H.R. MACKINTOSH, T.F. TORRANCE AND THE RECEPTION OF THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH IN SCOTLAND - WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF THE SELF-REVELATION OF GOD

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been entirely composed by myself, and that the work which it represents is solely mine.

Signed:

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August 1994
This thesis challenges the account of the reception of Barth's theology within Scotland, offered by T.F. Torrance; with reference to the concept of the self-revelation of God. I demonstrate that Torrance offers an established understanding, which I term the Discontinuity Scenario. Thereafter, I contend that within this Scenario there is posited a discontinuity between Barth's thought and that of Ritschl and Herrmann. Equally, I maintain that in Scotland, H.R. Mackintosh is presented as the principal recipient of Barth's thought. Thus, I grant to the Discontinuity Scenario the status of a 'paradigm'. In contrast, I offer an alternative, termed the Continuity Scenario. A central element in this Scenario is the contention that Mackintosh's positive response to Barth, turned, not on a rejection of Ritschl and Herrmann, but, on an appreciation of the fact that Barth was progressing in the same direction as Herrmann, with respect to an understanding of the nature of God's revelation. Further, I demonstrate that Mackintosh's perspective upon the Ritschl/Herrmann-Barth relationship was a distinctive one. In turning to examine Herrmann and Barth, I maintain that Barth's understanding can only be comprehended in the light of its relationship to the thought of Herrmann. In examining Torrance's thought, I indicate his indebtedness to Barth, and that, with the publication of, Theological Science, he believes he discerns within Barth an epistemology paralleling that found in modern physics; which, in turn, may mutually influence the substantial content of the disciplines of theology and science. I shall contend that this element in Torrance's thought is illegitimate from the standpoint of Barth's thought; on the basis that Barth's understanding of the nature of God's self-revelation is correlated to an understanding of the boundaries of theology, which would prohibit Torrance's understanding. This correlation is one that is also found within the thought of Wilhelm Herrmann. Thus, I contend that the correlation found in Barth is an integral element of his conception of the self-revelation of God, which reflects Herrmann's influence. Therefore, I contend that Barth's concept of the self-revelation of God is best understood as standing in continuity with the thought of Herrmann. Torrance does not discern this continuity, and fails to acknowledge that in the development of his thought he stands in discontinuity with Barth, whose position would proscribe any attempt to cross the boundaries of his discipline into the grounds of another. However, even as he stands in discontinuity, Torrance claims fidelity to Barth, and offers an account which, for all its power, is incoherent.
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The following abbreviations have been used, with respect to the titles of journals:

EQ = Evangelical Quarterly
ExT = Expository Times
RTR = Reformed Theological Review
SBET = Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology
SJTh = Scottish Journal of Theology
USQR = Union Seminary Quarterly Review
WTJ = Westminster Theological Journal

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In the quotation of sources, I have rendered all 'author's emphasis' by underlining. I have at no point added any marks of emphasis myself. The emphases contained herein subsist wholly in the words of the text.

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Within the Scottish theological scene during the latter half of the Twentieth Century, there has undoubtedly been no more powerful a voice than that of Thomas Forsyth Torrance. The range of his thought has been immense, and the influence of his contribution considerable, though perhaps this is less so in Scotland than it once was. In particular, he has championed the cause of Karl Barth as the theologian par excellence, and has presented his own thought as standing in self-conscious fidelity to that of Barth. As an element within this presentation, he has offered an account of the reception of the theology of Barth within Scotland in which H.R. Mackintosh is portrayed as the principal positive recipient of Barth's thought, and that Mackintosh's response to Barth turned upon the rejection of a line of theological thought which had formerly been highly influential upon him, namely that of Albrecht Ritschl and Wilhelm Herrmann. The cause of this rejection (which parallels Barth's own rejection) is adduced to be Mackintosh's dissatisfaction with the understanding of the nature of Revelation found in Ritschl and Herrmann. This, in turn, stands in contrast to the warm reception given by him to the said understanding which he finds in Barth.

Thus, within Torrance's presentation, there is a theological core which finds its focus in the particular understanding of the nature of Revelation presented by Barth, which, in turn, provides the essential clue to discerning the contours of the history of theology. A specific example of how this operates in practise may then be observed in his treatment of H.R. Mackintosh; that is, the understanding of the nature of Revelation
furnished by Barth provides a means of identifying those theologians whose teaching stands in continuity with the truth of God's self-revelation, (as understood by Torrance) and, logically, those whose teaching does not.

I intend to regard Torrance's understanding of Barth's concept of the self-revelation of God, and his account of the reception of Barth's theology in Scotland, as an established 'paradigm'; that is, a relatively established theological understanding, linked to a particular account of the history of theology. This I shall identify as the Discontinuity Scenario, since I would maintain that its most noted effect is its highlighting of those whose theology stands in a relationship of discontinuity to that of Barth, especially Barth's immediate theological predecessors.

However, in my judgement, this is a 'paradigm' which is unsatisfactory. This I judge to be so, in the light of the fact that the theological core which lies at the heart of Barth's understanding of the nature of Revelation, is intimately related to the theological core which lies at the heart of Herrmann's understanding. (The establishing of the nature, or degree, of this relationship, shall be an integral element within the thesis.) The failure to acknowledge, or recognise, this relationship, (that is, to render a satisfactory account of his own theological history) may potentially render Barth a poor guide as to the history of theology, and this, in my judgement, he has become. Thus, Torrance, who explicitly follows Barth's guidance on matters concerning the history of theology, has at the heart of his own theological position a theological concept whose history he has not properly discerned. Therefore, in order to test the received 'paradigm', I propose to offer an
alternative, which I shall identify as the Continuity Scenario. This alternative shall seek to establish that Barth's concept of the self-revelation of God is intimately related to elements within the teaching of Ritschl and Herrmann. Thus, within certain limits, it may properly be regarded as being in continuity with that teaching.

Therefore, in order to establish the proposed Continuity Scenario, I intend initially to examine the extent to which other interpreters have been able to read the relationship between Ritschl and Herrmann, and Barth, in terms of theological continuity rather than discontinuity. Thereafter, I shall seek to demonstrate that Mackintosh's positive response to Barth, turns, not on a rejection of Ritschl and Herrmann, but, precisely on a recognition of the fact that Barth's understanding of the nature of Revelation was one that was shared by Herrmann, and others influenced by Ritschl. Alongside this, I shall seek to place Mackintosh within the wider Scottish scene, and, in so doing, indicate the distinctive nature of his perspective upon the relationship between Ritschl and Herrmann, and Barth. I shall then turn to examine Ritschl, Herrmann and Barth, in respect of their understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God, and shall contend that Barth's concept (despite protestations to the contrary) can only be comprehended in its relation to the thought of Herrmann. I shall then seek to expound the thought of T.F. Torrance, demonstrating its dependence throughout on the thought of Karl Barth. However, I shall contend that, with the writing and publication of, Theological Science, and in his later writings, Torrance claimed to discern within Barth a theological epistemology paralleling the scientific epistemology of Einstein, et
al. I shall make clear that this is a self-conscious attempt to advance beyond Barth, albeit one which he claims has received the endorsement of Barth. This later development within Torrance's understanding is one which I shall contend to be illegitimate, judged from the standpoint of Barth's thought. I shall suggest that the basis for this judgement lies in the fact that Barth's concept of the self-revelation of God is correlated to a particular understanding of the discipline of theology, which would prohibit in principle the development which Torrance proposes. This concept, correlated as it is, will, in my judgement, indicate that Barth's position (with respect to the concept of the self-revelation of God) can only be explained in terms of its relationship to the thought of Herrmann, and the broader Ritschlian tradition. That is, Barth's position is best understood in terms of its being in continuity with the thought of Herrmann. I shall maintain that Torrance's failure to discern the extent to which Barth's concept stands in continuity with that of Herrmann, and his failure to acknowledge that the later development of his own thought places him in discontinuity with Barth, renders his account of the history of theology incoherent.

In conclusion, I shall contend that we should set aside the Discontinuity Scenario, on the basis that it is an inadequate account of the history of theology from within a Scottish perspective, and, that it provides an inadequate basis for understanding the concept of the self-revelation of God within the thought of Karl Barth.
CHAPTER 1 - THE RECEPTION OF THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH:
TWO PERSPECTIVES ON THE SCOTTISH SITUATION

i) T.F. Torrance and the Reception of the Theology of Karl Barth

The charting of the reception of Barth's theology poses a considerable task, such that some, 'limiting strategy', is necessary. (1) Thus, in the English-speaking world, we are confronted by such an array of responses, that we are indebted to the efforts of S.W. Sykes, (2) and R.H. Roberts, (3) who have attempted to propose such a, 'strategy'. In turning then to the narrower question of the reception of Barth in Scotland, we are, apparently, faced with a simpler task. For, however Sykes and Roberts may regard the response of the rest of the Anglophonic world, they are agreed upon the positive character of the Scottish response. Thus, Sykes may say of that response in the 1930's, that, 'From now onwards it is in Scotland that Barth is taken with the greatest seriousness in the English-speaking world'. He further suggests that the, 'crowning monument', to this, is the publication, by the Edinburgh publishers, T.&T. Clark, of the English Translation of the Church Dogmatics, which he links to the, 'evident enthusiasm', of T.F. Torrance, the co-editor of the translation. (4) Similarly, Roberts contends that, 'it is clear from an early stage that enthusiasm for Barth's work...was primarily a Scottish attribute.', with Torrance having, 'been responsible for the dominant interpretation of the mature work of Barth in Britain'. (5) The, 'limiting strategy', of any study of Scotland would thus seem to have emerged from within rather than having to be imposed from without.

Further, Sykes suggests that Torrance's 1962, 'contributions to the interpretation of Barth...mark the
beginning of a new and more sophisticated era for English-language reception of Barth.' (6) Sykes refers here to Torrance's book, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology 1910-1931, (Hereafter, Karl Barth: An Introduction) and to his, "Introduction", to the papers in the Barth collection, Theology and Church, (7) and sees them as having three obvious characteristics. Initially, there is the enthusiasm of Torrance for his subject, and finally there is the tendency, 'to lay special emphasis...on the methodological affinity of Barth's theology to that of an exact science.' (8) Lying between these, Sykes notes that Torrance particularly stresses that Barth, 'is fundamentally to be seen as a catholic theologian wrestling with the whole history of Christian thought in the light of the Nicene faith that God communicates himself in his revelation.' (9) Thus, with respect to the theological content of Barth's programme, Sykes highlights Torrance's stress on Revelation, and in particular the concept of God's self-revelation, suggesting that herein lies Barth's major contribution to Protestant thought. (10)

We are therefore presented with a straightforward, albeit brief, account of the Scottish situation, in which it would seem that Barth-reception has proceeded under the direction of T.F. Torrance, with his having offered a self-consistently 'Barthian' interpretation of Barth, which suggests that Barth marks the end of one theological era and the inauguration of another. It will be my intention to examine this account of the history of theology, with particular reference to the concept of the self-revelation of God, and subject it to critical scrutiny. Further, we shall offer, in the light of our examination of the Scottish situation, an alternative scenario on the place of Barth within the wider theological landscape, and, focussing again on the
question of God's self-revelation, suggest that Barth's theology exhibits considerable affinities to the theology in which he was schooled, namely that of Wilhelm Herrmann. From within this Scottish perspective we shall demonstrate that, alongside the scenario offered by Torrance, there was presented the possibility of understanding Barth's theology in terms which stressed the continuity between Barth's theology and that of later Ritschlianism, as opposed to the stress on discontinuity offered by Torrance. Thus, though we cannot ignore the course of history since the advent of Barth, it seems to me that we may re-read that advent from the perspective of those who did not discount the legacy of Ritschlian thought, and arrive at a very different understanding of Barth. This understanding, we trust, will enable us to comprehend more fully the true nature of Barth's theological programme, and in particular his concept of the self-revelation of God. It will be clear from this proposal, that a considerable revision of Scottish theological history is to be offered, particularly with respect to the place of T.F. Torrance, but equally, and critically, we shall reassess the place of H.R. Mackintosh, Torrance's teacher and the person who is regarded by Torrance as having turned Scottish theology away from Ritschlianism and towards Barth. We shall challenge this picture of Mackintosh, and point to his having had a more complex appreciation of Ritschl, Ritschlianism and Barth, than Torrance allows for.

Since, as suggested, a major revision in the reading of Scottish theology, particularly that of T.F. Torrance and that which he himself interprets, is being proposed, it seems appropriate that we review in somewhat more detail the career of T.F. Torrance (11) and pay particular attention to his early interaction with Karl Barth.
T.F. Torrance was born on the 30th of August 1913 at Chengtu, Szechwan, China; son of missionary parents, his father being the Rev. Thomas T. Torrance. His University education began in 1931, graduating from Edinburgh in 1934 with an M.A., having been taught by such noted philosophers as Norman Kemp Smith, (Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, 1919-1945) and his, 'revered teacher', (12) A.E. Taylor (Professor of Moral Philosophy, 1925-1941). Thereafter, he entered the Faculty of Divinity within the University in 1934, graduating in 1937 as a B.D. His principal teachers at this time were Hugh Ross Mackintosh in Systematic Theology, John Baillie in Divinity, Daniel Lamont in Practical Theology and Apologetics, Hugh Watt in Church History, Norman Porteous in Old Testament, and William Manson in New Testament. (13) Although our attention shall focus upon Mackintosh and, in part, Baillie, we should not ignore the possible influence of others upon Torrance. Lamont, for example, in, Christ and the World of Thought, demonstrates an enthusiastic openness to Barth and had a high estimation of his theological significance. (14) Porteous was himself a student of Karl Barth at Münster over the Winter Semester, 1928-29 and a contributor to the German, Barth Festschrift of 1936, (15) while Torrance may write of Manson, that, 'He influenced me more intimately than any other of my teachers and over the years he had become more and more a spiritual father.' (16) This influence is seen particularly in Torrance's book, Space, Time and Resurrection, (17) and what Torrance seems to have in mind, as regards Manson's influence, is his notion of theological exegesis, or, 'depth-exegesis', which, 'enabled him to penetrate through the surface treatment of pattern and form', in order to elucidate the, 'substance', of the New Testament. (18)
However, it is H.R. Mackintosh who is particularly credited by Torrance with introducing him to Barth's thought, and that introduction came through Mackintosh's lectures of 1935-36, which formed the basis of Mackintosh's book, *Types of Modern Theology*. (19) This book reflected Mackintosh's coming to terms with, *C.D. I/1*, and is regarded by Torrance as a key text for the introduction of Barth to the English-speaking world. Equally, Mackintosh's successor, G.T. Thomson, the translator in 1936 of *C.D. I/1*, may be regarded as one who would continue to direct attention towards the significance of Barth's thought. (20) Further possible influences may potentially be discerned in John Baillie's considerable awareness of the early Barth, while Torrance also refers to John McConnachie, as one who introduced him to Barth in the early years. (21) We may also note that John Dickie, (Professor of Systematic Theology, Knox College, Dunedin, N.Z.), delivered at New College in 1936, a series of lectures, *Fifty Years of British Theology*, and in his consideration of, "The Reaction to German Theology (Especially in Scotland)", he pointed, as we shall later see, to an essential continuity between Ritschlian and Barthian thought. (22)

Torrance studied for two semesters in the academic year 1937-38 under Barth at Basel, and in particular he focussed upon, *C.D. I/2*, published in German in 1938, and heard Barth lecture on the material which was to be the content of, *C.D. II/1*. Torrance himself testifies to the impact of, *C.D. II/1*, and states that he regards this as the high point of the whole, *Church Dogmatics*. (23)

Torrance notes that his doctoral thesis, *The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers*, began with Barth's suggestion that he attempt to work out the, 'inner connection giving coherence to whole structure of
Christian theology'. This connection was to be found in the notion of 'Grace', and Barth suggested he looked at the development of the notion in the Second Century. (24)

This project was delayed, firstly by Torrance being appointed to the Chair of Systematic Theology at Auburn Seminary, New York, in 1938, and then by the Second World War. Torrance records that he went to Auburn at, 'the insistence of John Baillie'. (25) He records the extent to which his time at Auburn was an opportunity to work out all that he had learned, and was learning, from Barth. He writes:

'Church Dogmatics, I.2, absorbed me, especially the sections on 'The Incarnation of the Word' and 'The Outpouring of the Holy Spirit'. Here I found myself getting more deeply into the coherent structure of Christian theology under guidance of Barth's discussion of the problem of Christology, and in the light of his powerful recovery of theological ontology which had begun with Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf of 1927.' (26)

He then notes that a parallel concern at this time, was the elucidation of the relationship between theology and science, and writes:

'I gave a course of lectures in Auburn on theology and science, not only to help elucidate the scientific nature and structure of the theology of redemption and creation, but to work out in some measure the interrelations between Christian theology and natural science, and thus to begin to clear the ground for rigorous Christian dogmatics expressed within the contingent rational order with which the Creator has marvellously endowed the universe and which under God is being increasingly brought to light through our scientific inquiries.' (27)

Regrettably these lectures have never been published, so that we are unable to ascertain the extent to which Torrance was reliant upon Barth in this attempted elucidation. Nonetheless, and in retrospect, Torrance
states that the concerns noted above, were with him from the very beginning of his theological career. (28)

In 1939 Torrance was appointed to a post in the Department of Religion of Princeton University, but the onset of the Second World War persuaded him to forego this and return to Britain. He continued his studies at Oxford from 1939-1940, being in touch with Donald MacKinnon, and MacKinnon acknowledges his, 'debt to the Rev. T.F. Torrance of New College, Edinburgh', (29) in formulating the insights which led to MacKinnon's book, God the Living and the True, the theological background to which was the, 'theology of revelation'. (30) MacKinnon's book is characterised by R.H. Roberts, as an attempt, 'to recast Barth's early dialectic', but this effort was to be both, 'daring and abortive'. (31) Thus, we note that Torrance would seem to have been aware of an approach to the interpretation of Barth, which, while not sustained, offered a radically different standpoint to the one which Torrance would eventually champion. Torrance's self-presentation of his reception of Barth is, as we have observed, of one who has offered a consistent, "orthodox" Barthianism', (32) from the very beginning, and while we cannot sustain a challenge to this view in the absence of hard evidence, we can legitimately point to his involvement in a circle which, even if only embryonically, offered the possibility of a very different understanding.

Following upon his time at Oxford, Torrance was ordained as a minister of the Church of Scotland and inducted into the parish of Alyth : Barony, on 20th March 1940. During the further years of the War he served with the Church of Scotland Huts and Canteens from 1942-1943, (33) and on the cessation of War, returned to Basel in 1946 to complete his thesis, under the direction of Oscar
Cullmann. B.J.A. Gray suggests that, with respect to Torrance's thesis, the influences most discernible are those of Manson and Mackintosh rather than of Barth, 'although the theme is within the framework of Barth's thought.' (34) Gray particularly highlights Mackintosh's, The Christian Apprehension of God, (35) as a guiding influence. The content of this book, for example, on, "The Idea of Revelation", (36) is, in my estimation, at some distance from that of Barth. Once more, a slight question mark is raised against Torrance's 'seamless robe' presentation of his faithfulness to Barth.

On 12th November 1947 he was translated to the parish of Aberdeen : Beechgrove, where H.R. Mackintosh had once ministered, and on 30th June, 1950, he was appointed to the Chair of Church History at New College, Edinburgh. On 1st October 1952, he succeeded G.T. Thomson and was translated to the Chair of Christian Dogmatics, a position he held until retirement in 1979. (37)

Throughout the course of his theological career, Torrance has returned to Barth on numerous occasions and by his shared editorship of the English translation of the Church Dogmatics, and his interpretation of Barth, he has established himself as one of the foremost Barth exponents in the English-speaking world. These things in themselves, make Torrance worthy of study, while, for our purposes, the account he presents has been largely predominant in Scotland.

ii) T.F. Torrance - 'Continuity' and 'Discontinuity'

Given what we have said, we must treat Torrance's position with considerable respect, but we should not concede that position without subjecting it to hard scrutiny. The best method of doing so would seem to me to
be to take the scenario which Torrance offers, which we shall call the Discontinuity Scenario, and offer an alternative to it, which we shall call the Continuity Scenario, and then test both in the light of the evidence which the scenarios claim to explain.

As a preliminary to this, we do well to ask, Is the invoking of the notions of 'Continuity' and 'Discontinuity', appropriate to the subject matter which we are studying? To answer this question, I would propose to outline a recent discussion of the problem of continuity, and thereafter highlight the fact that the concept of theological history utilised by T.F. Torrance is based on a model which inherently turns upon the notions of 'Continuity' and 'Discontinuity'.

S.W. Sykes in his book, The Identity of Christianity, suggests that, 'On the face of it there is no biblical precedent or basis for this consideration, [of the problem of continuity] since continuity was hardly a problem in the first decades of the Christian movement.' However, he notes that, 'the criterion of apostolicity is of remarkably early origin', and that this criterion, which implies a basis for continuity, is to be found within the New Testament. The challenge of Gnosticism, and the raising of questions for which no precedent was established in Scripture or oral traditions, raised the status of the question of continuity, and 'produced, precisely for the sake of preserving continuity, the distinction between the few and easily assimilated truths necessary for salvation, and the speculations permitted to the spiritual elite.' (38) Continuity is not a problem, 'so long as there can be confident affirmation of the identity of the contemporary Church with that of the apostolic Church.', but when criticism occurs which calls in question that confidence, such as happened at
the Reformation, the status of the question is again raised. Thus, at the Reformation, rival communities came into being which claimed to maintain continuity, such that, 'of the many episodes in which critics have unfavourably contrasted the present with the past the protest of the sixteenth-century Reformers was the most serious.' (39) The onset of the Enlightenment introduced deeper complexities into the overall issue of continuity, such that the nature of Scripture itself, and its role in providing a focus for the question of continuity, was called in question. Thereafter, appeal turned, 'away from a mere reference to to the biblical text, to a less formal and external criterion, such as biblical faith.' (40) Therefore, Sykes may conclude by suggesting that, from the eighteenth century onwards, continuity claims became essentially problematic. (41)

Sykes suggests that this analysis emerges, 'from a particular modern uncertainty, expressed in the question, What is Christianity? ', wherein the Christian tradition is faced with, for example, 'the multiple phenomena designated by the term "relativism"'. This, 'phenomena', in turn, 'present(s) peculiar and new challenges to theories of development, let alone of continuity in the Christian tradition'. (42) Thus, Sykes is clear that our modern situation is one in which we are prevented from asserting, in simplistic terms, that there are self-evident lines of continuity running through the diverse expressions of contemporary Christianity.

In the light of this situation, Sykes proposes to offer, 'some modest minimum conditions under which the identity of Christianity may be preserved.' (43) This is not to suggest that he is offering, 'any kind of "solution" of the identity crisis (if crisis there be) of contemporary Christianity.', for Sykes accepts in principle that there
will be theological pluralism, but equally he maintains that Church leaders are under obligation to provide a, 'proposal regarding the minimum conditions under which Christian identity may be optimally preserved'. (44)

Our necessarily telescoped overview of Sykes, provides us with a sufficient backdrop for our discussion, alerting us to the very real issue of stating what constitutes the irreducible minimum of a shared faith which is in continuity with the Christian tradition, though in the same moment highlighting the considerable difficulties facing any attempt to do so. Sykes himself has his own proposals which need not concern us, but we recall his declaring that they shall be minimal in character and necessarily modest. Equally, however, we may also recall Sykes, pointing to the fact that, for Torrance, Barth, 'is fundamentally to be seen as a catholic theologian wrestling with the whole history of Christian thought in the light of the Nicene faith that God communicates himself in his revelation.' (45) Thus, Sykes directs us to Torrance's identification of Barth's stress on the notion of God's self-revelation, as exemplified by the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, as providing the basis for Torrance's claim that Barth's theology is fundamentally a catholic theology, as against, 'a minor variant of Protestantism'. (46) Therefore, if continuity with the Nicene principle of the self-revelation of God, is the basis for Torrance's claim that Barth is the catholic theologian 'par excellence', we might, by reasonable deduction, find ourselves moved to ask, whether or not, we have uncovered the principle of continuity underlying Torrance's history of theology. That is, Is conformity with the concept of the self-revelation of God, as first enunciated at Nicaea, the irreducible minimum of any claim to be in continuity with the catholic Christian faith, as understood by T.F.
Torrance? If this is so, we might judge the proposal to be neither minimal nor modest, since it is offered, as we shall see, as a solution to the crisis of Christian identity, and as the rallying point for Christendom today. Therefore, let us examine Torrance's writings in order to demonstrate the validity, or otherwise, of this claim.

The earliest reference in Torrance to the notion that the concept of the self-revelation of God provides a potentially unifying theme within the history of theology, occurs in a book review of 1952, where he suggests that, for Athanasius, 'the uniqueness of God, and the uniqueness of His self-revelation.', are facts, 'of supreme importance.' (47) Further, 'the unique Revelation of God in Jesus Christ', acts as a critical control on all, 'illustrations and analogies', which we might draw upon to express our understanding of the nature of Christ. He then suggests that his reading of Athanasius, inevitably brings to mind, 'a great modern Athanasius, Karl Barth contra mundum, for it is precisely the same issue in which he is so energetically engaged, and it is basically the same answer which he gives.' (48) Therefore, we may observe an early pointer to that which is to come.

Equally, however, we note that his estimation of Nicaea would seem to be somewhat more equivocal than his later reading of it, for here Nicene Christology is seen as 'somewhat static and metaphysical', with Christ's Deity and Humanity being presented, 'quite apart from His work of redemption in death and resurrection.' (49) Thus, we might suggest that Torrance's estimate of Athanasius, Nicene theology, and the concept of the self-revelation of God as a unifying theme, are very much in embryo.
In a further assessment, of Barth's significance, it is evident that Torrance wishes to lift the name of Barth to the highest place, writing in 1955 that:

'Karl Barth is incontestably the greatest figure in modern theology since Schleiermacher, occupying an honoured position among the great elite of the Church - Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther and Calvin.' (50)

An honoured position indeed, though one we note which does not include the name of Athanasius, whose writings, as will be seen, Torrance takes to be the quintessential expression of Nicene theology. Further, we find this statement repeated verbatim in two later assessments of Barth in 1956 and 1958. (51)

We may note, in 1959, a coupling together of Athanasius, Calvin and Barth, as being highpoints in the development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but not as yet any developed notion of the concept of the self-revelation of God as a unifying theme in the history of theology. (52)

However, from 1962 onwards, we see the name of Athanasius increasingly invoked, and the emergence of a history of theology which appeals back to Nicaea (and beyond to the Apostolic witness) in order to establish an anchor-point for the notion of continuity. That is to say, we may see in embryo an approach to the history of theology which eventually blooms as Torrance engages more thoroughly with Athanasius, and Greek Patristic thought in general. Equally, we may note that initially this is to be found especially in the context of Torrance's discussions of Barth, though gradually assuming a wider significance. Thus, Torrance may suggest in his book, Karl Barth: An Introduction, that Barth, in the 'transition' period between, Die Christliche Dogmatik, in 1927, and, C.D. I/1, in 1932, was compelled to clarify his understanding...
of, 'the nature of Revelation.' (53) Torrance outlines the conclusions of Barth's clarifications thus:

'The content of Revelation is God, for what God gives is identical with the Giver. Hence when man believes in God he believes by believing Revelation, and when he believes Revelation he believes God himself, for Revelation is God. This relation of Revelation to God himself...was shown to involve the doctrine of the Trinity...But it was only when he re-wrote it in the Kirchliche Dogmatik that Barth managed to think it through sufficiently in relation to the Being of God, of his being Father, Son and Holy Spirit.' (54)

Torrance then notes that, at this juncture:

'(Barth's) studies in the history of dogma once more came to his help, for he saw more clearly that this was the great question lying behind the struggles of the Church in the fourth and fifth centuries, when it had to clarify its mind on the doctrine of the Trinity, in acknowledgement of the essential deity of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Spirit. That meant that the doctrine of Revelation and the doctrine of the Trinity were inseparable, for precisely in Revelation we have to do with the Being of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. That was now Barth's concern...Again, Barth's studies in the Reformation...convinced him that the same question was at stake in the struggle of the Reformers over justification by grace and the nature of Revelation...Hence the Reformation is to be understood as the struggle to reaffirm in its fulness the Nicene doctrine that God is himself the content of his revelation.' (55)

We thus begin to observe the development of a concept of theological continuity centring upon the notion of the identity of God with His Revelation, that is self-revelation, which is traced back from Barth through the Reformation to Nicaea. Similarly, in his 1962, "Introduction", to Barth's, Theology and Church, (56) Torrance may begin by amending his list of the great theologians in whose company Barth shall stand to include that of Athanasius. Thereafter, in the context of his discussion on Barth's understanding of the concept of self-revelation, where he suggests that for Barth, 'What
the Church insisted on guarding at all costs in the Nicene Christology is that God communicates himself in his revelation', (57) he may once again affirm that:

'Barth became convinced that one of the great decisive issues in the history of the Church, and therefore of theology, was the relation of revelation to the Being and Person of God himself...The Reformation represents a new struggle within the Church for the same truth expressed in the Council of Nicaea...The point of battle was doubtless the conception of grace, and the objectivity of divine grace was clarified in a struggle over justification by grace alone, but in and throughout it all it was the same truth, that in Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit God comes to us in Person and gives us himself.' (58)

Within this we may observe a form of theological, 'depth-exegesis', (59) wherein Torrance perceives that, at the Reformation, beneath the surface issue of, 'justification by grace alone', the critical issue was in fact the self-revelation of God, and that this establishes the element of theological continuity between Nicaea and the Reformation.

Therefore, we have in outline, the shape of Torrance's understanding of theological continuity, with the concept of self-revelation providing that continuous element, and this theological continuity being demonstrated in the discussions at Nicaea, the Reformation, and, in our own time, exemplified in Karl Barth. Of the latter, Torrance may ask rhetorically, in the title of an in 1962, "Barth - Equal to Athanasius ?". (60)

This understanding of theological continuity is further utilised and developed by Torrance, and, it seems to me, provides a theological and historical backbone to much of his work, such that we might reasonably identify it as a major element in his overall approach to theology. We may
highlight this at various points, and in so doing gain a sense of its importance for Torrance.

Naturally, Torrance sees the truth contained in the Nicene formula residing in the Apostolic witness itself, such that in, *Theology in Reconstruction*, (1965) he may speak of 'Theological activity', as a coming to terms with, 'the necessary and coherent thinking of the Apostles as they mediated the divine revelation of Jesus Christ to the world'. (61) Thus, he may suggest that:

'in formulating the homoousion the Fathers of Nicaea were penetrating into the interior logic of the apostolic witness, and allowing the truth to come to view in an orderly and articulate way...The homoousion is thus an articulation of what the Fathers of Nicaea had to think and say when they set themselves to a disciplined and objective inquiry into the biblical witness to Christ, for its basic formulation had already been given by the Apostles themselves.' (62)

We see then that, for Torrance, the ultimate source of theological continuity is, 'the Truth', inherent in the Apostolic witness, whose compelling logic is worked out by the Nicene Fathers, such that these, 'fathers spoke of him...(as)...the self-communicating, self-authenticating Word'. (63)

He may then speak of, 'The movement of the Reformation', as being, 'not contrary to but complementary to that of Nicaea, Ephesus, Chalcedon, etc.', noting that in the former the stress is on, 'the Acts of God in his being', and the latter on, 'the Being of God in his acts', a theme which will become fully developed by Torrance especially in relation to Barth. (64)

Indeed, it is Barth whom Torrance credits with working out the synthesis of the Nicene and Reformation positions, speaking, in an Obituary for Barth, of the,
'unparalleled synthesis', which he had accomplished. (65) Thus, Torrance presents Barth as opening up to us a way wherein our thought and experience of God may become coordinated through, 'the fundamental datum of Revelation'. This enables us in turn to understand:

'the way way in which Barth has tried to expound the Reality of God as the Being of God in His Act and the Act of God in His Being, in which he has thought through the ontological and relational doctrine of the Trinity as the ground of the fellowship which God seeks and creates between Himself and us.' (66)

In turning to what is perhaps Torrance's most significant book, Theological Science, (1969) we might be surprised to find only limited evidence in support of our proposed understanding, a fact which compels some explanation. We do see there a coupling together of Calvin and Barth, and a re-statement, in nearly verbatim form, of what was allegedly happening during Barth's 'transition' period between 1927 and 1932, but there is no invoking of Athanasius and Nicaea. Instead, it is to Anselm, Calvin and Kierkegaard that credit is extended, for providing Barth with the means to forge, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik. (67) What explanation might we offer for this? We should note, as Torrance does, that the 1969 book, Theological Science, is in fact based upon, 'the Hewett Lectures on "The Nature of Theology and Scientific Method", delivered in 1959 at Union Theological Seminary, New York'. (68) Torrance then catalogues the woes which prevented speedy publication, noting that the present work is, 'in a considerably expanded form'. (69) Indeed, he suggests that on each of the three occasions when he had attempted to finish, Theological Science, another book had emerged. (70) Thus, the initial point of origin, 1959, places the work in the period when, I would suggest that, Athanasius does not have the significance for Torrance that he will later assume, and we are alerted to the fact that much of
the material generated by attempted revisions of the Hewett Lectures appears elsewhere. If we turn to another work of 1969, Space, Time and Incarnation, which appeared in tandem with, Theological Science, (71) we see that Torrance is now beginning to turn towards a much fuller exploration of the implications of the Nicene theology. Thus, while Torrance's most noted work does not particularly advance the development of his concept of continuity in theological history, there seems to me to be good explanation for this, and ample indication of his concern to integrate Nicene theology into his overall theological framework.

In the light of his fuller exploration of Greek Patristic thought, Torrance is then able to point to the, 'continuing relevance of Athanasius', for our day, given that, 'the basic problems that confront us in modern theology...are essentially the same as those which Athanasius faced in the fourth century.' (72) However, Torrance wishes to go further than, 'continuing relevance', in his commendation of Athanasius, for he regards the theological method of Athanasius, whereby, 'he brought to light the immense epistemological significance of the homoousion and the structural centrality of the Father-Son-Spirit relation, both for the basic knowledge of God and for the organic pattern integrating all the doctrines of the Christian faith.', (73) as a paradigm for theological activity in our own time. Thus, Athanasius may be said to open, 'the possibility for a reconstruction of classical Catholic and Evangelical theology on its own proper scientific basis'. (74) Not only so, it may also serve as part of the basis for, 'the world-wide union of Christ's Church.' (75) Therefore, for Torrance, the theology of Athanasius may be seen as the Eastern counterpart to that of Barth in the West, with both providing crucial elements in the
line of theological continuity, which might in turn become the very basis of the renewal of the, 'one holy, catholic and apostolic Church', in our age. A vision which, to echo Sykes, is neither modest or minimal.

It seems to me that we have charted the development of Torrance's understanding of the concept of theological continuity to its point of relative maturity, and hereafter it shall be employed by him, more or less, as an axiom (among others) of theological interpretation. Therefore, in his writings throughout the 1980's it is a recurring theme, which, while not greatly developed beyond that which we have outlined, acquires significance by its continued affirmation. (76) Thus, he may speak of the teaching of Athanasius, as having, 'altered the whole concept of God, of his Being and his Act...the Act and Word of God we meet in Jesus Christ are eternally inherent in the Being of God, and...none other than the very Being of God himself is mediated to us'. In turn, he may suggest, 'That is the basic doctrine of God that in our day has been resurrected out of patristic theology and given massive expression in modern idiom by Karl Barth in his account of the Being of God in his Act, and of the Act of God in his Being'. (77) We should of course note that, while Athanasius, Calvin and Barth provide the major points of continuity, in respect of the concept of self-revelation, the concept is not utterly lost, to the intervening centuries, and to other places, and, for example, Hilary of Poitiers and Anselm gain honourable mentions. Thus, Torrance may point to Anselm being reproached by Aquinas, for insisting, 'that there is a distinct speaking (dicere) as well as understanding (intelligere) or a profound speech (locutio) inherent in the Being of God.' He continues:

'That meant for St. Anselm, as it had meant for the Nicene theology of St. Athanasius or St. Hilary, that...
God's Being is intrinsically eloquent and not mute for his Word dwells essentially in him, and that in his self-revelation to us in Word[,] God speaks to us in Person, communicating to us not just something about himself but his very Self, as is made clear in the incarnation of his eternal Word in the Person of Jesus Christ.' (78)

Thus, Hilary and Anselm may together be credited with having understood, 'the immense epistemological significance of the homoousion and the structural centrality of the Father-Son-Spirit relation...for the basic knowledge of God', and for having taken up, and developing, the insights first discerned by Athanasius. (79)

Equally, Torrance's own teacher, H.R. Mackintosh, may be presented as having understood the concept of the self-revelation of God in terms of the Nicene homoousion. Torrance writes of Mackintosh:

'Thus we find his insisting again and again that if the revelation of God in the New Testament is true, Jesus Christ must be in himself what he reveals; and if the New Testament message of salvation is true, what Jesus Christ does for us must be what God himself does...Apart from a real identity or unity between the revealer and the revealed, revelation suffers from a fatal discrepancy...Hence...like Athanasius and the Nicene theologians, Mackintosh laid constant emphasis upon the unique, incomparable and unshared connection in knowing and being and act between the Son and the Father...It was thus that his appropriation of the Nicene homoousion constituted the corner-stone of H.R. Mackintosh's Christology and soteriology.' (80)

Torrance then suggests that Mackintosh, with this concept of the the self-revelation of God, was able to judge, and find wanting, the concepts of divine revelation found in Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Indeed, Torrance may suggest that, 'Right from the start', of his theological career Mackintosh had operated with such an understanding of the nature of revelation, (81) and, further, contend that, *Types of Modern Theology*, is a testing of the theology
of, 'Schleiermacher, Hegel, Ritschl, Troeltsch, Kierkegaard and Barth.', in the light of the question, 'How far is it rooted in God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ?' (82) The conclusion of this questioning by Mackintosh, is, Torrance concludes, that he finds himself, 'instinctively drawn to the supreme truth upon which all Barth's theology turned, that God himself is the content of his revelation'. (83) Thus, in pointing to the immense personal impact upon him of H.R. Mackintosh, and in particular, Types of Modern Theology, we note the extent to which Torrance frames this in terms of his being in receipt of a concept of God's self-revelation.

We have charted the development of Torrance's understanding of continuity in sufficient depth, such that I trust it may be granted that we have identified an important element in his approach to theological interpretation. It remains to me to highlight the extent to which he utilises this approach in a series of six articles which appeared in 1986 to mark the Barth Centenary, (84) and which in fact provide the material for four of the eight chapters of Torrance's book, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, (as well as part of another) published in 1990. (85) From these especially, we see the extent to which Torrance finds the essential point of theological continuity in the concept of the self-revelation of God, and thus is able to link the heroic efforts of Athanasius to those of Calvin and Barth, with Athanasius and Barth being portrayed as standing, 'contra mundum for the substance of the Christian Faith'. (86) In so doing, he may again identify these as expressing the truth integral to the message of the New Testament, 'The Truth as it is in Jesus'. (87) There is nothing essentially new added in these articles, and so I shall restrict myself to a single quotation to sum up Torrance's position to date. He writes:
'As Karl Barth claimed, it was precisely that identification of divine revelation with God himself which lay behind the teaching of the Reformers, that the Word of God which we meet and hear in the Holy Scriptures is the very being and Person of God incarnate in Jesus Christ. Revelation, as both Calvin and Athanasius had taught, is "God speaking in Person". It was distinctive of Karl Barth that he should combine in a much more thoroughgoing way than before the Reformation emphasis upon the consubstantiality of the Word with the Nicene emphasis on the consubstantiality of the Son, for they were but two sides of one and the same truth. Revelation is God-in-his-revelation or God-in-his-Word, for in his revelation it is none other than God himself in his own personal being and reality that he communicates to us through Jesus Christ and in his one Spirit. (88)

The articles of 1986, and the subsequent volume of 1990, may be seen as marking the highpoint (to date) of Torrance's expression of an understanding of the nature of God's self-revelation, which is explicitly bound up with the idea that this provides the element of continuity throughout the history of theology. That is, those theologians who express the truths inherent in the concept of God's self-revelation, (as understood by Torrance) are in continuity with the Truth itself, with the theologians who have most markedly done so being, Athanasius, Calvin and Barth, and, in Scotland, H.R. Mackintosh.

As noted above, Athanasius and Barth are portrayed as standing, 'contra mundum', and thus in discontinuity with the prevailing theological trends of their days, as is H.R. Mackintosh, and this points us to a further element integral to Torrance's account of theological history. Indeed, we might judge this to be a logically necessary element in his account. That is, those identified by Torrance as being the principal contributors to the preservation of the truth inherent in the Apostolic witness, namely the self-revelation of God, acquire their
historical and theological significance, precisely through their being in opposition to those teachings which Torrance understands as denying, or diminishing, the self-revelation of God. Thus; Athanasius and Hilary are seen as standing in opposition to Arius, et. al., Anselm is to be viewed as opposing the, 'Augustinian-Thomist tradition of theology', (89) Calvin and the Reformers find their opponents in the Church of Rome, while H.R. Mackintosh and Karl Barth stand opposed to the line of theology exemplified in Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Therefore, it would seem that, for Torrance, theological history necessarily bifurcates, at the point where fidelity to the concept of the self-revelation of God is raised, into that stream of theology which is faithful to the Truth inherent in self-revelation, (Athanasius, Hilary, Anselm, Calvin and the Reformers, H.R. Mackintosh and Karl Barth) and that which finally is to be judged wanting (Arius, the 'Augustinian-Thomist tradition of theology', the Church of Rome, Schleiermacher and Ritschl). Thus, it seems evident that notions of 'continuity' and 'discontinuity' are inherent to Torrance's account of theological history.

We may at this juncture pause to ask the not unimportant question, What relation, if any, does Torrance's exposition bear to Karl Barth's understanding of the nature of theological history? R.A. Muller suggests that Torrance lifts the core of his approach from a single, very brief, and now eclipsed, essay, "Revelation", published in 1934, and translated into English in 1936 as part of, God in Action, (90). Torrance does indeed acknowledge that this was one of the works by which he was first introduced to Barth, (91) and in his 1990 book, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, he adds references (not found in the original articles on which the 1990 book is based) to this book which relate
directly to our concern. (92) However, and in spite of his acknowledgement, we may suggest that it is only in the 1986/1990 work that the impact of, "Revelation", becomes evident. (93) (There is a single reference in, Karl Barth: An Introduction. (94)) Muller continues by noting that the actual language in which Torrance presents his argument is drawn verbatim from this article, and the result is, in his view, a, 'rather unique overview of the great events of the history of doctrine'. (95) Clearly Muller is not enamoured with Torrance's position, (96) but this need not concern us.

What does concern us is his suggestion that the sole source of Torrance's view is a single, superseded essay by Barth, from which concern we are moved to ask, Is this true? As I have indicated already, Torrance only develops his position with explicit, though partial, dependence upon, God in Action, in his most recent work. Thus, the relative absence of references in the intervening period does make it difficult to draw any hard and fast conclusions. However, what is clear is that Torrance has taken an element in Barth's thought and developed it in a way which he judges to be faithful to Barth, and thus, as Muller puts it, 'What was implicit in Barth's essay becomes explicit in Torrance'. (97) However, I would question Muller's suggestion that Barth's exposition of, "Revelation", is the only source for Torrance's exposition, and the impression given that this somehow renders it eclipsed. For Torrance, quite legitimately in my opinion, may also cite from the, Church Dogmatics I/1, I/2 and, II/1, as well as, Die Christliche Dogmatik, in partial support of his suggestion that this is how Barth understood the history of theology, and there would seem to be several other uncited passages which would suggest that Torrance has not selected an idiosyncratic, and unrepresentative,
element out of the Barth corpus. (98) This is not to grant to Torrance that his further development of Barth's understanding is fully warranted by these various Barth texts, rather it is to say that Torrance believes it to be warranted.

Having established that Torrance has indeed taken up an element within Barth's thought and developed it, we might wish to reflect on whether or not the concept of the self-revelation of God was in fact the central issue under discussion at Nicaea in 325 A.D., or at Constantinople in 381 A.D., or at the Reformation, and whether it was understood so to be by the participants? Equally, We may question whether St. Hilary, or St. Anselm, can be adequately portrayed as wrestling primarily with the concept of self-revelation? Further, and most crucially, we have to ask, If we seek to comprehend H.R. Mackintosh in terms of his expounding a concept of the self-revelation of God, does it necessarily follow that he understands that in the same way as Barth? At the very least one would have to suggest that these points are debatable, and that any contention to the contrary would merit serious discussion. I do not propose to examine in detail each of the above cases, except that of H.R. Mackintosh, but it does seem appropriate to raise some preliminary questions in relation to Torrance's treatment of Athanasius and the Nicene theology, given the place assigned to it by Torrance.

In order to indicate the nature of the questions we might raise in respect of Torrance's use of the Nicene theology, let me briefly outline some of the issues which his approach to that theology would not seem to have taken into account. J. Pelikan for example, highlights the fact that the suggestion that there is any such thing
as, 'the Nicene faith', is in fact, 'an illusion', and that, 'the Nicene formulation left certain fundamental doctrinal questions unanswered and certain lingering suspicions unallayed.' (99) Equally, we note Pelikan's observation that Hilary, 'swore that he had not so much as heard of the Council of Nicea [sic] until he was about to go into exile in 356, but that he regarded homoousios and homoiousios as synonymous.' (100) Thus, we should not be misled by later presentations of the events of the Council, and its theology, which would tend to point to Athanasius being in the vanguard of an orthodox theological party which had a clear consensus in its understanding of the concept of the homoousios. Further, Pelikan notes that Athanasius, when seeking to establish the orthodoxy of the Nicene theology, cites the fact of his standing in continuity with Origen as being a guarantee of that orthodoxy, a fact which should make us very wary of retrospectively reading later theological positions back onto historical figures and then treating that reconstructed figure as if he or she was in fact representative of the original. (Origen is not, of course, to be found in Torrance's line of theological continuity. (101)) Later orthodoxies, Pelikan suggests, are a poor guide to the complexities of earlier historical discussions and persons. (102)

Our caution in treating Athanasius as an historical figure is increased the more so when we realise how little use he made of the concept of the homoousios in the years immediately following Nicaea in 325 A.D., a fact which R.P.C. Hanson draws our attention to. He notes a single use by Athanasius in, Orationes contra Arianos, dated by Hanson as c.339-345 A.D., and finds that, 'thereafter there is a complete silence in all ecclesiastical writers for nearly twenty years.' (103) It is only in, De Decretis, dated as 356 or 357 A.D., and
thereafter, that Athanasius begins to utilise and defend the term, and this can only mean that, 'the word homoousios when it was inserted in N[icaea] did not have the crucial importance in the eyes of people of that time which it was later supposed to have.' (104) We shall not enter into Hanson's very full discussion of the reasons for Athanasius' decision to use the term, save to say that he suggests that it was primarily for tactical reasons, and that had these tactical reasons not forced him to do so he would have been able to express his basic theological intention without any recourse to it. However, even this somewhat belated championing of the cause should not mislead us into thinking that his use thereafter is unambiguous and unconditional. (105) Hanson may then summarise his understanding of Athanasius, and suggest, 'It is evident...that Athanasius really thinks that the term homoousios must be balanced and modified by the use of other expressions and models in order to achieve the proper understanding of the Son's relation to the Father. The great slogan of the pro-Nicenes is not all-sufficient.' (106) Further, he suggests that Athanasius' inability to fully distinguish the Persons of the Trinity, means that finally, 'he could not fail to give the impression that he was in danger of falling into Sabellianism.' (107) Indeed, Hanson may note that, in respect of this full distinction, the Homoioussians were further advanced than Athanasius. (108) Clearly, Hanson's picture of Athanasius as theologian and of the Nicene theology, is markedly different from that of Torrance.

In all of this we sense the need for careful attention to historical detail in respect of the Council of Nicaea, given the possibility, as J.N.D. Kelly highlights, that Athanasius himself was later engaged in the production of, 'a politically misleading reconstruction of events.'
Through this act of, 'reconstruction' (in, *De Decretis* 20, dated by Kelly as 350 or 351 A.D.), he sought to suggest that the term *homoousios* had intentionally carried, from the beginning, the notion of an identity of substance (as opposed to shared generic substance) between the Father and the Son, a view which Kelly regards as historically untenable. This need for careful attention to historical detail is highlighted by J. Webster, in a review of Torrance's 1988 book, *The Trinitarian Faith*, (111) which may be regarded as the fullest flourishing to date of Torrance's work on Athanasius. Webster sees *The Trinitarian Faith*, as resting on two presuppositions which are utilised uncritically within the book, 'First, there is a straight line from the NT (itself a theologically uniform book) to the theology of Nicaea. Second, the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy in the early patristic period can be drawn very clearly.' (112) These presuppositions assume the place of axioms, and the absence of any attempt to justify their position leads to a presentation in which, 'the theological texts under consideration appear as detached, quasi-timeless statements brought into being simply by the fact that their authors submitted to the claims of God upon their minds.' Webster asks rhetorically, 'is this really a credible account of the functioning of fourth-century religious institutions, or of irascible characters like Athanasius ?' (113)

We do not claim that the issues highlighted above constitute a definitive rebuttal of Torrance's understanding of Athanasius, but it does seem that they raise such a range of critical questions that we would judge that a fuller examination of Athanasius, and the place of the concept of the self-revelation of God in his thought, would be as likely to finally undermine Torrance's version of the history of theology as the
course which I now propose to undertake. Equally, we may note that for the above writers, as far as I can observe, the concept of the self-revelation of God is nowhere used as a major explanatory tool in the exposition of Athanasius' thought.

Having reviewed Torrance's treatment of the concept of the self-revelation of God, and his construction of a history of theology around it, with Athanasius and Barth as the poles at either historical end, we must ask, What is the intention in so doing? My intention is to demonstrate the way in which Torrance uses the history of theology, in order that I may in turn utilise his general approach, (that is, tracing lines of continuity through the concept of the self-revelation of God) to demonstrate that, in the particular cases of H.R. Mackintosh and Barth, the lines of theological continuity point in a direction other than that which Torrance claims. I do not suggest that this approach to the history of theology is a valid one, nor that the concept of the self-revelation of God could be described as a valid shorthand summary of the theological basis of the Nicene Creed, or the Reformation, only that it is employed and understood as such by Torrance.

How then shall we, by utilising Torrance's general approach, demonstrate a basic flaw in that approach? It seems to me that if were to adopt Torrance's general approach to the history of theology, and then to challenge his particular account of a given theologian, we might legitimately ask whether that particular theologian was in fact in 'continuity', or not in 'continuity', with another theologian through the concept of the self-revelation of God. This could prove to be an essentially tautological exercise, for the initial premise (that is, the concept of the self-revelation of
God, as understood by Torrance) may be so structured as to admit into its ambit, only that limited number who are already deemed to be in continuity with the concept of the self-revelation of God, as understood by Torrance! However, if we can demonstrate, in relation to one or more of the theologians cited by Torrance, that their understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God might be judged, on balance, to point to their standing in substantial 'continuity' with a theological line other than that suggested by Torrance, then we can undermine his account of the history of theology.

An attempt to challenge Torrance's understanding of the history of theology based on an investigation of all the above movements and persons named, in order to determine the centrality of the concept of the self-revelation of God in their work, would indeed be a valid approach. However, it would also be an excessively lengthy one. Instead, as stated, I intend to focus on that concept in the work of Barth, as Torrance understands it to have been mediated to him, particularly by H.R. Mackintosh. Thus, my intention is to take H.R. Mackintosh, and Karl Barth, and assess the extent to which they can be read in the way that Torrance proposes, and shall do so by offering an alternative reading of the history of theology. In particular, I shall suggest that if Torrance had followed H.R. Mackintosh's assessment of Barth more carefully, he would have been as likely to read Barth as standing in continuity with the concept of the self-revelation of God as understood by Herrmann, as to see him standing in continuity with Athanasius. We might also judge in that connection that the concept of the self-revelation of God, as explicitly understood, is more likely to be found in Herrmann than in Athanasius. It is the demonstration of the possibility of the Herrmann-Barth connection, as understood/not understood by
Mackintosh and Torrance, that I wish to be the focus of this thesis.

iii) Two Scenarios on the Reception of Barth

Therefore, having I trust demonstrated that the notions of 'Continuity', and hence, 'Discontinuity', are integral to Torrance's account of the history of theology, I propose that we outline two alternative scenarios by which we might make sense of Barth-reception. These scenarios shall, at this point, be sketched in the broadest terms; there being firstly one which highlights the discontinuity which Torrance discerns within the history of theology between Karl Barth and his immediate predecessors, and then a counter position which suggests that we might better read the theological relationship between Barth and his predecessors in terms of continuity. The scenarios are as follows:

a) The Discontinuity Scenario

This proposes that we shall best understand the history of theology by seeing it as reflecting the theological discontinuity which Barth introduced, with respect to that theology which prevailed prior to him. We shall at this point proceed upon the assumption that Barth did indeed have a significant impact upon the theological scene, and shall seek to demonstrate the veracity of this in the Scottish context. There would be no more appropriate figure from whom to seek confirmation of this than Torrance, for, as we have already observed, it is he who has been the champion 'par excellence' of Barth's theology in Scotland. We do not seek in vain, for Barth is portrayed by Torrance as having severed the stream of theology which flowed from the wells of eighteenth and
nineteenth century, 'liberal theology'. He writes:

'(Barth) had come to look upon himself as sharing to some extent in the dominant theological trend led by the younger followers of Albrecht Ritschl, yet not without growing alienation... In his early period, it may be said, Karl Barth's theology falls within the thought-forms of Neo-Protestantism, as represented above all by the great Schleiermacher - that is, the liberal theology of religious individualism... In that sense, Barth admits, he was once a liberal theologian, even an enthusiastic one... Although his University training threw him into the prevailing philosophical and scientific discussion pursued within the tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries so that he was forced to think within its universe of discourse, yet from the start he felt deeply uneasy about it - it did not meet his theological hunger, for nowhere could he find a theology with radical clarity about its own positive task, but only one where the nature and function of theology were blurred through the subsidiary task of coming to grips with the spirit of the age.' (114)

b) The Continuity Scenario

This proposes that there is a continuity between Barth and the theology which prevailed prior to him, in respect of a concept which is crucial to both theologies, namely, the concept of the self-revelation of God. Given that it is the former scenario which has predominated in the Scottish context, under Torrance's influence, we shall devote considerable attention to the justification of this alternative, drawing upon a range of Barth commentators, as well as recent revisionist readings of Ritschl. That these elements of continuity are not acknowledged by Barth, does not mean that they are absent, rather that they may be insufficiently discerned. This non-recognition, if true, seems to me to be a weakness, insofar as it blinds the thinker to the possibility of generic development between his theology and that which was prior, especially if that prior theology was the very one in which you were schooled. This is not to deny to Barth the possibility of creative
development, rather to remind us that his thought is, at the very least, an answer to the questions of another theological system, and thus dependent upon that prior system to some degree. In this connection, there seems to me to be a certain appropriateness in citing a maxim from the thought of Albrecht Ritschl! Philip Hefner writes:

'catholicity (for Ritschl) seems to be constituted by historical continuity. In a revealing section of \textit{R.u.V. I}, Ritschl lays down the maxim that no figure in the History of Christianity can be interpreted as if his own personal religious and scholarly experiences formed the sufficient basis for his theological position.' (115)

This seems to me a sound principle, which, while it runs the danger of the genetic fallacy of explaining everything in terms of its origins, places due and appropriate emphasis on antecedent factors as well as novel ones. Thus, if we are to have a coherent picture of the reception of any thinker, it seems important that we take cognisance of elements of continuity as well as discontinuity. Ritschl propounded the matter thus:

'When once we depart from that method of treating Church history, which proceeds upon the theory that in the changes and in the advances of theological science the logically necessary development of thought must be traced, we have no longer any other point of view left to us than that which makes the religious and scientific experiences of the theological subject to form the sufficient basis for his particular theological views.' (116)

In case an element of bias might be perceived in taking a maxim of Ritschl as our foundation, let us turn to Eberhard Jüngel for guidance in the matter of, "Barth's Theological Beginnings". (117) He suggests that:

'Beginnings are points of departure and must be left behind if we wish to move on. Barth research will have to adopt this view if it wishes to avoid drawing false conclusions from the beginnings. It should be remembered, however, that Barth's theological beginnings

...
are not irrelevant to his historical development. Like "every word," so too every curriculum vitae "is still conditioned by its origin." And much of what is left behind continues to be influential, returning again and again in ever-changing forms. Therefore it is crucial, for a full understanding of Barth's theology, to take account of both the beginnings and the later developments, and to do so, we might say, dialectically.

(118)

Jüngel clearly points here to the dangers of the genetic fallacy, with his particular target being F.-W. Marquardt. (119) However, he is equally sensitive to the residual influence of, 'theological beginnings', stressing that their influence is perennially present. Thus, our journey in pursuit of a Continuity Scenario, will be one guided by the maxims of Ritschl and Jüngel.

In so journeying, we do not wish to pretend that our study is a superficially open-ended one, and that there does not underlie this thesis a particular view of Barth's theological position, and one that, (as we shall see) in embryo, we judge to have been presented by H.R. Mackintosh to, but misinterpreted by, T.F. Torrance. Thus, 'cards on the table.', we acknowledge once again that we are endeavouring to develop an alternative with sufficient explanatory power, such as would overthow a scenario already well established. This, 'cards on the table.', approach is advocated by Jüngel, (120) given that it is implicitly more honest. He suggests again that it, 'makes sense...to begin the study with the admission that one already knows the outcome and wishes to explain it in terms of the events which lead up to it.' (121) We shall not go so far as Jüngel, and say that we know the outcome, only that we know that the outcome typically presented is one that needs to be tested.

Therefore, I shall suggest that within Scottish theology there is considerable evidence of indebtedness to
Ritschlian theology, and to that of Wilhelm Herrmann in particular. Further, I shall contend that one of the best example of this is to be found in H.R. Mackintosh. Therefore, we might judge that he, more than most, is likely to have been sensitive to the possibility of theological continuity between Ritschlianism and Barth.

iv) Foundations for a Double-Scenario Thesis

We turn now to attempt to build a foundation for the double-scenario thesis just outlined. As noted above, we shall devote our attention to the development of an alternative scenario, and by the same token, grant the discontinuity scenario offered by Torrance the status of a 'paradigm' awaiting challenge. This devotion of attention to the alternative scenario is, in its way, a compliment, testifying as it does to the prevailing influence of Torrance's interpretation of events and the need to work out a credible counter-position. I have, I believe, already indicated sufficiently Torrance's position, such that this strategy seems justified, and offer the alternative only because I judge Torrance to be of such importance that his view cannot be ignored.

a) The Discontinuity Scenario - 'Strong' and 'Weak' Versions

Without invoking every aspect of T.S. Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (122) I would suggest that what is proposed in this scenario is, that there took place with the development and reception of Barth's thought, that which may be likened to the situation which prevails during a period of 'crisis' within a scientific 'paradigm', and is then followed by a 'revolution' and a resulting shift to a new 'paradigm'.

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Kuhn defined a 'paradigm' as, 'an entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community.', (124) and this definition should alert us to the difficulties inherent in any use of Kuhn's concept of paradigm outside its initial place of application, that is, the scientific community. I note this, as I nonetheless invoke some of Kuhn's terminology, because it seems to me that, in spite of its suggestiveness, Kuhn's definition, and his whole understanding of the status of a 'science', would seem to preclude us from saying that there is, or ever has been, a prevailing paradigm (and thus, within Kuhn's understanding, a science) shared by all the practitioners within the discipline of theology. However, it seems to me that it would still be legitimate to utilise the terminology and the underlying concepts, (with the limitations understood) where we could speak of significant groups within the wider theological community who share, 'beliefs, values, techniques', etc., such that these significant groups are to be regarded, even by their opponents who would offer a different set of, 'beliefs, values, techniques', as being dominant. We need to be quite clear that, on Kuhn's terms, we are here describing, 'pre-science', in which no clear 'paradigm' has as yet emerged, (125) but as long as we explicitly understand this, we may meaningfully invoke the terminology of 'paradigm', 'crisis', to describe the movements of different theological communities as they aspire to offer a unifying 'paradigm'. Thus, to make our position clear, there was no one 'paradigm' which commanded absolute assent before Barth, nor was there one during the period of his ascendancy, or thereafter. Rather, what we are speaking of are degrees of influence exercised by particular groups within the wider theological community, and if that particular group is regarded as being influential or representative, then we
may, in some sense, speak meaningfully of their offering a prospective 'paradigm'. That is, they offer a 'paradigm', believing it to be the one most likely to unify their discipline. Further, we may suggest that where that prospective 'paradigm' finds itself in difficulty, it would be appropriate to speak of a period of 'crisis', followed by a 'revolution', wherein a rival prospective 'paradigm' occupies a relatively more prominent position.

What evidence for this conjectured scenario do we see in Torrance's treatment of Barth? Torrance pays particular attention to the circumstances under which Barth's thought emerged, and points to Barth's perception of, 'the collapse of the prevailing theology.', of his time, a theology which is typified in the latter half of the nineteenth century by Albrecht Ritschl, and his revitalisation of the ethics and epistemology of Kant. (126) Thus, for Barth, liberal theology is, 'the prevailing theology.', which, in modified Kuhnian terms, we might describe as the prospective reigning 'paradigm'. This, 'prevailing theology.', Barth sees as holding the field until 1914, when two events are portrayed as evidencing the onset of what we would wish to describe as a 'crisis' within, 'the prevailing theology.', or 'paradigm'. We have on the one hand, the decision of Ernst Troeltsch to move from a chair of theology to one of philosophy, and, on the other, the decision of the 93 German intellectuals to support the policy of war advocated by Kaiser Wilhelm II. (127) Torrance describes Barth's reaction to this in terms of, 'the collapse of any hope he had put in his famous theological teachers', and of his pursuing an angst-ridden search for, 'new foundations.' (128) Torrance portray's Barth's position thus:
'All through the first world-war these [concerns] pressed hard upon him, giving him no peace, the urgent need at this very hour in the history of Christendom, to penetrate into the depths of the Christian faith, to make a new beginning, and to find a theological basis that would be really adequate and secure for the fulfilment of the Church's task in bringing the Word of God to mankind.' (129)

Torrance may then point to Barth's description of, 'the change that came over himself and the theological movement in which he participated', which is spoken of as a, 'revolution'. He then notes that, from one dimension of Barth's perspective, 'the revolution, materially regarded, was a sudden conversion', (130) a suggestion that parallels Kuhn's talk of the shift from one paradigm to another in terms of, 'a conversion experience'. (131) Immediately thereafter however, Torrance suggests that though, 'the revolution', when viewed from one dimension of that perspective, 'was a sudden conversion', yet it could equally be said of the process which precipitated, 'the revolution', that it had, 'developed gradually in a movement which confronted the prevailing theology...with a new and at the same time older and original Christian knowledge and language.' (132) This again finds a parallel in Kuhn's description of the process whereby there is, over time, a mounting number of unresolved problems within a 'paradigm', such that, for the practitioners within that 'paradigm', there is the gradual onset of, 'professional insecurity', (133) which eventually leads into a time of 'crisis'.

Therefore, it would seem to be reasonable to suggest that Torrance's analysis of Barth's break with, 'the prevailing theology.', is presented in terms which have real parallels to the processes which Kuhn analysed in his discussion of the nature of scientific communities, and that the 'discontinuity' which is integral to his
account, is of the kind that Kuhn posits as existing between rival 'paradigms'. Thus, for Kuhn, when a scientific practitioner changes 'paradigm', he sees the world in a different way, and, in a tangible sense, is now, 'responding to a different world.' (134) This latter point is quite radical in nature, for it brings into question the very source of our knowledge, and suggests that the incompatibility of rival 'paradigms' arises out of their fundamentally different starting points. Hence, if our analysis is correct, we should see that the 'discontinuity' which Torrance sees as existing between Barth and, 'the prevailing theology.', is a result of the derivation of their knowledge of God from different sources. Once again, we find this in Torrance's analysis of Barth, when he writes that what concerned Barth most in, 'the prevailing theology.', 'was that even God had lost for this theology real depth and meaning, for to think of God meant for it, with scarcely any attempt to conceal the fact, to think of man, religious man to be sure, but man.' (135) For Barth, the time had come where, 'We must let (God) speak again in his own words.', (136) and Torrance stresses that, 'There can be no doubt that the tremendous factor in this development was the discovery that God is God'. (137)

Therefore, with the limitations noted above, we may suggest that there is, according to the Discontinuity Scenario, a move from a (prospective) 'paradigm', exemplified in the latter half of the nineteenth century by the work of Ritschl, et. al., to a period of 'crisis', followed by a 'revolution', as a result of which there emerges the theology of Barth, which offers a new (prospective) 'paradigm'. Equally, we may observe that Torrance offers to us an understanding of Barth in which what is presented is, not so much a prospective
'paradigm', as a real paradigm in Kuhn's sense. This we may term the 'strong' discontinuity scenario.

However, alongside this there are various attempts to come to terms with Barth's theology, which, while granting the presence of elements of discontinuity, nevertheless acknowledge the presence of continuity. These various attempts, we may see as offering a 'weak' discontinuity scenario, and they exemplify the veracity of John Baillie's comment that:

'Whatever the measure of our agreements and disagreements with (Barth), we all have to reckon with him. I have often said that there can no hopeful forward advance beyond his teaching, as I fervently hope there will be, if we attempt to go round it rather than through it.' (138)

That is, we must pass into the valley of the shadow of Barth, engage with him, and then state our position with reference to his. Thus, the 'weak' discontinuity scenario suggests that, in Barth, we are confronted with a serious partner in theological dialogue, without in any sense committing ourselves to that partner's position. Further, as we shall see, when Baillie et al., are prepared to speak of continuity between Ritschl and Barth, there is a clear indication that Torrance's version of the history of theology shall not go unchallenged, and that this 'weak' discontinuity scenario may potentially merge into a continuity scenario.

b) The Continuity Scenario

As we turn to our alternative scenario, we need to be particularly conscious of what is being proposed in the above scenario, that is, in its 'strong' version. For if we accept this reading, we commit ourselves to the rejection of the possibility of finding affinity between
the old and the new 'paradigms', regardless of the fact that the new was schooled in the old. This seems to me to be a rejection of what, a priori, would be one potentially fruitful avenue into understanding the heart of the new 'paradigm', if such it be. This a priori case should not, therefore, be dismissed without having been thoroughly tested. The advantage offered by the 'weak' version of the scenario found in Baillie, is that it does not reject the a priori case, and builds upon it such that it can recognise informative affinities between the old and the new. However, if we can identify certain decisive features of a theological system, (decisive, because so defined by both parties, and decisive because of the impact that it would have on the overall structure of that theology) for example, the concept of the self-revelation of God, which exhibit these affinities, then, it seems to me, we would be in a position to go beyond the 'weak' discontinuity scenario.

The 'weak' discontinuity scenario admits both continuity and discontinuity. However, if we could demonstrate that at a decisive point (noting the emphases intended here) we could speak of substantial continuity between Barth and his theological teacher, Herrmann, then we would be justified in speaking of theological continuity, and thus establish our Continuity Scenario. By this I mean that the particular theological concept identified (the concept of the self-revelation of God) is of such significance that, if we could establish that there was continuity of substance, with respect to theological content, then we would be in a position to maintain that we ought to read Barth, at this point, not in terms of his being discontinuous with that which preceded him, but rather, in terms of his being in continuity.
We must be careful at this point to clarify what we are, and what we are not, saying. We are saying that, with respect to a decisive concept (once demonstrated that it is so) such as the self-revelation of God, we can identify certain characteristics, such that, if we were to observe those characteristics in a similarly termed concept within another theological system, we would be justified in seeking to formulate a prima facie case to the effect that they were related, and then prosecute that case to its conclusion. However, this is not to say that whenever we consider the approach of Herrmann and Barth to any issue we must read 'continuity' into our conclusions, for that would merely be to replicate an error which seems to me to be found in Torrance, namely an over-readiness to detect 'discontinuity'. Rather, what we are saying is that, because of their shared concept of the self-revelation, (and hence, shared starting point in respect of the source of theological knowledge) they belong, in terms of their theological identity, to the same genus, and that though they are distinct species and manifestations of that genus, they nonetheless may, and ought, to be traced back to their generic root, in order to be properly comprehended.

With this caution observed, I would wish to contend that there is, as well as the discontinuity scenario offered by Torrance, the possibility of discerning a substantial theological continuity between Herrmann and Barth. Indeed, we suggest that this is a function of the fact that Barth's thought, in certain important respects, inherited from, and was a child of, the very theology which he wished emphatically to reject. We should not deny, without examination, the possibility that the use Barth makes of the continuous elements may well be such that it could constitute a new theological starting point, but, equally, we should not reject without
examination the possibility that we shall most fruitfully understand Barth by taking the generic approach advocated by Ritschl. Further, we may suggest that the agenda of questions which Barth sees as requiring an answer, bears a striking similarity to the agenda of his own teachers. It may be replied, in answer to this, that this is hardly surprising since Barth wishes to correct his teachers. However, it seems to me, that Barth stands much closer to one of his teachers, Wilhelm Herrmann, than Torrance's Discontinuity Scenario would allow us to believe.

Thus, it is with respect to the concept of the self-revelation of God that I wish to develop the Continuity Scenario, and judge this to be appropriate in the light of Torrance's own use of the concept. I shall seek to demonstrate that this concept, as found in Herrmann and Barth is, with respect to theological content, substantially identical, albeit that it is expressed in a variant form. Therefore, I shall suggest that we best understand Barth's concept of the self-revelation of God, in the light of the continuity which (as we shall see) even he acknowledges between his concept and that of Herrmann. Further, I shall contend that, with respect to the said concept, Torrance has overlooked this substantial continuity, which, if this be the case, is to say that he has omitted a decisive explanatory factor. Equally, I wish to refute Torrance's interpretation of H.R. Mackintosh, and his suggestion that what we witness in Mackintosh is a decisive rejection of Ritschlianism. In place of this reading of Mackintosh, I shall demonstrate a willingness on Mackintosh's part to be open to both Ritschlianism and Barth, precisely at the point where he judges them to be offering a similar contribution in terms of understanding the nature of Revelation, and this at the very end of his theological writing, in, *Types of Modern Theology*.  

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It may be true to say that we stand too close in time to judge accurately Barth's overall impact, yet, it is not inconceivable that (to reverse Barth's judgement on Ritschl) history shall judge his work to have had the status of an episode, and not an epoch, and, in part, a Ritschlian one at that. (139) Equally, we recall H.R. Mackintosh's opinion that, in his time, the thought of Ritschl, lay, 'behind a passing cloud...too far for gratitude, too near for reverence.' (140) Now that sufficient time has elapsed, such that the cloud may be judged to have passed on, and a more reasoned evaluation of Ritschl made possible, we may be in a much better position to consider the relationship between Ritschlian and Barthian thought generally, and in particular, within the Scottish context.

v) Observations in support of the Continuity Scenario

In order to establish the Continuity Scenario we must contend that there is a case beyond the prima facie, and initially seek confirmation of this in the judgements of other writers. This does not, in itself, establish a Continuity Scenario, rather it establishes the fact that others have adopted a reading of the history of theology which differs from Torrance's, and if we judge them to offer a sound alternative, we may judge it prudent to explore that alternative within a Scottish context. In seeking to establish a Continuity Scenario, let us now examine the judgements of; a) David Tracy, b) Karl Barth c) Jürgen Moltmann, d) Eberhard Jüngel, e) H. Martin Rumscheidt, f) Adolf von Harnack, g) Wolfhart Pannenberg, h) Simon Fisher, i) John C. O'Neil, j) Paul Tillich, k) Rudolf Bultmann, l) Alister McGrath, and then offer, m) A Summary of these judgements.
a) David Tracy's analysis of theological pluralism, is one which seems to me to have a considerable affinity to the Continuity Scenario which we seek to develop, for within this he points to a link between, 'Liberal Theology', and, 'Neo-Orthodox Theology'. (141) Tracy's book, *Blessed Rage for Order*, outlines five basic theological models, through which he seeks to, 'set forth his own model for theological judgement and to compare that model critically with other existing models.', (142) and, within his review of these, 'other existing models', he notes the basic continuity between the liberal and neo-orthodox models, with respect to their understanding of the basic task of theology. He writes:

'In the context of the prior discussion of the liberal task, it seems fair to state that even the neo-orthodox critics of liberalism and modernism fundamentally share the liberal and not the orthodox understanding of the task of theology. There seems every good reason to agree with the judgement of Wilhelm Pauck that neo-orthodoxy is not really a radically new alternative model for theology, but rather is a moment – to be sure, a critical one – in the larger liberal theological tradition. Pauck is, I believe, exactly right when he states: "Orthodox theologies give rise to more orthodoxies; liberal theologies give rise to neo-orthodoxies."' (143)

Thus, he can suggest that Barth, 'at least the Barth of Romans...in a major sense continues the liberal tradition.' (144) (I doubt that the classification of, 'the Barth of Romans', as neo-orthodox is particularly apt, nor do I think his description of the Romans commentary as, 'probably still the classical neo-orthodox statement.', (145) is one that is helpful. However, this does not undercut his basic contention, and Tracy challenges any interpretation which would see Barth's commentary on Romans, as marking a radical break with liberalism, thus confirming once more that there are alternative ways of reading Barth's development.) There is equally a very prevalent sense in which neo-orthodoxy
develops beyond liberal thought, since, for Tracy, it contains in embryo, the seeds of a 'post-modern cultural analysis', which led to a rejection of 'the evolutionary optimism', of the earlier liberalism. (146) Thus, neo-orthodoxy is at once, 'both (the) acceptance and negation of liberal modernity'. He continues:

'This understanding of the neo-orthodox model for theology, therefore, is one which directly relates that theological alternative to its parent, classical liberalism. Such an interpretation may prove not only more faithful to the actual performance of neo-orthodoxy, but also may allow the permanent achievements of that tradition to continue into the more complex present theological moment.' (147)

Therefore, it would seem that, with respect to these two models, Tracy understands the relationship between them to be that of parent and child, and while he is at pains to stress the gains which the neo-orthodox model has realized, that is in no way to minimize the sense in which it is a derivative model.

b) Barth himself has acknowledged, albeit grudgingly, his indebtedness to Ritschl, and that he was indeed a disciple of that school in his younger days. He notes:

'To the prevailing tendency of about 1910 among the younger followers of Albrecht Ritschl I attached myself with passable conviction.' (148)

Further, Barth acknowledged more specifically, that his theology at this time was aligned to that of Herrmann. In a lecture delivered in 1922, he suggests that:

'For twelve years I was a minister...I had my theology. It was not really mine, to be sure, but that of my unforgotten teacher Wilhelm Herrmann'. (149)

As a particular example of this, we cite a letter to Eduard Thurneysen of January 1st, 1916, in which he
confesses:

'how frightfully indifferent I have become about the purely historical questions. Of course that is nothing new for me. Already under the influence of Herrmann, I always thought of historical criticism as merely a means of attaining freedom in relation to the tradition, not however, as a constituting factor in a new liberal tradition'. (150)

A further example of this indebtedness is found in Barth's lecture, "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann", (1925) (151) wherein he openly concedes the influence of Herrmann upon him. Indeed, he might, if he, 'had the temperament', confess that it was Herrmann who, in inspiring him to pursue theology, pushed him, 'into perpetual motion.' He writes:

'Herrmann was the theological teacher of my student years. The day twenty years ago in Berlin when I first read his Ethik (Ethics) I remember as if it were today...I can say that on that day I believe my own deep interest in theology began...And when on the day I began my ministry (26th September, 1909) the mail brought me, five minutes before I was to go to the pulpit, the new, fourth edition of the Ethik as a gift from the author, I accepted this coincidence as a dedication of my whole future.' (152)

In consequence, Barth finds himself forced to work out the relationship between, 'a real pupil of a real master'. He writes:

'I could never inwardly agree that I had really turned away from my teacher...In my own case, I let Herrmann say to me one essential truth. This truth, followed out to its consequences, later forced me to say almost everything else quite differently and finally led me to an interpretation of the fundamental truth itself which was entirely different from his. And yet it was he who showed me that truth. I cannot claim its discovery for myself and I must now openly and gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness.' (153)

In considering this, 'one essential truth', Barth points to the understanding of the revelation of God which
underlies Herrmann's, *Dogmatik*, (154) and it is with respect to the question of Revelation, that he acknowledges his indebtedness to Herrmann. Thus, Barth claims to have understood the implications of Herrmann's principles more fully than Herrmann did himself, in consequence of which he may write that, while, 'Herrmann on paper rebuts me...there is also a Herrmann in heaven, who perhaps does not offer a rebuttal.' (155)

Further, we note that Barth observes a certain inconsistency in Herrmann, with respect to the conclusion of his *Dogmatik*. For Barth directs our attention to the fact that Herrmann ends the *Dogmatik*, by pointing, in Barth's words, to, 'the Beyond, beyond reason and experience, in the context designated by the doctrine of the Trinity'. (156) Thus, Herrmann writes in the last paragraph of the *Dogmatik* I, pointing to the conclusion of the *Dogmatik* II, and of the whole system, that:

'At the end of the course the knowledge of the Nature of God which is implied in this divine activity will be summed up in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.' (157)

Herrmann then states that intended conclusion, once more in explicitly Trinitarian terms, suggesting that:

'The doctrine of the Trinity reminds us that we can only find eternal life in fellowship with God if he remains unsearchable to us - an eternal mystery. The way to the Christian religion is the unconditioned will to truth or to submission to the facts which we ourselves experience. But its beginning and its end is, none the less, the humbling of man before the Unsearchable. "God dwelleth in light unapproachable, whom no man hath seen, or can see" (1 Tim. vi. 16)' (158)

Now Barth contends that it is in this context, that, 'man must be put in question; he must be questioned through God's self upon his own self.' 'But', Barth continues, 'this means that the revelation towards which, according
to Herrmann, that question is to lead must be already understood as the presupposition for the question.' In other words, if we follow out the logic of Herrmann's position, 'The place to begin in dogmatics would therefore be with "God said" (Deus dixit)', and not, 'on the summit of an alleged "experience".' (159) Thus, according to Barth, the beginning of a Dogmatik on Herrmann's terms, (that is, one which ends with the unsearchable mystery of God as Trinity) is to be found within the revelation of God in His Trinitarian life. However, it is Barth's contention that Herrmann did not so begin, and that in consequence, Herrmann's claim to have offered a universally valid, 'way to religion.', is bankrupted. (160) Herrmann may have spoken, 'as if', he had the intention of beginning there, but Barth is certain that he did not, and indeed may claim, '(Naturally I know that he had no idea of so doing.)' (161)

Therefore, while Barth clearly believes he can detect a flaw in the logic of Herrmann's system, it seems to me that his attempt to formulate an adequate understanding of the concept of Revelation, develops out of his perception of the interior logic of Herrmann's, Dogmatik. To this point, we shall return in due course.

c) Support for this view is found in the suggestion of Jürgen Moltmann that it is in, "The Principles of Dogmatics in Wilhelm Herrmann", that Barth first works out his concept of Revelation. He writes:

'Karl Barth's doctrine of the "self-revelation of God" was first developed in detail in 1925 in his essay on "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann", in taking up and surmounting the famous "self" of Herrmann.' (162)
Moltmann then suggests that Barth takes over the concept of 'self-revelation' from Herrmann, with the intention of importing a different meaning. Nonetheless, he may write that while:

'Herrmann's "self" acquires in Barth a theological form. Yet it should be noted that it still retains all the attributes, all the relations and distinctions, in which it had been formulated by Herrmann.' (163)

Once more, we shall return to this point.

d) Thus, others have observed in Barth the recurrent influence of that which belongs, as Jüngel put it, to his, 'theological beginnings'. Jüngel himself openly concedes Herrmann's continuing influence, and writes:

'Herrmann made a lasting impression on the young Barth. And even after his break with liberal theology, Barth retained one thing he had learned from Herrmann: the (at least relative) independence of theology as a discipline, the "conviction of Christian truth as based on itself," needing no apologetic, that is, "the Christocentric impulse."' (164)

Further, Jüngel observes that Barth's concept of Revelation was not a scientific one, in the sense that it did attempt to derive the content of Revelation from historical study. This insight he believed Barth had especially derived, 'from Harnack and especially from Herrmann.', though of course Harnack and Barth would engage in a celebrated exchange precisely on this issue. (165)

e) In that connection, we note H. Martin Rumscheidt's analysis of the Barth-Harnack correspondence of 1923, wherein he suggests that it is Herrmann's influence which enabled Barth to break with Harnack. Thus, it is, 'the autopistia of faith (which) is a challenge to the historicism of Harnack.', (166) and in the light of this,
'Barth argues that mere credence in historical facts is no basis for faith in God.', a point which Herrmann had driven home to his students. (167) He writes:

'In 1908 Barth went to Marburg in order to study under Wilhelm Herrmann. And here we must begin to trace the development that led Barth away from Harnack, for it was Herrmann and not Harnack who became Barth's most revered and influential teacher... From him... Barth learned the concept or doctrine of the autopistia of faith. Its basic factors are the absolute transcendence of God and the impossibility of proving his existence scientifically. Faith is in no need of an ancillary science for its legitimation.' (168)

f) However, in this connection, and contrary to what we might expect, let us note Adolf von Harnack's, 'last word on the subject of the dialectical theology', (169) contained in a letter to Martin Rade, of 1928. His 'word' is of particular interest, for, from one who might be expected to deliver the final rebuttal, we find an acknowledgement that Barth's thought is basically rooted in Ritschl, and that von Harnack still entertains hopes that it shall yet be transformed. He writes:

'Our present theology is highly motivated and pays attention to main problems - and that is salutary. But how weak it is as science, how narrow and sectarian its horizon, how expressionistic its method, and how shortsighted its representation of history!... Ritschl is today the most betrayed, although in my estimation he offers a great deal with which the Barthians could comply. But the sons are still more antagonistic to the fathers than the grandparents were... We hope that this will prove to be only a stage of transformation, and that a real evangelical butterfly will emerge from the cocoon.' (170)

If von Harnack, in 1928, could still see continuity between Barth and Ritschl, then we might well consider ourselves justified in pursuing an alternative scenario!

g) Wolfhart Pannenberg, likewise notes the influence of Herrmann upon Barth's concept of self-revelation, though
he also points to the influence of the Hegelian Philipp Marheineke upon Barth, with respect to this concept. (171) Further, Pannenberg points to a certain confusion in Barth's assessment of Herrmann's concept. He offers the opinion that, insofar as Herrmann wishes revelation to be taken as a presupposition to the question of man's self, (Barth's view of Herrmann) then this leads to, and not away from, the concept of revelation which Pannenberg judges Barth to have. (172) Barth seems happy to concede the validity of Herrmann's argumentation, excepting that, in the final analysis, Herrmann does not draw out the implications of his own argument and begin his dogmatics with the 'Deus dixit'. (173) Thus, Pannenberg would seem to point towards a basic continuity between Herrmann and Barth, in respect of that in which Barth claimed to offer a decisively different approach, namely Revelation.

Pannenberg continues the thesis that Barth is indebted to Ritschl, et al., elsewhere, repeating his contention that Barth's basic programme is, in core, an extension of a Ritschlian one. He writes:

'Contemporary protestant theology has been quick to characterize itself as a pure theology of revelation. This is especially evident in Karl Barth and in the wide sphere of his influence. His theology has been walled off against any mixture of "natural," nontheological, and non-Christian knowledge. Only what can be founded on the revelation in Christ is valid as a dogmatic statement. In the background is Albrecht Ritschl's struggle for the uniqueness of revelation in Christ opposed to all conception of God in Greek metaphysics. Ritschl's antipathy against natural theology is taken to the extreme by Barth.' (174)

Further, Pannenberg insists that the inheritance from Ritschl militates against apologetic concern, and that Barth is merely following a well mapped path. He notes:

'Karl Barth's critical reservations about all programmatic apologetics, as well as his fight against
everything he calls "natural theology," is likewise in many respects an extension and radicalization of the battle position set up by Ritschl.' (175)

Thus, Pannenberg affirms that, in certain crucial aspects, Barth receives elements from the very tradition which he consciously rejects. That is to say, he inherits a theological agenda, and pursues a programme in which the questions addressed and the form in which the answers are given, are recognisably Ritschlian. This inheritance of a theological agenda, is further highlighted when Pannenberg seeks to trace the diminution of the place of Natural Theology in Protestant theology from Barth back to Schleiermacher. He writes:

'Barth's attack upon "natural" theology formed the climax and conclusion of a growing criticism in Protestant theology, since Schleiermacher and Ritschl, of the traditional philosophical doctrine of God and its use in theology. Schleiermacher actually described the "natural" knowledge of God as a mere abstraction derived from concrete historical religions...Ritschl, and Wilhelm Herrmann even more, intensified Schleiermacher's criticism by rejecting along with "natural" theology all metaphysical elements in the doctrine of God, and attempting instead to base it upon ethics. Finally, although Barth began in the school of Ritschl, he came to include even an ethically based knowledge of God on Kantian lines in "natural" theology, and argued instead that it should be replaced by the revelation of Christ as the sole source of a true knowledge of God. Thus the road leading from Schleiermacher to Barth showed an increasing extension of the concept of "natural" theology as a polemic conception opposed to the Christian theology of revelation, together with a progressive narrowing down of the way the Christian theology of revelation was itself understood by those who maintained it.' (176)

This seems to sum up the whole thrust of Pannenberg's critique of Barth's understanding of the place of Natural Theology, and the resultant implications for our knowledge of God. Equally, it places Barth within his wider context, making us aware of the possibility that we might interpret one of his distinctive contributions to
theological thought, that is, the place of Natural Theology, not as a novelty, but as a logical extension of a position already well established. Finally, we note that, for Pannenberg, this is the end of that particular line of thought, for the logical extension of this line is the, 'Death of God', (177) a theological position he regards as having its roots, in part, in Barth's thought.

h) Barth's confession of an early indebtedness to Ritschlian thought, receives a full analysis by Simon Fisher, (178) who details Barth's relationship to the theology of Herrmann and the philosophy of Cohen and Natorp, which prevailed in the University of Marburg at the turn of the century. Fisher's conclusions in this matter are, in one sense, to be expected, since he is primarily concerned with a phase of Barth's career in which there is relative agreement as to his dependency on, 'the Marburg School'. Yet Fisher is anxious to dispel the notion that we should view this as merely, 'a brief half-hearted flirtation with a liberalism that meant very little to (Barth).' He suggests this picture is one, 'championed by triumphant neo-orthodoxy and accepted with little hesitation by its adherents in Britain and America.' (179) Fisher does concede that the picture, gains credence from the fact that this is the persona and self-image adopted by Barth, yet he suggests that even the memory of Barth may be, 'subject to illusion, distortion, misplaced emphases, and polemical exigencies.' (180) Thus, Fisher may conclude that Barth's commitment to Ritschlianism was, for almost a decade, 'enthusiastic and whole-hearted.' (181)

That this picture has been actively presented on the Scottish scene is testified to by the fact that Fisher can cite, as an example of, 'triumphant neo-orthodoxy',

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T.F. Torrance, with Fisher clearly regarding the latter's analysis as unhelpful. (183)

Bruce L. McCormack (184) judges that Fisher's work is, 'a valid interpretation of Barth', and suggests that:

'The picture which emerges of the early Barth is that of a devoted follower of the religious individualism of Herrmann, whose agenda was shaped above all by the wealth of problems raised for theology given by Cohen and Natorp of religion in relation to culture.' (185)

i) John C. O'Neill (186) points, in more general terms, to the pervasive influence of Herrmann upon Barth, as well as to continuity in respect of Revelation. Thus, for example, he judges that, in Barth's interpretation of the Resurrection and the Virgin Birth, his categories of interpretation are those of his teacher. Therefore, although the unwary may understand Barth to say that the tomb was opened, and that the Virgin Birth took place, within the continuity of history, they are mistaken. Thus, drawing upon C.D I/2, (and elsewhere in his overall argument from as late as C.D III/2) O'Neill notes Herrmann's firmly established distinction between 'Mirakel' and 'Wunder', which Barth accepts, and writes of Barth's interpretation of the Virgin Birth thus:

'Barth very clearly affirms the Virgin Birth as 'Wunder' and not as 'Mirakel'...(it) is a 'Wunder' that cannot be understood from the continuity of other events in this world and it is not factually grounded in this continuity; in other words, it didn't happen. The Virgin Birth is on all fours with the empty tomb.' (187)

O'Neill clearly intends to place Barth within that generation whose intellectual formation took place prior to the First World War, and who then had to cope with the profound dissonance the War engendered. This, O'Neill
affirms, is the indispensable backdrop against which to understand Barth, with a particular interpretation of Kant giving sustenance to that generation's intellectuals. (188) Thus, he may suggest that Spengler, Bloch, Jaspers, et. al., believed, 'that they were on the edge of a new way of understanding, a break-through of the eternal...The dominant interpretation of Kant was that he preached we must behave as if God existed, as if the natural laws held, as if we have freedom, and as if we were eternal beings.' (189)

O'Neill notes that Barth compares his system to that of Kant, and suggests that in his attempt at, 'naming God', Barth's approach to Revelation is at one with the approach prevalent in his generation. Thus, Barth has to 'act' (190) 'as if revelation were taking place'. (191) Therefore, Revelation is for Barth the authoritative starting point of, 'the journey', and for him, 'the only way to experience authority was to put oneself under it, not to ask questions about its genuineness.' (192)

O'Neill's conclusions obviously depend upon the extent to which we can read Barth against the intellectual background of Germany at the turn of the century, and while it would be possible to judge this as illustrative of the genetic fallacy, it may be equally possible to judge that it is a setting of Barth in his proper context.

j) Paul Tillich, further notes the basic identity of substance, with respect to the Ritschlian and neo-orthodox concepts of Revelation, and may speak of them as 'allied' concepts. He suggests:

'While humanistic theology tends to identify the history of revelation with the history of religion and culture, thus removing the concept of final revelation, neo-
orthodox theology and an allied liberal (e.g. Ritschlian) theology try to eliminate the history of revelation by identifying revelation with final revelation. The latter group says there is only one revelation, namely, that in Jesus the Christ'. (193)

k) Rudolf Bultmann, writing in the same theological arena as Barth, in the mid-1920's, produces a very different account, from that of Barth, on the relationship between the dialectical theologians and the earlier theological tradition with which they wrestled. It seem clear's from reading Bultmann, that he views his theological work, and that of dialectical theology in general, as a development out of, rather than a rejection of, the earlier liberal theology. For example, in his review of, "Karl Barth's Epistle to the Romans in its Second Edition", (194) he suggests that, 'The book attempts to prove the independence and the absolute nature of religion.' However, this does not involve any suggestion of radical novelty on Barth's part, for Bultmann continues:

'It thus takes its place, even though it is in the form of a commentary, in the same line with such works as Schleiermacher's On Religion and Otto's The Idea of the Holy... However different all these attempts may be in detail, they seek to give verbal expression to the consciousness of the uniqueness and absoluteness of religion.' (195)

Further, Bultmann suggests that Barth's, 'polemic against "historicism" and "psychologism."...is original...not in his thoughts, but in their clear and powerful formulation.', with this polemic being best understood within the general context of his time, in which there was a particular backlash against, '"historicism" and "psychologism."' (196) Indeed, for Bultmann, no-one more exemplifies that polemic, and a determination to state, 'the independence and absolute nature of religion.', than Wilhelm Herrmann. He writes:

'No one in our time has proclaimed with this self-
confidence the uniqueness and absoluteness of "religion" (of faith!) with more clarity than Wilhelm Herrmann, with whom Karl Barth is in complete agreement...* What Herrmann called "experience" is not that against which Barth polemises. And Herrmann's polemic against the philosophy and of psychology of religion as opposed to mysticism was no less radical than that of Barth.' (197)

Therefore, Bultmann takes what seems to him to be the most obvious approach to understanding Barth, and expounds him from within the context of German theology. In so doing, Bultmann is clear that Barth has gone beyond Herrmann at certain points, such as in his answer to the question, 'How do I come to faith ?', but, equally, that at points Herrmann is superior to Barth, with Bultmann considering Barth's dialectic to be in danger of breaking down, 'into transcendental philosophy.' (198)

In respect of the question of Revelation, Bultmann notes that Herrmann and Barth are at variance. He asks, 'Or is there nonetheless a bit of reality which can enter the life of every man, and which is "perceptible" as the revelation of God ?'. He suggests that:

'Herrmann would answer, Jesus! The inner life of Jesus, that which perceived from the Gospel tradition grasps the observer as reality, as the living embodiment of holiness and love, overcomes, transforms, redeems him.' (199)

Barth, he judges, would reject this answer on the grounds that NT scholarship has indicated that we cannot recover, 'the inner life of Jesus', and that, 'Jesus as a man belongs to the psychic historical reality, to the "world,"' from which we can derive no guidance as to the revelation of God. Instead, Barth offers the answer, 'The Christ is the revelation of God.' (200) Thereafter, Bultmann expounds Barth, and while confessing, 'that I simply do not understand him.', yet awards Barth's exposition a, 'Good.' However, while granting the evident power of Barth's exposition, to ask, 'But cannot this
also be said of the "life of Jesus" in general?" (201)
Thus, once more, Bultmann points to Herrmann's conception having a similar explanatory power, and equal validity, to that of Barth.

Elsewhere, Bultmann continues to set dialectical theology in what he sees to be its proper context, and writes:

'the attack against the so-called liberal theology is not to be understood as the repudiation of its own past, but as a discussion with that past...It is no accident that the latest movement originated not from within orthodoxy but out of liberal theology. Barth was a student as Marburg, Gogarten at Heidelberg, Thurneysen at both.' (202)

Thereafter, in discussing Barth's denial of the possibility of a general Christian ethic, he suggests:

'Here again Barth and Gogarten state the conclusions which are actually inherent in liberal theology. For who has emphasized more forcibly than W. Herrmann that there is no specifically Christian ethic?" (203)

Therefore, we observe the extent to which Bultmann is aware of the way in which dialectical theology was related to the liberal theology which preceded it, that is, for Barth and himself, to Herrmann in particular. For Bultmann, there would seem to be no other avenue of approach to understanding his own theology and that of Barth, except by way of its relationship to, and in part its dependence on, its predecessor.

R.W. Funk, in his, "Introduction", to Bultmann's, Faith and Understanding, notes this point, and writes:

'In associating himself with Barth and Friedrich Gogarten, Bultmann joins in the attack on the so-called liberal theology (i.e. on the Ritschlian theology, broadly speaking), but he takes care to observe that dialectical theology is the immediate and grateful progeny of liberal theology.' (204)

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This is not to say that Bultmann's perspective is 'correct', whilst Barth's is 'incorrect'. Rather, it is to say, at the very least, that Bultmann may have been more aware of the extent to which they wrestled with an inherited agenda, rather than creating a new one, and that in respect of the concept of the self-revelation of God, it was by no means immediately obvious to Bultmann that Barth's conception is superior to that of Herrmann. We ourselves need feel no pressure to assume otherwise than Bultmann, prior to an examination of the question.

1) Bultmann's perspective is highlighted by Alister McGrath, who has also reached conclusions, with respect to Barth's concept of the self-revelation of God, which are in line with our scenario. He notes that, 'Barth's early affinities lay with the liberal tradition, particularly the form associated with Wilhelm Herrmann.', a tradition which he describes in the following terms:

'The strong emphasis upon the religious personality - the "inner life", as Herrmann preferred - of Jesus which is associated with this movement points to it being Jesus-centred. The historical actuality, the existence in human history, of Jesus Christ initiates an historical process which mediates the experience of God to us. Faith is "awakened by God's historical revelation" in Jesus.' (205)

Further, he suggests that Barth's intention is to break with this tradition. However, in spite of the intention, McGrath suggests that Barth so de-historicises his understanding of the nature of Revelation (a legacy of Herrmann) (206) that he precludes the possibility of any discussion of Revelation which is not in fact a discussion of the human capacity to receive Revelation. Thus, for all his protestations, Barth's 'self-' and Herrmann's 'self-', in the concept of 'self-revelation', are not as diametrically opposed as Barth might have us
believe. McGrath draws upon the, Church Dogmatics, to support this conclusion, up to, and therefore as late as, IV/1 and IV/2 (1953, and, 1955 in the German originals respectively). He puts it thus:

'Despite all Barth's protests to the contrary, there are excellent reasons for supposing that he regards man's knowledge and insight, rather than God's activity, as constituting the centre of theological reflection, precisely because that 'activity' belongs to eternity, rather than time. The temporal recapitulation of that "activity" can only be regarded as the "re-presentation" of what has already taken place in eternity, in order that man may learn of what has already happened. The 'eternalization' (Aternisierung) of revelation, necessary for Barth on the basis of presupposition of the divine freedom and exclusion of anthropological considerations from theology, inevitably means that the emphasis is actually shifted from that revelation itself to man's recognition and appropriation of that revelation - and hence from God's activity to man's insights and knowledge (or, more accurately, to man's epistemic capacities and incapacies). As God "is in revelation what he is antecedently in himself", it is impossible to speak of revelation "happening" in time unless one refers to the event of the human appropriation of that revelation qua revelation.' (207)

Therefore, McGrath suggests:

'Perhaps the most surprising conclusion which must be drawn from this analysis is that, despite all differences in substance and emphasis, Barth's Christology is constructed within precisely the same framework as those of the Aufklärung, and the nineteenth century in general. Although Barth inverts the nineteenth century subject-object relation in respect to God and man, his central interest remains the anthropologically conditioned question concerning man's knowledge of his situation.' (208)

McGrath then suggests that Barth has, 'inverted liberal Christology, without in any way altering its fundamental point of reference or its preoccupations.' (209) Thus, we have the suggestion that, in respect of the, 'essential point of reference', there is a substantial identity in the concept of the self-revelation of God, as understood
by Herrmann and Barth, albeit that Barth has inverted the language-form in which the concept is to be expressed.

McGrath's position is one that upholders of the Discontinuity Scenario, would clearly be unhappy with. Thus, we find A.I.C. Heron challenging McGrath on his analysis of Barth's Christology, suggesting that he has failed to take into account the contribution of Torrance, amongst others, in formulating his assessment. (210) For Heron, Barth's work stands in continuity with the Reformers, and, on this basis, he is enabled to, 'recognise and diagnose...the chronic weakness of post-Enlightenment German Protestant theology.', (211) and to stand in discontinuity with it. Heron's judgement on this question arises from his decision that Barth was correct to view himself in continuity with the Reformers, and in discontinuity with, 'post-Enlightenment German Protestant theology.' (212) We shall not evaluate the full merits of Heron's criticisms of McGrath, but we shall heed his words of caution about filtering out of our analysis assessments of Barth which would tend to undermine our position. Equally, however, we note Heron's approach, in which Barth, through stressing his continuity with the theology of the Reformers, seems to be lifted out of his historical context. This, in turn, seems to overlook the possibility of finding illuminating continuities between Barth and liberal theology.

m) Summary of the Observations in support of the Continuity Scenario

We have not yet established that there is a basic continuity between Herrmann and Barth, in respect of their understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God. However, what we have done is to establish that the question is an open one, and worthy of further study.
Further, we have directed attention to the fact that Barth must be understood within his own context, and highlighted that his contemporaries found other ways of reading their situation, which seemed to them to be quite congruent with their shared experience. The clear implication of this summary is that we have reason to pursue the attempt to establish the Continuity Scenario, as against Torrance's presentation of Barth. Equally, within the Scottish context, we shall have renewed reason to examine the true nature of the theological legacy of H.R. Mackintosh.

We note then the suggestion that there are crucial elements carried over from Ritschlian thought into that of Barth. In summary, we can identify a number of these elements, the presence of which we would seek to justify in our further study. We think in particular of: 1) The focus on the category of Revelation, especially as mediated by Herrmann. 2) The concept of 'self-revelation', which raises the crucial question of what meaning we should attribute to the word 'self-', in the couplet, 'self-revelation'. That is, Is the reference to the human 'self-' to whom Revelation comes, or is it to the 'self-' of the God who reveals himself, or indeed, is it to both? 3) The Christocentric restriction of the knowledge of God, to that which is found in Christ alone, and the further identification of this with 1) and 2). 4) As a corollary of 3), the rejection of the possibility of Natural Theology as a source of knowledge. 5) The elimination of any suggestion of a metaphysical basis for the working out of a theological system. 6) The denial of the possibility of an apologetic route into the understanding of the Christian message. 7) Further, we note Barth's suggestion, derived, he believed, from a correct interpretation of Herrmann's intention, as to the
proper place of the Doctrine of the Trinity, in relation to the concept of Revelation.

In this, we do not wish to deny to Barth the genuine possibility of creative freedom, rather we seek to demonstrate that Barth's approach exhibits crucial similarities to the Ritschlian one, and that this is so because of the continuity between their concept(s) of the self-revelation of God. This attempt to demonstrate and commend our Continuity Scenario seems to me to be especially justified insofar as Barth's own self-understanding of his work is, generally speaking, a denial of continuity, and that we may, if we follow his perspective alone, bypass a crucial element in formulating a proper understanding. Further, we might find justification for our efforts in the fact that the perspective of many on Ritschl, et. al., is in fact that created and mediated by Barth, especially through his book, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, (213) and this might be judged to be especially so in the English-speaking world. (214)

vi) Ritschlian Studies and the Continuity Scenario

We have primarily focussed so far on how Barth has been perceived, but, equally, we note that a revival in Ritschl scholarship has also been willing to view their relationship in a way that would tend to support the Continuity Scenario. I do not propose a full review of all the evidence in this matter, rather to give a representative sample of the general conclusions drawn, which I trust will indicate the extent to which continuity can be seen from that perspective also.
We have already noted the impact of Barth’s, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, and the ascendancy of his perspective on Nineteenth Century theology. This has created difficulties for Ritschl scholarship, and hindered attempts to gain a balanced picture of that period and its contribution to subsequent theology, especially that of Barth himself. D.W. Lotz writes:

'Karl Barth's attitude toward Ritschl, for example, has bordered on the overtly hostile and is reflected in the harsh, cursory treatment accorded him in Barth's history of nineteenth-century theology. Ritschl's theology is there considered but a passing phase in modern Protestant thought, a transitional phenomenon in a century which began and ended with the regnant influence of Schleiermacher...Ritschl is charged with the "Verbürgelichung" or acculturation of Evangelical theology, namely, its conformation to the bourgeois ideals of the age of Bismarck. Until the recent reappraisals Barth's critique has largely shaped the course of subsequent Ritschl study, supporting that reading of his theology which finds therein foremost instances of religious subjectivism, moralism, anthropocentrism, etc.' (215)

In respect of Barth's own theology, Lotz expresses surprise that Barth never acknowledges, in his treatment of Ritschl, certain of the key themes of his own theology, and confesses:

'It is quite remarkable that Karl Barth should say little or nothing in his survey of nineteenth-century theology about Ritschl's rejection of natural theology and Ritschl's christocentrism.' (216)

In similar vein, Philip Hefner, may write:

'Three of Ritschl's most important and most strenuously argued assertions provide formal resources for his twentieth century Barthian antagonists: his insistence that theology must base itself on the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as portrayed in the New Testament (what developed into Barth's so-called Christo-monism); his adamant rejection of any "natural" theology or philosophical statement of the Christian faith; and correlative argument that the theologian must irrevocably take his stand within the community of believers, the
church, and do his theologizing from that standpoint.' (217)

Thereafter, Hefner notes that one of the principal channels for the mediation of those, 'areas of commonality', was, 'Wilhelm Herrmann, a close friend and disciple of Ritschl, who was a respected teacher of both Barth and Bultmann.' (218) Further, he suggests that it is in the very elements which were inherited from Ritschlian thought that the weaknesses of Barth's theology are to be found. He notes, 'The restriction to the New Testament revelation, with its corollaries of restriction to the community of believers and rejection of philosophical resources for stating the Christian message', (219) as points of weakness in the Ritschlian and Barthian positions, with the consequence that they do not provide adequate resources for meeting the changed theological conditions of the present era. Thus, we may note the possibility that the Achilles' Heel of Barth's theology, is a direct consequence of maintaining identical presuppositions to that of the theology it claimed to radically reject and replace.

James Richmond, approaches these issues in a similar vein, and comes to similar conclusions. He writes as a former pupil of Barth, and, in his reappraisal of Ritschl, advances the following thesis:

'The Barthian claim that Barth's 'new beginning' in theology involved a massive abandonment and reversal of central theological trends from Schleiermacher to Ritschl will, hopefully, be shown to be not merely false, but intellectually arrogant.' (220)

He concludes:

'Certainly, we affirm that Barth learned much more within his early Ritschlian theological matrix than he or his followers were able or willing to concede. Certainly, we affirm most strongly that Barth and his co-workers were
standing, more than has been realized or admitted until recently, upon the shoulders of a man whose name, in the words of Harnack, they vilified. Certainly, we affirm with Bultmann and others, that Ritschlian 'liberal theology' fathered dialectical theology, and that according to sound genetic principles we cannot understand the make-up of an 'immediate and grateful progeny' without an intimate understanding of the parent. And certainly we affirm that grave misunderstanding of Barth's contribution will result if we do not try to root many of its characteristics in the system which immediately preceded it.' (221)

Finally, we take a further Ritschl scholar, David L. Mueller, who once more adopts a new perspective on the Ritschl-Herrmann-Barth relationship. He writes:

'Barth's negative estimate of Ritschl and his school above all others in the nineteenth century poses some peculiar problems. How could Barth repeatedly speak such appreciative words for his "revered teacher" Wilhelm Herrmann - whom many regarded as Ritschl's most faithful disciple - and yet be so opposed to Ritschl? Is it wholly without foundation that Ferdinand Kattenbusch, a Ritschlian and author of German Evangelical Theology Since Schleiermacher, could interpret Barth's early theology as bringing the best of Ritschl to fulfilment? The answers to these questions would lead us too far afield. They may serve, however, to apprise us of the fact that contemporaries of the early Barth saw more lines of continuity between his thought and the theology of the nineteenth century and Ritschl in particular than he himself observed or admitted. This is due no doubt, in part, to a kind of myopia which often afflicts prophetic figures such as Barth in the throes of establishing new theological frontiers...Our own historical distance from the events surrounding the attack of the dialectical theologians on Ritschl and his successors makes possible more balanced estimates of his contribution.' (222)

Therefore, we note that in contemporary Ritschl interpretation, a non-Barthian approach to the subject-matter, has generally yielded conclusions which support the view that there is indeed continuity between Ritschl, et. al., and Barth, and that Barth can only properly be understood, in part, as a scion of the master. (223)
vii) A Scottish Basis for the Continuity Scenario

However, all our attempts at outlining possible scenarios shall be in vain if we cannot demonstrate within the Scottish context, an awareness of Continuity as well as Discontinuity. Thus, we must pose the question, Were Scottish theologians sensitive to the roots of Barth's theology? The answer, I will contend, is, Yes!

H.R. Mackintosh, in the following extract from *Types of Modern Theology*, seems definite in his contention that, while the theological form of expression found in Ritschl and Barth may differ, their basic intention is shared, much more so, 'than has often been supposed.' He writes of Ritschl first of all, in the following terms:

'He and those who learnt from him gave life, variety and freshness to the dogmatic field for a whole generation; and in virtue of their sustained contention that Christian faith is its own sufficient basis, that theology must rest entirely on the revelation of God in Christ, and that systematic doctrine exists to further the practical work of the Church, they were widely felt to be liberators of the theological mind.' (224)

Thus, Ritschl, et al., have, for Mackintosh, made definite progress towards, among other things, stating an adequate basis for theology, namely that it, 'must rest entirely on the revelation of God in Christ'. Immediately thereafter, he continues:

'It is now some years since Ritschl's great successor, Karl Barth, stepped into the arena; and that Barth is definitely a more Christian thinker than Ritschl no one, I should suppose, can doubt who takes revelation seriously. But in declared intention and programme the two theologians are much nearer to each other than has often been supposed. The difference may, perhaps, be shortly put thus: that Ritschl undertakes to furnish a theology inspired throughout by Scripture, but too often fails to keep his promise, whereas Barth is set upon thinking out something that will deserve to be called a "Theology of the Word of God", and has so far proceeded...
with a consistency and power which is engaging the attention of the whole Christian Church. It is in performance, not in chosen aim, that the two men stand so far apart.' (225)

Therefore, in comparing the merits of Ritschl and Barth, Mackintosh clearly sees both theologians taking their point of departure from the same place, that is, Scripture, and sharing the same intention, that is, stating their understanding in line with the conviction that it, 'must rest entirely on the revelation of God in Christ'. That one of them has, in Mackintosh's view, performed the task more adequately than the other, and thus more successfully fulfilled the intention, does not however invalidate the initial premise of Mackintosh's case. Ritschl and Barth together, share the same theological intention, that is, the substance of what they wish to express finds its source in an understanding of the nature of Revelation, which rests, 'entirely on the revelation of God in Christ'.

However, Mackintosh's pupil, T.F. Torrance, who acknowledges that it was Mackintosh who led him to Barth, (226) betrays no awareness of this insight. We shall, of necessity, return to a much fuller analysis of Mackintosh's reception of Barth's thought, and of his relationship to Ritschlian theology in his earlier years. We offer the above sample as a foretaste of a crucial element within the overall thesis.

Nor was Mackintosh the only one of Torrance's teachers to be so perceptive, and with good reason. John Baillie, (Professor of Divinity, Edinburgh, 1934-1956) in his autobiographical, "Confessions of a Transplanted Scot", (1933) (227) reflects upon the theological influences which have shaped his thought, and, in the course of so doing, directs attention to the influence of Herrmann
upon that thought. Indeed, for Baillie, 'chief place must be given to Wilhelm Herrmann.', (228) in the assessment of these influences. Thus, having gone, 'to Marburg in the spring of 1911', he notes that he was particularly open to Herrmann, such that he may write:

'as I listened to Herrmann and read his Ethik I was more and more led to agree that religion cannot really be important...unless it can offer us an insight into the nature of the unseen world which is quite specific in character, which can be obtained in no other way than by the practice of religion itself, and which is far superior in point of certainty to any of the conflicting theories defended by the various philosophic schools.' (229)

Thus, it was the case that, as D. Fergusson puts it:

'Baillie was clearly impressed not only by the piety of Herrmann's teaching but by his resolute claim that religion is sui generis and can only be understood from the inside.' (230)

As a result of Herrmann's teaching, Baillie derived a series of seven axioms, (231) which he regarded as providing, 'the presuppositions of my theological thinking'. These were not independent axioms, but rather a series, 'deducible from a single principle', namely:

'the principle...that religious faith is not a dim fore-grasping of a reality which other and exacter processes of thought and research will afterward more clearly reveal and more securely establish, but a way of knowledge which is at least equal to any other in point of reliability and which leads us into the presence of a Reality that is not discoverable by any other means.' (232)

Baillie notes thereafter, that he took this principle, 'from the Schleiermacher-Ritschl tradition in which Herrmann stood', as well as following Herrmann in his approbation of, 'the Kant-Ritschl tradition', (233) which clearly perceives, 'the organic nature of the relation
between faith and morals, between our religious belief and our consciousness of obligation.' (234)

This is not to say that Baillie endorsed in a wholesale fashion, 'the Schleiermacher-Ritschl tradition', and he specifically rejects, 'the subjectivist trend in Schleiermacher's thought'. Equally, and for our purposes most instructively, he then highlights the elements in Ritschlian thought which he would wish to eschew, and, among these, he notes, 'its narrow Lutheran Christocentrism', and, 'its inhospitable attitude toward whatever religious insight stands outside of the Christian tradition'. (235)

Having thus fully established, with appropriate caveat, his indebtedness to Herrmann, (236) Baillie writes:

'At this point I may interject the remark that the so-called Theology of Crisis seems to me, as regards one side of its teaching, to have grown out of precisely those aspects of Ritschlianism which I found myself from the first rejecting; and this in spite of the fact that the Ritschlian system is in other respects the object of its direct and very bitter attack. Professor Barth listened to Herrmann's lectures at Marburg very nearly at the same time as I was listening to them, but we must have been attracted and repelled by very different sides of our teacher's thought.' (237)

We may hazard the suggestion that, although Baillie does not explicitly link Barth to these, the, 'one side', which he has in mind, relates to that narrowness which may be induced by a misplaced Christocentrism, and the, 'inhospitable attitude toward whatever religious insight stands outside of the Christian tradition'. (238) This suggestion would seem to agree with that of D. Fergusson, when he professes the view that:

'Herrmann's Christocentrism, as Baillie saw it, failed to allow sufficient scope for an awareness of God outwith the revelation given in the person and work of Christ.
While Barth reinvigorated Herrmann's Christocentrism Baillie resisted it.' (239)

However, the identification of one-sidedness in Barth, does not signify a wholesale rejection of his teaching, for Baillie finds in Barth much to, 'warmly welcome', even if finally he cannot endorse his position. (240)

Thus, Baillie points to Barth's indebtedness to Ritschlian thought, as exemplified in Herrmann, and then highlights the partial nature of that indebtedness.

We do not know how Baillie first became aware of Barth's theology, but he would have received guidance from Deitrich Bonhoeffer's presentation of that theology, to Baillie's seminar in 1930-31, during Bonhoeffer's time at Union Theological Seminary. (241) Bonhoeffer's comments on Baillie are of note, and he typifies him as having, 'a liberal theology oriented on Ritschl', and further suggests that it is one, 'which stands between Ritschl, Herrmann and the Scottish tradition'. (242) Clearly one would anticipate sensitivity in matters of theological continuity from one such as Baillie.

Baillie's 1934 work, And the Life Everlasting, displays a considerable awareness of the early Barth in their German originals, and notes his association with, 'the striking theological movement which has now appeared among us in express reaction against our prevalent shallow optimisms'. (243) He was, as noted, well aware of the fact that Barth's theology stood in stated opposition to that of Ritschl and Herrmann. Nonetheless, in relation to the theme of, And the Life Everlasting, that is, the Resurrection, he clearly regards their presuppositions to be the same. (244) Further, Baillie is aware of the ambiguity integral to Barth's account of the
Resurrection. Thus, for Barth, the Empty Tomb is not to be viewed as the ground of faith. Rather, it is, as to its historicity, ambiguous, and a fact of a wholly different order from that of the event of the Risen One. Thus, in this important respect, Barth and his Ritschlian forebears are to be regarded as being at one. (245)

Baillie's co-editorship of the symposium, Revelation, for the 1937 World Conference on Faith and Order, to which Barth contributed, (246) renewed his opportunity to reflect on the nature of Revelation. He writes:

'It would appear then that the topic of revelation is of the first order of urgency as regards the Church's total task in the present age.' (247)

He notes the distinctiveness of Barth's position, and suggests that it is one, 'which he has made so peculiarly his own and which has deeply influenced Christian thought in so many different communions.' (248) Further, he writes:

'Professor Barth, if I rightly understand him, would hold that only in Christ have we any true knowledge of God, and only in a perverted, invalid and loose sense of the concept can there be said to exist any revelation apart from Christ.' (249)

Further, Baillie, in, Our Knowledge of God, (1939) once more places Barth firmly within the context of his forebears, with respect to Revelation. He writes:

'He stands, as did Ritschl and Herrmann in previous generations, in the tradition of that Lutheran christocentrism which made Christ the Mediator no less of knowledge than of salvation; the christocentrism which denies that except in His Incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth God has ever spoken to man at all; the christocentrism which seizes eagerly on the New Testament declaration that 'neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him', and understands that to mean that not merely God's fatherliness but His very reality was made known to men
through Jesus alone. Except through revelation, he teaches, there is no knowledge of God, and there is no revelation except in Christ'. (250)

He then notes that in his teaching on the 'imago dei', Barth is at once dependent on, and in opposition to, that of Ritschl. (251)

We might be tempted to qualify Baillie's opinions, by observing that they come from an early period in the reception of Barth, and that the later Baillie would have had a different estimate. However, Baillie, writing in 1957, after a lifetime of critical engagement with Barth, continues the earlier line of thought, when he suggests:

'(Barth) would have nothing to do with the traditional apologetic which sought to stop what Calvin had called "the obstreperous mouths of unbelievers" by forcing them, for instance, to admit the historicity of the Gospel miracles and our Lord's resurrection. And he followed Kant and Ritschl in his angry denial of the validity of natural theology. In all this he was, and is, still a child of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment'. (252)

Thus, Baillie maintained the position that the theology of Karl Barth is best understood as a development from the line of thought represented by Kant, Ritschl and Herrmann, and seems to have done so from the beginning, and then to the end, of his theological career.

Therefore, from two of the finest Scottish theologians of the century, we have a little heeded indication of the house and lineage of Barth, which, in spite of neglect, may yet serve as a guide to the truth of the matter.

viii) Conclusion and Prospect

On reflection, it seems to me that we have successfully established that there is a particular approach to the
theology of Barth which has been championed in Scotland by T.F. Torrance. This approach stresses the essential discontinuity between Barth's theology and that which preceded it, and we have, not inaptly I trust, referred to this as the Discontinuity Scenario. I have indicated that I intend to challenge this by offering an alternative perspective on the theology of Barth and the theologians who came before him, and in so doing would suggest that this scenario has greater explanatory power than that offered by Torrance. This perspective I have called the Continuity Scenario, since I believe that it is possible to identify far greater continuity between Barth and, for example, Herrmann, and indeed Ritschl, than Torrance's Discontinuity Scenario would allow for.

Further, I have noted Torrance's claim that H.R. Mackintosh is, in great measure, responsible for introducing Barth to him, and have indicated that I intend to challenge Torrance's understanding of Mackintosh's view of Barth, particularly, as we shall see, with respect to Revelation. I have identified the concept of the self-revelation of God, as one that is crucial to both Herrmann and Barth, and have indicated that we shall examine the extent to which there is a real continuity in their understanding of this concept. To support this view, I have amassed, what I take to be, a not inconsiderable list of those who would hold that the question of continuity is an open one.

To then view the question, as it were, from the other side, I have indicated that Ritschl scholarship is, in considerable measure, willing to support the notion of greater continuity between Ritschl, et. al., and Barth. Finally, I have demonstrated, in preliminary fashion,
that there was in fact, within the Scottish tradition, an awareness of what I have called the Continuity Scenario.

How then shall we summarise and present the intention of this thesis? From whence do we take our point of departure, and to what end do we work? It seems that some words of H.R. Mackintosh shall best indicate our point of departure, that is, where he suggests, speaking of Ritschl and Barth, that, 'in declared intention and programme the two theologians are much nearer to each other than has often been supposed...Ritschl undertakes to furnish a theology inspired throughout by Scripture, but too often fails to keep his promise, whereas Barth is set upon thinking out something that will deserve to be called a "Theology of the Word of God"...It is in performance, not in chosen aim, that the two men stand so far apart.' (253) From this we take up the suggestion that a student of Ritschl, Ritschlianism, and Barth, might best pursue his study, with respect to the concept of the self-revelation of God, by seeking to determine if their concepts, although their forms may vary, do not in fact encapsulate an understanding of the nature of Revelation which evidences a substantial continuity. That is, we shall pursue the suggestion that, in stating their understanding of the nature of Revelation, Ritschl, a Ritschlian such as Wilhelm Herrmann, and Barth, have a shared intention. Clearly Mackintosh felt able, in reviewing Ritschl and Barth, to discern under the different forms in which their understanding of the nature of God's self-revelation was expressed, such similarity of intention, that he could speak of them as he did. Thus, he credits Ritschl, 'and those who learnt from him', with sharing the, 'sustained contention that Christian faith is its own sufficient basis, that theology must rest entirely on the revelation of God in Christ'.

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Thus, 'cards on the table.', (254) we pursue the suggestion that Ritschl, Herrmann, and Barth, have a shared intention, which is an expression of the fact that the substance of what they wish to express finds its source in an understanding of Revelation, which rests, 'entirely on the revelation of God in Christ'.

The adoption of the criteria of, 'intention', is not without precedent, and is a crucial element in H.W. Frei's seminal dissertation from 1956, *The Doctrine of Revelation in the thought of Karl Barth, 1909 to 1922: The Nature of Barth's break with Liberalism*. (255) Frei, in studying the development of Barth's thought, suggests that a coherent understanding of the form and content of that thought is hard to maintain, given the complexity of the various changes in expression, that is, of form, which Barth introduced over that time. It becomes harder to maintain when Frei finds reason to believe that Barth's personal recollections of the period and its events are somewhat suspect. This is especially the case when Frei finds Barth making the, 'affirmation that form and content of thought are inseparable!' (256)

For example, Barth, in reviewing the process which led to the formulation and recasting of, *C.D. I/I*, out of its original form, 'as volume 1 of a *Christian Dogmatics in Outline*', may look back to his, 'experience of twelve years ago in re-editing the *Römerbrief*', and find that his experience then is very much paralleled by his experience in 1932. (257) He writes:

'I could and I wanted to say the same thing as before; but now I could no longer say it in the way which I had said it before.' (258)

Frei finds Barth's recollection difficult to make sense of, given that, 'it involves a writer who in one case
reports (and documents !) a change in fundamental outlook, and then a second change, which supposedly involves thought-form and content but not basic outlook.' (259) He continues:

'Against this affirmation of continuity in basic perspective, one is bound to remind himself that one of Barth's constant reiterations in regard to theological thought has been the inseparability of form from content.' (260)

Thus, while Barth may caution, 'Let me warn you against this. It is rare in life to be able to separate form and content.', (261) Frei judges that this warning has not been heeded by Barth himself, and in the final analysis he holds that Barth on Barth is no sure guide to Barth's development. Therefore, we find ourselves with a dilemma when coming to investigate Barth's thought. For; while Barth contends that there is a continuity of intention, and, on the other hand, that form and content are closely related and express this intention, Frei maintains that the changes in the form of Barth's expression have been so radical that his twin contentions simply cannot stand, and, in effect, his recollections are incoherent. Frei expresses the dilemma thus:

'If the thought-form changes drastically, then, is the author not fooled by his own memory if he claims identity or continuity of basic intention ?' (262)

Frei clearly wishes to rescue Barth from the morass, and, to do so, seeks to formulate a distinction based on the notion of, 'continuity of basic intention'. He writes:

'In this difficult situation it seems inevitable to introduce another distinction, that of intention from content and form. The intention is the author's basic meaning, his conscious but intangible motive power.' (263)

Therefore, Frei holds that we can discern the basic
intention which runs through the thought of Barth, (as, I would suggest, does Mackintosh, in respect of Ritschl and Barth) and use this as a guide to understanding the development of his theology. This is especially so given that Barth clearly indicates what his intention is, and Frei judges that the approach he advocates is legitimated by such statements of intent. However, the introduction of the notion of, 'intention', is in no way to be seen as the entrance of an arbitrary form of theological higher-criticism, and the notion is, in principle, integrally related to that of, 'content and form.' Indeed, it derives meaning from, and in turn expresses, the content which the form encapsulates. Thus, the notion of, 'intention', as applied by Frei, may be understood thus:

'About the only way to judge a writer's intention is by the form and content of his thought. Intention is indeed distinct but also inseparable from form and content. And even if it is his intention to be completely loyal to another, e.g., to the thought of Scripture, this loyalty of intention is not only understood in the light of the other, but much more in the conformity, so far as one may judge it, of the writer's form and content to his expressed intention.' (264)

However, as indicated, Frei perceives that there has been a considerable change in the form of expression used by Barth, and, in response to this, he seeks to work out an understanding of Barth's position which will allow him to make sense of his claims to consistency. With this concern in mind, he writes:

'Mutual conformity of thought-form and content will be a fair criterion for judging the correctness or incorrectness of an author's stated intention. When the two clash, one must await further evidence before speaking about consistency or inconsistency in his intention and its conformity to conceptual expression...An author's intention may be measured by his conceptual expression only over a period of time and, if possible, through a variety of conceptual expressions.' (265)
Having considered the evidence from this significant period, Frei finds himself, 'forced to agree with Barth at least in seeing a continuity in intention between the period of the break with liberalism (1915) and the publication of the second edition of The Doctrine of The Word of God (1932)' . (266) Not that this conclusion is without difficulties, for we are then placed :

'in the position of having to seek the unity in Barth's intention by reading backward, by seeking to find implicitly in earlier work what has become explicit in later work. And this has to be done without subjecting the author's mind to categories of unbroken, unilinear development or, even worse, to the thesis that essentially there has been no real development in Barth's thought - just a more and more dogmatic expression of the same convictions, or even a complete repristination of theological thought.' (267)

Frei notes that H.U. von Balthasar was aware of the difficulties which he has drawn attention to, (268) and we may note, on our own account, that for von Balthasar :

'There is no doubt that Barth's later works are, in a real sense, his earlier works as well, [sic] that the intense radiation of Church Dogmatics represents the explosive unleashing of an intellectual power that was there from the very beginning. We can understand the whole process only if we regard the Epistle to the Romans and related writings as the first symptomatic formulations of a deeper intention.' (269)

Employing this perspective, we can, according to von Balthasar, see that Barth desires throughout his work, 'to lay hold of theological reality', (270) and that underneath the, 'stylistic form of expression', employed in, The Epistle to the Romans, there is an attempt to point to, 'the pure reality that Revelation essentially is.' (271) However, in order, 'to lay hold of theological reality', Barth, 'deliberately abandoned the cryptic abstractionism of his earlier thought', and was enabled
to grasp that reality, 'at the place where it presents itself: in the Revelation of sacred scripture.' (272)

Thus, for Frei (and, von Balthasar) we may from a certain point look back and trace through a period of theological development, a, 'continuity of basic intention', in Barth's thought.

Our primary concern, in looking at Frei, has been to detail the basis of his approach, rather than with the theological reality which this approach seeks to discern. This is so because we wish to draw parallels between Frei's approach and that of Mackintosh, that is, they both discern a, 'continuity of basic intention', in respect of the theological subjects they observe. In other words, we are here seeking a precedent for the approach we now wish to take. However, we ought to note that the reality which Frei discerns, is a realisation of the fact that Barth has sought to express, throughout the period studied, a theology which consistently reflects certain presuppositions. These presuppositions are, 'The complete foundation of faith, and the correlation of faith in the doctrine of revelation or of God', (on this latter point, Frei understands Barth to mean that, 'except in revelation God is not God.' (273)) and, 'his persistent Christology.', with Frei seeing these as, 'closely related...inheritance(s) from the liberal period in Barth's theology', (274) such that, 'the sole content of revelation is the Word of God - Jesus Christ.' (275) From these presuppositions we may derive the basic intention of Barth's thought, in that they are manifest as the content of Barth's theological expressions, even though the form of expression changes. Indeed, Frei repeatedly asserts, 'that it was precisely the change in thought-form which, far from obscuring or changing his basic theological intentions, served to explicate their
continuity.' (276) That is, Frei believes that the reality which Barth wishes to point to, is consistently the same, regardless of the thought-form employed, and while Barth may be inconsistent in his claim that content and thought-form are always strictly correlated, he nonetheless is consistent in trying to express his basic intention, which is derived from, and expresses the presuppositions noted above.

We have, I trust, derived from Frei, sufficient warrant for believing that an approach which seeks to discern continuity of intention in theological expression can be fruitfully utilised. Further, we have good reason to believe that H.R. Mackintosh had such an approach in mind when comparing the contributions of Ritschl and Barth. That is, he believed that Ritschl and Barth, and, as we shall see, Herrmann, have a shared theological intention, which reflects the fact that the substance of what they wish to express finds its source in an understanding of the nature of Revelation, which rests, 'entirely on the revelation of God in Christ'.

This, I believe, has provided, both; a basic agenda, and a basic justification, for the thesis. To what tasks must we now turn? We have already charted out Torrance's understanding of the history of theology and its relation to his conception of the self-revelation of God. However, our emphasis here has been rather more on the historical aspect than upon an exposition of its theological content, and, in due course, we shall seek to rectify this by providing just such an exposition. However, prior to this, we shall have to examine the extent of Barth's impact upon H.R. Mackintosh, in order to establish in what sense we might reasonably talk about Continuity or Discontinuity. In this concern, we shall particularly wish to establish Mackintosh's own theological position.
and his perspective on Herrmann and Barth, and, most crucially, his understanding of their contribution to the elucidation of the concept of the self-revelation of God. Equally, we shall seek to place Mackintosh within his wider Scottish context. Thereafter, we shall attempt to ground our suggestion of theological continuity between Herrmann and Barth more securely. This task having been achieved, we shall then return to our analysis of Torrance's understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God.

It is to these tasks that we now turn.
CHAPTER 1 - THE RECEPTION OF THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH: TWO PERSPECTIVES ON THE SCOTTISH SITUATION


9 Ibid., 10.

10 Ibid., 11.


Lamont stood in a long line of Scottish thinkers concerned to relate scientific and theological thought. He had questioned the rationalisation of Chairs at New College, in the wake of the 1929 Reunion, which led to the suppression of the Chair of Natural Science within the Divinity Faculty, (such Chairs and Lectureships, being part of the Free and then United Free legacy. (H. Watt, Op. Cit., 24, 31)) on the grounds that inadequate attention was to be given to the apologetic task of relating the two disciplines. (G.R. Logan, "Memoir", in, - 84 -


24 Ibid., 123-124.

25 Ibid., 124.

26 Ibid., 124-125.

27 Ibid., 125.

28 Ibid., 126.


30 Ibid., 19.


32 Ibid., 139.

34 B.J.A. Gray, Theology as Science : An Examination of the Theological Methodology of Thomas F. Torrance (Unpublished Doctorate in Sacred Theology Dissertation, Louvain, 1975), 98.


36 Ibid., 64-91.


39 Ibid., 227.

40 Ibid., 228.

41 Ibid., 230.

42 Ibid., 4.

43 Ibid., 5.

44 Ibid., 6.

45 Idem, "The Study of Barth", in S.W. Sykes (ed.) Karl Barth - Studies of his Theological Methods, 10.

46 Ibid., 10-11.


48 Ibid., 208.

49 Ibid., 206.

For other early comments by Torrance on Athanasius, see, for example, "Predestination in Christ", EQ 13 (1941), 108-141, where Athanasius is alleged to betray Platonizing tendencies in respect of the Incarnation, such that he denies, 'that time relations...mean something for God Himself', (Ibid., 138-139 n.61, see also, Ibid., 125). Torrance's, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Edinburgh : Oliver & Boyd, 1948), which was the published version of his doctoral dissertation, notes a further weakness in Athanasius'
thought, where, 'even... such good theologians as Irenaeus and Athanasius', take up the, 'idea of deification', a concept which Torrance regards as sub-personal, with grace conceived, 'as ghostly potency', in terms very similar to, 'Greek mythology or the mystery religions.' (Ibid., 140, and, 140 n.3)

Clearly Torrance's perspective on Athanasius will have to undergo a radical alteration before he can reach his later position, as found in his 1988 book, The Trinitarian Faith. (See, for example, Ibid., 138ff., 188ff.)

We see Torrance reaching towards that position in his contributions to the Church of Scotland's, Special Commission on Baptism, in 1956. (Edinburgh : Church of Scotland Reports to the General Assembly, 1956), 605-646, esp. 633ff. Here, for example, we see Torrance beginning to link Athanasius to Calvin, (Ibid., 636, 638) with the suggestion that they both teach that Christian Baptism is constituted in the person of Christ, that is in His Humanity, and that our Salvation is to be understood as being after the pattern of Christ's humanity. These comments are amplified in Torrance's, "Draft of the Interim Report" (Church of Scotland : Special Commission on Baptism - Draft of Interim Report, 1956. Unpublished MS, New College, Edinburgh, 101pp. See esp., Ibid., 46, 50, 70-71, 78-81, 87, 96)

(The status of these Reports as the writings of T.F. Torrance seems to me to be somewhat ambiguous. They are listed in, what we may take to be, the definitive bibliography of his writings for the period 1941-1989, (I.R. Torrance, "A Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas F. Torrance 1941-1989", SJTh 43 (1990) 225-262.) under the years 1955-1962, during which time Torrance was Convener of the Special Commission. However, the position of Convener does not, it seems to me, confer the right to claim "authorship" of any subsequent Report, even where any particular hand has been pre-eminent in the composition of the final Report. The report of any commission or committee is, by its very nature, a composite creation, and unless explicitly acknowledged, or verifiable by comparison with a draft, we should not assign authorship to any one person, even if we claim to "know" who it really was. The, Special Commission on Baptism Reports were all contained within the General Assembly Reports of the Church of Scotland, and were not for general publication. However, where elements of the Reports were published more widely, for example, The Biblical Doctrine of Baptism (Edinburgh : St. Andrew's Press, 1958), it is clear that it is very much a corporate creation. (Ibid., 5) This may, or may not, be a guide to what happened in other years, but in, The
Doctrine of Baptism (Edinburgh: St. Andrew’s Press, 1966, being the General Assembly Report of 1962) that corporate dimension is again noted, without at any point mentioning the name of the Convener. (Ibid., 3))


53 Idem, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology 1910-1931, 145.

54 Ibid., 145.

55 Ibid., 145-146. We note that Torrance's understanding of Calvin is one that has been considerably influenced by Barth. Thus, as early as 1947, we see that Torrance's exposition of Calvin has been inspired by Barth, and indeed Barth is presented as having crystallised the insights of Calvin and brought them to the fore in our day. (See, T.F. Torrance, "The Word of God and the Nature of Man", in, F.W. Camfield (ed.), Reformation Old and New (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947), 121-141. See, 121, 126-127, 128-129, 135-136.) We may equally note the allegation that Torrance has been guilty of a, 'Barthianization of Calvin'. (See, Richard A. Muller, "The Barth Legacy: New Athanasius or Origen Redivivus? A Response to T.F Torrance", in, The Thomist 54 (1990), 673-704, 690 n.39. See also, Idem, "The Place and Importance of Karl Barth in the Twentieth Century: A Review Essay", in, WTJ 50 (1988), 127-156, Idem, "Karl Barth and the Path of Theology into the Twentieth Century: Historical Observations", in, WTJ 51 (1989), 25-50.) This is regarded as an element of a much wider, 'Barthianization of history', (Idem, "The Barth Legacy: New Athanasius or Origen Redivivus? A Response to T.F Torrance", 684 ff.) wherein the history of theology is analysed and interpreted in a manner which claims fidelity to Barth, to produce an account of that history which is congenial to the theology which those such as Torrance wish to expound. Therefore, we may wish to view the overarching theological continuity, which stretches back to Nicaea, to be an extension of a position already established in respect of Calvin and Barth.
57 Ibid., 25.
59 See page 4 of Chapter 1, and n.18.
62 Ibid., 40.
63 Ibid., 41.
64 Ibid., 265.
65 Idem, "Karl Barth", in, SJTh 22 (1969), 1-9, 4.
66 Ibid., 3.
67 Idem, Theological Science, 6-7.
68 Ibid., vii.
69 Ibid., vii.
70 Ibid., vii-viii.
73 Ibid., 264.
74 Ibid., 266.
76 Idem, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture (Belfast : Christian Journals Ltd., 1980), 105-106. Idem, The Ground and Grammar of Theology (Belfast : Christian - 89 -

78 Idem, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, 105.
79 Idem, Theology in Reconciliation, 264.
81 Ibid., 163.
82 Ibid., 170.
83 Ibid., 172.
85 For the use of the above articles in, Idem, Karl Barth : Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, see, xi-xii.
86 Ibid., 160-161
87 Ibid., 219-220. See, 244, for what is clearly intended to be the correct sub-section heading.
88 Ibid., 173.
89 Idem, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, 104.
91 T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth : Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, 83.

92 Compare, Ibid., Chapter 2, 27-83, with the piece on which it is based, that is, Idem, "Introduction", in Karl Barth, Theology and Church, 7-54.

93 Idem, Karl Barth : Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, 4, 43, 45, 83, 84, 87, 94, 100, 192.

94 Idem, Karl Barth : An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931, 146.


96 Ibid., 700-704.

97 Ibid., 677.


100 Ibid., 210, citing De Synodis 90 (PL 10 : 543-545)

101 T.F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, Passim.


104 Ibid., 436-437.

105 Ibid., 437-445.

106 Ibid., 441.

107 Ibid., 444.
108 Ibid., 440.


110 Ibid., 234-237.


112 Ibid., 32.


See further, C. Stead's, *Divine Substance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). Here, Stead offers a thorough examination of Athanasius' use of homoousious, and his treatment points to the ambiguities inherent in that use, such that we might judge it prudent to exercise caution in claiming any decisive interpretation of Athanasius on this question. Further, we might also wish to continue that cautious approach when claiming that any theological developments, claimed as an extension of such interpretations, were in fact legitimately "Athanasian".

Stead notes the complexities which surround any attempt to specify the meaning of the term *homoousious* at the time of Nicaea, and points out that Athanasius' own recollections of the Council are set down, 'after a lapse of twenty-five years.' (Ibid., 243) In particular Stead is at pains to suggest it is unlikely that, at the time of Nicaea, the concept of the *homoousios* was meant to explicitly express the essential unity, (as Athanasius claimed) as well as the equality, of the three Persons of the Trinity. (Ibid., 251ff.)

In his analysis Stead indicates that Athanasius uses the term, 'perhaps 150 times...but many of these instances are mere reports of the opinion of others, and less than half of them really illuminate his own usage.' These uses, 'are almost without exception closely geared to the actual clauses of the Nicene Creed, that [the] Son is homoousios with the Father.' He then continues, "Thus
Athanasius never says that the Father and Son are homoousios; still less, of course, that the Father is homoousios with the Son. Nor does he ever connect the term with a noun referring to the Godhead as a whole; he does speak of the "consubstantial Trinity" (as he does of the "indivisible Trinity"), nor of the "consubstantial Godhead" (as he does of the "one Godhead"). There is in fact a built-in asymmetry in his use of the term, which suggests that he is moving only very cautiously away from the moderate Origenism of Alexander.' (Ibid., 260-261)

All of this should alert us to the dangers of claiming the "Athanasian" tag for any development of the concept of the homoousios. Athanasius is himself too cautious and limited to permit such a claim.

114 T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth : An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931, 16, 33.


118 Ibid., 53-54.

119 Ibid., 8-9.

120 Ibid., 55-56.

121 Ibid., 55.

122 T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago : Univ.of Chicago Press, 1970). Torrance does not himself invoke the use of Kuhn's terminology and concepts in relation to his exposition of Barth, but is well aware of their implications in other fields, and his use of them is, with certain cautions, generally very positive. See for example, T.F. Torrance, Theological Science, 221. Idem, God and Rationality, 46, 106. Idem, Theology in Reconciliation, 272. Idem, The Ground and Grammar of Theology, 47. Idem, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge, 103, 243, 260.

123 See for example, A.F. Chalmers, What is this thing called Science? (Milton Keynes : Open Univ. Press, 1978), 85-93. See also, S.L. Jaki, The Road of Science...


125 Ibid., 13, 19-20.

H. Küng, "Paradigm Change in Theology: A proposal for Discussion", in, Paradigm Change in Theology (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1989) explicitly raises, 'The question of continuity', and does so in the context of his discussion on, 'the theory of paradigm change', in theology, (Ibid., 3) as mediated to us through the work of T.S. Kuhn. (See generally, Ibid., 3-31) His observations on continuity seem to me to be particularly relevant to our discussion, as the following quotations make clear. He writes:

'We must remember that in natural science also - in all scientific "revolutions" - there is never any question of a total break. In every paradigm change, despite all discontinuity, there is a fundamental continuity...I affirm even more. There is a common language for theoretical discussion and a procedure for comparing results; thus the "conversion", not necessarily an irrational event, is not without arguments sanctioning the change of the standpoint, is never an absolute break with the past.' (Ibid., 29-30)

Küng continues:

'Indeed, this is my conviction: if we ever want to understand the development of theology, we have to avoid the choice not only between an absolutist and a relativist view, but between a radical continuity and a radical discontinuity. Every paradigm change shows at the same time continuity and discontinuity...In theology (and in the historical sciences) much more than in the basically unhistorical natural sciences, which mention their fathers and heroes only in introductions and in the margin, there is no question of the rediscovery of tradition. It is a question of a new formulation of tradition'. (Ibid., 30)

These insights seem to me to highlight the need for sensitivity to the reality that in a real theological sense, 'there is nothing new under the sun', (Ecclesiastes 1 v.9) and to point to the truth that what we find in new theological movements are reformulations, based, in part, upon preceding movements. Now, of course, Torrance would, I imagine, agree with this latter point, excepting only that there seems to be a lack of awareness of the possibility that what Barth is reformulating is,
in some considerable measure, the tradition in which he was immediately schooled, that is Wilhelm Herrmann, as well as other elements of the theological tradition which lie more distant in time, such as Athanasius or Calvin.

126 T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931, 37.

127 Ibid., 37-38.

128 Ibid., 38.

129 Ibid., 38.

130 Ibid., 38.


134 Ibid., 111.


136 Ibid., 39.

137 Ibid., 39.


139 Compare this with Barth's view of Ritschl, as expressed in, Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (London: SCM, 1972). He writes of Ritschl thus:

'It has been said of Ritschl that in the history of theology since Schleiermacher he is the only one who, in the true sense, has given birth to an epoch. This is not true because all the strivings proceeding from Schleiermacher, who was, despite all argument, the only one who really gave rise to an epoch, continued on their way in a very significant fashion beside Ritschl, and were even more than ever taken up again after him...Ritschl has the significance of an episode in more recent theology, and not, indeed not, that of an epoch.' (Ibid., 654)

140 H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology (London: Nisbet & Co. 1937), 141.

142 Ibid., 22.

143 Ibid., 27, citing, W. Pauck, 'A quoted oral comment'. See, 37 n.29.

144 Ibid., 27.

145 Ibid., 37 n.30

146 Ibid., 28.

147 Ibid., 28.


152 Ibid., 238.

153 Ibid., 239.

154 Ibid., 239.

155 Ibid., 256.

156 Ibid., 258.


158 Ibid., 152.


160 Ibid., 256.

161 Ibid., 258.


163 Ibid., 54.
165 Ibid., 29.
167 Ibid., 128, 47.
168 Ibid., 4.
170 Ibid., 225.
174 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Revelation as History, 3.
177 Ibid., 101-102.
179 Ibid., 173.
180 Ibid., 174.
181 Ibid., 208 n.12.
182 Ibid., 173.
183 Ibid., 207 n.11.
185 Ibid., 505.

187 Ibid., 277. C.D. I/2 is cited, e.g. on 276-277, viz. the Virgin Birth, and C.D. III/2 on 273, viz. Barth' view of History.

188 Ibid., 277-278.

189 Ibid., 278.

190 Ibid., 282.

191 Ibid., 279.

192 Ibid., 279.


195 Ibid., 100.

196 Ibid., 102.

197 Ibid., 102.

198 Ibid., 113.

199 Ibid., 115.

200 Ibid., 115.

201 Ibid., 117.


203 Ibid., 45.

204 R.W. Funk, "Introduction" to Ibid., 13. We may also note, as being of interest in this matter, D. Fergusson's suggestion (in, Bultmann (London : Geoffrey Chapman, 1992) that, in contrast to Barth, Bultmann is to be understood as one who, 'believed he was developing the theological tradition of Herrmann.' (Ibid., 23) Fergusson then quotes a previously untranslated letter of Bultmann's to this effect, as follows:
'I must frankly confess to you that the war was not a shattering experience for me. Of course, there were endless issues but not the war as such. It is clear to me, as I have maintained in numerous conversations, that what happens in war is not different from peacetime; a shipwreck, an act of meanness, as they occur daily, present to us exactly the same question as the mass of events in the war. I do not believe, therefore, that the war influenced my theology... On the question of the origin of our theology, I am of the opinion that the internal debate with the theology of our teachers plays an incomparably greater role than the experiences of the war or the reading of Dostoevsky.' (Ibid., 23) ("Brief an Erich Foerster", in, Bernd Jaspert (ed.), Rudolf Bultmanns Werk und Wirkung (Darmstadt, 1984), 73-74.)

Fergusson contends therefore, that we are not to read into Bultmann's theological development, 'a sudden, radical shift', as a result of his affirmation of the dialectical theology, rather, 'the result of a sustained dialogue with the work of his teachers, and a sense of the shortcomings of their conclusions.' (Ibid., 24) Fergusson then continues, 'As an ally of Barth and Gogarten, Bultmann is not setting out upon a new course, but is developing what he has already learnt from Wilhelm Herrmann.', (Ibid., 24) and cites from a further Bultmann letter as follows:

'I perceive my position as an ally of Barth and Gogarten in no way as the crossing over to a new theology, but as the consistent continuation of what I have learned from Herrmann.' (Ibid., 24) (Letter of 23 March, 1926, in, Bernd Jaspert (ed.), Op. Cit., 42.)


207 Ibid., 111-112. C.D. IV/1 is cited, e.g. on 111-112, and C.D. IV/2 on 113-114. C.D. IV/3 is also cited, but is not explicitly drawn in for criticism.

208 Ibid., 110.

209 Ibid., 112. See also, P. Monsma, Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation (New Jersey : Somerset Press, 1937), 28-29, on the extent of the continuities between Herrmann and Barth.

211 Ibid., 127.

212 Ibid., 126-127.

213 K. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (London : SCM, 1972), Ch. 29, "Ritschl", 654-661.


216 Ibid., 184 n.85.


218 Ibid., 40.

219 Ibid., 41.


221 Ibid., 292.


223 As well as Hefner and those cited at n.214 above, there are a variety of other works propounding the same basic thesis, as noted in P. Hefner, Op. Cit., 47-50, and J. Richmond, Op. Cit., 42-45.


225 Ibid., 173.


228 Ibid., 50.
229 Ibid., 50.
232 Ibid., 51.
233 Ibid., 51.
234 Ibid., 54.
235 Ibid., 52.
238 Ibid., 52.
242 Ibid., 89-90.
244 Ibid., 144.
245 Ibid., 146, 144. See also 271ff. See, W. Herrmann, Op. Cit., 125-127, for an understanding of the Resurrection appearances which displays considerable affinities to that of Baillie.

By way of contrast, we note that Torrance, in, Space, Time and Resurrection, sees the Resurrection as a, 'real happening in our human existence, as objective act of God, within the space and time of our world', (66) and explicitly links this view to the name of Karl Barth. Thus, for example, when he states that we must, in opposition to, 'would-be "avant-garde" theologians',
understand the Resurrection as indicative of, 'the being and action of God himself in space and time.' (Ibid., 80) following Barth at, C.D. I/2, 130ff. Further, in, C.D. III/1, 445ff., Torrance sees Barth holding out against Bultmann's reduction of the Resurrection, to, "the Easter faith of the first disciples", and thus maintaining an understanding of the nature of the Resurrection akin to his. (Ibid., 66 n.6)

Clearly, we cannot reconcile Baillie's view of Barth on the Resurrection, with that of Torrance on the same subject. Further, we note that they cannot both be correct.

We further note H.R. Mackintosh's opposition to Herrmann's view, as in, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, (315-317). Here he observes that for Herrmann, 'the distinction between the ground of faith (Glaubensgrund) and the convictions generated by faith (Glaubensgedanken). is of, 'great importance.', with the Resurrection clearly being placed in the latter category. (Ibid., 315) However, for Mackintosh, 'the resurrection is itself part of the revelation to be interpreted. It is an integral element in the whole presented datum in which the love of God has become manifest for our salvation...Jesus' experience did not end in death. It embraced resurrection also, and this can be ignored only by a violent effort at abstraction.' (Ibid., 316)

246 K. Barth, "Revelation", in, J. Baillie & H. Martin (ed.s), Revelation (London : Faber & Faber, 1937), 41-81.
248 Ibid., xiii.
249 Ibid., xix.
251 Ibid., 24 n.1.
255 H.W. Frei, The Doctrine of Revelation in the thought of Karl Barth, 1909-1922 : The Nature of Barth's break

256 Ibid., 92. See, 89-92 generally.

257 K. Barth, C.D. I/1, vii.


260 Ibid., 92.


263 Ibid., 92.

264 Ibid., 93.


266 Ibid., 104.

267 Ibid., 104-105.


270 Ibid., 45.

271 Ibid., 47.

272 Ibid., 45.


274 Ibid., 570-571.

275 Ibid., 571.

276 Ibid., 551. See, 99-103.
CHAPTER 2 - H.R. MACKINTOSH AND THE RECEPTION OF BARTH

Hugh Ross Mackintosh (Professor of Systematic Theology, Edinburgh, 1904-1936) was undoubtedly one of the pre-eminent theologians in the Scotland of his day, and he presents an interesting case-study insofar as he can be seen as representative of a broadly Ritschlian approach to theology, who then offers a welcome to the theology of Barth. This being so, his reception of, and response to, Barth, are of considerable note.

i) H.R. Mackintosh - A first sighting of Barth

We may credit Mackintosh with the first sighting on the theological horizons by a Scot, of Barth. This took place in April 1924, when he spoke of, 'the influence of the new Calvinism championed by Karl Barth, of which we shall no doubt hear more.' (1) Equally, we have already noted his discernment of a basic similarity in approach between Ritschl and Barth, such that he wrote in 1936 that:

'in declared intention and programme the two theologians are much nearer to each other than has often been supposed.' (2)

The intervening period sees only one significant article on Barth by Mackintosh, as well as a number of incidental references in book reviews and articles, such that there is only limited evidence upon which to base any assessment of Mackintosh's response to Barth. This should be borne in mind when reviewing the claims of those who suggest that there is a significant turn from Ritschlianism to Barth in the Mackintosh's thought, though we also note evidence to suggest a considerable written correspondence between the two men. (3)
The brief comments found in the reviews and articles would hardly be noteworthy were it not for the sparsity of references by Mackintosh to Barth, and our need to establish the nature of the former's attitude to the latter. Therefore, I shall attempt to draw out such significant pointers as may be found in them to Mackintosh's attitude, before turning to a brief review of his *Expository Times* article of 1928, "Leaders of Theological Thought. Karl Barth". (4)

Later in 1924, in his review of, "The Swiss Group", of theologians, (5) Mackintosh identifies Emil Brunner as being the most able of a group of theologians, 'whose provocative work is arousing so much interest on the Continent.', (6) and one which includes Barth. In his assessment of this, 'Group', he suggests:

'It may well be that we are witnessing the first beginnings of a new movement, the counterpart, and in a sense the antipodes, of the Ritschlian school, dating from fifty years since. The antagonism, however, can only be partial; there are stronger ties of agreement, for example, between Brunner and Herrmann than the former seems willing to recognize.' (7)

Thus, Mackintosh, in his earliest assessment of the relationship of Ritschlian thought to the theological group with which Barth was associated, is careful to stress; both discontinuity, which is undeniable in certain respects, and, alongside this, a degree of continuity which even the participants in the group cannot themselves recognise. Further, he notes again, in 1926, the development of this group of theologians, which includes, 'Barth of Göttingen', such that he may suggest that, 'The recent uprising in definite Calvinism in Continental theology is one of the most interesting and suggestive phenomena of our day.' (8) However, although Mackintosh may regard this phenomena as interesting, he
is open to a searching criticism of it. Thus, in 1927, he may say of a book in review, that it opens, 'with some relevant pages on the paradox or perversity of Barth's theological estimate of history as the medium of revelation', (9) and his overall treatment of the book under review is favourable, so much so that he finds its impact parallel to the impact of Herrmann. (10) This critical vein is continued in a further review of 1928, (11) where he may say, in summarising Barth's strengths and weaknesses himself, that:

'Barth himself is a preacher in temperament, and a preacher of immense force, whose thundering protest against utilitarian religion has carried far and wide. But he gives us disappointingly little help in thinking out Christianity.' (12)

Further, he may write:

'"Our Nay is deeper than our Yea," says Barth in a typical utterance; but Dorries will carry most people with him in his contention that Ro 8 [sic] is the direct repudiation of this. The God whom Jesus brings and reveals is not far off; He is both far off and near, and it is the very heart of the gospel that the Holy One has made Himself ours in grace. Barth seems bent on making men afraid of God. All honour to his hatred of man-centred religion and his warning cry that man, by himself, is nothing. But then Jesus has enabled us to believe that man is never wholly "by himself." There is a living God, who seeks and finds His children perpetually.' (13)

Therefore, while welcoming the polemical corrective found in Barth's, The Epistle to the Romans, Mackintosh is dissatisfied with the result Barth has so far offered.

However, this recognition of imbalance in Barth's thought does not mean, for Mackintosh, that it is fundamentally flawed. For in a review, in 1928, of a book by Otto Ritschl, (14) he notes Ritschl's suggestion that Barth's thought is a, 'hastily developed', and, 'one-sided
reading', of the notion of paradox, (15) and replies:

'This is worth thinking over, but does it carry us very far to call Barth one-sided? Of course he is, but then so were Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Albrecht Ritschl himself. Every new movement zigzags at a tangent, and if we are to get the good of Barth we shall have to listen to his powerful voice, allowing for his over-emphasis.' (16)

Once more, we see a balanced assessment of Barth, which recognises the points where he advances alongside his retarding weaknesses. This equitable response to Barth is continued in a further review, in 1930, of a book by G. Wobbermin, (17) where Mackintosh notes that Wobbermin charges Barth with, 'scholasticism'; of, 'falling back into an unfortunate dogmatism, which prevents his being fully sensitive to the need for historical research', and that, 'His dialectic method runs the danger of inviting once more the deleterious influence of speculative thought in theology'. (18)

In response, Mackintosh writes:

'One may acknowledge the detailed force and point of most of this without at all ceasing to feel the religious power of Barth's teaching as a whole. Nothing but good can come from such carefully considered criticism of a thinker who deserves all the critical care that can be spent upon him.' (19)

In particular, Mackintosh judges this to be so in respect of Barth's response to Feuerbach, (20) for, 'the religious power of Barth's teaching', (21) in opposition to Feuerbach, takes us beyond the Ritschlians who, 'failed to stand up to him'. (22) Thus, in 1932, in this respect, Mackintosh points to an aspect of Barth's teaching which he deems superior to Ritschlianism.

This review of references to Barth in Mackintosh, serves as a useful backdrop to his 1928 article on Barth,
indicating as it has a willingness to engage with Barth, and evidencing a desire to give credit where credit is due. Equally, it is clear that there is no wholesale embracing of Barth, and, in particular, there is a distancing of himself from what he understands to be the dialectical method of Barth.

The article, "Leaders of Theological Thought. Karl Barth", begins by noting that Barth self-consciously stands outside of the line of theology which is Schleiermacher's, charging him with having, 'confuse(d) God and man - in theology the unpardonable sin.' Thus, the task of theology is to, 'speak of God', in the light of having heard, 'the essential voice of the Bible, where in His Word God reveals Himself'. (23) Equally, Mackintosh points to the significance of the Word of God as the focus of theology within his thinking:

'We have to submit our minds, as theologians, to the essential voice of the Bible, where in His Word God reveals Himself...Every chapter in Dogmatic, like every sermon, should bear the inscription, "God speaks", and what He speaks we discover sufficiently and exclusively in the Bible.' (24)

He further credits Barth with bringing back to the fore, 'a serious use of the idea of "revelation"'. He suggests that for Barth:

'The historical (i.e. real) Jesus must always be contemplated in the light of His supra-historical relationship to God...Neither Christ's death nor His resurrection can be read simply in terms of history; in both God is invisibly and sovereignly active, reflecting the transcendent "beyond" into the world of time...The limits of human possibilities have been broken through, and the Divine possibility has become a fact.' (25)

Equally, Mackintosh is conscious that here Barth may be misunderstood, for he so underplays, 'the Jesus of History', (26) that he may seem to be denying Jesus'
significance within history and time. This, Mackintosh suggests, is not Barth's intention. However, the misunderstanding arises through the infelicitous nature of the paradoxical language he employs. Rather, Barth's intention is seen to be the stressing of the absolute otherness of God's revelation, given that, 'eternity has invaded time.' (27)

In conclusion, Mackintosh declares himself conscious of the, 'passionate and prophetic intensity', with which Barth seeks to draw us back to the absoluteness of, 'objective revelation'. Equally, he is conscious of the imbalances in Barth's thought, but ends with the prophetic word, 'this distribution of accent may yet change, and if it changes, Barth will prove an even greater and more revolutionary Christian force than at this hour.' (28) Therefore, Mackintosh's significance at this point, lies in the relatively positive, though not uncritical, welcome which a leading Scottish theologian accords to this emergent force, and his recognition that it is specifically with respect to his understanding of Revelation that Barth is to be marked out.

R.H. Roberts, commenting on this article, contends that the English-speaking reception of Barth is characterised by a tendency to distance itself from, what was perceived to be, his, 'early dialectical extremity', and then, 'to "normalise" his teaching.', (29) making it more acceptable within the British cultural context. However, he finds in H.R. Mackintosh an exception to this rule.

'H.R Mackintosh, however, resisted this tendency either to drain away or to apologise for the extremity perceived in Barth's teaching. With characteristically judicious learning and caution, he situated it in a wider context, putting a different interpretation upon Barth's most famous book, The Epistle to the Romans'. (30)
Roberts' final assessment of Mackintosh sums up his openness to receive Barth as he is, rather than to mould him in his own image:

'Thus Mackintosh was able to circumvent questions as to the validity of Barth's views in relation to the norms of tradition and formulate an agnostic and provisional judgement: "Barth is important and memorable, if not for his solutions, at least for the cardinal questions he forces us to encounter."' (31)

Therefore, Mackintosh can be seen as one of the earliest positive recipients, in Great Britain, of Barth's thought, and J. McConnachie notes in his charting of the progress of Barth's theology within Scotland, the, 'generous, if not uncritical, welcome to Barthian theology', given by one, 'of the older Scottish theologians...H.R. Mackintosh'. This, he suggests, in 1935, is in the face of, 'The strong Ritschlian influence which has prevailed in Scotland for the last half century'. (32) Further, as we shall see, Mackintosh is, over the period covered in our review, engaging with, and drawing positive conclusions from, the theology which stands in the line of Ritschl, such that any analysis of Mackintosh must reckon with the fact that, at a relatively late point in his life, he remained influenced by that line. These observations should prompt us then to question the precise nature of Mackintosh's response to Barth, and, in particular to ask, Does a positive response to the theology of Karl Barth necessarily involve the rejection of Ritschlian theology?

ii) Mackintosh's relationship to Ritschlian thought - A persistent relationship?

Mackintosh himself had been part of the, 'caravan' of students, (referred to by Barth and John McConnachie -110-
who journeyed to Marburg to sit at the feet of Herrmann, and was much indebted to Ritschl, such, 'that he made himself jointly responsible for the translation of Justification and Reconciliation which appeared as early as 1900.' (34) Equally, we note that Mackintosh's Edinburgh University D.Phil. dissertation (1897) was entitled, "The Ritschlian doctrine of theoretical and religious Knowledge", (35) in which he assesses the underlying theoretical basis of Ritschlian thought, and his somewhat critical assessment of that basis is found in the article, "The Philosophical Presuppositions of Ritschlianism" (1899). However, when subsequently reprinting the article, in 1923, he sees fit to clarify that what he is criticising is not Ritschlian theology in itself, but the philosophical theories which Ritschl later adduced in support of the theological position he had already developed. He writes, in the original article, that:

'No one can deny that the school of Ritschl is at once the most interesting and the most conspicuous feature of the theological landscape at the present moment...It is all the more essential that the metaphysical assumptions which have to bear the weight of a superstructure so imposing should be carefully and critically analysed...One is haunted, when reading the writings of the Ritschlians, by the feeling that they have failed as yet to make out the objectivity of the norm or standard by which judgments of value are to be criticised.' (36)

Thus, we see a willingness to recognise the positive theological character of Ritschlian thought, while rejecting the, 'metaphysical assumptions', which were then used to undergird it. However, in further recognition of the positive character of Ritschl's theology, he could write in 1914, that, 'He revived theology as no man has done since Schleiermacher', and in 1937 (posthumously), of him as, 'a pioneer', regardless of what criticisms we offer, and notwithstanding the,
'more positive', theology of later Ritschlians who transcend his thought. (37)

Of those later Ritschlians, he acknowledges that he was considerably indebted to Herrmann, and particularly, 'his priceless book... _Communion with God._' (38) Of this book Mackintosh had written:

'Herrmann of Marburg's _Communion with God_ belongs to that small class of great books on theology... which are also great books of devotion... (he) has done more than any other man in our time to elucidate the basal meaning of Christian faith.' (39)

This, written in 1929, demonstrates Mackintosh's longstanding relationship to Ritschlian thought, a relationship which was widely recognised elsewhere. Thus, when the German journal, _Christliche Welt_, in 1925, sought a reviewer for the German edition of Herrmann's, _Dogmatik_, they turned to Mackintosh, which indicates, both; his theological standing, and his theological position, which, if not part of a Ritschlian 'school', is within that stream of influence. (40)

Similarly H. Rolston, in his 1933 review of Barth and Brunner, sees Barth's work standing in sharp contrast to the, 'prevailing theological thought of the day', with respect to the starting point of theology. That prevailing tendency he links to the names of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. (41) In looking for a typical example of the widespread influence of their, 'fundamental assumptions', he turns to the "General Introduction" of, "The Library of Constructive Theology" found in Mackintosh's, _The Christian Experience of Forgiveness_ (1927). (42) Thus, he sees its author firmly rooted in that, 'prevailing theological thought', insofar as it attempts, 'to lay stress on the value and validity
of religious experience', and seeks to develop, 'theology on the basis of the religious consciousness.' (43)

In a parallel manner, R. Birch Hoyle, in his exposition of Barth's teaching (1930), places Mackintosh within a group whose, 'stress upon psychology of religion and appeal to the contents of religious experience...mark(s) present-day British theology'. (44) He further suggests that Mackintosh's, The Christian Apprehension of God (1929), 'builds on Christian experience in a way that Barth inveighs against'. However, alongside this, he does suggest that Mackintosh, 'point(s) in the same way as Barth's and Brunner's finger point(s). This is so insofar as they share in an attempt to recover, 'the Speaking God.' (45) Thus, Birch Hoyle places Mackintosh within the stream of theology whose source is religious experience, though noting the similarity of his, and Barth's, ultimate quest.

We further note, notwithstanding his earlier comments, that John McConnachie, writing in 1931, can find in Mackintosh, an example of the position Barth opposes in his works. Thus, McConnachie may quote Mackintosh's, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, (1912) as typically Ritschlian in that it seeks, 'to find some basis for faith in scientifically ascertained facts of our Lord's life.', and suggests that Barth and Mackintosh begin at opposite poles in expounding the concept of Revelation. (46) Thereafter, McConnachie notes that, 'already Herrmann begins to have doubts', about the approach of Ritschl in this matter, and focuses instead on, 'laying hold of the inner life of Jesus'. (47) As we have noted above, Mackintosh was very ready in 1929, to commend the approach of Herrmann, and while in 1912 he may be judged close to Ritschl (in certain respects), by
1929 and, as we shall see, 1937, he may equally be judged closer to Herrmann and the later Ritschlians.

Therefore, we may agree with J.W. Leitch's assessment that the starting point of Mackintosh's theology is very much within the nineteenth century, 'near its outermost border, no doubt, yet within it.', (48) and continue ourselves to suggest that there is evidence pointing to the fact that, in certain respects, the starting point remained there throughout his theological career. However, we have to ask, Did it fundamentally shift with his reception of Barth?

iii) The Prevailing Assessment of Mackintosh's Response to Barth

In order to highlight the prevailing assessments of the nature of Mackintosh's response to Barth, I wish to analyse the views of; T.F. Torrance, (49) J.W. Leitch, (50) and, R.R. Redman. (51)

Torrance is one whose views are, naturally, of considerable importance. Leitch's book, being originally his doctoral dissertation under Barth, represents, as far as I am aware, the only major attempt to come to terms with the question of the nature of Mackintosh's reception of Barth. Here, Leitch offers a study of Mackintosh as a theologian in transition, with the poles, between which he journeys, being represented by the theology of Albrecht Ritschl and that of Karl Barth, (52) while Redman's dissertation explicitly acknowledges the position already established by Leitch. (53)

It is the impact of Mackintosh's, *Types of Modern Theology*, which may regarded as the inspiration for the

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views of the above named, especially given the attention which Mackintosh devoted to Barth. Here, Mackintosh traced the path of modern theology via Schleiermacher, Hegel, Ritschl, Troeltsch, Kierkegaard and Barth. The work bears similarities to Barth's, *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, (54) and is, in part, an attempt to come to terms with the theology of Barth, as exemplified in, *C.D.* I/1. Mackintosh died in 1936, and the final editor of the book, A.B. Macaulay, (Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology, Trinity College, Glasgow, 1919-1934) notes:

'To Chapter VIII (on Barth), the author devoted a great deal of thought, for he held Professor Karl Barth in high esteem, and was anxious to do full justice to the changing phases of his theological work.' (55)

Torrance, reflecting on the impact of Mackintosh, some fifty years after the publication of, *Types of Modern Theology*, describes it in the following way:

'Mackintosh's lectures had made an unusually disturbing and profound impact...This must undoubtedly be linked with the impact upon New College of the first half-volume of Karl Barth's *Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of the Word of God*...It soon became clear that through this alliance of the Christian dogmatics of H.R. Mackintosh with the Church dogmatics of Karl Barth something of great importance had begun to take place among us - the essential status of evangelical dogmatics as the pure science of theology was being rehabilitated...I think I began to understand at least a little of what was involved when in the following year (1937) I read and reread his last book *Types of Modern Theology* which was, so to speak, his last will and testament to us.' (56)

Torrance suggests that Mackintosh very much anticipated Barth's response to Schleiermacher and Ritschl, and that in coming to terms with Barth's theology of the Word of God, Mackintosh had been forced to reassess his own theological position. The fruit of this reassessment was to be found in *Types of Modern Theology*. (57) He is at
pains to emphasise the discontinuity between Barth and Ritschl, but does not recall Mackintosh's noting of the basic similarity of their theological agenda.

J.W. Leitch's study of Mackintosh's theology suggests that at the beginning of his theological career, 'he took over so much from Ritschl and his followers that we might be tempted to call him a Ritschlian, though it is clear that from the first that we could not do so in anything but a modified sense.' (58) and this seems to me to be a correct assessment of Mackintosh's position. However, having begun at this point, Leitch then contends, 'But at the end he had reached a position which was clearly and definitely non-Ritschlian.' and continues, 'Our task will be to seek to bring to light the nature of this change and the way it came about'. (59) Thus, there is explicitly in Leitch's study, and from the very outset, the assumption that we shall best understand Mackintosh's theological development in terms of a transition from one position, that is a quasi-Ritschlian one, to another. The latter position is that which is represented in the theology of Barth, towards which Mackintosh turned in his last days, as, Leitch contends, is evidenced in, Types of Modern Theology. (60) Leitch may then suggest:

'In the last years of his life, helped chiefly by Barth, he broke through the maze of nineteenth-century thought and found himself...nearer to the apostolic Christianity he had all along sought to express...Here he stood closer to Barth than he had ever done to Ritschl, so that he would seem to represent the remarkable - and indeed unique - spectacle of one who, starting as at least in some sense a Ritschlian, finally completely changed his direction and found himself in close proximity to Barth.' (61)

Leitch's concluding suggestion that Mackintosh, 'finally completely changed his direction', is one that we shall find good reason to challenge, the more so as we read the
text of, *Types of Modern Theology*. We should not wish to deny that there is theological development within Mackintosh. However, those who propose a final and complete change of direction, would seem to have the onus placed upon them to prove this position, preferably by the citation of explicit testimonials by Mackintosh to this effect, and where such testimonials are absent, caution in drawing any judgements is necessary. Notwithstanding these observations, we may note that Leitch continues from the above conclusion, (which is in fact the conclusion of his "Introductory" chapter, and thus the premise of the book) to contend that:

'It is only - or at least most clearly - on reading his works backwards (so to speak) that one discovers that this seemingly completely new outlook was not the result of a sudden revolutionary change in his thought, but was to a large extent implied and fore-shadowed in elements which were all along present...What he owed to Barth was not so much a completely new set of ideas as a fresh insight into old problems, not so much a sudden transportation on to a new path, as a clearer sense of the direction of the path he was already on.' (62)

Now, at this point in his argument, it does seem that we can learn from Leitch, at least in part. For, while I will contend that we should reject the notion that Mackintosh, 'finally completely changed his direction', I will further contend that we cannot deny that Mackintosh did indeed gain insights from Barth, and that, in a certain sense, Barth's thought expresses the direction which Mackintosh wished to take. Indeed, from the nature of Leitch's argument, we can see that he wishes to stress that there is a theological continuity running through Mackintosh's thought, for all that he wishes to suggest that, in the final analysis, Mackintosh sees himself and the Ritschlians standing in a relationship of theological discontinuity. These continuous elements are supplied, as Leitch understands it, by Mackintosh's Free Church
upbringing with its strong, 'Calvinistic influence', which in turn provided him with certain, 'fundamental principles', which, 'rendered him good service throughout his struggle with Liberalism in all its forms.' (63)

Thus, Leitch wishes to portray Mackintosh's turn to Barth as being, in part, a recovery of these, 'fundamental principles', such that he can say that Mackintosh was, 'on the way to a position which was undoubtedly nearer to the Confession and Catechisms of his Church than to Ritschl'. (64) However, we must ask, (if we grant for the moment that, *Types of Modern Theology*, contains no explicit repudiation of Ritschlianism) Could it not be the case that the theological continuity which Leitch does concede to be present, and which links the later Mackintosh (Leitch's, 'Barthian' Mackintosh) to the earlier Mackintosh, is evidence of the continuing influence of Ritschlian thought? Indeed, might we go further and raise the possibility that it is his ability to identify a continuity between Barth and certain of the later Ritschlians, in respect of a theological concept which Mackintosh considered crucial, that is, the self-revelation of God, that created the very possibility of his relatively positive response to Barth. In other words, Did Mackintosh welcome Barth because he found in him a development of a position with which he was already well familiar with through Ritschlianism?

R.R. Redman offers a very full and detailed account of the Christological and Soteriological implications of Mackintosh's developing thought, which takes Leitch's work as providing a point of orientation. Thus, while his work has the same orientation as Leitch's, it is not explicitly concerned with the same subject area. However, Redman does offer an interesting periodisation of Mackintosh's life, and here his work has implications for our study. (65) He periodises Mackintosh's life into four
phases, and I shall briefly outline these. He speaks first of all of the student period from 1893-1903, wherein Mackintosh, 'was becoming familiar with Ritschlian theology', having studied at Halle in 1894, where, for example, he heard Martin Kähler, and at Marburg in 1895, where he heard Wilhelm Herrmann. During this period he also completed his D.Phil. dissertation, (1897) and, in 1900, shared in the translation of Vol. III of Ritschl's, *Justification and Reconciliation*. (66) The second phase, from 1903-1912, may be seen as focussing upon Christology, culminating in the publication of, 'the magisterial *Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ* and the more popular *The Person of Jesus Christ*.' During this phase, Redman sees Mackintosh moving beyond Ritschl, though doing so with the aid of the likes of Herrmann and Kähler. (67) The third phase, from 1914-1927, seems, as Redman acknowledges, to be harder to classify, and Mackintosh's concerns range widely, culminating in, *The Christian Apprehension of God* in 1929. (68) (Redman notes the publication date as 1928, but is one year out.) 'The fourth phase, from around 1928 until his untimely death in 1936, may be termed his Barthian phase.' Within this fourth phase, Redman sees Mackintosh rethinking his whole theological position in the light of, 'the dialectical theology associated with Brunner and above all Barth.', (69) with the period culminating in, *Types of Modern Theology*. On this point, Redman particularly depends upon Torrance's 1987 memories of Mackintosh's personal impact at this time. (70)

Periodisations may provide useful frameworks for analysis, but they also present ready targets for criticism, given the often artificial nature of the framework imposed. Redman's presentation of his framework seems reasonably cogent through the two opening phases he identifies, though, as noted, the third phase he finds
harder to classify, given its diffuse nature. This latter point being so, it is therefore all the harder to pinpoint the beginning of the, 'Barthian phase.', and, as already observed, Mackintosh does in fact begin to engage with Barth at least as early as April 1924, and while in 1928 he does publish an article on Barth, we have to bear in mind its modest nature. Equally, we note the fact that he published nothing else upon Barth other than the posthumous, *Types of Modern Theology*, albeit that the book began life as the Croall Lectures delivered in the Autumn of 1933, which indicates that he was beginning to engage more fully with the thought of Barth from that point onwards. (71) Further, we see that after 1929, and the publication of, *The Christian Apprehension of God*, (which is, in fact, within Redman's, 'Barthian phase.') there are no major new publications at all, (72) while such publishing activity as there is could not necessarily be construed as signalling the beginning of a, 'Barthian phase.'

Thus, for example, we see in 1928 the publication of the translation of Schleiermacher's, *The Christian Faith*, of which Mackintosh was joint-editor, (73) while, in 1931, we see the appearance of a considerably reworked third edition of, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, of which Mackintosh was joint-editor. (74) The latter work is of interest in that it contains selections from the writings of Kant, Schleiermacher, Lotze, Ritschl and Otto, selected and introduced by Mackintosh, and we note that of these, the one addition, as compared to the previous edition in 1909, is that of Otto. (75) We observe then that, in 1931, Mackintosh found no need to alter the relatively positive welcome he gives to such as Schleiermacher, Lotze and Ritschl, (76) and that the additional thinker whose thought he highlights is Rudolf Otto. We should not give too much weight to this
observation, but we note that whatever Mackintosh's thoughts on Barth were at this time, they did not so dominate his thinking that he felt compelled to exclude other significant theologians from influencing his thought in ways which he saw as positive.

Undoubtedly much of Mackintosh's energies during the period 1928/9-1936, were consumed by the re-union of the Church of Scotland in 1929, (77) and the reshaping of New College which followed this, (78) as well as being Convener from 1930-1935 of the General Assembly's Committee delegated to compose a, "Short Statement of the Church's Faith". (79) Further, he was, in 1932, Moderator of the General Assembly, and so we see that Mackintosh was involved in a variety of other tasks which would have limited his ability to pursue publishing projects, and this surely explains the dearth of new material in this period. Equally, it serves to highlight the fact that the period is one which will yield little firm material, such as would be useful for identifying such phenomenon as, 'Barthian phase(s).' (Given the character of this period in Mackintosh's life, we might propose that we term this his, 'ecclesiastical phase'.) In the absence of such material, it seems to me that we are compelled to take two complementary courses of action; in the first place we must be necessarily modest in respect of any claims that we make concerning this period, while secondly, we must retreat, that is retreat in time, to those theological positions of Mackintosh's of which we may be more certain, and allow these to be our, at least partial, guide to the possible direction of Mackintosh's thought. That, again, is not to deny to Mackintosh the possibility of theological development, but, given the absence of any explicit abandonment of Ritschlian thought in favour of Barthian, (and I will contend that, *Types of Modern Theology*, should be viewed as such an absence) we
should be cautious in making any such claims, and we may wish to see such an absence as calling us to a more subtle interpretation of our subject.

However, the latter observations not being to the fore for the moment, we may observe that the prevailing interpretation of Mackintosh's reception of Barth, is one in which Mackintosh's position is perceived to have undergone a transformation in consequence of his having read and assimilated C.D. I/I, the evidence for which is to be found in, *Types of Modern Theology*.

iv) Mackintosh on Ritschl and Ritschlians

While the possibility that there is substance in the conclusions of Torrance, et al., should not be dismissed without consideration, it is important to listen to all that Mackintosh says on Ritschl, and in particular to recollect that in, *Types of Modern Theology*, he clearly distinguishes between Ritschl and Ritschlianism. He suggests, with respect to Ritschl's theology, that:

'The careful student of the subject, it should be added, will be wise to guard himself against the mistake of hastily identifying "the theology of Ritschl" with what is known, more generally, as "the Ritschlian theology". Comparatively few of the objections raised in the foregoing pages to the teaching of the master himself could fairly be urged, at all events as they stand, against the views set forth by Herrmann, Haering, or Kaftan. In their pages we find a resolute effort to state the meaning of revelation, and specifically of Jesus Christ, in terms more in harmony with the New Testament.' 

(80)

Would that all Mackintosh's students had been so wise! An eclectic reading of, *Types of Modern Theology*, could yield, in part, the conclusions of Torrance, et al., but to further conclude that a severe censure of Ritschl,
which is undoubtedly present, is to be equated with a rejection of Ritschlianism, is an unwarranted conclusion. Mackintosh explicitly points ahead to the, 'more positive', Ritschlianism, and explicitly notes that he will not deal with this in, *Types of Modern Theology*. (81) In all our judgements of Mackintosh's final theological position, as exemplified in, *Types of Modern Theology*, this statement as to his position is an irrefutable certainty of which we should not lose sight.

Leitch's conclusions in this matter are all the more curious because they are reached in spite of the fact that his study begins by noting Mackintosh's caution on distinguishing between, 'the Ritschlian theology', and, 'the theology of Ritschl', and his observation that Mackintosh favours the former, while still acknowledging the latter as, 'pioneer'. (82) At the very least, Leitch should have given Mackintosh's words on, 'Ritschlian theology', the same weight as he gives to his words on Barth. However, instead of a proper weighting, Leitch avers that he can read the true intention of Mackintosh, which can be discerned beneath the surface appearance of his words. Is it a material fact in this case, or merely coincidence, that Leitch's book on Mackintosh was originally a dissertation supervised by Barth? (83) Irrespective of our answer, we note Leitch's conclusion:

'It is true [sic] that, as Mackintosh points out, the younger Ritschrians were freely critical of their master's work and did much to strengthen its more obviously vulnerable points. Yet it requires only a little care to detect that their fundamental principles remain practically the same, whereas Mackintosh's standpoint is radically different...his practical interest, whatever its outward similarity to Ritschl's, has a fundamentally different ground...His thought is often Ritschlian in outward form; yet it is thoroughly biblical in its foundations...No doubt many of the windows look the same from the outside, but when we view them from within we find a richness and a glory of which Ritschl could never have dreamed.' (84)
Leitch's interior reading of the true Mackintosh, imaginative though it is, seems to me to run contrary to the most obvious reading of Mackintosh, and does not take account of his own acknowledgement of the 'Ritschl'- 'Ritschlian' distinction so basic to an understanding of Mackintosh. The giving of equal weight to this 'obvious' reading seems to me to be appropriate, for we are in danger of doing violence to our subjects if we do not let them speak to us from their own, explicitly stated, ground, and instead take up an, implicitly superior, interior one. Leitch misconstrues Mackintosh's enthusiasm for Barth to also equal rejection of Ritschlianism, a conclusion which, while it may owe much to Barth, seems not to have forced itself upon Mackintosh.

A.C. Cheyne (Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Edinburgh, 1964-86), in his assessment of the influence of Barth's thought in Scotland, comes to a similar conclusion. Having cited Leitch's views on Mackintosh, (85) he wryly comments, 'The case is not entirely convincing, however.' Cheyne then suggests that, 'Although Mackintosh deserted Ritschlianism...there was something about even his latest work which raises doubts as to his true-blue Barthianism.', (86), and while I would follow him in his doubts on, 'true-blue Barthianism', it does seem that even Cheyne misses the indications from Mackintosh as to a continuing relationship with Ritschlian thought. In pursuit of his doubts however, Cheyne then directs us to A.B. Macaulay, (87) who had a somewhat more balanced picture of Mackintosh's position on Barth. Macaulay writes:

'(Mackintosh's) theological outlook may perhaps be described as that of either a 'right-wing' liberal or a 'left-wing' conservative...He held Professor Karl Barth in high esteem, and sympathised warmly with the Swiss theologians evangelical fervour. But he had imbibed too
much philosophical wisdom from Pringle-Pattison for the fact to escape him that, if the result of the reduction of reality necessarily involved in the process of man's apprehension of it has the effect of vitiating the truth of ordinary knowledge, the same reduction must attend the process of his apprehension of revelation and have the effect, therefore, of vitiating the truth of the knowledge supposed to be reached by faith.' (88)

Thus, Macaulay suggests, it is precisely in Barth's concept of Revelation that Mackintosh is most wary of Barth, and that as a result of the, 'personal idealism', (89) of his philosophical mentor Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (St. Andrew's, 1891-1919, Edinburgh, 1919-31). For Pringle-Pattison, God could not be conceived of in abstraction from the universe in which he had become manifest, and, as J. Macquarrie sums up his position:

'Nature, man and God form an organic whole so that any one of these three, taken in isolation, is an abstraction...We are not to think of God as a pre-existent Deity who called the world into being by an arbitrary act of will. The world is God's eternal manifestation rather than a creation which he could do without.' (90)

While not suggesting that this was equivalent to Mackintosh's final position, A.B. Macaulay notes the residual influence of a, 'personal idealism', which militated against the acceptance of that in Barth which denied the possibility of apprehending knowledge, other than through, 'revelation...by faith'.

J.K. Mozley, is a further commentator on, "The Scottish Tradition", (91) whose conclusions point to the need to understand Mackintosh in ways which reflect his own perceptions of other theologians, rather than attempting to fit him into a relatively predetermined schema. In his assessment of, *Types of Modern Theology*, Mozley highlights Mackintosh's treatment of Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard and Barth, (92) and in the case of
Schleiermacher, notes that Mackintosh, 'is decidedly more sympathetic, though far from uncritically so, than is Brunner', for example. (93) Further, he points to Mackintosh's belief that, regardless of the ambiguities which surround the concept, Schleiermacher, 'by his famous "feeling of dependence"...probably meant a mode of objective apprehension, not a merely subjective state', (94) an assessment which betokens a desire to treat the theologian with such charity as is necessary to produce clarity in our assessment of him. In turning to Kierkegaard, Mozley notes the continuation of this approach, with Mackintosh having, 'much to commend and to criticize in Kierkegaard.' (95) Thereafter, he writes:

'His attitude to Karl Barth proceeds along the same lines: very appreciative of the positive gains involved in Barth's teaching concerning the particularity of the divine self-revelation in Christ and the doctrines of grace, he could not accept the account of the "one-way relation between God and the world, with the world regarded as always "over against God."' (96)

This assessment of Mackintosh seems to me to be accurate, highlighting those points at which he saw significant progress made by Barth, such as in his treatment of, 'the divine self-revelation in Christ', with this balanced by observing the limitations of Barth's approach. Thus, Mozley may commend Mackintosh as one exemplifying, 'the generous interests of a receptive and sensitive mind.', (97)

Thus, we are faced with a very different picture of Mackintosh from that of Torrance, et al., in which we find the possibility of a critical openness to a range of theological influences, including later Ritschlianism and Barth. This possibility is one that has tended to be foreclosed by Barth's own self-interpretation, especially as found in, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth
Century, and a too easy acceptance of that in the English-speaking world. (98) (An early Scottish example of this is found in J. McConnachie's 1948 review of the German original, where he may write, having dispensed with Ritschl, that, 'At no point does Barth allow his own theological position to influence his judgment of other standpoints.' (99)) However, if we have correctly understood Mackintosh, the axiom of interpretation later established for many by Barth's book, that is, that acceptance of Barth's reading of the history of theology necessarily entails rejection of Ritschl, et. al., seems not to have been established in Mackintosh's time, and was not forced upon him by his reading of Barth. If this is so, it may also suggest that we are not forced to read a Ritschl-Barth disjunction into that history either.

(Nevertheless, we must be aware of the critics response to our reading of Mackintosh, that, while we may have correctly understood Mackintosh, Mackintosh has failed to understand the radically new standpoint offered by Barth. However, as shall be obvious from the alternative scenario offered in Chapter 1, the response to this criticism is that Mackintosh is, in point of fact, correct to discern a basic similarity of intention between later Ritschlianism and Barth, which we might judge to stem from their common theological heritage.)

Thus, we shall contend that, because Mackintosh was able to discern this basic similarity in intention among the later Ritschlians and Barth, he felt able to call upon both. However, we must be clear on this issue, and ask, At precisely which point was Mackintosh most able to discern similarity in intention ? We shall most profitably answer this question, by turning to look at Mackintosh's distinguishing between Ritschl and the later Ritschlians, and at how Barth, in Mackintosh's view,
takes up the theological baton at precisely the point where he judges Ritschl to have laid it down. We further note that it is at precisely the same point that the later Ritschlians have also risen to the challenge, and similarly taken up the baton. This latter point being an echo of the, 'irrefutable certainty of which we should not lose sight.'

v) The Theological Distinction between Ritschl and the Ritschlians

Thus, in order to establish our proposed reading, we must address the question, In precisely what terms did Mackintosh see the later Ritschlians as being distinct from Ritschl himself? We have already noted that, for Mackintosh, it is, 'the meaning of revelation, and specifically of Jesus Christ', that sets them apart, so we must enquire how he perceives Ritschl to understand Revelation. He begins by stressing the positive gains of Ritschl's approach, such that, 'Ritschl was wholly in the right when he insisted that we can only know God in the measure that He puts Himself sovereignly within reach of our knowledge.' This knowledge, 'must be mediated by apprehension of His decisive Word, spoken in Christ, of judgment and mercy. With all the fathers of the Reformed Church, Ritschl taught that this Word of God is to be found in Scripture only.' (100) This approach, sets Ritschl apart from Schleiermacher, since we are no longer called to, 'elucidate the existing state of the Christian mind', rather, 'to set forth the revealed truth'. The intention of Ritschl then, 'is to spell out the infinite meaning of Jesus Christ for our conception of God.' (101) Thus far, for Mackintosh, all is well in Ritschl's intention. He concludes initially:
'Whether Ritschl's actual performance was equal to his intention is quite another story; but at all events his deliberate and announced purpose merits grateful recognition, and, amid the successive developments of nineteenth-century theology, stands out arresting by its originality and power.' (102)

Thus, we see Mackintosh's commendation of, and his caution on, Ritschl's theology. Wherein did his doubts lie as to the adequacy of Ritschl's performance? Mackintosh states that the criteria for Ritschl's theology is, 'The historical revelation of God in Christ.', (103) and initially this is seen as a strength.

'It was indeed his regard for the facts of history that gave Ritschl his charter of freedom in critical research; to him nothing mattered but the revelation of God given not alongside of history but within it, given in great religious personalities and their experiences, above all in Christ.' (104)

However, it is precisely with respect to the mediation of Revelation that Mackintosh wishes to part from Ritschl. We have already noted J. McConnachie's observations on Herrmann's doubts, with respect to Ritschl's approach in this very matter, and that he focussed instead on, 'laying hold of the inner life of Jesus'. I then hinted that Mackintosh, would, in time, make a distinction similar to that of Herrmann, that is, one that moved him away from Ritschl's conception of the nature of Revelation in history. It is to the making of that distinction that we now turn. Mackintosh writes:

'it cannot be said that the bearing of revelation and history on each other is quite so simple as Ritschl takes it to be. Christ, the Revealer of God, is indeed in history; but Ritschl failed to see, or at least failed to insist, that He is not of history, and that for this very reason His being in history at all is a Divine marvel. The historian's business is to make each event luminous as the outcome of its antecedents and milieu; but if the being of Christ is in fact transcendent...then to approach the interpretation of His Person with the normal assumptions as to what history is, is inevitably
to confuse the issue.' (105)

For Mackintosh, in departing from Ritschl, 'The insight of faith is something else than historical perception, just as the grace of God is something more than historical affiliation,' (106) The argument of Ritschl, 'appears to rest on the assumption that the Person and life-work of Jesus confront us as a homogeneous piece of "profane" history, the divine import of which is accessible to direct historical inspection...The facts simply qua history are revelation.' (107) He continues:

'Thus the emphasis on history as the sphere or locus of revelation, which had been Ritschl's strength in his conflict with Idealism, came eventually to form a source of the gravest weakness.' (108)

His final judgement on Ritschl continues in this vein, and he writes:

'We must therefore conclude that Ritschl had done hardly more than make a beginning with the uniquely difficult problem - a problem really peculiar to Christianity - of Revelation and History in their relations to each other.' (109)

It is precisely here, that Mackintosh judges Ritschl to have dropped the theological baton, and then in turn, precisely here, that he judges Barth to have taken it up. For he continues, after the above quote, to identify the question of the relationship between Revelation and History as the key question for theology in his day, and identifies Barth as the leading exponent of the answer to that question. He writes:

'It is the problem which most of all preoccupies theology at the moment, and what is perhaps the leading part in the discussion is being taken by Karl Barth and the distinguished thinkers who are, or were, his coadjutors.' (110)

Therefore, Ritschl lays down a task unfinished, which
Barth takes up, namely that of the resolution of the relationship between Revelation and History.

However, this is not Mackintosh's last word on things Ritschlian. For it is immediately after this exposition, that Mackintosh offers his guidance to, 'The careful student', on the need to distinguish Ritschl from the later Ritschlians, such that the criticisms so fully directed against Ritschl, will carry little weight against, 'Herrmann, Haering, or Kaftan.' Equally, he directs attention, as we have seen, to their efforts to give a sound Christological base for their attempts, 'to state the meaning of revelation...in terms more in harmony with the New Testament.' (111) They also have taken up the task, the same one upon which Barth is now engaged, and their contribution is clearly welcomed. Thus, it is in respect of the issues of Revelation and History, and the provision of an adequate Christological basis for understanding them, that Mackintosh judges there to be a basic similarity of intention between the later Ritschlians and Barth. It is to be regretted that Mackintosh was unable to further develop the contribution of the former, and may only write, 'The story of Ritschlianism as eventually worked out by writers of a more positive type cannot be told here.' (112) However, this is in no way to be regarded as grounds for concluding that their theological contribution finished at the same point as Ritschl's.

Therefore, if this is so, and though we have no exposition of the later Ritschlians in, Types of Modern Theology, it seems to me that we can legitimately return to Mackintosh's earlier estimates on Herrmann. Thus, for example, in his discussion of Herrmann's Dogmatik, which he entitles, "Theology at its Best", (113) he may speak of, 'a book of rare worth.', and speculate, 'whether...
anywhere in the world a hundred pages...could be found which set before us so clearly the essential Christian convictions.', and all for, 'half a crown'! Mackintosh clearly sees Herrmann's system to have an intensely personal and religious orientation, such that he draws a comparison between, 'Henry Drummond's meetings of thirty-five years ago and Herrmann's classroom at Marburg', and, this being so, 'It would have been quite natural for the lecturer to close, any given day, by announcing an after-meeting would be held in a room upstairs.' Mackintosh concludes, 'Conversions must often have taken place under his (Herrmann's) teaching.' (114) Indeed, Barth cites these very words of Mackintosh, when forming his own estimation of Herrmann's Dogmatik, namely, 'Herrmann's whole system is oriented towards the cure of souls, to the genesis of Christianity in the individual.' (115)

Mackintosh is not insensitive to the weaknesses of the Dogmatik, but nonetheless he may commend Herrmann's theological starting point, and the, 'triumphant certainties', which he delivers. (116) In expounding what is, 'fundamental with Herrmann', he suggests:

'If it be asked precisely how Jesus reveals God, Herrmann replies that revelation is not an event in the remote past, but a personal experience now. Revelation is what happens when a man meets Christ and is changed by Him...But how do I know that this Christ is real?...The truth is, we know Christ to be real because, and when, we are apprehended by the power of His inner life.' (117)

Therefore, we may observe the extent to which Mackintosh regards Herrmann as a positive attempt, 'to state the meaning of revelation...in terms more in harmony with the New Testament.' Similarly, Herrmann's, Communion with God, also stands in continuity with that attempt. Here, for Mackintosh, 'What really happens to create certainty in the earnest seeker's heart is not so much that he lays
hold of Jesus as that Jesus, with irresistible power, lays hold of him.' (118) Here, beyond the acids of Gospel criticism, and above the ambiguities of history, (119) we find the certainty of faith. Mackintosh writes:

'Thus to the question what it is in the New Testament tradition of Jesus Christ that stands out as a fact operating directly upon as at the present hour, Herrmann replies, it is Himself, it is, His inner life. The decisive experience is that we see him for ourselves. We know Christ to be real because we are overwhelmed, mastered, captured by the power with which He brings Himself home to conscience and thought.' (120)

Therefore, in transcending the ambiguities of history, Herrmann offers religious certainty, in a way which Mackintosh judges to be in harmony with the New Testament. Thus, elsewhere in a review, Mackintosh commends a writer for observing, 'so clearly the points at which Herrmann has outstripped Ritschl', and he may continue thus:

'Herrmann has a more searching eye for everything in Jesus that is personal and inward; he speaks more about Christ and less about the Kingdom of God. Also he feels more keenly the problem set by 'faith and history'. In fact, he had just one great problem perpetually before his mind - what is faith, and how is it generated, and how do I thereby have such fellowship with God as makes me more than conqueror? ' (121)

Further, he notes that Herrmann's, 'lack of interest in historical research', has rather, 'diminished his appeal', but judges that, 'this will in all likelihood be temporary.' (122) Thus, we note again Mackintosh's high estimate of Herrmann, and that he found his understanding of Revelation to be in harmony with the New Testament.

Therefore, it would seem reasonable to conclude that Mackintosh saw in Herrmann a stress upon a particular understanding of Revelation, and upon Christ as transcending History, which was a fitting expression of
New Testament emphases, and that as a self-conscious modification of Ritschl. These theological truths seem to me to be the crucial elements that Mackintosh wishes to preserve for his own theological quest, and, I contend, it is those elements which enable him to see Barth as being in continuity with the later Ritschlians.

vi) Ritschlianism and Barth - Mutual Influences on the thought of H.R. Mackintosh

The leading attempt, in Mackintosh's estimation, at resolving the problem of the relation of Revelation to History, is offered by Barth. (123) However, to reiterate, Mackintosh seems in no sense to regard his high estimation of Barth as the occasion to overthrow the whole house of Ritschl. Far from it! Indeed, we contend again that it is precisely because he is able to discern continuity between the later Ritschlians and that other noted student of Herrmann, Karl Barth, that he is able to welcome Barth so readily. Barth, of course, openly concedes the influence of Herrmann upon him, such that, in trying to work out the relationship between, 'a real pupil of a real master', he may write:

'I (Barth in 1925) could never readily agree that I had really turned away from my teacher. Nor can I so agree today...In my own case, I let Herrmann say to me one essential truth. This truth, followed out to its consequences, later forced me to say almost everything else quite differently and finally led me to an interpretation of the fundamental truth itself which was entirely different from his. And yet it was he who showed me that truth. I cannot claim its discovery for myself and I must now openly and gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness.' (124)

As to what that, 'one essential truth', is, Barth suggests that, 'the "pure or normative doctrine of evangelical Christianity" as the "understanding of
revelation of God and religion", as the experience "of pure dependence in free surrender" is the quintessence of Herrmann's *Dogmatik*. (125) Thus, it is specifically in relation to Revelation, that Barth acknowledges his inheritance from Herrmann, albeit that he alters it radically. Therefore, in wrestling with Herrmann's, 'last will and testament', (126) we must reckon with the fact that both Mackintosh and Barth draw on Herrmann, and that while Barth claims to reinterpret this inheritance completely, it would seem possible (and for Mackintosh, actual) given the acknowledged inheritance, to discern such basic similarities of intention between Herrmann and Barth, that one could legitimately claim their contributions to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Indeed, Barth may claim to have interpreted Herrmann more faithfully than Herrmann did himself, such that he may suggest that, while, 'Herrmann on paper rebuts me...there is also a Herrmann in heaven, who perhaps does not offer a rebuttal.' (127)

Mackintosh is undoubtedly enthused by Barth, though not such that he cannot set aside Barth's criticism that Ritschl, is merely a, 'going back...to the essential tenets of the Aufklärung.', as being, 'much too strong'. (128) Likewise, while we can see Mackintosh attempting to come to terms with Barth's impact, that should most emphatically not be read as a rejection of the broader approach of Ritschlianism. Thus, when Mackintosh writes, 'in declared intention and programme the two theologians (Ritschl and Barth) are much nearer to each other than has often been supposed...(but that) It is in performance, not in chosen aim that the two men stand so far apart.', it seems clear that he wishes to suggest a relative failure on the part of Ritschl to meet his own criteria, (that is, he has failed to provide, 'a theology inspired throughout by Scripture') rather than a failure
to begin from the correct starting point. Barth meanwhile, having begun from the same point, has more consistently met the same criteria as was set before Ritschl, and therefore provided a theology better deserving the title, 'a "Theology of the Word of God"'.

Thus, for Mackintosh, the success of Ritschl and Barth, in adequately stating, 'the meaning of revelation...in terms...in harmony with the New Testament.', is to measured by the same criteria, rather than viewing Barth as having begun from a point dissimilar to that of Ritschl, and thereby introducing a radically new concept of Revelation. Equally, it seems clear that we cannot make assumptions about Mackintosh's theological responses simply by reading Barth's views back into Mackintosh.

To illustrate the latter point, not as conclusive proof but merely as a confirmatory caution, let me highlight the response of Barth and Mackintosh to the, Glaubenslehre of Horst Stephan. (130) For Barth in, "The Humanity of God", it is the appearance of works such as Stephan's, Glaubenslehre, which provided a justification for, 'turn(ing) the helm through this angle of 180 degrees.', against the theology which prevailed up to the close of the First World War. Barth asks, with respect to this, 'Were we right or wrong? Undoubtedly we were right. Just read the Glaubenslehren of Troeltsch or Stephan...Blind alleys!' (131) On the former Mackintosh would undoubtedly agree, and specifically excludes Troeltsch from honourable mention in the line of the later Ritschlians. (132) On the latter however he passes a very different judgement. He writes in a review:

'Stepian's Glaubenslehre...has reached a well-merited second edition, and ought to have reached it years ago...The revision is worthy of the unusual importance of the book...(it) is the best and most satisfying that has been issued in its field for years. The writer's work is
done in sympathy with Herrmann, but with a breadth of view and a richness of technical equipment to which even that great teacher could lay no claim. To those who wish to know the best that Germany has been thinking and writing on the most urgent problems of Christian faith, and who must confine themselves to a single volume, this book may be commended without reserve.' (133)

One man's blind alley is another man's open vista, and that beyond Herrmann! Mackintosh's review also takes into account Stephan's, 'on the whole critical', opinion of Barth, (134) and while written in 1929, and thus before, C.D. I/1 appeared, it seems to me that, though he may be judged to have switched his allegiance to Barth's work as the book to, 'be commended without reserve.', we could anticipate that his positive judgement of Stephan would stand, given that Stephan has made progress in the same direction as, though beyond, Herrmann. We must therefore exercise considerable caution in any judgements of the influence of Barth on Mackintosh that would foreclose the possibility of seeing Mackintosh as anything other than a proto-Barthian, even in 1936.


This need for caution shall perhaps be best highlighted by looking at Mackintosh's final two works, that is, The Christian Apprehension of God (1929), and, Types of Modern Theology, (posthumously, 1937) with the former giving a detailed exposition of his understanding of the nature of Revelation, and the latter charting the progress, or otherwise, of theology through the Nineteenth, and into the Twentieth, Century, culminating in Karl Barth. If, as I have contended, there is no explicit rejection of his previous understanding of the
nature of Revelation, and, indeed, the very opposite, that is, an explicit recognition that Barth's concept of God's Revelation in Christ makes progress in the same direction as Herrmann, Haering and Kaftan, then it seems to me that we have valid reason to return to the position fully developed in, *The Christian Apprehension of God*.

The above notwithstanding, however, we do not suggest that the position outlined in, *The Christian Apprehension of God*, is equivalent to Mackintosh's final position. Thus, Mackintosh may speak of Barth making genuine progress and expressing an understanding, in respect of the self-revelation of God, which Mackintosh aspires to. However, that final position, such as we are able to recover it from, *Types of Modern Theology*, should be seen, not as a rejection of the former position, but, as a refinement of that position. Equally, we shall note that the theologian who, for Mackintosh, most adequately expresses an understanding of the nature of Revelation consonant with the New Testament understanding of it, is not above striking criticism, even at the very point where he might be judged to be making progress. Thus, Barth's position is not to be viewed as the terminus of Mackintosh's theological quest, rather as the most adequate expression to date of that which Mackintosh, in company with Herrmann, et al., wished to express, namely that position which is in harmony with the New Testament's understanding of the nature of Revelation. Thus, we shall see that for Mackintosh; Herrmann, et al., may be judged to stand in continuity with Barth, insofar as they express an understanding of the nature of Revelation harmonious with the New Testament.

We may at this juncture enquire as to the standard by which Mackintosh judges theological expressions to be adequate, or otherwise, since it is clear that there is
such a standard in Mackintosh's thought. The answer to this enquiry is that the New Testament is that which Mackintosh takes to be his standard, (135) and adequacy, or otherwise, is judged by the extent to which the theological expression is expressed, 'in terms...in harmony with the New Testament.' (136) This view of Mackintosh as being, in essence, one who sought to express his theology in terms harmonious with Scripture, and who took Scripture as the mark against which to measure theological expression, is one which has commended itself to Torrance, (137) Leitch, (138) Redman, (139) Cheyne, (140) and Mozley. We may quote Mozley's view as representative of the consensus. He writes:

'Mackintosh would have found it unnatural to approach any religious questions, however speculative, except by attention to the guidance given in Scripture. His orthodoxy was rooted in Scripture; to pass outside of the control of the Word of God in the Bible, and to treat as outside the range of Scripture problems to which, whether definitely or by implication, it claimed to possess the solution, would have seemed to him an essentially unreasonable course. But with his scriptural orthodoxy Mackintosh combined the generous interests of a receptive and sensitive mind.' (141)

However, while we have stated the formal principle by which Mackintosh sought to judge the adequacy of theological statements, that is, being, 'in harmony with the New Testament.', it might be observed that most theologians, declare that it is their intention to offer a theological position, 'in harmony with the New Testament.' Thus, our statement on Mackintosh's position may seem to offer form without substance, and therefore to be empty of significance. What then, in, Types of Modern Theology, is the substantial content of Mackintosh's principle of being, 'in harmony with the New Testament'? This is not independently set out in, Types of Modern Theology, but, as D.M. Baillie has observed, it is, 'a book in which (Mackintosh's) own position in
theology may well be studied indirectly.', (142) and in the context of our particular concern, some comments by Mackintosh on Ritschl most clearly reveal his own position. In discussing Ritschl's rejection of, 'Natural Theology and Mysticism', he suggests that:

'Ritschl was wholly in the right when he insisted that we can only know God in the measure that He puts Himself sovereignly within reach of our knowledge... apart from Christ we cannot know or grasp God as a redeeming Father; and on our own account we may add the point that even what God has written of Himself into Nature can only be truly read by those whose eyes have been opened by the great revelation in Jesus.' (143)

Thus, as Mackintosh understands him, Ritschl wishes to stress Christ as the principal source of Revelation, such that knowledge of the, 'redeeming Father', arises through Him alone, and our relationship to God, 'must be mediated by apprehension of His decisive Word, spoken in Christ'. (144) Further, it is clear from the context that Mackintosh endorses the tenor of Ritschl's approach, as, when he acknowledges that Ritschl's teaching in this matter, places him in the lineage of, 'the fathers of the Reformed Church'. Thereafter, he writes:

'With all the fathers of the Reformed Church, Ritschl taught that this Word of God is to be found in Scripture only. The New Testament in particular, he added, is our supreme source of truth because its writings spring from a living connexion with the primitive age of the Church and reveal a unity of vital tissue with the faith of the Old Testament. Once we have understood this, we need no special doctrine concerning the inspiration of the Bible.' (145)

Therefore, we see that, for Ritschl, (as Mackintosh understood him) the Word of God, found in Scripture alone, as the principal source of revelation, 'is our supreme source of truth'. Further, we may suggest that, for Mackintosh, being, 'in harmony with the New Testament.', is to express a theology such as would be
derived from adherence to the principles enunciated by such a one as Ritschl, as outlined above. We may then recall Mackintosh's comparison of the theological, 'performance', of Ritschl and Barth, wherein, he suggests that, 'in declared intention and programme the two theologians are much nearer to each other than has often been supposed.', and further recall that what separates them as theologians is performance, and not principle. (146) Thus, 'Ritschl undertakes to furnish a theology inspired throughout by Scripture', and though Mackintosh judges Ritschl to have fallen short of Barth, he in no sense denies that they share the same theological starting point, and have the same, 'intention'. Therefore, both may be regarded as seeking to achieve an understanding, 'in harmony with the New Testament.'

a) In looking at the general nature of Revelation, we see that in, The Christian Apprehension of God, a fundamental conviction, 'to follow St. Paul', is that:

'non-Christians also enjoy Divine revelation; they recognize God's invisible being through His visible works; they recognize His voice in conscience. In other words, outside Christianity more is to be observed than a fruitless search on the part of unaided man for the Divine reality; there has to be a positive self-disclosure of God. We cannot but relate all the phenomena of man's religious history to a vast redeeming Divine plan.' (147)

Thus, following Robertson Smith in his, Religion of the Semites, he may suggest that the description of religious feelings found in, 'Nature-religions', approximates, 'to the description of typically religious feelings which would be offered by, say, members of the theological school of Ritschl'. (148) Thereafter, we see that Mackintosh wishes to portray Christ as the consummation of an ongoing process of Revelation, rather than the negation of the possibility of any valid knowledge of God.
apart from Christ. He states the matter thus:

'For Christian thought, the religiously complete revelation of God in Jesus Christ is the confirmation of all that is good and prophetic in lesser forms of faith, however rudimentary. By His very meaning Christ is proof that in religion, right on from its lowest stages, man has not been stretching out his hands into a universe empty, blind, and deaf.' (149)

In conclusion, we note Mackintosh's contention that, 'All religious knowledge of God, wherever existing comes by revelation; otherwise we should be committed to the incredible position that man can know God without His willing to be known.' (150)

(Curiously, (given the context which the previous quotations and exposition have established) this last quotation is cited by Torrance in, Theological Science, (151) in the context of his exposition of, "The Possibility of Theological Knowledge", which Torrance takes to be comparable to Barth's exposition of the same subject in, C.D. II/1. (152) One might question whether Barth wishes to establish, in C.D. II/1, the position that, 'the religiously complete revelation of God in Jesus Christ is the confirmation of all that is good and prophetic in lesser forms of faith, however rudimentary.' (!) Mackintosh's words could be read in the sense which Torrance brings to them, but not in the context in which they occur. Mackintosh clearly means something other than Torrance intends.)

Types of Modern Theology, continues the appreciation, first noted by Mackintosh in the, Expository Times, article (1928), of the extent to which Barth, 'has forced men to take Revelation seriously', (153) so let us turn to his exposition of Barth on this subject. Mackintosh notes that, for Barth, Revelation is understood as a
continually renewed event whose subject is God, the locus of which is singularly found in Jesus Christ. (154) It is not a possibility developing out of an inherent human potentiality, rather it is, 'what is new in the strict sense, something hitherto unknown because wholly concealed.' (155) For Barth, 'Jesus Christ, in whom revelation is present and operative, is a concrete reality, to which there are no analogies. Revelation is simply once for all.' (156) Thus, an awareness of this Revelation, and of Jesus Christ as, 'in His person the Eternal Word of God made flesh.', does not emerge out of general religious considerations. Instead, 'we cannot recognize him in that character at all except as we perceive that Revelation means grace for sinners.' (157)

The reception of this, 'pure grace', once experienced, imparts an awareness of the fact that there could never, in principle, be any Revelation other than that which was mediated through Christ. For it is in the Incarnation that we find the truest sense of Revelation, where Jesus Christ, in true manhood and full deity, 'brings us face to face with God in the fulness of His glory'. Apart from such an encounter there is no Revelation. (158)

With respect to the possibility of Revelation being found outwith the immediate mediation of Christ, Mackintosh affirms that in Barth's thinking this is excluded for the Christian believer. This said, he is careful to spell out the way in which we are to understand Barth on this issue, and suggests that, in excluding this possibility:

'He is speaking of the Christian believer - not of the detached spectator, not even of the anxious inquirer - and elucidating that which, through the persuasion of the Holy Spirit, has become for him an irrefragable conviction. If I receive grace, and thus perceive that I need grace and that I am the object of God's pure compassion, for me the question is closed.' (159)
Mackintosh is aware of the Barth-Brunner debate over the 'imago Dei', and of Barth's judgment that, 'this "imago" has been totally lost and obliterated by sin'. However, he suggests that within Barth's earlier thought there is contained a mediating position which would have allowed for an, 'ultimate agreement between the two thinkers.' Unfortunately, he only notes this, and does not further develop this mediating position. (160) He quotes from Barth's, The Epistle to the Romans, (5 v.12) thus :

'In all the negativity there is no point which does not bear witness to the summit. There is no relativity which does not reflect a vanished absolute which can never be wholly obliterated, since it is this absolute which makes relativity relative. Death never occurs but it calls attention to our participation in the Life of God, and to that relationship of His with us which is not broken by sin.' (161)

The force of Barth's argument in respect of the nature of Revelation clearly impresses Mackintosh, and the stress on Christ as the focus of God's revelation of Himself is a position which Mackintosh clearly wishes to adhere to. However, in turning to the, 'fundamental subject', of the nature of God's image in us and of our capacity to receive Revelation, he finds the most appropriate expression of this within Barth's writings, not in, C.D. I/1, but, in, The Epistle to the Romans. Now Mackintosh is aware that Barth, 'no longer wishes his Epistle to the Romans to be taken as an authoritative source of his theology.', (162) yet he returns here to find a mediating position between Barth and Brunner, which would, I judge, bring Barth closer to Brunner rather than the opposite. Further, we may note the care with which he clarifies the context of Barth's argument, that is, 'He is speaking of the Christian believer - not of the detached spectator'.
Therefore, this position, while sharpening the emphasis on Christ as the true Revealer, does not wish to negate the reality of that, 'which can never be wholly obliterated', and we may judge Mackintosh's position to be an advance upon, but not thereby a rejection of, the position held in, The Christian Apprehension of God.

b) In turning to look at the context in which God reveals Himself, we may anticipate, Types of Modern Theology, and note that the doctrine of the Trinity shall be highlighted as the indispensable context for any concept of God's self-revelation, and that Mackintosh sees a definite gain in Barth's emphasis here. Thus, the proper place of the doctrine of the Trinity in any system may be judged to be at the outset, rather than at the conclusion. In noting this, we see that Mackintosh has in fact departed from his statement of the issue in, The Christian Apprehension of God, where, although, 'a genuinely Trinitarian view of God can hardly be evaded by those who try to think out and think through the ultimate problems of the Christian faith', (163) this should not be taken to mean that the doctrine has a logical position at the head of the system. He writes:

'It really is impossible to read the Gospels freshly and gain the impression that when Jesus spoke of God, or presented God through action, the thought in the foreground of His mind, that which He chiefly longed for men to grasp and make their own, was the thought of God in three persons.' (164)

Therefore, the conclusion Mackintosh draws is that the doctrine of the Trinity, is, 'an implication of the experience into which (Jesus) leads.', (165) and thus a derivative of a prior religious experience, rather than the basis for understanding religious experience.
In, *Types of Modern Theology*, Mackintosh stresses that Barth's exposition of the nature of Revelation is mutually informed by his exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. Here, he suggests that, 'for God to reveal Himself is "eo ipso" to reveal Himself as Triune...Always in revelation He is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.' (166) He further credits him with keeping that exposition close to Scripture's record of the self-revealing of God, and, 'to the actual revelation in Jesus', emphasising that the doctrine of the Trinity is no piece of extra-Biblical speculation, but is rooted in the nature of the Gospel itself. (167) 'The Trinity is no mere appendage to, much less an inference from the Gospel; "ab initio" God is revealed as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.' (168) Equally, he notes that, in Barth, the Trinity, 'is the point at which his doctrine of God begins.' A proper exposition of the doctrine of Revelation requires us to take our starting point in, 'the "ordo essendi"', as against, 'the "ordo cognoscendi".' (169)

As an example of the impact of this stress on the Trinity as the context in which to understand the nature of Revelation, we note that, for Mackintosh, this is particularly evident in Barth's understanding of the Word of God. Here, Mackintosh notes a basic distinction in his thought, between the primary and original Word, and the Word as addressed to man. Thus, in the former sense, we have, 'the Word "which God speaks by and to Himself in eternal hiddenness"; a truth which is developed in the doctrine of the Trinity, for Jesus Christ is the Word of God from all eternity.' Thereafter, in a distinct but derivative sense, we have the Word as addressed to man, which is presented in a threefold form, namely, 'in preaching, in Scripture, and in revelation.' Mackintosh appreciates the distinction, but questions whether or not the two elements are sufficiently well related in Barth's
exposition. (170) The latter point notwithstanding, he notes that Revelation, that is the, 'Deus dixit', is the form of the Word of God that establishes proclamation and Scripture. This is so insofar as proclamation rests upon Scripture, and then in turn Scripture rests upon and attests to the act of God speaking to men. Indeed, inasmuch as they do rest upon the primal Revelation, proclamation and Scripture, become and are, the Word of God. The forms of the Word of God are mutually informative, and, 'each is known only through the others.' (171) Such is the degree of coinherence, 'The sole analogy which Barth can find for them...is that of the three "Persons" in the Trinity.' (172)

Therefore, Mackintosh generally approves of Barth's placing of the doctrine of the Trinity, and of its impact upon our understanding of Revelation. Further, he notes that Barth's Trinitarian doctrine stands in marked contrast to the prevailing trend in theological circles, and, within the context of, Types of Modern Theology, he has already highlighted deficiencies in the Trinitarian thought of Schleiermacher, Hegel, Ritschl and Feuerbach, with the latter being seen as parasitically dependent on Hegel. (173) This commendation of Barth may thus appear to signal a radical shift away from the earlier position of, The Christian Apprehension of God. However, I would contend that we shall best understand Mackintosh's position by recollecting the suggestion that what we find in, Types of Modern Theology, is a refinement of the position initially held, on the basis of trying to achieve an understanding, 'more in harmony with the New Testament.' Mackintosh has indeed moved, but this does not in itself imply rejection. Rather, might we not recall, with Barth, Herrmann's affirmation that the starting point of his, Dogmatik, is, in fact, the Trinity. (174) Thus, Herrmann says explicitly of the
proposed conclusion of the, Dogmatik, that, 'At the end of the course the knowledge of the Nature of God which is implied in this divine activity will be summed up in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.' (175) Thus, what is spoken of throughout Herrmann's, Dogmatik, should be understood as Trinitarian in character, and given the importance of this point we might state its conclusion:

'The doctrine of the Trinity reminds us that we can only find eternal life in fellowship with God if he remains unsearchable to us - an eternal mystery. The way to the Christian religion is the unconditioned will to truth or to submission to the facts which we ourselves experience. But its beginning and its end is, none the less, the humbling of man before the Unsearchable. "God dwelleth in light unapproachable, whom no man hath seen, or can see" (1 Tim. vi. 16)' (176)

Thus, for Herrmann, the Trinity is both the foundation and the conclusion of the theological system. Therefore, the refining movement within Mackintosh, striving after harmony with the New Testament, is indeed a move in the direction which Barth takes us. However, it is also a move in the direction which Herrmann takes us, as noted by Barth himself, for the logic of that movement takes us into the company of both. To this point we shall return.

c) In turning to look at, "The Special Character of Religious Knowledge", (177) and the nature of God's self-revelation, we shall see that in, The Christian Apprehension of God, Mackintosh is very much dependent on Ritschl, Kaftan, Herrmann, and Rothe. In speaking of the mode by which we apprehend God's self-revelation, he suggests that in religion, 'there is an apprehending mind, and there is an apprehended reality.' (178) such that, 'the apprehended reality.', has an independence of, and objectivity apart from, the human act of cognition. Thus, Mackintosh may write:

'revelation, i.e. the self-disclosure of God in and
through the facts of the world and of human experience, is as definitely presented to, but not created by, the knowing mind, as the natural world is presented to the scientific intelligence.' (179)

As regards the most, 'promising contribution', towards understanding the mode of apprehension, Mackintosh is clear that this is found in, 'what may in general terms be designated as the theory of value-judgements in religion.' (180) In respect of this approach, Mackintosh demonstrates fully the sources which have influenced him, when he writes:

'In some degree this special interpretation of religious knowledge goes back to Kant and Schleiermacher; some help in elucidating it was given by Lotze, who understood religion as on the whole few philosophers have done; but it is to Ritschl and some followers of his, notably Kaftan and Herrmann, that the prominence attained by the conception in recent thought is mainly due.' (181)

Mackintosh is at pains to defend Ritschl, et al., against the charge that they, 'invented "value-judgements."' (182), and notes that the concept has a distinguished pedigree, especially in the field of ethics. He further stresses that the act of making a judgement of value does not in itself constitute that which we believe in, rather that which we believe in has reality independent of, and prior to, our belief in it. Further, we note that he regards Herrmann as having made considerable progress in formulating an approach towards understanding the special character of religious knowledge, such that he had left behind an earlier position wherein he saw Christian faith as wholly distinct from other forms of knowledge. (183) Thus, he understands Herrmann to no longer, 'keep his scientific knowledge and his religious knowledge in separate and hermetically sealed compartments, with no communication or mutual influence between.' (184) The result of this is not that the scientific and religious approaches to

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knowledge are identical, rather that they, 'are complementary to one another and are both needed for even an approximately satisfying view of the universe as a whole.' (185)

Therefore, to approach religious knowledge through 'value-judgements', made upon the objective reality of God's self-disclosure, is deemed the most promising direction for theology to take if it is to make a contribution towards a shared understanding of the nature of the Universe. In the light of this, we may ask the question, How does this self-disclosure of God manifest itself in the World? Revelation for Mackintosh, is no abstract concept, rather, it, 'really stands for the most concrete and personal object with which we can have to do, viz. God, as He makes Himself known savingly to man.' (186) In turn it is seen as, 'given or presented or found to be inescapably there'. He then suggests that:

'What mediates revelation in its highest form is a significant fact or series of facts occurring in time, "fact" being used here in a sense capacious enough to include personality; and the task of faith is to discern and receive and proclaim the redemptive meaning which these facts contain for the sinful.' (187)

There is no argument that can convince us of the reality of God, rather is it a matter of 'direct intuition.' with God being known only by revelation. (188) Thus, he may quote A.B. Davidson, to the effect that, 'If men know God, it is because He has made Himself known to them.' (189) Thereafter, he highlights the, 'two manners or stages.', in which revelation takes place, such that, 'One stage is primary, the other remedial.' (190) In the primary sense of Revelation, there are, 'three elements or constituents...Nature, history, and conscience', with the primary elements furnishing, 'in the view of Scripture all the conditions for the rise and progress of
true religion.' (191) However, Mackintosh notes that we should not understand primary revelation to offer the possibility of 'Natural Religion' (192), for he draws the conclusion that, while the longing for God remains and is unquenched, it is only, 'by a new and better self-manifestation of God', (193) that the human condition can be remedied.

Mackintosh sees this remedy effected through God's progressive self-disclosure of Himself, such that, 'This, the revelation of God par excellence, takes shape century after century in great historical incidents and persons, through which and through whom shines the light that saves.' (194) For Mackintosh, there are elements in the Old Testament understanding of God which we would now wish to set aside, but this does not invalidate the revelation progressively given and summed up in Christ. Further, he may suggest that, 'the record deposited by that rising and broadening self-disclosure of God is the Bible.' As to how we understand the place of the Bible, Mackintosh then turns to W. Robertson Smith in the following terms. He writes:

'We do well to take as our own the words of the great Biblical scholar, Robertson Smith, for as a statement of truth they could hardly be improved upon: "If I am asked why I receive Scripture as the Word of God, and as the only perfect rule of faith and life, I answer with all the fathers of the Protestant Church: Because the Bible is the only record of the redeeming love of God, because in the Bible alone I find God drawing near to man in Christ Jesus, and declaring to us in Him His will for our salvation. And this record I know to be true by the witness of His Spirit in my heart, whereby I am assured that none other than God Himself is able to speak such words to my soul."' (195)

It is worth stressing at this juncture that Mackintosh's perspective in tracing out the progressive revelation, is a Christological one, such that he may say, 'It is of
first-rate importance that we should thus build from the start on the self-revelation of God in Christ, and that in consequence our thoughts of God should be regulated by Christ from end to end.' (196) Therefore, although he is at pains to stress the progressive and cumulative nature of Revelation, he is only able to do so from an already established Christological perspective.

In turning from the Scriptures to the field of theology, Mackintosh notes one theologian in particular who has given insight into how we understand the specific nature of God's self-revelation, namely, Richard Rothe. He sums up Rothe's position as follows:

'On the one side, he argues, stands the interposition of God in the actual history of the world, and this he calls Manifestation. On the other side is the Divine enlightenment of prophetic men, enabling them to interpret the events in which God is manifested; and to this he gives the name Inspiration. Both things together, outward event and insight quickened from above, form, as a living unity, revelation.' (197)

From this position, Mackintosh takes it to be the case, 'that revelation meets us pre-eminently in the field of history, though, 'In bringing this out, there is no need to confine revelation to the person of Jesus, as some recent thinkers have been apt to do'. (198) Thus, while there is a Christological focus in our understanding of God's self-revelation, this does not indicate an utter negation of God's primary revelation, in, 'Nature, history, and conscience'. Therefore, 'Anyone who moves from the sound position that in Christ supremely and decisively we see God to the quite different position that revelation comes exclusively through Christ, has some very formidable questions to meet.' (199)

It may be suggested that there is not a little inconsistency in Mackintosh's position, in that he seems
to wish to hold to a view which makes Christ the supreme and decisive revelation of God, while, at the same time, holding that this does not negate God's primary revelation. Whether this is an inconsistency, or, in fact, a paradox known to every theologian who reflects on God's presence perceived, both; in the created order, and, in Christ, and who then seeks to harmonise what is perceived, I cannot here resolve. Instead, we simply note that this is his position, and further suggest that this is the position maintained through to, *Types of Modern Theology*, as will be observed in his comments on the Barth-Brunner debate, as well as in statements made in the course of expounding Ritschl, as noted below.

In turning to, *Types of Modern Theology*, I do not propose to expound this work at great length, in part because there is no independent sustained statement by Mackintosh of his own position. In response to this, it may be suggested that there is indeed a very full statement by Mackintosh, in his chapter on Barth. However, we do well to stress that what we find in Mackintosh's writings on Barth is sympathetic exposition, which is not the same as positive endorsement, and if we are not careful we may confuse the two. Naturally, sympathetic exposition may lead to positive endorsement, and in Mackintosh's discussion of Barth it partially does. However, the two are not to be confused. Instead, I shall limit myself to the restatement of two observations already made, (partially amplified) plus two additional comments.

We have noted that in his treatment of the Barth-Brunner debate, Mackintosh endorses a mediating position which returns to the 'early' Barth, and one which we could envisage Brunner endorsing. This position seems to me to be not far distant from that in, *The Christian Apprehension of God*, such that the, 'formidable
questions', would seem to remain as yet unanswered. In line with this, we note Mackintosh's comments when expounding Ritschl, which he explicitly marks out to be his own, to the effect, 'that even what God has written of Himself into Nature can only be truly read by those whose eyes have been opened by the great revelation in Jesus.' (200) This statement implies, on the one hand, that there is a knowledge of God written in Nature, and, on the other, that such knowledge is properly apprehended only under a Christological form. Once more, I would suggest that this position places Mackintosh nearer to Brunner than to Barth, and while our focus has very much been upon the Mackintosh-Barth relationship, we should not forget that Brunner shared cordial relations with his, 'friend...Professor H.R. Mackintosh', and defended his own theological position at New College, Edinburgh, during Mackintosh's time. (201)

Further, we may return to the cardinal point I have so forcefully stressed, that is, that Mackintosh clearly distinguishes Ritschl from the later Ritschlians, and recognises the progress the latter have made over the former, with respect to Revelation. Thus, given that this is so, we may take it to be the case that the positive endorsements given to Herrmann and Kaftan still stand. The focus on Revelation may indeed be sharpened through Barth, but not exclusively so, and certainly not to the exclusion of Herrmann, et al.

In addition to these reiterated observations, we further comment on the necessarily limited scope of, *Types of Modern Theology*. It is not intended as the last word on many of the issues raised, and this in part justifies my return to Mackintosh's earlier writings. Equally, many of the figures mentioned by Mackintosh, such as; R. Rothe, A.B. Davidson, and, W. Robertson Smith, who are clearly
very significant for him, are not treated in this book. There is no final assessment of their contribution, nor should we expect there to be, and all that we can take from them is that their contributions stand in harmony with Herrmann, et al., in terms of the direction in which they take Mackintosh's thought. Thus, a key feature of my case, is that the absence of material renders it difficult to form judgements on Mackintosh, of the sort that Torrance, et al., wish to make.

A related, but distinct, comment, returns us to J.W. Leitch's suggestion that in his later years Mackintosh returned to his Free Church roots. In reply, one might note that the principal Free Church Fathers whom Mackintosh relies upon are, A.B. Davidson, and W. Robertson Smith. Their names, I would judge, are not associated in the annals of the Free Church with the heritage of the Westminster Confession and the Shorter Catechism, and while we do have some very limited evidence of interest in the latter documents, it is hardly sufficient to establish Leitch's claim. (202)

Therefore, in conclusion, having looked at, The Christian Apprehension of God, and, Types of Modern Theology, it would seem to me to be the case that, between the two works, we can discern a movement which we might take to be Mackintosh striving after a theological expression in harmony with the New Testament. The position found in, Types of Modern Theology, would seem to be a refinement of that set out in, The Christian Apprehension of God, but not one so formally and substantially dissimilar that we would feel compelled to regard the two books as standing opposed to each other. Barth clearly aids very considerably this process of refinement, but not to the negation of Herrmann, et al. In the light of this a revised reading of Mackintosh seems to me to be required.
viii) Towards a Revised Reading of Mackintosh

For a view more akin to our revised reading of Mackintosh, we turn to John Dickie's retrospect on British theology over the previous fifty years, delivered in New College, Edinburgh, in 1936, in which he suggests a rather more general openness to Barth from among those previously influenced by Ritschl, and here, of course, he includes Mackintosh. While not distinguishing carefully between Ritschl and Ritschlianism in the way that Mackintosh would wish, his comments are nonetheless suggestive. He writes:

'So far as they are still alive, all the British Theologians who were sympathetically influenced by Ritschl...have welcomed the Dialectical Theology, because it conserves the values both religious and intellectual which they found conserved by Ritschl, as they understood and developed his fundamental positions.' (203)

Thus, Dickie, (Professor of Systematic Theology, Knox College, Dunedin, New Zealand (204) a Scot, and a former assistant of W.P. Paterson at New College, who could claim, in virtue of this, to be in, 'close contact with Dr. H.R. Mackintosh', (205) seems to me to strike a note somewhat different to that which is sounded by those wishing to stress discontinuity, indeed he directly links the acceptance of Barth, to the fact that Barth, 'conserved', the values, 'religious and intellectual', conserved by Ritschl. In particular Dickie is thinking of the fact that, 'Barth...maintains as emphatically as Ritschl ever did the autonomy of theology, and its independence of metaphysics and the shifting sands of human knowledge and opinion.' Equally, he notes that Barth is in accord with that British line of theologians who contend that, 'Scripture is not the revelation, but the record of it - a record which verifies itself anew and authenticates itself as divine to those who hear God
speaking to them in and through it.' By the same token, those same theologians have, in the main, been willing to concede that Barth's conception, 'of the Person and Place of the Lord Jesus Christ', is more satisfactory, 'than Ritschl ever attained.' (206)

John Henderson, a Scot, a student of Mackintosh and Dickie's successor at Knox, notes that, 'When my predecessor was called to this chair the influence of Albrecht Ritschl and the Ritschlian school of theology, particularly Herrmann, Haering and Harnack, was still dominant. Dr. Dickie came, indeed, fresh from the translation of Haering's Dogmatics', (207) (A task set for Dickie by H.R. Mackintosh. (208)) However, he regards Barth as having forcibly brought the Ritschlian era to a close, and further regards Mackintosh as having pointed to Barth as the future of modern theology. (209) While Henderson may be right in his judgement on the close of the Ritschlian era, it seems to me to be only part of Mackintosh's story to say that the future of theology lies with Barth.

Bryan J.A. Gray, is a further commentator who it seems to me adopts an all too hasty reading of Mackintosh, and the impact of Barth upon him. He correctly points to, 'the impact which (Ritschl) had on a whole generation of Scottish theologians prior to the advent of dialectical theology.', and notes that this was also mediated via Wilhelm Herrmann, and is directed to these influences by Dickie's book, Fifty Years of British Theology. (210) He then characterises H.R. Mackintosh's theology as, 'a type of Calvinistic Ritschianism.', (211) a designation which he takes to highlight two of the most important influences upon Mackintosh; namely Ritschianism and the Highland Calvinism of the Gaelic-speaking Free Church within which he was raised. Thereafter, in turning to
Barth, Gray follows far too uncritically the conclusions of J.W. Leitch, and fails to make the basic distinction between Ritschl and Ritschlianism. (212) Thus, Gray's thesis which assumes that the early 'Ritschlian' Mackintosh, turned to Barth while rejecting Ritschlianism, and then in turn passed Barth on to T.F. Torrance, (213) is flawed. By this I mean, that it does not tally with a full reading of Mackintosh, whose work would have allowed him to embrace a broader range of influences, which were not, for him, mutually exclusive options. Mackintosh did indeed mediate Barth to Torrance, but there were further options available to the careful reader of, *Types of Modern Theology*, and these are not taken. Equally, it would seem that Gray has not fully absorbed Dickie's observations on Barth as the conserver of the same values as Ritschl.

Dickie's observations, and Mackintosh's openness to embrace, throw up for us an intriguing reading of theological history, albeit an 'heretical' one for Barth, and I suspect for confirmed 'Barthians'. However, if we were to set the latter to one side, and read H.R. Mackintosh in his own light, we would be faced with a reading which, at the very least, would call into question the received wisdom on the matter of Mackintosh's reception of Barth, and would in turn offer us the possibility of reading far greater theological continuity between the later Ritschlians and Barth, than we have hitherto been accustomed to.

Barth may thus be a little ahead of himself, when he writes the "Foreword" to Leitch's book on Mackintosh, which was, as said, originally a dissertation supervised by Barth. (214) He says of Mackintosh:

'I had reason to admire him (Mackintosh) for...the
thoroughness with which this man had penetrated and made himself familiar with the positions of nineteenth-century German theology, of the school of Schleiermacher and particularly Albrecht Ritschl and his followers, and the honest unrest and refreshing frankness in which, because the Scottish Calvinist tradition was still as live in him as ever, he strained beyond those positions...I found him engaged quite independently in a movement which, in its general direction, was very like my own...Is it not the case that in all ages proper theology has existed only as "Theology of Transition" in Latin, theologia viatorum? As such may it find...some representatives as earnest as this man'. (215)

Barth here echoes the, 'ideal of theologia viatorum', (216) which he seeks to follow, and sees Mackintosh as being a companion on this pilgrimage. Similarly, he notes, *Types of Modern Theology*, as a, 'considerable treatment', of the same subject matter as his, *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century*. (217) However, regardless of what Barth may say, it seems clear to me that Mackintosh's own conclusions are very much more open, and that enthusiasm for Barth does not betoken rejection of Herrmann, et al., even if it does mean censure of Ritschl.

In similar fashion, we shall have to disagree with the conclusions drawn by R.A. Muller, when he suggests that Mackintosh saw Barth as launching an, 'assault on worn-out liberalism', and further when he writes, 'Mackintosh manifests little concern for historical circumstances surrounding and contributing to Barth's theological development.' (218) Mackintosh, to repeat, does indeed have a very high estimation of Barth, but that is not the equivalent of a rejection of the theology of the Ritschlians, and while, *Types of Modern Theology*, does not major on the, 'historical circumstances', I would suggest that Mackintosh would have been far more sensitive to these than most English-speakers, as a student of Wilhelm Herrmann, and Martin Kähler. (219)
Therefore in considering the theological legacy of H.R. Mackintosh, as Torrance puts it, 'his last will and testament to us.', (220) we do well to note where Mackintosh's emphases fall. This is particularly so, because there is not a single 'Barthian' emphasis in Mackintosh, rather there is a theological openness which can embrace both Barth and later Ritschlian thought, given that he can discern an underlying similarity of intention, namely the furnishing of a Biblical Christology which adequately provides a coherent basis for relating Revelation and History. Thus, Mackintosh may emphasise both the later Ritschlians and Barth, albeit that he is only considering one of them extensively in, *Types of Modern Theology*. Clearly there was nothing in the mind of Mackintosh which compelled him to make an either/or choice between the two, and his reading of Barth seems not to have entailed the rejection of the Ritschlian stream of influence, rather, to a recognition of considerable progress by Barth, beyond Ritschl, a progress that later Ritschlians, such as Herrmann, et al., were also making. Thus Barth, for Mackintosh, seems indeed to, 'conserve', the later Ritschlian emphases highlighted by John Dickie above, (221) such that I would suggest a careful rereading of Mackintosh is essential if we are to understand the true significance of this important figure.
CHAPTER 2 - H.R. MACKINTOSH AND THE RECEPTION OF BARTH

1 H.R. Mackintosh, "Recent Foreign Theology", in, ExT 35 (1924), 317-318.

2 Idem, Types of Modern Theology, 173.


4 H.R. Mackintosh, "Leaders of Theological Thought : Karl Barth", in, ExT 39 (1928), 536-540.

5 Idem, "Recent Foreign Theology", "The Swiss Group", in, ExT 36 (1924), 73-75.

6 Ibid., 73.

7 Ibid., 73.

8 Idem, "Recent Foreign Theology", in, ExT 37 (1926), 281-283, 282.

9 Idem, "Recent Foreign Theology", in, ExT 38 (1927), 369-371, 369.

10 Ibid., 370.

11 Idem, "Recent Foreign Theology", in, ExT 39 (1928), 261-262.

12 Ibid., 262.

13 Ibid., 262.

14 Idem, "Recent Foreign Theology", in, ExT 40 (1928), 91-92.

15 Ibid., 91.

16 Ibid., 91.

17 Idem, "Recent Foreign Theology", in, ExT 41 (1930), 377-379.

18 Ibid., 378.
19 Ibid., 378.

20 Idem, "Great Attacks on Christianity. V. Feuerbach and Illusionism", in, ExT 43 (1932), 197-203.

21 198. See also, 200, 203.

22 197.


24 Ibid., 536.

25 Ibid., 538.

26 Ibid., 538.

27 Ibid., 538.

28 Ibid., 540.


30 Ibid., 108.


In similar vein, D.M. Baillie, in, "Mackintosh, Hugh Ross (1870-1936)", in, L.G. Wickham Legg (ed.), The Dictionary of National Biography 1931-1940 (Oxford : OUP, 1949), 581-582, notes of Mackintosh that he had first of all imbibed Ritschlian at Marburg under Herrmann, (Ibid., 581) and that:

'He helped to introduce Ritschlianism to the English-speaking world by translating (in collaboration with Dr. A.B. Macaulay, 1900) the most important of the three volumes of Albrecht Ritschl's great work, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation. Mackintosh's own work plainly shows the influence of
Ritschl. Yet he was critical of the Ritschlian theology at many points, and he cannot fairly be called a Ritschlian.' (Ibid., 581)


36 Idem, "The Philosophical Presuppositions of the Ritschlian School", in, Some Aspects of Christian Belief, (Hodder & Stoughton : London, 1923) 121-155. Title of the article reprinted from the, American Journal of Theology, January 1899. In the reprint of 1923, Mackintosh clarifies the intention of the original article, and enters certain caveats, in the following terms:

'I have ventured to reprint it, virtually in its original form, although many of its points would now be otherwise expressed and the perspective on the subject as a whole has changed. Not the Ritschlian theology, which has taught this generation so much, is the topic of discussion, but the Kantian and Lotzian theory of knowledge with which Ritschl buttressed it. This was really for him an afterthought: he was apt to work out his methodology, not always felicitously, after putting his methods in operation. And his early statements on the doctrine of value-judgments were in fact exposed to just such criticisms as I have offered. Later interpretations by members of his school, especially by Reischle in his Werturtheile und Glaubensurtheile, have strengthened the more vulnerable points. They emphasise the character of faith as a definite mode of apprehension and exhibit clearly the objective reality of spiritual values.' (Ibid., 121 n.1)

37 Ibid., 176. Barth, in, Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, offers a radically different perspective on the respective merits of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. He writes:

'It has been said of Ritschl that in the history of theology since Schleiermacher he is the only one who, in the true sense, has given birth to an epoch. This is not true because all the strivings proceeding from Schleiermacher, who was, despite all argument, the only one who really gave rise to an epoch, continued on their way in a very significant fashion beside Ritschl, and were even more than ever taken up again after him...Ritschl has the significance of an episode in more recent theology, and not, indeed not, that of an epoch.' (Ibid., 654)

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To further amplify our understanding of Mackintosh's position, we note that he had consistently maintained, throughout his theological career, this position on the respective merits of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. He writes, in, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, that:

'The work begun by Schleiermacher was taken up fifty years later by Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889), who strove even more persistently to vindicate for the historic Christ the central place in His religion.' (Ibid., 278-279)

38 Idem, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, 352 n.1.

39 Idem, "Books that have influenced our Epoch : Herrmann's "Communion With God.", ExT 40 (1928-29) 311-315, 311. This review also appears in, Christliche Welt 1925, no. 20-1, col. 467 f., as noted by, K. Barth, Theology and Church (London : SCM, 1962), 261 n.4.


46 J. McConnachie, The Significance of Karl Barth, 120.

47 Ibid., 120.


57 Ibid., 170.


59 Ibid., 32.

60 Ibid., 33-34.

61 Ibid., 33-34.

62 Ibid.,34.

63 Ibid., 3. See, 2-4 generally.

64 Ibid., 33.


66 Ibid., 15.

67 Ibid., 15.

68 Ibid., 15-16.

69 Ibid., 13.

70 Ibid., 17-18.


72 See the Bibliography of Mackintosh's writings as found in, J.W. Leitch, Op. Cit., 210-212.


75 Ibid. v, and, xi.

76 Ibid. For, Schleiermacher, see, 256-304, Lotze, 367-384, and, Ritschl, 430-446.


78 See, H. Watt, New College Edinburgh : A Centenary History, Ch. XII, "Into and Within the Larger Union", 131-152.


81 Ibid., 180.


83 Ibid., V-VI.

84 Ibid., 193, 203-204.


86 Ibid., 213.

87 Ibid., 214.


90 Ibid., 47.

The affinities between H.R. Mackintosh's thought and that of A.S. Pringle-Pattison, are perhaps best illustrated in
Mackintosh's article, "A Philosopher's Theology", in, Some Aspects of Christian Belief, 259-278. Here he expounds the thought of his, 'admired and beloved teacher', Pringle-Pattison, in a manner which is highly laudatory, and suggests that Pringle-Pattison's, The Idea of God, 'is a lofty and impressive statement of the Idealism which is most in harmony with the fundamental convictions of religious faith, and, in its final outcome, betrays a definite sympathy with Christianity itself...at all events there is inspiration for Christian thought in the study of a metaphysician who invariably speaks nobly of the soul its nature, its affinities, its destiny.' (259-260) Further, Mackintosh's memories of, and reflections upon, Pringle-Pattison, following the latter's death, speak poignantly of the high regard in which he was held. He writes of Pringle-Pattison, in, The Scotsman, (of 2nd September, 1931, as cited in, J.B. Capper, "Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison 1856-1931", in, Proceedings of the British Academy (Vol. XVII), Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison 1856-1931 (London : Humphrey Milford, n.d.), 3-17, 17.) that:

'In no life lived in our time has there been witnessed a more complete allegiance to the ideals of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful; and over all arched the sky of the Divine.'

Equally, we may note that Pringle-Pattison had high regard for H.R. Mackintosh. Thus, for example, having approvingly cited the work of another of his former pupils, John Baillie, (The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity (Edinburgh : T.&T. Clark, 1929), 136.) to the effect that, 'The real humanity of Jesus', is the, 'assumption and starting-point', for, then current, attempts to restate the meaning of the Creed, Pringle-Pattison, in, Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1930), 247, goes on to note that this position is, 'elaborately stated by Professor H.R. Mackintosh'. He then quotes Mackintosh, (The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, 469-470) with respect to the life of Jesus, thus:

'His life on earth was unequivocally human. Jesus was a man, a Jew of the first century, with a life localized in and restricted by a body organic to His self-consciousness; of limited power, which could be, and was, thwarted by persistent unbelief; of limited knowledge, which, being gradually built up by experience, made him liable to surprise and disappointment; of a moral nature susceptible of growth, and exposed to lifelong temptation; of a piety and personal religion characterized at each point by dependence upon God. In short, He moved always within the limits of an experience humanly normal in constitution, even if abnormal in its
sinless quality. The life Divine in Him found expression through human faculty, with a self-consciousness and activity mediated by His human milieu. We cannot predicate of Him two consciousnesses or two wills: the New Testament indicates nothing of the kind, nor indeed is it congruous with an intelligible psychology. The unity of His personal life is axiomatic.' (Ibid., 247. See, 243-248, generally.)


92 Ibid., 140-141.

93 Ibid., 140-141.

94 Ibid., 141.

95 Ibid., 141.

96 Ibid., 141.

97 Ibid., 140.

We further note the suggestion of D.M. Baillie, Op. Cit., 581, that:

'When the "dialectical" theology of Karl Barth took the world by storm, Mackintosh was both appreciative and critical, as can be learnt from chapter viii of his Types of Modern Theology, Schleiermacher to Barth (published posthumously in 1937), a book in which his own position in theology may well be studied indirectly.'

98 A view propounded in, J. Richmond, Ritschl : A Reappraisal, 35-38, D.W. Lotz, Ritschl and Luther, 15-


100 H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, 147.

101 Ibid., 147-148.

102 Ibid., 148-149.

103 Ibid., 155.

104 Ibid., 156.

105 Ibid., 157.

106 Ibid., 158.

107 Ibid., 178.

108 Ibid., 178-179.

109 Ibid., 179.

110 Ibid., 179.

111 Ibid., 179-180.

112 Ibid., 180. In respect of the relationship between Revelation and History, Mackintosh is particularly anxious to do justice to Barth's position, and he sets it out with great care, noting fully its weaknesses, yet seeking to understand it as sympathetically as possible. He notes that, for Barth, Jesus Christ as, 'a human fact', is not, in Himself revelation. Nor are His words or deeds, as such, revelation. Rather they are signs and tokens that revelation is there, 'for many who heard His words and and beheld His deeds did not believe in Him.' (Ibid., 281-282)

Once more however, and echoing his earlier concerns, Mackintosh finds Barth's emphasis in question, and wonders, 'how far Barth's thought makes room for the Jesus Christ described in the Gospels as having companied with men'. (Ibid., 282)

113 H.R. Mackintosh, "Recent Foreign Theology", "Theology at its Best", ExT 36 (1925), 326-328.

114 Ibid., 326. -169-
115 K. Barth, *Theology and Church*, 261 n.4.


117 Ibid., 327.

118 Idem, "Books that have influenced our Epoch: Herrmann's "Communion With God."", 313.

119 Ibid., 313-314.

120 Ibid., 313.

121 Idem, "Recent Foreign Theology", *ExT* 36 (1925), 519-522, 521.

122 Ibid., 521.


124 K. Barth, *Theology and Church*, 239.

125 Ibid., 239-240.

126 Ibid., 251. See also, 256, 260.

127 Ibid., 256.

128 H.R. Mackintosh, Op. Cit., 141 n.1

129 Ibid., 173.


131 K. Barth, "The Humanity of God", in *God, Grace and Gospel*, SJTh OP n.8 (1959) 29-52, 34.


133 Idem, "Recent Foreign Theology", *ExT* 40 (1929) 470, 471-472.

134 Ibid., 471.


136 Ibid., 180.

137 T.F. Torrance, Op. Cit., 161. Thus, he writes, 'As Mackintosh used to teach us, dogmatics is not the systematic study of the sanctioned dogmas of the Church, but the elucidation of the full content of the Word of -170-
God as contained in Scripture, and as such is concerned with the intrinsic and permanent truth which Church doctrine in every age is meant to express.'

138 J.W. Leitch, Op. Cit., 3. Thus, he writes, 'From first to last it was his intention to be guided by nothing else but the Word of God as made known in the Scripture through the inner witness of the Holy Spirit, and if at times he may have wandered from the way, he never wandered really far and soon came back to it again.'

139 R.R. Redman, Op. Cit., 219. Thus, he writes, 'Mackintosh attempted to make the biblical witness to the person and work of Christ the starting point of reflection.'

140 A.C. Cheyne, Op. Cit., 214. Thus, he writes, 'What can be said without fear of contradiction is that...Mackintosh was in the last analysis a Biblical theologian.'

144 Ibid., 147.
145 Ibid., 147.
146 Ibid., 173.


149 Ibid., 38.
150 Ibid., 70.
151 T.F. Torrance, Theological Science, 47 n.1.
152 Ibid., 43 ff.

153 H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, 276, 281.
154 Ibid., 276, 281.
155 Ibid., 276.
156 Ibid., 276.
157 Ibid., 276.
158 Ibid., 276-278.
159 Ibid., 277.
160 Ibid., 316.
161 Ibid., 316, citing, Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (London: OUP, 1933) 170, slightly amended. For the debate between Brunner and Barth, see, E. Brunner & K. Barth, Natural Theology (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946).
162 Ibid., 272.
164 Ibid., 116.
165 Ibid., 116.
166 Idem, Types of Modern Theology, 280-281.
167 Ibid., 299-300.
168 Ibid., 299.
169 Ibid., 299.
170 Ibid., 287.
171 Ibid., 290-291.
172 Ibid., 291.
173 Ibid., For Schleiermacher, see 78-79, Hegel, 105, Ritschl, 160. On Feuerbach, see 122-126. See also, Idem, "Great Attacks on Christianity. V. Feuerbach and Illusionism", in, ExT 43 (1932), 197-203.
174 K. Barth, Theology and Church, 257-258.
175 W. Herrmann, Systematic Theology, 65.
176 Ibid., 152. The suggestion that we should view Herrmann as a Trinitarian theologian may well strike some as novel, and if this is the case then we do well to
consider the extent to which our view of that theologian has been conditioned by others, namely Karl Barth.

In a more or less identical case, that of F.D.E. Schleiermacher, very similar questions might be raised as to the nature of his Trinitarianism. We may note that Barth himself, in, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, suggests that, 'Schleiermacher, in principle, enters into the course of Trinitarian theological thinking together with the Reformers. Even if he does not go beyond this, the fact must not be overlooked in the assessment of his undertaking.', and while we should receive the former part of this quotation more or less as it stands, we should not feel compelled to accept unexamined the statement that, 'he does not go beyond this'. (458)

As a result of his suggestion, Barth judges Schleiermacher to offer, in principle, a true, 'starting-point', from which, 'a genuine, proper theology could be built up'. (Ibid., 460) Of course, Schleiermacher starts from a position which reverses the Reformers' order of thought, such that while, 'the Reformers propagated the teaching of the Word of God in its correlation with faith as the work of the Holy Spirit in man. Schleiermacher reversed the order of this thought...But this reversal of theology's way of looking at things was not necessarily bound to mean that theology was now no longer theology, or had even become the enemy of true theology.' (Ibid., 459-460)

Now Barth clearly judges Schleiermacher to have failed to offer a, 'true theology.', and that for all the potential inherent in the reversed starting-point, the result has not fulfilled that potential.

However, just as Barth is not the last word on Herrmann, neither is he on Schleiermacher. Thus, we should note that, for example, H.R. Mackintosh credits him with making, 'a genuine effort to reach a Trinitarianism', albeit one that falls short. (Types of Modern Theology, 78-79) Similarly, R.F. Streetman, in, "Some Questions Schleiermacher Might Ask about Barth's Trinitarian Criticisms", in, Barth and Schleiermacher : Beyond the Impasse ? (Philadelphia : Fortress Press, 1988), 114-137, makes a sustained defence of Schleiermacher, arguing that, The Christian Faith, is marked by an, 'implicitly trinitarian character', (Ibid., 134) with the doctrine of the Trinity placed at the conclusion of the system with the deliberate intention of making explicit its unifying function. Thus, the doctrine does indeed have an, 'organic connection with the rest of the system.' (Ibid., 134) such that Schleiermacher, 'acted systematically in response to his earlier statement that only The Christian
Faith in its entirety would be sufficient to describe his doctrine of God, by making the explicit doctrine of the Trinity in the conclusion serve as the "composite" doctrine or metadoctrine that caught up all the divine attributes and forged them into an organically whole system.' (Ibid., 134)

There is no definite conclusion as to the nature of Schleiermacher's Trinitarianism to be reached from this discussion, except that the question is an open one, and that Barth's word should not be regarded as the last word on the subject.

By analogy to this case, we may suggest that in respect of Herrmann, the question is similarly open, with no last word having been spoken by Barth.


Equally, we should not feel compelled to see Barth's placing of the doctrine of the Trinity at the head of his system as being wholly novel, even within the context of Protestant theology in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. As he himself has indicated, I.A. Dorner had clearly grasped its significance. He writes, in Theology and Church, that :

'Dorner knew that Christian truth is not dependent on experience, that its basis is in itself, as classically formulated in the doctrine of the Trinity; that this doctrine, contrary to the opinion not only of the modern age, but also to certain statements of the Reformers, could not possibly be surrendered...The time is coming when men will be surprised - or perhaps will not be surprised - that Dorner could be ignored for Ritschl.' (215, see also, 232 n.1)

(See also Barth's chapter on, "Dorner", in, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 577-587, esp., 579.)

Further, we note that Wolfhart Pannenberg, in, Grundfragen systematischer Theologie (Band 2), pp. 98
ff., 'has sought to establish a connection between Barth and Dorner.', in respect of their understanding of the Trinity. (As cited by, T. Bradshaw, "Karl Barth on the Trinity : A Family Resemblance", in, SJTh 39 (1986), 145-164, 156-157.)


(On Dorner generally, see, S.H. Russell, "I.A. Dorner : A Centenary Appreciation", in, ExT 96 (1984), 77-81.)

178 Ibid., 45.
179 Ibid., 45-46.
180 Ibid., 51.
181 Ibid., 51.
182 Ibid., 51.
183 Ibid., 63-64.
184 Ibid., 63.
185 Ibid., 65.
186 Ibid., 69.
187 Ibid., 70.
188 Ibid., 71.
190 Ibid., 74.
191 Ibid., 75.
192 Ibid., 75.
193 Ibid., 76.
194 Ibid., 76.
195 Ibid., 81.
196 Ibid., 93.
197 Ibid., 82.
198 Ibid., 83.
199 Ibid., 94.

202 J.W. Leitch, Op. Cit., for example, 3-4. Clearly Leitch had access to lecture notes which are no longer available, that is, those on the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the Shorter Catechism. These are missing from the New College collection of H.R. Mackintosh's papers. However, the use which even Leitch makes of them is so minimal that we may suggest that their impact upon our overall thesis would be negligible.

203 J. Dickie, *Fifty Years of British Theology*, 100-101.
205 Ibid, 8.
206 Idem, *Fifty Years of British Theology*, 101.
210 B.J.A. Gray, *Theology as Science: An Examination of the Theological Methodology of Thomas F. Torrance*, 60. On Dickie, see 60 n.1, 70 n.3.
211 Ibid., 82.
212 Ibid., 84.
213 Ibid., 70-71. See 70 n.4
215 Ibid., VI

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221 J. Dickie, *Fifty Years of British Theology*, 101.
i) The Significance of Barth within Scottish Theology

We have already devoted considerable attention to H.R. Mackintosh's position with respect to the reception of Barth in Scotland. However, it need hardly be said that he was not operating in a vacuum. Thus, while it has been contended that we should view Mackintosh's response to Barth in terms of his perceiving a continuity with respect to the nature of God's self-revelation, we ought to be aware of the impact of Barth on other Scottish theologians. Indeed, were we to discover that questions of Continuity/Discontinuity were wholly absent from their concerns, we might reasonably ask whether the application of such scenarios to the study of Mackintosh and Torrance was appropriate. Equally, if we observed that questions in respect of the nature of Revelation were at the periphery of their concerns, we might again query if the focus on this in the cases of Mackintosh and Torrance was not a distortion of our perspective. Further, if, as contended, Torrance's stress on Barth as one who stands in discontinuity with the theology of the Nineteenth Century, is at odds with Mackintosh's understanding of Barth, might we not reasonably seek other theologians whose interpretation of Barth created a perspective on the issue which took, either implicitly or explicitly, something akin to our Discontinuity Scenario to be, more or less, axiomatic in the interpretation of Barth. This will not, of itself, establish any definite evidence of influence upon Torrance, but, as suggested, it might establish that the issues which have been our focus, were in fact at the very heart of the Scottish reception of Barth, and thus provide a relevant backdrop to our more specific discussion on Mackintosh and Torrance.
In attempting to outline Barth's significance for Scottish theological thinking, I shall first of all highlight some observations on the specifically Scottish form of Barth-reception, and then map out the initial reception to Barth's thought as seen in articles and books in the period 1924-1939. In so doing, I shall seek to observe the extent to which the question of Revelation is to the fore in the discussions relating to Barth, and whether the discussions might validly be read in terms of our proposed scenarios. The justification for my choice of this period can be found in the fact that it is in 1924 that we have observed the first reference to Barth by H.R. Mackintosh, (1) and this provides a self-evident terminus a quo, while our terminus ad quem of 1939 arises out of the conjunction of the commencement of the Second World War, and the publication of the last of a number of important works which all contained significant assessments of Barth's position, namely John Baillie's, Our Knowledge of God. In the last three years of our period there had been a marked upsurge of interest in Barth's theology, and assessments of his position were beginning to be drawn. Inevitably, the onset of war sidelined this process, and so it seems to me that we are well justified in taking these assessments as our terminus ad quem. This upsurge is evidenced by a number of publications, a notable invitation, and a further Scottish doctorate.

Thus, for example, we may suggest that G.T. Thomson's English Translation of, C. D. I/1, published in 1936, (2) is, (to borrow the phrasing of R.H. Roberts but to place it in a different context) 'probably as regards [Scottish] theology the single most important theological act of cultural translation in the first half of the twentieth century' (3) Its impact upon H.R. Mackintosh, and, in turn, T.F. Torrance, as well as its role in the
wider dissemination of Barth's thought are of great importance. We may also note the appearance in 1936 of a small volume of essays by Barth in English, entitled, God in Action, that contained, as we have observed, a chapter on "Revelation", which has been judged in some quarters to be influential on Torrance. (4) 1937 saw, of course, the appearance of H.R. Mackintosh's, Types of Modern Theology, and the symposium of essays on, Revelation, for the World Conference on Faith and Order, held in Edinburgh in August 1937, containing an essay by Barth on "Revelation", as well as the assessment of this by John Baillie. (5) Equally, there was the accolade of an invitation, in 1935, to deliver the Gifford Lectures, at Aberdeen in 1937-38, which Barth did, under the title, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God. (6) Particularly in the first series delivered in 1937 on "The Knowledge of God", there was a very full and characteristic expression of Barth's position on that subject, based on the, Scots Confession, a somewhat neglected document in the Scotland of 1937. (7) That Barth was invited to be the Gifford Lecturer was, in itself, a significant indication of the impact he had made in Scotland. (8) Further, we shall see the appearance of a genuinely 'Barthian' work of theology, (as opposed to expositions of Barth's thought) that is, G.S. Hendry's, God the Creator, (9) which in its time aroused a notable controversy, in respect of the very issues which are our central concern. In 1938, there appeared a further work containing a significant assessment of Barth, namely, Revelation and Response, (10) by Edgar P. Dickie, (Professor of Divinity, St. Andrew's, 1935-1967) which, as the title might suggest, offers a full review of the concept of Revelation, and seeks to place Barth's theology within the context of the prevailing trends of the time. Finally, in 1939, as noted, John Baillie's, Our Knowledge of God, marks our
terminus ad quem, yet begins, more or less, Baillie's ongoing engagement with Barth on the issue of Revelation. (11) Given that I have already devoted some attention to Baillie in our opening chapter, I do not propose to return to him once more, and what is to be found there should be read in conjunction with this chapter.

We note also certain incidental matters, which point to the way in which Barth was perceived in the 1930's. Thus, for example, we observe the fact that the 1936 Festschrift for Barth, *Theologische Aufsätze: Karl Barth zum 50. Geburtstag*, contained four contributions by English-speakers, three of which were by ministers of the Church of Scotland. Namely, Norman W. Porteous, Barth's first English-speaking student from Munster in 1928 (12), John McConnachie and G.L.B. Sloan. (13) We are made further aware of Barth's significance by the fact that he was awarded, on the 18th of June 1930, an honorary doctorate by the University of Glasgow, as, 'the most-discussed theologian of Germany', (14) and in September 1937, a further honorary doctorate by the University of St. Andrew's. (15)

Therefore, it seems to me that we have sufficiently indicated, in the first instance, that Barth's theology did indeed make an impact upon the Scottish scene, and that the first wave of influence reached a peak in the period 1936-39. Hereafter, as indicated, I shall highlight the character of the Scottish response, and then survey the general reception of Barth's theology in our chosen period. This chapter, and that on Mackintosh which preceded it, should, of course, be read in conjunction in order to gain a full picture of the general reception of Barth in Scotland.
ii) Assessments of Barth's Impact on Scottish Theology

R.H. Roberts' study of the Anglo-Saxon reception of Barth, highlights fully the particular receptivity of Scottish thought to Barth's theology. He writes:

'it is clear from an early stage that enthusiasm for Barth's work (as opposed to mere curiosity) was primarily a Scottish attribute. J.H. Morrison, N. Porteus, [sic] H.R. Mackintosh, J. McConnachie and (presumably) A.J. MacDonald were all Scots, and it would seem apparent that Barth's revivification of the reality of the Word of God as the existential core of the human encounter with the divine corresponded with their expectations.' (16)

Roberts' study is, 'a specific sequel', (17) to another attempt, 'to outline the history of the English-speaking world's reception of Barth's thought.', (18) namely that of S.W. Sykes. Sykes contends that, from the 1930's onwards, 'it is in Scotland that Barth is taken with the greatest seriousness in the English-speaking world'. (19) At the same time Sykes is sensitive to the fact that this reception is in no way uncritical. Thus, he suggests that H.R. Mackintosh offers a, 'rather cautiously positive response to Barth's work'. (20) He further notes:

'Both John and Donald Baillie, whose important contributions to theology cover more than thirty years of Scottish university life, were independent and critical observer's of Barth's influence.' (21)

This ties in with Walter M. Horton's characterisation of the Baillies as, 'former liberals who have tempered and corrected their views in the light of Barth's criticisms and emphases, but have not accepted his system as a whole.', and his highlighting of John's fight in Scotland, 'against a too worshipful acceptance of Barth's system.' (22) (Equally, we note Horton's suggestion that, 'the work of Barth, Brunner and Heim has nowhere received a more friendly welcome than in Scotland'. (23)) We
recall also John Macquarrie noting that John Baillie's, The Interpretation of Religion, (1929) (24) testifies to the continuing influence of Ritschlianism. Further, he characterises his final work, (and that of Donald), 'as an attempt to combine the best insights of both dialectical and liberal theology.' (25) He writes:

'In particular, the problem of revelation and of our knowledge of God continually exercised his mind; and while he welcomed many of the insights of such theologians as Barth and Brunner, he received them critically and shunned what he considered to be excesses.' (26)

In contrast to the Baillies, the person who most surely personifies receptivity to Barth, is T.F. Torrance, and Sykes may suggest that, 'Torrance's work marks the beginning of a new and more sophisticated era for English-language reception of Barth.', (27) and, in this very brief detailing of the assessments of Barth's impact upon Scotland, we see the overall assessment to be essentially positive, as typified by Torrance himself.

However, we must also take into account those who, while noting the Scottish predilection for Barth, have questioned its adequacy. Thus, P.L. Lehmann may write:

'In Scotland a virulent 'Barthian scholasticism' obstructs the freedom of God in his revelation to be God for man in the world, and enervates the faith and life of the churches.' (28)

Dietrich Ritschl, writing out of a sustained and personal exposure to Scotland and Scottish Barthians, draws rather similar conclusions. He notes that Swiss and Scottish adherents of the cause are not quite identical in character, and comments on the latter, that, 'They seemed to know all the answers.' (29) In even stronger terms, Richard A. Muller, in a series of articles, questions to
what extent Scottish theologians such as H.R. Mackintosh and, especially, T.F. Torrance, have wholly misunderstood the place of Barth within the history of theology. (30)

We thus observe the extent to which the positive reception of Barth in the English-speaking world is regarded as a peculiarly Scottish phenomenon, (albeit that some have doubts as to its adequacy) and note those mentioned in that connection. This is not to imply that within the Scottish theological community there was a uniform response to Barth, only that within that community there was a greater probability that the response would be positive. As an illustration of the diversity of response to Barth, even in Scotland, we may note A.C. Cheyne's classification of the various forms of response to, 'the Barthian movement.' He writes:

'Roughly speaking, they fell into four groups: those who were only superficially influenced and therefore continued the liberal tradition without much change; those whose entire outlook was affected but who in the end withheld their whole-hearted approval; those who may be described as real if cautious admirers; and those in whom we can discern the unqualified zeal of out-and-out converts.' (31)

Cheyne himself names a theologian whose response typifies each of the four groups he identifies. Thus, where there seems to me to be sufficient evidence to justify the identification of any of the theologians whose efforts we now review, with one of the groupings Cheyne identifies, I shall make that judgement. This, I suggest, would be appropriate since Cheyne's categories express in effect the same idea which underlies the Continuity and Discontinuity Scenarios which we have outlined. With these thoughts in mind, let us now turn to the detailing of the early Scottish responses.
iii) Responding to Barth

a) Barth himself draws attention to a probable early encounter with his thought by a Scottish theologian. This arose in connection with the World Council of the Alliance of Reformed Churches holding the Presbyterian System, held at Cardiff, Wales in 1925. (32) Here, Principal Alexander Martin, (Professor of Apologetics and Practical Theology, New College, Edinburgh, 1897-1935) delivered a paper on the possibility of a universal Reformed Creed, while Barth's thoughts on this were presented in a paper, "The Desirability and Possibility of a Universal Reformed Creed", (33) though not, it would seem, in person. (34) Barth offers only a passing note on Martin, (35) and we have no means of assessing its significance, if any, in terms of Barth's impact on Scottish thinking. However, it is at least possible that it lead to an increasing awareness of his thought in Scotland, and, in particular, at New College.

b) John McConnachie, a parish minister, through his 1927 Hibbert Journal article, "The Teaching of Karl Barth : A New Positive Movement in German Theology", (36) offers what may fairly be regarded as the first significant assessment of Barth, by a Scot, to be published. McConnachie here suggests that Barth's theological method is to be regarded as a decidedly dialectical one, with the principal opponent, against whom the method is deployed, being Schleiermacher, 'the leader of the romantic movement which made religious experience the starting-point of theology, and the only subject of theological consideration.' (37) Further, he notes that man's very religiosity is under attack, suggesting again that it is particularly, 'the romantic pietistic view of religion', which draws his fire. This is characterised as, 'a betrayal of theology, in so far as everything is
based on subjective experience, instead of on the objective, that is, on God.' (38)

McConnachie is therefore clear as to that which Barth opposes, and, in assessing Barth's counter to this, suggests that this is governed by his doctrine of God.

'God is "the completely other", the invisible, the transcendent, the presupposition of all events, the incommensurable yonder over against all here; the absolute, over against all relative'. (39)

Thus, McConnachie may suggest that, for Barth, there is no knowledge of God to be found in Nature, history or human experience. Instead:

'Our only knowledge of God comes through Revelation with a capital R, that is, as it has reached us in the Bible. The distinctive view of the Bible is...the breaking through of the divine into human life.' (40)

This Revelation, contained in the Word of God, is characterised by its focus upon Jesus Christ, though McConnachie notes that, for Barth, there is no revelatory significance in Jesus of Nazareth as such. The life of Jesus culminating in the Cross, looked at from the human side, is fraught with ambiguity. The Resurrection likewise, is no more accessible.

'But place it into the category of revelation, as an act of God, and the Resurrection becomes the great wonder, the miracle "direct from above," the breaking through of the new world out of the unknown dimension into the known world.' (41)

In his own critique, McConnachie regards Barth as being far too, 'one-sided', with a, 'religious and ethical pessimism', pervading his scheme. He further regards Barth as having left no place for the, 'verification of faith by experience', and of failing, 'to work out
satisfactorily the relation between the historical Jesus and the Risen Christ...leav(ing) an unaccountable break between the earthly and the heavenly life of our Lord.' (42) He sees Barth's aim, praiseworthy in itself, as being the deliverance of faith from the uncertainties of the historical and psychological, but sees his project as failing because he rejects precisely the point from where our knowledge begins. However his final conclusion as to the contribution of, 'Barth and his group', is this:

'They have restored the category of Revelation to a place of honour, and called Christian thought anew to reverence the Word of God. This, and not their negative criticism, is their central contribution.' (43)

We have reproduced McConnachie's view fairly fully, given that his was the earliest significant response to Barth, and because, like Barth, he was in his younger days a disciple of Herrmann. (44) Thus, McConnachie may be viewed as one sensitive to the theological issues which are our concern, and one whose stress, in expounding Barth, tends to fall towards emphasising the element of discontinuity between Barth's thought and that of his liberal forebears.

We may also note the credit extended to McConnachie by others, for his efforts in popularising Barth. Thus, R.H. Roberts may describe John McConnachie, as, 'a faithful populariser of Barth's work', (45) while H. Jochums, in his German perspective on the reception of, "Dialectic Theology in the English-speaking World", regards McConnachie as being more sympathetic in his response than many other English-speakers. (46) Equally, A.L. Drummond, notes that the cause of Barth in Great Britain was aided by, 'judicious interpreters', such as McConnachie. (47) Further, T.F. Torrance acknowledges the extent to which McConnachie influenced him, in terms of
introducing him to the thought of Barth, (48) and at least one other early populariser of Barth, F.W. Camfield, an English Congregationalist, (49) found the inspiration to learn German, in order to read Barth in the original, from the reading of McConnachie's article in the Hibbert Journal. (50) In reciprocal fashion, McConnachie acknowledged that he had been influenced by Camfield's work, Revelation and the Holy Spirit: An Essay in Barthian Theology, (1933), which McConnachie had originally examined when in thesis form. (51) In speaking of the Barthian theology, as expounded by Camfield, he writes, 'As this is the only theology which, in my opinion, is taking seriously at the present moment the rethinking of the doctrine of Revelation, I would bespeak for this able and scholarly volume a warm welcome from the whole Church.' (52) These comments being so, we may begin to detect a movement within McConnachie's thought, from being one whose, 'outlook was affected but who in the end withheld their whole-hearted approval', to being a theologian who could be regarded as one of the, 'out-and-out converts.' (53)

McConnachie's books, The Significance of Karl Barth, (1931), (54) and, The Barthian Theology and the Man of Today, (1933), (55) as well as a number of articles, (56) serve to emphasise this latter point, and we shall now examine how he further introduces the theology of Barth. The two books expound Barth's thought, with the former assessing the early Barth, and the latter supplementing it in terms of the impact of, K.D. I/1. With respect to, K.D. I/1, published in late 1932, (57) we note that McConnachie had read, assimilated, and written upon it by February 1933. (58)

Of the former book Barth had written:

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'I have read it attentively and I am glad to tell you that I am entirely satisfied with its contents. I acknowledge it gladly as a good and accurate introduction to the work which I am trying to do.' (59)

McConnachie opens The Significance of Karl Barth by affirming that, 'The "Barthian" movement is an attempt to recollect, what is so often forgotten, God's Revelation', (60) and that in liberal Christianity the category of Revelation has been particularly diminished. This is so in spite of the fact that, 'the school of Ritschl, and particularly W. Herrmann, emphasised the independence of Christian experience, and sought from this point to establish the character of Christianity as a Revelation.' (61) For, insofar as human experience became the key to the knowledge of God, man became the centre and measure of all things. McConnachie is well aware of Barth's dependence on Herrmann in his younger days, and notes that, as well as Herrmann's picture, 'having an honoured place on his walls', Barth, 'accepted without question.', Herrmann's, 'repeated insistence that Revelation was not doctrine', and that religious experience was the means of access to that Revelation. (62)

He then describes Barth's new perception of the category of Revelation, as worked out in his Dogmatik I. Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes, from 1927, and we see here a sympathetic and enthusiastic exposition of Barth's teaching. He commences by noting Barth's crucial concern to distinguish Religion and Revelation, and writes:

'Here Barth makes his great assertion, on which his whole teaching hinges, that the two are not one and the same. Religion is not the subjective possibility of Revelation. Religion is one thing, Revelation is quite another thing.' (63)

Further, he emphasises the once-for-allness of Christian Revelation, and that this stands in contrast to the line
of Schleiermacher and Otto for whom Religion and Revelation are correlates. Of that line he suggests:

'All this type of theology evacuates the objective content of the Christian Revelation, making Christian doctrine a product of the religious mind, and basing the Word of God on faith, instead of faith upon the Word of God. Even if it uses the word "revelation," as it does, it uses it in an entirely different sense from its use in the Scriptures.' (64)

In conclusion, McConnachie suggests that the fact of Barth's beginning on, 'the plane of Revelation', excludes, in principle, the possibility of dialogue between, 'Science and Revelation', because of the fact that they operate on wholly other planes, (65) and here McConnachie explicitly refers to Natural Science. (66) Clearly this, 'judicious interpreter', and, 'faithful populariser of Barth's work', seems to have drawn conclusions which would prohibit the dialogue between, 'Science and Revelation', such as that integral to the programme, Theological Science, initiated by Torrance.

Neither, McConnachie suggests, can Historical Science equip us with the tools to categorise Revelation, for, 'Historical science simply cannot cope with Revelation.', (67) and is ultimately irrelevant for faith, for once more the stress is on God as the active and speaking God who transcends History. He continues, in similar vein:

'There is in the Bible, he says, no static, traditional Word of God, abstracted from the acting Person of God. God is always the speaking Subject, not the object of Revelation.' (68)

McConnachie is anxious to defend Barth against the charge that his conception of Revelation, depreciates the historical aspect of Christianity and that the impact, 'of his teaching will be to empty history of content'. (69) In the face of this charge, McConnachie avers:

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To say that God revealed Himself in Jesus Christ is to say that He revealed Himself in One who entered into history, and at a definite place in history, and Who is only to be found there. It is this historical aspect which, to Barth, makes Christianity a Revelation, and not a mere myth or speculation. Revelation is History... But it is not in the Jesus of History - and not in the historical facts of Christianity - that Barth finds the Revelation of God. In so far as Jesus belongs to historical events, He is irrelevant for salvation.' (70)

It does not seem to me that McConnachie has adequately resolved the tensions implicit in Barth at this point, and to suggest that, 'Barth's mind is chiefly occupied with the "eternal moments," when this new strange world of God breaks through into the world of time', (71) serves only to exacerbate the tensions rather than to resolve them. Indeed, when he affirms of Barth that, 'He does believe in the fact of the Virgin Birth. He does believe in the fact of the Resurrection. But in so far as they are historical events, they can only be perceived as historical events. They can never be matter for faith.', (72) might it not be contended that Barth's conception of the matter is not so far removed from Herrmann's? (73)

Thereafter, McConnachie seeks to set Barth's apparent neglect of, 'Revelation in Nature', in its wider context, and suggests that in fact, 'For Barth, God is hidden also in the creation'. Similarly he contends that Barth does not deny the truth of 'natural revelation', (74) and that, 'In the theologia revelata (revealed theology) the theologia naturalis (natural theology) is comprised.' (75) In truth however, these things mean little to us, with respect to our apprehension of Revelation, since, 'Nature is not capable of revealing what is beyond all the relativity of concrete existence.' (76) Once more then, we see McConnachie seeking to defend Barth and obviate charges of neglect against him. Further, we note
with interest that Barth could be read in terms which did not preclude the inclusion of a theology of Nature, as opposed to a Natural Theology, a position which might be judged to anticipate that of T.F. Torrance. (77)

McConnachie states explicitly that his estimation of Barth has altered since that taken in his, Hibbert Journal, article, and indeed issues a general withdrawal of his earlier criticisms, (78) and we may judge, The Significance of Karl Barth, to be the first whole-hearted embracing of the Barthian position by a Scot. Equally, we note that McConnachie now clearly sees the issue of Revelation to be central to the basis of his claim that Barth stands in discontinuity with Herrmann, et al. Further, we may take note of the fact that this embracing of Barth occurs prior to the appearance of, K.D. I/1.

However, as noted, McConnachie does not seem to have sufficiently acknowledged the extent to which it could be contended that Barth's position exhibits certain similarities to that of Herrmann. Indeed, the very focus on the category of Revelation, along with the rejection of Natural Theology and of the possibility of dialogue between Theology and Natural Science, might be taken to be, not so much bold Barthian initiatives, as, natural extensions of Herrmann's position.

Of further interest to our thesis, is the fact that McConnachie can find sufficient examples of the positions Barth opposes in the work of his fellow Scottish theologians. Thus, in criticising Ritschl and Herrmann for seeking, 'to find some basis for faith in scientifically ascertained facts of our Lord's life.', (79) McConnachie may quote H.R. Mackintosh's, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, as a typical example of that approach, and suggest that Barth begins
intentionally at the opposite pole from Mackintosh in expounding his concept of Revelation. (80) Therefore, we may again note, that, in 1931, as far as McConnachie perceived it, H.R. Mackintosh was to be regarded as one indebted to Ritschl and Herrmann for his understanding of the nature of Revelation. In similar fashion, he cites John Baillie's *The Interpretation of Religion*, as, 'one of the ablest expositions of the modernist position', writing that, 'if Roman Catholic theology leaves the door ajar between man and God, modernism flings it wide open.' He concludes, 'Barth and Baillie here face each other across a gulf over which no bridge leads.' (81) Once more, he takes Baillie to be the antithesis of Barth, in respect of the notion, 'that conscience is an organ of Divine Revelation', a position which he regards as impossible for Barth. (82) McConnachie says of Barth, 'Conscience is not to him the organ of Revelation. In the voice of conscience we have a broken echo of God, as He is reflected back in the conscience of His creature, who is fallen from Him.' (83)

Therefore, we note with interest the prominent Scottish theologians arraigned by McConnachie, precisely because they were perceived, at that point in time, to stand on the other side of the discontinuity which the theology of Barth has produced.

In turning to, *The Barthian Theology*, I do not propose to detail this as fully as, *The Significance of Karl Barth*. Instead, I shall focus upon those places where he develops issues we have already highlighted. We note that this book is, quite explicitly, a coming to terms with the impact of, *K.D.I/1*. (84) It can readily be discerned from, *The Barthian Theology*, that the embracing of Barth which occurred prior to the appearance of, *K.D. I/1*, is now more deeply intensified, (85) such that we can
further, 'discern the unqualified zeal of out-and-out convert'. (86)

The first significant development which he highlights is the conflict between Barth and Brunner, with respect to our capacity to receive Revelation, as a result of which, 'the question of general revelation, and of the Imago Dei', is now very much to the fore. Of Barth he says:

'He will not allow to man...any natural capacity to take hold of God. The capacity for God is lost through sin, and the lost point of contact must be restored by grace. The point of contact is to be found not outside but inside faith.' (87)

In the light of this reality, Barth is perceived to intensify the stress on the necessity of Revelation, such that, 'It is the Revelation itself which creates in man the necessary point of contact.' (88) Further, Barth emphasises the exclusive nature of that Revelation, and McConnachie suggests, in consequence, that:

'Barth will not have the Christian Revelation treated as a species of the genus, revelation. The knowledge of God, which the Church has, does not stand or fall with the possibility of man's religious knowledge. Revelation to Barth...is an event of faith. Man does not possess it as a natural capacity, but only by faith.' (89)

McConnachie then heightens the sense in which we are to understand the exclusive nature of Revelation, when he notes that Barth, in reformulating his concept of the Word of God, as now expressed in, K.D. I/1, was, 'astonished now at what he wrote in his first edition...that the Word of God was made dependent on its reception by man', and that this shortcoming was remedied by, 'a deeper stress on the objectivity of the Word of God.' (90) Thus, for McConnachie, the place of human receptivity is made to stand in the greater, and all-consuming, light of the givenness of Revelation.
The above notwithstanding, McConnachie notes that Barth does not reject the concept of analogy, but rather seeks to re-express it, such that he may suggest that, 'While Barth rejects the analogia entis (likeness of being between God and man)...he does not deny the idea of analogy, but substitutes for it an analogia fidei (likeness through faith).' (91) Further, in rejecting the analogia entis, he wishes to guard against the suggestion that, by this, Barth, 'leaves no room for the Revelation of God in Nature and conscience when once the Divine image in man is restored by grace.' (92) He writes:

'On the contrary, he sets forth from the position that the Word of God is, first of all, the Word of God the Creator and Lord of our being. He holds that there can be no right understanding of God as Redeemer apart from the Revelation of God as Creator, just as there can be no right knowledge of God as Creator apart from the Revelation of God as Redeemer. To the image of God lost in Adam, but restored in Christ, belongs the capacity to hear the Word of God that is spoken to us, and to know it and to receive it as the Word of God.' (93)

Thus, Barth, as approbated by McConnachie, wishes to place, alongside the denial of a prior human capacity to receive the Word of God, a new emphasis upon how we do receive that which is given.

Throughout our exposition of McConnachie's earliest thoughts, and in, The Significance of Karl Barth, the central place he gives to Revelation within Barth's system is self-evident. This continues in, The Barthian Theology, such that he may write that, 'The Barthian Movement, in its origin, might be described...as an effort "to think through again the category of Revelation." It was a recognition that Revelation had become the most vital concern of the Church of our time.' (94) Further, we note the extent to which McConnachie is in sympathy with this approach, when he writes that,
'Barth has rightly perceived that the problem of Revelation constitutes the central problem for our time'. (95) What then are the consequences of this perception? McConnachie's reply to this, which most fully displays the gravity of the situation he understands the Church to face, might be found in the following. He writes:

'The recognition that this problem of Revelation has become critical for our time, and that the very future of historical Christianity depends upon it, has led Barth and those associated with him, to set themselves against the whole modernist tendency in theology, and to seek to bring the Church back what they believe to be New Testament foundations. For the New Testament places in the foreground not an approach of man to Reality, but an approach of Reality to man, in answer to his quest.' (96)

Thus, there is no sense in which we can see the New Testament reflecting, 'an evolutionary process of discovery'. Instead, the New Testament points to, 'a revolutionary Act of God upon the world'. (97) and, in the final analysis, McConnachie understands that, 'Barth proposes to put the Revelation of God in Christ into a category by itself, as describing God's approach to man in His Word.' (98) This being so, the necessity of building a philosophical basis for theology is excluded, and the possibility of seeking an apologetical dialogue with modern thought is discarded. (99)

In conclusion, let me suggest that we have now taken cognisance of the Scottish theologian who has most fully and consistently exhibited the characteristics of an, 'out-and-out convert', as Cheyne understands them. (Indeed, I would suggest that my choice of McConnachie over Cheyne's choice of G.S. Hendry, (100) in the ranks of the, 'out-and-out converts.', shall be justified precisely on the grounds of consistency. For, while Hendry most certainly displays an early, 'unqualified
zeal', we shall see that it is not maintained in the later development of his thought.)

T.F. Torrance, as we have noted, was not unaware of McConnachie, and indeed had written that, 'I was introduced to the teaching of Karl Barth through John McConnachie and Hugh Ross Mackintosh'. (This is one of the few explicit mentions of John McConnachie by Torrance. (101)) However, in the light of our expositions of McConnachie and Mackintosh, it would seem to me to be evident that, in the Scottish theological scene of the 1930's, only one of them could be understood to offer an embracing of Barth, which was also a rejection of Ritschl, et al., and that one was not Hugh Ross Mackintosh. Therefore, any attempt to stress the discontinuity between Barth and the Ritschlian line, as Torrance does, cannot turn to H.R. Mackintosh, as Torrance does, and suggest that in the Scotland of the 1930's, it was Mackintosh who decisively broke with the line of Ritschl, and turned to Barth. Mackintosh's writing on Barth, are, by comparison with McConnachie's, limited in scale, and, in the final analysis, nowhere near as definite in their conclusion.

However, let us note that even McConnachie did not unequivocally exclude the possibility of some future rapprochement between, 'the Theology of Experience', as found in, 'the line Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Herrmann.', and, 'the Theology of the Word', as found in Barth. Thus, for example, McConnachie can see in the move by Schleiermacher, 'away from the idealistic utterances of his romantic period, as found in, 'the early Schleiermacher of the Addresses', towards the position reached in his, 'ripe Glaubenslehre', a, 'return to the Christian verities', albeit that he still remains a representative of, 'the School of Religious Experience'.

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He then suggests (unfortunately without expanding the suggestion) that:

'there may later arise some hope of an understanding between the Theology of Experience and the Theology of the Word when once the differences are clearly recognised and grappled with.' (103)

For all the stress on discontinuity, the possibility of reconciliation is not excluded.

c) Donald M. Baillie (Professor of Systematic Theology, St. Andrews, 1934-1954), another former student of Herrmann, (104) writing in 1927, is a further significant Scottish thinker who was at an early stage aware of Barth. Thus, he may note Barth as a member of, 'the quite new school of theologians in Germany', alongside Brunner, Gogarten and Thurneysen', (105) as well as indicating awareness of the very first references to this, 'school', which appeared in British journals (though not by British authors). (106) Baillie's work is further noteworthy, in that he acknowledges his concept of faith, to be indebted to that of Ritschl and Herrmann, and that his general approach is very much dependent on that stream of theological thought, though as a free adaptation of themes rather than a rigid adherence to any particular position. Thus, he may write:

'throughout this book, while I have obviously learned a great deal from Herrmann and from the Ritschlian school in general, I have not made much use of the Ritschlian label, because I am not at all sure how far the positions adopted would be regarded as compatible with some of their typical, but very difficult, ideas.' (107)

Therefore, at this stage of his thought, Baillie is to be found operating within the parameters mediated by Ritschl and Herrmann, while perceiving that Barth stands in opposition to Schleiermacher and the, 'experience-theology', of which he is the, 'father'. (108) Thus, we
may observe in Baillie, albeit briefly, an awareness of
the relative discontinuity to be found between the
thought of Barth, and that of Ritschl and Herrmann. This
is most clearly evidenced elsewhere, as in the following
limerick of his composition. He writes:

'There was a young thinker called Barth
Who walked by himself quite apart.
His favourite motto
Was blast Rudolf Otto,
And Ritschl was wrong from the start.' (109)

d) J.H. Morrison, a parish minister, writing in 1932,
(110) characterises Barth's theology as, 'The Theology of
the Word', and suggests that it 'bears the impress of the
agony of the World War'. To those who suggest that this
imparts, 'a lack of sanity, balance, and philosophic
calm', Morrison suggests that, 'All great revelations
have come through blood and tears'. (111) Further, he
notes that Barth's position; that, 'Christianity is
either faith in the revelation of God or it is nothing',
arose precisely out of his attempts to engage in
preaching the Word of God, and that this response is a
timely reminder of the function of preaching which is to
allow the Word of God to speak. (112) Equally, Barth's
emphases on Divine transcendence and sovereignty are
noted, and he regards his stress on God as the 'totaliter
aliter' as, 'a wholesome and timely protest against the
modern tendency to raise man to the level of the Divine
and ignore the gulf that lies between.' This gulf is to
be crossed only from the Divine side, with Jesus Christ,
the perfect embodiment of the Word of God, summoning man
to an existential decision. This word comes in an
historic form, 'but it is not received upon historic
evidence, even the strongest. It carries its own
trustworthiness within itself'. (113)
Morrison here demonstrates, in company with McConnachie, et al., the extent to which the issues discussed were not the preserve of academics but aroused lively concern among certain groups of parish ministers. Barth has, for them, led to a, 'revivification of the reality of the Word of God', (114) and while we have no more developed expression on this matter from Morrison, we note a willingness to embrace Barth's position, including its opposition to certain prevailing theological tendencies.

e) Norman W. Porteous, (Professor of Hebrew and Oriental Languages, St. Andrews, 1931-1934, thereafter, Edinburgh, 1934-1968), writes as a former student of Barth at Munster, (Winter Semester of 1928-1929) and his article is explicitly an attempt to introduce, and explain, Barth to a wider audience, as indeed he had sought to do in a lecture at New College in 1929. Porteous may be regarded as someone well acquaint\textsuperscript{a} with the line of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Herrmann, having been introduced to it in his student days (1924-1927) by H.R. Mackintosh, at a time when the latter might be perceived to be particularly under the influence of Herrmann. (115) He suggests, in 1932, (116) that, 'Barth has done us the incalculable service of summoning us once more to the earnest consideration of the big central things of the Christian faith', while categorising Barth as a representative of the, 'Dialectical Theology'. (117) Porteous is anxious to rescue Barth from the charge that he confused and equated, 'Man as Created', and, 'Man as Sinner', though he does admit that Barth's thinking has had to move beyond the, 'early confused stage', in which they seemed so to be equated. He writes :

'(Barth) saw two things – firstly, that man the created is not the same as God the Creator; and secondly, that the relation between the Creator and the created has been disturbed by human sin, and he made the mistake of confusing these two things. But they are both true, even
though they must be distinguished from each other.' (118)

He continues:

'Barth maintains, not that the human mind has become completely incapacitated for all apprehension of the divine will, from all understanding of the divine nature, but that it has through sin become an untrustworthy guide.' (119)

Porteous regards this issue as having a crucial bearing upon the future of, 'dialectic theology', and writes:

'It is perhaps worthy of mention that, in a letter to the writer, Barth gave it as his opinion that it was in their attitude to this question of the limits of natural theology that the differences between the various representatives of the school of dialectic theology would become most apparent.' (120)

Barth's pessimism as to human nature, is regarded by Porteous as, 'the verdict passed by God and made known through revelation'. In that Revelation there is no general conception which lies behind Jesus, 'regarding Him as a symbol for general ideas', and in his discussion on the possibility of, 'forgiveness', he writes:

'The real Word of God is not the general statement that God forgives and judges sinners, but that God forgives and judges me, and that is a thing that I can only know when the transaction takes place between God and myself'. (121)

Thus, it is only in relation to a particular and actual response to the Word of God, that we have the possibility of speaking of that Word as a Revelation to us.

Therefore, Porteous points to the crucial questions which he believes are raised by Barth, that is, the extent to which knowledge of God may be known outwith the revelatory event of Jesus Christ, and the human capacity for the reception of Revelation. Equally, his view of
Barth seems to be one which regards him primarily as a representative of, 'the school of dialectical theology', to the neglect of other developments in his thought. Further, we note that he does not draw any particular contrast between Barth and his theological predecessors, and, given this absence, we may regard Porteous as an interested observer, whose future academic career led him in other directions.

f) William P. Paterson; (Professor of Divinity, Edinburgh, 1903-1934) who had studied in, Leipzig, Erlangen, and Berlin, may be regarded as considerably indebted to the theology of, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Kaftan, Herrmann, Troeltsch, and Harnack. In particular, his theology exhibits considerable affinity with that of Adolf von Harnack, with its emphases on the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. (122) He would thus seem to be in an excellent position to observe the relationship of that line, to the theology of Barth. He notes, in 1932, (123) that, 'the Barthian school, which in the recent period has agitated German Protestantism', is to be characterised as, 'dialectical theology', and, 'the theology of crisis'. (124) As to the content of Barth's position, Paterson notes that his purpose is, 'to begin, continue and end with utter reliance on God.' (125) This he portrays as being in opposition to the typical starting point of modern theology, namely man. Paterson continues:

'It may be said that a chief intention of the Barthian school was to protest against modern conceptions of the Christian religion which have altered it and even transformed it, and to revert to the deeper and richer interpretation which was embodied in the traditional theology of the Reformed Churches. The doctrine of the sovereignty of God, which has been recognised as the material principle of the Calvinistic system, is equally central in the Barthian theology.' (126)
Thus, Paterson is clear that, for Barth, to know, 'God is Lord', is to know the, 'meaning and purpose of revelation', and that this Lordship is to be found in the revelation of God as the Triune God. (127) He is also clear that this material principle cannot be separated from the formal principle, so that there can be no valid attempt to formulate a notion of, 'the essence of Christianity', prior to a consideration of the, 'authentic Word of God'. (128) Paterson notes also, the three-fold form in which the Word is given, namely, 'the original revelation, the Bible, and the preaching and teaching of the Christian Church.' Equally, he stresses that, for Barth, Scripture is not, in itself, the Word of God. Rather it is, 'the authoritative witness to the primal revelation'. (129) Further, he recalls the suggestion of Barth, that, 'A mechanical revelation would in truth be no revelation at all.' (130) In summing Barth up, Paterson stresses that his work is that of a Reformed and a Calvinistic theologian, suggesting that:

'It may be described as Neo-Calvinism - a modified Calvinism because of a modernist strain, but also a true Calvinism because of its reassertion of the sovereignty of God'. (131)

Further, he sees Barth's theology as an exhortation to return to God, 'and to take revelation still more seriously as the very word of God.' (132)

Therefore, we may suggest that Paterson can be regarded as having clearly perceived the initial significance of Barth, and his opposition to the prevailing theology of the day. Curiously, McConnachie regards Paterson's response to be a negative one. (133) However, it seems, in my judgement, to be marked by a cautiously positive acceptance of the challenge which Barth throws out, 'to take revelation...more seriously'.

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Alongside the above evidence, we do have certain other insights into Paterson's perception of events at this time. He writes as one well acquainted with the tradition of German theology, yet it would seem that this very familiarity led to him enduring considerable disillusionment with that tradition in the aftermath of the First World War, during which he had lost two of his sons. (134) The editor of his diaries suggests:

'In short, his gospel had failed its generation. The duty to fight merely heightened the sense of failure of Christian nations at war against each other. So his theologising all but ground to a halt - unable to come to terms with the "Barthian" onslaught, unwilling to let go the good he knew existed in what he held'. (135)

Thus, Paterson, most poignantly, seems on one level, to be prepared to offer a broad welcome to Barth, while, on another level, he also exhibits the insecurity of one whose profound allegiance to the theological line which Barth opposes, renders him unwilling, or unable, to let go of that line.

g) R.W. Stewart, a parish minister, writes in 1934, (136) as the revision editor of the English translation of Herrmann's, Communion with God, whose words he recalls, 'were to me...an inspiration, and whose influence has been so wide and deep in this country as well as in Germany.' (137) This being so, we should not be surprised to find his response focussing particularly on Barth's, 'theory of revelation.' (138) In a remarkable assessment of Barth in the light of quantum physics, Stewart finds marked parallels between Barth and this, then novel, scientific discovery. He writes, with reference to the mathematical figures conjured up in Barth's, The Epistle to the Romans, that:

'Revelation, it asserts, must not be described as education, or the growth or stimulation of the moral
sense or religious perception. It consists in flashes. It constitutes events. It offers no material for informing us about its source or its occasion. It just occurs as mysteriously as the disintegration of a radium atom.' (139)

He continues:

'If, however, we cease to regard the revelation in Christ as part of the flow of life in time, and conceive it instead as a series of moments in which time is intersected by eternity, and if we reflect that these two cardinal events, the conception and the resurrection, must have been physically, like the liberation of a quantum, instantaneous, then the speculative solution can be expressed in a diagram as neat as any differential equation in modern physics.' (140)

Stewart regards this as a most unsatisfactory approach to understanding; 1) the life of Jesus, and, 2) the nature of Scripture, with respect to their revelatory significance. He does so because in both cases there is denied the possibility of continuity. Thus, he suggests that to view, 'the life of Jesus', as a, 'discontinuous series of events', 'is opposed not only to the ordinary sense of what life means, but particularly all such descriptions of His life as He gave Himself when He spoke of "The Father abiding in Me."' In like fashion he believes that this understanding denies to Scripture any sense of, 'growth or evolution'. (141) He sums up thus:

'The quantum theology which thus finds an essential discontinuity in revelation, which atomises the Word of God alike in the Person of Christ and in Scripture, imposes the same scheme upon ethics'. (142)

This, 'quantum theology', he clearly regards as wholly unsatisfactory, and elsewhere may write in scathing terms of the, 'quantum theologians', whose stress, 'on the transcendent aspect of miracle...leave(s) in personal life and in history only the illusory degree of reality which attaches to a Mickey Mouse film.' (143)

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We may wonder at the aptness of Stewart’s scientific parallels, but we note the interest shown by Gunter Howe and other physicists at Göttingen, in their attempt to enter into a dialogue between the theology of Barth and quantum physics. T.F. Torrance notes appreciatively Howe’s work, and regards it as pointing to a fruitful possibility within Barth’s thought, though one, we may suggest, which Barth never availed himself of! (144)

Therefore, we may observe a powerful reaction against Barth from one committed to the line of Ritschl, et al., albeit that the grounds of his rejection are unusual. Further, we note that it is Stewart who offers, in 1947, an unashamedly Ritschlian understanding of Jesus in, An Introduction to Jesus for the Twentieth Century. (145)

h) Daniel Lamont, (Professor of Christian Ethics and Practical Theology, Edinburgh, 1927-1945) writes, in 1935, (146) of the various revolutions in thought which were then taking place in the spheres of Science, Philosophy, Ethics and Theology, and concludes:

'We are thus in the midst of a revolution in every domain of knowledge. It is in each case a revolution at the foundations.' (147)

In speaking of the theological revolution, Lamont believes that it is the thought of Karl Barth which has initiated that revolution. He writes:

'The significance of Karl Barth in modern thought is that he has reversed the direction in which theology was moving when he found it. There is much in his theological system that is open to criticism, but that is another matter. He has done the biggest thing that a theologian has done since Luther and Calvin. Taking up the line of the prophetic Kierkegaard and the deep-seeing Dostoievsky, he has brought back into the light what should never have been allowed to slip into the shade, that God is neither an object among objects nor a subject.
among subjects, but the subject of subjects.' (148)

The significance of this revolution is seen, by way of contrast with the approach to theology which characterises Schleiermacher and those after him, namely that, 'Theology since Schleiermacher has tended increasingly to discuss God as a Being over against whom one could legitimately stand as a dispassionate observer.' (149) Thus, Lamont credits Barth with attempting to deliver theology from the tendency to treat God as an object among other objects. He does not see the Barthian revolution as having, 'yet conquered theology, but it is safe to say that it must do so if theology is to emerge again into influence among men.' (150)

Lamont further notes that Barth rightly stresses, with the Reformers, the incognito of Jesus, such that, 'the Deus revelatus, the revealed God, was at the same time the Deus absconditus, the hidden God.' (151) He concludes, by suggesting that this incognito is central to the concept of Revelation, that is, it is concealed, 'until the faith which appropriates it is evoked.' (152)

Therefore, Lamont can be seen as extending considerable credit to Barth, and as one who welcomes the theological revolution his work initiates. The revolutionary nature of his thought places him, for Lamont, in sharp opposition to the line of Schleiermacher, et al.

affirms that one of Barth's principal contributions is that he has protested in favour of allowing God to speak of Himself, for indeed it is only God who can speak of Himself. He writes:

'It is one of the great services of the Barthian movement to our generation that it keeps up an energetic protest against what it regards as a quite arrogant tendency to push systems and definitions into that ultimate region where God alone can speak.' (154)

Further, Stewart notes that the, 'supreme service' of 'the Barthian movement', whatever its weaknesses, is that it rescues religious thought from the, 'subjectivism', which he sees as rife. (155) Thus, we have been able to recover the God who reveals Himself, and in consequence to hear that God. In commenting upon the Pauline text, 'It pleased God to reveal His Son in me', (Gal. 1 v.15), Stewart writes, in Barthian style, that:

'No horizontal line of cause and effect could explain it: it had come vertically from above. The living God, unsearchable in His sovereign freedom, inscrutable in His absolute wisdom, had there and then interposed.' (156)

Stewart again invokes the name of Barth, as one who has been concerned to allow God to speak to this age, and who refuses to relegate Paul to merely antiquarian interest. As to one particular weakness within Barth's thought, Stewart suggests that while his stress on, 'the wholly Other', is correct, it is a one-sided emphasis, which shall require to be better balanced. (157)

Therefore, we may see Stewart as a limited, but appreciative, recipient of Barth, with an awareness of the characteristic emphases of the, The Epistle to the Romans, and with a sense that what Barth proposes is radically different from currently accepted views. (Stewart takes a noted English theologian W.R. Matthews
to be typical of these current views, and assails him in the basis of this fact. (158) As we shall see, G.S. Hendry shall treat Matthews likewise.)

j) G.T. Thomson (Professor of Systematic Theology, Edinburgh, 1937-52) was, of course, responsible for the 1936 translation of Barth's C.D. I/1, and, I would suggest that no understanding of the reception of Barth in Scotland is possible without a recognition of the impact of this translation. It seems evident that Thomson had already translated the 1927 Dogmatics, and had then to contend with the vastly expanded form of the revised edition, (159) but nonetheless offers the opinion of the German original of, C.D. I/1, that it:

'is undoubtedly the greatest treatise on the Trinity since the Reformation...I have read nothing like it except Martin Luther and John Calvin...Karl Barth has meant much to myself spiritually, and I consider his work to be a vital and much-needed challenge to all theology, as well as to that of our own Reformed Church and his.' (160)

k) David S. Cairns, (Professor of Dogmatics and Apologetics, Aberdeen, 1907-1937) writing in 1937, (161) specifically directs attention to Barth's understanding of Revelation, and, in consequence, the knowledge of God which can be apprehended through Natural Theology. Cairns notes that Barth limits Revelation solely to, 'the Word of God in the Scriptures', (a rather simplistic summary of Barth's position) but specifically identifies this as a polemical device, directed against the elevation, 'of "blood and soil" as media of divine revelation in the post-war period', in Germany. This he believes is a distortion of the true nature of Revelation, for Cairns believes Christian revelation to involve 'corroboration', that is, we would not know that there was a Revelation,
if there was not something already in our experience to allow us to comprehend it. (162)

Cairns believes that Barth, on the issue of Natural Theology, is quite incomprehensible apart from an understanding of the situation in the Germany of that time, in which a, 'racial mysticism' has been generated, and where a peculiar form of Natural Theology has arisen. This is a form, he suggests:

'which believes that it finds a true revelation of God in the national genius and history of the Germanic races, and which seeks to accommodate the revelation of God in Christ to this other revelation.' (163)

Cairns suggests that it is the extremity of Barth's opposition which has split the, 'Dialectical theologians', and specifically separated Barth from Brunner. He sums up Barth's position thus:

'Barth repudiates altogether every form of "natural theology," holding that sin has destroyed the image of God in man, and so prevented man from gaining any real knowledge of God either from His works in Nature, or His voice in conscience. Nor can there be any real knowledge of God apart from the Bible revelation in any human being. The saints and prophets of heathendom, Socrates, Gautama, Plato, were unvisited by Him or His message. Nor can the true missionary recognise any real point of contact in the noblest representative of heathen religion to whom he comes. As there is in such a man no real knowledge of God there can be no real point of contact.' (164)

Cairns, while not unsympathetic to the political and moral pressures which have forced Barth to this position, regards that position as Scripturally untenable, and ends with a series of questions to Barth:

'Can any true and final revelation be recognised as such that does not corroborate something that is there before? Can there be revelation that is not corroboration? If we have no glimmerings within us of the knowledge of God, how can we recognise His Son as the
fulness of His glory? Can the Divine Image in man really be destroyed without the destruction of the essential personality?' (165)

Cairns, who had in his time offered, 'hero-worship', to Herrmann at Marburg, and who saw the theological world of his younger day as dominated by Ritschl, (166) is clearly not in sympathy with the Barthian position, and it is Cairns whom A.C. Cheyne regards as being, 'The most attractive exemplar of...those who were only superficially influenced and therefore continued the liberal tradition without much change'. (167)

1) George S. Hendry's book, God the Creator, (1937) as noted, may be regarded as the first self-consciously 'Barthian' work on an aspect of theology to emerge from a Scottish pen. (McConnachie's books, I take to be primarily expositions of Barth's thought.) In particular, it is of interest because of the way in which he engages with W.R. Matthews', God in Christian Thought and Experience. (168) Matthews was the Joint General Editor of an influential series, "The Library of Constructive Theology", which spoke for the British 'school' which stressed the primacy of 'religious experience'. (H.R. Mackintosh contributed to this series, the book, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness. (169)) Matthews, et al., sought to consciously reconstruct theology on the basis of religious experience, and Hendry challenges Matthews (as J.S. Stewart had done (170)) as to whether or not this is an appropriate basis, working himself from a 'Barthian' understanding of Revelation.

Hendry suggests that modern English theology rests on the, 'conviction of the value of the religious consciousness and the reality of its data', (171) and contends that:

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'Modern theology in the Anglo-Saxon world...is consciously resolved to carry on the great tradition of "adjustment". Its programme has been set forth with admirable candour and lucidity in the "General Introduction" to the volumes in the series entitled "The Library of Constructive Theology".' (172)

Further, he highlights the basis of this theology, by quoting from the "General Introduction". This states, in speaking of the contributors to this series, that:

'They desire to lay stress upon the value and validity of religious experience and to develop their theology on the basis of the religious consciousness. In so doing so they claim to be in harmony with modern thought.' (173)

Hendry notes that, 'It is Schleiermacher who pointed the way', for this approach, and in so doing effected a, 'Copernican revolution', such that, 'religious consciousness is treated, not only as the starting point, but also as the source and the norm of theological knowledge.' (174) Equally, the concept of revelation with which they operate, 'first found classical expression in Schleiermacher's Reden, and it has become the generally prevailing view.' (175) As Hendry views it:

'the concept of revelation has come to be generally employed with a meaning which is quite spurious. It has ceased to be an act of divine disclosure and it has become an act of human perception, a category of thought, or a method of apprehension....(it) is predominantly intellectualistic or aesthetic; it belongs to the world of idealism and romanticism. The content of this revelation is not the foundation of man's life, but the final element required for a complete and co-ordinated view of reality or the key to a satisfying aesthetic appreciation of it.' (176)

Once more, Hendry explicitly likens this view to that of W.R. Matthews, and replies, 'This view is completely at variance with the Christian understanding of revelation.' (177) He continues in characteristically Barthian terms:

'In Christian faith revelation bears its strict and
essential meaning, a drawing back of the veil to disclose something which could not otherwise be known at all. It is not a category or a mode of viewing reality, but an event, single, unique, once for all. It is not a mere opening of men's eyes to see what was there all the time, but a literal self-disclosure of God; it is not an activity of man, but a real movement on the part of God...(it) is opposed to every conception of it which postulates a continuity between God and man. It is no mere extension of nature, no high-point of the evolutionary process. To the whole known realm of thought and history it stands in the relation of sheer discontinuity...This discontinuity between God and the world, which Christian faith affirms, is implied by the nature - or rather the fact of revelation itself...The discontinuity is a presupposition given in revelation itself.' (178)

Thus, for Hendry, there is no possibility of a natural theology, (and here he attacks the subtle natural theology, of A.E. Taylor's, The Faith of a Moralist, (179) to which author and book, T.F. Torrance notes his indebtedness in, Theological Science. (180)) and he may write that, 'The theology of revelation is "in real contradiction" with the conclusions of all natural theology', (181) while rejecting the possibility of any analogy between the World of our experience and God. Further, he attacks Matthews', 'analogy of artistic "creation"', as being opposed to the notion of, 'Creatio per verbum'. (182)

Thus, Hendry may be seen as dependent on Barth's thought, such that in the, "Preface to the Fifth Edition", of, God in Christian Thought and Experience, (183) Matthews launches a forceful attack on Hendry and Barth. He notes that these comments, 'from the standpoint of a follower of Dr. Karl Barth...almost compel,' a response, (184) and writes:

'Mr. George S. Hendry's recent book, God the Creator, almost challenges some kind of answer, however inadequate, for he has singled out the "Library of Constructive Theology" in general, and my volume in
particular, as examples of a method which he condemns in the names of Barth and Luther...In reply to this I must say that it is probably true that my conception of the nature of revelation is different from that of Dr. Karl Barth or Mr. Hendry. I cannot be sure of this because I have not been able to discover what the Barthians mean by revelation or how they suppose it to be authenticated.' (185)

Matthews' reply directly raises the question of the nature of Revelation and the knowledge of God, and he sees himself responding to Barth, through Hendry. He then asks a series of questions, which seem to him to be at the very heart of the matter, and, which he believes he offers an answer to. The questions are as follows:

'Do they assert that revelation is wholly absent from all religions except Christianity? Do they hold that revelation can be given in some other way than through the religious consciousness, and, if so, in what other way? Do they believe that revelation needs no recognition on the part of man? Can God be conceived as making Himself known to men unless there is something in man, some affinity, which can respond to the approach of God?' (186)

In this dialogue between Hendry and Matthews, we see that, for Hendry, there has taken place in Barth a theological Copernican Revolution, the result of which means that the very basis of our understanding of Revelation must be thoroughly reconceived, and the previous basis departed from completely. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the questions raised by W.R. Matthews are still pertinent, and that the 'Barthian' theology of Hendry is, at this stage, immature in its expression, reflecting perhaps the first flush of theological enthusiasm and new insight, but, as we should note, not an enthusiasm which was to stand the test of time. (187)

m) E.P. Dickie, (Professor of Divinity, St. Andrews, 1935-1967) writing in 1938, warmly commends, what he terms, 'the Theology of Crisis', for the way in which it,
'rejects the idea of an autonomous human reason which is able of itself to apprehend the Divine.', and notes that Barth, in line with this stance, disavows any claim that there can be an explicitly philosophical foundation as the basis for our apprehension. (188) Thus, for Barth, 'intellect along with feeling, conscience, will - are alike to be disregarded as possible "anthropological centres" at which experience of the Word of God becomes possible.' (189) The above notwithstanding, we may regard Dickie's characterisation of Barth's position in 1938 as, 'the Theology of Crisis', to be somewhat anachronistic, especially given that he himself is explicitly reliant on, C.D. I/1, and regards this work as an advance on Barth's earlier position. (190)

However, while there is a commendation of Barth, it is by no means unequivocal, for however much Barth's point is, 'well said', 'it is not always guarded against dangers of misinterpretation.' (191) He then suggests that Barth's treatment of the concept of analogy, even where following the points at which Scripture provides analogies, is confused, and finally loses the meaning which the Scriptural analogy is meant to carry. This is not to say that Barth has wholly misconstrued the issue, rather that, in trying to avoid, the, 'very real menace.', of, 'Anthropomorphism', he has come to the false conclusion, 'that all anthropomorphic thought is deceptive.' (192) In opposition to this, Dickie contends that:

'We are men and therefore must think in terms belonging to men...The real choice is between worthy and unworthy anthropomorphism.' (193)

Dickie then attempts to develop, albeit briefly, a response to Barth, which is, at the same time, rooted in the premise of Barth's position. He writes:

'Barth would acknowledge that the Word of God, made
known, not to man in general, but concretely to this man or that, is clear, luminous, and sufficient. It ought to follow, I take it, that, since the nature of God is of a piece, every Word of God "for me" is an index of the Word in general. It is communicable. It has intellectual content. Idea is in it, though idea is not all of it. Man's reason, directed and illuminated, not only may but must work on it.' (194)

Thus, as Dickie understands the issue, there will arise in our experience, 'adumbrations, suggestions, or symbols, at first sight purely human', which will prove to be, 'the medium of the Word of God.', (195) such that he can affirm that, 'the imago dei is not obliterated.' (196) Further, Dickie maintains that there, 'is in man a capacity...not to find his way to God or to achieve his own salvation, but to respond to the revelation of God'. (197) In so maintaining, Dickie seeks to challenge Barth's thinking at a point which he believes that, if his line of thought were pursued, the result would be an enervating, 'Irrationalism'. (198) He writes:

'There is a danger of so construing human nature as to make it difficult to understand how an intelligible Word of God can come to creatures who are wholly different from God; how God can reveal Himself where there is no kinship between Himself and the recipient of His revelation.' (199)

Indeed, Dickie regards the extremity of Barth's stress on the, 'transcendent God', to place in danger the very possibility of speech about God. (200) For, if we so negate the human side of the God-Man relationship, and proclaim that, 'Man is nothing; God is all.', (as Dickie understands Barth to do) then there emerges:

'The difficulty inherent in the Barthian theology...(that is) that you cannot destroy one side without destroying the whole relation. Between the All-real and the not-real there cannot even be distance!' (201)

Therefore, although for Barth, 'his absolute, is
revelation', Dickie maintains that this statement of his position, 'is hampered by the fact that it is not easy to know when it is revelation.', (202) for we have no point of contact within our range of experience which will allow us to know that we are in relationship with God, and, thus, to know that we are the recipients of revelation. (203) Thus, Dickie may be seen as one open to the corrective which Barth brings, but not finally willing to embrace his overall position. Equally, for Dickie, the question of our knowledge of God remains to be resolved within the court of human experience.

iv) Conclusion

I trust that it will be evident from our discussion that the nature of Revelation was very much an issue to the fore when Scottish theologians sought to assess the impact of the theology of Karl Barth. Indeed, this issue might be regarded as a filter through which perceptions of Barth were formed. Thus, it would seem to me to be the case that a focus upon this issue, in respect of H.R. Mackintosh and T.F. Torrance, was neither, inappropriate, nor, distorting of an accurate perspective on the reception of Barth in Scotland.

Further, I would also take it to be evident that an awareness of the question of Continuity/Discontinuity was integral to many of the responses made to the thought of Barth. Thus, writers such as McConnachie, Lamont, Morrison, J.S. Stewart, Thomson, and Hendry, and Paterson, (though for different reasons) may be regarded as those who see Barth's theology as standing in discontinuity with that which preceded it, and see that as being to the detriment of the latter. Equally, and by way of contrast, R.W. Stewart, and, Cairns, while
agreeing that there is discontinuity between Barth's theology and that which preceded it, are very much of the mind that this is to the detriment of Barth. Meanwhile, D.M. Baillie, and, Dickie (again agreeing on the question of discontinuity) may be taken to offer a split judgement, stressing the positive aspects of Barth's thought, though, in the final analysis, seeing this overshadowed by the negative. What would seem to me to be obvious from this survey is that no-one sees Barth's thought as standing in continuity with that of his theological predecessors, and, given the perspective on H.R. Mackintosh's thought which I have sought to offer, this is surely of considerable significance. Thus, if I have presented an accurate picture of the Scottish theological situation in the early years of the reception of Barth, it would seem (with reference to Chapter 1) that only John Baillie and H.R. Mackintosh have offered a perspective on Barth which could be deemed to support the suggestion that Barth's theology was in substantial continuity with that of Ritschl, et. al. Alongside this, it might fairly be said that Baillie's final perspective on Barth (as posthumously offered in 1962, in, The Sense of the Presence of God (204)) is that he offers a deficient understanding of the nature of Revelation. Therefore, it would seem (admittedly from limited evidence, though the same limited evidence from which the counter-claim is made) that only H.R. Mackintosh may finally be held to champion of the view that the line Ritschl-Herrmann-Barth offers evidence of substantial continuity in terms of their understanding of the nature of Revelation, and the conceptual form in which it was presented. Equally, he holds that this line offers a sufficient understanding of the nature of Revelation.

Does this mean that H.R. Mackintosh's perspective on Barth is virtually unique, within the Scottish context in
the period covered? In short, Yes. (Though, Mackintosh's view, as I have suggested in Chapter 1, is by no means unique in a wider context.) While one hesitates to make such a claim, (on the grounds that it would seem to offer a tautological justification for the thesis) I would not be the first to suggest that Mackintosh had maintained a distinctive, and indeed unique, perspective on Barth. Thus, we may recall R.H. Roberts' suggestion that, in relation to the reception of Barth's, Römerbrief, Mackintosh resisted attempts to 'normalise' the teaching of Barth, and to present it in a form more immediately accessible to then contemporary thought. His words are worth recollecting again, when he writes:

'H.R. Mackintosh, however, resisted this tendency either to drain away or to apologise for the extremity perceived in Barth's teaching. With characteristically judicious learning and caution he situated it in a wider context putting a different interpretation upon Barth's most famous book, the commentary on Romans...Mackintosh was able to circumvent questions as the validity of Barth's views in relation to the norms of tradition and formulate an agnostic and provisional judgement'. (205)

Roberts does not go on to offer any perspective on Mackintosh's reception of the later Barth, as in, C.D. I/1. However, generally speaking, we may note that he is very clear that Mackintosh was not afraid to hold to a position which fell outwith the general conventions and canons of interpretation. This being so, we need not feel quite so hesitant in affirming the distinctive, and unique, nature of H.R. Mackintosh's perception on the thought of Karl Barth, nor be unduly concerned that it is not aligned to, then prevailing, or, currently prevailing, norms of interpretation. H.R. Mackintosh must be seen in, and for, his own self, and not retrospectively presented as the precursor of anyone else, or, of any particular view.

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1 H.R. Mackintosh, "Recent Foreign Theology", in, ExT 35 (1924), 317-318.


3 R.H. Roberts, Op. Cit., 106. Here he gives his estimation of, 'E.C. Hoskyns' translation of the second Romerbrief in 1933', judging it to be, 'probably as regards British theology the single most important theological act of cultural translation in the first half of the twentieth century'.

4 Karl Barth, God in Action (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1936). See, T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, 83ff. R.A. Muller, "The Barth Legacy: New Athanasius or Origen Redivivus? A Response to T.F Torrance", The Thomist 54 (1990), 673-704, esp. 674ff., suggests, as noted already, that Torrance lifts the basic argument from Barth's, God in Action, and uses it as the core of his interpretation of Barth.


7 E. Busch, Karl Barth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 279-280. See also, G.D. Henderson (ed.), Scots Confession, 1560 and Negative Confession, 1581 (Edinburgh: Church of Scotland, 1937), where he notes that, 'When Dr Karl Barth this year commenced his Aberdeen Gifford Lectures, the difficulty of obtaining any convenient copy of the Scots Confession was keenly felt.' (5) See also, R. Swanton, "Scottish Theology and Karl Barth", in, RTR 33 (1974), 17-25.


15 Ibid., 281.


17 Ibid., 96 n.2

18 S.W. Sykes, "The Study of Barth", 3.

19 Ibid., 6.

20 Ibid., 6.

21 Ibid., 7.


23 Idem, Contemporary Continental Theology (London: SCM, 1938), 211.


26 Ibid., 340.


31 A.C. Cheyne, Op. Cit., 207-208. Cheyne identifies John Baillie as one of, 'those whose entire outlook was affected but who in the end withheld their whole-hearted approval', (Ibid., 209-212) while H.R. Mackintosh is identified as one of, 'those who may be described as real if cautious admirers'. (Ibid., 212-214)

32 K. Barth, Theology and Church, 112.

33 Ibid., 112-135.


37 Ibid., 388.

38 Ibid., 389.

39 Ibid., 391.

40 Ibid., 391.

41 Ibid., 395.

42 Ibid., 399-400.

43 Ibid., 400.


48 T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, 83.


51 Ibid., vii-viii.

52 Ibid., viii.


57 E. Busch, Karl Barth, 212.
59 Ibid., 9.
60 Idem, The Significance of Karl Barth, 10.
61 Ibid., 15.
62 Ibid., 19-20.
63 Ibid., 67.
64 Ibid., 69.
65 Ibid., 92.
66 Ibid., 90-92.
67 Ibid., 113.
68 Ibid., 115.
69 Ibid., 276.
70 Ibid., 276-277.
71 Ibid., 277.
72 Ibid., 112.
73 W. Herrmann, Systematic Theology, 125-127.
75 Ibid., 280.
76 Ibid., 280.
77 See, for example, J. Polkinghorne, Science and Creation (London: SPCK, 1988), 13-15. He writes:

'Torrance emphatically rejects this idea that natural theology is just a prior preparation for revealed theology, a warming-up exercise before the real action starts. Rather it is an integral part of the whole theological endeavour...He calls natural theology the "epistemological "geometry"" of revealed theology. In that somewhat curious phrase he has in mind the analogy of the integration of geometry and mechanics which Einstein's General Theory of Relativity brought about.' (14)

Thus, Polkinghorne suggests, by analogy with Einstein's integration of, 'Space and matter, geometry and physics', -224-
(as Torrance understands it), 'It is Torrance's contention that the same is true of natural and revealed theology.' (Ibid., 14-15)

Further, we may observe what Polkinghorne takes to be Torrance's position, from the following passage he cites, taken from, T.F. Torrance, Reality and Scientific Theology (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985), 40. It runs thus:

'If we reject a deistic disjunction between God and the world, which we are bound to do, natural theology cannot be pursued in its traditional abstractive form, as a prior conceptual system on its own, but must be brought within the body of positive theology and be pursued in indissoluble unity with it. No longer extrinsic but intrinsic to the knowledge of God, it will function as a necessary infra-structure of theological science.' (Ibid., 14)

79 Ibid., 120.
80 Ibid., 122.
81 Ibid., 144.
82 Ibid., 212.
83 Ibid., 213.
84 Idem, The Barthian Theology, 40.
85 Ibid., Ch. II, 38-58.
88 Ibid., 46.
89 Ibid., 46.
90 Ibid., 47.
91 Ibid., 46.
92 Ibid., 70.
93 Ibid., 70.
94 Ibid., 210.
95 Ibid., 210.
96 Ibid., 212.
97 Ibid., 212.
98 Ibid., 213.
99 Ibid., 214-216.

101 T.F. Torrance, Op. Cit., 83. There are references to McConnachie, in, Idem, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology 1910-1931, at, 17, and, 140, but they are hardly indicative, in themselves, of significant influence. However, an indication of influence can be found in, Idem, Calvin's Doctrine of Man (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949). Here Torrance credits, 'the Rev. Dr. John McConnachie, of Dundee', with encouraging him to prepare the material which resulted in the aforementioned book. (Ibid., 7) This book, as Torrance was to claim, in, Idem, "My Interaction with Karl Barth", in, D.M. McKim, (ed.) How Karl Barth changed my Mind (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1986), 52-64, was his attempt, 'to cut through the tangled debate between Barth and Brunner on the relation between grace and nature, for in their appeals to Calvin they appeared to be shooting past each other.' (Ibid., 57) Thus, we have some limited indication of influence from this source. Further, we may note the editorial comment, by T.F. Torrance and J.K.S Reid, in the Scottish Journal of Theology 1 (1948) following McConnachie's death, that his, 'encouragement and counsel did much to bring this Journal into being.' (Ibid., 336)

103 Ibid., 252.

'During his theological course Donald spent two long semesters at German Universities, one at Marburg under Wilhelm Herrmann and Adolf Julicher, the other... in Heidelberg under Ernst Troeltsch and Johannes Weiss. Of these scholars and thinkers it was Herrmann who impressed him most. He used to say in later life that Herrmann's Communion with God was almost a second Bible to him in those days'. (Ibid., 24)


107 Ibid., 251 n.2.

108 Ibid., 135.


111 Ibid., 314.

112 Ibid., 315.

113 Ibid., 316.


115 I am indebted to Prof. Porteous for supplying the above information in a letter to myself, dated, 23rd May, 1992.


117 Ibid., 342.

118 Ibid., 342.

119 Ibid., 343.

120 Ibid., 343.

121 Ibid., 343.


124 Ibid., 401-402.

125 Ibid., 402.

126 Ibid., 405-406.

127 Ibid., 406.

128 Ibid., 404-405.

129 Ibid., 402-403.

130 Ibid., 404.

131 Ibid., 402.

132 Ibid., 407.

133 J. McConnachie, "The Barthian Theology in Great Britain", 304.


135 Ibid., 283. See also, Idem, In the Day of the Ordeal (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1917). This volume of Sermons reflects the tensions of the First World War, and is dedicated to the memory of his sons who were killed during it.


137 Idem, "Reviser's Note", in, W. Herrmann, Communion with God, v.


139 Ibid., 451.

140 Ibid., 452.

141 Ibid., 452.

142 Ibid., 453.

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147 Ibid., 11.
148 Ibid., 10.
149 Ibid., 11.
150 Ibid., 10.
151 Ibid., 288.
152 Ibid., 287.


154 Ibid., 4.
155 Ibid., 123.
156 Ibid., 124.
157 Ibid., 88, and, 149.
158 Ibid., 123-124.

160 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics : The Doctrine of the Word of God, v.


162 Ibid., 180-181.

163 Ibid., 364.

164 Ibid., 365.

165 Ibid., 366.


In this autobiographical work, Cairns makes it clear that, whatever his reservations about, and rejection of, Barth, he is aware of the fact that, in some sense, Barth was a variation in the line of Ritschl, albeit that it was a deviant variant. He writes:

'And so the Ritschlians in time dissolved, or rather the movement failed to hold more than a generation or so. Many of the epigoni went over to what was, I think, indistinguishable from humanitarian Unitarianism, while others like Barth reverted to Luther and Calvin and the older creeds.' (Ibid., 135)


172 Ibid., 9.


175 Ibid., 17.

176 Ibid., 16-17, and, 19.

177 Ibid., 18.

178 Ibid., 18, 20, and, 21.


180 T.F. Torrance, Theological Science, viii, and, passim. The index contains fourteen references to A.E. Taylor.


182 Ibid., 26-27, and, 179.


184 Ibid., xi.

185 Ibid., xi.

186 Ibid., xiii.

187 Hendry provides us with a curiously instructive example, (albeit after he had left he Scottish scene, to become Professor of Systematic Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, NJ) of a 'fallen' Barthian, who having once radically embraced Barth, then turns his back upon him. In 1947, (in, "The Rediscovery of the Bible", in, F.W. Camfield, (ed.) Reformation Old and New (London : Lutterworth Press, 1947), 142-156) and, 1948, (in, "The Exposition of Holy Scripture", in, SJTh 1 (1948), 29-47) Hendry may be seen as operating within Barthian parameters. However, by 1957, in, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, (London : SCM, 1957) we see him entering a phase of critical engagement with Barth, where, to take but one example, he may suggest that in his interpretation of the 'filioque', the Spirit, due to an excessively Christological interpretation thereof, has become indistinguishable from the Son. (51-52) He writes:  

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'Barth is obliged to evacuate the concept of the Spirit of one of the principal elements which belongs to it in the New Testament, viz., the element of subjectivization...Spirit here signifies a movement which proceeds strictly and exclusively from God to man; it has nothing whatsoever to do with man's subjectivity...The external operations of the Trinity are not only undivided - they have become indistinguishable.' (Ibid., 51-52)

This critical engagement deepens, such that by 1959, and in his book, The Gospel of the Incarnation, (London: SCM, 1959) there may be observed a considerable shift away from Barth. Here, Hendry notes with agreement, those who have accused Barth of, 'disparag(in)ing the historical aspect of the fact of Christ as of little or no consequence in the faith, which centers on the risen and exalted Lord.' (34) Then, and most remarkably, he affirms, specifically against Barth, that the conception of the work of Christ which he is expounding runs along similar lines to that of Wilhelm Herrmann. (Ibid., 144-145) Herrmann's, Communion with God, he regards as the product of theological 'crisis', and that it seeks to effect a, 'realignment of evangelical faith and piety', whose most crucial task, 'was that of establishing a personal relation with the Christ of history.' The key to establishing this, was found by Herrmann in, '"the inner life of Jesus"', which becomes an element in our experience, thereby allowing us to enter into that relationship. Hendry is in turn critical of Herrmann for isolating this, insufficiently explained, element in the incarnate life of Jesus, but nonetheless credits Herrmann with being correct in his basic approach. (Ibid., 151-153) The abandonment of adherence to the paradigm is complete by 1980, for in, Theology of Nature, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980) Hendry may write of Barth thus:

'The theological revolution that was led by Karl Barth may be simply described as a shift of focus...from the third to the second article of the Creed...Barth's Christocentrism, or Christological constriction, came as near as any to being a unitarianism of the second article...excluding not only the psychological but also the cosmic. His volume on the doctrine of creation is certainly one of the weakest in the Church Dogmatics...(giving) nothing to the scientifically informed person who wants to know what light, if any, theology has to shed on the world of nature.' (25)

The 'revolution', is now merely seen as a shift of focus, motivated by, 'an aversion to a theology of experience which was almost pathological', (Ibid., 25) a shift which is fundamentally flawed. Hendry's 'falling away' should
alert us to the possibility that Barth's approach, especially as offered by proponents of our strong discontinuity scenario, may be seriously deficient in terms of integrating all possibly valid theological insights, especially those emphasising the subjective appropriation of Revelation.


189 Ibid., 99.
190 Ibid., 99.
191 Ibid., 99.
192 Ibid., 100.
193 Ibid., 100.
194 Ibid., 101.
195 Ibid., 101.
196 Ibid., 102.
197 Ibid., 102.
198 Ibid., 106.
199 Ibid., 105-106.
200 Ibid., 187.
201 Ibid., 201.
202 Ibid., 210.
203 Ibid., 187.

204 J. Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God (London: OUP, 1962), 254-256. Baillie maintains his high estimation of Barth's impact to the very end of his life, and notes that, 'He has changed the face of Protestant theology far more radically than any other theologian during my life-time.' (254) Equally, while welcoming signs of a return to a more liberal perspective, he affirms that, 'it must be a liberalism... chastened by the many valuable things he has taught us.' (Ibid., 255) However, in the final analysis, Baillie must depart from Barth, especially when he contends that, 'mankind had no knowledge of God save in Jesus Christ.' (Ibid., 255) As Baillie sees it, 'This is new teaching, and it is precisely what I have never been able to accept.' (Ibid.,
255) Thus, for Baillie; Creation, Conscience, and, Law, are witnesses to the reality of God's presence, 'and all this is knowledge which man possesses before he meets with Jesus Christ.' (Ibid., 255) Finally, he then affirms that, 'It is clear that this is the view which pervades the whole Bible. It has nowhere been more strongly re-affirmed, in cogent and indeed merciless refutation of Dr Barth, than in Dr Gustav Wingren's book Theology in Conflict'. (Ibid., 255)

G. Wingren's Theology in Conflict (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1958), 23-44, and, 108-128, offers, as Baillie notes, a full-blooded rebuttal of Barth, and Baillie's approbation of it clearly marks where he wishes to stand. We may take the following as indicative of Wingren's, and Baillie's, view, when the former writes:

'The knowledge of God which man lacks he receives from Scripture, i.e. from Christ. This is the simplest formula in which Barth's theology can be expressed. And about this formula we must say that it is entirely unbiblical. There is no possibility of interpreting the biblical writings correctly from this point of view.' (Ibid., 42, as cited by, J. Baillie, Op. Cit., 255)

Our study of H. R. Mackintosh has clearly revealed that there is, when comparing the evidence with the typical presentations of Mackintosh's position, a certain ambiguity in relation to the way in which we are to understand his reception of Barth's theology. (Naturally, I would contend that such ambiguity is resolved by an endorsement of the conclusions of Chapter 2.) Further, we have highlighted the suggestion that Mackintosh's positive reception of Barth did not necessarily involve the rejection of the Ritschlian influences upon his thought which were evident from the beginning of his theological career. Indeed, to state the case once more, it would seem that his welcome of Barth was an extension of his welcome to certain elements in Ritschlian theology, especially the latter's understanding of the nature of Revelation, and, in particular, Herrmann's understanding of the self-revelation of God. Therefore, it would be valuable to clarify the relationship of Barth's thought on these matters to that of Ritschlian thought, and, in particular, to that of Herrmann.

Thus, I propose to provide an outline of Albrecht Ritschl's understanding of the nature of Revelation, to be followed by a brief analysis of the relationship between his thought and that of Wilhelm Herrmann. Thereafter, I shall furnish a more specific analysis of Herrmann's concept of the self-revelation of God, and then highlight the extent to which the latter might be understood to provide an indispensable preface to an understanding of Barth's concept of the self-revelation of God. Throughout, our purpose, to follow Jüngel's advice about having our cards on the table, (1) will be
to identify such elements of continuity as are to be found between Herrmann and Barth, in respect of the said concept. Further, if we judge this concept to have a central role within their respective theological systems, we shall consider if we would be justified in identifying these systems as belonging to the same genus, and, therefore, fundamentally similar in theological substance. That is, even if we identified dissimilarities in form of presentation, we would judge it accurate to regard them as having a shared identity.

i) Albrecht Ritschl on the Nature of Revelation

Our task of outlining Ritschl's understanding of the nature of Revelation is not an easy one, for while, to quote J.K. Mozley, 'there can be no doubt.', as to his, 'belief in an all-important revelation of God', there has to be an equal acknowledgement that his specific understanding is by no means clear. (2) Indeed, J. Orr may suggest that, 'The idea of revelation, generally, is one of the least carefully investigated of all the notions in Ritschl's system.', (3) this notwithstanding the fact that he may state that, 'Nothing could be more satisfactory in itself than this insistence...on Christ as the positive principle of the Christian Revelation.', and his granting that, 'Ritschl and his followers are quite in earnest with the idea of Revelation.' (4)

Equally, however, we have in Chapter 1 (vi) Ritschlian Studies and the Continuity Scenario) already highlighted certain indications of continuity which modern Ritschl interpreters have discerned between Ritschl and Barth, such that we may embark on our task not wholly without the expectation that we shall be able to piece together the core of his understanding.
Ritschl opens the first volume of, *Justification and Reconciliation*, with the declaration that, 'The Christian doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation', which, 'constitutes the real centre of the theological system.', is developed as, 'the determinate and direct result of the historical revelation of God's purpose of grace through Christ'. (5) The corollary of this is that the Christian community should be the centre of reflection upon the gracious giving of God. Indeed, he suggests that, 'We can discover the full compass of His historical actuality solely from the faith of the Christian community.', (6) such that the possibility of understanding His purposes has as its precondition, that we should be members of the Church and subordinate to Him. (7) Thus, the possibility of authentic knowledge of Christ cannot be sustained when we invoke, 'that great untruth', and claim an, 'absence of presuppositions', for this would be to stand outwith the community and to seek to establish another means of comprehending Christ's significance. (8) The direct result of this is that, 'every part of theological knowledge is construed from the standpoint of the Christian community, since only so can the worth of Christ as Revealer be employed throughout as the basis of knowledge in solving all the problems of theology.' (9) We may sum up Ritschl's position, from his, *Instruction in the Christian Religion*, as follows:

'Since the Christian religion has its origin in a special revelation, and exists in a special community of believers and worshippers, [sic] its peculiar conceptions of God must always be interpreted in connection (a) with the recognition of the one who bears this revelation and (b) with the right appreciation of the Christian community, if the total substance of Christianity is to be understood correctly. A system of doctrine which ignores either of these two elements will prove defective.' (10)
Ritschl suggests that it is particularly Luther who sets forth this, 'new principle', such that there can be, 'no "disinterested" knowledge of God'. Thus, to sum up his understanding of Luther, he contends that our knowledge of God, 'is so exclusively bound up with Christ, that whatever knowledge of God exists alongside of it does not, as the Scholastics suppose, arrive at a neutral idea of God, but issues solely in contempt or hatred of Him.' (11) Ritschl takes this as typical of Luther, and of the early (that is, c.1535) Melanchthon. However, he suggests that by 1543 Melanchthon echoed only, 'in a feeble way the principle that God is knowable only through the mediation of Christ'. (12) Instead, Ritschl sees Melanchthon turning to a Scholastic model, which is ultimately a return to Aristotle, such that, 'he builds Christian doctrine on a foundation of natural theology'. Thus, he sees Melanchthon, 'abandon(ing) the task of constructing theology on Luther's principle.' (13)

In response, Ritschl proposes to take up the task which he judges Melanchthon to have failed in, and to construct such a theology, 'in the full consciousness that my action is justified and rendered imperative by the standard writings of the Reformation.' (14) The corollary of this, to restate Ritschl's position, is that:

'if we can rightly know God only if we know Him through Christ, then we can know Him only if we belong to the community of believers. Not only, however, are God and all the operations of His grace to be construed through the revelation in Christ, but even sin can be appreciated only in virtue of the forgiveness of sins which is Christ's special gift'. (15)

Thus, we have in Ritschl an increasingly Christocentric focus (16) in respect of the possibility of the knowledge of God, which excludes the possibility of any knowledge of God based upon Natural Theology. This in turn is
complemented by an emphasis on the Christian community as the focus of the outworking of God's revelatory activity. All this, Ritschl believes, he derives from Luther.

However, that is not to say that Luther's, 'theological method', (17) succeeded in achieving its aim, and in, Theology and Metaphysics, Ritschl notes that, while, 'the epistemology which I use in theology corresponds to the actual intention of Luther, in particular, his aim to break with the scholastic methodology. He was not able to perform the task.' (18) Neither, of course, was Melanchthon adequate to the task, 'On the contrary, this leader of theology in the church of the reformation set out on a return trip to the scholastic methodology - slowly but with progressively greater decisiveness.' (19) This scholastic method has conditioned theology ever since, such that he judges even Schleiermacher to have fallen under its baneful influence. Thus, he may write:

'Even Schleiermacher shares in the fundamental error of this mode of theology, in that he portrays the pious self-consciousness as the first part of theology, which is presupposed in every excitation of Christian sensibilities and yet, at the same time, is also contained within it. That is, as with Melanchthon, his general doctrine of God is natural theology.' (20)

Therefore, we may regard Ritschl as one whose, 'ancestral line', in this respect, (to borrow Barth's words) 'does not include Schleiermacher.' (21) Nor does he stand, (again to borrow Barth) 'In such a line the next previous representative (of which) might possibly be Melanchthon.' (22) On the contrary, he rejects that line, and rejects all a priori attempts at formulating a concept to enable us to comprehend God's revelation. He writes:

'Logically, the rejection of natural religion means...a rejection of all universal concepts which one might possess prior to the particular structures of revealed religion or apart from the actuality of those structures
in the founder and in the community.' (23)

Ritschl wrote, *Theology and Metaphysics*, (between the 15th of April, and the 6th of June, 1881) very much as a way of addressing some of the specific issues with which we are concerned, especially the question, How does God reveal Himself? (24) This work was prompted by certain attacks on his position, notably by the Luther confessionalists, C.E. Luthardt of Leipzig and F.H.R. Frank of Erlangen, and the pietist, H. Weiss of Tubingen. That the attacks did not abate is reflected in the Prefaces and the text of the 2nd (1883) and 3rd (1888) editions of Volume III of, *Justification and Reconciliation*. (25) In particular, Ritschl takes Luthardt to task for the development of his own (that is, Luthardt's) theological, 'principle of knowledge'. (26) He notes that Luthardt begins his doctrine of God with the assertion that, 'The Christian doctrine of God is the doctrine of God as the revelation of redemption.', an assertion which he takes to reflect Luther, a judgement with which Ritschl does not differ. (27) Indeed, as Ritschl reads it, this assertion would lead us to expect that Luthardt would proceed, 'to build his dogmatics upon the principle of knowledge derived from Christ, because it is the authoritative revelation of God for the Christian church.' (28) However, Ritschl confesses himself gravely disappointed with Luthardt, for, 'this expectation is not fulfilled by the said dogmatican. On the contrary, (he then) deals with the natural revelation of God.' (29) For Ritschl, there can be no rational relationship between the principle of theological knowledge which Luthardt asserts and the subsequent development of his thought. The, 'result', of Luthardt's approach, 'is thoughtlessness compounded by confusion.' (30) To which Ritschl responds in the following terms:

'if one has experienced the fact that he knows God in
Christ and only in Christ - and this fact arises from within the Christian community that the theology is to serve - then other revelations of God are, at the most, only of interest when one can measure them against the revelation that is mediated by the Son.' (31)

Therefore, and again, we find in Ritschl a radical Christocentricity in respect of our knowledge of God, which excludes by its character the possibility of authentic and salvific knowledge of God based upon natural revelation. Further, Ritschl affirms the allied principles that a proper understanding of Revelation, is, 'subject to the truth of the principle that Revelation goes beyond reason (revelatio supra rationem)', and, 'that revelation goes contrary to reason (contra rationem)' (32) In order that he may be understood, especially as regards the latter principle, Ritschl goes on to say that, 'By reason here is meant a connected view of the world which interprets the order of nature and spiritual life with instruments of knowledge which have no relation to Christianity.' (33) In this, Ritschl intends to oppose the understanding of, 'ratio', which is offered, 'by Materialism...(or) monistic Idealism.', and, in this same context, to affirm the presence of, 'ratio in theology', (34) such as he has outlined in, Justification and Reconciliation III, (35) and in, Theology and Metaphysics. (36) Therefore, Ritschl emphasises the fact that, 'Revelation must be given', in order that it may be correctly understood, always recalling that, 'the correct forms of the understanding...are subject to the principle that Revelation goes beyond reason (revelatio supra rationem).' (37)

This stress upon the givenness and priority of Revelation, allied to a radical Christocentricity, runs throughout, Justification and Reconciliation III, such
that we again find Ritschl affirming that:

'In Christianity, revelation through God's Son is the punctum stans of all knowledge and religious conduct.' (38)

Indeed, for Ritschl, there is no possibility of abstracting, from the varieties of religious experience found in different religions, a general concept of Revelation, against which to measure particular revelations. Instead, we are to regard the revelation given by Christ as, 'complete after its own order'. (39) Similarly, he suggests that, 'The content of the Divine will is to be deduced from the revealed reciprocal relations between Christ and God, and from no other starting point.', and that to attempt to formulate, 'a theological doctrine of God', by appealing to some, 'conception of the Absolute', which is prior to this, would be to set, 'up an idol instead of God.' For, according to Ritschl, any proposed Absolute would, once more, reflect an inappropriate abstraction. (40) Thus, our, 'conception of God', again finds, 'its starting-point', in the way, 'in which the relation of God to His Son our Lord is expressed', (41) that is, when it takes in the full significance of the New Testament expression, 'of the Christian name for God, which when fully stated runs, "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ"'. (42) We may, in summation of Ritschl's position, cite his thoughts on the absolute and final nature of the revelation which is in Christ, when he writes that:

'Christ founds His religion with the claim that He brings the perfect revelation of God, so that beyond what He brings no further revelation is conceivable or is to be looked for. Whoever, therefore, has a part in the religion of Christ in the way that Christ Himself intended, cannot do other than regard Christ as the Bearer of the final revelation of God.' (43)

In looking specifically at the concept of the self-
revelation of God, there is no particular form in which this is developed by Ritschl. Though, as we have seen, and as we shall see in Herrmann, the supporting apparatus for such a concept would seem to be in place. Nonetheless, Ritschl does give indications that such a concept lies, in embryonic form, within his thought. Thus, for example, in seeking, 'to construct a scientific doctrine of God', he makes it clear that this can only be developed out of the reality of the God's revelation of Himself, through Christ, to the community which is the Church. He writes:

'it is clear that, when God reveals Himself as Father through His Son Jesus Christ, the process is only completed when the community accepts the revelation by acknowledging the Mediator who brings it as its Lord...The name God has the same sense when used of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (Matt. xxviii. 19). For the name denotes God in so far as He reveals Himself, while the Holy Spirit is the power of God which enables the community to appropriate His self-revelation as Father through His Son (1 Cor. ii. 12).'

Further, in speaking of the awareness which Jesus had as to His purpose as an instrument of God, (and relating this to the idea of making value-judgements in religious thought) Ritschl may suggest that:

'His estimate of Himself betrays, it is true, a sort of sliding scale in the way in which He describes His own relation to God, not only in John, but also in the other Gospels; yet amid this variety of presentation, describing Himself at one time as a mere ambassador who has seen and heard God and executes His commands, and at another time as the Son of God Who pursues God's work and in His own person exercises God's lordship over men for the ends of the Kingdom of God, Jesus attributes to His life as a whole, in the unity which for His own consciousness it possesses, the worth of being the instrument of the complete self-revelation of God. This is the purely religious type of self-judgment.'

Thus, we note Ritschl's suggestion that it is within the self-consciousness of Jesus, that is, within His own
self-understanding, that there emerges the concept of the self-revelation of God. Further, we see from this invoking of the notion of, 'self-judgment', that he wishes to maintain a particular approach to religious knowledge, that is, one in which knowledge is seen to arise through the formulation of value-judgements. (46) Indeed, it would seem that the first specific formulation of the idea may be credited to Wilhelm Herrmann, who suggests, in essaying a defence of Ritschl's position, (in, Die Metaphysik in der Theologie (1876)) that, 'This confession, the final element in a Christian's view of life that Christ possesses for him the value of Godhead, is no concurrence in a metaphysical proposition but in a religious judgment, since it stands inseparably related to experience of the value of religious blessings.' (47) In noting this dependency of Master upon 'pupil', Robert Mackintosh suggests that, 'we get the interesting result that the formula is older than Ritschl's adoption of the phrase Value-Judgment.', (48) though he further notes that, 'Ritschl's own most striking statement stands in all editions of Justification, vol. iii. "An authority which either excludes all other standards or else subordinates them to itself, which at the same time regulates in an exhaustive fashion all human trust in God, has itself the worth of Godhead."' (49) Therefore, the substance which Herrmann encapsulates in his statement of the form of the idea, may in fact find its origin in Ritschl.

That the role of value-judgements in formulating religious knowledge was influential in certain strands of Scottish thinking, is illustrated by A.B. Bruce's well-known statement ('often attributed to Ritschl' (50)) that, 'Jesus has for the Christian consciousness the religious value of God.' (51) Thereafter, we may note H.R. Mackintosh, (in 1912) summing up the Christological
thought of Ritschl, and pointing to the way in which the, 'absolute revelation', which Jesus brings is the sole medium through which we have access to God the Father. (52) Mackintosh expresses Ritschl's position thus:

'Like every other doctrine, our view of Christ must be stated in judgments of value or appreciation (Wert urteile), which affirm His significance for the soul; or, to put it otherwise, we see the Divine quality of Christ's person in the Divine character of his work. The impression He makes is most fitly expressed by saying that He has for us the religious value of God.' (53)

That Mackintosh was himself (partially) influenced in his own thought by this Ritschlian approach to formulating an understanding of the revelatory significance of Christ, is illustrated by his contention that, 'we must ask whether He has the reality as well as the religious value of God.' (54) Equally, we may observe him maintaining, as a statement of his own position, that, 'Christology is only a reasoned account of how the Man Jesus has for us the value and reality of God.' (55) Indeed, in, Types of Modern Theology, Mackintosh suggests that, 'Ritschl proceeded throughout on the fundamental assumption that faith, in making value-judgments, bases itself upon, and responds to, the saving revelation of God in Christ.' (56) However, despite that suggestion, he finally judges Ritschl's idea of value-judgements to be wanting, (57) because the latter brings, 'ready-made', certain moral standards by which Christ is to be measured. (58) Thus, Mackintosh judges (referring specifically to Ritschl) that, 'resolute preoccupation with moral values is apt to render a man blind to the absolute newness and transcendence of God's self-revelation.' (59) (That Ritschl was perceived as having such a preoccupation is acknowledged, even by Ritschl. However, he most emphatically rejected the charge, which is a point that
Mackintosh, as one of the translators of, *Justification and Reconciliation* III, might have observed. (60))

Thus, for Mackintosh, it is, 'the absolute newness and transcendence', of God's self-revelation, which now renders Ritschl's, 'value-judgements', obsolete, (and Mackintosh's earlier approbation of them) and in Mackintosh's move away from Ritschl towards a more adequate (as he saw it) statement of the nature of the self-revelation of God, we see certain parallels with Herrmann's move away from Ritschl. (61)

In our review of Ritschl, we may suggest that the characteristic elements in his thought reflect the relatively self-consistent expression of a theological position which is marked by integrity and vigour. Those elements which we might judge to be characteristic are:

1) The focus on a Christocentrically mediated Revelation, with a concomitant limiting of the knowledge of God to that which is found in Christ alone. 2) The emergence of the concept of the, 'self-revelation' of God. (This may not be termed, 'characteristic' of Ritschl's thought, but its presence, even in embryonic form, is significant.) 3) The rejection of Natural Theology as an additional, or supplementary, source of knowledge of God. 4) The rejection of a formal overarching metaphysical (though not epistemological) basis for his theological system.

ii) Ritschl and Herrmann - Continuity and Discontinuity

The relationship between Ritschl and Herrmann should not be thought of as one where the latter is simply the mouthpiece of the former. Rather, we may see Ritschl as having a significant, but not unqualified, influence upon Herrmann, especially in relation to the characteristic
elements of Ritschl's thought which we sketched above. Thus, the inheritance from Ritschl may be said to provide the form in which the young Herrmann sought to express the substance of his thought, which c.1876, with the publication of, Die Metaphysik in der Theologie, may be thought of as closely aligned to that of Ritschl. (62)

However, alongside (and interwoven with) the theological inheritance mediated via Ritschl, there also stands an epistemological one, which illustrates, both; the similarity of their initial shared orientation, and, the point at which Herrmann shall later depart from Ritschl. Thus, S. Fisher may suggest that, 'Important to Herrmann's appropriation of neo-Kantian philosophy was the impetus given by Ritschl, who felt the possession of a sound epistemology was an essential prelude to any systematic theology.' (63) Thus, Ritschl had written, in, Theology and Metaphysics, that, 'every theologian, as a scientific worker, is under the necessity or obligation to proceed according to a certain epistemology of which he is aware and whose correctness he must demonstrate.' (64) That is, a theologian, 'must follow an epistemology which proceeds according to a concept of "things" in its determination of the objects of knowledge; that is, it proceeds metaphysically.' (65) Thereafter, Ritschl proceeds to make clear that he has intentionally repudiated the, 'dominant...theory of knowledge', which prevailed among the theologians he opposed, that is, 'the Platonic', and does so precisely because the orientation of this, 'theory of knowledge', is not, 'upon Christ as the bearer of revelation'. (66) Alongside this, we may see him preferring the epistemological understanding offered by H. Lotze, in which the nature of Metaphysics is prescribed by the nature of the reality which it investigates, and not vice versa. (67)
This shared epistemological outlook may, in part, have stemmed from their having studied Kant under the philosopher J.E. Erdmann at Halle. (68) However, it would seem clear that Herrmann departed from this position in, Die Religion im Verhältnis zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit, (1879) (69) on the grounds that Ritschl's position was, epistemologically speaking, inadequate. Thus, M.T. Mueller suggests that Herrmann sought to:

'isolate and define religion as a totally independent entity which is not grounded in speculative metaphysical knowledge, nor in ethics (the error of Kant), but in revelation - the event where we experience God as the almighty will of our blessedness'. (70)

In so doing, Mueller contends that Herrmann drew a distinction, which he maintained throughout his writings, and that the distinction:

'between the realm of the scientifically demonstrable (Welterkennen) and the realm of the religiously experiential (Erlebnis) was his solution to the insufficient epistemological foundation of Ritschl's theology.' (71)

Thereafter, Mueller may suggest that this epistemological breach led to Herrmann's theology being, 'irrevocably separated from that of his mentor...Ritschl.' (72) Further, we note that both Fisher and Mueller highlight the extent to which Herrmann developed his own epistemological (and theological) position, in the light of his dialogue with the Marburg Neo-Kantian philosophers, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. We shall not develop this in detail, but, once more, we may suggest that Herrmann's relationship to this school of thought may be understood in terms of a conscious awareness of, and deliberate distancing from, the body of their teaching. This is not to say that Herrmann's relationship to Cohen and Natorp can be traced in definite terms, for, as Fisher notes, it is a point of dispute as to whether
the impact of the latter upon the former is to be understood as, 'a formative influence or...limited to one particular period.' (73) However, Fisher's judgement on the matter is that it is clear that Herrmann's, Die Religion im Verhältnis zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit, reflects an early appropriation of Cohen, while his 1914 work, Die Wirklichkeit Gottes, (74) indicates that he, 'had adopted the neo-Kantian Wissenschaftsbegriff in its entirety.' (75) As to the awareness of, and distancing from, we may note, for example, Mueller's suggestion that, 'it is precisely in his radicalisation of the Self, or the Individuum, that Herrmann shows his deepest affinities with Marburg Neo-Kantianism', (76) while Fisher may contend that, 'It is no understatement to affirm that Herrmann's theology aspired to protect the integrity and efficacy of divine activity in revelation from the sophisticated idealizations of the Marburg philosophers.' (77) Indeed, Fisher may go on to say that Herrmann, 'reversed the epistemology of Marburg Kantianism.' (78) Thus, in the light of the experience of, 'God's self-revelation', we may come to understand that:

'Instead of thought generating reality from the tasks it sets itself, faith, being an experience in which something real is given and known, generates conceptual forms for expressing the new reality it has encountered.' (79)

Therefore, in review, we note Herrmann's early dependence upon Ritschl, in theological and epistemological terms, which is followed by a departure from Ritschl, with respect to epistemology, with the latter being allied to an increasing engagement with the developing Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. This latter engagement may be thought of as heightening the focus upon the concept of the self-revelation of God.
iii) Wilhelm Herrmann on the Self-Revelation of God

However, while the epistemological influence of Ritschl upon Herrmann was to be relatively short-lived, the theological inheritance would seem to have a continuing significance. In particular, the focus upon Christ as the bearer of revelation, and the subsequent development of the concept of the self-revelation of God, (aided by critical reflection upon the emphases of the Marburg neo-Kantians) reflect this continuing significance. The above notwithstanding however, we should not imagine that Herrmann can be understood simply in terms of his intellectual antecedents. Rather, we note J.C. O'Neill's contention that, 'Herrmann was a liberal theologian who had seen through liberalism', and that he was someone who provided the, 'decisive impulse', to a generation of theologians who succeeded him, and who sought to move beyond the liberal position typified by, say, Adolf von Harnack. (80) In particular, Herrmann was to provide that, 'impulse', through his development of the concept of the self-revelation of God. (81) The centrality of this concept within Herrmann's thought cannot be underestimated, for, as Fisher puts it:

'The typically Herrmannian themes of life, faith, and experience find their systematic anchorage in the concept of revelation which becomes synonymous with the beneficia Christi experienced by the believer...Throughout all his writings, Herrmann intentionally focused upon the experience of Offenbarung and the divine power actual in it, so that even his own theology could never be taken as a formal "law of faith".' (82)

Thus, the primacy of the experienced reality of the revelation of God is always to the fore in Herrmann's thought, and this emerges particularly in his debate with the differing voices which claimed to represent the genuine Protestant (Lutheran) tradition, especially when, 'We part Company with the Older Protestantism.' (83)
According to Herrmann, 'the older Protestant orthodoxy', sought to provide a logically consistent presentation of, 'those thoughts in which the classic witnesses to Christianity had expressed their faith.' In response Herrmann states, 'We go further back.' (84) According to, 'the older Protestant orthodoxy', a, 'Man was to appropriate the salvation which was set before him in the doctrines of faith.', (85) but this, for Herrmann, is tantamount to suggesting that, 'it was evident that the unredeemed man had to be credited with the power to transplant himself into the new spiritual life.' (86) Herrmann rejects this utterly and contends that:

'If I am to be saved, everything depends on my being transplanted into that inner condition of mind in which such thoughts (of the, 'idea of redemption') begin to be generated in myself, and this happens only when God lifts me into communion with Himself.' (87)

Within this experience of communion with God, as understood by Herrmann, there may be discerned a particular structure, and this Fisher expounds by pointing to its essential, 'bi-polar(ity)'. He writes:

'There is first a universal anthropological axis maintaining that all human beings desire to be truthful in will and deed, yet are unable to be so through autonomous effort. It is at this point that a second, more theological polarity enters, whereby the individual experiences a supernatural power that heals the will and creates a new moral identity by gathering together the dislocated and opposing movements of the will, which, for Herrmann, was the essence of personality.' (88)

The experience of this, 'second polarity of the revelatory event', should not be thought of as the product of human energy and resolve, and is instead to be understood as the human self allowing itself to be overcome by the reality of a God who reveals Himself to us. Herrmann himself expressed it thus, 'We seek God when we long for such a reality and when we encounter such a
reality God reveals himself to us [so offenbart sich uns Gott].' (89) Further, he suggests:

'We grasp the reality of God - to the extent that we can grasp it - in the moment where we understand ourselves to be apprehended by a power...to whom we freely surrender ourselves with a whole heart. The moment in which we become conscious of this is the moment of the revelation of God to us.' (90)

Equally, we may observe him stating the essential, 'bipolar(ity)', in the following terms:

'If we, as beings who have fallen prey to death, are to become truly alive, then the most important thing is that the person of Jesus should obtain decisive power over us or that he becomes our Lord. We are to experience that as a transformation through his power but at the same time as a conversion which is required on our part. The liberation which is bestowed upon the Christian is something he is to produce nevertheless in himself. In the eyes of a man who does not know Christ the Redeemer, that is an intolerable contradiction. For the Christian the contradiction is annulled by means of the fact that what the power of Jesus does to him can only be self-experienced in the form of one's own free surrender.' (91)

Mueller suggests at this juncture, that Herrmann's:

'very deep insight that the proper correlation of man to God results in two reciprocal subjectivities, with the priority given to the divine initiative, is one of the most important legacies which Herrmann bequeathed to his pupils...That sovereign, divine events become our own self-experiences establishes precisely the subjectivity and historicity of the self.' (92)

Thereafter, he suggests that, in so doing, Herrmann:

'has successfully set aside the hegemony of the Cartesian subject-object pattern which had so dominated western thinking, especially in the sciences, for several hundred years.' (93)

(Mueller, in drawing this conclusion, seems to have exactly paralleled Torrance's conclusion, in respect of
Karl Barth and his, 'overcoming (of) Cartesian dualism'. (94) That such parallels can be drawn would seem to me to be highly suggestive.)

Therefore, for Herrmann, according to Mueller, 'the correlation of man to God means precisely the correlation of faith and the Christ event.' (95) However, as Mueller maintains, this does not mean that faith is understood simply as a human action. Rather, as can be observed from the following quotations, faith is to be understood as essentially in the gift of God. Thus, Herrmann may suggest that, 'We do not regard faith to be our own work, but God's gift to us.', (96) and, further, that, 'a faith which is to make a new being out of man...may not be self-experienced as a work of human exertion (Anstrengung) but must be self-experienced as a work of God.' (97) Equally, he may contend that, 'faith is not a work which man can only experience as his own work, but is the life which is bestowed upon him in which his soul becomes free.', (98) while highlighting the fact that faith is that, 'which Christ elicits from us through the impression of his person', (99) or, that, 'which Jesus creates in us through the power of his person.' (100)

Thus, we see that, for Herrmann, 'faith is unconditional submission to a Power which a Christian distinguishes from his own inner life - that is, to the Revelation of God.' (101) In stating this, Herrmann is summarising Ritschl's position, as it stood in opposition to that of, 'the liberal school in theology', influenced by Schleiermacher. (102) The latter, according to Herrmann, sought to promote an understanding of faith in which it is to be understood as, 'a religiousness which, in their view, is rooted in the nature of the human soul.' (103) However, Ritschl, according to Herrmann, resolutely (and rightly) opposed this, such that he could say, 'Of the
two propositions - Faith saves a man, and, Faith is a submission to the authority of a revelation - they [that is, 'the liberal school in theology'] are willing to hold only the former. Ritschl maintained both.' (104) In Herrmann's view, his correlation of these, 'fundamental propositions', constitutes that which, 'is really great and imperishable in Ritschl', such that Ritschl's theological system, imperfect as it is, ('As imperfect Christians we must have imperfect systems.' (105)) is at the very forefront of the attempt to preserve the genuine theological insights of Luther. (106)

Thus, it would seem clear to me that Herrmann has indeed sought to achieve a, 'proper correlation of man to God', that is, through, 'the correlation of faith and the Christ event.' (107) and that this correlation turns upon the concept of the self-revelation of God. However, to state this latter point is to raise a fundamental question, which is brought to the fore by Fisher's acute observation that, 'A particular crux in this concept of revelation concerns the meaning of the word self.', (108) That is, 'Is the "self" or "self-revelation" to be understood theologically or anthropologically ?' (109) In seeking to answer this question himself, Fisher draws upon the analysis of the issue provided by J. Moltmann, in, Theology of Hope, (110) and suggests that :

'Moltmann correctly perceived that Herrmann intended to use the term Selbst both theologically and anthropologically, so that the human "self" was defined theologically and God's revelatory activity upon the individual anthropologically'. (111)

Immediately thereafter, Fisher cites Moltmann's summation of Herrmann's position, in the following terms :

'Revelation is not instruction, and not an emotional impulse. Revelation of God cannot be objectively explained, but it can certainly be experienced in man's
own self, namely, in the non-objectifiable subjectivity of the dark, defenceless depths in which we live the moment of involvement. The revealing of God in his working upon ourselves is therefore as unfathomable, as non-derivable, as much grounded in itself as the living of life, which no one can explain, but everyone can experience.' (112)

However, it would seem to me that Fisher misunderstands, or overstates, Moltmann's case, for immediately after the above quotation, Moltmann goes on to suggest:

'That is why no catchword is more characteristic of the theology of Herrmann than the word "self" in an anthropological sense.' (113)

Moltmann is, at this juncture, seeking to analyse how we might understand Herrmann's statement from his book, Gottes Offenbarung an uns, wherein he suggests that:

'We have no other means of knowing God except that he reveals himself to us ourselves by acting upon us.' (114)

Moltmann notes here the presence of a self-evident, 'actualism which...links together revelation, action, and knowledge of God', and judges that Barth and Bultmann would commend and approve of this. (115) However, Moltmann makes it clear that his concern in analysing this statement is not with how Herrmann himself understood it. Rather, his concern is with how such a statement might be interpreted and used as a point of departure, as in the cases of Barth and Bultmann. As to how Herrmann did understand it, Moltmann's statement, 'That is why no catchword is more characteristic of the theology of Herrmann than the word "self" in an anthropological sense.', (116) would seem to make his position clear, and, equally, to indicate that Fisher has rather misunderstood Moltmann.
The question of how Herrmann understood the, 'self-', in speaking of the self-revelation of God, remains with us, and the line pursued by Fisher would seem open to question. However, even if we reject his analysis of Moltmann, we may yet return to Fisher's contention that, 'Herrmann intended to use the term Selbst both theologically and anthropologically, so that the human "self" was defined theologically and God's revelatory activity upon the individual anthropologically'. (117)

iv) Wilhelm Herrmann as an 'indispensable preface' to understanding Karl Barth's concept of the Self-Revelation of God

Before proceeding to attempt to indicate the nature of the relationship between the thought of Herrmann and that of Barth, I would make the following observations. While it is undoubtedly true (within the context of this thesis) that it is hard to read Herrmann without thinking of the Herrmann-Barth relationship, we should not assume that Barth at every point takes us beyond the position of Herrmann. That is, we should never concede that Barth is, per se, 'superior to', or, 'an advance upon', Herrmann. By this I mean that, while we are conscious of the claims made for, and by, Barth, in respect of his understanding of the self-revelation of God, and, further, conscious of Barth's claims that his understanding reflects a fairly self-conscious departure from Herrmann, we should be open, in principle, to the possibility that Herrmann's understanding might be judged (of course not finally and absolutely, but relatively so) to be, 'superior to', or, 'an advance upon', that offered by Barth. That is, we might judge that Herrmann's understanding of the self-revelation of God offers a fuller insight into the 'proper correlation of man to God'. At the very least, we
should be open to the suggestion that Herrmann's understanding is no less theologically viable; no less theologically adequate to the subject matter of theology, than that offered by Barth. Therefore, the possibility exists that we might judge their respective merits to have an equal value, even if those merits are not identical.

We may begin our attempt to answer the questions raised above, by noting that the English translator of, Moltmann's, Theology of Hope, (that is, the Scot) J.W. Leitch, in looking at Herrmann's statement, 'We have no other means of knowing God except that he reveals himself to us ourselves by acting upon us.', suggests that the German original, "dass er sich uns selbst offenbart" - can also mean, "that he himself reveals himself to us". (118) Therefore, it may be suggested that Moltmann's selected Herrmann text is at least as capable of bearing the meaning that Fisher discerns within it as any other.

Further, we may recall our earlier exposition of Bultmann, (in Chapter 1) in which he himself assessed the merits of the positions of Herrmann and Barth. Within this, we note that Bultmann judged it to be clear that Barth's understanding of how we come to faith was a marked advance over that proposed by Herrmann. Equally, he felt that the dialectic employed within Herrmann's thought might be judged to be more finely balanced than that evident within Barth's. (119) Thereafter, in turning to look at their respective understandings of revelation, Bultmann notes the evident divergence in the approaches of Herrmann and Barth. However, despite the evident divergence, Bultmann would seem to reach a conclusion similar to one of the possibilities sketched above, that is, that their respective merits have an equal value, even if those merits are not identical. Thus, he asks, on
behalf of Herrmann and Barth, 'is there nonetheless a bit of reality which can enter the life of every man, and which is "perceptible" as the revelation of God?’, and suggests that, 'Herrmann would answer, Jesus! The inner life of Jesus, that which perceived from the Gospel tradition grasps the observer as reality'. (120)

In highlighting, 'The inner life of Jesus', Bultmann touches upon something which is central to Herrmann's understanding of the way in which we apprehend God's revelation, and we shall now give due consideration to it. According to Herrmann, our knowledge of God's revelation can never be based upon the findings of historical research, even at its best. (121) Thus, for Herrmann, G. Lessing's strictures (such as, for example, his contention that, 'If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths.') (122) are to be accepted, and he contends that, 'it is impossible to attach religious conviction to a mere historical decision. Here Lessing is right.' (123) Nonetheless, in the midst of the historical reality of our lives, (124) 'the person of Jesus is so certainly a fact to us Christians that we do see in Him the basis of our faith, and the present revelation of God to us'. (125) How does this come about? According to Herrmann, we are, through, 'Christian fellowship' :

'made acquainted, not merely with the external course of Jesus' lot in life and of His work in history, but we are also led into His presence and receive a picture of His inner life. For this we are most certainly dependent, in the first instance, upon other men. For the picture of Jesus' inner life could be preserved only by those who had experienced the emancipating influence of that fact upon themselves.' (126)

Thus, the New Testament may be regarded as a record of the testimony of those, 'who had experienced the emancipating influence', of Jesus in the historical
reality of their own lives. However, at the same moment, we are aware of the fact that historical criticism has led to a heightened questioning of the Gospel narratives, such that doubts as to the sufficiency of the Gospels may arise. In response, Herrmann affirms that what the Gospels give to us, is, 'an overpowering reality which allows no doubt', that is, they give to us, 'the inner life of Jesus itself.' (127) However, that does not mean that the records definitively, and personally, communicate, 'the inner life of Jesus', to us. Herrmann writes, in, Communion with God, that:

'We start, indeed, from the records, but we do not grasp the fact they bring us until the enrichment of our own inner life makes us aware that we have touched the Living One. This holds true of every historical personality; the inner content of any such personality is laid open only to those who become personally alive to it, and feel themselves aroused by contact with it and see their horizon widened. The picture of a personality becomes visible to us in this way, and cannot be handed over to us by any communication from others; it must arise within ourselves as the free revelation of the living to the living. It is thus, therefore, that the inner life of Jesus becomes part of our own sphere of reality, and the man who has experienced that will no longer say that, strictly speaking, he can know only the story of Jesus as a real thing. Jesus Himself becomes a real power to us when He reveals His inner life to us; a power which we recognise as the best thing our life contains.' (128)

The experience of the, 'inner life of Jesus', may then be said to acquire historical significance, insofar as it becomes actualised in our experience as historical beings. Herrmann writes elsewhere that:

'The Person of Jesus becomes to us a real power rooted in history, not through historical proofs, but through the experience produced in us by the picture of his spiritual life which we can find for ourselves in the pages of the New Testament.' (129)
Further, we find Herrmann unreservedly maintaining that our present-day apprehension of Jesus is virtually identical with, 'that of the first Christian community'. (130) This is so, insofar as the basis of that apprehension is the realisation of, 'the Person of Jesus as a fact of our own experience', and an awareness of, 'the same power that the first witnesses knew.' (131)

The phrase, 'the inner life of Jesus', is one which may seem to have a rather psychological ring to it. However, as H. Thielicke points out, it is not to be understood in this way. Rather, Herrmann intends that we understand by it, 'the identity of Jesus with his task or cause. He has in mind his unconditional loyalty to his calling, his fellowship with the Father'. (132) In so developing this understanding, Thielicke points out that Herrmann specifically intended to oppose, 'the Pietist practice of imaginary intercourse with the exalted Lord.', in which, 'the primary encounter with the historical person of Jesus tends to be replaced by one's own ideas and imaginings.' (133) Thus, following Thielicke, we may suggest that, 'the primary encounter with the historical person of Jesus', that is, with the 'self-' of God as given in revelation, can be adequately differentiated from the human 'self-'. Therefore, it may be suggested that there is in Herrmann, through the model of, 'the inner life of Jesus', a maintaining of the essential 'bi-polar(ity)' of his concept of the self-revelation of God.

However, as Bultmann makes clear, Barth would be unable to endorse Herrmann's understanding of, 'the inner life of Jesus'. Barth, according to Bultmann, would reject Herrmann's answer on the basis that we cannot recover, 'the inner life of Jesus', and offers instead the affirmation that, 'The Christ is the revelation of God.' (134) What then does Bultmann make of Barth's preferred
alternative? As we have already noted in Chapter 1, Bultmann is evidently impressed by the power of Barth's affirmation. However, that does not lead him in the final analysis to prefer Barth's alternative. Indeed, when he takes the insights offered by Barth's position, he judges that they do not take us beyond that which is offered by Herrmann, and, 'the "life of Jesus" in general'. (135) Therefore, for Bultmann, although their conceptions of the form in which the revelation of God takes place differ, it would seem that Herrmann's conception may be judged to have a theological viability of equal validity to that of Barth? (We may note H. Berkhof's suggestion that Bultmann has somewhat underestimated the distance between Herrmann and Barth, even though he is correct to highlight the convergence of the two. (136))

Now, at this juncture, someone who was opposed to the line advanced by Bultmann, might observe that Bultmann was discussing the Barth of, The Epistle to the Romans, and not the Barth of the, Church Dogmatics. Thereafter, they might contend that, this being the case, Bultmann's suggestion that Herrmann and Barth offer different, but equally valid and viable, understandings of the nature of God's self-revelation, would be invalidated, on the grounds that the position of Barth developed and matured subsequent to, The Epistle to the Romans. The presupposition of such a counter-claim would undoubtedly be that the 'later Barth', of the, Church Dogmatics, developed a more definitely Christological orientation which gave his concept of the self-revelation of God a greater theological adequacy, and thus a greater theological viability, than it had previously had. Further, and in the immediate light of what has just been stated, this 'later' position might be judged to have a greater theological adequacy and viability than that offered by Herrmann. (An understanding of Barth such as I
am sketching for my 'opponent' of Bultmann, I take to be exemplified throughout T.F. Torrance's, Karl Barth : An Introduction.)

However, the presupposition of such a counter-claim would seem to me to be open to challenge. Thus, if we take H. Berkhof's contention that, in Barth, 'there are areas of agreement, in part a common inheritance from the school of Ritschl : negatively, rejection of natural theology and metaphysics, and positively, a rigorous Christocentrism.', (137) and then note his suggestion as to when the latter elements came to fruition, we may ourselves contend that the line taken by the 'opponent' above is thoroughly undermined. Berkhof writes:

'This second and very essential element of Herrmannian vintage only acquires its methodological centrality in Barth later - around 1930. The twin pillars of his mature thought as it comes to expression in his Church Dogmatics are this Christocentrism and, as its counterpart, the radical repudiation of natural theology.' (138)

Therefore, if we judge Berkhof's contention to be correct, we may ourselves further contend that the position reached by the 'later Barth', of the, Church Dogmatics, (which is indeed a move away from the position represented in, The Epistle to the Romans) is in fact a move towards Herrmann, rather than a move away from Herrmann. That is, in formulating his understanding of the self-revelation of God in more explicitly Christological terms, Barth drinks again of the, 'Herrmannian vintage'.

Berkhof himself highlights the fact that J. Moltmann has pointed to the, 'important structural parallel', which obtains between Herrmann and Barth in their understanding of the, 'self-', as understood in the concept of the self-revelation of God. Thus, Berkhof may suggest that:
'the "defenseless non-groundability" in Barth becomes, in theologically consistent form, the "transcendental subjectivity" of the self-revealing God, a process in which the "self" still "retains all the attributes, all the relations and distinctions in which it had been formulated by Herrmann."' (139)

Berkhof is clear that Barth intends that his position (as found in, "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann" (1924)) be clearly differentiated from that of Herrmann, but, equally, Berkhof may suggest that, '(Barth) did not repudiate (Herrmann); on the contrary'. (140) Thereafter, he quotes Barth to the effect that what he intends to achieve in his theological work is a consistent drawing out of the conclusions of Herrmann's position. As Barth himself had written in the lecture noted above, 'I should now like to show in what direction we should look for the really consistent conclusions to be drawn from Herrmann's theology.', and intimates that he is like one who, 'must depart' from the teachings of the master, '"after the flesh" and yet "after the spirit"...will not wholly depart.' (141)

Thus, we ask, In what sense is it the case that what we see in Barth is an extension of a position whose origin lies with Herrmann? Berkhof, in looking at Herrmann's response to the increasing encroachment of secularism upon what was previously regarded as a preserve of the faith, ('the flood of empiricism and determinism, psychologism and historicism' (142)) writes:

'When I read Herrmann what emerges in my mind is the image of a rock in the midst of a rising flood. In Ritschl the rock of moral autonomy still had a broad surface. Now, however, with the waves of the flood rising higher and higher, it becomes much narrower. The parts that are closer to the sea - like corporeality, psychological development, history, social relationships, and the authority of Scripture and the Christian tradition - have already been inundated. Herrmann now withdrew to the narrow center, to individual (though
conceived as interpersonal) inwardness where the individual is in communion with God through "the inner life of Jesus." With a splendid sort of consistency, he devoted his intellectual powers to the defense of the peak of the rock.' (143)

In particular, Berkhof suggests that faith is now conceived as, 'based on something above history and beyond the reach of (historical) research, namely...on "the inner life of Jesus."', and that latterly Herrmann severs the, 'essential connection between revelation and history.' (144)

Thereafter, in turning to Barth, Berkhof notes that, 'in the Ritschlian school in which Barth had been educated theologically there had taken place, under the pressure of the advancing secularization of the world, a retreat to an ever smaller base...from which they believed they could "still" cling to the absolute.' (145) Berkhof's judgement on the sense in which Barth's position is an extension of that found in Herrmann is then delivered when he writes, 'In Barth this "base" is totally gone...The retreat has become a clean break.' (146) Thus, as Berkhof sees it, Barth's position may be seen as a logical development of an element within the, 'Ritschlian school', with Wilhelm Herrmann's theology being the final point of departure from that 'school', and the entrance into a new one.

(We may note that Berkhof's judgement on the relationship of Barth's theology to that of Herrmann parallels that of W. Pannenberg. We may recall the latter's suggestion that Barth's rejection of Natural Theology, 'formed the climax and conclusion of a growing criticism in Protestant theology, since Schleiermacher and Ritschl, of the traditional philosophical doctrine of God and its use in theology.' In particular we recollect the way in which
Barth's position is understood as an extension of a line of thought which runs back through, 'the school of Ritschl', and beyond to Schleiermacher, and the, 'progressive narrowing down', of the way in which the revelation of God is to be understood. Pannenberg's conclusions on the matter may be restated in this context with profit. He writes:

'Finally, although Barth began in the school of Ritschl, he came to include even an ethically based knowledge of God on Kantian lines in "natural" theology, and argued instead that it should be replaced by the revelation of Christ as the sole source of a true knowledge of God. Thus the road leading from Schleiermacher to Barth showed an increasing extension of the concept of "natural" theology as a polemical conception opposed to the Christian theology of revelation, together with a progressive narrowing down of the way the Christian theology of revelation was itself understood by those who maintained it.' (147)

Therefore, I judge it to be established that there is a movement within the theology of Herrmann, et al., which tends towards the creation of a theological position which might be considered, even by Barth, to be a point of departure for the creation of another theological position, which would understand itself to offer a radical critique of that from which it had departed.

The above conclusion seems hardly contentious, and Barth's, "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann", would seem to exemplify this position. Indeed, this is confirmed again at the commencement of, Die Christliche Dogmatik, (1927) where Barth states, 'I could only view the dogmatics of my respected teacher Wilhelm Herrmann as the final stage of a development with which, with all good will, I could only make a break.' (148) However, although, as Berkhof notes, 'Barth did not again involve himself so explicitly with Herrmann's theology.', this should not be taken to mean that the
subsequent development of Barth's thought reflects a movement away from Herrmann (even if Barth so understands it). Thus, he suggests that:

'now that we can survey Barth's development as a whole from a much greater historical distance, the last word has to be not "break" but "ambivalence."' (149)

What then does Berkhof intend by this statement? He is well aware that there are, 'clear and deep', differences between Herrmann and Barth, in respect of many aspects of their theology. However, as noted above, he is equally aware that, in respect of the rejection of Natural Theology and metaphysics, and the development of a rigorous Christocentrism, Barth gives a, 'methodological centrality', to, 'essential(ly)...Herrmannian', concepts. Further, as noted above, these concepts acquired their significance at a later point in time, 'around 1930.', and express Barth's, 'mature thought'. (150)

What then, to pursue Berkhof's line of thought, are the implications for Barth's understanding of the self-revelation of God? Does he break with Herrmann? Or, in intending to depart from Herrmann, does Barth purpose to leave, and having journeyed so to do, find himself upon a shore hauntingly familiar, the accidental features of which were somewhat changed by the restless tide, but which was, in substance, the place from whence he came?

In turning to look at a particularly illuminating passage from, "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann", (151) wherein Barth discusses the closing (and, as he notes, significantly altered) chapter of Herrmann's, Dogmatik, (that is, '$58 The doctrine of the Trinity' (152)) we see him highlighting the fact that there is in Herrmann a recognition that, 'the little word "self" suddenly appears not to be the last word'. Barth
suggests that this, 'little word "self"', understood primarily in terms of its anthropological significance, has a particular meaning for Herrmann. However, as noted, he further contends that it is not, 'the last word'. (153) He quotes Herrmann to the effect that, 'The way to the Christian religion is the unconditioned will to truth or to submission to facts which we ourselves experience. But its beginning and its end is none the less man's humbling of himself before the unsearchable.' (154) Thereafter, he writes:

'There is no word more significant for Herrmann's theology than the word "self". His theology stands or falls with the assertions that man must "himself" will, yet cannot; and then must "himself" experience or receive the revelation. But in this passage, [that is, in the Herrmann quote above] just before the door shuts, we are told that not only at the end but also at the beginning of the "submission" (as so understood) to facts, there must occur another wholly different "submission", man's humbling himself before the "eternal mystery" which God must remain to us; and even that there is danger of the loss of the eternal life which had before seemed secured to us in the communion with the same God depending on that first submission...The consummation of our life in communion with God depends on this second, wholly different "submission" which has nothing to do with the first, the "submission" of the "self"-experienced...Herrmann knows that one does not "experience" God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the mystery of God. "Even where he reveals himself, God continues to dwell in darkness."' (155)

Further, Barth stresses that, for Herrmann, 'the acceptance of this mystery is not...a luxury which can be discarded'. Indeed, he points out that, '(it is Herrmann who says it, not I) it is the beginning and end of the "way of religion".' (156) Thus, as Barth reads Herrmann, 'the absoluteness of our will for "self"-experience', stands under, and is bounded by, the doctrine of the Trinity. (157) Having thus exegeted Herrmann, Barth is forced to concede that the passage quoted is a veritable hapax legomenon in the Herrmann corpus, but he may
contend, 'None the less, it does stand here and it
confronts us with a question which affects the whole.'
(158) Even indeed, when he may further concede that there
is the possibility that Herrmann would regard his own
statement on the Trinity as being, 'one of those
"reflections of faith" belonging to the second,
supplementary part of dogmatics.', (159) (It should be
noted that Herrmann never actually states this in his,
Dogmatik. Equally, elsewhere in the, Dogmatik, it may be
noted that he maintains distinctions between the primary
ground of faith and secondary reflections upon faith, as
in his treatment of the Resurrection. (160)) he refuses
to rest at the point where Herrmann does. That is, he
refuses to rest at the point where Herrmann has correctly
stated the truth of the matter, but then failed to draw
out the implications of that truth (as Barth understands
them). He continues:

'if one has once had the idea that at the beginning and
end...there stands the majesty of the Triune God, the
Father whom none sees except in the Son who is One with
him and through the Spirit who again is One with him; if
one has once thought that God is eternally Subject and
never object, that he determines himself and is knowable
exclusively through himself in "pure act" (actus
purissimus) of his Triune Personality - then one has
thought it and must continue to think it. The thought
cannot afterwards be put in brackets as just a
"reflection of faith".' (161)

Thereafter, Barth contends, 'It becomes obligatory to ask
whether dogmatics does not have to begin where Herrmann
ends. Herrmann on paper naturally rebuts me. But there is
also a Herrmann in heaven, who perhaps does not offer a
rebuttal.' (162) (We may observe that, in the context of
the hapax legomenon, Herrmann does not rebut Barth.)

Therefore, we may readily comprehend Berkhof's sentiment
when he contends that, 'Barth decisively took his leave
of the school of Herrmann; but even as one who had said

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his good-byes he remained a Herrmannian of a higher order.', (163) and with this view I wholly concur.

Thus, it seems to me that we have come very close to the point at which we might agree with Fisher's contention that, at this decisive point, 'Herrmann intended to use the term Selbst both theologically and anthropologically, so that the human "self" was defined theologically and God's revelatory activity upon the individual anthropologically'. (164) Barth, in attempting to, 'begin where Herrmann ends.', may be judged to be at the point where Berkhof judged Herrmann to be when the latter, in conceiving faith as, 'based on something above history and beyond the reach of (historical) research, namely...on "the inner life of Jesus."', finally severs the, 'essential connection between revelation and history.' (165) Equally, we may concur with his parallel judgement that, 'In Barth this "base" is totally gone...The retreat has become a clean break.' (166)

Barth's position, which is endorsed by T.F. Torrance and viewed as the definitive solution to the correlation of the human subject to the Divine Subject, will be fully outlined in the following Chapter. However, to anticipate somewhat, we may summarise the manner in which Barth deploys his concept of the self-revelation of God, in order to observe the principal continuities and discontinuities between himself and Herrmann.

Barth's, 'begin(ning) where Herrmann ends.', would seem to me to commence with an attempt to reconceive, 'the proper correlation of man to God'. Thus, he may be understood as attempting to relocate the human subject (the 'self-') within a Christological perspective, (that is, within the humanity of Christ) and to have transferred that subject from the human side of the
correlation to the divine. Therefore, in terms of, 'the proper correlation of man to God', the place of the human subject is to be found within a Christological framework. In so doing Barth removes this correlation from the ambiguities of human history and lifts it into, what we might term, divine history. Thus, he may be judged to have altered the form of the concept of the self-revelation of God, as compared with that which is to be found in Herrmann.

However, equally, (and in my view, better) it may be suggested that Barth has not so much altered the way in which we understand the human subject within, 'the proper correlation of man to God', as stood it upon its head. That is, he has altered the manner in which it is deployed. Thus, the form in which his conception of the self-revelation of God is to be found is not so much a radical alteration of Herrmann's, as a radical inversion, (with respect to the human subject) with the basic form unaltered. However, in so doing, it does not seem to me that he has altered the substance which that concept seeks to express. In Herrmann, the concept seeks to express, 'the proper correlation of man to God', with the essential, 'bi-polar(ity)', of the concept being fully recognised. In Barth this recognition is no less so. That notwithstanding, it seems to me that Barth's solution to the 'problem' of the place of the human subject in the midst of the ambiguities of human history, is no better a one than that which is offered by Herrmann. At this point we may recall the, 'surprising conclusion', drawn by A. McGrath, with respect to Barth. He writes:

'Barth's Christology is constructed within precisely the same framework as those of the Aufklärung...Although Barth inverts the nineteenth century subject-object relation in respect to God and man, his central interest remains the anthropologically conditioned question concerning man's knowledge of his situation.' (167)
We may not fully agree with McGrath's suggestion as to Barth's, 'central interest', (Barth clearly intends to pursue another, 'interest') but we may agree with him in the suggestion that what has taken place in Barth may best be termed an 'inversion' of the, 'subject-object relation', which prevailed in the Nineteenth Century.

It should be repeated that it is Barth's intention to offer a better 'solution' than that which is offered by Herrmann, and, further, that he understands himself to have done so. With respect to the solutions offered, the position which was realised in the teaching of Herrmann, and that which was realised by Barth, are helpfully summed up for us by Moltmann. He writes:

'Herrmann - this was his Kantian heritage - had taken it to be self-evident that revelation cannot be objectively grounded...The non-objectifiability of God and the non-objectifiability of each peculiar existence or each peculiar "self" constituted one and the same mystery for him. The ungroundable character of God and the ungroundable character and gratuitous of life that is lived merged for him into one. That is why he held knowledge of God to be the "defenceless expression of religious experience".' (168)

Further, he suggests that, for Herrmann, the presence of God in the midst of this world is known to us through, 'self-reflection', that is, through secondary reflection upon our experience whereby we grasp the reality of life in a manner which is foreclosed to science. Thus, he suggests, 'For that reason we cannot say of God what he objectively is, but only what effect he has on ourselves.' (169) In turning to Barth, Moltmann may then contend that:

'For Barth, however, this defenceless non-groundability of religious experience cannot yet claim the required autopistia and autousia, but can only be a pointer towards the ground that is really grounded in itself,
that "is never in any sense "object", but is always unchangeably subject"...Nor does the negative talk of the non-provability, the non-groundability and the non-objectifiability of God yet achieve that change of thought which Barth demands - the change to the transcendental subjectivity, expressed in trinitarian terms, of the God who reveals himself to man in the act of the Deus dixit.' (170)

It is the effecting of this, 'change', which Barth offers as a solution to the problem presented by the human subject. That is, he seeks to break from Herrmann, 'by separating...the non-objectifiable subjectivity of God in the act of the Deus dixit from the subjectivity of man, that is, God's "self" from "man's self"'. (171) Further, Barth relocates the human subject (the 'self-') within a Christological perspective, and thus transfers that subject into what he might term, 'the proper correlation of man to God'. This then entails a concept of the self-revelation of God in which the proper place of the human subject, as well as the Divine Subject, is to be comprehended as residing on, to put it colloquially, the divine side of the equation. Thereafter, Moltmann may contend, as noted by Berkhof, (172) that:

'In this way Herrmann's "self" acquires in Barth a theological form. Yet it should be noted that it still retains all the attributes, all the relations and distinctions, in which it had been formulated by Herrmann.' (173)

Therefore, Barth, in attempting to, 'begin where Herrmann ends.', may be viewed as one who had sought to journey far from his place of origin; and, having circumnavigated the theological globe, has returned to his place of departure, except that he now enters by a different gate.

Undoubtedly, the radical inversion of the form of the concept of the self-revelation which has occurred in Barth's thought, with respect to the place of the human
subject, must be viewed as a determined attempt to effect the, 'change', which he sought. However, for all that, we must ask, Does the theological substance (that is, the self-revelation of God) which Barth's 'change(d)' form encapsulates, differ radically from that which is encapsulated in Herrmann's?

Berkhof, it seems to me, points to that evidence which would lead to our answering such a question negatively. He suggests that Barth felt compelled, by increasing secularisation, to, 'withdraw revelation even further from the world.', (that is, even further than Herrmann had done) such that his position is best understood as a radicalisation of that adopted by Herrmann. Thus, he understands that in Barth there takes place a severing of, 'the connection between Geschich 

te and Historie.' (174) Further, Berkhof suggests that this severing, particularly evident in, The Epistle to the Romans, was not overcome in the, Church Dogmatics. He writes:

'In his Church Dogmatics (Barth) attempted to bring Geschicht 

e and Historie closer together in his thinking. But even there he failed to reach clarity on this decisive issue in modern theology. In regard to this problem Barth, with his base in the transcendental subjectivity of God, did not surpass Herrmann, who dealt with it on the basis of the transcendental subjectivity of the religious man. From either point of departure human history is merely a neutral instrument.' (175)

In an identical manner, Moltmann suggests that Barth's understanding of the self-, 'still retains even in the idea of the self-revelation of God its old reflective note from the thought of Herrmann.' He writes:

'It contains the reflection that arises when God can no longer be proved from the world after the manner of the proofs of God, and it is to that extent a polemic term encumbered by the problem complex of the provability of God.' (176)
Indeed, Moltmann judges that, even in Barth's attempt to develop the concept of the self-revelation of God within a context which is, formally speaking, Trinitarian, (as in, C.D. I/1) 'the immanent form of the divine Trinity appears to give the revelation of God the character of transcendental exclusiveness as a "self-contained novum".' (177) Thus, the potentially Trinitarian character of Barth's concept is negated by the fact that it is, in the final analysis, conditioned by its origins in the transcendental subjectivity of God. (This conclusion would seem to me to cohere entirely (though not from Barth's point of view, deliberately) with Barth's own analysis of his relationship to Herrmann's thought, as highlighted above. (178)) Moltmann is, of course, fully aware that Barth has revised, 'the transcendental eschatology of his dialectical phase.' However, he judges that such revision (with respect to matters transcendental) must surely involve such a revision of Barth's concept of the self-revelation of God as he himself did not carry out, even in the later volumes of the, Church Dogmatics. (179)

Therefore, in conclusion, the answer to our question, Does the theological substance of the concept of the self-revelation of God which Barth's 'change(d)' form encapsulates, differ radically from that which is encapsulated in Herrmann's ?, would seem to be, No. For all that the stated intention is to stand in discontinuity with the line of the house of Ritschl, (and for all that we might judge that Barth does so, with respect to other theological issues) we might reasonably judge that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that, in respect of the theological substance of the concept of the self-revelation of God, there is a basic continuity in the thought of Herrmann and Barth, albeit that the form within which it is encapsulated is construed in a
different manner. Thus, and again, we may contend that Herrmann's understanding of the self-revelation of God constitutes an indispensable preface to any attempt at understanding the parallel concept in the thought of Karl Barth.

v) Nachwort

If the suggestion that Herrmann and Barth's concepts of the self-revelation of God are best to be understood as variant manifestations of the same genus, and thus intimately related, still rather defies the prevailing scenario with respect to the Herrmann-Barth relationship, (that is, one of radical discontinuity between them) what might we make of H.R. Mackintosh's report, (cited with approval in, Types of Modern Theology) of a comment made to him by Wilhelm Herrmann, when the latter said, 'I regard myself as infinitely nearer to Nicaea than either Schleiermacher or Ritschl. They put Christ alongside of God, and argued from one to the other; in Christ I find God personally present.' ? (180) Does not Herrmann's understanding of the self-revelation of God deliver to us precisely that which Torrance understands Barth's to deliver ? At the very least, we might judge that H.R. Mackintosh understood it to be so !
CHAPTER 4 - RITSCHL AND HERRMANN ON REVELATION AND THE CONCEPT OF THE SELF-REVELATION OF GOD - AN INDISPENSABLE PREFACE TO BARTH'S THOUGHT

1 E. Jüngel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, 56.


7 Ibid., 3.

8 Ibid., 2-3.

9 Ibid., 6.

10 Idem, Instruction in the Christian Religion, 221.


12 Ibid., 6-7.

13 Ibid., 7. See also, Idem, Theology and Metaphysics, 203-209.

14 Ibid., 7.

15 Ibid., 7.


18 Idem, Theology and Metaphysics, 209.

19 Ibid., 209.

20 Ibid., 209.


22 Ibid., 196.


24 Ibid., 150.


27 Ibid., 152.
28 Ibid., 153.
29 Ibid., 153.
30 Ibid., 153.
31 Ibid., 153.
33 Ibid., 24.
34 Ibid., 24.
35 See, Ibid., 'The scientific conditions of Systematic Theology', 14-25.
36 See, Ibid., 19-20, for confirmation that Ritschl's approbation of Lotze in 1881 was no transitory state. The Third Edition of The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation Vol. III, was published in 1888.
37 Ibid., 24.
38 Ibid., 202.
39 Ibid., 202.
40 Ibid., 237.
41 Ibid., 272-273.
42 Ibid., 273.
43 Ibid., 388.
44 Ibid., 273.
46 Ibid., 436.
48 Ibid., 275.

52 H.R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, 279.

53 Ibid., 279. See also, 423.

54 Ibid., 286.

55 Ibid., 410.


57 Ibid., 175.

58 Ibid., 155, 175.

59 Ibid., 174.


'The line of thought set forth here has been met by the contemptuous objection that it bases Christianity upon morality. The sapient persons who thus prefer the charge that I, like Kant in his *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, make religion a subordinate appendix to morals, though my mode of doctrine shows the very opposite, would do better to acquire a thorough knowledge of the elementary distinction between the ratio essendi and the ratio cognoscendi, instead of sitting in judgment upon me.'

Karl Barth's comments in respect of this matter are of interest. He writes:

'the basic subordination of theology to ethics became and remained the rule, to which at any rate the leading theologians of modern times have adhered. This constituted the very nerve of the theology of A. Ritschl, and even at the beginning of our own century it was the firmest point of agreement between the two heirs of Ritschl who are otherwise furthest apart, W. Herrmann and E. Troeltsch.' (C.D.I/2, 786)

See also, *C.D. II/1*, 270.


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63 S. Fisher, Revelatory Positivism ?, 125.

64 A. Ritschl, Theology and Metaphysics, 187.

65 Ibid., 187.

66 Ibid., 187-188.

67 Ibid., 186-187.


69 W. Herrmann, Die Religion im Verhältnis zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit (Halle: Max Riemeyer, 1879).


71 Ibid., 5-6. See also, 56.

72 Ibid., 6.


78 Ibid., 154.

79 Ibid., 154-155.

80 J.C. O'Neill, The Bible's Authority, 286.
84 Ibid., 40.
85 Ibid., 41.
86 Ibid., 42.
87 Ibid., 42. See also, 47-48.
93 Ibid., 152.
102 Ibid., 33.
103 Ibid., 34.
104 Ibid., 34.
105 Ibid., 34.
106 Ibid., 34.
109 Ibid., 145.
116 Ibid., 52.
118 J. Moltmann, Op. Cit., 52 n.3
120 Ibid., 115.
121 W. Herrmann, Communion with God, 71-72.
124 Idem, Systematic Theology, 51.
125 Idem, Communion with God, 72.
126 Ibid., 72-73.
127 Ibid., 75.

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128 Ibid., 74.
129 Idem, Systematic Theology, 51.
130 Ibid., 49.
131 Ibid., 49.
132 H. Thielicke, Modern Faith and Thought, 349.
133 Ibid., 352.
135 Ibid., 117.
136 H. Berkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1989), 198-199.
137 Ibid., 200.
138 Ibid., 200. The general thesis that there is a far greater continuity between the Barth of the, C.D. I/1, and beyond, and the earlier Barth, is advanced cogently (and, in my view, decisively) by B.L. McCormack, in, A Scholastic of a Higher Order: The Development of Karl Barth's Theology, 1921-1931 2 Vol.s (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1989). Unfortunately, McCormack's work explicitly notes that, because of, 'Considerations of space', (Ibid., 379) he will not treat Barth's essay, "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann", from 1925, (See, Idem, Theology and Church, 238-271.) Nonetheless, the general thrust of McCormack's position may be gathered from the following programmatic statement:

'For most, the name Karl Barth is synonymous with "Neo-Orthodoxy". Recent revisionist work in Germany and Switzerland has done much to shatter that image..."Neo-Orthodoxy" is a most unhelpful way of describing Barth's theological achievement because it suggests the presence of a repristinating spirit which was actually lacking...The lessons learned during Barth's "dialectical phase" were never simply left behind. Unfortunately, past interpretations of Barth's development have concealed this by depicting a turn from dialectic to analogy (associated with Barth's 1931 book on Anselm), thus giving the impression that Barth's dogmatic work represented a drastic departure from his earlier dialectical theology. The net effect has been to reinforce the "Neo-Orthodox" stereotype.' (from the, "Abstract". See, Ibid., 1-15, passim.)
As will be obvious, this general thesis stands opposed to that propounded in, T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology 1910-1931, passim.


140 Ibid., 199.

141 K. Barth, "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann", in, Idem, Theology and Church, 253. See also, 239.


143 Ibid., 146.

144 Ibid., 146-147. The inherent difficulties which Herrmann's procedure involved are well exposed in, B.W. Sockness, "The Ideal and the Historical in the Christology of Wilhelm Herrmann: The Promise and Perils of Revisionary Christology", in, Journal of Religion 72 (1992), 366-388.

145 Ibid., 197-198.

146 Ibid., 198.


150 Ibid., 200.

151 K. Barth, "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann", in, Idem, Theology and Church, 253-256.

152 W. Herrmann, Systematic Theology, 151-152.


154 Ibid., 253-254, citing, W. Herrmann, Systematic Theology, 152.

156 Ibid., 254-255.

157 Ibid., 255.

158 Ibid., 255.

159 Ibid., 255.

160 W. Herrmann, Systematic Theology, 125-127.


162 Ibid., 256.


166 Ibid., 198.

167 A. McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 110. See also, 112.


169 Ibid., 54.

170 Ibid., 54.

171 Ibid., 61.


175 Ibid., 201.


178 See, for example, K. Barth, Op. Cit., 256.

179 J. Moltmann, Op. Cit., 57. C.E. Gunton points to Moltmann's identification of Barth's failure to revise his concept of th self-revelation of God, as a possible explanation for Barth's partial inability to sustain an adequate understanding of the nature of theological development. That is, because the event in which God reveals Himself is conceived of as essentially timeless, the said event is limited as a motivating force for the facilitation of an understanding of the nature of development in theological thought. Thus, this unrevised concept (if such it is, and Gunton does not wholly endorse Moltmann at this point) takes us little further than a static conception in which theological truth is conceived as being a, 'deposit', with the task of the theologian being to restate that which is deposited. See, C.E. Gunton, "Karl Barth and the development of Christian doctrine", in, SJTh 25 (1972), 171-180, 175.

We have already devoted considerable attention to T.F. Torrance's understanding of the history of theology, and suggested that this is intimately related to his conception of the nature of God's revelation. Equally, we have noted that the latter is particularly tied to his perception of the concept of the self-revelation of God, especially as he believes it to have been mediated to him by Barth. This, in turn, is based on the assumption of a discontinuity between Ritschlian thought, and the thought of Barth; and, as we have seen, on the assumption of a discontinuity between the earlier Mackintosh and the later Mackintosh. However, we have lacked a full presentation of Torrance's understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God, and this deficiency I will now remedy. We will, of course, highlight the extent to which Torrance understands his approach to derive from that of Barth, especially where Torrance sees that approach as placing himself and Barth in discontinuity with their theological predecessors.

Initially, I shall seek to demonstrate the manner in which Torrance utilised an understanding of the nature of God's revelation which was derived from Barth, and, more specifically, a concept of the self-revelation of God. Further, in order to focus directly on the theological issues which lie at the heart of our concern, I shall take Torrance's work, Theological Science, as the quintessential expression of his theological position, and shall highlight the degree to which he perceives his own approach as offering the possibility of a new direction in theology and theological method. That is, he offers an approach discontinuous with previously
prevailing approaches. Thereafter, I shall seek to offer an extended critique of that position.

i) T.F. Torrance, 1941-1955

The earliest significant indication of the extent to which Torrance shall utilise the concept of the self-revelation of God, is to be found in the pamphlet, *The Modern Theological Debate*, (1941) (1) which I would judge to reflect an early indebtedness to the thought of Karl Barth. (2) This I would maintain in spite of the absence of the name of Barth, which might be thought strange given that Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Herrmann, et al., are all mentioned. (3) The above mentioned theologians figure well nigh entirely on the debit side of the theological equation, while I would judge that Barth's theology provides (anonymously) that which lies on the credit side. Thus, having summed up the varied, and largely negative, attempts of religious thought to express the relationship between God and Man, Torrance believes that, 'modern theology must assert with vigour', that, for example:

'God is always Subject. He approaches me, and gives Himself to be known. Knowledge of God is through the self-authenticating Presence of God in His Personal Word. Here the ordinary relations of knowing are reversed. God is not dug out of the depths of the human spirit; He is fundamentally personal and transcendent...The living encounter of the Word of God as the only way in which men may "get over" to God.' (4)

Further, it must reassert, as a corollary of, 'the doctrine of justification by Grace alone', that, 'through Christ alone I may know God.', (5) and Torrance later notes that the coming of Christ is, 'The Self-bestowal of God to man'. (6) Thereafter, he turns to the question, 'How do we as a matter of fact come to know God ?', and suggests that we must first reckon with the question,
'Who is the God we know?'. He answers it thus:

'(a) He is the Self-Announcing God. He names His own name to us, for we cannot name Him. "I am the Lord thy God." This means that no other branch of knowledge is parallel to the knowledge of God, for here it is the object of knowledge that takes the initiative. Knowledge of God is, strictly, being known by God; a relationship in which God is always Subject. (b) He is the Self-Existing God...(c) He is the Self-Asserting God...(d) He is the Self-Giving God. God gives Himself to us, and all our relations with Him have their ground in His action...This Self-Giving is fundamental to all these statements, and has been implied already in that the Self-Existing God gives Himself'. (7)

In turn, one of the corollaries that Torrance draws from this is that:

'Since God's reality is grounded on Himself alone, therefore the truth concerning God is grounded on God, or in itself; it is self-authenticating, self-explaining, and self-communicating. There is no norm or judgment by which we can prove the truth of God's Word; it can only be accepted on a ground that is self-evidencing on the part of the truth itself.' (8)

Further, Torrance maintains that Creation brings to us no possibility of a knowledge of God, 'For God is revealed by an act identical with Himself, and not by one that is distinct from Himself (as in creation).' (9) Alongside this, Torrance avers that, 'We must distinguish between the form and content of the Bible', such that he maintains that Revelation is not to be found in the, 'human language', of the Bible, 'as such', but rather does it come to us when Revelation breaks through, 'the veil of flesh', which is the, 'human language'. Thus, Torrance may suggest, 'Parallel to God's incognito in Jesus, our Lord hid His Word in parables.' (10)

Therefore, Torrance believes that, 'theology must assert that no knowledge of God is possible outside Revelation and faith', and that no, 'religious "a priori"', that is,
'some form of "analogia entis"', may be imported into the task of theology in order to interpret that Revelation. Further, the impact of Revelation is such that it brings about a complete reorientation of our conception of the subject-object relationship, 'in which the object of our knowledge assumes the role of subject and takes the initiative.' (11) He continues:

'That is really a way of saying that theological knowledge is unique, and what faith knows is essentially a self-contained "novum"...It is by acknowledgement of, and obedience to, the Self-Revelation of God that reason attains the the conformity to its object necessary for faith'. (12)

We have reproduced, at reasonable length, Torrance's understanding of the nature of Revelation, as it may be found in 1941, in order to allow some judgement to be made as to the extent of his early indebtedness to Barth. Thus, it would seem that, even though the name of Barth is absent, it is the theology of Barth, (as Torrance had knowledge of it (13)) and certain characteristic themes of the opening volumes of the, Church Dogmatics, (14) to which Torrance is indebted.

Equally, having indicated the extent to which Torrance appropriates elements of Barth's thought, it is worth noting that, negatively speaking, he also appropriates the same theological adversaries as Barth. Thus, by choosing to stand in continuity with Barth, Torrance stands in discontinuity with Barth's theological predecessors. Thus, he writes that:

'Ritschl is the evil influence in theology. His contribution to the debate was the doctrine of epistemology in which Revelation is interpreted by means of value-judgments...Neo-Protestantism has made a return to Catholicism via Ritschl, teaching the pagan doctrine of self-justification, only in a way much more subtle and refined than that of Catholicism'. (15)
Further, he regards, 'The great modern liberal theological movement - men such as Ritschl, Kaftan, Harnack, Herrmann, etc.' (16) as having failed to take the Incarnation seriously, such that, 'the historical humanity of Christ is thereby denied', and, 'the importance of Christ's person', passed over. (17)

Therefore, the appropriation of Barth's thought brought with it a concomitant rejection of another stream of thought. Equally, while aware of that stream, there is deemed to be no possibility of a fruitful engagement with it. By the same token, there is no mention of any inheritance from the, 'modern liberal theological movement'; and, in relation to our particular concern, no mention of the possibility of a concept such as the self-revelation of God being derived from Herrmann.

The importance of a proper understanding of the nature of God's self-revelation, continues to be exhibited in a number of Torrance's early writings, (18) though he continues to exhibit a certain ambivalence in respect of his own approbation of Barth. Thus, in a review of Cornelius Van Til's, The New Modernism : An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner, (1947) he embarks on his rebuttal of Van Til's view, by suggesting that he does so, 'without wishing to identify himself with the views of Barth and Brunner', (19) such that it appears that he was not yet confident enough to affirm his own position as one aligned to that of Barth. However, from that same year onwards such reticence fades, as is evidenced in his contribution to the Barth Festschrift, Reformation Old and New, that is, "The Word of God and the Word of Man". (20)

In this article Torrance takes up some of the concerns noted above, and presents these as placing Barth in
continuity with the Reformed faith. Thus, he sees in Barth a revivification of certain aspects of the theology of Calvin; and, for example, Barth is understood to hold, 'in his essential position', a view on the question of natural theology, which is, 'not different from Calvin.' Therefore, when Calvin speaks of man's natural religion as a, 'shadow religion', (21) Torrance sees this paralleling Barth's rejection of natural theology, when the latter refers to this as, '"the shadow-side" of the Revelation of God.' (22) In particular, he takes Barth to say that the only foundation for our knowledge of God, lies in that, 'which was laid in Christ Jesus, the Self-revelation of God.' (23) This does not mean that we reject on metaphysical grounds the possibility of a natural theology, rather we do so only upon the grounds of, 'the actual event of grace as setting it (that is, natural theology) completely aside for faith.' (24) For Torrance, there is in Barth a championing of the essence of the Reformed position, such that Christ, understood as, 'the Self-revelation of God.', becomes the, 'ground for the Reformed polemic against the incursion of natural theology.' (25) Further, when Calvin teaches that God, 'In His revelation...accommodates Himself in His Word to the capacity of our understanding', (26) Torrance sees this paralleled in Barth's development of the concept of analogy, such that, 'it might be argued that the whole of his theological position is based on a vigorous affirmation of analogy, but it is an analogy of grace, not an analogy of being'. (27) Thus, God gives Himself to be known, and the means by which we apprehend this revelation is based upon an analogy which, 'must correspond with the essential motion of grace.' (28)

A further indication of Torrance's developing position is found in his public correspondence in 1952 with Prof. Brand Blanshard, on the subject of, "The Theology of Karl
Barth". (29) Here, Torrance opposes the, 'antiquated blunder', of treating Barth and Brunner as representatives of, 'the "theology of crisis"', which he judges to lie at the heart of Blanshard's approach. Instead, Torrance suggests that a more helpful guide is to be found in the recently published book by Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Barth, Deutung und Darstellung seiner Theologie, in which the latter highlights the centrality of a Christologically conditioned concept of analogy for our knowledge of God. (30) Torrance is particularly determined to rescue Barth from the, 'charge of anti-rationalism', (31) and suggests that here Blanshard has particularly failed to grasp the significance of the self-revelation of God. For, in Torrance's view, 'autonomous reason', in its determination, 'to behave in terms of itself and its own norms', cannot but be offended at God's revelation. Equally, Torrance maintains that Barth's theology is the rational theology par excellence, if we understand the, 'elementary principle of science that the nature of the object must prescribe the specific mode of the activity of reason, and that reason must answer appropriately to the object given.' (32) Thus, Torrance contends:

"it would surely be a highly unscientific and irrational way for reason to behave if when directed to know the living God it refused to answer appropriately to His Self-revelation, but insisted instead that God must conform to the categories that reason had acquired elsewhere in "common sense and reason."' (33)

Further, Torrance sees Barth maintaining a view in which, 'the objective revelation of God in the historical Christ is archetypal', such that this, 'objective revelation...governs all our theological analogies', with the result that there is no possibility of constructing an independent natural theology. (34)
Torrance may now be seen as having gradually consolidated his understanding of the nature of God's self-revelation in Christ, such that in an assessment of Barth's significance, from 1955, he contends that:

'Barth insists that reason is unconditionally bound to its object and is determined by it, and that the nature of the object must prescribe the specific mode of the activity of reason. Faith is this reason directed to the knowledge of God and involves a way of knowing that answers to the nature of the unique and incomparable object, the Living God, that refuses to prescribe arbitrarily to the object how it is to be known, and that humbly tries to be obedient to Divine Revelation in Jesus Christ alone as given to us in the Holy Scriptures.' (35)

Thus, we see, prescribed in the above, the form under which theological knowledge is to be found, derived by Torrance from Barth. He has not so far consistently worked out the substantial content of that knowledge.

Therefore, in looking back over the period 1941-1955, we see Torrance gradually beginning to affirm a commitment to an understanding of the nature of God's revelation which is dependent on characteristic themes and concepts drawn from Barth. That understanding is present, in embryonic form, at an early stage, but it is only over the period sketched that it begins to gradually emerge.

However, it may be suggested that the notion of a gradual development in Torrance's commitment to an understanding akin to Barth, is at odds with the way in which he has been typically portrayed, that is, as a fully-fledged Barthian from his very earliest days. Indeed, this portrayal owes not a little to Torrance's own self-portrayal. (36) In response to this, I can only suggest that the evidence from this period points to the sort of understanding of his development which I am suggesting. Equally, in looking at Torrance's doctoral dissertation
from the University of Basel, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers, (37) to which we might have turned in the expectation of finding evidence of a commitment to Barthian themes, we find, I judge, no particular evidence of this. (38) This said, it is equally true that Torrance now stands on the threshold of a fully developed commitment to an understanding of the self-revelation of God whose most obvious source is Karl Barth.

ii) T.F. Torrance, 1956-1962

The year 1956 sees what I take to be the first systematic outworking of Torrance's understanding of the nature of God's self-revelation, in a manner which may be regarded as unequivocally derived from Barth. Thus, in, "The Place of Christology in Biblical and Dogmatic Theology", (39) Torrance explicitly acknowledges his, 'indebtedness throughout', to, C.D. I/2, the English translation of which he had been overseeing at this time. (40) He begins the article by stating the form under which knowledge of God is to be found. He writes:

'Christian knowledge of God arises out of the self-revelation of God in and through Jesus Christ, for in Him the Word of God has become man in the midst of man's estrangement from God, committing Himself to human understanding and creating communion between man and God. Biblical and dogmatic theology is the careful unfolding and orderly articulation of this knowledge within the sphere of communion with God, i.e. the sphere of reconciliation into which we are drawn by the activity of His Word, and of the obedience of faith in which all our thinking and speaking is brought into conformity to the self-communication of His Word. The way which God has taken in Jesus Christ to reveal Himself and to reconcile us to Himself is the way which we have to make our own in all true understanding and thinking and speaking of Him. Theology, therefore, involves a knowledge which is determined and controlled in its content by what is given in Jesus Christ, and operates with a mode of rational activity which corresponds to the nature of the object of this knowledge in Jesus Christ. It is the incarnation of
the Word which prescribes to dogmatic theology both its matter and its method, so that whether in its activity as a whole or in the formulation of a doctrine in any part, it is the Christological pattern that will be made to appear. That does not mean that all theology can be reduced to Christology, but because there is only one Mediator between God and man, the Man Christ Jesus, in the orderly presentation of the doctrines of the Christian faith, every doctrine will be expressed in its inner coherence with Christology at the centre, and in its correspondence to the objective reality of God's revelation in Jesus Christ who is true God and true Man.' (41)

This opening paragraph of, "The Place of Christology in Biblical and Dogmatic Theology", serves to make explicit the source, and future direction, of Torrance's thought, and to indicate that the concept of the self-revelation of God is to the fore in his thinking. Thus, Torrance does not see his proposed direction as signalling the working out of, 'a logical system...after the fashion of scholastic theology', nor is it a development out of the resources provided by, 'religious consciousness'. Rather, he sees the task of theology in terms of its conformity to that which is revealed in the giving of the Word of God made flesh in Christ, that is, 'to the activity of the Word'. He sees this, 'activity', taking place in, 'three stages', which, 'correspond to the activity of the Word', their being seen:

'in the incarnation of the Word, in the apostolic foundation of the Church, in the disciplined articulation of the Church's understanding of the Word.' (42)

Let us then examine in detail the first of these, 'three stages', (since it is the stage primarily concerned with the theme of the self-revelation of God) that is, '1. The Incarnation of the Word of God', (43) in terms of its significance for an understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God.
a) The Incarnation as a, 'double fact'

For Torrance the Incarnation presents us with a, 'double fact', namely that:

'in Jesus Christ the Word of God has become man, has assumed a human form, in order as such to be God's language to man, and that in Jesus Christ there is gathered up and embodied, in obedient response to God, man's true word to God and his true speech about God. Jesus Christ is at once the complete revelation of God to man and the correspondence on man's part to that revelation required by it for the fulfilment of its own revealing moment.' (44)

Thus, in Christ, we have, summed up in His Person, the revelation of God, and, man's response to that revelation, with the latter being required by the former, 'for the fulfilment of its own revealing moment.' Therefore, for the revelation of God's self to reach its goal, it is, 'required', that there be a response from the self of man. Indeed, this response, on the part of man, may be said to, 'belong to the the content of God's complete revelation of Himself to man.', (45) for it would seem that the concept of the revelation of God's self precludes the possibility of it, 'return(ing) void to God.' (46) Torrance may then conclude from this, 'that there is an essential bi-polarity in God's revelation of Himself to man.', (47) and then continue by suggesting:

'In other words, the incarnation shows us that God reveals Himself (God) in terms of what is not-God (man), that revelation is given to us only in terms of what it is not, in the humanity of those to whom it is given, so that from first to last we have to reckon with an essential bi-polarity.' (48)

b) The Significance of the Humanity of Christ

So then, we understand that it is, 'only...in the humanity of...(man)', that we find the self of God
revealed, as that humanity is assumed by Christ. Further, Torrance affirms that, 'We cannot divide between the so-called form and content, between the human word of revelation and revelation itself', such that revelation, coming, 'in the form of the humanity of Christ...is of the very substance of revelation.' (49) To underline this once more, Torrance states that, 'revelation is determined and shaped by the Humanity of Christ', (50) such that we find revelation to be exclusively mediated through, and exclusively found, in Christ. He may then sum up the place of Christ, by suggesting that:

'Jesus Christ is the Truth, Truth as God is Truth, and that same Truth in the form of Man, Truth answering itself, Truth assuming its own true form from the side of man and from within man. As such He is not only the Truth of God in man, but the Truth for man and in man, and therefore the Truth of man.' (51)

Throughout the course of his argument, Torrance stresses that, 'revelation is...(a) real act of man achieved through human obedience to the word of God.' (52), and that the incarnation was a, 'true human life truly lived in our actual humanity.', such that even Jesus Christ may be described as a, 'Believer.', in His responsiveness to the act of revelation. Thus, revelation gives, 'the human full place within the divine action issuing forth out of man's life.', for the obedience of Jesus is not to be seen in instrumental terms, 'but (as) an integral and essential part in the divine revelation.' (53)

c) The Capacity for Revelation as the Gift of God

Nonetheless, Torrance is on guard against the suggestion that this might in any way be construed to imply that man has a, 'capacity for revelation.' Thus, he wishes to make it clear that God, 'open(s) up man', towards Himself, and that it is God who, 'realize(s) from the side of man his
understanding of revelation and his obedient response to it'. (54) Further, he concludes that:

'This capacity for revelation is not to be judged in terms of the receiver, as if he could achieve it on his own, but in terms of the Giver, the Father in Heaven...In other words, in revelation we have the divine assumption of our human word into union with God's own Word, effecting it as the human expression of the divine Word, and giving it, as such, real and full place as human word in obedience to the divine.' (55)

Therefore, to repeat, for Torrance:

'We are not concerned simply with a divine revelation which demands from us all a human response, but with a divine revelation which already includes a true and appropriate and fully human response as part of its achievement for us and to us and in us.' (56)

Thus, through the union in Christ of the divine nature and the human nature, we are confronted with, 'a divine-human Word', such that we cannot, 'separate out the human word from the divine, for the Word of God to us is precisely this one divine-human Word in the mutual involution of revelation and reconciliation.' (57)

d) The Incarnation and Theological Method

As well as spelling out the theological content of his understanding of the nature of revelation, Torrance points to the implications which this understanding has for theological method. For just as Torrance sees the form and content of God's self-revelation to be essentially integrated and amenable to presentation in an ordered manner, (58) so he understands that our theological knowledge is mediated to us precisely after the pattern in which it was formed. Thus, the, 'unique content', of our knowledge, that is, Christ, is matched by the, 'normative pattern', for our apprehension of that knowledge, (59) such that he may suggest that, '(Christ)
is not only the content of our theological knowledge but he provides for us in Himself the way which our theological knowledge must take.' (60)

Therefore, because through the incarnation we have, 'a divine-human Word', and because the, 'obedient humanity of Jesus Christ.', (61) provides the, 'normative pattern' of our knowing, Torrance concludes that, 'the Humanity of Jesus Christ is of essential importance for dogmatic procedure and method'. (62) He writes:

'The Humanity of Christ provides us not simply with an externally imposed norm for theological understanding and articulation, but the actual medium in and through which God acts upon our thinking and speaking, giving them an inner obedience to His Word through our participation in the holy Communion of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.' (63)

e) Christ as Truth

Thus, we receive our understanding of the self-revelation of God only through the humanity of Christ, for it was as, 'the Son of Adam', (64) that he entered into our experience of estrangement from God, and only as he so entered our experience may we receive an understanding of the self-revelation of God. Therefore, through the humanity of Christ, we are given to know, 'Jesus Christ as Himself the Truth', with His humanity being understood to be the, 'subjective reality', of the Truth. (65)

However, this is not to say that the, 'subjective reality of this Truth', may become a, 'separate theme for theology', (66) for the subjective reality of the Truth is grounded in the objective reality, and cannot, in principle, be separated from it. Torrance writes:

'That Humanity as the subjective reality of the Truth is already enclosed in the objective reality of the Truth: that is precisely the significance of the Humanity of Christ for the procedure of dogmatics. From end to end,
therefore dogmatic theology must be determined and shaped by the Humanity of the Son of God.' (67)

**f) Conclusion**

Therefore, we see that the incarnation has an unqualified significance for Torrance, insofar as it is understood as the locus of God's self-revelation. Knowledge of God arises exclusively out of God's self-giving, and the corollary of this is that there is no residual capacity for revelation to be found in human nature. However, the self-revelation of God is exclusively mediated to us through the humanity of Christ, such that we cannot know Christ apart from the humanity he assumed in the incarnation. Thus, Christ is, to us, the self-revelation of God, and, to God, the obedient response of Humanity to that self-revelation, that is, the objective reality of self-revelation and the subjective realisation of that same self-revelation. The pattern which our knowledge of this self-revelation must take is already indicated in its normative form in the event of the incarnation.

Thus, we can see that by 1956 Torrance has formulated a relatively self-consistent understanding of the nature of God's revelation, and had done so with conscious indebtedness to Barth. He has sought to do justice to the objective reality of God's self-revelation which finds its sole source in Christ, and we can hardly doubt his success in giving an account of that self-revelation which is highly objective in its form. Equally, he has sought to do justice to the subjective realisation of God's self-revelation, and believes that he has done so by grounding the source of that subjective realisation solely in our humanity, that is, as assumed by Christ.
This emphasis on Christ as the Truth is developed in, The School of Faith, when Torrance speaks of the, 'unique Truth in which Christ's Person and His Message are inseparably one.', and suggests that, 'It is this double character of Christian Truth which distinguishes it from all other truth.' (68) The significance of this is that when, 'He communicates Himself to us as the Word addressing us.', the intention is that there should be from us, 'a personal response in word.' (69) However, our human capacities do not produce that, 'personal response'. Rather, 'the response in word is put into our mouth by the Truth Himself.' (70) Torrance suggest that:

'What could be more appropriate to the fact that Christ has come not only to bring to us the Word of God, but in our name and on our behalf to bear the Word before God, i.e. give to God an account for us, and so to be the true Word of man in response to the Word of God ?' (71)

Thereafter, Torrance builds upon this foundation when he suggests that Reformed theology is essentially, 'dialogical'. 'That is to say, it is concerned with the address of the Word of God and the obedient response of faith.' (73) This conception of theology as being in essence a dialogue is integral to Torrance's thought, and, in affirming this, he seeks to reassert a truly Reformed, 'positive theology'. (73) What does Torrance intend by this ? He writes:

'here we have a conception of theology as the conformity of thought with its object, but here the object is God revealing Himself in his Word, encountering us as Subject, and addressing us as subjects over against Him and in communion with Him.' (74)

Therefore, the self-revelation of God creates, by its character, the way in which we apprehend that revelation, such that we may speak of His self-revelation establishing a dialogical relationship between ourselves
and God. Thus, 'it is in the obedient Humanity of Jesus Christ Himself that we are provided not only with the form of God's Revelation but with the true norm and pattern of all exposition of it.' (75) Further, Torrance suggests that our knowledge of Christ is, 'informed and determined from the start', (76) by God's intention to reveal Himself through Christ. Thus, we have no knowledge of Christ apart from His incarnation. He writes:

'(Christ) does not come to us in the flesh apart from His own Word and self-revelation...Christ cannot be separated from His mission of Revelation and Reconciliation or His Mediatorship, and therefore we cannot know Him "naked", as it were, without His "clothing". The only Christ we know is Christ clothed with His Gospel, and that is Christ with all His human life and historical acts and His self-communication to us through them.' (77)

This understanding of Christ, and the way in which we apprehend God's self-revelation, is fundamental to Torrance, and he perceives that the loss of such an understanding lies at the root of the difficulties which afflict Reformed theology when it seeks to present a coherent Christology. (78)

Thus Christ, in virtue of having assumed human nature, becomes the sole medium through which we may apprehend God's self-revelation, and He establishes a dialogical relationship between God and Man in His own person such that He is, both, Word of God, and, a perfect response to that Word. It could be objected at this point that, while it is established that Christ became a particular Man, His relationship to all men is not, by contrast, sufficiently well established. However, Torrance maintains that not only is Christ a, 'particular Man', but He is also ontologically related to all men. That is, Christ, 'is He in whom all men cohere for He is the Creator who gives them being and through His Spirit holds them in being.', such that it may be said that He has
established, 'an ontological relation between the creature and the Creator'. That is not to say that the Creator is in some way dependent on the creature, for, while there is an ontological relation, that relation, 'as Barth has so clearly and decisively shown, is not reversible.' (79) Torrance proposes that we understand the relationship between the, 'particular Man', and, 'all men', in the following terms. He writes:

'the Son and Word of God became man by becoming one particular Man, but because He is the Creator Word who became Man, even as the incarnate Word He still holds all men in an ontological relation to Himself. That relation was not broken off with the Incarnation.' (80)

Therefore, the self-revelation of God through Christ occurs in a manner which is universal in intention, and particular in its actuality. Further, the universality and the particularity are both, equally and firmly, rooted in the humanity assumed by Christ.

In his 1962 book, Karl Barth : An Introduction, Torrance notes that he does not intend to, 'expound the content of (Barth's) thought', rather that he intends to set out, 'the course of his debate with modern theology'. (81) Thus, there is less exposition of the theological content of the the self-revelation of God than might be anticipated, (82) such that it would seem to be assumed that it is integral to Barth's position, with that position being regarded as, in some sense, normative.

The above notwithstanding, the setting out of the course of the debate, alongside such exposition as is present, is indicative of Torrance's understanding of Barth. Thus, Torrance highlights the fact that, 'The primary factor which gave rise to dialectical thinking', as reflected in the Barth-Harnack exchange of 1923, was, quite simply, the question of revelation. (83) The, 'primary factor',

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being understood in the following terms:

'It was the new attempt to do justice to the witness of the Holy Scriptures to revelation, that is, not to the uncovering of some religious potentiality hidden in human nature, but to genuine Revelation as the act of God himself among men'. (84)

Alongside this, Torrance notes that, for Barth, Scripture is understood to point to, rather than to embody, the, 'Revelation we are concerned with'. (85) Further, he notes that, for Barth, any attempt to maintain that Scripture in itself embodies revelation is, in fact, a denial of the self-revelation of God. He writes, in his exposition of Barth, that:

'It is important, then, to recognise that in the Bible there is this "wall" between us and divine Revelation, namely, the man-conditioned and time-conditioned character of the witness. If we deny or ignore it, then we turn the Bible into an organ of direct and immediate oracular communication, and, in fact, deny Revelation itself, that is, deny God himself in his Revelation whom we hear and know only in decisive encounter and to whom we respond in faith and obedience.' (86)

Thereafter, Torrance highlights the fact that the, 'actuality of [the] communication of God's Word to us in the Bible is grounded in, and included within, the actuality of Revelation itself.' Thus, he suggests that, 'the Bible is the Word of God...because of the identity given them by the action of the Holy Spirit in speaking the Word of God in the Bible, and in enabling the Church to hear that Word in the human words of the Bible.' (87)

It should be noted that this exposition of Barth is of his thought prior to the, Church Dogmatics, and thus, in Torrance's view, that which was to be superseded by the, Church Dogmatics. (88) However, it would seem that, for Torrance, the above stress on the actuality of God's self-revelation is not so much rejected by Barth, as realigned, as a result of a process of transition which
Torrance charts in Barth's development. For, the question of, 'the nature of Revelation', (89) raised in the Barth-Harnack correspondence, received further clarification, according to Torrance, in the course of the period termed the, "Transition to Church Dogmatics", that is, 1929-1931. (This period is viewed by Torrance as being crucial to Barth's development, and as one in which the foundations of the, Church Dogmatics, are laid. (90)) Here, Torrance sees Barth moving, 'from his emphasis upon the pure Act of the Word...to emphasise also the Being in the Act.', (91) and he affirms that the result of this period of, 'transition', realigned Barth's understanding of the self-revelation of God. Thus, Torrance may suggest that, 'it was only when he re-wrote it in the Kirchliche Dogmatik', was able to clarify the, 'relation of Revelation to God himself'. (92)

Equally, we note that it is here that Torrance invokes Barth's studies in, 'the history of dogma', in support of the contention that what Barth offers in his concept of the self-revelation of God is nothing less than the orthodox faith of the Church. By which, Torrance means the faith as worked out in, 'the struggles of the Church in the fourth and fifth centuries, when it had to clarify its mind on the doctrine of the Trinity, in acknowledgement of the essential deity of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Spirit.', (93) and, 'in the theology of the Reformation', especially in, 'the Institutes of Calvin and the Heidelberg Catechism'. (94) (We note that the results of Torrance's own studies in, 'the history of dogma', parallel those of Barth.) Therefore, for Barth 'the Reformation is to be understood as the struggle to reaffirm in its fulness the Nicene doctrine that God is himself the content of his revelation.', and at the core of this doctrine there lies the possibility of penetrating, 'more deeply into the nature of the Word of
God, as grounded in his Being, through the knowledge of the Being of God in his Act.' (95) Thus, we must comprehend the shared identity of God and the revelation of God, such that Torrance may say that for Barth, 'God's revelation is God himself, the one, ever-present, eternal, living God, the Holy Trinity.' (96)

A further example of Barth's significance for Torrance, is found when Barth distinguishes his position, 'from the romantic, impressionalistic theologies which like to think of the divine revelation as the impartation of life rather than as the communication of truth.' (97) In this connection, Torrance draws attention to, 'Barth's critique of Herrmann's insistent idea that Revelation is nicht Lehre'. (98) However, at this point, Torrance would seem to misinterpret Barth. For, in the passage from, "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann", which Torrance notes, (99) it is not Barth's intention to offer a criticism of Herrmann's position, rather an exposition of his thought. Admittedly, this exposition does note Herrmann's approbation of, 'the young Schleiermacher of the Speeches', as against, 'the elderly Schleiermacher', (100) and so Herrmann would indeed seem to fall under the proscription of, 'impressionalistic theologies'. (101) However, we may observe, as Barth does, that in his affirmation that, 'Revelation is the event which confronts us with reality of God.', (102) Herrmann opposes the, 'traditionalism', which would confuse revelation with the, 'transmission of the ideas of other believers'. In so opposing, Barth further notes that, 'It was for this cause that (Herrmann) knew himself to be finally separated from his honoured teacher, the "great" theologian Ritschl.' (103) Thus, in this context, when Barth notes Herrmann's affirmation that, 'revelation is not doctrine.', (104) we would hardly imagine that Barth wished to reverse the
direction of Herrmann's thought. Equally, Barth would surely be placed in the line of those who wished to affirm that, 'that Revelation is nicht Lehre.'

The above notwithstanding, we note that Torrance heaps further opprobrium upon those who, 'like to think of the divine revelation as the impartation of life'. He contends that, while the Word of God is not, 'to be identified with rational propositions, or propositional ideas, for the Word of God is God himself in his Revelation, yet, 'in the Word we are confronted with an Object which is Subject, that is, with One who is both Person and Message.' (105) Thereafter, he suggests that:

'Revelation is not just the communication of life, but the impartation of rational truth which we are given in and through the Word made flesh and which is inseparable from the Person of the Word.' (106)

Thus, we are to understand that the self-revelation of God is essentially rational in its content, as against, 'the basic irrationalism and romanticism of Neo-Protestantism'. (107)

In reviewing the development of Torrance's thought concerning the concept of the self-revelation of God during the period 1956-1962, it would seem evident that this has taken place as a result of his self-conscious interaction with Barth's thought. The point of development at which we become most conscious of this is in, "The Place of Christology in Biblical and Dogmatic Theology", (1956) and here he seeks to express the objective reality of God's self-revelation which finds its sole source in Christ, alongside the subjective realisation of this self-revelation, which he believes he has done by grounding the source of that subjective realisation in our humanity, as assumed by Christ.
Further, the book, *Karl Barth: An Introduction*, (1962) may be taken (both explicitly, as we have noted above, and implicitly, by the very nature of its attempt to empathetically read the whole history of theology in the post-Enlightenment period through the eyes of Barth) as an endorsement of the essential verity of Barth's theological point of departure, that is, the self-revelation of God. Thus, a plateau may be said to have been reached, which sees Torrance expressing his own position via a relatively uncritical exposition of Barth. That is, the point of development reached in 1962 may be taken as the outworking of Torrance's understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God, in a manner which may be said to reflect his dependence on Barth, and, once more, this is quite self-consciously the case.


iii) *Theological Science* - Exposition and Critique

The development of Torrance's understanding of the self-revelation of God which takes place in, *Theological Science*, is presented therein as reflecting the influence and impact of Barth. (We note that Barth is the most frequently cited writer in the, 'Index of Names' (109)) However, I will suggest that, whereas up to 1962 it is essentially a dependence upon, and exposition of, Barth which is to be found in Torrance's writings; in, *Theological Science*, the understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God which is reached is one which
goes beyond the parameters of a repristination of Barth. Therefore, we now find ourselves dealing with Torrance in his own right, (albeit indebted to Barth) rather than with Torrance as the acolouthite of Barth.

a) The Subject-Object Relation

Torrance commences, *Theological Science*, by indicating how critical it is for our theological knowledge to have a correct understanding of the nature of, 'the Subject-Object relation', and by affirming, 'a principle that is still only imperfectly realized in many branches of knowledge', the principle being:

'that genuine critical questions as to the possibility of knowledge cannot be raised in abstracto but only in concreto, not a priori but only a posteriori.' (110)

Torrance then contends that modern theology, especially in its, 'existentialist', (111) varieties, has failed to heed Kierkegaard's profound understanding of the, 'Subject-Object relation', wherein, 'Kierkegaard tackled...both sides of the subject-object relationship.' For Torrance, following Kierkegaard:

'The object of the theological knowledge is Truth in the form of personal Being, that is Truth as active Subject, but this Truth must be known, must be an object of knowledge, in a way appropriate to its nature as Subjectivity, for only then will the knowing subject be in the truth in relation to it. Thus the very mode of apprehending the Truth belongs to the truth.' (112)

This, according to Torrance, is how we are to understand Kierkegaard, when the latter speaks of 'Truth as Subjectivity', (113) and following this understanding, Torrance suggests that, properly understood, (114) Kierkegaard offers a bulwark against confusing, 'the object of faith...with faith', and, equally, a corrective against the suggestion that, 'the knowing subject
constructs the object out of, or discovers the truth in, his own subjectivity.' (115) Immediately thereafter, Torrance suggests that:

'On the contrary the very passion of faith is the opening up of the knowing subject to the most objective of all realities, God Himself as He actively communicates Himself to us in Jesus Christ.' (116)

Thus, for Torrance, a, 'tradition', would seem to have been established by Kierkegaard wherein we are to understand the nature of Truth; and, theologically speaking, we find this, 'tradition', particularly articulated in Barth's thought.

According to Torrance, Barth's, Christliche Dogmatik, was an attempt to, 'lay the foundations of a theology of the Word within the medium of the objective reality of divine Revelation'. However, it was an attempt partially flawed by the fact that Barth was not entirely free of the suspicion of having invoked the existentialist understanding of Kierkegaard; (117) which, Torrance suggests, is the source of so many misunderstandings of Kierkegaard. (118) Having himself realised the error of his ways, Barth drew upon, 'his epoch-making studies of Anselm', and, thereafter, embarked upon the, Church Dogmatics. (119) Thus, following the direction given by Anselm, Calvin and Kierkegaard, Barth sought to found theology upon its proper object, as made known through, 'the concrete act of God in Jesus Christ', and, 'to develop from within the actual content of theology its own interior logic and its own inner criticism which will help to set theology free from every form of ideological corruption.', (120) with his theological, 'method', being most clearly revealed in, C.D. II/I, Chapter V. (121)
In so doing Torrance sees Barth as being compelled to go, 'behind the scientific methods developed in scholastic theology (whether in its Roman or in its Protestant form)', which, 'through the use of traditional logic and dialectic operated with great antinomies in its doctrines of God and man, such as, mind and will, being and act, election and freedom, justice and mercy, etc.' (The prevalence of such, 'antinomies', in Scholastic theology should not be conceded unquestioningly, though we shall not explore the issue here.) Thus, Barth, 'thrust behind and beyond these antinomies and dialectics...to build up a positive theology with "new" logical forms derived from the Word of God.' (122) In his attempt at, 'a rethinking and restating of Reformed theology', Torrance suggests that Barth has been particularly appreciative of, 'the contributions of scientific and philosophical thinking to the task of theology, which, just because it operates within the same world of speech and thought as they, cannot and must not isolate itself from them.' (123) In respect of the contribution of the scientific community, Torrance especially wishes to stress the parallels between, 'this new positive and dynamic theology', and, 'quantum physics.', and the way in which both have sought to overcome, 'the old antinomies between object and subject...being and act...etc.' (124)

Therefore, the theology of Barth is presented as an attempt to work out a, 'rational method', (125) and to forge a, 'scientific theology', (126) which, in its attempt to overcome, 'Cartesian dualism and romantic irrationality (e.g....Otto)', (127) is essentially realist in nature. Within this, 'scientific theology':

'we begin with the actual knowledge of God, and seek to test and clarify this knowledge by inquiring carefully into the relation between our knowing [sic] of God and God Himself in His being and nature. Then in the light of this clarification we seek to be more and more open and
ready for God, so that we may respond faithfully and truly to all that He declares and discloses to us of Himself. It is through this disciplined obedience of our mind to God as He gives Himself to be known by us that we advance in knowledge of Him.' (128)

Thus, 'scientific theology', is our response to the actuality of our knowledge of God, which arises as a result of God's self-giving and revelation. Equally, and by way of contrast, there can be no valid attempt at scientific theology, which begins with an a priori inquiry into the possibility of a knowledge of God. Following on from this latter point, it then becomes impossible to formulate, 'an account of theological epistemology', apart from the actual event of knowing, and while Torrance concedes that, 'we operate with an inchoate epistemology as soon as we begin to engage in theological inquiry', nonetheless, our epistemology must be an, 'open epistemology', that is, one which is, 'clarified and modified', as our knowledge of the object of our inquiry deepens. (129) Therefore, 'How God can be known must be determined from first to last by the way in which He actually is known.' (130)

Thereafter, to sum up, before proceeding, 'more deeply into the nature of our knowledge of God', Torrance suggests that, 'Knowledge of God is essentially a rational event.', (131) and that this knowledge, 'is knowledge in the proper sense of the word.' Thus, to speak of, 'knowledge', is to speak, 'formally in the same way in which we use it in every branch of true knowledge or scientia.', though, of course, theological knowledge is materially different from the other, scientia. (132) Further, this, 'Knowledge of God', is to be understood as, 'conceptual both in its acts of cognition and in its acts of expression.' Indeed, Torrance goes on to say that :
'the whole movement of theological thought consists in developing and clarifying the conceptual structure of this knowledge by constant reference to the object and by advancing in the cognitive modes of rationality set up between us and God as He communicates Himself to us. This conceptual character of the knowledge of God arises out of His self-disclosure in His Word, in the Word which God is and which He reveals to us.' (133)

Thus, our understanding of the nature of God's revelation will develop insofar as we are able to grasp the conceptual form in which the self-revelation of God is given to us. As to how we comprehend the conceptual form, Torrance suggests that, 'The outstanding characteristic of theology is that it operates with a direct act of cognition in hearing God and engages in the act of conception through audition.' (134) By this, Torrance means us to understand that there takes place, in genuine theology, an, 'intuitive', audition, whereby we may hear the Word of God address us. (135) Indeed, the, "propositional" element', given in the revelation of the Word, (for such there is) is not in any sense to be regarded as, 'a second-order reflection upon faith', but rather, is to be seen as, 'aris(ing) out of the immediate conceptual content of our intuitive knowledge of God.' (136) (We note Torrance's preference for, 'hearing', as against, 'vision', (137) as the means whereby we lay hold of God's revelation, (138) and that he, in part, credits Barth for suggesting this. (139))

b) The Actuality, Objectivity, and Possibility of Revelation

Having thus established the character of our knowledge of God, and the basis through which our concept of the self-revelation of God arises, Torrance then goes on to work out the, 'Actuality, Objectivity, and Possibility', (140) of this knowledge, in a fashion which particularly

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exhibits an indebtedness to Barth. Thus, Christian theology is seen to arise, 'out of the actual knowledge of God given in and with concrete happening in space and time.', (141) and therefore to be derived not from a centre within ourselves, 'but from a centre in God, from a divine ground.' (142) Theological thinking may then be said to, 'pivot...upon the fact that God has made Himself known and continues to make Himself known, that He objectifies Himself for us, so that our knowledge is a fulfilled meeting with objective reality.' (143)

This, 'objective reality', has about it a facticity which is distinct from the sort of facticity which prevails in the natural world. For, while the facts of the natural world have to be, 'made to "talk"', (that is, given a form of expression by us) the God who reveals Himself, 'is not a mute fact'. Thus, 'the given fact is the Word of God, God giving Himself to us as Word and in Word, God speaking to us in person', and, insofar as God makes Himself to be this fact, He engages in an act of, 'self-communication and self-disclosure'. (144) Thus, the way in which Torrance conceives of the actuality of God's self-revelation turns upon the givenness of an objective reality, which, in turn, creates the possibility of genuine theological knowledge.

This theological knowledge is to be seen as essentially rational, that is, 'devoted and bound up with its object', and must, in seeking to comprehend the object, renounce all recourse to any presuppositions which might be presented as a precondition to the proper comprehension of the object. Therefore, the, 'attachment to the object...carries with it detachment from all a priori judgements.' (145) Torrance, then sums up what he means by this objectivity in the following statements:

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'The absolute primacy of the Object - the Lord God Himself...The Object is given to us in a unique sense of given...God is Person, and when He objectifies Himself for our knowledge He does not cease to be Subject, to be Himself...The Object of theological knowledge is speaking Subject, God addressing us personally - that is, the Word of God...The object of theological knowledge is the living, loving, acting God, God in His action toward us...The object of theological knowledge is engaged in purposive action - God fulfilling His creative and redeeming purposes.' (146)

c) Double Objectivity

However, for all the stress on the reality of the objective self-giving of God, we note that Torrance differentiates between, 'His ultimate and divine objectivity', and the kind of objectivity with which He, 'clothes', Himself, in order to make Himself known. Further, he traces this distinction between a primary and a secondary objectivity, back to Barth. (147) Later, again citing Barth, (148) he may suggest that:

'the Object of theological knowledge has a two-fold objectivity, a primary objectivity which is God's giving of Himself the Lord, a secondary objectivity in which He gives Himself to us in human form within our space and time. It is dialogue which God conducts historically and dynamically with His people, but only through the media of creaturely and earthly forms which He uses as the signs and instruments of His self-communication, as tools of His Word.' (149)

Thereafter, Torrance details some of the implications of this, 'double objectivity.', when noting that, 'The object of theological knowledge is creaturely objectivity bound to divine objectivity', and specifically that, 'creaturely objectivity which the divine objectivity has assumed, adapted and bound to Himself, Jesus.' Further, he suggests that, 'In the nature of the case', it is impossible to reach, 'ultimate objectivity...the sheer reality of God', by an empirical examination of this, 'creaturely objectivity', though, not withstanding this.
latter point, we are still, 'unconditionally bound', to the form in which the, 'creaturely objectivity', is presented to us, that is, in the Incarnation. This is so, such that, in order to be regarded as, 'Scientific', theology must render, 'unconditional obedience to the Object', as He gives Himself to be known to us. (150)

However, Torrance may also observe that it is precisely, 'under this secondary form of objectivity, as Barth has called it, that all false objectivities take cover'. Further, he may suggest that, because God has, 'cloth(ed) His ultimate and divine objectivity with the kind of objectivity with which we are familiar in creation', the task of realising, 'direct encounter with the Truth.', is, 'not so easy to undertake'. Thus, 'ruthless and relentless Christological criticism', is required, in order to be able to distinguish, 'as far as possible, between genuine and false objectivity.' (151)

Therefore, to summarise and criticise the argument of, Theological Science, so far; it would seem to me that Torrance, despite the claim that his theological method offers, 'objectivity', is forced to concede that, in dealing with the form in which the self-revelation of God occurs, what we are dealing with is a secondary, or derivative, form of objectivity. Thus, if derivative, we may suggest that this, 'secondary', objectivity, despite claiming to be, 'unconditionally bound', to the Object, is a reflection, or image, (or even, if Torrance would prefer, an echo) of the Object, rather than the Object itself. That is, our knowledge of the Object is not of the Object-in-itself, but of the Object as it is for us in a form appropriate to our condition. In other words, there is, as the medium between the Object and ourselves, a form of the Object's presence which is bound up, 'within the space and time of this world.', (152) and
thus apprehended by us in a manner appropriate to our condition. A strong link between the Object and the form of the Object's presence in our world is, of course, posited; but we may reasonably ask, How is such a link, once posited, to be maintained? For, if, as Torrance concedes, we, in our theological efforts, 'inevitably manifest the fruit of original sin', (153) then it would seem that we can only distinguish between, 'genuine and false', insofar as it is creaturely possible, that is, only provisionally, and not absolutely. Once more, it would seem that Torrance would have to concede this latter point when he suggests that our distinguishing of, 'genuine and false', can only be done, 'as far as possible', (154) that is, and again, only provisionally. Thus, it would seem that even Torrance's strongly, 'objective', form of theology has to reckon with the limiting conditions imposed by our creaturely reality.

Further, we note that Barth's distinction between, 'primary', and, 'secondary', forms of objectivity, and the impact that this would have upon the claim that what we find in Christ is the self-revelation of God, arouses similar sorts of concerns to those voiced above in the thought of R. Gregor Smith. Equally, we observe that it is precisely Barth's treatment of the issue in, C.D. II/1, (155) which gives rise to Gregor Smith's concern. Thus, Gregor Smith notes that, 'For Barth the primary reality of God is in God's relationship to himself, that is, in his intra-trinitarian being. Only after the establishing of this order of being does Barth speak of God in relation to the world'. (156) Having identified Barth's position thus, Gregor Smith develops what he takes to be the implications of this when he highlights the fact that Barth may contend that, 'God's relation to the world and man...(is) not to be taken "with true and final seriousness"'. (157) That is, God as He is given to
us should not be used as the measure of God as He truly is in Himself. For Gregor Smith the implication is that there, 'is a strong note of scepticism in (Barth's) view of man's relation to God.', (158) such that the claim that there is an identity between God Himself, 'and God as he gives himself in his revelation.', (159) is to be viewed with suspicion. Gregor Smith was, of course, well aware of Barth's assertion that such an identity is to be found. However, he considers the basis, upon which this is done, ('the assurances of Scripture' (160)) to be weak, in relation to the fundamental considerations which structure Barth's understanding of the nature of God's being. For Gregor Smith, those fundamental considerations are to be found in, 'a specific philosophy of being, namely, that of an intra-trinitarian reality, self-related, primary and aloof.' (161) Thus, Gregor Smith may contend that the, 'assurance', which Barth gives, 'does not carry Barth's thought into the possibilities of a being of God which is based upon the primacy of historical revelation.' (162) For, in the final analysis, Gregor Smith notes that, in Barth:

'God's being is understood as basically "ein selbstbezogenes Sein", a self-related Being, and this is the "primary objectivity of God", namely within the life of the Trinity...God's objectivity, therefore, in his revelation is "secondary objectivity". Thus in his relation with men in the revelation through Christ, God is, "in action", accessible, "auf dem Plan" only in his work, which points as a sign to him.' (163)

Therefore, we find the suggestion that it is the, 'philosophy of being', undergirding Barth's approach, (which compels him to draw the distinction between, 'primary', and 'secondary', objectivity) that prevents us from according him the accolade that he genuinely delivers to us an insight into the self of God. Indeed, by the nature of this, 'philosophy of being', there is no

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possibility of making the epistemological 'leap' from the historical realm to the divine.

At this point, we might be tempted to suppose that Gregor Smith offers us a rather one-sided interpretation of the issue. This supposition might be thought an accurate one were it not for the fact that he derives it from what he takes to be the implications of E. Jüngel's approach in, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God's Being is in Becoming. (164) According to Gregor Smith, Jüngel attempts to assert, 'simultaneously the absolute difference of God from everything else, and his relation to everything else, without diminution of the difference'. (165) However, Gregor Smith suggests that he, 'cannot avoid the impression, which Professor Jüngel's interpretation does not extinguish but indeed unwittingly strengthens, that Barth is relying basically upon a specific philosophy of being, namely, that of an intra-trinitarian reality, self-related, primary and aloof.' (166) What are we to make of Gregor Smith's alleged derivation from Jüngel? Jüngel, in the course of his exposition, (167) suggests that, according to Barth:

'Because God in the objectivity of his revelation in which he lets himself be known to men, reveals himself as the Lord, we must...speak of a "primary objectivity" of God...Because God as the Lord is objective to himself he sets forth his self-demonstration in the "secondary objectivity" over against men with compelling force.' (168)

He continues:

'God's intratrinitarian being-as-object comes to realization in the act in which God knows himself. In revelation God gives man a share in this event of the knowledge of God and of his truth. This sharing is first made possible through the event of God's knowledge of himself and thus rests on the fact, "an occurrence takes place in God himself which is, so to say, copied in the revelation in which man participates...In revelation itself we again see God's self-knowledge, God's own and
original objectivity in the modes of being of the Father and of the Son through the mode of being of the Holy Spirit." But now in so far as in revelation this event and thus God's own and original being-as-object is "copied", the sharing in this event becomes an indirect sharing.' (169)

However, Jüngel, having apparently opened the door to the suggestion that such indirectness could be construed as driving a wedge between the, 'primary objectivity', and the, 'secondary objectivity', quickly moves to close it. Thus, he contends that, 'The indirectness of the sharing in God's knowledge of himself must not be taken to mean that in his revelation God does not give himself to be known by us completely'. (170) Therefore, we must be in no doubt that Jüngel firmly intends to foreclose any suggestion that a wedge could be driven into the heart of Barth's understanding of the nature of Revelation. In particular, through the concepts of, 'interpretation', and, 'reiteration', Jüngel wishes to affirm the identity of the, 'primary objectivity', and the, 'secondary objectivity'. Thus, we see in Jungel's concluding theses, (171) the suggestion that, 'God's being for us is event in Jesus Christ. This event is called revelation and as such is God's interpretation of himself.' (Thesis 2) Thereafter, he may suggest that, 'God's being-for-us does not define God's being but certainly God in his being for us interprets his being.' (Thesis 3) Further, he contends that, 'As relational being God's being-for-us is the reiteration of God's self-relatedness in his being as Father, as Son and as Holy Spirit.' (Thesis 4) Therefore, for Jungel, the, 'primary objectivity', of God, constitutes, 'the event of revelation, ('God's being-for-us') in which we know God after His, 'secondary objectivity'. (Thesis 6, paraphrased) (172)

However, as might be sensed from the third thesis, there remains a certain tension (such as was alluded to by
Gregor Smith) in Jüngel's interpretation of Barth. This is already evidenced in his suggestion that, 'for Barth according to the distinction of God's "primary" and "secondary" objectivity God himself has actually come into the picture', to which he must add, 'but "only" in his work which is the sign that points to him.' (173) Thus, we might sense that for all the power of Jungel's argument, the talk of, 'indirect sharing.', and of, 'the sign that points', suggests that the fundamental dichotomy (for such it is) between the, 'primary objectivity', and the, 'secondary objectivity', is not yet overcome, and that some particular, 'philosophy of being', still exercises its influence. (174)

The specific identification of this, 'philosophy of being', is not pursued by Gregor Smith, but we may note the suggestions made by J. Moltmann and W. Pannenberg, when they point to the influences which they believe to be evident in the work of Barth. Thus, for example, J. Moltmann may say that in his development of the doctrine of the Trinity, as found in, C.D. I/I, (175) 'Barth's Idealist heritage finally betrays itself', and that his approach parallels Fichte's, when the latter, 'talked about "being", about "the existence of being" and about "the bond of love" or of reflection, which permits the two to be one.' Moltmann then suggests that if we translate this, 'intellectually necessary...triadic process of reflection', into a theistic key, we may contend that, 'It is through self-distinction and self-recollection that God shows himself to be the absolute subject.', and, further, that this is precisely what Barth has done. (176) Equally, he notes that:

'A reflection of subjectivity like this has not necessarily anything whatsoever to do with the biblical testimony to the history of God. The notion of God's reflexively differentiated subjectivity and self-revelation can be conceived even without any biblical
Therefore, we note Moltmann's contention that the concept of the self-revelation of God, as found in Barth, finds its philosophical roots in Idealism.

W. Pannenberg similarly identifies the philosophical roots of Barth's approach when he suggests that:

'the Church Dogmatics does not develop the doctrine of the trinitarian God from the data of the historical revelation of God as Father, Son, and Spirit, but from the formal concept of revelation as self-revelation, which, as Barth sees it, entails a subject of revelation, an object, and revelation itself, all of which are one and the same. This model of the Trinity of revelation is easily seen to be structurally identical with that of the self-conscious Absolute, especially when God's revelation has to be viewed primarily as a self-revelation.' (178)

We may note as we point out the philosophical affinities which have been observed, that to do so is not in any way to impute guilt by association. Nor, are we suggesting that Barth's approach is conditioned by, say, Fichte or Hegel, as if they were the 'key' to understanding Barth. Instead, we are undertaking the legitimate task of identifying such affinities as are to be found, in order that the insights provided by these affinities may enable us to better understand Barth. Equally, when there arise rival claims, as to how best to understand Barth, we are compelled to make some sort of judgement as to which has the greater explanatory capacity, and if the identification of such affinities helps us to explain more adequately the development of Barth's thought, then we are right to draw upon them. (Indeed, E. Busch reports that Barth had, 'a certain weakness for Hegel', and was, 'fond of doing a bit of "Hegeling"'. Further, he reports Barth's suggestion that the Christian has a freedom so to do, and that he himself did so, 'eclectically'. (179)) Such judgements are, of course, provisional and subject
to revision, but nonetheless they may be made. Once more, we observe that the conclusions of Moltmann and Pannenberg point to a structure within which we are to understand the self-revelation of God, which owes very little to the approach which Torrance champions.

d) Intuitive Audition

In stating the argument in this manner, it would seem clear that there remains for Torrance an epistemological chasm to be crossed, if he wishes to maintain the claim that the possibility of, 'direct encounter with the Truth.', remains open. Indeed, intuitive audition, under the limiting conditions which Torrance's, 'secondary objectivity', imposes, does not seem to me any more, or less, likely to yield a, 'direct encounter with the Truth.', than intuitive vision. Further, we sense that, in principle, Torrance, by these very limitations, is no better placed to deliver an understanding of the nature of God's self-giving than the theologians and philosophers whom he criticises. How then does Torrance propose to answer these counter-criticisms, and cross the epistemological chasm? I believe that we find the answer to this question in his concept of, 'intuition'. As noted, he has suggested that, 'The outstanding characteristic of theology is that it operates with a direct act of cognition in hearing God and engages in the act of conception through audition.', and by this he means that there takes place an, 'intuitive', audition, through which the Word of God addresses us. (180)

R.F. Thiemann helpfully traces out the implications of Torrance's approach here, and we shall profit by following his exposition. He suggests that Torrance's recourse to intuition is an attempt to rescue himself from the fact that he propounds within, Theological
Science, an, 'inconsistent triad.', of propositions. The, 'triad', which Thiemann observes, runs thus:

1. Theology is a rational discipline exemplifying the characteristics of a true science.

2. The reciprocal relation between the investigating subject and the object of inquiry is a general characteristic of rational scientific activity.

3. Theology's unique object is the truth which imposes itself on the subject independent of the subject's reciprocal influence.' (181)

Thereafter, Thiemann may suggest that:

'The assertion of any two of these propositions demands the denial of the third. Since Torrance's argument requires all three assertions, his position appears doomed to inconsistency.' (182)

However, as noted, the recourse to intuition is an attempt to escape from this dilemma. Thiemann observes that, in Torrance's view, there is for, 'Human subjectivity', a role which, while, 'nonconstituitive', (with respect to the event of revelation) is nonetheless, 'essential'. This is so insofar as the revelation which is initially given then moulds human subjectivity until it conforms to a pattern which, 'corresponds to revelation's essential structure.' (183) This process of conformity continues until our, 'categories and concepts...are united with God's self-interpretation.' (184) The task of the theologian is then to, 'penetrate to the inner reality of God's secondary objectivity and thereby trace the "logic of grace"...Only if the theologian thinks with the "inner compulsion" of God's self-revelation can theological concepts be adequate to their revealed object.' (185) To the theologian, who follows this process, there is yielded, the auditory equivalent of the beatific vision, 'an intuitive apprehension of the whole pattern of faith', (186) that

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is, there is, 'revelation', and an apprehension of, 'God's essential reality.' (187) Thus, we are enabled to truthfully speak of God, because, in the act of intuition, God's reality imposes itself upon us, and, as a result, there is established a, 'correspondence between our language and God's reality'. (188) Thiemann's conclusion clarifies the thrust of Torrance's intention, when he suggests that:

'The experience of revelation unifies our interpretation and God's self-interpretation and establishes a correspondence between our assertions and God's reality. All that takes place through an act of intuition in which we apprehend God's reality directly.' (189)

Thiemann's work is of interest because, in attempting to identify and classify epistemological, 'foundationalism', (190) he places a most unlikely trio into the same theological bed. Thus, he suggests that:

'Though they differ decisively on many issues, John Locke, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Thomas Torrance all exemplify the standard procedures adopted by modern theologians in reformulating doctrines of revelation. Each theologian 1) follows Descartes rather than the reformers in construing claims to knowledge of God not as axiomatic background beliefs but as dependent beliefs in need of justification, 2) adopts a foundational epistemological theory to justify the possibility of revelation, and 3) employs the notion of "intuition" to justify the claim that knowledge of God is a gift of God's grace. The apologetic strategy exemplified by these three procedures has lead to the confusing impasse which plagues current discussions of revelation.' (191)

Thiemann's claim that Torrance follows Descartes, as against the Reformers, would undoubtedly be rejected by Torrance. Indeed, we have to make the elementary observation that, given the fact that Torrance lives in a world post-Descartes, and post-Enlightenment, it is hardly surprising that his procedures differ from those of the Reformers. Thus, Torrance's approach may be characterised as one in which knowledge of God is an,
'axiomatic background belief', but which then seeks to provide justification for that belief. This would seem to me to reflect exactly Torrance's understanding of Anselm's, 'fides quaerens intellectum'. (192) We may observe in passing that Torrance's understanding of Anselm, dependent as it is on Barth, may, or may not, be a true reading of Anselmian intention, and the suggestion that Anselm was in some way a proto-Barthian is one that would have to be rigorously scrutinised. (193) Torrance would undoubtedly claim that this concession to his position, and the invoking of Anselm, places his theology on a wholly other plain from that of Locke and Schleiermacher. However, insofar as his work is an attempt to, 'provide justification for...belief', that is, it is essentially apologetic in nature, we may agree with Thiemann's classification of Torrance's position. Further, it would seem to me that Thiemann's suggestion that Torrance, 'adopts a foundational epistemological theory', is not diminished by the above caveat, and that, likewise, the central place of, 'the notion of "intuition"', is rightly recognised.

We have already noted the suggestion that Torrance inescapably operates in a context altogether different from that of the Reformers, and that this will inevitably affect his approach to theological questions. In speaking of altered contexts within which the practice of theology may be pursued, we may further observe that Thiemann wishes to suggest that the modern development of the doctrine of Revelation, (as typified by Locke, Schleiermacher and Torrance) can only be understood in the light of the challenge which Kant brought against claims to a knowledge of God. Indeed, Thiemann suggests that Kant's critique of such claims might have been regarded as sounding the death knell for any attempt at a doctrine of revelation. For, if, 'the scope of knowledge
is limited by the mind's categorial structure and its interaction with the sensible manifold.', then the only conclusion which may be drawn is that, 'God lies beyond the limits of human knowledge.' (194) Thus, any attempt at formulating a doctrine of revelation must take account of Kant's challenge, and, in observing such attempts, we should be aware of the extent to which their very approach to the central question, that is, How does God reveal Himself?, is shaped by the intellectual context provided by Kant. Thiemann continues, with respect to the doctrine of Revelation, as follows:

'in fact the doctrine has flourished in the intellectual atmosphere permeated by Kant's challenge to knowledge of God. In light of the Kantian critique a theoretical justification for the Christian claim to revelation has seemed all the more important...The modern doctrine of revelation in its classic post-Kantian form attempts to provide a theoretical justification for revelation by formulating a universally valid argument for a unique mode of access to God's reality.' (195)

To observe the, "Index of Names", in, Theological Science, is to observe that Kant provides the most heavily quoted of Torrance's 'opponents', (196) and Thiemann makes clear that Torrance is aware of the challenge which Kant poses. However, he notes that Torrance's defence of his position, with respect to that challenge, is characterised by a, 'reject(ion) (of) the absolute priority Kant grants to the structure of reason in the formation of knowledge.' (197) Further, Thiemann notes that for Torrance, 'the content of revelation is true in itself, independent of our recognition of its truth.' (198) Thus, the latter's position involves a radical recasting of the question of the nature of our knowledge of God, which, 'asserts that a reassessment of the Kantian system allows a renewed appreciation of the object's role in forming knowledge.' (199) The object, in theology, being the God who gives Himself to be known.
A particular concern of Torrance, as Thiemann observes, is to demonstrate that, in its fidelity to the object of its inquiry, theology as a discipline exhibits the characteristics of a science, and is worthy of being so described. Thus, Torrance seeks to formulate, 'General criteria of rationality', which, 'can be applied uniformly to all disciplines.' (200) However, Thiemann suggests that the Achilles' heel in Torrance's argument is to be found precisely here. He writes:

'(Torrance's) argument for revelation's uniqueness and rationality appear to contradict one another. In his criticism of Kant, Torrance acknowledged that a reciprocal relation between subject and object is a general characteristic of all rational inquiry. His definitions of realism and objectivity in science depend upon acceptance of that reciprocity. But in defending the uniqueness of theology's object, Torrance denies that such reciprocity characterizes the relation between the theologian and God. How can the claim that theology is a rational discipline be maintained if theology fails to exemplify that characteristic of scientific activity which establishes a discipline as objective? If Torrance consistently denies that human subjectivity has a reciprocal effect on the divine object, then either he must deny theology's rationality or he must use the terms knowledge and rationality equivocally.' (201)

Thus, Thiemann may suggest that Torrance's, Theological Science, is built upon an, 'inconsistent triad.', and that, in his attempt to face the Kantian impasse, (with respect to the possibility of a knowledge of God) Torrance is driven into logical inconsistency in seeking to maintain both; the absoluteness of revelation, and, the scientific nature of theology. However, as noted Torrance turns to, 'intuition', in order to cut the Gordian knot.

Thiemann is clear that Torrance's form of intuition, 'is not equivalent to that of Schleiermacher.' For, whereas in Schleiermacher, 'intuition...connotes an immediate pre-cognitive experience', in Torrance, revelation
involves the impartation of cognitive and propositional content which 'intuition' apprehends. Thus, 'The direct experience of God of which Torrance speaks is not precognitive but rather signifies God's direct imposition of true propositions on the mind of the believer.' (202) In proposing, 'intuition', as a means of apprehending revelation, Torrance believes that this, 'imposition of truth...is unique to theology', but, as Thiemann observes, it is in fact, 'characteristic of all foundational epistemologies.' Indeed, Thiemann suggests that the basic notion, that in perceiving the truth of a proposition concerning an object we are then caused by the object to affirm the proposition's truthfulness, is essentially Platonic. His conclusions on Torrance are summed up in the following, when he suggests that:

'Torrance uses the term intuition to signify the indubitability and incorrigibility of this causally imposed knowledge. Torrance wants human subjects to be involved in the act of revelation; he simply does not want their reception to influence the absolute certainty of its content. Thus human beings must be the passive recipients of a self-evident truth. But this appeal to intuition surely does not resolve the inconsistency in the logic of Torrance's position; it simply makes the nature of his difficulties more apparent...Torrance's defense of revelation commits him to a form of theological foundationalism.' (203)

In moving on from Thiemann's specific critique of Torrance, though retaining our focus upon the concept of intuition, we may observe parallels between Torrance's understanding of intuition and that which pertained in writers with whom Torrance was well familiar with, that is, John Baillie and Norman Kemp Smith.

J. McIntyre notes the similarities between Torrance's, Theological Science, and John Baillie's book, The Interpretation of Religion, (1929) when he answers the question, 'what is theology ?', in the following terms:

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"The simplest form of answer to the question which I know was given by Professor Torrance's old mentor and my own, the late Principal John Baillie, many years ago, when he said that "theology is the logos of theos"...When we remember Dr Baillie's insistence in one of his earliest books [The Interpretation of Religion] upon the fact that theology is a science and that the kind of enquiry which it prosecutes is scientific, then we will be struck by the similarity between his view and that stated by Professor Torrance forty years later: "theological science has for its primary object the one God who is the source of all being and the ground of all truth". (204)

Thus, McIntyre suggests that, in their understanding of the scientific nature of theology, there is an affinity between Torrance's, Theological Science, and Baillie's, The Interpretation of Religion. In turning to, The Interpretation of Religion, we may also note with interest that there is, as an integral element in Baillie's discussion, a chapter entitled, "Theological Intuitionism and the 'Religious A Priori'". (205)

Now it would seem to me, contra McIntyre, that the affinities between Torrance and Baillie are rather limited, in respect of, 'theological science'. Thus, though there is a use of similar terminology, the thing which is signified by terms such as, 'theological science', is substantially different. (206) In turning then to look at Baillie's treatment of intuition, our suspicion that there is a basic dissimilarity in this matter also would seem to be confirmed rather than denied. Thus, Baillie may suggest that Kant was, 'entirely wise both in affirming that there are certain ultimate ethical principles which are genuinely self-evident, and denying that there are any specifically theological propositions for which a similar claim can be made.', (207) and, in so doing, rules out the possibility of an intuitive apprehension of, 'any specifically theological propositions'. (208) Therefore, it would seem
that Torrance and Baillie betray no affinity at all when we consider the intuitive apprehension of theological truth. Indeed, this view would seem to be strengthened when we find Baillie suggesting that, 'Our fundamental moral values are given to us directly, and intuited by us directly; but for everything in religion that goes beyond this direct intution of moral value, there is required the activity of faith.' (209)

However, in reflecting upon the significance of what Baillie achieves in his affirmation that, 'fundamental moral values are given to us directly, and intuited by us directly', we do well to recall the first of the, 'four propositions', which D. Fergusson sees as characterising Baillie's theology, circa 1930. (210) In this, Fergusson suggests that, 'The awareness of God in the human soul arises initially from a consciousness of moral values not of our own making to which we are ineluctably obligated.' (211) Therefore, while Fergusson regards the derivation of, 'a full-blown theology from...moral intuitions', as implausible in our present age, (212) nonetheless we may observe that Baillie's intention, in appealing to intuition, is to apprehend 'fundamental...self-evident...moral values', which provide an indispensable basis for comprehending the way in which faith may perceive, 'the incarnate love of God', to be the crowning expression of ultimate moral reality. (213)

Therefore, despite the evident dissimilarities in the approaches of Baillie and Torrance, it would seem to be the case that they both seek a similar end in their adoption of the notion of intuition. That is, they seek to transcend the epistemological limitations imposed upon the thinking subject, by an appeal, via intuition, to fundamental truths and values which are apprehended directly. Those fundamental truths and values, once
apprehended directly, then provide an impregnable basis for the rest of the theological project which is to be undertaken. In the cases of, *The Interpretation of Religion*, and, *Theological Science*, that project is the working out of an adequate understanding of, 'theological science', albeit that the way in which each expresses the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem within their forms of the project is somewhat different. Thus, we may suggest that within the thought of Baillie and Torrance, the notion of intuition serves a similar function.

Therefore, when we recollect one of A.S. Pringle-Pattison's biographers, noting the evident influence of Pringle-Pattison's, 'Personal Idealism', (214) upon Baillie's, *The Interpretation of Religion*, (215) and D. Fergusson pointing to a similar influence, (216) we may at least pause to reflect upon the fact that Torrance's procedure, at a crucial point in his thought, turns upon an appeal which is equally well-suited to an approach to theological truth which he would eschew.

The suspicion that Torrance's procedure has profound affinities with certain forms of Idealism is strengthened when we turn to look at the thought of Norman Kemp Smith. Kemp Smith, was Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh, (and taught Torrance during his M.A. degree (1931-1934)) is another whose understanding of the notion of intuition parallels that of Torrance. He propounded a form of critical idealism, particularly evident in his book, *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge* (1924). This work contains within it a section, entitled, "Intuition a Mode of Direct Contemplation", (217) which attempts to answer what Kemp Smith takes to be a, 'serious difficulty', compounding an already present, 'fundamental difficulty', that is, 'how intuiting...regarded as distinct from sensing, can be
capable of yielding direct knowledge of the independently real.' (218) In speaking of the, 'independently real', Kemp Smith is particularly concerned to maintain the independent reality of space and time, (as opposed to the suggestion that space and time are merely constructs of our thought) such that he may contend that, 'it is public time and public space which we directly intuit'. (219) The conclusion of this section, is as follows:

'It will not, as already stated, suffice to regard space and time as interpretations given to the sensa. They must be more than that; they must be intuited, i.e. contemplated. They must be apprehended in a face to face manner, as actual components of independent reality.' (220)

The parallels between Kemp Smith's attempt, via intuition, to apprehend an independent reality, within his critical idealist framework, and Torrance's attempt, via intuition, to apprehend, in the self-revelation of God, an independent reality, within his framework, seem to me to be considerable. Further, to follow Torrance, given that our knowledge, and thus any attempt to formulate an adequate response to the self-giving of God, is vitiated by, 'original sin', (221) might it not be thought that Torrance's framework is akin to that of Kemp Smith's. That is, it acknowledges the limits within which we formulate knowledge and then attempts from within these limits, through intuition, to apprehend the real? The parallels are, of course, not absolute, but nonetheless seem to me to be considerable, and, if so, suggest that Torrance's framework is not so very far removed from those philosophers and theologians whose works he believes his position transcends. Therefore, we may note again the suggestion that Torrance's procedure has profound affinities with certain forms of Idealism, that is, those which seek to secure an irrefragable basis for their system, through intuitive apprehension of a
prior given. We have no explicit evidence to suggest that Baillie or Kemp Smith had a direct influence upon the thought of Torrance, rather we note the parallels between the thought of teachers and pupil. Further, we note that the procedure whereby Torrance seeks to secure an unimpeachable basis for his system is by no means unique.

However, let us not forget Thiemann's suggestion that Torrance's recourse to intuition arose as a result of his attempt to escape the logical inconsistencies of his own presuppositions. That is, in attempting to face the impasse which Kant's strictures on the possibility of knowledge create, Torrance is logically inconsistent in maintaining both; the absoluteness of revelation, and, the scientific nature of theology. Let us then consider whether Torrance's attempt to maintain both, does, in fact, create insurmountable difficulties, and, further, enquire whether a theologian guided by the light of Barth, might have been able to avoid any such pitfalls simply by following the example of the Master. We begin our consideration of these questions by looking at how Torrance treats the possibility of our knowledge of God.

e) The Incarnation

In turning to look at, 'The Possibility of Theological Knowledge', Torrance again signals his indebtedness to Barth. This is particularly so when he acknowledges that to ask about, 'The Possibility of Theological Knowledge', is only possible once the question has first of all been, 'correlated with the actual knowledge of God.' (222) that is, correlated to that which was prior. Further, Torrance may suggest that, 'We cannot genuinely discuss the possibility of the knowledge of God outside of its own actual reality.', (223) and, in the final analysis, point, with Barth, to the fact that every discussion of
the, 'possibility', is conditioned by the way in which God has in fact given Himself in Christ. He writes, again drawing attention to the influence of, C.D. II/1, upon his thought at this juncture, that:

'As Karl Barth has argued so strongly throughout the volume we have in mind in this chapter, God's decisive action in Jesus Christ invalidates all questions [about] whether He might have acted otherwise.' (224)

The task of the theologian, in the light of God's self-giving, is, 'to explicate and elucidate the possibility arising out of its actuality, and in that way to bear witness to it.' (225) In so doing, we may, Torrance suggests, 'distinguish three "moments" in the realization of our knowledge of God in Jesus Christ.' (226)

In the first of these, we are invited to see that, in the self-revelation of Himself through Jesus Christ, God has, 'objectified Himself for us within our world and its natural objectivity', and, in so doing, 'condescended', to meet us, 'within our subject-object relations and even within the structural relations of our minds to natural objectivity'. However, we should note that this is not to imply that God, by so doing, has ceased to be the Lord God. (227) Thus, taking the divine condescension and the divine reservation in tandem, Torrance may suggest, explicitly following Barth, that:

'the possibility of our knowing God is grounded ultimately in His divine freedom and grace to cross the boundary between Himself and us, and really to give Himself to be known by us in our condition as frail creatures of earth..."Knowledge of God is thus not the relationship of an already existing subject to an object that enters into his sphere and is therefore subject to the laws of this sphere. On the contrary, this knowledge first of all creates the subject of this knowledge by coming into the picture....Only because God posits Himself as the Object is man posited as the knower of God. And so man can only have God as the self-posited object."' (228)

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The second, 'moment', which Torrance discerns, arises when we perceive that we are essentially alienated and estranged from God, and that, in consequence, such alienation and estrangement must be overcome. Indeed, the possibility of perceiving this situation arises only in the light of the Incarnation, (that is, the, 'adaptation of humanity to God', by God (229)) when we become aware of our need for reconciliation. (230) However, even as we perceive the need, 'for repentance (metanoia) on our part, for radical change even in the inner slant of our mind', we become aware of the impossibility of such a repentance. So great within us is the, 'hostile disposition toward God and toward the Grace and Truth He manifests towards us in Jesus Christ.', that we cannot make an adequate response to the Truth of the self-objectification of God (that is, the first, 'moment'). To sum up the import of this second, 'moment', we note Torrance's conclusion:

'the Incarnation reveals that as a matter of fact man stands outside that relation with God in which true knowledge of Him is actualized, and cannot get inside it because in his very existence he is imprisoned in the closed circle of his own estrangement...There is, therefore, no possibility for man really to know God unless he can be taken into the closed polarity where such knowledge is to be realized, that is, unless he enters into the required adaptation of humanity to God.' (231)

We may observe that, for Torrance, knowledge of God is to be found only within a, 'closed polarity', with the possibility of apprehending that knowledge being lifted out of the sphere of normal human possibility. It is this seemingly unbridgeable chasm which leads us to a consideration of the third, 'moment'.

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This, 'moment', is realized when we perceive that Jesus Christ, by His adaptation of man to Himself, takes man, 'into the closed polarity'. He writes:

'In short Jesus Christ is Himself both the Word of God as spoken by God to man and that same Word as heard and received by man, Himself both the Truth of God given to man and that very Truth understood and actualized in man. He is that divine and human Truth in His one person.' (232)

Therefore, the closed circle which in principle barred us from the possibility of apprehending God is broken. For, we now see that, in Jesus Christ, 'there has already been fulfilled what we are unable to achieve, the reconciliation and adaptation and union of man with God, without which there is no true knowledge of God'. (233)

Our exposition of these three, 'moments', leads us to acknowledge that Thiemann is correct to suggest that one of the propositions which undergirds, Theological Science, is that, 'Theology's unique object is the truth which imposes itself on the subject independent of the subject's reciprocal influence.' (234) This is not to say that Torrance is unconcerned with the subjective appropriation of that which is objectively given, (235) rather it is to say that the subjective appropriation in no way conditions the object.

Before proceeding to contend for the propriety of another of Thiemann's propositions, that is, that for Torrance, 'Theology is a rational discipline exemplifying the characteristics of a true science.', (236) let us note certain difficulties which seem to me to arise in Torrance's exposition.
f) A Variety of Critiques

The suggestion that it is in Christ alone that we find the self-revelation of God, and that this is a result of a unique adaptation of human nature to the Word of God, is one which should be subjected to very careful scrutiny given that the latter element is an absolutely crucial element in Torrance's thought. Thus, for example, N.F.S. Ferré, in, The Universal Word, may suggest that this very uniqueness may create just as many problems as it solves, and that Torrance's approach to the whole issue is indicative of a pedigree which we can all imagine the latter eschewing. Ferré writes:

'Such a uniqueness presupposes a substantive, a Greek, view of God, a complete discontinuity between Jesus Christ and all men. We cannot in such language genuinely speak of other men, for the unique Godhead of Jesus Christ constitutes an incomparable human nature, a miraculous mystery of union, never achieved, except in Christ, before or since.' (237)

Now, quite clearly, Torrance would wish to reply that his position guarantees genuine continuity between Christ and all men, given that Christ has truly assumed human nature. Further, he would wish to contend that it is because Christ has achieved this union, for and on behalf of all men, and thus assumed humanity, that we may say that this union is constantly being realised in the daily life of the Christian. However, it would seem to me that Torrance's difficulty, which Ferré pinpoints, is that, in the final analysis, the, 'unique object...which imposes itself', (238) for all that it claims to be adapted to my humanity, has placed itself in a category which denies to me the possibility (in principle) of verifying whether or not the humanity assumed is in fact identical to that which I experience. Thus, in principle, the claims which Torrance makes for Christ are, in the sense which Karl
Popper intends, unfalsifiable. (239) Indeed, we might imagine someone such as A. Flew citing Torrance's assertions, with respect to the humanity of Christ, as evidence of the fact that theological statements are unfalsifiable, and, if unfalsifiable, devoid of meaning and significance. (240) If we were to hold to the position that theological statements must, in principle, be falsifiable in order to have significance, then we would wish to suggest that Torrance's, 'unique object...which imposes itself', (241) for all the claims to adaptation, has removed itself to a position wherein it denies to itself the very possibility of having theological significance. Thus, we may suggest that, 'the closed circle which in principle barred us from the possibility of apprehending God', is not, 'broken', (242) as Torrance intended. Further, we may say that, because what Torrance's method offers is, not so much a breaking of, 'the closed circle', as, an invitation to enter it, the inner language may be characterised as tautological in nature, and, while having about it a most resilient logic, finally elusive in content.

Therefore, we may suggest that the language in which this theology of the self-revelation of God is presented, is robbed of significance by its very nature. Thus, in virtue of its being unfalsifiable, there is a danger that a theology of the self-revelation of God may seem to contain nothing beyond a magnificent rhetoric. To enter into the inner logic of the rhetoric is indeed to sense its power, but the loss of signification seems to me to be too high a price to pay.

Torrance would undoubtedly reply to this by affirming that Christ's adaptation of humanity is of real significance, and that, to suggest otherwise, is quite simply to have failed to understand the significance of
what Christ has done. Equally, as we shall see, he maintains that the Christ who adapts humanity to Himself is the One who gives to the discipline of theology a rationality which it shares with other disciplines. Clearly, if this latter claim is true then the objections raised against Torrance's approach would need to be drastically revised.

However, we may judge from the fact that writers as diverse in character as C.F.H. Henry and J. Hick have felt the weight of such a line of criticism, that we have touched upon an identifiable area of weakness. Thus, Henry suggests that in, *Theological Science*, Torrance retains his indebtedness to Barth, (with respect to his understanding of Revelation) and that, 'While Torrance wants conceptual revelation and knowledge of God', he nonetheless, 'insists on a distinction between the "inner" Word of God and the outer "words" - between the Word heard and the words used to communicate revelation'. This position, for Henry, is unsatisfactory insofar as it downgrades the place of Scripture as the Word of God. (243) Equally, his further comments are of significance to us, insofar as they highlight the sense in which Henry observes that what is taking place in, *Theological Science*, is that, 'the Truth of revelation', is being removed from the realm of rational discourse, and that in consequence, 'the possibility of establishing theology as knowledge in the sense that other sciences claim to offer knowledge.', is thwarted. He writes:

'Torrance surely shifts the meaning of the rationality of faith, for he exempts the Truth of revelation from universal validity, logical consistency, and the relevance of coherence as a test...[thus] the validity of revelation depends on internal decision and requires a miraculous change in the logical structures of the mind...Apparently God uses a different logic than that which serves man in all other knowledge relations.' (244)
Therefore, according to Henry, Torrance's understanding of Revelation is deficient, precisely because its Barthian indebtedness leads it to posit an unverifiable 'Truth' which cannot be discussed within the structures of rationality which pervade all spheres of knowledge, and, thus, the rational significance which we might wish to attach to the theological terms used is denied to us.

The degree of difficulty which Torrance is in at this point is magnified by the fact that, in the nature of his criticisms, Henry finds himself in the undoubtedly unfamiliar company of J. Hick. Hick notes that, in, Theological Science, for all Torrance's claims to offer a scientific theology grounded upon revealed Truth, (with a universal significance) what we in fact find ourselves presented with, 'is not a science, but only one particular kind of Christian dogmatics.' (245) Further, Hick suggests that, in offering this, Torrance implicitly, as well as explicitly, rejects a whole range of understandings of the, 'Truth'. Thereafter, he highlights (most memorably) the essential narrowness of Torrance's position, when he writes:

'Thus Torrance could say...When I say scientific theology I mean Christian theology; and not only Christian theology but Reformed theology; and not only Reformed theology but the theology of Karl Barth as interpreted in Edinburgh.' (246)

Alongside this criticism, Hick suggests that Torrance's understanding of the nature of science (in which scientific data is provided by, 'revealed truths...accepted on authority') which he purports to find in his, 'theological science', 'is so foreign to the scientific mind as to make it doubtful whether theology, as Torrance conceives it, is properly to be classified as a science.' (247) Indeed, after noting Torrance's definition of science ('thought which is determined by
the reality with which it is concerned' (248)) Hick makes bold to suggest that, 'Would not fairy-lore, for example, qualify as a science under Torrance's definition?' (249) Therefore, for Hick, Torrance's understanding of the nature of science is so fundamentally weak, that, in the act of structuring his theology so as to signify that which is universal, he quite paradoxically narrows the range of its significance, and the net result is to limit that range to the environs of Edinburgh!

g) The Nature of Science

In noting this fundamental weakness, our thoughts return to Thiemann's proposition that, for Torrance, 'Theology is a rational discipline exemplifying the characteristics of a true science.', (250) Thus, Thiemann may suggest that, for Torrance, theology exemplifies the true hallmark of a science in being characterised by fidelity to the object of its inquiry. Therefore, according to Thiemann, Torrance seeks, in the light of his understanding of science, to formulate, 'General criteria of rationality', applicable, 'uniformly to all disciplines.' (251) This notion, of fidelity to the object of the inquiry as the hallmark of a science, may then be taken to typify Torrance's approach (and justify Thiemann's proposition) when we hear him suggest that:

'When we turn to discern the relation between theology and the other sciences we concentrate upon that aspect of theological activity that is strictly scientific...we do not abstract theological knowing from what is actually known for its structural forms cannot be uprooted without alteration from their inhesion in doctrinal substance. Hence no direct comparison between theological science and the special sciences is possible...What we may do, as far as theology is concerned, is to trace the structural forms of its knowledge to their doctrinal source and show the procedure that theological thinking cannot but adopt within them if it is to be true both to the nature of its divine Object and what He reveals of Himself. The only kind of comparison that would be apt would be one of
proportionality in which there is no direct transference of language or extrapolation of method but a comparison between the relations subsisting between the knower and the object in one field of knowledge and that between the knower and the object in another field of knowledge."

(252)

Thus, we may observe that fidelity to the object of the inquiry is a condition imposed upon the discipline of theology by the very nature of God's self-revelation. Further, we see that Torrance has a clearly formulated understanding of the sense in which theology is a science, and the image which he presents is of the various scientific disciplines standing in a parallel relation to one another, whereby we may observe the manner in which they, within their own category, exemplify the hallmark of a science. Equally, at this point, Torrance seems clear in his view that there can be, 'no direct transference', of the substantial content of one scientific discipline into the sphere of another. Theology, for Torrance, takes its rightful place among the sciences precisely because we may discern that the relationship between the knower and the known parallels that pertaining in other scientific disciplines.

However, although we have already credited Thiemann with an accurate characterisation of Torrance's approach, it seems to me that we can go further than characterisation, and suggest that, in taking fidelity to the object of the inquiry as the characteristic par excellence of a science, Torrance has been misled by Barth. Thus, W. Pannenberg may highlight the fact that, 'Barth's basic idea that scientific status rests on appropriateness to the subject first and research method only in a secondary manner was rejected by H. Scholz in 1931.' (253) In so doing, we may recall that in, C.D. I/1, (254) Barth treats at some length Scholz's argument as to, 'What it takes to accommodate oneself to the concept of science
which is accepted and holds sway today, and probably not only today'. (255)

Prior to discussing Scholz, Barth makes it clear that theology, in its claim to be a science, has no need to justify itself, 'least of all by submitting to the claims of a concept of science which accidentally or not claims general validity.' (256) Indeed, Barth goes so far as to suggest that, 'it would not make the slightest difference to (theology's) real business if it had to rank as something other than science.' (257) Nonetheless, because it shares with other sciences, 'a definite object of knowledge...(and) a definite and self-consistent path of knowledge', (258) of which an account can be given, it may lay claim to the title of a science without prejudice to the unique nature of its object.

In the light of the comments which Pannenberg makes, with respect to Torrance's, Theological Science, we may benefit from taking cognisance of the postulates which Scholz laid down in his article, "Wie ist eine evangelische Theologie als Wissenschaft möglich?", (1931) (259) as the fundamental criteria of scientific status. Barth presents them as follows:

'In an ascending scale, the demands made upon an undertaking which aspires to rank as "science," and therefore upon theology, are listed by Scholz as follows: 1. freedom from contradiction in all the propositions to be constructed in the so-called science ("the proposition postulate"); 2. unity in the sphere of its object ("the coherence postulate"); 3. the possibility that all the propositions presented might be tested by any "sufficiently attentive readers or hearers" ("the verifiability postulate"); 4. respect for that which is physically and biologically impossible ("the congruity postulate"); 5. freedom from all pre-judgments ("the independence postulate"); and 6. the possibility of all propositions being broken up into axioms and theorems and demonstrated on this basis (this being the solemn "supreme demand which is made of a science").' (260)
(To clarify what is intended here, as Torrance understands it, we observe that the 1975 re-translation of, C.D. I/l, under the editorship of G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, contains an, 'Editor's note.', which succinctly expresses the above. It runs thus:

'These six requirements correspond to what we would think of as (1) formal consistency, (2) inherent consistency, (3) openness to control through a community of verifiers, (4) antecedent credibility, (5) impartiality or, positively stated, according to the principle of sufficient reason, and (6) formalisability.' (261)

Barth accepts that Scholz adequately expresses the concept of science which pertains today, but nonetheless replies, 'theology can only say point-blank that this concept is unacceptable to it.' (262) Indeed, Barth would even reject the first of the postulates, as proposed by Scholz, (that is, 'freedom from contradiction in all the propositions to be constructed') and offers a qualified acceptance of it, which, as he readily concedes, would be wholly unacceptable to Scholz. Clearly there is an unbridgeable chasm between Barth and Scholz, in respect of their understanding of what would constitute a science. It is this which Pannenberg highlights, when he points out that Scholz rejects, 'Barth's basic idea that scientific status rests on appropriateness to the subject', (263) that is, fidelity to the object of the inquiry. Further, Pannenberg notes Scholz's statement of his reason for so doing; that is, 'I have not yet found a criterion by means of which any given idea can be judged appropriate to its subject, even in cases of serious disagreement.' (264) Thereafter, he suggests:

'This is the crux of the controversy between Barth and Scholz. We can only regret that Barth's argument for the scientific status of theology on grounds of appropriateness to its object is sometimes used to justify far-reaching assertions with no mention of
Scholz's disagreement with him and the problems it has raised.' (265)

We note, with interest, that the example Pannenberg has in mind, of those who make, 'far-reaching assertions', is T.F. Torrance, and specifically, Theological Science. (266) As Pannenberg suggests, 'the criterion of appropriateness', runs throughout, Theological Science, such that this criterion, 'requires scientific statements to be based on "the given"...God in his word'. (267) However, as Pannenberg makes clear, the whole question of the applicability of, 'the criterion of appropriateness', is a moot one, and an issue in which Pannenberg accepts Scholz's basic point.

Therefore, we see that the core of Torrance's response to the self-revelation of God; that is, that the scientific nature of theology is given by the nature of the One who reveals Himself, and that fidelity to the object of the inquiry is required as a result, is seriously undermined if we accept Pannenberg's conclusions (which I suggest we should). Indeed, we may go further and suggest that Torrance, particularly in his uncritical following of Barth and in his failure to respond to Scholz, fails to establish that the proper response to the self-revelation of God should be a project such as is undertaken in, Theological Science. In addition, we may suggest that, because Torrance's understanding of the way in which we appropriate the self-revelation of God is so bound up with his notion of fidelity to the object of the inquiry, what confronts us is (for all its protestations to the contrary) a theological language that claims to speak of the self-revelation of God, but which is not in principle verifiable. Instead, we are presented with a language whose signification is, in principle, unverifiable, and,
further, a language which is, in principle, unfalsifiable in the terms previously discussed.

Pannenberg is well conscious of the implications of the approach of Barth and Torrance, whose understanding of the nature of God's self-revelation lifts that revelation out of, and above, the realm of rational discourse. According to Pannenberg, a project such as that envisaged by Barth endangers the scientific status of theology, and, 'also the priority of God and his revelation over human beings, on which, for Barth, everything rests.' (268) In observing the import of Pannenberg's statement here, we note the considerable paradox that is involved; that is, that those most concerned to secure the absolute primacy of God in His revelation place that primacy in gravest danger by their theological projects. Why does Pannenberg take this to be so? He writes:

'Barth's unmediated starting from God and his revealing word turns out to be no more than an unfounded postulate of theological consciousness. Barth rightly rejects the reduction of theology to human religious consciousness, but his use of God and his revelation as an unmediated premise provides no escape from these problems...a positive theory of revelation not only is not an alternative to subjectivism in theology, but is in fact the furthest extreme of subjectivism made into a theological position...Barth's apparently so lofty objectivity about God and God's word turns out to rest on no more than the irrational subjectivity of a venture of faith with no justification outside itself.' (269)

Thus, for Pannenberg, a theology of the self-revelation of God, as presented by Barth, et al., might best be understood as a counterpart to that which it most strenuously seeks to distance itself from; namely, subjectivism as the proper starting place for theology. Further, we note the conclusion of his discussion of the Barth-Scholz dialogue, in which he agrees with Scholz when he contends that, 'even theological statements
cannot be exempt from logic.' (270) This latter point, mild as its expression may seem, carries profound implications, for, as Pannenberg puts it, if we admit this, 'we admit...that a view of theology based on the positive nature of revelation is untenable.' (271) Therefore, in the light of the arguments advanced against Torrance's understanding of the nature of science, we may conclude that it is seriously flawed and incapable of sustaining the project envisaged in, Theological Science.

iv) Beyond Theological Science

However, to do justice to Torrance's position, we must take cognisance of his later claim to have, quite self-consciously, transcended Barth, and yet, in so doing, to have realised a position always inherent in Barth. Thus, Torrance has sought to highlight the parallels between Barth's theology of the self-revelation of God and the progress in the scientific world made by Einstein. (272) Further, we observe Torrance's claim that Barth acknowledged his (that is, Torrance's) developed position to be a genuine outworking of his own. (273) Torrance suggests that Barth's aim was to set, 'theology back on its own proper ground in the revealed knowledge of God...And in so doing he restored the scientific integrity and grandeur of the theological enterprise.' (274) Further, he contends that, with Barth:

'the pure science of theology took a giant step forward...under the controlling insight that what God the Father is toward us in his self-revelation through Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit he is inherently and eternally in himself as the living God, the Creator of all things visible and invisible.' (275)

Thus far there may seem to be little which is not already explicit or implicit in, Theological Science. However, in
the conclusions which Torrance draws from the above, his position is given a new focus and a heightened intensity. Thus, he may claim that Barth's theology:

'led to a profound shift in the epistemological structure of theology which matched the radical shift in our scientific understanding of the God-given intelligibilities of the created universe that ranged from the emergence of field-theory in the physics of Michael Faraday and James Clerk Maxwell to the relativistic physics of Einstein and his heirs.' (276)

Further, Torrance claims that in his rejection of, 'all antecedent conceptual systems', (that is, 'an independent "natural theology"') according to which all, 'revealed knowledge of God', would have to be, 'schematised', in order to be judged, 'rational', (277) Barth:

'without realising it at the time, was doing in theology precisely what Einstein was doing in natural science, when he questioned the validity of schematising physics to the rigid framework of Euclidian geometry, that is of an independent and antecedent conceptual system detached from actual experience'. (278)

For Einstein, according to Torrance, geometry must be, 'incorporated into the heart of physics where it becomes four-dimensional, indissolubly bound up with the structure of physical knowledge as itself a form of "natural science"'. (279) This, in turn, is paralleled in Barth, according to Torrance, by the former's, 'insistence that natural knowledge must be incorporated into the actual knowledge of God where it is indissolubly bound up with its epistemological structure and serves its scientific articulation and formulation.' (280) To amplify further what Torrance takes to be the implications of Barth's approach, we note that he is not saying that Barth rejected natural theology as such, rather Torrance suggests that Barth's intention is to, 'transpose...it into the material content of theology
where in a changed form it constitutes the epistemological structure of our knowledge of God.' (281) Indeed, Torrance takes this to be the outcome of, 'Barth's reinterpretation of the Anselmian method', worked out in 1930, and then utilised in, C.D. I/1, and, C.D. II/1, (282) with this, 'reinterpretation', helping him to overcome the dualistic implications of the radical rejection of natural theology which had characterised his thought up until that time. (This interpretation of Barth was proposed by Torrance in 1970. (283)) We note that the motivation for this earlier radical rejection lay in his desire to reassert the absolute primacy of God, in order that, 'God could really be recognised as God', and that, in part, the influence which shaped his thought in this direction was Wilhelm Herrmann. Thus, Torrance may point to the fact that Barth's position was reached as a result, 'directly as well as indirectly through Herrmann, of Kant's critique of the traditional arguments for the existence of God.', and further suggest that the dualism inherent in the, 'residual influence upon him of Wilhelm Herrmann of Marburg', remained to be overcome, (284) as he claimed it was through Anselm.

We are particularly compelled to take note of Torrance's suggestions as to the full implications of Barth's theology of the self-revelation of God, by the fact that he details a discussion held with Barth a few weeks before the latter's death. Torrance states the conclusion of their discussion in the following terms:

'Karl Barth expressed full agreement with my interpretation of his thought, and said, rather characteristically, of the relation of geometry to physics, "I must have been a blind hen not to have seen that analogy before".' (285)

Therefore, with the imprimatur of Barth seemingly secured, there would seem to be, at the very least, a
prima facie case for suggesting that Torrance, in his fidelity to the self-revelation of God as expounded by Barth, has established a coherent relationship between theological science and natural science, and thus to have validated theology's claim to be worthy of the title, 'science'. Indeed, we can hardly question that a prima facie case has been established. However, even as the prima facie case is established the seeds of its own dissolution are sown. For, as Torrance is compelled to concede, Barth, in allegedly, 'doing in theology precisely what Einstein was doing in natural science', was doing so, 'without realising it at the time'. (286) That is, the allegedly Barthian foundation for the project pursued in, Theological Science, and beyond, was established without Barth being aware of it. Further, although Torrance regards Barth as being, 'far ahead of his contemporaries', in theological terms, he is again forced to concede that Barth, 'did very little to work out the implications of what he was doing for the transformation of the received frame of thought that is needed if the results of his work are continually to be regained and appreciated.' (287) Not only so, Torrance contends that:

'what Karl Barth did not seem to appreciate adequately, was the fact that since God makes himself known to us in the created universe where he has placed us and therefore in and through the spatio-temporal structures and intelligibilities of the universe which, under God, are more and more disclosed to our scientific inquiries, there are basic interconnections between theological concepts and natural scientific concepts which have to be brought to light, if we are to do full justice both to our knowledge of God and to our knowledge of the created order.' (288)

Thus, Torrance would seem to offer a most intriguing picture, for; on the one hand, Barth's understanding of the self-revelation of God is presented as the foundation for Torrance's work in, Theological Science, and beyond,
while, on the other hand, Barth is regarded as having little or no awareness of the implications of his thought in this regard. Now, it need hardly be questioned that a person may not always be aware of the implications of their thought, and we cannot deny Torrance's claim that he has legitimately worked out the implications of Barth's position without good reason. The questions we might then ask are, Do we have reason to believe that Barth was aware of the alleged implications of his thought, with respect to natural science ?, and, Does his refusal to develop these alleged implications have a significance which is not perceived by Torrance ?

H.P Nebelsick, in, "Karl Barth's Understanding of Science", (289) clearly favours the approach offered by Torrance, (290) yet, in his exposition of Barth's, 'Understanding', the evidence demands that he note Barth's refusal to join in, 'the Göttingen Theologian-Physicist conversations that took place between the years 1949-1961'. These, 'conversations', involved such notable physicists as C.F. von Weizsacker, Werner Heisenberg, and Gunter Howe. (291) Indeed, the last named had contributed to the 1956 Barth Festschrift, Antwort, an article entitled, "Parallelen zwischen der Theologie Karl Barths und der heutigen Physik", (292) in which he highlights those elements within the thought of the, Church Dogmatics, where he considers fruitful parallels to modern physics are to be found. (293) Thus, we might conclude that, at the very least, Howe's article made Barth aware of the possibilities allegedly latent in his thought, and that his failure to pursue those possibilities after 1956 cannot be attributed to ignorance of the facts. Therefore, some explanation of why he did not pursue those possibilities is surely necessary. According to Nebelsick, Barth's refusal to participate in the conversations, 'was probably a tragic
result of his formal misunderstanding of "the sciences."

That is, Barth's understanding of natural science was essentially, 'pre-modern'. (294) It is all the more curious therefore, to hear Nebelsick suggest, on the same page as the above, that, 'Barth quite literally rescued theology in our time as a proper science.' (295) Therefore, with Nebelsick, we have a further intriguing picture of Barth, in which Barth, on the one hand, offers the possibility of, 'a giant step for mankind.', through his having, broken, 'with the nineteenth-century idealistically-influenced Enlightenment', (296) while on the other, he seems unable to break with, 'nineteenth-century neo-Protestantism from which he has done so much to save the rest of us.', (297) seemingly captive to his, 'pre-modern', ways.

Therefore, according to Torrance and Nebelsick, Barth, at the moment of his greatest contribution to human thought, lies unshaken from his dogmatic slumbers, blissfully unaware of all the fuss, as a result of his antediluvian ways. However, the picture presented, of a rather somnambulistic and Janus-like Barth, is not a credible one. Rather, there seems to me to be a much simpler, and more elegant, explanation of Barth's position, which does not, to employ Ockham's razor, require the multiplication of entities beyond necessity.

Before proceeding to examine this claim, let us carefully recapitulate what Torrance is contending here. He suggests that, 'there are basic interconnections between theological concepts and natural scientific concepts which have to be brought to light', (298) and that the theologian may more fully appreciate the nature of God's self-revelation, (that is, the substantial content of that self-revelation) by observing the procedure of another scientific discipline. In particular, it is in
observing, 'the relation of geometry to physics', (that is, the substantial content of another discipline) that a theologian may trace out the, 'basic interconnections', and thereby learn how to comprehend the substantial content of his own discipline. Thus, having observed, 'the relation of geometry to physics', (299) Torrance suggests that, 'a closer relation must be established between natural theology and revealed theology.' (300) In this, Torrance consciously seeks to go beyond Barth, but to do so guided by the intention of Barth, as Torrance understands it. Thus, Torrance judges that:

'Karl Barth rightly attacked traditional natural theology as constituting an independent conceptual system on its own, and therefore as constituting the prior and prescriptive framework within which revealed theology could only be distorted and misinterpreted.' (301)

However, Torrance suggests that, in rejecting Natural Theology, Barth was not objecting to, 'its rational structure as such', but, as noted, 'its independent character'. (302) Thus, were a proper context within revealed theology to be found into which a rationally structured Natural Theology could be placed, then, Torrance judges that the knowledge of God given in the latter would be true knowledge. Torrance then contends:

'natural theology must be brought within the heart of positive theology, where of course its structure will change, for then physical statements and theological statements will be intimately correlated. This means that positive theology will change also, for it will have to be pursued in indissoluble relation with the space-time structures of the creation, which in a different way are explored by natural science.' (303)

We note very carefully that what Torrance intends here is nothing less than that the substantial content of the discipline of theology be open, in principle, to review in the light of the possible contributions of another discipline. Further, we note again that Torrance takes
this to be a position consonant with, 'Barth's reinterpretation of the Anselmian method', (304) such that Torrance may envisage Natural Theology being, 'transpose(d)...into the material content of theology where in a changed form it constitutes the epistemological structure of our knowledge of God.' (305) Equally, we note again that such a transposition is envisaged as a direct result of the discipline of theology being informed by the contribution of another discipline. We may, or, we may not, judge this to be a fruitful manner in which to pursue the discipline of theology. However, we may ask, Was this approach ever envisaged by Barth ?, and further, Could this approach ever have been envisaged within Barth's thought ?

Therefore, with these questions in mind, let us once more pursue an explanation of Barth's position, with respect to the relationship of theology to other sciences.

v) The Boundaries of Theology - Karl Barth

The explanation of Barth's position which seems to me to be most satisfactory is in fact highlighted by Nebelsick, but the conclusions which follow from what he highlights are explained away in favour of a position akin to Torrance's. Nebelsick contends, writing of Barth; in a way that recalls Torrance's earlier comments on the residual influence of Herrmann upon Barth, and of Kant being mediated to Barth through Herrmann, (306) that :

'His idea of the independence of theology that in itself is not only inaccessible to the other sciences but has nothing to learn from them, comes from his once revered but later rejected teacher, Wilhelm Herrmann.' (307)

Thus, we find it suggested that Herrmann's influence upon
Barth was, not only with respect to the concept of the self-revelation of God, but also, with respect to Barth's understanding of the nature of science. We might then reasonably ask, Are these strands of influence related? At this point, we may wish to recall some of the contentions of Chapter 4, wherein it was suggested that Barth felt compelled, by increasing secularisation, to, 'withdraw revelation even further from the world.', with Barth's position then being understood as a radicalisation of that adopted by Herrmann. Further, it was suggested that the result of this withdrawal is a severing of, 'the connection between Geschichte and Historie.' (308) Equally, it was maintained that Barth's understanding of the 'self-', reflects, and is conditioned by, the position which arises once we concede the impossibility of any attempt to prove the existence of God, after the manner of the proofs of God. Thus, we may suggest that Barth's theological position necessarily has implications for his understanding of the relationship between theology and any other discipline.

The latter observation may seem a trifle obvious. However, given the necessary implications which I wish to highlight, I gladly risk such a comment. Wherein might we find a statement of Herrmann's position which ties in with Nebelsick's contention? In turning to the opening Chapter of Herrmann's, Dogmatik, we find precisely such a statement. Thus, to summarise, Herrmann contends that other disciplines, in virtue of their being conditioned solely by mundane realities, do not stand on the same footing as the discipline of theology, which is conditioned by a supramundane reality. One notable result of this is that the possibility of laying claim to the title 'science', on the same basis as other disciplines, is denied to Christian dogmatics. However, that does does not mean that the Christian community cannot formulate
its insights into the nature of God's self-revelation in ways which are properly to be regarded as 'scientific'. Rather, it is the case that only within the boundaries of the Christian community may the insights, so formulated, be regarded as 'scientific' in nature. (309)

Therefore, our conclusions drawn in Chapter 4 with respect to the theological substance of the concept of the self-revelation of God, (that is, that there is a basic continuity between Herrmann and Barth, albeit that there are differences in form) would seem to be correlated (most clearly so far in Herrmann's case, but, as we shall see, equally in Barth's) to an understanding of the boundaries of theology, in which the supramundane nature of that which is revealed necessarily precludes any dialogue with that which is formulated on a mundane level. This may be perceived by some as a weakness. However, it is a position whose greatest strength might be regarded as the fact that it is inviolable. That is, in refusing to admit as valid any contribution from outwith your discipline, you necessarily preclude the possibility of your own discipline being undermined. Equally, by maintaining the boundaries of your own discipline, and refusing to cross into another discipline's preserve, you similarly maintain the integrity of your own discipline.

Nebelsick further contends that the above standpoint explains Barth's failure to deal with the scientific questions posed by the, "The Doctrine of Creation", as exemplified in, C.D. III/1 (1945). Therein, Barth suggests that, 'There is free scope for natural science beyond what theology describes as the work of the Creator...Theology can and must move freely where science which really is science, and not secretly a pagan Gnosis or religion, has its appointed limit.', (310) a view
which Nebelsick clearly regards as an abnegation of responsibility. (311) However, we shall see that Barth's position reflects, not a failure of theological nerve in the face of immensities, rather, the consistent working out of the basic presuppositions which underlie his understanding of the relationship which obtains between theology and any other scientific discipline.

With respect to Nebelsick's contention, and to the earlier comments by Torrance on Herrmann and Barth, it would seem to me that here we in fact touch upon the very essence of Barth's understanding of the relationship between theology and any other intellectual discipline. Equally, while it might be true to say that Barth rejects certain elements in Herrmann's teaching, it would not be true to say that he rejects the essentially Kantian understanding of the relationship between theology and any other discipline. Further, I would suggest that this understanding provided Barth with what he regarded as an absolutely indisputable position - to repeat again, an absolutely indisputable position - from which to fully and freely develop a coherent understanding of the self-revelation of God. Thus, given that he had an absolutely indisputable position, he had no need to look beyond the sphere allotted to his own discipline, nor any reason to expect that his position would be enhanced by an engagement with other disciplines. That is not to say that the insights of other disciplines do not shed light upon the same reality as that which a theologian has to do with. However, that is not to say that the languages generated by these insights are commensurable. They are not! Thus, as we shall see in Barth, for a theologian to concede to another discipline anything from within the sphere allotted to his discipline, or for a theologian to attempt to intrude upon that sphere which properly belongs to another discipline, would be to commit an
error of the first order. Therefore, in the final analysis, the freedom of a theologian and his discipline is safeguarded by his resolute refusal to cross the boundaries of that discipline.

Wherein do we find such an understanding presented by Barth? Let me suggest that we find it in Barth's 1960 contribution to his brother Heinrich's Festschrift, entitled, "Philosophy and Theology". (312) As regards this article, S.W. Sykes notes:

'With constant reference to the influential piece by Kant on the Dispute between the Faculties, Barth cannot envisage anything other than conflict between faithful theologians and genuine philosophers, in which, from the theological side at least, concessions are out of order.' (313)

As Sykes further notes, this is not to say that the theologian cannot learn from the philosopher, and that they should not remain, 'within earshot'. (314) (What precisely Barth believes the theologian may learn from the philosopher remains unclear. (315)) However, he suggests that, in the final analysis, Barth accepts Kant's basic contention that there is a necessary and unavoidable conflict between theology and philosophy. (316) Thus, a basic pattern of relationship is established between theology and philosophy, which would seem to me to exemplify for Barth the basic relationship which obtains between theology and any other discipline. Within that basic pattern, the essential tenet to be observed is that of respecting the boundaries of the discipline.

Barth begins, "Philosophy and Theology", by stating that the relationship between the theologian and the philosopher is characterised by a mixture of, 'confrontation and cooperation', and, given what has been
stated above, the suggestion of, 'cooperation', may come as somewhat of a surprise. In the light of this, we are compelled to ask, In what sense does Barth understand there to be, 'cooperation', between theologian and philosopher? Quite simply, Barth believes that the element of, 'cooperation', emerges from the fact of their, 'fellow-humanity', (317) from which fact Barth derives two points.

In the first instance, he suggests that the theologian and the philosopher are together confronted with, 'the one, single, whole Truth among all the differentiation of its components'. That is, as the, 'Truth disclos(es) itself in its wholeness.', they stand as, 'fellow-human being(s)'. (318) However, in the very moment of their solidarity, (that is, in together confronting the Truth) differentiation, and thus confrontation, develops. This is so because each discipline estimates, 'the primary difficult task', which faces it to be different, (319) and, as a result, each discipline finds itself engaging with the Truth in a, 'designated...sphere', (320) with that, 'sphere', having arisen (or so it would seem in Barth's somewhat circular line of argument) out of the estimation by the theologian or philosopher of what their primary task is. Thus, Barth may write that:

'Both of their enterprises, on their paths separating themselves on the question of the primacy of their common difficult tasks, will themselves not only have to execute their respective tasks always strictly on the basis of the one whole Truth as such, but also on the basis of the validity of the presupposition that each on its respective path may ever circumnavigate this Truth and only it.' (321)

In the second instance, Barth contends that no-one within a discipline can claim that the language of their discipline is more fitted than the language of the other discipline to describe the Truth which mutually confronts
them, such that he may declare, 'that neither the one nor the other is in a position to speak down from heaven'. (322) Further, in commenting upon, 'the "dispute of the faculties"', (323) he may say:

'thus has neither of them yet the power, as a possessor of (the Truth), to lead it into the arena, there to let it speak in behalf of his own subject matter and against that of another. They can and should indeed let themselves both put forward a claim by means of it, but they cannot lay claim to it for themselves, neither the philosopher nor the theologian. They can both only be at its disposal, viz., to want to serve it.' (324)

Thus, Barth in no sense envisages a complementarity of understanding emerging out of their, 'fellow-humanity', (albeit that both are enjoined to carry out their tasks, 'in great humility', (325) using, 'the same human (also far too human) thought and speech'. (326) This is so, because each discipline is confronted with the Truth as it wholly (not partially) discloses itself within the boundaries of that sphere, and thus (because there is a full disclosure) no discipline may deny to another that it has insight into the Truth. That is, the understanding of, and insight into, the Truth, generated within a sphere is complete in itself, and does not require to be complemented. (327) Further, Barth may contend that there is no possibility, here upon the earth, of one discipline being judged superior to the other, rather, 'They both can only appeal to the one whole Truth superior to them both.' (328) Therefore, for Barth, 'there will indeed be one way according to the philosopher, and another way according to the theologian.' (329)

The theologian, if called upon to give an account of the task of his discipline, can speak only in the terms given to him, that is:

'that Jesus Christ is the one whole Truth through whom the path of his thought and speech has been shown to him
just as strictly as the philosophical path has been cut off.' (330)

Thus, in Christ, there is given the axiom around which the thought of the theologian revolves, and precisely here is the theologian, 'astonished concerning the philosopher', for the theologian cannot comprehend that the philosopher would wish to pursue his task, now, 'antiquated in Jesus Christ.', (331) given the reality of, 'the Truth illuminating the whole world and thus also the philosopher and the theologian!' (332) Having thus begun from the reality of Christ, the theologian has, 'no facultas [capability] for participation', in the task of the philosopher, and rightly, 'sticks at his own business'. (333) Therefore, with, 'his whole thinking and reflection hav(ing) been (pan noema [every thought] 2. Cor. 10, 5) "taken captive into the obedience of Christ."', (334) the way which the theologian must take is clearly established. Thereafter, Barth writes :

'Therewith is it clear in which direction he is free to think and to speak. For this path of Jesus Christ clearly leads from above to below and from there back towards the above, from the condescension of the Creator to the elevation of the creation and not the reverse.' (335)

In a modulation of the tone of his position, Barth thereafter returns to affirm, 'the fellow-humanity' of the theologian and the philosopher, (336) and even concedes that the one may learn from the other quite simply because of this, 'fellow-humanity'. However, even here, the word of caution is sounded, for Barth affirms that, 'the learning of the one in the presence of the other will never be able to mean this, that he for his part may now cross over to the path of the other'. Further, this learning of the one from the other should not be construed to mean that a complementarity of understanding has been established. (337) Thus, even
within the limited possibility of learning, the boundaries within which understanding takes place remain.

What then may we say that Barth has achieved by the adoption of the position developed in, "Philosophy and Theology"? It may well be that few would find Barth's position to be a suitable basis for inter-disciplinary dialogue, and, more than that, that many would find in his position a virtual abnegation of the responsibility of a theologian. However, it does seem to me that Barth has clarified his position, in the sense that he has (or believes he has) established an absolutely indisputable position from which to fully and freely develop a coherent understanding of the self-revelation of God. Thus, Barth would seem to have established the boundaries of his own discipline, such that he can contend that no other discipline has any right to impinge upon the substantial content of theology, (that is, the self-revelation of God) while conceding to the practitioners of any other discipline the right to pursue their discipline without fear of interference from the discipline of theology. (In so doing, Barth has developed a position which would seem to me to parallel that reached in Kant's, The Conflict of the Faculties. Naturally, Kant comes to the matter from the other side of the question, but the essential position is the same. (338)) Therefore, given that Barth has established this absolutely indisputable position, there is no need for him to look beyond the boundaries of his own discipline.

vi) Karl Barth and T.F. Torrance - A Discontinuity Unveiled

What then may be said of the relationship between the position adopted by Barth and that pursued by T.F.
Torrance, beyond, *Theological Science*? The answer, I contend, is that they stand in a relationship of discontinuity. That is, there is no possibility of moving from the position advocated by Barth, (which, as Torrance and Nebelsick have lamented, has been maintained with such consistency) to that now advocated by Torrance. For the latter, which claims to find its roots in an understanding of the self-revelation of God expounded by Barth, ignores the basic tenet (for Barth) which permits the theologian, within the absolute freedom of his own discipline, to respond to the self-revelation of God. This should not be construed as a suggestion that Barth is 'right', and Torrance 'wrong', with respect to their understanding of the relationship between theology and other disciplines. Instead, it is to deny that Torrance's position is a coherent exposition of Barth's understanding of the self-revelation of God, on the basis that an understanding of the proper boundaries of the discipline of theology is an integral element of Barth's overall position. Finally, we shall have to say that Barth's position, in this respect, would seem more to stand in continuity with that of Kant and Herrmann, than with that of T.F. Torrance. (339)

However, there remains one final question to be faced, that is, What of Torrance's claim that in discussion with Barth shortly before his death, 'Karl Barth expressed full agreement with my interpretation of his thought'? (340) This is a very considerable claim, and one which Torrance repeats in, *Karl Barth : Biblical and Evangelical Theologian*, (1990) (341) while, equally, it is cited enthusiastically by those who wish to expound Barth in Torrance's terms. (342) In reply, I would wish to highlight once more the basic contention that, in respect of the relationship between theology and other disciplines, Barth was a firm respecter of boundaries.
That is not to say that he denied that, through his shared humanity with the practitioners of other disciplines, he could not learn from their insights. Nor does Barth fail to appreciate that the science of theology is close, 'methodologically to the inductive sciences based on observation and induction.', (343) a comment made in 1948. Further, in, Evangelical Theology, (1962) Barth is happy to suggest that the God who is known in His self-revelation may become, 'the object of human science', (344) and may say of the characteristics of that science that:

'there is none that, mutatis mutandis, presupposing the requisite changes, could not and would not have to be the characteristics of other sciences as well.' (345)

However, the recognition of a shared humanity and of a certain methodological closeness which may permit the recognition of the fact that a particular science, qua science, may exhibit the general characteristics of a science, did not lead Barth at any point in his massive corpus to embark upon a project such as that proposed by Torrance. Further, as already highlighted, Barth was aware, (at the very latest, in 1956) through G. Howe, et al., of the alleged parallels between his thought and that of physics, and, should he have wished to do so, Barth would surely have taken the opportunity to correct the deficiencies in his thought, with respect to the relationship between theology and physics. However, he did not, and the simplest explanation as to why he did not, seems to me to lie in the fact that, from the standpoint of an absolutely indisputable position from which to fully and freely develop a coherent understanding of the self-revelation of God, he observed no deficiency. From this standpoint, Barth was quite happy to observe parallels between his discipline and other disciplines. However, at no point does a
recognition of broad parallels in methodology ever lead him to reconsider the substantial content of the concept of the self-revelation of God. Therefore, it would seem to me that Barth would be happy to recognise the analogy which Torrance put to him, (that is, that another discipline exemplified the characteristics of a science in the same manner as the discipline of theology) without ever envisaging a project along the lines suggested by Torrance. In so contending, we are not suggesting that Barth's position is necessarily the most helpful and fruitful one for Christian theology to adopt. However, we are suggesting that it is Barth's position, and, if this is so, Torrance's claim to expound the self-revelation of God in fidelity to Barth's intention has foundered.

vii) Conclusion

Our aim has been to trace the development of T.F. Torrance's understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God, and, in particular, to highlight the degree to which that understanding has been shaped by interaction with the thought of Karl Barth. In my judgement, that aim has been realised.

Therefore, we may suggest that, in the development of his understanding up to the publication of, *Theological Science*, Torrance may be portrayed as one who passively receives and expounds the thought of Barth, that is, one whose work is characterised by fidelity to the intention of Barth. However, during the period in which the content of, *Theological Science*, was being forged, (that is, c.1959-1969 (346)) Torrance begins to move beyond the boundaries of Barth's thought, though always claiming fidelity to the latter's intention, such that he may
further claim to have received the imprimatur of Barth in this development.

However, in developing his understanding of the said concept in the manner exhibited in, Theological Science, and beyond, Torrance would seem to me to have failed to grasp an absolutely crucial element in Barth's understanding. Thus, in his attempt to navigate the vast ocean which is the issue of the intelligibility of theological language, (understood as a response to the self-revelation of God) Torrance finds himself caught in the ferocious currents of a veritable Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, in professing fidelity to Barth, Torrance finds himself exposed to the charge which the latter himself faced, namely, (to sum up very crudely) that of denying to theological language the possibility of sharing in the same structures of meaning as certain in other disciplines. On the other hand, in seeking to establish the intelligibility of theological language within a shared structure of meaning, (and, thus, as I contend, moving away from Barth) yet claiming fidelity to a theological position which would, in principle, deny the legitimacy of such an endeavour, Torrance, 'shall be likened unto a...man, which built his house upon the sand'. (Matthew 7 v. 26, A.V.) Barth, by way of contrast, never leaves his rock and may be said to enjoy a certain impregnability. He may be likened, 'unto a wise man', (Matthew 7 v. 24, A.V.) at least with respect to the relative consistency with which he applies the principles implicit in, "Philosophy and Theology".

However, a plea of mitigation may here be entered on Torrance's behalf. For, insofar as Barth denied (or failed to appreciate) that his approach stood in continuity with his theological predecessors, he failed to signal to Torrance the origins of that approach. As we
have already seen, in the thought of Ritschl and Herrmann we have an indispensable preface to any attempt to understand the concept of the self-revelation of God as enunciated by Barth. Further, we now see that which is implicitly correlated to this, namely; that there are genuine boundaries beyond which a theologian should not stray. Indeed, we may suggest that the presence of the latter is a powerful indicator of the former's influence.

Torrance's failure, to appreciate the theological and epistemological continuities which we have highlighted, is culpable. However, he does not stand at the bar alone.
CHAPTER 5 - T.F. TORRANCE ON THE NATURE OF GOD'S REVELATION: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO, THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE


2 There are a variety of themes and concepts found in, C.D. I/1, I/2, and, II/1, which we might judge to be exhibited in Torrance's, The Modern Theological Debate, and I shall briefly highlight these. The concept of God as Subject, (The Modern Theological Debate, 10, 19) is a characteristic theme of Barth, and is to be found in, C.D. I/1, 380-383, and, C.D. II/1, 3-4, 21-31. Equally, the notion that the giving of God is self-grounded (The Modern Theological Debate, 11) is to be observed, for example, in, C.D. II/1, 31-61. A further characteristic of Barth's thought, his affirmation that God the Lord is the root of Revelation, as found in, C.D. I/1, 306-308, and, C.D. II/1, 45-47, is also echoed in Torrance (The Modern Theological Debate, 11). The relationship between Scripture and Revelation (The Modern Theological Debate, 13) is a further area in which we can discern echoes of Barth, as may be observed in, C.D. I/1, 111-120, and C.D. I/2, 457-472. Alongside this, the question of how we in fact come to know God, (The Modern Theological Debate, 11) would appear almost to be lifted straight from, C.D. I/1, 189, and the answer given generally by Torrance, to reflect Barth's treatment in, C.D. I/1, "$6. The Knowability of the Word of God", 187-247.

The understanding of theological knowledge as the knowledge of faith (The Modern Theological Debate, 14) finds support in, C.D. II/1, 12-15, while, the recognition that it is only through our being reconciled through Christ that we may perceive revelation (The Modern Theological Debate, 12) finds similar support in, C.D. I/1, 399-414. Further themes to be found in, The Modern Theological Debate, which would seem to have their parallel in Barth, are that, for example, the Word of God is, in essence, veiled, (The Modern Theological Debate, 13) C.D. I/1, 174-186, and, that obedience is an essential prerequisite of the theological task, (The Modern Theological Debate, 20) C.D. I/1, 17-24.
3 See n.1 above. The reason for this reticence, with respect to the name of Barth, is, I would venture, the theologically conservative nature of the audience to which the lectures, contained in the pamphlet, were originally delivered. On the IVF, see, D. Johnson, Contending for the Faith (Leicester: IVP, 1979).


5 Ibid., 10.

6 Ibid., 12.

7 Ibid., 11.

8 Ibid., 11.

9 Ibid., 12.

10 Ibid., 13.

11 Ibid., 19.

12 Ibid., 20.

13 Idem, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, 121, 124. We may recall at this juncture the extent of Torrance's exposure to Barth's thought in 1941, and, in particular, to the, Church Dogmatics. Thus, we note that he had before him the English translation of, C.D. I/1, and the German of, C.D. I/2, while, in his time at Basel, he had heard Barth lecture on what was to be the content of, C.D. II/1. Equally, we note from the index of, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, that his references to these three volumes far outweigh his references to the rest of the, Church Dogmatics, that is, by sixty nine (69) to twenty six (26). (Ibid., 246. See also, Idem, Theological Science, where Torrance is, in particular, heavily indebted to, C.D. II/1, especially throughout the fundamental opening chapter on, "The Knowledge of God", 1-54.) Therefore, it would seem that, in considerable measure, Torrance had formulated his characteristic understanding of the nature of Revelation, and of the self-revelation of God, at a relatively early stage in his theological career. However, it is clear from, The Modern Theological Debate, that Torrance had not at this stage formulated an understanding which was able to integrate the findings of, 'the exact sciences', into the theological schema in the way that he attempts to do in, Theological Science. (See, Idem, The Modern Theological Debate, 20-22.)

14 See n.2 above.


21 Ibid., 135. Here, 'Calvin called natural religion a "shadow religion" over against the manifestation of God'. See, J. Calvin, Institutes I, 4, 4.

22 Ibid., 135. Further to n.24, Torrance suggests that, 'Karl Barth, who has championed the the Reformed rejection of natural theology to-day, has called it "the shadow-side" of the Revelation of God.' See, K.D. II/1, 131.

23 Ibid., 136.

24 Ibid., 135. Torrance notes Barth's suggestion that, 'our rejection of natural theology must not be any kind of metaphysical denial; rather must it be grounded only upon the event of grace as setting it completely aside for faith.' See, K.D. II/1, 190.

25 Ibid., 136.

26 Ibid., 137.

27 Ibid., 138.

28 Ibid., 139.


30 Ibid., 4.
31 Ibid., April 19th, 6.
32 Ibid., 6.
33 Ibid., 6.
34 Ibid., April 23rd, 6.
36 In, Idem, "My Interaction with Karl Barth", in, D.K. McKim (ed.), How Karl Barth changed my Mind (Grand Rapids, Mich. : Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1986), 52-64, Torrance tends to give the impression that he was, 'a fully-fledged Barthian', from the very beginning. We cannot doubt the significance of Barth's influence upon Torrance from an early stage, but there was definitely development, even for Torrance, in his approbation of the Master.
38 B.J.A. Gray, Theology as Science : An Examination of the Theological Methodology of Thomas F. Torrance, 97-98.
40 Ibid., 13 n.1.
41 Ibid., 13-14.
42 Ibid., 14.
43 Ibid., 14.
44 Ibid., 15.
46 Ibid., 15.
47 Ibid., 15.
48 Ibid., 15.
49 Ibid., 15-16.
50 Ibid., 16.
The significance, for Torrance, of the concept of theology as dialogue is particularly evident in, Theological Science, and, recollecting that, Theological Science, had its origins in a series of lectures delivered in 1959, (Idem, Theological Science, vii) (that is, in the same period which saw the publication of, The School of Faith, and prior to his 1962 book, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931) we may suggest that the significance
which it acquires is related to Torrance's understanding of the development of Barth's thought. Within Torrance's book, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931, we may note the extent to which he wishes to stress the transitory (and unsatisfactory) nature of Barth's, 'dialectical thinking', (Ibid., 80-90) within which an inherent Christological weakness rendered his approach incapable of substantiating its own claims. (Ibid., 138-139) During this period of transition, Barth (according to Torrance) may describe theological, 'dialogue', as, 'dialectical thinking in which two partners are locked in conversation, in which the answer to the Word is never final but always in the form of an inquiry back to the Word again.' (Ibid., 130) Thereafter, following the decisive transition in Barth's thought (which Torrance regards as occurring around 1930 (see n.88)) there is a movement away, 'from dialectical to analogical (i.e. Christological) thinking.' (Ibid., 142) Torrance's conclusions here are then carried over into, Theological Science, where the dialectical method is contrasted, always detrimentally, with the dialogical approach, (Idem, Theological Science, 7, 42, 128, 141, 157, 307) with the latter assuming a central place within Torrance's thought. (See, Ibid., "Index of Subjects", on, 'dialogical thought', 359)

74 Ibid., xlvi.
75 Ibid., lxiii.
76 Ibid., lxxxiii.
77 Ibid., lxxxiii.
78 Ibid., lxiii.
79 Ibid., cxii.
80 Ibid., cxii.
81 Idem, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931, 9.
82 Ibid., 113-118.
83 Ibid., 81.
84 Ibid., 81.
86 Ibid., 121.
87 Ibid., 121.

88 Ibid., See, 10, 133. Torrance writes:

'The really decisive transition in Barth's thinking took place about 1930. In March of 1929 he delivered several formidable lectures in Dortmund under the title Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie in which he sought to clarify the relation of theology to philosophy and to think his way through to a thoroughly consistent theology untainted by ideology. It was in the following year that he held his seminar on Anselm's Cur Deus Homo in Bonn...The results of the study he carried through on Anselm were published under the title Fides Quaerens Intellectum. These are all works of great significance, for they show us the transition from the Christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf of 1927 to the Kirchliche Dogmatik of 1932.' (133)

This particular understanding of the significance of Barth's work on Anselm is also found in other contemporary Barth interpreters. See, for example, C.E. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford: OUP, 1978), 117-127. T.H.L. Parker, Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1970), 70.

89 Ibid., 145.

90 Ibid., Ch. V, 133-198. See n.138, in Chapter 5, for an indication of the sustained challenge which has been offered to the type of Discontinuity Scenario presented by T.F. Torrance. That is, as offered by B.L. McCormack, in, A Scholastic of a Higher Order: The Development of Karl Barth's Theology, 1921-1931 2 Vol.s (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1989).

91 Ibid., 145.

92 Ibid., 145. See n.5, citing, C.D. I/1, Ch. II, $8.

93 Ibid., 145.

94 Ibid., 146.

95 Ibid., 146. See n.1, citing, C.D. II/1, Ch. VI, $28.

96 Ibid., 146.

97 Ibid., 100.

98 Ibid., 100 n.2.

99 K. Barth, Theology and Church, 248f.
100 Ibid., 246.
101 Ibid., 246. See, 246-249.
102 Ibid., 248.
103 Ibid., 248.
104 Ibid., 248.
106 Ibid., 182.
107 Ibid., 182.
110 Ibid., 1.
111 Ibid., 5.
112 Ibid., 4.
113 Ibid., 4.
114 Ibid., 5.
115 Ibid., 6.
116 Ibid., 6.
117 Ibid., 6.
118 Ibid., 4-6. Torrance's understanding of Kierkegaard and Barth, with respect to the relationship between Subject and Object, is derived, in large measure from, J. Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology (London: SCM, 1955), passim. Torrance's indebtedness to Brown is acknowledged in, Theological Science, where he opens this book with a long quotation from Brown's work. (T.F. Torrance, Theological Science, 1, and, 1 n.1, citing, J. Brown, Op. Cit., 170-171. See also, 5, 12, 131, 308.). Torrance's reading of Kierkegaard at this point would seem to me to owe more to Brown than it does to Barth.
119 Ibid., 6-7.
120 Ibid., 7.
121 Ibid., 7 n.2. See, C.D. II/1, Ch. V, 3-254.
122 Ibid., 7-8.
123 Ibid., 8.
124 Ibid., 8. See also, 10.
125 Ibid., 8.
126 Ibid., 9.
127 Ibid., 9 n.2.
128 Ibid., 9.
129 Ibid., 10.
130 Ibid., 9.
131 Ibid., 11.
133 Ibid., 13-14.
134 Ibid., 23.
135 Ibid., 23 n.2.
136 Ibid., 30 n.4.
137 Ibid., 21.
139 Ibid., 23 n.3. See, C.D. IV/2, 102f.
140 Ibid., 25. See, 25-54, generally.
141 Ibid., 26.
142 Ibid., 29.
143 Ibid., 29.
144 Ibid., 29, 157. See, C.D. II/1, 205f.
145 Ibid., 34-35.

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Here Barth may suggest that:

'If we ascribe objectivity to God (as we inevitably do when we speak of the knowledge of God) a distinction becomes unavoidable. As He certainly knows Himself first of all, God is first and foremost objective to Himself...In His triune life as such, objectivity, and with it knowledge, is divine reality before creaturely objectivity and knowledge exist. We call this the primary objectivity of God, and distinguish from it the secondary, i.e., the objectivity which He has for for us too in His revelation, in which He gives Himself to be known by us as He knows Himself. It is distinguished from the primary objectivity, not by a lesser degree of truth, but by its particular form suitable for us, the creature. God is objectively immediate to Himself, but to us He is objectively mediate. That is to say, He is not objective directly but indirectly, not in the naked sense but clothed under the sign and veil of other objects different from Himself. His secondary objectivity is fully true, for it has its correspondence and basis in His primary objectivity. God does not have to be untrue to Himself and deceive us about His real nature in order to become objective to us. For first to Himself, and then in His revelation to us, He is nothing but what He is in Himself...It is in, with and under the sign and veil of these other objects that we believe in God, and know Him and pray to Him. We believe in Him in His clothed, not in His naked objectivity. That we know Him in faith has a double significance. We really know Him in his objectivity (even if it is clothed); and we really know Him only in His clothed objectivity.' (K. Barth, C.D. II/1, 16)

147 Ibid., 43, citing, C.D. II/1, 16. See, n.150.

150 Ibid., 137. See, 138-140, generally.
156 Ibid., 87.

157 Ibid., 87-88. See, C.D. II/1, 325, and, C.D. II/1, 260.

158 Ibid., 88.

159 Ibid., 88.

160 Ibid., 88.

161 Ibid., 89.

162 Ibid., 89.

163 Ibid., 89.


166 Ibid., 90.


168 Ibid., 49-50.

169 Ibid., 50-51, citing, C.D. II/1, 51.

170 Ibid., 51.

171 Ibid., 105-106.

172 Ibid., 106. Jüngel's adherence to the position which is sketched out here is evidenced in, Idem, God as the Mystery of the World (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1983), for example, 368-373. Here Jüngel affirms himself in, 'unqualified agreement', with K. Rahner, The Trinity (Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oates, 1970), 22, when the latter contends that, 'The "economic" Trinity is the "immanent" Trinity and the "immanent" Trinity is the "economic" Trinity.' E. Jüngel, Op. Cit., 369-370. Jüngel's affirmation may be seen as being in agreement with his understanding of the concepts of, 'interpretation', and, 'reiteration', as they emerge out of his understanding of the nature of Revelation. T.F. Torrance's similar approbation of Rahner may be found in,

As something of an antidote to the above, we might note J. McIntyre's comment, in, The Shape of Christology (London : SCM, 1966) that, 'What Barth does not indicate clearly enough is the quite unhistorical character of the exposition he gives of the root of the doctrine (of the Trinity). Revelation considerations in no way affected the course of the great trinitarian controversies in the third and fourth centuries; and even now would carry conviction only to those who were prepared to accept Barth's rather esoteric approach to the subject.' (Ibid., 159. See, Ibid., 157-161, generally.)

173 Ibid., 59.

174 Gregor Smith suggests that:

'In Barth we have the last, and possibly the greatest, certainly an awe-inspiring, effort on the part of traditional metaphysical theology to overcome the difficulty of relating "God in his being for himself" with "God for the world in Christ". But if you begin with "being", is there any way to the world of time and movement, the historical world where faith takes its rise?' (R.G. Smith, Op. Cit., 91)

C.E. Gunton, in, Becoming and Being : The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford : OUP, 1978), devotes a full chapter (Ibid., Ch. IX, 186-212) to an exposition of, C.D. II/1, as well as indicating a considerable indebtedness to Jungel, without in fact dealing with the issues raised. We note, A.E. Lewis' comment, in a, Review of, Becoming and Being : The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth, in, SJTh 34 (1981), 73-75, that Gunton, 'scarcely break(s) fresh ground beyond Jungel's Gottes Sein ist im Werden'. (Ibid., 74). Indeed, we may suggest that, in omitting a crucial element of Barth and Jungel's exposition, he has fallen short of Jungel.


176 Ibid., 142.

177 Ibid., 142.


182 Ibid., 38.

183 Ibid., 38.

184 Ibid., 38-39.


186 Ibid., 39, citing, T.F. Torrance, Op. Cit., 129. However, we note that Torrance speaks of the, 'intuitive apprehension of the whole pattern of Truth', rather than, 'the intuitive apprehension of the whole pattern of faith', as Thiemann has it.


189 Ibid., 39.

190 Ibid., 1-7.

191 Ibid., 15.


193 See, M.J. Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 40-46, for a rejection of what he terms, (most aptly in my view) "Karl Barth's St. Anselm". He writes:

'To sum up: If Barth's interpretation of St. Anselm's position on faith and reason is correct, St. Anselm must have been out of step with the whole Augustinian tradition of his own time; he must have been misunderstood and misrepresented by his contemporaries, including his own close disciples; and finally St. Anselm himself must have been unaware of the revolutionary character of his own views. We conclude then that, even though Barth's view of St. Anselm contains many valuable insights, his interpretation must be rejected. In other words, St. Anselm cannot be interpreted as having denied
in principle the possibility of a "natural theology", a rational approach to God, logically prior to and independent of faith.' (Ibid., 45)

See also, J. McIntyre, St. Anselm and his Critics (Edinburgh : Oliver & Boyd, 1954), 24-38, and, Idem, "Remoto Christi", in, RTR 9 (1950), 3-17.


195 Ibid., 25.
198 Ibid., 34.
199 Ibid., 35.
200 Ibid., 35.
201 Ibid., 37-38.
202 Ibid., 40.
203 Ibid., 40.
206 Ibid., 3-10.
207 Ibid., 245.
208 Ibid., 246.
209 Ibid., 246.
211 Ibid., 133.
212 Ibid., 136.
213 Ibid., 133.
218 Ibid., 196.
219 Ibid., 197.
220 Ibid., 199.
222 Ibid., 43 n.3. See, C.D. II/1, 64ff.
223 Ibid., 44.
224 Ibid., 45.
225 Ibid., 44.
226 Ibid., 46.
227 Ibid., 46.
228 Ibid., 46-47. See, C.D. II/1, 22f.
229 Ibid., 50.
230 Ibid., 48-49.
231 Ibid., 50.
232 Ibid., 50.
233 Ibid., 51.


246 Ibid., 58.
247 Ibid., 58.
248 Ibid., 57.
249 Ibid., 57.


251 Ibid., 35.


254 K. Barth, C.D.I/1, 8-9.

255 Ibid., 8.

256 Ibid., 8.

257 Ibid., 8.

258 Ibid., 7-8.


261 Ibid., 8.

262 Ibid., 9.


265 Ibid., 269-270.

266 Ibid., 270 n.557.

267 Ibid., 270 n.557.

268 Ibid., 272.

269 Ibid., 272-273.

270 Ibid., 275.

271 Ibid., 275-276.


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275 Ibid., vii.
276 Ibid., viii.
277 Ibid., ix.
278 Ibid., ix.
279 Ibid., ix-x.
280 Ibid., x.
281 Idem, Space, Time and Resurrection, x.
282 Ibid., x.


284 Idem, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge, 285-287. Torrance's acknowledgement of the residual influence of Herrmann upon Barth, brings him into a rare moment of agreement with J. Barr! Barr writes that (in, J. Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology):

'The Barthians disliked Ritschl and hated to see any suggestion of a continuity between Ritschl and Barth, but the continuity is not to be denied. Barth's own major teacher, Herrmann, was one of the Ritschlian group...Thus...the denial of natural theology was one of the aspects in which Barthianism was continuing the line which Modern Protestantism had initiated'. (Ibid., 106)

We note Barr's implicit suggestion that the residual influence of Herrmann, with respect to Natural Theology, is not overcome by Barth. In this, Barr, of course, differs from Torrance. Further, we note his citation of H. Berkhof's judgement on this matter. Berkhof writes that, 'Karl Barth's battle against natural theology was in respect of content a conflict with the theology of the 19th century; formally and programatically, however, it was an inheritance from that century.' (Ibid., 106 n.5, citing, H. Berkhof & H.-J. Kraus, Karl Barth's Lichterlehre (Theologische Studien 123; Zurich : Theologischer Verlag, 1978), 39.)

285 Idem, Space, Time and Resurrection, x.
286 Idem, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge, ix.
287 Ibid., viii.

288 Ibid., x.


290 Ibid., 196, 209.

291 Ibid., 199-200.


293 Ibid., passim. Torrance commends Howe's observations (T.F. Torrance, Theological Science, 289 n.1.) with the comment that, 'This is why some modern physicists find in the theology of Karl Barth ground for dialogue and rapprochement in understanding between theology and physics.', (Ibid., 289.) However, physics, post-Einstein, can hardly be said to have flowed in the direction that Torrance, et. al., seem to imagine. (For example, S.D. Wigley, Op. Cit., 89, writes, 'Anselm's role is to point, as do Barth and the Nicene Fathers, and as Torrance believes so also do recent developments in post-Einsteinian physics, to a proper scientific basis for knowledge, that is to say one which is grounded upon the intelligibility and rationality of God who has revealed himself as the Triune God.') Indeed, Einstein rather despaired of its direction, and lamented the rise of the form which quantum theory took. (See, for example, A. Pais, Subtle is the Lord (Oxford : OUP, 1982), 440-459. P. Davies, Other Worlds (London : Penguin, 1988), Ch. 1, and, passim.) Perhaps then, Barth might be judged an especially wise man for refusing to cross the boundaries of his own discipline to embrace the indeterminate positions of another. That Torrance's approach lags a generation or two behind modern physics is brought out by J. Polkinghorne, when he suggests that Torrance's, 'great heroes, Maxwell and Einstein, are figures of the final flowering of classical physics rather than to be found among the creators of the new world view that quantum theory brought about.' (J. Polkinghorne Science and Creation (London : SPCK, 1988), 84-85.

J. Dillenberger, Protestant Thought and Natural Science (London : Collins, 1961), suggests that Howe, 'is particularly impressed by the similarity between the concept of complementarity as used by Bohr and the way in which the attributes of God are developed in Karl Barth's...
theology.' Dillenberger then adds, 'Assuming that the analogy is true, we are still left with the question whether it is significant.' (Ibid., 290)


295 Ibid., 200.

296 Ibid., 200.

297 Ibid., 200.

298 T.F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge, x.

299 Idem, Space, Time and Resurrection, x.


301 Ibid., 281. See also, Idem, "The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth", 293-294.

302 Idem, "The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth", 293.


304 Idem, Space, Time and Resurrection, x.

305 Ibid., x.


308 H. Berkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology, 200.

309 W. Herrmann, Systematic Theology, 15-19.

310 K. Barth, C.D III/1, x.


313 S.W. Sykes, "Introduction", in, H. Martin Rumscheidt (ed.), The Way of Theology in Karl Barth, 1-24, 5-6. See, I. Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties (Nebraska: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1992). Kant attempts in, The Conflict of the Faculties, to establish for the, 'Lower Faculty', (43-47) of philosophy, its right to prosecute its interests without interference from the, 'Higher Faculties', (Ibid., 31-43), that is, Theology, Law and Medicine, and, further, without interference from the State. (The occasion which prompted Kant to compile, The Conflict of the Faculties, was his conflict with the Prussian State censors, and allied theologians, (c.1794) in respect of their charge that he was denigrating the Christian religion by his teaching, and thus (by moving into the field of theology) exceeding the bounds of his duties. (Ibid., v-xxix, 9-21) In the light of this, it would seem to me to be self-evident that an adequate defence of Kant's position would be to establish the boundaries of your own discipline and call upon other disciplines to respect them.) Kant writes:

'Now the power to judge autonomously - that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general) - is called reason. So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government. But a department of this kind, too, must be established at a university; in other words, a university must have a faculty of philosophy. Its function in relation to the three higher faculties is to control them and, in this way, be useful to them, since truth (the essential and first condition of learning in general) is the main thing, whereas the utility the higher faculties promise the government is of secondary importance. We can only grant the theology faculty's proud claim that the philosophy faculty is its handmaid (though the question remains, whether the servant is the mistress's torchbearer or trainbearer), provided it is not driven away or silenced. For the very modesty [of its claim] - merely to be free, as it leaves others free, to discover the truth for the benefit of all the sciences and to set it before the higher faculties to use as they will - must commend it to the government as above suspicion and, indeed indispensable.' (Ibid., 43, 45. - N.B. The German Text runs between the English Translation)

Further, he may suggest that:

'the theologians of the faculty [of Theology] have the duty incumbent on them, and consequently the title, to uphold biblical faith; but this does not impair the freedom of the philosophers to subject it always to the critique of reason. And should a dictatorship be granted
to the higher faculty for a short time (by religious edict), this freedom can best be secured by the solemn formula: Provideant consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat ["Let the consuls see to it that no harm befalls the republic"]. (Ibid., 123)

(See also, Ibid., 22-139, generally)

318 Ibid., 80.
319 Ibid., 79.
320 Ibid., 80.
321 Ibid., 80.
322 Ibid., 80.
323 Ibid., 81.
324 Ibid., 81.
325 Ibid., 81.
326 Ibid., 90.
327 Ibid., 80.
328 Ibid., 81.
329 Ibid., 81.
330 Ibid., 89.
331 Ibid., 89.
332 Ibid., 89.
333 Ibid., 89.
334 Ibid., 89-90.
335 Ibid., 90.
336 Ibid., 90.
337 Ibid., 91.

338 See, n.313. Insofar as Barth would seem to reject any crossing of disciplinary boundaries, he may be judged to refine even Kant's basic approach. See, I. Kant, Op. Cit., 123, as cited at, n.313, where the Faculty of Philosophy reserves the right to criticise the Faculty of Theology, in the light of Reason.

339 J.C. McLelland, "Philosophy and Theology - A Family Affair (Karl and Heinrich Barth)", in, H. Martin Rumscheidt (ed.), Footnotes to a Theology (The Corporation for the Publication of Academic Studies in Religion in Canada, 1974), 30-52, further notes the essentially Kantian presuppositions which underlie much of Barth's thinking, and we may observe his conclusions with interest (even if we were not fully minded to agree with them). He writes:

'I have held that first, Karl Barth (as well as Heinrich) operates within a Kantian problematique, in that the polarity of real and idea, the dialectic structure of human knowing, is accepted as the correct description; second, the transitional work on philosophy and theology issued in theological actualism, positing credal affirmations as data for analytic thought; third, the aim of showing the scientific nature of theology itself is part of a Kantian package, and depends on tendentious definitions of both philosophy and science (and theology).' (Ibid., 47)

The above notwithstanding, we note that McLelland holds the view that T.F. Torrance has properly understood Barth's intention in wishing to maintain the scientific nature of theology, and allied this to a perceptive understanding of the direction scientific method. As a result of the latter, McLelland judges Torrance to have liberated the former from Barth's anachronistic understanding of science. However, we shall suggest that it is Torrance whose understanding is anachronistic, and that Barth's position, however we judge it, has at least saved him from the error of tying his theological understanding to any particular (passing) phase in scientific understanding. (See, n. 293 above)

340 T.F. Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, x.

341 Idem, Karl Barth : Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, 130.

342 See, for example, R.S. Anderson, "Barth and a New Direction for Natural Theology", in, J. Thompson (ed.), Theology beyond Christendom, 241-266, 244. S.D. Wigley, "Karl Barth on St. Anselm : The Influence of St. Anselm's -392-
"Theological Scheme" on T.F. Torrance and Eberhard Jüngel, in, SJTh 46 (1993), 79-97, 89.

343 K. Barth, C.D. III/2, 12.


345 Ibid., 12.

346 T.F. Torrance, Theological Science, vii-viii.
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION

Any attempt to establish lines of continuity or discontinuity throughout the history of theology is fraught with difficulty, given that much will depend on the personal judgement of the interpreter who seeks so to do. However, given that others have already sought to present a particular understanding of the history of theology, we are faced with two options. On the one hand; we may simply acquiesce to the understanding presented and acknowledge it to be an accurate guide to that history, or, we may subject the understanding thus presented to critical scrutiny in order to satisfy ourselves that it does indeed offer a coherent account of the history of theology. If we judge that it does not, we would then be under obligation to offer an alternative understanding. In either case, a personal judgement is required. I have chosen the latter option.

Thus, with respect to the account of the reception of Barth's theology within Scotland offered by T.F. Torrance, I have demonstrated that there was such an established understanding, and have chosen to term this the Discontinuity Scenario. With the theological focus being upon the concept of the self-revelation of God, I have shown that within this Scenario there is posited an essential discontinuity between Barth's thought and that of his theological predecessors, Ritschl and Herrmann. Equally, I have shown that within Scotland, H.R. Mackintosh is presented as the principal recipient of Barth's thought, and that his response turns upon a rejection of Ritschl and Herrmann in favour of Barth.

In contrast to this understanding, I have offered a Continuity Scenario. I have granted to the Discontinuity Scenario something akin to the status of a 'paradigm',
and have initially established the extent to which other interpreters have read the Ritschl/Herrmann-Barth relationship more in terms of continuity than of discontinuity. Thereafter, I have shown that within Scotland one of the principal recipients of the theology of Ritschl and Herrmann, albeit critically, was H.R. Mackintosh. Further, I have shown that Mackintosh's positive response to Barth, (for such there was) albeit critically, turned, not on a rejection of Ritschl and Herrmann, but, on an appreciation of the fact that Barth was progressing in the same direction as Herrmann, et. al. In particular, Mackintosh appreciates that this progress is evident with respect to the question of Revelation. As to Mackintosh's place within the wider Scottish scene, I have indicated that Mackintosh's perspective upon the Ritschl/Herrmann-Barth relationship was a distinctive one. In turning to examine Ritschl, Herrmann and Barth, in respect of their understanding of the concept of the self-revelation of God, I have demonstrated that Barth's understanding can only properly be comprehended in the light of its relationship to the thought of Herrmann, that is, primarily in the light of Herrmann's concept of the self-revelation of God.

In turning again to Torrance, I have demonstrated that he is considerably indebted to Barth, with respect to his understanding of the self-revelation of God, albeit that from around the time of, Theological Science, he believed he discerned within Barth a theological epistemology which paralleled that found in the physics of Einstein. This latter element in the development of Torrance's understanding I have judged to be illegitimate from the standpoint of Barth's thought. I believe this judgement finds its basis in the fact that Barth's understanding of the nature of God's self-revelation is correlated to an understanding of the boundaries of theology, which would
prohibit in principle the development which Torrance proposes. This correlation of a particular understanding of the nature of revelation to a particular understanding of the boundaries of theology, is one that is also found within the thought of Wilhelm Herrmann. Thus, I would judge that the correlation found in Barth is an integral element of his conception of the self-revelation of God, which most probably reflects the pervasive influence of Herrmann, albeit that this influence is not identified as such. Therefore, I would contend that Barth's concept of the self-revelation of God is best understood as standing in continuity with the thought of Ritschl and Herrmann. Torrance has not explicitly discerned this element of continuity, and fails to acknowledge that in the later development of his thought he in fact stands in discontinuity with Barth, whose thought would proscribe any illegitimate attempt to cross the boundaries of his discipline into the grounds of another. However, even as he so stands in discontinuity, Torrance claims fidelity to Barth, and, in my judgement, offers an account which, for all its power, is incoherent.

Therefore, in my judgement, the Discontinuity Scenario must be set aside, as an inadequate account of the history of theology within Scotland, and, as an inadequate basis for understanding the concept of the self-revelation of God within the thought of Karl Barth.
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APPENDIX - THE IMPACT OF GERMAN THEOLOGY ON SCOTTISH THINKING PRIOR TO BARTH

i) Ritschlian Influence - An Established School?

The proposed Continuity Scenario maintains, as a background assumption, that within the Scottish theological tradition there is considerable evidence of the influence of German thinking (in particular, Ritschlian thinking) upon that tradition. Thus, upholders of the Continuity Scenario would maintain that a theologian such as H.R. Mackintosh was sensitive to the theological continuities which might exist between Ritschlian thought, and the thought of Karl Barth, schooled as he was in the Ritschlian tradition. Further, I would suggest that upholders of the Discontinuity Scenario would wish to maintain this assumption also. That is, they would wish to maintain that a theologian such as H.R. Mackintosh was sensitive to the theological weaknesses within Ritschlian thought, such that he might be judged to be particularly open to respond to the thought of Karl Barth. Therefore, while we shall not examine this assumption within the main body of the thesis, I shall append a survey of the evidence in support of the stated assumption.

Thus, we shall suggest that there was in Scotland among representative theologians, prior to the advent of Barth, a particular awareness of a theology which we may broadly term 'Ritschlian'. This is not to contend that there was in Scotland a 'Ritschlian school' of theology, which was identifiably so, nor that there was a rigid adherence to the theological conclusions of Albrecht Ritschl. Rather, as stated, it is to maintain that there was among these representative theologians, an awareness, and willingness to acknowledge the influence, of Ritschlian theology. This, and no more.

As an example of how the possibility of there being in existence, a 'Ritschlian school', was treated, we may turn to H.R. Mackintosh. In an article on, "The Development of the Ritschlian School", (1) (1914) he may suggest that, 'We can now see it (that is, Ritschlianism) to have been the biggest theological fact in the second half of the nineteenth century, and up to date it has had no successor.', (2) and therefore we are left in no doubt as to Mackintosh's judgement as to its past and present value as a theological movement. However, while Mackintosh begins by noting the indebtedness of Herrmann, Kaftan and Haering to Ritschl, a fact which establishes that, 'it is more than likely that he was a great man and did a great work.', (3) he nevertheless goes on to contend that, 'On the other hand, it is evident that Ritschlians no longer form a characteristic group.', and
that his, 'disciples have abandoned some positions held by the leader, and have moved further on to right or left.' (4) He acknowledges the possibility that there might have been an early phase in which, for close disciples, 'the master's least word was sacred', but stresses that, 'this phase was soon over. Followers who took to print made their independence clear by the freedom and persistency with which they criticised the leader.' (5) Mackintosh then sums up the sense which might be attributed to his use of the word 'school' to describe the Ritschlians, by suggesting that, 'The school has been held together, indeed, not by conclusions, but by common pursuance of a method.' (6) Therefore, if Mackintosh is able to speak of a, 'Ritschlian school' in Germany, only in this very limited and qualified sense, it is hardly likely that he would contend for its existence in Scotland in any greater sense, and he does not. However, as noted in Chapter 2, he is willing to acknowledge his own, very considerable indebtedness to Ritschl, and to the later Ritschlians, maintaining, of course, a careful distinction between the two. (7)

Further evidence of a peculiarly Scottish competence on matters of German theology, particularly Ritschlian, is to be found in our noting of the fact that H.R. Mackintosh, John Baillie, Donald Baillie, and many others, were schooled at Marburg, under Herrmann, and we shall in due course particularly highlight this in relation to H.R. Mackintosh. Thus, John McConnachie may write:

'Like most of my contemporaries in Scotland...I was also trained in the School of Ritschl, as interpreted by Herrmann, being one of the Scottish "caravan" of students, as Barth was one of the Swiss "caravan" who travelled yearly to Marburg to sit at the feet of the master. I also think of Herrmann as "my unforgettable teacher," kindest of men, to whom I owe more than I can tell.' (8)

McConnachie notes elsewhere, the generally pervasive influence of Ritschlian theology in Scotland, (9) and John Dickie, in his 1937 survey, Fifty Years of British Theology, likewise affirms the extent of this influence, noting again, that, 'many Scottish students had studied under his disciple Herrmann.' (10)

Thus, we may see an acknowledgement of the influence of Ritschlian thought which does not in itself constitute a tight-knit "Ritschlian School", but rather a willingness to engage with a significant theological movement, and one to which many in Scotland had been exposed by study in Germany.
ii) William Robertson Smith - Student of Ritschl

However, Dickie's most interesting suggestion is that the mediation of Ritschl to the English-speaking world is again a largely Scottish-inspired affair, stretching back to the 1870's, and he recalls the William Robertson Smith (Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Aberdeen, 1870-1881) inspired project towards the translation of Ritschl's, Justification and Reconciliation. (11) The translator of Volume I, (1872), John Sutherland Black, a parish minister and student of Ritschl's at Gottingen in 1869, writes, on behalf of Robertson Smith and himself, that the translation was done, out, 'of gratitude for what we feel we owe to Professor Ritschl.' (12) This volume appeared only two years after the German original, but the project to translate all the volumes was abandoned, (13) in part we might suspect due to his increasing difficulties within the Free Church, and, for some, the suspicion of heterodoxy associated with the name of Robertson Smith from at least 1875 onwards, which led, of course, to his deposition from the chair at Aberdeen in 1881. (14) Irrespective of this latter point, we may note Dickie's further suggestions as the influence of Ritschl on Robertson Smith. He writes:

'One of the first, not merely in this country, but anywhere, to realise Ritschl's importance for Dogmatics, was William Robertson Smith. Before there was any "Ritschlian School" he attended Ritschl's lectures in Gottingen along with those of Wellhausen, and was almost equally impressed and influenced by both. There are frequent and appreciative references to him in Otto Ritschl's Life of his father.' (15)

Robertson Smith had been a student of Ritschl's at Gottingen in 1869, and throughout the course of his life he remained in close touch with his teacher, (16) such that his biographers (one of whom was his student companion at Gottingen and the translator of Volume I of Justification and Reconciliation, John Sutherland Black) might speak of him as an, 'attached Ritschlian'. (17) Indeed, Ritschl had written a testimonial strongly supporting Robertson Smith's candidature for the Chair at Aberdeen, as did Ritschl's later philosophical mentor Hermann Lotze. (18) In a similar vein, we may also note that Robertson Smith might write to Ritschl, addressing him as, 'den Urvater der "Aberdeen heresy"', a title which Ritschl did not deny, while well aware that his teaching might provoke controversy. (19) Indeed Robertson Smith's trial, and all that was associated with the, 'Aberdeen Heresy', was closely followed by Ritschl, who regarded one of the principal issues at stake in the proceedings to be his own theology. (20)
Robertson Smith, as noted, had been a student of Ritschl and Lotze at Göttingen in 1869, but among the other theological writers who had particularly influenced him, he was happy to acknowledge Richard Rothe (Professor of Theology, Heidelberg, 1837-1867). Rothe represented the Vermittlungstheologie, which sought, 'to find an intermediate position between liberalism and orthodoxy.' (21) and Robertson Smith found considerable inspiration in his work, Zur Dogmatik, (22) a copy of which he subjected to serious scrutiny in 1868, although he never actually studied under him. Upon the basis of this study, he produced the first complete theological work of his which is extant, entitled, "Christianity and the Supernatural", (Jan., 1869) (23) which brought him into early conflict with the theologically more conservative elements of the Free Church. He described that essay as, 'very much a rendering of Rothe's ideas from an English starting-point and in English forms of thought.' (24)

Rothe held that there were two dimensions to Revelation, that is, manifestation and inspiration, which are, so to speak, the objective and the subjective poles of Revelation. God manifests Himself in history, but because of our human limitations we are unable to grasp the significance of this manifestation, and therefore the subjective aspect is necessary, that is inspiration, which stands in a relationship of correspondence to the manifestation of God. (25) Thereafter, he saw these, 'elements coincid(ing) in Christ the Revealer.' (26) who may authoritatively interpret the manifestation of God in history to man. The records of that Revelation, which are the products of the process of inspiration, are not however to be seen as inspired, for, 'Only as they revealed the living Christ in the redemptive experience...did they achieve, by faith, a supernatural quality and thereby became a divine revelation.' (27) Faith then, rests, not on the record of that inspiration, that is Scripture, but, on the ongoing process of Revelation. This ongoing process occurs because as a result of Christ's coming as Revealer, 'The idea of God concealed in revelation enters the universal consciousness of man', and further to this, 'so permeates all the pores of the world', that we can agree with Barth's summation that, for Rothe, 'revelation means the setting in motion of natural psychical powers of the human consciousness of God by God himself, in a way that is to be compared with the playing of the organ'. (28)

Robertson Smith's biographers see in this early approbation of Rothe, a significant pointer to the future direction of his thought. They write:

'It is interesting to remember that Ritschl also, towards the close of his career as a theological undergraduate,
spent a summer (1845) at Heidelberg under Rothe. Both the older and the younger disciple show the powerful influence of this master of historical and speculative theology, alike in their confident affirmation of the fact of a supernatural Divine revelation, and in their refusal to assign a special supernatural character to the records in which the fact of that is conveyed.' (29)

As an indication of how Robertson Smith viewed Ritschl, we may note his early, and enthusiastic, commendation of his Göttingen professor, when he writes to his father:

'Ritschl is a strong Calvinist...He is a man of great acuteness and his lectures are of a kind that will be directly useful in Scotland...(He) has been very profitable, far the best course of lectures I ever heard.' (30)

R.R. Nelson, in analysing why the young Robertson Smith should have been so attracted to Ritschl, suggests that it was Ritschl's concentration on the actuality of God's revelation, thereby re-establishing the possibility of theology per se, which appealed to his pupil. Having accepted, 'Kant's dictum that things-in-themselves are unknowable; only appearances are apprehended by the pure reason.', (31) Ritschl is portrayed as then transcending Kant, by suggesting that things-in-themselves may be known, not in-themselves, but by their impact upon us, as witnessed in our response to them. There is no knowledge of God apart from His revelation, but the reality of that revelation is not apprehended directly, rather we perceive it by its impact upon our lives. Nelson sums up his analysis, by contending that:

'The reality of God's personal revelation as the only starting point in theology was a position with which Smith was in heartiest agreement. It was no coincidence that Ritschl had studied briefly under Rothe, the "mediating" theologian so highly regarded by Smith.' (32)

Thus, it is in respect of the starting point for a valid theology, namely the concept of Revelation, that Robertson Smith has been judged by Nelson to be indebted to Ritschl.

This sense of a formative and influential theological relationship between Ritschl and Robertson Smith, is summed up by R.A. Riesen, when he writes:

'That Ritschl and Smith were close friends and that Ritschl had a profound influence on Smith can hardly be doubted. That is clear from the Smith biography and the voluminous correspondence (much of it in German) carried on between them.' (33)
Riesen is commendably cautious however, in respect of the precise nature of any dependency of Robertson Smith upon Ritschl, and we note his suggestion that, 'There is nothing anywhere to suggest that Smith had imbied the whole of Ritschl's system', (34) and there is only limited evidence of direct dependence on Ritschl. Thus, we do well to follow Riesen in his caution, while disavowing any suggestion that we would wish to contend that he had indeed, 'imbied the whole of Ritschl's system'. However, alongside this, we have to bear in mind that Robertson Smith's scholarly efforts were principally directed towards the critical study of the Old Testament, and thus theological influences upon him may have to be traced indirectly, though no less legitimately for that. We may further note that towards the end of his life, Robertson Smith cited the following in a list of the contemporary theologians who had most influenced him, namely; 'A.B. Davidson, Rothe (Zur Dogmatik), Ewald, Ritschl... (and) Dr. John Bruce.' (35) This complete list of acknowledged modern influences, containing as it does the names of Rothe and Ritschl, suggests that the potential influence of these thinkers would not be accurately measured only by the number of times they are cited. Once more, and in support of our contention that Robertson Smith was one of the first thinkers in Scotland to be significantly influenced by Ritschl, we have to note, as seen above, that the first major publishing project Robertson Smith was associated with, related, not to Old Testament Higher Criticism, but, to the theology of Albrecht Ritschl, a project of which Ritschl was well aware of and closely followed. (36) Alongside this, we must also set the evidence of their correspondence, indicating a sustained personal relationship, and, Robertson Smith's enigmatic ascription of glory to Ritschl to the effect of his being, 'den Urvater der "Aberdeen heresy"'. (37) Therefore, it seems to me, notwithstanding Riesen's caution, that we have warrant enough to go beyond the explicit references to Ritschl, and to search for indirect indications of his influence upon Robertson Smith.

A further reason which might lead us to wish to make such a search, is Nelson's suggestion that, in temporal terms, Robertson Smith's, 'departure from the received doctrine at this point (that is, the doctrine of Revelation) preceded the adoption of the particular critical positions that led to his heresy trial.' (38), and we note again the enthusiasm with which he greeted the views of Rothe and Ritschl in his student days. Nelson continues:

'It is significant that while his opponents consistently sought to link his views with those of Kuenen and other biblical scholars of the "rationalist" school, at an
early stage in the trial (February 1877) Smith wrote to his former professor of theology, Albrecht Ritschl of Göttingen, hailing him as "den Urvater der 'Aberdeen Heresy!'" (39)

Clearly, for Nelson, the reason that Robertson Smith may address Ritschl so, is his belief that, logically prior to the critical study of the Biblical text, there lies in Robertson Smith a concept of Revelation, which he suggests was acquired through Rothe and received its final shape under Ritschl.

Obviously any search for indirect evidence of the influence of one writer upon another will turn upon a judgement of what constitutes such an influence, and hence the criteria we employ in so making that judgement. It seems to me that the criteria most likely to yield support, and denial, to our claim, will be the extent to which we can maintain that Robertson Smith introduced theological ideas which would be judged novel against the background of the, then contemporary, Scottish theological scene. That he did so do can hardly be doubted, (and this contention is so thoroughly well established that I do not propose to seek to prove it again (40)) and quite naturally, most attention has been paid to the impact of his teaching upon the study of the Old Testament, and Biblical studies in general. However, this should not lead us to ignore the possibility that what provided the foundation for the very possibility of the critical study of the Scriptures, in Robertson Smith's case, was the logically prior possession of a concept of Revelation which would not be touched by the results of that critical study.

iii) William Robertson Smith - Theology in Transition

The demonstration of theological novelty, and of movement away from one position to another, is greatly aided by there being in existence that which is relatively absent today, namely the presence of established theological norms, against which we might measure such movement. However, it seems, with certain caveats, that it may be granted that there was within the Free Church of Scotland a relatively established body of teachings in respect of how Scripture is to be understood, and that in consequence we can outline that Church's position in respect of the doctrine of Revelation, and trace any movement away from it by one such as Robertson Smith. The evidence which would lend credence to our claim that Robertson Smith was markedly influenced by Rothe, and then in turn by Ritschl, will be, as we noted above, the extent to which we can maintain that he introduced into the arena of theological discussion, ideas which would,
against the backcloth of Scottish thought, be judged novel. Their emergence at this particular point in time, and in the particular form in which they are expressed, would, quite reasonably, call for some sort of explanation, and while, by the nature of the evidence, we are not able to offer conclusive proof of direct influence, we shall, I would judge, be able to establish, on balance, the fact that the novel theological ideas expressed by Robertson Smith have very considerable parallels to those found in Rothe and Ritschl. In consequence, we may form the judgement that these are the formative influences upon Robertson Smith, in respect of his understanding of the nature of Revelation, and that such influences preceded, in logical and temporal terms, his later critical study of Scripture.

What I would propose to do then is to very briefly outline the position of a representative Free Church thinker in respect of his understanding of the nature of Revelation and related issues, namely one of Robertson Smith's teachers, James Bannerman, (Professor of Divinity, New College, Edinburgh, 1849-1868) whose, Inspiration: The Infallible Truth and Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, (1865) (41) 'was hailed as the definitive defence of the orthodox doctrine.', (42) and in which he, 'gave a classic statement of the view of Scripture that prevailed in Scotland at the time.' (43) Thereafter, I shall outline Robertson Smith's theological position, particularly as contained in "Christianity and the Supernatural", (44) (which is, as noted earlier, an attempt to work out the implications of Rothe's position) and in, "The Work of a Theological Society" (45) (Nov., 1869), which was delivered after his return from Gottingen, and his time of study under Ritschl. These pieces of work are, I would suggest, representative of the theological position of Robertson Smith immediately prior to his taking up his Professorial post at the Aberdeen Free Church College in 1870, having been elected to the Chair by the General Assembly in May of that year. In so doing, I would hope to indicate the nature of the movement by Robertson Smith away from the standards of the Free Church, and to suggest that the most likely influences upon him, which led to this movement, were those of Richard Rothe, and one of Rothe's pupils, Albrecht Ritschl.

Bannerman's opening remarks leave no doubt as to that which he wishes to defend, namely his holding to, 'the scriptural fact of the plenary inspiration of the record in which God has embodied His supernatural revelation.', believing that he can establish, 'by its proper evidence the twofold fact of the infallible truth and of the divine authority of the inspired word.' (46) He further writes:

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'The doctrine of the infallibility of the one record which we have of a supernatural revelation from Heaven, is so vitally connected with the grounds of a Christian's faith, and affects, in a manner so fundamental, the certainty of all that we believe and hope in reference to God, that the importance of it can hardly be over-estimated, viewed whether in its theological or practical bearings.' (47)

He continues elsewhere to say of the Scriptures, that:

'In the first place, they contain a communication of truth supernaturally given to man; and in the second place, they contain that truth supernaturally transferred to human language, and therefore free from all mixture or addition or error.' (48)

Thus, we see Bannerman presenting a view which entails the plenary inspiration of Scripture, though, as Riesen notes, he was very cautious in specifying, 'a theory of how the Bible was inspired.', (49) and indeed distanced himself from the notion of verbal inspiration. (50) So much did he do this that, when studied from a later perspective, he could be viewed as eroding the very idea of inspiration which he sought to defend, even if that was not his intention at the time of writing. (51) Robertson Smith himself noted, in "Christianity and the Supernatural", that, 'even...Dr. Bannerman (is) forced to distinguish revelation and inspiration', (52) in the manner which he (that is, Robertson Smith) wishes to do, though, this apart, there is no other evidence to suggest that he ever found Bannerman taking him in the direction he was to go. Whatever we make of this point, it is at least clear that Bannerman's intention is that Revelation should be seen as co-extensive with Scripture, and that any attempt to draw a distinction between the Word of God and the Bible, is one that is to be vigorously resisted. (53) There is, for Bannerman, no point of compromise on this issue, either, 'The Bible is God-given or it is man-given', (54) and, for example, any attempt to distinguish, 'between the substance and the form', in the text of Scripture, is tantamount to trying to distinguish, 'between those parts of the Bible which are revelation and those which are not'. (55) In attempting to describe the nature of Revelation, and that which is to be revealed, Bannerman speaks in terms of the communication of, 'the objective truth', (which is the precondition of the very possibility of Revelation, and which can be clearly distinguished from the act of communication, (56)) and he describes the process as follows:

'We have in the first place the truth or knowledge to be
revealed, as it originated in and comes from the divine mind; and in the second place we have the presentation of it, in some adequate manner or another, to the man to whom the revelation is made.' (57)

With this typical presentation of the position of the Free Church forming the backcloth against which we might measure theological novelty, let us turn now to our exposition of Robertson Smith.

"Christianity and the Supernatural", explicitly acknowledges Robertson Smith's indebtedness to the ideas of Richard Rothe, (58) and he begins with a polemic against what he saw as the tendency for apologetics to dominate the theological agenda, to the neglect of what he conceives to be logically prior to apologetics, that is a, 'Christian consciousness of God', which, 'rests on His historical manifestation of Himself to man, - rests, in a word, on a supernatural history.' (59) This, 'supernatural self-manifestation of God', is not however, Robertson Smith judges, readily affirmed, and as a result of the intrusion of deism and pantheism, apologetics comes to play a far greater role, but one which he regards as inappropriate, given that the logically prior belief in God's self-manifestation has been neglected. (60) Thus, we may observe clearly that Robertson Smith's conception of God's Revelation is a fully supernatural one, a position which he finds in practice, though not in principle, to be often in conflict with apologetical theology. A return then to, 'the premises of Christianity', is necessary, and he judges this to have begun within German theology. (61)

He takes as his axiom, the statement that, 'Divine revelation, then, is a communication of truth from God to man. Only by apprehending this truth is salvation possible', and notes that Rothe points out that in the light of this, religious interest centres thereafter, upon securing with certainty the source of such revelation. In contrast to this, the traditional path taken by the Protestant churches was to secure the source within Scripture, such that, 'belief in the authority and infallibility of the Bible', was seen as an indispensable precondition of Christianity, with the supernatural element being the, 'supernatural communication of truth.' (62) Miracles, on this view, are, he believes, in a subsidiary position, and, 'have merely an apologetic function', with no actual value in themselves, that is, they point to the, 'scheme of redemption', rather than being integral to it. (63) This view of Scripture, Robertson Smith wishes to reject. In its place, he wishes to set a supernatural, 'conception of a personal intercourse between God and man'. (64) In consequence Christian faith is no longer to be conceived of as belief

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in a set of doctrinal propositions, rather, 'the work of redemption', is reunited with the, 'communication of the knowledge of that work'. (65) A further consequence, is that we no longer need to secure for Scripture the claim of infallibility before we can believe in, 'Christ's redeeming work...for it is only through the Christian miracles, i.e. through the phenomena of Christ's supernatural work, that the way is cleared for the doctrine of inspiration.' (66) We thus observe that the place of the Scriptures, in terms of the mediation of the truth, has been conceived in terms radically different from that of traditional Protestant orthodoxy.

He continues the path now taken, by stating what he sees to be the essential distinction between Revelation and the record of that Revelation, such that the knowledge given in Revelation, 'is not the knowledge of facts but the knowledge of a Person. What God reveals is simply Himself'. (67) He further writes:

'The Bible is not revelation but the record of divine revelation - the record of those historical facts in which God has revealed Himself to man. That God really has so revealed Himself to man - not that we possess an inspired record of this revelation - is the point on which Christianity stands or falls.' (68)

Robertson Smith then affirms his conception of Revelation to be in line with, 'the epoch-making work of Rothe.', and credits Rothe with giving to him, 'my first clear insight into the subject.', though the final exposition here presented is his own. (69) He continues then to stress that the act of Revelation and the activity of redemption integral elements of the same process, such that:

'Revelation...is that form of God's redemptive activity whereby man's consciousness of God is purified and strengthened, and so man is enabled rightly to apprehend God. And here I must repeat, at the risk of being tedious, that the knowledge communicated directly by revelation is from this very conception of revelation knowledge of God only.' (70)

This knowledge of God is not, in Robertson Smith's conception, to be imparted, 'by a sheer mechanical process...infusing certain conceptions into men's minds.', (71) rather God acts upon man by establishing a person to person relationship, and does so by taking the initiative and manifesting Himself in His actions in history. This is not to say that revelation is part of the, 'organic process', nor is it merely the, 'evolution of energies naturally existent in the world', rather it is, 'a new and specifically divine history let down into
the world.' (72) Revelation is then correlated to personal faith, such that, by personal faith, we perceive God's manifestation, 'in events that are at once seen to form no part of the chain of nature but to be directly personal and explicable only as acts of God.' (73) In summing up, Robertson Smith may then suggest that:

'In revelation then we must distinguish and yet regard as inseparable two sides. The outer and objective side is manifestation, the inner and subjective inspiration.' (74)

The clear target of Robertson Smith's attack is the view which treats revelation, 'as a revelation of doctrines', which necessarily involves, 'the infallible communication of truth', and, inseparable from it, 'the infallible transmission of the truth.', for this view renders the communication of truth through prophets and apostles quite, 'valueless', in itself, 'incomplete till the fleeting word is fixed in the abiding letter'. (75) In contrast to this view, he wishes to stress that the objective reality of Revelation, 'is secured in the divine manifestation...This done, the revelation is already a power in the world; an historical fact not be got rid of.', and thus, 'no further supernatural step is necessary to give revelation its full force.' (76) The Scriptures, under this view, acquire their normative character through being records, 'at first-hand', of the inspired actors who grasped the significance of God's manifestation, and who took part in the history they record, such that, 'In the record of an actor the events of history live again.' (77)

Historical criticism may work on the records which are Scripture, and may produce, 'a much more accurate narrative, but never a narrative possessing the same living power.' (78) Thus, for Robertson Smith, criticism can never have any final significance for faith, for our faith does not rest, 'on the Bible as an infallible book, but on the historic manifestation of God in Christ'. (79) He writes:

'No criticism can take from us our personal fellowship with God in Christ - no criticism can withdraw from the Bible its living power as the medium wherein we are brought face to face with Christ; for a personal faith lies too deep to be touched by criticism.' (80)

In consequence of this, the question of the infallibility of Scripture becomes a non-question, since it is the Scripture's ability to convey, 'a true image of our Lord.', (81) which is of the supreme importance, and which secures its authority. That authority derives from
the Christ who is mediated through Scripture, rather than being seen to reside in Scripture in and of itself. (82)

The nature of apologetic within Robertson Smith's conception is radically revised, and he declares that the, 'root of a true apologetic', is to be found grounded, 'in the immediate certainty of Christian faith wherein we feel ourselves supernaturally brought into fellowship with a divine personality'. (83)

The great strength of recent German theology which Robertson Smith wishes to commend, 'lies precisely in the clear knowledge that faith in the inspiration of the ecclesiastical canon is not the condition, not the necessary first step, in coming to faith in Christ - that with such a faith in Scripture Christian faith is not yet given or even grounded.' (84)

"The Work of a Theological Society", continues to see Robertson Smith developing a standpoint markedly different from the Free Church Fathers, and in order to distinguish his dialectical approach to the theological process, from the deductive approach, he cites an unnamed, 'man of great mark in our Church', for whom, 'Theology is simply the elucidation and vindication of the system of doctrines already deduced from Scripture as embodied in our Confession of Faith'. (85) This latter approach, in Robertson Smith's opinion, cuts the nerve of the dialectical approach, and renders the prospect of theological progress hopeless.

(We might describe the dialectical approach, paraphrasing Robertson Smith, as follows ; a) the offering of a position, followed by the offering of, b) a counter-position, resulting in, c) a greater clarity as a result of the synthesis which enables us to place the correct emphases within our overall theological understanding. (86))

For Robertson Smith, 'dialectical opposition', is not in itself, 'inconsistent with fundamental unity', and he is at pains to insist that the Reformed community listens to the Lutheran community, and hopes that in so doing, there will be an, 'advance to a higher position.' (87)

In turning to examine what he takes to be, 'the question of the true relation of theology to Scripture.', Robertson Smith notes, 'a somewhat perplexing degree of haziness in the current theological opinions.' (88) and finds this exemplified in no less a person than William Cunningham. (Professor of Divinity, then Church History, New College, Edinburgh, 1843-1861)
Cunningham seems, to Robertson Smith, to be retreating from the older orthodox Protestant position, as exemplified in John Owen, which, 'though it rests on the false conception of revelation as a supernatural communication of doctrines and on the false identification of Scripture and revelation which were current in his day, is manifestly clear and consistent.' (89)

He continues:

'On the contrary, it is admitted - I quote from Dr. Cunningham - "that there is not one of the peculiar doctrines of the Christian system which is set forth in Scripture with such an amount of explicitness as it was abstractly possible to have given to the statement of it"'. (90)

Thus, even so redoubtable a defender of the identity of Scripture and Revelation as Cunningham, is deemed by Robertson Smith to recognise, and thus in effect to concede, the ultimate difficulties inherent in the orthodox position. The further consequence of this is that once these difficulties are recognised and conceded, we can no longer claim that the confessional statements of the Church and its doctrines are, 'simply deductions from Scripture', (91), rather the true method of theology should be a dialectical one, which seeks to integrate, 'the theological consciousness of various individuals or Churches.' (92)

This is not to say however, that what Robertson Smith proposes is simply Rationalism writ large, and he is at pains to stress this, (93) for the source of revelation, and hence theology is, 'the revelation of God's person...a living personal fellowship...with God in Christ', such that it must be, 'understood that the consciousness of this fellowship with God is no mere subjective feeling but the consciousness of a life far more true than the natural life which no man dreams of doubting'. (94)

Robertson Smith then suggests:

'The subjective consciousness of union of God in Christ is absolutely the first thing in true Christianity, and it is from this consciousness outwards that the Christian develops for himself a true notion of God and a true notion of man.' (95)

This, 'subjective consciousness', is not merely an element in our psychological processes, rather is it the work of the Holy Spirit, creating, 'a real objective revelation'. (96) How then does Robertson Smith
understand this, 'objective revelation'? He writes:

'The true idea of revelation is such an activity of God among and towards men as shall enable man to apprehend God in His holiness, justice, and redemptive love, just by the same kind of experience as enable us to know our fellow-men. It is the record of such a revelation that lies before us in Holy Scripture. For there we read how God from the earliest time dealt personally with mankind in a supernatural history culminating in the incarnation, death, and resurrection of our Lord, and how, from age to age, the Church of God was able to lay hold on the divine person thus manifested, by faith unto salvation. Christ Himself appears in this history as the full manifestation of God. He is the Word of God, i.e. revelation is a word not in the sense of a truth dictated by God but as the living expression of the inmost heart of the speaker.' (97)

Through our exposition of his thought, the degree to which Robertson Smith has moved from the teaching of Bannerman, et. al., seems to me self-evident, such that by severing the concept of Revelation from that of Scripture, he has moved to an understanding of the former which seems to echo very clearly the influence of Rothe and Ritschl.

Thus, while we have not proved definite dependence by Robertson Smith upon Rothe and Ritschl, it does seem to me that the theological case presented, along with the earlier evidence in respect of the correspondence and personal contact, does point to the likelihood that we should see the source of Robertson Smith's understanding of the concept of Revelation as lying in the teaching of Rothe and his pupil Ritschl.

As I suggested previously, the very fact of such a considerable deviation from a relatively well established theological norm does deserve some form of explanation, and I judge that the explanation just outlined is the one with the highest degree of probability.

We have devoted a not inconsiderable amount of space to William Robertson Smith, and to the suggestion that he is one of the first Scottish thinkers to realise the significance of the thought of Albrecht Ritschl, and my reasons for so doing I shall set out. Although I have chosen not to repeat the oft told story of the Robertson Smith trials from 1876-1881, we should in no way underestimate the extent to which it was a watershed in the history of Biblical scholarship and in attitudes to theology generally, a fact which is well summed up by A.C. Cheyne in speaking of, 'The Biblical Revolution', which took place in Victorian Scotland. (98) He writes,
'of the most important point of all.', as follows:

'Robertson Smith's deposition did not prevent - may, indeed, have hastened - the ultimate triumph of his approach in the Free Church and its sister Churches of the Presbyterian order in Scotland...With every year that passed, indeed, the balance of theological opinion seemed to tip a little further to the liberal side...and long before the end of the century it was clear that while the conservatives had scored a notable victory in one particular bout their adversaries were on the way to winning a whole succession of return matches.' (99)

In so doing, Cheyne links Robertson Smith to Rothe and Ritschl. (100) Thereafter, he sketches, "The Confessional Revolution", (101) in which he notes, 'a very marked tendency', among Scottish theologians in the 1870's, 'to distrust all metaphysical systems - and theological systems also, the Westminster one among them.', a tendency which he links to, 'the influence of Albrecht Ritschl', with Ritschl being the only named German theologian in the chapter. (102) Thus, we should be in no doubt as to the significance of Robertson Smith, nor of the theological ideas which became commonplace in Scotland following his deposition, which, I trust I have demonstrated, may be traced, most probably, back to Albrecht Ritschl.

Thus, we have observed the point at which a radically new understanding of the nature of Revelation entered into the mainstream of Scottish thought, and the detailing of that seems to me to be a not unworthy task.

iv) Scotland and Germany - Evidence of an extensive Relationship

In detailing the extent of the relationship between Scottish and German thought we may further note the considerable number of works by Ritschl, and Ritschlian theologians, translated by Scots, as well as works expounding and criticising their positions. Thus, we may see that Volume III of Ritschl's Justification and Reconciliation, was translated in 1900, the editors being H.R. Mackintosh and A.B. Macaulay. (103) Similarly we see that Scots were responsible in considerable measure for the editing and translation of works by the Ritschlian theologians, Adolf von Harnack, Julius Kaftan, and Theodor von Haering, as well of course as works by Wilhelm Herrmann. (104) Thus, for example, A.B. Bruce (Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow, 1875-1899) had been the editor of the translation of von Harnack's, History of Dogma, and one of the translators bears, 'testimony to
the profound interest Dr. Bruce took in Harnack's great work, to his painstaking and unwearied efforts to secure that it would be adequately presented to English readers'. (105) As to the results of this interest in things Ritschlian, Robert Flint (Professor of Divinity, Edinburgh, 1876-1903), (regarded by H.R. Mackintosh, 'a determined antagonist of Ritschlianism' (106)) writes in his, "Prefatory Note", to Kaftan's work, of the dominance of Ritschlian thought in Germany at that time, and further suggests that this predominating influence is, 'almost inevitably', spreading to Scotland. (107) In similar vein, Alan P.F. Sell suggests that, 'The bulk of the early work of introducing Ritschl to Britain was done...by Scots who all happened to be graduates of, or teachers in, Glasgow'. (108)

This Glasgow interest, which was at times highly critical as well as expository, is exemplified in the works of James Orr, (Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology, Trinity College, Glasgow, 1900-1913) such as, The Christian View of God and the World, The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith, and, Ritschlianism, Expository and Critical Essays. As to Orr's significance for Ritschl studies in the English-speaking world, Sell suggests that:

'Orr did more than most to introduce Ritschl (1822-1889) to English readers, and though he was as concerned to warn as to expound, he was characteristically quick not only to indicate the deficiencies, but also to measure the strengths of Ritschlianism.' (109)

Similarly, James Denny, (Professor of Systematic Theology, 1897-1899, and of New Testament Exegesis and Theology, 1899-1917, Trinity College, Glasgow), engaged at length with Ritschlian thought in his, Studies in Theology, (110) while such notable contributions to the literature as, A.E. Garvie's, The Ritschlian Theology, and, Robert Mackintosh's, Albrecht Ritschl and His School, were also by Glasgow students. (111)

This is not to suggest that Glasgow had a monopoly on things Ritschlian, and we see significant studies emerging from Edinburgh students such as, J. Oman's, (Professor of Theology, Westminster College, Cambridge, 1907-1935) The Problem of Faith and Freedom, and, W.P. Paterson's, (Professor of Divinity, Edinburgh, 1903-1934) The Rule of Faith, which both contain extended treatments of Ritschl, et. al. (112) Equally, we may note that the Aberdeen graduate P.T. Forsyth, followed up the suggestion of his, 'friend Robertson Smith', and, 'spent a semester at Gottingen under Ritschl.', which he came to regard as one of the most crucial formative events in his intellectual development. (113) Crucial and formative,
such that it provided a theological basis for his later theological orientation. Thus, in speaking of the period in which his theological outlook underwent a considerable reorientation, Forsyth notes his giving himself, as a result of this reorientation, 'to those theological influences imbibed first from Maurice, and then more mightily through Ritschl, which came nearer to life than science, sentiment or ethic can ever do.' Then, he may add thereafter, as a sign of the abiding legacy of these influences, that, 'My faith in critical methods is unchanged. My acceptance of many of the new results is as it was. This applies to the criticism of traditional dogma no less than of Scripture.' (114)

While it is undoubtedly true to say that the direction of influence in all of this, is primarily from Germany to Scotland, Herrmann, for example, was not unaware of, and influenced by Scottish thought. Thus, we find him writing to H.R. Mackintosh, to commend a book, The Fact of Christ, (115) (which, I would suggest, has an approach very similar to that of, Communion with God) by a Scottish parish minister, Patrick Carnegie Simpson (later Professor of Church History, Westminster College, Cambridge, 1914-1938), in the following terms:

'I have lost no time in recommending Carnegie Simpson pressingly to my students. It amazes me that the book has not been translated into German. His statements of the matter is, in many points, such as none of us here has yet succeeded in giving.' (116)

However, we should not think that the relationship between German theological thought and its Scottish counterpart is to be limited only to an interest in Ritschl, et. al. Indeed, it has a much broader base, such that we may note, for example, that the translations of Schleiermacher's, Speeches on Religion, The Christian Faith, The Christian Faith in Outline, and Christmas Eve, were all executed by Scots, so that we become more fully aware that receptiveness to German theology did not originate with the translation of Barth's Church Dogmatics. (117) Equally, if not more so, when we consider the massive output from Edinburgh of the publishing company T&T Clark's, "The Foreign Theological Library", which saw the publishing of 180 volumes of foreign, principally German, theology, into the English language, during a 45 year period, 1849-1894, (as well as many other works outwith this series) we sense that the Scottish-German connection is very strong indeed. (118) Thus, to take only a sample, the works of, Frank, Lotze, Luthardt, Ritschl, Schleiermacher and Tholuck, were all available from this one Edinburgh publishing house. (119) In that brief sample we see that there is to be found, both the tormentors of Ritschl,
Frank and Luthardt, (120) and the philosophical 'mentor' of Ritschl, (whatever we make of his influence) Hermann Lotze. (121) Thus, any Scottish predilection for Ritschl, if such there was, did not arise in the absence of an awareness of his German opponents. Equally, the influence of Herrmann did not arise in a vacuum, there having already been in Scotland an awareness and approbation of the forces which were formative upon him.

In respect of this latter point we may observe that F.A. Tholuck, (Professor of Theology, Halle, 1826-1877) Wilhelm Herrmann's teacher, is also included in the list. Barth states of Tholuck that he, 'was and remained a pure theologian of the Revival', whose, 'theology rediscovered the idea of free grace for sinners', (122) in the Nineteenth Century, and bequeathed to it a legacy, 'it could no longer completely forget.' (123) Similarly, A.L. Drummond, the Scottish Church Historian, notes that Tholuck, 'made Evangelical religion a living power in his native land'. (124) and that, from the 1830's and 1840's onwards, 'his fame drew to Halle Scotsmen of the calibre of...W.B. Robertson, and John Ker.' (125) and we may note the influence upon the Secession Churches (thereafter, from 1847, the United Presbyterian Church) in Scotland. J. Dickie likewise notes the openness of the United Presbyterians to German theology, and suggests that the publishing efforts of T.&T. Clark did much to make Scotland aware of German thought, 'with the result that it became customary for numbers of Scottish students to go to Germany in order to learn the language and acquire some knowledge of German theology at first-hand.' A further result of this custom was, 'that by the middle of the 'sixties or a little later a working knowledge of German had come to be regarded as practically essential for a theological Professor of the Free Church of Scotland.' (126) G.D. Henderson confirms the above trend when he notes that from the 1830's onwards, 'Scottish scholars began to visit German Universities', (127) and further when he writes:

'It was among the Seceders that the pilgrimage to Germany began. Principal John Cairns went to Berlin in 1843 during his student course and heard Schelling, Neander and Ranke. From about that period until the outbreak of war in 1914 a select group of young Scottish theologians could always be found in German Universities, and the Scottish ministry was steadily cognisant of the various schools of thought that succeeded one another in popularity there. Schleiermacher, Hegel, Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack, Eucken and numerous others made their impression.' (128)

Finally, R.W. Stewart notes that Herrmann's theological education was, unusually in Germany, spent entirely at
the University of Halle, from 1866-1870, with three of the four years being spent as amanuensis to Tholuck, and in whose house he was introduced to Albrecht Ritschl. (129) and may then point to Tholuck, as one who, speaking of Scotland, 'forms a link between Dr. Herrmann and many of our own older theologians.' (130)

v) John Laidlaw - A Student's View

As a further example of the influence of German thought on a particular Scottish theologian, and one which may serve to point to the theological concerns shared by Robertson Smith and H.R. Mackintosh, I wish to look briefly at John Laidlaw (Professor of Systematic Theology, New College, Edinburgh, 1881-1904), and to do so primarily through the eyes of H.R. Mackintosh.

The principal biographical work on Laidlaw, by his student H.R. Mackintosh, (131) points to a number of features of his life which seem to me to form a link between the theological ferment of the 1870's and 1880's occasioned by Robertson Smith, and the post-revolutionary era (to borrow Cheyne's terminology (132)) which was the theological scene in the Scotland of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century, that is, the theological scene of which H.R. Mackintosh was a part.

Indeed, Laidlaw played a not unnoteworthy role in the Robertson Smith case itself, having proposed a motion, which Riesen describes as, 'pro-Smith', (133) at the General Assembly of the Free Church in 1880, which though not in itself successful, was only superseded by another pro-Smith motion, which of course secured Robertson Smith's position, though only for another year. (134)

This is not to suggest that Laidlaw actively supported Robertson Smith's views, indeed Mackintosh makes clear that he did not. However, it is equally clear that he was not willing to have Robertson Smith ejected on the basis of his writings up to 1880. (135)

Laidlaw had himself been a student of Richard Rothe at Heidelberg in 1858, and Mackintosh suggests that, 'one of the most acute and live of his (that is, Laidlaw's) later essays is...on the piquant character and theological system of that high-souled divine.' (136) 'This', Mackintosh notes, 'was the first of many visits to Germany. It was a country which he understood by instinct, and with whose manly and devout religion he deeply sympathised.' (137)

In 1863 Laidlaw is again to be found in Germany, and we note particularly his time at Halle with, 'the saintly
Tholuck', described here by Mackintosh as, 'so beloved a personality'. (138) We see from Laidlaw's conversations with Tholuck, that Tholuck had been to Scotland and was personally acquainted with Candlish, Cunningham and other notable Scottish ministers and theologians of the day. (139) 1889 again finds Laidlaw in Germany, on this occasion at Marburg on Sabbatical. 'In Marburg he became intimate with the eloquent and beloved Professor Herrmann, whose prophet-like witness to Jesus Christ, many of us feel, is among the richest possessions of present-day religion.' (140) (So Mackintosh)

For Laidlaw, (and here Mackintosh reproduces the text of a letter by Laidlaw (141)), Herrmann is to be seen as a 'consistent Ritschlian', who rejects the 'Unio mystica', as they reject all mysticism. (142) He continues:

'What Herrmann substitutes for this is a "communion with God" through the historical Christ, who alone reveals God to us. But (here comes in Herrmann's own peculiarity) it is not the bare historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth who is our "way to God." It is "the Christ" of Christendom - the Christ as interpreted and beheld by the spiritual insight of His disciples, and so transmitted by the first believers down all Christian ages.' (143)

Despite, 'the self-contradictory element of his thinking', Laidlaw is clearly impressed by Herrmann as one who points to, 'the true spiritual way of communion with God'. The reason for this is quite clear in Laidlaw's mind, that is, 'He was a scholar of Tholuck, of Halle, before he became a follower of Ritschl at Gottingen'. (144)

The above sketch of Laidlaw is revealing both of Laidlaw and Mackintosh, and whether or not it is a rounded presentation of Laidlaw, it does highlight the features which Mackintosh remembered and wished to stress, which for our present purposes is most useful as a guide to the possible future direction of Mackintosh's thinking.

vi) Conclusion

The purpose of this Appendix has been modest in nature, but nonetheless it is of significance if we are to form a fuller picture of the theological situation prevailing in Scotland, prior to Barth's advent. Therefore, we have noted William Robertson Smith's use of a concept of Revelation which stood in the line of Rothe and Ritschl, and owed little to the traditional approach of the Free Church. This is not to suggest that Robertson Smith introduced Ritschlianism as a definite body of teaching into Scottish thought, nor that there was a School of
Ritschl in Scotland. Rather, it is to point to the increasing openness to, and engagement with, German thought, which is evident in Scotland throughout the Nineteenth Century. This openness and engagement may be said to have changed the character of Scottish theological thinking in a highly significant manner, and this is reflected in the thought of H.R. Mackintosh's teacher, John Laidlaw.
APPENDIX: THE IMPACT OF GERMAN THEOLOGY ON SCOTTISH THINKING PRIOR TO BARTH


2 Ibid., 156-157.

3 Ibid., 156.

4 Ibid., 156.

5 Ibid., 167.

6 Ibid., 167.

7 Idem, Types of Modern Theology, 178-180.


9 Idem, "The Barthian Theology in Great Britain", The Union Seminary Review XLVI (1935), 303.


11 Ibid., 94-95.


18 Ibid., 119.


20 Ibid., 247, and, Ibid., 314-315.

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26 K. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 602.


30 W. Robertson Smith, Letters to father dated 8 May 1869 (Göttingen), and 12 August 1869 (Göttingen), Smith MSS, 7449-5. These manuscripts are located in the Anderson Room, Cambridge University Library. As cited in, R.R. Nelson, Op. Cit., 94-95, n.s 52 and 54.


32 Ibid., 95.


34 Ibid., 186. See also, 183.


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39 Ibid., 83.


47 Ibid., 1.

48 Ibid., 149-150.


52 W. Robertson Smith, "Christianity and the Supernatural", 131.


54 Ibid., 174.

55 Ibid., 177.

56 Ibid., 154.

57 Ibid., 154.

58 W. Robertson Smith, "Christianity and the Supernatural", where references to Rothe are to be found as follows, 118, 124-125, 133. See esp. 130 ff. See also
his inaugural lecture to the Free Church College at Aberdeen, (Nov. 1870) "What History teaches us to seek in the Bible", in, J.S. Black and G. Chrystal (ed.s), William Robertson Smith : Lectures and Essays, 207-234, esp., 227 n.3.

59 Ibid., 114.
60 Ibid., 109-117.
61 Ibid., 117.
62 Ibid., 118.
63 Ibid., 119-120.
64 Ibid., 121.
65 Ibid., 121-122.
66 Ibid., 122.
67 Ibid., 123.
68 Ibid., 123.
69 Ibid., 124-125.
70 Ibid., 125.
71 Ibid., 125.
72 Ibid., 126.
73 Ibid., 127.
74 Ibid., 130.
75 Ibid., 131.
76 Ibid., 131.
77 Ibid., 132.
78 Ibid., 132.
79 Ibid., 134.
80 Ibid., 134.
81 Ibid., 134.
82 Ibid., 136.
83 Ibid., 135.
84 Ibid., 136.
86 Ibid., 138-141, 147.
87 Ibid., 142.
88 Ibid., 143-144.
89 Ibid., 144.
91 Ibid., 146-147.
92 Ibid., 147.
93 Ibid., 151 ff.
94 Ibid., 154.
95 Ibid., 157.
96 Ibid., 157.
97 Ibid., 158.
99 Ibid., 51-52.
100 Ibid., 45.
101 Ibid., Ch. III, 60-87.
102 Ibid., 81.

105 William M'Gilchrist, "Translator's Note" in, A. v. Harnack, History of Dogma Vol. VII (London : Williams & Norgate, 1899). Bruce may be regarded as being open to Ritschlian thought in general, and J.K. Mozley, Some Tendencies in British Theology (London : SPCK, 1951), notes that in his, Apologetics ; or, Christianity Defensively Stated (Edinburgh : T.&T. Clark, 1892) Bruce, 'speaks again in accents familiar to the student of Ritschl, and very different from anything that we could read to-day in the pages of Dr. Karl Barth'. (110) Indeed, he may point to the occurrence of, 'Precise Ritschlian terminology', in that work, (111) and to the place where Bruce says that, 'Jesus has for the Christian consciousness the religious value of God', (398) an expression which A.P.F. Sell, Defending and Declaring the Faith (Exeter : The Paternoster Press, 1987) suggests is, 'often attributed to Ritschl'. (99) Thus, for example, we see H.R. Mackintosh, in, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, (278-281) outlining the details of Ritschl's Christological conceptions, and here suggesting that, 'The impression (Christ) makes is most fitly expressed by saying that He has for us the religious value of God. (279)


118 T.&T. Clark's, "Foreign Theological Library", provided an enormous wealth of theological material as the following note will demonstrate. Appended to, J. Kaftan, *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, Vol. 1, (from 1894) 359-360, it is noted, 'Forty-five years have now elapsed since the commencement of the Foreign Theological Library, and during that time Four Volumes annually (or 180 in all) have appeared with the utmost regularity'. (359) and this publishing feat ably demonstrates the degree of interest in German theology generated in Scotland.

In similar fashion the London publishing house, Williams & Norgate, with their "Theological Translation Library" and "The Crown Theological Library", was also guided in considerable measure by the editorial work of Scots such as A.B. Bruce, Allan Menzies (Professor of Biblical Criticism, St. Andrew's, 1890-1919), and James Moffat (Professor of Church History, U.F. College, Glasgow, 1915-1927).

119 For a brief, randomly selected, and in no way complete, sample of the works available through T.&T.


123 Ibid., 517.

124 A.L. Drummond, German Protestantism since Luther (London: Epworth Press, 1951), 127.

125 Ibid., 128.


128 Ibid., 53.

129 R.W. Stewart, "Biographical Note", in, W. Herrmann, Faith and Morals (London: Williams & Norgate, 1904), v-xii, v, vi, xi. R. Voelkel, "Introduction", in, W. Herrmann, The Communion of the Christian with God (London: SCM, 1972), xv-1xii, notes that Herrmann was at Halle for six years from 1864-1870, and that, 'he lived for two and a half years in the home of F.A.G. Tholuck.', xv.


We may also note the proselytising efforts of G. Matheson, Aids to the Study of German Theology (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1874), in attempting to introduce German thought to Scotland.

This is not to suggest that such links were universally welcome, nor that some did not sharply criticise Ritschl and Herrmann, having had their theological education in Germany, but under those who stood opposed to Ritschl,
et. al. Thus, on the former point, we may note John Kennedy's observations of 1879, in, The Present Cast and Tendency of Religious Thought and Feeling in Scotland (Edinburgh : Hunter, 1902), 18. (Cited in, A.P.F. Sell, Op. Cit., 31.) which we may take to characterise the conservative reaction in Scotland, that, 'not a few of the latest accessions to the ministry must have come to their office with rather unsettled beliefs, and with more respect for the speculations of errant Germans, than for the doctrines of the Confession of Faith, and for the accredited systems of Calvinistic theology.' On the latter, we may observe the striking criticisms made against Ritschlian thought, and that of Herrmann in particular, by D.W. Forrest, (Professor of Systematic Theology, Trinity College, Glasgow, 1914-1918) in, The Christ of History and of Experience (Edinburgh : T.&T. Clark, 1897), 158-168, 415-416. Forrest had been a student at Leipzig under Luthardt in 1880, at the height of Luthardt's controversy with Ritschl and Herrmann. (See, A.P.F. Sell, Op. Cit., 173, and, n. 120 above.) While there is no direct evidence to link the criticisms directly back to Luthardt, the connection seems worth noting.


132 See, n.98, and, n.101 above.


134 For further details of Laidlaw's involvement, see, J.W. Keddie, "Professor MacGregor, Dr. Laidlaw and the Case of William Robertson Smith", in, EQ 48 (1976), 27-39.

135 H.R. Mackintosh, "Introductory Memoir", in J. Laidlaw, Studies in the Parables, 32-34.

136 Ibid., 6. In, J. Laidlaw, "Richard Rothe, of Heidelberg : His Centenary", in, The Expositor 5th Series X. (1899), 439-454, the position of Rothe, in respect of his understanding of Revelation, is summed up as follows:

'Revelation completes itself through a manifestation of God in historical and natural occurrences which bear a miraculous character; and, on the other hand, through inspiration, which acts on the human mind, not magically, but morally. Rothe does not allow that Revelation and Holy Scripture are identical. Scripture is the necessary historical annal or account of Revelation. But the Bible does not contain the entire truth; there follows after it
always new and further Christian truth. The result of Biblical research must contribute its part, the repression or concealment of which will only stir up doubt and mistrust. These ideas of Rothe were not new, but the manner in which they were expressed, from a believing standpoint, made a great impression on the theological world.' (Ibid., 450-451)

Laidlaw also suggests that one of Rothe's, 'favourite ideas anticipated, and...originated, one that has become prominent and characteristic of the Ritschlian school.', namely that the we, 'can only believe with inward truth in an undogmatic Christ.', and that, 'The Christ of the theologians can never, for Christians in general, become an object of belief. The large proportion of hearts beats [sic] cordially for the undogmatic Christ of the New Testament, even when they have turned from the Christ of the theologians.' (Ibid., 451)

137 Ibid., 6-7.
138 Ibid., 10.
139 Ibid., 11.
140 Ibid., 41.
141 Ibid., 41-42 n.1
142 Ibid., 42.
143 Ibid., 42.
144 Ibid., 42. Laidlaw notes elsewhere the growth of the influence of Ritschlian theology. See, J. Laidlaw, Review, including, W. Herrmann, Der Evangelische Glaube und die Theologie A. Ritschl's (Marburg, 1890), in, Critical Review II (1892), 179-182. He writes:

'Ritschl's theological influence is no longer merely in the air. It has gone farther. Already its effect is perceived in the thoughts and words of not a few religious teachers in several Protestant lands and Churches, more or less aware of the source whence it proceeds. For all professed theologians the movement has a keen interest. This turns mainly on the fact that Ritschlianism presents a positive reconstruction of Protestant theology, instead of that mere disintegration of its established doctrines with which modern divergents from orthodoxy have hitherto wholly occupied themselves, when they touch on theology at all.' (Ibid., 179)