Civil-Military Relations in Developing Nations:
Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta

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ABSTRACT

We have chosen four West African states, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey and Upper Volta, in order to discuss civil-military relations in developing countries. We explore three broad areas of questioning. (1) Are there characteristics common to all developing nations which increase the probability of military intervention? If so, what are the final precipitants contributing to the coups? (2) What is the record of military governments in societies seeking modernization? Are there specific properties of military life which either benefit or inhibit the junta's ability to govern? (3) Why does a military government withdraw from overt political control? What are the prerequisites for a return to the barracks?

First, we note that economic, social, and political factors (in brief, a crisis in economic development, lack of national unity, and weak political institutions) set the scene for the military emerging as the predominant political force in the state. Moreover, there are final precipit specific to each case which further explain the incidence of military intervention. These include the self-appointed mission of the soldier as savior of the nation, intervention in the name of the national interest, and intervention for the safe-guarding of a variety of self-interests.

Secondly, once the military has obtained political power, it faces the same predicaments the previous civilian regimes had been unable to solve. Moreover, the internal characteristics of the military restrict its ability to transform its organization into a government directing social economic, and political development. Three major obstacles include its
lack of legitimacy, lack of political and administrative skills, and lack of cohesion within the army apparatus. We discuss incidences of each and methods by which the juntas attempt to overcome or by-pass these problems. We also discuss the record of the military's economic and financial policies as a gauge to measure the strategic contribution the military may offer to developing countries. We find the record is hardly impressive.

Thirdly, we discuss the process of demilitarisation. The military withdraws from overt political control as a consequence of its failure to form an effective government. There are three pre-conditions before the process of recivilianisation is complete. (1) The military must be willing to return to its barracks. (2) The successor regime must be acceptable to the military. (3) The creation of a civilian regime viable without the support of the military. The first two pre-conditions are invariably fulfilled as the military withdraws from overt political control. However, the final pre-condition is not met as long as the conditions leading to the original coup remain. Thus, the political life of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta remains subject to military intervention and other forms of military blackmail for an indefinite period of time.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The armed forces of former British West Africa trace their origins to the constabularies commissioned by trading companies and colonial administrators during the late nineteenth century. With the advent of the Ashanti Wars and fears of French intrusion into Nigeria, the forces from Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia were drawn together to form the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). In French West Africa black troops were first recruited for the conquest of the Soudan. These troops served directly in the metropolitan army according to the French policy of assimilation. The RWAFF fought in East Africa during World War I and in Burma in World War II; the French West African forces fought in Europe and overseas during the World Wars and also in Indo-China and Algeria during the wars for independence. Otherwise, the forces both in British and French West Africa acted with the colonial civil service in the maintenance of law and order. These two roles gave a paradoxical image to these forces: the experience outside his homeland opened the soldier's eyes to social and political changes taking place in other underdeveloped areas and he returned home to express these ideas; his punitive duties with the colonial administration adversely affected his prestige within the community.

With the coming of independence, the individual regiments of the RWAFF returned to their respective states to form the nucleus of
the national armies. In French West Africa, national forces were created by dividing up the existing regiments of the French army according to the origin of their personnel. The shift in roles from the agents of an imperial power to that of the embodiment of national sovereignty was a delicate move on the part of these forces. Although the role of the army had been designated as protector of the new independent state, the armies in several West African states have overthrown the civilian political authorities. The coup d'état has become an established phenomenon: no less than twenty have taken place in Africa since 1963. Therefore, a vital area of study of African politics is the nature of civil-military relations in these countries. This, at best, is difficult to define, particularly in societies in which civilian and military institutions operate within ambiguous areas of competence. However, in order to understand the role of the armed forces in these states, it is necessary to examine military governments and their impact on the social, political, and economic systems of their countries. This thesis is a survey of the role of the armed forces with a special reference to Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta.

In the following chapters we will investigate three separate but inter-related areas of questions concerning the role of the military in developing countries. The first is the question of the causes of military coups. Are there general characteristics common to all developing nations which increase the probability of military intervention? If so, what are the final precipitants contributing to the coups? Secondly, what is the record of military governments in
societies seeking modernization? Are there specific properties of military governments which inhibit or benefit their ability to govern? Finally, why does a military government withdraw from overt political control? What are the prerequisites for a return to the barracks?

A useful point of departure, therefore, in our study of military governments is to examine the economic, social, and political backdrop of the states experiencing military rule. In Chapter II, we will attempt to discern a basic pattern in the countries under examination here. First it can be demonstrated that these states were all suffering from grave economic and financial problems which the civilian political authorities were either unable or unwilling to rectify. Secondly, these states contained highly diverse component groups. In short, a sense of nationhood had not yet developed to offset the centrifugal forces of ethnic and regional blocs. Those groups who were politically active were becoming more and more stringgent in their demands to the central political institutions. Thirdly, we find that the political institutions of the states were unable to mediate or moderate the group political activity or to satisfy the demands of the politically mobilized stratum in the society. Thus, the governments came to rely increasingly on coercive tactics to rule and to maintain their position of power.

This broadly describes the pre-coup conditions of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta. However, these characteristics could also apply to other African states not experiencing military rule. It is necessary, therefore, to discuss final precipitants which could
further explain the incidence of military intervention. These precipitants are specific for each case and include three categories: the self-appointed providential mission of the soldier as savior of the nation; intervention in the name of the national interest; and intervention for the safeguarding of sectional self-interests. The first two categories are closely related and were often used by the military leaders as justification for their intervention. The final category which includes action to protect or advance the interests of the military, sections of the military, personalities, or particular groups in the society are generally identifiable precipitants in each instance of military take-over. In Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta, we will find that given the social, economic, and political backdrop, the military intervened with little or no resistance from the population for a variety of sectional self-interests.

The limit of our discussion in Chapter II is that it relies heavily on ex post facto causal analysis. The danger here is the invalidity of single-cause analysis. The dilemma is the complexity of multiple causation in that it is impossible to identify and examine all the inter-relations of a large number of factors. Thus, what we resort to is the case study in an attempt to show why military intervention was likely to occur in these states. The use of such case studies as predictive devices is dubious at best.

Once the military achieves political control, it finds itself faced with the same predicaments the previous civilian leaders had been unable to correct. This leads to our second area of questioning:
What strategic contribution can the military offer as governor of a developing nation? We will turn our attention to this in Chapter III. Here the internal characteristics of the armed forces create additional handicaps affecting its ability to direct social, economic, and political development.

The first impediment of military government arises from its method of achieving power. Its seizure of power is facilitated by its control over the instruments of violence (whether openly deployed or tacitly threatened) and by the organizational format designed to carry out military objectives (i.e., combat and combat preparation). While this makes it a relatively simple matter for the military to seize political control, it is rather more difficult for them to govern relying on the use of force. The military government is illegal. While legality is an ambiguous question in these states, the military government still seeks to legitimize its position. There are two practical reasons for such a policy: (1) rule by force alone increases the probability of a challenge from any contender who feels he has the necessary strength; and (2) rule by force alone is not an economical means of securing obedience of the population on a long-term arrangement. Beyond this, there was a desire on the part of the juntas to obtain international recognition for their regime.

However, the very nature of the military impedes its ability to secure a base of support among the population. The military officer lacks the expertise in verbal skills, bargaining, negotiation, compromise, and mass appeals. Instead, he has been trained to operate within an organized environment with little or no contact with outside clients.
In his distrust for such political maneuver, the officer is unable to supply political leadership to the civilian populace necessary in the formation of stable government.

There are ways, however, employed by the junta in an attempt to organize public support and to gain legal status. We shall discuss instances of each in Chapter III. Constitutional proclamations are issued at the outset of each military government which are designed to lend an air of constitutionality to the junta, and at the same time, to guarantee the support of the civil service and the judiciary in the day-to-day business of government. In other cases, notably in Ghana, there are appeals to traditional values in seeking respectability. The ubiquitous commission of inquiry is employed to discredit the ousted regime, thereby granting the junta acceptability as a popular alternative, and also involving citizens through their participation and evidence. Moreover, a series of non-partisan organizations might emerge to attract public participation meanwhile directing this civic activity along lines the military feels suitable. Finally, since opposition does appear, military governments rely freely on standard forms of coercion; curtailment of the freedom of speech, censorship of the press, arrest, detention, exile, and the banning of all civilian political activity are a monotonous repertoire in the conduct of military governments.

A second major factor limiting the military's effectiveness in government is its administrative weakness and its inability to provide policy-guidelines for the administration of the country.
At first glance, it would appear that the military could form a well-ordered bureaucracy for a developing nation. The army in Africa is often the forerunner in the technological field. Its organizational format is hierarchial, centralized, ordered on an elaborate system of rules and regulations, and held together by a highly developed \textit{esprit de corps}. Even if this description of military organization were entirely accurate in regards to African armies, the potential advantages of such are circumscribed. The character of the military, based on its function of combat and combat preparation, is not directly transferable to large-scale organizational planning and management. Although a larger proportion of officers are currently assigned to staff duties as opposed to field appointments, their experience is meagre in comparison with their civil servant counterparts.

While the army has proven to be adequate in managing its own affairs or in maintaining law and order within a state, its resources are over-taxed while attempting to deal with the problems of a developing nation which include agricultural and industrial planning, budgetary regulation, economic management and the like. The army in this situation turns to the trained bureaucracy already established within the state. This symbiotic relationship is readily formed due to the colonial heritage and westernized outlook of both the institutions, but more importantly due to the seminal role of the civil service in developing nations. However, there are inherent dangers in this arrangement. Due to the political inadequacies of the army officers, the junta cannot provide policy-guidelines for the bureaucrat's
activities. Thus the civil service takes on an exceptionally strong role in policy decision-making beyond their administrative functions. The position of the civil service is greatly strengthened while in coalition with the junta. Not only are their demands as a privileged high-consumption group a threat to the junta's effectiveness, but their entrenchment in the role of policy-maker also impedes the future development of civilian political institutions.

The final problem which the junta faces during its years in power is the cleavages within the armed forces. This has a decided detrimental effect on its ability to form a stable government. In order to understand the causes and effects of the lack of cohesion, it is necessary to study the composition and career structure of the armed forces in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta.

The development of an officer corps of most African states is a recent phenomenon. The first African officers were commissioned less than a decade prior to independence. This rapid Africanization causes several problems. Since the officer corps was recently formed, it is small. This restricts its capacity as a government particularly with the loss of officers during the coup or the shuffling off of questionable officers to foreign posts. The officer corps is further reduced with the absorption of officers into governmental posts. There are not enough officers to "colonize" the civil service, but those who do take on posts in the military government are split from those still attached to the army proper, particularly when those still in direct contact with the army organization feel they are deprived of the benefits
enjoyed by the junta members. As a result, the small officer corps is limited in the differentiation and specialization of roles necessary for political organization.

The second problem of rapid Africanization is the rapid growth rate of the African officer corps since independence. This expansion has a detrimental effect on the training process of young cadets. Rather than adopting all the values and beliefs of the modern institutions, the army men retain links with their regions or ethnic groups. These men still judge themselves and others in part by local criteria. This is manifested by the formation of cliques within the army along regional and ethnic lines and these cliques may act to protect or advance the interests of these extra-military groups.

A third aspect of Africanization is the distortion of the age structure and promotional pattern within the officer corps. The rapid promotion of African officers to fill the posts left vacant by the departing colonial army is blocked within a few years. The frustration of the junior and middle-level officers compounded by the difference in training (i.e. those trained locally or who came up through the ranks and those sent abroad to train) serves as a focal point of instability particularly when this is aggravated by grievances from other sources.

The rank and file of these armies are also marked by a lack of unity. An ethnic imbalance is evident; the rank and file are generally drawn from the poorer, more remote areas. Here, as in the case of the officer corps, the ethnic and regional differences serve as outlets for a whole array of problems both within the army and within the wider socio-political context. Thus, neither the officer corps nor
the rank and file presents itself as a monolithic unit and the internal splits of the military organization impedes its ability to maintain power or to govern effectively.

These problems - legitimacy, administrative weaknesses, and internal cleavages - are characteristic of the military governments of West Africa to varying degrees. They appear to be endemic to military rule as they stem from the characteristics of the social, economic, and political environment of West Africa as well as from the history and character of the military apparatus. In Chapter III, we will discuss these problems as they relate to Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta and attempt to discern the similarities and explain the peculiar differences of our case studies.

The economy is a vital area of concern in developing nations and as such, we will use the military's record in economic and financial affairs as a gauge to measure the strategic contribution of the military to development. The juntas are limited in their ability to give overall direction to the economy first by the low level of administrative skills, lack of adequate goals or overall policy, and deficiencies in personnel; and secondly, due to the catastrophic economic situation inherited from the previous regimes. In all four states, the military has been able to forestall bankruptcy. However, only in Upper Volta is the military able to do more than place the economy on a "care and maintenance" basis. The military's economic policies in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey is not only detrimental to the long-term welfare of these countries, but it is also an issue seized upon by sections of the civilian population as
well as sections of the army as a focal point for their opposition to the juntas. In Chapter IV, we will discuss the economic policies of the juntas in our four case studies.

Our final area of concern in this thesis is the process of demilitarization of politics. Here we pose two questions: Why will the military withdraw to its barracks? What are the pre-conditions of such a withdrawal?

The possibility of military disengagement from overt political control comes as a result of three conditions. First, the original coup-making group has broken up with growing personal and policy differences growing among the military leaders. Secondly, there is growing dissent within the military organization. Thirdly, it is increasingly apparent that the military regime is unable to deal with the problems of a developing nation. In this thesis, we will show that these three phenomena are evident in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and less so in Upper Volta. The stability brought on by the shock effect of direct military action against the former regime soon deteriorates. However, before the juntas do withdraw from political control, three pre-conditions must be satisfied. First, the armies must be willing to withdraw and return to their barracks. This may be a result of the fear of destroying the reputation of the armed forces in light of its continuing failure to answer the demands required of a government of a developing nation or a fear that the military apparatus will be further dismembered during its role in political control or a fear of a growing civilian opposition to extended military rule. Secondly, the successor regime
must be acceptable to the military. It feels this necessary in order to protect itself from reprisals if friends of the ousted regime regained power and in order to retain a preponderant voice in the successor government, thereby guaranteeing the army's privileged position. The final pre-condition for re-civilianization of politics is the creation of a civilian regime viable without the support and approval of the military. In Chapter V we will discuss these three pre-conditions in relation to the empirical data available concerning the return to civilian rule. We will discover that the first two pre-conditions are invariably fulfilled. However, these pre-conditions lead only to the withdrawal of the military from overt political control. It is the creation of civilian political institutions viable without the support of the military which is a prerequisite for the complete demilitarization of politics. However, it appears that this pre-condition has not been met. We will see, therefore, that the period of military rule does not solve the problem which leads to military intervention in the first place. There still remains the problem of building political institutions which command the effective support of the civilian population. As long as the conditions leading to the original coup remain, there is a greater probability that the military, given a final impetus, will intervene again.

We have chosen four West African states in order to examine the role of the military in developing countries. This introduction has been a brief survey of the discussion in the following chapters. We will follow the course of military involvement in politics beginning with the conditions leading to coups d'état through the record of military
government to the final withdrawal of the military from overt political control. Perhaps the greatest handicap in this study is the difficulty of obtaining verifiable information. There is either a proliferation of data as in the case of Ghana or the paucity of study concerning Upper Volta. The gap in available empirical data is, unfortunately, too obvious in this work and frustrates comparative analysis. Furthermore, we must be aware of the danger of generalizations. Nonetheless, it is hoped that these case studies will provide some useful guidelines toward a broader theory of civil-military relations in African states.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND AND MOTIVES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

The last five years or so have been characterised by a spate of articles, monographs, and books on the role of the military in Africa. Much of the literature, however, is confined to either a general description of the army or to a catalogue of coups in Africa. There is a growing realization that although such studies have yielded interesting facts, we are still a long way from formulating meaningful generalizations about the military in Africa. Accordingly, what we propose to do in this chapter is to present a background to the military intervention in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey and Upper Volta in the light of a general discussion of the economic, social, and political systems of developing countries and to delineate the similarities or peculiar characteristics of the final motivations behind the military interventions.

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By the early 1960's, France and Great Britain had transferred political power in their West African colonies into the hands of an African political elite. The ability of these African leaders to retain this political power and to create a stable political system depended to a large extent on their capability to meet the demands of economic development and national unity.¹ Thus since there appears to be a set of

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economic and social facts which underlie political events and determine the pattern of politics, we must first examine the characteristics of the economic and social structures of developing nations in West Africa. Then we will proceed to a brief discussion of the trend of politics in these states since independence.

The Economic Structure

The economy of West African states can be summed up in the word "under-developed", and the consequences of the underdevelopment have had serious repercussions in the political stability of these states. There are three sources of the fragile economic situation: the physical or natural impediments; the colonial system of exploitation; and the limited alternatives for economic development available to independent African governments coupled with their inability or unwillingness to break from the colonial economic pattern.

What has been termed the "curse of Black Africa" reads as an account of seemingly insurmountable obstacles to economic growth. The list includes the remoteness of large interior areas combined with the difficulty of overland movement and problem of navigating rivers from the sea inland, large areas with restricted productivity due to climatic handicaps (particularly inadequate and unreliable rainfall), the vast extent of poor to mediocre soils, the low quality of natural vegetation, and the presence of harmful animals, insects, and organisms.1 These

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problems have led to the under-population of large tracts in contrast to densely settled "islands" through West Africa, the serious and widespread malnutrition of the population, and a wide variety of debilitating diseases. Nonetheless, there has been considerable optimism that these conditions can be conquered, particularly in view of the untapped reserves of minerals and energy, the advances made possible with modern agricultural techniques, and the wise and dedicated action from Africans and developed nations, both East and West.¹

In what manner the African economy would have evolved if left alone cannot be answered. It was the colonial occupation which established the economic structure of these states and set into motion a cycle of poverty in West Africa. Under colonial rule, the economies of the territories were geared to meet the basic European need for primary products. Thus, the colonial administration introduced and encouraged the production of cash crops such as cocoa, palm products, and ground nuts by African farmers while the import-export trade in the colonies remained a European monopoly. This development brought significant changes to the structure of the economy.

The colonial cash crop system in West Africa included several inherent drawbacks for future economic development. There was an overemphasis on one export for revenue. Those areas suited for cash crop cultivation or which were mineral rich as well as the trade and administrative centres were the primary receptors of investment capital.

while the other regions were virtually ignored. This resulted in uneven regional development throughout the colonies and was to be a source of friction between the "have-some" and "have-nothings" within each country. This emphasis on cash crops, moreover, was to the detriment of food stuff production. Some colonies were no longer self-sufficient in food and the expensive importation of basic supplies was necessary. Furthermore, the lack of a food surplus meant there was not a readily available, inexpensive food supply for an urban population.

There was not an agricultural backbone on which to build a manufacturing sector in the colonies. There was, anyway, little investment for the introduction of industrialization, particularly to meet the demand for consumer goods by the money-earning African. Consequently, this demand for consumer products could be met only by increased imports. Therefore, the lack of diversity of production resulted in the increased reliance on imported goods, both food stuffs and manufactured products. Moreover, the goods were imported solely by and from the colonial power.

This was also the case for the export of the cash crop. The dependence on one market, the Western nations, left the African producer at the mercy of world market fluctuations. It was difficult for them to control their economy since the factors influencing it were external and in the hands of the colonizing nation.

Thus we may characterize the "classical" colonial economies of West Africa as severely limited in their range of products, sources of capital and markets, and as predominantly agrarian, with production in the hands of peasant farmers.

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(1) Post, p. 121.
Although France and Great Britain aimed to increase the development of their colonies through the post-World War II programmes of the Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social des Territoires d'Outre-Mer (FIDES) and the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, little was changed. At independence, the West African states remained as producers of raw materials with an import-export dependence on the West. The new African governments pledged themselves to economic development but how were they going to increase their countries' economic resources and their control over ways in which these resources were disposed?

The search for methods of economic development more often centred on the adoption of a creed of "African socialism" and on a reverence for economic planning. Since the group of African entrepreneurs with capital to invest was limited, the state was to play a role in economic development and the economic plan was to be a yearly guideline to success. After the early years of independence had passed, however, these states found themselves with little indication of economic growth and the growth indices negated by a rapidly expanding birth rate. The failure was largely a reflection of the inability or unwillingness of the governments to change the structure of the economy or to break radically with the basic patterns laid down in colonial times.

The nature of the import-export trade was a major obstacle. There were attempts to diversify trading partners in order to break with the monopoly of the old colonial powers, but this was no easy task while all the import-export machinery was directed to the colonial
market system. Attempts to induce trade among African states were of limited success as long as these states were primary producers. Moreover, the dependence on one export product left these states susceptible to world market prices. Yet, since this was their source of revenue, increased production appeared the only means to increase capital. More often this led to a flooding of the world market supplies and a drop in prices. The African farmer was producing more in order to keep his income stable or only to see it drop. Poverty and economic stagnation replaced the early optimism for economic independence.

The answer, it seemed, was the diversification of production, primarily the build up of secondary economic activities. In order to do so, all machinery, fuel oil, construction material, as well as expertise, had to be imported. The result: an exhausted foreign exchange reserve, an adverse balance of trade, and debt. Attempts to check the deteriorating economic state through selective tariffs, monetary exchange controls, and austerity measures were only partially successful.

While much of the blame for the unsound economic situation in West Africa can be laid at the colonial doorstep, the economic priorities of the post-independence regimes also contributed to the emerging economic and financial crisis. Much planning, particularly the massive expenditure on infrastructure, although a necessary base for further development, did not yield immediate benefits for the nation as a whole. The misuse of public funds by government officials for their personal use as well as a penchant for showy projects were common and prolific. Large debts were incurred with little productivity achieved. On top of this, the
institutions of economic development and financial control - state trading corporations, development banks, etc. - led to a greater bureaucratic muddle, corruption, and more and more of the budget spent on salaries. And, perhaps of greatest detriment to the population was the neglect of the agricultural sector for the production of necessary food stuffs and the lack of encouragement of small-scale industries in order to concentrate on large-scale, unproductive and ostentatious schemes.¹

By the mid-sixties, the political elite were far from being able to control the economic situation of their countries. The economic morass was an underlying feature to the collapse of the civilian regimes and the take-over by the armies who were, however, no more able to answer the demands of economic development than were their civilian counterparts.²

The Social Structure

At independence, the former colonial boundaries were accepted as the geographical base for political power. The task then was how to create a national unit within borders containing multiple diverse component groups. Although the degree of fragmentation varied from state to state, it is possible to examine the nature of West African social systems as viewed as a general division between a large peripheral "traditional" sector and a small central "modern" sector. This is a simplistic conception of the society within a state, and although useful for analytical purposes, it must be noted that there were numerous cross-cutting and over-lapping

¹ See René Dumont.
² Post, p. 138.
variables which determined the social order.

In the rural areas of Africa where subsistence agriculture has survived as the dominant means of livelihood, social differentiation is largely a function of geographic and ethnic considerations. In many instances, the value systems are promoted and controlled by the traditional institutions of kinship and ethnic group rather than by the "modern" institutions of the state. These institutions, therefore, often act independent of the sanctions of the central state organization for effectiveness and legality. Although the central government may claim to extend its authority throughout these peripheral areas, there can be no doubt that the traditional structure also carries out the regulation of some economic affairs, personal status, and other political functions.1

The people in the rural areas have at various times been brought tangentially into the political conflicts of the centre. During the independence momentum, parties appealed to the periphery for votes. Combined with the rapid spread of universal suffrage, the result was often the politicization of primordial ties.2 However, the appeal of political leaders to the people in the "traditional" sector often included ethnic or regional particularisms and often resulted in a heightened awareness of ethnic and regional distinctions among the people in the periphery. This does not mean, therefore, that the central institutions have gained acceptance in the periphery, but rather that these peripheral groups may join the competition for the resources the centre may offer. The central government may receive pressure for demands for

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(2) ibid, p.22.
greater share of the national budget for development schemes or for greater status devolved to the traditional elite from peripheral areas acting as regional or ethnic blocs.

The centre is the small core of the population comprised of individuals who propound the "modern" value and beliefs instilled in the machinery of modern state politics and market economic activity. Social status at the centre is determined by income and occupation, although as we shall discuss, "traditional" elements such as regionalism, ethnicity, and family ties retain their vitality.

Contained in the centre are two groups that may be loosely categorised as the "middle class" and the "proletariat" including the "lumpen-proletariat". The origins of these groups are found in the colonial economic structure - the production and export of cash crops and the administration of the colonies as profitable economic enterprises.

First, a "middle-class" emerged. What would be termed a rural middle class was found in the areas in which African farmers pursued cash crop production. Linking these farmers to the large European-controlled import-export firms was a group of local middle men, the small retail traders. Furthermore, as towns grew up around the colonial administrative centres and ports of trade, a group of Africans, taking advantage of new educational opportunities, entered new careers such as clerking, the civil service, and the professions (including doctors, lawyers, teachers, and in the years leading to independence, a new group of upper level military

personnel). These individuals inculcated European beliefs and values both through the process of Western education and through their career experiences. However, in spite of the fact that these groups were nominally middle-class in occupation and out-look, they hardly formed a monolithic "modern" unit in direct juxtaposition to the "traditional" periphery. Several ties of a "traditional" nature were strong points of cross-group identification. First, ethnic and regional identification both blurred the edges of social stratification based on economic activity and in other cases, re-enforced "class" demands. For example, the civil service and the military, while internalizing Western norms, continued to act in part on the basis of family and ethnic links. On the other hand, ethnic and regional identification tended to re-enforce divisions based on "class" status. For example, where one region was the centre of cash crop production, regional and class interests coincided. Thus, there was often an element of regionalism and ethnicity in agrarian discontent (e.g. the Ashanti cocoa farmers in Ghana). Furthermore, those ethnic groups in whose area colonial administrative centres developed and who were thus the first groups to benefit from the educational and employment opportunities made available in the colonial system continued to manifest a certain pretention based on a high position within what can be considered an inter-ethnic organization of social stratification. These same groups may also unite along ethnic lines to oppose the influx of other Africans entering the towns in search of employment. In Sierra Leone, however, there is a unique situation with the Creole population in and around Freetown. The ex-slaves, returning from

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(1) Zolberg, pp.70-72.
Great Britain had no up-country ties and thus acted as a whole to oppose any increased role of the indigenous Africans in the "modern" economic and political activity of the country which would threaten the Creoles' privileges.

Secondly, a generational split developed among the "middle-class" Africans. With the opening of educational opportunities in post-World War II West Africa, more and more individuals with educational and occupational qualifications appeared on the scene. However, after the rapid Africanization of governmental jobs with independence, both this and other job markets were restricted and often closed. This new generation was less affected by colonial norms than by the social, economic, and political changes in these countries moving toward independence as opposed to the experiences of the older generation. The tensions between the generations easily spilt over into the political sphere as demands for security of positions from the older generation conflicted with the young men's demands for job opportunities and promotion.

In conclusion, we can note that a "middle-class" based on types of economic activity did develop as a result of colonial rule in Africa. However, this "middle-class" was divided along ethnic, regional, and generational lines. The demands of this group which was shaped both by "modern" and "traditional" criteria were to have important consequences for the move to independence and afterwards.

(1) ibid., p. 74.
The colonial system also gave rise to an African "proletariat". This was a result of the increased mobility made possible by rail roads and feeder roads devised for cash crop export and by the job opportunities made available in the cash crop system. There was large scale seasonal migration from the hinterland to the agricultural and mining centres and which has become a permanent feature in West Africa. The transport system facilitated the African's travel to new urban areas. It was, more importantly, a drive to earn money and thus to gain access to the consumer money-earning society that brought individuals from the rural areas to the new towns. There were profound social consequences of the rapid urbanization both for the country-side and the city. It hastened the decline of the rural areas where over-population had not been a cause of poverty and created the problems of the cities: poverty and unemployment. This African "proletariat" was a small group owing to the lack of industrialization in the colonies. The individuals filled the low wage jobs (e.g. construction work, menial labour, house boys for the colonial officials, etc.) or joined the rank of the unemployed.

Nor was this "proletariat" identified by its economic base alone. Tribal and kinship links remained strong for the urban labourer. Many came to cities seeking temporary wage-paying jobs; the young men often arrived without their families and expected to return to their villages eventually. Not only did these men keep close contact with their "traditional" setting but they would also form associations while in the city with members of their ethnic groups. Thus, "traditional" values

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would often take precedence over the "modern" institutions. The fact that the urban dweller might not accord complete legitimacy to the central authorities coupled with a growing frustration over the lack of economic benefits was to create in the urban "proletariat" a potential political problem, particularly to the leaders of the independent African state wishing to remain in political control.

The demands of the "middle class" and the "proletariat" at the centre were sources of political activity and agitation. Yet, as we have noted, the concept of "class" in the Western sense is of limited applicability in West Africa. A major reason for this is that the economy remains relatively undifferentiated. While some areas set the pace by producing cash crops or as the location of colonial administration, subsistence agriculture remained the principle economic activity of the large peripheral areas. Those groups emerging with new types of economic activity were small and the class divisions embryonic. Moreover, the importance of social stratification introduced with colonialism was circumscribed by colonial dominance in the political and economic spheres. Finally, and perhaps most relevant, considerations other than class economic interests, such as regionalism and ethnicity, while increasingly reinforced by economic factors, were influential in group identification and often cross-cut any consciousness of class.¹

If, however, we are to identify and discuss the strata of the population which were active in the political life of the country, we would recognize them as emerging primarily from the groups at the centre

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¹ Post, p. 43.
(although the traditional elite also played a substantial role both as leaders in the peripheral areas and in their relations with the central political institutions.) To define the groups engaged in political activity, therefore, is to include those, no matter what class, who were in contact with the modern values and institutions of the central authority and who were actively participating in politics in the government; in opposition groups; in interest groups; and in party affairs. This group of the centre engaged in political activity is small in proportion to the country's population and, as such, political conflict is confined to a small stratum of society.

From this politically active stratum of society emerged the political elite, those actually in control of the political institutions. Once again it is difficult to equate the political elite with one economic class because of the vaguely defined class structure and the incongruence between personal wealth and political power in West Africa (particularly with the economic wealth of the country remaining largely in the hands of expatriates). However, the history of struggles for political power in West African states reveals that although the national movements were directed more against the colonial power than for the advantage of one particular group in society, the early political leaders rose from the professional "middle-class" elements. These well-educated Africans attempted to protect their privileged positions in the modern centre but were only partially successful as they did not hold the ultimate control over the political institutions in the colonial

(1) ibid., p.44.
system. With the post-War expansion of education, a new group aspiring to political leadership emerged from rather humble origins - school teachers, clerks, etc.¹ These newcomers, with their desire for status and benefits of political leadership, specialized in mass appeals which, as we stated previously, included ethnic and other "traditional" particularisms to bring the various components of the society onto a party bandwagon. As the prize of the control of an independent government was to be awarded to that party which could present the most "national" face, a tenuous national front was pulled together in the struggle for independence.

However, the very nature of the political movements - the fact that they were put together with a disparate coalition of many interest groups - militated against the establishment of a stable permanent national unity.²

**Political Trends**

Once independence was achieved, the political elite was left with the problem of governing a developing nation, and, what was to become their dominant criterion for action, maintaining their elite position. In the first place, there was considerable difficulty for these leaders whose political experience had been limited to an anti-colonial conflict to switch their tactics to the proclaimed modernization goals.

Furthermore, the institutions of government which had been super-imposed on the country by departing colonial officials were unsuitable instruments

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² Zolberg, *Creating Political Order*, p. 36.
by which the African political elite could direct development. Secondly, the elite were basically insecure in their positions of political power. They had risen rapidly to their newly acquired privileges and status which were determined by their position of controlling politics. They wanted to stay there. However, as politics was one of the few lucrative careers in a developing nation, given the paucity of other career opportunities, the political elite confronted constant pressure from rival aspirants for political power and the benefits of political power. Opposition groups resurfaced in force after the lull of the early years of independence. The opposition included demands from the older generation of politicians who had been defeated during the mass independence movement. Other "middle-class" groups such as trade unions, civil service, cash crop farmers pressed their demands for increased economic advantage. The military, by this time, had emerged as a politicized group pushing for increased privileges and voice in political affairs. The armed forces as members of the politically active population formed alliances with other groups for mutual advantage or traded off goals in return for support from other groups. "Social, political, and economic factors intrude into the military spheres ... the army exchanges functional autonomy for political influence." Meanwhile, the growing frustration of the urban worker was giving rise to increased demands for the benefits that only the political incumbents seemed to enjoy. All these groups' demands focused on the central political institutions as these were the only

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(2) S.R. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p.211.
source of rewards in terms of status and privileges at the centre. However, with the deteriorating economic conditions, the political elite were hard put to satisfy demands from these politicized groups much less to direct the pace of socio-political change. There was a widening gap between the leader's ideological aspirations and their capacity to formulate and implement their policies.

In what manner did the political leaders attempt to deal with the opposition threatening their positions? More often than not, the political elite came to rely increasingly on severe negative sanctions for compliance with governmental policies. However, the government in a high-coercion system, according to Apter, becomes less accountable for its activities and consequently political life attains a conspiratorial quality full of opportunism, corruption, error, and incompetence.¹

Although no African rulers have ever abandoned completely their reliance on the techniques of machine politics to maintain themselves in office, illustrations of trend toward the use of force abound and by now constitute a monotonous recitation of unpleasant but familiar facts of African political life: intimidation, exile, detention, or assassination of political opponents, modification of the electoral system to make competition impossible or at least very costly to those who attempt to engage in it; reduction of the independence of the judiciary or creation side-by-side with it of dependable political courts; redefinition of loyalty to unquestionable obedience and sycophancy; the use of the military, the police, and of political thugs to bulldoze dissidents into passivity and passives into demonstrative supporters; creation of additional quasi-military or quasi-police bodies to offset the questionable loyalty of the existing ones.²

Thus there were no legal means through which to channel the demands of the politically active stratum, there were no effective

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political institutions capable of moderating or mediating group political activity, and there was no agreement on legal and authoritative methods of resolving the conflict among the groups. The politically active groups faced each other nakedly and employed means of direct action on the political scene which were peculiar to their nature and capabilities (e.g. the workers strike, the students riot, and the mobs demonstrate). These become the principal means of bringing pressure upon the civilian regime. In reaction, the regime moves further from rule based on authority to rule based on force.

At this point, the military may become the predominant actor on the political scene. The armed forces use the ultimate means of bringing pressure on the regime, i.e. the coup. "It is however, usually a reaction to or a product of other types of political action by other groups ... military intervention is one strand in a complex pattern of direct action techniques."2

In developing nations, the overthrow of civilian regimes by the military is thus a response to the escalation of social conflict by several groups when personal frustrations of the coup leaders coincide with lines of conflict within the society and when there is a decline in the institutions effectiveness and legitimacy of whatever political/may exist. The coup is an extreme exercise of direct action against the civilian regime. By removing the regime, it reduces other forms of direct action. An immediate after-effect of a coup may be the reduction of the level of conflict and at least a short-term demobilization of the groups from

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(1) Huntington, p. 196.
(2) ibid, p. 212.
politics as they retire to wait upon the course of events. The military
take-over will have a temporary stabilizing effect on the political system.
However, the coup can only bring short-term relief. The causes for military
intervention are endemic to the political system. They cannot be remedied
by simply eliminating people. In addition, once the army does overthrow
the civilian regime, the military’s relationship to the political system
is forever altered. Institutional and personal self-interest combine
to make the coup leaders fearful of the retaliation they may face if these
civilian political elite are allowed to return to power. Thus, the
incentives to intervene are re-doubled and the army is irreversably
committed to prevent the return of these civilians to complete political
control. As Thucydides wrote of Athens:

For by this time your empire has become a Despotism
(Tyrannus) a thing which it is considered unjust
to acquire, but which can never be safely surrendered.¹

* * * * * * *

We have discussed the importance of economic and social factors
which shape the political events in the new states of Africa and which set
the scene for military intervention. In such states, military inter¬
vention takes the form of overtly over-turning a civilian regime and either
installing another civilian regime or itself in its place. However, the
final impetus driving the military further and further into the political
arena is related to specific events in each state. There are several
final motives behind a military take-over.² First, "manifest destiny" or

¹ Quoted in Gilbert Murray, Euripides and His Age
² S.E. Finer, Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press,
1962), pp. 23-60.
the providential mission of the military as saviors of their countries is an oft quoted justification for the army's intervention. As the army is theoretically uninvolved with party politics; as it is the symbol of national sovereignty; as it is indoctrinated with the spirit of nationalism, the army could assume a sacred duty to move in and "save the nation". It is difficult to prove this as a motive as there is generally an abundance of evidence to show that the military had other, less altruistic, reasons for their intrusion into politics.

The second hypothetical motivation for intervention is in the name of national interest. In this instance, the military takes on a role of custodian and claims to have intervened to veto specific decisions made by the civilian authorities. The junta states that it has taken control temporarily to allow the people to choose new leaders. There may be difficulty in differentiating between motives of "saving the nation" and acting in the "name of the national interest". However, in both cases, once the military is in power, it finds it is "riding the tiger's tail" and it is increasingly difficult for the army to relinquish its power until its interests are safe-guarded.

The final group of motives are those of sectional interests. First, the army may intervene on behalf of a specific group within the state with which it feels a common interest (eg. the privileged, high consumption labour unions). Secondly, regional self-interest may play a part, particularly if the army displays an ethnic imbalance in its composition or command structure. Another form of sectional interest is action to protect the corporate self-interest of the armed forces.
Here the military insists that it has the right to determine matters affecting the armed forces not only in the area of equipment, training, and recruitment, but also in domestic and foreign policy. A fourth and final form of sectional interest is individual or material self-interest. When the army or a section of the army either feels a personal animosity to its leaders (civilian or military) or feels it is relatively under-privileged in terms of status or remuneration or that these privileges are being threatened, it will intervene.

It is not always possible to classify the individual coups into any one category. The motivations for intervention are mixed; a coup is rarely monocausal. Nevertheless, in the remainder of this chapter, we will discuss the economic, social, and political background of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta and attempt to show some of the final precipitants for military intrusion into the political process in light of our opening remarks on developing countries. We will examine each country separately and then compare the different situations.

Ghana

The Convention People's Party (CPP) under Kwame Nkrumah emerged as the leading nationalist movement in pre-independence Ghana. Although the CPP never won more than 60 per cent of the vote in a free election after 1951, it was considered to have mass support throughout the country and it was to the CPP that the departing British relinquished political power in 1957. After 1957, the only political group with a large following in opposition to the CPP was the United Party (UP), a disparate coalition of Ashanti cocoa farmers, intellectuals, and others with individual grievances against the Nkrumah regime.

One reason that the opposition was restricted to regionalism and

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Arguments on democracy and liberty during the early years of independence was the lack of economic difficulties. Ghana had inherited £200 million surplus at independence and the world cocoa prices (the major cash crop) were at top levels during the late 1950's. The government's economic program was one of reconstruction and placed emphasis on the development of infrastructure such as Tema Harbour, the Volta Dam, and highway schemes. This vast development program was carried on without having to restrict private consumption. However, after 1961, the economic position deteriorated and as the opposition re-emerged, the years of respite for the CPP came to an end.\(^1\) The rapid rise of the cost of living index from 364 in July 1960 (based on 100 in 1939) to 386 in December, 1963, coupled with a minimum wage policy unchanged since 1960, led to a decline in living standards. The shortage of consumer goods and a rise in the cost of foodstuffs by 36 per cent from March 1963 to December 1964 added to the economic hardship.\(^2\) A major case was the drastic fall in world cocoa prices to a level in 1965 which was the lowest in 25 years.\(^3\) As cocoa is the major money crop and export item for Ghana, this not only hit the cocoa farmers hard but also created a large, disconsolate pool of unemployed. Another reason for the financial difficulties by this time was poor planning and management of the economic projects. First, it was difficult to have long-term planning since the government income was unreliable. The tax from cocoa sales was unpredictable because of the fluctuation of the world market price and income from the other exports of manganese, timber, and diamonds also were


\(^{3}\) West Africa (February 26, 1966), p. 213.
variable. Secondly, because Ghana was too dependent on the West for imports and exports and was not successful in diversifying trade partners, Ghana lacked an advantageous bargaining position. Thirdly, there was no central body for economic decisions. Also, after 1960, Nkrumah relied increasingly on the civil service but they did not support his economic policies.¹ The result of these factors was a growing gap between the government's economic aspirations and its ability to direct the course of economic development.

Meanwhile, opposition which threatened the unity of the state and widespread public disorder emerged. Nkrumah "resorted to a series of repressive measures, deportations, arrests, censorship, and overt intimidation".² Strikes were made illegal in 1958 and in the same year, the Preventive Detention Act was passed. By the end of the year, 318 arrests had been made under this act,³ and it was implemented to arrest opposition leaders such as J.G. Danquah, one of the oldest and most respected national leaders.

The Republican Constitution of 1960 created a highly centralized state. Under this Constitution, the head of state was granted several arbitrary powers of which Nkrumah was quick to take advantage. He was proclaimed President for life in 1962; Ghana was declared a one-party state in 1964; and in 1965, the Voting Acts Amendment instituted nominat-

¹ Genoud, pp. 127-147.
tion of all legislative candidates by the Central Committee of the CPP and by Nkrumah.\(^1\) In such a manner, Nkrumah was successful in eliminating any official opposition. However, he was psychologically separated from the needs and demands of the Ghanaians. This problem was further compounded by the lackeys surrounding him who prevented the information necessary for decision making and implementation from reaching Nkrumah. Moreover, a different type of opposition was developing within the government's own ranks, particularly after the massive strikes by organized labour in 1961. "The CPP became an unmanageable lobby of the different pressure groups, with tussles for power carried on at the university, in the press, in Parliament, and in government ministries, as well as in the party itself."\(^2\) There were two causes of the decline of the CPP as a political party with mass appeal and support. First, as corruption became more obvious, as ideological indoctrination was intensified, and as the repressive measures were implemented, both the technocratic civil servant and the peasant became alienated from the CPP. The civil servant resented the emphasis placed on ideology in policy decisions. The peasant, who is vulnerable to economic fluctuations, suffered under the corrupt and inefficient regime. The Ghanaian people who had developed such high expectations were now restless and dissatisfied.\(^3\) Secondly, not only could the CPP not mobilize mass support, it had ceased trying to do so. Mobilization of the masses for development action was

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never given serious consideration; instead Nkrumah began to rely more and more on the civil service. Genoud suggests that a reason for this was the type of development that the Nkrumah government was emphasizing (i.e. the infrastructure) prevented the people from feeling a vested interest in the regime. As he states: "Not that the government was not doing anything for anybody; on the contrary, but precisely because what was being done - and which was important - was done in a diffuse way, for everybody, through the administrative machinery of the government and without involving the people through mass mobilization."¹

Such was the situation in Ghana in early 1966. Social unrest which had increased with the deteriorating economic situation was further aggravated by the austerity economics introduced in the last CPP-regime budget; Ghana was being deserted by the West after Nkrumah made tentative contacts with the East; the Government was corrupt and inefficient and relied on coercion to prevent an organized opposition; the CPP had become a shell of a party; and there was no constitutional means of changing the regime. Therefore, while Nkrumah was flying to Peking to offer peace solutions for the Viet Nam War, Colonels Kotoka and Ocran, Major Afrifa, and Police Commissioner Harlley were able to plan and execute the coup. There are diverging accounts as to which man was responsible for setting the plan into operation, but the army and the police worked together and found it necessary to do so.² The main buildings in

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¹ Genoud, p. 191.
² For further detail see Major-General A.K. Ocran, *A Myth is Broken* (Accra: Longmans, Green & Co.Ltd., 1968) and A.A. Afrifa, op cit.
Accra were captured and CPP and government officials were arrested. There was little resistance from party activists; the CPP seemed to disintegrate over-night. "The power vacuum and instability after the coup correspond to the atomization of power before; they represent, as it were, its most striking a posteriori evidence." 1

The coup was quick and virtually bloodless. Kotoka announced in a dawn broadcast on February 24, 1966:

The myth surrounding Awame Nkrumah is broken;
Kwame Nkrumah has been dismissed from office;
the Parliament has been dissolved and the CPP disbanded. 2

A National Liberation Council (NLC), consisting of military and police officers, was established to replace the government, and as the Constitution had been abolished, it was to rule by decree. The following chart shows the initial emphasis placed on representing all regions and the major ethnic groups and the parity of representation given the police and the military. Ghana was now under military rule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Original Position</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj.-Gen. J.A. Ankrah</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Ga</td>
<td>Former Army Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. E.K. Kotoka</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Ewe</td>
<td>Commander of 2nd Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. A.K. Ocran</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Fanti</td>
<td>Commander of 1st Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. A.A. Afrifa</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ashanti</td>
<td>Staff Officer, 2nd Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.T. Harlley</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Ewe</td>
<td>Commissioner of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.A. Yakuba</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Northerner</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.E.O. Nunoo</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Ga</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.K. Deku</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Ewe</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner of Police (CID)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Genoud, p.193
(2) Broken Myths: News Commentaries from Radio Ghana, March 1966 (Accra: Ministry of Information), Introduction
What were the motives behind the 1966 coup? The idea that the army was the savior of the nation was used as an excuse. Afrifa later wrote, "... the coup was necessary to save our country and our people". However, this was more of a rationalization on the part of the young officer and there is evidence which points to other motives. There were also elements of intervention in the name of the national interest. The army and the police leaders probably did feel that they were preventing Ghana from slipping into Communist hands under Nkrumah, particularly since the officers were closely linked to the British army's tradition of conservatism. However, we propose here that the prime motivation behind the coup was the protection of the corporate self-interest of the army.

The civil-military relationship in Ghana had been harmonious during the early years of independence, particularly with Nkrumah's speedy Africanization of the officer corps. However, after the assassination attempt on Nkrumah at Kulungugu in 1962, Nkrumah began to purge the police and the army, meanwhile setting up his own security system. He placed all responsibility for military affairs in his own office and began to set up CPP party cells within the army ranks. This emphasis on political loyalty strained his relations with the military. Whatever the political reasons, the abrupt retirement of Generals Ankrah and Otu infuriated the officer corps (it was no way to treat an officer and a gentleman!) and also started rumours of an impending over-all purge.

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(1) Afrifa, p.37.

The two generals were probably dismissed because of their criticism of Nkrumah's own para-military force, the Soviet-trained and Soviet-armed Palace Guard. Not only was this organization seen as a threat to the effectiveness and autonomy of the regular army, but it was also better equipped and better paid. Other problems arose over the training of cadets in the Soviet Union which would have further diminished the cohesiveness and command structure with an army of mixed arms and mixed training. The army officers resented Nkrumah's using the army to further his political goals outside Ghana. During the Congo operation, the Ghana army found itself the object of derision from the Congo people it had been sent to protect. There was also a lot of political manoeuvering between Nkrumah and Lumumba involving the army command in the Congo, which the officers resented. Finally, the Ghana army's equipment was run down and one battalion faced a mutiny while another suffered serious casualty losses. In all, the Congo experience was considered a blow to the prestige of the armed forces by the officer corps. Therefore, when rumours started in the mid-sixties that Nkrumah was considering sending his army to Rhodesia, the officers felt that they must act to prevent a further erosion of its status. The officers believed that Nkrumah was forcing them to "heel" and the only solution was intervention to protect themselves and their professions.  

Overall, threats to the corporate self-interest of the army led

(1) First, p.194.
(2) Dowse, p.235.
to the overthrow of Nkrumah. When the army's grievances coincided with the grievances of other social groups, the prospect of military intervention became more and more probable. In Ghana, the inability of the Nkrumah regime to create effective political institutions and mobilize support through such institutions meant that the coup itself was carried out with little resistance from counter-balancing forces.

Sierra Leone

Since its formation in 1951, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) dominated the political scene in Sierra Leone. It was able to do so largely because of its close alliance with the local chiefs in the southern and eastern regions of the state, or what is termed Mendeland. This close alliance with the traditional elite had two ramifications for the SLPP. On one hand, since the SLPP leaders had close links with or were members of the traditional ruling families and were thus men of high traditional standing, they had no psychological or economic threat need/to reject the traditional society. Moreover, even when these men were merged into the new Western-educated elite, they maintained elements of traditional patterns of behavior through their membership in the Foro Society, a secret Mende organization. On the other hand, the SLPP

(1) There was also a case of individual self-interest as a motivation in Ghana during the abortive April 1967 coup led by Lt. Arthur. We will discuss this instance in more detail in Chapter III, but the primary cause of the planned coup was the frustration that Arthur and other lower ranking officers felt over slow promotions. See Legon Observer, Vol. II, No. 9 (28 April-11 May, 1967), p.23.

relying on the chiefs as the principle channel of communication to the grass roots level, did not feel the need to build up an autonomous party structure. Elections within each constituency were fought over local issues; the candidate had to develop a personal, not a party appeal.¹ This pattern of localism was reinforced by the varying rates at which the regions were developing. Since the SLPP held the majority in the central government, most development funds and activities went to the south and east while the north lagged behind.

During the late fifties and early sixties, the SLPP's position was being challenged. First, there was a shift in the tribal basis of opposition from the Creoles of the West and Freetown to the northern tribes. Secondly, there was the emergence of "radical" political parties which relied less on traditional links for support. The All People Congress (APC) formed in 1960 consisted of men of lower social strata who did not have connections with traditional rulers.² However, while the APC claimed that its opposition to the SLPP was on a class basis, its main support came from the Temne and Limba tribesmen in the north. In the 1960's, dissatisfaction over benefits given the north polarized the country and the APC became more a "tribal" and less a "radical" party. In the 1962 elections, the majority of its 16 Parliament seats were from the north.

Sierra Leone came to independence in 1961 under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai of the SLPP. After Sir Milton's death in 1964, his brother Sir Albert Margai took over the Prime Ministership and the

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² ibid., p.262.
leadership of the SLPP. Much of the tension in Sierra Leone after 1964 was due to Sir Albert's tactics in attempting to solidify his control over the SLPP and to counter-act any opposition.\(^1\) His references to making Sierra Leone a one-party state cost him support among the SLPP members who feared he would extend his tenure in office. In 1966, he proposed a draft constitution to make Sierra Leone a Republic which would give the Prime Minister extensive control over the President and the Chief Justice. It alienated the Creoles, an important source of political support, and moreover, it tended to increase the popularity of the APC as an alternative to Margai. The appointment of Gershon Collier as Chief Justice, a close associate of Margai's, was seen as an attempt to reshape the judicial system to be more sympathetic to Margai. All of these measures were considered to be Margai's means to establish his control over the SLPP and the government. They were resented not only by the Creoles and the other non-SLPP groups, but also by the SLPP members.

Meanwhile, Margai was turning his attention to the APC. He did not carry through the recommendation of the 1963 census that all northern districts should have increased representation. Furthermore, he arrested and imprisoned four APC members of Parliament. During the months leading to the 1967 General Election, Margai redoubled his attacks on the APC. He refused to allow the opposition parties to

\(^{1}\) *ibid.*, pp 239-272.
advertise in the *Daily Mail*, the largest Freetown paper. The APC responded by increasing the distribution of its own paper, *We Yone*. Margai aimed to label the APC as subversive by openly linking it to the abortive coup alleged to have been planned by Col. Bangura earlier that year. Finally, Margai endorsed the harassment of the APC; the officials in charge of the elections were told to do anything possible to keep the SLPP in power. Nonetheless, the mid-sixties was a record of growing APC support and a weakening of the SLPP from both within and without.

Meanwhile, the economic conditions were in a decline. The Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) had lost over £50 million (£50p.) and was not able to reimburse the farmers for their harvests. Import goods were scarce and prices rose. The IMF was invited to propose an austerity budget in 1966, but it caused discontent among those Sierra Leoneans who were forced to tighten their belts as they watched the corrupt SLPP officials grow fat.

Therefore, in spite of the plans by the SLPP to rig the March 1967 elections, the APC won the plurality needed to have Siaka Stevens, their leader, appointed Prime Minister. The following chart shows the results of both the 1962 and 1967 elections. The most obvious feature of the election results was the great increase of support for the APC between the two general elections. Although the Independents may be considered SLPP-supporters (and thus the APC victory hardly a land-

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it was still an outstanding achievement by the APC in view of the handicaps it faced during the election.


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Looking at the chart, one can see a sharp regional cleavage. The APC captured nearly three-quarters of the vote in the north and west including Freetown, while obtaining only a tenth of the vote among the Mendes in the south. The SLPP, on the other hand, held its predominance in the south and east but only gained a quarter of the vote in the northern and western areas. In terms of seats, the APC was

(1) Allen, p.320.
more broadly representative of the country, except in Mendeland. Its 32 representatives consisted of 15 Temnes, 7 from other northern tribes, 7 Creoles, 2 Konos, and one Sherbo. The SLPP members elected included 19 Mendes, 3 from other southern tribes, and only 6 non-southerners. The Independents won six of the other seats in the south and were closely associated with the SLPP.

Although the elections took place on March 17th, the results were not announced until the 21st. Reasons for the delay included uncertainty over the positions of four independent candidates and the question as to whether to announce the results before or after the election of the House of Chiefs. After Stevens refused to accept a proposed coalition government, Governor-General Lightfoot-Boston, acting on the results of the ordinary election, appointed Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister. Immediately, Col. Lansana, head of the Sierra Leone army, arrested the new Prime Minister and declared a state of Martial Law. The short life of Lansana's junta was marked by open reprisals on APC supporters, including plans to execute seventy opposition leaders. On March 23rd, Majors Blake, Jumu, and Kai-Samba overthrew Lansana. The young officers formed the National Reformation Council (NRC) and recalled Colonel Ambrose Genda to head it. Genda, a Mende from the south, was soon replaced by Colonel Juxon-Smith so that a tribal balance could be established within the NRC. The Council suspended the Constitution, banned all political parties, and retained Martial Law. Sierra Leone

(1) Cartwright , p.250.
(2) Allen, p. 324.
was under full military rule.

It is hardly likely that the coups led by both Lansana and the "Three-Majors" were motivated by a desire to save the nation. Lansana was deeply involved in the SLPP and the Majors acted in a more subtle way to prevent the APC from taking power. Also, intervention in the name of national interest does not appear to be a concrete reason for either coup. A radio broadcast by Lansana promised that "as soon as politicians can come together, there will be a constitutional government for the nation." But, the politicians were not co-operating; they did not meet together in Freetown as Lansana had ordered. Instead, Lansana's actions were aimed at the total destruction of the APC. Blake, when the second coup took place, implied along similar lines that the military had acted only to prevent the nation's collapse and would soon relinquish its control to the politicians:

I want to remind you, my dear people, that we are soldiers, and want to remain soldiers, and politics is not our mission. We will hand over, back to the politicians, as soon as the situation becomes favourable. The NRC will do all in its power to bring about a civilian government in the shortest possible time.  

However, even if Blake and his associates were honest in their promises in March 1967, the subsequent record of the NRC demonstrated that these promises were soon forgotten.

The prime incentive for the coups appears to be sectional in nature. Regional self-interest was pronounced. Approximately 50 per cent

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(1) Radio transcripts recorded by Humphrey J. Fisher from Sierra Leone Radio, March 1967. (no pagination).
(2) ibid.
of the army in 1967 were Mende from the south. When the SLPP, which drew much of its support from the south, lost the election, Lansana, a Mende, acted to prolong a southern-based government and to keep his close associates in power. The three majors were also Mende and acted to keep government funds flowing into the south and not diverted to the north as the APC had threatened. They did arrest their fellow tribesmen, Lansana and Margai. However, both of these men had lost the support and respect of the SLPP and their removal protected the remaining SLPP hierarchy from reprisals.

Genda, also a Mende, was first appointed head of the NRC but he was later removed to produce an impression of tribal impartiality in the NRC. This was hardly the case. The NRC renewed the appointment of many Mende officials prominent in the previous SLPP regime while maintaining the exclusion of the Temne and northern tribes participation in the government. Finally, the NRC made no immediate effort to release the Temne Deputy Commander of the Army, Col. Bangura or the six other non-Mende officers arrested by Margai for the alleged coup attempt in early 1967.

There were also elements of individual self-interest in the second coup. The younger officers felt a great personal animosity toward their commander, Lansana. They also saw him as a liability in the Mende-controlled SLPP government because of his close assoc-

(1) Allen, p.324.
iation with Margai who had lost much support and respect from the party.1

There was a third coup in Sierra Leone which will be discussed later. However, this April 1968 coup represents a case of individual self-interest. The men leading the coup against the NRC were aroused by the fact that the NRC members were growing rich while the enlisted men and warrant officers saw no improvement in their own pay or living conditions. These lower ranking soldiers felt that a civilian government would be more easily blackmailed into granting them pay increases to avoid another military take-over. The APC had promised to concede these improvements,2 and thus, the 1968 coup-makers acted with a measure of material and individual self-interest.

Sierra Leone, in spite of its economic, social and political problems, was in March 1967 on the eve of becoming the first West African State to have a change of regime through legal and constitutional channels. Unfortunately the interests of the military, which was southern based, coincided with the interests of the losing political party, which was also southern based. The procedures and institutions of government were not firmly entrenched in popular support; the military was able to take control illegally and maintain its position with little resistance from the population.

Dahomey

Dahomey is, at best, confusing. We have neither the time nor the space to unravel the complexities of Dahomean politics; what is offered here is a short discussion of the three elements - the economy, the political class, and the labour unions - which are involved in the overall picture and an examination of the coups. In later chapters, we will go into a deeper analysis of what has happened in Dahomey since the first coup in 1963.

The backdrop to Dahomey's troubles is the economy. Economic stagnation is due in part to an overdependence on palm product exports which are vulnerable to world market fluctuations. The industrial sector is confined to a few processing plants and is hampered by high power costs, a small domestic market, skilled manpower shortages, and a lack of mineral resources.¹ The trade deficit grew from approximately 2,400 million CFA francs in 1960 to 3,300 million CFA francs in 1962. The situation is further compounded by increasing unemployment. Dahomey, unfortunately, is dependent on French aid for her very existence and this gives "the Quai d'Orsay a bargaining power of such magnitude that no political compromise at the local level can evade the constraints of what amounts to a clientage relationship".²

Politics in Dahomey has been a history of shifting coalitions

(2) René Lemarchand, "Dahomey: Coup within a Coup", in Africa Report (June, 1968), p.46.
among three power centres — the north, the southwest, and Porto Novo in the southeast — headed by three perennial politicians — Maga, Ahomadegbe and Apithy respectively. The unitary constitutional arrangements deposited by the French did not take into account these regional divisions. Regionalism, in fact, was magnified during election times. In order to marshal votes, the candidates relied on regional loyalty. However, since no one region could maintain power on a national level by itself, any coalition that emerged was more a product of compromise than of genuine national concord. The un-workability of the coalition system became apparent in the years leading to independence in 1960.

The political history of ... Dahomey is, in effect, the permanent conflict between a foreign system and a local structure, the recurring attempt to animate the Dahomean societies within an accidental legal framework.¹

After the Territorial Assembly Elections in April 1959, Maga became Dahomey's first Prime Minister. His victory was largely a result of the skill with which he exploited his southern rivals. Ahomadegbe and Apithy were split over differences arising from an alleged election fraud in Mono constituency. No one party was able to secure a majority and the Ahomadegbe and Apithy feud precluded a southern coalition. Thus, Maga's Rassemblement Démocratique Dahoméen (RDD) entered a coalition with Ahomadegbe's Union Démocratique Dahoméen (UDD). As the RDD held a slight majority over the UDD,

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Maga claimed the office of Prime Minister. The RDD-UDD coalition was short-lived. Conflict arose over which party would lead the state into Houphouët-Boigny's Conseil de l'Entente, an economic grouping of Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast and Niger. Maga and the RDD had taken steps to join this extension of the interterritorial RDA party alliance, but since Ahomadegbe's UDD was affiliated to the RDA, he felt that the UDD should take the initiative for entrance. Maga refused Ahomadegbe's preference and turned to Apithy's party, the Parti Républicain du Dahomey (PRD), for support. Therefore, in the November 1960 election, Maga became the first President of Dahomey in a RDD-PRD coalition government. The UDD and Ahomadegbe were now the opposition.

Maga's downfall lay in his tactics to secure a hold on national politics. In November 1960, the UDD and PRD joined to form the Parti Dahoméen l'Unité (PDU) and established single-party rule, albeit only on paper. By April 1961, Maga had dissolved and banned the UDD in accordance with a security bill which gave the government wide powers in dealing with security threats (i.e. opposition parties). The following month, Maga charged Ahomadegbe and ten other leaders of the old UDD with conspiracy to assassinate the President. Although they were sentenced to only five years for this fairly serious (if implausible) charge, the UDD supporters in the southwest were growing uneasy over the treatment of their political elite.

restlessness spread to Cotonou and Porto Novo when Theodore Hessou, the ex-deputy mayor of Cotonou and a close associate of Ahomadegbe, was imprisoned. Furthermore, the grievances of the south were augmented when Maga placed northerners in all key posts during a cabinet reshuffle in August 1963.

By now, the opposition to Maga was joined by the trade unions largely which were made up of civil servants, teachers, public service workers, and other white-collar workers. As Lemarchand notes:

> Although organized labour comprises a small fraction of the total wage-earning population of this primarily agricultural country, is weakly organized, and is chronically wracked by intra-mural rivalries, it has nonetheless been the decisive factor behind every governmental crisis since independence.¹

The unions in Dahomey are among the most developed in West Africa partly because of early educational advantages and their early involvement in nationalist movements. Their importance is also geographical. Centred on Cotonou, the commercial, technological, industrial and educational capital of Dahomey, the unions play a seminal role in national affairs. Any Dahomean politician needs the support of Cotonou and thus, the unions, if he is to control Dahomey.

Dahomey has long exported civil servants to other French African territories. After these states became independent, there was massive repatriation of the administrative cadres. Their ranks have been further swollen by the expulsion of Dahomeans from Niger in 1964 over the Nette Island dispute and from the Ivory Coast after

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¹ Lemarchand, p.46.
anti-Dahomean riots there in 1962. Many of these returning citizens belong to the public service unions which have tended to be the most militant. These civil servants were not only frustrated by what little Dahomey had to offer, but were also more experienced and cosmopolitan in outlook and expectations.\(^1\) The unions needed the smallest grievance to set them off and Maga supplied many such grievances although he amalgamated the unions in 1963 to form the \textit{Union Générale de Travailleurs Dahoméens} (UGTD), he had little control over them. The unions resented Maga's personal extravagances (e.g. a $3m. palace), his excessive foreign travel, and the general level of government corruption, particularly in view of the chronic budget deficit. The 10 per cent tax on civil service salaries was a constant complaint. This led to the bitter reaction to Maga's enlarging the cabinet in the August 1963 reshuffle. The UGTD adapted the following resolution:

\begin{quote}
The latest cabinet reshuffle cannot in any way justify the austerity measures imposed upon us by the government. The money spent on these new ministries should be turned over to us as a token of gratitude for all the sacrifices to which we have thus far consented.\(^2\)
\end{quote}

The uneasiness of the south and the embittered mood of the trade unions combined to create the pre-coup situation. The final straw was the Bohiki affair. Bohiki, a deputy from Sokete in the north,

\begin{itemize}
\item[(1)] Kay Whiteman, "The Military Regimes of Togo and Dahomey" seminar paper presented at London University, Institute of Commonwealth Studies (November, 25, 1970), quoted with author's permission.
\item[(2)] Lemarchand, p.49.
\end{itemize}
was accused of murdering a Gon from Porto Novo. When the National Assembly released Bohiki and gave him legislative immunity, the move was interpreted as an indication of regional discrimination. Riots broke out in Porto Novo against the National Assembly. First, Maga released Ahomadegbe in hopes that it would pacify the urban masses and then sent in the army. By this time the unions had organized anti-Maga demonstrations. When Maga arrested a few unionist leaders, they called for a general strike. In a last ditch effort Maga offered to bring Ahomadegbe into the government and to recall Apithy from Paris where he had been sent as ambassador, but the unions went to the army for support. On the night of October 26th a march organized by the unions went to the army camp, chanting for Col. Soglo, head of the army, to step in. The following day there were demonstrations in Cotonou again demanding the army to take power. Finally on October 28th, Soglo, appropriately in front of the Bourse de Travail announced that he had dismissed the National Assembly. Later on in the day, he established a provisional government with Apithy, Abomadegbe and Maga as his Ministers.

One motivation for the 1963 coup appears to be Soglo's fear that the nation was falling apart. The army felt it was performing its duty by protecting the interests of national security. The prospect of bloodshed, especially after Maga's supporters armed with bows and arrows were brought in from the north on lorries, was what prompted Soglo to move. He was, at least up to 1963, a non-political officer who had climbed his way up the ranks. Another motive would be intervention on behalf of a specific sector of the population, the
trade unions. It was, according to observers, Major Alphonse Alley, a close associate of Soglo, who persuaded Soglo to intervene. Alley, from the central regions, was in sympathy with the southerners' plight. This could be a result of his "de-tribalized" outlook as he had travelled throughout West Africa and had been through officer training courses with the French army. Alley was popular with the southern urbanites and it was probably his persuasion that led the army to align with the trade unions. In this way, the army acted as a protective agent for middle-class sectional interests.

There was also an element of army discontent with the Maga regime; this may have provided motives of corporate self-interest. Maga's former Defense Minister, Arouna Mama, demonstrated his preference for the gendarmerie which had created animosity within the army ranks. By ensuring the downfall of Maga, the army would be in an advantageous bargaining position for its share of privileges.

Overall, the Dahomey army prior to 1963 was uninvolved in political affairs. However, once the army had taken a political initiative, the relationship between the civilian and military authorities was never quite the same. Nonetheless, the actions of the military leaders point out that the army had no intentions of remaining in power after the 1963 coup. Soglo naively had hoped for a reconciliation among the Big Three, but when a plot to restore Maga was

(1) Whiteman, p.9. Quoted with author's permission
(2) Ibid., p.10. Quoted with author's permission.
discovered in November, Soglo arrested Maga. Soglo, who did not yet have the heart of a politician, pushed through the January 1964 elections. Ahomadegbe was elected Prime Minister and Apithy, President.

The dual executive did not last long in view of the personal dislike and distrust between the two men and the chronic economic crisis. The bicephalous government existed as long as it had the support of the army. In March 1964, the army, under Alley’s command, was sent in to quell the riots in Parakou, home of Maga, which had broken out over the northerners’ unease of being excluded from the government. Chabi Mama, the PDU General Secretary, was held responsible for the violence between the northerners and the southerners living there. He was arrested and imprisoned. Moreover, Major Hachême, a Fon from Abomey, was appointed military governor in Parakou. His brutal measures for controlling the inhabitants there only compounded the problem. ¹

Meanwhile in the south, the trade unions were still disgruntled. They accused the government of doing little to ease the economic problems, then went on strike to oppose austerity measures which included a 25 per cent tax on civil service salaries.

The breaking point came when Ahomadegbe and Apithy turned on each other over rival claims as to which of the two should appoint the Supreme Court President. This culminated in an attempted civilian coup in November 1965. The Parti Démocratique Dahoméen

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¹ Lemarchand, p.50
(PDD), which had by now replaced the PDU as the only legal political organization, censured Apithy and appointed Ahomadegbe as head of state and government. There was a pro-Apithy demonstration on November 29th in Porto Novo and the army once again stepped in and took power.

After 1963, the army had lost its political innocence. First, there were elements of individual interests in that Soglo was wary of the close association between Col. Aho, his old rival, and Ahomadegbe. Soglo was afraid that if Ahomadegbe was successful in his power-bid, Aho would take his place as head of the armed forces. As a result Soglo supported those officers who were in sympathy with the Porto Novo demonstrations and unions. In this respect, Soglo's actions again benefitted the middle-class union members by upholding their interests.

Soglo dismissed Ahomadegbe and Apithy and installed a moderate northerner Tahirov Congacou, a former president of the National Assembly, as head of a provisional government. Congacou was unable to establish a working coalition for the government and on December 22, 1965, Soglo took over complete political powers for the first time. He dismissed the National Assembly, abolished the FDD, suspended the constitution, and declared himself head of state.

(2) Whiteman, p.11. Quoted with author's permission.
(3) Robert Cornevin, "Dahomey", in Année Africaine 1965, p.216.
The impetus driving the military further and further into the political arena in 1965 was a culmination of the motives behind the previous coups. First, Soglo believed that the army alone could prevent the nation from disintegrating into rival camps. Soglo claimed the army's mission was to establish "a new style of politics under which men will unite around a programme, not around a group of personalities". He later recalled:

... the army did not plot to overthrow the previous regime. It was virtually forced to take over responsibility when the constitutional crisis, due to dispute between Apithy and Ahomadegbe, had reached its climax and resulted in a real absence of government.

Remember, however, that the Ahomadegbe-Apithy conflict was merely a symptom of the political, social and economic malaise in Dahomey. It was the last straw which opened the crisis with the trade unions. We propose that instead of the army acting to prevent the collapse of the state under such political, economic, and social problems, it was just these problems which created a politicized army. The competition between the three regions spilt over into competition for friends within the army. The trade unions appeared to win the army's support and thus, the army acted to promote the interests of one section of the population. When Soglo took power in December who had 22nd, the men (e.g. Alley) backed the trade unions and Apithy were in prominence.

(1) West Africa (January 1, 1966) p.3.
(2) West Africa (November 25, 1967), p.1526
(3) Whiteman, p.11.
Another motive for the December coup was based in the change of attitude among the military men. Since the 1963 coup, the army had benefitted from its privileged position. There were promotions, pay increases, and other perks (e.g. twenty officers were allowed to import cars tax and duty-free). The army was accustomed to being involved in governmental decision-making and it wanted to maintain this position. Corporate self-interest was a motive of growing relevance.

Soglo’s regime was marked by internal dissent and socioeconomic problems. The make-shift legislature and advisory body, the Comité Rénovation Nationale (CRN) was never assigned any specific functions and proved incapable of dealing with the problems at hand. Soglo, in an effort to balance regional representation, gave the Finance portfolio to Bertin Borno, a northerner and once Maga’s minister of finance. Aho, a proud descendant of Glélé, the king of Dahomey, and renowned for his favouritism of the south, was replaced as Defence Minister by Soglo. However, Soglo’s efforts to appease one region only alienated the others.

Soglo was confronted by a growing restlessness among the middle and junior grade officers. They were displeased over the corruption, inefficiency, clannishness of Soglo’s regime. In April 1967, the Comité Militaire de Vigilance (CMV) lead by Benoît Sinzogan replaced the CRN. The CMV consisted of fifteen middle

(1) Whiteman, p.11.
and junior grade officers and non-commissioned officers. But, the CMV was divided against itself. The most notable faction was the **Groupe d'Abomey** represented by Sinzogan, Benoit Adandegin and Hachème, all Fon who sided with Col. Aho in his dislike for Soglo.\(^1\) To offset the influence of the **Groupe d'Abomey**, Kouandété, a northerner and vice-president of the CMV, pressured Soglo into giving him the posts of Army Chief of Staff and Alley's **Chef du cabinet**. By this time, the CMV was collapsing under the weight of regional and personal antagonisms.

Neither was the military able to deal effectively with the chaotic economic scene. When Soglo returned from an aid-seeking mission to Paris in 1967, he announced that the Dahomeans would just have to tighten their belts. This infuriated the unions who were still unhappy about the 25 per cent tax on salaries. Although the tax had never been lifted, it had seemingly little effect on deteriorating economic conditions. The result was a strike by school teachers for salary claims; it spread to other unions after Soglo banned all trade union activity. Faced by a general shut down by workers, Soglo backed down and sent in Alley to negotiate with the unions. Soglo, however, underestimated the reaction of the northern officers to the appeasement of southern labour unions. On December 17, 1967, Kouandété and Kerekou, both northerners, took over Cotonou, dissolved the already defunct CMV, and established a twelve-member **Comité Révolutionnaire Militaire** (CRM) under Kouandété's leadership. Kouandété however, was not prepared for nor expected the

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\(^1\) Lemarchand, p.51.
repercussions of his actions. The French government suspended budgetary aid and de Gaulle was incensed that middle grade officers would overturn a man he had feted in Paris only a month previously. Meanwhile, the unions maintained their demands for the abolition of the 25 per cent tax.\(^1\) Kouandété found himself in a corner.

Thus on December 21st, it was announced that Alley would be head of state, and Kouandété the Prime Minister. Alley was placed in the top position mainly for his popularity outside military circles. He was also a Basila from the central regions which gave him the added advantage of not being identified with any one of the major power centres. He was also 38 by this time and neither a member of the old military set nor the 'young Turks'.\(^2\)

The motivations behind the 1967 coup are mixed. By this stage, there could be no justification in the name of the national interest. The problems of Dahomey were too deep rooted for the army or a section of the army to assume it could clear them up. In fact, Kouandété's intervention cost Dahomey its vital French aid.

Regionalism, of course, did play a part in the background to the coup. The northern officers did resent the soft treatment given the southern trade unions. Surprisingly enough, the junta itself was the least partisan of all. Although the coup was led by northerners, the majority of the CRM members were southern officers. This demonstrates how difficult it is to pigeon-hole politics in Dahomey.\(^3\)


\(^3\) Whiteman, p.13. Quoted with author's permission.

This also reflects this composition of the officer corps. Of the ninety officers, seventy-five are southerners.
The basic motives appear to be individual and corporate self-interest. The younger officers were unhappy with Soglo's regime; they felt he did not approach rule seriously enough. This was in part due to the split between the younger officers who had trained at St. Cyr and considered themselves "intellectuals" and the older generation who had come up through the ranks. The jeunes cadres personally resented Soglo - his corruption, his nepotism, and his domineering French wife.\(^1\) There were also a series of personal feuds. Aho, who had disliked Soglo all along, used the Groupe d'Abomey to neutralize the GMV. Sinzogan and Kouandété were in conflict; Soglo was against Kouandété and Kouandété against Alley.\(^2\)

The younger officers realized that the army was becoming more and more divided within and attacked from without. Another justification for the coup was to prevent this situation from growing. Alley stated that the army was compelled to intervene to ensure that the recent strikes caused by the shirking of responsibility by the existing authorities did not degenerate into labour disturbances capable of compromising and even destroying the prestige of the Dahomean army ...\(^3\)

However, for all their promises that the army would withdraw early to prevent further disintegration in the ranks, the young officers quickly filled all government posts.\(^4\) It was soon obvious that

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(1) Whiteman, p.13. Quoted with author's permission.
(2) Afrique Contemporaine (January-February, 1968), p.19
Kouandété was a political soldier and it was Alley who finally led the army back to their barracks in 1968. We will not presently discuss the CRM regime or the handing over of power to a civilian regime under Zinsou. This will be deferred to a later chapter. It is sufficient to note that it was done in a Byzantine fashion; nor was it the end of military involvement in politics.

Kouandété replaced Alley as army Chief of Staff in the Zinsou regime. Alley was infuriated and allegedly planned to eliminate Kouandété once and for all. In the summer of 1969, Alley was arrested and charged with plotting to kidnap and murder Kouandété. However, instead of sentencing Alley for attempted murder, a court sentenced him for five years imprisonment for conspiracy. Alley's trial marked the end of Kouandété's and Zinsou's association. Kouandété was disturbed over the Alley affair and further frightened by other attacks on his life. These attacks may have been instigated by political opponents purposely to split Kouandété and Zinsou; whatever the source of the assassination attempts, Kouandété suspected Zinsou.

Kouandété and Zinsou began marshalling loyal forces. Kouandété acted first and on December 8, 1969, he overthrew Zinsou. But, once again, Kouandété found himself in trouble. A majority of the officers did not want him as head of the government. After a three-day discussion, a new directorate emerged headed by a reasonably apolitical officer, Lt. Col. de Souza. The other two members were Sinzogon as head of the gendarmerie and Kouandété in third place.\footnote{West Africa (December 20, 1969), p.1535.}

\footnote{West Africa (July 26, 1969), p.876 and West Africa (October 11, 1969) p. 1228.}

\footnote{West Africa (December 20, 1969), p.1535.}
The motive for this final coup was the self-interest of Kouandété. The army was deeply divided; Kouandété was merely head of one faction. He was apparently striking the first blow before either Zinsou or other army cliques could do the same.

As we stated at the outset, Dahomean politics is confusing, complicated, and eventful. There seems to be three general trends. First, the economic problems were chronic. Whenever the government implemented austerity measures to ease the problem, the trade unions contested the issue and refused to cooperate. The unions strife was responsible for many of the government collapses. Secondly, the political institutions were weak and ineffective. There were no means of channelling popular support and participation on a national level; instead the three major power centres vied for the control of the state and for their share (if not all) of the benefits. Thirdly, the army which began its political career as an arbitrator of the middle-class unions' interests in 1963 eventually became a political force of its own. The army or cliques within the army promoted their interests much in the same way, but more effectively, as the other political groups in Dahomey. In doing so, the army reflected the already existing cleavages of Dahomean society.
Upper Volta

Upper Volta is a poor, landlocked, arid, and overpopulated country. Of all the countries we have discussed, Upper Volta has the least promising future compounded by two major problems: a barely struggling economy and a social setting still very much controlled by traditional values and beliefs.

The annual per capita income is $55 which makes Upper Volta one of the poorest states of Africa. More than 90 per cent of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture; cattle on the hoof is the largest export. Both farming of foodstuffs and cattle raising are hampered by periodic droughts and soil erosion. The greatest money earner is the seasonal migratory worker, one of 450,000 who bring home earnings from the Ivory Coast and Ghana coffee and cocoa harvests.¹ There is, nonetheless, an important trade union movement in Upper Volta. These unions, largely made up of civil servants and other white-collar workers, have a disproportionate voice in the government's economic policies because of their salaried members and location in the capital Ouagadougou.² They have proved to be a source of support vital to any political leader.

Nearly half of the population of over four million is Mossi who inhabit the central part of the state. The Mossi kings date

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² See Jean Meynaud and Anisse Salah-Bey, Trade Unionism in Africa (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd: 1967), Chapter II.
back to the early eleventh century and the emperor, the Moro Naba still holds court in Ouagadougou. Although the power of the Moro Naba was officially curtailed, he remains a powerful political and spiritual force as leader of the largest ethnic group. The other major ethnic group is the Bobo who live in the western part of the country around Bobo Dioulasso. They have been the traditional rivals of the Mossi.

Against such an economic and social background Upper Volta's political history has been passive. Maurice Yameogo was elected the first President in 1952. His party, a local branch of the RDA was first called Parti Démocratique Unifié (PDU) and later the Union Démocratique Voltaïque (UDV). It won 64 of the 75 legislative seats in the 1959 election. The only organized opposition was centred in the Parti Nationale Voltaïque (PNV) headed by Nazi Boni. Although the PNV won only 11 seats in 1959, Yameogo outlawed the party and exiled Nazi Boni. Shortly after independence in 1960, the PNV was replaced by the Parti Républicaine de la Liberté (PRL), but this party was also banned by Yameogo. All official opposition was driven underground.

Once Yameogo ascended to political power with independence, he instigated a long feud with the two most influential groups in Upper Volta: the trade unions and the tribal chiefs. This was


interesting in that Yameogo himself had been a union leader and he owed much to the Moro Naba who had supported the UDV in 1959. The trade unions came under attack, particularly the Christian trade union led by Joseph Ouédraogo. In 1962, all symbols of traditional rank were forbidden and Yameogo stopped appointing chiefs to traditional posts on the death of the incumbent. But, Yameogo underestimated the power of the unions and the chiefs. Having lost their support, he was in a difficult position by 1965 and he prompted his own downfall by committing a series of tactical errors.

His first mistake was his handling of the 1965 elections. By scheduling the Presidential election in October prior to the November legislative elections, Yameogo, as the President was able to put up a list of "yes-men" as candidates for the legislature. This offended almost everyone: those who had hoped Yameogo would make a fresh start and those prospective candidates whose names were left off the list. The legislative elections were boycotted on November 7th as were the municipal elections on December 5th.

Yameogo's personal life was also a subject of concern in traditional Upper Volta. He divorced his first wife and sent her back to her village in disgrace. In the meantime, he married the 23-year old Miss Ivory Coast and took her to Brazil for the honeymoon. The ill-treatment of his first wife lost Yameogo a great deal of respect among the traditional people; the divorce itself scandalized

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(1) Post, p.105
the influential Catholic hierarchy in Ouagadougou; the trip to Brazil infuriated those who were already unhappy about Yameogo's personal extravagance in light of the deteriorating economic situation.

Yameogo was beginning to govern capriciously. The numerous cabinet reshuffles created a group of discontented ex-Ministers. He was charged with nepotism after he appointed his two cousins Edouard and Denis Yameogo to cabinet posts. His personal extravagance (e.g. a Mercedes 600 and a country villa) disaffected many of his former followers. His intemperate attacks on Joseph Ouedraogo, former mayor of Ouagadougou and head of the trade union movement, irritated many of the unionists. The unions by now had formed the Joint Action Committee (J.A.C.) as a common front in opposing the government.

Having lost the active support and even the passive assent of the politically relevant strata in Upper Volta, Yameogo committed his fatal error when presenting his last budget on December 30, 1966. The proposed budget provided for a 20 per cent reduction in civil service salaries, a freeze on civil service promotions, and a reduction of civil service family allowances. The J.A.C., under Joseph Ouedraogo's leadership, immediately called for demonstrations and a general strike to protest against the budget. Yameogo unwisely counter-attacked by labelling Ouedraogo as Communist agent; this further infuriated the union members.¹ The government then declared

a nation-wide State of Emergency and outlawed the strike. But, on January 1st, there were clashes between the police and strikers as the unions pushed forward with their demands that the budget be repealed. The demonstrators moved to army headquarters and called for Lt. Col. Sangoute Lamizana, head of the army to take power. On January 3rd, Lamizana announced that he had taken over "to safeguard republican and democratic institutions and avoid all bloodshed". Faced with an uncontrollable situation, Yameogo declared that he was the "first to rejoice" and would be willing to serve under Lamizana. However, on the following day, the army suspended the constitution, disbanded the National Assembly, revoked the 20 per cent salary cut in order to get the civil servants back to work, and, finally, arrested Yameogo. Upper Volta was under military rule.

It is difficult, with the limited amount of information available, to analyse in any depth the motivation behind the coup in Upper Volta. First, it appears, on the surface, that the coup was a move to prevent the possibility of bloodshed and open conflict over Yameogo's budget proposals. The reason for Lamizana's action seems to be his abhorrence of firing on a crowd to safeguard an unpopular President who seemed willing to step down: Lamizana was the least political of the military leaders we have discussed, but it would have been most difficult for him to deny a crowd calling him to power. Secondly, Lamizana's action benefitted the trade

(2) West Africa (January 5, 1966), p.70.
unions. There were similar vested interests in both the privileged civil service and the privileged, traditionally respected army. Therefore, the coup could be said to be in part/motivated by sectional interests in siding with the union members.

In all, Upper Volta's economic and political situation had reached an impasse. The military was able to intervene against the current regime with the active support of the middle-class unions and with little resistance from the rest of the population.

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In our brief discussion of the economic, social and political background of these states, we are aware of basic similarities running throughout each state. All were in poor economic condition caused both by internal mismanagement and external forces such as world market prices. The austerity measures proposed to alleviate the financial problems were either ignored, instigated at the last minute, or created tremendous opposition from trade union members and others directly affected. The military governments found themselves faced with these economic problems and were forced to implement tighter austerity measures to arrest the downhill trend of their states' economy. The economic miasma also emphasized the regional splits within the countries as each area sought its share of development benefits. The centrifugal forces of regionalism were perhaps most obvious in Dahomey and Sierra Leone, but were also apparent in Ghana among the Ewe and Ashanti and in Upper Volta.
between the Mossi and Bobo. Since the governmental institutions of these states were highly centralized, popular demands and pressures were exerted on the central authority. But, the governmental institutions were weak, corrupt and unable to meet the demands. There were discernible moves to deal with opposition first by constitutional means and eventually by coercive measures. Ghana, Upper Volta and Dahomey (although only on the surface) were made into one-party regimes; Sierra Leone under Albert Margai, had made moves in this direction. Coercive measures included exile or detention of opposition leaders, using the army to quell riots and demonstrations, establishment of security networks to monitor the actions of those with questionable loyalty, etc.

The major differences between the ex-French and ex-British states was the prominence in the former of trade unions as an organization whose members shared similar vested interests. Their political activity was largely a result of the French practice in allowing civil servants to form labour organizations, particularly in the late 1930's and after World War II. Nonetheless, there were strong middle-class interests in all states, such as the Creole in Freetown and the large cocoa farmers in Ashanti.

Over all, the picture relates broadly to a model of a developing country whose weak political institutions are unable to support the loads or meet the demands of a politically mobilized stratum in the society and whose government has to rely increasingly on coercive measures to rule.
The final precipitants of the coups were mixed. Perhaps the armies of Dahomey and Upper Volta were the least politicized before their first excursion into politics, but almost every coup was motivated by various sectional interests. In Sierra Leone, the army acted first on behalf of the Mende-dominated SLPP; in Upper Volta and Dahomey, the armies' actions coincided with the wishes of middle-class privileged labour unions. In Ghana, Dahomey and Sierra Leone, the armies acted in part to protect their own interests. Finally, in each coup, there were elements of personal rivalry and animosity.

Two important points must be borne in mind. First, whatever the background conditions and final precipitants of the coup, military intervention does not solve the problems. It is simply a change in regime and a mechanism of extra-constitutional change. Once the army takes political powers, it faces the same problems which confronted the ousted leaders. Secondly, once the army moves into overt political control, there are internal changes in its professional standards, cohesion, and organizational structure. Moreover, its contacts with external groups and the precepts on which the traditional civil-military relationship was built are forever altered. The army becomes a political machine itself and this has long term implications for the army and for the society in which it exists.

(1) We shall discuss the internal characteristics and composition of the armies in Chapter III.
CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS OF RULING

Lack of Legitimacy

A primary characteristic of an army is its control of the instruments of violence. While the legal right to use force, real or threatened, is claimed by the political sponsor (i.e. the government) and the effectiveness and consequences of violence vary according to the political and social circumstances in which it is deployed, it is the army that possesses both weapons and experience in the management of violence.

The control over the instruments of violence is based on the technological make-up of the army. Andreski proposes that it is in part the technological basis of the armed forces that determines its relationship with the society. He writes:

The degree of superiority of the armed forces over the unarmed populace depends in the first place on the quality of armament: the machine gun confers upon its possessor a much greater superiority over an unarmed crowd than a sword.

Two points are raised to question the significance of the military's technical superiority in the management of violence. First, this


superiority of the armies under examination here was being challenged both by the introduction of better equipped paramilitary organizations as in Ghana and to some extent by the antiquated and inadequate military equipment dumped on these states by Western donors. Secondly, in Africa, it took very little, a few men and a jeep in some instances, to overthrow most governments. However,

[t]he fact that armies in new nations have exercised much of their political influence without combat or extensive bloodshed should not obscure the significance of force as the basis from which they exercise their political power.¹

It is more than the sheer use of force. It is more importantly the organizational format designed to carry out military objectives and the experience in the management of violence that augments the military's capability for political intervention. Thus, the control and specialized use of violence are key factors facilitating military intervention into the political process.

Nevertheless, "while it is relatively easy for the military to seize power, it has no contract to govern; it is illegal".² Once in power, the military junta soon realizes that rule by force alone is not enough. As Hannah Arendt put it: "No government exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed".³

(1) Janowitz, pp.31-32
(2) ibid., p.1.
Instead the junta must obtain recognition as the lawful and the rightful government if it is to maintain control and efficacy. The military, as a civilian government, must be recognized as having the moral right to demand obedience from the populace and the populace, or at least the politically mobilized sector of the populace, must recognize a moral duty to obey the commands of the government. ¹

There are two practical reasons for this. First, rule by force alone invites challenge from any contender who feels he has the necessary strength. Rousseau wrote:

> If force creates right, the effect changes with the cause. Every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity disobedience is legitimate: as the strongest being always in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest. ²

Hence, there is the phenomenon of successive coups as in Dahomey. In order for the military government to safeguard its position against other claimants for power, it must base its rule on more than the successful seizure of power. The junta must seek to exercise the right to govern.

Secondly, rule by force alone is not an efficient or economical means of securing the obedience of the population. ³

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³ Finer, p. 19.
Coercive power may be effective when dealing with specific or minor challenges to its position, but it has ineffective and unpredictable results in the long-term. Moreover, the military would expend its resources on threats and physical violence instead of on the task of governing a developing country. Here again the military junta must seek the voluntary compliance of the politically active sector of the population. That is, the military must develop a base of support outside the military organization.

However, the very nature of the military impedes its ability to secure a base of support among the civilian population. In relation to the political class, there is a distinction between military management and political leadership skills. As civilian leaders may specialize in verbal skills, bargaining, negotiation, compromise and mass appeals, the military operates within an organizational environment with limited contact with clients outside the military apparatus or with the political elite. Furthermore, the military lacks any clear-cut ideology other than a vague conservatism. Although they may continuously pronounce against corruption, decadence and public disorder, they rarely expound policy guidelines. The military is hampered in its...

(1) Janowitz, p. 49.
attempts to articulate the values, opinions and beliefs of the society and thus, cannot supply viable leadership to a broad political base. Not only does the military shrink from the role of political organizer, it also regards such activity with a deep mistrust. It then would appear that there is a decreasing transferability of the military officer's skills to domestic political activity. ¹ But, until the military can count on the probability of support from the civilian population and supply political leadership to the civilian population, it will form neither a stable nor effective government.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the methods employed by the military regimes in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey and Upper Volta to legitimize their seizure of political power, it is necessary first to examine briefly the general attitudes of the people to the coups. In Ghana there was not only little resistance to the military take-over but also reported outbreaks of open rejoicing. Whether or not the Ghanaian people are willing to accept any form of government due to an innate deference to those possessing power is a point open to debate, but, for whatever reasons, the MLC was not immediately confronted by dissent and their rule was generally accepted by a majority of the people at the outset.

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¹ ibid., p.42
However, Goody has noted that "the effect of relaxing the general pressure toward enforced consensus [as under Nkrumah] ... can be seen ... in restlessness to discipline of any kind". ¹ In Sierra Leone, dissent was open. Not only did the SLPP grow disgruntled when the NRC did not seem inclined to return Margai to power, but the APC also felt cheated of an election they had rightfully won. This was a serious problem for the NRC in its efforts to create a substantial base of support.

During the earlier coups in Dahomey, the military had the support of the politically mobilized trade unions who had originally called for the military to step in. However, the military rulers proved no more effective in uniting the country behind their leadership than had been the civilian rulers. Finally, the military itself split along the tri-partite division of the country and faced opposition from all quarters. In Upper Volta, the mobilized population (particularly the urban trade union members) called for the military to take over and the army was considered a popular alternative to Yameogo.

The military regimes enjoyed a brief honeymoon before serious opposition formed. With this in mind, let us now turn to a discussion of the methods employed by the military in order to consolidate their

position. Not every regime followed the same format, but we will discuss their efforts under the headings of constitutional aspects, traditional means, commissions of inquiry, non-political appeared, coercion to discourage and quell it. institutions, and when opposition. The first two, constitutional aspects and traditional means, were attempts to drape their seizure of power with either legalistic or traditional respectability. Commissions of inquiry were used to discredit the former regime thereby granting the military government acceptance in the public eye in that it perhaps would offer a better promise of security, welfare, and law. These commissions also were useful in involving the people in politics through their evidence and participation. This function was also to be that of the non-political institutions. By creating an organization which was deemed to be non-partisan, the military junta attempted to draw the population into civic activity meanwhile directing their approach to politics along the lines the military felt suitable. These organizations often served to promote those civilian political leaders to which the military was later to relinquish power (e.g. Busia and the Centre for Civic Education). However, in spite of the efforts of the juntas to legitimize their position of power and to create a base of support among the politically relevant strata of the society, it frequently relied on coercion to suppress the growing opposition. The military, from the outset, relied on the standard forms of suppression including curtailment of the freedom of speech and the press, arrest and detention, exile, and
and the banning of all civilian political opposition. The military, as the civilian regimes it had overthrown, was guilty of assuming that enforced consensus and the lack of overt opposition equalled unity and support.

In the following section we will discuss each country separately and examine the methods the military government employed in its attempts to gain legitimate status and create support among the civilian population. As we stated previously, individual juntas did not implement each method listed above. For example, we will discuss the use of traditional aspects only under the sub-section on Ghana. One reason for this is that there was a readily applicable traditional custom (i.e. the de-stooling of chiefs in Ashanti history) to be employed by the junta. However, the fact that traditional aspects are not discussed in regards to the other case studies may be a reflection of the lack of available data. Again we will notice that the use of non-political organizations is discussed only in the cases of Ghana and Upper Volta. By way of apology, this too is a reflection of the information available. It is also due to the fact that we shall only discuss those non-political organizations which were active over a length of time and which had a recognizable function as a means of gaining popular support for the juntas. We will note, however, that there is evidence to demonstrate that all the juntas used constitutional proclamations and commissions of inquiry (including the trial of deposed politicians) as means for gaining the support of important elements in the society (i.e. the politically active groups, especially the judiciary and the civil service) and for discrediting the
old regime. Finally, there are incidences of coercion in each case as a means to slam down on the opposition which inevitably arose.

Ghana

Although, as we have stated earlier, the military government in Ghana was met with little resistance at the beginning, it took great care in its attempts to legitimize its position of power. During the four years of rule, the NLC ran the gamut of procedures to establish its right to govern, to foster a basis of support from the civilian populace, and to suppress any opposition to its power.

The first method adopted by the junta was couched in legalistic verbiage. After the assumption of power, the military issued on February 23th the Proclamation for the Constitution of a National Liberation Council. This proclamation suspended the operation of the Constitution of Ghana, but provided for the continuance of all other laws and all judicial offices in Ghana.

However, the NLC was "granted the power for such purposes as they may think fit and in the national interest to make and issue decrees
which shall have the force of law in Ghana".  

The first decree, made as an amendment to the Proclamation, listed the members of the NLC. This Proclamation, although "vested with spurious Constitutional pomposity", was merely a statement of how the NLC would exercise its power and could be altered without formality. In spite of the grandiose 'constitutional' language used in the suspension of the old constitution and the creation of a new one, there was no constitution in Ghana in the generally accepted sense of the term - i.e. a set of fundamental rules, anterior to the rulers, specifying who is to exercise power, and how it is to be exercised. There was only military power.

However, there were some practical reasons why the NLC, as indeed the military regimes in the other countries of this study, issued such promulgations.

First, although the old regime was reputed to be corrupt, inefficient and dictatorial, it was still based on law - the old constitution - and this as the fundamental law which governed its operation gave evidence of its existence as a national state. The military regime, on the other hand, was based on naked force, "and any public statement which can direct attention away from that inconvenient fact, and shift it out of sight will be avidly seized

upon, hence a Declaration or Proclamation is promulgated which ... 
purports to get things off on a new legal footing".\(^1\) These 
statements with constitutional overtones serve to maintain the idea 
of the state.

Secondly, the NLC Proclamation by retaining the laws and 
judiciary of the Nkrumah regime was an assurance to the judiciary, 
public service, and the people at large that their every day lives 
would continue normally. In initially guaranteeing the public 
service and the judiciary of their pay and functions, it was more 
likely that these important segments of the population would support 
the military. The military needed to acquire and retain the services 
of these groups and failure to provide evidence of leadership and 
threatening the job security of public servants would open the way for 
the public service and judiciary to sabotage the new regime.\(^2\)

Finally, there was the question of judicial recognition. If 
the military did not obtain judicial recognition and thus resort to 
illegal measures in governing, it would be, furthermore, a constant 
reminder to the Ghanaian people and the world in general that the military 
rule was based on force, not law.\(^3\) Therefore, these practical 
reasons led the military to issue the proclamations and decrees 
no matter how transparent they appeared.

\(^1\) ibid., p.12.  
\(^2\) ibid., p.13  
\(^3\) ibid., p.14
Another base of legitimacy is in traditionalism or in the notion that "this is how things have always been".¹ In Ghana, as in most developing nations, there existed a substantial portion of the population that was still largely organized and controlled by the traditional value system. Moreover, many of those included in the "modern" sector of the state (e.g. the wage-earner, the city-dweller, the literate) still retained elements of the organizational and value system of the traditional order. The centre contained "traditionalistic" aspects. Therefore, the NLC was able to utilize a traditional and historical legacy in justifying the military's assumption of political power.

For example, it has been suggested that there was a conscious effort on the part of the CPP regime to portray Nkrumah in a position of chieftancy. Nkrumah was even called Osagyefo, an Akan title for a paramount or all-conquering chief. Thus, after the coup, General Ankrah drew an analogy that in ancient Akan-Fanti political practice, the king or chief was responsible to the people and could be deposed or de-stooled if he went beyond constitutional bounds. Ankrah stated:

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In taking bold steps, the Ghana armed forces and the Ghana police service acted in accord with the oldest and most treasured tradition of the people of Ghana, the tradition that a leader who loses the support and confidence of his own people and resorts to the arbitrary use of power shall be deposed.¹

The reliance on neo-traditionalism or "primordial sentiment" was an interesting aspect of the Ghana coup. It was designed to instill a willingness to obey among the people and to legitimize the military government.

One of the more common methods used in Ghana was the Commission of Inquiry. These commissions became both a vehicle for the repudiation of the former regime and a means of involving the populace in the psychological overthrow of the past regime.

Within the first few weeks after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the MLC had established numerous commissions of inquiry into virtually every aspect of the CPP government. One of the more important of the commissions was under the chairmanship of Mr Justice F.K. Apaloo, a judge of the Supreme Court. This commission was to investigate the extent of Nkrumah's properties and their use. As Apaloo stated, it was "to question whether the former President was sincere both to himself and to his country, when he led the country to believe that both the carrying on of business and the ownership of large property are incompatible with the socialism he often preached".²

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The Commission found that Nkrumah's property was worth in excess of £2½ million at the time of the coup. However, the main objective of the inquiry was to overwhelmingly discredit Nkrumah.

The NLC Decree of Investigation and Forfeiture enabled the commission to look into the means by which Ministers and Regional Commissioners of the deposed government and members of the defunct Parliament and party functionaries acquired their properties and the extent of such properties. The public was invited to submit evidence to the Chairman, Miss Annie Jiagge, a judge of the High Court. The objective of this commission was to further discredit the ex-CPP regime in the eyes of the Ghanaian people.

The Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances surrounding the National Development Corporation (NADECO) was under the chairmanship of S. Azu Crabbe, a justice on the Supreme Court. It examined the organization, ownership, control, management, operation, and most importantly, the connection with the CPP of NADECO. The commission began its inquiries with the suspicion that various expenditures of NADECO "looked fishy, to say the least." However, Mr. Crabbe was correct in his estimate. As a result of the commission's report, NADECO was dissolved by NLC Decree and all its assets and liabilities were transferred to the state.

Other Commissions to deal with the alleged corruption of the CPP and government officials were the Effah Commission to investigate the State Housing Corporation and the method by which it allocated houses and rental units; the commission to investigate the Cargo Handling Corporation and its relation with the CPP; a commission under Justice C.S. Acolatse, a Supreme Court Judge, to investigate the State Diamond Corporation; the Ollenu Commission to inquire into the practice of issuing trading licenses; and another commission under Judge Ollenu to examine the financial administration of the University of Ghana. There were also commissions of inquiry to deal with the Ghana Timber Co-operative Union and Timber Marketing Board under Mr. R.S. Blay, a former judge of the High Court; the Trade Unions Congress; the erstwhile Publicity Secretariat which published the Spark and Africa and the World; evidence against those in protective custody under Justice Lassey; and land reforms and agricultural development under Apaloo. There were also commissions to study the State Distilleries and the Fibre Bag Manufacturing Corporation. \(^1\) Thus, the Commissions of Inquiry was an important method used by the NLC to involve the people through participation, newspaper reports, and word-of-mouth talk in an indictment of the CPP regime and thereby giving justification for the presence of

\(^1\) See West Africa, Lagos Observer, Africa Report, 1966-1968
the army in the government. One final observation of the commissions was the fact that the NLC relied heavily on judges, past and present, of the Supreme and High Courts. Nkrumah had undermined the prestige of these men during his tenure; he had dismissed many at will and eroded the independence of the judicial system. Now, the NLC was bringing back the judges into prominence. This lent an air of impartial respectability to the commissions and legitimized them and the regime as well. Key legal personnel were Akufo-Addo, Chairman of the Constitutional Commission and later President of Ghana; R.S. Blay, Speaker of the Constituent Assembly; and N.A. Ollenu, later Speaker of the Ghana Parliament. The relationship between the judiciary and the military rulers was to be an important element in the process of re-civilianization.

Another method used by military governments in attempting to create a base of support is "to attempt to fill the vacuum of political institutions by the creation of non-political or at least non-partisan organizations ..." ¹ This was aptly demonstrated in the case of Ghana. One such supposedly non-partisan institution established by the NLC was the Political Committee. This group was to advise the NLC on political questions. Ankrah describes the members of the Committee as men of "the right sort of experience".

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² West Africa (July 30, 1966), p. 347.
which actually meant that they, like the NLC, were anti-Nkrumah and pro-West in their political ideals. In fact, over a third of the members, including the Chairman, Kofi Busia, had once been a part of the United Party in opposition to Nkrumah. Also, eight of these men formed their own political parties after the ban on political activity was withdrawn in May 1969.

The Centre for Civic Education was another attempt by the NLC to enlist popular support for a non-political organization. Established in June of 1967, the Centre was to provide education in democratic rights and responsibilities to its voluntary membership. Again, Dr Busia headed this institution which led to the criticism during the 1969 elections that he had been groomed by the NLC as the next leader of the government.

The NLC also reconstituted the Ghana Youth Council and the Worker's Brigade. These were all part of the massive attempt to consolidate support behind the NLC. However, as we shall see, the military leaders were eventually forced to revive party politics. The lack of attendance at the Centre for Civic Education and in the other organizations that were essentially non-political and non-partisan exemplified the futility of governing in a political vacuum.

The preceding has been an account of the various means employed by the NLC in an attempt to legitimize their regime and to

(3) Note that the problem of unemployment was a major reason for retaining the Worker's Brigade.
enlist popular support. However, the NLC, as any regime, faced opposition. The NLC was often guilty of authoritative and repressive measures in dealing with such opposition. Let us now examine the record of the NLC's reaction to dissension.

One way to quiet opposition is to curtail the freedom of the press and freedom of speech. In Ghana, Decrees 92 and 93 were instruments to this end. NLCD 92 passed in October 1966, prohibited the publication of rumours; NLCD 93 empowered the police to arrest anyone suspected of publishing rumours and to detain such people without bail. These decrees were later amended by NLCD 131 which listed vague crimes of subversion which could be tried by military tribunal.¹ There was a great deal of criticism of these decrees. The Legon Observer declared that they were "anti-liberal and anti-democratic" and that "Decree 93 was just as bad if not worse than the Preventive Detention Act of 1953".² Seven people were tried under Decree 131 within the first weeks of its existence, and these decrees were a serious threat to anyone wishing to oppose NLC decisions. The NLC refused to repeal or amend the law in spite of the immense criticism from the Court of Appeals, the Bar Association, and the public generally.³ Finally, on April 29, 1968, the first two decrees were abolished,⁴ but they remained as a blemish on the NLC's record.

Another decree which underwent much criticism before it was repealed was the Newspaper Decree. This prohibited the instigation of any action for defamation against the owners, publishers, or editors of government-owned newspapers without the agreement of the Attorney-General. The NLC tried to maintain control of the citizens partly through control of the press. Although the NLC actions were unjustified restrictions of the press, it did not unduly abuse its power in these matters. There were only a few instances in which the NLC exerted its arbitrary control in this area.

A former District Organizer of the disbanded Ghana Young Pioneer Movement.

One such instance was the sentencing of Atu-Mensah to three years imprisonment for publishing defamatory documents against the NLC. Again, when the Legon Observer openly criticised the delays in courts, the editor Yaw Twumasi, a lecturer in politics at Legon, was fined for contempt of court. Shortly afterward, the Legon Observer printed an apology.

However, the most vigorous clash between the junta and the intellectuals was over the ill-fated Abbott Agreement. The NLC had agreed to allow Abbott, an American pharmaceutical company, a monopoly within Ghana. As a result of the uproar over this agreement, the four editors of the Daily Graphic, the Ghanaian Times, and the Evening News were dismissed.

Following this action, the Commissioner of Information, Mr Osei-Bonsu resigned in protest.

The NLC chose the wrong issue and method to be tough, but these developments ... have demonstrated the limits which the military will tolerate disagreement with government decrees, and in particular, sensitivity to out-spoken intellectuals. ¹

In spite of these events, the press in Ghana regained some of the freedom it had lost under Nkrumah and the NLC did attempt to create a fresh image of the press. In this, note the establishment of a Press Council to preserve the freedom of the press and such activities as Press Week, held in Accra to glorify the newspapers' role in society in spite of the harassment of the press. ²

The curtailment of free speech, control of the press, and the suppression of rumours were hallmarks of military rule in Ghana. However, a large percentage of the population was not directly affected by the authoritarian nature of the military government. As long as the people did not disturb the civil order, they were left alone. "Only those who are already politicized feel the pressure of the oligarch's desire for consensus." ³ Those people who did feel this pressure often resisted the junta. One means of dealing with those who did not conform was by detention, imprisonment, or exile.


Note Shils was discussing the military in general, not specifically about Ghana.
In Ghana, both the army and police were given powers to detain politicians and administrators who had CPP affiliations, including those in Nkrumah's Own Guard Regiment. Many of these were released during the first few weeks. As stated before, anyone could be placed in protective custody if he was considered to be subversive. Although the NLC did not abuse their power to the extent Nkrumah had with his Preventive Detention, large numbers of soldiers and civilians were arraigned after the abortive coup of April 1967. By June of that year, 550 were still in prison. The NLC found a convenient method of ridding itself of those officers it did not approve of by appointing them to overseas embassies, but more of this will be discussed in a later section.

Thus, Ghana's military government faced overt opposition and since there were no institutions for the legal and peaceful expression of dissent, opposition often took on a violent nature. The NLC reacted with arrests, detention, and exile of those individuals involved in opposition movements which had so characterized the CPP regime it had ousted.

Sierra Leone

The coup in Sierra Leone which was instigated by the arrest of Siaka Stevens by Brigadier Lansana on March 21, 1967 and concluded with the arrest of Lansana by Majors Blake, Jumu, and Kai-Samba on March 23

was perhaps the least justifiable and popular of all the coups discussed in this study. As we stated previously, both the supporters of the APC and SLPP felt cheated. Therefore, the military regime faced a serious problem in its attempts to legitimize its position, to foster a base of support among the civilian population, and to suppress opposition to its power.

The first method employed by the military government in Sierra Leone involved constitutional matters. As a justification of the military takeover, Lansana had claimed and the three majors concurred that Governor-General Lightfoot-Boston had acted unconstitutionally in appointing Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister, and that this action had resulted in the breakdown of law and order within the state. ¹ Did the Governor-General by appointing Stevens as Prime Minister before the full results of the election were known abrogate the Constitution? S.58 (2) of the constitution provided that "whenever the Governor-General has occasion to appoint a Prime Minister he shall appoint a Member of the House of Representatives who appears likely to command the support of the majority of the Members of the House". ² Although the Governor-General was normally to act upon the advice of the ministers, S.64(1)

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¹ Radio Sierra Leone, March 1967. Transcribed by Humphrey J. Fisher (No pagination.)

expressly stated that he shall act "in accordance with his own
deliberate judgement". Thus, the Governor-General was to make
his own assessment in determining who was likely to command a
majority in the House and he was entitled by law to appoint Stevens
as Prime Minister. Lansana insisted that Lightfoot-Boston should
have waited until the election for the Paramount Chiefs was completed.
However, it had become a convention of the Constitution that the
chiefs supported the Government headed by the leader of the largest
group of ordinary members of the House. On March 17th, the largest
group was the APC. Although election petitions had been placed
against five SLPP members, the Governor-General could not be expected
to wait for these petitions to be heard before appointing a Prime
Minister. Therefore, by both political necessity and legal right,
the Governor-General was entitled to appoint Siaka Stevens. More¬
over, even if the Governor-General had been wrong, there were other,
non-military, means for reversing his decision either by a challenge
in the courts or a vote of "no-confidence" in the House. The
military's claim that Lightfoot-Boston had violated the constitution
was fallacious.

On the day of three majors' take-over, the new junta
issued a proclamation which suspended parts of the constitution and
authorized the junta to suspend other parts at any time. However,

(1) ibid.
(2) ibid.
"a suspension of part of a constitution by authorities that have no such power accorded to them by the constitution amounts to an unconstitutional action"\(^1\) and as such, poses the same problems of illegitimacy as does a complete abrogation of the constitution. This proclamation established the NRC and granted it all law-making powers. It was, in effect, to be the "constitution" of the military government.

There were, as in Ghana, practical reasons for these proclamations dressed in constitutional overtones. First, since the former constitution had been cast aside, it was necessary to contrive some legal basis for governing. The old regime had been based on a constitution which governed its operations and gave evidence of the existence of a new state. Until there was a new legal footing, the rule of the military was based on force. The proclamation served to lend an illusionary air of constitutionality to what the NRC was doing.

Secondly, the NRC was anxious to retain the loyalty of the civil service. By retaining the laws that regulated the civil service, the junta hoped to provide leadership to this important segment of the population. Throughout the broadcasts of the Sierra Leone radio service, the NRC beseeched the civil service to remain

\(^1\) McAuslan, p. 2.
at their posts and continue their work as usual. ¹ Thirdly, the NRC needed judicial recognition. By retaining the judiciary and assuring them of their conventional role, the NRC was able to obtain their support. Recognition by the judiciary was an important means to draw attention away from the forceful origins of the military government. Thus, for these practical reasons, the formal legal-looking proclamation was utilized by the NRC to legitimize its rule and to obtain the support of vital segments of the population.

The NRC also made extensive use of the commission of inquiry. Although Major Blake openly declared that "...the army does not propose to take cognizance of the past, to mount exhaustive inquiries into the liberty and possessions of individuals ..." ², the NRC turned to the use of commissions of inquiry for the purpose of discrediting the past government and procuring the participation and support of the people of Sierra Leone.

On April 17, 1967, a commission headed by Supreme Court Judge S.J. Forster was appointed to investigate corruption in ministries and public corporations since 1961. The commission, with great effort and precise detail, investigated the assets of many former ministers, including Prime Minister Albert Margai. The final report is a general indictment of the ex-government. The

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¹ Radio Sierra Leone Broadcasts

The political leaders who brought a politically rich-above-average country of the continent to a standstill and returned her well-nigh to jungle-law times, were inexcusably guilty of grave moral lapses...

It was not possible to build a stable government because of primarily, a fundamental lack of basic educational qualifications in many ministers and secondly, of a marked similarity with Dr Faustus in their sense of values. 1

This commission is most vitriolic in its condemnation of Margai. Labelling him a "modern day Machiavelli", the commission devotes a large portion of its final report to displaying the methods Margai used in the office of Prime Minister to unlawfully obtain large sums of money and other "sweets of office". There are even accusations that Margai and some of his ministers were involved in illicit diamond smuggling. 2

The findings of the Forster Commission were submitted to the HRC. The junta, in turn, ordered that Margai should not only pay the state a total amount of £e 771,037.14 (1 £e = 50p.) but also return his Cadillac saloon car. 3 The HRC also ordered twenty ex-ministers to pay the state specific amounts ranging from £e 52,957.80 which Mr R.G.O. King illegally obtained as overseas allowances, property purchases, and other assets to £e 61.00 which Mr S.J. Jusu Sheriff obtained as an allowance for attending political rallies.

(1) Report of the Forster Commission of Inquiry on Assets of Ex-Ministers and Ex-Deputy Ministers (Freetown: Sierra Leone Government Printer), p.44.
(2) ibid, pp. 59-66
(3) ibid, p.67.
Under the NRC (Forfeiture of Assets) (no.2) Decree, these ex-ministers had thirty days to pay their fines or their property would be confiscated. ¹ It is fairly obvious that the NRC did not propose to re-gain the lost money. The objective was to place the former regime in utter disrepute.

Another commission of inquiry appointed on May 8th by the NRC was for the investigation of the Freetown City Council and "to make recommendations with a view to a more efficient and effective system of administration of the Freetown Municipality". ² It was under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Percy R. Davies. A general appeal was broadcast for information, either oral or written, and during the course of the hearing, 73 witnesses were brought before the Commission. The report of the Commission concluded that the Freetown Council was both corrupt: "They were a group, like some in the former SLPP, who saw that much could be wrung from political power and organised themselves on gangster lines to exploit the people" ³, and ignorant: "We regret to report that the majority, if not all, of the former Councillors who appeared before us impressed us as people of the lowest type of education .... They had not the foggiest idea of what they set themselves out to do and were altogether incapable of following any matter to a logical conclusion.

(1) ibid., p.68
(3) ibid., p.4.
(4) ibid., p.6.
A third commission of inquiry was headed by Mr Beoku-Betts to investigate the operation of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPPMB). As the other commissions, this one went into great detail to uncover and display the corruption and inefficiency of the SLPP government. These commissions also made open appeals to the people (e.g. "The salvation lies in the people themselves.")

As in the Ghanaian case, the junta employed these commissions to repudiate the former regime and consolidate the regime's position within the country.

The NRC used both constitutional means and commissions of enquiry in attempting to legitimize their seizure of power. However, opposition to the military government became a serious problem, and the NRC relied on repressive measures right from the beginning in dealing with dissent.

The NRC dealt quickly with the press. On March 25, 1967, all newspapers were banned for one week except for the government-owned Daily Mail. Within a short while, the Press Law was enacted. This decree made it punishable by five years in prison for direct or indirect references to political parties in Sierra Leone, defamation of the members of the NRC, or publication of any report, rumour, or

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(2) *Percy-Davies Commission*, p.4
false statement to bring an MRC member into disrepute. The MRC also held the right to suspend any paper for six months. ¹

In May 1967, another decree ordered that the threatening of the life of any member of the MRC was punishable by death. There was also a fine of $2000 or five years in jail for anyone making false statements against the MRC. ² These decrees proposed to limit the freedom of expression and of the press in Sierra Leone.

All political parties were dissolved and political activity was strictly prohibited. Other organizations, considered disruptive elements, were banned such as the Settlers' Union and the Aborigines' Rights Society. ³

The MRC also instigated massive arrests of all politicians and others associated with Margai. Siaka Stevens and Albert Margai were both arrested. When these two men were released, they were, as were other potential trouble-makers, sent out of the country.

In Sierra Leone, the military attempted to legalize its assumption of power and to find a base of support. It was not totally successful in these efforts. Facing opposition, the MRC instigated several repressive measures against the press, political activity, and individual freedoms. These measures, too, were to prove unsuccessful in the long run.

(1) Africa Report, Vol.12, No.6 (June, 1967), pp.43-44.


(3) Radio Sierra Leone Broadcasts.
Dahomey

The successive military regimes in Dahomey were no more successful in uniting the country behind them than had been the civilian governments. There were efforts on the part of the military juntas to legitimize their seizures of power. Nonetheless, a tradition of violent political opposition developed in Dahomey during the past decade.

The 1963 and the November 1965 coups in Dahomey were not total military take-overs, but they still involved serious constitutional questions. In 1963, Soglo dismissed the National Assembly and repealed the constitution. However, instead of issuing formal proclamations establishing a military government, he appointed the big three political leaders of the country - Apithy, Ahomeadegbe, and Maga - as his three ministers. The old constitution was to be replaced by a new constitution which was drawn up by a Constitutional Committee.

Thus, this brief excursion by the military into politics was only to fill in vacuum until the new constitution was drafted and elections held, leading to the Ahomeadegbe-Apithy coalition government. After the November 1965 coup, Soglo immediately turned power over to the President of the National Assembly, Congacou. He justified this by pointing to Articles 17 and 35 of the 1964 Constitution which specified that the President of the National Assembly would assume leadership of the government in the event that the Prime Minister and
President were unable to fulfill their duties. However, since the constitution had been partially abrogated by the dismissal of Apithy and Ahomadegbe, the appointment of Congacou as the executive was, in essence, an unconstitutional act.

Congacou's provisional government was short-lived. In December 1965, Soglo completed his take-over bid by suspending the constitution and dissolving the National Assembly. He created his government on December 23rd which was declared to be official by a formal decree in January 1966. Another decree set up the Comité de Rénovation Nationale (CRN) on Christmas Eve 1965. The CRN program included reform of the administration and the drafting of a new constitution. However, in spite of the official proclamations and the proposals of a new constitution, this military government was not based in law and its rule was regulated only by arbitrary decrees.

The fourth coup in 1967 began on December 17th with the dismissal of Soglo and the dissolution of the Comité Militaire de Vigilance which had replaced the old CRN. The Comité Révolutionnaire Militaire was created by the "Proclamation du 17 décembre". There was at this time no constitution in Dahomey and the proclamations and decrees, draped in legal terminology, were means to draw attention away from this fact.

(2) Chronologie Politique Africaine (November-December, 1965), p.42
The final coup in 1969 resulted in the overthrow of Zinsou and the annulment of the 1968 Constitution. The new military directorate headed by de Souza claimed "charter legitimacy" by conferring on their regime "all powers traditionally pertaining to the head of state". This claim, however, was not based on any constitutional guidelines. Yet it was a transparent attempt on the part of the junta to legitimize its position of power.

Therefore, the military in Dahomey has utilized constitutional methods to legitimize its intrusion into politics either by pointing to specific articles in the constitution to justify their action as in the November 1965 coup or the issuing of formal declarations of legitimacy. We have previously discussed the practical reasons for such actions. These included: (1) to provide new legal footing for the military government and to maintain the idea of the state; (2) to guarantee jobs and pay to the civil service and judiciary so that these segments of the population would support the new government; and (3) to obtain judicial recognition.

In Dahomey, the commission of inquiry was used by whatever government was in power to discredit those out of power. Our evidence is scant, but the information we do have access to points out that commissions were set up to examine cases of embezzlement of public funds. For example, in November 1963, a commission

was charged to look into the accounts of Maga's ministers. On the basis of the findings, M. Paule Darboux (ex-Minister of Commerce), M. Bertin Borna (ex-Minister of Finance), and Gaston de Souza (Borna's Secretary) were charged with misappropriation of public funds. ¹ There were also plans to bring Maga to trial although these never materialized.

In early 1964, there were serious riots in Parakou in which twelve were killed and 80 soldiers and civilians injured. There were accusations that these disturbances were pro-Maga and a commission of inquiry was established in April 1964 to examine these rumours. ² Consequently, Chabi Mama, a staunch Maga supporter, and Boki Maga, the ex-president's sister, were charged with subversive activities. Mme. Maga was acquitted, but Chabi Mama was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment and five years' exile. ³ He was released in 1965 and became Minister of Education under Zinsou. ⁴

Under Alley, the commission of inquiry was also a tool used to discredit former regimes and thus to justify the military's assumption of power. A Military Correction Committee was established in March 1968 to deal with embezzlement of public funds. All previous

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¹ West Africa (November 23, 1963), p.24
trials were declared null and void, and those accused were to be re-tried. Other commissions were established to discredit Soglo's supporters. Major Louis Chasme, Soglo's quartermaster, was sentenced to one year in jail for embezzling 13,000 CFA francs (£200) and 4,500,000 CFA francs (£3000). Also, the Prefet of Borgu, Mono and the director of the General Broadcasting Company were dismissed following commissions of inquiry.

Since events occurred so rapidly and chaotically in Dahomey, many of the commissions of inquiry which were set up did not have time to bring forth evidence against specific people and often the next regime would overturn previous verdicts. The commissions, as in Ghana and Sierra Leone, were set up to expose the corruption of the former regime, to lend credence to the new government, and perhaps also to imprison and impoverish potential rivals amongst the old crowd.

The past decade of Dahomean politics has been characterized by numerous anti-governmental riots, assassination plots, and accusations of subversive activity. The military governments reacted with such repressive measures as censorship, arrest, exile, and imprisonment of the dissidents. We have previously mentioned the riots at Parakou which led to the arrest, imprisonment, and exile of Chabi Mama. The riot itself was harshly put down by the soldiers.

(1) West Africa (March 30,1968), p.409
(2) West Africa (March 16,1968), p.322
There was an assassination plot discovered in 1963 which aimed at the removal of Soglo and the re-establishment of Maga as President. This led to the arrest of Maga, press censorship, and the detention of half a dozen Maga supporters. In a broadcast, Soglo said:

"Hatched by a handful of blind and bribed irresponsible persons, the plot was designed to upset all that has been done, to establish the former state of things, in order to impose in Dahomey the silence of the tomb."

Soglo later released Maga, Chabi Mama, and the old ministers Darboux and Borna in order to prepare the conditions for national reconciliation. This was in 1965, and it appears that by that time Soglo understood that the opposition movements could not be discouraged by the arrest of the leaders.

Nonetheless, the arrests did not stop. In 1965, Edmund Doussou, Yobo, Honoré Onoumansou, Theophile Faoletti, and Jules Guezo were detained on charges of subversion. They were eventually released in 1967 by presidential decree. In 1966, the ex-Foreign Minister of Ahomadegé's government, Gabriel Lozes, was arrested for possessing subversive tracts; later that year, Noise Mensah, Minister of Rural Development, and Nicephore Soglo, Minister of the Economy, were dismissed because of disagreements over the government's

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(1) *West Africa* (December 7, 1963), p. 1375
(2) *Année Africaine* (1967)
budgetary policies. The military regimes also attempted to remove individuals considered untrustworthy by the government. In 1967, Benoit Adandesajan, a former member of the CMV, was detained for political crimes which included embezzlement; in 1968, Innocent Adotevi, prefect of Atlantique, and Dr L.Amlon, Director of Public Health, were tried on charges of misuse of public funds.

The military governments in Dahomey were unsuccessful in their attempts to legitimize their seizure of power or to build up a base of support throughout the country. Although they tried to suppress opposition by arrest, detention, exile, censorship, dismissal, or the use of troops against the civilian populace, not one of the military governments was able to maintain the control of the central political apparatus for any length of time. Clubs had become trumps in Dahomey.

Upper Volta

When the trade unions called for Lamizana to take control of the government in early 1966, the move was generally popular. The junta in Upper Volta was to justify its position of power essentially by the issuance of formal declarations of legitimacy and by a thorough discrediting of the Yameogo government. Yet, even though the military rule was initially accepted by the population, it was

also to face serious dissent.

The first method used by Lamizana was to issue a declaration granting the military political authority. On January 5th, he created the government of which he was head of state and in charge of a cabinet composed of both military men and civilians. By including civilians, the junta hoped to draw attention away from the fact that rule was in the hands of the military. The government was reinforced by the Conseil Superieur des Forces Armées, a group of senior army officers and gendarmes. Lamizana repealed the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. We have discussed the reasons for such formal declarations in previous sections. However, although these declarations lent an air of constitutionality to the military government, there existed in Upper Volta no fundamental legal guideline for the military rule.

Another method used by the military junta in Upper Volta in order to legitimize their rule and to build up a base of support among the civilian population was the creation of a non-political institution. The Comité Consultatif was created by decree on January 13, 1966.

Les membres civils de ce comité seront choisis en raison de leur connaissance des problèmes et de l'estime dont ils jouissent dans l'opinion générale.
Ce comité qui aura une vocation essentiellement consultative sera tenu constamment informé de l'action gouvernementale et aura à donner son avis sur les décisions à intervenir.

(2) Chronologie Politique Africaine (January-February, 1966.)
It consisted of 41 members including 10 officers, five members from the trade unions, and well-known civic figures such as Joseph Oudreago, Mme Quezzin Coulibaly, and Dr J. Conombo. What influence this body had on the decisions of the military government is not documented; however, it probably provided a public opinion gauge for the junta. Since the politically mobilized population of Upper Volta is small and concentrated in the urban centres, the need for a non-political organization to channel demands from a wide range of individuals and groups was not as acute as in Ghana. Also, the majority of the politically mobilized population were members of trade unions, and these unions were allowed to operate and formed an institution to articulate their demands.

A major tactic used to legitimize the military take-over was the trial of President Yameogo. The trial was a point of confusion during the early years of military rule. Lamizana refused to free Yameogo, who had been under house arrest since the coup, or to bring him to trial for misappropriation of public funds. Lamizana turned to the military council for advice; they were against his release (only by a small majority) while feeling that a trial would belittle the office of Presidency. The RDA, Yameogo's political party, called for his release but stipulated that he was not to return as party leader. The opposition party, the MLN, wanted to see Yameogo punished, but the party leader, Ki-Zerbo, opposed
the motion. Finally, there was strong and genuine opposition among
the Mossi to a trial. Thus, the feeling of the country was mixed.

The controversy as to whether or not to try Yameogo centred on several issues. First, Lamizana was wary of stirring up old political grudges by such a trial. Yameogo was still reported to have support among the Mossi at Koudougou although the RDA had expelled him from the party. Moreover, Houphouet-Boigny, the President of neighbouring Ivory Coast, had expressed his support for Yameogo. Secondly, there was concern over the health of the ex-President. He had attempted suicide twice, the last time during the OCAM meeting in 1968 as a call for sympathy. The issue was finally settled when the army announced in 1968 that it would return power to the civilians in 1970. Those who feared Yameogo's return to power wanted a trial to decide the issue.  

A special tribunal convened on April 28, 1968 to try Yameogo on charges of embezzlement and misuse of public funds. He was accused of embezzling 721,041,123 CFA francs (£1.2m.) and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. He also was fined 51m. CFA francs (£86,000) and ordered to pay the government damages amounting to 117.5m CFA francs (£300,000).  

(1) Africa Confidential, No.7 (March 29, 1967),p7.  
The special tribunal established to try Yameogo also was charged to try those accused of crimes against the state security and other political crimes. Later in 1968, it found the former Defence Minister Michael Touzouma guilty of embezzling 76,000 CFA francs and former Speaker of the National Assembly Bergnon Koné with two of his junior officials guilty of embezzling £150,000. Here as in our other case studies, these trials were a means to discredit the former regime. But, in Upper Volta, the security precautions and secrecy surrounding the trials point out that Lamizana feared that any political controversy created with the trial would result in violence.

Although it was true that the military regime in Upper Volta was not faced with opposition from a large politically mobilized population, the junta still met with some serious threats of dissent. In September 1966, there were riots in Koudougou which led to the arrest of six people and the suppression of all political party activity. During that year, Lamizana ordered the arrest of a number of "anti-patriots" and dismissed Commandant Maurice Samon because of his affiliation with these people. By 1967, a special court was set up to try those accused of subversive activities.

(3) Chronologie Politique Africaine (September-October, 1966), p.23.
(4) ibid., p.23.
The gravest threat to Lamisana's rule occurred in September 1967 when a plot to assassinate the President was uncovered. Thirty-eight were eventually tried for their plans to provoke demonstrations in order to incite the trade unions and to gain sympathy from a section of the army. Lucien Yameogo, a treasury official was sentenced to twelve years' hard labour for leading the plotters and thirteen others received sentences between three and ten years' prison. These included Herman Yameogo, son of the ex-President, Felicity Yameogo, his first wife, Bergnon Koné, and Maussa Sarvadogo, of the National Assembly.¹

A form of repression found in Upper Volta was censorship of the press. The press was subject to governmental approval during the state of emergency which lasted until June 1966. However, there appears to have been less interference in the press of Upper Volta. Not only were the political parties allowed to issue their own papers when they reformed in 1969 but also newspapers formed the Syndicat National Autonome de la Presse.²

Thus, although the military government in Upper Volta attempted to legitimize their rule and gain a base of support, opposition emerged in often violent forms. The military, in turn, reacted with various repressive measures.

(1) West Africa (June 1, 1968), p.648.
(2) Chronologie Politique Africaine (July-August, 1969).
In conclusion we have discussed the problems entailed as the military regime sought both to legitimize its seizure of power and to create a base of support among the civilian population. A brief survey of the methods employed include the use of legalistic promulgations to justify their abrogation of the constitution, an appeal to the traditional value system, the use of commissions of inquiry to discredit the preceding regime, and the creation of non-political institutions.

In all four cases, the military juntas issued legalistic proclamations which sought to justify their abrogation of the constitution. These proclamations performed three functions: (1) to draw attention away from the fact that the military government is not based on naked force alone and to get the junta off on a new legal footing; (2) to acquire and retain the services of the government bureaucracy and judiciary by guaranteeing them their jobs and pay; and (3) to obtain judicial recognition and thus show the population of the countries and the world in general that the junta was nominally legal. The proclamations issued by the juntas in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta usually established the military directorate and set down the method of ruling, i.e. by decree.

Only in Ghana do we find an example of appealing to traditional and historical precedents. Here the overthrow of the Osagyefo was likened to the de-stooling of chiefs. Although the removal of Nkumah distressed few Ghanians outside those enjoying
CPP patronage, Ankrah's use of this analogy is an interesting feature. 

In Ghana and Upper Volta, we find the juntas establishing non-political organizations. These included the Political Committee, the Centre for Civic Education, the Worker's Brigade, and Ghana Youth Council in Ghana and the Comité Consultatif in Upper Volta. The function of these organizations was to involve the population in "political" activity along lines the military felt appropriate and also to provide the military government with an opinion gauge, although generally this was an "elite" opinion. The lack of support, attendance, or enthusiasm for these organizations demonstrates the futility of governing in a political vacuum.

Another means of seeking legitimate status used by all military juntas was the commission of inquiry or the trial of deposed politicians (as in the case of Upper Volta). It was hoped that the population would feel involvement through giving evidence or merely the publicity given the findings. Moreover, the commissions and trials were also used to discredit the old politicians, thereby giving the military greater justification for their intervention. To discredit these politicians was also useful in lessening the probability of their return to power once the military withdrew from politics and thus guaranteeing that the military would be free from reprisals from the politicians they had removed from office. A final by-product of the commission's revealing the gross mis-use of public office was a resulting cynicism of the part of the population to all public authorities. Thus, it was important for the military junta to appear above suspicion or else face the same
charges levied against the politicians. Unfortunately for several military juntas, they did not take this precaution. Therefore, we will find a growing opposition to these juntas, notably the NRC in Sierra Leone and Soglo's regime in Dahomey, on charges of corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency.

Finally, in all four countries, opposition appeared. The military relied increasingly on coercive measures such as arrest, detention, and exile which had so characterized the very regimes the military had ousted. The juntas were to make the mistake of assuming enforced consensus meant national support and unity.
Administrative Problems

We have discussed previously the military's experience in the management of violence and how this facilitates its intrusion into a state's political life. There are further implications of the technological make-up of the army which at first glance would appear to give it certain advantages as an administrative body, particularly on a short-term basis, but which in fact are inherent disadvantages.

First, the military is often a pioneer in the technological field and does possess certain advantages in the relatively pre-technological society in which it exists. "Willingness to develop and maintain a modern army compels even small primitive armies to promote a trained cadre equipped with technical know-how, rarer in other sectors."¹ Special skills are emphasised in military life. Those which are particularly relevant for a developing nation include engineering, communications, transport, and logistics.

Secondly, the dependence upon technology entails a higher degree of specialization and differentiation than normally associated with institutions in developing nations. The administration of a technical sub-culture requires a refined organizational format. Ideally, the military organization is hierarchical with a tightly centralized command. Obedience to superiors (i.e. discipline and following orders) is the dominant basis for activity and is further ordered by an

elaborate system of rules and regulations. Finally, the military establishment is tied together by a highly developed *esprit de corps*, loyalty, and morale. Although the armies in the countries under discussion in this study deviated from the ideal, the hierarchical structure and faculty for quick decision-making in an emergency is an advantage on a short-term basis.

However, although the military's administrative skills may give benefits in the early days following the coup, these potential advantages are circumscribed. First, the character of the armed forces is derived from the requirement that its members are specialists in violence. The key to military organization is to see it as an expression of the unique functions of the military, namely, combat and combat preparation. "In general, military experience which emphasizes a simple calculus of violence is not directly transferable to large-scale organization planning or management." There is little evidence (except in Upper Volta) that the armies under examination here are either willing or capable of converting their organizational superiority and special skills for social and economic development.

Secondly, these armies are small and have a low proportion of staff offices. Although there is an increasing number of officers assigned to staff as opposed to field duty and they are presently trained in advanced techniques of personnel management and other administrative

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skills, the experience of the officers is limited in comparison with the experience of administrators in civilian occupations. There is a restricted opportunity for the officers to test their administrative skills. The army, therefore, is proficient in the administration of its own self-contained unit and would also have little difficulty performing "law and order" functions in the country. However, a state in which the economy is expanding and developing and in which the society is becoming more specialized and differentiated requires the existence of a trained bureaucracy. In such a situation, the military administrative skills are over-taxed when trying to control and accommodate a wide range of activities including agricultural and industrial development, budgetary regulatory functions, economic planning and the like. The army ceases to be able to administer by its own resources. It seeks collaboration with the civil service organization already in existence.

A symbiotic relationship between the military and the civil service is readily established. First, they are both country-wide and literate among a largely illiterate population. Secondly, both are within the most Westernized sector of the society. As inheritances from the colonial period, they often share similar viewpoints evolving from colonial traditions: not only the emphasis on law and order and the use of bureaucratic machinery for control rather than development but also a basic distrust of politicians. They share similar vested interests.

(1) Lissak, p. 145.
(2) Finer, p. 17.
Finally, therefore, the civil service is generally pleased to see the backs of the politicians which only the military has the power to remove and to work in close accord with the military in administering the country, a function only the civil service is capable of performing.

There are some inherent dangers in the bureaucratic - military coalition arising first from the policy weaknesses of the military and secondly, from the nature of the bureaucracy itself.

As we stated in the first section of Chapter III, the military is lacking in political skills. Thus, it cannot provide policy guidelines for the civil service. Apart from their basic distrust of political activity, the military leaders are limited in their ability to provide political guidance by several other factors. First, the central staff planning of the armed forces is restricted. "The absence of extensive staff planning limits the officers' experience in high ministerial responsibility, strategic planning, or innovation either organizational, economic, or political". Moreover, due to the young age of officers and the rapid rate of promotion during the early years of independence, many have spent most of their careers taking orders and carrying policy instead of giving orders or making policy decisions. They lack the experience necessary for national policy-making activity. Secondly, the officers are severely hampered in giving direction to economic development. "For one thing, military leaders infrequently understand the myriad and subtle problems involved in the business of giving rational

and coherent fiscal and financial leadership to the community.\(^1\) The military is not development minded; the economy is generally put on a "care and maintenance" basis.\(^2\) Thus, the country stagnates while demands for development increase. Thirdly, as we have stated earlier, the military junta rarely puts forth an ideology or blue-print for development. It often lacks long-term goals other than the removal of corrupt, inefficient politicians. Thus, the military can provide only a framework in which the civil service can act unimpeded by political interference. It is less able to act as a national policy maker.\(^3\)

In view of the military's inability to provide political leadership, the civil service in these states take on more and more the role of deciding and formulating policies. While the bureaucracy in all political systems has some degree of involvement in policy-making, this involvement is exceptionally high in developing countries in which the political institutions are weak vis-à-vis the civil service inherited from the colonial "administocracy".\(^4\) While in coalition with a military junta, the civil service gains a disproportionate amount of power.

This heavy reliance on the civil service both for day-to-day administration and for the composition of various special committees ... has considerably strengthened the position of senior bureaucrats and reveals the pathetic programmatic weakness and susceptibility of the presiding military in fields of decision.

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(3) Gutteridge, p. 11.

(4) For further discussion of the role of the civil service in developing countries see Fred Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries; The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton - Mifflin, Co., 1964).

Moreover, this poses severe problems for future civilian regimes in their attempts to limit the political role of the bureaucrat. The lack of balance between policy-making and policy-implementing institutions will impede the development of a stable political system.

Furthermore, without firm political guidance, the bureaucrats have weak incentives to provide good service, whatever their formal pre-entry training and professional qualifications. They tend to use their effective control to safeguard their expedient bureaucratic interests — tenure, seniority rights, fringe benefits, toleration of poor performance, the right to violate official norms — rather than to advance the achievement of programme goals.1

The civil service not only fails to accomplish the administrative goals set for it, but it also resists any changes which may affect its position of power. Thus, it becomes a powerful interest group protecting its privileges.

In the following section, we will discuss how the military regimes in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta came to rely on the bureaucratic machinery in operation for running the affairs of the state and thus, how much of the political and executive decisions rested in the hands of the civil service. Also, we will discuss the difficulty which the juntas were under while facing a civil service which manifested powerful group interests, particularly the civil service trade unions in the ex-French states.

Ghana

In Ghana, the MLC immediately fell back on the civil service. Beyond those points mentioned earlier, there were two additional factors facilitating this accommodation. First, the civil service in Ghana had long resented the treatment it received from Nkrumah. In particular, it was dissatisfied over the formulation of policy along ideological lines. Secondly, "unlike every other institution connected with the previous regime, the bureaucracy remained unscathed". ¹

At the time of the 1966 coup, there were 32 ministries over which were superimposed a number of supra-ministerial secretariats and offices directly responsible to Nkrumah. The MLC undertook to re-organize and streamline the bureaucracy. The Administrative Committee, including several senior civil servants, was established to make recommendations with regard to both central and local administrative machinery and to advise the MLC on all matters relating to central and local government. ² Acting on the advice of the Administrative Committee, the MLC reduced the number of Ministries, including the Office of the MLC, to 18. Members of the MLC were assigned the responsibilities of these ministries. ² In June, 1967, the MLC took its first tentative step toward civilian rule by dissolving

(1) Dowse, p.240
advisory departments and replacing them with 14 civilian commissioners who acted as quasi-ministers. Those matters which remained under direct control of the NLC were defence, finance, interior, and culture. At this time, a 31-member Advisory Committee was organized under Busia and was to act as a national "clearing house".

Regional and local administration were also reorganized on the advice of the Administrative Committee. Regional and District Committees of Administration were established and the number of administrative districts was, in the process, reduced from 168 to 47.

In all, fourteen national advisory committees were introduced by the NLC, including those on External Affairs, Agriculture, Economics. These, as the Administrative Committee said, consisted "mainly of civil servants, and it is they who have been wielding effective executive power in the country". As Afrifa stated: "I think the confidence we have built up in the civil service can be measured from the membership of public servants in the advisory commissions of the NLC." However, as reported in 1968, "leaning heavily on the experience of top civil servants, most

(2) A New Era in Ghana, p.11
(3) Dowse, p.240.
retained from Nkrumah's staff, the NLC has become accustomed to
decision making by administrative fiat.¹

The NLC also appointed several other committees to
examine the general administration. The Public Services Structure
and Salaries Commission under C.C. Mills-Odoi, the Judge Advocate
of the Ghana Armed Forces, made numerous suggestions for the
decentralization of the administration. Also an Expediting
Committee was established as the "first serious effort made in the
country in the direction of creating an institution to check
undesirable conduct on the part of public officers".² Thus, one
of the major results of the coalition between the military and the
civil service was to remove political interference from the bureaucracy
and re-create its independence. Moreover, the bureaucrat's role in
policy-making was increased and their position strengthened patently.

Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, the MRC announced on March 25, that "... the Council wishes to take this opportunity to assure all civil
servants that it will not tolerate victimization of any officer
[i.e. civil servant] for any past conduct in political matters
...."³ Thus, the MRC also realized that it would need to rely
on the civil service in order to administer the country.

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(1) Africa Report, Vol.13, No.4 (April, 1968)
(2) West Africa, (June 1, 1968) p.624.
The NRC streamlined the administration by reducing the number of ministries from fourteen to nine.\(^1\) The civil service, with the National Economic Advisory Committee appointed by the NRC, directed the day-to-day affairs of the country as well as the economic recovery programme.

The military also relied heavily on the civil service for policymaking. This can be seen in the fact that although the military had intervened to prevent an APC election victory, the policies advocated during military rule were very close to those proposed by the APC.\(^2\) A major reason for this was that much of the civil service were either pro-AFC or at least anti-SLPP. Although Peter Tucker, a Margai supporter, was retained as general-secretary to the junta and as head of the civil service, he had lost much of his influence due to his past record with the Margai regime. Thus the investigations into the affairs of the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB), the Freetown City Council, and Margai and his Ministers which had been proposed by the APC were carried out under NRC rule. Moreover, the economic policies, particularly the austerity budget and the re-vamping of the SLPMB had been called for by the APC. However, note that these economic policies had been also recommended by the IMF as conditions for the needed emergency aid. Therefore, with much of the policy-making in the hands of civil servants who were largely pro-AFC, the policies put forth during the military rule resembled those of the APC. It is important, however, to remember that the NRC was unwilling to hand power over to

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APC politicians and the two committees set up to review the process of re-civilianization, the National Advisory Committee and the Civilian Rule Committee, were biased to the South and East and filled with Margai supporters.

The military was wary of creating difficulty in their relationship with the civil service. Evidence of this can be found in the handling of the Forster Commission of Inquiry. The vigorous questioning into the affairs and assets of ex-politicians of the Margai government brought up the discussion of whether or not civil servants should be subject to similar procedures. It was assumed that if civil servants were called before the Commission, more rigid rules of evidence would be applied than usual in a commission of inquiry. The fear was that loose allegations might jeopardize civil servants' standing in their work.\(^1\) In order to protect the reputation and prestige of the civil service, bureaucrats were generally immune to interrogation by commissions of inquiry.

Thus, the reliance of the military upon the civil service for advice and policy can be seen in the policies put forth by the civil service and in the unwillingness of the junta to examine closely the affairs of civil servants. The bureaucracy in Sierra Leone expanded more so into the role of policy-maker under military rule there.

The civil service in French-speaking African states differ from their English-speaking counterparts in that it was legal for them to engage in overt political activity. Not only was there closer collaboration between the senior civil servants and the political elite, but the French system of bureaucracy standards also allowed the civil servants to form unions as powerful pressure groups. The unions, and the public service union was the most militant in Dahomey, had a seminal role in determining who would or would not/...
be in power. The civil servants in Dahomey, moreover, presented a special problem. Undoubtedly many were well-educated, but there were too many of them. After the independence of French West Africa, large numbers who had served in the French territories returned to Dahomey demanding positions. Also, many young Dahomeans pressed for civil service positions since it was one of the few avenues of employment open in a country which had a small private sector. Thus, there was a constant demand for employment while those already in the bureaucracy jockeyed for security of tenure, promotions and the maintenance of their traditional privileges. There was little else to fall back on outside the government. Not only did the civil service with the other unions have an inordinate amount of power in political and economic matters, but they expected to maintain this power because of the colonial inheritance of an administrative government. It is with this backdrop that we must look at the relationship between the juntas and the civil service and the reforms which Dahomey’s governments tried to enforce for the past decade.

Soglo’s first military government was launched in 1963 when the unions called for Maga’s overthrow. Among their grievances was the 10 per cent tax on all civil service salaries. The civil service remained unaltered under Soglo’s short reign although new ministers were appointed to head the various departments. Soglo stated:
Pour la première fois les ministres ont été choisis en raison de leur compétence à l'exclusion de tout autre critère: le ministre de l'éducation nationale est un professeur, celui de l'agriculture est un ingénieur agronome, celui de la santé un médecin ...\(^1\)

Also, Soglo repressed the 10 per cent tax on civil service salaries in the January 1964 budget.\(^2\) Whether or not this would have pacified the public service unions is debatable for when Ahomadegbe and Apithy were installed in the bi-cephalous executive they reinstated the tax and increased it to 25 per cent.\(^3\) This was part of their austerity program which was drastically needed in view of Dahomey's economic crisis. Nonetheless, the workers went on strike in July 1965 and Soglo returned to politics that November. Congacou, to whom political power was handed, set up an interim government of technicians.\(^4\) Still, the strike continued and Soglo finally took over complete political power in December.

At that time, the civil service in Dahomey accounted for over 60 per cent of all government expenditures. Thus, in August 1966, Soglo announced several bureaucratic reforms. There was to be a blockage of new recruitment, a ceiling was placed on civil service salaries, and family allowances were cut.\(^5\) These measures prompted a general strike in October, but Soglo stood his ground.

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(1) *Le Monde* (June 30, 1963)
Not only did he call in troops to put down the strike and dismiss many who had participated in the strike, but he also instigated further measures to restrict the civil service. In November 1966, he ruled that all civil servants were to be held accountable for deposits and funds to the Council of Ministers. This was a feeble attempt to reduce the level of corruption. Soglo also took tentative steps toward restructuring and decentralizing the bureaucracy. Each minister was now held directly responsible for all administrative functions, some of which had previously been the responsibility of the Ministry of Civil Service. The individual ministers thus held a tighter control over their employees. Moreover, a commission was set up consisting of union and governmental officials to study the organization of the unions, including the public service union.

Soglo met fierce opposition from the unions to his austerity and re-organization program. The unions demonstrated in December 1967 and demanded the abolition of the 25 per cent salary cut, a refund to the workers, and the re-employment of those who were dismissed after the 1966 strike. Alley was sent in to negotiate and it was rumoured that Decree 36, which banned strike activity, was to be repealed. According to some sections of the army, Soglo had sold out.

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(3) *Chronologie Politique Africaine* (November-December, 1967)
took control in December 1967. However, because of Alley's popularity, he was chosen to head the latest junta. The military government tried again to restrict the preference given to the civil servants. The 25 per cent tax remained in effect and the civil servants also lost their free accommodation and other perks, such as the use of official cars for private business.\(^1\) In March, the junta clamped down on the civil service again. Alley publicly warned them that they would be suspended for two days without pay each time they were late for work. The government, he said, was concerned about unproductivity and the "don't care" attitude among the civil servants.\(^2\)

Furthermore, the military would spot check the governmental offices for any offenders. The unions continued to express their displeasure with limited strike action, but refrained from any major protest since it was soon obvious to them that the measures were generally ineffective.

When Zinsou entered the presidency in July 1968, he also attempted to solve the civil service problem. In May 1969, he proposed to reduce recruitment into the bureaucracy by expanding job opportunities in the private sector. He kept the 25 per cent tax and reduced family allowances.\(^3\) Thus, in May and June, the

\(^{1}\) Chronologie Politique Africaine (September–October, 1967), p.35.
\(^{3}\) West Africa (November 5, 1968), p.1162
civil service went on strike. It ended pending negotiations over family allowances. However, the decision of the Council of Ministers was to reduce further the allowance from £4 to £1.3 per child. To offset a strike over the decision, Zinsou issued a decree which enabled the government to requisition public service workers in case of a call for strike action.

Although the unions did not actively instigate the 1969 coup, Kouandété seized power against a backdrop of union unrest and dissatisfaction. Under the last military regime, the civil service became further entrenched when Zinsou's ministers resigned en masse and Kouandété replaced them with senior civil servants who were in direct charge of the ministries.

Upper Volta

In Upper Volta, as in Dahomey, the civil service, as members of trade unions were highly politicized. Their violent reaction to the salary cuts proposed by Yameogo led directly to the 1966 coup. Lamizana, therefore, was aware of the disproportionate power of the civil service. He was caught between trying to maintain union support and attempting to solve the country's pressing economic

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problems which were aggravated by the unions' monetary demands. He appeased the unions by allowing them to operate, albeit 'non-politically', but he also pushed through severe austerity measures including a 15 per cent tax on salaries over 10,000 CFA francs which mainly affected the civil servant and a compulsory patriotic tax on all wage incomes.\(^1\) By 1969, Lamizana had cut the salaries of some civil servants as much as 25 per cent and expected the civil servants to farm a small garden under the "Full Stomach" program.\(^2\)

Not only did Lamizana need the political support of the civil service, but he also needed their assistance in running the country. The civil service remained virtually intact although in the 1967 budget there were plans for streamlining it as an economizing measure. There was also some discontent among the junta at the state of affairs in the bureaucracy. In August 1966, Kabore, the Minister of Public Works, called for reform. He stated that the civil service was rife with favouritism, inertia, and waste even though they received over 50 per cent of the national budget. He proposed to recruit new men chosen on the "objective" criteria of productivity, out-put, and efficiency and also to restore the principles of authority and subordination.\(^3\) Whether or not he succeeded is not documented. However, the formal organizational

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\(^1\) Chronologie Politique Africaine (November-December, 1967).
\(^3\) Chronologie Politique Africaine (July-August, 1966), pp. 18-19.
structure of the civil service was altered when the system of secretariats was replaced by ministries in 1967. There were both officers and civilians in charge of these ministries, but the key department, Finance, remained under the leadership of Lt. Marc Garango.

Lamizana also instigated reforms in regional and local administration. Municipal councils were replaced by special administrative delegations in early 1966. Also, the cercles, left over from the days of French rule, were replaced by seven departments headed by a prefet. The departments were divided into 32 arrondissements under sous-prefets, and between 120 and 150 communes. The prefets, sous-prefets, and mayors were all nominated by military decree. Lamizana also returned many of the administrative prerogatives back to the traditional chief in the rural areas.

Nonetheless, Lamizana was bedevilled by civil servants who abused their responsibilities. In May 1967, there were reports that governmental schoolmasters were interfering in legal problems such as land dispute settlements. Also, government medical officers were accused of acting like village chiefs and gendarmes. Lamizana broadcast to the nation that he was appalled by the "political motives which cannot be tolerated". But, by this time, the

(3) Chronologie Politique Africaine (May-June, 1966), p. 27.
civil and public service were deeply entrenched in political functions.

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In conclusion, the general trend in these states has been first, the reliance by the ruling military junta on the civil service and secondly, the problem of the civil service acting as a pressure group. In Ghana, the civil service regained much of its independence and influence which had been lost under Nkrumah. After the return to civilian rule in 1969, many who have been familiar with Ghana remarked how very much the new regime resembled the "administocracy" of the Gold Coast. Although there have been several recent moves to curb the power of the civil service, it would appear that its close relationship with the NLC regime amplified and confirmed its powerful position. In Sierra Leone, the military government attempted to streamline the civil service in order to make it a more efficient body for governing. The military was to rely on the civilian bureaucracy to an increasing extent since so many of the army officers were imprisoned or sent overseas and, finally in 1968, the warrant officers, who had little administrative experience, were to rely on the civil service almost totally. In Dahomey, the history of its multiple military and civilian governments is marked by the imposition of ineffectual reforms and restrictions on the civil service, and the increasing role of the
civil service technician in the governing of the state. The bureaucracy possessed two powerful assets: first, their strength as a pressure group through their union combined with their alliance with other unions and secondly, their presence in the government as the only instrument of power to have remained intact over the past decade. They could determine which man would govern and how that man would govern. Apparently, the civil service maintains its preponderate power under the present civilian regime and it is most likely that whenever civil service and military grievances coincide, the present government will lose its control. In Upper Volta, the civil service will play an important role in directing the type of government which will replace the military junta and will most assuredly retain much of its present power when the soldiers return to the barracks. Let us note, however, that the military regime in Upper Volta faced less complex administrative problems than the army in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey. Upper Volta is the least developed state in our study; there were fewer social groups and forces to co-ordinate. The army's administrative structure was more adequate in taking over the civilian functions. Nevertheless, Lamizana found it both expedient and advantageous to use the civil service apparatus already in operation.

Finally, each of these states will be confronted with the problem of a bureaucracy which has wide-ranging decision making and implementation powers. The civilian regimes which follow the
military juntas will be hampered in their attempts to control the political role of the civil service.
Dissent Within the Army

Cohesion is the capacity for collective action and a feeling of group solidarity; lack of cohesion implies unstable and fragmented involvement. Cohesion is a major determinant of the strength of any social institution and as such it will be an important criterion by which to evaluate the capacity of an African army as a government. Thus we must examine the degree of cohesiveness of the African armies which depends, in part, both on the social composition of the armies as well as their organizational and career experience.¹ In the following section, we will discuss the African officer corps and the rank and file of the armies and attempt to determine the causes and effects of unity or the lack of unity within the military apparatus.

The Officer Corps

The composition of the officer corps in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey and Upper Volta is an important factor in the understanding of civil-military relations in these states for it is these men who conduct the actions of the rank and file and who are in direct contact and conflict with the civilian elites. We must not underestimate the significance of their level of cohesiveness and some clue may be found in their origins.

In Ghana, the Africanization of the officer corps began in the early 1950's. The first to be commissioned were NCO's in the educational service and included Generals Ankrah, Ocran and Kotoko.  

Cadets were first sent to British military colleges in 1953 and even after the opening of the Ghana Military Academy at Teshie in 1960, the most promising young cadets were sent to Sandhurst. Education was a prime determinant of officer candidate selection and thus, the majority of the officers are from the southern regions, reflecting the greater educational opportunities there. After independence, there was pressure to Africanize the entire officer corps. To attract secondary school and university graduates, the basic salary for a newly commissioned lieutenant was £663 p.a., which compared favourably with the salary given new civil service recruits. The number of Ghanaian officers increased from 27 in 1965 to over 700 ten years later. In Sierra Leone, only 9 of the 50 officers were African at the time of independence.

By 1967, there were 65 African officers and only 10 expatriates. "The existence of a small Creole population of the Freetown area in juxtaposition with a medley of tribes (especially the rival Mende-Temne groups) has never made military recruitment a simple question. Selection of officers was based on educational requirements and the Creoles

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(3) Africa Confidential, No. 6, (March 17, 1967), p. 3.
and to some degree the Mende shared the advantage. There was also the monetary incentive; new lieutenants were started at a salary of £720 p.a.

In French West Africa, France began to make special arrangements for officer candidates under the Ressortissants des Territoires d'Outre-Mer. "Because the French were working within the unity of a single army, they were able to make a single plan for all their French-speaking African territories."¹ Preparatory military schools were organized and an African officer training academy, L'Ecole General Leclerc, was established in Chad in 1955-56. The overall program called for the creation of 13 colonels, 20 lieutenant colonels, 59 chefs de batallions, 142 captains, and 172 lieutenants and sub-lieutenants. The emphasis placed on Africanization was largely due to the imminent retirement of nearly half of the 75 African officers during the 1950's. By 1960, the French army contained 193 African officers although the majority were junior in rank.² At independence the officers returned to the respective countries to form the command staff of the national armies.

There were several adverse effects of rapid Africanization. First, since the African officer corps is a recent phenomenon, it

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² ibid., p.39.
is small. This restricts its capacity to govern as the loss of only a few officers, the elite, weakens the authority structure of a small army. The army can rarely sustain the loss of officers during the coups and the shuffling off of "questionable officers" to diplomatic posts overseas. The absorption of the military elite into governmental administration posts will reduce the officer corps and also split those officers who are still involved with the day-to-day military routine and those who are now involved in the nation's politics. Moreover, a small officer corps will be limited in its ability to develop and maintain a differentiated set of roles within the military establishment which are necessary for effective political control.

The officer corps under examination in this thesis were all plagued to varying degrees by these problems stemming from their small size. In Ghana, the NLC rid itself of those officers who had held positions in the CPP or who were believed to have sympathies for Nkrumah. For example, Major-General Nathan Aferi, Nkrumah's Chief of Staff, was appointed ambassador to Mexico, "an appointment he is said to have accepted with some reluctance." After the abortive

(1) African armies are small. J.M. Lee, p.5, gives the following based on 1967 estimates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army size</th>
<th>Air Force Size</th>
<th>Navy Size</th>
<th>African officers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
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coup in April 1967 during which General Kotoka was killed, the Commander of the Army, Major-General C.C. Bruce, and the Commander of the Navy, Rear-Admiral Hansen, were assigned to Washington and London respectively. Not only did this remove several experienced officers, but it also suggests that there was a growing split between those officers who remained as the active heads of the regular forces and those in the ruling junta. The commanding officers were held responsible for the actions of their subordinates.

In Sierra Leone, the officer corps was reduced when rival officers were either posted outside the country or otherwise removed from the scene. Colonel Ambrose Genda, who at one time had been recalled to lead the NRC, was appointed ambassador to Liberia. Lansana, the instigator of the first coup, was sent to Washington as Defence Advisor. Eight officers including Colonel Bangura who were alleged to have plotted against Margai in January 1967 were either retired or awaiting orders on "special duties". However, the situation reached its crisis when the entire officer corps was in prison, exile, or retired after the Warrant Officers' coup in 1968. At this time, the Sierra Leone army was forced to requisition British officers to fill in the gap.

In Dahomey, there was a game of musical chairs going on between the officers in power and those posted overseas, in exile.

or under arrest. Soglo joined the other ex-presidents and vice-presidents in Paris after he was ousted in 1967. Kouandété placed Alley, his persistent rival, under arrest in 1969 during the Zinsou reign. He later arrested Sinzogan and placed other officers under surveillance in January 1970 during the dramatic confrontation among the members of the Military Directorate.1

In Upper Volta there is no evidence to suggest that Lamizana removed fellow officers who may have rivalled his position. Throughout this section, we will notice that the officer corps in Upper Volta retained its cohesiveness to a greater degree than their compatriots in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey. We propose that one reason for this phenomenon was that these men were operating in a society in which there were relatively few politicized groups and thus there were fewer strong external pressures that might divide the army. Furthermore, the Voltaic army retained its sense of military discipline from its long involvement with the French army.

The small size of African armies has affected its ability to rule in that it weakens the authority structure within the military and inhibits the formation of differentiated and specialized roles necessary for political activity outside the military. However, although these armies are small, they have grown at an unrealistic rate since independence. A second problem of rapid Africanization has been that the rapid expansion of the armed forces meant that there were "few people experienced in colonial methods to hand on"

a sense of tradition to new recruits." The anglophone countries were particularly affected by this. For example, Ghana's army increased by 10.4 per cent between 1960 and 1967. The result of this rapid expansion was that the socialization process which the new officers underwent during their military training and active participation in the army was incomplete. The problem becomes more apparent when we consider the motives for the young officers' entrance into the army. These men were drawn largely from the rural areas; they were the sons of farmers or minor civil service officials. As Gutteridge said about the Ghana case: "An army officer at present is more likely to be the son of a peasant cocoa farmer or post office official than of a professional man who will probably have educated his son for the bar or the civil service or a similar occupation of established prestige." The officer candidates view the army as a path to social mobility and security. It is a strong career choice for the young men from the hinterlands as it gives expression to personal ambition. However, although the officers received their training and served in Western inspired institutions, they tend to think of themselves more in terms of local criteria of success and position than in terms of metropolitan professionalism. As Etzioni states: "Background factors such as social origin, early

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(2) Ibid., p. 105.
socialization, extra-organizational membership which precede participation in the organization influence the degree of cohesion and direction of involvement in the organization.\textsuperscript{1} In the African setting, it is generally evident that the operations of even the most modern institutions are governed by norms which stem from both the new and residual sets.\textsuperscript{2} The implication is that the officers who are still linked to their traditional society's norms/will form cliques along ethnic and regional lines. This will have ramifications prior to military intervention when sections of the officer corps will move to protect the interest of their regions (e.g. Sierra Leone and Dahomey). Moreover, and of greater interest to our study, these regional and ethnic splits within the officer corps will limit the ability of the ruling junta to act as a corporate unit.

In Ghana, the first sign of rivalry among the military rulers came with the dismissal of Air Marshall Otu on accusation of subversion in early 1968. He was detained although no evidence was brought against him and finally released in late 1969.\textsuperscript{3} On April 2, 1969, General Ankrah was forced to resign from the NLC after he was found guilty of accepting bribes for political purposes.\textsuperscript{4} Then on May 5th, the NLC announced that Nunoo, Commissioner of Police and a member of the NLC, would also retire. Nunoo had issued a statement impugning the accuracy of the NLC notice which listed the names of


the politicians alleged to have bribed Ankrah. The MLC declared that this was a breach of the Oath of Secrecy and justification for Numoo's resignation. The composition of the MLC had changed. Both Numoo and Ankrah were Ga; after their removal, the MLC appeared to many to be dominated by Ewe. This was to have a decided effect on the elections prior to the return to civilian rule.

In Sierra Leone, the military remained split along ethnic and regional lines. The Mende-Creole co-operation aggravated the Mende-Temne split there. In Dahomey, the officer corps eventually came to mirror the tri-partite division of the country. In Upper Volta, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the officer corps split along ethnic lines. There were, however, rumours of dissent within the army and Robert Coeffe, the Secretary of State for Defence, was sufficiently concerned to issue statements denying the rumours.

It appears that the army acted as a whole to bolster the traditional aspects of the society as seen in the re-instatement of the powers of the Mfo Naba, the Mossi ruler. However, other than the case of Upper Volta, the original ruling military elites were beginning to show signs of disintegration. This breakdown of the ruling junta impaired its ability to rule effectively.

Another aspect of rapid Africanization was that it distorted the age structure and promotional pattern within the officer corps. "The promotion system is designed to deal with ... intergenerational

(1) ibid.
(2) Chronologie Politique Africaine (September-October, 1966), p. 33.
cleavage by regulating the flow of officers through the ranks and by holding out to new recruits the promise of a successful and orderly career."¹ However, the promotional pattern in new African armies is unstable. The rapid rise in rank of African officers to replace the departing colonial officials enabled many of them to obtain relatively responsible posts at an early age. A few of these officers developed unrealistic expectations concerning their role and this produced fantastic ambitions.² Furthermore, once the officer corps had been fully indigenized, promotion at the senior level was blocked. Added to the ethnic and regional splits, the frustration of the middle and lower ranking officers prohibited the development of a cohesive officer corps. This was particularly evident where either there was a small gap in age, experience and rank between persons in command and those in subordinate positions or the higher echelons of officers had come up through the ranks as opposed to the younger Sandhurst or St.Cyr trained officers. Thus, the officer corps is divided both along generational lines and between those officers who trained locally and those who trained abroad. These cliques, in turn, become focal points of instability when aggravated by grievances and conflicts derived from other sources.³

¹ Janowitz, p.71.
³ Lee, p.125.
The most serious display of inter-generational discontent in the Ghana officer corps was the abortive coup led by Lts. Arthur and Yeboah in April, 1967. The Reconnaissance Squadron under Lt. Arthur captured Flagstaff House, Osu Castle, and the radio station before the movement disintegrated. Nevertheless, before those involved were arrested, there was considerable confusion both in the army and the nation. Several motives for the coup were mentioned during the trial. There were rumours of inter-tribal conflict since all the officers killed were Ewe, but there is little evidence to support that the coup was an Ashanti-Fanti plot. Also, claims of CPP backing were discredited. The basic motive was the young officers' frustrations over promotions and pay especially in view of the NLC members' rapid rise in rank. The inter-generational conflict within the army was most aptly demonstrated by Arthur's plan to shoot anyone above the rank of colonel.

The NLC dealt quickly and harshly with the rebels. Several were given jail sentences of 40 years. Arthur and Yeboah were publicly executed on May 9, 1967. The NLC spoilt the international image it had been carefully cultivating. The shocked expression of the Sunday Times editorial was typical of world reaction: "It was a major justification of the coup against Nkrumah that his rule in Ghana had become despotic and brutal ... But one thing he did not do was to stage a double execution by machine gun before a crowd.

of 20,000 people.\textsuperscript{1} The NLC withstood the storm of criticism. It was, however, deeply troubled by its sluggish reaction in organizing effective resistance to a poorly co-ordinated and minor challenge to its authority.\textsuperscript{2} Thus, in early 1968, a Defence Council was established and charged with advising the Executive Committee of the NLC in all matters of defence and security.\textsuperscript{3} Meanwhile, increased emphasis was placed on training in communications and weaponry. Finally, the NLC moved to investigate the young officers' grievances.

In Sierra Leone, Juxon-Smith had taken precautions to counter an effective challenge from his officers by posting some "suspicious" officers overseas and dismissing and arresting others. Therefore, the discontent was centred among the Warrant Officers and NCO's. The 1967 coup which we discussed in Chapter II was sparked by the grievances of the rank and file.

Inter-generational disputes were rampant in Dahomey. Soglo was disliked by the younger officers because they saw him as a rather simple-minded soldier who had come up through the ranks. The senior officers, in turn, did not trust the young "intellectuals" who had trained at St.Cyr and had no operational experience in Indochina or Algeria. The rift between the older and younger generation officers became a serious threat to the government Soglo had established after the 1965 coup. At that time, Soglo had set up

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(1)] \textit{Sunday Times} (May 14, 1967), p. 10.
\item[(2)] \textit{Africa Report}, Vol. 12, No. 6 (June 1967), p. 44
\item[(3)] \textit{Africa Report}, Vol. 13, No. 5 (May, 1968), p. 38
\end{enumerate}
a makeshift legislature, the Comité de Rénovation Nationale (CRN).

However, in early 1967, Soglo faced increased criticism of his government and pressure was on him to set up a military watchdog to supervise the activities of the civilians and older officers on the CRN. In a letter presented to him by a commission of officers, the grievances were formally aired. It read:

The people of Dahomey are left in complete ignorance of who really governs. Is the country ruled by civilians, by those very elements who disclaim all political responsibilities? Is it ruled by a handful of high-ranking officers who can no longer seriously claim to represent the army? Or is it ruled by the soldiers and junior officers - who will eventually be held answerable for the unfortunate consequences of the errors made by the present regime?1

The report also criticised the corruption and mismanagement, clannishness, cabinet rivalries, and the total inability of the government to come to grips with the economic crisis. In response to the report, Soglo replaced the CRN with the Comité Militaire de Vigilance. This was essentially the voice of the younger officers and brought into prominence for the first time Kouandété. The 1967 coup led by Kouandété, as we discussed earlier, was largely a result of the inter-generational conflict in the Dahomean army.

Kouandété as spokesman for the jeunes cadres led the dispute against Alley who was to become the voice of the older officers. As we shall see in the final chapter, this feud set the background

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for the attempts of the Alley regime to return power to a civilian government in 1968 and for the emergence and collapse of the Zinsou regime from July 1968 to December 1969.  

Therefore, the Dahomean army was deeply divided and its lack of cohesion limited its ability to govern effectively. The internal disputes of the army mirrored the problems of the country. Le Monde summarized the disunity in the army: "Même si, dans le cas du Dahomey, l'affrontement entre factions militaire se révèle moins brutal, des oppositions profondes existent entre les nouveaux promus..."  

In Upper Volta, there has been little evidence of inter-generational rivalries. A generational split may develop as Upper Volta moves toward civilian rule. The younger officers favoured the MLN, a more radical, anti-Catholic party; its papers are read in their mess. The older generation of officers favoured the more traditional, conservative RDA. The army had maintained its traditional hierarchy and strong internal discipline but this may be destroyed if certain officers were to embark on political adventures to serve their own ends. Lamisana is aware of this, and during the first moves toward re-civilianization, he has attempted to keep some political power in the hands of the military so that he might promote

(1) Whiteman, p.1h
(3) Interview with Mr. Kaye Whiteman (March, 1971).
the best qualified officers himself. ¹

We have seen how the officer corps in these states are divided along regional, ethnic, generational, or training-experience lines. Not all of these dimensions pertain to all countries; in fact, it appears that Upper Volta is an exception on most counts. A further source of the absence of cohesion in these armies is the lack of successful operational experience. They have rarely had the opportunity to test their combat skills. The armies of British and French colonies did have some combat experience in World War II, but since only a few of the men were officers at the time, this had little impact. Soglo and Lamizana fought in Algeria and Indochina, but the large majority of their fellow officers had never served outside their countries. The Ghana army, which did send a contingent to the UN mission in the Congo, returned with a poor combat record. It was, in fact, their function in internal security matters that further reduced the level of self-esteem and standards of cohesion.

We will conclude our discussion of the officer corps in these states with a brief examination of their level of professionalism. Here there are difficulties in applying Western norms to the African situation. Nonetheless, professionalism is defined as the possession of a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group cohesion, a

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¹ Le Monde Weekly Section (May 13, 1970)
complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an educational pattern adapted to its own aims, a career structure of its own, and a distinct place in the society in which it exists.¹

First, the military profession does include a specific body of technical knowledge and doctrine - that is, the specialization in violence. But not only have we shown in the first section of this chapter that such knowledge is at a relatively primitive stage of development in comparison to traditional Western armies, but also this knowledge and the organizational and skill structure built around it are not readily transferable to viable and effective political leadership. Secondly, we have shown that the officer corps is divided into numerous ethnic, regional, generational and educational background groups. The formation of various peer groups may be a result of the integrative and socialization function of army life, but these same groups, when reinforced by other grievances, tend to disintegrate the officer corps.² Thus, the officer corps does not represent a cohesive unit. Thirdly, the military does possess a complex of organizations peculiar to itself, but once it enters the political arena, the boundaries between the civilian and military organizations are segmented. Fourthly, the career structure of the army, because of rapid Africanization, has tended to split the officer corps not only along


² Luckham, "The Nigerian Military: Disintegration or Integration?" p.73.
generational lines but also between those men in direct contact with
the rank and file and those who have assumed government adminis-
trative duties. Finally, the army in Africa has not yet established
a distinct place in the society in which it exists. During the past
decade, its role has been an increasing involvement in the political
process culminating in the overthrow of its civilian sponsor, the
government.

Does the issue of professionalism enter into our discussion
at all? There are those (e.g. Finer and Luckham) who propose that
it is the lack of professional standards which leads the military
to intervene in politics. Others (e.g. Gutteridge and Janowitz)
have maintained that it is in fact that very professionalism which
has taken the army into politics. And still others (e.g. Van
Doorn) who deny that professionalism has anything to do with it at
all, but instead it is the lack of institutional controls throughout
the society and the military that results in coups d'etat. In
this study, however, we are assessing the ability of the officer corps
to govern. It appears that a low level of professionalism, partic-
ularly the criterion of cohesion, hinders the army in its role as
governor. Unable to maintain unity within the army, the ruling
junta is circumscribed in its efforts to provide leadership for a
developing country. As we shall see in the final chapter, the
disintegration of the original conspiratorial clique precipitates
their withdrawal from political power.
The composition of the rank and file of African armies also gives rise to incohesiveness. In Ghana, the colonial pattern of recruitment had no fixed ethnic or tribal quota. Traditionally, the recruit was an illiterate Moslem from the north since he was considered to be more reliable and disciplined for duty in the more populated areas. In 1961 this ethnic imbalance was still obvious - nearly 60 per cent of the recruits were from the Northern Territories. In Sierra Leone, recruitment campaigns were carried out once or twice a year whenever it was necessary to refill the ranks. As long as the Creole who looked down on military service refused to enlist, the Mende-Temne rivalry reinforced and consolidated the major tribe. The French recruited from the so-called martial races and these recruits were generally from the more backward and remote areas. Although these states have now instituted a policy of basing recruitment on tribal quotas and educational requirements, the ethnic and regional imbalance adversely affects the numerical and political balance of the military organization. These cleavages still exist in spite of the training process which these troops undergo. Theoretically, as the new recruits are brought together under training conditions, a process of re-socialization takes place. These men, removed from traditional links and separated from the rest of society, are provided a high degree of psychological security by the military system as they undergo
this rapid acculturation. The result is a "modern man" who has been taught not only technical know-how but also the importance of citizenship.\(^1\) However, as in the case of officer candidates, the integrative function of the military is not complete in developing countries since the "amount of socialization required by organizations depends, of course, on the degree to which organizational behaviour differs from the behaviour the participants have learned elsewhere".\(^2\) The ethnic and regional cleavages exist among the rank and file in spite of the training process. "Armies in new states are particularly vulnerable to the problems stemming from ethnic and religious heterogeneity, because the army itself is associated with specific ethnic groups and because the norms of the military may lead to an insensitivity to these ethnic/religious values. And these are not mutually exclusive possibilities."\(^3\) These cleavages make it possible for outside pressure groups (e.g. tribal associations, political factions) to seek alliances with segments of the military which cause problems of control for the regime and serve to make the military a major focus of political conflict. Finally, the ethnic and regional differences become outlets of expressions of tension for a whole range of problems within the army and also within the wider political context. It was only in

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(2) Etzioni, p.183.

Sierra Leone that we have evidence to show that sections of the military outside the officer corps became a political force independent of the leadership of the officers. This situation came to a head when the NCO's and Warrant Officers over-threw the Juxson-Smith regime. This was not so much a result of ethnic conflict (although the Warrant Officers were to bring the APC into power) but rather a generational conflict and a personal dislike for Juxson-Smith whose junta enjoyed the fruits of power while the rank and file received few benefits under NRC rule.

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In conclusion, we have seen in this section what the problems of cohesiveness are in the new armies of Africa. These problems are reflected both in the officer corps and in the rank and file or between the two groups and stem from ethnic, regional, experience, and generational differences. The effects of disunity upon the military government limit its ability to rule effectively. When a large percentage of time and energy are expended on the control of the army itself, the junta is hard-put to solve the pressing social, economic, and political problems facing the country. The army itself becomes a hot-bed of intrigue with different sections of the army conspiring to overthrow the present military government or at least placing additional pressure on the junta to satisfy their demands.
CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENTS

When the military assumes direct political power, it is called upon to give direction to the economic system of the state. An effective gauge for measuring the success or failure of military regimes, therefore, is to review their strategic contribution to the management of the economy.\(^1\) There are basic limitations of the military in supplying economic leadership to the country. As we discussed in the previous chapter, these limitations include a low level of administrative skills and training, the lack of adequate goals, and deficiencies of personnel. Furthermore, the military governments inherited catastrophic financial situations from the civilian regimes they had overthrown.

In the following chapter, we will note that the record of military regimes is unimpressive as measured by over-all economic development. The military proved incapable of ruling in any sense wider than putting the economy on a care and maintenance basis. Although the juntas in these states were effective in preventing the total collapse of the economic systems, their inadequacy in directing economic development became apparent.\(^2\) First, "if a generalization is possible, it is that the wider the sphere of economic involvement,


the less effectively is the military able to perform. The military operates with limited effectiveness in directing specific projects, but in tasks of managing wide sectors of the economy the military suffers from limitations inherent in the profession. Secondly, the more complex the economy, the less success will the military have in its attempts to direct economic development. In a primitive society, the economic development of such countries would be well within the capabilities of the army. "The more primitive the economy, the easier it is for the armed forces to administer it by purely military means and measures." However, as the economy expands, as the division of labour becomes more extensive, as the secondary and tertiary services develop, the junta must rely on a trained professional bureaucracy, technicians, and the like for the management of the economy.

We will examine the record of the military in their handling of economic affairs such as industrial and agricultural development, the budget, external trade, etc. With the use of the available statistical data, we will attempt to delineate a general trend in the economic policies of the military regimes in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey and Upper Volta.

**Ghana**

In Chapter II, we discussed the financial situation in Ghana prior to the 1966 coup. The export of cocoa is Ghana's major source

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(1) Janovitz, p. 80.
(2) Finer, p. 15.
of income. Nearly 40 per cent of the cocoa on the world market is contributed by Ghana, and thus, any increase of production of cocoa resulted in a decrease in world market prices rather than increased revenue for Ghana. As such, Ghana is highly dependent on fluctuations in the price of cocoa which the government cannot control to its benefit. The drop in the price of cocoa in the early 1960's was a major factor underlying Ghana's economic and financial ills.

In order for Ghana to achieve an adequate growth rate, it is necessary to increase not only agricultural production and productivity, but also agricultural diversification. Moreover, it is necessary to increase food production both for domestic use and export. However, under Nkrumah there was perhaps undue emphasis on the expansion of infrastructure and industrialization at the expense of agricultural development. While the transport and power facilities, particularly the Volta River Project, may yield benefits in the future and are a strong base for future development, much of the investment in state enterprises was ill-advised. Furthermore, excessive expenditure on prestige projects, the expense of a swollen bureaucracy for the management of state economic projects, and the poorly arranged financial agreement with both the East and West all contributed to the financial problems facing Ghana in 1966. There were enormous problems: inflation,...

and a spiraling cost of living; the imbalance of the government budget; unemployment; and the massive external debt that was tied to an unfavourable balance of payments account. Drastic action was imperative to arrest the downhill trend of the economy. Ironically, the Nkrumah regime had proposed such actions. In presenting the last budget only a few days before the coup, Mr Amoaka-Atta, Nkrumah's Finance Minister, stated: "Failure to make exchange controls even stricter than they might have been might result in a financial crisis of such magnitude that it would be difficult to crush".\(^1\) The cost of development had been high. Foreign exchange reserves were down from £170 million in 1957 to £5 million in September 1965 and probably nil by February 1966. Moreover, the situation had been aggravated by the loss of £30 million in foreign exchange due to the fall in world cocoa prices. Amoaka-Atta estimated that 25 per cent of the export earnings would be necessary to finance the national debt in 1966, a fact echoed by the NLC.

The CPP 1966-67 Budget, therefore, set out strict austerity measures. The government expenditure was estimated to be £185 million by December compared to the £194 m. budget for the previous year. Government revenue was estimated to be £115 m. The £70 m. deficit was to be made up of £50 m. from a new motor vehicles registration fee, a proposed 33\(\frac{1}{3}\) per cent rental tax, and £5 m. loan

\(^1\) *West Africa* (February 26, 1966), p. 246.
from the World Bank. Other remedial measures recommended by the
IMF had been introduced including a reduction of cocoa prices paid to
the farmers and rationalization of the licensing policy. However, the
major problem was excess of government spending over revenue and this
had "obviously not been tackled or in Dr. Kkrumah's eyes, even
realised."¹

The HLC found itself in the midst of economic chaos. The
first four months after the coup have been termed the "emergency phase". During this period, the HLC with the help of their Economic Committee
headed by the able economist E.N. Omoboe struggled to insure the supply
of essential commodities (with aid from Canada and the U.S. PL480)
and to restore the confidence of businessmen in the Ghanaian economy.
Other steps were taken to review uneconomic ventures. Fourteen
embassies were closed, the Ghana Airways and Black Star Line were cut
back, and the dredging of the Tema harbour and the second phase of
the Accra-Tema Highway were postponed.² Most pressing, however,
was the country's balance of payments situation combined with the
enormous debt which was estimated at £200 m. at the time of the coup.
The IMF was called in to give recommendations for a general overhaul
of the economy. It agreed to lend Ghana £13 m. to help cover the
immediate balance of payments difficulties. Long term, low interest
loans were also forthcoming from the U.S., U.K., and other Western

(1) ibid., p.231.
nations. A London Conference was held to examine the re-scheduling of the debt and similar negotiations were carried out with other supplier nations. The highest priority was given to the re-scheduling of debts and by 1969 the NLC had paid $220,000,000 of the $880,000,000 debt accumulated by that time.

Yet, from hindsight, the NLC could have adopted a more positive and realistic approach to these supplier's credits, for it is common knowledge that Ghana was overcharged or actually diddled on a number of contracts.

Instead of de-faulting portions of the debt as many had suggested, the NLC followed the notion that a "gentleman always pays his debts".

Moreover, since the NLC had to borrow $114,000,000 to keep projects going, the total indebtedness at the end of their rule was $1,003,000,00 or $125 per capita in a country which has a per capita income of $2,211.

In June 1966, Afrifa, Minister of Finance, announced a major economic proposal that dealt with the thirty-seven state-owned corporations. Seven of these were to be turned over to the private sector and eleven were to be adapted to joint state-private ownership. Even Mr. Amoaka-Atta had implied that something had to be done:

"...the performance of the state-owned corporation ... is a sad commentary on the efficiency of the management when compared to the performance of Joint State-Private enterprises". Many of these projects

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(1) 1 N$ = 41p.
were poorly conceived and located and, indeed, the record of the eighteen to be released from total state control was not laudable. The Marble Works had lost £526,000 or 10 per cent of its total assets; the Boatyards, £87,000 or 40 per cent; the Film Industry, £133,000 or 20 per cent; the Cannery Corporation £95,000 or 150 per cent. In view of their financial condition, it was difficult to find private investors to take on these enterprises. By 1966, three had been converted to private ownership, three to joint ownership, and nineteen were merged with the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation by ILC Decree.¹ There was criticism that the ILC had turned over many of the firms to overseas investors. Not only did the ILC de-nationalize those industries that had a higher probability of giving profits to attract foreign investors but it also offered additional tax incentives to the foreign investors.²

In July 1966, the ILC announced the first of many austerity budgets. The estimated government expenditure of £167 m. and revenue of £125 m. plus capital receipts of £23 m. left a deficit of £18 m. However, the £33 m. debt repayment due that year had been included in the government expenditure side. It was hoped that £18 m. could be re-scheduled and the budget would be balanced. At the end of that fiscal year, real expenditure was £268.9 m. and revenue only £230.9 m. The real deficit of £38 m. was made up by loans to leave a recorded


(2) Price, op cit.
deficit of ₦2 18m.

The immediate effect of reduced government spending was a substantial increase in unemployment. Although there were plans for more labour intensive projects such as road construction and low-cost housing, this budget did not offer the incentives for the appropriate labour that was needed.¹ By the end of military rule, over 100,000 workers had been considered redundant and one out of four workers were registered as unemployed.² Unemployment was one of the graver issues with which the NLC proved incapable of handling. It remains so today and has had severe repercussions.

The 1966-67 Budget was also aimed at helping the standard of living. The tax on foodstuffs imported from other African countries was eliminated and the duty on petrol was reduced to assist the transport of food within Ghana. The cocoa farmers were exempted from income tax on their cocoa sales. In fact, the proposed tax system was designed "to spread the tax net more widely to cover every able-bodied person who is gainfully employed and who is eligible to pay tax."³

The major criticisms of the first NLC budget were that it relied too heavily on the private sector for development and that it was based too much on hindsight. In all, it was for stabilization; it was an attempt to balance the budget by decreasing expenditure, not increasing taxation, perhaps impossible under the circumstances.

(2) Colin Legum, The Observer, (February 1, 1970), p.2. Note also that unemployment was partially a result of the population increase and the flow of school leavers onto the job market.
To stop inflation, the MLC attempted to reduce expenditure on imports by holding down the demand through fiscal, monetary, and licensing policies. Also, in July 1967, the cedi was devalued by thirty per cent. Although this would eventually raise the cost of living and reduce real income, devaluation was the major policy for reactivating the economy. This policy was designed to stimulate export production; the producers of export goods received 30 per cent more local currency although their goods earned the same in foreign currency.¹ These policies had some success. One measure of this was the fact that the bank loan rates fell from 7 per cent in 1966 to 5½ per cent in early 1968. "The rapidly rising price level which was a marked feature before the change in government in 1966 has now been brought into control".²

It was with this back-ground that the MLC announced its budget for 1967-68. Government expenditure was estimated at £196.6 m., up £29.6 m. from the previous year. Government revenue was estimated at £144.35 m., up £19.35 m. It was hoped that with more foreign aid and tax adjustments to maximise revenue, the receipts would total £52.35 m. which would mean a surplus of £100,000. However, at the end of the fiscal period, expenditure had equalled £359.2 m. and revenue only £294.1. Much of the £65.1 deficit was made up through loans, but it was still larger than the deficit in the 1966-67 year. The


economy had been stopped on its drastic downhill run, but then it began to stagnate. At the end of 1967, the GDP was increasing at a rate of 2.4 per cent, but this was due largely to the good weather conditions for food grain. However, the GDP had fallen by 0.6 per cent at current market prices. With the population increasing at 2.6 per cent a year, the growth rate of the economy was actually retrogressive.

In view of these circumstances, the 1968-69 budget was significant for the new policy assumptions behind it. Government expenditure was estimated at M$ 429.3 m., government revenue was estimated at M$ 340.4 m., leaving a deficit of M$ 88.9 m. There was general sympathy for the under-privileged groups which was reflected in the clear intention to tax luxury goods while easing the burden on the lower income worker. Nevertheless, the NLc did not follow up this policy. A 5 per cent import duty on essential commodity goods such as sugar, milk, flour, and rice was imposed in February 1969 which further aggravated the shortage of foodstuffs. In this budget, there was also new emphasis on the rural sector. Tax concessions were to be granted to industries locating outside the Accra-Tema area and M$ 6 m. was set aside for water development. However, as in all the NLc budgets, there was insufficient emphasis on agricultural development. The

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MLC had never proposed a definite policy for agricultural development other than establishing the Agricultural Advisory Committee and overhauling the state farms. Meanwhile, the agricultural sector was in poor shape. The increase in food production had slowed to 2 per cent per annum. This was not sufficient to keep pace with the population growth much less to provide the agricultural backbone necessary for industrial development.

Overall, the MLC's economic policies were a mixture of success and failure. It was successful in preventing the total collapse of the economy by slowing inflation, rationalizing economic practices, and re-scheduling the debts. However, the economic policies worked to the advantage of the bourgeoisie, the civil servants, the larger cocoa farmers, and the wage labourers, while ignoring the poor farmers and other impoverished groups. The stabilization budget did little to combat the massive unemployment and resulted in lower living standards and curtailed development in both agriculture and industry. The economic policies also benefitted the Western capitalist nations: the more lucrative state enterprises were turned over to foreign investors and these investors were given added incentives to move into the Ghanaian economic sector. Finally, the handling of the debt met with criticism. The debt places a crippling burden on the

economy for the next decade.\(^1\) In all, the NLC tended to be less development minded and less nationalistic in its economic program. Its basic contribution was to forestall bankruptcy.

**Sierra Leone**

Sierra Leone had not had a satisfactory pattern of growth and there appears to be few encouraging prospects. Agricultural development in the country, which is principally one of subsistence agriculture, was stagnant and the several projects to increase rice production, the staple food, had failed. Efforts to rationalize production of palm products, the major agricultural export, were disappointing. The Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) was grossly inefficient. It was necessary to import basic food supplies and in both 1964 and 1965, the import of food products exceeded the value of all agricultural exports.

Diamonds are major source of revenue in Sierra Leone. However, the smuggling of diamonds was a constant problem. Iron ore deposits had been discovered and were being exploited although much was of an inferior quality, and Sierra Leone also possesses the world's largest known deposits of titanium oxide which are as yet unexploited. However in spite of its wealth in mineral resources, Sierra Leone remains an agricultural country and most efforts at improving the agricultural sector were limited. Sierra Leone was in financial distress by

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\(^1\) Price, p. 425. The seemingly insoluble debt also led to the downfall of Busia in January 1972.
1966. The provisional figures for trade in 1965 showed imports at £ 76.64 m. and exports at £ 58.7 m. This adverse balance of trade of £e 18 m. was a marked deterioration from the £e 3 m. loss in 1964. This was aggravated by an increase of £ 4 m. imports of capital goods and a £e 7.6 m. drop in exported diamonds. Moreover, the foreign exchange reserves had fallen from £ 14 m. in 1964 to £ 8 m. in 1966. The civilian government had been living beyond its means.

However, the budget of the SLPP government presented in June 1966 was a last minute attempt to prevent total bankruptcy. This IMF-inspired budget proposed that imports would be drastically cut to the base essentials. Estimates were prepared on an austerity basis and development was to be concentrated on measures to reduce unemployment. The recurrent expenditure was estimated at £e 32,880,000 plus £e 1,237,000 for the railroad. Revenue was estimated at £e 38,314,000 against the revised estimate of £e 33,630,000 for 1965-66. Although

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(2) 1 £e = 50 p.
export revenues had fallen by £61 m. due to the closure of markets in neighbouring countries to which Sierra Leone goods were re-exported, it was hoped this would be covered by an additional £6 1½ m. from new taxes. These taxes were duties on imported vehicles, cars, alcohol, matches, nails and other commodities that were also produced on the domestic market.

However, the IMF recommendations and budget were not followed and the economy continued to deteriorate. "Had we been able to carry out these stabilization measures in the government budget and in the affairs of the SLPMB, there is little doubt that our position would now show some improvement ... But, we did not do this ..."

The economy was in a precarious position when the military came to power in 1967. The first move by the NRC was to set up the Economic Advisory Committee of senior technical people whose purpose was to co-ordinate fiscal and economic policies. It was also proposed that there be increased co-operation between the Bank of Sierra Leone and those departments of government dealing with financial matters. A National Development Bank was established to mobilise local capital resources. These problems of co-ordination and co-operation had never been solved by the Margai regime and this had been a major cause of the chaotic economic situation.

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The SRC budget for 1967-68 envisaged a program "for the public sector of our economy ... of considerable severity."\(^1\) The first proposal dealt with the SLPMB whose liabilities amounted to be 4.5 m. The operation of the SLPMB was to be confined to marketing export goods. Several of the plantations which were losing an estimated be 1 m. per year were to be closed down. This resulted in the laying off of 2,000 workers, but the budget provided that these men could continue to work on the land which was to be handed back to the chiefs or converted into local co-operatives. The plantations which had been economically viable were transferred to the Department of Trade, Industry and Agriculture. The producer price of cocoa, palm kernels, and coffee were revised downwards and ginger and benniseed were removed from the buying schedule. Finally, the internal organization of the SLPMB was to be revised.

The Sierra Leone Rail Road was to be phased out on advice from the World Bank. It was hoped that those workers who would be declared redundant could be absorbed into road expansion projects. The Rice Corporation activities were to be confined to marketing and milling. The production and expansion programmes were transferred to the Department of Trade, Industry and Agriculture.

The tax increases proposed in the SRC budget included a 40 per cent duty on imported motor vehicles and taxes on imported goods

\(^1\) *ibid.*, p. 71.
were duplicated by Sierra Leone producers. The export duty on diamonds was increased from 7½ per cent to 10 per cent.

Finally, a Business Names Registration Decree made it compulsory for anyone in trade or business to register. The purpose was to counter tax evasion. There were also efforts to improve the collection of taxes, another weak point in the Maré regime.

The NRC was successful in putting Sierra Leone's economy back on the road to recovery. The devaluation of the Leone helped to reduce imports while improving the country's position in foreign trade. The SLPMB was re-established, largely through the efforts of the Boiku-Retts Commission of Inquiry. Yet, the farmers never quite regained total confidence in the Board. The NRC also inaugurated the National Development Bank which could perform a useful function in future development. Also, the foreign reserves were up from £e 10.5 m. in November 1967 to £e 17.8 m. in June, 1968. However, the NRC was incapable of further sound economic management. First, there was evidence of faulty judgement in the budget proposals. The closing of plantations resulted in serious unemployment. The increase in diamond duties was reflected in an increase in diamond smuggling. Diamond purchases were at £e 17.3 m. in 1967-1968 as compared to £e 24.4 m. the previous year. Secondly, the NRC was not able to follow up its economic proposals. As an example, it did not succeed in closing down the bankrupt railroad. Finally, the unstable political situation added to the doubts by the international community of investors of
Sierra Leone's economic viability. As Forna, Minister of Finance at the return to civilian rule, stated:

... The deviation from civilian rule had also had a detrimental effect on international confidence in our economy because of the doubt created of our ability to pursue, without interruption, sound policies in the fields of economic development and financial management. ¹

Dahomey

Dahomey has suffered from a chronic economic crisis throughout the past decade.² One indicator of this is the unfavourable trade balance. Relying on the export of palm products as the chief cash crop, Dahomey is extremely vulnerable to both world market fluctuations and adverse weather conditions (e.g. the 1962 palm crop suffered from poor growing conditions).³ Figure 1 shows the deteriorating trade balance.⁴

A further factor compounding the trade problem has been the over-reliance on French markets. In the early sixties, France was responsible for 77 per cent of imports and 83 per cent of exports by value.

(3) Palm products accounted for 75 per cent of volume and 73 per cent in value of all exports.
Figure 1

TRADE DEFICIT - DAHOMEY

billion CFA francs


Figure 1
Dahomey has not been able to diversify either the exports or the trading partners and has been constricted by both facts.

Secondly, there has been little formation of capital assets necessary for investment for economic growth. Over 50 per cent of the government expenditure has gone to civil service salaries; this leaves little in reserve for capital expenses. Since the majority of the population remains on subsistence agriculture standards, it has been difficult to enforce a program of taxation and savings. Whenever an increase in taxes was imposed on the small group of wage-earners (i.e. the trade unionists), the result was more often the overthrow of the government. Also, because of the political instability, the country has not attracted foreign investment. Much of the investment and aid Dahomey has received has been from France; this has given France tremendous leverage in Dahomey's domestic affairs.¹ Moreover, because Dahomey has come to rely on foreign aid for existence, the state has accumulated a crippling foreign debt.

By the time of the first all-military budget in 1966, this pattern was well entrenched. Imports in 1965 were 8,490,954,000 CFA francs; exports were 3,366,823,000 CFA francs;² the trade deficit was 5,124,131,000 CFA francs or 13.7 per cent worse than the 1964-65 trade deficit. The budget deficit for 1965-1966 reached 1,800,000,000

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² 247 CFA francs = 1$ U.S.
CFA francs or $8 m. In spite of the $25 m. worth of French aid since 1960, the government debt was well over 8,000,000,000 CFA francs or close to the annual budget itself. In addition, the civil service salaries had risen by 60 per cent in six years and tax evasion had cost the government more than $5,600,000 per year.

When Soglo took power in December 1965, his first decrees dealt with the catastrophic economic situation. The Finance and Budget Laws and a 1966-1970 Economic and Social Plan were enacted for the purpose of increasing the peasants' income and eradicating the differences between the regions. Regional and national organs were created to implement the plan and were to serve under the direct control of a High Commissioner of Planning. A special investment fund of 1,073,000,000 CFA francs was proposed to be separate from the regular government budget. ¹

By August, 1966, the CRN recommended the application of strict austerity measures aimed at absorbing the public debt which was then 8,000,000,000 CFA francs. These measures included a 25 per cent tax on all salaries both in the public and private sectors, a halt in civil service recruitment, blockage of civil service promotions, reduction of family allowances, increase in the price of petrol and a tax on luxury items such as cigarettes. ²

² Robert Cornevin, "Danomey", in Année Africaine (1966), pp. 265-266.
There were also cuts in the proposed Ahomadegbe-Apithy budget. Government receipts were expected to reach 6,381,600,000 CFA francs (this was a decrease from 8,266,500,000 CFA francs in the 1965 budget) and expenditure was expected to be 7,640,900,000 CFA francs (this was down from the proposed 8,266,400,000 CFA francs in the 1965 budget). Moreover, the budget was later cut by approximately 1,000,000 CFA francs.

Soglo and his Minister, Zinsou, spent the year on a series of aid-seeking missions to the West, particularly to France, the U.S., and the U.N., who contributed vital capital for the development of water supplies, palm and cotton production, and other rural projects. Paris contributed 35,000,000,000 CFA francs to the Economic and Social Plan and also to ease the balance of payments problems.

However, in spite of a few signs of stabilization, the economic situation was still far from prospering by the end of 1966. The budget deficit was reduced to 501,000,000 CFA francs, but the government was deeper in debt. The trade balance deteriorated as exports fell more than imports. The percentage of imports over exports was 31 per cent as opposed to 39 per cent in 1965. In all, the year was one for emergency measures. However, these measures, particularly the austerity programs, affected the civil service and other wage earners who were constant in their demands that the salary cuts and taxes be relieved.

By 1967, there were faint signs that the economy may have been arrested from its down-hill spiral. The trade balance remained unfavourable although there was a slight improvement with exports now
amounting to 35 per cent of imports. Over 10,000,000,000 CFA francs worth of goods entered Dahomey with exports amounting to less than 4,000,000,000 CFA francs. The 1967 budget was also an exercise in deficit spending although the proposed deficit was 372,000,000 CFA francs as opposed to the 501,000,000 CFA francs in 1966. Revenue was estimated to be 7,550,000,000 CFA francs with an expenditure of 7,560,000,000 CFA francs with 61 per cent going to civil service salaries. However, the economy had not yet broken its downward course. By the time of the Kouandete led coup in December 1967, there was only 50,000,000 CFA francs left in the treasury. The civil service expected their salaries amounting to 125,000,000 CFA francs (£210,000) at the end of the month and were still demanding the repeal of the ineffective austerity measures, Dahomey once again was on the verge of bankruptcy.

When the military regime under Alley took power in 1967, they issued a new budget with expenditure of 8,257,600,000 CFA francs (£13.8 m.) and revenue of 7,757,300,000 CFA francs (£12.9 m.). The proposed deficit of over 500,000,000 CFA francs was to be covered by freezing some of the expenditure. Thus when Zinsou took office in mid-1968, he inherited an abysmal financial problem. He stated; "Bon an, Mal an, notre déficit s'élève à plus de deux milliards de francs CFA sur le budget inférieur à huit milliards de francs CFA." Zinsou's main theme was economic recovery and Dahomey probably benefited more

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under his rule than all the previous regimes. His international prestige drew in external aid which the donors had been hesitant to give to a notoriously fragile military regime. The French, who had cut off all aid after the 1967 coup, donated over 700,000,000,000 CFA francs between July and December 1968. Zinsou also nationalized the port authority under his program to nationalize service industries rather than economic production concerns.¹ There were also some unexpected boosts to the economy while Zinsou held office. First, the exploration of off-shore oil drilling began in earnest, although under the complete control of foreign investors. Secondly, by allowing the Red Cross landing privileges for its relief flights to Biafra, Dahomey gained an extra 30,000,000 CFA francs per month in airport tax. However, the use of Dahomey as a base for flights to Biafra gave the opposition an issue on which to fight Zinsou.²

The short-term alleviation of some of the more pressing economic problems came to an abrupt end when Kouandété once again led a coup in December 1969. By the time the 1970 budget was released, Dahomey had returned to her former disastrous economic state. In that year, the proposed budget deficit reached a record 1,486,873,000 CFA francs and the public debt soared to 170,437,000,000 CFA francs.

Therefore, the army in Dahomey, as the civilian regimes, not only failed to instigate economic development programs, but also was

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¹ Africa Confidential, No. 9, (25 August, 1969), p. 4
unable to come to grips with the current economic and financial problems. In the first place, the officer corps was too small, too divided, and too unskilled to formulate and implement a viable economic program. Secondly, the shaky political state made Dahomey unprofitable for foreign investment and what investment Dahomey did obtain only placed the country further in the hands of outside powers. Finally, until the off-shore oil is exploited, Dahomey has few resources which will pull the country out of the financial morass. Its only resource at present is the white collar administrator and he lacks the technical and entrepreneurial skills needed for economic development and has resisted every measure aimed at preventing the bankruptcy of the state.

Upper Volta

The economic system of Upper Volta is the least developed in our study. Over 90 per cent of the population exist on subsistence agriculture; there are few exports, the main one being cattle on the hoof to the southern neighbours. The military regime was confronted with two inter-related problems; the first, to improve the social services such as health, education, and community development; and secondly, to increase agricultural production both for domestic consumption and export. The first problem, the improvement of living

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standards, was a prerequisite for the further economic development of the country. Over 96 per cent of the people were illiterate. Serious health hazards such as bilharzia debilitated the work force. The second problem, the production of food and cash crops, had been relatively unemphasised, but such developments are essential to avoid dependence on expensive imports and to provide a money-making export. The three aims in agriculture were to produce sufficient food in subsistence areas, a marketable surplus for the urban population and cash crop export, and finally, to ensure future food supplies and the diversification of other agricultural crops. The military's economic program, under the very able direction of Lt. Marc Garango, has made substantial strides in these areas. As we stated earlier, the success of the military has been partially a function of the primitive state of Upper Volta's economy in 1966. As the economy expands and diversifies, the military may no longer be able to meet the demands for increased economic development. In the following discussion, we shall note that as the economy improved and passed beyond the crisis situation, the military began to shift to civilian rule. In Upper Volta, as in the other states, the military is most adept during crisis periods, but loses its efficiency in long-term economic development.

When Lamizana took power in early 1966, the economic and financial situations were nearing bankruptcy. The actual debt was near 4,000,000,000 CFA francs or 50 per cent of the current budget.
Garango first moved to reduce this debt by instigating austerity measures such as closing embassies, suppressing the administrators' perks, stopping television service, and reorganizing the civil service recruitment.\(^1\) The 1966 budget was balanced at 9,136,700,000 CFA francs. This was accomplished by reducing expenditure and particularly by the cut in civil service salaries by 20-25 per cent. Also included in this budget was an investment fund of 700,000,000 CFA francs. Finally, the army was available for recruitment in economic development projects. As Robert Coiffe, Secretary of State for Defence, stated: "This intention is not a recent one. The army has since its creation always openly expressed its ardent desire to contribute to the nation's economic activities in sectors where it can be usefully employed."\(^2\) However, there is no documented evidence available to show that the army itself was actively engaged in such projects.

After urgent problems such as the debt, the emphasis was placed on the agricultural sector and social services. We can see evidence of this when we examine the aid Upper Volta received during 1966. In March, France not only extended 688 m. CFA francs for economic and social services, but also guaranteed to import 4,000 tons of groundnuts per year from Upper Volta. More French aid was forthcoming for groundnut production (300 m. CFA francs). Concern was expressed over the

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drought-prone areas and the U.S. contributed for the development of water works.

In 1967, the budget was cut back and balanced at 8,374,773,000 CFA francs without exterior aid. However, further austerity measures were enforced. Gerango dismissed many low level civil servants considered to be parasitic. Taxes on salaries over 10,000 CFA francs pa. were increased from 10 to 15 per cent and a 3 per cent tax was imposed on salaries under 10,000 CFA francs p.a. Salaries were reduced, family allowances cut back, taxes were imposed on fish, kola nuts, rents, and a patriotic tax was created.

During this year, economic planning was emphasised. In March, the Société D'Économie Mixte (SOVOLCOM) was created to commercialize agricultural production. In June, a military decree established four commissions of planning: production/distribution, employment, finance, and information. An overall economic plan was announced in August by Lamizana. It aimed at increasing resources and keeping down expenses with the idea of increasing foodstuffs, export agricultural products and improving the distribution system necessary for this. A 27,000,000,000 CFA franc (£40 m.) fund was created for the plan.

(2) Chronologie Politique Africaine (November-December 1967).
(3) Chronologie Politique Africaine (March-April, 1967).
Finally, in 1967, the exploration of mineral resources began in earnest. Manganese deposits were located at Tambao, 230 miles north-east of Ouagadougou, and uranium and copper deposits near Gowa in the south west. Unexploited deposits of gold, chromium, and iron ore were also being investigated. However, because of the lack of investment capital within Upper Volta, the military has turned to outside capitalist states for the exploration and exploitation of these minerals.

Lamizana announced in August 1968 that the army would stay in power until the economic crisis was redressed. It was in 1968, also, that the economic and financial crisis was coming under control. Garango reported a favourable balance of payments which would provide the means to repay loans. There was, furthermore, a budget surplus of 231,564,644 CFA francs (£386,000) from the 1967 budget. However, there still remained liabilities of 224,650,689,000 CFA francs (£5 m.) left over from the Yameogo regime. Also, although 53 per cent of the budget went to pay administrative personnel, the unions, including the civil service union, called for increased wages. Garango refused these pay claims stating: "We cannot accept after all, that 1 per cent of the population absorbs nearly half of the budget, while the peasants, whose fate is hardly enviable, wait for us to do something for them. If we increase wages, we cannot help them".2

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There were several projects aimed at the decentralization of the financial advantages. In July 1963, Garango announced a fund which would guarantee loans to small trading and craft industries. The purpose, beyond the levelling of differences between the large towns and the rural areas, was to increase Voltaic trade. The Economic Development Plan was also proving successful. By July 1963, a reported 69 per cent of the proposed projects had been completed. The investment for 1968-1969 was to be reduced slightly to 7,800,000,000 CFA francs (£13 m.). The European Development Fund offered assistance for a £1 m. dam; other projects such as the Voltex textile factory and the paving of roads to Ghana and Mali were to be completed in 1968. All these projects aimed at improving Upper Volta's trade capabilities. The government also began to invest in food production, particularly in rice and sugar as there was not enough produced for home consumption. The Taiwanese directed rice plantations set up on the Louda, Kaya, and Koy plains. The goal was self-sufficiency in rice production by 1972. Ground-nut production increased to 8,200 tons although the end of the French surprix diminished their export value. Cotton production was up from 7,500 tons to 17,000,000 tons in 1968.

The military began to direct the course of re-civilianization in 1969, as the economy grew stronger. The proposed budget was

(1) *West Africa* (July 26, 1963), p. 876.
balanced at 9,030,537,000 CFA francs. As there had been an increase
of 8.8 per cent in the accounts since 1968, the military began to
relax a few of its strict austerity measures. For instance, taxes were
reduced from 15 to 10 per cent for salaries over 10,000 CFA francs
per year and from 15 to 12 per cent for salaries over 30,000,000 CFA
francs per year. The foreign exchange reserves were at one of the
highest levels since independence but the trade balance was still in
deficit. However, the greatest hindrance to the stabilization
program was the devaluation of the franc. As Garango stated:
"les conséquences négatives de la dévaluation du franc dépassent les
aspects positifs". More precisely, the franc devaluation placed
an extra and unexpected 1,500,000,000 CFA franc ($6 m.) burden on the
Voltaic budget.

Nonetheless, by 1970, the budget surplus reached 480,000,000
CFA francs and the proposed 1970 budget balanced at $14.6 m. The
newly elected military and civilian cabinet retained Garango as
Finance Minister and thus, his economic policies which had proved
capable of averting national bankruptcy, will be carried over into
the quasi-civilian regime. Upper Volta is not yet an economically
viable and self-sufficient state and the broad economic objectives
remain as stabilization policies including austerity measures and
fiscal reform.

(1) *Chronologie Politique Africaine* (September–October 1969),
p. 28.
The military government in Upper Volta was successful in averting a total collapse of the economic system of the country. It has been able to instigate basic economic reforms and development projects. It is doubtful, however, that the "progressive" role of Garango's economic policies can be carried over as the economy becomes more complex. Upper Volta remains one of the least developed of the less developed nations.

The military regimes in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta inherited grave economic and financial problems. Their basic contribution to the management of the economy of these states was the prevention of total bankruptcy. The military take-overs reversed the economic crises in the short-term. In the long-term, however, the record of the juntas, particularly in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey, is hardly impressive. The juntas proved to be as incapable as their civilian predecessors in directing economic development. Only in Upper Volta, and largely because of the primitive state of the economy there, did the military government's economic policies produce results in the expansion of the economy. Even this remains on a low level. Everywhere else, once the crisis had been reversed, the economy stagnated.

One further point should be mentioned in regard to the military's record in handling the economy. As it became increasingly obvious that the military could not solve the more pressing economic...
problems facing the country, the population which suffered under these economic policies grew increasingly disillusioned with the capabilities of the army as governor. The army was called upon to answer their demands, was unable to do so, and thus lost credibility as an effective government. Moreover, the members of the military grew disgruntled with the inability of the junta members to direct the economy. The junta lost the support of discontented officers who seized upon the issue of economic development in their opposition to the present military leaders.
CHAPTER V

DEMILITARISATION

The military's disengagement from overt political rule occurs through the culmination of three conditions: the disintegration of the original conspiratorial group; the growing divergence of interests between the junta of rulers and those military who remain as active heads of the fighting services; and the political difficulties of the regime\(^\text{(1)}\).

These problems which necessitate a "return to the barracks" of the armed forces have been discussed in the preceding chapters. The juntas were troubled with dissent both from the ranks and from the civilian population and continued military rule would result in the proliferation and intensification of these problems. In short, the "honeymoon" was over.

The possibility of military disengagement from political rule is determined by three pre-conditions\(^\text{(2)}\). First, the junta must want to withdraw and the subordinates must be willing to follow their commanders back to the barracks. However, before the military is inclined to relinquish political control, it will undoubtedly prescribe certain conditions which must be satisfied. This leads to our second pre-condition - the successor regime must be acceptable.


to the military. The new civilian regime must not consist of enemies of the interventionists and their policies or friends of the regime which the army had overthrown. The post-interventionist civilian regime may be required to grant concessions to the armed forces such as better pay and career prospects and the military may also demand access to the political process although it had ostensibly withdrawn from politics.

As the third pre-condition, the new civilian regime must be politically viable without military support. Most nations which have experienced military rule are characterised by a chronic economic crisis which the civilian political leaders are unable or unwilling to remedy. With this background, the political leaders are unable to satisfy the demands of the politicized groups. The weak, narrowly-defined political institutions, thus, cannot hold the effective support of the population. The leaders often rely on coercive measures in order to instigate policies or to maintain their position of power and prestige. When there is a shift to the use of force, the political leaders rely upon the armed forces for support, but if the public grievances coincide with military grievances, the probability of military intervention increases. Unless the political institutions are sufficiently developed to implement policies without abnormal dependence on force and are strong enough to prevent the re-engagement of the military into the political process, this final pre-condition is not likely to be met in most, if not all, cases. Although this pre-condition depends to some extent on ex post facto judgement, it is particularly important. As long as the situation which precipitated the first coup still exists, there is a great probability that
the military will intervene again. This is due in part to the fact that staging a successful coup for the army

is rather like losing one's virginity; apart from anything else it gives one a taste for more. It also inescapably alters your [the army's] relationship with the civilian power: they never quite know when you might not do it again. (1)

From these brief statements concerning the pre-conditions of military disengagement, two facts are obvious. (2) First, as long as the civilian institutions remain weak vis-à-vis the military, the military will lose little of its significance by substituting a civilian regime in place of its own direct rule. Secondly, a usual consequence of the withdrawal of one military regime is the replacement of it, either immediately or within a few years, by another military regime. With this in mind, let us turn to an examination of the process of demilitarisation in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta.

**Ghana**

It was doubtful that the NLC intended to remain in direct political control for an indefinite length of time. This was repeatedly asserted by all the members of the Council. Although in a BBC broadcast Harley stated: "The NLC has made it clear that it has no ambition

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(2) S.E.Finer, Man on Horseback, p.190.
whatsoever of ruling Ghana indefinitely ..."(1), and Ankrah wrote: 
"... the NLC has no intention whatsoever of ruling Ghana indefinitely ...

(2), nevertheless, one year after the coup both the NLC and the Ghanaian people were showing signs of a cautious approach to the return of civilian rule. In an address in March, 1967, Brigadier Afrifa outlined the pre-conditions which the politicians would need to satisfy before the return to civilian rule. (3) First the image of the CPP must be completely destroyed; secondly, the people must be re-educated about their political rights and familiarized with the qualities expected from future political leaders; and thirdly, the immediate factors that led to the coup of 1966 were to be completely removed. In regards to the first pre-condition, the CPP image had been effectively destroyed. Not only had there been open rejoicing of the population after the coup but also the commissions of inquiry had ensured that Nkrumah and Co. were thoroughly discredited. As for the re-education of the people about their political rights, Afrifa was criticized for underestimating the political acumen of the Ghanaians. Finally, the complete removal of the factors leading to the 1966 coup was an unrealistic goal in the near future, particularly

as the military was not capable of solving the broader economic, social, and political problems in Ghana. Nonetheless Afrifa stated:

As much as we would like to leave the scene as soon as possible, we would wish to complete our task. We cannot risk the lives of innocent soldiers in another revolution, we therefore want to be certain that the conditions are satisfactory for a civilian administration before we hand over power. (1)

Afrifa seemed to imply that the soldiers should take care of the pressing problems while civilian rule could wait.

Several public opinion polls taken in Ghana during this time pointed out that the people had a notion of the time limits for the return to civilian rule. In a poll taken at the University of Ghana, 43 per cent felt that civilian rule should be postponed for at least five years (2). "More impressive evidence came from a national poll of over 8,000 people in December 1967; 45 per cent did not want to return to civilian rule, 44 per cent wanted a return in 1970 and 31 per cent wanted it in 1971 or 1972, or were uncertain." (3) Thus a large percentage of the population were by no means anxious for an immediate return to civilian rule. Not surprisingly the government press supported these sentiments. Remarking on a speech given by Busia calling for an early withdrawal of the military, the Ghanaian Times asserted "... every bit of the speech smacks of a man who is desperate.


for political power."

In general, it was felt that civilian rule should not be later than three years. The constitutional and electoral laws would not be ready in less than that time and the NLC should be allowed several more years to take advantage of the confidence it had gained abroad. However, if it should remain in power longer, it would be more reluctant to step down. Finally, the cohesion of the NLC should be the main criterion for deciding if they should be in for a maximum or minimum period.

During the summer of 1967, the NLC initiated the first moves towards a return to civilian rule. The Siriboe Commission was appointed to examine and recommend the procedures of elections, registration of voters, and the criteria for the qualification or disqualification of voters and candidates. The Commission saw the main problem of past elections was that the responsibility for registration and conduct of elections was vested in the government of the day. It recommended, therefore, that an independent three-man body be made responsible for future elections. A five-year disqualification from public office was proposed for those found guilty of corrupt and illegal practices. Also, teachers, civil servants, and employers of state corporations were to be ineligible for running


(2) *ibid.*, Supplement VII.
for office. However, the Siriboe Commission did not think that all those with past CPP connections should be banned (1).

The first major step toward constructing a new Constitution was the appointment by NLCD 102 of a Constitutional Committee. This group was headed by Chief Justice Akufo-Addo and consisted of fifteen old opponents of Nkrumah. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was a conscious effort on the part of this commission to prevent the reversion to the practices of the past regime. Its terms of reference were to collect the views of all sections of the community on the type of constitution desired and to visit all parts of Ghana to collect evidence. It was clear that the NLC wished to involve as much public participation as possible. The Committee was to draw up a draft constitution which would include certain specified provisions (e.g. the separation of powers), submit this to a constituent assembly, and then prepare a final draft. The ambiguous nature of the constituent assembly did not specify that it would be representative of the people. (2) Unless some decision was made on the composition and selection of the assembly, it would appear that the NLC would have the final say on what was to be included or omitted from the future constitution. Ankrah wrote that "the main task of the commission will be to prepare for the approval of the

HLC - and thereafter for the entire nation - a Constitution." But, just how this was to be done was not clarified.

On January 26, 1966, the proposals of the Constitutional Commission were published. The power of the executive was to be divided to prevent another Nkrumah. The President was to have control and supervision over certain departments and organs of government and have the privilege of appointing some officers of state. He was to be a personification of the state and his role was largely ceremonial. However, there were some inherent defects in this proposal. The President was to be chosen by a simple majority in an Electoral College. If the Electoral College failed to elect a President on the first ballot, it would be dissolved. The Presidency would then become the chief issue in the election of a new College. Also, if political rivalries were ever to disrupt the legislature, the Parliament would be dissolved and the President would be ceded all executive power. Finally, the President was to serve eight years. This could present a crisis if popular opinion demanded a more frequent change in government.

A Council of State was proposed to aid and advise the President. This body was to include prominent Ghanaians and significantly, the Chief Justice and the Officer in Command of the Armed Forces.

(1) Ankrah, p.11.
The Prime Minister was to be selected from the national assembly on proposal from the President. His cabinet was to be selected from the Assembly and also from without on approval of the Assembly. All legislative power was to rest in the Parliament which was to be unicameral legislature with 140 members. There were four formal qualifications for election: Ghanaian citizenship, minimum age of 25 years, literacy in English, and a five-year residency in the constituency.

The independence of the judiciary was heavily emphasised. The Superior Courts of the Judicature were the Supreme Court which had exclusive jurisdiction in the interpretation of the Constitution, the Court of Appeals, and the High Court of Justice which would hear administrative complaints and labour/industrial disputes. The President, on advice of the Council of State, would appoint the Chief Justice. Finally, there was to be a Judicial Council to aid and counsel the Chief Justice in administrative functions.

Proposals on financial matters prohibited taxation other than by Act of Parliament. The Minister of Finance was to submit all estimates regarding the Consolidated and Contingency Funds to the Parliament. Also, there were suggestions for an independent Auditor-General and Audit Service to oversee the accounts of all public bodies.

In regard to Public Service, there was a recommendation for an independent Public Service Commission to advise the President.
on appointments to the civil and public services. There were also proposals for a Police Council, an Armed Forces Council, and a Prison Service Board. Local government was to consist of two tiers; Local and District Councils of two-thirds elected and one-third traditional and one-third elected and one-third traditional. Thus, the Commission felt the place of the chiefs was at the local level, much as it had been during colonial rule.

A Regional Development Council was to integrate regional development programs within an over-all framework.

Individual rights of privacy, expression, assembly, and association were guaranteed. There were also clauses to prohibit a revival of Preventive Detention. Moreover, an Ombudsman was charged with protecting the rights of the individual citizen. An Electoral Commissioner was to be elected and responsible for the supervision of elections and referenda. Finally, the Commission specified several categories of ex-CPP officials who would be disqualified from holding public office.

A general view of the proposed constitution demonstrated the biases which shaped it. (1) First, there was a reaction to the evils of the Nkrumah regime. The strict separation of powers, the determinedly weakened President, and the disqualification proposals are examples. Secondly, there appears a marked preference

for the counsels of old men. The President was to be fifty years of age at minimum; the compulsory retiring age of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals was seventy-five and seventy respectively. Thirdly, the draft constitution seemed to benefit those groups which had suffered under the CPP government; the civil service would be aided by an independent Public Service Commission; the armed forces and police were to be represented in various councils. Finally, there was no proposal for a constituent assembly. Akufo-Addo contended, "You will appreciate that the speed, whatever the rate, of progress to civilian rule is conditioned by the speed of progress towards a Constituent Assembly." (1)

In response to the presentation of the constitutional proposals, the NLC issued three important decrees (2). The first, NLCD 221 (Interim Electoral Commissioner Decree 1968) established the office of an Electoral Commissioner. His functions were to issue procedural rules and regulations for the registration of electors, register electors, receive nomination papers of candidates, and conduct and supervise the elections. However, the final interpretation was the prerogative of the NLC. The Council appointed a single commissioner, Mr Justice V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe of the High Court, although the Siriboe Commission had recommended a three-man commission.

(2) Ibid., pp.16-22.
The second was NLCD 222 (Constituent Assembly Decree 1968). Popular elections were to be held for the 140 members of the Constituent Assembly. Also, nine additional members were to be chiefs elected by the House of Chiefs in each region and from the Accra area. The qualifications for membership were Ghanaian citizenship, twenty-five years of age, and English speaking. Disqualification was based on criminal record, insanity, employment as a teacher, civil servant or state corporation worker, and past CPP association. The functions of the Constituent Assembly were to deliberate on the proposals submitted by the Constitutional Commission and report their findings to the NLC. The question remained as to whether or not the NLC would alter the draft constitution once it was submitted to them.

The final decree resolved the long debate on disqualification. NLCD 223 (Election and Public Offices Disqualification Decree) listed fifteen categories of people who "on or after the first day of June 1960 ... held office in the CPP..." Those affected were as follows: Ministers of State, Regional Commissioners, District Commissioners, Regional Secretaries of the CPP, teachers at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, graduates of the Ideological Institute, special advisors to Nkrumah, Regional Education Secretaries, CPP Members of Parliament, National Committee members, District Executive Committeemen, members of the Steering Committee, members of the Presidential Detail, and members of the National, Regional or
District Executive Committees of the seven integral wings of the CPP. These people, numbering in the thousands, were barred from elective or appointive office for ten years. A three-man Exemptions Commission headed by Apaloo, the Judge of the Court of Appeals, was established to hear appeals and examine the cases of the CPP affiliates. Exemptions were to be granted if it could be proved that while a member of the CPP, the appellant conducted himself in opposition to Nkrumah or else was forced into membership. (1) However, the final decision was the discretion of the NLC.

In the ensuing months, the NLC’s plan for recivilianisation ran into problems and criticisms. First, the registration of voters had been characterised by a marked lack of enthusiasm among the people. The Legon Observer contended that this was an issue of paramount national importance in which the NLC is showing uncharacteristic obstinacy and imperviousness to public opinion. Several views have been expressed to explain why the registration of voters has been, contrary to all expectations, so slow and uninspiring throughout the areas of this country where the exercise has been going on. One cogent reason put forward is the ban placed on political activities. It is believed that in the absence of political activity there is a feeling of acting in a vacuum without any specific perspectives and objectives. Since 1951 people of this country have registered within the framework of political activities, and politicians have played a determined, if not decisive, role in the success of the exercise.

The feeling was that politicians, who had a direct interest in registration, were more likely to generate enthusiasm and ensure full registration than bureaucratic orders. Also, since the members of the Constituent Assembly would probably be re-elected for the Parliament, voting on political lines would be assumed anyway. Therefore, it was argued that political parties were an immediate necessity.

In view of the lack of interest in the elections of delegates to the Constituent Assembly, the NLC issued on October 28, 1968, two new decrees: the Constituent Assembly (No.2) Decree 1968 (NLCD 299) and Constituent Assembly (No.2) Decree 1968 (Amendment Decree). These revised the functions and composition of the Constituent Assembly. The new Assembly was to have 150 members: forty-nine delegates elected by electoral colleges formed from the existing local councils; ninety-one delegates representing various occupational groups; and ten appointed by the NLC. The Council promised to lift the ban on political parties as soon as the Constituent Assembly convened. The 31-member National Advisory Council was dissolved to allow the members to enter politics.

However, the new proposals created new difficulties. The public wanted to know how the various groups represented would be determined, and how the ninety-one delegates would be divided up.

What was most disturbing was the narrow basis of representation. As one critic put it: "... the two decrees disfranchised about 90 per cent of the Ghanaian electorate."(1)

The Exemptions Commission was also under attack. The fact that "the fundamental political question had been left to the vagaries of quasi-judicial process..."(2) was a basic fault in the precept behind the commission. It was the exemption of Komla Gbedemah that eventually led to the repeal of Disqualification Decree 223. The decision to allow a former Minister of the Nkrumah government to hold public office aroused considerable criticism. Mr Joe Appiah, former opposition MP, issued a statement criticising the decision. He stated that "a situation when ... Mr Gbedemah, the creator of the CPP and for years the ex-President's most trusted friend, is exempted calls for serious examination."(3) Shortly afterwards the Pioneer published a long editorial calling for the abolishment of Decree 223 and criticising the military council's application of it. Even Brigadier Afrifa admitted that the disqualification decree made little sense and stated that the Ghanaian people should now be responsible for who would or would not hold office.(4)

Therefore, on February 18,

1969, the NLC repealed NLCD 223. It was replaced by the Elections and Public Offices Decree 1969 which limited disqualification to 152 people including Nkrumah, twenty-three ex-Ministers, nine CPP members, and three ambassadors.

The NLC appeared to be guiding the transition to civilian rule in order to impose a new regime which would be acceptable to the army. A general feeling of unease was developing about the transitional period to civil rule. As one commentator put it: "... the programme for the return to civilian rule has been modified in such a way that not a few people are expressing great concern about its propriety, if not its desirability. Might it be a move to pack the Constituent Assembly with favourite children who will lend their support to a 'fait accompli'?"

On January 6, 1969, the Constituent Assembly met in Accra. General Ankrah told the Assembly to ensure the freedom and liberty of the people, eliminate the possibility of a dictatorship, and prevent the abuse of the Constitution. A Speaker, Mr R.S.Blay, was elected and four committees (Privileges, House, Business, and Standing Orders) were formed. By July, the bulk of the proposals for the draft constitution had been deliberated. Nearly all of the

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Constituent Commission's recommendations were adopted, either intact or with minimal amendment. Some new provisions were added such as a National House of Chiefs. The most heated arguments arose over the inclusion of Article 71(2)(b)(ii). This disqualified to sit in Parliament for five years anyone who had been declared "by the report of a Commission of Inquiry to be incompetent to hold public office..." This clause was quite clearly intended to embarrass Gbedemah who had not been able to account for a small amount of his assets before the Annie Jigge Commission. This clause was written into the Constitution over the minority protests in the Constituent Assembly who felt that it gave ad hoc bodies the right to condemn men to political death.

In total, the new Constitution provided for division of powers with strong restraints on the Prime Minister and great emphasis on the judiciary. The underlying theme was the prevention of a new Nkrumah. The Preamble reads: "... We the chiefs and people of Ghana having experienced a regime of tyranny ... having solemnly resolved never again to allow ourselves to be subjected to a like regime ..."

On July 18, the Constituent Assembly adjourned after the Third Reading of all chapters of the Constitution. The question

(3) West Africa (August 23), p.1006.
remained as to who would promulgate it. The assembly had sent a resolution to the NLC asking that it be allowed to enact and promulgate the Constitution, but the NLC remained silent, saying only that the matter was under active consideration. (1) Some felt that neither the Constituent Assembly nor the NLC had the right to promulgate the new Constitution. They believed that the Assembly was not truly representative and that the NLC "had no authority in a democratic framework, to ratify a Constitution for the country." (2)

When the Constituent Assembly re-convened on August 12, the Speaker announced that the Assembly would enact the Constitution and the NLC would promulgate it. The following day, Nana Agyeman Badu gave notice of a proposal to establish a three-man Presidential Commission consisting of NLC members. This was rejected on the grounds that it was introduced after the Third Reading. Many then signed the Constitution and left. (3)

Meanwhile, several related events were taking place. Afrifa began a series of visits to army units praising the men for their valour during the coup and urging them not to intervene in political parties. Also, several promotions within the armed forces were

(2) Legon Observer, Vol. IV, No. 16 (1-14 August, 1969), p. 6
announced. Brigadier D.C.K. Amenu, Acting Army Commander, was made Deputy Chief of Defence Staff; Lt. Col. J.R.K. Acquah, Director of Military Intelligence, was promoted to Brigadier and given command of the Second Infantry Brigade; Brigadier A.K. Kattah was posted to the Washington Embassy. (1) It appeared as if the NLC leaders were ensuring the support of rank and file of the army and were phasing out the older or unsafe officers either into desk jobs or to overseas posts. Also, the radio and television coverage during that week was slanted in favour of a three-man Presidential Commission. All signs pointed to the fact that several NLC personnel were trying to keep a presence in the future civilian government.

On August 18, the NLC agreed that the Constituent Assembly would both enact and promulgate the new constitution under the Constituent Assembly (Amendment) 1969 Decree. However, the conditions of the decree were subject to the further consideration by the Assembly on the provision that anyone holding office under the NLC should continue to do so for six months under the new Constitution and reconsideration of the motion suggesting a Presidential Commission for three years. Afrifa stated that "decisions following these reconsiderations would be final." (2) The Assembly assented to the triumvirate clause. But, "does the NLC not appear to have

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played an unhealthy role in a situation when the Assembly was given the honour of promulgating a Constitution which provides for a Presidential Commission of three of its members?" (1) Afrifa, after consultation with his commanders, accepted the Chairmanship of the troika in which Harlley and Gen. Ocran would also serve. As J.A. Pensah put it: "the father figure (i.e. the President) has vital responsibilities, functions and powers; he needs least of all to be an ugly hydra-headed monster." (2) Nonetheless, the Constitution was ratified on August 22nd 1969. The stage was set for elections.

On May 1, 1969, the ban on political parties was lifted. The Political Parties Decree prescribed the character of political parties by requiring regional representation and restricting tribal preponderance among the founding members. Political parties were regarded as public bodies and as such, a system of registration was established to ensure that the details of the organisation were known. Also, there were to be no financial contributions from aliens. (3) Immediately after the lifting of the ban, political parties proliferated throughout Ghana. By the end of May, no less than sixteen had been formed. Two of these were banned: the Junior Civil Service Association on the grounds that the civil service should

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(1) Ibid., p. 2.
not be engaged in party politics and the People's Progressive Party on the allegation that it was backed by Nkrumah.(1) Others were either swallowed up or merged with larger parties. The parties which did remain in the race were the Progressive Party (PP) under K.A.Busia; the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) under Gbedemah; the United Nationalist Party under Joe Appiah; the All People's Republican Party under de Graff-Johnson and P.K.K. Quaidoo; and the People's Action Party (PAP) under Imoru Ayarna. But, "as the campaign progressed, it was clear that the small parties, like those who had abandoned the struggle earlier, could not match the dynamism of the two major units [PP and NAL] both of which were impressively organised and financed."(2)

The manifestoes of the parties and the campaign issues were virtually the same; all promised to extend the welfare services and rehabilitate the economy. The PP placed emphasis on Busia's long-time opposition to Nkrumah; the NAL stressed the organisational genius of Gbedemah. Basically, the campaign focussed on the past and on personalities.(3)

The election was held on August 29, 1969. Sixty per cent of the potential voters were registered and 61 per cent of these actually voted. Therefore only 36 per cent of the eligible voters

(3) Ibid., p.49.
participated Busia's PP won 59 per cent of the popular vote and 75 per cent of the seats in Parliament. The overall results of the election were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Alliance of Liberals</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Action Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nationalist Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All People's Republican Party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were numerous reasons for this outcome. First was the prominent position that Busia played throughout the NLC regime. He was head of the Political Committee, the Electoral Commission, and was active in the Constituent Assembly. As Chairman of the Civic Education Centre, he had always made it clear that he would form a political party. Thus, many of his supporters would have registered to vote. Busia had been the ostensible choice of Afrifa and other leaders in the NLC. Those who were reported to have favoured Gbedemah had been forced out of the Council, notably Ankrah and Nunoo. Also there were rumours that the NLC would only hand over to a civilian government led by the PP. This, coupled with the

(2) Legon Observer, Vol.IV, No.18/1 (September 5, 1969) p.3.
military's obvious determination to retain some political power for the next few years, understandably persuaded many Ghanaians that prudence, if nothing else, dictated their support for the man with the NLC's tacit approval. (1)

Secondly, the inclusion of Article 71(2)(b)(ii) had an impact on the elections. After its acceptance by the Constituent Assembly, Busia wanted it amended to include appeal, but this confirmed suspicions that his refusal to concede this earlier was a result of deliberate election strategy. (2) Article 71 placed in doubt the position of Gbedemah. This, plus his efforts to reverse the findings of the Annie Jiagge Commission, inhibited many potential supporters of the MAL from registering to vote when the future of their party leader was uncertain.

There was also residual bitterness over the CPP. Busia, a traditional opponent of Nkrumah, capitalised on this sentiment; Gbedemah, with old CPP connections, was in jeopardy. The PAP which attracted old CPP support did win two seats in Nzima. There is a question as to whether this was due to CPP support in Nkrumah's birthplace or the manner in which the NLC with Busia's advice had handled the mine strike there. (3)

Perhaps the division of support along tribal lines was one of the more disturbing aspects of the election. The PP was backed

(2) Ryan, p.53.
by a new coalition between the Ashanti and other Akan-speaking people; the NAL received its support in the Ewe centres of the Volta Region. One organisational cause of ethnic voting blocs was that the constituencies had been delineated along ethnic lines since the days of indirect rule. Moreover, the shortness of the period between the lifting of the ban on political activity and the elections meant that in order for any party to have any chance of winning, it would require overwhelming support in at least one region. "The ban itself may have forced would-be political leaders to start planning their activities in their own areas and presumably with members of their own tribes."(1) For example, Joe Appiah, an Ashanti, headed the UNP. However, it became known as the Ga party, especially after the removal of Ankrah and Nunoo from the NLC. Appiah was defeated in his own constituency (775 out of 10,533 votes) largely because of sentiments that he had sold out to the Ga. (2)

When the election results for the major parties are broken down into regions, the ethnic basis is explicit: (3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Progressive Party Seats</th>
<th>National Alliance of Liberals Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brong-Ahafo</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volta</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Ryan, p.49.
One rationale for the Akan voting bloc was the growing anti-Ewe sentiment. They claimed the Ewes had gained dominance in various corridors of economic, political, administrative and military power since the coup. The controversial Gbedemah, with his CPP background, also made the Akan cocoa farmers who had suffered under Nkrumah turn from the MAL to the PP. The overall PP support was 85 per cent in the constituencies which it won. Although the MAL's backbone was in the Volta region, it also won some seats in the Eastern Region in the areas peopled by those allies of the Ewes who feared Akan domination. However, the MAL's record was modest. Overall, 75 per cent of the votes cast in those areas were for Gbedemah's party, but in six districts it fell below 75 per cent. (1)

The election results exposed a dubious national unity. The political divisions between the MAL and the PP were much akin to those in the 1954 and 1956 elections. The clock had been turned back.

Ghana returned to civilian rule on September 3, 1969. Less than a year later, the military presidential triumvirate stepped down. On August 31, 1970, Busia sponsored Edward Akufo-Addo, a former Chief Justice and Chairman of the Constitutional Commission, for the presidential election held by the 140 members of Parliament

and 24 chiefs. He won the election by 123 to 68 votes. Therefore, both the Prime Minister and the President were members of the PP.

In the preceding discussion of the return to civilian rule in Ghana, we have seen that the first of the two pre-conditions for de-militarization were met. First, the junta appeared to be ready to withdraw from politics and their subordinates also were willing to return to their barracks. From the beginning, the military leaders stated repeatedly that they had no intentions of remaining in political power indefinitely. However, there was an attitude of caution exhibited both by the military and at least a large minority of the population.

The first move for a return to civilian rule began in the summer of 1967 with the appointment of the Siriboe Commission to study and recommend procedures for elections. From this time forward, the NLC can be seen directing the path of re-civilianization in so far that the future regime would be acceptable to the military. Moreover, the military was able to retain an amount of constitutionally recognized political power. Certain aspects of this attitude of the military should be re-iterated. First, the Constitutional Commission, the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution, the Electoral Commissioners and the Disqualification Decrees were characterised by a strong anti-Nkrumah stance. Moreover, all these were subject to the control of the NLC. The Constitutional Commission was made up of fifteen anti-Nkrumah members who were charged, in Ankrah's
words: to "prepare for the approval of the NLC — and thereafter for the entire nation — a Constitution." (1) The Electoral Commissioner was to establish rules and regulations for the conduct of elections which were subject to the final approval of the NLC. The Disqualification Decrees left the final decision for exemption up to the discretion of the NLC. The Constituent Assembly was to answer and submit its findings to the NLC. Also, the Constituent Assembly was criticized as being packed by the favourite children of the NLC including 10 members appointed by the junta. The most blatant interference by the military in the drawing up of the Constitution was the deal in which the NLC allowed the Constituent Assembly to enact and promulgate the new Constitution in exchange for including the motion for a Presidential Commission consisting of members of the NLC. Although the military troika dissolved itself within one year, it does not diminish the fact that the army was able to retain a large amount of overt political power.

Secondly, the Disqualification Decrees were considered a move on the part of the military to prohibit the formation of a civilian government which would consist of friends of the Nkrumah regime or enemies of the military government. These decrees, although modified considerably, acted in accordance with the findings of the

(1) Ankrah, p.11. (Italics author's)
Commissions of Inquiry and with Article 71(2) of the Constitution to prevent old CPP associates from participating in the new government. The case of Komla Gbedemah is most notable. Long before the lift of the ban on political activity, Gbedemah had been found guilty by the Annie Jiagge Commission of Inquiry of obtaining his wealth by illegitimate means. He was fined $41,000 and refused an appeal. However, these findings were not made public until Gbedemah declared his intentions of forming a political party. Gbedemah was originally disqualified by NLCD 223 but later exempted by the Apaloo Commission. He was again disqualified under the Political Party Decree, but public resentment led to an amendment of the decree and Gbedemah was again exempted. The final attack on Gbedemah came after his victory in the General Elections at his constituency in Keta. When the Constitution was ratified in September 1969, it was made retroactive to August 22 or just prior to the General Election. Article 71(2), which among other points disqualified from public office any public officers who had acquired money unlawfully. Thus, Gbedemah was refused his seat in Parliament because of his past record with the Annie Jiagge Commission of Inquiry. (1) This was considered by many observers to be most unfortunate since it was assumed that Gbedemah would have made an excellent opposition voice.

Thirdly, the NLC's promotion of Busia was another means of directing the pattern of civilian rule. The NLC had appointed Busia Chairman of the Centre of Civic Education, Political Commission, Electoral Commission, and he had been active in the Constituent Assembly. Busia was the ostensible choice of Afrifa, and Ankrah and Nunoo who had supported Gbedemah had been forced out of the NLC. As we have stated before, the promotion of Busia combined with the NLC's determination to retain political power for some time persuaded many Ghanaians that prudence called for them to support the PP and Busia.

Thus, the anti-Nkrumah attitude and the NLC influence of the Constitutional Commission, the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution, the Electoral Commissioner, and the Disqualification decrees, the NLC support of Busia and attacks on Gbedemah, and the Presidential Commission made up of the NLC all assured that the post-interventionist civilian regime would be amenable to the military.

Was the third pre-condition met in Ghana? Immense problems remained in Ghana and it was doubtful that the new civilian regime was politically viable without military support. "With the weakened executive and the enormous emphasis placed on the division of powers, the framework envisaged by the Constitution may lead to political inaction and this would prove to be inadequate to deal with the myriad problems of a developing nation."(1)

The success

(1) E.Card and B.Calloway, p.15
of civilian government depended to some degree on Busia's political abilities which were dubious at best. The ethnic tensions which emerged during the elections may also hinder the political process of a united country. Not one cabinet or sub-cabinet member was an Ewe. Gbedemah was disqualified only a day before the opening of Parliament, which compromised the role of a loyal opposition. The Parliament would also be immobilized by the lack of any extensive debate during the campaign about social, economic, and political issues. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the economy continued to deteriorate with the fall of world cocoa prices and the heavy burden of the debt. Although the army no longer held a constitutionally sanctioned role in the government, once the thread of legality had been broken, it could easily be broken again.

Busia's regime lasted until January 1972 when the military once again took control of the political institutions. In brief, the background to the coup was the economic crises which had gripped Ghana since the mid-sixties. (1) Ghana's debt had reached record heights, and the short-term loans were most pressing. These amounted to $368,000,000 and being short-term, the interest rates were as high as 9 per cent in some instances. The internal debt

was over $600 million which added to the inflation in the country. Added to this, foreign aid had only equalled the level of the debt payment. Compounding Ghana's inability to pay her debts was the drop in the world cocoa prices. This cost Busia much support in the Akan areas where most of the cocoa is produced.

Meanwhile, the trade union in Ghana, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), went on numerous strikes in opposition to the government's policy. The situation broke open when B.A. Bentum, leader of the TUC, denounced the 1971 budget. At this point, the government disbanded the TUC and called in the army to occupy the TUC buildings.

It was, however, Busia's attempt to limit the privileges of the army that led directly to the 1972 coup as had similar policies of Nkrumah led to the 1966 coup. In the 1972 budget, several of the traditional perks of the army officers, such as vehicle-maintenance allowances, were abolished. The austerity budget also attempted to reduce military costs and increase the productivity of the army — steps the military deeply resented. The budgetary allocation to the Ministry of Defence was cut by 10 per cent. To make matters worse, Busia devalued the cedi by 4½ per cent in the summer of 1971. This hit the economic elite of Ghana, including the officers. With hoarding and profiteering, inflation went up and in terms of real income, those who had been living on European standards experienced a loss as much as 25 per cent.
Busia realized that troubles may be forthcoming from military quarters and made moves to forstall this by shifting many of the top military personnel. He was too late and on January 13, 1972 the military was once again in control of the government of Ghana.

Sierra Leone

"Fellow citizens, I want to make this quite clear that we the senior officers do not intend to impose a Military Government on the people of this our beloved country ... we are soldiers and want to remain soldiers and politics is not our ambition. We will hand over to the politicians as soon as the situation becomes favourable. The National Reformation Council will do all in its power to bring about a civilian government in the shortest possible time". (1)

With these words, Major Charles Blake assured the people of Sierra Leone that the army did not intend to remain in power indefinitely. However, on the return of Juxon-Smith to head the NRC, the prospects for a quick return to civilian rule diminished. The pre-conditions for demilitarisation expressed by the NRC were an end to corruption, the rehabilitation of the economy, and the abolition of tribal conflict - all of which were beyond the capacity of the army to bring about.

The first move by the NRC towards re-civilianisation was to establish a Civilian Advisory Council headed by University of Sierra

Leone Vice-Chancellor Davidson Nicol and later replaced by the Pro-Vice-Chancellor S.T. Matturi. This council was changed to draw up a new constitution and to advise the NRC on the process of a return to civil government. Few APC supporters were included and the council was biased to the southern and eastern regions. (1) There is little evidence that this council was able to accomplish much in regards to re-civilianisation.

In May, 1967, the Dove-Edwin Commission was founded to "inquire into the Conduct of the late general election held on the 17th and 21st days of March, 1967 ..." (2) This Commission was to have considerable influence both on NRC rule and the process of its withdrawal from politics. When the investigations of the Dove-Edwin Commission were published in January 1968, the NRC was forced into a position in which it had to take definite action.

The report of the Commission found that the results of the 1967 elections were SLPP, twenty-two seats plus six unopposed; APC, 32 seats, and Independents, four. It concluded that:

The SLPP Government used corrupt means in order to win the elections ... the APC won the Elections on their own merit .... When the Governor-General ... appointed Mr Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister he was constitutionally right ... and When Brigadier Lansana said he had taken over and placed the Governor-General and Mr Siaka Stevens under house arrest he actually seized power from a duly constituted government ... (3)

The NRC White Paper, published with the Dove-Edwin Commission Report, was in agreement with the findings that the elections were rigged and corrupt. However, Juxon-Smith had justified the military rule on the fact that both political parties were guilty of malpractices during the elections, that the appointment of Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister was unconstitutional, and that civil war was imminent at the time of the coup. The NRC statements were set forth to maintain these myths. The report reads:

... both parties were to blame for the disturbances that took place in certain areas and the difference of culpability of both parties was just one of degree... there was a sudden upsurge of tribal feelings when the announcement of the final results was delayed. This would have developed into a tribal war if the National Reformation had not stepped in on the 23rd March, 1967... In the absence of anything to the contrary, the National Reformation Council is of the view that the Governor-General did not exercise his deliberate judgement, free from outside pressure, in appointing Mr Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister on the 21st day of March 1967... it is the considered view of the Council that the occasion for the Governor-General to exercise his discretion had not yet arisen on the 21st March, 1967, when he purported to exercise this discretion. This untimely action of the Governor-General gave rise to an increasing tension throughout the country. The situation was aggravated when the senior officers of the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces realized that Brigadier Lansana wanted to impose Sir Albert Margai as Prime Minister on the people of Sierra Leone. This would have led to chaos and bloodshed in the country. The National Reformation Council's intervention on the 23rd day of March, was a rescue operation and was not intended to impose permanently a military government on the people.

(1) Dove-Edwin Commission, pp. 2-4.
In spite of these efforts at rationalisation the NRC realised that many people were becoming suspicious about the willingness of the NRC to hand over to a civilian government. In the White Paper, the Council stated:

The National Reformation Council appreciates the earnestness of local aspirations for a return to civilian rule at the earliest possible time ... The National Reformation is strongly of the view that any return to civilian rule should be done in an atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill on the part of all concerned. (1)

Thus, by NRC Decree on January 16, 1968, a new Civilian Rule Committee was formed and chairmanned by Sarif Easmon. It consisted of representatives of paramount chiefs, local government authorities, religious bodies, the banned SLPP and APC with the exception of Albert Margai, the National Advisory Council, the Medical Association, the Bar Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the successful Independent candidates of the 1967 election. The Committee was to advise the NRC on the method and procedure for handing over power to a civilian government. While it was not formally charged with drawing up a new constitution, Juxon-Smith described it as a "pro tem constituent assembly". (2) The Civilian Rule Committee was to deal with the following questions: whether or not there should be an election before the handover, who should appoint the Prime Minister, and would there be a coalition government of the SLPP and APC.

(1) *ibid.*, p. 5.
The Civilian Rule Committee did not meet until the end of February and then only six times. Its most important recommendation was that there was no need for elections before the return to civilian rule.\(^\text{(1)}\) This was a direct contradiction of the wishes of the NRC who felt that elections were necessary and who did not want power to be handed to an APC-based government. "It looks therefore, as though the Committee and the Chairman [of the NRC] are working to very different time scales, since, if there is to be no general election, a return to civilian rule could, and probably should, coincide with the beginning of the next financial year [i.e. July 1968]; while if there is to be one ... it might not take place for a very long time."\(^\text{(2)}\)

Although some felt that a return to civil rule in July would be too soon since some Commissions of Inquiry were still sitting and there was still need of rigorous economic control, many were growing increasingly dubious over the credibility of the NRC promises.

There were several factors which made a hand-over to a civil government unpalatable to the NRC. First, among the officers on the Council and non-NRC officers, there were strong forces which opposed an APC administration which was alone acceptable to the majority of the electorate and which the Dove-Edwin Commission had shown to be the

\(^\text{(2)}\) *West Africa* (March 2, 1968), p.324.
rightful victors of the 1967 Elections. Also, the three Majors who led the March 23rd coup feared that an APC government would either dismiss or imprison them. Many of the officers were unwilling to give up prospects of rapid promotion and higher pay which military rule provided. Finally, Juxson-Smith and his compatriots seemed to enjoy ruling Sierra Leone. (1) A voluntary return to civilian rule was an obscure prospect.

On April 18, 1968, a group of NCO's and warrant officers overthrew the unpopular NRC. The leaders of the counter-coup stated that their immediate aim was to restore civilian rule. A fourteen-man Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) replaced the defunct NRC. The ACRM recalled Colonels Bangura and Genda, and a National Interim Council (NIC) was established under the former. (2) The NIC promised that it would restore civilian rule "within the earliest possible time in accordance with the Constitution as it stood in March 1967." (3) As such, the NIC was acting as an ad hoc Constituent Assembly. During the following days, eighty-five members of the former government and officers were detained, the Press Law was repealed, all officers were demoted to their pre-NRC rank, and the office and powers of the Governor-General were revived. (4) Governor-General Sir Henry Lightfoot Boston was

(1) Allen, p.328.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid., pp.798-99.
invited back to Sierra Leone but as he was in ill health the NIC appointed Chief Justice Tejan-Sie as acting Governor-General. He, in turn, requested that all successful candidates for the March 1967 General Elections assemble in Freetown. When the first session of the House of Representatives met on April 26, 1968, Siaka Stevens was chosen as Prime Minister. His cabinet of fourteen ministers included four SLPP members in such posts as Education, Health, Works and Social Welfare and two Independent members. It was an attempt to absorb the SLPP into the active government but an actual coalition was never established.

Let us sum up the preceding discussion of the return to civilian rule in Sierra Leone by examining the facts in view of the three pre-conditions to de-militarization. The first pre-conditions (i.e. the willingness of the military to return to the barracks) was not met by the Juxson-Smith junta. Although Juxson-Smith had stated that the NRC would hand over power to the civilians in the shortest time possible, the subsequent actions of the regime proved the contrary. On the other hand, the NCO's and Warrant Officers wasted little time in handing back power to a civilian government.

The reasons for the different timetables were in part due to the fulfilment of the second pre-condition. The NRC acted to direct the course of the return to civilian rule particularly to
prohibit the ascendency of the APC. There are several examples of this. First, the Civilian Advisory Committee was biased to the south and east while including few APC supporters. Secondly, there was an attempt on the behalf of the NRC to upstage the Dove-Edwin Commission Report by publishing a Government White Paper with the report. The government justified its takeover by declaring that the country was on the verge of collapse from a tribal war in March 1967 and that both the APC and SLPP had contributed to the disturbances. This contradicted the Report's findings that the APC had won the election fairly. Finally, when the NRC seemed to ignore the recommendations of the Civilian Rule Committee, there was a growing doubt that the NRC intended to hand over power to the APC. However, the NRC did consider the APC as an acceptable government. This was due, in the first place, to the fact that the lower ranks were unhappy with the Juxson-Smith regime. The NRC had enjoyed many prerogatives in their position of power while the enlisted men received none of these benefits. Secondly, the APC had promised to offer the enlisted men improvements in pay and living conditions.

The final pre-condition, that of the creation of a viable national government, was not met in Sierra Leone. The first year of APC rule was one of difficulty. There were problems which the APC government was compelled to solve before the political process was truly in the hands of the civilians. First, it was necessary to hold elections in twenty-five constituencies in which the 1967
Election results had been declared invalid. Most of these were ex-SLPP seats in the south and the east and included Albert Margai's constituency. The violence which erupted during the elections were largely due to the SLPP-APC antagonisms, but were also reinforced by ethnic conflicts and a Creole-Mende clash at Njala. Stevens postponed the elections indefinitely and declared a state of emergency. He also relied heavily on the army and police to quell the riots over the elections.

The second problem concerned the army officers in jail. After the 1968 coup, the army had only two officers and both of these had been recalled from abroad. A majority of the subordinate officers were eventually released, but their future role remained uncertain. In August, eighteen men, including Lansana, L.W.Hugh (the former Commissioner of Police), Majors Kai-Samba and Blake, and Lt. Norman were charged with treason. After a fifty-six week trial, these men were sentenced to death and in 1971, Lansana was finally executed.

The military continued to hover in the wings while the political situation in Sierra Leone has deteriorated in the past two years. Stevens began to consolidate his power. He detained the

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(1) West Africa (Sept. 28, 1968), p.1150
(2) West Africa (Nov. 23, 1968), p.1365
Ministers of Finance and Information, Dr Forna and Ibrahim Taqi, who still remain under arrest. A state of emergency was declared in 1970 and still remains in effect. When an opposition party, the United Democratic Party, broke away from the APC, Stevens detained its leaders and banned the party. However, it was the attempted coup in April 1971 which opened the door for Stevens to establish a strong presidential system. The coup and assassination attempts were allegedly led by Col. Bangura (head of the Sierra Leone army since 1966). Stevens used the coup attempts to conclude a defense pact with neighbouring Guinea and called in Guinean troops to restore order and bolster his regime. Stevens also seized upon this opportunity to declare Sierra Leone a republic on April 19, 1971, and establishing himself into a strong presidential position. There has been speculation that by the time of the next general elections in 1973, Stevens will have declared a one-party state in Sierra Leone. However, in order for Stevens to maintain power until that time, it will take more than the presence of Guinean troops which has displeased many Sierra Leoneans.

Dahomey

There have been four separate returns to civilian rule in Dahomey during the past decade. In each instance peculiar sets of circumstances both within the army and among the civilian political elite conditioned the process of re-civilianization. We will discuss each instance separately in the following section.

After Soglo intervened in the politics of Dahomey in 1963, there was no question that the army would stay in power. Soglo had set up a provisional government with Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga as his ministers. In spite of the lack of reconciliation among these men when Maga was arrested for subversive activity, Soglo was still sufficiently in command of the army to push through the return to civilian rule by January 1964. There were two steps in this re-civilianization of politics: first, the drawing up of a new constitution and secondly the elections.

Immediately after the seizure of power, the junta appointed a nine member commission which drew up a constitutional draft delineating a restricted executive and recognition of the rights of opposition. (1) However, the military government rejected their proposals, maintaining that they did not respond to the wishes of the masses. In fact, the military was in favour of a strong executive system. The sixty member

Commission Constitutionelle, appointed by the military in late November 1963, then drew up a constitution which was a compromise between an orthodox Presidential system and a classical parliamentary regime. (1) Under the 1964 Constitution, the President and the Vice President shared executive power with the President as head of state and the Vice-President as head of government. Legislative power was vested in a National Assembly elected every five years by universal suffrage. The proposed constitution called for a one-party state; the party was to be the Parti Démocratique Dahomeen (PDD). (2) A Senior Council was recommended to act in a consultative capacity to enable "the nation as a whole to benefit from the experience, traditions, and wisdom of the past." (3)

The proposed constitution met criticism from the students and trade unions. Paoletti, leader of the UGTD, opposed this presidential system. He later denied that the amalgamated unions were opposed to Apithy and Ahomadegbe, the leaders of the provisional government, and eventually retracted his opposition to the draft constitution. The constitution was to be placed before the electorate on December 15, but this was postponed until January 5 following the arrest of Maga and two of his former ministers on charges of subversion. The Soglo Constitution, as it was later termed, was accepted

by 99.80 per cent of the electorate (92.06 per cent of the electorate participated in the referendum.)

The presidential and legislative elections took place under military supervision on January 19th. 99.98 per cent of the vote was cast for the list presented by the PDD. Ahomadegbe became President and Apithy, Vice-President. "In theory, the partnership 'solved' Dahomey's leadership crisis, but the dual-executive - difficult in the best circumstances - could not paper over the long-standing personal and political animosities between the two men."

The dual executive lasted until November 1965 when Soglo once again moved into the breach. Another civilian government was attempted by the appointment of Speaker of the National Assembly, Congacou, as head of state in accordance with Articles 17 and 35 of the Soglo Constitution. Congacou promised that he would set up a commission to reform the constitution and to create a presidential system of government. He was unable, however, to form a working coalition among the three power centres and Soglo moved back into the breach that December.

Soglo's quasi-civilianized regime was overthrown in 1967 by the younger generation of officers lead by Major Maurice Kouandété.

(1) Gléle, p.254.
(3) Gélé, p.290.
The reasons for this coup, as we discussed in Chapter II stemmed from the discontent the younger officers felt with Soglo. Alley became the chairman of the military government largely because of his prestige outside the army rather than his support within the army. Needless to say, Kouandéte was unhappy that he had been replaced by Alley as head of the junta and Alley was uneasy that another coup-maker, potentially more of a threat than he, had emerged in the army. This feud between Alley and Kouandéte was to form the background to the return to power of elected civilians in June 1968 and later to the emergence and collapse of the Zinsou regime from July 1968 to December 1969.\(^{(1)}\)

While leader of the junta, Alley, recognizing the lack of support from the younger officers, acted on the assumption that his power was limited. On the other hand, Kouandéte used his position as spokesman for the jeunes cadres to strengthen his power. Numerous re-shufflings within the junta, particularly the replacement of Captain Hackème by Captain Matthew Kerekou, were designed to strengthen Kouandéte's position.\(^{(2)}\) Kouandéte and the jeunes cadres filled every post in the government with army people (except for the Minister of Finance). Many of the ministers, in spite of their lack of experience, were younger officers including three captains and four lieutenants and the members of the Revolutionary Committee were even more


junior. This brought into question Kouandété’s sincerity in wanting the army back in the barracks. His subsequent record makes him appear more a political officer. As Whiteman proposes: “Kouandété’s dislike of political manoeuvre and politicians may have caused him sincerely to want to take the army from politics. Yet this same contempt seems to have lead him to take political actions”.(1)

It was Alley, therefore, who announced the deadline for the return to civilian rule within six months and who guided through the new constitution at the end of March.

The first step to the return to civilian rule was the creation of a new constitution. Alley appointed a thirty-three man committee headed by Ignacio Pinto, President of the Supreme Court to draft the constitution. This draft was submitted to Alley in early March 1966. It called for (1) a strong presidency limited by the right of the individual to appeal to the Supreme Court for rulings on the constitutionality of presidential actions, (2) a National Assembly to be paid according to the number and length of sessions each delegate attends, (3) a judiciary with a guaranteed independence from executive and legislative interference, and (4) the institution of a single political party to be known as the Parti National Unique (PNU). (2)

Alley announced his preference for the strong Presidency on grounds that "a principal cause of our regression was the lack of

(1) Whiteman, p.15.
(2) Afrique Contemporaine, No.37 (1968), p.15.
firmness among our leaders". He also defended the idea of a single party as "the only means we have to insure the unification, cohesion, and stability we need so much since success in the economic and social fields depends above all on political stability." On March 31, 1968, the draft constitution was submitted to a national referendum. It was approved by 846,521 votes to 71,695 with 194,300 abstentions. Most of the "no" votes were in Abomey, Ahomadegbe's fief.

The second stage in the return to civilian rule was the election for the Presidency. The major problem revolved about the position of Maga, Apithy, and Ahomadegbe - the Big Three. In April, the jeunes cadres, probably under the leadership of Kouandété, excluded the ex-Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Ministers from the election by a sixty to thirty vote. Although the Supreme Court overturned this ban, the junta ignored the decision on the grounds that the new constitution did not come into effect until a new government was formed. The ban, as we shall see, resulted in the election disaster since the Big Three were able to rally their forces to cause a 75 per cent boycott of the elections.

Nevertheless, Alley pressed forward with the presidential nominations, and elections were scheduled for early May. The military

(1) Lemarchand, p. 54.
(2) ibid
presented a hand-picked list of candidates who began campaigning on April 21st. The five candidates, all nonentities on the Dahomean political scene, included Dr Basile Adjou Moumouni, a WHO doctor; Paul Hazoume, a minor politician; Eustache Prudencio, a teacher; Karim de Silva, a publisher; and J.B. Viernin, a company director. (1)

The May 5 election, pulling only one-fourth of the vote, was a fiasco. Dr. Basile Adjou Moumouni was technically the victor, yet he was hardly the man to work effectively with the jeunes cadres. He had spent most of his life outside Dahomey as a WHO doctor and as he was 46, he was considered too old by the young officers. Moreover, Adjou found support only in the Southwest (he was rumoured to be backed by Ahomadegbe) and his emergence as President would have caused an uproar in the southeast and north. Finally, he had little backing in the military. (2) It is not surprising, therefore, that the junta declared the election void.

After the elections, there was total confusion in the ranks. Alley appeared to be in favour of doing a deal with the Big Three and bringing them back. Kouandété refused. This set off a curious cabinet reshuffle in mid-May when a number of soldier-ministers were replaced by officers of the Ouidah paracommando unit. (3) Then followed the strange affair of the complot de Pentecôte. Again

(1) ibid
(2) Lemarchand, p.54.
(3) Whiteman, p.15.
involving some men of the Ouidah unit, which was a hot-bed of intrigue and loyal to no one by now, the plot was supposedly to assassinate Kouandéte and his followers.\(\text{(1)}\) Therefore, Alley was implicated and his reputation damaged. Again Alley lost favour when his planned meeting for Ahomadegbe, Apithy, and Maga in Niamey never materialized. Alley's promise of a return to barracks by June 17th was impossible. He had staked his reputation on this promise and had lost. On the other hand, Kouandéte's ascendancy in the army seemed proven when the army invited Dr Emile Zinsou to be President. Kouandéte was in favour of this compromise and with the army near to collapse from internal rivalries and with pressure from the unions and France so intense, this "fourth man" of Dahomean politics seemed the ideal compromise. Furthermore, it was rumoured that Zinsou arranged with Kouandéte that he would be appointed head of the army if Kouandéte supported his candidacy. This was agreed upon by the younger officers if only to exclude the Big Three.\(\text{(2)}\)

Therefore, Zinsou was appointed President for five years and given one month to form a government. His appointment finally united Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga. These men and Soglo called a press conference to express their collective opposition to Zinsou. Zinsou did have the support of the army, the unions, and a section of

\(\text{(1) ibid}\)

\(\text{(2) ibid}\)
the elite, but he lacked any grass-roots support. After his inauguration on July 17th, he announced that he would hold a referendum on July 28th to approve his appointment. He won a 74 per cent "oké" vote in spite of the urgings of the Big Three to their followers to boycott the referendum. (1) The vote gave Zinsou a somewhat illusory mandate to rule, but by this time, most Dahomeans had become so bored by political convulsions that he could count on a considerable supply of negative good-will. It also enabled Zinsou to feel he was not merely dependent on Kouandété's whims.

Therefore, on July 31st, the Comité Révolutionnaire Militaire dissolved itself stating "we can now go back to our barracks, convinced that we have laid down a precise framework in which the new President will function, as we set out to do on December 17, 1967." (2)

Zinsou's task was to bring an element of sanity into Dahomey's finances. During his seventeen months in power, he was able to offset serious union unrest and to counter opposition, but he was not able to control the Alley-Kouandété feud. Kouandété led the coup ousting Zinsou in December 1969, but as we have discussed earlier, de Souza was chosen to lead the latest military directorate.

As Whiteman put it, all was not sweetness and light. (3) De Souza released Alley as a symbol of the officer's esprit de corps which left Kouandété ill at ease. There was talk of restoring Zinsou

(2) Whiteman, p.15.
(4) Whiteman, p.16.
although Kouandété refused to accept this. The army was more divided than ever. On January 10th, a confrontation developed between the Kouandété and the de Souza-Sinzogan camps. Kouandété arrested Sinzogan and called him before a "States General" of officers. He also placed other officers under surveillance and surrounded the building in which the Sinzogan hearing was being held with armed troops. Paratroopers were brought in from Ouédah and as one correspondent reported, "every army faction at the meeting had its own armed troops ready to intervene." (1) After six hours of discussion, a compromise was reached: the three men of the Directorate, de Souza, Sinzogan, and Kouandété, would forget their disputes and cooperate and a committee under Lt. Col. Vodouh, a neutral, was appointed to organize elections before March 31st. This was considered a victory for the Big Three who had all been called back from exile and a defeat for Zinsou.

The general elections for the President and delegates to the National Assembly were scheduled from March 9th to March 31st. A deposit fee of £1,500 for presidential candidates limited the field to four: Apithy, Ahomadégbé, Maga, and Zinsou. Each formed a political party and issued party newspapers. (2) The Big Three began maneuvering in the accustomed manner in their respective political feifs.

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and the campaign carried a conspiratorial air. The election itself was disastrous. In Borgou in the north, violence erupted leaving six dead and over five hundred injured. This was enough for the military directorate first to suspend and later to cancel the elections. De Souza announced on March 29th:

Malgré l'engagement pris solennellement par tous les candidats de respecter la loi électorale, de prêcher la non-violence à leurs partisans, les élections sont, pour une catégorie de Dahoméens, l'occasion de déchanter leurs instincts: des vies humaines sont anéanties, l'insécurité des citoyens est devenue une réalité. Les votes sont entachés d'irregularités flagrantes.\(^{(1)}\)

At this time, the results of the five of the six departments were as follows:\(^{(2)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahomadegbe</td>
<td>200,091 votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apithy</td>
<td>186,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maga</td>
<td>152,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinsou</td>
<td>17,552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maga, who was trailing behind heavily in the southern areas (winning only 25,000 votes in those four departments), was then in the position of likely victor since he could count on the vote in the remaining department of Attacora which had 190,000 electors registered.\(^{(3)}\) Thus, the decision to annul the election results infuriated Maga's supporters. One stated: "La décision du directoire est une injustice dont nous sommes les seules victimes."\(^{(4)}\)

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\(^{(1)}\) *Jeune Afrique*, No 484, (April 14, 1970), p.28
\(^{(2)}\) Ibid., p.29
\(^{(3)}\) *West Afrique* (April 4, 1970), p.375
Thus, an assembly of chiefs, notables, and leading politicians from the north met in Parakou and this was interpreted as a threat of secession. As Pascal Chabikao, a spokesman for Maga stated: "Le mot secession ne nous fait pas peur."(1) There were rumours that an army of the north was being set up under Captain Ibrahim Chabi, one of Kouandété's ministers in 1968 and that secessionist flags were being raised in Parakou. There was also talk of merging northern Dahomey with Niger. Meanwhile, large numbers of southerners were fleeing from the north and an anonymous tract entitled "A Citizen's Revolt" was published in Cotonou threatening northerners in the south.(2)

The military directorate was facing a large scale crisis—civil war. Kouandété, a northerner, was obliged to issue a statement denying any part he might have with the northern secession plan. This was probably true for it was unlikely that Kouandété would have associated himself with the traditional political leaders such as Maga. (3) There was also talk of a "Ghanaian" solution in which Alley would lead a transitional government. This never materialized in view of the suspicion with which Alley was regarded by the other officers. When questioned, Alley answered, "Quelle situation? Celle du pays? Mais c'est l'affaire du directoire militaire ..., "(4)

The real pressure fell to Ahomadegbe, Apithy, and Maga to work out a compromise among themselves.

(1) Jeune Afrique No. 484 (April 14, 1970), p. 30
(3) Whiteman, p. 17.
The final agreement which produced the Presidential Commission or a troika of Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga was apparently a deal arranged by these political leaders themselves. Under this arrangement, Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga would serve on a rotating basis of two years as President of the Presidential Commission. The Commission was to be the supreme organ of the state and could be called together by demand of its President or by the other two members. Decisions must be unanimous, but if one member refused to vote three times, a majority decision would rule. (1) Maga was to be the first President of the Commission in view of his moral victory in the March elections and he led the country back to civilian rule when the Commission was inaugurated on May 7, 1970.

As Dahomey returned to civilian rule with a carefully balanced political leadership, the military also was organized to counter-balance the power of any one leader. Alley was made Secretary-General for Defence and Kouandété was appointed as his Deputy. Hachème was made head of the Service Civique and Vodounou was made Controller of the National Defence. Finally Chasme was appointed as head of Security until the post was transferred to a civil servant in October 1970. (2)

It is difficult to discuss the process of re-civilianization in Dahomey in view of the frequent re-entry of the military into the

(2) Whiteman, p. 17.
political arena over the past decade. There are, nonetheless, some clear examples of the pre-conditions for the abdication of the military junta which were met or not met in the various cases.

The first pre-condition is the willingness of the military to withdraw from politics. Each military junta in Dahomey stated at the beginning that it did not intend to remain in power for an indefinite period of time. Soglo, in 1963 and 1965, appeared eager to hand power back to the civilians and wasted little time in doing so. However, in both instances, the army intervened again within a short time. The third Soglo regime was becoming more and more quasi-civilianized, but ended abruptly by the Kouandété led coup. Here, in spite of Kouandété's announcements that he had intervened to bring civilian rule back to Dahomey, the fact that Houandété and his jeunes cadres filled almost every post in the government made their sincerity doubtful. It was Alley who forced through the elections which eventually led to the Zinsou presidency. After the final coup which ousted Zinsou, the military government was facing an impending civil war and was willing to abrogate its responsibility by bringing back the old politicians to work out a compromise. It was, by this time, difficult to speak of the army as a monolithic unit. Divided internally, the military was no longer able to impose its control over the country.

The military governments of Dahomey also attempted to shape the successive civilian regimes to their specifications.
After the 1963 coup, Soglo pushed through a strong executive system of government in the belief that a strong central authority could exercise control over the country. The 1964 Constitution, termed the Soglo Constitution, reflected this approach with the instigation of a bi-cephalous executive. Maga, accused of plotting against the military junta which had overthrown him, was prevented from holding office and it was left to Ahomadegbe and Apithy to form the civilian government. During the return to civilian rule in 1965, Soglo directed the formation of the new civilian government by adhering to the 1964 Constitution and appointing Oongaeou as executive. It was, however, the return to civilian rule in 1968 which was most shaped by compromise and manoeuvre within the armed forces. Here, the determination of the jeunes cadres to exclude the older politicians, led to the fiasco of general elections. Zinsou was finally chosen as head of the new government after various intrigues, plots and deals with the army. After the final retreat of the military from overt political rule in 1970, the military itself was unable to effectively direct the formation of the new civilian government. The country was on the verge of civil war and the army itself was as divided as the country. It was left to the Big Three to work out a compromise government and the army apparently had little to do with it.

Thus, civilian rule has returned to Dahomey. But, has the third pre-condition been met? Have the conditions which resulted in the army's engaging in overt political activity been removed?
For the first year of the Presidential Commission arrangement was a year of relative stability in Dahomey. However, the economic situation was going from bad to worse and the benefits from off-shore petroleum now being exploited will probably not be felt for several years. In June 1970, Maga presented a budget with a recurrent deficit of £300 million, the largest of Dahomey's continuous deficits. The French met half of this but there was feeling among the Dahomeans that whatever the government gave away would be taken away through some means as stepping up direct taxation. The trade unions were quieter with the repeal of the 20 per cent tax on all workers. Meanwhile, the students and intellectuals were happier with the promised University of Dahomey which was finally opened in early 1972. There was, however, an underlying sentiment of disquiet in Dahomey.

Dissatisfaction that all the old ills have been visited on them in a dose three times as strong is particularly acute among intellectuals, trade unionists, young people — namely those people who have chosen Dahomey's government so many times in the past. The major asset for Maga is that the shock of having been on the abyss of civil war in April is currently holding back reckless political activity.

In spite of the scepticism that the present arrangement in Dahomey would survive the first transfer of the post of president of the Presidential Commission, Maga did hand over the position to Ahomadegbe in May 1972. This was not without a background of intrigue both within the military and among civilian political activities beginning in early 1972.

(2) Whiteman, p. 19.
There had been acts of military indiscipline in early February 1972 at Ouidah, the home of past coup-makers. However, it was on February 23, that the situation came to a head with another coup attempt led by Kouandété. There was considerable confusion surrounding the events which included an unsuccessful assassination attempt on de Souza, the Army Chief of State, and the overthrow of the Presidential Commission. It was not until several months later that a final account was revealed. It seemed that the coup attempt was actually a coup within a coup. The first coup was planned by Kouandété. Since he no longer held an operational command and could not act alone, he had proposed the assassination plan to Captain Lucien Glélé, brother of Zinsou's former Minister of Rural Development and Co-operation Adrien Glélé and Commander of a unit in Cotonou. Glélé and a former supporter of Maga, Capt. Pierre Boni agreed to go along with Kouandété's plan to assassinate de Souza but their real aim was to eliminate Kouandété (who merely wanted to be head of state) and bring back Dr. Zinsou. Whether or not Zinsou was brought into their plans is unknown, but his brother René was involved.

However, due to the confusion of events, rumours were rife that Maga was behind the coup attempt in order to stay in power. These rumours were given substance by the fact that several of Maga's bodyguards were among the assassination squad members and that Maga was scheduled to leave for France on that day and thus out of sight of accusers. The rumours were spread about by Ahomadegbe, who was due

to take over Maga's position. His supporters, the Groupements de
Vigilance Républicains (GVR), better known as the Groupements des
Voyous Retrouvés, were busy propagating these ideas. Moreover, the
delay in bringing the twenty-two accused soldiers to court-martial as
well as the two accused civilians, Adrien Glélé and René Zinsou to trial
gave rise to speculation that Maga did not intend to give up his
presidential post. Nonetheless, Maga was very concerned to assert his
intention to step down and even went north to quell disturbances there and
in fact did hand power over to Ahomadegbe on May 7, 1972.

Now that Ahomadegbe has taken over as president of the
Presidential Commission, many are pointing to a probable change in the
character of the commission's proposals. Maga was reportedly a bland
personality and took care not to offend the other members of the
Commission. On the other hand, Ahomadegbe is known to be abrasive in
his approach. There may be moments of stalemate if Maga and Apithy
veto his proposals. Meanwhile, the military appears to be too divided
to act as a unit to promote the interests of any one section or politician.
De Souza appears to be a force behind the maintenance of the Presidential
Commission arrangement. Whether or not the stability of political
activity can continue depends to a large extent on the economic and
financial conditions in Dahomey and on how successful the triumvirate
arrangement can restrain and constrain the individual ambitions of the
politicians.

(2) In May 1972, several of the military plotters were
sentenced to death, including Lt. Col. Kouandété and Capt. Lucien Glélé.
The trial of Adrien Glélé and René Zinsou was repeatedly postponed when
the civilian magistrates refused to hear the case until given
reassurances that the sentences would be served.
Upper Volta

Political activity has been banned in Upper Volta after the Koudougou riots in December 1966. From that time until the ban was lifted in late 1969, civilian political activity remained underground. Party leaders were, however, called together to advise the junta on specific political issues (e.g. the trial of Yameogo). During 1968, the military set several dates for the return to civilian political activity, but it was not until rumours began to circulate that the army intended to stay in power until 1972, that Lamizana officially lifted the ban. Lamizana hoped that this would allow sufficient time for the political parties to organize before the announced election date of late 1970. He wanted to avoid a "campaign atmosphere". Military missions were sent throughout the country to explain why the army was allowing the resumption of political party activity. Lamizana stated: "This is when we are inviting all citizens not to systematically return such and such a politician for tribalist and regional reasons." (2)

Several political parties emerged after the ban was lifted. The Union Démocratique Voltaique–Assemblage Démocratique Africain (UDV-RDA) was the strongest and best organized. The conservative UDV-RDA, with its power base in the Bobo-Dioulasso region and among the Mossi, claimed 80 per cent of the electorate.

(1) Chronologie Politique Africaine (September–October, 1969), p. 27.
La plupart des cadres de l'UDV-RDA etaient restes en place dans l'administration du pays, ce qui donnait un avantage considerable a leur parti. Le soutien des partis freres RDA des pays africains voisins a ete important ainsi que celui des chefferies et en particulier celui de 'l'empereur des Mossi'.

The president of the UDV-RDA was Gerard Ouédraogo. A veteran politician and long time opponent of Yameogo, he was then serving the military administration as a senior official in the Foreign Ministry. The party's General Secretary was Joseph Ouédraogo, a former Minister and trade union leader.

The Mouvement de la Liberation Nationale (MLN) was the chief rival of the UDV-RDA. It was a socialist party calling for a "neutralism positif". Its supporters were mainly young Paris-trained intellectuals and although it had begun an energetic campaign to broaden its base of support, it found little following among the peasantry. Joseph Ki-Zerbo, a leading academic and Minister of Education from 1965 to 1969 was its leader. Another prominent member of the MLN was Pierre Damiba who had served as Minister of Planning under the military regime.

The Parti Républicain Africain (PRA) under the leadership of Dr Diongold Traore had a small pocket of support in the east, but its largest base of support was found in the western regions. The Groupement d’Action Populaire (GAP) was lead by Dr Siue Nouhou, and was formed from splinter fractions of the UDV-RDA.

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(2) ibid
As the political parties began to organize their support, the junta began to work on a draft constitution. A Consultative Committee was appointed by the junta to advise and submit a draft constitution to the public for a general referendum. The Committee of fifty was made up of twenty from the rural areas, two from women's associations, three from industry and commerce, four ex-servicemen, five from the trade unions, two chiefs, three from regional bodies and five from the army.\(^1\) In May 1970, Lamizana submitted a draft constitution to this body which would have given a preponderant role to the military. The proposed constitution stipulated that the President must be a member of the armed forces chosen by the officers for an unspecified duration. Although the Prime Minister could be a civilian, the army was guaranteed representation in the nation's political life. This was interpreted by the trade unions, political parties, and traditional chiefs as a betrayal of the long-standing promise of a return to civilian rule.

Two factors were involved in the military's move to block a civilian government from achieving complete political power.\(^2\)

First, the army wanted assurances that the country would not return to the previous disastrous state. There was no hint that the political factions were any closer to co-operation at that time than they had been in 1965. The MLN's leader, Ki-Zerbo, was being challenged

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by the young leftist intellectuals. The GAP and the PRA were on opposite ends of the political spectrum and did not constitute a major rival to the UDV-RDA. However, the UDV-RDA was troubled over questions of leadership. The military feared that a constitution allowing for a civilian President would lead to an UDV-RDA man, but to achieve that the UDV-RDA would need to agree on a single candidate. If the accord was narrow, the government would be fragile. This, the junta reasoned, would lead to a slackening of economic controls and the reappearance of instability. Secondly, as we stated in Chapter III, in spite of the degree of cohesion maintained in the military, certain young officers had acquired a taste for power. The strong hierarchy and internal discipline of the army would end if these officers were given a chance to embark on adventures to serve their own ends. Laizana felt it better to promote the best qualified officers himself into the political posts stipulated by the constitution as reserved for the military.

There were arguments against this proposed constitution. The chiefs, who had earlier threatened to form their own political party if they were not granted the respect they felt their due, wanted an hereditary Senate. The UDV-RDA, who had the strongest possibility of winning the elections, now saw success slipping through their fingers. However, both the MLN and the youth saw advantages in the proposed military President. The MLN considered the military government as a less conservative force than the UDV-RDA and the
young favoured the army for the same reasons. Finally, there were those who did not want Ki-Zerbo of the MLN to become Prime Minister because he was not a Mossi and came from the same village as Lamisana.

The military maintained that the role of a military President would be one of conciliation, independent of political parties. Lamisana had emphasized the neutrality of the military throughout his rule. He stated in an interview, "the army has to be neutral, above party politics. It cannot constitute a political group. There is a spirit of absolute neutrality among all the men of the army". Whether or not this was totally accurate, Lamisana believed that the participation of the military in the civilian government would "strengthen the guarantee of this conciliation indispensable during the transitional period".

Nonetheless, public criticism of the proposed constitution was vehement enough to force the military to make drastic modifications of their proposals. The only original provisions concerning the military's relationship with the civilian government remaining in the revised constitution were that the head of the army would serve as President for four years only and one-third of the government posts would be filled by military men during that time. The Constitution called for the election of the members of the National Assembly for five years by universal suffrage. The National Assembly

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(2) African Review (July, 1970) p.6
would then elect a Prime Minister who would appoint and dismiss members of the Cabinet with the approval of the President. (1) The political parties endorsed the final draft of the Constitution in spite of some theoretical differences of opinion. As Gerard Ouédraogo of the UDV-RDA stated:

We have endorsed the constitution but with the proviso that the military government pulls the army back into the barracks as soon as possible and fulfills its pledge given last November to hand over to civilians by the end of 1970. (2)

The draft constitution was submitted to a national referendum in June 1970. With the backing of the political parties, the vote was overwhelmingly in favour of the constitution. 99.74 per cent of the registered voters participated with 98.41 per cent in favour and only 1.59 per cent voting "non". Garango, the Minister of Finance stated:

La Haute Volta a choisi une politique de 'continuité et ouverture' en approuvant massivement le référendum du 14 juin 1970, voyant le retour à un régime constitutionnel. (3)

According to the new constitution, elections for the National Assembly were to be held within six months. The elections were held on December 20, 1970 under the supervision of the Ministry of Security and Interior. Over 95 per cent of the registered voters participated. (4) The results were as follows:

(1) Financial Times (August 6, 1970)
(2) West Africa (October, 24, 1970)
(4) Afrique Contemporaine (1971), No. 53, p. 16.
Those elected under the UDV-RDA banner included Commandant Daouda Traore, Minister of Interior and Security, Joseph Ou draogo, the old mayor of Ouagadougou and head of the party, Joseph Conombo, another ex-mayor of Ouagadougou, and Maleck Zonome, the current minister of Foreign Affairs. The PRA deputies included the Minister of Youth and Sports, Moise Tankanade. The MLN deputies included Ki-Zerbo, and Pierre Damiba, Minister of Planning. It was an overall success for the UDV-RDA; the independent candidates had little success except in the Kaya zone.

There were several reasons for the UDV-RDA victory. First, the party had strong links with the rural chiefs in a country in which 90 per cent of the population is in the rural areas and maintain a strong allegiance to traditional rulers. Many of the UDV-RDA men were linked to the royal families (eg. Joseph Ou draogo was related to the king of the Mossi kingdom of Yatenga) and fourteen customary chiefs were successful UDV-RDA candidates for the National Assembly. On the other hand, the MLN committed political suicide in the rural areas by campaigning against the traditional rulers.

Secondly, the RDA branded the MLN as likely to instigate a Keita type socialism. This went down badly in the border areas where trade had suffered during the Keita era in Mali and which had been influenced by the economic refugees from Mali. The MLN was described in Mossi as 'ko-tid-ri' or 'grow your harvest so we can share it'. This was a direct allusion to Mali co-operatives where peasants had stood in line for handouts.

Thirdly, the opposition parties were split. The young leftists considered their leaders to be members of the bourgeoisie and overcome by religious myths. The official MLN policy was to tone down allusions to scientific socialism and refer instead to Voltaic socialism. Also, compared to the UDV-RDA candidates who had been involved in political activity for years, the MLN candidates were not well known. The other opposition party, the PRA, was also divided, partly over the issue of whether or not to merge with the MLN. Its old leader, Nazi Boni, who had been able to cover over the internal cracks, had been killed in an auto accident in 1968.

The opposition's major attack on the UDV-RDA was that it was the party overthrown in 1966. The UDV-RDA countered by claiming that the former malpractices had been the work of a single man, Yameogo, who was not allowed to run for political office. The complete victory of the party in Koudougou, the home of Yameogo, showed that this explanation had been accepted.
Thus, the UDV-RDA had a clear advantage. It also benefitted from the divisiveness of the opposition. Moreover, it was likely that the independent deputies would join its ranks, particularly since they were largely former UDV-RDA members. When the government was formed two months later, Gerard Ouedraogo of the UDV-RDA became the Prime Minister. He won forty-seven of the fifty-seven votes with ten abstentions.\(^1\) Eight of the fifteen members of the cabinet were also UDV-RDA members. The appointment of two PRA members to the Cabinet pointed to a UDV-PRA coalition. With five of the deputies military officers in accordance to the constitution, the six MNL members are the only opposition in the National Assembly.\(^2\)

Upper Volta is presently governed by a quasi-civilianized regime with Lamizana serving as President until 1974 in accordance with the constitution. Although the military maintains a constitutionally sanctioned role in the government, we are still able to discuss the process of recivilization with reference to the three pre-conditions. First, is the junta in Upper Volta willing to abdicate the power it has enjoyed over the past six years? The military, as of yet, is not willing to withdraw completely from the political life of Upper Volta. There appears to be no motive of personal ambition on the part of Lamizana (indeed he is held in great esteem in the country) and there are only minor signs of

\(^1\) *West Africa* (February 20, 1971). p.232.

\(^2\) *ibid.*, p.215.
partisanship among sections of the army. Moreover, Lamizana has repeatedly stated that the military presence in the new Government is to rid the transitional process by acting as national arbiter. How willing he will be to give up this position is open to question.

Secondly, the military has attempted to restructure the civilian government to insure that it would be acceptable to the military. The first constitutional proposals drawn up by the junta allowed for wide powers of the military in the government. This was later modified to grant the military transitional status in the present government.

In relation to the above two points, we should note the difficulties arising from a transitional civil-military regime. There has been comment that the transitional phase has gone on too long as conflicts have arisen between the military and civilian members of the cabinet. The soldiers want the government to run efficiently and thus have little patience with the endless debates among the politicians. The crunch came earlier this year over the cabinet debate over the budget. Two items on the budget caused a split to develop between the civilian and military cabinet members: the allocation of defence funds and the payment of salaries to traditional chiefs. The civilians wanted to cut defense expenditure and to increase the chiefs' salaries. Yameogo had stopped payment to traditional rulers, but the military junta had reinstated their salaries by 50 per cent and felt the remainder should be made up by local contributions. Therefore, the military ministers opposed the increase of chiefs' salaries as well as the cut in the defence allocation. The matter was discussed during the cabinet meeting
and the military assumed the issue closed. However, when the budget was presented to the National Assembly, the items remained unchanged and were adopted. This resulted in the walk out by the military cabinet ministers who refused to meet again with the civilians.\(^1\) At the time of writing, this problem, which the military now considers a matter of principle, remains unsolved. It points out the difficulty of a transitional period.

Added to these problems, the conditions leading to the original military coup have not been completely eradicated. There are several problems remaining. First, what will be the future of a viable opposition in the National Assembly? With the UDV-RDA and PRA coalition, the MLN appears to have a difficult task in remaining an effective political party. Secondly, there is also trouble growing between the government and the National Assembly. Since the deputies receive no salary for their attendance in the National Assembly, they feel they should be more independent and active in controlling the executive. There is, moreover, a rivalry between the President of the National Assembly and Secretary-General of the UDV-RDA, Joseph Oudraogo, and the Prime Minister and President of the UDV-RDA, Gerard Oudraogo. The Prime Minister wants to preserve his power in the UDV-RDA. Unlike Joseph Oudraogo, he comes from a remote area of Upper Volta and has few supporters in Ougadougou, so he must satisfy the National Assembly in order to keep his power. However, he must also satisfy the military as he is ultimately responsible to Lamizana. His task is unpracticable and he has had serious difficulties.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) *West Africa* (February 25, 1972), p. 216.

Upper Volta is economic. The junta has introduced a measure of financial health in Upper Volta and has generated a degree of economic activity, particularly in agriculture. This has been accomplished through the able management of the Minister of Finance, Marc Garango, and considerable goodwill and aid from foreign nations. However, in spite of massive efforts to rescue Upper Volta from destitution, the country remains one of the poorest in the world.

In summary, we have seen that the possibility of military disengagement from overt political control comes through the culmination of three conditions. First, there was a disintegration of the original coup-makers. Secondly, there was growing dissent within the army organisation. Thirdly, it was increasingly obvious that the military regime was unable to deal with the problems of a developing nation. These three phenomena were evident in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and less so in Upper Volta. The stability brought on by the shock effect of military action against the former regime soon deteriorated. However, before the juntas did withdraw from overt political control, three pre-conditions were to be satisfied. First, the armies must be willing to withdraw. In Ghana, the NLC repeatedly asserted its desire to leave the political scene in spite of the cautious approach to the return to civilian rule. In Sierra Leone, Juxson-Smith and his junta were not willing to leave political office, and it was not until the Warrant Officers overthrew the NRC that the soldiers moved out of political control. The earlier juntas of Soglo in Dahomey were
basically interim governments. Later the military was firmly entrenched in the political life of Dahomey and changes of regime were effected largely through internal military feuds. Only after the threat of civil war did the army leave the political scene to the civilians. In Upper Volta, where the military government has been the most acceptable to the civilian population, there has been much caution and delay in the return to civilian rule which is still incomplete.

Secondly, the successor regime must be acceptable to the military. Here the juntas have been openly manipulative in the formation of the civilian regimes. In the case of Ghana, the NLC promoted Busia through the Centre for Civic Education, the Political Committee, etc.; directed the compilation of the new Constitution; and insisted on retaining a constitutionally sanctioned role in the successor regime via the Presidential Triumvirate. In Sierra Leone, the NRC, in spite of the findings of the Dove-Edwin Commission that the APC had justly won the 1967 General Election, refused to hand over power to a non-SLPP government. The Warrant Officers did return power to Siaka Stevens as they had been promised benefits from an APC government. In Dahomey, the various juntas worked both subtly and in a more open fashion to shape the civilian regimes. For example, Soglo was instrumental in drawing up the 1964 Constitution, later to be known as the Soglo Constitution. The jeunes cadres under the leadership of Kouandété eliminated the old politicians and hand-picked acceptable candidates for the 1968 elections. When this policy lead to the election boycott, the junta itself appointed Zinsou to form the new civilian regime. Lamizana
of Upper Volta has guided the transition to civilian rule while the military continues to play an official role in the governing of the country. Therefore, in all four cases, the military governments have carefully directed the process of re-civilianization. It has felt it necessary in order to protect itself from reprisals if friends of the ousted regime regained power and in order to retain a preponderant voice in the successor government thereby guaranteeing the army’s privileged position.

The final pre-condition for the re-civilianization of politics is the creation of a civilian regime viable without the support of the military. At first glance, it would appear that this condition has not been met in these four countries and that the civilian governments set up by the departing military juntas have been in fact allowed to rule only by courtesy of the military. Ghana, with deteriorating economic conditions and the lack of an effective opposition party in Parliament, once again fell to military rule in early 1972. Sierra Leone remains under a State of Emergency while Stevens relies on the army of neighbouring Guinea to bolster his position and to counter-balance the dissident forces within the country and the army. Dahomey, quiet for the past years after reaching the brink of civil war, was able to achieve its first constitutional change of government in May 1972 although this was accompanied by a final abortive coup d'état. Upper Volta is presently governed by a quasi-civilianized government and there is evidence of a growing divergence of the military and civilian members of government under the transitional set-up. We see, therefore, that
the period of military rule did not solve the problem which had led to military intervention in the first place. There still remains the question of creating viable political institutions which command the effective support of the population. As long as the pre-conditions of the original coup remain, there is a greater probability that the military, given the final precipitant, will intervene once again.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Military intervention has become a common feature in many new African states. In order to study this phenomenon, we have chosen to examine the role of the armed forces in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta in view of three separate, but inter-related areas of questioning we proposed in the introductory chapter. First, were there characteristics common to all developing nations which increase the probability of military intervention? If so, what were the final precipitants contributing to the coups? In Chapter II, we found a basic pattern of economic, social, and political problems which appeared common to these nations and which brought the military to the forefront in the political arena. However, we also noted that there were final motives behind the military usurpation, motives which were often identified as being the self-interest of the military or sections of the military. Secondly, once the military has taken over political control, were there specific properties of the military organization in these four states which either aided or limited the junta's ability to govern? In Chapter III, we considered three areas of problems facing the military governments which stem not only from the character of the military apparatus but also the economic, social, and political environment in which it operated. These included the lack of legitimacy of the military government, the lack of administrative abilities, and the presence of internal dissent within the armed forces. We discussed
incidences of each and the methods deployed by the junta in attempting to overcome these problems. We also used the discussion of the military's economic policies as a gauge to measure the strategic contribution of the military government to economic development. As we noted, the military's record was hardly impressive. Finally, why did the military government choose to withdraw from overt political control? What conditions were set before the armed forces finally returned to their barracks? In Chapter V, we saw that the military moved toward re-civilianization as it was increasingly obvious that the junta could not overcome the problems inherent in military governments. However, in all four states the juntas attempted to direct the return of civilian rule along lines the military felt suitable in order to protect its privileged status.

This thesis discussed the above questions. We have noted that except for specific characteristics, the record of the military governments in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey followed a basic pattern: in no case was the military able to provide leadership for the development of these states. However, Upper Volta appeared to be the exception in most cases. We proposed that a primary reason for this was the social, economic and political milieu of Upper Volta. Of the four states here, Upper Volta appeared to have the lowest level of development of the "modern" sector. The social structure remains largely traditional. The Mossi Emperor maintains a strong influence over a large percentage of the population with the Bobo as the only other major tribal grouping. Its economy, based on the export of cattle and migrant workers, was relatively undifferentiated and, as a result, there are few new groups based on
new forms of economic activity. Apart from a small but active trade union movement, there were few groups actively engaged in politics and making demands upon the central authorities. The army in such a state played a progressive role as in Upper Volta while in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey, the army's limited political abilities were over-extended.

However, it is appropriate here to note other factors which would have had an effect on the role of the junta in Upper Volta. One, the army there has a long tradition of military discipline and hard work. This derives from the military tradition of the Mossi and, more recently, from the fact that this area was a major reservoir for recruitment into the French army. Thus, the Voltaic army has maintained a higher degree of cohesion throughout its role as government than in the other three case studies. Moreover, although the army is small, there is a large association of veterans who carry considerable influence, particularly in the rural areas. Secondly, events surrounding the coup of 1966 gave the army a certain amount of moral authority. Not only was the army called to power by the trade unions but Yameogo also offered to step down in favour of the military. Thirdly, the armed forces transferred itself intact to politics. Lamizana, as head of the army, simply became President while there was no exile of potential rivals within the military. Finally, and perhaps of greatest note, has been the personalities involved. Lamizana, insisting on neutrality of the military, has exhibited no personal ambition. Furthermore, Marc Garango, Minister of Finance, has led the economic recovery of Upper Volta with considerable results. Perhaps for this reason, the military government in Upper Volta was
accepted with the most grace of all states examined here although there appear now to be difficulties developing between the military and civilian members of government under the transitional system.

Before we conclude, one final question remains. What are the benefits of military government in West Africa? First, it is often held that military intervention was desirable in that it prevented the total break-down of the state. When military activity is a result of a high incidence of social conflict, particularly among the politically active groups, the military coup curtails other forms of direct action techniques (e.g. the riot, the demonstration, the strike) by removing the object of these activities, the civilian regime. Thus, there is short-term stability in the political system. However, we have seen that this stability is not maintained by the military governments. The juntas, limited in their political skills, were soon faced with opposition not only from the civilian population but also from within the military organization.

A second rationalization of military rule is that military governments create greater material prosperity. It is true that the juntas acted to prevent the total collapse of the economy; the coup was a shock-action which allowed for the re-scheduling of debts, the introduction of strict austerity measures, and so forth. However, except for the case of Upper Volta, the military was able to do little more than place the economy on a "care and maintenance" basis. After this, the economy stagnated. Moreover, in these states, the military

(1) S.E. Finer, Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp 242-243,
governments tended to favour Western capitalist investment and markets, thus perpetuating many of the problems besetting the financial and economic structure of West African states. It has been suggested that this was a manifestation of the identification that St. Cyr and Sandhurst-trained African officers felt with their counter-parts in France and Great Britain. Beyond the impact of prior training on the military leaders' economic policies, there also existed a wide range of political and societal factors such as class and group interest (particularly in maintaining the privileges of the military) and ethnic and regional cleavages which influenced the relationship of the military to the economic system. And, as we saw in Chapter IV, the military's economic policies were generally ineffective in dealing with the problems of economic development.

A third justification of military coups is that the army provided an ideal modernizing agent in these states. Thus we find the proposition that since armies are often the most Westernized, achievement oriented, rational organizations in developing states, the military would become the dynamic centre for demanding change. Once again, however, we have shown that the armies in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and to a lesser extent, Upper Volta, have been limited in giving direction to social, economic, and political development both by their own characteristics and by the circumstances in which they operated. The record of the military governments in West Africa as a modernizing force is hardly impressive.

It has been suggested, however, that the creation of a national armed service in which all males would serve would provide a modernizing force in new nations. As Montesquieu wrote, the ability to direct military operations and the talent for government evolve at the same time in a people's history;¹ both are manifestations of a common will to maintain unity. Rapaport proposed a similar argument: "the sustaining sentiment of a military force has much in common with that which cements any group of men engaged in politics - the willingness of most individuals to bride private or personal impulses for the sake of general social objectives."² In the army, the quest for unity is regarded as an effort to instill respect for authority by a refined system of supra and sub-ordination, leadership, and obedience. In the state, the law performs the same unifying function as does discipline in the army. In short, "if it is possible to teach a man to be a good soldier, he can also be taught to be a good citizen."³ However, when the "Nation-in-Arms" hypothesis is applied to the African situation, its short-comings are apparent. It is difficult to envisage the armies of tropical Africa in terms of Mao's People's Liberation Army on two counts: first, the overthrow of the colonial regimes was accomplished through nationalist political parties, not armed combat; secondly,

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(2) ibid., p.79.
(3) ibid., p.80.
the armed forces of these states were regarded as representatives of the colonial power. Moreover,

few states could afford to create a national service which required each citizen to enrol in a disciplined organization, notably because of the heavy costs involved in making it nation-wide; but also because of the risks such an organization might bring to the delicate balance of the political system.1

So far, with the possible exception of Guinea and Tanzania, the majority of African states have refrained from experimenting with the idea of a people's army. Oddly enough, the Republic of Liberia successfully organized a people's militia to forestall foreign intervention as early as 1909. In general, however, the Nation-in-Arms has little validity to the states under examination here.

Returning to our final question, even if it could be shown that the military control of a nation did offer short-term benefits, one overriding consideration must be voiced. Are not the short-term benefits overbalanced by a long-term catastrophe? As we stated at the outset, in these states experiencing military rule the political institutions were not able to answer the demands nor retain the support of the politically active sectors of the population. This set the scene for the original military usurpation. Furthermore, once the military has intervened, the potential development of these institutions is jeopardized. We may, unfortunately, see the institutionalization of the coup d'etat and other forms of military blackmail in West Africa. In an

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indefinite period of time, the political development of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta may be subject to the threat of military interference. As in Yeat's "Second Coming",

"the falcon cannot hear the Falconer."


II ARTICLES


III GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

**A New Era in Ghana.** Accra: State Publishing Corporation.


IV. JOURNALS


Africa Confidential (1966-1970)


Africa Quarterly (1966-1969)


Chronologie Politique Africaine (1963-1971)


Jeune Afrique (1963-1971)


L'Année Africaine (1966-1970)

Legon Observer (1966-1970)

Sierra Leone Trade Journal (1966-1969)

The Parliamentarian (1967)

Transition (1966-1971)

Venture (1966-1969)

West Africa (1963-1972)
V. NEWSPAPERS

Le Monde

The Daily Mail (Freetown)

The Financial Times

The Observer

The New York Times

The Sunday Times

The Times

The Washington Post

VI. MISCELLANEOUS


APPENDIX 1

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS

October 28, 1963: Soglo seizes political control from Maga in Dahomey.


November 19, 1965: Soglo seizes political power in Dahomey and appoints Congacou as head of state.

December 22, 1965: Soglo seizes complete political power in Dahomey.

January 3, 1966: Lamizana seizes political control in Upper Volta.

February 24, 1966: Military seizes political power from Nkrumah in Ghana and establishes NRC.

December 1966: Political activity suspended in Upper Volta following Koudougou riots.

March 21, 1967: Lansana seizes political power in Sierra Leone following General Elections.

March 23, 1967: Majors Blake, Kai-Samba, and Jumu seize political power from Lansana and establish NRC.


December 17, 1967: Kouandété seizes political power from Soglo in Dahomey.

December 21, 1967: Alley chosen to head military junta in Dahomey.

April 18, 1968: NCO's and Warrant Officers seize political power from NRC in Sierra Leone and establish NIC.
April 26, 1968: Siaka Stevens appointed as Prime Minister and Sierra Leone returns to civilian rule.

July 17, 1968: Zinsou appointed President in Dahomey following boycott of elections on May 5th.


July 31, 1968: CRM dissolves itself and Dahomey returns to civilian rule.

August 22, 1969: Constitution ratified in Ghana with stipulation for 3-man military president.

September 3, 1969: Busia inaugurated as President and Ghana returns to civilian rule.

December 8, 1969: Kouandjité seizes political power from Zinsou and de Souza chosen to lead military junta in Dahomey.


May 7, 1970: Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga form Presidential Commission in Dahomey with Maga as Chairman for two years.

June 14, 1970: Draft constitutions stipulating transitional military president endorsed by referendum in Upper Volta.

August 1970: Edward Akufo-Addo chosen President in Ghana following dissolution of Military Troika.

March 1971: Guinean troops called in to support Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone after alleged coup attempt.

April 19, 1971: Sierra Leone declared a republic with Siaka Stevens in position of a strong presidency.
January 13, 1972: Military seize power from Busia in Ghana.

February 1972: Attempted coup led by Kouandété in Dahomey.

May 13, 1972: Ahomadegbe takes position as Chairman of Presidential Commission in Dahomey.
## APPENDIX 2

### ABBREVIATIONS

**Ghana:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALRP</td>
<td>All People's Republican Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Convention People's Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADECO</td>
<td>National Development Corporation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAL</td>
<td>National Alliance of Liberals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Liberation Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>People's Action Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Progressive Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNP</td>
<td>United Nationalist Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sierra Leone:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>All People Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Interim Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Reformation Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLPMB</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLPP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone People's Party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dahomey:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CNV</td>
<td>Comité Militaire de Vigilence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRM</td>
<td>Comité Révolutionnaire Militaire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRN</td>
<td>Comité Rénovation Nationale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Parti Démocratique Dahoméen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDU</td>
<td>Parti Dahoméen l'Unité.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>Parti National Unique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Parti Républicain du Dahomey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RDD  - Rassemblement Démocratique Dahomeen.
UDD  - Union Démocratique Dahomeenne
UGTD - Union Générale de Travailleurs Dahomeens.

J.A.C. - Joint Action Committee.
MLN  - Mouvement de la Libération Nationale.
PDU  - Parti Démocratique Unifié.
Pnv  - Parti National Valtaique.
PRA  - Parti Républicain Africain
PRL  - Parti Républicaine de la Liberte.
SOVOLCOM - Société d'Economie Mixte.
UDV  - RDA - Union Démocratique Voltaique -
    Rassemblement Démocratique Africain.