MARCUS JUNIUS BRUTUS

HIS

LIFE, TIMES and WRITINGS

by

David Dickson
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Chapter I.

Birth, Education and Youth.  85 B.C. - 60 B.C.

That there are large gaps in our knowledge of the early life of Marcus Junius Brutus and several problems connected with it, which admit of no completely satisfactory solution, is not surprising, when we recall that the same is true of nearly all the most prominent men in Roman History. The first of these problems is the year of his birth. From ancient sources we know that he was born either in 85 B.C. or in 78 B.C., but despite the efforts of several scholars, no incontestable proof has yet been advanced in favour of either of these years. I have discussed the problem at considerable length in Part II. Note 2., where it will be seen that the balance of probability definitely favours the earlier date. For a fair and proper study of his life, however, and for a just estimate of his conduct and character, the date of his birth is not of the first importance. This account of his life is based on the assumption that he was born in 85 B.C., but none of the conclusions, that are drawn in it regarding his private life and his contributions to his country's history, will be invalidated if, as is most unlikely unless with the help of new evidence from inscriptions, it is ever proved that he was born in 78 B.C. His birth occurred towards the end of the year, probably in the first days of October. (1.

The second problem is the very vexed question of whether Brutus was an illegitimate son of Julius Caesar, born of his adulterous connection with Brutus' mother, Servilia. The story cannot stand careful examination and it is time that scholars relegated it to the place it deserves, among the quite unfounded bits of scandalous gossip, which always cling to the names of great men. If Brutus were born in 85 B.C., as I believe, the story is at once disproved; for then Caesar was only 15 or 16 years of age. And even those, who date Brutus' birth in 78 B.C., have no real grounds for thinking that Caesar was his father. So far as we know that

(1. See Special Note 1. pp. 236f.
was never even suggested during the lifetime of the parties concerned; Cicero, than whom, no ancient writer was fonder of gossip concerning those in high places, never mentions it at all, though he refers more than once to the love-affair between Caesar and Servilia, nor is the story found in Nicolaus or Valerius Maximus or Velleius Paterculus, who are our sources nearest in time to Brutus and Caesar. The story did not become current until about a century after their death and even the later historians, who mention or suggest it, take care to indicate that they do not personally vouch for its truth. Plutarch, for instance, says ... it was believed that as B. was born when the affair (between Caesar and Servilia) was at its height he was really Caesar's son"; and Appian (obviously from a similar source), "It was even thought that Brutus was his son, as Caesar was Servilia's lover at the time of his birth". Apart from these more definite allusions, the scandal is suggested by Dio and Suetonius in their accounts of Caesar's last words on the Ides of March. There was a popular version that as Brutus approached him to contribute his share to the murder, Caesar addressed him in Greek "Thou, too, my son!", but both Dio and Suetonius explicitly state that this is not true, and that Caesar died without uttering a word. It will be seen, therefore, that the evidence for the story is of the very flimsiest. It did not arise until many years after the death of Brutus and Caesar, when they had become, thanks to the deification of Caesar, almost legendary figures. A plausible basis was found for it in the undeniable fact the Servilia had been a mistress of Caesar and it became very popular because "both the friends and enemies of Brutus were interested in spreading this rumour; the friends as thereby exalting the patriotism of their hero, who sacrificed natural affection for his country; and his enemies as deepening the guilt of one who added parricide to ingratitude." Both Plutarch and Appian point — though apparently unconsciously — to the weakness in the scandal's verisimilitude. They suggest that the affair of
of Caesar and Servilia was going on when Servilia's son was born, but even their own evidence makes it morally certain that it was not. For Plutarch gives a story of a love letter sent by Servilia to Caesar in 63 B.C.: Suetonius tells us that Caesar gave his mistress a present of a most expensive pearl in 59 B.C.; and Cicero's allusion to the affair is also in 59 B.C. These references date the affair in the period 63-59 B.C.; it is natural to imagine that it terminated or at least lost its real fervour with Caesar's departure to Gaul in 58 B.C.; but it is quite incredible that it had been going on unabated since 78 B.C.\footnote{Brut. 5, 3-3: Cat. min. 34, 1-2. \footnote{Jul. 50.} \footnote{Att. II, 34, 3.}}

Brutus' real father, M. Junius Brutus, must have been about 30 years of age when his son was born, for two years later, in 83 B.C., he became tribune of the plebs. The little we know of him can only cause surprise at the differences between him and his son. Although Cicero\footnote{G. Walter. Rev. des Quest. Hist. Jan. 1934. pp. 457 and 460 is still of the opinion that the story of Caesar's paternity of Brutus is true. His arguments, however, are worthless and (especially on p. 460) more akin to the worst type of French novel than to historical study.} describes him as "skilled in both private and public law", there is no indication that he possessed much of the scholastic enthusiasm, which characterised his son, and even Cicero's reference to him must not be too readily accepted, since it was addressed to his son. In politics the two were diametrically opposed. While the son regarded the Senate as possessing something like a "Divine Right", the father was a vigorous opponent of its rule. During his tribunate he was an active ally of Carbo and the Marians, and furthered their preparations to oppose Sulla on his return from Asia by proposing the foundation of a colony in Capua, which would serve as a base for the Democratic armies.\footnote{Brutus 82, 222: Cic. de leg. agrar. II, 33, 89.} When Sulla's victory was eventually beyond question, the elder Brutus seems to have submitted quietly to his Dictatorship, but he took a very prominent part in the first of the attacks on the Senate's restored position after Sulla's death in 78 B.C. One of the consuls of that year, Aemilinus Lepidus, began almost at once to gather
forces in Cisalpine Gaul under the pretext that they were intended for his proconsular year in the other Gaul. Brutus was his chief assistant in this recruiting campaign and towards the end of the year, when Lepidus marched against Rome itself, he was left to guard the North with a small force. Lepidus was soon defeated near the capital and Brutus, opposed by the young Pompey, now in receipt of the first of the extraordinary commands bestowed on him by the Senate, met with no more success. He was forced to retire into Mutina, where he withstood a siege for some time. Eventually he was induced by Pompey to surrender on terms, which included a guarantee that his own life would be spared. What actually ensued is not quite clear, but apparently, after letting him go with a small escort, Pompey sent a second force after him and had him put to death. Despite the difference in their political outlooks, the younger Brutus preserved a profound respect for his father and regarded Pompey as his murderer - an attitude which later had considerable influence on his political tendencies. (2)

Brutus' mother, Servilia, was one of the Grandesdames of her time, a forerunner of the series of remarkable women who had such influence in the first century of the Empire. She was the daughter of Livia, the sister of Livius Drusus, the famous tribune of 91 B.C., by her marriage with Q. Servilius Caepio. In another marriage Livia subsequently bore M. Porcius Cato of Utica, who was thus a half-brother of Brutus' mother. She had besides at least one full-brother Q. Servilius Caepio and a younger sister, who married and was divorced by Lucullus the consul of 74 B.C.

Thus, like his father, Brutus' mother was, through her famous uncle, connected with the Democratic party, and, had events followed a normal course, Brutus himself might well have become a member of that party too. Servilla was a woman of considerable charm and intelligence, and very interested in public affairs, where for a time her influence was not negligible. Though her affair with Caesar cannot be disregarded, and cannot, I think, be

(2) - Plut. Brut. 4, 3. (3) - See Special Note 2. p. 351. (4) - Plut. Cat. min. 1, 1: cf Special Note 5. p. 301. (5) - Plut. Lucul. 33, 1.
considered purely platonic, she was not an immoral woman; she does not seem to have had any other lover. Intensely devoted to her children and full of the highest ambitions for them, she will frequently appear in the story of her son's life. Even after Caesar's death, when Brutus had become one of the first men in the state, he still consulted his mother's opinion - a proceeding, which Cicero, who disliked the lady, frowned upon.

On both sides Brutus was descended from ancestors whose names held places of glory in the history of the Republic. An ancestor of his mother was that Servilius Ahala, who in 439 B.C., when master of the horse to the dictator Cincinnatus, slew Spurius Maelius on the suspicion of tyrannical designs. On his father's side Brutus claimed descent from the Lucius Junius Brutus who led the revolt against Tarquinius Superbus and became the first consul of Rome. Although this claim was disputed by Brutus' enemies later, it seems to have been as true as such claims generally are and was certainly widely accepted by his contemporaries. He was intensely proud of his family history, and had in the study of his house a family tree, composed by Atticus, which traced his descent from the two tyrannicides. The influence of that descent upon his attitude towards Caesar's tyranny is too well-known to require comment here.

The other members of his immediate family circle, with whom Brutus all his life preserved a close intimacy, were his sisters Junia and Tertia. I think, contrary to the common belief, that they were his full sisters born in Servilia's first marriage. Junia, the elder, married Lepidus, the son of the man, whose lieutenant her father had been in 78 B.C. Lepidus became triumvir with Antony and Octavian and his conduct in 43 B.C. was the cause of great anxiety to his wife's family. The younger sister married Cassius, Brutus' fellow-conspirator. Both sisters were, like their
mother, the subject, at least once, of scandalous gossip in Rome. Junia attracted the attention of the gossip-mongers, including Cicero and Atticus, when in 50 B.C. her portrait was discovered along with those of several other Roman ladies among the chattels of P. Vedius, a notorious roué, at a time when Junia was already married to Lepidus. Tertia was said to have been induced by her mother to become Caesar's mistress, and the extremely ambitious nature of Servilia's character makes the story not impossible. Despite these scandals, however, Brutus maintained a life long affection for his sisters, as for his mother. Tertia, with her mother was much in the company of her husband and brother in the difficult and trying months of June and July 44 B.C.; and in 43 B.C. when Lepidus was outlawed by the Senate, Brutus showed a deep concern for his wife and her children. It is worthy of notice too that neither Lepidus nor Cassius seems to have borne any grudge against their wives for the early scandals that attached to them, and Lepidus even went surety for his wife, at no small risk to himself, when she was involved in a plot against Octavian after Actium.

When Brutus' father died at Pompey's hands in 73 or early in 77 B.C., his son was a boy of seven, just of an age, when he should normally have passed from his mother's care and come under the supervision of his father. His father's place in that respect was taken by his step-uncle Cato. In what household Servilia found refuge during her widowhood we do not know, but it is probable, considering the intimacy between her son and Cato, that she resided part of the time at least with her half-brother, over whom, as over most men, she had considerable authority. Later when she married a second husband, D. Junius Silanus, we must presume that her children, whom she loved too much to be separated from them, accompanied her to the new household, but his stepfather seems to have had little influence with Brutus, and no matter how the domestic

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1. Cic. Att.i.i, 25  
2. Suet. Jul. 50 s.n.  
3. See p. 131 below.  
4. See p. 190 below.  
5. App. iv. 50. and Vell. II. 88.  
details were arranged it is certain that Cato's was the chief influence on him during his boyhood and youth. One historian calls him "Catonis imitator" and another says that he "admired his uncle most of all the Romans and sought to emulate him."

It was Cato who introduced Brutus into the conduct of public affairs and chiefly influenced his political attitude at that time, while even in 50 B.C. Cicero names Cato as the man to whom Brutus will naturally apply for a verdict on his own conduct. Thus the death of his father brought into Brutus' life an element that cannot be overestimated. Had his father lived, he would almost certainly, considering the affection he seems to have felt for him, have followed him into the fold of the Democratic party, where his mother's chief interests also lay. Cato's influence, exerted upon him in the formative years of his character, effected the exact opposite, and Brutus became, second only to his preceptor, the most stubborn believer in the merits of Senatorial government and the staunchest upholder of the Senate's position. Something in Cato's rugged independence appealed to the boy's instinct for hero-worship, and the reverence he conceived for him and consequently for his political creed, was stabilised in his character by the education he received under Cato's supervision.

That education was both catholic and thorough. Not only did he read widely in all forms of literature but his reading was painstaking and studious. His earliest schoolmaster was the grammaticus, Staberius Eros, who seems to have been a favourite among the noble families of his day. He was moreover a man of some character for during the Sullan proscriptions he had taught the sons of proscribed men free of charge - yet he earned enough to purchase his own manumission. Under what rhetoricians Brutus studied first in Rome we do not know but it is certain that he then

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1. Aur. Vict. de vir. ill. 82,1. 2. Flut. Brut. 2,1. 3. see pp.15ff below. 4. Att. v.21,13 init. and vi,1,7 fin. 5. - Suet. de gram. ill. 13.
laid the foundation of what became life-long studies in three particular fields - Roman History, Rhetoric and Philosophy. Later he followed the normal practice of young Romans of his class by visiting the city of Athens to finish his education. We have no direct evidence as to the date of his residence there, but from the references made to it by ancient authors especially Cicero, it must have been of at least the normal duration of about two years. If that is so it must have occurred before 58 B.C., since after that year we know that he could not have spent as long in Athens. He was twenty years of age in 65 B.C. and it is probable that he went to Athens about that time; if he were abroad in 63 B.C., it would explain the error he made later in describing the important events of that year.

He studied oratory in Athens especially under Pammenes, whom Cicero calls "by far the most eloquent man in Greece", and from him derived an intense admiration for Demosthenes, whose works Pammenes chiefly expounded. But, according to Cicero, Brutus was also well acquainted with the speeches of all the older orators both Greek and Latin. His studies in rhetoric were continued long after his "university days" were ended, and in his household he maintained two professional teachers of the art, Empylus who showed his affection for him by composing a monograph on the conspiracy against Caesar under the title "Brutus", and Strato, who attended him at his death. In philosophy we are told he was thoroughly familiar with the creeds of all the different sects and it is probable that he attended lectures at all the different schools. He became specially attached, however, to the Old Academy, one of the leaders of which Aristus of Ascalon, brother of the more distinguished Antiochus, was a guest with him for some time in Rome. Brutus also heard lectures from Aristus in Athens, presumably in his student days.

(1.- e.g. Brut.93,332 : Orat.30,105. cf. Aur.Vict.82,1. : (2.- see p.267f below. (3.- Brut. 1.c. : (4.- Brut.19,74.33,125 et al. : (5.- Plut. Brut.3,3. (6.- ibid.52,4. : (7.- ibid.2,1. : (8.- ibid.2,2. : (6.- Cic. Acad I, 3, 12. cf. de Fin.v,3,8,
Brutus' scholarship is discussed in another chapter. Here it will be enough to notice the general nature of his studies and the effect they had on his character and outlook. In all branches of literature he became most interested in ancient things. His knowledge of his country's history was outstanding even in a self-proud nation like the Romans and his especial interest seems to have been in the wars with Carthage, wherein Rome's greatness was founded. In philosophy he belonged to the Old Academy; and in oratory he preferred the style of the Old Attic School. This bent in his nature towards the past must be clearly understood. Unlike Cicero, who, when he studied past generations, was seeking from them lessons he could apply to the problems of his own day, Brutus was interested in the past for its own sake. He found there not lessons but ideals, and from his admiration for men of older times, whether Roman statesmen or Greek orators and philosophers, he fell into the unconscious but unfortunately common error of imagining that in their ways lay all the virtues, and that modern failings could only be corrected by a return to their habits and ideals. He became in short a "laudator temporis acti"; and failed, therefore, to appreciate the fact that the mere passing of time brings changes in its train, which can only be properly dealt with by revision and adaptation of old ideals. Thus in philosophy, new teachings on metaphysics meant nothing to him; in oratory he vainly imagined that an audience was still able to appreciate and be moved by the chaste, unemotional elegance of Lysias; more fatally, he still believed that rule by the Senate was the best system of government for Rome and cherished the fond notion—so little did he understand his fellowmen around him—that the Roman aristocracy was still able to produce Senators, who could rule, not a city-state as their forefathers had done, but an empire overseas. I do not mean to imply that Brutus ever asked himself whether the Senate could govern the widely spread dominions that Rome now possessed; he was reared with

\(\text{\footnotesize \text{1. - Chap. XIII p. 245, below. \quad 2. - see p. 247, below.}}\)
the idea of the Senate's authority as a first principle in all politics, and was constitutionally incapable of regarding any other system as anything other than subversion. He was repelled and shocked by modern individualism in politics, in exactly the same way as by the lax doctrines of modern Epicureanism or the pleasant superficialities of modern Asiatic oratory.

As a result of his engrossing interest in his studies, he seems to have lived rather apart from his contemporaries and his early life was in marked contrast with the round of hectic pleasures which filled so many of their days. One scholar has suggested that Brutus was an active member of that group of young bloods led by Calvus, but the evidence for the suggestion is neither considerable nor satisfactory. We do find Brutus' name linked with these of the Calvan brotherhood but never in such a way as to indicate any degree of intimacy with them. Like Calvus, Curio, Dolabella and Bibulus, he did repeat scandals about Caesar's behaviour; but though the occasion and context of the remark are not certain, it was probably made in 52 B.C. when Brutus had already plunged into politics and the story illustrates no more than an opposition to the triumvirs, which is too natural and proper to Brutus to indicate any alliance with the others. Brutus wrote poetry as did so many of Calvus' friends; but that does not prove any great friendship with them.

His name is linked with the notorious actress Cytheris, the mistress of Gallus and Antony; but this breath of scandal comes from a notoriously inaccurate source and has no supporting testimony whatever. Despite the reputation of his mother and sisters, Brutus seems to have had no leanings towards sexual pleasures; Porcia seems to have been the one love of his life and we find that he even admired Licinia, a famous bluestocking, who inherited mental and oratorical qualities from her father Crassus the orator, her grandfather Scaevola, the augur, and her great grandfather, Laelius. Brutus

\(3\). see below pp. 245-46. 
\(4\). Am. Phil. Set. 8, 1. 
\(5\). see below p. 316 and p. 405. 
\(6\). Cic. Brut. 38, 211.
is further linked with his young contemporaries in connection with the Vettian affair, but though that may show an opposition towards Pompey, which was shared by other young men, Brutus had his own reasons for hating the triumvir and Vettius' scare does not prove that he co-operated in any way with Curio and the others, as no plot existed. Lastly the fact that Caesar tried to win him over to his side by offering to accept his services as quaestor, as he tried at different times to win over Antony, Curio, Asinius Pollio and others, shows no more than that Brutus was like the others a promising young man; and that he did not respond to Caesar's invitation separates him at once from those others who did.

He appears in fact to have been rather a lonely young man; whatever friends he did have were certainly not among the group of Calvus, Curio, Caelius and the others - brilliant but gay and irresponsible young men. His nature was in direct antithesis to theirs; for he was neither brilliant nor gay and had even an exaggerated idea of his responsibilities. Boissier has noted as the most surprising thing about Brutus that even in his youth "he inspired respect" among older men. It was his lack of the more common youthful qualities, his seriousness and severity, that won him his early reputation: so that even Cicero, to whom he seemed rather frigid and dull, called him "princeps iuventutis".
Chapter II.

Early Public Experiences. - 59 - 56 B.C.

Brutus' first prominent intrusion into public affairs was not of his own seeking and from it he gained neither satisfaction nor credit. In the late summer of 59 B.C., the year of Caesar's first consulship, the political situation in Rome, which had gradually been growing more and more tense as Caesar became more and more high-handed, was suddenly brought to fever point by the revelation of an alleged plot against the life of Pompey. L. Vettius, a very unsavoury character, who had already made some profit from his profession of spy and informer during the Catilinarian conspiracy in 63 B.C., disclosed to young Scribonius Curio a plot, which he declared to be already well under-way against Pompey. Curio, instead of accepting the invitation to join it, passed the information on to his father, who at once informed Pompey. As a result of Pompey's complaint, Vettius was brought before the Senate and interrogated. In keeping with his character, he at once turned State's Evidence and disclosed publicly to the Senate the details of the plot and the names of the chief conspirators. They were all young members of the noble classes, said to be disgusted with the quasi-tyranny of the triumvirs, and prominent on the list was the name of Brutus. The fantastic story, which contained several inconsistencies, was not generally believed, and the Senate adjourned without taking any action, except to retain Vettius in custody. Next day he was brought before Caesar in the forum, and gave another account of his information. In this second version Brutus' name did not figure among the conspirators; and no one in Rome was ignorant of the reason. Brutus' mother had been for several years the mistress of Caesar, and when she learned of her son's danger, she immediately sought out the consul and persuaded him by a "nocturna deprecatio" to use his influence on her son's behalf.

Caesar had sent orders to Vettius and Brutus' name was erased from the

\[\text{[Cic. Att.II, 24, 2-3.]} \quad \text{[Cic.l.c.3.]}\]
The affair dissolved into a farce, and Vettius was thrown into prison, where conveniently, and probably not naturally, he died.

The real meaning of the whole affair is not clear, but it is at least certain that no plot existed against Pompey. Vettius was simply plying his trade, and whether it was on his own initiative or in someone else's employ, is neither discernible nor for our purposes important. The inclusion, however, of Brutus' name has some significance. Although we cannot infer from it that Brutus was on very friendly terms with the other young nobles mentioned - Curio, Aemilius Paullus, Lentullus, - it does give us some inkling of his political attitude at the time. Vettius, for all his bungling, could not have named Brutus as a conspirator against Pompey, unless there had been some grounds for believing that such a role would have appealed to him. Brutus' opposition to Pompey must have been well known. It was based on private as well as political reasons. Regarding him as the murderer of his father, he refused to recognise him when they met, which, in the comparatively narrow circle of Roman society, must have been fairly often. Politically too he was now in the opposite camp, and, as his other activities at this time show, he was opposed, thanks to Cato's influence, to Caesar as much as to Pompey. With Cato he regarded the triumvirs as the enemies of the Republic, and, though too young to play any important part, he used the little prominence he had to assist the opposition to their plans and purposes. Although the catch-phrase about Brutus and Ahala, which was current at the time, had probably no deliberate reference to the young Brutus, we may imagine that, when he heard it, he felt it to be specially applicable to himself, the descendant of both the heroes who had gained glory for their opposition to tyrants.

Before discussing the extent of Brutus' opposition to the triumvirs and the manner of its expression, we must consider a suggestion that he was in 59 B.C. betrothed to Caesar's daughter.

Several ancient authors tell that before Julia married Pompey in that year she had been engaged to a Servilius Caepio and that that previous betrothal had been abruptly broken off to permit the alliance with Pompey. Caepio was to have been solaced with the hand of Pompey's daughter but she eventually married Faustus Sulla, to whom she was betrothed at the time. By the time of the Vettian plot Brutus had certainly taken the name of Caepio, having been adopted by an uncle; and it is proposed to regard him as the discarded fiancé of Julia. It might be argued that Brutus' opposition to Caesar only began after and as a result of this disappointment, but it is more feasible to regard it as a continuance of the feelings inculcated during his boyhood under Cato's influence. There are other reasons for rejecting the proposed identification, the chief of which are the Brutus was never called Servilius Caepio and that no ancient author, not even Cicero or Plutarch, to whom such a slight against Brutus would have been of some moment, has mentioned it. In 59 or 58 B.C. Brutus took his first step in the 'cursus honorum' by filling one of the minor posts included among the duties of the vigintisextviri. He was one of the three officials - tresviri aere, argento, aureo flando feriendo - responsible for the issue of the ordinary coinage of the year. The office was open apparently to young members of any order in the state and towards the end of the Republican era was generally held a few years before the quaestorship, at the age of 27. Brutus must have been a little younger than the average, for when appointed he would be only 26. Whose colleagues were we cannot say for the only coins extant belonging to that year are those bearing his name. These are of two types. The first has on the obverse a head of Libertas and on the reverse the first consul L. Junius Brutus, walking, preceded by an accensus with a lictor before and behind him; the inscriptions are LIBERTAS and BRUTUS. The

other type bears on the obverse a head of Lucius Brutus and on the other side a head of Servilius Ahala, with the names of the heroes inscribed - BRUTUS and AHALA. It is obvious that with these coins Brutus was celebrating the ancestry of which he was so proud, but more than that is suggested by them. They are part of the propaganda against the triumvirs in the same vein as the catch phrase we have noted above. For that reason Brutus does not follow the usual practice of inscribing his own name, as moneyer, in full - Q. Caepio Brutus, but leaves the more simple and significant "Brutus".

One cannot be blind to the influence of Cato lying behind such boldly expressed antipathy to unconstitutional power and it is therefore not surprising to find him figuring more prominently in Brutus' next public function. In 58 B.C. Clodius, in the course of his plebeian tribunate of that year brought forward a proposal that the kingdom of Cyprus hitherto held rather precariously by a Ptolemy, brother of the Fluteplayer of Egypt, should be taken more formally under the official wing of Rome. The island was to come under Roman provincial administration and the king's vast wealth was to be taken over by the Roman treasury, while the king himself was to receive as compensation the post as high-priest in the temple of Venus at Paphos. The reasons behind this political manoeuvre were varied. The official pretext was the alleged delinquency of king Ptolemy in regard to the pirates, who despite Pompey's campaign of nine years before still infested the East Mediterranean, though in reduced numbers. Clodius asserted that Ptolemy had given them help, but a more probable explanation of Clodius' interest is that Ptolemy had been both backward and niggardly in contributing to the ransom paid for his (Clodius') release from the pirates some time before. Another factor - which certainly guaranteed the bill's popularity, if it did not actually bring it into being - was the welcome addition which the wealth of the Oriental monarch would be to Rome's ever ready treasury.

But behind all these considerations and more important than they lie the fact not of the decision to confiscate but of the man appointed to conduct the confiscation. Already Clodius had shown his ambition to rid himself and the triumvirs of their opponents by his attacks upon Cicero, which had resulted in the orator's departure from Italy. The other thorn in their flesh - Cato - was removed by the more delicate and subtle means of making him the official responsible for the annexation of Cyprus. On the surface this appeared a considerable compliment both to Cato's ability and his honesty, for the appointment was an extraordinary one and one by which an unscrupulous man could very easily enrich himself. Actually Cato had little to gain by it, and his acceptance of it gave his enemies three advantages. Cato was temporarily got rid of; his acceptance of this extraordinary appointment made it impossible for him to raise valid objections to any similar appointments of the future; and it would be unlikely that, after all his work in connection with his task, he would be at all active in any attempt to have Clodius' 'acta' repealed. It is in fact rather surprising that Cato accepted the post at all, and even Cicero appears to have felt that too, when he finds it necessary to defend Cato's acceptance: "Why did Cato obey the law? He is a citizen, he must obey the laws and cannot deprive the state of his services. Had he not obeyed doubtless they would have used violence against him." In keeping with the spirit in which the appointment was made Cato was given practically no assistance. His official appointment was as "quaestor cum iure praetorio" and the only public official nominated to help him was a quaestor. To complicate his task and postpone his return as long as possible a second duty was imposed upon him: There had been trouble at Byzantium in connection with the restoration of exiles and Cato was ordered to settle it.

To compensate for the lack of public assistants, Cato had the help

1. Cic.pro. Sext. 28, 61; 2. Vell.Pat.II.45.4f: "quaestor cum iure praetorio, adjecto etiam quaestore", as emended by Ed.Basil. The older reading "quaestor cum iure praetorio adjecto, etiam quaestor", although bad Latin is more in accord with Plut.Cat.min.34.3, who says the only public assistants supplied were two secretaries, one a thief, the other a creature of Clodius.

of a suite of his own friends and servants, and chief among the former were Canidius, Manutius Rufus and his nephew Brutus. On the way to Cyprus Cato stopped at Rhodes sending the others ahead with Canidius in charge to negotiate with Ptolemy regarding his proposed change of sphere, while he himself waited behind to make arrangements for an attack on the island if that should prove necessary. During this part of the voyage Brutus fell ill and was put ashore in Pamphylia to recuperate, while Canidius proceeded to Cyprus. He arrived there to find that the unhappy Ptolemy had found the easiest way out of his troubles by committing suicide. He had tried to take his treasures with him by scuttling a ship, loaded with them, in the harbour; but he had been unable to achieve such extravagance and returning to his palace had taken poison. When news of this pathetic event reached Cato, he was doubtless greatly relieved, for he could not have been at all well prepared to face resistance. Now that the way in Cyprus was open he characteristically decided to attend personally to the now more difficult task in Byzantium, leaving the straightforward business of converting the Cyprian treasures into money to his assistants. At the same time he had no confidence in Canidius who had in some way inspired doubts as to his honesty; Cato had been willing to entrust him with the preliminary negotiations but when it came to actually handling the treasure, he felt that Canidius required some supervision. He therefore wrote to Brutus and ordered him to proceed at once to Cyprus: the task was not to Brutus' liking. Apart from the embarrassment of taking over from one much his senior in circumstances that cast aspersions on the older man, he was at the time thoroughly engrossed in reading philosophy and felt it incongruous that he should have to lower his thoughts to the mundane process of

1. Plutarch. Cat.min.35,2. : (2. - T.& P. vol.VI.p.cx. have assumed that Brutus was already abroad when Cato left home and think that he had gone to Greece to study and to avoid unpleasantness caused by the Vettian affair. This assumption fails to take into account his office as moneyer, and moreover, Plut.Brut.3, the only passage they cite, says B. was convalescing in Pamphylia not in Greece. If he had gone to Greece to study and had taken ill there, why should he have gone to Pamphylia to convalesce? Plutarch's account is best interpreted by the version given above. cf. also Gelzer P.W.x pp.976f. who gives the same version.

2.- Val.Max.ix,4,3. : (4. - Plut.Brut.3,1.)
He thought, justly enough, that one, who sought the company of Plato and Socrates, should not be compelled to consort with auctioneers and valuators. But Cato's word was law and to Cyprus and its auction sales Brutus had to go.

There has been a tendency, arising from Plutarch's account in his life of Brutus, to exaggerate the importance of Brutus' position in this expedition. He was after all quite young and with no experience in public administration beyond the small office of moneyer. For all the reputation he had gained for honesty and virtue, it is unlikely that Cato would allow him too much control over the difficult task of converting objects of value into ready cash. His very devotion to his studies and the ignorance it left him with of his fellow men would make him an easy victim for the wily men of business who attended these, as all other, auction sales, and Cato was determined that every possible penny should go to the public treasury and as little as possible into private pockets. When he sent Brutus on after Canidius it was probably more with hope that his presence alone would curb any underhand activities of Canidius, than with expectation that he would assume a real control himself. Plutarch is the only ancient author, who even mentions Brutus in connection with Cato's work in Cyprus; Cicero, Livy, Velleius, Florus, Appian and Dio do not even introduce his name; and even Plutarch gives a much less exalted version of Brutus' work in his life of Cato. The passage in the "Brutus" "Nevertheless he exerted himself in this matter too and won praise from Cato; after converting the treasury into money, he brought the greatest part of it to Rome," is considerable watered down by the brief sentence in the "Cato. "He (Cato) sent his nephew Brutus on to Cyprus, because he did not entirely trust Canidius." It is a fair assumption that Cato's original reason for taking his nephew with him was to give him an introduction into the practical elements of public administration, so that he might learn some more worldly lessons than he could find in his Greek philosophers. Cato must have realised

3. Plut. Cat. min. 36, 1.
that Brutus was running the risk of becoming so devoted to study as
to lose touch with ordinary practical affairs and men.

There are signs that Cato's purpose was to some extent
fulfilled; for when Brutus returned to Rome with him in 56 B.C., he
had in the course of his two years in Cyprus learned not a little
about financial matters. Whether he gained anything like the expert
knowledge of accountancy which is attributed to Cato, is more than
doubtful but he did learn the value of money and was not slow to
appreciate the easiest way to earn it - by usury. Although the
pictures drawn by some writers of Brutus as a kind of money lending
vampire are absurdly overdrawn, it cannot be denied that he did form
in Cyprus connections which he later used to his own advantage. It was
Brutus' first real contact with the provincial subjects of Rome and by
that contact was determined for some years to come his attitude towards
provincials.

Brutus was a Roman noble laying claim, and having his claim
admitted, to the oldest and most honourable blood in the Republic.
He had, therefore, by instinct the current attitude of the Roman
aristocracy towards their subjects in the provinces - an attitude
which it is hard to understand in these days of a League of Nations
and Self-Determination, but one which, with very few exceptions, the
Roman noble classes shared to a man. To them the provincials were
definitely an inferior race; defeated in war; lacking the elements
of Roman culture, either rebellious and rude or else wheedling and
effeminate, they seemed to their conquerors to exist to supply Rome
and the Romans with what they could. While the Roman nobles did not
lack the ideal of public service - and none had it more highly de-
veloped than Brutus - the claim on their services came solely from the
central city. They would suffer loss for Rome; but the provinces
were there simply to help them to recuperate that loss. This arrogant;
selfish attitude, - as it appears now - was inevitable in one of
Brutus' descent and two such years as he spent in Cyprus were enough
to establish it for ever in his character. The mismanaged kingdom;
the failure to offer resistance; the unimpeded plundering; the flattery paid to the Roman leaders, Cato and himself; the backwardness and softness of the people and their subservience and inferiority to the Romans gave Brutus the justification - which, we may be sure, he did not deign to seek - for the haughty domineering attitude which he and his fellows adopted. Although the Cypriotes were, we are told, surprised and disappointed at their treatment at Roman hands, having expected to be allies rather than subjects, they appear to have been as pleased, officially at least, as was possible with Cato and Brutus. The city of Salamis, and doubtless other places as well, chose them as their patrons.

Chapter III.

From the Return from Cyprus till the Civil War. 56 - 50 B.C.

Of Brutus' life between his return to Rome from Cyprus in 56 B.C. and the outbreak of the Civil War we have no coherent account; for Plutarch passes straight from the Cyprian affair to the Civil War.

From Cicero, however, and other sources we can gather enough information to make a fairly comprehensive account of his activities in these years, and as far as possible the various items are here treated in chronological order.

Very soon after his arrival in Rome he and Cato were followed thither by a deputation from Salamis the chief city in Cyprus. It had been part of Cato's duty when he adopted their island into the Roman provincial system to impose on the Cypriotes, the common privilege of Roman provincials, the payment of tribute to the central government. The city of Salamis appears to have found almost immediately that this tribute could only be met by raising a loan, and for that purpose they sent an embassy to Rome. On their arrival there these simple and doubtless awestruck provincials soon discovered that by a law passed in the name of Gabinius in 67 B.C. no one might lend money to provincials in Rome, and any money lent contrary to that law was not recoverable by legal means. There was no one in Cyprus to lend them money; for 7000 talents had left the island only a few months before; and quite naturally the envos took their difficulty to Brutus, one of the few men they knew in the city, who was besides their official patron. Brutus saw in this a chance to make some profit and offered to lend them the money himself. The Lex Gabinia, of course, made the business a very risky one for the creditor and, therefore, he could charge them no

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1. The events here described took place in Rome not Cyprus as is sometimes imagined e.g. by Heitland and Ferrero. See Special Note 7. p. 316f.
2. An interesting account of the reason for this law is given in C.A.H. vol.IX. p345. Provincial embassies in the capital were accustomed to find that their only chance of obtaining a sympathetic hearing for their petitions was to pay for it, and very often to obtain money for this bribery of officials they had to borrow on the spot. The Lex Gabinia was intended to stop this kind of graft.
3. Plut.Cat.min.38,1.
...less than 40%; a rate which the Salaminians were quite pleased to accept. The deal was thereupon closed and a contract drawn up. From the fact that in 50 B.C. the total amount due to Brutus was calculated by adding 4.

1 years interest, there must have been a stipulation in the original bond that no payment would fall due for five years. Had Brutus been able to demand payment before then, he would have had no trouble in obtaining it while his father-in-law Appius was governor of the province from 53 to 51 B.C. Brutus' agent, M. Scaprices, did not begin to collect the debt until just before Appius' departure from Cilicia in June 51 B.C. Accordingly the contract was probably drawn up in May or June 56 B.C. -

Gabinio consulis - and payment was not to be made until 51 B.C.

Brutus did not intend to run any risk of losing his money despite the provisions of the Lex Gabinia and at once began to find a means of circumventing the law. Not the least interesting feature of this whole unsavoury business is the influence which he was able to command in the highest circles. Although not himself a member of the Senate - he had not yet been quaestor - he contrived to have passed a Senatusconsultum which would exempt himself and his debtors from the possibility of prosecution for their illegally contracted loan. -"ut neve Salaminii

seve qui eis dedisset fraudi esset". Afterwards he realised that that decree while protecting him from prosecution would not make his money recoverable at law in case of default by the Salaminians and therefore he had passed a second Senatusconsultum - "ut qui Ciliciam obtineret suis

exilia syngrapha disceret" - instructing future governors of Cilicia, to which province Cyprus had been joined, to pass judgement in any lawsuit concerning this debt strictly in accordance with the original bond. By these manoeuvres he fancied himself and his money to be safe.

About this time Brutus contracted the first of his two marriages. The lady of his choice - if indeed she was his choice - was one of the

daughters of Appius Claudius Pulcher, the consul of 54 B.C. Appius -

1.- Cic. Att.v.6,1,5 centesimis sexennii ductis. By then of course, payment was a year overdue. 4.- Ibid. v. 21,19 Appius, turmas...dederat hus Scapices. 5.- Ibid. 11, fin. 6.- Cic. Att.v. 21,12. 5.- Ibid. and 11, fin. 6.- Cic. - The error has been made of thinking that Brutus did not lend the money himself but merely acted as a guarantor of some kind; for refutation of this error see Special Note 7 p.314f.
he may well be described as 'one of the bad Claudians' - is a striking example of the kind of Republican citizen whose very existence is a complete justification for the establishment of the Empire. Dishonest and corrupt in office at home (witness, his bargain as consul in 54 with the candidates for 53), monstrously cruel and rapacious in the provinces and at all times supremely self-seeking, he was the last man with whom we should expect an honest sincere Republican like Brutus to ally himself. It is indeed most probable that the marriage was not of his own seeking but an arrangement made for him by his zealous, interfering mother. There is no evidence anywhere that Brutus ever had any deep affection for Claudia, and he certainly had none when in 45 B.C. he took an early opportunity after her father's death to divorce her. He seems, on the contrary, to have had a life-long affection for his cousin Porcia, the frequent companion doubtless, of his boyhood. Since he could not marry her - she had been given years before to L. Calpurnius Bibulus the consul of 50 B.C. and was already the mother of three sons - he was prepared, we may assume, to leave the choice to his mother. When we remember the friendly relations shown later between Appius and Pompey it may surprise us that Servilia should have chosen to unite her son to his family. She had every reason to be a partisan of Caesar and probably felt that her son's best chance of success lay in throwing in his lot with him, but even if we imagine that as early as 55 B.C. she realised that a struggle between Caesar and Pompey was inevitable, she had then no reason to think that Appius would favour the latter more than her own old lover. Up to that year he had indeed shown a tendency towards Caesar. His brother Clodius was notoriously Caesar's agent and as praetor in 57 B.C. Appius had given him not a little help in his efforts to prevent the return of Cicero from exile and in his little

\[\text{(2)}\] - cf. Cicero's descriptions in Att.v, 16, 2 & 17, 8. et al.
\[\text{(3)}\] - See below p.\text{67}:\text{\textdagger} See below p.\text{75}.
wars with Miltiades. In 56 B.C., when he was governor of Sardinia, Appius had been one of the 200 senators who paid court to Caesar at Lucca. His bias towards Pompey was marked later by the marriage of another daughter to Pompey's elder son, and for that reason it is probable that Brutus' marriage came first. The actual year of its occurrence cannot be determined, but it must have taken place before Appius' departure to his province of Cilicia in 53. For Brutus was already his son-in-law before Appius returned from Cilicia, and it is unlikely that the marriage would be performed in his absence. In 55 or 54 B.C. Appius was sufficiently friendly towards Caesar to make Brutus' alliance with him welcome to Servilia, and, moreover, Appius' wife was a Servilia, also a kinswoman of her own. He was besides, a man of wealth and importance and his family as ancient and honourable as that of Brutus. After his marriage Brutus had dealings with his father-in-law on several occasions and seems to have come considerably under his influence. That, combined with a corresponding temporary diminution of Cato's influence over him, may in part be responsible for his attitude towards the Salaminians and towards Cicero in 51 and 50 B.C.

There is evidence, unfortunately affording no details, that Brutus was quaestor in 54 or 53 B.C. Concerning the country in which he served no more may be said with safety than that it was either in Italy or in Cilicia with his father-in-law. No further details of his quaestorship can be given; but the lack of them indicates that it was uneventful.

About this time, from 54 B.C. onwards, Brutus began the publication of various writings. Reasons are given elsewhere for thinking that in these years were issued his epitomes of the historians Fannius and Coelius Antipater, but he had a more serious literary interest than that. Whether or not he entered on his political career as quaestor in 54 or 53 B.C. he had now reached an age when he must devote himself...
to the art of public speaking. It was a necessity for every Roman who wished to play any considerable part in public affairs to have some proficiency in that art and we know that Brutus worked hard at it and that his eventual accomplishments pleased himself if no one else. We have already seen that his grounding in rhetoric had been thorough and his reading of both Greek and Latin orators extensive. Now he came into closer contact with the practice of oratory as opposed to the mere study of it.

We find him carrying out the usual apprenticeship of the budding orator - attending cases in the courts as assistant to an orator of some standing and, as we should expect of a young man of such promise, those whom he most frequently attended upon were the two greatest speakers of the day - Hortensius and Cicero. We know of no particular case in which he took part with the latter and probably, making allowance for Cicero's inevitable exaggeration in the 'Brutus', they were few. With Hortensius he shared two cases which we know of. The first of these was in 51 B.C. when Hortensius defended M. Valerius Messalla, Consul of 53 B.C. who was prosecuted - and acquitted - on a charge of bribery; but we have no indication that Brutus spoke on that occasion. The second case is better known and was of more intimate concern to Brutus. His father-in-law Appius was, on his return from Cilicia in 50 B.C., accused almost at once of extortion and very rightly so if even a tenth part of Cicero's complaints against him are true. The defence was conducted by Hortensius and Brutus, and Appius was unanimously acquitted. But one is inclined to think that the verdict was secured less by the eloquence of his advocates - Hortensius was an old man by then and died shortly after this case - than by the influence of Pompey, then paramount in the city, who was easily induced to give his support to his son's father-in-law. In any case any pride Brutus could have felt in the case could only have been professional for few Roman governors more richly deserved...
condemnation.

Of Brutus' general interest in advocacy and his diligence in rehearsing its arts we have an interesting notice from Quintilian. When in 53 B.C. Cicero was failing to secure a verdict for his client Milo in the cause celebre over the death of Clodius, Brutus wrote purely as an exercise, and later published, a defence in which he pleaded for an acquittal on the grounds that the death of Clodius was an advantage to the State and Quintilian recommends as valuable to the student a comparison of his treatment of the case with that of Cicero. There is more than a passing interest in Brutus' anticipation at this time of the plea which he used himself later to justify his own deed of murder.

There is some rather slight evidence of non-judicial speeches made by Brutus at this time. In the 'Brutus,' Cicero says that Brutus is in the habit of making speeches to the assembly of the people. This was written in 46 B.C. when Brutus was in Cisalpine Gaul, and from 49 to 46 B.C. he was in Rome very little so that if these speeches were made at all, it must have been before 50 B.C. at about the same time as his interest in speeches in the law courts. The other evidence concerns a speech, possibly made in the Senate, and is more detailed and interesting. Quintilian mentions a

1: Cicero had a double interest in this case too: first because the accuser was his own son-in-law Dola ballots; and Cicero was very perturbed lest the latter's inconsiderate action might cause a break between himself and Appius, Pompey and Brutus; and secondly, because he had been asked by Pompey as well as by Appius to send suitable witnesses for the defence from Cilicia. Att. VI, 2, 10: Fam. II, 13, 2: Fam. III, 10, 11.

2: Brutus' speech 'pro Appio' is probably what the grammarian Diomedes refers to (1.367 K) as a eulogy of Appius. Such eulogies were usually written after the death of their subject and it does not seem likely that Brutus would compose one of Appius who died in 48 B.C. By then Brutus was tired of his Claudian connection and his wife was divorced as soon after that as was practicable.

3: III, 6, 93 and X, 1, 23. cf. Asconius in Mil. 32.

4: If C.A.H. vol. IX p. 326. really regards Milo as a "client" of Brutus— as is certainly indicated,—the writer has disregarded Quintilian's "exercitationis gratia" (III, 6, 93: "e.causa" X, 1, 23) and Asconius' "editat quasi egisset". Quintilian corrects Celsus, the author of "de Medecina" for saying that Brutus delivered the speech (Quint. X, 1, 23). Brutus seems to have been involved also in a debate in the Senate with Q. Metellus Scipio regarding Milo. See Special Note 8 p. 317f

5: Brut. 50, 197. 6: IX, 3, 95.
composition of Brutus under the name of 'de Pompeii dictatura' and gives a quotation from it, "Praestat enim nemini imperare quam alciui servire: sine illo enim vivere honeste licet, cum hoc vivendi nulla condicio est," which, though of the greatest interest as showing Brutus' life-long condemnation of servitude, gives no help in finding the occasion of the speech. There were, however, only two occasions before the civil war when Pompey could be said even by his opponents to be holding a dictatorship; the first when he was given a maius imperium to enable him to deal effectively with the pirates in the Mediterranean in 66 B.C. when Brutus was not yet 19 years of age: the second when in 52 B.C. he was in the extraordinary position of being sole consul in Rome and at the same time holding proconsular imperium over the provinces of Spain, with an army actually in Italy. Brutus' speech, if speech it was, must refer to this second occasion, when if not dictator in name Pompey was as powerful and unhampered as any dictator ever was. We have seen already the stubbornness of Brutus' opposition to Pompey and if any debate on Pompey's position was held in the Senate either before, during or after his tenure of this anomalous position, it is probable that Brutus, who by his quaestorship would have gained a seat in the curia would take part in it. However, we know too little of this work to be able to state whether it was an actual speech delivered in debate or a monograph published independently. It may have contained the story which Suetonius recounts as repeated by Brutus, in which Pompey was addressed as 'rex' and Caesar, with the well-known allusion, as 'regis'. At any rate the existence of the work and of the anecdote indicate a continuance of Brutus' opposition to the triumvirs.

During the years before the civil war began the friendship with Cicero which lasted persistently but fitfully for the rest of their lives. Two such staunch supporters of the Republican constitution were bound to become friendly sooner or later and the pity is that they

(1: It may, of course, have been written, like the pro Milone, purely as an exercise, as d'Addozio (p.139) thinks probable: in that case it may conceivably though not. I think, probably, have referred to 66 B.C. and been written any time after that. (2: - Jul. 49, 2. (3: - I find that Walter (op.cit.Mar.1934.p.576) has previously made this suggestion, but gives it as a fact.)
were too utterly different from one another to be friendly for other than political reasons. Just as Cicero was the quick thinking, volatile, inconstant Italian, Brutus was a slow-witted, persistent and stubborn Roman. Brutus must often have been disgusted at Cicero's indecision when a decision had been made, and Cicero at the long hesitant process by which Brutus arrived at a decision. Again where Cicero was all men's friend, Brutus was aloof; and it is certain that but for a third party drawing them together their early acquaintanceship in the law courts would have led to nothing. Even in their oratory they were centuries apart and Cicero, the egotist, would have little regard for a young man who so stubbornly refused to copy his style and even to approve of it.

It was Atticus who really made them more than mere acquaintances, and it was he too who frequently had to patch up the rifts which their essential opposition caused in their friendship. Surprise has often been expressed at the amount of self-humiliation which Cicero put up with in the early stages of their intimacy, and in consequence he has frequently been regarded as the one who took the initiative in it. While the orator was certainly very anxious to continue the friendship once it had begun, it was Brutus who took the first step in it. When in 52 B.C. a measure was passed, by Pompey's authority, insisting on a gap of five years between an official's year of office at home and his period of provincial governorship abroad, exconsuls and expraetors who had not held provinces after their service at home were called upon to fill the gap. To Cicero was allotted Cilicia, which, as we have seen, now included Cyprus. About the time that Cicero left Rome - May 51 B.C. - the debt of Salamis to Brutus fell due for payment. His agent Scaptius was already in the island, with an assistant P. Matinius, and was receiving the usual help in his debt-collecting from the governor, Brutus' father-in-law, who gave him a prefecture and several squadrons of cavalry. Brutus wished to ensure that he would obtain similar assistance from the new governor. By this time, also, Brutus had

1 - See page 62f. below. 2º - Cic.Att.V, 31,10. But Walter (op.cit.Mar. 1934, pp. 567ff.) is wrong in assuming that Scaptius and his colleague had been engaged in collecting Brutus' debt since Appius' rule began in 53 B.C.
lent money - where and when we do not know - to Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, and Cicero, who was the king's official guardian, was the very man to help in collecting that debt too. In Cappadocia Brutus had two other agents, a second Scaptius and one L. Cavius. To strengthen the force of his appeal to Cicero Brutus approached him through their mutual friend Atticus. It is in keeping with what we know of the latter's character, that he should have had the friendship of the young noble who seemed by nature and circumstance destined for high office and much influence. Atticus was very willing to bring his two friends together, and it was Brutus' promise of greatness that he emphasised to Cicero when they were introduced.\(^{3}\) The orator was too much of a politician to neglect the opportunity of obliging a young man of such desirable connections and character and gladly accepted his commissions. Ariobarzanes' debt was frankly explained to him, but over the Salaminian business Brutus was secretive and deceitful.

Whether he was ashamed of the legal circumvention he had employed in making the loan or thought that such abuse of the Senate's influence would have put Cicero against his case, he decided not to disclose the fact that he himself had lent the money in Rome and told Cicero that Scaptius and Matinius were the money lenders and his own interest in the case simply that of a guarantor that the debt would be paid.

As soon as he reached his province Cicero came into contact with Brutus' affairs. After the rudeness he suffered at the hands of Appius - how Cicero must often have damned those Roman nobles, in private! - he was informed immediately on his arrival at Ephesus, that Scaptius was employing his cavalry with a vigour, worthy of a nobler cause. Having failed to secure payment, apparently because he was insisting on more than was properly due, he had surrounded the

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1. Walter (op.cit.,Mar.1934,p.568) assumes quite without grounds that the loan was contracted in 53B.C. when, as he thinks (see pp.319) Brutus was with Appius Claudius in Cilicia as his quaestor.
2. That the two Scaptii were different persons is shown definitely in Cic.Att.VI,3.5, where the two are carefully distinguished: "Amicos habet... Matinium, Sceptium,...Sceptio, qui in Cappadocia fuit,..."
3. Cic.Att.VI,1.7"...quod tu ad me quibusdam litteris scripsisses: si uidel id in provincia nisi illius (i.e.Bruti) benevolentiam deportassem mihi id satis esse.
4. See Special Note 7p.314f. When Cicero (Att.VI,1,3) talks of a "libellus" of commissions, given him by Brutus, we need not assume that there were any others besides the two we have mentioned. In the letter cited it is obviously Cicero's aim to exaggerate the amount he is doing and he has no other instances to offer.
municipal chambers of Salamis while the council was in session and had held them in a rigorous siege. The council displayed a constancy quite surprising in an Oriental township and, although five of their number had died of starvation, still refused to satisfy Scaptius's demands. Almost Cicero's first act as governor was to order the dispersal of these soldiers.

About the same time he entertained his unhappy client Ariobarzanes for a few days, and urged him vehemently to pay his debt to Brutus. The king promised to do his best but after he had gone Cicero had little hope that full payment would be made. He knew that Ariobarzanes' personal poverty was not pretended and that his realm was hopelessly overtaxed; he had moreover a creditor of even more alarming eminence than Brutus - the great Pompey himself. whose loan was the greater of the two. Thus early in his reign Ariobarzanes is rather a pathetic figure. He is being harassed on the one side by Pompey's myriad agents, and has the prospect of a visit from his creditor in person; for there was a rumour that Pompey was coming East for a campaign against Parthia. On the other side he is badgered by his own legal patron Cicero, by his near neighbour Deiotarus, who sent an embassy to him on Brutus' behalf, and by Brutus' agents Scaptius and Gavius. According to Cicero, no one's efforts were so fruitful as his own. He sent frequent letters to Ariobarzanes, urging him in all of them to give Brutus his money, and to Scaptius and Gavius he granted prefectures in order to give them some standing in the country. At last though Brutus does not seem ever to have received his full dues, Cicero pronounced himself satisfied with the results of his own labours. In one year, he says, Brutus has received about 100 talents, whereas

2. - Cic.Att.VI,2,7. I agree with L.W.Hunter (J.R.S. vol.3 (1913) p.92) when he says that this meeting between Cicero and Ariobarzanes must have taken place soon after Cicero's arrival in the province, 16th-22nd Sept.51 B.C. Att. V,13,4 proves it conclusively.
3. - "Cappadocia est insanis". Fam XV,1,6. - a dispatch to the Senate cf. Att. VI,1,3.fin.
5. - ibid. "putatur (i.e.Pompeius)ad bellum Parthicum esse venturus".
6. - ibid.4,init. "Deiotarus .. narravit se ad eum legatos misisse de re Bruti."
7. - Att.VI,1,5.
Pompey had to be content with the promise of 300 talents in six months, which did not even cover the interest on his loan. Brutus seems to have accepted this as satisfactory and his agents too appear to have felt that everything possible had been done. Scaptius voluntarily resigned his prefecture as no longer necessary, and Gavius felt himself free to indulge in insolence towards Cicero.

The Salaminian affair was, however, much less pleasant for everyone concerned. After the dismissal of his squadrons, Scaptius had an interview with Cicero and asked for a renewal of the prefecture he had held under Appius. Cicero told him that was impossible, since he had adopted the principle that no one engaged in financial business in the province should hold that office, and that he had already made similar refusals to others, including Pompey. At the same time he assured Scaptius that there would be no difficulty for him in collecting his debts and thanking him politely Scaptius departed. Some time later he appeared again before Cicero with representatives from Salamis, to have their dispute settled. In fulfilment of his promise, Cicero refused to listen to the natives’ complaints against Scaptius and urged them, even ordered them to pay. This they were quite willing to do because, according to Cicero, they had saved a lot on the governor’s perquisite, since his own clement rule had begun. Then the real trouble started. Scaptius revealed that he expected to be paid at 48% per annum as his original bond laid down. Cicero pointed out that in his own edict, published, as was traditional, at the beginning of his term of office, he had decreed that interest on all loans in the province was not to exceed 12% simple. Scaptius, thereupon, to Cicero’s profound surprise, produced the Senatusconsultum of 56 B.C. according to which governors of Cilicia were to pass judgement in any such dispute as the present one, in accordance with the terms of the original bond. Cicero though

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1. - Att. VI, 3, 5. cf. 1, 3. 2. - Att. VI, 3, 5. 3. - ibid. 6. 4. - Att. V, 21, 10. ibid. VI, 1, 6. The Scaptius in Cappadocia was, of course, not in Cicero’s province. 5. - ibid. 11-12 contains Cicero’s account of this interview.
surprised was too skilled a lawyer to be confounded, and his immediate reply was that that decrēe gave the bond, which without it was illegal because of the Lex Gabinia, only the same standing as all other bonds but did not allow it to override the governor’s edict. That was too subtle for Scaptius and his next move was to draw Cicero aside and tell him that although the provincials reckoned the debt to be much less than he did, they were wrong and Cicero should urge them to pay the larger sum. Cicero naturally counted it up for himself and found the provincials right. Again Scaptius drew him aside and suggested that he should let the matter drop, hoping that the next governor would be more complacent. Cicero pardoned the impudence of the request and when the debtors demanded the privilege of depositing the money in a temple, where interest would not accumulate—as they were entitled to do since their creditor refused to accept payment—he even forbade them to do that. The interview eventually broke up in considerable disorder, with everybody shouting, Scaptius loudest of all, and no settlement found.

The biggest shock was still in store for Cicero. At the next meeting, which seems to have followed the other quite soon, Scaptius still refused to accept the compromise offered him. Cicero was prepared to allow him to collect 12% compound interest, though his edict allowed only simple interest, and he had prevented the Salaminians from depositing in a temple. Further than that he would not go not even for a friend of Brutus. Now Scaptius played his trump card and revealed that it was not really the concern of Brutus’ friends but of Brutus himself. He showed Cicero a letter which left no doubt that the real creditor was Brutus. Cicero’s surprise was profound and his indignation boundless. As he recalled Brutus’ deceit and the arrogant tone of his letters even when asking for favours, he decided that he had a allowed as much compromise as he could. Scaptius’ repeated request for a prefecture was again refused, despite the added supplication of

1.- There was the possibility of Cicero being succeeded by L. Aemilius Paullus, who was consul in 50 B.C. He was adoptive brother of M. Aemilius Lepidus, husband of Brutus’ sister Junia, and Scaptius could look for favours from him. cf. Cic.Att.VI,1,7. "quid iis fiet, si huc Paullus veniret? T.A.P. in their note (vol.III,p.174) misname Paullus as Marcus. 2.- This interview is described in Cic.Att.VI,1,6. 
3.- ibid.7. "ad me mutem etiam sum rogat aliquid, contumaciter, adroganter, scler scribere."
of Atticus. Brutus, piqued no doubt at what he considered Cicero's excessive scruples, continued to write in the same haughty and even insolent style and Atticus had to intervene to smooth the orator's ruffled feelings. Even his letters proved vain and it was not until more than three years later that the two were again upon intimate terms, and even then only after Brutus had done Cicero a favour. Meanwhile the eventual issue of the Salaminian affair was allowed to lapse into obscurity and we cannot now be sure how it ended. It is probable that Cicero let it stand over at the stage reached above, and that Brutus and his agents were content to wait for the next governor. The civil war, however, intervened to upset their calculations and although Brutus spent some time after its outbreak in Cilicia we have no evidence that he did anything in connection with the loan. It is, however, a plausible surmise that he reached some kind of settlement with his debtors then.

The Salaminian affair is unsavoury from beginning to end. It is a favourite cudgel for his modern detractors to beat Brutus with and it is vain to deny the pity of it. Brutus' behaviour is deplorable throughout; the duplicity and circumvention of the law is almost incomprehensible in one who had such a respect for the constitution of the Republic; his choice of agents seems strange for the man who later was to weep at the madness of a foreign city's self-destruction; his persistent importuning of Cicero to see that his money is collected hardly accords with the dignity of the philosophical studies he pursued; and his arrogant treatment of Cicero, the novus homo, savours of narrow minded snobbishness and petty pique. Nor is Brutus the only one whose conduct in the affair requires defence. Cicero's obvious desire to gratify a promising young noble is lacking in self-respect and his eventual supineness in persuading the debtors not to use the

(4. - V. Chapot. "Les Romains et Cyprès" in Mélanges Cagnat (Paris 1912) p.73) wisely remarks that if Cicero had settled it, he would have praised himself for it in the epistles.  


privilege of depositing their money in a temple, and in allowing the matter to wait over for judgement by his successor spoils the effect of his stand against the unscrupulous Scaptius. His conduct in this affair has been called "the one blot on his administration of Cilicia." Even Atticus comes in for some censure for his attempts to induce Cicero to abandon the principles of his edict and one of his biographers has felt it necessary to defend him on the score that he had no personal knowledge of what was going on in the island — "...his information came from Brutus who was probably ill-informed as to the character of his中间男人." But even after Cicero had informed both him and Brutus of Scaptius' villainy, Atticus still thought Cicero ought to let him have a few cavalry. Atticus was for many years on terms of intimacy with Brutus and frequently appears as his helper and adviser. Concerning the present affair they held at least one conference, at which a decision regarding the debt was made and communicated to, Cicero by Atticus. It is, therefore, probable that Atticus, the most famous business-man in Roman History, was a sort of unofficial financial adviser to Brutus and must share with him part of the discredit of this affair.

While it is impossible to justify Brutus' conduct, it is possible to explain it. His action was, though indefensible according to modern opinion, simply the normal behaviour of men of his class in his time. We have already observed what the attitude of the Roman nobles was to the provincials and Brutus' treatment of the Salaminians is simply the logical outcome of that attitude. They owed him money and must be made to pay it by whatever means were found necessary. That sentiment is precisely what his peers expected of him and Brutus doubtless felt as much indignation with Cicero for his nicety where provincials were concerned, as Cicero did with him for his arrogant demands. There can be by modern standards no real defence of Brutus' behaviour and attitude; we can only regret that his philosophy and

learning had not by this time found for him a more enlightened opinion
than his fellows had, and we must be pleased that the enlightenment did
come at last. In later years he showed a wiser and more humane under-
standing of the provincials so that his conduct even as a conquering
general among them stands comparison with any.

At the same time thanks to the prominence which Cicero's Letters
have given to his financial affairs, Brutus' reputation has suffered
unduly because of them. This one incident must not be allowed too
much weight - as it often is - in an estimate of his whole life, and
it must not be exaggerated. Such statements as "(Brutus) settled down
for some years in the East engaged in employing his capital at ruinous
interest" call up an absurd picture of him as a relentless moneylender
on a large scale with connections far and wide. There is no evidence
whatever that he lent money at interest to anyone beyond the Salam-
iniens and Ariobarzanes, and if he had had any other such business in
Cilicia or Cyprus, it is almost certain that Cicero would have men-
tioned it in his complaints.

Q. - Hitland. vol. III. p. 153ff. cf. also O. Spengler. (Decline of the West
I. p. 5), who calls Brutus a "millionaire-extortioner."
C. - The loan which he appears to have made to Casca later to enable
him to stand for an aedileship was on an entirely different footing.
Brutus during the Civil War.  49 - 47 B.C.

Since Pompey's sole consulship in 52 B.C., to which, as we have seen, Brutus had probably expressed his objections, affairs in Rome had been moving gradually to a crisis. The harmony in the triumvirate, re-established by the agreement made at Luca, had been disturbed again by two tragic events - the death in September 54 B.C. of Julia, daughter of Caesar and wife of Pompey, whose affection for both had been perhaps the chief bond between them, and the death at Carrhae in 53 B.C. of Crassus, who had all along acted as a kind of buffer between his colleagues. With these two influences gone began the mutual drifting apart of Caesar and Pompey which ended inevitably in a struggle for supremacy. By remaining near Rome instead of going to his province in 54 B.C. Pompey gradually assumed a predominance in the minds of the citizens, which Caesar by his absence could not counter. Pompey's superior importance was further established by his restoration of order in 52 B.C. and the suggestion lying behind it that without his help and influence the Senate was powerless. Whether Pompey by this time was deliberately trying to gain himself an advantage over Caesar cannot be clearly determined, but before the end of 52 B.C. he had secured a prolongation of his imperium over Spain for five years, which would outlast Caesar's in Gaul by at least two years. During 51 B.C. the gap between them became appreciably wider.

Rome, the consul, proposed the immediate recall of Caesar from Gaul on the ground that his work there was ended, but he was opposed by his colleague Sulpicius Rufus, a staunch Conservative and respecter of constitutional rights. Pompey, despite a personal dislike of Marcellus, did not offer him the opposition that Caesar probably expected of him, and instead of having the proposal completely quashed was content to let it be postponed until March 50 B.C. Caesar realised quite well that he could not afford to allow a gap in his tenure of imperium, that if and when he left his province he must, if he were to avoid prosecution, immediately enter the consulship, and that could only be done if he were allowed to stand as a candidate in his absence. That privilege
had already been laid open to him by a law passed early in 53 B.C. in the name of all Ten Tribunes, but a later measure of Pompey's, "de iure magistratuum", had rendered its validity doubtful, and there was an added difficulty in Caesar's path in that he wished to be a candidate in 49 B.C. contrary to the law that demanded a ten year interval between two consulships. Caesar naturally expected Pompey to secure a special dispensation allowing his candidature and it was in making no real effort to do so that Pompey made the eventual break between them. If he failed to secure permission to stand in his absence in 49 B.C. Caesar determined to hold on to his provinces even after his legal tenure was up by having the nomination of his successor postponed, as often as it was proposed, by means of the tribunician veto. For that purpose he secretly obtained the services of Scribonius Curio, hitherto an opponent of his own, who was to be tribune for 50 B.C. Early in that year, Pompey's desire to leave Caesar open to the attacks of his enemies by being temporarily without imperium became too obvious to be doubted, and Curio till cleverly preserving his pro-Republican reputation, vetoed all attempts to nominate the next governor of Gaul. Even a united demand by Pompey and the Senate - the break with Caesar is now very wide - that Caesar leave his province in November 50 B.C. was resisted by Curio. To secure a continuity of his influence in the tribunate, Caesar had Antony nominated and elected as tribune for 49 B.C., but his candidate for the consulship, Gallia, was not elected. Before these elections were held in the middle of July 50 B.C. Caesar had moved into Cisalpine Gaul and it was now obvious to all that civil war was impending. In August we find Cælius deploring its approach in a letter Cicero, who himself mentions it in October. Matters came to a head finally on December 1st. Curio made the brilliant suggestion - apparently on his own initiative - that Caesar and Pompey be called on to lay down their imperium simultaneously. The motion was vetoed, as it did not suit Pompey to lose his own power, and on the same day the consul Claudius Marcellus invited Pompey to assume command of all troops in Italy. The situation had now resolved itself into complete clarity; the two armies under the two

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Footnotes:


leaders were clearly defined; but Caesar made two further attempts to avoid conflict. He sent Hirtius to negotiate privately with Pompey, and Curio to repeat in the Senate his proposal for simultaneous demission of power by the two leaders. Hirtius returned without interviewing Pompey, when he found him already committed to command of the army and Curio's proposal was turned down by the Senate, though probably against the wishes of many. Caesar, his last efforts having proved vain, crossed the Rubicon on 10th January 49 B.C. (Julian 22nd November 50 B.C.)

It is not difficult to trace Brutus' attitude in the development of this crisis. He was, of course, too young to play any prominent part in since his display of opposition to Pompey in 52 B.C. his interest had been that of an ordinary Senator. That opposition must not be construed in a corresponding attitude of favour towards Pompey's rival. Brutus was for the Republic and Lucan's account of his eventual choice of Pompey's side though fanciful and probably based on no earlier account is nevertheless apt. "I am enemy neither to Pompey nor Caesar but to the victor." To Brutus, who saw the Senate of which he had recently become a member, as the very heart of the Republic, its failure to function without the stimulant of Pompey's support must have been grievously disappointing. His private enmity towards Pompey did not lessen the bitterness with which he saw his position gradually change from that of an unwelcome oppressor of the State to that of its acknowledged champion. The simple truth was that with two such powerful individuals in the State the Senate could not stand without the support of one to counter the influence of the other. Pompey, as the nearer of the two and the less personally ambitious, became the Senate's supporter, and when that choice had been made Brutus could only sink his personal feelings and acquiesce in it. Towards Caesar he had no personal feelings. His mother, had she been able, would perhaps have persuaded him to join her old lover, but there is no evidence of any attempt by her to bring pressure to bear on him at this time, unless it was in his quaestorship in 53 B.C., when she completely failed.

Statements of the intimacy existing between Brutus and Caesar before the civil war have been much exaggerated. We are told, for instance, that "Caesar had almost treated him as a son," which, when...
realise that Caesar's only recorded act of kindness towards him had been in the Vettian affair, and that Brutus had never ceased to be an opponent of the triumvirate, will seem almost as absurd as the same author's suggestion that Brutus sided with Pompey out of regard for Verrilla. Caesar's claim in a conversation, reported by Cicero on March 25th 49 B.C., that he was the avenger of Pompey's early victims, including Brutus' father, can hardly have been intended to appeal especially to Brutus who was probably by then out of Italy. It is wrong to imagine that Brutus had any great difficulty in choosing between Caesar and Pompey. His choice was determined for him by the Senate's decision and his only difficulty lay in his dislike of Pompey. He may have shared the feelings of Cato, who insisting that Pompey be given the fullest possible powers remarked, "The authors of great evils know best how to cure them."

Having committed himself to the side of Pompey Brutus sailed to Cilicia as legate with P. Sestius who had been appointed to succeed Cicero as governor of that province. From the words of Aurelius Victor "Civili allo a Catone ex Cilicia retractus Pompeium secutus est", it has been thought that Brutus was in Cilicia when the civil war broke out, having arrived there as soon as Cicero left the province to superintend personally the settlement of his debts. Plutarch's account however, makes it impossible since his appointment to Sestius' staff was made before he left Rome. The date of his departure is uncertain but if he left with his superior officer as is probable, it could not have been until about the middle of December (Julian) since Sestius had composed for Pompey on Dec. 26 a letter to Caesar. It is not necessary to account for Brutus' visit of Cilicia as his sphere of activity by referring to his financial

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"Civili allo a Catone ex Cilicia retractus Pompeium secutus est" - Cicero's letter to Caesar.

"The authors of great evils know best how to cure them." - Cato's remark.

"Civili allo a Catone ex Cilicia retractus Pompeium secutus est" - Aurelius Victor.

"The authors of great evils know best how to cure them." - Cato's remark.
business in Cyprus. That may, of course, have been considered but his
choice was a natural one for other reasons. His personal hatred for
Pompey made it both desirable and advisable that he should serve some-
where else than at the leader's side, and Sestius' departure for Cilicia,
the one province of which Brutus had any previous experience was there-
fore, opportune. Of Brutus' work in Cilicia in 49 B.C. we can say
nothing but, if the suggestion that Sestius, besides his imperium over
his own province, had also the task of general supervision in the East
and especially of collecting money supplies, Brutus' former financial
experience in the district would be of considerable value to him. It
is possible too that the Cilician legion which was in Pompey's force at
Dyrrachium and Pharsalus was organised by Sestius and his assistants.
It was formed from the remnants of the two legions Cicero had commanded
and was therefore called "Gemella". In the fleet which C. Cassius,
Brutus' brother-in-law, commanded for Pompey at the time of Pharsalus
were Cilician ships.

After about a year's service under Sestius, Brutus tired of the
comparative lack of opportunity so far from the real theatre of war and
learning, perhaps from Cato, that the rival armies were face to face at
Dyrrachium and that the decisive struggle could not be long delayed he
resolved to have his share in it despite his feelings for Pompey. By
the time Brutus reached his army, the stage was set for the final
struggle, for the two forces were already face to face at Pharsalus. In
the camp Brutus could summon no enthusiasm for his comrades-in-arms.
Pompey had been very effusive in his welcome. Greatly surprised at the
coming to his side of one who had always shown such determined antipathy
towards him, he was delighted at this apparent indication of faith in him.
When Brutus presented himself, Pompey rose in front of his bodyguard and
embraced him warmly with extravagant expressions of his pleasure at
seeing him. It is impossible to imagine Brutus' reaction to this re-
4. Aurelius Victor's few words "Civili bello a Catone ex Cilicia retract-
us" have been construed (cf.T.&P.VI.p.CXII) into the idea that Brutus was
very unwilling to go to Greece and that Cato had to bully him into it.
Apart from the difficulty of such long-distance bullying, Plutarch's ac-
count makes it improbable. He does not even mention Cato's letter and says
that Brutus went voluntarily. Probably then Cato's letter was informative
rather than jussive.
seption as other than frigid. Pompey continued to show him the same
favour and esteem and appears also to have admitted him to the council
of war and to have spent much time in his company. We have Cicero's
word for it that Brutus worked diligently for the Republican cause
"Brutus amicus (tuus) in causa versatur acriter." But the diligence
arose rather from his own conscientiousness than from any enthusiasm
for the side he had adopted. Its cause was doubtless just but nothing
else about it pleased him. The feelings he had for Pompey remained
unchanged and for the majority of his fellow soldiers he had no greater
liking. Luxury and lax discipline were rampant and accounts of the
general behaviour contrast vividly with what we know of Brutus'
conduct. "When Caesar's men took Pompey's camp they saw evidence of
the enemy's folly and frivolity. For every tent was crowned with
myrtle and furnished with flowered coverings on the couches and tables
loaded with cups; bowls of wine were laid out and the preparation and
decoration was that rather of men who were celebrating the offer of a
sacrifice than of those who are arming for battle." Some of them
were even quarrelling as to who should have Caesar's priesthood when he
was defeated. To Brutus this conduct at such a time seemed far from
seemly and later in his own camp he enforced frugality upon his
officers. At Pharsalus, however, - his first military campaign - he
had no authority and we find him withdrawing as much as he could from
the company of the others and spending the time reading and studying
quietly in his tent. Up to the very eve of the battle he was engaged
on the composition of an epitome of Polybius.

1. - Att.XI,4,2. The reading and interpretation of this passage are
both in dispute. MSS. give "Brutus amicus in causa versatur." This
cannot mean "our friend Brutus...." as it is not Ciceronian Latin for
such a rendering. I prefer the reading given above to the other
suggestion "Brutus amicus in causa...."; for there is no reason to
suppose that Cic. who was still at Dyrrachium had seen Brutus let
alone been on friendly terms with him. The next sentence "Hactenus
fuit quod caute a me scribi potest", T.& P. seem to regard as irony
against Brutus. I cannot see why. It seems to me a simple statement
that Cic. can give no more news with any confidence - because, of
course, he was not on the spot. cf. T.& P. vol.VI.p.CXII and note 165
who took their idea that Cicero was being ironical at Brutus' expense
from Schmidt. Bynum op.cit.p.24 note 1. disagrees with Schmidt as I do
with T.& P.  
suggestion that his devotion to study was caused by a desire to do as
little as possible for Pompey in order to prejudice himself as little
as possible in Caesar's eyes is palpably absurd. He could have
deserted!
What part Brutus played in the battle is not mentioned but it was neither considerable nor important. Lucan's picture of him among the ranks disguised as a common soldier seeking the chance to slay Caesar and prevented by a jealous fate because his time had not yet come is, of course, pure nonsense. If he was connected in any way, of which we have no evidence, with the Cilician legion, he may have been posted with it on the right wing. In any case when Pompey retired to the camp after his legions had been broken he was soon followed by Brutus, and when Caesar's men stormed the camp, Brutus, acting on his general's example, had escaped by a gate not yet closed. Whereas Pompey fled headlong Eastwards towards Larissa Brutus was content to seek refuge in a neighbouring marsh, where he hid among the reeds until nightfall.

According to Plutarch and Appian Caesar showed much concern for Brutus' safety and went so far as to give orders to his men before the battle, that Brutus’ life was to be spared, even if he refused to surrender and after the battle, when there was no sign of Brutus among the Pompeian prisoners, he was greatly concerned. That tradition bears the obvious signs of exaggeration and was doubtless an invention of Brutus' enemies to increase the depth of his so-called treachery towards Caesar. One cannot believe that in the great crisis of his life Caesar would worry about the life of a young man he had seldom seen or that in the moment of his greatest triumph, he would cloud his joy by worry over him.

Venturing forth under cover of the dark, while the Pompeian army was being cooped in by Caesar's veterans and the strays pursued by Antony, Brutus made his way to Larissa. In the course of his night of wandering - he had some thirty miles to cover - he had time to take stock of his position. Whatever enthusiasm he may have had for the Senatorial cause - and Pompey's presence had prevented it from being much - was now completely gone. Their army was completely routed by a force of much smaller numbers, and the

feelings of disgust that had come to him in the camp were brought
to a height by the headlong flight of the chosen leader. With no
one to urge him otherwise - Cato, who might have done so, was at

1. Dyrrachium - Brutus resolved to throw himself on Caesar's mercy.

It has been too seldom realised that in doing so he had no idea
what reception he would meet with, for he had no reason to imagine
that Caesar would be as kind to him now as he had been in 59 B.C.
Caesar however was in a clement mood and had decided to spare all
who surrendered. There were 24,000 of them; and Brutus may be
pardoned for following such a general example. The victor's
generosity was not devoid of policy. Apart from the odium he
would have incurred by any other course there were in the defeated
army many men who, if won over by his kindness, would become exactly
the kind of supporters he needed. In the rank and file were
thousands of good soldiers and among the officers was the large
majority of the Senators, whose influence would be valuable to him
in forming a new government. When therefore he received Brutus' letter, and recalled the reputation and promise of importance that
the young man possessed, he saw in him just the type of Senator
whose presence by his own side would be of great help in bringing
others to him. Brutus was assured of his life and when he met
Caesar on the latter's arrival at Larissa he was greeted with as
much cordiality as Pompey had shown him earlier. The account given
by Plutarch of Caesar's consultation with Brutus as to Pompey's
destination must be charily accepted. There was no good reason
why Caesar should seek Brutus' advice. He had himself as much
means of conjecturing where his rival was making for, and to say
that Brutus repaid Caesar's clemency "by showing which way Pompey
had fled" is absurd exaggeration. According to Plutarch Caesar,

2. App.II,112: Dio xli,63,6 is inaccurate when he says Brutus' was
captured(2,450) by Caesar.
3.- This point is however mentioned by Walter (op.cit.Mar.1934.p.580).
4.- Caes.B.C. III,99. : (4.- Brut.6,2. : (5.- T.& P.vol VIp.CXII.
finding no one who could say whither Pompey had fled, privately asked Brutus his opinion and, when Brutus said that he thought Pompey had made for Egypt, he straightway set out himself for that country. But not even Pompey, as Plutarch himself elsewhere admits, knew, before he left Greece, where his eventual destination would be; the decision to seek refuge in Egypt was not made apparently until after a council held in Pamphylia. Nor did Caesar know where Pompey had fled until he heard, while in Asia, that he had been seen in Cyprus, and even then that Egypt was his destination was no more that a conjecture on Caesar's part. Thus Brutus could have had no knowledge of Pompey's movements to reveal to Caesar and it is difficult to see on what grounds he could base even an opinion regarding them. If Caesar consulted Brutus at all it was only as a compliment to him and as an indication of his high opinion of the young man's powers of discretion.

Of where and how Brutus spent the next twelve months or so we have enough evidence to form a fairly detailed account, though much of the detail is based inevitably on conjecture and certainty, especially in chronological matters, is impossible to attain. We know that he was in Tarsus early in July 47 B.C. (April Julian.) and from then onwards his movements are fairly easy to follow. What happened between his surrender to Caesar on August 10th (June 7th Julian) 48 B.C. and July (April) 47 B.C. is not so clear. It has been sometimes assumed that as he was with Caesar at Tarsus he had been with him ever since Pharsalus, but there is no evidence whatever that he had spent the winter in Egypt. When Caesar pardoned Brutus at Larissa he did not enroll him in his army. Brutus ceased to oppose him but we have no reason to think that he imme-

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1. Plut.Pomp.76,4-6:77,1. : (E. - Caes.B.C.III, 106 init. 2. - Bynum (op.cit.p.25) stresses the fact that Brutus did not reveal any plan of Pompey's but merely expressed an opinion. It is possible, I think, that Brutus' opinion was given, if at all, at the meeting held in Asia (note 2.) and not at Larissa, as Plutarch seems to indicate. 3. - This seems to be the assumption of Rice Holmes. R.R. vol. III.p. 210.
lately began to serve him, and one is not prepared to believe, without evidence to support the suggestion, that he took part in the pursuit of his late commander. Another suggestion is that he went straight back from Pharsalus to Cilicia and there remained until Caesar's arrival. There was no particular reason why he should do so and the idea that because he was one of the most important patrons of that province he would naturally play a large part in the settling of it under Caesar, does not mean that he would feel it necessary to go there immediately after Pharsalus, when it was quite uncertain if and when Caesar would visit the province. In any case Brutus was a patron only of Salamis in Cyprus not of the whole province of Cilicia. On the other hand it is quite certain that he did not at once return to Italy after his surrender to Caesar, for although the decree, by which Antony forbade all Pompeian to land in the peninsula, did not apply to the pardoned Brutus, it is most unlikely that in the ten or eleven months between August 48 B.C. and July 47 B.C. (June and April : Julian) - including all the winter months - he would have sailed to Italy and then back again to Cilicia. Besides Cicero was all these months in Brundisium where Brutus was bound to have met him; and some reference would surely have been made by Cicero to such an encounter either in the letters of the period to Atticus or later in the 'Brutus'.

It appears therefore that he spent these months somewhere in the near East, around the Aegean. We have evidence that he visited at some time in his life Samos and Rhodes; and both visits may have occurred at this period. At Samos, we learn from Cicero, he attended a discourse by the eminent jurist Servius Sulpicius, the consul of 51 B.C., on the connection between civil and religious law. According to Appian, Brutus celebrated a birthday in Samos which would

5. App.IV,134.
date his visit there in October. That Brutus visited Rhodes is seen from another reference of Cicero wherein he mentions a famous painting of Ialysus by Protogenes, "which we have seen at Rhodes"; and a visit by Brutus to the island at this time would help to explain the statement of Aurelius Victor, not supported elsewhere, that Brutus studied "eloquence at Rhodes." Further, Rhodes had always been a favourite refuge for exiles, and although the natives had refused to allow certain Pompeians to land, that was before Caesar himself had visited the island and before the full extent of his clemency was known. It is certain that Cassius was in Rhodes at this time; and also Brutus' aunt, the younger sister of Servilia and widow of Lucullus who had been deposited there with her son by Cato. As Cassius was with Brutus at Tarsus in July (April) 47 B.C. it is natural enough to assume that they had been together in Rhodes before that.

During this winter Brutus renewed the correspondence with Cicero, which had ended in such unpleasantness some two and a half years before. Cicero refers in most glowing terms to a letter he received from Brutus in Asia by which, he says, 'he was recalled from the complete dejection of his own being to look upon the light of day again', an effect which he compares to the revival of Rome caused by Marcellus' victory at Nola after the battle of Cannae. The letter involves an interesting problem. Although it has not survived it is easy to imagine what its general tenour must have been. Cicero at this time was

1. - There is an obvious confusion between App. IV, 134 and Plut. Brut. 24.4. Both say that at a birthday party Brutus quoted a verse from Homer (II.16, 549) but whereas Appian says it took place at Samos, Plutarch places it in Carystus in the autumn of 44 B.C. (see p.152 below.) The verse in question ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπεξάνω τοῦ λόγου Πτέρεντίου ἦσσε seems to fit the latter occasion better. Gelzer P. W. vol.X p.982 places the visit to Samos in the following year 47 B.C. when Brutus was on his way home to Italy after his visit to Mytilene (see p.50f. below); but Appian's account of the birthday party indicates that the visit occurred during the autumn (cf.Special Note 1 p.268). Walter (op.cit.July 1934.pp.180-1), also appears to date the visit to Samos in 47 B.C. and says, without grounds, that Brutus had been sent there by Caesar to win over Sulpicius to his side.

2. - Orat. 2.5. Sandys (Cic.Deorator.intr.o.47) thinks that Brutus probably visited Rhodes on his way to Cyprus with Cato. That is possible, but he was sent on at once to Cyprus. (see p.17 above.)

living at Brundisium in extreme mental discomfort. He was by no means assured of the depth of Caesar's attitude of favour towards him and in particular was rather nervous of Antony who was in charge of Italy during his master's absence; at the same time he was perturbed by the realisation that he had quite lost the good-will of the other side too. His ready surrender to Caesar and the special dispensation allowing him to live on Italian soil made him nervous of what his late companions might think of him, especially as Caesar in Alexandria was in considerable danger and there was a distinct possibility of a Pompeian invasion of Italy from Africa. Cicero began to think that he had fallen between two stools and with his usual instability sank into deep despondency. Brutus' letter helped to revive him by giving him both a proof of how sincere Caesar's clemency to others had been and an example of how others had accepted that clemency, just as he had done. If Brutus, the paragon of virtuous conduct, had been no less ready to lay down arms than himself, he could afford to forget about the diehards who still clutched their swords - even though Cato was among them. We must remember, of course, to make considerable allowance for Cicero's inevitable flattery and exaggeration of the kind tone of the letter and of the efficacy of its advice, especially as only a few lines later he speaks of Atticus' "Annals" having had an equal effect and as he does not seem to have mentioned receipt of the letter to Atticus, who was so friendly with Brutus. Despite that the letter must have been friendly and kindly in its tone and much different from the arrogant, ill-bred epistles Cicero had received from Brutus in Cilicia.

While it is easy to see what the nature of the letter was it is more difficult to imagine Brutus' reason for writing it. We cannot believe that it came spontaneously from him; he never appears to have felt any urge to do an unevoked kindness for Cicero and nothing had happened to soften the irritation he felt for him two

1. Att.XI,15.
years before. We are forced to decide that Brutus had been invited to write by someone more interested in Cicero than he was himself. The suggestion that this third party was Caesar has nothing to commend it. It does not seem likely that the victor would be in the least concerned about Cicero's feelings and he had certainly no need to angle for the orator's friendship at this time; Cicero's surrender had been complete. Perhaps Cicero had himself written to Brutus asking how things were in the East, and it is certainly easier to imagine him swallowing his pride to reopen the correspondence than Brutus. Most probably however the mediator between them was, as so often, Atticus, who, worried by his friend's state of mind, asked Brutus to do something to reassure him. We know that Cicero did ask Atticus to persuade others, especially Balbus and Oppius to write well of him to Caesar.

Brutus and Cassius could not remain at Rhodes indefinitely. Caesar could not be ignored, especially by Cassius, who, although he had given up his opposition to the victor, had not yet received his pardon. When therefore news reached Rhodes of Caesar's departure from Egypt after his months of desperate fighting and luxurious love-making the two brothers-in-law set out to meet him. Caesar sailed first to Syria where he spent only a few days in settling affairs, and setting off again from Seleucia he landed in Cilicia at Tarsus, early in July 47 B.C. (April). There Brutus and Cassius met him and on Brutus' intercession Cassius was freely pardoned. If Cicero's story is true that Cassius planned

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1. O. E. Schmidt, Verh. d. 40. Phil. pp. 165–185. Schmidt's theory that Brutus was employed by Caesar as a "decoy-duck" to win over Pompelians has been adequately refuted by T. & F. vol VI. p. XXIV and by Purser in the article "M. Brutus as a Caesarian" in Hermathena IX. (1898) pp. 362–364. There is no real evidence to support it (see pp. 501 below) and Brutus was the last type of man - too rigid and severe - for such a task. Caesar may have hoped Brutus' acceptance of pardon would induce others to follow suit, but it is too much to imagine that he asked and persuaded him actively to bring that about.

2. Att. XI, 6. : (2) There was a rumour in Rome that Cassius had left Rhodes to go to meet Caesar at Alexandria in April (Att. XI, 13,1) but if it was true he appears to have changed his mind and returned (ibid. 15, 2.) He may have heard that Caesar was soon to cross the Mediterranean.

to murder Caesar on this occasion and was prevented only by Caesar's last minute change of a mooring place for his vessel, there is no indication that Brutus had any share in the intention or even any knowledge of it. The story is, in fact, rendered improbable by Cassius' acceptance from Caesar of the position of legatus under him. Cassius was not the man to make such a complete volte face so quickly nor to give up a deliberate plan so easily. In the Philippics truth is not always Cicero's guide.

From Tarsus Caesar made a rapid march northwards through Cappadocia towards Pontus, aiming at Pharnaces, who alone of the independent rulers of Asia still held out against him. It is probable that Cassius accompanied him as a legate on this campaign, which ended with such famous and startling brevity at Zela; for his former experience against Eastern armies made him a very useful officer. Brutus too was probably in the conqueror's train. When after his rapid victory, Caesar resuming his tour attended to the case of Deiotarus of Galatia at Nicaea in Bithynia, it was Brutus who undertook the monarch's defence. We have seen that Deiotarus had done Brutus a service in connection with his loan to Ariobarzanes in 50 B.C. and Cicero describes the king as "maxime necessarius" to Cato. In defending him Brutus more than repaid his former obligation. We have the word of Matius Calvena, quoted by Cicero that Brutus' speech was "so vigorous and outspoken that it drew from the judge the remark which he frequently made

1.- Fam.VI,6,10.
2.- It has been suggested that this trial of Deiotarus took place at Nicaea in Liguria. (T.& P. note on Att.XIV,1,2:vol V,p.225); but this is unlikely. It would have been unlike Caesar to leave Asia without dealing with Deiotarus and we have no reason to think that he did. Further, the only occasion when Brutus and Caesar were in Liguria together was when during Brutus' governorship in Cisalpine Gaul Caesar passed through on his way to Spain and on that occasion Caesar was in too great a hurry to waste time on a trial. See p.58, below.
4.- Fam.XIV,4,15.
thereafter about Brutus "magni refert hic quid velit sed quidquid vult valde vult". Deiotarus' offence had been the grievous one of rendering assistance to Pompey and though Brutus could not secure an acquittal he managed to save for his client the major part of his territories. Deiotarus had to surrender the tetrarchy of the Trocni in Galatia and Lesser Armenia.

Caesar was now on his way towards Rome, which he had not seen for some sixteen months and continued his tour rapidly towards the coast of Asia Minor through Bithynia and Galatia. It seems probable enough that Brutus accompanied him to the sea, though there is no evidence in proof of it. Caesar sailed from Asia at the beginning of September (middle of June) and Brutus left apparently about the same time though he certainly did not sail all the way to Rome in his company. On the way Brutus called in at Mytilene to pay a visit to Marcus Marcellus, one of Caesar's most determined opponents, who had, however, retired to that island even before Pharsalus was fought. It has been presumed that the purpose of Brutus' visit was to convey to Marcellus a message from Caesar inviting him to return to Rome, but if that were the case what need was there later for the 'pro Marcello' of Cicero and the Senate's plea to Caesar on Marcellus' behalf a year later? Cicero does not mention the latter's pardon by Caesar.

1. Cic. Att.XIV,1,2. cf. Plut.Brut.8,4. who gives it as οὐκ ἄλλα χρήσεις ΠΑΝΤlander οὐκ Εστίς ΣΕΙΔΑΝ. I agree with T.& F. in their note (vol V,p.225) that there is no need to insert 'non' before 'magni'. For a very full discussion of the phrase and its significance, see the article "Caesar über Brutus" in Rhein. Mus. 81.(1932) pp.324 ff. (wrongly given as in Hermes by C.A.E. vol X. p: 902) by M.Rothstein,who, reading the future 'vult' for the present 'vult',sees in Caesar's frequent use of the phrase an indication that he felt Brutus to be a possible conspirator against him. I feel, however, that the article, though ingenious, depends too much on a rather one-sided interpretation. Surely if Caesar's suspicions had been so well formulated he would have taken some steps to protect himself. The idea that he wanted to die cannot be upheld. see p.95 below.


4. e.g. Rice Holmes. R.R. III,p.215.

until September 46 B.C. Further if Caesar had commissioned Brutus
to bring over Marcellus and Brutus had failed to do so, he could
scarcely have spoken of him as he did in his 'de Virtute' in the
following year. His visit appears to have been a quite spontaneous
gesture of friendship for the highly respected exile and as such
is an important indication of the independence Brutus reserved for
himself in his dealings with Caesar. Had he considered himself a
follower of the dictator he could scarcely have gone out of his way
to visit such a notorious opponent of his master nor could he have
described the exile's behaviour with such eulogy as he did. He was
greatly impressed by the dignity and philosophical attitude of the
eminent consular and, in the book he published some months later,
he said that when he left him he felt that it was as if he himself
were going into exile instead of back to Rome. Brutus was probably
quite envious of the quiet scholarly life Marcellus was able to
lead in his exile. Caesar, we are told, did not put in at Mytilene
but sailed on because he could not bear to see such a noble man
living in disgrace. It appears, therefore, that Brutus travelled
to Rome some little distance behind Caesar.

1.- Fam.VI,6,10: of. IV,4,3-4 : (2.- See below p.63. :
3.- Seneca.l.c.9,6.
4.- This, though probable, is no more than an assumption. There is
nothing in the passage in Seneca to prove that Brutus' visit to
Mytilene and Caesar's passing by occurred at the same time. Although
the account I have given is, in my opinion, the most probable version
of Brutus' movements, the chronology may here and there be wrong. It
is possible for instance that Brutus may have visited Marcellus in the
winter of 46-47 B.C. before he and Cassius met Caesar.
Chapter V.

Brutus in Rome and in Cisalpine Gaul - 47 - 45 B.C.

When Caesar arrived at last in Rome in September 47 B.C. he found much need for his presence. Almost immediately after his departure for Epirus in January 48 B.C. trouble had started in the capital and things had gone steadily from bad to worse. Caelius, whom Caesar had left as praetor peregrinus had been the first cause of trouble by his determined opposition to his senior and more honest colleague Trebonius, the praetor urbanus, and by his persistent attempts to bring into being legislative measures aimed at the relief of debtors and calculated to win their author much popularity. His repeated failures drove him to the use of riotous methods and, when at last the consul P. Servilius had him ejected from the rostra during an attempt to address the people, he took refuge with Milo in the south of Italy where the irresponsible pair hoped by various means to foment a revolt against Caesar. Their efforts proved vain, and, indeed, fatal; both were slain by the country people whose loyalty to Caesar remained firm. For some months after that things were quiet but tense, while everybody awaited the issue of the struggle in Greece and was careful to show prejudice neither way. At last came the news which made them hasten to discover that they had always been supporters of Caesar and on top of it came the living proof of Caesar's mastery. To see to his interests at home during his continued absence, Caesar sent Antony with orders to have him (Caesar) made dictator and himself (Antony) his master of horse. Antony was a vigorous but undiplomatic viceroy: and soon disgusted the majority of better-class citizens by the disgraceful orgies which Cicero describes, albeit with exaggeration, in the Philippics. Worse than that, Antony

2. Phil. II, 24-25 et al.
found himself in trouble with the legions in Italy, which, weary of waiting for their long promised bounties, began to speak openly of mutiny and refused to be appeased even by a personal visit from Antony. In Rome Dolabella, who had been elected tribune for 47 B.C. was proving another thorn in Antony's flesh. He had adopted Caelius' policy of relief for debtors and even proposed the repeal of legislation Caesar himself had passed on that score in 49 B.C. Dolabella's personal popularity with the mob and the uncertain attitude of the legions made the situation a difficult one for Antony to handle despite the permission given him by the Senate to barrack troops in the city. With the one legion, however, on whose loyalty he could depend, he dispersed the assembly, which Dolabella attempted to hold in the Forum to pass his new bills, and executed the ring-leaders of his riotous faction. All the time, too, there was the distinct possibility of an attempt by the Pompeian troops in Africa under Cato to invade Italy.

At this juncture - about September 24th (July 10th) Caesar arrived. Almost by his presence alone order was restored everywhere. Antony and Dolabella were at once on their best behaviour and both were forgiven for their ill-timed excesses. One famous word sufficed to restore the rebellious legions to their senses and after various measures, made in magnanimous acceptance of the opinions of Caelius and Dolabella, to relieve debtors and stabilise the price of property, he began to prepare for the very necessary campaign against the Pompeians in Africa. Before he left towards the end of November (September) he made arrangements for the control of Rome and Italy during his absence. Naturally most of the plums of office went to those who had served him well in the recent struggles. Two good servants, Calenus and Vatinius, received the consulship for the remainder of 47 B.C., but for 46 B.C. Caesar had himself elected consul and still retained the title of dictator.

The numbers of the Senate, reduced by deaths in battle, were made up from knights and even centurions who had served him well; two extra praetors were appointed for 46 B.C. We have already observed that Caesar's attitude to the Pompeians, whom he had already defeated, was tempered not a little by his desire to have their willing assistance in the formation of a civil government. It was for that reason, in part at least, that he pardoned such as would accept pardon, and, in further token of his desire for a bridging of the schism in the state, he bestowed on the more prominent of those, who had accepted his pardon, several official positions. Among them was Brutus, who, although he had never been praetor, was appointed to govern the province of Cisalpine Gaul for 46 B.C.

As we have already seen Brutus arrived in Rome most probably not long after Caesar. Of his life in or near the capital during the months between his arrival and his departure for Gaul towards the beginning - as we must assume - of 46 B.C., we have little evidence. It was, however, characterised mainly by a closer intimacy with Cicero than the ill-matched pair enjoyed at any other time. They had no matters of private finance, as earlier in 50 B.C., nor of public policy, as later in 44 - 43 B.C., to quarrel over. Brutus' letter from Asia in the previous winter had effected a closing of the rift between them and they found something to bind them in their common devotion to letters. Also, their position as pardoned Pompeians, living in Italy while their late comrades continued the struggle elsewhere, gave them something in common. If the evidence of Cicero's rhetorical works is to be trusted, they saw a great deal of each other both in Rome, where the dialogue of the "Brutus" between Cicero, Atticus and Brutus is set and in the country towns, Cumae and Tusculum, where both had villas. Both philosophy and oratory were the subjects of their conversations, and in the following year they continued to exchange letters mainly, so far as can be judged, on

1.- Brutus.3,10 : (2.- ibid.87,300. cf. Orator.30,110.)
the same kind of literary topics. The results of this friend-
ship are to be seen in the number of works dedicated by Cicero to
Brutus at this time, some of them like the "Cato" and "Orator"
written by Brutus' invitation.

Apart from his friendship with Cicero and his appointment
to Gaul, there is one other incident in Brutus' life which must,
I think, be dated at this period - his election to the pontifi-
cate. Although none of the later historians, not even Plutarch,
mention Brutus' elevation to the cherished priesthood, several
references in Cicero make it certain that he was a pontifex. In
the 'Brutus' he makes Brutus tell how he heard Sulpicius dis-
cussing "nostrum ius divinum"; and later in the work Brutus is
made to refer to 4. Caeceilius Metellus Pius Scipio, the consul
with Pompey of 52 B.C. as "conlega mens". Three years later
writing to Brutus in Macedonia Cicero expresses a desire to have
his son elected "in vestrum collegium". Further and even better
evidence than that is provided by the insignia of the pontificate -
tripod, sacrificial axe and simpulum - on certain of the coins
issued in Brutus' name in the East in 42 - 41 B.C. Cicero's
references help us to date Brutus' election. It had obviously
taken place before the publication of the 'Brutus' in the early
months of 46 B.C., and from the context of the passage in which
Cicero discusses his son's candidature, it is evident that Brutus
was in Rome when elected. Unless therefore, we are prepared to
think he was made pontifex before the civil war, which considering
the high esteem, in which the appointment was held as a mark of

\[1\] Paradoxa Stoicorum: Cato: Orator: de Finibus: Tusculan
Disputations: as well as the Brutus.
\[2\] Brut.42,156: ibid.58,212. (4.) - ad Brut.I,5,3: cf
ibid.15,8. "vos pontifices".
(have knife instead of tripod) One coin no. 47 bears on its
reverse besides the tripod and simpulum an 'apex' or flamen's cap
which seems to indicate that Brutus also held the minor priesthood
of flamen. Of that we have no other evidence.
\[4\] Cicero is at pains to show Brutus that it would be quite legal
for his son to stand for pontifical election without coming to Rome;
his was in Macedonia with Brutus. Surely if Brutus had been elected in
absentia Cicero would not have gone as far back as C. Marius for a
precedent.
social standing, and Brutus' comparative insignificance at that time, is unlikely, we must date his election at the end of 47 B.C., the only time he was in Rome between the outbreak of the war and the appearance of Cicero's "Brutus". There does not seem to be any real difficulty in assuming that he listened to Sulpicius' lecture on religious law and its connection with civil law before he actually became a member of the priestly college. That assumption is at least better than the alternatives - that he was elected "in absentia" or else before 49 B.C.

His two appointments - as pontifex and as governor in Gaul - and perhaps also Cicero's closer friendship with him, are indications of the alteration in Brutus' position since he had left Rome for Cilicia at the beginning of the war. Then he had been merely a promising young man well known in the city both for his family connections and his own rather immature qualities, but not of any great importance. Neither his service under Cato in Cyprus nor his quaestorship in 53 B.C. had been marked by any outstanding events and his chief claim to prominence lay apart from his qualities of character, in his promise as an orator and his unqualified and openly shown opposition to the triumvirs, Pompey even more than Caesar. Now he appeared as one marked for special favour by the Dictator and there must have been many who, while respecting his new importance, compared it with his earlier declarations against the anti-Republicans. It must be said here - the subject is expanded later - that Brutus was not in his own eyes a servant of Caesar but of the state. Yet his office was not propraetor but the less independent one of "legatus pro praetore".

1. Gelzer P.W. X.p.963 places his election before his visit to Samos in 47 B.C. without apparently considering the context of ad Brut.1,5,3. T.& F. vol VI.p.CXIII and note 171 say that he was elected some time before 46 and that Metellus Scipio whose place he got, died in 46! (In their reference Plutarch, Brut. 212 should read Cicero, Brut. 212.). I do not know their evidence for regarding Scipio as the man whom he replaces, but their statement seems hardly credible when we find Brutus describing Scipio as his colleague (Cic. Brut. 60,211.)

2. See below pp68ff .

The province was at this time in an anomalous but rather interesting position. At the end of 50 B.C., when Pompey's departure from Italy gave Caesar the opportunity to pass whatever laws he wished, his earlier promises to the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul were made good by a law bearing the name of L. Roseius, the praetor of 49 B.C. By this law full citizenship was conferred upon the Gauls north of the Po and, as most of those of Cisalpine Gaul had received that gift in 89 B.C., Brutus' provincial subjects were all Roman citizens. An anomalous position is never an easy one to maintain and Brutus might have encountered frequent troubles during his year of office but for the careful attention which Caesar, even in the midst of a crisis, could give to details. Apparently within a year of the enfranchisement and certainly before Brutus' assumption of the governorship a second bill - the lex Rubria - had made provision for the conduct of the province. All the principles of Roman law and judicial procedure which applied elsewhere in Italy were put into force in Cisalpine Gaul and at the same time the possibility of clash between the local authorities and the governor appointed from Rome was avoided by a careful draft defining their relations. Brutus' task thus became a complete sinecure.

If the province's position was curious, its governor's was no less so. The land he was ruling was the very district in which his father had been killed by the man, whom Brutus had lately been fighting for. His appointment was due to the man whom he had lately fought against and who, at the moment Brutus was apparently serving him, was engaged in a campaign against Cato - who had been a second

father to Brutus.

of his conduct of the province the historians have taken but little notice; nor was there much to record. The peaceful con-
tented state of the district precluded the possibility of excitement within the province - even the troubles of 48 - 47 B.C. experienced in Rome and in the South of Italy appear to have left the North undisturbed; its borders had been for the time being at least pacified by Caesar, though Decimus Brutus three years later made a short campaign against the tribes among the Alps. In these circumstances Brutus' task was simple and pleasant.

Plutarch is probably rather extravagant in his praises when he describes Brutus' appointment as "a God-send" to the province and says that, while other provinces were oppressed like the vanquished in war by the violence and greed of their governors, Brutus acted as a kind of respite and relief from their sufferings to the people of his province. His attitude towards his subjects is not strict-
ly comparable with that of other governors, for Roman citizens, however recent their entry to that ennobling circle, could not be treated like Cypriots. Nevertheless, Brutus appears to have learned at this time to mitigate his old arrogant attitude to-
wards the provincials. The forbearance and humanity he later displayed in the East may be the fruits of this year in the more enlightened province of Gaul. Again, when Plutarch gives Brutus the credit for the display of affection that his province gave to Caesar on his way to Spain near the end of Brutus' year of office, he forgets that they did not need him to make them feel any attachment for the dictator; they had reason enough of their own to love him. At the same time there are indications that they

\textsuperscript{1} He had no campaigning. Expressions like "Brutus was 'fighting for Caesar!'" (Petterson op. cit. p.534) are misleading.

\textsuperscript{2} Brut.6,6. : \textsuperscript{3} - Brut.6,7.

\textsuperscript{4} I take it that Caesar was at the time of this journey on his way to not from Spain: when he returned from Spain Brutus, although he went north from Rome to meet him (see p.74 below), was no longer governor of the province and the compliments paid him would have been out of place.
conceived an affection for Brutus himself. A statue of him in bronze was erected at Milan, the chief city of the province and during all the later vagaries of his fortunes the people allowed it to stand. Even a visit from his successful opponent Augustus was not deemed sufficient reason for its removal. Again when the war with Antony broke out in 43 B.C. Cisalpine Gaul remained remarkably loyal to Brutus' kinsman and fellow-conspirator during his trying siege in Mutina. Decimus himself wrote to Cicero about the great attention which the people of Vicetia were showing to Brutus and himself, while Cicero talks in a letter to Cassius of the whole-hearted support of Italy and Cisalpine Gaul for the side of Brutus against Antony.

It has already been pointed out that although there was nothing spectacular for Brutus to do in Gaul, there was a considerable amount of more ordinary but none the less valuable work to be done. The civil war and earlier struggles had left an amount of disorder of a private rather than public nature, of which we see instances in the letters Cicero wrote to him as governor of the province. Rents for instance had here and there fallen into arrears and Cicero's own native town sent a commission to collect debts on property which it owned in Brutus' province. This commission Cicero recommends to his friend. In another letter he brought to Brutus' notice the case of L.Titius Strabo an equestrian friend of his own. An inhabitant of Brutus' province, P. Cornelius, owed money to Strabo who had sued him before the praetor of 46, Volcatius, at Rome. The latter had referred the case to Gaul for judgement by the Governor and, when Strabo's freedman was sent to represent him at the governor's court, Cicero paved the way for him

1. Plut. Brut. & Dion Cpd.5: Suet. de clar. rhet. 6. The statues mentioned in Cic. Orat. 31,110 and described by Sandys in his note as "complimentary busts...presented by the gratitude of provincial and municipal authorities" could hardly have included any from Gaul as the "Orator" was published while Brutus was still in the province. 2. Fam XII,19,2. 3: Fam. XII, 5,2. cf. Phil. X,5,10. 4. Gelzer.P.W.X.p.983. 5. Fam XIII. 11. 6. ibid. 14.
by a letter to Brutus. The effect of the letter and the issue of the case are unknown. From Cicero's correspondence also we learn the name of one member of Brutus' suite. His quaestor - obviously since he required a letter of introduction from Cicero, assigned to him by lot - was M. Terentius Varro with whom Cicero had some acquaintance. He was not, of course, the famous Varro and later when tribune in 43 B.C. won himself no little ridicule by denying that identification publicly when the Varro was proscribed. From the fact that Cicero had used him as a mediator with Caesar, it is clear that he was a supporter of the latter.

During his year in Gaul Brutus kept in close touch with Rome and had more or less regular correspondence with, among others, Atticus and Cicero. But the world outside his province did not concern him much and he came into close contact with it only twice. We have already noted the journey which Caesar made through Cisalpine Gaul to Spain in November of 46 B.C. and although, as we may imagine, the arrangements for meeting the dictator and escorting him with due honour and attention, may have caused Brutus a little concern, the occasion was one of pleasant friendliness. Caesar was delighted with his reception. The other intrusion of public affairs was less direct but less pleasant.

It must have been sometime in May or early June that Brutus heard of the death of Cato by his own hand at Utica. What his feelings were when the news came we have no means of learning but from his actions later we may guess that he was deeply moved. There can be no doubt that he had a deep admiration for his uncle and as much affection as his own undemonstrative but not unemotional, nature could feel for the rather frigid and uncompromising Stoic. He had always regarded him as his spiritual father, his mentor and exemplar, and to Brutus, no less than to many others, Cato was a

(1.) ibid.10. : (2.) He is sometimes styled Gibba: Ascon. in Mil. 49 K.S. : (3.) Dio. xlvi,5-4. : (4.) Cic. Fam. XIII, 10.3. : (5.) Cicero heard of it in May.
kind of symbol of the Republic. The fall of that symbol must have given him much food for thought, especially regarding his own position as a minister under the man responsible for Cato's death.

Almost his first reaction was the desire to have composed a literary memorial of Cato and before the middle of June he suggested to Cicero that he should undertake the task. It is ingenious but unnecessary to regard this request as burdened with political motives. The idea of O. E. Schmidt that by it he was giving Cicero a second chance to compose a piece of Caesarian propaganda - Cicero having failed properly to use the first opportunity in his 'Brutus' - is on the face of it absurd. Tyrrell and Purser have already pointed out that if Brutus had been acting for Caesar he would surely have ensured by reading these works before publication - they were both dedicated to him - and by using his influence with the author and the author's confidant and publisher, Atticus, that they were Caesarian in attitude and tone. Granted the natural desire for a eulogy of Cato, the most obvious man to compose it was Cicero, who was the greatest man of letters alive and had been Cato's contemporary and colleague in most of his political life. It is a mistake to explain the fact that Brutus did not at once assume the task himself on the grounds that he feared to offend Cicero. In the following year he did compose a 'Cato' and then he had no less reason to fear Caesar's displeasure than in 46 B.C. Cicero's work was completed and published by the end of July, and it does not appear to have satisfied the man who prompted it. Cicero's task was, for him especially, one of great difficulty. Any wish he may have had to praise Cato was tempered by a desire not to offend Caesar, as is already shown by his determined public avowal that he only

undertook the 'Cato' after Brutus' encouragement. It was impossible properly to praise Cato without risking offence to the dictator, for Cato was never more praiseworthy than in his opposition to Caesar. Thus Cicero's work was probably non-committal and insipid. It is difficult also to imagine Cicero refraining from at least a little self-glorification in his account of those of Cato's activities in which he had himself played some part. For these reasons Brutus felt it necessary to compose a 'Cato of his own.

Cicero's 'Cato' was not the only fruit of the literary alliance between him and Brutus. Before it appeared Cicero had already published his history of Roman Oratory, which he dedicated to Brutus and named after him. The work is replete with rather fulsome praises of Brutus, to whom is given also a part in the dialogue, but there are some admirable moral traits in it too. Cicero shows refreshing courage in his frequent references to the decay of oratory under the tyranny and in his praises of some of Caesar's opponents. It has been suggested that in some of these passages Cicero was trying to instil into Brutus a hatred of Caesar in the hope that he might be induced to lead an opposition against him. The passages concerned, however, are too vague and general and Cicero's conduct and attitude at the time too careful to make it probable that he had any deliberate intention of even encouraging others to oppose the dictator. More acceptable is the theory that with the 'Brutus' Cicero hoped to convert the younger man to his own views on rhetoric; there are several places in which Cicero seems to regard himself as a kind of tutor and adviser to Brutus. But if Cicero did entertain any such hopes they were certainly vain. Perhaps about the same time took place the controversy carried on by letter between Cicero, Calvus and Brutus on the merits of their respective styles of oratory and in

1. - Orat.10,35: Fam. IV.7.4: 61. - e.g. especially 5,21: 6,22: 2. - e.g. 96,330: 97,351: 3. - 26,148 ff. 61. - e.g. 14,53; where L. Brutus is mentioned with high praise. 4. - e.g. 8,22: 32,123: 5.- Tacit. Dial.18,21 ff.
that correspondence Brutus certainly had faults to find with
Cicero, while later when he composed the most important speech of
his life it was on Cicero's own admission quite un-Ciceronian.

The lack of excitement in his province and the more formal
nature of his duties left Brutus with much leisure, which he spent,
like the zealous student he always was, in literary study and
composition. Cicero says of him "Yet for all your occupations you
do not neglect your studies. You are ever composing something
or calling on me to do so." This is generally supposed to refer
to Brutus' "de Virtute", the best known of his philosophical works.
That book, however, is not mentioned by name until the de Finibus,
written in May - July 45 B.C., where Cicero records with obvious
relish that it is dedicated to himself, and if it had been
published before May - June 46 B.C. we should have expected
Cicero's reference to it in the Orator of that date to have been
more explicit. It appears probable, therefore, that the 'de
Virtute' came in the later half of 46 B.C. or early in 45 B.C.
and the works which Cicero referred to must have been lesser
compositions, including perhaps the 'de officiis' and the 'de
patientia' which are mentioned by other ancient authors. All of
Brutus' philosophical works are discussed elsewhere. Another
work of a different sort, which claimed his attention before his
year in Gaul was over, was his own eulogy of Cato. The work is
fully discussed in a later chapter. Here it is sufficient to
record its publication, which occurred about the month of March
of 45 B.C. and to indicate the bearing it had on his relations with
both Cicero and Caesar. The former was highly displeased with
it because it did not contain enough praise of himself but his
indignation did not on this occasion cause a long estrangement
from Brutus. Caesar was not apparently moved in any way by the

\[1.\] See below pp. 126 and 254. \[2.\] Orat. 10, 33. \[3.\] cf. Sandys' note on the passage in his edition. \[4.\] I, 3, 8. \[5.\] see Chap. XIII. \[6.\] Att. XII, 21, 1; dated March 17th. \[7.\] ibid. \[8.\] see below p. 66.
appearance of the pamphlet despite its Republican subject, but we cannot fail to think that it sheds some light on Brutus' attitude towards the Dictator. Whether deliberately conceived with that purpose or not, Brutus' praise of Caesar's most stubborn opponent cannot but indicate his own feeling of independence regarding him. He did not regard Caesar's omnipotence as reason for abandoning his own Republican beliefs or for refraining from free expression of them when the occasion demanded it.

1. - His one recorded criticism of it dealt with its style. see below p.407.
2. - See; further, p.68ff below.
Chapter VI.

Brutus in and near Rome 45 - 44 B.C.

Brutus was succeeded in Gaul by the staunch Caesarian[1]. Pansa and returned to Rome about the beginning of April 45 B.C. There he found no less peace and quiet than in his own province. Caesar's presence and activities in the city before his departure to Africa and later to Spain had ensured that there would be no repetition of the troubles which Antony had experienced while Caesar was still in the East. Rome and Italy realised, when they actually saw the dictator in power, that acceptance of his mastery was the only course open to them, and there was a general willingness to preserve the peace and give the leader a chance to show what his rule would be. The opposition to him in Africa and Spain had no real counterpart even below the surface in Italy and after the fall of Cato the sympathy of most Romans - even of Caesar's more bitter opponents[2], like Cassius - was for the dictator rather than for Gnaeus Pompey who had an evil reputation for cruelty and vengefulness. Lepidus, who had been left in charge as master of the horse with the able and faithful support of Balbus and Oppius, had very little trouble. The influence of Caesar was supreme everywhere and the prevalent feeling was one of resignation. With only the most rabid of the Pompeians still in arms abroad, Brutus found in Rome a community which, apart from those who were prepared for selfish or better reasons almost to worship Caesar, was willing to acquiesce in his rule provided that it kept within reasonable bounds. Brutus' feelings were precisely of that sort.

On his arrival in Rome he was accorded a formal reception,[3] from which Cicero absented himself. A month before Brutus had

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been humane enough to write his condolences to Cicero on the
death of his much-loved daughter Tullia, which had occurred in
February. The letter according to its recipient was wisely
written and in friendly vein yet it brought him many tears.

Brutus, in fact, seems to have guessed - he may have heard it
from Atticus or some other friend, or realised it from a letter
of Cicero's - that the orator was carrying his natural grief to
extremes, and his letter of sympathy contained also a certain
amount of reprehension. Cicero calls it "obiurgatoria". In
a letter to Atticus Brutus suggested that on his return he
would call on Cicero, and the latter expressed his pleasure at
the prospect. Before Brutus' return, however, his 'Cato' was
published and Cicero in pique at it preferred not to go to meet
Brutus. He hinted to Atticus that there were other reasons for
his remaining outside the city - he was staying at Astura - but
his hints are very vague and Atticus, troubled once more by a
breach between his two friends, did not consider his excuses
very worthy.

Brutus did not remain long in Rome. By the end of April
he was at Cumae and perhaps from pique in turn at Cicero's
neglect to welcome him he did not avail himself of an invitation,
given apparently at second hand through Atticus, to make use of
Cicero's villa there. Cicero considered his conduct very ill-
mannered. The breach between them, however, did not last long
on this occasion. A month later Brutus, apparently back again

1. - ibid. 13, 1 : 14, 4 : XIII, 6, 3. : (2. - Att. XII, 13, 1. "scriptae
et prudenter et amice multas mihi tamen lacrinas attulerunt". cf.
ib. 14, 4. "prudenter scriptae, sed nihil quod me adiuverat".
(3. - Att. XII, 6, 3. T. & F. in their note have, with their usual
ingenuity in casting aspersions on Brutus, translated the word
"persevering in obstinate condolent." The more obvious rendering
is the simple "upbraiding" as given by Shuckburgh. cf. Att. XII, 36,
2. "obiurgato eum". That my interpretation of Brutus' letter is
correct is clearly shown by Cicero's further reference to it in
Att. XII, 36, 3.
(4. - Att. XII, 14, 4. "Quod ad te scriptis, id vellem, ut ipse adesset."
(5. - It is obvious from Att. XII, 27, 1 "Nec ego Brutum vito nec....."
that in the letter Atticus wrote in answer to a previous one XII, 27
(cf. 27, 1. Silius ut scribis, Hodie") he had suggested that Cicero was
deliberately avoiding Brutus and without good reasons (cf. 27, 4 Valde
calm urbum fugio multas ob causas.")
(6. - Att. XII, 36, 3. It was Atticus, at least, who received Brutus'
excuse: "causam quam tibi dixit."
in Rome, wrote to Cicero telling him that he was coming to Tusculum, where the later was then in residence, and expressing the hope that they would meet there; the letter was "in an obliging spirit". Cicero at once became almost panicky at the prospect and, as if Brutus were some formidable and important person, begged Atticus to come and support him at the interview. Atticus despite the pressure of his many business interests went to Tusculum, but had to return to Rome before Brutus arrived. Cicero, therefore, had to face his visitor alone. He arrived at Tusculum on June 9th about 4 p.m., and the same evening Cicero wrote to Atticus about the inevitable and impending visit, or visitation as he seemed to regard it. With all the trepidation and excitement with which Cicero leads up to his interview, it is very disappointing that we have no letter describing it. Even what they talked about, we can only guess at. From the fact that the meeting was arranged at Brutus' request, it is obvious that he had something on his mind regarding which he wished to ask the older man's advice. His conduct immediately afterwards makes it probable that at least part of his problem was his intention to divorce his wife Claudia and marry Cato's daughter, Porcia. Claudia appears never to have been much more than a nominal wife to him, although there is no evidence that they were ever on bad terms, and as Porcia was now a widow, her husband having died in the Adriatic in the winter of 49 - 48 B.C., Brutus was minded to marry the woman for whom he had a genuine affection. That his father-in-law Appius was also dead made the divorce easier for him. The problem was, however, greater than a simple divorce and remarriage, which would in itself have occasioned some surprise and a little scandal. Bound up with it was the whole matter of his relations to Caesar and his...
political conduct generally. That conduct and these relations we must now examine; and the examination is of the greatest importance, for by its results the sincerity of Brutus' behaviour and the justice of his reputation for honour and virtue must stand or fall.

It was now some three years since Pharsalus, and during these years Brutus had been living apparently as a supporter of Caesar. It is very easy to say, as it has often been said, "Caesar gave Brutus his life and preferment in office; Brutus murdered Caesar; therefore Brutus was a wretched ingrate". The problem is more complex than that, but not too complex to be solved by logical means that strain neither facts nor credibility. The main point in the solution is that Brutus was never a personal supporter of Caesar. He never regarded himself as serving Caesar but always the Republic. When in 48 B.C., having witnessed the complete defeat of a leader whom he detested, Brutus accepted pardon from Caesar, his conduct was neither unnatural nor ignoble. The struggle in which he had taken part was not, however much Pompey might protest his loyalty to the constitution, one between the Republic and an ambitious monarchist, but between two individuals. Had Pompey won the battle, the Republic would have been no less overawed and controlled by him than it was in fact by Caesar. The control might have been less obvious; it would certainly have been less able. It had become increasingly evident since 53 B.C. that, for the time being at least, the ordinary Republican form of government must somehow be adjusted to satisfy the personal claims of either Pompey or Caesar. To Brutus the change of allegiance was not from the Republic to Monarchy; it meant merely a choice of Caesar instead of Pompey as the necessary evil, and at that choice none can cavil.

The choice did not imply any acquiescence on Brutus' part in monarchism or monarchical ambitions. As long as he was able to believe that Caesar did not cherish such ambitions, but was earnestly endeavouring and sincerely intending to give the help
of his genius and power for the reform and rehabilitation of the Republic, he was glad to serve under him. It was not till it became palpably obvious that Caesar was aiming at a permanent monarchy, that Brutus in the most natural and creditable manner turned against him. At no time in his service under Caesar did Brutus use his influence with him for his own advantage. In 47 B.C. it was to save his friends like Cassius and Deiotarus that he appealed to Caesar. His governorship in Gaul was not given at his own request; it was offered by Caesar and accepted by Brutus as a piece of necessary service to the state. So, too, later with his praetorship.

Of the fact that Brutus did not regard Caesar as the Master of Rome and himself as his servant - an impossible relationship for one of Brutus' character and upbringing - no further proof is needed than his composition of a sincere and outspoken eulogy of Cato and his marriage to Porcia. A tyrant's servant cannot enter upon alliances with the kin of his master's enemies; and Caesar never had more bitter enemies than Porcia's father, Cato, and her husband Bibulus, of whom he had so mercilessly made a laughing stock in 59 B.C. These two acts and his continued friendship with other Pompeians indicate beyond the possibility of doubt that Brutus regarded himself as a free agent so far as Caesar was concerned and, that he regarded Caesar not as the assailer of the constitution but as its prop.

At the same time in 45 B.C. he was in some perplexity. The talk of the Caesarians in Rome was doubtless responsible for his anxiety, and with the announcement of the final victory at Munda, which was made in Rome some three weeks after Brutus' return from

1.- I do not see to what acts of Brutus T. & P. refer (vol VI, p. CXIX) when they say he "continued to act openly as a Caesarian" and that "he had acted loyally for Caesar." His service in Gaul and later as Urban Praetor was public service to the State, not service to Caesar as an individual. No act of his can be properly described as "for Caesar".
Gaul, we may imagine that their expectations of Caesar's supreme rule would be strengthened. Caesar's own followers had no such ideas of a continuance of the Republican order of things as Brutus had, and even Cicero is found referring to Caesar as "the master" of the state. The knowledge, moreover, of Caesar's now world-wide supremacy and the immediate prospect of his return to Rome made Brutus' worry all the more pressing. He began for the first time really to wonder what Caesar's aims were and whether he was right in accepting service under him as he did. Whether he actually said to himself "Shall I marry Porcia? It may offend Caesar", we cannot now tell. But if the problem he discussed with Cicero on June 10th 45 B.C. was that of his marriage it was so only as the immediate and particular instance of his general conduct and attitude to Caesar. The marriage was but one facet of the wider political problem. It is pleasant to record that his independence was proof against the growing awe of Caesar and that the marriage did at last take place.

Apart from consideration of Caesar, however, there was another and more immediately pressing influence against the marriage with Porcia. Brutus' mother for more than one reason set herself definitely against it. She had been glad to see signs of a rapprochement between her son and her old lover, with whom she was still on friendly terms. Apart from the instinctive mutual disagreement between herself and Porcia, Servilia was naturally afraid that this marriage, if it did not offend Caesar irrevocably, would certainly cause a breach between him and Brutus, and Porcia, whom she recognised as a woman of character not unlike herself, was bound to influence her husband against the dictator. Servilia's efforts were, however, vain. After the

1. Fam. VII, 25, 1.
2. She is said to have received from him the estates of the Pompeian Pontius. Att. XIV, 21, 3.
interview with Cicero. Brutus returned to Rome and within a month he had divorced Claudia. That event caused a good deal of scandal, and Cicero was of the opinion that an immediate remarriage would silence the gossips. To divorce a woman for no fault on her part was scandalous and insulting to her, but a divorce could amply be justified, it seems, by the intention to marry someone else. It has been further suggested that the reason for the offensive talk regarding the divorce of Claudia arose from its apparent indication of a break between Brutus and the Pompeian party, of which Claudius had in the end been an adherent: Cicero accordingly urged a speedy marriage with Porcia to show that there was no such break.

Brutus did not marry Porcia until about the beginning of July. Almost at once a disagreement broke out between the mother and daughter-in-law, in which Brutus had to interfere. In Cicero's opinion he acted very properly towards both of them. Because Porcia was a daughter of Cato and a woman of some character, it has always been said that she had a decisive influence in turning Brutus against Caesar. Although containing some truth the idea must not be pressed too far as it has been in such a statement as "Cato's daughter was of sterner stuff than Cato's nephew." - an opinion which is proved completely false by the events of the Ides of March. The fact, moreover, that Brutus was unwilling at first to reveal to her that the conspiracy was under way shows that she was not wholly in his political confidence.

The rest of Brutus' problem - how to interpret Caesar's intentions and how to regulate his own conduct accordingly -

1. Att. XIII, 10, 3. : (2. - d'Addozio. op. cit. p. 46.
6. - Compare Att. XIII, 16, 2 (June 27th) and 17 (June 28th) in which the marriage is still a matter for question (e.g. "Brutus etiam esquid agit et quando?" 16, 2.) with XIII, 22, 4. (July 4th) in which Brutus is shown as a good son and husband ("in utraque officio pareat," accepting Orelli's reading.)
7. - See below p. 92f.
could not be so easily solved as the question of his marriage with Porcia. Cicero was ill fitted to advise him, as he himself was not clear as to how he should behave towards Caesar—witness the letter to him he composed on the lines of Aristotle's to Alexander and then destroyed. A day or two after he had divorced Claudia Brutus returned to Tusculum and renewed his conversations with Cicero. Cicero weary of these talks—one can well imagine how Brutus would go over the same ground time and again seeking a final decision—made the excuse of business in connection with some property to go to Arpinum. To Atticus he preferred another excuse, almost insulting in its ultrapoliteness, for his leaving Brutus—that he felt his presence in Tusculum and the attention Brutus was showing him was robbing the latter of the pleasures of his own villa. In the light of his later letters the true reason for his departure appears to have been sheer boredom, though we must remember that even as early as May 10th he had intended to go from Tusculum to Arpinum. The suggestion that he was avoiding Brutus because the latter was becoming involved in anti-Caesarian activities, from which Cicero from fear of Caesar wished to remain aloof, has nothing to commend it. Brutus was not yet so involved; and as soon as he arrived in Arpinum Cicero began to revise his Academica, recently issued with Catulus, Lucullus, Hortensius and himself as the interlocutors, and to recast it giving the parts to Cato, Brutus and himself, which clearly indicates that he had no idea of disclaiming friendship with Brutus.

By this time Brutus had decided to go to meet Caesar on his return and learn from his own lips what his intentions were. He

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2. - Att. XII, 42, 3. : (3. — Made e.g. by Gelzer P. W. X, p. 966.

displays an almost pathetic eagerness to prove that Caesar is no tyrant when he defends him from the possibility of guilt in regard to the death of Marcellus. The latter had been murdered at Athens on his way home from the exile he had so nobly endured, in circumstances which, as Cicero says, precluded the possibility of Caesar being connected however remotely with the crime. No one thought of accusing him of it, but Brutus quite gratuitously defended him. His proofs of Caesar's attitude are to convince himself not others. During the month of July Brutus was in Rome. He seems to have spent much time with Atticus, to whom he frequently expressed his affection for Cicero. These expressions were widely known; even Cicero's nephew, the naughty Quintus, wrote to his uncle about them, and Cicero says many people mentioned them to him. It almost looks as if they were a deliberate attempt on Brutus' part to give further proof of his independence by declaring publicly his friendship with the eminent Republican. He accepted, moreover, a commission from Cicero to attend on his behalf an auction sale of some property in Rome on July 15th, though Cicero later decided that Atticus' presence there would be enough; and he was also to witness Cicero's will. At the same time he was still anxious to see Cicero and, despite the prospect of a journey to meet Caesar, was willing to run down to Tusculum, whither Cicero had returned. He was also writing regularly to Cicero and in one letter pointed out to him a little "lapsus memoriae" in his "pro Ligario." Cicero in his turn had just published a eulogy on Brutus' aunt Poria, the wife of Ahenobarbus, and his "de finibus"...
At the end of July Brutus set off to meet Caesar; all eager to see for himself how the great man was disposed towards the Republic, and anxious to believe the best. Caesar did not disappoint him. Despite his 'Cato', which Caesar had read by this time, and his marriage to Cato's daughter, he received a warm welcome. He soon gained the impression he sought and was able to report to Atticus that Caesar was "tending towards the Conservatives". Completely reassured he settled down ingenuously again prepared to aid the dictator in his great task of restoring the Republic. He lacked the foresight of Cicero, who when he heard Brutus' report on Caesar's intentions remarked "He'd have to hang himself and find his Conservatives in Heaven".

During the rest of the year Brutus maintained this public attitude of faith in Caesar's good intentions and, when he was offered the post of Urban praetor, willingly accepted it, regarding his performance of its duties as his contribution to the welfare of the state. He was, of course, of the proper age for the office and, if my earlier deductions are correct, had fulfilled the necessary conditions by having held the quaestorship; but his appointment to the senior praetorship caused no little surprise. On the basis of past records it had been expected that Cassius, who was also to be a praetor, would receive the most important office, but Caesar, while frankly admitting the latter's superior claims bestowed it on Brutus. It does not follow that his purpose was simply to please the latter; for it was unlikely that he would do so in such a way as to offend Cassius, whose feelings for him he knew to require more alteration at this time than Brutus'. Caesar had already satisfied himself of Brutus' merits and ability and

(1) Att.XIII,21,1. (2) - ibid,44,3 shows he was still in Rome on July 19th or 20th and in 40,1. (Aug.7th or 6th) he has obviously just returned to Rome. "Brutus, inquis, eadem" in 39,2. (Aug. 5th) may mean that Atticus was daily expecting Brutus to arrive in Rome. cf. "Romam . . . veniam" preceding.


(5) - Plut. Brut. 7,1-2; App.II, 112. It is possible that the story of the contest between Brutus and Cassius over the chief praetorship has been exaggerated in these authors. Dio does not mention it nor, more significantly, Cicero whose letters to Atticus, however, are few between Caesar's return and the end of the year.
was probably of the opinion that of the two Brutus would be the better praetor. From what we know of their characters it is certain that Brutus' judgment in a case at law would be more trustworthy than his colleague's. He was less easily stirred by emotional appeal and less likely to take a biased view.

Before we leave the year 45 B.C. to examine the critical events of the following year it will be necessary to discuss the situation and in particular the elements in Caesar's position and behaviour, which led up to these events. Although with the battle of Munda Caesar achieved the unquestioned supremacy he had been fighting for, the difficulties of his career were by no means over. However much we regard him as a political adventurer and his career as a series of fortuitous events with little guiding principle behind them, it is impossible to deny that the power he had won he meant to use for other than merely selfish ends. Supremacy for its own sake was not the whole of his ambition and we cannot but believe that he had plans for some kind of reform of Rome's enfeebled state. How far these plans extended and what their essence was, we cannot now be sure, but the measures he took in the short months that were left to him are proof of his good intentions.

His task was one of enormous difficulty. There were so many different spheres in which reform was urgently needed, and so many interests with which reforms would clash. Changes and improvements on the vast scale that was necessary, could only be achieved with the willing co-operation of every class in the

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1. - cf. Plut. Brut. 6,4-5. Brutus' conduct of the praetorship lasted only until the middle of April and was, of course, submerged under the more important tasks of the conspiracy. We hear of one case - a testamentary dispute - in which he acted as judge; Cic. Fam. XIII. 21, in which he receives his legal adoptive name Caepio. For an excellent explanation of the very involved details of the case see T. & P.'s notes on the letter. vol. V, pp. 317 f.
state. To gain that co-operation was the most difficult part of his task, and his failure to do so was the reason for his downfall. From the common people and the army he could anticipate little or no trouble. He was no democrat but, when he chose, he was a skilful enough demagogue to bend the mob to his will; that he could at one blow strike off fifty per cent of the list of citizens in receipt of the free corn-dole without rousing agitation and opposition is proof enough of his popularity among the lower classes. The army, so long as he was not too tardy in handing out pay and donations, was his to a man; none could quell threatened insubordination as he could.

His troubles lay with the noble classes, and their attitude towards him in 45 B.C. must be clearly understood. Of real opposition against him there was none among them. They realised only too clearly that the Republic was sorely in need of the support of one strong hand if there was not to be a complete collapse. That need had been admitted as far back as 52 B.C., and though Pompey had been the original choice, the last year or two of the civil war had caused a curious shift round towards Caesar. The wise restraint he had shown and the complete absence of revengeful motives in his conduct had made him much preferable to Pompey's cruel and blood-thirsty sons; all the followers of the Senate's cause, who had given up the struggle before its final phrase, prayed for their own sakes that Caesar would be the victor in Spain. It must therefore have been with some measure of relief that they hailed Caesar when he returned triumphant. But in their relief was an admixture of trepidation.

2. Ferrero's picture (op.cit. vol II,pp.277f. and 305) of a "small aristocratic group" within the party of Caesar's supporters, consisting of Brutus, Cassius and Lepidus, from which the conspiracy eventually arose will not stand examination. Brutus and Cassius were, according to tradition, estranged by the former's receipt of the urban praetorship and Lepidus, though brother-in-law to both, seems to have had little intimacy with them.
They looked on Caesar much as a sixth form might look on a new headmaster—hopeful, but rather nervous, willing to help but very ready to resent any diminution of their privileges. To them Caesar was "dictator reipublicae constituendae"; that had been the title conferred on him, and it was naturally on the latter part of the phrase that the nobles laid emphasis. The reward of his victory was to be the privilege of 'restoring the Republic', and what greater honour, they asked, could a good Roman ask? But at the same time they wondered how good a Roman Caesar was.

How the dictator was to set about restoring the Republic, what changes if any he was to make, how, in fact, he was to make it impossible for another man to do what he had himself done, few people were prepared to tell him. Apart from Sallust's 'de Republica' pamphlets, written in the form of "open letters" to Caesar, no opinions on the problems of the day were publicly expressed, and even Cicero, than whom no one had greater confidence in his own political wisdom, had found it impossible to compose for Caesar an advisory monograph on the situation such as Aristotle had written for Alexander.

The inability of the optimates to offer suggestions did not diminish their expectations that the constitution would be left as nearly as possible intact. The aspect which mainly concerned them was that the Senate and magistrates should as in the past have the real control of the state and that there should be as little alteration as possible in the means of becoming a Senator and a magistrate. Their love of the Republic meant no more than a love of power in the Republic; their cry that the old constitution should be preserved was merely a demand that the privileges of their class be maintained. If Caesar meant...
to act on these lines they were willing to help him - Brutus and others, who believed that Caesar was so acting, did, in fact, help him - but they had to wait until they were asked to help, as Brutus was. The initiative must lie with the dictator. Hitherto his conduct towards them had seemed to indicate a readiness to consider their privileges, and he does appear to have tried to win their goodwill if not their co-operation. There were none of the fearful conscriptions, which, since Sulla, had been regarded as the natural accompaniment of an individual's rise to supremacy; some of his former enemies like Brutus, Cassius, Sulpicius; and others were even advanced in office; to others he showed a spirit of friendly consideration, as to Cicero, while even such a bitter opponent as Marcellus was allowed to return to the city. Such favours, however, were not enough to guarantee the goodwill of their recipients; they wanted to be freed from the need to accept favours.

We must examine the powers of Caesar's dictatorship in so far at least as they affected the Senate and magistracies. It may be said first that there was no official deification of Caesar at Rome in his lifetime. His powers in no way depended on any superhuman aspect of himself but were based on a thorough but, in the main, logical interpretation of the dictatorship. There was, for instance, no possibility of constitutional opposition to him. The Senate could in theory refuse to pass any of his decrees, but he could, and did, guarantee its support of himself by swamping it with an influx of new members from the ranks of his own followers. While some introduction of new members was necessary to compensate for the losses the house had suffered in the Civil War, the wholesale

2. - cf. p. 73 above.
creation of new Senators of quite ignoble and even provincial origin was a blow to the pride of the aristocracy. The magistrates could offer no opposition because the dictator’s imperium was supreme and even the tribunes’ veto constitutionally could not be applied. His control over the higher officials was further extended by the passing of a measure, proposed by L. Antonius, allowing the dictator the right to nominate magistrates. Caesar contented himself with “commending” candidates to the electorate and thus preserving the form of election, but in practice his commendation was sufficient to ensure return. The time-honoured and highly prized rewards of office—governorship of provinces abroad—became a matter of personal allotment by Caesar, since the Senate, in whose power the allotment officially lay, was completely under his dictation. By increasing the numbers of praetors and quaestors he guaranteed a constant succession of recruits to the Senate who would be men of his own choice. Officials were placed further under his control and had their powers in some measure controlled by his assumption of the right to appoint without election praefecti at home and legati abroad and by the supervision also of the magister equitum.

Other features of the dictatorship which caused offence to the aristocrats were his privilege of nomination for election to the sacred colleges, membership of which was a greatly valued distinction for social if not political reasons, and his power to create new patricians. In brief, the two things which the nobles most highly esteemed, their political privileges and their pride of caste were completely in Caesar’s power; and he used them with little respect or consideration.

In this state of affairs the Optimates could be expected

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2. Dio. xliii, 47, 2.
5. Suet. Jul. 41, 1:

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to acquiesce only as long as they regarded it as purely temporary. Caesar's latest appointment as dictator had been in the first place for ten years and the imposition of a limit was some solace. There were doubtless even some, who expected Caesar to follow Sulla's example and lay down his supreme office when the need for it was past, even if that should be before the ten years were up. Gradually, however, doubts arose as to the real trend of Caesar's aims, and these doubts grew more and more insistent as Caesar's attitude became more and more imperious. His assumption of completely personal control of the magistracies, especially when he adopted the practice of making appointments for several years ahead, had the very definite stamp of monarchy upon it, and his own behaviour did not tend to refute the growing suspicion that whatever constitution he might evolve would be to a large extent founded on a personal rule by himself.

Caesar must have realised that there was a fairly large body of the nobles among whom his rule was very unpopular and in so far as he took no real steps to satisfy them, but rather acted in such a way as to aggravate their discontent, he must himself share the blame for the tragedy that followed. At the same time it is unnecessary to accept the dramatic picture of him that Shakespeare took out of Plutarch, as one whose very elevation made him dizzy and whose mind had become diseased with greatness. Caesar when he died was perfectly sane, as is shown quite clearly by Cicero's description of him as a guest in December 45 B.C. He was, however, exceedingly vain, and his vanity received a fatal turn by his neglect of what is most essential in all monarchs - tact. He was perhaps too busy to be tactful. The man whose every moment must have been

occupied with plans for all sorts of things - public works, new colonies, land settlement, a reformed calendar and fresh conquests - could have had little leisure to cultivate minor social graces. It would appear in fact that in the midst of his labours he forgot about the potential opposition to him, or decided that he could afford to ignore it. He did not realise that his every act was the subject of comment and criticism, and that everything he did and said was examined for signs of regal ambitions. When he wore the red boots of his ancestors in Alba Longa, it was remarked that these ancestors had been kings; when he wore the laurel wreath and purple robe of a triumphant and sat on a gilded throne it was recalled that only kings did so habitually; when his portrait appeared on coins, people remembered that only states ruled by kings had such a coinage; when it was decreed that the chief pontificate should be handed down in his family, they saw in that the analogy of a dynasty; when he said, even if it were in private, that the Republic was a sham and his word was law, what could be taken from that but a declaration of regal ambition? It does not follow that Caesar had established a constitution that could be unequivocally described as a 'regnum', but it was easy for the convinced Republicans to regard it as such.

From the beginning of 44 B.C. Caesar's conduct gave rise to greater discontent and more bitter feelings. He committed the great crime of remaining seated, when the Senate came to inform him of their decision to bestow new honours upon him. Whether it was vanity that prompted the slight, whether he was, in fact, too ill to stand, or whether, as is least likely, he wished deliberately to show his contempt for the venerable institution, the incident gave rise to much indignation. A few days later his jealous act in having two tribunes removed from office,
who had arrested someone for calling Caesar 'King', brought a greater odium. Suspicions of his intentions were aggravated by the conduct of Antony at the Lupercalia on Feb. 15th. When the consul offered Caesar a crown it was observed that Caesar's refusal of it came after the crowd's expression of disapproval, and his order that the refusal be recorded in words which seemed to indicate that Antony's offer was made with public approval, was as unpopular as the offer itself.

By the middle of February 44 B.C. Rome, in the high places at least, was seething with animosity towards Caesar. Many were now convinced of his regal intentions and nothing indicates more clearly the frantic state of mind that his conduct had created than the fantastic rumour, then current, of his plan to remove the seat of government to Alexandria or Troy. A Sibylline prophecy had been interpreted to mean that the Parthians, against whom Caesar was then planning a campaign, could only be defeated by a king; it was suggested, therefore, that Caesar should adopt that title but use it in the provinces only. If that happened it was not inconceivable that he might set up a capital among the provinces; and his affair with Cleopatra, then brazening out the scandalized stares of the Senators in Rome, pointed to Alexandria. The addition, however, of Troy as an alternative is enough to indicate the story's complete lack of foundation. In the condition, nevertheless, that Caesar's supreme position and imperious conduct had created in Rome, it was just such unfounded scandals that were eagerly pounced on and digested by those whom he had offended. From such a condition of affairs conspiracy and murder inevitably emerged.


3. - Aut. 12. : (3. - The extent of Caesar's responsibility for this offer of the crown cannot be determined; but it seems unlikely that he would adopt such a traditionally odious title as rex so soon before his intended departure for Parthia; to do so would have been to invite serious trouble in his absence. Unless Caesar arranged the scene in order to try the feelings of the populace, I inclined to consider it a drunken prank on Antony's part.

Chapter VII.

The Conspiracy against Caesar - Feb. - Mar. 44 B.C.

Secrecy is the very essence of any conspiracy and it is inevitable that there should be much obscurity with regard to its historical details. In view of the lack of any original documentary evidence, and of the effect of the subsequent amnesty in preventing any official recording of the facts, it is surprising that we know as much as we do about the personnel, dates and other details of the conspiracy against Caesar.

With regard first of all to its date, it is naturally impossible to say with certainty on what day the conspirators held their first meeting, but close examination of facts and tendencies enables us to state approximately, when the widespread but disconnected murmurings against the dictator became crystallised into a definite shape. Some writers, ancient as well as modern, write of the conspiracy as if it had been in existence in a definite form for several months before the Ides of March, and references are loosely made to previous proposals to murder Caesar, as if these were in some way connected with the deed of the Ides. Several features of the plot, especially the fact that, despite the large numbers involved in it, its secret was successfully kept, and the complete absence of any plans or arrangements for anything beyond the deed itself, indicate that there was little time between the original meeting and the murder. The earlier proposals, attributed to Trebonius and Cassius, that Caesar should be murdered, were, despite their authors' participation in the later plot, completely unconnected with it. Trebonius' proposal seems to have gone no further than the sounding of

\[\text{\textit{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{1}}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{2}}}\]

(1. - e.g. Dio.xliiv,1-8. T. & P. vol.VI,p.CXIX.)
his tent-companion, Antony, on their way to meet Caesar returning from Spain in the summer of 45 B.C., and the latter's refusal to respond to the suggestion seems to have induced (1) Trebonius to abandon the idea. Cassius' intention, as we have already seen, was also very readily abandoned. We have already observed that Caesar's obnoxious supremacy and his arrogant behaviour were only tolerable to the Optimates so long as they could regard his rule as purely temporary. When, therefore, we seek a date for the beginnings of the conspiracy proper, we should seek some event which would destroy the expectations of an eventual abdication of the dictatorship, and we should expect to find that event a few weeks only before the Ides of March. On February 14th, just a month before his murder, Caesar crossed his second and a far more dangerous Rubicon, when he assumed a perpetual dictatorship. It is tempting and almost certainly correct to regard that act of his as the one which eventually broke the patience of his noble opponents and made them realise that their only means of release from a detestable rule was through murder. It is most probable therefore that the beginnings of the conspiracy proper are to be placed in the days following February 14th.

According to ancient testimony the numbers of the conspirators was over sixty. Of the total number we know the

(1.) Cic.Phil.II,14,34. Plut.Ant.13,1. Whereas Plutarch merely says that Antony was sounded by Trebonius regarding his attitude towards plotting against Caesar, Cicero accuses him of having actually entered into such a plot ("quam...Narbone hoc consilium cum Trebonio cepisse notissimum est."). We may safely assume that Cicero, as so often in the Philippics, and especially the Second, is exaggerating Antony's faults.

(2.) Cic.Phil.II,54,87.cf.Meyer.Caesar's Monarchie p.526 and note 2. The discussion between Brutus and Cassius (see below p.29) which may be said to mark the real beginning of the plot occurred, according to Plutarch, (Brut.10,2.) a few days before March 1st. The discussion was, however, preceded by the preliminary spade-work of Cassius.

(3.) The only authors who give figures are Suetonius (Jul.69,4.), Aubriotus (VI,25.) Orosius (VI,17 init) and Nicolaus Dam.(19). The first three agree in giving over 60; but Nicolaus gives over 80. As we know the names of no more than 20, the exact figure is not important and probably even Brutus could not have given it.
names of no more than a score, of whom ten were former followers of Pompey, six adherents of Caesar and four uncertain. If we may take these figures as representing a fair average; it appears, that, while the majority were, as was to be expected, former opponents of the dictator, no less than a third of the number were drawn from the ranks of his own supporters. This apparent treachery is not surprising. Caesar's policy of showing favour to the conquered at Pharsalus and elsewhere must have been very galling to those who had risked everything for his sake. When they expected to receive the plums of office themselves, they could not but be discontented to see their former opponents advanced over their heads. Even those whom he advanced were not thereby satisfied. Although his favours were acceptable, it was odious that what had always been the free reward of service to the state should now have to be accepted as the favour of an individual, and it was insupportable that such a situation should be continued indefinitely.

It would, however, be unjust to imagine that such ignoble motives of jealousy and pique were the only reasons behind the conspiracy. Too often the murder of Caesar has been condemned as the blind act of ungrateful and selfish egoists, while the dangers his murderers were risking have been too often forgotten. They had no reason to be confident that their deed would be acceptable beyond the comparatively narrow confines of their own class. Even the Senate was packed with Caesar's followers, while the common people and, above all, the army and the crowds of ex-servicemen could not be expected to regard the murderers of their leader with any favour. Although, thanks to

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1. cf. Groebe P.W. vol. X, p. 255 who mentions 7 other names as erroneously given by various authors.
2. Seneca (de ira, III, 30, 4-5) says that in the plot were more of Caesar's friends than of his enemies. He probably includes among the former some of the pardoned Pompeians like Brutus and Cassius.
Caesar's dismissal of his bodyguard, they were quite safe in the actual committing of the murder, they could not have failed to realise the risks they would be running after the deed, and the guard of gladiators with which they provided themselves would have been of little use against an infuriated mob. These risks they were not running for selfish ends, for their coup d'état did not follow the usual course of establishing the revolutionists immediately at the head of affairs. Far from making certain of their own supremacy or even advancement after the deed, they were content to await the verdict of their fellow citizens. The murder was, in fact, inspired by a sincere and high-minded, if misguided, patriotism. The murderers, convinced now of Caesar's intentions to found a monarchy but not persuaded— as later writers with a better perspective could be—either of Caesar's superiority to themselves or of the political necessity for some form of monarchical government, felt it their duty as true Republicans to put the tyrant to death. At the same time it must be understood that the revolt though patriotic was not democratic. The cult of Brutus and Cassius which was one of the features of the French revolutionary Jacobin clubs, is pathetically ill-founded. France herself seldom produced more thorough-going "aristos" than that pair of Romans. Their patriotism was confined to their own oligarchy; their love of country was little more than a love of the privileges of their own class. But even in such a love there is room for a sincere breadth of vision, which goes a little beyond the mere selfish jealousy frequently attributed to them.

1. Caesar had dismissed his guards after the Senate had sworn on oath to protect his person (Dio.xliv,7,4. cf.Suet.Jul.86,1.Plut. Caes.57,4) and despite the warnings of his friends, especially Lictius and Pansa (Vell.Pat.II,57,1) he refused to recall them. While this may indicate, as some think, that Caesar preferred to run any risk rather than live with the uncomfortable trammels of the traditional tyrant, it was at the same time unjustifiably rash and may equally well be regarded as the outcome of the vanity we have already noticed in him.

There are certain inconsistencies in the accounts given by ancient authors of how the first step was taken towards the formation of the conspiracy, but these are neither important nor irreconcilable, and the following is the probable story.

For months, as we have seen, Caesar's conduct had been increasing the ill-feeling caused by his supremacy, and the murmurings against him were spreading more and more. For a long time, however, no one offered himself as a leader, and no one tried to co-ordinate these murmurings. There was a strong feeling in certain quarters that a successful attack on the dictator could only be led by Brutus, who appeared to be the natural tyrannicide, but no definite proposals were made to him. The malcontents tried his feelings by means of anonymous hints, which appealed to him on the score of his descent from the first Brutus. His family pride was a well-known fact. To the statue of his famous ancestor were affixed writings:

"Would that thou wert now alive, Brutus!" and "Thy posterity is unworthy of thee." On Brutus' own tribunal, from which as praetor he dispensed justice, he found notes, "Brutus, thou sleepest," and "Brutus, art thou bribed?". But these hints had no appreciable effect on their recipient. In common with many of his peers Brutus had undergone a complete but sincere change of feeling towards Caesar. The confident expectations, of August 45 B.C. and that cheerful optimism, which had led him to give Caesar his help in restoring the Republic, had been slowly undermined by the obvious trend of Caesar's conduct. Brutus was, however, slow in making up his mind on any problem and his solution of this one - the greatest of his life - was only to be found by a weary and painful process. He realised his own personal debt to Caesar, to whom he owed both life and

1. Suet.Jul.80,3;Plut.Brut.9,2-5;Dio.xliv,12;App.II,118. Ferrero (vol.II.p.304) says that Cassius was responsible for these writings, but there is no evidence of that. In Plutarch (I.c.10,3) Cassius insists that the writings come from a noble not a plebeian source, but does not even hint - it would not have suited his policy to do so - that he was their author. Gelzer (F.W.A.p.969) thinks from the fact that Suetonius (I.e.) mentions only the notes affixed to the statue of L.Brutus, that their particular application to M.Brutus is purely traditional. Suetonius' account however, is very brief and need not outweigh the more detailed story of the later historians.
and official recognition, and he had a measure of admiration for him. But to Brutus the problem, being political in essence, was not to be solved in the light of personal feelings. He was not, for instance, concerned with his own prospects of further advancement under Caesar. We have stressed the fact, as shown by his whole conduct, that he did not think of himself as serving Caesar, and the suggestion that he ever fancied himself as the heir of the dictator's wealth and power is quite without foundation, nor is it probable that Caesar ever seriously considered him as such. Whether the idea of murdering Caesar occurred independently to Brutus, or was put into his mind by the suggestions of others, it is impossible to say, but in either case he could not readily dismiss it. For a tyrant he could envisage only one just end - death. He had already published his belief that murder could be justified on the grounds of public service, and tyrannicide was included in the lessons he learned from both Roman History and Greek Philosophy. To him philosophy was not the airy pursuit of theoretical knowledge, but a deliberate search for rules of conduct, which might be applied to practical life, and in the same way the lessons of Republican history were learned as a guide to personal conduct. On the one hand Aristogeiton and Harmodius, on the other the first Brutus and Servilius Ahala, gave clear guidance how to deal with a tyrant. To Brutus their guidance had a special importance. He realised that if Caesar was to be slain as a tyrant, the obvious man to slay him was the descendant of both of Rome's great tyrannicides. Brutus and Ahala seemed to claim him as their destined successor, and he was too much under the influence of his pride of family and of

4. - One of the provisions of Valerius and Horatius in 449 B.C. was "qui cresasset (magistratum sine provocatione) eum ius fasque esset occidi, neve ea caedes capitalis noxae haberetur." Livy III, 65,5.
his own stringent conscience to refuse what seemed to be his destiny. He was therefore easily convinced that, if Caesar was a tyrant, Brutus must kill him, but he found it harder to satisfy himself that Caesar was in fact a tyrant. That side of the problem was less susceptible of definite proof and it was his difficulty in reaching conviction regarding it that prevented the anonymous appeals made to him from having any immediate effect.

At last on his indecision there broke in his brother-in-law Cassius. Cassius was a man of passionate nature, headstrong and confident, and he had no doubts about Caesar's intentions. The idea of murdering the dictator was attributed to him long before the present occasion, and apart from political motives he seems to have had a violent personal dislike for him, which could not have been lessened by his recent disappointment over the chief praetorship. To Cassius the chief credit belongs of making the first move towards co-ordinating the antipathy against Caesar. He began to sound friends and acquaintances here and there, whom he knew to be ill-disposed towards the dictator. He may even have had the hope and intention of organising a conspiracy under his own leadership, but he came up against a curious unanimity, which demanded Brutus to lead the attempt. This demand was not very welcome to Cassius, because the dispute over the praetorship had caused a breach between him and his brother-in-law.

1. The same applies to Cicero's hints, if they are such, in Brutus 14,53 and Att.XIII,40,1. : (2.) See above p.48f.

6. - Plut. Brut.8,3.

4. - Plut. Brut.10,1. App.II,113. On the other hand Dio (xliiv,13, 1:14,1) names Brutus as the prime mover and Cassius as the one who was persuaded to join the plot. Dio's version is accepted by some scholars, e.g. Fröhlich P.W.III,p.1730 and Gelzer P.W. X.p. 96%. who also cite Nic.Dam.19. Actually Nic.Dam. does not support Dio, for he attributes no greater responsibility to Brutus than to Cassius for the first moves. If only for their numerical superiority Plutarck and Appam might be the more acceptable, but in addition Dio's palpable blunder in naming Cassius, instead of Brutus, as the city praetor (cf.p.151n1 below.) tells very much against him in this issue.

5. - Cassius, besides, was not a popular man with his fellows. Plut. Brut. 29,1-2.
which their relationship had not yet healed, and it was difficult for one so passionate as Cassius to sink his pride. At last, persuaded perhaps by the creation of the dictatorship for life and by the rumours that Caesar was to be made a king, he threw off his own indecision and approached Brutus. The latter was in that state of mind, which needs no more that the headlong enthusiasm of another, quite confidently convinced, to weigh down the scale. Cassius hammered in the inevitable inference of the recent decree of February 14th and of the rumours about the title 'rex', and Brutus, wearied by his own doubts, was convinced. At last he could say 'Caesar is a tyrant'. He had already said 'A tyrant must die, and I, Brutus, must slay him'. When the decision was taken, Brutus had no further hesitation; events moved swiftly to their logical conclusion.

It was natural that Roman nobles, looking round for someone to slay a tyrant, should look at once to one, who was descended on both sides of his house from slayers of tyrants. But Brutus was not chosen for his descent alone. He had, besides, the character and personality, that were almost ideally suited for the immediate task. He was, in the first place, a sincere believer in the merits of a Republican regime, and, with him at the head, his followers could be certain that they were not setting up another opponent to Caesar, who would revive the purely personal combats between individuals, which had recently ended. He was moreover, of implacable reputation, and his presence alone was enough to refute any imputations of merely selfish motives in the conspiracy. That fact in itself - that his participation could make murder honourable - is Brutus' greatest glory. He was besides notoriously resolute and firm of purpose, as Caesar himself had admitted, and could be depended upon to carry the deed through to its end.

He was however, lacking in two respects, and in

1. If we are to believe Plutarch (Brut.7,1) they had not been on good terms even before the decision regarding the praetorship. Perhaps Cassius thought Brutus just too enthusiastic in his hopeful attitude towards Caesar.  : (2.) Plut.Brut.10,2-4. App.11,113.: (3.) cf.Plut.Brut.10,1. : (4.) "quidquid vult,valde vult." see p.49f. above.
these lay the reason for his eventual failure. He did not possess any of the worldly knowledge of men and their motives, which makes it easy for one man to unite various elements into a coherent and unified whole, and keep them moving in a common direction. Until Caesar's death the conspirators for all their different origins and objects had a supreme purpose to unite them. After the murder Brutus was unable to hold them together. Secondly, he was lacking in that quickness of wit which, when a policy, long pondered and finally embraced, fails for some unforeseen reason, enables a man to discard it at once for something new.

Having assumed the leadership Brutus' first task with Cassius was to determine who should be admitted to the plot. It was desirable that a considerable number should share in it to indicate that the movement was a general one, and not just a private quarrel, and, in further indication of its comprehensiveness, it was necessary to secure the assent of some of Caesar's acknowledged supporters. For the same reason also, perhaps, some knights were included. At the same time admission had to be made carefully and grudgingly, for the risk of disclosure was great. When we consider the duplicity and dishonesty which had characterised Roman politics for many years, it is almost beyond belief that Caesar had no hint of the attempt. There were several narrow escapes, and once or twice only Caesar's own vanity or his occupation with other affairs prevented him from learning that those whom he was tending more and more to despise, were at last turned against him. That the secret was so admirably kept, seems to indicate that hatred of Caesar was very bitter. It was essential that there be no conspirator who might be tempted to draw back; their strength

1. According to Eutropius VI, 25.
2. See below p. 98.
must lie in unanimity. For that reason Cicero, too nervous, excitable and unstable, was kept in ignorance. Brutus chose from his friends such as he knew were dependable, and Cassius and others of the ringleaders found similar supporters. They did not always meet with enthusiastic acceptance. Brutus, on one occasion, being uncertain how his friends Statilius, Favonius and Labeo would respond to his invitation, tested their sentiments by means of a theoretical philosophical discussion, which probably deceived none of them. Favonius replied that civil war was worse than any monarchy, and Statilius, an Epicurean, denied that any wise man was bound by duty to risk his life for the follies of others. Though Labeo dissented from both and was later admitted to the plot, such well-reasoned rebuffs as that of Favonius must have added to Brutus' natural anxieties. As the plot developed and came nearer to completion, it became more and more obvious to Porcia, that her husband had some serious problem on his mind, which he had not chosen to reveal to her. Realising that she was debarred from learning of it simply because, as a woman, she was considered too weak to keep a secret, she sought to prove her ability to be silent, and, in an enthusiastic but theatrical manner, she stabbed herself in the thigh and said nothing of it for several hours. Then advancing that silence as proof of her capacity for secrecy she demanded to know the reason for Brutus'
worried demeanour and sleepless nights. Overcome by her demonstration and doubtless glad to have someone to discuss his troubles with, he revealed the plot to her. She kept the secret admirably, but it was unfortunate that she had to add to her husband's anxiety on the Ides by having a fit of hysterics.

When new members were enrolled in the plot no formal oaths were demanded of them. Oaths by their nature demanded the accompaniment of sacrifices, and a succession of these would have attracted attention. Similarly to avoid attracting attention they held few meetings, and the meetings were never attended by their full number. A kind of executive committee appears to have been formed of the more prominent members including, besides Brutus and Cassius, Trebonius and D. Brutus Albinus, who, although a great favourite of Caesar's, was persuaded to join the conspirators, only when he learned of his kinsman's participation, and after refusing invitations from Cassius and Labec. By these leaders most of the decisions were probably made.

The first question they had to settle was the number of their victims. Was Caesar alone to die or were they to include the most intimate of his supporters, especially Antony? At one stage early in the plot's development, the question was mooted of inviting Antony to join them, if we are to believe Plutarch, but the idea was discarded when Trebonius told of

\[1\] - (a) Gelzer P.W. X.p.986 places this anecdote before instead of after Brutus' decision to join the plot. If we accept the story from Plutarch and Dio - and Gelzer admits its probability as derived in Plutarch's case at least from Bibulus - we must accept also their chronology : both relate it as occurring after Brutus was already in the plot. Thus it is wrong to attribute any share to Porcia of Brutus' decision to enter the conspiracy. (b) According to Dio (xliiv,l3,l) Porcia was the only woman who knew of the conspiracy. T. & P. (vol.VI,p.CXX, note 191) are concerned with what Servilia's attitude was, but there is no reason to imagine that she knew anything about it. If his wife had to go to such lengths to learn the secret, it is unlikely that Brutus told his mother of it.


\[3\] - Plut. Brut. 12,4-5.

\[4\] - Plut. Ant. 13,1.
Antony's previous refusal to join with him in a similar venture. Many of the conspirators, taking the sensible view that Antony was as dangerous as his master, were anxious that they should die together. Antony's behaviour had been no less arrogant, and his activities at the Lupercalia especially had incurred much distrust and hatred. But for reasons both of ethics and of policy, advanced and strongly supported by Brutus, it was eventually decided to spare him. Brutus insisted, as we should have expected of him, that to slay Antony was plain unquestionable murder, which would inevitably bring discredit on their noble and selfless tyrannicide, while their policy after the murder depended entirely on the deed being accepted as purely patriotic. Brutus with his rigidly logical code of ethics sought to elevate the murder to the high level, at which he saw it, of a sacrifice to the good of the state; to murder Antony also would reduce it from that level. Antony besides was consul of Rome, and the office still inspired much respect especially among those who were so rigidly constitutional. Their hope was that after Caesar's death the Republic would resume its old forms and functions, and to have one consul alive would facilitate that resumption in some degree. Brutus had hopes, too, that Antony might yet

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(1) According to Vell.Pat. II,56 Antony's death was especially urged by Cassius.

(2.-(a) Cic. Att. XV,20,2 fin. : Vell.Pat. II,56. : Plut. Brut. 18,2-3 : Ant.13,2. : Dio. xliv, 19,1-2. Dio makes no special mention of Brutus in this connection. Ferrero (III,p.68 note ) and others (cf. d'Addozio p.54 note 2.) have thought that it was Decimus not Marcus Brutus who persuaded the conspirators to spare Antony. Ferrero argues that in Cic. Att. XV,11,2. "amissas occasiones Decimumque graviter accusabant" refers to the sparing of Antony, and that "Haec omnis culpa Bruti" (Att. XV,20,2.) - which does refer to the sparing of Antony - applies to Decimus. But the former quotation more probably refers to Decimus' inactivity in Gaul so far as opposing Antony was concerned (cf. Fam XI,4); and as for the latter, when Cicero says Brutus he usually means M. Brutus.

(b) According to Dio. xliv,18,1-2 they also considered the question of killing Lepidus, Caesar's Master of Horse, but the fact that, being on the point of setting out to his province of Hither Spain, he had a military force just outside the city, made him safe. Suet. Jul. 82 fin. also says they feared Lepidus as well as Antony.
prove an honest Republican; and he knew him to be an able
soldier and second only to Caesar in the army's affections.
As it turned out, though this has not been sufficiently noted,
it was Antony who after the murder was mainly responsible for
saving the conspirators' lives - though not because he loved
them.

When they came to consider the arrangements for the
deed itself, their task was rendered easier by the fact that
Caesar had now no permanent bodyguard accompanying him. He
had been induced to dismiss that symbol of the tyrant, when
the Senate had sworn on oath to protect his life. Doubtless
Caesar felt that if he could not live safely in Rome without
constant armed protection, it was hardly worth while living at
all. But at the same time there is no need to suppose that
he was deliberately courting assassination. The Senate's
oath was in the main sincerely given. It was only a
minority, who later broke it and it was Caesar's vanity which
once more blinded him to that possibility. The suggestion
that he was tired of life and had decided to give intending
murderers every chance, does not accord either with his
character or with the ambitious programme he had arranged for
his future activities both at home and abroad. With the
prospect immediately before him of a campaign in Parthia,
which would by itself bring him greater glory and greater
popularity at home than all his years of fighting had done, he
could have had no thought of encouraging his enemies to
murder him.

The proposed Parthian campaign was an important factor
in bringing the conspiracy to a head. Caesar was bound soon
to surround himself with his soldiers again, and it was there-

3.- based on Suet. Jul. 86, 1.
fore essential that the attempt on his life should be made before the details of his campaign had been completely arranged. The conspirators had to decide quickly, when and where the attack should take place. The quality of solemn dignity, which they wished their act to possess, made it necessary that it be done in some public place, quite openly and frankly. There must be no shabby lying in wait in the darkness, no cowardly assault in a private house. Several suggestions were offered of a place and a time. Some proposed that he should be attacked in the Campus Martius, while crossing a certain bridge, and thrown from it by one of them, while others waited below to despatch him. Other places suggested were the Theatre, and the Via Sacra, where he often walked, since as Pontifex Maximus he lived in the Regia close by. During their consideration of this question, a meeting of the Senate was called for the Ides of March, to be held in the hall of the theatre which Pompey had built on the Campus Martius. That meeting seemed to have been appointed by fate for their deed. No more suitable place than the Senate could be chosen for the act, that was to re-establish the Republic and the Senate's authority. There was in the place a statue of Pompey, so that Caesar's death would be witnessed by the man on whose overthrow Caesar's supremacy had been founded. A more practical consideration was, that at a meeting of the Senate there would be no one armed except those who were in the plot; and they could hope that with the whole Senate as their witness, their deed would receive its immediate approval.

1. Nic.Dam.23.: Suet.Jul.60,4 seems to err in thinking that the bridge was the actual "pons" of the voting place.
2. Suet.Jul.60,4: Nic.Dam.23: Plut.Brut.14,1-2: App.II,114. Dio.xlv,16,1-2. Dio's further suggestion that the Senate was chosen because their swords could be carried in deed-boxes is fanciful and is quite discounted by the fact that they did not use swords but daggers. Surely a Roman toga was hiding place enough for a "pugio". cf. p.301 note9.
In an unarmed Senate, with all the advantages of surprise on their side, they anticipated little trouble; but their preparations were thorough. Antony was feared both for his physical strength and his spirit, and it was arranged that he should be delayed at the entrance by Trebonius, who knew him well, and kept there in conversation until the blow was struck. In case of possible disturbances Decimus Brutus was to post some of his gladiators between the arcade and the theatre behind. A signal was arranged for the first blow and the personnel of the party to attack Caesar was determined. All there were to strike. This careful planning of the deed itself is in marked contrast with their complete lack of preparation for the sequel.

With their plans carefully laid there was nothing to do but wait for the appointed day. In this short interval - it could have been no more than a week - their chief anxiety must have been fear of disclosure. The story of Porcia's concern for Brutus is evidence of the mental strain he was undergoing, and from this time forward, for more than two years, he was ceaselessly the prey of cares, which in the end told considerably on his health. In the hotbed of intrigue and gossip which Rome had become their secret ran many risks of betrayal. At one time Caesar seems to have felt some mistrust of Brutus, probably because of his renewed friendship with the intransigeant Cassius, but when he was

2. Plut. Caes. 66, 6. 4. Two further intentions are attributed to them (a) Velleius II, 55 says that but for Brutus, Caesar's will would at Cassius' suggestion have been destroyed. If ever discussed, this idea was certainly discarded before the Ides (b) According to Suetonius (Jul. 62, 4) they had intended even on the Ides to throw Caesar's body into the Tiber, to confiscate his property and rescind his acts. In the light of what happened that is obviously a mere slander. Suetonius says they refrained from doing these things, from fear of Antony and Lepidus; but on the Ides neither of these men was in any way intimidating. Lepidus was not in the city (Dio. xlv. 19, 2.) and Antony fled into hiding when Caesar fell.
5. See below p. 211f.
warned against them, he preferred to believe that Brutus was incapable of conspiracy. Such warnings against individuals must have been frequently given to him, and he may have come to neglect them for their very frequency, but, at the same time, he completely failed to realise the depth and sincerity of Brutus' republican convictions. Although Caesar received no definite information, word of the plot and even of the details of its arrangements had leaked beyond the circle of the conspirators, and on the morning of the Ides there were several, who knew of it - Popilius Laenas, the soothsayer, Artemidorus, who gave Caesar a written account of it which he did not read, and apparently many others. For one reason or another these sources of information remained closed to Caesar.

When at last the Ides arrived, Brutus went down to his duties in the city early, leaving at home a nervous and anxious Porcia: His praetorian chair was set up outside the theatre, and there he spent the hours before the meeting of the Senate was due to begin, giving decisions in the cases that came before him as calmly and with as much deliberation as if the day were no different from other days. Cassius had a son who was about to assume the toga virilis, and several of the conspirators escorted the youth from his father's house to the forum after the usual custom on such occasions. Thence they joined their leader at the theatre. There among the busy

4. - Plut. Brut. 14, 3.: Thuc. II, 115. The other authorities do not say so explicitly but Plutarch (l. c.) implies that Brutus did not go to the Forum with the others, while Dio (xlv, 16, 2.) and Nicolaus Dam. (23) says that they all assembled in the Senate house. I think, therefore, that Gelzer (P. W. X. p991.) is wrong in saying that Brutus performed his praetorian duties in the Forum as usual.
5. - Plut. Brut. 14, 3. The others Nic. Dam. 23, App. II, 115, Dio. xlv, 16, 2, do not mention the conspirators' activities before they met at the Senate House, and Dio in disagreement with Plutarch says that they met there at dawn.
city throng - apart from the crowd entering the theatre for
the games, the portico had for the moment become the centre of
judicial authority - it was easy for them to disguise their
excitement. But they were not to achieve their purpose with-
out several very anxious moments.

When the stated hour for the meeting came round Caesar
had not appeared. Fearing a last minute alteration in their
plans, and alarmed lest the dictator had received word of their
intentions, the conspirators sent Decimus Brutus, the most
intimate friend of Caesar among them, to induce him at all
costs to attend the meeting. Decimus found Caesar suffering
from the effects of a restless might. He had the previous
evening dined with his master of horse, Lepidus, and in
consequence, perhaps, of the banquet and of the conversation,
which had run on death and kindred subjects, his sleep had been
disturbed by bad dreams. Calpurnia, his wife, had suffered
from even worse visions, and she and his doctor advised him to
remain indoors for the day. Their advice was repeated by his
augurs, who found their omens most unfavourable. Caesar was
on the point of sending Antony to dismiss the Senate, when Decimus
arrived. He laughed to scorn the advice of Calpurnia and the
augurs and begged Caesar on no account to cast further slight on
the Senate, who were waiting to receive him. Caesar was
persuaded to go; for he was rather vain, where his contempt of
omens was concerned.

Meanwhile in the portico, the conspirators were suffering
one alarm after another. Some one came up and said to Casca,
one of their number, "You hid the secret from us, Casca, but
Brutus has told us everything." While Casca, who appears as a dull rather stupid man but thoroughly sincere, was wondering if Brutus had betrayed them, but could find no words, the man laughed and added, "Where did you find the money to stand for the aedileship?" Casca realised just in time that the man did not refer to the plot. Then Popilius Laenas, a member of the Senate, whispered slyly to Brutus and Cassius, "I pray with you for the success of your plans. But make no delay: already men are speaking of it." So, anxiously they awaited their victim wondering all the time, if he already knew of their plans and was prepared for them. At last Caesar arrived and all seemed well; but there were more shocks for them. Laenas went up before them all to speak to Caesar and, fearing disclosure, they were on the point of anticipating their plans and acting hastily there and then, when they realised that Laenas was saying nothing of the plot, but merely gratifying a sardonic sense of humour by making a request of the dictator. Almost at the same moment, Brutus received a message that his wife was very sick. The share of his anxieties which she had demanded as her right, had been too heavy for her, and she had spent the morning hysterically asking for news of her husband, and, being always disappointed, had at last collapsed. Brutus could give no regard to her plight, but had to enter the chamber with the others.

The presessional omens were again unfavourable, but again Caesar chose to ignore them. Ushered in by Decimus Brutus, he entered the meeting and the carefully laid plan

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went on without delay. Trebonius kept Antony in conversation at the door, while his colleagues crowded round Caesar, ostensibly to support Tillius Cimber in his petition for the restoration of his brother, who was in exile. As Caesar gave the expected refusal to his request, he snatched the dictator's toga and pulled it from his shoulder. This was the pre-arranged signal for action and Casca standing behind struck the first blow - an ill-aimed effort which merely glanced off Caesar's shoulder. As Caesar turned to face his assailant he received a second stroke in his left side from Caesar's brother. From the effect of this blow he collapsed and fell uttering no more than a groan but the others pressed round him eager to share actively in the deed, and in their eagerness they even wounded some of their own number, including their leader Brutus, whose hand was cut. So, unprotected by friends, or Senators, Caesar died and in his body were no less than twenty three wounds.

(1.- Cic.Fam.X,xvii,10,22. Plut.Brut.17,1.App.II,117 init.Dio.xliiv,19,3. Although Plutarch says (Caes.68,3.) that it was Decimus Brutus who detained Antony, it is, considering the other evidence, an obvious error, despite his statement in Ant. 13,2. that it was done by "some of the conspirators". One is surprised that Rice Holmes (R.E. III.p.343) should interpret Plutarch to mean that Decimus stayed with Trebonius. Apart from the negative evidence or Cicero's letter, and of the other authorities, Nicolaus, whose account Professor Holmes elsewhere (III,p.508) praises, positively says that Decimus led Caesar into the Senate chamber. (Nic.24) (2.- Suet.Jul.82,1. Nic.Dam.24. Plut.Brut.17,2: Caes.66,3. App.II,117. : (3.- Suet.Jul.82,1. Nic.Dam.24. Plut.Brut.17,2: Caes.66,4. App.II,117. Dio xliiv,19,4. (4.- cf. above p.2. : (5.- It had been arranged that each should strike;Plut.Caes.66,6. : (6.- Nic.Dam.24. Plut.Brut.17,4. Caes.68,7.App.II,117 fin: 122. According to Nicolaus and Appian (122) it was Cassius' weapon which wounded Brutus. : (?.- Nicolaus (26) however, says that two of his friends Calvisius Cabinus and Consorlinus offered some slight opposition to the assassins. (6.- Nic.Dam.(24) gives the number as 35 and C.Schmidt Jahrb. für Class.Phil.sup.13,p.674 suggests a double tradition. But no other author gives Nicolaus' number and no less than nine give 25-28 (epit.116).Suetonius (Jul.82,2) Florus (II,15,65).Valerius Maximus (IV,5,6).Appian (II,117).Plutarch (Caes.66,7.).Eutropius (VI,28).Orosius (VI,17,1 init.) and Zonaras (X,111). It is therefore more probable that Nicolaus' manuscript is at fault; that KΓ has been corrupted into EΓ. (cf.Hall,edition of Nicolaus Smith, Coll. Class.Stud.no.IV,p.90.) (3.- It should be added, perhaps, that the weapons used upon Caesar were not swords (gladius) but daggers (dagger). Although Dio seems to have believed they used swords (109,84 in xliii,16,1 and xlvii,11,1.) and Appian and Plutarch definitely have been doubtful (e.g. Appian's 17.11.17 (twice)18.11.17 (twice)19.11.17 (twice)19.11.17 (twice) in the same paragraphs. Plutarch's 19.2.5,28.11,34.11 and 61.17.) Suetonius used the word pugio (Jul.82,2,69,3,fin) and the matter is put beyond all doubt by Cic.Pil.11,12,28 and 30 where the weapon of Brutus is described as "exactum pugionem." Again the weapons on Brutus' later coin (Gruber vol.II,p.480 nos. 65-70: vol.III plate Cal no 19) are obviously daggers not swords.
Chapter VIII.

The Days after the Murder. Mid-March to Mid-April 44 B.C.

Rejoicing in the complete success of their carefully laid plans and exulting in the glory of their deed, the conspirators turned to receive their reward - the approbation and applause of their fellow-senators. But it was at once apparent that something had gone wrong with their calculations. The senators, not having been informed that this was simply the death of a tyrant and rebirth of the Republic, regarded it as an ordinary political murder and expected more deaths to follow it. When Brutus, the acknowledged orator of the conspiracy, stepped forward to address them, they were already crowding through the doorway. The same element of surprise which had overwhelmed the victim and guaranteed a successful issue to the immediate deed, had in equal degree by causing perturbation among its witnesses ruined the conspirators' intentions for the future. The Senate had not waited to voice any opinion on the act, but each man in a headlong panic sought safety for himself elsewhere. That panic was the first set-back to the conspirators' plans, and it found them sadly wanting. From that moment onward, from the very moment of their success, their attempt was doomed to failure.

We have already mentioned the contrast between the careful and thorough planning of the murder and the pathetic lack of arrangements for its sequel, and it has always been the fashion to condemn the conspirators for criminal stupidity, in that they had had no forethought for what was to happen afterwards. It is, however, not quite true that they had given no thought to the future. They had adopted a certain policy and formulated certain intentions and hopes, and it is only fair to

consider what these were and appreciate the reasons for their failure. They were hampered from the very outset by the nature of their conspiracy. It was no coup d'état provided with military support to guarantee the maintenance of an initial success. Their intention all along was that, with Caesar removed, the Republic should resume its old order, and their confident hope was that the people as a whole would welcome the change with sufficient enthusiasm to guarantee that restoration. They felt that their own task was practically ended by the murder, and that others would arise to carry on the work. Though these hopes were proved by the event to be absurdly optimistic, it is easy to see how they were deceived. When Sulla the dictator had retired, the Republic had at once taken up its former functions; and though his had been a voluntary retiral, there was no reason why the violence of Caesar's death should alter the circumstances. The old machinery of the Republic was still in existence and still in working order, though with certain limitations imposed upon it. The Magistrates, Senate and Assemblies were still, though under Caesar's domination, performing their ancient functions, and it was easy, especially for those of thoroughly Republican convictions, to imagine that Caesar's removal would allow that machinery to function more easily, and that it would automatically leap into renewed vigour. At the same time they realised the possibility of interference by other agents; they were fully aware that some other individual might attempt to assume Caesar's place, and, as we have already seen, gave special attention in their deliberations to Antony and Lepidus. Antony as consul and Lepidus as master of the horse were both in a sufficiently elevated position to make an attempt to rise higher. We may argue then, as many have done since the very Ides themselves, that these two should have been killed also. For quite sensible and admirable reasons, however, the
conspirators decided to limit their victims to the condemned tyrant. They could make no attempt to win over their possible opponents before the murder for fear of disclosure, and the same reason prevented any attempt to gain the support of the army.

Their hopes were that the regained liberty would arouse such widespread joy and enthusiasm among the citizens in general, that neither Antony nor Lepidus, nor any other of Caesar's old followers, would be able to do anything. They were even fond enough to imagine that they, too, would feel their share of enthusiasm. While, therefore, we may condemn them in the light of what actually did happen, we must at the same time realise that the elements of danger, though quite apparent to them, and fully appreciated by them could not in any way be prepared for. In fact by striving always to exalt their act to the level of the highest patriotism and by insisting that everything they did was not only in the interests of the state but also according to its constitutional ordinances, they were doing all they could to counter any attempts at later subversion. That policy - persistent regard for the Republican constitution which they were seeking to save - determined their actions in the days immediately after the murder and was also the principle to which Brutus and Cassius adhered in the months that followed. The policy itself was sound enough; their error lay in over-estimating the Roman people's love of liberty, just as Caesar had under-estimated their own hatred of tyranny. For both the policy and the error of judgment Brutus appears chiefly responsible. It was he who, as it were, set the moral tone of the affair and to his mind, completely

(1. Plut. Brut. 18,1-2.)
logical as well as thoroughly Republican, strict adherence to the constitution, even in their murder, was a necessity. And because, blinded by his own almost religious love of the Republic, he was quite out of touch with current political feelings, he vainly imagined that the majority had the same reverence for the old order that had been bred in himself and carefully nurtured during all his life. That reverence had been developed by the excitement and enthusiasm of the conspiracy to an almost spiritual level.

Their immediate intention had been to address the Senate, which was ready to hand to hear them. Brutus was to explain the reasons for their act, condemn Caesar as a tyrant and call on the Senate to take up their new found freedom with eager hearts like the Romans of old. Then the whole body would march forth and communicate their enthusiasm to the people at large, who would be no less inspired by the theme of Liberty. Amid the general zeal and excitement none of the supporters of Caesar would be able to take any immediate action against them, and the example of Caesar would serve as a deterrent to any future attempts at tyranny. With all possible expedition the Senate and Assembly would be called, a new consul elected and the Republic proceed with its work.

That roseate prospect was ruined by the flight from the Senate house, and instead of enthusiasm it was panic and terror that was spread among the people. Although the conspirators, attempting to retrieve the situation, rushed out into the streets, giving every assurance that no more murder would be done, and calling upon Cicerö, whose name would be a token of their loyalty to the Republic, the sight of their daggers only served to increase the panic and made the

populace more eager in their flight to their homes. The conspirators, reached the forum, whence, finding no one to listen to them and fearing greatly an immediate attack either by Lepidus or by the veterans in the city, they took refuge in the Capitol, guarded by Decimus Brutus' gladiators. The Temple of Jupiter was the most proper refuge for the Republic's defenders, and it was possible, moreover, to prepare the hill top against attack. There they sat down to consider what they should do in the unexpected and unwelcome turn that events had taken.

In the city, meanwhile, when it was seen that no further murders were taking place and when the personnel of the conspiracy became known, a certain measure of confidence was restored, and early in the afternoon a number of the more influential Senators, who had not been in the plot, paid a visit to Brutus and his colleagues. Encouraged by their assurance, Brutus descended to the forum to address the people. He received a good hearing, but neither his speech nor the murder inspired any enthusiasm. To Brutus the people listened with the respect due to his character and reputation, but they did not acclaim him as a hero, and others, who, speaking after him, tried to defame Caesar, roused bitter anger. Again they had to retire to the Capitol. A council
was held, attended by some of their visitors including Cicero to consider their next move. Cicero urged them to summon a meeting of the Senate at once in the Temple of Jupiter and thus retain the initiative which the murder had gained for them. For some reason his advice was not accepted. The reason, sometimes advanced, that they were not able constitutionally to summon the Senate, although it accords very well with their declared policy, cannot be accepted as probable. Besides the consul, a tribune could convene the Senate, and Cicero who was a master of procedure, would not have advised a meeting had it not been practicable. The conspirators may have felt that by calling the meeting on their own account and, so to speak, on their own ground they would impair the character of complete disinterestedness which they wished their act to possess, and they may not, recalling the Senate's flight of the morning and its Caesarian majority, have been convinced, as Cicero, relying on his own eloquence, was, that an immediate meeting would save the situation. Eventually and probably after much heartburning, they decided to make overtures to Antony and Lepidus, as senior magistrates, requesting them to summon the Senate to consider the situation. Thus within a few hours and by their own act, the initiative was allowed to pass into the hands of the men whom they had most reason to fear.

Antony, when he realised what was happening in the Senate, had broken away from Trebonius at the door and fled to his own house, where he remained in hiding until nightfall. When he heard of the doubtful reception accorded to the murder in the city, he took heart and, when the envoys came from the

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2. Nic.Dam.27 : App.II,123. Cicero, naturally, was opposed to this decision and refused to act on the embassy. (Phil. II, 35, 38)

Capitol, promised them an answer on the following day and lost no time in getting into touch with Lepidus. He showed real quickness of wit in estimating the situation and in realising how it could best be handled to suit his own interests. Although he had no veterans nor forces of any kind immediately under his orders, he was confident in his ability to gather them in time. He had, therefore, to prevent Lepidus from using his force to attack the conspirators and thus gaining a predominance, from which it might be difficult to upset him. During the night Lepidus brought his men into the city and occupied the forum and on the next day (March 16th) he and Antony, and others of the Caesarian party, held a council to determine their attitude: Lepidus was all for an immediate attack on the Capitol, but Antony managed to dissuade him - which was justification enough for the conspirators' sparing of him. It was finally agreed that Antony, as consul, should call a meeting of the Senate for the following morning (17th) to discuss the murder, and decide what public action be taken regarding the murderers. The meeting Antony called, not at the Curia, which was not far from the Capitol and therefore too near the conspirators' own stronghold, but in the Temple of Tellus, close to his own house: He invited Brutus and his fellows to attend, knowing well that they would not dare to do so for fear of the veterans, whose agrarian interests ensured that they would be nearby in large numbers. Such a meeting was all the conspirators could now hope for, and they arranged that Cicero should be present to state their case.

At the meeting, which began almost at dawn, Cicero,
although already bitterly disappointed at the dilatoriness of the Republican leaders and at the indifference of the citizens in general, did all he could to further the interests of Brutus and the others. First he had to devote his energies to preventing their condemnation. He dared not, with a silent but menacing throng of veterans at the door, be over-enthusiastic either in praising the murderers or in decrying Caesar's tyranny, and in compromise, he urged the Senate to declare an amnesty on the same lines as that of the Athenians after the revolution of 404 B.C. Antony, who seems to have controlled the trend of the meeting with remarkable skill, still pursuing his policy of holding Lepidus in check and confident that he could control the conspirators also in the future by means of the veterans and the populace, did not oppose the amnesty and it was easily carried. The friends of the conspirators, encouraged by this success, then proposed, though not apparently with Cicero's support, that the murderers receive some public reward as public benefactors. That proposal did not suit Antony's interests, whose aim was to keep the conspirators as much in the background as possible, and while it was being debated he confused the issue by pointing out that the bestowal of rewards upon the murderers involved the condemnation of Caesar as a tyrant. If that were done, all Caesar's acts would require to be annulled, and many people, actually then present would suffer thereby. Those who were then in office, those who had been promised offices for the future and all those, who had received their seat in the Senate by Caesar's gift, would have to give up these honours and advantages. The only way in which that could be avoided.

was to declare an amnesty "in the interests of public welfare," and at the same time to ratify all Caesar's acts. The Senate, containing so many of Caesar's beneficiaries, could not but accept this compromise, and Antony, having already possessed himself of Caesar's treasury and papers, which Calpurnia, too grief-stricken to care what happened to them, had handed over to the consul without demur, was well content. He had succeeded in making himself more prominent in the public eye than either Lepidus or Brutus, and planned with the help of Caesar's wealth and, as he later realised, his papers too - to use the rest of his consulship to gain as much influence as possible, and to follow it by a lengthy proconsular command with a large army in a province near Rome. He had learned well from his late master.

While the Senate was in debate, the conspirators were doing what little they could to gain the popular favour, of which they had been disappointed. But how little they could do! how feeble, how devoid of policy and cunning, their conduct is in comparison with Antony's! Realising the importance of the veterans, they sent out messages to them assuring them that there was no intention to disturb them in the possession of the lands Caesar had given them, and declaring that their own sole agrarian policy was to compensate former owners of lands, which Caesar had sequestrated. They invited the people to come up to the Capitol and hear what their purpose and intentions were. A considerable audience was gathered but, as two days before, Brutus' speech roused no enthusiasm.
Meanwhile in the Senate other business had been done. To satisfy the veterans a separate decree was passed to secure their possession of the lands, they had received from their commander, although the general ratification of Caesar's acts should have sufficed for that too. After another heated debate it was further decreed that Caesar's will be read in public and his body receive a public burial. Although Cicero and others realised the dangers that lay in such public demonstrations, they were unable to prevent them; for, so long as Caesar was not declared a tyrant, neither his will nor his funeral could be interfered with. Only Antony seems to have realised the value of his well-chosen formula "in the interests of the public welfare."

After the meeting as a symbol of the harmony established between the Republican and Caesarian groups, Antony and Lepidus sent their sons as hostages to the Capitol. The conspirators then came down to the city, in many cases, doubtless, with trepidation and with no intention of remaining long in it. The leaders of the reconciled factions celebrated the establishment of concord by dining together - Brutus with his brother-in-law Lepidus, and Cassius at Antony's house. Perhaps their relationship ensured that the former pair had a harmonious banquet - though on naturally wonders what were the feelings of Junia and Tertia over the whole affair. Antony and Cassius, less urbane than their colleagues, appear to have spent the

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evening throwing verbal daggers at each other.

The great disappointment which the conspirators had suffered at the poor reception with which their noble and successful efforts had met, was intensified in the next few days by the increase in their unpopularity caused by the reading of Caesar's will and by his funeral. These two events took place within a day or two of the meeting in the Temple of Tellus, apparently on March 20th. The will was read by L. Piso, Caesar's father-in-law, in Antony's house, and its contents immediately spread abroad. The important clauses, nominating his chief heirs and so on, were but little regarded in comparison with the fact that he gave his trans-Tibertine gardens to the State to be a pleasure park for all time, and made a present of a sum of money to every Roman citizen. Such generosity could not fail to rouse in the populace feelings of regret at the manner of his death, and the consequent resentment against the conspirators was intensified by the fact that D. Brutus was actually named among Caesar's heirs-in-reserve. The funeral, closely following upon the reading of the will, ended in serious rioting. Antony, even if we agree that he did not make any lengthy speech such as Shakespeare, following the account of Plutarch, Appian and Dio, puts into his mouth, must still be held responsible for the riot. His plans were proceeding very smoothly. Lepidus was now completely under his thumb, and very soon afterwards departed to his provinces of Hither Spain and Old Gaul. If Antony could now make Rome too uncomfortable for the conspirators, he would have the city to himself. He had heard doubts of the grief which the sight

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of Caesar's body, borne pathetically home after the murder by three slaves, had already occasioned; and the funeral was an obvious opportunity for fanning the antipathy against Brutus and the others. Though Piso, as Caesar's father-in-law, was officially making the arrangements, it was easy for Antony as consul and as a relative of Caesar's to interfere. The whole affair was carefully and deliberately stage-managed. The various devices employed were calculated to play on the popular emotions roused by the items of the will. An image of Caesar with the wounds marked on it, his robe, blood-stained and torn by the assassins' weapons, would not have been produced unless the arousal of the mob's emotions was intended. Antony, appointed to make the funeral oration, contented himself with reading the long list of honours which the Senate had decreed to Caesar and finished, quite impertinently, with a recital of the Senate's oath to preserve his life. The long series of reminders of Caesar's greatness and generosity and of the Senate's contrasting treachery stirred the mob to fury. It needed few more words on Antony's part to make them rise and take things into their own hands. The body was cremated there and then in the forum, and the maddened throng turned from the pyre with flaming torches to attack and fire the houses of the murderers. Antony now left them to their own devices, well content to await the result of his propaganda. The conspirators naturally were not present at the funeral and, when they heard first of the mob's state of mind, prepared for the attack by barricading their houses and arming their slaves. By these means the mob was driven off, but not before at least

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one house had been destroyed.

The effect of these riots was never deleted and within the next week or two most of those who had been ringleaders in the plot left the city, some of them, like Trebonius and Brutus to the provinces which Caesar had assigned to them. Brutus and Cassius as praetors remained in the city and did their best to live up to the spirit of the amnesty. At first they tried to make their customary official appearances in the forum, but feeling against them was too bitter to allow them to continue. They had to remain within the safety of their own houses and tried again to win the favour of the veterans by publishing, in their capacity as praetors, an edict allowing settlers to sell the land given them whenever they wished to, the old law having forbidden alienation till the end of twenty years. Such measures were of no avail and a further complication made matters worse for them.

There had been living in the city for some years past a youth named Herophilus or Amatius, who claimed, apparently with little justification, to be a grandson of the great Marius and therefore a relative of Caesar. The dictator for some reason had chosen to ignore his existence and after the funeral this pseudo-Marius took the opportunity to acquire for himself no little notoriety and a considerable amount of

1.—that of L. Bellienus (Cic. Phil. II, 36, 91.) who is perhaps the Pompeian mentioned in Fam. VIII, 15, 2.
2. — Gelzer (P.W. X, p. 993.) assumes quite unwarrantably that Brutus and Cassius left the city immediately after the funeral and its riots and then returned to make an attempt to carry on with their normal duties before their final departure in April. Neither Cicero, Appian nor Dio gives any indication of that and Appian III, 2-3:6 and Dio xlvi, 20, 1 expressly deny it. Plutarch Brut. 21, 1, whom alone Gelzer cites, does indicate that Brutus and Cassius left the city after and because of the riots at the funeral, but his account is obviously sketchy and inaccurate. He says nothing for instance of the riots of Amatius; and, in any case, he does not imply that Brutus returned to the city. It is obvious that the departure he describes is the final one — though the destination, Antium, which he gives was not their first one — and that his chronology is at fault. (6. — Dio xlvi, 20, 1. 4. — Cic. Att. XIV, 3, 2.
influence among the city rabble. Pretending the deepest grief at the death of his distinguished relative, he erected a kind of altar, on the site of Caesar's pyre in the forum and instituted a form of worship of him, which spread with alarming rapidity among the plebeians. Around himself he gathered a band of desperadoes with whom he proceeded to terrorise the city, aiming especially at Brutus and Cassius and openly threatening to kill them. One or two recent occurrences - the good reception given to Cassius' brother Lucius in the theatre during the first week of April, and the fact that even such a convinced admirer of Caesar as Matius Calvella was anxious to have Brutus' good opinion - may have momentarily relieved the despondency of the chief conspirators, but in the end they realised that to stay any longer in the city, with the populace and veterans in their present state of mind, was almost certain death. One last indignity remained for them. As praetor of the city Brutus was forbidden by law to absent himself from his duties there for more than ten days in succession. Only a special decree of dispensation could enable him to leave the city for longer without the risk of prosecution and he had to humble his pride to appeal to Antony to secure him that decree. About April 10th he and Cassius had a conversation with Antony in which they came to some agreement regarding their future relations. Antony was very willing to assist their departure since it left him without a rival in the city, save Amatius. That humble but dangerous rioter was, in fact, arrested by Antony and summarily executed just before Brutus and Cassius left the city, after

Note: The text includes footnotes for historical and literary references.
receiuing the required permission of the Senate or at least the promise of it. His death, however, although receiuing the approval of Brutus and Cassius was not enough to guarantee their safety - the cult of Caesar which he had set up continued unabated for several weeks and they lefit the citie, of which they had dreamed of being the acclaimed and exalted saviours, just about a month after their great triumphi - never to enter it again.

1. Cic. Phil.II.16,31. (2. Cic. Att.XIV,8,1."Bruto nostro probari Antonium." (3. Cic. Att. XIV,7,1:10,1. Phil.X,3,7. App.III,6. Dio.xlvii,20,2-3.(inaccurate)! App. III,6.wrongly says that the measure taken to legalise Brutus' departure was the allotment to him of a corn-commission. That commission was not given until June 5th and Cicero (Phil.l.c.) shows the kind of arrangement made: "M. Brutus legibus est solutos, si ab urbe plus quam decem dies afuisset." Shuckburgh (Cicero's Letters Trans. (Bell.1899-1900) vol. IV p.71 note 3) thinks that the indemnity for leaving the citie was not granted until June 5th but in the light of Brutus' "colloquium...non incommodum" with Antony before he left the citie (Cic. Att.XIV,6,1) it was more probably given at the time of departure. If it had not come until June, Brutus' absence from the citie in May would have been illegal and we should have expected some reference in Cicero's letters to the delay in granting indemnity.

J.D. Denniston (Cicero's Philippiics I and II, Oxford,1936:p 73) argues that since the departure of Brutus from Rome was made secretly - for Cicero did not hear definite news of it for nearly a week (Att.XIV,10,1)- the permission to leave could not have been given until after he had left. But even after permission had been granted Brutus' movements would still be kept secret from fear of the veterans. It is at least certain that a promise of security was given him before he lefit.
Chapter IX.

Brutus in Retirement in Italy - Mid-April to August 44 B.C.

The conversation, which Brutus and Cassius had with Antony before their departure from the city seems to have resulted in some kind of informal agreement between them, and for the next few weeks the two chief conspirators allowed Antony's wishes to have some weight with them. Since the meeting was, therefore, of some importance, it is unfortunate that Cicero's comment on their talk was limited to the phrase "not bad under the circumstances," but it is easy to see what the terms of the agreement were. Antony received an assurance that the two Republicans would not attempt to organise any opposition against him from without the city. Although he knew that such an attempt was contrary to the declared policy of the upholders of the constitution, he was doubtless nervous that his own future conduct might give them some such pretext to evade the constitution as they had found in the case of Caesar, and he was aware that in the country districts the murder of Caesar had been received with all the generous approval that the conspirators had hoped to find in the city. According to Cicero, the people were "jumping for joy," and in many towns supporters of the Republican cause were mustering as if for some definite purpose.

On Antony's advice, as they themselves admitted, Brutus and Cassius forbade such assemblies. In turn Antony gave them a promise to do all he could to ensure that they would be able...
to return to Rome as soon as possible. It may seem surprising in the light of the later events that Brutus and Cassius should have been so ready to accept Antony's promises as sincere, but we have to remember that up to the end of April his conduct was almost exemplary. Except for the riots at Caesar's funeral, responsibility for which it would have been hard to prove against him, he had done nothing to oppose the Republicans' interests and much to further them. In the crucial two days after the Ides it was he who had held Lepidus in check, and in the Temple of Tellus his vote had been for the amnesty. Since then he had abolished the dictatorship, had crushed the leader of the most dangerous riots against Brutus and Cassius, and had helped the former to leave Rome without breaking the law.

The hope of an early return to Rome was the determining feature of Brutus' policy at this time. Cassius and he were still bound by the fixed intention to do nothing to upset the normal Republican routine, their conduct had to be consistently constitutional, and if by their enforced absence from the city they were robbed of the chance to share in the administration, they had only one alternative in mind - voluntary exile. At the time of their departure from Rome and for several months afterwards the idea of a recourse to arms and the raising of another civil war was never in their serious thoughts. In any case despite their popularity in the country, which is always the spiritual home of conservative thought, they would have had no hope of victory in an immediate war against Antony in Italy. Cicero himself said on May 11th, "If he (Brutus) sets up as leader of a civil war, no one will follow him, except such as will be easily defeated." By their policy of waiting for a...
peaceful return to Rome - the only possible policy for them at the time - they were condemned to a period of forced inactivity and indecision, from which they could derive neither credit nor advantage. From mid-April until September, while others occupied the centre of the stage they had originally set, Brutus and Cassius lived in different country towns - Lamuvium, Astura, Antium - eating out their hearts in idleness, alternating between pride in their achievement and despair for their future, making futile decisions and pathetically discarding them, endeavouring to win the support of this man and that, never at any time able to take a single step towards securing their own restoration, until in the end they were obliged to abandon the main theme of their creed and stir up the war they had sworn to avoid.

On April 14th or 15th Cicero heard a rumour that Brutus had been seen near Lamuvium, which later proved correct. In that town Brutus had a villa and there he stayed for about a month. His house was equipped on fairly luxurious lines and reflected its owner's love of Greek culture. The porch of the garden was named the Stoa Persice after the famous one in Sparta, and a stream, which flowed through the property, bore the heroic name of the Eurotas. Cassius was probably not with Brutus at Lamuvium.

With his chief hopes centred on an early return to Rome, Brutus directed his energies now towards securing the support of various men of importance for his Republican policy. He and

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(1.-Those writers who blame Brutus for not adopting a stronger policy do not properly appreciate the circumstances. see Special Note.14 pp.335f. (2.-He also had houses at Antium (see below pp.127ff) unless indeed it was Cassius' hospitality he later enjoyed there, and at Cumae (Cic. Brut,87,300). (2.-Att. XIV,7,1: cf.16,1. (4.-Att. XV,9,1. (5.-See Special Note 11 p.316)
Cassius were now abandoned by their former colleagues, and though some of these, like Decimus Brutus and Trebonius in their provinces, might be regarded as promising a safe refuge if the worst happened, the two leaders of the party had to ensure for themselves as much favour as possible among those who had not been in the plot. About the middle of April probably, in fact, before he left Rome - Brutus received a letter from Lepidus, now in his province in the South of Gaul. The letter, brought to Brutus by his sister Junia, Lepidus' wife, was written "moderate et amice," as if Lepidus had by then forgotten his original resentment at the murder of Caesar. If the tone of the letter indicates any rapprochement between Lepidus and Brutus, originating with the former, it led to nothing. Probably it was really inspired by Junia and its importance domestic rather than political. A few weeks later - about May 10th - we find both Brutus and Cassius urging Cicero to make a good Republican out of his neighbour Hirtius, who with Pansa was consul-elect for the following year and therefore a man of importance; but these relations with Hirtius and Lepidus do not justify the suggestion that Brutus was trying to form a party among the Caesarians in particular. His purpose was to gain all possible support for the Republic, no matter from which camp it might come.

About ten days after his arrival at Lanuvium Brutus wrote a letter to Antony. We know nothing of its contents, except that it was friendly and calculated to increase the

\[1\text{-Att. XIV,8,1. The context indicates that the letter came from Lepidus to Brutus and not vice versa, as Tyrrell and Purser in their note on the passage think possible. Cicero seems to regard the letter as on the same footing as one Aemilius Paullus received from his brother Lepidus. (2.-This change of tone probably indicates that Lepidus' hostile attitude on March 15th-16th was inspired less by regret for Caesar's death than by desire for personal importance. (3.-Att. XIV, 20,4: XIV,6,1:6,1. (4.-Byrne.op.cit.p.93. (5.-Cic. Att. XIV,16,1.}
apparent goodwill between the two. Probably it contained merely an assurance of the writer's gratitude and benevolence, and the hope that Antony was doing what he could to make Brutus' return to Rome possible. We have no evidence of Antony's answer if any was given; but his true reply was seen a few days later when he departed to Campania to visit the veterans there. This letter of Brutus however had the effect of encouraging Cicero to hope that things were on the mend. Ever since Brutus had been compelled to retire to the country, Cicero had been very pessimistic about the prospects of the Republic, and had in his letters to Atticus frequently deplored the mistakes that had been made on and after the Ides of March, disapproving especially of the lingering on the Capitol and the granting of a public funeral to Caesar. His censures were so severe that Atticus had taken up the cudgels on Brutus' behalf, as if Cicero had been blaming him for the failure, a suggestion which Cicero promptly and vehemently denied. Brutus' letter to Antony, of which Cicero heard on April 27th or 28th aroused in him a new optimism and the hope apparently that some kind of real understanding might be formed between the two. This optimism was further encouraged by news from Rome of the activities of Dolabella, who was now Antony's colleague in the consulship. Near the end of April, Antony left the city to supervise personally the allotment of lands to the veterans in Campania. Dolabella, probably to spite Antony - they had never been very friendly - immediately assumed a strongly Republican attitude. The worship of Caesar, begun by Amatius, had not been stamped out by its chief priest's death and had been increasing rapidly. Antony's interest in it had been

merely to rid himself of a possible rival in Brutus and he took no trouble to stop the cult after the ringleader's execution. Dolabella decided to crush it vigorously. The new ringleaders were arrested and many, both slaves and freemen, executed, the pillar in the forum was pulled down and arrangements made to have the site of it repaved at once. This decision of Dolabella's, affecting as it did the element which had been finally responsible for Brutus' retiral, seemed to Cicero a great cause for rejoicing. "In my opinion," he wrote to Atticus, "our friend Brutus could walk through the forum even with a golden crown on his head. For who would dare to attack him with the fear of cross and rock before his eyes?" The mob does, in fact, seem to have shown some approval of Dolabella's vigorous and strictly illegal action, but its applause was probably discreet rather than sincere.

Cicero however in the flush of his new enthusiasm wrote letters to both Brutus and Cassius, in which he tried to communicate to them his renewed optimism and urged them on to nobler deeds for the Republic. From Brutus, however, his efforts struck little response. Brutus' hopes had mainly depended on Antony and the consul's visit to Campania left no room for doubt that he meant at all costs to win the friendship of the veterans. That he could not do without declaring his opposition to the murderers, and Brutus, realising only too clearly the supreme influence which Antony with the veterans behind him would have, was not deceived even momentarily by the show of Republicanism of Dolabella, whom in any case he did not trust. Accordingly, his reply to Cicero although he expressed polite pleasure at

1. -Cic. Att. XIV,15,2:16,2:17a(i.e. Fam.IX,14):18,1:19,5:20,4:
The letter to Cassius still survives. Fam.XI,1.
receipt of the letter, was very dashing to the orator's high spirits; for Brutus wrote to him that he was seriously contemplating exile.

He was resolved, however, to make one more trial of the feelings of the populace. Antony had summoned a meeting of the Senate for June 1st, at which he proposed to have the province of Macedonia, previously allotted to him, exchanged for the two provinces of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul and to have the period of his tenure prolonged. Such an obvious recollection of Caesar could not but cause perturbation to the Republicans and Brutus, therefore, wished to be in the city on the day of the meeting. Attendance at the meeting, however, was the less important part of his intentions; for he had in mind to deliver a speech directly to the people in the forum. From his reception there he would decide whether it was possible for him to continue his active interest in politics or whether he must go into exile. For that reason he laid great emphasis on the occasion, which is reflected in the insistence with which he sought Cicero's help and advice. It is not, I think, certain that he asked Cicero to attend the meeting with him, as is generally thought, but he certainly did wish to have an interview with him before June 1st, and about May 15th wrote suggesting one. Cicero could see no reason for meeting him, as he had no advice to offer, but, knowing Brutus' pertinacity and learning that he had been asking Atticus when he (Cicero) was expected to be in Tusculum, he did not hope to avoid the interview. There is, however, no reason to think that they did meet one another at this time. About May 20th Brutus left Lanuvium with the intention, as I think, of joining...
Cassius at Antium. To gratify Cicero, he put up probably for no more than a day or two at the latter's villa in Astura, as its owner had frequently urged him to do. When he left Lanuvium, he had probably abandoned the idea of talking with Cicero himself, and instead sought to arrange a meeting between the orator and L. Caesar; the uncle and opponent of Antony, a sincere and loyal Republican, who was at this time in bad health. Cicero's advice for himself he sought in a letter instead of an interview, and on May 25th or 26th wrote asking his opinion on the definite question of whether he should go to Rome or not. Cicero was completely at a loss what to say and thought that silence was his safest course.

Further indication of the importance given by Brutus and his friends to the occasion of June 1st is to be seen in the attitude of Atticus. The financier was at this time as intimate with Brutus as Cassius was. They were exchanging frequent letters and about May 16th had a discussion at Lanuvium; Atticus was thoroughly conversant with all of Brutus' plans and activities, and it was from him that Cicero got most of his news of Brutus. It seems, indeed, that the cautious Atticus came nearer at this time to committing himself definitely to one political faction than at any period of his curious life. He was, however, too wary to allow his friendliness towards Brutus to be publicly avowed and for that reason declined to signalise it by contributing to a public
fund, which some of Brutus' friends tried to raise on his behalf. At the same time his affection for the tyrannicide cannot be denied - later he gave him financial help generously - and now as earlier it was he who sought to mediate between him and Cicero. Sympathising with Brutus' intention to visit Rome on June 1st and appreciating the importance of it, he asked Cicero to help Brutus by composing a speech for him to deliver on that day: Cicero's surprise was considerable: that Atticus, whose successful life was based on his tact, should ask Cicero, the Rhodian, to write a speech for Brutus, most Attic of the Atticists, and one who was perfectly satisfied with his own style and ability, and had no sympathy whatever with Cicero's undignified mannerisms! We may be certain that the request did not emanate from Brutus and it serves to show the importance, which Atticus attached to the occasion and at the same time, doubtless, his fear that Brutus was not the orator to use the occasion properly. His earlier speeches to the people had proved to everyone except Brutus himself that his chaste and reasonable style was not the weapon to use on the Roman mob. Cicero, quite naturally declined to risk the resentment which he knew Brutus would feel at any offer to compose his speeches for him, and all along his attitude towards the proposed visit to Rome was far from encouraging. He felt from the start that Brutus would be lucky if he got a chance to speak at all: About May 14th he heard that Antony on his return to Rome from Campania had begun to gather a large body of veterans in the city and there could be no doubt that these would by their presence control the meeting of June 1st. This move on Antony's part completely destroyed Cicero's recently formed hopes and like Brutus he came

1.- Nepos. Att. 6,3-4. 2.- see p.152 below. 3.- Cic. Att. XIV,20,5. 4.- see p.257f. below. 5.- Cic. att. XIV,20,7. 6.- "tue utinam liceat isti contionari." 6.- ibid.22,2,fin.
to see Antony as the villain of the piece. On May, 14th he expressed regret that Antony had not been killed on the Ides of March and felt that there would be no profit from the murder of Caesar until Antony was dead too:

The same news about the veterans came to Brutus' ears and had its inevitable effect upon him. Gradually it became more and more evident that it would be impossible for him to show himself in the city, and his mood became more and more despondent. As a relief from political worries he turned to study, busyng himself especially in composing for publication the speech he had delivered on the Capitol on March 17:

This literary activity at a time when the fate of the whole state was in the balance is a curious repetition of Cicero's conduct in 45 B.C., but we must remember that apart from giving him something with which to occupy his mind, the publication of the speech could be regarded as valuable propaganda for the Republican cause aimed especially perhaps at conciliating the veterans. This aspect of it seems to have been appreciated by Atticus, who doubtless published the speech. Brutus sent his completed speech to Cicero asking him to suggest whatever alterations he thought necessary. Cicero wisely offered few, if any, criticisms, but to Atticus he gave his true opinion:

"It is a speech of quite perfect finish so far as the sentiments are concerned, and not to be surpassed in point of language. Nevertheless, if I had had to handle that case, I should have written with more fire." Atticus felt the justice of Cicero's remarks and suggested that he should compose a speech on the same subject and allow it to be published. Once more Cicero was surprised at Atticus' apparent lack of tact and again we can explain it only on the assumption, that Atticus felt the

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1.-ibid. 2.-Cic. Att. XIV.1b,2, cf. p.323. below 3.- Ibid.
4.-Ibid. XV.3, 3.
need for some good propaganda for Brutus' cause in the city.

When at last Brutus and Cassius, now living together at Antium, were finally persuaded that a visit to Rome was impossible, they contented themselves with writing a letter of protest to Antony. The letter, written some time in the last week of May, survives in Cicero's correspondence: It has a pleasing, well-balanced style and its complaints are expressed with calm dignity and confidence. They do not abuse Antony but rather reproach him, protesting that, whereas they have lived up to their part of their bargain by disbanding their eager friends in the country towns, he has betrayed their confidence in him by gathering so many veterans in the town on a very flimsy pretext. They were especially concerned at the rumour that the veterans were proposing to restore Amatius' altar to Caesar, which had done so much harm to the Republican cause already. Disclaiming any fear of Antony or concern for their own safety, they reaffirm their desire to avoid disturbing the general peace but at the same time manage to convey the suggestion that Antony should watch his conduct.

The consul, surrounded by his veterans, could afford to neglect their warnings, although, according to Hirtius, he was sometimes a little nervous of what might happen if they suddenly acquired a new determination. His plans were progressing very favourably. He was now beyond question the most powerful individual in the state and his rivals, Lepidus

Eventually Cicero did apparently consent to write a short monograph in the style of Heracleides (ibid, 4, 3). This may be the work referred to in Att. XV, 27, 2 of July 3rd, but it was not to be published. cf. also XVI, 2, 6. (2.-Fam. XI, 2. For reasons given in Special Note 11 I think that this letter was written in Antium and not Lanuvium, as editors have assumed. p. 328ff. below. (3.- His excuse was that he was intending to bring in a bill affecting their interests and that they should therefore be present. (Fam. XI, 2, 3.) Actually no one would have dared to oppose such a bill even with no veterans in the immediate neighbourhood. (4.-Cic. Att. XV, 6,1 fin.)
and Brutus, could now be discounted. The young Octavian, who had arrived in Rome during Antony’s absence in Campania at the beginning of May, had indicated that he was prepared to oppose the consul, but he could not yet be regarded as a serious rival. Antony, like everyone else, did not anticipate the precocious young man’s future. Antony had learned from Caesar that consular power was of no importance to an ambitious individual, unless it were followed by a period of proconsular command, and, as we have seen, he intended to gain such a command—and for a period of five years—from the Senate on June 1st. Something went wrong at the meeting; it was, thanks to the presence of the veterans, poorly attended; and perhaps there was not a quorum. For whatever reason it was, Antony failed to secure his decree but, nothing daunted, he appealed to the assembly and, on the same day or the day after, he had a law passed by the people granting him, in exchange for Macedonia, the two provinces of Gaul for five years and allowing him to retain the Macedonian legions. Pleased with his arrangements for his own future, he now turned to settle the future of Brutus and Cassius. In the normal course of events they would receive provinces as propraetors for the year 43 B.C. and it was obviously Antony’s policy to ensure that their provinces should be unimportant and should contain no legions. At first he proposed to have the praetorian provinces allotted on June 1st in the Senate; but he was afraid to leave Brutus and Cassius in Italy for the rest of 44 B.C. His own recent conduct and the obvious trend of his plans was bound to remind them of Caesar and he remembered the threat Cassius had made to

C.-see Rice Holmes.A.R.E.P.125. (C.-Att.XV,5,2."de provincia Bruti et Cassii per senatus consultum.”
him at dinner on the evening of March 17th. His move to rid himself of their presence in Italy was very clever. After the fiasco of June 1st at which nothing was done, he proposed in a second meeting of the Senate on June 5th that that body should bestow on them commissionerships of the corn-supply for the rest of 44 B.C. The office was quite trivial; for, although Pompey had held it as late as 57 B.C.; his appointment had been a special commission "cum imperio" applying to the whole of the provinces, and therefore not comparable with that of Brutus and Cassius, which carried no imperium and applied only to one province in each case. It involved, however, that the two Republicans would have to leave Italy, Brutus for Asia and Cassius for Sicily, where they would lose touch with affairs at home and with one another. To accept the appointment was to accept an insult and to admit Antony's superior influence; but if they refused it their credit as true Republicans would be destroyed and they could be held responsible for the scarcity of corn in the city — an economic circumstance which could be quite safely depended upon.

Cicero heard of these intentions of Antony from Balbus on June 2nd and we may presume that Brutus and Cassius were informed by some of their friends in the city about the same time. Although the agenda of the meeting was to contain also the allotment of the provinces; that was poor compensation for the other item. Cicero's first reaction was of disgust at the indignity which his heroes were to suffer, but he felt at the same time that almost anything was better for them than

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1. Dio xlv, 34, 7. When Antony asked "You don't have a dagger under your arm at the moment, have you?" Cassius replied "Yes; and a pretty big one, too, if you ever have any hankering after the rôle of tyrant." Of. also the polite veiled threats of Fam. XI, 2. 2. Cic. Att. IV, 1, 6-7. Livy epit. 104. Plut. Pomp. 49, 4. Dio XXXIX, 9, 2-3. 3. Cic. att. XV, 9, 1. 4. Ibid.
the life of demoralising idleness they had been leading for
the past two months. Brutus and Cassius were naturally
indignant and Cassius especially was exceedingly enraged; but
they could do nothing to prevent the passing of the decree.
On the 5th, as arranged, the commissions were allotted to them
and even the compensation of knowing for certain that they
were to have a province in some six months was denied them.
The provincial question was shelved:

Brutus and Cassius at once resolved upon a full
council of war of all their most intimate friends. They
invited Cicero and Atticus and others to join their immediate
family circle at Antium for a full discussion of what reply
should be made to Antony's manoeuvre. Atticus was prevented
by business - or his own cautiousness - from attending and
Cicero was not at all anxious to go: He felt that even to
give them advice was a dangerous step and he was, besides, at a
loss what advice to give. Acceptance of the post was, he
thought, too degrading, but, by their own inactivity and the
feeble support they were able to command, they were debarred
from taking any decisive action. A further complication lay
in the fact that by going to Asia Brutus would make it
completely impossible for himself to superintend personally
the games of Apollo, which as urban praetor he was due to give
very soon. Considerable importance was attached to these
games, especially by Brutus himself, from the point of view
of regaining some popularity with the people, but in any case,
as things were, it did not seem at all probable that he would
be able to be in Rome for them. Although Cicero, realising

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}}\text{-ibid.}\quad \text{(2.-see Special Note. 18 .pp.335, below. App.III,106.}
\text{\textsuperscript{b}}\text{ments the bestowal of the "cura annonae" but makes two errors}
\text{\textsuperscript{c}}\text{(a) that it extended over all the provinces and (b) that the}
\text{\textsuperscript{d}}\text{Senate gave it as an honour to Brutus and Cassius. \textsuperscript{2}-Cic. Att.}
\text{\textsuperscript{e}}\text{17,10,1init.} \quad \text{(4.-ibid.fin.}}\]
the possibility of trouble between Antony and Decimus Brutus, when the time came for the one to hand over Cisalpine Gaul to the other, felt that some definite declaration of policy would require to be made soon by Brutus and Cassius, he found it difficult to decide what course they should take, and would in fact have preferred to give them no advice at all. Remarking that Brutus had his mother to give him advice in person - Cicero had no liking for Servilia - he resolved to give his by letter.

The next day, however, he changed his mind and went to Antium for the meeting. Brutus gave him a warm welcome and the discussion began at once, even in the absence of Cassius. Present, in a large gathering, were Brutus' women-folks Servilia, Portia and Tertia, who had made a good recovery from a miscarriage which she had suffered about a month before, and also Brutus' friend Favonius, the clownish disciple and adherent of Cato. Cicero having carefully pondered what he should say on the way over, gave it now as his considered opinion that they should accept the commission. He felt now that all they could do was to consult for their safety, both for their own sakes and the Republic's, for on them and their eventual conduct the Republic depended. To refuse the commission would lay them open to attack by Antony and to linger on in Italy defenceless would, under the circumstances, be fatal. At this point Cassius arrived "breathing war," and declared point-blank that he would not go to Sicily. When Cicero repeated his arguments about the dangers of remaining in Italy in defiance of the Senate's decree and without proper protection, he replied that he would go to Achaia in exile.
which was, in fact, what Cicero himself was intending to do, though he disguised his absence as a "libera legatio." Cicero, thereupon, turned to Brutus and asked his intention. Nobly - but rather fatuously - Brutus expressed his readiness to go even to Rome if Cicero advised it. The orator replied that, if Brutus could be safe in Rome, he would urge him to go and to stay there even in the following year rather than go to a province; but as things were, the city was definitely unsafe for him. Then the discussion developed into a series of complaints over lost opportunities, led mainly by Cassius and aimed especially at Decimus Brutus, who, Cassius thought, should have led his legions against Antony instead of against Gallic tribes, as he had done. Cicero took up the same tone for a time and recounting all the mistakes they had made - lingering on the Capitol, granting the public funeral and so on - told them how, by summoning the Senate to the Capitol and firing the people's enthusiasm, they might have won the day then and ensured the Republic's safety. Thereupon Servilia tried to join in and object to his remarks but he managed to forestall her by rising to go.

When Cicero left them at last and went along the coast to his villa at Astura, he took with him the impression that they had come to a definite decision. Servilia, still seeing herself as the grande dame she had been in Caesar's day, undertook to have their appointment as corn-commissioners rescinded, but neither her son nor her son-in-law seems to have paid much heed to her promise. Brutus was determined to accept

1.-Att. XV,11,4:19,2:20,1. Phil.I,2,6. (2.-The last four words are conjecture; but it is not easy to see how else Cicero could have silenced Servilia, and he has no more details to add of the discussion. (3.-Att. XV,12,1.
the commission and the very next day began to gather ships for his voyage to Asia. Cassius on the other hand was, it seems, equally determined to refuse the commission, no matter what came of Servilia's efforts, and to go to Achaea. There is no direct evidence of the result of Servilia's attempts, but it is probable that she found herself unable to achieve any success. Her day was over.

To Brutus the eventual arrival at an active decision was a great relief. The weary lingering, the dilatoriness and disappointments of the past two months had taken great toll of his nervous stability and we are not surprised at Cicero's account of him and Cassius as supine and spineless. After the council at Antium he wrote of them to Atticus, "In good truth I found a ship with its timbers all started or rather gone to pieces. No plan, no system, no method." The one satisfaction he derived from the meeting was that he had been able to bid Brutus goodbye, before they both left Italy, in case they should never meet again! In reaction from his recent idleness Brutus plunged with energy and enthusiasm into the tasks now before him. On the 9th of June he began to gather ships for the voyage: The pirates were still strong enough in the eastern Mediterranean to make adequate protection advisable and it must be affirmed that this mustering of a little navy on Brutus' part had no end in view beyond the provision of that protection.

At the same time he had another task to perform. As we have already seen, his decision to leave Italy removed completely the possibility, which since his departure from Rome

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1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. Some writers, e.g. A. C. Clark in Class Rev. XV (1904) p. 175, have assumed wrongly that her efforts were successful. As late as July 10th Cicero expected Cassius to go no further than Sicily "Nam Cassil classem... non numero ultra fretum" (Att. XVI, 4, 4) i.e. "I'm not counting on Cassius' fleet beyond the Sicilian strait." It is clear, therefore, that the "cura annonae" had not been cancelled by them.

4. Att. IV, 1, 3. 5. Att. XV, 12, 1. 6. Brutus was not at this time planning civil war. cf. Special Note 17, p. 346.
had been of the slightest, of his presiding in person at the
Indi Apollinares. Nevertheless he was determined, at first
probably merely in order to satisfy his sense of official duty,
to provide the games at his own expense and leave the honour of
presiding over them to someone else. He was resolved also
that they should be on as lavish and unstinted a scale as possible,
and, in the course of his work in connection with them, he came
to hope that from them he might regain some of the popularity he
had lost in the city. This idea soon became uppermost in his
mind and explains the change noted by Cicero in his attitude
towards the voyage to Asia. On June 8th Cicero said of him,
"it looks as if Brutus would like to set sail for Asia from
Antium itself;" and a month later on July 10th "Brutus doesn't
seem to be in the least in a hurry. He is waiting for news of
the end of his games." His duties as praetor of the city had
been taken over by his colleague Caius Anton, brother of the
consul, and it was he who was to manage the games also.
Naturally Brutus could not expect him to show any eagerness to
make the games good propaganda for the tyrannicides, and
accordingly took great pains himself to ensure their magnificence.
These games of Apollo, though mainly scenic, finished with a
beast-hunt in the circus. For that part of the festival
Brutus had collected a large number of animals, which presumably
he had left in the city, and he now sent orders that every one
of them was to be used and none reserved for sale or for later

however, makes the astonishing blunder of saying that it was
Cassius who was City Praetor and responsible for the games.
Ins. Att. xv. 12, 1: cf. also 18, 2; 26, 1: 27, 3; 28: XVI, 5, 1:4, land 4;
6.-Att. XVI, 4, 4. 4.-Oic. Att. XV, 12, 1: XVI, 2, 3. (T. & P. in
their note on this passage (vol. v. p. 337. cf. also p. 332) seem
to accept the error of Granovius that it was Lucius, not Caius
Antony. It was Caius who was Brutus' fellow praetor since he,
not Lucius, received a province for 43 B.C. Lucius seems to have
been tribunus plebis in 44. Att. XIV, 20, 3.) App. III, 23. Dio
xxvii, 20, 2.
He did all he could also to ensure that the actors for the plays would be as good and as numerous as possible. He journeyed specially to Naples himself to interview the actors there and urged various friends to help in procuring others. We have the names of two of his "stars" - Cannutius, a Greek actor of some reputation, whom he asked his friends to persuade to go to Rome since a Greek could not be compelled to do so, and Bacchus; an actress, whose services Atticus seems to have secured for him. It was Atticus, as we might have expected, who shouldered the chief burden of the arrangements; and we find him dealing with even such petty problems as the provision of garlands for statues.

Although he probably had some say in the choice of plays for the occasion, which would naturally be of the most Republican and antimonarchical spirit, Brutus does not seem to have been familiar with the details of the week's programme, as it was actually performed. On the day, for instance, when the "Tereus" of Accius was played, he had expected it to be the same author's "Brutus". One may imagine the latter play had been Brutus' suggestion and that by Antony's influence a change was made from such an obviously "party-piece." Not content with arranging for the performers and performances, Brutus tried also to provide a desirable audience. He was particularly anxious that Cicero should attend; thinking doubtless that the orator's preserve would add considerably to the Republican

1. - Plut. Brut. 21,3. 2. - Plut. ibid. This journey may be referred to by Cicero in Att. XV, 19, 1 of June 15th-19th, when he asks "quid autem se reperit Brutus?" Hearing Brutus had gone South to Naples, Cicero may have thought this was the first stage of the journey to Asia, about which Brutus had been so keen only ten days before. (Att. XV, 11, 2, fin) He cannot understand, therefore, why Brutus has returned to Antium.

atmosphere. Cicero declined to go — he was too nervous of the reception the veterans might give him — pleading, rather feebly, that his journey to Greece had already begun though he did not reach ship-board until July 17th; and that it was hardly fitting for him, after such a long absence from Rome, to return merely to attend a festival. According to Appian, others besides Cicero received special invitations and professional "pleauditores" were hired to encourage a warm reception.

There is much conflicting evidence with regard to the reception the games met with. In the Philippics Cicero describes the people as having shown a rapturous enthusiasm "while they soothed their regrets for his (Brutus) absence by constant shouts and demonstrations of affection," but in that picture there are obvious signs of oratorical licence, especially when we compare it with the account in Cicero's own letters. There we learn that on the opening day, when a play in the Greek fashion was produced, the attendance was very disappointing: Cicero, who could not abide such plays, was not surprised. A little later in the week, during the performance of the "Tereus" some lines expressing obvious Republican sentiments were warmly applauded, and Brutus was gratified by that news. The mention of such a particular moment of enthusiasm makes one think that such moments were few during the week. We know that Caius Antony the president, was doing what he could to discourage the effect Brutus was hoping for. In the advertisement for the third day of the festival he described the day as "Nonis Julius," — which from Cicero's astonishment we may presume to have been the

1.-Aatt. XVI,3,6: and even then he was only leaving Pompeii.
4.-Aatt. XVI,5,1. (5.-ibid. (6.-ibid,4,1.
first use of the month's new name: It was a clever move to honour Caesar in advertising the games his murderer was providing, and Brutus, exceedingly vexed at what he considered to be a gratuitous insult to himself; sent orders to Rome that the month should receive its old name in the next advertisement. The inconsistency of Cicero's comments on the games in his letters as compared with his fulsome descriptions in the Philippics, makes one the more inclined to accept the circumstantial account of Appian; though many of its details have no independent support. He says that at first, thanks to the hired applauders, some enthusiasm was kindled and the cry was taken up for Brutus' recall, which was just what Brutus and his friends were hoping for; but the opposite sentiments were in turn so vigorously expressed that the games were interrupted until all mention of Brutus' return ceased. It is to be expected that in the city there was a party in favour of Brutus, who would naturally at his games express their desire for him, but their opponents, more numerous and containing the more disorderly elements of the rabble, would be more likely to prove superior in a contest of catcalls and applause. In any case even if by his games Brutus did regain for himself a little of the people's affection; his success was soon discounted by the games, which Octavian gave a week later in honour of Caesar's victory at Thapsus, and once more Brutus' hopes of returning to Rome

with the goodwill of all parties were disappointed.

Of his other activities during the weeks, in which the preparations for the games were being made, there is little to be said. For a week or two he stayed on in Antium, and though Cicero had expected a visit from him at Asturâ, it never apparently took place. A few days after he began to gather his vessels, Antony tried to bring fresh discredit upon him and Cassius by pretending that they were plotting some act of violence, providing himself thereby with a reason for further increasing his bodyguard. The accusation was certainly without foundation. On the 20th of June Brutus was still determined to leave at once for Asia, and Cicero expressed a genuine regret at the prospect, fearing that neither he nor Atticus would ever see him again. On the 25th he left Antium very early in the morning; and we may presume that he went South to Nesis, where he was when Cicero visited him on July 8th. Nesis (the modern Misidia) is a very small island off the coast of Campania between Puteoli and Naples, owned by Brutus' relative Lucullus. On June 30th Cicero received the letter from him asking him to attend the games at Rome. The rest of this letter Cicero found difficult to appreciate, and he sent it to Atticus for his opinion, saying "The rest of his letter may be interpreted in two different lights; but, nevertheless, he does at times

1.-Att.XV,12,1.fim. (2.-ibid,17,1. (3.-ibid.20,3. "Brutus quidem subito"... (4.-ibid,24. (5.-ibid,XVI,1,1.
6.-Shuckburgh (op.cit.vol.IVp.98 note 1.) suggests wrongly that the villa was Sergilla's and that it may be the one originally owned by Pontius which she obtained through the offices of Caesar (Att.XIV,21,3.) T. & P. (op. cit. vol. V. p.329.) say, without reference, that Lucullus had a villa on the island. The required reference is Cic. Phil. X,4,8 whence it appears that Lucullus owned the whole island."insula clarissimi adolescentis, Luculli, propinqui sui." Lucullus was a cousin of Brutus, his mother being sister to Sergilla. Plut. Cat. min. 54,1. Nicolaus Dam. 51. says not quite accurately that Brutus and Cassius were at Dicaearchia i.e. Puteoli.
7.-Att. XV,26,1.
emit some sparks of manly courage." The nature of this ambiguity we have no direct evidence to decide, but Cicero's comment suggests that it contained, what was the main theme of Brutus' declarations at the time, an expression of his readiness to go into exile for the sake of preserving peace. That avowal Cicero might regard either as noble self-sacrifice or as cowardly supineness; while 'the sparks of courage' may have unconsciously been dropped in his references to Antony and the fate that would await a second Caesar. Four days later came another letter to Cicero and of it he gave an unhesitating opinion, he was keenly aware of Brutus'.

On July 8th Cicero went over from Puteoli to see Brutus. He took with him his nephew Quintus, who was then in the throes of a curious reformation. He had quarreled with Antony from disapproval of his tyrannical aims and conduct, and had become fired with the intention to serve Brutus. The latter gave them a charming reception and was delighted at the young man's change of front and convinced of his sincerity. Of Atticus, who was Quintus' maternal uncle, he also spoke very affectionately, and he was glad to hear Cicero's news of events at Rome. At the same time he was obviously ill at ease and this Cicero accounted for by the anxiety he felt about the games. These were by then in full swing and Cicero's description of Brutus' feelings shows how important he had come to regard them. He was pathetically unwilling to leave Italy, and to the end his hope was that he might yet be able to return to Rome.

Nevertheless, he had not been remiss in gathering ships,
and had received help in that task from several friends - Domitius, Sestius, Bucilianus and others. They were, at the time of Cicero's visit on July 8th, engaged in congregating their various contingents at Nesis. Cicero, who had not expected his ships to be very large, was surprised both at the quality of the fleet and at the progress that had been made in the preparations for the voyage. Both Brutus and Domitius included in their flotillas some really good two-banked galleys, while the others had some fine vessels also. Cassius, who had recently joined the muster at the island had as one might expect of the most experienced soldier among them, gathered the best fleet of them all. Cicero was impressed enough by their armament to think it quite adequate protection for himself against the pirates and was anxious for an invitation to sail with them. Brutus, however, took no notice of the frequent hints he dropped, and Cicero was later in the day informed by Cnaeus Lucceius, who was one of Brutus' more intimate companions at this time, that Brutus was now in no hurry to sail pending the result of the propaganda at the games, and that, when he did leave his progress would be leisurely with frequent calls. Nine days later, on 17th July, Brutus was still at Nesis and Cassius in close proximity at Naples.

During Cicero's visit to Brutus occurred a curious incident, which may or may not point to another activity on Brutus' part. It concerned Sextus Pompeius the younger son of Caesar's rival, who had since his brother's defeat at Munda been lingering on with a small force in the South of Spain. On
Caesar's death, Sextus, as a Pompeian leader with a force under arms became something of a public figure and the attention of both parties, Caesarian and Republican, was turned to him. When Lepidus, quite soon after the Ides of March, left for his province in South Gaul, he was commissioned on Antony's suggestion to open negotiations with Sextus, and to offer him recompense for the confiscation of his father's estate. Thus Antony hoped to win him over to his own side, but there was in fact little prospect of that. For a time in April we find Cicero expressing doubts as to whether Sextus will prove a dependable Republican; but by the end of that month he felt assured that there was little probability of any alliance between him and Antony, and from then onwards his anxiety centred round the prospect, which he felt to be far from remote, of a civil war between them. That undesirable contingency seemed to be becoming more imminent when, in June, rumours reached Rome of Pompey's success in winning support in Spain. At that point, however, Lepidus managed at last to get into touch with Sextus, and, when Cicero sailed to Nesis, the current rumour was that Sextus was about to throw in his lot with the Caesarians. Then, while Cicero was holding his conversation with Brutus, news of the most reliable sort arrived in the shape of a letter from Sextus himself. Among Brutus' supporters at Nesis was L. Scribonius Libo, who was Sextus' father-in-law. He came to Brutus on the afternoon of July 8th with the news that a letter had come from Sextus, brought by freedmen of both Sextus and himself, addressed to the consuls. With it was a letter to Libo himself and a copy of

the other, and it seems that Sextus had asked his father-in-law to look over the copy and give it his approval. The letter contained Pompey's answer to Antony's offer of friendship, that he would consider no proposals unless he were allowed unconditionally to return to Rome, and he gave it as his opinion that all armies in existence should be disbanded. Libo read the copy to Brutus and Cicero "to see if anything occurred to them." Apart from a few criticisms of its style, they gave it their complete approval and the only alteration made was in its address. To ensure that the consuls should not be able to suppress it, it was readdressed "to the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people and senate."

Does this incident indicate any attempt on Brutus' part to negotiate with Sextus in opposition to Antony? Although Pompey's sons had not enjoyed much popularity among the optimates still in Italy after the earlier phases of the civil war, it would have been natural enough for the latter after Caesar's death to regard the Pompeian camp in Spain as a possible refuge for them in time of need, and, as Sextus did in the end ally himself with Brutus and Cassius against the Caesarian party, it would not be surprising if Brutus had been in communication with him in the summer of 44 B.C. Apart, however, from this incident of the letter, there is no evidence of such communication and it seems that Brutus' connection with it was more or less accidental. Scribonius, whom Sextus used as his link with official Rome, happened to be with Brutus when his son-in-law's letter arrived, and that he made known its contents to Brutus cannot be taken to prove any wider intimacy between Brutus and

6.-"Harum exemplum nobis legit, si quid videretur." Att.XVI, 4.1. (cf pp. 65, 76. above.)
It does show, however, that Brutus had means of learning how things were elsewhere and that he was in the habit of using them. One wonders what he would have done if the letter had been of an exactly opposite tenour. Would he have suppressed it? Probably, however, had Sextus been giving a favourable answer to Antony's advances, he would not have sent it through his father-in-law's hands, and it may be, since he must have known Scribonius to be on Brutus' side, that he wished his reply to be known to the Republican leader.

Before July 30th Cicero had left the bay of Naples on the first stage of his journey to Greece and after July 17th he has nothing to say of Brutus in his letters until his spectacular return to the scene of action a month later. That silence is unfortunate for the weeks it covers were full of various activities and intentions on the part of both Brutus and Antony. We are able however, to reconstruct with reasonable certainty the course of events.

Brutus's hopes of a return to Rome had, as we have seen been dashed a third time by the failure of his games and the success of Octavian's. The latter had ended on July 30th with a reconciliation, formal, premature and quite hollow between Octavian and Antony. Brutus and Cassius made a final renunciation of their hopes in a public manifesto, in which they declared their willingness to go into perpetual exile, if that would guarantee peace for the state, but at the same time made demands for some concessions to themselves. The exact nature of these concessions it is impossible to say with certainty; but they could not have been other than quite reasonable. They may have asked, as I incline to think most probable, to be relieved of the degrading decree which foisted the 'cura annonae' upon them;
but it is not impossible that all they asked was leave to resign their praetorships. About the same time,—whether before or after their manifesto cannot be determined for certain,—Antony made a speech in the Forum, which was so mild in tone as to inspire in Republican circles the hope that he might mend his ways and come to some sort of agreement which would enable Brutus and Cassius even yet to return to Rome, and take a share in the government. It was even hoped by some that Antony would abandon his claim to the Gallic provinces, which he had obtained through the popular assembly, and would submit to the authority of the Senate.

A meeting of the Senate was called for August 1st, at which some sort of decision regarding the future of Brutus and Cassius would be made. They circularised all Senators of consular and praetorian rank urging them to attend. Once more the hope of returning to Rome became the centre of their existence; once more their hopes were disappointed. At the meeting on August 1st, Antony in no ambiguous terms showed that the mildness of his earlier speech had no permanent implications. What he said we do not know; but he made his opposition to Brutus and Cassius so obvious that, except for L. Calpurnius Piso, the father of Caesar's widow, no one dared to speak against him. The others preserved the silence, which Antony's influence with the veterans made advisable, and the possibility of Brutus and Cassius receiving any profit from the meeting fell to the ground. Perhaps at this same meeting their provinces...
were at last allotted to them and in that again they were given to understand how small a part was allowed them in public affairs. Brutus received Crete and Cassius, apparently, Cyrene, - two of the humblest provinces on the list.

Antony's show of opposition did not stop even there. professing to be angry that they had made demands in a public manifesto, but more probably because, from fear of Octavian's growing popularity among his uncle's old soldiers, he wished to parade publicly his enmity to Caesar's murderers, he in turn published an edict, "insulting and threatening," in which he accused the two tyrannicides of holding levies illegally, of raising money by forced contributions and of tampering, by means of envoys, with armies in the provinces, presumably Macedonia and Syria. This edict he reinforced by a private letter to them on the same uncompromising lines:

To this edict and epistle Brutus and Cassius replied on August 4th with a letter to Antony from Naples, still surviving in Cicero's correspondence: It is no less dignified and suited to the occasion than their earlier protest to him of the end of May. Expressing surprise at the indignation which their publicly made request roused in him, they claim a similar indignation for themselves at being denied the right to make such a request. His accusations of treasonable conduct they mention simply to ignore, and express surprise that the consul

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\[\text{Special Note 18 p.356} \]
\[\text{Fam. XI, 3.1.} \]
\[\text{It is impossible to say definitely whether this edict and letter actually followed or preceded the meeting of August 1st. But it is reasonable to imagine that Brutus' reply would be made within, at most, two days of the receipt of the letter. As the letter to Antony (Fam. XI, 3.) is dated August 4th one is tempted to suggest that Antony's letter was written just after the meeting of August 1st. That the verbal declaration should precede the written is more in keeping with Antony's character; he would enjoy the dénouement of his speech in the Senate. (Fam. XI, 3. Cicero describes it as "scriptum praeclare" Att. XI, 7, 7) \]
\[\text{Gelzer (P.W. X, p.998) wisely points out that Antony's accusations could have meant very little since he himself took no real action regarding them. Cf. Special Note 19 p.344.} \]
should descend to the level of throwing Caesar's death in their teeth. His threats they take no heed of and allow them no weight in their consideration of whether or not civil war is to be avoided. In their turn they warn Antony - their words are too dignified and chastely chosen to be called threats - that he should consider his actions and should ponder not how long Caesar's life had been but how short his reign.

That letter marks the turning point in their lives. Hitherto the desire to uphold the constitution and preserve peace in the state had ever been their most important motive, and the hope of a return to Rome their one immediate purpose. Four times since he had left it in the middle of April, Brutus had built up his hopes of returning to the capital - in April with Antony's help, in May for the meeting of June 1st, in July as a result of his games and on this last occasion by an understanding with Antony - and each time his hopes had been cruelly dashed. His latest disappointment was too profound to allow him ever again to entertain hopes that the Republic would function as he had expected Caesar's death would allow it to. Apart from the mere discarding of old hopes he was forced by these recent events to a revision of his old estimates and a complete alteration in his future policy. Until the letter of August 4th he had avoided all consideration of civil war. Now Antony's conduct and intentions made it undeniable that he aimed at occupying some such place as Caesar had held. His use of the veterans, his abuse of his consular position with regard to Caesar's "acta" and the question of land settlement, his overwhelming of the Senate's authority and his acquisition of extended proconsular power in Gaul made even Brutus confess that here was a second Caesar. He was further embittered.

1. "neque quam diu vixerit Caesar sed quam non diu regnarit, fac cogites." (Fam. XI, 3, 4.)
against Antony by the latter's violent outburst on the 1st of August, by his insulting decree and letter and by the allotment to himself and Cassius of such insignificant provinces. In these circumstances he definitely at last turned his eyes towards the provinces and war.

Shortly after the letter to Antony Brutus moved southwards with his fleet and Cicero, summoned back by news of the hopes of the last days of July, met him on August 17th at Velia, a little town some three miles south of the River Hales, at the mouth of which the fleet was moored. Brutus hearing of Cicero's arrival in the town had walked over at once to see him. Their meeting was perhaps the most genuinely friendly they ever had; and it was their last. Brutus was sincerely glad that Cicero had abandoned his rather frivolous trip to Greece and was returning to lend the valuable support of his presence to the Republican cause.

With the acknowledged leaders of the cause scattered throughout the provinces someone was needed at Rome to co-ordinate their efforts and to ensure for them the support of the Senate. Both men were excited by the crisis and by the prospect of real activity and for once Brutus rid himself of the repressions of his nature and poured out for Cicero the inner feelings of his heart. He told him all that had happened since the beginning of August - Piso's lonely effort in the Senate, Antony's edict and letter and their own reply. The latter Cicero described as "praeclare scriptum." Wonderfully encouraged by...
Brutus' unwonted enthusiasm he went on towards Rome, while Brutus, envying him his destination, turned to his own task abroad.

Exactly what at this time he considered that task to be, is a problem of some difficulty, which I have discussed at length elsewhere: Here it is enough to state the conclusions I have come to. When we consider the rapidity with which Brutus moved after he had taken the first step in the civil war, it is impossible to deny that, when he did leave Italy - some short time after his talk with Cicero at Velia - the intention of raising forces to oppose Antony was in his mind, however nebulously. At the same time there is no evidence to show that any preparations had been made towards the war before he sailed; and, indeed, it is difficult to see what he could have done from Italy in the space of two or three weeks, which was all the time that elapsed between his decision to consider civil war and his departure from Italy. It seems, therefore, most probable that, when he sailed, he had in mind some kind of reconnaissance, especially of Macedonia, with a view to deciding there according to what he found, whether it would be worth while to raise a war against Antony. The district in which he chose to examine his chances can cause no surprise. Only in the East would the Republicans hope to find the necessary arms and equipment to oppose Antony. There were no troops of any account for them in Italy; and the provinces of the West were in the hands of men, on whom they could not depend - Lepidus, Pollio and Flancus. In the East, however, the conspirators, Trebonius and Cimber, held Asia and Bithynia respectively, and it was obvious that the one real chance of

[The whole question of when Brutus and Cassius arrived at the decision to make war on Antony is fully discussed in Special Note 17, p. 348. The above is a statement of my solution of the problem.]
success against Antony lay in consolidating the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean, where men and money were plentiful. The key provinces apart from that of Trebonius were Macedonia and Syria. Of these the former was governed by Hortensius Mortalus, son of the orator whom Brutus had assisted in 53-50 B.C., who was related to Brutus by marriage. Syria was at the time in a state of upheaval, which Dolabella hoped to settle; but Cassius, with his former experience and reputation in the province had good reason to hope he might win it. Brutus therefore, decided to make trial of Macedonia himself.

It is probable that when he sailed, he was preserving an official fiction that his eventual destination was either his allotted province of Crete or Asia for his corn commission, and that his journey would be a leisurely one with quite a lengthy halt at Athens. Cassius, in the meantime, being unable to sail to his province, Cyrene, or to Sicily via Syria, waited behind in Italy pretending that he would yet sail to one of these places but in fact waiting to hear the result of Brutus' researches.

Before we follow Brutus to the East it is worth while to relate the story, given by Plutarch, of his parting from his wife. As the story comes in the first place from Bibulus, Porcia's son, there is every reason to believe it. It not only illustrates the intimate knowledge of Homer among cultured Romans of the time but also shows us the high respect Brutus entertained for Porcia's public abilities and suggests also a charming and kindly wit, not commonly seen in the sober
stolid man, that Brutus usually appears. Porcia trying hard to preserve the air of outward calm befitting the kind of woman she claimed to be, broke down at last before a picture of Hector's farewell to Andromache and was found frequently gazing at it in tears. Brutus, accompanied by some friends, came on her one day in that plight and Acilius one of his companions quoted from Andromache's speech to her husband: "But Hector thou to me art honoured father and mother, and brother; my tender husband too art thou!" Brutus smiled and said, "But I certainly have no mind to address Porcia in Hector's words. "Ply thy loom and distaff and give orders to thy handmaidens," for though her body is not strong enough to perform such tasks as men do, yet in spirit she is as valiant in defense of her country as we are."
Assuming that Brutus left Italy a few days after his interview with Cicero at Velia on August 17th, and allowing him some four weeks for the journey, we may date his arrival in Athens in the second half of September. There he took up residence with a friend and devoted his leisure to his favourite pursuit of philosophy, attending lectures of both the Academic and Peripatetic schools, which were then presided over by Theomnestes and Cratippus. At the same time, however, he was busy exploring the possibilities of gaining support to oppose Antony. His first impressions were very bright. The fame of his great deed had preceded him and he found himself the acclaimed hero of Athenians and Romans alike. The natives gave him a great reception and did him honour in various public decrees; they voted to him and Cassius bronze images to be set up alongside those of their own tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and Brutus may have received encouragement from the recollection that though the Greek heroes by their murder of Hipparchus had not won immediate freedom for their city, freedom in the end had come. This popularity of Brutus among the Greek population extended into the country districts. The people of Oropus, a small town in the borders of Attica and Boeotia, described him in an inscription as their 'saviour and benefactor.' Among the many young Roman students in Athens Brutus was held in the same high esteem, and soon his hopes began to grow, that there in the provinces he might...
find support enough to discount his unpopularity in the city. His first consideration was where to get money for his initial expenses. Just before he left Italy he had received one encouraging gift of 100,000 sesterces from Atticus which must have been a welcome addition to an exchequer greatly depleted by the expenses of the Games of Apollo, but more was needed. Soon word came to Athens of the departure from Asia of M. Appuleius, quaestor of the province, with a large sum of money - tribute which he was conveying to Rome. Appuleius was known to Brutus, who decided, therefore, to meet him and test his feelings regarding the Republic. The meeting took place at Carystus, at the south end of Euboea, and Appuleius, who from his recent work in Asia knew something of the local attitude, was ready enough to support Brutus in any endeavour. The money he carried - 16,000 talents, according to Appian - he handed over unreservedly and with it such troops as he himself had. Brutus placed such importance on this interview that later in an official despatch to the Senate, he described Appuleius as "princeps ad conatum exercitus comparandi." The day of their meeting was Brutus' birthday and in the banquet, with which they celebrated the occasion, they drank as toasts "Victory to Brutus" and "Liberty to the Romans."

Whether Cassius called at Athens and met Brutus on his way to Syria and, if so, when their meeting took place, it is

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\[\text{---Nepos Att. 8, 6. Atticus later repeated this generosity with an even greater gift p. 167.} \]
\[\text{(1)} - \text{There may also, of course, have been some liaison between Brutus and Trebonius, governor of Asia.}\]
\[\text{These obviously refer to the same occasion. Dio gives the detail that the money came from Trebonius in Asia; Appian supplies Appuleius' name (cf. also Cic. Phil. X, 11, 24: XIII, 16, 32); Plutarch gives the place of meeting. (2.-IV, 75. (3.-Appian alone says that Appuleius gave men to Brutus, and if he did so they could only have been a few men, forming his own escort.}\]
\[\text{6.-Phil. X, II, 24. (7.-Plut. Brut. 24, 3-4.}\]
impossible to say with certainty. All we know is that they had a definite agreement of some kind between them. Each was to act independently in his own area, Brutus on the Greek mainland and Cassius in Syria, and when they had assumed complete control of these districts they were to meet again and discuss the campaign against Antony, to which these first efforts were merely preliminary. Before he left Italy, Cassius had seen further instances of Antony's opposition to themselves. The consul had - and not without just cause - opposed the granting of a travelling allowance to a legate of Cassius on the ground that the latter was intending to proceed to another province than that allotted to him by the Senate's decree; early in October Antony had gone to Brundisium to meet the legions coming to him from Macedonia, which could hardly be regarded as other than the first step in an attack on Decimus Brutus; and there were rumours that their claims to the consulship of 41 B.C., the year in which they would become eligible, were being set aside. Besides an understanding with Cassius, Brutus had also some sort of agreement with Trebonius, the governor of Asia. He sent to Brutus what money he could and also fortified certain towns in the Republican interest. Almost at once Brutus sent home word of

C.-Gelzer (P.W. X, p.999.) thinks that they were in Athens together, but Dio (xlvii, 20, 4) whom alone he cites is not reliable on this point since he believes (ibid.) that Brutus and Cassius left Italy together; and that they did not do. See Special Note 16. pp.341ff Plutarch, however, (Brut. 28,4) says they parted at the Piraeus, and though he is vague as to Cassius' precise movements, it is quite probable that Cassius called at Athens on his way East. (2.-Cic. Fam. XII,3,2. (3.-on October 9th he left Rome. Cic. Fam. XII, 23,2; cf. App. III, 40. (4.-Fam. XII, 2,2. Plut. Cees. 82,3. says that Brutus was to be consul three years after 42 B.C., as if Caesar had made that arrangement, and Vell. Pat. II,56,3. definitely states that Brutus had been promised a consulship by Caesar. There is, however, no really good (i.e. contemporary) evidence that Caesar had made such a promise, but rather the contrary. All that Cicero means by "vestro anno" in the passage cited is the year in which Brutus and Cassius would normally be consuls, i.e. three years after their praetorships. Had there been a definite arrangement made by Caesar, Cicero would certainly have mentioned the fact in this letter. Further Nicolaus, 32, though he mentions appointments made by Caesar for 43 and 42 B.C. says nothing about 41 B.C. E.-Dio xlvii, 21,3. (E.-App. III, 26.
his final decision to embark on a campaign. His messenger
was Scapulius, presumably one of the two men of that name, who
had acted for him in his private concerns in 51 B.C., and on
this first occasion at least the message was sent to his
mother. Servilia gathered round her a group of Brutus' special friends, who formed a kind of party to look after his interests at Rome:

As always when his decision was taken, Brutus wasted no
time in proceeding with his task. In Greece itself he met with no difficulty despite the presence there in nominal command, of a former lieutenant of Caesar, Acilius. This rather shadowy figure was a friend of Cicero's and obliged to him for professional services and we must assume that, having in any case no legions at his command, he stood back and let Brutus have his way. Volunteers flocked to his standard. The young Roman students in Athens joined his army almost to a man and provided a supply of subalterns of the best kind. Among

1.-Cic. Att. XV, 13, 4. C.-above pp.266. 3.-below p.166. 4.-In an attempt to find a date for the beginning of Brutus' military activities, Gelzer (P.W.X.p.1000) thinks that the meeting of the Senate on November 26th at which Crete and Cyrene were taken from Brutus and Cassius and reallocated, was the factor which forced Brutus to a decision. This cannot be right. For Brutus cannot have heard of that meeting until about December 26th and he could not have done all that he did in Greece and Macedonia between then and the beginning of 43 B.C., when the provinces were definitely in his hands. Moreover, is it not more probable that Crete and Cyrene were reallocated after and because it had become known that Brutus and Cassius were intending to devote their attentions to Macedonia and Syria? If that is so, Brutus' first step must have been known in Rome by Nov. 28th, and must, therefore, have been taken by, about Nov. 5th or 6th. C.-Cic. Fam. VII, 30, 3. "Acilius, qui in Greciam cum legionibus missus est" at the end of 45 B.C. His. Dom. 18, and Hall's note p.81. There is some doubt as to this individual's identity. Schwartz (Hermes XXXIII (1898) p.150) calls him Manius Acilius Glabrio; Sternkopf (Hermes XLVII. (1912) p. 336.) following E. Klebs (P.W. I.p.252. no. 15) gives his name as Marcus Acilius Ganius. C.-Cic. loc. 7.-Ferrero (vol. III.p.136) who seems unable to believe that Brutus could initiate anything, draws an absurd picture of him - the severe proud aristocrat - being carried away and forced into the war, by the Republican enthusiasm of the young students. Gelzer, P.W.X.p1001, also disagrees with Ferrero's estimate.
them were the poet Horace, whose services if we may accept his own modest account, were not important, and the son of Cicero, who, on the contrary, was an efficient and courageous officer. At the same time he found a fruitful recruiting ground among the many veterans of Pompey's army, who had preferred to remain wandering up and down in the land of their defeat rather than return to an Italy where their conquerors were supreme. Brutus' chief need, however, was for regular trained and experienced legions, of which the nearest were in Macedonia and Illyricum. The latter province was governed by an old supporter of Caesar, the notorious P. Vatinius, from whom Brutus could look for little support. Macedonia, however, was in the charge of P. Hortensius Hortalus, son of the famous orator. It appears from an Athenian inscription found at Delos; that this Hortensius was an uncle by marriage of Brutus, for in it he is described as Θεός Ἀριστηνός, and, though the relationship is not mentioned elsewhere, it is most probably true. To interview Hortensius and apprise him of his own hopes and intentions, Brutus sent ahead Herostratus, who was apparently one of his most trusted legates. Meanwhile he himself sailed up the east coast of Greece to Demetrias in Thessaly and seized a large store of ships, arms and money, which Caesar had placed there in readiness for his Parthian

1.-Od. II,7,2. Ep. II,43ff. 2.-Od II,7,9ff. 3.-see below pp.135,162,171ff. 4.-Plut. Brut. 25,1. Dio xlvi, 21,3. 5.-cf. Catullus 52,3:53,2. 6.-Th. Holmelle in B.C.H. III (1879)p.159. 7.-How this relationship may be true is best explained by Munzer (P.W.VIII,p.3469 no.8 and p.3461. np. 16); he thinks that Hortensius' sister was married to Brutus' adoptive father. J. Hatzfeld (B.C.H. XXXIII (1904) pp.467- 471) suggests either that Hortensius was married to a sister of Servilia - which is not possible - or that he was a son of Nucia, mother of Porcia and therefore Brutus' mother-in-law (whom Cato had lent temporarily to the elder Hortensius): Thus Hortensius minor would be half-brother of Brutus' wife - a relationship so involved and incapable of description that the Athenians, who made the inscription, either from sheer confusion or in despair of a better word used αἰτέος. 8.-Plut. Brut. 24,2. 9.-see below p.192f. 10.-cf. Gelzer P.W.X. p.1001.
campaign, and which Antony was even then arranging to have brought to him. Hortensius fell in with Brutus' plans at once and immediately handed over to him his province and the legions in it. The latter however, were by this time very diminished; for of the original six in the province, Antony had already, probably on the authority of the lex de permutatione provinciarum, summoned four to his own command in Italy, and one had been transferred to Dolabella. The remaining legion was under the command of a legate of Antony, L. Piso, but young M. Cicero, whom Brutus sent to take it over, met with no opposition from him. Brutus obtained regular recruits from other sources. Dolabella, who about this time - December 44 B.C. - passed through Greece on his way to his province of Syria, supplied him with some, though involuntarily. Besides stragglers and sick men; whom Dolabella had to leave behind in his hurry to be out of a land that was rapidly going over to the Republicans, two separate detachments of cavalry were won over to Brutus' side. One body of 500, apparently of its own free will, deserted the quaestor Cinna, who was in command of it, and joined Brutus; the other was seduced from its leader by Cn. Domitius and taken to Brutus in Macedonia. Hortensius also busied himself in holding levies in his province and many of the

1.-Plut. Brut. 25,2: App. III,63. 2.-Plut. ibid. Dio xlvi,21, 4-5. cf.Cic. Phil. X,11,24. 3.-App. III,24:35:43. cf. Cic. Att. XVI, 8,2: cp. Rice Holmes A.R.E. pp.301f. 4.-Tyrrell and Parser vol. VI, p.XXXVI, note 97 seem to err in supposing that this legion was won over by Cicero during the campaign against C. Antony. The context of Phil. X,6,13, indicates that it was already part of Brutus' force before that campaign began. 5.-Dio.xlvi, 21,3. 6.-I think I am right in identifying the 500 cavalry under Cinna, mentioned by Plutarch (Brut. 25,1) with the first detachment, mentioned by Cicero in Phil. X,6,13. 7.-Phil. X,6,13. 8.-ibid.
kings of the surrounding tribes attached themselves to Brutus' side. By the beginning of 43 B.C., Brutus was in complete control of the whole of Greece and Macedonia and, though his forces were small and on the whole lacking in recent experience of war, he felt himself prepared to face the attempt he knew would be made by C. Antony to retake the province.

Macedonia had been allotted to Antony's brother-in the notorious meeting of the Senate called by the consul on November 28th. The meeting was held so late in the day as to have been illegal and it was even hinted that the lots had been tampered with. On December 20th the decisions of that meeting were cancelled - Antony had by then left Rome and gone to Cisalpine Gaul - and it was decreed that until further notice provinces were to remain in the hands of the governors of 44 B.C. Despite that fact C. Antony proceeded with his attempt to gain Macedonia. He knew before he left Italy that his chief opponent would be, not Hortensius the legitimate governor, but Brutus, who had in fact no more - and no less - legal right to the province than Antony himself. Antony, being unaware how far Brutus' influence extended, made all haste to reach Illyricum and join forces with Vatinius, before Brutus could reduce that province also under his power. His haste roused Cicero to irony: "If he had not stopped on the way to gather some lapsed inheritances, you would have said he did not march, but flew. Usually we have difficulty in driving men to their public duties; this man we drove on by trying to keep him back."

Whether or not he was aware of Antony's haste, Brutus showed no less expedition. In his desire to seize as much of the district as he could before his opponent should arrive, he
undertook a march, which, for courage and stamina, can bear comparison with any of Caesar's. He was apparently, before he started, in the eastern part of Macedonia - he probably sailed on from Demetrias to Thessalonica, the chief city of the province, and was received there by Hortensius - and from there, despite the time of year, he set off with the few forces he had by then gathered, probably no more than two legions of infantry and some hundreds of cavalry. The country they had to cross was difficult, mountainous and ill-provided with roads; they suffered from several snowstorms; in the speed of their march of over 250 miles the provision train was left far behind; and when at last they reached their objective, they had endured more than might have been expected of an army newly recruited from various sources, under a general they hardly knew. Brutus seems to have known that Vatinius was in Dyrrachium and that town was his immediate objective; he hoped to secure it and the forces in it, before Antony could effect a junction with the governor. The march showed great courage on Brutus' part and great powers of endurance; it is no less praiseworthy that by his own example he preserved the loyalty of his men through such trials and sufferings; but it was not good generalship. He had no reason to think that Vatinius would welcome him as Hortensius had done, for, however abandoned and unscrupulous the former was, he had always been loyal to his master Caesar; and, so far as we know, Brutus had no reason to suspect the loyalty of his legions to their governor. To face the probable opposition of such a man, who had an army, fresh, unwearied and well fed, Brutus by his audacious haste had put his own men in a sorry position. When they reached the

\[\text{Plut. Brut. 25,3-4.}\]
town they were in no condition to fight; cold, fatigue and shortage of food had weakened them terribly and Brutus himself, since he shared all their hardships, was in no better plight. He was very ill with the sickness which was called 'Boulimia.'

No food was to be obtained outside of Dyrrachium and Vatinius had closed the gates of the city, prepared to withstand a siege and hoping for relief from Antony. Had Vatinius attacked Brutus' force on their arrival, it is difficult to see how he could have failed to defeat them; but for once Brutus found fortune favouring his boldness. The governor was not sure of the loyalty of his men and for that reason had been content to shut himself up in the city. Encouraged perhaps, by rumours of this lack of sympathy between the enemy and their general, Brutus' men in desperation applied to the guards at the gates for food. When they told how sick their own leader was, they met with a kindness they had no right to expect and food and drink was given them. Prompted by this generosity Brutus made further advances to them and, despising their own general as much as they admired Brutus they refused further to obey orders. Vatinius was forced to open the gates and watch his men go over to Brutus. No harm of any kind was done to the city or the citizens.

1. - Plut. Brut. 25,2-4. The chief feature of the disease was a ravenous hunger. 2. - Plut. Brut. 25,1. Dio, xlvii, 21,6. 3. This account of Vatinius' conduct does not agree with Phil. 4,15, where Cicero mentions him in laudatory terms for having opened the gates and having handed over his army as if he did so voluntarily. All the information Cicero had, came from the despatch Brutus sent after his success, which was brief and gave few details. Appian is the only historian who seems to agree with Cicero and he too is brief and gives no details. They (epit.116), Vell. Pat. (I, 69,3) and Plut. (Brut. 25, 2: 4) all imply and Dio (47, 21,5) definitely states that Vatinius made some show of opposition, as his previous record would lead us to expect. From him d'Addozio (p.80 and note 1) thinks that "senex ille laudatus a nobis" of Phil. X, 8,13, shows that Vatinius had already shown some favour towards the Republic since Caesar's death and that he had always at heart hated Caesar. The phrase in Cicero's mouth however is no more than the politeness of the politician, and, in any case, there is no valid reason for limiting its application to the period after Caesar's death. 4. - Plut. Brut. 25,1. 5. - He suffered from some kind of scrofula. Cf. Cic. Sest. 135: Vat.39: Att. II, 9,2. Plut. Cio. 26,2.
Meanwhile, Gaius Antony had reached Apollonia and was trying to establish himself there and secure a force strong enough to oppose Brutus. Vatinius had left some men in that city and these Antony was particularly anxious to secure for himself. Speed, therefore, was still of the greatest importance to Brutus, since he must close with his opponent before he could gain any extensive influence. Accordingly after giving his men a brief respite, Brutus advanced south towards Apollonia. At this juncture he decided to send an official report to the Senate at Rome of his activities and seek approval for them. It is typical of Brutus that he should thus take the earliest opportunity to legalise his unconstitutional conduct. It would have been pointless and useless to ask the Senate's permission, even had M. Antony been out of Rome, before he embarked on a course of unorthodox behaviour, and there was equally no point in asking for approval of his acts, until he had achieved some worthwhile result. For that reason he waited until he had secured Greece and Macedonia and made reasonably sure of winning Illyricum, before offering submission to the Senate's authority. His despatch contained a brief statement that Macedonia was in his power, described the support given him by Hortensius, Appuleius, Domitius and Cicero, mentioned that Vatinius had given up Dyrrachium and that Antony was in Apollonia with a small force, which he hoped to defeat easily. In the meantime, until his acts should receive official sanction, he was content with the knowledge that, if not legally correct, his conduct had been morally justified; that he was acting — and

suffering - solely for the Republic - was justification enough for him and, if he himself had no legal right to the provinces he had secured, no more, at least since December 20th, had Gaius Antony; and the latter was seeking to win them purely in furtherance of his brother's selfish policy.

The optimism of Brutus' despatch regarding the coming struggle with Antony was fully justified. The soldiers in Apollonia were of the same mind as those in Dyrrachium and Antony could not depend upon them to face the enemy. He decided therefore to retreat southwards before Brutus' advance.

According to Plutarch he was making for Buthrotum and may have intended to re-embark there and abandon the province. Brutus, with nothing to fear, followed him up vigorously. His own force had been increased both at Dyrrachium and Apollonia; and Antony had a mere 7 cohorts with which to oppose him.

From Cicero's comments on the campaign it appears that Antony had secured some hold of the country south of Apollonia, the towns of Byllis, Amandia and Oricum being especially mentioned; and it is probable that he had originally landed at Oricum - the most southerly coast-town of the province - and, marching northwards as far as Apollonia had made sure of the country he passed through. As the two forces moved southwards, however, it became increasingly obvious that Antony had no chance of escaping Brutus' superior numbers. Before reaching Byllis he had lost three cohorts, which Brutus completely cut to pieces. At Byllis Antony called a halt and perhaps by making a show of defending the town compelled his enemies to

take up a position outside it. On this position he led a
desperate assault, which was beaten off by young Cicero.

Compelled by this reverse to continue his retreat, Antony
found it more difficult to keep his men in control. Eventually
he allowed himself to be overtaken in a marshy district with his
men scattered. Brutus, hoping for a success with the minimum
of bloodshed, - recruits were more valuable to him than
victories - refused to let his men attack. According to
Appian, Antony then tried to lay an ambush, which failed in its
purpose. In turn Brutus ambushed the opposing forces and
again allowed them to escape unharmed. Antony's men, at
last realising the futility of further resistance and
appreciating their conqueror's generosity, surrendered. Antony
could do nothing but give himself up too and Brutus was left in
complete control of the whole of the Greek peninsula south of
these and of all the forces in it. The campaign of
Illyricum had been completed between about the middle of January
and the first week of March.

It is necessary now to look back and examine briefly the
course of events in Italy since Brutus' departure in the
previous August. It had been obvious then, that the spirit of
the amnesty of March 19th was rapidly fading. Antony was
leaving no room for doubt concerning his intentions to over-
throw the precarious peace that had existed since Caesar's
death and civil war was bound to break out, when, in fulfilment
of the plebiscite of the first days of June, he demanded the
province of Cisalpine Gaul from Decimus Brutus; Brutus was
bound to resist him. When Marcus Brutus sailed from Velia, he

(1) The position occupied by Brutus' force may, on the other hand,
have been taken up by a body sent ahead under Cicero to anticipate
Antony's arrival. See Special Note 21 p. 367. (2) - Flut. l.c.
(3) - Gelzer (P.W. Xp. 1003.) thinks that it was probably the marshes of
the river Aous, on which Byllis stands. (4) - Flut. Brut. 26, 3.
(5) III, 78. (6) - Plut. Brut. 1 c. Appx. 1 c. Dio. XLVII, 21, 7. (inaccurate
see Special Note 21 p. 566.) (7) - For less detailed statements
of Brutus' campaign in Illyricum see Livy epit. 118: Vell. Pat. II, 69.
Autop. VII, 3 init.
was looking to Cicero to oppose Antony and the quarrel between these two was not long in breaking. On September 1st. in Cicero's absence Antony made abusive reference to him in the Senate; to this Cicero replied on the following day with a restrained oration, only mildly upbraiding the consul for his recent conduct; this speech was the first of the famous series which came to be called the Philippics. Antony answered it seventeen days later with a harangue full of the vilest insults and accusations. Cicero retired to compose his second Philippic to counter it and the break between them was put beyond repair.

At the same time Antony broke with Octavian. Their hollow reconciliation, made at the end of July, lasted only until Antony, jealous of the other's still growing importance, opposed his desire to stand for a tribunate, rendered vacant by the death of its holder. A little later, Antony openly accused Octavian of plotting to murder him. On October 9th the consul hastened to Brundisium to take over the legions summoned by him from Macedonia, and, in spite of defection and mutiny among them, sent the three, which had arrived, to Ariminium for the occupation of Cisalpine Gaul. Hurrying back to Rome he summoned the meeting of Senate on November 28th at which the provinces of Brutus and Cassius were reallocated with eleven others. Immediately after it he pushed on to Cisalpine Gaul, whither Octavian, with the troops he had independently gathered had, with Cicero's approval, preceded him. Decimus Brutus, as was expected, refused to quit the province at Antony's bidding and retiring into Mutina, prepared to resist a siege. The civil war had begun.

At Rome Cicero returned to the helm. On December 20th the decisions of November 28th were rescinded. On January 1st the new consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, assumed office and Cicero made great efforts to persuade the Senate to prosecute the war against Antony immediately and relentlessly.
time he was hindered by the activities of Antony's friends, especially Calenus, on whose motion it was decided to send an embassy to Antony in the hope of reaching a settlement without a formal declaration of war. In anticipation of his reply the consuls held a levy of troops and Hirtius set off to the North, while Octavian, for his public spirit in being ready to oppose Antony, was made a senator and given formal command of his army as propraetor. At the beginning of February the envoys returned with Antony's answer, which, with its defiant and insolent counter-demands, at last persuaded the Senate that the troubles could only be settled by the defeat of Antony in war.

A few days later came Brutus' first despatch, recounting his conduct in Macedonia and his hope of final success against Antony and asking for the Senate's approval and sanction. The letter was delivered to Pansa, who summoned the Senate to discuss it without delay. He himself opened the meeting by reading the despatch and in his speech was complimentary to Brutus. Calenus, who as usual at this time was asked first to give his opinion, moved that Brutus be congratulated for his letter but removed from his command, on the grounds that he had no legal right to raise an army and that, if he were allowed to do so, the veterans of Caesar would be angered and antagonised. Cicero replied with the Tenth Philippic. Appreciating that it was a prime necessity for Brutus to have his command sanctioned by the Senate, if he were to be a recognised champion of the State, and realising that, after Antony's insolent reply to the Senate's overtures, his audience would be all the readier to encourage any vigorous action calculated to assist them against him, Cicero gave

- see above p.160. -This and the other details come from Phil. 1. -ibid.1,2. -ibid.1,3-5,6.
Brutus' plea his unqualified support. Insisting on Brutus' virtues, on the value of his services, and on the sincerity of his attitude towards the Republic, he discounted Calenus' fears of the veterans by pointing out that veterans were serving under Decimus Brutus and under others to relieve Decimus; it would be besides a sorry state of affairs if the Senate must ever bow to the fancies of the soldiers: He finished up with this formal motion: "That whereas Q. Caepio Brutus, proconsul, by his own efforts, counsel, industry and valour has, in this most difficult public emergency, retained in the power of the Consuls, Senate and People of Rome the provinces of Macedonia Illyricum and the whole of Greece, with their several legions, armies and cavalry, this has been done by Q. Caepio, proconsul, nobly, in the interests of the State and in accordance with his own honourable position and that of his ancestors and with their habitual custom of good administration in the Republic; that this is and will be well pleasing to the Senate and People of Rome, whose pleasure it also is that Q. Caepio Brutus, proconsul, should guard, defend, preserve and keep in safety the province of Macedonia, Illyricum and the whole of Greece; that he should be in command of the army, which he himself has raised and appointed; that he should levy and employ for the purposes of war, so far as may be required, any public monies that can be levied; and that further for the purposes of war he should borrow monies and make requisitions for food supplies, from whatever source seems good to him; and that he should see to it that he remain with his forces as near to Italy as possible." The motion was carried at once and Brutus' fullest desires thus...
The command given him was not an ordinary provincial governorship; Hortensius was to continue in that capacity in Macedonia and Vatinius perhaps—though no specific mention is made of him—in Illyricum; Brutus was to have a "minus imperium" over the whole area. The formal announcement of his appointment must have reached Brutus late in February, when he was still pressing C. Antony hard.

Among loyal citizens in Rome Brutus' success caused great jubilation. Rumours of it, reaching the city before his own official despatch, had raised him in the estimation of Republicans, who were now roused by the spirit of war; and after the rumours were confirmed, he gained "egregiam laudei." Such vigorous action had, in the circumstances of his departure, scarcely been expected of him and the pleasure it caused was enhanced by the rapidity of his success. The enthusiasm thus caused resulted in his receiving a flood of very welcome recruits from Italy, among whom were many men of note and the sons of others. Brutus' second despatch, sent on the completion of his campaign, further increased the joy in the city. It arrived in the city on March 19th.

Pansa had left for Cisalpine Gaul some hours before its arrival and, according to Cicero; only the absence of both consuls, the general confusion and anxiety over the war at Mutina and

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[Notes and references omitted for brevity.]

[Endnotes and references continue here, typically listing page and line numbers, references, and footnotes for the text.]
the opposition of Brutus' own friends, prevented a vote of fitting honours and thanksgiving.

His conquest of Illyricum finally achieved, Brutus, in obedience to the Senate's decree, stayed on in that province. His headquarters were at Dyrrachium - it was from there that he wrote to Cicero - and there he busied himself in organising his army and his treasury. The soldiers, gathered, as they had been, from many different sources and filched from several commanders must have been difficult to handle and Brutus, as will soon appear, was not long in encountering for the first time the disciplinary troubles, which were to be his bugbear for the rest of his life. His financial worries were eased by two unexpected windfall:

Atticus, with whom, we may presume, he had kept touch by letter, added to his former generosity by sending instructions to his estates in Epirus that 300,000 sesterces were to be given to Brutus; Antistius Vetus, quaestor of Syria, followed the earlier example of Appuleius and handed over to him 2,000,000 sesterces of public money: Brutus tried to persuade Antistius to remain with him and serve as a senior officer, but he preferred to go straight to Rome to stand for the praetorship. Brutus commended his candidature to Cicero and Antistius promised, if the elections were postponed for reasons of emergency, to return at once to Brutus as a legatus.
All the time Brutus was in constant communication with his friends at Rome. This liaison seems to have been in existence since soon after his departure from Italy and through which Brutus received frequent and prompt accounts of all matters of importance. His friends formed themselves into a small party to consult his and Cassius' interests and among them may be reckoned Servilia, Porcia, Tertia, L. Cassius the brother of Cassius, Caesae now tribune of the plebs, Labeo and perhaps the M. Servilius, a relative of Servilia, who introduced Cicero to the assembly, when he delivered a speech after the Eleventh Philippic. Of this group Scaptius acted as a sort of organising secretary. Atticus probably helped them from the background and Cicero, though his position did not permit of his committing himself to any one of the various elements in the Republic, was always ready to help them with advice. He did not, however, have a high opinion of the group's political wisdom; he describes them as "indeed most excellent citizens, but lacking experience in public affairs." Brutus was also in close touch with Cicero and the letters between them which are still extant are by no means all they exchanged at this time.

The earliest of these extant letters is one from Brutus to Cicero written on April 1st at Dyrrachium. It begins with expressions of sorrow and anger at the murder of Trebonius in Asia by Dolabella the details of which Brutus had learned from

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Spinther, as quaestor of Asia, had automatically become official in charge of the province since Trebonius' death, and had repaired at once to consult Brutus. Brutus, despite his abnormally wide jurisdiction was unable, because of the Senate's injunction to hold his army near Italy pending the result at Mutina, to go himself to Asia and Spinther returned to his province. Brutus was confident that Dolabella would not be able to hold the province against the Republicans. He had, however, a more pressing and closer anxiety. He was already feeling the difficulties of holding C. Antony prisoner. He was not by nature a jailer and disliked the task of restricting the liberty of one of his fellow-nobles, especially one to whom he owed a small debt of gratitude on the score of the Games of Apollo. At first he showed Antony exceptional consideration and even allowed him to continue wearing the dress and insignia of his praetorian rank. At the same time, however, he realised well enough that that state of affairs could not go on for ever, that sooner or later a decision must be made either to execute him or set him free. Antony was presenting entreaties to his captor on his own behalf, by which Brutus on his own showing was much affected. Brutus knew also that the prisoner's presence was causing some disturbance among the legionaries but when on April 1st he wrote "I fear a violent outburst in some quarter may carry him off," he was not, it seems, aware that the disaffection was the result of C. Antony's own mutinous activities. He was very anxious to know what Cicero thought he ought to do regarding him.
Brutus had heard of Cassius' success in Syria and we must assume that he had a regular correspondence with him too. In this same letter he passed on the glad news to Cicero and at the same time in a letter to his mother he warned her and Tertia not to publish the message until they had consulted Cicero. Cassius took the same precaution when he wrote to his wife. They were anxious not to complicate Cicero's task by doing anything without his cognizance, which might cause offence to the Caesarian party; among they were both inclined to include the consuls Hirtius and Pansa; and they knew that without definite instructions Servilia would not deign to consult Cicero. They need not have worried; for Cicero received the news two days before Brutus' letter arrived, in a letter from Lentulus, handed to him in the Senate, and immediately rose and announced Cassius' success; it was to him something to be broadcast as soon and as widely as possible. After some words in praise of those of Cicero's Philippics which he had received and of their title, Brutus put in a plea on his own behalf for men and money. He thought Cicero might, by private arrangement with Pansa, obtain for him a share of the consular levies; but, if Pansa were niggardly, he wanted Cicero to appeal to the Senate. The money he could obtain for him from the Senate directly. Despite the generosity of Atticus, Appuleius and Antistius Vetus, Brutus needed more and more money; he seems to have had difficulty in raising funds in Illyricum and did not expect to get much even out of Asia, when Dolabella was done.

with it. The letter ends with some words, well chosen and obviously sincere, in praise of young Cicero. It is a pity that Cicero's son did not live up to these early estimates of his youth.

Cicero received that letter on the evening of April 11th, but before it arrived he had given a note to Scauptius for posting to Brutus. There was little in that note, however, beyond general comments on political affairs, especially on the protested loyalty of Plancus, governor of Transalpine Gaul, and the shiftiness of Lepidus in Spain, and on the anxiety felt regarding the war at Mutina; and when Brutus' letter came Cicero, despite all the bustle of the usual levée, answered it early in the morning, so that his reply should reach Brutus by the same courier. He tells Brutus about his own unsuccessful efforts to obtain for Cassius a position in Syria analogous to Brutus' own and promises to send him a copy of the speech he delivered. Regarding Gaius Antony, he thinks Brutus should hold him prisoner until the issue of things in Cisalpine Gaul is settled. He seems to have thought that Gaius would act as a kind of hostage for his brother's good behaviour, but he knew little of Marcus, if he really expected his brother's captivity to influence his actions in any way. Regarding Dolabella Cicero is puzzled by an apparent contradiction in Brutus' messages to Rome. To himself Brutus had said that Dolabella was harassing Asia, while he had told various other friends in the city, that he had attempted unsuccessfully to make a

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1. I have shown (Special Note 23 p. 370.) that Cicero minor was probably not with Brutus at this time but on service elsewhere. Yet Brutus does not mention that fact here.
3. ibid. The first note is Brut. II, 2.
5. ibid. E. Phil. Al. Brut. II, 4, 2. (6. ibid. 3.)
In case Brutus is in any doubt as to how he stands with regard to Dolabella, Cicero advises him that if Dolabella has in fact left Asia, he should remain in Illyricum in accordance with the Senate's instructions, but if there is any chance of Dolabella securing a firm hold of Asia, Brutus must drive him out; for Asia was too important and too wealthy to be left in non-Republican hands. To Brutus' request for money and men from Italy, Cicero offers no encouragement. The State was almost bankrupt and even a special property tax imposed later yielded very little while the armies of the consuls and Octavius were costing a great deal. Pansa, far from being willing to let Brutus have some of his recruits, was very jealous of the numbers of volunteers who were leaving Italy for Brutus' camp. There was even a suspicion in some quarters that the consul was loth to see Brutus' power increasing.

Hitherto Brutus and Cicero had been on the best of terms. The orator was genuinely full of admiration for the energy and resourcefulness of Brutus' efforts and the latter was no less grateful for Cicero's uncompromising opposition to Antony and his whole-hearted support of himself. But early in April the pair lapsed into the state of disagreement, which was unfortunately the normal one between them. The first cause of discord at this time was Brutus' attitude towards C. Antony. Although Cicero had advised the preservation of Antony's life until the war at Mutina was over, he had expected Brutus to treat him severely

1.-ibid. The news regarding Dolabella and Rhodes, which was false, had been given to Brutus, I think, by Lentulus cf. Special Note, 22, p.369. 2.-ibid. 4. a similar request for money from the Senate by Cornificius in Africa met with a similar refusal. Fam. XII, 28, 2. (3.-Brut. I, 18, 5. (4.-Brut. II, 4, 4. Cicero, however, did not share the suspicions of Pansa.
as a prisoner of war and to show him the scant respect, that was due to one who had aided his unprincipled brother in his impious attack on the State. When, therefore, on April 13th a letter was received from Brutus, containing indulgent references to Antony and accompanied by a letter from the prisoner himself, in which he styled himself "Proconsul" in contempt of the Senate's decree of December 20th 44 B.C., which had deprived him of the command in Macedonia, Cicero was quite nonplussed: The letters were brought by one Pilius Celer, apparently a relation of Atticus and rather a friend of Antony than of Brutus; he delivered them in the absence of both consuls to a tribune, who in turn handed them over to the senior praetor Cornutus. When on the same day this official laid them before the Senate, they caused a mild sensation. Cicero's first instinct was to pronounce Brutus' letter a forgery, but he was afraid to say so in case he was wrong. He chose the safest course and said nothing. Next day the letters were again before the Senate for discussion - we have no hint whatever of their subject matter - and Brutus' friends had to make some comment on them. Labeo bluntly declared them to be forgeries; they had not Brutus' seal upon them, they were undated and they were not accompanied, as Brutus' letters invariably were, by others to his friends. All Cicero could do was to make some noncommittal declaration but he believed them to be genuine and was very indignant with Brutus. Writing to him on the 16th he

G. Brut. II, 5, 3. Ganter (Jahrb., 1894) p. 623 thinks that Brutus had allowed C. Antony to hold a position in Illyricum like that of Mortensius in Macedonia, i.e., as proconsul of the province under Brutus' 'imperium.' I do not consider the assumption justified by the evidence of this passage, and the Greek historians (Plut. Brut. 26, 4, 5. App. III, 79. Dio xlvii, 23, 1ff.) conveys no such suggestion. Plutarch and Dio insist that Brutus allowed Antony at first to retain the trappings of his praetorship, but no further meaning can fairly be taken from them. Ferrero (vol. III, p. 146) agrees with Ganter but Gelzer (P.W.X., p. 1003) opposes him. 2 of T & P's note on the passage. vol. VI, p. 150. (2. Cio. Brut. I, 18, 9, from which and the following section come the above details. (4.-I know of no evidence for Ferrero's assumption (vol. III, p. 146f.) that in his letter C. Antony demanded peace for himself and his brother. (5.-Brut. II, 5.
adjured Brutus to see Antony in his true light as a treacherous
scurril, as bad as his brother and deserving of no consideration;
Brutus' leniency was a noble sentiment but on this occasion
misplaced; if he must show leniency at all let it be towards
the soldiers but let him treat the leaders in civil war with
stern severity. In another letter on the following day he put
forward the same request, pleading for more vigour on Brutus' 
part and giving him the warning "oppremini nisi providetis."
Cicero's judgment was right: C. Antony caused Brutus
no little trouble. It was soon discovered that it was he who
was responsible for the discontent among some of Brutus' men
and that, although held at Apollonia, he had managed thanks to
the comparative freedom he was allowed, to foment trouble among
the legions at Dyrrachium. Brutus, still determined to treat
him generously, did nothing more than restrict his movements to
some extent. Antony persisted with his attempts and met with
considerable success. A body of soldiers deserted from
headquarters and marched on Apollonia to set him free. Brutus,
however, had learned of their intentions from an intercepted
message and had the prisoner removed to a safer place —, according
to Plutarch, on board a vessel in the harbour. Antony caused
him no further trouble. There is no need to seek obscure reasons
for Brutus' attitude towards C. Antony; it is throughout in
keeping with his character. Unwilling for natural and

1.-bid.5 fin. "ut in duces vehemens sis, in milites liberalis."
5.-Brut. 26,4. The differences in the accounts of Dio,
Plutarch and Appian (III,79) seem to be caused merely by a
difference in the attention they devote to the incident.
Plut. gives only a very brief summary; Dio gives more detail
regarding Antony's attempts; Plut. naturally gives more space
to Brutus' solution of the trouble. In a very corrupt passage
Brut.26,3) Cicero seems to refer to the mutiny, which may
give an approximate date for it. Cicero's letter was written
about 'May 20th' and therefore Brutus' letter, which he answers,
probably about 'May 10th.'
commendable reasons to put him to death summarily, he found an excuse for keeping him alive as a hostage. Cicero's approval of this policy pleased him considerably. If kept alive Antony must be treated with the consideration due to his position, for Brutus was too conventional to do otherwise to a fellow noble. There was no important reason for preventing him from writing to the Senate and indeed Brutus was very anxious that his case should come before that body. That Antony with the effrontery typical of his family should style himself "proconsul", was no reason for withholding the letter - even if we presume that Brutus saw it, which is by no means certain - for in other respects it seems to have been proper enough, since Cicero makes no complaints regarding its matter: 

Brutus' attitude towards his prisoner is admirably

1.-cf. Brut.I.4,3. quoted below. G.-It is of interest to note that Antony issued coins as proconsul of Macedonnia though he never reached that province. cf. Grueber. E.M. Cat. vol.II, p.470.no.37: vol. III,plate CXI,no.3. G.----an absurd picture is drawn by Ferrero of Brutus' relations with Caius Antony. (vol. III,p.146.) "the clever Antony had befooled him with a thousand flatteries and was attempting to embroil him with Cicero, telling him that Cicero was .... destroying any possibility of an understanding; that it was absurd to trust to Octavian.... In short he aroused the old mistrust of the conspirator in Caesar's son. Thus the feeble Brutus had become his friend"........ There is no evidence whatever of any such intimacy between Brutus and his prisoner and it is complete nonsense to suggest that he required anyone to arouse in him mistrust of Octavian. The idea that Brutus was thinking of "doing a deal" (sic.) with Marc Antony is repeated by Richards (op.cit.p.201), who says "it is as clear as can be." It is fortunate that many things are clearer. Brutus may well have thought that Antony might yet be a better friend to the conspirators than Octavian - as I have suggested below p.177. - but the idea that he seriously contemplated an alliance with him before or after Mutina, will not stand unprejudiced examination. Consider for instance the joy he expresses over Antony's defeat at Mutina (Brut. I,4,1); and his warnings to Cicero are directed against Octavian not in favour of Antony. The idea of an Antonian alliance is on a par with the story that he wrote a letter of encouragement to Octavian (Dio xlvii,22,3.), which Gelzer (P.W.X p.1004) and Elia Holmes (A.R.E.L.p.50 note 3) agree in rejecting. These scholars also disbelieve the conclusion that Brutus was seeking friendship with the Antonies.
expressed in the letter he wrote about May 7th, in answer to Cicero's protests against his clemency. "You say in your letter that the three Antonies are all on the same footing and that it is for me to decide what my own attitude is to be. Well, my decision is exactly this. With regard to those citizens, who take part in the war and are not killed, judgment lies with the Senate and People of Rome. "Ah but," you will say, "You are making a mistake in calling men citizens, whose feelings to the state are hostile." On the contrary, I am completely right. For what the Senate has not yet decreed nor the Roman People ordered, I do not presume to pass judgment on nor do I claim it for my own decision. This attitude I abide by strictly: that the man whose death circumstances did not force upon me, I have robbed of nothing from sheer wantonness but have simply held in my power for the duration of the war. I consider it much the more honourable course, and one which the State can more profitably concede, not to oppress the unfortunate..." In these words we see the same Brutus, who refused to murder M. Antony on the Ides and who refused later to oppose him actively until his tyrannical aims were proved, rigidly bound by the constitution of the Republic, of which the keystone was that no man be put to death without appeal to the Senate and People. That side of Brutus' nature is adequate explanation of his refusal to treat Antony as other than a fellow-noble, temporarily his prisoner. The indulgent references which Cicero accuses him of making to the other Antony also have, almost certainly, their political reasons. Brutus was increasingly suspicious of the power and popularity of Octavian and he, alone of the Republic's leaders, realised the dangers inherent

in the rise of Caesar's heir. He felt that even yet Antony might be preferable to Octavian and did not fail to see that the latter could not but profit by the former's total eclipse. We ought not to leave this matter of C. Antony without noticing how Brutus handled the mutiny he caused. He is not usually considered — and rightly so — a good general, but here was one case — and the march to Dyrrachium was another — which even Caesar could hardly have managed better. When the mutineers discovered that their attempt was forestalled, afraid of the consequences, they took possession of a hill overlooking Apollonia. Realising the impossibility of resisting their general, they sent to him and offered to come to terms, if he would visit them. This rather impudent request Brutus answered by a stern injunction that, if they wanted his pardon, they must come and beg it. Frightened by this, they gave in at once. The ringleaders were executed and the others pardoned. Brutus, in fact, showed a proper balance of severity and clemency, such as Caesar himself would have commended, but it should be remarked that under Caesar the need for either quality would probably not have arisen: and even if a mutiny had broken out, one cannot imagine the handful of discontents asking Caesar to come and see them.

On top of their quarrel over Antony, Brutus and Cicero found another cause for disagreement in Octavian. This time the roles were reversed and it is Brutus who appears as the plaintiff and Cicero who is accused of over-indulgence. At first
Cicero had been slow to succumb to Octavian's offers and suggestions, but by the end of April 43 B.C., he was expressing the most enthusiastic admiration for him. No blame can attach to him for his final acceptance of Octavian's offers. At the end of 44 B.C. there was a desperate need of forces to fight Antony and no one knew how far Hirtius and Pansa would be dependable. When, therefore, Octavian showed his readiness to oppose his father's lieutenant and that in defence of one of his father's murderers, and when without protest he allowed another of them - Casca - to become tribune, Cicero could not but accept his services. On January 1st, therefore, when in the Senate he urged that the State prosecute the war against Antony without delay, it was inevitable that he should demand for Octavian, as for the other leaders, honours, privileges and a definite rank. Later when Antony had been defeated it was again natural and proper that he should reckon Octavian among those deserving praise and reward. He proposed an ovation for him. Learning of this enthusiasm of Cicero's from his friends at home, Brutus was naturally perturbed and resentful. He did appreciate the sheer necessity, which had made it impossible for Cicero to refuse Octavian's help, and all he could see was that the orator was heaping the most fulsome praise and trying to bestow important honours on one who, as he proudly asserted his claim to be Caesar's adopted son and

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heir, should be suspect in the eyes of all true Republicans. He was beyond doubt annoyed also with Cicero's criticism of his own treatment of C. Antony, especially of such superior pieces of advice as "facias...ne tua liberalitas dissolutione" and he always distrusted and despised the orator's flights of enthusiasm, which were so foreign to his own slow and cautious nature. Accordingly in the same letter, in which he defended his own clemency against Cicero's attacks, he politely and rather frigidly warned him against "bestowing upon men of influence gifts that may inflame their arrogance and ambition.... Your geese too often are swans, dear Cicero."

Brutus was not alone in disapproving of Cicero's praise of Octavian, for the proposal that he be honoured with an ovation was rejected and far from showing him gratitude and respect, the Senate went out of its way to offer him a gratuitous insult. Later, in July, Cicero commented on the opposition to his proposal shown by Brutus' group of partisans, but how far they and Brutus are to be held responsible for the Senate's action does not appear, nor can we be certain how Octavian would have responded to gentler and more tactful handling. Gradually Cicero realised that Octavian was getting out of hand. By the middle of June he was letting it be known that he wanted to be one of the consuls in place of the dead Hirtius and Pansa, and Cicero, writing to Brutus, blames others - but

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1 Phil. XIV, 14, 32-7. 2-1 Cic. Brut. I, 3, 3. 5 - "nimis credere videris spei tuae" Brut. I, 4, 5. One should not fail to miss a point in the first sentence of this letter, not hitherto, so far as I know, commented upon by editors. Describing his joy over the happy result at Mutina Brutus says: "How glad I was to hear of the success of our friend Brutus and of the consuls, you can guess more easily than I can describe: in the whole affair nothing evokes more praise and joy from me than the fact that Brutus by his own sortie contributed largely not only to his own safety but to the general victory." He lays most emphasis on the services of his fellow-conspirator Decimus and makes no mention at all of Octavian. 4-1 Cic. Brut. I, 15, 8-9. Livy Epit. I19, Val. II, 22. App. III, 74. Pl Plut. XLVI, 40, 1. 5 - Val. I, 1. Cio XI, 41, 1. 6 - Brut. I, 15, 9.
mentions no names - for putting such ideas into the young man's head. Early in July Octavian made his demand for the consulship through a body of centurions. It was a severe blow to Cicero. He defended his policy regarding him at great length to Brutus, and it is obvious that he was greatly perturbed by his own mistaken judgment. "But, as I write," he says to Brutus, "my greatest sorrow is that after the state accepted me as surety for that youth - I can almost call him a boy - it looks as if I shall scarcely be able to fulfil my promises."

Among the many differences of opinion between Brutus and Cicero, this is one of the few occasions when Brutus was right. Yet one's sympathies are rather with Cicero. Brutus' distrust of Octavian was purely instinctive and he was probably as surprised as any one, when the youth became as influential as he did. He feared the young man's name and his heritage, but we have no indication that he appreciated his political genius. Cicero, compelled by circumstances to allow him his first step towards his ambitions, could not but give him some consideration thereafter. He always fancied himself as a philosopher and guide to younger men and he was confident that this young man - a mere stripling of nineteen - would be ready to follow his advice. That he did not see in the stripling a greater than himself - a greater indeed than Rome had yet seen - is not surprising. Even so, Cicero might, had the Senate backed him, have found some means of controlling him for a time at least, but for the cruel luck that killed both

consul almost on the same day.

Since the news about the final defeat of Antony at Actium reached Rome on April 28th, we may fairly assume that Brutus heard of it by May 6th or 7th at the latest. Very soon after he heard from Cicero that Octavian and Decimus Brutus were hot in pursuit of Antony. Thus he had every reason to believe that the Republican cause in Italy was flourishing. About the same time he was informed that five cohorts of Dolabella's had landed in the Chersonnesus from Asia. Brutus, as he must have known by this time, had been ordered by the Senate at a meeting on April 27th to use his own discretion regarding the prosecution of the war against Dolabella and now he had to consider rapidly what he should do. This move of Dolabella's — assuming that the cohorts were not mere deserters — was a great surprise; for no one had imagined that he would attempt to gain a footing anywhere in Europe, and Brutus, though he had not been able to get very reliable news of his movements in Asia, had thought since the beginning of April that he was moving thence Eastwards. This small force

1. In the above account of the quarrel over Octavian I have taken no account of Brut. I,15 and 17, of which Cicero's attitude towards Octavian is almost the sole theme. I am unable to reach any confident conclusion regarding their composition. Neither is of much importance even as regards their own theme. The causes and course of the quarrel are sufficiently made clear from the other letters, instanced in the above pages, and all that these letters do is to push the disagreement further to the stage of personal abuse. Tyrell and Purser (vol. VI, p. 180) think "the poverty of thought displayed... a mark of genuineness. When a feeble man gives way to inability he is generally verbose." I believe — and Julius Caesar thought so too — that Brutus was not a feeble man. My belief is that these letters are forgeries cf. Special Note 369. (Pam.XI,14,3, Brut. I,15,6 cf. T. & P's notes. 2. Letters took 10 days to reach Rome from Dyrrachium. 3. Brut. II, 4,1. 4. Brut. I, 3,4. dated v. Kal. Maias i.e. April 27th. 5. Cicero's answer to Brutus' letter informing him about these cohorts in Brut. I,2,sec. 1-3 (374 in T. & F.) written "about May 30th. 6. Brutus' letter was probably sent therefore about May 10th. The letter has not survived but I think that the news may have been given as late as May 15th in the missing first part of Brut. I,4, sec.3-6 (369 in T. & F.) if we assume that Brutus moved from Dyrrachium before informing Cicero of his intention to do so. 7. Brut. I, 2, 1. 8. Brut. I, 3, 1. C. - Cic. I.c. says they were sent by Dolabella. (P.see p. 371. above, and below. 369. )
might be the forerunner of a larger one and in any case even five cohorts in the Chersonese could hold up almost indefinitely a much superior army. If contact was eventually to be made with Cassius, as had all along been Brutus' intention, there must be a clear passage for them through that peninsula. Further it was now some five months since Brutus had been in Macedonia, and even then he had only spent some weeks in the province.

Considering therefore these recent developments both in Italy and in Thrace, he decided that it was to the State's interest that he should no longer remain in Illyricum where, since Antony's defeat in Cisalpine Gaul, his presence was no longer necessary, but should move eastwards where affairs required his personal attention. This decision was heartily approved by Cicero when he learned of it.

After the necessary arrangements which included the warning of troops in winter-quarters in other parts to proceed at once to Macedonia, he left Dyrrachium by the Egnatian Way about May 12th or 13th. Two or three days later having reached a point on the road some 40 or 45 miles from Dyrrachium, he wrote to Cicero. He adjured Cicero to make full and proper use of the

1. Though Brutus probably did not know of it, Dolabella did have an idea of returning with his forces to Italy, if he were barred from Syria and Egypt. Lentulus Spinther claimed (Fam. XI,13,2) to have learned this from an intercepted dispatch. 2. Selzer (P.W.X,p.1002 and 1004) suggests that, since by the original decree of the Senate (Phil. X,11,25-6) Brutus' imperium extended only to the Balkan peninsula (see p.185f. above), it must have been later extended to include a supervision over all the East (App.III,83 fin. IV,58. Vell.Pat.II,92) and he thinks that the latter decree may have been passed on April 27th when the war against Dolabella was finally entrusted to Cassius (Brut.I,2,1). It is certainly true that on that day the Senate gave Brutus the right to take whatever steps he thought fit regarding Dolabella. (ibid.) But we must remember that as early as April 12th Cicero had expressed the opinion that if Dolabella looked like obtaining a firm grip of Asia Brutus should pursue him there. (Brut. II,4,3). 3. Brut.I,2,2. 4.-including every body of cavalry posted in Ambracia under young Cicero. 5.-Brut.I,4. sec.3-6. (866 in T. & P.) The first part of the letter is missing.
victory at Mutina, reminding him that he was the most important man in the State and warning him, especially, in regard to Octavian, not to raise by the gift of the consulship another Antony in place of the one they had just beaten down. Just before this letter was posted a message came to him that Cicero had himself been elected consul. Brutus was delighted at the news, but it was, of course, false.

Some four days later when among the mountains of Campania, Brutus received a letter from Cicero, written on May 6th, containing an account of the meeting of Senate on April 27th. Then the Senate having, as they thought, disposed of Antony turned their attention to the other arch-criminal Dolabella. Servilius moved that the war against him be entrusted to Cassius. Supporting that motion Cicero added to it that Brutus, if he thought it necessary, should also take action against Dolabella. It was to be left entirely to Brutus' discretion, whether any such action was advisable or not - a gesture, which Cicero considered a great compliment to Brutus. He was very decisively of the opinion that Dolabella must be crushed not only to avenge the murder of Trebonius but also to prevent him establishing a place of refuge for the fugitives from Mutina. He was sure that Brutus would agree with him.

This news, although he must have heard it before, was a justification of Brutus' action in leaving Illyricum and he replied at once: For the compliment Cicero had paid his discretion, their close friendship, he thought, rendered thanks superfluous. Before writing he had just heard from one
Satrinius a former legate of Trebonius, who had it apparently from a friend Cicorcius, that Dolabella had been defeated by the combined armies of Tillius Cimber, governor of Bithynia, and King Deiotarus. How this news affected Brutus' movements we have no knowledge. It may have settled any question there may have been of Dolabella making a real effort to land in Europe, but its significance is not shown either in this letter or in any of the other messages from Brutus to Rome, which have survived.

The remainder of the above letter from Candavia and the whole of his next one are taken up with less important matters, which, nevertheless, throw some light on one aspect of Brutus' character. In the midst of all the work and worry involved in his command, he found time to give attention to the affairs of his friends and even of his servants. Before this time he had written to Cicero to commend the candidature for a praetorship of Antistius Vetus, and now he shows a like concern for the political advancement of several other of his officers. Cicero's son wished to go to Rome to stand for election to the pontificate, and although his father thought that a candidature could legally be accepted 'in absentia,' it was agreed that he had more chance of being elected if he were actually in Rome. Young Cicero had been sent some weeks before to bring certain troops from winter-quarters in Ambracia, and his original orders had been to lead his force into Macedonia through Thessaly, presumably to meet Brutus at Thessalonica. When Brutus heard of his father's
desire to have him in Rome he had, despite the father's protestations that on no account must his son leave his commander if a campaign in Asia were intended, sent a counter-order bidding Cicero to meet him at Heraclea in Lyncestis, to discuss the matter of his election. Domitius Ahenobarbus, a nephew of Brutus' uncle Cato, and Cato's own son, both serving with Brutus, as well as Appuleius, young Lentulus and Brutus' own step-son Bibulus, and perhaps others were desirous also of standing for one or other of the priestly offices. Their

1-ibid.I,5,3. 2-This is my interpretation of Brut.I,6,1. 
"Filius tuus a me abest, in Macedonia congressissem; ilius est enim Ambracia ducere equites per Thessaliam. Scripsi ad eum ut Heracleam occurreret;” i.e. "Your son is not with me at present, but we shall meet in Macedonia. He was ordered to bring his cavalry from Ambracia by way of Thessaly. I have written to him to meet me (instead) at Heraclea." If I am right in thinking that it is Heraclea in Lyncestis that is meant (T. & P. vol.VI, p.200 think so too) then the order to meet Brutus there must have been a second and amended order. For Cicero would not have been asked in the first place to go from Ambracia to Heraclea via Thessaly. That this was an amended order is not usually brought out by editors and translators e.g. T. & P. seem to misunderstand the situation, when they say in note on Brut. I,4,5, ("Filius valet et in Macedonia cum equitatu praemissus est.") "Brutus had sent young Cicero into Ambracia with orders to bring some cavalry which were there through Thessaly and Macedonia and meet him at Heraclea in Lyncestis." Two mistakes are involved in this (a) From Ambracia to Heraclea Cicero would go through Epirus not Thessaly (b) Cicero had not been recently sent to fetch cavalry, but had left headquarters to join cavalry in winter-quarters before Lentulus met Brutus there (Fam.XII,14,8), which as T. & P. (vol.p.237) themselves admit was at end of March or beginning of April, but was more probably, as I think, about the middle of March. see Special Note 22 p.385.

There is another Heraclea in Macedonia, north of Chalcidice near Lake Presias, to reach which from Ambracia would involve a march through Thessaly. But it would have been a curious place to choose as an original rendezvous, situated as it is some 40 miles beyond Thessalonica. The other places called Heraclea in Greece and Thrace need not be considered. 3-Brut. I,14,1 fin. (I agree with T. & P. (vi. p.299) that "Bibulorum" should perhaps read "Bibuli aliorum") of Brut. I,6,3.
commanding officer did what he could to assist them all. Bibulus received a special letter of commendation to Cicero and so also, it appears, did Appuleius. As it happened Brutus' efforts for them were not needed. The elections were postponed because of the political crisis and Cicero wrote quickly to tell Brutus so as to save the men a fruitless journey.

Flavius, a very dear friend of Brutus - as witness his sorrow over his death at Philippi - and now, perhaps, acting as his "praefectus fabrum", was involved in a financial dispute with the people of Dyrrachium. The city had, as they themselves admitted, borrowed money from a man, who, dying, had made Flavius his heir; but when Flavius claimed payment of the debt, the citizens insisted that Julius Caesar had given them remission of it. The disputants agreed to accept Cicero as arbiter - he was a patron of Dyrrachium - and Brutus urged him to see that Flavius received justice. The other instance of Brutus' kindness is even more interesting. His freedman Achilles was brother-in-law to Glycon, the medical slave of Pansa, who had been in attendance when his master died of wounds. The slave had come under suspicion in connection with the death and was actually under arrest.

Brutus scouted the charge on the sensible grounds that the slave, who was a good-living man, had more to lose than anyone else by his master's death and begged Cicero to have him released.

At this time Brutus was still receiving recruits from

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Italy, and sometimes from quite unexpected sources. L. Clodius, for instance, who came to him with a letter of introduction from Cicero, had after serving Appius Claudius as "praefectus fabrum"—when he may have made Brutus' acquaintance—been for some time on the side of Antony and had accepted promotion from him. He was now, Cicero assured Brutus, quite convinced of the error of his ways. Shortly after him came one C. Nasennius, a wealthy citizen of Sessa, who had already had some military experience under Metellus in Crete twenty four years before.

Of Brutus' movements after his halt among the mountains of Candavia we learn no more from Cicero's letters. All we do know from that source is that he declined to accede to urgent requests from Cicero that he should come to Italy. It appears even that the Senate had actually passed a resolution urging him to bring his army to their support sometime about the beginning of June. Their request set Brutus a new problem. He had just embarked upon a new summer's campaign with the hope and at first, at least, under the impression, that all was well in Italy, and the order to return there put him in something of a dilemma. He had an instinctive respect for any opinion of the Senate but on this occasion the other considerations involved prevented him from an immediate acceptance of it. The state of uncertainty into which he was thrown is shown by the fact, that he took longer than was customary to reply to the Senate's message. But as always when his mind was made up,
he refused to alter his decision despite persistent and eloquent pleas from Cicero; in which the orator set forth the unhappy course of events since Antony's defeat, which made the presence of Brutus and his army desirable. Antony had, thanks to Octavian's delinquency and Decimus Brutus' consequent weakness, managed to escape into southern Transalpine Gaul, and at the end of May had persuaded Lepidus to unite forces with him. Decimus succeeded eventually in making a junction with Plancus, the governor of Gaul north of the Province; but Plancus' loyalty was held suspect in Rome, as also was that of Pollio, who commanded forces in Further Spain. Octavian meanwhile was causing internal troubles, as we have seen, in Italy and both he and his army were showing a complete lack of respect for the Senate.

Brutus has been frequently reproached by historians for this so-called desertion of Cicero and the Senate, but those who have properly examined the circumstances have agreed that his decision to remain where he was was the correct one. He had much better reasons than the jealousy of Octavian or resentment against Cicero, which his detractors attribute to him, for his refusal, and his friends at Rome were by no means convinced that it would be advantageous for him to come to Rome. His army was small - when he left Dyrrachium he had no more than

1. - Brut. I, 9, 3:10, 1:12, 2:14, 2:15, 12:18:2. cf. Fam. XI, 14, 2:26, in which Decimus Brutus approves of summoning Brutus; and Fam. XII, 6:1:9, 2:10, 4, in which Cicero urges Cassius as well as Brutus to come. (2. - Brut. I, 10, 3. "Illudimur.... tum militum deliciis, tum imperatorum insolentia", referring to Octavian and others. (C. T. & F. (vol. VI, pp. lxiv and cxxi), inevitably, condemn his decision, and their verdict has the assent of Richards (p. 192), Selland (p. 405 ff), and Marsh (F. R. E. pp. 183 f: H. R. W. p. 231 f.) Bee Holmes, however, (A. R. E. p. 65) and Peterson (p. 673) are vigorous in his defence, and Gelzer (F. W. K. p. 1009) finds his decision a proper one. (4. - Brut. I, 18, 1.
six legions — and it consisted of men, who had either had little recent training and experience or had gained their training under Caesar. He had no fleet sufficient to transport them across the Adriatic, for the only ships we know him to have possessed at this time were the few he had taken over at Demetrias. Even if he had gathered a fleet from the Illyrian coast, as might have been possible, and crossed to Brindisi, he would have certainly have been opposed by Octavian, whose intentions were now only too obvious, and apart from the probability of desertion among his Caesararian legionaries, his forces, even if augmented by volunteers in Italy — whose uselessness in war he had earlier realised; and whose numbers and quality could not have been increased by the levies of the consuls — would have been no match for Octavian's eight disciplined, loyal and experienced legions. Had he been able to trust Octavian to join with him and Plancus to remain loyal to Decimus Brutus, the four combined armies could certainly have overthrown Antony and Lepidus. But Octavian he rightly did not trust, and Plancus and Pollio too were proved by events to have no true loyalty to the Republic. Had Brutus taken the risk and suffered defeat, which was far more probable than victory, the Senate's cause would have been unable to offer further resistance to its assailants, and Cassius in the East would have been outnumbered and overcome at the Caesarians' leisure. In these circumstances a decision to go to Italy would certainly have been 'fatuo.' Brutus realised that before he could

C.-App. III,79. of the six, 1 had previously been under Sertenius, 3 under Vatinus and 1 under C. Antony, the other being gathered from various sources, old Pompeians etc. When Cn. Brut. I,2,1 says he had 5 legions at this time, he is probably thinking only of the regular legions, and omitting the stretch one. (C.-see Page 119 above.) C.-Rice Holmes A.R.E.p.55.
return to face the several opponents of the Senate, certain and probable, he must increase the numbers and efficiency of his own army and make a junction with Cassius. He therefore continued his journey eastwards.

Between him and Cicero relations became more and more strained. The latter continued to beg him to come to Italy and sent similar pleas to Cassius in Syria; but his resentment at Brutus' failure to respond and his pique at Brutus' criticisms of his policy regarding Octavian appear here and there in his letters. A further cause of discord between them was the fate of Lepidus' children. Brutus, when he heard rumours that Lepidus would go over to Antony, tried to anticipate the inevitable decree against him by asking Cicero to have special regard for his children for his, their uncle's, sake, and to ensure that they did not suffer by their father's fault. Cicero, although protesting his great efforts on their behalf and even naming Servilia as his witness, pointed out to him that it was an unavoidable principle of law that an outlaw's children should be involved in their father's fate; and eventually he even urged their condition as a further reason for Brutus' return to Italy.

About this time - July or August 43 B.C. - Brutus suffered a severe blow by the death of his wife at Rome. In their marital relations they were outstanding in their age for their sincerity, dignity and devotion to each other, and Porcia appears as a truly tragic figure. Having had her first marriage blighted, as it must have been to a woman of her spirit, by the ignominy in which her husband had constantly been involved by

1. See above page 188, note 1. 2. Brutus I,13. 3. ib. 15,16:18,6. 4. ib.13,2. 5. ib,16.6. 6. For questions in connection with the date and manner of Porcia's death see Special Note 25. 7. PP.76ff.
Caesar's machinations, she had been married no more than ten months to the man whom apparently she had always loved, when she discovered him deeply involved in the perils of the conspiracy. From then onwards her intimacy with him lasted for but five months more, a time of the greatest despondency and anxiety, until in August they were parted for ever. She had been very sad at the parting and with her emotional nature, which the lack of friendliness between herself and her domineering mother-in-law would not mitigate, she had fallen ill. At last despairing of life and happiness, despite the close attentions of her friends and household, she contrived to kill herself by the dramatic and frightful method of swallowing live coals. The manner of her death could not have softened the blow for her husband and, even if he derived a little consolation from the letter addressed to him by Cicero, he seems to have sought what solace was to be found in the work he had undertaken.

For the rest of Brutus' movements until Philippi we have to rely on the Greek historians with occasional assistance from Romans like Velleius and a few coins and inscriptions. Although we miss the details that Cicero's letters give us for earlier periods, we can construct a surprisingly comprehensive and detailed account of what he did both during the rest of his stay in Macedonia and in his campaigns in Thrace and Asia. To the six legions he had in May when he left Illyricum, he added two, gathered in Macedonia from the

1.-Plut. Brut. 57,5. " διὰ νόσον " op. Cic. Brut. I,17,7 from Brutus to Atticus. Even if this letter be as a whole considered a forgery, the final section of it (7) may be genuine. cf. Gurlitt. Jarhb. vol.147(1892) pp.413-418.
4.-cf. Appendix I,iv.411b
native populace, which he trained to fight in the Roman fashion—an experiment, interesting in the light of the Macedonians' earlier history, which seems to have been quite satisfactory. What happened to the half-legion of Dolabella's, against which he originally set out, we do not know, but it is reasonable to assume that it was merged in his forces, as Cicero had from the first expected it to be. There is disagreement, noted below, among the Greek sources regarding his Thracian and early Asian campaigns in the latter half of 43 B.C., but the following is a probable version. From Macedonia he marched to the Chersonese reaching it, probably, about the beginning of July. From there, having no trouble in dealing with Dolabella's efforts, he seems to have crossed into Asia, leaving most of his army in Europe. He did not intend to make any lengthy stay nor to engage in any sort of campaign, but simply to call the attention of the Asians to his presence nearby as commander of the whole district, and in particular to arrange for the building of a fleet; for in that arm he was especially weak. The task of building or procuring ships for him was allotted to the people of Cyzicus in the Propontis and to the Bithynians. The latter province had since 44 B.C. been under the charge of Brutus' fellow-conspirator Tillius Cimber, but he had recently left it to join with Deiotarus in a successful battle against Dolabella. In charge of the preparations in Cyzicus Brutus

1.-App. III,79:IV,75. 2.-Brut. I,31 fin. 3.-allowing an average of about 12 miles per day cf. Sertor. Japh. (1894) p.333 ff. T. & P. vol. VII,p.lxiv. note 193 and p. 202. 4.-Dio xlvii,3:cf.25,1. Neither Appian nor Plutarch say anything of this preliminary visit to Asia, but Dio's account is circumstantially probably. It is reasonable that Brutus, being in Thrace should cross to Asia for the reasons I have indicated and while the silence of Appian and Plutarch regarding such a short visit is understandable, it would be difficult to account for Dio's story if it were not true; and for one detail (page 193 below,note 3) Dio has support of Livy. 5.-Plut. Brut. 28,2. 6.-Sic. Brut. I,6,3. cf. Fam; XII,13,3. Brutus had learned this on May 15th in Candavia from a Greek letter transmitted by one Sabius, a legate of Trebonius. T. & F. (vol.VI,p.lxiv note 193) have no grounds for asserting on the basis of this passage that Brutus had correspondence with Deiotarus.
left Herostratus, whom he had entrusted before with an independent commission and judging from the highly complimentary description of him in a Cyzicin inscription he seems to have created a very good impression. After a very brief stay in Asia, during which the only event of note was an abortive plot against him by Gellius Publicola, he hastened back again across the Hellespont to his legions, whose loyalty, as he realized too well, was not proof against a long absence of their general. For several reasons he decided to undertake a campaign in Thrace. It was necessary for his liaison with Asia and eventually with Cassius in Syria, that the way should be quite open to them between Macedonia and the Hellespont. To ensure that he won over, as far as possible by friendly means, the support of the chieftains ruling in the southern part of the country, the most important of whom was Rhascouporis, the joint-ruler with his brother Rhascus, of the powerful Sapaêans. He became involved with other tribes and found it necessary to play an important part in Thracian affairs. The chief royal family of the country - the Odrysian dynasty - became extinct with the death in 42 B.C. of Sadales son of Cotys. He, as other eastern monarchs had done before him, invited the Romans to interfere in his kingdom by bequeathing it to them in his will. Brutus, acting for the Senate, took over the realm and

(1.-cf. p.158 above. (2.-J.A.R. Monro in J.H.S. XVII. (1897) 325-7. cf. C. Wachsmuth. Rhein. Mus. LVI (1901) p.149-50. (3.-Dio xlvi,34,3-6. Livy epit.122. Publicola, a brother of T. Massalia, who joined Brutus about the end of July or even later (Cic. Brut.1,17,1.) seems to have been persistently disloyal to the Republicans he professed to serve. After this plot against Brutus, for which he was pardoned for his brother's sake, he undertook, according to Dio, a second attempt against Cassius. He was again pardoned by his mother's intervention and eventually threw in his lot with the Triumvirs and attained the consulship in 36 B.C. Dio seems to link his first plot against Brutus - with an attempt by Antony to rescue his brother Gaius. "καὶ τὸν Ἀντιόγον ὁ Ἀδελφὸς ὁ Μάγκος ἐξαιρετὰς Πελοπίας πάντας, ἐξερήθη αὐτῷ ὁ τριβμβός," but it is difficult, though not impossible to see how Publicola could have had an understanding with Antony. (4.-Dio xlvi,25,3. App.IV,67 et al. (5.-Dio xlvi,29,1-2.}
named his own ally Rhascouporis as the new king. This appointment naturally was not universally popular and seems to have been especially resented by the fierce and warlike tribe of the Bessi in the north of Thrace, who lived among the mountains of Haemus near the sources of the river Hebros and were neighbours of the Odrysae. Backward in their mode of life, they were regarded asbrigands even by the brigands surrounding them. Against them Brutus made an expedition, in which Rhascouporis assisted him. For this campaign, which might be regarded as no less open to criticism than that of Decimus Brutus against Alpine tribes in 44 B.C. and for the same reasons, Brutus had a variety of motives. The Bessi had to be punished for their attitude towards the arrangement he had made for the Odrysae; they were besides a formidable enough enemy to provide his army with some much needed experience and practice; and at the same time Brutus was anxious to increase his own prestige as a military commander in the eyes both of his own troops and his enemies, by winning the title of "Imperator". We know none of the details of the campaign but from the fact that he was hailed as Imperator and used the title thenceforward in his coins we must deduce that he gained at least one victory in battle, while the evidence of Livy's epitome may indicate that he failed to achieve anything like a permanent subjection of the tribe, which would indeed have been a long and difficult task in their mountainous country.

The affairs of at least one other tribe in Thrace
because his concern also. The unnamed chieftain of an unknown tribe died in this year leaving as his heir a very young son. His widow, Polemocratia, fearing an attempt on the life of her son, brought him and the royal treasure also to Brutus for protection. The treasure was a very welcome addition to his war chest and from the gold and silver of which it contained a considerable amount he struck coins. The young prince was deposited in Cyzicus, which Brutus had so recently visited, until he should have leisure to restore him to his throne.

After his activities in Thrace Brutus returned to Macedonia to make a final settlement of the province, before he should have to quit it in order to reduce Asia completely. It was obvious by this time that the Republican cause in Italy was lost. After Lepidus threw in his lot with Antony at the end of May the Senate's authority rapidly diminished. Although Manius was still standing by Decimus Brutus, the two of them were afraid to take any active step against Antony and Lepidus and remained where they were in Gaul, leaving Octavian as the only general with an army in Italy. He had not been long in showing the boundlessness of his ambitions and with his army of veterans behind him was able to demand and obtain on August 19th the consulship, which the death of Hirtius and Pansa had left open. The Senate could offer no real resistance and he was able without difficulty to make himself master of Rome. Soon afterwards he set out for the North in order to come to an understanding with Antony and Lepidus, and it became apparent that the true division of the State, with the former partisans of Caesar opposing his murderers, was at last to be made. Under the circumstances it became a prime necessity for Brutus to join with Cassius and towards the end of the summer he marched once more to the Hellespont and crossed practically all his forces into Asia.

\[\text{C.\textendash}App.\textendash IV, 75. That this story is not the same as that in Dio xlvii, 25,1-2 given above, is shown in detail in Special Note 24. p.372ff.\]
CHAPTER XI

Brutus in Asia.  

About the time of Brutus' departure from Europe or shortly after his arrival in Asia, he ordered the execution of his prisoner, Caius Antony. The Greek historians stress the fact that he was influenced in reaching this decision by the deaths, at the hands of his enemies, of Decimus Brutus and Cicero, and it has been more recently suggested that Cassius was a force behind it. Since the failure of his attempts to cause mutiny earlier in the year, Antony, closely confined on board ship at Apollonia, had given no further trouble, but Brutus may have felt that his existence there in captivity might invite an attack on Macedonia by his brother, and he had no desire to come to blows with the triumvirs before he and Cassius had united forces and stabilised their conquests by reducing Asia.

Whatever his motives, he sent an order for the execution to Hortensius, whom he appears to have left behind in Macedonia to represent the Senatorial cause. Hortensius in turn passed the order on to Clodius who was, it seems, the actual gaoler of Antony.

In Asia, Brutus busied himself in securing the submission of the last remnant of Carthaginian power in Spain. Dio (xlvii, 24, 4) and Plutarch (Brutus 29, 1) agree in stating that Brutus' decision was prompted by the death of Decimus Brutus, while Plutarch alone adds Cicero's death as a further reason for it; Brutus could not have known of the former until near the end of 43 B.C. since it occurred in Gaul in September (App. III, 86) nor of the latter which took place in December 43 B.C., until early 44. Dio says that the order was given when Brutus was in Asia during his first visit, i.e. before the Thracian campaign, while Plutarch who does not mention the first records it as given when Brutus was at the Hellespont on his way to Asia cf. also Livy epit. 121. Plut. Ant. 32, 3. App. III, 79. Senec. Consol. ad. Polyb. 35. 2 - Gelzer in P. W. vol. X p. 1001, thinks it probable that Cassius had some influence in the final decision because of Brutus' clement attitude towards Antony earlier. It is impossible, since we cannot fix the time Brutus' decision, either to prove or disapprove this suggestion, but I think that the death of his own friends and the reasons of policy outlined above were sufficient in themselves to alter Brutus' attitude. 3 - Plut. Brut. 36, 4. Dio xlvii, 24, 2. 4 - According to Dio xlvii, 24, 4 such an attempt was made. 6 - This is the most feasible explanation of Plutarch Brut. 28 and Dio xlvii, 24, 4. The former says the order went from Brutus to Hortensius; the latter (l.c. and 24, 2) names Clodius as the man immediately responsible.
and practical assistance in money and war materials of various towns and peoples. Before the arrival of Cassius, whom he had summoned from Syria to join him in Asia, he had succeeded in gaining without recourse to arms the support of most of the province and of the surrounding allied kings. He also undertook the civil administration of the province, as his 'malus imperium' granted by the Senate in February and March 43 B.C. entitled him to do; for he could not regard Octavian's assumption of the consulship or the events that followed it as legitimate. Horace, who must have accompanied his army to Asia, gives a humorous account of a case which he judged at Classomnae. There may be evidence also - though I consider it unlikely - of his intervention in the domestic affairs of Ephesus in regard to the problem of Jewish rights. Josephus refers to an interview which the Jews of that city were granted with a Roman proconsul, but the text is too corrupt to allow of identification of the latter with Brutus. Another passage in Josephus has given rise to the suggestion that, when he was too busy with military operations, as later after the arrival of Cassius, he delegated the civil duties to Casca but, although one of the Cascas issued coins for Brutus and although the other, despite his presence in Rome in 43 B.C., had perhaps joined Brutus by this time, we have no indication that either held any post more responsible than that of legate, and the passage concerned could not apply to them.

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Cassius in Syria had achieved a success even more striking than Brutus' in Macedonia. Securing the help of Marcus Crispus and Staius Marcus the Caesarians, who on his arrival were with six legions contesting for the province with the Pompeian Caeceilius Bassus, he even persuaded the latter also to submit and give him a legion. He took over also four of Caesar's legions, which were marching from Egypt, where the dictator had left them in 47 B.C., having been sent by Cleopatra to Dolabella, and had a fleet built for himself in Phoenicia. With these forces he was able when Dolabella threatened to enter Syria, to shut him up in Laodicea and even force an entry into the town. Dolabella committed suicide. Cassius was on the point of setting out for Egypt to punish Cleopatra for her attempt to co-operate with Dolabella, when he received Brutus' request to come to Asia. Although rather unwilling to abandon his projected expedition, he realised the force of his colleague's argument that the Republic could now best be served by their uniting their forces, and set off at once to meet him, making sure on the way of the submission of Tarsus and the rest of Cilicia.

The two champions of the Republic met in Smyrna, sometime towards the end of the winter of 43-42 B.C. The occasion was one of great rejoicing and mutual congratulation, and the power of their armaments was all the more surprising and encouraging, when compared with the feebleness and futility of their position when last they had been acting together. It was astonishing that the two men, who had lived despairingly (1).

and dejectedly in Antium with no ability to face the enemy who had jockeyed them into a position of degradation and even of jeopardy, were now commanders of a combined force of nearly twenty legions, of thousands of auxiliary troops and of a powerful fleet and were possessors of considerable financial resources. Even more surprising was the fact that old soldier of Caesar, who had formerly been their chief stumbling-block, now composed the major part of their infantry. And all their new power was the result of their own efforts. I feel that not enough credit has been given them for their energy, courage and resourcefulness in these two highly successful years from September 44 B.C. to September 42 B.C.

They had made certain arrangements for guarding their recent conquests in Macedonia and Syria during their absence. In the latter province Cassius had left a legion under his nephew Lucius, more as a reminder of his supremacy than anything else, and it is probable, as we have already seen, that Brutus had left Hortensius in Macedonia for a similar purpose. Almost all of their forces, however, were with them in Asia. Of their fleets Brutus', to be commanded by Domitius Ahenobarbus, was still in course of construction in the north of Asia, while Cassius' under Staius Marcus was with him in Smyrna, or at least arrived soon after him. A good deal of jealous pride existed between the officers of the two armies, as was perhaps natural among men who were only amateurs in soldiering, and this rivalry had its counterpart among the rank and file. Cassius' men were proud of their superior numbers and their larger treasure chest, and in connection with the latter - a certain amount of prevalent feelings of jealousy was

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\[\text{Footnotes:} \]

1. App. IV, 63.
2. See page 136 above.
3. C. - He used it against the Rhodians. Page 207 below.
communicated to the two generals. Brutus had not been so harsh in his methods of collecting tribute as his colleague, and his field of operations had been worked well by others before his arrival. The recent cost of building and equipping his fleet had depleted his store considerably and he, therefore, asked that Cassius should give him a share of what he had collected. Brutus rightly pointed out that the money of each army was public property, gathered in the name of the State and to be used for the State's advantage. Cassius' officers murmured against this and pressed their general to refuse the request. Cassius, however, as always, succumbed to Brutus' arguments and gave him one-third of what he had. Brutus had similar whisperers among his staff and their activities militated against the harmony that was essential between the joint commanders. This spirit of rivalry between the armies was later to cause Brutus much trouble.

They now had to consider their next move. Affairs in Italy and the West had resolved themselves into a condition of clarity, and the sides for the impending struggle were clearly defined. Octavian had formed an understanding with Antony and Lepidus and with them composed a triumvirate to rule the Roman world. Against the Republicans they had immediately begun to act with the bitterest severity; their opponents were proscribed en masse and the members of the conspiracy against Caesar found guilty of murder. Caesar's former supporters were now in arms together against his assassins and the amnesty of April 17th 44 B.C. was now seen as a mere postponement of what had been an inevitable struggle. All that

1. - Plut. Brut. 30,1. 2. - see page 235. below
the amnesty had achieved had been to make the contest a
world-wide one, instead of the mere local riot which it would
have been immediately after the murder; but, at the same
time, it had given Octavian his entry into public affairs.
Brutus and Cassius had, therefore, to decide where and when
they would offer battle to the triumvirs. It was obviously
to their own interest to make their opponents come from Italy
to meet them. Had they themselves invaded Italy, apart from
making their auxiliaries fight in unusual circumstances and
exposing their Caesarian troops to greater temptations to
desert, they would have been faced by almost all their enemies'
much superior forces. By luring them from Italy they
compelled them to lead less troops into the field, as some
legions had to be left to guard the homecountry. They decided,
therefore, that the battle should be fought in Macedonia; but,
since the triumvirs were obviously too much engaged with various
activities, especially against Sextus Pompey; to be able to
leave Italy soon, they knew that, if they went back to
Macedonia at once, they would have to wait in idleness there
for some time, and that was made undesirable by the uncertain
tamper of their own troops and by the scarcity of food in
Macedonia: Besides, there were still two communities in Asia -
Lycia and Rhodes - which had refused to acknowledge their
supremacy and contribute to their resources. It was obvious
that, before leaving for Europe, they ought to secure their
rear and ensure that there would be no place, in which the

0. According to Appian IV, 65, the triumvirs had in any case
already decided to come to Macedonia to meet Brutus and Cassius.
Their advanced force of 8 legions had already crossed the
Adriatic when the latter met at Smyrna. It is doubtful,
however, how far such rather vague chronological details are to
be trusted. (2) I do not think Dio can be taken seriously when
he says (xlvii, 32, 3) that Brutus and Cassius were prepared even
to invade Italy, when they left Asia. Had they intended to
cross the Adriatic they would have set out much sooner.
(3) Dio xlvii, 32, 3. cf. App. IV, 91. fin. (4) see page 223. below.
enemy could establish a station behind them; and expeditions against the peoples mentioned would provide more practice for their troops. Cassius, whose fleet was with him and who, having studied at Rhodes, knew it well, undertook the conquest of that island, while Brutus gave his attention to Lycia.

Somewhere in Asia, whether before or after the Lycian campaign we cannot say, Brutus encountered, wandering in a state of poverty, the Chian rhetorician Theodotus, who, as tutor of the young Ptolemy of Egypt, had in 48 B.C. suggested the murder of Pompey. The wretch was put to death by Brutus' orders and an added prestige came to him as the avenger of the Senate's former champion.

The Lycians were an ancient people proud of their history and independence. Homer mentions them frequently and the district seems to have been an early settlement of the Greeks. Croesus had never succeeded in subduing them, and they were one of the last peoples of Asia to submit to the Persians. Since the days of Roman dominance in the Levant, they had always shown respect for the conquerors, and for their good behaviour, especially in that they had given no help to the pirates, they had been allowed to retain their time-honoured constitution. In this no less than twenty three towns had representation; the six largest - Xanthus, Patara, Myra and three others, had three votes each, smaller towns two and the smallest one. This confederacy made some attempt under influence of a demagogue Naucrates to offer a

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5. fin. App. II, 90. Appian says it was Cassius who slew Theodotus as against Plutarch. Perhaps both had a share in the decision.
united resistance to Brutus. As he advanced south from Smyrna they gathered an army and met him among the hills of their northwest frontier. Their army, however, seems to have been of little account: they had had little military experience for many years and one may imagine that such a force under such a leader would have little discipline.

Brutus defeated them with no difficulty, after surprising them with a cavalry attack while they were at breakfast and killing six hundred of them. That debacle ended the united resistance of the people and Brutus was able to advance into their territory, taking over villages and fortresses as he went. Prisoners were immediately dismissed for he hoped to subdue the country with the minimum of bloodshed. There was still however, a more obstinate and warlike element among them, which refused to be won over by his display of kindness and became concentrated in the larger towns, especially Xanthus. This famous old town, standing some six miles from the mouth of the river of the same name, had already in the past suffered siege on two famous occasions, by Harpagus, the general of Cyrus, and by Alexander; now the inhabitants prepared to resist Brutus. On that side of the city, which was not protected by the river, they dug a huge ditch, fifty feet in depth and breadth, from behind which they could fight, as if surrounded by a river; all the buildings beyond the ditch were destroyed, so that Brutus might find neither cover nor material among them. Faced with these preparations and finding his attempts to avoid an

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engagement of no avail, Brutus proceeded with the necessary siege with characteristic vigour. Although material had to be brought up from a considerable distance he built mantlets to protect his men against the enemy’s fire from across the ditch and by organising his forces in relays he secured a constant effort, by which the ditch was crossed and access gained to the city walls within a few days. The citizens were now closely confined within their walls and made attempts to break through Brutus’ lines by swimming under the surface of the river. This manoeuvre was prevented by the ingenious method of blocking the river with nets on the top of which bells were strung, so that when a swimmer became entangled in them warning of his presence was given. Despite the use of battering rams on the walls and attacks on the gates with constant relays of fresh men, Brutus was unable to force an entrance, although some small parts of the walls and a few towers were brought down. He could not afford to devote long to the siege of one town and the longer it was able to resist the less chance he had of reducing the other towns by the mere display of his power. Accordingly he resorted to the ruse of withdrawing his men some distance from the city, as if to rest them and as if leaving his siege-engines unprotected. As he anticipated, the Xanthians made a sortie by night against the engines, intending to set fire to them but Brutus had a force lying in wait, which attacked them and drove them back to the gates. The guards at the gates seeing the

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1. I take this to be the meaning of Appian’s rather vague reference in IV,76. The trench seems to have been some little distance from the walls and ἐκείνης ἐκ τοῦ ποτήριου ἐπὶ οὐκ ἐσφηθέν, ἣς καὶ τοὺς μετῆτριος ἐσφηθέντο, καὶ οἱ Σανθιοὶ κατὰ κλάσουσθαν τοὺς ἐκδιακονοῦντος. This seems to mean that Brutus managed to cross the ditch and get close up to the walls. (2.-Plut. Brut. 30,4. (3.-App. IV,77. (4.-ibid.)
Romans so close behind their own men were afraid to leave the gates open for them, and the raiding party was overtaken and slaughtered outside. Brutus still held his men away from their machines and the townspeople retaliated about mid-day. This time they succeeded in firing the siege engines, but, when they were once more driven back by Brutus' counter-attack, the gates were left open for them to avoid the tragedy of the first sortie and on their heels, as they entered, came 3000 Romans, who, thereupon, found themselves shut in the city, when the portcullis fell. As they fought their way through the streets to the Temple of Sarpedon for refuge, Brutus outside did all he could to break in to help them. The gate, protected by iron on the outside, could not be broken down, and in the fire at his siege-works he had lost most of his scaling-ladders and towers, and improvised ladders were of little avail. At least some men from the neighbouring town of Cenomdris, who were in Brutus' camp, volunteered to lead a force into the city by a dangerous path up a steep and slippery rock: A few of the Romans were able to follow them and scale the wall at the top; these managed to break down a small gate, despite its protection of thick palisade and a few more daring men were admitted. They made their way to the main gate and assisted their friends' assault on it from without by hacking at it on the inside, where it had no iron facing. It was nearly sunset when the gate at least gave way and the Romans poured into the city.

An amazing panic took hold of the Xanthians and, now that their city had fallen, they resolved to destroy it and themselves.

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1.-ibid. 2.-App. IV,78. Plutarch and Dio mention only one sortie - Plutarch placing it in the night, Dio by day; but Appian as usual in military passages is more detailed and trustworthy. (3.-App. IV,78. 4.-ibid.79.)
as their ancestors had done when the city fell to Harpagus. Fire had broken out among the buildings, whether deliberately started by the Romans or spreading from their siege works, and its course was encouraged by the inhabitants. Brutus, hating the thought of such needless destruction, ordered his men to quench the flames and spare the citizens, but their efforts to do both were stubbornly resisted. He sent messengers to offer the besieged terms of surrender but, with a curious mixture of pride and despair, they drove off his envoys and slew their families and themselves. Although Brutus even offered rewards to his men for each Xanthian saved, less than 150 freemen and a few women survived and their mad 'love of death' resulted in the complete destruction of the city, except for a few temples saved by Brutus' efforts.

Brutus hoped that the fall of Xanthus would be the end of the resistance to him, but when he moved down the river to Patara at its mouth, he was again faced with closed gates and defended walls. There was a party in that city consisting mainly of the lower classes - slaves and debtors who, probably to encourage resistance had recently been freed from their servitude and obligations - which still clamoured to resist him, as the Xanthians had done. His first offers were rejected but by a show of kindness to the Xanthian prisoners he overcame their stubbornness.

1. Plut. Brut. 31,1-5. App. IV,80. Appian says that they committed the same mass suicide also when Alexander took the city.
2. Plutarch (Brut. 30,4) gives the latter version; Dio xlvi,34,3 the former while Appian (IV,80) seems to consider the Xanthians responsible for it themselves with their funeral pyres.
7. Dio l.c. 8. The details of how Brutus induced Patara to surrender are given differently by our three historians. Plut. (Brut.32,1) says he held some Pataran women as prisoners, wives and daughters of prominent men. These he released and their accounts of his kindness won over the city to him. Appian (IV,91) and Dio (xlvi,34,4) agree that the prisoners were Xanthians; Plutarch's variation may be accounted for by Dio's statement that the prisoners were related to the Patarens by marriage. Appian says that Brutus released the prisoners to persuade the Patarens; but Dio has a long account of an auction sale of them held under the walls; while he continued to sell them as slaves, the people on the walls remained unaffected, but when he gave it up and set them all free, they were charmed into surrender by his generosity.
and was admitted without any bloodshed to the city. A third town, Myra, also surrendered with little opposition. Lentulus Spinther, who had been assisting Cassius at Rhodes, was sent by Brutus with a small fleet to Andriace, the port of Myra. There he succeeded in breaking through a defensive chain across the harbour and captured the chief officer of the city. When he marched up to Myra itself, he was admitted at once without hindrance.

With the fall of three of its chief cities, the opposition in Lycia collapsed and the confederacy sent envoys to treat with Brutus. They found him a gentler victor than they had probably expected. There were no executions and no banishments; the policy which Brutus had declared in the particular case of Caicus Antony; he was now applying even to non-Romans - a striking contrast with his earlier attitude towards eastern provincials; even the surviving Xanthians were restored to their ruined city. The confederacy as a whole was forced to pay a tribute, but it was small in comparison with what Cassius exacted from Rhodes; Xanthus had to pay besides 150 talents, and gold was collected in Patara and Myra. The Lycian fleet was taken over and sent north to Abydos to assist in the eventual crossing to Europe.

Meanwhile Cassius had met with an equal success against

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1. App. IV, 82. Dio xlvi, 34, 6. Plut. does not mention the place by name. 2. - App. IV, 72. 3. - App. IV, 82. Brutus' fleet at its fullest consisted partly of ships from Bithynia, partly of Lycian ships. The former were at this time still in process of building and the latter were not taken over until this campaign was over. Therefore I think that Lentulus was sent by Cassius to help Brutus, because the latter had not ships enough to attack Myra properly. 4. - Dio l.c. mentions the capture of the Ceratyes but attributes it to Brutus not Lentulus, whom he does not mention. 5. - App. l.c. 6. - App. IV, 81. 7. - see page 176 above. 8. - App. IV, 82. 9. - App. IV, 82. 10. - Plut. Brut. 32, 2. 11. - App. IV, 81 and 82: Dio xlvi, 34, 6. 12. - App. IV, 82.
the Rhodians, defeating them in two naval battles and taking their city after a short siege. The two generals met once more at Sardis to make their final arrangements before setting out for the crucial campaign against the triumvirs. They had by now exhausted the immediate resources of Asia both in men and money, and had even sent an envoy, Q. Labienus, the son of Caesar's old comrade and enemy, to secure help from Orodes of Parthia. During the delay at Sardis the strained relations, which had arisen between Brutus and Cassius at Smyrna over the division of the treasure, soon became evident again. The true reason for their disagreement lay in their natures and particularly in their different attitudes towards war and its attendant evils. Cassius was a real soldier and with a soldier's uncompromising outlook regarded everything as subordinate to military necessities. In the collecting and disciplining of the largest possible army and the gathering of all kinds of supplies for it, he considered that any unhappiness caused to others or any departure from the normal moral code, while regrettable, was inevitable. Brutus, on the contrary, could not thus subordinate the claims of his strict conscience or the logical application of his ethical beliefs to the exigencies of the moment, and this to Cassius seemed ultra-righteous and priggish. Brutus, however, was at least sincere. They had the sense to realise that harmony must be maintained between them and met alone to discuss their differences in a friendly manner.

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(1) App. IV, 65-74 Dio xlvii, 37. Vell. II, 85. Val. Max. I, 5, 3. (2) -Plut. Brut. 34, 4, 11. Neither Appian nor Dio mentions this rendezvous at Sardis, but it seems unlikely that the armies would march south to North Asia separately and Plut. has several detailed stories of their activities there, probably derived from Volumius or Mella (see Page 165) which give his account verisimilitude. Dio (xlvii, 35, 1) indicates, without details, a meeting somewhere in Asia. (3) -Dio xlvii, 34, 5. Justin. xliii, 4, 7. Ferrero thinks this an invention of their enemies (vol. III, p. 175) "It was so impossible an idea that I cannot believed Cassius ever conceived it." But Labienus was certainly with Orodes in Parthia, and the same impossible idea had been conceived by Pompey (Caes. B.C. III, 32, 5. Dio xlil, 55, 3. xliii, 2, 3. xliv, 43, 3. Those who properly understand Brutus and Cassius will realise that the idea was more likely to originate with the latter than with Brutus. (4) -Plut. Brut. 34, 1-4. M. xlvii, 35, 1.)
as a result of their great labours and their meeting was the occasion of a bitter quarrel. It was easy for men of such opposite natures - Cassius the soldier and realist and Brutus the scholarly idealist - to find things with which to reproach each other. At last the quarrel was stopped by the entry of the impetuous, clownish Favonius and, with peace restored between them, they dined together the same evening. On the very next day, however, an incident occurred which, illustrating perfectly the difference in their attitude, nearly brought about a fresh quarrel. An officer and friend of Brutus, Lucius Pella, who had fulfilled for him various offices of trust, was accused by the Sardians of embezzling public funds. Brutus himself heard the case, condemned Pella and publicly disgraced him. This seemed to Cassius too stringent an application of justice and he resented it particularly, because in a similar case some days before, in which two officers of his own had been involved, he had been content publicly to acquit them, though admonishing them in private. He protested to Brutus against his decision, claiming that in time of war less regard need be paid to such peccadilloes, but Brutus maintained its rectitude, insisting that, as tyrannicides, they must not allow in themselves or their subordinates the sort of injustices which are typical of tyranny.

To counteract these petty squabbles between them Brutus was always careful to show the greatest respect towards his colleague; and although in matters where ethics and high policy were concerned Brutus was almost invariably the superior authority, in matters of purely military interest Cassius' judgment was of supreme importance; for though very little older than Brutus he had much greater military experience and

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ability. This superiority was reflected not only in the
greater size of his army and its stores, but in its better
discipline and training. We are told, for instance, that if
during a march Brutus' men came first to an unfordable river
they would wait by it until Cassius sent men forward to build
a bridge. At Philippi Brutus experienced the greatest
difficulty in maintaining discipline in his army; yet in his
disputes with Cassius he appears as the stronger personality.

It was now past midsummer and they must obviously move
into Europe soon if they were to fight the triumvirs before
winter set in. Their arrangements for the march were simple.
Both armies were to proceed together to the Hellespont and were
to cross over there from Abydos to Sestos with the help of
part of the fleet under Tillius Cimber, who would remain in
co-operation with them. The rest of the fleet was to sail
to the Adriatic in order to harass the enemy's crossing from
Italy; for already as Brutus and Cassius must have known,
Antony had sent an advance guard of eight legions into Macedonia:
most of Cassius' ships had already been sent, after the capture
of Rhodes, to the Peloponnesse to intercept the Egyptian fleet,
which was reported to be on the way to Italy to assist the
triumvirs: Domitius Ahenobarbus was sent from Asia with the
remainder of the joint fleets to join with Murcus and proceed
with him to the Adriatic. The small force which Cassius had
left in Syria was apparently summoned to accompany the main body
to the final struggle, for Lucius Cassius, who had commanded it,
fought at Philippi: Hortensius in Macedonia was probably

\[^{1}\text{Frontinus, Strat. IV, 2, 1. (C.-see page 233f. below.}}^{2}\text{C.-App. IV, 102.}}^{3}\text{C.-Plut. Brut. 39, 1. App. IV, 65: 87. Dio xlvii, 39, 2.}}^{4}\text{C.-App. IV, 32. The Egyptian fleet was scattered and wrecked}}^{5}\text{C.-Ibid. 86, fin.}}^{6}\text{C.-Ibid. 135.}
informed also of their departure from Asia and impending approach to his territory. In various key towns in Asia and the Aegean they left behind officers with small forces to protect their rear by maintaining their authority and to provide supplies when needed. About the middle of July they set off for the Hellespont.

By this time Brutus was feeling the strain of the past two years. Ever since he entered the conspiracy, he had had a series of major anxieties of one sort or another. The anxiety inherent in the plot, the instant disappointment of its result and the demoralising months of idleness that followed, had taken toll inevitably of his strength, and, when, at last, he had found solace in doing things, he had plunged too zealously into his new activity and had fallen ill at Dyrrachium. That illness was not apparently of long duration and his trouble at this time was mental rather than physical. Bodily, in fact, he seems to have stood up well to the labours of his task; but they put a great strain on his mind. The activity which had at first seemed a welcome release from enforced idleness became gradually more burdensome, not because he shirked or disliked work, but because so much of what he had to do was distasteful to him. Fighting, killing, burning and destroying ran counter to his philosophical nature and even the gentler duty of exacting tribute was not to his taste. He was not, moreover, a natural disciplinarian of others and the

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1.--We must assume that Hortensius retreated before Antony's advance party when it landed in Macedonia. We hear nothing of him after his connection with the death of C. Antony until his own death at M. Antony's hands after Philippi. (3.--App. V, 2. 2.--Calculated from the date of Philippi which was late October -early November. see Special Note 30 .p.466). The march from Sardes to Philippi would take at least two months. (Cf. Gelzer P.1013) 4.--One cannot agree with Ferrero (III.p.166) that Brutus suffered in these years from gastric troubles. see p.264 note 1 .below.
task of controlling his large body of miscellaneous troops with the help of a staff little more professional than himself was difficult. In the circumstances it is not surprising that his sleep was disturbed and he suffered from hallucinations. Yet his courage was still high and he was still proudly convinced of the rectitude of his conduct. On the way to Philippi he wrote to Atticus and assured him that all was well with him. He was content with his choice either to be free or to die fighting for freedom. His cause was right and Antony was already punished for his folly, in that his name would be linked with tyrants instead of with the men of independence.

1. Plut. Brut. 36,4; 8,1; Caes.63,6-7. The story of these visions is too well known to bear recounting. One may, however, repeat that it was Shakespeare's genius which converted Brutus' visitant into Caesar's ghost. In Plutarch it is merely a phantom, claiming to be Brutus' evil genius. 2. Plut. Brut. 28,6, ἐκ ποτε κακέσοι πλησίασει. It is, of course, very possible that this letter, which Plutarch knew, was a forgery. Its subject matter and especially its accurate prognostication of a future struggle between Antony and Octavian may point that way. At the same time it fairly represents what, from the evidence of his conduct before and after this time, we would expect Brutus' sentiments to be; Valerius Maximus (VI,4,5) also mentions Brutus' preparedness to be victorious or die.
Towards the end of July Brutus and Cassius led their united forces from Sardis. With Asia completely subdued they met with no opposition and reached the Hellespont in September at Abydos. There they were joined by Tillius Climber with the small part of the fleet detailed for the crossing to Sestos. The crossing was made apparently without noteworthy incident and the army marched to Lysimacheia at the north end of the Chersonese. From there the usual route to Macedonia was along the coast through Aenos and Doriscus to Philippi, but they learned from their native ally Rhascouporis, that the two most important passes on the road were already in the hands of the enemy. As we have previously seen, Antony had anticipated any attempt to blockade Brundisium by sending over an advanced party of eight legions under the command of Norbanus Flaccus and Decidius Saxa, with a view to holding up the enemy advance as much as possible, and ensuring that the main body would on its arrival have the necessary territory to manoeuvre on and to establish a base of operations. This force had marched straight through Macedonia without opposition and into Thrace and before Brutus and Cassius arrived had taken up strong positions in two detachments - the forward one under Decidius in the Corpilan pass a few miles west of Doriscus and

- App. III, 87-88. (3.-1b. 87, cf. Dio. XLVII, 35, 2. Plut. Brut. 38, 1. both of which lack the details of Appian. (3.-Although Appian in IV, 87 init. mentions Decidius before Norbanus, as if he were the senior, and is followed in that by C.A.R.X. 32f. Rice Holmes A.R.E. pp. 81f. and Ferrero III, p. 195, it is evident from 103 init. 104 fin. and 108 that Appian really regarded Norbanus as the senior. Dio in XLVII, 35-6 uses each order twice, while Plut. (Brut. 39, 1) mentions only "Norbanus and his army." (4.-We must suppose that Hortensius had retreated before them. He was apparently in Macedonia, when Brutus left for Asia (pass above) but must have joined him again somewhere; for he fought at Philippi where he was captured and killed by Antony. (Plut. Brut. 28, 1) (Ant. 22) But according to Livy he committed suicide after Philippi.
the other under Norbanus in the Sapaean pass further west.

Brutus and Cassius were anxious to get as far on as they could with all possible speed; for the season was already far advanced. For that reason a circuitous route was undesirable and they suspected, moreover, that Norbanus had advanced more for the sake of food supplies than with the intention of holding up their much superior force so far from his commander-in-chief and the rest of the army. They decided therefore to push on by the normal route and, if the enemy forces seemed inclined to hold their positions, they hoped to compel them to retire by using the fleet of Tullius, with which the land forces from the coast-road could easily co-operate. From Lysimacheia they marched along the shores of the Gulf of Melas towards Aenos. After apparently one day's march they held a review of their combined forces. The testing time for them all was at hand and the enemy they had been gathered to oppose would soon be encountered. The review was meant to inspire the troops not only with confidence at the sight of their own multitude but also with loyalty; for the fear of desertion especially among the veterans of Caesar was always in the minds of the Republican leaders. Besides the usual harangues they distributed a handsome donative to each man. Brutus' army, we are told, far outshone the others in the splendour of its arms, for it was a deliberate policy of his to allow his men to use as much gold and silver in their actual equipment as they wished, though in other things he

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1. App. IV, 87:102 fin. For the position of these passes see Special Note 2B. page 397 ff. 2. According to Appian IV, 87 the alternative route, presumably on the north, was over difficult ground and three times as long. 3. Appian, or his text, in IV, 88 is obviously wrong, in placing Aenos and Maronea east of Lysimacheia and Cordia. 4. Appian IV, 88. 5. Appian ibid. 6. Plut. Brut. 38, 3. though only Octavian's is mentioned in the comparison.
frowned on excessive luxury. He believed that men would fight the harder to retain their precious arms, and apparently Caesar and Sertorius agreed with him. Mithridates, on the other hand, thought that costly equipment was as great an incentive to the enemy as to his own troops. One must suppose that Horace's 'little shield' was not of gold.

From the gulf of Melas they pushed on past Aenos to Doriscus, where because of the proximity of Mt. Serrheion to the sea their road bent inland. Just beyond the town they encountered Decidius as they had expected. Immediately their plan was put into action and, while the main body of the army remained on the road before the pass, one legion with some archers boarded the ships of Cimber and sailed along the coast. It is unlikely that they intended to land the troops immediately beyond the Corpilan pass in order to attack Decidius in the rear; for that manoeuvre would have rendered the legion exposed itself to attack on its rear from Norbanus. It was little more than a demonstration and they hoped, by showing the enemy that they did have a means of passing them, to dislodge them without further effort from both of their positions. They were only partly successful. As soon as Norbanus saw the fleet rounding Cape Serrheion, he realised the need to concentrate his forces and summoned Decidius to his own position at the Sapean pass. The Republican army immediately pushed on through the vacant Corpilan pass and Cimber proceeded further along the coast, but, when they came near to the enemy's second position, it became obvious

that Norbanus was not frightened by their demonstration. He realised that the fleet was not large enough to carry sufficient troops to attack him in the rear and his position, with eight legions to hold it, was impregnable.

Now that their manoeuvre by sea had failed Brutus and Cassius had to reconsider their position. They were for obvious reasons unwilling to retrace their steps and take after all the longer route, and it was not worth the almost certain risk of failure to attack the enemy's position. To pass between him and the sea was impossible and the only alternative left was a march through the mountains on the north. Rhascouporis told them that these mountains had never been traversed; they were very rocky, there was a very thick forest covering them and there was no water. However he considered it possible to cross them, if a path were cut through the forest and if they carried their water with them. He calculated that they would need enough water for three days and that on the fourth they should reach a river at a point, from which one day's easy march would take them to Philippi. Thus in five days, if they were willing to undergo the hardships of the journey, they would round the enemy's position and cut off his retreat into Macedonia. It was decided to make the attempt. An advanced party was sent ahead under L. Bibulus with Rhascouporis as guide to cut a way through the forest.

For three days they laboured at their very difficult task, and the fourth day was nearly ended and their water supply

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1. I disagree with Kromayer (Näch.411,468) who thinks that Brutus' fleet could have taken all his men on board. If that had been the case surely Brutus would have tried to land a force behind the enemy. The crossing of the Hellespont, where the fleet did carry the whole army, must have been made, as it easily could, in several convoys. (2-App.IV,103. (3.-ibid. 104. Bibulus, being his step-son, was probably an officer of Brutus; and it is noteworthy that, despite the superior reputation of Cassius' men in practical campaigning, (see p.210 above) this advanced party was apparently supplied by Brutus.
nearly exhausted, when they reached the river their guide had spoken of. Their complaints and suspicions of Rhascouporis turned to shouts of triumph and joy. The rest of their large army followed behind. Meanwhile Norbanus, although confident in the safety of his position, had sent Rhascus, the brother of Rhascouporis, who with true oriental cunning had ensured that his family would serve the winning side by joining in with Antony's men, to discover where the enemy had made for and how they were faring. Rhascus, either by an instinctive ability to anticipate his brother's moves or by some more mundane means of securing information, had guessed where the Republicans march, if successful, would take them to, and he was near enough to Bibulus' army when they reached the river, to hear their shouts. Immediately he hastened back to warn Norbanus and the latter succeeded in withdrawing his whole force before the Republicans reached the road. He retreated to Amphipolis and took up a new position there, while Brutus and Cassius descended unhindered to the plain of Philippi.

We should have expected Brutus and Cassius to pursue the retreating force of Norbanus at once in order to force him into an engagement, before the rest of Antony's army could come up. That they did not do so is best explained by the supposition, suggested by Appian, that they learned soon after they reached Philippi that Antony was already on his way to join his advanced guard, and after the rigours of their long march the Republican army must have needed some rest before proceeding. Moreover, at Philippi Brutus and Cassius found a position almost...
ideally suitable for their purpose and they decided not to go beyond it. The plain of Philippi was a fitting arena for the last struggle of the Roman Republic. More fertile and beautiful than most of the plains of Greece, it was redolent with mythology and history. It was there that Pluto had carried off Persephone to be his bride; Dionysus was connected with it and - by then hardly less superhuman than he - Philip and Alexander of Macedon. It had the shape of a huge natural arena: "The foothills of the Sunitza Planina and Pangaeum approach near Angista leaving only a narrow passage.... From here the plain extends in a rectangular shape sharply defined and rigidly limited on every side by mountain barriers. The southern end of the plain is cut off from the sea by a ridge of hills, the Symbolon of antiquity, which overhangs Kavalla and Leftera Bay. So marked is the barrier that the waters of Pangaeum that descend to the plain on the north east side of the mountain find no route to the sea and form a small shallow lake. The road from Philippi to Kavala has to ascend to the height of some 500 feet before it can descend again to the sea level at the port."

The positions adopted by Brutus and Cassius and indeed the whole course of the battles present little difficulty, except in a few details, to the historian. Appian has given a remarkably accurate and feasible account both of the site and the various manoeuvres and it has been possible to indentify

1. L. S. Casson. Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria (O.U.P. 1926) p.8. The accompanying sketch map is from the same book (fig. 5) and gives a splendid idea of the basin-like nature of the plain.

On p. 25 Casson says that the existence of the lake (Berebeth Geul) in ancient times is uncertain and may be due to the blocking up of some through the ridge of hills above Kavalla. (2. IV, 105-6.)
his details on the ground with very little alteration. He says
that Brutus and Cassius pitched their camps on two hills about
eighteen stades from Philippi and some eight stades from each
other, Brutus on the northern hill, Cassius on the southern.
Brutus' position was protected on the open right flank by the
impassable trackless gorges of the mountains, and Cassius' on
the left by the marshes and ponds. They connected the two
camps with a fortification built alongside the River Gangas or
Gangites. Their fleet was stationed at Neapolis (modern,
Kavalla) and the island of Thasos opposite was their supply-
base. The details of the description were identified by
Hearne without much difficulty, and his variations from Appian
especially in distances are not great. Cassius' camp he
fixed without any doubt on the hill Madjyar Tepe just north
of the marsh; he describes this hill as large and rounded
with a flat top, 32 metres in height with a diameter of about
500 metres. The top of the hill is not large enough to have
held all of Cassius' forces, but it is reasonable to suppose
that they spread down the slope and even on to the plain behind
and to the north of the hill. Between this hill and the
marsh is a lesser eminence - Kutchuk Tepe - which also features
in the manoeuvres of the campaign. The site of Brutus' camp
cannot be so accurately fixed, for despite Appian's description
of it as being, like that of Cassius, on a λόφος, there is no
such hill in the neighbourhood. Appian has here obviously

(I. Casson (op. cit. p. 274) thinks Appian's description so vivid
"that it almost suggests autopsy." From one or two mistakes,
however, especially his ignorance of the position of the
Symbolon and his idea that the marshes at the south side of
the plain extended right to the sea (IV, 105 and 107 fin) I
deduces that he had not actually seen the place himself. His
description is probably derived from the account of some officer
who had taken part in the battle. e.g. Messalla or Volumnius.
C. Mission Archeologique de Macédoine. Paris, 1876. pp. 101-
9.)
sacrificed accuracy for symmetry of diction and Brutus' camp must be placed somewhere on the footslopes of Panaghir Dagh. According to Appian the camps were only eight stades apart but if we accept this distance it would necessitate the placing of Brutus' camp in the plain. Heuzey places it on the slopes due north from Cassius' camp just above where the Bannarbach stream - the ancient Gangas or Gangites - bends southward towards the marsh. This position is rather more than Appian's eight stades from Cassius on Madjiyar Tepe, but we have to remember that the camps would spread considerably into the plain towards one another. There are traces of the fortification which, Appian says, joined the camps, in the obviously ancient *levée de terre,* which runs from a spot some 125 metres from Cassius' hill due north to the road - the ancient Via Egnatia. There are no traces of it beyond the road, which might have helped to site Brutus' camp, as the land north of the road has been under cultivation.

These positions Brutus and Cassius began to fortify at once. They kept to separate camps to make discipline easier to maintain among their motley throng, but, to make communication safe between them, they built the rampart from one camp to the other. Their position was very favourable especially for a struggle, in which they did not intend to take the initiative. In front they were protected by the stream of the Gangas and by their own rampart. Their flanks were guarded on the right.

1. One obvious error in Heuzey's map is his siting of the peak of Panaghir Dagh. He places it too far North and West. Actually it lies about midway between Rache and Bunar Bashi. see the British War Office map of Turkey (1:250,000) Geographical Section G.S. No.2097. (Gumuljina and Salonika Sheets) which is based on the G.S. Map of Austria 1907. (2. On this point I think Kromayer has been too ready to accept Appian's distances. On his map Brutus' camp appears to be so far into the plain as to leave a gap between it and the hills. (3. Heuzey, op.cit.pp. 103 ff. 4.-App. IV,106. Dio xlvii,36,6.
by the mountains and on the left by the marsh, from the other side of which an impassable mountain range ran down to the sea. Their supplies on Thasos were safely guarded by the fleet stationed in the bay of Neapolis, from which the line of communication to the camps was equally safe. The Gangas supplied them with water in plenty and good dry fuel was available in the hills behind them.

Sooner than they had expected Antony arrived. With great daring and no little good luck he and Octavian had succeeded in piercing the partial blockade of Marcus at Brundisium. At Dyrrachium Octavian had been too ill to proceed and Antony had pushed on with his own legions making all speed to save his advanced party under Norbanus from having to face the large Republican army unsupported. Finding it safe at Amphipolis, he decided to push on still further and leaving his supplies at that city, protected by one legion under Pinarius, he advanced to the plain of Philippis. There he settled down in face of the enemy to await Octavian. The latter was afraid to remain more than a few days at Dyrrachium; for he realised that, if Antony fought the Republicans without him, the battle would tell against himself, no matter what the result was. Antony's defeat would leave him to face a much stronger enemy alone and a victory for Antony would increase his power and prestige beyond his own. He joined Antony ten days after the latter's arrival: They were left with no alternative but to pitch their camp in the plain, a position which had as many disadvantages as their opponents' had advantages: They had

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5. Ibid. xlvii, 37, 2.
6. Ibid. 37, 3.
7. Ibid. 38, 3.
8. Ibid. 107.
9. Ibid. 107. 5. Heuzey (p. 158) admits the impossibility of fixing the site of their camp exactly but suggests that they occupied an undulation in the plain, rather higher than the surrounding ground just north of the modern farm of Bohonasa. App. IV, 107. 30 διαὶ ταῦτα ἕνεκα ὁδηγοῦ does suggest some slight elevation.
no natural protection either in front or on the flanks, except for the marsh on their right. Their base of supplies at Amphipolis was many miles distant; water could only be obtained by digging wells and such fuel as the marsh provided was meagre and damp; even the soil they were encamped on was wet and unhealthy. Unlike their opponents they kept their two armies close together, Antony on the right of their large camp facing Cassius, with Octavian opposing Brutus:

In numbers there was no great disparity between the two armies. Both had nineteen legions, but those of the Republicans were mostly understrength so that their full total of trained infantrymen was only 80,000; if anything the triumvirs' legions were overstrength and must have totalled about 110,000 men. The advantage in cavalry, however, lay on the other side; Antony and Octavian had 13,000, Brutus and Cassius between them 20,000 mounted troops, of whom 4,000 were archers; the latter also had auxiliary footsoldiers from Galatia. There were many different nationalities among them, Gauls, Spaniards, Thracians, Thessalians, Macedonians, Illyrians, Arabs, Medes, Persians and even Parthians.

For the struggle that was to settle the future of the Roman state was of worldwide interest.

Brutus and Cassius saw - and it was obvious enough - that their best policy was to avoid a real battle. Their own position was, with ordinary carefulness, impregnable. They had free access to their supplies and, with the sea entirely to

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\[\text{L.\textsuperscript{1}}\text{c.\textsuperscript{1}}\text{App.\textsuperscript{2}}\text{IV,\textsuperscript{1}}\text{107} \text{and 108. Dio I.c.\textsuperscript{4}}\text{4. (2.-App. III,\textsuperscript{8}}\text{4. 88:79:92: IV,3:75:98:107:108:V,6. Dio xlvii,37,6,39,2. Plut. Brut. 36,3:76,4. Rice Holmes A.R.E. pp.217f. has an excellent note on the Triumvirs' forces. For those of the Republicans see Special Note,3\text{plebelow. (3.-App.IV,88. Both Brutus and Cassius had Parthian cavalry, but they could not have been many in number, for Labepus, the envoy to Parthia, never rejoined Brutus and Cassius. App.V,65:133. Dio. xlvii,34,4-5.sqq.}]


themselves, there was no danger of the supplies giving out. Their opponents were in exactly the opposite case. Since Sextus Pompey and Marcus had complete control of the western seas no food or supplies of any kind could reach them from Italy or Sicily, Spain or Africa; even in Egypt where they might have looked for help there was a shortage of food and the Egyptian fleet, even if it had wished to reach them, had suffered too severely in a storm some weeks before to make the attempt. Thus they were forced to depend for food on Macedonia and Thessaly and both these countries were nearly exhausted. Moreover their unhealthy position in marshy ground and the approaching rigours of winter made it necessary for them to have the campaign ended as soon as possible. There was yet another consideration. Sextus Pompey, who was already in possession of most of Sicily, might attack Italy, and, if he achieved any success against Lepidus there, he could depend upon plenty of support against the triumvirs among those, who had suffered in the proscriptions. Nevertheless, no matter how anxious Antony and Octavian might be to press for a quick settlement, it was obvious that they had little chance of success in an assault on the enemy’s position and they could not lure the whole of their forces from behind their walls. The usual cavalry skirmishes took place with the usual lack of decisive result; if anything Brutus’ men were the more successful. Meantime both parties paid attention to their artificial defences. Antony to compensate for his camp’s lack of natural protection surrounded it with a strong rampart of the usual sort and raised also numerous towers. The Republicans completed the

system of walls already described and Cassius added to it by building another wall from his post on the Kutchuk Tepe into the marsh - a narrow space which hitherto he had neglected presumably because it could be adequately defended by the piquet on the hillock. Now they had a continuous line of fortifications stretching from the hills on the right to the marsh on the left, and in complete confidence in their impregnable-ability they seem to have grown rather careless.

All along it had been obvious that the left was their weaker flank, indeed their only weak spot; perhaps that was why Cassius, as the more skilful general, took post there and perhaps for the same reason Antony, who by his earlier arrival had the choice, had encamped nearer to Cassius leaving Brutus and his trackless gorges to Octavian. In an attempt to force the issue Antony decided on what was in truth a foolhardy and practically impossible task. The only way, in which the Republicans could be forced into a battle, was by cutting them off from their fleet and food supply on the sea. The road to these passed about a mile and a half behind Cassius' camp and the only access to it unbarred by an enemy wall was through the marsh. Antony undertook the task of building a road there almost under Cassius' nose. Each day he drew up his army in full battle order before his camp to hold the attention of the enemy opposite, while a party of sappers worked day and night constructing a causeway in the marsh. Cassius' men - even if we allow that he was justified, by the improbability of Antony's manoeuvre, in not patrolling the marsh regularly - cannot escape censure for
not having noticed this activity at once from their position on Kutchuk Tepe beside the marsh. It is true that Antony's men had good cover from view among the reeds but their task was of such difficulty, involving the carrying of stones for the causeway and piles to stiffen the softer parts of the morass, that they should not have been allowed, as they were, to work unobserved for ten days. By that time they had succeeded in carrying their roadway right past Cassius' line of fortifications. On the tenth night Antony sent out a body of troops, who occupied the key positions along this roadway and hastily but silently built a series of redoubts. Next morning Cassius saw at once what they had done and what their intentions were. He replied to their manoeuvre with an imitation of it, continuing the rampart he had already built to the edge of the marsh right into it and up to Antony's wall, thus cutting off those of the enemy, who were east of his own line, from their comrades. Whether this was done in one night does not appear from the ancient account; but it seems that Antony in his turn remained ignorant of their activity until their cross wall was completed.

Meanwhile in the camp of Brutus and Cassius a change of attitude towards the question of a battle had taken place. All along there had been a large number, especially among the allies, who wanted a real battle: and as the days of dreary waiting slowly passed, others began to share their desire. Cassius almost alone seems to have had the great patience needed for a policy of continuous inactivity. Most of the other officers were young men, inexperienced in warfare and impetuously confident in their ability to defeat the enemy in open battle. This feeling of superiority had been increased by the different manner, in which the two sides had celebrated their lustrations.

1.-It is, however, probable; the distance was not great and Cassius' wall would be a simple enough structure. (2.-Plut. Brut. 38,1-2. Dio xlvii, 38,4: 40,7.)
The triumvirs had held theirs, contrary to the accepted practice, within their camp and for their sacrifices had issued to the men only some meal and five drachmas each. The Republicans, on the other hand, conducted the ceremony in the open field and sacrificed a large number of cattle; to each man they gave 50 drachmas. Even Brutus was feeling the strain of waiting; he had not any of the detached impersonal attitude towards war, which is necessary in a commander, and was, even before this campaign started, in a distraught state of mind. The continued waiting behind walls aggravated his nervousness and he came to feel, that an immediate settlement of their fate was preferable to the nerve-racking idleness of the past few weeks. He found, moreover, specious reasons for taking the initiative. They had, he argued with Cassius, every reason to expect victory. They had lately been showing a marked superiority in the cavalry skirmishes and their advantage in cavalry would balance the enemy’s more numerous infantry. The ground, moreover, was in their favour for attack as well as for defence; for it sloped gently down from their lines, just enough to give their assault a greater impetus than the enemy could hope for. Besides, their whole army was being adversely affected by waiting. The allied troops were impatiently threatening to disband and desert them unless an early decision were come to, and some desertions had already occurred. Even the Roman legionaries were showing signs of nervousness especially over the number of bad omens which had visited them. For all his military skill and his conviction that delay was

their best policy, Cassius, with his fatal inability to withstand Brutus' arguments, was persuaded much against his will: the decision was made, apparently on the very night when Cassius' cross wall was being completed, to offer battle on the following day. Both leaders spent the eve of the battle dining with their most intimate friends and, whereas Cassius, contrary to his wont, was gloomy and silent, Brutus was full of good spirits, as always when he had reached a final decision, and took the lead in a philosophical discussion such as he loved:

In the morning arrangements were made with considerable leisure but Brutus at last led his forces from their camp and drew them up in line before it. Cassius was just in process of doing the same, when about the middle of the day Antony saw that his opponent had managed with his crosswall to counter his plans and that all the ingenuity, labour and carefulness of the past ten days had gone for nothing. In desperation, perhaps more from sheer bad temper than with any deliberate design, he suddenly, without consulting Octavian, led his whole

1. Plut. Brut. 39,4-6 (who, nevertheless, says l.c.2 that for all his Epicurean doctrines Cassius too was affected by the series of ill-omens.) Dio (xlvi,40,7-8) says that Brutus was as unwilling as Cassius to fight. Gelzer (P.W.X p.1019) thinks that Brutus did not urge Cassius to fight, as Plutarch says he did, because (a) that is not mentioned by Appian or Dio and (b) Brutus' later behaviour before the second battle, when he tried to hold off from fighting, suggests a similar policy before the first. Plutarch, however, is obviously using on account by Messalla (cf. sec. 40,1) and he can hardly be wrong in such a point of importance to him as Brutus' biographer; his attitude of heroworship towards Brutus makes it very unlikely that he would have attributed the blame of offering battle to him, unless the authority for it was incontestable. Gelzer's two reasons are easily explained (a) Appian and Dio do not explicitly deny Plutarch's account, but are not interested enough in Brutus as an individual to recount his personal feelings; (b) Brutus' policy of delay before the second battle came, after he had learned his lesson in the first battle. Gelzer further suggests that Cassius' sole reason gor giving battle was fear of Antony's activities in the marsh and Perrero (III, p.203) thinks this was part of his reason. But Cassius had completely frustrated Antony's attempts. (App.IV,109 fin. 110 init.).

2. Plut. Brut. 39,6. Dio xlvi,38,5. For an explanation of the apparent discrepancies between the versions of Plutarch and Appian of the decision to fight and the beginning of the battle see Special Note.73 p.405.

3. Plut. Brut. 40,1-2 (4.-It was about October 2nd see Special Note30 pp.4066).-Ibid. 3-6 on the authority of Messalla:cf. 2 and 6.-App.IV,110.
force in an assault on Cassius' line between his camp and the
marsh. They charged vigorously across the short space between
the camps and, although the slight slope of the ground was
against them, they reached their objective before Cassius and
his men, astonished at the suddenness and audacity of their
assault, were properly prepared to receive them. Brutus'
forces, on the right, when they saw the beginning of this
unlooked for and almost impudent attack, without waiting for
orders from their general, who was engaged in a final review
of his ranks, dashed down to the plain where, as they could
not meet the assaulting force: face to face - for they were
moving diagonally across their front - they merely grazed
their flank, killing many men in the process, and allowed
their own impetus to carry them on to the triumvirs' camp.
Thus almost simultaneously both the lines of fortification
were attacked at their left ends. Antony's impetuosity drove
back part of Cassius' line against the wall and rushing on he
led a vigorous assault on the defences. Cassius was unable
to rally his men properly from their first shock of surprise
and, while the main part of each army engaged in a hand to
hand struggle before the wall, Antony succeeded in piercing
it at several places. All this happened so quickly that,
when the party of Republicans, who had been working in the
marsh, reached the scene of the struggle, the enemy were
already within the walls. These sappers were driven back
into the marsh again and Antony, wheeling left, assaulted the
camp from the flank: It had very few defenders inside it and

account of the battle is mere rhetoric (xlvii, 42-44). 3.-Plut.
Brut. 42, 2. App. IV, III. 4.-App. I. c. The story, mentioned by
Plutarch (Brut. 42, 3 and Ant. 22, 3) and Florus (II, 17, 10), that
Antony fled from the field at the start of the battle and hid in
the marsh, has all the appearance of a later invention of his
political opponents. Appian and Dio do not mention it but
give him (especially Appian) the chief credit for his wing's
success. The dash and foolhardiness of the attempt is very
typical of the headstrong Antony.
was easily taken. When Cassius' men, who were faring none too well in the fight in front, saw that their camp was in the hands of the enemy, they broke and fled in complete disorder. Thereupon Antony's men too went completely out of control and proceeded to plunder the camp. Their general could not reorganise them and had to leave them to return to their camp, when they were willing.

Meanwhile in the opposite corner of the battlefield the same thing had happened. Here Octavian's men like Cassius', although drawn up like the other three armies outside their camp, were taken by complete surprise and their leader was actually not with them. They were immediately routed and their camp entered. Brutus like Antony had lost all control of his men - indeed he had had none since the beginning of their attack - and they too started to plunder the enemy's camp. With all the running to and fro and with the great amount of dust which their movements had raised on the broad plain, Brutus was completely ignorant of how his colleague had fared. As soon as the success of his own assault was assured, he sent a party to inform Cassius and to find out what had happened on his wing. The unlucky Cassius had retired to a piece of elevated ground somewhere near Philippi and there, with amazing lack of patience and common sense, had committed suicide. Whether his hasty act was caused by the news of Brutus' success after his own dismal failure or by sheer despair

and dejection at the feeble effort he and his troops had made after two whole years of preparation, cannot be decided. After their desire for plunder was sated, Brutus' men returned, like Antony's to their own camp.

The afternoon's fighting made little alteration in the situation; neither side was even appreciably nearer to victory. Although both lines had been pierced and damage done in both camps neither side had held its advantage and by evening both armies were back in their former positions. The triumvirs had lost twice as many men as the Republicans - 16,000 compared with 8,000 - but, when Messalla claims a victory for the latter on these grounds and because he had taken three eagles and many lesser standards without losing any, we have to remember that they had suffered the most serious loss of all by the death of Cassius. From beginning to end the battle was complete confusion and, considering the occasion of it and the issue that depended upon it, the antagonists on both sides gave a poor account of themselves: All four leaders were guilty of serious faults. Of the defeated pair, Octavian, even allowing for his illness, showed none of the fortitude to be looked for in a future Emperor of Rome, while Cassius, despite the unexpectedness of Antony's assault, should have been able to make a better effort to check it and he was certainly too ready to accept defeat and too quick to despair after it. Antony had been guilty of the gravest fault in launching an attack without consulting his colleague and even the success he gained was due entirely to his dashing audacity and the luck that so
often accompanied it: only his success justified the risk he took. That, however, is typical of Antony; more surprising is the utter lack of control he had over his men, when once they entered the enemy's camp. There was, in fact, no discipline anywhere in the battle, and least of all, perhaps, in Brutus' army. His men had attacked without orders and, even though he had contrived to keep among them, he was, like Antony, unable to make further use of them when their first objective was taken. Had he managed to reorganise them and lead them against Antony's plunderers, victory would have been almost certain. But the same might be said of Antony.

To Brutus alone now fell the difficult task of controlling a huge, motley and ill-disciplined army of some 100,000 men. His first task was to arrange for the burial of Cassius. He was genuinely upset and saddened by Cassius' death and the unhappy manner of it. He and his brother-in-law, despite the quarrels and disagreements that arose between them almost inevitably from the differences in their character and outlook, had for nearly three years been working for their cause diligently, unselfishly and for the most part in harmony. Brutus had much for which to thank his more soldierly and forthright colleague; and he knew that now his presence would be greatly missed. His despairing suicide seemed to impress on Brutus the hopelessness of their struggle and it was in anticipation of the Republic's fall that he called him "last of the Romans." The body he ordered to be taken secretly to Thasos for burial there; for a public funeral before the soldiers would have caused too much grief among them. The

whole night after the battle Brutus spent, without food or rest, rallying the scattered forces of Cassius and at last managed to gather most of them back into their camp. Many of them had been old soldiers of Caesar held together mainly by their respect for Cassius as a soldier and to ensure their continued loyalty Brutus promised them 2,000 drachmas per man to compensate for their losses in the destruction of the camp. He also removed his own headquarters to Cassius' camp partly perhaps to encourage the defeated troops, but more because he realised that the left flank was still the weak spot in his defences and that the enemy were bound still to concentrate upon it. His own army remained in their own camp.

On the morning after the battle Antony and his men, who had at first been thoroughly dejected by their failure to force a decision, were heartened by the news, brought apparently by a deserting servant Demetrius by name, of the death of Cassius. They knew him to be their enemy's best leader and their hopes at once revived. Antony led them out in battle order before their camp, and Brutus, to avoid the semblance of defeat, led his men out also: No fighting, however, took place and both armies returned within their defences to receive a harangue from their generals: Both leaders promised increased rewards for a victory and Brutus, we are told, so far forgot his reputation for humane warfare as to promise his men the cities of Thessalonica and Sparta for booty:

1. App. IV, 114. 2. Plut., Brut. 44, 2. Dio xlvi, 47, 2. 3. Dio xlvi, 47, 2. implied perhaps in App. IV, 121. 4. Plut., Brut. 45, 1. cf. App. IV, 119. med. 5. Plut., l.c. 2. App. IV, 114. 6. App. IV, 117-120. cf. Plut., Brut. 46, 1. 7. Ibid. Plutarch admits this as true whereas Appian gives it as the account of others. (118 fin.) We have no means of deciding whether it was true or not. It contrasts greatly with his reputed conduct in Asia (see pp. 207f.), but he was now in desperate straits and may well have stopped to desperate methods. Again I feel that Plutarch would not give the story except on good authority. Tyrrell and Purser (vol. vii. p. CXIII, note 107) and Gelzer (P. W. X. p. 1016) remark that these cities had probably both been hostile to the Republican. It is true that 2,000 Spartans were serving in Octavian's army (Plutarch, Brutus 44, 4: not Antony's army as T. & F. say) and we may presume that Thessalonica had been willy-nilly helping the Triumvirs also.
The policies of the opposing generals were again what they had been at the start of the struggle. The triumvirs had more reason than ever to desire a decisive battle; the battle had in no way altered their plight but rather intensified their discomfort. Macedonia and Thessaly were now almost stripped of their resources and there was a real danger of famine.

Antony had to send a legion as far as Greece to gather food wherever possible. Their camp had been destroyed and, even after it was rebuilt, they were made more uncomfortable by rains and frost. To add to their troubles news reached them of the defeat and destruction of a fleet under Domitius Cælenus, carrying two legions and other forces across the Adriatic. It had been met by Murcus and Enobarbus with a vastly superior fleet and completely overwhelmed. Tradition says that this battle was fought on the same day as the first battle of Philippi. Antony and Octavian were troubled also by fear of desertsions and some actually did take place, among the German auxiliaries. Brutus, on the other hand, now saw clearly that delay was his best card. He had learned from the narrow escape of the first battle that the risk of defeat was not worth it.

1. App. IV, 117 fin. 122 init. Dio xlvi, 47, 4. 2. App. IV, 122. 3. Plut. Brut. 47, 3. App. IV, 122 med. 4. Plut. Brut. 47, 2-3 App. IV, 115–118: 122 med. Dio xlvi, 47, 4–5. These authorities disagree as to whether or not Brutus knew of this victory before the second battle was fought at Philippi. Plutarch says roundly that he did not or else he would not have allowed the second battle to go on; he even says that on the day before the battle a deserter, Clodius, from the Triumvirs’ camp brought the news to Brutus’ army, but was disbelieved and not allowed even to talk to the general. Appian (122 med) on the other hand, says that the news had reached both armies (εἰς ἑαυτῶν ῶν δὲ τοῦτο), which cannot, surely, mean the armies of Antony and Octavian. Dio, again, says that the Triumvirs were very anxious to have a decisive battle before news of the sea-fight should spread among their own men and the enemy, but he does not indicate whether they were successful. Most modern writers, without comment, think that Brutus must have known of it. The matter, however, is not, I think, of such importance as Plutarch seems to have thought. It seems hardly possible that the rumour could fail to spread from one camp to the other, but even if Brutus did hear it, it told him no more than he already knew—that his fleet was supreme even in the Adriatic. 5. Dio xlvi, 48, 3. 6. App. IV, 117–118: 121 init. Dio xlvi, 47, 3: 48, 1.
running and he made his decision not to fight, but to wait for
cold and hunger to win his victory for him. But he showed
plenty of vigour and resourcefulness too. It was better for
himself and his men, that they should have something to do and
he tried to improve their spirits, while destroying those of
the enemy, by frequent assaults on the latter's camp especially
by night; and once he diverted the course of the river, so that
it swept away part of the camp. To protect his communications
with the sea, which was his chief tactical concern, he stationed
part of his army in piquets along the road.

After leading his men out daily in battle order for some
days without result 1, Antony had to return to his former tactics —
for there was nothing else he could do — and try to force
Brutus to fight by threatening the road to the sea. He had
this time, however, thanks to a serious mistake on Brutus' part,
more chance of success. On the hill, Kutchuk Tepe, just south
of Cassius' camp Brutus had not placed an outpost, imagining
doubtless that it could be easily enough rendered untenable for
the enemy by arrow fire from the camp. The triumvirs decided
to seize it and use it as a base, from which to work eastwards.
During the night four of Octavian's legions occupied it and,
protecting themselves against Brutus' arrows with fences of
wickerwork and skins, they managed to erect a more stable means
of defence. Under their cover ten legions were pushed round
the south side of the hill to a position five furlongs beyond,
where they encamp just north of the marsh; and two more legions
were able to move four furlongs further east. Here they had
reached within about two and a half miles of the road to the
sea, but they could get no nearer to it. Brutus replied to

1.-Dio xlvi, 47, 3. (2.-App. IV, 121, init. (3.-ibid. (4.-App. IV, 121.
their manoeuvre by extending a line of defence and building a series of forts, opposite and parallel to this new line of the enemy. Though the historians do not say so, we must assume that he extended his line beyond theirs and then southwards so as to cut them off from the road. Thus the armies adopted quite new positions facing North and South instead of East and West, but Antony was no nearer to forcing a battle. In fact it is to be noted that his new position was exceedingly dangerous for himself. Lying only a matter of yards north of the marsh, he had absolutely no line of retreat at all and a vigorous assault might have driven his men back into the difficulties of the morass. The movement, however, is but another example of Antony's foolhardiness.

Had Brutus been strong enough to hold to his own conviction and abide by the decision not to fight, he would certainly have won the campaign. But gradually the firmness of purpose, which had always characterised him, was worn down. His camp was full of trouble and discord. Much of it had its root in the discontent of Cassius' men: the jealousy, which we have noted already between the two parts of the Republican army, had not been diminished by their joint service and it is easy to imagine Brutus' men, after their success against Octavian, taunting those of Cassius - professedly the superior soldiers - for their defeat by Antony. Cassius' men were soured and dispirited. But Brutus' troops were, for different reasons equally troublesome. Their success in the first battle made them all the more unwilling to wait for famine to do what they thought they could do themselves at one blow. They murmured against their general's inactivity and were critical of his orders and slow to obey them. Brutus had never achieved

1.-see Henzy op.cit.p.112. (2.-Plut. Brut.45,3:45,5.
3.-App.IV,123.)
anything like true military discipline in his army for, where Cassius had been general enough to give an order and say no more, Brutus had always been inclined to give his men reasons for his decisions. And now they wanted to argue with him. He sought to avoid the possibility of being forced to act against his will by a united demand from them by holding no further assemblies, in which such a demand could be expressed. He had himself become quite despondent, broken in strength, tired of his distasteful life and indifferent to his fate. His mental weariness is shown by the trouble he had over the prisoners taken in the first battle. There were too many of these to be adequately guarded and Brutus decided to rid his camp of them. The slaves he put to death and dismissed the freedmen, doing so secretly because they were bitterly hated by some of his own men. Trouble, however, was caused by two of them especially Volumnius and Sarchulio, ill-bred scoundrels who used abusive and insulting language towards their captors especially about the dead Cassius. Brutus' officers were deepiy affronted and hauled the pair before their general, who was at the time engrossed in other matters. In his presence a debate began as to how they should be treated. Messalla facetiously proposed that they be publicly whipped and sent back naked to their camp. This suggestion caused some laughter and Casca, honest and blunt, rebuked them for their mirth when their dead general had been insulted, and demanded that Brutus, as was his duty, pass judgment upon the captives. In exasperation Brutus pettily used the oldest and poorest shift in the world "Why push this business on to me? Do whatever you please": so different from his attitude towards prisoners eighteen months before. Even among his officers he had no real control and it was one of his misfortunes that, himself

only an amateur soldier with neither liking nor aptitude for his task, he had no professionals of any standing among his advisers. His officers were mainly young and headstrong and even though they appreciated the reasons for his policy of waiting, they nevertheless kept urging him to give battle again. He should use, they argued, the willing spirit of his men while it was there and, even if they did not win, they would still have their walls to retire to and no harm would be done. Arguments of this kind gradually wore down his powers of resistance and it became a definite apprehension for him that, if he delayed longer, he would have wholesale desertions and mutiny in his camp. For since the failure of his attempt to reach the road Antony had tried other means to lure Brutus into battle. Pamphlets were distributed among his troops urging them to desert; and two leaders, at least, did desert, Amyntas the general of Deiotarus and Rhascoupolis the Sapaean, both valued allies: Antony's men advanced daily right up to the ramparts of Brutus' position and from there hurled abuse and insults on his men, taunting them with cowardice and challenging them to fight like soldiers. Brutus' men were obviously more and more affected by these tactics and murmured more and more openly against his refusal to fight until at last, fearing an open mutiny, he gave in and consented to lead them forth.

1.-App. IV,124 init. (2.-Dio xlvi,48,1. (3.-ibid. (4.-App. IV, 122 fin. (5.-App. IV,124. Dio xlvi, 43,2. Appian's story that, after announcing his decision, Brutus compared himself with Pompey at Pharsalus is given by Plutarch of Cassius before the first battle (Brut. 40,2). The latter, from his use of Messalla as a source, is probably correct. Kromayer (op.cit. col.117) and Rice Holmes (A.R.E.I,p.87 notes 3-4) suggest that Brutus was moved to his decision, less by fear of desertion than of Antony's cutting through his line of communication; but it seems certain from the ancient authorities that Antony's attempts to do so had completely failed and had been abandoned. cf. especially App. IV,122,
Even allowing that delay was Brutus' best policy, there would still have been every reason for him to hope for success in a battle, if he had taken his fate in his hands and risked a daring assault, such as Antony had made in the first battle. As then the advantages of the ground were all - even more so now than before with the Republicans. They still had the slope running from them to the enemy and behind the enemy was the marsh. But Brutus was too cautious and, because he fought against his will, he did not fight with any abandon. When he led his men out before their fortifications; he himself took charge of his own troops again on the right wing and his main concern was to protect his camp on Madjyar Tepe; a force was left inside it and his men were ordered not to go far from his wall, so that, in case of failure in the battle, they should still have a safe retreat wherein to continue the campaign. The idea of defeat was apparently uppermost in his mind, whereas had he realised his good chances of success by a wholehearted attack without thought of defence he might easily have won. And, in any case, even if he managed to hold his camp in the event of an unsuccessful battle, of what avail would it have been once Antony managed to reach the road to the sea? On the left wing Cassius' men were placed as before, but we are not told who their new commander was. It may have been Messalla, who seems to have been one of Cassius' foremost assistants, but, on the other hand, he was young and the accounts of his intimacy with Cassius, whom he certainly admired, are from his own pen. If failing to plan a really vigorous attack was Brutus' first error in the battle, his second was made by extending the left wing further than its

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1.-The second battle was fought on October 23rd, 42 B.C. see Special Note .30 p.Aoste-2.-App.IV,125 init. 3.-L. Bibulus was another senior officer. App.IV,104:139.
strength justified. Presumably his idea was to prevent Antony, who again was to occupy the triumvirs' right, from working round the left flank and securing a position on the road, but the extension left them weak in the middle. As he rode along the ranks, Brutus was rather dismayed to observe that some of his troops showed little enthusiasm for the fight. The allied cavalry were especially apathetic and seemed inclined to hang back until they should see how the infantry fared. Meanwhile the triumvirs were in the same way arranging their forces and this time their generals took care to consult together and to have a thorough understanding of what their different tasks should be. On their left Octavian was to tackle Brutus - it was his troops who were on Kutchuk Tepe - and when they had succeeded in driving back the enemy - how different their attitude was from that of Brutus! he was to attend especially to the main camp opposite him, to close its gates, bottling up the troops within it and preventing the others from gaining admission, while Antony continued the pursuit of those left outside.

About three o'clock in the afternoon both sides were ranged ready. Two dramatic incidents preceded the conflict - neither of which could have increased Brutus' confidence. Camulatus, an ally of Brutus, distinguished for his courage in battle, rode out almost from his own general's side and went over to the enemy. Then, in the space between the armies two eagles appeared in the sky and fought with one another, while the soldiers below silently watched. The one on Brutus' side at last admitted defeat and fled. Thereupon the other

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1. PLUT. Brut. 49, 3. 2. Ibid. 1-2. 3. App. IV, 128:129 fin.
4. PLUT. Brut. 48, 2. App. IV, 123 init. 5. PLUT. l.c.
battle was joined. There was none of the usual prelude of

cavalry skirmishing or javelin throwing, but the armies engaged

at once in hand to hand fighting. For several hours they

fought fiercely and courageously with neither side gaining

much advantage. Even Brutus' cavalry behaved well and his

army showed that their demands for a battle had not been just

empty words. But their enthusiasm could not counter the

spirit of their opponents, whose more desperate plight gave

them an added impulse, and whose discipline and fighting

qualities were in any case better. Gradually Octavian's

men rolled back those of Brutus slowly towards their walls.

On the left Antony pressing on suddenly broke through in the

centre. Disheartened by this Brutus' first line broke; his

second and third lines were unable to make a stand and soon

his whole army was in headlong retreat. The triumvirs exploited

their success with admirable vigour and understanding: Octavian,
as arranged, closed round the camp, while Antony shut up the

lesser forts on the line guarding the road and organised the

pursuit of the scattering army. Despite the falling

darkness, he sent cavalry to close the avenues of retreat,
especially the straight road down to the sea at Neapolis; the

various groups of the enemy were cut off from one another

and the leaders especially pursued to prevent any attempt to

reorganise. In all this work Antony made great use of

Rhasus, brother of Rhascouporis, for his local knowledge. The


attributes to Brutus a success over Octavian on the right

wing; but the final advantage even there seems to have been

with the Triumvirs.  3.-App. IV, 129. Plut. Brut. 50,1.

Dio xlvii,48,5.
The general line of the flight was by the stream of Zygaetes (zygasto) from the head of which some made for the sea, some for the mountains.

Brutus himself, cut off by Octavian from his camp withdrew into the hills behind Philippi. He was attended still by a number of friends and servants, and the remains of four legions kept close to him. They did not move far from the battlefield. After crossing over one ravine with steep wooded sides and a stream at the bottom of it, they came to another hollow, where they found a huge rock that afforded splendid natural protection. Here, since it was now quite dark, they decided to pass the night. He had not yet abandoned the intention of continuing the struggle, if possible, and hoped to return either to his fleet or to his camp, if that were not yet taken by the enemy. A scout was sent - Statilius - to find out what had happened at the camp. He succeeded in reaching it and reported by means of a light signal, that it had not yet surrendered, although, as we know, Octavian's army was besieging it under Norbanus to whom the general owing to his own illness had handed over his command. Statilius, however, on his way back to Brutus was taken by one of Antony's patrols. Brutus knew from this that the enemy were occupying the ground between him and his camp and a noise nearby indicated that they were not far from his present position.

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2. - App. IV. 130 init. cf. Dio. XLVII, 49, 1. (4. - Plut. Brut. 51, 1) describes the place in detail, presumably from the account of Volumeus who was one of Brutus' companions. Dio describes it as \( \omega \) (XLVII, 49, 4) which must be translated as a place of strong (natural) fortification, and not as it has been a "well fortified stronghold" (E. Cary, Loeb edition. 1917). Velleius (II, 79, 4) has the word "tumulus". Heuzey (op. cit. p. 114) identifies the spot as the head of one of the ravines now occupied by the hamlets of Isabola and Kidjilik; the fact that neither ravine is now wooded means, as he says, nothing. (5. - Plut. Brut. 51, 4.
6. - Plut. 1. o.3. (7. - Ibid. (8. - Plut. Brut. 51. 4.)
Their proximity was proved beyond all doubt by the wounding of one of his followers, when he went back for water to the stream they had crossed earlier. Brutus accordingly, asked the officers of the legions near him, if they were willing to make an effort to relieve the camp and occupy it again; but they had had enough of fighting and were convinced of their defeat. Although his friends urged him to flee, Brutus determined to die. Some of the details of his last hours we know from Volumnius, one of the officers who attended him. As he pondered over his long struggle for the Republic, he was at once heartened by the thought of his friends' loyalty towards him and saddened by the death of so many of them. He mourned especially for Flavius, his chief engineer, and for Labeo, whom he himself had induced to enter the conspiracy. We are told that he made two quotations from Greek tragedy. One of these was certainly an imprecation against Antony; looking up to the stars he used the words of Medea against her enemy, "Forget not, Zeus, the author of these evils." The other quotation Volumnius had forgotten by the time he wrote his book, but it may have been the lines given by Dio:

"O Wretched Virtue thou wert but a name
And yet I worshipped thee as real indeed
But now it seems thou wert but Fortune's slave."

Even if he did use these words they do not indicate that he had recanted what had been the guiding principle of his whole...
life—that Virtue was superior to all things. He said them, if at all, in a momentary fit of natural dejection, ruefully and with no little irony describing his own failure. For we know that he remained to the end steadfast in the conviction that the life he had led and the fight he had fought were right and true. He was confident that future generations would judge him more favourably for his virtue than his conquerors for their success, and even in failure he claimed greater happiness than they, because, while they had been victorious, he had done no wrong. Uttering these sentiments to his friends, he shook hands with them all and thanked them for their loyalty. Several he asked to assist him to end his life—Cleitus his slave, Dardanus his armour-bearer, Volumnius and others,—but none had the heart for it. He urged them, then, to take measures for their own safety and, bidding them farewell, retired from their sight with only two or three of his most intimate companions. Among these was Strato, a Greek, with whom he had studied rhetoric, and this man, preferring that Brutus should not have to find a slave to perform the last kind office for him, helped him to die by holding his sword while he fell upon it. We are told that Antony treated his body with all proper respect and that he sent his ashes to his mother Octavian, on the contrary, cut off his head and sent it to Rome to be cast at the foot of Caesar's statue, but that ignominy was prevented by the loss of the head in a storm during the voyage over the Adriatic.
Of Brutus' army, the rank and file mainly joined the armies of the conquerors, as had become the custom in the civil wars. Of the officers, some, like Messalla and Bibulus, made their peace with the triumvirs and handed over to them the stores on Thasos; many, like young Cato and the nephew of Cassius, had died in the battle; others, especially those who had been proscribed, committed suicide, like Labeo; while some managed to escape from the scene of their defeat and join the officials who had been left in charge in places in the Aegean and Asia. Most of these made their way in time to the fleets of Sextus Pompey, Marcus, and Ahenobarbus; but the struggle for the Republic was over. When Brutus died, there was no leader left who was prepared to fight for the old regime; Sextus, who might have succeeded to his place in the eyes of the still numerous Republican party, was seeking solely his own selfish advantage. Crematius Cordus was therefore right, when he described Brutus and Cassius, in the words that the former had spoken of his colleague, as the "last of the Romans". The state had been moving to a change for nearly a hundred years, and it is Brutus' death that may most nearly mark the change. While he lived, the Republic could not be said to be dead; with him gone, there was no one to claim life for it. It is not too much to say that the Republic came with a Brutus and went with a Brutus.

4.- ibid. Plutarch (Brut. 51, 2) makes Brutus mourn Labeo as killed in the second battle. 6.- App. V, 2.
Chapter XIII.

Brutus as a Man of Letters.

We have had occasion in the previous chapters to mention in their order of occurrence most of the literary compositions from Brutus' hand, of which we have knowledge. It is worth while, if we are to reach a proper estimate of him as a man of letters, to consider all his writings in a separate chapter. The extent and variety of these writings would probably surprise the casual student of Roman history, who thinks of Brutus only as the murderer of Caesar and a defeated leader at Philippi. His recorded works fall under no less than five different headings of greater or less importance, which in the most probable chronological order of his main interest in them, are Poetry, History, Oratory, Philosophy and Epistles, the last mentioned of course, overlapping most of the others.

Of his Poetry there is little to say. It was certainly light unimportant stuff, for the younger Pliny describes it as written in hours of leisure for the author's own amusement, and Tacitus tells us that it was not meant for publication. Although Pliny seems to think that, as he himself did, Brutus wrote poetry as a relaxation in his adult years, there is no evidence of that either in Plutarch or in Cicero's letters, nor does it seem in keeping with the severity of Brutus' later attitude. It is more probable that the poems came in his youth.

\[\text{\textit{Ep. III,5,3. Statius, Silvae IV,9,20 has}}\]
\[\text{\textit{Sed Bruti senis oscillationes}}\]
\[\text{\textit{de capsam miseribellionis}}\]
\[\text{\textit{emptum plus minus asse Caiano donas \ldots}}\]

but it is not certain that the reference is to our Brutus. The description "senex" hardly seems to fit him, unless it be used meaning "of olden time", which is not at all usual.

\[\text{\textit{Dial. 21.}}\]
of their subject-matter we have no evidence, and of their merits only one devastating criticism. One cannot imagine Brutus excelling at the kind of composition, which above all, requires lightness of touch and delicacy of thought. One has, therefore, no regrets that none of his verses have survived, but we should be grateful to them for providing Tacitus with the opportunity of delivering one of the neatest witticisms in all Latin literary criticism. Speaking of the poetry of Brutus and Caesar he says "Fecerunt enim et carmina et in bibliothecas retulerunt, non melius quam Cicero, sed felicius, quia illos fecisse pauciores sciunt."

We have already noticed the attention Brutus devoted in his youth to the study of history, and have commented on the influence, which that study had on his later political creed. Wide and intensive reading was not, however, the whole extent of his historical study. We have sure evidence of three pieces of historical writing from his hand, though none of them was original. They are all epitomes of the work of earlier historians, L. Caelius Antipater, C. Fannius and Polybius. The last mentioned epitome Brutus was engaged on at the time of the battle of Pharsalus in 48 B.C.; the former two are mentioned by Cicero in his correspondence of June 45 B.C. It is of course, impossible to say whether these were Brutus' only examples of this kind of composition, and it is equally impossible to state the order in which they came. I tend, however, to think that the "Caelius" and "Fannius" were written before the Civil War, probably during Brutus' residence in Rome from 56 B.C. until 50 B.C. For Cicero when he mentions them in 45 B.C. does not indicate that they were recent works, and

it is natural to suppose that the lesser preceded the greater. Polybius' History of Rome from 220 to 146 B.C. was the most important thing of its kind before Livy. Further in his leisure time after the Civil War Brutus appears to have been devoted to Philosophy rather than History.

Of the authors, whom Brutus epitomised, the least important is Fannius. Cicero describes his 'Annals' as "non ineleganter scripta" but he had little real eloquence and his work was not much used by later historians. In his own time he was a distinguished figure; son-in-law of Laelius, he was consul in 122 B.C. and Cicero makes him an interlocutor in the de Republica and de Amicitia. Caelius - or Coelius - wrote with more lasting effect and was used as a source in later centuries by Livy for Books XX - XXX, by Plutarch and Dio. His "Annales", continued apparently down to his own times - for he received information straight from C. Gracchus - contained an especially useful account of the second Punic war. Though naturally he lacked polish and was too fond of rhetorical flourishes, he was, in Cicero's judgment an improvement stylistically on his predecessors and, more important than that, he showed some degree of critical ability; we know that he examined, for instance, Greek pro-Hannibalic sources.

Polybius is too well-known and imposing a figure to be briefly described here. Suffice it to say that he has been described as the "first true historian of Rome" and that in some respects he is acclaimed as the superior of Livy. He was more impartial, displayed a cooler judgment and was far more diligent in seeking the causes of things.

We have no direct evidence of the merits of Brutus' epitomes of these authors. Of his "Polybius" we know nothing at all, except that he was engaged on it right up to the eve of the battle of Pharsalus, and that his interest in it was proof against even the most pressing affairs of military service. It must have been of considerable length - Polybius wrote 40 books in all - and may have been completed during the winter of 48 - 47 B.C., in which he spent in the Aegean. The others were good enough to be consulted by Cicero. The "Caelius" he asked Atticus to send him along with a copy of Panaetius' τῆς προούλησις at a time when he was engaged in writing the "de Natura Deorum", and, as he used the Greek work in his preliminary study for that composition he may have wished to consult Brutus' epitome in the same connection. Cicero made use of Brutus' "Fannius" to prove himself correct in opposition to Atticus, when he said in his "Brutus" that Fannius was a son-in-law of Laelius, Cicero had taken that relationship from Hortensius, but Cicero considers Brutus' statement, as being derived straight from Fannius himself, to be beyond the question.

Whether by reason of these works or not, Brutus' reputation as a historical scholar was well established. Throughout the "Brutus" Cicero introduces him as one, whose knowledge of things past may be taken for granted or as one, who, confessing ignorance on any minor point, is anxious to be enlightened. Once also, we find Cicero readily accepting Brutus' correction of a mistake he himself had made in the "pro Ligario". The Romans were fond of epitomes, as providing a short cut to knowledge, and Cicero's use of them.

2. see Layor's ed. of de Nat-Deor, Camb. 1883) p. XXI.
3. It is interesting to note that Cicero quotes Caelius once in the de Natura Deorum. II, 3, 6.
4. 26, 100.
5. - Att. XII, 5, 2.
indicates that Brutus' examples of the art, if it can be so called were of good standing. We may be sure that they were honest and painstaking, and what more need an epitome be?

As an orator Brutus enjoyed a considerable reputation among his contemporaries and also, though in a less degree, in later generations. We have already seen the early training which he received in rhetoric, and also his apprenticeship as an advocate. Most of his recorded speeches have been mentioned too in their proper places, but before we go on to examine their styles and merits, it may be useful to give here an complete list of them with dates and historical comments.

1. "de dictatura Pompeii", written probably in 52 B.C. It may have been simply a monograph or was, perhaps, published as such, after delivery in the Senate.

2. "pro Milone", was written in 52 B.C. purely as an exercise.

3. "pro Appio Claudio", was delivered in 50 B.C. when Brutus assisted Hortensius to defend his own father-in-law against a charge of extortion.

4. "pro rege Deiotaro", was delivered in 47 B.C., before Caesar, the dictator, at Nicaea in Bithynia when Deiotarus was called in question for the help he had given Pompey in the Civil War.

5. "ad Populum in Capitolio"; the speech which Brutus delivered to the people in the Capitoll on March 17th 44 B.C. in defence of the murder of Caesar and the policy of the murderers, was later published for purposes of propaganda in May 44 B.C.

6. "Contiones apud milites"; Harangues by Brutus are mentioned in 7. and had apparently been committed to writing. They contained

1. see pp. 25 above. 2. - Quint. IX, 3, 95. cf. p. 27 above.


references, naturally of an uncomplimentary kind, to Octavius, and were therefore certainly delivered during the campaign of Philippi. How they came to be preserved cannot be explained, unless on the assumption that some of his literary friends and followers made copies of them at the time they were delivered.

Although there are none of his public utterances surviving beyond a mere fragment or two, there are enough comments and criticisms on them in the best ancient critics to make it easy to form a fair estimate of their quality. If we examine what Cicero, Tacitus and Quintilian have to say, we find a curious unanimity. All three admit him to their lists of eminent speakers, and all three dislike his speeches. Cicero in the "Brutus" makes public his regard for Brutus as the natural successor to his own position as the most prominent orator of the day, and that, even allowing for the flattery inevitable in the circumstances of the statement, is high praise indeed.

Tacitus includes Brutus' name in a list of eminent orators along with those of Cicero, Caesar, Caelli, Calvus, Asinius and Messall; and Quintilian mentions him with Caesar, Caelli, Calidius, Asinius, Messall, Sulpicius and Cassius. But all three have criticisms to offer, more or less damning, which indicate clearly enough that their personal opinion of his oratory was not high.

The school of oratory to which, in his own aloof manner, he attached himself is yet another indication of the "old-

(27, 331. (2) - as an example of Cicero's flattery compare Brut. 6, 21 where he describes Brutus' "pro Diotaro" with the adverbs "ornatissime et copiosissime", with Tac. Dial. 21, who uses the nouns "lentitudo et tepor." (3) - Dial. 17, 36. (4) - XII, 10, 11. Velleius II, 36, 2 includes Brutus in a similar list, (5) - Sandys' edition of Cicero's Orator (Camb) (1885) p. X1.
fashioned" bent in his nature. Although the three styles of oratory, which were popular in Rome in the earlier half of the first century B.C., have been described as having "Successively presented themselves", there was a short time — about 53 B.C. — when all three were being practised together in greater or less degrees of popularity, and that time coincided exactly with the period of Brutus' greatest interest in the art. The Asiatic style most eminently represented by Hortensius was derived from "the rich and redundant manner of the degenerate oratory of Asia", and combined in its chief exponent at least "the pointed and epigrammatic manner of Meneicles and the following volubility of the Milesian Aeschines". This style, overornamental and vulgar, gradually lost place before that adopted by Cicero, whose fame by 53 B.C. may be said to have quite eclipsed that of his predecessor, although the latter continued to make speeches in his own manner until his death in 50 B.C. Cicero's style — Rhodian as it is called — does not admit of brief description. It was in part a reaction of better taste from the vulgarity and meretricious qualities of Hortensius, but its nature was eclectic, and Cicero was not above making use of many of the superficial but popular elements of the Asiatic school. Despite Cicero's preeminence and more or less supreme authority in the field of rhetoric, there was a third school, which, while agreeing with him in his reaction from the Asiatic, felt that he had not gone nearly enough.

1. Sandys' edition of Cicero's Orator (Camb) (1885) p. XI.
2. Ibid. p. XII.
3. Ibid.
far enough and that he too was still lacking in perfect taste. This school, composed mainly in 53 B.C. of younger men contemporaries of Brutus, with Calvus as their accepted leader, sought their inspiration three or four centuries back in the Attic orators, from whom their style was named. It was to this latest development that Brutus, despite his early apprenticeship with Hortensius and Cicero, became attached, an attachment quite in keeping with the character of one whose other interests—political, historical and philosophical—were in things of old. Apart from that consideration, Brutus felt more at home in the Attic style, because its appeal was to the mind rather than the senses, its genius was intellectual rather than emotional. Brutus’ "gravitas" shirked from a display of feelings or any attempt to arouse feelings, and we are told that, as a praetor, he despised importunity and the inability to withstand it. He expected a problem, whether in the law courts or the Senate or even the popular assembly, to be settled in strict accordance with facts and logic, without any of the colouring, if not actual distortion, of facts, which arises from emotional and sentimental appeals.

While this Roman Attic school found their models in the orators of ancient Athens, there was much divergence in the choice of individual ideals. Messalla, for instance, followed Hyperides and Calvus, while mainly following Lysias, appears to have had also some stylistic resemblance to Demosthenes. Brutus’ choice forms an interesting problem in psychology. His own genius was mainly for lucid and unemotional statement in simple unadorned and unadulterated language and his obvious parallel in ancient Athens was Lysias who was in fact the model most highly

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1- cf. Cic. Att. XV, 1b, 2 Tin. 2- Plut. Brut. 6,5. 3- Quint. X,5,2. 4- Seneca. Controv. VII,4,6-7. 5- see for instance his joint letters with Cassius to Antony in 44 B.C. Cic. Fam. XI, 2 and 3. cf. pp.127 and 131 above.
honoured by the Roman Atticists. We find, however, that the Greek, whom he chiefly admired was the fiery, restless Demosthenes, who, though more effective than Lysias, achieves that effectiveness very often by the sort of emotional purple passages, which the Atticists professed to despise. Calvus frequently found himself imitating Demosthenes unconsciously, because he had himself a hot and fiery temper, which broke out despite his attempts to be cool and detached. Brutus, on the other hand, was in public, at least, naturally cool and detached, and he could not call forth any of Demosthenes' thunder, even when it was most needed. The fire in his own nature was of the slow burning kind that is all-consuming but never bursts forth in flames for all to see. His admiration for Demosthenes, amounting almost to hero-worship, is surely a hint of how he longed at heart to give expression to the fire within him, though the inhibitions of his early training and his adoption of the ancient ideal of severe dignity damped it down. The criticisms of Cicero, Tacitus and Quintilian are in accord with that estimate and with one another. Cicero says that Brutus had "wonderful natural genius, a perfect training and outstanding zeal for work", and these are the qualities, which time and again he insists on as the essentials, for good oratory.

1.- Cic. Orator, 30,105 tells us that under Pammenes in Athens Brutus studied especially Demosthenes; while from 31,110 we learn that he kept in his villa at Tusculum a bronze statue of that Greek Orator. We see further in Orat. 13,40 that Brutus had only a qualified admiration for Isocrates. In Orat. 9,32, a vague allusion by Cicero to someone, who wants to emulate Xenophon, has been compared with a similar passage in Brutus 29,112 and it has been suggested that the person meant is Brutus (Piderit in his edition of the Orator) (Leipsig 1865). But the allusion is not explicit enough and Xenophon is certainly not Attic enough for Brutus.


3.- Yet he did criticise details in Demosthenes' style of quint. IX,4,76.

4.- "et natura admirabilis et exquisita doctrina et singularis industria Brut.


6.- de Orat II, 57, 232.
In that Cicero is not unduly flattering Brutus, for he did have more than an ordinary share of these qualities. His training was thorough and catholic; his industry was unbounded; and his natural genius, so far as it went, was sound. But it was a genius for logical unadorned statement and that was of little avail in a period like the late Republic, when public taste, like all other things public, was far from elevated. Further criticisms all lead to the same conclusion, that Brutus "could say things but he could not speak". In the most detailed criticisms of a speech of Brutus, which we possess, Cicero says that, while his sentiments were perfect and his language no less so, the speech he delivered on the Capitol after Caesar's murder was completely lacking in the fire and vigour, which the occasion demanded. "Granted", he says, "the kind of orator our Brutus aims at being and the opinion he holds of the best style of speech, he has secured an unqualified success. Nothing could be more polished. But I have always aimed, rightly, or wrongly, at something different". That Brutus could at times be impressive and forceful is shown by the effect on Caesar of his speech for Deiotarus, but the impressiveness came, not from any inflammatory manner, but from a serious and sincere statement of incontrovertible facts; and such a presentation of a case, while ideally suited for an audience of one impassive judge, would have little effect on a Roman mob, gathered in circumstances of great excitement.

Again, it is his serious dignity and his sincerity, that both Tacitus and Quintilian praise. Tacitus describes him as "gravior" and says that he alone of his contemporaries spoke his mind with sincerity and frankness, without ill will or envy to any man. Quintilian says that it was easy to know that,

1. Att. XV, 1b, 2.  2. Cic. Att. XIV, 1, 2. Plut. Brut. 6, 3-4.  3. Dial. 25.  4. ibid.
what he said he really felt to be true, and names "gravitas" as his chief characteristic. But, like Cicero, both critics feel that something is wanting. Tacitus besides quoting a criticism of Cicero's to the effect that Brutus was "tedious" and disjointed, describes his "pro Deiotaro" - the speech which when delivered, impressed Caesar so much - as "wearisome and insipid", when read; and he would, in short, leave Brutus to his philosophy - "for in his speeches even his own admirers admit he is less distinguished". Quintilian's final judgement is similar; for, though he includes him in one list of orators, his name does not occur in a second list but comes instead, immediately after it, as an admirable writer in philosophy and much more distinguished in that sphere than in his speeches.

Despite these later criticisms of his style and despite Cicero's contemporary dislike and almost contempt for it, Brutus himself had no doubts of his merits as an orator. Whatever his reactions might have been to advice from Demosthenes, had that been possible, he was by no means ready to take it from Cicero, and though the latter fancied himself for a time to be a sort of oratorical father to Brutus and sought to win him over to his own opinions he had to admit himself beaten in the end, and eventually even shrank from giving him help in the composition of a projected speech to the people. Brutus, in fact, had his own criticisms to offer of Cicero's oratory, which he did not hesitate to express to him directly. In letters to him he said that he considered him "feeble and enervated", and after reading Cicero's "Orator", which had been composed at his suggestion, he wrote to the author, as well as to Atticus, that he was far from agreeing with Cicero's idea of the optimum
genus dicendi. In this as so often in his relations with Cicero, Brutus annoys one with his smugness and his calm assumption that, as an orator, he was at least on Cicero's level. He was completely satisfied with his own style and achievements; and, in so far as he refused to alter his style, one does not blame him. He had clearly before him the picture of the kind of orator he wished to be — though his admiration for Demosthenes may indicate a wistful longing for something else — and though his manner was not the kind that fires a mob or even rouses a Senate, it was the manner best suited to his own nature — sincere, logical, without popular frills, expressing dignified sentiments in careful, correct language. What he lacked as an orator was those qualities which though as essential for success as eloquence, belong rather to the actor's trade than the speakers'. For his limitations one does not blame him, but the smug self-conceit, which made him blind to Cicero's vast superiority to himself, does disgust one.

As a philosopher Brutus enjoyed an even greater reputation than as an orator. That reputation is shown not only by the statements, already noted, of Tacitus and Quintilian and by the latter's placing of him as second only to Cicero in a list of Roman philosophers which contains the names of Celsus, the two Sextii, Catius and Seneca, but by the eulogies also of Cicero himself. Cicero says for instance — "My friend Brutus whose ability is outstanding in every kind of worthy pursuit, sets forth philosophy in Latin in such a way that you would not miss the Greek", and again he addresses Brutus "You who are second

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not even to the Greeks in philosophy? The number of important philosophical works, which Cicero dedicated to him is another indication of Brutus' eminence among the philosophers of his race and age. The Paradoxa Stoicorum in the first half of 46 B.C., the de Finibus of May - July 45 B.C., and the Tusculan Disputations of August 45 - March 44 B.C. were all inscribed to him, while the Academica of May - July 45 B.C. was at one stage meant for him though later presented to Varro.

Yet it may be said that he earned his reputation very easily, so far as any claim to original thought was concerned. To be acclaimed a philosopher in Rome required nothing more than a thorough reading of Greek writings and the translation of Greek thoughts into the Latin language. Even Cicero's philosophy was confined to these narrow limits, and Brutus could certainly claim to have both read and translated. He was by nature a voracious reader and in the spirit of his age, so eminently exemplified by Cicero, he was anxious not simply to declare and maintain his adherence to one school of thought, but to explore all possible sources of wisdom and learn all the lessons that could be found. Plutarch says that of all the Greek philosophers - and their name was legion - there was none with whom Brutus was unfamiliar, and Cicero, in the works dedicated to him, frequently mentions the extensive nature of his studies. Brutus was genuinely interested in philosophy and in all kinds of knowledge and there is nothing to surprise us in Appian's statement that, during the years he spent in the East, despite his absorption

1. - de fin. 1, 6. (2. - Brut. 2, 1.)
in military and political affairs, he was everywhere anxious to see and hear everything "being a philosopher of no mean report". Like Cicero he was fond of discussion with his friends of philosophical problems.

Before we go on to examine his translations we must discuss briefly the school of philosophy, to which in particular he was attached. Modern writers have carelessly called him a Stoic, thinking perhaps of Cato's influence on him and of his own reputation for a rigid virtue. He was, however, professedly attached to the Academic school, as the evidence of Plutarch and of several passages in Cicero clearly shows. His choice, considering the catholic nature of his studies, is not surprising; for it had always been the characteristic of the Academy to preserve independence of judgment. Nor is it surprising that of the three divisions of the Academy - Old, Middle and New - Brutus with his tendency, which we have already noted, for ancient things should prefer the Old. His adherence to the Old Academy was not, however, slavish, for in Athens in September and October of 44 B.C. he attended the lectures of a peripatetic professor as well as the Academic. The leader of the Old Academy at this time was Antiochus of Ascalon, a man for whom Cicero had the greatest respect and by whose teaching in ethics he was particularly influenced. Brutus was more closely connected with Antiochus' brother Aristus whose lectures he attended in Athens and whom actually entertained as a guest in his household for some time. It is not possible for us to date the period of this intimacy but it may have been in 47 to 45 B.C. when Brutus' active interest in philosophy was greatest. He may

1. App. IV, 133 fin. (2. Plut. Brut. 12, 3:

40,1. Cic Orat. 33. (3.- Petersson Cicero p. 533e. 5. Sihler Cic. of Arpinum. Yale 1914 p. 825. Byrne op. cit. p. 34. (2.- Brut. 2, 2 40, 180: 40, 145: 97, 372: Att. XIII, 25, 3. (7.- cf. de Leg. 1, 55. t.- cf. Reid's edition of Academica (Macm. 1885) Intro. p. 16. (6.- presumably in his student days Cic. Acad. 1, 3, 2. cf de Fin. V, 3, 8. (4.- Plut. Brut. 2, 2. The MSS of Plutarch gives his name as Arist. (Agiròwv -areus.) Either the author or his copyist are at fault, for Arist. was a Peripatic of Alexandria (Diog Laert. 7, 164). Reid (op. cit. pp 105 and 165) suggests that Plutarch may have been misled by a recollection of Cic. Acad. II, 4, 12 where Arist. and Aristo are mentioned together,
even have brought the philosopher back with him from the East in 47 B.C., for Aristus was in Athens in 50 B.C. when he entertained Cicero on the way home from Cilicia. Cicero displays considerable affection and admiration for Aristus and Plutarch describes him as "inferior" to many philosophers in literary ability but equal to the best of them in his proper and gentle conduct of life. Doubtless it was this trait in him, that he put his beliefs into practice every day, that attracted Brutus to him.

There is neither occasion nor room for a discussion of all the views of Antiochus, as representing the Old Academy, for though independence of judgment was, as we see in Cicero, the boast of the New even more than the Old Academy, yet freedom of opinion was too firmly established in all the academic discipline, and Brutus himself was too confident in his own powers of discretion, for us to imagine that he acquiesced in all of Antiochus' tenets. We need, therefore, examine only these philosophical ideas, about which Brutus' opinion is in some way known to us and as we examine them we must bear in mind the fact which we have already laid down, that to Brutus philosophy was not a matter of theoretical ideals or formulae but a means of gaining definite guidance for practical life. The doctrine one learned was to help one to solve the common problems of everyday existence. The physical and Metaphysical departments of philosophy, which had little practical guidance to offer, were therefore of least interest to Brutus, though the fact that Antiochus did not subscribe to the view of the New Academy and Cicero, that certain knowledge was impossible of

2. Plut. l.c.  
3. See p. 88 above.
attainment and that probability was all that could be hoped for, would attract him; probabilities were not enough to give the definite guidance he sought. His main concern was with Ethics and in that field we know of three compositions by him - a "de Virtute", a "de Officiis" and a "de Patientia". The last named is mentioned only by the grammarian Diomedes. It is interesting, however, to observe that, in Cicero's opinion, patience was one of Brutus' most obvious and admirable traits, displayed especially in the difficult months from March to September 44 B.C. The "de officiis" is mentioned twice by grammarians - Charisius and Priscian - and it must be the same work from which Seneca quotes under the title "πετίκεδην ζητέωσιν". Seneca tells us merely that Brutus laid down a long list of rules of conduct for parents, children and brothers, and makes objection that these rules are disconnected things with no general standard of conduct underlying them, to which they may be referred. Inevitably one thinks, there from, of Brutus' desire, above all, for straightforward rules in philosophy rather than vaguer abstractions, and the nature of the rules reminds one of Brutus' scrupulously conscientious attitude towards his mother and sisters throughout his life, and in particular of his concern for his nephews in 43 B.C. when their father, Lepidus, was outlawed. We have no evidence to help us to date the appearances of these works, but one is fairly safe in naming 47 B.C. as the terminus post quem, for it was not until after his return from the Civil war that Brutus' interest in philosophy.

1.- cf. Reid et al. pp 60-63. (2.- C.L. p. 378
2.- Cic. Phil X,3,7 "Tantamne patientiam di boni" of 7, 14
3.- L. 11, 25. (4.- C.L. P. 83. (5.- C.L. P. 679
6.- Ep. mor. 93, 45. (7.- see 380 above.
became active. It has been suggested from consideration of Cicero's silence concerning these works, that they were published posthumously. It is especially significant that Cicero does not mention Brutus' "de officiis" in his own work on the same subject, which, published about June 45 B.C., was dedicated to him; and if Brutus' work were not published by that date it is not likely, considering his other activities from then until his death, that it was published in his lifetime.

Of the "de Virtute" we can speak more confidently and with more detail, as it is mentioned several times by Cicero as well as by Seneca. The first mention of it by name is in the "de Finibus" published about June 45 B.C. so that it had probably appeared about or before the time of Brutus' return from Cisalpine Gaul in April of that year and was almost certainly one of the works which Cicero refers to in the "Orator" as engaging Brutus' attention during his stay in the province. The theme is the familiar one, the normal teaching of the Old Academy, that virtue alone is enough to guarantee a happy life. One of the examples he chose to prove his contention, was that a man of virtue might be happy even in exile, and instanced the famous case of Marcellus living in Mytilene. He had himself visited him in 47 B.C. on the way back to Italy and so obvious had been Marcellus' contentment that, when Brutus left him, he felt that it was he, returning to Rome, was the exile, and not Marcellus.

Doubtless Brutus was to some extent genuinely envious not only of Marcellus' equanimity, but of the quiet retired life he was leading, with the chance to pursue all kinds of study.

1. - d'Addozio op. cit. pp 118ff.
2. - de fin. 1,3,8, Tusc. V, 1,1.  
3. - ad Helv de cons. 8,1: 9,4.  
4. - Orat. 10,34.  
5. - Tusc. V, 1,1 "virtutem ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam".  
6. - Sen. 1,1,8,1. "M. Brutus satis hoc putat quod in exilium antibus virtutes suas sequae ferret".  
7. - Sen. 1,1,8,4, Seneca only describes this second reference (9,4) as being to Brutus' de Virtute, but it is obvious from the similarity of subject that the other (8,1) is the same work.
Cicero himself discusses the same problem in the fifth Tusculan Disputation, and from him we learn further that Brutus followed the official and traditional tenet of the Old Academy, that, while virtue alone was enough for a happy life, it did not necessarily bring the happiest life. He, as Antiochus taught, considered that other things were 'good' besides virtue - strength, health, wealth, honour, fame. While admitting that Brutus' work was no more than a translation of some Greek predecessor, it is not profitable, with the little evidence we have, to enquire who that predecessor was, but we may be sure that he made much use of Antiochus himself, from whom Cicero too borrowed considerably in the fifth Tusculan.

Cicero describes Brutus' work as written "accuratissime" and in another place as "gratissimus". Despite that praise, however, and despite the position freely granted to Brutus by contemporary and later critics, it is impossible by modern standards to find much to rouse our enthusiasm in his work as a philosopher. Roman philosophy, with its emphasis laid on form rather than subject, and its complacent readiness to recognise as important what was mere translation from one language to another, had a viewpoint that was very different from ours. On the other hand, it is unfair for us to expect from Brutus more than his contemporaries did and within the comparatively narrow limits set him, we must grant him his share of praise. As a reader and scholar he was diligent and thorough. As a writer, if not original and probably lacking in breadth of vision and depth of perception, he was at least sincere: "it was easy to realise that what he said he really believed". Perhaps,

4.- Quint X, 1, 133.
like his friend and tutor Aristus, his chief claim to philosophical eminence lay in the sincerity with which he sought to apply his beliefs to ordinary life and to live up to the creed he had adopted.

Like so many Romans, Brutus was by modern standards a voluminous letter-writer. His frequent and lengthy absences from Rome, his political importance at least from 44 B.C. onwards, the width of his interests and the number of his friends and acquaintances made that inevitable. In Cicero's correspondence alone there were originally nine books, of 'Epistola ad M. Brutum', of which we may assume almost half would be from Brutus. Of these, some may have been written in 51-50 B.C. when Cicero was in Cilicia, some during the Civil War in 48-47 B.C., when Cicero was in Italy and Brutus in the Aegean, some in 46-45 B.C., when Brutus was in Cisalpine Gaul, some in April to August 44 B.C., when Brutus was in Campania and Latium, and the remainder from then until Cicero's death when Brutus was in Macedonia and Illyricum. It is certain also that he kept up a correspondence during most of his life with Atticus, with Cassius and other public men after Caesar's death and we know that he wrote to several people in Rome during his leadership in the East.

Of all these letters we have knowledge only of one written to another than Cicero - the one he wrote to Atticus before the Battle of Philippi: and it may be a forgery. Of the 'Epistola ad M. Brutum' in Cicero's correspondence only 24 are extant and of these only seven are written by Brutus. Before we examine these seven we must recall that they were not written with any view to publication, and that many of them were composed

(1) I calculate that he spent some ten or eleven years away from Rome - a quarter of his life. : (2) - cf. Nonius 431, 28, who quotes from a Book IX; and the masterly arguments of Gurlitt in Jahrb. 1885. p. 584 show there were no more. : (3) - see p. 212, above. The occasional notices in Cicero's letters of 44-3 B.C. of Brutus' letters to other friends in Rome are too brief to give us any real knowledge of them e.g. Brut.II, 4, 3, and 5, 1 and 4 fin: I, 18, 6, et al. : (4) I omit Brut.I, 16, and 17 of the authenticity of which I am not convinced; it should be noted that Brut.I, 2, 3, and 4 each contain two letters. The seven by Brutus in order of writing are II, 3, 11; 4 (1-3) ; 4 (3-6) ; 6; 7; 13.
in moments between the harassing duties of leading an army
and ruling a province. At one time the style of these
letters was considered so bad that it was advanced as a reason
for regarding the letters as forgeries. How that view could
took be held is incomprehensible. To an unbiased reader
there is nothing in them in any great way different, so far as
Latinity is concerned, from those of Cicero's other correspondents;
and one can only regret how easy it is in a work, which for
other reasons is considered unauthentic, to find examples of
bad style and misuse of words.

There are in the letters many traits which one would
expect to find - (i) the Laconic brevity, which according to
Plutarch characterised Brutus' Greek letters, as when he
expresses his conviction that Dolabella will not manage to hold
Asia - provinciae......quum recuperari facile est.

(ii) an almost pedantic precision in Grammar, as when he calls
cicero's speeches "Philippici", making the adjective masculine
to agree with "libellis" used in the previous sentence, instead
of the feminine we should expect.

(iii) old-fashioned usages, e.g. "adversus" used as a preposition
with no sense of hostility, and the spelling "nequeopinantibus".

(iv) a difference from Cicero's usage is very pointed where he
says "hoc, quod --- Cassius gessit", whereas Cicero in his answer
says "ea quae".

(v) an occasional clumsiness of phrase e.g. "qui vestris paucorum
respondat laudibus."

(vi) infrequent lack of lucidity, as in the whole passage in ad
Brut. I, 11, 1. "nam. qui ------ coniunxit".

(vii) the amissance, which Cicero complained of in his letters in
solicitudine ac stomacho". "I cannot write much to you for worry
and vexation". From this sentence Ferrero (III,p.189) deduces that
Brutus "was suffering from a stomachic disorder." But surely "for
worry and my stomach" would be a very violent zeugma.

1. e.g. by Markland "Remarks on the Epistles of Cicero to Brutus.
etc. 1745.

2. - II,3,1. : 3.- ibid. 4. : 5.- ibid. 5.
T.'s note (Vol. VI,p.203.).
50 B.C., does not often appear in these later ones, but there is a trace of it when he demands very brusquely that his nephews the sons of Lepidus, be safeguarded:

On the other hand there are touches, here and there, more surprising perhaps and more welcome:

(i) vividness of phrase, as when he describes his dilemma regarding C. Antony in two graphic words - "plane aestuo".

(ii) remarkable gracefulness in turning a neat compliment, especially for one of his austerity; as in his reference to Cicero's son - "Cicero, filius tuus sic mihi se probat -- omni denique officio ut porsus numquam dimittere videatur cogitationem cuius sit filius," -- and in his reaction to the news, false as it proved, that Cicero had been made consul - "tum vero incipiam proponere mihi rempublicam iustam et iam suis nitentem viribus, si istuc videro."

(iii) excellent good taste and restraint are shown in I, 4. in the way in which he shows his distrust of Octavian first by ignoring his part in the war in Gaul, and later by using quite general references in his warnings to Cicero regarding Caesar's heir. A similar good taste and sound sense prevails in the letter of commendation to Cicero written for Antistius Vetus, where he simply recounts the man's recent patriotic actions and lets them speak for themselves; and the tail piece of that letter is a pleasantly modest introduction of himself - "et mihi gratissimum erit".

(iv) Sometimes the sober Brutus shows a touch of wit, clumsy and
rather brusque, as when he says of Cicero’s Philippics “And
now I suppose you’re waiting for me to praise them”; and
sometimes his humour is grim, as when he says that Dolabella’s
excesses in Asia have been such as to make his murder of
Trebonius no longer his most inhuman crime:

Quintilian has a minor criticism to offer of Brutus’
epistolary style. He complains of the frequency in his
letters of verse endings and quotes one example of a hexameter
ending "neque illi malunt habere tutores aut defensores
quoniam causam sciunt placuisse Catoni". He adds further
that iambic endings were common in Brutus’ writing, because of
his passion for severity of style. There is indeed a lack
of lightness in Brutus’ letters; they have few of the delicate
touches, subtle assonances, pointed order of words, clever
innuendo, neatness of phrase, that make Cicero’s letters among
the most interesting things in Latin. As a correspondent
Brutus was at his best, as his character would lead us to
expect in the formal kind of letter required by an important
occasion. There is little anywhere in Latin prose more
dignified in a calm, dispassionate, courageous and yet pointed
manner, than the letter sent by Brutus and Cassius to Antony in
May 44 B.C. The phrasing of it was, we may be sure, Brutus’;
Cassius, who was much less of a scholar, would have been more
fiery, more brutally direct and much less effective. A
passage of similar dignity and courage is that, in which Brutus
justifies to Cicero his attitude towards prisoners taken in
Civil War.

One other interesting point in the letters may be commented
upon. Although he frequently used Greek words and quotations
1.- II, 3, 4 "Nunc scilicet hoc expectas dum eas laudem".
2.-ibid 5. "ut iam non videatur crudelissimum eiusmod facinus
interfectio Trebni". These instances may be compared with his
vitricism at the expense of Caesar see p. 27 above. 3.- IX, 4, 75.
4.- ibid. 76. : 6. - Fam. XI, 2 cf. Ibid. 3. : 6. - Brut. I, 4, 2,
translation on p. 176 above.
in private conversation, there is no instance of the habit in his letters. The best explanation of this may be that his use of Greek was confined to conversations with his more intimate friends, and the letters we still possess from him are not of that nature.

There is another literary composition by Brutus which must be mentioned - his eulogy of Cato. This work, though we know little of its contents, is very interesting for the circumstances in which it was written. We have already seen how after Cato's death early in 46 B.C., Brutus at once asked Cicero to compose a memoir of him and that work was published in the summer of that year. Either because he thought Cicero had not done his uncle justice, or because he felt it his own peculiar duty to record the story of Cato's life or because he wished to assert his independence of Caesar, Brutus later composed a 'Cato' of his own, which was published by Atticus in March 45 B.C., shortly before the authors' return to Rome from Cisalpine Gaul. Atticus, after reading the work and presumably before publication wrote to Brutus pointing out an error he had made in connection with the debate in the Senate on December 5th 63 B.C. regarding the punishment to be inflicted on the captured supporters of Catiline. Apparently Atticus had allowed Cicero to read the work also and he had been highly displeased with it. He considered that his own exploits, especially in 63 B.C., had been scantily dealt with, and even the description of him as "optimus consul" he thought merely damned him with faint praise. Atticus, knowing how touchy Cicero was, especially where his consular activities were

1. Plut. Brut. 40,1 fin. 2. It may have contained the condemnation of Cato's suicide which Brutus later confessed himself to have made too rashly for a philosopher. Plut. Brut. 40,4. 3. pp.63f above. 4. Cic. Att. XII,21,1. 5. One naturally wonders how Cicero's work in connection with the conspiracy was described in his own 'Cato'.

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concerned, wrote to Brutus pointing out the mistake he had made and suggesting, apparently, that he might introduce a little more mention of Cicero. Brutus accepted the correction yet, to Cicero's increased indignation made no other alterations. It is clear from the passage in Cicero's letter dealing with the matter, that Atticus had found fault only with one point, and there is absolutely no justification for such modern descriptions of it as "full of errors". Even the mistake, which was made, was a natural one and not of vital importance. Brutus had assumed that since the decree passed after the debate on December 5th was in the name of Cato, it was Cato who had been the first to propose the penalty of death involved in the decree. Actually that penalty was pronounced by Silanus - Brutus' own stepfather, - who as consul elect had opened the debate, and by fifteen other senators of consular rank who spoke after him, but, when Caesar suggested a compromise, these earlier speakers were won over by his arguments and would certainly have recanted, but for the vigorous speech of Cato, insisting on execution. Brutus' error therefore was not a heinous one. Nor, from what we know, had Cicero much justification for his other complaints. An eulogy of Cato could not be reasonably expected to devote more than a share of praise to other politicians and "optimus consul" would surely have satisfied most men. To me it appears that it was not Brutus, who acted in an "ingracious paltry and jealous manner", but Cicero; and when one finds Cicero two months later urging Atticus to publish an 'anti-Cato' by the Caesarian Hirtius,

1. "The other things" which Atticus had written to Brutus about (ad cetera vero tibi quem ad modum rescriptis") were, as seems obvious from the context, his references to Cicero. (2. - vol. X. p. CXXVII. cf. C.A.H. vol. IX. p. 504. As Gelzer (P.W. X. p. 984) suggests, Brutus' estimate was much the same as that of Sallust (Cat. 15, 5: 39, 1: 41, 51; 46, 6: 52, 1: 53, 1: 55, 1) to whom Cato was second only to Caesar. 4. - T. and P. op. cit. vol. VI. p. CXVII. 5. - Att. XII, 45, 1, where Cicero admits that it contains much praise of himself "cum maximis laudibus meos".)
what can one think but that it contained much praise of himself? In the circumstances his plea that from Hirtius' abuse Cato will gain the greater praise, does not ring sincerely and one imagines that if Cato's efforts in 63 B.C. were minimized Cicero's were probably given all the more prominence.

There were other ancient criticisms, mainly contemporary, of Brutus' "Cato". Caesar, comparing it with Cicero's, said in a letter to Balbus, that after reading Cicero's frequently he had become more fluent himself, but when he read Brutus', he felt very learned indeed; and I can see no cause to doubt that he was being ironical at Brutus' expense. The attitude of other ancient writers also makes one believe that it was not an inspired work. It may be the deepest condemnation of all that Augustus felt himself capable of writing a reply to it - his "Rescripta Bruto de Catone", of which he gave his friends a private reading. After him it seems to have been completely forgotten. Even Plutarch makes no mention of it, Tacitus and Quintilian never refer to it and it seems to have been unfamiliar to the Grammarians. It was probably sincere but dull. Brutus with his undemonstrative nature and his unemotional style was the last person to find eulogy an easy theme. In Latin at least, the eulogy demands superlatives, both in language and thought, and these it was not in Brutus' nature either to find or use. The most praiseworthy thing about it was the courage with which it was published, symbolising, as it did, its author's attitude to the conqueror of Cato.

1.- Att. XII, 45, 3. : 2.- Cic. Att. XIII, 46, 2 "multa de meo Catone quem saepissime legendo se dicit copiosiorem factum, Bruti Catone lecto se sibi visum disertum". : 3.- Suet. Aug. 35 init.
Apart from his own labours in the field of letters, Brutus was genuinely interested in literature and the arts generally. It is not, indeed, too much to say that he was a scholar before anything else and, though his own exacting conscience and sense of duty to the Republic dragged him into public life, there is every reason to believe that in another age he would have spent his life in scholarly retirement. We have already noticed the extent of his reading in history and philosophy. He had read no less widely in Greek literature and his knowledge of Homer and the Tragic Poets is illustrated by the readiness, with which he could, when he chose, quote from them; and at the same time it is pleasant to learn from Appian that his conversation was not burdened with quotations. His interest in Greek literature is to be seen also in the names, which he applied in a fanciful mood to parts of his properties. A room in one of his houses was called his "Parthenon": at Lanuvium he had a Ζυγάνων and a river Eurotas. There are signs too that he was interested in art. Martial twice mentions a statuette known as "Brutus' boy"; Pliny reveals the fact that it was by Strongylion and says that it received the adornment of Brutus' name, because he loved it.

In giving a general estimate of the value and merits of Brutus' literary works, one would naturally be more confident if more examples of them than the few letters we possess were extant.

As it is we have to be content with the verdict of others. Of his

2. Flor. II, 17, 11. : (2. - 1.c.
contemporaries only Cicero's judgment has survived (except for the brief sentences of Caesar's on his pro Deiotaro and on his Cato) and he cannot always be relied upon. Sometimes allowance must be made for flattery as in works like the 'Brutus', de Finibus and Tusculans, and sometimes for jealousy and pique as in some of his letters. Nevertheless Cicero's opinions properly interpreted and those of later critics, of whom Tacitus and Quintilius are fully qualified to pass a proper judgment, enable us to form an estimate of his work, which should be accurate enough to do him justice. He had in common with most of his contemporaries absolutely no creative genius in literature and even in an age, which was less prepared to accept as worthy mere translation or imitation, it is unlikely that Brutus' work would have shown originality either in matter or in manner. Although we must not forget that he died at an early age, when his abilities were perhaps not fully developed, there is nothing in his earlier work to lead us to expect that he would have achieved any real greatness. He was essentially a scholar and student rather than a creative artist. His true interest was in learning what others had thought and said; and his own opinions were founded always on a thorough consideration of those of others, with rather less of his own original thought than he himself probably realised. Thus we find that his work was mainly repetition of others' productions in perhaps a rather different form. His epitomes were confessedly so; his philosophical works were little more than mere translations and it is unlikely that he even had before him the ideal that Cicero had, of making Latin a suitable vehicle for the expression of philosophy. Even those works in which his own personality might best have been expressed - his speeches and his 'Cato' - were cursed with an academic idealism, that made them flawless but dull. Against his dullness and his lack of originality one can set only his sincerity and his painstaking carefulness. He expressed no opinion until it was fully formed and he formed it only after a long ponderous process.
of weighing pros and cons. In this way he achieved the impression - a true impression - of sincerity, which especially was felt by ancient critics, whether in his oratory, philosophy or letters. But the same method robbed his work of the graces of fluency and ease. Lightness of touch was not in his nature, nor the quickness of thought that makes for interesting writing.
Chapter XIV.

Brutus' Appearance, Reputation and Character.

Thanks to the coins published in his name in the East in 43 - 42 B.C., which bear his portrait, we are able to form some idea of Brutus' personal appearance. In Plutarch we are told that he was, in the phrase Shakespeare made famous, of the "lean and hungry" kind: for though the poet applies the description only to Cassius it was in the original used of Brutus as well. The portraits on the coins indicate that the story may have been true. They show a head much longer than broad, with thin almost hollow cheeks and prominent bones in the upper and lower jaws. The brow is not high but the hair seems to have been allowed to fall some distance over it. The eyes are deepset, the nose rather long straight and sharp; the mouth is firm but with more generous lips than the rest of the face would lead us to expect. The chin is well-rounded but small, firm but by no means prominent. There are signs of a slight beard on the lower jaw - probably a war-time adornment - and the hair is thick and plentiful with a low fringe over the forehead. The neck is long and thin with a prominent Adam's apple. It would be surprising if with such a physiognomy, Brutus' physique was other than lean. Of his height we have no indication but we may imagine him as a man of normal stature with a spare lean frame. His constitution appears to have

\(^1\) - Plut. Brut. 9,1: Cass. 62,5. The adjectives used are \(\alpha\chi\gamma\omicron\sigma\) pale or sallow: \(\alpha\chi\nu\omicron\sigma\) - lean: \(\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron\tau\omicron\sigma\) - thin.

\(^2\) - Lucan II, 372-6, tells us that at the outbreak of the Civil War Brutus swore to allow his beard to grow until the war was ended. Whether that was true or not, it is not probable that Brutus continued to wear a beard after Pharsalus. The beard on the coins is obviously a recent growth.
been sound, for we hear only of two bodily illnesses, the one in 58 B.C. on the way to Rhodes - apparently mere travel-sickness - the other in the winter of 44 B.C. in Illyricum, the result of exposure and lack of food in the long and rigorous march to Dyrrachium.

1. I have taken no account of portraits of Brutus on gems, or of marble busts. Bernouilli in Romische Ikonographie I, pp. 187 - 195 and Orto-register mentions six different gems purporting to bear Brutus' portrait; even if genuine - and Brutus did become sufficiently an object of admiration to be so portrayed - they would be based on contemporary busts or on the coins and therefore give no additional evidence. The busts being larger would be more useful, if we could be sure of their authenticity and of the correctness of their identification. No less than twelve busts exist which claim, most of them with no good reason whatever, to be portraits of Brutus. (cf. Bernouilli l.c.) Even the two most likely of them - those in the Capitoline Museum and in the Museum at Naples - are regarded by, for instance, Anton Hekler (in Greek and Roman Portraits (1912) pp. XXXII) as very doubtful identifications. Hekler thinks they are "Julio-Claudian" in period, because of the shadow cast by the overhanging hair on the forehead, but the same detail is found on Brutus' coins.
The name of Marcus Brutus stands among the most prominent of the Roman Republic and its place there was won by a single deed - the murder of Caesar. Because of that deed he inevitably occupies a foremost place in Roman History and because of it also his name found its way into the literature of the world. In that literature he is judged solely on account of that deed, so that those who love Caesar, as Dante did, must hate Brutus, while those like Lucan, Rousseau or Michael Verdung, who hate tyrants must love Brutus. Fortunately for his reputation in the world at large Shakespeare used Plutarch, who had admired Brutus, and it is Shakespeare's picture of him as a noble, selfless patriot, that has become the accepted one. Despite Dante's condemnation of him - he ranks him with Judas Iscariot - the legendary figure of Brutus is that of Shakespeare:

"And Brutus is an honourable man.

This was the noblest Roman of them all

His life was gentle, and the elements so mixed in him that Nature might stand up And say to all the world, "This was a man!"

To set up such a figure, almost perfect in all virtues, was but to ask for the brickbats of classical scholars, and these have not been wanting. Inevitably there began in the modern phrase a "debunking" of Brutus and with equal inevitability the pendulum swung too far in the opposite direction. Among classical scholars, as among lesser mortals, the spirit of partisanship is rife, and they, no less than others, can be led

1. Inferno Canto XXXIV, 65.
by hero-worship into incredible excesses. Curiously those scholars who have been most bitter in their attitude to Brutus have not been the admirers of Caesar. More often they look down with Olympian serenity from the heights that their own hero had attained and smile with condescending pity on his assassin, as an earnest but misguided mortal. The man, for instance, who could see resemblances in Julius Caesar to Jesus Christ could yet describe Brutus as "of more than average honesty." Brutus has suffered more at the hands of Cicero’s partisans, and of these especially the greatest editors of his letters—O. E. Schmidt and Tyrrell and Purser. Boissier has said at the beginning of his chapter on Brutus that the only means by which we may see the true Brutus through the mists of legends and political propaganda that surround him is with the aid of Cicero's letters. Those who know these letters best show how false a judgment can be formed by using them alone.

Schmidt went completely astray in his estimate of Brutus when he thought, quite contrary to the evidence of even Cicero himself, that he was an agent of Caesar in 46 - 45 B.C. and a fanatic in 44 B.C. These two absurdities completely vitiate Schmidt's verdict and render it useless. Yet Schmidt's attitude, though these errors were rejected, was transmitted without loss of passion to the English editors; and from the extreme nature of their opinion and the frequency and vehemence with which it is expressed, they have done much to spread an estimate of Brutus, which is false and quite biased and which, moreover, has created an expectation that any full-length examination of his life would result in a similar levelling of Plutarch's hero—and Shakespeare's—to the dust. The final

judgment I have reached may, therefore, be to some disappoint-
ing. It is at least honest and has striven to be sane.

Tyrrell and Purser can see little in Brutus that is
good at all and even his virtues are used against him. For his
money-lending, his letters to Cicero in 50 B.C. and the
savageness of his agent Scaptius, they heap the bitterest
sarcasm on him and claim that his reputation is the exact
opposite of what it should be; "tradition is rarely so per-
verted as actually to reverse the character of her favourites."
They are made more inimical to him because of the absurd
exaggeration that he betrayed the secret of Pompey's destination
to Caesar after Pharsalus, and say that "Loyalty appears to
have been a virtue unknown to Brutus", - this of a man who
sacred everything for loyalty to his political ideals.

Although they admit that Brutus' hostility towards despotic
power was genuine and sincere and that he honestly held to it,
yet they are prepared to believe that he had motive enough for
murdering Caesar, when he realised that the tyrant "considered
he had already bestowed sufficiently ample favours on" him.

They make scathing remarks about Brutus' failure to achieve
anything in Italy in the months after the murder, quite failing
themselves to appreciate Brutus' circumstances and his policy.
In Asia, they say "he acted like the most ordinary general; he
plundered and pillaged the provincials"; and all the evidence
for that - though there is much against it - is the crazed
conduct of the Xanthians in burning their city, despite their
conqueror's appeals to them. His promise to his soldiers of

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1. vol. III, pp. XXVI - XXXII. : 2. - ib. p. XXXI. : 3. - vol. VI,
p. CXII. cf. p. 451 above. : 4. - In passing it is pertinent to
notice the misuse they make of Aurelius Victor as an authority.
Sometimes they accept his unsupported statements without question
eg. vol. VI, p. CXII, note 164, and, when it suits them, they refuse
without further discussion to believe him, eg. p. CXXII, p. 200.
8. - ibid.
two Greek cities to plunder is not allowed to pass, and they add a final nail to the coffin of his reputation when they claim that he renounced before he died "all belief in the virtue, which he fancied he had sincerely followed". That is also a misstatement. Despite the apparent depth of their feelings towards him they are at a loss to explain how he acquired his reputation not only among later writers but among his contemporaries. They attempt to explain it, while admitting that it still "remains a problem", in a footnote, on the grounds that he was "a striking example of the advantage of keeping an atmosphere", and seem to imagine that he had thrown around himself a kind of haloesque mist, through which men saw him as possessed of virtues and merits which were not in him. They even admit that in this magic manner he deceived "friends and enemies, men of all shades of character from Antony to Massala (who) united in praising him". One envies the confidence of those who think they can see the true nature of a man from written accounts of him at a distance of nearly two thousand years, while his friends and enemies, who saw him live, were completely deceived. There is a saying current among showmen, journalists and other caterers to the public taste that 'you can deceive some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the time, but you can't deceive all of the people all of the time'. Yet Brutus, who "devoted himself... to overmuch study", contrived to succeed where the more worldly wise invariably fail, so that, though possessed of neither real virtue nor merit nor ability, he managed to make all of his contemporaries think he had all three - young men like the
students at Athens, old men like Caesar, Cicero, Atticus and Calvina, friends like Cassius and Labeo, enemies like Antony, the whole body of the Roman people and the large number of Senators, who would trust him and only him as leader of their conspiracy. One can only be surprised at the lack of balance and discretion shown by scholars of such great knowledge and ability as Tyrrell and Purser possessed. They have allowed themselves to be carried away by an initial and natural bias, revolting from the contrast with his reputation of Brutus' financial adventures and his unfriendly attitude towards Cicero in connection with them. Starting from that basis they contrived to turn everything he did to his discredit, than which nothing is easier to do in the case of almost any public man.

Others too have felt the urge to throw Brutus from his pedestal. He has even been described as "that most detestable of all Romans", how harshly and absurdly is obvious when we remember Clodius, Vettius, Appius Claudius and a dozen others. Ferrero although admitting that he possessed certain virtues rare in high society, sobriety, continence and an unusual austerity, showed a high disdain for vulgar ambitions and was reasonably intelligent, regards him nevertheless as "the very opposite of a strong man". He is especially hard on him in his account of the unhappy months after the murder, when he imagines that Brutus did nothing but hamper his associates by his vacillation and want of nerve, and that "in a fit of depression he would abandon an enterprise when it had hardly begun". Nothing is further from the truth and even

5.- III, p. 49 f.
Ferrero admits that in the critical moment of the Ides, when they all thought that Popilius Laenas was giving away their secret to Caesar, it was Brutus "calmer than his colleague" (Cassius), who had the courage to look Caesar for an instant in the face. Like many others Ferrero has failed to understand Brutus' aims, hopes and difficulties after Caesar's death.

G. Walter pillories Brutus in a more recent series of articles which trace his life, with many inaccuracies and wrong deductions, up to the conspiracy.

There have been, however, many scholars who have arrived at less extreme and much truer estimates of Brutus, e.g. d’Addozio, Boissier, Gelzer and others. They base their own opinions in the proper way partly on the recorded opinions of Brutus' contemporaries, partly on a sane and appreciative interpretation of his conduct. The personal opinions of later writers cannot be accepted as valid evidence of Brutus' personality because Caesar and his chief assassin soon became almost legendary figures. But it is significant that the common verdict of these writers, both Roman and Greek, is that apart from the murder, which to them could not be other than an act of impiety, Brutus was a man of most unusual virtue and honour. Aspersions are never cast upon his personal qualities, as they are, for instance, upon Antony's, whose most redeeming feature - his courage - is even doubted. Most significant are the statements of Nicolaus, who most of all might have been expected to submerge his merits and emphasise his faults. He says that Brutus was "second to none in the estimation of the Romans at that time" and Brutus was honoured in his whole life because of his discretion, the renown of his ancestors and the fairness which he was thought to possess."

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{- vol. II, p. 314. : \textsuperscript{2}}\text{- Rev. Quest. Hist. (1934). : \textsuperscript{3}}\text{- Nic. 19. : \textsuperscript{4}}\text{- Nic. 26b.}\]
Though refraining, as a hanger-on of Augustus had to, from
giving his own opinion, he is, nevertheless, unable to avoid
recording the general esteem in which Brutus was held.

We are fortunate in that from various sources, Cicero
and Plutarch in particular, we can gather the views held of
Brutus by many of those who knew him well and thus estimate
with complete certainty what the general attitude towards him
was in his own time. Men older than himself and men of the
first importance saw him as no ordinary youth. When Pompey,
in spite of the uncompromising antipathy Brutus had always
shown towards him, welcomed him with the greatest warmth at
Pharsalus, he indicated the great respect he had for him and
the high value he placed on his support. Caesar gave evidence
of a similar regard for his character and ability, when he
chose him out for special attention after Pharsalus and made
him governor of Gaul and praetor of the city; and the well-known
words he used of him on more than one occasion, "quidquid vult,
valde vult" show that what impressed him most was his obvious
forcefulness and tenacity of purpose. Although Cicero had no
real sympathetic amity with Brutus, even when he was most
indignant with him he was still anxious to preserve his friend-
ship and nothing proves the truth of the rather jealous respect
he felt for him despite their frequent differences of opinion,
than the prominent place he gives him in his literary compositions.
Other men of greater age than himself display a similar attitude
towards Brutus; Atticus, his life-long and adviser, came nearest
for his sake to committing himself to a political faction;

4.- See p. 40f above.  
5.- See p. 124 above.  
6.- See p. 50 and note 1. above.  
7.- See p. 42f above.  
8.- See p. 80 and note 1. above.  
9.- See p. 124 above.
Ligarius was ready to rise from a bed of sickness to share in an enterprise that Brutus led; and the worthy Calvina, Caesar's staunchest supporter and sincerest admirer, was still anxious to preserve the good opinion of Caesar's assassin. Even his greatest enemy had no small admiration for him; Antony considered that he alone of the conspirators had acted against Caesar from purely honourable motives and the magnanimous treatment he gave to his dead body was the outcome of his admiration.

As representative of men younger than himself we make accept the judgments of Asinius Pollio, friend of the Triumvirs, and Messalla Corvinus and L. Sestius, who served Brutus till his death. The former, we are told, handed down an excellent memorial of him in the history that he wrote:

Messalla, besides the admiration he had for Cassius, found it a reason for praising Strato and even for commending him to Augustus that he had been Brutus' nearest friend at his death, while Sestius even under Augustus kept Brutus' memory alive, had images of him in his house and delivered eulogies on him.

The conspirators, more than sixty in number were unanimous that Brutus should lead their enterprise, and to many of them his leadership was a necessary condition of their participation. Even the Roman populace, with whom Brutus had no sympathies and whose character he did not understand, had a sincere respect for him so that to him alone of the conspirators they paid courteous attention when speeches were made after the murder. But nothing better illustrates the worthiness of Brutus' personality than the loyalty of his friends and his gracious

1.- Plut. Brut. 11.  
2.- Cic. Att. XIV, 5, 1.  
4.- ibid. 53, 3.  
5.- Tac. Ann. IV, 34.  
7.- Dio. liii, 32, 4.
acknowledgement of it. Just before he died he said that it gave him great happiness that none of his friends had ever been disloyal to him, and just a few hours before one of them, Lucilius, had deliberately given himself up to the enemy pretending that he was Brutus, so that Brutus might have a chance to avoid capture.

It is impossible to deny that Brutus enjoyed a widespread reputation of the highest kind among his contemporaries. Those who believe that the reputation was false and that they themselves can see Brutus better than his fellows could must be allowed to do so. Others more reasonably will look in his life for the reasons for his reputation and find the elements in his conduct and character on which it was based. His youth was marked by rare austerity and sobriety which made him stand out from his fellows. By nature he was studious and diligent and these qualities became more pronounced as a result of his association with Cato. He had none of the effervescence of youth which is its main attraction and entirely lacked the spirit of good fellowship which makes men popular. Yet he was not despised or scorned as a recluse and bookworm. However little he might share his contemporaries' pleasures, they and their elders had nothing for him but respect and that feeling was engendered by his obvious sincerity. These qualities in particular, austerity, diligence and sincerity, combined with an impressive presence, a forceful personality, a high sense of public duty and distinguished ancestry and family connections made it inevitable that he should play a prominent part in the politics of his time, where especially, austerity, diligence and sincerity were sadly lacking. But they were no guarantee that he would play

1.- Plut. Brut. 52, 2. 2.- ibid. 50. App. IV, 129.
his part successfully, despite the share of more than ordinary intelligence which his philosophical studies show him to have possessed.

It is necessary to say, what I have tried in my account of his life to show, that he never departed from the sincerity, which the ancients claim for him. All through his public career, he acted according to his conscience and whether following Pompey, assisting Caesar the Restorer, murdering Caesar the Tyrant, preserving peace at the expense of personal degradation, or seizing a province without legal sanction, he was doing what he honestly believed to be in the best interests of what he sincerely considered the best form of government. He could and did work hard and diligently and he had the ability to form his own decisions - though he always took long to reach them - and the strength of character to hold to them. The tragedy is that with all the qualities that make for success, his life was from the outset doomed to failure. For his ideas were out of date and those very qualities, which are most to be praised in him, sincerity and constancy, made it impossible for him to form new ideas or even to realise that those he had were no longer sound. Enough has been said already of the reactionary and conservative trend of his thought and these characteristics, frequently to be admired and approved of, were fatal in a politician of his time and generation, where changes were both necessary and inevitable. He was quite out of touch with the real political problems of the day and had no understanding whatever of the vast changes that had been wrought in Rome by the gradual acquisition of an empire overseas. Yet it would be harsh to blame him greatly for that, for not even a handful of his fellows had begun to grasp the true imperial idea. Starting of with a very pronounced bias for
the old system his mind was too ponderous and his wit too slow for him to realise his mistake or readjust his theories, and it is true also that he was too stubborn and proud to have been easily convinced of the need for alteration.

We must look at him further as a provincial governor and as the general of an army. His early attitude towards provincials, as shown by his treatment of his Salaminian debtors, displays an indifference and haughtiness which ill accords with the rest of his reputation. But it is part and parcel of the times he lived in and it accords no better with his later conduct. His government in Gaul, his treatment of Macedonians, Greeks and Lycians show the development in him of a new humanity, a softening of the old values of a proud young noble and the growth of a kindliness which prompts him to make efforts to save the life of a servant's kinsman. Condemn his haughtiness and indifference by all means — and condemn even more the petulant snobbishness towards Cicero which resulted from these — but grant at the same time the later signs of a new grace and gentleness. As a soldier he was even less successful than in politics. Here again he was diligent and hardworking. His fortitude and physical courage are never in question and in his earlier campaigns at least he showed plenty of vigour and enterprise. But he lacked experience and he had no real interest in soldiering. Worse than these he had not the quality of single-mindedness essential to a general, and could not achieve the attitude which subordinates all considerations to the military needs of the moment. Gradually these weaknesses and the anxieties that evolved from them and from other — political and domestic — perplexities undermined his strength of will and weakened his mental powers until at Philippi he was a chastened and nervous shadow of himself.

(1) — Cic.Brut. I, 6,2.
His discipline over his motley troops became in the end negligible, and against his will they forced him to give battle. But none will deny that he died bravely as a Roman should.

Over all his public life he is to be praised for his sincerity, his tenacity of purpose, his faithfulness to duty even unto death - a point which is frequently forgotten - his vigorous pursuit of an approved policy, his conscientious application of the highest moral principles, and his complete unselfishness. On the other scale are the slowness of his mind which made his decisions hard to come by, the stubbornness that made him loth to admit his errors, the ignorance of the world immediately around him and of the men in it that vitiated all his expectations and underlying everything the fatal conservatism of his thought.

In considering the more private elements of his nature we must guard against being too much influenced by the details of Cicero's letters, which, however welcome they may be, present a picture which cannot avoid being one-sided. We see him there haughty and overbearing, conceited and thoughtless, frigid and unsociable. He was certainly all of these at one time or another towards Cicero; but there was much in the latter, especially his instability and flightiness, which Brutus despised and much, like his quick-wittedness and the modernity of his thought, which Brutus could not appreciate. The essential differences in their natures raised a barrier between them and like a true noble Brutus merely stood on his dignity when he failed to understand the sharp-minded parvenu, more intelligent than himself. When Brutus was most distant and aloof towards him, Cicero had mainly his own shameless flattery to thank. They were seldom on easy terms with each other and one thinks with no little pleasure of their meeting at Velia on August 17th 44 B.C., when for a short hour or two
they achieved a true intimacy. With his other friends, of whom in his later life he had not a few, he was on better terms. His women-folks - mother, sisters, and wife - had obviously much affection for him, which they could hardly have felt for one so cold and dislikeable as he is so often shown by Cicero. Indeed his marriage with Porcia, who was so like himself in many ways, is one of the more beautiful things in his life. Towards his other intimates he was kindly and considerate, ever ready to help even the humblest of them. Although not jovial he was not morose and was fond of those dinner parties where intelligent conversation was the most important item.

It seems proper to end this study of him with the same thoughts which were his just before his death. Though far from being a social lion like Caesar, he attracted to himself a circle of friends whose loyalty was proof against all his vicissitudes. Their fidelity and his acknowledgement of it at his death form not only "the most attractive story that is told of Brutus" but also the highest compliment to his personal qualities.