 24 August 1915, BGC, 12, 46.

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their spiritual experiences and struggles. Mrs. Josephine Westervelt reported on the intimate devotional times she had with her students at the Kijabe school and concluded that such involvement was essential to evangelism:

It is only in the measure in which we enter into the lives, feelings and understanding of the ways of those about us that we really reach them. If one does not learn to see from their standpoint very little can be done for them, and how much can one do for them by entering into their life struggles with patience and prayer and letting them know you do.  

These experiences could produce strong relationships between missionaries and individual converts. Kala, who had come to Kijabe from Kangundo, formed such a close relationship with Lee Downing, that he faced depression when the Downings went on furlough.

RESPONSES TO EVANGELISM

1. Reasons Africans Came to the Mission Stations

As the missionaries developed positive relationships, people began coming to the mission stations. They came for many different reasons, not all "religious" in the Western sense of the term. Hurlburt noted that people were coming to the services at Kangundo, but "many doubtless come because of the desire to obtain work or some favor." Many people came to Muinga, but according to Rhoad: "This coming has not been due ... to any sincere interest in the Gospel, but to a natural curiosity in what was transpiring here. Many others came with various things to sell;...." And of

266H&D (July-September 1907): 17. Hurlburt reported on sharing the spiritual struggles of young Africans: "Night after night individual men or little groups have gathered in my room to ask about the Way of Life and pray together over their temptations and struggles... (H&D (July-October 1906): 6)."

267Hurlburt to Downing, 20 August 1913, KBA: FC-76. Also see Hurlburt to Downing, 30 December 1913, KBA: FC-76.

268H&D (September-October 1902): 5.


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course many people came to the mission stations for medical treatment.270

Many outside pressures encouraged people to move onto mission stations. Girls came fleeing parental or marital abuse,271 and Masai came seeking to avoid strife between the age-sets.272 Others came to avoid an oppressive colonial chief,273 the forced labor imposed upon them by the colonial government,274 or paying hut and poll taxes.275 Some landless Gikuyu came because they could get land there and on better terms than either in the Kikuyu Reserve or as a squatter on a settler's farm.276 Occasionally, colonial chiefs encouraged involvement with the Mission, especially with its schools.277

Finally, some Africans came to the mission stations because they were interested in the religious message the missionaries had brought. Mulungit agreed to come to Kijabe because he had heard the gospel at Naivasha from a travelling

270See above p. 256.
271See above pp. 254-256.
273See above p. 258.
275Sandgren, p. 123.
276Ibid., pp. 122-123. The man who settled at Kambui, but had to move when he took a second wife appears to be an example of this (see above footnote 235).
277Youngken to "Fishermen Fellows," 8 October 1915, BGC,12,46.
missionary and wanted to hear more.278

2. Evaluating the Responses to Evangelism

Aware of the difficulty the African people had understanding the gospel and of the "ulterior" motives that brought many people to their mission stations, the missionaries believed that it was necessary to cautiously evaluate the responses made by their African hearers. When a number of young men responded at Kijabe, Hurburt wrote: "We... want to be very careful to be sure they understand and are sincere."279 William Knapp practiced a similar caution at Kambui: "We have been very slow to baptized, feeling it better to wait until they are well grounded in the word and settled in their Christian experience."280

Evaluating the genuineness of conversion was extremely difficult. Conversion, as understood by A.I.M., was a crisis experience of moral guilt and forgiveness that changed a person's religious and moral outlook resulting in changed behavior and attitudes. Coming from the American rivalist tradition, A.I.M. missionaries were accustomed to evangelistic methods designed to bring people to this crisis experience by inducing in their hearers a sense of moral guilt before God, and relieving that guilt through a rational decision to accept the forgiveness of God.

The missionaries experienced great difficulty in conveying this concept of conversion and using this evangelistic methodology in Africa. They found it hard to communicate the idea that conversion was more than a nominal acceptance of certain theological beliefs or the superficial adoption of new religious rituals and behavioral

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280Ibid., p. 5.
When A.I.M. first decided to use the revivalist technique of asking hearers to publicly respond to the preaching of the gospel, they made the decision only "after much thought, prayer and conference." Just as Hotchkiss had tested the sincerity of his first converts by emphasizing the difficulties that they would face, so Hurlburt "tried to make it plain, but difficult enough to demand real decision and a coming out from the old life." The emphasis seemed to be on behavioral change, but Hurlburt also saw emotional or affective evidence of the genuineness of the conversions, "tears and such simple earnest petitions." And finally, the missionaries felt it necessary to evaluate the results, judging that some were "insincere."

A.I.M. missionaries came from churches in the United States that had clear ideas about what behavior they thought indicated the genuineness of a person's conversion. So when presenting the gospel in Africa and looking for evidence of genuine conversion, it was natural for the missionaries to emphasize similar changes in outward behavior. Knapp noted what he thought gave evidence of genuine conversion in the young Christians at Kambui:

One sees the work of the Spirit in their lives in the putting off of their ornaments. Some who, when they came, used tobacco, have felt led without any word from us to stop its use. Some who had sulky and fretful dispositions have gotten victory over these. Some who had charms, considered of real value to the heathen in curing sickness and keeping away evil spirits, have brought them to be burned publicly in the chapel.284

Other signs of spiritual growth included the willingness to break traditional taboos by

281 Knapp wrote that his African hearers found it difficult to understand what he called "a change of heart" (H&D (March-April 1903): 10).

282 H&D (November-December 1902): 8. Hearing and Doing published two accounts of an early "revival" service (the one above and H&D (July-October 1903): 18-9). It is difficult to tell if these are two accounts of the same meeting or two separate meetings that were very similar.

283 See above p. 235.

284 H&D (July-September 1907): 14.
participating in a Christian funeral and contributing to famine relief projects.\textsuperscript{285}

While outward behavior was emphasized, it was not the only thing that the missionaries watched for. Zeal in evangelism\textsuperscript{286} and tenderness of heart during worship were viewed as other signs of genuine conversion. Hurlburt reported a time of great spiritual interest at Kijabe:

Some who had been thoughtless and indifferent are beginning to understand what it means to be a Christian and to ask with much seriousness about the way of life. Several of the young converts, some of whom had been filled with pride and self-confidence, have had sore testings and some grievous falls; yet nothing could be more tender nor strong and evidently sincere than their confessions and repentance.

Only a few days ago a young man who had been proud and haughty in his Christian life and felt himself superior to the other natives, broke down utterly and said, "I have sinned worse than those who have not heard the words of God, and nothing but God's strength can help me," and with sobs and tears he confessed his sins to God.\textsuperscript{287}

Spontaneous acts of religious devotion were regarded as a sure sign of conversion. John Riebe recounted observing two African boys praying on the path, and noted that praying when away from the watchful eye of the missionary was a sure sign of genuine conversion.\textsuperscript{288}

Finally, the missionaries were concerned lest Africans became "converts" in the hope of securing economic benefits from the Mission. Therefore, when wanting to emphasize the purity of their religious motives, converts often said things similar to this statement by a Kijabe young man: "I will not seek for money; only give me food and clothing, and restore the joy to my heart; I will not ask for more."\textsuperscript{289} For a

\textsuperscript{285}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{286}H\&D (April-June 1906): 5.

\textsuperscript{287}Ibid., p. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{288}Riebe to Mathers, 26 August 1909, KBA: Riebe General Correspondence.

\textsuperscript{289}H\&D (April-June 1906): 4. Mulungit made a similar pledge to John Stauffacher (Westervelt, pp. 39-40).

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missionary to make this same claim about one of his converts was to attest to the genuineness of the conversion. Thus, Johnston offered high praise of his convert, Wambua: "With him following the words of Jesus is not a matter of so many rupees a month, as it is apt to be with many of these people, but he is turning his back on the old life because the Lord has touched his heart." Some missionaries were too aware of the danger of supposed converts looking only for material benefits from the new religion. However, when Mulungit was wavering between joining the missionaries or remaining with his people, John Stauffacher refused to accept the cynical judgement of some of his colleagues, knowing that such cynicism would only destroy his ability to build the positive relationships with Africans that were vital to his ministry.

Such judgements as these guided missionaries' evaluation of their converts' suitability for baptism. In addition, formal baptismal policies were developed. The first of these dealt with polygynous men who wished to be baptized. The initial policy was surprisingly lenient. Polygynists did not have to put away their "extra" wives before baptism but merely promise not to take any more. Unmarried men had to promise to take only one wife. The 1908 Annual Field Conference formalized the preparation and requirements for baptism. A baptismal candidate had to undergo a two-year probation period during which his life and character would be evaluated and he would be instructed in the Christian faith. The candidate was then to publicly vow:

(a) To learn of Christ and to serve Him.
(b) To engage in public and private worship of God regularly.
(c) To abstain from all customs contrary to the Word of God.
(d) If married, not to marry another woman.
(e) To give according to their means for the support of the church and the furtherance of Christ's kingdom.
(f) To endeavor to bring others, especially those of their own household, to

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292 H&D (July-October 1903): 19.
Polygynists would no longer be baptized.

Gradually, the missionaries made a few converts, but not all of the African peoples among whom they worked were equally responsive.

3. Kamba Response to Evangelism

Work among the Kamba began promising enough. As early as 1900 Severn reported two converts from among the orphans at Kangundo. In August 1902 and in May or June 1903 the missionaries held "revival" meetings with about 20 people responding each time.

Despite this good start, the work among the Kamba was very difficult. The move of the mission headquarters probably hurt the work at Kangundo. Most of the missionaries moved to Kijabe, and when they took the orphans with them, they took some of the strongest of the Kangundo Christians. Furthermore, the work was continually being interrupted by changes in workers. Elmer Bartholomew remained in charge of Kangundo after the move to Kijabe and continued to report progress on the station. But crushed by the deaths of his sister-in-law, two children and his wife,
and broken in health, he returned to the United States in 1906.298 Edwin Harrison picked up the work the next year. In the next four years, he turned the community against the Mission and returned to England with his health destroyed.299 Not deeming it wise to assign another missionary there, the Mission placed Kangundo in the care of the African teacher, James Juma Mbotela.300 Under Mbotela’s leadership, the church grew slowly,301 but he was working against several obstacles in addition to the animosity toward the mission. Mbotela was a Swahili,302 so was considered an outsider by the Kamba community. But far more devastating was the defection of Kikuvi, former station headman during the famine, Hurlburt’s guide and translator, and A.I.M.’s most prominent Kamba convert. His example must have had a highly detrimental impact on the work at Kangundo.

If the work at Kangundo was slow and discouraging, the work at Machakos was almost impossible. Johnston felt that influence of the nearby British fort "made Machakos one of the most difficult as well as the most needy fields in the Mission."303 But people further afield from Machakos were also uninterested, so Johnston and Rhoad discontinued itinerant preaching entirely.304 It took Johnston five years to win his first converts305 and was not until 1911 before he could perform his first

298H&D (March-April 1903): 4-5; (July 1905): 1; and Stauffacher, “History of A.I.M.,” p. 21.
299See above footnote 249.
300Mbotela to Riebe, 29 March 1909; Riebe to Hurlburt, 16 June 1911, KBA: Riebe, General Correspondence;.
301H&D (October-December 1913): 12, 13.
303Ibid., p. 8.
304H&D (January-February 1904): 10-11; also see above p. 272.

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baptism.\textsuperscript{306}

In 1906 Rhoad tried to reopen the station at Muinga (formerly Kilungu), but found that "the Akamba work seems to grow more, rather than less, difficult."\textsuperscript{307} In 1908 he moved to Mboni, where his defense of the people and road building activities won him such popularity that crowds of 250-300 were coming to the Sunday services.\textsuperscript{308} In time, however, the novelty wore off. By 1911 the average attendance at the daily meetings had dropped to 30.\textsuperscript{309} The response among the Kamba at this time was so small that Hurlburt wrote in his 1910 annual report: "In the Akamba tribe the work is believed by many missionaries to be the most difficult."\textsuperscript{310}

4. Gikuyu Response to Evangelism

Compared to the discouragements that the missionaries experienced with the Kamba, they found much greater response among the Gikuyu. At this time the Gikuyu were more open to cultural change than the conservative Kamba, so were more receptive to the missionaries and their message.

At first the work in Ukambani and in Gikuyuland appeared to be progressing at about the same rate. Thembigwa was established among the Gikuyu at the same time Kangundo was recovering from the famine. Krieger, who had rejoined A.I.M., baptized his first convert on 6 December 1903, only six months after the first baptisms at Kangundo.\textsuperscript{311} That same year Kijabe was founded, and Hurlburt reported 100

\textsuperscript{306}H&D (July-September 1912): 8.
\textsuperscript{307}H&D (November-December 1906): 3.
\textsuperscript{308}See above p. 258.
\textsuperscript{309}H&D (July-September 1911): 15-16.
\textsuperscript{310}H&D (January-March 1911): 11.
\textsuperscript{311}H&D (January-February 1904): 7, 9-10.
people coming to the Sunday worship services. The next year saw the first Kijabe baptisms.

A sampling of the reports from *Hearing and Doing* showed that this promising beginning continued. In 1906, Hurlburt wrote:

There has been marked interest among the people at Kijabe during the past six months; numbers expressing their desire to be Christians, and proving their sincerity by consistent Christian lives....

The following year he noted that over 70 Africans had "expressed a desire to become Christians", six inquirers classes in progress, and the church building had become overcrowded. A new stone church replaced the mud and wattle chapel, but with the number of Africans living at Kijabe increasing, the new building was soon filled.

The growth at Kijabe included growth in spiritual maturity and outreach. In his 1910 annual report, Hurlburt summarized this growth:

The work at Kijabe, the headquarters of the Mission, has been most marked by a steadiness of growth and deepening of the spiritual life, the little native church learning how to maintain its own affairs, and how to reach out in service for others.

Such growth was evident not only at Kijabe, but at the other Gikuyu stations. When the Knapps returned to Kambui in early 1906, they found that the school work had increased and the Christian community had grown in numbers and spiritual life.

The following year saw continued response at Kambui with Knapp reporting

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conversions every month, "a large inquirers' class," six ready for baptism, and six more seeking baptism.319 Ngenda was founded in 1906. During that first year the missionaries saw the people move from "no desire or inclination for the things of God"320 to "deep interest".321 In 1910 Hurlburt reported:

Perhaps the most aggressive work by native Christians in going out into the surrounding districts has been done at Ngenda, while one of the strongest and deepest spiritual movements among the natives has been found at that station.322

Matara mission station was founded in 1907. Within two years enough young men had accepted Christianity and were zealous to share their new-found faith that Emil Sywulka organized them to visit the surrounding homesteads, teaching each family a Bible verse to recite in church the following Sunday. This way they visited 30 homesteads regularly and had 200 people in church.323

5. Masai Response to Evangelism

While the work among the Kamba was frustrating, and the work among the Gikuyu was progressing, the work among the Masai proved abortive. When Kijabe was established in July 1903, contact was quickly made with the Masai through the use of medicine.324 Some moved close to the station, probably hoping for a profitable alliance with the white men similar to the one Lenana had forged at Fort Smith.325

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321 Ibid., p. 16.
324 H&D (January-February 1904): 5-6, 10; and Westervelt, p. 34.
325 H&D (January-February 1904): 5-6, 10; and Westervelt, p. 34. On Lenana’s alliance with the British see Mungeam, pp. 41-45, 430; and Tignor, p. 21.
John Stauffacher arrived at Kijabe in August and was assigned to evangelize the Masai. 326 By visiting the surrounding manyattas, Stauffacher developed excellent relations with the Masai, 327 and within a year, had made his first convert, Mulungit, one of his language informants. 328 Highly intelligent, a born leader, and the son of a rich and influential elder, Mulungit made rapid progress in Christianity, and Stauffacher had great hopes that he would be the principle evangelist to the Masai. 329

At this time European settlers were pouring into Kenya. 330 Many cast covetous eyes upon the Masai grazing ground in the Rift Valley along the railway line near Lake Naivasha. Therefore in 1905 the colonial government alienated a large portion of the Masai's best land and forced them to divide and occupy two reserves, one southwest of Nairobi and the other to the north on the Laikipia plateau. 331 The Masai resented this treatment and hardship it caused. 332

For Mulungit, the Masai move was an intense personal crisis. He had returned to his people for circumcision, was elected leader of his group of warriors, and shared with them the hardships and uncertainties of the move. For a time it seemed that he

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326 Stauffacher, "History of A.I.M.,” p. 20.
328 Riebe, "Mulungit," p. 2; Stauffacher, "History of A.I.M.,” p. 20; and Westervelt, pp. 34-36.
332 See H&D (July 1905): 7-8; and Tignor, pp. 33-34.
was lost to the mission. He made a series of journeys through northwestern Kenya, visited to Uganda to observe the church work there, and then joined Stauffacher at Rumuruti. After an intense struggle with himself and his people Mulungit finally threw his lot in with the mission for good.333

Stauffacher was angry at the treatment of the Masai334 but could do nothing about it. He hoped that the disruption to their traditional way of life caused by colonialism would make the Masai responsive to evangelism.335 The great problem for missionaries trying to evangelize pastoral peoples had always been the inaccessibility created by their semi-nomadic way of life. Attracted to the medical care at Kijabe and the rich pastures of Naivasha, this problem had not been apparent before the first Masai move. After the move, Stauffacher hoped to both overcome the obstacle of their nomadic way of life and to provide them with the means of surviving in the new colonial world336 by inducing the Masai to settle down and become mixed farmers.337 He first attempted this with the southern Masai at Ngong338 but quickly decided to move on to the northern reserve near the government station at Rumuruti.339

The government's efforts to end Masai raiding340 threatened the warriors'

333H&D (July 1905): 7-8; and Riebe, "Mulungit," pp. 3-5. Also see Tignor, pp. 139-140.

334H&D (July 1905): 7; Westervelt, p. 40.

335H&D (July 1905): 7-8.

336Stauffacher accepted the common view that the Masai were declining and on the way to extinction. He wrote "I have met only one man outside our mission, Mr. Gilkison [the government official at Rumuruti], who had any words of hope whatever for the tribe..." (H&D (December 1905): 3). On this view, see Tignor, pp. 16-17.


340H&D (December 1905): 3; and (July-October) 1906): 12.

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position in Masai society.\textsuperscript{341} Furthermore, efforts by the elders to restrict the size of the new class of warriors produced violent conflicts among the Masai near Rumuruti. As a result some young men sought sanctuary at the mission and were willing to go to school and learn gardening as long as they were paid for it.\textsuperscript{342} There were other encouraging signs. Massagondis, the local Masai "chief" kept a small garden at Rumuruti, so was seen to favor cultivation.\textsuperscript{343} Mulungit seemed to be regaining the influence he had lost when he left his people to live on the mission station.\textsuperscript{344} Perhaps the most important was the conversion of Tagi Oloposioki, a Masai sergeant in the colonial army, who became Stauffacher's strongest convert and a remarkable linguist.\textsuperscript{345}

Despite these hopeful signs, Rumuruti remained Stauffachers' "difficult work among the Masai."\textsuperscript{346} The Masai still feared the mission station, and those who lived there were ridiculed and despised as "foreigners".\textsuperscript{347} Three years later, Stauffacher did his best to put a good face on it, but could still only report: "Regular, systematic work

\textsuperscript{341}Guarding the Masai herds and raiding the herds of others in order to build up their wealth for marriage, had been the purpose and past-time of the warriors. The suppression of stock raiding by the colonial government reduced the warriors to the demeaning role of stock herders for the elders. For the Masai social structure, the effect of colonial policy upon it, and its role in Masai resistance to colonial change see Tignor, pp. 73-93. For the same in regard to Stauffacher's work at Rumuruti see: H&D (December 1905): 3; and (January-March 1907): 5-6. Also see above p. 271.

\textsuperscript{342}H&D (July-October) 1906): 12; (January-March 1907): 10; and (April-June 1907): 12-13.

\textsuperscript{343}H&D (December 1905): 3.

\textsuperscript{344}H&D (April-June 1907): 13.

\textsuperscript{345}Westervelt, pp. 73-76; and Tignor, p. 141.

\textsuperscript{346}H&D (January-March 1907): 16.

\textsuperscript{347}H&D (January-March 1907): 9-10; and (January-June 1908): 5-6. Also see above p. 271.
is now being carried on in five kraals, reaching perhaps 150 people. The school had only thirteen students, and most of these were not the most desirable products of Masai society.

Stauffacher's interests began to change. The social changes that he thought would open the Masai to mass evangelism did not occur. The work remained slow, and, to a man of Stauffacher's temperament, tedious. New areas of missionary work were being opened up to A.I.M. In 1906 and 1907 Stauffacher went on survey trips to western and northern Kenya. Also in 1907, Mulungit and another convert began to press for areas of their own to evangelize. In 1908 Stauffacher proposed a new missionary strategy. Only one station should be established in each language group. The missionaries would train African evangelists for seven or eight years, and then move on leaving the Africans to evangelize the rest of the people.

The Stauffachers left for furlough in 1909 to recruit missionaries for the new fields that A.I.M. was entering in Tanzania and Zaire. With them they took Mulungit, who studied in the United States for the next three years. Albert and Elma Barnett and the Masai evangelists were supposed to complete the work of evangelizing the Masai.

However it was not to be. Settlers now wanted the Laikipia plateau. In 1909

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348 H&D (January-June 1908): 5.
350 Westervelt, pp. 66-73, 85-86.
353 H&D (July-September 1909): 8-9; and (October-December 1909 and January 1910): 6-7, 7-12.

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the colonial government ordered the northern Masai to move south and join their southern brethren in an enlarged southern reserve. The Masai resisted this move even more than the first, and the government had to threaten and bully the Masai leaders into agreement. In 1912 and 1913 thousands of Masai and their cattle died in a series of ill-prepared and hurried attempts to move them south.355

Because of the unrest, the mission station at Rumuruti closed and the only evangelism to be done for the next six or seven years was by Mulungit and Tagi operating out of Kijabe.356

A.I.M.'s evangelistic efforts produced different responses among the Kamba, Gikuyu, and Masai. Yet, over all, the African response was very small before World War I as illustrated by the table on "Average Attendance at A.I.M. Worship Services" for 1911-1912.357

TENSIONS OVER EVANGELISM
A.I.M. had always been a mission orientated toward occupying new fields. This was inherent in Peter Cameron Scott's original vision of a chain of mission stations from Mombasa to Lake Chad.358 The original constitution had stated that: "It

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355 Bennett, p. 284; Leys, pp. 103-104, 111, 114; Low, "British Rule," pp. 36-38; Mungeam, pp. 259-70; Sorrenson, pp. 196-209; Tignor, pp. 34-37.


357 This table was compiled from: H&D (July-September 1911): 15-16; and (January-March 1913): 5-6.

358 See above Chapter 1, p. 14.
shall be the object of this Mission to occupy new territory rather than to trench upon fields already occupied..." This policy was aimed at comity with other missions. As long as all of A.I.M.'s fields were new, there was no problem. But as soon as the work became established in one area, tensions arose as to whether Mission resources should go to develop the established work, or to open up work in new, unreached areas.

In 1908 Stauffacher argued that the Mission should always be moving to new, unreached areas, and a version of his forward moving, aggressive missionary strategy was incorporated into the A.I.M. Constitution the following year:

It shall be the policy of this Mission to open its new work in tribes which seem to the General Council to offer greatest opportunities and to establish well manned stations far enough apart to permit the evangelization through native workers... It shall be the policy of the Mission to give the advanced training of these native evangelists at the Central Station, Kijabe.  

This new policy produced two tensions within A.I.M. Coming immediately after the comity section on not "trenching on occupied fields," it easily gave the impression that this policy now applied not just to comity with other missions, but to fields already occupied by A.I.M. as well. In other words, A.I.M.'s priorities would now be on "occupying new territory" rather than developing the work in existing fields of work.

Secondly, the prominence given to Kijabe was to cause dissention.

The priority of new, outreach work was strongly supported by both Hurlburt and Stauffacher. Hurlburt wrote in 1910: "...it is our purpose to push forward preaching the gospel to the tribes who have not heard, as rapidly as we are able to do..." In 1908 Bishop Tucker offered to turn the C.M.S. work in the northwestern

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359 A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VI, KBA: General Council.

360 A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article IX, Section 2, KBA: General Council.

361 Hurlburt to Whiteside, 24 May 1910, KBA: Pre-1911 Hurlburt Correspondence.

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part of German East Africa over to A.I.M. In the following year, former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt secured permission for A.I.M. to begin work in northeastern Belgian Congo. Stauffacher was part of survey teams in 1909 and 1910 that explored the area in German East Africa and tried to find a way to extend A.I.M.'s work into the Congo. In 1912 Stauffacher lead a party of missionaries to the Congo and began the work there.

The first sign of conflict between established and new areas came from Stauffacher. He was impatient to start the work in the Congo and had to be restrained by Hurlburt, who wrote in March 1911 advising him not to explore a new route to the Congo until Hurlburt arrived back from furlough. Stauffacher responded by threatening to resign from A.I.M. if the General Council placed another station in an established area and did not make expansion into the Belgian Congo the top priority of the Mission.

Stauffacher continued to argue his case in a paper read at the 1912 Annual Field Conference and reprinted in *Hearing and Doing*. He argued that the only task given to the Church by Christ was world evangelism, and that over the past 2,000 years, the Church failed to evangelize the world because it had turned aside to other

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366 Hurlburt to Stauffacher and General Council, 3 March 1911, KBA: General Council.
good, but less important tasks such as education and reform. An emphasis on the development of existing work is in danger of falling into this trap. Furthermore, by concentrating on work already started, no matter how great the need, A.I.M. and its missionaries stood in great danger of developing a narrow, parochial vision, and loosing the burden for evangelizing the whole world. Stauffacher urged A.I.M. to follow the example of the itinerant ministry of the Apostle Paul. After initial evangelism, the development of the work should be left in the hands of the African converts while the missionary moves on to evangelize among a different group of people. Stauffacher concluded by arguing that the wide evangelization of Africa could not be delayed because of the threat posed by the rapid expansion of Islam.

Opposition to the new expansion was centered in Ukambani, A.I.M.'s oldest work. Here the work had been extremely frustrating and the results meager. Furthermore, in the opinion of the Ukambani missionaries the bulk of the Mission resources were going to Kijabe and other areas, while they struggled even to maintain their work among the Kamba. There was some truth to this accusation. The number of missionaries working among the Gikuyu grew from three to 47 in the four years following the move of the Mission headquarters to Kijabe, while the number of missionaries working among the Kamba declined from eleven to six. From 1908 to 1913 the missionaries in Ukambani had difficulty in even staffing their mission stations. During five out of those six years the Mission could not staff all of the mission stations in Ukambani. There were many legitimate reasons for this disparity of resources, but the Kamba missionaries felt neglected by A.I.M., and it appeared to them that the Mission was expanding at their expense.

These frustrations came into the open in the disciplinary action against

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369 See above pp. 281-284.

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DISTRIBUTION OF A.I.M. MISSIONARIES
1900-1913

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5/5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5/5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5/5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# of Miss = Number of missionaries
# of Stat = Number of mission stations
S/T = Number of stations with missionary staff/total number of stations.

Johnston in 1913. Johnston charged that A.I.M. neglected the work in Ukambani, and had showed favoritism to Kijabe. Rhoad sympathized with his frustration: "The pressure during the past years, because of the many unsupplied needs in the Ukamba work, has been tremendous and there has been much to suggest - 'an irresponsible attitude on the part of the Mission'..."

Hurlburt responded by charging that Johnston "had been opposed to our advancing into new territory." This charge was at the heart of the dispute, and was

370Directory of Missionaries" published in each issue of Hearing and Doing.
371See above Chapter 3, pp. 112-114.
372Conference between Charles F. Johnston, O. R. Palmer and W. L. Degroff, over the Differences on the Field between the Council and our Brother." 18 September 1913, BGC,22,8.
373Rhoad to Palmer, 30 October 1913, BGC,22,8.
374Hurlburt to Palmer, 3 November 1913, BGC,22,8.

Chapter Six: Evangelistic Practice, page 294
### GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF A.I.M. MISSIONARIES IN DIFFERENT AREAS, 1900-1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kamba</th>
<th>Gikuyu</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1903</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
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<td>1906</td>
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<td>1907</td>
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<td>1908</td>
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<td>30</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

375 "Directory of Missionaries," published in each issue of *Hearing and Doing*.

Chapter Six: Evangelistic Practice, page 295
readily admitted by another Kamba missionary, William Wight, who repeated the charge of favoritism toward Kijabe and then continued: "Mr. Johnston, Mr. Rhoad and myself have always been opposed to advance work in new territory while the already established work was unequipped and not properly developed."

Eventually, the confrontation was resolved and Johnston was permitted to return to the field, but the disagreement over developing existing work or going into new work did not go away. Hurlburt made clear his position when he appointed the furloughing Lee Downing to represent him to the American Home Council:

Need I urge you to steadfastly press upon all home workers our call to push a line of stations on to the far northwest and to be undaunted by difficulties; to realize that God's blessing on our present undertakings depends not alone on our faithful doing of the work already in hand but also upon our faithfulness to the original purpose for which God called us into being i.e. the planting of a chain of stations northwest into the far interior of Africa till we meet workers coming this way.

However, opposition to expansion and charges of favoritism continued to smolder, and burst into flame again in the controversy that surrounded Hurlburt's 1925 resignation. With the resignation of Hurlburt, the force for expansion died. The General Secretary of the A.H.C. Henry Campbell explained that A.I.M. had expanded beyond the means of home constituency to support and could barely support the work it was already doing.

CONCLUSION

A.I.M. claimed that it would only engage in direct evangelism, but when it

376Wight to Palmer, 30 December 1913, BGC,22,8.

377Hurlburt to Downing, 2 November 1920, KBA: FC-76.

378At that time Hurlburt was accused of favoritism (Campbell to Pierson, 5 February 1926, BGC,21,18) and keeping some missionaries under his direct patronage (Campbell to Barnett, 3 February 1926, BGC,19,20).

379Campbell to Maynard, 8 March 1929, BGC,10,5.
arrived in Africa, the Mission had to engage in many other activities. Some of these like exploring, building, and gardening were necessary for the physical survival of the missionaries. Other activities like language and cultural learning were necessary preparation for evangelism. Some activities, like medical work, were both humanitarian in nature and attracted the African people to the missionaries. Education was carried out from the beginning both as an evangelistic method and with the intention of training African evangelists. Given A.I.M.'s pragmatism, the missionaries tried to turn all of these activities into opportunities for evangelism.

Successful evangelism, however, had to overcome many obstacles. These included cultural misunderstandings, difficulty with the language, theological difficulties, the degree of cultural change required by conversion, and the missionary role and methods. As the missionaries established personal relationships with African people, they began to experience success in their evangelism.

The African people responded to the missionaries in different ways. Some were hostile and indifferent, but for many different reasons some came to the mission stations. The missionaries were aware that the Africans came to the mission stations for different reasons and that it was difficult for them to understand the missionary concept of conversion, so the missionaries carefully evaluated the lives of converts to judge the genuineness of the professed conversion. The work among the Kamba was difficult; the Gikuyu showed the greatest response, and A.I.M.'s work among the Masai proved to be abortive.

A.I.M. was founded for the purpose of taking the gospel to people who had never heard. This was no problem until A.I.M. had actually established work in Kenya, then tension arose over whether the established areas or extension into new areas should have priority in the Mission. Stauffacher argued most strongly for expansion. The Kamba missionaries, believing that the expansion was being done at their expense opposed it. As long as Hurlburt directed the Mission, A.I.M.

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emphasized expansion into unreached areas. After Hurlburt resigned the Mission stopped expanding and concentrated on maintaining the work already started.
CHAPTER SEVEN
A.I.M. AS AN EVANGELISTIC MISSION: CONFLICT WITH EDUCATION

The tensions inherent within A.I.M.'s values and between those values and the African context were readily apparent in the debate over education that racked the Mission between 1920 and 1950. Within A.I.M. tension existed between the Mission's commitment to the priority of evangelism on the one hand and its pragmatism and humanitarianism on the other. Between A.I.M. and the African context, there were tensions between A.I.M.'s avowed religious purpose and the socio-political use the colonial government, European settlers, and African people wanted make of the missions in Kenya.

THE AFRICAN DEMAND FOR WESTERN EDUCATION

1. Change in African Attitude toward Education

During the First World War the African attitude toward Western education changed dramatically. The table on "A.I.M. Growth in Kenya, 1910-1923" shows that in a little more than a decade A.I.M.'s educational work grew from nine schools with about 300 students being taught by missionaries to 129 schools in which over 2,000 students were being taught by 178 African teacher-evangelists. African chiefs and elders who had previously opposed the missionaries and their schools were now either easier to persuade, or were asking for more schools. In 1915 Charles Youngken reported that at Kinyona the "station school and the two outschools were running down rather than building up, but now [as a result of the conversion of Chief Njiri] the attendance is much increased and much desire is shown for more outschools."1

1Youngken to Fishermen Fellows, 8 October 1915, BGC, 12, 46. That same year Hurlburt reported that at Kijabe "more out-station work has been carried on by the native workers, and schools have been conducted at centres of surrounding chiefs" (H&D 20 (April-June 1915): 8).

Chapter Seven: Evangelism and Education, page 300
Four years later Jesse Raynor reported that after "much persuasion" he had been able to convince three chiefs around Githumu to let him open outschools in their districts. Nor was this increased interest in education limited to the Gikuyu or to the colonial chiefs. In 1925 the elders at Machakos asked that the school for their children be expanded.

2. The Effects of World War I

Prior to World War I, colonialism was a distant irritant for many of the African peoples who saw no reason to turn from their time-honored ways. However, the war and its immediate aftermath brought the dislocations of colonialism home to the African population on a broader scale than ever before.

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Some 160,000 Africans were forcibly recruited into the Carrier Corps, where nearly 50,000 died, mostly from poor food and the lack of adequate medical treatment. The war brought together large numbers of Africans from many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds for the first time. For many this was their first exposure to the world of the white man. As a result large numbers of African men were exposed to a new, wider world and to new social systems.\(^5\)

The desire to avoid conscription into the Carrier Corps produced a flood of young men onto the mission stations. But when the government decided in 1917 to draft mission adherents and British missionaries, the missions, including A.I.M. formed the "Kikuyu Mission Volunteers" under missionary officers.\(^6\) According to Inland Africa, the missions did this "to shield them [their African converts] from the temptations of army life, to help them to preach the Gospel to their comrades, and to safeguard their health."\(^7\) Through the example of the Kikuyu Mission Volunteers many of the other carriers could see the practical advantages of Christianity, as the A.I.M. Masai convert, Tagi, reported:

As we were on our way home, we passed a great many people many of whom said, "How is this that you are able to return home so soon? Here we have been here 2 or 3 years and you go home before us, and how well you look. Most of those whom we see on their way home are sick and dying." We told them that our God was a great and mighty God and that He cared for us.\(^8\)


\(^6\) *IA* (July 1917): 1-2; (September 1917): 12; and (March 1918): 7.

\(^7\) *IA* (July 1917): 2. A.I.M. changed the name of its magazine from *Hearing and Doing* to *Inland Africa* in January 1917.

\(^8\) *IA* (July 1918): 14.

Chapter Seven: Evangelism and Education, page 302
The loss of so many men to the Carrier Corps caused tremendous disruption to the African communities where some districts were virtually depopulated of able-bodied men. In addition, draught, rinderpest, smallpox, influenza, and bubonic plague killed more at home than died at the front. These troubles shook African faith in their traditions and brought more people to the missionaries and their schools. These troubles mixed with missionary teaching fueled the African imagination. Expectations of an African "messiah" excited the Gikuyu around Kijabe, and in other places, according to William Anderson, "people streamed into Church literacy-classes, to escape 'the wrath to come'...."

3. Post-War Pressures for Education

After the war, the onerous aspects of colonialism intensified. New measures were passed that increased the Africans' sense of insecurity about their land. The reduction of the African population due to the war and increased demand for labor in the post-war economy threatened to drive wages up. With the increased labor costs, the appreciation of the currency, and the collapse of commodity prices the European farmers faced ruin. To survive they attempted to reduce African wages and pressured the colonial government into introducing a host of oppressive, new policies to force

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9 Rosberg and Nottingham, pg. 28.


11 A missionary from Kijabe wrote that many Africans found their traditional means of fighting disease to be ineffective against the influenza epidemic and also noted that most of the African Christians, who did not practice the traditional remedies, recovered. As a result the number of conversions at Kijabe increased significantly. (H & D (June 1919): 9-10).


13 W. Anderson, p. 78.

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the African people to work on the European farms. All of these actions brought the African people into contact with colonial society in more ways than ever before and presented them with a host of problems for which their traditions had no answers. As a result, African people began to turn with increasing frequency to the missionary and his schools. By the 1920s the first generation of African students were beginning to demonstrate that mission education was an advantage in dealing with the colonial political environment.

Colonial oppression and politics were not the only pressures turning Africans to the mission schools. The expanding economy of the 1920s and a deliberate policy on the part of the government and settlers to replace Asian artisans and clerks with Africans provided educated Africans new and attractive economic alternatives to agriculture. This also made the mission schools attractive.

The most important agent in promoting both Christianity and education was the mission-trained, African teacher-evangelist or catechist. Charles Hurlburt saw A.I.M.'s teacher-evangelists as essential to the expansion of the Missions' evangelistic activities. First, he believed that the African teacher-evangelist was a natural cultural

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17 Tignor, pp. 208-209, 216, 222-225.

Chapter Seven: Evangelism and Education, page 304
bridge over which Africans could cross into the new age. Secondly, he noted that the teacher-evangelist was a positive example of the benefits of the new ways. Finally, Hurlburt saw the experiences and leadership of the teacher-evangelist as essential to the establishment of a truly indigenous church.  

4. Government Interest in African Education

Just as the African people started to see Western education as the key to their political and economic advancement, the colonial government also began to take an interest in African education. The government first considered African education in 1907 but concluded that the educational needs of the Africans were being adequately met by the missions and merely encouraged them to co-ordinate their work.  

A.I.M. was glad to do this and joined with other missions in Kenya to develop uniform educational codes and standards. In 1909 the government began providing small grants to missions for industrial education and established an Education Department in 1911, but remained largely uninvolved until after the war.  

Two major post-war developments brought the government actively into African education. The first was the political struggle between the European and Asian communities that prompted the Europeans to push for the training of African...
artisans and clerks to replace Indians. The second was the 1922-1924 recession which prompted the government also to seek to train Africans as a cheap labor alternative to Indians.\textsuperscript{22} The East African Protectorate Education Commission recommended in 1919 that all mission schools and teachers be registered and supported by the government with funds, advice, inspection and a common syllabus.\textsuperscript{23} Discussion of African education culminated with the 1924 visit of the Phelps-Stokes Commission and the passage of the Education Ordinance. The Phelps-Stokes Commission stirred enthusiasm for African education among many missionaries, including some in A.I.M.\textsuperscript{24}, and motivated the government to increase its programme of grants-in-aid to mission schools. The Education Ordinance required that all schools be registered with the Department of Education, provided for the licensing of all teachers before they were permitted to teach, and authorized the Department of Education to inspect the schools and enforce standards.\textsuperscript{25}

THE CASE FOR ACCEPTING GRANTS-IN-AID

The African demand for an increase in the quantity of education and the government's moves to increase the quality of education provoked a debate that was to divide A.I.M. for the next 25 years. At first, the Mission viewed the growing popularity of Western education among the African people as an increased

\textsuperscript{22}Tignor, pp. 208-209.


\textsuperscript{24}Collins to Friends, 1 March 1924, BGC,19,21; and Grimwood to Campbell, 6 August 1926, BGC,1,84.


Chapter Seven: Evangelism and Education, page 306
### SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE OVER ACCEPTING EDUCATIONAL GRANTS-IN-AID FROM THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARGUMENTS FOR GRANTS</th>
<th>ARGUMENTS AGAINST GRANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Education is essential to evangelism and church work.</td>
<td>1. Education competes with evangelism for resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. If A.I.M. loses its schools it loses its churches.</td>
<td>a. Education leads to &quot;Modernism.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Changed circumstances require changed methods.</td>
<td>b. Education is a false salvation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A.I.M. wants standards in its schools as high or higher than the government requirements.</td>
<td>2. Accepting grants will lead to government control of A.I.M.'s work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Accepting grants is not solicitation, but using money the Africans have already paid in taxes.</td>
<td>3. Accepting grants would violate A.I.M.'s Faith Basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A.I.M. has a responsibility to educate its converts.</td>
<td>4. Education is the responsibility of the government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

opportunity for evangelism rather than a threat to the Mission's commitment to evangelism. The greater threat appeared to be the colonial government's growing interest in African education.

### 1. Fear of Government Control

First some A.I.M. missionaries feared that without adequate resources to bring their schools up to the government standards, they would be closed or turned over to another agency. Despite efforts to establish educational standards\(^\text{26}\) the lack of resources had left A.I.M. schools in poor shape. In 1919 Charles Johnston complained: "In the matter of education our mission and our converts have practically no standing in the Protectorate."\(^\text{27}\) He saw the improvement of the schools' resources

\(^{26}\)See above Chapter 6, p. 249.

\(^{27}\)Johnson to Palmer, 4 November 1919, BGC,22,8.

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to be an urgent need, and William Blaikie told him that when he returned for furlough, he should tell the people that "there is the great need of native education, the need of reorganization and skilled supervision." Hurlburt saw the establishment of a central college to professionally train teacher-evangelists to be the "supreme need" of the Mission and wanted to build one at Kijabe, but A.I.M. did not have qualified personnel to staff it. Five years after Johnston's pessimistic assessment of A.I.M.'s educational efforts, George Rhoad wrote: "All over the field murmurings are heard that indicate we have not only lost the confidence of Government but of large sections of the native people also."

The offer of grants-in-aid from the government did not solve A.I.M.'s dilemma, for now the Mission feared that accepting government grants would lead to government control of its schools, reducing their value for evangelism and Christian teaching. In 1922 the missionaries unanimously passed a resolution declaring that A.I.M. would neither ask for nor accept any government grants that would bring their schools under government supervision or control.

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28 Johnston to Fletcher, 5 February 1920, BGC,22,8.

29 Blaikie to Johnston, 11 April 1923, BGC,22,8.


31 Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.


Chapter Seven: Evangelism and Education, page 308
2. Fear of Government Control Exaggerated

The enthusiasm generated by the Phelps-Stokes Commission and the passage of the Education Ordinance in 1924, however, renewed the debate. Those seeking a change in policy now argued that the fear of government control was exaggerated. Johnston wrote that the government inspectors visiting the Kijabe industrial school had never once inquired about the religious activities of the school.34 Another missionary pointed out that though the C.M.S. and C.S.M. had been among the first to accept government grants, neither had experienced any restrictions on the religious programmes in their schools.35 He argued that government assurances and the creation of the Advisory Committee on African Education were adequate safeguards of the Mission's religious interests.36 Besides, the Education Ordinance made the government standards mandatory, making fear of government control an irrelevant issue.37 However, some missionaries remained intractable to the end. Emily Messenger wrote:

We have come to a stage here where we will either work hand in hand with the government - take their grants and do their bidding - or be pushed out. For myself, I'd just as soon we'd be pushed out of Kikuyu and pushed on to the tribes right near us, who have no one to teach that Christ came to save them.38

3. Education Essential to Evangelism

The proponents of the grants-in-aid also advanced positive arguments to

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34Johnston to Leasure, 1 May 1922, cited by Rae, p. 53.

35Deputy General Director to All missionaries in Kenya, 26 June 1924, cited by Rae, p. 53.

36General Deputy Director [sic] to All Missionaries in Kenya, 26 July 1924, cited by Rae, pp. 53-55.


38Messenger to Stumpf, 24 April 1924, BGC,12,46.

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support their case. Fred McKenrick argued that A.I.M. had "no moral right to deny to the native peoples who live within our A.I.M. spheres the better" educational resources that the grants could provide.  

Harmon Nixon, who first arrived on the field at this time, reflected years later that:

...national Christians should have a broad education in order to set up a truly Christian society. If Christians were to support their own institutions adequately they would need a good education in order to have an income commensurate to the need.  

Furthermore, changing conditions in Kenya also required changing methods of work. McKenrick argued:

That the conditions within the Colony which have developed with such amazing rapidity and ... public sentiment of a well informed character, all foretell that we cannot hope to have things our own way as in the past, and must more seriously attend to educational work....

However, the greatest argument for accepting the grants and expanding A.I.M.'s educational work was that education had simply become an indispensable part of A.I.M.'s evangelistic work.  

Answering those missionaries who argued that A.I.M. should simply turn its schools over to the government, Hurlburt wrote that the schools were important not only because here Africans were "being taught to read the Word of God," but also because there was "a reasonable expectation that in

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39 McKenrick to All Missionaries in Kenya, 26 June 1924, quoted in Rae, pp. 58-59.


41 McKenrick to All Missionaries in Kenya, 26 June 1924, quoted in Rae, p. 59.

42 The Deputy General Director for Kenya, probably Fred McKenrick, argued that 95% of A.I.M.'s converts came from its schools, attendance at school often provided the most tangible evidence of an African's interest in the gospel, and no evangelistic method of comparable effectiveness was available to the Mission (General Deputy Director [sic] to Hurlburt, 10 May 1924, quoted in Gration, pp 158-159; and in Rae, p. 57).

43 For example see Stauffacher to Campbell, 23 February 1927, BGC,13,10. Though written in 1927 Stauffacher said that he was expressing an opinion that "I have always held".

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connection with most of these village schools we shall find in the near future a village church."

In July 1924 Hurlburt published a strong appeal for the establishment of a college to train A.I.M.'s teacher-evangelists. He saw the Mission being squeezed between the demand for more schools on the part of the African people on the one hand and the demand for higher standards by the government on the other. He sought to refute the charge that an expanded educational programme would divert resources from evangelism by emphasizing the limited nature of the education to be offered and by advancing a two-sided argument for the essential nature of education to A.I.M.'s work. On the one hand, education had become the most important evangelistic tool that A.I.M. had. The expanded demand for education was an enormous opportunity for evangelism that should not be missed. On the other hand, to lose the schools would be to expose potential converts and new Christians to either the "evil" influences of secular government schools or to religious teachings that ran contrary to A.I.M.'s evangelical doctrine.

4. The Decision to Accept Grants-in-Aid

In 1924 and 1925 it seemed that those who favored accepting the government grants-in-aid had won. In the United States, Hurlburt oversaw the resignation of his opponents on the American Home Council, the decision to accept grants-in-aid.

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44Hurlburt, "Another Year", pp. 4-6. Hurlburt attempted to support his point by trying to establish a statistical relationship between the number of schools and village meetings the teacher-evangelists conducted in a given area and the number of conversions.


46These opponents included Orson Palmer, the American Home Director, and other members of the American Home Council (Tignor, p. 123). This occurred in September or October 1924 for Palmer was listed in the "Directory" published in Inland Africa at least through August 1924. No American Home Director was listed in the October issue, and Hurlburt was listed as "Acting Home Director" in November.

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aid,\textsuperscript{47} and the appointment of a new American General Secretary, Henry Campbell.\textsuperscript{48} In March 1925, the lead article in \textit{Inland Africa} was an appeal by the President of the British Home Council for the recruitment of missionaries who not only had piety and evangelistic zeal, but also professional skills in education, medicine, linguistics, or church development.\textsuperscript{49} In Kenya, A.I.M. lost no time in applying for the grants\textsuperscript{50} and for a bursary for one of their teacher-evangelists, Daudi Muciri, to attend the Jeanes Teachers' School in Kabete.\textsuperscript{51}

THE CASE AGAINST ACCEPTING GRANTS IN AID

1. Hurlburt’s Resignation

Any rejoicing by the proponents of African education, however, proved to be premature. For one thing the great debate over grants-in-aid resulted in an anticlimax, for the government was out of funds and could not respond positively to A.I.M.'s application for grants.\textsuperscript{52} Secondly, Hurlburt, himself, was out of the Mission in May 1925.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{47}This took place in October 1924 (Campbell to Kenya Field Council, 6 August 1926, BGC,22,9).

\textsuperscript{48}\textit{IA} (January 1925): 8.


\textsuperscript{50}Chairman of the [A.I.M.] Native Education Committee to Director of Education, 7 November 1924; and Field Director to Director of Education, 9 December 1924, cited by Rae, pp. 59-60. Allan to Blaikie, 24 December 1925; Director of Education to Rhoad, 12 March 1925; 20 April 1925; and Rhoad to Director of Education, 24 April 1925, KBA: FC-76.

\textsuperscript{51}Unsigned letter to Principal of Jeanes School, Kabete, 30 November 1925, KBA: FC-83; and Bliss to AIM Kijabe, 30 April 1926, KBA: FC-1.

\textsuperscript{52}Chairman to the [A.I.M.] Native Education Committee to Director of Education, 16 November 1924, cited by Rae, p. 60.

\textsuperscript{53}See above, Chapter 4, pp. 158-160.
Though not specifically mentioned, Hurlburt's education policy was among the issues that alienated his constituency and led to his ouster. His resignation also revealed a division between the Kenya field leadership and the American Home Council over the issue of grants-in-aid and the place of education in the Mission's programme. In a July, *Inland Africa* editorial, a month before Hurlburt's resignation was officially accepted, Campbell argued against the new educational policy stating that "undue stress perhaps is being laid on education." In the letters to the field leaders announcing Hurlburt's resignation, Campbell also noted that "the educational policy of the Mission, particularly for Kenya, was gone into at some length" by the A.H.C. At its meeting the following year, the A.H.C. again discussed the "educational question" and directed Campbell to investigate the Kenya Field's commitments to education and to convey "that a strong feeling exists among the members of the Home Council against receiving grants-in-aid."

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54Campbell bolstered his argument against Hurlburt's education policy by asserting that "some of the more conservative mission leaders" in America opposed devoting missionary resources to education (*IA* (July 1925): 9). Hilda Stumpf wrote that to talk about education to some of A.I.M.'s constituency "is like a red tablecloth to a turkey gobbler!" (Stumpf to Campbell, 5 February 1929, quoted in Gratton, p. 163).

55Tignor probably overestimates the effect that Hurlburt's change of policy would have had on A.I.M.'s educational program in Kenya, for with few resources at A.I.M.'s disposal there was little the Mission could do besides accept the grants-in-aid and publicize the need for money and qualified teachers for the schools. However, his perceiving the educational issue behind Hurlburt leaving the Mission was most astute (Tignor, pp. 122-123).

56In 1927 Stauffacher wrote "that on at least one very important question, (education in Kenya) the [American] Home Council, and the Field Council in Kenya are not at all agreed," and then went on to elaborate the support for African education by the Kenya field leadership from 1920 on (Stauffacher to Campbell, 23 February 1927, BGC,13,10).

57*IA* (July 1925): 9.

58Campbell to Pierson; Campbell to Acting [Kenya] Field Director; Campbell to Marsh; and Campbell to Woodley, 10 August 1925, BGC,21,18.

59Campbell to Kenya Field Council, 6 August 1926, BGC,22,9.

60Campbell to Field Councils and Officers, 11 August 1926, BGC,11,11.

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2. Education as a Competitor to Evangelism

As in most arguments, the two sides in A.I.M.'s debate over education did not address each other's arguments directly. As often as not they simply talked past each other. Each responding to a different set of fears and concerns, they put forward their own, alternative views of reality. Thus, the opponents of A.I.M.'s involvement in education never answered the claim that its schools were A.I.M.'s most effective instruments of evangelism. Rather, they asserted that education was a competitor to evangelism that would divert the Mission from its true task. In his Inland Africa editorial, Campbell claimed that money for African education would come "from the share that rightfully belongs to evangelism." The General Secretary of the British Home Council, Ernest Grimwood, feared that educational institutions would tie missionary personnel down on existing mission stations and not permit the freedom to take the Gospel to those who have not heard. The experience of missionaries on the field seemed to justify this fear. Albert Barnett wrote: "We are anxious to visit some of the unworked tribes close around us but we are kept so busy with the station work and out-schools, that we have not had the time." John Stauffacher argued that education was a matter of "secondary importance" that was really the responsibility of the government, not of the Mission. Grimwood agreed, arguing that the government was far more competent to provide "education beyond the primary stage" and the work of A.I.M. must be limited to those

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62 Grimwood to Campbell, 17 August 1926, BGC,1,84.

63 Barnett to Campbell, 7 March 1928, BGC,19,20.

64 Stauffacher to Campbell, 23 February 1927, BGC,13,10. In his 1912 article evangelistic strategy, Stauffacher had argued that education and other "civilizing" activities were competitors to evangelism, which in the past had prevented the Church from completing the task of world evangelization (John W. Stauffacher, "Side Tracked for 2,000 Years," *H&D* (October-December 1912): 1-8).

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activities that were useful in building a strong indigenous church. According to this argument the work of the Mission was exclusively "religious", and concerned exclusively with personal morality in this life and preparation for the life to come. Preparation for making one's way in this life was not the concern of the Church. Thus in his editorial, Campbell saw a great difference between "teaching the Bible to Christians" and training church workers, which was legitimate for A.I.M., and providing education so Africans could "make a prosperous way in the world," an activity that was not. The division between the sacred and the secular in Western culture made the distinction between the role of religion and the role of education a legitimate Western issue. However, it was not an African issue where all life was a unity and religion primarily concerned itself about "this worldly" matters.

Another consequence of the separation of the sacred and secular was the elevation of education to a secular form of salvation. In the West, education was often seen as an alternative to religion and religious conversion. In A.I.M.'s view, education could westernize Africans, but alone it could neither make them better people nor prepare them for the life to come. Moreover, it could make them resistant to religious conversion. To Hurlburt, this potential for Western education

65These he listed as "primary education, translation of the Scriptures, pastoral visitation, medical relief and intensive evangelism with the aid of an instructed ministry." By "primary education," Grimwood was probably referring to literacy (Grimwood to Maynard, n.d. [8 July 1926], BGC,1,84).

66IA (July 1925): 9. Grimwood made the same point even more emphatically: "...wherever we adopt education ... for the purposes of merely intellectual or commercial advantage, we cease to function in the strict missionary sense and the work will lie as a wreck at our feet" (Grimwood to Campbell, 6 August 1926, BGC,1,84).

67Grimwood to Maynard, n.d. [8 July 1926], BGC,1,84; Campbell to Maynard, 4 August 1926, BGC,10,5. Grimwood called "a polished paganism" the prospect of an African society that was westernized through education, but not Christianized through Christian conversions.

68Andrew Andersen thought he saw this process already happening as westernization undermined Kipsigis culture (Andersen to Campbell, 28 May 1990 [sic, 1930], BGC,19,5).
to become a secular salvation provided all the more reason for A.I.M. to expand its educational work and provide Christian schools for its converts and potential converts and not leave them to the secular influence of government schools. Grimwood responded in the opposite direction. He believed that though educationalists and missionaries in African seemed to have the same goals, their fundamentally different views of salvation would either corrupt A.I.M. or bring them into cross purposes with each other.

Campbell shared Grimwood's fear, but in the United States where the Modernist-Fundamentalist controversy was reaching its heights, and where the educational system based on an evangelical world view had rapidly secularized, such fears inevitably took the form of a suspicion that the emphasis on education reflected a "Modernist" effort to replace evangelism with education. Campbell argued: "This educational program is subtle and to my mind, along with grants-in-aid, will open the door to what we call 'Modernism', that which is as old as the fall of the devil." Nevertheless, the fear of Modernism never became a significant argument against A.I.M. accepting grants-in-aid.

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69 See above pp. 310-310.
70 Grimwood to Campbell, 6 August 1926, BGC, 1, 84.
72 Marsden maintains that the Fundamentalists turned away from the social activism of their evangelical past because they believed the Modernists had substituted social activism for individual conversion (Marsden, pp. 91-92).
73 Campbell to Grimwood, 3 August 1926, BGC, 1, 84. Another time Campbell confided that because of the fear of Modernism, the A.H.C. was "rather shy of this new educational propaganda in Africa" (Campbell to Grimwood, 12 November 1926, BGC, 1, 84).
3. Grants-in-Aid Violate the Faith Basis

Despite the strong words, the belief that education was competitor to evangelism was not the crucial one. Far more important was the belief that the grants-in-aid violated the Faith Basis. Some missionaries believed that the act of applying for the grants was a form of solicitation, because the Mission had to "ask" for the money. For the A.H.C., however, the issue was that the Mission never knew from day to day the money or personnel God would provide, so Campbell wrote:

We are quite unable to promise other missionary societies or any government that we will carry out certain plans, as, for instance, the expenditure of so much or so little money, and the providing for teachers or other missionaries qualified to a certain degree to do specific kinds of work. ...we can make no promises without adding "if the Lord wills".

If it were not for this perception that the acceptance of the grants-in-aid violated the constitution of the Mission, it is likely that the A.H.C. would have acceded to the grants-in-aid and an expanded educational programme, despite their grave misgivings.

The A.H.C. instructed Campbell to send a questionnaire to the Kenya Field Council to find out its opinion of the 1924 decision to apply for grants, the degree to which A.I.M. was already committed to the government educational programme, and whether A.I.M. could avoid meeting the government standards and continue its current religious work. Campbell and the A.H.C. appeared to be operating under a fundamental misconception of the nature of the educational programme in Kenya.

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74 Davis to Wadham, 10 October 1936, BGC,19,25; and Maxwell to American Home Council, 17 November 1941, quoted in Rae, p. 163.

75 Campbell to Grimwood, 22 July 1926, BGC,1,84.

76 Even though the Kenya field should not accept the grants or make specific promises, Campbell allowed that the Mission should still do whatever it could for African education with the limits of its meager resources (Campbell to Maynard, 4 August 1926, BGC,10,5).

77 Campbell to the [Kenya] Field Council, 6 August 1926, BGC,22,9.
Education Ordinance of 1924 set the standards for all schools. The grants-in-aid were to provide the financial resources that would enable the missions to bring their schools up to the required standard. In theory the government could close or take over substandard schools whether they were aided or not. Campbell seems to have assumed that the Mission became obligated to meet the government standards only if it accepted the grants-in-aid hence the concern for making promises that the Mission might not be able to keep. Oddly enough, the A.H.C. did not rescind the 1924 decision to accept grants-in-aid. Instead it simply muddied the waters by expressing its unofficial disapproval and prohibiting the Mission from making any promises or commitments. This ambiguous "policy" left the Kenya Field free to accept grants-in-aid, but without the blessing of the A.H.C.

A.I.M.'s educational work struggled in a desultory manner. Downing accepted a government appointment to the Central Committee on African Education in 1926. He applied for grants only to find once again that the government coffers were empty. It is unclear whether A.I.M. ever received any grants-in-aid, though by the mid-1930s it was receiving some money from the Local Native Councils.

CONTINUED PRESSURE ON A.I.M.

1. Pressure from A.I.M. Converts

The blocking of a more aggressive educational policy by the Home Councils

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78 Campbell to the Field Councils and Officers of Tanganyika Territory, Kenya Colony, West Nile District, French Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo, 11 August 1926, BGC,11,11; BGC,22,9.

79 Downing to Bliss, 7 September 1926, KBA: FC-1.

80 Bliss to Downing, 20 November, 1926; and Downing to Acting Director of Education, 30 November 1926, KBA: FC-1.

81 Johnston to Station Superintendents, Ukamba, 1933; Johnston to Campbell, 21 September 1933, BGC,22,9; and Downing to Campbell, 10 August 1934, BGC,20,12.

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did not lessen the pressure for education which the Mission faced in Kenya. From 1925 the pressure came increasingly from A.I.M.'s own converts. In that year John Guilding wrote from Machakos:

> We had quite a talk with the Atumia [i.e. church elders] the other night. They had presented several matters to me, the most important of which was concerning more schooling for their children. ... I don't know what we are going to do.82

During the next two years LeRoy Farnsworth and Charles Johnston both reported that the delay in starting a Bible school and teachers' training college was straining relations with the Kamba Christians.83 Suffering the brunt of the African frustration in 1928, Johnston wrote that the increase in government social services had only served to raise the expectations of the Africans who looked to the Mission to provide the same services free of charge, and blamed Johnston for the Mission's failure to do so. Johnston also wondered how many services normally provided by a government A.I.M. should ask its supporters to provide. But most discouraging of all, Johnston could not see that the Mission's religious goals were being met: "As I look about me I see no signs that any of these things promote godliness of life, or zeal in proclaiming the good news of salvation."84 Johnston concluded his lament by asking for Campbell's objective and "dispassionate council". Campbell replied that A.I.M. needed to reach a point where it offered no social services at all.85 His response revealed not so much "objectivity" as the fact that he was isolated and out of touch with the pressures that were to nearly overwhelm the Mission. It did reflect the view of A.I.M.'s home constituency, which still hung tenaciously onto A.I.M.'s "evangelism

82Guilding to Johnston, 15 February 1925, BGC,22,8.

83Farnsworth to Campbell, 20 March 1926, BGC,10,5; and Johnston to Campbell, 21 February 1927, BGC,22,9.

84Johnston to Campbell, 5 March 1928, BGC,22,9.

85Campbell to Johnston, 14 May 1928, BGC,22,9.

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only" principle despite the countervailing pressures coming from the African context.

The pressure for increased education was not only coming from the Christians in Ukambani. In 1929 ecumenical conferences of Gikuyu church elders were held at Tumutumu and Kambui. Though they assembled to discuss matters of church discipline, the elders raised the issue of more educational opportunities for their children. The ensuing female circumcision controversy, however, emptied the mission schools for cultural and nationalistic reasons, temporarily relieving A.I.M. of Gikuyu pressure for more education.

2. Pressure from the Colonial Government

In addition to the African pressure for more schools, the colonial government continued to press the Mission to raise the standards of its schools, often threatening to turn A.I.M.'s areas over to other missions. For its part, A.I.M. struggled on with inadequate resources, while pro-education missionaries used the government threats to press their argument that the educational programme was vital both to evangelize the Africans and to protect them from "inferior" forms of Christianity.

In 1926 a government suggestion that it might be forced to favor the Roman Catholics in Ukambani prompted the Field Council to designate funds for a teachers' training school in Machakos. Five years later Downing argued that to prevent the government giving its spheres to other missions, A.I.M. had to continue its educational work and should help to pay the salary of the Kenya Missionary Council's new educational advisor.

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87 Unsigned letter to Campbell, 7 September 1926, BGC,13,16.

88 Downing to Campbell, 26 November 1931, BGC,13,16.

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A.I.M.'s inability to meet government standards was not so much a matter of Mission policy as a lack of resources. Adequate staff to run the educational programme had always been a problem. In 1926 the Kenya field requested an educational director for Kijabe.89 The next year Laura Collins complained that A.I.M.'s policy of not accepting missionary candidates over 30 years of age was making it difficult to recruit fully qualified and experienced educators.90 In 1930 Andersen described as "urgent" the need for a missionary to manage the mission press, which produced educational materials.91

A.I.M. was also short of funds, especially as it began to feel the effects of the economic depression in America. For months on end the Mission could not even pay the missionaries salaries, much less provide for other needs like the educational work.92 The lack of money affected staffing on the field for there was no money either to send out new workers or to return missionaries from furlough.93

By 1934 financial shortages threatened to disrupt the work on the field. The Mission risked losing Mbooni because of the lack of personnel94 and faced losing other stations because it could not afford to meet the government's demand that the land be surveyed.95 Andersen could not visit and supervise his outschools for lack of

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89Grimwood to Downing, 27 April 1926, KBA: FC-1.
90Collins to Campbell and Lanning, 16 July 1927, BGC,19,21.
91Andersen to Campbell, n.d. [July 1930], BGC,19,5.
92Campbell to Andersen, 3 February 1930; 22 October 1930; and Andersen to Campbell, 17 October 1930, BGC,19,5.
93Campbell to Davis, 21 December 1931, BGC,10,5; and Campbell to Andersen, 21 June 1932, BGC,19,5.
94Campbell to Downing, 3 January 1934, BGC,20,12.
95Downing to Campbell, 4 August 1934, BGC,20,12.

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funds.\textsuperscript{96} He was able to maintain his family and work at Litein only by manufacturing bricks for sale and accepting outside employment.\textsuperscript{97} Similarly, the sale of produce from the Kijabe gardens had "been furnishing funds for furloughs, and many other pressing needs."\textsuperscript{98}

Because of these handicaps, many A.I.M. schools were in very poor condition, and A.I.M.'s Gikuyu schools had been getting very poor inspection reports.\textsuperscript{99} The poor reports plus discontent on the part of non-A.I.M. Africans with the Mission's strong stands on female circumcision, tobacco, and alcohol seem to have prompted the government in 1931 to propose turning Githumu over to the C.M.S. This would have greatly damaged A.I.M.'s evangelistic work in the area.\textsuperscript{100}

3. Kenya Field Response to the Pressure for Education

The missionaries on the field responded to the pressure for education by accepting the grants that the Local Native Councils were now offering. In 1933 A.I.M. accepted L.N.C. grants for its Gikuyu schools and appointed Kenneth Downing, son of Kenya Field Director Lee Downing and a trained educator, to supervise the Githumu schools. The threat of losing this area was averted and

\textsuperscript{96}Andersen to Campbell, 7 December 1932, BGC,19,5.


\textsuperscript{98}Johnston to Campbell, 9 May 1935, BGC,22,9.

\textsuperscript{99}Given the fact that A.I.M.'s Gikuyu schools had gotten very poor inspection reports in 1932 and 1933, it is a fair assumption that the reports in the preceding years were no better. See: "Staff Safari Report, Kikuyu Safari - August, 1932,"; and "Excerpts from the Report of the Government Inspector of Schools (November 10, 1933) on His Visit to the Outschoools Attached to the Mission School at Githumu," both quoted in Gration, pp. 169, 383-386; and "Minutes of the Field Council," 21 August 1922, cited by Rae, pp. 160-162.

\textsuperscript{100}Davis to Campbell, 25 November 1931, BGC,10,5.

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confidence was beginning to be established.101

In Ukambani, the acceptance of L.N.C. grants enabled the missionaries to open schools that had been closed for lack of finances102 and to bring all of their schools up to the government's standards.103 But even here the missionaries may have overestimated their achievements, for Lee Downing reported: "the Principal of the Government School at Machakos has refused to admit any pupils from our Mulango School".104

Despite the continuing financial difficulties facing the Mission in the United States, the missionaries continued to request more educational staff. The desire of the Kipsigis people for more education presented A.I.M. with the opportunity to expand its work there, but the Mission had to meet government educational standards or the work would be offered to the Roman Catholics or Seventh-Day Adventists. In 1934 the Kenya Field Council wrote to the A.H.C. requesting funds and personnel to take advantage of this opportunity,105 and for an additional educator for Githumu.106

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102Downing to Campbell, 10 August 1934, BGC,20,12.

103Johnston to Campbell, 21 September 1933, BGC,22,9.

104Downing to Campbell, 10 August 1934, BGC,20,12. A.I.M. seems to have felt that its school was being discriminated against for Downing wrote that this was done "without giving any reason for this action." It may be that the principal of the government school was not yet convinced of the improvement in the standards of the A.I.M. school, for the Director of Education "expressed surprise" at the action and the School Inspector "feels that our Mission has not been fairly treated."


106Downing to Campbell, 25 June 1934, BGC,20,12.

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next year the K.F.C. asked for two more teachers, a medical doctor, and a secretary and pled for a missionary to relieve Herbert Innis, who for years had been working among the Luo in western Kenya and desperately needed a furlough. Lee Downing argued that A.I.M. could not let its Luo schools decline because it needed good schools to protect its converts from false doctrine. Early in 1936, Downing again urged Innis' case upon the A.H.C. urging them to: "Please remember that the school is our best agency for saving souls."110

4. A.H.C. Response to the Pressure for Education

The African and government pressure for expanded and improved education transmitted to A.I.M.'s American constituency by the pro-education missionaries ultimately provoked an anti-education reaction. In 1934 the Chicago District Committee rebuked A.I.M. missionary, Harry Miller, saying that "some of the brethren had felt that he had lost his vision and a passion for souls and had become too much occupied with the educational part of the work."111

Also in 1935 a number of A.I.M.'s supporting churches began to accuse the Mission of neglecting evangelism. Cicero Bible Church in suburban Chicago

107Downing to Campbell, 16 February 1935, BGC,20,12.


110Downing to Campbell, 11 January 1936, BGC,20,13.

111Chicago District Committee, 22 December 1934, BGC,2,87. The following year the Committee emphasized to Miller's new wife "the importance of a passion for souls ... and that educational work was secondary on the field." Later the same year another candidate was admonished on "the importance of winning souls for Christ rather than education" (Chicago District Committee, 27 April 1935; and 26 October 1935, BGC,2,87).

112Campbell to Downing, 19 March 1935, BGC,20,12.

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accused Norman Johnson, one of A.I.M.'s Kamba missionaries, of engaging in education to the neglect of evangelism.\textsuperscript{113} Campbell feared that supporting churches were concerned about more than just the educational work. Referring to a new missionary who had just revived the industrial school at Kijabe, Campbell commented: "I question whether the First Baptist Church of Hackensack would be willing to support Wellesley Devitt if his 'missionary' life is to be given up to agriculture or industrial work."\textsuperscript{114}

Campbell's opposition to these "social programs" was not just a response to pressure from A.I.M.'s constituency. Campbell himself reflected that constituency. He reported that he intended to talk to the Norman Johnsons "on the subject of education and industrial work. To my mind the farther we go into these lines of effort the farther we get away from a real deep work of God."\textsuperscript{115}

Many of the missionaries on the field agreed with Campbell.\textsuperscript{116} Charles Johnston defended Johnson by blaming the Kenya field leadership:

\begin{quote}
...Norman Johnson - with others in Ukamba - were pushed by the Field Director [i.e. Lee Downing] to undertake more in the way of education. \\
...pressure was also brought to bear through [Mr.] Dougall, who is employed by the K.M.C. as Educational Secretary.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

In another letter he went on to comment that though he agreed with Campbell in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113}\textsuperscript{113}Johnston to Campbell, 4 March 1935; and Campbell to Johnston, 7 April 1935, BGC,22,9.
\item \textsuperscript{114}Campbell to Johnston, 7 April 1935, BGC,22,9.
\item \textsuperscript{115}Campbell to Johnston, 21 May 1935, BGC,22,9.
\item \textsuperscript{116}Harmon Nixon, the Kenya Field Director in the 1940s, recalled the views of eight leading missionaries working in Ukambani during the first half of the century. Six believed that A.I.M. should provide Bible schools for its converts, but not general education, which was the responsibility of the government. However, some of the majority did run schools "as a matter of necessity" ("Views," 26 April 1971, BGC,12,45).
\item \textsuperscript{117}Johnston to Campbell, 4 March 1935, BGC,22,9.
\end{itemize}

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principle, A.I.M. was too deeply committed to some programmes to back out now.\textsuperscript{118}

The pressure from churches within A.I.M.'s constituency came just at the time when Charles Propst applied to the Mission, and the K.F.C. requested that he be accepted to do agricultural work at Kijabe. The A.H.C. responded by questioning the nature of the missionary work being done in Kenya:

Our Council would like to have from you full information regarding not only educational work but agricultural and industrial work, as carried on at Kijabe. ...and for a statement as to what practical results were reached, as far as the real work of missions is concerned, from any work called agricultural and industrial, and what is called merely educational.\textsuperscript{119}

Lee Downing defended the Mission's work. The K.F.C. had no more interest in receiving missionaries who were not qualified for evangelism than the A.H.C. had in sending them. The Field Council thought that Propst was strong in that area. Furthermore, every department of the mission engaged in evangelism. This was especially true of Devitt who used his "industrial work" as the base for a most effective and wide ranging evangelistic ministry.\textsuperscript{120}

In his opposition to education and other "social" programmes, Campbell revealed an unfortunate religious ideology that radically separated the sacred and the secular and greatly restricted his view of what constituted religious activity. This blinded him not only to the necessity to new approaches in Africa and the possibilities in other approaches, but also to the very work that his missionaries were accomplishing. Known as "Bwana Jambo", Wellesley Devitt was one of the most successful and well loved A.I.M. missionaries in Kenya. In an extraordinary manner he combined a ministry of teaching industrial skills, constructing churches and

\textsuperscript{118}Johnston to Campbell, 9 May 1935, BGC,22,9.

\textsuperscript{119}Campbell to Downing, 19 March 1935, BGC,20,12.

\textsuperscript{120}Downing to Campbell, 20 April 1935, BGC,20,12.
schools, supervising schools, practicing evangelism, and giving godly counsel.¹²¹ All up and down the Rift Valley, from Nairobi to Eldoret, elderly Africans still remember with great fondness Bwana Jambo.

RENEWED DEBATE ON GRANTS-IN-AID

This attack on A.I.M.'s "social" programmes reopened the debate on grants-in-aid all over again. Displaying the same fundamental misunderstanding of the issue, Campbell reacted in 1936 exactly as he had ten years earlier. He responded to a K.F.C. report on grants-in-aid by demanding to know what commitments the Field Council had made to the Kenya government and repeating that as a Faith Mission, A.I.M. could not make promises to maintain any specific educational standards.¹²²

Kenneth Downing defended A.I.M.'s educational work on the basis of the Mission's responsibility to its converts and on the strains that were created between the Mission and its converts by the failure to meet that responsibility:

One wonders if our Mission has ever come to the full realization of the seriousness of all that is involved in assuming responsibility for the enlightenment and development of a primitive people, and that they naturally look to us for leadership and help in their problem of becoming adjusted to the new order which is inevitably brought by light and knowledge. Many people have felt that one of the chief causes of lack of loyalty to the A.I.M. among the Kikuyu tribe in the past few years is the past policy in regard to education. Loyal church members have said to me on various occasions that in the past the Mission wanted them and their children to feel educated when they could "read Matthew" while members of other missions were being given real educations.

We have resented any encroachment upon our sphere by other missions but we have expected our people to remain loyal while the Mission policy seemed to be to make them only semi-literate.¹²³

¹²¹ The story of this remarkable man is told by his wife, Edith Devitt, in On the Edge of the Rift (Pearl River, NY: Africa Inland Mission, 1992).

¹²² Campbell to Downing, 2 October 1936, BGC,20,13.

¹²³ K. Downing to Campbell, 5 November 1936, quoted in Rae, p. 52. Given the very strong stand in favor of education that Kenneth Downing took, and the fact that he was forced to attempt to enforce a policy with which he disagreed, Sandgren does him a grave disservice in Chapter Seven: Evangelism and Education, page 327
Elwood Davis, however, described the dilemma in which most missionaries found themselves. On the one hand they still feared that the grants would lead to government domination of their work. But on the other hand they recognized that the African people deserved to receive the benefits from their taxes that the grants could provide. They were also well aware that their refusal to apply for the grants greatly strained their relations with their converts. Though most missionaries thought that to apply for the money violated the Faith Basis, they would be happy to help administer the money if their African church applied for it, but the colonial government would only respond to applications from Europeans.\(^{124}\)

Not all members of the A.H.C. took Campbell's very rigid position. Herbert Hogg thought that if safeguarded to protect the primary purpose of the Mission, grants-in-aid would neither bring the Mission under government domination nor violate the Faith Principle.\(^{125}\) However, the final "resolution" to the issue was merely a repetition of the ambiguous policy of 1924 and 1926: the Kenya Field could apply for the grants-in-aid as long as it did not have to promise to meet the government's educational standards.\(^{126}\)

**THE PRESSURE FOR EDUCATION REACHES A CRISIS POINT**

This "solution" on the part of the A.H.C. did not make the problem go away. Instead the pressure continued to intensify. In December 1937 the K.F.C. asked the

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\(^{124}\)Davis to Wadham, 10 October 1936, BGC,19,25.

\(^{125}\)Hogg to Campbell, 12 October 1936, BGC,10,5.

\(^{126}\)Campbell to Downing, 21 October 1936, BGC,20,13.

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Home Office to send more teachers as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{127} Lee Downing explained that A.I.M. needed to increase the number of its primary schools and improve the quality of its teacher training because the Mission's church members were sending their children to schools with lower religious standards and A.I.M. was losing opportunities for evangelism.\textsuperscript{128} Six months later, the pressure from the government and from the Gikuyu became so strong that the K.F.C. considered turning Githumu and its outschools over to another mission.\textsuperscript{129}

By 1939 the government and African pressure was reaching a crisis point. In Gikuyuland, A.I.M. was losing students, schools, and churches to the "independents".\textsuperscript{130} In Nyanza, the bad reports on A.I.M. schools caused A.I.M. adherents to leave the Mission.\textsuperscript{131} University educated Africans returning to Kenya began to press A.I.M. to provide higher levels of education.\textsuperscript{132} The government required school supervisors to be university graduates\textsuperscript{133} and threatened to close A.I.M.'s Luo and Kamba schools for not meeting the required standards.\textsuperscript{134}

Harmon Nixon, the new Kenya Field Director, was nearly in despair. On the one hand he argued that "unless we really want to conduct our schools efficiently, I

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{128} Downing to Campbell, 19 January 1938, BGC,20,13.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Nixon to Campbell, 30 June 1938, cited by Gratton, p. 174.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Nixon to R. Davis, 8 February 1939, cited by Gratson, p. 174, n. 46. Sandgren describes this in some detail (Sandgren, pp. 364-368).
\item \textsuperscript{131} Nixon to R. Davis, 10 May 1939, quoted in Gratson, pp. 169-170.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Nixon to R. Davis, 17 July 1939, cited by Gratson, p. 175.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Nixon to R. Davis, 19 May 1939, cited by Gratson, p. 170.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Nixon to R. Davis, 31 May 1939, cited by Gratson, p. 170, n. 36.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}

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see no justification for having them at all."\(^{135}\) On the other hand he pointed out that A.I.M. had 10,000 students in its schools, but with only 10\% of its 280 teachers qualified to teach A.I.M. stood to lose these students to the Roman Catholics, Seventh Day Adventists, and Pentecostals.\(^{136}\) With government pressure on A.I.M.'s poor schools, Nixon could only lament that A.I.M. missionaries in Kenya appeared willing to continue conducting its educational programme in a "half-hearted way" and to oppose the acceptance of grants-in-aid on the belief that they violated Faith Principle and "work against our indigenous [church] principles."\(^{137}\)

The British Home Council responded to the pressure by acknowledging the importance of education to evangelism and the health of the church, suggesting that the Mission co-operate with the government in providing quality primary education, and making provision for the advanced education of Christian leaders in key areas of the Church's work.\(^{138}\)

Not understanding the seriousness of the situation, the A.H.C. continued to insist that A.I.M. resist the government and African pressure. It belittled the government's threat to close A.I.M.'s schools, promised to try to recruit qualified school supervisors, but if it failed, the Kenya missionaries were to remember that education was secondary to evangelism and the responsibility of the government.\(^{139}\) In August 1939 the A.H.C. repeated its ambiguous policy on grants-in-aid, and ruled that A.I.M.'s educational programme be limited to Standard IV.\(^{140}\) Campbell then

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\(^{135}\)Nixon to R. Davis, 19 May 1939, quoted in Gration, p. 170, n. 36.


\(^{137}\)Nixon to Wadham, 15 July 1939, quoted in Gration, pp. 170-171.


\(^{139}\)R. Davis to Nixon, 23 June 1939, cited by Gration, p. 171.

naively suggested that if the missionaries approached the government in a friendly manner, it would accept the status quo.\footnote{Campbell to Nixon, 11 August, 1939, quoted in Gration, p. 172.}

During and after World War II the African pressure for better schools and higher levels of education reached a crisis point. In 1940 church leaders in Machakos asked A.I.M. to leave because of their failure to develop a proper educational programme.\footnote{Nixon to R. Davis, 13 February 1940, cited by Gration, p. 176, n. 51.} In a demonstration that was becoming increasingly common, Luo Christians walked out of church to protest A.I.M.'s alleged opposition to the construction of a primary school.\footnote{Nixon to R. Davis, 16 March 1942, cited by Gration, pp. 175-176.}

In the face of this crisis, the Mission policy finally began to change. In January 1941 the A.I.M. Native Education Committee presented a memorandum to the Kenya Annual Field Conference which traced the educational crisis to the cultural changes that had occurred in Kenya. To those who argued that education was the work of the government and not the Mission, the Committee asked if they were prepared to be ordered out of their areas by the government. A.I.M. could not continue to occupy these areas, the Committee argued, "and hold a second and third generation of believers to the educational standard of our first converts, while their fellow-tribesmen are being carried forwards."\footnote{"Memorandum of the Native Education Committee (January 1941): The Education Problem in the Africa Inland Mission, Kenya Field," quoted in Gration, pp. 381-382, and in Rae, pp. 172-173.} The "Memorandum" concluded that if A.I.M.’s educational work was to continue, it had to have the whole-hearted support of the missionaries on the field and the Mission in the homelands, which needed to explain

Kijabe, 10 August, 1939, BGC,13,16; and Campbell to Nixon, 11 August, 1939, quoted in Gration, p. 172.
"the peculiar conditions existing in Kenya today" to the Mission's constituency. In the United States, the new General Secretary, Ralph Davis, heeded the call of Kenya's "Memorandum". In visits to the District Committees, Davis explained the dilemma that A.I.M. faced in Kenya and acknowledged that a new generation of missionaries was rising that supported a strong educational programme. In 1944 A.I.M. was attempting to recruit fully qualified teachers. In 1946 the Mission made plans for an "education department" that would seek to recruit "Missionary and African Staff with suitable training" and to establish schools that would "be truly soul-winning and character-building centers", and could be turned over to African management.

These changes did not come soon enough for Githumu. In 1947 the conflict erupted into an open schism as disenchanted church members left A.I.M. to form the Africa Christian Church and Schools. The following year Kamba church members in Machakos District again asked A.I.M. to leave, but the change in A.I.M. leadership and policy had come soon enough to avert a break.

The 1950s and 1960s became decades of intense educational activity as A.I.M., frantically trying to catch up with the changed circumstances in Kenya, built

145 Ibid.

146 Minneapolis District Committee, 6 May 1941, BGC, 7, 109.

147 Hubbard to R. Davis, 19 June 1944; R. Davis to Hubbard, 17 July 1944, BGC, 6, 64; and Blakeslee to R. Davis, 11 April 1945, BGC, 19, 12.

148 "Suggested Working Plan for the Education Department" the report of the Educational Secretary to the Kenya Field Council Meeting, August 12-16, 1946, BGC, 13, 16.

149 For two different accounts of this dispute see Gration, pp. 179-182; and Sandgren, pp. 373-392.

150 "Selected Questions for the President of the Africa Inland Mission from Elders A.I.M. Mbooni Station, Machakos District (June 6, 1948)," quoted in Gration, pp. 387-389; and George Weppler, "Meeting with Africans at Mbooni, 19 June, 1948," (typewritten), cited by Gration, pp. 178-179.

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full primary schools, secondary schools, and teacher training colleges. Education was finally accepted as a legitimate evangelistic activity.

CONCLUSION

In the issue of education, A.I.M.'s founding principles came most clearly into conflict with the African context. As a lay mission, A.I.M.'s assumptions about the amount of education its missionaries needed to serve in Africa proved wrong. As Africans demanded more and better education, A.I.M. needed more highly educated missionaries, but was unable to supply them. As a Faith Mission, A.I.M.'s Faith Basis proved to be the major obstacle the Mission's willingness to accept grants-in-aid from the Kenya colonial government. Had A.I.M. been able to remain a field-governed mission, it most likely would have been able to respond in a more positive manner to the African demand for education. It was the power of the Home Councils which were unable to understand the Mission's situation on the field that prevented A.I.M. from doing more to meet the educational demands of its converts.

It was as an evangelistic mission that A.I.M. experienced the greatest tensions, for A.I.M.'s commitment to the priority of evangelism conflicted both with A.I.M.'s pragmatism in regard to evangelistic methods and with the African context. This challenge occurred in two ways. First the Mission's educational work proved to be its most successful method of evangelism. Second, A.I.M.'s African Christians demanded more and better education from A.I.M.

Because of the tension between A.I.M.'s principles and the African context, the issue of education proved to be a long struggle within A.I.M. and between A.I.M. and both the African people and the colonial government. In the end, however, the Mission's principles had to bend to accommodate the African context.

Gratia, pp. 182-194.

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The Africa Inland Mission was established from the beginning as an ecumenical mission. By this we mean a mission whose founding principles included interdenominational fellowship and co-operation, and which wrote these principles into its constitution and practised them on the field. We will examine this issue by summarizing the principles of unity in A.I.M., then by seeing how they were put into practice on the mission field collimating in A.I.M.'s participation in the "Kikuyu" church union movement, and finally the limits to ecumenism.

PRINCIPLES OF UNITY

A.I.M. operated on two basic principles of unity: 1) co-operation rather than competition in outward relationships toward other churches and mission organizations, and 2) denominational liberty within A.I.M. Both of these principles of unity were based positively on a sense of a common work that all churches and missions had to unite and work together to accomplish, the recognition of a common piety that cut across ecclesiastical and theological lines, and the acceptance of a common doctrine that united around the basic facts of the gospel but permitted liberty on other issues. Negatively, A.I.M. sometimes expressed an opposition to denominational divisiveness.

1. A Common Work

The inaugural issue of Hearing and Doing proclaimed A.I.M.'s positive

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1David Sandgren charges that "the AIM was generally distrustful of other mission societies" ("The Kikuyu, Christianity and the Africa Inland Mission," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976), p. 80). The evidence in this chapter will show that Sandgren's charge is at best an over simplification.
outlook toward other mission organizations:

The purpose of the Africa Inland Mission is easily stated. It is not to criticise [sic], nor antagonize, nor attempt to supplant existing organizations, but to join heart and hand with them in a work of such stupendous difficulty, and sweep that existing agencies, with all the supplementary ones that may arise, are still none too adequate to accomplish it. In this Soudan region are sixty millions of human beings who have never heard the name of Christ in praise, prayer, or promise.... Existing missionary boards are so pressed with other fields as to confess their inability to furnish either men or means in any degree adequate to the needs of this one.²

Here the principle of co-operation rather than competition is clearly seen and is firmly


American Christianity does contain its own strain of "primitivism" or "restorationism" which showed hostility to existing denominations and rejected denominational traditions as it sought to restore primitive Christianity based, as is supposed, solely upon the Bible (See: Winthrop S. Hudson, Religion in America: An Historical Account of the Development of American Religious Life (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), pp. 124-126; and Mark A. Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992), pp. 151-152). While some A.I.M. missionaries were influenced by this tradition, it was not the dominant tradition within A.I.M. and was explicitly denied being any part of the basis of A.I.M.'s ecumenism. Rather A.I.M. had a positive view of denominational structures and traditions, but wanted to transcend them for the sake of the gospel.

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based on the common work of evangelism. The founders of A.I.M. were conscious of
the "objections against the multiplication of new agencies" which could result in the
charge that they were dividing the missionary force and its resources. So, they were at
pains to establish that A.I.M. was not being founded because of any fault found in the
existing missionary societies, nor out of any sense of rivalry, but because need for
evangelism was far beyond the resources of existing missionary agencies. New
resources could be developed by mobilizing thousands of lay men and women who
did not have the educational advantages to qualify them for service in the existing
denominational agencies.4

Looking back six years to the founding of the Mission, one of its first
missionaries, Lester Severn, wrote that the Faith Basis and the practice of pioneering
work among new tribes were adopted at least in part to maintain good relations with
the existing mission agencies, and that denominational liberty was practised within the
Mission to present a united front to non-Christians in Africa.5 During A.I.M.'s first
year in Africa, Peter Cameron Scott described an attack by so-called "driver ants" that
drove several missionaries from their homes. From this experience Scott derived a
lesson on Christian unity in which he protested the divisiveness of denominationalism
and rooted his ecumenism firmly in the common work that needed to be done:

...you are compelled to admit, "I can learn a lesson from thee, little one," and
that is, "united effort." Oh that the whole church of Christ were thus banded
together.... But no: her forces are divided; she is rent asunder by sect and
schism, and while she is quibbling over some man-made dogma, and many of
those who are called shepherds of the flock are tearing or trying to tear down
the foundations of God's building by attempting to prove to us that Moses did
not write the Pentateuch, and that every Scripture is not given by inspiration of
God, millions are going on in the error of their way without even having heard

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4See above Chapter 2, pp. 26-28.

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the blessed name of Jesus.\textsuperscript{6}

In Scott's mind doctrine could be divisive, and the new forms of biblical scholarship just beginning to make their impact in America at this time were to be deplored because they were divisive.

2. A Common Piety

In \textit{Hearing and Doing}, James H. Brooks, one of the foremost leaders of American premillenialism,\textsuperscript{7} thundered against the division caused by sectarians and pled for unity based on the simple piety of "looking unto Jesus":

All genuine Christian experience, from first to last, consists in looking unto Jesus. Yet how often this simple truth is forgotten.... Men have withdrawn from the evils of sectarianism to form the most sectarian of all sects; they have denounced the unscriptural practices of human [theological or ecclesiastical] systems to find themselves bound hand and foot in the narrowest of all systems....

The cause of their failure is readily explained. They grew weary of looking unto Jesus....\textsuperscript{8}

Unity based in a common piety was clearly seen in the attitude of A.I.M. missionaries towards the members of other societies on the field. Commenting on the Church Missionary Society missionaries in Mombasa, Scott wrote: "I have found the

\textsuperscript{6}H&D (September 1896): 2. In his protest against "man-made dogma," Scott may be implying a certain criticism of denominational traditions and reflecting a certain amount of American "primitivism," but more to the point, he is protesting the divisiveness that can be produced by these traditions rather than the traditions themselves.

\textsuperscript{7}See Marsden, pp. 46, 51; and Sandeen, pp. 134, 135-246 passim.

\textsuperscript{8}James H. Brooks, "Looking Unto Jesus," \textit{H&D} (November 1897): 4. Brooks is arguing against the sectarians who separated from their churches decrying the divisiveness and human traditions of the denominations, only to found new denominations far more divisive than the denominations they left. Having had contact with the Plymouth Brethren himself, and having popularized much of their theology, it is likely that he has the Plymouth Brethren specifically in mind.

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missionaries of the C.M.S. deeply spiritual people." On their first trek inland, the missionaries stopped at the C.M.S. station of Rabai, and Scott again reported, "We dined with Rev. Smith, of the C.M.S., and found him a fine specimen of Christianity." A number of years later Lee Downing described a group of Scandinavian missionaries in German East Africa as "earnest, devout Christians." 

3. A Common Doctrine

Some of these ecumenical principles were enshrined in A.I.M.'s first constitution. In a paragraph on relationships "to other missions" the external principle of co-operation was officially established with these words:

It shall be the object of this Mission to occupy new territory rather than to trench upon fields already occupied, but while working on the lines which Gld [sic] has marked out for us, to act in fellowship with other evangelical missions. 

This statement made missionary comity the official policy of A.I.M. It also established the principle of doctrinal agreement as a basis for unity, for this fellowship was to be with "other evangelical missions" [italics added]. However, there was no attempt to define the term "evangelical".

For members of the Mission the theological basis of unity was more explicit. Members were required to accept the constitution of the Mission, which included a list of doctrines with which the missionaries had to agree. This list, however, was not like a denominational creed or confession. It was a minimal list of those doctrines thought to impinge most directly on evangelism. The doctrines were named and

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9H&D (February 1896): 5.

10H&D (Supplement to April 1896): 2.

11Downing to Hurlburt, n.d., KBA: FC-76. The first page of this letter is missing, but an earlier mission archivist suggested "late 1912" in a penciled notation on the letter.

12A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VI, paragraph 4, KBA: General Council.

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defined merely with the words of scripture with no effort at precise theological definition.13

The principle of internal denominational liberty was evident in the fact that the doctrinal statement mentioned neither sacraments nor form of church government, common denominational fault lines. Rather, the constitution established that when the missionaries in charge of a particular station organized a local congregation, they were free to choose for themselves the denominational principles upon which the new congregation would be established.14 That this policy reflected the desire to practice denominational liberty within A.I.M. can be seen from an exchange of letters between Hulda Stumpf, who was applying to A.I.M., and J. Davis Adams, the Home Secretary. Reflecting a strain of anti-denominational primitivism, Miss Stumpf criticized this policy:

Does this mean any of the many Denominational forms of government? If so, I cannot subscribe to it as denominationalism is the very thing I am trying to get away from. There is only one form of church government, as I understand the term, and that is based upon the scriptures, and the scriptures alone, leaving out man's notions as to how a church should be governed.15

Adams, however, denied that A.I.M.'s policy stemmed from any anti-denominational bias. Rather it reflected the desire to permit denominational freedom within A.I.M.:

In answer to your inquiry ... this sentence means that should the missionary in charge of the station at the time of the formation of a church be inclined toward the Baptists, with the Bible for their creed, immersion as the form of baptism, that form of church government would be continued by his successor.... Should the missionary be inclined toward the Mennonites with their plain dress, their "non-resistance" teaching, etc. his successor would continue the same teaching....

"Denominationalism" in the sense that I presume you mean is lost sight of as a rule when a missionary gets to the work on the field and faces the awful need and realizes how short the time is and how few the laborers. We have no quarrel with denominations. We have Presbyterians, Methodists,
Congregationalists, Evangelical Association, Baptists, Church of Christ, and expect to have Mennonites in the near future on the field. It would be most unwise to arbitrarily elect any specific form of church government in view of the various denominations represented. The largest liberty is allowed consistent with the best results for God.¹⁶

This denominational freedom was practised on the field with some stations practising infant baptism while others practised believer's baptism by immersion.¹⁷

These principles were not only enshrined in the original constitution of A.I.M. but were also strengthened in succeeding revisions. In 1909 the General Council was given the responsibility to confer with other missionary societies concerning unity in the African church, and co-operation in education and translation projects.¹⁸ When the General Council was abolished in 1912, this responsibility was transferred to the Field Directors.¹⁹ The 1912 Constitution also added a preamble that established evangelism as the official basis of A.I.M.'s ecumenism.²⁰

At the same time that A.I.M. was strengthening the constitutional foundation of its ecumenism with outside organizations, it was tightening the doctrinal basis for unity within the Mission. It did this by providing the means to enforce its doctrinal basis and by making the doctrinal basis more specific. The 1909 constitution charged the General Council with the duty to "maintain the fundamental principles and doctrines of the Mission."²¹ In 1912 the Presidents of the Home Councils assumed the

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¹⁶Adams to Stumpf, 3 November 1906, BGC,24,23.

¹⁷This is evident from the fact that from time to time missionaries, presumably from a Baptist background, would question whether infant baptism should be continued. For example see: "Minutes of [General] Council," 18 January 1911, KBA: Minutes and Reports (1911).

¹⁸A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article V, Section 6, KBA: General Council.

¹⁹A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article X, Section 3, BGC,11,11.

²⁰Ibid, Preamble, BGC,11,11.

²¹A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article VI, Section 1, and Article V, Section 3, KBA: General Council.

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responsibility to enforce the principles and doctrines of the Mission in particular "its faith basis ... [and] its belief in the integrity of the Scriptures and in the Deity and Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ." In 1922, the doctrinal statement was rewritten, adding theological explanations and nine new doctrines. The general effect was to make the whole statement more specific and detailed, with the exception of the statement on eschatology from which premillennialism had been dropped.

At first glance these two trends, toward increased ecumenism on the one hand and toward greater doctrinal strictness on the other, appear to be contradictory. This is explained partly by the fact that A.I.M. did not expect the same degree of agreement to be the basis of unity with those outside of the Mission that it expected of members within. Not being able to rely on the unifying forces provided by denominational loyalty and tradition, A.I.M. had to forge an organizational unity and loyalty while practising ecumenism at the same time. Hurlburt expressed this dilemma in a general letter written to the missionaries in response to a rash of criticism being voiced against the Mission. In this letter Hurlburt combined a challenge to remain loyal to the specific missionary principles of A.I.M. with a generous attitude toward missions that operated on the basis of different principles:

Is it loyal to talk against these Mission principles to each other and outsiders? ...if one is clearly decided and dissatisfied, [he should] ... withdraw and join some more congenial society. Our plan is not the only wise one. There is variety enough in mission methods for every honest worker to find a congenial society....

This generosity even extended toward missions whose methods A.I.M. disapproved. Hurlburt wrote concerning Mr. Harrison, a non-A.I.M. missionary who feared that

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22A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article V, Sections 1-3, and Article VII, Section 3, BGC, 11, 11.

23A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Article III, BGC, 11, 11. For a copy of the 1922 doctrinal statement and a comparison with the original statement, see Appendix A.

24Hurlburt to "Fellow-Member of the A.I.M.", 1 July 1914, KBA: FC-76.

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one of his associates, a Mr. Clark, was trying to draw A.I.M. into a dispute that had erupted between the two:

Harrison is putting his work on a fair basis, with all property in the hands of the home council, and is trying to do an honest work for God. He does not work along the lines that we could fully approve, but I have assured him that however much you disapproved his methods you had only love in your heart and had not joined with Mr. Clark in any scheme to persecute Harrison.25

This apparent contradiction can be further explained by what George Marsden calls "the paradox of revalist fundamentalism".26 Marsden maintains fundamentalism contained two divergent and contradictory traditions that could not be wholly integrated. One was a pragmatism that dismissed doctrine as unimportant. The other was to assign vast, controlling importance to doctrine.27 This "paradox" existed within A.I.M. in the tension between its twin emphasis on ecumenism and doctrinal purity.

PRACTICE OF UNITY
1. Missionary Cooperation

A.I.M. missionaries began to practice these principles of unity from the first day that they arrived in Africa. Initially they were on the receiving end of the practical ecumenism of the C.M.S., which welcomed the A.I.M. party when it arrived in Mombasa in October 1895. The newcomers were housed and cared for at "Freetown" [later Freretown]. The C.M.S. extended to Scott "the privilege of preaching to the English congregation" on Sunday, and gave both Scott and Frederick Krieger the opportunity to preach in open-air, evangelistic meetings later in the week. When the men in the A.I.M. party journeyed inland to establish their first mission station, the

25Hurlburt to Downing, 2 December 1913, KBA: FC-76.

26Marsden, pp. 43-44.

27Marsden saw the former tendency best illustrated by evangelist D. L. Moody, who subordinated all other concerns to soul-winning. He saw R. A. Torrey, president of Moody Bible Institute, as exemplifying the latter tendency.

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C.M.S. at Freretown cared for the women. On the way, the C.M.S. missionary at Rabai assisted the A.I.M. party by supplying them with porters to replace some who had run off. In January, Scott was able to return a favor to the C.M.S. He returned to Mombasa for the ladies just in time to help defend Freretown from the attack of the Arab leader, M'baruk, who was resisting the introduction of British rule.

The cordial relations and co-operation established between A.I.M. and the C.M.S. continued to characterize A.I.M.'s relations with other missions as the following examples illustrate. In 1908 A.I.M. agreed to co-operate with other missions in church policy, education, and translation work. In 1911 Hurlburt directed that A.I.M. doctors treat the sick or injured of other missions without charge. When the Theodora Hospital was opened at Kijabe in 1915, missionaries from other societies attended the ceremonies, and Rev. George Burns of the C.M.S. and gave the principle address. In 1922 A.I.M. agreed to loan an experienced African printer to the Church of Scotland Mission, and the following year agreed to train a C.S.M. apprentice in typesetting. Nor was this cooperation the result of impersonal, institutional policy, for respect and friendship grew up between the

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28H&d (February 1896): 4-5.
29H&d (Supplement to April 1896): 2, 4.
31H&d (January-March 1909): 20. Also see: Minutes of meeting "...held at the home of Dr. H. E. Scott of the Scotch Church Mission at Kikuyu, to see whether it would not be possible to come to some agreement between the missions working among the Gikuyu people, which would lead to unity in translation work...", 9 March 1908, KBA: Translations.
32Hurlburt to Downing, 11 April 1911, KBA: General Council. A.I.M. also used the services of the doctors from other missions (Riebe to Barr, 21 August 1909, KBA: FC-84).
33Hurlburt to Watson, 12 May 1915, BGC, 12, 46.
34McKenrick to Arthur, 31 October 1922; Taylor to McKenrick, 27 September 1923; and McKenrick to Taylor, 2 October 1923, KBA: FC-83.

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2. A.I.M. as an "Umbrella" Mission

For a time, A.I.M. attempted to be an "umbrella mission", whereby it would provide the structure under which small missions could work together for the evangelization of Africa. When Willis Hotchkiss resigned from A.I.M. in 1899, to "organize a Mission in Africa to represent the Friends Church", the Philadelphia Missionary Council asked him if the Friends would not do their work through A.I.M. so as not to have an additional mission organization on the field. Hotchkiss turned down A.I.M.'s offer, but Mr. and Mrs. William P. Knapp did not. The Knapps had been sent to Kenya in 1899 by the Christian Unity Association of New Britain, Connecticut to establish the East Africa Industrial and Evangelistic Mission [later called the Gospel Missionary Society]. In 1901 they agreed to bring their work under A.I.M. In 1906 two Mennonite societies agreed to work under A.I.M. Attempting to provide an institutional "umbrella" for these non-A.I.M. missions provided an organizational challenge for A.I.M. In 1907 G.M.S.

35John Riebe wrote that the "surgeon at the Church of Scotland Mission at Kikuyu station [was] a leal friend of mine" (Riebe to Barr, 21 August 1909, KBA: FC-84). Hurlburt wrote that the Rev. George Burns of the C.M.S. was "one of the most spiritual missionaries in this part of the country" (Hurlburt to Watson, 12 May 1915, BGC,12,46). Fred McKenrick confessed that "we have a very warm place in our hearts for the C.S.M." (McKenrick to Taylor, 18 September 1923, KBA: FC-83).


38H&D (May-December 1910): 14; (January-March 1907): 17; Stauffacher, "History of A.I.M.," p. 22. These Mennonite societies were the Defenseless Mennonite Board and the Central Mennonite Board.
missionaries, William Knapp, Charles Atwood, and Richard Starr made several recommendations to smooth relations between their own society and A.I.M. They asked that candidates who were accepted by their own society, but turned down by the A.I.M. Home Council be given a year's trial on the field. Then if they were evaluated positively by the Field Council, they would be accepted by the A.I.M. Home Council. They agreed to report the money that they received to the A.I.M. Home Council, but asked that each society be granted representation on the Field Council and that all property purchased with money raised by their societies be held in trust for them.39 The essence of these recommendations was accepted by A.I.M. and incorporated into the 1909 constitution.40

The arrangement, however, did not last. In 1911 the Mennonites withdrew from the relationship and sold their stations to A.I.M.41 The 1912 constitution ended the experiment by eliminating the accommodation of non-A.I.M. societies, and transferring governing authority from the field to the Home Councils.42 By the time the April-June 1915 issue of Hearing and Doing was published, the G.M.S. stations and missionaries were no longer listed in the A.I.M. directory.

The specific issues that led to each break are no longer known for certain, but we can infer some general causes. In all probability, the basis for unity proved to be


40A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article V, Section 5, Article VII, Section 1, KBA: General Council. The missionaries on the field accepted all of the G.M.S. proposals ("[Kenya] Field Council Minutes," 16 September 1907, KBA: General Council; and "Minutes of Business Session of 1907 [AIM] Annual [Kenya Field] Conference," 21 September 1907, KBA: General Council). However, the recommendation concerning missionaries not accepted by the A.I.M. Home Council being given a year's trial on the field was neither accepted by the Home Council nor incorporated into the 1909 constitution.


42A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article VI, Section 1, Article VIII, Section 7, BGC,11,11.
too narrow. The Faith Basis was one of the most important and contentious principles upon which unity based within A.I.M. Some Mennonite missionaries wanted a guaranteed salary, but this conflicted with the Faith Basis. This may have contributed to the Mennonite decision to withdraw from A.I.M. Some organizational issues were never resolved, such as the status of missionaries found to be unacceptable to A.I.M., but perfectly acceptable to an "allied society". Ultimately, however, in the struggle that occupied A.I.M. to determine where the real power in the Mission should lie, with the missionaries, with General Director, or with Home Councils there was no room for the kind of federated, field-based structure that would have been necessary for an "umbrella" mission to have worked.

3. The Practice of Comity

Fundamental to the principle of co-operation with other missions was the practice of comity. A.I.M. was founded to take the gospel to parts of Africa unreached by existing mission organizations. Therefore, when Scott arrived in Mombasa, he immediately led his missionaries inland to avoid conflict with the mission agencies working on the coast. Though it settled 250 miles from the coast,

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43See above Chapter 3.

44Mennonite missionary Jesse Raynor said that he would remain at Kinyona only if he was guaranteed a salary ("Transcript of Minutes [of Joint Meeting of Kenya Field Committee and General Council]", 6-7 September 1911, KBA: General Council).

45For example in 1911 a joint meeting of the A.I.M. General Council and Kenya Field Council expressed its opposition to "an allied society" (i.e. the G.M.S.) accepting Miss Mary Gamertsfelder, a missionary dismissed by AIM ("Transcript of Minutes [of Joint Meeting of Kenya Field Committee and General Council]", 6-7 September 1911, KBA: General Council).

46See above Chapter 4.


48H&D (Supplement to April 1896): 1.

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A.I.M. was not alone for long. In 1897 Thomas Allan reported that they had hoped to extend their work to the Gikuyu, but dropped the idea when they learned that the C.M.S. was also planning to move into that area. A series of set-backs prevented any thought of expansion until 1902, when Charles Johnston moved to Machakos. When A.I.M. heard that the C.M.S. also planned to place a missionary there, Hurlburt wrote if they did so, A.I.M. would "adhere to our principles and go further south to the untouched fields." As it happened the C.M.S. changed its mind, so Johnston went ahead with the A.I.M. station. At the same time, A.I.M. planned their main expansion to be north in the direction of Mount Kenya. But after exploring the area and gaining the agreement of the colonial government, Gikuyu elders, and other missions, the plans were abandoned when the C.M.S. changed its mind and decided to develop the area itself. In an effort to reassure their supporters at home, Hurlburt wrote that:

...the willingness of the Church Missionary Society to evangelize that territory was to us the call of God to go on into fields where the Gospel had not been and could not otherwise be preached. ... It is therefore with the kindliest feelings and great joy that this district is surrendered to the earnest, faithful workers of the Church Missionary Society....

As new areas were explored, care was taken not to conflict with any work already established. In 1909 A.I.M. agreed that the Meru should be assigned to the United Methodist Mission, except for the northern most part, which it wanted to develop as a
base for reaching the Samburu to the north.54 When A.I.M. surveyed the Meru area in 1910 and found the C.M.S. working among the Embu and the U.M.M. already among the Meru, it suggested that its G.M.S. missionaries work among the Chuka and Muimbe located between them.55 Even after comity agreements were made, they could be altered if it suited the parties involved. The C.M.S. let A.I.M. enter the Thika-Maragwa area in 1913 so that A.I.M. could open a new center at Githumu,56 and in 1923 A.I.M. transferred the Suk [Pokot] and Turkana regions to the Friends Africa Mission.57

4. A.I.M. Annual Field Conferences

One of A.I.M.'s most visible and important expressions of ecumenism was the inclusion of non-A.I.M. missionaries in the A.I.M. Annual Field Conference. The first A.I.M. constitution provided for conferences for the "promotion of spiritual life, and encouragement of the missionaries, and for the unifying of the work".58 By 1903 these conferences had become annual events complete with business meetings to discuss matters of mission policy.59 Non-A.I.M. missionaries were invited to the Field Conference as early as 1904.60 In the 1907 Conference, over a third of the speakers

54 Handwritten note signed by Griffiths and Hurlburt, n.d. [1909], KBA: General Council.


56 Hurlburt to Downing, 6 November 1913, KBA: FC-76.


58 A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VII, KBA: General Council.


60 Hurlburt to Binns, 29 July 1907, KBA: Conference 1907.

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were non-A.I.M. missionaries, who were invited to present almost half of the addresses in the conference. Copies of the "Tentative Programme" were sent to members of other missions asking for their reactions and suggestions. Though the 1908 Conference had no more non-A.I.M. missionaries in attendance than the 1907 Conference, its ecumenical impact was much greater. Six resolutions were passed by the Conference designed to co-ordinate A.I.M.'s work with the other missions in Kenya. Perhaps one of the most astonishing things was that Dr. Henry Scott, Superintendent of the Church of Scotland Mission, chaired one of the meetings and offered several of the resolutions that were adopted by the Conference. While the influence of non-A.I.M. missionaries was greatest in the 1908 conference, their presence continued to be a part of the Annual Field Conferences. As late as 1941 Laura Collins wrote that the messages of the principle speaker at the conference, Canon Butcher of the C.M.S., were "wonderful", and that "many of other societies

61"Tentative Programme, Missionary Conference at Kijabe, B.E.A., September 17-22, '07" and copies of letters inviting speakers to the conference, and copies of letters inviting the leaders of other missions to attend the conferences or to send "representatives" are contained in KBA: Conference 1907. Also see H&DM (October-December 1907): 1-2.


63Riebe suggested that this was due the absence of the "strong personality" of Hurlburt, who was in the United States at the time (H&DM (January-March 1909): 3-4.

64These resolutions were: 1) affirmation of the value of medical missions, 2) requirement of a two-year probation period for baptisma candidates, 3) specification of public vows to be taken by baptisma candidates, 4) recommendation of the formation of an inter-mission education committee, 5) request that this education committee gather information that would enable the missions to adopt uniform policies toward African customs, and 6) endorsement of the work of the Voluntary Language Committee that had already been formed by the A.I.M., C.M.S. and C.S.M. ("Minutes of Business Session of 1908 [AIM] Annual [Kenya Field] Conference," 19 September 1908, KBA: General Council; and H&DM (January-March 1909): 4-5).


66For example Hurlburt noted both C.M.S. and C.S.M. missionaries who were to attend the 1914 Field Conference (Hurlburt to Downing, 30 December 1913, KBA: FC-76).

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A.I.M. did not only invite missionaries from other societies to their conference, but their missionaries also participated in conferences held by other missions. In late 1907 or early 1908 Hurlburt attended a C.M.S. conference in western Kenya, receiving from Archdeacon J. J. Willis thanks for his "help and sympathy, & especially for the Bible readings on St. John." John Riebe attended the Kavirondo Missionary Conference held at the C.M.S. headquarters in January 1909.

THE PEAK OF UNITY

1. The Vision of a United African Church

The most significant issue to be raised at the 1908 Annual Conference, significant not only for A.I.M., but for Christianity in Kenya and for the history of the Ecumenical Movement, was the vision of a united, African church. In his report on the conference Riebe wrote: "If I were asked to name the dominant idea and ideal of our communion together, I should say it lay in the vision and prophecy of a united 'African' church...." He probably referred to this idea, when he spoke of the A.I.M. missionaries being "thrilled" with the sense of responsibility toward "the future native Church" that "made them tingle with desire to be broad and generous, not narrow nor petty." The significance of this for A.I.M. was that it put the Africa Inland Mission squarely in centre, if not the forefront of the ecumenical, church union movement. This was the first time that the issue of a united, African church had been publicly

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67 Collins to "Co-workers", 11 March 1941, BGC,19,21.
68 Willis to Hurlburt, 10 January 1908, KBA: Pre-1911 C. E. Hurlburt Correspondence.
69 Riebe to Kunkle, 20 February 1909, KBA: Riebe General Correspondence.
71 Ibid., p. 4.

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2. The 1909 Nairobi Conference

In the 1909 Field Conference, A.I.M. came out officially for "the development, organization and establishment of a united self-governing, self-supporting and self-extending Native Church as the ideal of our Missionary Work" and enthusiastically threw itself into the work of the United Missionary Conference held in Nairobi the same year. The Conference had been organized to consult on several issues that the missions were facing, but from the perspective of A.I.M.'s ecumenism, the most important result was the call for "the orderly development, organization, and establishment of a united, self-supporting, and self-propagating Native Church be a chief aim in all mission work". The bases of this united African church were to be "the Holy Scriptures as our sole standard of faith and practice", "the Apostles and Nicene Creeds as a general expression of our common faith", and "a regularly ordained and properly safeguarded ministry."

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72Riebe to Kunkle, 20 February 1909, KBA: Riebe General Correspondence. Dr. Arthur also dated the beginning of the movement for a united church from the A.I.M. Annual Conference in 1908 ("Kikuyu Conference: Resolutions and Events of Important Meeting," 23-27 January, 1922, KBA,18,7, pg. 3).


74Hurlburt served on the "Arrangements Committee". Of the 43 delegates from eight missions that attended the Conference, 19 were A.I.M. missionaries. Hurlburt chaired one session and offered or seconded a variety of proposals for the running of the Conference and resolutions expressing the Conference conclusions. Lee Downing brought a devotional, and Josephine Hope and William Knapp each presented a paper. "Report of the United Missionary Conference held at Nairobi, Monday June 7th to Friday, June 11th, 1909" (Nairobi: Advertiser Coy., Printers, 1909), KBA,18,7, pp 1-3, 44-45, 6-62.

75United Missionary Conference," 1909, p. 44.

76Ibid.

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Friends defeated a resolution to include the administration of "the two sacraments, Baptism and Holy Communion" as part of the basis of a new church.\(^{77}\) To begin implementing these decisions, the conference appointed a committee representing all the missions to draw up plans for a united church.\(^{78}\)

3. The "Memorandum" and the 1911 Conference

This committee met at Kijabe in October 1909, and in January 1910\(^{79}\) and formally approved a "Memorandum on Proposed Union of Native Churches in British East Africa." This "Memorandum" offered a "Proposed Constitution of the United Native Church" for the missions to consider.\(^{80}\) Realizing that it was unlikely that this constitution could be adopted in the near future, the committee suggested the formation of a "Federation of Missionary Societies" to help the missions develop common policies and practices for the churches that they were establishing "with a view to ultimate union of the native churches."\(^{81}\) The "Memorandum" concluded with "Recommendations" of specific policies concerning "Mission comity", "Ministry", "Public Worship", "Membership", "Sacraments", "Marriage", and "Discipline."\(^{82}\)

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\(^{77}\)J. J. Willis foresaw this possibility in his address to the Conference. The Conference report recorded that four votes were cast against the resolution, though it did not specify who cast the dissenting votes. However, since there were three delegates from the Friends Africa Industrial Mission and Willis Hotchkiss of the Lumbya Industrial Mission was also a Quaker and given the fact that the Friends do not practise the sacraments, it is likely that these were the ones who voted against this resolution. "United Missionary Conference," 1909, pp. 24, 44, 62.


\(^{79}\)This chronology is from Bishop Willis' review of the history of the "Kikuyu Effort towards Church Re-union" contained in "Report of the United Conference of Missionary Societies in British East Africa, Kikuyu, July 23\(^{th}\)-26\(^{th}\), 1918," KBA, 18, 7, pp. 3-4.


\(^{81}\)Ibid., pp. 3-6.

\(^{82}\)Ibid., pp. 6-8.

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Both Hurlburt and Knapp were on the committee that drew up the "Memorandum". Given Hurlburt's dynamic and forceful personality, no doubt he was deeply involved in its preparation. His hand can be clearly seen in an addition to the 1909 doctrinal basis specifying "belief in the absolute authority of Holy Scripture as the Word of God, in the Deity of Jesus Christ, and in the atoning death of our Lord as the ground of our forgiveness."\(^{84}\)

The "Memorandum" was presented to a second united conference held in Nairobi in January 1911, but the conference was unable to agree on the proposals.\(^{85}\) Probably the different denominational traditions proved impossible to reconcile in a single church. The administration of the sacraments would have been a stumbling block to the Friends,\(^{86}\) and the issues of confirmation and believers' baptism may have divided the Baptists, mainly in A.I.M., from the Anglicans in C.M.S.\(^{87}\)

4. A.I.M. Hesitates

Later in the year, the A.I.M. Annual Field Conference reported that A.I.M. hesitates

\(^{83}\) United Missionary Conference," 1909, p. 29.

\(^{84}\) "Memorandum," [1910] p. 2. These words parallel very closely the provision added to A.I.M.'s 1912 constitution requiring members who ceased to believe in "the integrity of the Scriptures and in the Deity and Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ" be dropped from the Mission (A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article V, Section 1, BGC,11,11).


\(^{86}\) It is likely the Friends had blocked the proposal to include the sacraments in the basis of the united church during the 1909 conference (See above p. 351). The sacraments were included in the "Proposed Constitution of the United Native Church" in the 1910 "Memorandum" that was presented in the 1911 Conference. It might be significant that none of the Quaker members were able to attend the last meeting of the committee, when the final form of the constitution was approved. ("Memorandum," [1910], pp. 1-2.) When the "Federation" was finally approved in 1913, the Friends did not join. (Willis, "Kikuyu Conference," p. 28; and Capon, p. 15.)

\(^{87}\) This specific issue was dealt with in the 1913 Kikuyu Conference. (Capon, p. 14.)

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was unable to enter into a united African church at that time.\textsuperscript{88} It is difficult to know just why A.I.M. backed off from the united church. Given the number of Baptists in A.I.M., the baptism/confirmation issue may have been enough, but a clue is given in the comments Charles Hurlburt made at the 1918 Kikuyu Conference. There he noted that the non-episcopal missions had approached union cautiously for two reasons.

First, they feared it might bring them into union with some "who though nominally agreeing with this basis, were really trending towards - at least - some doubt of the integrity of Scripture, and the Deity of our Lord. Such an attitude would make alliance impossible."\textsuperscript{89} At this time many American evangelicals considered the higher critical methods of biblical scholarship and theological liberalism to be producing apostasy in the churches. They were beginning to become alarmed at the degree to which these movements, generally known as "modernism", were sweeping the theological schools and becoming entrenched in the denominations.\textsuperscript{90} Disturbed by these trends, A.I.M.'s American constituency was putting pressure on the Mission at the time of the 1911 Conference. Hurlburt gave this as the reason for tightening up the doctrinal discipline in the 1912 Constitution.\textsuperscript{91} A.I.M. feared that other societies in the proposed union might send "modernist" missionaries to Kenya, who formally accepted the basis of the union, but so reinterpreted it as to deny it in practice.\textsuperscript{92}

Second, some missionaries expected an attempted union of all churches "which would be based upon compromise, and dishonour of God, without bringing


\textsuperscript{89} "United Conference," 1918, pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{90} For a general background to this period in the United States see Marsden, pp. 102-138.

\textsuperscript{91} Hurlburt to Downing, 7 October 1912, KBA,4, Hurlburt 16.

\textsuperscript{92} Ten years later, Charles Hurlburt expressed his bitter belief that this in fact had been happening in the C.M.S. (Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76).

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the proposed united church into any real fellowship."93 Some American evangelicals associated the growing "apostasy" with schemes for church union. Some, in the growing "Dispensational" school, saw a union of "apostate" churches led by the "anti-Christ" to be predicted in the Bible.94 Nor was this association limited to "extremist" millenarian groups. Even the eminent, and generally tolerant, Baptist theologian, Augustus H. Strong, came to identify apostasy with church union.95 Given this background, the astonishing thing is not that A.I.M. now hesitated to join a united church, but that she had been involved in the first place.

5. The 1913 Kikuyu Conference

The death in 1911 of Henry Scott, head of the C.S.M. and one of the prime movers in the church union movement, also stalled momentum.96 But when Dr. John Arthur returned from Scotland in 1912 as the new C.S.M. leader, he urged his fellow mission leaders to try again to achieve unity and invited them to the C.S.M. mission station of Kikuyu in 1913.97 Putting their doubts aside, A.I.M. once more joined the process and participated fully.98

94Marsden, p. 52.
95Ibid., pp. 165-166.
98Downing worked with Bishop Peel and Dr. Arthur on the arrangements (Downing to Hurlburt, 28 February 1913, KBA: FC-76), and Hurlburt brought a series of devotional messages from I Corinthians on the theme of Christian commitment and unity (Macpherson, p. 59).

Again A.I.M. was well represented, "six of the fifteen official delegates were from the A.I.M. and fifteen of the thirty-four other members in attendance were members of the Africa Inland Mission" (H&D (April-June 1914): 8). This counts only the delegates and members of

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While the conference dealt with many issues, the most important were proposals for a "Federation of Missions". Bishop Willis introduced the proposals, and Hurlburt spoke strongly for their adoption arguing that they would make the work of evangelism, translation, education, and industrial training more effective. They would impress the new African converts with the inherent unity of the Church and its Message, would be a step toward fulfilling the Lord's prayer that his followers "all may be one", and would serve as an example to the churches in the missionaries' homelands. Finally, they would solve the practical, pastoral problems that were emerging as increasingly mobile Africans moved from one mission sphere to another.99

These were essentially the same proposals that had been presented in the 1911 Conference in Nairobi.100 While each mission in the Federation would remain autonomous in their own comity sphere, they would be loyal to a common doctrine, recognize a common membership, establish a common church organization, administer Baptism and Holy Communion, establish an ordained African ministry, welcome the ministers from other Federation churches into their pulpits, and recognize each other's discipline. In regard to the sacraments, baptism could be performed by sprinkling or immersion and administered to infants or adults. Members temporarily residing in the sphere of another church could receive the Eucharist in that church. Together they would work to develop common forms of worship,

conference from the four missions that signed the proposed Federation. See "The Proposed Scheme of Federation Embodied in the Resolutions of Conference," in J. J. Willis, The Kikuyu Conference: A Study in Christian Unity (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913), pg. 24). Bishop Willis later wrote that "the Rev. C. E. Hurlburt had been one of the pioneer movers in formulating the proposals to be brought to the conference" (Willis, "Kikuyu Conference," pp. 28-29), and Dr. Arthur declared that the 1913 Kikuyu Conference had been lead by "Bishops Peel and Willis and Mr. Hurlburt" ("Kikuyu," 1922, p. 3).

99Capon., p. 13.

100See above pp. 351-353.

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common attitudes to African customs, common approaches to discipline, and common courses of instruction for catechumens and ministers. The conference threatened to stall on the question of adult baptism or confirmation as requirements for membership, but each side agreed to waive their normal rule for members brought up in other missions. A.I.M., C.M.S., C.S.M., and U.M.M. joined the Federation by signing the Constitution. The F.A.M., G.M.S., German Lutherans, and S.D.A. attended the conference but declined to join.

It is not clear why these proposals, which had failed in 1911, passed in 1913. It may be that a change in conference rules permitted the proposals to be accepted by some instead of all of the missions. Perhaps there was a greater spirit of give and take in 1913 as evidenced by the handling of the baptism issue. But an important factor had to be A.I.M.'s change of mind, for A.I.M. was a large and deeply involved part of the movement from the beginning. What caused A.I.M. to change its mind is not clear, but some reasons were likely. For one thing the G.M.S. missionaries left A.I.M. sometime between the 1911 and 1913 conferences reducing the amount of opposition to the Federation within A.I.M. Then again, the settlement of the


102 Capon, p. 14; and Macpherson, p. 60.

103 Capon, p. 15.

104 What suggests this is the 1909 defeat of the proposal to include Baptism and Holy Communion in the basis of any united church. "Owing to four members of Conference voting against this Resolution, it was dismissed in accordance with minute of Conference. ("United Missionary Conference," 1909, p. 44). A policy that permitted such a small minority to block such basic provisions would only result in stalemate.

105 See above pp. 344-346. Also note that William Knapp, the head of the G.M.S., was listed among the A.I.M. delegates in the 1909 Conference and on the committee that produced the 1910 "Memorandum", but in 1913 the G.M.S. was listed as a separate mission that did not join the Federation. See above pp. 351, 352, 356.

106 This is inferred from the fact that the G.M.S. did not join the Federation.
baptism issue may have reassured Baptists within A.I.M. And finally, Hurlburt had approached the heads of the other missions about the possibility of their societies sending only missionaries who abstained from drinking alcoholic beverages and who held conservative views on biblical criticism.\textsuperscript{107} The willingness of Dr. Arthur and presumably other mission leaders to explore the possibility of having only conservative missionaries sent to Kenya no doubt reassured A.I.M. that it could proceed with the plans for the united church without fear of compromise.

The report of the Conference at Kikuyu was received with wide acclaim around the world. The reaction to the Federation proposals within A.I.M.'s American constituency, however, is not known. A.I.M.'s actions were evidently accepted. However, given the suspicion of church union within that constituency, Hurlburt had to tread carefully. The Mission did not publicize the Conference or trumpet its results. The only public reference to it was in Hurlburt's annual report published in \textit{Hearing and Doing}, where it was treated as merely one activity of the Mission among many others of the past year. Furthermore, Hurlburt deliberately attempted to distance A.I.M.'s actions from church union as such:

\begin{quote}
Reports in American papers of interviews with American clergymen seem to indicate a total ignorance of the real facts of the case, the whole purpose of the conference being to form as close a federation as possible of Mission Societies and not a question was disputed or even considered by the native church.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{107}Ogilvie to Arthur, 25 July 1913, National Library of Scotland, MS.7563, Folios 567-70. This letter from the secretary of the Foreign Missions Committee of the Church of Scotland to the head of the C.S.M. in Kenya is in answer to Dr. Arthur's request that only missionaries who hold these views be sent to Kenya. He mentioned that in private conversation Rev. Hurlburt had stated that A.I.M. would not be able to remain part of a union if missionaries who did not hold these views were sent out. While Rev. Ogilvie was not in sympathy with the request, he said that he would do what he could to comply with it, although such missionaries might not always be available.

He defended A.I.M.'s involvement in the Conference on the grounds of A.I.M.'s traditional bases of unity: the piety and doctrinal orthodoxy of the Conference and its utility for strengthening evangelism.\textsuperscript{109}

In Britain the Kikuyu Conference provoked a bitter and widespread controversy when Frank Weston, the Anglo-Catholic Bishop of Zanzibar indicted the C.M.S. leaders of the church unity movement, William Peel, Bishop of Mombasa, and J. J. Willis, Bishop of Uganda, "with the grievous faults of propagating heresy and schism".\textsuperscript{110} Objecting to the joint communion service that Bishop Peel had celebrated for the conference delegates and assuming that the C.M.S. bishops had already united their dioceses with the "Protestant Bodies whose very existence is hostile to Christ's Holy Church", Weston demanded their trial before the Archbishop of Canterbury. Archbishop Davidson refused to try Peel and Willis and instead summoned the Consultative Body of the Lambeth Conference to investigate issues of the Federation and the joint communion service and to advise him. On Easter Sunday 1915 the Archbishop made his ruling on the Anglican participation in the Federation. Everything in the proposed Federation was given qualified approval except for Anglicans accepting Holy Communion from non-Anglican ministers.\textsuperscript{112} The effect of

\textsuperscript{109}H&D (April-June 1914): 8.


\textsuperscript{111}Quoted in Bell, p. 694.

\textsuperscript{112}The story of the Kikuyu Controversy in the Anglican Church has been told in many places. Weston made his case in Frank Weston, Ecclesia Anglicana, for What Does She Stand? An open letter to the Right Reverend Father in God Edgar, Lord Bishop of St. Albans by Frank, Bishop of Zanzibar (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1914), pp. 16-20, and the story was told sympathetically from his point of view in H. Maynard Smith, Frank, Bishop of Zanzibar: Life of Frank Weston, D.D. 1871-1924 (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1928), pp. 145-170. Willis defended the Kikuyu Conference and his actions in Willis, Kikuyu Conference, pp. 5-17; and Willis, "Kikuyu Conference," pp. 16-51. Finally the story is told from the perspective of Archbishop Davidson in Bell, pp. 690-708.
the controversy, perhaps even more than the specifics of the Archbishop's ruling, was to slow the momentum toward church union. It gave A.I.M. pause to realize that communion with C.M.S. also meant communion with the Anglo-Catholic Universities' Mission to Central Africa, which Hurlburt mistakenly suspected of "modernism".113

6. The 1918 Kikuyu Conference

Despite the Anglican reaction, Hurlburt wanted A.I.M. to press on with church unity. In an extraordinary letter114 to Lee Downing and George Rhoad, the A.I.M. representatives to a "Conference of Heads of Missions," Hurlburt emphasized the importance of continuing the work started at Kikuyu. All of the missions in Kenya would benefit politically from united representation to government, professionally from shared ideas and co-operation, and spiritually by meeting with earnest Christians from other missions.115 He urged Downing and Rhoad to put themselves in the place of the Bishops Willis and Peel, recognize the personal sacrifice they made for unity, and be patient with the "extreme conservatism" of the Anglican Church appreciating the difficulty it had understanding A.I.M.'s "radical liberalism."116 Despite the


114Hurlburt to Downing and Rhoad, n.d. [@1915], KBA: FC-76.

115Hurlburt showed his high regard for A.I.M.'s partners in union when he wrote that at the ecumenical gatherings the A.I.M. missionaries would be meeting "the keenest soul-winners of the other Societies," because "usually it is the most deeply spiritual and fruitful workers who attend and participate in such gatherings" (Hurlburt to Downing and Rhoad, n.d. [@1915], KBA: FC-76).

116In speaking of A.I.M. "liberalism" and Anglican "conservatism", Hurlburt was, of course, speaking specifically of A.I.M.'s "more liberal views of intercommunion" and not of theological Liberalism. Nevertheless, given A.I.M.'s conservative, American constituency, that was already worried about the growth of theological Liberalism, it is astonishing that Hurlburt would claim for A.I.M. a "radical liberalism" over against the Anglican's "extreme conservatism". Furthermore, in this letter Hurlburt opposed "secders" at a time when some within A.I.M.'s broader constituency were already beginning to leave their denominations

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setbacks, Downing and Rhoad should remain committed to a united African church. However, unity could not come "at the cost of principle," so Hurlburt cautioned the delegates that "should the proposed alliance ... come under the controlling influence of those who deny either the Deity of our Lord Jesus Christ or any other fundamental doctrine," A.I.M. would have to disassociate itself from it.

During 1915 the "Kikuyu" proposals were revised in the light of the Anglican objections. The proposed "Federation" was replaced by the recommendation of an "Alliance of Missionary Societies" in which the organizational distinctness of the member societies was more clearly maintained and intercommunion between Episcopal and non-Episcopal Missions explicitly denied. However, the death of Bishop Peel in 1916 and the pressures of the World War prevented any action being taken to ratify the constitution and actually establish the Alliance.

The experience of Christian unity by the members of the Kikuyu Missions Volunteers, part of the Carrier Corps in the war, resparked enthusiasm for church union. Consequently, as soon as the war ended another united conference was held. Again, A.I.M. participated fully. This conference was notable for two because of "modernism".

117 These are the words of J. J. Willis who emphasized in his address and plea for a united church that union could not be purchased "at any cost of principle", "by the sacrifice of all that is distinctive and definite in our belief," or "by the sacrifice of communion with outside Christendom" ("United Missionary Conference," 1909, p. 26).

118 Hurlburt to Downing and Rhoad, n.d. [@1915], KBA: FC-76.

119 Capon, p. 19.

120 "United Conference," 1918, pp. 5-6.


122 Hurlburt and Downing brought devotional messages. Of the 22 official delegates who signed the Alliance constitution, nine represented A.I.M. ("United Conference," 1918, pp. 2, 17).

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things: the presentation of the proposal for an "Alliance of Missionary Societies" and Bishop Weston's proposals for a united church. Weston, who had been specifically invited to attend, suggested that the united church be based on an acceptance of the unity of the Church, its Bible and creeds, the fact of the Episcopacy, and the principles of "Sacramental Grace", absolution, and corporate worship. Some essential details of the standards would have to be negotiated, but great liberty would be granted in their doctrine and practice. All non-Episcopal ministers would have to accept Episcopal ordination, but by the same respect he (and presumably all Episcopal ministers) would submit to any non-Episcopal ordination the others might require.

Because these proposals were unexpected, the conference adjourned to consider them. When they reconvened, Hurlburt responded on behalf of the non-Episcopal missions. He reviewed reasons why they had approached union cautiously, and then explained that the non-Episcopal missions could not accept the Bishop's proposals at that time:

because while in fullest sympathy with the desire for unity without compromise, they felt that no basis which placed the church above the Word of God, no ritual which would take the place of personal communion, and no ecclesiastical control which limited personal liberty in vital things, or failed to honour authority conferred by their own churches was possible.

In this response, Hurlburt was not rejecting eventual union between Episcopal and non-Episcopal churches. Rather he was responding to the concerns that the non-

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123 See above pp. 353-354.


125 M. G. Capon and, following him, Roland Oliver clearly do not understand Hurlburt's response to Weston's proposals (Capon, pp. 22-23; and Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, second edition (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), p. 228). Neither seem to be aware of the important place Hurlburt and A.I.M. had in the Kenyan church unity movement. Nor do they understand the American context of Hurlburt's concern for "modernism" entering the Alliance [see above pp. 353-355] and suppose that he primarily had the U.M.C.A. in mind. They underestimate the difficulty that non-Episcopal churches would have in accepting Weston's proposals and overstate Hurlburt's response. Capon states, "It is clear that the A.I.M. would never have accepted them...." And Oliver declares that "discussion
Episcopal missions had with the Anglo-catholic wing of the Church of England. These dealt with the source of authority, role of ritual, and power of the episcopate. The Conference did not accept Weston's proposals, but went on to ratify the Alliance with the same four missions that had joined the "Federation" in 1913, A.I.M., C.M.S., C.S.M., and U.M.M., joining the Alliance.

7. The 1922 Kikuyu Conference

During the next two years the Alliance's main work toward unity was plans for a common training program. This was to be the Alliance College to train African ministers, teachers, and medical workers. A.I.M. participated fully in the planning of this college. For example, in 1920 Hurlburt objected to a proposal to purchase land for the college at Kikuyu, and offered to donate land at Kijabe instead.

The Lambeth Conference met in July 1920 and approved "An Appeal to All Christian People", which had been prepared by a committee that included the three...
East African bishops: Weston, Heywood and Willis. In this "Appeal" the Anglican Communion recognized all baptized Christians who believe in Jesus Christ to be members of the universal Church. They called for the reunion of all Christians on the basis of the Holy Scriptures, Apostles and Nicene Creeds, sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion, and a universally recognized ministry. A representative and constitutional Episcopacy was seen as the best means of providing that ministry. The bishops expressed the willingness of Anglican bishops and clergy to submit to the ordination of non-Episcopal churches if the ministers of those churches would accept Episcopal ordination for themselves.

A third "Kikuyu Conference" was held in January 1922 to consider, along with statements on church union from other denominations, the implications of the Lambeth "Appeal". Once again A.I.M. participated in the Conference. The Conference called on the home authorities to permit a common membership, mutual recognition of existing ministers, and joint ordination of future ministers.

In September, the Representative Council of the Alliance appointed a ten-member Committee on Reunion to follow up the work of the Conference with Fred McKenrick, George Rhoad, and Charles Johnston representing A.I.M. This committee met on 20-21 November 1922 and recommended first of all that "after Union all Members of the uniting Churches be equally full Members of the U.A.C.

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133 George Rhoad brought one of the devotional lessons ("Kikuyu," 1922, p. 3).


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This, however, brought up the problem of discipline and particularly the differing policies of the member Churches towards the use of alcoholic beverages. The Committee could not recommend a policy, but outlined three options: 1) let the united church make its own rules, 2) let each individual congregation make its own rules, and 3) provide for the discipline of non-moral offenses that did not go as far as exclusion from Holy Communion. However, the most important recommendation was that the united church accept the Episcopate, a recommendation that included the following:

(a) That all ministers of the uniting Churches ordained before Union be fully recognized as ministers in the U.A.C.
(b) That all future ordinations to the Presbyterate (Ministry) would be performed by the laying on of hands of at least one Bishop and two Presbyters (Ministers).
(c) That without accepting any theory as to its reasons, the ancient practice of presenting Bishops Elect to three Bishops for consecration be agreed to.

These proposals were accepted by the A.I.M. members of the Committee and endorsed by Hurlburt.

8. The Fundamentalist-Modernist Controversy

Just when it seemed that the great barrier of Episcopacy was crossed, and a united church was within reach, another issue came to a head and ended that


\[137\] The "Report" noted "...that in some Churches anything that has to do with intoxicants is made a disciplinary offense, while in others those who are guilty of moral offenses in this or other connections are disciplined. On the one hand it was pointed out that the laws relating to intoxicants had been made for the safeguarding the purity of the Church.... On the other hand, it was contended that breaches of the moral law as laid down by the Holy Scriptures alone could be the Church's guide for its disciplinary measures ("Report of Committee on Reunion," 20-21 November 1922, KBA,18,7)."


\[139\] Hurlburt to Arthur, 26 December 1922, KBA,4, Hurlburt 3.
possibility for A.I.M. With America's entrance into World War I, the conflict between conservatives and liberals that had been smoldering for a quarter century burst into a raging inferno as from 1917 to 1925 first liberals and then fundamentalists tried to exterminate each other.\textsuperscript{140} In this battle Biblical authority, the miraculous, particularly in relation to the person of Christ, and the atonement were flash points. Missions had been a key element in the evangelical consensus that dominated American religious life for a hundred years and were now in the center of the fray. According to George Marsden:

> On the mission field the implications of liberalism were obvious, practical and urgent. Here the suggestion of the more extreme liberals that God revealed himself in non-Christian cultures had profound implications for missionary programs. ... The conservatives believed the issue at stake was nothing less than the salvation of souls....\textsuperscript{141}

Fear of liberalism among their missionaries sparked battles in the Baptist and Presbyterian denominations in 1917 and 1921 respectively,\textsuperscript{142} and A.I.M. drew many of its missionaries from these Churches.

To a lesser degree, this battle was fought in Britain as well.\textsuperscript{143} In 1922 a five-year struggle within C.M.S. on whether or not to accept missionaries with higher critical views of scripture came to a head resulting in the withdrawal of the

\textsuperscript{140}For the background to this period in America, see Marsden, pp. 141-95; James Alan Patterson, "The Loss of a Protestant Missionary Consensus: Foreign Missions and the Fundamentalist-Modernist Conflict," in Earthen Vessels, pp. 73-91; and Carpenter, pp. 92-132.

\textsuperscript{141}Marsden, pp. 167-8.

\textsuperscript{142}Ibid., pp 165-6, 168.

\textsuperscript{143}Keith W. Clements has chronicled some of these conflicts in Lovers of Discord: Twentieth Century Theological Controversies in England (London: SPCK, 1988). Ironically from the perspective of our study, Frank Weston's attack on the Kikuyu Conference of 1913 and the uproar it caused in England, was coupled with an attack on modernism that was included in his Ecclesia Anglicana.

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conservatives, who formed Bible Churchmen's Missionary Society.144 News of this crisis caused Charles Hurlburt to present a "Memorandum" to the Representative Council of the Alliance stating that A.I.M. could not continue as part of the planned united college (that was the issue under discussion) unless the other Alliance missions agreed to send out only missionaries who believed in:

- The absolute and eternal Deity of the Lord Jesus Christ.
- His substitutional Atonement.
- The absolute Authority and Integrity of the Holy Scriptures as held and interpreted today by the Conservative Evangelical party of the Church of England.145

The members of the Representative Council accepted A.I.M.'s request and agreed to pass it on to their home societies.146 In the meantime, A.I.M. continued the process of working for the united church, joining in the unanimous decisions of the Reunion Committee that approved a united membership, Episcopacy, and other measures.147

When A.I.M. first entered Africa, it was easy to contemplate uniting their work with the other missions in Kenya, because, aside from traditional denominational differences that A.I.M. transcended within its own organization, there was really very little religious difference between A.I.M. and its sister missions.148 But over the years

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145Capon, p. 28. See also Hurlburt to Arthur, 26 December 1922, KBA,4, Hurlburt 3; and Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76. It is unfortunate that the "Memorandum" defined the doctrine of scripture that A.I.M. could support in terms of one of the parties of the Church of England, for it made it appear that A.I.M. was attempting to enter the dispute within the C.M.S. In actual fact, A.I.M. was trying to maintain within the union a principle that was as crucial to A.I.M.'s existence as a mission as Episcopacy was to the C.M.S. and for which the traditional formulations and safeguards were proving ineffective.

146Capon, p. 28.

147See above pg. 364.

148The following contemporary description of early C.M.S. missionaries in Kenya could just as easily have described A.I.M. missionaries:

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the situation began to change as some societies began to send out missionaries with more thorough theological training. Some of the newer missionaries espoused methods of Bible study that, to their more conservative brethren, appeared to undermine the authority of Scripture. McKenrick believed that he met such missionaries in the C.M.S. And C.M.S. missionary, W. A. Pitt-Pitts, expressed concern about "tendencies towards denying or lessening the authority of Scripture". As long as these "modernists" remained a small minority within the united church and the other missions in the Alliance promised to send only conservative missionaries A.I.M. was able to remain in the union process. But the controversies raging in the United States and especially in the C.M.S. threatened all that.

Most of the missionaries were conservative evangelicals or fundamentalists who were deeply concerned about personal conversion. It was for this reason that their theology of mission was basically spiritual conversion of individuals as stated in the word of God. Their yearning for spiritual wholeness and real communion with the Lord was an integral part of both their teaching and their experience. They preached adventism - a sense of urgency and constant struggle in expectation of a fresh outpouring of the Holy Spirit, missionary zeal (Mt.28:19) and the second coming of Jesus Christ. The watchword was "act as though it is the last hour." (Rabai to Mumias: A Short History of Church of the Province of Kenya 1844-1994 (Nairobi: Uzima Press, 1994), pg. 3.)

Written by a current Kenyan Anglican, this description is anachronistic and reflects a modern perspective, but it illustrates that fact that A.I.M. and C.M.S. missionaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were so similar that present churchmen could scarcely tell them apart.

Because this broad religious consensus still united the missionaries of their different societies, the Alliance was willing to accept A.I.M.'s 1922 "Memorandum" (See Macpherson, pp. 70-71).

149 Hurlburt to McKenrick. n.d., KBA,4, Hurlburt 32.

150 Capon, p. 80.

151 Hurlburt was more interested in the willingness of the other societies in Kenya to try and cooperate with A.I.M. in this than in whether or not they were completely successful (Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76).

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9. Withdrawal from the Church Union Movement

In the first place A.I.M. risked losing the support of its home constituencies. Pressure built up in A.I.M.'s American constituency as rumors spread that A.I.M. had joined the united college and was now co-operating with "modernists". The C.M.S.-B.C.M.S. split put A.I.M. in a very difficult position with its British constituency. The Chairman of A.I.M.'s British Home Council had become a member of the B.C.M.S., while the rest of the B.H.C. members sympathized with it. For A.I.M., the dilemma was how to continue in close association on the field with an organization its home constituency had repudiated.

Secondly, A.I.M.'s unity on the field was in danger. John Stauffacher, playing Frank Weston to Hurlburt's J. J. Willis, charged "that those favoring the union were themselves not loyal to the evangelical faith". Hurlburt and others who favored union ran the risk of suffering guilt by association, and the Mission threatened to divide as missionaries began to take sides. Hurlburt wanted to remain in the union, keeping as the standard against compromise, not the existence of "modernists" in the

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152In Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76 Hurlburt reported that he was disturbed to learn of these rumors that A.I.M. had joined the united college. John Stauffacher was one A.I.M.'s most vociferous opponents to ecumenism. In a letter written five years later, he clearly identified A.I.M.'s involvement in the united college as co-operation with "modernism" (Stauffacher to Campbell, 23 February 1927, BGC,13,10).

153Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

154Hurlburt asked, "Will it be possible for us to work on the field in harmony with an organization in which our elders, contributors and friends at home have been compelled to withdraw from?" (Hurlburt to Arthur, 26 December 1922, KBA,4, Hurlburt 3).

155C. E. Hurlburt to L. H. Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

156In Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76, Hurlburt named some of the missionaries who joined Stauffacher in his denunciations of the united college, including the influential George Rhoad. In Hurlburt to Arthur, 26 December 1922, KBA,4, Hurlburt 3, he referred to "strong letters" he received from "members of our mission" and to "hasty words and actions" that would have treated A.I.M.'s agreements to participate in the united church and united college as "scrapes of paper".

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union, but the union coming under their "controlling influence".\textsuperscript{157} If the other missions were willing to send out conservative missionaries, Hurlburt was prepared to tolerate a few "modernists" for the sake of maintaining unity with the conservatives in the other missions. Stauffacher believed that there were far more "modernists" in the united college than Hurlburt thought and that they posed a serious risk to A.I.M.'s ministry. Therefore, he was willing to sacrifice the unity.\textsuperscript{158}

Third, the C.M.S.-B.C.M.S. division made it clear that the C.M.S. would no longer agree to co-operate with A.I.M.'s request for conservative missionaries. This agreement on the part of the Alliance missions had helped to preserve the broad religious consensus among the missionaries in Kenya and had helped to shield A.I.M. from the fundamentalist-modernist controversy in the United States. Hurlburt strongly appealed to his efforts to secure this agreement in his defense to the critics of unity the movement.\textsuperscript{159} Furthermore, Hurlburt believed "that these members now on the field in sympathy with the Modernist Movement will greatly multiply"\textsuperscript{160} and would come to dominate the church unity movement, a condition that he had already stated would be intolerable for A.I.M.\textsuperscript{161}

Hurlburt's description of the "modernists" that he believed the C.M.S. was sending to Kenya clarifies several things about A.I.M.'s attitude toward church union:

...as they [C.M.S.] have been sending out people who deny the integrity of the Scripture, the virgin birth and thus practically the deity of Christ, ... they will continue to send such workers. Nominally they say that they can only stand by their previous position of the Thirty-nine Articles and the Nicene creed

\textsuperscript{157}Hurlburt to Downing and Rhoad, n.d. [@1915], KBA: FC-76.

\textsuperscript{158}Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76; and Stauffacher to Campbell, 23 February 1927, BGC,13,10.

\textsuperscript{159}Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

\textsuperscript{160}Hurlburt to Arthur, 26 December 1922, KBA,4, Hurlburt 3.

\textsuperscript{161}See above pg. 360.

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particularly in their relation to the integrity of scripture. These of course, are as plain and clear as the English language can well be put, but the people whom they have been sending out have signed the same Thirty-nine Articles and Niccan [sic] creed and have gone out extreme modernists; living it, teaching it and upsetting all spiritual life and power on their fields. To affirm that they will continue to do as they have done and that no other course is possible, cuts us off from any organic relationship with them.\(^{162}\)

The close association between belief in the Virgin Birth and belief in the deity of Christ explains A.I.M.'s consistent highlighting of the Deity of Christ in her own constitution, in the plans for church union, and in the conditions on missionaries sent to Kenya. Though denial of the deity of Christ was not common, denial of the Virgin Birth was becoming common, and for A.I.M., denial of the one was virtually a denial of the other.\(^{163}\) Also, A.I.M. kept asking the missions in the Alliance to send only conservative missionaries to Kenya because they had no confidence that the doctrinal basis of the union alone sufficiently safeguarded against "modernism" and "apostasy". Finally, A.I.M. was intent on keeping "modernists" out of the united church because A.I.M. associated spiritual life and power with sound doctrine and moral failure with doctrinal error.\(^{164}\) Instead of seeing close association with C.M.S. as bringing A.I.M. into contact with "the keenest soul-winners" and "the most deeply spiritual and fruitful workers",\(^{165}\) Hurlburt saw the C.M.S. now becoming filled with "extreme modernists ... upsetting all spiritual life and power." Union at such a cost would be self-defeating.

A.I.M.'s ecumenism was based on a common work of evangelism, a common

\(^{162}\)Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

\(^{163}\)Of course A.I.M. was not alone in this belief. Clements notes that this had long been the belief of "ordinary believers and sophisticated theologians alike" (Clements, p. 75).

\(^{164}\)See for example Campbell to Johnston, 12 July 1928, BGC,22,9, in which the American Home Director reports that under the attack of Satan, many clergy in the American church were falling into moral failure and doctrinal error.

\(^{165}\)Hurlburt to Downing and Rhoad, n.d. [@1915], KBA: FC-76.
doctrine of salvation, and a common practice of piety, and these three were seen to be interdependent. In A.I.M.'s eyes "modernism" threatened all three. Therefore to A.I.M. unity was important, but purity of life and doctrine were far more important. As Hurlburt wrote to Arthur:

Purity is more important than union, just as loyalty to Christ and the great foundations of our faith are vastly more important than union. ... a unity that leads to an indifferent spiritual life and indifferent faith would be the most bitter calamity that could befall the native church.166

In stating this, Hurlburt echoed what Bishop Willis had said back in the 1909 Nairobi Conference,167 that unity could come at too high a price.

10. Continued Ecumenism

Though A.I.M. could no longer remain within the church union movement, it was not abandoning its ecumenical principles. On the contrary, to the practical, spiritual and theological reasons for unity that Hurlburt had given in the past,168 he now added the defense of the Faith as a new reason.169 Because its ecumenism could no longer find expression in the church union movement, Hurlburt told Arthur that A.I.M. would have to "find some other basis of close and loving friendship and fellowship with the dear workers in both the C.S.M. and C.M.S. who are really loyal to the fundamentals of our faith."170 When Hurlburt notified the Kenya Field of the Mission's decision to discontinue involvement in the church union movement, he wrote: "Tell [the Annual] Conference we cannot consistently assume organic

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166 Hurlburt to Arthur, 26 December 1922, KBA,4, Hurlburt 3.
167 See above footnote 117.
168 See above pp. 355, 356.
169 Hurlburt to Arthur, 26 December 1922, KBA,4, Hurlburt 3.
170 Ibid.

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relationship in College or Church.... Christian love compels closest possible alliance with loyal missionaries.\textsuperscript{171}

A.I.M. withdrew from the Alliance in 1923, but political tensions in the aftermath of the suppression of the Harry Thuku movement caused A.I.M. to appreciate anew the benefit of the united representation to the government that the Alliance provided.\textsuperscript{172} This and fears that comity spheres might be ended to A.I.M.'s disadvantage,\textsuperscript{173} made it prudent for A.I.M. to return again in 1924, though she would not participate in either the united college or a united church.\textsuperscript{174} A.I.M. remained a member for the rest of the Alliance's history. A.I.M. was also a founding member of the Kenya Missionary Council and remained so until the Missionary Council dissolved itself to form the Christian Council of Kenya in 1943.\textsuperscript{175}

Though no longer a part of the united college or church union movement, A.I.M. continued to follow their activities with interest and helped when it could. A.I.M. continued to aid the united college,\textsuperscript{176} participated in the Alliance study of church discipline\textsuperscript{177} and joined with the C.S.M. and U.M.M. in the joint ordination of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{171}] Quoted in Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.
\item[\textsuperscript{172}] Capon, p. 30.
\item[\textsuperscript{173}] Andersen to McKenrick, 15 May 1923, KBA: FC-83.
\item[\textsuperscript{174}] Capon, p. 30.
\item[\textsuperscript{175}] Arthur, "After \textquoteright KiKuyu," pp. 66-68; and Capon, pp. 35, 42, 73-74.
\item[\textsuperscript{176}] For example, in 1923 when A.I.M. was not a member of the Alliance, McKenrick asked the A.I.M. office in New York to get a catalogue of school furniture for the united college, noting that the missions developing the college were "allied Societies with whom we are so closely affiliated here, and count it a privilege to do this for them" (McKenrick to Fletcher, 4 December 1923, BGC,22,27). In 1926 the Kenya Field asked the A.I.M. British Home Secretary, Mr. Ernest E. Grimwood to represent A.I.M. on the committee selecting the first principal of Alliance High School (Unsigned letter to Grimwood, 21 June 1926, KBA: FC-1).
\item[\textsuperscript{177}] Barlow to Woodley, 28 July 1924; and [Woodley] to Barlow, 30 July 1924, KBA: FC 82 (KMC).
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each other's African clergy. In 1929, A.I.M. missionaries and Gikuyu church elders took part in ecumenical conferences at Tumutumu and Kambui. And during its first few years, 1928-1930, A.I.M. provided accommodation at Kijabe for the Kenya Keswick Conventions.

Though A.I.M. could not join a united church, C.M.S., C.S.M., and U.M.M. still hoped for union, and A.I.M. still attended the church union conferences held in 1932, 1934, and 1940 to show "interest and sympathy." However, as time went on, church union became increasingly more difficult. The female circumcision crises created differences in church discipline and strained the relations between missions concerning their policies toward the African Christians who had left the churches over the issue. These tensions and the renewed fear of Anglican domination made progress on union impossible, and the last meeting of the Church Union Committee was held in 1936.

In the 1960s the effort for church union was renewed, but though A.I.M. was no longer involved, it foundered again on familiar rocks:

...the root cause of the failure was the wide spectrum of belief on the significance accorded to the historic episcopate. Other difficulties which were encountered included the conceptions and practices of High and Low Churchmanship, and those of conservative and liberal theology, the relationship of regional unity to catholicity and to world-wide


180Capon, p. 81.

181"Church Union in East Africa: Record of Conference held in Nairobi, Oct. 13th & 14th 1932; "Conference of Alliance of Missions," 21-22 September 1934; and "Record of a Conference Held at the Alliance High School, Kikuyu, May 7th - 13th 1940," KBA,18,7.

182Davis to Campbell, 4 September 1931; and 7 March 1935, BGC,10,5.

183Capon, pp. 53-54.

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LIMITS OF ECUMENISM

A.I.M.'s involvement in the church union movement, showed just how far A.I.M. was willing to go in ecumenism, but it also revealed the limits to ecumenism. The years following saw A.I.M. refining its ecumenism, both within A.I.M. and toward other missions.

1. Roman Catholicism and "Modernism"

Doctrinally A.I.M. tried to maintain ecumenical relations with as broad a range of Christianity as possible, but there were two forms of Christianity with which she could not compromise. These were Roman Catholicism and Protestant "modernism". A.I.M.'s antipathy toward Roman Catholicism was shared by the other Protestant societies in Kenya at the time. When the ship carrying Rhoad and Stauffacher to Kenya stopped at Marseilles, 14 White Fathers, bound for Mombasa, boarded the ship. Rhoad's and Stauffacher's reactions, though expressed strongly, were probably typical of the day. Rhoad wrote:

Yesterday our hearts were made sad by seeing fourteen "White Fathers" - an order of French Jesuits - come aboard and learned that they were bound for Mombasa and Chinde. Oh, beloved, must poor Africa, that Jesus redeemed by His precious blood, bear the additional burdens of Romanish superstition and oppression?

Though A.I.M. continued its involvement in both the Alliance and the Kenya Missionary Council, the fear of modernism remained a cloud. In a letter to Henry

184Nthamburi, p. 130.

185Bishop Willis, for example, argued that the division of Protestant missions was a grave disadvantage in the face of a united Islam and a united Roman Catholicism. See: Willis, Kikuyu Conference, pp. 6-7; and Willis, "Kikuyu Conference," pp. 21-24.

186H&D (July-October 1903): 17.
Campbell, Stauffacher expressed a reaction to the 1928 meetings of the K.M.C.\textsuperscript{187} that was at variance with the "official" view of the Kenya Field, but one that had become common within A.I.M. Much to his surprise, Stauffacher was appointed to be an official delegate, because "there are very few in the Mission who will accept the position." Stauffacher did not intend to indiscriminately condemn the K.M.C. or the people associated with it, but he felt out of place with the "modernistic" influence that he thought dominated the Council. First, the "program" of the Council dealt with political and social issues that Stauffacher considered were only of secondary importance. Secondly, he could not identify with the spirituality of the Council. To Stauffacher, "devotions" and "things spiritual" referred to the relationship of the individual to God, when prayer for political and social problems dominated the devotional time, he found communion with God to be weak or missing entirely.

It would be a mistake to assume that Stauffacher represented the totality of A.I.M. thinking toward the K.M.C. or social issues. In the same letter to Campbell, Stauffacher identified three different parties within A.I.M., each with their own prescription for the problems facing the Mission.\textsuperscript{188} Some missionaries were interested in the same political and social questions that concerned the K.M.C. and tried to introduce discussion of these issues into the Annual Field Conference. Other missionaries ignored the issues that Stauffacher thought needed to be addressed\textsuperscript{189} and insisted "that our only need was to receive a Baptism of the Holy Ghost." Stauffacher himself believed that only "a real Revival" could now "meet the need." Because he mentioned A.I.M. missionaries concerned for "Social Service and Politics",

\textsuperscript{187}Stauffacher to Campbell, 7 February 1928, BGC,13,10.

\textsuperscript{188}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{189}Stauffacher was concerned about divisions in the Mission and Church, which he believed were caused by the lack of personal piety among the missionaries and African Christians (Stauffacher to Campbell, 7 February 1928, BGC,13,10).

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Stauffacher added this reassurance: "This I can say confidently that as a Mission we are still wholly free from any suspicion of Modernism. God is still preserving us for better days." 190

Fear of modernism affected not only A.I.M.'s ecumenical policies, but others as well. It was a factor in the American Home Council's opposition to an expanded educational work in Kenya and to other new ideas. 191

2. Doctrinal Limits within A.I.M.

A.I.M. required a greater degree of doctrinal unity within the Mission than was necessary for co-operation with those outside. Nevertheless it was still committed to an internal ecumenism or "denominational liberty" within A.I.M. Determining the limits of this "denominational liberty", however, was not always easy. Mrs. Sam Anderson was permitted to remain in A.I.M. despite her belief in "British-Israelism" only if she did not propagate it. However, new candidates would be asked if they believed it, and rejected if they did. 192

When the District Committees screened missionary candidates, they noted doctrines that separated A.I.M. from "modernism". The minutes of the Minneapolis committee recorded with approval that Miss Mabel Olsen believed in:

...the full inspiration of the Bible, salvation by faith in Jesus Christ, ...

190 Stauffacher to Campbell, 7 February 1928, BGC, 13, 10.

191 Campbell to Grimwood, 3 August 1926; and 12 November 1926, BGC, 1, 84. Also see above, Chapter 7, p. 315.

192 Downing to Campbell, 13 May 1937; and Campbell to Downing, 3 June 1937; and 3 July 1937; BGC, 20, 12. British-Israelism was the belief that the Anglo-Saxon race descended from the "Ten Lost Tribes of Israel" and that their domination of the world was a fulfillment of biblical prophecy. In determining how to deal with this belief, Downing declared that while A.I.M. did not want to be doctrinally exclusive, there were limits, and this belief was clearly beyond them. Campbell agreed not to discipline Mrs. Anderson, but because British-Israelism was "subversive" to the Faith no new missionaries who held this view would be accepted into A.I.M.

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personality of the Holy Spirit, the personality of the devil, that heaven is a place, hell is a place, the second coming of Christ, ... and in the eternal state of the saved and the unsaved.

... She believes that the heathen are lost without Christ. 193

The Chicago committee declined to recommend Rev. William Hoffman because he "was somewhat uncertain along the line of the fundamental doctrines of the faith. He could not give a good definition of the Gospel ... was not clear as to the resurrection of Christ." 194

"Strange views" or doctrinal extremes were also noted. But sometimes it was difficult to know where to draw the line. Three issues coming from the Holiness and Pentecostal Movements were of particular concern to A.I.M.: "tongues" [i.e. glossolalia], divine healing, and moral perfection.

In 1915 the applications of Horace and Sadie Thomas were turned down because, among other things, "They both are identified with the 'TONGUES' movement [emphasis in original]." 195 In 1937 the Chicago District Committee, recommended that Miss Copeland be accepted, despite her membership in a Pentecostal denomination, because she did "not agree with their teachings concerning the gift of tongues, and the baptism of the Holy Spirit." 196 However, this opposition to "tongues" was aimed more at practice and extremes than doctrine per se for Miss Esther Siegrist was approved, because she "believes there is a genuine gift of tongues but has no sympathy with the ultra-position of many who so believe." 197

With the danger that tropical diseases posed to the health of European

193 Minneapolis District Committee, 26 July 1937, BGC,7,109.

194 Chicago District Committee, 22 October 1928, BGC,2,87.

195 Chicago District Committee, 16 May 1915, BGC,2,87.

196 Chicago District Committee, 30 October 1937, BGC,3,1.

197 Chicago District Committee, 19 September 1915, BGC,2,87.

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missionaries, the issue of divine healing (also known as "faith healing") was not just an issue of theological theory, but a very practical one.\textsuperscript{198} Most candidates accepted the possibility of healing either through the direct intervention of God or by God working through modern medicine.\textsuperscript{199} Those candidates who professed to believe in healing only as the direct, miraculous action of God were accepted if the committee thought that they would accept medical treatment when they actually had to face a serious illness.\textsuperscript{200} In evaluating the candidates' answers, the committee was less concerned about their doctrine per se than about its practical implications for their health and for unity within the Mission.

Most A.I.M. missionaries believed the Keswick doctrine that the Christian received (was "baptized" or "indwelt" by) the Holy Spirit at conversion, but that a second experience was necessary to be "filled" with the Holy Spirit for victory over sin and power in service.\textsuperscript{201} A fine line had to be drawn between this doctrine and a similar holiness belief that in an experience subsequent to conversion the Christian received both the Holy Spirit and moral perfection.\textsuperscript{202} Often the minutes indicated that

\textsuperscript{198}In 1889 a group of YMCA members perished in the Sudan when they sought divine healing of malaria and refused to take quinine. This would have been well known in A.I.M. circles for Charles Hurlburt had been a YMCA leader and A. T. Pierson, had been an advisor to both the YMCA group and the founders of A.I.M. (Robert, p. 39). Despite the fact that nearly a dozen A.I.M. missionaries died of disease, extremes in health issues remained a concern. In the 1890s Thomas Allan cited health concerns as the reason missionaries could not adopt an African standard of living (\textit{H&D} (October 1897): 1-2) and wrote a long article on missionary health care (Thomas Allan, "The Physical Missionary or the Missionary's Relation to His Body," \textit{H&D} (July 1898): 1-7). In 1913 Charles Hurlburt opposed a missionary whose asceticism was bringing strife into the Mission (Hurlburt to Downing, 30 December 1913, KBA: FC-76). And in 1915 an advice sheet was prepared for new missionaries that included health tips: "Suggestions to New Missionaries," 24 August 1915, BGC,12,46.

\textsuperscript{199}Chicago District Committee, 3 November 1915; and 18 March 1926, BGC,2,87.

\textsuperscript{200}Chicago District Committee, 16 May 1915; and 19 September 1915, BGC,2,87.

\textsuperscript{201}See above, Chapter 2, pp. 29-39.

\textsuperscript{202}The difference between these two beliefs was often a matter of semantics. However, those like A.I.M., which held the Keswick doctrine feared that the doctrine of "sinless

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a candidate held the correct doctrine simply by noting that he believed in "scriptural sanctification". Miss Mary Pilant believed the Holy Spirit "counteracts sin but sin is not eradicated." But absolute agreement on this issue was not required, for A.I.M. included those who believed that to solve the Mission's problems "our only need was to receive a Baptism of the Holy Ghost." In this diversity it was necessary to maintain unity. The Minneapolis minutes noted approvingly that Miss Mae Forseth "could work with those who hold other views regarding the Holy Spirit."

Maintaining denominational freedom within A.I.M., keeping out extremes that might upset the unity of the Mission, and avoiding alienating supporters was a delicate task. Assistant Home Secretary, Ralph Davis, explained just how difficult it was for the Mission to deal with the issue of the Holy Spirit:

...we realize anew the grave danger that may be incurred from such a statement [on the Holy Spirit] as we are now preparing, for we must ever keep in mind that we are an interdenominational work, and at the same time that we cannot take into our midst certain undesired element[s, and] we must be careful that we inculcate nothing in our doctrinal statements that would cause certain fundamental friends to feel their need of withdrawing.

A.I.M. had to accomplish this fine balancing act without the benefit of the structures, perfection" could undermine Christians' moral lives by deceiving them into thinking that they could lead lives of moral indifference and blatant sin because they were already "perfect".

203 Minneapolis District Committee, 26 July 1937, BGC,7,109.
204 Chicago District Committee, 19 September 1915, BGC,2,87.
205 Twin City District Committee, 18 December 1945, BGC,7,109.
206 Stauffacher to Campbell, 7 February 1928, BGC,13,10.
207 Minneapolis District Committee, 18 December 1939, BGC,7,109.
208 R. Davis to Dean, 16 December 1938, BGC,6,77.

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traditions, and loyalties that helped manage this in denominational missions.

A.I.M.'s denominational liberty extended to baptism in both doctrine and practice.\textsuperscript{209} Though there was some evidence that at least one district council leaned in the direction of believers baptism by immersion, there was no record of any candidate being rejected because he did not hold the Baptist view.\textsuperscript{210} In the early 1930s, a dispute developed on the field when Frederick Holland began to teach the "ultra-dispensationalist" belief that water baptism and Holy Communion were not for this age.\textsuperscript{211} Apparently this view was tolerated within A.I.M. as long as the missionary did not teach it. Holland's teaching this doctrine resulted in a small, though bitter dispute that ended in his resignation in 1935 with the Mission refusing to commend him to any other Christian work.\textsuperscript{212} This dispute apparently prompted a move to place a specific reference to baptism in the Mission constitution.\textsuperscript{213} When this was done in 1936, the denominational liberty of the Mission was preserved by requiring only belief in "the observance of the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's supper."\textsuperscript{214} This

\textsuperscript{209}See above pp. 338-339.

\textsuperscript{210}The minutes of the Chicago District Committee frequently noted whether or not a candidate had been immersed and what his attitude was toward immersion. The only references to pedobaptism were to note that the candidate did not believe in it, or if accepting it would not make it a divisive issue in the Mission. See: Chicago District Committee, 11 July 1915; 3 November 1915; 30 September 1933; 27 October 1934; and 17 July 1937, BGC,2,87.

\textsuperscript{211}H. H. Rowdon, "Dispensational Theology" in New Dictionary of Theology, edited by Sinclair B. Ferguson and David Wright (Leichester: InterVarsity Press, 1988), pg. 201. This belief was known in A.I.M. as "Bullingerism".

\textsuperscript{212}Campbell to Downing, 22 March 1935, BGC,20,12. Also see the other correspondence in this file; the Chicago District Committee, 3 November; 24 June 1933; 30 September 1933; 28 October 1933; and "Views of Early Missionaries of the Africa Inland Mission in Ukamba Concerning the Methods & Goals of Operation of the Mission," transcript of interview with Harmon Nixon at Media, the A.I.M. retirement center near Clermont, Florida on 26 April 1971, BGC,12,45.

\textsuperscript{213}Davis to Campbell, 1 September 1934; and Campbell to Davis, 7 September 1934, BGC,19,25.

\textsuperscript{214}A.I.M. Constitution, 1936, Article III, KBA,17,6.

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concern appeared in the interviews as candidates were asked if they believed in "water baptism" or "water baptism for the church age."215

In the end, A.I.M. tried to retain denominational liberty while avoiding doctrines that it considered to be subversive, divisive, or extreme by only accepting candidates who could answer negatively to the question, "Do you accept any of the critical teachings of modernism or of modern cults such as Christian Science, Seventh Day Adventism, Russelism, Pentecostalism, Anglo-Israelism, Sin Eradication, et cetera?" and positively to the question, "Do you whole-heartedly believe in and practice the ordinances of the Lord's Supper and Baptism?"216

3. Reversal of the "Umbrella" Policy

While A.I.M. was refining the doctrinal limits of her ecumenism, her attitude toward other missions also underwent a change. In the early days of the Mission, A.I.M.'s positive attitude toward other missions had been seen most dramatically in her attempt to be an "umbrella mission" for the smaller societies coming into Kenya217 and in her practice of comity.218 Both of these attitudes underwent a change in the years after the failure of the united church movement.

After the experiment in an "umbrella mission" failed, A.I.M.'s attitude hardened toward the acceptance into A.I.M. of missionaries from other missions, any suggestion of mission merger, or even joint projects. This was especially evident after the controversy that surrounded Charles Hurlburt's resignation in 1925. The shock of

215Chicago District Committee, 26 January 1935, BGC,2,87; and Minneapolis District Committee," 26 July 1937; and 19 December 1938, BGC,7,109.

216Form letter to be filled out by the candidate and sent to the Candidate Committee of the Africa Inland Mission, n.d., BGC,7,108.

217See above pp. 343-346.

218See above pp. 346-347.
this conflict caused the American Home Council to turn inward and become suspicious of relations with other missions. During ten years from 1926 to 1936 no less than seven proposals for absorbing, merging, or forming other forms of associations with other missions were opposed by the A.H.C.

In 1925 seven of the nine members of C. T. Studd's Heart of Africa Mission approached A.I.M. about the possibility of transferring from H.A.M. to A.I.M. Many A.I.M. missionaries on the field wanted to accept them, and the British Home secretary, Ernest Grimwood, was sympathetic.219 Capable of viewing this request only in terms of the dispute with Hurlburt, however, the American Home Secretary, Henry Campbell, adamantly opposed the transfer. Fearing that the H.A.M. missionaries might be Hurlburt allies or rebels against their own mission, Campbell insisted that they apply to A.I.M. as individuals.220

With some former A.I.M. missionaries and supporters, Hurlburt formed a new mission in 1927, the Unevangelized Africa Mission.221 By 1930 there was talk of A.I.M. and U.A.M. reuniting or of the U.A.M. dissolving and its missionaries rejoining A.I.M. Though this proposal had at least some support among A.I.M. missionaries, Campbell once again insisted that they apply individually to A.I.M. as new missionaries.222

The same year that the U.A.M. missionaries sought reunion with A.I.M., Roland V. Bingham, the founder of the Sudan Interior Mission, suggested a union

219Grimwood to Campbell, 26 January 1926, BGC,1,84.

220Campbell to Grimwood, 7 January 1926; and 8 February 1926, BGC,1,84.

221Campbell to Grimwood, 22 November 1927, BGC,1,84.

222Marsh to Campbell, 18 November 1930, BGC,21,18; Campbell to Downing, 28 January 1931; 26 February 1931, BGC,1,84. Campbell's decision effectually ended any idea of an A.I.M.-U.A.M. "merger", though the idea was still being broached as late as the mid-1940s (Springer to Hubbard, 25 January 1944, BGC,6,64; Chicago District Committee, 23 May 1944, BGC,3,1).

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between A.I.M. and S.I.M.\textsuperscript{223} Over the next five years, Bingham continued to raise the idea, but A.I.M. was not prepared to consider a union that appeared to be simply an absorption by S.I.M. Therefore, the two missions remained rivals.\textsuperscript{224}

More serious was the objection of the A.H.C. to plans by the British Home Council to co-operate with the South Africa General Mission. In 1933 the Kenyan colonial government offered its old station of Kapsowar to the British A.I.M. missionaries working in the Eldoret area, and the B.H.C. proposed a joint A.I.M.-S.A.G.M. effort to develop the station.\textsuperscript{225} Campbell reacted explosively, accusing the B.H.C. of entering "an organic union with the S.A.G.M." without consulting the A.H.C.\textsuperscript{226} Despite the efforts of the B.H.C. and the American missionaries in Kenya to correct his misunderstanding,\textsuperscript{227} Campbell would not be mollified, and this issue in conjunction with others brought the two Councils almost to the point of rupture.\textsuperscript{228}

At this same time three other proposals were made to link A.I.M. with other missions. In 1933 Andrew Andersen proposed that A.I.M. work jointly with the newly arrived National Holiness Association (now World Gospel Mission) to evangelize the Kipsigis.\textsuperscript{229} The following year, Willis Hochkiss applied to rejoin

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{223} Campbell to Garwood, 5 August 1931, BGC,9,9.
\item\textsuperscript{224} R. Davis to Campbell, 28 April 1936; 29 April 1936; 25 May 1936; and Campbell to R. Davis, 13 May 1936; 21 May 1936; 27 May 1936, BGC,19,26.
\item\textsuperscript{225} Smith to the [American Home] Council of the Africa Inland Mission, 11 November 1933, BGC,1,85.
\item\textsuperscript{226} Campbell to Downing, 8 December 1933; and Campbell to Smith, 18 December 1933, BGC,1,85.
\item\textsuperscript{227} Garwood to Campbell, 15 January 1934, BGC,1,85; and Downing to Campbell, 7 March 1934, BGC,20,12.
\item\textsuperscript{228} On this and the other issues that divided the American and British Home Councils see above chapter 4. pp. 246-275.
\item\textsuperscript{229} Andersen to Campbell, 8 September 1933; and Campbell to Andersen, 17 October 1933, BGC,19,5.
\end{itemize}

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A.I.M. with his Lumbwa Industrial Mission. And finally, in 1936, George Rhoad, who had left A.I.M. in the midst of the Hurlburt upheaval, sought co-operation between A.I.M. and his new Gospel Furthering Fellowship. In each case, the missionaries on the field favored the co-operation, and in each case Campbell turned it down.

4. Struggles over Comity

The other area where A.I.M.'s ecumenical attitude changed was in the practice of comity. Cooperation had not ceased altogether. A.I.M. and G.M.S., for example, cooperated together in sharing teachers, establishing out-schools, and mutual consultation. A.I.M. also worked closely with the Lumbwa Industrial Mission, and the National Holiness Association in the Kipsigis area.

But over the years comity spheres became less the means of promoting co-operation and more fiefs to be defended. As the work of the missions in Kenya solidified and became institutionalized, and as mobile Africans began to shift freely from one mission sphere to another, a certain sense of rivalry began to develop. A.I.M. feared that the C.M.S. and the C.S.M. wanted to take over their territory in Kikuyuland and Western Kenya. For its part, the C.M.S. missionaries in Kisumu complained that they had not been consulted when Herbert Innis joined A.I.M. and transferred the area of his Nilotic Independent Mission south of Kisumu to A.I.M.

Thus a debate developed on whether or not to continue comity spheres with the

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230 Campbell to Davis, 21 August 1934, BGC, 19, 25.

231 Campbell to Downing, 21 October 1936, BGC, 20, 12.

232 Knapp to Downing, 1 April 1929; 4 April 1929; and 20 May 1929, KBA: FC-18.

233 Allen to Blaikie, 5 May 1925, KBA: FC-76; Davis to Campbell, 25 November 1931, BGC, 10, 5; and Andersen to McKenrick, 10 May 1923, KBA: FC-83.

C.M.S. and U.M.M. arguing to abolish them, and A.I.M., C.S.M., and G.M.S. wanting their retention.235

In this "competition" A.I.M. often felt at a disadvantage. The inferior quality of A.I.M.'s educational work resulted in the lose of adherents to other missions. Downing wrote that at Ogada, the "schools have declined and the pupils are drifting into other schools."236 A.I.M.'s African teachers in Ukambani became disgruntled when they discovered that they were not paid as much as teachers in other missions.237 There was fear that if A.I.M. could not improve its schools it would lose its spheres to other missions.238 This would have been a disaster for A.I.M. for it would have turned her most fruitful source of new converts over to other missions.239

This sense of competitive disadvantage was not just A.I.M. paranoia. Other missions sometimes felt at a disadvantage of their own. For example, in 1912 Rev. A. W. McGregor of the C.M.S. accused A.I.M. of violating the comity agreements by enticing schoolboys from his area to the A.I.M. industrial school at Kijabe.240 However the other missions generally recognized that A.I.M.'s inferior educational system placed her at a disadvantage and created strains on inter-mission relations.241

But inferior schools was only one way in which A.I.M. felt at a disadvantage.

235See "Conference of Alliance of Mission," 21-22 September 1934; and "Record of a Conference held at the Alliance High School, Kikuyu, May 7th - 13th 1940," KBA, 18, 7.

236Downing to Campbell, 23 October 1935, BGC, 19, 25.

237Davis to Campbell, 5 December 1931, BGC, 10, 5.

238Downing to Campbell, 25 December 1931, BGC, 13, 16.

239Downing to Campbell, 9 March 1934, BGC, 20, 12.


241"Minutes of a Conference on Missionary Co-operation which met at Kahuria from Friday 13th October to Monday 16th October 1933," KBA, 18, 7.

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The A.I.M. missionaries believed firmly that their strict church rules were necessary for the moral purity of the church. However, they did think that those rules put A.I.M. at a disadvantage to other missions whose rules were not so strict. A meeting of the Representative Council of the Alliance discussed the movement of Africans from one church and school to another. When an A.I.M. missionary suggested that there was a drift to churches with less stringent moral demands, Rev. Pitt-Pitts took offense at the inference that A.I.M. was more spiritual than C.M.S.242

Because of this sense of competitive disadvantage, A.I.M. clung to the educational and religious monopolies that the comity spheres established. However, the missionaries were not indifferent to the responsibilities that those monopolies placed upon them. This sense of responsibility (also prompted by the fear of the entrance of the Roman Catholics) caused the A.I.M. missionaries in Ukambani to plan a teachers' training and theological school.243 Furthermore, the missionaries used a combination of this sense of responsibility and A.I.M.'s competitive disadvantage to pressure the American Home Council for more human and financial resources. Thus Dr. Kenneth Allen wrote to William Blaikie: "if our Mission cannot promptly carry out the program that the natives are urgently asking for, we [should] consider the advisability of turning Githumu over to a society that can and will."244

A.I.M. missionaries, however, supported the continuance of comity spheres for more reasons than competitive survival. The spheres had originally been established to avoid the religious confusion that direct competition and the proselytizing of converts from one mission to another would cause. A.I.M. supported their continuance for the same reason. Johnston objected to the Salvation Army

242Davis to Campbell, 4 September 1931, BGC,10.5.

243Unsigned letter to Campbell, 7 September 1926, BGC,13.16.

244Allen to Blaikie, 5 May 1925, KBA: FC-76.

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because: "The S.A. will not observe any prior rights, nor consider the effect of unchristian encroachment, nor the result of duplication of places of worship in a small community."

Furthermore, A.I.M. wanted to protect the people in their areas from "false doctrine". It was partly the fear of Roman Catholicism that led to the decision to build a school to train pastors and teachers in Ukambani. Innis pleaded with the A.H.C. to send more resources because: "If the work already started is not developed our native Christians become discouraged and go to other Missions less spiritual, and in some cases where there is modernistic teaching."

Finally, A.I.M. wanted to maintain the comity spheres for the spiritual and moral protection of the Church. A.I.M. opposed the rumored transfer of her Gikuyu sphere to the C.M.S., because A.I.M. believed that the more tolerant C.M.S. attitudes toward smoking, drinking, and female circumcision would compromise the "purity" that the missionaries had worked so hard to establish. Elwood Davis criticized the Salvation Army for entering A.I.M. areas and complained: "It is easier for the African to join the Salvation Army as polygamists are accepted ... and I understand that drinking and smoking do not prevent their joining the army."

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245 Johnston to "Doctor" [Elwood Davis], 23 July [1930], BGC,22,9.

246 Unsigned letter to Campbell, 7 September 1926, BGC,13,16. Elwood Davis wrote that Stauffacher was concerned about the "marked efforts of the Roman Catholics and Seventh Day Adventists to secure a hold on the Masai" (Davis to Nixon, 7 April 1938, BGC,19,25). Ralph Davis, then American Home Secretary, expanded this fear to all of Kenya (Minneapolis District Committee, 6 May 1941, BGC,7,109).

247 Innis to Members of Home Council, 25 September 1935, BGC,20,13. Downing pressed Innis' plea and argued that because the schools at Ogada had declined "the pupils are drifting into other schools where the true Gospel is not taught" (Downing to Campbell, 23 October 1935, BGC,19,25).

248 Davis to Campbell, 25 November 1931, BGC,10,5.

249 Davis to Campbell, 5 December 1931, BGC,10,5.

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Unfortunately in A.I.M.'s defense of comity spheres the protection of vested interest sometimes played a part. Campbell refused to seriously consider Hurlburt's request that part of A.I.M.'s Congo field or the French Equatorial Africa field be turned over to his newly formed Unevangelized Africa Mission. The U.A.M. was a splinter mission, formed as a result of a bitter dispute within A.I.M. But given A.I.M.'s shortage of workers, Campbell's position that the U.A.M. should go into new areas rather than to seek to take over A.I.M. areas sounded like someone who considered comity spheres to be territory to be defended, rather than a policy to aid the advancement of the gospel. It would have been more gracious if Campbell could have followed the example of the C.M.S. which turned its field in Northern Kenya over to the B.C.M.S. Campbell's opposition to the B.H.C.'s cooperation with the S.A.G.M. also appeared to be primarily a defense of vested interests.

5. Ecumenism among the Kipsigis: A Case Study

A.I.M.'s work among the Kipsigis revealed something of the complexities involved in A.I.M.'s ecumenism and practice of comity in the late 1920s and 1930s. A.I.M. came to work among the Kipsigis of Western Kenya via Willis Hotchkiss. Hotchkiss helped establish the Friends Africa Industrial Mission among the Luo in 1902 and then pushed on alone to work among the Kipsigis, where he founded the Lumbwa Industrial Mission in 1905. Two years later Andrew Andersen joined

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250 Campbell to Grimwood, 22 November 1927; and 26 January 1928, BGC,1,84.

251 See above p. 384 and Chapter 4, pp. 192-197.

252 In particular see Campbell's comments in Campbell to Downing, 8 December 1933, BGC,1,85.

Hotchkiss. Over the next several years all of the missionaries, except Mr. and Mrs. Hotchkiss, left the L.I.M. In 1912 Andersen joined A.I.M. and pioneered several stations among other Kalenjin groups before returning to the Kipsigis and establishing a station at Lumbwa (i.e. Kipkelion) in 1919.254 In 1923 Andersen relocated the A.I.M. station at Litein, which became the permanent center for A.I.M. work among the Kipsigis.255

Andersen moved to Litein the same year that A.I.M. dropped out of the Missionary Alliance. He became alarmed lest, without A.I.M.'s influence on the Representative Council, the comity spheres would be discontinued opening up the Kipsigis to the moral and doctrinal influences of other missions and his students to discrimination at the hands of missions with better educational programs.256

Anderson's defense of comity in western Kenya, however, did not define his whole attitude toward other missions. In 1929 Rev. Clara Ford, daughter of F.A.I.M. missionaries, returned to Kenya looking for a work to establish for the National Holiness Association (later World Gospel Mission). From the beginning Miss Ford and the N.H.A. worked closely with A.I.M. N.H.A. missionaries worked on A.I.M. stations, particularly with the Andersens at Litein. For years the N.H.A. published jointly, with A.I.M., a Christian magazine in Kiswahili, Matangazo ya Injili [Announcements of the Gospel]. A.I.M. argued for the acceptance of the N.H.A. on to the Kenya Missionary Council, over the objections of some missions which feared

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255"Meeting with Leaders and Elders of Bureti Regional Church Council and Belgut Regional Church Council, Litein, Kenya, 5 October 1993," typewritten summary in the possession of the author.

256Andersen to McKenrick, 10 May 1923, KBA: FC-83.
that the N.H.A. missionaries were fanatics, and applied on behalf of the N.H.A. for the site of Tenwick Mission Station.257

In 1932 the aged Hotchkiss thought that he now had, in the N.H.A., someone to carry on his work. With the N.H.A. in this small area and taking over the L.I.M., A.I.M. began to discuss turning Litein over to the N.H.A. and withdrawing from Kipsigis. Its only concern was that the N.H.A. would continue A.I.M.'s policies against female circumcision and companionate marriage.258 When the A.H.C. rejected the proposal of turning the A.I.M. work over to the N.H.A. and the Hotchkiss-N.H.A. union broke up, Andersen proposed that A.I.M. form a long-term association with the N.H.A. to supply the resources that A.I.M. had been unable to provide alone, and to maintain a unified African church.259 This proposal did not meet with A.H.C. approval either.260 The N.H.A. then explored the possibility of starting work among the Watende on the Kenya-Tanganyika border. The Kenya Field Council proposed transferring the stations in the southern half of the "Kamasia [i.e. Tugen] Reserve" to the British A.I.M. missionaries working in the Eldoret area so that the Americans could properly man the Kipsigis area.261 Hotchkiss also suggested that he rejoin A.I.M. and turn the L.I.M. work over to A.I.M.262 Campbell, however, would not accept either of these ideas.263

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257 For the story of the close association of A.I.M. and N.H.A. (W.G.M.) see Fish and Fish, pp. 56-77, 98-102.

258 Andersen to Campbell, 17 March 1932, BGC,19,5.

259 Andersen to Campbell, 8 September 1933, BGC,19,5.

260 Campbell to Andersen, 17 October 1933, BGC,19,5.

261 Downing to Campbell, 2 February 1934, BGC,20,12.

262 Campbell to Davis, 21 August 1934, BGC,19,25.

263 Campbell to Davis, 3 March 1934; and 21 August 1934, BGC,19,25.

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In 1935 the Kenya colonial government granted Hotchkiss the Tenwick site. Hotchkiss then arranged an exchange of outschools with A.I.M. so he could turn the L.I.M. and Tenwick site over to the N.H.A. as one contiguous area, and A.I.M. adherents went to Tenwick to help the N.H.A. begin its work.264

CONCLUSION

A.I.M. was an ecumenical mission founded on the principle of cooperation rather than competition in its outward relationships toward other missions and denominational liberty within. This ecumenism was based on a common work, piety, and doctrine.

A.I.M. practiced denominational liberty by accepting missionaries irrespective of denominational affiliation and giving each missionary the liberty to establish the congregation on his station according to his own denominational polity. A.I.M. attempted to provide an organizational framework under which many smaller missions could serve in Kenya more effectively, but could not develop an organizational structure to sustain the idea. A.I.M. and non-A.I.M. missionaries socialized and cooperated with little regard for which society to which they belonged. Two of the most important forms of ecumenical co-operation and fellowship for A.I.M. were comity and the A.I.M. Annual Field Conference.

The height of A.I.M.'s ecumenical involvement was its participation in the "Kikuyu" church union movement. Charles Hurlburt was one of the pioneers and leaders in the Movement. A.I.M. participated in all of the church union conferences from 1909 to 1922. A.I.M. was one of founders of both the Alliance of Protestant Missionary Societies and the Kenya Missionary Council, and were among the original planners of Alliance High School. The fundamentalist-modernist controversy

264Fish and Fish, pp. 77, 99, 102.

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destroyed the unity upon which A.I.M.'s participation the church union movement was built. The 1922 division over modernism in the C.M.S. brought the fundamentalist-modernist controversy home to A.I.M. forcing it to withdraw from the church union movement. Though A.I.M. was no longer part of the church union movement, it followed their activities and helped when it could.

Dropping out of the church union movement did not end A.I.M.'s ecumenical relations with other churches and missions, but did reveal its limits. A.I.M. did not recognize Roman Catholicism or "modernism" as legitimate forms of Christianity. Fine lines were drawn to maintain the interdenominational character of A.I.M. while at the same time avoiding extremes or deviant forms of Christianity. The concept of A.I.M. as an "umbrella" organization gave way to a suspicion that caused the A.H.C. to rebuff every offer of union or association by other missions. Comity spheres came to be seen not as a means of co-operation but as areas to be defended.

A.I.M. began as an ecumenical experiment with the goal of transcending denominational divisions for the sake of the gospel. However, A.I.M.'s experience in Africa had the ironic effect of transforming the interdenominational mission into a denomination.
CHAPTER NINE
INDIGENOUS CHURCH PRINCIPLES:
THE MISSING PRINCIPLES

Conspicuous by its absence from A.I.M.'s founding principles were indigenous church principles. The first issue of *Hearing and Doing* made no mention either of establishing an African church or of indigenous church principles. The goal of establishing an indigenous, African church was not officially endorsed by A.I.M. until 1909. This chapter examines why there was this omission in A.I.M.'s earliest missionary writings, how A.I.M. tried to implement indigenous church principles once it adopted them, and why A.I.M. was so slow in establishing an indigenous African church.

THE REASONS FOR THEIR ABSENCE

1. The Influence of Premillennialism?

It is tempting to argue that because of A.I.M.'s premillennialism, the missionaries thought that Christ's return was so near that there would be no need to build church structures. It is true that many A.I.M. missionaries did believe that the Second Coming was near, and this belief did motivate them to missionary work. However, without direct evidence, it would be unwise to infer the failure to mention of indigenous church principles from A.I.M.'s premillennialism. For one thing, the common belief that the evangelization of the world was necessary to usher in the

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1The danger of jumping to conclusions from a mission's theology is pointed out by Kevin Ward, who notes that A.I.M.'s failure to satisfy the educational aspirations of its converts has been explained by its "fundamentalism" or eschatology, but that the Seventh Day Adventists "were equally conservative in doctrine and had an eschatology very much more elaborately defined than the AIM" yet established an excellent school system in southwestern Kenya (Kevin Ward, "Evangelism or Education? Mission Priorities and Educational Policy in the Africa Inland Mission," unpublished paper, (University of Nairobi, 1974), p. 1).
parousia did not seem to have had a significant effect on A.I.M. The belief in the imminent return of Christ was nowhere used as an argument to support A.I.M.'s insistence on evangelism as the sole role of missions. Rather, A.I.M. expected that the missionary work would require patient endurance over a long period of time. Peter Cameron Scott expected that Africa would be evangelized only as the missionaries won converts and then trained these converts to win others. Early missionaries Willis Hotchkiss, Margaret Scott, and Thomas Allan realized that it would take a long time before the missionaries would know Kikamba sufficiently to address the Kamba on religious issues, and that this process should not be hurried. When a sense of urgency was expressed, it was because of unevangelized Africans dying and going to perdition or because of the spread of Islam.

2. A.I.M.'s Other Founding Principles

Rather than trying to see A.I.M.'s premillenialism as the explanation for the absence of indigenous church principles from among A.I.M.'s founding principles, it is more likely that this omission stemmed from three of those founding principles.

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2 On this belief and A.I.M.'s premillenialism see above Chapter 5, pp. 211-214.

3 H&D (July 1896): 5; and "Africa Inland Mission," publicity pamphlet, n.d. [1915], BGC,9,9; BGC,12,45.

4 H&D (April 1897): 8; (January 1898): 6; and Margaret C. Scott, "A Descriptive Sketch," H&D (August-September 1897): 11.


6 Charles E. Hurlburt, "Africa," H&D (March 1899): 6. In the article where John Stauffacher strenuously argues for missionary work being limited to evangelism (John W. Stauffacher, "Side Tracked for 2,000 Years, H&D (October-December 1915):1-8), Stauffacher makes extensive use of the arguments of the premillenial popularizer, C. I. Schofield, and quotes from Schofield's Addresses on Prophecy (pp. 2-3), but does not develop the imminent Return of Christ as a reason for the Mission to engage exclusively in evangelism. Though Stauffacher mentions this at the end of the article (p. 8), it is the threat of Islam, that Stauffacher develops as the reason for the urgency to evangelize Africa (pp. 6-8).
namely evangelism, ecumenism, and lay ministry. There is no question that A.I.M. was single-mindedly evangelistic.\(^7\) From the very first statement of purpose in *Hearing and Doing*,\(^8\) through the purpose statements of all the various versions of the A.I.M. constitution,\(^9\) and A.I.M.'s publicity literature,\(^10\) the purpose of A.I.M. remained the evangelization of Africa. The establishment of an indigenous African church was never part of the stated purpose of A.I.M. even after this became established as part of the official policy of the Mission.\(^11\) With evangelism as the burning passion of the founders of A.I.M., it is possible that their thoughts were so preoccupied with the "salvation of souls" that they gave little thought to what should happen once these souls were saved.

Furthermore, as an ecumenical mission, A.I.M. attracted missionaries who were not churchmen, that is missionaries who did not have a strong degree of personal denominational identification and loyalty. Being Americans, they would not have identified any Christian denomination with the "true church of God", so the concept of missions conceived as the organizational extension of a Western denomination would have been far from their thinking. Strongly influenced by the individualism of American revivalism and Keswick piety, these missionary recruits

\(^7\)See above Chapter 5, pp. 214-218.

\(^8\)*H&D* (January 1896): 3-4.


\(^11\)The earliest inclusion of "the formation and establishment of local churches" among the officially stated objectives of A.I.M. seems to be in the 1965 revision of the constitution (A.I.M. Constitution, 1965, Article II, KBA,17,6).

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would have had far less sense of "church" as a corporate body. Their sense of "church" would not have extended in any corporate sense much beyond the local congregation. In so far as the early A.I.M. missionaries thought about the results of their evangelism, they probably thought of no more than local churches on their mission stations.12

Directly related to this was the fact that A.I.M. was founded as a mission of laymen. Not only would this further reinforce the non-sectarian thinking of A.I.M. missionaries, but it would also mean that few, if any, A.I.M. missionaries would have been fully trained in the traditions and government of a specific denomination. Thus without the cultural and educational influences of strong churchmanship in its background it is unlikely that A.I.M. (or perhaps any American mission) would ever have produced thinkers on missionary ecclesiology like the Anglicans, Henry Venn and Roland Allen.

3. Assumed by A.I.M.'s Founders?

There is the possibility that indigenous church principles were simply assumed by the founders of A.I.M. who did not feel the necessity to state them. This seems to be what Charles Hurlburt was saying in 1924, when he wrote:

> From the founding of the Mission the leaders of the work, both at home and on the field, have believed that our ideal must always be a self supporting and self directing native church, led and taught by native ministers....13

Long-time British Deputation Secretary, D. M. Miller, wrote something similar in 1949. He explained that after the death of Scott it was necessary to make explicit the

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12That this was the case is suggested by the fact that the first policy dealing with the establishment of an African church dealt only with the establishment of the "church" on each local mission station (A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VI, KBA: General Council).


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beliefs and policies of the Mission that had previously been assumed: "The foremost of these ... were ... the establishment in Africa of a native Church with principles of self-support and self-propagation..." 14 After he had retired as an active missionary former Kenya Field Director Harmon Nixon reflected on the philosophy of missions of the pioneer missionaries in Ukambani, whom he knew personally, and reported that they all believed in "Roland Allen's thesis concerning the indigenous church, that it should be self-supporting, self-propagating, and self-governing." 15

An examination of when indigenous church principles began to appear as statements of official policy, however, would seem to suggest that Hurlburt, Miller, and Nixon may have been reading later policy back into the minds of the founders. It is true that Scott's plan to use African evangelists to evangelize Africa was at least compatible with the principle of a self-propagating, indigenous church, if not an actual expression of that principle. Hurlburt, most certainly anticipated the establishment of African "churches" [i.e. local congregations] for he wrote the policy governing their establishment into A.I.M.'s first constitution. 16 However, it is unlikely that A.I.M. started thinking seriously about the African church until Dr. Henry Scott, the Superintendent of the Church of Scotland Mission, gave the challenge for a united African church that so stirred the A.I.M. missionaries at their 1908 Field Conference. From John Reibe's report on this conference it appears that this was new thinking for the A.I.M. missionaries:

It was his [Henry Scott's] statesmanlike advocacy of advance measures that thrilled the assembly of over fifty missionaries with a profound sense of their responsibilities unto God with regard to the future native Church in British


16 A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VI, KBA: General Council.

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When Hurlburt returned to the field the following year, the Field Conference came out with the first explicit statement of A.I.M.'s adherence to indigenous church principles, stating "the development, organization and establishment of a united self-governing, self-supporting and self-extending Native Church as the ideal of our Missionary Work", and A.I.M. threw itself into the center of the Kikuyu Church Union Movement. Even before this, however, there must have been some development of the issue of the African church going on in Hurlburt's mind, for the 1909 constitution, which came out too soon to have incorporated the declaration of the 1909 Field Conference, gave the members of the newly established General Council the responsibility "to do all in their power to secure practical unity in the native church." The acceptance of indigenous church principles by the 1909 Field Conference was made part of A.I.M.'s constitution in 1912 by adding the statement that "it shall be the policy of the Mission to establish self-supporting, self-extending, self-governing, native churches.

IMPLEMENTING INDIGENOUS CHURCH PRINCIPLES

1. A Self-Propagating Church

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18Quoted in M. G. Capon, *Towards Unity in Kenya: The Story of Co-operation between Missions and Churches in Kenya 1913-1947* (Nairobi: Christian Council of Kenya, 1962), pg. 11. It is possible that "united" was the only new concept in this statement, or that the missionaries had a nominal belief in these indigenous church principles, but this was the first time that there was serious discussion of plans about actually working to put them into effect.

19See above Chapter 8, pp. 349-374. If A.I.M. had not given much thought to the establishment of an indigenous, African church, its participation in the church union movement most certainly stimulated such thinking.

20A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article V, Section 6, KBA: General Council.

21A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article XI, Section 2, BGC,11,11, KBA,17,6.

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Having established that A.I.M. did adopt indigenous church principles, though somewhat belatedly, the next question is how successfully A.I.M. implemented these principles. When Harmon Nixon recalled that the Ukambani missionaries believed "that the church should be self-propagating", he often added a word of explanation such as "that every Christian should be a witness" or the missionary "taught that every believer was responsible for making Christ known." 22 This shows that the concept of a "self-propagating" church was not only part of A.I.M.'s missionary strategy from the beginning, but was intrinsic to A.I.M.'s conception of the Christian life. From our study of A.I.M. as an evangelistic mission it is clear that A.I.M. implemented this principle both by teaching Africans to share their Christian faith, and by using them extensively as evangelists. Furthermore, the African converts needed little encouragement to share this new way of life with their compatriots. Of the three indigenous principles, this one came most naturally to both missionary and African. If tensions arose, it was because some converts were zealous to evangelize before the missionary thought they were adequately trained23 while others did not seem to retain their zeal.24

2. A Self-Supporting Church

Nixon maintained that the missionaries also "believed that the Church should be self-supporting", "constantly urged the church to give generously", and opposed "foreign subsidy".25 For a variety of reasons, however, this principle became very

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22"Views of Early Missionaries," BGC,12,45.


24"Fred McKenrick complained," may of our boys and men who were formerly very earnest in preaching and in personal work [i.e. group and individual evangelism] now do little if any work of this kind" (McKenrick to Palmer, 17 January 1916, BGC,22,27).

25"Views of Early Missionaries," BGC,12,45.

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difficult to implement. For one thing the missionaries did not agree on how to implement it. Some tended to undermine the very principle which they claimed to be establishing. For example Nixon recalled that "Mr. [George] Rhoad contributed largely out of his own resources to the work and heavily subsidized the work with funds from abroad", and that while Frederick Holland believed in a self-supporting church, "he did sometimes give aid to struggling pastors who were worthy of help." While most missionaries "were strongly of the opinion that the national church should support its own institutions without foreign subsidy", others "felt that it would be proper to receive financial help from abroad for building and maintaining such institutions as colleges, seminaries, and hospitals."27

Perhaps the greatest difficulty in attempting to implement the principle of self-support was that it flew in the face of African expectations. When the missionaries first came, the African people who welcomed them did so with the expectation that they would receive some temporal benefits from the missionaries' presence among them.28 Over the years inducements that the missionaries offered to attract African people and the obvious benefits of employment, protection, and education that the missionaries provided only reinforced these expectations. Furthermore, the original necessity to pay from Mission funds the salaries of the African teachers and evangelists and to establish and maintain the various church institutions only established more firmly in the African's mind the idea that it was the Mission's responsibility to pay for the benefits they received.

26Ibid.

27Ibid. Also see: Johnston to Campbell, 30 January 1930, BGC,22,9, where it appears that the missionaries at Kijabe disagreed with the Ukambani missionaries' insistence that the students at Ukamba Bible Institute be supported solely by the church, and not the missionaries. Much earlier the missionaries had disagreed on whether or not to provide incentives to induce African young people to attend the mission schools (see above Chapter 6, p. 248).

28See above Chapter 6, pp. 243-245.

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The first effort on the part of the Mission to begin to move the church towards self-support was the decision to teach the Faith Basis to its African church workers. In 1916 the Kenya Field Council approved the following recommendation from the Annual Field Conference:

That the native teachers and evangelists be brought into alignment with the Faith Basis, and that they be taught to look to God and not to the Mission or the missionaries for their support. By this we do not mean that we shall relieve ourselves of responsibility for their maintenance, but ... that as God provides they shall receive a certain wage according to their standard and ability.\(^\text{29}\)

In one sense, this resolution was a declaration that the Mission would begin to lay the theological and spiritual basis for a self-supporting African church. In another sense, it was a disclaimer against the Mission assuming the responsibility of guaranteeing its African workers full salaries should funds run short.

The task was nigh unto impossible. For one thing not to ask for what you need flew in the face of a culture where asking and receiving were a normal form of social intercourse and often created bonds that helped to hold the society together. Furthermore, to the practical-minded Africans, to pray for a need but not to also tell the ones who could meet the need made as much sense as praying for food without bothering to dig a garden.

But the Faith Basis not only flew in the face of African culture, it also flew in the face of the experience of the African teachers and evangelists. They had already been receiving a salary from the Mission through the Native Evangelist and Teachers Fund, and the Mission was going to continue paying their salaries from the same source. The African workers would experience no difference in how they received their money. The only difference was that if not enough money came in to pay their full salaries they would only receive a percentage of their salary. Given A.I.M.'s

\(^{29}\)"Abridged Minutes of Field Council Meetings Conference Week," 7,10 February 1916, BGC, 12,46.

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meager resources, this would likely have occurred whether the Africans were on the Faith Basis or not, and in either case they would be equally unable to understand why the rich white men were not paying them.

The effort proved futile as the Mission faced not greater piety on the part of its African workers, but demands for greater economic rewards. The Faith Basis notwithstanding, teachers at Kijabe filed a formal complaint against A.I.M. with the department of education in 1928.30

The same year in Ukambani, the growing demand for education and other benefits on the part of the African believers31 collided with the missionaries' attempt to apply the principle of self-support to the African church. Walter Guilding wrote:

The conditions here [at Machakos] at the present are anything but encouraging. Our attempt to urge the native Church to take on more responsibility in the work, & take a step forward in the direction of becoming a self-supporting Church has seemingly failed. Our elders failed to do what we quite expected of them... We feel that on account of their attitude there is quite a set back in the work.32

Two years later, Charles Johnston summarized his view of the conflict, which he believed was rooted in bad policies, not wrong teaching:

Instead of our difficulties being due to wrong preaching I believe some of them are due to a wrong method of support for our native agents. It is now just two years since we began to change, and then too is when trouble began. Two years ago the trouble was greatest here at Machakos because the elders, who then composed the church session, had drawn up a series of demands that called for a considerable larger sum of foreign funds. Instead we came back from the annual conference with a scheme whereby the burden was shifted to their shoulders, with us standing by to help. Their passive resistance lasted for a year and even now they have only half heartedly accepted the principle, and

30Kijabe teachers to Biss, 12 August 1928, KNA. Educ. 1/1064, cited in Kevin Ward, p. 11.

31Johnston described the pressure that the African Christians were putting on the missionaries to provide more social services in Johnston to Campbell, 5 March 1928, BGC.22.9.

32Guilding to Campbell, 7 April 1928, BGC.13,19.

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then only a comparative few.33

Precisely what things the missionaries had tried to "shift" to African "shoulders" is unclear. One of those things may have been paying the salaries of their own teachers, for in that same year the missionaries at Machakos faced demands for higher wages by the teachers. The missionaries combined ideas from indigenous church principles and the Faith Basis and told "them that they were supported by their churches, so they must look to the Lord for their supplies."34

Another "burden" given to the African church was the support of their students at the newly established Ukamba Bible Institute. The missionaries agreed that they would use no overseas funds to support the students.35 Johnston explained why:

We believe that the native pastor needs to be as clearly and definitely called of the Lord as the white pastor. In addition we believe it is absolutely necessary for his own progress and growth, as well as for the good of the church, that he receive no financial help from outside his own country. To subsidize the native pastor would be fatal to the future of the church, and if he has no means of his own for the support of himself and family it is expected that his home church will undertake his support. If we were willing to receive moneys from home for the support of these students we would have many applying but it would be difficult later to get their church to take over the burden. These difficulties they face in the Bible School will test the genuineness of their call, as well as prepare them for other difficulties later.36

33 John to Campbell, 30 January 1930, BGC,22,9.
34 Davis to Campbell, 5 December, 1931, BGC,10,5.
35 The missionaries in Ukambani drew up and signed a memorandum ("The Ukamba Bible School," October 1929, BGC,22,9) that listed the qualifications and procedures for admission to the new Bible school and included a pledge that they would adhere to the policy of self-support of African Bible school students.
36 John to Campbell, 4 July 1929, BGC,22,9. A year later John wrote that despite the fact that it would be "fairly easy to secure liberal support at home for each and every candidate that might apply," this should be refused because "it very important that they [the Bible school students] be started right." He continued: "The Africa Church will be harmed beyond repair if it is not encouraged, ye compelled, to support its own pastors and to support them from the start. Not only so but I am confident that it is well able to adequately support every one of their number called of God to the ministry. (John to Campbell, 30 January 1930, BGC,22,9)."

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However, the missionaries realized that the African Church was not yet able to totally support this work, so agreed to accept foreign contributions to the capital development of the Bible school.37

3. A Self-Governing Church: Missionary Authority

Perhaps A.I.M.'s attitude toward developing a self-governing African church is best summed up by Nixon's recollection of George Rhoad's approach:

At the time he was on the field he did not think that the church was ready for self-government but he had already begun to prepare the church for that step in delineating responsibilities to leaders he had selected.38

A.I.M. "did not think that the church was ready for self-government". The constitution of the Mission clearly established the authority of the Mission over the Church. When the first constitution was written only local congregations of African believers were envisioned. These congregations would be organized by the missionaries in charge of each station who determined their form of government.39 By 1909 African converts were being made, so the second constitution gave to the General and Field Councils the responsibility for "the discipline of ... native Christians."40 It placed the central institutions ministering to the African people under the General Council,41 and defined A.I.M.'s missionary strategy as "evangelization

37Johnston to Campbell, 4 July 1929; and "The Ukamba Bible School," October 1929, BGC, 22, 9.

38"Views of Early Missionaries," BGC, 12, 45.

39A.I.M. Constitution, [1897], Article VI, KBA: General Council.

40A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article V, Section 8, Article VII, Section 4, KBA: General Council.

41That is the "school for native evangelists and teachers, the industrial school and the home for native boys and girls" (A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article V, Section 10, KBA: General Council).

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through native workers, under the supervision of the missionaries. And by the time the constitution was again revised in 1912, African churches had been established, so the Field Council was explicitly given "control of the native Church". That the Mission would play a primary role in establishing and supervising the African Church in its early days is understandable. Unfortunately these provisions remained part of A.I.M. constitutional law throughout the time period covered by this study.

This constitutional authority that the Mission held over the Church existed not only in theory but was exercised in practice as well. The A.I.M. Field Council and Annual Field Conference often drew up rules for the African Church. The 1908 Annual Conference drew up the rules governing the baptism of African believers. In 1915 the Field Council decided that the "native teachers and evangelists" be taught the Faith Basis and passed rules governing marriage among A.I.M.'s converts. There is no evidence that the missionaries in any formal manner consulted any of their African believers when they made these rules. The missionaries were clearly in

42 A.I.M. Constitution, [1909], Article IX, Section 2, KBA: General Council.

43 A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article IX, Section 3, BGC,11,11, KBA,17,6

44 All of them remained part of the 1922 constitution (A.I.M. Constitution, 1922, Article XI, Section 2, Article XIII, Section 2, Appendix Article II, Sections 2 and 9, BGC,11,11). After that the Mission's direction of African evangelism and control of the African schools and "Homes for native girls" are found in the "Rules" of the Kenya Field ("Rules of the Africa Inland Mission adopted by The Field Council Kenya Colony," 1929, KBA,17,6), and the Field Councils "control of the native church" and "discipline of native Christians" was found in the Kenya Field by-laws ("Africa Inland Mission Kenya Field By-Laws," 25 January 1936, By-law 8, KBA,17,6). By then the provision permitting the missionary in charge of the station to determine the form of government the church would take on his station had become redundant.

45 Minutes of Business Session of 1908 Annual Conference, 19 September 1908, KBA: General Conference. Also see H&D (January-March 1909): 4-5.

46 Abridged Minutes of Field Council Meetings Conference Week," 7,10 February 1916, BGC,12,46.

47 It is likely that African believers were informally consulted on at least some of the issues upon which the Field Council and Annual Conference ruled. For example the rule on
charge of each mission station, and a convert transferring from one station to another had take with him a letter from the missionary in charge of his former station explaining the reasons for the transfer. The missionaries also exercised discipline over the African converts. A report on the "Standing of Githumu Church Members" listed 87 people disciplined for 102 separate offenses.


While not all of the steps taken to establish a self-governing African church are clear, the Mission did try to follow Rhoad's practice of preparing the church for self-government by "delineating responsibilities to leaders he had selected." When large numbers of Africans began moving onto Kijabe station to avoid the oppressive rule of a nearby colonial chief, the missionaries appointed a committee of young African converts to help them manage the influx. The missionaries relied heavily upon these young men to screen would-be residents of Kijabe and to explain and enforce the station rules.

As early as 1909 A.I.M. was training some of its converts as

African marriage required that "a moderate dowry must be paid" ("Rules of the Africa Inland Mission adopted by The [Kenya] Field Council April 1915," Rule 22, KBA: FC-83). It would not be unreasonable to assume that the missionaries had discussed the traditional dowry system with the African believers and its adaptation to Christian marriage before they passed this rule.

When the Harrisons had to leave Kangundo and A.I.M. had no missionaries to assign there, Mr. Downing had to consult with the colonial District Commissioner about leaving the station in the charge of the African teacher-evangelist, James Juma Mbotela. This was clearly considered to be an atypical situation (Riebe to Hurlburt, 16 June 1911, KBA: General Council).

"Rules of the Africa Inland Mission adopted by The [Kenya] Field Council April 1915," Rule 21, KBA: FC-83. The reason for this rule was clearly an attempt to maintain church discipline among their converts and school discipline among their students.


"Views of Early Missionaries," BGC,12,45.


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teacher-evangelists, placing them in charge of schools on the mission stations, and even sending them out to start their own out-schools. By 1913 baptismal candidates were being approved by the missionaries and the "native church". In 1919 and 1921 African Church elders were appointed at Kijabe and Githumu respectively.

From time to time the Mission entrusted the entire work of a mission station into the hands of its African workers. In 1911 circumstances required that A.I.M. place African teachers-evangelists in charge Kangundo. From all reports they did a good job. Lee Downing was sufficiently impressed with these and the other teacher-evangelists on the Kamba stations that he expressed the belief that the Africans could carry on the work themselves when the missionaries went on furlough. So when the Wights left for furlough, the "native teachers ... carried on the school work" themselves at Mukaa.

Perhaps the Mission had considered the practice of leaving Africans in charge of mission stations to be only a temporary expedient, for the experiment was short-lived. In 1915 Dr. and Mrs. Davis were transferred from Machakos to take charge of Mukaa, and Mr. and Mrs. W. J. Rampley were sent to Kangundo. When in 1917 and

53See above Chapter 6, p. 251.
55IA (February 1919): 14, 16 reported the ordination of five Gikuyu elders and the appointment of four women leaders at Kijabe while IA (May 1921): 13 reported the organization of the church at Githumu with the election and ordination of four elders.
56See above Chapter 6, p. 282.
57Stumpf to Young, 27 February 1913, BGC, 24, 22; and H&D (October-December 1913): 12, 13.
58Downing to Hurlburt, 27 December 1912, KBA: FC-76.
60Ibid.
1918 A.I.M. was unable to supply missionaries to staff Ikutha and Miambni,\(^61\) the Mission did not send African teacher-evangelists, but allowed these stations to disappeared entirely from the index of A.I.M. stations.\(^62\) In 1925, however, four mission stations, Matara, Kinyona, Kivaani, and Kangundo, were again being staffed solely by "resident native helpers."\(^63\)

5. A Self-Governing Church: Need for Church Structure

If the Mission was willing to give its African workers responsible positions for carrying out Mission policy, such as the responsibility for an out-station or, occasionally, of mission stations, it was much more reluctant about involving Africans in the formation of policy. Bible conferences for its African workers that included African speakers were highly approved by the Mission.\(^64\) However, when the African teacher-evangelists at a conference at Machakos apparently used it as an opportunity

\(^{61}\) *IA* (January-February 1917): 7; and (February 1918): 10.

\(^{62}\) *IA* (October 1919): 27.

\(^{63}\) "Kenya Stations and Workers," n.d. [1925], KBA: FC-76. Sandgren, whose account is entirely from the perspective the African critics of A.I.M. maintains that Kinyona had no resident missionaries and was under African leadership because the Christians of Kinyona refused to submit to A.I.M. domination any more and the Mission was unable to exert its control, though "Kinyona did not actually sever its AIM connection". Exactly what continued to constitute Kinyona's "AIM connection" Sandgren does not explain (David P. Sandgren, "The Kikuyu, Christianity and the Africa Inland Mission," Ph.D. thesis (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976), pp. 172-177, 183-184). Virginia Blakeslee, presenting what is probably a somewhat sanitized account from the perspective of the Mission, wrote that both "Matara and Kinyona were being carried on as outstations with Kikuyu Christians in charge" and that they continued to participate in the rudimentary ecclesiastical system that brought "the elders from all the out-districts" to one of the central mission stations (Githumu or Kijabe) to bring the church offerings for the support of the teacher-evangelists, for discussion of church matters, and for prayer (H. Virginia Blakeslee, *Beyond the Kikuyu Curtain*, Chicago: Moody Press, 1956), pp. 177-178). The truth is probably somewhere between these two extremes.

\(^{64}\) Palmer to McKenrick, 15 November 1915, BGC,22,27; McKenrick to Woodley, 11 April 1920, KBA: FC-83; Collins to Friends in the Homeland, 8 October 1924, BGC,19,21; and *IA* (June 1919): 4-5; (July 1919): 9-10; (April 1920): 7, 14;
to discuss their terms of employment, Hurlburt was alarmed. He warned against "authorizing or approving of a private conference of native Christians to determine" such matters but did see value of missionary-led conferences that touched on the problems of the ministry: "It may take much wise and prayerful steering, but ... there are many large problems which require their interested study."65

The lack of a clearly defined church structure seems to have severely hurt the A.I.M. work among the Gikuyu. When the teacher-evangelists lived on the mission stations, the protection of the Mission, shared experiences, and strong personal relationships maintained by constant contact all built and maintained a common identity, social cohesion, and organizational loyalty among the teacher-evangelists and between the teacher-evangelists and the missionaries. When the teacher-evangelists left the mission stations they established outstations that had little or no direct connection with the Mission. Once off the mission station, the teacher-evangelists found themselves isolated, facing a hostile colonial world, and dependent on hostile non-Christian communities with only minimal structural ties back to the support of the mission stations. The result in many cases was a greater identification with the non-Christian community and a weakened loyalty to the Mission. When the Mission tried to exert its control over these outstations with a very rudimentary ecclesiastical structure, resentment was engendered against the Mission as these outstations lost their autonomy. And when the Mission's form of Christianity came into conflict with the non-Christian culture, the teacher-evangelists often sided with the community against the Mission.66

65Hurlburt to Downing, 11 March 1918, KBA: FC-76.
66Sandgren makes a valuable contribution in describing these processes (Sandgren, pp. 139-192). Care needs to be exercised in using Sandgren because his interest and sympathies lie entirely with how these processes contributed to the growth of Gikuyu nationalism. Issues relating more directly to the transmission of Christianity, growth and development of the African church among the Gikuyu are not dealt with except as they contribute to Gikuyu.
These processes were reaching their height immediately after World War I at the same time the Kenya colonial government was enacting a number of measures that greatly threatened the welfare of the Gikuyu people. The Crown Lands Ordinance and the Soldier Settlement Scheme increased Gikuyu insecurity about his land. Economic pressures and labor competition caused the European settlers to attempt to lower African wages and press the government to pass a number of oppressive and humiliating measures to force the Gikuyu to work on European farms.67 These actions sparked a protest by Gikuyu political groups, the most volatile being led by Harry Thuku, a former Gospel Missionary Society adherent, who articulated the grievances that many felt against both the government and the missions, and whose tours through Gikuyuland generated a mass protest movement. Nearly all of A.I.M.'s Gikuyu adherents joined the protest bringing what Hurlburt reported to be "a complete cessation of mission work for a time on some of our stations in the Kikuyu tribe."68 Through a combination of suppression and accommodation the government quelled political development.


68Charles E. Hurlburt, "Annual Report from the Field," IA (June 1923): 2-3. Also see Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.
the movement,\textsuperscript{69} and the A.I.M. adherents returned to the Mission.\textsuperscript{70}

It is hard to say whether or not better organizational structures would have enabled A.I.M. to deal with the crises and to have avoided some of the invective heaped on the Mission from its own adherents. However, the disruption did give A.I.M.'s believers the opportunity to voice some of the grievances that they had against the Mission, and against the attitudes and behavior of some of the missionaries.\textsuperscript{71} Hurlburt intervened directly to resolve the grievances in a way that both granted the first significant degree of self-government to the African church leaders and provided the beginnings of effective church structures:

I met the elders of the church at both Kijabe and Githumu, called the elders for a united meeting, asking Matara and Kinyona elders to come with them. ... The church itself was given practically \textit{sic} control of its own affairs; missionaries were prohibited from dominating influence in the church against the will of the majority; and it was agreed that difficulties in any local church should be settled by a representative gathering of elders from all the churches in that tribe; and that we would try to effect an organization in which there might be a third and higher court over the representatives of all the churches in the

\textsuperscript{69}For different accounts for the protest in Central Provence see: Abuor, pp. 30-36; Bennett, pp. 293-294; Middleton, pp. 356-359; Odinga, pp. 28; Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 42-52; and Thuku, p. 20-27, 31-34. On the concessions that the government made see: Brett, pp. 187-190; and Wrigley, pp. 237-239. For A.I.M.'s view of the protests see: Blakeslee, pp. 155-162; Hurlburt, "Annual Report from the Field," pp. 2-3; and Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

\textsuperscript{70}Hurlburt, "Annual Report from the Field," \textit{IA} (June 1923): pp. 2-3; and Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

\textsuperscript{71}For some reason, it seems that some unusually harsh A.I.M. missionaries were working among the Gikuyu. Hurlburt spoke of Raynor at Githumu having an "uncontrolled temper", and at Kijabe of Hassler "haranguing" the people, Leasure taking "some very unjust and ill considered actions" (Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76), and McKenrick being "severe to the point of extreme cruelty" (Hurlburt to Wadham, 4 December 1925, KBA: FC-76). For nearly two years the missionaries in Kenya were divided over whether Dr. Kenneth Allan of Githumu should have been disciplined for alleged "harsh treatment" of the Africans (Unsigned letter [Downing?] to Holland, 28 December 1926; Downing to Davis 7 January 1927, KBA: FC-1; Campbell to Maynard, 26 August 1927; Maynard to Campbell, 4 October 1927, BGC,1,84; Collins to Campbell and Lanning, 2 August 1927; Campbell to Collins, 3 August 1927; 8 August 1927, BGC,19,21; Johnston to Campbell, 13 April 1928, BGC,22,9; Campbell to McKenrick, 2 March 1927; and 23 March 1927, BGC,22,28).
different tribes in the A.I.M. territory.\textsuperscript{72}

Whether or not A.I.M. would have built on this start towards the creation of a self-governing African church had Hurlburt not resigned in 1925 cannot be known. In any event, Hurlburt's initiative seems to have died, for from Virginia Blakeslee's description of the church "organization" in the late 1920s A.I.M. appears to have reverted to the simpler, missionary dominated patterns prior to the Thuku protest.\textsuperscript{73} A large conference in 1924 with over 1,000 in attendance did include a business meeting of elders from Kijabe, Matara, Githumu, and Kinyona.\textsuperscript{74} A.I.M. elders also participated in several ecumenical conferences of Gikuyu elders in 1929. Though only advisory to the churches represented, the elders were, none-the-less, able to discuss without missionaries being present such issues as female circumcision, alcohol, mission spheres, the transfer of membership between denominations, Sunday trading, marriage, and education. The elders requested that the conferences be made annual.\textsuperscript{75} This initiative, however, appears to have been lost in the frenzy of the Gikuyu circumcision crisis.

6. A Self-Governing Church: African Clergy

At this time a major step was taken in laying the foundation for eventual self-government by the establishment of pastoral training institutes that went beyond the simple training given to the teacher-evangelists. With the establishment of the Ukamba Bible Institute in 1928 and the W. Y. Moffat Memorial Bible Training

\textsuperscript{72}Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76. Also see Hurlburt, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{73}Blakeslee, pp. 177-178

\textsuperscript{74}Collins to "Friends in the Homeland," 8 October 1924, BGC,19,21.

\textsuperscript{75}"Minutes of a Conference of Kikuyu Church Elders. Held at Tumutumu from March 8\textsuperscript{th} to 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1929," KBA: FC-18; "Minutes of a Conference Church Elders of the Kikuyu Country Held at Kambui, Oct. 17-20, 1929," KBA: FC-18.

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Institute at Kijabe in 1929, A.I.M. began training leaders for a self-governing church.

The establishment of these Bible schools also precipitated a debate concerning the ordination of African ministers. This concern was not new to A.I.M. Beginning in 1909 A.I.M. participated in the various conferences planning for a united African church, which would include "a regularly ordained and properly safeguarded ministry." According, to Nixon A.I.M. missionaries believed in "the ordination of nationals" but "did not think that untrained men should be ordained", and it took A.I.M. a long time to provide pastoral training for its converts. When arguing for the establishment of a Bible school in Ukambani, Johnston used his embarrassment that A.I.M. was behind other missions in ordaining Africans to bolster his case. So, when A.I.M. established pastoral training institutions, the issue of African ordination immediately confronted the missionaries. Johnston in 1929 reported:


78"Views of Early Missionaries," BGC,12,45. All of the pioneer missionaries in Ukambani mentioned by Nixon connected their belief in ordaining African pastors with their support for the training of African pastors.

79For some of the difficulties A.I.M. faced in providing pastoral training see Charles Hurlburt, "Another Year," IA 5 (August 1921): 6. On the efforts to establish a Bible school in Ukambani as early as 1918 see Farnsworth to Campbell, 20 March 1926, BGC,10,5 and Johnston to Campbell, 21 February 1927, BGC,22,9.

80Johnston to Campbell, 21 February 1927, BGC,22,9.

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As yet there are no candidates [for ordination] ready, but we have eight
preparing, who in the matter of a year or so will come up for examination. We
need to have the matter wholly settled before that time so that no
postponement will be necessary.81

When the missionaries tried to deal with the issue, they found it more difficult
to accept African ordination in practice than in principle. The first problem arose from
the interdenominational nature of A.I.M. As an interdenominational missionary
society, A.I.M. was not a church or the arm of a specific church, so the question of
A.I.M.'s authority to ordain was raised.82 Johnston asked:

How can we, a nonecclesiastical body, function in ecclesiastical matters in such
a way that we shall not offend our brethren in the other missions, and also
commend our native pastors to the pastors of neighboring churches, and to the
Government?83

Furthermore, the missionaries wanted to know if the interdenominational nature of
A.I.M. would change if it began to exercise such ecclesiastical functions. Ernest
Dalziel asked, "And when we ordain native ministers of the A.I.M. does not that make
the A.I.M. a denomination with certain Church rules [and] orders etc [sic]?"84
Dalziel's conclusion to the matter proved to be prophetic: "I cannot see how the
A.I.M. can ordain native ministers unless an African Church is formed."85

81Johnston to Campbell, 4 July 1929, BGC,22,9.

82Dalziel to Campbell, 22 March 1929, quoted in John Alexander Gration, "The
Relationship of the Africa Inland Mission and Its National Church in Kenya Between 1895 and

83Johnston to Campbell, 4 July 1929, BGC,22,9.

84Dalziel to Campbell, 22 March 1929, quoted in Gration, p. 233. Though A.I.M. was
not an ecclesiastical body in the homeland, it had functioned as a denomination on the field
from its inception. The failure of it to recognize this fact prevented the Mission from
understanding the desire of the Africa Inland Church in the 1960s that the Mission drop its
separate organization and identity and merge into the Church. The tension between the
Mission's desire for "partnership" and the Church's desire for union is the theme of chapters 6
and 7 in Gration's thesis.

85Dalziel to Campbell, 22 March 1929, quoted in Gration, p. 233, n. 18.

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The second problem stemmed from the paternalism of the Mission. A.I.M. was not prepared to grant self-government to its African Church in 1929, and African ordination was seen as a possible threat to missionary control if ordained African pastors served on stations supervised by unordained missionaries. Dalziel argued strongly "that it is not right or fitting that we should ordain native ministers administering the Ordinances ect [sic] whilst senior missionaries are not allowed to do so."

This does not mean that Dalziel opposed African ordination. On the contrary, he said that "many of us feel that we should have ordained native ministers", but if A.I.M. had the authority to ordain African ministers, then the Mission had the authority to ordain its own missionaries, and in fact should ordain all senior missionaries who desired it. The problem was that Dalziel did not think that A.I.M. possessed the authority to do either.

The missionaries discussed the issue in the 1929 Annual Field Conference and, "because of divergence of opinion", referred the issue to the American Home Council. The A.H.C. could not resolve the issue, but Campbell wrote back his suggestions. On the issue of A.I.M.'s authority to ordain, and indirectly on whether this would turn A.I.M. into a denomination, Campbell wrote that "an ordination council could be called from among the ordained men who are members of the Africa Inland Mission, and the missionaries set apart for the ministry," and that such ordinations were recognized by most churches in A.I.M.'s constituency. He readily agreed that senior missionaries should be ordained, but was not ready to seriously

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86 Dalziel to Campbell, 22 March 1929, quoted in Gration, p. 232.
87 Ibid.
88 Dalziel to Campbell, 22 March 1929, quoted in Gration, pp. 231-232.
89 Johnston to Campbell, 4 July 1929, BGC, 22, 9.
90 Campbell to Dalziel, 1 October 1929, BGC, 19, 24.

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consider African ordinations:

As far as I can see it, we should go very slowly in the ordination of native workers and I do not feel that any native worker should be ordained until he has proved by years of faithful service that he is trustworthy.  

Not realizing that many graduates had served the Mission faithfully for years as a teacher-evangelist prior to entering Bible school, Campbell added: "To our mind it would be unwise to ordain natives graduated from a Bible Training Institute, before they had had years of practical faithful service."  

To Johnston he suggested "a simple setting apart of the native workers through the laying on of hands and prayer." 

Whatever the missionaries on the field might have been able to work out for themselves once they had a means of ordination presented to them is unknown. However, this semi-official discouragement from ordaining African ministers no doubt quenched their initial enthusiasm.

During the 1930s the better trained Bible school graduates began to take their places among the African congregations, and attitudes began to change within the Mission. In 1933 the missionaries in Ukambani proposed that no new missionaries were needed. Giving his hearty endorsement of this plan, the Kenya Field Director wrote:

I cannot conceive of any other policy for the future here in Ukamba... It is unthinkable that we shall go on supplying workers from overseas when they can be had right here, and that in ever increasing numbers, and of better and better quality.

Two years later the Kenya Field Council established a "Licensing and Ordaining

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91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Campbell to Johnston, 7 August 1929, BGC,22,9.

94 Johnston to Campbell, 21 September 1933, BGC,22,9.

95 Downing to Members of Kenya Field Council, 14 December 1933, BGC,20,12.

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Committee" and authorized the printing of ordination certificates. In 1936 some measure of control was transferred to the new African pastors, and in 1938 the B.H.C. advised its missionaries that they take every opportunity to turn more of the responsibility for the work over to the African Christians. In 1942 the Bible school at Kijabe added a one-year pastor's course to prepare for ordination men who had completed the three-year course and had church experience. At the same time committees of missionaries and Africans prepared a constitution for a self-governing African Church. This constitution was ratified by Mission and Church in 1943, and the first African pastors of the Africa Inland Church were ordained on 19 April 1945.

WHY A.I.M. WAS SLOW TO ESTABLISH AN INDIGENOUS CHURCH

If A.I.M. believed in indigenous church principles why did it take the Mission so long to establish a self-governing church? First, the missionaries were children of their times. They shared many of the common ethnocentric and paternalistic assumptions that caused them to both underestimate the abilities of the Africans and overestimate their own. When John Stauffacher wrote a letter praising the abilities and character of Tagi Oloiposioki, his convert and friend, he commented: "I cannot help but smile now, at the ridiculous opinions some of us held in the early years of our

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97Gration cites former Kenya Field Director, Erik Barnett, as saying that A.I.M.'s total, authoritarian control of their African Church continued until 1936. What happened in that year is not mentioned (Erik Barnett, "Memorandum on Need for Possible Changes in A.I.M. Policies and Operations," 27 May 1964 cited by Gration, p. 240).


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work as to whether or not the native would ever be able to do much in evangelizing his own people."\(^{101}\) Even as Charles Hurlburt extolled the virtues of the Mission's teacher-evangelists and declared the Mission's intention of establishing "a self supporting and self directing native church, led and taught by native ministers," he added that "the teaching, counsel, and guidance of the missionary may be needed for an indefinite, and probably very long, period."\(^{102}\) Andrew Andersen commented that the African Christians needed missionary tutelage because "our poor native Christians who do not have the knowledge of books and God as we have."\(^{103}\)

The colonial context reinforced these tendencies. The colonial government required the Mission to exercise control over its mission stations and schools. At times the government prevented the Mission from developing African responsibility. According to Elwood Davis the Mission proposed that the African church apply for educational grants-in-aid, which would be administered jointly by the Mission and church but the "Government will not give their money to Africans and wants the missionaries to receive it and dispose of it and account for it."\(^{104}\)

Other factors that reinforced the common missionary paternalism stemmed the nature of A.I.M. as a mission. One was A.I.M.'s poverty, which forced missionaries to pay for African institutions out of their personal allowances. At Githumu the

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101 Stauffacher to "Friends of the Africa Inland Mission," n.d. [1923], BGC,12,45.


103 Anderson to Fletcher, 9 August 1922, BGC,19,4. Not all A.I.M. missionaries felt this way about the ability of their converts to make such cultural decisions. From an interview with Rev. Johana Nyenjeri, the first African pastor of the Kijabe church, Peterson Ngata wrote: "It becomes quite clear from Nyenjeri's points on White-Black planning that the missionaries relied very heavily upon the Africans for all their plans: church problems, especially dealing with Kikuyu customs; committees for planning services, open air meetings, conferences (Written report of interview with Johana Nyenjeri by Peterson Ngata, August 25, 1970. NCCK archives, St. Paul's United Theological College, Limuru, Kenya. (From the collection of David Sandgren.) quoted in Gration, p. 240, n. 41)."

104 Davis to Wadham, 10 October 1936, BGC,19,25.

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missionaries built many of the outschools with their own money and personally bore "the expense of food, clothing and blankets for the girls [home]." The investment of personal resources in these projects no doubt gave the missionaries a sense of ownership of them and reinforced their need to control them.\textsuperscript{106}

A second factor was A.I.M.'s nature as a lay mission. According to Hurlburt, the lack of properly trained missionaries long delayed the establishment of pastoral training institutions.\textsuperscript{107} Though all A.I.M. missionaries gave lip service to developing an indigenous church, most did not have the training, breadth of vision, or intellectual acumen to know how to bring it about. Hurlburt complained in 1923:

...Johnston favors a real native church within the A.I.M. No one else seems to have thought through much of what it meant, but all approved it. The lack of deep, conservative thought and statesmanship among our missionaries never seemed so appalling to me as it does now.\textsuperscript{108}

Even if the missionaries had the capacity, they were usually so overworked that they had little time with which to grapple with the issues of developing a self-governing church. Johnston complained about the ineffectiveness of the Kenya Field Council:

I do feel, however, that we are not as "strong" a committee out here as we might be because we meet too seldom, and when we do meet there is too much of a rush. We go up to Kijabe for a Council meeting and find the members resident there "up to their necks" in work. ... The two, three or four days allotted for the meeting are crowded full of the consideration of pressing problems, and invariably there is lack of time to look into the future, and anticipate any of its almost certain needs. Then when they overtake us it is so

\textsuperscript{106}This of course is a common human motive. Sandgren relates that because the Gikuyu of Kamunyaka had built and maintained their church and school with their own resources, they wanted to control them and resisted efforts to bring this outstation under the control of Githumu (Sandgren, p. 171). Oddly enough Sandgren never mentions the outstations that had been built with the personal funds of the Githumu missionaries.

\textsuperscript{107}Hurlburt, "Another Year," p. 6; and Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

\textsuperscript{108}Hurlburt to Downing, 12 March 1923, KBA: FC-76.

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easy for one to blame another for the unpreparedness.\textsuperscript{109}

Finally, the great concern that A.I.M. had for the purity of the church reinforced A.I.M.'s paternalism. Hurlburt expressed his concern for the purity of the African Church in a letter to Dr. John Arthur, the Superintendent of the Church of Scotland Mission, explaining why A.I.M. was pulling out of the church union movement:

Purity is more important than union, just as loyalty to Christ and the great foundations of our faith are vastly more important than union. ... a unity that leads to an indifferent spiritual life and indifferent faith would be the most bitter calamity that could befall the native church."\textsuperscript{110}

Concern for the moral purity of the Church "compelled" Lee Downing to dismiss the Kinyona Elders for refusing to accept the Mission's rules regarding female circumcision.\textsuperscript{111} Concern for the doctrinal, moral, and spiritual purity of the Church led A.I.M. to set strict rules for church members and to support the continuation of comity.\textsuperscript{112} It was concern lest "the cause of Christ suffer" that caused Campbell to advise the Mission "go very slow in the ordination of native workers" and require "years of faithful service" before an African candidate for ordination be considered.\textsuperscript{113} The perception that "one of the greatest difficulties in Mission work among native Africans is the constant tendency to drift back again into the old heathen state"\textsuperscript{114} seemed to justify the continuation of missionary control.

Despite all of this, however, A.I.M. did give birth, albeit belatedly, to an

\textsuperscript{109}Johnston to Campbell, 26 July 1926, BGC, 22, 9.

\textsuperscript{110}Hurlburt to Arthur, 26 December 1922, KBA, 4, Hurlburt 3.

\textsuperscript{111}Reynolds to Campbell, 18 June 1927, quoted in Gration, pp. 239-240.

\textsuperscript{112}See above Chapter 8, pp. 385-389.

\textsuperscript{113}Campbell to Dalziel, 1 October 1929, BGC, 19, 24.

\textsuperscript{114}Stauffacher to "Friends of the Africa Inland Mission," n.d. [1923], BGC, 12, 45.

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indigenous church.

CONCLUSION

Indigenous church principles were not part of A.I.M.'s original missionary strategy. This was probably because of A.I.M.'s single-minded emphasis on evangelism and the lack of a strong ecclesiastical background on the part of the A.I.M. missionaries. The mission did, however, adopt the goal of establishing an indigenous, African church in 1909.

Adopting indigenous church principles was easier than implementing them. Both the Mission and their converts found it natural to practice the principle of self-propagation, but when A.I.M. tried to introduce the principle of self-support, the African Christians resisted. A.I.M. was slow to implement the principle of self-government because of missionary paternalism, the nature of the colonial context, the lack of a clear ecclesiology, and the desire for a pure African church. Nevertheless, in 1947 A.I.M. did formally establish the Africa Inland Church, which today is one of the largest denominations in Kenya.
CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION

Richard Barrett described two essential elements of the perspective of the cultural anthropologist: cultural relativism and subjective understanding. Cultural relativism, Barrett, defined as "the belief that any particular set of customs, values, and moral precepts are relative to a specific cultural tradition, and that they can only be understood and evaluated within that particular milieu," and subjective understanding as the "anthropologists attempt to assimilate the outlook of their informants to such a degree that they can begin to perceive the world as it appears to them."¹ These two attitudes are necessary to avoid the anthropologist's ethnocentrism that would destroy any attempt at anthropological study.

History is also a cross-cultural study that requires its own application of cultural relativity and subjective understanding if the historian is to transcend the limitations of his own background. For example, A.I.M.'s role in the Kikuyu Church Union Movement has often been judged harshly because the European historians, approaching the issue from a state church perspective,² have not understood American Christianity. Thus the Anglican rejection of the 1913 Kikuyu "Federation" is seen as unfortunate but treated with sympathy and understanding. A.I.M. on the


other hand is criticized for trying to force its views upon the other members of the Church Union Movement. Not understanding American Christianity or adopting a position of "cultural relativity" these authors failed to see that A.I.M. was trying to build the union and maintain what it considered to be essential to the nature of the Church. Nor did they seem to realize that A.I.M.'s view of the Church was as legitimate for A.I.M. as the Anglican view was for the C.M.S. Nor did they understand the great risk that A.I.M. assumed for the sake of the Church Union Movement. In this study we have tried to understand A.I.M. in terms of its own historical/cultural context.

Barrett continued in his description of anthropological methodology to note that some anthropologists pushed their "subjective understanding" to the point that they even assumed the prejudices of the people they studied. Thus he reported that an anthropologist studying the Congo Pygmies presented "a decidedly unflattering portrait of their village-dwelling neighbors with whom the Pygmies maintain mildly uncordial relations."

Historians are subject to the same temptation. Often students of African history have so completely identified with the sufferings of the African people and their struggles against colonial oppression that they are tempted to interpret all African history in terms of the opppressor and the oppressed. This is an historical theme that has led to great strides in our understanding of Africa and the African people, but it may not be an appropriate motif for all aspects of African history. David Sandgren used the motif of oppressed and oppressor in his study of A.I.M. and the Gikuyu. In so doing Sandgren contributed significantly to our understanding of dynamics involved when African teachers left the mission station and established themselves in the community and of the growth of nationalist sentiment in the rural

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3R. Barrett, p. 10.

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areas prior to the Harry Thuku movement. He also presents a good picture of the A.I.M. Gikuyu dissidents. In the process he paints such a highly negative portrait of A.I.M. as a failure as a mission that he totally begs a whole series of questions: why the Africa Inland Church exists today, why is it so large, why does A.I.M. continue to enjoy such good relations with it, why did A.I.M. not have similar difficulties in the other areas where it worked? Furthermore one must also ask to what degree did A.I.M.'s conflicts with the Gikuyu occur because of A.I.M. oppression and how much was due to cultural misunderstanding on the part of both the missionaries and the Gikuyu? An approach to African history that respects the integrity of the various players and examines the cultural interaction between them may provide a fruitful approach for new study. We have attempted to use this approach in this study.

Men and organizations adopt principles and make plans, but somehow reality gets in the way. A.I.M. saw itself as a mission based on some of the newest ideas in missionary thinking. A.I.M. intended to have a major impact on Africa. Instead, Africa had a big impact on A.I.M. A.I.M. intended to be a mission of uneducated laymen, but no sooner had the first missionaries arrived in Africa, then they were crying for more highly skilled missionaries. It was going to be a Faith Mission, but found it hard to turn piety into policy, found it impossible to teach to their African converts, and found it difficult to know if it always applied in the African context (i.e. grants-in-aid). A.I.M. meant to be a field-governed mission, but Africa separated missionaries from their homeland supporters and from each other raising unexpected questions about who should be in control. Above all things, A.I.M. was an evangelistic mission, planning to do only evangelism, but the African context demanded that the Mission engage in many other activities. And A.I.M. was founded as an ecumenical mission and found ecumenism easy to practice at first, but imported theological differences and the Africans willingness to play one mission off against the other or leave the missions entirely made ecumenism harder to practice as time went
on. A.I.M. came to Africa with no clear conception of indigenous church principles, but Africa forced A.I.M. to adopt them and then chose which principles it would practice. Amid tears and travail, all of A.I.M.'s principles changed, but the central purpose of A.I.M. was achieved. A.I.M. came to bring Christianity to Africa and whether because of A.I.M. or in spite of A.I.M., whether in fellowship with A.I.M. or in their own independent churches, Christianity has been firmly planted in the hearts and lives of the people in the areas where A.I.M. has worked.
ARTICLE III

The members of this Mission declare their belief

First, Concerning the Triune Godhead, that "I am the Son of God," (John 10:36). "I and my Father are one" (John 10:30). "God has sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts," (Gal. 4:6). "Saith God...I will pour out in those days of my Spirit" (Acts 2:17-18).

Second, Concerning the Verbal Inspiration of the Old and New Testaments in the Original Manuscripts, that "God spake all these words" (Ex. 20:1). "All scripture is given by inspiration of God" (2 Tim. 3:16). "The Spirit of the Lord spake by me and His word was in my tongue" (2 Sam. 23:2). "The prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost" (2 Pet. 1:21). "The things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord (1 Cor. 14:37). "The things which are now reported unto you by them that have preached the gospel unto you with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven" (1 Pet. 1:12).

Third, Concerning the Substitutional Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ, that "He was wounded for our transgressions; He was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon Him; and with His stripes we are healed" (Isa. 53:5). "Who His own self bare our sins in His own body on the tree" (1 Pet. 2:24). "Christ died for the ungodly" (Rom. 5:6). "By whom we have now received the atonement" (Rom. 5:11).

Fourth, Concerning Salvation by grace through faith, that "By grace are ye saved through faith....not of yourselves....not of works" (Eph. 2:8-9; Titus 3:5-7)

Fifth, Concerning

1. The eternal conscious blessedness of the Saved, that "The righteous (shall go) into life eternal" (Matt. 25:46). "The beggar died and was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom" (Luke 16:22). "So shall we ever be with the Lord" (1 Thess. 4:17).

2. The eternal conscious woe of the Lost, that "These shall go away into everlasting punishment" (Matt. 25:46). "Where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched" (Mark 9:44). "The rich man also died and was buried, and in hell he

1With minor word changes this doctrinal statement remained the same in the 1909 and 1912 constitutions (A.I.M. Constitution, n.d. [1909], Article III, KBA: General Council; and A.I.M. Constitution, 1912, Article III, Section 1, BGC,11,11, KBA,17,6).

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lifted up his eyes being in torment" (Luke 16:22-23). "The devil that deceived them was cast in a lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever" (Rev. 20:10).

Sixth, Concerning the Evangelization of the World as the supreme mission of the people of God in this Age, that "He said unto them, Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature" (Mark 16:15). "Jesus came and spake unto them saying Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt. 28:18-19). "God hath given unto us the ministry of reconciliation" (2 Cor. 5:18). "We are witnesses of these things" (Acts 5:2).

Seventh, Concerning the Personal and Pre-millennial return of our Lord Jesus Christ, that "This same Jesus which is taken up into heaven shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven" (Acts 1:11). "The Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel and with the trump of God, and the dead in Christ shall rise first" (1 Thess. 4:16). "But the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished" (Rev. 20:5).


ARTICLE III.

Doctrinal Basis

The members of this Mission declare their belief concerning-

First: The Trinity of God, i.e., Father, Son and Holy Spirit, co-equal and eternally existing in three Persons (a); that the Trinity of God is His tri-personal existence as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This doctrine involves these elements, viz., the unity of God (b) and the distinction of persons in the Godhead. The word "person" means that the distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are of a personal nature. The Scriptures reveal the Deity of each member of the Godhead; their mutual knowledge (c) and love (d); their distinctive, yet relative offices (e).

Second: The Personality of God, that we affirm this because operations of intellect, sensibility and will are ascribed to Him - Intellect (f); Sensibility (g); Volition (h).

Third: The Personality and Deity of Jesus Christ, that He was begotten of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, and was truly God and the God-Man - Prophecy (i); His own claim (j); Divine attributes (k); Divine titles (l). Fourth, Personality of the Holy Spirit, that the Scriptures teach that the Holy Spirit is a Person, because personal pronouns are used in relation to Him (m); personal qualities are ascribed to Him: knowledge, love, and will (n); personal acts are attributed to Him: speaks, intercedes, testifies, teaches, guides, commands, communtes, and works miracles (o); personal treatment accorded to Him: grieved, done despite to, and lied to (p).

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Fifth: The Supernatural and Plenary Inspiration of Scriptures, that it is inerrant in the original writing and of supreme, absolute and final authority in all matters of doctrine and deed (q).

Sixth: The Sinfulness of Man, that all human beings are born with a sinful nature and those that reach moral accountability become sinners in thought, word and deed (r).

Seventh: The Atonement, that the Lord Jesus Christ was the sinner’s substitute before God (s).

Eighth: The Necessity of the New Birth, that a man must be born again in order to enter the kingdom of God, and will show his regenerate life by His Christian walk (t).

Ninth: Salvation by Grace, that it is by grace through faith, not of works (u).

Tenth: The Assurance of the Believer, that the New Birth introduces him into eternal life and the assurance of God’s perfect work (v).

Eleventh: The Maintenance of Good Works, that faith unto life must be revealed by good works (w).

Twelfth: The True Church, that it is composed of all regenerate persons united to Christ and together by the baptism of the Holy Spirit (x).

Thirteenth: Evangelization of the World, that the supreme mission of the people of God in this age is to preach the Gospel to every creature (y).

Fourteenth: The Personal Second Coming of Christ, that the Lord Jesus Christ will return personally and visibly (z).

Fifteenth: The Literal Resurrection of the Body, that we shall rise again to be forever with the Lord (aa).

Sixteenth: The Everlasting Blessedness of the saved and the Everlasting Punishment of the lost (bb).

[The numbers in parenthesis referred to scripture references in the Appendix of the constitution that were supposed to prove each doctrinal point.]
APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING
A.I.M.'S ATTITUDE TOWARD CHURCH UNION

Reverends L. H. Downing and G. W. Rhoad,

In asking you to represent the A.I.M. at the Conference of Heads of Missions in November to decide what may be done in the cooperation of Missions in B.E.A. permit me to lay before you a few things which seem to me important for your consideration.

1st. The importance of our pushing forward the work begun or developed at Kikuyu, because of,

a. Its value in preserving a united front to Government. This has been demonstrated over and over and would in itself be sufficient reason for favoring cooperation at considerable sacrifice.

b. The help given to all our work by comparison of methods, in united conferences and in the meeting of committees appointed to carry out plans of cooperation. Only the most statesmanlike and far-seeing of our missionaries realize how great this is. I need only call your attention to the help we have received in language work, educational work both for raw natives and for native teachers and evangelists, and translation work to emphasize the importance of cooperative work along these lines.

c. The gain spiritually through the meeting of our missionaries with the keenest soul-winners of the other Societies. Usually it is the most deeply spiritual and fruitful workers who attend and participate in such gatherings, and they bring their best thoughts and ideas to their fellows. If it were only with the hope of such bible and prayer conferences, the proposed alliance would be well worth while.

d. Kikuyu struck a note of practical fellowship and helpfulness that we dare not recede from [it]. Go forward we must or bear the responsibility of joining the adversary who has sought with satanic cunning to defeat the movement.

That there are exceedingly grave dangers to guard against no one can realize more clearly than I do but the importance of going forward makes sure to us Divine Grace to overcome all obstacles and avoid all dangers.

2nd. Let me urge you in the Conference to put yourselves in the place of the Bishops, who at great personal sacrifice have taken so responsible a part in the movement. Remember that in accomplishing this alliance the traditions of many centuries must be overcome, and that not by seceeters [sic] who might count on the enthusiasm of radicals or of those who love new movements, but by loyal conservatives who hope from within the ranks to win the ultraconservative brethren to a wider view and a more generous relation to fellow Christians in other denominations. I am convinced that neither Bishop Peel nor Bishop Willis understands

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3Hurlburt to Downing and Rhoad, n.d. [@1915], KBA: FC 76.

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the Arch Bishop's pronouncement to mean either a denial of the right of all nonconformist ministers to administer the communion or to directly forbid their members from communing with us as some appear to believe. If therefore their members residing in our districts desire to commune with us we do no discourtesy to the Arch Bishop or the Anglican Church by heartily welcoming them. Bishop Willis will send you a copy of his letter to me which sets forth their position. I do not think we should ask or expect more than this till the Lambeth Conference which as you know speaks for the Anglican Church, is able to outline a more generous policy in its relation to the nonconformist churches. Let us be thankful to God for raising up such men as Bishops Peel, Willis, Moule, and many others, who are leading the Anglican Church out of the conservatism of the past and help all we can, remembering that it is as hard for them to understand and approve our radical liberalism as it is for us to sympathize with the Anglican Church's extreme conservatism. Very great advance has been made in the recognition of other clergymen --- in more liberal views of intercommunion, and chiefly in the fact that the most evangelical and spiritual men of the Church earnestly desire and seek for the widest fellowship consistent with truth and good order. Let us who have less to overcome be as generous and patient as they are.

3rd. Let us in spite of all difficulties keep before us a big generous hope for a native church not divided by endless shibboleths but united to make our Lord Jesus Christ King of Kings and Lord of Lords.

4th. Let us safe guard ourselves from any God-dishonoring relation by making it always understood that should the proposed alliance at any time come under the controlling influence of those who deny either the Deity of our Lord Jesus Christ or any other fundamental doctrine, the A.I.M. is by that fact and without further action cut off from any relation to or affiliation with it.

Carefully considering these things you are authorized to act for me and for the Mission at the November Meeting of Heads and representation of Missions, and pray that if possible I may be permitted to meet with you at the United Conference in February.

Faithfully,
Charles Hurlburt

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