The purpose of this study is basically to write a commentary on De Trinitate of Novatian of Rome. Considerable attention is given to the historical background of this treatise, particularly to the theological and philosophical sources that would have influenced Novatian. We find especially that Stoic epistemology with its realist view of the relation of language to reality made a deep impression on the thought of this theologian. We have endeavoured to show that Novatian’s contribution to the development of Christian Theology (e.g. his understanding of the doctrine of the "accommodation" of God in revelation, as well as his clear statement on the eternal Sonship of Christ) is closely related to his epistemological realism. Frequent reference has been made to the writings of the Early Church Fathers, which is essential to an understanding of Novatian’s De Trinitate. Since this thesis includes an English translation of his treatise, we have made a study of the textual tradition and variations. Attention is also paid to Novatian’s literary style throughout the commentary. A historical introduction and also an appendix on Stoic Philosophy and Early Church Theology is given so that the treatise may be seen in its proper context.
NOVATIAN OF ROME

Douglas Floyd Kelly

PART I

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SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is basically to write a commentary on De Trinitate of Novatian of Rome. Considerable attention is given to the historical background of this treatise, particularly to the theological and philosophical sources that would have influenced Novatian. We find especially that Stoic epistemology with its realist view of the relation of language to reality made a deep impression on the thought of this theologian. We have endeavoured to show that Novatian's contribution to the development of Christian Theology (e.g. his understanding of the doctrine of the "accommodation" of God in revelation, as well as his clear statement on the eternal Sonship of Christ) is closely related to his epistemological realism. Frequent reference has been made to the writings of the Early Church Fathers, which is essential to an understanding of Novatian's De Trinitate. Since this thesis includes an English translation of his treatise, we have made a study of the textual tradition and variations. Attention is also paid to Novatian's literary style throughout the commentary. A historical introduction and also an appendix on Stoic Philosophy and Early Church Theology is given so that the treatise may be seen in its proper context.
Life and Work of Novatian of Rome

His Life

Little is known of either the origin or decease of Novatian, first theologian of the Roman Church to write in Latin and famous schismatic bishop. According to Philostorgus he came from Phrygia. This is from a late, uncertain source, and seems unlikely. The position that he held in the Roman Church together with his Latin — which was strongly influenced by Virgil and Cicero, and "displays

1 The very name of Novatian — especially in the East — has been subject to confusion. Cyprian, Jerome, etc. correctly call him Novatianus. At times his name was confused with that of Novatus, schismatic priest of Carthage (e.g. in Eusebius — Novatoc — H.E. vi. 43; and Epiphanius — Novatoc — Haer. 59).

2 Before Novatian M. Felix wrote Octavius in Latin, but he is not a theologian. Perhaps Sixtus II wrote letters in Latin, but not theological treatises.

3 Philostorgus, H.E. viii. 15.

4 See Hagendahl, Augustine and the Latin Classics, p. 318, on how every schoolboy read Virgil.

5 See e.g. Commentary on De.Tru.I.8.
no trace of 'Easternisms', make it most probable that he was of Roman background. Since he was an established priest and theologian in the year A.D. 250, he would probably have been born within a few years on either side of the year 200. Our information is also scanty on his early life. Nearly all of it comes from his adversaries. His great Roman adversary - Cornelius - says in a letter to Fabius of Antioch (preserved in part by Eusebius, H.E.vi.43) that Novatian was baptised when he was in bed with a serious illness. This does not necessarily mean that he was an unworthy, last minute "death bed" conversion. In the first few centuries of this era, Christians often delayed baptism until the last possible moment to avoid sins after baptism. It would appear that the hands of the bishop (i.e. Fabian of Rome) were never laid on him to confirm his baptism, but this is not certain. What is certain though is that Pope Fabian thought highly enough of Novatian to have him ordained priest. According to later rules in the church (Council Neocaesar., cn.12, from A.D. 314-325) it would not be in order to ordain a clinically baptised person. Whether or not this was a standing rule as early as Novatian is unclear. Perhaps it was irregular even then, and if so - Pope Fabian made an exception - which testifies to his high regard for Novatian. Cornelius says that the Pope ordained him against the wishes of one part of the Roman clergy and people.

6Chr. Mohrmann, "Les Origines de la Latinité Chrétienne à Rome"; Vig. Christ. 3 (1949) 65-106; 163-183.

7Cornelius says that his baptism was connected to an exorcism to rid him of the devil - Cyp., Ep. 69, 15, 16.
Even from the testimony of his enemies, we gather that Novatian was a gifted individual of powerful intellect, excellent education, literary gifts, and eloquence. Cornelius, even though in sarcasm, speaks of him as "a marvellous man", and "this dogmatist, champion of the doctrine of the church." Cyprian speaks of Novatian in Ep.60,3, as "proud doctor", but in Ep.55,24, witnesses to his knowledge of philosophy and his eloquence. His surviving works testify to his ability to write excellent Latin - on a par with late Classical Latin. He was surely influenced by Virgil (see especially ch.I and VIII of commentary), Cicero, Seneca, Pliny, and others (referred to in commentary), which betokens a good literary education. Almost certainly he knew Greek. Apart from the fact that the early third century was a time when the Roman Church was gradually changing over from Greek to Latin (and so both were widely known), the philosophical and theological content of his writings indicate a direct knowledge and borrowing from Greek sources - e.g. Athenagoras, Clement of Rome, Justin Martyr, Philo, Theophilus of Antioch, Hippolytus, Sibyline Oracles (see ch.I and VIII, etc. of commentary). Also as schismatic bishop he evidently wrote letters in Greek. In addition to his linguistic background, he had a good training in philosophy. Cyprian speaks of him as a Stoic philosopher. To Cornelius he was more of a philosopher than a Christian. The rhetorical description he gives of nature

8 Eusebius, H.E.vi.43.

9 Cyprian, Ep.55, 16.
shows a widespread borrowing from late Stoic sources (see I.2-8 of commentary. VIII.44,45, etc. and pp.676% of appendix). He makes use of much Stoic terminology (supra). His frequent use of the hypothetical syllogism (e.g. II.11), the way in which he sees the relationship of language to reality - as is shown in his explanation of anthropomorphisms (e.g.11.12,13), together with his reliance on Stoic epistemology (see appendix at length) are indications of his intimate acquaintance with Stoic philosophy. His writings show a deep knowledge of both the Latin and Greek Fathers of the Church (see appendix on regula veritatis). He was especially influenced by Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus. His refutations of various heresies (particularly Gnosticism and Monarchianism) show a knowledge of their writings in some measure.

We have no information as to when he would have done the studying that his knowledge would have required. Probably his basic literary, philosophical training was during his early years, which indicate that he would have come from a family of some means. We do not know whether his knowledge of the Church Fathers would have been acquired before or after his baptism (since he may have been a believer long before his illness and baptism). Vogt has argued very convincingly that after his baptism Novatian spent a considerable time as an ascetic, during which time he both studied, and did his major writings.\textsuperscript{10} It seems definite that Novatian was ab-

\textsuperscript{10}Vogt, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.21sq.
sent from Rome in the months immediately following the death of Pope Fabian (January, 250), and was not there until summer 250. Possibly he was away in some ascetic community. It may well have been there that he wrote *De Trinitate* (which bears absolutely no traces of his later schismatic argumentations). Vogt makes it quite likely that this is the place from which he wrote *De Cib.* and *De Spect.* These letters on theological subjects are from a leader in absence to his people. But there is no indication that it was forced absence (due to persecution). Further the very tone of the letters and their subjects (e.g. Jewish Meats and their meanings) do not indicate a time of danger and persecution. Furthermore they do not manifest his schismatic teaching or anti-catholic tirades.

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11 Novatian was not the author of *Ep.* viii (from the Roman clergy to Cyprian) early that year. See also Cornel., *Ep. ad. Fab.*: Eusb., *H.E.* vi.43, and Vogt *op. cit.*, p.22.

12 A Novatianist tradition of the sixth century claims that he lived for awhile as an ascetic - Phot., *Bibl. Cod.* 162.

13 Vogt points out that in c.3 of *De Cib.*, Novatian calls Jews and heretics "inquinati", heathen "immundi", and believers "mundi". The later schismatic Novatian would not have called all believers (which term includes those in the Catholic Church) "mundi" - because only the Novatianists were then considered to be the "pure" (Vogt, p.29).
But the letters do make it clear that they are from a church leader to his flock. If Novatian was living as an ascetic, would he have been in charge of a Roman congregation? Vogt discusses in some detail how the great Roman congregation was divided into seven parts, each with a deacon under Fabian. Possibly Novatian was appointed deacon over one of these groupings, and it is to them he writes from his temporary monastic dwelling. This is uncertain but it seems to fit the facts better than the assumption that he writes as the schismatic bishop separated from his flock by an enforced absence in time of state persecution. If this hypothesis is correct, it was probably from this monastic period that he wrote some of the other works referred to by Jerome in De Vir. Ill.70 (De Sabbato, etc.). The writing De Bono Pud. is the only one of his extant writings which seems definitely to have been composed after his break with the Catholic Church in A.D.251, which was occasioned by the consequences of the Decian persecution.

This persecution broke out in 250, with an edict which commanded all people to sacrifice to the pagan gods. Some Christians actually sacrificed to the gods ("sacrificati") whereas others obtained a (false) written declaration that they had offered sacrifice ("libellatici"). There was a particularly large number of "Libellatici" in North Africa, who soon wanted re-admission to communion with the church. Bishop Cyprian of Carthage was absent during this persecution. In his absence difficulties de-

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14 Catol.Liber.21; see Vogt, p.31.

15 Cyprian, Ep.45,57.
veloped. Some "confessors" took it upon themselves to write letters of forgiveness on behalf of the "lapsi" which allowed them to receive communion without penance and laying on of hands by clergy and bishop. Cyprian withstood this laxist innovation, and demanded due penance of the lapsed, and reconciliation through the bishop before admission to communion. Cyprian wrote to the Roman Church for their commendation of his position.

Pope Fabian had died a martyr in prison in January 250. Because of the continuing persecution it had not yet been possible to elect a successor to Fabian. Sometime between January and summer 250, Novatian had returned from his ascetic residence to active participation in the presbyterium of Rome. He was in fact one of the leading clergy, and seems to have directed the affairs of the presbyterium during this period of vacancy. It was he that replied (on behalf of the Roman clergy) to Cyprian's letter during summer of 250 in Epistles 30 and 36. He (and the clergy of Rome) upheld Cyprian in his demand that the lapsed do penance satisfactory to the bishop before they be admitted to communion. Novatian shows his rigourism in commending the "severitas evangelicae disciplinae" (Ep.30,4), but even so he recommends forgiveness for the lapsed when in danger of death (Ep.30,6). Roman confessors who were close to Novatian in friendship and opinion (Moyse, and others) wrote Ep.31 to Cyprian, praising him for his stand against laxism.

16 Ep.15,2. 17 Ep.61,3 and De Lapsis 16.
18 Catol.Liber.21 19 Thus says Cyprian, Ep.55,5.
By March of 251 the persecution abated when Decius left Rome to do battle against rivals elsewhere. It was now possible to elect a successor to Fabian. Sixteen bishops met and chose Cornelius. Novatian was disappointed at not being chosen. The clergy may have passed him over (even though he was a likely successor) because of his increasing rigorist tendencies, which were a movement away from the accepted practice of penitence for sinners in the church. Novatian and a party of supporters very soon repudiated this election and accused Cornelius of being a laxist, as well as being a "libellaticus", who was in the party of certain bishops who had sacrificed to idols. Novatian evidently had sizeable support including respected "confessors" (Maximus, Urbanus, Sidonius, and others) - who however soon returned to the

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20 Buseb. 6. vi. 43; Cyprian, Ep. 45, 2.

21 While Harnack (History of Dogma, Eng. Tr., II, p. 111 sq.) claims that Novatian's rigorism was the ancient practice of the church, and the forgiveness of idolatry, adultery, and murder was an innovation (by such as Cornelius and Cyprian), this seems to be against the facts. Novatian was not able to appeal to any such ancient rigorist practice of the church. It is far more likely that the forgiveness of heinous sins after due penitence was closer to the old practice - and that Novatian was the innovator in his strict puritanism.

22 Cyprian, Ep. 55, 10
Catholic Church. The Novatianist party believed that the essence of the faith would be destroyed by admitting the "impure" into the fellowship. For this reason even more than for personal ambition to be pope, Novatian had himself consecrated as bishop (and anti-pope) by three bishops from South Italy. He then sent "missionaries" to important churches all around the Mediterranean to degrade Cornelius and gain support for himself. Apparently whole churches in the East went over to him while Carthage - after some time of indecision (waiting to gather the facts), clearly repudiated him. In numerous places rival bishops were soon consecrated and rival churches set up.

An inconsistent - and undoubtedly temporary - alliance was made with enemies of Cyprian from Carthage who had split from the church for precisely opposite reasons from those of Novatian - they were laxists. Since Cyprian (their enemy) decided in favour of Cornelius, they sent men to Rome to work against him. The Carthage priest - Novatus - while in Rome in this capacity, joined himself to Novatian. The Catholic Liber accuses him of

23 Ep. 51, 1

24 Although Cornelius claimed that they were drunk, there is no evidence that they ever repented of their action - Euseb., H.E. vi. 43.

25 Ep. 44, 1; 45, 2; 46, 2.

26 Euseb., H.E. vi. 46

27 Ep. 44, 55, 10; 59.

28 Ep. 59.

29 See Ep. 14, 4; 34, 1; 43, 2; 59; 9.
ordaining Novatian in Rome and Nicostatus in Africa (c. 22). This is incorrect. Novatus was accused of immorality (Ep. 52, 2). It is certain that Novatian would not have tolerated a laxist such as this in his purist community for long.

There were some hopes of reconciliation between Novatian and the Church. Dionysius of Alexandria wrote him, requesting his return. This was without avail. A Roman synod excommunicated him, and the confessors returned to the Catholic Church.

His last days are lost in obscurity. According to a tradition reported in the fifth century by Socrates, he suffered martyrdom in the persecution under Valerian. H. Valesius denies this on the authority of Bishop Eulogius (sixth century) as does Pacianus. A tomb, discovered in 1932 near S. Lorenzo in Rome, shows the inscription: NOVATIANO BEATISSIMO/MARTURI GAUDENTIUS DIAC/FEC.

Whether or not this refers to the schismatic Bishop Novatian is not clear. If it does, it is strange that it does not say "Bishop" on the inscription.

The Novatianist movement spread all over the Mediterranean World, and at times seemed close to reconciliation with the Catholics. Both Socrates and Sozomen give considerable space to the

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30 Euseb., H. E. vi. 45.
31 Ep. 55, 6; Euseb. H. E. vi. 43
32 Socrates, H. E. iv. 28.
33 H. Valesius, Annotationes 96.
34 Sympron, 2, 7.
Novatianist bishops and churches in their histories. The Novatianist representatives accepted the Nicene Creed and homoousion. They were given strong setbacks in the fifth century under Pope Innocent I and Celestine I. They seem to have survived in small groups down to the eighth century.

The Work of Novatian

We have already referred to his authorship of several works. Jerome (De Vir. Ill. 70) says he wrote: "De Pascha, De Sabbate, De Circumcisione, De Sacerdote, De Oratiorne, De Cibis Judaicis, De Instantia, De Attalo, and many others especially a great volume on the Trinity." Jerome also speaks of a collection of Novatian's letters. Most of these works are lost, and none survived under his name. De Trinitate survived under the name of Tertullian. As early as the late fourth century Rufinus attributed it to Tertullian, and complained that heretics in Constantinople hawked copies of it on the streets, bound with Cyprian's epistles (i.e. to claim Cyprian wrote it — and arrogate to it his authority). Jerome answered that neither Cyprian nor Tertullian wrote it, but Novatian — and that its style revealed the true author's eloquence. Elsewhere Jerome makes the statement that it is "quasi operis Tertulliani" (De Vir. 70). While Adv. Prx. of Tertullian has a strong influence on De Trin., the latter work is much larger and goes beyond it in several points of doctrine (though it lags

36 For the most complete study of their development and decline, see K. Vogt, pp. 183-290.

behind it in certain others — see commentary). At any rate it is not an επιστολή of Adv. Prx. However Jerome was often inexact in his literary and historical criticisms.

Jerome of course makes no mention of the date of its writing. We have already seen that it was written before the schism of the year 251. How long before is uncertain. Weyer in his study (pp. 14, 15) mentions the fact that since Novation speaks against the heresy of Sabellius (who was put out of the church under Callistus, who died 222) — it was obviously after this time; and also since Novation is very careful (especially in the last two chapters) to avoid the charge of ditheism (leveled at Hippolytus), whose works he otherwise often uses, De Trn. can be presumed to have been composed sometime after the career of Hippolytus (who died c. 235).

As we have seen, in the time of Jerome this work of Novatian was already attributed to Tertullian. This is the only way the work of the schismatic bishop survived the centuries — i.e. bound with the writings of Tertullian. Pamelius (1579) was the first to re-attribute De Trn. to Novatian. While the vast majority of scholars accept this attribution, a few have from time to time questioned it. J. Quarry suggested that De Trn. was merely a Latin translation of a Greek work of Hippolytus against Artemon. De Trn. is manifestly not a translation from Greek, but is a very polished original Latin work (as is evidenced e.g. in the use of clausula, homoteleuton, anaphora, etc.). H. Hagemann held that

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held that it was a work of a disciple of Hippolytus, and an attack on the position that Pope Callistus held on penitence.\textsuperscript{40} This raises more problems than it solves. De Trn. is certainly not an attack on Callistus' (or anyone else's) view on penitence. And furthermore it studiously avoids the Ditheism of which Hippolytus and his disciples were accused, which makes it appear to be of a later date.\textsuperscript{41} A. Laurentin has suggested that De Trn. was written in the latter half of the third century - after the time of Novatian, by someone else who was refuting the misuse that Paul of Samosota made of predestination in Jn.17:5.\textsuperscript{42} But it is likely that the Gnostics, and perhaps also the Ebionites, had used this sort of argument before the time of Novatian - so he could have been answering them (see Commentary). Thus a later date is not necessitated.

\textsuperscript{40} Die römische Kirche und ihr Einfluss auf Disziplin und Dogma in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten (Freiburg, 1864) 371-411: Novatians angebliche Schrift von der Trinität.

\textsuperscript{41} See Harnack, R.E.für Protest. Theol. und Kirche, X, 653.

The basic critical work of Landgraf-Weyman\(^{43}\) which was followed by that of d'Ales\(^{44}\) and later Melin\(^{45}\), has solidly established the relationship in vocabulary, style, and thought between De Trn. and the other known works of Novatian. Frequent reference is made to this in this commentary (e.g. see the comparative notes under: I.1;3; II.14; IV.23;26; VI.31;33;34; VII.37;38; VIII.44; IX.46;48; X.50, etc.). Novatian of Rome is undoubtedly the author of De Trn.

We have now to consider the textual tradition of this work, and then to speak briefly of the rest of his remaining works. De Trn., as has been stated, survived at least from the fourth century to the sixteenth joined with the works of Tertullian. E. Dekkers mentions six different collections of Tertullian's works:

Corpus Trescense, Corpus Agobardinum, Corpus Masburense, Corpus Cluniacense, a Corpus witnessed to by a few pages discovered in the Vatican (in 1951); and Corpus Corbeiensis\(^{46}\).

Mlle. Chr. Mohrmann discusses in particular five of these sources (Trescense, Masburense, Agobardinum, Cluniacense, and the one discovered in the Vatican)\(^{47}\). To the best of our information, De Trn. of Novatian came down in the Corpus Corbeiense. All the ms.

\(^{43}\) Landgraf-Weyman, Arch. für Lat. Lexik. 11 (1898-1900) 221-226.

\(^{44}\) d'Ales, Novatien, pp.8-17.

\(^{45}\) Melin, op. cit., passim.


\(^{47}\) Mohrmann, (introduction to) Apologeticum, etc., Monumenta Christiana, 1,3 - Utrecht -Bruxelles, 1951, pp.xli-xxx.
of this group have evidently been lost. However some record remains of three witnesses of this group (1) a Corpus mentioned in the catalogue of the Cathedral of Cologne of 833; (2) mentioned in a more recent catalogue of the Abbey of Corbie; and (3) in a lost ms. of a certain "Johannes Clemens Anglus", who sent the variants to Pamphilus, who used them in his edition of Tertullian in 1579. 48 In two of these collections (Corbie and Jn.Clemens) De Trn. is mentioned by name. 49 The the Catalogue of Cologne one finds instead the term "De Fide libri II". Dekkers has demonstrated that this must certainly refer to De Trn. 50 (Originally De Trn. may well have circulated under the title "De Fide" - as did De Trn. of Hilary; or it could have been entitled "De Regula Veritatis"). It is very probable that Corpus Corbeiense (to which these three collections bore witness) preserved De Trn. of Novatian, whereas the other collections did not, because this collection was made by: "Les derniers representants occidentaux du montanisme, peut-être chez les Novatians, ou dans les cenacles des rares Tertullianistes..." 51

Some of the sixteenth century editors of the works of Tertullian (including Novatian) had access to certain of these mss. All of them are now lost, and we must depend on the sixteenth century printed editions for all our knowledge of Novatian's original text -


51 Dekkers, p.377.
with one small exception. There is a short ms fragment of De Trn. in the Patristic Florilegium of Monte Cassine of the IX-X century (cod. 384), which contains a quotation from ch. 18 of De Trn. under Tertullian's name. 52

The major edition of De Trn. is by Martin Mesnartius of Paris in 1545. He added De Trn. and De Gib. (still under the name of Tertullian), part of De Pat., and nine other writings to the earlier edition of Tertullian by Beatus Rhenanus of 1539. These added treatises came, he said: "ex vetustissimo codice desumpta". Dekkers has shown that Mesnartius probably used not one, but several manuscripts (among them representatives from Acobardinus, Trecensis, and Corbeinsis). 53 It is of course from Corbeinsis that De Trn. has come.

In 1550 Sigismund Gelenius published an edition in Basel. He claims on the title page to have based his text on many ancient ms from French and German libraries, and in particular on an ancient, excellent, and incorrupt ms from Britain: "ex ultima Britannia Ioannes Lelandus...communicavit exemplar in Masturensi coenobio gentis eius vetustissimo repertum..." Many have even doubted that such a ms ever existed, though Dekkers thinks that this is going too far. 54 Gelenius' veracity is doubted basically because the variant readings and corrections he gives in most of his printed works do not manifest sufficient evidence that he actually made use of ms not available to the other editors. 55 But this edition


53Dekkers, p. 381  54Ibid.

55See G.F. Diercke, Tertullianus, De Oratiana, Bsum, 1947, xvi sq.
of De Trn. appears to be based on an actual msc. not used by Mesnartius, by means of which he properly corrects Mesnartius. As Fausset shows (op.cit., p. 55) Gangneius (i.e. Mesnartius) altered the text to make it more orthodox. Mesnartius also "corrected" the Latin, which Gelenius changes back to the original (e.g. XVIII - quae malum ratio est). Dekkers suggests that Gelenius corrected Mesnartius on the basis of the Coloniensis (one of the three witnesses to Corpus Corbeiense). The third edition of De Trn. was by Pamelius (Antwerp, 1579). He says that he bases it on a msc. from England, of which the variants were communicated to him by one Johannes Clemens. In his explanatory note, he lists the same seven books as those of the Corpus Corbeiense (which he says confirms the text of Gelenius - though as we see in the critical apparatus, he corrects certain mistakes of Gelenius).

These three editions then are based on the witness of three mss. Weyer shows their proximity through their common lacunae and corruptions (common lacunae in paragraph: 71, 79, 125, 151, etc. and common corruptions in par. : 28, 31, 37, 39, 44, 73, 81, 106, 114, 123, 132, 156, 174, 177). These were corrected by Welchman, who also

56 See Dekkers, p. 381
57 See examples in critical apparatus - e.g. ch. XVI.
58 Dekkers, p. 382
59 Weyer, p. 17, note 53.
corrected the confused order of the chapters (which confusion was also common to the three mss.) 60 These three mss. appear to have been in the family of Corpus Corbeiensis - which apparently alone contained De Trn. of Novatian.

All other editions are based on the first three. Franciscus Junius reprinted Pamellius' text at Franeker in 1597, with numerous conjectured emendations. J. Wouver in a small book - Emendationes Epidicticae (Frankfurt, 1603 and 1612) gives several textual variants, but no text. These variants which come from Pulvio Grisini may well rest on a true ancient msc. 61 (see Critical apparatus)


John Jackson in 1728 published a critical edition of the text of Pamellius with many notes in the back. This edition was largely used by Gallandi (Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum III, Venice, 1767); and Migne (Patrologiae Latinae, Paris, 1886). R. Ganszyniec refers to an unknown Belgian, who gave numerous critical observations of

60 Published in Oxford, 1724. Before that chapters 14-27 were in disorder: i.e. Old Editions Welchman

| xxiii       | xiv fin. xv  |
| xxiv       | xvi          |
| xxv        | xvii         |
| xxvi       | xviii        |
| xxvii      | xix to esset Christus |
| xv         | xix fin. xx  |
| xvi        | xxi          |
| xvii       | xxii         |


Other works of Novatian.

We may now only briefly make mention of other generally accepted works of Novatian. Cyprian tells us that Novatian was author of Ep. 30. Ep. 36 is very close to it in style and content, and is surely by Novatian. Other letters that he wrote (e.g. to Dionysius of Alexandria) are lost. Ep. 31 closely corresponds to Ep. 30 and 36 of Novatian, but was apparently written not by Novatian himself, but by the confessors of Rome (though Melin thinks Novatian wrote this epistle also). *De Cibis Judaeis* which survived with the works of Tertullian, was restored by Pamelius to Novatian, Jerome (De Vir. 70) ascribes it to Novatian. D'Ales (Novatien, pp. 7-30) and Melin (op. cit. 95 sq.) show the close correspondence in vocabulary, style, content and situation between *De Cibis*, Ep. 30, 36, *De Trin.* and two other works (to which our commentary makes frequent reference).

We have already discussed the probable date and historical circumstance in which this work was written. It gives a spiritualised

\[62\] Ganszyniec, BOS 31 (552).  
\[63\] In Ep. 55, 5.  
Christian interpretation of Jewish dietary regulations (not entirely unlike the ancient Letter of Aristæas - at least in spirit). It shows marks of Novatian's puritanism (at least in the beginning stages - though by no means developed into the later schismatic teaching).

Two other works that have been preserved with those of Cyprian are now widely accepted as coming from the pen of Novatian - i.e. De Spectaculis and De Bono Pudicitiae. Jerome does not mention these works, although he does say Novatian wrote "many others" (De Vir. 70). These two works are not attributed to Cyprian in the ancient catalogues, and as D'Ales states, they have an abstract character unlike the permanent public contact of the Bishop of Carthage. Also Cyprian dealt with the subject of De Spect. in Ad Donatum, and treated the subject of De Bono Pudicitiae in De Habitu virginum. These works do not quote scripture so frequently as those of Cyprian, nor do they treat Scripture in the same way. The following nineteenth century studies have helped establish the authorship of Novatian for these two works: C. Weyman.

65 D'Ales, Novt., p. 5. 66 Ibid.
68 Über die dem Cyprianus beigelegten Schriften De Spectaculis und De bono pudicitiae, in Historisches Jahrbuch, xiii, p. 737-748 (1892); Nachträgliches zur Schrift De bono pud., Ibid., xiv, p. 330-331 (1893).
J. Haussleiter\textsuperscript{69}, and A. Demmler\textsuperscript{70}. In addition D'Ales gives a close comparison of the opening paragraphs of these works with \textit{De Gif.}, \textit{Ep.} 30, 36, and \textit{De Trn.}, which helps to establish their common authorship.\textsuperscript{71} Melin confirms these results in his work (which is used throughout this commentary).

\textit{De Spect.} is Stoic in its world view (see chapters I and VIII of commentary) and generally puritan in its conclusions (thus being doubly characteristic of Novatian), but gives no evidence of having been composed after his schism, as we have already noted. \textit{De Pud.} is much more rigorous and was certainly written after the Novatianist schism.\textsuperscript{72}

Many other works of uncertain authorship have at times been attributed to Novatian. None of these attributions have been generally accepted and for the sake of space we will not enter into this subject.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{69}Drei neue Schriften Novatians, \textit{Theol.Litter.bl.}, 1894, pp. 481-487.

\textsuperscript{70}Über den Verfasser der unter Cyprians Namen überlieferten Traktate \textit{De bino pudicitiae} und \textit{De Spectaculis}, Tübingen, 1894.

\textsuperscript{71}D'Ales, \textit{Novt.}, pp. 6-18.

\textsuperscript{72}Vogt, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 35sq.

\textsuperscript{73}See D'Ales, \textit{Novt.}, pp. 19-29; with which conclusions Melin agrees.
General background of Novatian's writing and summary of his thought.

Novatian was writing at a time near the end of the old Apologetic period of the second and early third centuries, and before the beginning of the great Post-Nicene Theology of the late third and fourth centuries (and following). In the early third century Christianity was rapidly gaining acceptance in much of the Hellenistic world. Christian writers were no longer particularly concerned to refute the old charges of "cannibalism", "misanthropy" etc., leveled against the earlier church. The major problem for them now was heresy within and outside the church. That the Christian Gospel should be widely misunderstood and perverted is no surprise in light of the philosophical and moral confusion that apparently held sway in the first two or three centuries of the Christian era. As we have seen in the appendix on Stoicism, the old dogmatic systems of Plato and Aristotle had given way to widespread scepticism concerning knowledge of truth and proper moral action. This scepticism had helped to shatter the prestige of the old Roman gods, and optimistic trust in the city gods, the city state (and empire), and city ethics was weakened. Stoicism attempted to stem the tide of scepticism in giving the individual (which was their concern more than the city or society - especially in late Stoicism) some basis for true knowledge and moral behaviour. In addition to inner scepticism all sorts of outer Eastern philosophical speculation and religious cults began moving into Rome and into Hellenistic thought - the inevitable result of scepticism and cosmopolitanism, which caused
one Latin poet to complain that "the filth of the Orontes is pouring into the Tiber" (Juvenal 3.62).

Into this widely confused background, sceptical on the one hand, but on the other eclectic (the natural result of scepticism) Christianity heralded forth its message. Naturally people saw it through the "spectacles" of their own frame of reference. Those whose lives were renewed through Christianity had to re-examine and gradually (or rapidly) change their frame of reference. This is what the apologists wanted to aid them to do (as at least one of their tasks - this was not the only or even main ambition of the apologists). But others in varying degrees wanted to transmute Christianity so it would fit into their own modes of thought. Various eclectic compromises were attempted. This was the way of heresy which wished to reinterpret Christianity in terms of diverse Greek-Eastern speculation and cultism. From the detailed refutations that Irenaeus and Hippolytus in particular make of these heresies, we have a good idea of the general patterns of thought and error which had naturally come over from society into the church - against which Novatian had to contend.

These various heresies - their leaders and intellectual, historical basis are discussed in some detail in appropriate places in the commentary (e.g. on Gnosticism: I.1 note (2); 6-n. (5); II.10-n. (1), (4); IV.22-n. (4); V.28-n. (3); IX.46-n. (3); X.52-n. (1); 53 (Valentius, Marcion, etc.); on Docetism: X.50-n. (1); 54n. (1), (2); Ditheism: IX.46 n. (2); Ebionitism: XI.58 n. (1); Adoptionism: XI.56-n. (1) (Theodotians and Artemas); further on Artemas: XVI.93 n. (1); XXI.121 n. (1); XXIII.132 n. (1); Patripassian Monarchianism:
XXIV.137 n.(1); XXVI.145 n.(1); "Dynamic" Monarchianism: XII.64 n.(1); etc.). It is not necessary to repeat this information here. In general summary we may note two of the major problems that were at the heart of these heresies.

One was their assumption (particularly in Gnosticism) of the utterly removed, abstract nature of God. Somewhat like the Epicureans they placed Him far above contact with this world. This involves a long development from many different sources in the history of thought. For our purposes we may remark in passing that as the Gnostics read this into Christianity, they removed God the Father to a transcendent sphere, uncontaminated by this created world (which was held to be inherently evil because material) - created by a bad, lesser god (i.e. of the Old Testament). To explain reality (especially with reference to evil) they had to resort to a whole series of intermediaries such as this (i.e. the bad O.T. God) between man and the transcendent good God (supposedly of the New Testament). Christ was (in varying ways, depending on the different sort of Gnosticism) one of these intermediaries. He was in no real sense (in any Gnostic interpretation) the unique Son of God who had in His historic life and ministry bridged the gap between the transcendent God and fallen man.

Another root cause of heresy - not unrelated to this abstract, removed view of God - was the assumption that God must be unpersonal. This lies behind much of Adoptionism, Docetism, and patripassian Monarchianism (with their many variations). Whether (with the Adopt-
ionists - Ebionites and Theodotians) Christ is only a man (who for a temporary period has a special effusion from God); or with the Modalism of Praxeas, Noetus, etc. Christ is a temporary manifestation of God the Father - on either side Christ is temporary, and God is still only One Person in isolated loneliness (He does not exist in an eternal relationship involving three persons). By definition the Incarnation is ruled out, as is the coming of the Holy Spirit into humanity (i.e. in the sense that God is actually present to men), because Jesus is not God Eternal, and the Holy Spirit is not God Eternal. Thus redemption as manifested in the Gospel is ruled out, and other substitutes must be made. When Novatian and the Church Fathers are fighting heresies, it is not from a merely academic interest. They are striving for the very realities of redemption.

In the appendix on the "rule of truth" we have seen that from the beginning, the Catholic Church accepted Christ as God, and the Holy Spirit as God. Though the reality was always there, it took centuries of reflection to understand and state theologically (against both the synagogue and heresy) how God could be Triune and yet one. This attempt at reconciliation of these two truths involved some of the earlier theologians in subordinationism and (perhaps) a mild form of Ditheism (on subordinationism see especially notes throughout ch. XXVIII and XXXI; on ditheism - IX.46 n. (2) etc.).
We can now suggest only in brief summary fashion how Novatian went about working this question out— for details one must refer to the commentary. M. Spanneut in his study of Stoicism in the Church Fathers, states concerning Novatian: "On a trop cherché du stoïcisme dans sa morale, pas assez dans sa vision du monde..." While accepting this suggestion, we would go further and say that to appreciate the solution he offers to the basic questions of the theology of his period, one must take into consideration his use of Stoic epistemology. This was useful to him as he sought an understanding both of the essential nature of God and also of His actions towards men.

The structure of De Trin. is based on the three sections of the regula veritatis: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (with an appendix on their unity). At the heart of Novatian's theology is an Infinite, Transcendent, but also Personal and Present God. Thus from the beginning — against the Gnostics — God is not utterly removed and unknowable (because He is person, and men-created in His image — are persons; there is mutual knowledge possible); and against the unipersonalists, God does not exist in eternal isolation, but in an inner family relationship as Three in One, and so can reveal Himself in His Tri-unity (on his personhood and infinitude, see II.12 n.(1) and IV.23 n.(1)). Novatian starts with the givenness of God's self-revelation as it is witnessed to in Scripture and safeguarded in the "rule of truth". He then employs the

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74 Spanneut, op.cit., p.425.
Stoic hypothetical syllogism to put further questions to the nature and activity of God (see II.11 n.(2); IV.23 n(1) for this methodology). As we have already seen, lying behind his use of the Stoic syllogism is the Stoic view of the relation of language to reality (e.g. II.13 n.(3)). In the light of the infinite nature of God, language about Him (even Biblical language) must be judged in accordance with His nature: it is not fully adequate to express that nature. With this understanding Novatian can explain "anthropomorphisms" in Scripture - e.g. VI.31 n.(1).

Also on this realist basis he makes the definite advance in the development of Christian Theology of purging out the "corporalism" of Tertullian and others, who held that God (Spirit) to be real had to be body. That is, he adjusts language to fit the nature of its subject rather than imposing improper connotations of human language onto the Divine Subject. This most important theological principle was followed by Hilary and Augustine.

Yet on the same basis (a realist view of language) he is not left with scepticism in his knowledge of God. God in fact does use language - human language and Biblical language - to make Himself known. "Names" do indicate definite reality (even though they do not fully contain or exhaust that reality). This other side of the truth enables him to make another theological advance over his predecessors (Tertullian and Hippolytus) in maintaining the Eternal Sonship of Christ (the name "Son" means just that on an eternal level; He was not first Logos and only later Son).
Novatian's understanding of the actions of God towards men is also influenced by his background in Stoic epistemology. In the appendix it is noted how the dynamism of Stoic thought helped the early Fathers overcome the Greek and Eastern philosophical idea that change is degrading to God (p.95). With this in mind he explains the whole action of God towards men in His Self-revelation as being based on the principle of accommodation (III.18 n.(4)). This explains anthropomorphisms, Old Testament Theophanies, "improper" Biblical descriptions of God, the very Incarnation itself. God lowers Himself to earth so He can lift man up to heaven.

Novatian's explanation of this "lifting up" of humanity in Christ is very close to that of the early Greek Church (as is noted throughout the commentary). He sees sin in terms of death, caused by separation from the life of God; and salvation in terms of life, which is restored through Christ, who lifts us in Himself back up to God. Novatian thus sees that Christ took on flesh of mankind who had been affected by the Fall, and it is precisely this that is lifted up. But Novatian fails to think out consistently the implications of this as we shall see. In his ontological view of salvation, he indicates very little understanding of the question of guilt and cleansing through the death of Christ (which was a factor in causing him to judge the worthiness of the individual believer as being his own "purity" rather than in the achieved shared purity of Christ. This is a basic cause of his schism).
As he applies the Stoic "open question" to the realities of redemption (see appendix on Stoicism), he is able to have a deeper grasp of what lies behind those realities. As he sees the movement of God in His Self-revelation as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost towards man (XXXI.192 n.1; XII.65 n.1) he has at least some comprehension that behind this lies the eternal, antecedent interchange of communication and fellowship within the essential Being of God. This is an important step in anticipating the way in which Christian Theology has come to an understanding of the Trinity. Along this same line he also indicates some grasp of the doctrine later known as ἐπτάς or circuminception. On another level, he sees the realities of manhood and Godhood in Christ in such a way that he goes behind this to anticipate what later theology came to call (generally in the East) the "hypostatic union", (and in the West) the "communication of idioms" (e.g. XI.60 n.(1); XIII.70 n.(1)).

In these ways we see how Novatian was aided by his background in Stoicism to make certain advances in the development of Christian Theology. Not all of his work could be considered progressive. We have mentioned directly above that theological failure lay behind his schism. Elsewhere we have discussed how he takes a step backwards in refusing to use such theological terms as "Trinity" or "Third Person" (for the Holy Spirit), although the reality is there in his thought. The commentary examines at length his failure to extricate himself from subordinationism. Some aspects of his
thought seem to anticipate a solution to this problem (see XII.65), although he never finally works it out. He has by some been accused of "pre"-Nestorianism (see X.56; XXIV.135 n.(1)), Apollinarianism (XXL.125 n.(2)) and "Spanish" Adoptionism (XXIV.138 n.(1),(3).

As the commentary indicates, we believe these charges are not supported by the evidence of the facts.

With all of his failures in view, we may still consider him "a champion of the church's dogma" (to borrow the words of Cornelius), who expounds this dogma with an objectivity and realism that comes (as we have seen - p.403 of appendix) from the Revelation of God in His Word; the previous writings of the earlier Church Fathers, and Stoic epistemology.

Influence of De Trinitate in the history of thought

Since Novatian was a schismatic, and his work was circulated under other names, it is not easy to trace the direct influence of De Trn. upon later theological thought. It seems highly probable that his realist view of language had some influence upon St. Hilary of Poitiers (particularly in his De Trn.) 75 whose widespread influence over later Christian thought is unquestioned. Thus Novatian's

75 Hilary often discusses the fact that the mind of man cannot contain God, nor human language fully express Him. He has a clear understanding of the principle of accomodation in revelation.
influence over the later church would have more indirect than direct. Apparently St. Ambrose knew directly some of the works of Novatian (whom he criticises in De Poent.) Since he was the teacher of St. Augustine it is possible that Augustine was acquainted with Novatian's works. Further, Augustine knew well St. Jerome, who gives the list of Novatian's works (including De Trn.) which list Augustine probably knew. It is possible to trace definite influence from Hilary, De Trn. to Augustine, De Trn. We may also trace some influence of Novatian on this work of Augustine, but perhaps it is more indirect (through Hilary) than direct. If it is true that Novatian has exercised some sway (even at the one point of accommodation and linguistic realism) over the great Church Fathers Hilary and Augustine, then his influence over the history of Christian thought would be by no means inconsiderable.

In addition to the question of linguistic realism and accommodation, we may note another decisive point established in the work of Novatian that was never reversed in the following centuries. Before the time of Novatian the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship of Christ was not clearly stated by the famous teachers of the Church (such as Tertullian and Hippolytus). They saw Christ first as Logos, and only later (in creation) as "perfected" Son. After the time of Novatian, who definitely established the eternal, perfect Sonship of Christ, no orthodox doctor of the Church goes backward from this teaching.

In smaller ways, as we have indicated in the commentary, Novatian may have influenced some later writers such as Lactantius - but
Not on any vital points that had real bearing on the development of Christian thought. It would appear that the decisive contribution of Novatian's work to later Christian doctrine is his understanding of the proper relationship of language to the Being of God, particularly as this is expressed in the principle of accommodation. If we are correct in assuming that Novatian influenced Hilary on this subject, then we may attribute to Novatian a lasting influence that endured even to the time of the Reformation. This influence would be traced from Hilary's *De Trin.* through the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, so important in the thought of Western Medieval Theology. Peter Lombard borrows a phrase from Hilary concerning the proper relationship of human language to God, which was later taken up by John Calvin (perhaps through the teaching of John Major). Hilary's thought at this point is very close to the objective Stoic epistemology of Novatian in *De Trin.* If this historical influence of Novatian has been correctly traced, then Novatian's work has helped to establish (or at least to state clearly) for later Christian Theology one of the most important principles for a true understanding of the Self-revelation of God in Holy Scripture and in His Son: the principle of accommodation.
The Bible text

D'Ales (Novt., pp. 31-82) gives a full study of the Biblical text used by Novatian. In summary we may note that his text often (though not always) differs from the Latin text of N. Africa (as used by Tertullian and Cyprian). It is not likely that he made his own translation. Probably he was following some witness of the "Old Italic" version. Down to the time of St. Augustine (De Doctr. Chris., II, xv, 22) the Latin Biblical tradition was a very open one. Nonetheless the quotations (which abound in Novatian - from both Old and New Testament - see index) are generally very close to the other Latin Fathers (before Jerome).76

Regula exigit veritatis, ut primo omnium credamus in deum patrem et dominum omnipotentem, id est rerum omnium perfectissimum conditorem: qui caelum alta sublimitate suspenderit, terram deiecta mole solidaverit, maria soluto liquore diffuderit, et haec omnia propius et condigna instrumentis et ornata et plena digesserit.

1 Hyperbaton (an inversion in which a substantive is separated from its determinative by a verb - e.g. "regula exigit veritatis") is a very frequent literary device of Novatian. It is employed some 53 times in De Trinitate. Elsewhere Novatian uses it in De Spec. 3 times; Cib. Jud. 6 times; Ep. xxx once; Ep. xxxvi twice. See Ammunsden, Novt., p.17 and d'Ales, "Le Corpus de Novt.", Recher.de.Sc.Relig., IX, 1919, pp.309-310.

2 Gen.1-2; Neh.9:6, etc.

3 Compare Athenagoras, Apol.xiii: "Who stretched out and vaulted the heavens, and fixed the earth in its place like a centre..." The following words are found in Virgil, an author who had much influence upon the vocabulary and literary style of Novatian (See Harnack, Texte und Untersuchungen, XIII,4,p.39ff):

caelum alta ... suspenderit as in Aen.vi.862; mole solidaverit - as in George.i.179 maria soluto - George.iv.302; liquore... - George. iii.484
On the expression "terram deiecta..." compare Novt., De Spec. ix; also Seneca, Nat. vi. 4. 1: "terram...quod tanti molem ponderis"; Ovid, Met. i. 12sq.

"et ornata..."—compare Tertullian, Adv. Herm. xxix. 1: "de hinc exornatis velut ..."
Novatian CONCERNING THE TRINITY

I.1. The rule of truth (1) requires that we should believe first of all in God the Father and Lord Almighty; that is the most perfect Founder of all things (2). He suspended the skies in lofty sublimity (3), He laid out the solid earth beneath, He spread the flowing seas abroad. And all of these He has plentifully and ornately equipped with their own naturally appropriate tools.

(1) See the introduction for the historical background and theological significance of the rule of truth as the starting point of this work of Novatian. This treatise, following the three basic articles of the "rule of truth", can be divided into three major parts: I. Of God the Father (ch.I-VIII); II. Of God the Son (ch.IX-XXVIII); III. Of God the Holy Spirit (ch.XXIX); plus an epilogue-IV, Of the Unity of the Godhead (ch.XXX-XXXI). As Labroille has pointed out (Histoire de la Litt.Lat. Chr., p.231): "C'est moins encore une théorie complète de la Trinité qui y est développée, qu'un essai sur les rapports du Fils avec le Père." Nonetheless it directly deals with the three Persons of the Godhead, and so deserves to be called De Trinitate (See Jerome, De Vir.III.70, for first mention of this title).

(2) Novatian immediately connects God the Father with the work of creation. Against the Gnostics, who held material to be inherently evil,
and in the line of both Stoicism and the Judaeo-Christian Revelation, he affirms the material creation to be the good work of God. And yet against Stoicism, and with the Scriptures, he refuses to identify nature with God; but shows Him to be the infinite Creator of the finite order.

(3) In paragraphs 1-9 of Ch. I, and again in VIII, Novatian gives an eloquent description of the created order, which seems to have drawn directly from sources in Scripture, Late Judaism, Classical Greek and Latin Literature, and earlier Church Fathers. Some have suggested a liturgical background for similar descriptions of nature. These paragraphs of Novatian are similar to a lauding of the created world in bk. VIII of *Apostolic Constitutions*, about which P. Drews says: "Nach allem kann es kaum einen Zweifel unterliegen, dass Novatian in K. I und VIII, nach einer Liturgie von Clementinischen Typus gearbeitet hat, und zwar muss ihm eine schriftliche Relation vorgelegen haben" (Untersuchungen über die sogen. clementinische Liturgie in VIII Buch der Apostolischen Konstitutionen, 1906, p. 121).

W. Bousset as well held that fragments of Late-Jewish prayers could be detected in these parts of the *Apost. Const.* (Eine jüdische Gebetssammlung im siebenten Buch der Apostolischen Konst. Gött., Nachr., Beiheft. 1915, 435-489). Campbell Bonner has seen a like influence (of Late Jewish-Early Christian Liturgy) on Melito of Sardis! /
Novatian as well as Melito was probably influenced by old collections of Jewish and early Christian prayers of praise on the creation. But by far the preponderant influence is on his oratorical description of nature in both ch. I and VIII are certain passages of Cicero as to form, and various texts of Holy Scripture as to content. A comparison of paragraphs I.1-8 of De Tr. with sections 19.49-21.56, and 52.130-64.162 of De Natura Deorum of Cicero will show that Novatian follows fairly closely the same order in his description of the various beauties of nature that Cicero gives in his dialogue. In Tr.I.2, Novatian speaks of the regular movements of the sun, moon, and stars. This is reminiscent of the speech of Balbus on the beauty of the movement of these same heavenly bodies (Nat.dr.19.49-21.56). In Tr.I.3 and 4, Novatian describes the springs, rivers, mountains with their vegetation, and how this is provided for man. Nat.dr. 52.130-133, moves in this same order of progress ("gushing springs...gliding...rivers... all for man"). Tr.I.5, speaks of man, the crown of creation, whose body is material, and whose spirit is in the image of God. Nat.dr.54.133-59.149, gives a teleological description of the body of man, and also of the human spirit. Tr.I.6, emphasizes the restraint of law on all the natural order. This/
This corresponds to *Nat. gr.* 62.154 (as well as 31.78-80), which shows how man and all nature are under the regime of law. A similar order can be found in the *Sibylline Oracles* III.19-75:

Tr.I.1-(describes) Deum omnium... *Sib. Or.* III.19- θεοῦ χῶμον
conditorem...κρατέοντος...καλοθραυσθήν coelum alta
terram deiecta
maria soluto liquore
2-luciferos solis
lunae candentem
astrorum
dies; menses
3,4-animalium (here the order
differs slightly)
5-hominem
4-nec terminos...excederet

The same sort of progressive description of the natural realm is to be found in the First Epistle of St. Clement of Rome to Corinth; a work that would certainly have been well known to Novatian, who was a presbyter of Rome.

Tr.I.2-haec omnia...circumire...
voluit

3-animalium greges ad...
hominum servitutes utiliter..
fruges in cibum elicuit...
4-nec terminos concessos
excederet...iura...
4-rursum in se redirect (i.e. sea waters)  
XX. 6-ob paræxèzisai tà 
perì tevēthmèa autì plhàv

9-in omnibus partibus redundantes 
XX. 11-úlpér èmpirìsòcèi 
ìmòd tòvòv èmpirìsòcèi tòvòs 

The Epistle to Diognetos has a descriptive order related to 

De Tr. I: 

Tr. I. 1, 2-coelum... maria... solis... lunae... astrorum 

Diognet. VII. 2- oðravòdos èktìsèn... 
èklàssan... kòlioc... skêlìm... tà àstera

4-nec terminos concessos...

Ibid-èklàssan lèilòiè ènèklexìsèn...

The Apostolic Constitutions, bk. VIII, enumerates the wonders 
of nature in much the same order as Novatian in Tr. I. 1-8. It 
is more likely that these two works flow from common sources, 
rather than either one being directly dependent on the other.

Tr. I. 2, 3, 4-heavens, earth, sea, 
animals, fixed bounds etc. 

Apost. Const. VIII. 12 (the 
following enumeration in 
the context of a worship 
service): fixed firmament... 
prepared day and night... sun, 
moon, stars, water, air, fire... 
bounds of oceans, mountains, 
rivers... living creatures.

I. 5-creation of man 

Ibid. creation of man 

6-fall by free will 

fall by free will 

7-hope of eternal life 

hope of eternal life

For the same general order compare Apol. of Aristides (Armenian 
creatus... et caelis, terra, ac mari, sole, luna, et stellis, 
caeterisque omnibus creaturis conspectus..."

There is also a close relationship between the description of
nature that Novatian gives in De Spec. IX (of which work we hold him to be the author) and De Tr. I. 1-8. This work, along with relevant texts from Virgil, Seneca, Theophilus, Tertullian, Recognitions of Clement, and others are considered on the opposite page—inasmuch as they appear to be more related to the literary style of Novatian—his particular vocabulary and phraseology—than to the actual order of his exposition, or its philosophical, theological content.
I.2. Nam et in solidamento caeli luciferos solis ortus excitavit, lunae candentem globum ad solacium noctis\(^1\) mensurnis\(^2\) incrementis orbis implevit\(^2\), astrorum etiam radios variis fulgoribus micantis\(^3\) lucis\(^b\) accendit. et haec omnia legitimis meatibus circumire totum mundi ambitum voluit\(^4\), humano generi\(^5\) dies, menses, annos, signa, tempora\(^6\) utilitatesque factura.

\(^{1}\)lunae candentem globus—compare Virgil, Aen.vi.725; Apost.Const.,viii.12,11 6 κατατύπες πυρ προς σχότους (and A.C.vii.34,2; 35,5). Ps.Rufin in Psalm.41,4 (Migne PLXXXII) lunam tenebras consolantem; and Hieron. tract.de Psalm.10, p.3,19 (Morin): "Nam in die, non in nocte sublustris, cum tenebrae lunae solacio temperantur"; Novatian, De Spec.ix: globum lunae, and (as De Tr. solis ortus) solis ortum aspiciat; Tert., Adv.Hermog., xxix: nam et lumen non statim splendore solis implevit et tenebras non statim solatio lunae temperavit; and Ad Nat.i.i.5: lunam, solacium noctium.

\(^{2}\)noctis...incrementis—cfr. Virgil, Eclog. iv.49; Novt. De Spec.ix: cursus incrementis suis detrimentisque signantem; De Tr. orbis implevit—cfr. Seneca, Ad Marc.xviii.2: implere solem.

\(^{3}\)astrorum..micantis—cfr. Virgil, Aen.ix.189; i.90; and Seneca, Ad Marc.xviii.2: stellas micare; Ad.Hely.viii.6: stellas micantis; Ad Marc. xviii.3: sidera diversas (as De Tr. radios /
varii); Novt. De Spec. ix: astrorum micantes choros...astrorum fulgore.

"et haec omnia legitimia...circumire...voluit - cfr.
Virgil, Aen.vi.849; Seneca, De Prov.i:...hanc inoffensam velocitatem procedere aeternae legis imperio; Tert., De Resc.Cr.
xii.8: Praemisit tibi naturam magistram; Theophilus, Ad Auto.
i.6... the orderly courses of the stars, the orderly succession of days and nights, and months and years; Recogn. of Clement
viii.20:... the courses and beauties of the stars, and their paths assigned to them by fixed laws and periods; viii.22:... the courses of the sun, that he might mark out by his diverse motions, hours, and days, and months, and changes of seasons.

5humano generis - compare this general concept (of nature working for the benefit of man) with notes in De.Tr.i.3.

6...tempora utilitates - see Genesis 1:14; Seneca, Ad
Marc.xviii.2: cotidiano cursu diei...signantem.
Furthermore in the firmament of heaven He has placed the sun, which brings the dawn with its radiant beams; the brilliant sphere of the moon as well, serving as a relief for the night, as it waxes to fullness month by month. He kindles the twinkling rays of the stars with their various degrees of splendour. And He has willed all of these to orbit the entire earth in their prescribed paths, so that they may serve as days, months, years, signs and seasons for the human race, and other uses also.
I.3. In terris quoque altissimos montes in verticem sustulit, valles in ima diecit, campos aequaliter stravit, animalium greges ad varias hominum servitutes utiliter instituit, silvarum quoque robora humanis usibus profutura solidavit, fruges in cibum elicuit, fontium ora reseravit et lapsuris fluminibus infudit, post quae, ne non etiam ipsis quoque deliciis procurasset oculorum, variis florum coloribus ad voluptatem spectantium cuncta vestivit.

1 His repetition of *quoque* in this paragraph is an example of Novatian's frequent use of anaphora. The expression *ne non etiam* is also typical of his literary style, being one of his many pleonasms. An almost identical pleonasm is found in his Epistle xxx, 3 (to Cyprian): nec non etiam...quoque.


3 *in cibum elicuit*—cfr. Virgil, *Georg.* i. 109


5 *deliciis...*/
cum satiatus spectaculo supernorum in terram oculos deieceris.

The general tenor of this passage with its exultation in the beauty of the created order is reminiscent of a passage from Corpus Hermeticorum v.5 (text and translation from Festugiere, Revel. d'Her. Trism., t.II,p.446): "Plût au ciel qu'il te fût donné d'avoir des ailes et de t'envoler dans l'air, et là, placé au milieu de la terre et du ciel, de voir la masse solide de la terre, les flots étendus de la mer, les cours fluides des fleuves, les mouvements libres de l'air, la pénétration du feu, la course des astres, la rapidité du ceil, son circuit autour des mêmes points! Oh! que cette vue est la plus bien heureuse, enfant, quand on contemple en un seul moment toutes ces merveilles, l'immobile mis en mouvement, l'Inapparent se rendant apparent au travers des oeuvres qu'Il créé!"
On earth also He has lifted up the mountains with their towering heights, carved out the deep valleys, made level the plains, and established the herds of animals to provide for the various needs of man. He has thickened the solid timber of the forest for the uses of man, He has brought forth fruit for food, and unlocked the mouths of springs, pouring them into the swelling rivers. In addition to all this, so that our eyes should not lack for delight, He has clothed the whole earth with flowers of every colour to bring joy to those who see them.

(1) Novatian's view of the world as created for and constantly working for the benefits and furtherance of man is a central theme for the Stoic philosophy. He refers to this a number of times in the early sections of this treatise (e.g. Tr. I. 4: possessoris humani...homo custodiret; II. 10... ad maiora... nobis; etc.). The Latin Stoics, Cicero and Seneca, both deal with this theme of the man-centered world. See Cicero, De Nat. Dr. 53. 133: Seneca, Ad Helv. viii: (mundus) propria nobis... nobis cum mensura sunt. The late Stoic philosopher Epictetus, writes: "God brought man into the world to be a spectator of Himself, and not merely a spectator, but an interpreter also" (I. vi. 19). Tertullian is strongly influenced by this concept.
1.3 (See the study of Spanneut, Tertullien et les Premières Moralistes Africains, p.3 seq.). Compare Tert.: God created the world for man, not for Himself—Adv. Marc. I, 13.306, 21-23; the Creator provided for the pleasures of man—De Cor. viii, 170, 30-31; all was done with regard to man—De Car. Reg. v, 32, 9-11; xii.41, 27-29; the beasts were given by the Lord for our use—De Pat. iv.5, 17-19; the whole universe in its movement conspires to the interest of man—Ad Nat. ii.5, 103, 4-5; man is centre and master of creation—De Car. Reg. v. 52, 13-9, 37, 25-26; man is lord of all that dies and is renewed—Apol. xlvi.9, 115, 49; man is possessor of the entire universe—De Spec. ill. 4, 11-12; Adv. Marc. ii.4, 338-11, 9, 347, 13; all is for the service of man and is his property—De An. xxxiii.357 (these preceding citations of Tertullian are all taken from Spanneut, loc. cit.). This central place in nature of man the crown of creation is mentioned in even earlier theology (See E.H. Blakeney, "A note on the Epistle to Diognetus," x, 1, in the Journal of Theological Studies, 42, 1941, p.193-195). The world was created for man, says Diognetus: \\

\textit{δ' ὦθες τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγάπησεν, ὅτι ὄν πρότερος τῶν κόσμων.}\\

In the Shepherd of Hermas, the world is said to have been created for the church—Visiones ii.4: \textit{διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἐξιλήσαν ὡς κόσμον ἐκτίμησεν.} This may be related to the Assumption of Moses i.12, which says the world was created for the Jews (or for the sake of the Torah). See/
See also Syrian Baruch xiv.18, in Charles, *Apocrypha and Pseudepi*., vol. II, p. 491 (referring to Ps. 8:6). This theme has then Biblical and Late Judaistic roots, as well as Stoic. Blakely (*op. cit.*., p. 194) mentions the (anti-Stoic) remark of Celsus, in his *Aluahic Alpaei*, quoted by Origen: "The universe was no more made for man than for the lion, the eagle, or the dolphin."

Alexander of Aphrodisias, commentator on Aristotle, refers to certain Stoic-minded opponents who put forward this doctrine of the world for man as follows: (*De Fato*, xxviii) πες ὁμολογήσωσι κάθιστον γεγονέναι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν άνθρωπον, διὸν γὰρ κάπτα τάλα γενέσθαι ὡς συντελέσαντα πρὸς τὴν τούτων σωτηρίαν.

Other early Church Fathers reflected this concept: Justin, *Apol.* i.10, and *Apol.* i.5; Lactantius, *Inst.* vii.5, 3: *Mundum non propter se Deus fecit, quia commodis eius non indiget sed propter hominem qui eo utitur; De Ira.* xiii.1; *Inst.* vii.3-13.
I.4. In ipso quoque mari, quamvis esset et magnitudine et utilitate mirabile, multimoda animalia nunc mediocris, nunc vasti corporis finxit, ingenium artificis de institutionis varietate testantia, quibus non contentus, ne forte fremitus et cursus aquarum cum dispendio possessoris humani alienum occuparet elementum, fines litoribus inclusit; quo cum fremens fluctus et ex alto sinu spumans unda venisset, rursum in se rediret nec terminos concessos excederet servans iura praescripta, ut divinas leges tanto magis homo custodiret, quanto illas etiam elementa servassent.

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1. The "usefulness" of the sea is parallel to his statement in I.1: et haec omnia propriis et condignis instrumentis...

2. Ps. 103:25


4. et alto sinu... - cfr. Virgil, Aen. iii.268:xi.625; Seneca, Thyest. 577: sic ubi ex alto tumere fluctus; Apost. Const. vii. c.34, 2: ήτις (οὐκαςον) ἔρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ πελάγους μανομένη, καλυστομεῖ σὲ ἄπο τόμον, τὴν οὖ προστατῇ καλυσμένη.

5. rursus in se rediret - cfr. Min. Felix, Octv. iii, 3: cum in ipso aequoris limine plantas tingueremus, quod vicissim nunc adpulsam nostris pedibus adluderet fluctus nunc relabens ac/
vestigia retrahens in sese resorberet.

6. This seems to come from Ps.103:9, and possibly Prov. 8:29. In contrast to most of the other early church fathers, both East and West, Novatian is quite sparing in his use of Proverbs. Only one other place in Tr.(xvi.94) is there a possible reference to Proverbs (Prov.30:6). Novatian entirely avoids any reference to Prov.8, which many fathers used as evidence for either the pre-existence of Christ (e.g. Tertullian) or of the work of the Holy Spirit (e.g. Theophilus, Irenaeus). This is indicative of the general conservatism and lack of speculation of Novatian (who, for example, as against Theophilus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, and others, does not even once employ the relatively modern term "Trinity"—though of course, he expounds and defends the reality behind the word).

7. ...iura praescripta-cfr. Job 38:8-11; 26:10; Ps.33:7; 104:6sq.; Jer.5:22. Also Virgil, Georg.II.479eq: Musae... monstrent... unde tremor terris, qua vi maria alta tumescant obicibus ruptis rursusque in se ipsa resident; Seneca, Nat.iii.27,10, and iii.30,2; Cicero, Tusc.v.69: Inde est indagatio nata initiorum et tamquam seminum...quibus cavernis maria sustineantur; Horace, Ep.1.12,16: cum tu... nil parvum sapias et adhuc sublimia cures: quae mare compescant causae, quid temperet annum... and Prop. iii. 5,37; Apost.Const.vii.34,3.
See note under VIII.45 on "natural law."

The vocabulary, tone, and concepts of this paragraph may be related to a passage in Pseudo-Aristotle's *De Mundo*, vi.399a (text and translation from Festugière, *op.cit.*, p.472): (As a choir of voices) fait une seule harmonie concertante, ainsi en va-t-il du Dieu qui gouverne l'univers. Car, au signal donné d'en haut...les astres et tout le ciel inaugurent leur mouvement éternal, le soleil qui brille sur toutes choses entreprend sa sa double course, soit que, se glissant à travers les signes zodiacaux en avant vers le nord et en arrière vers le sud, il amène les saisons de l'année. Pluies, vents, rosées et tous les autres phénomènes qui se produisent dans l'atmosphère viennent en leur temps grâce à la cause première et originelle. En conséquence, les fleuves s'écoulent, la mer se gonfle en vagues, les arbres croissent...Quand donc le chef et le créateur de toutes choses, qui n'est visible qu'à la seule raison, a donné le signal à tous ces corps qui accomplissent leur course entre le ciel et la terre, ils entrent tous en mouvement et ne s'arrêtent plus, chacun dans son orbite et ses limites propres..."
I.4. Then too in the sea, which in itself is so marvellous in its vastness and usefulness, He has formed all sorts of creatures—some of medium size, and others with tremendous bodies—all bearing witness by their very variety to the ingenuity of the Craftsman who fashioned them. Even after all this He was still not content; for the roaring, surging waters might have encroached upon a domain beyond their natural bounds, at the expense of its human possessor. He has enclosed the waters with shores as bounds so that when the roaring billow and churning waters from the depths of the sea reach the shores, they must turn themselves back again. They cannot pass their allotted bounds, but obey fixed laws; thus teaching men all the better to observe the divine laws, inasmuch as the very elements themselves obey them.
I.5 Post quae hominem quoque mundo praeposuit, et quidem ad imaginem dei factum: cui mentem et rationem indidit et prudentiam, ut deum posset imitari, cuius etsi corporis terrena primordia, caelestis tamen et divini halitus inspiratio substantia.

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2See Cicero on man's material body-De Nat.4r.54.133-58.146, and his "divine" spirit-Ibid.59.147-149; and Pseudo Origenis (almost certainly by Gregory of Elvira) Tractus, de Libris SS. Scr.1-which distinguishes between the outer man "delimo terrae plasmatus" and the inner man "(animalia invisibilis immortalis rationalibus mobilis) ad imaginem dei factus." Novatian here extolls the divine origin of the human soul, but this does not mean that he has in any sense a low view of the body. In fact his view of the body is in accordance with Scripture and mainline Stoicism, a very high one. See Tr.X.51: Quid sum a te in resurrectione consecuturus, qui me ipsum non recipio, dum corpus amitto. Novatian is in the line of Scriptural and Patristic doctrine, as against the ancient gnostics (as well as some forms of modern liberal thought) he insists on the value and eternal destiny of both body and soul.
I.5. Next He appointed man, made in the image of God\(^1\) as ruler over the earth, with his gifts of mind, reason, and foresight\(^2\) that he might be an imitator of God. While the basic elements of his body are earthly, yet his substance is heavenly, inspired with the breath of God.

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\(^1\)While Novatian applies this statement from Genesis to the human race directly, it appears from later texts in Tr. (XVII.96;97; XXII.127) that he follows a Christocentric interpretation of "the image of God" as does the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (See how Heb.2 interprets Ps.8, which speaks of the glory of man, as referring pre-eminently to Christ, and secondarily through Him to all men). Christ is the very "form" of God (Tr.XXII.127: quia ergo est iste, qui in forma dei...) and as such is the direct "image of God." Man is not in the form of God, and is only created "after the image of God." In Tr.XVII.96 we are told that Christ is God, and that through his agency man was created. In XVII.97, it is made clear that the one after whose image man was created is therefore Christ. Man is in this sense the image of the archetypal image. Or as Weyer explains (Commentary on De Tr., p.37, note 4): "So besteht die Stufung, dass der Sohn 'imago dei' ist, der Mensch aber 'ad imaginem dei' geschaffen wurde, also nur 'imago imaginis' ist." Compare Irenaeus/
Adv. Ha. V. 16, 2, and also III. 16, 6, where he teaches that man can be made perfect only through the Incarnate Son, who is "unitus et consparsus suo plasmati secundum placitum patris." Also (a century later) Hilary, De Tr. v. 9: "If therefore man is created through God the Son after the image of God the Father, he is created also after the image of the Son; for all admit that the words—after our image and likeness—were spoken to the Son... so that it is God Who moulds man into the image of God..."

Hilary's thought however was influenced by the Old Latin translation: Ad imaginem. A strikingly similar understanding of man being created not "in" the image of God, but only secondarily "after" it, is found much earlier in Philo. He has Logos in the intermediate position between God and man, whereas the Fathers have Christ. As to how direct an influence Philo would have had (even e.g. on Justin) is difficult to estimate. One would think that the Fathers were more influenced on this question—certainly as to content—by the teaching of the Epistle to Hebrews and the Johanine writings. Yet Philo's influence—at least as to form—is not ruled out. See Quis Rer. Div. Her. xlvii (Loeb Transl., p. 399): "He gives the name of birds to the 2 words or forms of reason, both of which are winged and of a soaring nature. One is the archetypal reason above us the other, the copy of it which we possess. Moses calls the first the "image of God", the second,
the cast of that image. For God, he says, made man not "in
the image of God" but "after the image" (Gen.1:27). And thus
the mind in each of us, which in the true and full sense is the
"man", is an expression at third hand from the Maker, while between
them is the Reason, which serves as model for our reason, but
itself is the effigies of presentment of God."

(2) Novatian's description of the image of God in the soul
consisting in mind, reason, foresight, is close to the Stoic
teaching on the ἹΕΡΩΝΙΜΟΣ and is to be found in other church
fathers. Compare Tertullian, Adv.Prax.vii, who along with immor-
tality and free will mentions as properties of the soul: rationalis,
capax intellectus et scientiae. M. Felix speaks of God as mens,
anima, ratio. Vogt in his study of Novatian (Coetus Sanctorum,
p.106) attaches considerable significance to the fact that where-
as Tertullian in Prax.vii and Adv.Marc.ii.5, lists free will as
inhering in the soul of man, Novatian does not (which lack, Vogt
maintains, affects adversely his doctrine of guilt and redemption).
While this will be discussed in more detail later, suffice it to
note here that in Tr.1.6, Novatian teaches that man was created
with free will, which he misused, thus placing himself under the
sentence of death.
I.6. Quae cum omnia in servitutem illi dedisset, solum liberum esse voluit. et ne in periculum caderet rursum soluta libertas, mandatum posuit. 3 quo tamen non inesse malum in fructu arboris dicetur, sed futurum si forte ex voluntate hominis de contemptu datae legis praemoneretur. nam et liber esse debuerat, ne incongruenter Dei imago serviret, et lex addenda, ne usque ad contemptum dantis libertas effrenata prorumperet, ut et præmia condigna et merita poenarum consequenter exciperet, suum iam habens illud, quod motum in alterutram partem agitare voluiisset. ex quo mortalitatis invidia utique in ipsum redit, qui, cum illam de oboedientia posset evadere, in eandem incurrunt, dum ex consilio perverso deus esse festinat.

1 Gen. 1.28

2 soluta libertas—cfr. Virgil, Georg. ii. 386

3 Gen. 2: 16sq.
1.6 Having given him all other things for his service(1), God willed that he alone should be free. Then to keep this unbounded freedom from becoming a peril, He laid a command upon him. This was to teach him—not that evil was in the fruit of the tree(2)—but to forewarn him that evil would follow if in fact he used his free will to disregard this law that had been given. Indeed both things were necessary; man had to be free lest the image of God be distorted into slavery(3), and on the other hand the law had to be given lest his freedom should have broken its bounds and degenerated into contempt for its Giver. Appropriate rewards and penalties are brought about by man's actions, because he has in his own power the choice between the different alternatives that cross his mind. And so mortality comes back upon him due to envy(4) for man—though he could have escaped by obedience—following perverse council, rushes into mortality by trying to become God.(5)

(1) See note 1 under Tr.1.3.

(2) That the fruit of the tree was not inherently evil was pointed out by Philo, Leg.Alleg.1.106, and Theophilus, Ad Auto. 11.25: ὁ γὰρ, δὲς ἀρνησάτω τινς θανάτον εἴχεν τῷ θεὶν.

(3) /
(3) Lest the image of God be distorted into slavery: See parallel passages in Irenaeus, Adv.Hi.iii.19.1; Hippolytus, Ref.x.34,3-4. Also Hilary a hundred years after Novatian repeats the same thought: For man not to have free choice would be unworthy of the image of God—De Tr.

(4) envy—suggests Fausset (Treatise of Novt., p.4, note 6) refers to the devil's jealousy of man. F. Scheidweiller (in Novatianstudien: Hermes 85 1957,62) seems strictly speaking, to be correct in denying this (invidia diaboli) as unlikely: "Da an der ganzen Stelle von Teufel keine Rede ist ... Es handelt sich um die invidia Adams..." But on the other hand, the reference further down in the passage to man's "following perverse council" could well be an allusion to the Tempter. If so this would agree with the teaching of Methodius of Olympus, who on the subject of free will remarks: "The devil's envy of man led to the fall" (Lib.arb.xviii.4sqq).

(5) Novatian puts great weight on man's free will. His interest here is in no sense to exalt free will over against the "bondage of the will" in so far as this is connected to the question of prevenient grace, the order of salvation and predestination.
To think he is in this passage taking a position on this matter would be a historical anachronism. His real concern is to combat the gnostic teaching, widespread in his day (this aspect of it perhaps coming from Parseeism) that man's "Fall" is simply the imprisonment in unworthy matter of a divine spark of life. Novatian says man is a fallen creature, not because he is a divine soul existing in an earthly body, but rather because he misused his free will against the very One Who gave it to him. In this way Novatian, as well as the other church fathers, avoids the category mistake of the Gnostics, and of some later Western philosophers, who confound the two fields of morals and metaphysics. That is to say, man is immoral because he sinned and fell, not because his creation as a limited, material being necessarily entailed sin, evil, and immorality.
I.7 Cuius tamen poenam nihilominus indulgenter temperavit,
dum non tam ipse quam labores eius maledicuntur super terram.
neam et quod requiritur, non ex ignorantia venit, sed spem hominis
futurae in Christo et inventionis et salutis ostendit. et quod,
ne de ligno arboris vitae contingat, arcetur, non de invidiae
maligno livore descendit, sed ne vivens in aeternum, nisi peccata
Christus ante donasset, circumferret, secum in poenam sui
semper immortale delictum.

\[ ^1 \text{Luke 19:10} \quad ^2 \text{Gen. 3:22} \]

\[ ^3 \text{Cfr. Augustine, \textit{Conf.} I.1.1: homo circumferens mortalitatem suam, circumferens testimonium peccati sui et testimonium quia superbis resistis.} \]
Yet God mercifully tempers his punishment, for it is not so much man himself who is cursed, as his labours upon the earth. God searches for him, not that God is really ignorant of his whereabouts, but to reveal to him the hope of a future rediscovery and salvation in Christ\(^1\). He is kept from touching the fruit of the Tree of Life, not because God is stooping to envy and malice\(^2\) but to save man from living forever and bearing the penalty of immortal guilt\(^3\). This would have happened had not Christ in anticipation forgiven his sins.

\(^1\)This translation—like that of Weyer (op. cit., p. 40, note 9) and H. Moore (Treatise of Novt., p. 23)—does not follow the suggested emendation of Welchman and Jackson of redemtionis for inventionis, because this would destroy the imagery and play on words of the sentence (i.e., God "searches" for lost man in the Garden as a dramatic prophetic picture of how He will in Christ "seek and save that which was lost.") Compare Iren. Adv. Hr. v. 15, 4 (transl. of Ante Nicene Christian Lib., vol. ix, Edinburgh, 1869): "Wherefore also the Scripture, pointing out what should come to pass, says that when Adam had hid himself because of his disobedience, the Lord came to him at eventide, called him forth and said, "Where art thou?" That means that in the last times the
very same Word of God came to call man, reminding him of his doings, living in which he had been hidden from the Lord. For just as at that time God spake to Adam at eventide, searching him out; so in the last times, by means of the same voice, searching out his posterity, He has visited them. "See similarly Tert., Adv. Marc. ii.25.

(2) Novatian insists that it was a sign of the goodness of God to keep fallen man from the Tree Of Life, to refute certain Marcionite gnostics, who used this prohibition to make a separation between the evil, jealous Creator of the world, and the "good" God (Father-in some sense-of Jesus). The Marcionites claimed that the "bad" Old Testament God kept man from the tree of eternal life out of jealousy (and therefore could not be the "good" God of the New Testament). Novatian wishes to show that from the beginning God deals with fallen man in a most merciful way, which is entirely consistent with his innermost nature as it is revealed in Jesus Christ. Irenaeus explains this prohibition of God to fallen man in the same way (Adv. Ha. iii.23,6): "... and removed him far from the Tree of Life, not because he envied him the Tree of Life as some venture to assert, but because he pitied him, lest he should continue a sinner forever, nor that the sin which surrounded him should be immortal, and evil, interminable
and irremediable. But he set a bound to his (state of) sin, by interposing death, and thus causing sin to cease..." See a like comment by Novatian in Tr.V.29, where against Marcion, he stresses the sheer grace of God to body and soul even in punishment and continuance of existence: Non ex vitio eius (sc. Deus) venit, sed ad remedium nostri illud facit. Also Theophl. Ad Auto.11.26: "And in so doing (i.e. see par.25, where man through disobedience falls victim to death) God conferred a great benefit upon man. He did not let him remain forever in a state of sin but, so to speak, with a kind of banishment he cast him out of paradise, so that through this punishment he might expiate his sin in a fixed period of time, and after chastisement might later be recalled... God's calling and saying, "Where are you, Adam?"... not as if he were ignorant but because he was patient and gave him an occasion for repentance and confession" (translation of R.M. Grant, Theoph., Ad Auto., Oxford, 1970). Grant suggests that this particular slander against God's goodness was such as was raised in the Syllogismata of the Marcionite Apelles—cfr. Ambrose De Paradiso viii.38,40,41; Harnack, Marcion: das Evangelium von fremden Gott (ed.2, Leipzig, 1924), pp.415,416.

(3) ne vivens in aeternum—Novatian along with the other Orthodox Fathers teaches that the death of the body is the result of sin, but still he holds to the immortality of the soul—as does
the New Testament (e.g. Mt.10:28; Mt.22:32; Mk.9:43-48; Lk.16:19-31; 2Cor.5:6-8; Phil.1:21-23; Rev.6:9-11). See TR.XVI.143, where he teaches that while the body dies, still the soul possessess "generositas immortalitatis." This immortality is due to the "generosity" of God. The church fathers do not—as the Greeks—claim that immortality naturally inheres in the soul due to its shape, substance, etc. It is maintained in being by the grace of God—Compare Iren. Adv.Er.v.2.3: "Out of his transcendence, not out of our own nature, do we possess eternal continuance"; Justin, in Dial.vi.1.2, teaches that life is not inherent in the soul (against the Greek thought) as it is in God; yet the soul lives because God wills it to live. Therefore it is not proper to claim, as do some modern scholars, that the Christian doctrine of immortality is a mere borrowing of pagan Hellenistic philosophy totally divorced from scriptural sources.
I.6. Quamquam etiam superioribus, id est super ipsum quoque solidamentum, partibus, quae non sunt hodie nostris contemplabilis oculis¹, angelos prius instituerit, spiritales virtutes² digesset, thronos potestatesque³ praefecerit, et alia multa caelorum immensa spatio et sacramentorum⁴ infinita opera condiderit, ut immensus hic licet mundus paene novissimum magis dei corporali sum rerum appareat opus esse quam solum.

¹contemplabiles oculis - This negative expression may be compared to a similar phrase of Novatian (with a positive meaning) in Spec.ix: ...contemplari potest. Melin (in Studia in Corpus Cyprianeum, p.136) suggests that this fairly peculiar turn of expression may have come originally from a passage in Tert. He says: "Potest enim fieri, ut auter Spec.ix, id in memoria haberit, quod Tert. Sp.xxx legerat: "Quale autem spectaculum in proximo est adventus domini... quae illa exultatio angelorum... qualis civitas nova Hierusalem!"


³Eph.6:12; Col.1:16

⁴sacramentorum— This word (from the Greek μυστήριον) originally in New Testament usage refers to the sacraments of the Lord's Supper, Baptism, etc, as it does also in Ignatius, Eph. 19.1; Mag.9:1. Sometimes it can be applied to the whole church—Did xi.11: ποιον εἰς μυστήριον κοσμικόν ἔκχλησε
(See Kraft, *Clavis Patrum*, p. 299). At other times it can refer to God's mysterious works in the natural or spiritual world, as in St. Athanas. *Hom. in Chr. Nativ.* (Migne, *P.G.* xxviii. 960):

\[ \text{See Kraft, *Clavis Patrum*.} \]

It is in this later sense of God's operations in the universe that Novatian uses *sacramentum* here.
Furthermore in the higher region—even above the firmament itself—places which at present are beyond our sight(1), he in prior times ordained angels(2) and established spiritual forces; he founded thrones and powers and many other immense tracts of heaven with unlimited mysterious operations. Thus it appears that this immense world is the latest of God's material creations rather than his only work.

(1) beyond our sight—This distinction may go back in part at least to the old Greek idea of an opposition between the superior—etherial heavens above the firmament (where all moves in perfect circles), and the inferior ones below it, as in Plato, Phaedrus and Timaeus; Arist., Meteol.: then in Poseidonius and Cleomedes (the latter two in particular would have been well known to Novtian as a Stoic). See Festugière, op.cit.,pp.447-450; K. Reinhardt, Poseidonius,pp.183-207. It may well be that the major source of this cosmological imagery is Gen.1:7, which speaks of the waters above the firmament being divided from those beneath it (thus presupposing great areas above the firmament which we cannot see). Compare Theophilus, Ad Autoc., ii.13: "In this preliminary statement in the narrative of the creation of the world, the Holy Scripture spoke not about this firmament but about another heaven which is invisible to us. Afterwards this heaven visible to us is called 'firmament'" (transl. of Grant, op.cit.,p.49).
Novation would certainly have rejected the teaching of Origen (e.g. De Prn.iii.5.3) of an eternal creation, involving angels as part of a previous world before this world. Nonetheless with most of the early fathers, he would hold that angels were indeed created before man (probably because the Creation Narrative in Gen.3, presents an already fallen Tempter, which many early exegetes connected to an ancient fall before man's creation; which they thought was alluded to in Isa.14, Ezk.37, concerning Lucifer). Augustine says in De Civ.Dei,xii,16, that angels did not exist "before all time", but may have existed "in all time", although he is careful to add that time cannot be "co-eternal with the immutable eternity of the Creator."De Simone (Treatise of Novt... Rome, 1970) p.58, points out that: "Although St. Augustine was aware of the widespread opinion of the anterior creation of the angels, he did not dare condemn it as contrary to the Rule of Faith. St. Augustine took simul of Ecclesiasticus 18:1: Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul- to mean simultaneously (De. Gen.ad Litt.4.33,34; 5.23; 6.3). The meaning of simul however in that passage is equally, all alike; that is God created all things without exception."
I.9. Nam neque quae infra terram iacent, neque ipsa sunt digestis et ordinatis potestatibus vacua-locus enim est, quo piorum animae impiorumque ducentur, futuri iudicii praediudicia sentientes—ut operum ipsius in omnibus partibus redundantes magnitudines non intra mundi huius capacissimos licet, ut diximus, sinun conclusas videremus, sed etiam intra ipsius mundi et profunda et altitudines cogitare possemus, et sic considerata operum magnitudine tantae molis digne mirari possemus artificem.

\[1\] in omnibus partibus redundantes— an example of what he means by "exuberance" is found in I.3:… deliciis procurasset oculorum, variis florun coloribus ad voluptatem spectantium cuncta vestivit. The idea is that God has gone far beyond mere necessity in the creation to add things of beauty and delight. This is very close to the Hebraic joy in the creation as it is, for instance expressed in wisdom literature such as Job 38:7 "When the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy" and Ecc. 3:11 "He hath made everthing beautiful in its time." This is the extreme opposite of the Zoroastrian-Gnostic despisal of the material world. See Clement of Rome, Ad Cor., xx.11: ἅπαξ ἐξ οὗτως προσπεραγόντας τοὺς οἰκτημοῖς αὐτῶ...
tantae molis - See this same expression in Virgil, Aen. I.33; also a similar phrase expressing the same concept ("the mass of earth") is found in Aristotle, Meteorol.A.352.27,28.

digne mirari - The same thought of admiration is in Seneca, Ad Helv.viii.4: animus contemplator admiratorque mundi ...

... Compare also Apol. of Aristides i.3,4: huius mundi constitutionem admirans miratus sum...; M. Felix, Cely.xviii: ita in hac mundi domo, quem coelum terramque perspicias... crede esse universitatatis dominum parentemque ipsis sideribus et totius mundi partibus pulchriorum; Clement of Alex., Strom.vii.60: "Starting with that admiration for the creation which he (the true gnostic) brings with him as an evidence of his capacity to receive knowledge, he becomes an eager disciple of the Lord...

his admiration prompts him to believe..."
Indeed the regions beneath the earth are not without their duly appointed ruling powers. For there is a place to which the souls of both the righteous and the unrighteous are taken, already conscious of their own future judgment. So we see the tremendous activities of God, overflowing in every direction, not confined to the manifold tracts of this world, vast as we have seen them to be, but we may conceive of them as extending to the depths and heights of the world. Thus considering the vast magnitude of his works leads up to the worthy admiration of the Craftsman of such a mighty mass.

There are of course numerous references in Virgil to the underworld as the habitation of souls; e.g. Aen. iii. 5. 570 sqq., etc. However it is not necessary to presuppose pagan sources for this statement of Novatian. It is Biblical and Patristic. The Fathers were very influenced by the story of Dives and Lazarus in Luke 16: 19f., and also the mention of the return of Samuel from the other world in I Sam. 28, and the appearance of Moses and Elijah on the Mound of Transfiguration (Mt. 17), as well as the general Old Testament belief in Sheol as the world of the departed—so often mentioned in Psalms. De Laude Mart., which some would attribute to Novatian (though this attribution is rightly denied
by most scholars) gives considerable details on this "underworld" habitation of souls. These details were undoubtedly influenced by Virgil and other secular literary sources (i.e. in De Id. Mrt.). Novatian is much more Biblical and restrained. Justin Martyr was evidently the first to speak of dilatio inferni - Dial. v. 31. 2. Tertullian says in De Es. Cr. and De. An. lv, that all souls but martyrs remain apud infernos until the general judgment. He (following Luke 16) mentions two "compartments" in Hades: the good with Abraham, and the bad in flames - De An. lviii. Compare a similar statement of Novatian in Ep. xxx, 7: Paravit coelum, sed paravit et tartarum. Paravit refrigeria, sed paravit etiam aeterna supplicia. Paravit inaccessibilem lucem, sed paravit etiam perpetuae noctia vastam aeternamque caligiginem. As we will mention later, Christians were already (as early as Theophilus of Antioch) transforming the whole idea of space and place, especially in relationship to God (e.g. Origen, who teaches that the Son of God was able to descent to earth without leaving His heavenly throne empty (C. Cels. I. 275. 14f). See further II. 10.
II.10  Super quae omnia ipse continens cuncta\(^1\), nihil extra se vacuum deserens, nulli deo superiori, ut quidam putant, locum relinquit, quandoquidem ipse universa sinu perfectae magnitudinis et potestatis includerit, intentus semper operi suō et vadens per omnia et movens cuncta et vivificans universa et conspiciens tota et in concordiam\(^2\) elementorum omnium discordantes materias sic conoctens, ut ex disparibus elementis ita sit unus mundus ista coagmentata\(^3\) conspiratione solidatus, ut nulla vi dissolvit possit, nisi cum illum solus ipse, qui fecit, ad maiora alia praestanda nobis solvi iussit.

\(^{1}\) continens cuncta – cfr. Theoph. *Ad Auto*.1.5... So the whole creation is surrounded by the Spirit of God and the surrounding Spirit, along with the creation, is enclosed by the hand of God. Origen shows that the Transcendent God is able to be immanent in the created universe without in any sense being limited by it or contained in it (See *De Prin*.I preface, and iv.1f.). "God is not in a place" (*C.Cels*.II.284.14f). He "contains" all things, is related to the fact that He "comprehends" all things—thus making them rationally comprehensible (*De Prin*.272.16f). Clement of Alexandria shows that the WORD is not contained by anything, but He Himself contains all things (*Strom*.II.2.)

\(^{2}\)
2 **concordiam** - This word is widely used in a similar sense in earlier writings. Compare Seneca, *Nat*. vii.27,4: mundi concordia; Ovid, *Met*. i.433: discors concordia; Horace, *Ep*. i.12,19: rerum concordia; Cicero, *De Nat. Dr*. i.19: rerum... concordia; iii.28: naturae... conspirare; *De Mundo* v; *Lact. Div. Inst*. i.11.9,17: concordia mundum; also Novatian, *Spec*. ix: nexibusque concordiae.

3 **coagmentata** - cfr. Cicero, *De Nat. Dr*. i.11.119: mundi... coagmentatio.
God Himself is above all these things. Since He contains all things in Himself, He has left nothing empty outside of Himself, and thus no room for the "Superior God" (1) as some people imagine. He has included all things in the bosom of His perfect greatness and power. He continually watches over all his works. He pervades all things, moves all things, gives life to all things (2) beholds all things, and so binds together discordant materials of all the elements into such harmony that together they make up one universe (3), bound together in a solid agreement; indestructible by any force, until the One Who made it commands it to be dissolved for our greater blessing (4).

(1) In denying the "Superior God", Novatian is refuting the Gnostic teaching that above the "bad" material Creator God (Demiurge) is the "good" spiritual God, and between them and this world is a whole system of "aeons" which make up a "pleroma," which in some sense proceeds out of the higher God, but is not freely made by him; and is not under his control. Fausset (op. cit., p. 8, note 9) particularly refers this doctrine to Valentinus and also to Late Mithraism, which "assigned to Mithras (the sungod) a position like that of the Gnostic Demiurge" (Ibid.). This was also the doctrine of Marcion, which Novatian would have known well from Irenaeus, Adv. Ha. ii. 1. 2, as well as Hippolytus and Tertullian.
(2) He pervades all...gives life to all things...— Tixeront (Histoire des Romans, 7th ed., Paris 1915) p.49, shows a similar view of God's relation to the world existed in some forms of Late Judaism, especially with regard to personification and activity of the Logos in late diaspora Judaism. This is seen from the Fragments of Aristobulus (in Eusebius, Praep.Evang.xii, 12,5) cited as a verse of Orpheus: "Le verbe ancien luit avant le monde; mais il subsiste par soi et tout subsiste par lui: il circule partout, et aucun des mortels ne le voit, mais lui nous voit tous deux." But by far the major source from which Novatian and others draw their concepts and imagery of God "circulating" through the material world is Stoicism (which had already influenced Late Judaism—see p.67*) Spanneut (Le Stoiciisme dans les Pères de l'Eglise), p.235, sees a trace of the Stoic "animist system" in which God was the "soul of the world" in phrases such as Novatian uses above. In "La conspiration qui rassemble et fait un monde unique," he rightly finds "une théorie d'inspiration stoicienne: un air subtil, chaud sans doute, qui pénètre le tout, le nourrit et l'unit dans la commune" (Ibid.,p.341). We find like imagery and vocabulary in the Late Latin Stoics. Compare Virgil, Georg.iv.221: Deum namque ire per omnis; Aen.vi.726: spiritus intus alit, totumque; Cicero, Nat.Dei.i.27: "Pythagoras thought
God was the soul pervading all nature'; Seneca Ad Helv. viii. 3: sive divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus. There are traces of these concepts in the Syrian Apology of Melito, and numerous parallel passages in other early fathers: cfr. Clement of Rome, who says God "envelops" (εμφερείχοντος) the universe; and Theoph. Ad Auto. v., who uses the same word. Also Aristides, Apol. xiii. 5: "God our Lord, who while He is one, is present in all"; Athenag., Leg. viii: "All is filled by God" and "all which surrounds (of the cosmos) is occupied by Him"; Leg. xxii: "God unbegotten, eternal, and homogeneous, throughout all being"; Iren. Demon. 45, which mentions "God filling all" and perhaps comes from Justin, Dial. 127. Similar words are seen in Tertullian, Apol. xxi. 10: Your philosophers are agreed that logos is author of the universe.... Cleanthes attributes it all to spirit, which according to him, circulates throughout all the universe." See Clement Alex., Strom. v. 89. 3: "God is present throughout all substance." In De Spec. ix, Novatian writes: "The intermediate air is maintained with equality, in a sublime conspiration, and extends itself in the avenues of concord, nourishing all things through its subtile composure." This whole line of thought, on the other hand seems to be rejected by Tatian, Ad. Gr. iv. 1, 2: "Our God does not have his const-
itution in time. He alone is without beginning; He Himself constitutes the source (διάφορα) of the universe. God is spirit. He does not extend through matter but is the author of material spirits and of the figures (οὐκομομάτω) in matter. He is invisible and intangible."

(3) "one universe" is also a theme of Stoicism with its stress on ἰδίου and ἰδίου. The unity of the world is discussed by Clement of Rome, Ad Cor. xxxvii; and is mentioned in the late pseudonymous Recognitions of Clement, viii.l4: "There must have been someone who collected several (i.e. elements and bodies) into one, and preserving the measure of tempering, made a solid body out of diverse parts."

(4) Until God dissolves the world for our greater blessing"—This reference to the fate of material creation at the end of the age is not sufficient evidence to place Novatian in the chiliast school of thought. There is no evidence of millenarianism in any other of his writings (which have survived), nor among his followers. On this subject, as on so many others, Novatian is restrained (as over against Hippolytus), unspeculative (over against Origen), and Biblical (more in the line of Irenaeus—though he in fact held a form of millenarianism). He is still dealing with the question of the relationship of God and man to the material creation. Undoubtedly some of the Gnostics would have seized
upon the Christian doctrine of the end of the age, and dissolution of the present order as a proof that the material creation was after all bad, should never have existed to start with, and was finally being dealt with properly. This final dissolution would then be a triumph of the superior "good" God (ἢθος) over the Demiurge, as well as over his work. Not so, says Novatian. The one true Creator God is in full control even of the dissolving of what He has created. All his works and ways are consistent with his nature of goodness, and his will to bless man. This very work of changing the world at the end of time will consequently be a deed of goodness and blessing. This is consistent with the teaching of II Pt.3, which while stating that "the elements shall melt wilt fervent heat" (vs.10), adds that "according to his promise, we wait for a new heaven and a new earth wherein righteousness dwelleth" (vs.13); also of Rom.8, which shows that the very creation itself is groaning for its deliverance "from bondage to decay" to obtain "the glorious liberty of the children of God". In stating that the dissolution will be for "our greater blessing", Novatian must be referring to the fact that the material creation is not annihilated, but rather transformed from decay and death into the eternal newness of the life of God. See Tertullian, Re.Car.xii.6:...nihil deperit nisi in salutem.
At this point Novatian quite clearly diverges from the Stoic cyclical view of the repeated death, burning, and renewal of nature in which all things happen over again (after the renewal, bondage returns) to follow the Hebraic-Christian linear view of the "new thing" that God will do. It is also possible that in making this point of a blessed end, Novatian could have in mind the old Roman gainsayers—in addition to the religious Gnostics—who reproached Christianity for teaching the cruel destruction of the universe. He could be answering a remark such as the one made by the unbelieving lawyer in M. Felix, Octav. x: "But the Christians... what monstrosities do they feign!... because they threaten conflagration to the whole world, and to the universe itself, with all its stars, are they meditating its destruction?—as if either the eternal order constituted by the divine laws of nature would be disturbed, or the league of all the elements would be broken up, and the heavenly structure dissolved, and that fabric in which it is contained and bound together would be overthrown."
Hunc enim legimus omnia continere et ideo nihil extra ipsum esse potuisse, quippe cum originem omnino non habeat, consequenter nec exitum sentiat, nisi forte, quod absit, aliquando esse coeperit, nec super omnia sit, sed, dum post aliquid esse coeperit, intra id sit, quod ante ipsum fuerit, minor inventus potestate, dum posterior denotatur etiam ipso tempore.
II.11 For we read that He contains all things\(^1\), and therefore nothing could have existed apart from Him. God has no origin, and consequently He can experience no ending; unless—for be the thought from us—He began at a certain time to exist, and is not above all things. In that case He would have begun to exist after something else, and would be less than that previously existing thing. Accordingly He would be found to be less powerful than that thing, through the claim that he follows it in time\(^2\).

\(^{(1)}\) For the word and concept of God "containing all," see note 1 under II.10, and also note (1)—opposite page. Novatian goes on in II.16, to show that God, though He contains all, is not Himself contained.

\(^{(2)}\) These sentences are prime examples of Novatian's theological reasoning in which he employs the Stoic hypothetical syllogism ("if A=B, then C...") which better enables him to examine the parts in light of the whole, the verbs in light of the subject—and in so doing to gain a wide range of Knowledge concerning the actions and/or nature appropriate to the being of the subject. This means that one puts questions to certain given information in a way appropriate to that subject matter, so that through these open questions (i.e. "if" or "in that case"); not simply "A=B, B=C, therefore A=C") more information can be
revealed about the questioned subject. Instead of an unconditional syllogism which in general is limited to one conclusion already contained in the premise (though there are several variations of this); the Stoic modal logic that Novatian employs with its open questions, is equally open to many conclusions (that would not necessarily have been seen by the person who sets up an unconditional syllogism to draw out an inherent implication). Specifically given that God possesses the twofold attributes of Personhood and Infinity, one can examine numerous possibilities concerning His nature and action in light of this basic subject matter. For example: positively—if God has no origin, then He would have no ending; negatively—if He began to exist after other things then his power would be limited, which would be inconsistent with His infinity that excludes origin. Thus one possibility is affirmed in light of the subject and another is denied by the use of open questions that form a part of the Stoic hypothetical syllogism. All through De Tr., we shall find that Novatian keeps referring theological questions—even Scripture itself—(e.g. ch. VI on anthropomorphisms) to the light of the great Infinite, Personal Subject as He has revealed Himself in the Written and Incarnate Word, and in His continually giving Himself to be known to His church in "the Gift"—the Holy Spirit.
II.12 Ob hanc ergo causam semper immensus, quia nihil illo maius est, semper aeternus, quia nihil illo antiquius. id enim, quod sine origine est, praecedit a nullo potest, dum non habet tempus. ideo immortalis, non deficiens in consummationis exitu, et quoniam sine lege est, quicquid sine origine est, modum temporis excludit, dum se debitorem nemini sentit.

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1immensus- this word is found in Apol. of Aristides, i.9:... in immensum pertinens mihi videtur...

2quoniam - is an expression frequently used by Novatian in De Tr. and also in Ep.xxx, and xxxvi. Melin (op.cit., p.206) says: "quoniam et quoniam nec ad Novatianum nos ducit."
II.12. Therefore He is ever boundless\(^1\), for nothing is greater than He; ever eternal, for nothing is more ancient than He. For that which is without origin can be preceded by none, because it is not subject to time. Thus God is immortal. He will not attain a stage of perfection and then pass away. And since that which has no origin is under no law, He is therefore not under the law of temporal limitation\(^2\). God does not feel Himself indebted to anyone.

\(^1\) Novatian here and in II.13, establishes a pivotal epistemological principle for theology and philosophy. His principle has two sides. First, that which is infinite can be known only in part. But secondly, it can to that extent be known truly. While it can never be known in its entirety, yet its immensity and infinitude does not make it utterly unknowable or non-conceptual. God is immensus and for this very reason He can be known only in part: "ad cogitandem... omnis merito muta est et mens omnis exigua est, maior est enim mente ipsa nec cogitari possit..." (II.13). But on the other hand He is not for that reason unknown to us: II.13: "Sentire enim illum taciti aliquatenuis possumus, ut autem ipsa est, sermone explicare non possimus"; IV.26: "Quando nomen suum deus... praefert, non tam legitimam proprietatem appellationis sciamus..."
esse depromptam, quam significantiam quandam constitutam, ad quam
dum homines decurrunt, dei misericordiam per ipsam imetare posse
videantur"; VIII.40: "Hunc ergo...deum novit et veneratur ecclesia
..." and pre-eminently VIII.42: "Per quam (Christum) nobis in
notitiam venire voluit et in nos... et in abiectis locupletem
spiritum conferendo." Novatian's teaching at this point is to
be seen as a considerable advance over much previous thought. In
earlier Hellenistic philosophy, and in some theology, there was
a tendency to make a deep separation between infinity and know-
ability. The Stoics thought that what was unlimited was unknown-
able and irrational. Therefore to make God knowable, they made Him
limited (i.e. He is the "bounded" spherical world-soul). Origen
appears to be following in the Stoic pathway when he proclaims
that God's power is limited—De Prn.11.9.1 (though there are other
places in Origen in which he seems to go in the other direction:
where he claims that God is transcendent to creation, and is
therefore uncontained by it—C. Cels.vii.34; De Prn.iv.4.4).
This was a problem well before the Stoics in Pythagoreanism,
and in Plato after that. It is instructive in this regard to
notice the changes that Plato makes when he takes over certain
Pythagorean concepts (as in the Timaeus— which we use here as
an example) and "reduces" or cuts out the infinity (perhaps in
order that a thing will thus be apprehensible). Plato explained apprehension by means of his doctrine of forms. Things partake of forms, and are ultimately knowable because God apprehends the forms, and his apprehension of them inspires "his orderly motions" (in which order it is possible for souls to participate and thus to know—on the ground that God Himself is a soul; having self-motion, not a mere form). But do things and subjects have to be limited in order to apprehend and to be apprehended? This is not entirely clear in Plato, but he appears to tend in this direction. When in dealing with the problem of knowing reality (in the Timaeus for instance) he substitutes for the Pythagorean ἀξιόν/πέρας* the μέγα καλμερόν/"unit" (so he cuts out the ἀξιόν/*immensum or infinite). See A.E. Taylor Commentary on Timaeus—p. 130 et passim. Thus in Greek thought there was a tendency to shy away from the infinite, or to submerge it into finitude where one is concerned with the problem of knowing. There was the corollary thought—particularly in Stoicism—that since "like can only be known by like", the rational element in the universe can only be known by the same rational element in man (See Zeller, Outlines of Philosophy, p. 22). This was extended to say that therefore God has to be finite to be rational. Against this confused current of thought Novatian sets an example of clarity
for later Western Theology to follow (as St. Augustine, and before him St. Hilary—to mention two outstanding examples—do). First he refuses to reduce the infinity of God ("immensus"... "cui compari nihil potest"); but secondly, he does not for that reason fall into a non-conceptual agnosticism (as it was for instance expressed in the East in various forms of Buddhism and Hinduism; or in the West in the fantastic Gnostic mythologism—all of which are analysed by Hippolytus in Philosophumena). This non-conceptual agnosticism was also a present factor in Neo-Platonism, though this philosophy was not founded before the time of Novatian. Novatian’s solution as to how we can apprehend the Infinite would seem to be as follows. On the one hand God and man are radically different: God is infinite, man is finite. The Stoics are correct in recognizing that of itself the finite would be incapable of knowing the infinite ("like is known only by like"). But the Judaeo-Christian revelation shows that the Infinite God is also Person (the concept of personhood seems in fact to have come directly from the doctrine of the Trinity). Now man, being created in (or after) the image of God is a person too. In this sense (derivatively) man is like God, and can know God ("like is known by like"—both being persons) while the eternal difference in infinitude still remains. Pseudo Hippolytus (?) in Contra Beron makes precisely the same point in Fragment I, that God is infinite and as such is unknowable to the finite creature.
But in Frag. II, he shows that nevertheless God became man (showing Himself to be Person) and in this way the creature does know the Creator (Ante-Nic. Lib., Hippol., Vol. II, pp. 71 sqq). The real solution to the problem is in Jesus Christ (above all see Tr. VII, 42—already quoted). It is through Him and in Him that we know the Infinite God. Christ is a person. He is one with the Infinite Father, living and communicating in relationship to Him as His Eternal Son. Therefore the Infinite God is a Person. Being created after the image of Christ (Tr. I, 5) we are persons through and in Him. The same passage (VIII, 42) that says we come to know God in Christ, goes on to discuss how the Holy Spirit is sent to fill us and bring us to the Father. In other words the Spirit unites us to Christ in His apprehension of the Father. As we shall later see, the Stoics held man to be the δέομος or bond holding the celestial and terrestrial worlds together. Novatian makes it plain further on in his work that Christ is the δέομος between the Infinite Reality of God and the finite reality of man. He is the key to our knowing. In Him God knows man and man knows God, without ceasing to be God and man in the process.

(2) On this subject of the pure spirituality of God and His transcendence over his creation, Novatian is Biblical, and anti-Stoic. From the very beginning of this treatise (1, 1), Novatian
shows that God created all material reality (and thus is above it and not subject to it); and in I.2, implies that time itself is created by God (because it can be experienced and measured only on account of the movement of created celestial bodies)—therefore God is above, and not subject to time. What he states in this paragraph (et quoniam sine lege est, quicquid sine origine est, modum temporis excludit) is really only a making explicit of what was already implicit in the earliest paragraphs of this work. At the heart of Novatian’s theology is the infinity of God, who is nonetheless Person. With his Stoic background, Novatian is well aware of how easy it is to limit one’s understanding of God by projecting spatial, temporal concepts onto Him. Novatian reacts against any attempted descriptions of God that is not appropriate to his infinite Nature. Here and in other places he is strongly maintaining the Transcendence of God against any sort of Stoic immanenist thought. See Tr.II.16 “mems est...quae sineullo aut initio aut termino temporis causas rerum naturaliter nexas...”; VI.31: "Sed nos, qui dicimus, quia lex spiritualis est, non intra haec nostri corporis lineamenta modum aut figuram divinae maestatis includimus, sed suis illam interminatae magnitudinis, ut ita dixerim, campis sine ullo fine diffundimus”; VII.39: "Denique,si acceperis spiritum substantiam dei, creaturam feceris deum-omnis
enim spiritus creatura est, erit ergo iam factus deus..." An understanding of this central doctrine of Novatian on the infinity of God will be casting light on all parts of his theology throughout this Treatise: e.g. on his explanation of anthropomorphisms, his understanding of the "mission" of Christ and the Spirit, and the apostles in the work of redemption; on the way he submits even the Scriptures to examination in the light of God's nature; and on the very relations within the Trinity itself as will become evident through the various parts of De Tr.
II.13 De hoc ergo ac de eis, quae sunt ipsius et in eo sunt, nec mens hominis, quae sint, quanta sint et qualia sint,igne concipere potest, nec eloquentia sermonis humani aequabilem maiestatem eius virtutem sermonis expromit. ad cogitandum enim et ad eloquendum illius maiestatem et eloquentiam omnis merito muta est et mens omnis exigua est. maior est anim mensa ipsa nec cogitari possit, quantus sit. ne, si potuerit cogitari, mente humana minor sit, qua concipi possit. maior est quoque omnis sermone nec dici possit. ne, si potuerit edici, humano sermone minor sit, quo, cum edicitur, et circumiri et colligi possit. quicquid enim de illo cogitatum fuerit, minor ipso erit, et quicquid enuntiatum fuerit, minus illo comparatum circum ipsum erit. sentire enim illum taciti aliquatenus possimus, ut autem ipse est, sermone explicare non possimus.

While this is not a quotation from Scripture, it may be a reflection of Ps. 145:3: "Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised; and his greatness is unsearchable."
II.13 Concerning Him therefore and all those things which are related to his works and nature, the human mind is quite unable worthily to conceive their existence, greatness, and quality\(^1\). Human eloquence does not have the power to give a description appropriate to His majesty. At the contemplation and utterance of His majesty, all eloquence is rightly dumb; the mind is bewildered. For God is greater than mind itself. His greatness cannot be conceived\(^2\). If in fact one could conceive of His greatness, then He would be less than the human mind which was able to form the conception. He is greater than all language; words cannot describe Him. If He could actually be described, He would be less than the human language which was able to comprehend and measure all that He is. All our thoughts about Him will be less than He, and all the declarations we can make will be far beneath comparison with what He really is\(^3\). We can of course to some degree feel after Him\(^4\) without the use of words—but to explain just what He is in our language is quite impossible.

\(^{1}\)Novatian is following in the mainstream of Judaeo-Christian Theology in this statement. To mention a few representative predecessors: Philo, De Monarch, i.4; De Migr. Abr. viii: "All that can be said falls far short of God's reality";
Apol. of Aristides, i: "To enquire about Him...seems to me to quite exceed the comprehension, and to be most difficult; and to speak accurately concerning Him is beyond compass of thought and of speech, and brings no advantage; for His nature is infinite and unsearchable and imperceptible, and inaccessible to all creatures"; Athenag. Apol. x: "We acknowledge One God, uncreated,...incomprehensible...who is apprehended only by the understanding and reason"; Theophl., Ad Aut. i. 3: "He is ineffable, indescribable"; Iren., Adv. Ha. i. 28. 4: Tert., Apol. xvii; Origen, De Prn. i. 1. 5; iv. 3. 18: "God is incomprehensible by a human mind." Theologians of the fourth century maintained this fundamental principle so clearly expressed by Novatian. Cfr. Hilary, De Tr. i. 6: "For it seemed that the greatness of God so far surpassed the mental powers of His handiwork that however far the limited mind of man might strain in the hazardous effort to define Him, the gap was not lessened between the finite nature which struggled and the boundless infinity that lay beyond its ken" (transl. of Nicene and Post-Nic. Fathers, vol. ix, pp. 41, 42); and Cyril of Jerusalem, Cath. Lect. vi. 2.

(2) Compare Iren., Adv. Ha. ii. xxv. 4: "For thou wilt not be able to think Him fully out..."

(3) This is another example of Novatian's use of the Stoic understanding of language—though adopted into the Christian
framework—in his theological reasoning. In the light of the nature of God, language itself must stand judged. One of the problems of many types of heresy is that it conforms God to human logic and sentences. But the reasonable position is to see that language is by nature inadequate when applied to God. And yet following the Stoic line (against pyrrhonic and Middle Academic Scepticism, and various sorts of agnosticism), it is because we recognize the very inadequacy of language that it can be used to lead us to a knowledge of God. That is, there is an empirical relation beyond the linguistic and semantic. This is the reason why the verb-sentire-immediately follows the declaration of the inadequacy of words: to show that a proper understanding of the nature of God and the nature of language leads not to scepticism, but to true knowledge and experience of God.

("feel after Him"—on what basis can man "feel after" God? Iren. seems to give the same basic answer that is found in Novatian: Adv. Ha. iii. 24. 2—"God allowed man... to have knowledge of Him; a knowledge indeed, which was not commensurate with His greatness or nature, but with the fact that He made and fashioned man and breathed the breath of life into them, and sustains... but foolishly imagining that He is a God above Him (See Novt. Tr. II. 10, which refutes the "Superior" God), whom no
man can know, has no communication with the human race" (Compare this to Novatian's teaching in Tr.I.5, and II.12, see notes in both places). Irenaeus, like Novatian, shows that even though man is separated from God by God's infinity; yet he is like Him through His creation of him as a person after the image of His own Personhood. On this basis there is a knowledge of God. The fact that this knowledge cannot possibly be complete in the finite mind nor be adequately described in words does not make it an irrational or non-conceptual "knowledge." The "feeling" of Novatian that God can be known does not lead off into a mindless mysticism, but rather like Pascal's: "Je sens qu'il ya un Dieu..." which leads on to a true knowledge of "the God of Abraham, Issac, and Jacob" (Pensees, II<Partie>) Préface, vii).
II.14. Sive enim illum dixeris lucem, creaturam ipsius magis quam ipsum dixeris, ipsum non expresseris. sive illum dixeris virtutem, potentiam ipsius magis quam ipsum dixeris et deprompseris, sive dixeris maiestatem, honorem ipsius magis quam illum ipsum descripserseris. et quid per singula quaeque percurrrens longum facio? semel totum explicabo: quicquid omnino de illo rettuleris, rem aliquam ipsius magis et virtutem quam ipsum explicaveris. quid enim de eo condigne aut dicatas aut sentientias, qui omnibus et sermonibus et sensibus maius est, nisi quod uno modo et hoc ipsum quomodo possumus, quomodo capimus, quomodo intellegere licet- quid sit deus, mente capiemus: si cogitaverimus id illum esse, quod, quale et quantum sit, non possit intellegi, ne in ipsum quidem cogitationem possit venire.

1Quicquid omnino... explicaveris—cfr. the similar language of Ps. Orig. (Probably Gregory of Elvira) Tractatus, p. 11: "Et quidquid de eo dixeris, efficientiam operum suorum et dispensationes sacramentorum ipsius nominalis: non tamen ipsum qualis et quantus sit poteris explicare."

2condigne—This is a word widely used in Novatian, both as an adjective and as an adverb. Particularly in its use as an
adverb (e.g. Tr. II.16; IV.16; Cib. I), some would hold it to be a characteristic of later Latin writing—yet whether or not this is the case—it is most certainly a mark of Novatian’s literary style. See Melin (op. cit., p. 121): "Vocabula, quae sunt condignus et condigna, in posteroire Latinitate passim adhiberi haud-quam-quam nego." Condigne is characteristic of Origen in his emphasis that we must think and speak worthily of God—i.e., in a way appropriate to His majesty (De Prn. v. 32.18; 132.8; 144.12ff. C.Cels. VII.4 etc.).
II.14. If you describe Him as light\(^{(1)}\), you have described a part of his creation; you have not expressed what He is. If you call Him power, then you have expressed more His attribute of strength than what He is in Himself. Or if you should speak of Him as Majesty, you will have given a description of His honour rather than of Himself. Well why should I go on into any more details? I shall explain the whole business in brief. Every statement that you can make about God will express some possession or power of His, rather than God Himself. What words or thoughts are worthy of Him, who indeed is above all language and all thoughts? There is only one way that we can perceive in our minds what God is—and how can we even do that since He is beyond our capacity and intelligence—unless we realise that He is a Being whose existence, attributes, and greatness are beyond our powers of understanding and thought.

\(^{(1)}\) This is extremely close to the earlier work of Theophilus, Ad Aut. i.5: "For if I call Him Light, I speak of His creature; if I call Him Logos, I speak of His beginning; if I call Him mind, I speak of His intelligence; if I call Him Spirit, I speak of His breath; if I call Him Sophia (wisdom), I speak of His offspring; if I call Him strength, I speak of His might;
if I call Him power, I speak of His energy; if I call Him providence, I speak of His goodness; if I call Him kingdom, I speak of His glory; if I call Him Lord, I speak of Him as judge; if I call Him Judge, I speak of Him as just; if I call Him Father, I speak of Him as all things; if I call Him fire, I speak of His wrath." The words of Irenaeus are alike: "He (God) is however above these properties, and therefore indescribable. For He may well and properly be called an understanding which comprehends all things, but He is not like the understanding of men; and He may most properly be termed light, but He is nothing like that light with which we are acquainted. And so, in all other particulars, the Father of all is in no degree similar to human weakness. He is spoken of in these terms according to the love; but in point of greatness, our thoughts regarding Him transcend these expressions" (adv. Hr. ii. xiii. 4). Theophilus, Irenaeus, and Novatian are at one in pointing out how God's reality and transcendence far outstretches our words and analogies. We shall later see that Novatian puts great emphasis on certain irreplaceable analogies connected with the life and words of Christ for our knowledge of God. Since man is in the image of Christ, and Christ is in the image of God; therefore analogies anchored in his incarnate Person, work, and teaching are more appropriate than any others to make known to the creatures what the one is like after whose image they are created.
II.15. Nam si ad solis aspectum oculorum nostrorum acies hebetescit, ne orbem ipsum obtutus inspiciat obviorum sibi superatus fulgore radiorum, hoc idem mentis acies patitur in cogitatione omni de deo et, quanto ad considerandum deum plus intenditur, tanto magis ipsa cogitationis suae luce caecatur.

1oculorum...acies hebetescit - see a similar expression in Virgil, Aen.11.605.
II.15. Our eyesight is dulled if we gaze directly upon the sun. We cannot look upon the orb itself, because the effulgence of its direct rays are too powerful to get through. The same thing happens to our mind in all thought about God. The more it tries to reach an understanding of Him, the more it is blinded in the light of its own meditations.
II.16. Quid enim de eo, ut iterum repetam, condigne dicas. qui est sublimitate omni sublimior\(^1\), et altitudine omni altior, et profundo omni profundior, et omni luce lucidior, et omni claritate clarior\(^2\), omni splendore splendidior, omni robore robustior, omni virtute virtitior\(^b\), omni pulchritudine pulchrior, veritate omni verior, et fortitudine omni fortior, et maiestate omni maior, et omni potentia potentia potentior, et omnibus divitiis ditior, omni prudentia prudentior et omni benignitate benignior, omni bonitate bonior\(^c\), omni iustitia iustior, omni clementia clementior ? minorem enim sint necesse est omnium genera virtutum eo ipso, qui virtutum omnium et deus et parens est, ut vere dici possit id deus\(^d\) esse, quod eiusmodi est\(^f\), cui comparari nihil potest. super omne est enim, quod dici potest. mens\(^3\) est enim quaedam gignens et complens omnia, quae sine ullo aut initio aut termino temporis causas rerum naturaliter nexas\(^h\) ad utilitatem omnium summa\(^5\) et perfecta ratione moderetur.

\(^1\)sublimitate...etc. There are 19 parts in this poetic exaltation of the nature of God. Stylistically it is like the clause in Corpus Cyprianum, Ep. xxxi, 3 (if not by Novatian himself, certainly by close associates of his, influenced both by his thought and style) with 17 parts (quam, quid, etc.).

\(^2\)clarior...cfr. M. Felix, Octv. xviii: "visu clarior est"

4 causas...nexas- cfr. Virgil, Aen. ix.219

5 ad utilitatem omnium summa - The general thought expressed here is perhaps related to that of Rom.8:28a: "For we know that all things work together for good..." 'though one is in the context of the natural world, and the other in the realm of grace and redemption).
II.16. What could you possibly say then that would be worthy of Him? He is more sublime than all sublimity, higher than all heights, deeper than all depth, clearer than all light\(^1\), brighter than all brilliance, more splendid than all splendour, stronger than all strength, mightier than all might, more beautiful than all beauty, truer than all truth, more enduring than all endurance, greater than all majesty, more powerful than all power, richer than all riches, wiser than all wisdom, kinder than all kindness, better than all goodness, juster than all justice, more merciful than all mercy. Every kind of virtue must of necessity be less than He, who is the God and source of all virtue. It can truly be said that God is He with whom nothing can be compared\(^2\) for He is above everything that can be said\(^3\). He is mind of a certain sort\(^4\) which originates and fills all things. Without beginning or ending in time, He controls with supreme and perfect reason the chain of natural causes so that it results in the benefit of all.

\(^1\)clearer than all light – Possibly this was connected in the thought of Novatian to Ps.36:9: "For with thee is the fountain of life; in thy light shall we see light"; and to phrases from Irenaeus such as: "God is all vision..."–Adv. Ha. ii.xiii.8; or "He conceives that which He also wills, and wills when He conceives."
He is all conception, all will, all mind, all light, all eye, all hearing, all fountain of every blessing." See also Athenagoras, Supp. xvi.2 (God is all things to Himself, independently of external relations—light unapproachable, spirit, power, word, etc.).

(2) ...nothing can be compared—See Tert., Adv.Marc.1.7: "...because the principle which we have just expounded, that the Supreme Being admits of no comparison with Himself forbids it."

(3) above everything that can be said—Compare the work attributed to Hippolytus, Contra Beron, frag.I: "For comparisons can be instituted only between objects of like nature, and not between objects of unlike nature. But between God the Maker of all things, and that which is made, between the infinite and the finite; there can be no kind of comparison, since these differ from each other not in mere comparison (relatively), but absolutely in essence"; and fragm.II: "The God of all things therefore became truly, according to the Scriptures without conversion, sinless man, and that in a manner known to Himself alone, as He is the natural Artificer of Things which are above our comprehension..." (Ante-Nic.Lib., transl., Hippolt., vol II, pp.71sqq.).
(4) a certain sort of mind — In this statement Novatian exemplifies an important principle for theology. He is attempting to derive an understanding of mind and nature (insofar as these are here related to God) from God's revelation of Himself, rather than trying to take a natural definition of mind and nature, and then imposing that on God. In other words he is trying to understand mind and nature in the light of God the Creator first, instead of beginning with the creaturely realities and then understanding God in light of them. This is undoubtedly related to the Stoic epistemological principle which examines verbs, actions, and connected parts of a whole in light of the subject of the action — i.e. in modal logic (as a general tendency) actions are explained more in light of the actor, than is the actor described in light of the actions (Both ways are taken, but the first is decidedly primary). If, as we believe, Novatian is Stoic in his methodology here, he is certainly anti-Stoic, and Biblical, in his content, as he works out his understanding of nature and mind in reference to God. He does the opposite of what M. Felix reports of the pantheistic Stoics, in Catv. xix.10,11: "Cleanshes gives the name God sometimes to mens...animus...ratio. Chrysippus (considers) divine rational nature of the world...God." This is an utterly inappropriate transference and identification of one level of reality with another. Novatian in discussing mind
does not make this false identification. Rather he endeavours to begin with the Creator Reality, and in light of that, view the created reality (without transmutation of one into the other—on the analogy of God and man knowing each other through common Personhood and Grace, without confounding their uncommon infinitude/ finitude). As M. Spanneut says (Stoics. dans les Fr., p. 341, note 43): "Il ne faut pas y voir (i.e. mens...quae...complens omnia) un Stoicisme direct. L'auteur repousse l'idée d'un énorme surnaturelle (naturam nescio quam artificem — Tr. III. 19). Tout ici relève du Créateur." Tr. III. 19 shows how Novatian takes his view of nature (as in II. 16 his understanding of mind) from God (Biblical), instead of God from nature (Stoic):"... non naturam nescio quam putemus artificem, sed deum agnosceremus potius, quod erat verius conditorem."
III.17 Hunc igitur agnoscimus et scimus deum, conditorem rerum omnium, dominum propter potestatem, parentem propter institutionem. Hunc, inquam, qui dixit et facta sunt omnia; praecepit, et processerunt universa; de quo scriptum est: omnia in sapientia fecisti; de quo Moyses: deus in caelo sursum et in terra deorsum; qui secundum Esaiam mensus est caelum palmo, terram pupillo; qui aspicit terram et facit eam tremere; qui continet gyrum terrae et eos, qui habitant in ipso quasi locustae; qui expendit montes in pondere et nemora in statera, id est certo divinae dispositionis examine, ac ne facile in ruinam procumberet magnitudo inaequaliter iacens, si non paribus fuisset librata ponderibus, onus hoc moderanter terrenae molis aequavit.

1Ps.114:8 2Ps.103:24 3Deut.4:39 4Isa.40:12 5Ps.103:32
6Isa.40:22 7Isa.40:12

Dispositionis - a word often used by Novatian, which is an inheritance of early Christian Theology, originating in the New Testament itself - cf. Eph.1.10. As early as Tatian, Orat. ad. Graec.v.1, it was used to refer to the relationship of Father and Son. In Irenaeus the "economy" refers to the Incarnation and Redemption in Christ. In Hippolytus, Adv.Noet.xiv, the Third Person of the Trinity is called the ὀλοκνομικαῖς τε τριάντων. For Tertullian, in Præx.3, economy means Trinity. It was apparently through the influence of Irenaeus that this word becomes closely attached.
to the Being and purposes of God that lie behind the revelation of God in Christ. To quote A. d'Alès (Le Mot Oikonomia, in Revue des Études Grecques, vol. xxxii, 1919, pp. 8-9): "Avec un vocabulaire aussi surveillé, Irénée coupaît court à beaucoup de malentendus. Tout le monde n'imiterait pas cette réserve, et dès la génération suivante on voit deux théologiens qui lui doivent immensément, saint Hippolyte de Rome et Tertullien de Carthage, adopter le mot oikonomia ou ses équivalents latins à l'exposition du trinitaire. Novatien suivra cet exemple. Pendant un demi siècle, on oppose "l'économie" divine au monarchisme sabellien..." (See also W. Gass, Das Patriistische Wort oikonomia, in Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, vol. xvii, 1874, pp. 465-504; and Hauser-leiter, Trinitarischer Glaube und Christusbekenntnis, pp. 20-22; 119-122, Gutersloh, 1920). Novatian however uses "dispositio" in a wider sense than "Incarnation" or "Trinity." These senses are involved, but generally by dispositio he refers to the broad economy and ordered carrying out of the purposes of God in the harmony of nature as well as in the world of Grace and in the reality of God's innermost Being. Novatian perhaps more than most of the other Fathers is very interested in the purposes of God in nature (compare his teaching on natural law in VIII. 45, note (2): which is more concerned with nature than with morality or conscience—contrary to most of the other Fathers). It may be
that his interest in the "economy" in nature and in natural law is due in part to his stoic background, and also to his deep knowledge of the Psalms of David. On the other hand, see Tr.XV.88, where it refers to the relationship of the Son to the Father; XVIII.104, where dispositio means the will of the Father to visit the human race (more like the thought of Irenaeus); XXIV.139—which is concerned with the divine-human natures in the Incarnation; XXVII.148—rather like the use of the word in Tert. and Hippolyt., as it refers to the relationship of Father and Son in the Trinity. VI.32 seems to bring all these meanings together (in that it presupposes them) when it implies that the fundamental way to understand the Scriptures is as an accommodation of the Infinite God to make Himself known to finite man through his majesty in nature, His grace in the Incarnation/Atonement, and His Spirit lifting humanity into the family life of the Trinity.

9librata ponderibus — This is again a Stoic theme on the harmony and unity of the world. Compare Novatian's similar description in his Ep.xxxvi.14,1.
III.17 Him then we recognize (1) and know as God, Creator of all things; Lord because of His power, Parent because He brought them into being. He is the one who "Spake and all things were created." He commanded "and all things came forth." Concerning Him it is written: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Moses speaks of Him: "God is in heaven above and in the earth beneath," and according to Isaiah: "He hath measured the sky with the span, and the earth with his hand; Who looketh upon the earth and maketh it to tremble, who holds fast the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers; who weighteth the mountains in scales, and the forests in a balance." That is by the exact perception of the divine arrangement. If its great magnitude were unequally distributed, it would quickly fall to pieces through unstable equilibrium. But He has equally distributed this great weight throughout the mass of the earth.

(1) recognize - It is significant epistemologically that this verb *agnoscere*, should be placed before the parallel verb-*scire*. In Stoic Logic the primary step in knowledge is "recognition" of what is objectively there, imposing itself on one's attention. One first merely "assents" to given reality; and only secondly uses the powers of the intellect (in a more discursive sense) to make comparisons, contrasts, etc. so that one may have a fuller knowledge of what has been recognized.
When this order of knowing is applied to God, it points to his objectively given existence (independent of and antecedent to the knower), and to his initiative in commencing this knowing process (by imposing Himself on the mind of the knowing subject—see III.19: "Because He wants to impose Himself upon our knowledge in order to stir up our souls to worship Him, He says..."). This is consonant with the starting-point of Tr.I.1 in the *Regula*, which presupposes that in knowing God, we know One who is objectively existent, giving Himself to be known—not one who is "made by the hands of a craftsman, or conjured up by the imagination of a heretic"—III.18. See III.19, for further usage of the verb *agnoscere.*
III.18. Qui dicit per prophetam: ego deus, et non est praeter me\(^1\), qui per eundem prophetam refert quoniam maiestatem meam non dabo alteri\(^2\), ut omnes cum suis figmentis ethnicos\(^3\) excludat et haereticos, probans deum non esse, qui manu artificis factus sit\(^4\), nec eum, qui ingenio haeretici factus sit. non est enim deus, cui, ut sit, quaerendus est artifex. quiue adhuc adiecit per prophetam: caelum mihi thronus est, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum: qualem mihi sedificabis domum aut quid locus requies meae ?\(^5\) ut ostendat, quoniam multo magis illum templum non capit, cum mundus non capit. et haec non ad sui iustitiam, sed ad nostri scientiam refert. neque enim ipse a nobis desiderat magnitudinis gloriam, sed nobis vult religiosam, quae pater, conferre sapientiam.

\(^1\text{Isa.45:22} \quad ^2\text{Isa.42:8} \quad ^3\text{ethnicos - See this word elsewhere in Novatian, Spec.2;5;} \quad ^4\text{Hos. 8:6} \quad ^5\text{Isa.66:1} \quad
III.18. Who says by the prophet: "I am God, and there is none beside me"; and again by this same prophet: "My glory will I not give to another." Thus he excludes all heathen and heretics with the figments of their imaginations, and so proves Him to be no god who has either been made by the hand of a craftsman or conjured up by the imagination of a heretic. He is no God who requires a craftsman for his existence. Again he adds through the prophet: "Heaven is my throne, earth my footstool; what house will ye build for me, or what is the place of my rest?" This shows that as the universe cannot contain Him, how much less can a temple. He says these things not bragging on Himself, but for our instruction. He is not asking from us glory for his greatness, but as a Father wishes to bestow upon us religious wisdom.

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1. An idea like that of Calvin, *Instit*I.v.12, that the mind of man is an idol factory (Suum enim cuique ingenium instar labyrinthis est...immensa deorum turba ab hominum mente profluxit...).

2. Novatian follows the clear teaching of earlier Patristic Theology that God is not contained by the universe He has made. He decisively breaks with the Stoic at this point. Theophilus in *Ad Aut.*1.5, speaks of God as "containing" the world; but goes on in 11,iii,x, to show that God Himself is not contained. Origen,
speaking of the Cosmic Christ, says in De Prn. iv. iv. 4:

"All idea of confinement in a particular place is undoubtedly excluded"; On. Cels. vii. xxxiv: "And we do not ask the question 'How shall we go to God?' As though we thought that God existed in some place. God is of too excellent a nature for any place. He holds all things in his power, and is Himself not confined by anything whatever..."; M. Felix, Gct. xxxii: "What temple shall I build to Him, when this whole world fashioned by his work cannot receive Him? And when I, as a man, dwell far and wide, shall I shut up the might of so great majesty within one little building?" This same point is made by Prof. Torrance, when he states that the first article of the Nicene Creed begins: "With the transcendence of God over all space and time for they were produced along with His creation. It follows that the relation between God and space is not itself a spatial relation" (Space, Time, and Incarnation, p. 2).

(3) The fact that God speaks and makes Himself known not for his own interests - "but for our instruction" is a central theme of Tr. Novatian's whole understanding of the meaning of salvation is intertwined with this concept. He repeats and expands this concept in several places, among them are: Tr. IV. 26 (God gives his name to help us come to Him; not to describe his own Being); VII. 39 (God deigns to be called Spirit, fire, etc., to
help a dull people learn lessons that will result in their blessing and uplifting); VIII. 42 (the very reason Christ came was to give us a knowledge of God and lead us into His blessings); X, 55 (on how the resurrection of Christ was for the benefits of our dying flesh). The next sentence sheds light on the content of this "instruction" (see below).

(4)"as a Father to bestow upon us religious knowledge"—God "accomodates" Himself to humanity in Scripture, and pre-eminently in the Incarnation of His Son, so that He can lift us up to a knowledge of Him as Father; which involves full restoration to His image, partaking of His eternal life, and participation in the inner family relationship of the Triune God. Novatian is very Johannine in his teaching that in knowing God we become "like Him" (cfr. I Jn. 3: 2—"... But we know that when He appears we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is.") God bestows knowledge of Himself together with life from Himself. This knowledge and life comes to us in Christ. It is the life of Christ, and Christ's knowledge of the Father that must be bestowed upon us. When this happens (as it has in the Incarnation) our knowledge of God is like that of Christ—He is our Father.

We are in a relationship with Him like that of Christ: we can pray to Him as Father—"Per quem (Christum) nobis in notitiam venire voluit...quem pro deo in suis iam postulationibus patrem diceret" (VIII, 42). For Novatian this is the essence of salvation. What he
saying about accommodation, anthropomorphisms (ch. VI, etc.) the mission of Christ-Spirit-apostles, must be seen in this light. Novatian is far more Eastern in his understanding of salvation than Western. With him it is more a question of ontology than of guilt, penalty, and payment. Christ is more the life bringer to those who are slipping away into decay and death, than he is the cleanser from guilt for those immersed in sin and under the wrath of God. Whether or not Novatian does justice to the truth in both Eastern and Western viewpoints, we will discuss at later appropriate places. Here we will give some texts from earlier sources that may have either influenced his thinking on this matter, or perhaps the sources themselves were touched by the same currents that entered his doctrine of salvation. Even before the Christian era, Philo was explaining the accomodation of God in Scripture in terms of his purpose to lift us up to knowledge of Himself. See Philo, De. Abrah., x (Loeb. Tr., p. 31), where he makes precisely the same point that Novatian made in De Tr. VIII. 42 (...postulationibus patrem dicere): "God indeed needs no name; yet though He needed it not, He nevertheless vouched safe to give to the human kine a name of Himself, suited to them, that so men might be able to take refuge in prayers..." That the knowledge God gives leads to nearness to Him as is evidenced in prayer was a widespread theme in Late Judaism. Notice the "Sifre" on Deut. 11:22: "Those who interpret the implications (of Scripture) say: If you would learn to know Him
at whose word the world came into being, learn Haggadah for by this means you will come to know the Holy One and cleave to His ways" (Sifre Deut.par.49, ed. Friedmann, f.859—quoted in G.F. Moore, p.161). While there are similarities, there is also a world of difference between a knowledge of God that one works up on one's own (even in the community) on the basis of knowing and keeping the law; and knowledge of Him into which one is brought by union with Christ in his Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection. Justin Martyr explains the difference as follows:

"Our doctrines then appear to be greater than all human teaching; because Christ who appeared for our sakes became the whole rational being, both body and reason and soul...For whatever lawgivers and philosophers uttered well, they elaborated by finding and contemplating some part of the Word (Logos). But since they did know the whole of the Word, which is Christ, they often contradicted themselves"—II Apol.x; also "For the seed and intimation...that God...should be present with His own creation, saving it and becoming capable of being perceived by it...in order that man having embraced the Spirit of God, might pass into the glory of the Father"iv.xx.4;...He (although) beyond comprehension and boundless and invisible rendered Himself visible, and comprehensible, and within the capacity of those who believe, that He might vivify those who
receive and behold Him through faith... It is not possible to live apart from Life, and the means of life is found in God, but fellowship with God is to know God, and to enjoy His goodness. "iv.xx.5;

"And they (the angels) are not able to search out the wisdom of God by means of which his handiwork confirmed and incorporated with His Son is brought to perfection; that His offspring, the first-begotten Word should descend to the creature, i.e. to what had been moulded and that it should be contained by Him; and on the other hand, the creatures should contain the Word, and ascend to Him, passing beyond the angels, and be made after the image and likeness of God" v.xxxvi.3. Clement of Alexandria sees that God brings us to knowledge of Himself through Christ, but he is not so clear on the Incarnational Union. "Wherefore also the Lord, who was not of the world, came as one who was of the world to man. For He was clothed with all virtue, and it was His aim to lead man, the foster-child of the world, up to the objects of intellect, and to the most essential truths by knowledge, from one world to another" Strom.vi.xv (378). What we have referred to as the Eastern view of salvation was carried on beyond the third century and developed in the writings of the great fourth century theologians such as Athanasius, the Cappadocian Fathers, and others. This view underlies his numerous related matters in De Tr.-anthropomorphisms, accomodation, the missions of Son, Spirit and Apostles.
II.19. Quique praeterea ferinos nostros animos et de agresti
immanitate tumidos et abruptos ad lenitatem trahere volens dici:
et super quem requiescat spiritus meus, nisi super humilem et
quietum et trementem verba mea\textsuperscript{1}, ut deum aliquatentus, quantus sit,
possit agnoscere, dum illum per spiritum collatum discit timere.
qui similiter adhuc magis in notitiam nostri volens pervenire, ad
culturam sui nostros excitans animos, aiebat: \textit{ego sum dominus,}
qui feci lucem et creavi tenebras\textsuperscript{2}, ut vicissitudinem istarum,
quibus noctes diesque moderantur, non naturam nescio quam put-
emus artificem, sed deum agnosceremus potius, quod erat verius,
conditorem.

\textsuperscript{1}Isa.66:2 \quad \textsuperscript{2}Isa.45:6
III.19. Once again because He wishes to lead our beast-like souls from their wild savageness, pride, and forocity to gentleness(1), He says: "And upon whom shall my Spirit rest, save upon him who is humble and quiet, and trembleth at my words?" So that one can recognize(2) how great God is - to some degree-while learning to fear Him through the Spirit which He has given us. Similarly, because He wants to impose Himself upon our knowledge in order to stir up our souls to worship Him, He says: "I am the Lord, who made light and created darkness"; so that we will not ignorantly give credit to abstract "nature"(3) for controlling the due alteration of day and night, but rather that we should truly recognize(2) God as their Creator.

(1) Novatian shows that these portions of Scripture are not to be taken as a literal description of God, but as a "stooping down" by Him to speak in our language, so as to give us "sign-posts" that will be of help in raising us up to His life and knowledge. In V.28, VI.31, etc., he explains anthropomorphisms by this same principle. This principle is above all carried out in the Incarnation of God in Christ. See note (4) under III.18.

(2) For the significance of this verb-agnoscere-see note (1) -III.17.
(3) This is a denial of the pantheistic naturalism of the Stoics (e.g. Cicero, *Nat. Dr.* i.100; ii.48; M. Felix, *Octv.* xix. 10, 11). See note (4) II.16.
III.20. Quem quoniam obtutu oculorum videre non possumus de operum magnitudine et virtute et maestate condiscimus. invisibilis enim ipsius, inquit apostolus Paulus, a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur; sempererna quoque eius virtus et divinitas\(^1\), ut animus humanus ex manifestis occulta condiscens de operum magnitudine, quae videret, mentis oculis artificis magnitudinem cogitaret. de quo idem apostolus: regi autem saeculorum immortalis, invisibili, soli deo honor et gloria.\(^2\) evasit enim oculorum contemplationem, qui cogitationis vicit magnitudinem, quoniam, inquit, ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia\(^3\). nam et imperio eius omnia, ut ex ipso sint, et verbo eius digesta, ut per ipsum sint, et in iudicium eius re cidunt universa, ut, dum in ipso exspectant libertatem, corruptione deposita\(^4\) in ipsum videantur esse revocata.

\(^1\)Rom. 1:20 \quad \(^2\)I Tim. 1:17 \quad \(^3\)Rom. 11:36 \quad \(^4\)Rom. 8:21
III.20. Since we cannot see Him with our physical eye, we may learn to know Him by the greatness of His works, power, and majesty. "The invisible things of Him," says the Apostle Paul, "from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and God-head." Thus the human soul learns to know the hidden things by means of things that are visible, using the eyes of the mind to contemplate the greatness of the Craftsman by means of the greatness of His works. The same apostle speaks of Him again: "To the King, eternal, immortal, invisible, to the only God, be honour and glory." For He who has surpassed the greatness of thought, has certainly gone beyond the sight of the eyes. "For," it is said, "of Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things. For by His command all things exist, thus they are "of Him"; all things are disposed by His word, and are therefore "through Him"; and all things submit to His judgement, and in so doing are looking forward to liberty "in Him" when the bondage of corruption is laid aside as they find themselves recalled "to Him."

(1) Novatian is in the great mainstream of patristic teaching (in regard to) the knowledge of God "ex operibus." Athenagoras sees from nature: "Numerous reasons for worshipping God: the order,
complete harmony, colour, form and arrangement of the world"—Lég.iv: Tatian recognizes something of God's invisible power from His works—Cat. iv; Irenaeus makes like observations in Adv.Hé.ii.viii. 1; iii.xxix; iv.4; Cyprian (in Adv. Don.xiv-CSEL III,1,15, 13-14) says: "the soul in contemplating the heavens knows their author"; and in the Pseudo-Cyp. Quod Ideola, before the "One God present and known everywhere," the people "often confess God naturally" (ix-CSEL III-1,26, 18-27). Clement Alex. "sees in the stars that the pagans have worshipped (Protr.63,4-5) a way given to the heathen to bow themselves before God"—Sttm.vi,110,3-l11,1. M. Felix in Octv.xix,1 and xviii,11, recognizes (as do the Stoics) through universal harmony. Tertullian in Adv.Marc.1.11, says: "There is no other sign so manifest of the existence of God than all this work which He has created." The Stoics used proofs like these, which would have undoubtedly influenced the Church Fathers. And yet the idea of the works of nature being a witness to the Creator has deep Biblical roots, as well as Stoic (e.g. Ps.8; 19; Acts 14: 17, etc.). Novatian occasionally alludes to this principle of passing from the works of the creation to the Creator (e.g. Tr.I.9; III.20;—implied in VIII.45). But in light of the rest of the theology of Novatian, it would not be correct to infer from these places that he teaches that man does in fact have a proper knowledge of God from nature. On the contrary, man in his natural surrounding is a "beast-like, ferocious" soul.
It takes the Spirit of God to lead him to the gentleness that true knowledge of God imparts (Tr.III.19).

(2) Novatian does not use this verse as do some of the other Fathers as a reference to the Three Persons of the Trinity (see Origen, ad Rom.8:13—in Rufinus’ transl.; Hilary, de Tr.viii.38; Augustine, de Tr.11.15,25).

(3) Another reference to the eschatological renewal and recreation of the universe (note (4), II.10). Novatian repeats this Biblical theme to affirm the goodness and eternal destiny of the material creation against the Gnostics. This is an example of what he means in II.16, that all things in nature work "ad utilitatem omnium summa."
IV.21 Quem solum merito bonum pronuntiat dominus\textsuperscript{1}, cuius bonitatis totus testis est mundus, quem non instituisset\textsuperscript{2}, nisi bonus fuisset. nam si omnia bona valde\textsuperscript{3}, consequenter ac merito et, quae instituta sunt bona, bonum institutorem probaverunt et, quae a bono institutore sunt, aliusd quam\textsuperscript{4} bona esse non possunt.

\textsuperscript{1}Luke 18:19

\textsuperscript{2}quem non instituisset - notice the same expression in Novt. Spec.x; Cib. 2; 3.

\textsuperscript{3}Gen. 1:31

\textsuperscript{4}Notice his frequent use of anaphora-quem...cuius...quem... quae... etc.
IV.21. The Lord rightly declares God alone to be good. The whole world is a witness to His goodness. He would not have established the world if He had not been good\(^1\). Now if "all things were very good," the goodness of the creation would then consequently prove the goodness of the Creator, and the works of a good Creator can only be good.

\(^{1}\)"If He had not been good...if all things were very good"—These are examples of how he applies the stoic hypothetical syllogism to his theological task. In the process of knowing one starts with what has been objectively given, recognised and assented to by the recipient mind (See notes on the verb \textit{agnoscere} in III.17; 19). Then by use of the hypothetical syllogism one seeks to know what has been given more fully out of itself. Instead of describing it by used of the more definitive conditional syllogism, which presupposes that one already has the essential information inhering in the premises: one approaches it with the open questions of the conditional syllogism. These questions are open to correction and affirmation in the light of what is there.
IV.22. Ex quo malum facessat a deo. nec enim potest fieri, ut sit initiator aut artifex ullius mali operis, qui nomen sibi perfecti vindicat et parentis et iudicis, maxime cum omnis mali operis vindex sit et iudex, quoniam et non aliunde occurit homini malum, nisi a bono deo recessisset. hoc autem ipsum in homine denotatur, non quia necessae fuit, sed quia ipse sic voluit, unde manifeste et, quid malum esset, apparuit et, ne invidia in deo esse videretur\(^1\), a quo malum ortum esset, eluxit.

\(^1\)The passive voice is extremely frequent in Novatian. His works show a high usage of *videretur*. 
IV.22. All evil then is a departure from God\(^1\). It is impossible that He should be the originator or architect of any work of evil, seeing that He claims for Himself the name\(^2\) of both Perfect Judge and Perfect Designer; and even more impossible seeing that He is the avenger and judge of every evil work. Evil does not reach man from any other cause than by his departure from the good God. This indeed is what happened with man, not that it was necessary, but that man himself willed it\(^3\). Thus it has been made clear what evil is; and the source of evil has been brought to light, lest it should seem that God is capable of jealousy\(^4\).

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\(^{1}\) evil a departure from God - Two important points are involved here. First God is the source of good and of life. To be separated from Him means evil, decay, and death. It is in these terms that Novatian understands the "mission" of Christ to come down into our evil and death, and lift us back up to the life and goodness of God. Secondly evil is not an existing "thing" (either the "bad" Creator God of Gnosticism or the inherently bad material creation). Reification of evil into dualism is ruled out. The same teaching is carried on in Hilary and Augustine that evil is essentially a privation of good.

\(^{2}\) Novatian is helped here by the Stoic realist view of names. He is not guilty of a nominalism that would identify and
shut God up in a name (IV.26); or of a sceptical agnosticism which would treat names as finally having no real relation to the Being of God (See again IV.26).

(3) Evil was not necessary, but comes from man's will. As we have seen, Novatian denies that the material creation was inherently involved in evil because it was material. He takes the Biblical position that what man as the crown of creation does, affects the rest of the creation. Evil came upon the rest of creation when man misused his will. Earlier Fathers—especially Tertullian—made much of the fact that the seat of sin is in the will. Cfr. _Scorp._ v.153; iv.152; in _De iei._ he says the main thing is to submit one's will to the will of God — _xiii.291, De idol.xxx11.56, and De pud._ vi.229, teach the primacy of the will in man. _De paent._ iii.11-16, asks the question: "The will, is it not the source of sin...?"

(4) Novatian again refutes the Marcionite teaching that the bad world creator sent evil punishment upon man because of his jealousy that Satan had of man, when according to Gen.3:5, he tried to make man think that God was envious of him.
IV.23. Hic ergo semper sui est similis nec se umquam in aliquas formas vertit aut mutat, ne per immutationem etiam mortalis esse videatur\(^1\). immutatio enim conversionis portio cuiusdam comprehenditur\(^2\) mortis. ideo nec adiecto in illo umquam ullius aut partis aut honoris accedit, ne quid umquam perfecto defuisse videatur\(^1\), nec detrimentum in eo aliquod agitur, ne gradus mortalitatis receptus esse videatur\(^1\), sed quod est, id semper est, et qui est semper ipse est, et qualis est, semper talis est. nam et incrementa originem monstrant et detrimenta mortem atque interitum probant, et ideo: ego, ait, sum deus, et non sum mutatus\(^3\), statum suum tenens semper\(^4\), dum id, quod natum non est, converti non potest.

\(^1\)videatur-see note 1, IV.22.

\(^2\)comprehenditur - This particular construction is a fairly unusual one. It is found elsewhere in Tr.V.29-intelligatur. As Melin says: "Verba quaedam passivi generis satis abundantur usurpata" (op.cit.,p.207).

\(^3\)Mal.3:6

\(^4\)Notice his repeated use of anaphora-semper est...semper est... etc.
IV.23 God then is always like Himself\(^{(1)}\). He never changes or turns Himself into any form, which would be a sign of mortality. This would involve alteration, which is a step towards death of some sort. Therefore there is never any addition of parts or honour to Him, for that would imply\(^{(2)}\) that at some time He had been lacking in perfection. Nor can there be any sort of diminution in Him, for that would be a step towards death. But what He is He always is, and who He is He always is, and his quality is always the same. For any addition to a thing shows that it had an origen, and any diminution proves its mortality and death. Therefore He says: "I am God, I change not." He always maintains his same state; for that which was not born cannot alter.

\(^{(1)}\)As we saw from II.12 (see note (1)), Novatian understands the basic nature of God to be that of Personhood and Infinity. Everything that is known about God and stated about God must be judged in that light. It is therefore vital to any proper knowledge of God to have a fuller understanding of what His infinity involves. When one has a clear apprehension of this central fact, then one is enabled to move out from the hub of the wheel as it were, to the rim — and in so doing, deal with less central questions of anthropomorphisms, names of God, etc. This is the order Novatian follows from here on. But in this place before he moves on, he is
putting questions to the Given Reality of the infinity of God to see more of what it involves. In the earlier paragraphs (notably III.18) he showed that the infinity of God means that He is not limited by space. Here (IV.23) he is showing that God’s infinity means He cannot be limited by time. This follows from his teaching in I. 1,2, that both space and time are realities that God has created.

(2) "imply" - this language shows how he is thinking in terms of the hypothetical syllogism.
IV.24. Hoc enim in ipso, quicquid illud potest, quod est deus\(^1\), semper sit necesse est, ut semper sit deus servans sese virtutibus suis. et ideo dicit: ego sum, qui sum\(^2\). quod enim est, ideo hoc habet nomen\(^3\), quoniam eandem semper sui obtinet qualitatem. immutatio enim tollit illud nomen quod est. quicquid enim aliquando vertitur, mortale ostenditur hoc ipso, quod convertitur; desinit enim esse, quod fuerat, et incipit consequenter esse, quod non erat. idcirco et merito in deo maneant semper status suus, dum sine detrimento commutationis semper sui et similis et aequalis est. quod enim natum non est, nec mutari potest; ea enim sola in conversionem veniunt, quaecumque fiunt vel quaecumque gignuntur dum, quae aliquando non fuerant, discunt esse nascendo atque ideo nascendo converti. at enim illa, quae nec nativitatem habent nec artificem, excluderunt a se demutacionem, dum, in qua conversionis causa est, non habent originem.

\(^1\) *quod est deus* is an expression very frequent in *De Tr.* of St. Hilary.

\(^2\) *Ex. 3:14*—H. Weyer would appear to be correct in stating that Novatian is the first writer in the West to use *Ex. 3:14* as a basic explanation of the nature of God (*op. cit.*, p. 54—note 26). A century later Hilary takes the same approach, though he considerably expands the implications that he draws out of the verse (*cf. Hilary, Tr. I. 5 sqq.*)
This again may suggest a possible influence of Novatian on his thought. The use of Ex. 3:14 as a cardinal explanation of God's nature passed on into great Western Theologians such as Augustine, Peter Lombard, Anselm, Aquinas.

3 See note (2) - IV.22.
IV.24. For whatever constitutes Deity must always be in Him, so that He may be always God, upholding Himself by His own power. Thus He says: "I am that I am." That which is therefore has this name, because it always maintains the same attributes. Alteration would deprive Him of the name "That which is"; because everything that alters shows itself by its very change to be mortal. It ceases to be what it was, and consequently begins to be what it was not. It follows that God therefore always maintains his own state of being, in which He is ever equal to and like Himself, without any loss which change would entail. That which is not born is not changeable; for only those things that are made or are begotten can undergo change. Things which were once without existence, by coming into being experience existence, and therefore by coming into being they experience change. On the other hand things which are neither begotten nor made are exempt from change, since they have no beginning, and beginning is the cause of change.
IV.25. Ideo et unus promuntiatus est, dum parem non habeat. a
deus enim, quicquid esse b potest, quod deus est, summum sit nec-
esse est. summum autem quicquid est, ita demum summum esse oportet,
dum extra comparum est. et ideo solum et unum sit necesse est, cui
conferri nihil potest, dum parem non habet, quoniam nec duo infini-
ta esse possunt, ut rerum dictat ipsa natura. infinitum est autem,
quirquid nec originem habet omnino nec finem. excludit enim alterius
initium, quicquid occupaverit totum. Quoniam, si non omne id quod est,
quicquid est, continet, dum intra id invenitur, quo continetur,
deus esse desierit c in alterius potestatem redactus, cuius mag-
nitudine, qua minor d fuerit inclusus, et ideo, quod continuit,
deus potius esse iam coeperit.
Therefore God is declared to be one, as having no equal\(^{(1)}\). For by definition whatever is involved in being God, God will be that to the very highest degree. Now "in the highest degree" is beyond having any equal. Thus He must be one and alone; nothing can be ranked with Him since He has no equal. For as the very nature of things declares, there cannot be two infinites\(^{(2)}\). That alone is infinite which has neither beginning nor end; for whatever occupies the whole excludes the entry of any other. Unless God contains everything that is—no matter what it may be—then He will be contained in something else, and thus be less than the thing that contains Him. In that case He would cease to be God since His power would be reduced on account of His inferiority to the greatness of the One who contained Him\(^{(3)}\). Therefore that which contained Him would have the better claim to be God\(^{(4)}\).

\(^{(1)}\)"God is one, having no equal"—In proclaiming the necessity of monotheism, Novatian can be thought of as being near the end of the line of the old apologists, who had to set forth Christianity in the polytheistic Hellenistic world. Novatian's words are fairly close to certain earlier Christian writings that would have been well known to him. Cfr. the fragment from Sibyll.Or. (a phrase that originally stood at the beginning of book III, and is quoted in Theolph., \textit{Ad Aut.} i.36: "There is one God...He guides the heavens, rules the earth, Himself exists." This same fragment is
also quoted in Clement Alex., and in the anonymous Cohortatio ad Gentes, and by Lactantius, Div. Inst. iv. 6. 5 (See R. Grant, Theop., p. 89, note 36). Compare Theoph., Ad Auto. iii. 9: "We acknowledge a God, but only one, the founder and maker and demiurge of this whole universe. We know that everything is governed by providential care, but by Him alone." Numerous examples of similar statements are to be found in Irenaeus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, and others.

(2) There cannot be two infinites—This is a concept that is found in earlier Christian writers—e.g. M. Felix, Octv. xviii: "Canst thou believe that in heaven there is a division of the supreme power and that the whole authority of that true and divine empire is sundered, when it is manifest that God, the Parent of all has neither beginning nor end—that He who gives birth to all gives perpetuity to Himself—that He who was before the world, was Himself to Himself, instead of the world" (Ante-Nic. transl., vol. XIII, part II—p. 478): Irenaeus Adv. Hin. ii. i: "For how can there be any other fullness or principle or power or God above Him, since it is a matter of necessity that God the Pleroma (Fullness) of all these, should contain all things in his immensity, and should be contained by no one? But if there is anything beyond Him, He is not then the Pleroma of all, nor does He contain all...Thus according to them (the Marcionites), the Father of all...is enclosed in some other...who must of necessity be greater, inasmuch as that which contains is greater than that which is contained. But then that which
is greater is also stronger, and in a greater degree Lord: and that which is greater and stronger, and in a greater degree Lord—must be God" (Ante-Nic. transl., vol V, pp. 117, 118). Similarly Athenagoras, Suppl. viii and Tertullian. The concept of the impossibility of two infinites is also in Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Lantantius, two generations later appears to have followed Novatian closely—in places almost verbatim—on this concept in Div. Inst. i. 3: 

"(our inquiry is) whether the universe is governed by the power of one God or of many... For what need is there of many to sustain the government of the universe? Unless we should happen to think that if there were more than one, each would possess less might and strength... But God who is the eternal Mind is undoubtedly of excellence, complete, and perfect in every part. And if this is true, He must of necessity be one. For power or excellence which is complete retains its own peculiar stability. But that is to be regarded as solid from which nothing can be taken away, that as perfect to which nothing can be added... But if more than one divide the government of the world, undoubtedly each will have less power and strength, since every one must confine himself within his prescribed portion... But the nature of excellence admits of greater perfection in him in whom the whole is, than in him in whom there is only a small part of the whole. But God, if He is perfect (because He is perfect), as He ought to be, cannot but be one, so that all things may be in Him" (Ante-Nic. transl., XXI, I, pp. 6, 7). Writers such as
Novatian would have been influenced from two sources on the impossibility of two governing powers. First from the Scriptures, which consistently proclaim God the Father Almighty, Creator and Ruler of heaven and earth. Reason itself shows that if there is one such infinite God, there by definition could not be another. Secondly the form of the arguments that the Stoics used to prove one harmonious governing force running through the whole sphere of nature seem to have affected the form of arguments used in Novatian and in other Church Writers for single creation and single providence.

(3) One who contained him... - In this usage of the conditional syllogism when one comes to an unacceptable conclusion, then the premises must be ruled out, as is done here. Thus one learns by open questioning. The fact that God being contained by anything else is an unacceptable conclusion was clearly proclaimed in the very early fathers. See Theoph., Ad.Auto.ii.x: "For there was nothing coeval with God; He was his own place (οὗτος ἑαυτὸς ἰδιός)."

Notice also Philo (from whom Theophilus may have derived his statement): "God is his own place, containing all things... contained by nothing else..." Leg.Alleg.i.xiv (Loeb tr., p.175).

(4) In this paragraph we see that by the use of the hypothetical syllogism, Novatian is still working out what infinity in God involves, before he proceeds to examine various portions of Scripture and popular thought in light of that infinity.
IV.26. Ex quo effectum est, ut nec nomen dei proprium possit edici, quoniam non possit nec concepi. id enim nomine continetur, quicquid etiam ex naturae suae condicione comprehenditur. nomen enim significantia est eius rei, quae comprehendi potuit ex nomine. at quando id, de quo agitur, tale est, ut condigne\(^1\) nec ipsis intellectibus colligatur, quomodo appellationis digna vocabulo pronuntiabitur, quod, dum extra intellectum est, etiam supra appellationis significatian sit necesse est \(?\) ut merito\(^2\), quando nomen suum deus ex quibusdam rationibus et occasionibus\(^a\) adicit et\(^b\) praefert, non tam legitimam proprietatem appellationis sciamus esse depromptam, quam significantiam quandam constitutam, ad quam dum homines decurrunt, dei misericordiam per ipsam impetrare posse videantur.

\(^1\) condigne - on the characteristic usage of this word in Novatian, see note 2, II.14.

\(^2\) ut merito - as we have seen (in introduction and word list), this word is constantly used by Novatian. It would ordinarily appear to have the sense of "rightly" or "as to be expected", etc., but here and in a number of other places (e.g. chapters VII, X-twice, XII, XIII, XV-twice, XVII, XIX, XXVII, XXX, XXXI) it has the power of a consecutive conjugation, meaning as Melin suggests, in the German language (folglich (op.cit.,p.84) or Fausset: "Merito denotes logical necessity or the requirements of consistent statement" (op.cit.,p.31, note 7). As Melin shows: "In his omni-
bus (i.e. the above mentioned places) exemplis ut consecutivam vim habere pro certo affirmare licet" (op. cit., p. 89). This use of *ut merito* therefore with a consecutive force is a mark Novatian's literary style, that is to be expected throughout his works.
Hence it results that the proper name of God cannot be uttered by us because it is beyond our powers of conception. Now a name contains what one has comprehended from the conditions of the subject matter. To name something means we are able to comprehend the whole significance of the subject that we are naming. But when one is dealing with a subject matter which is entirely beyond being encompassed by the intellect itself, how could it then be properly expressed by a single word of appellation? For since it is quite beyond the powers of the intellect, then by consequence it is even further above being described in the compass of a name. Now when God for certain reasons and on certain occasions, introduces and mentions his name, we know it is not given as a literal one-to-one description of Himself; but it is instead intended somehow to signify reality beyond itself, so that men may run to it, and through it obtain the mercy of God.

(1) A name contains... - Novatian would seem to be drawing a parallel between a name and a temple (see III.18) in that they are both inadequate to contain the reality of God. Novatian is at one with the stoic realism in, on the one hand refuting nominalism, which tends to identify the full truth and reality of the thing named with the name; but on the other hand, does not follow Pyrrhonian or Middle Academic Scepticism, which tends to almost totally
disconnect names with reality that they intend to point out. Thus Novatian is realist in recognizing the limitations of names without falling into agnosticism. The main function of a name is apparently "to signify reality beyond itself" (as he says in this same paragraph). A reality which is greater than itself; therefore not encompassed and comprehended by it—and yet a reality to which it bears a true relationship, is what he means by this. If it only points, it nonetheless points in the right direction. Novatian is almost certainly influenced here by the stoic teaching on χροληγήσις (see introduction). A name is a sort of χροληγήσις which if properly followed out can be of help in leading one into true knowledge—but can never be confounded with the actual complete reality of which it is only a pre-cognition or herald.

(2) A name cannot be a literal "one-to-one" description of God... This principle is of course understood in the Scriptures themselves, and is something that late Judaism and early Christianity had to stoutly maintain against paganism without, and heresy within. There are many examples of how early theologians stated this principle in a way that is similar to and probably bore an influence upon this concept in Novatian. The following text of Philo agrees almost point for point with this paragraph of Novatian - De Mut. Nom.: "... (the context of the ineffability of God) all below the Existent ...

... are available to apprehension (είς κοινωνίαν) ... but He alone by His very nature cannot be seen... It is a logical consequence that
no personal name even can be assigned to the truly Existent... Yet that the human race should not totally lack a title to give to the supreme goodness He allows them by licence of language, as though it were His proper name, the title of Lord God. For those who are born into mortality must needs have some substitute for the Divine Name, so that they may approach if not the fact, at least the name of Supreme Excellence, and be brought into relation with it... And indeed if He is unnameable, He is also inconceivable and incomprehensible" (Loeb, pp.147, 148,151). Justin Martyr, who apparently makes use of Philo's writings, says in II Apol. vi: "(speaking of the "Nameless Father" and the pre-existence of Christ the Son) God is not a name, but an opinion implanted in the nature of men of a thing that can hardly be explained. "M. Felix, Cevv.xviii:"... He is greater than all perceptions, infinite, immense, and how great is known to Himself alone. But our heart is too limited to understand Him... Neither must you ask a name for God. God is His name. We have need of names when a multitude is to be separated into individuals by the special characteristics of names; to God who is alone, the name God is a whole... Take away the addition of names and you will behold His glory." Clement Alex. in Strom.v.xiii, xiii, says: "This discourse respecting God is most difficult to handle. For since the first principle of everything is difficult to find out, the absolutely first and oldest...is difficult... For how can that be expressed which is neither genus, nor difference,
nor species, nor individual, nor number; nay more is neither an event nor that to which an event happens. None can rightly express Him wholly. For an account of His greatness He is ranked as the all...indivisible...infinite...not having a limit. And therefore it is without form and name. We speak not as supplying His name; but for want, we use good names, in order that the mind may have them as points of support, so as not to err in other respects...we understand then the unknown by the divine grace, and by the Word alone that proceeds from Him..."

(3) Signify reality... - see note (1) on stoic ὀνοματικός. Origen is also in the line of the Stoics (who followed Plato) in seeing that a name does not describe, but signifies - De Prin. iv. iii. 15 (Latin) - see translation of Butterworth, Origen, First Principles, p. 312): "Let everyone then who cares for truth, care little about names and words...let him be more anxious about the fact signified than about the words by which it is signified...Our aim has been to show that there are certain things, the meaning of which it is impossible adequately to explain by any human language, but which are made clear rather through simple apprehension than through any power of words." In De Tr. V. 28, Novatian shows what he means by the difference between "signification" and a literal "one-to-one" correspondence.

(4) In this sentence the three major aspects of Novatian's theology are brought together: his view of the incomprehensible
infinity of God as well as the mercy of His personhood; and based on this (infinity) his realist view of names and language, and based on the aspect of his personhood, his understanding of the main purpose of revelation being a "missio" in which God lowers Himself, sending His Son out to bring us up to God.
IV.27. Est ergo et immortalis et incorruptibilis nec detrimenta sentiens omnin nec finem. nam et quia incorruptibilis, ideo et immobilis, et quia immortalis, utique et incorruptibilis, utroque, invicem sibi et in se conexione mutua perplexa et ad statum aeternitatis vicaria concatenatione producta, et immortalitate de incorruptione descendente et incorruptione de immortalitate veniente.
IV.27. He is therefore immortal and incorruptible, experiencing no sort of diminution or ending at all. For since He is incorruptible, He is for that very reason immortal; and because He is immortal, He is of course incorruptible. Both of these qualities are bound together in a mutual relationship which is maintained through all eternity, immortality flowing from incorruptibility, and incorruptibility coming from immortality\(^{(1)}\).

\(^{(1)}\) Compare Theoph., Ad Auto. ii.4: "Furthermore as God is immutable because He is uncreated, if matter is uncreated it must also be immutable, and equal to God; for what is created is changeable and mutable, while the uncreated is unchangeable and immutable." Also Lactantius, Div. Inst. i.3 (which may be a reflection of Novatian's teaching on the bond between incorruptibility and immortality): "But if destruction is far removed from God, because He is incorruptible and eternal, it follows that the divine power is incapable of division."
V.28 Cuius etiamsi iracundias legimus et indignationes quasdam descriptas tenemus et odia relata cognoscimus, non tamen haec intellegimus ad humanorum relata esse exempla vitiorum, haec enim omnia, etsi hominem possunt corrumpere, divinam vim non possunt omnino vitiarum passiones enim istae in hominibus merito esse di-

centur, in deo non merito iudicatur. corrumpi enim per, haec homo potest, quia corrumpi potest; corrumpi per haec deus non potest, quia neque corrumpi potest. habent igitur ista vim suam, quam exerceant, sed ubi praecedet passibilis materia, non ubi praecedet impassibilis substantia.
V. 28. But what if we read of His wrath, and contemplate certain descriptions of His indignation, and know that there are accounts of His hatred? Well, we are not to understand these on the same level (1) as similar human vices. All of these can corrupt human nature, but they can in no sense impair the Divine Power (2). Such actions as these are rightly called passions in men, but they cannot be properly so judged in God. Man can be corrupted by them, because he is capable of corruption; God cannot be corrupted by them, because He is not capable of corruption. Thus they have a power of their own, which they can exercise where they find material capable of passion, not where they find substance (3) incapable of passion (4).

(1) realities in God are not on the same level as those in man...- There is the understanding in Novatian, as well as the other early Church Writers, that when we predicate words of God which we use in ordinary human experience, there must occur a certain shift in meaning though the same word has to be used (for we have no non-human words). There must be a recognition by those using the words (human characteristics applied to God) that there has to be an adaptation in the meaning of the words when they are applied for example to a finite subject, and then to an infinite subject. They cannot be "on the same level" but must have a shift in meaning
appropriate to the subject to which they are attached. But on the other hand—in accordance with the stoic realism of names—even where there is an appropriate shift in meaning between the divine and human subjects, the meaning is still not totally different (for this would be no help to man—and God speaks our language for the express purpose of helping us—see V.29: "These expressions are used by God as medicine for our souls"). The relationship then is neither univocal, nor equivocal, but analogical. Tertullian expresses this analogical shift in meaning in _Ady.Wac_.ii.16: "And all these He experiences in His own way, in which it is fitting that He should experience them."

(2) actions that corrupt man cannot impair the Divine Power...

Novatian is taking the middle analogical way in explaining the actions of God. One cannot make a direct equation of wrath in God, and as did the world view lying behind many of the Greek and Roman myths. Nor can one on the opposite side make such a radical differentiation between e.g. wrath in God and in man that there is finally absolutely no relationship between the two: so that one denies that there is any such thing as wrath in God. This second alternative seems to have been the main philosophical argument that Novatian and other early theologians had to overcome. Some forms of Greek Philosophy so stressed the transcendence of God (e.g. Aristotle's unmoved mover—especially in later Middle Academic and then Neo-Platonic
interpretation); Plato's indescribable deity in Tim. 28c, the utterly removed God of the Epicureans; plus the "good" god of the Gnostics, who was entirely above any relation to the material creation or to any emotion, decision, or movement that could be involved in such a relation (such as wrath, love) — that they were not prepared to admit that any sort of reality lay behind a word such as wrath when applied to God. Novatian, Irenaeus, Lactantius, and others deny this equivocal line of thought by showing that there can be a reality behind words such as wrath, when applied to God if one understands the "emotions" or actions of the subject in light of the subject. This is what Irenaeus is doing in Adv. Ha. ii. 4, 5, 21, etc., against the Gnostics (they are inconsistent, he shows, in denying movement in God, and affirming it in the "aeons" that proceed from Him. If God is utterly impassible—so must be the aeons.) Lactantius deals with this problem in De Ira Dei xi, when he speaks against the philosophers and poets who confess one supreme God: "Since they believe that He is always beneficent and free from the corruption of passions, think that He is neither angry with anyone, nor needs any worship." In other words these men took a correct insight (that wrath in God and in man is not the same) too far—that there is no relationship at all; and thus no corresponding reality in God. This would be disastrous for true piety. Lactantius avoids this pitfall by taking the "middle realist way." So does Novatian.
Novatian gets around the objection that if there is any reality of wrath in God, it would corrupt his nature in V.29, where he says: "(such actions) come from the reason (or purposes) of God—not from vice or weakness." Thus he maintains the reality of a wrath—properly understood—in God against an extreme dualistic transcendentalism.

(3) The concept of impassibility in God...—The Old Testament teaching of the transcendence of the Infinite Creator God that was so fully expressed in the thought of Late Judaism (e.g. Philo, and the Targums, which tend to avoid mentioning the very name of God by means of various paraphrases) had to be emphasized by early Christian Theology against its Hellenistic background. On the one hand against the immanentism of the old mythological culture that saw God or gods as essentially projections of humanity (stronger, higher, but not transcendent) and against stoic pantheism, and on the other hand against a dualistic transcendentalism (see note (2)) which perhaps had roots in Plato's thought (and ultimately from Pythagoreanism and earlier) which was taken up by the Gnostics and perverted into the doctrine that the true God is utterly transcendent, utterly impassible, and can have no relation to the material, passible sphere. Both of these extremes are unbiblical, and are rejected by the Church Fathers. Nevertheless the Fathers had considerable difficulty in bringing together the doctrine of the transcendence and impassibility, of the nature of God, and the
doctrine that the very heart of God was involved in the active passion of the Incarnation and Atonement. In fact as H. Kung points out, even the Orthodox Fathers came fairly close at times to failure in avoiding the Platonic transcendental doctrine of God: "Danach wird schon zu Beginn der christlichen Theologie der Satz von der Leidensunfähigkeit Gottes nicht eigentlich aus der Schrift begründet, er tritt vielmehr als selbstverständliches Axiom auf, praktisch übernommen aus der Gotteslehre Platons. Nur zu oft erblickt man hinter dem Christusbild "das unbewegliche, affektlose Antlitz des Gottes Platons, vermehrt um einige Züge der stoischen Ethik" (quoting W. Elert, Der Ausgang der altkirchlichen Christologie, p.74) in H. Küng, "Kann Gott leiden?" Exkurs II- Menschengewordnung Gottes, Freiburg, 1970, p.631. We will see how Novatian strives to work this out in later portions of De Tr. Here we have to note some of the earlier patristic teaching on "impassibility" that is likely to have influenced Novatian in his affirmation of impassibilitas substantiae. (Here we pass by Philo—see V.29). Ignatius of Antioch says in Ad Polyc.iii: "Wait for him...who for our sakes became visible, who cannot be touched, who cannot suffer, who for our sakes accepted suffering"; Ad.Eph.viii.2: "He was first passible, then impassible"; Justin, Apol.1.25.2: "God unbegotten and impassible (ἀπαθέος)"; Athenag. Legat.viii and x: "God is impassible"; Irenaeus, Adv.Hr.iii.17.6: (In the Incarnation) "The invisible was made visible, and the incomprehensible comprehensible, and the impassible possible." These
preceeding places while accepting the fact of the impassible nature of God, show that it was his purpose in some sense to be made passible in Christ. Thus the earlier Fathers had to combat an extreme transcendentalism. In only a few years the truth that they had maintained was taken too far by certain heretics who said that not only had God the Father been involved in the passion of Christ, but that it was the Father Himself who became passible and died. Thus Tertullian and Hippolytus have to stress anew the impassibility of the Father in order to restore the balance. See Hippol., Contra Nast.ix.10; x.27 (denying that the impassible Father suffers and dies); and Tert., Adv.Præ.i (refuting the claim that they "crucified the Father"). From Hippolytus' writing (Philosop.ix.11) we know that Pope Callistus of Rome taught that the Father was not susceptible to suffering. Methodius of Olympus (Symp.viii.10) refutes Sabellius for teaching "that the Almighty had suffered." Tertullian to safeguard against these widespread heretical views teaches not just the impassibility of the Father, but also the essential impassibility of Christ in respect to His divinity. Cfr. Præ.xiv: "The Son in respect of His divinity is invisible" - which point Novatian brings out in De Tr.XXV: "Not the divine, but the human taken up in the divine suffers." Alexandrian Theology is equally insistent on the impassibility of God. Clement Alex. in Strom.v.11,12, says that where divine anger and threatenings are spoken of, there is no intention to ascribe affections (____)
to God. In *Strom.*vi.9, Christ is said to be altogether impassible, but then in vi.8, he says: Christ suffered because of His love towards us." *Strom.*vii.2 shows that "Christ assumed our flesh to train it to impassibility." Origen in *De Prn.*ii.4.4, speaks of the impassibility of God and "anger" that the Old Testament attributes to Him. In *Num.* Hom.xxiii.2, he explains: "Now all these sayings in which God is spoken of as sorrowing or rejoicing or hating or being glad are to be understood as uttered by the Scripture after an allegorical and human manner. The divine nature is altogether separated from every affection of passion and change, and remains unmoved and unshaken forever on that pearl of blessedness." Gregory Thaumat. writes an entire treatise on this question of "whether the impassible God can suffer." He tries to answer it by drawing a distinction between will and nature, which clash in man, but are harmonious in God. In other words, if God purposefully wills for Christ to suffer then it does not detract from the essential impassibility of His nature (see this in more detail under V.29). Methodious of Olympus says in *De Cruce et Passione Christi* (Migne, P.G.xviii,pp.398-403): "In the possible, He remained impassible." H. Kung correctly states against Harnack that the compelling interest in the impassibility of God in early Christian theology does not primarily come from Hellenistic philosophical speculation, though this does have some influence; but more from the question of 'Who is Jesus Christ?' - "Harnacks ritschlianisch
bestimmte These von der Hellenisierung des Evangeliums-sowie die ähnlichen Auffassungen der grossen Dogmengeschichtler Loofs und Seeberg-können gerade in der Christologie nicht ohne Korrekturen übernommen werden. Neue philosophische Begriffe wurden nicht bloß um der metaphysischen Spekulation willen in die Christliche Theologie eingeführt, sondern um der konkreten Person Jesu Christi willen (so schon das Wort "Logos" im Johannesprolog), und der christologische Dogmatisierungsprozess war bei allen fremd einflussen doch auch immer wieder neu bestimmt von konkreten Christusbild der Schrift und insbesondere der synoptischen Evangelien" (op.cit.,pp. 622,623). It is significant however that methodologically Novatian does not primarily approach this question of the impassibility of God from a Christological viewpoint (though this is indeed brought in later). He approaches it as he seeks a fuller understanding of the nature of God's infinity (rather than at the point of His personhood). One wonders whether his starting point with the truth of God's infinitude (and its implications-immortality and impassibility) rather than the truth of His Personhood (as revealed in Christ) does not adversely affect his understanding of redemption and particularly forgiveness (resulting in his schism.) More positively however we will see further on in De Tr. how Novatian tries to bring some solution to this problem of impassibility / Incarnation through his Stoic understanding of the limitations of
language, realism of names, and thus his use of the hypothetical syllogism: with resulting open concepts, which are more "significations" (IV.26) than descriptions.

(4) **substance** (incapable of passion) contrasted to (passible) material — A brief survey of the background of this word will help us to see how Novatian uses it. In Tertullian, **substantia** seems to mean about the same thing as nature. D'Aës (in _La Théologie de Tert._) points this out in his study of the use of **substantia** in **Adv. Prax.** — especially **Prax. ii:** "unius autem substantia et unius status et unius potestatus, quia unus deus..." et also **De Arm. xx:** "concludimus omnia naturalia animae ut substantia eius ipsi insesse et cum ipsa procedere atque proficere." D'Aës shows that in Tertullian **substantia** is a term equivalent to **status,** which "Signifie nature ou réalité." The real crux of the meaning of substance (and **status**) is brought out by its usage in **De Fug. iv:** "non sensus hominis praesidicat statui rerum, sed status sensui..." on which d'Aës comments: "**Status** s'oppose ici à **sensus,** comme la réalité objective a l'appréciation subjective" (op.cit., p.81). Thus "objective reality" is the main sense that **substantia** bears in Ante-Nicene Latin Theology. Because of the stoic materialist background of Hellenistic thought, the usage of **substantia** as "objective reality", even when applied to God, raised problems of material, physical imagery. In Cyprian for example, the word is used to mean the same thing as **foundation** (and though 'spiritual
'foundation' is intended, inevitably the picture of physical structure is raised) - see De Un. Eccl. Treatise iii.11, where he uses the word in quoting Jer. 23:21? "If they had stood on my foundation..." Now we see that the main problem that Novatian and the earlier theologians had with this word was to maintain the concept of "objective reality" without identifying with or reducing it to a material, physically encompassed thing. Prestige in God in Patristic Thought shows how the concept of substantia (σωματικόν and μορφωτικόν in Greek Theology) was taken from the physical realm, and then applied to God. Particularly concerning Greek Theology, he notes that σωματικόν and μορφωτικόν were fluid concepts before Nicea (not having yet received their specific technical definitions). But nonetheless "hypostasis came to mean content or substance in general" (p.166): as in Iren., Adv. Hr. i.15.5; Hippol., Ref. i.8.5; Origen, Cels. vi.71; Cyril of Jerus., Cat. Ort. ix.5. These and other places show how the ordinary physical concept of substance was taken and applied in a different, and more appropriate way to the reality of God. "In Theology a certain use is made of this conception as applied to the content or substance of God, corresponding to what in the case of ordinary objects constitutes their determinative extension... the "substance" of God means the divine 'content', whether the actual term employed is οὐσία or hypostasis. To the mind of the Fathers down to the time at which the terminology became fixed and technical, the practical meaning
of the two terms was substantially identical. They both indicated, to take the inevitable physical metaphor, the particular slab of material stuff which constitutes a given object... and neither term is used in a generic sense" (Prestige, op.cit., pp.166-168). We notice that Novatian here in Tr.V.28 opposes substantia to materia. In doing this he is trying to overcome the physical connotations of a word such as substantia when applied to God. Two points stand out in Novatian's thought on this. First, against his Stoic background he denies that reality (substantia - "objective reality") has to be material. Here he is making a definite theological advance over Tertullian, who still held the Stoic view that anything real-even spirit (Prax.vii) had to be material. But secondly, and now in agreement with his Stoic background (epistemologically) he lets the reality of the subject (the infinite, immortal, uncreated Creator) determine the meaning of the name or adjective (i.e. substantia) that is here attributed to Him. Novatian showed in V.27 that words can "signify" reality in God without literally describing Him. So here the word "substance" signifies that there is objective reality in God, without identifying this with material reality that we know in man. As we saw in note (1) - V.28, since God is an Infinite Subject, words used of Him cannot be "on the same level" as those used of finite man. There has to be a shift in language when it is applied to God so that the meaning of words are appropriate to the subject by being open to determination by the reality of his nature.
as it is known \textit{a posteriori}. Novatian's cognizance of this necessary shift was aided by the stoic epistemology of open statements referring analogies and words directly to God's nature—so that they are not enclosed in and reduced to \textit{a priori} concepts based on man's nature.
V.29. Nam et quod irascitur deus, non ex vitio eius venit, sed ad remedium nostri illud facit. indulgens est enim etiam tunc, cum minatur, dum per haec homines ad recta revocantur. nam quibus ad honestam vitam deest ratio, metus est necessarius, ut qui rationem reliquerunt, vel terrore moveantur. et ideo omnes istae vel iracundiae dei vel odia vel quaecumque sunt huissamodi, dum ad medicinam nostram proferuntur, ut res docet, ex consilio, non ex vitio venerunt nec ex fragilitate descendunt; propter quod etiam ad corrumpendum deum valere non possunt. materiarum enim in nobis, ex quibus sumus, diversitas ad iracundiae consuetit corrumpentem nos excitare discordiam, quae in deo vel ex natura vel ex vitio non potest esse, dum non utique ex coagmentis corporalibus intelligitur esse constructus. est enim simplex et sine ulla corporea concretione, quicquid illud est totus, quod se solus scit esse, quandoquidem spiritus sit dictus.
V.29. Wrath on the part of God does not come from vice in Him, but is used as a remedy for us (1). He is kind even when He threatens, for through this He calls men back to the right way. Fear is necessary where reason is not sufficient to make men live virtuously (2), so that those who have forsaken reason may be moved by terror. Therefore all those expressions of wrath, hatred, and so forth on the part of God are set before us, as experience teaches, as medicine for our souls. They come from the purposes of God, not from vice or weakness (3). It is impossible for them therefore to cause corruption in God. The diversity of the materials of which we are made constantly arouses in us the corrupting discord of anger (4). But this cannot exist in God, where it could flow from neither vice nor nature; since his nature is not constructed from a collection of corporeal elements. That which He alone knows Himself to be, whatever be the sum total of His Being is simple, and free from any bodily mixture. Thus He is called Spirit (5).

(1) "wrath" does not come from vice in God...—Philo was explaining this to the Hellenistic world before the early Christian apologists—whom he likely influenced. Cfr. Quod Deus xi (37): (discussing Gen.6:7 - "I was wrath"): "Some suppose that the Existent feels wrath... whereas He is not susceptible to any passion at all..." (Here Philo seems to make wrath a non-entity in God). He
goes on to add, in a way similar to Novatian, the reason for Script-
tural usage of this word: "All the same the lawgiver uses such exp-
ressions just so far as they serve for a kind of elementary lesson
to admonish those who could not otherwise be brought to their senses"
(Ibid.). Tertullian in explaining wrath in God, takes a very differ-
ent approach than Philo. Tertullian is careful to show that divine
wrath is not a non-entity - e.g. Adv. Marc. II.xvi: "...For we do not
possess them (i.e. sensations and emotions) in perfection, because
it is God alone who is perfect...Angry He will possibly be, but not
irritated, nor dangerously tempted. All appliances He must needs use,
because of all contingencies...all these affections He is moved by
in that peculiar manner of His own in which it is profoundly fit
that He should be affected; and it is owing to Him that man is also
similarly affected in a way which is equally his own." Tertullian
is not so precise as Novatian in showing that wrath in God is dif-
ferent from wrath in man. He does of course hold this—but more in
the sense of via eminentior, which has been greatly misused in much
natural theology. Novatian is between Philo and Tertullian. He holds
with Philo that wrath in God cannot be like that in man, but with
Tertullian he does not reduce it to a mere non-entity. Yet unlike
Tertullian (and here he is helped by his background in stoic epist-
emology, with its constant viewing of the actions of a subject in
light of the nature of that subject) he does not differentiate
wrath in God from that in man by merely "raising" wrath to the
nth degree of perfection. He refers it to the very nature of God - i.e. V.29: "But this cannot exist in God, where it could flow from neither vice nor nature; since His nature is not construed from a collection of corporeal elements." Once again Novatian examines Scriptural statements in the light of the infinity of God - which means a necessary shift in understanding of the language employed. Lactantius was influenced by Novatian in his thoughts on this subject. His approach in De Ira Dei is somewhat different from Novatian in De Tr., though he makes use of the concept of the nature of God making His wrath a necessarily different thing. His main argument for wrath as a true entity is that wrath belongs to the very existence of "imperium dei." Remove one, and you remove the other.

(2) Fear is necessary where reason is not sufficient... Vogt (op.cit., p.106) believes that Novatian must stress fear as an instrument to make man behave, because he is completely Stoic in not following free will as an actual power of man's soul: "...dass er den Willen nicht einmal für eine eigene Seelenpotenz halt, womit er sich in die Tradition der Stoa stellt." Weyer as well (op.cit., p.39-note 7) thinks Novatian has a stoic low view of free will: "Für ihn (Novatian) ist der Wille keine selbständige seelische Funktion, sondern mit dem Verstand gegeben, durch den das Begehren ausgelost und in seiner Richtung bestimmt wird." Vogt holds that Novatian's idea of lack of free will causes him to have no theory of objective guilt, and thus perverts his doctrine of grace,
redemption, and forgiveness—culminating in his church schism. Whether such evidence as we have for Novatian's view on free will can bear such weight of interpretation, we must discuss later. Since the other earlier Fathers whom Novatian follows in so many ways clearly teach free will (e.g. Justin, I Apol. xlii, 1-8; II Apol. vii, 9; Dial. lxxxviii, 5; cii, 4, etc.; Tatian, Grat. viii, 11; Athenag., Res. xviii; Theoph., Ad Aut. ii. 27; Iren., Adv. Ev. iv. 7; iv. 40, 1-2; iv. 43. 3; iv. 44. 3; Demonst. 11; Hippolt., Refut. x. 33; Tert. Adv. Marc. 11. 9; De Am. xxii, 1, 2; xx. 5; xxxviii, 6; Idol. ix; M. M. Felix, Octv. xxxvi. 1. One would not expect him to deviate too far from them in this respect. Furthermore it is not clear that the Stoics taught pure fatalism. In fact the origin of much of their peculiar form of dialectic comes from their attempt to maintain moral responsibility on the basis of free choice, and yet to hold to an optimistically deterministic world system. None-theless it is true that the Stoics never give free will an important place in the soul's makeup (as one can see from their teaching on the ἑρμηνευτικά — see introduction). At least we can affirm that Novatian has some idea of free will from Tr. I. 5 (man's fall by his own choice) — though his view of free will is insufficient.

(3) Wrath proceeds from purpose in God, not vice or weakness... We find that he follows the stoic procedure all through this section (ch. IV, V, VI) of referring actions that are predicated of God to the reality of His nature as an Infinite Person, to keep
from making the categorical mistake of equating human actions with related divine actions. He does the same here. Mozely (The Impassibility of God, Cambridge, 1926) makes the pertinent observation that Hellenistic philosophical thought held that the passions had a destructive effect upon the substance of the person in whom they were operative (pp. 45, 49, 50). Novatian then had to show that wrath in God could not be destructive of his substance, because his substance was not liable—contrary to man's—to corruption. If corruptibility can be predicated as a cause for wrath in man (as well as suffering its results) this cannot therefore be the case. What then could be the cause of wrath in God? His reason or "purposes" is the answer given. To quote Mozely: "Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics exalted the principle of reason above everything else in their various accounts of human nature. As a parallel with what Novatian says about anger, references may be made to the Republic viii, 586c, e, where Plato argues that no satisfaction is to be obtained in anger if it is pursued 'apart from reason and mind.' Weber (History of Philosophy, pp. 128 sqq., Eng. trs.) interpreting Aristotle's doctrine of man, points out the preeminence for Aristotle of "the active intellect" ( νοῦς ἐν ἔννοιᾳ). It is the one, divine, immaterial and impassible thing in man. It alone is able to conceive the universal and the divine and "enjoy the privilege of immortality." For Stoicism the human ideal is the wise man, who is wholly rational. So in
his Hymn, Cleanthes speaks of the noble life as the intelligent obedience to the one rational principle (logos) of all things" (Mozely, pp.45,46 -note 2). But Novatian understands more by reason than the proceeding Hellenistic philosophical idea—though that is involved. It is mentioned in this chapter in the context of God's condescending "mission" to stoop down and raise us up (as we have seen earlier - e.g. III.18). There is an intimate link between the "reason" that is brought forward here, and God's gracious purposes. Thus we have translated the word as "purposes" in V.29, and "design" in V.30.

(4) The diversity of the materials of which we are made constantly arouses in us the corruptive discord of anger... This statement is a negative illustration of what the Fathers meant by simplex (simplicity) in God—see VI.36: "unum et simplex et semper est."

(5) God is free from any bodily mixture. He is Spirit... Up to the time of Novatian there were two general lines of thought concerning the "substance" of God within Orthodox Theology. Some Fathers took a rather materialist view of God: e.g. Athenagoras (who seems ambivalent on the subject) rejects a gross corporality of God for a "superior" corporality - Leg.xx. Some have thought that Melito of Sardis held to the corporality of God (Gennadius says so in his Liber ecclesiasticorum dogmatum iv; and Origen mentions a writing of his, which by its title must have referred to the
corporality of God, and not to the Incarnation of Christ — though some have interpreted the title in this way — elvat τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνου τοῦ Θεοῦ In Gen.1.26). But it seems very unlikely that Melito in fact believed in the corporality of God. Tertullian above all following this central stoic dogma, taught that God had to be corporeal to be real; as Augustine said: "He believed that the soul was corporal...for fear that it would be nothing if it were not body" (De Gen.ad Litt.x.25,41 — P.L. xxxiv,427). Tertullian says in Prax.vii: "For who will deny that God is body, although God is a Spirit? For spirit is body of its own kind, in its own form."

He speaks of divini corporis — Adv.Marc.11.16 (though in that place he makes it clear that God does not literally have a human body such as ours). To affirm "body" means to affirm reality; so he opposes "spiritual body" to "human body" (two types of reality) in Adv.Marc.v.8. In De An. v, he quotes Zeno, that "spirit is body."

He speaks of the "corporal soul" in De Reg.Carn.xv and liii. Theophilus in Ad Auto.11.13, mentions "corporal spirit" as does Clement of Alexandria in Strom.vi.71. But there was another stream of patristic thought that did not hold this materialist view. Origen in C. Cels.vii.49, refutes the followers of Zeno, who held God has a body. Up to the time of Novatian, there were two streams of teaching in Orthodox Christianity concerning the nature of God; one affirming His materiality, the other His spirituality. After Novat-
ian's clear affirmation of God as pure Spirit there was (at least in the West) only one line; God is spiritual, not corporal – as is seen in Lactantius, Hilary, Augustine, etc.
V.30. *Et ideo haec, quae in hominibus vitiosa sunt et corrup-\textsuperscript{tia}, dum ex corporis ipsius et materiae corruptibilitate nascuntur, in deo corruptibilitatis vim exercere non possunt, quoniam quidem\textsuperscript{a} ut diximus, non ex vitio, sed ratione venerunt.*
V.30. Thus these things which in men are vicious and corrupting, since they arise from the corruptible material of his body, cannot exercise their power of corruptibility in God; since, as we have said, they come from design, not from vice.
VI.31. Et licet scriptura caelestis\(^1\) ad humanam formam faciem divinam saepe convertat, dum dicit: oculi domini super iustos\(^2\), aut dum: odoratus est dominus deus odorèm bonae fragrantiae\(^3\); aut dum traduntur Moysi tabulae scriptae digito dei\(^4\); aut dum populus filiorum Israel de terra Aegypti, manu valida et bracchio excelso\(^5\) liberatur; aut dum dicit: os enim domini locutum est hæc\(^6\); aut dum: terra scabellum pedum\(^7\) dei esse perhibetur; aut dum dicit: inclina aurem tuam et audi\(^8\): sed nos qui dicimus, quia lex spiritu- alis est\(^9\), non intra hæc nostri corporis lineamenta modum aut figuram divinae maiestatis includimus, sed suis illam interminatae magnitudinis, ut ita dixerim\(^10\), campis sine ullo fine diffundimus. scriptum est enim: si ascendero in caelum, tu ibi es, si descendero ad infernos, ades; et si assumpero alas meas et abiero trans mare, ibi manus tua apprehendet me et dextera tua detinebit me\(^11\).

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\(^1\) scriptura caelestis- This expression is rare in other Christian writings, but very frequent in Novatian - e.g. chapters XIX, XXI, XXIII, XXX-twice; and in Spec. I. It is found only once in Cyprian (Laps. xxiii). Melin states: "Apud alios, ut mihi videtur, admonendum rara est, neque enim Tertullianus neque Minucius Felix neque Arnobius neque Lactantius ullam exemplum, quantum scio præbet" (op. cit., p.116). Elsewhere this expression is apparently to be found only in
Hilary, *In Matth.19.*, I; Cassiod., *Inst. Div.* xxii; Pseudo-Cyr. (Sixtus II?) *Ad Novt.* ii; *Ad Vigilium Episcopum* iv. D’Alès suggests that the passage in *Ad Novt.* ii, may be making allusion to its constant usage in Novatian: "Est-ce par allusion à une expression particulièrement frérente chez Novatien, que l'auteur de l'Ad Novt. dit, 2, p. 54, 20: "Audite, igitur, Novatiani, apud quos scripturae caelestis leguntur potius quam intelleguntur" (D'Alès, *Le Corpus de Novt.*, Rech. de Sc. Kl., *loc. cit.*).

2 *Ps. 33:* 16  3 *Gen. 8:* 21  4 *Ex.* 31: 18  5 *Ps. 135:* 12

10 *ut ita dixerim...* - This expression "qualifies the metaphor", as Fausset points out (*op. cit.*, p. 19-note 10). It is an expression indicative of the literary quality of Novatian's writing, and is used elsewhere to qualify statements and for smooth transition: e.g. *Cib.* iv; *Spc.* ii - "hoc in loco non immerito dixerim"; *Tr.* XXI. 121; XXII. 126 - "ut ita dixerim."

11 *Ps. 138:* 8–10
VI.31 It is true that the heavenly Scriptures often attribute human shapes(1) to the Divine Appearance. For example it says: "The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous"; or "The Lord smelled a sweet savour"; or tables "written with the finger of God" are given to Moses. Or again the children of Israel are delivered from the Land of Egypt "with mighty hand and stretched out arm." It says "the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it", and the earth is asserted to be "the footstool of God." Also it says: "Incline thine ears and hear. But we who say that "the law is spiritual"(2) do not enclose within the outline of our bodily frame either the mode of existence or the shape of the Divine Majesty. On the contrary we extend it infinitely, so to speak, over the field of its own unbounded greatness(3). For the Scriptures say: "If I ascend into heaven, Thou art there; If I go down to hell, Thou are there also; if I take my wings and depart across the sea, there shall thy hand hold me, and thy right hand shall keep me."

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(1)human shapes to the Divine Appearance...-This problem was dealt with in Late Judaism and in Christian Theology from its inception. Cfr. Philo, Leg. Alleg.i.xiii (p.171, Loeb tr.): (commenting on 'He breathed into man the breath of life'): "It is monstrous folly to think God employs breathing organs"; I.xiv (p.175) - "It is impiety to suppose that God tills the soil..." Justin often treats this theme - e.g. Dial.cxiv: (commenting on 'the heavens are
the works of thy fingers') "Unless I understand his method of using words, I shall not understand intelligently, but just as your teachers suppose, fancying that the Father of all, the unbegotten God has hands and feet; and fingers, and a soul, like a composite; and they for this reason teach that it was the Father Himself who appeared to Abraham and to Jacob..." Also in Clement Alex., Strom. v. xi: "Wherefore let no one imagine that hands and feet, and mouth and eyes, and going in and coming out, and resentments, and threats are said by the Hebrews to be attributes of God. By no means; but that certain of these appellations are used more sacredly in an allegorical sense..." We will see directly how Novatian refers anthropomorphisms to be understood in the light of God's essential nature of Infinity, which accommodates itself to the abilities of the human mind.

(2) we who say the 'law is spiritual'... -Novatian may be contrasting his teaching ("we") to that of Melito of Sardis as it is also combatted by Origen in Catena Ergan., Delarue, ii.25. See Ammudsen (op. cit., p.29) where he refers on this matter to Butler's article in Journal of Theological Studies, Oct.1900, p.114. Although Novatian teaches that the Scriptures have a spiritual meaning, he never follows the extreme allegorism of the Alexandrian School (Clement, Origen) even in his typological De Cibis (which in a few places does indulge in slight allegory).
He generally follows a historical-typological explanation of Old Testament. Probably the reason he refers to the law as "spiritual" is to combat the Marcionites, who—as Harnack points out (Marcion, Leipzig, 1924, p. 259sq) — took literally every anthropomorphism in the Old Testament further to differentiate between the "bad" creator God and the "good" God.

(3) over the field of its own unbounded greatness... —Novatian understands the names of God and anthropomorphisms in light of the nature of God as an Infinite Person, who has by this means accommodated Himself to be known. Thus with the Stoics he understands attributions and actions of a subject in light of the nature of the subject; and with Scripture, he understands the revelation of God to man as essentially redemptive on the behalf of man.
VI.32. Rationem enim divinae scripturae de temperamento dispositionis cognoscimus. parabolis enim adhuc, secundum fidei tempus, de deo prophetes tunc loquebatur, non quomodo deus erat, sed quomodo populus capere poterat. ut igitur haec sic de deo dicantur, non deo, sed populo potius imputetur sic et tabernaculum erigere populo permittitur, nec tamen deus intra tabernaculum clusus continentur. sic et templum exstruitur, nec tamen deus intra templi angustias omnino saepitur. non igitur mediocris est deus, sed populi mediocris est sensus, nec angustus deus, sed rationis populi angustus est intellectus habitus.

1parabolis enim...populus capere poterat - see the like expression in Tractus Orig.p.10 (probably by Gregory of Elvira), modeled on Novatian: "non enim lex et prophetae sic de deo loquebantur quomodo deus erat, sed quomodo homo capere poterat."

mediocris...—See Pseudo-Cyr., De Laud. Mart. ix. xviii: "humana mediocritas"; and Tert. Adv. Marc. ii. 27: "mediocritati"; a word used to express the limitations of man's finiteness as contrasted to God's infinity.

3Scheidweiler in his study on the text of Novatian (with particular reference to metrical, clausula-endings) comments on the rather difficult grammatical construction of this sentence: "nec angustus deus, sed rationis populi angustus est intellectus habitus."
He says (op.cit., p.70): "Aber das est würde ich umstellen: 'intelli-
ectus est habitus' ergibt dann kl $1^{3}\gamma \xi$ (his particular symbol for a popular metrical ending with Novatian). Der Sinn ist: eng ist der geistige Horizont des Volkes." This change would make a more simple construction, but without any textual evidence, such an emendation would seem to us unjustified.
VI.32. To understand the meaning of the divine Scriptures, we must remember the principle of accommodation. Thus in olden days the prophet spoke about God in parables which were appropriate to the period reached in the development of faith as the people were able to receive their message, not as literally describing God. The necessity for speaking of God in such language must be attributed to the people, not to God. On the same principle the people were allowed to erect the tabernacle, although God cannot be contained within the limits of a tent. Thus the Temple is erected, though certainly God cannot be boxed up within the narrow confines of a temple. Therefore it is not God who is limited, but the understanding of the people is limited. God is not straitened, but the reasoning powers of the human intellect are straitened.

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(1) the principle of accommodation... Here we follow the paraphrase of H. Moore (op. cit., p. 37) which expresses the meaning of Novatian better than a literal translation, which would be "the moderation of its ordering." See note 8 under III.17 on the various uses of dispositio in early Christian Theology and in Novatian.

(2) the period reached in the development of faith... Novatian has a lucid historical understanding of the differing stages of development in the revelation of God to His people.
Novatian may have been helped in his historical sense by Hippolytus, who saw the doctrine of the Trinity itself (that is to say man's understanding of it) was involved in historical development - especially with regard to the Deity of the Holy Spirit: "The economy as being one of harmony leads to one God; for God is one. It is the Father who commands, and the Son who obeys, and the Holy Spirit who gives understanding (συναδελφόν); the Father who is above all, and the Son who is through all, and the Holy Spirit who is in all. And we cannot otherwise think of one God, but by believing in truth in Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit. For the Jews glorified the Father, but gave Him not thanks, for they did not recognize the Son. The disciples recognized the Son, but not in the Holy Spirit (here we see Hippolytus' sense of historical development or "stages" in faith - i.e. the disciples did not at first recognize (says Hippolytus) the Holy Spirit - this developed at a later stage) wherefore they also denied Him. The Father's Word therefore, knowing the economy and will of the Father, to wit, that the Father seeks to be worshipped in some other way than this, gave this charge to the disciples after He rose from the dead: "Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and Son, and Holy Ghost" (Mt. 28:19). And by this He showed that whosoever omitted any one of these failed in glorifying God perfectly. For it is through this Trinity (συναδελφόν) that the Father is glorified. For
the Father willed, the Son did, the Spirit manifested. The whole Scriptures then proclaim this truth"—Contra Noetum, xiv. This sense of a historical development in God's revelation of Himself seems to have been particularly sharpened in the minds of the Christian Apologists through their polemic with the synagogue; as they endeavoured to show how Christ was not a totally new revelation, but a perfection and fulfilling of the old economy, for which the world was not ready until "the fullness of time" (Gal. 4:4). Justin maintains this throughout his Dialogue with the Jew Trypho, and in II Apol. xiii, he distinguishes two developing stages in faith: one the "implanted word" and the other the Word Incarnate. This fuller revelation was given in accordance with the "capacity of faith": "For the seed and intimation imparted according to capacity is one thing, and quite another is the thing itself, of which there is the participation and imitation according to the grace which is from Him"—Ibid. Clement Alex. also sees the "enigma of prophecy" and the later fullness of revelation in Christ as a historical development connected with the capacity of the people—Strom. v, viii, though his main interest there—and elsewhere—is not so much the development from Judaism to Christianity, as it is of the development of "simple" faith to mature "gnostic" faith within Christianity. It is important to place this teaching of Novatian on the developing stages of faith into its context—where he sees it as part of the "missio" in which God reaches down to man,
accomodating Himself so that gradually mankind may be lifted up in Christ back into the fullness of the life of God.

(3) as the people were able to receive their message, not as literally describing God...—the fact that revelation is given in a way that can be received by the people at any particular stage was noted in Philo and in later Christian Theology. See Philo, Quod Deus xvii: "The Creator knowing His own surpassing excellence... and the natural weakness of His creatures...will not to dispense benefit or punishment according to His power, but according to the measure of capacity (in man)”; De D.xiii—"Why then does Moses speak of feet and hands...jealousy, wrath...? To benefit all whom his work reaches" (the better people already know better and do not need it, but) "those whose nature is dense and dull." (Here Philo is like Clement Alex. in implying that some "spiritual" persons could know God without the anthropomorphisms of scriptural revelation. Novatian rightly differs from them both in presupposing the universal need for God's accomodation in feeble human language such as anthropomorphism. The "better" people need it as well as the "dense and dull"). Philo brings this problem up very often—De Sacr. Abel. xxix (to say 'God swore an oath') "is a mere crutch for our weakness"; xxx (the phrase 'as a man cherisheth his son') "is not used of God in its literal sense, but it is a term used in figure, a word of help to our feeble apprehension"; In Guest. in Gen. iv.(p.281,Loeb tr.) he says that God's words "I will go
down" are "an accommodation to our nature." Justin Martyr, following
the train of Philo makes similar observations. He explains
circumstances to Trypho (Dial.xix) "...Wherefore God, accomodat-
ing Himself to that nation enjoined them also to offer sacrifices
as if to His name, in order that you might serve idols." See also
Dial.lvii, on God "eating food" - Gen.18; and xcix (in the context
of Ps.22:1 and Christ): "Even as there was no ignorance on God's
part when He asked Adam where he was, or asked Cain where Abel was;
but (it was done) to convince each what kind of man he was, and in
order that through the (Scriptural record) we might have a knowled-
ge of all..." Clement Alex. in Strom.v.xiii states that names of
God are given to help us—not God. Origen summarizes well the whole
principle in C.Cels.lxxi: "But...Celsus not understanding that the
language of Scripture regarding God is adopted to an anthropopathic
point of view, ridicules those passages which speak of words of
anger... we have to say that as we ourselves, when talking with
very young children, do not aim at exerting our own powers of
elocuence, but adapting ourselves to the weakness of our charge
both say and do those things which may appear to us as useful for
the correction and improvement of the children as children, so the
word of God appears to have dealt with the history, making the
capacity of the hearers and the benefit which they were to receive,
the standard of the appropriateness of its announcements: e.g. Deut.
"The Lord thy God bare with your manners, as a man would bear with
the manners of his son". It is as it were, assuming the manners
of a man in order to secure the advantage of men that the Scripture makes use of such expressions; for it would not have been suitable to the condition of the multitude, that what God has to say to them should be spoken by Him in a manner more befitting to the majesty of His own Person. Irenaeus shows that Scripture has a spiritual meaning, and that through it God is teacher and man is pupil—Adv.Hr.iI.28.3.

(4) The tabernacle and temple were to teach the people, not to contain God... Irenaeus also taught this in Adv.Hr.iv.14.3, that the tabernacle was erected to teach people truth, not literally contain God.
VI.33. Denique in evangelio\(^1\): *veniet hora*, dominus aiebat, *cum neque in monte isto neque in Hierusalem adorabitis patrem*\(^2\), et causas reddidit dicens: *spiritus est deus, et eoa ergo, qui adorant, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet*\(^3\). efficaciae igitur ibi divinae per membra monstrantur, non habitus dei nec corporalia lineamenta ponuntur.

\(^1\)denique in evangelio...This is a word that is continually employed by Novatian. See Tr.xxiv.136; xxix.164; ep.xxx,xxxvi; Pud.,Spe., and Cib. many times (see the study of this in Melin, *opcit.*, pp.88sqq). Generally Novatian equates evangel with law (e.g.xxiv.164), which may give us an insight into the reasons for his schism; though we cannot prove too much from these references, because Cyprian (who did believe in forgiveness) uses similar ones - e.g. Ep.xxvii "evangeli plenus vigor et disciplina robusta legis dominicae."

\(^2\)John 4:21 \quad \(^3\)John 4:24
VI.33. Finally in the Gospel, the Lord says: "The hour is coming when neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem shall ye worship the Father." And He adds the reason: "God is spirit and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." Thus the divine powers are expressed by means of bodily members. It is not the appearance or physical outline of God that is set before us.

(1) Here he quotes John twice. He quotes John more than any other book in De Tr. (some 99 times). Lebreton (Histoire du Dogme de la Trinité, t.p. 489) speaking of Athenagoras Apos. x, says "Athenagoras is the first to show the clear influence of John's Gospel on Christology" (in particular as he stresses the unity of Father and Son). Novatian follows Athenagoras in his use of Johanine Theology, especially as it regards the unity of Father and Son. The whole understanding of Novatian concerning salvation as a restoration to the Eternal life of God in Christ, "Who is come that we might have life" is a reflection of this theology—and is found also in Ignatius of Antioch and Methodios of Olympus.
VI.34. Nam et cum oculi describuntur, quod omnia videat, exprimitur; et quando auris, quod omnes audiat, proponitur; et cum digitus, significantia quaedam voluntatis aperitur; et cum nares, precum quasi odorum perceptio ostenditur; et cum manus, quod creaturae sit omnis auctor, probatur; et quando bracchium, quod nulla natura contra robur ipsius repugnare possit, edicitur; et quando pedes, quod impleat omnia nec sit quicquam, ubi non sit deus, explicatur.

proponitur...—This verb is characteristic of the literary style of Novatian. He often uses it along with another verb (collocare). Melin comments: "Synonyma ergo sunt apud Novatianum proponere et collocare, etiam cum hanc significationem habent. Mirabilis profecto haec verbi collocandi notio" (op.cit.p.118). They are used together in chapters xviii, xxi, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii—twice, xxx. Proponere is used separately here and in xi.59. He uses this verb also in Spe.i, and Bud.i. This usage is a further illustration of Novatian's dependence upon Cicero—not only for stoic philosophical and epistemological content, but also for vocabulary and style. See Cicero, Fin.i.i.100...elegantius poni—among many such other expressions.
VI.34. Therefore when eyes are mentioned, it is to express the fact that He sees all\(^1\); the ear shows that He hears all things; the finger signifies the carrying out of His will; nostrils show that He perceives prayers as a nose perceives odours; hands prove that He is the author of all creation; an arm shows that nothing in nature can resist His power; feet, make it clear that He fills all things, and that there is no place where God is not present\(^2\).

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\(^1\)Eyes are mentioned to express the fact that God sees all—Novatian is carrying out a principle that was enunciated in Origen, *De Prin.* ii. iv. 4: (in the context of commenting on 'God is angry') "...we do not take such statements literally, but look for the spiritual meaning in them, endeavouring to understand them in a way that is worthy of God..." and much earlier in Philo, *Quod a Deo* (p. 421, Loeb tr.): "And the sacred word ever entertaining holier and more august conceptions of Him that is, yet at the same time longing to provide instruction and teaching for the life of those who lack wisdom, likened God to man...For this reason it has ascribed to Him face, hands, feet, mouth, voice, wrath, and indignation...in following this general principle in its language, it is concerned not with truth; but with the profit accruing to its pupils."

\(^2\)no place where God is not present...—Twice in *Leg. Allg.*, Philo makes this point: iii. 2—"How can one hide from God, who fills
all things ...(one cannot as is seen in Deut.4:39 etc.) The bad man thinks God is not in a place”; iii.17—"God is not somewhere, for He is not contained, but contains the universe (συνεπελεύθη).” Justin, who as usual is like Philo, says in Dial. cxvii the same thing in a different context (where he wants to distinguish the activity of the Logos from that of the Father): "For the ineffable Father and Lord of all neither has come to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor rises up, but remains in His own place, wherever that is, quick to behold and quick to hear, having neither eyes nor ears, but being of indescribable might; and He sees all things, knows all things, and none of us escapes His observation; and He is not moved or confined to a spot in the whole world, for He existed before the world was made. How then could He talk with anyone or be seen by any one, or appear on the smallest portion of the earth?" Similarly, Theoph., Ad Auto.11.22.
VI.35. Neque enim sunt ei aut membra aut membrorum officia necessaria, ad cuius solum etiam tacitum arbitrium et serviunt et adsunt omnia, cur enim requirat oculos, qui lux est? aut cur quaerat pedes, qui ubique est? aut cur ingredi velit, cum non sit, quo extra se progressi possit? aut cur manus expetat, cuius ad omnia instituenda artifex est et silens voluntas? nec auribus a eget, qui etiam tacitas novit voluntates a. aut propter quam causam linguam quaerat, cui cogitare iussisse est? necessaria enim haec membra hominibus fuerunt, non deo, quia inefficax hominis consilium fuisset, nisi cogitamentum corpus implesset; deo autem non necessaria, cuius voluntatem non tantum sine aliqua molitione opera subsequuntur, sed ipsa statim opera cum voluntate procedunt.

1 cogitamentum — a rare Latin word, Dictionnaire Latin-Français des Auteurs Christiens (Blaise et Chirat, Turnhout, 1954, p.163) finds it elsewhere only in the Vulgate translation of 4 Esdr.7:22, and in Martin of Braga (c.560) Iact. pro Repellendo Iactantia v.c.34d.
VI.35. Neither members nor functions of members are necessary to Him to whose sole judgment, even unexpressed in words, all things are present and obedient. For why should He require eyes who is Himself light(1)? Or why would He who is everywhere need feet? Why would He desire to walk, when there is nowhere outside of Himself to go? Why should He seek for hands when even His unspoken will is the architect that establishes all things? He needs no ears, who knows even our secret desires. Why should He need a tongue with whom to purpose is (already) to have commanded? These parts are necessary to men, because a man's design would have ineffectual without a body to carry out his thought(2). But they are not necessary to God(3), whose will is executed without any delay since command and execution are simultaneous with Him(4).

(1) Who is Himself light... - See M. Felix, Octv.xxxii.9,10: "It is no cause for wonder if you see not God...How could you bear the sight of the author of the sun Himself, the fountain of light?"

Clement Alex., Strom.vii.ii: "For from His own point of view the Son of God is never displaced; not being divided, not severed, not passing from place to place; being always everywhere, and being contained nowhere...the complete Paternal Light..."

(2) These scriptural designations are not literal descriptions of God; they must be understood in light of God's nature to see what truth they are given to "signify" (see note (3)-IV.26).
Thus one will be understanding language out of God's nature, rather than understanding God's nature out of human descriptive language. Tertullian shows this in *Adv. Marc. ii. xvi*: "(one must) discriminate between the natures (i.e. of God and man) and assign to them their respective senses, which are as diverse as their natures require. Although they seem to have a community of designations, we read indeed of God's right hand, and eyes, and feet; these must not however be compared with those of human beings, because they are associated in one and the same name... You allow with others, that man was inbreathed by God into a living soul, not God by man; it is yet palpably absurd of you to be placing human characteristics in God, rather than divine ones in man, and clothing God in the likeness of man, instead of man in the image of God..."

(3) God is not dependent on a body...—This is clearly set forth in Origen, *De Prn. i. i. 6*: "God is therefore not to be thought of as being either a body or as existing in a body, but as an uncompounded intellectual nature, admitting within Himself no addition of any kind... But mind for its movements or operations needs no physical space, nor sensible magnitude, nor bodily shape, nor colour, nor any other of these adjuncts which are the properties of body or matter." Novatian is in these sections bringing scriptural designations of God to examination in light of His nature as an Infinite Person (which was set forth as the starting point in the early chapters).
Novatian shows that the nature of God's will depends upon and is consistent with the nature of His being (which since it is infinite, admits of no limitations as to space or time; both being created realities). Origen also makes this point in *Prin. i. i. 6:* "Wherefore that simple and wholly intellectual nature can admit of no delay or hesitation in its movements or operations, lest the simplicity of the divine nature should appear to be circumscribed or in some degree hampered by such adjuncts..."
VI.36. Ceterum ipse totus oculus, quia totus videt; et totus
auris, quia totus audit; et totus manus, quia totus operatur: et
totus pes, quia totus ubique est. idem enim, quicquid illud est
totus, aequalis est et totus ubique est. non enim habet in se
diversitatem sui, quicquid est simplex. ea\quad ^{a}\quad enim demum in divers-
itatem membrorum recidunt quae veniunt ex nativitate in dissolva-
nem, sed haec quae concreta non sunt, sentire non possunt. quod\quad ^{b}\quad enim immortale est, quicquid est\quad ^{1}\quad illud ipsum, unum et simplex et
semper est. et ideo, quia unum est, dissolvi non potest, quoniam,
quicquid est illud ipsum\quad ^{c}, extra ius dissolutionis positum, legibus
est mortis solutum.

\quad ^{1}\quad quicquid est... - This peculiar expression of Novatian's
("whatever He is") may be a reference to Ex.3:13-"I am who I am",
quoted elsewhere.
VI.36. Furthermore He Himself is all eye(1), because He is all-seeing; and all ear, because He is all-hearing; and all hand, because He is all performing; and all feet, because He is everywhere entirely, and this presence is harmonious in all places(2). There is no diversity of parts in Him, but rather simplicity. Now diversity of parts occurs only in those things which pass from birth to dissolution, but those that are not composite cannot experience it. He who is immortal, whatever else this may involve, is one and simple and eternal(3). Therefore since He is one, He cannot be dissolved; for He lies outside the law of dissolution, and so is freed from the law of death.

(1) He is all eye... - See Clement Alex., Strom. vii.11 (part of which is already quoted in VI.35): "He (the Son of God) is all eye, seeing all things, hearing all things, knowing all things..."

(2) harmonious in all places - ... - The teaching of Origen is similar: De Prn. 21.13ff; 22.4ff; 23.1ff; as is that of Athanasius - Ad Serapionem 3.4.

(3) one, simple, eternal... - The mutual connection of unity, simplicity, eternity, and incorruptibility is a locus communis in early Theology. See Philo, Leg. Allg. 11.1: "God being one, is alone and unique, and like God there is nothing...God is prior to the
universe"; Origen, De Prn.i.1.6: "Wherefore that simple and wholly intellectual nature can admit of no delay or hesitation in its movements...lest that which is the beginning of all things should be found composite and differing, and that which ought to be free from all bodily intermixture, in virtue of being the one sole species of Deity, so to speak, should prove instead of being one, to consist of many things." Compare Tr.IV.27; V.29 on simplicity.
VII.37. Sed illud, quod dicit dominus spiritum deum, putem ego sic locutum Christum de patre, ut adhuc aliquid plus intellegi velit, quam spiritum deum. hominibus enim licet in evangelio suo intelligendi incrementa\(^1\) facientibus disputet, sed tamen\(^2\) et ipse sic adhuc de deo loquitur hominibus, quomodo possunt adhuc audire vel capere, licet, ut diximus, in agnitionem dei religiosa iam facere incrementa nitatur.

\(^1\)This word \textit{incrementa} is a popular one in Novatian's writings. It is a significant word because it is connected in his thought to the great condescending movement of God in Christ, by which He lowers Himself to lift up man. This concept is borne out in the usage of the word: Tr.XIII - In agnitionem dei religiosa...facere incrementa; XVIII - Gradatim enim et per incrementa fragilitas humana nutriri debuit... ad istam gloriam; (further in XVIII) mediocribus incrementis fallenter assurgens oculos hominum sensim asuefacit ad totum orbem suum ferendum per incrementa radiorum; also Pud.i-vobis fidei et scientiae per dominum incrementa praestare.

\(^2\)sed tamen...-is a common expression in Novatian (usually following the word \textit{etsi} ) -see Tr.XIV.37; and Ep.xxxi,3. Melin (op.cit.,p.190) takes it for a telling mark of the literary style of Novatian.
VII.37. The Lord says that "God is Spirit", but I think that Christ uses this expression of the Father so that He may lead us to an even higher understanding of Him than spirit. It is clear that in the Gospel He reasons with men in order to increase their understanding, and in so doing He Himself speaks to men about God in such a way as they are able to hear and receive it, and all the while, He is—as we have said—endeavouring to increase their religious conceptions to knowledge of God.

(1) lead us to a higher understanding...—This is to be considered in the context of salvation as Novatian envisions it. Salvation is the missionary movement in which God reaches down to lift us up gradually in accordance with our increasing capacity to enter into His knowledge and life.

(2) to increase their religious conceptions...—A re-echo of III.18: "neque enim ipse nobis desiderat magnitudinis gloriam, sed nobis vult religiosam, qua pater, conferre sapientiam."

(3) religious conceptions...—There could possible be a reference here to the Stoic teaching on "anticipatory conceptions" or "clues" (προμηθέης) which was carried on in Clement Alex., according to which man's mind has a pre-conception of some reality which is beginning to impose itself on his attention, though as of yet the mind has not fully grasped or understood this thing. As
his attention is further turned to this given reality, he will receive more information which will lead him to "assent" to the reality of the thing which he has thus come to know.
VII.38. Invenimus enim scriptum esse, quod deus caritas dictus sit\(^1\), nec ex hoc tamen dei substantia caritas expressa est; et quod lux dictus est\(^2\), nec tamen in hoc substantia dei est. sed totum hoc de deo dictum est, quantum dici potest, ut merito et quando spiritus dictus est, non omne id, quod est, dictus sit, sed ut, dum mens hominum intellegendo usque ad ipsum proficit spiritum, conversa iam ipsa in spiritu, aliud quid amplius per spiritum conicere deum esse possit\(^3\). id enim, quod est\(^4\), secundum id, quod est, nec humano sermone edici nec humanis auribus percipi nec humanis sensibus colligi potest. nam si, quae praeparavit deus his, qui diligunt illum, nec oculus vidit nec auris audivit nec cor hominis aut mens ipsa percepit\(^5\), qualis et quantus est ille ipse, qui haec repromittit\(^6\), ad quae intellegenda et mens hominis et natura defecit.

\(^1\) I Jn.4:8 \(^2\) Jn.1:5 \(^3\) II Cor.3:15-18 \(^4\) Ex.3:14

\(^5\) I Cor.2:9

\(^6\) repromittit- This verb (and the substantive-repromissum) is used many times by Novatian with reference to the promise of salvation - See Tr.IX,XII,XV,XXVII (there 9 times), XXIX, and Pud.13,9.
VII.38. We find then in Scripture that God is called love, but this
does not mean that the substance of God is expressed in the term
love. He is also called light, but the substance of God does not
consist in this either. It is a way of saying all about God that
can be said. Consequently when He is called spirit, His entire
Being is not thereby described, but rather the purpose is that man's
understanding may first pass to the concept of spirit, and thus
having been spiritually changed itself, may advance to a fuller
conception of God(1). What He is cannot be uttered by human speech
in accordance with what He actually is; nor can the ears of man
perceive it, nor the human senses grasp it. If "neither eye hath
seen, nor ear heard, neither hath the heart of man nor even his
mind perceived the things that God has prepared for them that love
Him," what must He be like, and how great must He be, who promises
these things which are beyond the natural understanding and mind
of man?

(1) See note (1) VII.37
VII.39. Denique, si acceperis spiritum substantiam dei, creaturam feceris dum omnis enim spiritus creatura est, erit ergo iam factus deus, quomodo et, si secundum Moysen ignem acceperis deum, creaturam illum esse dicendo institutum expresseris, non institutorem docueris. sed haec figurantur potius quam ita sunt, nam et in veteri testamento ides deus ignis dicitur, ut peccatori populo metus incutiatur, dum iudex ostenditur, et in novo testamento spiritus esse profertur, ut refector a et creator b in delictis suis mortuorum per hanc bonitatem collatae credentibus c indulgentiae comprobetur.

1The uplifting of these dead in sins may reflect Eph.4:24;
II Cor.5:17

2credentibus...-Novatian stresses the necessity of right belief: See this word in Pud.2, and its opposite in Tr.VIII.43-propter incredulitatem.
VII.39. Finally if you accept spirit as the substance of God, you make God into a creature, because every spirit is a creature(1), which means God will be created. In the same way if, following Moses, you take God to be fire, you will have maintained that God is a creature rather than the Creator(2). These are figurative rather than literal expressions. As in the Old Testament God is called fire to strike fear into the hearts of the sinful people by setting Him forth as Judge, so in the New Testament He is set forth as spirit, that men may find evidence of Him in the goodness shown in the mercy bestowed on those who believe—as renewer and creator of those who were dead in their sins.

(1) On the question of the teaching of Novatian and other Church Fathers on the corporality or non-corporality of the Spirit, see notes under V.29. The point to be noticed here is that Novatian understands by spirit the breath of life that God breathes into man, making him a living soul, as well as the whole animation of the universe in general. Obviously God is more than this—because these are merely His creatures. Thus His character as infinite Creator is not encompassed in a term such as spirit. Pamelius pointed out that because of this phrase ("every spirit is a creature") the Macedonians attributed this treatise to Cyprian (so as to add to its authority) and (as Rufinus says) hawked it on the
streets of Constantinople—to add weight to their argumentation against the deity of the Holy Spirit. Of course this is to ignore the fact that Novatian is making no reference at all in this place to the Holy Spirit. The Macedonians also twisted Tr.XVI.90 to their own ends (to make the Holy Spirit less than Christ).

(2) that God is a creature rather than Creator...—Compare M.Felix, Octv. xviii: "Quem si patrem dixero, carnalem opineris: si regem, terrenum suapiceris: si dominum, intellegis utique mortalem. Aufer additamenta nominum, et perspicies eius claritatem."
VII.40. Hunc ergo omissis haereticorum fabulis atque figmentis deum novit et veneratur ecclesia, cui testimonium reddit tam invisibilibum quam etiam visibilium et semper et tota natura: quem\(^1\) angeli adorant, astra mirantur, maria benedicunt, terrae verentur, inferna quaeque suspiciunt; quem mens omnis humana sentit, etiamsi non exprimit; cuiri imperio omnia commoventur, fontes scaturiunt, amnes labuntur, fluctus assurgunt, fetus suos cuncta parturiunt, venti spirare coguntur, imbres veniunt, maria commoventur, fecunditates suas cuncta ubique diffundunt.

\(^{1}\)quem angeli adorant...cuncta ubique diffundunt - The style and vocabulary in these phrases may have been influenced by Apuleius Isidem, Met.xi.25: "te supericolunt...crescunt germina..." In both we notice anaphora (Tr.-quem...quem...cuiuc...; and in Met.-te...tu...tibi...tuo), and many identical words.
VIII.40. This, then is He whom the church\(^{(1)}\) knows and worships as God, rejecting the fables and fictions of heretics\(^{(2)}\). The whole universe of things\(^{(3)}\) both visible and invisible ceaselessly bears witness to Him. Angels adore Him, stars marvel at Him\(^{(4)}\), seas bless Him, lands fear Him, even things beneath the earth acknowledge Him\(^{(5)}\). Every human mind feels Him, though it cannot express Him\(^{(6)}\). At His command all things move, springs flow, rivers run their courses, waves arise, all creatures bear their young\(^{(7)}\), winds are compelled to blow, showers descend, seas are stirred, all things overflow with fruitfulness\(^{(8)}\) in all places\(^{(9)}\).

\(^{(1)}\) ch. VIII is closely connected to Ch. I in its praise of the beauties of the creation and its worship of the Creator. In ch. I, Novatian is more concerned with the various details of creation, whereas in VIII, he takes a general view of the whole, particularly as it is related to the providence of God.

\(^{(2)}\) He again establishes a clear relationship between the God of the Church and the Creator of the material order. In so doing he refutes the Gnostics in general, and Marcionites in particular.

\(^{(3)}\) The whole universe of things...—There is in this phrase the Stoic idea of wholeness which "forces assent" from the mind as to the reality of the harmony and unity of the world; though Novatian goes further than the Stoics in seeing that the whole created
order instinctively leads the mind to God (e.g.I.9: "Thus considering the vast magnitude of His works, leads up to the worthy admiration of the craftsman of such a mighty mass").

(4) stars marvel at Him...Cfr. Apost. Const. viii.12: "... and didst ascribe in heaven the choir of stars to praise thy glorious majesty." See note 3 under I.1, for the relationship between Apost. Const. viii and De Tr.I and VIII.

(5) The worship that nature gives to God, according to Novatian, resembles the description that Tertullian gives of all creatures praying to God, De Or. xix.200: "The angels likewise all pray. Every creature prays; cattle and wild beasts pray and bend their knees; and when they issue from their layers and lairs, they look up heavenward with no idle mouth, making their breath vibrate after their own manner. Nay the birds too, rising out of the nest, upraise themselves heavenward, and instead of hands, expand the cross of their wings, and say somewhat to seem like prayer." This view of the relationship of nature to God recalls Ps.148, in which all creation expresses praise to God, and Rom.8, in which the "creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now (vs.21), waiting for the deliverance from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of children of God."

(6) every human mind feels Him, though it cannot express Him...—this recalls the teaching of II.13, that because of the infinity of God, no human mind can comprehend or express Him; and yet there is a sense in which man can "feel after" the Person in whose image
he has been created. This "feeling" after God is likely connected in the thought of Novatian to the Stoic idea of ἀπολύματι (which has been discussed several times so far). Furthermore the fact that he uses the verb sentire when he is discussing knowledge of God from nature—and not cognoscere—shows that he saw the inadequacy of natural revelation to lead to an actual knowledge of God. Personal and scriptural revelation is required to take man beyond feeling to true recognition and knowledge of God.

(7) bear their young...—Cfr. Theoph., Ad Aut. i.6: "...or the instinct provided to animals themselves for generating and nourishing offspring."

(8) overflow with fruitfulness...—The same concept was earlier expressed in I.9: "ut operum ipsius in omnibus partibus redundantes magnitudines..."

(9) This sense of beauty in the movements of the world is widespread in early Christian Theology—e.g. Athenagoras speaks of the beauty of God overflowing into nature—Leg. v, and elsewhere mentions the beauty of the world—Ibid. xxxiv, xvi; as does Apol. of Aristides, xv, xvi. Tertullian shows how even the Greek word ἀνάμορφος contains the idea of order and ornamentation—Hermog. xl, Adv. Mrc. i.13, Apol. xvii, i. He shows how even the smallest things (e.g. a sea shell or rose) are objects of admiration—Adv. Mrc. i.13, 14; Anm. x. The work attributed to Hippolytus—Discourse on Holy Theoph. I exalts this same beauty in nature. Clement Alex. also mentions it in Strom. i. 85. 5. See further M. Spanneut, Stoic des Pères, pp. 371 ff.
VIII.41. Qui peculiarem protoplastis aeternae vitae mundum quendam paradisum in oriente constituit, arborem vitae plantavit, scientiae boni et mali similiter alteram arborem<sup>1</sup> collocavit<sup>2</sup>, mandatum dedit sententiam contra delictum statuit, Noe iustissimum de diluvii periculis pro merito innocentiae fideisque servavit, Enoch transitulit, in amicitiae societatem Abraham allegit, Issac protexit, Iacob auxit, Moysen ducem populo praefecit, ingemiscentes filios Israel e iugo servitutis eripuit, legem scripsit, patrum sobolem in terram repromissionis induxit, prophetas spiritu instruxit, et per hos omnes filium suum Christum repromisit et, quando daturum se apoponderat, misit.

<sup>1</sup>Gen.2:9

<sup>2</sup>arborem collocavit... This metrical ending is, according to Melin, as follows: arborem collocavit. He adds: "Quo loco verbum collocandi per se nihil notabile habet, sed observari debent et variatio et bona clausula (cum alia orationis figura, ἐποιεισέλευτον dico, coniunctae)." The precision of Novatian's clausula endings as well as the eloquence of his style rules out the theories of some that De Tr.is a mere Latin translation of a Greek work of a disciple of Hippolytus. De Tr. exhibits every mark of an original Latin composition—not a translation.
VIII.41. He appointed a paradise in the East for His first-created, as a world of eternal life. He planted the tree of life, and placed there another tree corresponding to it "of the knowledge of good and evil." He gave a command, and decreed a judgment against sin.

He preserved the most righteous Noah from the perils of the Flood, because of his innocence and faith. He translated Enoch, admitted Abraham into friendly relationship with Himself, protected Issac, and increased Jacob. He gave Moses for a leader to the people, delivered the groaning children of Israel from the yoke of slavery; wrote them the law, and led the descendents of the fathers into the Promised Land. He instructed the prophets by His Spirit, and through all of them promised His Son Christ; and sent Him at that time at which He had pledged Himself to give Him.

(1) This brief recital of the history of the people of God resembles similar recitations in Scripture itself, Late Judaism, and the Church Fathers. In parts it is like Deut. 6-8; 26; Ps. 78; 105; 106; 135; 136; Neh. 9:6-13; Heb. 11; Ezek. 20. In Late Judaism see Sirach 44:16sq; Sapient. 10sq; I Macb. 2:51; III Macb. 16: 16-18:11; IV Esd. 3:4sq. The Apost. Const. (heavily indebted to Late Judaism) have similar phrases - e.g. viii.12,26. Among the Fathers of the Church, see Ignat., Ad Phil. ix.1; Iren., Adv. Hr. iii.2: "Deum omnipotentem...qui induxerit cataclysmum...angelis eius..."; Origen, De Prn. i. praef. 4- "Adam, Abel, Seth...misit dominum Iesum"; Tert.,
Praeclarum xi.-"...mundi conditorem...visum a patriarchis...mississe vicariam..."

(2) He wrote the law...—compare Cib.2- "ut per illam proficerent et redirent ad mores bonos quos cum a patribus accepiissent..." This shows his high view of the law ("mores bonos"), which is seen in other places where he identifies law and gospel (XXIV.164). His stress on the law, added to his misunderstanding of mercy, his denial of forgiveness, all combined to result in the Novatianist Schism from the Catholic Church.

(3) by His Spirit...—Though Novatian never uses the word Trinity, nonetheless all three Persons of the Trinity are in this passage.

(4) through all of them promised Christ...—Christ unites the two Testaments, who as the Son on the Creator God was already promised in the Old, and is the subject of the New (so ruling out the Marcionites who would separate the Old Testament and the bad Creator God from the New, and Christ and the good spiritual God).
VII.42. Per quem nobis in notitiam venire voluit et in nos indulgentiae suae sinus largos profudit, egenis et abiectis loc-
uplement spiritum conferendo, et quia ultro et largus et bonus est ne totus hic orbis aversus gratiae eius fluminibus aresceret, apos-
tolos institutores generis nostri in totum orbem mitti per filium
suum voluit, ut condicio generis humani agnoseret institutorem
et, si sequi maluiisset, haberet, quem pro deo in suis iam postu-
lationibus patrem dicaret.

1Mk.16:15

2condicio generis—This expression in later Latin and early
Christian literature usually refers to the mortal condition of the
human race—e.g. Cicero Pan.4.iv.11: "est haec condicio liberorum
populorum"; Off.1.13,14: "Condicio infirma et fortuna servorum";
Tusc.1.8,15: "condicio humana"; also Cat.i.ii.1,2; and Seneca, Et.
Sap.xxxi.1; Quintilian, Decl.308; Lactantius (centuries later)
in Opif.xii.15, applies it to our mortal state—"suis moribus et
condicionibus dicta."
VIII.42 Through Him\(^{(1)}\) He willed that we should come to knowledge of Himself, and richly poured out upon us the generous stores of His kindness\(^{(2)}\), by conferring upon the needy and desolate the abundance of His Spirit\(^{(3)}\). His liberality and goodness reach further. In order that the whole world should not dry up in its aversion to the streams of his grace, He willed that through His Son\(^{(4)}\) apostolic messengers should be sent into all the world to instruct our race, that mankind in its condition might recognize its Creator, and if it would then follow Him, could have one whom it might address in its prayers as Father\(^{(5)}\) instead of God.

\(^{(1)}\) God is known through Christ—This was an accepted fact in the teaching of the Orthodox Fathers—Cfr. Iren. Adv. Hr. iv. xx. 4 (already quoted in note \((4)\)-III.18); Clement Alex., Strom. iv. xxv: "God then, being not a subject for demonstration cannot be the object of science. But the Son is wisdom and knowledge and truth, and all else that has affinity thereto. He is also susceptible of demonstration and description. And all the powers of the spirit, being collectively one thing, terminate in the same point—that is, in the Son." He shows again that God can only be known by God, i.e. the Father only in the Son—"Strom. v. i: "...for there are some that draw the distinction that faith has reference to the Son, and knowledge to the Spirit...but we must know who is the Son of God. Now neither is knowledge without faith, nor faith without
knowledge. Nor is the Father without the Son, for the Son is with the Father. In order that we may know the Father, we must believe in the Son...and the knowledge of the Son and of the Father, which is according to the gnostic rule—that which in reality is gnostic—is the attainment and comprehension of the truth by the truth."

See note (4)-III.18, which discusses the whole missionary movement of God, culminating in the knowledge of the Father that we should have by our being lifted into union with the Son through the Spirit.

(2) generous stores of His kindness...—cfr. Theoph., Ad Autol., ii.36: "Who (i.e. God) pours forth joy for men, sweeter than honey" (a quotation from Sibylline Oracles).

(3) by conferring His Spirit...—all through De Tr., he shows that blessing comes to needy humanity through the Spirit, which brings it back into the life of God. God is known in Christ, and it is the Spirit who brings us into His knowledge and life. Athenagoras speaks of the movement of God in the Spirit to bring us into His life: "The Holy Spirit Himself also, who operates in the prophets, we assert to be an effluence of God, flowing from Him and returning back again like a beam of the sun"—Apol. x.

(4) through His Son apostolic messengers... Novatian shows that salvation comes from God the Father, through God the Son and Spirit. It is made known to the apostles, who then spread the knowledge of it to all humanity. In the thought of Novatian salvation is another term for eternal life, or the life of God. One could think of the spreading of salvation as a movement of Life eternal originating in
God the Father, flowing through the Son and Spirit into the Apostles and through their preaching into humanity in general. This movement of the Life of God into the soul of man seems to reflect the divine exchange of fellowship and communion within the Trinity - see De Trin. xxxi.192. Irenaeus showed how the life of God came through the Son and Spirit to man—e.g. Demonstr. v: "Well also does Paul his apostle say: "One God the Father, who is over all, and through all, and in us all." For over all is the Father, and through all is the Son, for through Him all things were made by the Father; and in us all is the Spirit, who cries "Abba, Father", and fashions man into the likeness of God... Now the Spirit shows forth the Word, and therefore the prophets announced the Son of God; and the Word utters the Spirit, and therefore is Himself the announcer of the prophets, and leads and draws men to the Father": Demonstr. vii: "For this reason the baptism of our regeneration proceeds through the three points: God the Father bestowing on us regeneration through His Son by the Holy Spirit. For as many as carry the Spirit of God are led to the Word, that is to the Son: and the Son brings them to the Father, and the Father causes them to possess incorruption. Without the Spirit it is not possible to behold the Word of God, nor without the Son can any draw near to the Father: for the knowledge of the Father is the Son, and the knowledge of the Son of God is through the Holy Spirit; and according to the good pleasure of the Father, the Son ministers and dispenses the Spirit to whomever the Father wills and as He wills."
(5) Address Him in prayer as Father instead of God...—Compare Tr. XXVIII.155: "Qui penitus et plene et cum tota fide et tota religione accessit ad dei filium, omnibus modis per ipsum filium, in quem sic credit, ad patrem perventus sit eundemque visurus", see the comment on both passages in note (4)—III.18, where related statements from Late Judaism, Irenaeus, Origen, etc. are quoted. We might add the teaching of Clement Alex. on this subject, since he too is in the Greek understanding of salvation as the mission of Christ and Spirit to restore dying man to the life and light of God the Father: "Therefore the Gnostic prays in thought during every hour, being by love allied to God... that becoming pure in heart through the knowledge which is by the Son of God, he may be initiated into the beatific vision face to face, having heard the Scripture which says: "Fasting with prayer is a good thing..." and as in the case of Moses, from his righteous conduct and from his uninterrupted intercourse with God, who spoke to him, a kind of glorified hue settled on his face; so also a divine power of goodness clinging to the righteous soul in contemplation and in prophecy...uniting the soul with light through unbroken love, which is God-bearing and God-borne: thence assimilation to God the Saviour arises to the Gnostic, as far as permitted to human nature, he being made perfect 'as the Father which is in heaven'"—Strom. vi.xii. Tertullian also sees the coming of Christ and the giving of the Spirit as resulting in a true personal knowledge of the
Father: "It was God's will to make a new covenant for the very purpose that in a new way his unity might be believed in through the Son and the Spirit, so that God who had aforetime been preached through the Son and the Spirit without being understood might now be known in His own proper names and persons." - *Adv. Prax.*, xxxi.
VIII.43. Cuius providentia non tantummodo singillatim per homines cucurrit aut currit, sed etiam per ipsas urbes et civitates, quorum exitus prophetarum vocibus cecinit, immo etiam per ipsum totum orbem, cuius propter incredulitatem exitus, plagas, dominitiones poenasque descriptit. et ne quis non etiam ad minima quaeque dei putaret istam infatigabilem providentialiam pervenire, ex duobus inquit dominus, passeribus unus non cadet sine patris voluntate, sed et capitili capitis vestri omnes numerati sunt. cuius etiam cura et providentia Israelitarum non sivit nec vestes consumi nec vilissima in pedibus calceamenta deteri, sed nec ipsorum postremum adolescentium captiva sarabara comburi. nec immerito, nam si hic omnia complexus est omnia continens, omnia autem et totum ex singulis constant, pertinget consequenter eius ad usque singula quaeque cura, cuius ad totum, quicquid est, pervenit providentia.

\[^{1}\text{Mt.10:29sq.}\quad^{2}\text{Deut.8:4}\]

\[^{3}\text{postremum - This word (used here as an adverb - "finally") is when so employed in most classical Latin rendered postremo:}\]
\[^{4}\text{e.g. Cicero, Agr.ii.23- "primum...deinde...postremo"; Hor., S.i.i.ii. 132- "ad postremum"; Tertullian, Apol.iv-postremo. When it is used as an adjective, it is rendered postremum - e.g. Cicero, Cr.xv.50 - "alia postrema"; Plaut., Cist.Fin.- "postrema in comoedia". Hence Novatian appears to deviate here from classical usage.}\]
4. *sarahara* - an Aramaic word for trousers or Persian breeches (See Fausset, *op.cit.*, p.25-note 17). In Vulgate Dan. 3:9 it is rendered sarabala, and in the LXX *εκθήρα.*

5. Dan. 3:27
VIII. 43. His providence ran, or rather runs its course among men, not only among individuals but also among cities themselves and states, of whose overthrow He sang by the voices of the prophets, and indeed through the whole world. He describes the results of the world's unbelief—overthrow, plague, loss, and punishment. And lest anyone think that the never failing providence of God does not extend to the smallest detail, the Lord says: "One out of two sparrows shall not fall to the ground without your Father," "even the hairs of your head are all numbered." His care and providence did not allow "the garments" of the Israelites to perish, nor the commonest shoes of their feet to be worn out; nor even the trousers which the three children wore as captives to be burnt in the furnace. There is a reason for all this, namely that He who contains all things has thus embraced all things—and so includes every particular thing in this whole(1). Consequently His care extends to every particular thing since His providence is over the whole(2), without exception.

(1) The question of providence extending to both general and particular was current in Stoic thought as well as early Christianity. The distinction of totum and singula is found in the Hermetic Literature (C.H. Fragm. divers.20.4, vol.iv, ed. Nock-Festugière, p.118) and in Maximus of Tyre (cf. G. Soury, Apercus de Philosophie
religieuse chez Maxime de Tyr, Platonicien éclectique, Paris, 1942, p. 24). Athenagoras contrasts common logos and ἐκ τῆς μέρους — Leg. xxiv and xxv. Clement Alex. shows that "providence works in the affairs of the whole as well as of the particular" — Strom. vi. 158. 4

(ἐν τῇ τοῖς καθ' ὅλῳ ἐν τῇ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς μέρους).

(2) His care extends to every particular thing...—cfr. Apol of Aristides 1. 6, 7: "quia iis omnibus quae reguntur atque moventur..."
VIII.44. Hinc est, quod et desuper cherubim sedet\textsuperscript{a}, id est, praeest super operum suorum varietatem, subjectis throno eius animalibus prae ceteris principatuum\textsuperscript{b} tenentibus\textsuperscript{c}, cuncta desuper crystallo conget\textsuperscript{d}, id est caelo omnia operiente, quod in firmamentum de aquarum fluente materia fuerat deo iubente solidatum\textsuperscript{e}, ut glacies robusta aquarum terram pridem contagentium dividens medietatem dorso quodam pondera aquae superioris, corroborationis de gelu viribus, sustineret. Nam et rotae subiacent\textsuperscript{f}, tempora scilicet, quibus omnia semper mundi membra volvuntur talibus pedibus adiectis, quibus non in perpetuum stant ista, sed transeunt. Sed et per omnes artus\textsuperscript{g} stellata sunt oculis\textsuperscript{h}, dei enim opera pervigili obtutu contemplanda sunt. In quorum simul carbonum medius est ignis\textsuperscript{i}: sive quoniam ad ignem diem iudicii\textsuperscript{j} mundus iste festinat, sive quoniam omnia opera dei ignea nec sunt tenebrosa, sed\textsuperscript{k} vigent\textsuperscript{l}, sive etiam ne, quia ex terrenis ista fuerant orta principi\textsuperscript{m}, naturaliter de originis suae rigore torperent, addita est omnibus interioris spiritus calida natura, quae frigidis concreta corporibus ad usum vitae aequalia omnibus libramenta monstraret.

\textsuperscript{a}Dan.3:55; Ps.79:1  \textsuperscript{b}Ezk.1:15sq.  \textsuperscript{c}Ezk.10:1  \textsuperscript{d}Gen.1:6
\textsuperscript{e}Ezk.1:15sq; 10:9sq. 10:11sq.
\textsuperscript{f}Ezk.10:12; 1:18; Apoc.4:6  \textsuperscript{g}Ezk.1:13  \textsuperscript{h}II Pt.3:12
\textsuperscript{i}vigent - is a characteristic word of Novatian, often used in slightly other forms in De Tr.(see word list), and elsewhere in
Spec.i; Ep.xxx init.; Ep.xxxvi init. It is also widely used in Cyprian, and is found in Virgil, Aen. iv. 175 (among many other places); Cicero, Nt. Dr. i. 33, 85; Tusc. i. 27, 66; Livy vi. 22, 7; Lucr. iii. 150; Horace, C. i. 12, 18 etc. It is also in the Latin translation of Irenaeus, Adv. Ha. v. 35, 2.
VIII.44. That is why He is said to "sit above the cherubim"(1); that is, He rules over all His various works. The living creatures which hold dominion over the rest are in subjection to His throne, and a crystal covering is above all things. In other words the heavens which conceal all things, were made at God's command into a solid firmament(2) from the fluid material of the waters, that the tough ice, hardened by frost might form a division between the waters which at one time covered the earth and so bear upon its back the weight of the water which is above the earth. Wheels lie beneath it, meaning times and seasons rolling on like wheels forever(3), or feet upon which ride all the members of the world, never standing still, but always passing on. All their limbs are studded with eyes so that the works of God may be contemplated with watchful inspection. In the midst of all these things is a fire of glowing coals(4). This may mean that this world of ours is hastening to the fiery day of judgment, or that all the works of God are fiery—not dark and dead—but full of life(5); or again that it is God's purpose that these members of earthly origin should not slip back into the inactivity natural to the cold elements of which they were made. Thus He endowed them with the warm nature of an interior spirit to mingle with their frigid bodies(6) and so to equip them all properly for the exercise of life(7).

(1) Novatian models this passage on Ezekiel's vision of the cherubim. He makes a rather "poetic" symbolic connection between
cosmology and this vision. His world picture is of course influenced by the Old Testament, Late Judaism, Stoicism, and probably— as Weyer suggests (op.cit., p.72—note 40) — by Eastern sources, particularly certain elements of the Babylonian world view as it had been transformed and passed down in this eclectic period. Philo connected the Seraphim and the four elements — De Deo...; and the Cherubim and the various planetary spheres — De Cherub.21; De Vita Mos.11.98.

(2) solid firmament...—compare Discourse on Holy Theoph.1, (attributed to Hippolytus): "So necessary is the element of water; for the other elements (στέρνητο) took their places beneath the highest vault of the heavens, but the nature of water obtained a seat also above the heavens." It does not seem necessary to conclude that this sort of imagery comes primarily from the Babylonian world view (as e.g. Weyer, op.cit., pp.72,73—note 40: "Im allgemeinen folgt er aber dem babylonischen Weltbild...danach ist die Erde eine in der Mitte des Weltalls schwebende...über der sich das Firmament aus Eis wölbt...Dieses Firmament trägt die Hälfte des Wassers, während die andere Hälfte auf der Erde zurückblieb—Gen. 1:6"). It is more likely that he gets his basic idea from Genesis, which gives us a picture of a firmament (or "expanse") separating "the waters above" from "those beneath." The story of the Great Deluge (Gen.9-11) seems to indicate that the "waters above" the firmament may have been thick canopies of water vapour that for
some reason (perhaps volcanic eruptions "when the fountains of the
great deep were opened") condensed and percipitated—according to
the description in Genesis. Whether or not this be the case, our
point is that Novatian gets the concept of a balanced cosmological
order with divided systems of water from the Old Testament primarily,
though secondarily the current world views of his time probably
influenced him in various details as well.

(3) rolling on like wheels forever...—see Seneca, Ad Hr.xviii.1-
"legibus aeternisque...caelestium...volventem"; M. Felix, Oety.xvii.
5-11- "coelum...quam rapide volvitur..."(in the context of this
"rolling" he explains the seasons). There may lie behind this some
idea of the Babylonian sidereal time and "world year" that apparently
came into Greek thought through Neo-Pythagoreanism, if not earlier.

(4) a fire of glowing coals...—This comes from the basic
stoic theory of fiery ether (αῦρχερφίνοιοκ) as being the very
essence of all reality, the source and maintenance of life. Compare
Seneca, Ad Hr.xviii.7: "et in mediis terris medique rursus mari
aeriae ignium faces..."; M. Felix, Oety.v.5: "sic congresatis ignium
sominibus, solea alios atque alios semper splendere..."

(5) full of life (vigor)...—cfr. Cicero, De Mt.Pr.ii.24: 42;
Virgil, Aen.vi.730 — igneus vigor.

(6) frigid bodies...—compare De Mundo (Pseudo-Aristotle),
i.392b (tr. Festugière, op.cit., p.463): "Après cet élément au-
dessous de lui, l'air est répandu, troublé et glacé de sa nature:
cependant, quand il est tout ensemble illuminé et réchauffé par l'élément igné, il devient lumineux et chaud..."

(7) for the exercise of life... - compare Cicero, *De Nat.Dr.* 33:83, where he speaks of how the life of earth is nourished by "vapours of air and (warm) aether, going and returning," etc.; Clement Alex., (speaking on the importance of heat and the need for proper equality in the elements): "...for day is fed by moisture, as also cold by heat; in which...if one be defective, the whole is dissolved" - *Strom.* viii.16.
VIII.45. Hic est igitur currus, secundum David, dei currus enim, inquit, dei decies milies tanto multiplicatus, id est innumerus, infinitus, immensus, sub iugo enim naturalis legis omnibus datae alia quasi frenis revocata retrahuntur, alia quasi effusis habenis excitata impelluntur. mundum enim istum currum dei cum omnibus et ipsi angeli ducunt et astra, quorum varios licet meatus, certis tamen legibus vincitos, inspicimus ad metas definiti aibi temporis ducere: ut merito nobis quoque cum apostolo et artificem et opera mirantibus exclamare iam libeat: o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae dei. quam inscrutabilia iudicia eius et investigables viae eius. (quis enim cognovit sensum domini? aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? aut quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia; ipsi gloria in saecula. amen.)

\footnote{Ps.67:18}

\footnote{Rom.11:33-36, Weyer rightly restores to the text the closing verses of Rom.11 (op.cit.,p.74). The sixteenth century texts of De Tr. have etc., which was apparently added in by earlier copyists, who omitted the closing portion to save space (verse 36 of Rom.11 having already been quoted in Tr.III.20).}
VIII. 45. This then, according to David is the chariot of God (1). "The chariot of God," he says, "is multiplied ten times a thousand times"; that is, it is innumerable, infinite, immense. Under the yoke of natural law (2) given to all, some things are held back as if pulled in with a bridle, while others are urged forward, as if sped on by slackened reins. The angels and stars guide the world (3) which is the chariot of God, with all things in it. Although their courses are varied, yet they are controlled by definite laws, so that we see them guided to their goal with perfect timing. Therefore we may rightly cry out (4) with the Apostle as we admire both the Architect and His works: "Oh the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counselor? or who hath first given to Him that He might be repaid? For of him, and through him, and to him are all things. To whom be glory forever. Amen"

(1) the chariot of God...—See Discourse on Holy Theoph.: "And what is there swifter in the course than the chariot of the sun?"

(2) natural law...—This concept so important to the philosophical and legal, social structure of Western Civilisation, was integral to the thought of Stoicism—especially in its later period. The Stoics seem in fact to have been the first to clearly formulate this concept (see M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, p. 132-133; Stoa und Stoiker,
die Gründer, Panaitios, Poseidonios, Zürich, 1950, p.xvi; also the actual stoic texts in Von Arnim, SVF III, pp.367-376, pp.89-91). It was of course based on their idea of harmony in nature, all things sharing in a common rational Logos, which made for order, law, and armonía in all of nature. Justin Martyr mentions it: II Apol.iv; Dial.xi.2; etc. For him it is more a question of natural morality. Athenagoras sees it in connection with the physical order-Res.xiv.init.; xxiv; Leg.iii. In Irenaeus it bears the sense of being the material counterpart to the Jewish Law - Adv.Hr.iv. xxiv. In this regard it is also mentioned in Apost.Const.vi.22,5-13,2. (See for more detail the study of Spanneut, Stoicisme,pp.252-254). Tertullian speaks of it more often than the other fathers—usually in connection with an implanted sense of morality. In De Spect.ii.2,26, he makes reference to knowledge (conscience) of natural law; De Cor.vi.162 - "the law of God in the tables of nature"; ibid.163 - "natural law and legal nature." It was apparently for Tertullian "the unwritten law" (anterior to the Decalogue) "which was naturally understood and applied by our fathers - Adv. Jud.ii.256. Natural law is "common wisdom" - De Cor.vii.164; it is complementary to positive law - Adv.Hr.v.13; and Adv.Jud. vili.vi, says the decalogue is a precision of natural law. Novatian is also concerned with the more human, moral aspect of natural law in De Cib.iii (discussing the perverted will, which does not follow it); but here in De Tr. his concern is clearly with the harmonious
physical (not moral) results of natural law. So at this point he is closer to Cicero than to the Church Fathers -cfr. Cicero, De Legg. i.6; De Nat. Dr. xxxi.78-80; lxii.154.

(3) angels and stars guide the world... - Weyer in his German translation (op. cit., p.74 - note 42) has correctly stated against the English translations of Fausset and H. Moore, that angeli and astra are bound together as subjects of the verb (though even if they were objects—which is possible grammatically, nom. and acc.pl. being alike here—they would still be connected and not separated, as in Fausset and Moore, who understand "angels" as leaders, while stars are objects). To equate the "activities" of angels and stars seems unusual. There is some Biblical imagery for a relationship between angels and nature (e.g. Ps.104:4, Heb.1:7), but not between angels and stars (unless it be Job 38:7 - "When the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy"). In Late Judaism, but particularly in some patristic thought there is imagery that compares angels and stars. Hippolytus, Refut. x.33.5, thinks that the nature of angels is of the same sort of fire as sun, moon, stars. Clement Alex., Eclogae, 56, commenting on Ps.18: In sole posuit tabernaculum suum, speaks of a certain rank of angels being "in the sun" (See Danielou, Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux 11e et 11e siècles, Desclée & Cie, Tournai, 1961, pp. 419-425). At any rate the idea of angels being a part of indirect providence in nature was a widespread one-cfr. Justin, II Apol. v.2, 3; Clement Alex., Strom. vii.9.3. Novatian takes this concept plus
the idea (mentioned in Tr.I.2) that the stars are for signs and seasons, and speaks of them as together "guiding" the world.

(4) cry out with the apostle... - this exclamation of joy over the creation is like a phrase in Clement of Rome, Ad Corinth. xxxiii.2: (though Novatian speaks of the people rejoicing, and Clement speaks of God rejoicing) "α δημιουργος...ἐκ τος ἐργων αὐτοῦ ἀγαλλιάται."
IX.46. Eadem regula veritatis docet nos credere post patrem etiam in filium dei, Christum Iesum, dominum deum nostrum, sed dei filium, huivs dei, qui et unus et solus est, conditor scilicet rerum omnium, ut iam et superius expressum est. hunc\(^1\) enim Iesum Christum, iterum dicam huius dei filium, et in veteri testamento legimus esse repromissum et in novo testamento animadvertismus exhibitum, omnium sacramentorum\(^2\) umbros\(^3\) et figuras de praesentia corporatae veritatis implementam.

\(^1\)hunc- Part of the elegance of Novatian's literary style consists in his use of anaphora. From IX.46–49 he uses this word hunc 16 times.

\(^2\)See note 4 under 1.8 on the basic meaning of sacrament in Novatian and the early Church writers. There it was noted that sacrament signified mysteries in God's creation. Elsewhere we find Novatian referring to sacrament in De Tr.46, 105, 114, 116—where it refers to "shadows" in the Old Testament being made realities in the New; Tr.167 on the revelation of the secrets of the New Testament; Tr.134, 139, 146—on the Incarnation of Christ as the content of the whole Evangel. In Pud.1, and Ep.30,3—it seems to sum up all the realities of the Christian faith, which are involved in the confession of the name of Christ; and Ep.30,7—where it means, to quote Vogt (op. cit., p.127): "Die ganze Fülle der kirchlichen Glaubens und Sittenlehre und Praxis, deren der Christ in der Taufe
teilhaftig wird. Also ist sacramentum immer in der Nähe der Taufe zu sehen." That sacramentum should be closely connected to baptism and confession of the name of Christ in Novatian’s thought is exactly what we would expect in light of the fact that De Tr. is an exposition of the regula veritatis, which comes from the baptismal formula.

3 dei filium... omnium sacramentorum umbrae... cfr. a similar phrase from Ch.5 of Novatian: "Christus... quae sacramentorum nebulae."
The same rule of truth teaches us to believe after the Father also on the Son of God\(^{(1)}\), Jesus Christ our Lord God, but the Son of God\(^{(2)}\)—the Son of this one and only God, that is to say the Creator of all things as has been expressed above. This Jesus Christ, I say again, the Son of this God, was promised, as we read, in the Old Testament\(^{(3)}\), and we find Him set before us in the New Testament, fulfilling the shadows and types of all mysterious foreshadowings\(^{(4)}\), by the presence of the embodied truth\(^{(5)}\).

\(^{(1)}\) Novatian now comes to expound the second part of the "rule of truth", which comprises chapters IX-XXVIII—forming the bulk of the treatise. See note (1) under I.9.

\(^{(2)}\) "God...but the Son of God"—It is evident that Novatian is taking great care to avoid the charge (levied at his predecessor Hippolytus) of "ditheism". He deals with this problem in more detail in Tr.XV,87. This difficult concept was worked out in successful formulation only after many years of thought and controversy by the best minds of the Church. See E.Amann, "Novatien et Novatienisme" DTC 11, (1911) 323; J.Lebreton, "Le Désaccord de la foi populaire et de la théologie savante dans l'Église du IIIe siècle" III, p.7: Dionysius of Rome, Ap. Athana. de Dicretis Nic.Sym., 26.

\(^{(3)}\) Again Novatian makes it very clear in opposition to the Gnostics and Marcionites that the Christ of the New
Testament is none other than the Son of the Creator God of the Old Testament. In the next paragraphs he shows how the entire life and ministry of Jesus Christ is rooted in the Old Testament revelation, and so is a continuity and fulfillment of it-never a contrary or entirely new thing.

(4) Shadows and types—Novatian frequently shows how revelation is an accommodation of God to man, in which God gradually leads man up to greater reality as man is made able to receive it. Thus Christological typology is understood to be a part of this movement. Tertullian makes the same point in *Pxon*.xvi: "Omnem ordinem divinae dispositionis per filium decucurriisse", which is a summary of the principle of Old Testament typology.

(5) "embodied truth"—This is in accord with Johannine Theology (see note (1) under VI.33) which stresses that truth is in a Person—i.e. in Christ, and that to know and "do" the truth is to be united to Him. Novatian's theology is strong in seeing truth as personal reality: but is weak in not going further (as did Athanasius) to see how the Spirit brings us into the life, knowledge, and action of the Incarnate, Risen Christ. This weakness undoubtedly influenced his misunderstanding of the whole question of forgiveness and repentance, for he turned the individual to his own worthiness, rather than to that of Christ.
IX.47. Hunc enim Abrahae filium, hunc David, hunc non minus et vetera prædicta et evangelia testantur. Hunc ipsa Genesis, cum dicit: tibi dabo et semini tuo\(^1\); hunc quando luctatum ostendit hominem cum Iacob\(^2\); hunc quando dicit: non deficiet princeps de Judæ neque dux de femoribus eius, donec veniat\(^3\), cui repromissum est: et ipsa erit expectatio gentium\(^3\); hunc Moyses, cum dicit: provide alium, quem mittas\(^4\); hunc idem, quando testatur: prophetæ vobis, dicendo, suscitabit deus ex fratribus vestris, cum quasi me audite\(^5\); hunc, quando dicit: videbitis vitam vestram pendentem nocte ac die et non credetis ei\(^6\).

\(^1\)Gen.17:8 \(^2\)Gen.32:23
\(^3\)Gen.49:10 (widely used in early Fathers as referring to Christ—e.g. Justin, I Apol.xxii; Hippolt., Treatise on Anti-Christ vii; Cyprian, Ep.lxii.
\(^4\)Ex.4:13
\(^5\)Deut.18:15—e.g. Clemt.Alx. Paed.I.vii
\(^6\)Deut.28:66—compare Melito, Homily on Passion (p.10, line 62, ed. of C. Bonner, London, 1940); Iren., Adv.Hr.IV.X.2; Tert., Adv.Iud. XI; Cyprian, Testm.II.20. It is alluded to by Clemt.Alx., Strom.V.XI.72,2; Origen C.Cels. II.75. These texts come from Testimonia common property throughout the early church, which were constructed on analogy of Jewish Florilegia (as have been found in Qumran). Daniélou notes that Novatian quotes
the verb credetia in the plural, whereas the African Testimonia quote it in the singular. Thus he is following Melito—and not the African Testimonia—at this point, though he usually does follow the African texts. (Daniélou, *Etudes d'Exégèse Judéo-Chrétienne*, Paris, 1966, note 2, p.56).
IX.47. To Him, the Son of Abraham and Son of David, the ancient prophecies as well as the Gospels bear witness. Genesis itself witnesses to Him when it says: "To thee will I give it and to thy seed"; and so does the man whom we are shown to have wrestled with Jacob. Again, "A prince shall not fail from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until he shall come to whom it hath been promised, and he shall be the desire of nations." Moses speaks of Him when he says: "Look out for another, whom thou mayest send"; "God shall raise up a prophet unto you from among your brethren"; "Ye shall see your life hanging by night and by day, and shall not believe him."

1 Isa. 11:1—quoted earlier by Justin, I Apol. xxxii;
2 Isa. 7:14—similarly quoted in Justin, I Apol. xxxiii;
3 collocat dicens—This is a verb (collocare) used frequently by Novatian. He employs it often at the end of clauses to make a propermetrical ending. Melin analyses the metre here as collocat dicens, which makes the ending "clausulam bonam" (Melin, op. cit., p. 408).
4 Isa. 35:5 sq.—also cited by Justin, I Apol. xlviii.
6 Isa. 55:3.
7 Isa. 55:4 sq.
IX.48. Isaiah bears Him witness: "The rod of Jesse shall put forth shoots, and a flower shall spring from his root"; "Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son." He foretells His works of healing: "Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened, and the ears of the deaf hear: then shall the lame man leap as an hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall sing." Isaiah describes the strength of His patience: "His voice shall not be heard in the streets; a bruised reed shall He not break, and the smoking flax shall He not quench." Again he describes His gospel: "I will make with you an everlasting covenant, even the unfailing holy things of David." He prophesies that the Gentiles shall believe on Him: "Behold, I have made him a ruler and commander to the peoples. The peoples which have not known thee shall call upon thee, and the nations which know thee not shall flee unto thee."
IX.49. Hunc eundem, quando ad passionem eius exclamat dicens: sicut ovis ad occasione ductus est, et sicut agnus ooram tendente se sine voce, sic non aperuit os suum in humilitate; hunc, quando flagrorum eius ictus plagasque de scripsit: livore eius nos sanati sumus; aut humilitatem; et vidimus eum, et non erat ei species neque honor. homo in plaga et sciens ferre infirmitatem; aut quod populus non erat crediturus: tota die expansi manus meas ad populum non creditent; aut quod resurrecturus a mortuis: et erit in illa die radix Iesse, et qui surget imperare gentibus, in eum gentes sperabunt, et erit requies eius honor; aut sum tempus resurrectionis: quasi diluculo paratum inveniems eum; aut quod sescusurus ad dextram patris: dicit dominus domino meo; sede ad dexteram meam, donec ponam inimicoce tuae scabellum pedum tuorum; aut sum possessor omnium collocatur: postula a me, et dabo tibi gentes hereditatem tuam et possessionem tuam terminos terrae; aut quod iudex omnium ostenditur: deus judicium tuum regi da, et iustitiam tuam filio regis. nec hoc in loco plura persequer, quae annuntiata de Christo omnibus haereticis, sed et ipsis veritatem tenentibus magis nota sunt.

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1 Isa.53:7sq. similarly quoted in Justin, Dial.Try. cxix:cxiv:etc.: Iren., Adv.Hr.IV.33.1; IV.33.12; Tert., De Fuga 12; De Res.Crn.20; etc.
This paragraph has many homoteleuta: e.g. humilitatem...infirmitatem...creden tem; mortuis... resurrectionis...patris; omnium collo catur...omnium ostenditur.


5 aut quod—Novatian appears to repeat this expression (instead of using the more ordinary quia) for the effect of anaphora.


7 Isa.11:10 8 Hos.6:3


IX. 49. He bears witness to his passion when he cries out: "He was brought as a sheep to the slaughter, and as a lamb before her shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth." He describes further the blows of the scourges and the stripes:

"By his stripes we are healed"; and also His humility: "And we beheld him, and he had no beauty or honour. A man bruised, and knowing the bearing of weakness." He witnessed concerning the future unbelief in Him of the people: "All the day long have I stretched forth my hands unto an unbelieving people."

And so concerning His resurrection from the dead: "And in that day there shall be a root of Jesus, and one who shall arise to rule the Gentiles, in him shall the Gentiles trust, and his rest shall be glorious." Or when he speaks of the time of His resurrection: "As at daybreak shall we find Him ready." He is to sit at the right hand of the Father: "The Lord said unto my Lord, sit thou on my right hand, until I make thine enemies they footstool." He is represented as the Possessor of all things: "Desire of me, and I will give thee the peoples for thine inheritance, and the utmost ends of the earth for thy possession." Also He is shown to be Judge of all things: "Give the Kind thy judgment and thy righteousness unto the King's Son." I shall not in this place pursue the subject further. These testimonies to Christ are well known to every heretic, but even better to those who hold the truth.
(1) Here and in four other places in Ep.-X.54; XI.56; XIX.116; XXI.125, Novatian speaks of the sufferings of Christ. Vogt correctly states (op. cit., p.65) that with the exception of Ep.XXI.125: "Wo vom leiden Christi die Rede ist, wird seine Sühnekraft mit keinem Wort angedeutet." This fact along with Novatian's neglect of the doctrine of the vital union of the sinner with the Incarnate Christ in all His benefits, are the primary factors in causing him to misunderstand the doctrine of forgiveness, which led in turn to his schism.
X.50. Sed illud admoneo, non alterum in evangelio Christum exspectandum fuisse, quam hunc a creatore veteris testamenti litteris ante promissum, maxime cum et, quae de ipso praedicta sunt, impleta sint, et, quae impleta sunt, ante praedicta sint: ut merito haereticorum istorum testamenti veteris auctoritatem respuantium\(^1\) nescio cui commenticio et ex fabulis anilibus ficto Christo atque fucato possim vere et constanter dicere: "quis es? unde es? a quo missus es? quare nunc venire voluisti? quare talis? vel qua venire potuisti?\(^2\)

\(^1\)testamenti veteris auctoritatem respuentium–Novatian uses many similar phrases concerning authority: in Tr. XI, XII, XIII, XVII, XIX (twice), XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXV, XXVII, XXX, XXXI and in Cib.1–auctoritatem vobis eius nomina vindicare possitis; Cib.2 (twice); Ep.xxx,5; Spc.3,13–Indulgentes patroni... praestant vitiiis auctoritatem; Spc.2–Christiani sibi nomini auctoritatem vindicantes"; Pud.6;10.

\(^2\)Notice the anaphora of questions from Tr.50-52: Quis...unde...a quo...quare...quid..."
X.50. May I remind my reader that no other Christ was to be expected in the Gospel, than this Christ who was promised by the Creator in the writings of the Old Testament; especially since the predictions about Him have been fulfilled, and all that has been fulfilled was predicted. With good reason I may faithfully and constantly say to that fanciful "Who knows what"—that false and painted up imaginary Christ of the heretics\(^1\), who reject the authority of the Old Testament: "Who are you? From where are you? By whom were you sent? Why did you choose to come at this time? Why are you what you are? By what way were you able to come?"\(^2\)

\(^{1}\) Novatian refutes Docetism in this chapter. This was one of the earliest of heresies that the Church had to face. As early as the New Testament itself, the Apostle John writes against heretics who deny that Christ is come in the flesh (I John). Ignatius of Antioch deals with the heresy in his letters. This heresy, apparently based on certain strands of Middle and Near Eastern dualistic thought, considered material in and of itself evil, and so they held the Messiah could not have a fleshly body, which would have made him evil. According to Eusebius, in the time of the Apostle John in Ephesus, this sort of teaching was propounded by Cerinthus. Some have held that the heresy started even before Cerinthus with Simon Magus of Samaria (mentioned in Acts)—though this is by no means clear.
However the heresy became quite widespread in the earliest days of Christianity. The Syrian Gnostic, Cerdo, came to Rome in the time of Bishop Hyginus (c.A.D.137). He was the teacher of Marcion, who claimed that Christ appeared (ζωοκράτησα) without birth. Valentinus, the Egyptian Gnostic, also came to Rome when Hyginus was Bishop, and was there for some 30 years. He denied the reality of Christ's birth and real body (See note under X.52). His disciples were Heracleon, Ptolemaeus (author of the Letter to Flora), and Theodotus (strongly refuted by Hippolytus). These disciples have been classified by some as the "Italian School" of Docetism, in contrast to the even more speculative "Eastern School" of Axionius and Bardesanes. The Church Fathers opposed this heresy with the basic principle: no true incarnation; no true redemption (See "Docetisme", by G. Bareille, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, IV, Paris, 1911, pp.1483sq., and Seeberg, History of Doctrines, Part I, p.93, Eng.tr.). Also R. Haardt, Gnosis, Character, and Testimony, Leiden, 1971, Eng.tr. of J.F. Hendry—especially Introduction, pp.1-28.

(2) This type of rhetorical questioning is found in earlier theologians: Iren., Adv.Hr.IV.33.2,5; Tert., Adv.Mr. II.13; III.8,10.
X.51. "Vel quare non ad tuos abisti, nisi quod probasti
tuos non habere, dum ad alienos venis? quid tibi cum mundo
creatoris? quid tibi cum homine conditoris? quid tibi cum
figmento corporis, cui eripis spem resurrectionis? quid ad
alienum venis famulum, alienum sollicitare desideras filium?
quid me a domino eripere conaris? quid me in patrem
blasphemare atque impium esse compellis? aut quid sum a te in
resurrectione consecuturus, qui me ipsum non recipio, dum
corpus amitto? si salvare vis, fecisses hominem, cui salutem
dares, si a delicto eripere cupis, ante mihi, ne delinquere
contulisses."
"Why did you not go away to your own people instead of coming among strangers? Thus you are proved to have no people of your own. What have you to do with the Creator's world, or with the Creator's man? What do you have to do with a fictitious body, which you rob of the hope of the resurrection (1)? Why do you come to another man's servant, and desire to draw away another man's son? Why do you try to tear me from the Lord? Why do you urge me to blaspheme and become impious (2) against the Father? What would I gain from you in the resurrection (3), since I would lose my body and thus not regain myself? If you wish to save, you ought to have made man to whom to give salvation. If you wish to deliver me from sin, you should have kept me previously from falling into sin."

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(1) rob of the hope of resurrection—compare Tertullian's eloquent plea to these same heretics: "Parce unicae spei totius orbis...certum est, quia impossible est."

(2) to blaspheme and become impious—The thought of Ignatius in Trallians X, is almost identical: "Godless men say he suffered in semblance" (i.e. to deny Christ's real Incarnation and suffering is godless blasphemy, or as I John says: "The Spirit of Anti-Christ.")

(3) what would I gain from you in the resurrection? Ignatius (Smyrneana iii) shows similarly that Christ's real
body is our only hope of resurrection: "He was in the flesh even after the resurrection...Therefore also they despised death, and were found to rise above it."
X.52. "Quod autem tecum suffragium circumfera\footnote{Compare Tert., Adv. Marc. III. 3: "praecessisse debuerat mittentis patrocinium in testimonium missi...subito filius...nihil a deo non dispositum."} legis? quod habes testimonium propheticae vocis?\footnote{Compare similar phrases of Novatian on this subject, where he speaks not only of the righteousness of marriage (Pud. 13-coniunctio legitima) but also of it as a divine covenant (Pud. 5 - pactum divini foederis).} aut quid mihi possum de te solidum repromittere, cum te videam in phantasmate et non in soliditate venisse? quid ergo tibi cum figura corporis, si corpus odisti? Immo revinceris corporis, quod odisti, circum-ferre substantiam, cuius suscipere voluisti etiam figuram. odisse enim debueras corporis imitationem, si oderas veritatem; quoniam si alter es, aliter\footnote{Compare similar phrases of Novatian on this subject, where he speaks not only of the righteousness of marriage (Pud. 13-coniunctio legitima) but also of it as a divine covenant (Pud. 5 - pactum divini foederis).} venire debueras, ne dicereris filius creatoris, si vel imaginem habuisses carnis et corporis. certe si oderas nativitatem, quia creatoris oderas nuptiarum coniunctionem, recusare debueras etiam imitationem hominis, qui per nuptias nascitur creatoris."
X.52. What credentials from the law do you carry about with you? What testimony do you have from the voice of the prophets? What substantial promise can I take for myself from you, when I see that you have come as a ghost, and not in a substantial body? If you hate the body, what then do you have to do with an outward form? You desire to take upon you the outward form of a body proves that after all you carry about with you the substance of a body; for if you hated the reality, you ought to have hated even the imitation of a body. If you are someone else, then you ought to have come in some other way to keep yourself from being called the Son of the Creator from your having even the appearance of flesh and blood. Indeed if you hated birth inasmuch as you hated the Creator's ordinance of marital union(1), you ought to have refused even to resemble a man, who is born according to that union.

(1) The Gnostics against whom Novatian is speaking obviously forbade marriage as fleshly, material, and therefore evil. This would be in line with the tendency of Tatian and the Encratites. However as R. Haardt points out (op.cit., p.9) even early Gnosticism had a double character of radical asceticism on one side, and antinomian libertinism on the other. As time went on apparently the antinomianism tended to prevail in Gnostic circles. Discoveries made at Chenoboskion (Upper Egypt) in 1946 (See W.P. Albright, "Recent Discoveries in
Palestine and the Gospel of John", in The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology in Honour of C.H. Dodd, edited by Davies and Daube, Cambridge, 1956) of early Gnostic codices (dated as late third and early fourth centuries A.D.), which contain many lost treatises belonging to Sethians, Ophites, etc., show that a virulent immorality held sway in many of these groups that had theoretically denied marriage. These discoveries to a considerable extent confirm the accuracy of the knowledge of Hippolytus and Irenaeus (mentors of Novatian) on Gnosticism. Also they show that denial and repression of the proper marital relationship leads to a proliferation of aberrant sexual relationships.
X.53. Neque igitur eum haereticorum agnosceimus\textsuperscript{1} Christum, qui in imagine, ut dicitur, fuit et non in veritate-nihil verum eorum, quae gessit, fecerit, si ipse phantasma et non veritas fuit-neque eum, qui nihil in se nostri corporis gessit, dum ex Maria nihil accepit-ne non nobis venerit, dum non in nostra substantia visus apparuit-neque illum, qui aetheream sive sideream, ut alii voluerunt haeretici, voluit carnem-ne nulam in illo nostram intellegamus salutem, si non etiam nostri corporis cognoscamus soliditatem-nec ullam omnino alterum, qui quod vis aliquid ex figmento haereticorum gesserit corpus fabularum.

\textsuperscript{1}Neque...agnoscimus- As we have seen, behind this verb stands the Stoic epistemology, according to which the mind of man is "compelled" to recognize (agnoscere) what is objectively there by the very fact of its reality and then to assent to it. That which is imaginary and non-existent has therefore no compelling power to force recognition and assent.
Therefore we do not recognize the Christ of the heretics, who is imaginary as it is said, and does not exist in reality—none of the things that he did were real if he was a mere ghost and had no reality himself. Neither did he bear anything in himself of our body since he received nothing from Mary (1). He did not come to us at all, since he appeared as a vision and not in our substance (2). Nor (do we recognize) him who came with an ethereal or siderial flesh (3), as the heretics have pretended. We would perceive no salvation in our own Lord, if we did not know that He has the substance of our own body in Himself. We do not recognize any other one at all, who carries about a fictitious body devised by the imaginations of the heretics (4).

(1) The Egyptian Gnostic Valentinus (contrary to Cerinthus, who taught that Jesus was not born of the Virgin—see R. Haardt, op. cit., p. 63) held to a "seeming birth" of Christ. He claimed that Christ's body passed through the body of Mary as a channel (διὰ διά μεθανόης); but that his body was from above, so that he received nothing from her.

(2) "Did not come to us...since He appeared as a vision..." cf. Hippolytus on Daniel 25 (Ante-Nicene Lib., Hippoll., Vol. I, p. 455): "For the Word was to bear us all, binding us like a girdle round His body, in His own love. The complete body was His, but we are members of His body, united
together, and sustained by the Word Himself." Hippolytus, before Novatian, saw the absolute importance for salvation of the Incarnation of Christ. Our salvation springs from the Incarnation of Christ, for in it we are united to Him, and so are prepared to receive the other benefits of His life, death, resurrection in our humanity. If the Incarnation is unreal, everything subsequent to it in redemption is unreal for our humanity for it would have no application to us. It is here in the Incarnation that Novatian lays stress for our salvation rather than on the death of Christ for our sins. As Vogt has pointed out (op.cit., p.66): "Diese Kontakt Gottes mit der Menschheit bezieht sich auf alle Menschen, weil die Menschen durch ihre aus einem Ursprung hervorgehende Leiblichkeit unter einander eins sind."

(3) "siderial flesh" - The follower of Marcion, Apelles (spoken of in Tert., De Prec.Hr.xxx, and Eusebius, Hist.Eccl. V.13) taught that Christ was clothed in an "astral" body, made of superior substance, and thus uncontaminated by true humanity. See Tertullian, Crn.Chr.vi.8 on the "siderial body" of Christ.

(4) "A fictitious body devised by the imaginations of the heretics" - compare DeTr.III.18: "Thus he excludes all heathen and heretics with the figments of their imaginations, and so proves him to be no god who has either been made by the hand of a craftsman, or conjured up by the imagination of a heretic."
X.54. Omnes enim istos et nativitas domini et mors ipsa
confutat. nam et verbum, inquit Iohannes, caro factum est et
habitavit in nobis: ut merito corpus nostrum in illo fuerit,
quoniam quidem nostram carnem sermo suscepit, et sanguis
idcirco de manibus ac pedibus atque ipso latere demanavit, ut
noster consors corporis probaretur, dum occasus nostri legibus
moritur, qui dum in eadem substantia corporis, in qua moritur,
resuscitatus ipsius corporis vulneribus comprobatur, etiam
resurrectionis nostrae leges in sua carne monstravit, qui
corpus, quod ex nobis habuit, in sua resurrectione restituit.
lex enim resurrectionis ponitur, dum Christus ad exemplum
ceterorum in substantia corporis suscitatur.

1 Jn. 1:14
2 sermo: Novatian translates λόγος by both verbum and
sermo without any apparent distinction in meaning being attached
to the two Latin words. In some writers there was in fact a
distinction in meaning between these two alternative Latin
translations of λόγος, which was related to a distinction in
the earlier apologetic theology. Some of the Christian
Apologists (influenced by Philo and the Stoics) drew a
distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθεσις and λόγος προφορικός.
The basic idea is that one is a word remaining within the
thought, whereas the other is that thought or word actually
uttered. This was borrowed and applied by some Apologists to
the two "states" or "generations" of Christ the Word: first, eternally existing as a thought in the mind of the Father, but later brought forth ("uttered") in the creation (usually connected to Prov.8 in their theology). Theophilus is the first Christian Apologist to make this distinction (Ad Auto. II.10). Tertullian holds to it in Prr.vi-viii, as does Justin in a number of places. Also Hippolytus mentions it in G.Noet.x. Sometimes (though this usage is not always consistent) it appears that λόγος ἐνδίδησεν tended to be translated by verbum in Latin, and λόγος προφορικός by sermo. Thus in general sermo tended to gather more material connotations, and verbum more intellectual and spiritual. This basically unBiblical distinction (between internal and uttered word) was never held by all of the Fathers of the Church. Irenaeus speaks against it in Adv.Er.II.xxxviii.6, as does Cyril of Jerusalem in Cath.iv.ii. Even in the early writer, Melito of Sardis, in whose Pascal Homily (c.A.D.167) there is the teaching of John 1, and the pre-existent Logos, we nevertheless find that the idea of Christ as a Son far predominates over the idea of Christ as Logos. The idea of two generations of the Logos is thus entirely absent from his writing (See C. Bonner, op.cit., p.28). We might then notice two main lines of thought in early Christian Theology on the question of philosophical Logos speculation over against the more solid Biblical teaching on sonship. Theophilus, Justin, Clement of Alex, Origen, Tertullian, and Hippolytus are in the former line, while Melito,
Irenaeus, and Novatian are in the latter. Though Novatian uses (as here) the Latin word *sermo*, it is clear that he does not connect this word to the idea of Λόγος προφορικός (which he never in any place even mentions), and so it would seem that for him there is no significant distinction between *sermo* and *verbum* as far as they are related to the translation of the Greek word Logos. In Latin Theology, particularly by the fourth century, *sermo* was being dropped as a translation of Logos—as was the whole idea of "inner" and "uttered" word. Although Augustine does mention this distinction—*verbum intimum* and *verbum prolatum* (e.g. *De Tr.* xv.11,20), yet as has often been pointed out, he makes very little of the distinction, and largely ignores it in his Christology (See O. DuRoy, *L'Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin*, Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris, 1966, p.429; and A. Schindler, *Wort und Analogie in Augustine Trinitateslehre*, coll. Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, 4, Tübingen, J.B.C. Mohr, 1965, pp.104-114). Augustine usually translates Logos by *verbum* (not *sermo*). This tends to be the standard translation after his time. His teacher, Ambrose, denied the truth of the "two states" of the Word—*Fid.* iv.4; iv,7,72; as did the later Cassiodorus in *Hist.* v.7 (*Fid.* Sirm.). As we see from Cassiodorus, the idea of Λόγος ἐνδιδαχτός and προφορικός was condemned by the Council of Sirmium (A.D.451). We may note that the less speculative line to which Novatian belonged, which stressed Christ as Son rather than Logos, is the line that finally won the approbation of the
Church. The word Logos does not appear in the Nicene Creed, and Athanasius always emphasized Christ as ὄνομα rather than Ἱερός—as did the later ecumenical councils. As we have remarked before, Novatian with his lack of speculation and his general conservatism has on certain points more nearly anticipated the mind of the Church on the meaning of Scriptural teaching than did the more speculative theologians.
The birth of the Lord as well as His death confounds all of them\(^{(1)}\). "For the word,"\(^{(2)}\) says John, "was made flesh and dwelt among us"; and consequently He was in Himself our own body since He took on our flesh\(^{(3)}\). And the blood flowed from His hands and feet, and even from His side, as proof that He dying under the laws of human dissolution, shared our human body. The wounds in that same body proved that He was raised in the substance of the very body in which He died. His restoration in the resurrection of the body which He derived from us demonstrates the laws of our own resurrection. For the law of resurrection is established when Christ rises in the substance of His body as the example for all the rest\(^{(4)}\).

\(^{(1)}\)"His birth...and death confounds them"—This type of argument for Christ's true Incarnation is not a new one. It was used by Ignatius of Antioch (who was influenced by I John), in Trall.ix, where he speaks against the Docetists: "Christ was truly born, and ate, and drank, was truly persecuted under Pontius Pilate, was truly crucified and died... was truly raised up from the dead."

\(^{(2)}\)In De Tr.X.54,55, Novatian shows that our salvation depends upon the fact that Christ took on Himself the same substance of flesh that we have. His flesh like ours was fully human, and was subject to the same laws of decay, dissolution, and death that plagues fallen humanity. The
whole point of this discussion is that the humanity that Christ assumed is humanity which has been affected by the Fall. Unfallen humanity, as the Fathers understood it, would not pertain to us, and would in fact require no redemption. Novatian does not state this fact de novo, but is following a long tradition of Patristic thought in regard to the flesh that Christ assumed. If we can accept as authentic (?) the quotation from Justin in Leontius, Against Eutychians, etc. Bk.II (Ante-Nicene Chr.Lib., Justin M. and Athenagoras, Vol.II, p.358), then Justin clearly teaches that Christ assumed fallen humanity: "Man...became subject to corruption. Corruption then becoming inherent in nature, it was necessary that He who wished to save should be one who destroyed the efficient cause of corruption. And this could not otherwise be done than by the life which according to nature being united to that which had received the corruption, and so destroying the corruption, while preserving as immortal for the future that which had received it. It was therefore necessary that the Word should become possessed of a body, that He might deliver us from the death of a natural corruption. For if, as ye say, He had simply by a nod warded off death from us, death indeed would not have approached us on account of the expression of His will; but none the less would we again have become corruptible, inasmuch as we carried about in ourselves that natural corruption." Irenaeus, in opposition to Gnostics, consistently maintains the true humanity of Christ. By "true humanity", 
Irenaeus appears to mean that which is carried by the sons of
fallen Adam, which is therefore subject to weakness and death
(though on the other hand, in some places where he speaks of
"recapitulation" of humanity in Christ, the Second Adam, one
could interpret him to be saying that what Christ takes is an
entirely new thing, better even than the unfallen Adam, and so
in this sense not connected to him. However, the main thrust
of his teaching as a whole leads us to interpret this in a
different way, as is to be seen directly). It is this humanity
which is subject to death that Christ takes on, so He can lift
it back up into the light and life of God, as is seen in a
number of places in Irenaeus. In Adv. Hr. I. 9.3, he shows that
the flesh of Christ was parallel to that of Adam: "But flesh
is that which was of old formed for Adam by God out of the dust,
and it is this that John has declared the Word of God became."
In Adv. Hr. II. 20.3, he further shows that it is the flesh of the
fallen Adam that Christ assumes: "...But the Lord, our Christ,
underwent a valid, and not a merely accidental passion. Not
only was He Himself not in danger of being destroyed, but He
established fallen man (corruptum hominem) by his own strength,
and recalled him to incorruption." He makes this even more
explicit in Adv. Hr. V. 14.2: "For the Lord, taking dust from the
earth, moulded man; and it was upon his behalf that all the
dispensation of the Lord's advent took place. He had himself,
therefore flesh and blood, recapitulating in Himself not a
certain other, but that original handiwork of the Father, seek-
ing out that thing which had perished." And further in V.14.3, he states: "If then anyone allege that in this respect the flesh of the Lord was different from ours, because it indeed did not commit sin, neither was deceit found in his soul, while we, on the other hand are sinners, he says what is the fact. But if he pretends that the Lord possessed another substance of flesh, the sayings respecting reconciliation will not agree with that man. For that thing is reconciled which had formerly been in enmity. Now if the Lord had taken flesh from another substance, He would not, by so doing, have reconciled that one to God which had become inimical through transgression. But now, by means of communion with Himself, the Lord has reconciled man to God the Father, in reconciling us to Himself by the body of His own flesh, and redeeming us by His own blood, as the Apostle says.. (quoting Eph.1:7; 2:13; 2:15)." Or again in V.14.2, he says: But if the Lord became incarnate for any other order of things, and took flesh of any other substance, He has not then summed up human nature in His own person, nor in that case can He be termed flesh...But...the Word has saved that which really was (created, viz) humanity which had perished, effecting by means of Himself that communion which should be held with it, and seeking out its salvation... He had Himself therefore flesh and blood, recapitulating in Himself not a certain other, but that original handiwork of the Father, seeking out that thing which had perished." Elsewhere Irenaeus explains how Christ lifts
up this fallen humanity by uniting it to Himself, and bringing
his holiness and Godhood to bear on every stage of life as He
lives it out in Himself on behalf of the whole race. In this
idea of man developing in Christ, Irenaeus may well have been
influenced by the Gospel of Luke, which speaks of the ἐνδείξις
of the child Jesus, "Who increased in wisdom, and in stature,
and in favour with God and man" - Luke 2:52. Irenaeus writes:
"Being a Master, therefore, He also possessed the age of a
Master (i.e. 30 years), not despising or evading any condition
of humanity, nor setting aside in Himself that law which He had
appointed for the human race, but sanctifying every age by that
period corresponding to it which belonged to Himself. For He
came to save all through means of Himself...He therefore passed
through every age, becoming an infant for infants, thus
sanctifying infants; a child for children, thus sanctifying
those who are of this age...a youth for youths...thus
sanctifying them for the Lord. So likewise He was an old man
for old men, that He might be a perfect Master for all...sanctifying at the same time the aged also" (Adv. Hr. II.22.4). Underlying all of this exposition is of course the truth that
although Christ subsumed frail flesh, He was never tainted by
guilt, and was no sinner. It is precisely as the "Holy One"
that He redeems the stages of life. Irenaeus holds together
the two truths that the Epistle to the Hebrews also holds, that
Christ is a merciful and sympathetic High Priest because He has
been tempted in every point "like as we are" - but on the other
hand "yet without sin" (Heb.4:14-16), for He is "holy, harmless, and undefiled, separate from sinners" (Heb.7:26). In Irenaeus' thought the fact of Christ's taking on flesh is always connected to His work of bringing man back to communion with God. "Therefore...He caused man to cleave to and to become one with God. For unless man had overcome the enemy of man, the enemy would not have been legitimately vanquished. And again unless it had been God Who had freely given salvation, we could never have become a partaker of incorruptibility. For it was incumbent upon the mediator between God and man, by His relationship to both, to bring both to friendship and concord and present man to God, while He revealed God to man...

Wherefore He passed through every stage of life, restoring all to communion with God" (III.18.7). As we have seen in Tr.III.18 (note (4)) and VIII.42 (note (5)), the result of Christ taking our flesh, bringing it back to God in obedient life and atoning death is our salvation - e.g. Adv.Hr.II.20.3: "...but the Lord, having suffered and bestowing the knowledge of the Father, conferred on us salvation...our Lord also by His passion destroyed death, and dispensed error, and put an end to corruption, and destroyed ignorance, while He manifested life and revealed truth and bestowed the gift of incorruption."

Clement of Alexandria and Origen are not so clear as Irenaeus on the fact, purposes, and results of Christ's assuming human flesh, though the substance of their teaching on the Incarnation is fairly close to his. Clement and Origen have at times a
docetic tendency (which however is usually offset by statements elsewhere in their writings that affirm true Incarnation). This tendency for instance causes Clement to deny that Christ really suffered hunger, etc., and it causes Origen to view Christ's coming not so much as an assumption of and cleansing of guilt and death, as a gentle training of humanity to perceive the full light of the revelation of God (i.e. more concerned with than ontology or moral cleansing). So Origen states in G.Cels. VI.LXVIII: "And who else is able to save and conduct the soul of man to the God of all things, save God the Word... and had become as flesh, that He might be received by those who could not behold Him, inasmuch as He was the Word... and was God?... He calls to Himself those who are flesh, that He may in the first place cause them to be transformed according to the Word that was made flesh, and afterwards may lead them upwards to behold Him as He was before He became flesh..." Yet Clement and Origen are very like Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian in that they teach the same results of Christ's Incarnation— as a restoration to the likeness of Christ (See Clement, Strom.VI. 12—previously quoted), and thereby a restoration to the light of the Father's face—e.g. Origen, G.Cels. IV.15: "But if the immortal God—the Word—by assuming a mortal body and a human soul, appears to Celsus to undergo a change and transformation, let him learn that the Word, still remaining essentially the Word, suffers none of those things which are suffered by the body or the soul, but condescending occasionally to (the
weakness of) him who is unable to look upon the splendours and brilliancy of Deity, He becomes as it were flesh, speaking with a literal voice, until He who has received Him in such a form is able through being elevated in some slight degree by the teaching of the Word, to gaze upon what is, so to speak, his real and pre-eminent appearance." The same general lines are followed in Hippolytus, though he like Irenaeus, is more clear on Christ's full assumption of actual human flesh in its enfeebled condition. In C.Neot.xvii, he shows that it was the old adamic nature that Christ assumes and so redeems: "...God the Word came down from heaven, into the Holy Virgin Mary, in order that taking the flesh from her, and assuming also a human body, by which I mean a rational soul, and becoming thus all that man is with the exception of sin, He might save fallen man, and confer immortality on men who believe on His name...Also did He come and manifest Himself, being by the Virgin and the Holy Spirit made a new man; for in that He had the heavenly (nature) of the Father, as the Word, and the earthly (nature) as taking to Himself the flesh of the old Adam, by the medium of the Virgin, He now coming into the world, was manifested as God in a body, coming forth too as a perfect man. For it was not in mere appearance or by conversion (κατὰ παρατιθέμεν ἀπὸ ἀρχής), but in truth, that He became man." In Refut.X.29, he discusses the ἀρχή of Christ in terms like those of Irenaeus: "This (Logos) we know to have received a body from a Virgin, and to have remodeled the old man by a new creation.
(We know) (the Logos) to have passed through every period in life, in order that He Himself might serve as a law for every age, and that by being present (among) us, He might exhibit His own manhood as an aim for all men." Hippolytus more clearly than Irenaeus, would seem to be saying that while Christ is connected to the old fallen Adam, yet His Incarnation from the beginning is such a new thing, that it is more to be described in terms of a new creation untainted by sin at any point, rather than a restoration of post-Adamic humanity. However Hippolytus does not teach that Christ's humanity is a sheer replacement of Adamic flesh—a totally new thing (See G. Noet. xvii, already quoted). The relationship between the old and new humanity is never made clear by Hippolytus. Tertullian goes into far more detail on the exact relationship between the humanity of Christ and that of Adam than does Hippolytus. In De Car. Chr. xiv, he emphasizes, like chapter 2 of Hebrews, that Christ took not the nature of angels, but that of man: "Christ then was actuated by the motive which led Him to take human nature. Man's salvation was the motive, the restoration of that which had perished...No such cause however existed for Christ's taking on Him the nature of angels..." In Car. Chr. xvii, he states that the human flesh that Christ assumed was that which had been affected by the Fall: "Hence it was necessary that Christ should come forth for the salvation of man, in that condition (of flesh) into which man had entered ever since his condemnation." Tertullian nonetheless is careful to assert
that Christ assumed fallen flesh without thereby being made a sinner. In two places he explains this mystery in more detail than any other of the fathers. In Car.Chr.xvi, he deals with the ultimate paradox that Christ assumes fallen flesh not as a fallen one, but precisely as the Holy One of Israel, so He can raise it again to holiness: "We maintain moreover that what has been abolished in Christ is not *carnem peccati*, but *peccatum carnis* - not the material thing, but its condition; not the substance, but its flow...Now in another sentence he says that Christ was "in the likeness of sinful flesh"...but he means us to understand likeness to the flesh which sinned, because the flesh of Christ, which committed no sin itself, resembled that which had sinned - resembled it in its nature, but not in the corruption it received from Adam; whence we also affirm that there was in Christ the same flesh as that whose nature in man is sinful. In the flesh therefore, that sin has been abolished, because in Christ that same flesh is maintained without sin, which in man was not maintained without sin. Now it would not contribute to the purpose of Christ's abolishing sin in the flesh, if He did not abolish it in that flesh in which was the nature of sin...then you say, if He took our flesh, Christ's was a sinful one. Do not however, fetter with mystery a sense which is quite intelligible. For in putting on our flesh, He made it His own; in making it His own, He made it sinless." This may indeed be as close as anyone can come to explaining this double-sided truth. In De An.xl, he
again tries to think out how it is possible for Christ to take fallen flesh without at the same time being fallen. His discussion here is neither so clear nor so much to the point as the one just quoted; but he does—in a round about way—establish the important principle that sin is not an inherently constitutive part of what is entailed in being human. Christ establishes what is inherently constitutive of human nature, and drives out what is not (which means He does not have to be a sinner to be fully human—in fact He is fully human only because He is not a sinner, and in this way is able to "expell" that which is not only not constitutive of human nature, but is destructive of it). "Now although the flesh is sinful...yet the flesh has not such ignominy on its own account. For it is not of itself that it thinks anything or feels anything for the purpose of advising or commanding sin...It is only a ministering thing...and its ministiration is not like that of a servant...annihilated; but rather that of a vessel...it is body, not soul...accordingly the flesh is blamed in the Scriptures, because nothing is done by the soul without the flesh in operations of concupiscence...But what has the flesh alone without the soul, ever done in operations of virtue?...What absurdity however it is to attribute sin and crime to that substance to which you do not assign any good actions or character of its own...? (xli)...There is then, beside the evil which supervenes on the soul from the intervention of the evil spirit, an antecedent, and in a certain sense, natural evil
which arises from its corrupt origin... Just as no soul is without sin, so neither is any soul without seeds of good... (in the new birth of regeneration) the flesh follows the soul now wedded to the Spirit, as a part of the bridal portion—no longer the servant of the soul, but of the Spirit." The main point of Tertullian here that "fallenness" is not in the flesh, but in the soul, is really no help in solving the mystery of how Christ can take on fallen man (whether the "fallenness" be in body or soul) and yet be the Holy One who redeems. What is of interest however in this passage is not his main argument, but a minor point discussed directly above, that sin is not an essential part of what constitutes humanity. Tertullian is in agreement with the other fathers in his explanation of how Christ lifts this flesh of fallen man to holiness and life. In various places he states that Christ by His very taking of flesh, rendered it exempt from sin (Adv. Marc. V. 14; Car. Chr. xvi; De An. xvi). In Car. Chr. iv, he goes further to say that Christ by His taking flesh, cleanses it: "Our birth He reforms from death by a heavenly regeneration; our flesh He restores from every harassing malady; when leprous, He cleanses it of the stain; when blind, He rekindles its light; when palsied, He renews its strength; when possessed with devils, He exorcises it; when dead, He reanimates it—then shall we blush to own it?" Tertullian with Irenaeus, sees the development of Christ as a moving forward of all humanity in Him through the various stages of His life: "Even in Christ,
knowledge had its stages of growth; through which stages the Apostle too passed" (Pud. i). In Res. Cr. xlviii, he reinforces the doctrine of all humanity being involved in Christ by the distinction he draws between "Christ in the flesh" and "the flesh in Christ." "For the very same body which fell in death, and which lay in the sepulchre, did also rise again; not so much in Christ in the flesh, as the flesh in Christ..." He is again like Irenaeus when he summarizes the whole movement of humanity in Christ as a recapitulation in Him who "takes the Omega back to Alpha." He says in De Mon. v: "The apostle too, writing to the Ephesians, says that God 'had proposed in Himself at the dispensation of the fulfillment of the times, to recall to the head' (that is to the beginning) 'things universal in Christ, which are above the heavens and above the earth in Him.' So too the two letters of Greece, the first and the last, the Lord assumes to Himself, as figures of beginning and end which concur in Himself: so that just as Alpha rolls on till it reaches Omega, and again Omega rolls back till it reaches Alpha, in the same way He might show that in Himself is both the downward course of the beginning on to the end, and the backward course of the end up to the beginning; so that every economy, ending in Him through whom it began — through the Word of God, that is, who was made flesh — may have an end correspondent to its beginning. And so truly in Christ are all things recalled to "the beginning", that even faith returns from circumcision to the integrity of that (original)
flesh as 'it was in the beginning'...and lastly the whole man into paradise, where he was 'from the beginning.' Elsewhere he deals with the important principle that unless that which is lost is taken up by Christ, it cannot be saved; or put another way, if the entire man (body and soul) is lost; then the entire man must be assumed: "But when He adds, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost"...man, there can be no doubt of it, is here the subject of consideration. Now, since he consists of two parts, body and soul, the point to be inquired into is, in which of these two man would seem to have been lost? If in his body, then it is his body, not his soul which is lost. What however is lost, the Son of Man saves. The body (flesh) therefore has the salvation...If man is wholly lost in both his natures, then it is necessary that salvation be appointed for the entire man; and then the opinion of the heretics is shivered to pieces, who say that there is no salvation of the flesh." From this we believe that Tertullian, the earlier fathers, as well as Novatian, would have agreed with the explicit teaching of Gregory Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria in the fourth century, when combattting Apollinarianism which claimed that the Logos took flesh, but not the mind of man; established the principle that: "The unassumed is the unhealed" (ἡ υπερ ἐκκολασθηρ, ἡ ἀναφεράτηρ ...) - Greg.Nazn., Ep.101; and "That which is not taken up, is not redeemed" (ἡ μὴ προσερθηρ, ἡ υπερ σωτηρ) - Cyril, Comment on Jn.12:27,28. Novatian himself deals with this
question in some eight different places in De Tr. The passages can be divided into two main heads. The first deals with the fact that Christ partook of frail, fallen flesh (yet without guilt and sin), and the second with the results of that assumption. In X.53, he shows that Christ took none other than our own body, which was subject to dissolution and death—the wages of the Fall: "And the blood flowed from His hands and feet, and even from His side, as proof that He dying under the laws of human dissolution, shared our human body." In ch.XXXV, he argues against the assertion that the death of Christ disproves His Godhood, and he counters with the a fortiori argument that even the soul of a man cannot die, therefore how much less can the soul and Logos of Christ. In this argument, altogether apart from the major premise, he makes an important point (without specifically setting out to do so) concerning the flesh of Christ. It is this. Whereas he distinguishes the Divine soul of Christ and the human soul of man (XXV.143, 144), he does not distinguish the flesh of Christ and the flesh of man. Both of them are subject to the same laws of death. Yet from the whole context of Novatian's teaching, we believe he understands this subjection of Christ's flesh to death as an "economic" one, rather than ontologically necessary. From X.55, we can gather that Christ's assumption of flesh would involve no guilt on his part (because He assumes the substance of the flesh, and not its guilt). The fact that Christ has taken frail flesh in its weakened condition is further
reinforced in Ep.XIII.63, where he speaks of the "weakness of the flesh he wears," and XV.31, which mentions the "frailty he took." Under the second heading, Novatian shows the results of this assumption of humanity. He is at one with the other fathers on this point. In XXI.125, he shows how Christ's assuming flesh cleanses it. This assumption and uplifting bring about our eternal salvation. According to XXIII.134: "This most profound and hidden mystery, destined before the world for the salvation of the human race, is found to be fulfilled in the Lord Jesus Christ, both God and man, that the frail estate of human nature might be brought up to the enjoyment of eternal salvation." In X.54, he pinpoints the principle of this uplifting of flesh to salvation as being in the resurrection of Christ: "His restoration in the resurrection of the body...as the example for all the rest." Vogt in his study of Novatian points out as we have already noted, that when Novatian speaks of the death of Christ, particularly here in X.54, it is not so much to speak of His blood being shed to cleanse our sins as it is to prove the reality of His body (Vogt, op.cit., p.194). This is a definite weakness in the theology of Novatian, but on the other hand he is not totally lacking in seeing some connection between the death of Christ and the removal of our guilt. He mentions for instance in X.55, in one sentence the removal of baptism, the dissolution of the body in death, and then as a result the restoration of the flesh to innocence. While he does not
appear to be specifically referring to the death of Christ (in "dissolution of the body in death"), still it is clear elsewhere (from his basing the three points of the "rule of truth" on the baptismal formula), that he connects baptism with the historic death of Christ, and therefore when he speaks - as here - of the "removal of guilt in baptism", this removal of guilt has a reference (even if indirect) to the death of Christ.

But as we have discussed earlier (See III.18, note) Novatian follows more closely the Greek ontological view of salvation than the Western moral-guilt understanding.

(3) This is a reecho of the argument of Saint Paul in ICor.15:20-23, "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and is become the first fruits of them that slept."
X.55. Quoniam, cum caro et sanguis non obtinere regnum dei scribitur¹, non carnis substantia damnata est, quae divinis manibus, ne periret, exstructa est, sed sola carnis culpa merito reprehensa est, quae voluntaria hominis temeritate contra legis divinae iura grassata est; quae in baptismate et in mortis dissolutions sublata caro ad salutem revertitur, dum ad statum innocentiae deposita criminis mortalitate revocatur.

¹A. Demmler points out (Über den Verfasser der unter Cyprians Namen überlieferten Traktate "De bono pudicitiae" und "De spectaculis", Diss. Tubingen, 1894, pp.51sq.) the unique translation that Novatian follows here when he deviates from the Vulgate and most of the Latin Fathers in using the verb obtinere instead of possidere. He uses this same unusual translation again in De Pud., which as Melin notes, is a good argument for his authorship of that work: "Novatianus solus obtinere habet; nonne ergo mira est inter Tr.10 et Pud.7 concordia?" (Melin, op.cit., p.162).
X.55. Although it is written that "Flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God"(1); yet it is not the substance of the flesh that is condemned. This was fashioned by the hands of God so that it should not perish. It is only the guilt of the flesh that is rightly rebuked because of man's bold and willful rebellion against the claims of divine law. When this guilt has been taken away in baptism(2), and in the dissolution brought about by death, then the flesh is lifted up to salvation by being recalled to the state of innocence, when the mortality of guilt is put away.

(1) The explanation that Novatian makes of this phrase is close to that made earlier by Tertullian in De Resr. 48-51. There he combats the Gnostics who perverted this text to disprove bodily resurrection. He explains that what is meant is not an exclusion of flesh and blood as such from heaven, but first, the sins which caused them to become unworthy, and secondly, its present state of corruption which makes it incapable of inheriting the eternal kingdom. On the contrary, he replies, as Christ was raised in His flesh, so shall we be raised in our flesh-bearing His image, transformed into immortality. So he says in Resr. 50: "Dum pro meritis distinctionem resurrectionis opus substantiae, non genus, patitur, apparat hinc quoque carnem et sanguinem nomine culpae, non substantiae, arceri a Deo regno, nomine tamen formas resurgere in judicium, quia non resurgant in regnum...Sed quorum
est adire regnum Dei, induere oportebit vim incorruptibilitatis et immortalitatis, sine qua regnum Dei adire non possunt." In Adv.Msci.V.10.14, Tertullian makes again the first point (that these words exclude the sins of the flesh - not the flesh). In Adv.Msci.V.13.35, Irenaeus brings out the second point (that only the present state of corruption cannot inherit the kingdom of God). Elsewhere he mentions the first point (Adv.Msci.V.9.3.4; xii.3; xiv.4).

(2) We may compare this statement on the meaning of baptism with other references in Novatian. His words in Cib.V are similar: "elementa, quibus per baptismam mortui sumus" (though in Cib.V, he stresses more the outer aspect of baptism, while in Tr.X.55, it is more the inner aspect he has in view). He teaches rebirth through baptism in Pud.2: "renatos ex aqua et pudicitia" as he does in Tr.XXIX.169 (where he specifically says this rebirth is through the Spirit): "Hic est, qui operatur ex acquis secundam nativitatem...quodam aeternae salutis." In Spe.4, rather like the opening Cathechetical Lecture of Cyril of Jerusalem (whom he may have influenced at several points) he shows that baptism is a renunciation (according to Cyril - of the demons and the world): "cum semel illi renuntians rescissa sit res omnis in baptismate." Vogt in his study states that on the question of baptism, as well as on the death of Christ, Novatian fails to specifically mention the cleansing of sins: "Bei alldem ist bemerkenswert, dass von einer Tilgung der Sunde nicht die Rede ist...einem eigentlichen
Begriff von Sünde hat er nicht. Deshalb ist auch die Sündervergebung für ihn keine Realität" (op. cit., p.101). As we have noted (see III.18, X.54) Novatian’s doctrine of redemption sees Christ as the Lifebringer more than the Cleanser from guilt.
XI.56. Verum ne ex hoc, quod dominum Iesum Christum, dei creatoris filium, in substantia veri corporis exhibitum asserimus, aliis haereticis hoc in loco hominem tantum et solum defendentibus atque ideo hominem illum nudum et solitarium probare cupientibus aut manus dedisse aut loquendi materiaem commodasse videamur, non sic de substantia corporis ipsius exprimimus, ut solum tantum hominem illum esse dicamus, sed ut divinitate sermonis in ipsa concretionem permixta etiam deum illum secundum scripturas esse teneamus.

asserimus—This is a verb frequently used by Novatian especially where he is dealing with the question of Deity. Cfr. Tr. XI-Deus ex operibus asseratur; XII-asseritur; also in XXII, XXIV (twice), XXVI, XXX, XXXI (twice), and elsewhere: De Spec. 3.10—sinceritatem rei asserit; 12-vitiorum assertores blandi; 4.4; 4.10-asseritur.

sermonis—Contrary to some of the other fathers, it would seem that Novatian makes no particular distinction between the meaning and usage of sermo as opposed to ratio. This is probably because he has nothing to say concerning the distinction of λόγος ἐνθετος and λόγος προφορικός (See note under X.55).
XI.56. Now when we assert that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Creator, was manifested in the substance of a true body, we must not seem to have capitulated or to have provided the foundation of an argument to other heretics, who in this matter maintain that He was merely a bare man(1) and nothing more. We thus speak concerning the substance of his body as not to assert that He is only a mere man, but to maintain that according to the Scriptures, He was also God, through the joining in union of the divinity of the Word in Himself(2)

(1) merely a bare man—According to Epiphanius in Haer. 51.1 (4th century), it was the Theodotians who affirmed that Christ was a mere man (ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον). He considered them to be a sect of the "Alogoi", who denied the Logos and Gospel of John. Hippolytus mentions them also, as he does one Artemas. It would seem that Artemas had an even lower view of Christ than did the two Theodotians. They held that Christ was a heavenly "power" which came into the man Jesus. Along with many Gnostics, Artemas apparently would not even go that far, and said that Christ was a "mere man" (See E. Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise Against Praxeas, p.17).

(2)"man...and God...through the joining in union of the divinity of the Word in Himself"—Here and in certain other places Novatian attempts to state the truth of the hypostatic union. This is of course before the formulas of the fourth and
fifth centuries, which much more clearly expressed the reality of
this union. Some interpreters have questioned whether or not
Novatian had any understanding at all of this reality. The follow-
ing passages are particularly in question:

XIII.67: præsertim...concordiam
XV.81: homo...copulatus
XXI.123: propter...reperitur. Et ideo...negetur
XXIV.139: quoniam...cognoscant.
In the first place, true Nestorianism holds that the unity of the two natures (or rather in their view, the two "persons") in Christ is extrinsic - not essential; a "moral association" instead of a real inner union of two natures consisting in one true person. Some of the words that Novatian uses to express this union could be interpreted in this way, unless one takes them in their proper context. As we see from the above quotations, he speaks of it in terms of a permixtio, an annexio, a transductio, and a connexio et permixtio sociata. Christ is spoken of as ex utroque connexus, contextus, and concretus. As Tixeront has shown (op.cit., pp.414sq.), these terms are basically the same as those employed by other early fathers. Tertullian who is perhaps the clearest of the Ante-Nicene Fathers on the hypostatic union (particularly in Adv.Pr.x.27, where he coins the useful phrase "duae substantiae (naturae), una persona"), uses similar terminology in Adv.Mrc.II.27: miscente in semetipsa hominem et deum; as does Hippolytus in De Anti-Chr.IV: ὀγκρασοὶ, μιξοὶ. Taken alone and in themselves, these words could be interpreted either in a merely external way in which two different things continue to be precisely that - two different things, somehow held together; or in a more internal way - of two things that are confounded into a tertium quid - so that both have lost their distinctive properties. But this is certainly not the way Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Novatian use these words. According to Wolfson (Philosophy of the Church Fathers, I,
p.372sq.) in using these words denoting "mixture", they would have had in mind certain Aristotelian and Stoic explanations of physical union. The only union upon which they would have based an analogy was the "union of predominance" discussed by Alexander of Aphrodisias, 2nd century commentator of Aristotle (Ibid, p.385). In the "union of predominance", the more powerful of the two constituents "predominate", although the less powerful constituent remains without destruction, and is related to the greater as matter to form. As Wolfson explains it, the Fathers use this as an analogy to explain something of how the Logos (who is the one person in Christ) predominates in the real union with humanity in Jesus Christ. Thus it is not a question of two equal "persons", or even two unequal persons in an external union, but rather of the Logos, who predominates, uniting to Himself manhood in one person. Tixeront has pointed out this true unity of personhood in Novatian: "Une idée domine cependant tous ces efforts vers l'expression décisive, c'est que le même sujet est Dieu et homme, c'est qu'il y a en Jésus Christ une personne unique" (op.cit., p.415). The second problem that arises in giving a Nestorian interpretation of Novatian's theology is that this would mean that he understood "flesh" to be an individual, independent person before and after the Incarnation. The passages we have quoted however will not bear this interpretation. Novatian never teaches that the flesh of Christ existed independently before the conception of the Incarnate Logos - though as Tixeront points
out, he is not very precise about just when this union took place, probably because he has nothing new to add to the traditional view that it began in the conception in the Virgin. Further it would not appear that he considers the flesh ever to be an independent person in contrast to the Logos (or "Son of God"). The fact is that according to Tr.XI, Novatian considers "the Son of Man" and "the Son of God" to be the same person: "Qui legunt ergo...nuncupatus est."

As we have seen, he was lacking in the precise formulas that were later developed in the church - particularly at Nicea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon. In his time the basic controversy was Trinitarian rather than Christological. Therefore we do not find the Christological precision of later Christian thought in Novatian. But we do find him witnessing to the same basic reality, even though his language is at times far from clear. His attempts to understand this reality, even if inferior to the clarity of Tertullian, were nonetheless a step forward in gaining more precise formalisation of the truth of the hypostatic union.
XI.57. Est enim periculum grande salvatorem generis humani, totius dominum et principem mundi, cui a suo patre omnia tradita sunt et cuncta concessa, per quem instituta sunt universa, creata sunt tota, digesta sunt cuncta, aevorum omnium et temporum regem, angelorum omnium principem, ante quem nihil praeter patrem, hominem tantummodo dicere et auctoritatem illi divinam in his abnegare. haec enim contumelia haereticorum ad ipsum quoque deum patrem redundabit, si deus pater filium deum generare non potuit.

\[1\] I Tim.1:17
\[2\] contumelia haereticorum...reundabit—compare the same verb in a similar expression in Cib.2: culpa...reundabit.
XI.57. For it is very dangerous\(^{(1)}\) to say of Him who is the Saviour of the human race, the Lord and Ruler of the whole world, to whom all things have been delivered and granted by His Father, through whom all things were made, all things created, all things arranged, the King of all ages and times, the Ruler of all angels, before whom\(^{(2)}\) nothing existed save the Father, that He is man only, and to deny His divine authority in these orders. This contempt of the heretics will also extend to God the Father, implying that He could not beget God the Son\(^{(3)}\).

\(\text{(1)}\) It is very dangerous—Novatian stresses the importance of right belief, and the eternally fatal consequences of false belief—see e.g. Tr.XI.61: perturbata regula veritatis...grande conflaverit.

\(\text{(2)}\) before whom nothing existed save the Father— as both Fausset \((\text{op.cit.}, \text{p.36})\) and Weyer \((\text{op.cit.}, \text{p.85})\) point out, the "before" is used here not in a temporal prior sense, but instead to express an eternal reality unlimited by time, as is seen in Tr.XXXI.183: semper autem...originem nescit.

\(\text{(3)}\) On the eternity of God the Son compare the statement in XI.60— et quomodo qua homo post multos, sic qua deus ante omnes. Novatian as we have seen at other points, unlike Tertullian and Hippolytus, is restrained and unspeculative concerning the "how" of the generation of the Son.
of God. He makes no mention of a double "intra" (eternal) and "extra" (temporal) generation of the Son.
XI.58. Sed enim veritati caccitas haereticorum nulla praescribet nec, quoniam in Christo aliquid tenent, aliquid non tenent, alterum vident, alterum non vident, cripistem nobis illud, quod non vident, per illud, quod vident, quasi hominis enim in illo fragilitates considerant, quasi dei virtutes non computant, infirmitates carnis recolunt, potestastes divinitatis excludunt, quando, si probatio haec ex infirmitatibus Christi illuc proficit, ut homo ex infirmitatibus comprobetur, probatio divinitatis in illo collecta ex virtutibus illuc proficiet, ut etiam deus ex operibus asseratur, si enim passiones ostendunt in illo humanam fragilitatem, cur opera non asserant in illo divinam potestatem? ne, si hoc non profecerit, ut deus ex virtutibus asseratur, nec passiones proficiant, ut etiam homo ex ipse esse monstretur, quacumque enim lex in alterutro fuerit posita, in altero invenietur esse suspecta, periculum enim erit nec hominem illum ex passionibus ostendi, si non potuerit etiam deus ex virtutibus approbari. non est ergo in unam partem inclinandum et ab alia parte fugiendum, quoniam nec tenebit perfectam veritatem, quia quisquam veritatis excluserit portionem.

\(^1\)quoniam—Melin (op.cit., pp.187,208) suggests that the words quoniam and quoniam nec, used so often by Novatian, are a sure sign of his literary style, and thus confirm his authorship.
XI.58. The blindness of the heretics\(^1\) shall certainly not prescribe what the truth shall be. And if they hold with one thing in Christ, and not with something else, or see one part and do not see another, the part which they do not see shall not be snatched away for the sake of the part which they do see\(^2\). They pay attention to the frailties of a man in Him, but they do not take account of His powers of divinity; they emphasize the infirmities of His flesh, but they exclude the mighty acts of His divinity. Yet if the proof drawn from the infirmities of Christ is sufficient to prove from those infirmities that He is man, the proof of divinity in Him drawn from His powers will be sufficient to assert from His works that He is also God. If His sufferings show the human frailty, why may not His mighty works show the Divine Power that was in Him? For if this be insufficient to prove Him to be God from His powers, then His sufferings do not suffice to prove Him to be man. Whatever principle is accepted on either of the two sides, will be found to apply equally to the other. It is dangerous to maintain that His powers do not prove Him to be God, for then His sufferings do not prove His manhood. We cannot lean to one side of the truth and evade the other side; whoever excludes any part of the truth will not hold the truth in perfection.

\(^1\)"blindness of the heretics"— In Tr.XV, he also speaks of the "blindness of the Jews" for the same reason: both can see the humanity of Christ, but not His divinity. In Tr.X,
Novatian was refuting the Marcionite Gnostic heresy which denied the humanity of Christ, but here in XI and following chapters, he refutes heretics on the other extreme, who deny the divinity of Christ. His affirmation of Christ's divinity is much longer than that of His humanity, probably because in the third century there were far more heretics who denied His divinity than His humanity. Certainly this was the case with the Jews—particularly the sect of the Ebionites (possibly connected with the Qumran people)—as it was with the various groups of Gentile adoptionists.

(2) "see one part and not another"—Novatian points to one of the main characteristics of heresy—namely that they "choose" (διαμένω) one part of the truth—and stress it to the exclusion of another part. Other fathers mention this same one-sided distortion that heretics make, especially in regard to the interpretation of Scripture. Hippolytus brings this out in C. Noet.III, where he shows that the heretics willfully choose only one class of passages: "In this way then, they choose to set forth these things, and they make use only of one class of passages, just in the same one-sided manner that Theodotus employed when he sought to prove that Christ was a mere man." So Tertullian accuses the heretics in De Pres.Hr. xvii: "Now this heresy of yours does not receive certain Scriptures..." Irenaeus says that heretics have taken certain scriptural expressions out of their context in the whole body of truth to misuse them (one-sidedly): "...But when he (the
true believer, holding to the rule of truth) has restored everyone of the expressions quoted to its proper position, and has fitted it to the body of the truth, he will lay bare, and prove to be without any foundation the figment of these heretics" (Adv.Hr.I.9.4). Clement of Alex. in Strom.VII.16, shows that the heretics do not use all the Scriptures; they use only part of them, and those are taken out of their context. Origen in De Prn.IV.3.5, mentions how the true interpreter must search all through the Scriptures to get the meaning from the body of truth as a whole. Therefore we see that Novatian is closely following the other Fathers in offering as a remedy to the one-sidedness of heresy, the wholeness of the Scriptures. He speaks against one-sidedness in Tr.XI.67 in terms of "ex duobus" and again in XIII.72 - "utrumque merito."
XI.59. Tam enim scriptura etiam deum annuntiat Christum, quam etiam hominem ipsum annuntiat deum; tam hominem descripsit Iesum Christum, quam etiam deum quoque\(^1\) descripsit Christum dominum, quoniam nec dei tantum illum filium esse proponit, sed et hominis, nec hominis tantum dicit, sed et dei referre consuevit, ut dum ex utroque est, utrumque sit\(^2\), ne, si alterum tantum sit, alterum esse non possit. ut enim praescripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum esse, qui ex homine sit, ita eadem natura praecribit et deum credendum esse, qui ex deo sit. ne, si non et deus fuerit, cum ex deo sit, iam nec homo sit, licet ex homine fuerit, et in alterutro utrumque periclitetur, dum alterum altero fidem perdidisse convincitur.

\(^1\)etiam deum quoque—See note 1 under 1.3 on this type of pleonas... 

\(^2\)This paragraph is a notable example of Novatian's use of homoteleuta: sit...sit...possit...praescripsit...sit...sit...decripsit...decripsit...proponit...dicit...consuevit... etc.
XI.59. The Scripture announces that Christ is God(1) just as clearly as it announces that He is man. It describes Jesus Christ as man, as clearly as it describes the Lord Christ as God. It sets Him before us not only as the Son of God, but also as the Son of Man. It not only calls Him the Son of man, but habitually calls Him the Son of God; so that being of both, He is both. Otherwise if He is only the one, He cannot be the other. Nature itself compels us(2) to believe Him to be man who is of man; and compels us equally to believe Him to be God, who is of God; otherwise if He is not God, when He is of God, He is not man though He be of man. Thus both statements would be endangered in one or the other alternative; rejection of one causes loss of belief in the other(3).

(1) Christ is God—Novatian and other fathers make this same clear statement against Ebionites, Theodotians, and various other adoptionists; e.g., Tertullian, De Presc. Hr. x.33; De Car. Chr. xiv.18; Hippolt., C. Noet.4.

(2) "Nature itself compels us to believe Him..."—his background in Stoic epistemology is evident here in his idea of compulsion, wholeness, and objectivity. The basic way to arrive at truth is to look at things in their wholeness (either nature—e.g. the "world soul" or a set of inter-related facts—concerning who Christ is), and then truth (i.e. things as they are) will by the power of their own objective reality compel assent from the mind which has been opened to their wholeness.
This type of procedure is in marked contrast to the heretical methodology of XI.58, which only looks at part of the truth.

(3) Here is a good example of how Novatian uses the Stoic hypothetical syllogism in his theological reasoning: "if... then..."
XI.50. Qui legunt ergo hominis filium hominem Christum Iesum, legunt hunc eundem et deum et dei filium nuncupatum. nam quomodo est qua homo ex Abraham, sic est etiam qua deus ante ipsum Abraham, et quomodo qua homo filius David, ita dominus David qua deus nuncupatus est, et quomodo qua homo sub lege factus est, ita qua deus sabbati dominus expressus est, et quomodo qua homo sententiam patitur, sic omne qua deus de vivis et mortuis judicium habere reperitur, et quomodo post mundum qua homo nascitur, sic ante mundum qua deus fuisse perhibetur, et quomodo ex semine David qua homo genus est, sic ita per ipsum qua deum mundus dicitur institutus, et quomodo qua homo post multos, sic qua deus ante omnes, et quomodo ceteris qua homo inferior, sic omnibus qua deus maior, et quomodo in caelum qua homo ascendit, sic inde qua deus ante descendit, et quomodo ad patrem qua homo vadit, sic oboediens patri qua filius inde descendens est, ita si mediocritates in illo approbant humanam fragilitatem, maiestates in illo affirmant divinam potestatem.

1There is anaphora of quomodo and sic in this passage.

the frequency of the passive verb here is very typical of Novatian: patitur...reperitur...perhibetur...etc. This is the style we find in his letters - e.g. Ep.30,5-videtur; Ep.31,6-produci; Ep.36,1-traderetur, etc.
XI.60. Let them therefore, who read that Jesus Christ the
Son of Man is man, read also that this same Jesus is called
both God and the Son of God. For in whatever sense as man, He
is "of Abraham", He is also, as God, "before Abraham" himself;
in whatever sense as man, He is "the Son of David", He is also
as God, proclaimed "the Lord of David"(1). In whatever sense
as man, "He is made under the law," He is also as God,
proclaimed to be "the Lord of the Sabbath"; in whatever sense as
man, He endured the sentence of death, He is found as God to
"exercise" full judgment over quick and dead. In whatever
sense as man, He is born after the creation of the world, He is
declared to have existed, as God, before the world was; in
whatever sense, as man He was born "of the seed of David", it
is said that "through Him" as God, "the world" was made. In
whatever sense as man, He was after many brethren, He was as
God, before all men; in whatever sense, as man He was servant of
the rest, as God He was greater than all. In whatever sense
as man, He ascended into heaven, as God, He first descended
from heaven; in whatever sense as man, "He goeth to the Father;"
as a Son obedient to His Father is He to descend from the
Father. Thus if limitations in Him prove human frailty,
majesties in Him affirm divine power.

(1) Novatian is one of the first church writers to set
forth the famous doctrine that came to be known in the Latin
Church as the "communication of idiom." He does not describe
it in any detail - as we can see - but the substance of the thought is clearly there. We find this truth also expounded by Origen in De Præn. II. II. 3: "Moreover the Son of God is said to have died in virtue of that nature which could certainly admit of death, while He of whom it is proclaimed that "He shall come in the glory of God the Father with the holy angels," is called the Son of Man. And for this reason, throughout the whole of Scripture, while the divine nature is spoken of in human terms, the human nature is in its turn adorned with marks that belong to the divine prerogative." In the work Baron and Helix (attributed by some to Hippolytus), this is also taught: "But as He was without flesh, He remained without any circumscription. And through the flesh He wrought divinely (τελετί) those things which are proper to divinity, showing Himself to have both those natures in both of which He wrought, I mean the divine and human..." It is possible that both Origen and Novatian were influenced by Hippolytus on this point. Origen heard Hippolytus preaching in Rome c. A.D. 215, and Novatian knew and used Hippolytus' writings.
XI.61. Periculum est enim, cum utrumque legis, non utrumque, sed alterum credidisse, ex quo, quoniam utrumque in Christo legitur, utrumque credatur, ut fides ita demum vera sit, si et perfecta fuerit, nam si ex duobus, altero in fide cessante, unum, et quidem id, quod est minus, ad credendum fuerit assumptum, perturbata regula veritatis tementias ista non salutem contulerit, sed invicem salutis de iactura fidei periculum mortis grande conflaverit.

\[1\] altero in fide cessante—This is a characteristic phrase of Novatian. He employs this same verb and thought elsewhere; Tr.XIX-non cessat eadem scriptura; Gib.1-sine cessatione in Evangelio perstare; Spg.14,8-In dei voluntatis opere cessasse.
XI.61. It is dangerous to read of two principles, and to accept only one and not both. As we read of both principles in Christ, we accept both in order that our faith may be complete and thus true. For if one of two principles is lost in one's faith, while the other, and that the less important, is taken up as a matter of faith, the rule of truth is thrown into confusion, and such presumption will not confer salvation, but will instead bring about grave danger of death\(^{(1)}\) through rejection of the faith.

\(^{(1)}\)"grave danger of death through rejection of the faith"—compare the statement in Tr.XIX.111: "Now if He is Christ, as in fact He is, that man is in terrible danger who says that Christ is a man only..." See note (1) under XI.57, on the importance of right belief.
XII.62. Cur ergo dubitemus dicere, quod scriptum non dubitat exprimere? cur haesitabit fidei veritas, in quo scripturae numquam haesitavit auctoritas? ecce enim Osee prophetes ait ex persona\textsuperscript{1} patris: \textit{iam non salvabo eos in arcu neque in equitibus, sed salvabo eos in domino deo ipsorum}\textsuperscript{2}. si deus salvare se dicit in deo, non autem salvat nisi in Christo deus, cur ergo humo dubitet Christum deum dicere, quem deum a patre animadvertit positum perscripturas esse? immo si non salvat nisi in deo pater deus, salvari non poterit a deo patre quisquam, nisi confessus fuerit Christum deum, in quo se et per quem se repromittit pater salutem daturum: ut merito, quisquis illum agnoscit et deum, salutem inveniat in deo Christo, quisquis non recognoscit et deum, salutem perdiderit, quoniam alibi nisi in Christo deo invenire non poterit.

\textsuperscript{1}persona- Novatian uses this word throughout his writings. What he means by \textit{persona} would have likely been influenced by the use Tertullian and Hippolytus make of it. Hippolytus uses the (Greek) word πρόσωπον \textit{(G. Noet. 7; 14, etc.)} to express the hypostasis of the Trinity. As is often pointed out, πρόσωπον was originally a word connected with the theatre, denoting masque or role, and was by metonomy applied to the actor himself. In Hippolytus' thought the very idea of person is far deeper than this superficial sense, for it is rooted in the objective inner relations within the Trinity. Tertullian is the most explicit of the early fathers on the meaning of
person (e.g. Prx.27, already quoted). Harnack and others have suggested that he takes the basic idea of the entity of person from Roman civil law (a "person" being one who can inherit a legacy, etc.—cf. Cicero, De Orat.3,14,53—"ut rerum, ut personarum dignitates ferunt"), and applies this to the hypostases of the Trinity. M. Stier denies this legal background for the word (Gottes und Logos Lehre Tertullians, p.72sq.), and says Tertullian took it entirely from the Apologists (e.g. Justin, Dial.88fin., and I Apol.36sq.). Stier would appear to us to go too far in totally denying any juridical influence on Tertullian's understanding of the word "persona". What however is more important than the background of the word, is the actual use these fathers made of it. In Hippolytus and Tertullian it is most widely used to designate the Divine Hypostases of the Trinity in their distinctive, objective reality (although Tertullian also uses it to designate the different "states" in the Logos—cf. Prx.5,7). As Melin has shown (op.cit., p.110), Novatian to some extent reflects the old meaning of persona as "role" in his use of the word in Spec.3; Giv.1; and 6. This seems to be the main sense in which it is used here (i.e. the prophet has the role or task to speak from God), and also in XVIII.106 and XXIX.168. Yet even here persona does not have the purely superficial theatrical sense of "put on" or actor. Already the process of thought is at work in which Christian Theology saw that an entity is a person is relationship to another person (i.e. the prophet is
established in relationship to the person of the Father; or in
Hippolytus, the persons of the Trinity are ever established in
relationship one to another). This underlying meaning of
person is further seen in Tr.XXVI.145; XXVII.148; XXXI.187,
where Christ is spoken of as a person – precisely in this sense
of His being differentiated from (and thus established in
relationship to) the Father. Thus we see Christian Theology in
the process of remoulding the old word persona with a content
and meaning rooted in the Trinity itself. Novatian mentions
persona in other places, where the context gives it a somewhat
different meaning. In XIX.116, it bears a related meaning where
it is said that the Angel of Great Counsel (whom Novatian
identifies with the pre-Incarnate Christ) cannot be the same
Person as the Person of the Father (so the idea of person is
still related to relationship and distinction). The same
general idea holds in XXVII.149, 151. In XVI.94, persons are
distinguished from things. In Tr.XVII.97 and XXI.121, Novatian
is rather like Prx.27 of Tertullian in describing the person of
Christ as consisting in a divine and human nature. In Tr.XX.
118, the word person appears in a quotation from Ps.82, where
the argument turns not on the word person, but on the word
"gods". Novatian attaches no particular significance to the
use of person in this place.

2Hos.1:7.
XII.62. Why then should we hesitate to say what Scripture does not hesitate to express\(^1\)? Why is the truth of faith to falter where the authority of Scripture has never faltered? Behold the prophet Hosea speaking as the Person of the Father: "I will not save them by bow, nor by horses, nor by horsemen; but I will save them by the Lord their God." If God declares that He saves them by God, and God does not save except by Christ, why should man hesitate to call Christ God, when he observes that it is laid down by the Father, through the Scriptures, that He is God? Indeed if God the Father does not save, except by God, none can be saved by God the Father, unless he has confessed that Christ is God, in whom and through whom the Father promises to grant salvation. And so, consequently, whoever recognizes Him to be God, finds salvation in Christ who is God, and whoever does not recognize Him as God loses salvation, since he cannot find it except in Christ, who is God.

\(^1\) Chapters 12-28 are a unit in that they all contain proofs for the divinity of Christ. De Simone (op.cit., p.83) suggests that Novatian is following this basic outline:
1-Scriptural proofs (chs.12-13, 17-22)
2-Theological proofs (chs.14-16)
3-Proofs drawn from the adversaries (chs.23-28).
XII.63. Quomodo enim Esaiae: ecce virgo concipiet et pariet filium, et vocabitis nomen eius Emmanuel\(^1\), quod interpretatum est: nobiscum deus\(^2\), sic Christus ipse dicit: ecce ego nobiscum sum usque ad consummationem saeculi\(^3\). Est ergo nobiscum deus, immo multo magis etiam in nobis est. Nobiscum est Christus: est ergo, cuius nomen est nobiscum deus, quia et nobiscum est. aut numquid non est nobiscum? Quomodo ergo dicit se nobiscum esse? est ergo nobiscum. sed quoniam nobiscum est, Emmanuel, id est nobiscum deus, dictus est. 

\(^1\) Isa. 7:14 \(^2\) Mt. 1:23 \(^3\) Mt. 28:20.
For as Isaiah says: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and ye shall call his name Emmanuel," which is interpreted, "God with us"; even so Christ Himself says: "Lo, I am with you, even unto the end of the world" (1). God is therefore with us. Indeed He is much more even in us. Christ is with us: He it is then, whose name is "God with us" because He is in reality with us. Or is He not with us? How then does He say that He is with us? Well He is therefore with us, and as He is with us, He is called Emmanuel, that is "God with us". As then it is God who is with us, He is called "God with us".

(1) In a work on the Trinity it is indeed strange that the second part of Mt.28:20 would be cited, while the first part - which is the most classical evidence in all the Scriptures for the Trinity - is never mentioned. We cannot be certain why Novatian would omit such relevant evidence. D'Ales (Novatien, p.63) suggests a reason - which is, as he says "bien risquée": "Dira-t-on que le prêtre a qui on reprocha toujours de n'avoir reçu qu'un baptême hâtif en danger de mort, éprouvait quelque gêne à rappeler la rite baptismal? L'explication paraît bien risquée, mais nous n'en savons pas de meilleure."

1 Isa.35: 3-6
2 Notice his use of the passive: sequuntur... videntur.
3 videntur—Scheidweiller wishes to substitute nituntur for videntur, first to keep the metrical scheme of "clausula heroica", which is very frequent in Novatian (which
Schd. designates klly), and secondly, to make better sense of just what the heresy of the Patripassians did to Christ: "Die Patripassianer scheinen doch nicht bloss ihre sogenannte Blasphemie, Christus sei mit den Vater identisch, zu vertreten. Ich glaube, wir müssen hier videntur durch nituntur ersetzen..." (op. cit., p.65). There is however absolutely no textual variation at this point, and thus no external evidence for such a change.
XII.64. The same prophet says: "Be strong, ye weak hands and feeble knees; be comforted, ye of weak heart, be strong, fear not; behold our God will award judgment: He will come and save us; then shall the eyes of the blind be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall hear; then shall the lame man leap as an hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall speak freely." These are the signs which the prophet says shall follow at the coming of God, and they have been wrought. They must either recognize Christ to be the Son of God, at whose advent, and by whom these wonders of healing were performed; or being overcome by the truth of the divinity of Christ, they must rush into heresy on the other side. As they will not confess that Christ is the Son of God, and God, they must confess that He is the Father(1). For being bound by the words of the prophets, they can no longer deny Christ to be God. What can they answer when the prophets declare that at the advent of God these signs shall follow, which were manifested at the coming of Christ? In what sense do they accept Christ as God? It is no longer possible for them to deny that He is God. Do they accept Him as Father or as Son? If it is as the Son, why then do they deny that the Son of God is God? If it is as the Father, why are they not followers of those who are seen to maintain this form of blasphemy? Well then in our battle with them for the truth, it is sufficient for our present purpose that being convinced in any kind of way, they should confess that Christ, whose Deity they wished to deny, is both God and man.
The heresy that Christ is the Father...—This particular heresy is generally referred to as "dynamic monarchianism" (in contrast to "modalistic monarchianism"). Scheidweiller (op. cit., p. 64) describes it: Novatianus hat es hier mit den dynamistischen Monarchianern zu tun, Vertretern eines strengen Monotheismus (daher 'Monarchianer'), die infolgedessen in Christus einen Menschen wie alle anderen sahen, der nur von einer unpersönlichen göttlichen Kraft erfüllt und so von Gott gewissermaßen adoptiert wurde. Die 'altera haeresis' ist die der Modalisten oder Patripassianer, die, ebenfalls strenge Monotheisten, im Vater und Sohn nur verschiedene Erscheinungsformen ('Modi') ein und derselben Gottheit erblickten...Denn die Modalisten leugneten keineswegs die Gottheit Christi; und bei denjenigen, die hier aufgefordert werden, ihn als Gottvater zu bekennen, ware damit eine solche Leugnung ja auch absurd."
XII.65. Per Habacuc prophetam ait: deus ab Africo veniet, et sanctus de monte opaco et condensae. quem volunt isti ab Africo venire? si venisse aiunt omnipotentem deum patrem, ergo de loco deus pater venit, ex quo etiam loco cluditur et intra sedis alicuius angustias continetur; et iam per istos, ut diximus, Sabelliana haeresis sacrilega corporatur, siquidem Christus non filius, sed pater creditur, et novo more, dum deistis destrictae homo nudus asseritur, per eos rursum Christus pater deus omnipotens comprobatur. at si in Bethlehem, cuius metaturae regio ad meridianam respicit plagam caeli, Christus nascitur, qui per scripturas et deus dicitur, merito deus hic ab Africo venire describitur, quia a Bethlehem venturus esse praevidebatur.

\(^1\)Hab. 3:3
XII.65. He says by the prophet Habakkuk: "God shall come from Africa, and the Holy One from the dark and thick mountain." Whom would they have to come from Africa? If they say God the Father Almighty came, God the Father came from a certain place; from which it follows that He is enclosed in a place, and contained within the limits of some abode\(^1\). And so by such persons as these, as we have said, the sacrilegious heresy of Sabellius\(^2\) is embodied — if they in fact believe that Christ is the Son and not the Father — and strange to say, while they insist upon the assertion that He was a bare man, yet on the other hand they prove that He was God the Father Almighty. But as Christ, who is described in Scripture as God, as well as man, was born at Bethlehem, which locality faces the South, the Scripture rightly speaks of this God as coming from Africa, for the prophet foresaw that He would come from Bethlehem.

\(^1\) Many of the Ante-Nicene Fathers use this same argument that in the Old Testament Theophanies, it had to be Christ the Son who appeared, and not the Father, because to appear means to be visible and enclosed; and while this is utterly impossible for the Father, it is yet in some sense appropriate to the Son. See Justin, Dial.56-60 (e.g. that the angel who spoke to Abraham, rained fire upon Sodom, etc., is not a mere angel, nor yet the Father, but the Son of God). The same thought is repeated in I Apol.I.63. Theophilus of Antioch in Ad Auto.II.22, in answer to this question: "How can
the Infinite God walk in the Garden (i.e. of Eden)?" gives the solution that it was God the Son. Tertullian repeats this in _Prx_.16, and uses the same principle elsewhere - e.g. _Adv.Mrc_. II.27; III.9; _Adv.Jud_.IX. This is the principle by which Novatian explains the "Who" of the Theophanies. Taken at its face value, this principle can be very dangerous, and has been seen by many as containing the seeds of Arianism - i.e. if the Son is by His nature visible, whereas the Father is invisible - then He is finally not of the same nature (δυνατόν ευς) as the Father; and our salvation is not then grounded in the Being of the Eternal God Himself. But the Ante-Nicene Fathers, we believe, never intended any such interpretation to be placed on their (admittedly) imprecise and unguarded statements which were inevitable at this early stage in the development of doctrinal terminology. Bishop Bull seems to be basically correct (in _Defensio Fidei Nicaenae_, IV.111.4. Eng.trans., Oxford, 1852, p.599) when he gives two reasons to show that these Fathers most certainly did not have such an "Arian" view of Christ: "First, they all (ancient Christian writers) in many other passages allow that the Son, as well as the Father, is in His nature indeed immeasurable and invisible; in the next place, most of them do expressly interpret those statements of theirs by the economy." This is seen for instance in Justin Martyr, _Oratio ad Graecos_ 21: "For it was fitting, I think, that He who was to be ruler and captain of the Hebrew race, should first of all know the (self-) Existent God. Wherefore having
appeared to him first, so far as it was possible for God to appear to man, He said unto him, 'I am He that is'" (Thus Justin, when speaking of Christ as seen by Moses and 'enclosed', is referring to the economy, not to His essential properties). This is clear in Irenaeus, as in Adv. Ha. IV. 24, 2: "And His word being by nature invisible, became palpable and visible among men, and condescended even unto death." Tertullian affirms the same view of the Son's full Godhood - Prx. 14: "But we affirm that the Son also, considered in Himself is invisible, so far forth as He is already, from the condition of His substance the Word and Spirit of God, and in that He is God and Word and Spirit..."; and in Prx. 23 - (commenting on Mt. 17:5): "You have the Son on earth, you have the Father in heaven; this is not a separation, but a divine economy. But we know... that God exists everywhere...that the Son also, being indivisible (from Him) is everywhere with Him. Nevertheless in the economy itself, the Father willed that the Son should be held on earth and Himself in heaven..." Novatian also upholds this side of the truth. In Tr. XIV, he holds that Christ by nature is omnipresent "Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus? cum haece hominis natura non sit, sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit." Yet even these passages do not remove the fact that these Fathers so strongly distinguish the Son and the Father as to which could be sent that this can be (and was by some later heretics) read back into their essential nature. Furthermore they do not always make it
clear in the particular passages where they speak of the visibility, enclosure, etc., of Christ, that this is economical and exhaustive and ontological (though as we have seen, other places in their works make us know that this is in fact how they understood it). Even though their teaching cannot properly be called a seedbed of Arianism, yet it is a fact that the Arians fastened on it—exaggerating it (especially a certain subordinationism, which is to some extent evident in several of these Fathers: see in this regard St Phoebeadius, De Fide 8). Therefore by the fourth century, the Catholic Church rejected this interpretation of the theophanies. This was due in large measure to the work of the great Saint Athanasius (see e.g. De Synodin, where he shows how ἀμέσως of Father and Son is the very essence of the Christian Faith; and Books II and III of Contra Arianos, on the hypostatic union, where it is shown that has to be from one who is what he communicates). Also Eusebius of Caesarea, even though considered a compromiser by the Nicene-Homoousion defenders, helped to turn the tide of favour in the church against the Ante-Nicene interpretation of this sending of the Son in the theophanies (See Grat.de Laud. Constant.xiv, where he teaches that even after the Son takes true manhood into the unity of His person, He continues the same unchangeable, immense, and omnipresent God). Saint Ambrose similarly rejected the old view of the theophanies (See L.2 in Lucam) as well as Saint Augustine, who quotes this passage of Ambrose in Ep.111, and discusses in detail the whole question of
whether the "Angel of Great Council" is in actuality an angel, or perhaps a pre-Incarnate appearance of the Son of God. Even if one allows the possibility of the second interpretation (and there seems to be no finally compelling reason to exclude it — at least in a few passages, in light of John 8:56-58; 1 Cor. 10:4, etc.), the Fathers, one must note, in general failed to consistently apply what they in reality took for granted; that when the Son of God came to earth, He did not exhaustively abandon His heavenly position of Governor of the Universe. This truth was known in Post-Reformation days by the title of "Extra-Calvinisticum." Calvin taught it in Inst.II.13.4: "Here is something marvelous: the Son of God descended from heaven in such a way that, without leaving heaven, he willed to be borne in the Virgin's womb, to go about the earth; and to hang upon the cross; yet he continuously filled the world even as he had done from the beginning!" See also the Anglican Hooker, Eccl. Polity, book V, who teaches that Christ lived on earth without abandoning the government of the universe. This doctrine came through John of Damascus (De Fide Orthodoxa) from the early Fathers. Hippolytus teaches it in Luke (Ante-Nicene Chr.Lib., Hippolyt.II,p.485, from Mai, Script. vet. collectio nova, IX,p.645): "For lo, the only begotten entered, a soul among souls, God the Word with a soul (human). For his body lay in the tomb, not emptied of divinity, but as while in Hades, He was ever in essential being with His Father, so was He also in the body and in Hades. For the Son is not contained in space, just as the
Father; and He comprehends all things in Himself." The Alexandrians were most notable for this doctrine. Clement Alex. says in Strm.VII.11: "For from His own point of view the Son of God is never displaced; not being divided, not severed, not passing from place to place; being always everywhere, and being contained nowhere; complete mind, the complete Paternal Light; all eye, seeing all things, knowing all things...He, the Paternal Word, exhibiting the holy administration for Him who put (all) in subjection to Him." Origen says in C.Cels.II.9.5: "The Son of God was in no wise circumscribed by the body that he assumed, but is everywhere present"; and in C.Cels.V.12: "God therefore according to His goodness, condescends to men, not locally but by providence...the Christ of God, who is also locally with us below upon earth; who, being present with those who in every place are joined to Him, is also at once everywhere present with those even who know Him not." But as we have noted, these Fathers never made a wide or consistent application of this important principle, which could have been used as a corrective balance against undue subordinationism in their interpretation of Old Testament divine appearances. But on the other hand there is a strength in what lay behind the thinking of the Fathers on this point. They appear to have understood at least to some degree the pivotal Trinitarian principle that each of the Persons does in revelation what is peculiarly appropriate to that Person in His essential manner of Being. This principle explains why they taught that the Father could
not be sent, whereas the Son could. Bishop Bull summarizes it as follows: (op.cit.IV.III.4, pp.598,599)...Why were they so anxious to remove this very thing from God (i.e. that He could be sent), as if it were unworthy of His supreme majesty?...In their opinion...God the Father never was seen...(because) He had not originated from any beginning, nor was subject to anyone; nor can He be said to have been sent by another, any more than to have been begotten of another. On the contrary, the Son of God, in that He is begotten of God the Father, on that ground at least is indebted to the Father for all His authority, and it is no less honourable to Him to be sent by the Father, than to be begotten of the Father...In the most Holy Trinity, although there is no disparity of nature between the Father and the Son, yet there is certainly a kind of order, according to which the Father is the principle and head of the Son; which order would be inverted, if the administration of the universe were effected by the Son through the Father, not by the Father through the Son..." Karl Rahner brings out this same principle where he teaches that the "economic" trinity is the immanent Trinity (The Trinity, trns1. by J. Donecel, London, 1970, p.23). That is, the various ways the Three Persons of the Trinity are revealed in history are directly related to the distinctive modes of their own inner-most Being. Rahner speaks of the Logos (and this principle can be applied to the other Persons): "Here something occurs "outside" the intra-divine life in the world itself, something which is not a
mere effect of the efficient causality of the Triune God acting as one in the world, but something which belongs to the Logos alone, which is the history of one divine person, in contrast to the other divine persons. There has occurred in salvation history something which can be predicted of only one divine person" (Ibid). He goes on to explain (as Bull has intimated) that this appropriateness of action in revelation is related to their own particular position in their mutual inner relations: "Of course, this self-communication of the persons occurs according to their personal peculiarity, that is, also according to and in virtue of their mutual relations... In other words these three self-communications are the self-communication of the One God in the three relative ways in which God subsists. The Father gives Himself to us too as Father, that is precisely because and in so far as He Himself, being essentially with Himself, utters Himself and in this way communicates the Son as His own personal self-manifestation..." (op.cit., p.35). (This of course rests upon their relationship as Unbegotten, Begotten, and Procession or Spiration). Just what this means for our salvation is alluded to in note 34 (p.36): "It follows as a formal axiom that if the distinction present in something communicated by God exists only on the creature's side, then there is no self-communication of God in the strict sense. If, on the other hand, there is a real self-communication with a real distinction in that which is communicated as such, hence with a real distinction "for us",
then God must "in Himself" carry this distinction. His unity is not affected, and we characterize it as a relative manner of being related to Himself. Hence we may say that if revelation (a) testifies to a real self-communication, and (b) explains this self-communication as containing distinctions "for us", that it considers as mediated, of a mediation that is not merely created (which would do away with the character of a real self-communication), then it affirms ipso facto distinction and mediation in God as He is in Himself." While of course one cannot read this sort of precise statement (which is the fruit of centuries of theological reflection) back into the Ante-Nicene period, yet we believe the substance of the principle was already there. This it would seem is the underlying reason (rather than "proto-Arian" subordinationism) why those fathers held that the Son could be sent (in Old Testament theophanies), while the Father could not. Novatian appears to be grappling with this principle in Tr.XXXI, where in speaking of how Christ is not invisible and incomprehensible (in the "economy"), he adds as the reason, a statement of this very principle: "...Whatever He is, He is not of Himself, because He is not unborn..."

(2) Sabellius—This is the only heresy that Novatian identifies by name (here and in Ch.XVII). In the time of Hippolytus (c.A.D.217) Sabellius was in Rome, and taught what
is generally termed "Modalistic Monarchianism", which in common with "dynamic Monarchianism" (or adoptionism) and later Arianism sees God as uni-personal. Therefore any true personal distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost was denied. He explained away their Personhood as temporary "modalities" through which the One God Himself passes. Thus God is not eternally in Himself what He is in His revelation. Hippolytus refuted this heresy, as did Callistus I, Bishop of Rome.
XII.66. Eligant ergo ex duobus, quid velint, hunc, qui ad Africo venit, filium esse an patrem-deus enim dicitur ab Africo venturus-si filium, quid dubitant Christum et deum dicere-deum enim scriptura dicit esse venturum-si patrem, quid dubitant cum Sabellii temeritate misceri, qui Christum patrem dicit, nisi quoniam, sive illum patrem sive filium dixerint, ab haeresi sua inviti licet descisant necesse est, qui Christum hominem tantummodo solent dicere, dum illum rebus ipsis coacti deum incipiunt promere, sive dum illum patrem sive dum illum filium voluerint nuncupare.
XII.66. Let them choose from the two alternatives the one that they wish, either that He who came from Africa is the Son, or that He is the Father; for (either way) it is God who is said to be coming from Africa. If it is the Son why do they hesitate to call Christ God? For Scripture says it is God who shall come. If it is the Father, why do they hesitate to be associated with the boldness of Sabellius, who says that Christ is the Father? Whether they call Him the Father or the Son, they are forced to withdraw from the heretical assertion that Christ is merely man. They are compelled by the facts themselves to exalt Him as God, whether they choose to call Him Father or Son.

Christum, cujus est nativitas, et quia caro factus est, esse hominem, et quia verbum dei, deum incunctanter edicere esse, praesertim cum animadvertat scripturam evangelicam utramque istam substantiam in unam nativitatis Christi foederasse concordiam?

1 Jn. 1:14  2 (possibly a reference to Rev. 19:13)
3 Ps. 45:2  4 Ibid.  5 Jn. 1:3  6 Col. 1:16  7 Jn. 1:11
8 Jn. 1:10  9 Jn. 1:14  10 Jn. 1:14
XIII.67. And so John, describing the birth of Christ says: "The word was made flesh and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." For His name is called "the Word of God"; and rightly so, for "My heart," he says, "hath uttered a good word"(1) — the good word which then he calls by the name of King, when he says: "I speak of what I have made unto the King." He is king, because "All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made." "For whether they be thrones," says the Apostle, "or dominions, or powers, or principalities, all things visible and invisible, through him consist." This word is the word which "came unto his own, and his own received him not." For "the world was made through him, and the world knew him not;" and this "word was in the beginning with God, and the word was God." When in the last clause it is said that "the word was made flesh and dwelt among us," who then can doubt that Christ, whose birth is described, is man, seeing that he was made flesh, and God, seeing that He is the Word of God? Especially when he notices that the Gospel Scripture has associated both of these substantial natures in the single harmony of Christ's birth.

(1) Ps. 45:1,2 sq. was a Christological locus classicus in the Ante-Nicene Fathers. They probably saw it through Heb. 1:8,9. The entire Psalm is quoted in Justin, Dial. xxxviii, and messianically expounded in lvi. Irenaeus mentions vss. 3,8,
4 and 5 of it in *Adv.Hr*.IV.55.1, as proof that the prophets foresaw the glory of Christ, and elsewhere in *Ibid*.III.6.1; III.32.1; IV.9.2; *Demonstr*.47. Theophilus mentions it in *Ad Auto*.II.10. Tertullian uses Ps.45 in *Prx*.vii.11; *Adv.Hre*.II.4; IV.14; *Adv.Hermog*.xviii; Cyprian, in *Test*.11,3; Origen in *Comm*.in *Joan*.I.24 quotes it (not entirely approving the use to which some fathers put it). E. Evans (*op.cit.*, p.227, from whom most of these references are taken) points out that Tertullian always reads *sermone optime*, whereas Cyprian reads *verbem bonum*. Here Novatian agrees with Cyprian.
XIII.68. Hic est enim, qui sicut sponsus egreditur de thalamo suo, exsultavit ut gigas ad currundam viam; a summo caelo egressio eius et usque ad summum regressio eius.¹ quoniam usque ad summum: nec quisquam in caelum ascendit, nisi qui de caelo descendit, filius hominis, qui est in caelis², repetens hoc ipsum dicit: pater, clarifica me eo honore, quo fui apud te, antequam mundus esset³. ac si de caelo descendit verbum hoc tamquam sponsus ad carnem, ut per carnis assumptionem filius hominis illuc posset ascendere, unde dei filius verbum descendereat, merito, dum per conexionem mutuam⁴ et caro verbum dei gerit et filius dei fragilitatem carnis assumit⁵, cum sponsa carne conscendens illuc, unde sine carne descenderat, recipit iam claritatem illam, quam dum ante mundi institutionem habuisse ostenditur, deus manifestissime comprobatur. et nihilominus, dum mundus ipse post illum institutus refertur, per ipsum creatus esse reperitur, quo ipso divinitatis in ipso, per quem factus est mundus, et claritas et auctoritas comprobatur.⁶

¹Ps.18:6  ²Jn.3:13  ³Jn.17:5

⁴per carnis assumptionem—Tixeront states (op.cit., p.413sq.) that assumpsit carnem, suscepit hominem, substantiam hominis induit, etc. are the favourite expressions of Novatian to represent the Incarnation (as in Tr.XIII, XXI, XXII, XXIII).

⁵per conexionem mutuam—Novatian follows the major Patristic witness on the doctrine that in the Incarnation Christ retained His divine and human natures in one acting person
without either being fused or confounded into the other.

XIII.68. This is He who "cometh forth out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a giant to run his course; his coming forth is from the highest heaven, and his return even to the highest again." His return is to the highest; and "no man hath ascended up into heaven, but he who came down from heaven, even the Son of Man, who is in heaven." He repeats this same thing when he says: "Father, glorify thou me with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." If this Word is descended from heaven to take our flesh, as a bridegroom takes his bride, in order that by taking flesh He might ascend again as Son of Man to that heaven from which as Son of God He had descended, and by a mutual conjunction flesh wears the Word of God, and the Son of God assumes the weakness of flesh; He consequently ascended again with His bride the flesh to that place from which without flesh He had descended, and so at length receives the glory which He is shown to have had before the creation of the world. Thus He is most manifestly proved to be God. Further when the world itself is said to have been created through Him; this itself is a proof of the glory and authority of Divinity residing in Him through whom the world was made.
XIII.69. Quodsi, cum nullius sit nisi dei cordis nesus
secreta, Christus secreta consipcit cordis\(^1\); quodsi, cum
nullius sit nisi dei peccata dimittere, idem Christus peccata
dimittit\(^2\); quodsi, cum nullius sit hominis de caelo venire, de
caelo veniendo descendit\(^3\); quodsi, cum nullius hominis haec vox
esse possit: ego et pater unum sumus\(^4\), hanc vocem de
conscientia divinitatis Christus solus edicit; quodsi postremo
omnia divinitatis Christi probationibus et rebus instructus
apostolus Thomas respondens Christo: dominus meus et deus meus\(^5\),
dicit, quodsi et apostolus Paulus: quorum, inquit, patres et ex
quibus Christus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia deus
benedictus in saecula\(^6\), suis litteris scribit; quodsi idem se
apostolum non ab hominibus aut per hominem, sed per Iesum
Christum\(^7\) constitutum esse depromit; quodsi idem evangelium non
se ab hominibus didicisse aut per hominem, sed per Iesum
Christum accepisse contendit: merito deus est Christus.

\(^1\)Mt.9:4; Jn.2:25- secretas...cords- Novatian uses
this expression also in Ep.31,7: "in secretis cordis..."
Similar expressions are also found in Cyprian-e.g. Sel.et Liv.7;
Ep.57,3 (arcana cordis); Op.et Eleem.13 (secrata et abdita
mentis); also in Rufinus, e.g. Orig.in Num.10,3, etc. Lactantius,
who at a number of points seems to have been influenced by
Novatian, may reflect this though and expression in Div.Inst.IV.
17,1- "Qui non faciam sicut homo, sed intima et arcana pectoris
intuetur" (See Melin, op.cit., pp.20,21).
3V-Z
Mk.2:5  
3Jn.3:13

Jn.10:30—This verse is quoted three times in De
Tr.: XV.87, and XXVII.148 (where Novatian gives his exegesis
of it).

Jn.20:28  
Rom.9:15  
Gal.1:1  
Gal.1:12
Furthermore what if it is the property of none but God to know the secrets of the heart, and Christ beholds the secrets of the heart; what if it is only God to whom it belongs to forgive sins; and Christ forgives sins. And then it is the portion of no man to come down from heaven, but Christ has descended from heaven in coming here. What if the word is true of no man, "I and the Father are one," and yet Christ alone, in the consciousness of His divinity makes this declaration. The Apostle Thomas, convinced at last by all the proofs of His divinity, and by the facts, responds to Christ, "My Lord and my God." The Apostle Paul says, "Of whom are the Fathers, and of whom Christ came according to the flesh, who is God over all, blessed forevermore"; and again, that he is "an apostle, appointed not of men, or through man, but through Jesus Christ;" and asserts that he "has learnt his gospel, not of men or through man, but through Jesus Christ." Christ is consequently God.
XIII. 70. Itaque hoc in loco ex duobus alterum constare debet, cum enim manifestum sit omnia esse facta per Christum, aut ante omnia est, quoniam omnia per ipsum\(^1\), et merito et deus est, aut, quia homo est, post omnia est, et merito per ipsum nihil factum est. sed nihil per ipsum factum esse non possimus dicere, cum animadverteramus omnia per ipsum facta esse scriptum\(^2\). non ergo post omnia est, id est, non homo tantum est, qui post omnia est, sed et deus, quoniam deus ante omnia est—ante omnia est enim, quia per ipsum omnia—ne si homo tantum, nihil per ipsum, aut, si omnia per ipsum, non homo tantum, quoniam, si homo tantum, non omnia per ipsum, immo nihil per ipsum.

\(^{1}\)Col. 1:16 sq. \(^{2}\)Jn. 1:3
XIII.70. Therefore in this matter one of two alternatives must be accepted. Now since it is evident that all things were made through Christ, either He is before all things— for "all things are through him"— and if so, it follows that He is God; or else because He is made, He is after all things, and it follows that nothing was made through Him. But we cannot say that nothing was made by Him, when we observe that it is written, "All things were made through Him." He is not then, after all things; that is, He is not only man—who is after all things, but also God; for it is God who is before all things. He is before all things because "through him are all things." On the other hand, if He is man only, nothing is through Him; but if all things are through Him, He is not only man. For if He is only man, all things are not through Him; indeed nothing is through Him(1).

(1) Novatian uses here again the hypothetical syllogism to see which way relevant evidence leads. Implied in this paragraph is an elementary awareness of the communicatio idiomatum (though this is not the burden of his argument: it is only a corollary to his proof of the divinity of Christ). This aspect of the paragraph seems to reflect Frx.27, of Tertullian.
XIII.71. Quid ergo respondent? nihil per ipsum, ut homo sit tantum? quomodo ergo omnia per ipsum? ergo non homo tantummodo est, sed et deus, siquidem omnia sunt per ipsum; ut merito intellegere debeamus nec hominem esse Christum tantummodo, qui est post omnia, sed et deum, cum per ipsum facta sint omnia. quomodo enim<et deum esse neges, cum per ipsum facta sint omnia,> aut hominem tantummodo dicas, cum illum etiam in carne conspicias, nisi quoniam, si utrumque animadvertitur, utrumque merito credatur.
XIII. 71. What then do they reply? That nothing is through Him, so that He is only man? How then are all things through Him? Therefore, He is not only man, but also God, since all things are through Him. Consequently we must understand that Christ is not only man, but that He is also God, since all things were made through Him. How indeed can you deny Him to be God, since all things were made through Him or say that He is only man, because you have observed Him in the flesh? If both truths are duly observed, then both will be rightly believed.
XIV.72. Et tamen adhuc dubitat haereticus Christum dicere esse deum, quem deum tot et rebus animadvertit et vocibus approbatum. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo veniens in hunc mundum *in sua venit*\(^1\), cum homo nullum fecerit mundum? si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo *mundus per ipsum factus*\(^2\) esse refertur, cum non per hominem mundus, sed post mundum homo institutus referatur?

\(^{1}\) Jn.1:11  \(^{2}\) Jn.1:10
And yet the heretic still hesitates to say that Christ is God, though he perceives that He is proved to be God by so many facts and words (of Scripture). If Christ is only man(1), how did He "come unto his own" when He came into this world, seeing that there is no world made by a man? If Christ is only man, how is the world said to have been "made through Him," when it is stated, not that the world was formed through a man, but that man was formed after the world?

(1) "If Christ is only man" - this expression is used 24 times from XIV.72-XVI.93.
XIV.73. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo non ex semine tantum David Christus, sed verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis? nam etsi protoplastus non ex semine, sed tamen protoplastus non est ex verbi et carnis coniunctione concretus, non est enim verbum caro factum et habitavit in nobis, si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo, qui de caelo venit, quae vidi et audivi, testificatur, cum constet hominem de caelo, quia ibi nasci non possit, venire non posse? si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo visibilia et invisibilia, throni, virtutes et dominationes per ipsum et in ipso creata esse referuntur, cum virtutes caelestes per hominem fieri non potuerint, quae ante hominem ipsum esse debuerint?

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1 Jn.1:14  2 Jn.3:31 sq.  3 Col.1:16
XIV.73. If Christ is only man, how can it be that Christ is not of the seed of David only, but that "the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us"? Now although the first man was not born of human seed, yet neither was he compounded from the union of the Word and flesh. In the first man the Word was not made flesh, and did not dwell among us. If Christ is only man, how does "He who came down from heaven testify what he hath seen and heard," when it is clear that as a man cannot be born in heaven, he cannot come from heaven? If Christ is only man, how are "things visible and invisible, thrones, principalities, and powers" said to have been "created through him, and in him", when the heavenly powers cannot have been created through man, as they must have existed actually before man?
XIV.74. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus, cum haec hominis natura non sit, sed dei, ut adesse omni loco possit? si homo tantummodo Christus, cur homo in orationibus mediator invocatur, cum invocatio hominis ad praestandum salutem inefficax iudicetur? si homo tantummodo Christus, cur homo in orationibus mediator invocatur, cum invocatio hominis ad praestandum salutem inefficax iudicetur? si homo tantummodo Christus, cur homo in orationibus mediator invocatur, cum invocatio hominis ad praestandum salutem inefficax iudicetur?

1 Cor.15:19  2 Jer.17:5  3 (I K.2:25).
XIV.74. If Christ is only man, how is He present everywhere when we call upon Him? For it is not the nature of man, but of God to be present in all places. If Christ is only man, why do we call upon Him in prayer as mediator, since it is useless to call upon a man to grant us salvation? If Christ is only man, why do we rest our hopes in Him, when "hope in a man" is declared to be "accursed"? If Christ is only man, why may He not be denied without destruction of the soul, when it is declared that an offence against a man can be forgiven?

(1) Novatian's method in XIV.13,14 is to prove the Godhood of Christ by showing that the properties attributed to Him in Scripture can only belong to one who is fully God: such as knowledge of hearts and forgiveness of sins (ch.13), and ubiquity (ch.14).

(2) Origen in his work on Prayer (De Orat.xv), says that Christians are not to pray directly to the Son, but this was clearly against the theology and practice of the great majority of the Church (In Acts 7:59 and 9:14, the verb ἵπτω implies direct prayer to Christ). In fact Origen himself seems to state the other opinion in C.Gels.viii.12, where he upholds prayer to Christ (though from the context it is not clear whether he means Christ directly or as Mediator). Tertullian on the contrary very clearly taught that one is to pray to Christ (see Orat.2, and compare Erx.23).

While Novatian in this paragraph teaches that Christ is
Mediator in prayer, he goes on to say in XIX.111 that Christ is God (and not a mere angel) because vows (which can be made only to God) are made to Him. By this principle therefore, Novatian would certainly hold that one prays directly to Christ.

(3) "If Christ may not be denied without destruction of the soul..." Compare Ep.30,7, where Novatian quotes the word of warning: "Whoever denies me before men, I will deny before my Father in heaven." The later writing Ad Novt. says that Novatian was constantly repeating this warning of Christ in Mt.10:33-Ad Novt.7,8,12,15: "De sine unius capituli praescriptione terrere."

(4) Saint Ambrose writes in De Poen.1.25 in criticism of Novatian (and followers): "Cum omnia peccata stoicorum quodam more paribus putent aestimanda mensuris et aequae eum qui gallum, ut aiunt, gallinaceum atque illum qui patrem suffocaverit, perpetuo asservant coelestibus abdicandos mysteriiis." But the sentence in the paragraph above proves that Novatian did not consider all sins to be equal (i.e. he distinguishes between sin against God and against man - and so does not follow the Stoic teaching on the equality of all sin, as e.g. set forth by Cicero in pro Murena 29). As H.Koch says (Cyprianiache Untersuchungen, Bonn, 1926, p.273): "Nun unterliegt es allerdings keinem Zweifel, dass Novatian nicht schlechthin die Gleichheit aller Sünden gelehrt hat, da er ja de Trin.14, zwischen Sünden gegen Gott und Sünden gegen den Nebenmenschen unterscheidet."
XIV. 75. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo Ioannes Baptistae testatur et dicit: qui post me venit, ante me factus est, quia prior me fuit\(^1\), cum, si homo tantummodo Christus, post Ioannem natus ante Ioannem esse non possit, nisi quoniam illum, qua deus est, ante praecessit?

\(^1\)Jn. 1:15
XIV.75. If Christ is only a man, how does John the Baptist bear witness to Him, saying: "He who cometh after me was made before me, for He was before me?" If He is only man, born after John, He cannot be before John. In other words He existed as God before John.
XIV.76. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo, quae pater facit, et filius facit similiter¹, cum homo caelestibus operibus dei similia opera facere non possit? Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo, sicut pater in se vitam habet, ita dedit filio vitam habere in semetipsa², cum exemplo patris dei homo in se vitam habere non possit, cum non in aeternitate sit gloriosus, sed in materia mortalitatis effectus?

¹Jn.5:19 ²Jn.5:26
XIV.76. If Christ is only man, how is it that "whatsoever things the Father doeth, these also the Son doeth likewise," when a man cannot do works like the heavenly works of God? If Christ is only man, how is it that "As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself," when a man cannot have life in himself in the manner of God the Father, since he does not exist in glorious eternity, but is made of the materials of mortality?
XIV.77. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo refert: *ego sum panis vitae aeternae, qui de caelo descendit*, cum neque panis vitae homo esse possit ipse mortalis, nec de caelo descenderit, nulla in caelo constituta materia fragilitatis? si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit: *quia patrem deum nemo vidit unquam, nisi qui est a deo, hie vidit deum?* quoniam, si homo tantummodo Christus, deum videre non potuit, quia deum nemo hominum vidit, si autem, dum ex deo est, deum vidit, intellegi voluit.

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1 Jn. 6:51  2 Jn. 6:46
XIV. 77. If Christ is only man, how does He say: "I am the bread of eternal life, which came down from heaven," when neither can mortal man be himself the bread of life, nor has mortal man descended from heaven, since perishable material has no place in heaven? If Christ is only man, how does He say: "For no man hath seen the Father at any time, save he which is of God, he hath seen God?" Because if Christ is only man, He could not see God; but if being of God, He has seen God, He wishes it to be understood that He is more than man, since He has seen God.
XIV.78. Si homo tantummodo Christus, cur dicit: quid si videritis filium hominis ascendente illum, ubi ante erat?\(^1\) ascendit autem in caelum: ibi ergo fuit, dum illum redit, ubi prius fuit. quodsi de caelo missus a patre est, non utique homo tantum est, homo enim, ut diximus, de caelo venire non potuit. non igitur ibi ante homo fuit, sed illum ascendit, ubi non fuit; descendit autem dei verbum, quod ibi fuit, verbum inquam, dei et deus, per quem facta sunt omnia et sine quo factum est nihil\(^2\). non igitur homo inde sic de caelis venit, sed dei sermo, id est deus, inde descendit.

\(^{1}\)Jn.6:62 \(^{2}\)Jn.1:3
XIV.78. If Christ is only man, why does He say: "What if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before?" But He did ascend into heaven; He was therefore before in heaven, as heaven is the place to which he returns where He was before. But if He was sent down by the Father from heaven, He certainly is not man only; for man as we have said, could not come down from heaven. Therefore as man He was not there before, but ascended to heaven where as man He had not been. But the Word of God, which was in heaven, descended - the Word of God, I repeat, which is God, "through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made." So it was not as man that He came down from the heavens, but as the Word of God, that is as God(1).

(1) Again Novatian uses the hypothetical syllogism to exegete the implications of the passages.
XV.79. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo ait: etsi ego de me testificor, verum est testimonium meum, quia scio, unde venerim et quo sem. < vos ignoratis, unde veniam et quo sem. > vos secundum carnis iudicatis? ece et hie illuc se dicit rediturum, unde se testificatur ante venisse, missum scilicet de caelo. descendit ergo, unde venit, quomodo illuc vadit, unde descendit, ex quo, si homo tantummodo Christus esset, non inde venisset, atque ideo nec illuc abiret, quoniam non inde venisset, veniendo autem inde, unde homo venire non potest, deum se ostendit venisse, sed enim huius ipsius descenditionis ignorant et imperiti Iudaei heredes sibi haereticos istos reddiderunt, quibus dicitur: vos ignoratis, unde veniam et quo sem, vos secundum carnis iudicatis. tam isti quam Iudaei, carnalem solam esse Christi nativitatem tenentes, nihil aliud Christum esse quam hominem crediderunt, non considerantes illud, quoniam, cum de caelo homo non potuerit venire, ut merito illuc posset redire, deum esse, qui inde descendereit, unde homo venire potuerit.

1 Jn. 8:14 sq.
XV.79. If Christ is only man, how is it that He says: "Though I bear record of myself, my record is true, for I know whence I came and whither I go; but yet cannot tell whence I came or whither I go. Ye judge after the flesh." Notice also that He says here that He will return to the place from which He bears record that He previously had come down, having been sent down, that is from heaven. He descended then from that place from which He came, just as He goes to that place from which He descended. Well then if Christ were only man, He would not have come from that place, and so He could not depart to it, since He would not have come from it. Moreover by coming from that place from which a man cannot come, He showed that He came as God. It was indeed this very descent which caused the Jews to leave their heritage of ignorance and incompetence to these heretics, to whom it is spoken: "Ye know not whence I come, nor whither I go, ye judge according to the flesh." Right along with the Jews, they hold that the birth of Christ according to the flesh was His only birth, and believe that He is nothing else but a man. They do not consider that as a man could not come down from heaven, so as to be consequently able to return there, He who descended from that which he could not have come as man, is God.
XV.30. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit: vos ex inferioribus estis, ego desursum sum; vos de hoc mundo estis, ego non sum de hoc mundo? ideo autem, si omnis homo ex hoc mundo est, et ideo in hoc mundo est Christus, an homo tantummodo est? absit. sed considera, quod ait: ego non sum de hoc mundo. numquid ergo mentitur, cum ex hoc mundo sit, si homo tantummodo sit? aut si non mentitur, non est ex hoc mundo. non ergo homo tantummodo est, quia ex hoc mundo non est.

1 Jn. 8:23
XV.80. If Christ is only man, how does He say: "Ye are from below, I am from above: ye are of this world, I am not of this world"? Now then if every man is of this world, and Christ is only in this world, is He for that reason only man? Certainly not! Consider what He says: "I am not of this world." Is He then telling a lie, since He would be of this world - if He is only a man? On the other hand, if He is not telling a lie, He is not of this world. Therefore He is not only a man, because He is not of this world.
XV.84. Sed ne lateret, quis esset, expressit, unde esset: ergo, inquit, desursum sum\(^1\), hoc est de caelo, unde homo venire non potest. non enim in caelo factus est, deus est ergo, qui desursum est, et idcirco de hoc mundo non est, quamquam etiam quodam modo ex hoc mundo est. unde non deus tantum sit Christus, sed et homo, ut merito, quomodo non est ex hoc mundo secundum verbi divinitatem, ita ex hoc mundo sit secundum suscepti corporis fragilitatem; homo est enim cum deo iunctus, et deus cum homine copulatus.

\(^1\text{Jn.8:23}\)
XV,81. But to make it clear who He was, He declared where He came from: "I am from above," He says; that is from heaven, from which place a man cannot come. For man was not made in heaven. He who is from above then, is God, and therefore is not of this world. However in one sense He is of this world. This follows from the fact that Christ is not only God, but also man. Consequently on the one hand He is not of this world according to the Divinity of the Word, but on the other, He is of this world according to the weakness of the flesh, which He took upon Himself. In this way He is man united with God, and God joined with man.
XV.82. Sed idcirco nunc hic Christus in unam partem solius divinitatis incubuit, quoniam caecitas Iudaica solam in Christo partem carnis aspexit, et inde in praesenti loco silentio praeterita corporis fragilitate, quae de mundo est, de sua sola divinitate locutus est, quae de mundo non est, ut, in quantum illi inclinaverant, ut hominem illum tantummodo crederent, in tantum illos Christus posset ad divinitatem suam considerandam trahere, ut se à deum crederent, volens illorum incredulitatem circa divinitatem suam, omissa interim commemoratione sortis humanae, solius divinitatis oppositione superare.

1caecitas Iudaica - he uses the same phrase in De Cib.
XV.62. But for that very reason in this passage, Christ emphasized one side only - that of His divinity. As the Jews in their blindness looked only at the carnal side of Christ's life, He passed over in silence the weakness of the flesh, which is of this world, and spoke of His divinity alone, which is not of this world: the purpose of this stress being to lead them to consider His divinity so that they might believe Him to be truly God, as willingly as they had disbelieved in His divinity. So He omitted mention of His human condition in order to overcome their opposition to His divinity.
XV.33. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit: ego ex deo prodiit et veni\textsuperscript{1}, cum constet hominem a deo factum esse, non ex deo processisse\textsuperscript{2}? ex deo autem homo quomodo non processit, sic dei verbum processit, de quo dictum est: eructavit cor meum verbum bonum\textsuperscript{3}. quod quoniam ex deo est, merito et apud deum est; quodque, quia non otiose prolatum, merito omnia factit; omnia enim per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil\textsuperscript{4}. sed enim hoc verbum per quod facta sunt omnia, <deus est>\textsuperscript{5}: et deus, inquit, erat verbum. deus ergo processit ex deo, dum qui processit sermo, deus est, qui processit ex deo.

\textsuperscript{1}Jn.8:42 \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{2}Ps.45:2 \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{3}Jn.1:3 \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{4}Jn.1:1
XV.83. If Christ is only man, how does He say: "I proceeded forth and came from God," when it is evident that man was made by God, and did not proceed forth from God? The Word of God proceeded forth from God, as man did not proceed; of Him it is said: "My heart hath brought forth a good word." Because this Word is of God, it is for that very reason with God; and since it was not uttered without effect, it consequently makes all things. For "all things were made through Him, and without Him was not anything made." But this Word, through whom all things were made is God. "And God," he says, "was the Word." God then proceeded forth from God (1), because the Word which proceeded is God, who proceeded from God.

(1) Novatian carefully draws a distinction between being made by God (i.e. man) and proceeding from God (Christ). Thus he concludes: "God proceeded forth from God." It is precisely this that the full subordinationists and later Arians denied: that God could be generated or proceed. It was a large part of the work of Saint Athanasius to defend and expound this truth, which was worked out in fuller precision in the "Cappodocian Settlement" (particularly as regards the essential modes of Being of the Three Persons of the Trinity).
XV.84. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo ait: si quis verbum meum servaverit, mortem non videbit in aeternum\(^1\)? mortem in aeternum non videre, quid aliud\(^2\) quam immortalitas est? immortalitas autem divinitati societ, quia et divinitas immortalis est et immortalitas divinitatis fructus est. sed enim omnis homo mortalis est. immortalitas autem ex mortalibus non potest esse. ergo ex Christo homine mortalibus immortalitas non potest nasci. sed qui verbum custodierit, inquit, meum mortem non videbit in aeternum\(^1\). ergo verbum Christi praestat immortalitatem, et per immortalitatem praestat divinitatem\(^a\). quodsi non potest exhibere, ut immortalitatem alterum faciat ipse mortalibus, hoc autem Christi verbum exhibet pariter et praestat immortalitatem, non utique homo tantum est, qui praestat immortalitatem, quam, si tantummodo homo esset, praestare non potest. praestando autem divinitatem per immortalitatem\(^b\) deum se probat divinitatem porrigendo\(^3\), quam, nisi deus esset, praestare non potest.

\(^1\) Jn.8:51

\(^2\) quid aliud quam... adding on aliud to quid seems to be a mark of Novatian’s style. He does this in Pud.2, and Cib.1 (where it is aliut) 7 (twice) 12. Cyprian in his letters does not add aliud (See d’Ales, R.S.R., op.cit., p.306; Landgraf and Weyman, Novatianae epistulae “De cibus Judaicis”, Leipzig, 1898, p.243). For this fairly peculiar expression, examples are found in at least two writers by whom Novatian was
clearly influenced: Cicero, Cat.5; Div.II.15; Off.III.55; Fin.II.54; and Minucius Felix, Cat.36,2 (See Melin for these references, op.cit., p.102).

3 corrigendo—This is a verb of which Novatian is especially fond. Its constant use is an indication of his authorship of this and other works. It is used in Tr.XV (twice); XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXIX, XXXI (where it could usually be replaced by the more ordinary offerre, praebere, or dare. He employs it in Ep.31,5; Spec.1,10; Pud.10; Cib.2. It is found in Cicero (Mil.9) and in a few other Church Fathers: Tertullian, Pud.17; Cyprian (where it usually means extendere rather than dare); Don.6;12; Unit.5; and Min.Felix 17,10;29,8 (See Weyman, Uber die dem Cyprianus beigelegten Schriften De Spectaculis und De bono Pudicitiae. Historisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft,13,1892, p.743; and Melin op.cit., p.114sq.).
XV. 34. If Christ is only man, how dare He say: "If any man keep my word, he shall never see death?" Never seeing death is the same thing as immortality. Immortality is involved in divinity, for divinity is immortal, and immortality is the fruit of divinity. But every man is mortal; and immortality cannot spring from that which is mortal. So immortality cannot originate in Christ as a mortal man. But He says, "He who keeps my word shall never see death." Therefore the word of Christ bestows immortality, and through immortality, divinity. It is not possible that one who is himself mortal can maintain the work of making another immortal. Yet the word of Christ not only maintains this work, but actually bestows immortality, which He could not bestow if He were only man. Rather by bestowing divinity through immortality, He proves Himself to be God, by offering divinity, which He could not give, if He were not God.
XV. 85. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo inquit: ante Abraham ego sum\(^1\)? nemo enim hominum ante eum potest esse, ex quo ipse est; nec potest fieri, ut quicquam\(^a\) prius fuerit ante illum\(^b\), ex quo ipsam\(^c\) originem sumpsit. sed enim Christus, cum ex Abraham sit, ante Abraham esse se dicit. aut mentitur igitur\(^d\) et fallit, si ante Abraham non fuit, qui ex Abraham fuit, aut non fallit, si etiam deus est, dum ante Abraham fuit. quod nisi fuisset, consequenter, cum ex Abraham fuisset, ante Abraham esse non posset.

\(^1\)Jn. 8:58
If Christ is only man, how does He say: "I am before Abraham"? No man can be before Him from whom he is descended; indeed it is not possible for anything at all to be before that from which it derives its origin. Yet Christ, though He is descended from Abraham, says that He is before Abraham. Either He is a liar and deceiver if He was not before Abraham, from whom He is descended, or He is not a deceiver, if He was before Abraham, and therefore is truly God: If He had not been God, it follows that as a descendant of Abraham He could not be before Abraham.

(1) Tertullian in Prx. 22, also mentions that Christ was before Abraham. His interest there though is to prove that it was the Son that Abraham saw, and not the Father; whereas Novatian simply wishes to prove that Christ, being before Abraham, is divine.
XV.86. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo ait: et ego agnoscam eas et sequuntur me meae; et ego vitam aeternam do illis et numquam peribunt in perpetuum? sed enim, cum omnis homo mortalitatis sit legibus alligatus et ideo in perpetuum se ipse servare non posset, multo magis in perpetuum alterum servare non poterit. at in perpetuum se Christus repromittit salutem daturum, quam si non dat, mendax est, si dat, deus est. sed non fallit, dat enim, quod repromittit, deus est ergo, qui salutem perpetuam porrigit, quam homo, qui se ipsum servare non potest, alteri praestare non poterit.

\[^1\text{Jn.10:27sq.}\]
XV.36. If Christ is only man, how does He say: "I shall know them, and my own follow me; and I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish forever"? Every man is bound by the laws of mortality, and therefore cannot keep even Himself alive forever; much less can he keep another man alive forever. But Christ promises to give salvation forever. If He does not give it, He is a liar; if He does, He is God. But He is not a deceiver, He gives what He promises. Therefore He is God, who bestows the gift of eternal salvation which a man, who cannot even keep himself alive, cannot give to another.
XV.87. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quid est, quod ait: ego et pater unum sumus? quomodo enim ego et pater unum sumus\(^1\), si non et deus est et filius, qui idcirco unum potest dici, dum ex ipso est et dum filius eius est et dum ex ipso nascitur, dum ex ipso processisse reperitur, per quod et deus est? quod cum invidiosum Iudaei putassent et blasphemum credissent eo, quod se ostenderat his sermonibus Christum esse deum, ac propterea ad lapides concurrissent et saxorum ictus inicere gestissent, exemplo et testimonio scripturarum adversarios suos fortiter refutavit. si illos, inquit, dixit deos, ad quos verba facta sunt, et non potest solvi scriptura: quem pater sanctificavit et misit in hunc mundum, vos dicitis, quia blasphemae, quia dixi: filius dei sum ego\(^2\). quibus vocibus neque se negavit deum, quin immo deum se esse firmavit. nam quia sine dubitatione dii esse dicuntur, ad quos verba facta sunt, multo magis hic deus, qui melior illis omnibus inventur.

\(^1\) Jn. 10:30 \(^2\) Jn. 10:35
XV,87. If Christ is only man, what does He mean when He says: "I and the Father are one"? How can "I and the Father be one," if He is not both God and Son? He can only be said to be one with the Father, for the very reason that He is of the Father, and is Son, and born of Him – and is found to have proceeded from Him. For these reasons He is God. The Jews hated this and considered Him a blasphemer, because Christ had shown Himself in these words to be God. Therefore they rushed together with stones, preparing to cast them at Him. But He strongly refuted His adversaries by the example and testimony of the Scriptures. "If he called them gods," He says, "unto whom the Word of God came – and the Scriptures cannot be broken – say ye of him, whom the Father sanctified and sent out into this world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?" He did not deny Himself to be God by these words, rather He further confirmed Himself to be God. For undoubtedly they to whom the words of God came are called gods; much more is He God, who is found to be better than them all.

(1) Tertullian gives a similar explanation of these verses in Prx.22, though his aim there is to draw a distinction between Father and Son, while Novatian's purpose here is to prove the divinity of the Son, rather than His distinction from the Father (though he goes on to deal with this in the next paragraph).
XV.88. Et nihilominus calamniosam blasphemiam dispositione legitma congruenter refutavit. deum enim se sic intellegi vult, ut filium dei et non ipsum patrem vellet intellegi, missum enim se esse dixit, et multa opera se ex patre ostendisse monstravit, ex quo non patrem se, sed filium esse intellegi voluit. et in ultima parte defensionis filii, non patris, fecit mentionem dicendo: *vos dicitis, quia blasphemas, quia dixi: filius dei sum?*\(^1\) ita quod ad crimen blasphemiae pertinet, filium se, non patrem, dicit; quod quatem ad divinitatem spectet ipsius, *ego et pater unum sumus*\(^2\) dicendo filium se esse et deum probavit. deus est ergo, deus autem sic, ut filius sit, non pater.

\(^1\)Jn.10:35 \(^2\)Jn.10:30
And nevertheless He refuted their slanderous blasphemy in a most appropriate manner. He wishes Himself to be understood to be God, but as the Son of God, and not as God the Father Himself. Accordingly He says that He was sent, and showed Himself by His many works to have come from the Father. From this it is clear that He wished to be understood to be not the Father, but the Son. Also in the last part of His defence, He made mention of the Son, not the Father, when He said: "Say ye, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?" Thus in dealing with the charge of blasphemy, He says that He is the Son, not the Father; but when He is dealing with His own divinity, by saying "I and the Father are one," He proved Himself to be both Son and God. He is therefore God; but in the sense of Son, not Father.
XVI.89. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo ipse dicit: et
omnia, qui videt et credit in me, non morietur in aeternum\(^1\)?

\(\text{sed enim, qui in hominem solitariunm credit et nudum, maledictus}
\)
\(\text{dicitur\(^2\);} \text{ hic autem, qui credit in Christum, non maledictus,
\)
\(\text{sed in aeternum non moriturus refertur. ex quo, si aut homo}
\)
\(\text{est tantum, ut haeretici volunt, quomodo, quisquis in eum}
\)
\(\text{credit, non morietur in aeternum, cum maledictus esse teneatur,
\)
\(\text{qui confidit in homine? aut si non maledictus, sed potius ad}
\)
\(\text{aeternae vitae consecutionem, ut legitur, destinatus, non homo}
\)
\(\text{tantummodo Christus, sed et deus, in quem qui credit, et}
\)
\(\text{maledictionis periculum deponit et ad fructum iustitiae}
\)
\(\text{accedit.}
\)

\(\text{\(^1\) Jn.11:26 \quad \text{\(^2\) Jer.17:5}}\)
XVI.89. If Christ is only man, how is it that He Himself says: "And whosoever seeth and believeth in me shall never die"?\(^{(1)}\)

Now indeed whoever trusts in simple and bare man is called accursed; but here on the contrary, whoever trusts in Christ is not accursed, but is said never for all eternity to die. Now in light of this, if He is only man, as the heretics would have it, how is it that whoever believes in Him shall never die, when he that trusts in man is placed under a curse? Well on the other hand, since he who trusts in Christ is not accursed, but rather, as we read, destined for eternal life, Christ is not only man, but also God; in whom whoever believes casts away the danger of the curse, and attains to the fruit of righteousness.

\(^{(1)}\) Tertullian (in *Prx. 21*) uses the same argument (eternal life through trust in Christ) as a proof of Christ's Godhood, though he quotes from elsewhere in John (i.e. Jn. 5:19–27, etc.).
XVI.90. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo paracletum dicit de suo esse sumpturum, quae nuntiaturus sit? neque enim paracletus ad homine quicquam accipit, sed homini scientiam paracletus porrigit; nec futura ab homine paracletus discit, sed de futuris hominem paracletus instruit. ergo aut non accipit paracletus a Christo homine, quod nuntiet, quoniam paraclelo homo nihil poterit dare, a quo ipse homo debet accipere, et fallit in praesenti loco Christus et decipit, cum paracletum a se homine accepturum, quae nuntiet, dicit: aut non nos fallit, sicut nec fallit, et accipit paracletus a Christo, quae nuntiet. sed si a Christo accipit, quae nuntiet, major ergo iam paracleto Christus est, quoniam nec paracletus a Christo acciperet, nisi minor Christo esset. minor autem Christo paracletus Christum etiam deum esse hoc ipso probat a quo accipit, quae nuntiat, ut testimonium Christi divinitatis grande sit, dum minor Christo paracletus repertus ab illo sumit, quae ceteris tradit; quandoquidem, si homo tantummodo Christus, a paracleto Christus acciperet, quae diceret, non a Christo paracletus acciperet, quae nuntiaret.

\[1\text{Jn.16:14}\]
XVI.90. If Christ is only man, how does He say that the Paraclete will receive of His, that which He is going to declare? The Paraclete receives nothing from man, but bestows knowledge upon man: the Paraclete does not learn things to come from man, but instructs him concerning things to come. Therefore either the Paraclete did not receive His message from Christ, for no man will be able to give anything to the Paraclete, from whom man himself has to receive: and so in that case Christ is mistaken and is a liar, when He says that the Paraclete will take of Him — a man — the things He will show. Or else He does not deceive us — as in fact He does not — and the Paraclete did receive from Christ that which He is to declare. But if He received it from Christ, then Christ is greater than the Paraclete, since the Paraclete would not receive from Christ, unless He were less than Christ. Now the fact that the Paraclete is less than Christ, clearly proves that Christ, from whom He receives what He declares, is God. It is a great testimony to the divinity of Christ that the Paraclete is found to be less than He\(^{(1)}\), and that He takes of Him that which He delivers to others. If Christ is only man, He would receive from the Paraclete that which He is to speak; the Paraclete would not receive from Christ what He is to declare.

\(^{(1)}\)"The Paraclete is found to be less than He" — This passage, which on the surface appears to inculcate gross
subordinationism, made De Trinitate attractive to the Macedonian heretics (who denied the Deity of the Holy Spirit) and who hawked this treatise on the streets of Constantinople (c.A.D.350). There is unquestionably an element of subordinationism here, but it is perhaps more due to the terminological and theological imprecision of the Ante-Nicene period in regard to the Holy Spirit, than to any heretical intent (such as the later Macedonians and Arians definitely had). In light of the fact that Novatian is speaking of the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit in the matter of redemption ("receiving" and "declaring" things pertaining to our salvation in re Jn.14,15,16) we gather that the inferiority is more in reference to the "economy" than to actual antecedent essence. We must compare this to the way Novatian explains the relationship of Father and Son. As d'Alès states (Novation, p.119): "Pour bien entendre cette assertion: minor Christo Paracletus, il faut se reporter au commentaire donné par Novatien à la parole du Seigneur: Pater major me est. Tout est commun entre le Père et le Fils, sauf que L'un donne et l'autre reçoit. Il n'en va pas autrement entre le Fils et le Paraclet. Le rôle ministériel du Paraclet n'implique aucune infériorité d'essence." D'Alès suggests that this "inferiority" is a question of origin, and that this passage is a support for the Latin doctrine of "filioque". Weyer thinks this is going too far (op.cit., p.113, note 67), but it seems to us that this passage as well as an even clearer one in Hilary, De Trinitate,
may well be foreshadowings of this doctrine. On any interpretation, a certain subordinationism remains in this paragraph. But this is to be balanced by ch.XXIX (See notes there), where Novatian assumes the full Deity of the Holy Ghost. Even in XVI.90, the whole argument which uses the inferiority of the Holy Spirit to Christ to prove Christ's divinity, rests upon the implicit assumption of the Deity of the Holy Spirit. It would add absolutely nothing new to Novatian's previous arguments, nor would it exalt Christ, to say that He is greater than a creature. Only on the presumption that the Holy Spirit is God, would Christ be exalted by "giving" to Him. Certainly Novatian is hampered by the fact that the important doctrine of the περικεφαλαία or "circumincessio" of the Three Persons of the Trinity had not yet been clearly and fully formulated. This would have solved his problem at its roots. This however was developed fully only after Nicea by Saint Athanasius (e.g. Ad Serap.3.4; 4.4; 4.2), the Cappadocians, Hilary (De Trn.3.1), and more precisely by the sixth century "Pseudo-Cyril" (See Prestige, op.cit., pp.282sq.).
XVI. 91. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quare credendi nobis
talem regulam posuit, quo dicaret: *hacce est autem vita
aeterna, ut scient te unum et verum deum, et quem misisti Iesum
Christum*? si noluissest se etiam deum intellegi cur addidit:
et quem misisti Iesum Christum, nisi quoniam et deum accipi
voluit? quoniam si se deum nollet intellegi, addidisset: et
quem misisti hominem Iesum Christum. nunc autem neque addidit
nece se hominem nobis tantummodo Christus tradidit, sed deo
iunxit, ut et deum per hanc coniunctionem, sicut est, intellegi
vellet.

\[\text{1 Jn. 17:3}\]
XVI.91. If Christ is only man, why did He lay down for us a rule of faith, in which He says: "This is life eternal, that they should know Thee, the one and true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent"? If He did not wish Himself, as well as the Father, to be understood to be God, why did He add: "And Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent," unless He wished to be accepted as God? Had He not wished to be understood to be God, He would have added: "And the man, Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." But He added no such thing, and did not deliver Himself to us as man only. He joined Himself with God, and by this very conjunction, He wishes to be understood for what He is - God.
XVI. 92. Est ergo credendum secundum praescriptam regulam in dominum, unum verum deum, et in eum, quem misit, Iesum Christum consequenter, qui se nequaquam patri, ut diximus, iunxisset, nisi deum quoque intelligi velit. separasset enim ab eo, si deum intelligi se noluisse. inter homines enim tantummodo se collocasset, si hominem se esse tantummodo sciret, nec cum deo iunxisset, si se non et deum nosset. nunc et de homine tacet, quoniam hominem illum nemo dubitat, et deo se iungit merito, ut crediturus divinitatis suae formulam poneret.
XVI.92. Therefore we are to believe according to the prescribed rule, in the Lord, the one true God, and consequently in Jesus Christ, whom He has sent. He would never have joined Himself, as we have said, with the Father, unless He wished to be understood to be God also. He would have separated Himself from Him, if He did not wish to be understood to be God. Indeed He would have placed Himself merely among men, if He had known Himself to be only man, and would not have linked Himself with God, if He had not known Himself to be also God. Now He is silent concerning His manhood, because no one doubted that He was man. But He rightly joins Himself to God, to lay down the formula of His divinity for those who are going to believe.
XVI. 95. Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit: *et nunc* honorifica me gloria, quam habebam apud te, priusquam mundus esset 1? si, antequam mundus esset, gloriae habuit apud deum et claritatem tenuit apud patrem, ante mundum fuit; nec enim habuisset gloriae, nisi ipse prius fuisset, qui gloriae possent tenere. nemo enim habere aliquid poterit, nisi ante ipse fuerit, qui aliquid tenet. sed enim Christus habet gloriae ante mundi institutio- nem; ergo ante institutionem mundi fuit. nisi enim ante institutionem mundi esset, ante mundi institutionem gloriae habere non posset, cum ipse non esset. sed enim homo gloriae ante mundi institutionem habere non potuit, qui post mundum fuit; Christus autem habuit; ante mundum igitur fuit. non igitur homo tantummodo fuit, qui ante mundum fuit; deus est igitur, quoniam ante mundum fuit et gloriae ante mundum tenuit.

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1 Jn. 17:5
XVI.93. If Christ is only man, how does He say: "And now glorify me with the glory which I had with thee before the world was"? If, before the world was, He had glory with God, and in the very presence of God maintained this glory and brightness, then He existed before the world; for He could not have had this glory, unless He had existed before the world so as to possess glory. No one who possesses anything can have it unless He exists before it. Now Christ has glory before the foundation of the world; therefore He existed before the foundation of the world; and therefore He was not only man, He who existed before the world, and if not only man, He is God, since He existed before the world and possessed glory before the world.(1)

(1) The followers of Artemon, spoken of by Eusebius (H.E.V.28; VII.30.17), claimed that Christ was God only by predestination.
Nec praedestinatio ista igitur dicatur, quoniam nec posita est. aut addant hoc, qui hoc putant. sed vae est adicientibus quomodo et detrarentibus positum. non potest ergo dici, quod non potest adici. sublata ergo praedestinatione, quae non est posita, in substantia fuit Christus ante mundi institutionem-verbam est enim, per quod facta sunt omnia, et sine quo factum est nihil, quoniam, etsi in praedestinatione dicitur gloriesus et ante mundi institutionem fuisse praedestinationem, ordo servetur, et ante hunc erit multus numerus hominum in gloriam destinatus, minor enim per istam destinationem Christus ceteris intellegatur, quibus posterior denotatur. nam si haecc gloria in praedestinatione fuit, praedestinationem istam in gloriam novissimus Christus accepit, ante enim praedestinatus Adam esse cernetur et Abel et Enoch et Noe et Abraham et reliqui ceteri. nam cum apud deum et personarum et rerum omnium ordo digestus sit, ante hanc praedestinationem Christi in gloria multi praedestinati fuisse dicentur. et hoc pacto minor ceteris hominibus Christus esse deprehenditur, qui melior et maior et antiquior ipsis quoque angelis inventur. aut haecc igitur omnia tollantur, ut Christo divinitas non asseratur, aut, si haecc tolli non possunt, Christo ab haereticis divinitas propria reddatur.

\[1\text{(This seems to reflect: Deut. 4:212; 32; Prov. 30:6, 13;} \]
\[\text{Mt. 5:19-though } vae \text{ is not found in any of these texts, as }\]
\[\text{Fausset observes-}\text{op.cit., p.57, note 16}.\]
XVI. 4. This is not to be explained by predestination, because the Word does not say so, and those of this opinion must add to the written word. But woe is pronounced upon them that add unto, as to those who take away from, that which is written. Therefore one cannot assert what cannot be added to the word. Predestination therefore is to be put aside, since it is not mentioned. Christ existed in substance before the foundation of the world. For He is "the Word, through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made." If however it is asserted that He was glorious only in predestination, and that this predestination took place before the foundation of the world, then let proper order be maintained, which means that a huge number of men, before Christ, were predestinated to glory. Such predestination will show that Christ is less than other men, because He is obviously after them in order. Now if this glory consisted in predestination, Christ was the last to receive this predestination to glory; for one finds Adam to have been predestinated before Him, and Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, and the rest. For since the order of all persons and things is arranged by God, many will thus be said to have been predestinated to glory, before the predestination of Christ. On this basis Christ is less than other men, He who is actually better, and greater, and more ancient even than the angels. Therefore the heretics will have to remove all these things in order to destroy the
divinity of Christ; or if they cannot remove them, then they must restore to Him His proper divinity.
XVII.95. Quid? si Moyses hanc eandem regulam veritatis exsequitur et hoc in principio suarum nobis tradidit litterarum, quo discamus omnia creatae et condita esse per dei filium, hoc est per dei verbum? id enim dicit, quod Ioannes, quod ceteri, immo et Ioannes et ceteri ab hoc intelleguntur accepisse, quod dicant. si enim Ioannes dicit: omnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil\(^1\), prophetes autem refert: dico ego opera mea regi\(^2\), Moyses autem introducit praecipientem deum, ut lux fiat in primis, caelum firmetur, aquae congregentur, arida ostendatur, fructus secundum semina provocatur, animalia producantur, luminaria in caelo atque astra ponantur; non alium ostendit tunc a duisse deo, cui praeciperentur haec opera, ut fierent, nisi eum, per quem facta sunt omnia et sine quo factum est nihil. ae si hic verbum dei est-nam eructavit cor meum verbum bonum\(^2\) ostendit in principio verbum fuisse, et verbum hoc apud patrem fuisse, deum praeterea verbum fuisse\(^3\), omnia per ipsum causa esse. sed enim hoc verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis\(^3\), Christus scilicet filius dei, quem dum et postmodum secundum carnem hominem accipimus et ante mundi institutionem dei verbum et deum videmus, merito secundum institutionem veteris et novis testamenti et deum et hominem Christum Iesum et credimus et tenemus.

\(^1\) Jn.1:3 \quad \(^2\) Ps.45:1 \quad \(^3\) Jn.1:14
XVII. 95. Now what if even Moses follows this same rule of truth, and delivers to us in the beginning of his writings the principle through which we may learn that all things were created and founded through the Son of God, that is through the Word of God? For he says the same that John and the rest say; indeed we perceive that John and the others received from Him what they say. For if John says: "All things were made through Him, and without Him was nothing made," and the prophet also says: "I speak of the things which I have made unto the King," Moses introduces God as commanding first that light be made, then that the heaven be established, the waters be gathered into one place, the dry land appear, that fruit be brought forth according to its seed, animals be produced, the lights and stars be placed in the heavens. He shows that no other was then present with God to receive the command that these things be made, than He "through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made." And as He is the Word of God — for "My heart has uttered a good word" — He shows that "In the beginning was the word," and that this "word was with the Father," and furthermore that the "Word was God, all things were made through Him." Moreover this "word was made flesh, and dwelt among us," that is, Christ the Son of God. As we receive Him to be man according to the flesh, after His Incarnation, and see Him as the Word of God and God, before the foundation of the world, then we rightly believe and maintain that Christ Jesus is both God and man according to the
instruction of both Old and New Testament\(^1\).
XVII.96. Quid, si idem Moyses introducit dicentem deum: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram\textsuperscript{1}, et infra: et facit deus hominem, ad imaginem dei fecit illum, masculum et feminam fecit eos\textsuperscript{2}? si, ut iam docuimus, dei filius est, per quem facta sunt omnia, utique dei filius est, per quem etiam homo institutus est, propter quem facta sunt omnia. sed enim deo praecipiente, ut homo fiat, deus refertur esse, qui hominem facit; facit autem hominem dei filius, verbum scilicet dei, per quem facta sunt omnia et sine quo factum est nihil. hoc autem verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis; ergo Christus est deus. Per Christum igitur homo factus est, ut per Dei Filium.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Gen.1:26 \item \textsuperscript{2}Gen.1:27 \item \textsuperscript{3}Jn.1:14
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
XVII. 96. And what if again Moses introduces God as saying: "Let us make man in our image after our likeness," and below, "And God made man, in the image of God made he him, male and female created he them." (1) If as we have learned to believe, it is the Word of God, through whom all things were made; then man for whose sake all things were made, was ordained through the Son of God. Moreover when God commands that man shall be made, He who makes man is declared to be God, and it is the Son of God, that is the Word of God "through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made," who makes man. And this "Word was made flesh and dwelt among us"; therefore Christ is God. It is through Christ therefore that man has been made, thus He is the Son of God.

(1) See note (1) under 1.5, on the image of God.
XVII.97. Sed deus hominem ad imaginem dei fecit; deus est ergo, qui fecit hominem ad imaginem dei. deus ergo Christus est, ut merito nec veteris testamenti circa personam Christi vacillet auctoritas¹, dum novi testamenti manifestatione fulcitur, nec novi testamenti intercepita sit potestas¹, dum radicibus veteris testamenti eiusdem nititur veritas. ex quo, qui Christum, dei filium et hominis, tantummodo praesumunt hominem, non et deum, contra testamentum et vetus et novum faciunt, dum et veteris et novi testamenti auctoritatem veritatemque corrumpunt.

¹auctoritas...potestas— These two words are used frequently in this treatise, often together. Potestas appears to be a wider term than auctoritas, and can include auctoritas in its meaning. Potestas in Tertullian and Novatian can mean the same as the Greek δυνατίς (power-inherent in a person or as actually exercised) or as ἐξουσία (authority-inherent in a person or as it is carried out). E. Evans (op. cit., p. 55sq.) suggests that potestas as δυνατίς is found in Novatian in ch. 11, 13, and 19; while potestas as ἐξουσία is found in ch. 17, 20, 25, 27, 31. When potestas (in the sense of ἐξουσία) is used next to auctoritas (e.g. here in XVII.97), Evans states that the only difference is that auctoritas implies priority, which potestas does not (op. cit., p. 56). This is borne out in Tr. XXVII: "dicendo, ego et pater, proprietatem personae suas,
id est filii, a paterna auctoritate discernit atque distinguít, non tantummodo de sono nominis sed etiam de ordine dispositae potestatis." There the Father has auctoritas in that He is source of the Trinity; while the Son has potestas as second (i.e. in the economy de ordine dispositae).
XVII.97. But God made man in the image of God; therefore the one who made man in the image of God is God; thus Christ is God. So consequently the authority of the Old Testament concerning the person of Christ does not waver, and is supported by the manifestation of the New Testament(1). Now the power of the New Testament is not reduced by its truth stemming from the roots of the Old Testament. Those who presume that Christ, the Son of God and Son of Man, is only man, and not God also, do so in opposition to both Old and New Testaments, and thus corrupt the authority and truth of both.

(1) Compare Augustine, Quaest.73 in Exod.: Novum testamentum in vetere latet, vetus testamentum in novo patet.
XVII.98. Quid? si idem Moyses ubique introducit deum patrem immensum atque sine fine, non qui loco cludatur, sed qui omnem locum cludat, nec eum, qui in loco sit, sed potius in quo omnia locus sit, omnia continentem et cuncta complexum ut merito nec descendet nec ascendat, quoniam ipse omnia et continet et implet, et tamen nihilominus introducit deum descendentem ad turrem, quam aedificabant filii hominum, considerare quaerentem et dicentem: venite, et mox descendamus et confundamus illie ipsorum linguas, ut non audiat unusquisque vocem proximi sui; quem volunt hic deum descendisse ad turrem, illam et homines tunc illos visitare quaerentem? deum patrem? ergo iam loco cluditur, et quomodo omnia ipse complectitur?

\(^1\text{Gen. 11:7}\)
XVII. 98. And again what if Moses everywhere represents God as boundless and limitless; He cannot be enclosed in space, for He includes all space. He is not one who is in any place, but rather all space is in Him; containing all things and embracing all things, so that consequently He can neither descend nor ascend, since He contains all things and fills all things. Yet God is represented as descending to consider the tower which the sons of men were building, and saying: "Come, and let us go down quickly, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech." Now whom do they wish to have been the God who went down to the tower, in this place, seeking to inspect those men at that time? God the Father? In that case God is enclosed in a place and how then does He embrace all things(1)?

(1) See note (1) under XII. 65.
XVII.99. Aut numquid angelum cum angelis dicit descendenter et
dicentem: venite, et mox descendamus et confundamus illic
terminam linguas? sed enim in Deuteronomio animadvertimus
rexitisse deum haec deumque dixisse, ubi ponitur: cum
dissemiharet filios Adam, statuit fines gentium iuxta numerum
angelorum dei2. neque ergo pater descendit, ut res indicat,
neque angelus ista praecepit, ut res probat. superest ergo, ut
ille descenderit, de quo apostolus Paulus: qui descendit, ipse
est, qui ascendit super omnes caelos, ut impleret omnia3, hoc
esse dei filius, dei verbum. verbum autem dei caro factum est
et habitavit in nobis4. hic erit Christus. deus ergo
pronuntiabitur Christus.

\[1\text{Gen.11:7} \quad 2\text{Deut.32:8} \quad 3\text{Eph.4:10} \quad 4\text{Jn.1:14}\]
XVII.99. Or does he say that it is an angel descending with angels, and saying: "Come and let us go down quickly, and confound their tongues"? On the contrary, we observe in Deuteronomy that it is God who uttered these words, and God who spoke; there it is written: "When He separated the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the angels of God." The Father certainly did not descend, as the subject itself indicates, and it was not an angel who commanded this, as the facts prove. Therefore the only conclusion is that He it was who went down, of whom the Apostle Paul says: "He who descended is the same also that ascended up above all heavens, that He might fill all things"; that is, the Son of God, the Word of God. But "the Word of God was made flesh, and dwelt among us." This has to be Christ. Therefore we must declare Christ to be God.

(1) Justin also rejects the idea that this could be a mere angel—Dial. 62.
XVIII.100. Ecce idem Moyses refert alio in loco, quod Abrahae
visus sit deus\(^1\). nam idem idem Moyses audit a deo, quod nemo
hominum deum videat et vivat\(^2\). si videri non potest deus,
quomodo visus est deus? aut si visus est, quomodo videri non
potest? nam et Ioannes: \textit{deum nemo, inquit, vidit \textit{unquam}}\(^3\); et
apostolus Paulus: \textit{quem vidit hominum nemo, nec videre potest}\(^4\).
sed non utique scriptura mentitur; ergo vere visus est deus.
ex quo intellegi potest, quod non pater visus sit, qui numquam
visus est, sed filius, qui et descendere solitus est et videri,
quia descenderit-imago est enim invisibilis dei\(^5\)-ut mediocritas
et fragilitas condicionis humanae\(^6\) deum patrem videre aliquando
iam tunc assuesceret in imagine dei, hoc est in filio dei.
gradatim enim et per incrementa fragilitas humana nutriri
debuit per imaginem ad istam gloriam, ut deum patrem videre
posset aliquando.

\(^1\)Gen.12:7 \(^2\)Ex.33:20 \(^3\)I Jn.4:12 \(^4\)I Tim.6:16
\(^5\)Col.1:3
\(^6\)As we have noted earlier, this expression is similar
to those used by Cicero to indicate the frail condition of
humanity.
Behold once again Moses in another place says that "God appeared unto Abraham."\(^{(1)}\) And yet the same Moses hears from God that "no man can see God and live." If God cannot be seen, how did He appear? Or if He appeared, how is it that He cannot be seen? John also says: "No man hath seen God at any time," and the Apostle Paul: "Whom no man hath seen nor can see." Now certainly the Scripture does not lie\(^{(2)}\); God was truly seen. From this we can understand that it was not the Father, who has never been seen,\(^{(3)}\) that was here seen, but the Son, who was accustomed\(^{(4)}\) to coming down to earth, and so was seen. For He is "the image of the invisible God"; being so in order that weak and frail human nature might become eventually accustomed to see God the Father in the image of God, which is God the Son. So gradually and by degrees frail human nature had to be lifted up by means of the Image, to that glory which is to be able one day to see God the Father.

\(^{(1)}\)"God appeared to Abraham" — we have seen how this is brought out in Justin and Tertullian. Earlier Philo explained that it was the Logos who appeared to Abraham (De Cherib.4:7). God being seen by Abraham is mentioned in Shepherd of Hermas VII.2,1, and Clement Alx., Strom.V.1.86, among others.

\(^{(2)}\)Novatian is at one with the other Church Fathers in holding a high view of the truth of the Scriptures. Clement of Alexandria witnesses to their truthfulness in Strom.VII.46,
as does Origen in De Prn.IV.2.2. Irenaeus exalts their veracity in many places—e.g. Adv.Er.II.28.2. Tertullian says in De Car.Cr.III. that "what is written cannot but have been." In De Tr.XXX.178, Novatian speaks of the Scriptures: "quae numquam fallunt."

(3) Novatian says twice (here and XVIII.102) that the Father is by nature invisible. He is probably following Tertullian, Prx.14, who states this in even more detail: "hic ex diverso volet aliquis etiam filium invisibilem contendere, ut sermonem, ut spiritum, et dum unam conditionem patris et filii vindicat unum potius atque eundem confirmare patrem et filium. sed diximus scripturam differentiae patrocinari per visibilis et invisibilis distinctionem. nam et illud adiciunt ad argumentationem, quod si filius tunc ad Moysen loquebatur, ipse faciem suam nemini visibilem pronuntiaret, quia scilicet ipse invisibiles pater fuerit in filii nomine."

(4) Tertullian more than any of the other Fathers laid emphasis on the theophanies of the Old Testament as being pre-incarnate appearances of Christ, in which He was habituating both Himself and the human race for His full appearance in the Incarnation—e.g. Adv.Mrc.IV.10; Prx.16; etc.
XVIII.104. Periculosa sunt enim, quae magna sunt, si repentina sunt. nam etiam lux solis subita post tenebras splendore nimio insuetis oculis non ostendet diem, sed potius faciet caecitatem. quod ne in damnum humanorum contingat oculorum, paulatim disruptis et dissipatis tenebris ortus luminaris istius mediocribus incrementis fallenter assurgens oculos hominum sensim assuefacit ad totum orbem suum ferendum per incrementa radiorum.
XVIII.101. For all great forces are dangerous if suddenly brought to bear. Even the light of the sun, if it strikes in its splendour on eyes accustomed to darkness will not reveal the light of day, but will rather cause blindness. And so to prevent this happening and injuring our human eyes, the darkness is broken up and scattered by degrees, and the rising of that luminary is gradual by small degrees and so unnoticed — thus it gently accustoms men's eyes to bear its full orb by the gradual increase of its rays.
XVIII.102. Sic ergo et Christus, id est imago dei et filius dei, ab hominibus inspicitur, qua poterat videri. et ideo fragilitas et mediocritas sortis humanae per ipsum alitur, producitur, educatur, ut aliquando deum quaque ipsum patrem, assueta filium conspicere, possit, ut est, videre\(^1\), ne maiestatis ipsius repentina et intolerabili fulgere percussa intercipi possit, ut deum patrem, quem semper optavit, videre non possit. ex quo filius est hic, qui videtur, dei autem filius dei verbum est. dei autem verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis\(^2\): hic autem Christus est. quae, malum, ratio\(^3\) est\(^4\), ut dubitetur deus dici, qui tot modis deus intellegitur approbari?

\(^1\)(I Jn.3:2) \(^2\)Jn.1:14
\(^3\)quae, malum, ratio—"a startling colloquialism"

according to Fausset (op.cit., p.63, note 18).
In the same way therefore, Christ - that is the Image of God, and the Son of God - is looked upon by men, so far as He is able to be seen; and so the fraility and weakness of human nature is nourished, lifted up, and educated through Him, so that through being accustomed to behold the Son, it may one day be able to see God the Father Himself "as He is." Otherwise His sudden and intolerable brightness would strike upon and overwhelm it, so that it could not see God the Father, whom it has always desired to see. Thus this is the Son who is seen, who is however the Son of God and the Word of God. And "the word of God was made flesh and dwelt among us"; and this indeed is Christ. What earthly reason is there for hesitating to call Him God, who in so many ways is proved to be God?
XVIII.103. Ac si et Agar ancillam Sareae de domo eictam pariter et fugatam angelus convenit apud fontem aquae in via Sur\textsuperscript{a}, fugae causas interrogat\textsuperscript{b} atque accipit\textsuperscript{c}, et post haec humilitatis consilia porrigit\textsuperscript{d}, spem praeterea illa materni nominis facit, quodque ex utero eius multum semen esset futurum spondet atque promittit, et quod Ismael ex illa nasci haberet, et cum ceteris aperit locum habitatioinis ipsius actumque\textsuperscript{1} descriptit, hunc autem angelum et dominum scriptura\textsuperscript{e} proponit et deum\textsuperscript{2}-nam nec benedictionem seminis promisisset, nisi angelus et deus fuisset-quaerant, quid in praesenti loco haeretici tractent: pater fuit iste, qui ab Agar visus est, an non, quia deus positus est ? sed absit deum patrem angelum dicere, ne alteri subditus sit, cuius angelus fuerit. sed angelum dicent fuisset. Quomodo ergo Deus erit, si angelus fuit, cum non sit hoc nomen angelis umquam concessum ? nisi quoniam ex utroque latere nos veritas in istam concludit sententiam, quia\textsuperscript{f} intellegere debeamus dei filium fuisset, qui, quoniam ex deo est, merito deus, quia dei filius, dictus sit, quoniam patri subditus et\textsuperscript{g} annuntiator paternae voluntatis est, magni consili\textsuperscript{3} angelus pronuntiatus est.

\textsuperscript{1}actum- "manner of life" - Novatian also uses this word in Spc.3,11 - "In vitae actu graves"; and in Ep.xxx.1 Cyprian uses it in Unit.21; Laps.21; Dom.Or.14. It is found in Minuc.Felix, 32,7.

\textsuperscript{2}Gen.16:6-13

\textsuperscript{3}Isa.9:6
XVIII, 103. And further when Hagar, the handmaid of Sarah left home, partly driven out, and partly wishing to escape, was met by an angel near the spring of water on the road to Shur, who asked why she had fled, and having found out why, advised her to humble herself, giving her the hope that she should bear the title of mother. He pledged and promised that from her womb there should be a numerous progeny, and that Ishmael was to be born of her, and further described the place of his dwelling and his manner of life. Now Scripture sets forth this angel as both Lord and God; for He would not have promised a blessing upon her seed if He had not been both angel and God. Let the heretics see what they can make of this passage. Was it the Father that was seen by Hagar or not? For He is declared to be God. But far be it from us to call God the Father an angel; that would make the Father subject to another being whose angel He is. But they will say that He was only an angel. How then can He be God, if He was only an angel? This name is nowhere granted to angels. Therefore these two truths leave us with only one conclusion: that He was the Son of God. He being of God is rightly called God, because He is the Son of God; and since He is subjected to the Father, and the Announcer of the Father's will, He is called the "Angel of Great Counsel."
Ergo si hic locus neque personae patris congruit, ne angelus dictus sit, neque personae angeli, ne deus pronuntiatus sit, personae autem Christi convenit, ut et deus sit, quia dei filius est, et angelus sit, quoniam paterna dispositionis annuntiator est intellegere debent contra scripturas se agere haeretici, qui, Christus cum dicant se et angelum credere, nolint illum etiam deum pronuntiare, quem in veteri testamento ad visitationem generis humani legunt saepe venisse.
Therefore this passage is neither suited to the person of the Father, since He would then be called an angel, nor to the person of an angel, for then the angel would be called God. But it is suited to the person of Christ, that He be both God, because He is the Son of God, and also angel, because He declares the economy of the Father. The heretics must understand that they are contradicting the Scriptures, when they say that they believe that Christ was both man and angel, but will not declare Him to be both man and God, of whom they read in the Old Testament that He often came to visit the human race.
XVIII.105. Adhuc adiecit Moyses Abrahae visum deum apud quercum Mambra, sedente ipso ad ostium tabernaculi sui meridie, et nihil minus, cum tres conspexisset viros, unum ex illis dominum nuncupasse. quorum cum pedes lavisset, cinericios panes cum butyro et ipsius copia lactis offert et, ut hospites retenti vescerentur, hortatur. post quae et quod pater futurus esset, audit, et quod Sara uxor eius paritura ex ipso filium esset, ediscit, et de exitu Sodomitarum, quae merebantur pati, recognoscit, et quod propter clamorem Sodomorum deus descendisset, addiscit. quo in loco si patrem volunt videri tunc fuisse cum angelis duobus hospicio receptum, patrem visibilem haeretici crediderunt; si autem angelum, cum ex angelis tribus unus dominus nuncupatur, cur, quod non solet, angelus deus dicitur? nisi quoniam, ut deo patri invisibilitas propria reddatur et angelo propria mediocritas remittatur, non nisi dei filius, qui et deus est, Abrahae visus et hospicio receptus esse credetur, quod enim erat futurus, meditabatur in sacramento Abrahae factus hospes, apud Abrahae filios futurus, cuius filiorum pedes ad probationem, quod ipse esset, abluit, reddens in filiis ius hospitalitatis, quod aliquando illi faeneraverat pater.

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1Gen.18:1-22- This theophany is either mentioned or explained in the same way (though in less detail) in other Patristic texts. Compare Justin, Dial. lvi (discussing the two angels and the son) and lvii (where he tries to explain
away the fact that divine beings are said to have actually eaten); cxxvi; Irenaeus, Adv.Hr.IV.10.1 (briefly mentioned); Tertullian, Prx.16 (where he gives no details on the two angels, but only says one was Christ); and Adv.Hre.II.25.
To this incident Moses added the appearance of God to Abraham at the oak of Mamre, as he was sitting at the door of his tent at midday, and that though he saw three men, he yet addressed one of them as Lord. When he had washed their feet, he offered them bread baked on the ashes, with butter and milk in abundance, and urges them to stay and eat as his guest. Then he is told that he will be a father, and learns that Sarah, his wife, is going to bear a son by him: he is made aware of the coming, well-deserved destruction of the people of Sodom; and learns that God had come down on account of the cry of the people of Sodom. If the heretics will have it that in this passage it was the Father who with the two angels was received with hospitality, they then believe that the Father is visible. Or if however it was an angel, why is an angel called by the unusual title of God, one of the three being addressed as Lord? The reason must be that appropriate invisibility is to be vouchedsafe for God the Father, and appropriate inferiority left to the angel. It was no other than the Son of God, who is also God, that we must believe to have appeared to Abraham, and have been received with hospitality by him. As the guest of Abraham, He was rehearsing in a mystery what He was after to become, when he would come among the sons of Abraham; for He washed their feet to show that it was He Himself, thus paying back to the sons the right of hospitality, which their father had long before advanced to Him.
XVIII.106. Unde et, necqua esset dubitatio, quin iste Abrahae hospes fuisset, in Sodomitarum exitu ponitur: quoniam pluit dominus super Sodomam et Gomorrham ignem et sulphur a domino de caelo. sic enim et prophetes ex persona dei: subverti vos, inquit, sicut subvertit dominus Sodomam et Gomorrham. dominus ergo Sodomam subvertit, id est, deus Sodomam subvertit. sed in subversione Sodomorum dominus pluit ignem a domino. hic autem dominus visus est Abrahae deus, deus autem hic hospes est Abrahae visus utique, quia tactus. sed cum pater qua invisibilis nec tunc utique visus sit, visus est et hospitio receptus et acceptus est, qui solitus est tangi et videri. hic autem filius dei dominus a domino pluit super Sodomam et Gomorrham sulphur atque ignem. hic autem dei verbum est, verbum autem dei caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, hic autem Christus est. non pater igitur apud Abraham hospes, sed Christus fuit; nec tunc pater visus est, sed filius; visus autem est Christus. merito igitur Christus et dominus et deus est, qui non aliter Abrahae visus est, nisi quia ante ipsum Abraham ex patre deo deus sermo generatus est.

1Gen.19:24  2Amos 4:11  3Jn.1:14  4Jn.8:58
XVIII. 106. There may be no doubt but that it was He who was the guest of Abraham, for it is declared "When the Lord rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah fire and sulphur from the Lord out of heaven." Thus says the prophet in the very person of God: "I have overthrown you, as the Lord overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah." The Lord then overthrew Sodom, that is God overthrew Sodom. But in the overthrow of Sodom, it was the Lord that rained fire from the Lord. This Lord appeared to Abraham as God; this God is the guest of Abraham, certainly seen, because He was touched by Him. But the Father, who is invisible, was assuredly not seen at that time. He who was seen and was received with hospitality, was accustomed to being touched and seen. He, the Son of God, and the Lord, "rained sulphur and fire from the Lord." He is the Word of God, and "the Word of God was made flesh, and dwelt among us." He is Christ. It was not then the Father who was the guest of Abraham, but the Son; it was not the Father who was seen, but the Son; it was Christ who was seen. It follows then that Christ is both Lord and God, who could appear to Abraham only, because before Abraham himself was, God the Word was begotten of God the Father.
Adhuc, inquit, idem angelus et deus eandem Agar fugatam de domo Abrahae cum puero consolatur et visitat. nam cum illa in solitudine exposuisset infantes, quia aqua defecisset ex utre, cumque puere ille clamasset, fletum et planctum levasset, et audivit, inquit scriptura, deus vocem pueri de loco, ubi erat. cum deum esse, qui vocem infantis audivit, retulisset, adiecit: et vocavit angelus domini ipsam Agar de caelo, angelum referens esse, quem deum dixerat, et dominum pronuntians esse, quem angelum collocarit. quique angelus et deus adhuc ipsi Agar promittit maiora solacia dicendo ne timueris, exaudivi enim vocem pueri de loco, ubi erat. surge, sume puerum et tene, in gentem enim magnam faciam sum. hic angelus, si angelus tantum est, cur hoc sibi vindicat, ut dicat: in gentem enim magnam faciam sum, cum hoc utique genus potentiae dei sit, angeli esse non possit? ex quo etiam deus confirmatur esse, qui hoc potest facere, quoniam, ut hoc ipsum comprobetur, adicitur per scripturam statim: et aperuit deus oculos eius, et vidit putum aquae vivae, et abiit et implevit utrem de puteo et dedit puero, et erat deus cum puero. si ergo hic deus erat cum puero, qui aperuit oculos Agar, ut videret putum aquae vivae et hauriret aquam propter urgentem sitis necessitatem, hic autem deus e caelo illam vocat angelus dictus, cum superius vocem audiens clamantis pueri deus esset potius, non alius intellegitur quam angelus esse pariter et deus.

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\(^1\text{Gen.21:17} \quad ^2\text{Gen.21:17sq.} \quad ^3\text{Gen.21:19sq.}\)
XVIII.107. This same angel, says the Scripture, who is also God, visits and consoles Hagar, when she fled with her son from the house of Abraham. In the desert she had cast the child away, because the water was spent in the bottle, and when he cried she lifted up her voice and wept. "And God," Scripture says, "heard the voice of the lad from the place where he was." Having declared that it was God who heard the voice of the lad, it adds: "And the angel of the Lord called unto Hagar out of heaven." It calls Him angel whom it had just set forth as angel. Now this angel and God promises to Hagar herself greater consolations saying: "Fear not, for I have heard the voice of the lad from the place where he was. Arise, lift up the lad, and hold him; for I will make him a great nation." Why does this angel, if he be only angel, claim for Himself the power to say: "For I will make him a great nation"? This kind of power assuredly belongs only to God; it cannot belong to an angel. He is further confirmed to be God since He is able to do this, because Scripture adds immediately afterwards in proof of this very point: "And God opened her eyes, and she saw a well of living water, and she went, and filled the bottle with water, and gave the lad a drink, and God was with the lad." Now therefore this well is God who was with the lad, who opened the eyes of Hagar, so that she saw the well of living water, and drew from it to satisfy his thirst. It is God who calls to her from heaven. Though He is called "Angel" previously when
He heard the voice of the lad crying. He was actually God. So He is to be understood as both angel and God.
XVIII.108. Quod cum patri competens et conveniens esse non possit, qui tantummodo deus est, competens autem esse possit Christo, qui non tantummodo deus, sed et angelus pronuntiatus est, manifeste apparet non patrem ibi tunc locutumuisse ad Agar, sed Christum potius, cum deus sit, qui etiam angeli competit nomen, quippe cum magni consilii angelus \(^1\) factus sit, angelus autem sit, dum exposít sinum patris \(^2\), sicut Ioannes edicit. si enim ipse Ioannes hunc eundem, qui sinum exposít patris, verbum dicit carnum factum esse, ut sinum patris posset exponere, merito Christus non solum homo est, sed et angelus; nec angelus tantum, sed et deus per scripturas ostenditur, et a nobis hoc esse creditur, ne, si non Christum tunc locutum ad Agar voluerimus accipere, aut angelum deum faciamus aut deum patrem omnipotentem inter angelos computemus.

\(^1\) Isa.9:6

\(^2\) Jn.1:18—Novatian here and in Tr.XXVIII takes the object of ἐπιφάνεια to be τὸν θεόν—as in Prx.2:1,3; 15,6; 8,3, of Tertullian. Hippolytus is the same in C.Noet.5: μόνος ὁ πάτερ καὶ τέλειος ἀνθρώπος καὶ μόνος διηγηθημένος τὴν βουλήν τοῦ πατρὸς.
XVIII.198. This description cannot be appropriate and fitting for the Father, who is God only; but it can be appropriately applied to Christ, who has been declared to be not God only, but also angel. It is therefore obvious that it was not the Father who spoke to Hagar in this passage, but Christ; since He is not only God, but Him to whom the title of angel is also appropriate by the very fact that He was made "the angel of Great Counsel." He is, according to John, the angel that declares the bosom of the Father. For if John himself says that this one who reveals the Father, was made flesh, so that He might be able to declare the heart of the Father: then it follows that Christ is not man only, but also angel; and not only angel, but He is shown in the Scriptures to be God also. And we believe this to be true. Otherwise if we refuse to accept that it was Christ who spoke to Hagar in that situation, then we must either make an angel God, or reckon God the Father Almighty among the angels.

¹Gen. 31:11-13--Justin speaks of this in Dial. lviii.
XIX.109. Well what if in another place we read in like manner that God is described as an angel. When Jacob was complaining to his wives Leah and Rachel of the ill treatment of their father, saying that now he desired to go and return into his own land, he also adds the authority of a dream, during which he says that the angel of God had spoken to him through the dream: "Jacob, Jacob. And I," he adds, "said, what is it? And he said, lift up thine eyes, and see the goats and rams leaping upon the sheep, and the she-goats streaked with white variegated, speckled, and spotted. For I have seen all that Laban hath done unto thee. I am God who appeared unto thee in the place of God, where thou anointedst the pillar unto me, and vowedst a vow unto me. Now therefore, arise and get thee out from the land and go unto the land of thy birth, and I will be with thee."
XIX.110. Si angelus dei loquitur haec ad Iacob, atque ipse angelus infert dicens: ego sum deus, qui visum sum tibi in loco dei, non tantummodo hunc angelum sed et deum posuitum sine ulla haesitatione conspicimus. quique sibi votum refert ab Iacob destinatum esse in loco dei, et non dicit: in loco meo, est ergo locus dei, est et hic deus. sed enim ibi simpliciter est in loco dei positum; neque enim dictum est: in loco angeli et dei, sed tantummodo: deis. hic autem, qui ista promittit, deus atque angelus esse perhibetur, ut merito distinctio sit inter eum, qui tantummodo deus dicitur, et inter eum, qui non deus simpliciter, sed et angelus pronuntiatur.
XIX.110. Since the angel of God speaks thus to Jacob, and the Angel Himself goes on to say: "I am God, who appeared unto thee in the place of God," we perceive without any hesitation that He who is presented here is not only an angel, but also God, since He declared that Jacob's vow was addressed to Him "in the place of God," and does not say "in my place." He is therefore the place of God; He who speaks also is God. Furthermore the words say simply "in the place of God"; not "in the place of the angel and of God," but only "of God". So He who promises these things is shown to be both God and angel. Consequently there is a distinction between Him who is called God only, and Him who is declared to be not simply God, but also angel.
XIX.111. Ex quo, si nullius alterius angeli potest hic accipi
tanta auctoritas, ut deum quoque se esse fateatur et votum sibi
factum esse testetur, nisi tantummodo Christi, cui non quia
angelo tantum, sed quia deo votum voveri potest, manifestum est
non patrem accipi posse, sed filium, deum et angelum. hic
autem si Christus est, sicuti est, vehementer periclitatur, qui
aut hominem Christum aut angelum tantummodo dicit, subtracta illi
divini nominis potestate, quam ex scripturarum caelestium fide
frequenter acceptit, quae illum angelum frequenter et deum
dicunt. 
XIX.111. From this it follows that if so great an authority cannot be regarded as belonging to any other angel in that He can profess Himself to be God, and also bear witness that a vow was made to Him except Christ alone — to whom a vow can be vowed — not as angel only, but as God; it is clear that we cannot acknowledge Him to be the Father, but the Son, who is both God and angel. Now if He is Christ, as in fact He is, that man is in terrible danger, who says that Christ is either man only or angel only, withdrawing from Him the power which belongs to the Divine Name, a power which He constantly receives according to the faithful testimony of the heavenly scriptures, which continually call Him both angel and God.
XIX.112. His omnibus etiam illud accedit, ut quomodo illum et angelum frequenter et deum posuit scriptura divina, sic illum et hominem ponat et deum exprimens eadem scriptura divina, quod erat futurus, et depingens iam tum in imagine, quod habebat esse in substantiae veritate. remansit enim, inquit, Iacob solus, et luctabatur homo cum eo usque in mane. et vidit, quoniam non potest adversus sum, et tetti latitudinem femoris Iacob, cum in cum luctaretur et ipse cum eo, et dixit ei: dimitte me, ascendit enim lucifer. et ille dixit: non te dimittam, nisi me benedixeris. et dixit: quod est nomen tuum? et ille dixit: Iacob. dixitque ei: non vocabitur iam nunc nomen tuum Iacob, sed Israel erit nomen tuum, quid invaluisti cum deo, et cum hominibus potens es. et adhuc adicit: et vocavit Iacob nomen loci illius: visio dei. vidi enim deum facie ad faciem, et salva facta est anima mea. ortusque est ei sol, max transivit visionem dei, ipse vero claudicabat femore suo.

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1Gen.32:24-31 - See Justin, Dial.cxxv.
XIX.112. In addition to all these things even more is added. Just as the Divine Scriptures constantly declare Him to be both angel and God, they further declare Him to be both man and God, when expressing that which He was to be, and representing even then in figure that true substance that He was later to have. Indeed it says: "Jacob remained alone; and there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day; and he saw that he prevailed not against him, and touched the hollow of Jacob's thigh, as he wrestled with him, and he with him, and he said to him: let me go, for the morning star ariseth. And he said: I will not let thee go, except thou bless me. And he said: what is thy name? And he said, Jacob. And he said unto him, Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel shall thy name be; for thou hast prevailed with God, and with men thou art powerful." And he further added: "And Jacob called the name of that place, Vision of God; for I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved. And the sun rose upon him, as presently he passed over the Vision of God; and he halted upon his thigh."
XIX.113. Homo, inquit, luctabatur cum Iacob. si homo
solitarius, quis est iste? unde est? quare cum Iacob
contendit atque luctatur? quid intercesserat? quid factum
fuerat? quae ratio contentionis istius tantae tantique
certaminis? quare praesterea Iacob, qui ad tenendum hominem, cum
quo luctabatur, fortior inventur et benedictionem ab eo, quem
detinebat, postulat, quia iam lucifer oritur, ideo postulasse
reperitur? nisi quoniam praefigurabatur contentio haec inter
Christum et filios Iacob futura, quae in evangelio dicitur
perfecta, contra hunc enim hominem collucatus est populus Iacob,
in qua collucatione potenter populus est Iacob repertus,
quippe cum adversus Christum iniquitatis suae victoriam sit
consecutus. quo in tempore propter facinus, quod admisit,
incessu fidei propriae et salutis claudicare gravissime incertus
et lubricus coepit, qui, quamvis superior damnando Christum
repertus, eget tamen ipsius misericordia, eget tamen ipsius
benedictione.

1fidei...lubricus—compare to the words of Cyprian in
Ep.67,7-lubrica fides (See H. Koch, Cyprianische Untersuchungen,
p.476).
XIX.113. A man, it says, wrestled with Jacob. If He is a mere man, who is he? Where does he come from? Why does he strive and wrestle with Jacob? What was the reason for such a great strife and battle? Why, further, is Jacob, who we find, is strong enough to hold the man with whom he wrestled, and asks a blessing from him whom he held because the morning star was rising, made his request for that reason? It can only be because the strife between Christ and the sons of Jacob, which was then in the future, but is recorded in the Gospel to have been actually accomplished, was here prefigured. Against this man the people of Jacob indeed wrestled; they proved the more powerful in the struggle, winning the victory of its own unrighteousness over Christ - at which time, because of the crime it had committed, began to halt most sorely - hesitating and slipping - in the walk of its own faith and salvation. Though that people was found to be the stronger by its condemnation of Christ, yet it needs His pity and blessing,
XIX.114. Sed enim hic homo, qui cum Iacob luctatus est: non, inquit, vocabitur etiam nunc nomen tuum Iacob, sed Israel erit nomen tuum. ac si Israel est homo videns deum, elegantem ostendebat dominus, quod non tantum homo esset, qui luctabatur tunc cum Iacob. sed et deus. videbat utique deum Iacob, cum quo luctabatur, quamvis hominem ipsius in colluicatione retineret. et ut nulla adhuc posset esse dubitatio, interpretationem ipse posuit dicendo: quia invaluisti cum deo, et cum hominibus potens es. ob quam causam hic idem Iacob intellegens iam vim sacramenti et p ervidens auctoritatem eius, cum quo luctatus fuisset, nomen loco illius, in quo luctatus est, vocavit visionem dei. superstruxit praeterea causas ad interpretationem dei porrigendam: vidi enim, inquit, deum facie ad faciem et salva facta est anima mea. vidit autem deum, cum quo luctatus est quasi cum homine, sed et hominem quidem quasi victor tenuit, benedictionem autem quasi a deo, ut inferior, postulavit. ita cum deo et cum homine luctatus fuit. ac si luctatio haec ibi quidem praefigurata est, in evangelio autem inter Christum et porulum Iacob perfecta est, in qua quamvis populus superior inventus sit, minor repertus est, dum nocens comprobatus est, quis dubitabit Christum, in quo haec luctationis figura completa est, non hominem tantum, sed et deum etiam figura ipsa luctationis videatur comprobasse?
Well then this man who wrestled with Jacob says: "Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel shall thy name be."(1) Now if Israel is the man who sees God, then the Lord was beautifully showing that it was not only a man who was the wrestler with Jacob, but God also. Certainly Jacob saw God, with whom he wrestled, though it was a man whom he held in his grip. And so to remove all doubt, He Himself gave the interpretation, saying: "For thou hast prevailed with God, and with man thou art powerful." For this reason Jacob, understanding already the meaning of the mystery, and perceiving the authority of Him with whom he had wrestled, called the name of the place where the struggle had taken place - "Vision of God." Moreover he added why God gave this interpretation: "I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved." Indeed he saw God, and wrestled with Him as a man; but while he held the man as victor over him, as an inferior he asked of him a blessing, as from God. Thus he wrestled both with God and with man(2). And so that struggle between Christ and the people of Jacob was here prefigured, and in the Gospel fulfilled; in which struggle the people proved the more powerful; yet they proved the weaker by being shown to be guilty. Who would hesitate to acknowledge Christ, in whom this prefigured struggle was fulfilled, as not man only, but also God, when he sees that the figurative struggle itself proves that He is both man and God?
Weyer states (op.cit., p.134, note 78) that this etymology is found in both Philo and Hippolytus-Erg.16. See Philo, De Abrh. (Loeb trn.) p.358: "Ἱσραήλ ἔτρεψεται δρᾶν ὶςδῦ. Irenaeus' words in Adv.Er.IV.10.1, seem to be an allusion to this view of the meaning of his name: "...And again when He becomes visible, and directs Jacob on his journey." See also note 1, p.404, Ante-Nicene Chr.Lib.-Irenaeus, Vol.I, which derives Philo's Greek explanation from the Hebrew מִשְׁלָחֵי הָעַרְבּ (which was probably the source of this patristic exegesis).

Novatian appears to take his idea that the heavenly wrestler is both God and man from Justin (Dial.lviii) and not from Tertullian, who does not mention this.
XIX.115. Et tamen etiam post haec aequa non cessat eadem
scriptura divina angelum deum dicere, deum angelum pronuntiare.
nam cum Manassen atque Ephrem filios Ioseph benedicturus esset
hic ipse Iacob, transversis super capita puerorum manibus
collocatis: deus, inquit, qui pascit me a inventute mea usque
in hunc diem, angelus, qui liberavit me ex omnibus malis,
benedicat pueros hos.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Gen. 48:15 sq.
XIX.115. And even after all this, the same divine Scripture does not cease to call an angel God, and God an angel. When this same Jacob was about to bless Manasseh and Ephraim, the sons of Joseph, he placed his hands crosswise upon the heads of the lads, and said: "God, who feedeth me from my youth up unto this day, the angel which hath delivered me from all evil, bless these lads."
XIX, 116. Usque adeo autem eundem angelum ponit, quem deum dixerat, ut singulariter in exitu sermonis sui posuerit personam, de qua loquebatur, dicendo: 

**benedicat pueros hos.**

si enim alterum angelum voluisset intellegi, plurali numero duas personas complexus fuisse. nunc unius personae singularem numerum in benedictione deposuit, ex quo eundem deum atque angelum intellegi voluit. sed enim deus pater accipi non potest, deus autem et angelus Christus accipi potest. quem ut huius benedictionis auctorem etiam transversas super pueros manus Iacob ponendo significavit, quasi pater illorum esset Christus, ex quo manus ponere figuram et formam futuram passionis ostendens. nemo igitur Christum, sicut angelum non dubitat dicere, ita etiam deum haesitet pronuntiare, cum hunc eundem in puerorum horum benedictionem per sacramentum passionis digestum in figura manum et deum et angelum intellegat invocatum fuisse.
XIX.116. He goes so far in affirming Him to be an angel whom he had called God, that at the end of his discourse, he mentions the Person of whom he was speaking in the singular number, saying: "May He bless these lads." If he had wished the one to be understood as God, and the other as angel, he would have joined the two persons together with a verb in the plural; but, in fact, he used the singular number for one Person in the blessing. Hence he wished God and the angel to be understood to be the same person. It is not possible to accept God the Father as an angel, but Christ is to be accepted as both God and angel. And by laying his hands crosswise on the heads of the boys, Jacob signified that Christ was the author of the blessing, as though He was their Father. He showed by laying his hands in this way, the future figure and form of the passion. Let no one therefore who is prepared to call Christ an angel, hesitate to call Christ God; especially when he understands that He was invoked as both God and angel, to give His blessing to the lads - through the mystery of the passion, intimated in the figure of the crossed hands(1).

(1) Tertullian also interprets Jacob's crossed hands as a sign of the passion - De Bap. viii.2. Interestingly, Justin in Dial. xci, gives several far-fetched types of the cross (the blessing of Jacob in the "horns of the unicorn" in Deut. 33:13-17, etc.) without mentioning Gen. 48:15.
XX.117. Ac si aliquis haereticus, pertinaciter obluctans adversus veritatem, voluerit in his omnibus exemplis proprie angelum aut intellegere, aut intellegendum esse contenderit, in hoc quoque viribus veritatis frangatur necesse est. nam si omnibus caelestibus, terrenis et infernis Christo subditis etiam ipsi angeli cum omnibus ceteris, quaecumque subiecta sunt, Christo dicuntur subditi, et tamen quivis angelus subditus Christo deus potest dici, et hoc si dicitur et sine blasphemia profertur, multo magis utique et hoc ipsi dei filio Christo competere potest, ut deus pronuntietur. si enim qui subiectus Christo angelus deus promitur, multo magis et constantius Christus, cui sunt omnes angeli subjecti, deus esse dicitur, nec enim naturae congruit, ut, quae minoribus concessa sunt, maioribus denegentur. ita, si angelus Christo minor est, angelus autem deus dicitur, magis consequenter Christus deus esse dicitur, qui non uno, sed omnibus angelis et maiore et melior \(^1\) inventur\(^2\).

\(^1\)maior et melior—H. Koch (Cyprianische Untersuchungen, p.476) compares these words to those of Cyprian in De Hab.Virg.24: et maiore et meliore parte.
XX.117. And if some heretic, obstinately struggling against the truth, either wishes to understand or even insists that it must be understood that a mere angel is spoken of in all these instances, then he must be shattered by the force of truth in this also\(^1\). For since all things in heaven, in earth, and under the earth are in subjection to Christ, the angels are included among these things; for there are no exceptions. Yet any angel, though in subjection to Christ, can be, and is, called God, and the title is given without blasphemy. How very much more then is it appropriate to declare that Christ, who is Himself the Son of God, is God. Now if an angel who is in subjection to Christ is declared to be God, much more properly will Christ, to whom all angels are in subjection, be said to be God. For it is contrary to nature, that what is granted to the less should be denied to the greater. Since then an angel is less than God, and yet an angel is called God, Christ is consequently said to be God; for He is greater and better – not just than one angel, but than all.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Stoic epistemology is again in the background of Novatian’s thought. He rests his case upon the sheer objectivity of the truth (which is so substantial and objective that just to bring it to light "shatters" heresy). The way he brings the objective truth to light, is to look at the relevant facts as a whole. To do this, he puts questions to them by means of the hypothetical syllogism.
(2) As Weyer has correctly shown (against Scheidweiler, *Novatian und die Engel christologic*, 132sq.), Novatian is not teaching that Christ is an angel. Rather he is concerned to show that in the Old Testament theophanies, what appeared to be an angel was in fact God the Son (see Weyer, p.138, note 80).
XX.118. Ac si stetit deus in synagoga deorum, in medio autem
deus deos discernit\(^1\), in synagoga autem aliquotiens Christus
stetit, Christus ergo in synagoga deus stetit, diiudicans
scilicet deos, quibus dicit: \textit{usquequo personas hominum
accipitis}\(^2\), accusans scilicet consequenter homines synagogae
non exercentes insta iudicia; porro si illi, qui reprehenduntur
atque culpantur, propter aliquam tamen causam hoc nomen
adipisci sine blasphemia videntur, ut dii nuncupentur, multo
magis utrique hic deus habeitum, qui non tantum deus in
synagoga deorum stetisse dicitur, sed \textit{cæliam deos discernens et
diiudicans ex eadem lectionis auctoritate aperitur}\(^b\).

\(^1\textit{Ps.} 82:1\)
\(^2\textit{Ps.} 82:2\)
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XX.118. And then, "God stood in the congregation of Gods, God in the midst doth judge the Gods." Now Christ often stood in the synagogue. Therefore Christ stood in the synagogue as God, judging between the Gods, to whom He says: "How long do ye accept the persons of men?" Thus accusing the men of the synagogue for not preaching righteous judgement. Further, since the men who are reproved and blamed, nonetheless appear for some reason to receive without blasphemy this name, so that they can be called Gods; much more assuredly shall He be esteemed God, who is said not only to have stood in the congregation of Gods, but is shown by the authority of the same passage deciding and judging between Gods

(1) This exegesis of Ps. 82:1,2, is not without Scriptural and Patriotic precedence. Christ applies it to Himself in Jn.10:34-38. As often as Novatian quotes from John, he would have been well aware of Christ's usage of this passage (even though he does not explain it in exactly the same way). Justin in Dial. cxxiv applies the verse ("Ye are gods") to all Christians. Likewise Tertullian in Adv. Herm. V, interpretes it to mean that we can become gods. In Prx. xiii, he applies it to those who have "Become sons of God by faith," and then pre-eminently to Christ. Irenaeus in Adv. HG. III.6.1, applies it to Christ.
XX.119. Ac si illi, qui tamquam unus de principibus cadunt¹, 
dii tamen nuncupantur, multo magis deus esse dicetur, qui non 
tantum tamquam unus ex principibus non cadit, sed ipsum quoque 
malitiae et auctorem et principem vincit.

¹Ps.82:7
XX.119. And further, if those who "fall like one of the princes" are yet called gods, much more shall He be said to be so called, who not only does not fall like one of the princes, but vanquishes the author and prince of wickedness himself.
Quae autem, malum, ratio est, ut, cum legant hoc etiam Moysi nomen datum, dum dicitur: deum te nosui Pharaoni. Christo negetur, qui non Pharaoni deus, sed universae creature et dominus et deus constitutus esse reperitur? et in illo quidem hoc nomen temperate datum, in hoc profuse, in illo ad mensuram, in hoc supra omnem omnino mensuram—non enim ad mensuram, inquit, dat filio pater pater enim, inquit, diligat filium; in illo ad tempus, in hoc sine tempore, divini enim nominis potestatem et super omnia et in omne tempus acceptit, quodsi, qui unius hominis acceptit potestatem, in hac exiguitate huius datae potestatis nomen tamen istud dei incunctanter consequitur, quanto magis, qui in ipsum quoque Moysen habet potestatem, nominis istius auctoritatem consecutus esse credetur?

\[1\text{Ex.7:1} \quad 2\text{Jn.3:34}\text{sq.}\]
XX.120. Well then for what earthly reason, when they read that this name was given even to Moses, since it is said: "I have made thee a god to Pharaoh," should it be denied to Christ, who is declared to have been appointed not to be a god to Pharaoh, but to the entire creation both Lord and God? In the former case this name was indeed given with reserve, but in the latter most abundantly; in the one case by measure, in the other beyond all measure whatever: "For the Father," it says, "giveth not by measure unto the Son," "for the Father loveth the Son"; in the one, for a time; in the other, without reckoning of time. For he received the power of the Divine Name, both above all things and also for all time. But if (Moses), who received power over one man, in spite of the very limited nature of that power given him, is without hesitation granted the name of God, how much more shall we believe that He who has power over Moses himself, has the authority of the name given to Him?
XXI.121. Et poteram quidem omnium scripturarum caelestium eventilare tractatus et ingentem circa istam speciem\(^1\) Christi divinitatis, ut ita dixerim, silvam commovere; nisi quoniam non tam mihi contra hanc haeresim propositum est dicere, quam breviter\(^2\) circa personam Christi regulam veritatis aperire. quamvis tamen ad alia festinem, illud non arbitrur praetermittendum, quod in evangelio dominus ad significantiam suae maiestatatis expressit dicendo: *solvite templum hoc, et ego in triduo suscitabo illum*\(^3\): aut quando alio in loco et alia parte pronuntiat: *potestatem habeo animam meam ponendi et rursus recipere eam, hoc enim mandatum aperci a patre*\(^4\).

\(^1\) *istam speciem*—species meaning case or question is so employed in Tertullian: *Apol.* 1: "si ad hanc solam speciem auctoritas vestra de iustitiae diligentia in publico...";

*De Caec.* 1; *De Idol.* 15; *Ad Nat.* 1:18; *Pud.* 7, 20 (case of discipline); *De Paen.* 1; also in Cyprian, *Ep.* 18, etc.—all of which may have been influenced by the earlier usage of the word by Pliny I (See A. Blaise, *Dictn. Lat.* Fr. des Auteurs Gré., p. 768).

\(^2\) *quam breviter...aperire*—He uses this and similar expressions often: *Tr.* xxvii.162—dictasse, paucis de multis;

*Pud.* 2—nisi quod breviter; Compare also Cyprian, *Ep.* 55, 30—paucis de multis...breviter enumerat. Tertullian often says this:

*Exx.* 11—his itaque paucis tamen manifeste distinctio trinitatis exponeitur... Perhaps these expressions (as to their thought, if
not their language) were influenced by the writer to the Hebrews-11:32—"And what more shall I say? For time would fail me to tell of Gideon..."

{3Jn.2:19} {4Jn.10:18}
XXI.121. And indeed I could go through all the heavenly Scriptures gathering proofs concerning this question of the divinity of Christ to set out, as it were, a great forest; but I have not so much undertaken to speak against this particular heresy\(^{(1)}\), as to explain the rule of truth concerning the person of Christ\(^{(2)}\). However, though I must hasten on\(^{(3)}\) to other matters, I do not think I ought to pass by this point that Christ made in the Gospel to signify His majesty: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will build it up again"; or again in another place and on another subject, He declares: "I have power to lay down my life, and to take it up again; this command have I received of the Father."

\(^{(1)}\)"This particular heresy"—is apparently that of the Artemonites.

\(^{(2)}\)Again we see (as in XX.117–note (1))—the epistemological methodology of Novatian. The best way to refute error is to turn the heretics' attention to the truth in its wholeness and objectivity. The truth then through its own objective power can "shatter" error (XX.117).

\(^{(3)}\)"I must hasten on"—see note 1, XXI.121.
XXI.122. Quis est enim, qui dicit animam suam se posse ponere aut animam suam posse se rursum recuperare, quia hoc mandatum acceperit a patre, aut quis dicit destructum corporis sui templum resuscitare rursum et reaedificare se posse, nisi quoniam sermo ille, qui ex patre, qui apud patrem, per quem facta sunt omnia et sine quo factum est nihil, imitator paternorum operum atque virtutum, image invisibilis dei, qui descendit de caelo, qui, quae vidit et audivit, testificatus est, qui non venit, ut faceret suam voluntatem, sed potius, ut faciat patris voluntatem, a quo misus ad hoc ipsum fuerat, ut magni consilii angelus factus arcanorum caelestium nobis, iura reseraret, quique verbum caro factus habitavit in nobis, ex nobis hic Christus non homo tantum, quia hominis filius, sed etiam deus, quia dei filius, comprobetur.

1 Jn. 1:1-3  2 cf. Jn. 5:19  3 Col. 1:15
4 Jn. 3:31; 6:38  5 Jn. 3:32  6 Jn. 6:38
7 Isa. 9:6  8 Jn. 1:14
9 iura reseraret-In Cib. 5, he uses this verb (also in connection with the idea of law - probably coming from his Stoic background): "Christus supervenit, cuncta legis reserans..."
Now who is it who says that He has power to lay down His life, or that He can take it up again, because He has received this command of the Father? Or who says that when the temple of His body has been destroyed, He can revive it again and rebuild it? It is none other than that Word, who is "of the Father," who is "with the Father," "through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made," the imitator of His Father's works and powers\(^{(1)}\), "the image of the invisible God," who "came down from heaven," who "testifies what he hath seen and heard," who "came not to do his own will," but rather "to do the will of the Father," by whom He had been sent for this very purpose, that He, being made "the angel of great counsel," might reveal to us the laws of the heavenly secrets, and Who as "the Word made flesh, dwelt among us." This Christ who is of us, is proved to be not man only, but also God, because Son of God.

\(^{(1)}\) One will and action between the Father and Son—this is certainly a seed of what later developed into the Cappodocian explanation of the unity of the Divine Monarchy (i.e. residing in one will and one energy and operation as well as one  \(\phi\)\(\delta\)\(\eta\)). Concerning the one will, see Clemt. Alx., Strm. V.1; VI.3; Athanasius, G. Ar. III.66; Basil, De Sp. Ec. XXI; Greg. Nyssa, G. Eun. II.216: on one energy—Athanasius, Ad Serp. I.19; XXXI In. it.; Basil, G. Eun. III.4; on one operation—Greg.
Nyssa, Comm. Not., Migne 45.180c; non tres dei, Migne 125, C.D.; and Greg. Nazn. on all three unities in Or. XXXI.16 (See further Prestige, op.cit., ch.xii, pp.242sq.).
XXI.123. Quodsi et primogenitus omnis creaturarum \textsuperscript{1} ab apostolo dictus sit Christus, quomodo omnis creaturarum primogenitus esse potuit, nisi quoniam secundum divinitatem ante omnem creaturam ex patre deo sermo processit? quod nisi ita haeretici acceperint, Christum hominem primogenitum omnis creaturarum monstrare cogentur, quod facere non poterunt. aut igitur ante omnem est creaturam, ut primogenitus sit omnis creaturarum, et non homo est tantum, quia homo post omnem creaturam est, aut homo tantum est, et est post omnem creaturam, et quomodo primogenitus est omnis creaturarum, nisi quoniam divinum verbum illud, quod est ante omnem creaturam et ideo primogenitus omnis creaturarum, caro fit et habitat in nobis, hoc est, assumit hunc hominem, qui est post omnem creaturam, et sic cum illo et in illo habitat in nobis, ut neque homo Christo subtrahatur, neque divinitas negetur, nam si tantummodo ante omnem creaturam est, homo in illo subtractus est. si autem tantummodo homo est, divinitas, quae ante omnem creaturam est, intercepta est, utrumque ergo in Christo confederatum est, et utrumque coniunctum est, et utrumque conexum est, et merito, dum est in illo aliquid, quod superat creaturam, pigneratora in illo divinitatis et humilitatis videtur esse concordia, propter quam causam, qui mediator dei et hominum effectus exprimitur, in se deum et hominem sociasse \textsuperscript{2} reperitur.

\textsuperscript{1}Col.1:15
Novatian has frequent recourse to this verb, especially to explain the unity of the two natures in Christ. See Tr. XXIII—si humanam illi potestatem sociassent; XXIV—connexione sua et permixtione sociata; Ibid. illum filium sibi dei sociavit; similarly in XXV and XXIX. Compare his use of this verb in Ep. xxx.1; xxxvi.1; Spe. 14.5—Preces ad dominum et vota sociamus.
XXI.123. And if Christ is called by the Apostle "the first-born of every creature," how could He be the first-born of every creature, unless according to His divinity He came forth from God the Father, as the Word, before every creature? Unless the heretics accept this interpretation, they will be constrained to show that Christ is the first-born of every creature as man; and this they cannot do. Either therefore, He is before every creature, so as to be the first-born of every creature, and then is not man only, for man is after every creature; or else He is man only, and is therefore after every creature. And how is He the first-born of every creature, if not by virtue of His being the Word, who is before every creature? Therefore the first-born of every creature is made flesh and dwells among us, that is He assumes man's nature, which is after every creature, and so with it and in it dwells among us, so that neither is the humanity withdrawn from Christ, nor is His divinity denied. If He is before every creature only, His manhood is taken away; and if He is man only, His divinity, which is before every creature is denied. Both of these then are bound together in Christ; both are joined, both are linked into one; consequently since there is something in Him which is superior to every creature, this is then a pledge of the harmony between the Divinity and humanity in Him. This is why He is expressly declared to have been made "the Mediator between God and man", in that He has allied in Himself God and man.
(1) His procession from God as the Word—cfr. Tertullian, Prx. 7: "Tunc etiam ipse sermo speciem et ornatum suum sumit... cum dicit deus: fiat lux. Haece est nativitas perfecta sermonis, dum ex deo procedit;" and Prx. 8: "Sermo ergo et in patre semper... protulit deus sermonem... sicut radix fruticem et fons fluvium et sol radium." As we have seen, Novatian unlike Tertullian does not distinguish two states in Christ as Word (i.e. immanent and uttered). Therefore for him, unlike Tertullian, the Word is always in its perfected state, and is identified with the Eternal Son— which means the Father is eternally Father. This rules out the idea that Hippolytus advanced, that while Christ was always perfect Word, He was not always perfect Son.
XXI.124. Ac si idem apostolus de Christo refert, ut exutus carnes potentates dehonestavit, palam triumphatis illis in semetipso, non utique otiosse exutum carnis proposuit, nisi quoniam et in resurrectione rursum indutum voluit intellegi. quis est ergo iste exutus et rursus indutus? requirant haeretici. nos enim sermonem dei ac minus indutum carnis substantiam, eundemque rursum exutum eadem corporis materia, quam rursus in resurrectione suscepit et quasi indumentum resumpsit. sed enim neque exutus neque indutus hominem Christus fuisse, si homo tantum fuisse. nemo enim unquam se ipso aut spoliatur aut induitur. sit enim necessae est aliud, quidquid aliunde aut spoliatur aut induitur. ex quo merito sermo dei fuit, qui exutus est carnes et in resurrectione rursus indutus; exutus autem, quoniam et in nativitate fuerat indutus. itaque in Christo deus est, qui induitur, atque etiam exutus sit oportet, propterea quod is, qui induitur, pariter et exuitur necessae est. induitur autem et exuitur hominé quasi quadam contexti corporis tunica. ac propterea consequenter sermo fuit, ut diximus, dei qui modo indutus, modo exutus esse reperitur.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}Col.2:15}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}ac propterea consequenter— another example of asundetos. One would have expected in the place of consequenter the more ordinary (with Novatian) merito.}\]
XXII.124. And then the same Apostle says of Christ, that "having put off the flesh, He spoiled powers, triumphing over them openly in Himself"(1). Certainly he did not use the expression "put off the flesh" without a definite meaning; he wished it to be understood that He put it on again in His resurrection. Who is this then, that puts off, and again puts on, the flesh? Let the heretics search it out. We know that it was the Word of God that put on the substance of the flesh, and that again He put it off, in the same material body, which He took again in His resurrection, and resumed as a garment. Now had Christ been only a man, He would neither have put off, nor put on manhood; for no one is ever spoiled of himself, or clothed with himself. It must necessarily be something else, which is either spoiled or put on. It follows then that it was the Word of God, who put off the flesh, and in His resurrection put it on again; since He had put it on at His birth, He was able to put it off(2). Therefore it is God who in Christ is put on, and it must be also God that was put off, because He who is put on must necessarily be the same as He who is put off. Now He puts on and puts off manhood as though His body were a woven garment(3). Consequently it was the Word of God, as we have said, who is found to have at one time put on, and at another put off, the flesh.

(1)Novatian cites Col.2:15 to refer to the cross itself (even before the resurrection) as a triumph. As we have
discovered, in his thought, the atonement is explained more in terms of the regaining of the Life of God than the cleansing of guilt. Compare *SNC*.x, (where he speaks again of the victory of Christ in putting the devil under His feet) - though it is not entirely clear whether he refers to the death or the resurrection in that place: "*totum triumphaverat mundum. . . . sub pedibus Christi iacentem."

(2) The authority of Christ to "put on" and "put off" must in the thought of Novatian be analogous to the authority that Christ claims in Jn.10, to "lay down" His life, and to "take it up" again.

(3) "As though His body were a woven garment"— compare Hippolytus, *De Antic.*iv; C.*Noet.*xv (on the "vesture"), and C.*Noet.*xvii.
XXI.125. Hoc enim etiam in benedictionibus ante praedixit: 

lavabit stolam suam in vino, et in sanguine uvae amictum suum. 

si stola in Christo caro est, et amictum ipsum corpus est, 
requiratur, quis est ille, cuius corpus amictum verbi fuisse, 
quique sanguine, id est vino, lavit substantiam corporis et 
materiam carnis, abluens ex parte suscepti hominis passione, 
ex quo, sicut quidem lavatur, homo est, quia amictum, 
quit lavatur, caro est, qui autem lavat, verbum dei est, qui, 
ut lavaret amictum amicti susceptor effectus est: merito ex ea 
substantia, quae recepta est, ut lavaretur, homo exprimitur, 
sicut ex verbi auctoritate, qui lavit, deus esse monstretur.

1Gen.49:11
XXI.125. Indeed He foretold this in His blessing: "He shall wash his garment in wine, and his clothes in the blood of the grape"\(^{(1)}\). If this garment is the flesh in Christ, and the clothes are His body, then let us ask: who is this, whose body is His clothes, and His flesh His garments? To us it is evident that the flesh is the garment, and the body the clothes, of the Word, who washed the substance of His body, and the material of His flesh in the blood of the grape; that is in wine, cleansing it - in regard to the human nature that He had taken\(^{(2)}\) - by His passion\(^{(3)}\). It follows that as He is washed, it is as man, because the garment which is washed is flesh; but He who washes it is the Word of God, who in order that He might wash the garment, was made the wearer of the garment. Consequently He is shown to be a man by the substance which was taken that it might be washed, even as He who washed it is shown by the authority of the Word, to be God.

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\(^{(1)}\) Novatian in applying Gen.49:11 to the passion of Christ is following a long Patristic line of exegesis. Clement of Alexandria in Paed.I.6.(145), mentions it, saying that the wine is Christ's blood, though he does not actually refer to His death. Justin refers to it often. He says in I Apol.xxxii, that "the blood of the grape" is predictive of the passion of Christ. In Ibid.liv, he (strangely) gives the verse as the origin of certain heathen myths, due to misinterpretation by
In Dial. lxi, he mentions the verse without explanation. In liv, he connects the blood of the grape to the washing of sins. Again in lxiii, he quotes the verse, and in lxxvi, he says that it means Christ's blood "is from God - not man."

Irenaeus quotes the verse in Adv. Hr. iv.10.2, without comment, and in Demon.57, refers it to the washing of sins. Hippolytus, in Gen.xlix.11 (Vol.I, p.11, Ante-Nic.Chr.Lib.) quotes it, and in De AntiC.xi, specifically identifies the blood of the grape with the blood of Christ. Tertullian says that the "garments" mean the flesh of Christ, and the "wine" His blood - Adv.Mrc.iv. xl. Cyprian applies the verse to Christ in Ep.lxiii.6.

(2) The human nature that He had taken- compare Tert. Adv.Frz.27: "adeo salva est utriusque proprietas substantiae, ut et spiritus res suas egerit in illo, id est virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa sit." From this passage, and from passages in Tr.XXIV and XXV, some have held that Novatian had pre-Apollinarian ideas (i.e. denying the real integrity of the humanity of Christ - particularly His rational, intellectual soul), e.g. Ammundsen, op.cit., p.37. If one takes Novatian in his historical context, this interpretation will not hold. Before the time of Apollinarius (c.310-390) the question of the rational soul of Christ was not discussed in any detail. One believes it was implicit in the Fathers' theology, because it was so rapidly made explicit when its integrity was attacked in the fourth century. The Ante-Nicene Fathers however had not yet developed a precise, theological vocabulary
to express the mystery of the person of Christ. Novatian for example often uses *caro* (as here) to indicate the humanity of Christ, but this cannot be taken to mean that thereby denies the soul of Christ. "Flesh" as d'Ales says, can be used by metonymy for both. "L'âme humaine du Christ demeure ici simplement hors de cause, aussi n'obtient-elle aucune mention. Mais son existence n'est pas, pour autant méconnue. On peut trouver que l'auteur s'exprime avec peu de précautions, quand il désigne l'humanité du Christ par le mot *caro* et paraît l'opposer à l'humanité commune, qui est *caro et anima*-soit. Mais en désignant l'humanité du Christ par le mot *caro*, il ne fait que reproduire la métonymie de l'Apostre Saint Jean (I.14); et en désignant l'humanité commune comme *caro et anima*, il a regard seulement à la différence qui la sépare du Christ, lequel est *caro et deus*. Il serait bien étrange qu'un auteur si attentif à trancher la distinction des deux natures ait réalisé l'étrange fusion que réaliseraient les hérétiques du ivⁿ siècle, en faisant pour ainsi dire entrer la divinité en composition de l'humanité du Christ" (d'Ales, Novatien, p.108).

(3) This is the only place where Novatian mentions the saving significance of the passion of Christ, as Weyer (op.cit., p.147, note 87) and Vogt (op.cit., p.64) both point out. Novatian mentions the word "redemption" in only one place - Pud.2: "praestetur etiam propter redemptionem, ut corrupi non possit, quae a Christo consecrata." As we have seen before, Novatian has the Greek ontological understanding of salvation in
Christ as being a winning back of life. He has little to say about salvation as man's objective cleansing in Christ from moral guilt.
XXII.126. Cur autem, licet ad aliam partem disputandi festinare videamur, illum praetereamus apud apostolum locum: qui cum in forma dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est aequalem se deo esse, sed aequalitatem exinanivit, formam servi accipiens, in simulitudine hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo: humiliavit se, oboedientia factus usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis: propterea et deus illum super exaltavit et dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur caelestium, terrestrium et infernorum, et omnia lingua confiteatur, quoniam dominus Iesus in gloria est dei patris.

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¹Phil.2:6-11
XXII. 126. Although we must hasten on to another part of the argument, still we must not pass by that passage of the apostle: "Who though He was in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a slave, being made in the likeness of man, and found in fashion as a man: He humbled Himself, being made obedient even unto death; even to the death of the cross; wherefore, also God hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name: that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus is Lord to the glory of God the Father."
XXII.127. **Qui cum in forma dei esset**, inquit. *si homo tantummodo Christus, in imagine dei, non in forma dei relatus fuisse. hominem enim scimus ad imaginem, non ad formam dei factum. quis ergo est iste, qui in forma dei, ut diximus, factus est? angelus? sed nec in angelis formam dei legimus. nisi quoniam hic praecipuus atque generosus prae omnibus dei filius, verbum dei, imitator omnium paternorum operum, dum et ipse operatur sicut et pater eius¹, in forma, ut expressimus, est dei patris. et merito in forma pronuntiatus est dei, dum et ipse super omnia et omnis creaturae divinam obtinens potestatem et deus est exemplo patris-hoc ipsum tamen a patre proprio consecutus, ut omnium et deus esset et dominus esset-et deus ad formam dei patris ex ipso genitus atque prolatus.

¹Jn.5:19
XXII.127. "Who though He was in the form of God," he says. If Christ were man only, He would have been described as "in the form of God;" for we know that man was made in the image, not in the form of God. Who then is this, who, as we have said, was made "in the form of God?" An angel? But we do not read of the form of God being in angels; except it be in this one who is pre-eminent and noble above all, the Son of God, the Word of God, who is the imitator of the very works of the Father, in that He Himself works even as the Father works. It is He, as we have stated, who is in the form of God the Father. He has been rightly declared to be in the form of God, since He Himself is above all, and holds divine authority over every creature, and is God after the pattern of the Father. Yet He obtained this from His own true Father, that He might be both God and Lord of all, and God according to the form of God the Father, begotten and brought forth from Him.

(1) See note (2) under I.5.

(2) Phil.2:6-11 and especially "the form of God" is referred to by other fathers, though never in great detail. Irenaeus quotes various parts of the passage, but never expounds it (or the parts). In the Treatise against the Jews (which some have ascribed to Hippolytus - though this seems very doubtful), in c.4, the author speaks of Christ's suffering and praying as being "economical" (while He was still ontologically God): "But as I have already said, it was the "form of the
servant" that spoke and suffered these things." Tertullian quotes Phil.2:6 in Adv.Mrc.V.20, and De Re.Crn.VI. In Prx.VII, he uses it to (1) distinguish the Son from the Father, and (2) to show that Christ is substantial and not empty (i.e. has a true "form").
XXII.123. Hic ergo, quamvis esset in forma dei, non est rapinam arbitratus aequalem se deo esse. quamvis enim se ex deo patre deum esse meminisset, numquam se deo patri aut comparavit aut contulit, memor se esse ex suo patre et hoc ipsum, quod est, habere se, quia pater dedisset. inde denique et ante carnis assumptionem, sed et post assumptionem corporis, post ipsam praeterea resurrectionem, omnem patri in omnibus rebus oboedentiam praestitit pariter ac praestat. ex quo probatur numquam arbitratum illum esse rapinam quandam divinitatem, ut aequaret se patri deo; quin immo contra, omni ipsius imperio et voluntati oboedientes atque subjectus, etiam ut formam servi suscipserat, contentus fuit, hoc est hominem illum fieri et substantiam carnis et corporis, quam et paternorurn et secundum hominem delictorum servitute venientem nascendo susceptit.
XXII.128. He then, "although He was in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God." For although He remembered that He was God, of God the Father, He never either compared or ranked Himself with God the Father, mindful that He was of His Father, and that He holds the place He does, because the Father had given it to Him. Hence both before and after He had taken on flesh, and again after His resurrection He rendered, and does render, all obedience in all things to the Father. This proves that He never thought of His divinity as a kind of robbery(1) in which He would make Himself equal to God the Father; but on the contrary, He was obedient and subject to all His rule and will; being content even to take upon Himself the form of a servant - that is to be made this particular man with His substance of flesh(2) and body, which He took upon Himself at His birth, which came to Him from the bondage of the sins of His forefathers, according to His manhood.

(1) This is perhaps the most strongly subordinationist passage in Novatian's writings. Taken in the context of his view of the "mission" of Christ being related to His eternal begottenness as Son in the Godhead (see note under XII.65), the phrase "Before...He had taken on flesh...He rendered obedience" may not in effect differentiate between the essential nature of Son and Father so strongly as it seems. But this does not remove the fact that there is an element of subordinationism in this interpretation of Phil.2. It would appear to us that
Novatian has in fact missed the point that the text is making: that is, that Christ did not have to deal with equality with God as a

(2) (rapinam) precisely because He already had it, and therefore did not need (on either interpretation of ἀρχηγός ) either (1) to snatch at it; or (2) to hold on to it (i.e. the manifest glory that He economically hid in the Incarnation).

Novatian however in XXII.129, does show some understanding of this second point: "...concedescending for awhile to take upon Himself humanity, and not exercising His own true powers."
XXII.129. Quo tempore se etiam exinanivit, dum humanam
condicionis fragilitatem suscipere non recusavit. quoniam si
homo tantummodo natus fuisset, per hoc exinanitus non esset.
homo enim nascens augetur, non exinanitur. nam dum incipit
esse, quod, cum non esset, habere non potuit, ut diximus, non
exinanitur, sed potius augetur atque dicatur. ac si Christus
exinanitur in eo, quod nascitur, formam servi accipiendo,
quomodo homo tantummodo est, de quo verius dictum fuisset,
locupletatum illum esse tunc, cum nasceretur, non exinanitum?
nisi quoniam auctoritas divini verbi, ad suscipientum hominem
interim conquiescens nec se suis viribus exercens, deicit se ad
tempus atque deponit, dum hominem fert, quem suscepit. exinanit
se, dum ad injurias contumeliasque descendit, dum audit infanda,
experitur indigna.
XXII.129. It was then that He emptied Himself, not refusing to take upon Himself the frailty of the human condition. For if He had been born as man only, this would not have been an emptying. A man is made greater, not emptied through birth. He begins to be something which he could not have possessed when he did not exist, so that he is not emptied, as we have said, but is rather increased and enriched. But if Christ is emptied in being born, in taking upon Himself the form of a servant, how is He man only? If that were so, it would be truer to say that He was enriched, not emptied at the time of His birth. But in reality the authority of the divine Word, condescending for awhile to take upon Himself humanity, and not exercising His own true powers, casts Himself down and deposes Himself while He bears the humanity that He has taken upon Himself. (1) He empties Himself so long as He stoops to bear insults and reproaches, listens to abominations, and submits to indignities.

(1) "deposes Himself while He bears humanity..."

(interim conquisescens)...This may be a reflection of what Irenaeus said earlier concerning Christ in His divinitate quiescente. The underlying idea is that the divinity of Christ was as it were "in repose" during His temptation in the wilderness, in the Garden, and on the cross, etc.; when he refrained from calling in divine power to deliver Himself from what He had come to endure on our behalf. Thus the basic
thought would be closer to "reposing" Himself, rather than actually "deposing" Himself.
XXII.130. Cuius tamen humilitatis adest statim egregius fructus. acceptit enim nomen, quod est super omne nomen, quod utique non alium intelligimus esse quam nomen dei. nam cum dei sit solius esse super omnia, consequens est, ut nomen illud sit super omnia, quod est eius, qui super omnia est, dei: est ergo nomen illud, quod super omne nomen est, quod nomen est eius utique consequenter, qui, cum in forma dei fuisse, non rapinam arbitratus est aequali sec deo esse. Neque enim, si non et deus esset Christus, omne se in nomine eius genu flecteret cælestium et terrestrium et infernorum, nec visibilia aut invisibilia aut rerum omnium omnis creatura homini esset subiecta sive substrata, quae se ante hominem esse meminisset.
XXII.130. Yet His humility immediately bears noble fruit; for He has received "a name which is above every name," which assuredly we understand to be none other than the name of God. For since it belongs to God alone to be above all things, it follows that that name, which is above every name, is His only, who is above all things. For the name which is above every name is that of God. This name must consequently belong to Him, who although He was in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God. Now if Christ were not God, neither every knee of things in heaven and things on earth, and things under the earth, would bow at His name; nor would things visible and invisible, and the whole creation be in subjection or placed under man. For they would remember that they existed before man.
XXII. 131. Ex quo et dum in forma dei esse Christus dicitur, et
dum in nativitatem secundum carnem sese exinanisse monstratur,
et dum id accepisse nomen a patre, quod sit super omne nomen,
expressur, et dum in nomine eius omne genu cælestium,
terrenorum et infernorum se flectere et curvare monstratur, et
hoc ipsum in gloriam dei patris succurrere assertur,
consequentem non ex illo tantum homo est, quia *obediens patri
factus est usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis*, sed ex his
etiam rebus superioribus divinitatem Christi sonantibus dominus
Christus Iesus et deus, quod haeretici nolunt, esse monstratur.
XXII.131. Thus Christ is said to be in the form of God. He is shown to have emptied Himself in being born according to the flesh. He is declared to have received from the Father a name which is above every name; it is shown that every knee of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth bend themselves and bow down; and it is asserted that this very thing adds to the glory of God the Father. Therefore it follows that He is not man only, since He was made obedient to the Father even to death, the death of the cross; and indeed all of these considerations above shout aloud the divinity of Christ; the Lord Jesus Christ is proved to be God, which the heretics do not wish to accept.
XXIII.132. Hoc in loco licebit mihi argumenta etiam ex aliorum
haereticorum parte conquirere. *firmum* est genus *probationis*,
quod etiam ab adversario sumitur, ut veritas etiam ab ipsis
inimicis veritatis probetur. nam usque adeo hunc manifestum
est in scripturis et deum tradi, ut plerique haereticorum,
divinitatis ipsius magnitudine et veritate commoti, ultra modum
extendentes honores eius, ausi sint non filium, sed ipsum deum
patrem promere vel putare. quod etsi contra scripturarum
veritatem est, tamen divinitatis Christi argumentum grande
atque praecipuum est, qui usque adeo deus—sed qua filius dei,
natus ex deo—ut plerique illum, ut diximus, haeretici ita deum
acceperint, ut non filium, sed patrem pronuntiandum putarent.
aestiment ergo, an hic sit deus, cuius auctoritas tantum movit
quosdam, ut putarent illum, ut diximus superius, iam ipsum
patrem deum, effrenatus et effusius in Christo divinitatem
confitentes, ad hoc illos manifesta Christi divinitate cogente,
ut quem filium legerent, quia deum animadvertent, patrem
putarent.

manifestum—This expression is used by Tertullian,
Prx.xiii—*plenius manifestatus*—where he refers it to the Father
being revealed in Christ; whereas Novatian refers it to Christ
being revealed in the Scriptures.
At this point allow me to draw some arguments from the position occupied by other heretics. It is a very solid proof which is gathered from an adversary, so that the truth is confirmed by the very enemies of the truth. It is so clear that He is represented in the Scriptures to be God, that a large number of heretics moved by the magnitude and truth of His divinity, have actually gone above measure in extending honours to Him, and so have dared to claim or at least to think that He is God the Father Himself. And although this is contrary to the truth of the Scriptures, it is still a great and extremely effective argument for the divinity of Christ. He is God to such a definite extent — although He is God as the Son of God, born of God — that many of the heretics, as we have said, have accepted that He is to be called God to the point of being not the Son, but even the Father. Let them therefore consider whether or not He is God; He whose authority has so moved some of them, that, as we have said, they have confessed the divinity of Christ so impetuously and profusely as to claim that He is God the Father Himself; compelled to do so by the manifest divinity of Christ; so that though they read of Him as the Son, because of His Godhood they have esteemed Him to be the Father.

(1) The "large number of heretics" are in the opinion of d'Alès (Novt., p.101) the followers of Artemon, "dont les idées allaient être reprises en orient par Paul de Samosate (le
rapprochement entre Artemas et Paul de Samosate est indiqué dans la lettre synodale des Pères qui condamnerent Paul à Antioche, et qui l'invitent ironiquement à rechercher la communion d'Artemas—Eusèb., H.E.vii.xxx)." We might add that even closer at hand than this was the same general heresy (i.e. modalistic monarchianism or patripassianism), held by the opponent of Tertullian—Praxeas, and the earlier Noetus of Smyrna, refuted by Hippolytus—as well as the later, more refined teaching of Sabellius. The "other heretics" are the Gnostic Docetists such as Marcion.
XXIII. 133. Alli quoque haeretici usque adeo Christi manifestam amplexati sunt divinitatem, ut dixerint illum fuisse sine carne, et totum illi susceptum detraxerint hominem, ne decoquerent in illo divini nominis potestatem, si humanam illi sociasset, ut arbitrabantur, nativitatem. quod tamen nos non probamus, sed argumentum afferimus usque adeo Christum esse deum, ut quidam illum subtracto nomine tantummodo putarint deum, quidam autem ipsum crediderint patrem deum, cum ratio et temperamentum scripturarum caelestium Christum ostendant deum, sed qua filium dei, et assumpto a deo etiam filio hominis credendum et hominem.
Moreover, other heretics have so far embraced the manifest divinity of Christ, as to say that He was without flesh, and to withdraw from Him the humanity which He took upon Himself, lest by associating with Him a human birth as they look at it, they should empty Him of the power of the divine Name. While we do not agree with this idea, yet we bring it forward as an argument, that Christ is God to the extent that some withdraw His humanity from Him, and so consider Him to be God only: and still others have thought Him to be God the Father Himself. The heavenly Scriptures however with rectitude and proportion show Christ to be God, but as the Son of God, and also that He must be believed to be man also, in that the Son of man has been taken up by God.
XXIII.134. Quoniam si ad hominem veniebat, ut mediator dei et hominum esse deberet, oportuit illum cum eo esse et verbum carnis fieri, ut in semetipsa concordiam confibularet terrenorum pariter atque caelestium, dum utriusque partis in se conectens pignora et deum homini et hominem deo copularet, ut merito filius dei per assumptionem carnis filius hominis, et filius hominis per receptionem dei verbi filius dei effici possit. hoc altissimum atque reconditum sacramentum, ad salutem generis humani ante saecula destinatum in domino Iesu Christo deo et homine inventur impleri, quo condicio generis humani ad fructum aeternae salutis posset adduci.

1 I Tim.2:15
2 Note his continued frequent use of the passive.
3 concordiam confibularet- This somewhat unusual expression is found elsewhere in Novatian: Tr.xiv.140-"in eadem utriusque substantiae concordia mutui ad invicem foederis confubulatione sociatum." Gfr. Gib.5- "fibula caritatis membris mutuis innexum"; Pud.5- "caput enim convenit membris et membra capiti suo, utraque naturali fibula in concordia mutua cohaerent."
XXIII.134. Now if He entered into humanity in order that He might be the Mediator between God and man, it was necessary for Him to be with man, and for the Word to be made flesh, so that He might forge together in Himself the harmony between things earthly and things heavenly; joining in Himself the pledges appropriate to both sides, and so connecting God to man, and man to God, in order that consequently the Son of God might be made the Son of Man through the assumption of the flesh, and the Son of Man be made the Son of God through the reception of the Word of God\(^1\). This most profound and hidden mystery, destined before the world for the salvation of the human race, is found to be fulfilled in the Lord Jesus Christ, both God and man, that the frail estate of human nature might be brought to the enjoyment of eternal salvation.

\(^1\)"The Son of Man be made the Son of God" - compare Hippolytus, Philos. X.34 – γέγονας γὰρ θεός...καταλαμβάνεις, ὁ άνθρωπος, γεννηθεὶς.
XXIV.135. Sed erroris istius haereticorum inde, ut opinor, nata materia est, quia inter filium dei et filium hominis nihil arbitrantur interesse, nea facta distinctione et homo et deus Iesus Christus facile comprobetur. eundem enim atque ipsum, id est hominem filium hominis, etiam filium dei volunt videri, ut homo et caro et fragilis illa substantia eadem atque ipsa filius dei esse dicatur, ex quo, dum distinctio filii hominis et filii dei nulla secernitur, sed ipse filius hominis dei filius vindicatur, homo tantummodo Christus idem atque filius dei asseratur. per quod nituntur excludere: verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis1, et: vocabitis nomen eius Emmanuel2, quod est interpretatum: nobiscum deus3.

1Jn.1:14  2Isa.7:14  3Mt.1:23
XXIV.135. Now the source from which has arisen this error of
the heretics is, I think, from this: that they judge that
there is no distinction between the Son of God and the Son of
Man, because if such a distinction were made, Jesus Christ
would easily be proved to be both man and God. But as they
will have it, He - the Son of Man and also the Son of God - is
one and the same, so that the man and flesh and frail substance
is said to be the same as the Son of God Himself. Hence since
no distinction is drawn between the Son of Man and the Son of
God, but the Son of Man Himself is asserted to be the Son of
God, they can then assert that Christ, as man only, is the same
as the Son of God(1). By this assertion they attempt to
exclude these words: "The word was made flesh, and dwelt among
us"; and "Thou shalt call His name Emmanuel, which is
interpreted, God with us."

(1)"Since no distinction is drawn between the Son of
Man and Son of God" - This passage sounds to some extent like
the later Nestorian teaching that separated the divinity and
humanity in Christ into two divided persons. This is surely
not the intention of Novatian. Here he is combatting "human-
ists", and is attempting to show that Christ was and remained
Son of God, even while Son of Man.
The question is: does Novatian make the two natures of Christ into two persons? This cannot be the case, for he teaches that in the Incarnation the Son of God became the true Son of Man (clearly implying one acting person). Furthermore he goes on in his exegesis of Luke 1:35 to uphold the unity of Christ's person (See the whole of XXIV.140). There is never in Novatian a division between a human Jesus and a divine Christ (as the heretics held, who were refuted by Tertullian, Prx.27, and Hippolytus, Philos. vii.35,36).