Lex Dei Regula Vivendi et Vivificandi:
CALVIN'S CHRISTOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW
IN THE LIGHT OF HIS CONCEPT OF CHRISTUS MEDIATOR LEGIS

BY
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NOVEMBER 2003
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been presented to any other academic institution than the University of Edinburgh, to which it is submitted for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself, and is a result of my own research.

BYUNG-HO MOON
NOVEMBER 2003
ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to give an account of the truth, scope, and validity of Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law from the perspective of his concept of *Christus mediator legis*, which is illustrated most lucidly in his commentary and sermon on Galatians 3:19. The thesis is based on this argument: while Lutherans, sustaining their confessional principle *lex semper accusat*, tend to separate the theological use of the law from its normative use, and while covenant theologians, although paying primary attention to the normative character of the law, regard its peculiar role as merely a preliminary element to establish the mutuality and conditionality of the covenant, Calvin understands the nature of the law as the rule of living (*regula vivendi*) and, from this point of view, deals with the whole office of the law, whether theological or normative, as the rule of life-giving (*regula vivificandi*).

In dealing with the formation and development of Calvin’s theology of the law, before turning to specific agendas the thesis refers initially to the young Calvin’s humanistic and legal studies and the influence of the *via moderna* and the *devotio moderna* upon him, and then to his Christological understanding of the law explored in his early catechetical works and the successive editions of the *Institutes*. These studies lay the groundwork for my subsequent inquiry into the theological foundation of the necessity and extent of Christ’s mediatorship. It is true that the necessity of the Mediator is primarily discussed negatively in relation to the miserable state of depraved humanity. However, more emphatically, this necessity, for Calvin, is associated with God’s grace in accommodating himself to human capacity, even human barbarity in the Old Testament, and the so-called *extra Calvinisticum*, by which he argues for the eternal and continual mediation of Christ according to both his divine and human natures.
From the study of Calvin’s position on the law revealed in his controversies with Servetus and his tract *Ad quaestiones et objecta Iudaei cuiusdam responsio*, the thesis verifies the wide extent of Christ’s mediation, ranging from even before the fall, and the fact that Calvin’s literal and historical interpretation of the Old Testament does not witness to any feature of *Calvinus Iudaizans*, but rather to the unique way of his biblical interpretation, which is founded on the concept of Christ’s mediation of the law. Then the thesis examines how Calvin interprets Christ and the law in his exegesis of the Four Gospels in view of the fact that Christ who is the substance of the law becomes its interpreter and fulfilment. Calvin’s emphasis here is largely on Christ’s appealing to the original nature of the law, which is consistent and eternal throughout history. Finally, before the conclusion that there is a coherence between Christology and soteriology in Calvin’s theology of the law is reached, the thesis examines Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law in his exegetical works on Pauline theology, where he distinctively investigates the use and office of the law in the whole process of salvation. It is here sought to verify that as Calvin develops the theological use of the law from its normative use, he claims the continuity between the covenants of works and grace and the unity between *lex vivendi* and *lex vivificandi* in the light of *Christus mediator legis*.

Throughout these studies, the thesis comes to the conclusion that Calvin’s dynamic understanding of the law originates in his dynamic understanding of Christ’s mediation of the law as Reconciler, Intercessor, and Teacher; just as from the beginning Christ has been the Mediator of the law, so in its nature, the law is the rule of living and life-giving. This demonstrates why Calvin in his *Institutes* calls the third normative use the principal (*praecipuus*) one and closer to the proper purpose of the law (*in proprium legis finem propius*).
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# ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used in this bibliography are explained below.

[ ]: Original Publication

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<td>Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte</td>
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<td>CC</td>
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<td>RD</td>
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<td>Restitutio</td>
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<td>SCJ</td>
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<td>WA</td>
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<td>Wilbur</td>
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<td>Westminster Theological Journal</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: CALVIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE LAW

1.1 Exploring Calvin’s Christological Understanding of the Law

Due to its forensic yet distinctively normative feature, Calvin’s concept of the law was regarded by the post-Reformation Reformed theologians as the theological foundation on which they were able to establish their doctrine of the covenant (foedus, pactum, testamentum), especially with reference to God’s grace and human responsibility.\(^1\) For this reason, in dealing with the continuity of theology between

Calvin and covenant theologians, scholars have mainly focused on how the covenants (foedera) of works and grace were accepted as compatible with the doctrine of the eternal decree of God, how the law preserves its validity in light of Christ’s atonement despite the apparent contradiction that was explained, and how the value of the good works of the law (bona opera legis) was understood in the whole process of justification and sanctification.\(^2\)

Recent debates on the viability of “two Reformed traditions” in the Reformation, which were evoked by the controversy over the continuity (or discontinuity) between Calvin and Bullinger in their understanding of the covenant, demonstrate that the crucial points of dispute are how the law works continuously with the covenant of grace and how the principle of sola gratia invalidates the concept of the covenant of works.\(^3\) Scholars who oppose the notion of the two traditions are mostly in favour not only of the continuity between Calvin and Bullinger but also of their continuity with later federal theologians. So they point out the unilateral feature of the covenant, which dominates in Calvin, who regards the foedus legale in the Old Testament as “a synonym for the old administration of the

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\(^2\) Cf. Peter A. Lillback, *The Binding of God: Calvin’s Role in the Development of Covenant Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 126-141, 194-209, 264-304; James B. Torrance, “The Concept of Federal Theology—Was Calvin a Federal Theologian?” in *Calvini Sacrae Scripturae Professor: Calvin as Confessor of Holy Scripture*, ed. Wilhelm H. Neuser (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 15-40; Anthony A. Hoekema, “The Covenant of Grace in Calvin’s Teaching,” *CTJ* 2/2 (1967), 133-161; *RD* 281-300, 371-409. According to Heppe, the Reformed Orthodoxy theologians accept Christ as “the Mediator of the covenant of grace (mediator foederis gratiae)” and deal with the communicatio grattiarum, idiomatum, and operationum in the person and work of Christ in light of the continuity of the covenant of grace (*RD* 410-487, *DERK* 293-351). On the other hand, although Cocceius proclaims both the covenants of works and grace (foedus operum, foedus gratiae), he does not seem to maintain the covenant of redemption specifically. He implies the natural origin of the covenant when he says, “Man who comes upon the stage of the world with the image of God, exists under a law and a covenant, and that a covenant of works (Homo, qui in mundi procerentium prodit cun imagine Dei, sub lege et foedere et quidem foedere operum existit)” (*RD* 281, *DERK* 207), and “So far as the covenant of works rests upon the law of nature, it may be called the covenant of nature (Foedus operum, quatenus lege naturae mittitur, foedus naturae appellari potest)” (*RD* 284, *DERK* 208). For the life and theology of Cocceius, Charles S. McCoy and J. Wayne Baker, “The Zenith of Federal Theology: Johannes Cocceius,” in *Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenant Tradition with a Translation of De testamento seu foedere Dei unico et aeterno (1534)* by Heinrich Bullinger (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991), 63-79.

On the other hand, scholars who insist on “the other Reformed tradition” of Bullinger emphasize the conditionality of the covenant of works, and differentiate it from the covenant of grace. Meanwhile, a similar issue has been in debate since Paul Helm argued in his book *Calvin and the Calvinists* against R. T. Kendall, who claims that “the central figures of Puritanism such as William Perkins and William Ames derived their theology not from Calvin but from Theodore Beza.” Helm criticized Kendall for differentiating Puritan theologians who sustain their view on the ground of “the law before the gospel” from Calvin, who insists on “the gospel before the law.”

It is true that covenant theologians made an important contribution to defining and elaborating on such critical issues as the law before the fall, the validity of the law for believers, and the continuity and discontinuity between the Old and New Testaments. One thing to be noted here is that when covenant theologians in Reformed Orthodoxy conceived of placing the gospel prior to the law and sought the origin of this idea in the theology of Calvin, they did not intend to argue for the precedence of the gospel in the process of salvation, as Zwingli did, who spoke of “faith as the foundation on which the law is built,” but rather to point out the principle of *sola gratia*, which is engraved in God’s decree (*decretum*), by applying it to the covenant of works as well as to the covenant of grace. Therefore, their

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8 By referring to their concept of the absolute and ordained will of God, the late medieval nominalists, who followed the Franciscan theological tradition, tried to explain the compatibility between the covenantal (or conditional) acceptance of God and the principle of *sola gratia*. Cf. Heiko
concern cannot be identified with that revealed through Lutheran controversies over the law and the gospel, i.e., over the role of the law in the process of *poenitentia* (1537-1540), over the realm of the *adiaphora* (1548-1552), and over the normative use of the law called the third use of the law (1556-1557). While for covenant theologians the whole divine *oeconomia* mattered as to the place of the law in its relation to the gospel, Lutheran theologians concentrated on the use of the law in salvation history (*Heilsgeschichte*) and, more specifically, in the process of personal salvation. The revival of the study of Calvin’s concept of the law among German scholars which took place in the first half of the twentieth century reflects the influence of the Lutheran controversies over the relationship between the law and the gospel, whereas it does not seem as apparent in the continental covenant theology.

The debates of German scholars for or against Barth’s position on natural law and moral law denote the two most distinctive trends in this period. Sharing their legal tradition established on the basis of Luther’s two-kingdom theory, they have explored Calvin’s understanding of natural law and moral law in the light of their relation to civil (positive) law since the publication of the works of Paul Lobstein and Ernst Troeltsch, in which the ethical and social aspects of Calvin’s law are identified as *die Lebensregel*. Josef Bohatec pinpointed for the first time the theological

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10 For the formation and influence of Luther’s law-gospel doctrine, see Thomas A. McDonough, *The Law and the Gospel in Luther: A Study of Martin Luther’s Confessional Writings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 26-38.


foundation of natural law in Calvin. Bohatec examined the influence of natural law upon and its relation to Calvin’s concept of the law, in his Calvin und das Recht, published in 1934, a year famous for the eruption of the natural law debate between Barth and Brunner.  

Brunner established his doctrine of natural law on the ground of the “analogia entis” that “God is original, man a derived subject.” With this understanding of the imago Dei, Brunner argues, “Calvin is not afraid to relate this lumen naturale [an immortal soul, a conscience] directly to the Spirit of God.” From this perspective Brunner states definitively, “Calvin is concerned to point out that the lex scripta has no other function but to make the lex naturae effective again. For the lex naturae is the will of God.” Brunner takes account of the continuity of natural law and the divine law in Calvin by identifying both of them with the will of God.

By citing a famous phrase of Calvin, Barth criticizes Brunner’s stance on natural law as it “can only be discussed hypothetically: si integer stetisset Adam,” and points out that there is no formal imago Dei but “Christ,” so we can taste “a duplex cognitio Domini, from creation and in Christ.” In his article “Nein!” Barth’s critique of Brunner’s position on natural law (or natural theology in relation to his analogia entis) concentrates mostly on Brunner’s infidelity to Calvin’s sola scriptura and sola gratia. These principles were maintained in his ground-breaking article published two years later under the title of “Evangelium und Gesetz.”


Calvin und das Recht (Feudigen in Westphalen: H. Boehlaus, 1934), esp. 32-39, 87-93, 97-129. In this book, Bohatec emphasizes the influence of Luther and Christian humanism on Calvin’s position on natural law, church and state, etc.


Ibid., 42.

Ibid., 39.

Ibid., 106, cf. 109. Quot. Inst. 1.2.1. For Barth’s criticism of the formal imago Dei, see ibid., 89-90.

Ibid., 105, cf. 80-85.

Ibid., 79-80, 106-107.
emphasis was specifically on *sola gratia in Christo*, i.e., on the fact that *Christum in se esse gratiam*, as he says, “The Law is nothing else than the necessary form of the Gospel,” and “Jesus Christ, he himself and he alone the grace.” Barth’s Christological view of the law is basically epistemological. Like Brunner, he admits that “The Law is the manifest will of God.” But he lays his emphasis on the question, “Where is the will of God manifest?”20 While Brunner develops the ontological conception of the law by investigating natural law in the light of *analogia entis* in the *imago Dei*, Barth is initially concerned about the epistemology of the law based on the *analogia fidei* in the person and office of Christ. From this point of view, Barth asserts that Christ himself is the grace of God “in both form and content.”21 The law therefore is not other than the revelation of the event of Christ. “This event is, however, the occurrence of the will of God at Bethlehem, at Capernaum and Tiberias, in Gethsemane, on Golgotha and in the garden of Joseph of Arimathea. Because this occurrence of the will of God, therefore the occurrence of his grace, becomes manifest to us, the Law becomes manifest to us. From what God does for us, we infer what he wants with us and from us.”22 In conclusion, Barth’s epistemological understanding of the law is established on the ground that the content of the law is grace, i.e., the incarnate God, Jesus Christ.23

Barth’s new perspective stimulated many scholars to examine Calvin’s law from the perspective of Calvin’s Christology and to regard the law as the law of the

20 Ibid., 77. Cf. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, vol. 2, *Doctrine of God*, tr. G. W. Bromiley, et al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 511-512: “The Gospel itself has the form and fashion of the Law. The one Word of God is both Gospel and Law. It is not Law by itself and independent of the Gospel. But it is also not Gospel without Law. It is first Gospel and then Law. It is the Gospel which contains and encloses the Law as the ark of the covenant the tables of Sinai. But it is both Gospel and Law. The one Word of God which is the revelation and work of His grace is also Law. That is, it is a prior decision concerning man’s self-determination. It is the claiming of his freedom. It regulates and judges the use that is made of this freedom. As the one Word of God, which is the revelation and work of His grace, disposes of man, it is also the impulse directing him to a future that is in keeping with this ‘disposing’.”

21 Brunner and Barth, *Natural Theology*, 77.

22 Ibid., 77-78.

23 Cf. ibid., 75: “Consequently, God’s grace, his grace for our humanity, the goodness, mercy, and condescension in which he is our God and as such accepts us, is Jesus Christ, he himself and he uniquely. Grace, and that means the content of the Gospel, consists therefore simply in the fact that Jesus Christ with his humanity, which he assumed in his birth, preserved as obedience in his death, glorified in his resurrection—he himself and he uniquely intercedes for us with our humanity.”
covenant (Bundesgesetz) that is grounded in the incarnation of Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{24}

Starting from this perspective, Wilhelm Niesel claims: “Only it ought to have been appreciated that Calvin understands the law from the point of view of its fulfilment in Jesus Christ.”\textsuperscript{25} In the same vein, H. H. Wolf says that Calvin’s special “esteem” of and “emphasis” on the law “was its relation to its anima (Christ) and its being included in the covenant of grace.”\textsuperscript{26}

Meanwhile, Barth’s view was criticized by a Lutheran theologian, Werner Elert, who sustained a firm conviction of the “substantive dialectical opposition (realdialektischer Gegensatz)” between law and Gospel.\textsuperscript{27} Elert’s criticism is that, like Barth, Calvin ignored the fact that lex semper accusat by defining the law as a “reigle [règle] de bien vivre et iustement (a rule of right and just living)”; therefore, according to Calvin even God’s judgment becomes God’s grace.\textsuperscript{28} It seems that Elert follows the misleading understanding of early Lutherans who separated lex accusans and lex vivendi and would not admit their compatible roles in the whole process of salvation. By revealing the grace-side of the law, Elert, in spite of his critical motivation, consequently played a part in introducing a different image of Calvin to those already accustomed to his dour portrait, which was typically drawn by Reinhold Seeberg who deprecated Calvin’s emphasis on the normative use of the law


\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 47. On the other hand, another Lutheran theologian, Paul Althaus, contrives the concept of “the divine command.” He defines it as the original law commanded by God before the publication of the law as he explains the eternity of the will of God. The Divine Command: A New Perspective on Law and Gospel, tr. Franklin Sherman (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 6-7, 26-32, 43-47. We should clearly distinguish Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law from that of Barth. Barth concentrates on the law in Christ. He fails to explain properly Christ in the law by adhering to the assumption that the law is the form of the gospel. In this respect, Barth’s view can be called Christocentric. On the other hand, Calvin pays equal attention to both Christ in the law and the law in Christ. So he deals with the law in its relation to Christ both before and after the incarnation. In this respect, Calvin’s view can be considered truly Christological.
calling it an expression of “fanaticism of submission” saying, “This God of Calvin is the omnipotent Will, ruling throughout the world; the God of Luther is the omnipotent energy of love manifest in Christ.”

From the three perspectives founded on the view of natural law we have observed, which are covenant-theological, salvation-historical, and ethical, scholars have dealt with Calvin’s concept of the law in certain respects, or sometimes synthetically. However, the first comprehensive examination of the law in Calvin’s theology was set forth by I. John Hesselink in his Calvin’s Concept of the Law.

Emil Doumergue’s treatment of the law in his epoch-making work is well balanced and paramount in its scope but its focus is centred upon Calvin’s Institutes. Hesselink derives the dynamic character of Calvin’s concept of the law from his definitive statement that “the law is not only an expression of the will of God, it is the will of God.” The first part of the definition has been held with reference to the normative nature of the law by Reformers and covenant theologians in the post-Reformation era, but the latter part is so strongly will-oriented that it resounds with God’s arbitrariness in potentia inordinata, which had been argued by the medieval voluntarists who explored the concept of voluntas absoluta Dei. From this perspective, natural law is also defined as “merely one way of expressing God’s

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31 Emil Doumergue, Jean Calvin: Les hommes et les choses de son temps, vol. 6 (Lausanne: G. Bridel, 1926), 181-204.
32 Hesselink, Calvin’s Concept of the Law, 35. In conclusion of this book, Hesselink claims that the dynamic character of Calvin’s concept of the law is derived from his linking of the law to the will of God practically and ethically. Based on this assumption, he describes the dynamic characteristics of Calvin’s theology of the law in three ways, i.e., Christ is the examplar and image of the law, the guidance and leading of the Holy Spirit in understanding and living out the law, and the goal of the law: the restoration of the image of God (278).
34 For instance, when Zwingli defines the law as “the eternal will of God,” more specifically, as “nothing else than teachings as to the will of God, through which we understand what He wills, what He wills not, what He demands, what He forbids,” he seeks to identify the law with the expression of potentia ordinata. He confirms this by stating immediately thereafter: “But that the will of God is permanent, so that He is never going to change any part of that law which has to do with the inner man, is evident from the words of the Lawgiver Himself.” Huldrych Zwingli, Commentary on True and False Religion, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson and Clarence Nevin Heller (Durham, N.C.: Labyrinth Press, 1981), 137-138.
orderly will for both his creatures and his creation."35 The influence of the voluntarist tradition (Scotism) on Calvin is highlighted when Hesselink says, "Calvin’s concern about the unity of law and gospel is thus ultimately a concern about the unity of God’s holy will and saving purpose. God is one; therefore his revelation is fundamentally one."36

The definition of the law as the expression of God’s will helps us to understand in epistemological terms the continuity of God’s will, revealed in natural and divine laws, and God’s accommodation to human capacity. It also helps to explain the covenant of works from the perspective of sola gratia. However, what this definition reveals is more related to the distinctive feature of God’s decree that was pinpointed by Reformed theologians in dealing with the sovereign grace of God, than to the law itself and its substantial (substantialis) relation to the gospel. When Hesselink designates the law of Moses as the law of the covenant (of grace) and regards the whole law as pointing to Christ on the ground that the law is the will of God, this is not so much a statement on the law itself as on the way in which God’s decree is revealed and accomplished in history.37 It is against this theological background that Hesselink argues for a law-gospel-law paradigm in Calvin’s theology.38 Overall, based on the fact that the law is an expression of the will of God, Hesselink concentrates on the character of Christ as the best interpreter and example of the law as he explains the Christological significance of the law in Calvin’s theology.40

35 Hesselink, Calvin’s Concept of the Law, 52.
36 Ibid., 160.
37 Ibid., 87-88.
38 For the Christological significance of God’s decree, see Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), 35-38.
As in the case of Hesselink, Edward A. Dowey shows his epistemological position on Calvin's law in the light of Calvin's understanding of the knowledge of God the Creator and Redeemer. Dowey affirms that God's law for Calvin is "related closely" to "God's orderly will in creation," but "over against man's freedom God's orderly will is not actualized directly, as in the case of natural events, but through revelation and man's response—that is, God's will has normative value for man." 41

This normative value of God's will revealed in the law, denotes not only the precepts but also the promises of the Ten Commandments, however, as Dowey points out, Calvin's high evaluation of the law is directed to "the perfect idea of law which he [Calvin] sees behind them." 42 "The perfect idea of the law," which Calvin designates as "the orderly, harmonious Creator-creature relationship," 43 is revealed to us sometimes recognizably as the definite rule of life and sometimes unrecognizably as "God's mystery." Therefore, we should turn to God the Redeemer, Christ the Mediator, who is the complete revelation of the law, in order to recognize "the unknowable side of the known God." 44 Dowey's discovery of the normative feature of the law lying between God's revelation and human responsibility stands out, but by treating the relationship between the incarnation of Christ—God's accommodation par excellence—and Christ's fulfilment of the law as an epistemologically "dialectic" one, 45 he misses the crucial ontological point of Calvin's Christological understanding of the law, which is based on the fact that Christ is the substance and truth of the law. So, Dowey comes to the same conclusion as Hesselink when he says, "Calvin equates God's orderly will as revealed in creation with the moral law as given to Moses, and the Mosaic moral law with the ethical teachings of Jesus." 46

While Dowey perceives the law as the expression of the orderly will of God

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42 Ibid., 225-226.
43 Ibid., 223.
44 Ibid., 17.
45 Ibid., 14-17, 238-239.
46 Ibid., 230.
the Creator and from this perspective argues for the substantial unity between the
divine moral law and natural law, T. H. L. Parker, in dealing with Calvin’s concept of
the law, refers mainly to the fact that “the law witnesses to Christ,” who is the eternal
Word of God (aeternus Sermo Dei) hidden per se but revealed in nobis and pro
nobis.47 He does not acknowledge any “mystery” lying between the hidden and
revealed will of God, as Dowey does, but maintains the concept of “Deus
absconditus” considering the fact that “He who is revealed is He who reveals
Himself.” 48 Thus Parker replaces the epistemological dimension of God’s
accommodation with the soteriological dimension of God’s revelation when he says,
“the extra-Biblical revelation is conceived by Calvin purely in reference to salvation
in Christ.” 49 Parker criticizes Dowey for importing “Brunner’s doctrine of
responsibility and answerability” thus using Brunner as a basis on which he explains
the normative value of the law, i.e., the necessity of human response.50 For Parker,
there is no room for human reaction through the revelation of the law because there
is neither a difference nor a separation between “the revelation of God in Christ” and
“the reconciliation of God in Christ.” 51 Therefore, the normative characteristic of the
law does not originate from the law itself, but from its relation to Christ who is “the
everal Wisdom and Will of God,” and “the clear expression of His purpose (expressa
consilii eius effigies).” 52 Parker attempts to unite God the Creator and God the
Redeemer in the light of Christus pro nobis and to overcome some epistemological
problems in Calvin’s theology by concentrating on Christ’s mediatorship in the
revelation and fulfilment of the law,53 but his overemphasis on Christ the Redeemer

48 Ibid., 27-28, 85.
49 Ibid., 55.
50 Ibid., 55-56
51 Ibid., 111.
52 Ibid., 91.
53 Ibid., 99-129. This position of Parker reveals the influence of Barth who writes: “Without
the biblical revelation that defines God the Redeemer Calvin sees no real knowledge of God the
Creator, and conversely knowledge of God the Redeemer is simply a sharper and clearer seeing of the
revelation of God the Creator. Materially the two forms of knowledge are exactly the same. We
differentiate them only at once to grasp more truly their essential unity.” The Theology of John Calvin,
results in the lack of recognition of Christ in the law and the lack of the normative use of the law to reveal God’s will not only for believers but also for non-believers. Overall, Parker’s view of the law is negative, when he says, “The Commandments witness to Him [Christ] in an indirect manner by convicting of sin.”

Calvin gives no full definition of the law, even though he mentions it in two ways, directly yet epistemologically that the law is the expression of God’s will, and indirectly yet ontologically that Christ is the truth, substance, soul, and end of the law. These two definitions are not separated because Christ is not only the substance of the law but also the revelation of God’s will, i.e., without him there is no true knowledge of God’s will. Taking this into account, we can see the existence of “a double aspect of the law,” which François Wendel designates as the law which is “peculiar to the people of Israel” and the law which is “oriented towards the Christ.” Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law is both epistemological and ontological. It, based on the concept of Christ the Mediator of the law, presents both Christ in the law and the law in Christ. This view reflects previous scholars’ insights, particularly the major contributions of covenant theologians, but it mostly sheds new light on the study of Calvin’s concept of the law by considering at the same time the substance and revelation of the law, and the unity and continuity of the law.

1.2 Theologizing the Law

Although a brilliant student of law who was educated by leading scholars of his time, Calvin, unlike Melanchthon, who annotated Cicero’s De officiis with prolegomena in which he dealt with the nature of the law and presented the exposition of the Decalogue, did not write any specific work on Roman law or

54 Ibid., 95.
common law, except for his *Commentary on Seneca’s De clementia*, which contains a noticeable number of legal passages. However, Calvin showed his consistent and deep concern for the law through his doctrinal and exegetical works, and through his tracts and treatises on church polity. Particularly, the registers of the Consistory of Geneva, established by Calvin just after his return to the city in 1541 for “suitable church discipline (*discipline Ecclesiastique convenable*)” according to the legislation of *Les Ordonnances ecclésiastiques*, illustrate how Calvin applied biblical teachings of the law to various civil affairs.

Calvin’s Christological view of the law is set out in the academic discourse delivered by Nicolas Cop (1533) and Calvin’s preface to Olivétan’s French translation of the New Testament (especially the Latin and French preface written in 1534). His special concern for the normative characteristic of the law and its Christological and soteriological relevance is revealed conspicuously in his three catechetical works written around the period of his first stay in Geneva, entitled *Christiana religionis institutio* (1536), *Instruction et confession de foy dont on use en l’Eglise de Genève* (1537), and *Catechismus, sive christiana religionis institutio* (1538). In the first *Institutes* of 1536 he treated the law as a crucial *locus theologicus* whose spirit overarches the whole process of salvation noetically and soteriologically by discussing the two kinds of knowledge and the doctrine of *sola fide* under the title

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60 Quot. Nicolas Colladon, *Vie de Calvin*, CO 21.64.

61 The Consistory took into sincere consideration the regulations of common law, as we can see from the insertion of an article from *Corpus Juris Civilis, Codex Iustinianus* under the title *De repudiiis* with reference to a case regarding the repudiation of husband or wife to their spouse, saying, “*Consensu licita matrimonia posse contrahi* (Lawful marriage can be contracted by consent).” *Registers of the Consistory of Geneva in the Time of Calvin*, vol. 1. 1542-1544, ed. Robert M. Kingdon, et al., tr. Wallace McDonald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 326.
of "De lege."\textsuperscript{62}

The next stage can be designated as the period in which Calvin's 1539, 1543, and 1550 \textit{Institutes} were written. This decade witnessed Lutheran controversies over antinomianism and the theological realm of \textit{adiaphora}, and the \textit{colloquia} and \textit{disputationes} between Protestants and Catholics.\textsuperscript{63} All through these discourses and disputes, both the validity and extent of the law for believers were recognized as enigmas that must be solved in order to establish the true doctrine of salvation. As we can see from the controversy between Calvin and Sadolet, the different understandings of \textit{sola fide} resulted in various opposing views on the office of the law not only in the justification stage but also in the sanctification stage.\textsuperscript{64} Calvin was involved in these debates mostly by producing letters and theological tracts and treatises, and sometimes by participating in them, and eventually his views were reflected in his later theological works.\textsuperscript{65} A most significant example is Calvin's \textit{Acta Synodi Tridentinae cum antidoto}, which was published after the first seven sessions of the Council of Trent in 1547. This work was so brilliant that it established

\textsuperscript{62} Scholars, treating the formation of the first chapter of the 1536 \textit{Institutes}, emphasizes the influence of Zwingli's \textit{De vera et falsa religione commentarius} on Calvin's view of the \textit{cognitio Dei ac nostri} and Luther's influence on Calvin's interpretation of the Decalogue. See F. Büsser, "The Zurich Theology in Calvin's \textit{Institutes,}" in \textit{John Calvin's Institutes: His Opus Magnum}. Proceedings of the Second South Africa Congress for Calvin Research, 1984 (Pothefstrom: Institute for Reformational Studies, 1986), 135-136; Wilhelm Diehl, "Calvins Auslegung des Decaloges in der ersten Ausgabe seiner \textit{Institutio} und Luthers Catechismen," \textit{Theologische Studien und Kritiken} 70 (1898), 141-162. On the other hand, Wilhelm H. Neuser points out the close connection between \textit{triplex usus legis} and the whole process of salvation, including justification and sanctification, and asserts that in the first chapter of the 1536 \textit{Institutes} "Lutheran sequence of law and Gospel has been destroyed." "The Development of the \textit{Institutes} 1536 to 1559," in \textit{John Calvin's Institutes: His Opus Magnum}, 38.


\textsuperscript{64} In his letter to the Genevans written targeting Calvin, Sadolet asserts that there is no faith which is not accompanied by good works because "the true habit of divine righteousness (\textit{verus divinae iustitiae habitus}) must belong to those justified. Calvin, criticizing this argument, points out the fact that the justified "possesses Christ" and "Christ never is where His Spirit is not (\textit{Christus autem musquam sine suo spiritu est})." \textit{A Reformation Debate: John Calvin and Jacopo Sadoletto}, ed. John C. Olin (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976), 35-36, 68 [altered] (CO 5.374, 398).

\textsuperscript{65} As we see later in related sections, the successive editions of Calvin's \textit{Institute} include his several debates with Osiander, Pighius, Stancaro, Biandrata, Servetus, Socinus, etc. For example, like Bucer and Melanchthon, Calvin produced a French edition of Acts of the Regensburg Colloquy, \textit{Actes de Ratisbonne} (CO 5.509-684).
him as the principal advocate of the world of the Reformation.66

The three editions of the Institutes published during this period illuminate apparently heated issues on the law such as the continuity of the Old and New Testaments, the relation between the law and the gospel, and the validity of the law in relation to double righteousness (*duplex iustitia*) and double imputation (*duplex imputatio*).67 His commentaries on Romans (1540), I Corinthians (1546), II Corinthians (1547), Galatians to Colossians (1548), and Hebrews (1549) contain his chief arguments about the above subjects. Through these works, Calvin understands the concept of equity from the perspective of God’s love revealed in Christ’s reconciling work, and deals with *adiaphora* with an emphasis on the interpretation of the law according to its purpose, the only barometer of which is none other than the love of Christ. From this perspective, Calvin strikingly claims the unity of moral law and natural law. Especially, in the Institutes of 1543–1550, Calvin devoted many sections to demonstrating how the principles of the divine law should be applied to church polity and discipline and the rule of a magistrate. This reflects Calvin’s urgent concern for the ecclesiastical and political consolidation of Geneva.68

In the following stage of Calvin’s life, as we can see for example in his controversy with Osiander over justification, the role of the law in the justification

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67 For Calvin, *duplex iustitia* largely denotes *duplex imputatio*, “sola fide non tantum nos sed opera etiam nostra iustificari” (*Inst. 3.17.10, CO 2.598*). Therefore, it should be differentiated from the Catholic concept of *duplex iustificatio*, which is based on their synergistic view, and from Osiander’s concept of “a twofold righteousness (*duplicis iustitiae*)” which is based on “essential righteousness and essential indwelling of Christ in us (*essentiam iustitiam et essentiam in nobis Christi habitacionem*)” (*Inst. 3.11.10-11, CO 2.540-543*). Calvin also uses the terms *duplex iustitia* in order to express the twofold (revealed and hidden) justice of God. Cf. Susan E. Schreiner, “Exegesis and Double Justice in Calvin’s Sermons on Job,” *Church History* 58/3 (1989), 322-338.

68 Calvin wrote *Les Ordonnances ecclésiastiques* (1541) and *Le Catéchisme de l’église de Genève* (1542), and published the Psalter that had been set to verse by Marot (1543) in addition to the publication of the new edition of the Institutes (1543) for the consolidation of Geneva in the early years after he returned to Geneva. See Bernard Cottret, *Calvin: A Biography*, tr. M. Wallace McDonald (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), 163-174. William G. Naphy indicates that Calvin’s role in this period was “more that of redactor than legislator.” *Calvin and the Consolidation of the Genevan Reformation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 85.
process with reference to Christology was still a vital issue.\textsuperscript{69} In his commentaries on the Synoptic Gospels and on the Gospel of John (1553, 1555) and on the Acts of the Apostles (1552, 1554), Calvin argues for the unity of substance (\textit{substantia}) between the law and the gospel by highlighting their Christological relevance and the normative nature of the law as the revelation of the eternal righteousness of God. Calvin's unique understanding of the presence and work of Christ the Mediator is demonstrated prominently in his Old Testament exegeses, especially in his commentaries on Genesis (1554), Isaiah (1551), and in his lectures (\textit{praelectiones}) on the Minor Prophets (1559), Daniel (1561), Jeremiah and Lamentations (1563), and Ezekiel (1564). Some explications present in these works caused Calvin to be accused of being a Judaizer by some of his contemporaries, including Servetus. They centred their criticism mostly on Calvin's historical and literary interpretation stemming from his own Christological perspective. The core of the conflict between Calvin and Servetus is no doubt doctrinal in relation to the Trinity and the person of Christ, but their opposing views originate in their different interpretation of the Old Testament. They accused each other of being a Judaizer, Calvin for his historical approach and Servetus for his literal interpretation that did not take into account Jesus's mediating role in the Old Testament.\textsuperscript{70}

Calvin's commentaries on the Psalms (1557) and on the last four books of Moses (1563), as well as his sermons on the Psalms and on Deuteronomy dating


\textsuperscript{70} Castellio criticizes Calvin as Judaizer mainly as a result of his historical interpretation of the Old Testament law. He argues that Calvin did not know the fact that "The whole law has been transformed by Jesus Christ." See Daniel Augsburger, "Castellio and the Mosaic Law," in \textit{Occasional Papers of the American Society for Reformation Research}, vol. 1 (1977), 169-170.
from 1553 and 1555, demonstrate his positive stance on the normative feature of the law based on the covenant of grace, emphasizing the importance of the law to everyday life. Calvin’s mature view of the law is apparent regarding the connection between Christ and the law and the role of the law in the process of justification by faith, outlined in his sermons on Genesis (from 1559), in which he discusses the relation of faith in Christ with the righteousness of the law in the Old Testament. Presumably, for some period before he died, Calvin preached on Christ’s teaching of the law in the Sermon on the Mount.71 In his final commentary on Joshua, published just after he died (1564), once pointing out that God’s commandment to establish the cities of refugees clearly showed “how precious human blood is in the sight of God,” he observed, “the law was just, equitable, and useful, both in the public and private spheres.”72

Calvin’s increasing concern for the law throughout his life is well demonstrated in his Christological formulation of the law in the successive editions of the Institutes. In dealing with Christology in the 1559 Institutes, Calvin explains how we can obtain knowledge of Christ our Mediator, revealed and represented by the law (2.7-11), prior to sections on the person and works of Christ (2.12-17). By highlighting the unity and continuity of covenants (foedera) and testaments (testamenta) in sections where he treats the relation between the law and the gospel (2.9) and between the Old and New Testaments (2.10-11), Calvin testifies to Christ not only being the fulfilment of the law but also the substance and truth of the law. The mentality of this ordo docendi of the 1559 Institutes appears in the Harmony of the Books of Moses as well. In treating the synopsis of the last four books of Moses according to the Decalogue schema, Calvin highlights the precept and promise of the

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71 CO 46.iii.
law at the same time, and so demonstrates that the law, which is by nature the rule of living, reveals Christ as its substance, soul, and life. Here Calvin interprets the law as the law of the covenant without losing its historical meaning.\footnote{73 T. H. L. Parker argues that Calvin rearranged Moses’ four last books into a synopsis called \textit{harmonia} in order “to correct unconvincing relations of time.” \textit{Calvin’s Old Testament Commentaries} (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1986), 122. This observation is insightful, but not convincing. Presumably, when Calvin commented on the \textit{Harmony} in four categories i.e., preface to the law, the exposition of the law, the supplements, and the end and use of the law, he might have recalled the \textit{Code of Justinian}, particularly the Justinian Digest and Pandects, which as the one perfect code included words of cause, regulations and application, and punishments. Professor David F. Wright observes that the value of the \textit{Harmony} lies in his “enlarging of the boundaries of the Decalogue” by “turn[ing] it into a thoroughly Christianized code.” “The Ethical Use of the Old Testament in Luther and Calvin: A Comparison,” \textit{Scottish Journal of Theology} 36/4 (1983), 475.}

Calvin’s Christological stance on the law is revealed prominently once again when he points out the dynamic characteristic of salvation in Book 3 of the 1559 \textit{Institutes}. He deals with regeneration prior to justification claiming that justification and sanctification cannot be separated from each other and, in a strict sense, the most crucial impact of sanctification is our realization of the justified being justified. Initially, he discusses the Holy Spirit (3.1) and faith (3.2), then the regeneration (3.3-5) and the Christian life (3.6-10), and finally the doctrine of justification (3.11-18). These chapters demonstrate that Calvin regards the dynamic relationship between Christ and the law as theologically more crucial to the whole process of justification as he explored it in the first chapter of the 1536 \textit{Institutes} than the view that Christ is the example (\textit{exemplar}) and type (\textit{typum}) set for those trying to live according to God’s will revealed in the law by the special illumination of the Holy Spirit. In the same vein, Calvin, calling the doctrine of Christian freedom “\textit{appendix justificationis},” emphasizes Christian freedom \textit{in} the law rather than Christian freedom \textit{from} the law, and relocates just after justification in the final edition of the 1559 \textit{Institutes} (3.19.1, CO 2.613).

Those who regard Calvin’s third use of the law as restricted to its purely normative use in the Christian life tend to relate the first theological use to justification and the third normative use to sanctification, the former to Christ’s
mediation as the Reconciler, the latter to the special work of the Holy Spirit.  

However, it should be noted that historically the relation between law and gospel had been discussed mainly with reference to the role of the law in the whole process of salvation, as we can see most distinctively in the debate between Melanchthon and Agricola over poenitentia and in Article 5 of the Regensburg Colloquy, which witnesses that for Calvin’s contemporaries the notion of justification (iustificatio) was considered closely related to the righteousness of the law (iustitia legis) validated in justification and sanctification.

In Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law, the character of Jesus Christ as the Mediator who has been working for us is discussed more fundamentally than that as an example or type of the normative application of the law in our life. With the continuous mediation of Christ, God’s righteousness revealed in the law is continuously being imputed. Between the unity of God’s will and the continuity of God’s grace instituted by the divine covenant, there is the continuity of Christ’s mediatorship. Therefore, we cannot deal with Calvin’s law theologically enough if we do not investigate it from the Christological point of view.

74 Edward A. Dowey, “The Third Use of the Law in Calvin’s Theology,” Social Progress 49/3 (1958), 20-27; Hesselink, Calvin’s Concept of the Law, 219-221, 251-254; Mervyn S. Johnson, “Calvin’s Handling of the Third Use of the Law and Its Problems,” in Calvinitana, 33-50. Johnson relates the first use to “a theological reflection upon humanity,” and the third use of the law to “a theological reflection upon God,” and argues that the dialectic of the knowledge of God and humanity in Calvin originates from this extrapolation based on the distinction between the law and the gospel. In many cases, like here, scholars’ misunderstanding of Calvin’s triplex usus legis comes from their tendency to treat the first and third use as if they represent two different natures of the law.

75 For the historical background and theological reflections, see Wengert, Law and Gospel, esp. 25-45, 67-75, 79-102, 156-169.

76 A comparison between Calvin’s attitudes towards Article 5 of the Regensburg Colloquy and the Council of Trent (especially its sixth session) is intriguing. Calvin was positive to the concept of duplex iustitia in Article 5 even though he was strongly opposed to Catholic understanding of duplex iustificatio when he agreed with the phrase “iustitiam accipit et habet per Christum etiam inhaeretem (receoit justice, et que par Christ il l'a fai mesme residente en soy)” (CO 5.526). In the Antidote, however, Calvin criticized the Fathers of Trent because they regarded “the cause of justification (causa iustificationis)” as “twofold” “partim remissionem peccatorum, partim spirituali regeneratione” and explained justification in two ways “partim imputatione, partim qualitate” (CO 7.448). Calvin’s positive attitude towards Article 5 has been asserted by W. H. Neuser, “Calvins Urteil über den Rechtfertigungsartikel des Regensburger Buches,” in Reformation und Humanismus, ed. M. Greschat and J. F. G. Goeters (Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1969), 186-189; Anthony N. S. Lane, “Calvin and Article 5 of the Regensburg Colloquy,” unpub., presented International Calvin Congress (Princeton, 2002), forthcoming in Calvinus Praeceptor Ecclesiae, ed. Herman Selderhuis (Genève: Droz, 2004), 231-261.
1.3 The Thesis and Tasks of Our Study

As seen above, scholars have tended to explore various views of Calvin’s concept of the law from their distinct perspectives. This tendency may be revealed more clearly by those who adhere to Calvin’s so-called central dogma. Those who accept the doctrine of predestination as the central dogma may seek to explain the office and use of the law on the basis of the assurance of faith. Those who think of the union with Christ as central may take issue with the imputation of Christ’s righteousness as primary in discussing the role of the law in the context of the whole process of salvation. Meanwhile, those who regard Calvin as the doctor of the Holy Spirit may think of the dynamic characteristic of Calvin’s concept of the law as a result of the special illumination of the Holy Spirit and try to associate the normative use of the law with Christian piety.

It does not seem plausible to argue for the centrality of the law in Calvin’s theology, even though his dynamic and creative understanding of the relationship between Christ and the law has been considered the very core upon which the whole system of his theology is founded regarding the two kinds of the knowledge of God in the Institutes. Calvin’s frequent references to the normative nature of the law reflect his firm conviction that Christ is the substance (substantia), truth (veritas), soul (spiritus), and life (vita) of the law, as well as its example (exemplar) or type (typus). In dealing with the Christological meaning of the law, Calvin maintains the concept of Christ the Mediator of the law (le mediateur de la loy) by describing it in three ways: Christ as the Mediator of reconciliation (mediator reconciliationis), intercession (patrocinii), and teaching (doctrinae). In so doing, he presents us with an insight through which we can understand why he designates Christ as the

substance of the law, on what ground he asserts the normative nature of the law (lex vivendī), and from this explores the life-giving office of the law (lex vivificandī), and from what perspective he identifies the Holy Spirit that works in and through the law with the Spirit of Christ our Mediator.  

This dissertation plans to examine Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law in the light of his concept of Christus mediator legis. I will investigate whether there is any unique feature of the law found in the theology of Calvin, mostly by studying his works and sometimes by comparing them with those works of other Reformers’ deemed the most influential. My thesis is based on this argument: while Lutherans regard lex accusans as the principal use and separate it from lex vivendī in order to keep their principle lex semper accusat, and while covenant theologians, although considering much of the normative use of the law, treat the peculiar office and use of the law as merely an important element in explaining the mutuality and conditionality of the covenant, Calvin understands the nature of the law as regula vivendī and, from this point of view, deals with the theological use of the law, which had been typically depicted by Lutherans and some Reformed theologians as officium legis accusantis, positively as the office of lex vivificandī. From this argument, based on the continuity of Christ the Mediator (with reference to the person of Christ) and the continuous mediation of Christ (with reference to the works of Christ), I come to the conclusion that Calvin sustains his dynamic view of the law by claiming the unity of lex vivendī and lex vivificandī. This study eventually gives an answer to why Calvin calls the third (normative) use of the law the “principal” one (Inst. 2.7.12, CO 2.261).

80 Calvin, Sermons on Galatians, 3:19-20 (453, CO 50.543); Comm. Gal. 3:19 (62, CO 50.216-217). Concerning the relationship between the law, salvation, and Christ’s mediation, see esp. Serm. Acts 7:35-37 (SC 8.312-314, 328-330); Gen.15:6 (SC 11/2.758-764). All citations of Calvin’s sermons are marked as “Serm.” with the biblical reference followed by the page number of the English translation (if available) and the volume and page number of the French citation from Calvini Opera (CO) or Supplementa Calviniana (SC).

81 All citations of the 1559 Institutes are from the Battles translation (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960). The first reference marks the book, chapter, and section number. The second reference is from Calvini Opera, which is abbreviated by CO followed by the volume and column number.
Before treating some specific key issues of Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law, it would be helpful to study the formation and development of Calvin’s theology of the law. This subject can be carried out appropriately through a thorough study of his life and theology. In chapter 2, I will concentrate on the influence of the via moderna and the mos novus upon the young Calvin’s view of the law along with the influence of his legal study. Through the study of the via moderna, I examine how late medieval nominalists’ Scotism impacted on Calvin, especially with reference to their understandings of God’s ordained and absolute will and the merit of Christ. Studying the influence of mos novus, the new method of interpreting Roman law established by Calvin’s teachers, Pierre de l’Estoile and Andreas Alciati, gives us the clue to solving the origin of Calvin’s historical interpretation of the law. The following study of Calvin’s Institutes in chapter 3 allows us to see the development of his Christological understanding of the law and from this to realize the necessity and validity of our study.

Chapter 4 is devoted to Calvin’s concept of Christus mediator legis. Firstly, I concentrate on his commentary and sermon on Galatians 3:19. Then, I treat three types of mediation of Christ, as Reconciler, Intercessor, and Teacher, revealed throughout his works. In particular, with reference to its theological foundation, I ask if the so-called extra Calvinisticum is applicable to the realm of the law and if there is any room for extra legem in Calvin’s theology. These theological agendas lead us to another question, how we should understand Calvin’s concept of Christus mediator legis in its relation to his favourite theological-rhetorical use of God’s accommodation.

The next three chapters are based on Calvin’s interpretation of the Old Testament, the Gospels, and Pauline letters, but the subject of each chapter entails particular themes of Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law on the basis of his view of Christus mediator legis. In chapter 5, I investigate how the law is related to Christ the Mediator in his historical and literal interpretation of the Old Testament. From his controversy with Servetus, I show that although their difference is
prominent in the matter of their Christology of the Old Testament, their dispute is basically hermeneutical rather than doctrinal. Besides this, a study of Calvin’s treatise Ad quaestiones et obiecta Iudaei cuiusdam responsio sheds light on his attitude towards the Jews in the post-biblical era. On the whole, in this chapter, I will verify the extent of Christ’s mediation, ranging over the Old Testament, and the fact that Calvin’s literal and historical interpretation of the Old Testament in the light of Christus mediator legis does not witness to his Judaic tendency, but rather to his unique biblical interpretation.

In chapter 6, I examine Calvin’s treatment of Christ’s teaching of the law, and the significance of Christ’s works for the law and its relevance for his Christological understanding of the law, centred on his commentaries on the Four Gospels. I observe how Calvin identifies God’s righteousness revealed in the law with the original meaning of the law in the light of Christus mediator legis. Then, by comparing Calvin with Melanchthon and Bucer, who influenced Calvin most prominently by their commentaries on the Gospels, I demonstrate that Calvin’s unique understanding of the law is based on his firm conviction of the continuity of the law by linking the law taught by the Mediator with the law fulfilled by the Mediator.

My comparative study of Calvin and other Reformers continues in chapter 7, but here the emphasis is on the use and office of the law for the whole process of salvation. I first deal with the role of the law especially with reference to its role in poenitentia perpetua (including repentance in the stage of sanctification). The relationship between the offices of the law, i.e., lex accusans and lex vivendi, is pinpointed here. Then I deal with Calvin’s triplex usus legis from the perspective of Christus mediator legis. My argument I verify here is that Calvin develops the theological use of the law from its normative use, and furthermore sustains the continuity between lex vivendi and lex vivificandi by understanding the law in the light of Christus mediator legis and on this grounds the continuity of the covenants (foedera) of works and grace.
In chapter 8, finally, I summarize previous discussions, and give some concluding remarks on the coherence between Christology and soteriology in Calvin’s theology of the law, referring especially to his sermons.
CHAPTER II
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF CALVIN'S CONCEPT OF THE LAW

2.1 The Significance of the Young Calvin's Legal Culture

The influence of Calvin's humanistic and legal studies on his theology has been dealt with by scholars from biographical, rhetorical, and theological aspects. In his interpretation of the law, Calvin was evidently influenced by Christian humanists, Protestant theologians, and by the humanistic jurists who led the *mos novus* (new way) of legal studies. However, it is another task for us to explore how it impacted on his theology. This task is especially difficult, because he did not write any specific work before his conversion dealing with theological position on the law, nor did he write any work after his conversion on his humanistic legal thought and conceptions.

On this account, some scholars have felt a certain hiatus between the periods before and after Calvin's conversion and have had a tendency to overvalue Calvin's

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1 The adjective "intellectual" is added in order to differentiate the humanistic background of Calvin's theology of the law from the "spiritual (theological)" foundation of his dynamic understanding of the law, which is sought most significantly in the concept of *Christus mediator legis*.

2 We can hardly find any hermit-character of the late medieval mysticism in Calvin; rather he was quite a social person. He strengthened close personal relationships with his friends, colleagues, teachers, and many acquaintances throughout his life, and devoted his whole life to informing his people of what he was convinced of in the *familiar* (familier), *vivid* (vif), *joyful* (joyeux), *elegant* (mignon), and *noble* (noble) style of writing. Richard Stauffer, *The Humanness of John Calvin*, tr. George H. Shriver (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971), 47-71; Emil Doumergue, *Le caractère de Calvin: l'homme, le système, l'église, l'état* (Neuilly: La Cause, 1931), 33-55. Notwithstanding, Calvin did not speak about himself willingly (*De me non libenter loquor*), including his conversion. *Responsio ad Sadoleti Epistolam*, CO 5.389. Calvin's reticence should not be regarded as a revelation of his personal character but understood in the light of his willing devotion to glorify God by denying himself, as we can see from his sermon on Isaiah 53:7-8 (89 [altered], CO 35.637), in which he says, once contrasting our sinfulness with God's righteousness, "We glorify God by keeping silent about ourselves (nous glorifions Dieu en nous taisant)."
sudden conversion (subita conversio), which he himself confessed as such in the preface of his commentary on the Psalms, and they have pointed out the discontinuity between his early thought and later theological positions. Meanwhile, other scholars have investigated the influence of Calvin's early studies on his theology, and by this have tried to prove the continuity in his thinking. In doing this, they have depended mostly on Calvin's writings rather than on his life itself. The following observation of Alexandre Ganoczy shows on what ground their assumptions are founded.

[T]he "I" of Calvin is inseparably tied to his doctrine. This is not the same as with Luther, where the subjective element often "transfigures" the objective element of a statement. Quite the opposite. With Calvin, the objective dominates the subjective. But in dominating the subjective, the objective preserves the reality of the subjective.

Ganoczy perceives Calvin's sudden conversion not as "a sudden or miraculous element in spiritual transformation" but as "a response to a call to reform the Church." A similar approach is also found in the works of William J. Bouwsma, who explains the continuity in Calvin's life before and after his conversion in the

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5 The Young Calvin, 242.

6 Ibid., 251, 266. In the same breath, Ganoczy takes into consideration the influence of the devotio moderna on Calvin's religious life before his conversion. Ibid., 57-71.
light of his anxiety overarchingly the whole of his life, in the works of Heiko A. Oberman, who tries to relate the cause of his anxiety to the character of viator and link it with the prominent feature of the "refugee Reformation," in the works of Herman J. Selderhuis, who tries to read Calvin's mind from the notion of asylum (refugium), a frequently reoccurring feature in his commentary on the Psalms, and in the works of Olivier Millet, who attempts to portray the "I" of Calvin by referring to the rhetorical meanings of his autobiographical statements and comes to a conclusion similar to that of Oberman and Selderhuis.

Even for scholars who argue for the continuity, it has been regarded as a hard task to prove a specific link between Calvin's early thinking and his later theological views. They are very positive as to the fact that the uniqueness of Calvin's theology should be understood from the background of his early life, but they do not take into serious consideration his theological position before his conversion. This is true of

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7 John Calvin: A Sixteenth Century Portrait (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 32-48. 230-234. Bouwsma does not consider seriously Calvin's sudden conversion itself; rather, he emphasizes the continuity of Calvin's self. He writes, "Although his [Calvin's] career was filled with accomplishment, his inner life showed few signs of the progress which he associated with godliness; he was still wrestling at the end of his life with the self-doubt, confusions, and contradictory impulses that had been with him from the beginning." Ibid., 9.


10 Calvin et la dynamique de la Parole: Etude de rhétorique reformée (Genève: Editions Slatkine, 1992), 515-554. Seeking the rhetorical meaning of Calvin's sudden conversion in the preface of his commentary on the Psalms by comparing the humanity of Calvin with that of David, Millet observes: "Les motifs de la rhétorique antique, avec son sens de la dignité et de l'efficacité oratoires, rejoignent ceux de la culture chrétienne pour interdire à Calvin toute expression de soi qui ne serait pas soumise aux impératifs de la distinction des genres, à ceux de l'argumentation, ou encore à ceux de l'édification collective des âmes dans de cadre d'une typologie psychologique et spirituelle dont seul le théologien-exégète a les clefs. Sur le plan de l'ethos comme sur celui du pathos, les traits qui pourraient contribuer à dessiner le portrait de l'auteur ressortissent aux seules règles, formulées par la rhétorique, du discours public" (525).

11 Some scholars have investigated the continuity and discontinuity between the two Calvins by investigating the meaning of his conversion from his own perspective. Most noticeably, Ganoczy examines how Calvin uses the term metanoia in his works, and concludes that for him it denotes not "basically detachment (disgust, refusal, break) but attachment (a higher love, acceptance, commitment)," The Young Calvin, 243. Oberman's conclusion is similar to Ganoczy's in his article, "Subita Conversio: The Conversion of John Calvin," in Reformierter Erbe: Festschrift für Gottfried W. Locher zu seinem 80. Geburtstag, vol. 2 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1993), 279-295. Alister E. McGrath also seems to have an opinion of the twofold meaning of Calvin's conversion, when he explains Calvin's "religious reorientation" as "the transition from a 'consensual' to a 'committed' understanding of religion." A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1990), 75. For the theological meaning of the word "conversion" in Calvin's
his theology of the law. They set a high value on his commentary on Seneca’s De clementia as a humanist’s chef-d’oeuvre, but they do not pay specific attention to its influence upon his later theological stance on the divine law.\textsuperscript{12}

Regardless of biographical arguments on how he started his legal studies and what his attitude towards the law was,\textsuperscript{13} Calvin must have been one of the most brilliant law students of his time, who tried to accomplish with amazing ardor and ability his academic goal, i.e., interpreting law in the light of the principle of ad fontes. Law was an essential feature in Calvin’s life and thought, whether it be God’s law or civil law. He attended two colleges of law in Orléans and Bourges, where he studied (Roman) civil law and canon law.\textsuperscript{14} Calvin, as a second generation Reformer, realized that law is both indispensable and crucial, like the “sinews” of the body, in the building up of church (cf. Inst. 4.10.27-32, esp. 4.10.27) and in organizing the Christian community upon the normative foundation of equity (cf. Inst. 4.20.14-21).\textsuperscript{15} He definitely regarded the law as the connecting point between epistemology and doctrine, between justification and sanctification, and between the Christian life in the church and in the world.\textsuperscript{16}

Not only did Calvin as the Reformer devote his life to establishing ecclesiastical constitutions for the church of Geneva, but he also played a major role


\textsuperscript{13} According to Colladon, Calvin decided “to study law rather than theology, for at that time theology was corrupted in the schools” (CO 21. 54).

\textsuperscript{14} According to Breen, although it is not certain if Calvin took up a study of canon law, taking into account that the College of Orléans offered the course of canon law and the greatest jurists of Calvin’s times were usually doctors of both civil and canon law, we are able to confirm the influence of canon law on the young Calvin. John Calvin, 137, 139; T. H. L. Parker, John Calvin: A Biography (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), 13; Reid, “John Calvin, Lawyer and Legal Reformer,” 152.

\textsuperscript{15} For the political character of Calvin’s Geneva, see John T. McNeill, “The Democratic Elements in Calvin’s Thought,” Church History 18/3 (1949), 153-171.

in instituting constitutions over the period of the Genevan legal reforms.\textsuperscript{17} He was involved as church leader in formulating the articles on moral standards of the 1536 Geneva Constitution and as the author of the 1543 Geneva Constitution, \textit{Ordonnances sur les offices et officiers}.\textsuperscript{18} His concern for the application of Geneva laws to their social and religious context was no less significant than his concern for the legislative process itself, as we can see in the registers of the Geneva Consistory.\textsuperscript{19} Certainly, he was “a man of law,” who discovered that the grace of the law lies in its normative sense.\textsuperscript{20} As he says in the \textit{Institutes}, the law “warns, informs, convicts, and lastly condemns,” but it also becomes a source of delight because it contains “not only the precepts, but the accompanying promise of grace, which alone sweetens what is bitter” (\textit{Inst.} 2.7.6, 12, CO 2.257, 262).

Calvin attended two colleges with the intention of becoming a priest, and two colleges in order to become a lawyer. However, when he published at his own expense his first book on Seneca, he intended to make himself known as a humanist like Budé and Erasmus. These three images—priest, lawyer, and humanist—looked incompatible even to Calvin’s contemporaries. Few people lived a life similar to Calvin’s. Petrarch, Montaigne, and Luther studied law at one time in their lives.\textsuperscript{21} However, nobody lived a life so full of religious piety, legal thought, and humanist


spirit as Calvin. This uniqueness of Calvin’s life gives us a clue to understanding the uniqueness of his theology of the law.

Dealing with the influence of the young Calvin’s humanistic and legal studies on the formation and development of his theology of the law, I will concentrate on two subjects with reference to his Christological understanding of the law. First, I will study the humanist jurists of the time. Their influence is crucial in discussing the origin of Calvin’s historical-literary interpretation of the law. Secondly, I will examine late medieval views of the righteousness of good works of the law in relation to the idea of the merit of Christ. This study will help us to understand the background of the Christological relevance for the normative use of the law, which is prominent in Calvin’s theology of the law. These studies are historically related to the movements of the *mos novus* and the *via moderna*. Especially, with reference to the Christological understanding of the law, the influence of the *devotio moderna*, which pursued Christ-centred spirituality and life, should be considered.

Finally, I will deal with Calvin’s commentary on Seneca’s *De clementia*, in which the young legal student who tried to make himself known as a Christian humanist like Erasmus deployed his view on one of the crucial issues in his times—the clemency of the magistrate—an idea closely related to the rule of the law, especially to equity and moderation in the legal practice. These elements are of capital importance especially in dealing with Calvin’s historical interpretation of the law. Therefore, it is worthwhile to treat them before investigating the Reformer’s view of the law as revealed in his early works and in successive editions of his *Institutes*.

### 2.2 Mos Novus: A Historical Philological Approach to the Legal Texts

Scholars have dealt with Calvin’s literal interpretation of the Scripture in varying ways, most focusing on his Christocentric biblicism and on his theory of
verbal inspiration. In spite of the different approaches, however, they eventually take the same position when they characterize Calvin’s biblical interpretation as both historical and Christological. As Richard A. Muller notes, how to find the meaning of “literal” in biblical exegesis must have been a very important agenda for Calvin, as it was for Nicholas of Lyra, who was faithful to the literal meaning of the Scripture by pursuing its textual and contextual (either historical or Christological) significances based on his theory of a double literal sense (duplex sensus literalis), and also for Lefèvre d’Étaples, who believed that there was no specific literal meaning of the Scripture that can be separated from its contextual (spiritual) significance.

On the other hand, another approach to the origin of Calvin’s historical and literary interpretation of the Scripture has been suggested by some scholars in the light of the influence of his legal education, which was noticeable in connection to the historical and philological interpretation of the Corpus of Roman law. In asserting the similarities between the Mosaic law and the Roman law as to the three kinds of the law—moral, ceremonial, and judicial—the fourfold grouping of the Mosaic codes in his commentary on the four last books of the Pentateuch, the threefold use of the law, and the concept of iustitia (in its relation to the concept of

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epieikeia), as Ford Lewis Battles confidently asserts, “what Calvin wrote about the Mosaic law in general, and on justice and equity in particular, was profoundly affected by his early studies in Roman law at the Universities of Orléans and Bourges.”

My main concern in this section is not to explore the whole range of the influence of Calvin’s legal studies on his theology of the law but to focus on the new highly context-oriented way of textual interpretation and its influence on Calvin’s historical interpretation of the law. This study will enable us to understand the formation of Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law as we become aware of some characteristics of his contemporary philological approach to Roman law, according to which the genuine sense of a text was believed to be explored along with its ancient cultural background and the intention of the author of the ancient text.

Roman law had been dealt with as a theme separate from feudal law and canon law since Imerius opened the era of the so-called glossators by collecting the texts of the Corpus Juris Civilis in order to comment on them in the University of Bologna in the twelfth century. The dawn of the revival of Roman law in the sixteenth century began with Lorenzo Valla’s (1406-1457) establishment of textual criticism. Renaissance philologists devoted themselves to studying original languages, vocabulary, grammar, and literary structures in order to perfect their historical interpretation of the text. While the glossators meant to comment on Roman law “as if Justinian were still alive and the Roman Empire still a going concern,” the Renaissance humanists regarded their task as finding out the original

26 Two works are especially helpful for this study: Michael L. Monheit, “Passion and Order in the Formation of Calvin’s Sense of Religious Authority,” Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1988, esp. 242-507; Patrick Le Gal, Le droit canonique dans la pensée dialectique de Jean Calvin (Fribourg Suisse: Éditions Universitaires, 1984), esp. 89-161.
28 Quirinus Breen, “Renaissance Humanism and the Roman Law,” in Christianity and Humanism, 183-199. The glossators and postglossators had a sense of textual criticism and historical interpretation in pursuing ancient sources (ad fontes). They however did not succeed in connecting the literal meaning of a text to its historical context, but only revealed the discrepancy between them, as was found in the case of Bartolus. Monheit, “Passion and Order,” 112-124.
meaning of a text, i.e., that which was most faithful to its own historical and cultural context, by means of textual criticism. Therefore, for the humanists, “the Emperor [Justinian] is no god of law.”

Calvin studied Valla’s works with the help of his Latin teacher Mathurin Cordier at the Collège de la Marche in Paris. Valla criticized the position of the glossators and postglossators, who believed that a word or expression in a text had a precise and fixed literal meaning, regardless its context, and he applied the knowledge he had on Roman history and Roman rhetorics. Valla showed his special affection for Ciceronianism and his ideal standard of Latin usage was modeled on the best ancient writers. The influence of Valla’s humanistic legal interpretation is apparent in Calvin’s use of rhetorical skills, his frequent dependence on ancient writers in designating exact meanings of some specific words, and his moral interpretation according to its textual and contextual meaning in his commentary on Seneca’s De clementia. In particular, Valla’s attack on the “Donation of Constantine” in the Decretals of Gratian may have been a definite influence which induced Calvin to realize the fallacy of the papacy as he describes it in the Institutes 4.11.23.

29 Breen, “The Twelfth-Century Revival of the Roman Law,” 149, and “Renaissance Humanism and the Roman Law,” 189. The glossators and postglossators turned to the concept of the “merum imperium” as they advocated the authority of the emperor Justinian. Scholars who did not have a humanistic background such as Valla and Bude opposed this concept as contradictory to their textual criticism. On the other hand, Zasius and l’Estoile, who had a strong jurist background, claimed the continuous validity of this concept with special reference to the judicial power of the emperor of France and the imperial cities of Germany. Alciati also favoured the authority of the emperor even though he did not develop it theoretically. Monheit, “Passion and Order,” 106-210, esp., 112-124, 130-147.


32 Calvin introduces Valla’s annotation of the word “licitia” in his commentary on Seneca: “Obseruandum est verbum licentiae hic positum in malam partem, quemadmodum ferè accipitur apud authores: vt Valla annotauit” (Clem. 19.24-26). The phrase “in malam partem” implies that the word “licitia” is regarded as a product of interrogation. This shows the influence of Calvin’s law study. Cf. Breen, John Calvin, 111-112.

33 Cf. Breen, “Renaissance Humanism and the Roman Law,” 188; Monheit, “Passion and Order,” 109. Alciati recognized the fraudulency of the Donation of Constantine, but he did not deny the authority of the edict of the emperor. Monheit, ibid., 147. According to Torrance, Calvin’s
It might have been due to the influence of Valla that Calvin moved to Orléans and finally to Bourges from the university of Paris. Both schools were "fountainheads from which the waters of the new spiritual awakening overflowed into every part of the Kingdom of France." However, as far as the Faculty of Law was concerned, the academic character of Orléans, which was headed by Pierre Taisan de l’Estoile (Petrus Stella), and that of Bourges, which was headed by Andrea Alciati (Alciato, Alciat), was quite different.

Pierre de l’Estoile (1480-1537), vicar-general (vicaire général) in the diocese of Orléans, exercised a great influence on Calvin not only spiritually as a man of the church but also academically. He did not claim any new way of commenting on the Corpus Iuris Civilis. He was inspired by the humanists’ great concern for the text itself but was critical of their historical, rhetorical approach to the text and even their own tendency of ad fontes. In designating a genuine meaning of a text, he rather shared with the medieval Roman jurists their conviction of the universal applicability of the law and non-contextual literalism based on the assumption of the complex logical construction of the whole text. He was convinced that a word or a passage had its explicit literary meaning and it could be pursued by reading it in the whole text. This is the point that differentiates him from Ulrich Zasius (1461-1535), who, although he criticized Valla’s and Budé’s humanistic approach, utilized their philological way and allowed for the flexibility of a word by claiming its implicit meaning beyond the text itself.

Stella’s way of literary and logical text-reading within the text itself almost

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34 Le Gal, Le Droit Canonique, 61.
35 Clem. 21*.
36 Cf. Battles, “Calvin’s Humanistic Education,” 55-57; Reid, “John Calvin, Lawyer and Legal Reformer,” 151-152.
37 Doumergue, Jean Calvin, 1.130-132; Ganoczy, The Young Calvin, 66; Wendel, Calvin, 22. Calvin praises de l’Estoile as “quo est praeditus ingenii acuminii, qua industria, qua denique juris peritia” in Praefatio in Nic. Chemini Antapologiam (CO 9.785).
certainly influenced Calvin’s harmonious interpretation of the Old and New Testaments, and the holistic understanding of the regulations of the law and their historical background in the *Harmony of the Books of Moses*. In particular, Calvin’s spiritual (sometimes typological) interpretation of some biblical passages in the Old Testament in the light of the bodily presence of Christ by the work of the Holy Spirit demonstrates the distinctive influence of Stella’s logical text reading way of exploring the true meaning of a word or a passage.\(^{39}\)

The Faculty of Law in Orléans was divided into two sections: civil law employing five professors, and canon law employing three professors. Calvin’s study of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* in Orléans was by way of the glosses of Accursius and Bartholus. Particularly, Bartholus’ commentaries on the *Digesta* and *Infortiatum* informed Calvin not only of the *Corpus* itself but also of its practical application to civil law and, furthermore, to theology.\(^{40}\) In the following, T. H. L. Parker describes Calvin’s study at Orléans, which kept in balance Roman law, civil law, and theology:

The student would therefore be expected to gain a knowledge of early Church doctrine and in particular of Christology, as well as some acquaintance with the early history of doctrine. It would seem then that Calvin’s first theological studies took place not at Paris but at Orléans. But the philosophy of law and the theology occupied in extent only a small part of the *Corpus*. For much of the time he spent in Orléans, Calvin would be concerned with the innumerable material causes of man’s dissensions with his neighbours—the disposal of rain-water, rights of way, leases, purchase and possession, marriage and divorce, inheritance—and the decisions which generations of Roman and medieval jurists had given in such disputes.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{39}\) Cf. Monheit, “Passion and Order,” 416-507. The author sets a higher value on Stella’s approach than Alciati’s, especially with reference to their influence on Calvin’s interpretation of the law.

\(^{40}\) Parker, *John Calvin*, 13-16. Concerning the mutual influence between Roman law and church law, Guenther H. Haas, *The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics* (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997), 22-30, 33-39. Since Rome was re-established as the Christian empire, Roman law had been increasingly revised to conform to Christian principles, as we see clearly in the case of Justinian’s *Corpus* (24). In the medieval revival of Roman law Gratian and his successors applied the juristic method of the Roman texts, especially of the *Digest*, to the law of the church (28). This “juristic” method of the glossators and postglossators, which played a key role in the emergence of a system of canon law, was challenged by the philological and historical method (*mos novus*) in the Renaissance era (36-39). So we can presume that in the early sixteenth century the comparative study between Roman law and church law would be regarded as one of the most crucial legal agendas. However, Breen, overvaluing the influence of humanism in Orléans, comments negatively on Calvin’s study of canon law. *John Calvin*, 139.

\(^{41}\) Parker, *John Calvin*, 15-16.
Calvin’s studies with Andrea Alciati (1492-1550) did not last longer than one
and a half years, but Alciati’s influence on Calvin was still dominant in Calvin’s
relationships with the jurists who led the principal centre of the *mos gallicus* in the
college of Bourges—François le Douaren, François Hotman, and Jacques Cujas. Like Valla and Budé, Alciati introduced the philological way of textual criticism to
the legal profession. His contribution, however, is especially prominent in his
engrafting this legal humanism onto the study of history. As Emile Doumergue
puts it, “C’était une double nouveauté qui lui permit de ‘débarbariser’ la jurisprudence et lui mérita le nom glorieux de fondateur de l’école historique.”

Fundamentally, Alciati and Budé took the same position in approving of and
applying of the historical and philological approach to textual interpretation. However, Budé, the leader of the Gallican way of teaching (*mos docendi gallicus*),
was more a Christian humanistic thus biblical in his approach than the Italian who,
although attacked the Italian way of teaching (*mos docendi italicus*) at the same time
retained the Italian humanistic freedom. Alciati did not maintain such an
uncompromising historicism as Valla did. Just as he believed that the philological
approach is not contradictory to the historical background of a text, so he was
convinced that the historical meaning of laws does not exclude their spiritual
significance, which reveals the intention of their author most prominently. The

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42 This was between April of 1529 when Alciati started lecturing and September 1530 when Calvin left the school. Doumergue, Jean Calvin, 1.145; Millet, Calvin et la dynamique de la parole, 36.
44 Kelly, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship, 87-100; Breen, John Calvin, 140. This approach is prominent in Alciati, In tres posteriores Codicis Justiniani libros annotatuum (1513). Clem. 22-24.
45 Doumergue, Jean Calvin, 1.143.
48 Kelly, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship, 98. In dealing with Budé’s and Alciati’s interpretation of the “Ubi decretum” of the third century Imperial jurist Ulpian, Monheit observes, “Like Budé, . . . for Alciato, too, the recovery of the past could be of immediate, practical exemplary value; but for him this exemplarity lay in the substance of Ulpian’s thought. Unlike Budé
mediating position of Alciati between the medieval Roman jurists and humanists can be understood from his connection between the “spirit of the laws (mens legum)” and the “intention (voluntas or mens)” of the lawgiver.49

We should take care not to overestimate Calvin’s negative evaluation of Alciati in his preface to Duchemin’s Antapologia. Calvin’s criticism there was given against Alciati’s arrogant attitude towards his former teacher de l’Estoile, but not about his academia itself.50 We can find the influence of Alciati notable not only in Calvin’s commentary on Seneca, in which he interprets some words with historical flexibility rather than focusing on their linguistic origins, but also on his theological understanding of the law.51 In the Institutes, Calvin claims that the first principle of the law is the spiritual interpretation of the law according to the purpose of the lawgiver and then emphasizes Christ as the interpreter of the law (Inst. 2.8.6-7). We should keep in mind that these assertions regarding spiritual interpretation of the law are based on his basic stance on the historical literal interpretation. Under the tutelage of Alciati’s mos novus, Calvin did not only learn the textual interpretation of the Justinian Corpus but also the medieval glossators’ practical application of the law article by article to each case;52 therefore, it must have been a great help in Calvin’s legislation of church ordinances and their practical application to each case in the Consistory of Geneva.

In his excellent study on the life and works of Alciati, Paul Émile Viard sees his distinctive achievement in his brilliant usage of the literatures of diverse classical Greek and Latin writers.53 However, Alciati was not thoroughly learned in the

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51 For the influence of the philological and historical interpretation of Alciati on Calvin, see Monheit, “Young Calvin, Textual Interpretation and Roman Law,” 269, 276-282; Le Gal, Le Droit Canonique, 64-65.
52 Monheit, “Young Calvin, Textual Interpretation and Roman Law,” 266; Parker claims that Alciati “was also a practical lawyer and, like the Bartholists before him, went to the Corpus for help in contemporary problems.” John Calvin, 20.
philosophy of language, as was Budé. The influence of mos Italicus resulted in Alciati’s flexibility, which was revealed sometimes in relation to his view of history, as we see in his acknowledgement of the authority of the emperor in the case of the Donation of Constantine, and sometimes in relation to his acceptance of loose interpretation by the glossators. This mediating position of Alciati caused Calvin and his friends to be disappointed at his first lectures in Bourges.54

Guillaume Budé (1468-1540) played a major role in the revival of Roman law in France by annotating some parts of the Justinian Pandectae and by writing several important humanistic works. Indisputably, he was a man who enhanced the intellectual level of France in the times of Renaissance. As we see from the debates between his followers and the adherents of Erasmus, which were being held while Calvin was in Orléans and Bourges, he was regarded by some advancing contemporaries as the pride of the Gauls.55 Calvin and his close friends would have talked about him with some respect and admiration as they were reading his Annotationes in Pandectas (1508) and Annotationes reliquae in Pandectas (called by Calvin Annotationes posteriores, 1526).56 Calvin must have remembered these debates when he spoke of Budé “primum rei literariae decus et column,” while he called Erasmus “literarum alterum decus” (Clem. 42.37-38, ii. 3).

According to Battles, we can find at least ninety-one references to Budé, including seven instances where Calvin names him as reference in Calvin’s commentary on Seneca. The references are mostly to his Annotationes and De asse et partibus eius (1515) concerning legal terms, Roman institutions, political philosophy, and literature. Calvin especially turned to Budé’s Commentarii linguae Graecae (1530) an erudition on Greek literature and philosophy.57 Budé raised the issue of equity in the world of jurisprudence from the political-philosophical perspective,

54 Cf. Parker, John Calvin, 20
55 Cf. Clem. 27*.
56 Le Gal, Le Droit Canonique, 62-63; Breen, John Calvin, 139.
57 Battles, “The Sources of Calvin’s Seneca Commentary,” 69-73, 86.
based on Aristotle’s conception of *epieikeia*.

In his commentary on Seneca’s *De clementia*, Calvin distinguishes “equity (*epieikeia*)” from “the letter or rigor of the law (*iuri summo seu rigori iuris*),” and insists that there are certain things “not permitted by the common code of living souls (*commune ius animantium*) for man to do to man” (*Clem. 111.3-9, 112.8-9* [English translation altered]).

This view of the young Calvin reappears in the *Institutes* when he is discussing the principle of synecdoche in the interpretation of the law, saying, “a sober interpretation of the law goes beyond the words (*Ultra verba progredi sobriam legis interpretationem*)” (*Inst. 2.8.8, CO 2. 272*). Budé’s historical, philological approach based on his erudition in ancient languages and original sources influenced the young Calvin, who wanted to make his name renowned as a Christian humanist such as Erasmus and Budé himself, but Budé’s mystical and allegorical interpretation of major theological issues such as Christology was regarded as unacceptable to Calvin even before his conversion.

Calvin kept a close personal relationship with Budé and his family after his conversion. The influence of Budé’s views of Christian philosophy, natural law, and the relationship between the magistrate and his servants still overshadow Calvin’s *Institutes*, and, most of all, the influence of his philological and historical interpretation dominates in Calvin’s wide use of ancient sources. Nevertheless, Calvin probably preferred Alciati, who sought *brevitas* in writing in spite of his erudition and emphasized not only the principles of the philological textual approach but also their practical applications to the various facets of the laws, to Budé, who pursued stylistic grandeur rather than clarity and had a tendency to ignore the

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practical application of a specific law to a specific case.62

Budé believed that there were many contradictions and different realities in the compilation of Roman laws63 and criticized not only the glosses of the medieval jurists but also the text of Justinian himself as he explored the historical contextual meaning of texts with the spirit of ad fontes,64 whereas Valla claimed the need for the new way of textual criticism by revealing the erroneous approach of the glossators and postglossators and their ignorance of Latin.65 However, like Valla, Budé was neither a legal practitioner nor a profound philosopher of the law. Calvin was not able to harmonize his literary and historical interpretation of the Scripture with this stance of Budé. Although Budé differentiates Christianity from philosophy, and humanistic interpretation of a text from meditation on the Scripture, his Christian humanism was basically oriented towards a logical contingency rather than the revelation of the text itself. This is why he finally came to the allegorical and mystical interpretation of Scripture in De studio literarum recte et commodè instituendo (1532), and De transitu Hellenismi ad Christianismum (1535). While Erasmus clearly developed Valla’s humanistic approach in his annotations on the Gospels, there was no such development by Calvin with regard to Budé.66

We can attempt to point out the continuity between Budé and Calvin. Like Quirinus Breen, we can appreciate that Budé revealed “the essential note of the Reformation” when he emphasized that “Christianity is obedience to the commandments of Christ, an imitation of the Master’s life upon earth” in De studio.67 Like Josef Bohatec, we can understand this Christ-centred view of Budé from his eschatological view of Christian philosophy and admit its influence on

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63 McNeill, Guillaume Budé and Humanism, 108.
65 Monheit deals with the relation between Valla and Budé, only focusing on their similarities, in “Passion and Order,” 130-146.
67 Breen, John Calvin, 120.
Calvin’s theology of the Christian life.⁶⁸ We can further argue that Calvin refined Budé’s philological approach and applied it to the Scriptures themselves.⁶⁹ However, we should keep in mind not to overestimate Budé’s theological influence on Calvin. With reference to Calvin’s Christ-centred mysticism or spirituality, this was rather more dependent on the theological reformism of Lefèvre d’Étaples.⁷⁰ Also, concerning Calvin’s biblical interpretation, we should give adequate attention to the influence of Nicholas of Lyra, and with regard to the relation between Word and Spirit, to the influence of late medieval spirituality.

2.3 *Via Moderna* and *Devotio Moderna*: The Merit of Christ and the Role of the Law, and Late-Medieval Spirituality⁷¹

The significance of the influence of the *via moderna* and the *devotio moderna* upon the young Calvin has been discussed increasingly, because both of these trends have been regarded crucial for the study of the intellectual and spiritual origin of Calvin’s theology.

The influence of the voluntarist tradition advocated by the theologians of the *via moderna* in the late medieval era upon Calvin is noticeable in the *Institutes*. Criticizing the Epicurean concept of the idle god, he says, the Epicureans “so apportion things between God and man that God by His power inspires in man a movement by which he can act in accordance with the nature implanted in him, but He regulates His own actions by the plan of His will” (*Inst. 1.16.4, CO 2.147*). Also, when criticizing the Stoic concept of fate, he claims that “God’s will is the highest and first cause of all things because nothing happens except from his command or permission” (*Inst. 1.16.8, CO 2.152*). In his response to Socinus (1555), Calvin takes

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⁷¹ For the concept of “spirituality” in Calvin’s times, which usually denoted the Christian life following the type of Christ and worshipping God with the true knowledge of God and man, see Richard C. Gamble, “Calvin and Sixteenth-Century Spirituality: Comparison with the Anabaptists,” in *Calvin Studies Society Papers*, 1995, 1997, 32-36.
the voluntarist position, saying, “Apart from God’s good pleasure Christ could not merit anything (nam Christus non nisi ex Dei beneplacito quidquam mereri potuit)” (Inst. 2.17.1, CO 2.387). Calvin confirmed this position in a new section added in the 1559 Institutes in this way: “In considering Christ’s merit, we do not consider the beginning of merit to be in him, but we go back to God’s ordinance, the first cause” (Inst. 2.17.1, CO 2.387).

The influence of the via moderna is obvious concerning Calvin’s emphasis on the sovereign will and the eternal decree of God, but we should be careful not to overemphasize the influence of the voluntarist tradition upon Calvin’s theological position on the relationship between the absolute will of God and the merit of Christ in the process of salvation. As Calvin puts it continuously in response to Socinus:

[W]henver Christ’s grace is joined to God’s love. . . . Christ bestows on us something of what he has acquired (eum de suo quod acquisivit). For otherwise it would not be fitting for this credit to be given to him as distinct from the Father, namely, that grace is his and proceeds from him (Inst. 2.17.2, CO 2.387-388).

The theologians of the via moderna associated the ratio meriti Christi not so much with the truth and extent of Christ’s mediation as with the economy of God’s omnipotent will. As we see from the works of William Ockham and Gabriel Biel, they concentrated more on Christ as Legislator than Salvator in dealing with his merit for salvation. This stance reflects the effect of their distinctive understanding of the incarnation of Christ. In dealing with the concept of Deus manifestatus in carne in view of the assumptus-theory of Peter Lombard, Ockham refers chiefly to the fact that God became man by assuming the “humanitas”; but he does not give

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73 Willis notes that Calvin, by referring to the acceptatio of God, points out the sufficiency of the merit of Christ, whereas Scotus leaves more room for another offering. Ibid., 236.


proper attention to the hypostatic union in the person of Christ as the "homo." 76 This Christological lacuna, as Alister E. McGrath calls it, appears in Biel, who grasped the coming of Christ as the kenosis of God and claimed that the incarnation does not prove the humanity of Christ but his divinity, not the kenosis but the fact that the immutable God became man. 77

The theologians of the via moderna held the Franciscan voluntarist position and highlighted the ex opere operato character of the merit of Christ. They were not very concerned about linking the principle of sola gratia with the free imputation of the grace of Christ, rather, they sought to take issue with the merit of Christ in the process of applying the axiomatic principle that "facientibus quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam (God does not deny grace to those who do what it is in their power to do)" to the whole process of salvation. 78 Inspired by Augustine, who asserted that "qui creavit te sine te, non justificabit te sine te," 79 they referred to the synergistic facientibus principle even in the explication of justification "in terms of the concept of the reliability of the potentia ordinata with reference to the notion of a 'covenant' or 'contract (pactum)' between God and man." 80 It is against this background that they developed their idea of justification in terms of two stages of merit—meritum de congruo, which is based on gratia gratum faciens, and meritum de condigno, which is based on pura gratia gratis data. 81

The congruent merit signifies God’s grace infused in every natural man who

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77 In this respect, Oberman says, the feature of the so-called extra Calvinisticum for Biel appears as the kenosis of God Himself. The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 265.


80 The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation, 81.

is able to prepare himself for salvation, voluntarily, by eliminating obstacles and by repentance. It pertains to the first stage of justification, in which the synergism in the *facientibus* principle works totally and individually. At this stage, God binds himself to nothing but to his convenantal promise, not out of his strict justice but out of his liberality (*liberalitas*). In this sense, his will works both absolutely and ordainly.  

The concept of congruent merit helps us to explain the principle of *sola gratia* in the process of justification with respect to the liberality of God and the merit of the believer’s conviction of *iustificatio sola fide*, but it does not set forth the objective *opus operatum Christi*—the gratuitous grace of Christ’s redemption.  

Calvin’s strict objection to Catholic synergism targets this merely subjective understanding of *sola gratia* in the process of justification (cf. *Inst.* 3.11.13-20, 3.17.1-15).

On the other hand, the condign merit denotes the persistent convenantal grace of God for those already regenerated by congruent merit. The Franciscan theologians of the medieval era who followed the Scotic voluntarist tradition explored this concept in order to explain the perfection of eternal life by referring to the *ordinatio* of God; thus they regarded that as coming out of the strict justice of God binds himself for salvation, voluntarily, by eliminating obstacles and by repentance. It pertains to the first stage of justification, in which the synergism in the *facientibus* principle works totally and individually. At this stage, God binds himself to nothing but to his convenantal promise, not out of his strict justice but out of his liberality (*liberalitas*). In this sense, his will works both absolutely and ordainly. The concept of congruent merit helps us to explain the principle of *sola gratia* in the process of justification with respect to the liberality of God and the merit of the believer’s conviction of *iustificatio sola fide*, but it does not set forth the objective *opus operatum Christi*—the gratuitous grace of Christ’s redemption.

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The synergistic position of the *via moderna* was rejected by the theologians of Council of Trent, who argued that “none of the acts which preceed justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification.” Oberman, “Duns Scotus, Nominalism, and the Council of Trent,” 217, n. 80.

Calvin disagrees with the doctrine of the co-operation grace of Lombard and Bernard, and, most greatly, with the nominalists, whom he calls “the more recent Sophists” (*Inst.* 2.2.6, CO 2.191). For medieval Pelagianism, see Oberman, “*Justitia Christi* and *Justitia Dei*: Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification,” in *The Dawn of the Reformation*, 108-114. Oberman presents Luther’s criticism of Ockham’s Pelagianism and points out that Luther’s view of law and gospel starts from his radical re-interpretation of “facere quod in se est” (109, 114). For Ockam’s attitude towards Pelagianism, see Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, 2 vols. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 1279-1295.


According to Joseph Wawrykow, since the medieval understanding of condign merit, including that of Aquinas, is based not on the foreknowledge of God but on the *ordinatio* of God, Calvin’s critique of Aquinas in the *Institutes* 3.22.9 is groundless. “John Calvin and Condign Merit,” *ARG* 83 (1992), 80-90. For Aquinas’ view of foreknowledge and Scotus’ criticism on this, see
God, i.e., his equality rather than his liberality and related to his ordained will rather than to his absolute will.\textsuperscript{87} Basically, the theologians of the \textit{via moderna} were faithful to this Franciscan tradition.\textsuperscript{88} However, with a view to defending their synergistic view of the sacraments, they tended to ascribe the condign merit even to God’s \textit{liberalitas}, as they, based on their \textit{pactum}-theory, replaced Aquinas’s intellectualistic views on the infused habit of grace and the merit of the sacrament as the secondary cause with the \textit{potentia ordinata Dei}.\textsuperscript{89} Although the theologians of the \textit{via moderna} did not deny the existence of created habits itself, they did not accept the Dominican theory of \textit{habitus} as such; their emphasis was shifted from the ontological to the covenantal causality.\textsuperscript{90} Their emphasis was not on the qualification of the regenerate but on God’s grace upon a \textit{viator}, i.e., God’s absolute will (\textit{liberalitas}) in regard to \textit{gratia gratum faciens}.\textsuperscript{91}

It might look plausible that Calvin was influenced by the \textit{via moderna} insofar as asserting the dynamic relationship between justification and sanctification and the

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\textsuperscript{88} With regard to the merit for eternal life, “[with congruent merit], there is no equality in value between moral actions and God’s payment. Yet God is merciful, and gives more than we deserve”; whereas “in condign merit, there is an equality in value between the morally good act and God’s reward. This equality in value is rooted ultimately in God’s will.” Wawrykow, “John Calvin and Condign Merit,” 80-81. According to Oberman, the late medieval nominalists’ position on the relationship between \textit{meritum de condigno} and \textit{de congruo} substantially contributed to the final formulation of the decree on justification. “Duns Scotus, Nominalism, and the Council of Trent,” 216.


\textsuperscript{91} McGrath, \textit{The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation}, 80-81; Oberman, “Wir Sein Petterl. Hoc Est Verum,” 105. In dealing with cooperative merit in the Catholic tradition, the prevenient of the actual grace of God (\textit{gratia gratis data}) to congruent merit and the prevenience of the sanctifying grace of God (\textit{gratia gratum faciens}) to congruent merit are crucial. But it is not always obvious, as in the case of Biel. Oberman, “Duns Scotus, Nominalism, and the Council of Trent,” 204-233.
normative nature and use of the law. However, it should be noted that when Calvin discusses the double grace of God to receive both our persons and our works and emphasizes the third use of the law in the Christian life, he does so on the basis of God’s grace to receive our “imperfect” works as righteous, while the theologians of the *via moderna* argue for good works which are merited as “perfect” by the ordained yet absolute will of God. In the following passage, Calvin criticizes them for replacing the merit of Christ with the liberality of God in dealing with the covenant of grace.

[H]ow deluded the Sophists are, who thought they had neatly got around all these absurdities by saying that works of their own intrinsic goodness are of no avail for meriting salvation but by reason of the covenant (*ex pacti ratione*), because the Lord of his own liberality (*liberalitate*) esteemed them so highly (*Inst. 3.17.3, CO 2.592).*92

Biel’s position on Christ and the law, to provide an example, makes us realize how far it is from Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law, even though they look very similar at first. Biel claims that “the Old Law” and “the New Law” are differentiated only by “the difference between *quo* and *qua*”; although the Jews did not know how to respond to the Lord, they were fully aware of what is the substance and purpose of the law.*93* This recalls the remarkable similarity between Biel and Calvin with reference to their understanding of the substantial unity between the law and the Gospel. Especially when Biel asserts that the sacraments of the New Testament are efficacious not only *ex opere operantis* but also *ex opere operato*, it reminds us of the *ratio* of the continual mediation of Christ in the so-called *extra Calvinisticum.*94

However, in spite of these seeming similarities, there is a crucial discrepancy between Biel and Calvin with regard to their understanding of Christ’s mediation. As Oberman observes, for Biel, “Indeed, whereas Christ himself is legislator, Moses is

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92 Calvin differentiates “necessity” from “compulsion” (*Inst. 2.2.5, 2.3.5*). For him, there is no room for the concept of *necessitas coactionis*, by which the voluntarists appeal to the self-imposed restriction of God. Cf. McGrath, “Homo Assumptus?” 286, 288.

93 Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology*, 112.

94 Ibid., 114.
only a herald and a promulgator of the law of God. But, again, this is merely a difference of degree, between mediate and immediate, since through Moses God himself gave his law, as clearly appears from the form of the Decalogue.\(^95\)

Commenting here on the phrase “in manu Mediatoris” in Galatians 3:19, Biel lays more emphasis on the absolute will of God than on the mediatorship of Christ as he points out the fact that both the immediate and the mediate causalities are subject to God’s necessity. The same tendency indicates both the intellectualistic and the voluntaristic stream in the medieval era.\(^96\) On the other hand, as far as Calvin’s theology of the law is concerned, the difference between mediate and immediate is not merely quantitative, but lies in the nature, revelation, and fulfilment of the law.\(^97\)

In conclusion, the via moderna fails to notice the significance of Christ’s mediatorship; therefore, its influence on Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law is limited.

Regarding the formation of Calvin’s theology, the influence of John Major has been discussed significantly by some scholars. Major was known as the person who reconciled the realist and nominalist view of hermeneutics\(^98\) and pursued the unifying of the intellectual and spiritual aspects of Christian philosophy.\(^99\) His influence upon Calvin has been most emphatically presented by T. F. Torrance. According to Torrance, Major’s theological and philosophical characteristics are reflected so greatly in Calvin’s theological thought that we can hardly deny their

\(^{95}\) Ibid., 115.

\(^{96}\) Ibid., 118. According to Oberman, this position of Biel does not show any difference from that of Bonaventura, Aquinas, and Scotus.

\(^{97}\) Heinrich Heppe uses the terms “the unio immediata” and “the unio mediate” in order to describe the union between the human nature and the person of the Logos and the union with the two natures which is mediated by the Holy Spirit. RD 431. If we can apply this distinction to the divine-human relationship, the former represents the mystical relationship between God and man, whereas the latter shows the characteristic feature of Calvin’s pietism based on the mediatorship of Christ. On the other hand, Dowey explains “the immediate presence of a mysterious will [of God]” in creation by God’s accommodation to human capacity in “God’s Creative Word” and to human sinfulness in the office of Christ as the Mediator. The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology, 7, 10.

\(^{98}\) Torrance, The Hermeneutics of John Calvin, 24.

\(^{99}\) Cf. Le Gal, Le Droit Canonique, 34-40; Richard, The Spirituality of John Calvin, 144-147. Le Gal points up the influence of the devotio moderna on Major through Standonck, but Richard does not indicate this point specifically.
close relationship in the Collège de Montaigu. Torrance claims that although there is no general agreement with Reuter’s thesis—that Calvin learned a ‘new conception of anti-Pelagian and Scotist theology, and a renewed Augustinianism’ at Paris under the tutelage of Major—the influence of Major on Calvin was indelible, especially on his study of language. The same position is claimed by Patrick le Gal, who suggests that under the guidance of Major, Calvin was taught the principle of “fides quaerens intellectum,” which is essential for establishing the connection between the absolute and ordained powers, the conception of anti-Pelagianism, and the spiritual and constitutional position of the church. McGrath does not agree with Reuter’s thesis as such, but takes into consideration his assertion of the influence of the via moderna and the schola Augustiniana moderna upon Calvin positively, via the works of Gregory of Rimini during his stay at Paris.

As Oberman and Ganoczy point out, there is no historical evidence to clearly verify that Major taught Calvin at Paris and exercised a decisive influence over the formation of his theology. However, it should be noted that Major, influenced by the schola Augustiniana moderna as well as by the voluntarist tradition and the late medieval nominalism, seeks to find the scopus of the sacred writings not only in Christ’s teaching but also in Christ himself, and like Calvin he explores the absolute will of God as one mediated by Christ in its revelation and office. On this Christological basis, the two take a similar position on the unity of the will of God,

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100 Torrance, The Hermeneutics of John Calvin, 1-57, 80-95.
101 Ibid., 80. Torrance’s view is based on Reuter’s assumption, explored in Grundverständnis der Theologie Calvins, 21, 35-36. Although Reuter continues to argue for the influence of Major upon Calvin in his later work Vom Scholarem bis zum jungen Reformator, he gave up his assumption that Calvin attended Major’s lectures in the theology faculty. Anthony N. S. Lane, “Calvin’s Use of Bernard of Clairvaux,” in John Calvin: Student of the Church Fathers (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999), 87-95. Most major biographical works on Calvin basically support Torrance’s position. Cf. Ganoczy, The Young Calvin, 174; Parker, Calvin, 11; McNeill, The History and Character of Calvinism, 100; Wendel, Calvin, 19.
as seen in Major, who understands *potentia dei absoluta* as a presently active power of God because it is known to us as the divine order by *potentia dei ordinata* as it is revealed in Scripture.\(^{106}\) Calvin reads the distinction between the *potentia absoluta* and the *potentia ordinata* as a distinction between *potentia ordinata* and *inordinata* and regards all power of God, realized and unrealized, actual and potential, as pertaining to *potentia ordinata*, power ordered by God's justice.\(^{107}\)

Now it would be helpful to turn to the influence of the *devotio moderna* upon Calvin, which scholars have discussed as another possible element working for the Christological formation of Calvin's theology.\(^{108}\) In the *Golden Booklet of Christian Life*, Calvin highlights that the heart of the Christian life is the following of Christ as the type and example and the meditating on the future life with the firm conviction of eternal union with Christ. This indicates the influence of the modern devotion, especially that of Thomas à Kempis (Inst. 3.6-10).\(^{109}\) We can also find this influence significantly in Calvin's first theological book, *Psychopannychia* (1534).\(^{110}\)

According to Albert Hyma, Calvin was informed of the new spirituality by those who were influenced by the *devotio moderna*, most significantly Lefèvre d'Étaples and Bucer. It is quite plausible that Calvin's Christological understanding of the law was closely related to d'Étaples' Christ-centred spiritual interpretation of


\(^{108}\) The characteristics of the *devotio moderna* are: 1) the person of Jesus Christ stands central; 2) the core of the gospel reveals in the life and passion of Christ; 3) the whole approach to the Scripture and Christ should be moralistic and antipspeculative; 4) finally, through these efforts, inwardness and interiority should be pursued. John Van Engen, tr., *Devotio Moderna: Basic Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), “Introduction,” 25-27. These elements are also highlighted with reference to the influence of the *devotio moderna* on Calvin through the book of Lucien Joseph Richard, *The Spirituality of John Calvin* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1974). The author believes the influence was especially prominent in Calvin’s concept of *pietas* and *eruditio* from the 1536 *Institutes* (98).


the Bible and Bucer’s doctrine of the union with Christ.\textsuperscript{111} During his studies at the Collège de la Marche, Calvin esteemed Mathurin Cordier as the model of the ideal master who besides grammar taught his students the pious Christian life in the spirit of the \textit{devotio moderna}.\textsuperscript{112} Also, at the Collège de Montaigu, which had taken into itself the soul of mysticism and brethren life since John Standonck, Calvin probably read à Kempis’ \textit{De imitatione Christi}, as did Ignatius Loyola.\textsuperscript{113} À Kempis contends that knowledge is a source of human merit but the \textit{aeterna veritas} lies beyond our reach; therefore, the truth is known to us by the cooperation between God’s self-knowledge (\textit{noverim te}) and our self-knowledge (\textit{noverim me}).\textsuperscript{114} Upon this knowledge of God and man, à Kempis emphasized the Christian life as one of self-denial, bearing the cross, and following Jesus Christ our master.\textsuperscript{115}

2.4 Commentary on Seneca’s \textit{De Clementia}: A Discovery of the Educational Function of Law

Calvin wrote his commentary on Seneca’s \textit{De clementia} not as a theologian; he did not have any theological purpose. In the words of André Malan Hugo, this commentary is “a perfect specimen of early sixteenth century \textit{classical} scholarship.”\textsuperscript{116} In spite of the citations of 74 Latin and 22 Greek authors, this


\textsuperscript{114} Torrance, \textit{The Hermeneutics of John Calvin}, 76; George H. Tavard, \textit{The Starting Point of Calvin’s Theology} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 172-173.


\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Clem.} 19*.
commentary contains only seven biblical references. \textsuperscript{117} At the same time, by examining the commentary we find evidence of the influence of people and movements described in the previous section.

However, in this work Calvin shows a characteristic feature of \textit{ad fontes} in his times, \textit{Christum praedicare ex fontibus}, \textsuperscript{118} by referring to seven church fathers, including Augustine, who is quoted 22 times. \textsuperscript{119} So here we encounter with, as Ganoczy notes, “the perspectives of the Christian moralist, a disciple of Paul and Augustine,” as well as the rhetorical skills and the historical criticism of a humanist. \textsuperscript{120} Calvin must have been familiar with many references of the church fathers through his studies of law. \textsuperscript{121}

It is helpful to start our study of Calvin’s position on the concept and use of natural law and civil law in the commentary by examining how there he comments on the Stoic concept of God. Stoics identified God with the logos, by which the world was created orderly and has been governed according to the rational laws of nature. \textsuperscript{122} Calvin criticizes the Stoics, who saw the necessity of God’s providence as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Battles, “The Sources of Calvin’s Seneca Commentary,” 68, 86. However, according to Haas, it cites 56 Latin and 22 Greek writers, and according to Boisset, 55 Latin and 22 Greek writers. Haas, \textit{The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics}, 10; Jean Boisset, \textit{Sagesse et Sainteté dans la pensée de Jean Calvin} (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1959), 248. The notable difference of Battles from the others is because he includes all unnamed sources.
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{Clem.} 415 (index). Cf. Doumergue, \textit{Jean Calvin}, 1.222.
\end{itemize}
subject to fate (*fatum*), and the Epicureans, who maintained the concept of *fortuna* in order to explain the mysterious economy of God and finally engaged in a struggle for the idle God (*Clem. 5:38 ff.*). Calvin says that fortune belongs to God but not vice versa because he “takes decisions and lays down the law” (*Clem. 7.25-28*). As he indicates that the word “Fortune” should be replaced by “God” in the axiom “the prince is nothing but the instrument of Fortune” (*Clem. 7.22-28*), Calvin claims that second causality or second causes (intermediate causes) are subject to neither the necessity of fate nor the fortuitous economy of fortune, but to the providence of God. This position of the young Calvin reflects some influence of the conception of covenantal causality and the dialectic between the absolute and ordained will of God in late medieval nominalism.

Natural law had a Greek origin. Its concept had been completed by the Stoics and then passed onto Roman jurists and the Christian church, and became an important principle of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, which was actually the church law in Rome (A.D. 534). For Stoics, living according to natural law and the supernatural will of God means to live in accordance with nature. There is no supposed

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124 Cf. Pierre-François Moreau, “Le Stoicisme aux XVII et XVIII siècles: Calvin et le Stoicisme,” in Cahiers de Philosophie Politique et Juridique (Caen: Publications de l’Université de Caen, 1994), 15-21. Doumergue and Boisset are very critical of the influence of Stoicism on Calvin’s view of God’s providence. They assert that even in the commentary on Seneca Calvin, as a Christian, criticizes the Stoic view of necessity. Doumergue, Jean Calvin, 1.219-222. Boisset, Sagesse et Sainteté dans la pensée de Jean Calvin, 248. On the other hand, Wendel acknowledges the Stoic origin of Calvin’s view of God’s providence, at least “partly.” Calvin, 29. This view of Wendel is totally supported by P. Marie, “Calvin’s God and Humanism,” in Our Reformation Tradition: A Rich Heritage and Lasting Vocation (Potchefstroom: Potchefstroom University for Christian High Education, 1984): 353-365. Parker, who maintains the early conversion of Calvin, does not think that his humanistic study was so strong as to swerve his faithful attitude towards the teaching of the Scripture “a nail’s breath.” Calvin: An Introduction to His Thought (Louisville/John Knox, 1995), 4.

125 Calvin’s theological view of God’s providence (*Inst. 1.16-17*) is in accordance with his early view in the commentary on Seneca. Concerning second causality, see esp., *Inst. 1.16.9* and “On How We Ought to Understand the Providence of God by which He Does Everything, and How the Libertines Confound It All When Speaking of It: The First Consequence of the Preceding Article,” TAL 243-247 (CO 7.186-190).


The dichotomy between a unitary deity and natural laws (or reason) in their doctrine of the *logoi spermatikoi* (the seminal reasons or seeds of the logos).\(^{128}\) So when Stoics consider nature or natural law to be “the best guide (*optimam ducem*)” for lawful rule, they relate this not only to legal duty but also to divine piety (*Clem.* 79. 18-22, 115.15).

In the same vein, Cicero says that the notion of equity (*aequitas, epieikeia*) refers to religious piety, spiritual sanctity, and moral justice (*Clem.* 93.19-21). In several places Calvin claims that moral justice is a characteristic feature of equity in relation to judicial proceedings. Citing Quintilian and Cicero, Calvin argues that in the process of interrogation “not the act itself but its quality (*facti qualitas*)” should be considered; and in the process of the application of the law, the law should not be enforced “with the utmost rigor” but “circumstances (*circumstantiis*)” should be taken into consideration if they are subject to equity (*Clem.* 21.28-29, 22.13-14, 17-18). Moreover, in judgment, “equity and right (*aequi bonique*)” should not be subject to “the letter or rigor of the law (*iuri summo seu rigori iuris*)” (*Clem.* 111.5-9). This philological and historical interpretation based on *ad fontes* reflects Budé’s influence most prominently (cf. *Clem.* 111.3-9).

In the commentary, Calvin shows the influence of jurisconsults, who believed that jurisdiction embraces all sorts of cognizance (*Clem.* 9.11-12). He frequently uses terms related to the court and jurisdiction because he has a firm conviction that proper judicial proceedings are the best way to discover the truth (*Clem.* 21.25 ff; 42.3 ff; 47.2 ff; 87.7 ff; 103.11ff; 111.3 ff; 115.8 ff; 125.1 ff; 157. 31 ff).\(^{129}\) This jurisdictional and interrogative interpretation of legal texts was the effect of Calvin’s legal studies by which he learned to interpret a text on the ground of its context. Especially, with the knowledge of treating judicial proceedings justly, he must have realized the capital importance of the people in a specific historical context rather than the context itself.

\(^{128}\) Colish, *Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature*, 32-34.

Seneca’s view of the nature of humanity is generally pessimistic (cf. Clem. 13.34ff, 46.9-12, 132.15-16). Although human beings have “rational souls” and a “natural disposition from divine spirit” (Clem. 32.35; 36.38-39), according to Seneca, “everyone follows the seeds of his own nature” (Clem. 33.5). Seneca’s negative view of human nature is mostly related to the evil disposition (affectus) of humanity rather than its quality (qualitas). However, Calvin depicts Seneca as believing in “the rule of reason (imperio rationis)” in the human soul, following Plato, and putting a special emphasis on habit (habitus), following Aristotle (Clem. 17.28-29, 33.2-4, 27.7-39). Aristotle distinguishes habitus from consuetudo, and says, moral virtues are acquired by consuetudo, and consuetudo is transformed into the habitus of nature (Clem. 27.33-34, 38-39). Indisputably, this axiom of Aristotle influenced Aquinas’ synergism, which was based on the created habits of the regenerated. Along with habitus, in the commentary Calvin shows his view of conscience, by which people examine themselves before God’s judgment seat. Metaphors such as a worm and tormentor are used here negatively, but the typical metaphor “witness (testis)” represents its positive role prominently (Clem. 93.30-37, 94.5. Cf. Inst. 1.3.3).

Calvin’s commentary reveals both the pessimistic and optimistic sides of humanity and especially points out the social character of human beings. This understanding of man reflects the influence of Calvin’s legal studies. We cannot find any theological view of total depravity in the commentary, but Calvin shows his

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131 "... moralem virtutem ex consuetudine comparari. ... consuetudinem in naturae habitum transformari." Both habitus and consuetudo are translated by Battles and Hugo as “habit” without discrimination, but their meanings in Latin should be differentiated.


basic concern for the common nature of humans by indicating crucial elements of the human soul. His attitude is more Christian than Stoic when he quotes from Augustine in order to attempt to find the cause of the clemency of the prince: “Let us prosecute in them their own wickedness, but let us have pity on the common nature (misereamur communem naturam) they share with us” (Clem. 11.19-21).134

The influence of jurisdiction is revealed noticeably in Calvin’s equal emphasis on both the human character as a social man and human responsibility in society. Citing Plato and Aristotle, Calvin points out that mankind has been created as part of society and seeks after a commonality of life as a social animal (Clem. 38.34-36, 29.3-5). Calvin also discusses “the common good (bono gentium),” and indicates that citing Seneca, “Mankind has been created for mutual assistance (Homo in adiutorium mutuum generatus est)” (Clem. 29.8-9).135 The relations between God (logos), nature, and humanity are succinctly expressed by Seneca in his Dialogue: “The real purpose for which a man exists, the supreme good (summum bonum), is to bring himself, as a part of nature, into harmony with the whole, so that he, through virtue, may ‘keep company with God’.”136

It is from this understanding of human nature that Calvin explores the relationship between state and law, and the three uses of legal punishment. Calvin looks upon a state as “an assembly or gathering of men associated by law” (Clem. 87.8-10). He points this out by citing Cicero, who says, “As our bodies without the

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134 According to Bouwsma, both Stoicism and Augustinianism have “compatibility” and even “affinity” in that they “were bound up with the ancient rhetorical tradition,” and both notions go “back to the yearning of early Christian converts for some bridge between the old world of thought and the new.” On the other hand, he points out the clear difference between them in relation to “the biblical understanding of creation” as he says, “the Stoic view of man attributed to him a divine spark or seed, identified with reason, which gave man access to the divine order of the universe, from which the existence, the nature, and the will of God could be known. Stoicism therefore pointed to natural theology,” “The Two Faces of Humanism,” 5-9.

135 Cf. John H. Leith, John Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1989), 184-185. According to Leith, Calvin makes very plain that every person has a real responsibility for society, which arises out of the solidarity of humankind and out of the Christian gospel, and when he uses the word “neighbor,” it signifies all people including non Christians.

mind, so also a state without law, cannot use its parts, which are analogous to sinews and blood and members" (Clem. 85.15-16), and by citing Plato, who described "laws as sinews (nervos) in man" (Clem. 33.1. cf. Inst. 4.20.14).

Calvin’s interpretation of Seneca’s statement on the three uses of punishment refers not only to the use of common law (or civil law) but also to the use of natural law. The first use of punishment is to reform (emendare) a man who is convicted. Its need is derived from human nature, which is so corrupt that a man, if his sin is not punished, becomes more vicious and more unbridled (Clem. 125.11-12).

Proper punishment has an educational function to lead a bad man back onto the right path. Calvin notes that this use corresponds to the Greek words which are translated into "warning," "correction," and "advising," and monitio and animadversio in Latin (Clem. 125.14-16). Cicero considers this admonishing and nourishing function of punishment when he says, "A salutary severity is better than an empty show of clemency" (Clem. 23.27-28, Cf. 24.36-37). Concerning the practice of punishment, Calvin notes, for the renewal of sinful men gentleness and clemency are more needed than severe punishment (Clem. 126.2-3). The first use of punishment corresponds to the third use of the law and the third use of church discipline, for the former admonishes believers and urges them on in well-doing and the latter makes men ashamed of their baseness so that they may begin to repent (Inst. 2.7.12-13, 4.12.5).

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137 Clem. 124.18-21: "... alienas inuiiras, in quibus vindicandis haec tria lex sequuta est: quae princeps quoque sequi debet, aut ut eum quem punit, emendet: aut ut poena eius caeteros meliores reddat:..."


139 Battles calls the third normative use of the law the pedagogical one and from this point argues that since the first use of punishment is a part of the third use of the law, there is no relation between the first use of the law and the three uses of punishment. Ibid. On the contrary, Hesselink regards the pedagogical office of the law as the core of its first theological use. Calvin’s Concept of the Law, 231-234.

140 Cf. Battles, ibid.
The second use of punishment is to make the rest better by punishing a bad man. According to Plutarch, punishment functions to “deter and restrain some by the chastisement of others.” Cicero says, punishment “might for the future establish a warning for all lest anyone be minded to imitate such insanity” (Clem. 125.34-35). The essence of this use is well presented by the Greek paradeigma and the Latin exemplum (Clem. 125.26-28). Calvin argues that even for the innocent, clemency is necessary because they come to learn the name of virtue through an equitable punishment (Clem. 21.19-24). This use of punishment corresponds to the second use of the law, which deters those not yet regenerate from evil-doing (Inst. 2.7.11).  

The third use of punishment is to remove bad men in order that the rest may live in greater security (Clem. 125.37-126.1). This use was prevalent for ancient people who distinguished between those who are reformable and those who are incorrigible, and thought that, as “the rule of Plato” says, to deprive the incurable of life was to “be doubly beneficial to the rest. For the rest are deterred by their example and also the city is cleansed of wicked men” (Clem. 24.2-28). Calvin distinguishes the innocent from the “hopeless” and the “forever lost (deploratur in perpetuum)” (Clem. 24.15, 21). He says, although a prince should consider his people as his sons and take care of them like a physician, he sometimes kills and cuts “the public ulcer (ulcus publicum)” when “public welfare (publica utilitas)” demands it and the depravity of men needs to be cured (Clem. 96.13-15, 18-20; 109.25-32 [altered]). Accordingly, the third use of punishment corresponds to the first and second uses of church discipline, but it is not related to the use of the law itself (Inst. 4.12.5).  

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141 Cf. ibid.
142 Cf. Clem, 137*. Plato deals with the second and third uses of the law together, but does not claim the third type of punishment (Clem. 24.4-8, 125.38).
143 Cf. Clem. 137*-138*. Battles argues that Calvin’s remarks about a class of deplorati in the commentary have obvious implications for the distinction between the redeemed and the reprobate in his theology. However, the terms used by Calvin, mostly quoted from philosophers, such as “hopeless,” “incurable,” and “forever lost,” designate habitual criminals of the wicked rather than their reprobation. In the commentary Calvin does not pay much attention to the Stoic concept of “wise men,” which is based on Stoic fatalism. He rather accepts the Stoic understanding of the human state as more related to Aristotle’s concept of habitus rather than to human nature (Clem. 27.27-39).
144 Battles, “Against Luxury and License in Geneva,” 325.
From the previous discussion on the threefold use of punishment, we recognize Calvin’s keen awareness of the tension between “personal concern” and “public morality” in Stoic philosophy (Clem. 143.20-21). With reference to personal concern, we have found some aspects of the young Calvin’s Christian thought, and with reference to public morality, we have seen the great influence of humanist and jurist legal traditions. Calvin demonstrates his stance in considering the interpretation of the law and the application, and the meaning of the law itself and its context at the same time. Therefore, for Calvin, the social character of humans and society itself are equally important. This is why Calvin takes so much interest not only in the literal and historical meaning of a text but also in the character of specific people who live in that context. Calvin’s view of the three aims of punishment demonstrates this well.

Calvin finds the key to solving this tension in the clemency of the prince. By emphasizing the divine origin of the power of the prince, Calvin asserts his authority and duty at the same time. In this respect, Calvin calls magistrates God’s servants, ministers, and vicars (Clem. 1.13, 5.38-6.35, cf. Inst. 4.20.4). Therefore, if the prince enters into meditation, he receives the composure of his mind with the conviction that God’s providence is the reward of following his conscience (Clem. 5.39-6.3). In order to reveal that this idea is not different from “the confession of our religion (confessio religionis nostrae),” Calvin adds Romans 13:1, “Power comes from God alone, and those that exist have been ordained by God.”

The fact that a prince was endowed with authority from the gods makes him different from other people in his relation to the law. He is in the position not only to distribute God’s justice according to the “law of analogy (ius analogum)” (Clem. 20.11), but also to conduce and contribute to public morality (Clem. 143.21). Therefore, the prince is called by Cicero “the living law (lex animata)” (Clem. 125.4,

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145 Concerning Calvin’s use of “nostra religio” in the commentary, see Clem.130*-132*. According to David C. Steinmetz, while Melanchthon insists that there are two grounds for the Christians’ obedience to the magistrate: first, reason and natural law; second, God’s own ordination of the state and the rule of law. Calvin, focusing on the positive side of political order, argues that there is no other ground but “divine ordination.” “Calvin and the Civil Magistrate,” in Calvin in Context, 202-205.

Calvin uses the rhetoric of accommodation in the commentary in order to explain the interrelationships between the prince and his people, and between the prince and God: “As the people ought to moderate (attemperare) themselves to the will of the prince, so should the prince see to it that he keeps Jupiter and the gods propitious. . . . Therefore the prince should consider that he has received his administration of the people from the gods, and is sometime to render an account thereof to them” (*Clem*. 12.22-24, 27-28). Calvin also uses this rhetorical skill when he compares the duty of a prince to the duty of a parent (*Clem*. 97.30ff).

In the following commentary, Calvin clearly expresses the principle of accommodation:

He [Seneca] reminds the prince of the natural law (*principem legis naturalis*): that he [the prince] treats his subjects as he would have the gods treat himself, for the gods rule him as he himself governs men. But if he lives and breathes by the tenderness of the gods, why shall man not rather be favorable to men and open to their entreaty? (*Clem*. 50.27-31).

Calvin’s rhetorical use of accommodation in the commentary is made for a hortatory oration. It is different from the theological rhetorical use of the conception of God’s accommodation to human capacity, which was used by Calvin for apologetic, hermeneutical, and pastoral purposes, as well as for rhetorical reasons.146 However, in the commentary Calvin depicts the prince with metaphors, typically used to describe divine accommodation. The prince is presented as “a shepherd of the people (*pastor populorum*)” (*Clem*. 30.12), “the father of his country (*pater patriae*)” (*Clem*. 97.37, 106.24ff), a “teacher (*praeeceptor*)” (*Clem*. 107.36 ff), and a “physician

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2.5 Conclusion

In his small but very insightful book *Le caractère de Calvin*, Emile Doumergue asserts that the theology of Calvin overcomes *intellectualisme*, whose characteristics are indicated there as extreme literalism and dogmatism, and presents *mysticisme*. With reference to Calvin's *mysticisme*, Doumergue discusses “the faith of the heart (*la foi du cœur*)” and “the mystical union (*union mystique*)”. It is surely the case that these two conceptions represent the most significant features of Calvin’s pietism, but they cannot be identified with the elements of mysticism. Rather, it should be noted that through his early life Calvin experienced both the intellectualism and the mysticism of his times, and finally reached his own theological pietism. In dealing with the young Calvin’s legal and humanistic culture, we should keep in mind that he was a pious Christian who wanted to be a priest even though, as he confessed, his soul was not yet teachable (*ad docilitatem*) to the divine truth.

To a brilliant young student of law, the teaching of the *via moderna*—that it is God’s will that those who are justified by the merit of Christ ought to live according to the law so that they finally reach the eternal life—may have looked closely related to the emphasis of the *mos novus* in Roman legal studies which claims that interpretation of the normative imperative of the law should be based on its historical context. The nominalist concept of covenantal causality may have influenced the young Calvin’s legal thought. Just as he found out that the nature of the relationship between God and his people is crucial in the covenant, so he found out that designating the meaning of law in relation with the circumstances crucial. Here, we

147 For Calvin’s use of these metaphors in his theological works, see Bouwsma, *John Calvin*, 211-212; Battles, “God Was Accommodating Himself to Human Capacity,” 27-31.

148 Doumergue, *Le caractère de Calvin*, 64-75.


150 *CO* 31.21. Doumergue gives specific attention to the development of religious piety even before the conversion of Calvin. This position of Doumergue is also demonstrated in his comments on Calvin’s commentary on Seneca’s *De clementia*. *Jean Calvin*, 1.218-222.
can presume that the nominalist concept of *pactum* helped the young Calvin to take the *via media* between the literal determinism of the glossators and the philological historical approach of the jurists. This is why we should take into special consideration the thought of de l’Estoile, in spite of the definite influence of the *mos novus* on Calvin.

The influence of the young Calvin’s synthetic legal position on his theology is considerable in his interpretation of the divine law, which is described characteristically by three principles in the *Institutes*. The first principle, to interpret the law spiritually in accordance with the purpose of the lawgiver, shows the legacy of Alciati’s historical interpretation of law (*Inst. 2.8.6-7*). Then, the second principle, that “a sober interpretation of the law goes beyond the words” shows the influence of Budé, as we have seen prominently from his view of equity (*Inst. 2.8.8-10*). Finally, the influence of de l’Estoile is striking in relation to the third principle, when Calvin claims that we should understand the first and second tables of the Decalogue according to their individual purpose but harmoniously because all the commandments are for God’s glory—for God’s own sake (*Inst. 2.8.11-12*). Unlike Alciati and Budé, Stella believed that the meaning of a word or a sentence is determined by the text it belongs to, and unlike Zasius, he was convinced that the text itself presents its complete meaning. I do not think that this categorization is always proper, but I believe that it provides sufficient evidence of the intellectual origin of Calvin’s dynamic understanding of the law.

Christian humanists in Calvin’s times tried to find their way back to the apostolic era. Their slogan *ad fontes* was not just a literary or cultural expression but its aim was to save the church from the papacy and recover the true catholicity of the early church.\(^{151}\) Although they worshipped God according to the Catholic traditions, they already were imbued with Protestant ideas. They saw scriptural interpretation as the culmination of *ad fontes*. They lived their lives in the era of transition from *ad*

So along with the influence of Budé’s linguistic and literary interpretation, Alciati’s purely philological approach to the text, and de l’Estoile’s determinative but practical position on the annotation on the text, we should take into account the religious pietism of the jurists. As we see from the lives of Budé, de l’Estoile, and Major, who was influenced by the devotio modera, the legal and logical mind was not regarded as incompatible with religious spirituality. They did not differentiate legal duty from religious piety and from the covenantal obligation of the chosen people. For the first time, people began to realize that it was more important to elucidate the existence and character of people who are designated by the regulations of the legal texts, rather than the texts themselves. This represents the soul of the Renaissance.

The new understanding of the normative role of the law was influenced by this new perspective on man, “the renaissance man.” Calvin probably found the source of the new thought in the ancient philosopher who was known as a Stoic with Christian sympathies, Seneca, who showed throughout his writings “a strong sense of sin, with an accompanying practice of self examination and sensitiveness to conscience.”

In the commentary on Seneca’s De clementia, the prince is depicted not only as the interpreter and executor of the law, but also the law himself. His position is basically understood as the reconciler who resolves the tension between personal virtue and social morality. Also, he is presented as the mediator between God and his people in view of the fact that he does not only rule over his people with an authority which has a divine origin, but has to serve his people because it is a divinely given duty. Meanwhile, man is described as one who longs for the commonality of the society and at the same time should be ruled in order for the public good. People are sinners and are to be reformed by discipline itself.

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152 In Calvin’s times, the word “jurists” was used to denote not only professional lawyers who studied law but also people who were well read in canon law and civil law as well as Roman law. Michel Reulos, “Les Juristes: En Contact avec Calvin,” in Calvin et ses contemporains, ed. Olivier Millet (Genève: Droz, 1998), 213.

153 Breen, John Calvin, 72.
From this understanding of humanity and society, Calvin deploys his view of law in the commentary. The relationship between law and society is compared to the sinews and soul of the body. The law plays a negative role when it expels people who are incorrigible, but mostly it works for the education and renewal of people. The normative meaning of the law is not always a fixed one but can change according to the historical context. But this does not mean that the norm of a specific law depends on fortuitousness.

In many cases in the commentary, Calvin shows his Christian view *fontibus Christianis*, especially with notable citations from Augustine. Can we, then, find any theological view of the law of the young Calvin in the commentary? From the first *Institutes*, Calvin emphasizes the continuity between natural law and moral law (1536 *Inst.* 1.4, CO 1.29). In the 1559 *Institutes*, Calvin discusses the identities of natural law and divine law in their essence not only in the section on the interpretation of the law but also in the section on civil law (Inst. 2.8.1, 4.20.16). Thus, Calvin’s view of natural law is crucial in understanding his theology of the law. It is worthwhile to investigate the young Calvin’s stance on Stoicism, however, the more important task is to prove how it was maintained or abandoned or modified.

Calvin provides many crucial insights we may encounter when we deal with natural law in a theological manner. He reveals the textual and contextual approach to a specific text. He presents various kinds of rhetorical skills which are also found in his later works. He also demonstrates his strong propensity for the normative use of the law. He claims that the reading of texts should strongly take into account the specific people in the specific context. These concerns of Calvin are well reflected in

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154 All citations of the 1536 *Institutes* are from the Battles translation (rev. ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986). The first reference marks the chapter and section number of the English translation. The second reference is from *Calvini Opera*, which is abbreviated by CO followed by the volume and page number.

his theological works, especially in his commentary on the last four books of the Pentateuch in relation to its structure and its emphasis on God's accommodation to the hardness of heart of the ancient people.  

With all these concerns, however, we should keep in mind that the Stoic understanding of the law is based on the prominent ethical virtue of moderation rather than on the Christian concept of self-denial, and on the Stoic view of necessity rather than on the Christian doctrine of predestination. Calvin's commentary on *De clementia* does not give us any clue to the origin of his Christological understanding of the law, however, it reveals the young Calvin's resolution to bring together "a fusion of God-given instruction and God-directed history" with the omnipotent providence of God, even though it is not as theological as in his commentary on the Pentateuchal laws.

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CHAPTER III

THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF CALVIN’S CHRISTOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW

In this chapter we are going to explore the formation and development of Calvin’s theology of the law taking into consideration its place and significance in the whole structure of his theology. This is going to be very useful for the overview of Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law before we deal it with more specifically in the light of his concept of Christus mediator legis.

3.1 The Law in Calvin’s Early Writings

The authorship of Nicholas Cop’s academic address, delivered on 1 November 1533 (Concio academica nominem rectoris universitatis Parisiensis, CO 9.873-876, CO 10/2.30-36), has been discussed in relation to whether it was in fact Calvin’s first theological work. Some scholars have recognized it as crucial to establishing the time of Calvin’s conversion. In this inaugural lecture, the new rector of the University of Paris proclaimed “philosophia christianæ,” which he designated as “Christi philosophia” in view of the fact that our true faith should be established on “Christ, best and greatest, who is the one true intercessor with the

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1 Concerning the authorship of this work, scholars have mostly agreed that Calvin at least drafted it or co-operated with Cop upon it since Jean Rott suggested this theory in “Documents strasbourgeois concernant Calvin,” Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses 44 (1964), 290-305 (text with notes, 305-311). Cf. Joseph N. Tylenda, “Calvin’s First Reformed Sermon? Nicholas Cop’s Discourse—1 November 1533,” WTJ 38/3 (1976), 300-310 (translation with notes, 310-318); W. de Greef, The Writings of John Calvin, tr. Lyle D. Bierma (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989), 23, 86-87; Ganoczy, The Young Calvin, 80-82; Hans Scholl, “Nicolaus Cop—Pariser Rektoratsrede vom 1. November 1533,” CSA 1/1.1-9 (text and translation, 10-25). For scholars such as Parker who uphold Calvin’s early conversion, this address is regarded as his first work written as a Protestant, but for scholars such as Bouwsma and Wendel who argue for the continuity of humanistic background and Calvin’s late conversion, it is considered to show his “Evangelical humanism position.” Parker, John Calvin, 30; Bouwsma, John Calvin, 15; Wendel, Calvin, 40.
Father, to illuminate our minds with his life-giving Spirit.”² From this perspective, Cop, sharply critical of les sophistes de la Sorbonne who “vilify and contaminate everything, and enclose it within their own sophistical laws,”³ emphasized the grace of the law as well as the accusing function of the law. He said that “Christ is setting before our eyes his grace and his kindness; and is rightly interpreting Moses’ teaching as to how the Law is to be understood,”⁴ and that “the Law mentions the mercy of God, but only on a definite condition: provided the Law be fulfilled.” Therefore, he claimed, there is no other way but “the promise of Christ” to “live a godly life.”⁵

The other example of how Calvin understands the relationship between the law and the gospel in light of the relation of the law to Christ can be found in his French preface to Olivetan’s New Testament translation published in 1535 (A tous amateurs de Iésus Christ, et de son S. Evangile, salut, CO 9.791-821).⁶ In the following lines, he succinctly asserts that Christ is the substance and fulfilment of the law.

God has confirmed his people in every possible way during their long waiting for the great Messiah, by providing them with his written law, containing numerous ceremonies, purifications, and sacrifices, which were but the figures and shadows (figures et umbres, figureae et adumbrationes) of the great blessings to come with Christ, who alone was the embodiment and truth (le corps et verité, corpus substantia veritas) of them. For the law was incapable of bringing anyone to

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³ Ibid., 364-366 (CO 10/2.30-31). Note Calvin’s rhetorical expression to accuse the Sorbonne theologians in the following passage including the quotation: “Hoc vitium perditissimi sophistae incurrerunt, qui de lana caprina perpetuo contendunt, rixantur, altercantur, nihil de fide, nihil de amore Dei * *
³ nihil de veris operibus disserunt * *, omnia calumniantur, omnia suis legibus, id est, sophistices coercent” (CO 10/2.31). The unknown fragments marked as * * might be suggested as “nihil de remissione peccatorum, nihil de gratis, nihil de justificatione,” and “Aut si certe disserunt,” Scholl, tr., “Nicolaus Cop—Pariser Rektoratsrede vom. 1. November 1533,” 12.
⁴ Ibid., 367 (CO 10/2.32).
⁵ Ibid., 369 (CO 10/2.34): “Lex misericordiae Dei mentionem facit, sed certa conditione: si impleatur. . . . ex sola Christi promissione, de qua qui dubitat pie vivere non potest et gehennae incendium sibi parat.”
⁶ From 1551 on, the title of the foreword read: Epistre aux fidèles montrant comment Christ est la fin de la loy. The Latin version of this preface was published by Beza in 1576 under the title of Praefatio in N.T. cuius haec summa est: Christum esse legis finem (CO 9.792-822). De Groot, The Writings of John Calvin, 90-92; Ernst Saxer, “Calvins Vorrede zur Olivetanbibel (1535),” CSA 1/1.27-32 (text and translation, 34-57).
perfection; it only presented Christ, and like a teacher spoke of and led to him, who was, as was said by Saint Paul, the end and fulfillment (la fin et accomplissement, finis et complementum) of the law.\(^7\)

Calvin claims emphatically that the law is the rule of living in his early catechetical and confessional works including the 1536 Institutes (Christianae religionis institutio), the first catechisms in French (Instruction et confession de Foy dont on use en l’Eglise de Genève of 1537, CO 22.33-74) and in Latin (Catechismus, sive christianae religionis institutio of 1538, CO 5.317-362),\(^8\) and the catechismus posterior in French (Le Catéchisme de l’église de Genève of 1542, CO 6.9-145) and in Latin (Catechismus ecclesiae Genevensis in 1545, CO 6.10-146). The normative function of the law was proclaimed in the Genevan confession (Confession de la foy of 1536 or 1537, CO 22.85-96), which was presented by Farel and Calvin, in Article 3: “[B]ecause his [God’s] will is the only principle of all justice, we confess that all our life ought to be ruled in accordance with the commandments of his holy law in which is contained all perfection of justice, and that we ought to have no other rule of good and just living (reigle de bien vivre et iustement).”\(^9\)

Calvin called the first catechisms “a brief summary (summa) of religion” in the “Letter to the Reader” of the Genevan Catechism in 1545.\(^10\) Although the two catechisms do not contain his characteristic remarks on the threefold use of the law.

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\(^8\) Opposing the position of Rilliet and Dufour, who argue that Calvin translated the French Catechism into Latin, Rodolphe Peter suggests that the Latin version preceded the French. Olivier Millet, “Le premier ‘Catéchisme’ de Genève (1537/1538) et sa place dans l’oeuvre de Calvin,” in Catéchismes et Confessions de foi, ed. Jean Boisset (Montpellier: Université de Montpellier, 1995), 216.


\(^10\) The Catechism of the Church of Geneva, CTT 90 (CO 6.8); Rilliet, “Notice Historique,” 22 ff.
they touch on very crucial theological issues regarding the law, which were further developed in his later major writings. As a foreword to his interpretation of the Ten Commandments Calvin points out that the law, which is “the most perfect rule of all righteousness (perfectissima totius iustitiae regula),” reveals “the Lord’s everlasting will.” Then he claims that the sum of the law (legis summa) is love. In the following section, entitled “Quid ex sola lege ad nos redeat,” Calvin defines the nature of the law as “the true pattern of a righteous and holy life and even the most perfect image of righteousness itself (verum iustae ac sanctae vitae exemplar, adeoque imago iustitiae ipsius absolutissima),” and says that since the fall this original office of the law never works as desired without “the promise of eternal life.” Here Calvin is eager to relate the normative feature of the law to the promise of eternal life contained in our salvation.

Although Calvin does not devote a specific section to the threefold use of the law, he deals with the first and third uses of the law succinctly in the sections called “Legem gradum esse ad Christum” and “Per fidem sanctificamur in legis obedientiam.” Especially, the latter shows the Christological origin of the third use of the law very impressively.

Scripture teaches that for us Christ was made not only righteousness but sanctification as well. The observance of the law does not therefore require our capacity, but rather spiritual power whereby it comes to pass that our hearts are cleansed of their corruption and softened to the obedience of righteousness. Now Christians make a far different use of the law than those without faith can make of it. For where the Lord had engraven on our hearts the love of his righteousness, the outward teaching of law, which previously was accusing us of nothing but weakness and transgression, is now a lantern (lucerna, une lampe) for our feet to keep us from wandering away from the straight path. It is our wisdom by which we are formed and instructed to complete uprightness. It is our discipline which does not permit us to abandon ourselves in more wicked license.

It should be noted that Calvin writes this passage in the light of having stated

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12 First Catechism 11-16 (CO 5.327-332, CO 22.38-46).
14 First Catechism, 19-20 (CO 5.335-336, CO 22.49-50).
that “Just as Christ by his righteousness intercedes on our behalf with the Father, that with him as our sponsor we may be reckoned as righteous, so by the participation in his Spirit he sanctifies to all purity and innocence.” Calvin here relates the third use of the law, which is developed along with his doctrine of double grace, to the communication of Christ’s righteousness through the working of the Spirit of the Mediator. As we see later, this position of Calvin is prominently shown in his 1539 Institutes.16

It is obvious from its title that in the Catechism of the Church of Geneva of 1542/45, which is called Catechismus posterior, Calvin is more concerned about the practical use of the law in the Christian life than its systematization.17 This work, termed “solemn christianae communionis symbolum,” is composed of four parts: faith, law, prayer, and sacrament.18 The section on the law includes the definitional question and answer—“M: What rule of life (vivendi regulam) has he given us? C: His law”—, the interpretation of the Ten Commandments, “a brief compendium of the whole law,” and the “duplex officium legis.”19 These themes had been introduced in his first Catechism, but here Calvin emphasizes the third use of the law more.20 It defines the law as “a perfect rule of all righteousness (perfectam omnis iustitiae regulam),” ultimately revealing “the form for rightly worshipping God (formam Dei rite colendi).”21

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15 Ibid., 19 (CO 5.335, CO 22.49).
16 Olivier Millet points out that Calvin’s first catechisms should be dealt with not so much as the summary of the 1536 Institutes as with reference to its relation to both the 1536 and 1539 Institutes. His argument is based on the fact that Calvin’s ideas in the first catechisms developed partly to the confession of faith in 1536/1537 and partly to the 1536 and 1539 Institutes. “Le premier ‘Catéchisme’ de Genève (1537/1538) et sa place dans l’oeuvre de Calvin,” 209-229, esp. 212, 224.
17 The full title of the 1542 French Catechism is Le Catéchisme de l’église de Genève, c’est a dire le Formulaire d’instruire les enfants en la chrestienté. Also, its Latin version of 1545 had the same title.
18 The Catechism of the Church of Geneva, “Letter to the Reader,” 90 (CO 6.8), and text, 91-139 (CO 6.9-134).
21 The Catechism of the Church of Geneva, 117-118 (CO 6.79-82). Although basically in agreement with the theory of Jacques Courvoisier, who argues for the influence of Bucer’s catechisms (1534, 1537) upon Calvin’s 1542 Catechism, Olivier Millet points out their difference as he comments that while Bucer in his catechisms deals with “la fois du colloque religieux humaniste et du traité
3.2 The Development of Calvin’s Christological Understanding of the Law in the *Institutes*

3.2.1 Theological Apologia in the First Chapter of the 1536 *Institutes*

According to Jean-Daniel Benoît, the development of Calvin’s *Institutes* 1536-1560 was “organic.” It was not like adding new blocks upon broken walls but “rather the growth of a living entity, the increase of which is at the same time the concern of all the members of the organism.” In dealing with theological *loci* and *disputationes* for the formulation of his Christological understanding of the law, Calvin clearly reveals this tendency.

As has frequently been observed, the first edition of the *Institutes* was written basically to conform to the classical pattern of catechism in the order of *de lege, de fide, de oratione,* and *de sacramentis* under the influence of Luther’s *Small and Large Catechisms* of 1529. However, Calvin’s concern in this book was not restricted to its catechetical or confessional purpose as had been the case in the schools of the Middle Ages, but he extended the scope to current apologetic agendas such as religious tolerance, false Catholic sacraments, and Christian freedom, including ecclesiastical power and civil government. This is noteworthy, but we

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23 August Lang, “The Sources of Calvin’s *Institutes* of 1536,” *Evangelical Quarterly* 8 (1936), 134; Benoît, “The History and Development of the *Institutio,*” 103; Battles, “Introduction,” 1536 *Inst.* xlviii-xl; Wendel, *Calvin* 112; Neuser, “The Development of the *Institutes* 1536 to 1559,” 36-38; Elsie McKee, “Calvin’s 1536 *Institutes:* The Church’s Book,” in *Calvin Studies III,* 36; McNeill, *The History and Character of Calvinism,* 124-125; Dowey, *The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology,* 232. Among these scholars, Wendel, Lang, and Dowey are very positive about the influence of Luther’s *Small Catechism* on the order of the 1536 *Institutes.* On the other hand, Neuser, Battles, McNeill, Benoît, and McKee regard it as of great importance that Calvin followed the traditional pattern of Catechism in the late medieval period. From this point of view, Neuser particularly criticizes W. Diehl, who overvalues the influence of Luther’s *Large Catechism* on Calvin’s 1536 *Institutes.* Cf. Diehl, “Calvins Auslegung des Dekaloges,” 141 ff.

24 According to Albert Rilliet, this differentiates Calvin’s 1536 *Institutes* and first catechisms from Luther’s *Large Catechism* and shows some characteristics of Calvinism in its early stage. Rilliet, “Notice Historique,” 42-44. Richard A. Muller notes that the contents of the final chapter of the 1536 *Institutes* are analogous to those of the “table of household duties (*tabula oeconomica*)” which was appended by Luther to the *Small Catechism.* *The Unaccommodated Calvin,* 120.
should not disregard the fact that in the 1536 *Institutes* Calvin’s apologetic was not exclusively concerned with defending of Christian freedom and true ecclesiastical and secular orders but he emphasized the proclamation of “the nature of doctrine (\textit{qualis sit doctrina})” and “certain rudiments by which those who are touched with any zeal for religion might be shaped to true godliness,” as he pointed out in the dedicatory letter to king Francis I of France (1, \textit{CO} 1.9).

Calvin’s theological apologia in the 1536 *Institutes* was not so much polemical or formal as doctrinal, and sheds light on the formation and significance of his “Reformed” view of Christian doctrine. This is especially prominent in the first chapter, where Calvin deals with crucial theological doctrines under the title of the law, which, brief as they are, cover the whole schema of salvation, i.e., the knowledge of God the Creator and the Redeemer and the knowledge of man, the righteousness of God revealed in the law, the grace of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit, justification by faith, and the threefold use of the law. Calvin here relates the two kinds of knowledge to the law, that are the revelation of God’s will, and the doctrine of justification to the threefold use of the law.

As regards the formation of Calvin’s theology of the law in the 1536 *Institutes*, mentioning of the influence of Luther and Melanchthon has become commonplace in contemporary Calvin studies, regarding the distinction between the two tables of the Decalogue and the relationship between the old law and the new law of Christ. Also, the influence of Bucer and Zwingli on Calvin’s normative and spiritual understanding of the law in the 1536 *Institutes* has been persuasively argued

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Cf. McKee, “Calvin’s 1536 *Institutes,” 35-37.}
\end{footnotes}
for by some scholars, with reference to the former’s view of double justification and union with Christ and the latter’s moral theology based on the conception of the spiritual duty of the law in his theory of forensic atonement.  

There are three noteworthy points in the 1536 Institutes that seem to reveal Calvin’s dynamic position on the understanding of the law. We can say that these points are early indicators of what later matures into Calvin’s fixed position on the law. First of all, he concentrates on the instructive role of the law, which is to illuminate our heart so as to make us see the true righteousness of God, and to convict every man of his own unrighteousness. Emphasizing the fact that “the law teaches (edocet) God’s will,” he points out that the instruction of the law is both indicative and imperative. As he puts it, the law “teaches us what perfect righteousness is and how it is to be kept” (1.4, CO 1.29).

Calvin’s emphasis on the instructive function of the law stems from his conviction that God, who is “himself a just judge,” is “merciful and gentle,” i.e., a merciful justifier. From this seemingly dialectical attribute of God, Calvin explains the “righteousness” of God, which is ultimately revealed by “the whole righteousness of the law” (1.1, CO 1.27). Therefore, the revelation of the law refers not only to the godly life according to the rule of living but also to the renovation of the whole life.

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As Calvin puts it, “in lege docetur, vitae perfectionem vere esse iustitiam” (1.4, CO 1.29).

By using the verbs *doceo* and *edoceo* repeatedly here, Calvin shows his dominant interest in the office of the law to reveal and teach how to keep and fulfil (*absolvere*) its rules, rather than in its office to convict (*convincere*) sin. The law reflects our miserable state like “a mirror (*speculum),” but it also shines with God’s grace in imputing his righteousness gratuitously unto us (1.4, CO 1.29). Therefore, God reveals by the law both God the Creator and God the Redeemer. As Dr. Hesselink observes, in the 1536 *Institutes* “Calvin’s concept of the law is viewed by him in direct connection with the revealed will of the Creator-Redeemer God, the God of the gospel.”

Secondly, Calvin points out that Jesus Christ came as “the best interpreter (*interpretem*) of the law,” not as “the giver (*latorem*)” of another law that might be called “the law of the gospel (*legis evangelicae*)” (1.25, CO 1.43). Commenting on the pedagogical function of the fourth commandment, Calvin indicates that “we still retain the truth of the precept which the Lord willed the Jews and us to have forever and in common” (1.13 [altered], CO 1.36). In dealing with the continual validity of the law for the Christian life, Calvin emphasizes that with the outward works of the law completed, Christ made our heart affected by the teaching of the law through his Spirit. He calls this persuasion of the heart “a true and living faith (*vera vivaque fides*)” (1.6, CO 1.31). Following from his dynamic concept of faith, Calvin points out that the principle of *sola fide* applies to all the benefits of salvation, including “free forgiveness of sins, peace and reconciliation with God, the gifts and the grace of the Holy Spirit” (1.6 [altered], CO. 1.30). In claiming that the right and holy living of the Christian is the special gift of the Holy Spirit, Calvin relates the normative use of the law to the Spirit of Christ on the basis of his doctrine of the union with Christ.

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30 Hesselink, *Calvin’s Concept of the Law*, 32. Cf. Wernle, *Der evangelische Glaube*, 3.4-23. According to Wernle, with regard to the theological use of the law Calvin discusses the office of the law to reveal, like the mirror (*der Spiegel*), both the knowledge of God the Creator and God the Redeemer; in the same vein, in dealing with the sum of the law—love—in place of the third use of the law, he emphasizes the Christological meaning of the precept and promise (grace) of the law.
the substance and truth of the law (1.6, CO 1.31).31

Thirdly, Calvin testifies that God justifies us by imputing his righteousness into us so that he may not only liberate us from the bondage of the law to find refuge in Christ, but he also engrave the law on our heart in order for us to live accordingly. As Anthony N. S. Lane observes, “the fact that justification is by faith alone does not mean that one can be justified with faith alone.”32 Calvin says, “to be Christians under the law of grace does not mean to wander unbridled outside the law, but to be engrafted (insitos) in Christ, by whose grace we are free of the curse of the law, and by whose Spirit we have the law engraved upon our hearts [Jer. 31:33]” (1.26, CO 1.44). Thus, Calvin’s view of the duplex iustificatio—justification not only for our soul but also for our good works—means to die to the law and to live again in the law. In the 1536 Institutes, Calvin already explores his own understanding of duplex iustificatio, which signifies the double imputation of God (1.32, CO 1.49). Concerning the value of good works he says, “the works are acceptable to God, and the believers are pleasing to him in these: not that they thus deserve (merentur), but because the divine goodness has established this value for them” (1.36 [altered], CO 1.53).

In the 1536 Institutes, Calvin does not qualify any specific use of the law as proper (proprius) or principal (praecipus), but depicts the third use as “no unimportant use (non mediocrem usum)” (1.33, CO 1.50). However, in his first Institutes Calvin already takes special consideration of the third use. He deals with the continual validity of the law for believers before treating the threefold use of the law in an independent section (1.26, 32). Moreover, the following sections, which Battles classifies under the title of justification, are actually related to the third use as a whole (1.34-38). He declares the core of the normative use by indicating that “the law is an exhortation (exhortatio) to believers” (1.33, CO 1.50).

The law serves to reveal our sin, but it is not only accusing but also

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31 Therefore, we share “the gifts of Christ” when we are members of his flesh. Cf. Comm. I Cor. 11:1 (246, CO 49.487).
32 Justification by Faith in Catholic-Protestant Dialogue, 27 (author’s italics).
instructive, even in the stage of repentance. It is not only legally punitive but also theologically forensic, for “all promises and curses [are] set forth for us in the law itself” (1.6, CO 1.31). Calvin follows Bucer and Melanchthon, who separates legal repentance (poenitentia legalis) from evangelical repentance (poenitentia evangelica) and relate the former to mortification and the latter to vivification (5.12-13, CO 1.147-148), but he believes that the only repentance that is true is out of the “true and pure fear of God,” which arises from the knowledge of the precepts and promises of the law (5.14-15, CO 1.148-150).33

In order to bring our attention to the law of grace (lex gratiae), Calvin refers to Augustine’s famous dictum, which appears in his Confessions: “Let him [the Lord] give what he commands, and command what he wills (Det ille quod iubet, et iubeat quod velit)” (1.26, CO 1.44).”34 However, it should be noted that unlike Augustine, who emphasizes the work of the Holy Spirit in dealing with God’s grace upon the good works of the law, Calvin turns specifically to the forensic righteousness of God fulfilled by the mediation of Christ and Christ’s imputation of it (1.38, CO 1.54).35 Thus, with reference to “satisfaction,” Calvin points out that there is no other way but “the prerogative of Christ’s blood alone (solius Christi sanguinis praerogativam)” (1.37, CO 1.53).

3.2.2 Exploring the Soteriological Significance of the Law in the 1539 Institutes

In the 1539 Institutes, some parts which belonged to the first chapter of the 1536 Institutes, entitled “De lege,” were developed as independent chapters entitled “De cognitione Dei,” “De cognitione hominis et libero arbitrio,” and “De


iustificatione fidei et meritis operum." The section "De poenitentia" was augmented to form a separate new chapter and put before the chapter "De iustificatione fidei," thus the repentance-justification framework was formed, which was maintained throughout the later versions. "De praedestinatione and providentia Dei" became an independent chapter and was placed after a new chapter "De similitudine ac differentia veteris ac novi testamenti." Finally, with a new chapter called "De vita hominis Christiani" appearing, all major chapters on the law in the 1559 Institutes were already established here. 36

The ordo docendi of the 1539 Institutes shows the influence of the commentaries on Romans written by contemporary theologians, especially Melanchthon’s published in 1519 and augmented in 1530. 37 The influence of Bucer’s Romans commentary (1536) is definitely more recognizable here, with reference to the Christological understanding of the law focused on the union with Christ through the work of the Holy Spirit. 38 Also, the influence of the Zurich theologians is considerable upon Calvin’s view of the continuity of the law in the Old and New Testaments, upon the common origin of natural law and the divine law, and upon the doctrine of the civil government in the light of covenantal grace and the duty attached to it. 39 Calvin wrote the new edition of the Institutes in order to establish the whole schema of the theological doctrines, so that he “shall have no need to undertake lengthy doctrinal discussions and to digress into loci communes” in interpreting the Scriptures. The commentary on Romans was the first "example (specimen)" of this intention. 40 Calvin hastened to write a new edition of the

36 Wernle asserts that in the 1536 Institutes Calvin treats the whole range of major doctrines in the title of the law and in 1539 these themes are reformulated according to the basic schema of the two kinds of the knowledge of God. Der Evangelische Glaube 3.23-24, 166 ff.
37 Ibid., 3.166; Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin, 129-130. Muller notes that the structure of the 1539 Institutes “ought to be described not as a movement from catechism to system but as an integration of the catechetical topics and order with the topics and order of Pauline soteriology.”
38 Wendel, Calvin, 140.
40 OS 3.6 (CO 1.255). Also cited in Parker, Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries, 10. Concerning the relation between Calvin’s Romans commentary and the 1539 Institutes, see T. H. L. Parker and D. C. Parker, ed., John Calvin, Commentarius in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos (Genève:
Institutes from the beginning of 1537 and must have finished writing many parts of it before he visited Strasbourg.\textsuperscript{41}

In the 1539 Institutes, Calvin gives some very important accounts of the concept and use of the law in the sections on free will (2.76-94, \textit{CO} 1.356-372).\textsuperscript{42} Emphasizing that the law has the two sides: “command” and “promise,” and works not only as a rule of living but also as a way to grace (2.82, \textit{CO} 1.361), he explains “the three classes (\textit{formis}) of precepts,” which basically correspond to the threefold use of the law (2.83, \textit{CO} 1.362). In dealing with the normative use of the law, he highlights the exhortation of the law by adding new passages on it (2.80, \textit{CO} 1.359-360).

Calvin’s propensity towards a Christological understanding of the law on the ground of \textit{Christus mediator legis} is clearly noticeable. In treating the connection between Word and Spirit, he declares that the law becomes “the word of life (\textit{verbum vitae})” when it “shows forth Christ,” but it “slays its readers” when it is “apart from Christ (\textit{citra Christum})” (1.36, \textit{CO} 1.302). In dealing with the divinity of Christ before his incarnation, Calvin points out the work of the Spirit of Christ, who is “Jehovah our Righteousness,” in order to explain the revelation of the law in the Old Testament (4.8, 11, \textit{CO} 1.481, 483-484). The 1539 Institutes augments Calvin’s stance on the soteriologico-historical (\textit{heilsgeschichtlich}) aspect of the law. For example, in the 1536 Institutes Calvin, interpreting the word “crucified” in the Apostles’ Creed, claims that Christ “had been cursed (\textit{maledicta}) by God’s law” (2.14, \textit{CO} 1.69). In the 1539 edition he adds that Christ’s crucifixion “was foreshadowed (\textit{adumbratum}) in the law” (4.23, \textit{CO} 1.527).

In the 1539 Institutes, some passages on justification which belonged to the

\textsuperscript{41} Cf. Wilhelm Niesel, “\textit{Descriptio et historia editionum Institutionis latinarum et gallicarum Calvino vivo emissarum},” in \textit{OS} 3. XII.

\textsuperscript{42} All citations of the 1539, 1543, 1550 editions of the \textit{Institutes} are from \textit{Calvini Opera}, which is abbreviated by \textit{CO} preceded by the chapter and section number and followed by the volume and page number.
first chapter of the 1536 Institutes formed a new chapter, “De justificatione fidei et meritis operum,” with significant augmentations that help us understand Calvin’s concept of the law regarding its soteriological significance.

First, he augments some passages on the perfection of righteousness, specifically on God’s grace that allows our good works to be seen righteous. “The complete observance of the law is perfect righteousness before God,” but “the teaching of the law is far above human capacity” (3.91, CO 1.426-427); therefore, “not rejecting our imperfect obedience, but rather supplying what is lacking to complete it, he causes us to receive the benefit of the promises of the law (legalium promissionum) as if we had fulfilled their condition” (3.92, CO 1.427).

Secondly, Calvin argues that although those whose sins are forgiven thus regarded as righteous in front of God are liberated from the bondage of the law, they are still to live according to the teaching of the law (3.104, CO 1.435). He criticizes Bucer and Melanchthon who interpret the phrase “deleto quod contra nos erat, chirographo in decretis” in Colossians 2:14, focusing on its literal meaning, by asserting that although their interpretations are rightly based on the distinction between the moral and ceremonial laws and between the accusatory and instructive functions of the law, they do not pay proper attention to the fact that in this verse Paul argues for the merit of Christ’s blood-sacrifice in which the continual validity of the law is sustained rather than annulled (3.105, CO 1.435-438).

Thirdly, Calvin underscores the third use of the law by emphasizing that obedience to the law is the gift of grace. He argues that humans are incapable of living according to the law, which is “the rule of perfect righteousness (perfectae iustitiae regula).” Our obedience is like “the payment of a debt”; however, God promises a “reward” of “eternal life” for it; “He therefore yields his own right when he offers a reward for our obedience.” From this point of view, “the perfect teaching of righteousness that the Lord claims for the law has a perpetual validity” (3.2-3.6, CO 1.371-375). In the 1539 edition, Calvin emphasized the third use and the validity of the first two uses concerning believers and nonbelievers. For the first time he
regards the third use of the law the “principal” use, which “pertains more closely to the proper purpose of the law” (3.101, CO 1.433).\textsuperscript{43}

Calvin introduces a new metaphor: “the scales of the law (legis trutinam)” in addition to the law being “a mirror (speculi)” used in the 1536 edition to explain the punitive function of the law which is to inform us of our miserable state and convict the “presumption of fictitious righteousness” (3.94, CO 1.429). He adds new arguments about our incapacity to meet the perfection of God’s righteousness and the truth of justification in Christ. He says, “in the precepts of the law, God is but the rewarmer of perfect righteousness, which all of us lack, and conversely, the severe judge of evil deeds. But in Christ his face shines, full of grace and gentleness, even upon us poor and unworthy sinners” (3.94-3.98, CO 1.428-431, quot. 3.97). In spite of his elaborate explanation of the righteousness of the law in the process of justification, Calvin indicates that this kind of teaching should be “far from abusing the law (legi contumeliosa)” and says, “the grace of God, which nourishes us without the support of the law, becomes sweeter, and his mercy, which bestows this grace upon us, becomes more lovely” (3.96, CO 1.430). Calvin closes this section by indicating that the first use refers even “to the reprobate” (3.98, CO 1.431).

As to the second use of the law, there was no specific augmentation except to point out that the law works as “tutelage (paedagogia)” and “a halter (retinaculum)” “even for the children of God” (3.100, CO 1.432-433). It seems that this reflects the influence of Lutheran antinomian controversies. Afterwards no other augmentation for the first two uses was made except for an addition of one section in relation to the second use in the 1543 Institutes.

With regard to the third use of the law, Calvin says that owing to the function of “teaching (doctrina)” and “exhortation (exhortatione)” of the law, believers are “to learn more thoroughly each day the nature of the Lord’s will” and are “to conform and accommodate (componat et accommodet)” themselves to “their master’s ways (mores domini).” In order to express this use of the law more figuratively, Calvin

\textsuperscript{43} “Tertius usus, qui et praecessus est et in proprium legis finem proprius spectat, . . .”
uses a new metaphor of “a constant sting (assiduus aculeus),” and implies that what David sings of the nature of the law in Psalm 119 and what Paul teaches in Romans are “what it [the law] can of itself confer upon (conferre) man” rather than “what use the law serves (praestet) for the regenerate” (3.101, CO 1.433). Calvin connects the knowledge of God to living according to the law more specifically than in the 1536 Institutes when he deals with human free will. He says that spiritualis perspicientia consists in “knowing God, His will towards us, and the way of framing our life according to it” (2.37, CO 1.327). Also, in the 1539 Institutes he argues that by the precepts of the law, which is a rule of life (vitae regula), we are “converted to God,” “bidden to honor God,” and finally we “remain under God’s grace” (2.82-83, CO 1.361-362). He devoted a new section to criticizing the Libertine sect and John Agricola, who maintained the annulment of the old law and denied the function of the law in the process of salvation (3.102, CO 1.433-434).

In the 1539 Institutes, Calvin reinforced the critique of 1536 against the view that “Christ was another Moses, the giver of the law of the gospel” by dealing with the continuity of the law in the light of the purpose of the lawgiver. He criticizes some contemporaries for having thought “that Christ added (adiicere) to the law when he only restored (restituit) it to its integrity” and of “the perfection of the law of the gospel, that it far surpasses the old law—in many respects a most pernicious opinion!” (3.9, CO 1.376). Furthermore his interpretation of Colossians 2:13-14 argues that the substance of old ceremonies has not been destroyed by the blood offering of Christ although their practices were annulled (3.105, CO 1.435-438). Calvin’s argument for the agreement between the Old and New Testaments was deployed against Servetus and the Anabaptists who tried to eliminate any

44 “Deum nosse, eius erga nos voluntatem, et formandae secundum illam vitae rationem.” This sentence is augmented in 1559 in this way: “Deum nosse, paternum erga nos eius favorem, in quo salus nostra consistit, et formandae secundum legis regulam vitae rationem” (Inst. 2.2.18, CO 2.200).
45 Cf. McNeill points to Melanchthon and Aquinas as these theologians in footnote 12 at Inst. 2.8.7.
Christological significance from the Old Testament law.\textsuperscript{46}

It should be noted that although Calvin sustained his view of law and gospel, and the role of the law in the whole process of salvation, which was asserted in the 1536 Institutes, he here elaborated on more precisely the “promises and threats” of the law. He stressed how far humans are from “the sufficiency of the law” and accordingly how great the grace of God is (3.3-6, CO 1.372-375). He then explained three principles of spiritual interpretation of the law (3.7-14, CO 1.375-380) and Jesus Christ’s teaching of the law (3.80-88, CO 1.421-425). Finally, he concludes that the commandments of the law regulate “all the duties of piety and love (\textit{omnia pietatis et dilectionis officia})” (3.81, CO 1.421).\textsuperscript{47}

3.2.3 Institutes 1543-1550

In the 1543 Institutes Calvin dealt with religious vows and monasticism in a separate chapter called “De votis” and with the doctrine of faith in a new chapter called “De fide.” In the new versions, the 1543 and 1550 Institutes, Calvin added current debates on the doctrine of the church and civil government extensively.\textsuperscript{48}

The newly written sections on the doctrine of angels (3.24-43, CO 1.497-503) and on images, where Calvin distinguished \textit{latria} and \textit{dulia} in order to testify the true worship of God (3.24-43, CO 1.384-397), revealed his special concern for major issues concerning the church.\textsuperscript{49} With a large number of passages cited from the early


\textsuperscript{47} The title of the first French version of the Institutes, published in 1541, which is the translation of the 1539 Institutes, shows the book is “une somme de piété” and “de salut.” Cf. Doumergue, \textit{Jean Calvin, 4.3}.


church fathers, especially from Augustine, this edition of the *Institutes* can be rightly called the “most patristic.”

There is no specific augmentation regarding the third use of the law in the 1543 *Institutes*, but in dealing with the perfection of Christian life Calvin points out the complex working of the law for believers by indicating that man is *simul iustus et peccator* (2.63-66, *CO* 1.348-350). In the same vein, in the chapter on repentance, he emphasizes “the duties of piety toward God, of charity toward men in the whole of life, holiness and purity” (9.10 [altered], *CO* 1.692).

In 1543 Calvin added a new section on the second use of the law, paying special attention to Galatians 3:24, “the law was for the Jews a tutor (paedagogum) unto Christ” (3.100, *CO* 1.432-433). In his commentary on this verse, published later in 1548, Calvin focused on the first use of the law by using two metaphors, i.e., “a mirror (speculo)” with a view to pointing out the use of the law to reveal our unrighteousness and “the grammarian of pupils (grammaticus puerorum)” in order to explain the function of the law to enlighten our heart by “the theology of faith.”

In the 1543 *Institutes*, however, Calvin relates this verse not only to the first use of the law but also to the second use. He says that even for some of the elect who have not yet been regenerated by the “chaste and pure fear (timore casto et puro)” of God, the law serves to keep them from committing sins by threatening them with punishment “in such a way that the bridle of the law restrained them [God’s sons] in some fear and reverence toward God until, regenerated by the Spirit, they began wholeheartedly to love him” (3.100, *CO* 1.432-433).

The fact that Calvin clearly acknowledges the expansion of the second use to the elect yet to be regenerated is not irrelevant to his understanding of the church. In the 1543 *Institutes*, Calvin distinguished the invisible church which is composed of the “children of God” from the visible church which is composed of “the whole multitude of men spread over the earth who profess to worship one God and Christ,”

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and says that in the visible church “are mingled many hypocrites who have nothing of Christ but the name and outward appearance. There are many ambitious, greedy, envious persons, evil speakers, and some of quite unclean life. Such are tolerated for a time either because they cannot be convicted by a competent tribunal or because a vigorous discipline does not always flourish as it ought to” (8.8, CO 1.542). Thus we become aware that Calvin’s convincing statement supporting the application of the second use of the law not only to the reprobate but also to the elect corresponds to his consistent emphasis on the visible church since the 1539 Institutes.

In the same vein, Calvin, deploying the two-kingdom theory in the 1543 Institutes, points out that since human laws are “consonant with God’s word,” even people who are regenerated spiritually should obey them faithfully (12.16, CO 1.840). In treating the power of lawmaking in the chapter of De traditionibus humanis, Calvin asserts that “in his law the Lord has included everything applicable to the perfect rule of the good life, so that nothing is left to men to add to that summary” (13.7, CO 1.843). Calvin refers to the close relationship between the law of God in the visible church and civil law, when he justifies the right of the government to wage war; not only do “both natural equity and the nature of the office dictate” this but also “the Holy Spirit declares such wars to be lawful by many testimonies of Scripture” (20.10. CO 1.1109).

We find a striking number of passages on church law added in the 1550 Institutes. Calvin there explains the origin and content of conscience in more detail in connection with the power of legislation and Christian freedom. He argues that law is “the outward forum (externum forum)” working through “the forum of conscience (forum conscientiae)” in which we are led to “an awareness of divine judgment (sensum divini iudicii).” With the adoption of this principle in the realm of Christian

52 For Calvin’s understanding of the church as corpus mixtum, see Herman J. Selderhuis, “Church on Stage: Calvin’s Dynamic Ecclesiology,” in Calvin and the Church, ed. David Foxgrover (Grand Rapids: CRC Production Services, 2002), 51-54.
53 This position of Calvin sheds light on why he emphasizes so sharply human responsibility in dealing with predestination. Cf. Doumergue, Le Caractère de Calvin, 108-124.
54 “Quod ad perfectam bene vivendi regulam pertinebat, id totum sic complexus est Dominus lege sua, ut nihil hominibus reliquerit, quod ad summam illam adderent.”
freedom and civil law, Calvin confirms that the second use of the law refers not only to non-believers but also to believers who are not yet regenerated. Also, in dealing with this so-called political use of the law, he points out that this tutelage (paedagogia) of the law to control outward activity (opus exterius) by the fear of punishment makes people recover their reverence towards God (Inst. 2.7.10-11, CO 2.260-261). Calvin’s positive attitude towards the political use of the law originates in his dynamic view of conscience, which works as “a certain mean (medium) between God and man.”\(^5\) The function of human conscience is to lead us to fear punishment, to learn the will of God in our lives by making us realize the rule of right and godly living. In this regard, the difference between the first and second uses of the law lies not so much in their theological foundation as in their effect on humans.

In the 1543 and 1550 Institutes Calvin elaborates a practice of the law, which he defines in the 1536 Institutes as “a silent magistrate (mutum magistratum)” (1536 Inst. 6.47, CO 1.237), not only for the government of society but also for the ministry of the church. He pays special attention to the inner state of man as well as to the outward observance of the law in dealing with the use of the law by emphasizing human conscience. Even in his doctrine of predestination, Calvin does not emphasize the invisible church more than the reality of the visible church. This high view must have been of much value for the rule of God’s law in Geneva.

3.2.4 1559 Institutes: Formulating the Whole Process of Salvation in the Light of the Concept of Christus Mediator Legis

In the 1559 Institutes, Calvin restructured his whole doctrinal system according to the quadripartite division of the Apostles’ Creed,\(^6\) which had been

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\(^6\) Benoît, “The History and Development of the Institutio,” 109; Wendel, *Calvin*, 121-122. According to Muller, in the 1559 Institutes Calvin successfully integrated the credal model, already present within the Institutes, with the catechetical model and, above all, with the basic outline of Pauline loci, with all its organizational patterns drawn from the Apostles’ Creed. *The Unaccommodated Calvin*, 137-138.
treated along with the doctrine of faith in the same chapter since 1536 and had been divided into three chapters since 1543.\textsuperscript{57} The new edition, which he believed was founded on a “suitable order and method (ad aptissimam methodum, en ordre et méthode bien propr),”\textsuperscript{58} has innumerable transpositions but does not show any essential diversion from the previous views on major doctrines.\textsuperscript{59} The chapters of the new edition are arranged in this order: the revelation of God’s righteousness or the knowledge of God the Creator (1), the misery of fallen man (2.1-5), fallen man ought to seek redemption in Christ (the necessity of a Mediator) (2.6), the law (2.7-11), and justification (3.2). Except for the fact that in the new edition Christology (2.12-18) and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit (3.1), which had been dealt with as parts of the Creed, were placed between the doctrine of the law and justification, the new order remarkably corresponds to the arrangement of the themes deployed in the first chapter of the 1536 \textit{Institutes} entitled “De lege.”

Theologians have debated if there is any uniqueness in Calvin’s view of \textit{ordo salutis}, considering the sequence of faith (3.2)-repentance (3.3-5)-Christian life (3.6-10)-justification by faith (3.11-18) in book 3 of the 1559 \textit{Institutes}. These chapters demonstrate Calvin’s dynamic understanding of salvation as a whole, but when it comes to the doctrinal significance of the order of salvation, Calvin’s remarks are concentrated in the last part, which deals with the principle of \textit{sola fide}. On the other hand, chapters on the first three themes are mostly devoted to their biblical references and their significance in the Christian life. The earlier versions also show the same tendency. Through the successive editions of the \textit{Institutes}, Calvin deals with the whole range of the doctrine of salvation in the name of the doctrine of justification by faith. In this respect he calls the chapter on Christian freedom (3.19), which follows chapters on justification by faith, “appendix \textit{iustificationis}” in 1559.

\textsuperscript{57} Since the 1543 \textit{Institutes}, Calvin had divided the chapter on the Apostles’ Creed into three parts yielding a chapter on faith, God, creation; another chapter on Christ and the Holy Spirit; and a final chapter on the church, forgiveness of sins, and the resurrection.

\textsuperscript{58} Muller, \textit{The Unaccommodated Calvin}, 132-133, 245 (n. 87).

\textsuperscript{59} Doumergue, \textit{Jean Calvin}, 4.9-10; Neuser, “The Development of the \textit{Institutes} 1536 to 1559,” 51-52.
Calvin understands the concept of justification dynamically, as related to the whole process of salvation. From this perspective, he understands the continual imputation of the grace of Christ not only for our justification but also for our sanctification. When Calvin applies the Chalcedonian formula—distinguished but not separated—to the relation between justification and sanctification, this is also relevant to the theological and normative use of the law. Therefore, in spite of Calvin’s successful integration of the credal model in 1559, replacing the remaining elements of the catechetical model since 1536 in ordo docendi, with regard to ordo doctrinae salvificae he was persistent in the sequence “law-justification by faith” in his holistic view of justification. In this respect, Calvin does not have the concept of the order of salvation found in Reformed Orthodoxy. He applies the law-faith order not only to justification but also to sanctification. This shows the dynamic feature of his doctrine of salvation most clearly.

Whereas in the 1539 Institutes Calvin pays primary attention to the continuity of the Old and New Testaments in dealing with the soteriological significance of the law, in the final edition he focuses on the relationship between Christ and the law in the light of the concept of Christ’s mediation of the law. He devotes a new chapter to treating the necessity of Christ the Mediator, entitled “Homini perdito quaerendum in Christo redemptionem esse” (Inst. 2.6). Also, he augments sections to point out the mediation of Christ in dealing with the law as the law of the covenant (Inst. 2.7-8). Particularly, he refers to Christ’s mediatorialship in claiming the continuity of the law and the gospel in the new chapter called “Christum, quamvis sub lege Iudaeis cognitus fuerit, tamen in evangelio demum exhibitum fuisse” (Inst. 2.9).

In the following passage, enlarged in 1559, Calvin shows the foundation of

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60 Cf. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin, 135; Wendel, Calvin, 120-121.
his view of Christus mediator legis.

Indeed, because Christ had not yet been manifested, it is necessary to understand the Word (sermonem) as begotten of the Father before time [cf. Ecclus. 24:14, Vg.]. But if that Spirit, whose organs were the prophets, was the Spirit of the Word (sermonis spiritus), we infer without any doubt that he was truly God. And Moses clearly teaches this in the creation of the universe, setting forth this Word as intermediary (intermedium). . . . For here we see the Word understood as the order or mandate of the Son (pro nuitu vel mandato filii), who is himself the eternal and essential Word of the Father (Inst. 1.13.7, CO 2.95).

He emphasizes the continuity and the dynamic characteristic of the law from the Christological perspective. As he puts it, "since God cannot without the Mediator be propitious toward the human race, under the law Christ was always (semper) set before the holy fathers as the end to which they should direct their faith" and "the kingdom finally established within the family of David is a part of the law" (Inst. 2.6.2, 2.7.2, CO 2.250, 254). The law reveals "the form of religion (formam religionis) handed down by God through Moses" and "if the figures of the law (legales figurae) are separated from its end (finem), one must condemn it as vanity" (Inst. 2.7.1 [altered], CO 2.252-253). Calvin here uses terms such as "umbra," "figura," and "typus" in order to express the Christological significance of the law in the Old Testament (Inst. 2.7.1. CO 2.252-254).63 Particularly in dealing with the historical significance of the law in the light of the mediation of Christ (the Word), Calvin frequently refers to the concept of God's accommodation to human capacity and barbarity.64

Calvin did not significantly augment or revise the existing contents on Christian life and Christian freedom in 1559, but he explicitly focused on their relevance for the doctrine of salvation, especially in relation to the role of the law for the whole process of salvation. He begins the doctrine of the Christian life by indicating that "the object of regeneration" is "a harmony and agreement between

63 Calvin uses the word typus in place of the figura which is used in the Vulgate and Erasmus' translation of verses 6 and 11 of I Corinthians 10 (CO 49.456, 460).
64 The following references in the 1559 Institutes reveal that God's accommodation refers not only to the use of the law but also to the creation and fulfillment of the law. Inst. 1.13.1 (1539), 1.14.3 (1543/1559), 1.14.11 (1543), 1.17.13 (1539), 2.6.4 (1559), 2.10.6 (1539), 2.11.13 (1543), 2.16.2 (1539), 4.1.5 (1559), 4.1.8 (1539), 4.1.4.3 (1536), 4.17.1 (1543), 4.17.6 (1539).
God’s righteousness and their obedience,” and “the law of God contains in itself that newness by which his image can be restored in us” (Inst. 3.6.1, CO 2.501).65 Through the two passages, augmented anew for the doctrine of Christian freedom, Calvin emphasized the believer’s willing obedience to the law which is due to the living grace of Christ the Mediator (Inst. 3.19.13, CO 2.613, 622).66

In order for us to gain a better understanding of Calvin’s view of the continual validity of the law for the regenerate, it is worth examining his position on the role of the law in the process of repentance. In the 1536 Institutes, Calvin asserted that true repentance arises from the true fear of God through faith, mainly in the course of criticizing false Catholic sacraments, but extended his scope of criticism to Lutheran theologians (Melanchthon and Bucer) (5.12-13, CO 1.147-148). In the edition of 1539, Calvin focused on the theological meaning of repentance working in the process of salvation, reflecting his criticism of the Anabaptists who believed themselves spiritual (5.1, CO 1.685-687).67 Calvin in 1543 augmented remarks on “the duties of piety” in the life of a Christian in dealing with continual repentance (2.63-66, CO 1.348-350 and 9.10, CO 1.692). Finally, in the 1559 edition of the Institutes, Calvin augments some passages on the normative use of the law. As he puts it, “briefly, the more earnestly any man measures his life by the standard of God’s law, the surer are the signs of repentance that he shows” (Inst. 3.3.16, CO 2.446).68 Stating this, Calvin points to “the Jesuits,” who followed Ignatius Loyola’s position on exterior and interior penance, as the “companions” of the Anabaptists (Inst 3.3.2, CO 2.436).69

65 “Scopus regenerationis esse diximus, ut in vita fidelium appareat inter Dei iustitiam et eorum obsequium symmetria et consensus, atque ita adoptionem confirmat qua recepti sunt in filios. Etsi autem novitatem illam qua imago Dei in nobis instauratur, lex ipsius in se continet, ...”

66 In the first passage augmented, Calvin criticizes people who ignore the true doctrine of Christian freedom as fellows of “Lucianic men (Lucianici homines)” (Inst. 3.19.1, CO 2.613). In the second passage augmented, Calvin’s tone becomes more radical and apologetic (Inst. 3.19.13, CO 2.622).

67 The Anabaptists’ view of man is helpful to understanding their position on the validity of the law. Cf. 1539 Inst. 2.67, CO 1.350-351.

68 “Denique quo maiore quique studio vitam suam exigat ad normam legis Dei, eo certiora poenitentiae suae signa edit.”

69 Cf. McNeill’s footnote 8 at the same section.
We have seen that Calvin's view of repentance should be differentiated from the Catholic sacramental understanding, which was eventually promulgated by the Council of Trent, and from the views of the Anabaptists and the Jesuits, as well as from Lutherans, who would be properly placed in the middle between the Catholics and the Anabaptists. Through the successive editions of the Institutes, Calvin consistently sustained his own view of repentance. In its relation to the use of the law, the doctrine of repentance has been regarded as a crucial issue for the designation of the right relationship of law and gospel and for the categorization of three kinds of divine covenant. Calvin did not follow Zwingli's gospel-law framework, but upheld the precedence of the law in the order of salvation in spite of his conviction of the same substance between law and gospel—Christ. The twofold office of the law, which can be depicted typically as lex accusans and lex vivendi, is crucial in the early stage of salvation with special reference to repentance because from this concept we can approach the nature of the law more closely in light of the fact that Christ is the substance and truth of the law.

In the 1559 Institutes, with the insertion of the words "extra controversiam esse debet" Calvin confirmed his on-going assertion since 1539 that "repentance not only immediately follows faith, but is also born of faith (Poenitentiam vero non modo fidem continuo subsequi, sed ex ea nasci)" (Inst. 3.3.1 [altered], CO 2.434). Calvin relates the gospel to the whole process of salvation in view of the fact that Christ is the fulfillment of the law, and understands the threefold use of the law from this perspective. For Calvin, with regard to the use of the law, whether it is punitive or normative, only the sequence "faith-repentance" is applicable (Inst. 3.3.2, CO 2.435-436). He believes the law and the gospel always work together, although the grace of God working without the support of the law becomes "sweeter (suavior)"

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70 Neuser affirms "the sequence of Christology (Gospel) first and then the law" in the 1559 Institutes by adhering to the order of chapters in the second and third book on Christ and the law, and justification and sanctification. "The Development of the Institutes 1536 to 1559," 50.

71 Calvin in this section reiterates the statement "the sum of the gospel is held to consist in repentance and forgiveness of sins," which existed from 1536 (1536 Inst. 5.15, CO 1.149, cf. Inst 3.3.19, CO 2.449-450).
and “more lovely (amabilior)” (Inst. 2.7.7, CO 2.258-259).

In conclusion, in the 1559 Institutes, the dialectic between the fact that Christ is “the truth (veritas)” of the law (Inst. 2.7.1, CO 2.253) and the fact that Christ is “the fulfilment or end of the law (complementum legis, vel finem)” (Inst. 2.7.2, CO 2.254), demonstrates that the dynamic feature of Calvin’s understanding of the law is based on his unique thought of Christus mediator legis. This dialectic leads us to the proper understanding of Calvin’s equally unique position on the relation of lex vivendi and lex vivificandi.

3.3 Conclusion

Calvin’s position on Christ and the law, presented consistently in his early writings and the successive editions of the Institutes, may well be regarded as his distinctive answer to the critical question of the late medieval era about the merit of Christ and good works. As opposed to the radical perspective of Luther, who clearly separated law and gospel, Calvin tried to explain the dialectic between law and gospel by pointing out the normative nature of the law itself, which is not different from the gospel circa essentiam.72 As a Christian who experienced a sudden conversion by which his heart was made teachable to the truth of God, Calvin realized that what has been changed since the fall is not the truth or teaching of the law itself but the status and quality of humanity. So, the reason the gospel was given was not for any change or destruction of the law, but for the salvation of fallen humanity, which does not bring the denial of the law but the total overcoming of human depravity.

Therefore, with Christ’s coming as the Mediator, the revelation of the law has become perfect as a rule of living (regula vivendi), and moreover as a rule of life-giving (regula vivificandi). Calvin clearly asserts that Christ, as the substance of the law, fulfilled the law. He believed that there is no other proper way to learn the normative meaning of the law but through the mediation of Christ. Christ, who

72 Cf. Imbart de la Tour, Calvin et l’Institution Chrétienne, 86-87.
fulfilled the demands of the law, leads us to the perfection of our life that we may live according to the law, but through this grace. This is the very point by which Calvin has solved the riddle of *meritum de condigno* and *meritum de congruo*.

Calvin holds to his position steadfastly, to distinguish the unchangeable nature of the law, which is the rule of right and godly living, from its variable significance to man before and after the fall. He regards the third normative use of the law as the principal one, from this stance, understands the “accidental” use of the law, which is called the theological use. Calvin’s adherence to the unchangeable nature of the law is derived from his conviction of the unity and continuity between natural law and the moral law of God. Aquinas suggested a hierarchy of law in order to describe the relationship between natural and divine law, whereas Gratian maintained their unity for the legitimate claims of customary practices of the positive law, which he believed to be the expression of natural equity. However, these approaches were focused mostly on the similarity of natural law and the divine command before the fall. Calvin extends this horizontal stance on the nature of the law by adding the concept of continuity to the unity of the law before and after the fall, with no reliance on any optimistic philosophical view of man, which had been suggested since Aristotle and adopted by the Stoics and the medieval Scholastics. Calvin’s understanding of the unity of the law is based on the fact that Christ is the substance of the law. The continuous validity of the law is argued by Calvin not on the ground of the ability of human reason, but based on his view of the total depravity of man and *sola gratia* of Christ our Mediator. Calvin’s understanding of the whole structure of the law does not rely on any legal hierarchy, which is actually based on the hierarchy of divine and human reason, but on the dialectic between

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73 For the hierarchy of the law, see Thomas Gilby, tr., *Saint Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 357, n. 1; Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology*, 90-91: “In view of the ‘intellectualism’ of Thomas Aquinas, it is not surprising that for him God’s will is only a partner in the operation of the intellect in establishing the hierarchy of eternal law, natural law, and positive law. . . . Duns Scotus stresses the direct dependence of all law on God’s will without, however, endangering the hierarchy of eternal, natural, and positive law.”

74 Cf. James A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law* (London: Longman, 1995), 154-155. The author asserts that “the Canonist, unlike Roman lawyers, also taught that laws ceased to have effective force when the reason that had prompted them ceased to exist” (173).
Christ as the substance and truth of the law and Christ as the fulfilment of the law. Calvin’s early works and his successive editions of the *Institutes* demonstrate impressively how he sought to explore the hermeneutic and theology of the law by the concept of *Christus mediator legis*. 
CHAPTER IV
CALVIN'S CONCEPT OF *CHRISTUS MEDIATOR LEGIS*:
ITS THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION AND SCOPE

4.1 Christ and the Law

The relation between Christ and the law has been regarded as a crucial issue in demonstrating the substantial unity of law and gospel (cf. *Inst.* 2.9), and as the hermeneutical centre by which the continuity and discontinuity between the Old and New Testaments can be explained (cf. *Inst.* 2.10-11). In regard to its ethical significance, this subject has been discussed in relation to Calvin’s doctrine of the Christian life, in which he emphasizes living according to the example and pattern of Christ (cf. *Inst.* 3.6-10). Scholars who share these positions mostly link Christ’s mediation to the law only in view of the fact that Christ fulfilled the law, on the basis of their conviction that for Calvin the law is the law of the covenant.

On the other hand, scholars who are concerned about Calvin’s doctrine of

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1 The title “Christus mediator legis” is the Latin translation of the phrase “le Mediateur de la Loy” which appears in Calvin’s Sermons on Galatians 3:19-20 (453, CO 50.543).


3 Cf. *Inst.* 3.6.3 (CO 2.503): “Christ, through whom we return into favor with God, has been set before us as an example (exemplar), whose pattern (formam) we ought to express in our life. What more effective thing can you require than this one thing?” For the use of the law in the Christian life, see Hesselink, *Calvin’s Concept of the Law*, 278-286; Ronald S. Wallace, *Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), 112-122; Leith, *John Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life*, 45-60.

atonement and the so-called extra Calvinisticum consider the incarnation of Christ to be the prerequisite for their theories. Accordingly, although they are keen to acknowledge Christ's mediation before the incarnation, they do not show a positive view of Christ's mediation of the law in the Old Testament. Some base their theory of atonement on the conception that Christ is our legal substitute through his redemptive death, so they view Christ's mediation restricted to fulfilling the law. Others explain the wide extent of Christ's mediation with regard to both the divine and human natures even beyond his ascension in terms of the so-called extra Calvinisticum. Their view is restricted to the historical presence and action of Christ as the Mediator, not to mention its sacramental significance.

In the Institutes, Calvin deals with the unity of the person of Christ on the basis of communicatio idiomatum, focusing on how the divine and human natures of the Mediator co-operate rather than on how the two sets of properties communicate, that is, on communio naturarum itself (Inst. 2.14.1-3). Even in interpreting the deity of the second person of the Trinity, Calvin points to the hypostasis of the “intermediary (intermedium)” rather than the divine essence itself (Inst. 1.13.7, CO 2.95). Also, Calvin, commenting on the word “Logos,” concentrates on its “twofold

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8 Cf. Confessio de Trinitate propter calumnias P. Caroli, CO 9.706-707: “Quod ad Christum peculiariter attinet, dubius ipsum naturis constare affirmamus. Nam antequam carmen indueret, verbum illud aeternum fuit ex patre ante saecula gentium, verus Deus unius cum patre essentiae, potentiae, malestatis, adeoque Iehova, qui a se ipso semper habuit, ut esset, et alius subsistenti virtutem inspiravit. Itaque scripturae, tametsi proprietates illas distincte nobis considerandas proponunt, dum Christo interdum quod solius est Dei, interdum quod hominis est tribuant, earum tamen confuncionem quae in Christo subest tanta religione exprimunt, ut eas quandoque inter se
relation to God and men.” From this perspective, he translates it not into *verbum* but into *sermo.*

As was noted, the emphasis of the theory of atonement is put on *Christus ad nos,* whereas that of the so-called *extra Calvinisticum* on the presence of *Christus in se.* How then should we harmonize these two positions on the ground of *Deus manifestatus in carne* and then apply them to the mediation of Christ in the Old Testament? Tracing the issues raised by this question it should be most crucial to examine Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law. He suggests no direct answer to this question yet illustrates it most comprehensively in his concept of *Christus mediator legis.*

### 4.2 Christus Mediator Legis

Calvin uses the concept of “mediator” widely throughout his *Institutes,* exegetical works and apologetic treatises. It appears mostly as “the Mediator” or “mediator” to denote Christ’s sole mediatorship, except for some cases, where it points to the office of a priest, Moses, Aaron, David, Abraham, Nazarites, etc. On the
other hand, the plural form of the word, “mediators,” is seen mostly in its apologetics, in order to reveal the fallacy of the Judaic and Catholic concepts of the intercession of priests and saints, which Calvin believes follow the Platonic concept of angel. Sometimes the mediation of men and angels is mentioned, almost unexceptionally, with the note that Christ is the chief Mediator who rules over them. Characteristically, Calvin claims the mediation of specifically denoted Old Testament figures to clarify its significance in presenting the true Mediator, and the mediation of the Angel with reference to the presence of the Mediator.

Calvin turns to the relationship between the deity (deitas) of the Son of God and the divinity (divinitas) of Christ the Mediator in order to demonstrate the uniqueness of Christ’s mediatorship. He explains the deity of Christ as the Son of God from the economic-Trinitarian viewpoint in the chapter on the Trinity by referring significantly to the existence and work of the divinity of Christ in his intercession not only for the whole process of salvation but also for the creation of the universe as its author (autor) (Inst. 1.7-13).

Also, in his controversies with the Polish ministers Francesco Stancaro and Giorgio Biandrata, who asserted that “Christ is not a Mediator, except according to the flesh,” Calvin insists that Christ’s mediatorship according to both natures refers not only to Deus manifestatus in carne, but also to the Word of God before the incarnation (cf. Inst. 2.14.3). Criticizing Biandrata’s anti-Trinitarian position, Calvin says, “the Mediator, God-man, is truly the Son of God according to both

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12 Cf. Comm. Gen. 8:20 (1.281, CO 23.138); Ex. 3:2 (1.61, CO 24.35-36); Jos. 5:13-14 (87-88, CO 25.463-464); Dan. 7:27 (2.77, CO 41.85); Zech. 12:8 (358, CO 44.332); Col. 2:18 (338-340, CO 52.111-112); Articles Agreed upon by the Faculty of Sacred Theology of Paris, with the Antidote, T&T 1.94 (“de orandis Sanctis,” CO 7.23), 1.96 (on the intercession of the saints, CO 7.25-26); The Necessity of the Reforming the Church, T&T 1.130, 154-159, 191-192, 195 (CO 6.462, 480-483, 504-505, 507).

13 Cf. Comm. Jer. 11:13 (2.93-95, CO 38.112-113); Dan. 2:11 (1.133, CO 40.569).


16 Beza, Life of John Calvin, T&T 1.116-117.
natures by reason of their union; but properly in respect of the divinity, because the
Word is of the Father before all ages.” Calvin especially points to “modus
communicationis” between God and humanity regarding the unity and continuity of
the deity and divinity of Christ in order to defend the deity of the Mediator against
Stancaro, who distorted the condescension of God with his own tendency to
Arianism and insisted on Christ’s mediation not only between God and us but also
between God the Father and God the Son.18

Calvin believes that the names Adonai, Elohim, and Jehovah refer to Christ’s
mediatorship. Adonai expresses the messenger nature of Christ’s mediatorship.19
Elohim refers to the person of the Mediator (persona mediatoris) who has divine
power and glory,20 and the name Jehovah (Jahweh) reveals Christ as Saviour and
Leader.21

Calvin maintains the versatility and continuity of Christ’s mediatorship that
started before the time of the Old Testament and has been in operation ever since. He
declares that Christ was revealed not only as the substance, soul, light, and truth of
the law, but he is also the end of the law, even for the people of the Old Testament.22
With regard to Christ’s mediation of the law before the incarnation, he argues that
the law served not only to represent Christ but also to reveal the presence of Christ as the
Mediator in the Old Testament. For instance, in dealing with the ancient Jewish
priesthood, he points out that if there were no mediation of Christ, the blood offering

17 Joseph N. Tylenda, “The Warning that Went Unheeded: John Calvin on Giorgio
Biandrata,” in “John Calvin’s Response to the Questions of Giorgio Biandrata,” CTJ 12 (1977), 62
[altered] (CO. 9.332): “Mediator Deus et homo, vere est filius Dei secundum utramque naturam
ratione unionis, proprie tamen divinitatis respectu, quia sermo est ante saecula ex patre.”
18 Joseph N. Tylenda, “Christ the Mediator: Calvin versus Stancaro,” CTJ 8/2 (1973), 5. This
article includes the translation, “How Christ is the Mediator: A Response to the Polish Brethren to
Refute Stancaro’s Error,” 11-16 (CO 9.337-42); id., “The Controversy on Christ the Mediator: A
Response to the Polish Nobles and to Francesco Stancaro of Mantua,” in “The Controversy on Christ
the Mediator: Calvin’s Second Reply to Stancaro,” CTJ 8/1 (1973), 146-157 (CO 9.349-58, quot. CO
9.350). These two articles including translations are hereafter cited as “First Response to Stancaro”
and “Second Response to Stancaro” respectively.
21 Comm. Ex. 14:19 (1.248-249, CO 24.153); Zech. 3:3-4 (87, CO 44.171).
22 Cf. Comm. Ex. 28:42 (2.205-206, CO 24.435-436); Isa. 29:11-12 (2.322, CO 36.492); Eze.
16:61 (2.176-178, CO 40.395-396).
of priests would be futile, and mentions that Jesus Christ is the eternal High Priest.\textsuperscript{23} Calvin demonstrates in many instances that Christ’s presence as the Mediator is not restricted to some narratives related to the appearance of the Lord as angel or in visions of the Prophets, rather, he applies Christ’s headship of the church to the people of the Israelites, which is called the ancient church.\textsuperscript{24}

In his sermon on Galatians 3:19-20, indicating “that Our Lord Jesus Christ was the mediator of the Law (\textit{que nostre Seigneur Iesus Christ a esté le Mediateur de la Loy}),” Calvin argues that “the continual (\textit{tousjours}) Mediator” has reference there not only to the Jews but also to the Gentiles, and not only to the theological use of the law for justification but also to the normative use of the law for sanctification.\textsuperscript{25} From this dynamic understanding of Christ’s mediation of the law, Calvin understands the continuity of Christ’s mediatorship in the Old and New Testaments. As he puts it:

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\text{If we consider how our Lord Jesus Christ was the mediator in the publishing of the law (\textit{Mediateur pour publier la Loy}): it showeth unto us, that if he be our advocate (\textit{advocat}) at this day, it will be a good and sufficient discharge for us: insomuch that although God have pronounced his sentence of cursing against us, yet we must not be dismayed at it, nor so overpassed with heart grief and anguish of mind, as though the mischief were incurable: but assure ourselves that our Lord Jesus Christ will very well agree to both twain, that is to wit, both make us ashamed that we may learn humility, and therewithal also make us sure of our salvation. And therefore let us learn, that whensoever we be beaten down, there is none other means to raise us up again, but to know that the selfsame person which was ordained to be the mediator for the publishing of the law, is now manifested unto us at this day with the same commission, and will make us to perceive it by experience.}\textsuperscript{26}
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In the following, I will study first how Calvin deals with the necessity of Christ the Mediator in relation to the nature of the law and the human capacity to live according to the law. Then, I will examine the extent of Christ’s mediation of the law


\textsuperscript{25} Serm. Deut. 33:9-11 (1202a-1209b, \textit{CO} 29.142-155).

by concentrating on the extent of Christ’s mediatorialship. To this end, I will deal first with how Calvin understands Christ’s mediation in terms of both divine and human natures in the Old Testament as well as in the New Testament, the relationship between God’s accommodation and Christ’s mediatorship, and the scope of the so-called extra Calvinisticum.

4.3 The Necessity of the Mediator of the Law

4.3.1 Human Soul Depraved: Knowledge and Conscience

Unlike Osiander, who infers with the firm conviction of the existence of substantial righteousness (substantialis iustitia) that even if the fall had not taken place, Christ would still have become man, Calvin sees the need for a Mediator in filling the huge gap between the imperative of the law and our state of total individual deprivicy (Inst. 2.12.6, CO 2.345; 3.11.5, 10. CO 2.536-537, 540-541). He refers particularly to the soteriological meaning of the faculty of human soul, comprising the intellect and the will, rather than to its philosophical or metaphysical significance.

Calvin distinguishes “spiritual insight” in three ways: the knowledge of God, the knowledge of his favor towards his people, and the knowledge of how to frame

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our life according to the rule of law (Inst. 2.2.18, CO 2.200).\(^\text{32}\) The first two types of knowledges are related to such lofty wisdom about the existence and mercy of God that even the greatest geniuses are blinder than “moles” to be able to recognize them (Inst. 2.2.18-21, quot. 2.2.18, CO 2.200). On the other hand, with reference to the third one, Calvin acknowledges the noetic function of natural law, restricting it to the role of conscience (Inst. 2.2.22-24).

In the Institutes, Calvin explores the office of conscience in relation to the knowledge of the Second Table commandments (Inst. 2.2.24, CO 2.205). He turns to the forensic term “witness (testis)” in order to describe the normative aspect of the noetic function of conscience, which makes us aware of our duty before God to live according to his will revealed in the law.\(^\text{33}\) The following definition of conscience demonstrates its relation to the theological use of adiaphora, the third type of Christian freedom, which strikingly reveals the dynamic character of the normative use of the law.

For just as when through the mind and understanding men grasp a knowledge (notitiam) of things, and from this are said “to know (scire),” this is the source of the word “knowledge (scientiae),” so also when they [believers] have a sense of divine judgment (sensus divini iudicii), as a witness (testem) before the Judge’s tribunal, this sense is called “conscience (conscientia)” For it is a certain mean (medium) between God and man, because it does not allow man to suppress within himself what he knows, but pursues him to the point of convicting him . . . Therefore, this awareness which hails man before God’s judgment is a sort of guardian appointed for man to note and spy out all his secrets that nothing may remain buried in darkness. Whence that ancient proverb: “Conscience is a thousand witnesses” (1550 Inst. 13.3, CO 1.841, Inst. 3.19.15, CO 2.623-624).\(^\text{34}\)

Calvin here verifies that the term conscientia originates from scientia (or

\(^{32}\) “... spiritualem illam perspicientiam, quae tribus potissimum rebus constat, Deum nosse, paternum erga nos eius favorem, in quo salus nostra consistit, et formandae secundum legis regulam vitae rationem.”


\(^{34}\) The same definition of conscience appears in 1550 Inst. 13.3 (CO 1.841) and Inst. 4.10.3 (CO 2.868-869).
notitia) and denotes sensus divini iudicii. He distinguishes this sense of divine judgment from sensus divinitatis—the knowledge of “Deum et quod Dei est” (Inst. 2.2.19, CO 2.201). The former denominates semen iustitiae, while the latter signifies semen religionis. In this way, Calvin keenly designates the role of conscience within the realm of the intellect, although it is very closely associated to the function of the will to decide right from wrong.

Conscience enables us to conceive “the natural light of righteousness” as “a law,” but it does not implant into our heart “a full knowledge (cognitionem) of the law.” In spite of the noetic function of conscience, if we are not “convinced (persuasi) of Christ’s grace” by the special illumination of the Holy Spirit, we are not at all able to recognize the promises of the law (Inst. 3.19.15, CO 2.264). Therefore, conscience itself cannot lead us to the full knowledge of the instruction and exhortation of the law, and it merely makes us inexcusabilis because of our ignorance (Inst. 2.2.22, CO 2.204). Although by conscience we are able to perceive the will of God for us, neither can we have any good will to live according to it without the help of the Holy Spirit (Inst. 2.2.25-27), nor are we led to the knowledge of our salvation, which is composed of a sense of individual wretchedness (propriae miserae sensus), the knowledge (agnitio) of Christ, and the

35 Cf. Inst. 1.15.2 (CO 2.135): “Certe conscientia, quae inter bonum et malum discernens, Dei iudicio respondet, indubium est immortalis spiritus signum.”
37 Comm. Jn. 1:5 (1.12, CO 47.6).
38 Cf. Randall C. Zachman, The Assurance of Faith: Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther and John Calvin (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 102: “Calvin associates conscience (conscientia) with consciousness (conscius) or awareness (sensus), whereas Luther associates conscience with the syllogism of practical reason, possibly indicating the Platonic versus Aristotelian influences in their anthropologies.”
40 By using the word persuasio, Calvin generally points to the special illumination of the Holy Spirit, especially that of the Spirit of Christ the Mediator: “Et sane certo sciant; sed divinae veritatis persuasione confirmati magis, quam rationali demonstratione edocti” (Inst. 3.2.14, CO 2.410); “In summa, vere fidelis non est, nisi qui solida persuasione Deum sibi propitium benevolentiam promissionibus fretus, indubitatem salutis exspectationem praesumit” (Inst. 3.2.16, CO 2.411). David E. Willis deals with the concept of persuasio as closely related to the office of conscience to make people wary of the judgment of God and lead to good behaviour. “Persuasion in Calvin’s Theology: Implications for his Ethics,” in Calvin and Christian Ethics, 83-94.
knowledge of the grace of Christ with solid confidence.  

4.3.2 Human Soul Depraved: Free Will

In dealing with the soteriological significance of the faculty of the human soul, Calvin clearly distinguishes the function of the intellect from that of the will. He is not so positive about the volitional function of natural law as about its noetic function. He does not think that “Themistius’ rule,” that man does not sin if he knows the truth, can be always applied to human behaviour, because people tend to commit sins out of evil desires despite their consciousness of their sinfulness (Inst. 2.2.23, CO 2.204). While the intellect refers to the revelation of God’s will, the will refers to God’s will itself. Accordingly, Calvin, treating free will, gives his primary attention to the relationship between [human] voluntas and [divine] necessitas.

Man, who fell into the state of non posse non peccare after the fall, lost both freedom “from sin” and freedom “from misery.” However, he still has freedom “from necessity” (Inst 2.2.5, CO 2.190) in the light of the fact that “he sins of necessity, yet sins no less voluntarily (dum necessario peccat, nihil tamen minus voluntarie peccare)” (Inst. 2.4.1, CO 2.224, cf. 2.5.1, CO 2.230). Calvin makes clear this position by citing Bernard, who writes: “Hence, neither does necessity, although it is of the will, avail to excuse the will, nor does the will, although it is led astray, avail to exclude necessity. For this necessity is as it were voluntary” (Inst. 2.3.5, CO

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42 The Necessity of Reforming the Church, T&T 1.133-134 (CO 6.464-465).  
43 Dowey asserts that both “sensus divinitatis” and “conscientia” belong to the intellect, which is clearly differentiated from the will. The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology, 32, 72. On the other hand, Dennis E. Tamburello argues that for Calvin, the word “will” in a large sense includes “knowledge” and “understanding” and “will” is different from “intellect” inasmuch as the latter is “a desire to know God in essentia.” From this perspective, Tamburello understands the believer’s union with Christ in Calvin’s theology as the “union of wills.” Union with Christ: John Calvin and the Mysticism of St. Bernard (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1994), 35-40, 105. Muller also notes the close relation between the will and the understanding as he points out their soteriological significance in Calvin’s theology. He says that the will is placed “between the intellect and the senses.” “Fides and Cognitio,” 216.  
Calvin thinks that God’s will, whether absolute or ordained, is subject to no necessity, other than the necessity of his own plan, so he does not accept the distinction between *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata* (*Inst.* 1.16.9, *CO* 2.153). With regard to the reason why God gave an imperfect will to the first humans, he states in the same vein, “no necessity was imposed upon God of giving man other than a mediocre and even transitory will, that from man’s fall he might gather occasion for his own glory” (*Inst.* 1.15.8, *CO* 2.143). There are “the wisdom that resides with God and the portion of wisdom God has prescribed for men” (*Inst.* 1.17.2, *CO* 2.155). The necessity is hidden in “the best reason (*optima ratio*)” of God. Therefore, it is not perceived as such by the measure of human understanding (*Inst.* 1.17.1, *CO* 2.154, cf. 2.2.12).

Calvin denotes freedom from necessity as the state in which man acts upon the wisdom which is voluntarily prescribed for him and revealed to him. Man is subject to the necessity of God but free from it when he lives according to the

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46 “… nec necessitas (quum voluntaria sit) excusare valeat voluntatem, nec voluntas (quum sit illecta) excludere necessitatem. Est enim necessitas haec quodammodo voluntaria.” Calvin’s understanding of the relation between *voluntas* and *necessitas* becomes the centre of Brümmer and Helm’s debate over the influence of Bernard on Calvin’s view of free will. Vincent Brümmer, “Calvin, Bernard and the Freedom of the Will,” *Religious Studies* 30 (1994), 437-455; Paul Helm, “Calvin and Bernard on Freedom and Necessity: A Reply to Brümmer,” *Religious Studies* 30 (1994), 457-465. According to Brümmer, Bernard clearly distinguishes necessity from compulsion and claims the existence of a “kind of necessity from which the will remains free in spite of sin” (446). He thinks that Bernard’s “freedom from necessity” is not different from what Calvin refers to as “freedom from compulsion” (447). Against this view, Helm argues that “to be free from compulsion is, for Calvin, not to be indeterministically free, but to be psychologically free, to be acting in accordance with one’s preferences. Such psychological freedom may be consistent with either metaphysical necessity or contingency, and Calvin opts for the former” (461). Anthony N. S. Lane concludes after detailed research that Calvin’s distinction between necessity and coercion was not drawn from Bernard. *Calvin and Bernard of Clairvaux,* Studies in Reformed Theology and History New Series, no. 1 (Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1996), 100.

47 In his sermon on Job 23:1-7, Calvin accuses the Sorbonne doctors’ assertion that God has an absolute or lawless power as a diabolical blasphemy invented in hell (415a, *CO* 34. 399-340). For Calvin’s rejection of the distinction between the absolute and the ordained power of God, see Steinmetz, “Calvin and the Absolute Power of God,” 45-50.


revealed will of God.  

This position of Calvin is derived from his firm conviction that God’s will revealed in the law is not contradictory to his will which is hidden from us. Calvin writes:

"Therefore, since God assumes to himself the law (ius) of ruling the universe, which is unknown to us, let our law (lex) of soberness and moderation be to assent to his supreme authority, that his will may be for us the sole rule of righteousness, and the truly just cause of all things. Not, indeed, that absolute will of which the Sophists babble, by an impious and profane distinction separating his justice from his power—but providence, that determinative principle of all things, from which flows nothing but right although the reasons have been hidden from us (Inst. 1.17.2 [altered], CO 2.156).

For Calvin, what freedom from necessity signifies is nothing different from freedom “in” necessity. It is none other than for us to adjust our law of moral living to the divine rule of righteousness and by this to inquire into the hidden will of God. Calvin’s view of the relationship between voluntas and necessitas gives us a crucial clue to understand the origin of his equal emphasis upon both God’s grace and human will, and both God’s sovereignty and human freedom. Calvin’s emphasis here is on God’s glory rather than on God’s sovereignty (cf. Inst. 1.15.8). On this ground, we can understand the basic principle of Christian ethics for which Calvin argues as follows, against his opponents who misunderstood the true relationship between God’s grace and human free will (cf. Inst. 2.5.1-19): “nothing good can arise out of our will until it has been formed again (reformata); and after it is formed again (reformationem), in so far as it is good, it is so from God, not from ourselves” (Inst. 2.3.8 [altered], CO 2.218). Calvin’s view of free will and freedom from necessity eventually make us realize how we, as fallen man, preserve confidence in living according to the will of God, and in what way Christ still mediates for our normative life. Here are Calvin’s words:

50 Mary Potter Engel explains this in two ways, from the perspective of God and from the perspective of man. John Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 140-144.


52 This position of Calvin was charged with fatalism by his contemporary opponents (Pighius, Hesshusius, Castello, and Bolsec) and even by his friends, most notably by Melanchthon. Cf. Egil Grislis, “Seneca and Cicero as Possible Sources of John Calvin’s View of Double Predestination: An Inquiry in the History of Ideas,” in In Honor of John Calvin, 29.
I say that the will is effaced; not in so far as it is will, for in man’s conversion what belongs to his primal nature remains entire. I also say that it is created anew; not meaning that the will now begins to exist, but that it is changed from an evil to a good will (Inst. 2.3.6, CO 2.215).

4.3.3 Free Will to Do Good Works by the Grace of Christ

In dealing with free will with special reference to human ability to live according to rule of the law (Inst. 2.5.4-11), Calvin strictly opposes Ockham’s view of a co-operating grace that “grace is denied to no one who does what is in him (eam [gratiam] nemini denegari facienti quod in se est),” and follows Augustine’s formula, “the grace of God is efficacious of itself” (Inst. 2.3.10, CO 2.220). In doing so, Calvin takes into consideration the new state of the regenerate, non posse peccare, which is superior to the state of original human beings, posse non peccare (Inst. 2.3.13, CO 1.222-223).

Calvin’s negative view of “quod in se” is due to his recognition of the dilemma that humans face between the divinely ordered duty and their lack of ability to carry it out. This miserable state is pinpointed by the fact that God orders not what we can do but what we ought to (non quid possint homines sed quid debeat). Notwithstanding, Calvin refers in detail to the gratia tota not only for our salvation

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53 "Voluntatem dico aboleri, non quatenus est voluntas; quia in hominis conversione integrum manet quod primae est naturae. Creati etiam novam dico, non ut voluntas esse incipiat, sed ut vertatur ex mala in bonam." There have been some debates related to this passage, whether the reformation of the will pertains only to its form or extends to its matter. Muller and Lane approach this issue on the assumption that Calvin here shows the influence of Aristotle. They claim the former view. Richard A. Muller, "Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism," Trinit&y Journal (1998), 92-93; Lane, "Introduction," in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, xxiv-xxvi. On the other hand, Ronald N. Frost, a Lutheran theologian, traces it with an emphasis on the influence of Luther upon Calvin, and denies any kind of formal reformation of human will by regeneration. "Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism: A Brief Rejoinder," Trinity Journal 19 (1998), 99-101, and "Aristotle’s Ethics: The Real Reason for Luther’s Reformation?" Trinity Journal 18 (1997), 223-241.


55 On this ground, Augustine asserts, "Faith achieves what the law commands (fides imperat quod lex imperat)" (Inst. 2.5.7, CO 2.235). For the influence of Augustine upon Calvin concerning the superiority of the novissima libertas in the state of non posse peccare to Adam’s original freedom in the state of posse non peccare, especially with reference to its significance after the resurrection of godly people, see David F. Wright, "Non posse peccare in this life? St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia 12:33," in St Augustine and his Opponents, Other Latin Writers, Studia Patristica, vol. 38 (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 348-353.
but also for good works. For this purpose, he quotes Augustine: “God does not measure the precepts of his law according to human powers, but where he has commanded what is right, he freely gives to his elect the capacity to fulfill it” (Inst. 2.5.4, CO 2.232, cf. 2.5.7, 9).56

The law was given as the rule of living. However, no one reaches the perfection of God’s righteousness by keeping the law perfectly because God does not measure the precepts of the law according to our ability. Therefore, it is God’s grace that he wants us to live according to the rule of life prescribed in the law and “requires only what is within our power.” God accommodates himself not to our natural capacity but to our capacity renewed by his grace, so he makes us free from necessity even though we are always subject to his necessity, which is hidden for us (Inst. 2.5.6-7, CO 2.234-235). Therefore, the reconciling grace of Christ is taken into consideration with reference to the exhortative office of the law (Inst. 2.5.5, CO 2.233-234).

By the bare precepts (nuda praecepta) of the law, we are taught merely our spiritual death, but with the grace poured upon us, the law itself reveals the promises of the free imputation of the righteousness of Christ the Mediator. Through the promises of the law not only are we converted to God but we are also persuaded to love the precepts (Inst. 2.5.10).57 When Calvin talks about the grace (or promise) of the law, he is concerned not only with God’s grace to reveal the precepts and promises of the law, but also with God’s grace to enable us to live according to the rule of the law.58

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56 “[U]bi Deum legis suae praecepta non humanis viribus metiri docet, verum ubi iussit quod rectum est, gratis dare implendi facultatem suis electis.” This argument between Augustine and the Pelagians is presented by Calvin precisely in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, 141-142 (CO 6.329-330), 166 (CO 6.347).


58 Calvin distinguishes between lex nuda and lex tota according to whether the law is clothed with the grace of Christ the Mediator or not. Cf. Inst. 2.7.2, CO 2.255; Comm. Deut 29:29 (1.412, CO 24.256). He argues that “where the whole law is concerned (de tota lege), the gospel differs from it only in clarity of manifestation” (Inst. 2.9.4, CO 2.312). As we see in the following commentary on Psalm 19:8 (1.322, CO 31.201), the bare law signifies the letter of the law itself which does not contain the promise of God’s grace in it: “Without Christ (extra Christum) there is in the law nothing but inexorable rigour, which adjudges all mankind to the wrath and curse of God . . . without the
Calvin’s view of good works can be understood on the ground of his dynamic understanding of the relation between the precepts and promises of the law. Good works are not our works but God’s because they come “from the pure prompting of the Spirit (ex mero spiritus instinctu)” (Inst. 2.5.15, CO 2.243). They are commanded to believers out of necessity because they cannot sin (non posse peccare) anymore. This does not mean that the regenerate have the free will to do good works by themselves; it rather means freedom from necessity, i.e., freedom to do good works voluntarily without coercion. This kind of necessity is made known only to the people who are guided and directed by the Spirit of Christ the Mediator, who is the fulfilment of the law (Inst. 2.5.15-19).

Calvin’s treatment of free will regarding Christ’s mediation of the law makes us anticipate his later emphasis on the normative use of the law as the principal one, his own view of double justification, and his view of the relationship between regula vivendi and regula vivificandi. Calvin has a firm conviction of Christ’s saying, “Without me you can do nothing” (John 15:5) (Inst. 2.5.4, CO. 2.232). Upon this foundation, he delves into the reality of human free will after the fall and the positive function of the law for the people who are regenerated by the grace of Christ the Mediator.

4.4 The Threefold Mediation of the Law

4.4.1 Threefold Mediation and Threefold Office

In the following commentary on Galatians 3:19, Calvin classifies the mediatorial office of Christ into mediator reconciliationis, mediator patrocinii, and mediator doctrinae:

promise of grace, it strictly and rigorously exacts from us the duty which we owe to God; but David, in praising it as he here does, speaks of the whole doctrine of the law, which includes also the gospel, and, therefore, under the law he comprehends Christ.” For the use of these two terms, see Hesselink, Calvin’s Concept of the Law, 158, 170-172.

59 This position is described by Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr. as “Calvin’s soteriological voluntarism.” John Calvin and the Will: A Critique and Corrective (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997), 51-52.
As He is the Mediator of reconciliation, by whom we are accepted of God, and the Mediator of intercession, through whom the way is opened for us to call upon the Father, so He has always been the Mediator of all teaching, because by Him God always revealed Himself to men.60

Calvin deals with the first two kinds of mediation as the office of a priest and the third as the office of a prophet in the Catechism of the Church of Geneva (1542).61 He had expressed his view of the threefold office of Christ (Christi munus triplex) since the 1539 Institutes (4.2, CO 1.513-514), but most parts of the office of Christ were augmented in the 1559 Institutes.62

In 1559, Calvin relates the prophetic office of Christ to the mediation of teaching in view of the fact that “the prophetic dignity in Christ leads us to know that in the sum of doctrine (summa doctrinae) as he has given it to us all parts of perfect wisdom are contained” (Inst. 2.15.2, CO 2.363). He describes the priestly office as representing the reconciliation and intercession of Christ. In asserting this view, he returns to the insight that in Christ both priest and sacrifice belong to the same person (Inst. 2.15.6, CO 2.366-377). In dealing with the kingly office of Christ, Calvin emphasizes Christ’s rule over both the whole body of the church and each individual member, also pointing out “the perpetuity of the church” and the “blessed immortality” of believers (Inst. 2.15.3, CO 2.363-364). With reference to this office, Calvin pays much attention to Christ’s continual mediation for the godly and right living of the Christian (Inst. 2.5.14, CO 2.364-365). Christ’s kingly office is especially denoted when he is described as the chief of the angels, who rules angels and menservants.63 This office does not seem to belong to any specific type of

60 Comm. Gal.3:19 (62, CO 50.216-217): “Sicuti ergo mediator est reconciliationis, per quem accepti sumus Deo, mediator patrocinii, per quem accessus nobis patet ad patrem invocandum: ita mediator semper fuit omnis doctrinae: quia per ipsum semper Deus se hominibus patefecit.”
61 CTT96 (CO 6.21-22). Calvin expresses a two-office view of Christ (king and priest) in the 1536 Institutes (2.14, CO 1.69) and in the 1537/8 catechism (First Catechism 22, CO 5.338).
62 For the development of Calvin’s concept of the threefold office of the Mediator, see Klauspeter Blaser, Calvin's Lehre von den drei Amtern Christi, Theologische Studien 105 (Zürich: EVZ Verlag, 1970), 7-23.
63 Calvin points out the office of Christ as the head of the angels in order to explain Christ’s mediation before the fall. Cf. “First Response to Stancaro,” 13 (CO 9.338); “Second Response to Stancaro,” 147 (CO 9.350).
mediation, but to the whole process of mediation. In his commentary and sermon on Galatians 3:19-20, Calvin argues that Christ’s mediation ranges through the whole process of the law, i.e., its creation, publication, interpretation, and use. Moreover, he asserts Christ’s mediation to be pertinent to the whole process of salvation. In this respect, the threefold office of Christ refers completely to Christ’s threefold mediation of the law.

4.4.2 Christus Mediator Reconciliationis

When Calvin deals with the reconciling work of Christ as part of the priestly office, he focuses chiefly on the merit of Christ’s redemptive death. However, for Calvin, the concept of Christ’s mediation of reconciliation refers to the Old Testament as well. The ancient people also felt the necessity of a Mediator, because they were aware that without propitiation, the law did not bring them near God. God’s mercy-seat was commanded to be built in order to reveal the grace of the Mediator. “For as long as the law stands forth before God’s face it subjects us to His wrath and curse; and hence it is necessary that the blotting out of our guilt should be interposed, so that God may be reconciled with us.” Calvin comments that if all the sacrifices of the fathers were not “directed to the Mediator” and did not look to “the

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64 The third type of mediation is relevant to Willis’ “mediation as sustenance” in that “the performance of sustaining mediation means that the Eternal Son’s full equality of nature with the Father was not diminished just because the Father ordered the universe through him.” Calvin’s Catholic Christology, 70.

65 In the sermon on Gal. 3:19-20 (448-455, CO 50.539-544), these points are strongly proclaimed with reference to Christ’s mediation of the law: that “a Mediator” in the passage should be interpreted as denoting Christ rather than Moses, that in Old Testament times Christ appeared as the Mediator in the form of “the Angel,” that Christ’s mediation refers not only to his reconciling work but also to his office to enable us to live according to the law voluntarily, that Christ as “the continual Mediator” has been working not only for the Jews but also for the Gentiles today, and that the extent of Christ’s mediation of the law is manifested throughout its publication, teaching, and fulfillment.

66 According to Blaser, in the context of Calvin’s Institutes the threefold office of Christ is expressed in three ways: das Freiheitsamt, which signifies Christ the eternal Word (Wort) who makes us free by his truth, das Gehorsamsamt, which signifies the person of Christ (Wesen) who intercedes between God and us as he humbles himself and becomes obedient to death, and das Lebensamt, which signifies the work (Werk) of Christ who accepts us as righteous and leads us to eternal life by imputing his righteousness to us. Calvin’s Lehre von den drei Ämtern Christi, 24-44. These three aspects of the office of Christ correspond respectively to each of the characteristic features of the threefold mediation of Christ.

medium of a reconciliation,” they “differ in no respect from mere profane butchery.”

Calvin argues that we cannot discern any merit of Abel which differentiates him from his brother Cain but his firm conviction of the grace of Christ. As he puts it, “the chief point of well-doing, for a pious person, is relying on Christ the Mediator, and on the gratuitous reconciliation procured by him.”

There is no true piety without the perception of the grace of the Mediator, for we cannot contemplate God himself and his providence without the knowledge of his will, that he gives mercy to his people through the hand of his Son. By giving the name Immanuel to Christ, God the Father shows his everlasting will towards his people, to give eternal life to them. Therefore, Christ is properly called Immanuel because of his mediatorship.

Calvin repeatedly refers to the nature of the lawgiver (natura legislatoris) for the purpose of illustrating the nature and purpose of the law. Mostly, in these cases, he points to God’s mercy as revealed in Christ’s reconciliation. Thus, when the law reveals God’s will, it also reveals its accomplishment by the mediation of his Son. “God interposed His Son to reconcile Himself to us because He loved us.”

4.4.3 Christus Mediator Patrocinii

Christ’s office as the Mediator of intercession between God and man is relevant to all the laws that foreshadow Christ, who is the reality and substance of

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68 Comm. Ex. 29:38-41 (2.293-295, CO 24.489-491). For the sacrifices pointing to the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ, cf. Comm. Lev. 1:1-17 (2.322-326, CO 24.506-508); Lev. 17:1 (2.260, CO 24.468); Gen. 8:20 (1.281, CO 23.138); Ps. 119:108 (4.482, CO 32.261): “It was the design of God, by that ceremony, to testify to the fathers that no prayers were acceptable to him, but those which were joined with sacrifice, that they might always turn their minds to the Mediator.”

69 Comm. Gen. 4:7 (1.201, CO 23.89).

70 Comm. Isa. 8:10 (1.274, CO 36.173); Matt. 1:23 (1.68-69, CO 45.68-69).


72 Comm. 1 Jn. 4:10 (292, CO 55.354): “[F]ilium suum interposuit Deus, ad se nobis reconciliandum, quia nos amabat.”
them.\textsuperscript{73} For if a ceremony were held with no expectation of Christ, it bears only a “bare sign (nudo symbolo)” because nothing can make it worthy except Christ’s intercession.\textsuperscript{74} As Calvin puts it:

But as we have elsewhere seen in what manner blood atones for souls, i.e., in a sacramental manner, upon which it must be observed that what properly belongs to Christ is thus transferred by metonomy to figures and symbols, yet in such a way that the similitude should neither be empty nor inefficacious; for in so far as the fathers apprehended Christ in the external sacrifices, atonement was truly exhibited in them (\textit{quatemus in externis sacrificiis Christum apprehenderunt patres, illic vere exhibita fuit expiatio}.)\textsuperscript{75}

Christ’s mediation of intercession is well expressed in Calvin’s use of the sacramental terms “lift one’s heart higher (\textit{sursum corda})” in relation to the function of the sacrifices in the Old Testament (\textit{Inst. 4.17.36} [altered], \textit{CO} 2.1039, cf. \textit{4.17.18}, \textit{CO} 2.1016-1017).\textsuperscript{76} This concept is prominent in the mediation of prayer.\textsuperscript{77} Calvin calls prayer “an intimate conversation of the pious with God” and says, “we should


\textsuperscript{74} Comm. Ex. 30:1-9 (2.182, \textit{CO} 24.421).


\textsuperscript{76} Cf. \textit{Inst. 2.7.1}, \textit{CO} 2.253: “Yet that very type shows that God did not command sacrifices in order to busy his worshipers with earthly exercises. Rather, he did so that he might lift their minds higher (\textit{alius erigeret eorum mentes})”; Comm. Ex. 12:21-22 (1.221, \textit{CO} 24.222): “We elsewhere see that the Paschal lamb was a type of Christ, who by His death propitiated His Father, . . . And there is no doubt that by this visible symbol He raised up their minds to that true and heavenly Exemplar (\textit{extulerit ad verum et coeleste exemplar}), whom it would be absurd and profane to separate from the ceremonies of the law.”

lift up our minds (tollendas esse sursum mentes) to a pure and chaste veneration of Him” (Inst. 3.20.16, CO 2.642). Further, he points out that due to the merit of Christ the Mediator God regards our prayer as worth listening to and offers all good things.78

Christ’s mediation as “the eternal intercessor (deprecatorem)” is represented notably by the priestly office, to purify and nourish people into the perfection of life as well. It is on this ground that Calvin regards the grace of Christ as the foundation of the eternal beatitude (Inst. 2.15.6, CO 2.367),79 and takes into consideration the priestly office of the Mediator and God’s accommodation in Christ’s kingly office at the same time as he deals with the sursum corda of believers (cf. Inst. 2.15.5).

4.4.4 Christus Mediator Doctrinae

This type of mediation, which is closely related to Christ’s office as Prophet, is based on the fact that we have no knowledge of God extra Christum.80 We can find this kind of mediation most distinctively in Calvin’s commentary on Genesis 28:12, where he comments that the chief angel of God who appeared on Jacob’s ladder revealed the sign (signum) of Christ the incarnate. He fleshes out the presence of the Mediator etiam extra carnem as he points out “the fact that the body of Christ is finite in no way prevents his filling the heavens, since his grace and power spread over all.” By understanding the connection between the mediation of Christ before and after the incarnation from this shadow-reality framework, Calvin maintains that

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78 Cf. Inst. 3.20.1 (CO 2.625); First Catechism 27 (CO 5.343).
80 Cf. Comm. Jn. 5:27 (1.132, CO 46.118); Jn. 6:45 (1.165, CO 46.150); Jn. 10:7 (1.260, CO 46.238); Jn. 10:15 (1.266, CO 46.243); Jn. 17:3 (2.136-137, CO 46.376-377); Jn. 17:8 (2.139-140, CO 46.379-380). Willis reminds us of the totus-totum in the so-called extra Calvinisticum when he comments that “Calvin does not say we have no knowledge of God extra hanc carnem; he says we have no knowledge of God extra Christum.” From this point of view, he argues that the characteristic feature of Calvin’s doctrine of the knowledge of God is “beyond the humanity, to the divinity.” Calvin’s Cathlite Chriisology, 109, 114. Augustine also takes the position that we have no other way to the true knowledge of God but Christ the Mediator. Cf. Robert E. Cushman, “Faith and Reason,” in A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, ed. Roy W. Battenhouse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 304-310.
we can understand that in Christ the eternal image (aeterna imago) of the Father was revealed even to the ancient people.\(^81\)

Commenting on II Corinthians 4:4, Calvin writes: “When Christ is called the image of the invisible God the reference is not merely to His essence (essentia), because He is, as they say, co-essential with the Father, but rather to His relationship to us because He represents the Father to us.”\(^82\) Calvin here refers to the persona of the Mediator rather than to the immanent-Trinitarian view of the co-essentia of the Trinity. Therefore, Calvin claims that man is not created according to the image of Christ but through the mediation of Christ, as he debated with Osiander who, refusing to accept the distinction between the divine essence and the divinity (divinitas) of the hypostasis of the Son, insisted that the incarnation was the infusion of the divine essence to humanity (Inst. 2.12.6-7, CO 2.344-347).\(^83\)

Christ’s mediation of teaching is well presented in the character of priest, whom Calvin describes not only as a messenger but also as an interpreter of the doctrine of the law.\(^84\) In the following, Calvin demonstrates how the Levitical priest


\(^82\) Comm. II Cor. 4:4 (55-56, CO 50.51). Cf. Serm. Deut. 5:17 (165, CO 26.333). Calvin writes that not only must we acknowledge that we “are formed in the image of God,” but we must also remember that we “are members of our Lord Jesus Christ and that there exists [now] a more strict and sacred bond than the bond of nature which is common in all human beings.”

\(^83\) Osiander’s position on the person of Christ is based on the assumption that the divine essence cannot take on humanity. He understands the eternal existence of the Son of God as featured by the eternal presence of the divine essence invariably throughout, before, and after incarnation. Therefore, he argues, although man is not depraved, Christ would become flesh. As a result, Osiander denies the necessity of the coming of Christ as the Mediator, because he believes that man, being created by the image of Christ, bears the original righteousness infused through his divine essence. Osiander’s contention is not based on the free imputation of the righteousness of Christ but on the fact that “we are righteous together with God (nos una cum Deo iustos esse)” (Inst. 3.11.11, quot. 3.11.11, CO 2.541). For the debate between Calvin and Osiander over the image of God, see J. Faber, “Imago Dei in Calvin: Calvin’s Doctrine of Man as the Image of God by Virtue of Creation,” in Essays in Reformed Doctrine, 234-239; Peter Wyatt, Jesus Christ and Creation in the Theology of John Calvin (Allison Park, Pa.: Pickwick Publications, 1996), 39.

\(^84\) Comm. Deut. 17:8-11 (2.262-265, CO 24.470-471, quot. 262, CO 24.470). That Christ is the interpreter of the law (interpres legis) demonstrates the character of Christ the Mediator of all
mediates for his people as a type of the true Mediator.

What the Scripture sometimes relates, as to the inquiries made by Urim and Thummim, it was a concession made by God to the rudeness of His ancient people. The true Priest had not yet appeared, the Angel of His Almighty counsel, by whose Spirit all the Prophets spoke, who, finally, is the fountain of all revelations, and the express image of the Father; in order then that the typical priest (umbratilis sacerdos) might be the messenger (internuncius) from God to man, it behoved him to be invested with the ornaments of Christ. Thus even then believers were taught in a figure, that Christ is the way by which we come to the Father, and that He also brings from the secret bosom of His Father whatever it is profitable for us to know unto salvation.85

4.5 The Extent of Christ’s Mediation of the Law

Calvin claims that the eternal presence of Christ as the Mediator ranges from before the fall: “Certainly, the eternal λόγος was already mediator from the beginning, before Adam’s fall and the alienation and separation of the human race from God.”86 He states: “Even if man had remained free from all stain, his condition would have been too lowly for him to reach God without a Mediator” (Inst. 2.12.1, CO 2.340).87 It is surely the case that Calvin contends that Christ’s mediation ranges over the whole of history after the fall throughout his theological and exegetical works.88 He claims that “since God cannot without the Mediator be propitious toward the human race, under the law Christ was always set before the holy fathers as the point (objeectum) to which they should direct their faith” (Inst. 2.6.2 [altered], CO 2.250). Moreover, Christ’s mediation refers to the office and use of the law in the whole process of personal salvation. In the following commentary on Acts 17:18, Calvin teaching most significantly. Cf. Lev. 10:9-11 (2.235, CO 24.453); Num. 35:1-3 (2.249, CO 24.462); Jn. 3:13 (1.71-72, CO 47.62).

86 “Second Reply to Stancaro,” 147 (CO 9.350): “[Nam] certe λόγος aeternus iam ab initio ante lapsum Adae, et alienationem ac dissidium humani generis ad Deo, fuit mediator.”
87 “Quamvis ab omni labe integer stetisset homo, humillior tamen erat eius conditio quam ut sine mediatore ad Deum penetraret.” Cf. Tylenda, “First Response to Sancaro,” 12 (CO 9.350): “[N]ot only after Adam’s fall did he begin to exercise his office of mediator, but since he is the eternal Word of God, both angels as well as men were united to God by his grace so that they would remain uncorrupted.”
88 Cf. Comm. Gen. 18:13 (1.475, CO 23.254); Ex. 3:2 (1.61, CO 24.35-36); Isa. 19:20 (2.75, CO 36.344); Isa. 63:17 (4.359, CO 37.405); Matt. 1:23 (1.69, CO 45.69); Jn. 5:46 (1.143, CO 47.129); Jn. 16:23-24 (2.125-128, CO 47.367-369); Jn. 16:26 (2.129-130, CO 47.371); Heb. 8:5 (107, CO 55.99); Serm. Matt. 26:36-39 (65, CO 46.846); Matt. 26:27-10 (114, CO 46.886); Gal. 3:13-14 (407-408, 412, CO 50.515, 518); Gal. 3:15-18 (423-437, CO 525-534).
points this out in opposition to the false concept of mediators argued by the Gentiles. He says,

Christ as the Mediator ... teaches that salvation must be sought from Him alone; that it [our faith] bids us seek the expiation, by which we may be reconciled to God, in His death; that it teaches that men, who had previously been unclean and in the grip of sin, are restored and renewed by His Spirit, to begin to live righteous and holy lives; lastly, that, from such beginnings, which make it clear that the Kingdom of God is spiritual, it finally lifts our minds to the hope of the future resurrection.\textsuperscript{89}

In the following section, I will deal with the function of the so-called \textit{extra Calvinisticum} in Calvin’s theology with respect to Christ’s mediation according to both the divine and human natures before the incarnation and after the ascension, and God’s accommodation through the mediation of Christ with respect to the issue of the \textit{extra-legem} related to Calvin’s understanding of the absolute will and the ordained will of God.

\subsection*{4.5.1 The So-Called \textit{Extra Calvinisticum}}

The so-called \textit{extra Calvinisticum} has been developed through the controversies of the Reformed and Lutherans, who criticized Calvin’s understanding of the bodily presence of the bread as opposed to their view of \textit{communicatio idiomatum} and scorned it as “\textit{extra Calvinisticum}.”\textsuperscript{90} The notion has been supported in the light of the fact that Calvin makes use of \textit{etiam extra carnem} to take account not only of the doctrine of the Holy Supper but also of his Christology leading to Christ’s mediation with regard to both his natures even after his ascension.

In his fundamental study on this subject, David Willis seeks the doctrinal origin of the so-called \textit{extra Calvinisticum} based on the distinction between \textit{Christus totus} and \textit{Christus totum} from the early church fathers and ecumenical councils and, of most importance, from Augustine and Lombard, and evinces its great significance for Calvin’s dynamic understanding of Christ’s mediatorship.\textsuperscript{91} Oberman’s view of the extra dimension of Calvin’s theology is more comprehensive than that of Willis,\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{90} Willis, \textit{Calvin’s Catholic Christology}, 1-25.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 26-60, 67-78.
ranging over *extra ecclesiam*, *extra coenam*, *extra carnem*, *extra legem*, and *extra praedicationem*. He also explores the influence of Calvin’s view of *etiam extra carnem* on his position on the continual mediation of Christ. As he puts it:

The *extra calvinisticum* serves to relate the eternal Son to the historical Jesus, the Mediator at the right hand to the sacramental Christ, in such a way that the ‘flesh of our flesh’ is safeguarded. Rather than hiding secret divine resources, which mark a divide between the incarnate Christ and fallen man, the *extra calvinisticum* is meant to express both the reality of the kenosis and the reality of the Ascension. The theological motive is the *caro vera*, the religious motive is the *spes resurrectionis*.

Following the *consensus Tigurinus* of 1549, Calvin defends against both the Catholic view of transubstantiation and the Lutheran concept of *ubiquitas*, the believer’s partaking of the body and blood of the Lord, which is “spiritual” but “real.” He pays specific attention to the continual mediation of Christ with regard to both natures and turns to the principle of “*totus ubique, sed non totum*” in order to explain it. He manifests this principle in the 1559 *Institutes*: “since the whole Christ is everywhere, our Mediator is ever present with his own people, and in the Supper reveals himself in a special way, yet in such a way that the whole Christ is present, but not wholly” (Inst 4.17.30 [altered], CO 2.1032).

While Lutheran theologians such as Joachim Westphal and Tileman Heshusius employed the concept of *ubiquitas* in order to explain the local presence (*localis praesentia*) of Christ’s body, Calvin called on the principle of the *totus non totum* presence of Christ’s body to elicit the omnipresence of the human nature of Christ after his ascension in relation to his continual mediation. Following Augustine, Calvin argues that “the flesh of Christ is to be worshipped in the person of the

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93 Ibid., 249. From this perspective, Oberman explains “Calvin’s shift of accent from a natures-Christology to an offices-Christology, converging towards a Mediator-theology” (253).
94 *Exposition of the Heads of Agreement, T&T 2.239-240 (CO 9.32).*
95 Ibid., 240-244 (CO 9.33-36).
96 The influence of Augustine and Lombard on Calvin’s distinction between *Christus totus* and *Christus totum* is clearly shown in Inst 4.17.30 (CO 2.1031-1032) and Last Admonition to Joachim Westphal, and *The True Partaking of the Flesh and Blood of Christ*. Cf. Willis, Calvin’s Catholic Christology, 29-33, 44-49.
97 “Mediator [ergo] nostre quum totus ubique sit, suis semper adest; et in coena speciali modo praesentem se exhibet, sic tamen ut totus adsit, non totum.”
Mediator.”

That is, regarding the sole mediatorship of Christ, he pointed to the fact that in Christ sacrifcium becomes sacerdos. Although his debate with Lutheran theologians was concentrated on the meaning of the Lord’s Supper, Calvin extends the totus-totum distinction to the mediation of Christ. He says, “the Mediator, God and man, is whole everywhere, but not wholly (totus ubique, sed non totum), because in respect of his flesh he continued some time on earth and now dwells in heaven,” and “because his empire and the secret power of his grace are not confined within any limits.”

Also, while Lutherans developed their theory of communicatio idiomatum for the reason of the transformation of properties, whose insight originated from Luther’s view of ubiquitas, Calvin deals with it in the light of the totus-totum distinction (Inst. 1.14.1-3, cf. 4.17.29-30). Calvin distinguishes the unity of the hypostasis of Christ from the union of properties. He relates unity (unitas) to totus, and union (unio) to totum, as he argues, “although the two natures form the one person of the Mediator, the properties (proprietates) of each remain distinct, since union is a different thing from unity.” From this point of view, Calvin asserts, “Christ our Mediator is everywhere entire, but not as to His flesh, which is confined within its own limits, while His power is infinite, and its operation felt on earth as well as in heaven.”

According to Calvin, not only the unitas but also the unio is always and everywhere present. So he sometimes uses expressions such as “the deity keeps silent” or “at

98 Last Admonition to Joachim Westphal, T&T 2.468 (CO 9.231).
100 Cf. Willis, Calvin’s Catholic Christology, 8-25.
101 The Best Method of Obtaining Concord, T&T 2.576 (CO 9.520). As Willis demonstrates with reference to the thinking of Lombard, the distinction between totus-totum is “between Christ as the second hypostasis of the Trinity, the Eternal Son of God, and Christ the second hypostasis with what he united to himself in the Incarnation.” Calvin’s Catholic Christology, 35.
102 Comm. Jer. “To the Illustrious Prince” (1.xx, CO 19.75): “Christum mediatorem esse ubique integrum, sed non carnis respectu quae finibus suis continetur, quam infinita sit eius potentia et operatio in terra non minus quam in coelo sentiatur.” Cf. Inst. 2.13.4 (CO 2.352): “For even if the Word in his immeasurable essence (essentia) united with the nature (natura) of man into one person (personam), we do not image that he was confined therein. Here is something marvelous: the Son of God descended from heaven in such a way that, without leaving heaven, he willed (voluit) to be born in the virgin’s womb, to go about the earth, and to hang upon the cross; yet he continuously filled the world even as he had done from the beginning (ut semper mundum implieret, sicut ab initio)!”
rest” with reference to the biblical passages which seem to refer only to the human nature of Christ.\(^{103}\)

We should remember that when Calvin discusses *etiam extra carnem*, he does so both from the connection of *unitas-unio* with reference to the second person of the Trinity and from the connection of *totus-totum* with reference to the eternal presence of the Son of God with regard to his two natures. Calvin’s understanding of the continuity of the person of Christ in *etiam intra carnem* and in *etiam extra carnem* stems from his conviction that the Son of God was begotten as the Mediator from the beginning and will continue to mediate for us until our glorification by his second coming. As we see from Calvin’s commentary on the Tabernacle in the Old Testament, two meanings of the body are always significantly noted. First, the body of Christ itself is the way to heaven: “He is said to have made through His body a way (*iter*) to ascend into heaven because He consecrated Himself to God in that body: in it He was sanctified to be true righteousness and in it He prepared Himself to make His sacrifice.” Second, he still mediates for us in the body: “He intercedes (*intercedit*) for us in heaven because He has put on our flesh and consecrated it as a temple to God the Father and has sanctified Himself in it to make atonement for our sins and gain for us eternal righteousness.”\(^{104}\)

Calvin illustrates Christ’s mediation *etiam extra carnem* by referring to the continual distribution of the body and blood of the risen Christ by the special work of the Holy Spirit, designated as the Spirit proceeding from Christ, that is, as the Spirit of Christ.\(^{105}\) The eucharistic concept of *sursum corda* is declared for the purpose of taking account of the continual mediation of Christ for the sanctification and,  

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ultimately, glorification of the saints. Here are Calvin’s words, preached on Christ’s headship of the church:

It is not enough then for us to come to seek in him [Christ] the supply of the good things that we lack that he may impart them to us, but in the first place, he presents himself, and says, “Here is my body which is delivered up for you, here is my blood which will be shed for the remission of your sins.” And this is done in order that we should know that he dwells in us by the power of the Holy Spirit; that we live by his own substance; that it is not said here without cause that the union of the body proceeds from him (la liaison du corps procede de lui) and that he is its provision; and that when we lack the graces and gifts that belong to our spiritual life, we must draw them out of that fountain. And when we resort to him with perseverance in the faith of the gospel, we shall feel ourselves more and more strengthened and confirmed in all these graces, even until he has rid us of all our imperfections and infirmities so that we may enjoy his heavenly glory with him. 107

So far, we have discussed the so-called extra Calvinisticum, focusing on the relevance of the principle of totus ubique sed non totum for Christ’s mediation after the ascension in relation to the bodily presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper. Can we apply this eucharistic idea to Christ’s mediation before the incarnation in Calvin’s theology? A study of Christ’s mediation of the law in the Old Testament in the light of the so-called extra Calvinisticum presents us with an insight to grasp the doctrinal foundation upon which Calvin’s historical and literary interpretation of the law is based. The presence of Christ the Mediator before the incarnation is suggested most persuasively by the conception of the eternal nativity (nativitas) of the Son, based on the inner begetting in the Trinity. 108 From this perspective, Calvin argues for Christ’s mediation according to both the divine and human natures (Inst. 2.14.3, CO 2.354-

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106 Jn. 17:12 (2.142, CO 47.382): “While He dwelt on earth He had no need to borrow power from elsewhere to keep His disciples; but all this relates to the person of the Mediator, who appeared for a time under the form of a Servant. But now He tells the disciples to raise their minds direct to heaven (recta in coelum sensus suos attollere) as soon as they begin to be deprived of the outward help. From this we conclude that Christ keeps believers today no less than before, but in a different way, because divine majesty is displayed openly in Him.” Cf. Last Admonition to Joachim Westphal, T&T 2.390 [altered] (CO 9.174): “Hence, too, we infer that whenever he says he will be present, it is by a proper attribute of Godhead. For although he adheres to his body as Mediator, yet the Spirit is the bond of sacred union, who, raising our souls upwards by faith (sursum fide attolens), inspires life into us from the heavenly head.”

107 Serm. Eph. 4:15-16 (404, CO 51.592).

108 Cf. Second Defense of the Faith Concerning the Sacraments in Answer to Joachim Westphal, T&T 2.301 (CO 9.87-88).
Thus perfect unity (perfecta unitas) was taught by the Mediator: while, we remaining in him, he remained in the Father, and remaining in the Father, remained in us—thus, advancing us to unity with the Father, since while he is naturally in the Father in respect of nativity, we are naturally in him, and he remains naturally in us. That there is this natural unity (naturalis unitas) in us, he himself thus declared, Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, abideth in me, and I in him (John vi. 56.)

As seen here, Calvin identifies the spiritual unity with the natural unity from the standpoint of the so-called extra Calvinisticum. It reflects his eucharistic theology as well as his stance on the presence and work of Christ as Mediator before his incarnation. From this perspective, Calvin, identifying the angel who appeared to Jacob in his dream as Christ, says that “the fact that the body of Christ is finite, does not prevent him from filling heaven and earth, because his grace and power are everywhere diffused.” Also, in the same vein, he asserts that “when Christ anciently appeared in human form (forma hominis), it was a prelude to the mystery (praeludium mysterii) which was afterwards exhibited when God was manifested in the flesh.” Although Christ was not yet the Mediator in the flesh (carne), “whenever he manifested himself to the fathers, Christ was the Mediator between God and them,” and he revealed “a pattern (specimen) of his future mission.”

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109 In his book Calvin's Catholic Christology, Willis claims that "the primary sense of Mediator for Calvin is Deus manifestatus in carnis. When he speaks of the Mediator, without any explicit or contextual qualifications, Calvin means the One Person formed by the assumptio carnis. Even in restricting 'Mediator' to this, however, Calvin is especially cautious to see that the divinity’s part in the mediation is not denied" (68). In this respect, Willis continue to say, Calvin argues for Christ the Mediator "before the Incarnation even prior to and apart from the Fall" (69).

110 The True Partaking of the Flesh and Blood of Christ, T&T 2.540 (CO 9.494).

111 Cf. Inst. 1.13.24, CO 2.111: “For from the time that Christ was manifested in the flesh, he has been called the Son of God, not only in that he was the eternal Word begotten before all ages from the Father, but because he took upon himself the person and office of the Mediator, that he might join us to God.”


113 Comm. Jos. 5: 14 (87-88, CO 45.464). In his book Calvin's Catholic Christology, Willis demonstrates his positive position on the mediation of Christ before the incarnation (68-71. 124-125). However, he does not claim the revelation—presence and representation—of the humanity of the Mediator in the Old Testament. He says, "Before the movement of the Eternal Word towards us, there was no human side of Jesus to which the Word could be added to make One Person; the human nature of Jesus had no separate existence apart from or prior to the assumptio carnis" (72).

114 Gen. 18:13 (1.475, CO 23.13).
There seems to be every reason to assume that this special emphasis on the presence of Christ the Mediator before the incarnation originates in his conviction of the spiritual but real (bodily) omnipresence of Christ throughout history.

4.5.2 “Deus coram loquitus sit, et tamen per internuncium”\(^{116}\): God’s Accommodation and Christ’s Mediation

“The teaching of the law is far above human capacity” (Inst 2.7.3). Human beings tend to measure their capacity by the precepts of God’s law, and as a result to accommodate them to the capacity of their own will.\(^{117}\) This fallacy is founded on their arrogant conviction that God must accommodate what belongs to him to human capacity because he is love. However, God’s accommodation, as understood by Calvin, refers not so much to the precepts of the law as to God himself.\(^{118}\) The precepts of some case laws in the Old Testament, which we call the tribal law of the Israelites, were given according to the capacity of the ancient people, to their barbarity, so that they did not fall into eternal death by abandoning all attempt at morality. On the other hand, the precepts of moral laws, whose nature is eternal and unchangeable, were given not according to human capacity but according to the necessity of God. In the former case, the character of God is represented by God who compromises, whereas in the latter case, God who condescends.\(^{119}\)

In Ford Lewis Battles’ well-known article “God Was Accommodating Himself to Human Capacity,” the late church history professor and translator of the

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\(^{115}\) Comm. Ex. 23:20 (1.404, CO 24.252). Cf. Comm. Ex. 3:2 (1.61, CO 24.35-36); Ps 132:10 (5.153, CO 32.347); Isa. 19:20 (2.75, CO 36.344); Dan. 7:13 (2.40-44, CO 41.59-62); Dan. 8:15 (2.111-112, CO 41.109-110); Matt. 28:18 (3.250, CO 45.821); II Tim. 1:5 (292, CO 52.348); Heb. 8:5 (107, CO 55.99); Heb. 8:6 (108, CO 55.99-100).


\(^{117}\) Comm. Rom. 8:3 (158, CO 49.138): “It is, therefore, absurd to measure human strength by the precepts of the law, as if God, in demanding what is just, had regarded the character and extent of our powers.”

\(^{118}\) For example, God reveals “himself” as expressed as father, teacher, physician, and even God the drunkard, etc. Battles, “God Was Accommodating Himself to Human Capacity,” 27-31; Wright, “Calvin’s Accommodating God,” 3-10.

Institutes describes God’s self-portraits as three, Father, Teacher, and Physician, for the purpose of taking account of Calvin’s rhetorical use of the divine accommodation. With reference to “Physician,” Battles turns to God’s accommodation in Christ as he argues, “the cross of Christ is God’s medicine for us.” Battles deals with the incarnation of Christ particularly in the last section of the article independently, calling it “the accommodating act par excellence.” There he emphasizes the accommodating act of Christ’s intermediation.

Expounding I Peter 1:20 on the manifestation of the blood of Christ which was foreknown before the foundation of the world, Calvin demonstrates the character of Christ as the Mediator along with the divine accommodation.

Since God is incomprehensible, faith can never reach to Him, unless it had immediate regard to Christ. There are two reasons why faith cannot be in God, unless Christ intervenes as a Mediator (medius). First the greatness of the divine glory must be taken into account, and at the same time the littleness of our capacity. Our acuteness is very far from being capable of ascending so high as to comprehend God. Hence all thinking about God without Christ is a vast abyss which immediately swallows up all our thoughts. . . . The second reason is that, as faith ought to unite us to God, we shun and dread every access to Him, unless a Mediator (mediator) comes who can deliver us from fear, for sin, which reigns in us, renders us hateful to God and Him in turn to us. . . . It is evident from this that we cannot believe in God except through Christ, in whom God in a manner makes Himself little (quodammodo parvum facit), in order to accommodate Himself to our comprehension (ut se ad captum nostrum submittat), and it is Christ alone who can make our conscience at peace, so that we may dare to come in confidence to God.

God’s accommodation is revealed by Christ’s mediation by which we are taught the knowledge of God and have access to God’s majesty. Further, Calvin asserts the accommodation of Christ himself for us, as he comments on Christ coming as the witness of his Father. “By distinguishing Himself from the Father He accommodates Himself to the capacity of His hearers (se auditorum capitui accommodat). He does this for the sake of His office; for at that time He was the Father’s minister, and so He asserts that the Father is the Author of all His

120 Battles, “God Was Accommodating Himself to Human Capacity,” 31.
121 Ibid., 36.
122 Ibid., 38. Peter Opitz regards Christ’s mediation according to both the divine and human natures as the accommodation of the Word of God. Calvins Theologische Hermeneutik (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1994), 132-134.
Calvin gives more detailed explanation on God’s accommodation in Christ’s mediation as he deals with his kingly office, which he believes is spiritual in nature and pertains to the perpetuity of the whole body of the church and to the immortality of each individual member (Inst. 2.15.3, CO 2.363). God’s accommodating act in the mediation of Christ is seen by Calvin as relating not only to God’s condescension in Christ but also to our enhancement through his [Christ’s] grace. It is noted both that God “wills to rule and protect the church in Christ’s person” (Inst. 2.15.5, CO 2.365) and that Christ “shares with us all that he has received from the Father. Now he arms and equips us with his power, adorns us with his beauty and magnificence, enriches us with his wealth” (Inst. 2.15.4, CO 2.364). As Calvin comments,

Why did he take the person of the Mediator? He descended from the bosom of the Father and from incomprehensible glory that he might draw near to us. All the more reason, then, is there that we should one and all resolve to obey, and to direct our obedience with the greatest eagerness to the divine will (nutum)! (Inst. 2.15.5, CO 2.366).

In addition, God’s accommodation means his receiving our imperfect obedience, compensating for the lack with his own merit. As Calvin states, “not rejecting our imperfect (semiplenam) obedience, but rather supplying what is lacking to complete it, He causes us to receive the benefit of the promises of the law as if we had fulfilled their condition” (Inst 2.7.4, CO 2.255-256).

Calvin sees the characteristic feature of Christ’s mediation of the law as embodied in the law itself, whose significance as a rule of life is found not only in its precept but also in its promise. Once the promise of the law is revealed, one recognizes that it needs to be fully observed, despite the fact that it is beyond his or her ability. With this intention, Calvin cites Augustine, who says, “the usefulness of the precepts is great if free will is so esteemed that God’s grace may be the more honored” (Inst. 2.5.7, CO 2.235). With regard to God’s accommodation through the mediation of Christ the Mediator, it is not our capacity as such but rather our capacity

124 Comm. Jn. 8:17 (1.212-213, CO 47.194).
to which we are converted by the proper grace of God.

The relation between Christ’s mediation and God’s accommodation is stated even more expressively in Calvin’s commentary on Deuteronomy (29:29; 30:11-14). Expounding 29:29, “The secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever, that we may do well the words of this law,” Calvin comments that the reason why God set forth the doctrine openly in the law but allowed his counsel (consilium) to be hidden and incomprehensible (occultum et incomprensibilem) was that God reveals things which are profitable to us and retains to himself secret things which neither a concern nor a profit for us. Calvin argues that the doctrine of the law itself, the rule of just and pious living (pie iustique vivendi regula), is perpetual, but God sometimes makes it obscure in order to grade himself “down to the measure of our understanding (ad modulum ingenii nostri demisit).” In the doctrine of the law, God declares his will, which is the will accommodated to human capacity.125 In the commentary on Deuteronomy 30:14, “But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it,” Calvin demonstrates that the divine will, accommodated to human limited capacity, is the free imputation of God’s righteousness by the grace of Christ our Mediator, which is the catalyst of the gospel. This gratuitous grace is due to God’s fatherly indulgence (paterna indulgentia) to receive our imperfect obedience pleasantly and to relax the rigorous requirement of the law.126 Therefore, the true will of God who accommodates himself to human capacity cannot be revealed unless we are aware of Christ’s mediation of the law. That is, only from the perspective of Christus mediator legis can we grasp God’s.

125 Comm. Deut. 29:29 (1.410-412, CO 24.255-257). Cf. Wright, “Calvin’s Accommodating God,” 19: “The revealed God is always still for Calvin the partly hidden God, for all knowledge of God is accommodated knowledge—which means knowledge tailored to our measure and hence knowledge curtailed. We must make do with the prattling of God until hereafter he speaks to us face to face.”

126 Comm. Deut. 30:11-14 (1.412-414, CO 24.257-258). Cf. Serm. Deut. 5:28-33 (284-285, CO 26.417): “Now therein we are readily informed that God wills to draw us to himself, but we must not infer that men can merit anything by serving God. For the papists, when they hear passages like these, stress their merits and suppose that God is obligated to them in the same proportion. On the contrary, God clearly wishes to show us that he is ready to accommodate himself to us along human lines, that he only wants to induce us to obey him.”
accommodation to human capacity, sinfulness, and barbarity. In the following sermon, Calvin preaches how God accommodated himself to the limited human capacity and sinfulness as the living God, whose definite revelation is described as the presence of the eternal Son of God as the Mediator.

Because we are not yet participants in the glory of God, thus we cannot approach him; rather, it is necessary for him to reveal himself to us according to our rudeness and infirmity (rudesse et infirmité). The fact remains that since the beginning of the world when God appeared to mortal men, it was not in order to reveal himself as he was, but according to men’s ability to receive him. We must always keep in mind that God was not known by the Fathers. And today he does not appear to us in his essence (en son essence). Rather he accommodates himself (s’accommode) to us. That being the case, it is necessary for him to descend according to our capacity in order to make us sense his presence with us. . . . For if God does not reveal himself to us in as lofty a manner as our ambition requires, remember that it is for our profit and salvation that he does so.

In dealing with the accommodated will of God, it should be noted that the single will of God, which is hidden and incomprehensible, is sustained in spite of its varying revelations. God’s accommodation to the ancient people is the expression

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128 Serm. Deut. 5:4-7 (53 [altered], CO 26.248). God’s accommodating act is depicted more vividly and decisively in Calvin’s sermons on the Ten Commandments than in his commentaries. Cf. Serm. Deut. 5:4-7 (56, CO 26.251, God’s accommodation to our weakness); Deut. 5:8-10 (69, CO 26.261, God’s accommodation to our “ignorance,” “anger,” “wrath,” and “indignation”); Deut. 5:8-10 (77, CO 26.267, God’s accommodation to our nature, by hiding “his naked essence”); Deut. 5:11 (83, CO 26.271, God’s accommodation in our using his name); Deut. 5:16 (135, CO 26.310, God’s accommodation to our ignorance: He “spoke in the rough language”); Deut. 5:17 (153, CO 26.323: “God spoke in a gross and uncultured manner in order to accommodate himself to the great and the small and the less intelligent”); Deut. 5:17 (155 [altered], CO 26.324: “And seeing that he had descended so low (est descendit si bas), there is no one so ignorant who cannot understand what the law contains”); Deut. 5:22 (241-242, CO 26.387: “God has so truly accommodated (conformé) himself and stooped (abaissé) to our smallness . . . Therefore, let us keep in mind that our Lord has not spoken according to his nature”); Deut. 5:23-27 (257, CO 26.397: “God accommodates himself to our lowness and weakness (s’accomode à notre petite et infirmité). For when it pleases him to send us his Word which must be preached to us and when we have men like ourselves who are his messengers, he therein expresses his concern for what is fitting and useful to us”); Deut. 5:28-33 (285, CO 26.417: “God clearly wishes to show us that he is ready to accommodate himself to us along human lines, that he only wants to induce us to obey him”).

129 Concerning “the single will of God,” see Wright, “Calvin’s Accommodating God,” 13-15, 18-19: “Condescension is the hallmark of all the dealings that God the transcendent has had with humanity. That is why the motif, or cluster of motifs, of divine accommodation takes us to the heart of
of God's grace given in accordance with the requirements of the age, which correspond to "the childhood of the Church (pueritia ecclesiae)."130 It is for the hardness of heart of the rude and uncivilized people.131 In particular, through the limited application of the theory of adiaphora to the ancient people, Calvin distinctively shows God's accommodation to the barbarity of the ancient people.

Calvin's theology. . . . Yet God remains in control throughout, but at the cost of self-limitation, sometimes to such an extent that the true knowledge of God and his will is largely veiled. That is why there is uncanny similarity at times, as I said earlier, between allegory and accommodation. . . . The real truth was as much masked as exposed by the text" (18-19). Cf. Comm. Deut. 25:5-10 (3.178, CO 24.172): "Since we understand the intention (finem) of the law, we must also observe that the word brethren does not mean actual brothers, but cousins, and other kinsmen, whose marriage with the widows of their relative would not have been incestuous; otherwise God would contradict Himself."

131 For God's accommodation to the barbarity of the ancient people, cf. Comm. Lev. 11:2 (2.61, CO 24.347, on the clean animals); "Afterwards, when God imposed the yoke of the Law to repress the licentiousness of the people, He somewhat curtailed this general permission, not because He repented of His liberality; but because it was useful to compel in this way to obedience these almost rude and uncivilized people (rudes fere et indomitos)"; Lev. 17: 10-14 (3.31, CO 24.619-620, on eating blood): Calvin here points to God's accommodation to barbarity for the purpose of keeping the ancient people from falling into more aggravated barbarism, commenting that "this mode of instruction was necessary for a rude people, lest they should speedily lapse into barbarism"; Ex. 21:18-19 (3.40, CO 24.624, on smiting together): "Whenever . . . God seems to pardon too easily, and with too much clemency, let us recollect that He desirously deviated from the more perfect rule (ab optima regula), because He had to do with an intractable people (indomabili)"; Deut. 20:12-14 (3.53, CO 24.632, on making war): "It has already been stated, that more was conceded to the Jews on account of their hardness of heart (pro cordis duritate), than was justly lawful for them"; Num. 35:19-27 (3.65, CO 24.639, on the revenger of blood himself): "[S]ince this indulgence [of punishments by private will] was conceded on account of the people's hardness of heart (duritiem), God here reminds them how needful it was to provide an asylum for the innocent, because all murderers would else have been indiscriminately attacked"; Lev. 18:26-30 (3.74, CO 24.646, on keeping the whole statutes and judgments of God): "The exhibition of His severity, which He had referred to, might indeed have sufficed for the instruction (erudiendo) of His people; but in order to influence them more strongly He at the same time added the way pointed out to them in the law, which would not suffer them to go astray, if only they refused not to follow God"; Deut. 22: 23-27 (3.79, CO 24.649, on the adultery of a virgin pledged to be married): "Although . . . the terms are accommodated to the comprehension of a rude people (ad captum rudis populi accommodatur sermo), it was the intention of God to distinguish force from consent"; Ex. 21:7-11 (3.81, CO 24.650, on the fact that "the sanctity of the marriage vow" is greater than the slave covenant): "[Al]though God is gracious in remitting the punishment, still He shows that chastity is pleasing to Him, as far as the people's hardness of heart (duritiem) permitted." Calvin here also alludes that it is God's accommodation to the barbarity of the ancient people to allow them to sell their children for the relief of their poverty (3.80, CO 24.650); Deut. 24:1-4 (3.93, CO 24.657-658, on divorceement): God did not punish divorce because the perverseness of their heart was so great that it "could not be restrained from dissolving a most sacred and inviolable tie [the bond of union between husband and wife]"; Ex. 22:1-4 (3.140, CO 24.687-688, on the law of restitution): "Now follow the civil laws, the principle of which is not so exact and perfect; since in their enactment God has relaxed His just severity in consideration of the people's hardness (duritiem) of heart"; Ex. 21:1, et al (3.160, CO 24.701, on the freedom of slaves in the seventh year): "[B]ut the tie of slavery could not only be loosed by divorce, that is to say, by this impious violation of marriage. There was then gross barbarity (barbaries) in this severance, whereby a man was disunited of half of himself and his own bowels. . . . The sanctity of marriage therefore gave way in this case to private right; and this defect is to be reckoned amongst the others which God tolerated on account of the people's hardness (duritiem) of heart."
Calvin distinguishes clearly Christian freedom and its use, as he deals with the realm of *adiaphora* (Inst. 3.19.7-13). The core of this theory is represented by the distinctive teleological and deontological attitudes towards the use of what is allowed, i.e., the distinction between “an offense given (*scandalum datum*)” and “one received (*acceptum*)” (Inst. 3.19.11. CO 2.619). It is known that Calvin’s application of *adiaphora* to the use of images in the church, which is related to the second commandment, is very limited in comparison to that of Luther and Melanchthon as we can see it in his commentary on the last four books of the Pentateuch, in which he claims that God accommodated to the barbarity of ancient people because of their hardness of heart and of the incompleteness of the revelation in the Old Testament era.

Regarding Leviticus 18:18, “Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister . . .,” Calvin mentions the principle of *adiaphora* negatively with reference to its use for the ancient people. As he puts it:

Since from long custom it is established that cousins-german (*consobrinus*) should not marry, we must beware of giving scandal lest too unbridled a liberty should expose the Gospel to much reproach; and we must bear in mind Paul’s admonition, to abstain even from things lawful when they are not expedient (I Cor. 10:23).

Also, as to “objects of vow,” Calvin points out that the principle of *adiaphora* is only applicable when it is legal. He says,

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\text{[I]nasmuch as there is an intermediate degree (modius gradus) between that which God has expressly prescribed and forbidden, it might be objected that it was allowable to make a vow in respect to things which are called indifferent}
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My reply to this is, that since the principle ought always to be maintained by the godly, that nothing is to be done without faith (Rom. 14:23), it must ever be considered whether a thing is agreeable to God's word, otherwise our zeal is preposterous.\textsuperscript{135}

Calvin uses the adiaphora in a strictly limited way in the interpretation of the Old Testament law, for he believes that to practise it is not yet suitable for the ancient people who are in the childlike and barbarous state. Calvin’s comment on the prohibition of shaving the way the uncircumcised did, reflects how Calvin limits the use of adiaphora even in the realm of the indifferent, because he maintains that the ancient people were in a childlike and barbarous state; therefore the use of adiaphora was not suitable for them.

The same thing was also commonly practised by others; inasmuch as the world is easily deceived by the exposure of parades. But though this were a thing in itself indifferent (medium), yet God would not allow His people to be at liberty to practise it, that, like children, they might learn from these slight rudiments, that they would not be acceptable to God, unless they were altogether different from uncircumcised foreigners, and removed themselves as far as possible from following their examples; and especially that they should avoid all ceremonies (ritus) whereby their [the uncircumcised’s] religion was testified to. For experience teaches how greatly the true worship of God is obscured by anything adscititious, and how easily foul superstitions creep in, when the contrivances (commenta) of men are tacked on to the word of God.\textsuperscript{136}

4.6 Conclusion

As a rule of just and godly living, the law makes us aware of our limited capacity and causes us to realize the necessity of the Mediator. Further, the law reveals the promise of the coming of Christ as the Mediator. As well as that, Christ mediates the law as the Reconciler to satisfy its demand, as the Intercessor to recover the communion between God and us by eliminating its curse, and as the Teacher to reveal its true nature.

God accommodates himself not to the natural state of people, which is totally depraved because of the fall, but to the state of people renewed by the mediation of

\textsuperscript{135} Comm. Deut. 23:21-23 (2. 414, CO 24.564).

\textsuperscript{136} Comm. Lev. 19:27-28 (2.51-52 [altered], CO 24.341). I translates the words pomparum objectu literally into “by the exposure of parades” in order to distinguish its meaning from that of ritus. Also we need to take care that the word commenta should be translated as “contrivances,” “inventions,” and “devices,” etc. It should not be translated as “comments.”
Christ. Therefore, with respect to the law, God’s accommodation to human capacity, sinfulness, and barbarity should be taken into account on the basis of the fact that Christ is the Mediator of the law.

God is subject to no necessity but that of his own plan. He is the law to himself. Therefore, he is not subject to the law either. God’s will remains beyond the regulation of the law, but is not contradictory to his wisdom. In commenting on a case law on the guilt-by-association system, Calvin says,

[S]urely our natural common sense (communis sensus naturae) dictates that it is an act of barbarous madness to put children to death because they hate their father. If any should object to what we have already seen, that God avenges “unto the third and fourth generation,” the reply is easy, that He is a law unto Himself (eum sibi esse legem), and that He does not rush by a blind impulse to exercise vengeance, so as to confound the innocent with the reprobate, but that He so visits the iniquity of the fathers upon their children, as to temper extreme severity with the greatest equity (aequitate). Moreover, He has not so bound Himself by an inflexible rule as not to be free, if it so pleases Him, to depart from the Law; as for example, He commanded the whole race of Canaan to be rooted out, because the land would not be purged except by the extermination of their defilements; and, since they were all reprobate, the children, no less than their fathers, were doomed to just destruction. Nay, we read that, after Saul’s death, his guilt was expiated by the death of his children (II Sam. 21:2), still, by this special exception, the Supreme lawgiver did not abrogate what He had commanded; but would have His own admirable wisdom (consilio) acquiesced in, which is the fountain from whence all laws proceed.  

Calvin here asserts that although some regulations of judicial case laws are not in accordance with those of natural law and moral laws, the consistency of God’s will towards his people should not be denied. Even the act of God, which cannot be justified by any regulation of the whole law, should be regarded as done according to God’s wisdom and the great divine equity. Speaking of death in dealing with another case law, “He that smiteth a man, so that he die,” Calvin comments that there is no concept of Stoic fatalism allowed, but nothing is done without God’s secret counsel (arcano Dei consilio). God takes away life even from an innocent man according to his will without any reason comprehensible to us. God’s providence, therefore, should not be philosophized (philosophari) according to our measure. The secret counsels of God found in some cases of judicial laws and historical events are

beyond our measure, but show God’s will to deliver his people from eternal death and to nurture them. No other reason is suggested by Calvin, but God’s accommodation to the barbarity of his people because of the hardness of their heart.139

Therefore, the reality and significance of God’s accommodation cannot be recognized fully and definitely unless it is by the mediation of Christ. With reference to the law, God’s accommodation signifies none other than Christ’s mediation of the law not only for its revelation but also for its fulfilment. For Calvin, the Word denotes not only the deity of the second person of the Trinity and the divinity of the incarnate Son, but also the hypostasis of the Son as the Mediator, the peculiar properties (proprietates) of “wisdom (sapientia), counsel (consilium), and the ordered disposition (dispensatio) of all things” (Inst. 1.13.18, CO 2.105). The Word denotes both the essence of God and the property of the Son of God at the same time, because it is “understood as the order or mandate of the Son (pro nutu vel mandato), who is himself the eternal and essential Word of the Father” (Inst. 1.13.7, CO 2.95). Therefore, no secret counsel of God has been revealed in any other place but in the Word since the “hidden and inward (arcana et interior)” begetting of the Son before time.140

Christ is the substance of the law, the expression of the will of God. Also, as the Mediator, Christ reveals and accomplishes the precepts of the law. Therefore, for Calvin the etiam extra legem is related not so much to God’s absolute will itself as to his accommodation revealed by it. Just as the revelation of God had been present by the inward begetting of the Son of God during the time before the incarnation, so Christ had been working as the Mediator even before he was manifested as the Mediator. This being so, not only God’s will in the law but also God’s will etiam extra legem—even extra legem—is revealed solely by the mediation of Christ the Son of God. In this respect, Calvin differentiates himself from late medieval

nominalists, who equated God's rule *extra legem* with the rule of the absolute or ordained will of God.\textsuperscript{141}

For Calvin, Christ's mediation of the law is understood as the typical expression of God's accommodation to his people by the imputation of the grace of his Son. The nature or soul of the law is unchangeable because it reveals the eternal righteousness of God. No one can satisfy its demand, but with the grace of the Mediator, God deems our status and our works as worthwhile to receive. God lowers himself and stoops to the imperfect obedience of his people by enhancing them through the grace of his Son. Calvin explains Christ's mediation according to two natures, not by the *communicatio idiomatum*, which is based on the absoluteness of God's will, but by the principle of *totus ubique, sed non totum*.\textsuperscript{142} From this perspective, he maintains Christ's mediation before the incarnation, even before the fall. Polish theologians such as Stancaro and Biandrata did not rightly understand the unity and continuity between the deity of the eternal Son of God and the divinity of Christ the Mediator because of their anti-Trinitarian tendency, so they could not accept Christ's mediation according to the divine and human nature.

Christ reveals the law, and the law reveals Christ. Although the emphasis of the Old Testament is more on Christ in the law and is more on the law in Christ in the New Testament, Calvin grasps these two at the same time in dealing with the relation between Christ and the law. When Christ in the law and the law in the Christ are revealed at the same time by the mediation of Christ, we can overcome the voluntarist view of *extra legem* and truly understand God's accommodation par excellence.

Although many critical theological issues on Christ's mediation of the law

\textsuperscript{141} For the similarity between Calvin and the late medieval theologians in their view of *extra legem* and their resort to the ordained will of God, see Oberman, "The ‘Extra’ Dimension in the Theology of Calvin," 256-257.

\textsuperscript{142} The principle of the bodily presence of *Christus totus-non totum* had been developed and supported by Augustine, Lombard, and Aquinas, for the purpose of eliciting the continual mediation of Christ according to two natures. However, this tendency was changed by the theologians of the medieval voluntarist circle from Duns Scotus to Gabriel Biel, who emphasized the *communicatio idiomatum* based on the absoluteness of God's will. Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology*, 40-43.
concentrate on the person of the Mediator in the Old Testament, Calvin’s chief concern, which was shown in his debates with Stancaro and Biandrata, is rather related to its significance for the glorification of the chosen people. Calvin’s concept of Christus mediator legis reveals the characteristic feature of the Reformation of refugees.\textsuperscript{143} The zenith of God’s accommodation is found in the fact that God sent his only Son into the world as a viator, like us. Christ will not reveal his glory fully until the end of his journey. Therefore, we should be careful not to fall into false humility and try to separate the divinity from Christ the incarnate before God’s time. Here are the words of Calvin:

Unblemished, Christ will be placed as intermediary between us and the Father; nothing is taken away from his immeasurable glory, even though he is perceived under the veil of his humanity (in a more obscure way) until the time when Christ in his human nature, with the course of his mediatorship completed, submits to the Father, and his divine essence and majesty immediately shine forth in splendor.\textsuperscript{144}


CHAPTER V
CHRIST’S MEDIATION OF THE LAW IN THE OLD TESTAMENT:
A PIVOTAL APPROACH TO CALVIN AND JUDAISM

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we are going to explore Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law focusing on the person and work of Christ the Mediator in the Old Testament. Despite his critical position on Judaic monotheism and Jewish literal interpretation, Calvin was accused of a Judaizer by some theologians, most significantly by Servetus and Hunnius, because of his historical interpretation of the Old Testament. The following study will be devoted to verifying how Calvin interprets the Mosaic law historically yet spiritually maintaining firmly his economic-Trinitarian position in the light of the concept of Christus mediator legis.

5.1.1 Calvin’s Criticism of “A New Judaism” of the Papists and the Anti-Judaism of the Anabaptists

Calvin’s criticism of the Catholic view of the church in the Institutes centres specifically on its distorted formalism. He accuses the Romanists of displaying certain outward appearances (larvae), in a similar fashion to the Jews who boasted of temples, ceremonies, and priesthood (Inst. 4.2.3, CO 2.769). He claims that the Roman Church constitutions distort and deny the truth of the law and enslave believers by bringing Jewish vexations upon the conscience (Inst. 4.10.1-32, esp. 4.10.10, 30).

Calvin, passing judgement on the Catholic tonsure as an imitation of the purification of the Nazarites, rebukes the Papists as those who are raising up “another
Judaism” and keep practising “the old Judaism,” which the Jews were allowed temporarily by God, who “accommodated (accommodarent)” himself to their limited human capacity and barbarity (Inst. 4.19.26. CO 2.1085). He expresses his view of “a new Judaism” definitely in the following, as he criticizes the papal doctrine of worship, which is based on their improper discrimination between dulia and latria.

A new Judaism (novus iudaismus), as a substitute for that which God had distinctly abrogated, has again been reared up by means of numerous puerile extravagancies, collected from different quarters; and with these have been mixed up certain impious rites, partly borrowed from the heathen, and more adapted to some theatrical show than to the dignity of our religion. The first evil here is, that an immense number of ceremonies, which God had by his authority abrogated, once for all, have been again revived. The next evil is, that while ceremonies ought to be living exercises of piety (viva pietatis exercitia), men are vainly occupied with a number of them that are both frivolous and useless. But by far the most deadly evil of all is, that after men have thus mocked God with ceremonies of one kind or other, they think they have fulfilled their duty as admirably as if these ceremonies included the whole essence of piety and divine worship (tota vis pietatis et cultus Dei).

Calvin further refers to the Christological significance of the sacraments by adducing the false doctrine of Catholic ceremonies, which he believes work in order to hide Christ rather than to set him forth as the substance of the sacraments (Inst. 4.10.14). It is the focal point of his argument that the Catholic false sacraments do not bear the promise of Christ declared by the Word of God, which is the crucial element not only regarding the sacraments set by Christ in the New Testament but also the ancient Jewish sacraments (Inst. 4.14.20-26). In commenting on the coat of Aaron, Calvin expresses his view against the Catholic formalism once again. He asserts that “this is the true perpetuity of the ceremonies, that they should rest in Christ, who is their full truth and substance (veritas et substantia).” He goes on to criticize the Papists because they have dared to obscure the brightness of the gospel with a new Judaism (novo Judaismo). They were altogether without the means of proving their priesthood, and so their easiest plan was to envelop their vanity in an immense mass of ceremonies, and, as it were, to shut out the light by clouds. So much the more diligently, then,

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1 The Necessity of Reforming the Church, T&T 1.131-132 [altered] (CO 6.463). Cf. Inst. 2.8.33 (on the observing days of the Jews), 4.5.5 (on Jewish ceremonies and Catholic ordination), 4.10.11, 13, 14 (on Judaism and Roman constitutions on ceremonies), 4.19.26 (on the purifications of the Nazarites), and 4.19.31 (on Catholic ceremony of anointing and Jewish ceremonies).
must believers beware of departing from the pure institution of Christ, if they desire to have Him for their one and eternal Mediator.²

This stance of Calvin recalls, as he puts it in the 1536 Institutes, that the true worship of God in divine sacraments is “to hunger for, seek, look to, learn, and study Christ alone”(4.52, CO 1.139; Inst. 4.18.20, CO 2.1065).³

On the other hand, Calvin’s criticism of the Anabaptists (Catabaptists) centres chiefly on their attitude towards the validity of the Old Testament law as far as their relationship with Judaism is concerned. He regards them as the new followers of Marcion who definitely separated the law from the Gospel.⁴ Calvin calls these people who insist on “soul sleep” and “celestial flesh” but deny infant baptism “certain madmen of the Anabaptist sect” in the 1539 Institutes (7.1, CO 1.802),⁵ and later categorizes Servetus as a follower of this sect in the 1559 Institutes (2.1.10, CO 2.313).

In a chapter added anew in the 1539 Institutes called “De similitudine veteris et novi testamenti,” Calvin declares his position on the continuity of the law succinctly but provocatively: “The covenant made with all the patriarchs is so much like ours in substance and reality that the two are actually one and the same. Yet they differ in the mode of dispensation (7.2, CO 1.802; Inst. 2.10.2, CO 2.313).”⁶ Then he goes on to explain the three chief points of the similarity between the Old and New Testaments:

[First] they [the Israelites] were adopted into the hope of immortality; and assurance of this adoption was certified to them by oracles, by the law, and by the prophets. Secondly, the covenant by which they were bound to the Lord was supported, not by their own merits, but solely by the mercy of the God who called them. Thirdly, they had and knew Christ as Mediator, through whom they were joined to God and were to share in his promises (1539 Inst. 7.2, CO 1.803; Inst. 2.10.2, CO 2.314).

Calvin here pointedly emphasizes the historical presence of Christ as the

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³ “Unum duntaxat Christum esurire, quaerere, spectare, discere, ediscere nos oportet.”
⁶ “Patrum omnium foedus adeo substantia et re ipsa nihil a nostro differt, ut unum prorsus atque idem sit; administratio tamen variat.”
Mediator alive throughout the whole of salvation history. It is on this basis that he develops the dynamic relationship between the universal church, individual churches, and individuals as well as the continuity of the church and the sacramental significance of various symbols of the ancient church (4.50, CO 1.543; Inst. 4.1.2, 9, CO 2.747, 754). He distinctively expresses his position again in a newly added sentence in 1559 at the outset of this chapter: “the patriarchs participated in the same inheritance and hoped for a common salvation with us by the grace of the same mediator” (Inst. 2.10.1, CO 2.313).7

As we have seen, the main focus of Calvin’s criticism of the Romanists is their lack of knowledge of the law in Christ, whereas, in the case of the Anabaptists is their failure to see Christ in the law. Calvin’s recognition of both Christ in the law and the law in him sheds light on his stance on Jewish monotheism and Jewish literal interpretation of the law. How then does one grasp the ad-hoc significance and validity of the law from the Trinitarian point of view in Old Testament interpretation? This might have been the question that made Calvin turn to the historical presence and works of Christ as Mediator in the Old Testament and explore the concept of Christ’s mediation of the law throughout the whole of salvation history extra etiam carnym.

5.1.2 Calvin and Veritas Hebraica

No clear evidence supports that Calvin personally met any Jewish person throughout his life.8 The Jewish issue was not prevalent in his time, at least politically. The turmoil of Christian anti-Semitism had already settled when Calvin

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7 “... patres eiusdem nobiscum haereditatis fuerint consortes, et eiusdem mediatoris gratia communem salutem speraverint, ...”
8 Salo W. Baron assumes that Calvin may have encountered Josel of Rosheim during his visit to Frankfurt in 1539 and this chief defender of German Jewry may have been Calvin’s counterpart in Ad quaeiones et oibecta Judaei cuiusdam responsio. “John Calvin and the Jews,” in Ancient and Medieval Jewish History: Essays by Salo W. Baron (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1972), 347. Gottfried W. Locher does not agree with Baron’s view. “Calvin Spricht zu den Juden,” Theologische Zeitschrift 23 (1967), 186, n. 7. On the other hand, there is an opinion that when Calvin visited Ferrara in 1535 or 1536 he might have had some contact with Jewish scholar Abraham Farissol. Phillip Sigal, The Emergence of Contemporary Judaism, vol. 3 (Allison Park, Pa.: Pickwick Publications, 1986), 61.
visited Strasbourg, the city of Bucer and Capito. In Geneva, the mass expulsion of the Jews was completed by the end of the fifteenth century.\(^9\)

Calvin widely read Jewish literature and was very well learned in Jewish thought,\(^{10}\) as demonstrated by his frequent quotations from Hebrew scholars such as Ibn Ezra (1092-1167), David Kimchi (1160-1232), Rashi (1040-1105), etc., and by his erudition about the etymology of the Hebrew language.\(^{11}\) In many cases, Calvin, expounding the Old Testament, refers to both Jewish and Christian sources at the same time when exploring the original meaning of a biblical term. In so doing, he prefers the Hebrew text to the Septuagint.\(^{12}\)

Although not so peritus as Reuchlin, Calvin was quite learned in Hebrew as well as in Greek and classical Latin.\(^{13}\) Simon Grynaeus and Wolfgang Capito helped him along Hebrew studies during his stay at Basel and Strasbourg.\(^{14}\) Calvin was not immersed in the mystery of the Hebrew language itself, as Reuchlin had been in his work *The Miracle-Working Word*,\(^{15}\) rather, he was mainly concerned with how to

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10 Cf. Comm. Dan. 2:44-45 (1.185, CO 40.605): “I have had much conversation with many Jews: I have never seen either a drop of piety or a grain of truth or ingenuousness—nay, I have never found common sense in any Jew. But this fellow, who seems so sharp and ingenious, displays his own impudence to his great disgrace.” Calvin here talks about Isaac Abravanel (1437-1508) whom he calls “a certain Rabbi Barbinel” (1.183).
read the Bible in the original language with etymological, grammatical, and contextual preciseness.  

Calvin did not share the political concern of earlier Reformers in relation to the mass conversion and mass expulsion of the Jews. The anti-Judaism debates in the early sixteenth century reflect the “new socio-cultural and religious entity” which had been formed since the Middle Ages. The controversies between the Jewish convert Pfefferkorn and the Christian Hebraist Reuchlin and between Luther and Josel of Rosheim in the Diet of Augsburg of 1530 raised politically significant theological agendas. Early writings of Luther and Sebastian Münster showed their special concern for the mass conversion of the Jews by proclaiming the truth of the Bible. However, as we see from Luther’s later works and Bucer’s Judenratschlag (the Cassel Advice), as time went by the Jewish issue among Reformers became more radically political which they believed to be related to the interpretation of civil law. However, on the whole, the Reformers were keen to distinguish between the

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16 Engammare, “Joannes Calvinus Trian Linguarum Peritus?” 47-60. The author properly distinguishes between Calvin’s ability in l’hébreu rabbinitique and in l’hébreu biblique and says, “Quant à l’hébreu biblique, il est indéniable que Calvin le connaissait relativement bien” (58).


political significance of anti-Semitism and the significance of the Jews in salvation history.\textsuperscript{22} For Bucer, this tendency is especially apparent. In his commentary on the Psalms, he shows favour for the Jews referring to Jewish sources from the historical and philological point of view. He also asserts, in his commentary on Romans, that there is a permanent place for Israel with respect to God’s plan of salvation. Calvin was influenced significantly by Bucer’s concept of “corpus christianum” founded on his understanding of the believer’s mystical union with Christ in \textit{De regno Christi}, rather than by his legal position on the Jews proclaimed in \textit{Judenratschlag}.\textsuperscript{23}

As has been noted, Calvin frequently makes Judaism a subject of discussion in dealing with Catholic formalism and the Anabaptists’ Marcionite view of the Bible. He reveals his position on Judaism, though neither explicitly nor directly, as he contradicts some theologians who have denied the deity or divinity of Christ such as Caroli, Biandrata, Stancaro, and Servetus, etc.\textsuperscript{24} More than anything else, his work \textit{Ad quaestiones et obiecta Iudaei cuiusdam responsio} demonstrates his stance on the Jews and Judaism with lucid brevity. Throughout these cases, Calvin differentiates his position on biblical interpretation from Jewish literal interpretation, and argues how far his doctrine of the Trinity originates in Judaic monotheism. Why then was Calvin accused of being a Judaizer by Servetus in his day and by Hunnius later?


\textsuperscript{24} The radical Reformers’ Jewish monotheistic tendencies motivated their critical debates with Reformers, the subjects of which ranged from the proper usage of the Hebrew alphabet to the doctrines of the Holy Supper, infant baptism, Christology, and the Trinity. Cf. George Huntston Williams, \textit{The Radical Reformation}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (Ann Arbor, Mic.: Edwards Brothers, 1992), 897-942.
5.2 *Calvinus ludaizans*\(^25\)

5.2.1 Not the Presence of the Person but the Personal Presence of Christ: Servetus' Anti-Trinitarian Christology and His Position on the Law

After he was tried by the fourteen ministers of the Genevan council in the middle of September of 1553, Servetus wrote a brief paragraph with his signature\(^26\) and a letter to Calvin\(^27\) in which he expressed his defiance towards the charges made against him. Servetus inserted them as a conclusion to his marginal comments on the prosecution document, a list of thirty-eight *Sententiae vel propositiones* excerpted from his writings by Calvin.\(^28\) In this brief paragraph, Servetus reaffirmed his anti-Trinitarian position on the *hypostasis* of Christ, by indicating that no solid passage of the Scripture teaches either the invisible Son or the distinction between Father and Son.\(^29\)

Servetus revealed this same position in the first part of the letter, but on this occasion touching the origin of his dogmatic much more fundamentally. Servetus demurred towards the Genevan Reformer:

The main principle of which you are ignorant is that every action comes about through contact. Neither Christ, nor God Himself, acts on anything which He does not touch. Indeed, He would not be God if there were anything that escaped His contact. You dream up imaginary qualities, like the servitudes of lands. Neither the power of God, nor the grace of God, nor any such thing is in God which is not God Himself; nor does God send a quality into any part in which He Himself is not present. God, therefore, is truly in everything. He acts in everything, and He touches

\(^{25}\) The term "Judaizing" has often been used with regard to Jews who have become Christians (*conversos*) but in many cases it has represented a sarcastic and pejorative attitude of an accuser towards his or her opponent in intra-Christian polemics. Cf. Louis Israel Newman, *Jewish Influence on Christian Reform Movements* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925), 1-4; Baron, "John Calvin and the Jews," 340-341.

\(^{26}\) CO 8.553, footnote b.

\(^{27}\) CO 8.799-800.

\(^{28}\) *Sententiae vel propositiones excerptae ex libris Michaelis Serveti, quas ministri ecclesiae Genevensis . . .*, CO 8.501-508. The refutation of Geneva ministers on these 38 charges and Servetus' responses to them together with his comments on specific parts underlined by him appear in *Brevis cavillatonum refutatio, quibus Servetus errores sibi a nobis objectos diluere tentavit*, CO 8.535-554. Also, the introductory observation of the ministers *appears* in *Brevis refutatio errorum et impietatum Michaelis Serveti a ministris ecclesiae Genevensis magnifico senatui siciuti tussi fuerant oblata*, CO 8.519-522.

\(^{29}\) CO 8.553, footnote b.
everything. Everything is from Him, through Him, and in Him. When, therefore, the Holy Spirit acts in us, His deity is in us and He touches us. 30

This passage helps us to unveil Servetan modalism and leads us to discover the radical theological divergence between Servetus and Calvin. It demonstrates that Servetus regards the presence of the unique property of each person of the Trinity as the personal appearance of the same essence (essentia) of God. The incarnation of Christ denotes the transformation of the human matter into God in the process of the intermingling of the deity of God with human flesh, and thus the hypostatic union (unio) in the person of Christ denotes the substantial unity (substantialis unitas) of divinity and humanity. In the same vein, the believer’s union with Christ is understood as the indwelling of the deity of God in Christ by the work of the Holy Spirit.

In the latter part of the letter, following this discussion on the Trinity, Servetus pointed out another significant error of Calvin regarding the continuous validity of the law. Servetus claimed the abrogation of the law in the new era of grace when he accuses Calvin of being a Judaizer by using unleavened bread for Holy Supper. 31 The Genevan ministers strongly opposed Servetus’ position on the law in the final statement of the thirty-eight charges, 32 which must have made Calvin to accuse him of being a follower of the Anabaptist sect in the 1559 Institutes (2.1.10, CO 2.313). Servetus did not accept this charge. Moreover, he criticized Calvin’s position on the law claiming that it sounds like that of “some Mohammedan or

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31 CO 8.800: “Quare vos hodie in azimis iudaizatis?”

pseudo-Jew." It is ironical that Servetus, who was charged chiefly because of his affinity to Judaic and even Muslim monotheism, reproached Calvin for his positive interpretation of the law as Judaic. In the following, I will examine whether there is any relation between Servetus' view of the continuous validity of the law and the office of Christ, the character of which is designated by him crucially with reference to his unique understanding of the person of Christ and the believer's union with Christ.

The influence of contemporary Judaism and his "marrano" background upon Servetus was set forth most prominently in his edition of the Santis Pagnini Polyglot Bible (1542), where he interpreted some of the most typical messianic passages in the Old Testament in the historical and literal sense and argued that "the literal prophetic sense refers to Christ." This attitude of Servetus towards biblical interpretation was most significantly embodied in his magnum opus, Christianismi Restitutio (1553). As Jerome Friedman observes, "The rabbinic literature found in all his writings took on new meaning in the Restitution. Where in the past Jewish thought was used to snipe at Christian thought, Servetus was now able to incorporate this literature into his new Christian system."

As noted by Doumergue, it is extremely hard to understand Servetus' position on the Trinity, but it is much harder to define clearly its relation to Judaism. Although Servetus sustained his radical monotheistic view on the Trinity throughout

33 CO 8.694-695: "Mosaicam legem in eadem nobis qua et Iudaeis more observatione contendis, inimicam et contumeliam fieri dicens, si de eius regula sit quidquam immutatum. Videor hic mihi Mahometum audire, aut pseudoiudaeum alicuam."

34 For example, Calvin criticized Servetus for his interpreting Isaiah 53 as referring to Cyrus instead of Jesus. CO 8.497: "Quia singulis exciuitis tempus non dabatur: in primis objectum est caput Iesaiae LII cuius perspicuitas quom Iudaes quamlibet impudentibus ansam calumniandi praeciderit, his falsarius ausus est ad Cyrum torquere." For the Jewish background of Servetus' doctrine of God, see Newman, Jewish Influence on Christian Reform Movements, 572-588.

35 The several epistles of Servetus "elaborate this anti-Mosaic tendency on the part of the anti-Trinitarian." Newman, Jewish Influence on Christian Reform Movements, 592.


37 "Michael Villanovatus to the Reader," in Wright, An Apology for Dr. Michael Servetus, 310-312 (quot. 303).

38 Friedman, Michael Servetus: A Case Study in Total Heresy, 12-13, esp. 13.

39 Doumergue, Jean Calvin, 6.224.
his works, he persistently differentiated it from Judaic monotheism. In the beginning part of De Trinitatis Erroribus (1531), he expressed his opposition to the Jews who acknowledged Jesus but denied that he was Christ. Also, he devoted the initial part of Dialogorum de Trinitate (1532) to the argument that the Logos and Elohim and Christ were one and the same.\(^40\)

With reference to the person of Christ, Servetus clearly opposed Judaic monotheism in his comments on some parts of the selected passages and groups of passages from Tertullian, Irenaeus, and the supposed Epistula Petri prefaced to the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies.\(^41\) Referring to Tertullian’s Against the Jews and Irenaeus’s Concerning the Human Person of the Word, Servetus argued that he who spoke to Abraham, Aaron, and Moses in the shape of man was the Son of God (filium dei), the Word of God (verbum dei), Jesus himself (Iesus Ipse), the man Jesus Christ (homo Iesus Christus) who was visible (visibilis).\(^42\) Servetus claimed again, commenting on the apostle Peter, that the true prophet Jesus who appeared to Moses and struck the Egyptians was the Word of God, the personal Son (personalis filius), the man Jesus Christ (homo Iesus Christus).\(^43\)

In dealing with the presence of the Son of God, especially in the Old Testament, throughout the passages from the early fathers, Servetus was concerned mainly about the meaning of the term persona, which he believed to denote personalis repraesentatio\(^44\) or Christi facies iam hypostatice relucens.\(^45\) He interpreted John 1:1, “In the beginning was the Word,” as “there was a proclamation


\(^{41}\) “Ex Tertulliano,” “Loci ex Irenaeo, de humana Verbi persona,” and “Loci ex Petro apostolo et Clemente discipulo,” CO 8.507-515. The refutation of Genevan ministers on these passages, CO 8.522-535. For Servetus’ use of Irenaeus in his doctrine of Tertullian, compared with that of Tertullian, see David F. Wright, “Calvin and Servetus in Dispute over Irenaeus,” 1-21, forthcoming from the Center for Reformation Studies, Emanuel University of Romania.

\(^{42}\) CO 8.508, 512. In translating the documents of the proceedings (CO 8.501-553), I consulted Hughes’ translation (The Register, 233-285), along with the translation of the 38 final articles and Servetus’ replies presented by Willis (Servetus and Calvin, 406-417) and Wright (An Apology, 181-201).

\(^{43}\) CO 8.514.

\(^{44}\) CO 8.507.

\(^{45}\) CO 8.509.
in the deity representing (repraesentans) Jesus Christ.” The true form of the man Jesus Christ (forma vera hominis Iesu Christi), the visible person (persona visibilis) of the Son in the Word, which is his true hypostasis (subsistentia vera), is permanent and unchangeable. Servetus was accused by the Genevan ministers of claiming that Christ, the Son of God, was eternal in the very flesh which was visible and resplendent. Therefore, the incarnation of Christ signifies “the same face of Christ through which God was seen is now seen.”

This view was different not only from Judaic monotheism because of acknowledging the presence of the Son of God, but also from the traditional doctrine of the Trinity because he identified the personal (personalis) presence of Christ with the presence of the person (persona) of Christ. His own Trinitarian view was manifest most predominantly in his response to the first charge of the Sententiae vel Propositiones: “In the essence and unity of God there is no real distinction of three invisible entities. But there is a personal distinction between the invisible Father and the visible Son.” Servetus persistently sustained his conviction of the non realis sed personalis distinction in the Trinity throughout the process of the trial and in his last words, and when he was finally burnt on the fire, his prayer, in spite of Farel’s exhortation for his conversion, reflected his conviction. “Jesu, Thou Son of the eternal God, have compassion upon me!” He would never confess Jesus Christ as the eternal Son of God.

46 CO 8.512.
47 CO 8.510.
48 CO 8.511, 513-514.
49 CO 8.532: “... Christi caro aeterna fuerit in idea relucente.”
50 CO 8.512: “... eandem faciem Christi per quam Deus visus est, et nunc videtur”; CO 8.522: “Nam si visus est semper filius, necesse est semper fuisse filium.”
51 CO 8.515: “... in ipsa Dei essentia et unitate non esse realem trium invisibilium rerum distinctionem. Sed personalis esse invisibilis patris et visibilis filii distinctionem.” Servetus continues to express his conviction that in this way the Trinity is most piously (sanctissime) believed. Based on this confession of Servetus, Castellio upbraided Calvin for his religious intolerance. “Contra libellum Calvini in quo ostendere conatur haereticos iure gladii coerendos esse,” in Roland H. Bainton, Concerning Heretics ... An anonymous work attributed to Sebastian Castellio (New York: Morning Side Heights, 1935), 286.
52 Cf. “Michael Servetus’ Speech before he was burnt at Geneva, concerning the true knowledge of God and his Son,” in Wright, An Apology for Dr. Michael Servetus, 244-255.
53 Willis, Servetus and Calvin, 484, 487; Roland H. Bainton, Hunted Heretic: The Life and Death of Michael Servetus 1511-1553 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953), 214.
Servetus disapproved of the doctrine of the eternal deity of Christ. “From the beginning Jesus Christ was man with God in his own person and substance.” Servetus explaining the incarnation points out that “the one and same deity of the Father was communicated to the Son Jesus Christ immediately and corporeally.” He also asserted that the body of Christ is different from ours because he received into his body the body of God, the element uncreated (elementum increatum). On this ground, since Servetus believed that the presence of the deity of God in the Son denotes the existence of the substantial and personal Son, which he identifies with the person of Christ, he claimed that “from eternity God produced this Son from His own substance.”

Just as in the case of the use of the term persona, Servetus understood the hypostasis of the Son of God as denoting a visible appearance (visibile spectrum) of that which hypostatically subsists in God (id quod in Deo hypostatice subsistit), which he regarded as the true substance (vera substantia) of God. Therefore, for Servetus, each person of the Trinity is differentiated from the others not by its peculiar hypostasis, the unity (unitas) of person, but by the hypostatical union (unio). Servetus regards the conception of the unity of person separated from the personal union as imaginary and merely speculative. In response to the Genevan ministers who differentiated union from substantial unity, Servetus claimed:

Wherever there is substantial union there is unity. Just as the rational soul and the flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.

Accordingly, the incarnation is nothing else than the transformation

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54 CO 8.502: “Jesum Christum hominem ab initio apud Deum fuisse in propria persona et substantia.”
55 CO 8.504: “Unam et eandem deitatem quae est in Patre communicatam fuisse filio Iesu Christo immediatet et corporaliter.”
56 CO 8.504: “… in Christo esse [elementa] creata et increata, et substantiam Spiritus Dei, ipsi carni substantialiter communicatam.”
57 CO 8.516: “Deum de sua substantia ab aeterno protulisse filium hunc.”
59 CO 8.545: “Ubicumque est substantialis unio, ibi est unitas: sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus.” Cf. Servetus, Restitutio 16: “Christus vero est naturali natiitate Deus, naturaliter genitus de substantia Dei. Tota patris deitas, adoratio Dei, et visio Dei, est in Christo vero Deo”; ibid., 702: “Nam incorporea et invisiblis illa res, quae vobis est filius, non est vere mortua: id vero corpus, quod re ipsa mortuum est, vobis non est filius.”
transformatio) of the human matter into God and the intermingling (immiscere) of the created human element and the uncreated divine element, which I previously mentioned.60

In dealing with the person of the Holy Spirit, Servetus maintains that the union between the divine and human breath of the soul (halitus animae) of Christ is the unity of the Holy Spirit.61 He denies the existence of the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit before the advent of Jesus Christ because just as he understands the person of Christ as hypostasis visibilis, so he understands the person of the Holy Spirit as hypostasis perceptibilis.62 Servetus distinguishes the Holy Spirit of Christ from the spirit of deity (spiritus deitatis) which was implanted in all things from the beginning.63

As was seen in the first part of the letter which Servetus inserted at the end of the document of the proceedings, he was convinced of the indwelling of the deity of God in all creatures. Based on this seemingly neo-Platonic and even pantheistic view, Servetus argues for the existence of the substantial deity (deitas substantialis) in angels and in the elect from the beginning.64 He asserts that in the law, just as the Word represented the visible Son in deity, so the angels, which are resplendent, foreshadowed Christ.65 Servetus turns to the hypostatic union between the soul and the body in order to explain the believer’s union with Christ. In the passage cited earlier from the apostle Peter, Servetus maintains that when God made man, he

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60 CO 8.504: “Rorem illum coelestem virgini obumbrantem, et semini eius et sanguini sese immiscentem transformasse in Deum humanam materiam.” In responding to this, Servetus argues that “Transformatio est ibi glorificatio et illustratio” (CO 8.517). Cf. Dialogorum B6a (Wilbur 209): “Quid aliud est incarnations mysterium quam hominem Deo miscere?”


62 CO 8.505, 517.

63 CO 8.506: “Omnibus insitum esse ab initio spiritum deitatis ex Dei halitu.” Cf. CO 8.516: “Christus in se una persona est, sed in eo est vere spiritus sanctus, qui etiam persona est.”


implanted his divinity in us.66 In the following opinion of the Genevan ministers this position of Servetus is expressed more definitely: "both our soul and the Holy Spirit of Christ have an elementary substance essentially joined to themselves, just as the Word has flesh joined to himself."67

In conclusion we can say that it is not from the hypostatic union (unio) between the divine and human nature of the person (persona) of Christ but from the substantial unity (unitas substantialis) of the deity (deitas) of Christ68 that Servetus argues for the continuity between the Word and Deus manifestatus in carne claiming that there is no unique property (proprietas) of Christ which designates the second person of the Trinity but the peculiar appearance of "the Son of the eternal God."69 This position was predominant from his early works on the errors of the Trinity. Servetus says,

the Word was in the law as a prefiguring of Christ; the Word was the shadow, and Christ is the truth. John, both in his Gospel and in his Epistle, says of the Word, was; but now, after its being manifested, there is no such Word but the very being itself of which the Word was a type. For we never read of the Word, is, but, was. But now there is the Son, Jesus Christ, because what was in the Word exists as flesh, and the Word became flesh; that is, the Person became a being (persona facta est res), the shadow became light, as Paul says, Our glorifying became truth; that is, just as we gloried in the Word, so it was in fact. The Word, which was in the law as a shadow, was given through Moses; truth came through Christ. There was then a Word concerning the being which now is; that is, the being itself did not exist, but there was a Word concerning it, like a conversation about an absent being, which was then being represented by the Word.70

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66 CO 8.514: "Deus quum fecisset hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam, . . . esse nobis insitam divinitatem, . . ."  
67 CO 8.506: "... et animam nostram, et ipsum Christi Spiritum sanctum sibi essentialiter iunctam habere eiusmodi elementarem substantiam, sicut Verbum sibi iunctam habet carnem."  
69 Dialogorum A3a (Wilbur 190): "Ut probarem quod Verbum illud sit ipse Christus, dicebam Logon et Elohim idem fuisse." Cf. Dialogorum B4a (Wilbur 206): "Christ came forth into the world not after the manner of creatures, but being conceived by the Holy Spirit, being brought forth not out of nothing, but out of the very hypostasis of God, and being born of God’s Substance through the Substance of the Word incarnate and made flesh (ex ipsa Dei hypostasi eductus, et ex Dei substantiata genitus, per incarnatam et carnem factam Verbi substantiam)."  
70 Erroribus, 93a (Wilbur 143-144): "... quod Verbum illud erat in Lege, Christi praemans, Verbum illud erat umbra, et Christus erat veritas. Ioannes tam in Evangeli quo in epistola de Verbo dicit, erat, nunc autem post manifestationem, non est tale Verbum, sed res ipsa, cuius illud Verbum erat typus, nunc quam enim de Verbo illo legimus, est, sed erat, nunc autem est filius Iesu Christus, quia id quod erat in Verbo, caro extitit, et Verbum caro factum est, id est, persona facta est res, umbra facta est lux, sicut dicit Paulus, gloriatio nostra, veritas facta est, id est, ita
We cannot find here any room for the mediatorship of Christ in the Old Testament because Servetus does not approve of the presence of Christ who is true God and man, even though he admits that the substantial deity already existed not only in the soul but also in the body of Christ. He did not accept that the law itself had already revealed the presence of Jesus Christ as the Mediator in addition to its representing his future coming. For Servetus, the word persona does not signify an entity as hypostasis but rather reveals the form or disposition of a personal entity. Accordingly, the person of Christ is understood only as its visible revelations, which advanced in history. As he puts it, “The different mysteries of Christ are threefold; before the incarnation in a shadow, in the incarnation in infirm body, after the resurrection in glory and power.” Just as the Word that was (erat) in the law (in lege) disappeared with the advent of Christ, so the law of Moses was abolished by its fulfilment in Christ.

Servetus outlined his quite negative and dispensational view of the law in a series of letters he wrote to Calvin in 1546-1547. He regarded the Mosaic Law as given to serve its temporal office to meet the needs of the ancient barbarity and was annulled when it was fulfilled by Christ just as the ancient covenant came to its end by the proclamation of the new covenant in Jeremiah 31. The whole law of Moses, including the Decalogue, was abolished with the coming of the new era in

fuit in re, sicut fuimus Verbo gloriat. Verbum quod in lege erat, umbra factum est veritas. Sicut subdit, Lex, id est, umbra per Moysen, veritas per Christum, de re quae nunc est, tunc erat Verbum, id est, non erat res ipsa, sed de ipsa Verbum, tanquam de re absente sermo, quae eo Verbo tunc praesentabatur, . . .”

71 CO 8.502: “Non solum in anima, sed et in carne Christi est substantialis deitas.”
72 Cf. Dialogorum A3a (Wilbur 190): “. . . quicquid in lege visum est, umbrae vocare, ut corpus, id est, veritas ipsa sit Christi.”
73 Restitutio 457, translation from Friedman, Michael Servetus: A Case Study in Total Heresy, 65: “Triplex est differentia mysteriorum Christi, ante incarnationem in umbra, per incarnationem in corporis infirmitate, post resurrectionem in gloria et potentia.”
74 Epistola 25, CO 8.702: “Mosaica lex, ut tu censes, erat lex inertibus saxis data, lex irrationalis, lex impossibilis, tyrannica. Ia miseros et rudes populos, te iudice, in equelue execebat tunc Deus, sicut tyrannus Diomedes in lecto ferreo, ut equis essent in pabulum.”
75 Epistola 23, CO 8.699: “. . . Nihil ergo nunc damnationis est nobis insitis Christo Iesu, vero libertatis assertori, qui a lege decalogi, quae erat lex peccati et mortis, nos liberos reddidit. Etenim quod lex illa praestare non poterat, ipse praestitit, legem ipsum nos destruendum tollens. Adde adhuc locum unum, ut omnino cognoscas, decalogi legem nunc esse sublatam. Foedus initum cum patribus, quando egrediebantur de Aegypto, sublatum docet Ieremiae cap. 31. Hoc autem fuit foedus decalogi.”
which the work of the Spirit of Christ prevails. Even people who are justified by the living faith are led to Christ without any knowledge of the law, and now natural law compensates for the role of the law to reveal sin. In treating the annulment of the law, Servetus especially emphasizes the universal work of the Spirit of Christ, and on this basis he asserts that the spiritual norm of Christ supersedes the teaching of the law of Moses. Servetus differentiates the doctrine of the Spirit, which he calls lex Christi, lex spiritus, and lex fidei, from the doctrine of the law. In explaining the unique feature of the new law of Christ, he turns to his own understanding of the union with Christ, which, as we have seen, is founded on his view of the hypostatic union that signifies the substantial unity between the humanity of the believer with the deity of Christ.

5.2.2. Aegidius Hunnius’ Critique

As we have seen, Servetus’ criticism of Calvin’s Judaic interpretation of the law was founded on his peculiar understanding of the progress of revelation, which was derived from his dispensational Christology based on the concept that “persona

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76 Epistola 23, CO 8.697: “Absque lege illa decalogi, per quam erat cognitio peccati, ut ibi ait, chirographum nobis contrarium per decreta Christus delevit (Coloss. 2). Chirographus mandatorum dicetur decalogus digito Dei scriptus. Chirographus est, quo scripto obligamur ad aliquid faciendum, et contrarius est nobis, quando transgredimus. Tota ergo lex scripta Iudaeis erat chirographus nunc sublatus.”

77 Epistola 23, CO 8.698: “... quamdiu viva fide ei credimus. Ex hac sola fide poterat quis iustificari, etiam ignorans legem Mosis. Sunt qui decalogi vim sustinent, moralia dicentes esse leges naturae perpetue. Quibus illud obicimus: Quod ex natura perpetuum est, non est ex Mose, quum fuerit ante Mosen. Si haec naturae dictamina dicas, non dabis eis vim legis maledicentis, quum nesciretur maledicto talis, nisi per legem, nec ira talis, nisi per legem. Sublata ergo est lex, et nos non sumus sub lege, nec sub eius ira.”


79 Epistola 24, CO 8.701.

facta est res.” On the whole, however, with reference to the Trinity and the person of Christ, Servetus accused Calvin of denying the deity of the soul implanted in all creatures along with Simon Magus⁸¹ and following the merely speculative papist Trinity.⁸²

On the other hand, the Lutheran theologian, Aegidius Hunnius (1550-1603), criticized Calvin’s position on Christ in the Old Testament claiming that it was Judaic.⁸³ His criticism of Calvin’s exegesis reached its climax in his tract, *Calvinus Iudaizans* (1593),⁸⁴ which was written in response to the Reformed theologian David Pareus (1548-1622).⁸⁵ Here the Wittenberg theologian revealed the errors of Calvin’s anti-Christological interpretation of some of the verses which contain Messianic prophecies claiming that they reveal the influence of Judaism upon him.⁸⁶

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⁸¹ CO 8.514, 515, 518 (XXX, XXXV), et passim.
⁸² CO 8.507. Cf. Restitutio 670: “Whoever truly believes that the pope is Antichrist, will also truly believe that the papist Trinity, paedobaptism and other sacraments of the papacy are the doctrines of demons.” I owe the citation to Wright, “Calvin and Servetus in Dispute over Irenaeus,” 8.
⁸³ Calvin in his letter to Farel in April 1539 claimed that the Lutheran attitude towards ceremonies “was not far from Judaism (non procul esse a Iudaismo).” CO 10/2.340.
Hunnius’ criticism starts with Calvin’s interpretation of the word Elohim in Genesis 1:1. He claims that Calvin understands the plural form of the word not as describing the three persons ( personas) in God, but as signifying “those powers ( virtutes) which God put forth ( exseruit) in creating the world.”

Calvin believes that since Genesis 1:2 clearly refers to the third person of the Trinity (the Spirit of the Elohim), if we suppose three persons to be here denoted, we will involve ourselves in the error of Sabellius, for “it will follow, both that the Son is begotten by himself, and that the Spirit is not of the Father, but of himself.” Thus Calvin asserts that the plural form of Elohim in the first verse denotes not so much the three persons of God as the working of God’s power “included in his eternal essence ( essentia).”

Criticizing Calvin’s view, Hunnius says, “Indeed the fact that that name Elohim is sometimes given to each person individually is sought only from a sort of rei ratio which is no other than from the mystery of the beatific Trinity.” He demonstrates here emphatically his immanent Trinitarian position.

Also, as regards the repetitive use of the word “the Lord” (“Jehova . . . a Jehovah”) in Genesis 19:24, Calvin comments that the repetition is “emphatic (emphatica)” and in both cases the word Jehovah denotes “the Deity of Christ,” which is different from the interpretation of the Jews. Here Calvin is concerned with God who acts by the hand of his Son and with the significance of the Scripture in the historical context. He says that “the design of Moses” to repeat the same word “was to raise the minds of the readers to a more lively contemplation of the hand of

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87 In CTS, the word “exseruit” is translated as “exercised.” The translator may have confused it with exercuit. Hunnius’ criticism reminds us of Calvin’s criticism of Judaism: “the Jews [who] turned their backs and made the name Elohim fit also the angels and the powers (potestates)” (Inst. 1.13.9, CO 2.96).


89 The text, including the passage I quote, is: “Quod vero nomen illud Elohim, interdum uni singulatim personae tribuitur, petitur huiusce quoque rei ratio non aliunde, quam ex illo beatae Trinitatis arcano. Pater Elohim dicitur, quia non solitarie Deus est sine Filio, Spirituque Sancto, sed una cum his, adeoque in Trinitate Deus est: ita ut vox Elohim in hoc quoque personali significatu respectum mutuum illum pluralitatemque divinarum hypostasewn involuat. Unde fit, ut πρῶτος personis simul iunctis, secundario autem personis singulis exposito tam sensu atque modo attribuatur.” Hunnius, Calvinus Judaizans, col. 638b-c.
God.” As expected, Hunnius accuses Calvin of ignoring that this repetition indicates “the argument of proving the Trinity, that there are plural persons within God.”

Hunnius again criticizes the way Calvin interprets “Elohim” in his commentary on Genesis 35:7. Calvin claims that his interpretation is consistent with “a higher doctrine (superior doctrina)” manifest in Genesis 28:12, in which he comments on the ladder as “the symbol (symbolum) of Christ,” who is “the only Mediator.” This is Hunnius’ comment: “It is clearly obvious that Calvin unjustly by his gloss robs this testimony of its proof of the Holy Trinity against the Jewish people.”

In the following we are going to look at why Hunnius called Calvin a Judaizer. In his commentary on Genesis 3:15, Calvin interprets the word “אָדָם (her seed, semen mulieris)” not as a singular noun referring to Christ, but as a collective noun (nomen collectivum) referring to the people of God. Calvin does not deny that ultimately the phrase denotes the coming of Christ as Saviour and as head of the church, but he tries to point out the fact that the promise has been handed down through the ages. He believed that the woman’s seed could be interpreted according to three stages of history as: all men (against snakes), all men (against the devil), and Christ as the victor of all men (i.e., the head of the church). Calvin emphasizes “our” victory through the victory of Christ on the ground of the continuity of the church in the Old and New Testaments. In contrast with Calvin, Hunnius asserts that the promise refers to only one seed, who is Christ, as was

91 Hunnius, Calvinus ludaizans, col. 639d: “... argumentum probandi Trinitatis, quod nimimum in Deo plures sunt personae,...”
93 Hunnius, Calvinus ludaizans, col. 640d: “... luculenter apparebit, inmerito Calvinum hoc testimonium, probandi contra Iudaeos sacrosanctae Trinitatis, glossa futilis sua enervare.”
94 For the debate between Hunnius and Pareus over Genesis 3:15, see Schurb, “Sixteenth-Century Lutheran–Calvinist Conflict on the Protevangelium,” 31-40.
95 CO 23.71: “... ita per continuum aetatum seriem promittitur victoria soboli humanae. Generaliter ergo semen interpretor de posteris.”
promised to Abraham later on.⁹⁷

Referring to Micah 5:2, “But thou, Beth-lehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting,” Hunnius declares the eternal generation and essence of Christ, and the two natures in the person of Christ.⁹⁸ And he cites and rejects Calvin’s commentary on this verse:

Some, I know, pertinaciously maintain, that the Prophet speaks here of the eternal essence (essentia) of Christ; and as for myself, I willingly own that the divinity (divinitatem) of Christ is here proved to us; but as this will never be extorted from the Jews, I prefer taking the words simply as they are—that Christ will not come forth unexpectedly (repente) from Bethlehem, as though God had previously determined nothing respecting him. But others bring a new refinement,—that the Prophet uses the plural number, his goings forth (egressus), to designate the twofold nature of Christ (duplicem Christi naturam); but there is in this an absurdity; for the Prophet could not properly nor wisely mention the human nature of Christ with the divine, with reference to eternity.

Unlike earlier church interpreters, Calvin here does not put emphasis on the eternal divinity of Christ but rather pays primary attention to a present “consolatio” which God gave to his people.⁹⁹ He points out the fact that Christ will not “suddenly (repente)” come to this world in order that the Jews could understand and receive him as the Messiah. Moreover, while Hunnius points up the plurality of the word “egressus” in order to explain the two natures of Christ, Calvin turns to the interpretation of the Hebrews themselves. He says that it “is a common thing in Hebrew to use the plural form for a singular number.”

Calvin, in expounding Micah 5:2, avoids both the extremes of Christian spiritual interpretation and Jewish literal interpretation. He takes proper consideration of the Jews—both the biblical and contemporary—but he stubbornly rejects certain Rabbis’ assertion that “the Messiah was created before (primogenitus) the creation of the world” as “insipid fables.” The following shows the via Calvini

⁹⁸ Hunnius, Calvinus Iudaizans, col. 646c.
⁹⁹ Quotations from the lecture on the first part, Comm. Mic. 5:2 (294-298 [altered], CO 43.365-367).
which is most Christian and faithful to the context:

The prophet shows simply, that even before the world was made Christ was chief, as he is also called the First-born of every creature, for by him all things were created, (Col. i. 15) and the same Word of God, by whom the world was created, is to be the Head of the Church (caput ecclesiae), and by him what had been lost is to be recovered. We now then comprehend what the Prophet meant by saying, the goings forth of Christ are from eternity (egressus Christi esse aeternos). But I would not concede to the Jews, that only by the perpetual appointment of God the going forth of Christ has been from the beginning, or from all ages: but two things must be noticed by us,—that Christ, who was manifested in the flesh that he might redeem the Church of God, was the eternal Word, by whom the world was created,—and then, that he was destined by the eternal counsel of God to be the first-born of every creature, and especially to be the Head of the Church, that he might restore a fallen world by his grace and power.100

When interpreting the above verses Calvin directs our focus on Christ's presence and work in the Old Testament. Calvin was motivated by the salvation of the church (salus ecclesiae) that we may see Christ as Mediator and the relation between Christ and the law. Calvin's Christological interpretation of the Old Testament reaches its summit in his commentary on “the majesty of the name of Jehovah” in Micah 5:4, in which he emphasizes the two natures of Christ and his coming as the Messiah, along with his headship of the church: “Though Christ is God manifested in the flesh, he is yet made subject to God the Father, as our Mediator and the Head of the Church in human nature: he is indeed the Mediator between God and us.”101

5.2.3 Calvin's Criticism of Judaism

In spite of his radical criticism, Hunnius did not intend to call Calvin Arian.102 In fact, the dispute between Hunnius and Pareus mainly focused on Calvin's historical interpretation, which was faithful to the literal and literary meaning of the Scripture. Calvin himself had the same problem as Hunnius regarding Servetus:

100 Quotations from the lecture on the second part, Comm. Mic. 5:2 (298-301, CO 43. 367-369).
101 Comm. Mic. 5:4 (305 [altered], CO 43. 371): “Et Christus quamvis sit Deus manifestatus in carne, tamen dum nobis mediator describitur et ecclesiae caput in natura humana, subiicitur Deo patri. Est enim medius inter Deum et nos.”
102 Hunnius, Calvinius Judaizans, col. 636a: “Non accuso Calvinum Arianismi, sicut Grabius impudenti ore me immentem teterrimae huius haereseos accusavit.”
distinguishing the biblical exegesis from the dogma.

The influence of the Jewish literal interpretation on Servetus' biblical interpretation is extensive, but the impact of Judaic monotheism on his anti-Trinitarian position is much more overwhelming. Calvin defines the word *persona* as "a subsistence in God's essence, which, while related to the others, is distinguished by an incommunicable quality" (Inst. 1.13.6, CO 2.94). He frequently uses the word in order to express not only the entity of person but also its office, and sometimes in order to define the whole person in the Trinity. On this account, he has often been accused of "Judaizing," as we have seen in the case of Hunnius. However, in whatever way the word is used by Calvin, it conveys "the personal dynamic behind the office." On the other hand, Servetus, who understands the three persons of the Trinity as the three peculiar personal appearances and the peculiar property (or quality) of each person as the peculiar form in which the deity intermingles with the flesh and soul of Christ, turns to Jewish concepts of middoth and schechina in order to explain his own view of the Trinity. Servetus believes that the Jews use *persona* and *facies* interchangeably. The meaning of middoth should be differentiated from that of proprietas in Christian theology. For middoth signifies something which is in God as produced by God. It corresponds to the *elementum creatum* in Servetus. In

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104 *Persona igitur voco subsistentiam in Dei essentia, quae ad alios relata, proprietate incommunicabili distinguetur." For Calvin's theological use of the terms *substantia*, *hypostasis*, *persona*, see Irena Backus, "Aristotelianism' in Some of Calvin's and Beza's Expository and Exegetical Writings on the Doctrine of the Trinity, with Particular Reference to the Terms *oúria* and *únoia*," in Historie de l'exégèse au XVe siècle, 351-360.


106 Ibid., 282. David E. Willis finds this dynamic from the eucharistic relationship between the terms *persona* and *substantia*. "Calvin's Use of Substantia," in Calvinus Ecclesiae Genevensis Custos, 289-301.

107 Restitutio 108: "This is a clear issue for the Hebrews; what we call person (*persona*), they call image (*facies*)." Translation from Friedman, Michael Servetus: A Case Study in Total Heresy, 123.

108 Restitutio 700: "...three middoth, three properties (*proprietates*) are said by the Hebrews to be in God; produced from God, not separating things." Translation from Friedman, Michael Servetus: A Case Study in Total Heresy, 122. For Calvin's criticism of Servetus, Biandrita, and Stancaro over their understanding of the person of the Mediator, see Jill Raitt, "The Person of the..."
addition, in order to express the peculiar personal presence of each person of the Trinity, Servetus refers to the Jewish *schechina*, which signifies indwelling or inhabitation. Based on this understanding of the person, Servetus argues that the Jews also had the “Christian” concept of the Messiah.

It is helpful to sample some cases of Calvin’s criticism of Servetus’ interpretation of the presence of Christ in the Old Testament in order to further confirm their difference. Calvin, expounding “the appearance (*aspectus*) of a man” in Ezekiel 1:26, argues that Servetus misinterprets this as signifying “the appearance of the figurative Son (*figurativus filius*),” that is, “a man figured in divine essence (*homo figuratus in essentia divina*)” in the same vein, Calvin, commenting on “the Angel” in Hosea 3:4, criticizes Servetus “who imagined that Christ was from the beginning an angel, as if he was a phantom of man (*phantasma hominis*), and as if he was another exterior person, having the essence divided from the Father separately.”

On the other hand, in his commentary on Ezekiel 1:26, Calvin emphasizes that not the form of Christ, but Christ “himself” appeared in the form of man, though

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110 Cf. n. 62 (CO 8.504) of this chapter.

111 Dialogorum A7a-b (Wilbur 197); Restitutio 74: “The rabbis called divinity *schechina* from the verb *schachan* which signifies inhabitation (*inhabitare*). Therefore the divinity of Christ is an inhabitation of God (*inhabitatio Dei*).” Translation from Friedman, *Michael Servetus: A Case Study in Total Heresy*, 124. In fact, the word *middoth*, for the Jews, is related to the qualities of God rather than to the person, and the word *schechina* does not mean “the indwelling of Christ in God” but “the nature of God’s presence in the Tabernacle, the Temple, and even within each person.” Cf. Jerome Friedman, “Michael Servetus: The Case for a Jewish Christianity,” *SCJ* 4/1 (1973), 103.

112 Restitutio 134: “...the Hebrews said in this sense, the messiah is from the beginning, not because of some sophistical Trinity, but because his person and visible form subsisted in God.” Translation from Friedman, “Michael Servetus: The Case for a Jewish Christianity,” 94-95. In this article, Friedman, after investigating some passages of Servetus’ *Biblia Sacra ex Santis Pagnini Tralatione*, concludes that “Throughout his theological writings, both the Targums of Onkelos and of Jonathan are often cited, and it is through the use of these works that Servetus’ interest in Judaica is most apparent. More than any other type of literature, this source is consistently used to support the Spaniard’s notion of Christ as an emanation or aspect of the Father rather than as a separate entity” (99). Concerning the influence of Jewish mysticism Cabalah on Servetus, however, the author is not so positive (99-110).

113 Comm. Eze. 1:25-26 (1.97, CO 40.54).

not yet made man.\textsuperscript{114} Also he interprets “the Angel” in Hosea as the presence of Christ the Mediator. “Christ, though he was God, was also a Mediator; and as a Mediator, he is rightly and fitly called the angel or the messenger (\textit{nuntius}) of God, for he has on his own accord placed himself between the Father and men.”\textsuperscript{115} From these two commentaries, we recognize that for Calvin the entity of the Son of God in the Old Testament not only represents the coming Mediator but also signifies the presence of the Mediator as God in the form (\textit{forma}) of God and man.

Servetus understands that the Greek title \textit{Christos} signifies a mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus.\textsuperscript{116} Also, as seen previously, he recognizes that Christ’s appearance as a man in the Old Testament represents the presence of a mediator as the figuration of man, the state similar to that of an angel. He understands the person of Christ from the vantage point of the progress of revelation influenced by neo-Platonic thought and thus maintains that God cannot mediate between God and man. Therefore, he regards the presence of the Son in the Old Testament as merely a figure or a form of Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{117} On the contrary, Calvin, who believes in the historical presence of Christ as the eternal Son of God and God who acts in history by the hand of the Mediator, asserts that only God can mediate between God and man. This is what most strikingly differentiates Calvin from Servetus and Judaism. According to Calvin’s commentary on the chief angel who appeared to Abraham: “[W]henever he manifested himself to the fathers, Christ was as the Mediator between God and them; who not only bears the person of God in respect to the Word, but is also truly and essentially God.”\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{114} Comm. Eze. 1:25-26 (1.99, CO 40.55): “. . . tunc Christum in forma hominis, quamvis nondum esset homo.”
\textsuperscript{115} Comm. Hos. 12:3-5 (421 [altered], CO 42.455).
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Erroribus} 4a (Wilbur 9): “Mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus.”
\textsuperscript{118} Comm. Gen. 18:13 (1.475 [altered], CO 23.254): “[Q]uoties se patribus manifestavit, Christum fuisse quasi intermedium, qui non tantum verbi respectu sustinet Dei personam, sed vere et essentialiter Deus est.”
5.3 The Presence and Office of the Mediator in the Old Testament

Calvin’s via media in Old Testament interpretation has been suggested from the perspective of its relation to Judaism since Baumgartner published *J. Calvin Hébraïsant et Interprète de l’Ancien Testament*. The author there asserts that Calvin successfully overcame the weaknesses and errors of both Christian and Jewish interpreters and was keen to keep himself away from contemporary Christian Judaism as well as from Roman Catholicism. Also it is argued that in his Old Testament exegesis Calvin takes into consideration the specific historical context of the text prior to quest for its Messianic and eschatological meaning. The same view, although in a different way, is expressed by T. H. L. Parker when he observes: “[P]age after page he can look like *Calvinus Judaeus* and then suddenly show that, in his voluntary exile among the men of the Old Covenant, living with them in shades and shadows, he has not forgotten the Sun of righteousness who, as he himself already knows, will in their future rise with healing in his wings.” More recently, in his book *John Calvin’s Exegesis of the Old Testament*, David L. Puckett describes Calvin’s via media more characteristically, placed “somewhere on the continuum that stretches from Hunnius to Servetus.”

In fact, through the studies undertaken in the previous sections of this chapter, this middle position of Calvin has been examined and illuminated especially with reference to his Christological stance. In the following sections I will deal with

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119 Baumgartner, *J. Calvin Hébraïsant et Interprète de l’Ancien Testament*, 35-36: “[Calvin] montrera en peu de mots l’erreur des interprètes chrétiens et, par la même occasion, la faiblesses des interprétations juives, et il le fera de la manière la plus équitable et la plus impartiale. Il faut se rappeler qu’à son époque les rabbins dominent l’exégèse de l'Ancien Testament, que les principaux hébraïsants du seizième siècle ont été formés à leur école ou à celle de juifs convertis; le premier venu n’était pas capable de battre en brèche leurs idées en matière d’explication des Écritures. Nous n’avons qu’à rappeler le nom du grand Reuchlin et ses travaux sur la Kabbale pour montrer quelle importance on attachait alors aux interprétations et aux systèmes de rabbins. Calvin, avec son rare bon sens, avec cette sagacité critique qui savait se déblayer la route au travers de toutes les broussailles de la tradition tant juive que romaine, Calvin n’y va pas de main morte.”

120 Ibid., 39-40: “... la préoccupation constante de bien placer les textes dans leur milieu historique avant de chercher en eux une portée plus éloignée, messianique ou eschatologique.”


several characteristic features of the person and work of Christ as the Mediator on the Old Testament and their reflection in Calvin’s interpretation of the law.

5.3.1 Praesentia Figurae Personae Mediatoris

As has been noted, Calvin refers mainly to the presence and work of Christ as the Mediator in order to verify his eternal sonship. In dealing with the significance of the incarnation in his commentary on Matthew 1:23, he points out that Christ has performed "officium mediatoris" from the beginning, before he put on the title Immanuel in his new person.\footnote{Comm. Matt. 1:23 (1.69, CO 45.69).} Also in his commentary on Isaiah Calvin emphasizes the perpetual presence of Christ as the Mediator in order to identify the one who was prophesied to be Saviour.\footnote{Comm. Isa. 19:20 (2.75, CO 36.344): "He has always been the Mediator (perpetuus mediator), by whose intercession all blessings were obtained from God the Father; and now that he has been revealed, let us learn that nothing can be obtained from God but through him." Comm. Isa. 63:17 (4.359, CO 37.405): "To the ancient fathers also he was indeed the Mediator, but we have everything clearer and plainer; because they were still kept amidst the darker shadows."}

As regards the person of Christ before the incarnation, especially in association with his mediatorship, Calvin first designates the fullness of the deity dwelling in him and then turns to his spiritual but real bodily presence. This line of thought is demonstrated in his commentary on Genesis 28:12 in which he makes use of the so-called extra Calvinisticum for the purpose of taking into account the “Deus” in carne manifestatus. As he puts it, “The fact that the body of Christ is finite, does not prevent him from filling heaven and earth, because his grace and power are everywhere diffused.”\footnote{Comm. Gen. 28:12 (2.113, CO 23.391): “Nec obstat quod Christi corpus finitum est, ut coelum et terram minime impleat: quia ubique diffusa est eius gratia et virtus.”} Further, it deserves taking into consideration that it is on this doctrinal foundation that Calvin understands the believer’s union with Christ (unio cum Christo) in the Old Testament. He argues that Moses wishes to state both the fact that “the fullness of the deity dwelt in the person of the Mediator (plenam deitatem residere in mediatoris persona)” and that “Christ not only approached unto us, but clothed himself in our nature (induit naturam nostram), that he might make us
one with himself."\textsuperscript{126}

This position of Calvin is clearly different from that of Servetus who, being pantheistic, denies the person (or hypostasis) of Christ as the Mediator and regards the union with Christ as the infusion of the universal deity into the believer. While Servetus interprets the visible presence (ocularis praesentia) of Christ as the appearance of the figurative Son (Filius figurativus), Calvin, on the contrary, maintains that it denotes the prefiguration (praefiguratio) of the person of Christ the Mediator and highlights its sacramental significance.\textsuperscript{127} Particularly, Calvin shows a strong tendency to apply the so-called extra Calvinisticum to the personal presence of Christ in dealing with the sacramental significance of the Old Testament ceremonies.

In the following commentary on the burnt offering given as a sin-offering in Leviticus 4:22-24, Calvin tells us what he means by "the sacramental mode of speaking"\textsuperscript{128} by claiming that this ceremony signifies not only the presence of Christ but rather also his mediatorial office.

[A]s now in baptism sins are sacramentally (sacramentaliter) washed away, so under the Law also the sacrifices were means of expiation, though in a different way; since baptism sets Christ before us as if He were present (praesentem), whilst under the Law He was only obscurely foreshadowed (obscure adumbratus). Improperly indeed what applies to Christ only is transferred to the signs, for in Him alone was manifested to us the fulfillment of all spiritual blessings, and He at length blotted out sins by His one and perpetual sacrifice.\textsuperscript{129}

In dealing with the Old Testament sacraments as the prototypes of the sacraments in the Institutes (4.14.20-26, 4.15.9), Calvin argues that those sacraments established by the law of Moses bore Christ in them as their material (materia) or substance (substantia) (4.14.16, CO 2.952-953).\textsuperscript{130} He admits that the presence of Christ in Jewish ceremonies was shadowy, but definitely denies that they had no

\textsuperscript{126} Comm. Gen. 28:12 (2.113, CO 23. 391).
\textsuperscript{130} "Christum sacramentorum omnium materiam, vel, si mavis, substantiam esse dico: quando in ipso totam habent suam soliditatem, nec quidquam extra ipsum promittunt."
reality (solidum), for he is convinced of the presence of the power of Christ working inwardly in believers in the ancient times (Inst. 4.14.25, CO 2.960).131

The holy fathers believed in Christ as the head and foundation of the covenant (caput et fundamentum foederis) and tried to direct their lives towards the Mediator.132 They believed that as God promised to Abraham, Christ was ordained to be their Mediator.133 Thus, they lived and died in their faith in the Mediator, although he was not yet manifested.134 With the perception of the sacramental presence of Christ in the ceremonies, they not only held themselves to faith in the Mediator135 but also experienced “a taste (gustum aliquem)” of his grace.136 Therefore the faith of the fathers is different from the faith of the faithful who belong to a better covenant (potior foedus), but only with respect to its form (formam), and not to its substance (substantiam).137

For Calvin, concerning the temporal use of the ceremonial law, no Platonic concept of the progress of revelation is considered applicable except for God’s accommodation to his people according to their capacity, need, and barbarity. Most significantly, the ancient ceremonies, practices, and God’s various types of revelation teach us of God who acts in his own Son, the Mediator—God’s accommodation par

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131 "Paulum non ideo umbratiles facere caeremonias quod nihil haberent solidi; sed quia eorum complementum, usque ad Christi exhibitionem, quodammodo suspensum erat. Deinde non de efficacia, sed potius de modo significandi hoc intelligendum esse dico.Donee enim manifestatus est in carne Christus, omnia signa velut absentem eum adumbrabant, utcunque virtutis suae suique adeo ipsius praesentiam fidelibus intus exsererat."

132 Serm. Gal. 3:13-14 (407-408, CO 50.515): “Vray est que nostre Seigneur Jesus Christ n’estoit point encore apparu au monde, quand la promesse gratuite a esté donnee à nostre Pere Abraham: mais c’est assez que desia il avoit esté constitut nostre mediateur, à fin que par son moyen les hommes fussent reconcilez à Dieu”; Serm. Gal. 3:13-14 (412, CO 50.518): “D’autant donc que desia du temps d’Abraham nostre Seigneur Jesus Christ a esté ordonne mediateur, à fin que Dieu fust appaise envers nous par son moyen, et quand nous venons en son nom requerir grace qu’elle nous soit apprestee, et que nous ne soyons point frustrez de nostre attente: ...”

133 Comm. II Tim. 1:5 (292, CO 52.348).

134 Comm. Heb. 8:5 (107, CO 55.99): “There was a real spiritual meaning in everything, in that Moses was commanded to do every thing according to the original pattern which was heavenly... these practices [Old Testament ceremonies] were to hold the people to faith in the Mediator.”

135 Comm. Dan. 8:15 (2.112, CO 41.110).

excellence. The only difference between the old and new covenants is that for ancient fathers Christ was revealed not as the very one (pro ipso), but in the form (in forma) of the coming Mediator.

5.3.2 The Presence of Christ as the Angel, Jehovah, and Elohim

In order to explain both the work of Christ and his presence as the Mediator in the Old Testament, Calvin particularly points to his appearance as the Angel before the fathers and prophets, which he believes to be closely related to the hypostasis of the Son of God denoted by the names Jehovah and Elohim. Note his commentary on “the Angel of the Lord” who appeared before Moses in a flame of fire in Exodus 3:2.

[T]he ancient teachers of the Church have rightly understood that the Eternal Son of God is so called in respect to his person as Mediator, whose figure he bore from the beginning, although he really took it upon him only at his Incarnation. And Paul sufficiently expounds this mystery to us, when he plainly asserts that Christ was the leader of his people in the Desert (1 Cor. x. 4.). Therefore, although at that time, properly speaking, he was not yet the messenger of his Father, still his predestinated appointment to the office even then had this effect, that he manifested himself to the patriarchs, and was known in this character. Nor, indeed, had the saints ever any communication with God except through the promised Mediator. It is not then to be wondered at, if the Eternal Word of God, of one Godhead and essence with the Father, assumed the name of “the Angel” on the ground of his future mission.

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138 Cf. Stephen D. Benin, The Footprints of God: Divine Accommodation in Jewish and Christian Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 187-197, 210-211. This significant work of the Jewish theologian on God’s accommodation and Judaism contains a chapter devoted to Calvin’s understanding of the divine accommodation. Although insightful, the author’s view is not in line with the real Calvin’s at least on the following two points. First, the author overemphasizes that the characteristic of Calvin’s concept of the divine accommodation denotes a revival of Chrysostom’s oikonomía. As a result, he is misled to argue that Calvin tends to lose the sense of raison d’être which is prominent in Jewish thought. Secondly, the author, concentrating on the special work of the Holy Spirit, does not pay proper attention to God’s accommodation in Christ in both the Old and New Testaments.

139 Cf. Confessio de Trinitate propter columnas P. Caroli, CO 9.708-710 (“De Christo Iehova”).

140 Comm. Ex. 3:2 (1.61-62 [altered], CO 24.35-36): “... recte senserunt veteres ecclesiae doctores, aeternum Dei filium ita vocari, respectu personae mediatoris, quam licet vere demum una cum carne susceperit, figuram tamen gestavit ab initio. Et Paulus huius mysterii nobis idoneus est interpres, qui palam asserit (1. Cor. 10, 4) Christum fuisse ducem populi in deserto. Quanquam ergo tunc, propriè loquendo, nondum nuncius patris erat, praedestinatio tamen ad officium iam tunc ita vigebat, ut patribus sub hoc habitu cognoscendum se exhiberit. Nec sane alia unquam sanctic fuit communicatio cum Deo quam per mediatorum promissum. Itaque nihil mirum si aeternus Dei sermo, unius cum patre deitatis et essentiae, nomen angeli mutatus sit futurae legationis respectu.”
A syllogism is suggested here: Christ bore the figure of the person of the Mediator (figura personae mediatoris) from the beginning. Christ fulfilled the role effectively (vigebat) even before the incarnation. Therefore, Christ was called the eternal Son of God regarding the person of the Mediator (respectu personae mediatoris). Calvin calls this a mystery (mysterium), characterizing the presence and ministry of the Angel as those of Christ the Mediator.  

Calvin links the character of the Angel to Jehovah and Elohim. The Hebrew Jehovah represents the whole essence (essentia) of all the three persons of God. At the same time, it indicates the character of Christ as the Mediator. The name stands for the redemptive work of “the Angel” in the Old Testament, who led the people in the desert. On Hosea 12:3-5, Calvin comments:

Christ, the eternal Wisdom of God, did put on the character of a Mediator, before he put on our flesh. He was therefore then a Mediator, and in that capacity he was also an angel. He was at the same time Jehovah, who is now God manifested in the flesh.

Similarly, the meaning of the Hebrew Elohim represents angels and gods as a collective noun, it denotes the economy of the Trinity rather than the fact that they are in the same essence. At the same time, it defines a peculiar property of Christ; it reveals not only his divine majesty, but also his character as the Mediator. In the same vein, Calvin comments that when the Psalmist seeks the mercy of God (Elohim), he looks upon him as “the only true God” and “the servant of God and our brother (servus Dei et frater nostro).” He also regards him not only as the almighty

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141 Cf. Alexandre Ganoczy. Ecclesia Ministrans: dienende Kirche und kirchlicher Dienst bei Calvin (Freiburg: Herder, 1968), 108-113. In dealing with Calvin’s interpretation of the presence of the Angel in the Old Testament, Ganoczy does not consider seriously its Christological significance, which is based on the unity and continuity of Christ’s mediatorialship, but merely points up its significance as the theophany of God.

142 Cf. Comm. Eze. 1:25, 26 (1.99, CO 40.55); Jos. 5:13-14 (87-88, CO 25.463-464): “In the books of Moses the name of Jehovah is often attributed to the presiding Angel, who was undoubtedly the only-begotten Son of God. He is indeed very God, and yet in the person of Mediator by dispensation, he is inferior to God.”


God but also as “God manifested in the flesh”—“the head of the Church, the author and protector of our welfare (salutis nostrae custos et praeses).” In this case, the name “Elohim” reveals the character of Christ as our Lord, i.e., Jehovah, who “is shown to us not as he is in himself, but as he is toward us (non quis sit apud se, sed qualis erga nos)” (Inst. 1.10.2, CO 2.73).

Calvin often interprets the word Elohim as denoting the whole essence of God or the mutual relations between the persons, but mostly he focuses on the office of a specific person in the economy of the Trinity. In commenting on Genesis 1:26, “Let us make (faciamus) man,” Calvin first indicates what this phrase says about the office of “counsellor (consultor),” and then argues that the reason why the author used the plural form was to emphasize, in opposition to Jewish thinking, that God does not look for his counsellors outside, e.g., on the earth or among the angels: “since the Lord needs no other counsellor, there can be no doubt that he consulted himself (secum ipse deliberet).” More emphatically this is described as follows:

[T]here exists a plurality of Persons in the Godhead. God summons no foreign counsellor; hence we infer that he finds something distinct within himself; as, in truth, his eternal wisdom and power reside within him.

“Something distinct within himself (intus eum aliquid distinctum)”; this expression signifies the peculiar property (proprietas, proprium, qualitas) of each hypostasis or persona. Office (officium) cannot be separated from person because a particular office designates a particular property. Therefore, the Son of God is properly called “eternal wisdom and power (aeterna sapientia et virtus).”

Even before the person of the Mediator was manifested, his property had already been revealed clearly through his presence and works in the Old Testament. Characteristically, Calvin describes this state as the presence of the figure of the person of the Mediator. In the figure of Christ, the humanity of the Mediator was

146 Comm. Gen. 1:26 (1.91-93 [altered], CO 23.25).
147 Cf. Comm. Ps. 132:10 (5.153, CO 32.347). The Psalmist here depicts the character of Christ as “umbratilis mediator, qui exorandi fiduciam populo daret.”
already revealed as the property of the Son of God.\footnote{Comm. Eze. 1:25-26 (1.99-100, CO 40.55): “The whole deity, then, appeared to his Prophet, and that too in the form of a man, but yet neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit appeared, because the persons begin to be considered when the peculiar property of Christ is shown forth (quia in rationem venire incipient personae, ubi ostenditur quid peculiare sit vel proprium Christo).”} Therefore no other gods or angels could become human legitimately except for the eternal Son of God.\footnote{Comm. Gen. 48:16 (2.429, CO 23. 585): “We must remember what the Apostle says to the Hebrews, (ii. 16,) that ‘he took not on him the nature of angels,’ so as to become one of them, in the manner in which he truly became man; for even when angels put on (induerunt) human bodies, they did not, on that account, become (facti sunt) men.”} For Calvin, there is no room either for the concept of the personal presence of the figurative Christ or for the transformation of the substantial deity in the flesh, both of which were claimed persistently by Servetus.\footnote{Cf. Comm. Eze. 1:25-26 (1.97-100, CO 40.53-57). Here Calvin also criticizes the heresy of George Blandrata; Ps. 45:6-7 (2.183, CO 31.453-454); Ios. 12:3-5 (421, CO 42.455).}

5.3.3 Christus Caput Angelorum et Ecclesiae

Several scholars have dealt with Calvin’s doctrine of the unity of the church mainly in its relation to the unity of God’s people and the divine covenant, which is prominently explored in his commentary on Romans 9-11 and Institutes 2:10-11.\footnote{Cf. I. John Hesselink, “Calvin’s Understanding of the Relation of the Church and Israel Based Largely on His Interpretation of Romans 9-11,” Ex Auditu 4 (1988), 59-69; J. Marius J. Lange van Ravenswaay, Calvin und die Juden—eine offene Frage? in Reformiertes Erbe: Festschrift für Gottfried W. Locher zu seinem 80. Geburtstag, vol. 2, 183-194; L. Schümmer, “Le Mystère d’Israël et de l’Église, postérité d’Abraham,” Irénikon 1988/2, 207-242; Wolf, Die Einheit des Bundes; Mary Potter Engel, “Calvin and the Jews: A Textual Puzzle,” Princeton Seminary Bulletin, Supplementary Issue no. 1 (1990), 106-123.} They pay special attention to the continuity of the true or spiritual Israel (the ecclesiola in ecclesia), which is grounded in the pre-existent Christ.\footnote{Hesselink, “Calvin’s Understanding of the Relation of the Church and Israel,” 66; Engel, “Calvin and the Jews,” 114. Schümmer, “Le Mystère d’Israël et de l’Église,” 240.} We have demonstrated that Calvin verifies the eternal sonship of Christ by referring to his mediatorship whose characteristic is most strikingly revealed in the fact that he is the Angel, Jehovah, and Elohim. Based on this economic-Trinitarian understanding of the pre-existent Christ, Calvin defines him as the leader of God’s people and the head of the church, that is the Mediator of the church. The following commentary on an angel coming up before Zechariah allows us to understand Calvin’s dynamic position on the church.
[T]his chief angel was the Mediator and the Head of the Church; and the same is Jehovah, for Christ, as we know, is God manifested in the flesh. There is then no wonder that the Prophet should indiscriminately call him angel and Jehovah, he being the Mediator of the Church, and also God. He is God, being of the same essence with the Father; and Mediator, having already undertaken his Mediatorial office, though not then clothed in our flesh, so as to become our brother; for the Church could not exist, nor be united to her God without a head. We hence see that Christ, as to his eternal essence (respectu aeternae suae essentiae), is said to be God, and that he is called an angel on account of his office (respectu officii), that is, a Mediator. 153

Calvin emphasizes the headship of Christ over the church by referring to the fact that he is the head and chief of angels. 154 It is true that angels are appointed to do a particular work of God and have a divine majesty, but only on condition that they serve Christ as their master. 155 No mediatorial office can be undertaken by angels independently if they are not led by Christ the sole Mediator. Calvin finds the Platonic philosophy unacceptable which admits many mediators between gods and men. As he puts it, “it is brought about only through Christ’s intercession that the angels’ ministrations come to us” (1543 Inst. 5.38, CO 1.503; 1559 Inst. 1.14.12 [altered], CO 2.126). 156

Calvin claims that the main office of angels is their intercession between God and his people, and their leader is Christ (the Angel). In so doing he asserts that Christ is the head of the church. 157 Calvin, looking upon the church as a family or a household (domesticus), insists that as soon as we are grafted (inserimur) into the

153 Comm. Zech. 1:18-21 (57, CO 4.152). The last part of the passage quoted, “respectu autem officii vocetur angelus, quatenus scilicet est mediator, sed diverso respectu,” can be rendered more literally in this way: “however, for the sake of his office he is called angel, so far as he is deservedly a Mediator, but in different regard.”


155 Comm. Gen. 16:10 (1.432-433 [altered], CO 23.228): “That the angel here promises to do what is peculiar to God alone, involving no absurdity, for it is sufficiently usual of God to lead his ministers whom he sends in his own person, that the authority of their word may appear the greater. I do not, however, disapprove of the opinion of most of the ancients; that Christ the Mediator has always been present in all the oracles, and that this is the cause why the majesty of God is ascribed to angels.”


body of Christ we become members of it and constitute the *familia Dei.* The truth of the symbol of circumcision is regarded as an initiation into the family. Therefore, he argues against the Rabbis, “separating the Church from the Mediator is like leaving dead a mutilated body apart from its disjoined head.”

Calvin bases the continuity and unity of the church on the eternal mediatorship of Christ, and in order to explain it, he frequently refers to the fact that Christ is the head of the church. He sees the historical and eschatological significance of the church in the light of the historical presence and eternal glorification of our Lord who describes himself as “one with his Father in his person as mediator inasmuch as he is our head.”

It hardly is plausible that we should find the origin of Calvin’s doctrine of the unity and continuity of the church in any influence of a Judaistic Messianistic concept of the church and the Platonic analogy of shadow (*skia, umbra*) and substance (*substantia*) prior to his firm conviction of the continuity of Christ’s mediatorship throughout history. As David Steinmetz puts it in one of his “Ten

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160 Comm. Dan. 7:27 (2.77 [altered], CO 41.85): “Ergo quum separant ecclesiam a mediatore, perinde est ac si truncato capite relinquere corporum mutilum, et mortuum.”
161 Comm. Gal. 4:1-2 (71, CO 50.224). Calvin argues for the continuity of the church of God taking into account the fact that the Jews “held the same doctrine as ourselves, were joined with us in the true unity of faith, placed reliance with us on the one Mediator (*unius etiam mediatoris fiducia nobiscum frato*), called on God their Father, and were governed by the same Spirit.” For Calvin’s Christological understanding of the unity and continuity of the church, see W. McKane, “Calvin as an Old Testament commentator,” *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Theologiese Tydskrif* (1984), 254-256; Danielle Fischer, “Ministères et instruments d’unité de l’Eglise dans la pensée de Luther et de Calvin,” *Istina* 30 (1985), 14-17.
162 Comm. Gen. 20: 7 (1.526, CO 23.290); Ex. 3:15 (1.75, CO 24.45): “[S]ince, in the coming of Christ, the truth of the covenant made with Abraham was shown forth, and was thus demonstrated to be firm and infallible, its memory was rather renewed than destroyed; and that thus it still survives and flourishes in the Gospel, since Abraham even now ceases not to be the father of the faithful, under the one head (*sub uno capite.*)”
163 Comm. Jn. 17:21 (2.148, CO 47.387). Cf. S. H. Russell, “Calvin and the Messianic Interpretation of the Psalms,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 21 (1968), 37-47. Regarding “the threefold reference” of the Psalmist among David, Christ, and his church, the author asserts, “the master-key of Calvin’s exegesis of the messianic elements in the Psalms is the solidarity of Christ and His members both before and after the incarnation” (41-42). He also points out that the Davidic kingdom is not only “a mere representation of that of Christ” but it also shows that “the substance of His kingdom must be in some way regarded as present” (42, italics mine).
164 Cf. Hans-Joachim Kraus, “Calvin’s Exegetical Principles,” *Interpretation* 31/1 (1977), 17, and “Israel in the Theology of Calvin,” 80-82. In dealing with the unity of the church in the scope of
Theses” of Reformation-era biblical interpretation, although the meaning of a text is not confined within its ad hoc significance and in this respect the pre-critical exegesis has its own limitation, “the importance of the Old Testament for the church is predicted upon the continuity of the people of God in history, a continuity which persists in spite of discontinuity between Israel and the church.” Calvin sometimes seems to adhere very strictly to a peculiar office of God in order to pinpoint Christ as the Mediator of the church, but he is always keen enough not to confuse the entity of the person (persona) of Christ with his personal (personalis) presence in history. In this respect, we may say that Calvin’s via media is placed somewhere between Servetus and Hunnius.

5.4 The Christological Significance of Calvin’s Interpretation of the Old Testament Law

5.4.1 The Pattern of Interpretation of the First Table Commandments

We have examined the great significance of Calvin’s concept of Christus mediator legis for his Old Testament theology studying how the law reveals the presence of Christ as the Mediator and represents his future coming at the same time. How then was the position of Calvin reflected in his interpretation of the law in the Old Testament? Calvin’s exposition of the law was given mainly in three genres, i.e., sermons, lectures, and commentaries. His approach varies in accordance with each genre. However, his interpretation of the Ten Commandments that belong to the First Table presents a remarkably consistent pattern.

We can start exploring the pattern by examining his commentary on the second commandment concerning the burnt-offering in Leviticus 1:1-4, which shows

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166 Cf. Parker, Calvin’s Old Testament Commentaries, 9-41.
a typical example. First, Calvin seeks for the simplicity (simplicitas) of a text according to its context (ex contextu). He avoids using allegories (allegoriiis ludere); rather investigates the social and religious context of the Jewish concept of the burnt offering. He comments: “This, then, was the first rule of obedience, that men should not offer indiscriminately this or that sacrifice, but bulls or bull-calves of their herds, and male lambs or kids of their flocks.” Overall, in the first stage, as Puckett observes, Calvin tries to understand the context in which the document was originally produced, giving primary attention to “the original writer’s contemporaries.”

His special concern for historical biblical context carries on in the next stage, but from the spiritual perspective in which Calvin pursues a spiritual meaning of the law viewed by the lens of the original addressees. It is pointed out that even the ancient people believed that “unless they directed their faith to Christ, whatsoever came from them would be rejected.” Thus, the spiritual meaning of the burnt offering is described in this way: “since the sacrifices were figures (figurae) of Christ, it behooved that in all of them should be represented (repraesentari) that complete perfection of His whereby His heavenly Father was to be propitiated.” Both the fact that Christ himself is revealed in the law and that in Christ the truth of the law—the will of God—is revealed are equally considered at this stage. Calvin highlights the fact that God’s face (facies), which indicates Christ as the living and express image of God, shone forth in the law. At this point Calvin claims that Christ not only designates the norm of each law as “the sole standard (unica

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169 Puckett, John Calvin’s Exegesis of the Old Testament, 67-68. According to Puckett, for the “simple lexicological observation” in this stage, Calvin considers these four criteria: the opinion of Jewish commentators, etymology, biblical usage, and context (64-72).
170 Cf. Ibid., 84: “Calvin’s belief that all of scripture is a witness to Christ as the mediator between God and man is nowhere more evident than in his condemnation of Jewish exegesis.”
172 Comm. Ex. 20:3, et al. (1.419, CO 24.262): “... true and pure religion was so revealed in the Law, that God’s face (Dei facies) in a manner shone forth (tradita) therein.”
"regula)," but also reveals himself as the substance of the law.\textsuperscript{173}

While in the first two stages Calvin deals with the law before the coming of Jesus Christ and how the predestined promise of Jesus Christ worked for the Old Testament people, in the third stage he comments on the fulfillment of the law in Christ who is its reality, truth, and substance.\textsuperscript{174} As Calvin puts it in the commentary, "there was a price of satisfaction in the ancient sacrifices which should release them from guilt and blame in the judgment of God; yet still not as though these brute animals availed in themselves unto expiation, except in so far as they were testimonies of the grace to be manifested by Christ." In this stage, both the \textit{umbra-substantia} analogy and God’s accommodation to human capacity (especially to the barbarity of the ancient people) are to be taken into consideration in order to explain both the temporal validity and the continual significance of the ceremonial law.

Then in the final stage of the interpretation, Calvin claims the continuity between law and Gospel with his argument for the continuity and unity of the church. He frequently refers to the wide extent and continual validity of Christ’s mediatorship in their relation to the unity of the covenant in the Old and New Testaments.\textsuperscript{175} With reference to burnt offering, the continuity is revealed in the following: "Thus the ancients were reconciled to God in a sacramental manner by the sacrifices, just as we are now cleansed through baptism." Before closing each individual commentary, Calvin generally demonstrates its pedagogical significance. In so doing, Calvin maintains, as Parker notes, that "the context of any single book is the rest of the Holy Scripture. No book can be interpreted as if it stood outside the Bible."\textsuperscript{176}

Calvin’s commentary on the blood of burnt offerings gives us another good example of the pattern of his interpretation of the First Table commandments.\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{176} Parker, Calvin’s \textit{Old Testament Commentaries}, 81.
\textsuperscript{177} Comm. Ex. 24:5-8 (3.319-321 [altered], CO 25.74-76).
First, he writes about the significance of blood for the ancient people, as the “medium whereby the covenant was established and confirmed.” Secondly, he reveals the spiritual meaning by indicating the fact that the covenant “was sealed with the blood of Christ in type and shadow (umbra et typo).” Thirdly, he says that “the true and genuine nature of the Sacraments” was made complete in Christ; therefore, Catholic sacraments which are devoid of the substance of Christ are “dumb sacraments (muta sacramenta).” Finally, Calvin concludes that the principle of “gratuitous reconciliation” is prevalent throughout the whole Scripture.

This pattern is also prominently shown in Calvin’s commentary on the tithes, which we briefly presents: the tithes were given to priests as representatives (vicarios), an office of representative is allocated to Christ, Christ fulfils the office (munus) and now possesses the dignity (dignitas) alone, finally, the meaning of the tithes is that the tithes belonged to God originally but he gave them to the priests as his representatives in Old Testament times and to Christ the Mediator in the new covenant.178

We do not need to enumerate all the relevant commentaries here,179 but his commentary on the keeping of the Sabbath deserves presenting before we move on to the next section because it is of great help in understanding his commentary on Jesus’s teaching on the Sabbath in the Gospels, which I deal with in the next chapter. Calvin first investigates the literary and historical meaning of the fourth commandment. Even for the ancient Jews, he comments, the true meaning of the Sabbath was conceived as “the sum of sanctification, viz., the death of the flesh, when men deny themselves and renounce their earthly nature, so that they may be ruled and guided by the Spirit of God.” Then, he says that the fathers directed themselves to Christ who is the “body” and “substance” of the Sabbath. Then Calvin mentions that the Sabbath is fulfilled by Christ as he quotes a verse from Romans

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179 This typical pattern is dominant in these commentaries of Calvin: Lev. 20:25-26, et al. (2. 58-68, CO 24.345-351, on the clean and unclean beasts); Ex. 25:8-15 (2.150-155, CO 24.403-405, on the sanctuary); Ex. 28:4-8 (2.195-197, CO 24.429-430, on sacerdotal garments); Lev. 26:3-8 (3.214-219, CO 25.12-15, on the blessings of the law).
6:4: “Our old man is crucified with Christ (Rom. vi. 4).” Finally, he refers to the continual significance of the law as he argues that “we have an equal necessity (or need, necessitas) for the Sabbath with the ancient people, so that on one day we may be free, and thus the better prepared to learn and to testify our faith.”

5.4.2 Natural Law and the Second Table Commandments

Since the commandments of the Second Table are related mostly to the regulations of the moral law whose validity is continuous, Calvin’s commentaries and sermons on them are more concentrated on their nature and extent than their relation to Christ the Mediator. His focus shifted from the representation of Christ the Mediator in the law and Christ’s fulfilment of the law to what “Christus certissimus interpres” says in the New Testament and what he “shows (ostendit)” and “teaches (docet).” Therefore, it does not seem that the pattern of the interpretation of the First Table applies to the Second Table. What Calvin pursues here is the examination of the true meaning of the law derived “from the judgment of Christ (ex Christi sententia)”

In the commentaries on the Second Table Calvin frequently makes use of the three principles of the interpretation of the law which are founded on the spiritual interpretation of Christ (Inst. 2.8.7, CO 2.271). The introduction of the sixth commandment demonstrates that Calvin turns to such principles as “synecdoche” and “the opposite affirmation (contrariam affirmationem)” in order to read the will of

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184 In commenting on “the eating of blood” in relation to the sixth commandment, Calvin takes a similar position as he does in interpreting the First Table, but his commentary here is not on the precept of the commandment but rather on the significatio of the blood itself. Comm. Lev. 717:10-14 (3.31-32, CO 24.619-620).
186 The three principles of the interpretation of the moral law was established in the 1539 Institutes and remained without augmentation. See 1539 Inst. 3.7-14 (CO 1.375-380); Inst. 2.8.6-12 (CO 2.270-275).
God, who is the spiritual lawgiver, in the law. In particular, in arguing the original nature of each commandment, Calvin makes use of varying notions which stemmed from the order of nature or natural law, such as “conscientia,” “humanitas,” “aequitas,” and “caritatis regula (or normam caritatis).”

In the commentary on the Second Table in the _Harmony of the Books of Moses_, we can find a significant number of statements related to natural law and those that illuminate the influence of his study of law. This is true of his sermons

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194 For Calvin’s knowledge of common law in _Harmony of the Four Last Books of Moses_, cf. Comm. Deut. 21:18-20 (3.15-16, CO 24.607-608, on the power of life and death over his children and on the process of a trial); Lev. 14:17-21 (3.35-36, CO 24.621-622, on the law of retaliation); Ex. 21:14 (3.38-39, CO 24.623, on the wide difference between slaying a man presumptuously and with guile and the regulation of Roman law on the punishment enacted for wounds and blows); Deut. 25:1-3 (3.48-50, CO 24.630, on the punishment); Num. 35:16-18 (3.63, CO 24.638, on the regulation of the _Lex Cornelia_ on the voluntary and involuntary murder); Deut. 22:22 (3.78, CO 24.648-649, on adultery); Lev. 18:6-17 (3.99, CO 24.661, on incest); Lev. 19:35-36, et al. (3.120, CO 24.675, on measures); Deut.19:14 (3.121, CO 24.676, on the land-mark); Ex. 22:1-4 (3.140-142, CO 24.687-689,
According to Calvin, the law is nothing else than "a testimony of natural law" and its regulation is in accordance with the Roman laws. Calvin frequently uses the concept of natural law in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount in order to point out that Christ’s teaching of the law ultimately reveals the original nature (or righteousness) of the law which is not different from the teaching of natural law. A typical pattern of Calvin’s interpretation of the Second Table strikingly reflects that of the new teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. First, Calvin deals with the original nature of each commandment. In so doing, he is much concerned with the will of God towards his people, which he often calls the original righteousness. Then, he mentions natural laws related to each commandment, most significantly equity, moderation (moderatio), and the rule of love. Finally, he refers to what Christ says of the unity of the original nature of the law and natural law.

Calvin keenly applies this pattern of interpretation to his historical and literary exegesis of the moral law. With an emphasis on the continuity of the original nature of moral law, he refers to the mediatorship of Christ particularly as mediator omnis doctrinae. Although Christ was not manifested yet as the Mediator, he had already undertaken his mediatorial office effectively to reveal and instruct the truth of the law as its interpreter and to make his people turn their heart towards God as on punishment regulated in Twelve Tables); Ex. 22:7-8 (3.146, CO 24.692, on a deposit). Even though Haas devotes one chapter to "Equity in the Commandments of the Second Table" in his book The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics, he does not deal with those of the First Table separately because he considers the equity to be related mainly to the Golden Rule of Matt. 7:12, 93-106.


Inst. 4.20.16 (CO 2.1106): "iam quum Dei legem, quam moralem vocamus, constet non aliud esse quam naturalis legis testimonium, et eius conscientiae quae hominum animis a Deo insculpta est, tota huius, de qua nunc loquimur, aequitatis ratio in ipsa praescripta est."

Comm. Lev. 18:6 (3.99, CO 24.661): "The Roman laws accord with the rule prescribed by God, as if their authors had learnt from Moses what was decorous and agreeable to nature."

Cf. Comm. Matt. 5:25 (1.186-187, CO 45.177, "moderationem et aequitatem"); Matt. 5:43 (1.197-198, CO 45.187, "the course which nature herself dictates,” “the common tie of nature,” “the natural order,” “a general rule of the Law,” “the teaching of common sense”); Matt. 5:44 (198, CO 45.188, "lex caritatis"); Matt. 5:46 (1.200, CO 45.190, "humanity"); Matt. 5:48 (1.200, CO 45.190, "the sense of equality (aequalitatem)"); Matt. 7:1 (225, CO 45.214, "caritatis regulam").
the Intercessor. Although Christ was present as figura mediatoris, the ancient people believed him as the eternal Son of God by his peculiar mediatorial office not only to lead his people but also to teach them a rule of living in accordance with the specific historical environment in which they were living.

5.5 Ad Quaestiones et Obiecta Iudaei Cuiusdam Responsio

We are going to treat this tract because it has been regarded as the other document of Calvin which contains direct addresses to the Jews, along with the one known as the fourth preface to Olivétan’s French translation of the Bible. The authorship of this preface which begins with the clause “V.F.C. à nostre allié et confédéré le peuple de l’alliance de Sinai, Salut” is still uncertain. In spite of some persuasive references, I cannot find there any evident characteristic feature that enables us to ascribe its authorship definitely to Calvin in considering its style or its theological tone. Therefore, in the following I will only treat Ad quaestiones.

199 Cf. Inst. 2.8.1 (CO 2.206): “the Jews not only learned from the law what the true character of godliness (vera pietatis ratio) was; but also that, since they saw themselves incapable (imparæ) of observing the law, they were in dread of judgment drawn inevitably though unwillingly to the Mediator.”


201 Scholars’ various views on the authorship have been suggested on the basis of their unique interpretation of the initials V.F.C., e.g., as Votre Frère Calvin (Droz), as Viret, Farel, and Calvin (Reuss, Locher), and as V(W)olfgang Fabricius Capito (Roussel, White). Cf. De Greef, The Writings of John Calvin, 92; E. Reuss, “Fragmentes littéraires relatifs à l’histoire de la Bible française,” Revue de théologie 3 (1865), 217-252, and 4 (1866), 1-48, 281-322; Eugénie Droz, Chemins de l’hérésie: Textes et documents, vol. 1 (Genève: Slatkine, 1970), 108-115 (with a facsimile from the Neuchâtel Bible); Locher, “Calvin Spricht zu den Juden,” 187-188. Locher claims that Olivétan himself wrote the preface, but as a composite work with the three men; Bernard Roussel, “Francois Lambert, Pierre Caroli, Guillaume Farel ... Et Jean Calvin (1530-1536),” in Calvinus Servus Christi, 40-41: “On y relève de multiples auto-citations de ses œuvres par Capiton, et l’écho de débats strasbourgeois des années 1528-1534. De plus le style de ce texte mis en français à partir d’un original latin (lui-même traduit de l’allemand?) est incompatible avec ce qu’on peut lire dans le même volume et qui est indubitablement de Calvin”; Robert White, “An Early Reformed Document on the Mission to the Jews,” WTJ 53 (1991), 93-108. esp. 102-104. White maintains the authorship of Capito by identifying his theological position on such doctrines as Christ’s mediatorship, the covenant of grace, and the similarity between the Old and New Testaments.

202 Some points are to be presented in order to explain why I take the negative position on Calvin’s authorship of this preface. Most significantly, its theological position is quite different from that revealed in Calvin’s earlier prefices to the Olivétan Bible. For example, its author refers to
It is worthwhile to identify the Jewish interlocutor for the right understanding of the historical and theological background of the tract. Rabbi Josel of Rosheim has been suggested as the person. This assumption is supported by Calvin’s participation in the debate on the Torah in Frankfurt in 1539. However, we can hardly presume that there was such a critical theological debate between one of the most renowned Jewish scholars and a relatively young Christian pastor from Strasbourg who attacked him with a “violent, angry and menacing” harangue. Another view has suggested that Calvin’s Ad quaestiones was influenced by Sebastian Münster’s Hebrew-Latin diglot of the Gospel of Matthew, which contains the annotations of Sefer Nizzahon, and considers “a certain Jew” to be the unknown author of Sefer Nizzahon. The feasibility of view depends on the fact that the structure of the tract almost concurs with that of Calvin’s commentary on Matthew, the structure of which in turn is remarkably similar to Münster’s Matthew diglot. It does not, however, refer seriously to Calvin’s use of theological terms and his theological characteristics, nor does it take much consideration of the influence of contemporaries on Calvin’s commentary on the Harmony of the Gospels, especially of the influence of Bucer, the affinity of whose biblical interpretation to Christian Judaism is significant.

Therefore, most scholars who characterize this work as the one by which Calvin expresses his position on some crucial theological themes related to the biblical Jews rather than a wayward polemic against contemporary Jews have argued

Seneca’s view of man addressed to the Jewish audience rather than to the Christian concept of total depravity in order to explain the still-remaining ability of man to do good works according to his will in the grace of God (Laver, 262-268). The author claims that the promise of the law is related to the “charges of sin,” and thus as denoting the promise of the merit of good works (Laver, 275). On this ground, in dealing with the “letter” and “spirit” of the law, the author only takes into account the work of the Holy Spirit through the law. No statement on Christ’s fulfilment of the law based on the shadow-substance framework is presented (Laver, 280). Cf. “John Calvin’s Latin Preface to Olivétan’s French Bible (1535),” tr. Ford Lewis Battles from Latin (CO 9.787-790), 1536 Inst. 373-377; “Preface to Olivétan’s New Testament: Epistle to the Faithful Showing that Christ Is the End of the Law,” CC 58-73.

205 Ibid., 120.
that the Jewish interlocutor was created by the imagination of Calvin. Those questions raised by the interlocutor are mostly with the intention of criticizing the lack of continuity in Christian theology with the Old Testament. They range over the person and work of Christ, the relation of law and gospel, and the state of the Jews in the New Testament. In response to these questions, Calvin refers consistently to Old Testament passages in order to verify the continuity of Christian theology. Therefore, when we read this tract, we should pay special attention to “its academic character.” If we regard this work as a letter, as Beza did, the recipients would be Christians themselves rather than certain Jews.

Ad quaestiones may well be divided into three parts. Some of the first articles deal with the meaning of the coming of Christ. At the outset, the Jewish interlocutor asks about the paradox that Christ who came “to cleanse men from sins” “increased the sin of the Jews.” Calvin’s response is that Christ as the Son of God already came as “the light of life” not only to the Jews but also to the Gentiles, but they “turned the light into shadows by their own wickedness.” Therefore, Calvin argues, the wrath of God was not natural but provoked by the Jews, who made “a death-bringing poison out of medicine.” In the same vein, Calvin’s answer to the question about the abrogation of the law raised in Qs. 2 and 4 is as follows: “Certainly a clear change of external worship is shown under the reign of the Messiah; however, the law is not destroyed in this way, nor is a point of it diminished. Rather, indeed this is the true ordinance (sanctio) of the law: not an empty spectacle exposed to the eyes in the old forms but a spectacle of things which signified the substance shown forth in Christ.”

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207 Jacques Courvoisier, “Calvin et les Juifs,” Judaica 2 (1946), 204.
208 Ibid.
210 CO 9.657: “. . . sua malitia lucem vertisse in tenebras.”
211 CO 9.658.
212 CO 9.659: “Certe clara externi cultus mutatio sub regno Messiae ostenditur: neque tamen hoc modo dissolvit lex, vel apex unus ex eo minuitur: quin potius haec vera est legis sanctio, non
rests on the *umbra-substantia* analogy as he uses such words related to the sacraments as *umbra, figura, substantia, symbolum* and the verb *significare.*

The second part consists of questions related to Jewish literal interpretation, including Qs. 5, 8, 10, 12, and 13. Calvin here affirms his spiritual, but not allegorical, interpretation of the Bible. For instance, in answering the question about the length of Jesus’s lying dead on earth, Calvin, reminding us of his favorite rhetorical “syne
doche,” asserts that “in examples, full conformity is not essential, nor are they absurd if something dissimilar is noted.” In responding to the question why people did not have the power to move a mountain when they prayed in spite of the promise of Christ, Calvin says, criticizing the Jewish literal interpretation, that “if there were to be any grain of wit and sane intelligence in those beasts, they could learn without controversy that the word of Christ, in which they hunt after absurdity, is the most truthful.”

The third part, including all of the remaining questions, converges on the person and office of Christ as the Mediator. Calvin, accusing the Jews of thinking of the incarnation as the transformation of God into human flesh, claims that “we believe that he was manifested in the flesh but is still like himself.” Then, in order to explain harmoniously the eternal deity of the Son of God and his incarnation he refers to his own concept of *communicatio idiomatum,* which is based on the so-called *extra Calvinisticum* (Cf. *Inst.* 2.14.1-2). He says that “inasmuch as Christ is God, he transfers the vivifying power of his Spirit to human nature.”

First, the Jewish interlocutor raises questions about the presence of Christ as

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214 CO 9.665: “... in exemplis plenam conformitatem exacte non requiri, nec absurdum esse, si quid dissimile notetur.”
215 CO 9.666: “Si granum salis vel sanae intelligentiae in ipsis pecudibus esset, sine contro
dversia verissimum esse cognoscerent Christi dictum, in quo absurditatem venantur.”
216 CO 9.660: “Neque enim, ut somniant Iudaei, credimus Deum esse mutatum, sed in carne
manifestatum, et interea sui similem.”
217 CO 9.660: “... quatenus Deus est, in humanam naturam vivificam spiritus sui potentiam
transfundit.”
the Son of God in the Old Testament by asking about the difference or superiority of
the Son of God over angels (Qs. 6, 7). In responding to them, Calvin argues that
Christ is differentiated from other angels, who are called the sons and ministers of
God, considering the fact that he is “the Son” of God and “the Angel”—the chief of
angels. Citing David’s and Solomon’s words, Calvin points out that the superiority of
Christ is witnessed by them, that only the Son of God is prophesied legitimately as
the future Son of man.\textsuperscript{218} Also, as the Angel, Christ is called “the leader and
guardian of people (ducem populi et custodem).”\textsuperscript{219}

Secondly, in responding to Qs. 11, 16 about the visibility of the deity of
Christ after the incarnation, Calvin claims that God’s “divine essence” is visible only
to the spiritual eyes “in the person of Christ.”\textsuperscript{220} This answer recalls the \textit{totus
Christus, non totum} in Calvin’s theology of the Lord’s Supper. We participate in the
whole person of Christ spiritually, not in a carnal sense because he is not ubiquitous
but now dwells in heaven. In giving an answer to the question about how Christ felt
hunger and had his own will (human will) if he was the same as God, Calvin refers
again to his unique concept of \textit{communicatio idiomatum}. He says that “because it
was somewhat useful for him to be recognized by us as a brother, to whom the
condition of human life was common, he immediately returned to what is proper to
humans. Not because the infirmities of the human nature were overcome except to
that extent that by his own pure will he lowered himself to be like us.”\textsuperscript{221}

Thirdly, another question is raised about the relation between Christ and the
paschal lamb in Q. 15. In response to this question, Calvin claims that Christ was
“the figure (\textit{figura})” not only of the paschal lamb and of all sacrifices but also of all
priests and of the kingship in the Davidic family. He asserts that “God foreshadowed
something far superior in the whole legal worship” even to the ancient people and

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{CO} 9.662.
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{CO} 9.662.
\textsuperscript{220} \textit{CO} 9.665-666, 669-670.
\textsuperscript{221} \textit{CO} 9.668: “[Sed]quia non minus utile erat, fratrem a nobis agnosci, cu cui nobiscum
humanae vitae conditio esset commumis, ad ea quae propria sunt hominis, statim reversus est. Non
quod in eo dominatae sint humanae infirmitates, nisi quatenus mero suo arbitrio se submisit, ut nobis
esset similis.”
made them look for the Mediator Christ. Then, he accuses the Jews of having the false conviction that in order to communicate with God “more Christs should be found by us.”

Although Calvin’s responses to the third sets of questions contain significant remarks on the person and work of Christ as the Mediator, he does not use the word mediator at all before Q. 19, “If Christ was God, why, while he prayed, did he say to his Father that he would perform his will?” This question is a crucial one for the Jews because it touches on their doctrine of the mediation of priests and angels in prayer and sacrifices founded on the Torah, and even on their view of the coming Messiah. In the response to this question, Calvin demonstrates his unique understanding of communicatio idiomatum based on the so-called extra Calvinisticum:

They indeed do not here accuse us at all of what an Apostle declares with fear, that Christ died of the weakness of the flesh but rose again in the power of the Spirit (1 Peter 3:18). In Christ the office of the Mediator which could not be performed without his obedience should always be observed by us in this way that he could not fulfill the obedience unless he had humiliated himself. Christ, therefore, not only accepted being weak according to the human nature, but he assuming the form of a slave made himself empty not because anything at all was lost from his eternal power or became less but because his divinity kept itself silent until he showed the full obedience to his Father in the person of man. In this way, these two sentences concur: “I lay down life away from Myself, that I may take it up again” and “Father, glorify Your Son” (John 10:17 and John 17:1).

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224 CO 9.671: “Hic vero nihil nobis obiectant quod non intrepede apostolus praedicet, Christum ex infirmitate carnis mortuum esse, qui resurrexit in virtute spiritus (1. Pet. 3, 18). In Christo semper nobis observandum est mediatoris munus, quod praestare non potuit sine obsequio, sicuti nec obsequio potuit defungi, quin se humiliaret. Christus ergo secundum hominem non modo infirmus esse sustinuit, sed assumpta servit forma exinanivit se ipsum, non quod ex aeterna eius virtute quidquam decesserit, vel fuerit imminutum, sed quia quietam se continuit eius divinitas, donec in hominis persona plenam obedientiam patri suo praestaret. Hoc modo conveniunt duae istae sententiae: Ego a me ipso animam meam ponam et iterum sumam eam, item: pater glorifica filium tuum (Ioan. 10, 17; Ioann. 17, 1).” Calvin translates the latter part of 1 Peter 3:18 as “mortificatus quidem carne, vivificatus autem Spiritu.” Passive participles mortificatus and vivificatus denote the economy of the Trinity in the death and resurrection of Christ. The passage quoted in Ad quaestiones is from his commentary on the verse: “. . . et in passus est propter infirmitatem carnis, resurrexit in virtute spiritus” (CO 55.264). The word “resurrexit” itself should not be translated as passive, although it includes the meaning of “vivificatus” theologically. The same fault is found in the translation.
Then, in responding to Q. 20, "‘Total dominion of heaven and earth were
given to me.’ Who then gave it to him?" Calvin asserts, referring to Psalm 45:8,
that from the beginning Christ the Son of God performed the office of the Mediator
(mimus mediatoris) of intercession between God and man both as the king and as
Elohim in both his humanity and divinity. He insists: "To be sure, if Christ had not
assumed in his human himself our poverty and nakedness, that sort of giving would
have been superfluous." In Q. 21, the interlocutor asks how the divine nature of
Christ is sustained if he takes true humanity. Calvin finds the answer in the word
persona, which represents the unity (unitas) of the two natures in the person of Christ
rather than in their physical union (unio). The unity of the person of Christ, this is
the core of Calvin’s argument.

The last two questions are concerned with the contradiction between Christ’s
condemnation of Judas Iscariot and his promise of salvation. The Jewish interlocutor
asks about the probability of the salvation of the Jews. Calvin’s response emphasizes
that God accomplishes his providence with the intermediation of even a mere vicious
man, but this is not incompatible with the fact that Christ submits himself to his
Father’s will voluntarily. There is no conflict between God’s providence and Christ’s
voluntary accomplishment of his will on the cross: "The sacrifice [therefore] had to
be a voluntary one. But it was brought about by the secret and wonderful plan of God
that the very one who met his death voluntarily should be dragged by sinners to the

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225 CO 9.672: "...datum est mihi omne dominium coeli et terrae? Quis enim dedit ei?"
226 CO 9.672: "Certe nisi Christus cum hominis persona inopiam nostram vel nuditatem in se
sumpsisset, supervacua esset ista donatio."
227 CO 9.672: "Dicimus, sicuti anima et corpus hominem unum efficiunt, ita Christum ex
duabus naturis constare: non quod similitudo omni ex parte conveniat, sed quia apta et concinna est ad
exprimendum personae unitatem."
Recalling the final words of Christ on the cross which are about asking for forgiveness for the Jewish people, the Jewish interlocutor asks if this sin of theirs can be forgiven in the final question, with a word of petition: “However, if the Father and the Son are the same and have the same will, certainly this sin would be forgiven since Christ himself forgave it.” Calvin has already presented theological answers to this question in his responses to Qs. 19 and 22. So here he just touches on God’s rule on reward and punishment. He indeed confirms that God’s plan, God’s rule, and Christ’s mediation cannot be in discord with each other at all.

5.6 Conclusion

As we have seen, several crucial themes we examined regarding Christ and the law in Calvin’s Old Testament interpretation are discussed in Ad quaeestiones. Overall in this significant work, Calvin concentrates on the continuity of Christ’s mediatorship concerning creation and redemption in order to explain Deus manifestatus in carne. On this basis, he argues that Christ’s fulfilment of the law does not mean either annulment or abrogation of the law, instead, it signifies the manifestation of the substance of the true ordinance of the law. He explains the union (unio) of the two natures of Christ in terms of the unity (unitas) of his person which is revealed most prominently in his own concept of communicatio idiomatum. Calvin understands communicatio idiomatum the way in which the two natures of Christ work as the Mediator. In this respect, the extent of the so-called extra Calvinisticum reaches to the person of Christ the Mediator even before his incarnation.

The tract has no date, preface or conclusion, but is very well organized. It is also theological and academic as well as biblical. It is like a dialogue between the

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229 CO 9.674: “Sacrificium igitur voluntarium esse oportuit: arcano autem et admirabili Dei consilio factum est, ut idem qui sponte mortem obibat, ab impiis traheretur ad crucem.” Note Calvin’s own title of Inst. 1.18 (CO 2.167): “Deum ita impiorum opera uti, et animos flectere ad exsequenda sua iudicia, ut purus ipse ab omni labe maneat.”

230 CO 9.674: “Si autem pater et filius idem sunt, et est illis eadem voluntas, esset certe condonata haec iniquitas, quum ille ipsemet condonaret.”
Old Testament and the New. Mainly concerned about the Old Testament, Calvin does not quote from Romans 9-11. However, he affirms that the grace of our Lord is not only for the Gentiles but also for the Jews indiscriminately. He is concerned much about the salvation-historical significance of the betrayal of Judas and the great sin of the Jewish people, but he does not point out the superiority of the sinfulness of the Jews. Rather, he indicates the fact that not only the Jews but also the Gentiles rejected the Son of God who came as the light from the beginning. His tone is far from "violent, angry and menacing."231

If we take the position that this tract was written by Calvin in his later years, as the editors of Corpus Reformatorum believed, we may well presume that it was written in response to Servetus’ criticism of the Judaizing Calvin. Unquestionably, both Calvin and Servetus were influenced by Jewish literal interpretations of the Old Testament. Calvin was keen enough to match the historical and literary interpretation with his Christology in the Old Testament by referring to the concept of Christus mediator legis on the basis of the understanding of the so-called extra Calvinisticum. Convinced that Christ performed his mediatorship effectively even before his incarnation, Calvin was able to develop his positive and dynamic stance on the law without losing the continuity of the law.

On the other hand, Servetus, who was significantly influenced by the Jewish Cabbalistic understanding of the person of Christ, was so accustomed to the dispensational conception of revelation that he could not match Christ in the law in the Old Testament with the law in Christ in the New Testament. Thus, for him, the barbarity of the ancient Jewish people defines the character of the law as such. No divine accommodation is suggested except for their immaturity. He could not admit to the concept of the grace of the law before the law of Christ was proclaimed by his

231 Baron, “John Calvin and the Jews,” 347. Baron’s criticism is derived mostly from his prejudice against Calvin’s temperament. He says that this “violent, angry and menacing” man described in Jesel’s Diary “would quite fit” the temperament of Calvin, who attended the debate as Bucer’s “faction.” The following expressions reveal Baron’s stance more vividly: “Calvin was temperamentally far from inclined to give any opponent an equal chance . . .”; “It would quite fit Calvin’s temperament to have made a menacing speech against . . .”; “. . . his customary rancor.”
coming. Basically, Servetus' negative view of the law is founded on his anti-Trinitarianism. In this respect, his doctrine of the law cannot be called biblically-Jewish. Rather, it can be properly called philosophically-Judaic. He must have believed that his pantheistic understanding of the person of Christ, which he equates with his personal presence, corresponds to the neo-Platonic concept of the progress of revelation. He endeavored to apply this ratio to the veritas of the Bible in the course of expounding it as literally as possible. His anti-Trinitarianism was the fruit of this task. In fact, when he accused Calvin of Judaizing, it was more related to the ratio of the law than to its veritas.

Hunnius' criticism in his Calvinus Iudaizans was associated with the ratio, in this case, that of the Trinity and Christology in the Old Testament. He did not criticize Calvin's Arianism, but his historical interpretation focused on the original addressees. The Wittenberg theologian, who was influenced by his predecessor Luther’s Christo-typological interpretation of Messianic narratives and prophecies in the Old Testament, took issue with Calvin’s practice in Old Testament exegesis: to read a text according to its context and then to link its contextual meaning with a theological dogma, which is a typical pattern in Calvin’s commentary on Genesis 3:15. Hunnius was not keen to understand the fact that when Calvin talks about the economy of God, he actually denotes the mediation of Christ the Son of God in the Old Testament. In short, while Hunnius takes into consideration the existence of the Trinity in terms of its ratio, Calvin is concerned about its significance in terms of its economy and veritas (truth or reality).

Calvin’s tract Ad quaestiones demonstrates outstandingly Calvin’s mid-way position between Servetus and Hunnius. With reference to Christology in the Old Testament, Calvin emphasizes the office of Christ as the Mediator, but, unlike Servetus, he does not equate the personal presence of Christ with his person. Even though he definitely acknowledges the existence of the three persons of God in the Old Testament, unlike Hunnius, he understands it through their specific office and economy. With reference to the law, although Calvin emphasizes Christ’s fulfilment
of the law, unlike Servetus, he believes that the law played a positive role in the life of the ancient Jewish people. Calvin does emphasize the spiritual meaning of the law in the Old Testament, but unlike Hunnius he makes more use of the law in the historical context through the mediation of Christ than of just its typological and sometimes allegorical use. Against this theological background, we can rightly understand Calvin's criticism both of the "new Judaism" of Catholicism and of the anti-Judaism of the Anabaptists. In fact, strictly speaking, there is no via media; there is only medius noster, Christ our Lord.
CHAPTER VI
CHRIST THE MEDIATOR AS THE INTERPRETER AND FULFILMENT
OF THE LAW IN CALVIN’S EXEGESIS OF THE GOSPELS

A study of the work and teaching of Christ the Mediator in the Four Gospels
is crucial for exploring Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law from both
the perspectives of the *umbra-substantia* and the promise-fulfilment analogies
because it touches specifically on how Christ as the substance of the law interprets
the original nature of the law, which Calvin defines the eternal righteousness of God
revealed in the law, and how Christ as the fulfilment of the law accomplishes the
demand of the law. This chapter will be devoted to this study, especially focusing on
the relationship between Christ’s mediation of teaching and reconciliation.

6.1 Probing Calvin’s Christological Understanding of the Law in
His Commentary on the Gospels

Calvin’s commentary on the Synoptic Gospels was his first major work to be
published after the dramatic downfall of the former first syndic Perrin and his party.¹
Calvin dedicated it to the presidents and the Council of Frankfurt, to whom also his
opponent Joachim Westphal had recently dedicated his book on the Lord’s Supper.²
Unlike his contemporaries such as Bucer, Bullinger, and Melanchthon, Calvin began

¹ For the expulsion of Perrin and his partisans from Geneva, see Cottret, *Calvin: A Biography*,
² “Dedictory Epistle,” CNTC 1.vii-ix (CO 15.710-712). Westphal published *Collectanea*
sententiārum D. Aureliī Augustīni de coena Domīni in Frankfurt and dedicated it to its city council. In
opposition to this work, Calvin published *Defensio sanae et orthodoxae doctrinae de sacramentis* (CO
9.5-36) in January 1555. The publication of this treatise was delayed because of the censorship of the
Council of Geneva. This caused him to postpone writing the commentary on the Synoptic Gospels. Cf.
De Greef, *The Writings of John Calvin*, 100-101, 191-192; Jean-François Gilmont and Rodolphe Peter,
*Bibliotheca Calviniiana: Les œuvres de Jean Calvin publiées au XVIe siècle*, vol. 2 (Gèneve: Droz,
his commenting with the Epistles and, in turning to the Gospels, wrote on John before the Synoptics. Though Calvin's motivation for choosing this route through the New Testament remains unclear, Parker observes that Calvin might have intended to see the life and work of Christ in the light of the teaching of the Epistles and the Fourth Gospel. Calvin designates the first three Gospels as the "body (corpus)," which contain "all the duties (partes) of the Mediator," and the Gospel of John as its "soul (animam)" and "a key (clavem) to open to the understanding of others."

With reference to Christ's mediation of the law, the peculiarity of the Gospels demonstrates not only the fact that the Son of God is manifested as the Mediator in the person of Deus manifestatus in carne but also the fact that he, who is the substance of the law, reveals and fulfils the eternal righteousness of the law. When Christ teaches the original meaning of the law in the Sermon on the Mount and several narratives related to its authority and validity, he actually reveals himself, that is, his person and office as the Mediator. So, whenever Christ is manifested as the interpreter of the law in the Gospels, he is manifested as the fulfilment of the law at the same time. How then should we deal with the ad hoc significance of Christ's teaching of the law before its fulfilment?

Dieter Schellong keenly approaches this question with the assumption that Calvin's exegetical stance was taken "between the biblical text and the concrete position of the evangelical church in the era of the counter-Reformation" in his book Das evangelische Gesetz in der Auslegung Calvins, which was published as a part of his main work, Calvin's Auslegung der synoptischen Evangelien. He emphasizes in the former work that Christ was not merely "the proclaimer of the new law (ein Verkündiger neuer Gesetz)," but rather gave the new teaching of the law "to

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4 Parker, Calvin's New Testament Commentaries, 35.
5 "The Theme of the Gospel of John," CNTC 4.6 (CO 47.VII).
6 (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1968), "Einleitung."
accommodate himself to human beings (den Menschen zu akkommodieren),” specifically, den Menschen “der Gemeinde.”

Schellong holds, in reference to the ethical significance of the law for der Mensch der Gemeinde, that Calvin does not discriminate between a godly person and a worldly person as Luther does, but rather refers to the dual nature of man, which is finally overcome by the grace of Christ the Mediator. Influenced by Bohatec, Schellong farther asserts that Calvin bases the continuity of the law on the common ground of natural law, and explores it in view of the affinity between the precepts (praecepta) of the law and the divine counsels (consilia), as well as between the law (Gebot) and the divine instruction (Ratschlag).

Schellong makes two points concerning Calvin’s historical interpretation of Christ’s teaching of the law in the Gospels: “first, Calvin emphasizes the law of Jesus in the time of his public mission before the fulfilment of his mediatorial office; second, Calvin regards the demand of the law as pertaining to a specific person in a specific situation, so that we must detach it therefrom [i.e., from its historical particularity] and identify from it its general useful essence.” On this basis, Schellong argues, in his book Calvins Auslegung der synoptischen Evangelien, that Christ’s “radicalization (Radikalisierung),” which is examined by Calvin in his commentary on the Gospels, overall features none other than a transformation of man through “the inner teaching of Christ.”

Calvin’s historical and literal interpretation of the Gospels occasionally causes some Christological problems. In dealing with Calvin’s Christology in his commentary on the Synoptic Gospels, Johannes L. Witte claims that although Calvin maintains the oneness of the two natures of Christ and the person of the divine Word,

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 10-11: “Calvin konnte den Weg der Zweiteilung der Person nicht mitgehen.”
9 Ibid., 16-17, 18. In this respect, Schellong insists, Calvin’s ethical understanding differs from Luther’s political understanding of the law founded on his two-kingdom theory.
10 Ibid., 20-21.
he has a kindred spirit with Nestorius in that he considers the human nature not as coming “from the person of the Word who became man (auf die Person des menschgewordenen Wortes)” but as “an independent whole (ein autonomes Ganzes).” According to Witte, Calvin, influenced by the school of Antioch, refuses to accept the deification of the humanity of Christ, but instead refers to the work of the Holy Spirit in order to explain Christ’s mediation according to both the divine and human natures. The unity between the divine and human nature in Christ is so loosened that the humanity of Christ does not play an essential role in the process of sanctification; so Christ unites God’s people to himself and to his Father through the pouring out of his power, which is the power of the Holy Spirit, “always and exclusively (immer und ausschließlich).” In this respect, Witte claims, Calvin rejects the mediation between Christ in heaven and the faithful on earth taking place without the “personification (Verdinglichung)” of the power of the Holy Spirit through the Word of God and sacraments.

Witte’s view is completely different from that of David E. Willis, who maintains that “Deus manifestatus in carne . . . does indeed function to protect the fact that Jesus was Mediator as God manifested in the flesh, and that in the flesh he was never less God than he was before this fleshly manifestation. Deus manifestatus in carne serves also, however, to indicate the reality of both natures, their distinction, and their unity in the person of the Mediator Jesus Christ.” As studied before in chapter 4, Calvin understands the communicatio idiomatum as the way in which the two natures of Christ work in the whole process of his mediation in the light of the so-called extra Calvinisticum. Therefore, when Christ undertakes his mediatorial office, the power of the Spirit which proceeds from his divinity works together with the Holy Spirit who acts as the bond of the two natures.

13 Ibid., 515-516, 529.
14 Ibid., 528.
15 Calvin’s Catholic Christology, 63.
16 Ibid., 84. Willis is not convinced that Calvin differentiates the Spirit of Christ from the Spirit of God. According to Krusche, although Calvin acknowledges the peculiarity of the Spirit of the
Accordingly, Willis insists that Calvin’s Christology is “‘Spirit-Christology’ in the sense that it is so much a Filioque-Christology” and “Christ’s existence and ordering reality beyond the flesh are in large measure to be accounted for Pneumatologically.” Christ’s mediation in both his natures supports his voluntary subjection to the Father, the silence of the divine nature in the works which belong to the humanity of Christ, the existence of the Spirit working within the divine nature of Christ, which is often called by Calvin the Spirit of Christ, and finally the divine-human relationship moderated by the Mediator.

Each of these three scholars’ views gives us an insight for our inquiry into Calvin’s understanding of the person and work of Christ in the Gospels. Schellong teaches the continuity between the Word of God and the word of the incarnate Christ, and the ethical, evangelical, and contextual significance of his teaching and application of the law. Witte refers to the special work of the Holy Spirit in order to explain the union of the two natures of Christ especially with reference to his mediation as Deus manifestatus in carne. In so doing, both scholars are keen to distinguish the Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of God, but they are not concerned about linking their thought with Calvin’s peculiar understanding of communicatio idiomatum, which is based on the so-called extra Calvinisticum. Willis picks up this point and from it seeks to explain the continual mediation of Christ, which sheds light on our study of the relationship between Christ the interpreter and the fulfilment of the law.

In the following, reflecting on these theological observations, I will first examine Calvin’s interpretation of Christ’s teaching of the law with great emphasis

Eternal Sermo as the Spirit of the Mediator, he claims no differentiation between the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ. *Das Wirken des Heiligen Geistes nach Calv`, 128-129.

17 Ibid., 82-83.


19 Cf. Ganoczy, *Ecclesia Ministrans*, 45-61. Like Willis, Ganoczy refers to the so-called extra Calvinisticum in order to explain Calvin’s dialectical position on the person of Christ after the incarnation in accordance with the Chalcedonian formula. In doing so, however, Ganoczy turns to the dialogue between Gottes Götlichkeit and Gottes Menschlichkeit (Deus manifestatus in carne) rather than the hypostatic union between Gottnatur Christi and Menschennatur Christi.
on the influence and role of Christ the Mediator. At this stage I am mainly concerned
with the continuity of the law and the *ad hoc* significance of Christ’s interpretation of
the law. In the following section I will investigate the meaning of Christ’s fulfilment
of the law presented in Calvin’s interpretation of Matthew 5:17-18. With reference to
the fulfilment of the law, the fact that Christ is the substance and truth of the law will
be especially taken into consideration. Then, finally, I will deal with the life and
work of Christ, centred on its significance for the continual mediation of the law.

Throughout this chapter, I will concentrate primarily on Calvin’s exegesis of
the Gospels, but in the first two sections I will compare Calvin’s position with those
of Melanchthon and Bucer to show its characteristics more clearly.

### 6.2 Christ’s Interpretation of the Law

#### 6.2.1 "Ego autem dico vobis"

Through his teaching of the law in Matthew 5:17-48 Christ reveals not only
the true meaning of the law but also his authority as the Son of God, which is
authenticated by the typical expression in six antitheses, "Audistis quoniam dictum
est antiquis, ... Ego autem dico vobis, ..." It is worthwhile starting with Matthew
5:20 before we treat each individual teaching, because although Calvin, like Bucer,
deals with this verse along with the following teaching of the sixth commandment,
he regards it as a common introduction to the other five teachings.

In commenting on verse 20 along with the following verses, Calvin accuses
the Pharisees and Scribes of "perverse teaching" by which they bound the divine law
only to "the outward duties." More specifically, he identifies the Scribes who
"struggled to besmear the teaching of the Gospel as playing havoc with the Law" and
the Pharisees who "were not satisfied with the plain text (simplici litera), but claimed
to have a key to elicit hidden senses." Whereas the Pharisees fabricate the

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righteousness of the law and make it their own by distorting its precepts, Calvin comments, Christ never wished to “change,” “innovate,” or “correct” them.22 As he puts it,

Christ is not to be made into a new Law-giver, adding anything to the everlasting righteousness of His Father, but is to be given the attention of a faithful Interpreter, teaching us the nature of the Law, its object, and its scope.23

Regarding the continuity of the law, some key features should be noted. First, Calvin emphasizes the eternal normativeness of the law. The law reveals and works as “the precepts of holy and godly living (pie sancteque vivendi praecepta).”24 Secondly, the righteousness of the law is different from that of the temporary political and civil one, which is bound only to outward offices, because it is spiritually engraved within our heart.25 Thirdly, the spiritual nature of the law denotes the eternal righteousness of God, which is revealed ultimately and fulfilled by Christ the Mediator. Therefore, the law contains both the precepts and promises. In this respect Calvin argues: “The beginning of righteousness was once handed down in the Law, but its perfection was taught in the Gospel.”26 Thus, commenting on the phrase “Ego autem dico vobis,” Calvin claims that “He [Christ] does not set His answer against the precept of Moses, but against the popular fiction of the scribes.”27

6.2.2 Calvin’s Exegesis in Comparison with Melanchthon’s and Bucer’s

Calvin’s commentary on the Sermon on the Mount shows his lucid brevity of

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22 Comm. Matt. 5:21 (1.183, CO 45.174): “... atqui nihil minus propositum Christus habuit quam aliquid mutare vel novare in legis praeceptis. ... Quod autem nihil in eius praeceptis corrigere voluerit Christus, ...” (italics mine).
23 Comm. Matt. 5:21 (1.184, CO 45.175): “... neque enim fingendus est Christus novus legislator, qui ad aeternam patris sui iustitiam aliquid addat, sed tanquam fidus interpres audiendus est, ut sciamus qualis sit lex, quorum tendat, et quosque pateat.”
24 Comm. Matt. 5:21 (1.183 [altered], CO 45.174).
25 Comm. Matt. 5:21 (1.184 [altered], CO 45.175).
27 Comm. Matt. 5:22 (1.184 [altered], CO 45.175).
style and his zeal for the edification of church. In dealing with the so-called Synoptic problems, Calvin prefers Augustine’s position to Osiander’s, when he says that the Sermon on the Mount and the Sermon on the Plain in Luke 6 have the same origin. Here I study Bucer’s and Melanchthon’s commentaries on Matthew 5:17-48 and on some related verses in the Gospels, not only because these books have been believed to be a significant influence on Calvin’s commentaries on the Gospels, but also because, as Parker observes, “they also represented a distinctive literary tradition and had imposed this tradition on the commentary form.” I will accordingly refer to Luther’s commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, especially in discussing the origin of these Reformers’ works.

In the note of dedication of his commentary on Romans to Simon Grynaeus of Basel, Calvin appreciates three Reformers “among so many scholars of pre-eminent learning”: Melanchthon illustrated major points with excellent knowledge and skill; Bullinger expounded doctrine with an ease of expression; and, Bucer, to whom Calvin paid most homage, was superseded by no one in his precise and diligent interpretation of the Scripture. Calvin then critically evaluates

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28 Z. N. Holler, “Calvin’s Exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount,” in Calvin Studies III, 5. Calvin cites from Augustine on three occasions, from Chrysostom twice, and Erasmus once. He regularly refutes the Papists but not so severely as he does in his Institutes 1559.

29 Comm. Matt. 5:1 (1.168, CO 45.160): “Both Evangelists had the intention of gathering into one single passage the chief headings of Christ’s teaching, that had regard to the rule of godly and holy living.” Cf. Schellong, Calvins Auslegung der synoptischen Evangelien, 43-67; Henk Jan de Jonge, “Sixteenth-century Gospel Harmonies: Chemnitz and Mercator,” in Théorie et pratique de l’exégèse, ed. Irena Backus et Francis Higman (Genève: Droz, 1990), 156. In his commentary on the harmony of the Synoptic Gospels (1537), Andreas Osiander claims that “each evangelist had preserved the correct chronological order.” He is opposed to Augustine who argues that “none of the evangelists could be deemed to have preserved the true, historically correct order of the events narrated.”

30 Cf. Parker, Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries, 60-84; Schellong, Calvins Auslegung der synoptischen Evangelien, 9-42.


32 Wochenpredigten über Matth. 5-7 (1530/2). Das fünfte, Sechste und Siebend Capitel S. Matthei gepredigt und ausgelegt (1532), WA 32.299-544. Luther’s concept of the law is precisely described in Von den guten Werken (1520), WA 6.196-276.

33 The scholars mentioned here might be Valla, Ficino, Colet, Lefèvre d’Etaples, Erasmus, Luther, Zwingli, and Oecolampadius, etc. Cf. Fritz Büsser, “Bullinger as Calvin’s Model in Biblical Exposition,” in In Honor of John Calvin, 68. For the survey of the three Reformers’ exegetical methods in their New Testament commentaries, see Parker, Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries, 73-77.

34 “John Calvin to Simon Grynaeus,” CNTC 8.2 (CO 10/2.403-404).
Melanchthon and Bucer, for the former neglected many points and the latter was too verbose, and says that as a compensation for these weaknesses he “decided to treat every point with such brevity.”

Melanchthon lectured on the Gospel of Matthew in 1519-1520 and eventually published a collection in 1523 as Breves Commentarii in Matthaeeum. It followed the traditional method of catechism: composed of quaeestio et enarratio, objectio, and responsio. As he is in his commentary on Romans and Loci Communes which were lectured and written in the same period, in his commentary on Matthew Melanchthon “is deliberately applying to the understanding of the Bible a method the details of which he had originally evolved for the treatment of any document in general.”

Bucer, like Calvin, comments on the Gospel of Matthew verse by verse, but in a noticeably subject-oriented manner. His commentary is full of brilliant insights, which are quite logical, precise, and ranging over the whole of the Bible. He does not seem to simplify his view into conformity with any specific theological stream. Sometimes his ardent desire to allow both antithetical themes together makes him verbose and even complicated. Even so, he does not lose his own logical consistency. Calvin’s assessment of Bucer’s commentary on Romans is quite applicable here: “Bucer is too verbose (prolixior) to be read quickly by those who have other matters to deal with, and too profound (sublimior) to be easily understood by less intelligent and attentive readers.” In his case, the problem is related not so much to brevitias as

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35 CNTC 8.3 (CO 10/2.404).
36 CNTC 8.3 (CO 10/2.405): “Præsertim quum ita omnia succincte perstringere iuituerem, ut non magnam temporis iacturam facturi essent lectores apud me legendo quæ in aliis habentur.”
38 Parker, Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries, 62-64 (quot. 64).
40 “John Calvin to Simon Grynaeus,” CNTC 8.3 (CO 10/2.404).
to *facilitas*. Calvin, in the argument for his commentary on the *Harmony of the Gospels*, says that although he at times "dissents" from Bucer, he "imitates (sum imitatus)" Bucer.41

Bucer's influence on Calvin is worth taking into special consideration in dealing with Calvin's commentary on the Synoptic Gospels. Since Wilhelm Pauck designated Bucer as "the father of Calvinism," scholars have been concerned with the relation between Bucer and Calvin with special respect to their ecclesiology including church offices, church discipline, and sacraments, and sometimes in regard to their attitude towards union with Christ, Christ the Mediator, and the Holy Spirit.42 Even August Lang's earlier work on Bucer's commentary on the Gospels reflects this tendency.43 It may not be absurd to ascribe the reason for this phenomenon to overemphasis on *De regno Christi*.44 Bucer did not write any book alike Calvin's *Institutes* and Melanchthon's *Loci Communes*, but his theological views are inexhaustibly presented throughout his massive exegetical works. As far as I know, there has been no single work which deals with the relation between Bucer and Calvin solely with respect to their theology of the law, in spite of the presence of available sources.45

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41 "The Theme of the Gospel of Jesus Christ," *CNTC* 1.xiv (CO 45.4). For the influence of Bucer's commentary on the Gospels upon Calvin's 1536 *Institutes*, see van't Spijker, "The Influence of Bucer on Calvin as Becomes Evident from the Institutes," 109.


Now let us move on to Calvin’s commentary on Christ’s teaching of the commandments of the Second Table and compare it with those of Melanchton and Bucer. According to Calvin, Christ’s teaching of the sixth commandment in this passage reveals “love (caritas)” as its own righteousness, and in the same vein, “fratera concordia” and “moderatio et aequitas.” He claims that if kept perfectly, the law is not merely “a preliminary to true righteousness,” but “completes (absolvat) a righteous life.” Calvin interprets this passage in a more simple sense and criticizes the Papists, who established the purgatory by allegorizing Christ’s teaching.

He first emphasizes Christ as the faithful interpreter of the law who reveals the eternal righteousness of God. Then, he refers to the authority of Christ to fulfil the law. Finally, he points out the ad hoc significance of Christ’s teaching, as he puts it, “Christ cites the words of the law, but He accommodates (accommodat) Himself to the common capacity of people.” Calvin regards Christ’s using syneceodoche in vv. 23 and 24 as serving the same end with his accommodation.

On the other hand, Melanchthon, expounding this passage, is concerned chiefly with the difference (discrimen) between the gospel and the law, whereas Calvin concentrates on the eternal righteousness of God as the true and perfect meaning of the law. Melanchthon’s criticism of the Pharisees’ and the Scribes’ formalism does not aim so much at their attitude towards the law as at their attitude towards the gospel. He tends to equate the internal (spiritual) meaning of the law

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46 Comm. Matt. 5:21 (1.184 [altered], CO 45.175).
48 Comm. Matt 5:25 (1.186, CO 45.177).
49 Comm. Matt. 5:21 (1.183, CO 45.174).
50 Comm. Matt. 5:21 (1.183 [altered], CO 45.174).
51 Comm. Matt. 5:22 (1.184 [altered], CO 45.175): “Christus ad suam autoritatem, cui merito cedere debet omnis vetustas, populum revocat: . . .”
52 Comm. Matt. 5:21 (1.184 [altered], CO 45.174).
54 CR 14.586.
55 CR 14.587: “[E]t nihil dicebant de vera poenitentia, de vera humilitate, de Christo, de iusticia fidei, et de gratia, vel de illis veris consolationibus, de quibus concionantur Prophetae in promissionibus.”
with the gospel.

Melanchthon enumerates *poenitentia, fides, invocatio, and consolatio* in order to show the superiority of the gospel and to point out the difference between the teaching of hypocrites and of Christians.\(^\text{56}\) Following Luther’s negative position on the law, Melanchthon here adheres only to the accusing function of the law.\(^\text{57}\) Unlike Calvin, who emphasizes the normative use of the law for godly life, Melanchthon stresses “that we are justified by the Son of God, not by our fulfilment of the law.”\(^\text{58}\)

Melanchthon treats the kerygma of vv. 23-24 regarding the “*tota religio*,” which comprises “promise,” “precepts of moral works,” and “ceremonies.”\(^\text{59}\) With reference to the practice of the law, he says, these three correspond to “faith,” “good conscience in moral works,” and “ceremonies with proper knowledge.”\(^\text{60}\) Melanchthon’s attitude here becomes very polemical. He even cites Plato and Cato to defend his assertion against the false teaching of the Pope and monks.\(^\text{61}\) He earnestly endeavors to verify the significance of the doctrine of the church for the Christian life. However, he does not take into proper consideration the law as the rule of right and godly living.\(^\text{62}\)

Bucer, commenting on v. 20, accuses the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes of alienating themselves from the kingdom of God by replacing the law with the shadow of the law,\(^\text{63}\) and argues that the original righteousness of the sixth

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\(^{57}\) *CR* 14.589: “Taxavit et recens [Dominus Doctor Martinus], quia Deus vult agnosce peccatum, quod intus in corde haeret, et vult expavescere, vult nos agnoscre gratuitam remissionem peccatorum, et iusticiam propter Filium.”

\(^{58}\) *CR* 14.591: “... quod simus iusti propter Filium Dei, non propter nostram impletonem legis.”

\(^{59}\) *CR* 14.592.

\(^{60}\) *CR* 14.595.

\(^{61}\) *CR* 14.592.

\(^{62}\) Melanchthon has the similar positive position on the interpretation of this fifth commandment as Calvin, *Loci Communes* 1555, 110-112 (*CR* 22.234-236).

\(^{63}\) *MBEE* 48b: “Abstaruerant clavem scientiae, ut alibi illis Dominus opprobrat, sibi vendicata docendi interpretandique Legem facultate, et suffundentes sibiipsis et allis in Lege per se lucida tenebras, tam seipsos, quam alios a regno Dei alienabant.”
commandment denotes the single law—love (dilectio).⁶⁴ Bucer points out the
 distinction between the precept of the law and its practice, and deploys the concept of
 pietas based on their dynamic relation. He defines Christian piety as throwing away
 all kinds of carnal desire and living according to the guidance of the Spirit of Christ
 in pursuit of eternal spiritual felicity rather than the present external prosperity.⁶⁵

Unlike Melanchthon, who understands the righteousness of the law as either
preliminary or assimilated to the gospel, Bucer concentrates on the eternal
righteousness of the law working through the Spirit of Christ. Placing great emphasis
on the Spirit of Christ, Bucer points out that Christ’s office precedes the work of the
Holy Spirit in ordine, but in re Christ himself is still working as the Mediator through
his Spirit.⁶⁶ Bucer equally emphasizes God’s grace and love, in contrast with
Melanchthon, who focuses on specifically God’s grace. According to Bucer, the
teaching of Christ is that the sixth commandment works not only to make people
aware of their miserable state and to make them seek the grace of Christ, but also to
make believers live according to the rule of love following Christ. Thus, through our
union with Christ, God wants us to be united equally both with the grace of Christ
and his love.⁶⁷

6.2.2.2 On Adultery and Divorce (Matt. 5:28-32)

Calvin’s view of marriage and divorce has attracted scholars’ academic
interest, at first historically but recently more theologically. That interest has
increased markedly since the first volumes of the Registers of the Consistory of
Geneva were published in plain French and then translated into English.⁶⁸ Disputed
promises to marry, married life, adultery, divorce, and remarriage had been the most

⁶⁴ MBEE 48b: “Quemadmodum finis et consummatio Legis, adeoque et germanae iustitiae,
dilectio est, ita hanc Christus ubique unice urget, quam denique vel solam suis cum ubique, tum
iamiam migraturus ex hac vita, per novum suum et unicum praeceptum, commendat.”
⁶⁵ MBEE 49b.
⁶⁶ MBEE 49a.
⁶⁷ MBEE 50a: “Adeo vult Deus in summa gratia et charitate esse coniunctos.”
University Press, 1995); John Witte Jr., “Between Sacrament and Contract: Marriage as Covenant in
frequent cases facing the Consistory since the 1541 Marriage Ordinance left the government of marriage and family life to the Consistory and to the Small Council.\(^{69}\)

Adultery and divorce are dealt with differently, because whereas the former concerns both physical and spiritual chastity, the latter is mostly associated with the civil institution, even though marriage has been regarded as a religious issue with reference to its character as *sacramentum* since Augustine.\(^ {70}\) In dealing with divorce in Matthew 19, Calvin claims that the core of Christ’s teaching in this narrative is expressed strikingly by the law of marriage in Genesis 2:24. He regards this “perpetual law” as different from the Law of Moses regulating the permissiveness of divorce with a certificate in Deuteronomy 24:1-4 because the former regulates “the order of nature (*ordo creationis*)” and denotes “the inward law of God,” i.e., “the rule of love (*caritatis regula*),” but the latter was given as “the polity and external order” to meet the temporal need to rule the hardness of heart of the Hebrews.\(^ {71}\)

Calvin’s view of marriage is very positive yet strict.\(^ {72}\) He reckons the marriage commandment of Genesis 2:24 as “a sure law on the sacred and dissoluble bond of marriage.”\(^ {73}\) It was not given as a compensation for human desire but as “the order of nature” before the fall to establish “the indivisible society.” Therefore, the natural bond (*nexus*) of marriage is not less dissoluble than the bond of family; the former even precedes the latter.

No exception is allowed from the rule that “if a man divorces his wife the divine bond is broken.”\(^ {74}\) Calvin does not regard the only type of divorce allowed by

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\(^{70}\) Cf. Joel F. Harrington, *Reordering Marriage and Society in Reformation Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 50. Augustine designates a “triple good (*triplex bonum*)” resulting from the conjugal bond as procreation, fidelity, and sacrament, when he says, “Haec omnia bona sunt proper quae nuptiae bona sunt, proles, fides, sacramentum” (*Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum* [CSEL] 41:27). For the relation of marriage and the church up to the Reformation era, see ibid., 48-100.

\(^{71}\) Comm. Matt. 19:3, 4, 7-8 (2.243, 244, 246, CO 45.528, 530).

\(^{72}\) For Calvin’s view on practical matters in marriage, see *Projet d’Ordonnance sur les Mariages* (CO 10/1.33-44); *Quaestiones matrimoniales* (CO 10/1.231-244, CEA 121-136).


\(^{74}\) Comm. Matt. 19:4 (2.243-244, CO 45.528): “... divinum vinculum abrumpi, si vir ab uxore divorium faciat.”
the Lord in v. 9 as its exception because he believes that a rotten body contaminated by adultery cannot be called a part of the body and so it should be cut off.75 This rule applies to both parties because no party is the lord of the body (dominus corporis). The faith of the wife76 or anything disagreeable such as serious diseases and leprosy cannot be a proper cause of divorce because “God instituted marriage for the common welfare of the human race.”77

Calvin sees the role of marriage very positively: “when our nature had become corrupt, marriage began to be a medicine (medicina), and it is not surprising if there is some bitter taste mixed with sweetness.”78 Throughout the successive editions of the Institutes, he emphasizes the feature of marriage as “a remedy (remedium).”79 He claims that remarriage should be allowed to widows and widowers,80 and to divorced men and women if they are not bound either to “unlawful and frivolous divorces” or to “voluntary divorce (voluntaria divortia).”81

Therefore, no civil authority has priority to dissolve this sacred knot: “the magistrate who gives a man permission to divorce his wife is abusing his power.”82

Upbraiding the Pharisees who “were wrong in taking a rule for godly and holy life from the civil code,” Calvin claims:

The laws of the state are deflected from time to time by human morality, but when God presents a spiritual law, He does not consider what men can do, but what they

79 1536 Inst. 1.19 (CO 1.39). From 1539, Calvin pointed out the necessity (or need) of marriage more strongly: “… illam ipsam coniugalem in necessitates remedium esse ordinatum, ne in effraenem libidinem proruamus” (1539 Inst. 3.63, CO 1.410, Inst. 2.8.41, CO 2.296). Cf. Harrington, Reordering Marriage and Society in Reformation Germany; 53-54. Since the argument of Gratian in the Decretum and Peter Lombard in the Sentences, the sacramentum and the remedium had been the problematic dual ideals of marriage in the western church. Both the canonists had extended Augustine’s triplex bonum politically with respect to the remedium and religiously with respect to the sacramentum.
82 Comm. Matt. 19:6 (2.244, CO 45.529).
ought to do (quid possint homines, sed quid debeant). So perfect and complete righteousness is contained therein, although we may lack the means to live up to it.\textsuperscript{83}

Calvin’s position on the civil law is consistent. He admits its reality but he believes that it should be guided and corrected by the spiritual law of God.\textsuperscript{84}

Bucer’s position on marriage and divorce is very similar to Calvin’s regarding his emphasis on the eternal law of love, the need for severe punishment against marital crimes, and the positive attitude towards remarriage.\textsuperscript{85} Calvin avoids Bucer’s verbosity and “curious modernity”\textsuperscript{86} on divorce and remarriage but shows an affinity to the principle of marriage which is “mutual love and fidelity.”\textsuperscript{87} In spite of their similarity, however, their difference is also notable, especially in relation to Bucer’s distinction between the kingdom of Christ (\textit{regnum Christi}) and the kingdom of the world (\textit{regnum mundi}).\textsuperscript{88}

In commenting on Christ’s teaching of the meaning of adultery, Bucer relates the seventh commandment to the tenth. Just as Calvin catches a delicate “distinction between intended will (\textit{consilium}) and concupiscence (\textit{concupiscientiam})”\textsuperscript{89} Bucer argues that a man who has perverse cupidity in the heart already commits adultery and has a propensity to violate a female neighbour against the commandment of the love of neighbour.\textsuperscript{90} Like Calvin, Bucer realizes that the inward law does not speak

\textsuperscript{83} Comm. Matt. 5:31 (1.190, \textit{CO} 45.180).

\textsuperscript{84} From some critical biblical texts, Calvin recognizes the legitimacy of divorce in order to avoid greater sins, such as incest and polygamy, e.g., Gen. 29:29, Mal. 2:14, and Deut. 24:1-4. Witte, “Between Sacrament and Contract,” 45, n. 143. For the influence of his legal study and contemporary Reformers such as Bucer, Melanchthon, and Farel upon Calvin’s concept of marriage, see Bohatec, \textit{Budê und Calvin}, 127-148; Breen, \textit{John Calvin}, 40-66, 86-99.

\textsuperscript{85} Bucer’s position on the principle and practice of marriage and divorce appears precisely in \textit{De Regno Christi} 2.16-47 (Wendel edition, 153-236, \textit{LCC} translation, which does not include ch. 22-46, 317-333).


\textsuperscript{88} Witte claims that Calvin’s early view takes after Luther’s two-kingdom theory whereas his later view reflects Bullinger’s covenantal doctrine of marriage, but he does not mention Bucer’s influence specifically: “Between Sacrament and Contract,” 36-59.

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Inst.} 2.8.49 [altered] (\textit{CO} 2.302).

\textsuperscript{90} \textit{MBEE} 50a: “Unde videtur illud Ad concupiscendum, sic intellexisse, Qui ex prava concupiscentia mulierem modo fuerit intuitus utdammasse intelligas quemlibet aspectum natum ex concupiscentia, non solum eum qui ad concupiscendum et quaerendum illicitam voluptatem instituitur.”
of what we can do but of what we ought to do. Christ’s teaching on adultery is far beyond human ability, which is totally debilitated by the fall. Whence he recommends us “to hasten to run to our restorer Christ.”

Based on the following features, Bucer emphasizes the grace of Christ in dealing with marriage and divorce. The first thing we should note is that Bucer does not differentiate the law taught by Christ from the law fulfilled by Christ. In commenting on Matthew 5:31-32, he says, “Since Christ expounded the precept against all perverse desires and impurities, he without doubt carried out most faithfully all things by which he restored the true knowledge of the precept and fulfilled this part of the law profoundly.”

The second point is that Bucer only applies Christ’s teaching to the elect who belong to the kingdom of Christ. He insists in his commentary on Matthew 19 that sometimes marriage and divorce should be dealt with by secular authority rather than by church ordinances because although the regulations of civil law are not different from ecclesiastical orders where their principle is concerned, some variations should be considered with reference to their application. Commenting on Christ’s words, “Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo,” Bucer claims that Christ’s teaching on divorce only refers to the elect (electis), not to the common people who are bound to civil orders because various things can happen in secular society that necessarily (necessario) require divorce. He also argues that no progress in the republic can be achieved if there is no severe punishment for adultery such as death sentence, public disgrace, and physical torment.

Another characteristic of Bucer is found in the fact that he understands an eschatological dimension of the law Christologically. Commenting on celibacy in Matthew 19:10-12, he uses the words “regnum caelorum” as many as 14 times in

91 MBEE 50b: “...ad Christum nostri innovatorem accurramus avidius.”
92 MBEE 51a: “[Itaque] quum tractaret praeceptum contra stuprum et omnem impudicitiam, exequutus est procul dubio quam diligentissime omnia, quibus germanum praecepti intellectum restituueret, er hanc partem Legis penitus impleveret.”
93 MBEE 147b ff.
94 MBEE 148b-149a: “Postremo quia omnino quaedam in vita humana saepé incidunt, quae necessario divorci um requirunt, et de his vel novae leges condendae, vel veteres revocandae erant.”
two pages. He says that Christ's teaching of celibacy shows "a certain form (specimen) of the future life in heaven." He describes the kingdom of heaven as none other than "the place where Christ governs more expansively and communicates with more people." Bucer here shows a strong tendency to regard Christ's teaching as the present revelation of a future thing, whereas Calvin puts more emphasis on its significance for the original addressees.

Apparently, Calvin believes that the true meaning of the law which Christ taught in the Gospels is from the beginning and will last till the end without change, but he is very aware of the delicate distinction in dispensation between the law taught by Christ in the Sermon on the Mount and the law finally fulfilled by him on the cross. Calvin's historical interpretation of the law is consonant with his theological position on the law. On the other hand, for Bucer, "the analogy of faith (fidei analogia)" is considered first, then "the office of Christ," and finally "what Christ wanted to respond to and teach appropriately in each place," which was given "for the progress of piety most profitably and most persuasively." This position is reflected apparently in his definite stance on divorce: "Unless there is no highest necessity by which we are compelled, we should not permit divorce."

In spite of their differences, both Bucer and Calvin are convinced that the eternal righteousness of the law is revealed by Christ through his teaching on marriage and divorce. However, this is not true of Melanchthon, who relates the new teaching of Christ mainly to the revelation of the gospel rather than to the original righteousness of the law. He says that Christ's teaching on adultery in Matthew 5:27-

95 MBEE 150b-151a.
96 MBEE 150b: "... regnum caelorum, hoc est ut Christus latius regnet, et pluribus communicetur,..."
97 MBEE 150a: "Spectanda igitur fidei analogia est, spectandum quid officium Christi, spectandum denique quid proprie in unoquodque loco respondere et docere voluerit: et quod nusquam respondsere et docere alia potuerit quam quibus in omnibus pietas quam commodissime et suavissime promoveatur."
98 MBEE 150a: "Discamus ergo hinc primum ut a divorcio abhorreamus quam maxime, neque unquam id nobis nisi summa necessitate compulsi permittamus."
30 is given in relation to “the doctrine of sin, grace, and new obedience.”

Chastity (castitas) is identified with living in “pure (castus) Spirit” as “a member of Christ” and marriage is regarded as making “a sweet society,” i.e., “the church.” He argues that divorce results from original and other sins which have brought about domestic calamities. Therefore, he argues, “the soul of the Gospel (mentem Evangelii)” is “to return marriage to the original institution: two will be into one body.”

Melanchthon is more generous than Calvin in the permission of divorce. He deals with men and women who abandon their spouses for a long time without a valid reason as no better than adulterers and adulteresses. He approves a divorce from a spouse who is naturally unable to get married because such marriage is not marriage. However, his attitude towards divorce is strict. No disease, even leprosy, can be a proper reason for divorce. For, just as parents should not abandon sons and daughters because of their diseases, so men and women should not abandon their spouses because of weaknesses. Overall, Melanchthon focuses on the grace of God in the gospel. He deals with chastity as a natural virtue of marriage and asserts that it is given only by God as “a gift (donum).” In this sense, he says, the real consolation is to ask for God’s mercy in living according to his will in marital life.

6.2.2.3 On Oaths (Matt. 5:33-37)

In his Institutes, Calvin relates oaths to God and to a neighbour to the fourth

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99 CR 14.596. Melanchthons position on practical matters in marriage and divorce appears precisely in a section which has been regarded as an appendix to the third edition of Loci Communes (1543), LCC 19.247-259.
100 CR 14.599, 600.
103 CR 14.603.
104 CR 14.604.
105 CR 14.605: “... quando aliqua persona natura non est idonea ad coniugium, ... talis coniunctio non est coniugium.”
106 CR 14.605.
107 CR 14.605.
and the ninth commandment. There, he investigates the theological meaning of swearing focused on its relation to true worship and love of neighbour (Inst. 2.8.23-27, 48, CO 2.283-287, 301). In his commentary on Matthew 5:33-37, Calvin offers no further theological observation, with reference to his Christological understanding of the law, however, he demonstrates his typical pattern of exegesis. In v. 33, he insists that this law, according to “its original (germana) interpretation,” should regulate not only religious vows but also personal contracts and promises, and not only perjury but also trivial oaths by the name of God. When Christ says in v. 34, “Swear not at all,” he “does not refer to the substance (substantiam) at all but to the form (formam),” and in opposition to the Anabaptists’ literal interpretation, he claims, “So we must abstain from all unnecessary liberty in swearing, for when is is compelled by a right reason, the Law not only allows the oath but explicitly enjoins it.”

Calvin maintains this view in spite of Christ’s teaching in v. 37, which seems to prohibit taking oaths. He comments according to the text that Christ teaches “the simplicity which nature dictates,” but he overcomes the merely literal meaning of the text. He refers to the concept of adiaphora, when he says that “it does not follow that we may not legitimately take an oath as often as necessity demands it, for the use of many things is innocent, though their source be vitiated.”

Bucer emphasizes that those who have received the Spirit of Christ excel in making oaths. He indicates that ancient people were allowed and even encouraged by the law to swear to God and to neighbours, as we can see from many faithful oaths of the disciples of the Lord. He severely criticizes the obstinacy of certain

109 Comm. 5:33 (1.190-191, CO 45.181).
110 Comm. 5:34 (1.191 [altered], CO 45.182).
111 Comm. 5:34 (1.191 [altered], CO 45.182). Calvin criticism’s on the Anabaptists’ literal interpretation is briefly shown: “... vocem unam morose urgeo totum sermonis tenorem clausis oculis praetereunt.” Calvin’s criticism of the Anabaptists’ view of the oath is precisely presented in TAL 92-105 (CO 7.92-102).
112 Comm. 5:37 (1.193, CO 45.183).
113 Comm. 5:37 (1.193, CO 45.183): “Neque tamen sequitur, quin licitum sit iurare quoties id necessitas postulat, quia purus est multarum rerum usus, quarum vitiosa est origo” (italics mine).
114 MBEE 51b-52a: “A veteribus discipuli acceperant, satis ex fide cum proximo actum, si quod quis iurasset per Dominum, etiam praestitisset: Christus autem voluit docere id satis non haberi,
Anabaptists who were against any kind of oath whether religious or political. Here Bucer again emphasizes the continual work of the Spirit of Christ. As he puts it, “Christ did not come to prescribe a new reason of living by his words, but rather to give explanation of the thing itself which was prescribed in the law and by the Prophets, by bestowing his Spirit which he earned for us by his death.”

Melanchthon’s commentary is doctrinal and polemical. He defines, “To swear is to keep something said in the invocation of God.” A valid oath comprises “veritas,” “invocatio Dei,” “confessio,” and “promissio.” The Papists’ oath to the saints and the Pope is invalid “because the saints are not to be invoked.” He accuses the Pope of “taking for himself the authority to forgive so that people cannot make promises by swearing legitimately.” Melanchthon’s polemic against the Anabaptists is based on his strict discrimination between the law and the gospel. He argues that Christ forbids us to take an oath that is related to the gospel, e.g., the remission of sin, the purity of the heart, etc. On the other hand, he is quite positive on the political oath. He says that “legitimate oath is the bond of civil obedience and judgments.” To be short, oaths regarding our salvation are worthless. They are not oaths at all. Other religious oaths can be valid according to the law, but political oaths are subject to political orders.

6.2.2.4 Love Your Neighbour (Matt. 5:38-48)

sed oportere Christianos ea inter se fide et dilectione esse, ut nihil omnino iuramento apud eos locus relinquatur, quippe unoquoque de alio etiam iniurato, optime sentiente et sperante.”

MBEE 51b.

MBEE 52a: “... Christumque non venisse ut novam vivendi rationem praescriberet verbis, sed dare ipse potius exprimere, quam abunde in Lege et Prophetis praescripsit, donato in hoc suo Spiritu, quem nobis morte sua meruit:...”

CR 14.607: “Iuramentum est asseveratio alicuius dicti cum invocatione Dei.”


CR 14.609: “... quod Sancti non sint invocandi.”

CR 14.611: “... quod Papa sibi sumit autoritatem absolvendi homines, ne faciant promissa legitimo iuramento.”

CR 14.613: “... legitimum iusiurandum, quod est vinculum civilis obedientiae et iudiciorum.”

The last two antitheses contain Christ’s teaching of the Mosaic Law on the law of talio (lex Talionis) and the love of neighbour. The law of talio had been regarded as the basic principle for punishment in civil law. Christ’s response to this forensic principle is so revolutionary that Julian and others alike, as Calvin says, slandered him for making “a complete reversal of law and order.”

Whereas other Reformers deal with this passage with respect to practical issues such as “recourse to law” and “usury,” etc., Calvin concentrates on the more essential and theological aspects of it.

Accusing the Scribes of restricting the word neighbour (proximus) to one’s friends, Calvin argues that it corresponds to the order of nature to love people as friends without discrimination. He comments that Christ restores “the true and original meaning of the law”—“love (caritas).” The order of nature which commands mutual communication among us is still valid in spite of our total depravity because “the common nature unites (conciliat)” all men in general. Thus, the law of love is called “a general rule of the Law (generale praeceptum legis).”

We cannot satisfy the demand of the law of charity and be perfect by our own ability. The necessity of obedience is not enjoined by perfection where human capacity is concerned. The Papists distorted this truth for the defense of their doctrine of perfection by devising the concept of “counsels (consilia),” which are construed as the law whose precepts are transformed by human reason to adjust it to human capacity.

Not only should the perfection of the law not be measured by human criterion but also it should not be restricted by human capacity. As Calvin puts it, “Perfection

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124 In dealing with Luke 6:35 as a parallel verse, Calvin notes that to attach usury excessively to this sentence is absurd. Comm. Luke 6:35 (1.196, CO 45.186). However, Calvin, treating usury, appeals mainly to the epistles of Seneca rather than biblical passages. “On Usury,” CEA 83-87 (CO 10/1.245-249).
125 Cf. Inst. 2.8.55 [altered] (CO 2.306): “[W]e ought to embrace the whole human race without exception in a single feeling of love; here there is no distinction between barbarian and Greek, worthy and unworthy, friend and enemy, since all should be considered in God, not in themselves.”
[is used] here, not in the sense of equality (aequalitatem), but in relation to its likeness (similitudinem). However far we are from God regarding our capacity, yet we are said to be perfect as He is, as long as we aim for the same goal, that He presents us with in Himself.\textsuperscript{128} Christ shows us the reality and the extent of perfection. He reveals in advance by what criteria we shall be judged in the last judgment. They are not something to be agreed upon by us but something suggested to us by God. Therefore, “Christ wishes us to be imitators of His fatherly goodness and kindness.”\textsuperscript{129}

Although the necessity of perfection is imposed on us and made to be our goal, we are not qualified to meet it. However, “the free gifts of God are presented as a reward by way of encouraging us to do what is right.”\textsuperscript{130} Calvin claiming this points out the fact that by the work of “the same Spirit” we are made sons of God.\textsuperscript{131} Criticizing the Catholic concept of counsels regarding the commandment to love our enemy in the Institutes, Calvin indicates that the distinction between “the law of the Spirit of life (lex Spiritus vitae)” and “the law of sin and death (lex peccati et mortis)” does not lie in the difference of the precept of the law but in the dispensation of Christ’s redemptive work. He finds the answer for the dilemma between quid possint homines and quid debeat in the mediation of Christ. He states:

To be Christians under the law of grace does not mean to wander unbridled outside the law, but to be engrafted in Christ, by whose grace we are free of the curse of the law, and by whose Spirit we have the law engraved upon our hearts [Jer. 31:33]. This grace Paul called “law,” not in the strict sense but alluding to the law of God, with which he was contrasting it [Rom. 8:2] (1536 Inst. 1.26, CO 1.44, Inst. 2.8.57, CO 2.307).

Melanchthon defeats the Catholic concept of counsels by examining Christ’s teaching of tolerance in Matthew 5:38-41.\textsuperscript{132} He says the people not allowed to

\textsuperscript{128} Comm. Matt. 5:48 (1.200, CO 45.190).
\textsuperscript{129} Comm. Matt. 5:45 (1.199, CO 45.189).
\textsuperscript{130} Comm. Matt. 5:45 (1.200 [altered], CO 45.189).
\textsuperscript{132} In his sermon on Matt. 5:21, Luther expresses his view against the Catholic concept of counsels. He says that the perfect forgiveness, presented in the crucifixion, is not “recommended” but “commanded” (LW 21.75). In the 1521 edition of Loci Communes Melanchthon criticizes the Catholic Schoolsmen’s view of counsels by referring to their interpretation of Matt. 5:44 (59, CR 21.126). In the 1535 and 1543 editions, he does not mention at all who he argued with. However, in the 1555
punish who are not regenerated through penitence because it stems from their heart’s vengeance and hatred. Therefore, Christ’s teaching is “praeceptum, et non tantum consilium.”¹³³ He basically does not allow usury, but a proper setting of interest rate can be legally acceptable if it does not originate from greed (rapacitas). Then, it is a donation (donatio) and not a loan (mutatio).¹³⁴

In dealing with this passage, Bucer mainly focuses on how Christ’s teaching, the kernel of which he believes to be “the tolerance of soul,” is applied to church discipline and civil order “inwardly (penitus).”¹³⁵ He argues that the tolerance of the government should correspond “to the tolerance of Christ on the cross.” If not for the guidance of “the Spirit of Christ,” no magistrate would be able to properly understand “the will of God.” Therefore, true piety begins with the knowledge of “the intention (sententia) of Christ.”¹³⁶ Bucer accepts usury on the condition that it is not contrary to Christian piety.¹³⁷ Overall, in commenting on Christ’s saying, “Love your enemies,” Bucer concentrates on to what extent “the doctrine of pure love (dilectionis)” is applied to “the religion of Christ.”¹³⁸

6.2.2.5 On the Sabbath and Christ’s Attitude towards the Tradition of the Elders

Christ’s controversies on the Sabbath with the Pharisees and the Scribes illuminate his position on their tradition most strikingly. The contrast between a few Gentiles who were converted to Christian faith and the Jews who stuck to their traditions is already notable in the Gospels. According to Calvin, this contrast is prominent with reference to their attitude towards God’s Word. A centurion who

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¹³³ MBEE 53a.
¹³⁴ MBEE 54b.
¹³⁵ MBEE 56a-56b.
confessed Christ as the true and only God believed that the heavenly authority of Jesus Christ came from "the actual Word." He did not attach it to "His bodily presence," but rather to "the authority of the Word." On the other hand, the Pharisees and the Scribes infringed "the simple and pure Word of God" by their leaven. They are described as abandoning the "perfect holiness" of the law and binding themselves to "empty traditions." The elders misused the freedom to obey the law and replaced it with "a license to give commands." Thus, Calvin calls the traditions of the elders "secondary laws invented by scrupulous men." In dealing with the debate on the custom of washing before a meal, he asserts that Christ allows ceremonies to be used "in moderation (mediocritate)" according to their true purpose, not as "bare signs (nudis signis)." "A figure (figura)" itself becomes "scandal (offendiculo)" when it is substituted with God. Calvin here shows an aspect of the theological use of adiaphora.

According to the Gospels, Christ was faithful to keeping the law. He kept the Jewish festivals and the Sabbath. Christ's teaching was not contradictory to the law but rather based on it as illustrated by the two witnesses required in the Law of Moses recurring in John 8:17-18. The kernel of Christ's teaching on the Sabbath is represented in the following two sayings: "The Son of man is Lord of the Sabbath"

139 Comm. Matt. 8:8-10 (1.249-250, CO 45.236-237).
144 Jesus' positive attitude towards the law is presented characteristically in the following narratives of the Synoptic Gospels: the story of the leper healed by Jesus (Matt. 8:1-4; Lk. 5:12-14), violation of the laws of defilement (Lk 7:14, 8:54, 10:28-37), Jesus' desire to observe the Passover feast in Jerusalem (Mk 14:12-16), and the strict observance of the Sabbath during flight from Jerusalem in the last days (Matt. 24:20). For reference, see Robert Banks, Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Calvin frequently points out the soteriological significance of Christ's obedience to the law. Cf. Comm. Jn. 5:1 (1.116 [altered], CO 47.104): "He [Christ] must be subject to the Law in order to redeem us all from its bondage."
145 Christ frequently appeals to the authority of the law in the Gospel of John, particularly in defense of his Sabbath work (7:21-24), in defense of his claim to be the Son of God (10:34-36), and in defense of the authority of his teaching (5:31-47, 6:45, 8:12-20). For Christ and the law in the Gospel of John, see Severino Pancaro, The Law in the Fourth Gospel: The Torah and the Gospel, Moses and Jesus, Judaism and Christianity according to John (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975).
in Matthew 12:8, Mark 2:28, and Luke 6:5, and “My Father works even until now, and I work” in John 5:17. The former controversial statement mainly refers to the necessity of the observance of the Sabbath, which is described most impressively in Christ’s saying, “The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath” in Mark 2:27. On the other hand, the latter concerns the substance of the Sabbath which will be fulfilled in the future.

In treating the meaning of Christ’s teaching of the Sabbath, Calvin suggests five arguments by which he verifies the difference between Christ’s interpretation, which is faithful to “the mind of the Legislator” and the Pharisees’ “malicious and implacable superstition.”

Calvin comments:

The only purpose of the Sabbath was that the people might sanctify themselves to God and practice a true, spiritual worship, and that they might be released from all earthly business and join together in holy assemblies.

The first argument originates in the principle that “the ceremonies do not violate the law as long as godliness (pietas) is unharmed.” Ceremonies were given to satisfy the necessity of a true and spiritual worship, not vice versa. So, “what was forbidden for a certain purpose necessity (necessitas) made lawful (licitum).” In the case of David and his followers who ate the sacred bread, the necessity was associated with the saving of their lives by which God would be worshipped.

The second argument originates in the principle that “the duties of godliness

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147 Comm. Mk. 2:24 (2.28, CO 45.324): “Atqui haec tantum fuit sabbati ratio, ut populus se Deo sanctificans ad verum et spiritualem cultum se exerceret: deinde ut solutus ab omnibus terrenis negotiis sacros conventus liberius ageret.”

(pietatis officia) are not in conflict with one another." Calvin widely interprets by
synecdoche the holy duties such as offerings, circumcision, and the worship of God.
He argues that "when the Law commands men to abstain from their work it does not
forbid holy work." The third argument is that although the ceremonies of the law
serve the true worship of God in the first place, their purpose and intent are not
discordant with the righteousness of the commandments of the Second Table. Calvin
explains this by noting the precedence of the love of God to the love of neighbour yet
the concurrence in their dispensation.

The fourth argument demonstrates the characteristic of the mediation of
Christ as the interpreter of the law. His teaching does not yet point to his fulfilment
of the law, but signifies that the Spirit of Christ is already working among his people.
Although he is still subject to the law, he himself has the power to designate its true
and spiritual meaning. Christ says that "For the Son of man is Lord of the Sabbath." Calvin explains this passage as follows:

here He [Christ] says that power is given to Him to free His people from the
necessity of keeping the sabbath. 'The Son of man,' He says, 'because He is Lord,
has the power to regulate the sabbath and other legal ceremonies.' And indeed,
outside Christ the Law is wretched slavery (servitus) from which He alone releases
those to whom He freely grants the Spirit of adoption (adoptionis spiritus).

The fifth argument is based on Christ's words, "The Sabbath was made for
man, not man for the Sabbath." Calvin believes that by this teaching Christ does not
mean to speak about the abrogation of the law but rather about its "proper use (rectus
usus)." Especially, Calvin points out that here Christ accommodates himself to the
original addressees. He indicates again that although Christ claimed his authority
as the Lord of the Sabbath, "the full time of its abrogation was not yet come, for the

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149 Comm. Matt. 12:5-6 (2.29 [altered], CO 45.324-325).
152 Comm. Mk. 2:27 (2.30, CO 45.326). Cf. Léopold Schüümer, "Le Sabat, le Dimanche:
153 Comm. Matt. 12:5-6 (2.29, CO 45.325): "Christ adapting (accommodat) Himself to His
hearers. . . ."; 12:7 (2.29, CO 45.325): "Christ accommodates (accommodat) this verse to His own
time . . ."
veil of the Temple had not yet been rent."154

Based on these arguments, Calvin argues for the righteousness of the healing of Christ on the Sabbath by pointing out that it was "a divine work (divinum opus)." Calvin frequently refers to this concept in his commentaries.155 It may be defined as "the work of God in accordance with the law."156 First, it is God’s "work." Calvin appreciates Christ’s healing as the "substantial perfection" of the Sabbath. Secondly, it is "God’s" work, because the healing power proceeds from his divinity. Thirdly, it is the work of God "in accordance with the law." It is the work of God who subjects himself to the bondage of the law. The authority of Christ to heal the sick is that of the servant rather than that of the victor. Christ reveals himself as "the author of salvation (salutis autorem)," but not yet the fulfilment of salvation.157

Calvin finds the true meaning of the Sabbath for the people of God, not in the fact that they should do what is right for themselves but in the fact that they should make themselves ready by taking spiritual rest (quies spiritualis) so that the Lord may work in them through his Spirit (Inst. 2.8.34, CO 2.291-292).158 He argues that by his teaching, Christ demonstrates the "substance" of the fourth commandment to the Pharisees who "chase a shadowy righteousness" and "stick to the form (forma)."159 Commenting on Jesus’s teaching of the Sabbath, Calvin also points out Christ the Mediator who works for his people in order to fulfil the righteousness of the law. The necessity of the divine work on the Sabbath is enjoined to the people of God, but only on the condition that Christ as the Lord of the Sabbath mediates for them. In this respect, Christ is called "the end (finem) and soul (animam) of the law."160

154 Comm. Mk. 2:27 (2.30, CO 45.326). In the French version, the last part of the citation—"quia velum templi nondum scissum erat"—does not appear. CTS 16/2,51, n. 3.
155 Comm. Matt. 12:9 (2.31, CO 45.327), Lk. 14:1-6 (2.102, CO 45.394), Jn. 5:17 (1.123, CO 47.110), 5:19 (1.125, CO 47.112).
156 Comm. Jn. 5:17 (1.123-124, CO 47.110-111): "In hoc capite insistit Christus, non turbari divinis operibus sanctam quietem quae lege Mosis mandata est."
158 This teaching reflects on the three meanings of the spiritual observance of the Sabbath in the Institutes 2.8.28, 34.
160 Comm. Jn. 5:46 (1.143, CO 47.129).
Melanchthon’s assertion of the four aspects of the Sabbath in his commentary on John 7:21-24 is quite different from Calvin’s five arguments: first, the observance of the Sabbath should be spiritual, not literal; secondly, in order to celebrate the Sabbath we should mortify the flesh and spiritually become a new being; thirdly, because the Sabbath came from the spiritual law, no literal observance can satisfy its demand; fourthly, therefore, no one is justified by the righteousness of the law before God, but the law is fulfilled by faith. Melanchthon interprets the narrative on the Sabbath in the light of the gospel with which he replaces the inward, spiritual righteousness of the law. Although he mentions the revelation of eternal righteousness by the coming of the Messiah, he glimpses at its significance for the Jews of his time. In dealing with the healing of Jesus on the Sabbath, Melanchthon refers to “the principle of Christian liberty” rather than to the positive meaning of its commandment. Thus, his point is related mostly to the validity of the ceremonies of the Sabbath.

Bucer emphasizes that the true righteousness of the Sabbath is “solid love (dilectio),” which is founded on “the perfect and solid knowledge of Christ who is the eternal life.” Like Calvin, he asserts that “when necessity requires, nothing is impious (quum necessitas cogeret, nihil erat impii).” However, he fails to see the relation between the spiritual rest of the Sabbath and Christ’s mediatorial work for his people. Thus, he distinguishes between the Sabbath as rest and the Sabbath as salvation, and believes that the proclamation of Christ’s lordship of the Sabbath concerns only the latter. Like Melanchthon, he mentions “the freedom of the Gospel (libertas Evangelii)” instead of the positive rule of the law in dealing with the

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165 MBEE 110b.
166 MBEE 110b.
167 MBEE 110b.
true significance of the Sabbath commandment for the people of God.¹⁶⁸

6.3. "Non veni ut destruam, sed ut impleam"

6.3.1 Melanchthon's Forensic Understanding

According to Luther, Christ’s proclamation of the fulfilment of the law in Matthew 5:17-19 is not about the substantial fulfilment of the righteousness of the law, but about its perfect revelation. It is “not about life, but about doctrine.” It denotes not the perfection of the Christian life, but the perfect righteousness of the law.¹⁶⁹ It is but the full revelation of a way of life according to which we ought to live in the gospel in the new era. In this respect, it is related to the specific use of the law rather than the eternal substance of the law.¹⁷⁰

Melanchthon, following Luther’s thinking, leaves no room for the fulfilment of the moral law in addition to the concept of the gospel, and claims that Christ’s fulfilment of the law denotes on the whole the umbra-substantia analogy in the fulfilment of the ceremonial law. He argues that the promise of God’s grace is “signified (obsignata)” by the law, but fulfilled by the gospel. It should be noted that he does not say that the law reveals or includes the promise in it, just signifies it. The voice of the law (vox legis) merely imposes our weakness, whereas the promise of the gospel heals us, working as “the medicine (medicina).”¹⁷¹ Therefore, for Melanchthon, Christ’s fulfilment of the law denotes the fact that the gospel fulfils the promise signified by the law. In this respect, he calls Christ’s words, “non veni ut destruam, sed ut impleam,” “the most solemn statement concerning the law (de lege).”¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ LW 21.67-72.
¹⁷⁰ LW 21.69-70.
¹⁷¹ CR 14.581-582.
¹⁷² CR 14. 582, 584 (italics mine).
Using this argument, Melanchthon explains Christ’s fulfilment of the law in four ways: first, by completing the demand of the law through obedience; secondly, by bearing the punishment through which we become righteous before God; thirdly, by restoring us so that we can live according to the law; finally, by teaching the necessity of observation and by rooting out Pharisaic errors. Referring to the second way as “most admirable,” Melanchthon points out that Christ fulfilled the “types and symbols (typi et signa)” foreshadowed by ceremonial laws by accomplishing God’s wonderful decree and imputed his righteousness into us. Melanchthon refers specifically to “the intervening compensation (compensatione interveniente)” of Christ. Here he does not distinguish between moral and ceremonial laws but explains the Decalogue, in terms of the umbra-substantia analogy. The only difference he implies is that with reference to the fulfilment of the moral law, the first way is more relevant than the second way.

With reference to the third way of the fulfilment of the law, Melanchthon turns to the special work of the Holy Spirit in order to explain the spiritual function of the law. The Holy Spirit illuminates our hearts so that we may receive the law into our hearts and live according to the wisdom and will of God. Melanchthon frequently refers to the special work of the Holy Spirit in dealing with the penitent use of the law ranging over justification and sanctification. Typically, in the first edition of Loci Communes he contrasts the law—the will of God—with the Holy Spirit—the living will of God.

The law is the will of God; the Holy Spirit is nothing else than the living will of God and its being in action (agitatio). Therefore, once we have been regenerated by the
Spirit of God, who is the living will of God, we will spontaneously that very thing which the law used to demand.\textsuperscript{178}

In fact, when he defines the law as the will of God, he means the precept of the law, and more specifically, its accusing function. Thus, what is engraved into our hearts by the special illumination of the Holy Spirit is none other than the precept of the law which reveals our sin and accuses us. Even when he says, in the fourth way, “Christ fulfils the law by teaching,” Melanchthon still sticks to the use of the law to lead us “to repentance by disclosing our sin.”\textsuperscript{179}

6.3.2 Bucer’s Spiritual Understanding

Bucer’s commentary on Matthew 5:17-19 is quite wordy yet precise, and its scope is quite wide yet logically arranged. First he deals with three reasons why Christ gave this instruction to his disciples. He touches mainly on the significance of the fulfilment of the law and the continuity and discontinuity between the Law of Moses and the teaching of Christ. Then, he discusses Christian freedom as the fruit of the fulfilment of the law with emphasis on Christian piety. Finally, he deals with the two uses of the law which are equivalent to the first and third uses of the law in Calvin. Treating each of these themes, Bucer concentrates on how the righteousness of the law, which is fulfilled by Christ, operates in the Christian life through the Spirit of Christ.

In dealing with the three reasons, Bucer first indicates that all of the perfection of the law was accomplished by Christ, the Mediator of the new covenant. Christ restored the solid and internal righteousness of the law by his Spirit.\textsuperscript{180} Since the law was fulfilled by Christ through the work of his Spirit, it bears “the righteousness of the Spirit (iustitiam Spiritus),” and believers ought to live in “pietas

\textsuperscript{178} Loci Communes 1521, 123 [altered] (CR 21.195). Melanchthon defines the law as “the will of God (sententia Dei)” and the Decalogue as “the eternal will of God (aeterna sententia Dei)” (CR 14.581, 582).

\textsuperscript{179} CR 14.586.

\textsuperscript{180} MBEE 44a: “. . . ab admiratione externarum rerum, ad cultum solidae atque internae iustitiae suos revocare.”
solida et spiritualis." So the following is suggested as the message of Christ: “In fact, for the purpose of completing everything through the Spirit I [Christ] will give my power in abundance, delivering it from the Father, to those deserving my death.”

Regarding the second reason, Bucer emphasizes that Christ’s fulfilment of the law is “actually for the sake of our office (nostri profecto officii).” Christ encourages us towards “the desire of a more sanctified life.” He gives us an example to which we should respond by living a godly life. Bucer affirms again that Christian piety is living “relying on the Spirit of Christ.”

Bucer, treating the third reason based on v. 19, concentrates on God’s will towards his people who belong to “the kingdom of heaven,” which he calls “the Republic of the faithful which is governed by Christ the Lord with his Spirit.” Bucer identifies people who belong to the kingdom of heaven as “the Church of God (Ecclesia Dei)” and claims that they must “desire to live according to God’s will alone.”

In contrast with Melanchthon, Bucer, referring to the continuity of the law, concentrates on the character of the moral law, which he describes as “doctrina et vitae institutio.” He says that the new law of Christ in Galatians 3:19 is “the precept of the Decalogue and a series of primary orders concerning the love of neighbour.” In the same vein the judicial and ceremonial laws are regarded

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181 MBEE 44a.
182 MBEE 44b: “... tum virtutem meis per Spiritum omnia perficiendi, quem mea ipsus morte merebor, et a Patre mittam, suppeditabo.”
183 MBEE 44b.
184 MBEE 44b. According to Marijn de Kroon, for Bucer, the word pietas is the key that “proves to give access to the complex building of his theology, which impresses the reader with the abundance and richness of its thought but frequently also perplexes the interested visitor.” Bucer en Calvijn (Zoetemeer: Meinema, 1991), 93-94, quot. Selderhuis, Marriage and Divorce, 360.
185 MBEE 44b: “... regnum caelorum ... sanctorum Rempublicam, quam Christus Dominus suo Spiritu moderatur.”
186 MBEE 44b: “Magnum ergo et hoc stimulum habet ad impellendos nostras animos, quo ad Dei voluntatem vivere unice studeamus.”
187 MBEE 45a.
188 MBEE 45a: “Adhaec minima mandata intelligit, ut satis patet, quae in Mosche continentur: quae enim hic subiecit, non nova praecipita sunt, sed praecipitorum Decalogi explicationes, et primari mandati de diligendo proximo, series.”
fulfilled by Christ as "doctrina pietatis et iustitiae Dei." In his polemic against Calvin over the use of ceremonies, Bucer claims that a ceremony itself is pious if it is used humbly and those who are persuaded by the Holy Spirit that they belong to the kingdom of Christ can make use of the ceremonies in a true way. He claims that the ancient people with whom the Spirit of Christ communicated also knew the internal meaning of the ceremonial law. Therefore, there is no distinction between the Old and New Testaments as far as the substance (substantia) of the law is concerned. The difference is rather in the fact that the ancient people lived according to the law "with the immature Spirit given (donato Spiritu puerili)."

Bucer features the Spirit of Christ in its two specific aspects—Spirit of freedom and its office. The Spirit of Christ makes people free from the outward observance of the law to follow "the order (iussum) of Christ" "willingly (libere) from the Spirit of Christ." Bucer points out the theological meaning of the life of Christ the Mediator in explaining the presence of the living Spirit of Christ in the following passage with a strong rhetorical reiteration.

Christ alone fulfilled the law, and accomplishes and completes it every day among his people. He fulfilled it when he rescued the law from the haze of the Pharisees' interpretation by giving an explanation of the law, and restored it to its fine and genuine splendour. He fulfilled it when he alone expressed the law fully in his life, being made the unique perfect example of that which we all seek to emulate. He fulfilled it finally and fulfills it every day, when he gives his Spirit to us even now, which he earned by his death: by this Spirit it is pleasing and possible to live according to the law.

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189 MBEE 45b.
191 According to van’t Spijker, for Bucer, "the entire Old Testament points to Christ in a typology that is not primarily noetic but ontic." The Ecclesiastical Offices in the Thought of Martin Bucer, 40-41.
192 MBEE 46a.
In dealing with the work of the Spirit of Christ, Bucer emphasizes its character as “the Spirit of sons (Spiritus filiorum).” He particularly defines the living Spirit of Christ (Spiritus vivificans) working for the sanctification of believers as “the loving spirit of the law (legis amantem spiritum).” By the Spirit of Christ we discern what is lawful (fas) and what is unlawful (nefas) in a spiritual sense. Thus, as he puts it, “The whole law should be completed and fulfilled in us by this very Spirit of Christ.”

Bucer deals with how the whole law aims at true piety through its spiritual use. As a result, his focus is more on the continuity of the law and its use than on Christ’s fulfilment of the law as the Mediator. Bucer, regarding Christian piety, consistently refers to the work of the Spirit of Christ, but he does not give much consideration to the continuity of Christ’s mediatorship. When he says that “the reality of the internal law is the Spirit of Christ,” he is concerned with the inner dispensation of the law rather than the fact that Christ is its substance and truth. We may call this extensive spiritual use of the kerygma of Christ’s fulfilment of the law, going back to the time before the incarnation, an extra dimension of Bucer’s theology of the law.

6.3.3 Calvin’s Christological Understanding

Calvin’s commentary on Matthew 5:17-19 characteristically features his pursuit of brevity and facility in writing. It is not polemical. He mentions the Jews but not the Papists or the Anabaptists. He does not try to formulate the doctrine of

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195 MBEE 47.
196 MBEE 47b.
197 MBEE 48a: “... totam [quoque] Legem in nobis hoc ipso Spiritu Christi perficiendam impleandamque.”
198 MBEE 45b: “... res internae Legis, hoc est spiritus Christi.”
199 For Bucer’s spiritual interpretation of the Bible, see Van’t Spiker, The Ecclesiastical Offices in the Thought of Martin Bucer, 48-49, 57-58; Ganoczy and Scheld, Die Hermeneutik Calvins, 76-87.
200 Only once does Calvin polemicize against the Papists, but without noting their identity. Comm. Matt. 5: 19 (1.181-182, CO 45.173): “When Christ keeps out of His Kingdom such men as accustom others to condemn the Law, then it is a fantastic folly for them not to be ashamed of remitting, by blasphemous indulgence, the absolute demands of God, and calling them venial sins, in order to do away with the justice of the Law.”
the law, but simply pursues the intention of the author. He does not quote at all from the Letters of Paul. Only one verse is cited with theological intention, Jeremiah 31:33, which is noted for its revelation of a new covenant.

Overall, like Luther, Calvin takes the position that these words of Christ concern not the perfection of life but the perfection of teaching; thus, they are related to *quid debeat homines* rather than to *quid possint*. However, it should be noted that, in so doing, while Luther emphasizes the priority of the gospel to the law, Calvin points out the perfect revelation of the eternal truth of the law and its continual validity. He regards Christ’s fulfilment of the law as the recovery of “the whole system of religion (*totum religionis statum*)”.

In dealing with the fulfilment of the law, Calvin separates the doctrine of the law from its ceremonies. The doctrine of the law is eternal and unchangeable because it reveals “*justitia Dei*” as “*pie sancteque vivendi regula*.” On the other hand, the “practice (*usus*)” of ceremonies was abrogated although their “significance (*significatio*) was given further confirmation”; their form is lost like a “shadow,” although their “effect (*effectum*)” is sustained. When Calvin argues for the substantial unity of the law with the gospel, he refers to this eternal doctrine of the law, which reveals “*legislatoris consilium et finem*.”

Calvin, claiming the substantial (*substantialis*) unity and continuity between the law and the gospel with regard to the fulfilment of the law, seeks their link in Christ’s continual mediation of the law. He accepts the hypostasis of the Word of God as signifying Christ’s eternal sonship as the Mediator. Therefore, the differentiation between the doctrine of the law and the gospel is derived from the varying economies of Christ the Mediator in accordance with different dispensations.

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202 Comm. Matt. 5:18 (1.181, *CO* 45.172): “... the word accomplished is not related to men’s life, but to the solid truth of doctrine (*solidam doctrinae veritatem*), ...”
205 Comm. Matt. 5:19 (1.181 [altered], *CO* 45.173).
in history. As we have seen in his interpretation of the true meaning of the Sabbath, when Calvin explores the spiritual meaning of the law he takes into account that Christ still mediates for us. In conclusion, for Calvin, Christ's fulfilment of the law denotes the full revelation of the Christological meaning of the law. As he puts it:

Truly He fulfilled the deadness of the letter by reviving it with His Spirit, and eventually displaying in actual fact (re ipsa), what had till then been indicated figuratively (sub figuris).  

6.4 The Person and Work of Christ, and the Fulfilment of the Law in Calvin's Exegesis of the Gospels

6.4.1 The Manifestation of the Mediator as the Incarnate Word of God

Calvin believes that the incarnation is of great significance because through it the clear knowledge of the Son of God as the Mediator was revealed. He claims that “Jesus” signifies the revelation of the substance of the law which had been foreshadowed figuratively. The incarnation is regarded as the coming of the time for the full manifestation of the Mediator who had been promised to the ancient fathers. The other significance of the incarnation is that the church in the person (persona) of Christ is renewed (instauratur) through it.

Calvin's understanding of the Word (sermo) sheds light on our study of his position on the continual mediation of Christ. The Word is of the same essence with the God, but as “the eternal wisdom (sapientia) and will (voluntas) of God” has a hypostasis distinct from the Father. So, as proclaimed in a sermon, in the Word, “God’s plan is God.” The hypostasis of the Word denotes Christ’s mediatorship as

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208 Comm. Matt. 5: 17 (1.180, CO 45.171).
209 Comm. Lk. 1: 32 (1.24-25, CO 45.27-28).
210 Comm. Lk. 1: 31 (1.24, CO 45.27). In dealing with Christ's mediatorship, Calvin criticizes those who follow Arius and the cabbalists because they deny the lordship of Christ as Jehovah and looks upon him as an angel. Cf. Matt. 1: 21 (1.64, CO 45.64-65); Jn. 1: 1 (1.8-9, CO 47.2-3).
211 Comm. Lk. 1: 26 (1.21, CO 45.24).
213 Comm. Jn. 1: 1 (1.7-9, CO 47.1, 3).
214 Serm. Jn. 1:1-5 (20, CO 47.470-471): “... le conseil qui est en Dieu, il est vrayement Dieu.”
the Son of God. Thus, its office was revealed most significantly as “the life-giving light.”\textsuperscript{215} To the Word belongs “life united with the light of understanding (\textit{luce intelligentiae}).”\textsuperscript{216} Therefore, by the eternal Word of God the knowledge of salvation was taught even to the ancient people; and “the force and effect of this redemption, which was once displayed in Christ, were in fact shared by all generations.”\textsuperscript{217}

The peculiar property of the Word also signifies the substance and truth of the law. In the following commentary on John 1:17, “For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ,” Calvin argues that the law is the shadow of the body, but contains the truth of the body.

The Evangelist certainly means that the Law contained a mere shadowed (\textit{adumbratum}) image of spiritual blessings, but in Christ they show their wholeness (\textit{solide}). Whence it follows that if you separate the Law from Christ nothing remains in it save empty figures (\textit{inaes figurar}). This is why Paul says in Col. 2:17 that the shadow (\textit{umbras}) is in the Law, but the body (\textit{corpus}) is in Christ. But it must not be supposed that anything false was shown in the Law; for Christ is the soul (\textit{anima}) which quickens (\textit{vivificat}) what would otherwise have been dead in the Law.\textsuperscript{218}

In dealing with the life of Christ, Calvin frequently refers to Christ’s mediatorialship in order to explain his divine sonship. In commenting on the name “Immanuel,” he claims that Christ performed the office of the Mediator so that the ancient people could be united with God.\textsuperscript{219} In commenting on the transfiguration of Christ, Calvin describes him as “the only teacher (\textit{doctorem}) of the church” and “Reconciler.”\textsuperscript{220} In the following commentary on Christ’s baptism, Calvin points out his willing obedience for the sake of accomplishing his office as the Mediator. He says, “the reason for Christ’s undergoing baptism was to offer His Father full obedience, while the particular reason, was to consecrate baptism in His own body,

\textsuperscript{215} Comm. Lk. 1:78 (1.50, \textit{CO} 45.52): “... nihil esse vivificae lucis in mundo extra Christum.”
\textsuperscript{216} Comm. Jn. 1:4 (1.11 [altered], \textit{CO} 47.5).
\textsuperscript{217} Comm. Lk. 1:68 (1.45, \textit{CO} 45.46): “[Respondeo], vim et effectum huius redemptionis, quae semel in Christo fuit exhibita, saeculis omnibus fuisse communem.”
\textsuperscript{218} Comm. Jn. 1:17 (1.24-25 [altered], \textit{CO} 47.18).
\textsuperscript{219} Comm. Matt. 1:23 (1.69, \textit{CO} 45.69).
that it might be common between Him and us.”

In the same vein, Calvin comments on Christ’s circumcision, temptation in the wilderness, and many verses related to Christ’s obedience to the law. In commenting on the Beatitudes and the Lord’s Prayer, Calvin emphasizes spiritual obedience to the law through the mediation of Christ. This also refers to most narratives of Christ’s controversies relating to Jewish tradition, as I have already noted in the section that deals with Christ’s teaching on the Sabbath.

6.4.2 The Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension of Christ

As well as his commentaries, a series of Calvin’s sermons on the passion (including the resurrection) and ascension of Jesus Christ constitute good sources to gain an understanding of his position on Christ’s fulfilment of the law. Calvin sees the death of Christ as the fulfilment of his mediatorial work. In his sermon on Christ’s pronouncement in John 19:30, “It is done, all is fulfilled,” Calvin points out

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221 Comm. Matt. 3:13 (1.130, CO 45.125): “... baptismi ratio fuit Christo, ut plenum obedientiam praestaret patri: specialis autem, ut baptismum consecraret in suo ipsius corpore, ut nobis communis cum eo esset.”

222 Comm. Lk. 2:21 (1.81, CO 45.80). Calvin points out the twofold meaning of Christ’s circumcision, which is related to Christ’s obedience to the law—“God wished His Son to be circumcised that He might come under the Law, for circumcision was a solemn symbol by which Jews were initiated into the observance of the Law”—and Christ’s abrogation or fulfilment of the law—“Though its [the law’s] abrogation depends on the death and resurrection of Christ, this was something of a preliminary, that God’s Son underwent circumcision.”

223 Comm. Matt. 4:1-2 (1.133-136, CO 45.128-131). Calvin, commenting on the temptation, emphasizes Christ’s intervention for us: “Christ was tempted as the Representative (persona) of all the faithful” (135, CO 45.130).

224 Cf. Comm. Lk. 2:22-24 (1.89-90, CO 45.87-89); Lk. 2:49 (1.109, CO 45.106-107); Lk. 4:16-22 (1.146-147, CO 45.140-143); Matt. 8:4-4 (1.242-246, CO 45.230-233). For Christ’s observance of the law, see Max Dominici, L’humanité de Jésus d’après Calvin (Paris: Éditions “Je Sers,” 1933), 159-174.

225 Comm. Matt. 5:1-12 (1.168-174, CO 45.159-166). In commenting on the Beatitude, Calvin writes that “the philosophy of Christ’s disciples,” which he calls “Christ’s paradox,” is totally different from “Stoic paradoxical understanding of happiness” because the former is based on the mediation of Christ, which is taught “in the school of the cross” (169-170, 173, CO 45.161, 165). For Christ’s intercession in the Lord’s Prayer, cf. Comm. Matt. 6:9, 12 (1.206, 211, CO 45.196, 200-201).

226 “It is quite probable that Calvin preached the entire text of the Synoptic Gospels in the series of sermons” (CO 46, “Notice Preliminaire,” iii). However, only 45 sermons on the first part of the Gospels (up to Matt. 5:11, 12; Lk. 6:22-26) have remained. Notwithstanding, fortunately invaluable sermons have been preserved on the nativity, passion, and ascension of Jesus Christ our Lord along with Congrégation sur la Divinité de Jésus-Christ (CO 47.465-484), Sermons sur la Passion de Nostre Seigneur Jésus-Christ (CO 46.833-954), Sermons de l’Ascension de Nostre Seigneur Jésus-Christ (CO 48.585-622).
the fact that “He had acquitted Himself of His whole duty as Mediator.” Calvin differentiates the sacrifice of Christ on the cross as “the body (corpus)” from old sacrifices which were “shadows (umbras).” He also describes Christ the Mediator as “the Sun of righteousness (le soleil de justice), because He acquired life for us by His death.”

In his sermons on the passion of Christ, Calvin puts great emphasis on the continuous mediation of Christ. He does not see it merely as “an example and a mirror (exemple et miroir)” but concentrates on its impact upon his people “by the power of His Holy Spirit.” In order to explain this, he refers to the eucharistic theology on the bodily presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper. In the same vein, commenting on Matthew 27:51, “the veil of the temple was rent in twain,” he asserts that “as the substance of the shadows and the reality was fulfilled, all legal figures were transformed into spirit.” Also, the living sacrifice of Christ was given as a “visible (visibile)” one, but “spiritually (spiritualiter),” that through the practice of the Lord’s Supper “the Holy Spirit brings us back to what is visible in the death of Christ.” Through the action of his Spirit, the Mediator Christ becomes not only the end of the law but also the reality of its promises.

Calvin refers to the special work of the Holy Spirit in order to explain the continual presence and work of Christ as the Mediator through his resurrection and ascension. In these cases, the Holy Spirit is designated as the Spirit of Christ. The

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227 Serm. Matt. 27:45-54 (161, CO 46.924): “... qu’il s’estoit acquitte de tout devoir de Mediateur....”
232 Serm. Matt. 26:36-39 (64-65, CO 46.845); Matt. 27:45-54 (156-157, CO 46.920); Matt. 27:55-60 (175, CO 46.935).
233 Comm. Matt. 27:51 (3.211, CO 45.782): “... quia iam umbrarum substantia et veritas completa erat, figuras legales in spiritum conversas esse.”
235 Serm. Matt. 27:45-54 (156, CO 46.920).
benefit of the resurrection is that the believers can share in the body and blood of Christ through the Lord’s Supper. The benefit of his ascension is that the believers can be in communion with the Intercessor Christ. He writes:

Just as God is through all and in all things invisibly, Jesus Christ communicates Himself to us. And when we are united to Him, our souls are nourished by the substance of His body (although He is up there in heaven), but this is done by the power of faith and by the Holy Spirit. For Jesus Christ does not descend corporally.

Further, Calvin deals with the coming of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost in the light of the believer’s union with Christ, and explains it with the eucharistic theology of the bodily presence of Christ in the bread, the declaration that now we have Christ as “the Mediator in person (en personne)” by his Spirit, whereas the ancient fathers had him in various “types and shadows (figures et ombres).” By identifying the Spirit poured out on the disciples on the day of Pentecost with the Spirit by which Christ had baptized his disciples, Calvin suggests that the Spirit of Christ is the Spirit working through his mediatorial works. In commenting on the last teaching of Christ on the coming of the Holy Spirit, Calvin says that as “our Mediator and Intercessor” Christ “obtains from the Father the grace of the Spirit; but inasmuch as He is God, He bestows that grace from Himself (a se ipso).” He continues to say that the Spirit of Christ, Comforter (Paracletus), makes us believe in him as our eternal “Patron (patronus).” Then follows the commentary on Christ’s words, “Abide ye in my love”:

Some quite foolishly infer from these words that there is no efficacy in the grace of God unless it is supported by our steadfastness. I do not allow that the Spirit demands from us only what we are capable of (quae facultatis nostrae sunt). Rather, He shows us what we ought to do (quid fieri oporteat), so that if we have no strength

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243 Comm. Jn. 14:16 (2.82, CO 47.329).
we may seek it elsewhere. Likewise, when Christ here exhorts us to perseverance, we must not rely on our own efforts and industry (marte et industria), but pray to Him who commands us, to confirm us in His love.”

6.5 Conclusion

As a result of our examination, we have learned about each of the three Reformers’ unique positions on Christ’s fulfilment of the law, which are sometimes distinguished not so much by their theological stance as by the extent of their emphasis. Melanchthon persists in his gospel-centred position. Like Luther, he does not deal positively with the normative use of the law. He is concerned about the accusatory (accusans) office of the law even when he talks about the use of the law for believers. Thus, Christ’s fulfilment of the law is characterized as the fulfilment of the demand of the law itself, and Christ’s continual mediation of the law is regarded as groundless because the law is already fulfilled enough for its peculiar function to urge us to repent. In this respect, he refers to the umbra-substantia analogy of the ceremonial law even in explaining the fulfilment of the moral law.

On the other hand, Bucer deals with Christ’s fulfilment of the law, concentrating on the moral law. For him, the fulfilment of the law is none other than its spiritualization by the work of the Spirit of Christ. It signifies the inner function of the law in Christian piety. Referring to the union with Christ, Bucer emphasizes not only the communication of his grace but also the communication of his love. In this regard, Bucer’s understanding of the law is basically normative and dynamic. However, Bucer does not refer to the continual mediation of Christ in order to explain the continual validity of the law, but is concerned with the varying dispensation of the Holy Spirit. With reference to the fulfilment of the law, on the whole Bucer takes into consideration the spiritual use of the law for the people who

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244 Comm. Jn. 15:9 (2.97 [altered], CO 47.342).
245 Cf. van’t Spijker, The Ecclesiastical Offices in the Thought of Martin Bucer, 48-49: “Bucer’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit gets its prior signification from his Christology. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ and Christ alone disposes over Him. . . . Christ himself speaks, and works all things in the elect, just as he, after all, lives in them by his Spirit.”
246 In linking the working of the Holy Spirit with Christ’s mediatorship, Bucer’s focus is “more on the work than on the person of Christ.” Ibid., 39.
belong to the new covenant rather than the spiritual significance of the substantial fulfillment of the law.\textsuperscript{247}

Unlike Melanchthon and Bucer, Calvin understands Christ’s fulfillment of the law both as the clear revelation of the substance of the law and the fulfillment of its righteousness on the cross, and explains it as the manifestation of the Mediator and the fulfillment of his mediatorial office. He deals with the meaning of the life and work of Christ in the Gospels in the light of his continual mediatorship. Calvin understands the gospel not only as “the solemn proclamation of the presence of the Son of God revealed in the flesh to renew a fallen world, to restore men from death into life” but also as the good news about “Christ’s working (defunctum) out of the office of Mediator.”\textsuperscript{248} He argues that the perfect righteousness of the law is taught in the gospel because it reveals Christ as the substance of the law.\textsuperscript{249} The substance of the law does not only denote its fulfillment on the cross. As Calvin puts it, “the birth, death and resurrection of Christ contain in themselves the whole sum of our salvation, indeed are so much its substance (materia).”\textsuperscript{250} Based on this dynamic understanding of Christ’s fulfillment of the law, Calvin understands the agreement of the law and the gospel and the character of the law as the whole system of religion.

Calvin asserts the continuity between the Word of God and the word of Christ, not merely on an ethical basis, as Schellong observes, but substantially (\textit{substantialiter}), on the basis of the continuity of the person and work of Christ the Mediator. It is true that Calvin emphasizes the historical presence of Christ, and

\textsuperscript{247} Cf. Cornelis Graafland, “Alter und neuer Bund: Calvins Auslegung von Jeremia 31, 31-34 und Hebräer 8, 8-13,” in Reformiertes Erbe: Festschrift für Gottfried W. Locher zu seinem 80. Geburtstag, vol. 2 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1993), 135-145. According to the author, in dealing with the old and new covenants, Calvin emphasizes the unity between the substance of the law with that of the gospel by relating it to the unity between the Old and New Testaments, whereas Melanchthon points out the abrogation of the law as he explains the revelation of the gospel, Bullinger underscores the difference between the old and new covenants by referring especially to the temporality of the Old Testament law although he maintains their continuity, and Bucer focuses on the universal aspect of the law as he explores its spiritual meaning.


\textsuperscript{249} Comm. Matt. 5:21 (1, 83, CO 45.174).

\textsuperscript{250} “The Theme of the Gospel of Jesus Christ,” \textit{CNTC} 1.xii (CO 45.2).
sometimes the independence of his humanity, but this cannot be ascribed totally to the influence of the school of Antioch as Witte maintains. Calvin understands the unity of the person of Christ in the light of his own concept of the *communicatio idiomatum*, by which he explains the co-operation of the two natures on the basis of the so-called *extra Calvinisticum*.

In exploring the *hypostasis* of Christ from the perspective of the dynamic of his mediatorial office, Calvin refers to the properties of the Word of God, which he presents both as the counsel of God and as the life-giving light. These two demonstrate the property of *Deus manifestatus in carne* both as interpreter and as fulfilment of the law. For Calvin, the fact that Christ is the substance of the law is always taken into consideration together with the fact that the law is the expression of the will of God. As the Mediator of the law, Christ not only reveals, teaches, and fulfils the will of God, but he also reveals himself and fulfils his own office as the second person of the Trinity.
CHAPTER VII

LEX DEI REGULA VIVENDI ET VIVIFICANDI: CALVIN’S DYNAMIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE OFFICE AND USE OF THE LAW

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, we examined the relationship between Christ and the law in Calvin’s theology in the light of the fact that Christ is the Mediator of the law. Our main focus was the revelation of the presence of Christ in the law and its representation of him in the Old Testament and Christ’s interpretation and fulfilment of the law in the Four Gospels. These themes reflect Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law most distinctively, characterized as both Christ in the law and the law in Christ.

Now I will examine the soteriological significance of the law in Calvin’s theology, that is, Christ’s mediation of the law for justification and sanctification, described by Calvin as the communication of the righteousness of Christ, who is the head of the church. In treating this subject, I will concentrate on the office and use of the law with reference to Calvin’s own understanding of the double grace of God to accept both our persons and our imperfect works as righteous by imputing Christ’s righteousness to us.

As we see from the debate between Melanchthon and Agricola over poenitentia, the sixteenth century Lutheran controversies over the law featured the necessity of the law for vera poenitentia and the compatibility between the principle of justificatio sola fide and the enduring validity of the law for the Christian life. In spite of their different positions, they finally came to the agreement that the law still works for the regenerate, yet, without discarding their assumption that lex semper
accusat. They consequently acknowledged the normative use of the law for the faithful in a negative sense of continual repentance.

On the other hand, Calvin deals with the office and use of the law in the light of the continual mediation of Christ for justification and sanctification. He distinguishes the nature (natura) of the law clearly from the natural (naturalis) use of the law. Since the fall, the law plays its natural role to accuse and convict sinners in order to restrain them. However, the law, as the law of the covenant, plays its theological role to teach people the righteousness of God so that they may long for Christ as Saviour and be led to eternal life. Calvin explains the double grace of God with an emphasis on the normative nature of the law and Christ’s mediation in the whole process of salvation.

When we pay very close attention to Calvin’s consistent reference to the normative nature of the law for the explanation of the theological background of the threefold use of the law, we can reach the true understanding of his view of the office and use of the law and evade the false argument of Lutheran theologian such as Elert, who claimed that Calvin is ignorant of the theological use of the law—lex accusans—and concentrates only on the moral aspect of the law, the law as the rule of a right and godly living.\(^1\)

In the following, I will first deal with Calvin’s normative understanding of the nature of the law as lex vivendi. Then, I will deal with how the law, lex vivendi, works as lex accusans and lex vivificandi in the whole process of salvation, giving primary attention to the relation between Calvin’s dynamic understanding of the law based on Christ’s mediation and his dynamic understanding of salvation based on his doctrine of union with Christ. In treating this subject, I will compare his position with those of his contemporary Reformers whose great influence upon him he mentions in the preface of his commentary on Romans—Melanchthon, Bullinger, and Bucer. Also, I will refer to Luther’s view of the office and use of the law in order to pursue the theological foundations of these Reformers. Finally, I will interpret the

\(^{1}\) Elert, Law and Gospel, 7, 11.
threefold use of the law in Calvin’s *Institutes* 2.7.6-13 from his unique perspective on the twofold office of the law examined in the previous sections.

### 7.2 Lex Dei Regula Vivendi: Calvin’s Understanding of the Normative Nature of the Law

According to Calvin the law consists of the Ten Commandments, which is the rule of godly and righteous living, and of a form of religion on which the Mosaic Law was founded, that is the covenant of grace made with the seeds of Abraham (*Inst* 2.7.1, *CO* 2.252). As the promulgation of the rule of a just and pious life, which was initially delivered to Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, the Ten Commandments enforce “the perfect doctrine of piety and righteousness,” which signifies the moral law as a whole. Calvin distinguishes the moral law from the ceremonial and political law, but he maintains that the ceremonies supplement the rule of pious life, which is characterized by “the spiritual worship” in the First Table, and the political laws related to the Second Table help us with living according to “the rule of a good and upright life.”

As the rule of life, the truth of the law is eternal, but since the fall people have lost their ability to live according to it. Originally the law was good and perfect, but it “accidentally (accidentale) became the minister of death.” With the coming of sin into the world, the office of the law, without diminishing its nature as *lex vivendi*, was transformed to play a theological role for the salvation of God’s people. As Calvin puts it in his sermon on Ephesians, after stating that the Decalogue is the summary and perfection of the Christian life, which is persuaded by faith (related to

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3 Comm. Gen. 2:16 (125, *CO* 23.44): “... the only rule of living well and rationally (*unica bene et cum ratione vivendi regula*), that men should exercise themselves in obeying God.”


the instruction of the First Table) and illuminated by love (related to the instruction of the Second Table), the life submitted to the instruction of the moral law is to look towards Christ the Mediator who is the express image of God. In the same vein, in his sermon on the Synoptic Gospels, Calvin argues that the Decalogue regulates the rule of worshipping God and loving neighbours in the firm conviction of the reconciling grace of Christ, and that the truth and substance of the law are embodied in the mediatorial office of Christ.

Throughout his works, Calvin puts a balanced emphasis upon the normative and theological office and use of the law. He accuses people who advocate free will, asserting that the law (or the whole Bible) is nothing other than “a rule of living” (Inst 2.5.7, CO 2.235). They are criticized for adhering to “the natural use of the law (l’usage naturel)” working merely as a bridle to hold back our wicked desires and lusts. The use of the law which is taken into theological consideration may not correspond to the natural use of the law in punishment, which Calvin deals with in his commentary on De clementia.

According to Calvin, the theological use of the law for the conversion and continual nurturing of the human soul is related to the restoration of the image of God (Inst. 1.15.1-8, CO 2.134-143). Although the conditionality of the law was overcome by the death of Christ, its peculiar normative feature as lex vivendi continues to work as the criterion by which we should judge good from evil. He writes:

Although the Law is a testimony of God’s gratuitous adoption, and teaches that salvation is based upon His mercy, and invites men to call upon God with assured faith, yet it has this peculiar property, that it covenants conditionally (sub conditione paciscitur).

In this passage Calvin does not relate the word “conditio” to the merit of our good works, but underscores the validity of the righteousness of the law still working

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7 Serm. Eph. 1:15 (84-87, CO 51.312-315).
9 Serm. 1 Tim. 1:7 (44b-45a, CO 53.47-48).
10 Clem. 143.20-21.
in spite of the promise of the gratuitous grace of Christ in the divine covenant. In fact, the conditionality of the covenant rests on the mutuality between the precept and promise of the law. Therefore, “conditio” means the way in which the law, as lex vivendi, works for the salvation of people as lex accusans by making them look for the grace of Christ in “reverence and fear (reverentia et timor).”

The law regulates quid debeant homines, but not quid possint. As Calvin puts it in the 1536 Institutes, “in God’s law we must have regard not for the work but for the commandment” (1.28, CO 1.46). The law regulates not “our might, power, or ability, but our duties.” Notwithstanding, what the law requires of us is the righteousness accommodated to angels and to his people. The law reveals not only God’s will towards his people, that they ought to live a right and holy life according to the instruction of the law, but also the “eternity, power, wisdom, goodness, truth, righteousness, and mercy” of the lawgiver (1536 Inst. 1.1, CO 1.27).

From the proper understanding of the relationship between these two aspects of the law, each of which represents the precept and promise of the law individually, we can realize that Calvin points out the fact that the righteousness of the law reveals the eternal will of God towards our salvation when he proclaims in his first catechism, “In God’s law is given the most perfect rule of all righteousness, which is for the best of reasons to be called the Lord’s everlasting will.” Thus, the law is not “a preliminary (tirocinium) to true righteousness” but “the beginning (initium) of righteousness.” It is surely the case that the righteousness of the law, in Calvin’s judgment, should be differentiated from the higher righteousness (iustice plus haute) of God. The law itself does not reveal the secret providence of God, but points to the double grace of God for justification and sanctification. With reference to

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14 “... in lege Dei non opus respiendi, sed mandatum.”
16 First Catechism 11 (CO 5.327).
justification, the righteousness of the law instructs people on the principle of the righteousness of faith by revealing the eternal righteousness of God accomplished by his Son Christ the Mediator.\textsuperscript{19} Likewise, with reference to sanctification, the righteousness of the law denotes that one who is in union with Christ ought to live according to the instruction of the law through the continual communication of his righteousness.\textsuperscript{20}

In dealing with "the grace of the law" in his sermon on Deuteronomy, Calvin explains the significance of the righteousness of the law for the whole process of salvation in three ways. First, he is concerned with the normative aspect of the law: Men should keep the whole corpus of the law; Since men cannot meet the perfect righteousness of the law because of their sinfulness, God gave his Son whom he had decreed as a remedy before the publication of the law; In the grace of Christ God receives their life and their imperfect works as righteous.\textsuperscript{21} Then, he takes into consideration the righteousness of the law in view of the promise of the law: The law regulates not what men can do, but what they ought to do; The law, however, teaches that the promise of the law refers to the continual mediation of Christ both for justification and for sanctification; Therefore, men who are in union with Christ by the communication of the Spirit of Christ can live according to the law and this leads to eternal life.\textsuperscript{22} The first two aspects of the righteousness of the law are based on the fact that the law is the law of the covenant: The righteousness of the law is subject to the unconditional mercy of God in the covenant of grace; Even the promise which is conditional rests on the fatherly love of God; Therefore, the reward of good works is due to the grace of God who receives our imperfect works as righteous.\textsuperscript{23}

As observed, Calvin deals with the nature of the law very positively as the rule of life. With regard to the knowledge of the law, he emphasizes God's

\textsuperscript{19} Comm. Rom. 10:4-5 (222-224, \textit{CO} 49.196-198).
accommodating grace to reveal his own righteousness through the law, instead of inducing fear of his punishment. As the rule of a pious and upright life, the law plays its theological role in the whole process of salvation. Thus, according to Calvin, the perception of the normative nature of the law should be placed prior to the knowledge of its theological use for justification as *lex accusans* and for sanctification as *lex vivificandi*, by which he understands the use of the law for the believer’s perfection in eternal life.

7.3 The Office and Use of the Law

7.3.1 Luther: *Lex Semper Accusat*

In his treatise, *The Freedom of a Christian*, Luther strictly distinguishes between “commandments and promises,” and argues like Calvin that the commandments show not what we can do but what we ought to do. He does not admit that the promise of the law works in the process of salvation, and writes: “Repentance proceeds from the law of God, but faith or grace from the promise of God. . . . Accordingly man is consoled and exalted by faith in the divine promise after he has been humbled and led to a knowledge of himself by the threats and the fear of the divine law.” Since Luther does not acknowledge the promise of the law, he equates the righteousness of the law working in the process of justification with the merit of the works of the law, and differentiates it from “Christ’s righteousness,” which he calls “alien righteousness,” i.e., “the righteousness of another, instilled from without” in a sermon of Palm Sunday (1519) entitled *Two kinds of Righteousness.* The reason why Luther was so critical of the positive use of the law

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25 *Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings*, ed. Timothy F. Lull (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989. hereafter Luther), 600: “. . . the commandments show us what we ought to do but do not give us the power to do it.”
26 Luther, 601: “. . . the promises of God belong to the New Testament. Indeed, they are the New Testament.”
27 Luther, 616.
28 Luther, 155. 157.
in his early works was that he based his argument on the clear distinction between Christ’s righteousness and the righteousness of the law. Luther declares in his *Heidelberg Disputation* article 1, “The law of God, the most salutary doctrine of life, cannot advance man on his way to righteousness, but rather hinders him.”

Luther sustained his view of the twofold use of the law throughout his life although in a few places he mentions the use of the law in the life of a Christian. As Ebeling observes, for Luther “the absolute center of gravity is located in the usus theologicus, which really alone deserves to be called usus legis,” and “the distinction of law and Gospel encroaches on the doctrine of the usus legis.” In his 1519 and 1535 Galatians commentaries, Luther consistently points out the negative office of the law that it gives rise to the fear of punishment in order to explain the two uses of the law. In his commentary on Galatians 4:3, he writes:

... the Law is a custodian, because, since the letter of the Law compels the unwilling to do its works for fear of punishment, it compels them at the same time to acknowledge this reluctance and to run to Christ, who gives the spirit of freedom.

Like Calvin, Luther interprets “an intermediary” in Galatians 3:19 as Christ, but he does not mention Christ’s mediation of the law, but indicates that he is “the Mediator of a better covenant.” He concludes that this verse says that we are led to Christ the Mediator by our consciousness of the fact that there is nothing more “hateful,” “odious,” and “intolerable” than the law.

In his commentary on Galatians 3:20, Luther merely emphasizes Christ’s abolition of the wrath of the law. He writes:

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29 Luther, *Disputation against Scholastic Theology*, esp. 18-19 (articles 70-89), and *Heidelberg Disputation*, esp. 30-49 (theological theses 1-28).
30 Luther, 33-34.
31 In Ebeling, “On the Doctrine of the Triplex Usus Legis,” 62-65, Luther is said to have clearly taught the usus triplex legis at the conclusion of his Second Disputation against the Antinomians (1538): “Why should the law be taught? The law is to be taught for the sake of discipline ... that by this pedagogy men might come to Christ. ... Secondly, the law is to be taught in order to expose sin. ... Thirdly, the law is to be retained so that the saints may know which works God requires” (*WA* 391, 485). However, according to Elert, these sentences represent a forgery from Melanchthon’s 1535 *Loci Communes. Law and Gospel*, 38-39.
33 *LW* 27.286.
34 *LW* 27.271-272, 319.
35 *LW* 27.320.
That Mediator is Jesus Christ. He does not change the sound of the Law, as Moses did; nor does He cover it with a veil or lead me away from a view of the Law. But He sets Himself against the wrath of the Law and abolishes it; in His own body and by Himself He satisfies the Law.36

Then, he concludes:

Therefore the Law cannot do anything except that with its light it illuminates the conscience for sin, death, judgment, and the hate and wrath of God... Therefore the principal purpose of the Law in theology is to make men not better but worse; that is, it shows them their sin, so that by the recognition of sin they may be humbled, frightened, and worn down, and so may long for grace and for the Blessed Offspring.”37

Like Calvin, Luther has the conception that apart from the matter of justification, the law is “holy, righteous, good, spiritual, divine, etc.”38 However, he does not admit the grace of the law in its normative use for the Christian life because he believes that those who are regenerated by the Holy Spirit may live with the living faith (fides viva), not having to rest on the instruction of the law.39 Luther finds no room for the positive aspect of Christ’s mediation of the law, but only his annulment of its slavery. Accordingly, he can find no use for the continual validity of the law in the Christian life, particularly with reference to its theological use. Luther’s basic assumption is applicable to the whole process of salvation, that “the Law and Christ are mutually contradictory and altogether incompatible.”40

7.3.2 Melanchthon: From Lex Accusans to Lex Vivendi

Melanchthon’s debate with Agricola over poenitentia was evoked by the first statement of Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses (1517): “the entire life of believers to be one of repentance (poenitentia).”41 Along with the motto established in the Apology

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36 LW 27.325.
37 LW 27.327.
38 LW 27.365 (Galatians 4:3).
40 LW 27.366.
41 Luther, 21. In the same vein, in his work Discussion of Poenitentia (1518) Luther proclaims that “the best poenitentia is the new life.” Quot. Wengert, Law and Gospel, 16.
to the Augsburg Confession, “lex semper accusat,” this very comprehensive statement prompted the early Lutheran theologians to raise questions about the theological use of the law concerning continual repentance in the whole process of salvation.

Melanchthon was faithful to the sequence of lex-poenitentia-fides. He argued that the knowledge of the law is necessary for repentance, without which faith is nothing but a foolish dream. Agricola adhered to the sequence of fides-poenitentia. He allowed no room for the concept of legal repentance because he believed that faith should precede repentance and thus no theological use of the law should be proposed in evangelical repentance.

Agricola asserts that what makes people repent (poenitentiam agere) is not the office of the law, but the faith of people who are in fear (“fides minarum”). God’s people love his righteousness and live according to his will because they are illuminated by “the spontaneous Spirit of Christ.” Therefore, the regenerate should not turn to the instruction of the law when seeking the accomplishment of their righteousness any more. This position is very similarly to Luther’s early polemical position on the law.

On the other hand, Melanchthon derives legal repentance from the concept of the righteousness of the law, and distinguishes it from evangelical repentance. Three facts are considered with reference to the righteousness of the law: We are justified by perfect obedience to the law; No one can satisfy the demand of the law;

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44 Wengert, Law and Gospel, 23, 79. This view is presented precisely in Melanchthon’s Latin version of the Visitatio Articles of 1527, his catechism called Etliche Sprüche, and Scholium in Epistolam Pauli ad Colossenses, published in 1527, 1528, and 1534.
45 Ibid., 18-22. This view is well presented in Agricola’s catechisms called Elementa pietatis congesta: Christliche Kinderzucht and Hendert dreiflig gemeine Fragestücke, and Die Epistel an die Colosser S. Pauls published in 1527.
46 Ibid., 90-93, 126-138.
47 Girardin, Rhétorique et Théologique, 339.
Therefore, the law should be fulfilled by someone else instead of us. With the perception of the righteousness of the law, according to Melanchthon, we are led to legal repentance, and then with the true and living faith we are led to evangelical repentance.48 As Melanchthon puts it, in his scholia to Exodus 20 (1525), “The knowledge of the law is absolutely necessary because we cannot discover nor experience the gospel in our hearts without it!”49

Melanchthon acknowledges the wide use of the law in the process of salvation, but as he maintains the use of the law for continual repentance in the Christian life, which acts independently from the working of the gospel, he sustains his negative view of the nature of the law as lex semper accusans. He understands the first two uses of the law as being “to coerce the flesh and to terrify the conscience (cohere cere carnem et terrere conscientiam),”50 and the third use of the law as the application of the first two uses of the law to the Christian life, that is, the legal instructions for good works and its impact upon daily penance rather than to the teaching and exhortation of the law in seeking a godly life.

Melanchthon discusses the threefold use of the law for the first time in his 1534 Scholia on Colossians.51 He writes: “God gave the law for these three reasons: to coerce the flesh and to terrify or humble. The third reason pertains to the righteous, that they may practice obedience (ad cohere cere carnem, et ad ter rendum seu humiliandum. Tertia ad iustos pertinet, ut exerceant obedientiam).”52 He develops the normative use of the law for the believer on the basis of the double grace of God to justify both our person and our imperfect obedience.53 He is keen to link the third

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49 Ibid., 71.
50 Ibid., 91-93, 101.
51 In his second lecture on Paul’s letter to the Colossians 2:17 (1527), Melanchthon explicitly declares his view of the twofold use of the law—“to keep the fleshly man under control” and “to inspire fear, to condemn us and to humble us.” Melanchthon, Paul’s Letter to the Colossians, tr. D. C. Parker (Sheffield: The Almond Press, 1989), 65-66. The same view also appears in his commentary on Colossians 2:20, ibid., 68-69.
52 Wengert, Law and Gospel, 195-196. The phrase “exerceant obedientiam” is also found in Loci Communes 1535 (CR 21.406), 1543 (CR 21.719), and 1555 (CR 22.255).
53 Ibid., 179-191, quot. 182.
use to the Christian freedom to willingly obey God's will. However, he fails to understand the third use of the law in terms of its dynamic relation to the continual mediation of Christ. He is more concerned about the function of conscience than the believer's communication with the grace of Christ when he deals with the office of the law.

Although there is no specific place which directly refers to the threefold use of the law, Melanchthon's commentary on Romans (1532) presents us with its theological foundation very systematically. Melanchthon concentrates on the law's role in repentance, which he defines as to realize God's wrath and punishment, through this to come to the state of true confession and contrition, and to give up our merit and the righteousness of good works. For the sake of repentance, according to him, the law serves merely as a voice accusing us of our sins ("vox legis accusantis nos") and reveals no promise.

In dealing with the use of the law in the process of repentance, Melanchthon often refers to the inner judgment of conscience that works prior to faith and expresses his negative view of the law by adhering to the dictum, which is derived from a principle of common law, that "the law reveals, but does not remove sin (Lege tantum ostendi peccatum, non tolli)." He thinks that the "duplex usus" is common to the whole law including the Mosaic law but natural law, which he defines as follows: "the first is political, to coerce carnal men outwardly, and the second pertains to the judgment of God and to conscience, that is to accuse and frighten conscience." In the same vein, in dealing with the second use of the law (the theological use)

54 Ibid., 198.
55 CR 15.581: "Hic ergo cum fatetur Prophetæ se esse peccatorem, et addit exclusivam, tantum, abicit dignitatem propriae, agnoscit se habere immunditiem pugnante cum lege Dei, ac se reum esse ac meruit iram Dei et poenas. Haec confessio quid sit, in vera contritione piæ experiuntur. In his pavoribus excutiur arrogantia et fiducia propriae dignitatis, seu iusticiae legis."
56 CR 15.582.
57 Melanchthon regards the conscience as the place in which we realize God's redemptive and reconciling grace (CR 15.587). He argues that "conscience is erected by faith when in faith it recognizes the mercy of God (conscientia fide erecta, cum agnivit misericordiam fide propositam)." (CR 15.593)."
58 CR 15.585: "... alter est politicus, scilicet foris coercere homines carnales. ... Alter usus non est politicus, sed pertinet ad iudicium Dei et ad conscientiam, scilicet accusare et perterrefacere conscientiam."
throughout the editions of his *Loci Communes*, Melanchthon devotes most passages to the exposition of the inner judgment of the law focused on the fear and terror of the conscience, but gives no direct statement on the office of the law to make people to look for Christ as their Mediator. Likewise, he claims that Galatians 3:24 points to the first use of the law and pays more attention to the word “schoolmaster” than to the words “unto Christ.”

Just as Melanchthon refers to the fear of judgment arising in the conscience in order to explain the second use of the law, so he does likewise in order to explain the third use of the law for the continual repentance of the believer. Commenting on sanctification in Romans 6, he argues that mortification without faith is terror, but the terror of God’s children, which is accompanied by faith and the knowledge of Christ, will make them worship God and do good works. When Melanchthon says, “Truly the beginning of the new and eternal life is new and spiritual obedience,” he is concerned mainly with the power of the gospel rather than with the normative use of the law.

As noted in his commentary on the phrase, “*lex efficit iram,*” in Romans 4:15, Melanchthon differentiates “*promissio legis*” from “*promissio gratiae,*” and thinks that the former only signifies God’s reward for good works, whereas the latter contains the core of the gospel. So he argues that the promise of the law works solely to lead us to repentance. He believes that the promise of the law is related to the righteousness of the law, and the promise of grace to Christ the Mediator. He points out freedom from the bondage of the law and voluntary obedience to the law in relation to the normative use of the law, but for him the law still serves to evoke not the grace of God but the fear of God (*timor dei*). In conclusion, for Melanchthon, like

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60 CR 15.636: “… mortificatio sine fide est terror … terrores cum fide et notitia Christi, sunt timor filialis seu vera contritio, et flunt cultus Dei et bonum opus: …”
61 CR 15.635: “*Incoatio vere novae et aeternae vitae est nova et spiritualis obedientia.*”
62 CR 15.603-604.
the first two uses of the law, the third use also indicates an aspect of *lex accusans*. The vital difference to remember is that the first two uses of the law signify God’s works through the power of the law, but the third use signifies our works through the norm of the law.\(^63\) This feature shows the shift of Melanchthon’s emphasis, from *lex accusans* to *lex vivendi*.

### 7.3.3 Bullinger: From *Lex Vivendi* to *Lex Accusans*

Because Bullinger explores the nature of the law in terms of its relation to the office and use of the law from the standpoint of his covenantal theological understanding, I will here deal with his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount\(^64\) where he mainly refers to the original meaning of the law and its continuity between the Old and New Testaments, along with his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans\(^65\) and with his great sermons called *Decades*.\(^66\)

Concerning the nature of the law in his commentary on Matthew, Bullinger points out the perpetual validity of the precepts of the law for all the people in the old and new covenants.\(^67\) As he puts it,

> The law of God is the perpetual and best will of God, written by this finger of God and explained and published to the people through Moses, by which all human beings would know the will of God (what they should do in their whole life and

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\(^{64}\) Bullinger, *In Sacrosanctum Jesu Christi Domini nostri Evangelium secundum Matthaeum* (1546, Zürich, hereafter *HBEM*). Cf. Parker, *Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries*, 71-72, 226. Bullinger confessed in his *Diarium* that he had been nourished by Chrysostom’s Homilies on Matthew and what Jerome wrote on Matthew, the writings of Ambrose, Origen, and Augustine, along with Luther’s major theological tracts and especially Philip Melanchthon’s first edition of his *Loci Communes*.

\(^{65}\) Bullinger gave lectures on the Epistle to the Romans twice, in Kappel (1526) and in Zürich (1533). Here I use his second lecture *Commentarii in omnes Pauli Apostoli Epistolatas, atque etiam in Epistolam ad Hebraeos* (Zürich, 1582, hereafter *HBPE*), which was originally published in 1534. This publication was followed by that of his book *De testamento seu foedere Dei unico et aeterno* which was published in the same year (1534). Cf. Büsser, “Bullinger as Calvin’s Model in Biblical Exposition,” 70-71.


\(^{67}\) *HBEM* 8.178b: “Lex vero perpetua est, omni tempore valens, et omnibus hominibus praecepta vitae praescribens.”
Bullinger calls the eternal will of God revealed in the law the righteousness of the law, which prescribes not only the eternal decree of God’s salvation but also the divine norm of life. He states:

The law was first enacted by the Lord in order that it may set before our eyes sin and the kind of people we are by nature, lead us to Christ through this way as a teacher, and order the duties of life. Therefore, those who learn by the law that they are sinners and unjust people, and have no trust in their own strength catch the true and genuine sense of the law and are converted to Christ whom the law promised.

Bullinger believes that the “marrow (medullam),” “end (finem),” and “spirit (spiritum)” of the law were already revealed to the ancient fathers in the era of the Old Testament, even though they were not communicated with “the liberal and spontaneous Spirit of Christ.” He especially emphasizes the work of the Spirit of Christ in order to explain the fulfilment of the righteousness of the law for the whole process of salvation. He comments:

[However] the Spirit of Christ, who is conferred on believers through their faith, does not release a person from the law but subjects him to it: so that he should furnish obedience to God not as compelled (that people under the law are used to be) but as spontaneous and free. Thus, a Christian fulfills the law, but through Christ and in the Spirit of Christ.

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68 HLEM 3.54b: “Lex enim dei est perpetua et optima dei voluntas, in hoc digito dei exarata et exposita per Mosen vulgataque, quo omnes homines dei voluntatem (quid in omni vita sua faciant, et quid omittant) cognoscant, et cognitam faciant, id est, toti ab ea pendentes ita ut deus praescripsit vivant.” A similar definition of the law is found in Heinrich Bullinger, Sermom decades quinque, de potissimis Christianae religionis capitibus, in tres tomus digestae, vol. 2 (Zürich, 1572, hereafter Decades), 2.1.36a: “Lex aliud non est quam declaratio divinae voluntatis, praescribens quid facias aut quid omissas.”

69 HLEM 3.54b: “... totius vitae regula et faciendorum omittendorumque formula.”

70 HLEM 3.56a: “Est autem lex lata a domino, primum quidem ut peccatum et quales natura simus ob oculos statuat, et per hunc modum ceu paedagogus ad Christum deducat: deinde ut officia vitae praescirbat. Velem ergo et genuinum legis sensum capiunt, qui ex lege peccatores et inustos sese esse cognoscunt, ac ideo de suis diffisi viribus, ad eum convertuntur quem lex promisit Christum.”

71 HLEM 3.55a-55b.

72 HLEM 3.54b: “[Sed] et spiritus Christi, qui confertur per fidem credentibus, legi dei non eximit hominem, sed subdit: non ut coacta (quod solent qui sub lege sunt) sed spontanea et libera deo obsequia praestet. Complet itaque legem homo Christianus, sed per Christum et in spiritu Christi.”
Therefore, in those who have not the Spirit of Christ and walk according to flesh, in them not even justification of the law is fulfilled.\textsuperscript{73}

Consequently, the Christian’s fulfilment of the righteousness of the law is the embodiment of the righteousness of Christ which works through the work of his Spirit.\textsuperscript{74}

The impact of this understanding of the nature of the law based on the promise in the covenant of grace is well demonstrated in Bullinger’s understanding of the threefold use of the law which is explored in the eighth sermon of the third decade of sermons (1550). What he calls “\textit{praecipuum et proprium legis officium}” is similar to the second use of the law in Luther and Melanchthon, but more positive and comprehensive. He argues that apart from convicting us of our sins, the law describes the true and absolute righteousness of God in the doctrine of justification. In this sense, he says, it takes up the office of the gospel. Referring to Galatians 3:24, “the law was our schoolmaster,” he affirms that the law leads us to Christ the Saviour and declares “Christ and life in Christ (\textit{Christum et in ipso vitam}).” The law teaches the holy will of God as a whole, i.e., “not only the basic principles of righteousness but also the very true and absolute righteousness (\textit{non tyracinia tantum iustitiae, sed ipsam veram et absolutam iustitiam}).” Further, he mentions the pedagogical function of the ceremonies of the law to reveal Christ and his mysteries as a guide and schoolmaster (\textit{ductio et paedagogia}).\textsuperscript{75}

Bullinger’s second use of the law is similar to Calvin’s third use. Like Calvin, he points out the use of the law as the rule of a godly and upright life. The law teaches “\textit{quid sequantur vel quid fugiant iustificati in fide per Christum, et quomodo pii rite colant deum}.” Citing many passages from Psalms, Bullinger stresses that the precepts of the law are also applied “for the exhortation and consolation (\textit{exhortationem et consolationem})” of the regenerate. Thus, this normative office of

\textsuperscript{73} HBEM 3.54b-55a: “... ergo in quibus nullus Christi spiritus est, et qui secundum carnem ambulant, in iis nulla etiam legis iustificatio impletur.”

\textsuperscript{74} HBEM 3.56a: “Christus ergo est iustitia Christianorum, et communicat hic nobiscum iustitiam suam per fidem: unde apostoli appellarunt etiam fidem iustitiam Christianorum. Simul autem per fidem datur nobis spiritus Christi quo regeneramur.”

\textsuperscript{75} Decades 3.8.136a-137b.
the law encompasses “doctrinam perfectissimam et fidei in Deum et omnium bonorum operum.” Then, what Bullinger calls the third use of the law, which is “coercere petulantes,” is similar to the first use of the law in Luther. However, unlike Luther and Melanchthon, the negative office of the law to give rise to the fear of punishment is related only to its political use. He quotes I Timothy 1:9, “the law is good if one uses it properly,” as the most relevant verse, like Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin.

Bullinger’s interpretation of the role of paedagogus in Galatians 3:24 demonstrates his understanding of the office and use of the law based on the continual grace of the divine covenant. The law teaches not only the gratuitous grace of Christ for our justification but also the godly life according to the inspiration of the “liberating and spontaneous Spirit of Christ,” which he equates to “the spirit of the law (spiritus legis).” In his Romans commentary, he describes the righteousness of the law as “the mind of the law (mens legis),” by which the law teaches and inspires “pietatem, fidem, innocentiam et charitatem.” He particularly shows his strict antipathy to the merit of the works of the law for justification, but he does not deny the fact that the office of the law to reveal the rule of life precedes the accusing role of the law in the process of justification. Bullinger refers to the fact that the law is the expression of God’s will towards his people, which is represented by the restoration of the image of God in relation to the third use of the law in Calvin, for explaining the first use of the law. Bullinger’s covenantal understanding of the law is clearly shown when he asserts that although as the declaration of God’s will the law was revealed to the ancient fathers, if there is no death of Christ, there is no

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76 Decades 3.8.137b-138a.
77 Decades 3.8.138a.
79 HBPE 23, 46.
80 HBPE 26-27: “. . . the whole righteousness and works of ours are like the rag of a menstruous woman (omnes iustitiae vel opera nostra sicut pannus mulieris menstruatae).” This expression is inspired by the phrase in Latin Vulgate Isaiah 64:6, “filthy rags (NIV, vestimentum inquinatum, Calvin).” In the Institutes, Calvin quotes this Vulgate translation from Bernard of Clairvaux (3.2.25).
revelation of God's will.\textsuperscript{81}

7.3.4 Bucer's Holistic Understanding of Lex Vivendi and Lex Accusans

Bucer's commentary on Romans (1536) along with his commentary on the Synoptic Gospels (1527, 1530, 1536) is of capital importance in revealing his theology of the law.\textsuperscript{82} Bucer's position on the law in these two commentaries is consistent although the latter concentrates more on the original meaning of the law and the continuity of the substance of the law in the Old and New Testaments than the former where he stresses the relationship between the law and the Gospel, and on the continual validity of the law in justification and sanctification. Although Bucer's commentary is holistic and sometimes "too verbose to be read quickly," basically he is faithful to the text and gives very precise and refined presentations on \textit{loci theologici maiores}.\textsuperscript{83} Just as we can call Calvin's \textit{Institutes} "an extended commentary on Romans,"\textsuperscript{84} we may consider Bucer's commentary on Romans to be a small \textit{Institutes} of the Christian religion, even though it is relatively weak in its doctrine of the church and civil government.

In his commentary on Romans, Bucer explains his dynamic view of the office and use of the law from the concept of the righteousness of God (\textit{iustitia dei}). Expounding Romans 1:17, he underscores that Christ does not only give us new life, but pours his Spirit into our heart to live according to the teaching of the law with the eager desire for true and solid righteousness. The righteousness of God, therefore, embraces the concept of "the just and justifying God (\textit{deus et iustus et iustificans})."\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{HBPE} 45: "Per legem autem nolim intelligas voluntatem Dei, sed id quod legis indicio agnoscat, peccatum. Hoc enim beneficio mortis Christi extinctum iacet."


\textsuperscript{83} "John Calvin to Simon Grynaeus," \textit{CNTC} 8.3 (CO 10/2.404).

\textsuperscript{84} Battles, \textit{Calculus Fidei}, 145.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Metaphrasis et enarratio in epist. D. Pauli apostoli ad Romanos . . .} (Basileae, 1562, hereafter \textit{MBER}), 50-51. This book was originally published as a part of \textit{Metaphrases et enarrations perpetuae epistolarum D. Pauli Apostoli . . .} (Strasbourg, 1536).
Citing Augustine’s words, “Bona opera sequi iustificatum, non praecedere iustificandum,” Bucer gives an account of the triplex iustitia inspired by “the three kinds of eternal life.” The first righteousness is to receive eternal life by the merit of Christ, the second is to receive the Spirit of sonship that makes us cry out “Abba, Father,” the third signifies that the people who are blessed with “good things (bona)” are to reveal God’s righteousness by their “deeds (facta).”

As Professor Wright points out, Bucer demonstrates his “distinctive approach to the doctrine of justification, viz., his refusal to separate the imputing from the imparting of righteousness, that is, the gift of pardon and reconciliation from the production of the godly life in us through the Holy Spirit.” In dealing with the principle of iustificatio sola fide in his commentary on the phrase, “per legem enim cognitio peccati,” in Romans 3:20, Bucer shows his strict position on “non iustificari ex operibus legis, sed ex fide Iesu Christi.” However, even in this case, he refers to the normative use of the law which is most strikingly depicted in Psalms 19 and 119. When he argues that the whole law makes known “the free giver (largitorem) of eternal life” and instructs people in the truth that “anyone who believes will have eternal life,” by eternal life Bucer means the perfection of the whole process of salvation. Therefore, the office of the law presented here features both lex accusans and lex vivendi.

The same position of Bucer is found in his commentary on the phrase “sine lege iustitia dei manifestata est” in Romans 3:21. With the intention to highlight the total grace of God in our salvation, he first pays attention to the fact that “lex accusat et condemnat [peccatum].” However, he is keen not to discard the normative significance of the law in repentance. As he puts it, “sine lege” means “pro, non ex

86 “Bona opera sequi iustificatum” was a very controversial issue among Lutherans in the middle of the sixteenth century as to its relevance for Augustine’s thought that “We are reputed righteous on account of the fulfillment of the law affected in us by the Holy Spirit.” Melanchthon was once accused by his colleagues of supporting it. Wengert, Law and Gospel, 180.
87 MBER 119.
88 Wright, Common Places of Martin Bucer, 159.
89 MBER 183-184.
90 MBER 190.
He confirms his position by citing Augustine, who writes, "The righteousness of God which is given without the law, is not manifested without the law."  

Admittedly, "The law teaches righteousness; faith which persuades us into true righteousness, therefore, makes the law firm." When the law leads the elect to true repentance, it reveals not only "the knowledge of sin (cognitio peccati)" but also "the doctrine of upright life (doctrinam vitae rectae)." Based on this dynamic view of the relationship between faith and the office of the law, Bucer reaffirms that justification is the partaking of the righteousness of God (communio iustitiae).

God’s righteousness, which is imputed by the grace of Christ, is imparted by the power of the Spirit of Christ not only to us but also to the godly people in the Old Testament. Both the incarnation and death of Christ and the whole office of the Mediator were foreshadowed and prefigured in the law by the work of the Spirit of Christ. Bucer calls this "mysteria Christi." In the Old Testament, the mystery of Christ was revealed as a type, but in the new covenant its substance was revealed in the body of Christ. Bucer designates the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of Christ in order to point out that the spiritual order of Christ is not under the law but under the grace of Christ the Mediator. Therefore, we are now justified "by faith in the Mediator (fide mediatoris)," and God’s righteousness is communicated to us "by the Spirit of faith (spiritu fidei)." So, those to whom God’s righteousness is imparted take part in the divinity of Christ.

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91 MBER 185.  
92 MBER 186: "Iustitia [ergo] Dei sine lege, non sine lege manifestata est." Bucer here refers to Melanchthon’s concept of double righteousness in order to corroborate his position on the normative use of the law.  
93 MBER 212: "Lex sane iustitiam docet; Fides igitur cum iustitiam veram adducit, legem stabilit."  
94 MBER 210.  
95 MBER 191: "... in voce iustificationis, ut superius diximus, eius quoque doni significatio, quo nobis iustitia communicatur, praecipuum licet sit, quod ea vox exprimit, nostri absolutio in iudicio dei, peccatorum condonatio, vitaeque aeternae gratuita adiudicatio."  
96 MBER 204-209.  
97 MBER 198-200.  
98 MBER 211: "... quod talibus divinitatis suae donat esse participes, hoc est, solidae iustitiae; qui et haec de causa vasa misericordiae dicuntur, parata ad gloriam."
The law reveals the divine will of God, which is to teach us the truth of salvation and Christian piety. True piety means to “die to the law and be united to Christ (nos legi mori, et iungi Christo).” When people are united with Christ, the Spirit of Christ “makes the law our husband, in other words, a teacher so that the law, which is the interpreter of the divine will, may deservedly lead and moderate our entire life.” This very positive view of Bucer on the continual validity of the law for the regenerate is derived from his firm conviction of God’s grace which justifies and accepts the believer’s imperfect works as perfect.

Like Melanchthon, Bucer acknowledges the independent office of the law of legal repentance. He says that the law itself reveals our sins so that we flee to the grace of God even without the inspiration of the Spirit of Christ. However, no one who is not persuaded by the Spirit of Christ can be led to the true salvation and righteousness because the Spirit of Christ is “spiritus adoptionis.” Also, without the Spirit of Christ there is no “justification of the law (iustificatio legis)” because the Spirit of Christ is “spiritus verae iustitiae.” Only by the Spirit of Christ can believers be emancipated from the law because it is “spiritus libertatis.” Bucer acknowledges that the law itself (lex per se) serves to make people realize that they ought to agere poenitentiam; however if there is no special illumination of the Spirit of Christ it is merely an “occasion (occasio)” that has no fruit.

Bucer calls the law “the doctrine of piety and righteousness (doctrina pietatis atque iustitiae),” and the Decalogue “the perfect doctrine of piety (doctrinam

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99 MBER 348: “... legem, cum sancta, iusta, et bona sit, ut quae voluntatis divinae de nobis, sanctae, iustae et bonae expressio sit, sanctis omnibus quandiu hic vivunt salutem esse, meditarique in ea, ad instaurationem pietatis valere plurimum. Erudit ad salutem, et quavis sui parte: studereque ei, absolutum hominum Dei, ut instructus sit ad omne opus bonum.”

100 MBER 345: “... spiritu Christi. ... Hie facit legem maritum nostrum, alibi paedagogum. Nam lex quae est interpres bonae voluntatis Dei, merito omnem vitam nostrum regere et moderari debet:...”

101 MBER 350: “Sic lex sola, Christo non adflante suum spiritum, qui peccatum in nobis opporimat, et ad iustitiam impellat, in primis vero ad fiduciam in bonitatem Dei per Christum erigit, nihil quam augere peccatum, et nos occidere poterit.”

102 MBER 374.

103 MBER 383. Cf. MBER 384: “… nulla earum legum satis, nisi quae fide certa ut lex Dei excipitur.”

104 MBER 215.

105 MBER 216.
pietatis perfectam)."106 The most striking feature of Bucer’s understanding of the normative use of the law is that he applies the concept of the communication of the righteousness of God, which he developed in the course of expounding justification by faith.107 Bucer does not give any specific attention either to lex accusans or to lex vivendi, but believes that both are working together inspired by the Spirit of Christ “to increase, destroy, and condemn (peccatum augere, occidere, condemnare)” sin and to “vivify, manifest wisdom, restore, and illuminate (vivificare, praestare sapientiam, restituere, illuminare)” the perfection of the righteousness of God, that is, the eternal heavenly life.108

7.3.5 Calvin: From Lex Vivendi to Lex Vivificandi

As Calvin mentions in his note of dedication, if we understand the Epistle to the Romans, “we have a passage opened to us to the understanding of the whole scripture.”109 In no other work does he express his view of the office and use of the law in relation to its significance for the whole process of salvation more systematically, and with such brevity, than in his commentary on Romans. Calvin made great efforts to augment and refine this first biblical commentary throughout his life for “the common good of the Church” (1540, 1551, 1556).110 The vital importance of this commentary has been recognized by scholars who have noted its influence upon the 1539 Institutes, especially with reference to its ordo docendi which also reflects the impact of Melanchthon’s Romans commentary.111 In the following, I will examine Calvin’s understanding of the office of the law concentrating on Christ’s mediation of the law for the whole ordo salutis, the idea

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106 MBER 358-360.
108 MBER 363.
109 “John Calvin to Simon Grynaeus,” CNTC 8.2 (CO 10/2.403); T. H. L. Parker, Commentaries on Romans 1532-1542 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986), 1-83; Akira Demura, “Two Commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans: Calvin and Oecolampadius,” in Calvinus Sincerioris Religionis Vindex, 165-166.
110 “John Calvin to Simon Grynaeus,” CNTC 8.3 (CO 10/2.404). For the development of the successive editions of Calvin’s Romans commentary, see T. H. L. Parker, Commentarius in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos, “Introduction,” XI-XVII.
111 Ibid., LIV; Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin, 118-139.
which is mainly inspired by his dynamic concept of salvation expressed in his commentary on Romans.

7.3.5.1 *Duplex Officium Legis*

In his works Calvin often refers to the twofold office of the law which comprises *lex accusans* and *lex vivendi*.\(^{112}\) In his treatise against the libertines, Calvin argues for the perpetual validity of the law by indicating its office to arouse the fear of God’s judgment and to teach the rule of life.\(^{113}\) In the 1539 *Institutes*, he discusses the office of the law under the title of “the three classes of precepts (*tribus praecceptorum formis*),” commanding us to be converted to God, to live according to the law, and to remain under God’s grace. He claims that not only does the law serve to accuse our sin so that we may look for the grace of the Mediator, but it also works for our daily sanctification and perfection in the end, the state of which he favours depicting as the eternal heavenly life (1539 *Inst.* 2.83, *CO* 1.362, *Inst.* 2.5.8, *CO* 2.235-236). He repeats the definition of *duplex legis officium* in his Catechism of the Church of Geneva (1545)\(^{114}\) and in sermons on I Timothy.\(^{115}\)

In spite of his manifestation of the twofold office of the law, Calvin regards *lex accusans* as the subsequent result of *lex vivendi*. As noted typically in the 1559 *Institutes*, “[T]he Jews not only learned from the law what the true character of godliness (*vera pietatis ratio*) was; but also that, since they saw themselves incapable of observing the law, they were in dread of judgment drawn inevitably though

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\(^{112}\) Calvin does not always seem to use the words “officium” and “usus” discriminately. He uses these two words at the same time in order to express the threefold use of the law in *Inst.* 2.7.6. However, the former is more related to the nature of the law and the latter to its effect and efficacy.

\(^{113}\) TAL 271-272 (CO 7.206-207): “There are two things to consider in the law. That is to say, the teaching, which is the rule for right living. ... The second point is its rigor, since it declares to us that whoever fails in a single point will be cursed, and it promises salvation only to those who perfectly observe its commandments ....”

\(^{114}\) CTT 118 (CO 6.79-82). Here Calvin clearly proclaims “the double office of the law (*duplex legis officium*),” which serves both to accuse people of their sins so that they may long for salvation in the Lord and to teach “a perfect rule of righteousness (*une reigle parfaicte de tout bien, perfectam iustitiae regulam*)”

\(^{115}\) Serm. I Tim. 1:5 (44a, *CO* 53.47); I Tim. 1:8 (51a, *CO* 53.53-54). Here Calvin describes the twofold office of the law as teaching “the doctrine of salvation” and “a rule to live well and holily.”
unwillingly to the Mediator” (Inst. 2:8:1, CO 2.266). In his sermon on Genesis called "Sermon de la justification," Calvin points out the positive aspect of the punitive function of the law: to make known the righteousness of God by instructing his people in the rule of right living.\textsuperscript{116}

The law, whether it works as \textit{lex vivendi} or \textit{lex accusans}, plays its pedagogical role. The law teaches “the way of reconciliation between God and men” (Inst. 1.6.2, CO 2.54). Through the law we seek Christ’s grace (Inst. 1.9.3, CO 2.71), and try to imitate “Christ’s image” (Inst. 2.12.4, CO 2.342). Thus, the law of the Lord is “the very school (scholam) of God’s children” (Inst. 1.6.4, CO 2.55), and “Christ is the inner school master (interior magister)” (Inst. 3.1.4, CO 2.397).\textsuperscript{117} The whole divine law reveals the promise of God. Therefore, as Calvin puts it in his commentary on Deuteronomy 5:2, the teaching (\textit{paedagogia}) of law “must be accounted a peculiar blessing, and a very high honour to be taken into the covenant by God.”\textsuperscript{118}

On the other hand, Luther’s interpretation of the same verse is quite different from Calvin’s. He regards the covenant in Horeb as the covenant of the law, and asserts that “the New [the covenant of grace] is founded wholly on the promise of the merciful and faithful God, without our works; but the Old is founded also on our works. Therefore Moses does not promise beyond the extent to which they keep the statutes and judgments.”\textsuperscript{119} According to a Lutheran theologian, Walter R. Bouman, Luther understands the Decalogue in a narrow sense as “a folk law” called “\textit{Sachsenspiegel} of the Jews,” which, as the formal revelation of “universal natural law,” has no covenantal promise in it; thus, the promise of the law refers only to the

\textsuperscript{116} Serm Gen. 15:6 (SC 11/2.756-758): “Vray est que la Loy nous monstre bien que c’est de justement vivre, et d’acquierir justice si nous en estions capables, comme nous traiterons plus au long ici apres” (757).

\textsuperscript{117} With regard to Calvin’s first use of the law, Potter emphasizes its character as the “tutor of righteousness.” “The ‘Whole Office of the Law’ in the Theology of John Calvin,” 118-123.


\textsuperscript{119} \textit{LW} 9.63.
"Torah," which he designates as the gospel revealed in the law. While Calvin tries to look for the grace of the law from its normative nature on the basis of the covenant of grace, Luther keeps the righteousness of the law within the righteousness of good works and equates the nature of the law with that of natural law which works primarily for the condemnation of sin and accusation. Therefore, although both Reformers are faithful to Pauline theology, the difference between their views of the law is "denotive" rather than "connotative" and "theological" rather than "semantic." 

For Calvin, the righteousness of the law does not refer merely to the reward and punishment received according to the merit of good works. It has its negative side: it reveals human sinfulness and wickedness. However, mostly it is used positively, in relation to the restoration of the original nature of the law. It is argued that just as the Gospel becomes accidentally (per accidens) the occasion (occasio) of death but is not the cause (causa) or material (materia) of death, so does the law. He denies that the law is "the material cause of death (mortis materiam)" although he acknowledges that the death "is brought upon us by sin through the occasion (occasione) of the law." Lex accusans is regarded as accidental and occasional because as "via recte vivendi" the original nature of the law is holy, good, and just.

Accordingly, the occasional use of the law is derived from its proper use to instruct people in the rule of life and finally bring them to the eternal heavenly life. Calvin comments on "mortui estis Legi" in Romans 7:4 as to take off the curse and bondage of the law to be clothed with "the newness of life" and "holiness and righteousness," which is but restoration of the original meaning of the law. Therefore, people who unite themselves with Christ by a sacred bond are willingly subject to his
law because the law of Christ corresponds perfectly to the nature of the law.\textsuperscript{125} Likewise, Calvin claims the everlasting validity of the law with regard to the normative nature of the law, which he defines as the eternal righteousness of God revealed in the law.\textsuperscript{126}

In his commentary on "the new commandment" and "the old commandment" in I John 1:7-8, Calvin asserts that the eternal will of God had been revealed before the coming of Christ into the world. He writes:

\textit{[T]he Gospel should not be received as a recently born teaching, but as what has proceeded from God and as His eternal truth. It is as if he said, You must not measure the antiquity of the Gospel by the date at which it is brought to you. For in it is revealed to you the eternal will of God. Therefore, not only did God give you this rule of a holy life (\textit{pie vivendi regulam}) when first you were called to the faith of Christ, but the same has always been determined and prescribed by Him.}\textsuperscript{127}

\subsection*{7.3.5.2 Triplex Usus Legis}

\subsubsection*{7.3.5.2.1 The First Use of the Law}

We should bear in mind that when Calvin deals with the threefold use of the law, he refers to the whole law (\textit{lex tota}) which is spiritual and clothed with the grace of God by Christ's mediation of the law.\textsuperscript{128} It has been accepted as something of a commonplace in contemporary Calvin studies that the first use of the law is theological in the sense that it leads people to Christ (justification) and the third use is normative because it is related to progress in the daily Christian life (sanctification). Also, it is generally accepted that the second use of the law is political and thus related to outward activity.\textsuperscript{129} In categorizing these three uses, scholars are mostly interested in varying \textit{effects} of the three uses of the law.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\bibitem{123} Comm. Rom. 7:4 (139-140, \textit{CO} 49.121).
\bibitem{126} Comm. Rom. 7:2-3 (139-140, \textit{CO} 49.120-121).
\bibitem{127} Comm. I Jn. 1:7 (248, \textit{CO} 55.313).
\bibitem{128} There is no room for \textit{lex nuda} in Calvin's threefold use of the law (\textit{Inst. 2.7.2, CO} 2.254).
\end{thebibliography}
themselves, but inadequately consider their relation to Christ the Mediator, which Calvin developed most significantly in several sections (2.6.1-2.7.5) just before the *tripla usus legis* is handled in the *Institutes* (2.7.6-13).

In the *Institutes*, the first use of the law is described in this way: "while it shows God’s righteousness, that is, the righteousness alone acceptable to God, it warns, informs, convicts, and lastly condemns, every man of his own unrighteousness" (2.7.6). Similarly, in his sermon on Genesis 15:6, Calvin points out that the law makes us examine our life, throws us into despair of ourselves, and eventually makes us seek salvation in Christ. Unquestionably, by the first use of the law Calvin means that the office of the law is to make people realize their weakness and impurity and flee to Christ the Mediator. It corresponds to Luther’s and Melanchthon’s second use of the law, which they call *usus theologicus*.

However, in contrast with these two theologians who are mainly concerned about the punitive function of the law, with reference to the theological use of the law Calvin emphasizes the revelation of the law itself rather than its subsequent effect. The punitive function of the law is not merely instrumental, but rather existential. He uses two metaphors: "scale (trutina)" and "mirror (speculum)" (*Inst. 2.7.6, 7, CO 2.257-258*). They are not adopted in order to express the fear and wrath of God, but to shed light on the original office of the law to reveal the rule of right and godly living. What Calvin means by the first use of the law is not different from the expression of the general rule by which the law works: the nature of the law is "holy," "just," and "good," but because of the fall it becomes a curse to the human

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130 "... dum iustitiam Dei ostendit, id est, quae sola Deo accepta est, sua unumquemque injustitiae admonet, certiorem faciat, convincat denique ac condemnet."

131 Serm. Gen. 15:6 (*SC 11/2.758*): "Ainsi donc voilà comme la Loy nous doit faire entrer en l’examen de toute nostre vie, que nous n’ayons que desespoir en nous, et que par ce moyen nous soyons sollicitz de chercher nostre Seigneur Jesus Christ pour le commencement de nostre justice."


133 Luther describes it as the nature of this punitive use "to denounce and to increase sin, but for the purpose of righteousness; and to kill, but for the purpose of life." *LW 27.361* (Commentary on Galatians 1535, 4:3). In his 1521 *Loci Communes* (*CR 21.152*), Melanchthon declares that "prorium legis opus est peccati revelatio, aut ut clarius dicam peccati conscientia."

race as its precepts are beyond human capacity. However, the condemnation of the law is neither substantial nor ultimate because as the precepts of law initially make people disheartened, simultaneously the promises of the law comfort them when they call on Christ the Mediator in order to be saved (Inst. 2.5.4-11, 2.7.1-5).  

The first use of the law therefore is to make people realize who they are and convert themselves from their righteousness of good works to the righteousness imputed by the grace of Christ the Mediator. It refers to “adventitio qualitas” of humanity (cf. Inst. 2.1.11, CO 2.184), but it is based on the original nature of the law, which signifies the rule of a godly and upright life. The characteristic feature of the theological or punitive use of the law is consequently described as follows:

In the precepts of the law, God is but the rewarder of perfect righteousness, which all of us lack, and conversely, the severe judge of evil deeds. But in Christ his face shines, full of grace and gentleness, even upon us poor and unworthy sinners (Inst. 2.7.8, CO 2.259).

In conclusion, for Calvin, the first use of the law denotes not only the office of the law to lead people to Christ, but also the revelation of the substance of the law by Christ’s mediation. It denotes the use of the law to convince us that “the righteousness of Christ is efficacious to justify us (Christi iustitiam esse efficacem ad nos iustificandos).”

7.3.5.2.2 The Second Use of the Law

The second use of the law refers to “outward activity (exteriori opere),” not as to its cause, but as to its effect (Inst. 2.7.10).  

With reference to the way in which the law works, the second use is not different from the first use because it also serves to reveal and instruct the truth of the law as “a tutor (paedagogus).” Therefore, the political use of the divine law should be differentiated from the

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138 In this sense, Donald MacLeod depicts the first two uses of the law commonly as “a constant penitent.” “Living the Christian Life—L. Luther and Calvin on the Place of the Law,” in Living the Christian Life. Papers read at Westminster Conference (Huntingdon, 1974), 9.
tutelage (*paedagogia*) of common law which can work towards no theological conversion (*Inst* 2.7.11).  

7.3.5.2.3 The Third Use of the Law

The law still works “among believers in whose hearts the Spirit of God already lives and reigns.” Calvin explains the third use of the law (*usus in renatis*) in two ways: the office of teaching (*doctrina*) and exhortation (*exhortatio*). In the first case, the law continually plays a role to inform the regenerate of its precepts so that they may “make fresh progress toward a purer knowledge of the divine will (*Domini voluntas*).” Likewise, the law continually fulfils a pedagogical function for believers. This is the process in which God’s people are aware of his will and “conform and accommodate (*componat et accommodet*)” to it. The will of God corresponds to what Calvin defines as “the law of God” and “the law of mind” in his commentary on Romans 7:21-23. He says, “the law of God” is “the rule of righteousness by which our life is rightly formed,” and “the law of the mind” is “the readiness of the faithful mind to obey the divine law,” which is “our conformity to the law of God.”

Regarding exhortation, the law works for believers more positively: “by frequent meditation upon it to be aroused (*excitetur*) to obedience, be strengthened (*roboretur*) in it, and be drawn back (*retrahatur*) from the slippery path of transgression.” The office of exhortation is beyond the noetic instruction of the law; its efficacy is rather volitional. Believers who are taught the precepts of the law are persuaded by the Holy Spirit of the accompanying promises of grace and as a result

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139 Calvin acknowledges the same nature of the divine law and natural law (cf. *Inst*. 2.8.1, 4.20.16, *CO* 2.267, 1106). However, exploring the two-kingdom theory, he admonishes people not to mix up “the political order” with “the gospel teaching on spiritual freedom.” See 1543 *Inst*. 12.15 (*CO* 1.839), 20.2 (*CO* 1.1101-1102).

140 In this respect, Battles calls Calvin’s third use of the law “the pedagogical” one. “Against Luxury and License in Geneva,” 325.

141 Comm. Rom. 7.21 (152, *CO* 49, 133): “Legem Dei, quae sola propriae sic nuncupatur, quia est iustitiae regula, qua vita nostra recte formatur. Huic coniungit legem mentis, sic appellans propensionem fidelis animae ad obedientiam divinae legis: quia est quaedam nostri cum lege Dei conformatio.”

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they make themselves ready to live according to God’s will. In this case the law reveals the promise that Christ as the Mediator is still working for the believer’s holy and just living. Calvin uses such metaphors as “a whip (flagrum)” and “a constant sting (assiduus aculeus)” positively in order to illustrate this quickening use of the law (Inst. 2.7.12, CO 2.261-262).  

We can hardly find any definite difference between Bucer and Calvin with reference to the effect of the normative use of the law itself until we come to investigate its doctrinal significance for justification and sanctification. Calvin defines justification as acceptance by God through “the imputation of Christ’s righteousness (imputatio iustitiae Christi)” (Inst. 3.11.2, CO 2.534). It denotes the state of man who is “received into communion with Christ” and “clothed (vestitus) with Christ’s righteousness” (Inst. 3.17.8, CO 2.596). Calvin understands on this basis the double grace of God by which he receives our person and our works, which is declared in his first catechism (1537, 1538)143 and developed in his 1543 Institutes, where he says, “sola fide non tantum nos, sed opera etiam nostra iustificari” (1543 Inst. 10.70, CO 1.787, Inst 3.17.10, CO 2.598). Calvin’s commentary on Romans exhibits his doctrine of justification in more detail. The definition of justification is more specific: “communion in the death of Christ (communionis cum morte Christi),” which extends from the beginning of regeneration to participation in the eternal life.144 He also describes it as the process of “establishing a common likeness (mutua similitudo) between ourselves and the Redeemer.”145 Calvin points out that the gift of justification is not “a quality (qualitatem) with which God endows us,” but “the free imputation of righteousness.”146

142 From the 1536 Institutes, Calvin suggests the continual office of the law for the believers as “eos officii sui admonendo ad sanctitatis et innocentiae studium excitet... docere et exhortari et stimulare ad bonum” (1536 Inst. 6.2, CO 1.196, Inst. 3.19.2, CO 2.614).

143 First Catechism 21 (CO 5.336-337).


146 Comm. Rom. 5:17 (117, CO 49.100). God’s righteousness is neither infused (infusa) nor transfused (transfusa), but imputed grace (gratia imputata). This is the point by which Calvin attacked Osiander who argued for “essential righteousness (essentialis iustitia).” Cf. Inst. 3.11.5, 10 (CO
God's grace of free imputation reveals the continual imparting of newness of life, which is most strikingly represented in the concept of the communication of the righteousness of God.\(^{147}\) The gospel provides the firm conviction of the fact that the righteousness of God is communicated (\textit{communicatur}) to us in Christ.\(^{148}\) By “in Christ” Calvin highlights not only the fact that Christ intercedes between God and his people by his Spirit, but particularly the fact that the righteousness becomes “a quality \((\textit{qualitatem})\) of Christ, so it belongs “properly \((\textit{proprium})\)” to Christ.\(^{149}\) Therefore, there is no other way for us to own the fruits of righteousness—sanctification and eternal life—apart from being engrafted into Christ.\(^{150}\)

In his commentary on Romans, Calvin does not present the clear distinction between the righteousness of God and the righteousness of Christ, but with reference to the latter he emphasizes the merit of the blood of Christ, by which we are cleansed from sin, sanctified, and ultimately led to eternal life. In particular, Calvin, describing the Spirit of Christ as “life-giving \((\textit{vivificam})\),” takes into account the whole of life including rebirth, regeneration, and eternal life.\(^{151}\) Calvin confirms this as he comments that “the life-giving power exists in the Spirit of Christ, which is able to overwhelm our mortality.”\(^{152}\) The living and life-giving \((\textit{viva et vivifico})\) Spirit of God points to the Spirit of the Mediator that frees us from the bondage of

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\(^{148}\) Comm. Rom. 1:17 (28, \textit{CO} 49.20); Rom. 3:21 (70, \textit{CO} 49.57); Rom. 3:22 (73, \textit{CO} 49.60).

\(^{149}\) Comm. Rom. 5:19 (118 [altered], \textit{CO} 49.101).


\(^{151}\) Comm. Rom. 8:2 (157, \textit{CO} 49.137).

\(^{152}\) Comm. Rom. 8:10 (165 [altered], \textit{CO} 49.145): “… vim vivificandi in spiritu Christi inesse, quae ad mortalitatem nostram absorbendam valeat.”
the law and makes us to decide to live according to the law. Thus the exhortation of the law is put out of us by the continual mediation of Christ, as put forward in the following:

The interpreters who understand that those who have been renewed by the Spirit of Christ fulfill the law, introduce a misrepresentation which is completely foreign to Paul’s meaning. As long as believers sojourn in the world, they do not make such progress that the righteousness of the law (iustificatio legis) is full or complete in them. We must, therefore, apply this phrase to forgiveness, for while the obedience of Christ is imparted to us, the law is satisfied, so that we are accounted just. The perfection which the law demands was exhibited in the flesh for this reason, that its rigorous demand should no longer have the power to condemn us. But because Christ communicates His righteousness (iustitiam) only to those whom He joins to Himself by the bond of His Spirit (spiritus sui vinculo), Paul mentions regeneration again, lest Christ should be thought to be the minister of sin.

It is unlikely that in the cited passage Calvin means to categorize Bucer as one of “the interpreters” whom he must have defined as antinomians. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Bucer like the antinomians has a tendency to overestimate the enduring work of the Holy Spirit. We might presume that this is because of his conviction, as Alister E. McGrath notes, that “the man who is justified by faith will necessarily be justified by works.” Calvin shares this conviction with Bucer, too, yet based on the believer’s union with Christ: “Christ justifies no one whom he does not at the same time sanctify. These benefits are joined together by an everlasting and indissoluble bond (perpetuo et individuo nexu), so that those whom he illumines by his wisdom, he redeems; those whom he redeems, he justifies; those whom he justifies, he sanctifies” (Inst. 3.16.1, CO 2.586).

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153 Cf. Comm Jn. 1:17 (1.25, CO 47.18): “Christus enim anima est quae vivificat quod alioqui esset in lege mortuum”; II Cor. 3:7 (45, CO 50.43).
156 Cf. Lane, “Calvin and Article 5 of the Regensburg Colloquy,” 19-27 (pages shown in the paper presented in Calvin Congress).
157 McGrath highlights the difference between Bucer and Calvin regarding the ordo salutis claiming that “where Bucer links the first and second justifications [the iustitia impii and the iustitia pii] on the basis of the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit, Calvin relates them on the basis of the believer’s insitio in Christum.” Iustitia Dei, 224. For the comparison between the ordo salutis in Bucer: electio-iustificatio impii-iustificatio pii-glorificatio and in Calvin: electio-unio mystica (iustificatio, sanctificatio)-glorificatio, see McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 221-226, and “Humanist Elements in the Early Reformed Doctrine of Justification,” 10-17. As McGrath points out, regarding the ordo salutis, it must be noted that Calvin explains the doctrine of predestination and its impact on the Christian life in view
Both Calvin and Bucer underline the continual work of the Spirit of Christ, but for Calvin, Christ's continual mediation for believers is at work throughout the whole process of salvation. Like Bucer, who argues “pro, non ex observatione legis,” Calvin regards good works as of capital importance in the life of a Christian as he states: “we are justified not without works yet not through works (non sine operibus, neque tamen per opera), since in our sharing in Christ, which justifies us, sanctification is just as much included as righteousness” (Inst. 3.16.1, CO 2.586). However, Bucer, although points out the blessing of God as the free giver of eternal life (largitor vitae aeternae) in dealing with the righteousness of good works, concentrates on the work of the Holy Spirit, once given by God, rather than on the believer's continual communion with the righteousness of Christ by the work of his Spirit.

On the phrase “the law is spiritual” in Romans 7, Bucer comments that the law was originally given as “the law of life (legem vitae),” but after the fall it becomes “life-giving (vivificam)” when it is governed by the Spirit of Christ who is the life-giver (vivificator). He here highlights the power of the Holy Spirit to renew everything and to recover eternal life, but he does not mention Christ's mediation of the law regarding the way in which the law plays a life-giving role for Christians. We can find a similar statement of Calvin to Bucer's in his commentary on II Corinthians 3: that the law “will come alive and be life-giving (vivam and vivificam) only if it is inspired by Christ.” Calvin calls Christ “the spirit of the law (spiritum eius [legis])” and “the life of the law (legis vita).” Then he says,

Christ in regenerating us gives life to the Law and shows Himself to be the source of life, just as the soul is the source from which all man's vital functions spring. Christ is therefore, so to speak, the universal soul of all men not as regards His essence, but as regards His grace. Or, to put it another way, Christ is the Spirit because he animates us with the life-giving power of His Spirit (vivifica spiritus sui virtute).  

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158 MBER 363.  
159 Comm. II Cor. 3:17 (48-49, CO 50.45-46).
By designating Christ as the life and spirit of the law, Calvin supremely witnesses the working of the law as the rule of life and life-giving through the inspiration of the Spirit of Christ the Mediator. Also, by attesting that Christ is “the end (finem)” and “the only aim (scopum)” of the law, Calvin sets the foundation of the liberation from the bondage of the law seen in the previous verse.\(^\text{160}\) In conclusion, the law, which is a rule of living (regula vivendi), works as a life-giving rule (regula vivificandi) for believers by the Spirit of Christ the Mediator. This is what Calvin means by the exhortatory use of the law, which demonstrates the essence of Calvin’s third use of the law.

For Calvin, the Spirit of Christ works for the whole process of salvation as the Spirit of the Mediator. Therefore, the special work of the Holy Spirit should not be thought of as merely related to the third use of the law, just as the merit of Christ should not be associated merely with the first use.\(^\text{161}\) It is absurd to see the third use of the law as the “pastoral application” of the first two uses, and try to apply it to both believers and non-believers.\(^\text{162}\) It is even more absurd to affirm the “transformation” of the law in Christ in order to explain the theological foundation of the normative use of the law from the Christological point of view.\(^\text{163}\)

In dealing with the third use of the law, Hesselink is keen to derive the theological foundation of the normative use of the law from the fact that Christ is the soul, life, and fulfilment of the law. Hesselink here finds the answer to the question why in dealing with the Christian life Calvin prefers using the word “Christ” rather than the word “the law” in order to point up the character of the law as the norm or

160 Comm. II Cor. 3:16 (48, CO 50.45).
rule of godly living. From this perspective, Hesselink criticizes Hugo Röthlisberger, who regards the law and Christ as two different norms in Christian life, and Wernle, who accuses Calvin of Christianization of the law by concentrating only on its normative aspect. Hesselink emphasizes the special illumination of the Holy Spirit in order to explain the normative use of the law, but he does not pay specific attention to the fact that Calvin defines the Holy Spirit working for the normative use of the law as the Spirit of Christ who is still mediating for his members as the head. Overall, Hesselink, dealing with the relationship between Christ and the law, is more concerned about Christus exemplar legis than Christus Mediator legis. So he fails to distinguish the exhortation of the law from the instruction of the law.

7.4 Conclusion

As seen above, by presenting the continual validity of the law in the light of the concept of Christus mediator legis Calvin deals with the whole office and use of the law without losing the significance of the original nature of the law, which is righteous (before the fall) and life-giving (after the fall). In developing the concept of lex vivificandi in the light of the Spirit of Christ the Mediator, who is still working according to both his natures in the bodily presence totus-non totum, Calvin sets the theological foundation for Christ’s mediation of the law even before his incarnation in the Old Testament. The vivifying nature of the law sheds light on why Calvin calls the third use of the law the “principal (praecipuus)” one and “more closely related to the proper purpose of the law (proprium legis finem)” (Inst. 2.7.12, CO 2.261).

The law not only instructs the godly people with a rule of living, but it exhorts them to live according to it. Therefore, the offices of the law are both

164 “Christ, the Law, and the Christian,” 18.
165 Ibid., 15-16.
166 Calvin’s Concept the law, 278-281, and “Christ, the Law, and the Christian,” 13-14. The same position on Calvin’s third use of the law is found in Shepherd, who concentrates on Christ as the image of God par excellence in dealing with the relation between faith and the law. The Nature and Function of Faith in the Theology of John Calvin, 152-171.
167 Hesselink takes the position that only the third use of the law for Calvin refers to the normative use of the law (lex vivendi). He basically follows Emil Doumergue’s view that as regards
pedagogical and normative. The revelation of the law is sometimes frightening and sometimes encouraging, but the nature of the law is holy, good, and righteous. The first two uses denote the fundamental use of the law for believers and non-believers. There is a difference between their effects, but the way in which the law works is completely the same. On the other hand, the third use of the law refers to the continual validity of the law for believers. It basically signifies the pedagogical use, but its characteristic feature is shown in the office of lex vivificandi.

The third use is differentiated from the first use in terms of its effect, although both act at the same time. So, if we can admit any intrinsic and transformative tendency in Calvin’s theology of justification, it is derived from the dynamic of Christ’s mediation. Calvin defines faith as “the instrument by which we receive Christ, in whom righteousness is communicated to us,” and comments that if we do not embrace God’s grace not only for justification but also for sanctification, we have only “a mutilated faith (mutila fide).” He does not believe that justification and sanctification are separated although they are distinguished. Nor does he acknowledge the concept of legal repentance itself because he does not believe in the existence of mortification which is not followed by vivification. When Calvin defines justification as the communication of the righteousness of God in Christ, he presupposes the precedence of union with Christ who brings about justification and sanctification in the ordo salutis.

While in his commentary on Romans Calvin demonstrates mainly the theological foundation upon which the concept and use of the law is based, in his commentary on Psalms he elucidates remarkably the blessings of the law. Expounding the inner instruction of the law, he especially emphasizes that it is the Spirit of the Mediator who persuades the soul of the Psalmist so that he may open his

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168 Comm. Rom. 3:22 (73, CO 49.60); Rom. 8:13 (167, CO 49.147). Calvin asserts that faith justifies “because it leads us into fellowship with the righteousness of Christ (quia in communicationem iustitiae Christi nos inducit)” (Inst. 3.11.20, CO 20.550).

169 Calvin epitomizes his argument by stating that “man dies to himself that they may begin to live to God (hominem sibi mori ut Deo vivere incipiat)” (Inst. 3.3.3, CO 2.436).
eyes not only to the precepts of the law but also to its promises. Likewise he believes that the Psalmist delights in the law with a conviction that in Christ lex vivendi becomes lex vivificandi. Before closing the section on the doctrinal significance of the third use of the law, he confirms this: "[In the Psalms] David especially shows that in the law he apprehended the Mediator, without whom there is no delight or sweetness (oblectatio vel suavitas)" (Inst. 2.7.12, CO 2.262).  

Commenting on the phrase "the marvellous things of thy law" in Ps. 119:18, Calvin writes that "not only the ten commandments are included in the term law, but also the covenant of eternal salvation, with all its provisions, which God has made. And knowing, as we do, that Christ, 'in whom are hid all the treasures of knowledge and wisdom,' 'is the end of the law,' we need not be surprised at the prophet commending it, in consequence of the sublime mysteries which it contains, Col. ii.3; Rom. x. 4." (4.413-414, CO 32.222). Calvin, expounding Psalm 119, repeatedly refers to the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit in order to explain the internal instruction of the law. Cf. Comm. Ps. 119:12 (4.410, CO 32.219, "spiritu iudicii"); 119:18 (412, CO 32.221, "singulari spiritus gratia"); 119:26 (420, CO 32.226, "interior magister Dei spiritus"); 119:27, 33 (420, 424, CO 32.226, 228, "intelligentiae spiritu"); 119:34 (425, CO 32.229, "coelestis spiritus luce"); 119:64 (449, CO 32.242, "arcana mentis illustracione spiritus"); 119:125 (5.5, CO 32.270, "arcano spiritus instinctu").  

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION: THE COHERENCE BETWEEN CHRISTOLOGY AND
SOTERIOLOGY IN CALVIN’S THEOLOGY OF THE LAW

Calvin resorts to the special illumination of the Spirit of Christ the Mediator for the explanation of the spiritual blessings of the law, described most impressively in his commentary on the Psalms, which he calls “the anatomy of all parts of the soul.” He takes the position that the soul is the immortal and incorporeal substance (substantia immortalis et incorporea) in which the seed of religion (religionis semen) dwells, and, from this point, argues that just as Christ sustained the hypostasis of God and man after his ascension, so the human soul is eternal after death and keeps shining forth the image of God (Inst 1.15.6, CO 2.182-183). In identifying the spiritual character, and correspondingly the spiritual interpretation of the law, Calvin takes into consideration the substantia of man itself as well as the working of human ratio consisting of understanding and will. Specifically, as far as the office and use of the law is concerned, he gives primary attention to the regeneration and eternity of the soul rather than to its varying faculties.

2 Cf. Comm. I Cor. 15:12-13 (318, CO 49.542): “... Christus non sibi mortuus est, neque resurrexit, sed nobis: ergo ipsius resurrectio hypostasis nostrae est: et quod in eo factum est, oportet in nobis quoque impleri.” Calvin sees the soul not merely as the qualitas, but rather as the substantia of man. Cf. Comm. I Cor. 15:39 (336, CO 49.556), 15:44 (337-338, CO 49.557-558); Psychopannychia, CO 5.177-178, 203. Calvin’s idea of the eternal substance of the soul demonstrates the influence of Plato. However, Calvin, unlike Augustine who followed Plato’s position, does not think that the soul is always subject to the body, even though he is totally in agreement with Augustine as to the total depravity of human soul after the fall (Inst 1.15.8, CO 2.186-187). It is on this basis that Calvin develops his doctrine of the immortality of the soul after life. Heinrich Quistorp, Calvin’s Doctrine of the Last Things, tr. Harold Knight (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1955), 55-107. For the epistemological, ethical, and eschatological influence of the Platonic body-soul dualism on Calvin’s theology, see Wilhelm Schwendemann, Leib und Seele bei Calvin: Die erkenntnistheoretische und anthropologische Funktion des platonischen Leib-Seele-Dualismus in Calvins Theologie (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1996), esp. 201-210.
3 For the faculty of human soul (understanding and will), see thesis 4.3.
Calvin seeks to substantiate the spiritual character of the law by exploring the concept of *Christus mediator legis* on the basis of the normative nature of the law and its characteristic shape as the law of the covenant. He proposes the concept of moral law (*lex moralis*) as ranging over the whole law including both *cultus* in the First Table and *caritas* in the Second, and examines the covenantal significance of the law in the course of answering the question of how the law, the nature of which is characterized as *regula vivendi*, works as *regula vivificandi*. Thus, the spiritual office of the law refers not only to the spiritual regeneration of each individual person but also to the fulfilment of the kingdom of God by Christ’s mediation of the law as Teacher, Priest, and King.

Although we do not actually have any works of Calvin written before his conversion that might tell us directly what he thought of the divine law, there seems to be every reason to assume that his special emphasis on the inner working of the law originates from his early legal studies, by which he gained the erudition of ancient literature and philosophies as well as the knowledge of Roman law. Calvin’s literal yet spiritual interpretation of the law, which emphasizes its *ad hoc* significance, reflects the influence of the historical and philological interpretation of the jurists of the *mos novus*, represented by Aciati and Budé and the influence of de l’Estoile’s literary and logical text-reading method. As seen in his commentary on Seneca’s *De clementia*, the young Calvin was already keen to distinguish equity from the letter of the law and to link natural law with the divine law in terms of the concept of conscience. In addition, it may be quite plausible for us to suggest the influence of the *via moderna* and the *devotio moderna* upon Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law with reference to the covenantal understanding of *meritum*

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4 For the Christological interpretation of the normative nature of the law, see thesis 4.1-2, 7.2.
5 For the relationship between *lex vivendi* and *lex vivificandi*, see thesis 7.3.5.
6 For the threefold office of the Mediator and the threefold mediation, see thesis 4.4.1.
7 For Calvin’s legal studies, see thesis 2.1.
Christi and the unio mystica cum Christo. Especially, with reference to the influence of the via moderna, we must keep in mind the fact that Calvin, by referring to the dynamic feature of Christ’s mediation, overcame the late medieval theologians’ view of covenantal causality, which they had developed in dealing synergistically with the relationship between patum and meritum on the basis of their unique interpretation of the axiom facientibus quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam.

When Calvin argues for the spirituality of the law by referring to its original normative nature, he turns to the fact that Christ is the substance and soul of the law. He believes that the divine law works as such when it is mediated by Christ and consequently clothed with his grace. The grace of the law is not so much related to its individual effect upon justification and sanctification but associated with its essential relevance for the union with Christ which precedes both of them.

Therefore, there is no room for the concept of legal repentance that is independent of faith, as the one which is merely preliminary to evangelical repentance. The following commentary expounds this far-reaching grace of the law mediated by Christ.

I therefore take this defence [justificatio sola fide] of Paul to refer not only to ceremonies, not only to what are called moral precepts, but to the whole law in general. The moral law is truly confirmed and established through faith in Christ, since it was given to teach man of his iniquity, and to lead him to Christ, without whom the law is not fulfilled. The law proclaims what is right in vain, yet it accomplishes nothing but the increase of inordinate desires, in order to finally bring greater condemnation upon man. When, however, we come to Christ, we first find the exact righteousness of the law (legis iustitia) in Him, and this also becomes ours by imputation (per imputationem). In the second place we find sanctification in Him, by which our hearts are shaped to keep the law. True, we keep it imperfectly, yet at least we are aiming at keeping it. The argument is the same in the case of ceremonies. These cease and vanish away when Christ comes, but they are truly confirmed by

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9 For the influence of the devotio moderna and the via moderna, see thesis 2.3.
10 According to Alister E. McGrath, Luther overcame this attitude of the theologians of the via moderna by his theology of the cross. Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), esp. 86-92, 104-119, 126-128, 148-175.
12 In this respect, Calvin equates repentance with regeneration. Cf. Inst 1539, 5.8 (CO 1.690), Inst 3.3.9 (CO 2.8): “Uno ergo verbo poenitentiam interpreter, regenerationem, cuius non aliis est scopus, nisi ut imago Dei, quae per Adae transgressionem foedata, et tantum non obliterate fuerat, in nobis reformetur.” For ordo salutis in Calvin's theology, see thesis 7.3.5.
13 For Calvin's view of legal and evangelical repentance, see thesis 3.2.
Him. In themselves they are empty and shadowy images, and will be found to possess reality (solida aliquid) only in reference to a better end (meliorem finem). Their highest confirmation, therefore, lies in the fact that they have attained their truth (veritatem) in Christ. Let us, therefore, also remember to preach the Gospel in such a way that we establish the law by our manner of teaching, but let the only support of our preaching be that of our faith in Christ.14

For Calvin, Christ’s mediation ranges throughout the whole of history. “Right from the beginning God made no communication with men except by Christ. For there is no relationship between God and us unless the Mediator is present to procure His favour for us.”15 From the beginning, Christ has had the power of the lawgiver and worked as the Mediator of intercession and teaching.16 In view of Christ’s eternal mediatorship, Calvin claims that si integer stetisset Adam, Christ would not have become man in flesh.17 Originally, the role of the law is to reveal God’s will as the rule of right living. After the coming of sin into the world, however, it began to perform its theological office as lex accusans.

For depraved humanity, what the true and inward law regulates is not so much quid homines possint as quid debeant. Notwithstanding, the law requires the righteousness accommodated to the state of the regenerate.18 The law initially reveals God who is judge, then subsequently God who is father. This is true of both the Old and New Testaments. When the law was published, Christ had already been ordained to be killed on the cross by the eternal decree of God. Therefore, the whole promise of the law is founded on the grace of Christ. There is no conditionality in the covenant of God, whether it is the covenant of grace or the covenant of works, although the regulation of the law is sometimes conditional.19 The imputation of the righteousness of God pertains to the justification of our imperfect works as well as to

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14 Comm. Rom. 3:31 (81 [altered], CO 49.67-68).
15 Comm. Acts 7:30 (190 [altered], CO 48.144). For Christ’s mediation before the fall, see thesis 4.2, 4.5.1.
17 For Calvin’s critique of Osiander who maintains that Christ was ordained to come to the world regardless of human depravity, see thesis 4.3.1.
18 For God’s accommodation and the mediation of Christ, see thesis 4.5.2.
the justification of our persons. Sometimes the promise of the law is prescribed conditionally, but even on these occasions God’s reward is due to the grace of Christ communicated to godly people. As Calvin puts it:

When we are made partakers (participes) of Christ, we are not only ourselves righteous, but our works also are counted righteous in the sight of God (non ipsi solum iusti sumus, sed opera iusta reputatur coram Deo), because any imperfections in them are obliterated by the blood of Christ. The promises, which were conditional (conditionales), are fulfilled to us also by the same grace, since God rewards our works as perfect, inasmuch as their defects are covered by free pardon.

Calvin criticizes Schoolmen belonging to the so-called via moderna as “some modern theorists,” for they, like Augustine, regarded these two propositions as standing separately, that “man is justified by faith through the grace of Christ” and that “he is justified by the works which proceed from spiritual regeneration.” It is true that Calvin takes the strictly negative position on the merit of good works regarding justification, but he does not sustain nuda fides. Rather, he maintains the concept of living faith (fides viva) by which godly people reach the eternal heavenly life as they live according to the instruction of the law through the grace of Christ the Mediator. The works “of the law” have promise in them, and “the reward for works depends on the free promise of the law.” With regard to what brings about justification there is a distinct contradiction between the law and the gospel, and between faith and good works, but “there is no good works without faith.”

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20 Comm. Rom. 3:22 (73, CO 49.60).
23 Lane, Justification by Faith, 26-39. Cf. Inst. 3.15.3-4, 3.17.3-10 (on the validity of good works) and Inst. 3.18.5 (on the reward for good works).
25 Serm. Gen. 15:6 (SC 11/2.758-759): “Et pourquoi donc est-ce que saint Paul trouve une telle contrariété entre la Loy et l’Evangile? C’est au regard de nous justifier. Autant en est-il entre la foy et les œuvres. Il y a contrariété entant que les œuvres sont merites. Et qui plus est, nous ne pouvons faire nulle bonne œuvre sinon par foy, comme nous l’avons deja touché, et sera encore deduit plus au long. Car la cause et l’effet ne sont pas contraires, mais quand nous voulons establir quelque merite en nos œuvres, c’est à dire que nous voulons qu’elles doivent valoir pour nous aquirir grace devant Dieu, et que soyent une satisfaction pour nos pechez, brief, qu’elles nous servent à salut, c’est pour ruiner du tout la foy, et par ce moyen-là elle est anemie.” Calvin refers especially to James in order to explain this position. Serm. Gen. 15:6 (SC 11/2.780-785). Cf. Ganocy and Scheld, Die
Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law features both Christ in the law and the law in Christ. The law represents Christ as its truth and substance and reveals his eternal presence as the Mediator at the same time. The former aspect is distinctively signified by the *umbra-substantia* analogy, and the latter by the promise-fulfilment framework. They are distinguishable, but they are co-operative. On the basis of this dynamic understanding of the relationship between Christ and the law, Calvin develops his dynamic position on the office and use of the law in the process of salvation.

Calvin understands justification (*iustificatio*) in relation to the righteousness of God (*iustitia Dei*). He defines justification as to be reckoned (*censetur*) righteous by the communication of the righteousness of God. The righteousness of God refers not only to the will of God for an orderly life for his people, but also to the full recovery of the image of God. It is called the righteousness of Christ (*Christi iustitia*) because it is fulfilled by Christ and imputed to us as gift (*gratuita iustitiae imputatio*) by his grace.

Justification thus denotes communion (*communio*) with Christ who imparts his life to his members if they hold true and genuine communication (*communicatio*) with him. In this respect, justification signifies not only the free imputation of the righteousness of Christ but also the continual governing of his Spirit. Calvin seeks the righteousness of the law (*iustitia legis*) in the fact that “Christ communicates His righteousness only to those whom He unites with Himself by the bond of His Spirit.” As Calvin repeatedly claims in his sermons on Job, the righteousness of

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*Hermeneutik Calvins*, 194-201. The authors argue that Calvin’s frequent reference to James reflects the influence of Stoicism on him.

26 For the *umbra-substantia* analogy, see thesis 5.3-4.

27 For the continual mediation of Christ in salvation history, see thesis 6.3-4.

28 For the dynamic understanding of the office and use of the law, see thesis 7.3.5.


30 Cf. Santmire, “Justification in Calvin’s 1540 Romans Commentary,” 295-297.

31 Comm. Rom. 5:17 (117, CO 49.100).


the law, which is accommodated to our capacity, should be differentiated from the higher righteousness (justice plus haute) of God. The law itself does not reveal the secret providence of God, but points to the double grace of God for justification and sanctification.\textsuperscript{34} Therefore, only when we are clothed (vestiemur) with the righteousness of Christ does the law reveal the way of right living by which we are led to the perfection of eternal life.\textsuperscript{35} Accordingly, for Calvin, the righteousness of the law is equated with the righteousness of Christ imputed by his continual mediation of the law according to both the divine and human natures, the theological foundation based on the so-called extra Calvinisticum.\textsuperscript{36}

Calvin sought harmony between the Christological and soteriological understandings of the law throughout his successive editions of the \textit{Institutes}. In the first revision of 1539, he re-arranged what he dealt with in the first chapter of the 1536 \textit{Institutes} in terms of the credal order according to the salvation-historical order, i.e., the two kinds of knowledge of God, the principle of justification by faith, and the concept and use of the law. Then, through the considerable addition and augmentation in the editions of 1543 and 1550, he pursued the origin of the power of church law and the role of civil law by invoking the unity and continuity between the divine law and natural law. Finally, in the \textit{ordo docendi} of the 1559 edition, he set out the Christological and soteriological formation of the law by linking Christ's fulfilment of the law with the continual validity of the law for believers by the concept of Christ's mediation of the law.\textsuperscript{37}

Several sermons of Calvin demonstrate the coherence between Christology and soteriology in his theology of the law impressively.\textsuperscript{38} Referring to David as the


\textsuperscript{35} Comm. Rom. 7:9-11 (144-145, \textit{CO} 49.125-127); Rom. 8:3 (160-161, \textit{CO} 49.138-139).

\textsuperscript{36} For Christ's mediation of the law and the the so-called extra Calvinisticum, see thesis 4.5.1.

\textsuperscript{37} For the development of Calvin's Christological understanding of the law, see thesis 3.2.

\textsuperscript{38} We find an insight into the coherence between Christology and soteriology in Calvin's theology, argued most notably concerning the relationship between book 2 and book 3 of the \textit{Institutes}, in the recent work of Dawn DeVries, where the author explores this agenda in view of the relationship between \textit{Christus praesens extra nos} and \textit{in nobis}. \textit{Jesus Christ in the Preaching of Calvin and Schleiermacher} (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1996), 96.
figure of Christ and expounding his meditation on the law as glorifying the redemptive work of the Lord, Calvin in his sermon on Psalm 89 pays specific attention to the great and perfect instruction of the law as the way (chemin) to eternal life through the grace of Christ. In the first part, he initially mentions the twofold office of the law to reveal our sins and to teach us how to apply ourselves to the service of God. In so doing, he rests on the merit of Christ who fulfilled the law. Following this Christological observation, he indicates the soteriological significance of the law by linking the righteousness of the law with the righteousness of Christ who is the head of the church.\(^{39}\) The same position is sustained in the second part, but more focused on the Christian life. Calvin touches on the natural office of the law as revealing God’s punishment, but immediately proceeds to note the profit and instruction of the law springing from the grace of Christ. Then he again resorts to the believer’s union with Christ for the explanation of the continual validity of the law for the godly life.\(^{40}\) Finally, he finishes the sermon by pointing up the grace of the law originating from Christ’s freely imputed grace.\(^{41}\)

Calvin’s sermon on the name “Jesus” in the Synoptic Gospels provides another example. With reference to the *meritum Christi*, he argues that as its substance and truth Christ fulfilled and vivified the law through his Spirit.\(^{42}\) Then, following this Christological observation, he takes account of the office and use of the law in the process of salvation by underscoring the continuity of the mediation of the eternal Son of God and the continual work of his Spirit.\(^{43}\)

It is time to turn to four distinctive characteristics demonstrated in some passages of Calvin’s sermons setting forth his well-balanced Christological and


\(^{40}\) Serm. Ps. 89:31-39 (SC 7.67-70).

\(^{41}\) Serm. Ps. 89:31-39 (SC 7.70-72).

\(^{42}\) Serm. Lk. 1:33 (CO 46.80-81): “Car lesus Christ en [de la lóy] est la fin, comme il le dit en l’autre passage. Et puis encore en l’autre passage, C’est luy qui en est l’ame et l’esprit. Car c’est une chose morte que la Loy, et mesmes tous les Prophetes, sinon que tout soit vivifi par nostre Seigneur Iesus Christ, et que nous cognosissions que c’est en luy que tout gist et consiste, et qu’il est la vertu et substance de toutes les figures et ombrages qui ont este anciennement.”

\(^{43}\) Serm. Lk. 1:31-35 (CO 46.73-86). Calvin here accuses Servetus of denying the existence of the eternal Son of God and his presence as the Mediator (CO 46.79-80).
soteriological understanding of the law in order to verify Calvin’s emphasis on the fact that the Christ who fulfilled the law is still working for us as the Mediator. The first characteristic by which we may discover his dynamic understanding of the relationship between Christ and the law is his view of the unity and continuity of the church. Calvin identifies the church as the seed of Abraham belonging to Christ their head. From this point, he explains the communion of the saints and Christ’s mediation according to both his natures. By referring to Christ’s headship of the church, Calvin especially points out that the ancient fathers were aware of Christ as the substance of the law and moreover they were partakers of his righteousness through the special illumination of the Holy Spirit. He attributes the headship of the church to Christ because he both governs and mediates for his members. In doing this, he bases Christ’s government on his mediating grace.

Just as Calvin explains the unity of the church by the headship of Christ, so he explains its continuity by the continual mediation of Christ. Calvin demonstrates this stance most clearly in dealing with the meaning of ceremonies. The ceremonies were established by temporary ordinances, but their substance is eternal and unchangeable. Without the life-giving grace and mercy of Christ the Mediator, the temple and the tabernacle would be meaningless. On this occasion, Christ is not only the substance but also the perfection of ceremonial laws, and as long as we are in communion with Christ, we shall be instructed by the same truth of the ceremonies of the law. Also, the continual validity of the moral law is depicted in

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44 For the unity and continuity of the church as the body of Christ, see thesis 5.3.3.
45 Serm. Gen. 15:4-5 (89-93, SC 11/2.741-743); Ps. 147:18-20 (SC 7.11-15); Gal. 3:18 (430-437, CO 50.529-534).
47 Serm. Eph. 1:17-18 (107-110, CO 333-336); Eph. 4:16 (402-404, CO 51.591-592); Eph. 5:30 (600-604, CO 51.767-772).
50 Serm. Deut. 27:2-6 (9-13, CO 28.298-301).
the light of the continuity of the church because it plays its original role only for those who have the righteousness of Christ.⁵⁴

Now, we can appropriately take into consideration the continuity of Christ’s mediation of the law as another significant characteristic.⁵⁵ Calvin believes that although the law is distinguished from the gospel with respect to its economy, their substance is one and the same. Especially, in order to explain the soteriology of the Old Testament, Calvin resorts to the ad-hoc significance of Christ’s mediation on the basis of the so-called extra Calvinisticum. Calvin takes the position that even before the fall Christ worked as the Mediator to reconcile men to God and to join them to the angels of heaven.⁵⁶ In his sermons on Melchizedek, Calvin explains the continuity of Christ’s mediation by comparing it with the office of Melchizedek. Melchizedek represents Christ as the Son of God who performed his mediatorial office as Priest and King from the pre-Mosaic period.⁵⁷ It is argued that the knowledge of salvation was given before the publication of the law, and the Mediator Christ already worked for the believers.⁵⁸ Also, referring to the eternal priesthood of Melchizedek, Calvin explains Christ’s mediation after his ascension “in the person of the Mediator (en la personne du mediateur).”⁵⁹

Calvin does not associate Christ’s mediation merely with the effect of his office, but presents it as the believer’s participation in his substance by the power of his Spirit.⁶⁰ He explains the omnipresence of Christ the Mediator with emphasis on our participation in his body and soul, which are distinguishable but not separated

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⁵⁵ For the continuity of Christ’s mediation in salvation history, see thesis 5.3.3.
⁵⁶ Serm. Eph. 3:9 (261-262, CO 51.466): “Notons bien donc que tout a esté creé en Jesus Christ, quand il a esté ordonné chef des Anges et des hommes: voire encore que nous n’eussions point eu besoin de Redempteur, si est-ce que desia nostre Seigneur Jesus Christ avoit esté establi pour nostre chef. Il n’avoit que faire de vestir nostre nature, ni de s’offrir en sacrifice pour la redemption des pecheurs: mais quoy qu’il en soit, si ne laissoit-il point d’avoir desia cest office de reconcilier Dieu avec les hommes et les conioindre avec les Anges du ciel.”
⁶⁰ Serm. Eph. 4:10 (360, CO 51.552): “... non pas que nous soyons creez de sa substance, mais que par la vertu de son saint Esprit il fait decouler en nous la substance de son corps et de son sang, dont nous sommes rassasiez:...”
because they are made of the same substance. He acknowledges no transfiguration taking place in the personal presence of the Mediator after his ascension according to both the divine and human natures, but argues for his spiritual yet real presence by referring to the so-called extra Calvinisticum. Thus, Calvin explains the continuity of the church by the eternal headship of Christ throughout the old and new covenants.61

Another characteristic feature by which Calvin explores the soteriological significance of Christ’s mediation of the law in his sermons is that he frequently refers to the special illumination of the Spirit of Christ in order to explain the law. He depicts the Spirit of Christ as the spirit of perfection, the spirit of the fear of God, the spirit of purity, the spirit of all righteousness, and the spirit of truth.62 Moreover, due to the spiritual government of Christ over our hearts through his Spirit, the realm of Christ’s kingship and priesthood is regarded as extending to the spiritual kingdom of God.63 The peculiar feature of the Spirit of Christ is presented prominently in relation to its operation to make godly people partakers of his righteousness, to lift up their heart so that they stand before the Father with confidence, and ultimately, to lead them to the perfection of eternal life.64

It is surely the case that Christ is, in Calvin’s judgment, the life (vie) and soul (ame) of the law. This claim is based on the fact that by the special illumination of the Spirit of Christ, the law, which is “the word of life (parolle de vie)” and “the living word (parolle vivante),” performs its original office as regula vivendi and its theological office as regula vivificandi.65 Two further points should be noted here. First, the life-giving office of the law is suggested on the basis of the free imputation of the righteousness of Christ the mediator through the special illumination of his Spirit.66 Secondly, and more specifically, in this respect, a true submission to God’s will revealed in the law, denotes that the believer lives according to the type of Christ

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61 Serm. Eph. 4:10 (353-360, CO 51.546-554).
62 Serm. Deut. 9:17 (404b-405b, CO 26.697-701); Eph. 1:1 (14, CO 51.251).
63 Serm. II Sam. 8:15 (418-426, SC 1.244-249).
inspired by his Spirit. Calvin reflects these two points when he explains the end of the law in these three ways in his sermon on Timothy: the law teaches the rule of living rightly; the law reveals the promise of God to the godly people who belong to the seeds of Abraham; the law makes the elect assured of their salvation.

The final characteristic which is to be explored as the application of the three features I have raised, shows the significance of Christ’s mediation of the law in the double imputation of God in order to accept both our persons and our imperfect works as righteous. Calvin does not regard the first and third uses of the law clearly separated because he thinks that both are derived from the theological and normative office of the law. He relates the doctrine of salvation mainly to the first use and the regulation of the law to live well and in a holy way to the third use, but he is firmly assured that unlike the second use of the law, both are founded on the believer’s union with Christ and on the continual imputation of his righteousness, which is invoked by the spiritual operation of the law.

The original purpose of the law is pedagogical. The whole law, including ceremonial laws, was given for edification or instruction in order to restore and make the image of God within us perfect. The original nature of the law is normative, yet life-giving. The righteousness of the law should be distinguished from the higher righteousness of God. The grace of salvation was revealed on Mount Sion, and the law came from the gospel of Christ which had been present before the publication of the law. The name “Immanuel” suggests to Calvin that the continual presence and communication of Christ adheres to the role of Mediator. The substance which the law reveals is primarily "nostre medecin spirituel" which heals us by communicating Christ’s righteousness to us. The grace of Christ as a remedy (remede) refers to the

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67 Serm. Eph. 4:24 (437-441, CO 51.621-625).
68 Serm. 1 Tim. 1:5 (26b-37b, CO 53.29-40, esp. 28a-28b, CO 53.31-32).
69 Serm. Eph. 2:10 (165-169, CO 51.383-386).
72 Serm. Ps 48:2 (SC 7.51); Mic. 4:2 (SC 5.107, 114-120).
73 Serm. Matt. 1:23 (CO 46.266-269); Deut. 7:21 (336a-337a, CO 26.563-565).
whole process of salvation. The positive aspect of Christian freedom is founded on the fact that to die to the law in Christ is to die in the gospel, that is, when clothed by the grace of the Mediator, “a deadly death (mort mortelle)” becomes “a quickening death (mort vivifiate).” Accordingly, Christian freedom is nothing else than to believe in Christ’s mediation during the whole process of salvation.  

These four characteristics feature the varying aspects of Christ’s mediation of the law. As the Mediator of reconciliation, Christ accepts both our persons and our imperfect works by imputing his righteousness to us. In so doing, Christ reveals himself as the fulfilment of the law. As the Mediator of all teaching, Christ interprets and reveals the original meaning of the law so that we may ultimately be aware of its substance and truth. As the Mediator of intercession, finally, Christ prays for us and makes us lift up our hearts to God. Through the continual intercession of Christ, who is the head, the regenerate are instructed and exhorted to live according to the law.

As Ronald S. Wallace indicates, for Calvin, preaching is “a means whereby Christ establishes His rule in the hearts of His people.” As a result of the observations above, we recognize that Calvin’s concept of Christus mediator legis bears both Christological and soteriological significance and ranges over not only the realm of salvation history but also the whole process of personal salvation. Thus Calvin’s concept of lex vivificandi is due to his linking the normative nature of the law and Christ’s mediation of the law, which in turn demonstrates the theological foundation of Calvin’s dynamic understanding of the law.

Like Calvin, both Melanchthon and Bucer have a dynamic view of salvation based on the double imputation of Christ. However, Melanchthon fails to grasp the internal relationship between the righteousness of Christ and the righteousness of the law because he believes that the law always works primarily as lex accusans prior to

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77 For the threefold mediation of the law, see thesis 4.4.2-4.
78 Ronald S. Wallace, Calvin’s Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1953), 85.
faith. Bucer’s Christological understanding of the law is similar to that of Calvin, since both teach the embodiment of the grace of Christ in the law by the work of the Spirit of Christ. They both argue that the normative character of the law is not abandoned even when it performs its punitive office. However, with regard to the continual mediation of Christ in the course of the soteriological application of the grace of Christ to the office and use of the law, the difference between them is rather prominent. While Calvin points out the coherence between Christology and soteriology concerning the office and use of the law by the concept of Christ’s mediation, Bucer only refers to the continuing efficacy of the law which is sustained and revealed by the gospel for the sake of explaining the normative use of the law for the regenerate. This characteristic feature of Bucer has fundamental affinity to Bullinger’s covenantal understanding of the law. We should keep in mind that for Bullinger it is the frame of the promise and fulfilment of the law in salvation history that is primarily considered as opposed to its Christological origin, i.e., the substance of the law.

It can be properly argued that Calvin’s literary and historical interpretation of the law was influenced by his Christological understanding of the law based on Christ’s mediation of the law and on its soteriological application. Calvin differentiates his biblical interpretation from Jewish literal interpretation. For him, the historicity of the law reflects the historical presence and office of the Mediator and his historical biblicism is supported by the dynamic nature of Christ’s mediation. Accordingly, the true meaning of each individual law should be pursued in view of its Christological relevance.

Calvin’s peculiar position on the law originates from his view of its nature and substance rather than from his attitude towards the office and use of the law. His stance on the theological use of adiaphora, to take but one example, clearly bears

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79 For Melanchthon’s view of the law, see thesis 6.3.1, 7.3.2.
80 For Bucer’s view of the law, see thesis 6.3.2, 7.3.4.
81 For Bullinger’s view of the law, see thesis 7.3.3.
82 For the historical interpretation of the law in the Old Testament, see thesis 5.4.
83 For the Christological understanding of the law in the Old Testament, see thesis 5.2-3, 6.
witness to this point.\(^84\) Luther’s and Melanchthon’s assertion of the wide extent of *adiaphora* is due to their negative view of the law as *lex accusans*. Because the regenerate have living faith (*fides viva*) to submit themselves to the rule of the law voluntarily, both Reformers argue, they are not obliged to its bondage any longer.\(^85\) This assertion is based on their conviction that external, indifferent things can be sufficiently ruled by natural law and civil law.\(^86\) Calvin also accepts the concept of living faith, but on the basis of Christ’s continual mediation for believers.

Calvin’s view of living faith is different from those of Luther and Catholic theologians. Luther believes that there is no specific regulation of the law that is needed for the Christian life because “a living faith ‘spontaneously’ fulfils the demands of divine law.”\(^87\) On the other hand, Catholic theologians view a living faith as based on *iustitia inhaerens*, which parallels the *fides efficax caritate* that is testified in Galatians 5:6. For them, *fides viva et efficax* signifies the qualification or status of a believer rather than a persuasion of heart by imputed grace.\(^88\) Adhering to

\(^84\) For the theological use of the principle of *adiaphora* in relation to God’s accommodation, see thesis 4.5.2.

\(^85\) With regard to the validity of the law, Benjamin B. Warfield sees the difference between Luther and Calvin in the fact that while Calvin emphasizes the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit in dealing with the Christian life, Luther concentrates more on the liberty of the Christian man. *Calvin and Augustine* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1956), 105-106.

\(^86\) Steinmetz explains why Luther was generous about the extensive use of images in the church in this way: “Natural law requires that God alone be honored and worshiped. The prohibition of images, on the other hand, is a time-bound application of this principle to the situation to the Jews.” *The Reformation and the Ten Commandments*, Interpretation 43/3 (1989), 261. Similarly to Luther, Melanchthon admits the wide realm of *adiaphora* as to the validity of civil law in his commentary on Colossians 2:20. He writes: “Indeed, such traditions as specified fastings, festivals, forms of dress, have this one end function. It is to control and govern unrighteousness or inexperienced people, such as children and the common people.” *Paul’s Letter to the Colossians*, tr. D. C. Parker, 68.

\(^87\) Luther distinguishes “a living faith” from “a justifying faith.” While the former is related to “the doing of good works,” which he calls the third element of the Christian life, the latter is related to “repentance or contrition and grief, and faith,” which he calls the first two elements. *Instructions for the Visitors of Parish Pastors in Electoral Saxony*, LW 40, 275, 277.

\(^88\) In his letter to the Genevans, Sadolet points out living faith as the faith accompanying hope and love: “Est enim amplum et plenum vocabulum Fides, nec solum in se credulitatem et fiduciam continet, sed spem etiam et studium obedendi Deo, et illam, quae in Christo maxime perspicua nobis facta est, principem et dominam christianarum omnium virtutum caritatem: qua in caritate proprie et peculiariter spiritus sanctus inest, vel potius ipse est caritas” (CO 5.374-375). For Sadolet’s argument for the supremacy of *caritas* in obtaining eternal life, see V. E. d’Assonville, “Observations on Calvin’s Responsio to Cardinal Sadoletus’s Letter to the Genevans,” in *Calvinus Servus Christi*, 156-157. Calvin also does not maintain bare faith secluded from love and takes a similar position as Sadolet in *Inst. 3.2.41-43* (CO 2.431-434). However, in explaining the living faith, Calvin appeals specifically to the special work of the Spirit of Christ and the believer’s union with Christ rather than the inner working of faith itself. In his reply to Sadolet, Calvin especially emphasizes this point: “Nam
the normative nature of the law, Calvin insists that Christian freedom from the bondage of the law refers only to its occasional or accidental office. Therefore, in regard to the original nature of the law, Christian freedom signifies freedom in the law rather than freedom from the law. From this perspective, he admits the wide extent of the use of the law for the Christian life, but strictly restrains the realm of adiaphora. This stance of Calvin is evoked by his conviction of Christ’s continual mediation of the interpretation, work, and exhortation of the law.

Some reflections on Calvin’s sermons on Christ and the law lead us to the conclusion that his concept of Christus mediator legis, based on his normative understanding of the nature of the law, refers not only to the person of Christ the Mediator, who is represented and finally revealed as the substance and truth of the law, and his fulfilment of the law, but also to the office and use of the law for the whole process of salvation and its practices in the Christian life, distinctively with reference to the theological use of adiaphora. Due to Christ’s mediation for the instructive and pedagogical office of the law (Christ’s mediation as Teacher), Calvin’s epistemology, explored by the framework of the knowledge of God and men, reveals its uniquely dynamic feature with reference to the teaching (doctrina) of God’s accommodation to human capacity. Due to Christ’s mediation in the theological use of the law (Christ’s mediation as Reconciler), the law, which has a normative nature as lex vivendi, works as lex accusans and lex vivificandi at the same time for the total restoration of the image of God among the regenerate. Thus, we can

si Christum possidet qui iustitiam est adeptus, Christus autem nusquam sine suo spiritus est, inde constat, gratuiam iustitiam cum regeneratione necessario esse coniunctam. Proinde si rite intelligere libet, quam sint res individuac, fides et opera, in Christum intuere: qui, ut docet apostolus, in iustitiam et sanctificationem datus nobis est (I Cor. 1, 30). Ubi ergo cunque ista quam gratuiam praedicamus fidei iustitia est, illic est Christus. Ubi Christus, illic spiritus sanctificationis: qui animam in vitae novitatem regeneret* (CO 5.398). Concerning the concept of fides viva et efficax (la foy vive et efficace) in Article 5 of the Regensburg Colloquy (CO 5.525), Lane, “Calvin and Article 5 of the Regensburg Colloquy,” 13-16.

89 Zachman explains the difference between Luther’s and Calvin’s view of adiaphora by his reference to their peculiar stance on conscience. The Assurance of Faith, 229-243, esp. 242-243. For the different view of adiaphora between Calvin and Melanchthon in their letters, see Timothy Wengert, “‘We Will Feast Together in Heaven Forever’: The Epistolary Friendship of John Calvin and Philip Melanchthon,” in Melanchthon in Europe, ed. Karin Maag (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999), 33-36. Also, for Melanchthon’s view of adiaphora, see Clyde L. Manschreck, “The Role of Melanchthon in the Adiaphora Controversy,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 48/1 (1957): 165-182.
recognize that the conditionality of the covenant cannot be divorced from its mutuality, which rests totally on the principle of *sola fide* and *sola gratia*. Finally, due to Christ’s mediation for the perfection of eternal life in the Christian life (Christ’s mediation as Intercessor), the believer’s communion with the body of Christ and continual communication with his righteousness is set forth and vouchsafed. Therefore, Christian freedom signifies the believer’s fulfilment of the law of Christ by bearing his yoke (Matt. 11:28) with firm conviction of his continual mediation.\(^9\)

This is the core and culmination of Calvin’s Christological understanding of the law in terms of his concept of *Christus mediator legis*. *Soli Deo gratia in aeternum!*

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