HERDER'S CONTRIBUTION
to the
ROMANTIC PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
with special reference to
the
THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
by
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PREFACE

The present study is an enquiry into the philosophy of history and the implied and underlying theology of Herder, in its relationship to the philosophy of history and the theology of Romanticism. The concern of the work is not so much with the historical contacts of Herder with the Romantics - these are summarised briefly in an appendix - but rather with the inter-relationship of thought which may be traced. The aim is to determine to what extent the leading concepts of Herder passed over into the Romantic mind, and to show how with the Romantics they were counterbalanced and transformed as a result of other influences.

For the purpose of this enquiry the word Romanticism is used, not in the general sense of the whole European, or even of the whole German Romantic Movement, although many of the ideas discussed were common to the movement in this wider sense, but in the narrow and restricted sense of that German philosophical Romanticism usually known as the first German Romantic school, or the 'Berliner Romantik'. The main writers investigated are; of the leading members of the school, the literary critic Friedrich Schlegel, the poet Novalis, the philosopher Schelling and the theologian Schleiermacher; of those standing in a looser relationship to the group, the philosopher Fichte, in close touch during the Jena years and exertor of a powerful influence, the philosopher Hegel, whose youthful development was closely akin to that of the Romantics, and the poet Hölderlin, a fellow-student with Hegel and Schelling, whose thinking ran in many respects along parallel lines.

The method adopted in the enquiry is that of a critical
examination, in which the writers are set against the background of contemporary thought. In an Introduction the setting of Herder's philosophy, and the particular influences which helped to form and to shape it are discussed in three chapters. The first of these is devoted to a general sketch of thought in Germany in the later XVIII century; the second to a more detailed consideration of the philosophical influences brought to bear upon Herder; the third to a similar consideration of the aesthetic and religious influences.

The First Part which follows is an examination of the philosophy of history and the theology of Herder himself under three divisions: the first principles; the historico-philosophical concepts; the theology. To each division a chapter is devoted and each chapter is itself sub-divided according to the particular topics discussed. In the case of each topic a necessarily short attempt has been made to trace the development of the concept through the three thought-stages of Herder's life, stages which correspond roughly to the Riga, Bückeburg and Weimar periods. The main stress has been laid upon the final form assumed, but not at the expense of the more orthodox thinking at Bückeburg. The aim has been to present the thought of Herder as something living, developing, fluid, not as a fixed, abstract, dogmatic system. The progression in this Part is from the particular principles, through the leading concepts, to the final, and in reality the underlying and everywhere presupposed theological Weltanschauung.

In the Second Part a similar examination is made of the Romantic philosophies along the lines suggested by the exposition of that of Herder. The first chapter is a detailed consideration of the relationship of history to nature, or of naturalistic to ideal-
istic principles in Romantic thought; the second an enquiry into the main ideas in the Romantic philosophy of history, especially as concerning the Romantic view of progress and the triadic process; the third a discussion of the theological outlook of Romanticism, a discussion in which the work of Schleiermacher commands particular attention, but in which an attempt is made to penetrate to the underlying Weltanschauung of all the Romantic writers. Throughout this part the Romantics have, in view of the individual variations of thought, been treated separately and successively rather than as a school, although the interdependence in thought has everywhere been recognised. The order of treatment has been, first, the philosophers Fichte and Hegel, who stood outside the main trend, then Hölderlin, and finally and in greater fulness the leading Romantic thinkers themselves.

Finally, in the Conclusion, the various elements in Romantic thought are isolated, and an assessment of the indirect and direct contribution of Herder, in relation to that of other thinkers, is made. In the closing paragraph a comprehensive glance is cast upon the movement of German thought throughout the century, with a final statement of Herder's place within it. There is no attempt to estimate the ultimate value of any of the ideas discussed, nor are personal opinions expressed or judgments passed.

In all sections of the study copious use had been made of quotations from original sources, with the object of presenting ideas as exactly as possible in the words of the thinkers themselves, and also of bringing out the many close verbal resemblances, which point towards a direct contact of one thinker with another. The sentences quoted are in the majority of cases representative of whole
passages, to which the reference is often made. In a few cases, especially in quotations from the wordy Bückeburg writings, there has been some conflation, but care has been taken not to introduce essential words not found in the text, and to indicate the interposition of connecting words by the use of brackets. The spelling of the editions quoted has been retained.

Acknowledgements are due to Professor John Baillie of New College, who suggested and supervised the enquiry; to Professor Burleigh of New College for suggestions and criticisms in the development of it; to the staff of New College Library for their willing cooperation; to the staff of the Edinburgh University Library, through whose services many books not otherwise available were secured; finally to Mr. J. Stander M.A. for assistance in the correction of the typescript.

Edinburgh March 1943
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<td>H.R.S.</td>
<td>Haym: Die Romantische Schule</td>
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| M. (I-II)    | Friedrich Schlegel: Seine prosaischen Jugend- 
|              | schriften (Minor) |
| M.P.u.G.     | Herder: Sämtliche Werke (Müller) Zur Philosophie und Geschichte |
| M.R.u.T.     | Herder: Sämtliche Werke (Müller) Zur Religion und Theologie |
| N.S. (I-IV)  | Novalis: Schriften (Minor) |
|              | III S.H. Aus den Studienheften |
|              | III v.B. Aus der Nachlese von Bülow |
| S. (I f.)    | Herder: Sämtliche Werke (Suphan) |
| S.W.         | Sämtliche Werke (e.g. Fichte S.W.) |
| S.S.W. (I, I f.) Schelling: Sämtliche Werke |
| W.A.         | August Wilhelm und Friedrich Schlegel in Auswahl (Walzel) |
INTRODUCTION

THE FORMATION OF HERDER'S THOUGHT

In Germany and in Europe as a whole there were three main thought-systems at that period, each of which yet to leave its mark on Herder. For the purposes of this essay I shall it will be necessary occasionally to separate and characterise these movements. But, when this is rightly observed, in the century itself they were essentially interpenetrating one the other, the older characterised essentially German thoughts in this age being affirmative.

One of these three systems the most outstanding in the eighteenth century was the Rationalism which at the time of Adam's university there had completely overwhelmed the older Protestantism and established itself hand upon almost all the philosophical and theological schools in the country. For example, one may be traced back primarily to Descartes, who, with his principle "Cogito, ergo sum", had stood in much reason the
CHAPTER I  THE BACKGROUND OF THOUGHT OF HERDER'S AGE

J.G. Herder was born in the year 1744, just about the middle of the XVIII century. His early years were lived at a time when the main intellectual forces of the age had already emerged and were beginning to take definite form. His childhood was spent in isolation in the small village of Mohrungen (in East Prussia), but by 1762 he had arrived in Königsberg, which, in spite of its northerly situation, was well in the main stream of German and European thought - Hamann, Lenz, Kant and Herder himself were all destined to play important roles.

In Germany and in Europe as a whole there were three main thought-streams at that period, each of which was to leave its mark upon Herder. For the purposes of this exposition it will be necessary rigidly to separate and characterise these movements, but, as Hibben has rightly observed, in the century itself they were constantly intercrossing the one the other,1 the chief characteristic of (especially German) thought in this age being eclecticism.2

Now of these three movements the most outstanding in the middle of the century was the Rationalistic, which at the time of Herder's university years had completely overwhelmed the older Protestant scholasticism and established a firm hold upon almost all the philosophical and theological schools in the country. Rationalism may be traced back primarily to Descartes, who, with his famous formula 'Cogito, ergo sum',3 had found in human reason the

1 J.G.Hibben: The Philosophy of the Enlightenment Chapter I
2 R.Unger: Hamann und die Aufklärung pp.54 ff.
3 Descartes: Discours de la Méthode 4e Partie
one certain and absolute factor in life; but in Germany it was
Leibniz, with his conception of the universe as a monadic series,
in which man occupied a high place as a rational creature, capable
of clear perception,¹ who instituted the rationalistic revolt. The
form, however, in which Rationalism gained its ascendancy was that
impressed upon it by the populariser and systematiser of Leibniz,
J.C.Wolff, by whom the whole complex of knowledge was comprised
within one system, in which the rational sciences were carefully
distinguished from the empirical, and given an a priori validity.

In the Wolffian form, Rationalism, although it revolted
against the Protestant Scholasticism, was not unorthodox: indeed
it became the orthodoxy against which the Aufklärung proper and the
Poetic movement were to react. Wolffian Rationalism established
a natural religion of reason, but super-imposed upon it the truths
of revelation which reason alone could not discover. Aner has made
the position clear when he asserts that it acknowledged revelation,
but claimed also

das Recht der Vernunft mit zu sprechen.²

It was a theology along these lines which, developed by such men as
Canz, Köthen, Carpov, Neumeister, Reusch and Rambach,³ was
taught in the theological schools in the middle of the century.
In ethics, the utilitarianism of a Spalding;⁴ in jurisprudence, the
views of a Pufendorf; in literature, the dogmatisings of a Gottsched
all were developments in particular fields of the Wolffian system.

¹ Leibniz: Monadology Sctn.29
² K.Aner: Die Theologie der Lessingzeit pp.2-3
³ B.Pünjer: History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion
   pp.530-532
⁴ Spalding: Ueber die Nutzbarkeit des Predigeramts; a book
   which roused Herder to protest (3.VII pp.289 ff.)
Rationalism, however, could not stop at this point, and by
the middle of the century two further steps had been made, the one
in theology, the Neology, and the other in philosophy, the Auf-
klärung. The Neology, thoroughly treated by Aner,\footnote{Aner: \textit{op. cit.}} was an apolo-
etic theological movement which aimed to disarm the criticisms of
French Rationalism by interpreting even the revealed dogmas of
Christianity in the light of rational truths. No antagonism was
admitted between Christian and rational truth, but the former was
understood only in terms of the latter. Thus Eberhard interpreted
hell as a remedial process;\footnote{Ibid. p. 272 ('eine unendliche Arzenei')} Jerusalem redemption as a representa-
tion of sin and proof of God's love;\footnote{Ibid. p. 302} and so too all the other
doctrines, the Devil, Original Sin, the Sacraments, even Justif-
ication were, not denied, but transmuted.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 234-295} It is significant, as
will appear later, that Herder's theological teacher at Königsberg,
Lilienthal, was of the Neology, and that the sympathies of Lessing,
whom Herder so greatly admired, were \textit{passably} with this trend.\footnote{Cf. esp. his treatment of Original Sin, the Satisfaction of Christ and the Trinity in \textit{Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts}; Sctns. 72-75}

The Neology was in part responsible for a development
which was to prove of immense importance, the prosecution of his-
torical research into the Biblical documents. As Aner has labor-
iously shown, works of textual and historical criticism, translat-
ions and paraphrases, commentaries, discussions of authorship,
studies in comparative religion, church histories, all begin to
abound at this period, the main figures, Semler, Griesbach, the
Michaelis, Ernesti, and Lessing all being connected with the
Neology. Up to this point the Bible itself, apart from the attacks of the Materialists and such occasional works as the 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus' of Spinoza, had been accepted without question by most thinkers, but now, spurred on by the attacks of a Voltaire, reason asserted the right to conduct a thorough investigation into its claims. Other factors of course entered in, especially the growth of the Empirical method and that rekindled interest in the Bible which was one of the fruits of Pietism, but the subjection of the Bible to an independent rational investigation is important. This trend is of especial significance in the light of the subsequent work of Herder himself in the field of Biblical criticism and interpretation.

The Neology was from a larger point of view only the theological section of a wider movement of thought now familiarly known as the Aufklärung, a movement which by 1760 was already ousting the older Wolffianism upon which in fact it rested. Whilst, however, the leaders of the Aufklärung, Nicolai, Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn, were generally of the same cast of thought as the Neology, at two points they went much further: first, they aimed to subject all truths to an ultimate criterion of utility, and second, and even more important, they asserted the right of reason, not only to interpret, but to judge and even to reject the truths of Revelation. At this second point the inf-

1 It is no accident that the work centred at the Pietist University of Halle, now strongly Wolffian.
2 Punjer op. cit. pp.537-538. The Phadon of Moses Mendelssohn (1767) is a good illustration, and cf.Spalding's 'Über die Nutzbarkeit des Predigeramts' already mentioned.
luence of the destructive, sceptical Rationalism of Voltaire is apparent, but Aner notices that Lessing, who waged a campaign against all positive, revealed religion,¹ was here the true pioneer, aiming at nothing less than the complete overthrow of Revelation.² For Lessing a revealed religion, resting upon facts of history not verifiable in any absolute sense, could never itself be maintained as an absolute, even while admittedly containing many truths of absolute worth:

zufällige Geschichtswahrheiten können der Beweis von notwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten nie werden.³

Thus of no historical religion may the claim to absolute absoluteness be made good. Each religion has of course its relative value:

alle positive und geoffenbarte Religionen sind gleich wahr und gleich falsch;⁴

but each must be open to free and critical historical investigation, and to none must be ascribed an exclusive validity.

As will readily be seen, the Aufklärung, led by Lessing, Nicolai and Mendelssohn, could hardly avoid a conflict with Orthodoxy, whether of the surviving Protestant Scholastic or of the Wolffian type. The battle centred naturally around the Scriptures, since the overthrow of Scriptural authority would mean the overthrow of revealed religion altogether. Care must be taken, however, not to read into this movement of revolt more than was

¹ See H.B. Garland: Lessing Part IV. It must be remembered that even in 'Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts', in which revealed religion has its place as the handmaid of natural religion, in the third stage, that of the Spirit, it is no longer necessary Sctns 83ff.
² Aner: op.cit.p.359'die völlige Tilgung der Offenbarung'
³ Werke: Gosche VII p.273 Cf.p.348ff
⁴ Quoted by Garland (op.cit.p.173) from the essay 'Ueber die Entstehung der geoffenbarten Religion'
actually there. Although Lessing himself rose above the movement as a whole, introducing a keen historical sense, a relativity of judgment, a hatred of everything doctrinaire, even a feeling for progress - all these points are illustrated in his literary as well as his theological criticism - yet even he remained to the last a Rationalist, never doubting but that in both literature and theology an ideal, an absolute, and with it a fixed standard of judgment did exist, known and even erected by the human reason. It was this insistence upon an absolute rational standard which accounted for the essentially unprogressive nature of the Aufklärung during the latter half of the century.

The mid-eighteenth century saw Rationalism in one form or another dominant everywhere, but the future belonged to two other movements which began to push to the fore in Germany when Herder was at his most impressionable age. The first of these was that philosophical movement best summed up under the general title: Empiricism. Empiricism in its earlier stages had been rather a scientific method than a philosophy, the patient investigation into observable phenomena. Largely as a result of the bitter hostility of the Church and the scientific persecutions, together with the rediscovery of Classical Materialism, this scientific method had been exalted into a Materialistic philosophy, as for example by Hobbes and the French 'Libertins' of the XVII century. It was, however, Locke, with his epoch-making 'Essay on the Human Understanding', who gave to Empiricism as a philosophy a real significance, since Locke tackled that first problem as yet un-

1 In 'Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts', in which a development in three stages is postulated of religion
touched by previous thinkers, the problem as to the nature and origin of knowledge, the aim of Locke being to show that all human knowledge (and thought) is based upon sensual observation or upon general sense-experience.

Locke himself, as Pringle Pattison observes, did not limit sense-experience to sensations, but he certainly denied the possibility of innate ideas. With the spread of Locke to the Continent — a process in which the ardent advocacy of Voltaire was not without its effect — it was not long before a pure Sensationalism, and even a rigid Materialism, had developed, as with Condillac on the one hand, La Mettrie on the other. It is not necessary to study here the various ramifications of Locke's philosophy through the century, but it is important to notice briefly how the Empiricist philosophy made its way into Germany, and even more important to consider its effect upon scientific research and literary and historical criticism.

Now Germany under the domination of Wolff, and later of the Neology and the Aufklärung, was not at first fertile soil for the growth of Empiricism, although the work done by Voltaire and Diderot certainly had some influence, especially upon Lessing, who undoubtedly owed much of his greater historical sense and his belief in progress to this movement. It was during the university years of Herder at Königsberg that the real influx of Empiricism took place, with the writings of Hamann, himself a strong

2 See the 'Lettres Philosophiques' and 'Traité de Métaphysique' (1734)
3 Condillac: Traité des Sensations (1754)
4 La Mettrie: l'Homme machine (1748)
Sensualist,1 the introduction of Hume to Germany, and perhaps most of all the publication for the first time in 1765 of Leibniz' 'Nouveaux Essais'. With this latter event began the dissemination not only of the modified Lockianism of Leibniz 2 but also the leading ideas of Leibniz himself, with incalculable results as far as the three leading thinkers in Germany, Lessing, Kant and Herder, were concerned. The effect of the Empiricist philosophy upon the sciences is particularly noteworthy. Once it was recognised that knowledge is impossible apart from the observation of facts, the way was cleared for a new and vigorous prosecution of scientific research in every field as the only true basis of knowledge. It was no accident that the work of Newton and Leibniz in physics and mathematics went hand in hand with the teaching of Locke. Natural science, astronomy, chemistry, magnetism and electricity: in all these, immense strides were made during the century. A new interest was also kindled in geography and anthropology, an interest which is reflected in the extraordinary popularity of travellers' tales.3 The study of the Bible on critical lines has already been mentioned. The origins of an exacter study of history are also to be sought in this period, with the patient work of Leibniz, Moser, Möser and Schlözer in Germany, and the equally patient but far more imaginative study of such men as Montesquieu and Voltaire, Hume and Gibbon

2 Succinctly epitomised in the formula: Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu; excipe, nisi ipse intellectus (Nouveaux Essais Oeuvres I p.123)
3 Much read and used by Herder - he cites, with others, Shaw, d'Arvieux, Haselquist, Niebuhr, Carver, Cranz, Pococke (sic.) Curtis, Georgi, Klingstedt, Pallas, Ellis, McKintosh, Marsden, Chardin, Wilson, Marion. Some of the many French and English were known in translation.
abroad. The new interest in psychology, with Tetens for example, is also of importance, finding expression as it did in a whole flood of diaries and autobiographies in the second half of the century.

Even without the development of Empiricism as a philosophy scientific research would of course have continued, but with the philosophical development new principles were brought in which were destined to revolutionise modern thought. Empiricism banished all theological explanations. Acts of providence were eliminated from both history and natural science alike. The old theology and the old philosophy of history - so wonderfully elaborated by Bossuet - both fell to the ground. Empiricism aimed at interpreting all phenomena, whether of science or of human history, along purely causal lines. Montesquieu for example noted the rigid causality which linked historical events, and discerned the close connection between nature and history. Leibniz had erected a strong bulwark against against the onslaught of this latter view, the assertion of the self-sufficiency of the monad and the doctrine of the Pre-established Harmony, but even in Germany itself Empiricism conquered.

2 See W. Wallace: Kant pp. 149-150
3 E.g. the autobiography of Jung-Stillings, the diaries of Lavater, Baader and Novalis, Rousseau's 'Confessions'. Unger (op. cit. p. 110) sees here a fusion with Emotionalism.
4 Bossuet: Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle (1661)
5 Montesquieu: Sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de leur Décadence (1734) Oeuvres I
6 De l'Esprit des Lois (1748) Oeuvres III (Tome II: Livres)
7 Leibniz: Monadology Sectns. 80-81 / XIV-XVIII)
8 Dilthey op. cit. pp. 247-261
Empiricism introduced the principle of natural continuity, the coherence of the universe, the explaining of the parts in terms of the whole. The principle of continuity followed naturally upon that of causality, and is reflected in all the cosmogonies, that of Kant being a pertinent example. The Leibnizian conception of the world as a monadic series tallied well with this tendency; indeed it was upon a Leibnizian foundation that the dynamic world of Kant's conceiving rested. Finally Empiricism introduced the principle of progress, which, denied by the Cartesians of the XVII century, and even, as Bury points out, by the Wolffian Rationalists and by the Aufklärer (except in respect of the individual), was strongly asserted by the French Rationalists, once the famous Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes had finally shattered an excessive veneration of the ancient world. This Fontenelle, comparing the whole race to a single individual, had already seen progress to be inevitable: un bon esprit cultivé est composé de tous les esprits des siècles précédents. Again, Voltaire and the Encyclopedists saw a line of development from the darkness and superstition of the past up to contemporary Rationalism. By the end of the century, in Condorcet's 'Esquisse' for example, progress had become an inevitable, because automatic and purely mechanical process of perfectibility, except that now a greater importance was ascribed to the transcendental spirit of

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1 Wallace op. cit.p.103f; also E. Adickes: Kant als Naturforscher
2 J.B. Bury: The Idea of Progress p.239
3 Fontenelle: Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes (1688) Oeuvres IV p.139
4 This is the implied theme of the 'Essai sur les Moeurs' (1756) in spite of the cynical tone.
5 Condorcet: Esquisse d'un Tableau historique des Progrès de l'Esprit humain (1793)
man as against the mere chain of cause and effect. A similar if less spectacular growth of the principle of progress may be traced in Germany, where Leibniz' assertion of the development of the monads in an ascending scale provided a firm and solid basis.¹

The historical school of Schözer and Müller, with Spittler in the field of ecclesiastical history, quickly adopted the slogan 'development' (Entwicklung), but it must be noticed here that with Möser and Winckelmann a feeling for growth as against planned and ordered progress was beginning to assert itself.² Lessing in his 'Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts' gave powerful support to the doctrine, this time within the framework of a definite teleology, and by the end of the century the place of progress as a principle was assured. It is worthy of note that in natural science too the idea of development had begun to establish itself at this period, as is reflected in the various theories of Preformation and Epigenesis, and even of a naturalistic evolution of the species.³

From the foregoing account it will already be clear that Herder's thought matured in an intellectual world fluid and changing, not fixed and stagnant. The view that Herder himself was solely in revolt against a prevailing temper is obviously superficial, although of course there are elements of truth in this

¹ Leibniz: Of the Ultimate Origination of Things. In this essay he speaks of 'a certain perpetual and very free progress' (R. Latta p. 347). Cf. too 'Monadology' Sctn. 32 and 'New System' Sctn. 8, where however the progress is rather that of the individual monad.

² Dilthey op. cit. pp. 263-265

³ See Kant's discussion in the 'Kritik der Urtheilskraft' (Werke II p. 236 and p. 222f). Adickes (op. cit. II pp. 434-433) notes that Kant toyed with the idea of a theory of descent, regarded by him as 'ein gewagtes Abenteuer der Vernunft' (Werke II p. 236)
view. As yet, however, attention has been confined to the more strictly philosophical and intellectual movements, and no account has been taken of the third great force which in many forms agitated the surface of European thought and life during the XVIII century, namely, the great emotional revival. A complete study, even in outline, of that extraordinarily complex movement is of course quite impossible here, but in order that the background of Herder's intellectual and spiritual development should be properly understood some attempt must be made to indicate the main trends.

Emotionalism appeared first in Germany as a religious movement which has been summed up under the broad heading Pietism. Pietism, a term which may be used to cover a variety of religious trends, from the soberly sentimental faith of Spener himself to the speculative, rhapsodical flights of Lavater, had in all its forms this common feature, that it recognised the place of emotion, of emotional experience, in the Christian faith. In Spener and Francke it was not unorthodox,¹ and could show many fine examples of pious and ordered living, but with less sober-minded thinkers it tended to degenerate either into the visionary on the one hand or the mystical on the other. The influence exerted by Pietism upon German cultural and intellectual life was amazing. Not only did it link up with the sentimental poetic strain to produce a Klopstock, not only did it help prepare the way for the more directly emotional literature of the Sturm und Drang - Herder, Goethe and Lenz were all affected by it - but Pietism also played

¹ A good historical and doctrinal account of Pietism in its stricter sense is given by W. Hossbach: P. J. Spener. See also 'Unsere religiösen Erzieher (Spener, Francke, Zinzendorf)' pp. 125 ff.
its part in re-awakening interest in the deeper mystical and theosophical movements which flourished towards the close of the century. Goethe, Novalis and Schelling all owe their mystical interest, and with it their poeticisation of Spinoza, in large measure to pietistic contacts. The large initial impulse given to the work upon the Bible at Halle has already been mentioned, and where Pietism developed into mysticism, as in Ritter and Baader, it went hand in hand with a pursuit of natural science, the work upon Galvanism in particular owing much to this source. The extent of pietistic influence in an indirect way is incalculable, Kant and even Lessing not being outside its range.

Pietism was of course a specifically religious movement, but in Germany it had contacts with intellectual and cultural movements in a way and to a degree quite unknown in such parallel reawakenings as English Methodism. The revival of emotionalism in literature was not, however, entirely due to pietistic influences: indeed Pietism itself was only one manifestation of a resurgence of feeling which swept across the whole of Europe, and which is reflected in the literature of France and England as well as Germany. It appeared first in the new and timid theorisings of such men as Du Bos in France, Bodmer and Breitinger in German Switzerland. There was a period of pure sentimentalism: La Chaussée, Diderot, Richardson, Klopstock, even Lessing. By the sixties

1 See Lütgert op. cit. II pp. 74 ff. for an interesting study.
2 Goethe was drawn to Pietism through the mystical Frau von Klettenberg, his interest centring around mystical natural science and alchemy (eg. Paracelsus) Cf. Faust I
3 Lessing had a great admiration for the Moravians and his interest in Faust and Spinoza indicates mystical leanings.
4 For an able study of this trend in France, see P. Trahard: Les Maîtres de la Sensibilité française au XVIII siècle
a new poetic depth and power had become visible, and it is important to remember that in this decade, when Herder was in his most formative period, the revival of Shakespeare; the discovery of ancient poetry; the Ossian fever; the Bardic movements; the new belief in genius; the taste for the exotic and horrific; the cult of nature; the interest in the individual; the affecting of Gothic architecture, of the English garden, of the melancholic ruins and tombstones: all these were sweeping across the cultured classes from one end of Europe to the other. The immediate result in Germany was that new literary movement, the 'Sturm und Drang,' of which Hamann, with his intuitive emotionalism, his psychological realism, and his interest in origins, was the inspirer, Herder himself the critical founder and Goethe the leading representative. The wild world of the 'Geniezeit' was far removed from the utilitarian, rational world of the Aufklärung - hence the element of revolt - but contact was maintained with Empiricism through the realistic psychological approach, the mystical interest in nature and in natural forces, and also the new taste for the Bible as the poetry and folk-lore of a primitive people.

Emotionalism itself had not merely a religious and literary, but also a philosophical significance, and here two different trends must be distinguished, each of the greatest import-

1 Unger op. cit. p.127 etc. brings out and underlines this connection.
2 As with Goethe, and also Lenz ('Die Landplagen').
3 An important, if unexciting beginning to the study of the Bible as poetry had been made in England by Lowth ('De sacra Poesi Hebraeorum') 1763, but it was Hamann's fusion of revelation and poetry, and exaltation of the primitive, which exerted the decisive influence and prepared the way for Herder.
-ance. On the one hand there was the religious Sensualism 1 of Hamann in Germany, which found its inspiration in the primitive past, held strongly to the concept of poetic revelation, recognised original genius, conceived of the world dynamically as force and passion, and was at root realistic and pessimistic; on the other there was the optimistic naturalism 2 adumbrated by Vauvenargues 3 and fully developed by Rousseau in France, which stressed the natural goodness of man, 4 trusted implicitly in the instincts and passions of the heart, 5 found God in nature rather than in books or creeds, and exalted the individual over against society. The radical opposition of Hamann to Rousseau has been well shown by Unger, 6 and yet at the same time an affinity cannot be denied. In both there may be seen the same revolt against the dominion of reason, the same feeling for the individual, the same sense of the greatness and power of genius and of passion. And if to Rousseau's optimism Hamann opposed a stark and tragic view of life, with a full recognition of evil, Herder and the Sturm und Drang drank deeply of both streams, Herder himself striving to unite the realism and the dynamic outlook of Hamann with the optimistic faith of Rousseau 7 (warmly espoused by Abbt and Möser, whom he so greatly ad-

1 Unger op.cit.pp.122-126
2 Ibid.p.397
3 For a recent study see F.Vial: Une Philosophie et une Morale du Sentiment: Vauvenargues
4 Vauvenargues: Réflexions et Maximes: CCXIX, CCXCI, CCXCIV 'Il y a des semences de bonté...dans le coeur de l'homme'
5 Ibid.CXXIII, CXXVII 'Les grandes pensées viennent du cœu
7 H.I.p.341
It will be clear from this necessarily short and inadequate sketch that the world of thought into which Herder was plunged in 1762 was one of ferment, especially when it is remembered that there was at the time no strict or clear-cut division into schools and movements. The task in the two chapters which follow will now be to trace out in some detail the particular influences which were at work upon Herder himself as his thought was formed. For this purpose dissection is again inevitable, and a division of convenience will be made into Philosophical Influences on the one hand, Emotional and Aesthetic on the other. This division has at least the slight justification that some tension is discernible in the thought of Herder between an outlook of Rationalistic Humanism and one of Emotionalistic Faith. There was however no logical, or even chronological break in the formation of Herder's philosophy, since in Herder's mind the various forces were operative together, and it is only as one or the other gained the upper hand that Herder leaned in his works to the one side or the other.

1 Herder was the successor of Abbt in Bückeburg and wrote him an enthusiastic 'Denkmal'. Mös ser collaborated with Herder and Goethe in the essays 'Von deutscher Art und Kunst' (1773).

2 Haym in particular makes great play upon this tension, and evidently prefers the Rationalistic Humanist (H.I. p.496f.), condemning the 'Mysticism' as a false tendency (H.I.p.706). Baumgarten (ut supra) and more recently M. Doerne: Die Religion in Herders Geschichtsphilosophie both follow Haym here, but F. McEachran: The Life and Philosophy of J.G. Herder, is more cautious.
CHAPTER II THE PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES UPON HERDER

Herder arrived in Königsberg in 1762, with the intention of studying medicine. He was now eighteen years of age, with a great love for nature, a strong religious bent, an interested knowledge of the Bible and of Homer and an acquaintance with such contemporary writers as Klopstock, Ewald von Kleist and Lessing. At school he had acquired a smattering of history and geography, with some Greek, under the tyrannical Grimm. As far as philosophy and the general trends of thought were concerned, his knowledge and understanding were as yet fragmentary, even perhaps non-existent, but it was not long before Herder discovered his incapacity for medicine, and with his determination to read theology, a study made possible financially by the teaching post at the 'Friedrichskollegium', he was quickly plunged into the currents of XVIII century thought.1

The atmosphere in which Herder at first studied was one of Pietism, mingled and with a Wolffian Rationalism in theological outlook. The successive head-teachers in the college about this time, Schultz and Arnold, were both orthodox Wolffians of pietistic leanings; Schultz, who died in 1762, having also been professor of theology at the University. Already however the Neology was beginning to gain a hold, and under the teacher Lilienthal, a pupil of Schultz, Herder was introduced to that 'mediating theology'2 which Aner has described as his basic religious position.3 When Herder's place in the emotional revolt is considered, it is import-

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1 For full accounts of the early years, see Haym; H. Nevinson: A Sketch of Herder and his Times; F. McEachran: The Life and Philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder.
2 H. I. p. 29
3 Aner op. cit. p. 134
-ant not to overlook this early personal contact with both the Wolffian and the Neological Rationalism.

A more powerful influence than that of Lilienthal was the influence of the philosopher Kant, who was lecturing as a Privatdozent in logic, philosophy, cosmogony and geography, and whose lectures Herder attended, quickly becoming attached to his teacher. Kant was at this time still outwardly a Wolffian, but the reading of Hume and Rousseau, the use of the empirical method in natural science and the contact with Hamann were bringing on that crisis which was to result in the great Critiques.\(^1\) Herder was especially attracted by the clarity of Kant and his impressive simplicity, enjoying best the lectures upon the great laws of nature.\(^2\) It was through Kant that he must have come into contact first with many of those scientific theories which play so large a part in the later philosophy: a dynamic view of matter; the preformation theory of development; strict causality in the material world; attraction and repulsion as the basis of movement; God the 'omnitudo realitatis'.\(^3\) It is interesting to notice that in Kant's own speculations theories important in Herder's thought are discussed: the significance of the upright posture of man; the fixity of the species; nature as a flowering of seeds.\(^4\) Baumgarten also suggests that it was largely through Kant that Herder came to know Rousseau.\(^5\) Whether this is the case or not, there can be no doubt but that it was from Kant

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1 Wallace op. cit. pp. 30 ff.; 146 ff.
2 H.I. pp. 41f.
3 F. Paulsen: Immanuel Kant, sein Leben und seine Lehre (Die Metaphysik'): a useful exposition. See too Adickes op. cit.
4 Wallace op. cit. pp. 110-114. Kant and Herder often differed upon these matters.
5 Baumgarten op. cit. pp. 26-28
that Herder acquired the use of the analytical method, together with a general interest in scientific and philosophical study, and an approach to history and philosophy as anthropology.1

Herder at this point - and the realistic sensualism of Hamann served to reinforce the scientific empiricism of Kant - seems definitely to have leaned towards an empiricist scepticism, as his taste for the writings of Baumgarten, his own analytical aesthetics, and even from one point of view his Shakespeare enthusiasm bear witness. The narrow, mercantile atmosphere of Riga, to which he moved in 1767 to take up a post in the 'Domschule', confirmed in him this spirit (in spite of other influences to be noted later), and to these years belong the eager study of Buffon,2 the acquaintance with and reviews for Nicolai,3 the attraction to Montesquieu and the enthusiasm for Newton and Bacon,4 the praise of Michaelis and Spalding,5 and the warm admiration of Lessing, an admiration which was destined to survive the later breach with the Aufklärung. In Herder's eyes Lessing personified the spirit of free enquiry, which seeks truth impartially, whether in the field of philosophy or of theology. It is probable that there was no great direct influence of Lessing upon Herder in the narrower sense, and it is certainly untrue to imagine that Herder borrowed any of his main ideas from Lessing,6 but Lessing did stand for much that Herder too admired, and shared with and strengthened in him many of the most fruitful ideas which were

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1 H.I.p.46ff.
2 Baumgarten op.cit.p.35
3 M.Sommerfeld: Friedrich Nicolai und der Sturm und Drang pp.160ff
4 H.I.p.343
5 Ibid.p.283
6 Especially in connection with that of a divine education, an idea common to the age, which appears in Herder before Lessing's important development of it (See below Chapter V:5)
already germinating in his own mind: the need for a national literature; the conception of religion as something relative, not absolute in value; the pantheism which was a fusion of Leibniz and Spinoza; the belief in a progressive divine education; the theory of palingenesis; the ideal of humanity, of which the symbol was a purified Free Masonry. It must be remembered, however, that most of these ideas were common to the age as a whole.

Herder seems at this time to have been much attracted to the Neology, especially in his historico-critical exegesis, a field in which his studies were stimulated by Hamann. In an excellent, if slightly one-sided summary of the theological views of Herder just prior to the French journey of 1769, Haym stresses the historical approach to the Bible, the non-dogmatic and critical thinking, the conception of revelation in terms, the derivation of religion from fear (in accordance with the explanation advanced by Hume, for whose 'Natural History of Religion' Herder had the greatest respect) and the almost pure Deism. Haym is indisputably right when he points out that Herder had begun to apply the psychological, even the physiological method of Empiricism to aesthetics and to religion, as in the 'Kritische Walder' in the former, the 'Skizze einer Archäologie der Ebräer' in the latter field. His comparison of Herder with Sem- ller, Mich-

1 Lessing: Literaturbriefe
2 Lessing: Nathan der Weise
3 For Lessing's Spinozism see Jacobi: Ueber die Lehre des
4 Lessing: Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts / Spinoza
5 Tbid. Sc. 93 ff.
6 Lessing: Ernst und Falk. Herder was an active Free-mason during his Riga years (from 1766)
7 Hume: Works IV p. 443 The first ideas of religion... arose from the incessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind. The view was advanced by Herder in the essay 'Ueber die verschiedenen Religionen'
8 H.I pp. 279-293
aelis and Ernesti in the movement from a pietistic to a critical study of Scripture is also suggestive, if a little misleading. It is obvious, however, that Haym, in his marked preference for the neological Herder, over-estimates, or better, over-emphasises, the Rationalism of this period, and to speak of a pure Deism, or a merely ethical conception of revelation is to be guilty of a confusion of perspective in the consideration of Herder's development as a whole. Herder, the pupil of Kant, the admirer of Hume, did enthusiastically adopt the empiricist method, and may indeed have hoped to explain all human activity in terms of psychology and physiology - additional testimony is borne upon this point by the professed admiration for Montesquieu,¹ and the prize-essay 'Über den Ursprung der Sprache' - but even in the general philosophical outlook, quite apart from the emotionalist tendency so prominent during the sea-journey, there is ample evidence to show that even now Herder was very far from the Aufklärung.

Two points of value do emerge from the contact with Rationalism, and must be noted. The first has been mentioned before and need not be further stressed, that Herder had acquired in his theology a neological sub-stratum which was destined to remain. This fact will become more clear in Chapter VI. The second and the more important has also been mentioned, but requires a little further treatment, that Herder had learned to approach life, and the problem of a philosophical understanding of it, empirically and historically. History and philosophy (natural science could also be added) were to be inseparably inter-woven in all his thinking.

¹ In the 'Journal meiner Reise'. See H.I. p.343
Far from being a Rationalist, at any rate in the Wolffian sense, and interpreting life according to a priori speculations, Herder had learned like the French Rationalists to look upon life empirically, to explain it in terms of observed processes. The keen interest in historical study, already manifest in the 'Kritische Wälder', dates from this period, and there is obviously a growing impatience with the formal historical schematisings of a Schlözer and the pedantic, non-historical, a priori judgments of a Michaelis, an impatience which found an outlet during the early Bückeburg years in two severely critical reviews. What Herder was seeking in his historical and historico-critical reading, in Michaelis, Schlözer, Möser, Winckelmann, was, not moralisings or rationalistic explanations, but 'philosophische Geschichte, genetische Erklärung' an appreciation of the influence of external conditions, and of the inter-connection of all ages and peoples. In the historical field the true heroes of Herder were Möser and Winckelmann, in whom he found an attempt to explain historical movements as organic growths. His own thoughts are most clearly revealed in the 'Kritische Wälder' and the 'Journal meiner Reise', together with the slightly later 'Grundriss des Unterrichts für einen jungen Adeligen', which is almost a preliminary outline of the later 'Ideen'. In a recent thought-provoking article Gillies has shown

1 In the 'Frankfurter Gelehrte Zeitung' (S.V. pp. 423ff.), where Michaelis' 'Mosaisches Recht' and Schlözer's 'Universalgeschichte' were reviewed. Of Michaelis Herder complains that 'Er sieht alles im Geist unseres Jahrhunderts'. The review of Schlözer was so severe that it provoked a long controversy.

2 M:Ru. G.XX p.238
3 Dilthey: op.cit. pp.262-263
4 Ibid. p.260
that from his Riga days Herder was drawn towards the plan of an historico-genetic philosophy, a philosophy based upon facts empirically observed and conceived of organically.

Herder was not and could not be a Rationalist in the sense in which Nicolai and Mendelssohn were Rationalists. Emotional factors apart, the break with Nicolai was inevitable on philosophical grounds. One point the Aufklärung had perhaps in common with Herder, that ultimately the thought of both derived from Leibniz, but even here the difference was great, since the Aufklärung did little more than develop the Wolffian adulteration, whereas Herder went directly to Leibniz himself. The relations of Herder's thought to the philosophy of Leibniz seem never to have been fully explored, but they are always assumed, sometimes tacitly, and without some knowledge of Leibniz no true understanding of Herder is possible.¹ The Neology, Kant, Empiricism, Lessing, and (as will be seen later) Spinoza, Shaftesbury, Vico, Goethe, Hamann, Rousseau and the Sturm und Drang: all these contributed in various ways, but in basic structure and substance the thought of Herder is always Leibnizian, the other ideas being shaped in his mind according to the general Leibnizian pattern.

The publication of the 'Nouveaux Essais' in 1765, an epoch-making event, was fairly certainly the starting-point of Herder's closer reading of the original Leibniz, although through the Wolffian exposition and the dynamic cosmogony of Kant he must already have learned to know some of the general principles. Direct references to Leibniz are plentiful in the early works, especially

¹ J.T. Merz: Leibniz pp.191-206 gives a suggestive outline of the influence of Leibniz generally throughout the century
of course the essays 'Wahrheiten aus Leibniz' and 'Über Leibniz: Grundsätze von der Natur und Wahrheit'. In these two works, as well as in the more original 'Vom Erkennen und Empfinden', Herder is concerned with that first problem of knowledge presented in Locke and in the 'Nouveaux Essais'. It is noticeable that in this matter Herder, under the influence of Empiricism, takes up a line which is on the whole critical of Leibniz. An attempt has been made to deduce Herder's theory of perception (a physiologico-organic theory) from Leibniz' suggestive treatment of the 'petites perceptions', but this has been refuted by Fries, who rightly points out that although Herder has without doubt studied Leibniz with great care, he definitely criticises his theory of perception. With his strong sense of the inter-connection of the physical and the psychical (by Fries attributed in large part to Haller3), Herder could not possibly agree either with the assertion that the body and the soul are entirely independent the one of the other (their movements being coordinated in accordance with a Pre-established Harmony5), or with the parallel assertion that there is no mechanistic causality, at any rate in the intellectual world. Herder himself saw between the two functions 'knowing' and 'feeling' the closest of bonds, and related both to physiological factors, admitting both inward impulses and external environment as conditioning causes:

keine Psychologie ist möglich, die nicht in jedem Schritt Physiologie ist.6

Fries cautions against regarding Herder as no more than a sensualist

1 M.Kronenberg: Herders Philosophie nach ihrem Entwicklungs-
gang und ihrer historischen Stellung
2 M.Fries: Herders Religionsphilosofi med särskild Hänsyn
   till hans Ställning till Spinoza p.52
3 Ibid.pp.78-79
4 M.P.u.G.IX p.20
6 M.P.u.G.IX pp.22-23
and rightly points out that in the essay 'Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache' he criticises the sensualistic teaching of Condillac. Herder, like Leibniz, occupied a midway position, holding to an organic theory, which lay between the rationalistic and the sensualistic. He held that there is in the soul a seed of knowledge, i.e. a potentiality. The soul is no tabula rasa ('kein sonnenreines Papier'). At the same time he asserted a far closer relationship between physical and psychical activity than had done Leibniz, allowing for the large influence of physiological functions and external circumstances upon the mind and soul.

Apart from the special problems of knowledge raised by the 'Nouveaux Essais' it is clear that the philosophy of Leibniz as a whole played a leading part in the formation of Herder's thought. Three points in particular must be noted, each of which will have to be developed more fully in relation to Herder himself at a later stage. First, Leibniz conceived of the world, not materialistically, or even idealistically, but dynamically. The individual substance was for him not quantity, but force. The substantial forms were primary forces, souls. Already Herder had learned through Kant to look upon the world in terms of force, and later in the essay 'Gott' it was this Leibnizian idea of substances ('durch göttliche Kräfte erhalten') which was the leading concept. McEachran notices that the concept

1 Fries op.cit.p.63
2 Ibid.p.65
3 M.P.u.G.p.48 and p.82; M.R.u.T.XIV p.91, although here it is the seed of evil, not of knowledge, which is in question.
4 Monadology Introduction (R.Latta)p.33f.
5 New Systems:Sctm.3
6 S.XVI.p.439
action ('Wirkung') is dominant in Herder's aesthetic as well as his historical thinking,¹ and the Sturm und Drang conception of God as sheer force, both creative and destructive, is relevant here. Second, Leibniz saw through the universe, in all the variety of structures which it displays, a continuity of being, the world consisting of a monadic scale, with the unconscious monads at the bottom, and God, the perfect and the all-inclusive monad, at the top. Each monad in this scale was itself 'a continual fulguration of the Divinity',² each 'a perfect and living mirror of the universe',³ each was engaged, under the divine regulation, in a 'striving after the Infinite', being limited by the degree of perception of which it was capable.⁴ There is abundant evidence to show that Herder both knew and approved of this conception, quite apart from his own extensive development of it. He constantly used phrases of a Leibnizian stamp:

die Gradationen der Geschöpfe, die grosse Leiter;⁵
eine Reihe aufsteigender Formen und Kräfte;⁶
eine Progression fortstrebender Kräfte; die körperliche Organisation die Leiterin zu einer höheren Bildung.⁷

Leibniz' phrase 'Fulgurationen der Gottheit' is quoted approvingly as a fine image ('ein schönes Bild')⁸ and in the same passage Herder goes on to speak himself of the body as a world of living forces (ein Reich lebendiger Kräfte!). and of substantial forces as an image of the Godhead:

1 McEachran op.cit.p.34;p.77;pp.32ff.
2 Monadology Sctn.47
3 Ibid.Sctn.56
4 Ibid.Sctn.70
5 M.P.u.G.VIII p.213
6 Id.I p.260
7 Ibid.p.281
8 S.XVI.p.526
Third, Leibniz advocated as a cardinal doctrine the principle of development, on the basis of a Pre-formation theory. For Leibniz the monad was indestructible, death being a metamorphosis, 'the perishing of the outward mechanism'. Indestructible, yet subject to change, each monad was capable of 'a certain perpetual and very free progress', the unrolling of everything enfolded in it. Together with this view there went hand in hand other kindred doctrines, that of metamorphosis; reward and punishment after death; and a strong philosophical optimism, everything ordered for the best, and no ultimate reality in evil. In Herder the principle of development, although worked out extensively in other directions, is clearly central, and the evidence of Leibniz' influence is unmistakable. The laws of nature in the essay 'Gott' include for example:

V. Kein Tod, sondern Verwandlung. VII. Aus schlafenden Fähigkeiten, tätige Kräfte. VIII. Alles Böses ein Nichts. Another favourite expression of Leibniz which contains a similar thought, that 'the present is big with the future' is echoed almost word for word by Herder on two occasions:

die Gegenwart ist schwanger mit der Zukunft; die Zukunft ist die Tochter der Gegenwart. Elsewhere Herder takes up the idea of retribution as an eternal law:

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1 S.XVI p.545
2 Monadology Sctns.3-5
3 New System Sctn.7
4 Monadology Sctn.10
5 Of the Ultimate Origination of Things (Latta)p.350
6 Monadology Sctns.6-7
7 Ibid.Sctns.90 ff.
8 Of The Theodicy reduced to Syllogistic Form' esp.V.
9 Ibid. Evil is ascribed solely to limitation.
10 S.XVI p.510
11 Principles of Nature and Grace Sctn.12
12 M.P.u.G.VII p. 100 13 Ibid.p.57
die Vergeltung ist das moralische Gesetz der Welt.¹

Again, he admits the over-ruling of evil by good:

alle Laster und Frevel müssen dem Ganzen endlich zum Besten;² and there are hints of a doctrine of palingenesis, as when he speaks of 'die Palingenesie des Lebens'³ or terms the soul 'die Knospe zu einer zukünftigen Blume'.⁴ The corn of wheat is, significantly, Herder's favourite and ever-recurring simile.

There is amongst Herder-scholars a general agreement that the attraction to and interpretation of Spinoza were both influenced and coloured by Leibnizian principles. It cannot in any case be questioned that Herder's Spinozism in the essay 'Gott' was entirely Leibnizian in conception, since Herder himself consciously corrects Spinoza's inadequate terminology in accordance with the concepts of Leibniz.⁵ When Herder first came into contact with the work of Spinoza is not certain, but it is known that he was closely studying Shaftesbury in 1775, and a reading of Spinoza seems to have accompanied this study. A leaning to Pantheism (on the more mystical or poetical lines of a Shaftesbury) is of much earlier date, harmonising as it did with the general trend of thought of Herder the Stürmer und Dränger, and it is fairly certain that even at Königsberg and Riga he was already generally acquainted with Spinoza's doctrine.⁶ It was, however, the great Jacobi-Mendelssohn controversy over the dead body of Lessing which focussed his attention afresh and in more concentrated form upon Spinoza. Jacobi announced to

¹ M.P.u.G.XI p.212
² Ibid.VIII p.113
³ S.XVI p.567
⁴ Id.I p.299
⁵ S.XVI pp.448 ff.. Haym (II p.271)speaks of a 'leibniziane Umdeutung'
the world in 1783 that Lessing had in his late years been a Spinozist, that he had expressed a full philosophical agreement with the poetical Pantheism of Goethe's poem 'Prometheus':

Das ist mein eigener Gesichtspunkt, En kai pan! Ich weiss nicht anders;¹

and that he had even dared to suggest that at heart Leibniz himself had been a Spinozist.² Jacobi himself was of course bitterly opposed to the Atheism and Fatalism thus advocated; Mendelssohn denied the truth of his allegations; Herder (and with him Goethe) applied himself to a closer study of Spinoza's writings, and defended both Lessing and Spinoza. Whether Herder himself ever understood Spinoza in the sense intended is highly doubtful,³ since he rejected Spinoza's definitions (eg, of substance) and had little use for his method of argumentation. The Spinoza interest is, however, of the greatest importance, since it strengthened Herder in his movement towards an immanent view of God in His activity and revelation. The direct influence was not large.

Also bound up with the Leibnizian study and influence, and of greater importance than the attraction to Spinoza, was Herder's enthusiasm for the English philosopher Shaftesbury. At this point, as indeed at all points, the philosophical element in Herder merged with the emotional, Shaftesbury being valued for his aesthetic views upon genius and enthusiasm, and his rhapsodic-

¹ Jacobi ascribes these words to Lessing: Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza p.12
² Perhaps on the basis of the confession in the 'New Essays': 'You know...that I had begun to incline on the side of the Spinozists...... (Duncan p.309)
³ McEachran (op.cit.p.73) suggests that the dynamic reading of Spinoza is correct, and that Spinoza really thought of matter as rest-motion, not extension; ie, Herder said what Spinoza had meant to say. Fries (op.cit.p.3) holds a contrary view. Cf. A.C. McAlister: The God of Spinoza as interpreted by Herder (Hibbert Journal (1905)III4 pp.706-726)
al approach to nature. It has already been said that Herder was reading Shaftesbury in 1775, but he was acquainted with him, at any rate through Hamann, much earlier at Königsberg. In the later study of Pantheism it is significant that Shaftesbury was associated with Leibniz and Spinoza in Herder's mind. Leaving aside the aesthetic contribution, Herder was reinforced by Shaftesbury in ideas which had already been found in and developed from Leibniz, ideas conceived of and expressed by the English writer in a more attractive poetical form. Herder found in Shaftesbury the same sense of the relationship of man to the animal system; the same feeling for the oneness of nature, 

a mutual correspondency and relation from the minutest ranks and orders of being to the remotest spheres; the appreciation of the organic nature of historical growth, as for instance in the evolution of the clan or tribe from the family; the conception of nature as 'the vesture of God', and of God as 'original soul, diffusive, vital in all, inspiring the Whole'

O mighty Genius, sole animating and inspiring power, in all things thou art inmost! finally, the assertion that 'there is no real ill in things', nothing wholly or absolutely ill, that 'tis good which is predominant', that in spite of evil

1 Shaftesbury: Characteristics: The Moralists II 4; Virtue I 2 i; The Moralists III 1.
2 Ibid. Virtue I 2 i pp.12ff.
3 Ibid. Moralists II 4
4 Ibid. loc.cit.
5 Ibid. Moralists III 1
6 Ibid. loc.cit.
7 Ibid. Virtue I 2; i Moralists III 1
8 Ibid. loc.cit.
9 Ibid. The Moralists I 3
all may be perfectly concurrent to one interest, the interest of that Universal One.  

In a careful study Dilthey has listed the points of similarity between Herder, Shaftesbury, and the author of the essay 'Natur' (Goethe?). Of these the most important may be noted:

1. Der Begriff der Natur - die Mutter aller Dinge;
2. Die einheitliche Technik der Natur;
3. Vielheit, Wechsel und Tod als Mittel der Natur sich mitzuteilen;

Speaking more particularly of course of Goethe, Dilthey stresses the chronological priority of Shaftesbury's influence over that of Spinoza; also suggesting that it was through Shaftesbury that Herder's mind was first directed towards Pantheism:

Shaftesbury war das Organ, seine Gemüthsverfassung in den aesthetischen Pantheismus umzusetzen.

More recently Fries has contended for a far greater emphasis upon the influence of Shaftesbury even as compared with that of Leibniz. In support of this view it could be argued that in Shaftesbury all the Leibnizian ideas were presented in a poetical form which would exercise a far greater appeal for Herder, but on the other hand the references to Leibniz are too numerous, and the verbal similarities too close to be discounted.

In the study of Spinoza and Shaftesbury Herder, it will have been noticed, was always closely associated with Goethe, and the question arises whether, outside the purely emotional and poetical sphere, there was any interaction of thought between the two. Herder's acquaintance with Goethe dated from 1771, when

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1 Characteristics: The Moralists III 1.
2 Dilthey: Aus der Zeit der Spinozastudien Goethes Gesammelt Schriften III pp. 400ff. Other points are: the naturalness of society, the helplessness of the human infant (cf. Buffon: Histoire naturelle II p. 11)
3 Ibid. p. 397
4 Ibid. p. 409
5 Fries op. cit. pp. 156-157
the two came together in Strassburg. Their intercourse was at first mainly of a literary character, Herder playing the dominant role. When, however, the two were brought together again on Herder's settling in Weimar in 1776, the interests of both had broadened, and, after a preliminary misunderstanding, they enjoyed for some years a period of common work and intercourse, in which their leading ideas seem to have been substantially the same. Goethe, for example, shared, and as an independent investigator strengthened Herder's fundamental ideas upon natural history: the idea of nature as creative and destructive power;\textsuperscript{1} the idea of the universe as a continuous whole, a ladder;\textsuperscript{2} the idea of the evolution of all species from an organic seed and according to a common pattern;\textsuperscript{3} the idea of every mode of existence as a fragment of eternity,\textsuperscript{4} and yet also an end in itself (ein Zweck sein selbst);\textsuperscript{5} ideas all bound up with the final conception of God as in all things immanent.\textsuperscript{6} There can be no doubt but that in their parallel development at this period each thinker owed something to the other, the debt of Herder consisting mainly in the material which he gained from Goethe the investigator and discoverer, and the broadening of his outlook, especially in the theological sphere, by contact with Goethe the Humanist.

An attempt has been made within the last few years to show that Herder acquired all his main ideas in historical philos-

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{1}] H.Lichtenberger: Goethe I p.68
  \item[\textsuperscript{2}] Ibid.loc.cit. Cf.J.G.Robertson: Goethe and the Twentieth Century p.131
  \item[\textsuperscript{3}] Ibid.loc.cit.
  \item[\textsuperscript{4}] J.Middleton Murry: Heaven and Earth XVI-XVIII (p.237)
  \item[\textsuperscript{5}] Die Metamorphose der Tiere (Cotta XXVII p.204 and f. etc.)
  \item[\textsuperscript{6}] E.Franz: Goethe als religiöser Denker p.4. H.Leisegang: Goethes Denken pp.39 ff.
\end{itemize}
-ophy from the Italian thinker Giambattista Vico. 1 Vico was certainly known both to Hamann and to Herder; 2 and many of his suggestions, the organic nature of the growth of society, a psychological interpretation of history, strict causal interconnection between events, Providence as immanent rather than transcendent, all these recur in Herder. The case of Gemmingen is, however, a little strained when he would see in Herder a conscious disciple and completer of Vico, 3 and Croce's early judgment, that there is no more than an affinity of ideas and approach, even if a known one, is probably nearest the truth, 4 although Croce himself has since tended to ascribe to Vico a tremendous importance. 5 As against the solid and obvious influence of Kant, Leibniz, Shaftesbury and Spinoza, and, on the emotional side, of Hamann and Rousseau, it is merely fanciful to pretend that Vico was in any way the main source of Herder's thought.

Perhaps the later relations with Kant ought to be mentioned, although the anti-Kantian philosophical writings, 'Die Metakritik' and 'Kalligone' are not of any real value for an understanding of the philosophy of history. By the quarrel with Kant, however, Herder was led to lay a greater (and a disproportionate) emphasis than he would otherwise have done upon three points:

1 O.Gemmingen: Vico, Hamann und Herder
2 Hamann mentions Vico in a letter to Herder (1777) Roth V p.267; Herder later in the 'Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität' (1797), 'Vico suchte das Prinzip der Humanität der Völker' S.XVII p.245
3 Gemmingen op.cit.p.37
4 'un vago sentore dell' affinita di certe loro aspirazioni et attitudini con quelle dell'intelletto meridionale' This is quoted by J.G.Robertson: The Genesis of Romantic Theory p.181 n.1, in which there is a full and balanced discussion. See too Werner:EVico pp.290 ff.
the assertion of the relative value and happiness of every natural product; the tracing of a connection between the natural and the spiritual world (man himself being the link) - Swedenborg, who attracted also Kant's attention, no doubt reinforced this view - and the violent rejection of the Kantian doctrine of radical evil, Goethe at this point joining forces with him. The vehemence of Herder's feeling against Kant dates from Kant's unsympathetic review of the 'Ideen: Erster Teil' (1784) and there can be no doubt but that in a negative way Kant influenced greatly the expression and the emphasis (if not the essential content) of Herder's later thought. Thus many passages of the 'Zweiter Teil' were definitely and deliberately written in refutation of Kant's criticisms, and of his own 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht'.

Looking back over the whole field of Herder's philosophical reading and attachment, and attempting impartially to sift the evidence, without prejudice in favour of any one preponderating influence at the expense of another, one must acknowledge that two forces stand out as having exerted a determinative power: first, that of Empiricism, through the scientist and philosopher Kant and the historians Montesquieu, Winckelmann and Möser; second, that of Immanent Theism, through Leibniz, Shaftesbury and Spinoza.

1 Herder notes in the 'Adrastea': 'Swedenborg sah sich als Verbindung zwischen der Geister- und Körperrwelt'. (M.P.u.G. XII p.124. For Kant's interest see his 'Träume eines Geistersehers'. There was a general interest in the unseen and occult at the close of the century (See Lütgert: op.cit.II pp.7 ff. (1785)
2 Franz op.cit.p.149. 3 In the 'Jenaische Allgemeine Zeitung'
4 Cf.Id.Buch IX 3 III 'Der Mensch, der einen Herrn nötig hat, ist ein Tier; VIII 4 'Der Staat ist nicht das Ziel der Menschheit'; VIII 5 'Glückseligkeit ist ein individuelles Gut' with the corresponding passages in Kant: Werke VI p.12; p.15.
By the former Herder was drawn to that line of thought in which his genius could find its truest expression; the philosophical consideration of history. He learned from Empiricism to see thought, culture, indeed life as a whole, as an historical problem, necessitating a study of origins and growth as with any other such problem or as with a natural organism. In the latter Herder found the framework into which his general outlook, his historical philosophy could best be built; an understanding of all phenomena ultimately in terms of Godhead.

Whilst, however, the enormous debt of Herder to these philosophical forces must be admitted, and whilst in and through them the general pattern of Herder's thought may be discerned, it is highly doubtful whether the philosophical were ever the decisive impulses, even in the Riga and the later Weimar days. Side by side with the reading of philosophy, interacting upon, interpenetrating the philosophical thinking, an emotional and aesthetic, one might say with real truth a religious development was taking place, to which all that is most characteristic in Herder's thought must in the last resort be ascribed.¹ Empiricism gave direction; immanentism a philosophical background; but the life and impulse derived from other sources. The discussion of these sources must be the task of the following chapter.

¹ This fact has recently been emphasised by British scholars; in particular A. Gillies in three works: 'Herder und Ossian', a specialised study; the articles 'Herder's Approach to a Philosophy of History' and 'Herder and Pascal', both in the Modern Language Review: Volumes XXXV and XXXVII. In all these works it is urged that Herder's approach to both history and poetry is through and through religious; a struggle to apprehend all activity within revelation.
CHAPTER III  THE EMOTIONAL AND AESTHETIC INFLUENCES UPON HERDER

Chronologically the religio-emotional, even the aesthetic, not the intellectual and the philosophical, were the primary influences upon Herder's thought. Herder was born in the small East Prussian village Mohrungen, the son of a pious and god-fearing father and of a mother of thoughtful piety, with perhaps a touch of true poetry.¹ The early life was, according to Haym, passed in an atmosphere of religious earnestness and sincerity, which helped to create in Herder from the first a strong religious feeling:

das Gefühl für Erhabenheit, die Stimmung für das Düstere, Schaurige, Feierliche.²

From infancy Herder was nurtured upon the Bible, and at school, under the tyrannical Grimm, he appears to have acquired a little Greek, and a boyish fancy for Homer.³ Solitary walks in the forest strengthened in him the inclination towards a poetically religious faith, and soon, as the assistant of the new deacon Trescho, he not only found opportunities for a wider reading: Klopstock, Ewald von Kleist, Lessing, but also, Haym affirms, experienced a call to the ministry.⁴ The Herder who arrived in Königsberg in 1762, athirst for books, eager to break out of the narrow circle of village life, reserved but of a lively feeling and imagination, this Herder had already, long before his acquaintance with Empiricism or with Leibniz, received the poetic and religious impulse which was in large part to shape his later thought.

¹ Nevinson op.cit.p.6  
² H.I p.5  
³ Nevinson pp.9 ff.  
⁴ H.I p.8  
⁵ Ibid.p.10
At Königsberg, even whilst he was studying natural science under Kant, Herder found nourishment for his poetico-religious life in a close friendship with the eccentric 'Magus im Norden', J.G.Hamann. This was a fruitful as well as a lasting contact, one which left its mark not only upon Herder's own development, but also upon that of German literature and thought as a whole. Hamann was at this time thirty-two years of age, and had returned to Königsberg from London some four years before, full of a new religious experience and of a poetic enthusiasm for English literature, for Shakespeare, for Homer, for all primitive folk-poetry, above all for the Bible. In Hamann two strains had met: 1 on the one hand a sensualistic and realistic, which inclined him to psychological analysis, to concreteness of imagery, to a stress upon historical observation of origin and growth; on the other a religious and mystical, which gave colour to his conception of the world, opened his eyes to the mysteries of primitive feeling, deepened his interest in origins - the twilit history of mythology - and taught him to see in all sensual experience the revelation of the super-sensual. 2

Upon Herder, who had at this time been brought into contact with Rationalism and Empiricism, the influence of Hamann was crucial. By Hamann Herder was enabled to accept the essence of the sensualistic doctrine and to assimilate it into that poetico-religious experience which was the basis of his thought. An understanding of this assimilative process is essential to a true inter-

1 This thesis is developed in detail by Unger op.cit. pp. 114 ff.; pp.233 ff.
2 Ibid. p.126
interpretation of Herder's thought, for without it the apparently conflicting trends can only be explicated, as by Haym, by postulating a real disharmony and contest in Herder's mind. Gillies has well seen that the struggle of Herder's life was for an interpretation of the natural and historical, empirically observed, in terms of the poetical and religious. Changes of emphasis, at Riga, at Bückeburg, again at Weimar, were inevitable in the years of development before the final satisfying balance of the ripe Weimar years could be reached (partly now in co-operation with Goethe). The importance of Hamann lies in the fact that it was he who, at the time when Herder was in danger of being swept into a barren Rationalism, or Empiricism, indicated the way of reconciliation which Herder in a general sense to tread.

Hamann himself fully accepted the sensualistic teaching, with one or two Leibnizian modifications. He spoke categorically of the limitation of knowledge to that which could be sensually observed:

alle unsere Erkenntnis ist sinnlich, figürlich.

He stressed particularly the concreteness of the Christian revelation, in the Bible, which spoke by images, in history, in nature 'die sinnliche Offenbarung der göttlichen Herrlichkeit', finally in Christ himself: der Geist Gottes offenbart sich... in Knechtgestalt, ist Fleisch.

1 O.Mann(Der junge Friedrich Schlegel p.19) brings out this point not and cannot be denied.
2 Gillies: Herder's Approach to a Philosophy of History (Modern Language Review XXXV)
3 Lütgert op.cit.II pp.1 ff.
4 Roth: Werke I p.99; cf.p.103
5 Ibid.loc.cit.
6 Ibid.V p.71 (in a letter to Herder)
7 Ibid.II p.259
8 Ibid.I p.60
He was in many respects critical of Leibniz' 'Nouveaux Essais', but he commended them to Herder in a letter dated January 1765 and he himself often made use of Leibnizian expressions, as, for example, 

die Monade meines Hauses ist mir ein Spiegel des Universums. Hamann was thus able thoroughly to endorse the enthusiasm of Herder for Empiricism and for Leibniz during the Königsberg and Riga days.

Hamann himself, however, was not content merely with the empirical. He taught Herder to observe nature and history, but also to see beyond nature and history, to see in nature and history a poetical and religious manifestation of God. For Hamann, as for Shaftesbury and Leibniz, nature formed a living whole, of which man was the crown:

endlich krönte Gott die sinnliche Offenbarung...durch das Meisterstück des Menschen,

but of which, being the crown, he was also a part:

der Mensch hat nicht nur das Leben mit den Thieren gemein, sondern ist auch sowohl ihrer Organisation, als ihrem Mechanismus, mehr oder weniger, dass heisst, nach Stufen ähnlicher.

The basis of this unity of nature (again as in Shaftesbury and Leibniz) was God himself, the God who was active in and spoke through all his works ('durch Handlungen'),

ein Vater feuriger Geister und athmender Kräfte.

The God of Hamann's conceiving was a some great creative artist- genius créateur-who expressed himself concretely, as has been seen, in

1 Roth: Werke III pp.323 ff.
2 Ibid.V p.133
3 Ibid.II p.259
4 Ibid.IV p.40
5 Unger op.cit.p.319 (Cf.Goethe emendation of John I.1 'Im Anfang war die Tat' Faust 11.1224-1237)
6 Ibid.p.320
7 Roth: Werke II p.370
nature ('der Abdruck der Geisterwelt'\(^1\)), in history -

Gott hat sich Menschen offenbaren wollen; er hat sich durch
Menschen offenbart - \(^2\)

and supremely in the creative activity of poets, whom Hamann, cit-
ing the example words of Paul, regarded as divine prophets:

Paulus that einem Dichter die Ehre an, ihn einen Prophet seines
Volkes zu nennen.\(^3\)

Three important developments of this primary conception of
the world and of God must be noted, developments which contributed
much to the formation of the very similar view of Herder. First,
Hamann was led to lay inordinate stress upon poetry, poetry that was
primitive and spontaneous, not reflective and rational. For Hamann
true poetry was not an utterance of general truths of reason and it
was more than the expression of personal feeling: It was the revel-
ation of God himself. In Hamann's eyes the true poet was a creator,
a genius, who, inspired of God, expressed spiritual truth in image
and symbol - reflecting on a smaller scale the divine creative power.
Poetic talent was no mere disposition ('Anlage'), as taught by Nic-
olai;\(^4\) it was a divine indwelling force, a creative urge, which
like some great force of nature transcended the rules and the convent-
ions of men and acknowledged no laws but its own. At this point it
is clear that Hamann was taking up and developing the ideas of Shaft-
esbury and Young, but he went much further. Poetry, an impulse at
once natural and divine, was the true speech of primitive man, the
natural medium in which a non-reflecting, childlike age would ex-
press itself:

\(^1\) Roth: Werke I p.136
\(^2\) Ibid. I p.56 The reference here was to the Bible revelation
\(^3\) Ibid. I p.119 (referring to Titus I,12)
\(^4\) Sommerfeld: op. cit. p.43
Poesie ist die Muttersprache des menschlichen Geschlechts.\(^1\)

In the great poets, Homer, Ossian, Shakespeare, the thoughts and feelings, not of individuals, but of peoples and of the race found utterance. Since poetry, language and history were at root one, in the speech, that is to say in the poetry of a nation its whole destiny, its historical development and meaning was revealed:

in der Sprache jedes Volkes finden wir die Geschichte desselben.\(^2\)

Hamann thus arrived at the conclusion that a study of the origins of speech, poetry and religion was the key to an understanding of all the problems of life and history. It was for this reason that he himself, and with him Herder, was so keenly interested in the problem of the origin of speech, in questions arising out of the early records of the Hebrews and of other peoples, in the problems connected with the origin and growth of the folk-lore and folk-poetry of the nations.\(^3\)

Secondly, and inevitably, Hamann went on from this point to see a close inter-connection between nature and poetry, each being related to the other as a specific revelational medium of the Godhead. For Hamann poetry in the true sense was no intellectual exercise, no conscious work of the selective mind, but a product of nature, which, like any other such product, developed organically, according to the laws of growth and under the influence of external circumstances, climate, location, time, historical conditions. Thus Hamann could write: je naturaliserai l'art autant que Mrs. les Naturalistes artialisent la nature;\(^4\)
die erste Dichtkunst, nennt ihr gelehrter Scholast, ist botanisch.\(^5\)

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1 Roth: Werke II p.253
2 Ibid.II p.449
3 These were the great interests of Herder - cf. the 'Archäologie', 'Ursprung der Sprache', 'Aelteste Urkunde', 'Volks-
4 Ibid.II p.270 The precise meaning is not clear
The development of this idea in Herder's 'Fragmente', together with the parallel theories advanced by Winckelmann and Möser, who had already begun to seek an understanding of spiritual activity as genetic growth, aroused his enthusiastic support. In the realm of Biblical criticism Hamann's pregnant treatment of the Bible as eine Verschmelzung idealen Gehalts und erdwlchsiger Erscheinungsform, and his characteristic subjection of the Bible, as poetry, to those natural laws of culture which governed all art, opened up a whole world of new possibilities.

Thirdly, Hamann was led by his fundamental conception of revelation to see a vital interconnection between poetry and religion. Poetry itself, as has already been seen, was not a work of the intellect ('kein Werk der Vernunft';) but of the heart. Thus true poetry was charged with true feeling and with religious faith, which was also of the heart. For Hamann the poet was necessarily a prophet, a believer: Christ oder Poet.... Wundern Sie sich nicht, das diess Synonyma sind; die wahre Poesie ist eine natürliche Art der Prophezeiung.

The point of contact between poetry and mythology, or rather the fusion of the two, was mythology: die organische Einheit von Religion und Poesie.

All great poetry was mythological, or religious. The Bible itself, the most religious of books, was also the most poetical. Through its concrete imagery and its emotion God spoke to man in greatest fulness, and in them he was most vividly manifested. Not only

1 Unger op.cit.pp.422-423
2 Cf.'Biblische Betrachtungen'. The phrase quoted is Unger's / op.cit.p.208
3 Roth: Werke II p.36
4 Ibid. I p.414
5 Ibid. I p.120
6 Unger op.cit.p.256
in the Bible however, but in all great poetry - Homer, Shakespeare, Ossian, folk-song - religion and poetry are blended as revelation, the poet expressing mythologically, in symbol, the reality and the activity of God. A failure to understand this conception will lead to the erroneous view that Herder's interest in the Bible was exclusively, or mainly, aesthetic.\(^1\) The truth is that for Hamann and for Herder the distinction between the aesthetic and the religious was meaningless. True revelation, in nature, history or art, was poetry; true poetry revelation.

A few minor points in Hamann's world-outlook which coincide with, and perhaps influenced similar views in Herder ought perhaps to be mentioned, especially the firm belief in providence and the sense of retributive justice. Providence for Hamann meant not merely a general activity of God in the world, but a special control of God over even individual events:

\[\text{ohne eine individuelle Vorsehung kann Gott weder Regent des Weltalls noch Richter des Menschen sein.}^2\]

How Herder, in spite of his Pantheism, came to a very similar view will be considered a little later. From the above sentence it will be seen that providence and judgment with Hamann clearly hang together, and Hamann recognises that the world is so constituted and ordered by God that all human activities are within the scope of a retributive justice. Hamann insists, as Herder was later to do, that there is a retributive activity in nature and in history themselves, quite apart from any transcendental judgment:

\[\text{Die Natur und das Glück thut nichts umsonst; beide sind}\]

\(^1\) As V. Storr: The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century p. 166
\(^2\) Roth: Werke IV p. 414
Töchter und Hände Gottes zu Wohlthaten und Strafen. 1

No direct connection between Hamann and Herder can be traced upon either of these points, but even when allowance is made for the general currency of such views the similarity is suggestive and not insignificant.

Quite apart from his own direct influence, Hamann also opened up to Herder the whole field of English literature, not only inspiring him with his own enthusiasm, but teaching him English (with 'Hamlet' as text-book) and thus revealing to him the glories and the greatness of Shakespeare and initiating him into the aesthetic works of Shaftesbury and Young. The early works of Herder, those works which link him with the Sturm und Drang, 2 testify to the powerful effects of this orientation: a new theory of genius, a glorifying of the mediaeval and the national in art and architecture, a stress upon the need for natural, organic development, a search for emotional depth, a conception of the Godhead as creative and destructive power immanent in both natural and human (especially poetic) activity: die wahre beseelte und beseelende Kraft, die brutal sieghafte Allmacht. 4

The Bardic and Germanic movement under Klopstock and Gerstenberg, so warmly espoused by Herder, 5 undoubtedly received its initial

1 Roth: Werke VII p.393  
2 Cf. the 'Fragmente', 'Kritische Wälder', 'Denkmal an Thomas Abbt', the essays in 'Von deutscher Art und Kunst'  
3 A conception common to all the Sturm und Drang writers, and one closely connected with the theories as to genius or the 'Démon' (Cf. Goethe's 'Egmont'). It underlies the 'Promethas' of Goethe, the 'Landplagen' and essay on 'Götz' of Lenz.  
4 H.Kindermann: J.M.R.Lenz und die Romantik p.30  
5 A.Gillies: Herder und Ossian. Up to the 'Reise' Herder was guilty of that confusion of the Germans with the Celts which in large part underlay this movement (pp.64-66)
impulse and its inspiration from Macpherson's 'Ossian', whilst
the new historical studies of Winckelmann in the field of Greek
art,\(^1\) and Möser in a more general field,\(^2\) acquired a fresh signif-
icance in the light of the theories of Shaftesbury, Young and
Blackwell.

It has already been pointed out that during his Riga days
Herder betrayed a strong inclination to break away from the more
narrowly religious influence of Hamann in the direction of an
empiricist-Neo logical standpoint, an inclination which is most
clearly manifest in the naturalistic sketch, 'Skizze der Archäologie
der Ebräer', and above all in the essay 'Ueber den Ursprung der
Sprache', an essay which evoked a strong protest from Hamann and
was the occasion of a temporary breach between the two friends.\(^3\)
Herder however - and this is an extremely important point - did not
in any way modify his Sturm und Drang poetic conceptions, in spite
of the strong pressure exerted by Nicolai,\(^4\) and Haym is almost
certainly right when, as it were incidentally, he ascribes the
changed attitude of Herder towards Hamann largely to the influence
of Rousseau,\(^5\) whom Herder had of course read under the enthusiast-
ic Kant,\(^6\) and whose poetic naturalism offered an attractive alter-
native to the revelational immanence of Hamann.

For a man of the emotional temperament of Herder, with
all the early enthusiasm for the Bible and Homer, the feeling for

\(^{1}\) Winckelmann: Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums (1764)
\(^{2}\) Möser: Osnabrückische Geschichte (1765)
\(^{3}\) See Roth: Werke IV pp.1-96 for Hamann's criticisms.
\(^{4}\) Up to 1769 Herder was in friendly correspondence with Nic-
olai and contributed reviews to the Allgemeine deutsche
\(^{5}\) H.I.pp.341 ff.
\(^{6}\) See the Brief an Scheffner (Riga:23 Sept.1766; also 4 Oct)
J.G.von Herders Lebensbild (Erlangen 1846)I ii p.193
nature, the belief in genius, the sense of God everywhere active, a rationalistic Deism alone was out of the question. It was inevitable that Herder should be found somewhere in the emotional stream which was beginning to flow so strongly at this time. The real question before Herder in Riga and during the 'Reise' seems to have been this: How far could he go with Hamann in holding to a more specifically Christian irrationalism, with the belief in a concrete revelation, the assertion of the fall of man (a terrible stumbling-block for Herder), and the maintaining of the literal truth of the Genesis narratives, and how far could he find in the broader naturalism of Rousseau, which at so many points offered a complete contrast to Hamann, an alternative which would at once satisfy his Empiricism, his historicoc-genetic view of the world, and his own personal demand for a poetico-religious faith?

Once Herder was freed from personal contact with Hamann, it seemed for a time as though the influence of Rousseau would prevail, although still counter-balanced at certain points by that of Hamann. In Rousseau Herder found a hatred of the over-reflective, over-sophisticated modern age. In Rousseau he found a naturalistic interpretation of society which agreed well with his own expounding of speech and literature in terms of natural growth. In Rousseau he found a sense of the conditioning power of environment: les puissants effets de la diversité du climat;

1 Unger op.cit.p.337
2 'Alternative' is not used in the sense of a strict either-or. It is wrong to over-emphasise the chronological succession also, since the period of the close friendship with Hamann coincided with perhaps the greatest Rousseau enthusiasm (H.I.p.339)
3 Unger op.cit.p.212
4 In the two 'Discours': 'Sur les Sciences et les Arts' and 'Sur l'Inégalité' (Oeuvres I pp.127 ff.)
5 Sur l'Inégalité (Oeuvres IX p.152)
a power which no human institutions, not even religion,\(^1\) were able to escape. In Rousseau he found a relative judgment of religious faiths which allowed a measure of truth to all:

\[
\text{des religions peuvent toutes avoir leurs raisons.}^2
\]

In Rousseau he found a profound feeling for the immanence of God, especially in the world of nature,

\[
\text{non seulement dans les cieux qui roulent, non seulement dans moi-même, mais dans la brebis qui pait, dans l'oiseau qui vole, dans la pierre qui tombe, dans la feuille qu'emporte le vent.}^3
\]

In Rousseau he found an optimistic, in a wise and competent government of the world (par une volonté puissante et sage').\(^4\) In Rousseau he found an insistence that true religion is not of the mind or reason, but of the heart:

\[
\text{le culte que Dieu demande est celui du coeur;}^5
\]

\[
\text{je le vois, ou plutôt, je le sens.}^6
\]

In Rousseau, finally, he found a perfect faith in human nature as essentially, apart, that is to say, from the corrupting influence of society, essentially innocent and good.\(^7\)

That Rousseau did for a time exercise a very powerful and in some respects a permanent influence upon Herder, as upon the majority of his contemporaries, it is impossible to deny, since that influence is reflected in all his earlier writings, and espec-

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1. Emile IV (Oeuvres IX p.152)
2. Ibid., loc. cit.
3. Ibid., p.45
4. Ibid., p.49
5. Ibid., p.110
6. Ibid., pp.50-51
7. See the first 'Discours'. McEachran (op.cit.p.3) attributes to Herder an early faith in the goodness of man. He does not substantiate this statement, but this faith appears in the Riga sermons of which 'Menschheit' was the main theme (Abschiedsrede! M.R.u.T.X p.288). Here perhaps is the widest divergence from Hamann, who knew the weakness of man: 'die Schwäche des Willens und das Naturreich des Bösen' (Unger op.cit.p.163)
ially in those of the Bückeburg period. At the same time the claim of Joret, correct as a bald statement of fact, is in its implications surely extravagant.

Tout montre (he asserts) à quel point Herder était pénétré des écrits de Rousseau.¹ Fester maintains that as a matter of fact Herder, in his reaction against all things French, even became antagonistic towards Rousseau during the stay in Nantes,² and Gillies rightly points out that at Bückeburg he made a full and penitent return to the general position of Hamann.³ Much of the influence of Rousseau remained, of course, especially the belief in the goodness of man, never really abandoned by Herder,⁴ but in effect the Bückeburg period marks a victory of the supranaturalism of Hamann over the optimistic naturalism of Rousseau. This victory is recognised and deplored by Haym, who notes with disapproval Herder's intimacy with the pietistic circles at this time, notably with Lavater and Klessner.⁵

The important question must be asked why it was that Hamann prevailed over Rousseau at a period when Herder was clearly attracted to the wider movement of Rationalism and Empiricism, and when Rousseau seemed to offer the most satisfying synthesis. Two general reasons, both put forward by Haym, help in part to explain the reaction: first, Herder's disappointment with the French as a decadent nation;⁶ second, the preponderant effect of living contact with Hamann as compared with a mere reading, however enth-

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1 This claim is quoted with approval by M.E.Sandbach in a useful article 'Herder's Contribution to Nineteenth Century Thought'(Church Quarterly Review 38(I) p.303 Jan.1927)
2 R.Fester: Rousseau und die deutsche Geschichtsphilosophie p.45
3 Gillies: op.cit.p.193
4 But see M.Doerne: Die Religion in Herders Geschichtsphilosophie p.123
5 H.T.p.708; p.746
6 H.T.p.311 and f.
-usiastic, of Rousseau. At one important point, too, Herder found himself in complete and utter disagreement with Rousseau, maintaining consistently that man is by nature a gregarious animal, and thus ranging himself with Shaftesbury and Hume against Rousseau. Herder again refused to see in man merely a higher development of the animal species.

One or two other factors, which were probably of far greater significance, must, however, be borne in mind. First, Herder had had as a constant companion upon the sea-voyage a copy of 'Ossian', and the 'Reise' marked the high-water-mark of his Ossian-enthusiasm. Second, upon the journey North from France Herder underwent a soul-shattering personal experience when the ship upon which he was travelling ran aground upon a sand-bank off the Dutch coast during a night of wind and storm, and only after weary and anxious hours of waiting, during which Herder read the epic 'Fingal', were the passengers finally rescued. This was without doubt the decisive factor, since this experience plunged Herder back into an elemental world, of which neither the 'philosophes' nor even Rousseau took any real account, and in which Hamann, the Bible, Homer and Ossian alone could suffice. It is astonishing how little importance has been attached by Haym to this catastrophe, and Gillies has recently done good service by emphasising the importance of the role played by the events of that night, inexplicable in the terms of a merely Rationalistic theology, in the

1 H.I.p.344
2 S.V.p.112
3 S.V.p.94. Fester (op.cit.pp.45-53) stresses this point.
4 Gillies: Herder und Ossian p.16 and f.
5 Ibid.p.17-22
directing and moulding of Herder's thought. That Herder himself attributed his deliverance to an almost miraculous intervention on the part of Providence is clearly evidenced by the 'Erinnerungen' of his wife, Caroline von Herder:

oft erzählte er mit lebendigem Gefühl des Dankes zur Vorsehung die Geschichte dieser gefährvollen Nacht.

This point is borne out by the constant assertion of a belief in Providence in Herder's own works, and by his stress at Bückeburg upon an almost orthodox conception both of God's control of history and of his direct revelation of himself in history and in the Bible:

A further personal experience of great importance in Herder's life, following as it did upon the ship-wreck and the humiliating treatment as tutor to the Prince of Eutin, and coinciding with the engagement to Caroline and an extreme loneliness at Bückeburg, was the friendship and the deep spiritual intimacy with the pietistic Countess Maria, through whom, to quote again Caroline,

Herder wurde mit dem Geist und Gang einer Religion des Herzens vertrauter und versöhnter.

All Herder's tastes, enthusiasms, views and friendships during the Bückeburg years bear witness to a great emotional and religious reaction. In his loneliness, isolated from Caroline and all his friends, at odds with the Count, viewed with suspicion in town and court, he found a new joy and comfort in nature. Ossian was still his companion:

1 Gillies: Herder and Pascal (Modern Languages Review XXVII 1949) p.53
2 M.P.u.G.XXI p.132
3 This subject is treated more fully below Chapter V.2.
4 M.P.u.G.XXI p.62
5 H.I.p.471. Haym somewhat caustically describes the Bückeburg life as 'ein romantisches Leben als Einsiedler Philosoph und Schäfer'.
er wandelte durch die Wälder, einen Dichter, oft Ossian, in der Tasche.  

With his new and intense religious convictions Herder devoted himself to a close study of the Bible as the book of revelation, and in particular to the early chapters of Genesis as the key to a true understanding of human history. It is significant that Luther, always admired by Herder, now became a favourite hero, Herder having the aspiration, in the 'Provinzialblätter,' himself to play the part of a second Luther in German theological and ecclesiastical life. Gillies has recently shown that Pascal (to whose 'Lettres provinciales' the title ('Provinzialblätter' is a deliberate allusion) was also much in his thoughts, and that Herder saw in his development and thought a great similarity to his own. Pascal, coupled together in the same sentence with the mystic Jacob Böhme, is described by Herder as 'ein Riesenmann von Einbildung und Ur-theil.' The friendships of Herder are also significant. In addition to the intimacy with the Countess, and of course Caroline, he renewed by correspondence the association with Hamann, the surviving letters of Hamann (up to his death), and one or two of Herder's, being accessible in the Roth edition. Most noteworthy of all is the close, if not permanent, friendship with Lavater, caustically labelled by Haym 'der genialer Prophet aller frommen Schwärmer.' Herder's literary activity was directed in these

3 Gillies loc. cit.
4 S.VII pp. 276ff; 303ff.
5 Gillies: Herder and Pascal (Mod. Lang. Rev. XXXVII 1 pp. 55ff)
6 S. VII p. 319
7 Roth: Werke V etc.
8 H.I.p. 503
years almost exclusively into theological channels, this being the period of the 'Älteste Urkunde', the commentaries upon John and James and Jude, and the exposition of the Apocalypse. Until the renewed acquaintance with Goethe at Weimar Herder lived through a period of almost orthodox, pietistic faith, in which the lessons of Rationalism and Empiricism were not forgotten, but applied to an examination of history in terms of divine revelation and of divine purpose.

Haym is undoubtedly right when he points out that at Weimar, with the end of the lonely Bückeburg life, the break with Lavater, the renewed friendship with Goethe, perhaps most of all the death of Hamann (1788), Herder moved completely away from the narrow, pietistic circle in which his thinking had been confined during these years. At the same time he surely underestimates both the reality of Herder's deeper religious life and conviction, and the abiding influence of the Bückeburg experience. The fact is that from 1770 onwards all Herder's work (apart from the purely literary) has a religious orientation; that even in the 'Ideen' and in the Spinoza essay 'Gott', in which the philosophical element is so strong; even in the later neological writings and the bolder handleings of Biblical books (in the 'Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend', 'Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie' etc.): in all these the basic thought remains unaltered, the self-revelation of God, immanent, and fulfilling his will, in all his works. The 'Ideen' and 'Gott' are indeed no more than historical and philosophical expositions of this religious and theological conception, a conception the origin of which is to be sought in early youth, especially in the first contact with Hamann, and the predominance of
which may be ascribed, partly no doubt to the aesthetic, but more particularly to the religious experiences and enthusiasms of the Königsberg, Riga and Bückeburg days.

Already the approach of Herder to the philosophy of history has been discussed from the philosophical standpoint, and it has been seen that Empiricism determined the method, an Immanentism compounded of Leibniz, Shaftesbury and Spinoza the general trend of the philosophical thinking. The truth is now clear that the underlying urge, the deeper impulse, was poetic, and above all religious: the desire to understand the literature of primitive untrammelled genius; the feeling that God is present as an active indwelling force in literature itself, in the whole history of humanity, in nature; the struggle to comprehend all life both of man and of nature as a whole in terms of a revelation of immanent Godhead. Once this point has been grasped, it is possible to move on to a fuller understanding of Herder's philosophy of history itself, and to an estimation of the contribution made by Herder to the historical thought and the theology of Romanticism.
PART I  HERDER'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

...
1. **CONTINUITY**  It was by the two major influences, that of Empiricism on the one hand, which taught him to observe cause and effect, that of Leibniz-Shaftesbury-Spinoza on the other, which taught him to conceive of the world as a unity in God, that Herder was impelled towards the first of his primary philosophical principles, that of the continuity, or solidarity, of the universe, and of the interconnectedness of its history. XVIII century thought in Europe as a whole had moved steadily towards this principle.¹ Behind Leibniz' monadic scale, behind Shaftesbury's conception of nature, behind Buffon's natural history, behind the histories of Montesquieu and Voltaire, Hume, Gibbon and Ferguson: behind all these there had lain a sense of the oneness either of nature or of history, or indeed of both. Herder inherited the suggestions of all who had preceded him, and by a process of assimilation and transmutation he was able to weld them into a single principle of continuity. For him all phenomena, from those of inorganic nature (earth, soil and solar bodies) to those of the spiritual world, were links in the one chain of being. Herder broke down all the barriers which had been erected between the inorganic and the organic, the material and the spiritual. Everything in nature was seen to be a part of the one whole, and to belong to everything else. Although differences were not denied, in a world monistically conceived a fundamental continuity was discerned.

Already this thought had appeared in embryonic form in the earlier writings. Herder had, for example, introduced into the lit-

¹ Dilthey: Das achttzehnte Jahrhundert und die geschichtliche Welt Gesammelte Schriften III pp. 210 ff.
ery world such physical considerations as geography, climate and physiology, in an endeavour to understand each work according to the circumstances in which it had been produced. It was this sense of oneness too which in the 'Journal meiner Reise' underlay, not only the visionary comparisons of submarine life with human society, but also that grand conception which Herder had of a work upon the whole development of the human race and of its culture:

ein Werk über das Menschengeschlecht, die Kultur der Erde;¹ a work in which man was to be related to the rest of creation as but one link in the great chain of creatures ('in der grossen Kette von Geschöpfen'²).

The same principle was fundamental to both those special studies which must be regarded as in a very real sense preliminary investigations of an historico-philosophical character, the essays 'Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache' and 'Vom Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele'. When he came to investigate the phenomenon of speech Herder postulated at the very outset a connection between the primitive emotional cries of men and the sounds of animals - even in respect of speech it could not be said that man was unique or an isolated creature apart: indeed through speech sympathy was established with other creatures:

schon als Tier hat der Mensch Sprache;³ (er) ist nicht allein, sondern mit der ganzen Natur im Bunde.⁴

Herder found proof of this early inter-connection in the tongues of the primitive East.⁵ At the same time Herder carefully avoided a pure

¹ M.P.u.G.XXI p.178
² Ibid.loc. cit.
³ S.V p.5
⁴ Ibid.p.6
⁵ Ibid.pp.9-10
Naturalism, and attacked Condorcet and Rousseau, who saw in speech no more than a refinement of animal sounds, with just as much vigour as he did Süßmilch, (and through him Hamann), who had advanced a supernatural explanation. Herder developed the theory of continuity in rather a different direction. Speech was for him a potentiality latent in man as such, a potentiality which became actuality with the development of the powers of reflection and reason, with which it was indissolubly bound:

schafts der Vernunft kann ohne Sprache zu nehmen.

Three further points deserve notice: first, that speech itself grows from the primitive and concrete (ie. in early tongues) to the abstract and formal (ie. in modern languages), this growth accompanying the social development from the family and the tribe to the nation; secondly, that all speech is derived ultimately from the utterances of the first parents of the race ('das erste Menschenpaar'), a solidarity of the race in speech thus being asserted; thirdly, that the particular development of speech in any one country is carefully related to the modifying influences of environment, not only of geography and climate, but also of social and political conditions.

1 This point is important in view of the alleged Evolutionism of Herder.
2 S.V. pp.19; 21; 38
3 The whole work is a polemic against Süßmilch (Cf. pp.106 ff)
4 Hamann was provoked to indignant reply (Roth: Werke IV pp.6 ff)
5 S.V. p.28
6 Ibid. p.40
7 Ibid. pp.56-57; pp.78 ff.
8 Ibid. pp.113 ff.
9 Ibid. loc. cit.
10 Cf. Ibid. p.134 'So wie das menschliche Geschlecht ein progressives Ganze von einem Ursprung; so auch alle Sprache. Also p.115 'Das menschliche Geschlecht ist ein innigverbundenes Ganze'.
11 Ibid. p.125
The essay 'Vom Erkennen und Empfinden', which is extant in three forms, is concerned with the origin and nature of knowledge and emotion, and here again themes of a great historico-philosophical importance are developed. Knowledge itself is investigated as a psycho-physiological problem. The body is related by Herder to the soul as its outward expression:

der Körper ist ein Analogon, ein Spiegel, ein ausgedrücktes Bild der Seele.

Psychological characteristics, although not derived from, are intimately related to physiological:

der Muthdes Löwen liegt in seinem inneren Bau.

Knowledge and emotion themselves are seen by Herder to be fundamentally one, and are studied in relation to their mutual interaction, ihr Einfluss aufeinander und auf Charakter und Genie des Menschen.

Most significant of all, a common principle is seen to underlie both human emotions and also impulses of animals and the attractions and repulses of inorganic matter (e.g., in magnetism).

Haym sums up the whole essay and its teaching in a comprehensive sentence:

ein Faden, ein Gesetz, eine Entwicklung, das Geistige naturlicher, die Naturwirksamkeit vergeistigt, die Seelenlehre mit dem Mark der Physiologie verbunden.

The thought of attraction and repulsion as the basic pattern of all

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1 S.VIII pp. 236 ff. The three forms were: 'Übers Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele' (1774); 'Vom Erkennen und Empfinden: den zwei Hauptkräften der menschlichen Seele' (1775); 'Vom Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele' (1778).
2 There is on this point a strong criticism of Leibniz.
3 S.VIII p. 239
4 Ibid. p. 276
5 This is the general theme of the Second Part (1778).
6 Ibid. pp. 272 ff. The work of Haller is mentioned by Herder.
7 H.I. p. 672.
activity, both material and spiritual, was further developed in a smaller essay, 'Üeber Liebe und Selbsttheit', dated 1772 and written under the inspiration of Hemsterhuis.

In these works Herder had treated historical problems in the wider sense only incidentally, in so far as the development of speech and literature was bound up with historical movement as a whole. The evidence is not wanting to show that already in his fertile mind the outlines of a vast and all-embracing history of man, and indeed of the whole universe, had begun to take form. Two pedagogical sketches, the 'Grundriss des Unterrichts für einen jungen Adeligen' (1774) and the earlier 'Ideal einer Schule' (1769)

are of importance in this connection. Herder's approach in both these outlines is thoroughly historical. The subject of instruction is the universe in its successive manifestations, and a knowledge and understanding of it are sought by means of an historical survey, in which the history of man is merged into natural science, natural science into a cosmic history (geography and physics), and cosmic history into a great theological history, the self-revelation of God in all His works:

(die) Offenbarung Gottes in der Natur.

During the Bückeburg years Herder applied himself to a more

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1 See M. Montgomery: Studies in the Age of Goethe (IV) pp. 90 ff. The essay was printed (in French) with Hemsterhuis' 'Lettre sur les Désirs' under the title 'De l'Amour et de l'Egoisme par J.J. (sic.) Herder'. Montgomery notes (p. 90 n. 1.) that in Hemsterhuis Herder found a discussion of the likeness and unlikeness of man and the beasts, a vexed question of the

2 M. P. X. pp. 282-324. The Riga work is in the form of a school-time-table arranged for three years. Both reflect the strong pedagogical interest of Herder, who taught at Königsberg and Riga and was tutor to the Prince

3 Ibid. p. 290
4 Ibid. p. 317
5 Ibid. p. 288
particular study of the human race itself as a separate entity, his
special interest being now in the early origins. The first conclusions
were set forth in the two works 'Auch eine Philosophie der Ge-
schichte zur Bildung der Menschheit'(1774) and 'Die älteste Urkunde
des Menschengeschlechts'(1774 and 1776). In these studies Herder did
not make any general attempt to relate man to the phenomena of nature;
but even with the closer concentration upon the history of man himself
a larger continuity was still assumed; and the relationship of man
with both higher and lower forms of life was at many points asserted:

der Mensch ist mit allen unsichtbaren, durch die ganze Schöpfung
wirkenden Wesen in Verbindung; er ist das sichtbar gewordenes
Glied einer unendlichen, unsichtbaren Kette;¹
(im Anfang) erschien er doch nur als Thier der Erde; er stand
mit seinen Brüdern....in der Klasse der Erdthiere.²

A link between the creatures was perceived in the common act of nutrit
ion, by which the lower forms became the substance of and were assim-
ilated into the higher: durch Speise wird der Staub Pflanze, die
Pflanze Thier, das Thier Mensch und der Mensch Engel.³

Additional confirmation of an ultimate oneness was found in such other
minor things as the early friendship of man and the beasts,⁴ man's re-
lationship to the two worlds,⁵ and the inter-connection of sin and its
physiological counterpart, shame.⁶

The leading thought of these two works was, however, not the
relationship of the human race as a part to the whole, but the unity
and solidarity of that race within itself. As he now surveyed the
civilisations and cultures in all their variety, Herder did not fail
to find in and through them an ultimate unity. In the 'Auch eine Phil-

¹ S.VI p.497
² S.VII p.8
³ Ibid.p.31
⁴ Ibid.pp.37-39
⁵ Ibid.pp.17-18
⁶ Ibid.p.90
-osophie' and in the 'Alteste Urkunde' alike, as in the earlier essay on speech, Herder accepted in a literal sense the origin of the race in a single individual, or pair, and the spreading abroad of the peoples from a common home in Central Asia, in which was lived the golden age of the race's childhood. The traditions of ancient peoples were sifted for evidence in support of this theory, all the stories being traced back to a hieroglyphic given to Adam in the Garden by God himself. It must not be supposed that Herder was here concerned merely to defend a Biblical doctrine. His anxiety was to emphasise the unity of mankind, on grounds of descent as well as of interrelated history. The race was for Herder a great organic growth, as a man or a tree, a natural phenomenon, as a mighty river, which, rising in insignificance at a single source, swells out into an ocean of peoples. The great ages of civilisation corresponded for Herder to the stages of growth in individual life: the Orient, the golden childhood; Egypt and Phoenicia, the boyhood; Greece, the lovely youth; Rome, maturity; the modern age, at once a new man and the full age of the old (the spreading of the tree, 'Äste und Zweige').

The comparisons used by Herder were not new. Fontenelle

1 S.V.p.477
2 S.VIIpp.32-33
3 S.V p.481
4 S.VI pp.288 ff. Seth for example is identified with Thetis and Thauut.
5 Ibid.pp.325 ff. Herder derives the Egyptian chronology /for example from Genesis I
6 S.V.p.512
7 Ibid.loc.cit.
8 Ibid.p.481
9 Ibid.p.487
10 Ibid.p.495
11 Ibid.p.499
12 Ibid.p.515
13 Ibid.pp.562-563
14 Ibid.p.528-529
had already pointed out that the alleged superiority of the Ancients was contrary to the law of growth: if a comparison is made des hommes de tous les siècles à un seul homme, cet homme a eu son enfance, sa jeunesse...et est maintenant dans l'âge de virilité.\footnote{Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes Oeuvres IV p.139}

Voltaire had compared men in their variety to trees: (la providence) les y a plantés comme des arbres.\footnote{Essai sur les Moeurs Oeuvres XIV p.6}

Condillac\footnote{De l'Étude de l'Histoire Oeuvres XV pp.66 ff.} and Iselin\footnote{K.Schulz: Die Vorbereitung der Geschichtsphilosophie Herders im achtenhnten Jahrhundert pp.60 ff.} had both discussed the application of the individual stages, childhood, youth and maturity, to the historical development of the race. Herder, however, did not merely adopt a common analogy. Seeing an oneness which was not outward and mechanical, but inward and organic, he applied the analogy with a new closeness and a new seriousness. How wide was the gulf which separated Herder from the French and British historians will only become evident later, but that a gulf did exist is already plain when their different conceptions of unity are considered. For Herder the human race was both like and was in fact an individual organic unity, just as ultimately, the multiplicity of phenomena notwithstanding, the universe itself was also such a unity.

It was this thought of continuity, or oneness, in its very widest sense, which was the directing thought of Herder's ripest work, the 'Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit'. The scope of this work, in which all the scattered ideas of the earlier writings were gathered into a comprehensive synthesis, is immense. Herder aimed, not only to interpret history as history (i.e. as the life and development of man), but also to merge the history of man into that of nature, and thus to set forth a philosophy of history.
which was also a philosophy of nature and a theodicy. Human history itself was still envisaged as a unity, but it was now built up upon a solid basis of natural science and physiology.¹ This inter-connection of the historical and the natural had of course underlain the previous works, especially those upon literature, speech and psychology, but it was now set forth in fulness, as a principle fundamental to Herder's interpretation both of human history and of the universe.

The arrangement of the 'Ideen' indicates clearly the way in which Herder was now seeking to relate history, the part, to the universe, the larger whole. The first book was devoted exclusively by Herder to a consideration of the home of the race, the earth, from the astronomical, geological, meteorological and geographical point of view. Contemplating at the outset the larger universe, Herder found within the inexhaustible diversity a wonderful unity:

> ein Chor der Harmonie, eine Kraft im System der Kräfte, ein Wesen in der unabsehblichen Harmonie der Welt Gottes.²

The spherical shape of the solar bodies was seen by Herder to be conducive to this unity with variety, since it made possible

> Einheit, und doch Mannichfaltigkeit und Vielheit der Abänderungen.³

As he discussed the natural convulsions which in the geological periods had engulfed the world, Herder discerned an ascending scale of activity: die Luft, das Feuer, das Wasser, die Erde, Pflanzen-Thier-und Menschenorganisation.⁴

A rapid preliminary sketch was given of the disposition and main characteristics of the continents, in which Herder was careful to point out the influence of geographical factors upon historical development.

¹ H. II p. 207
² Id. I p. 61
³ Ibid. pp. 67-68
⁴ Ibid. p. 78
special emphasis being always upon the close interrelationship of the history of man with that of nature, the subject of this book.1

The two books which follow are an exposition at length and in detail of the more particular interrelationships between plants and animals on the one hand, man on the other. The principles of life common to all forms are noted: birth from a seed;2 the impulse to reproduction;3 the necessity of nutrition.4 A physiological similarity between the animals and man is driven home: der Menschen ältere Brüder sind die Thiere.5

For Herder (the influence of Buffon, and more especially of Goethe, must be borne in mind 6) man himself occupied the position of an archetype: he was the 'Hauptform' towards which all the others were tending, the 'Mittelgeschöpf' of which other creatures were the 'disjecta membra poetica'.7 The existence of common impulses and capacities, and the general similarity of structure 8 were adduced in support of this theory. In a further discussion of this point in the third book the common features nutrition and reproduction were again mentioned, this time in relation to the common

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1 For the more particular geographical sketch, see Id.pp.35f.
2 Ibid.p.66
3 Ibid.p.69
4 Ibid.p.75
5 Ibid.p.78
6 Buffon had devoted a full section of the 'Histoire naturelle' to a discussion of the 'Ressemblances et Différences entre l'Homme et les Animaux'. Goethe, like Herder, postulated a common form, first in the plant world ('Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen') and later in that of the animals and man('Entwurf einer vergleichenden Anatomie'); this form being the original pattern ('Typus') of which the species are variations. See Werke XXVII pp.12 ff. and 201f.
7 Id.I pp.38 f.
8 Ibid.pp.97 ff.
structural forms imposed by them.¹ A connection was traced between fibres in plant life, the muscles of the animals and the nervous system of man.² Many examples were given in illustration not only of the similarity of the animal and the human structure³ but also of the purposive adaptation of physical structure to the conditions of life necessary for the preservation of the species.⁴

Two points are quite clear from the introduction: first, that Herder explained all forms of life ultimately in terms of one factor, creative power; second, that there was no exclusion of man from the general natural order. At the same time Herder made it perfectly plain that between man and the rest of creation differences of a very radical character did exist. The continuity for which he was contending was not that of a crass Materialism or Naturalism which would ignore all but the biological and physiological factors. In Herder's conception man was seen differ from other organisations both in form and also in purpose.⁵ The upright posture was for Herder the distinguishing characteristic of, and impulse towards, the higher calling of man.⁶ Although very close similarities were observed between man and other animals, especially some types of apes and the orang-outang⁷('eine Gleichförmigkeit im Innern und Aussern')⁸, man yet stood upon a plane both higher than, and also different from, that upon

¹ Id.I pp.98 ff.
² Ibid.p.111
³ Ibid.pp.117 ff.;127 ff.
⁴ Ibid.pp.127 ff.
⁵ Id.I Books III:4 and IV
⁷ The discovery of the orang-outang had raised quite a ripple of excitement. Some fancied for the time that here were 'de véritables hommes sauvages' (Rousseau:Oeuvres I p.213 n.10). Herder wrote in refutation of this view.
⁸ Id.I p.185
which the four-footed beasts were to be placed. The great gulf
which separated man from the animal world was this: that man was a
creature, not of instinct and of nature, but of reason and of
freedom,\textsuperscript{1} capable of a true society, and of cultural and spiritual
attainment. The upright posture, with the uplifted head, was at
once the mark of and a physiological impulse to this higher spiritual
vocation and purpose.\textsuperscript{2}

Herder, it must be noticed, did not at this point abandon the principle of continuity, but rather extended and developed it. Man, the creature of freedom, still belonged to the world of nature (as its crown), because the power which worked through human freedom was still that same power which in the animals worked through instinct, the one creative power, self-manifested in a progressive series of created forms ('in einer Reihe aufsteigender Formen und Kräfte'\textsuperscript{3}), and equally purposeful in all in relation to the complexity of the structure attained. In man, the most complex of all the creatures, the highest manifestation was possible; possible because in him all the other forms were brought together in a single harmonious organism. The calling of man as a free creature is at once that which differentiates him from the animals and that which links him most closely to them, because the purpose of nature can only be achieved in and through him in virtue of the fact that physiologically he is a combination of all that is most useful and purposeful in all forms:

\begin{quote}
sein Bau ist aus den niedrigen Reichen zusammengesetzt.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Id.I pp.135 ff.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid.p.201
\item \textsuperscript{3} Ibid.p.265
\item \textsuperscript{4} Ibid.p.267
\end{itemize}
The fact that spiritual development was introduced into nature itself with and through man enabled Herder, not only, with Leibniz, to postulate a ladder of being which expanded from the world of pure nature to that of pure spirit, but also, over against Leibniz, to shatter that dualism of matter and mind which had dominated European thought for the last century. The body, for Herder, was a medium which at once was adapted for, and itself made possible and even exercised an influence upon, the life of the spirit. At the same time the body was in its own right a manifestation (on a lower plane of being) of that same power which was seen to be operative in and through physical and spiritual structures alike. In man the individual creature, body and soul were inseparably united; in man the species the physical and the spiritual in the universe as a whole were brought and linked together. Looking upon the world from the standpoint of a naturalistic immanentism, Herder found any attempt either to set body and soul over against each other, or to absorb the one into the other, intolerable.

A few words ought to be said about the less grandiose, but no less relevant, application of the principle of continuity to history in its purer and restricted sense. The leading theme of the 'Auch eine Philosophie', the unity of the race, was further developed in the 'Ideen'. Herder did not attempt to deny that the nations presented a bewilderingly varied spectacle, and differences of colour, physique, language, custom and culture were all recognised: but the conviction was unshaken that in the variety there was also a unity:

in so verschiedener Form das Menschengeschlecht auf der Erde erscheint, so ists doch Ein' und dieselbe Menschengattung.  

1 Id.I pp.308 ff.  
2 Id.II pp.4 ff.  
3 Ibid.p.73
The peoples differ, but only in the sense that they are the copies of the same original:

Schattierungen eines und desselben Gemäldes.\(^1\)

Many forces, both organic and environmental, are at work to produce variations, but in type, and indeed in origin, the race is nevertheless a unity. All the nations have sprung originally from the one source, gone out from the one home and inherited the one tradition:\(^2\)

das Menschengeschlecht sollte aus einem Blut am Leitfaden einer Tradition werden.\(^3\)

The Mosaic tradition in Genesis, although more freely interpreted, was still accepted as the purest form of the primitive tradition,\(^4\) a tradition upon which the religions and cultures of all the peoples, from China to Persia and the West, were seen to be based.\(^5\) The comparison of the race to a single individual was consciously abandoned in the 'Ideen', on the grounds that it imposed an impossibly narrow schematisation,\(^6\) but a common development, tradition and destiny were still ascribed to the race.

The less important, but extensive later or casual writings add little to that which has already emerged; but everywhere they serve to confirm Herder's belief in the continuity of all phenomena. The solidarity of the race was affirmed, once more:

wir arbeiten und dulden...für einander...und für das ganze Geschlecht

The interconnectedness of human life was frequently noticed:

1 Id., II p. 81
2 Ibid. pp. 209 ff.
3 Ibid. p.
4 Ibid. p. 313
5 Ibid. pp. 305 ff.
6 Ibid. I p. 2 (Vorrede)
7 M.P.u.G. XIV p. 130
es gibt Verbindungen, da das Schicksal eines Menschen durch ein Naturgesetz an das Schicksal des andern geknüpft ist.

It was stated as an important law that individuals perish, but the race survives: Menschen sterben, aber die Menschheit perennirt unsterblich.

The old schematisation: 'Kindes-Jünglings-Mannesalter' was revived in relation to the development of single nations. A stress was laid upon the inter-dependence of history and events in the physical world:

die grössten Revolutionen des Menschengeschlechts hingen von Erfindungen, oder von Revolutionen der Erde ab ((Klimate können sich ändern u. sw.).

Comments were made upon the alleged inter-relationships of man and the beasts in Monboddo's system, in which men were supposed once to have lived 'thierähnlich', and the common conception of the universe as itself an individual organism also reappeared. The theory of a progressive transmigration of souls gave to Herder a further opportunity to develop a favourite thesis, that the animals are preliminary adumbrations of man:

Halbbrüder....die zur Stufe höherer Wesen hinaufklimmen, and that man himself is that central type towards which even the insect structures point. In the 'Adrastea' those suggestions and researches of Leibniz which had contributed to the rise of a sense of continuity were commended, especially the theory of the monadic chain and the comparative treatment of languages as separate derivations from a single common form.

1 M.P.u.G.VIII p.19
2 Ibid.p.109
3 Ibid.p.119
4 Ibid.p.121
5 Ibid.p.117
6 Ibid.p.122
7 Ibid.p.222
8 Ibid.p.227
9 M.P.u.G.XII pp.19-23
How large a place the thought of continuity occupied in Herder's thinking will be evident from the fore-going discussion, but it must in conclusion be emphasised how important a place it was. Unless there is some continuity, whether within an orthodox faith, as with Bossuet, or even within a mechanistic determinism, as with Montesquieu, no philosophy of history is possible, and history cannot be more than the meaningless record of fortuitous accident and muddle. In his approach to history Herder was in any case forced, even if not consciously, to seek a unifying principle, and his work was bound, if it was to be more than a statement of determinism, to take ultimately the form of a theodicy. The achievement of Herder was that in his development of the monadic scale of Leibniz (now pantheistically conceived), he boldly envisaged a more comprehensive unity of being and purpose, a unity in which the natural and the historical, the physical and the spiritual, were brought together in one indissoluble whole. The continuity which Herder conceived was not merely historical, but universal in its scope, not outward and transcendental, but inward and immanent in its character. All creation was the subject of history, which was itself the drama of immanent Godhead. The way towards a philosophy of history more comprehensive and ambitious than any hitherto attempted was thus pioneered.

1 As it largely appears in Voltaire's cynical 'Essai sur les Moeurs'.
2 For a believer in God 'philosophy of history' and 'theodicy' must mean much the same thing. Hegel made this point in his 'Philosophie der Geschichte': Unsere Betrachtung ist eine Theodicee' (WerkeIX p.19); Fester has since termed it 'eine Rechtfertigung Gottes' (op.cit.p.263). In this connection it is illuminating to reflect that the underlying and decisive difference between Herder and Bossuet was the difference in the conception of God.
2. **Organic Growth**  
In one form or another the idea of the continuity of events and of the solidarity of man was common to all the historical writers of Herder's period.¹ In Germany itself, however, a further and very important development took place, that of a sense of the organic nature of historical movement. With Montesquieu, Gibbon, Voltaire or Hume the interconnectedness of events was noticed, but it was conceived of mechanistically: history was the interplay of forces, to a greater or lesser degree under the control of the human reason. Only in the Italian Vico at the beginning and, as Schulz maintains,² perhaps with some exaggeration, in the Scot Ferguson in the middle of the century, were there hints of a deeper and more satisfying conception.

In Germany the interpretation of history along organic rather than inorganic lines appeared first (apart from tentative suggestions in Iselin) in Möser and Winckelmann, both of whom spoke of unity and development in terms of natural growth. Möser compared the achievements of each nation to natural products, each culture thus differing from all others and being assessable only in its own right ("seinen Massstab in sich selbst habend"³). Winckelmann, whose special province was Greek sculpture, made it his aim to interpret and to explain classical culture as a natural growth in the light of conditioning factors.⁴ The growing importance attached by many writers, Montesquieu for example, to considerations of climate, geography and social and historical environment naturally favoured this interpretation, and all the German writers, Iselin,

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1 Dilthey op.cit.pp.210 ff.  
2 Schulz op.cit.pp 26 ff.  
3 Dilthey op.cit. p.250f.  
4 Ibid.loc.cit.
M"oser, Winckelmann, stressed these hitherto neglected factors.

Moser's point is with these pregnant words that Dilthey makes plain the position of Herder. Every influence upon Herder inclined him towards a genetic interpretation. The sense of continuity inherited from Leibniz and Shaftesbury, of a continuity far more profound than that of a mechanistic cause and effect, suggested naturally the analogy of the living organism, the plant, the animal, the individual man. Empiricism, which taught him to explain phenomena causally and in an observed development, impelled him to a study of historical phenomena in their origin and growth, a study in which conditioning factors and the laws of growth were to be taken into account. The aesthetico-religious Weltanschauung brought not only a deeper interest in origins and in the culture of the race's childhood, but also a feeling for the divine power creatively active in culture and in history. Finally the Leibnizian philosophy and the study of natural science introduced him also to the Pre-formation theory, the understanding of development as an unfolding of that already present in seed-form.

The genetic interpretation of history belongs, with the assertion of continuity, to the earliest stratum of Herder's thought. It appears in the first aesthetic writings, the cardinal principle of true criticism. The aim of the critic is in the literary forms to discover the genius of the people of which the form is the expression. For Herder the application of rational judgments to literature

1 Schulz op.cit.pp.60 ff.  2 Dilthey op.cit.p.267  3 Hume had compared the universe to 'an animal or an organised body'(Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion p.32). Although this work was translated by Hamann (by 1780) there is no evidence of any particular influence upon Herder at this point, and the comparison was not an uncommon one.  4 H.I.p.132f(Cf.S.I.p.20)
in accordance with some absolute is meaningless, since all works are natural phenomena and vary according to the genius which expresses itself and to the circumstances which have conditioned that expression. Speech, literature, culture: these are for Herder not formal, but living things. Winckelmann Herder hails enthusiastically, yet at two points he goes further: he denies that Greek art is an absolute and timeless ideal, and he extends the conditioning factors so that far more than climate, upon which Winckelmann had laid his main stress, is included. In particular Herder subordinates environmental factors to national genius, outward conditions to inward potentialities. In a discussion of taste Herder exemplifies the evolution of cultural phenomena along organic lines.

The Shakespeare essay of 1773, which marks the high-water point of Herder's literary work, is a magnificent exposition and application of the genetic principle. Herder rejects the attempt of Lessing to justify the drama of Shakespeare as a fulfilment of the classical rules, in spirit if not in letter. Shakespeare, he maintains, must be judged in and for himself. He can be understood only against the background of his own age and country:

nach Geschichte, nach Zeitgeist, Sitten, Meinungen, Sprache, Nationalvorurtheilen, Traditionen und Liebhabereien.

Unnaturally to compare Shakespeare with the Greeks, to judge the one by the other, is to be guilty of folly and vandalism:

1 H.I. p.140
2 Cf.S.II pp.119-124
4 Ibid p.254-254
5 Lessing: Die Litteraturbriefe (1759-1765)
6 S.V pp.216-217
With this work and its revolutionary approach to Shakespeare as the product of his own age and country, and as such supreme in his own right, a new era of Shakespeare study and appreciation dawned.

The principle thus set forth was not in Herder's mind limited to literature. It extended across the whole field of culture and of history. A hint of the vistas opening up was contained in the 'Skizze einer Archäologie', in which the Bible itself, as poetry, was drawn into the general genetic interpretation, and considered, as far as form was concerned, as a human production:

der Ausdruck seiner Zeit, Nation und Sprache.

The free treatment of Genesis ('eine mythische Naturlehre') makes it clear that the idea of looking upon the religious content in the same way, and thus of making the Bible relative as revelation, to other religious books, was already present. In the contemporaneous essay 'Ueber die verschiedenen Religionen', noteworthy for the fact that Hume's derivation of religion from hopes and fears - later abandoned, or greatly modified by Herder, - was adopted, Herder made a first attempt to study religion itself as an organic growth, and to set the Old Testament books against a general background of religious thought and experience. The haunting dream of the 'Journal meiner Reise' ('ein Werk über das menschliche Geschlecht, die Kultur'

1 S.V p.225
2 H.I. pp.276 ff.
3 S.VI p.35
4 Ibid. pp.1 ff.
5 H.I. pp.286 ff. Haym stresses particularly the influence of Hume at this period.
der Erde') indicates the extension in Herder's mind of the genetic principle to all the phenomena of life and of history. In the 'Journal' too, Herder is driven by the tales of the sailors to ask for 'eine genetische Erklärung des Wunderbaren'.

One of the main concerns of Herder's first literary work, the 'Fragmente', had been to show that a national language is the natural utterance of a people and the expression of its inner genius. In the years 1770-1771 Herder's attention was attracted to the deeper historical question as to the origin and growth of speech, and in the prize-essay 'Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache', already considered in relation to the principle of continuity, the concept of organic growth is applied and developed. Herder set aside both the supernaturalistic and the naturalistic solution. Speech originated not in a divine impartation, nor in animal cries, but in potentiality, through the working of those powers ('die verborgenen Kräfte der menschlichen Seele') which differentiate man from the beasts: understanding, reason and reflection. That speech as a capability was allied with other capabilities, such as reason, has already been seen, but now a further point must be noted, that these capabilities existed in man as potentialities by his very constitution as man. Speech, to take the example cited, was in its historical form the organic development of a potentiality of the soul. Thus the discovery of speech was for man natural:

(die) Erfindung der Sprache ist ihm natürlich.

1 M.P.u.G.XXI p.178
2 Ibid. p.139
3 S.Vwp.26f.
4 Ibid.p.23
5 Ibid.p.34
Indeed, in view of the purposiveness of nature:

die Natur gibt keine Kräfte umsonst, 1

speech was inevitable:

die Genesis der Sprache(war) ein so inneres Dringniss, wie der
Drang des Embryons zur Geburt. 2

The comparison here used is especially illuminating.

From the first then speech existed in seed-form, as potentiality. In its development, the growth from the seed, it was influenced necessarily by conditioning factors, and subject to the laws of growth, the movement being from the simple 3 (the first utterances in the garden, the early monuments and the concrete tongues of the East) to the highly complex 4 (the abstract and syntactical languages of the modern world). 5 At this point Herder made full allowance for external circumstances:

Clima, Luft und Wasser, Speise und Trank....Sitten, Treühung
der Familien durcb Entfernung, Wanderung, Familienhass. 6

He did not, however, concede that these were fundamental factors, refuting a purely naturalistic view:

die Meinung, dass die Sprache...eine natürliche Produkt-
ion ware... diese sich nur allmählich mit dem Menschen-
engeschlecht nach fremden Clitaten hingedogen....und verändert
hatte. 7

Speech developed hand in hand with reason under the primary impulse of inward power, conditioned certainly, but not determined by environment: diese erste, natürliche;" lebendige, menschliche Fort-
bildung der Sprache. 8

1 S.V p.93
2 Ibid.p.96
3 Ibid.pp.93 ff.; 134 ff.
4 Ibid.pp.70-83
5 It is interesting to notice that already in the 'Fragment' Herder had applied to speech the schema: Child-hood, Youth, / age, manhood.
6 S.V pp.125; 131
7 Ibid.pp.127-128
8 Ibid.p.107
In the essay 'Vom Erkennen und Empfinden' Herder applied
the genetic principle in very similar fashion to the two faculties,
knowledge and emotion, each of which was conceived of as a gradu-
ally unfolding potentiality. The sharp distinction between the pow-
ers of man and those of the rest of creation was, however, now dissolv-
ed, emotion, for instance, being related, as a higher develop-
ment, to cognate powers in the lower spheres, galvanism in inor-
ganic, irritability in organic nature. Ultimately all these powers
were for Herder developments of the one potentiality, or seed, in
the universal organism. It will be noticed that Herder was not
careful to state with any exactness his concept of genetic growth
from the seed. He made indeed an indiscriminate use of the one
concept in interpretation, now of cognate developments in differ-
ent spheres (as here), now of the historical growth of the human
race (genealogically from a single individual), now of the unfolding
of powers within man himself (from dormant potentialities), now of
the growth of culture (the expression of the genius of a people),
now of the movement of history (the issuing forth of revolutionary
movements from a small and unnoticed event). Herder's favourite
metaphor, the corn of wheat which must fall into the ground and die
in order to bring forth fruit, is used to describe all these process-
es. The confusion notwithstanding the sincerity and power with
which Herder asserted the genetic principle as a leading principle
of historical interpretation are not open themselves to question.

1 S.VIII p.272
2 S.V p.477
3 Ibid.p.26 (e.g., human speech)
4 Ibid.pp.208-209
5 Ibid.pp.517-518
6 Ibid.p.532. Innumerable other examples could be cited from
all Herder's works. The close parallel with the concept
of Leibniz (Monadology Sectns.74-75) will be recalled.
If knowledge and emotion are seen to be developments both of potentialities of man and also of potentialities of the universe in general, in both cases it is an organic growth which Herder advocates. Nowhere more clearly than in this essay is the concept stated, and an assessment of the relative importance of potentiality and environment made:

der Keim war da, aber Luft, Erde und alle Elemente mussten beitragen, den Keim, die Frucht, den Baum zu bilden.1

The principle of organic growth was still predominant in the 'Auch eine Philosophie', although the application was now more strictly to the cultural achievements of the race and of particular nations. The metaphors which Herder used - the individual man and the tree2 - were plainly significant, implying as they did that for Herder the race was not only a whole, but that as a whole it was also an organism, which developed in the same way, if on a larger scale, as the plant, the animal or the individual man. The metaphors had been used before as apt comparisons, or as convenient schematisations, but with Herder they became the statement of a reality. Even genealogically the race had grown from a seed, the first parents in the garden,3 in whom all men lay as it were latent, and in whose nature all future developments existed as potentialities. Historically the race had passed through all the stages of individual life: embryo, in the garden; childhood, in the East; boyhood, in Egypt and Phoenicia; youth, in Greece; manhood, in Rome; maturity and age in contemporary Europe. This development owed little or nothing to the conscious and rational planning of man;

1 M.P.u.G.IX p.48
2 S.V pp.481 ff.; 512.
3 Ibid. p.477
it was a natural development according to uniform laws of growth.\textsuperscript{1}
The determinative impulse in this growth was that of the primitive seeds ("die uralten Keime") - Greek culture, for example, was not to be regarded as an original creation, nor as the mechanistic product of converging forces, but as the bringing forth, under favourable conditions, of something already present as potentiality in the spirit of man as man, even here the seeds coming to Greece (to use a different application of the metaphor) from without:

dass Griechenland Samenkörner der Kultur anders woher erhalten

Such factors as climate, geography and historical conditions were accorded by Herder a subsidiary power: only where they were favourable, as in Greece, could there be fruition. These were the modifying conditions, not the determinants of growth.\textsuperscript{4}

That a gulf here separates Herder from the Rationalist historians, who interpreted events mechanistically and thought to discern a control by human reason, is plain to see, in spite of the superficial resemblances which exist. French Rationalism, with its tendencies towards Empiricism, had early come to look upon history as a causal succession, in which one event was determined by another, and in which external factors operated as contributary causes. Montesquieu had set the fashion in this respect. Not only had he studied Roman history as an interconnected chain of events,\textsuperscript{5} but also, in the monumental 'Esprit des Lois', he had devoted five

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{1} S.V pp. 504; 539
\item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid. p. 496
\item \textsuperscript{3} Ibid. p. 498
\item \textsuperscript{4} Ibid. pp. 495 ff.; 505-506
\item \textsuperscript{5} Montesquieu: Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de leur Décadence.
\end{footnotes}
entire books 1 to the demonstration of the influence of climate both upon the general character and upon the passions of men, 2 and also more particularly upon religion, 3 economics, 4 manner of life, 5 social structure, 6 health, 7 population, 8 historical vigour, 9 and, as a general consequence, upon the laws demanded to fit the varying conditions. 10 Other writers had followed his example: Condillac with a few generalised hints in his tedious 'Histoire ancienne'; 11 Voltaire in the 'Essai sur les Moeurs'; 12 Buffon, who was interested in the effects of climate ( 'la nourriture, l'air et la terre') 13) upon the coats of animals, 14 colour in man, 15 and bodily development; 16 Rousseau, who was alive to possible influences upon men and nations of geographical, climatic and seasonal variations. 17 It is interesting in this respect to notice the different theories advanced in solution of the vexed problem of the origin of colour, some, like Buffon, tending to ascribe the greatest influence to climate, others, as, for example, Voltaire, denying that climate is the primary cause, and tracing out in men, as in trees, different species. 18 In Britain and in Germany, with Robertson, Gibbon, Hume and Ferguson on the one hand, Iselin, Mös er and Winckelmann on the other, similar lines of development may be traced, except that, generally speaking, the emphasis was in

1 Tome 2; Livres XIV-XVIII (Oeuvres III pp.75 ff.)
2 Ibid.p.75
3 Ibid.p.85
4 Ibid.p.102 ff.
5 Ibid.p.134
6 Ibid.pp.134
7 Ibid.pp.159 ff.
8 Ibid.pp.75; 172 f.etc.. This is the general theme.
9 Condillac: Oeuvres VII (Introduction) p.16
10 Ibid.pp.247
11 Voltaire: Oeuvres XIV pp.2-9
12 Ibid. pp.224-275
13 Ibid.p.37
14 Ibid.p.247
15 Ibid.p.121
16 Ibid.p.134
17 Ibid.pp.88 ff.
18 Voltaire op.cit. pp.4 ff.
Germany upon the influence of external conditions, in Britain upon
the causal interconnection of events. Even Hume, however, who in
general discounted external influences in favour of a causal chain,¹
was forced at other points to acknowledge conditioning factors:

(the power) of age, disposition of the body, weather, food,
company, books and passions to alter the curious machinery of
thought.²

Herder was of course well aware of the fact that events
are causally interrelated, and he always asserted the power of
external conditions to shape and to modify development. His early
literary writings, in which the aim had been to study each writer
against the peculiar background of his age,³ confirm this point.
Herder, however, never thought of life merely as a product of converging
factors, either historical or geographical. Herder in his
historical interpretation fused an empiricist causalism with the
dynamic monadism of Leibniz; a fusion which had already been antici-
pated by Iselin, who also had seen potentiality and environment as
the two important factors:

die menschliche Natur das Primäre, die Umwelt ein Modifizier-
endes;⁴

but with which Herder, with his greater poetic insight and his adopt-
ton of the analogy of natural growth, was able more successfully to
effect. Leroux, speaking of Herder's view in a more general sense,
has stated the matter with admirable lucidity in a single sentence:

¹ Schulz op.cit.p.15. Montesquieu and Voltaire had both
stressed this causal interconnection and Fontenelle too
(op.cit.pp.173-175) had exalted it at the expense of
geographical considerations.
² Dialogues on Natural Religion p.66
³ Cf.S.II p.159; S.III p.212 etc.
il y a une force primordiale qui est évolutée chez les différentes espèces sous l'action des deux mêmes facteurs, la force vitale et le climat.  

Applied more particularly to history, this means that history itself is the outworking of potentiality under the modifying influence of environment. In the whole creation, as a unit, there is the germ of all possible forms of life; and in man as a unit there is the germ of all possible historical achievements; the different forms being successively (and Herder thought progressively) realised when favourable conditions obtain. Herder has this in common with the Rationalists, that he asserts both continuity and environmental influence, but by his conception of continuity in organic rather than mechanistic terms, and his ascribing to environment influence only as the condition of an organic growth, he was able to proceed to a far wider and profounder historical interpretation.

Following up this thought of the growth of the race as an organism, Herder gave in the 'Auch eine Philosophie' a rapid sketch of the leading cultures of the ancient world (themselves also organic unities) in their growth, blossoming and decay. The principle did not vary. The nation, itself a development within the race, had also within itself particular potentialities, which were realised in a threefold process: 'Wachstum, Blüthe und Abnahme'. A full development was possible only of those potentialities which were favoured by environment:

wozu Zeit, Klima, Bedürfnisse, Welt, und Schicksal Anlass gibt.

1 R.Leroux: La Philosophie de l'Histoire chez Herder et Guillaume de Humboldt Mélanges de Henri Lichtenberger p.146
2 Ibid.p.151
3 S.V p.504
4 Ibid.p.505
For each people there is a maximum of possible attainment, and of accompanying happiness, determined, first by the capacities of the people, second by the prevailing conditions. Each nation, like the race, is an organic unity: it grows from a seed; realises, in so far as environment permits, the potentialities within itself; decays once the maximum of growth has been reached. In his actual characterisation of the nations Herder wisely insisted that data only and not unrealised impulses and capabilities must be taken into account, since the second course can only lead to an overgeneral and even misleading assessment.

The 'Alteste Urkunde' does not add anything to this exposition of the idea of genetic growth, but in one or two passages the concept appears. The evolution of the race from a single man is again stressed. All potentialities within the race are traced back to, and seen dormant in Adam and Eve:

gewiss mussten in Adam und Eva Kräfte des ganzen Geschlechts eingehüllt liegen.

This same thought recurs, but with an even wider application, in another passage, in which Herder marvels at the power of God,

ein menschliches Wesen so unendlich verschieden an Kräften, Gliedern und Zwecken in das unendliche Eine eines Geschlechts zu leiten und bildcn.

The assertion is that both as a physical and also as a mental and spiritual being man is capable of an infinite modification in realis-

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1 S.V p.504, pp.503-512
2 It is not quite clear whether different capacities are ascribed to different peoples, or whether in different peoples under different circumstances different capacities of the whole race are manifested. It must be remembered that Herder seemed to conceive of a series of organisms within
3 S.V p.503
4 As a general theme (S.VI p.1 f.)
5 S.VI p.303
6 Ibid.p.320
-ation of all the forms latent in humanity. Although the idea is not worked out, it is important that it should be noticed in view of the development of it in the 'Ideen'.

It was of course in the 'Ideen' that the thought of organic growth was set forth most clearly and most fully. All the commentators are in agreement upon this point. Haym terms the whole work 'eine genetische Erklärung'.\(^1\) Leroux uses the phrase 'évolution végétale'.\(^2\) Sell notes:

in Natur und Geschichte waltet eines und dasselbe, das der Entwicklung; ...... der Zweck ist die Entfaltung der Kräfte.\(^3\)

Baumgarten writes:

(\textit{Herder}) sieht alles im Strom des Werdens.\(^4\)

Bürkner speaks of \textit{Herder}'s naturalistic conception of man:

ein Gewächs der Natur, das höchste Produkt der genetischen Kraft unseres Planeten.\(^5\)

In the 'Ideen' the organic principle was extended by Herder to cover even inorganic matter, the earth itself having undergone a process of development, through long periods and by means of immense natural convulsions,\(^6\) to become the great productive workshop which it is.\(^7\)

In organic life the principle was everywhere manifest. All life was from the seed: wie die Pflanzen sind Mensch und Thier aus einem Samen geboren.\(^8\)

Prevailing external conditions determined however the particular forms of life in particular localities:

\(^1\) H.II.p.193
\(^2\) Leroux op.cit.p.160
\(^3\) Sell (K.): \textit{Die Religion unserer Klassiker} (\textit{Herder}) p.92
\(^4\) Baumgarten op.cit.p.50
\(^5\) R.\textit{Bürkner}: \textit{Herder} p.195
\(^6\) Ia.I p.129 ff.
\(^7\) Ibid.p.59
\(^8\) Ibid.p.66
in Gegenden wo die Kräfte der Natur am wirksamsten sind, in ihnen gibt es auch die ausgebildesten, stärksten, grösstenen, muthvollsten Thiere.¹

Variations within the species themselves were for Herder similarly determined: die Gattungen gestalten sich beinah in jedem Clima anders.²

This did not mean that climate, or environment, could actually cause genetic changes: the discussion of racial variations in such matters as physiological structure and mental capacity leaves no doubt upon this point. The negro type, for example, was not for Herder the product of a tropical environment, but the realisation of a potential type of humanity, a realisation only possible in that environment.³ The impulse was from within the race itself, the conditioning factors alone from without. If the negro was a lower type, then that was because it was the only type possible under those particular conditions of life:

die Natur wendete die Hand und erschuf das daraus was er (i.e. the negro) für sein Land und für die Glückseligkeit seines Lebens nöthiger brauchte.⁴

Herder devoted a full section to a discussion of climate and its power,⁵ the concept climate being used in a wide sense to include, not only weather and altitude, but geography in general, food, clothing, manner of life, occupation, arts and crafts, culture, recreation, society - a whole host of causes ('ein Chaos von Ursachen⁶). The power of climate was freely admitted, but Herder steadfastly refused to see in it the ultimate or determinative

¹ Ibid. I p.83
² Ibid. p.85
³ Id.II pp.35 ff.
⁴ Ibid. p.47
⁵ Ibid. pp.93 ff.
⁶ Ibid. p.98
factor, which was for him genetic power:

die genetische Kraft, die Mutter aller Bildungen, der das Clima feindlich oder freundlich zuwirkt.¹

As the species were not determined, so they could not be transformed, by climate:

in einem fremden Clima wird nicht die Rose eine Lilie werden.²

The growth of particular forms could, however, be affected either for good or evil (and that radically) by climate,³ a favourable climate being necessary for a full and perfect development. The degeneracy which results from the too rapid transplantation of peoples from one climate to another (as of Europeans in the tropics⁴) was cited in illustration.⁵

Herder did not restrict the application of these laws to physical development, but widened it so as to include all forms of cultural and spiritual activity as well. There were in all men certain capacities of spirit inherent in man as such: sensual perception, imagination, practical understanding, emotion and happiness.⁶ These capacities were general, but manifested themselves differently in different lands and amongst different peoples, according to the different conditions of life. Thus the national cultures arose. As in the biological sphere, the primary impulse was from within, the conditioning of the form of manifestation from without. These powers could be said then to operate both climatically and organically.⁷

1 Id.,II p.104
2 Ibid. p.119
3 Ibid. loc. cit.
4 Ibid. pp.122-123
5 Ibid. p.121
6 Ibid. pp.130, 142, 158, 172, 194
7 Ibid. pp.130 ff.
an ultimate sense the products of latent organic powers, but their
growth was dependent upon and conditioned by the circumstances of life
which obtained in the sphere of their operation.

In one respect the thought of Herder was still confused. He ascribed broad capacities to the species as a whole, but he also in some passages ascribed peculiar potentialities, in a restricted sense, to particular nations. The position was further complicated by the fact that, anxious to stress the unity of the race, he in the case of man added to the two forces generally at work, organic power and environment, the third force, tradition. There was a growth of the race as well as of individual nations within the race. Perhaps the most satisfying interpretation is that for Herder the race, indeed the universe, consisted of a series, the race, with its peculiar potentialities, lying within the larger whole, the nation within the race, and so too the family and the individual, each being in itself also an organic unit. All forms of life were then themselves organic and conditioned, and also the realisation of potentialities within a larger whole. This thought is suggested in a sentence like the following:

das Menschengeschlecht ist bestimmt, mancherlei Stufen der Cultur in mancherlei Veränderungen zu durchgehen.

Surveying the actual civilisations of history, Herder en-

1 Id.II pp.209 ff; 223
2 Illustrated, for example, in the general growth of society (pp.249 ff.). Herder stressed that society was the natural state of man. The social unit was the people (as opposed to man-made constitutional states): 'ein Volk ist sowohl eine Pflanze der Natur wie die Familie'; 'der natürlichste Staat ist ein Volk' (p.261). This was aimed at Rousseau, but more especially at Kant, who found in an universal 'weltbürgerliche Verfassung' the goal of history (Werke VI p.16)
3 Id.III p.330
larged upon the leading theme of all his cultural criticism, that that which can develop must and will, according to natural laws,¹ and that all culture is, not a conscious achievement of man, but a growth from the soil:

\[\text{die Blüthe des Daseyns eines Volks, eine Naturpflanze.}²\]

Criticism itself was necessarily relative:

Shakespeare und Milton sind das in ihrer Art und auf ihrer Stelle was Sophokles und Homer in den ihren waren.³

Herder did not merely suggest the principle of organic growth in the cultural world as an analogy, but applied it with a full seriousness and closeness. The national culture was not only like, but was a natural organism, developing from the seed (potentiality) according to observable laws of growth and under environmental influences.⁴ An absolute fusion between nature and history was made: development in history was according to the same laws and principles as development in nature.⁵

Three notable features in Herder's historical judgment result from this fundamental conception: first, his lack of interest in great men (as individuals) and of appreciation of the influence exerted by them;⁶ second, his refusal to measure cultures by any absolute standards (already mentioned);⁷ third, his denial of any conscious direction of history by human reason.⁸ As in natural history the laws of growth are not decisively disturbed by the exceptional, absolute standards of judgment are inapplicable, and conscious

¹ Id.III p.211
² Ibid.p.216
³ Ibid.p.219
⁴ Ibid.pp.121 ff.
⁵ Ibid.pp.216 ff.; 330 ff.
⁶ Cf.ibid.pp.317-318
⁸ Herder was willing to allow that in European culture human qualities ('Kunst, Fleiss') had done much, but he still denied direction, and was aware of other important factors 'nach Ort, Zeit, Bedürfnis, Lage der Umstände, Strom der Begebenheiten drängte Europa zu seiner Cultur'(Id.IV pp.337-338)
direction on the part of the organism itself is impossible, so too in the history of mankind. Herder did not deny to man gifts of consciousness and reason - he laid indeed great stress upon them but these gifts were for him a development of the natural order itself. Leroux' criticism, that there is in the 'évolution végétale d'une créature rationelle' a contradiction, is really beside the point. Man was organised for freedom, but it was nature which so organised him: as 'der erste Freigelassene der Schöpfung' he belonged no less to the natural order of creation than any other creatures. It is important that this point should be borne in mind when the relationship of Herder to the Aufklärung, to Kant and to the Romantics is under discussion.

The later works do not add anything new to the full exposition of the 'Ideen', but in them organic growth was everywhere maintained. In the 'Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität' for example, Herder made a plea for a natural history of humanity, in which the special capacities of the negro peoples should be sympathetically reviewed in relation to those of Europeans. The view that European culture was a universal standard was censured. In an earlier essay 'Vom Einfluss der Regierungen auf die Wissenschaften' (1779) Herder had seen a mutual interaction between governments and cultures, but he asserted none the less strongly the organic principle:

was wachsen soll, muss natürlicher wachsen...was (diese Pflanze) werden soll, liegt in ihr. A metaphor elaborately worked out in the introduction indicates the relative importance ascribed by Herder to various conditioning factors

1 Id.I pp.133 f.; 225 f.
2 Leroux op.cit. p.160
3 Id.I p.231
5 Ibid. p.233
Klima ist das Erdreich; Nationalcharakter die Art des Saamens; ...die Verfassung...die Bearbeitung des Ackers, die Aussaat, die Himmelswitterung.1

The principle was differently illustrated in various passages in the other works, the allusion being, now to the natural laws which govern human growth,2 now to the blossoming and decline of nations:

jeder Staat hat eine Periode des Werdens, des Bleibens, und des Verfalls,3 now to the inter-relatedness of historical movements and great natural discoveries, terrestrial catastrophes and climatic mutations.4

In conclusion a few words ought to be said upon the question as to whether or not Herder, interpreting all phenomena genetically as he did, was in some sort a pre-Darwinian. Some writers have sought to maintain that Herder was indeed a precursor;5 and in his own day Kant, who himself played with the idea of a genealogical descent from the animals, feared that Herder's derivation of all species from a single seed-species would lead to some such theorisings ('Ideen die ungeheuer sind'6), complaining however that without a real descent the application of the analogy of nature to spiritual life was merely speculative, and the deduction of immortality from progression in nature, in which there was no continued identity, valueless.7 Three points may be urged in favour of the alleged Darwinianism: first, that if Herder's two main principles are pressed literally, they demand necessarily an evolutionist view; second, that Herder did

1 M.P.u.G. XIV p. 208
2 M.P.u.G. VIII p. 90
3 M.P.u.G. XIV p. 297
4 M.P.u.G. VIII pp. 121; 189
5 Fries discusses this whole point admirably and refers to the relevant literature (op. cit. p. 153 n.)
6 Kant: Werke VI p. 33
7 Ibid. p. 31
unquestionably include history within nature and see the same laws operative in both, the one being a continuation of the other; third, that Herder ascribed to environment a power of modification and hinted at a type of natural selection.\(^1\) On the other hand it may be stated categorically that Herder himself had no thought of an actual genealogical derivation,\(^2\) that the species were for him distinct, if successive and progressive realisations of different potentialities of life, and that environment was not conceived of as a mechanism for the evolving of new species by elimination and selection - the selection of which Herder spoke being quite different from the natural selection of Darwin.

Herder was not a pre-Darwinian, but he was necessarily an evolutionist. He conceived of all phenomena as stages in the one cosmic process, controlled by the common laws:

\[
\text{alle Kräfte der Natur wirken organisch; aus schlafenden Fähigkeiten werden thätige Kräfte.}\]

The two main principles of all evolutionary thought, a continuity which runs across all phenomena and the genetic growth of both physical and spiritual organisms: these were the very core of his philosophy of nature and of history. It is with these two thoughts in mind, together with the evolutionary outlook which they involve, that the main concepts of Herder in his interpretation of the history of man must now be investigated in more detail.

\(^1\) Id.II pp.46-47; 112.  
\(^2\) He dismissed the suggested kinship between man and the ape or the orang-outang: "wahrlich sind Affe und Mensch nie Ein' und dieselbe Gattung gewesen"(Ibid. p.57); 'den Orang-Untang kennet man jetzt, und weiss, dass er weder zur Menschheit noch zur Sprache ein Recht hat'(Ibid. p.77)  
\(^3\) These passages were aimed primarily against an identification of apes with men, but also against the false interpretation of Herder's own philosophy suggested by Kant.

S.XVI pp.569-570
1. PROGRESS  In the consideration of the two principles which underlie Herder's philosophy it must have become clear that Herder was committed to a doctrine of progress, or development, in some form or another. The fact that Herder saw a continuity of being across the universe, the fact that he looked upon all phenomena as organisms, which grew from the simple seed to the most complex of structures, the fact that he conceived of matter dynamically, as force or activity: these facts meant that he could not but believe that the movement both in human history and in the universe as a whole is one of upward striving, of development or evolution. What exactly the doctrine of progress meant for Herder, however, is not so easily known, and an understanding of his teaching is complicated by Rousseauistic tendencies, and by the contradiction implied in the analogy of natural growth and decay. It is necessary then to examine Herder's concept of progress in some detail, especially in relation to the progress-doctrines current in Rationalistic circles.

Leibniz had been the first great protagonist of the principle of progress in the XVIII century. For Leibniz the world consisted, not of bodies, but of indestructible monads and monadic groups, which were arranged in an ascending scale, and engaged in in an endless process of improvement, a striving after perfect clarity of perception, the Infinite. This process was quite independent of bodily growth and decay, since the body is no more than a 'mechanism which perishes' but souls persist, taking on ever new

1 Id.I p. 280 ("eine Fortschreitung")
2 Leibniz: Monadology Sctn. 60
3 Ibid. Sctn. 77
4 Ibid. Sctns. 4; 5
forms in the ascent to a greater clarity of perception.\(^1\) It is im-
portant to remember this teaching of Leibniz, since upon this basis
the concept of Herder was to a large extent erected.

In Germany itself the Wolffian Rationalism, and even the
Aufklärung proper, gave little support to the doctrine of progress,
nor progress being seen but that of the individual, a development of
the one monad, not of the universe as a whole.\(^2\) Of the historians,
Möser denied progress altogether,\(^3\) Wegelin made of it something per-
iodic,\(^4\) and Winckelmann gave but little countenance to it, since,
although he saw a movement through various stages of artistic growth,
he was thinking of national rise and decay only, and saw in Greek
art in any case the realisation of the highest ideal.\(^5\) Iselin, who
held to an intellectual development of the race as a unity,\(^6\) and Less-
ing, who introduced a plan of progressive instruction into religion,
a movement through the two stages, Judaism and Christianity, to the
religion of pure spirit,\(^7\) were the only writers of any standing to
advocate progress in the historical sphere.

Abroad however, and especially in France, a keen sense of
pride in the literary and intellectual achievements of the age had
kindled a firm belief in human progress, and once the Querelle des
Anciens et des Modernes had been fought and won, the doctrine was
espoused by the majority of writers. Montesquieu, for example,
postulated an impulse towards perfection as the driving-force in

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1 Leibniz: Monadology Sctns. 72 ff.
2 Bury: op. cit. p. 239
3 Dilthey op. cit. pp. 250-253
4 Schulz op. cit. pp. 73-75
5 Ibid. pp. 84 ff. Cf. Dilthey op. cit. p. 260
6 Schulz p. 63 Iselin's view was identical with that of the French; the peak of achievement being found in the XVIII

This is the thesis of the 'Erziehung des Menschen geschlechts'
human history. Voltaire, surveying the sorry scene of ignorance, error and prejudice which constituted history, could discern an upward movement to the rationality of his own age. Condillac, Diderot, Turgot, Condorcet, not least the enthusiastic Condorcet: in all the present with its culture and knowledge was eulogised, the past was regarded with a complacent horror, and a hope of infinite perfectibility held out for the future. Rousseau alone of the greater writers stood out against the general trend, and maintained the paradox that an age of culture and learning must be also an age of decline and corruption, and that the golden age is to be sought in the past, not in the days of absolute savagery, but in those of the first primitive and rustic society, when life was still lived in naturalness and innocence. Fester asserts, however, that even Rousseau had hopes of a new golden age in the future, with the attainment of moral freedom in the purified state. In Britain Hume, Robertson, Gibbon and Ferguson all to varying degrees advocated views of progress very similar to those put forward by the French.

Now it is obvious that Herder could not give his support to the Rationalistic doctrine of progress. The key-stone of his thought was this, that historical development is not rational and planned, as was assumed by the Rationalists, but that it is organic and natur-

1 Schulz op.cit.p.34
2 Ibid.pp.37 ff. (Cf. 'l'Essai sur les Moeurs')
3 Turgot made an interesting plea for a better understanding of previous ages, as necessary links in the chain. His work was not known to Herder (Schulz op.cit.pp.53-59)
4 Condorcet's 'Esquisse' is the high-water-mark of the Rationalist belief in progress
5 Rousseau: Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts (Oeuvres I)
6 Discours sur l'Inégalité (Oeuvres I pp.127 ff.)
7 Fester op.cit.pp.24 ff. Fester thus finds a place for the 'Contrat Social' in the general scheme of Rousseau's thought
For the French Rationalists progress meant the growing control of the human reason over an otherwise causally related, but purposeless historical movement. Belief in progress meant for them belief in the perfectibility of man, a development to perfection in which the guiding force was the rational effort of man himself, and which was made possible only as, by knowledge and reason, the irrationalities, superstitions, prejudices, follies and deceptions of the past were dispelled. It has been seen that a certain influence of environment was not denied by them, but on the whole, the influence of man-made institutions, governments, laws, customs, discoveries and cultures was rated higher. Historical movement was controlled by man, not by nature. The XVIII century, in which rational learning and culture had grown so enormously, and in which reason had begun to establish its control, was for the Rationalists the peak, towards which all upward movement in the past had been directed, the peak, and yet at the same time a first step towards a golden epoch of ceaseless rational development.

Herder, with his naturalistic conception, reacted strongly against this over-facile belief in human power, and the unwarranted optimism which it engendered. For a while indeed the thought of Herder moved in a Rousseauistic direction. The reaction was of course inevitable, since Herder had contended from the first, even in the earliest aesthetic works, that what is valuable in history is, not the work of man, but the natural blossoming of natural powers under natural influences. Herder did not deny progress, or growth: but the progress which he discerned in culture and in history was a natural growth from the soil, not rational, but national.

1 Cf. 'Kritische Wälder IV, 2, iii
The first movement was national, a blossoming of each culture in and for itself, that of Shakespeare with that of Sophocles, Ossian with Homer, Hebrew poetry with Greek. But Herder was also aware of a progress of the race as a whole, as appears from the essay upon speech. Reason, speech and society developed in concert, each making possible the continued growth of the other, each contributing to the formation of a common cultural tradition, the inheritance of the whole human race:

Lehrmeisterin der die Sprache lehret progressiv; so wie das menschliche Geschlecht ein progressives Ganzes, so auch alle Sprachen.

An upward movement was traced by Herder ('ein natürlicher Fortgang des Geistes') through the various stages of growth; family, tribe, nation; simple tongues, complex national tongues. This movement was not for Herder a planned and conscious development from barbarism and ignorance to clear rationality and knowledge, but, as in the case of national cultures, a natural and inevitable movement ('natürlich, wesentlich, notwendig'), through the different necessary stages of growth, from childhood to youth and youth to maturity, each stage having for Herder justification in and for itself in the light of its own proper and appropriate achievements. A similar thought underlies the 'Grundriss des Unterrichts' of 1774, in which progress was noticed, but a progress which was the expansion of innate potentialities, not the development of new powers, or an achievement of greater happiness:

1 Cf.S.V pp.298 ff.
2 'Kritische Wälder' I,17
3 'Fragmente' II,3 ff.
4 S.V p.67
5 Ibid.p.134
6 Ibid.pp.70 ff.; pp.115, 125
7 Ibid.p.112
8 This schema is already advanced in relation to speech in the 'Fragmente'(I,3,1)
die Menschheit ist nicht an Kräften oder an Glückseligkeit gewachsen, sondern auf andern und neuen Seiten von Fähigkeiten gebildet.¹

In the Bückeburg writings, notably the 'Auch eine Philosophie', Herder further developed his idea of progress along the lines suggested by the analogy of the individual man, who, having his origin in the seed, passes through the stages, childhood, boyhood, youth and manhood to full maturity. Herder stressed again the fact that each stage had its own record of cultural achievement, and that at each a measure of happiness had been attained.² Through the stages, however, the plan of a common upward striving ('ein Plan des Fortstrebens'³) was visible, the movement being complex, like that of a stream, or better of a tree,⁴ in whose growth there are periods when the process is arrested, the ages of turmoil, of transition and of decay in history corresponding to these periods. The civilisations, as stages, were transitory, but by the common striving a cultural tradition common to the race was being built up, a tradition which persisted, even though the temporary forms which it took perished. The close similarity to the teaching of Leibniz will here be noticed. Progress for Herder was no consciously directed work of the human mind, but the unfolding of the potentialities of the race in and through the various peoples successively, a process of growth and decay, in which as each flower withered, a new plant emerged, drawing its sustenance from that which had gone before ('Jedes baut auf das Vorige'⁵) and rising to a new height.

¹ M.P.u.G. X pp.293-294
² S.V pp.508; 512.
³ Ibid. p.511
⁴ Ibid. p.512
⁵ Ibid. p.512
of beauty and power. This thought emerged most clearly when Herder came to treat of the most decisive break in history, the collapse of the Hellenic world, the rise of Christianity, and the in- 
rush of the Northern hordes:

Rom war ein Leichnam: d'ward in Norden. neuer Mensch geboren.¹

Thus far Herder's view had differed from that of the Rationalists only in this one respect, that stress had been laid upon the organic nature of progress, and a new understanding of past ages been revealed. When Herder came to discuss the modern period, however, the width of the gulf which separated him from the Rationalists became apparent, and in the 'Auch eine Philosophie II' and the 'älteste Urkunde' a new and Rousseauistic thesis was developed, a thesis which, although not of such lasting value in Herder's own philosophy (it was very largely to be abandoned in the 'Ideen'), is of great importance in the light of subsequent Romantic developments. Herder began by pointing out that the fall of Rome and the Northern invasions meant the beginning of a new (and Christian) civilisation;² a civilisation in which, under the guidance of destiny, the tree of humanity spread itself out in boughs and twigs, the discoveries, sciences and achievements of the European world.³ In one important respect this new civilisation differed radically from the old, that man, as rational being, had now come to look upon himself as at once the director and the goal of history, interpreting and in and by himself fulfilling the designs of providence for the race. The proud cry of the modern thinker as he surveyed history was this:

¹ S.V pp.514 and f.
² Ibid. loc.cit.
³ Ibid. pp.523 ff.
It was precisely this proud assumption which, Herder perceived, underlay the doctrine of progress of Montesquieu and Voltaire, and with all his power Herder attacked the so-called progress of reason as a distortion of nature. For him the ability of man was no more than meddling, and Rationalistic culture a culture of pedantry and arid and short-sighted theorising, in which was neither true culture nor true thought. The plea of Herder was for the natural, not the theoretical:

Herz, Wärme, Blut, Menschheit, Leben; and he sighed for a man of wide vision and with a true understanding of things in their essence and breadth:

ein Sokrates der Menschheit, fähig, statt die grosse Schöpfung Gottes in ein kleines Gebäude des Köpfis zu verengen, blossdem Strome der Gotteskraft nach, sie in allen Formen, Gestalten und Schöpfungen tief und treu zu fühlen.

In his reaction against the over-sophisticated present Herder, with Rousseau, turned longing eyes upon the golden days of the past: the days of childish innocence in the garden; the days of great simplicity under the patriarchs; the days of youthful vigour during the great age of Greece. The thesis of the literary works was taken up again and developed: that true poetry is not a work of the self-conscious mind, but a natural product of the soil - the thesis now being widened to include all cultural and historical products. An age of rational control could only be an age of perversion and of

1 S.V p.558
2 Ibid. p.538
3 Ibid. pp.568-569
4 Cf. S.VII p.21
5 Cf. S.V p.481
6 Ibid. p.495
decadence. Right through the Bückeburg writings there runs the Rousseauistic antithesis: Nature - Reason; equated, as also in Rousseau, with the antithesis: Past - Present.

Herder, however, did not, like Rousseau, denounce society as such, nor was he without hope for the future. Taught by Shaftesbury and Hume, he saw that man was by nature made for society ('ein Geschöpf der Heerde'): thus true society was itself a natural growth. Even the movement from unreflecting innocence to self-conscious thought (Herder's interpretation of the fall of Adam) was seen to be a necessary and ultimately beneficial movement - a movement repeated in the life of each individual -

Adam musste fallen. Ins natürliche Leben gemacht, (war er)zu einem höheren Leben bestimmt.

It was this movement which, historically, had reached its climax in the modern age, with the replacing of an unreflecting by an reflecting culture, and if this age was one of fall and of foolish misuse, it was then also a necessary age of transition to something higher - trotz tausender Missbräuche, ein Werkzeug.

The very fact that in the historical process there can be neither perpetuation nor retreat means that this age too must necessarily be the stepping-stone to a new golden age,

ein neues, höheres Zeitalter, ein verjüngtes Geschöpf in einem neuen Frühling.

1 Shaftesbury: The Moralists II,4; B.M.Laing: David Hume p. 112
3 'Besonnenheit'(ibid.p.98) - which divides man from the anim-
4 'in allen Kindern'(S.VII p.130) /als.
5 S.VII pp.119-123
7 Ibid.p.5265
8 Ibid.p.575
The final message of the Bückeburg polemic was thus one of hope:

lassen uns ins Verborgene und Allweite sehen, denn wir arbeiten zu einer großen Zukunft;¹ ein goldenes Zeitalter ist nahe.²

An important development will here have been noticed, that Herder had learned from his analogy of natural growth to fuse the Rousseauistic thesis into a general scheme of progress. The progress which was an undeviating development according to rational plan had been rejected, but in its place had been found a progress which was a series of natural growths, in which periods of blossoming and decay must alternate, but in which each new growth, built up from the decaying old, attains to a new level. The present age was thus conceived of by Herder as one of the periods of decay, a period when the impious and meddling rationality of man had thwarted and checked true growth. Since reason itself, however, was for Herder ultimately a natural growth,³ there was every reason to believe that the degeneration and distortion caused by a false use of it would be temporary only, and that a greater age was dawning in which reason would play its part within the sphere of natural organic growth.

With this fusion of the two theses Herder was able in the 'Ideen' to revive his main conception of an organic development, a conception still grounded philosophically upon Leibniz (as is clear from the essay 'Gott'), but developed now more fully in a naturalistic direction. Progress was first discerned by Herder in the realm of nature itself; natural history being for him the story of the power of nature manifesting itself in ever higher and more complex forms:

¹ S.V pp. 572; 580
² Ibid. p. 523
³ Ibid. pp. 27 ff.
vom Stein zum Krystall, vom Krystall zu den Metallen, von diesen zur Pflanzenschöpfung, von den Pflanzen zum Thier, von diesem zum Menschen sahen wir die Form der Organisation steigen.

Nature itself was for Herder in a state of perpetual movement, the direction being that of a progression:

nichts in ihr steht still, alles strebt und rückt weiter: welche Progression strebender Kräfte.²

Individuals and species were seen to rise and fall, but the decay itself was the means to higher growth. Death in nature was for Herder synonymous with change and a means of progression:

das Hinwegeilen dessen was nicht bleiben kann, eine ewige Pal-ingeniesie, ein Fortrücken aus dem Chaos zur Ordnung, kein Tod, sondern Verwandlung.³

The progress thus traced out by Herder in natural history enabled him also to understand development in the history of mankind, which was itself only the continuation of natural history upon the higher plane of reason and freedom.⁴ The empires and the civilisations, like the organisms of nature, were seen by Herder to rise and fall, each fulfilling its own destiny ('das Gleichgewicht seiner lebendig wirkenden Kräfte'⁵), each achieving a measure of success and of happiness, each attaining to a certain level in the general upward movement, each perishing in order to make way for a new and higher growth. Every culture was for Herder, in its growth and decay, an organism complete in and for itself, yet none was in itself a final end. Across and through the growth of the civilisations there was also a growth of the race, just as also across and through the growth of the race there was a growth of the cosmos. The ob-

1 Id.I p.265  
2 Ibid.p.231  
3 S.XVI pp.566-570  
4 Id.III pp.301 ff. Thus Herder speaks of the 'Naturgesetze der Geschichte'  
5 Id.III p.219
jection, which Herder must already have encountered in Möser, and which was later to be raised against him by the Romantics, and more recently Leroux, 2 that the conception of history as a series of natural growths can only mean a cyclic and fatalistic view - history as a meaningless seasonal recurrence - this objection was raised and answered by Herder himself. 3 An iron law was indeed seen in history, a law of growth and decay which demands that when each civilisation has come to maturity it must perish:

die Nationen blühen auf und ab; vordübergehend ist alles in der Geschichte. 4

This did not mean, however, that the movement of history was only cyclic, that man was without hope of forward development,

an Ixions Rad gefesselt und zu einem Tantalischen Sehnen verdammt. 5

A progress of nature was seen by Herder in and through the successive growths. The destructive forces which prevented the perpetuation of any forms were necessary, since by them the way was cleared for new and higher growths upon the ruins of the old:

die zerstörenden Kräfte unterliegen den enthaltenden und dienen zur Ausbildung des Ganzen. 6

The fact that the progress of nature meant a development of rational powers and of human technique meant too that these destructive powers were destined always to decrease. 7 The perishing of the individual culture, however perfect in and for itself, was necessary, in order that there might be that growth of the greater whole in and through the individuals:

das menschliche Geschlecht ist bestimmt, durch mancherlei Stufen

1 See below pp. 214 f.
2 Leroux op. cit. p. 159
3 Id. III pp. 301 ff.
4 Ibid. p. 301
5 Ibid. p. 303
6 Ibid. p. 314
7 Ibid. pp. 319, 324 'Der Verfolg der Geschichte zeigt, dass mit wahrer dem Wachstum wahrer Humanität auch der zerstörenden Dämonen...wirklich weniger geworden sei.
It was by this alternation of growth and decline that a progressive historical movement was possible. Each generation perished, but not until it had forged a new link upon the evergrowing chain of tradition: alle Zeitalter ketten sich an einander in einer immer reicheren Tradition. 

In the light of this pronounced advocacy of a progress in rational powers and in cultural tradition it is not surprising to find that Herder had come to view the modern age far less critically, and that he had conceived hopes of the realisation, through discoveries, of an age of happiness and attainment on a larger scale than in any past epoch. The naivety of this hope is illustrated by the theory advanced that the invention of gun-powder would help to abolish war by making it so destructive as to be unprofitable. The present age was then for Herder no longer an age of decline, but one of newly ripening culture, the only fear of Herder being that, through an over-confident belief in and a perverted use of reason, the harvest would be premature ('dass das Beste sich zu früh reifet').

In the later writings Herder constantly maintained the central thesis, that progress is not a rational development, but the growth of human powers, a growth in which periods of blossoming alternate with those of decay, but in which the level of achievement rises with each successive growth. The essay 'Tithon und Aurora' is interesting, since in it the Rousseauistic thesis of Bückeburg is

1 Id.III p.330
2 It is noteworthy that Kant also based progress upon a dialectical movement, although the concept was rather different (Werke VI pp.9-10 'das Mittel ist der Antagonism der Anlagen in der Gesellschaft') Cf.Id.III p.
3 Id.III p.335
4 Ibid.p.324
5 Ibid.pp.325 f. Cf.Kant op.cit.p.17
6 Id.IV p.340
restated in terms of this general concept. Herder saw indestructible forces at work in history ('sich neu verjüngende Kräfte' 1), forces which manifested themselves, not in revolutions, but in evolutions ('Evolutionen'2), assuming from age to age outward forms which constantly changed. The outward forms of art, for example, were doomed to perish, but the inner power, or substance remained: das eigentliche Wesen erstirbt nie....desto sterblicher sind die Formen.3

The conclusion which Herder wished to draw was this: that there must be ages of transition, when the old forms perish and new are prepared and formed, and that that the dearth of achievement in modern Europe was due to the fact that this was one of the ages of transition, the age of preparation for a great future: auch in den Armen des alten Tithöns Europa schlummert eine neue Aurora.4

That in the successive civilisations there are at work eternal and indestructible powers of humanity:

eine Kraft, die sich oft noch auf unserm Erdball neu verjüngen könne, neu verjüngen werde,5

and that the civilisations are only the temporary forms or manifestations of these powers, this was a theory which Herder had already suggested in the essay 'Blicke in die Zukunft', this time in a discussion of the relation of the individual to the race in historical progress: Menschen sterben, aber die Menschheit perennirt unsterblich....Ihr Hauptgut...ist ein gemeines, und bleibendes Gut und muss fortwachsen....Die Menschen schaffen sich immer mehrere und bessere Werkzeuge.6

1 M.P.u.G.III p.17
2 Ibid.loc.cit.
3 Ibid.pp.8-9 This concept is clearly Leibnizian
4 Ibid.p.27
5 Ibid.p.23
6 M.P.u.G.VIII p.109
In this same work Herder made much of the fact that there is no straight line of progress:

nur stelle man sich die Linie dieses Fortgangs nicht gerade noch einformig;¹

that the opposition of destructive forces must be reckoned with and overcome.² He was confident however that the destructive forces would constantly decrease, that humanity could and would realise itself in ever higher forms, and in consequence perfectibility was no delusion, but a reality:

Perfectibilität ist keine Täuschung;³

perfection consisting entirely in self-realisation:

Vollkommenheit kann nichts seyn als dass das Ding sey, was es seyn soll und kann.⁴

In the essay 'Über die Seelenwanderung' Herder faced once again, and again discounted, the objection that natural organisms are condemned to an endless and meaningless cyclic movement ('ein wieder-kommendes Schicksal').⁵ The discussion in this work was of course rather of the fate of the individual soul than of the destiny of nations and of the race, but the argument illustrates Herder's more general view. Progress was postulated as a general law of nature: therefore if there was palingenesis, a transmigration of the one soul from one form of life to another, then that transmigration was, not retrogressive, nor cyclic, but progressive - a climbing of the soul to higher life through successive forms.⁶

It will be seen that this was no more than an application to individ-

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¹ M.P.u.G.VIII p.110
² Ibid. pp.110 ff.
³ Ibid. p.116
⁴ Ibid. p.107
⁵ Ibid. p.203
⁶ Ibid. pp.184 ff.
ual life of a law of progress through successive growths, the only difference being that now an identity of individual substance through changing forms replaces the larger concept of a development of the greater whole (e.g. the race) through individual manifestations (the historical cultures).

Herder's faith in a real progress, however expressed, did not waver. In his own way Herder was as warm an adherent of the doctrine as was Condorcet. The conception of Herder, however, a naturalistic development of the monadic progress postulated by Leibniz, was the very antithesis of that of the Rationalists. The superiority of Herder's conception lay in this: that it allowed for both a growth and also a decline of the civilisations, and that it made no pretentious claim either for the power of the human reason, or for the absolute achievement of the modern age. At the same time the Leibnizian teaching of identity, (whether of the race or of the individual) through change, enabled Herder to avoid the teaching into which a naturalistic view of history so easily glides, that of a mere recurrence. It may be noted at this point that the belief of Herder in progress was grounded ultimately in his pantheistic and optimistic conception of the universe, but these points must be discussed rather in connection with Herder's theology. 2

Herder's doctrine of progress has been developed in some detail, first because, as the natural implication of the two first principles, it is the most important, indeed the central historico-philosophical concept, and second because the others are intimately bound up with and proceed from it. A rather briefer mention must now be made of the several secondary concepts in the order determined, partly by their importance, partly by the closeness of their relationship to this primary concept.

1 A closer approximation to Leibniz 2 See Chapter VI
2. PROVIDENCE  A doctrine of progress necessarily carries with it the thought that in history there is both a plan and also an over-ruling, the directing of events and movements towards the fulfilment of that plan. Now it has already been seen that Herder rejected the idea that history is planned and directed by man, or even that the plan of history can be fully understood by man: Face to face with the innumerable and tangled phenomena of history Herder regarded it as beyond the power of the mind of man to discover the true plan of history in its fulness:

Since Herder denied a human control, and even, at least in his Bückeburg days, a human comprehension, he was forced to choose between, on the one hand a denial of direction altogether - but this would have been a denial of progress too - on the other the assertion of a higher providence outside, or above, historical events themselves. Only the latter course was open, and consequently it is not surprising to find the words 'Schicksal' and 'Vorsehung' of frequent occurrence in all Herder's writings, especially in the 'Auch eine Philosophie', in which, as against the Rationalists, a transcendental teleology was strongly asserted:

alles ist grosses Schicksal, vom Menschen unübertasten, unverhofft, unverwirkt; 1
es gibt einen grossen Plan Gottes im Ganzen, den eben ein einzelnes Geschöpf nicht übersieht; 2
die Kraft der Natur wirkte als eine thätig gewordene Idee seines (i.e. God's) ewig dauernden Entwurfs der Schöpfung; 3
das Schicksal deutet (nicht Zufall) sondern eine Reihe, eine unwandelbare Ordnung durch die festgestellten Gesetze an. 4

1 S.V.p.566
2 Ibid.p.531
3 Ibid.p.558
4 Id.I p.281
5 M.P.u.G.VIII p.14 and cf.p.57
It is clear enough from the frequency of these references to providence that Herder consistently held to a doctrine of providence, but it is also clear that the concept did not have for him in all the works quite the same connotation in the later as in the earlier writings, the situation being further complicated by some of the references in the religious works. A rather closer enquiry must then be made into the meaning of this doctrine for Herder.

One fact admits of not the slightest doubt, and it must be stated at the outset. Herder rejected entirely the assertion of final causes, already in bad odour as a result of the merciless attacks of Voltaire and Hume. In his own personal life Herder did seem to be aware of a particular providential ordering, and of the worth of the individual in the sight of God. The testimony of Caroline von Herder will be recalled in this connection, and again Herder himself wrote of the individual:

welche Spuren der Vorsehung und Weisheit Gottes!

In history as a whole the observed development of great movements from small and insignificant events caused him again to postulate a divine and over-ruling providence:

was wir begegnen, wuchs aus kleinen unbemerkten Anfängen heran.

1 M.P.u.G. XX p.132
3 Ibid. pp.61 ff.
4 M.P.u.G.VIII p.31
But in spite of these acknowledgments of a particular providence, the thought that nature and history existed merely that a few special ends might be accomplished, that the Roman Empire, for example, was raised up simply that it might be a tool for the propagation of the Christian faith, this thought was for Herder quite intolerable, and not of the slightest value:

die Philosophie der Endzwecke hat der Naturgeschichte kein Vorteil gebracht...wie viel mehr die tausendzweckige ineinander greifende Menschengeschichte.2

Of course Herder was willing to admit that in one sense every age was a tool, in the sense, that is to say, that no age was itself a final or absolute goal. This was true of Rome:

Also Italien war die Brücke. Rom die Mittelzeit der Härting des Kerns.4

Herder insisted, however, that every age and every nation was at the same time an end, the development of its individual faculties being one part of the completed plan:

kein Ding ist allein Mittel;5
ich fühle es in mir, dass auch die Absichten in meinem Wesen zur Wirklichkeit kommen müssen;6
wir sind bei dieser Fortrückung freilich auch auf unserer Stelle Zweck und Werkzeug des Schicksals;7
jedes Alter hat seinen Mittelpunkt einer Glückseligkeit in sich selbst.8

The realisation of potentialities was in fact for Herder the divine plan underlying both nature and history, and the fact that some potentialities could not be realised in this world was advanced as a proof of the immortality of the human soul.9 Where potentialities

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1 This contention of Bossuet is discussed in Id.III pp.294 ff
2 Ibid.p.296
3 S.V p.559
4 Ibid.p.563: but the inadequacy of this interpretation alone
5 Ibid.p.527
6 M.R.u.T.IX p.177
7 S.V p.557
8 Ibid.p.512
9 M.R.u.T.IX pp 175-177; Id.I p.305
were realised, and the maximum achievement attained, this achievement was of course temporary only, 'nur ein Punkt',\(^1\) but it marked the attainment of one particular end,\(^2\) each maximum of national development thus being in its own way and in its own right a perfect thing: jede Vollkommenheit ist national.\(^3\)

The rejection by Herder of final causes carried with it a strong opposition to the cognate concept of a transcendent, a hidden divine plan. There are passages in the 'Auch eine Philosophie' in which Herder, partly under strong Biblical influence, partly in reaction against the over-complacent rationalism prevalent at the time, did stress the mysterious, the complex, the unexpected elements in history, passages in which a divine plan, which embraced all things from the morning star to the lowly worm in one vast scheme,\(^4\) was seen unfolding like the plot of a mighty dramatic work:

\begin{center}
\textit{ein unendliches Drama von Szenen,} Epopee Gottes.\(^5\)
\end{center}

Even in these passages Herder did not, however, suggest that history was the fulfilment of a purpose not within itself, nor did he assert that the plan of history, although obscure, could not ultimately be known. He merely wished to discount the easy and superficial assumption that reason could understand the purpose and explain the course of history without difficulty, and the corresponding assumption that XVIII century philosophy was the final goal.

For Herder everything, whether in nature or in history, was of course purposeful: Herder accepted the common dictum:

\begin{center}
\textit{inder Natur ist nichts umsonst.}\(^6\)
\end{center}

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\(^{1}\) S.V p.508 Cf. Id.III pp.301 ff.  
\(^{2}\) Id.III pp.333 ff.  
\(^{3}\) S.V p.505  
\(^{4}\) Ibid.p.560  
\(^{5}\) Ibid.p.569  
\(^{6}\) M.R.u.T.X p.127
Herder, however, went a step further and sought the purpose of each organism, not outside, but within itself:

der Zweck einer Sache.....muss in ihr selbst liegen.¹

For Herder purpose meant no more than that a creature should fulfil its destiny in self-realisation, in being itself:

zu diesem Zweck ist unsere Natur organisirt.²

No creature was called upon to serve a higher, unknown, perhaps irrelevant purpose, but simply to be what it could be. This point of view was stated with great force in the Spinoza essay, in which Spinozism was preferred to the transcendentalism for this reason, that the latter conception, as seen in Descartes and Leibniz, left the way open for an introduction of arbitrary final causes ("Hussere Absichten nach Convenienz, Endzwecke"³), whilst in Spinoza's system these could find no place:

omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta.⁴

Herder was adamant that final causes were no concern of a true philosophy, which ought to aim at this:

genau, reine Naturgesetze zu entwickeln, ohne sich um parti-

ikulare Absichten Gottes...zu bekümmern.⁵

The inseparability of the philosophy of Herder from his theology is evident at this point.

For Herder then providence did not imply, ultimately, an over-riding power and the existence of an extra-mundane purpose, but rather that immanent compulsion by which every creature could not but realise itself, and realising itself fulfil its true

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¹ Id.III p.306
² Ibid.p.307 Cf.Id.I p.183
³ S.XVI pp.485-487
⁴ Spinoza Opera I p.213 ('Ethica')
⁵ S.XVI p.492
function within and as a part of the perfectly adjusted whole, as one manifestation of the power of God everywhere active and revealed.1 The fact that there was for Herder an immanent providential force, which ordered every created thing as an end in itself, and yet also used it as the means to the accomplishment of a greater end, meant that to Herder providence revealed itself in nature and in history in a succession which was also a progression, a series of manifestations, each built upon, and of a higher order than that which had gone before. Translated into the imagery of transcendence, this idea of a progression in history took the form of a picture of the movement of God across history and through the civilisations, each of which, succeeding in its proper place that which had perished, was a whole, and yet a part of the greater whole. Thus Herder spoke in the 'Auch eine Philosophie' of the 'Gang Gottes über die Nationen'2 - the pronounced transcendentalism of this phrase will be noted - and in later works there are similar passages:

das Werk der Vorsehung, nach allgemeinen grossen Gesetzen (a new stress upon ordered natural law) in seinem ewigen Gange fortdauernd;3
bei jedem der Völker, hat das Licht (die der Kultur)nur eine kurze Zeit gedauert.4

For Herder each of the great historical peoples had thus not only fulfilled its own destiny, but in fulfilling that destiny it had also in the providential ordering and progress of life contributed to the development of that larger whole, the race. Each had been both a goal - the realisation of the potentialities latent within it - and also the means to a higher goal - the realisation of all the pot-

2 S.V p.565
3 Id.III p.298
4 M.P.u.G.X p.293
entialities within the race, and ultimately within the universe. In Herder's ripest thought the concept of providence had thus lost all transcendental significance. It had come to mean no more than an inward compulsion of nature, that self-manifesting, in-dwelling power of Godhead, by reason of which all things were necessarily as they were, not in fulfilment of any external purpose, but in and for themselves as individuals, and in and for all things as parts of a greater whole, that progressive ordering of all the parts in succession for the harmonious development both of each part and also in and through the parts of the whole.\(^1\) A fuller understanding of this concept will only be possible in the light of Herder's teaching upon the relation of the universe and God, the discussion of which must be postponed until the next chapter.

3. **RELATIVITY OF VALUE** It has already been noted that from the very first Herder was led, by his organic conception of historical growth, to assert the relative value of each historical culture. If cultural growth is genetic, natural, then inevitably each culture, springing as it does from its own root, and developing under particular conditions, stands, like a plant, in its own right, justified according to its own nature and to the laws and circumstances which have controlled and conditioned its growth. In respect neither of the natural nor the historical growth does the question of an absolute standard of judgment arise. Herder's view of providence as an inward compulsion, not an outward direction, his rejection of any external plan, his relation of each species, or cultural growth, as a stage, to the larger, providentially self-ordering universe: these were clearly of a piece with his bold assertion.

\(^1\) Cf.Id.III pp.356 ff.
that historical and cultural values are relative only, not absolute.
In view of the significance attached by Herder to this doctrine,
and the importance of it in the later development of thought, a
rather closer, if necessarily brief enquiry must be made into it.

The claim that cultures are relative and national belonged,
with the principle which underlay it, that of organic growth, to
the oldest stratum of Herder's thought, and it was a leading theme
in his works upon literature and art. Prior to the 'Fragmente' and
'Kritische Wälder' of Herder the critics of all schools had more or
less taken it as axiomatic that there was an absolute or ideal in
art, this ideal or absolute being usually found either in the an-
cient or in the new French Classicism. Even in the famous Querelle
the moderns had not contended either for new standards, or for the
abolition of all standards, but merely for a superiority of the
French over the Greeks and Romans in the achievement of the one com-
on ideal, a superiority attributed solely to advances in technique.
The innovators of the XVIII century, as, for example, Voltaire,
had never any thought of overthrowing the rules, but sought merely
to improve technique and to exploit new themes and new situations
within the rules.2 Lessing, opponent as he was of the French Class-
icism, as imitated by the Germans, had even tried to justify Shake-
speare by pleading that in his way, in spirit, he had fulfilled the
rules more perfectly than had done Corneille or Racine, and that he
was thus the true successor of the Greeks.3 Winckelmann had intro-

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1 This seems to have been the view of Boileau himself (Lettre à Arnauld 1706) as of Fontenelle and Perrault.
2 The 'comédie larmoyante', 'roman' and 'drame' were new genres, and thus innovations in the stricter sense. In tragedy
the attitude to Shakespeare reveals the true position.
3 Lessing: Litteraturbriefe (1759-1765)
duced the genetic principle into the study of Greek art, but he too clung to the absoluteness of the Greek culture as an ideal and standard for all time.¹ Even in the field of philosophy the proclamation of progress did not carry with it the abandonment of everything absolute, but only too often the shifting of the ideal and standard from a past age to the age of enlightenment itself.²

Now although Herder appreciated to the full the excellences of Greek art and culture, his contention was from the outset that in art there is no absolute. Culture was for Herder a national, not an international growth. It existed in its own right and was its own absolute. Whether it was speech or literature, it sprang up as it were from the soil, not under the conscious direction of mind, but spontaneously, not in accordance with rules and standards, but according to racial and individual character, and geographical and climatic circumstance. True culture was natural, spontaneous, national, individual, relative.

This contention, already made in the earlier essays, was the magnificent theme of the two studies, the one of Shakespeare, the other of Ossian, which Herder contributed to the joint work 'Von deutscher Art und Kunst'.³ Shakespeare, for example, was rescued by Herder from that false criticism which would see in him the successor of Sophocles. Comparison, Herder maintained, was not possible, since in origin and in development the English and the Greek drama had nothing in common:

  in Griechenland war das Drama was es im Norden nicht seyn kann; im Norden ists also nicht, und darf nicht seyn, was es in Griechenland gewesen.⁴

¹ Schulz op.cit.pp.84-87; Dilthey op.cit.p.261
² As with Montesquieu, Voltaire, Iselin, Michaelis, Condorcet.
³ S.V pp.203 ff.
⁴ Ibid.pp.208-209
To measure the one by the other was thus impossible and the attempt ridiculous. Shakespeare and Sophocles, each a great creative artist ('eine Diener der Natur')\(^1\), both worked with those materials which were to hand and produced, each in his own way, incomparable masterpieces. As with Shakespeare and Sophocles, so too with Ossian and Homer, except that here the gulf was even wider, since Ossian represented a culture as ancient as, and acknowledging no indebtedness to, that of Greece,\(^2\) a culture which Herder made the initial mistake, with others, of relating to that Germanic culture which Klopstock was seeking to revive.\(^3\) Herder did not hesitate for one moment to maintain that the tearful and elegiac Ossian, who rang the death-knell of a glorious Celtic civilisation, was in his own way and against the background of his age just as great and just as important as the powerful and confident Homer, who heralded the civilisation of the Hellenic world.\(^4\)

The question was, it will be seen, not merely one of art or literature, but of the cultures and civilisations of which these were the expression. How important the principle of relativity was in Herder's historical estimate of world-cultures appears clearly in the 'Auch eine Philosophie'. Two applications are made. First, Herder works the relative principle into his schema of progress, by means of the analogy of the individual growth. The civilisations are the stages of growth, each complete, each justified in itself, each achieving the perfection natural and peculiar to itself, each at the same time being a part in the larger whole. Relativity within an ultimate teleological framework was thus secured. Secondly,

\(^1\) S.V p.222 \(^2\) S.VIII pp.334 ff. See too a later ess.

\(^3\) Gillies: Herder und Ossian p.64 /ey 'Homer und Ossian'

\(^4\) A point finely brought out by Gillies (op.cit.pp.121-124)
in a sharp polemic against Rationalism, the view that 'raisonnement',
attained in the XVIII century, was the final goal:
der Gipfel und Zweckäler menschlichen Bildung:1
this view was refuted. In Herder's eyes no age, no achievement of
any age, was a final, but each a partial, or a part of, the goal:
die Geschichte ist eine Harmonie von Tönen, wo jetzt man "auch
nur wenige Töne, oft nur ein verdrüssliches Stimmen von Miss-
tönen,2
was für ein Werk, zu dem so viel Schattengruppen von Nationen
und Zeiten..............gehören! ....Was für ein Werk, dies Ganze!
So viel Ordnung, so viel Wirrung!3
For Herder it was absurd to judge teleologically, according to an
absolute, an ideal, a final purpose -
nach einem idealistischen Schattenbild zu beurtheilen;4
just as it was also absurd to deny a measure of happiness and achieve-
ment 5 to any age or race. Every culture was for Herder both a
means and also an end,6 and every aspect of humanity was to be real-
ised: die menschliche Natur muss alles lernen.7
The prevalent lack of sympathy with the so-called 'Dark Ages'(as for
example in Voltaire and Hume) came in for especially severe condem-
ation.8 Herder himself made a plea for the merits of the Gothic
religion and culture of the Middle Ages:
ein ungeheures Gebäude, Überladen, drückend, finster, ge-
schmacklos, aber groß, reich, mächtig.9
Even the ages of decline and destruction, although they were of
course to be seen as ages of transition to something new -

1 S.V p.537
2 Ibid.p.560
3 Ibid.pp.585-586
4 Ibid.p.507
5 Ibid.p.510 Happiness and achievement were in Herder's
6 Ibid.p.546 mind complementary.
7 Ibid.p.505
8 Ibid.p.524
9 Ibid.p.522
even these ages were not without claim to some achievement, even these ages had also an existence and value in their own right, and not merely as the means to something else: 

kein Ding ist allein Mittel. 

The principle of relativity was particularly prominent in the 'Ideen', its importance in Herder's eyes having been augmented by Kant's assertion, in his 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht' (1784), first, that there is a hidden plan: die Geschichte der Menschengattung ist die Vollziehung eines verborgenen Plans der Natur; and second, that this plan had as its aim the setting up of a world-state, in which a full development of the faculties of humanity would be possible:

.....durch den Antagonismus der Anlagen in der Gesellschaft eine weltbürgerliche Verfassung zu bringen, als den einzigen Zustand, die Anlagen der Natur in der Menschheit völlig zu entwickeln.

This view of history was distasteful to Herder, not only because it was advanced in open opposition to Herder himself, but also because it implied, first, the existence of a transcendental plan, second, that a man-made state is the ideal rather than the nation - 'die naturgewachsene Nation' - and third, that only the last age will be one of achievement and happiness, the others being condemned to frustration as ages of mere preparation, as 'Werkzeuge'. Herder deliberately and in various ways emphasised his own thesis over against that of Kant:

1 S.Vpp. 527-528
2 Ibid. P. 528
3 Kant: Werke VI p. 16
4 Ibid. loc. cit.
Herder himself of course was not without his personal preferences—he disliked for example the civilisation of Rome 6—but to no age did he deny independent achievement,7 and his appreciation of the Arabic civilisation,8 and of the Middle Ages 9 (which had now for many reasons become distasteful10), whether considered in and for themselves or in relation to the larger whole, are particularly striking. The feeling for the pageantry of the Middle Ages (‘Städte Zünfte, die gothische Baukunst’11), a feeling which was of a piece with the general sympathy of Herder with everything colourful and poetical; this must be mentioned in view of the later Romantic enthusiasm for the mediaeval and the primitive. According to Herder the true task of the historian or the critic was not that of judgment but of interpretation, the assessment of each age or culture for that which it is worth in itself, and of this primary task Herder himself, even when dealing with ages uncongenial, never lost sight.

1 Id.II p.194
2 Ibid.p.202
3 Ibid.p.204
4 Ibid.p.218
5 Ibid.p.272
6 Id.III pp.223 ff.
7 Ibid.pp.227 ff; 309 ff.
8 Id.IV pp.239 ff.
9 Ibid.pp.274 ff.
10 Ibid.pp.227 ff; 299 ff., in which the Papacy and the Crus-
11 Ibid.pp.323 ff. (theses are harshly judged)
Enough has been said, both in this and in previous sections, to make it plain that Herder consistently maintained that aims and achievements were relative, even within an absolute scheme, the controlling and reconciling thought being this, that the ultimate goal of the race is self-manifestation in every form in a progressive series. From the latter works many passages could be cited to illustrate Herder’s tenacious insistence upon this point:

die jede Nation muss auf ihrer Stelle betrachtet werden.\(^1\)

The final picture in Herder’s mind was that of a whole achievement of the race, of which the individual cultures were in themselves complete and yet component parts, of a human happiness which was the sum total of the happiness of all the individuals, of diversity within an all-prevailing unity, and unity in diversity:

es gibt eine unendliche Verschiedenheit zu einer Einheit strebend;\(^2\) es gibt eine lebendige Harmonie, in der jedes Ding das vollkommenste Eins und doch Jedes mit Jedem so vielfach bewebt ist;\(^3\) die Glückseligkeit des Ganzen besteht nur in der Glückseligkeit aller Glieder.\(^4\)

The poetic catholicity of Herder, which inspired him to seek and to see relative aim and achievement everywhere, stands out in happy contrast both to the confident superiority of the Rationalists and to the grim transcendentalism, the complete subjection of the parts to a greater and as yet unattained whole, of Kant.\(^5\)

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1 M.P.u.G.XIV pp.146-147
2 Ibid.p.201
3 S.XVI p.551
4 M.P.u.G VIII p.166
5 Kant, in his criticism of the 'Ideen II' ('kein Glied, nur die Gattung, erreicht völlig ihre Bestimmung' Werke VI pp. 45-46) seemed not to have grasped Herder's real point, which was that the self-realisation of the whole is only possible in and through the self-realisation of the parts.
4. NECESSITY AND RETRIBUTION  Closely bound up with the concepts of progress and providence, and with the underlying interpretation of cultural development as organic growth, were two further concepts prominent in Herder's works, that of necessity and that of retribution. These concepts naturally come together in a consideration of Herder's philosophy of history, since they are in a sense complementarily the one to the other. They do not seem, however, to have been consciously associated with any closeness in Herder's own mind, and a brief separate treatment of each will be necessary.

The idea that a necessity underlay and determined the course of history did not find any formulation in Herder's thought until quite late, and it grew largely out of Herder's immanent concept of providence, but the idea of natural necessity was implicit in his thinking from the first. The moment that Herder applied to literature the analogy of natural organic growth, that moment he denied all possibility of a free direction of history by human reason and brought development under subjection to a law far more exacting than the mechanistic causality of the Rationalists, which had not excluded free choice on the part of man as a cause. Even the use by Herder of the term 'Genie',¹ with the stress upon the outstanding cultural achievement of individuals,² and the ascription to them of creative power,³ did not mitigate in any way the severity of the ultimate determinism. Genius was for Herder, as for the Sturm und Drang in general, not the free force of mind, but an elemental power of nature,⁴ which worked in man according to environment. The

¹ A concept derived through Hamann from Young and Shaftesbury  
² E.g. Shakespeare, Homer, Ossian, Moses, Milton  
³ S.v p.231 ('Schöpfer von Geschichte und Weltseele')  
⁴ Shaftesbury had addressed the genius working in and through nature itself: 'O might Genius, sole animating and inspiring power (Characteristics III:1 p.153)
creativity of human genius was not the free creativity of conscious mind, but the creativity of an overpowering indwelling force, the 'Dämon'.\(^1\) In speaking of Shakespeare, for example, Herder used the terms 'Schöpfer, Dichter, dramatischer Gott'\(^2\), but Shakespeare as an inspired genius ('mit göttlicher Kraft begabt')\(^3\) was opposed to the self-conscious French dramatists, whom Herder dismissed as mere artificers, 'elende Ceremonienmeister'.\(^4\)

The concept of necessity first comes to manifestation, like so many others, in relation to literature and art, but its application was clearly to culture and history, and to the universe, in a wider sense. In MacEachran's phrase, a 'cosmic determinism'\(^5\) underlay for Herder the whole process of history. Herder himself did not use the term 'necessity' in the 'Auch eine Philosophie', but it is clear that for him each culture was, as a stage in the growth of the race, a necessary growth, in the plan and purpose of an overruling providence. There was in this work a definite tendency to conceive of the necessity transcendentally and teleologically, the shaping of nations and cultures in fulfilment of a hidden purpose, incomprehensible, yet, in spite of the illusion of freedom, unavoidable.\(^6\) This transcendentalism was partly a reaction against omniscient Rationalism, partly a fruit of the pietistic reversion, more largely a product of the cosmic irrationalism of the Sturm und Drang; but it lay outside the main stream of Herder's thought. Indeed,

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\(^1\) 'Dämon' was a term much favoured by the Sturm und Drang (cf. Goethe's 'Egmont'). It connoted over-mastering force, (e.g. genius) immanent, impersonal, ammoral, both creative and destructive. Herder equated it with genius and providence (M.R.u.T XIV pp. 73) and destiny (M.P.u.G. X pp. 90), but in his thought the irrational and tragic elements were soon lost.

\(^2\) S.V p. 227

\(^3\) Ibid. pp. 217-218

\(^4\) Ibid. pp. 213 f.; 227

\(^5\) MacEachran op. cit. p. 32

\(^6\) S.V p. 536
even in the 'Auch eine Philosophie' passages are not wanting to show that the necessity which underlay history, if it was divine, was also immanent and therefore natural, a compulsion of divine power active within creation:

das Strom der Gotteskraft in allen Formen, Gestalten und Schöpfungen, and in and through the constraining and conditioning forces of environment, in such a way that nothing can be produced

als wozu Zeit, Klima, Bedürfnis, Schicksal Anlass gibt.2

That extreme irrational Sturm und Drang immanentism, which saw cosmic forces at work in men and nations, but blindly and apparently purposelessly, was avoided by Herder, who had already begun to relate necessity, and providence, to ordered natural growth.

The unavoidable problem of the relationship of human freedom to organic necessity as thus conceived formed one of the topics discussed by Herder in the 'Ideen'. The solution which Herder suggested was an inclusion of freedom within the scheme of organic necessity. Man was by his very nature free, since he had been endowed with reason and conscious determination in the place of animal instinct: das Thier ist ein gebückter Sklave: der Mensch kann forschen, er soll wählen.3

This endowment was itself, however, an endowment of nature, which, far from being outside of and above nature, operated according to natural law and in accomplishment of ends ordained by nature. A further point which Herder stressed was that the free acts of men themselves also combine in a new causal chain which binds both men and nations, the chain of tradition. Thus, even while admitting human freedom,

1 S.V p. 569
2 Ibid. p. 505
3 Id. I p. 231
Herder could also speak both of the operation of laws in the world of free spirit ('allgemeine grosse Gesetze'), the laws which determined the growth of nations according to capacities and conditions, and also of the existence of a chain of tradition ('die goldene Kette der Tradition') by which each new nation is of necessity linked to that which has gone before. In the last analysis Freedom meant for Herder very little more than the freedom to develop the powers of humanity already there, the power spiritually to realise oneself, to be what one can and ought to be.

Under the influence of the renewed study of Spinoza this conception of a natural necessity received a much more full and careful philosophical statement in the essay 'Gott', an essay in which Herder also for the first time clarified somewhat his ideas upon the variety within unity of the creation. Now Spinoza had asserted a rigid and thoroughgoing necessity as the inevitable corollary of his pantheistic teaching:

nullum contingens, sed omnia in necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt ad arto modo existendum et operandum.

Herder conceived of the universe rather on dynamic than materialistic lines, but the conclusion which he reached was very much the same:

jedes Ding ist, was es ist, aus innern Gesetzen der Notwendigkeit.

The necessity of which Herder spoke was not that of a blind fatalism, nor was it the irresponsible caprice of some external will ('so wenig wird die Willkür erlaubt'), but the natural compulsion of divine

1 Id.III pp.293; 330 ff.
2 Id.II pp.209 ff.
3 Spinoza: Opera I p.210
4 S.XVI p.519
5 Ibid.508-509; also p.482
6 Ibid.534
power immanent in nature and working through natural law. Caprice, both divine and human, was excluded, and even the measure of freedom still accorded to man was subjected to natural law and drawn into a causal nexus ('nichts ohne Ursache, nichts ohne Wirkung'). All things in history and in nature alike, as the expression of the Godhead, were seen to be ordered with a wise and benevolent immanent power, the character of God being itself wise and purposeful:

die Naturwerke (der Gottheit) sind die weiseste und beste Notwendigkeit.  

The ultimate conception of necessity was thus theological.

In later works little of value was added to this exposition. The term 'Dämon' was revived in the essay 'Mein eignes Schicksal', but with a meaning of no more than destiny, or even character:

meine Art zu seyn und zu handeln.  

Great stress was here laid once again upon a causal connection in history by which the fates of men and nations are linked:

das Naturgesetz, der Zusammenhang in der geistigen Welt.  

Herder seemed doubtful, however, in some of the later writings, as to whether man ought to be subjected too rigidly to natural necessity, and he granted to the spirit of man a share in the constructive power of nature:

der Mensch ist nicht nur ein mechanisches Glied der Naturkette, sondern der Geist, der die Natur beherrscht, ist theilerweise in ihm.  

The implication of this passage seems to be that in man as a spiritual being the compulsion is not altogether that of external natural law,

1 S.XVI p.548  
2 Ibid. pp.536-537  
3 M.P.u.G. VII pp.9-10  
4 Ibid.p.11; and also p.19  
5 M.P.u.G.XIIV p.144
but also that of direct creative power, working in accordance with its own inner necessity.

The central point is everywhere apparent, that for Herder necessity was at once divine, immanent, and natural, not the imposition of external will, but the compulsion of internal demand, the demand that every creature should be what it can and ought to be. It is at this point that Herder's view of historical and natural necessity touches upon that further principle so frequently observed by Herder in nature and in history, the principle of an inexorable retribution. The concept of retribution was only worked out fully by Herder in his later and riper studies, but it was implicit in earlier all Herder's writings, in which it appeared as that immanent judgment which falls upon any organism which fails to achieve its destiny, or which seeks to frustrate the laws governing its growth. It was throughout as a vengeance exacted by nature upon frustration or misuse that the concept was developed.

The reading of Rousseau, with the reaction which it produced against the culture of reason and sophistication, seems first to have pointed Herder to this principle. Like Rousseau, Herder came to look upon XVIII century cultural life as something thrust upon rather than growing out of nature, an artificial creation of man rather than a natural growth. The first protest was made in the critical works, in which of course poetry which was a growth from the soil was exalted against versification according to academic rule. The polemic was more general in the 'Auch eine Philosophie', and the French were now singled out for particular attack:

die Franzosen sind die Affen der Humanität. ¹

¹ S.V p. 536
European thought and culture as a whole was characterised as 'Spielwerk'.

The fact that for Herder the prevailing dearth of true achievement was the consequence of a substitution of the work of reason for that of nature meant that already an inevitable retribution was observed.

As yet no attempt had been made at a formulation as law, and it is not clear exactly when or under what influences this further step was taken. Perhaps the Biblical reading at Bückeburg proved decisive - St. Paul's statement of a moral law of retribution in Galatians 6:vi-viii must have proved particularly attractive, and Herder himself later made use of the same comparison from the life of nature. At any rate it was in the theological writings, 'das Hohe- lied' and 'Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend', and in relation to the moral life, that the law of retribution was first clearly stated. It was this law which was seen fulfilled in the life and fate of Solomon, the general conclusion being drawn:

die ganze Welt ist die Wage der Wiedervergeltung in jedes Menschen Leben;

whilst in the letters Herder related retribution and the moral government of the world, a natural law of sowing and reaping ('Saat und Ernte') being observed:

1 S.V p.540
2 Ibid. pp.540 ff.
3 Ibid. p.544
4 A possible influence of Leibniz' view of retributive justice (Monadology 39-90; On the Active Force of the Body Scw 5) must not be overlooked. Lessing himself defended and held to this view (Aner op.cit.pp.270 ff.)
5 M.R.u.T. IV p.98
130

-ische Regierung der Welt... nichts rächt sich so scharf als die Natur. 1

It was in the form suggested by the second phrase that the concept rose to prominence in the 'Ideen'. Herder warned for example against that too abrupt a change of manner of life or environment, which can lead to 'Verartung'; 2 he insisted upon the peril of defying nature: als ob die Natur an jedem Frelvel, den man ihr anthut, nicht räche; 3 he pointed out the transitoriness of those states and empires which were artificially built up by man:

ganz anders ist's mit Staaten, die, aus ihrer Wurzel erwachser, auf sich selbst ruhen: sie können überwältigt werden, aber die Nation dauret; 4

he warned against the evils attendant upon too great a good fortune:

das Volk und der Despot verstehen am wenigsten der Schicksalgöttin warnenden Blick. Vom Schall des Namens und vom Glanz des Ruhms zerblendet, stürzen sie hinaus über die Grenzen der Humanität; 5

he recognised that where a culture is corrupt or abusive it is due to the perversion or the frustration of natural powers:

irrtten sie, oder blieben auf dem halben Wege einer ererbten Tradition, so litten sie die Folgen ihres Irrthums und büsseten ihre eigne Schuld; 6

finally he feared lest as a result of a forced growth through the development of reason and inventive power the culture of Europe, which held out such great promise, might ripen too quickly. 7

The disappearance of the old antagonism against the modern age must be noted, but it is to be attributed rather to an inclusion of rational endeavour within the natural process than to an abandonment of

1 M.R.u.T.XIVpp.74f.
2 Id.II p.119
3 Ibid.p.126
4 Id.III p.126
5 Ibid.p.340
6 Ibid.p.309
7 Id.IV p.340
natural law.

In the later works retribution became a central and dominating theme in Herder's historical interpretation:

welche andere Göttin könnte der Geschichte vorstehen als Nemesis-Adrastea;¹
dieses Mass der Nemesis ist der einzige und ewige Massstab aller Menschengeschichte.²

For Herder retribution was an inflexible law of the moral world, by which sins were visited both upon those who erred and upon the race:

die Rache kommt bei jeder Verirrung;³
Schaden muss (das Menschengeschlecht) tragen, büßen, und entgelten.⁴

This law was a law both in the natural ('ein Gesetz der Natur')⁵ and also in the moral and spiritual world:

in der moralischen Welt herrsche ein Gesetz der Wiedervergeltung⁶

This law did not operate, however, either as the result of a blind fate or of a transcendental judgment, but in accordance with the holy necessity whereby all actions carry with them their own appropriate rewards.⁷ Retribution is thus borne within man himself:

wir tragen die Nemesis in uns.⁸

This law was of course seen to be of great importance when the future life was discussed, and in Herder's thinking the fate of man in the next world was (as with Leibniz) made dependent, according to the immutable decree of nature, upon his life in this.⁹ The concept of retribution was naturally prominent in all the later theological

1 M.P.u.G. VIII p.33
2 M.P.u.G. XIV p.189
3 M.P.u.G. XIV pp.189-190
4 M.P.u.G. VIII pp.114-130
6 M.R.u.T. XVI p.220
7 M.P.u.G. VIII pp.61 ff.
8 Ibid.loc. cit.
9 Ibid.loc. cit.
writings, appearing in a variety of forms, as for example:
wie wir andern thun, so wèrdeuns gathan. werden.¹

Particular stress was laid upon it in the Confirmations:
ein moralisches Gesetz; dass jedes Gutes sich selbst lohne,
jedes Böses sich selbst strafe.²

Illustrations could easily be multiplied, but the nature and importance of retribution in Herder's scheme of things must be already sufficiently apparent. This law of retribution seems in Herder's later thought to have occupied the position of a focal point upon which the other leading concepts: the continuity of nature and spirit; the organic nature of growth; the solidarity of the race; the peril of the artificial and unnatural; the law of necessity; the existence of a wise and righteous providence: upon which these and other concepts could converge.

5. **DIVINE EDUCATION** The belief that history is under the direction of a wise and beneficent providence led Herder, the immanence of that providence notwithstanding, to the further thought of a divine instruction of the race, an instruction which extended across the whole process of history. This was the idea which was of course to be most fully worked out by Lessing in his masterly short treatise, 'Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts', in which a progressive course of divine enlightenment was traced out in history, Judaism and Christianity being revelations in picture form of the truths of reason and thus stages in the advance to a religion of pure reason, the reign of the Holy Ghost. The revelation, or education, of

¹ M.R.u.T XVII p.220
² M.R.u.T. X p.107
which Lessing spoke was not of course the impartation of knowledge which could not have been discovered by the human reason, but a more speedy dissemination of it amongst the masses:

\[\text{eine Erziehung, die nichts gibt, worauf die menschliche Vernunft nicht kommen würde, nur früher.}\]

The mistake must not be made of thinking that Lessing was the first to propound this view. It had indeed been mentioned by Shaftesbury, who had envisaged a providence which allowed to the heathen 'their miracles and prodigies as an imperfect kind of revelation', but which gave to the race in Judaism and Christianity

a far better and truer revelation, with plainer oracles, a more rational law and clearer Scriptures.

The Neologians too had conceived of revelation as an enlightened reason (especially Jerusalem and Foster), and the idea of the use of revelational methods for instruction in rational truths and laws had formed the basis of the earlier elaborate discussion by Warburton.

Whilst then the greatness of Lessing's achievement in developing this thought into an historical interpretation of religion must not be minimised, it would be quite wrong to attribute the concept of a divine education solely to him, or to seek a decisive influence of Lessing upon Herder at this point. Indeed the facts plainly refute the latter theory, since Herder himself made use of the thought some ten years before Lessing's work was written. The probability

1. Lessing: Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts Sctn.4
2. Shaftesbury: The Moralists II:5 p.124
3. Aner op.cit.p.194
4. Warburton: The Divine Legation of Moses (1738) In this Warburton faced the accusation of sceptics that Moses made use of false miracles and revelations to advance rational and moral truths. He himself admitted the charge with regard to heathen systems, identified in substance the truth of revelation with that of reason, and granted that true miracles and prophecies were made possible for the more speedy propagation of the Gospel.
5. There does seem to be an influence in the theological "Briefe."
is that Herder became familiar with the idea during his years of theological study at Königsberg, and that he was attracted to it, not merely by the fact that it existed in embryonic form in Shaftesbury, but rather by the way in which it dovetailed into the pedagogic interests of the age 1, and Herder's own practical activity in the educational sphere.2

With Herder the concept was first put forward in the Bückeburg historico-philosophical and theological writings, in which it was particularly prominent. All culture was at this time traced back by Herder to that primitive divine instruction of man, later enshrined in the hieroglyphic which is the basis of the first chapter of Genesis.3 The first textbook of man was nature, since the method of instruction first adopted by God was by means of the concrete and visible ('Bilder, Sagen, Begebenheiten, die ganze Natur'4):

Adam lernte nicht bloss Sprache von den Thieren, sondern Art und Kunst. Die Natur ist das beste Buch nach der Bibel.5

By 1773, in the first sketch of the 'Provinzialblätter', Herder had already worked out a scheme of progressive revelation: he saw the revelation of God mediated successively (stufenweise) by patriarchs, prophets, apostles 6, and after the pattern of an individual instruction in religious truth:

Abrahams Erziehung der Seinen war ein Nachbild der grossen Gott-eserziehung des ganzen Geschlechts.7

In the fourth letter of the final version the thought was further

1 Witnessed in the avidity with which Rousseau's 'Emile' was received.
2 Herder was a teacher both at Königsberg and Riga.
3 Cf.S.VI pp.284 ff.
4 Ibid.p.272
5 S.VII pp.42-43
6 Ibid.p.177 This is indeed the general theme.
7 Ibid.p.130
developed under the text Hebrews 1:1.¹

An extension of the concept to the whole history of man may be observed in the 'Auch eine Philosophie' and the contemporary 'Grundriss'. In the former Herder did not actually speak of a divine education, but the thesis was presented that in the providence of God external circumstances were so ordered as to make possible a right development of human powers: the value of the despotic government under the patriarchs at the early stage of man's cultural growth may be cited in illustration:

der Morgenländer war unter der milden Vaterregierung der glücklichsten und folgsamste Lehrling.²

This education of the race could be seen most clearly of course during the earlier periods of human history. In the 'Grundriss' a full section was devoted to the concept of a divine education of the race, again in its childhood, and all culture, including knowledge and speech itself, was traced back to a first divine impartation, tradition, however, assuring its perpetuation and constant progress.³ Only a bare outline of this theory was given.

At this time Herder seems to have had leanings towards a more transcendentalist view of providence, and divine education was conceived of as a real impartation. By the time the 'Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend' were written the transcendentalism had begun to wane, and a change is noticeable in the concept of education. Herder still asserted that reason had developed under a divine guidance:

die Offenbarung (equated now with 'die Erziehung des Menschenge-schlechts) hat die Vernunft gebildet und erzogen;³

¹ S.VII p.484 Cf. this whole passage
² M.P.u.G X pp.291-292
³ M.R.u.T XIV p.17
but the suggestion of a supernatural impartation was excluded:

die gebildete Vernunft fällt nicht vom Himmel.¹

By 1784, when the first part of the 'Ideen' was published, the
transcendentalism had completely disappeared, and the thought of
an education of the race, although not discarded, was virtually
transformed. The stress was laid by Herder now, not so much upon
the still admitted education of the race in childhood by God, but
upon the education of the individual within the race:

es gibt eine Erziehung des Menschen, weil jeder Mensch
nur durch Erziehung ein Mensch wird.²

In so far as there was a more general cultural education of all men,
it was of a purely natural character, the earth being the school-
house,³ the aim the development of innate powers, and the chief
means a contact with the cultural tradition handed down from age to
age.⁴ Herder retained the concept 'divine education', but in fact
he robbed it of any particular meaning, and he even went on to
speak of genetic education.⁵ Culture was for Herder the product of
indwelling forces brought into play by natural means (speech was
developed 'durch Nachahmung des Klangs aller andern Wesen'⁶) and
extending their sphere of operation and power by transmission and
inheritance. That this purely natural cultural process took place
in the power and under the direction of God ('unter der oberen Haus-
haltung Gottes'⁷) denoted no more than that God was immanent in nat-
ural development, the most favourable conditions thus being realised

¹ M.R.u.T. XIV p.17
² Id.II p.212  Herder even opposed the idea of an education
of the race: Geschlecht und Gattung sind nur allgemeine
Begriffe; ausser sofern sie in einzelnen Wesen existiren.
³ Tbid.p.213
⁴ Tbid.pp.213-214
⁵ Tbid.loc.cit.
⁶ Tbid.pp.223 f.
⁷ Tbid.p.249
and achievement assured. The opposition to a pure naturalism was maintained in that Herder still asserted an origin of culture in a more direct revelation of God through nature, the revelation which has come down in its purest form in the records of Genesis: 1 but it will be noticed that even this revelation was not strictly supernatural, and for the rest culture developed as an evolution of innate powers by imitation, experience and inherited tradition. This education was divine only in the sense that all natural activity is divine. 2

The subject of a divine education hardly appears in the later writings and nothing new is added. There is a reference to education as the bringing forth of latent capacities 3 and the importance of speech as an organ of culture is stressed, 4 but in both these passages the reference is rather to an education of the individual. There is an apparent reversion to an earlier view in the Confirmation:

(Offenbarung ist)c...Leitung Gottes zur Erkenntnis der Wahrheit; 5 but even here there was no real question of a special manifestation, or of a transcendental ordering of God, since the qualifying phrase was added 'durch vorzügliche Gaben und günstige Umstände'. Herder meant in fact no more than that revelation in religion and theology is a term to describe the immanent activity of God in the advance of the human race, through natural means, to a knowledge of the truth. Divine education had come to mean for Herder the natural cultural development of the race, divine only as a work of immanent Godhead.

1 Id.I p.314
2 In this respect Herder differed from Lessing, whose statement was transcendentalist, at least in form.
3 M.P.u.G. VIII pp.107-108
4 M.P.u.G. XIII p.266
5 M.R.u.T. X p.176
6. MAN AND THE COSMOS

In the consideration of his concepts both of progress and providence it has been seen that Herder was opposed to all postulates of a transcendental goal. The aim of each species, and of each manifestation within the species, rested within itself, and was in fact that it should be itself. This was clearly stated by Herder himself in the 'Ideen':

Humanität ist der Zweck der Menschennatur; der Mensch sey Mensch; allenthalben ist die Menschheit das, was sie aus sich machen kann.

Species, culture, individual: none of these existed primarily as a means to something beyond itself. If there was an ultimate goal, it was the self-realisation of the whole through the self-realisation of the parts. This teaching was emphatically repeated in the later works:

die Antwort ist Menschheit;
Vollkommenheit ist, dass das Ding sey, was es sein soll und kann.
Vollkommenheit eines Menschen, dass er selbst sey und werde;
der einzige Antrieb ist Humanität; das Göttliche in unserem Geschlecht ist Bildung zur Humanität.

Herder never made any concession upon this point and maintained his opposition both against the orthodox and against Kant up to the very end. At the same time it must not be thought that self-realisation was Herder's last or only word upon the destiny of the human race. Herder had a keen sense of the value of each individual as an end, but he also had a keen sense of the continuity of all things, of the universe as itself an individual and thus also as a

1 Id.III p.306
2 Ibid.p.309
3 Ibid.p.312
4 M.P.u.G. VIII p.106
5 Ibid.p.107
6 M.P.u.G. XIII pp.133-137 Herder here took up the idea of a purified free-masonry as a brotherhood, with its aim humanity, (as already advocated in Lessing's 'Ernst und Falk')
larger end. It was indeed imperative that Herder should assign to each individual a place in the whole, since self-realisation was the goal of the universe as well as of the individuals. In this connection the Leibnizian character of Herder's universe must be remembered:

\[\text{eine Stufenleiter, (die)sich sich nicht anders als im All offenbart, (und in welcher) alle Kräfte da sind, die da daseyn könnten.}^{1}\]

In the same way then as Herder had already thought of the civilisations as both ends in themselves and also stages in the growth of humanity, so too he could think of humanity as both an end and also a stage in the growth of the whole.

The destiny of man and the place of the human species upon the ladder of being was a subject with which Herder was constantly occupied in his writings and one which was related in an intimate manner to his most essential thought.\(^2\) The first important point which Herder made was the commonplace, that man is at the very top of the ladder of creation as nature's highest achievement:

\[\text{der Mensch ist der Siegel und Krone des Ganzen.}^{3}\]

This thought dated from the Bückeburg, even from the Riga days, but it came most clearly to expression in the 'Ideen', in which the claim of man to be, not only the highest, but also an archetypal creature was asserted.\(^4\) All the influences brought to bear upon him must have confirmed in him this view.

It has been noted previously that Herder did not only stress the bond between man, the crown and glory of creation, and the other creatures, but that he was conscious too of that gulf which sep-

1 S.XVI p.542
2 MacEachran is surely wrong when in his discussion of the 'Ideen' he seems to dismiss Herder's thinking upon this subject as little more than incidental (op.cit.p.63)
3 S.VII p.8
4 Id.I pp.87 ff.
arated man from the other creatures. Man alone of all earthly creatures was endowed with spiritual powers. Now, before Herder, Leibniz too had made much of this gulf, and had pointed out that man, although he can, and often does act as a mere empiric, has attained to so great a clarity of perception that he has self-consciousness and is therefore a rational soul. Of man as a rational soul Leibniz could go on to say that he was made in the image of God, that he enjoyed fellowship with God, and that, although he belonged to earth as 'its most exalted work,' he was also a member of the city of God. Herder's views are so closely similar to those of Leibniz that a direct influence seems to be almost certain, although of course many of these ideas were common to the age, and the reading of the Bible may also have helped to direct Herder's thought into these channels. That the Biblical study did play some part is indicated by the fact that it was in the 'Alteste Urkunde' that the first clear statement upon the double nature of man, as a physical and a spiritual, an earthly and a heavenly creature, was made:

der Mensch ist ein Tier der Erde; die Erde...die Mutter, der Vater...der beseelende Gott; der Leib muss wieder zur Erden werden....so kehrt der Geist auch wieder zu Gott.

In the 'Ideen' the distinction between man and the rest of creation was fully developed, and an emphasis was laid upon the god-likeness of man as a creature endowed with reason and freedom.

For Herder man had, as a being with two natures, a foot in

1 Id.I pp.172 ff; 183 ff.
2 Leibniz: Monadology Sctn.23
3 Ibid.Sctn.29
4 Ibid.Sctn.33
5 Ibid.Sctn.24
6 Ibid.Sctn.36
7 Ibid.Sctn.35
8 S.VII pp.8 ff.
9 Ibid.pp.17-18
10 Ibid.p.19
11 Id.I p.235
two worlds, and it was in this that his importance in relation to the whole cosmos was sought. With man a link was forged between the material universe, of which he was the crown, and the spiritual, of which he was the foot. This conception too had its source in Leibniz, whose monadic scale ranged from material to rational beings, with man, the first self-conscious or rational being, as the connecting point.¹ There is evidence to show that Herder, in common with most thinkers of his age, believed in the existence of higher forces if not beings; Caroline referred for example to his faith

an noch unerklärte, oder unerklärliehe Kräfte der Natur, an die allbelebte, geisterfüllte Welt, an innere Kräfte der Natur und Seele;²

whilst the friendship with the credulous Lavater, and the interest in Swedenborg,

(der) sah sich als Verbindung zwischen der Geister- und Körperwelt,³

will be remembered. The attractiveness of a view of man as the crucial link in a progressive chain of being stretching from the lowest to the highest manifestations of divine power, the attractiveness of such a view for Herder can be easily imagined.

The concept appeared first in a religious context. In one of his sermons at Bückeburg Herder saw in the fact that the potentialities of man as a spiritual being are so weakly developed in this life the guarantee of continued life in the future,⁴ and he summed up the status of man in the following important sentence:

der Mensch ist ein Mittelgeschöpf zwischen Engel und Tier.⁵ ein grosser, prächtiger Gedanke Gottes in einer Hütte von Staub und Schwachheit⁶

¹ Leibniz: Monadology Sctn.30; New System Sctns.5-8. Leibniz denied the existence of any immaterial beings but God (On M.P.u.G.XXII p.190 /the Active Force of the Body /Sctn.4)
² M.P.u.G.XII p.114
³ M.R.u.T.IX pp.174-177
⁴ Ibid.loc.cit.
⁵ Ibid.loc.cit.
Largely in relation to this same question of immortality, the thought was taken up again in the 'Ideen', in which man was seen to be at once the highest link in the physical and the lowest in the spiritual sphere, and thus the link between the two:

der Menschen jetzige Zustand ist das verbindende Mittelglied zweier Welten.1

The fact that the spiritual capacities were in this life only present in seed form was the guarantee of a continuance of life in the next: unsere Humanität ist die Knospe zu einer zukünftigen Blume.3

In the later writings Herder reasserted the self-consciousness and freedom of man as a son of God, a spiritual being:

der Mensch ist nicht etwa nur ein mechanisches Glied der Naturkette, sondern der Geist, der die Natur beherrscht, ist theilerweise in ihm;4

and he adopted the common image, which Leibniz had also used, of the City of God:

(der Mensch) ist ein Mitbürger der grossen Stadt Gottes.5

It will be seen that in Herder's thought the whole question of immortality was closely bound up with the problem as to the significance and destiny of the race in the cosmos, and it was in defence of a belief in immortality that Herder, like Lessing, tentatively put forward, upon a Leibnizian basis, the idea of metamorphosis, and even transmigration, the ascent of the monad through all forms of life, with a transition to self-conscious and spiritual being at the human level. This idea was not present in the Bückeburg writings, in which the argument was rather different i.e. that

1 Id.I p.308
2 Ibid.p.315
3 Ibid.p.299
4 M.P.u.G.XIII p.144
5 Ibid.p.145
all creatures could not fully realise his nature in this world and that therefore he must have a further opportunity in some higher world, when the restrictions imposed by matter are abolished:

ich fühle es in mir, dass auch die Absichten in meinem Wesen zur Wirklichkeit kommen müssen.1

Herder had taken up this argument and elaborated it in the 'Ideen':

das Thier lebt sich aus.....jedes Thier erreicht, was es in seiner Organisation erreichen soll; der einzige Mensch erreicht nicht.....die Efflorescenz unserer Knope der Humanität wird gewiss in jedem Daseyn in einer Gestalt erscheinen, die eigent- lich die wahre, göttliche Menschengestalt ist.2

The weakness of this argument was, as Kant pointed out, that although natural potentialities are all realised, they are not necessarily realised in the same individual: if continued identity is postulated of spiritual development, then consistency demands also that it should be postulated of physical, otherwise the analogy of natural progression is irrelevant. It was mainly in answer to this objection that Herder played with the idea of a transmigration 3 of the indestructible monad through successive forms of existence in an ascent from unconscious to conscious and rational perception. This was the thesis which he presented in the essay 'Ueber die Seelenwanderung'. Transmigration either as a descent into animal life or as a hopeless recurrence was rejected by Herder, but in its place he substituted a transmigration which was a process of growth - 'eine Seelenwanderung von unten hinauf'.4 The monadic substance, now manifested as self-conscious and spiritual being in man, had passed

1 M.R.u.T.X pp.75-77
2 Id.I p.301 Herder himself shrank from a full application of the analogy of the physical seed to the spiritual life, maintaining only a parallel type of growth (Id.I pp.261-262)
3 Leibniz himself maintained 'metamorphosis', but not 'metampsychosis' or 'transmigration' (Monadology Sect.72)
through all the lower stages of physical life, and was destined, at human dissolution, to manifest itself in ever higher spiritual forms (vielleicht müssten wir durch alle Planeten reisen).

The main contention of Herder never altered, that man is the link between the two worlds, the point of connection between the physical and the spiritual, or rather of transition from the one to the other. This was indeed, in whatever guise it appeared, Herder's final word upon the place of man in the universe, and the cosmic significance of his being and history. The importance of this contention in Herder's thought cannot be overestimated:

diese Aussicht, die auf allen Gesetzen der Natur ruhet, giebt uns allein den Schlüssel seiner wunderbaren Erscheinung, mit ihr die einzige Philosophie der Geschichte.

This was no transitory or irrelevant development of a freak-idea, but a belief which belonged to the main texture of Herder's thought. In it the sense of continuity, the belief in progress, the feeling for an immanent providence, the conception of life as movement and change, in which outward forms perish, but the substantial powers are eternal and eternally active: in it all these leading principles were brought together to form the final conviction that human history, although it has its own end and meaning within itself, is at the same time but one scene in the great drama of the cosmos, one scene, and yet a crucial scene, in which, with the dawn of self-consciousness, life moves upwards from the physical to the spiritual sphere.

The message of Herder to men is a message to strangers and pilgrims:

du hast weiter kein Anrecht an die Erde; sie hat kein Anrecht an dich; mit dem Hut der Freiheit gekrönt und mit dem Gurt des Himmels gegrürtet, setze fröhlich deinen Wanderstab weiter.

1 M.P.u.G.VIII pp.212-216
2 Id.I p.308
3 S.XVI pp.532-571
4 Id.I p.317
1. THE UNIVERSE AND GOD  The discussion both of the first principles and also of the main concepts of Herder's philosophy of history has constantly made clear the fact that Herder's thinking revolved around a theological centre. The point cannot be too much stressed that for Herder the theology was not something additional or extraneous, nor was the spiritual office a subordinate interest or a means of livelihood, nor was the religious preoccupation something of importance only during the pietistic Bückeburg years. Baumgarten has drawn attention to the fact that Herder was by his very temperament religious ('eine religiöse Natur'). Heymar has noted that for him philosophy and theology were one and the same:

Herder der Geschichtsphilosoph und Herder der Theolog ist Eins.

It was as a theological student, and under the influence of the Christian Hamann, that Herder was first plunged into the world of culture, thought and history. Gillies has recently shown that from the earliest days the central problem of the philosophy of history was theological. In this chapter then an enquiry will be made into the most important of the theological concepts of Herder, in an attempt to understand in broad outline the theology as it affected, and was itself affected by the philosophy of history.

The first problem of Herder's theology, as indeed of all his thought, was that ultimate problem, mankind and the universe in their relationship to God. Now Herder, brought up in an orthodox but pietistic home, had leanings from the first towards a poetic-

1 Baumgarten op.cit.p.6
2 H.II p.194
al conception of God as one who could be seen and felt in the visible world, in nature and in poetry. Baumgarten asserts that Herder's early faith was an emotional fusion of religion, and of poetical enthusiasm:

Gefühl für Religion und für religiöse Poesie.

The influences brought to bear upon Herder in Königsberg tended if anything to strengthen this early poeticised faith. In reaction against the Rationalists Herder set aside all thoughts of a transcendent Deity, remote from the world: indeed he even rejected Hamann's assertion of the transcendental origin of speech in favour of a theory which postulated at root an immanent working of God. Haym's description of a Herder who was led by Neological influences to an almost pure Deism is quite extravagant.3 There were of course rationalistic trends at this stage, but under the tutelage of Hamann himself, who, in spite of his transcendentalism, and his sense of sin, saw between poetry and religion a living relationship, Herder was led to a clearer understanding of nature, history and poetry (which included the Bible) as the revelation of God,4 and to a new conception of God as a great creative genius.5 The thought of God active and immanent in nature was further buttressed by a reading of Shaftesbury and Rousseau, for both of whom God was immanent and self-revealed:

O mighty genius...sole animating and inspiring power...in all things inmost;6 je le sens en moi, je le vois tout autour de moi.7

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1 This is borne out by the early taste for the Bible and Baumgarten op. cit. p.10 /Homer/, and the love of nature.
2 Baumgarten op. cit. p.10
3 H.I p.285
4 Roth Werke II p.255
5 Ibid. p.372
7 Rousseau: Oeuvres IX p.51
In the earlier and more purely literary writings the underlying conception was of literature and poetry as manifestations in a people or an individual of the power of God working in and through men. It was of the very essence of all true poetry that it should be inspired of God. ¹

It is not easy to say with any definiteness how Herder conceived of God during the Bückeburg years. There are indications in some of the works that he inclined for a while towards the Sturm- und Drang view, in which God was no more than sheer creative and destructive force, active in the world of nature and of history, but impersonal, ammoral, blind, without feeling or purpose. This was the view which dominated the 'Landplagen' and the essay upon 'Götz' of Lenz,² and which in Goethe appeared in the 'Egmont' and 'Faust I', and especially in the poem 'Das Göttliche' ('Heil den unbekannten......Denn unführlend/Ist die Natur....'). In Herder it seems to be present in the Shakespeare essay, in which there emerges a primitive Spinozism of the Sturm und Drang type:

Gott ist grosser Geist.....die Welt ist Körper....und das Ganz ist jener Riesengott, den Spinoza Pan Universum heissen mag.³

It may be pointed out that while Herder recognises that Shakespeare was endowed with creative power, yet he is also aware that one day Shakespeare's work is doomed to be destroyed, remaining as no more than 'Trümmer und Kolossus'.⁴ The early reference to Spinoza in this essay is interesting, but not decisively significant - Herder was at this time a pantheist rather in the poetic manner of Shaftesbury, his outlook being parallel to that of Goethe as expressed in

¹ See H.I p.242
² Kindermann op.cit.pp.22 ff.
³ S.V p.226
⁴ Ibid.p.231
the famous confession of faith of Faust ("Wer darf ihn nennen?"').

The important point is that God was identified by Herder with that force of nature which was active both in physical and in cultural organisms, in and through the ordinary laws of growth and decay. 

A close interrelating of nature with God in one of the sermons, in which nature is described as the temple of God, is in some respects reminiscent of the fine hymn to nature of Shaftesbury, whilst even in the anti-pietistic 'Sabbath und Sonntagsfeier', in which a religion of awe-inspiring ceremonial and religious habit was dismissed, in the now time-worn phrase, 'Opium der Seele', the feeling for the active presence of God in nature was as strong as ever:

Gott, wie würde ich dich in der Natur überall finden, und mit dir sprechen...

On the other hand, during the Bückeburg period there may be also discerned a reversion to more orthodox lines of thought, as seen for example in the concession to Hamann that speech was after all a divine gift, the act of response to the divine voice. Whether there was in reality any serious recasting of Herder's thought is a doubtful matter, although Doerne has maintained that the Bückeburg period must be treated as a separate epoch in Herder's theological and philosophical development. In the "Älteste Urkunde" Herder spoke of God in the language of transcendentalism, but the conception was not radically different from that of the Shakespeare essay. God was still for Herder creative force, active, first in man himself:

1 Goethe: Faust I: Scene XVI ll.3432 ff.
2 Cf. Kindermann's phrase (op. cit. p.24 and f.) 'ein Weltbild von
3 M.R. u.T. IXpp.217 ff. /Werden und Vergehen/
4 S.VI pp.90 ff.
5 Ibid. p.107
6 S.VII pp.30 ff.
7 Doerne op.cit.pp.74 ff. Doerne speaks of a 'Neubegründung'
eine Sammlung unsichtbarer, mächtiger und so verschiedener.... Kräfte,\(^1\)

second, in the literary and cultural achievement of man, especially in poetry, which was, as with Hamann,

die Muttersprache des Menschengeschlechts,\(^2\)

third, in the works of nature, described by Herder as

die erste Offenbarung Gottes....ein unendliches Chaos von Wesen, Kräften....\(^3\)

The truth seems to be that at Bückeburg Herder took over the Biblical framework: God, Creation, Revelation, even the Fall; but within this Biblical framework he built up a Sturm und Drang structure of dynamic and tragic immanentism: God was the 'gegenwärtiger Gott',\(^4\) or the power operative in all things; Creation, the divine activity itself, with man the most perfect work, the clearest reflection of the Godhead; Revelation, the making known and apprehension of God in his working, through nature, history and culture; the Fall the revolt of human reason and freedom against the divine ordering in nature. A little reflection makes it plain, that, although Herder appeared to accept the Genesis narratives as literally true accounts,\(^5\) yet in fact everything transcendental was taken away. Cosmic forces of incalculable power were seen at work, but acting in and through, not upon the world. Nature and natural power were sacramental: more they were Godhead and divine power. Between the essay on speech and the 'Altste Urkinde' there is admittedly an immense gap, but it is a gap in form rather than in content. The immanentism, previously

1 S.VII p.13
2 Ibid.p.22
3 S.VI pp.265-266
4 S.VII p.14
5 But in a very free fashion: cf.S.VI pp.194 ff.;S.VII pp.60ff. It must be noticed that Herder objected strongly to an all-
egorising of the stories, but he did differentiate between content, or inner truth, and form, which was for him that of a 'Kinderfabel'
stated in the terms of naturalism, was now restated in those of a transcendentalist Christian pre-history, but the essential content was not changed.

Gillies and Doerne both plead for a real transcendentalism in Herder's conception of God at Bückeburg, pointing out that divine power, although expressed in and working through nature, was more than natural force. The main contention of Gillies is that Herder retained the immanentist form rather than the content, infusing into it the new Christian content. For Herder God in the ultimate sense, as He is in himself, was now, according to Gillies, unknown and unknowable, as was also the final goal of history, both God and his purposes being only so far known as they are revealed and can be comprehended in history. There is much that can be urged in favour of this interpretation, especially in the 'Auch eine Philosophie', in which, as has been seen, Herder did stress the inscrutable elements in both nature and history and the subservience of all phenomena to a higher purpose and to the ordering of God in his march across events. The tendency was undoubtedly to regard nature as the scene in which a divine drama was being unrolled, rather than the drama and the divinity itself. In favour of this view too there may be adduced the concept of a divine education in the 'Provinzialblätter', in which God is seen, through a manifestation of himself in nature and in the Bible ('das erste, liebste, einzige Bildungsbuch'), actively to provide for the cultural and spiritual instruction of man:

(er)nährt und erweitert, trägt und stärkt, die ganze Seele.

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2 Cf. ibid. p.513
3 S.VII p.243
4 Ibid. p.244
Herder did of course at Buckeburg, as always, think of God as revealed in the world, and yet more than the world, active in phenomena, but also above them, the sum of all the monads, and yet the highest and ideal monad apart, to adopt the Leibnizian phrase. This point does not admit of question. It is not quite so certain, however, that, apart from the Christian colouring, Herder went much beyond the ordinary Sturm und Drang view, in which, as in Shaftesbury, the over-riding power and the inscrutability of the divine in nature was stressed. In any case a thorough-going pantheism, the rigid identification of God and the world, was never the conception for which Herder contended. In spite, too, of the emphasis upon the tragic and inscrutable elements in history, it was, even in the 'Auch eine Philosophie', upon the active presence of God in all phenomena, and the working of God through the civilisations in their growth and decay, that the main stress was laid. That Deism which sought to banish God from nature and history as no more than a now disinterested and remote originator, a necessary first cause, was always the main target in Herder's onslaughts. The movement of Herder towards a more harmonious conception, in which God should be seen working, not inscrutably in the accomplishment of some hidden purpose, but openly and visibly according to the wise and purposeful laws of nature, may already be traced at this early period in the 'Grundriss des Unterrichts', in which nature was still the manifestation of God, but in which the divine powers expressed themselves in the ordering of phenomena, 1. nach Regeln der Weisheit... 2. nach Regeln der Schönheit. 3. zur Glückseligkeit alles Lebenden. 4

1 Gillies op. cit. p. 61
2 Leibniz: Monadology Sctns. 38-48; Carr: Leibniz pp. 113 ff.
3 Dilthey: Gesammelte Schriften II p. 400
4 M. P. u. G X pp. 288-290
The Sturm und Drang concept of God as power was retained, and this power was still related to natural and cosmic force, but the concept was divested of all the tragic and irrational elements, and fused into a world-system, not of Christian transcendence, but of naturalistic optimism after the manner of Shaftesbury. The presence of God in nature had of course always been upheld,¹ but it was now upon this active immanence of God as

ein gegenwärtiges, lebendiges, thätiges Wesen ²

that the emphasis came again increasingly to be laid. In the theological 'Briefe' a deistic transcendence was openly refuted:

\[
\text{den Unendlichen ausser der Welt begreife ich nicht...Wo Kraft in der Natur ist, ist er...wo Geist in der Natur ist, ist's Hauch und Kraft seines Geists. Er in allem, und es besteht alles in ihm.}³
\]

The final fusion of the Sturm und Drang into the naturalistic conception, with a relation of force to order and of creativity to law, was achieved in the comprehensive immanentist interpretation of the 'Idee' in the preface to which Herder made it clear from the outset that his universe was one, not of mechanistic causality, but of immanent Godhead: die Natur ist kein selbstständiges Wesen, sondern Gott ist Alles in seinen Werken.⁴

Nature itself was seen to display the goodness and the wisdom of God:

wem der Name 'Natur'...sinnlos und niedrig geworden ist, der denke sich statt dessen jene allmächtige Kraft, Güte und Weisheit, und nenne in seiner Seele das unsichtbare Wesen.⁵

The presence of phrases in which prominence is given to the thought of an overruling power and purpose of God indicates that Herder did not wish to deny a certain transcendence to God, in the sense that God, while in, is also more than nature, but the real teaching of

¹ Even in the 'Auch eine Philosophie'(Cf.S.V p.513) in which
² M.K.u.T. XIV p.63 nature was 'das redende Vorbild/Gottes'
³ Ibid. loc.cit.
⁴ Id.I p.3 (Vorrede)
⁵ Ibid.loc.cit.
the 'Ideen' is undoubtedly the active presence of God in his works as force working through and according to law.

Even then before the great Spinoza controversy, which flared up when Jacobi asserted with horror that Lessing had been a Spinozist, Herder had already come to a fixed view of God in relation to the universe, a view which was in substance that of a poetic immanentism, derived mainly from Shaftesbury and from the Sturm und Drang, but modified to some extent by the study of Leibniz and by Biblical reading. The main effect of the controversy was to stir up Herder, and with him Goethe, to a new and more intensive study of Spinoza himself, and to a clarification and formulation of his own conception of God along philosophical lines. The fruit of this study was the attempt at a philosophical statement in the important essay 'Gott,' a full discussion of which is hardly possible in this brief account, but of which the main points must be summarised in order that an estimate of Herder's mature position may be made.

First, Herder, as before, rejected entirely all deistic views, even as popularly expressed by Leibniz, his charge being that the God of Deism was no more than a 'müdiges, melancholisches Wesen.' Herder complained that deistic conceptions were not even orthodox, and was at pains to support his own views with Scripture quotations:

\[
\text{in ihm leben, weben und sind wir; von ihm, in ihm und zu ihm sind der Inbegriff alles Gedanken, das All ist Er.} \]

With Deism, the transcendentalism not only of a personal God, but also of a mere chance, or of a mechanistic causality, was ruthlessly excluded, as was also the widespread assertion of final causes.

1 S.XVI pp. 483 ff.
2 Ibid. p. 495
3 Ibid. p. 467
Secondly, Herder, while adopting the conception of Spinoza in essence, criticised and corrected it in accordance with the dynamic principles of Leibniz and of the Sturm und Drang. Spinoza's definition of substance as extension was rejected, and in its place Herder offered a new interpretation of substance as force:

je mehr man die Materie der Körper physisch untersuchte, desto mehr entdeckte man auch in ihr wirkende oder gegenwirkende Kräfte; die Gottheit offenbart sich in unendlichen Kräften auf unendlichem Weisen.2 (Gott) ist im höchsten, einzigen Verstände des Worts Kraft, d.i. die Urkraft aller Kräfte, die Seele aller Seelen.3 hätte Spinoza den Begriff der Kraft und Wirkung gewählt, so wäre ihm alles leichter (the merit of Leibniz in this respect was specifically acknowledged).4

In spite of the pre-occupation with Spinoza there seems to be little doubt but that Herder's view was really nearer to that of Leibniz, although the hypothesis of the Pre-established Harmony and the unfortunate denial of interaction of soul and body were severely censured.5

Thirdly, Herder, in Spinozistic fashion, conceived of the world as a single unit ('ein Eins') in which God was everything ('ein All').6 The created universe was thus comprehended in the concept Deity, or Godhead, although for Herder it did not exhaust the concept. In development of this same thought the laws of the material world were seen to be expressions, visible symbols, of the wisdom and the goodness of God, a manifestation of ultimate reality: ausdrückende Symbole der höchsten Wirklichkeit.7

Fourthly, Herder, although he was at one with Spinoza in denying human personality to God,8 insisted as against Spinoza that to the Godhead there must be attributed such qualities as thought and

1 S.XVI pp.450 ff.  
2 Ibid. pp.450;451  
3 Ibid.p.452  
4 Ibid.p.458  
5 Ibid.pp.459 ff.  
6 Ibid.p.496  
7 Ibid.p.529  
8 Ibid.pp.495 ff.
understanding in their original fulness and power:

Gott ist kein gedankenloses Wesen....in ihm ist die Vollkommenn-
heit eines unendlichen Denkens.¹

The identification of God with dead matter was abhorrent to Herder, and for him a God who was force meant a God who was also thought:

die unendliche, ursprüngliche Denkkraft.²

Herder insisted upon the fact that that necessity of immanent Godhead by which the world is governed is the necessity, not of a blind chance, as in Fatalism, but of a wise and intelligent purpose:

Eine Nothwendigkeit (die) nicht blind (ist), sondern lichtvoll
und denkend.³......die weiseste, beste Nothwendigkeit.⁴

Fifthly, Herder was careful not to equate God with the world, or the world with God.⁵ He did not endorse the suggestion attributed to Lessing by Jacobi, that the world is a body of which God is the soul - regarding this comparison as unsatisfactory because so easily made to appear ridiculous.⁶ - and he attempted to defend Spinoza himself against the charge of an inter-changeableness of the terms God and the world, and therefore of a materialistic atheism.⁷ For Herder the world was in God and God was in the world; but the world was not itself God, no part of the world was a part of God, and God was more than the world.⁸ The purest conception of the relationship of God to the world was in his eyes that of Leibniz, who had regarded the universe as a creative and active thought of God:

Gott hat die Welt aus sich herausgedacht.⁹

The Creator thus stood in much the same relationship to his creation

1 S.XVI pp.474-475
2 Ibid.p.476
3 Ibid.pp.481-482
4 Ibid.p.536
5 Ibid.p.507
6 Ibid.p.527; According to Herder it was advanced by Lessing
7 Ibid pp.508-509 / partly in jest
8 Ibid.pp.457;507
9 Ibid.p.523
as an author to his poem. The concept 'Weltseele' was only allowed as a metaphorical representation of the divine indwelling:

die einwohnende Kraft Gottes.¹

From this brief summary it will be found that Herder was not a Pantheist in the sense that Spinoza had been, and that in his defence of Spinoza he modified the teaching to accord with his own previous ideas. In a very able analysis M'Giffert has pointed out that what Herder was contending for was not a philosophical pantheism, but a poetical immanentism, with the world as the self-revelation of indwelling Godhead.² Fries has underlined the fact that Shaftesbury and Leibniz were the decisive influences rather than Spinoza, and concludes with the judgment that in his final outlook Herder stood closest to Shaftesbury.³ McEachran's summing up of Herder's position is that it was not pantheistic, but panentheistic: that for Herder God was more than nature expressed in nature.⁴ There seem to be no solid grounds for dissenting from this conclusion.

The thought of the active immanence of God in all phenomena was undoubtedly the one which gave cohesion and true meaning to all Herder's historico-philosophical principles and concepts: continuity, organic growth, progress, providence, relativity of value, necessity and retribution, education, the significance of man and of human history. This theological concept, a synthesis of the dynamic monadism of Leibniz, the poetical nature-worship of Shaftesbury and the systematic pantheism of Spinoza, was the cornerstone of Herder's whole philosophy. Were it to be taken away, then

¹ S.XVI p.526
² M'Giffert op.cit. Hibbert Journal III:4 pp.706-726
³ Fries op.cit.pp.155 ff.
⁴ Mc.Eachran op.cit.p.73
the other concepts, although they might still be formed as a result of observation, would be robbed of their full and true meaning, and nature and history themselves, that rise and fall of species and nations, would lose both purposefulness and ultimate significance. In the last resort Herder's philosophy of history was in origin, development, orientation and conclusion religious and theological:


2. REVELATION AND THE BIBLE

The fact that God was for Herder immanent in all his works meant, as has already been noticed briefly, that the word 'revelation' came to have for Herder a new and rather different signification from that in which it was used in his day. The whole thought of Herder centres around the view of God as the self-revealing One, the One who is immanent in all phenomena, and of whom therefore all phenomena are the outward expression, or manifestation, in a word, the revelation. It is obviously necessary that a closer enquiry into the exact nature and development of this concept should now be made in order that Herder's use of it may be properly understood, and its position in his theology, especially in relation to his view of the Bible, estimated.

Now in the Protestant orthodoxy of the age the term 'revelation' was used almost exclusively to denote a supernatural disclosing of truths which could not be known by reason alone. The Wolffians had found a place for revealed truths side by side with, and as

1 Id. I p. 3 (Vorrede)
the complement of those of reason.\textsuperscript{1} The Rationalists also used the term in this sense, but denied that revelation of this character was either possible or necessary,\textsuperscript{2} the more extreme claiming that the so-called miracles and prophecies, which were the means of supernatural revelation, were no more than frauds, perpetrated upon the ignorant and credulous, either in pursuit of purely selfish ends, or in order to impress upon the people rational truth and natural law.\textsuperscript{3} Between these two schools the Neology had attempted to steer a middle course, interpreting the truths of revelation in terms of those of reason, not denying their validity, nor connecting them with conscious deception, but robbing them of any supernatural significance. It was in the neological process that revelation itself first began to lose its connotation of an impartation from without, and to acquire a new signification as progressive enlightenment, the education and development of the reason itself under a divine providential ordering.\textsuperscript{4}

At many points Herder's theology was neological in method, but in spite of some approximations his approach to the concept of revelation was from a completely new angle. Herder accepted the term 'revelation' in its full sense i.e. to denote a work of God.\textsuperscript{5} He made no serious attempt to reduce revelation to a process of human enlightenment, which would be to rob it of its poetic and religious meaning. He had, especially in his younger days, no desire to identify divine truth with the commonplaces of human reasoning. Herd-

\textsuperscript{1} Aner op.cit.pp.3-4
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.p.4
\textsuperscript{3} It was this attack which Warburton had sought to counter.
\textsuperscript{4} Aner op.cit.pp.4 f.;172 ff. Gottsched had already made the interesting suggestion that revelation was not through miracles and prophecies, but through history and historical events. Lessing worked out most fully and suggestively the compromise along these lines.
\textsuperscript{5} Cf.Gillies (Modern Lang.Rev. XXXV 2 p.197)
er wished rather to give to revelation a far wider and grander meaning, and if ultimately he too robbed it of any special significance, it was not by reducing revelation to the level of the ordinary, but by raising the ordinary to the level of revelation. Herder spoke of revelation consistently in his writings: in the "Älteste Urkunde," in the "Auch eine Philosophie," in the "Provinzialblätter," in the "Grundriss," in the "Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend," in the "Ideen," in the essay "Gott," in the "Vom Geist des Christenthums," in the "Confirmationen." In all these works he gave to the word a full meaning as a direct action on the part of God, a self-manifestation. But in none of them, with the possible exception of the Bückeburg works, was the revelation of a supernatural or miraculous character. As has been seen, God was for Herder active in all things, both in nature and in history, even in culture and in literature. This meant that for Herder God was revealed in all things, whether in the great and unusual or in the small and everyday. In Herder's mind the question of a special, supernatural revelation did not arise, since all things were revelation. It is significant that between nature and Scripture, reason and revelation, Herder could see no quarrel. If God was immanent and self-revealed in all things, then both were upon the one level:

allel sind Geschenke Eines Gottes.

Herder was thus able, like the Neology, but from a differ-

1 S.VI p.265
2 S.V p.512
3 S.VII p.242
4 M.P.u.G. X p.233
5 M.R.u.T. XIV pp.5ff.
6 Td.I p.258
7 S.XVI p.542
8 M.R.u.T pp.163 ff. (XVIII)
9 M.R.u.T.X pp.176 f.
10 M.R.u.T.XIV p.15
11 Ibid.p.16
-ent standpoint, to retain the form of the theology of orthodoxy and tradition, whilst, except for the continued assertion of a divine gift of speech and culture at the very first,\(^1\) completely emptying that form of its old transcendentalist content, and filling it with the new content of his own poetic immanentism. Herder accepted revelation, making no attempt to equate it with human enlightenment, conceiving of it as a divine working. The revelation of which he spoke was, however, something quite other than the transcendental revelation of special miracle of which the older theologians had spoken. It was the revelation of the Godhead immanent in and finding expression in all created things, a making-known of the Infinite in and through the finite:

das Unendliche in der Naturkraft;\(^2\)
eine Vorstellung des Unsichtbaren im Sichtbaren.\(^3\)

The full significance of this adopting and transmuting of the old concept\(^4\) - which was itself derived of course from the basic immanentist conception of God - can only be grasped when Herder's attitude to the special book of revelation, the Bible, is examined and known. It has been seen in the Introduction that the Bible played a not inconsiderable role in the development of Herder's temperament and the formation of his thought, and throughout his life Herder was a diligent and a reverent student of the Bible. From the first, however, the Bible was for Herder a book of poetry as well as of religion; a book moreover which he quickly perceived to be the national treasury of verse of the Hebrew people.\(^5\) It was not that the Bible was for

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1 Cf. S.VII p.178; S.VI p.356; Id.II pp.338-339 etc.
2 S.XVI p.455
3 Id.II p.271
4 Upon this point see Baumgarten op.cit.p.100; Sell op.cit.
6 Cf. H.Ipp.276 ff. / must be remembered.
Herder no longer a book of revelation and a miracle, but that it had ceased to be so in a special sense. The Bible was a revelation, and a product of the divine activity - a manifestation of God in symbols and pictures - but just in the same way as any other poetic book, was also that peculiar literature of the people by whom it was written, in which the national genius and power had found lasting utterance.

Even in Königsberg and Riga Herder had ceased to regard the Bible as a book in any special sense inspired of God, and had learned to study it against the background from which it had sprung, and to compare it, and to evaluate it by comparison, with other poetic books. Herder denied that the Bible was a revelation in the current sense of the term: he denied to it a supernatural character; he denied that it contained a word from God different from that contained in other similar writings; he denied to it an inspiration which would mark it out from all other literature. The Bible was classed by Herder with Ossian, Homer, Shakespeare, folk-poetry. Herder, however, did not deny that the Bible was also revelation. Rather he broadened the concept 'revelation', so that all poetry was regarded as revelation, since in all poetry it was God who spoke and the power and activity of God which were manifest.

The sermon upon the 'Göttlichkeit und Gebrauch der Bibel' makes Herder's view perfectly plain. The main contention of the sermon is this: that the Bible is a human book and must be read as such:

die Bibel ist das Wort Gottes....Gott offenbart sich in einer menschlichen Sprache, die man versteht....Er kann nicht göttlich, er muss ganz menschlich reden.....in der Sprache und Denkart des Volks, des Erdstrichs, des Zeitalters, zu dem seine

1 H.I pp. 276 ff.
2 Ibid.loc.cit.
Stimme geschah.  
A measure of providential ordering was allowed, but the separate books were treated as the works of individual writers:

jeder Schreiber denkt und schreibt sich selbst;  
to be related, in language, form and content, both to prevailing circumstances, to each other, and to other poetic works. The beginning of a poetic study of the Bible which Lowth had made was received by Herder with enthusiastic approval.  
The anxiety of Herder was to dispel what was for him a false notion of an unique inspiration, and, stressing the human element in the separate books, he did not hesitate to point out scientific inaccuracies:

Fehler der Erdbeschreibung, der Geschichte, der Sternkunde.  
The divine character of the Bible was not ultimately denied, but the divinity was that of an indwelling and compelling of the divine spirit in and through the human and the natural, as in any other book.

Herder's own numerous studies of Biblical books at Bückeburg illustrate his theory. In the 'Alteste Urkunde' Genesis was studied, not as literal history, not as allegory, but as divine truth in the from of a poetic children's fable.  
Unimaginative and pedantic criticism or reinterpretation in the light of XVIII century knowledge was condemned as irrelevant and futile.  
The 'Erläuterungen' and the 'Briefe zu den Brüder' were attempts, first, to relate the language and concepts of St. John's Gospel to an Asiatic religious and cultural background, especially to the Zoroastrian writings newly 

1 M.R.u.T. pp. 248 ff. (X)  
2 Ibid. p. 268  
3 Cf. S.VI pp. 40 f. Spinoza's suggestions may have had some  
4 M.R.u.T. X p. 271 /influence Opera III pp. 16 ff  
5 S.VII pp. 194 ff.; VII pp. 60 ff.  
6 See too the harsh review of Michaelis' 'Mosaisches Recht'  
S.V pp. 423 ff.
discovered, translated and published by Anquetil du Perron; 1 second-
ly, to understand the letters of James and Jude in relation to that
primitive circle of Judaistic Christianity from which they were seen
to spring. 2 The later 'Hohelied' and 'Vom Geist der ebräischen Poe-
sie', undoubtedly Herder's most suggestive critical works, were
further studies after the same pattern. In the former Herder treated
the Song of Songs as a collection of love-songs ('eine Menge der
Lieder' 3) without doctrinal or allegorical significance; in the lat-
ter the Old Testament in general was set against the background of
Hebrew life and history, and sympathetically interpreted as the
poetry and literature of this Semitic people. Dogmatic problems
were set aside, and a new interest manifested in problems of date,
authorship and setting. 4 The general thesis of Herder was repeated
in the theological letters:

menschlich muss man die Bibel lesen, denn sie ist ein Buch
durch Menschen für Menschen geschrieben. 5

Herder insisted especially upon an understanding of, and sympathy
with, the book of Genesis as pure poetry:

Genesis ist keine scientifische Kosmogonie, sondern ein natür-
llicher erster Anblick des Weltalls. 6

In the less important later writings Herder applied the same method
to the Gospels in an attempt, by comparison, to trace a development
of all the Synoptics from a common Hebraic original. The thesis of
Lessing was first adopted, 7 but this Herder abandoned in favour of
a new and more interesting view: that Mark was the first Gospel:

1 S. VII pp. 337 ff.
2 Ibid. pp. 473 ff.
3 M.R.u.T. IV pp. 64 ff.
4 Cf. the discussion of the book of Job (M.R.u.T.I pp. 86 ff.)
5 M.R.u.T. XIII p. 11
6 Ibid. p. 43
7 M.R.u.T. XVI pp. 175 ff. ('Vom Erlöser der Menschen') Cf. Less-
ing's 'Fragmente' (Werke VII pp. 508 ff.)
ein Bild des uralten, palästinischen Entwurfs;

Luke a paraphrase written for Greeks, and with some new matter;
Matthew the adaptation of a syro-chaldaean Gospel which had been corrected against Mark and Luke.1

For Herder the Bible was no longer a supernatural book, without origin, background and history. The Bible was Hebrew literature, which as literature both could and ought to be studied in and for itself and in relation to other literatures. The Bible was a product of the same natural, cultural laws of which other poetic books were also the products:

die Poesie jedes Volks richtet sich nach dem Klima, in dem sie ist gebildet worden.2

As literature the Bible did not lose its character as revelation or as an inspired book, but it was divinely inspired revelation only in the same way that all literature, and nature itself, was also divinely inspired revelation. Herder could still speak of the Bible in the language of orthodoxy, and that without reserve or hypocrisy. The prophets were for him 'Gottesbegeistert', 'Weissager',3 'Enthüller';4 a real 'Eingeistung' was admitted.5 Except, however, that a higher relative value was assigned to the Bible as 'das erste, liebste, einzige Bildungsbuch';6 the Bible as divine revelation did not differ from other books, and Herder saw revelation everywhere:

alles was (helle)Gedanken erweckte, hiess Erleuchtung...woher es auch kommen mochte, es kam von Gott;7 Offenbarung geht durch alle Zeiten.3

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1 M.R.u.T. XVII pp.169 ff. ('Regel der Zusammenstimmung')
2 M.R.u.T. I p.46
4 M.R.u.T. XVIII p.162
5 Ibid. pp.60 ff.
6 S.VII p.243
7 M.R.u.T. XVIII pp.24-25 The idea here is rather 'neological'
8 Ibid. p.162
Even in the more orthodox 'Provinzialblätter' Herder had not hesitated to reckon Mahomet and Luther with the prophets.\textsuperscript{1}

Closely connected in Herder's mind with the question of revelation and the Bible was the problem of miracles, and a few concluding words upon this subject will help to bring into clearer focus his general concept. There were in Herder's day two ways of looking upon miracles: that of the orthodox, in which miracles were supernatural interventions; that of the Rationalists, in which, as contraventions of natural law were impossible, alleged wonders were dismissed as deceptions.\textsuperscript{2} Now Herder could not accept a supernatural working on the part of God, but he did not wish to deny the divine working altogether. Herder accepted the concept 'miracle,' but he gave to it rather a different meaning. For Herder a miracle was a work of God, and since God was in all things, and all things were the manifestation of his power, then all things were miracles. Miracles as supra- or contra-natural events could have no meaning or significance for Herder, since God worked in any case through the natural, and ultimately his power was the compulsion behind all phenomena and events.\textsuperscript{3}

In the light of this assertion Herder was bound to deny the validity of accounts of contraventions of the natural order in the Bible. He did not, however, allege a deception, but defended the Biblical accounts as poetic representations of purely natural events, with a feeling for the immanent working of God. In a general sense

\textsuperscript{1} S.VII p.190 The reference to Mahomet seems at least to imply this.
\textsuperscript{2} For a clear understanding of this question in relation to XVIII century thought, see Warburton's 'Divine Legation,' a defence in which the charge of the Rationalists was admitted in respect of pagan religions. This was the main point at issue in the Lessing-Goeze controversy. Lessing finally worked out a compromise, but not without a touch of cynicism.
\textsuperscript{3} Leibniz' thought of 'constant miracles' will be remembered.
these events were indeed miracles, since God himself was in them, but they were none the less ordinary and natural happenings:

auch kein Wunder wirkt Gott ausser durch Naturmittel und Kräfte. The representation in the form of extraordinary miracle was for the purpose of making clear to simple minds the hand of God in the events:

Gott spricht und handelt mit Menschen als Kindern.2

Even the resurrection of Jesus Christ was not, and ought not to be regarded as a miracle in any special sense:

geschieht im Naturreich Gottes etwas ohne seine Kraft und Allmacht? 3

If there was a specifically wonderful event, it was not the resurrection, but the spiritual awakening of the Apostles:

die Wiedergeburt der Apostel zur neuen Ideen und Hoffnungen.4

The resurrection itself was no more the fact of immortality as poetically conceived in accordance with Jewish religious imagery.5 The gifts of the Spirit were similarly interpreted as ordinary human powers symbolically represented:

geistige Kräfte, ohne dass sie deshalb Prodigien oder Mirakel zu seyn sich anmassten.6

In Herder's mind the natural and the supernatural thus merged into each other, and distinctions between the ordinary and the miraculous were finally dissolved:

alle Gnade ist Natur, und Natur Gnade.7

Herder preserved the form of the concept 'miracle' as he

1 M.R.u.T. II p.174
2 S.VII p.265  There was a reference here to a natural as opposed to the supernatural working of Grace - subject of a contemporary neological struggle
3 M.R.u.T. XVI pp.166-167
4 Ibid. pp.170-171
5 Ibid. p.141
6 M.R.u.T. XVIII p.76
7 Ibid. p.96
preserved that of the concept 'revelation' or 'inspiration'. But, denying the transcendental operation of God, Herder robbed the concept of its former content, and of any real significance. If the power of God is equally manifested in all phenomena, then miracle is a term which had no particular relevance or importance. The peculiar theological achievement of Herder is thus beginning to emerge: that like the Neology he identified Christian doctrines with general truths, but that he went the further step of lifting up the general into the 'revelational, rather than reducing the revelational to the general. It was not that Herder wished to bring down the divine to the level of the rational and natural, but that he wished to raise the natural and the rational to the level of the divine. Building as he did upon a poetical immanentism, Herder's approach was radically different: to quote the words of Sell:

\[ \text{eine völlig neue Auffassung des Wesens der Religion, von Jesu, Bibel, Gott und Kirche.} \]

In Herder's thought the gap between God and man, between the natural and the divine: this gap had been closed. Revelation, inspiration and miracle were found at every point, because at every point God himself, in his activity and power, was also found.

3. RELIGION AND JESUS CHRIST The further question, a question which has arisen incidentally in previous sections, must now be asked and answered, as to what place could be found for religion within Herder's universe in which God was everywhere present and self-revealed, and especially as to what place could be found for the Christian religion and for its source and founder, Jesus Christ. It is ob-

\[ \text{Sell op.cit. p.54} \]
-vious enough from the general character of Herder's life and work that to religion and Christianity a high value would be accorded in his thinking - no further substantiation of this point is necessary - but the precise meaning and importance of religion and of Christianity for Herder is in need of some more detailed investigation.

Now in Herder's thinking, as was only to be expected, religion was shorn from the first of all supernatural trappings. It was based upon revelation, in the case of Christianity upon the revelation in and through the Bible. But revelation itself, as has already been seen, was for Herder the purely natural and ordinary working and self-manifestation of God through nature, history and poetry. For Herder religion was no more than the expansion of a faculty, God-given and the highest faculty, of the human soul, through the indwelling power of God and by contact with the cultural and religious tradition of the race, which itself derived ultimately from God. Religion was indeed itself the recognition that it is God who is immanent and who works in all things, and the response of the heart to him. The distinction between a man-made religion and a God-given faith is one which did not and could not occur in Herder's writings, since, if God is immanent in all things, then man-made and God-given mean the same thing, and a natural revelation is also a divine.

Herder's first approach to religion, as to all other human achievement, was from the empiricist and historical standpoint. An early influence of Hume dominates the first work 'Ueber die Religionen', in which Herder, less sympathetic than usual, sought the origin of religion mainly in fear, tracing back all religions, with their varied development, finally to the one source, and accounting

1 H.I pp.286 ff.
for the variations by influences of environment. The religion of a
people, like its poetry or language, was a reflection of its inner
character,\(^1\) and a product of its external circumstances. In the con-
temporary 'Sabbath und Sonntagsfeier' the place of religion as one
spiritual faculty with others was recognised, and religion itself, as
distinct from a spurious religiosity, was seen to be 'gross und gut
und wohlgeordnet.'\(^2\) Herder's first thesis, that religion is the
natural growth of a faculty in the human soul, something which is
not implanted from without, but springs up from within, had thus
already been propounded.

Whilst at Bückeburg Herder discarded the hypothesis of Hume,
but he continued to regard religion as something natural to man. Man
was a creature born of God,\(^3\) who lived in a world in which the divine
activity was everywhere manifest.\(^4\) Religion was in origin the natur-
al recognition by man of the active presence of God in the world, this
recognition finding under God concrete expression in that first hier-
oglyphic,\(^5\) from which all the religions and cultures derived.\(^6\) Far
from being the product of fear, religion was a part of human life it-
sel from the very first:

das Element, in dem das Alles lebt' und webte:\(^7\)
the whole world was for primitive man a sacrament of the power and
also of the loving providence of God:

ingsum war das Segen Gottes.\(^3\)

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1 H.I pp. 286-287
2 S.VI p. 106
3 Ibid. p. 302
4 Ibid. p. 306
5 Ibid. p. 288
6 Ibid. p. 356
7 S.V p. 484
8 Ibid. p. 430
In the 'Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie' a definite attack was made upon Hume: Furcht und Unwissenheit, sagen sie, haben Götter ersonnen....das Gefühl der Anbetung bloss und zuerst nicht sklavisch Knechtsdienst gewesen.1

In the 'Ideen' Herder developed his ideas more fully. Religion was a faculty common to all men, as witnessed by the appearance of it even amongst the most primitive tribes.2 It was not the product of fear,3 but a blossoming of innate powers,

die erhabenste Blüthe der menschlichen Seele, eine Übung des menschlichen Herzens.4

In religion all human culture and learning had their source; it was

die älteste und heiligste Tradition der Erde, die die erste Wissenschaft und Kultur brachte.5

At its purest and best religion was identical with humanity itself, with everything, that is to say, that was finest and best in the human soul, with every generous feeling and high impulse:

die innere Anlage zur Humanität;6 die höchste Humanität.7

The later works, especially the important 'Vom Religion, Lehrmeinungen und Gebräuch', amplified this central thesis.8 It is interesting that in the Confirmation course for the Princess Karoline Louise Herder acknowledged that fear was one source of primitive religion, but insisted that conscience;

die innigste Regel des Rechts und Unrechts in allen Menschen;

the recognition of God's love and power; and the feeling for the

Ordnung, Güte und Schönheit der Natur und Würde und Schönheit der menschlichen Natur;

1 M.R.u.T.I pp.47-49
2 Id.I p.255
3 Ibid.p.256
4 Ibid.p.257
5 Id.II p.269
6 Ibid.p.274
7 Id.I p.257
8 M.R.u.T.XVIII pp.171-174
that these were other sources.

Herder rejected all supernaturalism, but he also shrank from a metaphysical or doctrinal religion. Religion as a faculty innate in man was more than a system of theories and dogmas: it was a product of the heart. Early pietistic and aesthetic influences seem at this point to have been decisive. The sermon upon prayer shows how early was the identification of true religion with inward feeling: das innere Gefühl des Herzens, Ehrfurcht, Gefühl, Anbetung. Herder reacted strongly against a mere religiosity, that feeling which was the product of a religious atmosphere:

ein gewisser, andächtiger Zwang, die Form mystischer, oder wenigstens feierlicher Empfindungen, Empfindungsunsinn. For him, however, true religion consisted none the less in a feeling for, an intuition of God, especially in nature:

Gott, wie würde ich in der Natur überall finden und mit dir sprechen. A new stress upon the need for dogma appeared in the 'Provinzialblätter', but here too there was a strong protest against the narrow utilitarianism and moralising religiosity of the Aufklärung. The work of God, Herder pleaded, was a work in and through the whole man, an allen Kräften der menschlichen Seele; a work which man had no right to canalise, to restrict or to judge. The characteristic by which true religion was to be known was sincerity and emotional depth, as illustrated chiefly in the poets, in Milton, Klopstock, Fénelon, Racine, Bossuet, Pascal, Luther, even Spalding and Lavater.

1 M.R.u.T. IX p. 213 and cf. p. 222 Cf. Goethe's 'Gefühl ist alles (Faust I: XVI 1.3456)
2 S.VI pp. 92-101
3 Ibid. p. 107
5 Ibid. p. 261 with reference again to the Grace controversy
6 Ibid. p. 270
7 Ibid. p. 300
Herder waged a long battle against the spirit which would reduce religion to metaphysical speculation and dogmatic systematisation. In the 'Auch eine Philosophie' as in the 'Fragmente zu einer Archäologie' and the 'Älteste Urkunde' he inveighed against all abstract theorising, especially the barren rationalising of the Deists, for whom God was little more than 'ein todter, metaphysischer Gedank-e'. Speculation, Herder maintained, entered in only at the Fall. In Eden religion was a childlike communion with God, a matter of feeling and poetry, an oneness with nature. Adam lived as a gardener: die ganze Natur auf ihn im Drange. In this paradise the serpent was 'der erste Metaphysiker', and once his voice was heard then reason began its perverting work and quickly transformed the first pure religion into a system of morals and dogma. Herder did not wish to deny to reason its proper place, but against this perverted use of it his whole nature rose up in protest.

At Weimar Herder moved far closer to the Neology, but he continued to maintain that true religion, although intimately bound up with the other faculties of the soul, even with reason itself, was at the very bottom a matter of inward emotional conviction, not of outward rational belief. The many definitions are of interest and drive home this point conclusively: in the 'Ideen',

ein lebhaftes und wirksames Gefühl; in the theological 'Briefe', 'eigene Überzeugung' (a distinction was here made between religion and dogmatics, which was 'eine Philosophie aus der Bibel geschöpf't); in the 'Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie',

1 S.VI p.46
2 S.VII p.23
3 Ibid.p.25
4 Id.II p.271
5 N.R.u.T.XIV p.44
6 Ibid.p.48
ein Gefühl der Menschen von dem unbegreiflichen Urheber;¹
in 'Von Religion, Lehrmeinungen und Gebräuchen,'
eine Sache des Gemüths, "Überzeugung;²
in the Confirmations,
unsere innerste Überzeugung,³ innige Gewissheit;⁴
in the Adrastea,
Sceu vor den Göttern...das Herz der Menschen will selbstgefühlte Religion.⁵

The distinction which Herder made between religion and the religious systems, the outward forms and manifestation of religion, was not a new one: indeed the XVIII century generally distinguished between natural religion and the religious faiths. What was new was the insistence that religion is not a creation of reason, but a faculty of the human soul, which exists in its own right, which is more basal than reason, and which is bound up with the emotional and the poetical faculties in man. The religious systems themselves Herder interpreted not as mistakes, superstitions or deceptions, but as the necessary expressions of this religious faculty, expressions which varied according to race, circumstance, need, external conditions, but which were all justified in their own right and upon their own level:

die Religionen sind die verschiedenen Stufen menschlicher Erkenntnisse von Gott...nach Kultur, Sprache, Zeiten und Klimaten...Woher mehrere? Die Ursache liegt in der verschiedenen Kultur, Sprache, Zeiten und Klimaten;⁶
das Menschengeschlecht ist eine Familie der verschiedensten Charaktere und Nationalreligionen...So würde jede Religion, auf ihrer Stelle angemessen, streben auf dieser Stelle die beste ihrer Art zu werden;⁷

¹ M.R.u.T. I p.50
² M.R.u.T. XVIII pp.174;175
³ M.R.u.T. X p.99
⁴ Ibid. p.173
⁵ M.P.u.G. XII pp.192;197 The defence of Herrnhutianism is to be noted.
⁶ M.R.u.T. X pp.172-174
⁷ M.P.u.G.XII p.200
The forms and beliefs were many, and relative in value, but true religious faith itself, as a faculty, was only one, and absolute:

\[\text{der Meinungen können viele seyn; echte Menschenreligion ist nur Eine;}\]

\[\text{auch Lehrmeinungen sind also nicht Glaube. Die Religion des Herzens ist nur Eine.}\]

What place then was left for Christianity and for Jesus Christ, with their claim to absoluteness and uniqueness, within this world-view which found in religion itself as a divine faculty the only absolute, and in historic religions merely relative forms and expressions? Herder did not wish in any way to undermine the Christian faith or to challenge its authority, and he safeguarded Christianity itself as he had done the Bible, by a transmutation of concepts. Just as for Herder the Bible was a revelation because God worked in and through it as in and through all poetry, its superiority lying only in the degree or potency of the divine inworking, so too Christianity was justified amongst and with other religions as one expression of the religious faculty, but superior to all others because it was not only a form, but at its purest and best also the essence religion, a renewal on the level of conscious life of that early religion of the race, when communion with God was still unbroken. An approach to this important conception may be seen already in the 'Auch eine Philosophie', in which Christianity emerged as

\[\text{die lauteste Philosophie der Sittenlehre.}\]

In the 'Älteste Urkunde' Christ himself was seen to be the one in whom

1 M.P.u.G. XII p.200
2 M.R.u.T. XVIII p.183
3 Ibid. p.182
4 Ibid. p.297
5 S.V p.519
the whole historical problem had found its solution:

Jesus ist die ganze Auflösung unseres Geschlechtes ganzen Knotens.1

The 'Erläuterungen' pictured the Gospel as a synthesis of the pure religious concepts and ideals of all ages and places, a restoration of the primitive religion reflected in Asiatic faiths:

Ideen und Ideenreichen aller Weltente.2

A full statement of Herder's position was made in the 'Ideen':

das Christentum ist die höchste Humanität, der üchte Bund der Freundschaft und Brüderliebe.3

If however Herder identified Christianity with pure religion, he distinguished between Christianity itself and its historical forms, and the latter came in for severe criticism.4 Herder aimed to show that Christianity at its purest and best, unencumbered with dogma and ceremonial, that this Christianity was identical with religion itself. The thesis thus established was the burden of the later writings: die christliche Religion ist eine Religion fürs Herz;5 die einzige und innig Menschenreligion;6 das Vorbild der echten Gottesreligion;7 die einzige Religion der Menschheit;8 die Religion aller Religionen;9 der reine Himmelstau für alle Nationen;10 die Religion, die allgemein ist;11 die Religion der Menschheit, jedermann verständlich;12 die Religion reiner Menschengüte, Menschenereligion.13

Herder thus sought for Christianity an absoluteness, not by a vindication of its historical form, but by an identification of its inner content with pure religion everywhere, not by an assertion of supernatural authority, but by the comprehension of it as the

1 S.VII p.130 2 S.VII p.354
3 Id.IV p.59 4 Ibid.pp.203 ff.
5 M.R.u.T.XIV Sctn.34 6 M.R.u.T.XVIII p.238
9 M.P.u.G.XII p.213 10 Ibid.p.199
11 Ibid.p.214 12 M.R.u.T.X.p.181
13 M.R.u.T.XVIII p.330
supreme expression of the universal religious faculty, not as the one religion, but as the religion of all religions.

It was along similar lines that Herder found for Jesus Christ an absoluteness within history as a religious leader. Jesus Christ was not for Herder the unique Son of God: there is in all men an indwelling of the immanent Godhead, and all men are divine. But Christ, the founder and the sole true representative of Christianity, was the one in whom true humanity was perfectly realised: in a word, true man, and therefore, in a higher sense than the term could be used of any other, true God:

das Ebenbild der Menschheit,1 echte Humanität;2 in(seinem) Freundschaftsbunde fanden wir das höchste Schöne und Gute der Menschheit;3 der gesellige Freund;4 der Held in der Liebe für das Gute;5 der Genius;6 der Menschensohn, weil seine Religion den Charakter der echten Menschheit ausdrückte;7 ein höchst menschlicher Charakter.8

Herder made it quite clear that Christ was for him not merely an ideal, or the personification of an idea: ('keine personificirte Idee') He stressed the fact that the divinity of Christ did not mean that Christ was more than a man, but that in Christ was manifested God as he is in true humanity: he was in a word

die für uns erkennbare Gottheit anthroplogirt.10

In the pure humanity of Christ there was revealed in all its fulness the true divinity in man ('das Göttlichste im Menschen'11). It was as pure man that Christ was also for Herder the Saviour, since by his life errors and superstitions were dispelled,12 in him perfect

1 S.VII p.207 2 M.R.u.T.XVII p.150
3 Ibid. p.163 4 M.R.u.T.XVIII p.84
7 M.R.u.T. X p.117 8 Ibid. p.195
11 Ibid. p.161 12 M.R.u.T.X p.120
humanity was attained, through his work pure religion was restored and the divine nature in man requicken{e}. The accomplishment of this task involved an act of pure self-sacrifice, the Cross:

als Mensch ging er, nicht als verzweifelnder Held, zum Tode: thus it is right and proper to speak of salvation through his death.

In the last resort Herder's approach to Jesus Christ was purely historical and relative, and he did not hesitate to estimate critically the sayings of Jesus, placing them like any other utterances against the background of contemporary life and usage. For the person of Christ Herder showed always a deep and sincere respect, but Christ could not be for him an absolute figure in the sense in which he had so been for historical faith. He was absolute and divine only in the sense that in him the Divine Word was most fully revealed in human form, that in him the immanent Godhead found expression in the most perfect humanity. The absoluteness of Christ was one of degree only, not of nature. Christ was not lifted out of the historical process as one inexplicable in terms of empirical science. He was regarded, within the process, as the one in whom the Godhead, active in all men, had attained to its clearest expression in the highest sphere of earthly life, the sphere of humanity.

4. EVIL AND REDEMPTION Closely connected with the question of the person and work of Christ as the Mediator and Redeemer, there was inevitably the problem of moral evil, and the general problem of its place within the world-order. The orientation of Herder's

1 M.R.u.T.XVII p.161
2 Ibid. p.123
3 M.R.u.T.XVI p.243
thought upon this whole question will already be largely clear from the study of his teaching upon progress, providence, and the immanence of God. Necessarily any view of evil as an active, malevolent, autonomous force was excluded from his thinking. The question must be asked however: What did Herder understand by evil at all, and to what extent was he prepared to allow it a place within his general understanding of human history and of the cosmos?

McEachran has maintained that from his earliest years, and in spite of the difficulties of his own youth, Herder had a strong faith in the essential goodness of the nature of man. The influence of Hamann, who from his own experiences knew and allowed for the devilish and animal element in man, and the weakness, if nobility, of the human will, was never strong enough to overthrow this early conviction, and upon this point Herder took his stand with Rousseau over against Hamann, finding additional support for his view no doubt in Leibniz' minimising of the reality of moral evil. The sermons at Riga are the first testimony to Herder's belief in man and to his insistence upon the nobility and divinity of his nature. For Herder at this period the spirit of man was capable of rising to a fulness of the Most High, eternity was in the human heart, and humanity, with its duties and powers, was god-created and god-given. Herder could not of course deny that there were blemishes, the frailties and errors of men, but to the evil aspects he did deny any ultimate reality: these were no more than the per-

1 McEachran op. cit. p. 3
2 Unger op. cit. pp. 131 f.; 163 f.
3 For Rousseau to be natural ('suivre l'ordre de la nature')
4 Leibniz: Of the Ultimate Origination /was to be good
5 M.R. u.T. IX pp. 213 ff. / of Things Latta pp. 345-347
-versions and mistakes, which would themselves in the long run serve to advance the greater good:

Krümmungen und Mittelzustände und Durchbrüche zu größern Licht.

In the discussion of Herder's doctrine of progress mention has already been made of Herder's attraction at Bückeburg to a Rousseauistic thesis, that man was by nature and endowment good, but that in historical fact over-rationalisation had led to a distortion and corruption. Herder, however, never gave himself over wholeheartedly to the doctrine of Rousseau, and his criticism of modern life was far less severe and his view of human history far less tragic. Herder held, as against Rousseau, that the state of society was itself a natural state and therefore good, and that reason, itself a natural endowment, was also good in itself, and when properly used a potent weapon of human advancement. The 'Auch eine Philosophie' closed on a note, not of gloom and despair, but of thorough-going optimism. In the 'älteste Urkunde' too, although Herder admitted a Fall in the Rousseauistic sense:

der Mensch ist nur gut, wenn er Mensch bleibt; aber er bleibt Mensch nicht;

yet at the same time the fall into rationality and consciousness was seen to be, in spite of temporary distortions, a step upwards in a march of humanity from the innocent life of childhood to the higher life of maturity finally manifested in Christ.

Herder was led by his Rousseauistic reading to a closer consideration, and an attempted interpretation, of the doctrine of the Fall as presented in the Bible, and the 'Erläuterungen' bear clea

1 M.R.u.T. IX p.113
2 S.V p.112
3 Ibid. pp.27 ff.
4 Ibid. pp.552-553 Fester (op.cit. pp.28-29) saw a similar
5 S.VII p.65 Rousseau is /final optimism in Rousseau
6 Ibid. pp.123 f. /quoted with approval
marks of the Scriptural study. Stirred up no doubt by the great neological controversy upon the existence of the Devil, Herder now discussed the possibility of the reality of evil spirits, reviewing the current interpretations of accounts of devilish activity as fables, or as transcendental representations of natural phenomena, but hinting at a personal belief in a realm of invisible and unknown higher powers ('ein unsichtbares Reich der Kräfte'). In the discussion of the Fall, Herder repeated his central tenet, that there was a Fall, but that it was a necessary, and ultimately a beneficial upward movement. The redemptive, or atoning, work of Christ Herder conceived of purely subjectively: Christ was the 'Befreier, Arzt, Seligmacher' who brought release to the soul, cleansed the mind from superstitions and deceptions and errors, and implanted the clear truths of true religion.

The question of moral evil was discussed more fully in the theological 'Briefe', in which, reviewing the doctrine of original sin, Herder put forward the two main alternatives: that of Bayle and Leibniz, that evil is imperfection; that of orthodoxy, that there is in man a natural disposition to sin. Herder himself was for the most part content to review the doctrines of others, without committing himself to a clear statement of his own views, but he recognised the reality of a Fall in the individual life, and seemed to incline towards the teaching of an hereditary evil, using the analogy of physical disease, and tracing out in the soul both good and also evil impulses or tendencies:

2 Ibid. pp. 366 ff.
3 Ibid. p. 334
4 M.R.u.T. XIV p. 84
5 Ibid. p. 90
6 Ibid. loc. cit.
7 Ibid. p. 92 (The teaching of Rousseau was now rejected)
Herder stressed of course the original innocence of man, and found in the revelation of God the means of redemption. This revelation worked, not by human rational effort, but by Grace, or immanent divine power ('die eigentliche energische Kraft').

A sharper edge was given to the discussion in the later writings by Kant's championship of a doctrine of radical evil, the opposition of natural desire to moral duty. This teaching was distasteful to both Herder and Goethe, and Herder developed his objections to it in the 'Ideen'. The historical picture presented in the 'Ideen' was one of a continued progress through successive growths, and in this schema the Fall could have no place except as a symbolic tradition ('eine alte Philosophie des Menschengeschlechts'), in which was represented the truth that progress brings possibilities of greater evil (through perverted use) as well as of greater good:

ein symbolisches Bild von dem, was unserm Geschlecht von jeher alles Wohl und Weh brachte: von dem zweideutigen Streben nach Erkenntnissen.

In the 'Ideen' Herder did of course admit the existence of destructive powers, but he was confident that these would diminish with the growth of a true enlightenment, and that the errors and distortions themselves tended eventually to a furtherance of humanity:

so arbeitet sich auch der Missbrauch, übertreibend mit der Zeit, zum guten Gebrauch.

Within the happy schema of the 'Ideen', in which evil had been robbed of any final reality, Herder found for Christianity a redemptive

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1 M.R.u.T. XIV p.31
2 Ibid. pp.94-96
3 Franz (op.cit.p.149) speaks of Goethe as 'ein erbitterter Gegner'.
4 Id.II p.313
5 Ibid.p.337
6 Ibid III pp.314 f.;319
7 Ibid.p.353
value as the religion which had first given to man an idea and a picture of true friendship and of true brotherly love.\(^1\) It is evident that in the 'Ideen' the Rousseauism had finally been merged into a more Leibnizian and even Rationalistic outlook.

The drift away from a definite doctrine of sin was even more pronounced in the 'Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität', in which Herder directly attacked the teaching of Kant. Herder's own teaching was along the lines already suggested by his now central doctrine of retribution. Evil was not something natural to man, but an alien accretion, better a distortion, a misuse:

\[
\text{wo Böses ist, ist die Ursache die Unart unseres Geschlechts, nicht seine Natur und Art.}^2
\]

Evil was for Herder perversion, corruption, misapplication, defectiveness: not something positive, but the negation, or want, of good. The cure of evil, and its avoidance, was the aim of all historical endeavour:

\[
\text{es ist Zweck unseres Geschlechts, uns diese Unart zu entladen.}^3
\]

This task could only be accomplished by an enlightenment, a reorientation of thought: and would be completed only

\[
\text{wenn neues Leben, Munterkeit zum Guten, Vernunft, Bescheidenheit, Billigkeit, Wahrheit, eine bessere Erziehung, bessere Gewohnheiten von Jugend auf einzeln und allgemein einkehren.}^4
\]

The concept of moral evil in the Confirmations is much the same, but with a more orthodox colouring. The source of moral evils was found in man himself and his misuse of natural gifts:

\[
\text{sie rühren...vom Missbrauch ihrer Gaben und Kräfte.}^5
\]

Weakness and divinity were seen side by side within the human breast:

\[1\text{ Id.IV pp.54 ff.} \]
\[2\text{ M.F.u.G. XIV p.197} \]
\[3\text{ Ibid.p.198} \]
\[4\text{ Ibid.p.197} \]
\[5\text{ M.R.u.T. X p.107} \]
eine schwache Natur, in der etwas Göttliches liegt.1
Hope was held out of a constant advance to an ever greater perfection and god-likeness, a stress being laid upon the role of Christianity as an important means towards the overcoming of moral evil. Jesus Christ himself was the one who could give
gesunde Kräfte.....den Mangel zu ergänzen, die Zerrüttung zu ersetzen;2
the one by whom all errors and superstitions were dispelled, and
the one who could quicken to new life by the Holy Spirit,
der mächtige Kräfte aufweckte zu Beförderung des Guten und zu Unterdrückung des Bösen.3
The definitions and descriptions which Herder gave of the work of God through Christ as a work of redemption from evil and advancement of the good are of particular interest: it was for Herder
die Ausbildung unseres Verstandes; Erleuchtung; Wiedergeburt; die Heiligung unseres Wollens, Vervollkommnung.......... der Geist klärt den Verstand auf......leitet auf das Gute.4
The whole trend of Herder's thought in these later works, as for example in the 'Vom Erlöser der Welt' and the 'Vom Gottes Sohn, der Welt Heiland', was towards a thorough-going subjectivisation both of moral evil and also of the redemptive work of Christ. The function of Christianity in the world-process was that of a pure idea,5 which brought with it a greater enlightenment and served to banish error: it was 'die einfache Lehre, die Wahrheit, die Befreierin'
The hope of humanity was that by contact with the teaching and example of Christ, limiting and perverting influences should be cast off, and that fulness of human development attained, which was al-

1 M.R.u.T. X p.138
2 Ibid. p.117
3 Ibid. p.121
4 Ibid. pp.122; 209
5 M.R.u.T. XVII p.139
6 Ibid. p.95
-ready displayed in him:

denn aus dem Menschengeschlecht kann, wird um muss, noch viel-es werden, was eben jetzt noch nicht vor uns liegt.¹

It must be remembered of course that although Kant did conceive of evil in a far more radical way than Herder, postulating a real cleavage between desire and duty, and insisting sternly upon the moral imperative, as opposed to nature, yet in the last analysis the teachings of the two were not so very different, the conflicting views upon nature apart. For Kant as for Herder moral evil was subjective only, and with him too the terms 'Devil', 'Sin', 'Rebirth' were borrowed from Christian doctrine to describe not outward realities but inward facts.² The points of divergence centre around Herder immanentist conception of the Godhead as self-revealed both in nature and in the moral law, a conception which reduced any final dualism to a complete absurdity, and which could only find a place for evil either as that which is imperfect or lacking, the not-yet of something which one day will be, ultimately then 'ein Nichts',³ or at the most as the misapplication of that which is good in itself, an abuse which both avenges itself and also has transitional value in that it paves the way for a proper use.⁴ Both with Herder and with Kant sin was in any case destined to disappear in a final synthesis of nature and reason. Thus although its presence was recognised, either as a yielding to or as a resistance against nature, there was a tendency, especially with Herder, to minimise its seriousness and to discount its potency.

To sum up the philosophy of history and the theology of Herder under one broad and comprehensive heading is not easy, but when the principles and concepts previously discussed are reviewed in their relation one to another: continuity, organic growth, progress, providence, relativity of value, necessity and retribution, education, humanity as a goal and as a stage, the immanence of God, the divine self-revelation, religion the natural impulse and emotion of the heart, Christ the perfect man and the emancipator, the ultimate unreality of sin; when these principles and concepts are brought together and interrelated, then it will be seen that Herder's final outlook upon history and upon the universe can only be described as one of cosmic optimism, a development of the nature-optimism of Shaftesbury and the Leibnizian theodicy.

The world of Herder's conceiving, although it was not a finished but an evolving world, although it was a world in which imperfections could still exist, in which higher manifestations of life were still to be realised, and the lower doomed to perish, this world was one in which everything was yet ordered wisely and for the greatest good, not only of the whole, but also of all the individual units which went to make up the whole.¹

This optimism of Herder, which belonged to his thought in its essential structure, dated back to the earliest years, and was formed without doubt under those powerful influences, Leibniz, Shaftesbury and Rousseau. It hardly came to any conscious expression in the earlier or in the Bückeburg works, but it was implicit in all of them. Even in the more tragic 'Auch eine Philosophie' Herder's last word was not a castigation of decadent modernity, but an exhortation to work and to hope: the greatest age was yet to be.²

¹ Id.III pp.361-362
² S.V p.580
In the 'Altste Urkunde' again the curse of man was not the final sentence; in the over-ruling providence of God the curse itself was also the means to greater blessing, and to a more glorious advancement of the race:

eben aus dem Gift brachte Gott Honig.¹

A clearer and more comprehensive utterance was given to this fundamental cosmic optimism in the riper works, particularly in the 'Ideen' and in the essay 'Gott'. In the 'Ideen' Herder faced at the very outset the difficult problem of natural catastrophes and of their place in the general scheme.² As against the 'unphilosophisches Geschrei' of Voltaire,³ Herder maintained the general optimistic thesis that these evils were necessary and right, because, however blind and purposeless in appearance, they served to promote the greater common good:

sobald in einer Natur voll veränderlicher Dinge Gang seyn muss; so bald muss auch Untergang seyn, eine Abwechslung von Gestalten und Formen.⁴

The same thought was further elaborated in a passage, which has already been discussed in relation to Herder's doctrine of progress, in which Herder found it to be a basic principle of world government: that order is produced out of chaos ('aus dem Zustande der Verwirrung Ordnung')⁵ only through the destruction of millions of creatures for whom there is no place in the harmonious development of the whole:

eine harmonische Ordnung...die nur durch den Untergang von Millionen bewirkt werden konnte.⁶

Catastrophic disturbances in nature were for Herder like great men in

¹ S. VII pp. 116-118
² Id. I p. 20
³ Ibid. loc. cit. The reference was to Voltaire's poem 'Sur le Désastre de Lisbonne'⁷
⁴ Ibid. p. 21
⁵ Id. III p. 315
⁶ Ibid. p. 316
history: they were violations of the general order, but in the long run they served none the less to strengthen and advance that order. In any case their number was small and would constantly be reduced.

A full exposition of the optimistic position was given in the essay 'Gott'. The teaching of Leibniz, that this is the best possible world, did not find favour, but only because, since God is immanent, the question of a free choice of possible worlds does not arise. With God the possible is the actual and the actual the only possible: all things that can be must be:

es gibt kein Reich des Möglichen ohne und ausser Gott.

Having made this correction, Herder accepted the Leibnizian optimism in its entirety, although at all points with an immanentist colouring. The world was for Herder governed by a necessity of inward compulsion which was a necessity of perfect power, wisdom and goodness. The immutable laws according to which nature operated were at all points all-wise and all-just. Every force had its place in a perfect plan and every force worked according to its nature. If there was at any point derangement or violation, then a corresponding compensation was arranged. Destruction, or death, was only a way to higher life, and was itself a natural law:

alles ist Veränderung; es ist kein wahrer Tod, nur eing ewige Palingenesie, ein Fortrücken aus dem Chaos zur Ordnung.

Things which seemed to be evil were so only in appearance, or as the antithesis necessary for the production of a higher synthesis:

1 ib. III pp. 317 ff.
2 S. XVI p. 483
3 Ibid. p. 482 (Cf. Leibniz: Monadology Sect. 44)
4 Ibid. p. 543
5 Ibid. p. 547
6 Ibid. pp. 562 ff.
alles Böses ist ein Nichts.....Schranke, Gegensatz, Übergang.1

Even mistakes served a useful purpose, in that they prepared the
ground for the eventual coming of the true and right:

auch die Fehler hilfen zu mehrerem Licht.2

It is clear enough that for the later Herder, his mind dominated by
an evolutionary naturalistic pantheism, evil had lost all reality,
and every phenomenon had become but one cog in the great machine of
natural self-realisation, the self-manifestation of the Godhead.

A no less definite expression was given to the optimistic views of
the Spinoza essay in the Confirmations:

physische Übel sind Erfordernisse der Natur, die immer einem
höheren Zweck zu einem größern Gute dienen;3

Vernichtung ist nicht in der Natur. Tod ist nur Übergang;4
die physischen Übel sind Folgen weiser und guter Naturgesetze,
mithin kein Übel.5

That Herder's optimism was grounded in Leibniz and Shaftes-
bury is so obvious that it requires little substantiation. With
Leibniz and Shaftesbury too, evil was always the means to a greater
good, and all things were seen to be concurrent to one interest, the
interest of that Universal One.6 Leibniz and Shaftesbury had both
looked upon the universe as a single whole governed by the wisest
laws, laws which, 'themselves just and uniform, speak of the govern-
ment of that Just One'.7 For Leibniz there was neither death nor ev-
il: death was only metamorphosis;8 evil, imperfection or limitation,
with an only negative reality.9 Both Leibniz and Shaftesbury had
admitted disorders in the parts, but pleaded that even these 'do but
 enhance the beauty of the whole'.10 Shaftesbury in particular stresse

1 S.XVI p.570 2 Ibid.p.571
3 M.R.u.F. X p.106 4 Ibid.loc.cit. /p.151
5 Ibid.p.187 5 Ibid.p.187 6 Shaftesbury: Moralists III
7 Ibid.p.126 (Sctns.10-11) 8 Ibid.loc.cit. /p.151
8 Theodicy (in Syll.10-11) 9 Monadology Sctns.72-76
9 (in Syll.10-11) 10 Ibid.loc.cit.
ed the folly of judging nature without respect to the whole:

we cannot say of any being that it is wholly or absolutely ill, unless we can show and ascertain that it is nowhere good besides in any other system or with respect to any other order or economy whatsoever;¹

when nature seems most ignorant or perverse, assert her even then as wise and provident as in her goodliest works.²

Interestingly, he too saw in destruction a means of progress, noticing that the Higher organisms draw their sustenance from the lower.³

Building upon this foundation, Herder himself erected a system which was finally one of unbounded confidence and hope. Through the conflicts of forces, across the catastrophes, in spite of the apparent opposition of nature,⁴ man (and with man the universe) was for Herder moving onwards in the fulfilment of a glorious destiny. Moral and physical evils existed, but all things were bound ultimately to work together in order that this destiny might be achieved: the evils themselves were not exempted:

alle Laster und Frevel müssen dem Ganzen endlich zum Besten ge-reichen.⁵

In accordance with the great immanent and active plan, everything in nature and in history was controlled by God for the best, evil destroying itself and serving to advance only the good:

Gott regiert und lenkt (die Weltbegebenheiten) zu seinen Absichten... auch das Böse, dass dennoch etwas Gute dadurch bewirkt wird.⁶

That it was optimism which lay at the heart of Herder's philosophy and theology is nowhere more apparent than in the challenging and confident passages in the 'Ideen':

das Vernünftige ist im Reich Gottes allenthalben günstig; die Vernunft geht im Ganzen des Geschlechts ihren Gang fort;⁷ es waltet eine weise Gute im Schicksal der Menschen.⁸

Against this challenging confession of faith in the power and wisdom of the immanent God no argument could prevail.

1 Virtue I:2:i p.14  
3 Ibid.p.28  
5 Ibid.p.113  
7 Id.III pp.363-364

2 Moralists I: 3 p.27  
4 M.P.u.G.VIII pp.111-112  
6 M.R.u.T.X p.108  
8 Ibid.p.356
PART II THE ROMANTIC PHILOSOPHIES
CHAPTER VII  NATURE AND HISTORY WITH THE ROMANTICS

The historico-philosophical, and indeed all the theoretical writings of Romanticism consist very largely of discussions of, and jottings upon, the mutual inter-relationships and inter-penetration of the natural and the historical worlds. It is clear, even at a first reading, that upon this fundamental question, brought very much to the fore by the 'Ideen' of Herder, in which the historical had been incorporated into the natural world, the Romantic mind was not at ease. In point of fact Romanticism found itself here face to face with two different modes of thought, each of which it wished to retain, but each of which also appeared to exclude the other. On the one hand it was anxious to assert that there is a basic unity, which runs across and binds together all forms of life, that the physical and the psychical, the organic and the inorganic, are not separated by any decisive gulf, that nature and history are indeed ultimately but the one process; on the other it was anxious to stress the freedom of the psychical or the spiritual from all physical restraints, to uphold the predominance of the transcendental world of thought over the world of sense, and to safeguard the autonomy of human history over against the domain of nature.

That there was this disharmony in Romantic thought is due to the fact that the Romantics were the inheritors of two separate and divergent traditions. On the one hand they stepped easily and naturally into the world of Herder and Goethe, a dynamic, aesthetico-religious, immanentist world, in which, as poets, they were instinctively at home. It was as the heirs of Herder and Goethe,¹ in whose world of immanentist naturalism and cosmic evolutionism man had

¹ O.Mann: Der junge Friedrich Schlegel p.27. In this introduction (pp.6-38) the influence upon Schlegel of Herder and Goethe is brilliantly summarised.
his place as the crown of creation, the highest manifestation of the
divine power active in all forms of life, that the Romantics inclined
towards a conception of natural and historical development as one
process. The extent to which this inheritance was directly from
Herder himself, or to which it was mediated through Goethe (whose
ideas were in large measure the same as those of Herder, and whom
the Romantics revered as the greatest and the only true poet of the
modern age) is not in this connection a matter of very great moment.
The central fact is beyond dispute, that Romanticism did step into
this inheritance, and that it was neither willing nor able entirely
to cast it off.

At the same time, however, the Romantics belonged to a genera-
tion upon which the critical philosophy had burst with full force and
freshness, a generation whose prophet was Fichte, with his in-
toxicating subjectivisation of the universe, and whose catchword was
transcendental idealism. All the Romantics found in Kant a common
starting-point; and it was in the form impressed upon it by Fichte
that the philosophy of Kant very largely made its appeal. Fichte
himself was in intimate association with Romanticism during its in-
cipient stages, and upon Friedrich Schlegel,\(^1\) Novalis,\(^2\) Schleiermack-
er,\(^3\) Schelling,\(^4\) to mention all the most important figures, he ex-
ercised a deep and decisive, if not a permanent influence. It was
from Fichte that the Romantics learned two of the lessons which col-
oured all their thinking: first, that the world is to be regarded
subjectively, as a sense-perception of the individual ego; second,

1 Mann op.cit.pp.47-48
2 E.Spenle: Novalis p.105
3 J.Oman: Translation of the 'Reden' Introduction pp.xxvii-
4 E.Fuchs:Vom Werden dreier Denker pp.139 ff. xxviii
that the will and the spirit of the ego is free and autonomous over against the world of appearance and its laws.

The conflict between the aesthetic pantheistic naturalism of Herder and Goethe and the transcendental idealism of Fichte was, in the Romantic mind, attracted as it was to both, inevitable, and it centred naturally around the basic historico-philosophical problem, the relationship of history, the sphere of human activity, to inorganic and organic nature, the sphere of natural law. Sometimes unconsciously, but often consciously, this was in all the Rom antic writers the one fundamental and essential problem, the solution of which necessarily determined to a very large extent the form, or forms, which the philosophy of history of Romanticism assumed.

The fact is plain at the very outset that the Romantics accepted and adopted those two first principles which underlay the naturalistic philosophy of Herder and Goethe, continuity and genetic growth, and that they applied these principles in a way which almost committed them to naturalistic views. The evidence in favour of this assertion is full and irrefutable. Even in Fichte himself there are clear traces, if not of the thought-forms, at least of the language of Herder. Fichte, for example, asserts that there is one life-force at work in all forms of life, including the ego, as creative substance:

\[ \text{dein Leben fliesst durch mich als sich selbst schaffende und bildende Materie;}^{1} \]

and he too can discern a development or growth of an organic character in the historical process.\(^2\) With Fichte no less than with Herder

\[ ^{1} \text{Fichte: S\"ammtliche Werke II pp.170 ff.} \]
\[ ^{2} \text{Ibid. pp.268-275; VII pp.6-7} \]
himself there is a strong sense both of the oneness of the universe: 
ich selbst bin ein Glied....der Mensch ist eine besondere Be-
stimmung aller Naturkräfte in Vereinigung,¹

and also of the unity of the human race itself in one organic whole: 
alles lebt in dem Ganzen.²

The difference between Fichte and Herder (which is a radical differ-
ence) is to be sought at this point, that with Fichte the unity pos-
tulated was that of a world transcendentally conceived within the 
spiritual consciousness. Fichte abandoned neither continuity nor 
organic growth, but he transformed both, or rather he lifted them 
out of the natural into the intellectual world. Thus history itself 
was for Fichte, not a natural growth, but the unfolding of an a 
priori plan, or idea:³ its movement and laws were in the last anal-
ysis not natural but logical.

In Hölderlin and the young Hegel, whose historico-philos-
ophical thinking moved along similar lines to that of the Romantics 
proper, the sense of continuity and of the genetic nature of develop-
ment was equally pronounced. Hölderlin especially was influenced 
by the naturalistic conceptions of Herder, as expressed in the late 
essay 'Tithon und Aurora'. From Herder Hölderlin inherited a keen 
feeling for the oneness of all creation, with man himself as the 
crown and centre.⁴ The thought of the ultimate oneness of things,⁵ 
of the existence of a unity 'which embraces all aspects of the same 
thing',⁶ is one which underlies all his poetry. For Hölderlin there 
was one life and one power at work in all creatures:

¹ Fichte op.cit.II pp.179-181
² Ibid.VII p.63 Cf.p.6
³ Ibid.VII pp.69; 138
⁴ A.Closs: Gedichte Introduction p.20
⁵ R.Peacock: Hölderlin p.23
⁶ Closs op.cit.p.20 (Introduction)
Hölderlin also learned from Herder to look upon the civilisations and the cultures of the past as organic growths, with their roots deep in the soil and their development according to natural law. In Greece, in which the highest cultural level in history had been attained, art and nature had developed in harmony; and the Greeks, as men who stood close to nature, and upon whom nature freely worked, were for Hölderlin a favoured race ('O die Kinder des Glück'3). The images which Hölderlin chose in speaking of historical as of natural movements were to a large extent those drawn from organic life and growth; with its blossoming, change and decay:

Doch der ewge Keim entfaltet
Bald zu neuer Blüthe sich;4
Wie ein Saamkorn, du die ehe re Schale zersprengst;5
Das Wechseln und das Werden;6 Das Werden und Wirken.7

With Hegel the early influence of the principles of Herder is also apparent, especially in the historical approach,8 and even in the later Hegel, the unity of nature in an ascending series;9 the continuity of historical development through the successive stages, childhood, youth and maturity;10 and the interpretation of historical phenomena as organic growths:

wie der Keim die ganze Natur des Baums.... in sich trägt, so enthalten auch schon die ersten Spuren des Geists virtualiter die ganze Geschichte;11
together with the stress upon the influence of geographical and

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1 Closs op.cit.p.46 2 Ibid.p.33(Peacock op.cit.p.25)
3 Ibid.p.90 4 The Greek age was the springtime of the race
 'die köstliche Frühlingszeit' (p.93)
4 Ibid.p.37 5 Ibid.p.95
6 Ibid.p.94 7 Ibid.p.107
8 See Dilthey: Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels Gesammelte Schrift-
en IV pp.137 ff.
9 R.Mackintosh: Hegel and Hegelianism p.155
10 Hegel: Werke IX pp.102-105 (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie
der Geschichte)
climatic conditions: all these were distinguishing features in his systematic world-view. With Hegel as with Fichte, however, the development, although organic, was in essence an intellectual and logical process in the world of ideas rather than an historical in that of facts.

When the works of those writers who in the stricter sense formed the Romantic movement are examined, it is everywhere apparent to how great an extent the thought of Herder had been assimilated by, and had become the common property of the Romantic generation. This is particularly the case with Novalis, with whom the oneness of man with nature and the organic nature of institutions were articles of faith. The jottings in the various 'fragments' of Novalis, as well as the larger writings, are full of sentences and phrases which illustrate this fact and which even in some cases bear a verbal witness to dependence upon Herder himself. For Novalis, man was a creature who physically belonged to the earth:

unser Körper ist ein Teil der Welt, Glied ist besser gesagt. 

Speech was seen to be organic in its origin and development:

auch die Sprache ist ein Produkt des organischen Bildungstriebes.

All life was for the Novalis growth from the seed:

alles ist Samenkorn.

A chain of being was discerned, in which a single power was operative: alle Wirkungen sind nichts als Wirkungen einer Kraft; alle Naturkräfte sind nur Eine Kraft.

The human race itself, with all its variety, formed for Novalis a
unity, the various generations and peoples being bound together by not merely mechanical but organic bonds:

alle Menschen sind Variationen eines vollständigen Individuums, einer Ehe;\(^1\)
eine Generation ist der Keim der unendlichen Generation, die das Weltdrama beschliesst.\(^2\)

Man himself was of course a part of the wider organic whole, in which the whole of nature was comprehended:

die Natur muss ein Kontinuum, eine Geschichte, ein organisches Gewächs...werden.\(^3\)

Novalis was so anxious to emphasise the unity of all things that he sought to dissolve all barriers between the material and the psychical:

Seele und Körper wirken galvanisch auf einander;\(^4\)
Denken ist eine Muskeltätigkeit.\(^5\)

The influence of external circumstances was naturally acknowledged:

alles, was uns umgibt....hat einen...höchst wichtigen Einfluss auf uns.\(^6\)

The dream of Novalis was of a world in which the life of man should be lived in a perfect harmony both of body and soul and also with external nature, and he looked back longingly to the age of innocence:

zu jener Zeit verstand (der Mensch) uns (die Natur), wie wir ihm verstanden;\(^7\)

and forward to the time when all men, with a right feeling for nature should be able once again to enter into the life of other created things ('sich in alle Naturwesen hineinzurühlen'). That unity which Novalis postulated was so profound that sometimes it found expression

1 N.S.III S.H.Sctn.62
2 Ibid.III Sctn.334
3 Ibid.III v.B.Sctn.198
4 Ibid.II Sctn.157
5 Ibid.III v.B.Sctn.95
6 Ibid.III S.H.Sctn.52
7 Ibid.IV p.25 ('Die Lehrlinge zu Sais')
8 Ibid.p.38
in the most fantastic of comparisons, in an attempt to abolish all distinctions between the physical and the spiritual worlds, as for example when Novalis spoke of 'poetic physiology',\(^1\) of mathematics as the life of the gods and a type of prophecy,\(^2\) of 'chemical music',\(^3\) of physical sickness as a musical problem, of which the cure is the solution.\(^4\) The influence of those mystical movements of which Ritter, St. Martin, Baader; and to a lesser extent Lavater, were prominent leaders, may be traced at this point, the galvanistic teaching of Ritter having obviously had a great effect.\(^5\)

All the main commentators, Dilthey, Haym, Mulert, Wehrung, Süsskind, are agreed in their emphasis upon the part played by the principles of continuity and organic development, not only in the scientific, but also in the general historical and historico-religious thinking of Schleiermacher. Like the other Romantics, Schleiermacher looked upon the world as a totality, discerning in it a scale of ascending forces ('eine Reihe organischer Evolutionen'\(^6\)), in which each individual creature had its place as a part of and a manifestation of the whole, and was only to be understood in its relationship to that whole:

> alles Einzelne (ist) ein Teil des Ganzen.\(^7\)

The human race, itself one representation of the whole ('nur Darstellung einer einzigen Modification\(^8\)'), formed again for Schleiermacher a smaller unity, in which the different races, with their

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1. N.S. II Sctn.199
2. Ibid. Sctn.282
3. Ibid. Sctn.215
4. Ibid. Sctn.194
6. Schleiermacher: Reden p.194
7. Ibid.p.41
8. Ibid.p.76
varying cultures and religions, were now the parts. When Schleiermacher came to his own particular subject, religion, he saw in religion, as in human endowment as a whole, not something transcendental, imposed from without, but something organic, springing up from within, and to be studied 'in seinem Werden'.1 Just as in nature everything is organic ('organische Potenz')², so too it is in history, since man himself is the crown and glory of nature:

die höchste Wirkung der Schaffenden Natur.³

Religion itself, for Schleiermacher 'ein Produkt der menschlichen Natur',⁴ did not escape the general law; and it was conceived of naturalistically, both in its origin and in its growth. It is not insignificant that both in the 'Reden' and in the 'Monologen' the metaphors which Schleiermacher used in speaking of the spiritual life were the common ones taken from organic growth in nature: 'Keim und Saat';⁵ 'Gewächs und Früchte'.⁶ Schleiermacher's understanding of the world and of life was obviously closely similar to that of Herder. For him there was one force which was active in all phenomena and in all achievements: species, individuals, cultures; and which manifested itself in various forms successively and progressively. Religion for Schleiermacher was basically an apprehension of the totality of things and of things in their totality: ⁷

so war es Religion, wenn die Alten jede eigentümliche Art des Lebens durch die ganze Welt hin als das Werk und Reich eines allgegenwärtigen Lebens ansahen.⁸

1 Reden p.73
2 H. Mulert: Schleiermachers geschichtsphilosophische Ansichten in ihrer Bedeutung für seine Theologie p.70
3 Dilthey: Das Leben Schleiermachers pp.392-393
4 Reden p.16
5 Monologen pp.62 ff.
6 Ibid. loc. cit.
7 Continuity was thus an essential principle in any religious outlook.
8 Reden p.41
Upon Friedrich Schlegel the influence of the principles of Herder was even more direct and powerful than upon the other Romantic thinkers, as is abundantly clear from all his writings, and especially from the early works upon the literature and history of the classical world. Schlegel as a literary critic approached the poetry, and indeed the whole culture of ancient Greece, entirely in the manner of Herder, studying it, as an organic unity, in its stages of growth, blossoming and decay, and attempting to interpret and to appreciate it in relation to those conditions of life in which it flourished and by which it was called forth. For the young Schlegel, all literary and cultural history was natural history:

die Bildung eines Landes ist organisch aus dem innern Organismen abzuleiten.1

The various schools, for example of Greek poetry, corresponded to the species in natural science, and were to be treated as such.2 Culture as a whole was only to be understood in the terms of natural science, as a growth from the seed to the fruit:

wie alle organische Kräfte sich allmählig bis zur Reife entwickeln, und nach erreichtem Gipfel sich wieder ihrer Auflösung nähern, so findet sich dieses auch im Ganzen und im Einzelnen der antiken Welt.3

This natural growth of culture ('eine stetige Entfaltung vom ersten Keim bis zur völligen Reife') was only possible of course, as with Herder, when favourable external conditions obtained, as was the case supremely in ancient Greece:

diese glückliche Naturentwicklung wurde durch Land, Klima, Rasse, politischer Freiheit ermöglicht.4

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1 W.A.p.237
2 M.I pp.1 ff.14
3 Werke II p.214
4 M.IId.p.259
5 Mann op. cit. p.75
In the genetic explanation of human culture an important subsidiary role was thus ascribed to environment. It is also to be noticed that building upon these foundations Friedrich Schlegel, and with him his brother August Wilhelm, developed as his method of criticism a technique of individual characterisation, according to time, place, opportunity and natural talent, a method already suggested and in part attempted by Herder himself.2

The wider philosophical works, especially the notes of philosophical lectures recently published by Körner,3 reveal the extent to which the principles of continuity and organic growth had entered into Schlegel's thought as a whole. This fact is noticed by Körner himself, who in his excellent introduction writes:

im Vordergrund steht der Begriff des unendlichen Werdens, der Grundsatz vom organischen Zusammenhang der Welt, die Hochschätzung der Geschichte, die Forderung der genetischen Methode.4

At the very outset Schlegel postulated an underlying unity of knowledge itself as the knowledge of nature:

alle Wissenschaft ist Naturwissenschaft.5

This knowledge was for Schlegel historical in character, since the world is only presented to our consciousness as a process:

die Materie der Philosophie soll historisch seyn....die Historie ist das Wissen von einem Werden.6

The unity of the world in all the multiplicity of phenomena and the solidarity of the human race as one species were both asserted:

es gibt nur eine Welt;7

1 See especially the 'Vorlesungen über dramatische Kunst und Literatur' W.A. Introduction p.xix
2 J.Körner: Friedrich Schlegel: Neue philosophische Schriften (Introduction)p.51
3 Ibid. p.210
4 Ibid. p.213
5 Ibid. p.154
die Welt ist das Ganze als System des Mechanismus gedacht; wir haben die Menschheit als ein organisches Ganzes zu konstruieren. 

As with all the Romantic philosophers this unity of the world and of mankind was conceived of as the unity of an organism:

das Universum ist ein Kunstwerk, ein Thier, eine Pflanze.

The view of Herder that all nature was living, and that all life was organic, reappeared in Schlegel:

tout est animé;
alles Daseyn ist organisch.

The terminology of Spinoza was, significantly enough, adopted at many points: thus Schlegel could write:

das Individuum ist ein Bild der einen, unendlichen Substanz;

and yet in spite of this fact it is clear that in so far as Schlegel did have any coherent conception of the world, it was the dynamic conception of Leibniz and Herder:

jede Bewegung ist dynamisch.

Schlegel's final interpretation was in terms of the familiar semi-theological concept, that nature is the finite, progressive self-manifestation of the Infinite:

un développement successif de l'Infini;
ein Bild der werdenden Gottheit.

In Schleiermacher and in Friedrich Schlegel the two principles of continuity and organic growth, although they lay at the very heart of the whole outlook upon life, had for the most part been specially applied to the particular themes, religion in the one case, literature in the other. It was in the philosopher Schelling (and

1 Körner p. 168
2 Ibid. p. 191
3 Ibid. p. 153
4 Ibid. p. 243
5 Ibid. p. 157
6 Ibid. p. 153
7 Ibid. p. 156
8 Ibid. pp. 240 f.
9 Ibid. p. 168
to a lesser degree the natural scientist Steffens) that a stricter application to the world of nature and to general philosophy was made. The scattered ideas which lie in the writings of Novalis, Schleiermacher and Schlegel are all to be found again in the works of Schelling, welded now into systematic and consistent philosophies of nature and the universe. A full exposition of these philosophies is neither possible nor necessary in this study, but some account must be given of the leading ideas in so far as they touch upon the historical and the theological problem.

Schelling, like all the Romantics, insisted from the first upon the essential unity (in variety) both of the universe in general and of the race in particular. The suggestion that a common type exists, upon which all the species are based, and which they reflect, was again presented:

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ein gemeinschaftliches Ideal schwebt der schöpferischen Natur vor...die verschiedenen Formen werden nur als verschiedene Stufen einer und derselben Organisation erscheinen.1
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Applying this doctrine in the smaller sphere of the race, Schelling discerned a unity in the species which transcended all varieties of type:

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es gibt eine Vorsehung des Processes, für welche die getrennten Völker doch nur die eine Menschheit sind.2
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The race was for Schelling one in origin, this unity being a fact ideally ('in der Ideenwelt'3) in spite of the serious difficulties against the maintaining of it as a physical fact:

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die unüberwindlichen Schwierigkeiten einer physischen Abstammung von einem Menschenpaar.4
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1 S.S.W.III,1 p.33 Cf.too IV,1 p.223 'Der schaffenden Natur wird bei allen ihren Hervorbringungen, im Ganzen nicht nur, sondern auch im Einzelnen, ein Typus vorgeschrieben'
2 Ibid.II,2 p.587
3 Ibid.I,2 pp.602 ff.
4 Ibid.p.509
Racial variety was no argument against this higher unity of species by which man was recognisable everywhere as man:

    eine ganz andere und höhere Einheit des Menschengeschlechts.1

The unity which Schelling postulated of the world in general was that of an ascending scale (eine dynamische Stufenfolge2), and Leibniz with his monadic scale was approvingly mentioned.3 There was for Schelling a single force which was operative in all organisms, the separate species being manifestations of this force at different levels: verschiedene Stufen der Erscheinung jener Einen Kraft.4 Differences were in degree of working, but not in essential nature:

    in der Pflanze wirkt die selbe Kraft, die im Thier wirkt.5

Man himself was not lifted by Schelling out of the scale, but was put at the very top, as a creature of intellect:

    das Gehirn des Menschen ist die höchste Blüthe der ganzen organischen Metamorphose.6

In man that archetype, which all creatures reflected, was attained:

    es gibt eine herrschende Identität, die nur im Menschen erreicht wird.7

It is true that for Schelling as for others man was a transitional creature, the being in whom the dominion of nature was replaced by that of freedom - the upright posture marked man out as the culminating point in the old order and the beginning of a new:

    schon die aufrechte Gestalt und Bildung des Menschen zeigt auf ihn als Schluss der Natur3-

but between the two worlds, that of nature on the one hand, that of

1 S.S.W.I,2 p. 508
2 Ibid.III,1 p. 68
3 Ibid.II,1 p. 46
4 Ibid.III,1 p. 206
5 Ibid.loc.cit.
6 Ibid.IV,1 p. 210
7 Ibid.VI pp. 137 ff.Sctn. 280
8 Ibid.VI,1 p. 438
spirit or freedom on the other, there was still a continuity or identity:

das System der Natur ist zugleich das System unseres Geists;\(^1\)
die Natur soll der sichtbare Geist, der Geist die unsichtbare Natur seyn......die absolute Identität des Geists in uns und der Natur ausser uns.\(^2\)

Throughout the universe, both as a whole and as a series of individual parts, the organic was for Schelling the dominating law, the organism being itself a reflection of identity:

ein unmittelbares Abbild der absoluten Substanz.\(^3\)

The universe was itself, as a totality, a great organism, the common Romantic conception:

die ganze Natur soll einem immer werdenden Produkt gleich seyn.\(^4\)

Within this greater organism a series of lesser organisms was contained, each of which was of course a necessary part of the whole.\(^5\)
The thought which seemed to underlie Herder's loose and confused use of the seed and its growth as a picture of developments of the most diverse types, the thought that within the one organism a smaller was always contained,\(^6\) this thought was taken up and systematically developed by Schelling:

jeder Organismus ist selbst wieder ein Ganzes von Systemen.\(^7\)

All development was from seeds ('Anlagen oder Keime') which, to take the specific example of man, were all contained in archetypal man, in man as such ('das Urindividuum'), but which under different conditions came to fruition differently in the various subsidiary units, the family, the nation, the individual.\(^8\) Each of these units was for Schelling

1 S.S.W.II,1 p.39
2 Ibid.p.56
3 Ibid.VI,1 p.377
4 Ibid.III,1 p.33
5 Ibid.II,1 p.373
6 See above pp.73;83
7 S.S.W.III,1 p.174
8 Ibid.pp.55-56
itself a seed-plot, the nation within the race, the family within the nation, the individual within the family, in a descending scale:

innerhalb jeder Sphäre (werden also) wieder andere Sphären sich bilden.....und so ins Unendliche.1

It will be seen that the world-view of Schelling was thus a development of that conception of the universe already suggested by Leibniz and Shaftesbury and worked out in some detail, if with no great clarity, by Herder himself.

The organic principle which obtained in nature as a whole extended also of course to all the individual parts, from the so-called inorganic world on the one hand to the world of spirit on the other. Schelling, the typical Romantic, rejected absolutely the conception of a dead or inorganic nature:

die unorganische Natur als solche existiert nicht.1

That which is commonly referred to as inorganic was for Schelling only so in appearance, being organic when conceived of as, and in relation to, the whole:

es gibt keine unorganische Natur an sich....die sogenannte unorganische Natur ist nur im Ganzen organisch.2

The organic principle was, as with Herder and Friedrich Schlegel, introduced at the other end of the scale into the historical and cultural world, in which it was for Schelling a leading principle of interpretation, sometimes, perhaps, more in a metaphorical sense, as when the Christian church was compared in its development to a seed:

die Absicht war nicht, diesen Keim den natürlichen und nothwendigen Gesetzen zu entziehen,3

but also in a more literal sense, as when Schelling explained genetically both speech and mythology:

1 S.S.W. IV,1 p.206
2 Ibid.VI,1 p.320
3 Ibid.IV,2 pp.294 f.
die Sprache ist organisch entstanden; \(^1\)
die Mythologie wäre nicht überhaupt nur ein natürliches, sondern ein organisches Erzeugnis... das aus ihr selbst wie ein Naturgegenstand erklärt werden muss. \(^2\)

In connection with this latter interpretation, Schelling was quoting a naturalistic view with which he did not wholly agree, but the substantial truth of which, as far as it went, he was willing to allow. For Schelling human history itself, the unfolding of the potentialities of the human mind, was organic. \(^3\) In estimating the relative importance of potentiality on the one hand, environment on the other, Schelling arrived at a conclusion not very different from that reached by Herder. The intellectual life, or reason, was compared by him to a plant, in which the determinative factor, the seed, existed from the first, but conditioning factors had also a necessary subsidiary part to play. \(^4\)

Quotations in illustration of these points could be multiplied without difficulty from Schelling's extensive writings, but already sufficient evidence had been collected, from Schelling and from others, to show that there is here no question merely of a few stray references, but rather of ideas which belonged to the very core of Romantic thought. Everything points to the fact that the principles of Herder's religious naturalism had penetrated deeply into the Romantic mind and had found place there as undisputed presuppositions in all Romantic thinking. On every hand in the writings of all the Romantics there may be seen that profound sense of continuity.

\(^1\) S.S.W.I,2 pp.51 f.
\(^2\) Ibid.loc.cit. and II,2 p.651
\(^3\) Ibid.I,2 p.235. Schelling saw two historical ages: the one 'absolut vorgeschichtlich'; the other geschichtlich. The former was inorganic, the latter, consisting of 3 eras: vorgeschichtlich,'vorhistorisch'and'historisch', organic.
\(^4\) Ibid.III,2 pp.62-63 'Der Samenkorn ist nicht unbedingt die Potenz der Pflanze, es müssen noch äussere Bedingungen hinzukommen, dass diese Potenz zum Actus wird...fruchtbarer Boden, Regen, Sonnenschein u.s.w.'
and that feeling for the organic both in nature and in history which Herder had by his conception of the universe and of life introduced and established.

One fact of supreme importance, however, must not at this point be overlooked. The Romantics saw continuity and genetic growth in nature: they saw a similar continuity and genetic growth in history: they were willing to assign to man, the historical being, a place at the top of the scale of creatures: they were anxious that the barriers between the physical and the psychical should be broken down. At the same time however the Romantics were obviously reluctant to see the historical merged entirely into the natural in their thinking, to look upon the spiritual achievements of man as no more than higher products of those same laws which operated in the vegetable and the animal world. The existence of a gulf between the rational creature man and the rest of creation - a gulf which Herder himself had perceived, but had also with his higher immanentist naturalism transcended - the existence of that gulf was always present to the Romantic consciousness. A higher unity was not denied, but man as a spiritual being was lifted above the ordinary natural level. In body he was still of the natural order ('irdisch'), but in soul and in mind, interrelationships of body and mind notwithstanding, he was above nature ('aussierirdisch'). History, which was the record of the development of the human mind and of its achievements, did no doubt follow a parallel course to that taken by nature, but it was no longer a part of nature. A distinction was drawn by the Romantics which Herder himself had never made, the distinction between the philosophy of nature and that of history.

1 N.S.III v.B.Sctn.310
For the Romantics, nature did not include history, but rather reflected in the concrete world of matter the spiritual world of history: being die reale Seite der Geschichte, der Spiegel der Geschichte;\textsuperscript{1} die Geschichte ist die höhere Potenz der Natur, die im Idealen ausdrückt was diese im Realen.\textsuperscript{2}

As has been seen the reason for this reluctance to plunge into a more thoroughgoing naturalism, however poetically or religiously conceived, was that side by side with the adoption of those principles which underlay the world-view of Goethe and of Herder there went also a revolt against those principles in favour of the transcendentalism and idealism of Fichte. Fichte himself of course spoke also of continuity and organic growth, but as processes in an ideal world. He used the phrases of naturalism, but he robbed them of any but metaphysical or verbal significance. Indeed Fichte himself was an avowed and consistent opponent of all philosophical naturalism, as is witnessed by his anger at the natural philosophy of Schelling with its tendencies in that direction.\textsuperscript{4}

For Fichte, the goal of human life and history was freedom,\textsuperscript{5} that freedom of the spirit of man which was to be attained in and through reason. Man was no creature of an external world of nature, but a free and autonomous moral agent ('frei und selbstständig'), conscious of himself, responsible for his own advancement, committed to the task of self-culture. The historical world was for Fichte the world of moral responsibility, the only true world:

meine Welt ist Objekt und Sphäre meiner Pflichten.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{1} S.S.W. pp. 306; 239 (V,1)
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid. VI, 1 p. 468
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. V, 1 p. 239
\textsuperscript{4} Fichte oS. W. VII pp. 111 ff. (Cf. too X. Léon: Fichte et son Temps II pp. 394 ff.)
\textsuperscript{5} Fichte S. W. VII p. 7
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid. II p. 135
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid. pp. 264 ff.
In this world reason and the will reigned, and instinct and natural impulse were no longer of decisive account. In the 'Grundzüge' an attempt was made to link up the transcendental world to the natural by the adoption of a Fall theory after the manner of Rousseau, the earlier Herder, Schiller and Kant. 1 Man existed at the first as a purely natural creature governed by instinct - it must be noticed that a physical descent ('Abstammung') from the animals (e.g. through the Orang-Outang) was denied 2 - but he had now fallen from the first estate of natural innocence and become a creature of reason and of moral freedom, whose activity was related to that of nature only by analogy. A fuller discussion of this thesis must be left for a later stage.

Goethe (in the 'Wilhelm Meister') and especially Schiller, for whom history was concerned with the 'moralische Welt', 3 held views which were at many points similar to those advanced by Fichte, and Hegel too developed in his own way the Fichtean philosophy. For Hegel, both the natural and the historical processes were included within the 'Idee', and thus Herder's naturalism was reversed and all life explained solely in terms of spirit. Within history itself Hegel regarded human freedom as both the driving-force and also the goal. The influence of nature was not discounted, but the true meaning of history was sought in a progression of man to rationality and freedom especially through the state. In a higher sense history was an awakening of reason to self-consciousness:

die Weltgeschichte ist die Darstellung, wie der Geist zu dem Bewusstseyn dessen kommt, was es an sich bedeutet. 4

1 Fichte S.W.VII pp.10 f.
2 Ibid. pp.133-134
3 Schiller S.W.,historische Schriften I p.4
4 Hegel S.W.IX p.21
Hegel's use of naturalistic terms has, especially in the later works, no real significance, since nature itself was for him only a manifestation of the 'Idee'.

Quite apart from its influence upon philosophical development, the idealism of Fichte has left clear traces of its working in the more general writings of the Romantics, as for example in Hölderlin and Schleiermacher. The poetry of Hölderlin is full of the tragic sense that the happy childhood of the race (and of the individual), when man lived and worked in harmony with nature, and in accordance with her laws, has come to an end:

Todt ist nun, die mich erzog und stillte,
Todt ist nun die jugendliche Welt. This is the broad theme of the 'Empedokles'.
Da der Jugend goldne Traume starben,
Starb fur mich die freundliche Natur. For man, now become an autonomous, rational being, no natural fulfillment was now possible. He could only strive endlessly after the ideal, a perfectness which could never be attained. Man was for Hölderlin, as for Herder and for the other Romantics, the crown of nature: Geboren, Mutter Erde, dein Schönstes Kind; but he was also a creature different from all others, a being apart:

Ihn scheuen
Die Thiere, denn ein anderer ist wie sie
Der Mensch. That which distinguished man from other creatures was his autonomy, which meant his power of self-determination and his power of defiance; and this power was precisely the source of everything tragic in the destiny of the race. Only when man learned, in a worship of the

1 Closs Gedichte p.41
2 Ibid.loc.cit.
3 Peacock op.cit.pp.47;105
4 Gedichte p.54
5 Ibid.loc.cit.
6 This is the broad theme of the 'Empedokles'
ideal (Diotima), so to combine freedom with nature that a true harmony is restored, will any achievement of perfection be possible:

die Kunst ist die Blüthe der Natur. Wenn jedes ganz ist, was es seyn kann...und eines verbindet sich mit dem andern, dann ist die Vollendung da.¹

Schleiermacher, in the 'Monologen', held out self-culture ('Selbstbildung') as the true aim and the goal of life. The world of spirit stood for him apart from and above the world of matter. Man was in origin a mere creature of nature('ein roher Sklave der Natur'²), but the dominion of nature had been shaken off and he stood forth as a free and conscious being, in whose life not blind instinct, not natural necessity, but conscious will was the determinative force. Even religion, which was for Schleiermacher something admittedly natural to man, was more than a mere process or product of nature. Religion did develop according to law, but its development was analogous to, not identical with, the organic development of the plant or animal. In a higher sense, in the sense in which nature itself was identified with the whole universe, religion, and with it all other spiritual activity, could be said to be intimately bound up with nature:

die Religion lebt ihr ganzes Leben in der Natur, aber in der unendlichen Natur des Ganzen, des Einen und Allen.³

The struggle between a sheer relativism and the demand for an absolute, which everywhere appears in the works of Schleiermacher,⁴ is indicative of the tension between naturalism and idealism in his general philosophical and historical outlook.

1 Quoted by Peacock (op.cit.p.39) from Werke (Wellingrath)III
2 Monologen p.60  See this whole passage / p.321
3 Reden p.37
4 This conflict is excellently discussed in its relation to Schleiermacher's philosophy of history by H.Süskind: Christentum und Geschichte bei Schleiermacher
The gulf which separates Herder from the Romantics at this crucial point must not be overemphasised, since Herder also, it will be remembered, ascribed to man freedom and self-determination, but it must be recognised that the gulf does exist. Herder did differentiate between the beasts on the one hand, creatures of instinct without spiritual capacities, and man on the other, endowed with reason and moral freedom, but Herder also looked upon reason and freedom as themselves natural products and growths, thus enclosing the spirit and history within the wider panentheistic naturalism. The Romantics, building upon the transcendental idealism of Schiller and more especially Fichte, stressed with Herder, but to a far greater extent, the difference between man the rational being and other creatures, but they refused to allow the spiritual to be absorbed into the natural, and, whilst retaining the analogy of growth, and even a higher continuity, they set the world of spirit and history over against the world of nature. Kinship and similarity were admitted, but it was denied that history belonged to nature, or nature to history. It will be of interest later to notice how great an appeal the Rationalistic view of progress as an ordered progress of the spirit to perfection exercised for the Romantics when freshly presented by Condorcet: the very antithesis of Herder's view of progress as organic natural growth.

The conflict between naturalism and idealism is nowhere more clearly or fully evident than in the writings of Friedrich Schlegel and Schelling, and it may be seen at its most acute in Friedrich Schlegel. In his earlier critical works Schlegel adopted without reserve the method of literary interpretation advocated and practised by Herder. He conceived of the classical culture which he studied as a natural growth of the soil, classifiable like any other natural
growth and observable in its periods of blossoming, fruit and decay, as well as to the modifying influences of environment. Thus he referred to the 'natürliche Klassen der griechischen Poesie' and explained local variations in accordance with the varying national characteristics and the geographical and social conditions, as, for example, Doric art:

ganz verschieden von dem Jonischen Geiste war der Dorische.... die Eigentümlichkeiten (der dorischen Poesie) entspringen so ganz aus dem Dorischen Nationalcharacter und der Dorischen Nationalcultur.

Even at this point however it is to be noticed that Schlegel was not without certain misgivings. To treat culture solely as a natural growth would be, logically, to deny all free creativity to man, to substitute for progress the natural rhythm of blossom and decline, and to make impossible any aesthetic judgment i.e. to make art purely relative. It was on these grounds that Schlegel hesitated to commit himself wholly to Herder's teaching, which he found opportunity to criticise directly in his review of the 'Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität: die Methode, jede Blume der Kunst, ohne Würdigung, nur nach Ort, Zeit und Art zu betrachten, würde am Ende auf kein anderes Resultat führen, als dass alles sein müsste, was es ist und war.'

The doubts of Schlegel found expression in the fine essays 'Vom Wert des Studiums der Griechen und Römer' and 'Ueber das Studium der Griechischen Poesie', in both of which he developed his ideas upon the relationship of history and culture to nature in great detail. Systems which would explain history causally, teleologically or naturalistically were set aside. History was for Schlegel the sphere in which nature and freedom were seen, not excluding, but counteracting and in conflict with each other:

1 M.Ipp.1f.
2 Ibid.loc.cit.
3 Ibid.p.116
die Geschichte ist das Wechselwirken der Natur und der Freiheit. All human endeavour, as, for example, poetry, was influenced, but not bound by natural conditions:

die Poesie ist eine universelle Kunst; denn schon ihr Organ, die Phantasie, ist näher mit der Freiheit verwandt.

Man could not escape natural laws entirely, but he could rise above those laws. The fact of human freedom, which Schlegel accepted, meant that man had within himself the power of eternal progression:

eine unendliche Fortschreitung.

The spirit in its working i.e. history was thus rescued from that fatal cycle of recurrence in which natural organisms were condemned to revolve, and its movement was one of progress:

die Kraft des Menschen wächst mit verdoppelter Progression.

With some severe criticisms Schlegel was prepared at this point to accept Condorcet's thesis of perfectibility ('unendliche Vervollkommnung').

How then could this transcendentalist view of history be squared with the naturalistic, which Schlegel himself was still unwilling or unable to deny or to renounce? This was the problem, that central problem of the Romantic philosophy of history, with which these essays of Schlegel were principally concerned. The solution proposed by Schlegel was the drastic one of a sharp and quite artificial separation of the ancient classical from the modern romantic world. Schlegel regarded classical art as something complete in itself:

die gleichartige Masse der griechischen Poesie ist ein selbstständiges, in sich vollendetes, vollkommenes Ganzes.

1 W.A. p.256
2 M.I p.113
3 W.A. loc. cit.
4 M.I p.116
5 M.II pp.50 ff. (the review of the 'Esquisse')
6 M.I p.144
Belonging as it did to an age in which nature and not freedom was the preponderant force, it fulfilled at every point the course of a natural organism, developed, achieved its maximum, and declined: wie der natürliche Keim durch stete Evolutionen des Bildungstriebes seinen Kreislauf vollendet, so auch jede Dichtart, jedes Zeitalter, jede Schule der Poesie.1

Antiquity was the period of a natural human development, and with reference to it one could rightly speak of 'die Naturgeschichte der Dichtkunst'.2 It was a period which in poetry reached its peak in the poetry of the Greeks:

ein Maximum und Kanon der natürlichen Poesie.3

The historical movement in this period was that of a natural cycle ('ein Kreislauf').4 A limited perfection was possible, and was indeed certain to be attained, but once this level had been reached, in the art of Greece at its height, then according to natural law no further development was possible, and decay was inevitable.

With the end of the Graeco-Roman world and the coming of Christianity this natural period in history came to an end, and the modern period of freedom began. The dominion of nature over the human spirit in its working had now been broken, and the spirit had shaken off its bondage to natural laws (not unchallenged by it in the former age) and asserted its freedom and autonomy:

der Mensch bestimmt, lenkt und ordnet nun seine Kräfte selbst.5

If ancient art had developed according to natural law, this was no longer true of art in the modern world:

die bewegenden Kräfte sind nicht etwa bloss organische Naturgesetze.6

1 M.I p.145
2 Ibid.p.125
3 Ibid.p.145
4 W.A.p.256
5 M.I p.131
6 Philosophie der Geschichte II p.181
The culture of the modern age was free, self-conscious and subjective. As compared with the art of the Ancients it could not but appear to be hesitant, capricious and incomplete, since it lacked the element of inevitability, of certainty, of perfection, possessed by the natural organism:

die ganze Masse der modernen Poesie ist ein unvollendeter Anfang

Being free, however, it did have this one great advantage, that it was capable of an infinite development and improvement. The cycle, the natural rhythmic movement, the 'Kreislauf' of the ancient world had been interrupted. Progress had replaced recurrence, and became the movement characteristic of the modern age.

Thus Schlegel, unwilling to overturn the naturalistic principle and yet anxious to avoid the implied denial of freedom, of progress and of aesthetic judgment, attempted a solution by the division of history into two great periods, the period of nature, to be interpreted and understood naturalistically, that of freedom, idealistically. The relevance of this solution to the general historical thought both of Schlegel himself and of the whole Romantic movement is obvious: here the foundations of a philosophy of history had already been laid. The division of history into the two eras, the one of naturalistic development, the other of free progress, meant that a framework into which all historical phenomena might be fitted and a principle by which they might be interpreted had already been found.

The conflict between the natural and the historical interpretation, between naturalism and idealism, is seen at its most apparent and acute in Friedrich Schlegel, whose temperament was so close...

1 Schiller's differentiation 'naive-sentimental' (in 'Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung' S.W. Philosophische Schriften II) will be recalled, although whether there was an influence upon Schlegel is not certain.

2 M.I p.144
ly akin to that of Herder and who felt in consequence a desire to shake free from the latter's influence - but it is the same problem with which Schelling is concerned, and he dealt with it at equal length and on the whole with greater lucidity and acumen. Schelling, like all the Romantics, stood for a while in his earlier years under the influence of Fichtean idealism: his first writings upon transcendental philosophy bear witness to this trend. Schelling was not a whole-hearted Fichtean - indeed Fuchs points out that he developed a criticism of Kant and Fichte which was not very different from that of Herder in his ill-fated 'Metakritik'. Nevertheless the impression made by Fichte was undoubtedly strong. Like Schleiermacher, Schelling was attracted by the ethical idealism, and learned with Fichte to see in the free ego, the autonomous individual will, the secret and goal of human destiny. The organic nature of all phenomena, whether human or natural, was acknowledged, but at the same time man was seen to be called to a free development. The great law and principle of self-conscious being was absolute freedom:

strebe, ein Wesen an sich zu werden, absolut frey zu seyn. Man was for Schelling no slave of nature, but its lord ('Herr der Natur'). Not only did he alone of all creatures walk upright, but he bore upon his face the imprint of freedom ('den Charakter der Freiheit'): daher der Mensch das einzige Wesen, das Physiognomie hat.

The goal of history was absolute freedom, in which also absolute happiness was seen to lie:

Selbstbewusstseyn ist das Ziel aller Handlungen des Geists.

The self-consciousness of which Schelling spoke was realised in the

1 Fuchs op.cit.p.256
2 S.S.W.I,1 pp.247-248
3 Ibid.p.248
4 Ibid.VI,1 p.483
5 Ibid.I,1 pp.388-389
6 Ibid.p.382
7 Ibid.p.382
act of willing ('das Wollen').

Schelling differentiated sharply in his earlier works between the world of matter and the world of spirit, the world of nature and the world of history. The spirit of man was not a part, but rather the counterpart of nature, having like nature its own constructive power:

der Geist ist eine sich selbst organisirende Natur.

A dualism of matter and spirit was thus reintroduced by Schelling, and the world of matter, nature, was set over against the world of spirit, history. The concept 'natural history', whether applied to nature or to history, was rejected by Schelling, since for him it was meaningless unless either an evolutionary process was postulated of nature or was used solely to describe the progressive discovery by man of the various natural organisms. Nature as such, Schelling asserted, could have no history, for three reasons: first, it has no goal:

die Geschichte ist nur überhaupt da, wo ein Ideal stattfindet;
second, it is governed by causal necessity and is thus not free:

wo Mechanismus ist, ist keine Geschichte..., in der Natur gibt
ist ein Schein der Freiheit, aber auch nur ein Schein;
third, it is not progressive:

was nicht progressiv ist, ist kein Objekt der Geschichte.

In connection with this latter point it must be remembered that although Schelling traced out in nature an ascending scale, this scale was of a logical and ideal rather than an actual character. In and through nature as such no progressive movement was to be seen

1 S.S.W.I, I p.395
2 Ibid.pp.463 ff.etc.
3 Ibid.p.386
4 Ibid.p.468
5 Ibid.p.467
6 Ibid.p.469
7 Ibid.pp.470-471
8 Ibid.p.470
The species were fixed and unalterable,¹ and repetition, not progress, was the law of nature. Nature and history were for Schelling contradictory terms. If history belonged to nature, then it was no longer history, whilst nature itself could not be thought of in terms of history.

It is worthy of note that in spite of his use of the terminology of organic naturalism to describe cultural processes Schelling never adopted explanations of these processes which were purely empiricist or naturalistic. The work upon mythology supplies decisive evidence here. Schelling did treat mythology as a developing organism, but he rejected interpretations of it as merely a natural growth, for example, from a primitive fetichism.² Mythology had for Schelling a transcendental significance. It grew organically, but in its growth it corresponded to the a priori theogonic process.³ The same law, or principle, was seen to operate both in nature and in history, but history was not part of nature, nor nature of history. The two processes were parallel, complementary, even, in a sense, identical, but not one. The reason for the apparent oneness was that behind both nature and history, and expressed equally in them, there stood the absolute which was absolute identity, in which both truly were one.⁴ For all his dualism Schelling thus never abandoned a fundamental monism. Nature and history stood over against each other, but only as two different aspects of the same thing: the absolute identity:

die Natur und die Geschichte sind die reale und die ideale Einheit, die Geschichte ist insofern die höhere Potenz der Natur, als sie im Idealen ausdrückt, was diese im Realen;⁵

das reale und ideale All fliessen zur absolut Identität zusammen in der Vernunft;¹ 
Reales und Ideales ist unmittelbar eins und dasselbe Ding.²

Schelling himself was obviously not entirely satisfied with this rigid differentiation, since, like the other Romantics, he admitted that in many products of the mind there was also an element of natural necessity. The lesson taught by Herder, that all human achievements are the natural flowerings of inward capacities under favourable conditions of growth, that lesson had been too well learned for naturalism wholly to be abandoned in favour of a Fichte-an idealism, even if that idealism did see natural processes reproduced in a higher way in the world of freedom. Natural necessity, if it did not govern, did at least enter into the historical world, since man himself also belonged to the world of nature as a physical being. Thus Schelling saw in history both freedom and also law:

nur die Freiheit und die Gesetzmässigkeit in Vereinigung consti-
tuirt das Eigenthümliche der Geschichte.³

History was indeed the record of the progressive emancipation of the human spirit from natural law. In the ancient world - Schelling fell back here upon the hypothesis of Schlegel - free will had exerted but little influence and natural law had been the dominant principle of growth: in the modern world the reverse was the case. Christ divided the two worlds as the crown of the old and the beginning of the new. For Schelling too than history had its natural period:

die alte Welt ist die Naturseite der Geschichte.⁴

The life-process of the culture of antiquity was that of a natural organism: indeed the aim of that culture was the expression of the Infinite in the finite, in nature,⁵ a process which culminated of

¹ S.S.W.VI;1 p.207
² Ibid.p.498
³ Ibid.III;1 p.590
⁴ Ibid.V,1 p.292
⁵ Ibid.pp.430 ff.
course in the coming of the Infinite into the finite with the incarnation. The cultures of the past were to be regarded then as natural products, complete in themselves and fashioned according to law. Ancient art was in one word realistic, its form that of a mythology, its subject-matter nature.\(^1\) It reached its height in Greece:

> die realistische Mythologie hat ihre Blüthe in der griechischen erreich.\(^2\)

As opposed to the classical the modern age was the age of freedom, since with the incarnation the realistic movement came to an end, and with the death and resurrection of Christ a new ideal principle was introduced,\(^3\) and the controlling power of natural necessity was cast off. Schelling saw a comparison between this movement in history and the movement from the so-called inorganic to the organic in nature.\(^4\) If there was a difference between the two ages it was this: that in the former the organising power was without, in the latter within. The art of the modern age was seen to reflect this change, since it took its subject-matter, not from nature, but from history (the free actions of the will),\(^5\) and it found in the universe, not a world of natural necessity, but a moral world of freedom:

> in der griechischen Mythologie wird das Universum angeschaut als Natur, in der Mythologie des Christenthums als moralische Welt.\(^6\)

There can be no doubt whatever but that in the philosophy of history of Romanticism as a whole this problem as to the relationship of natural necessity to the transcendental freedom of the spirit was the crucial problem. The Romantics clearly wished to, and in a large measure did retain those main principles asserted in the naturalistic world-view of Goethe and Herder. They saw a continuity both

\(^1\) S.S.W.V,1 p.427  
\(^2\) Ibid.p.424  
\(^3\) Ibid.p.430 (Cf.V,1 p.292)  
\(^4\) Ibid.I,2 p.234  
\(^5\) Ibid.V,1 p.427  
\(^6\) Ibid.p.430
in nature and in history and also between nature and history. They saw organic processes at work both in the phenomena of nature and also in the movements of history. They hesitated, however, to proceed to that complete fusion of the natural and the historical made by Herder because, taught by Fichte, they wished also to maintain the autonomy of the human spirit, not within, but over against the natural order.

If the evolutionary naturalism had to be abandoned because it did not leave room for a strong enough emphasis upon the autonomy of the spirit of man and its free creativity, the most satisfying alternative was undoubtedly that put forward by Schelling in the philosophy of identity. Schelling saw the historical process as the counterpart in the world of spirit to the natural in that of matter. The difficulty was, however, that history could not be regarded merely as a record of spiritual activity, since man belonged himself also to the material world. A tension between freedom and nature, between the physical and the spiritual in man, was thus seen to be the proper subject-matter of history. A division was made between the age in which nature still predominated, to give a limited perfection, and the age in which freedom was in the ascendant, to give incomplete beginnings capable of an infinite development and expansion. Already, however, by admitting that man belongs to both spheres, and by dividing history, Schelling had allowed his original postulate of identity to be lost in the Schlegelian view, that both processes, that of nature and that of spirit, are at work and successively predominant in history. It was around this view rather than the philosophy of identity that the philosophy of history of Romanticism, and with it the Romantic aesthetic, was in fact constructed.

1 The resemblance of the philosophy of identity (in substance) to the Pre-established Harmony of Leibniz is striking and was in fact noted by Schelling himself (S.S.W.VI, pp. 500-501. Cf. "Zwischen Realem und Idealem ist kein Causalzusammenhang' loc. cit.")
1. THE HISTORICAL PROCESS It has already been seen that the Romantic view of history rested primarily upon a dialectical conception of the relationship of history to nature, this conception itself being based upon an attempt to fuse the naturalistic and the idealistic understanding of the universe. The first important consequence of the refusal of Romanticism to commit itself wholly either to naturalism or to idealism was that it was forced inevitably to abandon a view of historical movement which would regard it as steady and consistent progress in favour of one in which it appeared as a dialectical process. On the one hand the evolutionary movement postulated by Herder was rejected, not only because it did not sufficiently allow for the free and autonomous action of man, but also because the Romantics, observing nature, perceived that its movement was not progressive, but rather cyclic, that even if the whole universe were compared to an organism, developing through the various stages to some culminating point, then the decay of the universe must follow inevitably upon its growth. On the other hand the Romantics were too keenly aware of the organic nature of cultural development and the influence of external circumstances to fall into the opposite extreme of a pure rationalism or idealism, and they also denied that man as a self-governing, free agent progressed in a straight line, unfettered by natural law. The concept of a cumulative moral, intellectual and spiritual progress did have a great appeal for the Romantics, but as they surveyed history they knew that the facts alone did not warrant so facile a creed.¹

¹ Fr. Schlegel M. II pp. 50 ff. Schlegel complains of 'Schwierigkeiten gelläugnet, oder bei Seite geschoben'
-ination of both views in the postulate of a dialectical relationship, history being conceived of as a process in which both nature and freedom were at work as opposing forces, with now the one, now the other in control. The Romantic conception of history derives in a direct line of descent, through Kant and Schiller, from that of Rousseau. Man was in origin a creature of nature, governed by instinct, subject to natural law, non-historical because non-progressive, distinguished from the beasts only by the fact that there were within him the potentialities of spiritual life. History, in the true sense, began with the Fall: a movement from the state of nature to that of freedom, the awakening to self-conscious life by a free act, an act of will. History was then the story of the conflict between a growing freedom on the one hand, the restraint of natural law on the other. In this conflict two main periods were to be distinguished: the first, the classical era, when a balance was achieved, with natural law still in the ascendant; the second, the modern or Christian era, when the supremacy of free and self-conscious will was finally established. The general trend of history was towards a restoration of harmony, the achievement of a perfect synthesis, with man, as a free and responsible agent, voluntarily fulfilling the natural laws. It will be seen that for the Romantics the historical process was, broadly speaking, triadic: a process of thesis (= nature); antithesis (= freedom); synthesis (= nature plus freedom). In such a process there was scope both for the observed organic growth (i.e. of ancient cultures, in the era when nature was still predominant), and also for the known autonomy of the spirit (i.e. in the modern era of triumphant freedom).

1 Schiller: Etwas über die erste Menschengesellschaft (S.W. Historische Schriften I pp. 24 ff.)
A typical outworking of this thesis was that of Fichte in his 'Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters', in which, notwithstanding the open hostility towards the philosophy of nature, and the mystical pantheism of the Romantics, the philosophy of history propounded was essentially that of Romanticism itself. History, Fichte maintained, was to be divided (on purely a priori grounds) into two main eras ('Hauptepeochen'): the one of bondage, the other of freedom. In the movement from the one era to the other five epochs ('Grundepochen') could be discerned:

1. that of instinct or innocence, a state of pure nature;
2. that of authority, with the growth of self-will, a state of sin;
3. that of complete emancipation from nature and scepticism, a state of absolute sinfulness ('vollendete Sündhaftigkeit');
4. that of the rise and growth of rational knowledge, a state of freedom;
5. that of a rational culture, a state of pure freedom, in which nature and freedom would be reconciled.

In his application of this admittedly a priori scheme to such history as could be fitted into it (other events were for Fichte non-historic) Fichte followed the general lines laid down by Rousseau and by the 'Auch eine Philosophie' of Herder. The ancient world comprised the second epoch (the first was of course pre-history) and Rome was the culminating point in this epoch. The third epoch began with the overthrow of classicism and the coming of Christianity, and was reaching its peak in the age of Fichte himself, an age of decadence.

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1 In this case the influence was rather of the Romantics upon Fichte than vice versa - the 'Grundzüge' were late 1804-1805
2 Fichte S.W.VII pp.3-9
3 Ibid. pp.10-12
4 Ibid.p.5
5 Ibid.p.133
6 Ibidp.135 Christianity was not censured by Fichte, but regarded as the true religion 'die einzige wahre Religion'
7 Ibid.pp.13ff.
and scepticism, an age of freedom run amok, but an age necessary as a period of transition to that final golden age of rational knowledge and culture which was already beginning to dawn (presumably in the idealistic philosophy). The violent polemic of Fichte against the modern age was aimed chiefly against the Romantics, but the identification of the age of decline with the modern age is in line with the view of the Romantics themselves, as well as with that of Rousseau, and of Herder in the 'Auch eine Philosophie'. The high importance attached by Fichte to the state as a means to the attainment of pure and rational culture\(^2\) betrays the influence of the Kantian development of Rousseau's thesis.

Although it was he who gave prominence to the triad postulated in the majority of the Romantic writings, Hegel himself did not subscribe to the general Romantic view of the historical process, but fused the ideas of Herder with those of Rationalism and Idealism, and conceived of progress, or of historical movement, as a more or less orderly and steady progression by stages:

\[
\text{ein Stufengang der Entwicklung des Prinzips, dessen Gehalt das Bewusstseyn der Freiheit ist.}^3
\]

Hegel saw operative in history an impulse towards perfection\(^4\) and the successive world-cultures were for him a series of manifestations of the spirit in an ascending scale.\(^5\) The well-known schema of Herder: childhood, youth, manhood, was revived by Hegel,\(^6\) and the thought of the spirit moving from east to west was prominent:

\[
\text{die Sonne, das Licht geht im Morgenlande auf;}^7 \\
\text{die Weltgeschichte geht von Osten nach Westen.}^8
\]

1 Fichte S.W.VII pp.111 ff. 2 Ibid.pp.100 ff. 3 Hegel S.W.IX p.54 4 Ibid.p.51 5 Ibid.p.63 (See W.J.Stace: The Philosophy of Hegel Paragraph) 6 Ibid.pp.103 ff. 7 Ibid.p.101 8 Ibid.p.102
The Christian, or Germanic age was for Hegel the last and final manifestation of the spirit, an age of self-consciousness and of rationality. It will be seen that the historical ideas of Hegel touch at some points upon those common to the Romantic school, and are based upon parallel concepts in Herder, but the historical thinking of Hegel was outside the main Romantic stream.

The historical attitude which underlay Hölderlin's general outlook upon life was far more closely akin to that of the Romantics proper, although here a profound influence exercised by Herder's late 'Tithon und Aurora' must be taken into account. In substance the thought of Hölderlin was triadic: a sequence of Day, Night, Day ('Harmonie, Zarissenheit, Freiheit'). The age of classical Greece was that of the day, an age of youth and sunshine, when man still lived and developed harmoniously as the child of nature. The collapse of the ancient world, equated with the coming of Christianity, meant the shattering of this golden age of harmony, Christ himself being for Hölderlin the last of the ancient gods, the culminating figure of the old world and the herald of the new:

Als der Vater gewandt sein Angesicht von den Menschen,
Und das Trauern mit Recht über die Erde begann,
Als erschienen zuletzt ein stiller Genius, himmlisch Tröstend, welcher des Tags Ende verkündet und schwand....
Aber indessen kommt als Fakelschwinger des Höchsten Sohn, der Syrier, unter die Schatten herab.

The modern age (as with Fichte) was seen as one of frustration and gloom, when there was neither culture nor true genius on the earth:

Es wandelt in Nacht...unser Geschlecht;
Die schöneren Zeiten ist untergegangen;

1 Montgomery (M): Studies in the Age of Goethe V
2 W. Böhm: Hölderlin I p. 44
3 Gedichte (Close) pp. 33 ff.
4 Peacock op. cit. p. 102
5 Gedichte p. 103
6 Ibid. p. 104
7 Ibid. p. 92
8 Ibid. p. 49
Aber Freund! wir kommen zu spät....
Nur zu Zeiten erträgt göttliche Fülle der Mensch... 

Although Hölderlin faced to the full the blackness of the present (as compared with the glorious past) he was no complete pessimist. If the rhythm of nature demanded that night should follow day, that the harmony achieved should be transitory, then it also demanded that the day should return and that harmony should be restored. In the spirit of Herder's 'Tithon und Aurora' Hölderlin could look forward to a new golden age, when man, the creature of reason and freedom, would again be at peace with nature, and capable now of a new perfection: Sanfter träumet und schläfft in Armen der Erde der Titan.

The hopes of Hölderlin when he looked forward to a new post-Christian culture centred upon Germany, the land and the people in whom the spirit, moving across the earth from east to west (as with Hegel), was to find a new manifestation. In two fine pictures Hölderlin fused into his general triadic scheme the thought of a progressive, periodic cultural growth:

Doch wie der Frühling wandelt der Genius
Von Land zu Land;
Der Adler, der vom Indus kommt
Und über den Parnassos
Beschneite Gipfel fliegt, hoch über den Opferhügeln
Italies, und frohe Beute sucht
Dem Vater, nicht wie sonst, geübter im Fluge
Der Alte, jauchzend überschwingt er
Zuletzt die Alpen, und sieht die vielgearteten Länder.

The present was indeed a period of darkness ('Entflohene Göter... der Tag erloschen'), but the future age was to be one of reawakened day, with the possibilities all the greater now that man as a free agent

1 Gedichte p.102
2 Ibid.loc.cit.
3 Ibid.p.103
4 Ibid.p.104
5 Ibid.p.127
6 Ibid.loc.cit.
would be reconciled with nature. Although the triadic scheme was always present at the foundation, there are indications that Hölderlin thought approximated more closely than that of the main Romantic writers to that of Herder in the 'Auch eine Philosophie', not only in the general conception of the triad, but more particularly in the insistence that all culture, whether natural or free, must be in conformity with natural law, and in the idea of a succession of cultural growths linked by a common tradition, an idea which came out strongly in the poem 'Am Quell der Donau':

So kam / Das Wort aus Osten zu uns.  

Hölderlin's final historical conception seems to have been one of progression through periodicity within the framework of a general triadic scheme: the conception of the earlier Herder himself.

The historical philosophy of the Romantics more properly so-called revolved in every case around the same triadic concept, although of course each individual writer developed the theme independently and in some new direction. The poems of Novalis, more especially the "Hymnen an die Nacht", were full of the contrast between the light of the innocent past, when man lived in communion with nature, and the darkness which descended upon the world at the Fall, when man became a rational creature:

Der lustige Garten / Des jungen Geschlechts / Verwelkte,
Und hinaus / In den freyeren Raum / Strebten die erwachsenen Unkindlichen Menschen...Verschwunden waren die Götter....

The hatred of that analysis and abstraction which was the fruit of the rational mind, a hatred which had already found expression in Rouss-

1 Peacock op.cit.pp.47 ff. Peacock sees a major difference of opinion between Hölderlin and Fr. Schlegel at this point
2 Gedichte pp.143 ff. The whole poem develops the theme / p.49
3 N.S.I p.32
-eau and in the Bückeburg Herder, reappeared in Novalis:

In Begriffe...zerfiel die unermessliche Blüthe
Des tausendfachen Lebens.¹

Novalis, it will be noticed, did not date the period of
darkness from the collapse of the ancient world and the coming of
Christianity, as had done Hölderlin and before him Herder,² but from
the Fall itself, the thesis of Rousseau. The years from the Fall
to the coming of Christ were years of an iron bondage:

Ueber der Menschen / Weitverbreitete Stämme / Herrschte vor Zeit
Ein eisernes Schicksal / Mit stummer Gewalt.²

According to Novalis' conception a new era of light began with the
coming, or rather with the resurrection of Christ:

Des Morgenlandes / Ahndende, blüthenreiche/Weisheit
Erkannte zuerst / Der neuen Zeit Beginn.³

The world was still in darkness ('in dunkle Nacht gehüllt'⁴) but
dawn was already upon the hills, since Christ had risen victorious,
to give new life:

Er stieg...Begrub mit eigner Hand
Die alte, mit ihm gestorbene Welt
In die verlassene Höhle.⁵

A similar conception of history underlay the 'Lehrlinge zu Sais', ex-
cept that here, strangely enough, the period before the Flood seem-
ed for Novalis to be the golden age:

erst in jener grossen Begebenheit, welche heilige Sagen die
Sündflut nennen, ging diese blühende Welt unter.⁶

A rather different orientation was given to the same basic

¹ N.S.I p.32
² There are traces of the other view in the Fragments e.g.
'die Kinder sind Antiken' (N.S.III v.B.Sctn.31) Cf. Hölder-
lin's comparison of antiquity and childhood: 'Todt ist nun
die jugendliche Welt' (Gedichte p.41)
³ Ibid.p.36 A reference to the
⁴ Ibid.p.54
⁵ Ibid.p.44 /wise men.
⁶ Ibid.IV p.37
thought in the essay 'Die Christenheit, oder Europa', and also in the songs from 'Heinrich von Ofterdingen'. In both of these the triadic process was introduced into the Christian era itself. The simple Catholicism of the Middle Ages (much romanticised) was the thesis: Protestantism, the self-assertion of human reason, the anti-thesis: the purified, mystical Catholicism of Novalis' dreams the final synthesis (to be realised in the new age of light still to come). Novalis sighed for the idealised past:

"es waren schöne, glänzende Zeiten, wo Europa ein christliches Land war;" 

he deplored the present: "verschwunden ist die Christenheit;"
he looked forward to the new great age of the future ('die neue goldene Zeit'), of which Böhme and Zinzendorf were already the heralds.

Scattered throughout the Fragments of Novalis there are many sentences which show how deeply the triadic principle (nature: freedom, synthesis) had entered into his thought as the one central principle of historical interpretation. In the 'Europa' itself he had hinted at an application of this principle to the particular movements as well as to the general movement of history as a whole: there was a periodicity in history and in all historical events:

"ist diesen eine Oszillation, ein Wechsel entgegengesetzter Bewegungen nicht wesentlich?"

Novalis was clearly feeling after that thought of progressive movement through successive growths which had dominated the thought of Herder and of Hölderlin. In the Fragments Novalis made further applications of the triadic principle, as, for example, to the world of

1 N.S. II p.22
2 Ibid. I p.97
3 Ibid. II pp.29 f.;39 ff.
4 Ibid. p.26
5 Cf. Ibid. loc. cit. 'Fortschreitende, immer mehr sich vergrößernde Evolutionen sind der Stoff der Geschichte' This thought was not developed.
art, in which he saw three successive periods of artistic genius (corresponding to the three historical periods), 'die thetische, die antithetische, die synthetische', the first the period of the natural man, the second of the theoretical, the third of the practical.\footnote{1} For Novalis the state of man in Paradise, which was a state of nature, was one in which genius worked by and through instinct: \textquoteleft Instinkt ist das Genie im Paradies, vor der Periode der Selbstabsonderung (Selbsterkenntnis).\footnote{2}

This state of nature was also one of perfection, but necessarily one too of limitation. The modern age was in contradistinction an age of imperfection but of progress, and Novalis held out an infinite perfectibility as the hope and the goal of history.\footnote{3} Like the other Romantics Novalis thus effected a fusion of the Rousseauistic with the rationalistic, or idealistic thesis.

Schleiermacher did not concern himself with any specific historico-philosophical problems - his remarks upon history were only of the most general kind - but it is clear enough that he too subscribed to the general historical construction. Schleiermacher saw in men a creature of instinct who, having from the first the potentiality of freedom within him, had awakened to autonomy and self-determination, and whose progressive development to self-culture, through confusion and conflict (both with nature and with himself), formed the subject-matter of history.\footnote{4} The goal of the historical process was full self-consciousness: history was
\begin{quote}
ein Sichsuchen der Vernunft; ein Zusichselftkommen.\footnote{5}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1}{N.S.II Sctn.67}
\footnote{2}{Ibid.Sctn.68}
\footnote{3}{Ibid.III S.H.Sctn.797 'Perfectibilität' was that which distinguished man from all other \textquoteleft Naturwesen'.}
\footnote{4}{Monologen pp.60 ff.}
\footnote{5}{G.Wehrung: Der geschichtsphilosophische Standpunkt Schleiermachers zur Zeit seiner Freundschaft mit den Romantikern p.129}
\end{footnotes}
As in Hölderlin, so too in Schleiermacher, especially in the Schleiermacher of the 'Reden', there are indications of leanings towards a more naturalistic conception, the regarding of progress as a natural process of growth through successive stages.\(^1\) Always, however, the final aim was intellectual, moral, self-conscious life. The more general thesis of a movement from barbarism to a true culture was accepted in the 'Monologen'.\(^2\) The modern age was of course an age of degeneracy, 'die Freundschaft herabgewürdigt, die Ehe entheiligt, der Staat missachtet',\(^3\) but already there could be discerned the signs of that better world of the future ('Funken des verborgenen Feuers').\(^4\) The aspiration in the 'Reden' sums up the whole philosophy of history of Romanticism in a single sentence:

> o goldenes Zeitalter der Religion! wann werden die Umwälzungen der menschlichen Dinge dich künstlich herbeiführen, nachdem du auf dem einfachen Wege der Natur verfehlt worden bist.\(^5\)

The contrast between a natural and a free culture, and the triadic movement: perfection, fall, new perfection on a basis of freedom; these were plainly the fundamental thoughts. The characteristic feature of human history was the free, if pantheistically rather than rationalistically conceived progress of man himself:

> das ins Unendliche fortgehendes Werk des Weltgeistes,\(^6\)

this progress being regarded as an expression of the Infinite through the free and self-conscious mind of man.\(^7\) Schleiermacher looked forward to the time when this progress would be smooth and uniform ('gleichförmig und ruhig'\(^8\)), and the ultimate goal was the fusion of the natural and the free, already foreshadowed in the new morality

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2 Monologen p.60
3 Ibid.p.61
4 Ibid.p.177
5 Reden p.225
6 Ibid.pp.48 ff.
7 Reden p.152
8 Monologen pp.30 f.
of the 'Lucindebriefe'. Schleiermacher was attracted, as were Novalis and Hölderlin, to the idea of an upward movement through alternating life and death, palingenesis, but even this naturalistic conception was in the 'Monologen' given an idealistic orientation, death here being seen as the means to a complete liberation of the spirit from natural laws.

The general position of Friedrich Schlegel has already been discussed in some detail and requires little further elaboration. It remains only at this point to draw together his thoughts upon history into a more consistent scheme. Schlegel was unwilling to accept either Herder's view of progress on the one hand, a natural movement of the spirit with tradition as the interconnecting factor, or that of Condorcet on the other, an over-naive belief in the conscious and directing power of the mind or reason. The final view of Schlegel was that there were two great historical periods, the classical and the modern, and that the dividing point was the coming of Christianity, with the contemporaneous collapse of Rome and the invasions from the North ('Ueberschwemmungen'). The classical age was that in which nature still predominated, when culture was natural in its growth, when perfection was achieved, but only within the limitations imposed by natural law. The modern age was an age in which the free spirit of man had gained the ascendancy, and thus one of imperfection and even perhaps of corruption, but at the same time an age in which there were possibilities of a limitless progress.

1 Wehrung op. cit. p. 119
2 Reden pp. 223-224
3 Monologen p. 32
4 W. A. p. 255 n. 1 /Philosophie
5 M. II pp. 50 ff.
6 W. A. p. 261 (Cf. the 'Auch eine
7 Ibid. pp. 133; 144-145
8 Ibid. pp. 144 f.
9 Ibid. pp. 144 f.
-al culture, being unself-conscious, was in bondage to nature: it could not fail to achieve the maximum of natural growth, but it could not transcend that maximum. Modern culture, being self-conscious, was free: there was no necessary growth to some maximum perfection, but there were the seeds of an endless free development:

in der Verderbtheit Europas gibt es Keime der höheren Bestimmung; die künstliche Bildung wenigstens kann zu einer... dauerhaft- en Vervollkommnung führen.  

It will be seen that history was thus in Schlegel's view triadic: natural culture; fall; the new culture of freedom. It is noteworthy, however, that although Schlegel did date the activity of freedom from the Biblical Fall, and saw in history as a whole the record of the conflict between nature and freedom, the classical ages, for example, being, not ages of pure instinct, but of nature still predominant over reason, that, these facts notwithstanding, Schlegel tended on the whole in his identification to see the classical age as the age of nature (with its culmination in Greece), to see in the Christian religion the decisive impulse towards freedom and away from nature, and to see in the rising Romantic poetry the dawn of the golden epoch of freedom. In the much later, post-Romantic and Catholic 'Philosophie der Geschichte' Schlegel reconstructed the narrative of the Bible in accordance with the triadic principle, but now he abandoned the earlier identification in favour of that of Novailis. The movement seen was from innocence, through the fall, to the reconciliation in Christ. In this movement Paradise was the

1 W.A. p. 294
2 M.I p. 97
3 W.A. p.256
4 Die Philosophie der Geschichte I pp. 40 ff.
thesis, the fall and the consequent bondage of the spirit the antithesis, the freeing of the spirit which was the result of the coming of Christ the synthesis.\(^1\) In relation to the ancient world the old schematisation of Herder, childhood, youth and age, was adopted,\(^2\) and the classical ages were regarded as those of bondage to natural necessity (as in the earlier Romantic thinking), not of free achievement.\(^3\) The postulate of two races, the slave race descended from Cain and the free from Seth, is a further interesting feature of this work,\(^4\) since this postulate had not only appeared in Herder and been developed by Schelling \(^5\) but was clearly a further development of the theory of the Romantic Schlegel, that history is the record of the conflict of freedom and necessity.

The various reconstructions suggested by Schelling himself, involved and even self-contradictory as they are, are all variations upon the general triadic theme. Schelling indeed was not content to see this process in history, or in the individual movements of history,\(^6\) but he introduced it into the whole of nature and in mystical, or rather theosophical fashion, into the Trinitarian Godhead. In the interpretation of Schelling the starting-point of history was the step by which man for the first time asserted his freedom and moved towards self-awareness and autonomy:

\[\text{die Mythologie lässt die Geschichte mit dem ersten Schritt aus der Herrschaft des Instinkts in das Gebiet der Freiheit, mit dem Sündenfall beginnen.}^{8}\]

This step was first equated by Schelling with that event which foll-

\(^1\) Christianity was thus still crucial, but now it ushered in the new golden age, not the age of decline.
\(^2\) Die Philosophie der Geschichte I pp. 58 ff. \(^3\) Ibid. pp. 45
\(^4\) Ibid. pp. 50 ff. \(^5\) S.S.W.I, 2 pp. 144 ff.
\(^6\) E.g. the ages of Peter, Paul and John in Christianity IV, 2
\(^7\) Ibid. I, 2 pp. 144 ff. II, 2 pp. 30 ff.
\(^8\) Ibid. III, 1 p. 589
owed upon the Flood, the division into nations and tongues.\textsuperscript{1} For Schelling, the whole period which preceeded this event (which was also that event which gave rise to mythology) belonged to pre-history.\textsuperscript{2} The first period of history in the stricter sense was the mythologic-al, the period in which nature, or natural process, was still the decisive factor.\textsuperscript{3} This period reached its culminating point in the culture of classical Greece.\textsuperscript{4} With the fall of the classical world and the coming of Christianity a new era, the era of a future freedom, began, an era of infinite progress in which the spirit of man was now predominant over nature, an era which would reach its culmination with the establishment of the world-state.\textsuperscript{5} The final ideal, the attainment of which belonged to the remote future, was one of a reconciliation of nature and spirit. Schelling postulated three historical ages to correspond to the movements in the historical pro-
cess: the age of fate, which was pre-history, but which also in-
cluded the ancient world; that of nature, the present; that of
providence, the future age of synthesis.\textsuperscript{6} The three movements them-
selves, reflected in mythology, corresponded to the three potencies
which Schelling postulated within the Absolute: God as 'Nichtseyend-
es', as 'reyn Seyendes' and as 'als solches gesetztes Seynkömmandes'.

Schelling never consistently held to the one interpretation and modified his views at many points, but the triadic principle was

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} S.S.W.I, 2 pp.100 ff.; 232-233 'Die geschichtliche Zeit ist
die Zeit der vollbrachten Trennung der Völker', 'das letzte
Resultat von innern Vorgängen und Bewegungen des Bewusst-
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid. pp.233 ff.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. III,1 pp.603-604 'seyns'
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid. II, 2 p.591
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid. III, 1 pp.603-604
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid. I, 2 p.537
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid. III, 1 pp.603-604
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid. II, 2 p.49; III, 2 pp.198 ff. ('Der Geist als der an
sich, für sich, bei sich Seyende'). The precise meaning of
these terms is doubtful, but the process seems to be
1. God in Himself, the Father
2. God in creation, the Son
3. God in spirit, the Holy Ghost: Thesis, Antithesis, Syn-
thesis.
\end{flushleft}
never abandoned, and the distinction between the ancient world as one of nature and the modern as one of freedom was also maintained. The most important modification was that in the 'Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums', in which the Fall itself was now, as with Novalis and Schlegel, regarded as the starting-point of history. The Fall was interpreted as a breaking-away from nature: ein allgemeiner Abfall, ein Abbrechen des Menschens von der Natur.\(^1\)
The classical age was the age of conflict between nature and freedom, with nature still predominant;\(^2\) this age being now that of antithesis: The end of the classical age was reached with the coming of Christianity and the collapse of Rome:

mit Rom kam der exoterische Proces zu Ende.....die Welt war still, und harrte der Dinge, die da kommen sollten.\(^3\)

Christianity, which brought the old world to an end, itself ushered in the new age of synthesis, Christ himself, by a free subjection of spirit to nature, which reached its climax at the Cross, having accomplished the work of reconciliation:

das wahre Unendliche kam in das Endliche, um dieses in seiner eignen Person Gott zu opfern, und dadurch zu versöhnen.\(^4\)

It is to be noticed that in this construction nature had lost its undisputed sway even with the Greeks, although the classical age, in contradistinction to the modern, was still referred to by Schelling as the age of subjection to nature, as for example in art.\(^5\) The complete emancipation from nature was the work of Christianity:

die erste Wirkung des Christentums war eben die Befreiung der Menschheit von der Macht der Finsternis.\(^6\)

\(^1\) S.S.W.V,1 p.290
\(^2\) Ibid.p.292
\(^3\) Ibid.IV,2 p.153
\(^4\) Ibid.V,1 p.292
\(^5\) Ibid.V,1 pp.423 f.
\(^6\) Ibid.IV,2 p.16
There was clearly some hesitation amongst the Romantics as to how exactly the classical world was to be regarded: whether naturalistically, as the golden age of pure nature - the view of Hölderlin and to some extent of Schlegel and of Schelling himself - or idealistically, as an age of strife between nature and spirit, symbolised in the conflict of the two races, and of the bondage of spirit to a still preponderant nature - the view of Novalis, of the later Schlegel and of Schelling in this work. The latter was undoubtedly the final Romantic view, and Schelling himself amended his historical eras to bring them into line with it. The first, or pre-historic age now was the period of nature; the second, or classical, the period of necessity; the third, or Christian, that of providence. The fall from a state of pure nature was now placed at the dawn of history, and Christianity brought, not the age of antithetical reason, but the age of synthesis, or reconciliation. The Romantic historival interpretation thus being brought into line with that of Rousseau, Kant and Schiller. One further important point in this respect is that the Romantics, with the possible exception of Schleiermacher, looked upon the pre-historic age as one, not of savagery, but of high culture. Modern culture was, according to Romantic theory, derived by tradition from the culture of that mythical race which inhabited the earth before the Fall (in some cases the Flood): the 'Normalvolk' of Fichte, the 'Urvolk' of Schelling and Novalis.

1 Cf. N.S.I p.32; S.S.W.I, 2 pp.500-501; 503 2 S.S.W.V, 1 p.290 (Both these views were fused by Fichte into a single triadic movement) 3 But cf. Reden p.152 4 Fichte S.W.VII p.133; S.S.W.V, 1 p.287 5 Fichte S.W.VII p.133 6 N.S.IV p.37; S.S.W.V, 1 p.287
It is important that this latter point should be mentioned side by side with the hesitation of the Romantics in their identification of the various ages, because in both these matters a marked influence of the Rousseauistic, Sturm und Drang 'Auch eine Philosophie' of Herder is to be discerned. It has already been pointed out that Herder himself was able to work the thesis of this earlier work into the general scheme of naturalistic development in the later 'Ideen', yet at several points, notably in the castigation of the modern age as one of degeneracy, the thesis differed widely from and was even opposed to that presented in the 'Ideen'. In actual fact the 'Auch eine Philosophie' was a development of the Rousseauistic attack upon artificiality and rationality, but with three important modifications: first, that the pre-Christian ages were for Herder the ages of nature; second, that Christianity was the watershed or point of division, when nature gave way to reason, the old man to the new; third, that culture and not savagery was for Herder the natural state, culture itself being a tradition based upon a primitive revelation and handed down from the first parents in the garden. A fourth modification which ought perhaps to be added was that Herder definitely looked forward to a new golden age in the future, an age of true rational culture which was indeed already beginning to dawn.1

There is no direct evidence to prove any decisive impact made by the 'Auch eine Philosophie' upon Romantic thought, but it seems certain enough that its influence in a general way must have been considerable. The modifications made by Herder were at those very points at which the Romantics themselves later either deviated from the Rousseauistic thesis, or betrayed a hesitancy in their choice between alternative presentations. That the naturalism of

1 On these points see above Chapter V Sctn.1
Herder did contribute in large measure to the Romantic philosophy of history in a more general way admits of no doubt: in its clash with Fichteian Idealism it constituted the central problem. But now a far closer, a more particular influence of Herder is to be noticed, an influence not upon the general problem of the philosophy of history but upon the Romantic construction and understanding of the historical process. In five matters of detail the Romantics adopted views so closely akin to those of the 'Auch eine Philosophie' that a direct relationship is hardly to be doubted, and this quite apart from the common adoption of a triadic framework: first, in the applying of the organic principle to the ancient world;\(^1\) second, in the conceiving of classical culture and history as a growth complete in itself according to the schema childhood, youth, age;\(^2\) third, in the regarding of Christianity, the collapse of Rome and the Germanic invasions as a decisive turning-point; \(^3\) fourth, in the decrying of the modern age as one of degenerate rationality, and yet the discerning in it of possibilities of progression to a new and more glorious epoch;\(^4\) fifth, in the linking of all cultures in one chain, of which the culture given by God to man in Paradise was the starting-point.\(^5\) Ignoring the sporadic attempts of Novalis and Hölderlin, the scholar must admit that the Romantics as a whole could not countenance the incorporation of this lesser thesis into that all-comprehensive immanentist naturalism of the 'Ideen' which would interpret all life, even the life of the spirit, in terms of natural growth, the rhythm, birth, growth, maturing, decay, death and rebirth.

1 Cf. Hölderlin's 'Archipelagus'; Schlegel M.I pp.1 ff.
2 Cf. Hegel's 'Philosophie der Geschichte'—also Schlegel's
3 Schlegel W.A. p.261; S.S.W IV,2 p.151
4 Schlegel M.I pp.111 ff.
5 S.S.W.V,1 p.236; Hölderlin's 'Am Quell der Donau'
The Romantics could and did, however, find in the lesser thesis of Herder's Sturm und Drang work one solution, or one adaptation of the solution of its central problem: the understanding of history as the field of conflict between nature and freedom. That the alternative solution which seems to be derived from Herder was itself at root only a variation of the general Rousseauistic interpretation does not affect the almost certain and important influence of Herder himself.

2. SECONDARY CONCEPTS  In Chapter VII the main problem of the Romantic philosophy of history was discussed in some detail, and now in the first section of this chapter an outline has been given of the general solution, the postulating of a process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis in the place of the more common theory of a steady development from the simple to the more complex. All the more significant forms in which this process assumed in the works of the Romantics have been taken into account. In the second section of this chapter the task is now to consider the most important of the many secondary themes which group themselves around the central concept, especially those themes which occur in more than one writer, or which show signs of being under the influence of parallel themes developed in Herder. In view of the fact that these themes did not belong to a consistent Romantic philosophy as such, and either varied or took on different forms with individual thinkers, it will be most convenient to treat them as they occur separately in the different writers, in spite of the repetition which this inevitably entails.

In Fichte several concepts already familiar may be discerned, although they occur rather in the form of incidental references, (for the most part) and are not consistently worked out, or expounded. Fichte, postulating as he did an a priori process, was for example
forced necessarily to acknowledge a providential ordering of the world: alles, was geschieht, gehört in den Plan der ewigen Welt und ist gut in ihm.1

The providence perceived by Fichte was of course not immanent but teleological, and although Fichte, with Herder, admitted that everything which is is necessary, and in and for itself good: was da nur wirklich da ist, ist schlechthin notwendig da,2 for him things were good, not merely because they were, but because they were purposeful:

alles, was da geschieht, ist gut, und absolut zweckmäßig.3

Again, although Fichte was willing to grant that everything had a relative value in itself:

jedes Glied hat seinen Wert....die Eine ewige Idee zeigt sich in jedem besonderen Individuum in einer neuen, vorher nie dagewesenen Gestalt,4

he definitely took his stand with Kant and against Herder on the two important questions: the place of the state in the progress of man, and the relation of the individual to the race. The state, according to Fichte, was a necessary master ('Zwingherr'5): the ideal state being the goal and the purpose of history. The ultimate goal was one which could be achieved, not by the individual, not even by the individual nation or generation (since these were not 'Wesen an sich'6), but only by the race, and through the sacrifice of the individual: es ist der größte Irrthum...wenn ein Individuum sich einbildet, dass er für sich selber daseyn und leben...könne.7

Each individual, building upon that which had gone before, contrib.
but full attainment was only for the race and in the future, when through the state mankind should have been welded into one body:

die Bestimmung des Geschlechts ist zu einem Körper zu vereinigen.²

Partly in this connection Fichte would appear to have been impressed by the natural law of Herder, that death is necessary as a means of rebirth to a higher form of life:

aller Tod in der Natur ist Geburt.³

The conception of a palingenesis was taken up for a moment in the 'Grundzüge':

alles lebt in dem Ganzen, und dieses Ganze selber stirbt ununterbrochen für sich selber, um neu zu leben.⁴

The idea too that man was a link between the real and the ideal worlds, already stressed by Herder, was prominent in Fichte, for whom the final goal of life in this world was spiritual and moral perfection:

ich bin ein Glied zweier Ordnungen, einer rein geistigen und einer sinnlichen.⁵

Man was set to attain a goal in this world,⁶ but when that was attained, as it would be,⁷ he was called upon to serve a final end which belonged to the higher world:

es muss sonach eine überirdische Welt geben, für deren Zweck er diene.⁸

Resemblances between Fichte and Herder clearly exist, but the influence of Herder upon a character so antipathetic in outlook and temperament was negligible, and the resemblances themselves must be

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1 Fichte S.W.VII p.41
2 Ibid.II p.274
3 Ibid.p.317
4 Ibid.VII p.63
5 Ibid.II p.283
6 Ibid.p.278
7 Ibid.loc.cit.
8 Ibid.p.281
attributed mainly to the fact that Fichte’s universe, idealistically conceived, was at root also monistic and pantheistic.

Hegel, like Fichte, showed little trace of any effective influence by Herder, except at this one important point, that he learned from him to appreciate the particular value of each individual nation or national culture as a separate manifestation of the spirit: jede Stufe hat ihr bestimmtes, eigenthümliches Prinzip.1 Hegel’s characterisation of the ancient world revealed a keen sense of the particular achievement of each people — it will be remembered that the schema childhood, youth and age was adopted.2 Hegel too had a firm belief in a providential ordering according to wisdom and power,3 but for him as for Fichte this providence was the providence of the transcendent reason or ‘Idee’. Hegel was bitterly opposed to peddling views of providence, which saw no plan in events, or asserted that the plan was unknown. Since the providential order was that of reason, Hegel was confident that it could be discerned:

es muss endlich an der Zeit seyn, auch diese reiche Produktion der schöpferischen Vernunft zu begreifen, welche die Weltgeschichte ist.4

Hegel marvelled at the power of providence to overrule and control events to the accomplishment of the one plan:

es wird noch ein Ferneres zu Stande gebracht, das auch innerlich (in Thaten) liegt, aber das nicht in dem Bewusstseyn und der Absicht der Menschen lag.5

Hegel of course denied to the individual any ultimate value or attainment: die Individuen werden aufgeopfert und preisgegeben;6 and he stressed (as against Herder) the influence exerted by great

1 Hegel S.W.IX p.63
2 Ibid.p.16
3 Ibid.p.30
4 Ibid.pp.17-18
5 Ibid.p.32
men (Geschäftsführer eines Zwecks'). Final realisation was only in and through the state, the individual states enshrining the spirit of individual peoples. As between Herder and Kant Hegel was undoubtedly upon the side of Kant.

With Hölderlin there are far clearer signs of a direct influence by Herder, and several concepts which were prominent in Herder reappear in the poems of Hölderlin. A general sense of destiny or fate hung across the world of Hölderlin, and it is to be noticed that fate in Hölderlin's conception was rather the domain of natural law than the decree of a transcendental idea. Life for Hölderlin was under the sway of natural rhythms:

Doch uns ist gegeben / Auf keiner Stätte zu ruhn,
Es schwinden, es fallen / Die leidenden Menschen
Blindlings von einer / Stunde zur andern,
Wie Wasser von Klippe / Zu Klippe geworfen,
Jahrlang ins Ungewisse hinab.

Attempts on the part of self-assertive man to defy these rhythms (as with Empedocles) could only lead to disaster. The familiar concept of a natural retribution was thus reintroduced side by side with that of a natural necessity and immanent providence. The rhythm of life perceived by Hölderlin was that of birth, death, rebirth - an eternal palingenesis. This thought seems to be contained in the image of the slumbering Titan at the end of the poem 'Brot und Wein'. A further suggestion of Herder, that the great spirits periodically visit the earth (this being the explanation of the ebb and flow of historical life), was also taken up by Hölderlin:

Nur zu Zeiten erträgt göttliche Fülle der Mensch.

1 Hegel S.W.IX p.32
2 Ibid.p.144
3 Peacock op.cit p.94
4 Gedichte (Closs) p.52
5 Peacock op.cit.p.42
6 Ibid.loc.cit.
7 Ibid.pp.88 ff.
8 Gedichte p.104
9 Ibid.p.102
Amongst other interesting themes the following ought to be mentioned: the demonic, natural force of genius in great men;¹ the measure of happiness and achievement possible for each individual:

Nur hat ein jeder sein Mass;²
the hope of a new age of the reconciliation of man with nature:

Nimmt denn nicht schon ihr altes
Freudiges Recht die Natur sich wieder?³
a reconciliation symbolised and already partly achieved in poetic enthusiasm; and finally humanity as the ideal goal of life,⁴ with the full and harmonious life upon earth as only the preliminary stage of that higher life beyond,⁵ again already tasted by the poet:

Hin ist dann mein dürftig Streben,
Hin des Kampfes letzte Spur;
Und ins volle Götterleben
Tritt die sterbliche Natur.⁶

The poet Novalis had little to say of a providential ordering of life, but he developed other themes in some detail. Like Herder and Hölderlin Novalis was conscious of the danger of meddling with the natural order and course of things:

alle Pläne müssen fehlschlagen, die nicht auf alle Anlagen des Geschlechts vollständig angelegte Pläne sind.⁷

Novalis was also alive to the peril of an over-speedy ripening of culture: he applied, for example, the words of Herder, 'zu früh reif' to the Jewish people.⁸ In the 'Fragmente' there is revealed a strong sense of the operation of a retributive justice, and of the solidarity of the race in guilt and punishment:

¹ As Buonaparte ('Der Dichter lass ihn unberühr't/ Wie den /Die Geist der Natur.....') and Rousseau (Gedichte pp.57-58;106).
² Gedichte p.125
³ Ibid.p.67
⁴ Closs Introduction p.20; Peacock op.cit.p.47
⁵ Peacock loc.cit.
⁶ Gedichte pp.44-45
⁷ N.S.II p.31
⁸ Ibid.I p.36
Although Novalis spoke like Fichte and Hegel of non-historical peoples, in the sense perhaps of peoples without records:

die Begierde (des Menschen) Gott zu werden, hat ihn von (den Naturwesen) getrennt.2

he had none the less a strong feeling for the relative values of all cultures, and in true Romantic fashion he was attracted to cultures distant either in time or in space, especially those of the Middle Ages and the Orient, popularised by Herder.4 Novalis believed that a strong state was necessary as the means to the attainment of the new golden age, but he rejected the idea of a world-state as the goal of history. The aim of man was, as with Herder, a full humanity, simply to be man:

der Mensch muss Mensch sein, zur Menschheit ist er bestimmt;5
die Liebe ist der Endzweck der Weltgeschichte, das Amen des Universums.6

Perfectibility was a concept which Novalis supported, and in connection with it he mentioned with approval Lessing’s thought of a Divine Education,7 but did not himself take up the idea. With his theosophical leanings Novalis was particularly attracted by the idea of palingenesis and of man as the link between the two worlds. It has been seen that with Hölderlin he came tentatively to see recurrence in the historical world,8 but a more definite doctrine of transmigration, the ascent by stages to a spiritual life, was to have been the main teaching of the unfinished 'Heinrich von Ofter-
The peculiar position of man as a citizen of two worlds, a theme which was bound up with that of a progressive transmigration, was referred to in many passages:

der Mensch ist der Nerv, der dieses Glied (i.e. this planet) mit der obaren Welt knüpfte;²
unser Geist ist Verbindungsglied des völlig Ungleihen;³
der Mensch findet sich in einem innig lebendigen Zustande zwischen zwei Welten.⁴

One phrase in particular ('göttliche Keime sind wir') suggests the direct impact of Herder’s thought.

The distinguishing feature in Schleiermacher’s writings, from the historico-philosophical point of view, is without doubt the tension between a naturalistic and a teleological understanding.⁵ Schleiermacher’s conception of providence or necessity, succinctly put in one of the finest and most striking phrases in all Romantic writing, was plainly teleological, and yet a naturalistic interpretation is not excluded:

so seht ihr (i.e. in and through religion), wie der hohe Weltgeist über alles lächelnd hinwegschreitet, was sich ihm lärmend widersetzt, wie die hehre Nemesis... unermüdet... die Erde durchzieht, wie sie Zuchtigung und Strafen den Ubermütigen ausstellt....⁷

The imagery is transcendental, and yet at root this was little more than Herder’s thought of natural necessity and retribution, that law of nature, or of the immanent world-spirit, by which things are as they are, and all attempts to thwart or to over-ride are speedily avenged. In his understanding for the relative value of all cultures and religions Schleiermacher approached even closer to the pure naturalism of Herder.⁸ The ’Monologen’ on the other hand were full

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2 N.S. I II Sctn. 131  
3 Ibid. III S. H. Sctn. 307  
4 Ibid. IV p. 27  
5 Ibid. III v. B. Sctn. 136  
6 See Süskind op. cit. for a discussion in detail of this point  
7 Reden p. 75  
8 Süskind op. cit. pp. 30 ff. etc.
of the sense of a transcendental moral purpose, with man now himself spirit, not bound by natural necessity, the lord and not the slave of nature. In the later 'Christliche Glaube' there was a reaction in favour of the absoluteness of Christianity, and providence was now conceived of, not as natural law immanent in the world, but as the ordering and governing of God ('die Weltregierung Gottes').

Other points which occurred incidentally in Schleiermacher's writings, and which make it clear to what extent he shared thoughts common to the age, may be summarised briefly. The goal of history was for Schleiermacher humanity, and this was to be realised in the ideal community, that City of God which was the foreshadowing upon earth of the heavenly life. Because this life in community was one of perfect humanity, it was itself for Schleiermacher divine: alles Menschliche ist heilig, denn alles ist göttlich.

Humanity was not, however, the final end of all life, but only a single and intermediate manifestation of the Infinite:

die Menschheit ist nur ein Ruheplatz auf dem Wege zum Unendlichen.

The thought of palingenesis was taken up, but was developed more particularly as a religio-historical concept: Schleiermacher saw at work in history, and especially in Christian history, laws of recurrence, periods of decline alternating with those of new development: der Geist des Christentums erwacht immer wieder......jede solche Epoche wird die Palingenesie des Christentums, und erweckt seinen Geist in einer neuen und schöneren Gestalt.

Schleiermacher seems to have perceived a general law, that death is

1 Monologen pp.65-66 (Cf. Reden p.76) 2 Süskind op.cit.p.26 3 Der Christliche Glaube II p.561 4 Süskind op.cit pp.161 5 Reden pp.127 ff. 6 Ibid.pp.76-77 Personal immortality was rejected as an irreligious notion (p.95) 7 Ibid.pp.223;226
the necessary transition to higher life. The idea of an education of the race by God did not arouse any enthusiasm, since it was bound up with that more personal conception of the Godhead which Schleiermacher rejected, but a progress in religion was postulated. Of course the concern of Schleiermacher with history was for the most part only indirect, and these lesser concepts appear only in the form of passing references or deductions, with no systematic development.

The main stress of Friedrich Schlegel, apart from the relationship of nature to freedom in historical movement, was upon the relative value of each culture in and for itself, at which point he plainly adhered to the teaching of Herder. Each individual man or nation had for Schlegel a worth, not in relation to an absolute, but simply in relation to its own growth:

jeder einzelne Mensch ist ein Zweck an sich. So auch jedes Zeitalter. Schlegel himself made direct reference to Herder's work:

die in mehreren Stellen des Herderschen Werks vortreffliche Gedanke darüber.

According to Schlegel there was for each people a maximum of possible development, (at any rate for each people in the ancient world,) and it was in relation to that maximum, not to an external absolute, that the achievement and development of the people were to be assessed. It was this relativity of historical and critical judgment which enabled Schlegel, as it had done Herder, to approach with such sympathy and understanding such different cultures as those of ancient Greece, the Middle Ages and the Orient.

Few other concepts of any importance stand out in the

1 Monologen p.32
2 Reden p.201 In the first edition Schleiermacher dismissed the idea of a personal God altogether pp.90 ff.
3 W.A. p.267
4 Ibid.loc.cit.
5 Ibid.loc.cit.
6 Schlegel laid the foundations of the critical study of Indian literature and thought. His brother shared his critical sympathy and insight.
writings of Schlegel except that in the philosophical lectures and
later, more drastically, in the Catholic ‘Philosophie der Geschichte’
there was introduced into history a strife between good and evil:
der unentschiedene Kampf des Guten und des Bösen.1
This was apparently a development of the triadic concept, since the
luke with freedom and championed by the posterity of
Seth, the evil with subjection to nature, championed by that of
Cain.2 Kant, and even Herder, had of course already postulated an
antagonism of good and evil as the dialectical basis of historical
movement,3 and in the ‘Alteste Urkunde’ Herder had hinted at a sep-
eration of humanity into two main classes or races, the one good and
the other evil, the Sethites and the Cainites;4 an idea which had
also been taken up by Schelling and referred to by Novalis, who spoke
of ‘Ursöhne’ and ‘das Gottesgeschlecht’.5 The other points of inter-
est in the ‘Philosophie der Geschichte’ are the understanding of his-
tory as a process of judgment ‘die Weltgeschichte als das Weltgericht’
and a firm trust in the visible control of history by providence.6
In this latter connection Schlegel adopted the common picture of the
spirit traversing the centuries and finding manifestation successively
in the world-peoples:
das Wesentliche ist, den in der Geschichte sich offenbarenden,
den Menscheninn erleuchtenden, richtenden Geist Gottes in sein-
em Dahinschreiten durch die Jahrhunderte wahrzunehmen.7
There is in this phrase some hint of a divine education, and at other

1 Körner p.219 Philosophie der Geschichte II p.135
2 Philosophie der Geschichte I pp.50 ff. / 1 p.36
3 See Kant S.W.VI pp.3 ff. (Also Schiller S.W.Hist.Schriften
4 S.VI pp.194 ff. 5 N.S.I p.32
6 Philosophie der Geschichte II p.7. The phrase is of course
7 Ibid.p.5 8 Ibid.p.137 / Schiller’s
points a common cultural tradition is presumed. Neither of these concepts is stressed: indeed the former idea did not find much favour with any of the Romantics. Schlegel noted, with Fichte, Hegel, Novalis and Schelling, that certain peoples are non-historical, but the individual worth of all cultures was still maintained. This work is not, however, of any great importance, except that in it the themes of Romantic thought are again taken up, but recast now in the mould of Catholic tradition.

A grouping of the historical concepts of Schelling is an almost impossible task, not because of their variety only, but because in each new work they are tricked out in different guises and presented in new tableaux. To the end Schelling's historical thinking revolved around the relationship of necessity to freedom, and perhaps the main subsidiary problem was the working out of a satisfactory concept of providence. In his earliest treatment of the question Schelling took the bold and momentous step of banishing causality from the field of history altogether:

das Progressive verstaltet keine Gesetzmäßigkeit von der Art, durch welche die freie Thätigkeit auf eine bestimmte....Succession von Handlungen eingeschränkt ist........
der Mensch hat nur deswegen Geschichte, weil, was er thun wird, sich nach keiner Theorie zum voraus berechnen lässt. Die Willkür ist insofern die Göttin der Geschichte.  

This extreme position was of course untenable, and Schelling himself had to readmit an element of natural necessity, side by side with free will, in historical movement:

nur die Freiheit und die Gesetzmäßigkeit in Vereinigung consti-

It was perhaps in this connection, although this is not

1 Philosophie der Geschichte I pp. 52 ff.; 243
2 Ibid., pp. 73 ff.
3 Ibid., p. 69
4 S. S. W., III, I p. 539; II, I p. 471
5 Ibid., III, I p. 590
quite certain, that Schelling distinguished in the 'Philosophie der Mythologie' between the two races, 'die Göttersöhne' and 'die Menschentöchter', the former being for him 'ein himmelstürmendes Geschlecht' with a self-conscious and independent life, the latter a subject people under the sway of natural law. Of these two races the former alone could truly be termed historical, since they alone were capable of free action. The rest were non-historical:

wir sehen einen und zwar den größeren Theil ausgestossen von der Geschichte.3

It may be noticed that at this point Schelling seems definitely to have regarded the state of nature as one not of perfection but of bondage, in the manner of Novalis and Schleiermacher rather than of Hölderlin. The movement of history thus became one of conflict and of emancipation, the thesis in the triad being un-self-conscious life, the antithesis, self-conscious life in opposition to the dominion of natural law, the synthesis, a free self-conscious life in harmony with nature. The first age was for Schelling that of 'Schicksal', the second of 'Natur', the third of 'Vorsehung'. Schelling did not, however, apply his schema in any consistent way to history itself, and it is not quite clear whether the classical age belonged to the first epoch, with the fall at the collapse of the ancient world (the view of the 'Auch eine Philosophie'), or whether it was, as with Schlegel, the period of conflict.6

As far as providence itself was concerned Schelling did not find it either in natural law or in human freedom, but in a transcendent process which directed and controlled both: that theogonic

1 S.S.W.1,2 pp.503 ff. 2 Ibid.p.501
3 Ibid.p.500 4 Ibid.III,1 p.539
5 Ibid.p.603 6 Ibid.loc.cit.
process which was self-revealed in mythology.¹ Schelling was thus able at once to justify natural law, to assert the autonomy of man over against natural law, and yet also to retain a teleological providence at work in both law and freedom. With this postulate of a higher teleological control all the old and familiar themes were introduced: humanity as the goal of history:

allerdings ist der Mensch das Ziel und in diesem Sinn alles des Menschen wegen;² a nemesis at work in the historical process, a point brought out in the earlier mythologies;³ the necessity of the state as a means to the attainment of true freedom:

nur im Staat findet und erlangt der Mensch die wirkliche Freiheit.⁴

All these latter concepts were for Schelling subsidiary to the central teleological problem, and in answer to the question as to whether there was a higher direction of history, Schelling constantly reaffirmed his conviction that there was such an over-ruling:

die Vorsehung des Processes, für welche die getrennten Völker doch nur die eine Menschheit sind, in der sich ein grosses Schicksal vollziehen soll.⁵

Schelling still seems to have wished to restrict the power of natural necessity in its historical working, and there are hints that he played for a while with the idea of substituting for it a causality of cultural tradition.⁶ Natural necessity would thus reign in nature, will, causally interconnected by tradition, in history. In any case, however, will itself was always subject to a higher providence: 'eine moralische Weltordnung'.⁷ Hence the introduction of the Kant-

¹ S.S.W.II, 2 pp. 3 ff. esp. 105ff. ² Ibid.I, 2 pp. 494, 500
³ Ibid.II, 2 p. 141; V, 1 p. 306 ⁴ Ibid.I, 2 p. 537
⁵ Ibid.II, 2 p. 587 ⁶ Cf. Ibid.III, 1 p. 589
⁷ Ibid.III, 1 p. 597
-ian teleology:

die einzige Absicht der Geschichte ist das Realisieren der Rechtverfassung... der Massstab der Fortschreitung die allmähliche Annäherung zu diesem Ziel.¹

Hence too the assertion that everything which did not serve the higher ends of history was either non-historical or of no more than transitional value.² Hence too the belief that the free acts of men were so disposed and directed as to bring about these higher ends:

es gibt eine Vorsehung, durch welche die Menschen durch ihr freies Handeln die Ursache sind von dessen, was sie nie gewollt haben.³

Hence finally the conviction that the aim, which was not the state itself, but the freedom made possible by and through the state,⁴ could only be achieved by the race as a whole and not by individuals:

der Handlungen der letzter Zweck ist nicht durch das Individuum allein, sondern nur durch die ganze Gattung realisirbar.⁵

Schelling's division of history into the three periods, of 'Schicksal', 'Natur' and 'Vorsehung', must be linked up directly with his thinking upon the relationship of nature to freedom, and of both to providence, which is in effect the synthesis of the two. The age of fate was that of instinct; of nature, that of a still preponderant natural necessity; of providence, that of the free accomplishment of the purposes of nature. This scheme was revised by Schelling, the first period becoming one of natural perfection; the second, of retribution; the third, of moral freedom and reconciliation;⁶ but the revision in no way destroyed the ultimate thesis,

¹ S.S.W.III,1 pp.592-593
² Ibid.loc.cit.
³ Ibid.p.594
⁴ Ibid.I,2 pp.553 ff. Schelling did speak of the state as an end, but only as the 'Bedingung der Freiheit'(III,1 p. 593). Here he makes the position clear: 'In Bezug auf die höhere Entwicklung ist der Staat nur Unterlage, Hypothese, Durchgangspunkt.'
⁵ Ibid.III,1 p.596
⁶ Ibid.V,1 p.290
that there was in history an element of freedom which destroyed any rigid causality, that such empirical causality as did exist was no more than a tool in the hands of a higher providence, and that in providence nature and freedom were reconciled, since they appeared as two aspects of the same thing:

The transcendent providence postulated by Schelling was thus merged into his general concept of the absolute identity:

The antithesis necessity: freedom was then ultimately a false one.\(^4\)

In Schelling's final view history was like some great drama (or better still, an epic) in which the individual characters act according to will and temperament, but contribute nevertheless by their acts to bring about some desired end:

Few other concepts appear in Schelling, and he had little use for many of the popular theories of the age. The idea of revelation as a divine education of the race, for example, was definitely rejected, (after a withering analysis) as the supposing of a conscious deception practised either by God or man.\(^6\) The thought of the relative value of one culture over against another received little

1 S.S.W.V, I p.310
2 Ibid.III, I p.594
3 Ibid.VI, I p.568
4 Ibid.V, I p.306
5 Ibid.III, I p.602; V, I p.310; VI, I p.57
6 Ibid.I, I pp.479 ff. (perhaps in the light of Schiller's treatment S.W.Hist.Schriften I pp.43 ff.). Lessing's three ages seem however to underlie all the theorisings upon the theogonic process.
attention, although it was not excluded by the transcendental process, in which the cultures were successive manifestations.\(^1\) The palingenesis theory did not appear in any historical form, although man's position as a link between the two worlds was recognised:

die Bedeutung des Menschen ist, das verbindende Mittelglied zwischen Natur und Geisterwelt zu seyn.\(^2\)

The concept of an earlier race which inhabited the earth before the Fall, and from which culture is derived, was made much of by Schelling.\(^3\) The interest of Schelling centred almost exclusively, however, upon the philosophical problem of the relation of causality to freedom and to providence; and of other topics there was little more than an incidental mention.

Enough has been said in this section to show that if a direct influence of Herder cannot at all points be demonstrated, at any rate the thinking of Romanticism was directed into those same broad channels in which that of Herder had already flowed. A real providence was asserted, conceived of now in transcendental rather than immanent terms; a natural necessity in history was in part admitted, together with a retributive justice; humanity was generally accepted as the final goal, even if to be achieved only through the state; palingenesis was taken up in various ways; the high destiny of man, as the crown of nature and the link with a world above, was maintained. The new importance attached to the state; the more insistent teleology; above all the exalting of freedom over against nature, and the common, although not consistent revolt against the natural life as one of bondage and darkness; these are reminders of the very powerful Idealistic influence; but none the less the whole circle of Romantic historico-philosophical concepts bears an imprint of the working of the philosophy of history of Herder which is plain to see.

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1 S.S.W.I, 2 p.494
2 Ibid. IV, 2 p.292 'Geisterwelt' signifies here for Schelling the world of angels; or 'Potenzen' ('eine eigentliche Geist
-erwelt')
3 Ibid. VI, 1 p.58
CHAPTER IX THE THEOLOGY OF ROMANTICISM

1. THE CONCEPTION OF GOD In the discussion of the Romantic philosophy of history the fact must surely have become plain that for the Romantics, as for Herder, an immanentist view of God was the only possible basis upon which the general thought could be erected. It is true of course that in the Romantic thinking a break was made between nature and history; it is also true that a theory of steady evolutionary development through successive growths gave way before the postulate of a triadic process: yet at bottom, there can be no doubt of this fact, the universal system of the Romantics' conceiving was a monistic system. Even with Schelling, who boldly set up an ideal over against the real world, as one autonomous entity over against another, an ultimate all-embracing unity was always postulated, that absolute identity, in which both the ideal and the real worlds were seen as complementary expressions of the one theogonic process. As for Schelling, so for all the Romantics. Across all the antitheses, there was in Romantic thought a final oneness of all things, not as themselves materialistic deity, not as the creation of transcendent deity, but as the self-manifestation of the absolute, in whom or which all things consisted.

The idealist Fichte, in spite of his open and bitter hostility to the pantheistic systems of the nature-mystics and theosophists, and his fundamental postulate that the will and knowledge of the Ego are the only reality, even Fichte identified, if in an inverted idealistic fashion, the Absolute, God, with the sum total of things or perceptions. For Fichte, the will alone was creative, truly real:

das Gesetz der übersinnlichen Welt wäre sonach ein Wille.1

1 Fichte S.W.II p.297
The world sensually perceived was no more than an expression of moral will and purpose i.e. of the Absolute. External nature was as it were the stage created by will for the revealing and display of the moral and spiritual reality to the mind of man. God himself was revealed through the knowledge of things, by an external process. Fichte applied them idealistically, but the expressions which he used were those of immanence, since the world was for him a unity in the one will. All life was the one life:

all unser Leben ist sein Leben.

All things consisted in the one Absolute:

wir sind in seiner Hand.

Between the individual and the eternal One there was no final discontinuity: so stehe ich mit dem Einen, das da ist, in Verbindung, und nehme Theil an seinem Seyn.

The philosophical construction of Hegel was along very similar lines and was at root an idealistic pantheism of the same type, the Hegelian 'idea' or 'thought' now being substituted for the older 'substance' of Spinoza. Dilthey has shown that in his younger days, at the time of the contacts with Hölderlin, Sinclair and Schelling, Hegel had leanings towards a more mystical and theosophical pantheism and although he passed over from this poetic nature-mysticism to idealism, in his monistic 'Weltanschauung' God remained as the reality underlying all things, the 'Idee'. Perhaps the main thought of Hegel was that of the world as a self-manifestation of the 'Idee' in successive and progressive stages, man himself as self-conscious being standing at the highest stage, and finding his achievement in the

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1 León op. cit. II pp. 214-215
2 Fichte S.W. II p. 303
3 Ibid. loc. cit.
4 Ibid. p. 299
5 Dilthey: Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels pp. 36 ff.; 133
It is significant that Hegel welcomed Christianity because in it he saw the one-ness of man and God consciously, because concretely, realised, not by an identity, but by an incorporation of man into God

The idealistic pantheism of Fichte and Hegel stood rather outside the main flow of Romantic thought, which in spite of the idealistic influence took a direction far less logical and far more mystical; but these have been mentioned because in their systems the general trend is clearly indicated, the seeking of a God who should be, not a transcendent creator but an omnitudo realitatis, an all-comprehending, all-pervading, self-manifesting Absolute. Hölderlin, who himself stood rather upon the fringes of the movement, illustrates again this general trend, but at this point, perhaps largely as a direct result of his reading of Herder, but more through his contact with Isaak Sinclair, the mystically inclined Hamburg jurist, with whom he contracted a warm friendship in Tübingen, at this point the more poetical Hölderlin stood closer to the central group. For Hölderlin, nature was itself a reality, but only as the self-manifestation of God. The gods of whom Hölderlin constantly spoke in his poems were nature-gods, deified natural forces, the divine powers

1 Stace op cit. Par. 633  2 Hegel S.W. IX (Philosophie der)
3 Ibid. p. 331  4 Ibid. p. 335 / Geschichte p. 12
5 The 'Eduard' of the poem 'An Eduard' (Werke I p. 172)
There is a reference to him in the poem 'Der Rhein'
Dir mag auf heissem Pfade unter Tannen oder
Im Dunkel des Eichwalds gehäult
In Stahl, mein Sinclair! Gott erscheinen (Gedichte p. 126)
active in and through phenomena:

Du aber, über den Wolken,
Vater des Vaterlands! mächtiger Äther! und du
Erde und Licht! ihr einigen drei, die walten und lieben,
Ewige Götter!

Nature was itself presented by Hölderlin in mystical fashion as the eternal mother: Ewig trägt im Mutterschoosse
Dich die allbelebende Natur;
Wir haben gedient der Mutter Erd'......

and a divine creative power was seen to be operative both in nature generally and also in a more special sense in man:

Der Göttermutter, der Natur,
Der Allesumfassenden möcht' er gleichen.

This power was of course the power of immanent godhead:

Denn es waltet ein Gott in uns.

There are in Hölderlin some passages in which, pessimistically describing the present age, he seemed to abandon this concept of the immanent divine power. The gods were pictured as departed and living in an ideal heavenly world, remote from the earth:

Entflohene Götter;
Zwar leben die Götter,
Aber über dem Haupt droben in andrer Welt;
Aufwärts stiegen sie all, welche das Leben beglückt,
Als der Vater gewandt sein Angesicht von den Menschen.

This transcendentalism was of course only a transcendentalism of imagery, the thought of Hölderlin being that the divine power was no longer active in man because man was living in alienation from nature. It was this alienation which was the tragedy of the reasoning Christian world, in which man no longer found God, or gods, everywhere active in nature, but lived in an autonomous isolation from

1 Gedichte p.97
2 Ibid.p.37
3 Ibid.p.137
4 Ibid.p.54
5 Ibid.Introduction p.17
6 Ibid.p.127
7 Ibid.p.102
8 Ibid.p.103
9 Gedichte p.97
10 Ibid.p.37
11 Ibid.p.137
12 Ibid.Introduction p.17
13 Ibid.p.127
14 Ibid.p.103
both nature and God. Christ himself was for Hölderlin the last concrete manifestation of the Godhead, and with his crucifixion the old world came to an end and the divine power was withdrawn. Hölderlin, however, did not see any fundamental break between God and man, and in the pursuit of the ideal, of Diotima, a re-identification with God was still possible, and was indeed symbolically achieved in artistic inspiration, a recovery of the lost communion with the Absolute: Wo wir eins und alles werden Da ist nun mein Element.¹

This re-interfusion of the human and the natural, but now upon the higher level of self-conscious life, was of course the great hope and aim of history, and with its attainment the power of immanent Godhead would again flow in and through the race.

Novalis, the nature-student and the mystic, plunged himself quite naturally into a full mystical and theosophical teaching, and fused the doctrine of Spinoza with that of Böhme, to give a poetical naturalistic pantheism. In the famous fragment Spinoza himself was eulogised by Novalis:

Spinoza ist ein Gotttrunkener Mensch. Der Spinozism ist eine Übersättigung mit Gottheit.²

Novalis never worked out his ideas into a system, but from the scattered fragments and other passages certain broad principles emerge. Nature was for Novalis a living thing: Alles ist belebt;³ and it was also divine, and, because a process of development could be discerned in it, historical:

alles Göttliche hat eine Geschichte, so auch die Natur.⁴

The powers at work in nature were seen to be ultimately but one pow-

¹ Gedichte p.45
² N.S.II Sctns.355-356
³ Ibid.Sctn.173
⁴ Ibid.III S.H.Sctn.419
alle Naturkräfte sind nur Eine Kraft.\textsuperscript{1}

As with Herder, activity was the characteristic of the Absolute:

\textit{Tätigkeit ist die eigentliche Realität.}\textsuperscript{2}

After some preliminary hesitation Novalis identified this power or activity in nature with an indwelling world-soul, which expressed itself progressively in the various forms of life:

\begin{quote}
alle Wirkungen sind nichts als Wirkungen einer Kraft, der Weltseele, die sich nur unter verschiedenen Bedingungen, Verhältnissen und Umständen offenbart.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

Nature, or rather the universe, was thus a symbol, a self-expression of the Absolute. Man himself, the highest creature, endowed with an autonomous self-consciousness, was destined eventually to be merged, in a perfect humanity, into the Godhead: indeed in the religious (mystical) life this was already attained:

\begin{quote}
jeder Mensch, der jetzt von Gott und durch Gott lebt, soll selbst Gott werden.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{quote}

The progressive movement in the divine self-manifestation was traced out, from dead nature, through plants and animals, to man, and thus back to God himself.\textsuperscript{5} As in Hölderlin, the alienation of man from nature was looked upon as the great tragedy of modern life, since it meant the alienation of man from immanent Godhead, but in the triadic process of history a re-identification of man and God, through the new poetical and mystical Catholicism, would ultimately be achieved.

Friedrich Schlegel was not so much concerned with religion, his interest being mainly in literature, but in some of his writings especially in the notes of philosophical lectures published by Körner,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} N.S.III S.N.Sctn.49
\item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid.Sctn.100.7
\item \textsuperscript{3} Ibid.Sctn.104.7
\item \textsuperscript{4} Ibid.Sctn.1052
\item \textsuperscript{5} Spenle op.cit.p.191
\end{itemize}
there are clear indications that at the basis of his Weltanschauung too there lay a pantheistic conception of God. Both Mann\(^1\) and also Körner\(^2\) have noticed and discussed this conception, and Körner in particular stressed the fact that it was the sense of the Divine in all things which finally drove Schlegel into Roman Catholicism, in the theology of which he found a kindred teaching.\(^3\) The immaneism of Schlegel seems, like that of Herder, to have been modified by Leibnizian influences,\(^4\) and there are also signs of an idealistic impulse. It appeared first in the literary writings, in which the divine inspiration of poetry was asserted, (with poetry itself as a representation of the infinite,) and in which too the earth itself was compared to some great divine poem:

\[
\begin{align*}
die Erde\text{\textit{ist ein Gedicht der Gottheit.}}^5
\end{align*}
\]

In the 'Ideen' the concept broadened and took on a more religious aspect, Schlegel being now under the influence of Novalis and Schleiermacher. Schlegel now saw the divine in all phenomena:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Überall erblicken wir Göttliches;}^6 \\
\text{Gott ist das einzige, unendlich Voll.}^7
\end{align*}
\]

In the philosophical lectures the common immanentist views were all prominent, but there was little original development: the existence of the all in the one:

\[
\begin{align*}
es \text{\textit{ist alles in einem und eins ist alles;}}^8
\end{align*}
\]

the self-revealing of the divine in nature:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Gott hat die Welt hervorgebracht, um sich selbst darzustellen;}^9
\end{align*}
\]

progression in the infinite:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{le développement successif de l'Infini;}^{10}
\end{align*}
\]

\begin{itemize}
\item \(^1\) Mann op. cit. pp. 6 ff.
\item \(^2\) Körner op. cit. p. 30
\item \(^3\) Ibid. p. 76
\item \(^4\) Ibid. p. 79
\item \(^5\) M. I. p. 339
\item \(^6\) Schlegel 'Ideen' 44
\item \(^7\) Ibid. p. 153
\item \(^8\) Ibid. 'Ideen' 44
\item \(^9\) Ibid. p. 122
\item \(^10\) Ibid. p. 240
\end{itemize}
The grounding of all individual life in the Godhead: 

ableitbar ist das Ich nur aus der Gottheit (Körner's phrase); 1

finally, Schelling's idea of the absolute identity, conceived of by Schlegel as a mystical absorption, the final aim of religion:

der letzte Zweck der Religion ist die Gottheit, oder absolute Identität. 2

The more transcendental view of God which appears in some of the latter Catholic writings is not of any interest or importance in this study.

The two writers who developed a Romantic theology most fully and systematically were the philosopher Schelling and the theologian Schleiermacher. In the case of Schelling, whose fertile mind seized upon and developed in bewildering detail the most diverse ideas, it is almost impossible to present in general outline the conception of God held. The God of whom Schelling spoke was the Absolute, 'reine Identität', 3 in which all things were, and of which all things were a representation. Nature was the representation of the Absolute in the real world, and under the form of a succession of phenomena. 4 There was in nature an organising principle, and all forces were ultimately the one force:

alle Funktionen nur Zweige einer und derselben Kraft. 5

Nature itself was characterised by activity:

die Natur ist absolute Thätigkeit. 6

In some of the earlier works Schelling played with the idea of a world-soul as this absolute force:

die Weltseele...ein organisierendes, die Welt zum System bildendes Prinzip. 7

1 Körner op. cit. p. 233
2 Ibid. p. 191
3 S.S.W. II, 1 p. 62
4 Ibid. p. 342 'In der Natur... ist das ganze Absolut erkenbar, obgleich die erscheinende Natur nur successiv gebildet, was in der wahren zumal und auf ewige Weise ist'
5 Ibid. p. 565
6 Ibid. II, 1 p. 565
7 Ibid. III, 1 pp. 11 ff.
This line of thought was not, however, pursued. If God was represented in the real world, (in nature,) the ideal world, (or history,) was no less a representation of Him.¹ The whole thinking of Schelling centred indeed around this twofoldness of the self-revelation of the one infinite identity, and he explained the different views of God in terms of it: heathendom was a recognition of nature as God:

das Schauen Gottes im Endlichen;²

Christianity the recognition of God in both nature and in the ideal world, in history, and thus of nature in God:

die Einbildung des Endlichen ins Unendliche....die unmittelbare Vergeistierung des Endlichen.³

This same twofold representation of God, the basis of the theogonic movement, was reflected in the triadic movements in history and religion, from unconscious identity with God, through alienation (in matter, or nature), to a conscious identity. At the heart of the involved theosophical speculations of Schelling was the central thought was always this, the Identity of all things in the one Absolute:

alles was ist ist, insofern es ist; die absolute Identität;⁴ alles ist Eins; Eins ist Alles; Gott ist das All selbst.⁵

History, like nature, was a self-manifestation of God, but in terms of the ideal - 'ein grosses Gedicht des Weltgeists!⁶ eine successiv sich entwickelnde Offenbarung Gottes;⁷ ein Epos, im Geiste Gottes gedichtet.⁸

It is worthy of note that Schelling, with Herder, attacked Spinoza on the ground that the divine unity which he postulated was that of a dead matter:

eine todte, unbewegte, unlebendige (nur substanzielle) Alleinheit.⁹

¹ S.S.W.VI,1 p.56 'Gott ist das unmittelbare AM sich der Ge-
² Ibid.V,1 pp.118-120 ³ Ibid.loc.cit. /-schichte'
³ Ibid.VI,1 pp.156 ff. ⁴ Ibid.loc.cit.
⁶ Ibid.V,1 p.445 ⁵ Ibid.loc.cit.
⁷ Ibid.VI,1 p.57 ⁶ Ibid.VI,1 p.445 ff.
⁸ Ibid.loc.cit. ⁹ Ibid.II,2 pp.49 ff.
Schelling himself wished to substitute for this Pantheism, not Theism, but the true Monotheism, the Triunity in which plurality exists side by side with unity, and in which movement is allowed for, the theogonic process. The world for Schelling was a reflection at all points of this divinity (and of the divine process in which the universe lay), in different ways and on successive levels.

Schleiermacher never allowed himself to be entangled, like Schelling, in a complicated net-work of speculation, but basically he conceived of God in his relationship to the world in very similar fashion. For Schleiermacher, as for Schelling, God was the Absolute, 'das Universum' - in the first edition of the 'Reden' indeed the name God did not appear and a particular attack was launched against the attributing to the Deity of personality, which meant the identification of Him solely with humanity:

die Menschheit ist nicht mein Alles....Kann also ein Gott, der nur sein der Genius der Menschheit wäre, das Höchste meiner Religion sein?

Humanity was for Schleiermacher but one manifestation of the Godhead:

nur Darstellung einer einzigen Modifikation seiner Elemente;

the Godhead being at once the sum-total of all things, (or the world-spirit at work in all things,) and a totality above all things.

In God there was both plurality and unity. False views stressed either the unity - God as blind fate (the materialistic Spinozism condemned by Schelling) - with the result that God was identified with matter, and in crude minds idolatry followed; or else they stressed the plurality - God in all individual things - with polytheism as the inevitable consequence. The true view recognised that God was
the totality: Einheit in der Vielheit.\(^1\) The conception of God advanced by Schleiermacher was little more than that of a Spinozistic pantheism, developed however on more spiritual, or rather more subjective lines: in the phrase of Haym 'eine Verinnerlichter Spinozismus'.\(^2\) Schleiermacher himself was fully conscious of his debt to Spinoza, and like Novalis he eulogised him as den heiligen, verstossenen Spinoza......voll Religion war er und vollheiligen Geistes.\(^3\)

Several important secondary thoughts had their origin in this first conception of God as the universal All. First, all things were seen by Schleiermacher to be manifestations of God under some particular form, the world-spirit being everywhere revealed: der Geist der Welt offenbart sich im Kleinsten eben so vollkommen und sichtbar als im Grössten.\(^4\)

The use of the Spinozistic term 'modification' in this connection has already been noted.\(^5\) Second, Schleiermacher came to regard it as the nature and aim of true religion to contemplate and to love the totality as revealed in the individual phenomena, the final goal of religion being the reabsorption of the ego into the infinite all. Thus 'Religion zu haben' is equated with 'die Anschaung des Universums';\(^6\) den Weltgeist zu lieben und freudig seinen Werken zuzuschauen ist das Ziel unserer Religion;\(^7\) erinnert euch, wie alles in (der Religion) alles darauf hinstrebt, dass wir durch das Anschauen des Universums so viel als möglich eins mit ihm werden sollen.\(^8\)

Third, Schleiermacher was led by his concept of the self-manifestation of the world-spirit to the further thought of activity as the underlying reality in both the universe and the Godhead:

\(^1\) Reden pp.92-93
\(^2\) H.R.S.p.482
\(^3\) Reden p.40
\(^4\) Ibid.p.63
\(^5\) Ibid.p.76
\(^6\) Ibid.p.58
\(^7\) Ibid.p.63
\(^8\) Ibid.p.95
The power of the impact made by the dynamic world-view of Herder upon the older static Spinozism is clearly to be seen at this point. Finally, postulating as he did the reality of the individual only as a mirror of the universal, Schleiermacher could hold no brief for views which exalted the individual over against the whole, and the belief in a personal immortality roused him to indignant protest: it was against the principles of all true religion. The hope of true religion was the hope of a reabsorption into the universal being:

im Einen und Allen zu leben.

In the second edition of the 'Reden' Schleiermacher modified many of the more drastic earlier statements: for example, the term 'God' was re-introduced. There was an even more pronounced return to orthodox conceptions in the 'Glaubenslehre', in which personal qualities were attributed to God, the creation ex nihilo affirmed, and the transcendence of God as something more than the totality of created or visible things ('die Ganzheit und Gesammtheit alles Endlichen') maintained. The Romantic doctrines were never completely abandoned: God was still the totality of things; he was immanent and active in all phenomena, in each individual unit; he was self-revealed and to be known in and through the contemplation of the external world; but Schleiermacher had moved to a more conservatively Christian position.

That the thinking of Romanticism upon God in his relation to the universe is parallel to that of Herder is obvious even from an elementary comparison of the leading concepts in both teachings. Indeed for the most part Romantic views upon God were no more than a

1 Reden p.63
2 Ibid.pp.95-96
3 Ibid.p.96
4 Der Christliche Glaube I pp.
5 Ibid.pp.170 ff
6 Ibid.p.157
further development of Spinozism, as it had already been modified by Herder (in terms of Leibnizian concepts) and as now reorientated by idealistic and mystical ideas. The three central points in the teaching of Herder: that God was in all things; that God was active in all things; that God was self-revealed in all things; these were the points in which in one form or another recurred in all the writings of the Romantics, and upon which their philosophy, like the of Herder, finally rested. There were naturally minor differences in outworking and presentation, but between the naturalistic panentheism of Herder, with its straightforward evolutionary teaching, and the more complicated pantheism of the Romantics, with the involved historical and theosophical processes, the final difference was in degree and in detail, not in essence or in kind.

2. THE APPROACH TO CHRISTIANITY The Romantic doctrine of God has been treated separately because it bulked large, and was of decisive importance in the Romantic view of the universe, and because in any case it was not necessarily bound up with a Christian outlook. The other theological concepts, with the one exception, Cosmic Optimism, were all connected to a greater or lesser extent with the general attitude of the Romantics towards the Christian faith, and although they are not unimportant in themselves and merit a more detailed consideration, they may for convenience be treated together in an examination of the whole approach of the Romantics to Christianity. The main topics around which the discussion naturally centres are: Christianity, as itself a religion, and in relation to other religions; Jesus Christ, the head and founder of Christianity, his person and historical significance; the Bible, as revelation, its position over against other religious and poetic books;
man, in his relation to God; finally, such subsidiary matters as immortality, miracles and inspiration, and other questions already implied in the more important and primary themes.

Now in spite of the hostility displayed towards him by the orthodox, the attitude of even the idealist Fichte towards Christianity (as such) was not one of antagonism but of accommodation. In this respect he was at one with the Romantic school, although in the methods of accommodation adopted he differed at several points. For Fichte, Christianity in its pure form was no more and no less than the religion of reason, the final concrete expression of that true religion which was the original religion of the race:

die wahre Religion des Normalvolks.2

Fichte was careful, however, to make the distinction, in his case derived almost certainly from Kant, between the essential content of Christianity and its historical form.3 The former alone had a final; the latter only a subsidiary value, as symbol. In Christianity three great truths were represented — this applied only to the pure Johannine Asiatic form and not to the Judaic Pauline, which Fichte rejected — the first truth, that God and man are one,5 the second, that man must die to the world of sense:

wohl muss man der Welt erst absterben,6

the third, that man is called upon to live a life of pure morality:

die Religion ist die Liebe des göttlichen Lebens und Willen.7

Strongly insisting as he did upon the autonomy of the moral will, Fichte had little use for a doctrine of sin, and the only moral ev-

1 Hirsch: Christentum und Geschichte bei Fichte p.12 Fichte
4 Fichte S.W.VII pp.96 ff. 5 Hirsch op.cit.p.47
6 Fichte S.W.II p.292 Leon op.cit.II p.266
7 Fichte S.W.VII pp.236-237
which he allowed was either imperfection or lack of effort. 1 Fichte believed in, but was not greatly concerned about the immortality of the individual Ego. 2 Jesus in the eyes of Fichte was outstanding, not as the Incarnate Son of God or the Saviour, but as the mediator and pattern, with whom the second religious age commenced, that of pure truth given under the form of symbol, (the third age, for which this was a preparation, being that of pure truth alone, an age of pure humanity in which forms and symbols would no longer be required). The influence of Lessing is marked at this point. Such concepts as revelation and miracle did not have any place in Fichte's religious thinking, since for him everything was revelation and every act of nature a divine act and thus a miracle. 3

The religious teaching of Hegel was very largely a development and elaboration of that of Fichte, and the main points are substantially the same. Christianity was again the absolute religion, religion itself; 4 the historical form was again sundered from the inward content (identified with Hegelianism, its pure expression in philosophy); 5 the oneness of God and man was seen to be the main lesson of the Incarnation ('ein höherer Anthropomorphismus'); 6 self-realisation through self-sacrifice was put forward as the central message of the Christian faith; 7 miracles were denied. 8 When Hegel came to speak of Christianity in its historical form he stressed the relative value of all religious forms and worked out a threefold scheme of religious development: natural religions; transitional (i.e. those in which there were some spiritual elements); spiritual

1 Hirsch op.cit.pp.10f. 2 Ibid.loc.cit. 3 Ibid.p.30 4 Mackintosh op.cit.p.255 5 Stace op.cit.Par.717 6 Hegel S.W.IX p.331 (Mackintosh 7 E.Caird: Hegel pp.43-44 8 Mackintosh loc.cit. / op.cit.p.256
religion or Christianity, the highest possible religious form.1

The interest of Hölderlin in Christianity was in the main historical rather than theological (despite his years of theological training), and the most important points in his approach to Christianity have already emerged. Hölderlin seems to have found himself torn between a repudiation of Christian doctrine, the inevitable consequence of his naturalism and his enthusiasm for the classical paganism, and an attraction to the Christian ethic and teaching, the result largely of his reverence for the person and life of Christ.2 On the one hand then he reacted violently against Christianity, its views of immortality, its ethic, its doctrine of sin; he found in the unnatural Christian age the age of broken harmony, of darkness, of decay, of true sin.3 On the other hand, especially in the later poems, he found for Christianity a high place in the triadic process, and for the Christian teaching a higher meaning and truth. Christ was now the last of the ancient gods, with whose death the naturalistic age came to an end;4 but also the inaugurator of the new age, when in a realisation of perfect and universal love, by a voluntary self-surrender, man would again be united with nature,5 and there would be a new 'Brautfest Menschen und Götter'.6 These later ideas were only suggested in a vague way and were never clearly stated or developed by Hölderlin. The attraction of Hölderlin towards a Johannine form of Christianity, the pure religion of universal love, is a characteristic Romantic feature and is worthy of note.7

Novalis inclined both temperamentally and by upbringing

1 Stace op.cit.Par.717  
3 Ibid.loc.cit.  
4 Cf.Gedichte (Closs) p.103  
5 Peacock op.cit.pp.104-105; Closs (Introduction p.31). Peacock quotes the phrase of K.Vigter 'pantheistischer Chilia
damus' (Die Lyrik Hőderlins p.145) but doubts whether it has any real meaning.  
6 Cf.Gedichte p.125  
7 Ibid.pp.130 ff.
towards religion of a poetical and emotional type. With him then there appeared an element so far lacking, the stress upon Christianity as the religion, not off the reason and the mind, but of feeling and of the heart:

Religion ist die Synthesis von Gefühl und Gedanke ohne Wissen. Christianity was for Novalis, as for the others, the true religion, religion in its essence:

es gibt keine Religion, die nicht Christentum wäre.

The dream of Novalis was of the realisation of this quintessential religion apart from forms in a new and wider Catholicism of a mystic al type. Several important points must be noticed: first, that Novalis saw in Böhme the mystic and Zinzendorf the Pietist the prophets of that new age, which was also to be the age of pure humanity; second, that he did not confine revelation to one book or to one creed - for Novalis too everything was revelation -

die ganze Geschichte ist Evangelium;

third, he sought after the distinction between the outward form of a religion and its inward content, but seems to have had doubts as to whether this distinction could properly be made:

Begriff eines Evangelii... muss es durchaus historisch (i.e. an historical record, the record of concrete events) sein, oder ist die Geschichte nur Vehikel? (i.e. a means of conveying spiritual truth or teaching);

fourth, he saw in prayer the very essence of religion:

Beten ist in der Religion, was Denken in der Philosophie.

The religious poems of Novalis reveal a warm emotional attachment to the person of Christ, as for example 'Wenn ich ihn nur

1 N.S.III S.H.Sctn.1141
2 Ibid.v.B.Sctn.115
3 Ibid.II p.45
4 Ibid.p.29
5 Ibid.III v.B.Sctn.299
6 Ibid.S.H.Sctn.606
7 Ibid.II Sctn.371
habe' or 'Wenn alle untreu werden',¹ and the sympathy of Novalis with mediaeval Catholicism, even with the cult of the Virgin,² is here well to the fore. There are hints that Novalis, unlike perhaps the majority of his contemporaries, felt the need for a more concrete doctrine of sin, partly no doubt as a personal unworthiness:

je sündiger man sich fühlt, desto christlicher ist man;³ partly as a bondage of the will, a teaching connected by Novalis with pantheistic determinism:

die Lehre vom servo arbitrio ist realistisch und spinozistisch.⁴

Significantly, however, Novalis finds in sin merely the antithesis which makes possible the more glorious synthesis:

Sünde ist der grosse Reiz für die Liebe der Gottheit... unbedingte Vereinigung mit der Gottheit ist der Zweck der Sünde und Liebe.⁵

With Novalis there was of course no theological formulation, but it is not too much to say that in him the new theological movement, that movement which found in Christianity the supreme religion of the heart, which emotionalised and subjectivised faith, which substituted the absolute of the emotion for the absolute of reason, which separated inward religious feeling from outward historical and dogmatic forms, it is not too much to say that in him this movement found an early poetical and fragmentary expression.

The religious thinking of Friedrich Schlegel during his Romantic years took a very similar course, except that Schlegel, whose interest in religion was largely the result of his contacts with Novalis and Schleiermacher, made far greater play of the cultural aspect. The first aim of Schlegel in the religious sphere

1 N.S.I pp.69 ff.
2 Ibid.pp.34 ff.
3 Ibid.II Sctn.366
5 Ibid.loc.cit.
was to found a new religion which should be culture expressed in terms of feeling, the conjunction of poetry and philosophy. ¹ This religion was to be the centre around which all life should revolve:

die Religion ist das Centrum aller übrigen; ²
die centripetale und centrifugale Kraft. ³

As the quintessential faith ⁴ this was to be the religion of pure humanity, ⁵ mediated by artists and men of culture:

ejeder Künstler ist Mittler für alle übrigen. ⁶

This was clearly little more than a development and restatement of ideas which derived from Hamann and Herder, already remoulded by Novalis and Schleiermacher. Schlegel, mainly perhaps under the influence of Novalis and of his own Indian studies, also no doubt of Schelling, quickly moved over from the earlier cultural to theosophical and mystical forms of religion, and this was the beginning of that process which led him finally, by a fusion of mysticism and mediaevalism, into the Roman Catholic church. ⁷ For Schlegel, as for others, Christianity was religion itself - 'die Religion der Religion' to adopt the common phrase. The central teaching of Christianity was the unity of God and man, the message of all religion:

Religion besteht in der Vereinigung mit dem Ganzen. ... ³³
Ihr letzter Zweck ist die Gottheit, oder die absolute Identität.

Like Novalis Schlegel had, however, some feeling for the contradiction in life, the dialectic of good and evil in historical movement:

der unentschiedenes Kampf des Guten und des Bösen. ¹⁰

Of the other religious ideas in the writings of Schlegel the most

¹ M.II Ideen 4; 34; 46; 85 etc.  ² Ibid. 31
³ Ibid. 31 ⁴ Ibid. 14
⁵ Ibid. 7; 95 ⁶ Ibid. 44
⁶ Ibid. 191 ⁷ Ibid. loc. cit.
⁸ Ibid. p.219 Cf. too M.II Ideen 63 'Die eigentliche Centralanschauung des Christenthums ist die Sünde'
important and characteristic were; the identification of freedom or will in man with the imago Dei: l'étincelle divine;¹ and the concept of religion as contemplation and feeling;

Anschauung des Endlichen, Gefühl des Unendlichen;² but neither of these ideas was in any way original in Schlegel. Indeed it may be said of Schlegel as a whole that he made little positive contribution to the religious thinking of Romanticism and that for the most part he did little more than repeat the generalities of his circle. The later theological development in the Catholic writings is not without interest at some points, the discussion of revelation in the 'Jacobiaufsätze' for example, but it is beyond the scope of the present study.

Schelling and Schleiermacher were the two Romantic writers who tackled the problem of Christianity, and of religion in general, most fully, and from whom the thoughts which found expression in Schlegel, and even to some extent in Novalis, ultimately derived. Schelling was first attracted to the study of Christianity by his interest in the early history of the race (during his university years) and by his mythological studies and speculations. He soon arrived at the first and central principle, that just as all life is an expression of the one Absolute, just as all philosophical systems are statements of the one truth, now from the realistic, now from the idealistic side, so too all religions reflect and proclaim the same Absolute truth, the mythological faiths consciously, Christianity consciously; the truth of religion being again, as with Fichte and Hegel, identified with the pure truth of philosophy:

wir werden in den Philosophien und Religionen der alten Welt noch bewusstlos und unvollständig, was bei uns mit Bewusstseyn und vollständig sich gleichsam entwickelt finden.³

¹ Körner p.238 ² Ibid p.249 There is a distinct between 'intuition,' whose object is 'le fini,' and 'sentiment,' 'l'infini'
³ S.S.W.I, I p.481
For Schelling, mythology was religion on the natural plane, Christianity, true religion, philosophy, a statement of the content of religion in purely spiritual terms. In every case the essential content was the same, but three stages in expression were thus discerned: natürliche Religion, geoffenbarte Religion, philosophische Religion, Erkenntnis.

That this was a further development of the schema of Lessing is manifest, but it must be noted that Schelling distinguished between all these religious forms and rational religion, which he bluntly rejected, and further that these three forms of religion were all manifestations in the religious sphere of the one reality, the underlying theogonic process.

It was in the discussion of revelation or revealed religion itself that Schelling developed more largely his ideas upon the relationship of Christianity to history, as indeed to the universe as a whole. Schelling here accepted the Christian doctrines as a statement in terms of revelation of basic truths, truths which had already been expressed unconsciously and naturalistically in the mythologies, and which Schelling himself was able to express in terms of pure thought or philosophy. He endorsed for example the doctrine of the Triunity, which represented the theogonic process. In Christianity the representation was inward and esoteric, the process being within the individual himself. Thus Schelling could write:

Offenbarung ist eine innere Geschichte.

The characteristic feature of the Christian religion was then a sub-

1 S.S.W. III, 2 p. 192
2 Ibid. loc. cit.
3 Ibid. pp. 310 ff.
4 Ibid. IV, 2 pp. 3 f.
jective experience i.e. faith:

der Glaube ist allerdings etwas Subjektives.¹

When he came to discuss the central teaching of Christianity, the person of Christ, Schelling found in an historical figure,² who fulfilled in historical symbol the role of reconciler. In Jesus the movement away from the life of spirit into the real:

der Ausgang der Menschheit von ihrem Centro,³

in him this movement, which was the true fall, reached its climax with a full incarnation; and by an act of self-renunciation at the Cross, a new synthesis was made possible, and the way prepared for the new age of pure spirit which began at Pentecost. This teaching is summed up in the pregnant sentence:

The two truths here expressed, the Fall and the Reconciliation in Christ, were of course ultimately theosophical, but they found in Christ a concrete historical embodiment or manifestation,⁵ and by faith they become the inward experience of the individual believer.

It must be stressed that Schelling did accept Christianity as a full statement of the basic truth behind and under all things. That is why he could speak of it as the universal religion 'das wahrhaft Allgemeine',⁶ and the original faith of man, 'so alt als die Welt'.⁷ It must also be stressed, however, that Christianity was for Schelling only one form of that theosophically conceived truth which found other forms of expression in mythology and in philosophy. The

¹ S.S.W. IV, 2 p. 16
² Ibid. p. 223
³ Ibid. VI, 1 p. 57
⁴ Ibid. IV, 2 p. 237; V, 1 p. 234
⁵ Ibid. V, 1 p. 294; IV, 2 pp. 36 ff.
⁶ Ibid. III, 2 p. 136
⁷ Ibid. loc. cit.
various Christian doctrines were thus related to theosophical concepts: the Trinity to the theogonic process;¹ the Fall to the movement into reality; the creation;² the Reconciliation to the fulfilment of this movement and its reversal by a voluntary death to reality, to the world of matter;⁴ Revelation itself to esoteric individual understanding.⁵

Further points in Schelling's reconstruction which must be mentioned include: first, his classification of the Old Testament, which was seen to be revelation working through mythology, and thus a mythological book;⁶ second, his view of miracles, which were for him events miraculous only in relation to the known order, but not in consequence outside order altogether:

nur Wunder in Bezug auf die gemeine Ordnung der Dinge, aber in der höheren.....selbst nur natürlich;⁷

third, his belief in the existence of a daemonic spirit or principle, the principle of Nicht-Seyn, together with a blunt assertion of the doctrine of radical evil in man:

die Erbsündé oder das radicale Böse, an dessen Daseyn nur eine seichte Philosophie zu zweifeln vermag;⁹

fourth, his introduction of the theosophical process into historical Christianity itself, in which the movement was from the Petrine, thesis, through the Pauline, antithesis, to the Johannine faith, synthesis;¹⁰ finally, his later reaction against too great an emotionalising of religion:

¹ S.S.W.III, 2 p.136 ⁴ Ibid.p.310 ff.
² Ibid.pp.349 f.; 411 ff. ⁵ Ibid.p.131
³ Ibid.p.137-138 ⁶ Ibid.iv, 228x2x2 pp.236 ff.
⁷ Ibid.p.269; VI,1 p.561 In the discussion of the Fall sin in man was equated with a proud self-assertion. These doctrines were of course revelational, not ultimate truths and Schelling inclined at times to see Satan as the 'real' principle in the Godhead - he had at any rate a place in the divine economy and movement.
¹⁰ Ibid.pp.324 ff.
Religion ist höher als Andacht und als Gefühl... ist Ausdruck der höchsten Einheit des Wissens und des Wandelns;\(^1\) Religion ist Erkenntnis des schlechthin-Idealen.\(^2\)

Christianity was for Schelling a true faith, but it had no claim to absoluteness over against other faiths. It expressed in clear and concrete, and, even more important, in conscious terms, that which was expressed in other religions unconsciously, figuratively and indistinctly, and that which has at last been stated ideally and in terms of ultimate reality in philosophy.\(^3\) If any claim for absoluteness could be made, it was only along the lines followed by the other Romantics: that in Christianity the reality which underlay all religions was revealed in purity and fulness:

das Christenthum, nicht als eine einzige empirische Erscheinung, sondern jene ewige Idee selbst.\(^4\)

It will be seen from this brief summary that Schelling had approached Christianity and religion mainly from the philosophical, or rather the theosophical angle, not from the theological, and that although religion and history were inseparably linked in his thinking, both were in effect subject to the higher theosophical construction of the Godhead as process. The concern of the theologian Schleiermacher was more directly with religion itself as an historical problem, and the approach of Schleiermacher, whose historical philosophy has already been seen to centre around the religious question, was almost exclusively from the historical standpoint. Philosophical considerations were not of course excluded, but they were not, as with Schelling, of primary importance.

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1 S.S.W.VI,1 p.553
2 Ibid.p.53
3 Ibid.I,2 pp.255 ff.;V,1 pp.120-124
4 Ibid.V,1 pp.303-305
macher was to a very large extent concentrated upon the crucial problem, the relationship of Christianity to other religions and to religion in general. A brief discussion of this point has already been necessary earlier in connection with the philosophy of history of Schleiermacher, and no more than a short summary need here be made. For Schleiermacher, at any rate for the Romantic Schleiermacher of the 'Reden', Christianity was not in any way an absolute religion, in the sense of an absoluteness which would exclude others, nor was it seen to make any claims in that direction. Christianity was the utterance, like any other religion, of a specific attitude towards the universe, a particular way of looking at things. As a religion it could be regarded as the highest so far, not because it was supernatural in origin, but because the view expressed in it was the highest and truest. Christianity was the highest religion, but the highest in a series, the finest religion at the third stage of development, the monotheistic, (the other two were the natural and the polytheistic). In the second edition of the 'Reden' Schleiermacher was willing to concede that Christianity was the highest possible religion, but this, not because it differed in kind from others, not because it rested upon a unique and final divine act of self-revelation, but because it was religion, the very core of religion, the quintessential religion itself, the attitude towards, and understanding of life found in it being those of all pure religion. The particular excellence of Christianity lay then entirely in the fact that it was grounded upon a view of life, an emotional experience, in which the ultimate truth

1 Süskind, op. cit.
2 Reden pp. 174 ff. Süskind, op. cit.
3 Reden p. 223
4 Reden p. 212 / pp. 25 ff.
5 Ibid., loc. cit.
6 Süskind pp. 21-23
7 Ibid., p. 26
was recognised, the truth that there is between the finite and the infinite a contradiction, and that religion is the removal of that contradiction by the reabsorption of the finite into the infinite:

It will be noticed that Christianity according to this conception made allowance for other religions as preliminary self-manifestations of God in the resolving of the antithesis.

Like Herder, Schleiermacher relativised all religious faiths and looked upon Christianity as the absolute only in so far as it was the quintessential religion. Three very important further developments were bound up with this relativisation. Schleiermacher had of course already separated the content religion from the outward forms religions: this was the basis upon which his relativisation and his reassessment of Christianity rested. Schleiermacher now proceeded to a redefinition of religion itself as distinct from the religions, this inner content religion being for him the all-important thing, the inner core of spirit and truth of which the systems were only expressions (nurtured in the schools,

die nichts anders sind als der Sitz und die Pflanzstätte des toten Buchstaben.3

The aim of the true theologian was always to pierce through the systems to the divine spark contained within:

diese himmliche Funken müsst ihr aufsuchen.4

In itself this separation of religion from the religions was not a

1 Reden p.212
2 Ibid.p.214
3 Ibid.p.21
4 Ibid.p.22
new one. Herder himself had insisted upon it in all his later writings, and the whole burden of Rationalism was that there was a general natural or rational religion apart from or within the creeds and faiths, the systems and dogmas. But Schleiermacher went a step further than all those who had proceeded him in that he redefined religion, not as the truth of reason — indeed he attacked the natural religion of the 'philosophes' as 'eine magre und dünne Religion':

die Negation alles Positiven und Charakteristischen in der Religion — 1 not as humanity, not as generous impulse, not even as mere feeling, but as a subjective emotional state, the individual contemplation of nature and of history, in a word of the 'Universum'. Religion was sundered from morality and metaphysics and identified with intuition and feeling:

die Religion befindet sich in einem schneidenden Gegensatz gegen Moral und Metaphysik.... ihr Wesen ist weder Denken noch Handeln, sondern Anschauung und Gefühl. 2

Schleiermacher thus severed the last ties between religion and an absolute,— whether it was the absolute of revelation, reason or humanity,— making of religion something purely subjective and therefore purely relative. If religion was indeed no more than 'Anschauen des Universums'; 3 then, although individual points of view would necessarily group themselves around central ones and religions would result in ein Individuum der Religion....kann nicht anders zustande gebracht werden, als dadurch, dass irgend eine einzelne Anschauung des Universums zum Zentralpunkt gemacht und alles darin auf sie bezogen wird — 4 although again some one central view would stand closest to that inner reality underlying all things, yet at the same time all religions

1 Reden pp. 201-202
2 Ibid. pp. 36-37
3 Ibid. p. 40
4 Ibid. p. 190
would be equally justified, a point Christianity itself was the first to admit:

unzählige Gestalten sind möglich.¹

A second development was this, that if religions, as the focal points, were relative to each other, then the religious leaders, those who mediated the new attitude, those who first led men to look at things in a particular way and from a particular point of view, these too were relative to each other, each justified in his own right. Schleiermacher stressed the tremendous importance of the mediator and his work. Mediatorship he saw to be one of the central doctrines of the Christian faith, and he himself in the 'Reden' began with a definition of mediators, 'das höhere Priestertum'², and a description of their office.³ Schleiermacher, however, resisted firmly the suggestion that there was only one mediator. For him there was a revelation and a mediator wherever there was a new religious approach. Christianity, as one way of looking at things, had naturally its own mediator, Jesus Christ, and in that Christianity was the highest religion and its approach the truest, Jesus Christ was the highest and the final mediator — this was recognised in the second edition.⁴ But Jesus Christ was not and did not claim to be the sole mediator: nie hat er behauptet....der einzige Mittler su sein⁵ indeed the true divinity of Christ did not lie in some mysterious, supernatural incarnation of a transcendent deity, but rather in the fact that Christ recognised the need for constant mediation as the means of restoring the broken unity between God and man:

das wahrhafte Göttliche(in Christo) ist die herrliche Klarheit,

1 Reden p.227
2 Ibid.p.9
3 Ibid.pp.7 ff.
4 Ibid.; Süsskind op.cit.pp.29-30
5 Reden p.222
zu welcher die grosse Idee..... dass alles Endliche höherer Vermittlungen bedarf, um mit der Gottheit zusammenzuhängen, sich in seiner Seele ausbildete.

It may be noted at this point that Schleiermacher, whose whole life and thought betrays a personal reverence and attachment to the person of Christ, was never willing to deny uniqueness to Christ categorically, but sought rather to explain that uniqueness in such a way as to bring it into line with his general assessment of religion and of religious leaders. It was upon this stone of stumbling that Schleiermacher fell in his attempt to erect a purely relative religious scheme.

The third development in the theology of Schleiermacher was, that as he had in the light of his subjective definition of religion reinterpreted both Christianity itself and also the person of Christ, so too he reinterpreted all the doctrines of Christianity, seeing in them no more than the formulations, the expressions in theological terms of subjective states. The process was that of a neological transmutation of dogma, but now the doctrines were not rationalised, but emotionalised and subjectivised. Schleiermacher himself stated clearly what the place and meaning of the dogmas was, and he gave several examples in illustration:


1 Reden p.220
3 Reden pp.84 ff.
The old dogmas were thus retained in name and as outward forms, but Schleiermacher emptied them completely of their original content and filled them with a new content drawn from his own fundamental conception of the universe and of religion.

The 'Christliche Glaube' belonged to a post-Romantic period in Schleiermacher's life, but even here the basic structure of Schleiermacher's theology was the same, except that now a greater stress was laid upon the absoluteness of Christianity and the uniqueness of Christ. The reinterpretation of the Christian doctrines as expressions of emotional states was now carried through systematically and in detail: this was indeed the major task which Schleiermacher had set himself. Religion itself was defined as 'Gefühl' rather than 'Anschauung', the main religious feeling being that of dependence: the Wesen der Frömigkeit ist dieses.....dass wir uns abhängig fühlen von Gott. The religions were the relative formulations of this subjective state of feeling. Christianity the highest because in it the feeling of dependence found perfect expression, Christianity being in fact the consciousness of salvation from the contradiction of life through the person of Jesus Christ:

das Bewusstseyn der Erlösung durch die Person Jesu von Nazareth. Christ himself was seen to be an archetype:

das Urbildliche in der Form des Geschichtlichen. He was divine because in him the consciousness of God was perfectly developed: das ihm einwohnende Gottesbewusstseyn war ein wahres Seyn Gottes in ihm.

His mediatorial work consisted in the impartation of his sinlessness
to believers and the sharing of his blessedness with them.\(^1\) Evil Schleiermacher minimised as a lack of self-consciousness, an imperfection ('Unvollkommenheit'), a good not yet achieved ('das nichtgewordene Gute'), a contradiction between flesh and spirit, a disproportionate growth of will in relation to understanding.\(^2\) In and through Christ evil was removed and the work of creation completed.\(^3\) Of the other Christian doctrines, the Holy Ghost was interpreted as the common spirit of the church;\(^3\) a the Scriptures - \(*x\) Schleiermacher ranked the Old Testament as inferior - as the first manifestation of the Christian faith:

das erste Glied in der fortlaufenden Reihe aller Darstellungen des christlichen Glaubens;\(^1\)

inspiration as the working of the common spirit of believers;\(^5\) revelation as the general, but not a particular working of God:

die heilige Schrift enthält die Offenbarung in sich, aber dies kann man von allen wahrhaft christlichen Reden und Schriften auch sagen........keineswegs darf man den Akt der Abfassung eines heiligen Buches, oder die ihr vorangehende...Gedankenerzeugung in der Seele des Schriftstellers, als einen Akt göttlicher Offenbarung ansehen;\(^6\)

miracles as phenomena as they appear to the eye of faith;\(^7\) faith itself as inner experience ('Innere Erfahrung').\(^3\)

Pietism, which sought in religion an individual emotional experience; Idealism, which underlined afresh the importance of the subjective as the final reality; the Neology, which taught to transmute the doctrines of Christianity whilst retaining the names and the outward forms; Empiricism, which insisted upon historical observation, and naturalised and relativised history: all these came together in Schleiermacher in an original and attractive fusion, and

it was thus that the Romantic theology properly speaking was born. It need hardly be recalled that it was a similar, although more tentative fusion which had already been effected in Herder himself, the major difference being that in Herder the rationalistic element was still too strong, and the identification of religion was with an absolute of reason or humanity rather than with the pure relative of subjective feeling and contemplation. Consciously or unconsciously Schleiermacher was without doubt the completer of the task which Herder had already begun, and in spite of the great difference which exists, a difference in spirit far more than in terminology, the leading ideas of both were substantially the same. In both, religion was regarded historically and found to be relative; in both, Christianity was an absolute only in so far as it was identified with religion itself; in both, religion and religious forms were differentiated; in both, traditional doctrines were accepted, but robbed of concrete meaning; in both, revelation was general and meant no more than new teaching, God-given in the sense that God manifested himself at all points; in both, Christ was the supreme religious teacher, the archetypal man, the highest point in revelation; in both, inspiration was equated with religious and poetic enthusiasm; in both, evil was regarded as deficiency, something negative only; in both, miracle was the term of faith for natural phenomenon; in both, finally, God was immanent in and was all things. The Romantic theology in its more general aspect was a completion, by a new and more radical process of subjectivisation, of that relativising and transvaluing of the Christian religion which had already been advanced so far by Herder himself.
3. OPTIMISM  The fact that the Romantic view of the universe was ultimately pantheistic meant inevitably that the Romantics, like Herder, were forced into a philosophical optimism in their final estimate. It is true of course that the Romantic thinkers and poets had all a feeling for the dark and tragic aspects of life as Leibniz and Shaftesbury had never had, and Herder only during the Sturm und Drang years. History itself was for the Romantics not a uniform progression, but a triadic process, in which the dark and evil alternated with the good. At the same time the final outlook of the Romantics was one of hope, and of certainty that the good would prevail. The Romantic world, which was the self-manifestation of God in his power and wisdom, was so ordered that in the process the antithesis itself was the means to the eventual attainment of the more glorious synthesis.

The problem of evil in the world, and of its relation to the general order, was seldom dealt with by the Romantics as a separate problem, but it is everywhere apparent that the outlook is one of optimism. The idealists Fichte and Hegel roundly asserted that by a wise and providential ordering everything served to advance the final good: 1 Alles dient zur Verbesserung und Bildung der Menschheit. 2 They were emphatic that there was no ultimate reality in that which appeared to be evil. 3 Fichte looked upon evil merely as a temporary slowing down of the process of development. 4 Like Herder, Fichte was not satisfied with the transcendentalist concept of a choice of the best of possible worlds, and he insisted that this present world was the only possible:

1 Stace op.cit. Paragraph 633; Hirsch op.cit.p.9
2 Fichte S.W.II p.304
3 Cf.Hegel S.W.p.19
4 Hirsch op.cit. p.9
The only possible world was however a good world 'eine durchaus gute'.

The Romantics themselves, notwithstanding their pronounced dissatisfaction with contemporary life, were all convinced, Wild-erlin not excepted, that the new golden age, the age of synthesis, was dawning, that nature and history were in the last analysis good, that the beneficent powers in the universe were stronger than the destructive, that the destiny which controlled events was no blind and purposeless fate but the wise and benevolent compulsion of immanent godhead. Philosophical discussions of the question are not numerous, but that of Schlegel, lacking as it does any original or distinctive features, is fairly representative. Schlegel acknowledged freely the existence of evil, but he maintained, with Leibniz, that an all-powerful God had chosen the best possible world. This world was for Schlegel still in a process of development, and in it evil was allowed as that contradiction which was necessary to stimulate growth:

alles Werden setzt einen Widerstand voraus......das böse Prinzip. Evil was thus the antithesis in the world-process, and it came to be equated with incompleteness or imperfection: it was that which yet remained to be done in the evolving universe.

Schlegel had obviously taken over many of these ideas from Leibniz and Herder, but it seems certain that he owed his final interpretation of evil mainly to Schleiermacher and Schelling, both of whom propounded very similar solutions. Schleiermacher found in the universal process active forces of opposition and destruction.

1 Fichte S.W. II p.304  
2 Ibid.loc.cit.  
3 Körner op.cit.p.245  
4 Ibid.p.172  
5 Ibid.p.246  
6 Ibid.p.156  
7 Ibid.Der Christliche Glaube I pp.222 ff.
the superiority of the Christian religion lay in this fact, that it rested upon a view of things which acknowledged the contradiction and found a solution in mediatorial action, supremely in the work of Jesus Christ himself. 1 The place of evil in the theology of Schleiermacher was not large. For him, as for others, evil meant imperfection or lack. In the "Glaubenslehre" he defined it as the other side of the good, asserting that everything which was good from the one side was evil if viewed from the other. 2 Death as such had no place whatever in his outlook and came to be equated with change. 3 Death had this value, that it stimulated the instinct of self-preservation and that finally it became the means to new life. Schleiermacher was at one with Herder and Fichte in rejecting the Leibnizian concept of a best of possible worlds. 4 For him there was no difference between the actual and the possible, or between will and attainment:

Wollen ist können. 5

The world as it was was for him, however, a good world.

The teaching of Schelling was on the surface more radical, especially in the discussion of Christian doctrines, in which the existence of an evil principle was postulated, a principle which in the moral sphere had entered the world at the fall. 6 The defeat of this principle had been assured, however, by the voluntary death of Christ upon the Cross, which was a submission of the human to the universal will, or alternatively a destruction of the finite and natural in the person of the incarnate Son and a resurrection to spiritual life. The radical nature of evil was thus asserted, but so too was its final overthrow. Schelling did not stop at this point, but in his theo-

1 Reden p. 212
2 Der Christliche Glaube I p. 227; II
3 Ibid. I pp. 230 ff.
4 Ibid. I pp. 256-259 /-pp. 76-89
5 Ibid. I p. 290
6 S.S.W. III, 2 pp. 349 ff.
-sophical speculations he went on to introduce the dialectical process into the godhead itself.¹ The role of evil was now that of the contradictory antithesis which alone could bring about the final synthesis. It was in the light of this development that Schelling could assign to Satan, the symbol of the contradictory and negative spirit, a definite position in the world-order:

Satan ist ein zur göttlichen Ökonomie gehöriges Prinzip.²

For Schelling, as for the other Romantics, death had no decisive significance, and was no more than the process of transition to higher life.³

The point need not be laboured, but it can be stated categorically that, although the Romantic understanding of life made possible an appreciation of the darker aspects, although the historical process as the Romantics viewed it allowed, and indeed demanded the element of contradiction, yet for the Romantics any system other than a philosophical optimism was excluded. If there was evil in the world, it was subservient to the good; if there was destructiveness, it was a means to greater creativity; if there was death, it was the condition of higher life; if there was the contradiction, it was temporary only, and existed only that the final synthesis might be achieved. The triadic view admitted evil, but incorporated it into the world process, and saw it even as one stage in the self-revelation of God. The optimism of the Romantics was less simple than that of Leibniz or of the 'philosophes', but it was in the last resort a restatement of that optimism on a new and more realistic basis. Being as it was a philosophy of immanent godhead, the philosophy of history of Romanticism could not but be, like that of Herder, a theodicy.

¹ Sitzber. III, 2 pp. 250 ff.
² Ibid. IV, 2 p. 247
³ Ibid. IV, 1 p. 146
CHAPTER X  HERDER'S CONTRIBUTION TO ROMANTIC THOUGHT

In the preceeding examinations of the philosophy of history of Herder and the Romantic philosophies the points of comparison and of contrast between Herder and the Romantics have already emerged, and notwithstanding the obvious differences attributable to Idealism, the general similarity, both in the content and structure of thought, and also in the manner of approach, has become evident. It now remains in this concluding chapter briefly to gather together in a broader and more comprehensive manner the divergent and the parallel lines of thought, and to attempt an assessment of the positive contribution made by Herder in relation to that made by other thinkers.

For the purpose of this summary and assessment it will be necessary to divide the main ideas of the Romantic philosophy and theology into three main groups. To the first group will belong those ideas which without question derived from idealistic sources, ideas which had little or no place in, or were even antithetical to Herder's thought. The separation of this element is not a difficult task, since the relations of Romanticism with Idealism, themselves an obvious fact of history, were for the most part immediate and direct, complicating interfusions in transmission thus being avoided. A primary separation of these ideas will serve a double purpose: first, to circumscribe the sphere of Herder's influence; second, to make it plain to what extent the influence of Herder was counter-balanced by an equally powerful and hostile thought-trend.

The second group will consist of those ideas which manifestly belong to the koine of thought of the age, ideas which appeared in Herder and also in the Romantics, but which were not in any sense
peculiar to them, and which cannot therefore, as they appeared in the Romantics, be attributed to the particular or direct influence of Herder. A large number of parallel passages and lines of thought in Herder and the Romantics can and ought to be explained in this way, and the common evil of much philosophical and literary criticism, that of establishing a direct connection upon the strength of parallel statements and concepts which were in fact common to the age as a whole, must be recognised and avoided. The truth is surely plain enough, as a little reflection suggests, and the slightest acquaintance with the background proves, that in the XVIII as in every other century there were certain ideas which were 'in the air', ideas which were discussed and in different ways elaborated by almost every writer. If a common source is to be found for these ideas, it must, in so far as Germany is concerned, be sought in Leibniz.

Whilst, however, the danger of confusing general with particular relationships must be avoided, it must not be thought that because an idea was common to the age, there was in respect of that idea no direct action of one thinker upon another. Broadly speaking, all ideas are common to an age. What is particular is the way in which they are developed, the form which they assume, the emphasis which is laid upon them. Through the particular development an individual influence of a direct character can be exercised. In the specific case of Herder and the Romantics there are instances in which the closeness with which the statements of ideas resemble each other, and the similarity of the emphasis laid upon them, suggest that it was as they had been developed by Herder (and perhaps reabsorbed into the thought of the age) that these ideas were carried over into the Romantic mind, that it was in the form given to them
by Herder that the Romantics first became cognisant with them, and that the stress placed upon them by Herder determined their relative importance in the Romantic scheme. The fact that an idea was common to the age does not exclude a secondary, and often very significant individual action of thinker upon thinker in relation to it.

Finally to the third group will belong those ideas which Romanticism clearly took over from Herder himself (or Herder with Goethe), and which must therefore be reckoned as a positive contribution made by Herder to the Romantic philosophy. It is evident that these ideas too were in a sense common to the age, since no thoughts are completely original, but they are to be distinguished from the ideas which belong to the second group by the fact that it was from Herder that these received a new orientation and emphasis, and that it was largely through him, and in the form impressed upon them by him, that they passed into the common stock of thought of the age. These were the ideas which had not merely been developed in a slightly different direction and with a slightly new emphasis by Herder, but which had in his mind undergone a radical reconstruction, and emerged in a new form and with a new standing.

Now of the ideas which definitely derived from hostile idealistic sources the significant ones have already been stated and treated in some detail, since they belong to the essence of Romantic thought, and only the barest recapitulation is therefore necessary. In the historico-philosophical field the following main points must be noted: the stress upon the autonomy of man, as a self-conscious being, morally free, rational and creative; the complementary rejection of a strict and binding empirical necessity (there was some hesitation in this rejection); the insistence upon a definite tel-
-eology, the postulating of an historical end, attainable, not by individuals, but only by the species, and through the state; the belief in the perfectibility of man as a moral and rational autonomous being (an influence of the older Rationalism is here discernible); the emphasis upon history as the conflict of the natural against the moral and the spiritual elements in man (the Romantics were torn between the naturalism of Rousseau and Herder which inclined them to favour the natural element, and the idealism of Kant and Fichte which taught them to condemn it, but the final balance lay with the exalting of reason and freedom over against nature); the substitution of a dialectical, or triadic process, for evolutionary development in the interpretation of the historical movement itself. In the theological field the influence of Idealism was less marked, but one or two small but not unimportant points must be noted: the stress upon the conflict of moral freedom against nature within man (manifestly derived from the Kantian and the Fichtean ethic); the emphasis upon self-conscious development and moral culture, with the accompanying hope of a final synthesis of nature and of freedom; the identification of Christianity, the symbolical expression, with idealistic thought, itself pure truth; even the subjectivisation of religion, which, although it was the product of many converging forces, could in a certain sense be regarded as an application to religion of the Transcendental Egoism. There were of course some other ideas which may be found in both Romanticism and Idealism, but which were ideas common to the age as a whole, and which must not therefore be reckoned in this group.

In spite of the gulf, indeed the open hostility, between Herder and Idealism, it would be exaggerated and false to imagine
that all the concepts derived from Idealism were distasteful to Herder, or that none of them had any place in his thought. For example Herder too had stressed the rationality and the freedom of man, and he too had for a while at Bückeburg conceived of history as a triadic process after the Rousseauistic pattern, with a dialectic of nature and reason. At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged that in respect of these ideas, and the forms which they assumed in Romantic thought, the influence exerted by Herder was negligible - the Bückeburg triadic construction of history is the one exception to this general rule. More than that, as far as the majority of the idealistic concepts were concerned, that of the teleology, for example, or the conflict with nature, the position taken up by the Idealists and the Romantics was the very antithesis of that which Herder had adopted. The truth must then be plainly stated, that a whole section of Romantic thought, a section which helped in large part to determine, if not the theology, at any rate the philosophy of history of Romanticism, that this important section not only owed nothing to Herder's influence, but was indeed a direct negation of that for which Herder had contended. It must be stated also, however, that in Romantic thought this idealistic element was never allowed to submerge the older naturalism, and that in the case of the triadic thesis the alternative of Herder was by many Romantics preferred to the Kantian reconstruction of Rousseau.

From this brief recapitulation a first conclusion may then be drawn, a conclusion which in view of the historical inter-relationships between Idealism and Romanticism has been obvious as a plain fact from the first, and which has already largely emerged in the main discussion, but which must now be restated for the sake of clar...
ity and completeness.

The first conclusion is: That there was in Romantic thought, especially in the Romantic philosophy of history, a large and important element which derived from idealistic sources; that in respect of this element the Romantics were not in any way indebted to Herder; that it was this element which, in its dialectical relationship to the naturalism of Herder, determined the Romantic interpretation of history; that in the development of that interpretation a not inconsiderable influence was exerted by Herder's 'Auch eine Philosophie'.

It follows naturally from this conclusion that any conception of Romanticism in which no account is taken of this idealistic element, as for example the view that Romanticism was no more than a development or a fulfilment of Herder or of the Sturm und Drang, is without sound foundation, and as far as the Romantic philosophy of history is concerned, misleading.

To that group of ideas which were held by both Herder and the Romantics in common with other writers of the century, many of the historico-philosophical concepts belong, as will be evident from the studies both of Herder's thought in its formation and also of the systems themselves. The principle of a continuity in nature and in history was advanced by both Herder and the Romantics, but this was obviously not a new or original thought, nor was it worked out in any very startling way, except that in Herder history itself was absorbed into nature. The doctrine of providence again was universally held: even those who rejected a particular providence and dealt so mercilessly with final causes continued to maintain an overruling or impelling of history towards the accomplishment of some end,
whether immanent or final. The belief in a retributive justice too was a current belief of the century - indeed the reality of punishment was one of the issues over which the neological battle was fought, and even Lessing was in favour of a Leibnizian retributive rather than a neological educative punishment. The prevalence of the idea of a divine education of the race, together with the attendant concepts, revelation as an aid to the propagation of the truths of reason, the divine origin of culture, Genesis as the record of that first culture, Christianity as the pure form of the early tradition and the fulfilment of Asiatic religions, the prevalence of these ideas does not need to be further emphasised. The suggestion that there is a transmigration of souls, with the cognate belief in a spirit-world, and the conception of man as the link between the world of spirit and that of matter, these again were widely mooted, especially towards the end of the century, and found expression in a great resurgence of occultism, mysticism and theosophy. The slogan 'humanity' was one which found favour in many circles, and there were many too who hoped that in a purified masonry a true brotherhood of man and a true humanity would be realised. In the theological sphere the belief that nature and history are a self-revelation of active Godhead was one which lay at the heart of the whole Sturm und Drang, and which had its roots in Shaftesbury, although it must be remembered that it was a belief which was in a large measure peculiar to the Sturm und Drang, and that Herder, the disciple of Hamann and teacher of Goethe, did at this point make a definite and positive contribution. The movement towards a re-interpretation of Christian doctrines, that movement which was carried forward in Herder's theological works, and which culminated in
the revolutionary subjectivisation of Schleiermacher, was of course the main German theological movement of the later XVIII century, and it is significant that the subjects which agitated Herder and which were prominent in the re-statement of Schleiermacher, as for example revelation, Grace, and miracles, although these are focus-points of the theological debate in any age, were also the subjects around which the neological controversy centred.

The more difficult question remains: to what extent did the treatment which these concepts received at Herder's hands determine the form in which they appeared amongst the Romantics and the emphasis which the Romantics laid upon them? A straightforward answer to this question is not in any case possible, since the extent to which Herder himself remoulded or developed the concepts varied in each individual instance. A general rule may be laid down, that where there was an individual development by Herder, it was in the direction of a poetical immanentist naturalising, but it will be clear that this development would not always be possible within the Romantic scheme. To take a concrete case, Herder developed the principle of continuity with a new profundity and comprehensiveness, including all phenomena within the one whole, but, in spite of a similar deep sense of continuity in Romantic thought, Idealism was now at work to prevent a complete identification of nature and history except as two sides of the one absolute. Other concepts were developed by Herder in the same naturalistic direction. Providence, in spite of Herder's alleged faith in a particular providence, became that immanent compulsion by which all things are as they are: but Romanticism, with its more pronounced teleology, inclined on the whole towards a more transcendental conception. Re-
tribution again was understood by Herder as an operation of natural law, the vengeance inevitably wreaked by nature upon organisms which sought to over-ride or to thwart her, but although this conception does play a big part in the Romantic constructions, especially in those of the poets Novalis and Hölderlin, the mastery of the human spirit over nature was commonly asserted. Herder made little contribution to the thought of a divine education, but developed the ancillary concept of a God-given revelation as the basis of the cultural tradition of the race, a revelation enshrined in Genesis, handed down through the Asiatic faiths, and finally purified and universalised in the Johannine writings. It has been demonstrated that the Romantics were more attracted to this theory than to the three-fold construction of Lessing, in spite of the visible influence exerted by the latter upon Schelling. Herder's developments of the common hypothesis of a transmigration undoubtedly left their mark upon Novalis, as is clear from the projected continuation of 'Heinrich von Ofterdingen', and especially upon Hölderlin, who was haunted by the thought of 'Tithon und Aurora', that great spirits periodically revisit the earth. The stress laid by Herder upon the position of man as a binding link has its counterpart in the similar strong emphasis in Romantic writings, and indeed at this point the phrases of Herder were taken up almost word for word. The concept 'humanity' was developed by Herder naturalistically, and came to mean not much more than self-realisation, that a man should be what he could be. Self-realisation was also a great goal and ideal of the Romantics, but except in Novalis and Hölderlin it was now conceived of idealistically, as autonomous, moral self-culture, rather than naturalistically, as the natural development of capacities implanted by nature.
Attention has been drawn to the important and definite contribution made by Herder to the Sturm und Drang concept of an active God self-revealed in all his works, a favourite theme of the Romantic writers, but this concept merges into the larger thought of an immanent Godhead, in which the influence of Herder was without question of a direct and positive character. It may be recalled at this point that Idealism itself, although it interpreted nature in terms of mind and thus reacted to some extent against the immanentist naturalism, had no basic quarrel with, and indeed continued to make use of, the widely current expressions 'self-revelation' and 'self-manifestation', understanding by them the representation of the absolute will or idea in successive sensual phenomena. For Romanticism proper the aesthetic immanence of Shaftesbury, Hamann and Herder, in which nature and history were as it were the poem of a divine creator, exercised a far greater appeal, and the idea of self-revelation and self-expression was everywhere well to the fore. At this point Romanticism undoubtedly inherited the Sturm und Drang tradition, further developing concepts which under the primary inspiration of Shaftesbury and Leibniz, Hamann, Herder and Goethe had established in the thought of the century. The general process of the Neology, the transmutation of Christian doctrines, had been carried forward a stage further by Herder, who as his particular contribution had initiated a new comparative study of the Bible and of religions, and brought to the fore the conception of religion itself as a matter of the feelings and of the heart rather than of the mind and of the reason. Whether or not the work of Herder exercised any real influence upon the Romantic theology of Schleiermacher, which was a much bolder step in the same direction must be a matter of pure conjecture, since there is no evidence of
any connection apart from the general similarity of ideas and some verbal resemblances. Schleiermacher's interpretation of dogmas as formal expressions of subjective emotional states was in any case far beyond anything that Herder had contemplated, in spite of the fact that Herder too had distinguished between religious forms and religion, and stressed the emotional aspect. In a broader sense both were moving in the same direction, but whereas the fusion in Herder was that of a poetical naturalism with Rationalism, in Schleiermacher it was that of Pietism and Idealism, with a naturalistic background. The claim that Herder exercised any real direct influence upon Schleiermacher would be difficult to make good.

The summarising and reconsideration of these leading ideas, common to the whole age, but in some cases developed in a new and important way by Herder, points to a second conclusion, a conclusion which it is difficult to state with any exactness, since it does not emerge of itself, and can only be reached by a careful balancing of the ideas of Herder and the Romantics both against each other and also against the complicated general ideas of the age.

The second conclusion may then be stated: That there was in Romantic thought a large element, which, whilst held in common with Herder, belonged to the general thought of the age; that upon the orientation and development of this element in Romanticism Herder did exercise a modifying influence, which varied with the individual concepts; that the extent of this influence was determined by the extent to which the naturalistic development of Herder could be harmoniously fused with the idealistic element.

The statement of these first conclusions leaves the way open for a final recapitulation and consideration of those ideas which
may rightly be included in the third group, ideas which, although not necessarily original in Herder, received their major development at his hands, and owe their predominance in Romantic, and indeed in modern thought as a whole, very largely to the emphasis laid upon them by him. These are naturally the ideas which must be regarded as the main and direct contribution of Herder to the Romantic philosophy of history and to the Romantic theology. As is only to be expected, they centre around that panentheistic naturalism which was Herder's final Weltanschauung, and which was also in substance, even when allowance is made for idealistic inroads, the final Weltanschauung of all Romantic thinkers. They may be briefly stated as follows: first, the principle of organic growth, with the cognate idea of a progress through growth and decline; second, the view that all cultures and religions are of relative and not of absolute value; third, the panentheistic conception itself, a conception in which, by a fusion of Leibnizianism and Spinozism, substance was defined dynamically as force rather than statically as extension.

The large place which these ideas occupied in Romantic thought has already been noted, but again it must be emphasised that these were for the Romantics underlying and central beliefs, not alien accretions. The principle of organic growth, Idealism notwithstanding, persisted in some form or another with all the Romantics. Even in the final interpretations, the cultures of the Ancient World continued to appear as natural genetic growths, and the conception of progress as a process in which new growth followed upon decay was at the heart of the Romantic philosophy of history, however idealistically worked out in the triadic schemes. The power of this principle of organic growth, which could be derived from no other thinker but
Herder, is most clearly manifest in the early literary writings of Friedrich Schlegel, who did his utmost to escape it.

Again, although Romanticism reacted against the complete rejection of absolute standards, although a teleology was reintroduced into history, yet at the same time the Romantics did in the main look upon culture and religion from a relative rather than an absolute standpoint, discerning a superiority only of degree, but not of final worth. This point could be abundantly illustrated from the literary writings of Schlegel and the early religious work of Schleiermacher: the literary characterisation of Schlegel implied an understanding of each writer in an for himself, without reference to an absolute ideal, whilst the subjectivisation of Schleiermacher led inevitably to a purely relative estimate of religions, religious books and religious dogmas. This relativity must like the principle of organic growth be traced back directly to Herder, since it was he who, foremost amongst the writers of the century, developed the relative method and favoured a relative approach both in literature and in religion alike.

Finally, and in spite of variations in statement, in the thought of Romanticism as well as that of Herder, the universe and God were both ultimately comprehended within the one monistic-pantheistic scheme - even in the thought of Idealism the same was true in an inverted sense. That this monistic pantheism had its source in those writers upon whose thought Herder himself drew, Leibniz, Shaftesbury and Spinoza, must of course be recognised, but none the less the character which it assumed in the Romantic works makes it clear, as witnessed in particular by the stress upon activity and the poetic conception, that it was not only inherited through
Herder, but that it was inherited in the form impressed upon it by Herder, that original and poetical fusion of the three thinkers. There were between Herder and the Romantics many vital differences: the conception of historical movement; that of the position of will in relation to nature; that of historical ends. Even ideas held in common were sometimes developed in different directions and with a different emphasis: the idea of providence and that of humanity.

The poetic naturalism inherited from Herder was in general affected at many points by the Idealism inherited from Kant through Fichte. Yet at the deepest level it must still be maintained that it was Herder's conception of God and the universe which was the Romantic conception. In the last analysis it was not the naturalistic, but the idealistic which was the irruptive influence, and Romantic thought is finally to be explained in these terms: that into a conception of the world which was that of pantheistic naturalism idealistic concepts had burst, complicating the understanding of life and history, introducing a dialectic, which could not be resolved except by the substitution of a transcendentalist triadic for the immanentist evolutionary process, but not ultimately destroying the underlying and fundamental naturalistic and pantheistic Weltanschauung.

The third and final conclusion is: That Herder contributed to Romantic thought directly, and in a full and positive sense, not only the important organic principle, not only the influential relative and comparative method of literary and religious study, but something far more profound, the basic Weltanschauung of Romanticism itself, a Weltanschauung derived originally from Leibniz, Spinoza and Shaftesbury, but taken over by the Romantics in the form into which it had been shaped by Herder; that Romantic thought is ultimately to
be understood as the dialectic of this older and deeper poetic pantheism and the new, attractive and overturning Idealism.

At its very broadest and simplest the movement of German thought in the XVIII century was a movement from Leibniz at the beginning to Romanticism and Hegel at the end, with Herder the most important focal point and channel, and Kant, the outstanding original thinker of the century, a powerful modifying influence. The difference between the Romantics and the later Hegel is to be sought mainly in this fact, that in Hegel it was Idealism, inherited through Fichte from Kant, which was the determinative outlook, and which absorbed the older naturalism: in Romanticism Idealism was a disturbing irruption into the poetical pantheistic naturalism, inherited from Herder, which was still at bottom the most congenial and the determinative outlook. From the evolutionism of Herder's 'Ideen' to the triadic processes of Romanticism, from the neologising of the 'Religion, Ehrmeinungen und Gebrauch' to the subjectivisation of the 'Reden' of Schleiermacher, it would seem to be a far cry; but the judgment which Dilthey has pronounced may still be taken as authoritative and sure; even although it is in the nature of a more general statement:


1 Dilthey: Gesammelte Schriften III pp. 267-268
Herder died in the year 1803 and he was therefore an older contemporary of the Romantics of the Berlin school, but it is not easy to trace direct contacts between them. The fact that contacts were so few, in spite of the great fundamental agreements which existed, may be explained, first, by the discrepancy in age, second, by the disagreement with respect to the Kantian and Fichtean philosophy.\(^1\)

By the time that the Romantics were beginning to put forward their new ideas, all the views of Herder had matured and the enthusiasm of for innovation which had been so prominent in his own Sturm und Drang youth had grown cold: indeed Herder resented the bold and supercilious modernity of many of the Fichtean school.\(^2\) The Romantics for their part had, like most innovators, little patience with those who obstructed them, and, having themselves been brought up under Kant and Fichte, they threw in their lot with the Idealists against the older thinkers. The hostility between Herder and the Romantics came to open expression in some severe reviews, as for example the pronouncement of A.W. Schlegel upon the 'Ideen':

\begin{quote}
\text{ein Buch, in welchem weder Ideen, noch Philosophie, noch Geschichte, noch Menschheit anzutreffen sei.}^3
\end{quote}

Herder himself was found in close relationships with the enemies of Romanticism, Kotzebue, Merkel, Falk, even his old antagonist, the inveterate opponent of all development, Nicolai.\(^4\) Too much must not be made of this hostility - the interesting suggestion of Nann, that the antipathy felt by Friedrich Schlegel was mainly the product of the

\(^1\) On this whole point see B. Benz: Die deutsche Romantik pp. 114f.
\(^2\) Nevinson op. cit. pp. 417 ff.
\(^3\) H. R. S. p. 642
\(^4\) Dilthey: Leben Schleiermachers p. 571
consciousness of so close a similarity,\textsuperscript{1} might be extended to include the wider relationship of Herder to the Romantic school. The one concrete difference, that in the attitude to Idealism, was an occasion rather than the cause of strife.

The existence of this antipathy or hostility did not mean that there were no cultural contacts between the Romantics and Herder at all - in the comparatively small literary circle in Germany at the time a complete isolation would in any case hardly have been possible. In point of fact three different types of contact may be discerned: first, contacts of a general nature; second, indirect contacts of a more personal character; third, direct contacts, either through personal intercourse or through a reading and study of published writings.

Of the indirect contacts of a general nature the most important was the contact through Goethe, who, although he himself was not in close personal relationship with the Romantics, was regarded by them with veneration as the great poet of the modern age. In general philosophical outlook Goethe did not differ substantially from Herder,\textsuperscript{2} and the two had worked out their ideas in common during the years of friendship which followed Herder's arrival in Weimar. Goethe exercised a clear and potent influence upon many of the Romantics, notably Novalis, Schlegel and Schelling, and it is to be noticed that it was upon the nature-philosophy of Romanticism that his impact was most powerful. Fuchs, however, has uttered a warning against the overestimating of the mediatorial work of Goethe:

\begin{quote}
Es gab eine Wirkung durch Goethes Vermittlung, aber in seiner Zeit war Herders Einfluss der grössere.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1} Mann op. cit. p. 27
\textsuperscript{2} H.II pp.197 ff.
\textsuperscript{3} Fuchs op.cit. p.300 For an estimate of Goethe's influence see H.III pp.431 ff; 613 ff.; 669 ff. Goethe himself, although critical, was deeply interested in Schelling's phil-
Subsidiary contacts of an indirect kind were the contacts through Schiller the historian, the historian J. Müller, and perhaps Steffens the natural scientist. Mann has stressed in particular the much neglected link through Schiller:

Schiller vermittelte zwischen Herder und den Romantikern.1

The fact that Schiller himself had no personal sympathies with Herder did not mean that he ignored his works, and his own writings, especially the historical (which had some effect upon the thinking of Romanticism), show clear traces of an acquaintance with Herder. Müller was of course a close friend and a warm admirer of Herder, and as an understanding historian of the Middle Ages and critic of old Germanic literature, himself practising the Romantic method, he stood high in the estimation of the Romantic school.2 Steffens was clearly a student of Herder's works, but it is doubtful whether he played any great part in the moulding of Romantic thought, except perhaps in his own specialised sphere of natural history.3

Indirect personal contacts were not numerous and apart from that through Müller, already mentioned, the contact through the scientist and mystic J.W. Ritter was the only one of real importance.4 Ritter was an eccentric if gifted scientist, whose main interest was in galvanism and whose philosophical leanings were towards a theosophical and occultist mysticism. He was a great admirer of Herder, with whom he was on terms of close intimacy, and at the same time a friend of the main Romantic thinkers, Schlegel, Schelling and Novalis. Spenle maintains that he belonged to the same occultist society as Novalis. There can be no doubt but that a

1 Mann op. cit. p. 39 2 Nevinson op. cit. p. 401; V.R.S pp. 312
3 H.R.S. pp. 680 ff.; Steffens did little more than expound and illustrate the ideas of Schelling.
personal link was forged between Herder and the Romantics through Ritter, especially on the mystico-scientific side. Naturally, however, Ritter himself was responsible for the fantastic turn which some of the ideas of Herder took. The novelist Jean-Paul Richter was another warm admirer of Herder, but in spite of some affinities he did not stand very close either to the Romantics individually or to Romanticism in general. Lavater, who had enjoyed a period of close friendship with Herder, was known to the Romantics and shared to some extent their theosophical and mystical interests, but it would be hard to show that he mediated either directly or indirectly between the Romantics and Herder. It is an interesting fact, although undue stress must not be laid upon it, that the indirect personal contacts of Herder with the Romantics were mainly in connection with the mystico-scientific movement.

The direct contacts are of course of far greater importance and although they are mainly of a literary, not a personal character, abundant evident exists to show that the Romantics had studied and appreciated Herder's principal works. Fichte alone of the writers mentioned betrays no sign of an acquaintance with Herder: his work was indeed wholly antithetical. The young Hegel on the other hand was greatly influenced by Herder, as his early writings upon religion and the Bible testify. Dilthey has stressed this influence, which clearly manifested itself in verbal reminiscences and even quotations:

    er zitiert ihn. An ihm klingen jetzt bis in die Worte hinein seine Darlegungen an.3

1 Herder's interest in Werner of Freiberg, the revered teacher of Novalis (cf. 'Die Lehrlinge zu Sais') and in Gall the phrenologist (Nevinson op. cit. p. 423) ought to be mentioned.
2 Nevinson op. cit. pp. 412 ff; Benz op. cit. p. 119.
3 Dilthey: Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels p. 23.
The similarity, which was not only in wording but in method of exposition and in underlying thought, was obviously the fruit of a careful study of Herder, a study which in large manner explains the affinities in Hegel's later works, especially in the field of history and of religion.

Hölderlin, who was a student at Tübingen with Hegel and with Schelling, also applied himself diligently to a study of the writings of Herder, together with those of the Stürmer und Drängen, of Goethe, Klopstock, Ossian, Rousseau and Schiller. In the judgment of Böhm the influence of Herder in these younger days was dominating:

"Herder beherrscht doch Hölderlins Anfänge," and this influence left a permanent mark. The commentators all agree in stressing the importance for Hölderlin of the essay 'Tithon und Aurora', which seems with its central thought of the periodicity of human achievement to have captured the imagination of the young poet.

Montgomery has made the influence of Herder at this period the subject of a special study, in which he has examined the impact of the two essays 'Liebe und Selbstdheit' and 'Tithon und Aurora' upon Hölderlin. The judgments of other scholars, A. von Grohmann, K.E. Hoffmann Betzendorfer and von Erdmann, all of whom emphasise the 'seelische Ähnlichkeit Hölderlins und Herders', are quoted by Montgomery.

Of the Romantics proper Friedrich Schlegel (and with him in some degree his brother August Wilhelm) is the one in whom the influence of Herder is most clearly marked. The earlier literary writings

1 H.R.S. pp.351 ff.
2 Böhm op.cit.I p.263
3 E.g. Böhm op.cit.I pp.34 ff.; Böckmann op.cit.p.87
4 Montgomery op.cit.pp.80 ff.
personal link was forged between Herder and the Romantics through Ritter, especially on the mystico-scientific side. Naturally, however, Ritter himself was responsible for the fantastic turn which some of the ideas of Herder took. The novelist Jean-Paul Richter was another warm admirer of Herder; but in spite of some affinities he did not stand very close either to the Romantics individually or to Romanticism in general. Lavater, who had enjoyed a period of close friendship with Herder, was known to the Romantics and shared to some extent their theosophical and mystical interests, but it would be hard to show that he mediated either directly or indirectly between the Romantics and Herder. It is an interesting fact, although undue stress must not be laid upon it, that the indirect personal contacts of Herder with the Romantics were mainly in connection with the mystico-scientific movement.

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2 Nevinson op. cit. pp. 412 ff; Benz op. cit. p. 119
3 Dilthey: Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels p. 23
who commanded his attention.¹

The relationship of Schleiermacher to Herder is one of those problems in the history of thought which defy solution. The textual evidence has been carefully collected by scholars, notably Stephans in his 'Schleiermachers Reden über die Religion und Herders Religion, Lehrmeinungen und Gebräuche' (Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche XVI 1906) and L. Göbel, 'Herder und Schleiermachers Reden über die Religion' (Gotha 1904).² This evidence seems to bear out a very real and potent influence of Herder upon Schleiermacher. In a more general way Dilthey has drawn attention to the fact that the development of Schleiermacher was on parallel lines to that of Herder:

durch den ganzen Verlauf dieser Geschichte zeigt sich eine innere Beziehung zwischen Herder und Schleiermacher.³

Dilthey, however, is careful to point out that there is almost no evidence either in the life or in the works of Schleiermacher for a direct influence of Herder, or even for an acquaintance with his writings:

von direkter Wirkung gibt es keine nennenswerte Kunde.⁴

In an additional note appended to Dilthey's great study by H. Mülert, the editor of the 1922 edition, it was argued that this silence is not of great moment:

dass Schleiermacher ihn kaum nennt beweist wenig: es war sparsam im Zitieren.⁵

There is no reason for dissenting from the sound and balanced conclusion of Mülert, that Schleiermacher must have known thoroughly and been greatly influenced by the major writings of Herder.

With Schelling the case is rather different. Schelling,

1 Spenle op. cit. pp. 171 ff.
3 Dilthey: Leben Schleiermachers p. 364
4 Ibid. loc. cit.
5 Ibid. p. 421 n. 2
with Hegel and Hölderlin, was attracted to and studied Herder during his university days: the interest in the Bible and in folk-lore displayed in the earliest works are a proof of this fact. In the dissertation on Genesis III 1 and in the essay on myths 2 there are direct references to and quotations from Herder, as for example the quotation from the 'Ideen' (II, 10, vii) in the latter work. Fuchs has argued even that Schelling was influenced by Herder's 'Metakritik' in his philosophical estimate of dogmatism and idealism, 3 whilst Haym points out that the approach to the philosophy of nature was along the lines suggested by Herder in the 'Ideen', the title of the first study being modelled upon that of Herder's work:

dem Titel dieses Herderschen bildete er den Titel seiner ersten naturphilosophischen Schrift nach. 4

In all the earlier writings Haym sees traces of the 'rhetorisierenden Manier des Herderschen Stils'. 5 The final judgment of Haym is that the whole philosophy of Schelling, as of Hegel, indeed of the whole Romantic school, rested ultimately upon that of Herder:

Schelling und Hegel setzten die Weltanschauung Herders mit den Mitteln des Kritizismus selbst durch. 6

That a gulf existed between Herder and the Romantics it would be purposeless to deny, but it can be stated categorically that in spite of that gulf the Romantics, although they had little personal intercourse with Herder, did recognise the importance of his works and study them with attention and profit. Not only then must the indirect relationships and such personal contacts as there were be taken into account, but this much larger contact through the works, conscious or unconscious, must also be given its place.

1 S.S.W.T. I, pp. 3-4
2 Ibid. pp. 44, 56 n. 2
3 Fuchs op. cit. p. 255
4 H.R.S. p. 642
5 Tbid. loc. cit.
6 H.II p. 632
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