Non-Traditional Security in Greece: Terrorism, Migration and Securitisation Theory

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DECLARATION

This is to certify that:

(i) This thesis has been composed by the candidate and is the candidate’s own work.

(ii) The work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

15 February 2005
Date
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This Thesis is Dedicated to my Parents, Nikos and Evgenia.
ABSTRACT

This thesis is about the shift in Greek security policy and thinking from a narrow focus on military issues and Greek-Turkish relations to a broader and more sophisticated policy, where ‘internal’ threats and non-traditional security issues are increasingly dominating the agenda. Drawing on debates in International Relations on the concept of security, this thesis assesses the conceptual and policy changes towards terrorism and immigration in Greece and argues that both issues have become central security concerns.

To explore the shift towards security in Greek policies on terrorism and migration this thesis utilises the theory of ‘securitisation’, as developed by the ‘Copenhagen School of Security Studies’. Despite its prominence in the literature on security studies, the specific dynamics of securitisation remain poorly understood. Adopting a constructivist security approach, this thesis aims to analyse the process through which terrorism and migration were upgraded in the Greek security agenda, as well as the reasons and the consequences of that move.

The study argues that the securitisation of internal security issues may have varying and wide-ranging effects. On the one hand, the belated securitisation of terrorism in Greece in the late 1990s was arguably the catalyst for the arrest of the ‘Revolutionary Organisation 17 November’ in 2002. On the other hand, the security logic of Greek migration policy has served as the legitimising factor for the restrictive –at times even xenophobic– responses of the Greek state and has been one of the main obstacles for the development of a more substantive approach to migration in Greece.

The overall analysis contributes to the understanding of policy developments in Greece on migration and terrorism and parallels these to developments in the European Union. In addition, by adopting an empirical approach, this thesis provides a practical assessment of the dynamics and value of securitisation theory, identifies some of its shortcomings, and contributes to improving and strengthening the theory.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>17N</td>
<td>Revolutionary Organisation November 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALN</td>
<td>Action for National Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EDU</td>
<td>European Drugs Unit</td>
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<td>ELA</td>
<td>Revolutionary People's Struggle</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europol</td>
<td>European Police Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INE/GSEE</td>
<td>Institute for Employment of the General Confederation of Greek Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>KYP</td>
<td>Greek National Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMONOIA</td>
<td>Political, Social and Cultural Association of the Greek National Minority in Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Red Army Faction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEEBRIG</td>
<td>Southeast European Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEV</td>
<td>Federation of Greek Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Schengen Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>TREVI</td>
<td>Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence Internationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Chapter 1: Non-Traditional Security in Greece

1.1 Introduction
At the start of the Twenty-first Century, Greek foreign and security policy horizons have expanded as never before in the country’s modern history. Greece has been greatly affected by changes in the international environment, its neighbouring countries and within the country itself. After suffering nearly a century of self-doubt, uncertainty about its place in the world and an unstable economy, Greece has progressively redefined its self-perceptions and its security priorities and has become increasingly more modern and more European. As part of this transformation, Greece gradually moved from a traditional focus on military issues and Greek-Turkish relations in particular, towards a more sophisticated security policy, with an increased emphasis placed on ‘internal’ threats and non-traditional security issues.

A number of remarkable developments took place in Greece in the area of internal security, developments which have provided the motivation for this study. First, after more than twenty-five years of stalemate and inability to make any progress in dealing with domestic terrorist activity, in 2002 the Greek police finally arrested members of the ‘Revolutionary Organisation November 17’, the most lethal terrorist group ever to operate in Greece. The arrest of the terrorists raised several obvious questions that have not yet been satisfactorily answered. Why did Greece take so long before a decisive strike against domestic, left-wing terrorism was recorded? What were the factors that led to the arrest of the November 17 terrorists? To answer these questions, it is necessary to analyse not only the operational changes in the Greek counter-terrorist strategy that started to materialise at the turn of the millennium but also the deep-rooted conceptual changes that led to the inclusion of terrorism in the Greek security agenda for the first time.

A second significant development in the area of internal security was the sudden and unprecedented increase in the influx of migration flows to Greece in the early 1990s, the vast majority of which consisted of irregular migrants. Greece, a country of emigration
up to that point, increasingly became a pole of attraction for immigrants but found itself unprepared and unable to manage and define a comprehensive policy on the issue. One of the main obstacles for the development of a concrete approach to migration in Greece was, and still is, the dominant perception that migration is considered a problem rather than a social, multidimensional phenomenon. Both in political discourse and practice, migration is interpreted as a problem and as a threat and as a result, the social and political climate appears to be hostile to immigrants and asylum seekers. In order to understand Greek policies on migration it is thus essential to explore the security logic that characterised them right from their outset and still remains their central feature.

Developments in Greece in the area of internal security parallel developments in the European Union (EU). Since the early 1990s, the European Union intensified its efforts to define its external borders in order to become an internal security actor and evolve into a coherent political territory in which internal borders would be eradicated. As the EU placed greater emphasis on internal security issues, security became the dominant paradigm for understanding policies on both terrorism and migration. Various scholars have studied how EU policies on immigration and asylum are addressed within a security framework and how the link between immigration and security is increasingly finding institutional expression at both European and national level.\(^1\) The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in Washington and New York further strengthened the migration-security nexus and brought terrorism at the top of the security agenda of the European Union and individual Member States. Noting these, it is interesting to analyse the impact of these developments on Greek policies and perceptions on terrorism and migration.

The main argument of this thesis is that both terrorism and migration in Greece have been shifted from the realm of normal politics and have become central security concerns. The aim of this thesis is to analyse the process through which these issues were upgraded in the Greek security agenda, as well as the reasons and the consequences of that move. To explore the shift towards security in Greek policies on terrorism and migration this thesis utilises the concept of 'securitisation', originally developed by Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and others. In doing so, the investigation of non-traditional security issues in Greece also draws on and contributes to broader debates in international relations theory, relevant to the concept of security.

1.2 The transformation of security studies
Since the 1980s, Western Europe has experienced a significant shift in the conception and perception of security as a political value and policy goal. New issues were brought forward in the security agenda, issues largely neglected in the past due to the Cold War hostility. The greatest threats to security were no longer considered to be only between states but also within and above them. Consequently, after the collapse of the Cold War system, security studies underwent a significant transformation. Questions about the concept of security and the issues that were to be included in the security agenda fuelled an intense academic discussion, which tried to get a grasp of the developments in the security policies of states and international organisations.

Traditionally, the study of security has been monopolised by the International Relations (IR) discipline. The most influential paradigm during the Cold War, the theory of realism, had also dominated the investigation of security. Realism treated the state as the only appropriate 'referent object' of security and focused on military confrontation as the defining characteristic of what constitutes a security issue. According to the realist premises, sovereign states are pursuing their self-interest by power seeking and self-help, in a decentralised anarchic international system, where war is endemic. Each state is in

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command of a discrete territory and population and the essential function of security is to protect them from external overthrow or attack. As a result, issues that did not have to do with defence and the state were not thought of as security threats.

In recent years, the concept of security has been re-examined, re-defined and re-conceptualised. New sets of theoretical approaches to the study of international security have been developed and have been applied to thinking about the evolving situation in Europe and beyond. Barry Buzan is credited with starting the security debate by arguing in 1983 that in its prevailing usage the concept is very weakly developed and that “a notion of security bound to the level of individual states and military issues is inherently inadequate.” With this observation as a starting point, Buzan and his colleagues focused their attention on developing a broader concept of security with a more coherent theoretical basis. By the mid 1990s, this body of work became internationally recognised as ‘The Copenhagen School of Security Studies’.

Central to the work of the Copenhagen School is its book ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, in which Buzan, along with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde mapped the new security concept and presented a “broad and powerful research agenda” of how to analyse it. The underlying argument of the book is that the relative importance of military-political threats has diminished, while the importance of ecological, economic and societal security issues has increased. By broadening the concept of security, the Copenhagen School scholars aimed to incorporate political, social, economic, and environmental factors in the post-Cold War security agenda. The pioneering work of the Copenhagen School paved the way to a revision of the way security is studied, leading

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4 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 3.


Jef Huysmans to describe it as “possibly the most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and implications of a widening security agenda for security studies.”

The Copenhagen School rejected the objectivist approach to international security that was central to the theory of realism. According to its framework, security is not considered a given, instead the conception of security policy depends on human agency and moral choice. Therefore, the Copenhagen School adopted a constructivist approach, which represents a fundamental transformation of epistemology from the traditional analysis of security and security policy. The main argument of this approach is that instead of focusing upon security as something out there, a security analysis should consider the process by which actors construct issues as threats to security.

In order to explain the inclusion and prioritisation of an issue in the security agenda, the Copenhagen School introduced the concept of ‘securitisation’, originally developed by Ole Waever. Securitisation occurs when a political actor pushes an area of ‘normal politics’ into the security realm by using the rhetoric of existential threat, in order to justify the adoption of ‘emergency’ measures outside the formal and established procedures of politics. In other words, securitisation is the process through which an issue becomes a security one, not necessarily because of the nature or the objective importance of a threat, but because the issue is presented as such. “In naming a certain development a security problem, the "state" can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites”.

The concept of securitisation is perhaps the most important tool in the security framework developed by the Copenhagen School. It was originally conceived for application in the sphere of international relations. Yet, despite its catalytic influence in the security debate of recent years, only a few studies have attempted to apply the

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10 Ibid., p. 54.
securitisation model to the domestic politics of a single country. As a result, the theory of securitisation has not been adequately tested and researched at the state level.

This thesis applies the framework of the Copenhagen School to analyse policy developments in Greece, in regards to terrorism and migration. The focus of this thesis is on those two non-traditional security threats that have become central security concerns in Greece. However, before introducing the issues of terrorism and migration in Greece, the next section briefly discusses the traditional security agenda and the profound changes that took place in Greek security thinking and Greek self-perceptions in the mid-1990s.

1.3 Greece’s new security thinking

Greece’s security policy is very much determined by its geostrategic position that has historically involved the country in great-power antagonisms (see figure 1.1). Located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa), Greece is at the heart of a turbulent region. Greece is an integral part of the Balkans and in close proximity to the Middle East and the Caucasus. It is also the only European Union member with no common land borders with other EU states. The end of the Cold War enhanced Greece’s strategic value but also increased fluidity and uncertainty on its northern borders. The disintegration of Yugoslavia released a variety of explosive ethnic, political, social and economic tensions and was the subject of considerable concern in Greece, whose security depends on the stability of the region. In addition, Greece’s security could be compromised by the fact that it shares borders with three former communist countries (Albania, FYROM, and Bulgaria) that are undergoing a period of political and economic transition and could under certain circumstances become destabilised.

However, the predominant issue in Greece’s security for the last thirty years has been its relations with fellow NATO-member Turkey. Greek security policy-makers and analysts have been concerned with the possibility of a military conflict with Turkey, considering that scenario the greatest threat to Greek security, a perception that was also widely shared by the public. The Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation of the northern part of Cyprus in 1974 was catalytic in worsening the bilateral relations of the two countries. Further disputes over the boundaries of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, the airspace of the Athens and Istanbul Flight Information Regions and the territorial waters, have been some of the issues that have fuelled Greek concerns about the perceived revisionist aims of Turkey towards Greece, expressed through official statements, diplomatic initiatives and military actions.\textsuperscript{12}

While the end of the Cold War and the resulting changes to the international security environment found European states and intergovernmental organisations like the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU)

adapting their policies to a broader conceptualisation of security, it did not significantly influence Greek security policy and thinking. Ambassador Theodoropoulos argues that the reason Greece was slow in adapting to these conceptual and policy changes was that “although the end of the Cold War brought an end to the Soviet threat, it did not affect Greece’s security policy because it did not reduce the country’s threat perceptions and insecurity towards Turkey”.

According to Contantinides, two alternative views of security existed in Greece during this time, one pessimistic and one optimistic. The pessimistic view, guided by realist thinkers such as the Prussian general and theoretician Karl Von Clausewitz favoured a traditional understanding of security, emphasising the military dimension of politics and supporting unilateral and nationalistic policies. The optimistic view, on the contrary, drawing from the philosophy of Jean Monnet, recommended the employment of political, diplomatic and economic leverage and placed special emphasis on Greece’s institutional connections with multilateral institutions such as the EU, NATO, and the WEU. Since the 1970s, the pessimistic view based on a realist, zero-sum understanding of politics and security dominated and guided Greek security policy and was most popular among both policymakers and academics in Greece. As Tsoulakis argues, the image that most Greeks had of their country was “that of a fort being surrounded by real and potential enemies.”

The ‘siege mentality’ had a negative influence on Greek-Turkish relations by imprisoning the two countries in a security dilemma. Hence, Greece embarked on a military modernisation program to counter perceived Turkish aggression and the two countries

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13 For instance, since 1991 NATO has officially recognised that security has political, economic, social and environmental dimensions, apart from a military dimension, and has begun to incorporate these dimensions into its policy formulation. The European Union has also adopted this new thinking to foreign and security policy, employing stabilisation through cooperation, democratisation and enlargement in order to increase security in its ‘near abroad’. Similarly, in 1992 the Petersberg declaration of the WEU highlighted the importance of ‘soft security’ issues, such as social and economic inequality, environmental risks and crime. See Helene Sjursen, ‘Security and Defence’ in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds), Contemporary European Foreign Policy (London: Sage, 2004), pp. 59-74.

14 Personal interview with Byron Theodoropoulos, 14 December 2002.

15 Contantinides presents a useful survey of the foreign policy debate in Greece along pessimist (realist) and optimist (pluralist) lines, see Stephanos Contantinides, ‘Greek Foreign policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis’, Hellenic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1996, pp. 43-61.

became engaged in an arms race, which resembled the Cold War antagonism of the two superpowers.\textsuperscript{17} The increased hostility between the two countries brought them twice since 1974 to the brink of war, over disputes in the Aegean Sea.\textsuperscript{18} The first crisis occurred in 1987 concerning oil-drilling rights in the Aegean. The second crisis took place in January 1996, when Greece and Turkey came close to an armed confrontation over an islet in the Aegean Sea (the Imia/Kardak islet), whose sovereignty was disputed. A third crisis came about when Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK (Kurdish) guerrilla was captured by Turkish intelligence, while he was leaving the residence of the Greek Ambassador in Kenya, but this time the crisis did not escalate.\textsuperscript{19}

Remarkably, despite the long-standing disputes and the still unresolved differences between the two countries, Greek-Turkish relations improved dramatically in the second half of 1999. The landmark in this new era in the bilateral relations of the countries was the catastrophic earthquake that rocked Turkey in August 1999. Greece responded generously and swiftly, being the first country to send aid and a rescue team. A month later, when an earthquake hit Greece, the Turks reacted in the same spirit, sending their emergency teams to Athens. The public opinion in both countries turned from hostile to being sympathetic and grateful to their neighbours.\textsuperscript{20} The resulting 'earthquake diplomacy' opened a window of opportunity for better cooperation and understanding between the two sides of the Aegean and signalled the dawn of a new era in their relations.

\textsuperscript{18} See Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantafyllou (eds), \textit{Greek-Turkish Relations: In the Era of Globalization}, The Ifpa-Kokkalis Series on Southeast European Policy, Vol. 1 (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2001).
\textsuperscript{20} The mutual empathy in both countries was first expressed on the aftermath of the earthquake in Turkey. For instance, the headline in a Greek newspaper was “We are all Turks”, to which a Turkish newspaper responded in Greek: “Efharisto Poli, File”, which means “Thank You, Neighbor”. See Ayten Gundogdu, ‘Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a period of Transformation?’, in \textit{MERIA, Middle East Review of International Affairs}, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2001, pp. 106-117.
The Greek-Turkish rapprochement had in fact started earlier before the earthquakes, as a result of a significant transformation in the self-perceptions and security thinking of Greece. The Foreign Ministers of the two countries, Ismail Cem and George Papandreou had taken initiatives to improve bilateral relations by cooperating in various so-called ‘low politics’ issues. Apart from the regular exchange of visits between the two Ministers, these initiatives included bilateral agreements on tourism, crime, drugs, illegal immigration, and terrorism as well as commercial and environmental cooperation. Papandreou traces the cooperation back to the Kosovo operation in which both countries were involved as NATO allies: “For the first time, Turkish military planes flew over Greece carrying humanitarian aid to Kosovo.”

In addition, since 1998 Greece and Turkey had agreed to cooperate in the formation of the 5,000-strong Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG), which included seven regional nations, for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. These developments signified an important change in Greek security thinking and a revision in Greek perceptions of Turkey. The natural disasters gave leaders on both sides the opportunity to claim a popular mandate for legitimising the rapprochement.

Central to this new security thinking was the Europeanisation of Greek security policy, which began in 1996. Until then, the European orientation of Greece had been characterised by introversion, opportunism and internal contradictions. Although a member of the European Communities since 1981, EU membership had been a

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23 The rationale behind Greece’s decision to join the European Communities was first, to safeguard the security of the country and second, to maximise the economic benefits from membership. As far as the former is concerned, membership meant a significant relative advantage over Turkey. In regards to the latter, Greece considered the European Communities an almost unlimited source of funding and financial assistance, which would help Greece reconstruct and modernise the Greek economy. For a more detailed presentation of the history of Greece in the EU see the website of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/>. See also Theodore Couloumbis ‘Introduction: The impact of EC (EU) membership on Greece’s foreign policy profile’, in Panos Kazakos, and Panayotis Ioakimidis (eds), Greece and EC membership evaluated (London: Pinter, 1994), pp 189-198.
controversial issue for some time. Consequently, Greece had a problematic self-perception as regards to Europe and often found itself isolated from the other EU Member States because of its national idiosyncrasies. The real opening towards Europe was also delayed because of the interests of certain elites that did not want to lose their influence on Greek political and social life.

Research under the auspices of the Rand National Security Research Division found that since 1996 Greece “has become progressively more modern and more European, and its international policy has become more sophisticated.” The RAND report demonstrated that the increasing Europeanisation of Greece now places virtually all of the country's external policy challenges within a multicultural, European framework. Reaffirming these findings, former Foreign Minister George Papandreou commented that Greece is “on a new track, and it's very much a European track.” He continued saying that “we may have begun as a Balkan country in Europe but now we are a European country in the Balkans...We are talking about a different Greece.”

Ioakimidis assigns the success of the Europeanisation of Greek security policy to the rise in power of a pro-European government led by Prime Minister Costas Simitis and to the success of the European Monetary Union (EMU) project. Kavakas refers also to the

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24 Characteristically, when Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis said in 1977 that “We belong to the West”, the opposition parties used that against him, arguing that Greece does not want to belong to the West. In particular, during the 1977 elections, PASOK pledged to take Greece out of the EC, adopting the political slogan ‘Greece belongs to the Greeks’, which contributed to PASOK’s electoral success. See George Kassimeris, Europe’s Last Red Terrorists: the Revolutionary Organization 17 November (London: Hurst & Company, 2001), pages 6 and 40. See also Susannah Verney, ‘To be or not to be within the European Community: The party debate and democratic consolidation in Greece’, in Geoffrey Pridham (ed), Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 203-223.


administrative changes that took place in the Greek Foreign ministry structure and the ‘socialisation effect’ of EU membership.\textsuperscript{30} A consequence of the gradual Europeanisation of Greek security policy was that Greece progressively adopted a more sophisticated foreign and security policy, which was increasingly influenced by its relations with the European Union.

The new approach to security in Greece represented a definitive paradigm shift. This shift was conceptual, as it was pragmatic. The transformation of Greece reflected a parallel process of adaptation to a broader conceptualisation and understanding of security and a revised perception and prioritisation of threats. What Contantinides had earlier described as the ‘optimistic view of security’ became more popular and more influential in determining Greek perceptions and political choices in regards to security policy.

As a result, many long-standing assumptions about Greek foreign policy goals and priorities have progressively fallen away, while new issues made their way onto the security agenda. The confrontation with Turkey can no longer be considered a permanently operating factor in the Greek security environment.\textsuperscript{31} Instead, Greece has become a key stakeholder in Turkish stability and prosperity and promoter of the latter’s application for membership in the EU. At the same time, reflecting the transformation in Greek security policy and thinking, new issues were upgraded in the Greek security agenda, issues that in the past had been overshadowed by the perceived Turkish threat. Two of the most prominent non-traditional security issues that gradually entered the security agenda were terrorism and migration. The next two sections briefly outline the main characteristics of terrorism and migration in Greece.


\textsuperscript{31} Lesser et al., \textit{Greece’s New Geopolitics}, p. 106.
1.4 Terrorism in Greece: The ‘Revolutionary Organisation November 17’

Greece’s problem with terrorism has primarily been with domestic terrorist groups. The phenomenon of terrorism in Greece has its roots in the resistance to the military junta, which ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. In the aftermath of that period two terrorist organisations first made their appearance, the ‘Revolutionary People’s Struggle’ (ELA) in 1974 and the ‘Revolutionary Organisation November 17’ (17N) in 1975. Since then approximately 250 terrorist groups claimed responsibility for terrorist acts, but November 17 was the most influential, lethal and radical group of all and the main source of violence and terror in Greece.

The Greek government unsuccessfully battled leftist terrorist groups operating in Greece from 1975 to 2002. Paradoxically, during that time Greece did not have a clear and coherent anti-terrorist strategy and in twenty-seven years of domestic terrorism had failed to arrest a single member of any terrorist group. As a result, the US State Department had characterised November 17 as the “most dangerous active terrorist organisation in Europe” and Greece as “one of the weakest links in Europe's effort against terrorism.”

November 17 was dubbed one of the world’s most elusive terrorist organisations and it was thus referred to as the ‘phantom organisation’.

However, in June 2002, a failed bombing attack in the port of Piraeus led Greek police to their first arrest of a November 17 member, which marked the beginning of the end for the group. Within a month, the myth of 17N had dissolved. Two of its hideouts were found, with weapons, files, banners, missiles and bombs stored in them, and nineteen suspected members of the group were arrested. In February 2003, members of the second major terrorist group, ELA, were also arrested by the police and Greece appeared to be finally closing a dark chapter of its post-dictatorship history.

November 17 was not related to any political movement like ETA in Spain or the Irish Republican Army (IRA) but was fuelled with the idea of revolution. George Kassimeris characterised 17N as “an armed communist organization with a revolutionary vocation in a non-revolutionary context.” The members of 17N were inspired by the revolutionary struggles of the Montoneros of Argentina, the Tupamaros of Uruguay, and the Action for National Liberation (ALN) of Brazil. They believed that genuinely socialist governance in Greece could only be achieved through proletarian action and the continuation of the armed struggle in order to overthrow not only the dictatorship but also the corrupted system and the external dependencies that it had created (‘de-juntification’). They considered the fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in July 1974 as nothing more than a changing of the guard of the bourgeois regime. Thus, in their eyes November 17 was the continuation of a predetermined communist tradition and the only vehicle for political change.

Organisationally, 17N was similar to other European Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups, such as Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF) and France’s Direct Actione, but Greece was the only EU country in which left wing terrorist activity remained a serious problem for the authorities during the 1990s. The group practiced the cell system, with a closed structure and a small number of members in its core, of no more than twenty-five people. The small number of members in the group, combined with the fact that many of them were linked with family or close friendship ties, made it easier for 17N to maintain its secrecy and security.

The ideology, the structure and the methods of 17N followed the writings of Regis Debray, Che Guevara and Carlos Marighella. Based on these texts the group prepared

35 ETA stands for Euskadi ta Askatasuna - or Basque Homeland and Freedom.
36 Kassimeris, Europe's last red terrorists, p. 201.
37 All of these groups sought to overthrow their respective national governments and thought of themselves as weapons of class struggle.
38 According to Debray ‘[t]he revolutionary guerrilla force is clandestine. It is born and develops secretly ... The guerrilla force is independent of the civilian population in action as well as in military organisation’. See Regis Debray, Revolution in a Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America (London: Pelican Books, 1968), p. 41.
39 Carlos’ Marighella book the ‘Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla’ is a concise summary of guerrilla tactics and organisation, which had also been adopted as the official training manual of the Italian Red
its own urban warfare handbook with the rules and principles of 17N, which described rules of conspiratorial action, security measures and bomb making techniques. Beforehand, during the military junta, members of 17N had also visited Cuba to get familiar with the methods of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and to be trained there.

Acting as the armed front line of the working class and defender of Greek national independence, November 17 was targeting symbolic elements of government, foreign interests and business interests in an attempt to promote a climate of rebellion. In its twenty-seven years of existence, 17N publicised fifty-five proclamations, carried out more than a hundred and forty attacks and killed twenty-three people, ranging from American and British Embassy officials and military personnel to Greek members of parliament, newspaper publishers, policemen, judges, leading industrialists and Turkish diplomats.

According to Walter Laqueur, terrorism “is an attempt to destabilize democratic societies and to show that their Governments are impotent.” November 17 was very successful in doing so. The vast majority of the 17N attacks were against the Greek establishment (60% - see figure 1.2). The group was selecting its targets carefully and was presenting its choices as legitimate in its proclamations that were published in the Greek press. In April 1977, it released a 28-page manifesto, entitled ‘A response to political parties and organisations’, in which it used violent rhetoric to denounce the Greek political structures, including the Communist parties, and to justify the legitimacy of the revolutionary cause through radical measures. Subsequently, the group attacked the

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Brigades, the German RAF, and the IRA. According to Marighella ‘It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed crisis by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the military situation into a political situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things.’ Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, 1968. Available from <http://www.kurtuluscephesi.org/gerilla/urbanguerrilla.html>

40 The handbook of November 17 was found on 29 January 1978 in Parintha and was published in the Greek newspaper ‘Kathimerini’ on 26 May 2002.


43 According to 17N, “Greece's historical experience had very clearly shown that there could be no peaceful transition to socialism”. See 17N: *The Proclamations 1975-2002: All the texts of the Organisation* (Athens: Kaktos Publications, 2002) [in Greek].
political elites for "selling Greece’s interests" and fiercely condemned capitalism, finance capital, the consumer society and parliamentary democracy.\textsuperscript{44}

Apart from the Greek establishment, 17N often targeted United States’ (US) interests for the American support of the Greek military dictatorship, for the US’s role in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and later on for its policies in the Middle East and in the former Yugoslavia (17% of attacks). Furthermore, the ideology of 17N was anti-NATO and anti-European, with the group arguing that external forces control and impede Greece’s development and sovereignty. Consequently, 15% of the 17N attacks were against the EU-most of them after 1990- in an attempt to sever Greece’s ties to NATO and the European Union. Finally, being extremely nationalistic, 17N was also targeting Turkish diplomats, demanding the removal of Turkish military presence from Cyprus (8% of attacks).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{targets_plot.png}
\caption{Targets of attacks by the ‘Revolutionary Organisation November 17’}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. See 17N communiqué, ‘A response to political parties and organisations’. 

16
The argument developed in chapter 5 of this thesis is that the failure of Greece to effectively deal with domestic terrorism resulted from the erroneous belief that terrorism was not a direct threat to Greek security. While since the mid 1970s most European countries dealt with terrorism as an important security issue and thus adopted strict anti-terrorist laws and increased their cooperation at the European level, until 1999 terrorism was not perceived as a serious threat or as a political priority for the Greek state. As a result, Greece was the only EU country in which left-wing terrorist activity remained a serious problem for the authorities. Chapter 5 explores the process of securitisation of terrorism in Greece, which, it argues, was the catalyst for the arrest of the November 17 terrorists.

1.5 Overview of Greek migration flows
Apart from terrorism, migration too underwent a process of securitisation in Greece during the 1990s. The increase of immigration flows towards Greece during that time and the social, economic and political issues related to it attracted the interest of many scholars from various disciplines. Economists studied the economic aspects of immigration in Greece, the 'push' and 'pull' factors and its impact on the labour market, unemployment and the welfare state. Sociologists investigated the increasing rise of xenophobia and racism, as well as the social tensions between immigrants and natives. Political theorists discussed the challenges posed by immigration to the socio-political order of the state and its consequences. Few attempts however have been made to explore in depth the security reasoning behind Greek policy-making on immigration.45

A brief review on the history of Greek immigration and emigration will serve as a socio-political platform to launch an understanding of the securitisation of migration in Greece.

45 The security logic of Greek immigration policy is addressed in the following two papers: Valsamis Mitsilegas, 'Of "Words and Guns": Security, Law, and Identity Formation in Contemporary Greece', Paper presented at the Socrates Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 12.2.1999); Charalambos Tsardanidis, 'Migration and Greek Foreign Policy', in Gabriel Amitis and Gabriella Lazaridis, Legal and Sociological Aspects of Migration in Greece (Athens: Papazisis, 2001), pp. 223-254 [in Greek].
For the most part of its modern history, Greece had been a country of emigration. From the beginning of the 20th century, it is possible to identify two main phases of emigration for economic, social and political reasons. The first one (1900-1929) had been directed mostly towards the USA, with 350,000 Greeks moving to the US in the period 1900-1920. Following World War II, a second wave of emigration began primarily towards Germany but also to the United States, Belgium, Canada and Australia. Between 1951 and 1981, gross emigration reached around 1.6 million, with 12 per cent of the Greek population leaving the country, mostly on a temporary basis (gastarbeiters), as low skilled, seasonal workers. The volume of emigration fell after 1973, because host countries introduced more restrictive immigration policies following the oil crisis and because the restoration of democracy in Greece after seven years of dictatorship increased optimism among the Greek labour force and encouraged repatriation. As a result, in 1975, annual return migration exceeded emigration for the first time (see figure 1.3).

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From the early 1970s, Greece started to attract economic immigrants from Asia and Africa. The influx of foreign workers was supported by the Federation of Greek Industries (SEV), due to shortages in the labour market. Until the mid 1980s, the number of immigrants remained small, about 30,000 legal immigrants and an estimated equivalent number for undocumented. However, the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe, which started in 1989, marked the beginning of a new era in international relations and also had a massive impact on the partners of migration from this region. Greece was one of the countries that experienced a migratory pressure from the East and

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50 Net migration is defined as the difference between the total population on 1 January and 31 December for a certain calendar year, minus the difference between births and deaths. Source: Eurostat Demographic Statistics.

51 The government invited foreign workers as a temporarily solution to the ad hoc economic needs of the time. These invitations however were not part of a broader policy that would consolidate Greece as a country of immigration. See also Dimitris Kastoridas, *Foreign Workers in Greece* (Athens: Iamos, 1994), pp. 17-19 [in Greek].
very rapidly, as well as unexpectedly, became host to a great number of immigrants. The majority of these immigrants originated from the Balkan countries and the republics of the former Soviet Union. In particular, the flow of migrants assumed great proportions after December 1990, when the opening of the Albanian borders led to mass waves of undocumented Albanians entering Greece from the country’s northern borders. Other large groups of economic immigrants and asylum seekers that entered and stayed in Greece are the Kurds, Pakistanis, Afghans, Bengalese, Indians, Iraqis, and Iranians.

The main ‘pull’ factors to immigrants and asylum seekers for choosing to move to Greece were three: First, the country’s geographic location, in the immediate vicinity of troublesome regions such as Africa, Asia and the Balkans; Second, the fact that Greece is the most politically and economically stable country in the region and the sole regional member of both NATO and the European Union; Third and most importantly, the style of the Greek economy, with the thriving underground market, the large informal sectors and the significant potential to offer employment to unskilled and semi-skilled workers.

The exact numbers of migrants that arrived in Greece during the 1990s is difficult to calculate accurately because the vast majority of them were undocumented. As table 1.1 shows, migratory flows to Greece until 1998, when regularisation campaigns started to be implemented, were almost exclusively irregular and undocumented, since all the legal channels for immigration were closed. As a result, while the number of legal immigrants remained stable at approximately 30,000, the number of irregular migrants increased steadily. There are no exact figures available concerning the number of irregular migrants that entered Greece but only estimates, which differ both on the basis of the source and the period to which they refer. The official estimates for 1991 provide figures ranging

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from 250,000 to 400,000.\textsuperscript{54} In 1994, the number put forward was that of 600,000.\textsuperscript{55} For the years 1995-1997, all the estimates ranged from 600,000 to 800,000. On the eve of regularisation, that is the end of 1997, the estimates ranged between 800,000 and almost 1,000,000. After the two one-off, non-renewable regularisation campaigns in 1998 and 2001, 580,000 immigrants were legalised, with more than 300,000 remaining in illegality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Legal immigrants</th>
<th>Irregular migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>10,259,900</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>250,000-400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>10,900,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>800,000-1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10,939,605</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>300,000-400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Estimated numbers of legal and irregular migrants in Greece 1988-2001

According to the official statistics issued by the National Statistics Service, Greece’s total population in 2001 was 10,964,020. Of these, 797,091 or 7.27 percent of the population was composed of foreigners. Unofficial figures provided by NGOs and the scientific community raise the immigrant population to 10 percent. Furthermore, a report by the United Nations estimated that the population of Greece would grow to 14.2 million by 2015, out of which about 3.5 million, or 25 percent of the country’s population, will be immigrants from outside the European Union.\textsuperscript{56} From the above it can be seen that suddenly Greece became the country in Europe with the largest number of irregular migrants and the country with the second highest proportion of immigrants relative to total population, after Luxemburg.

The sudden increase of population flows to Greece in the early 1990s was accompanied by a rapid increase in public insecurity and anxiety. Migrants, asylum seekers, and other

\textsuperscript{55} Parliamentary Proceedings, Greek Parliament, Session C, 23.05.1994.
\textsuperscript{56} Reported in Eleftherotypia, Greek Newspaper, 31 January 2003.
kinds of irregular migrants came to be treated predominantly as a security issue. The study of developments in Greek policies reveals that migration has been accepted as a security issue in both mainstream Greek security discourse and practice. Migration is perceived as a political, societal and economic threat and as a sensitive issue that needs to be tackled urgently and effectively, which at the policy level served as the main legitimising factor for the restrictive -at times even xenophobic- responses from the Greek state.

1.6 Research questions and thesis structure
This thesis applies the framework of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies to analyse policy developments in Greece, in relation to terrorism and migration. It starts with the hypothesis that both issues have entered the Greek security agenda and have been upgraded from the realm of normal politics to the security one, through a process of securitisation. The main questions that derive from the framework of the Copenhagen School are concerned with determining the referent object of security, identifying the securitising actors and exploring the process through which an issue becomes a security one. This thesis attempts to answer these questions in regards to Greek policies but also, based on theoretical reasoning and empirical observation attempts to go beyond them. More specifically, the following research questions are explored in this thesis:

1. How did terrorism and migration become securitised? The Copenhagen School focuses entirely on how securitising actors use language and political discourse to convince a specific audience of the existential nature of a threat. The analysis of the securitisation of terrorism and migration in Greece adopts this discursive interpretation of ‘politics’ and ‘security’ but also extends it to non-discursive practices, security measures and institutional changes.

2. Why did terrorism and migration become securitised in Greece? The Copenhagen School pays little attention to the motivations and catalysts that encourage securitising actors to articulate a matter in security terms. This however is a vital
parameter for understanding and evaluating policy responses and is therefore also addressed.

3. What were the consequences of the securitisation of terrorism and migration in Greece? This is an important issue for assessing the effectiveness of securitisation, yet the Copenhagen School does not pay adequate attention to it. Does securitisation lead to better handling of an issue? What are the unintended consequences and the costs for it?

4. What was the impact of European norms and perceptions on the securitisation of terrorism and migration in Greece? The findings in regards to this question contribute to the understanding of the reasons why these issues became securitised in Greece but also allow preliminary empirical observations to be made on how European norms on internal security issues are diffused to the national level.

Therefore, the main contribution of this thesis to knowledge is twofold. First, it contributes to the understanding of policy developments in Greece in relation to terrorism and migration that were previously lacking a sense of the ‘existential threat’ and security logic. Although during the 1990s Greece experienced far-reaching changes in its policies on terrorism and migration, no study has tried to explain and analyse these developments using a constructivist security approach. The framework of the Copenhagen School sheds light on the process and the reasons these issues were included in the Greek security agenda and in that way, it provides an alternative reading to policy developments on terrorism and migration in Greece.

Second, by adopting an empirical approach this thesis provides a comprehensive assessment of the dynamics and strengths of the securitisation theory and it helps identify its shortcomings. As only one of a few country-specific case studies that have applied the framework of the Copenhagen School to domestic politics, it serves as a test for the securitisation theory but also modifies and extends it.
In addition, by paralleling and contrasting Greek developments in the area of internal security to changes at the European level, this study determines whether the process of securitisation in Greece was primarily the result of domestic factors or was induced by European norms and identifies the interplay between the two levels. Thus a third contribution of this study to knowledge is that it examines how the securitisation theory works in two levels of analysis, the domestic, as the primary focus and the European, as the broader context.

The research questions are explored over seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical debates on the concept of security, looking at both traditional and new security approaches. It also positions the Copenhagen School’s approach within these debates and discusses the main arguments of its approach. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework applied to this research. It explores the theory of securitisation, discusses its strengths and identifies its weaknesses. It then presents the methods used to collect and analyse the empirical data used in this thesis.

Chapter 4 examines developments in the European Union in regards to terrorism and migration. It demonstrates that both issues have been securitised and traces their securitisation in discursive constructions of threat and institutional developments with the EC/EU framework. It also explores the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11 on EU policies on terrorism and migration, which reinforced the migration-terrorism-security nexus.

The following two chapters are the main empirical chapters on Greece. Chapter 5 analyses the securitisation of terrorism in Greece, looking at the history of domestic terrorism and the Greek state’s response to the terrorist threat. Similarly, chapter 6 examines the securitisation of migration in Greece, as demonstrated by both political discourse and practice.

Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter. It summarises the empirical findings and discusses the implications of the securitisation of terrorism and migration for Greek policies. It also
reassesses the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the securitisation theory. Finally, it presents some considerations for future work.
Chapter 2: The Renaissance of security studies

2.1 The concept of security

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the evolving concept of security and critically review traditional and new approaches in security studies. The concept of security is central to the study of international relations. All theoretical approaches to the study of relations between states are committed to analysing security as a concept and as a policy outcome. Nonetheless, what constitutes the notion of security remains undefined and changing. As one scholar put it, there is “no common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualised, and what its most relevant research questions are.” For that reason, some scholars have depicted security as an ‘essentially contested concept’. What they mean is that the concept itself is so value-laden that no arguments or evidence can ever lead to agreement on a single version as the ‘correct or standard use’. Questions about the concept of security have fuelled an intense academic debate, leading to security studies becoming one of the most dynamic and contested areas in International Relations theory.

The usage of the term ‘security’ as a noun has not always had the meaning it has acquired today. An examination of the history of the concept demonstrates the relative novelty of

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4 Emma Rothschild traced the origins of the term. She noted that the original Latin noun securitas referred “…in its primary classical use, to a condition of individuals, of a particularly inner sort. It denoted composure, tranquillity of spirit, freedom from care, the condition that Cicero called the ‘object of supreme desire,’ or ‘the absence of anxiety upon which happy life depends’. See Emma Rothschild, ‘What is Security’, Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 124, No. 3, 1995, p. 61; Also see Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 13-22.
its current usage. From a positive, comforting term, the concept has evolved to a negative one. Etymologically, the word security derives from the Latin phrase ‘sine cura’, which means ‘without anxiety’. Thus, the term’s original meaning was ‘careless’ or care-free, practically the opposite of its current usage, which relates to danger, fear and risk. The modern understanding of security as an attribute and goal of the state through diplomatic and military means, only became central in international affairs in the 1940s, with the introduction of the concept of ‘national security’. Daniel Yergin noticed that the new concept arrived with such force, that it “seemed always to have been with us.”

In 1983, Barry Buzan noted that prior to the 1980s there was a ‘lack of conceptual literature on security’, which led him to describe security as a neglected and ‘underdeveloped’ concept. He suggested that two of the main explanations for the neglect of security are the difficulty of the concept itself and its overlapping with the concept of power. David Baldwin however, offered a more plausible explanation. He argued that the lack of conceptual analysis of security was due to the fact that during the Cold War security scholars were primarily interested in military statecraft. As a result, it was military force, not security that was the central concern of security studies.

Accordingly, the theory of realism linked the concept to the protection of the state from military threats. The core of the realist argument is that sovereign states are pursuing their self-interest by power seeking and self-help in a decentralised anarchic international system, where war is endemic. The success of realism in describing and explaining the security dilemma and the relations of the two superpowers established it is as the most influential paradigm during the Cold War, also dominating the investigation of security.

8 Ibid., p. 195.
9 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 3-4.
However, realism's dominance during the Cold War era masked two substantive flaws in its theoretical investigation of security, one conceptual and one methodological. At the conceptual level, realism's preoccupation with the protection of a state's sovereignty from external overthrow or attack restricted the analysis of security to the level of individual states and military issues. In recent years, new sets of theoretical approaches and 'schools of thought' have sought to redefine security away from this traditional state-centric, militaristic view. Reflecting on these new approaches, Keith Krause and Michael Williams popularised the distinction between broadening and deepening security. On the one hand, the new approaches identified the need to move from a focus on the state to a broader focus on individuals, community and identity (vertical expansion). On the other hand, they recognised the importance of non-military and non-territorial threats that were not previously associated with security, such as demographic pressures, economic instability, resource depletion, global warming, population movements, terrorism and transnational crime (horizontal expansion).

At the epistemological level, realism's commitment to positivism resulted in deterministic claims about security and international relations. Realism sought to identify the systemic generalised explanations of reality, objectifying security threats and making truth claims about international relations. In that way, realism did not consider in its account of security the role of inter-subjective meanings, interpretations and cultural constructs. The rise of constructivism presented a challenge to the positivist approach of realism. Instead of trying to objectify security, post-positivist approaches emphasised the role of discourse, ideas and identities. Security threats, according to this view, represent linguistic claims rather than objective facts, an argument that reflects Wittgenstein's belief that language sets the limits of our world.

11 See Krause and Williams, *Critical Security Studies*.
The intense political and academic debate on the concept of security since the mid 1980s signifies that security can no longer be considered a neglected concept. Still though, some have argued that the recent debates on security have not contributed to the clarification but instead have led to a 'de-definition' rather to a redefinition of the concept.15 What is security then? This chapter reviews the debate on security examining both traditional and new approaches. Because the various conceptualisations of security have different starting points and central assumptions, section 2.2 first identifies four specifications to the concept that provide the structure for the comparison between traditional and non-traditional approaches. Having done that, section 2.3 analyses the realist view on security and its conceptual (section 2.4) and epistemological flaws (section 2.5), around which the new security thinking evolved. Finally, section 2.6 introduces the security framework of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, situating it in relation to both traditional and new security approaches.

2.2 Specifying security
According to the definition in the Cambridge Encyclopaedia, security is something, which provides safety, freedom from danger and anxiety. The most cited definition in international relations theory is that of Arnold Wolfers, which has become classic. He writes:

"Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."16

Wolfers believes that the sense of feeling secure is directly linked to the preservation of certain core values. His definition allows two dimensions to security. First, the existential lack of physical threat and second the psychological absence of fear. In that way, Wolfers successfully captures the core meaning of security. Similarly, David Baldwin considers

security to be a situation in which there is “a low probability of damage to acquired values.” Baldwin however acknowledges that definitions such as the above can only be a starting point for the theorist.

In order for the concept to be operational in empirical studies, a number of specifications are required. In particular, the following questions need to be addressed. Whose values might be threatened? Which are these values? Who might attack them? In what ways can these values be threatened and how can they be safeguarded? Therefore, security can be better defined in terms of four specifications: Security for Whom? Security for which values? Security from what threats? Security by what means? These questions will provide the structure for discussing the broadening and deepening of security.

The first specification concerns the ‘referent object’ of security, i.e. it questions what entity is to be secure or insecure. Referent objects are things or phenomena that may be subject to risks and threats and that are perceived to have some legitimate claim to survival. This could be a state, an individual, a nation, a culture or any core value. The second specification is directly drawn from the first. Since different states, individuals, groups etc. do not share the same values it is required to specify which values need to be protected. These values depend on a wide range of factors, such as the history, the culture and the priorities of the referent object of security and might change with time.

The previous two specifications suffice to define the concept of security, but give little direction or advice as to how to pursue it. Security is oriented towards specific or broadly

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18 Apart from these questions, Baldwin argues that the analyst should also ask the following: how much security, at what cost, and in what time period?
20 Moreover, individuals might seek to protect values that are not necessary compatible with the values of their state. For example, whereas the state’s security may require going to war, from the individual’s point of view this might be insufferable. In this case, the state can constitute a threat to the security of the individual. Another case where state and individual security collide is in reference to the priorities of the state. A state’s decision to spend a big proportion of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for military armaments is often at the expense of economic development and social care, with people having to suffer the cost for it. This for instance was the case in Pakistan, as well as in other developing countries in the past.
defined threats that have to be dealt with effectively. Threats represent a source of danger to the values of the actor in study. They can arise from many different sources and they carry a notion of subjectivity and thus need to be identified in the third specification. Finally, the fourth specification to the concept of security has to do with the means used in order to pursue the goal of security. With these four specifications in mind, the next section analyses the traditional approach to security, which is theoretically informed by realism.

2.3 Realism on Security
Although security is a key concept for the analysis of international politics, not many realists have tried to provide a clear definition of the term. Yet, by analysing their writings of four key realist thinkers, it is possible to deduct the main characteristics they ascribe to the concept of security and identify the core of their arguments.

Hans Morgenthau is one of the most prominent neo-classical realists. Although he does not attempt to conceptualise security, his understanding of the concept becomes clear by looking at his policy recommendations and political commentary. Morgenthau argues that security lies at the heart of the national interest. He believes that the main driving force behind states’ behaviour is their lust for power and suggests that the precondition for states’ defence of their national interest is that they seek policies that balance against the power of other states.\(^{21}\) Security in his view is about protecting the survival of the state from a physical danger of attack. He writes that the “the generally professed and most frequent actual motive for armaments is fear of attack; that is a feeling of insecurity”.\(^{22}\) By that, he acknowledges that the concept of security relies on a subjective or psychological base. It is the ‘feeling’ of security that states are pursuing, which can only be satisfied by means of armament and diplomacy in order to maintain the balance of power.


\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 331
Morgenthau sees security as a necessary value and considers insecurity as a product of man's instinctive will, to dominate others. John Herz however, argues that insecurity is not caused by the 'evil' human nature but is an environmental effect of anarchy. He argues that states often share common interests, but the structure of the international system prevents them from bringing about the mutually desired situation. Like Morgenthau, he also links the concept of security with the state's pursuit for power. His approach differs from classical realism because he recognises that the inevitable pursuit for power in an anarchic society creates what he calls a 'security dilemma'. In simple terms, a security dilemma exists when the actions of one state, in trying to increase its own security, cause a reaction in a second state, which, in the end, decreases the first state's security. As a result, the vicious circle of the security dilemma leads to competition for ever more power. "It is one of the tragic implications of the security dilemma that mutual fear of what initially may never existed, may subsequently bring about exactly that which is feared the most." From the above, it is understood that Herz, like Morgenthau, believes that security is a psychological condition, which he calls an 'urge'. He considers states the primary referent objects for the pursuit of security and he recommends that the military and political pursuit of power should be balanced with pacific strategies in order to limit the security dilemma.

Kenneth Waltz shares many of the assumptions put forward by Herz. He also starts with the observation that the organising principle of the international political system is its anarchic nature. In this anarchic realm states can only guarantee their security if they provide it for themselves. He claims that "self-help is the principle of action in an anarchic order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by

26 Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism', p. 158.
providing for their own security."\(^{28}\) The pursuit for security according to Waltz requires the use of force for offence, for defence, for deterrence, or for coercion. Peace and security however can better be achieved without actively using force if the distribution of capabilities among states is equal. For this reason, he argues that "Safety for all states... depends on the maintenance of a balance among them."\(^{29}\)

Writing in 1991, Stephen Walt represents a typical modern formulation of the neorealist conception of security. Walt’s conception of security is rooted in three main realist assumptions: First, because of the absence of a world government, the international system is characterised by anarchy, which is not socially constructed, but objectively observable. Second, states are not the only actors in the international system, but they are the most important ones. Third, the primary objective of security for all states is survival. Walt’s restricts his conception of security to the prevention of conflict through military means. Therefore, he argues, “[s]ecurity may be defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force. It explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war".\(^{30}\) According to Walt, only military issues should be considered security ones, excluding all the other potential threats related to ecological, social or economic issues.

The four writers discussed above are famous realists of different variations within the realist tradition and from different times. Although, they do not conceptualise security in the same way, it is evident that they ascribe to security a conceptual core that is common to all. The next section of this chapter critically examines the realist school of thought and discusses the new security thinking that emerged along the four specifications to security presented in section 2.2.


\(^{29}\) Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 132.

2.4 Challenges to realism and the redefinition of security

During the Cold War, realism dominated the study of security. The arms race between the two superpowers and the hostility in their relations divided the world in two groups, leading security experts to focus on national security and military threats and to adopt the principles and policy recommendations prescribed by realism. The realist paradigm however was challenged from various directions from the 1980s onwards, when changes in the international system rendered the traditional security thinking less relevant. The diverse challenges to the realist approach can be classified along four axes, each one of which represents the answers realism gives to the four specifications to security.

2.4.1 Security for whom?

In regards to the question of ‘security for whom’, the answer given by realism is the state. All the realist writers discussed above consider the state the only referent object of security. The security of the individual and the citizenry are identified with the security of the state and the state is charged with the duty of protecting them. As Scott and Carr argue, states are “organizations to which people look to perform functions of the first importance that they cannot perform for themselves.”

The citizenry recognises the authority and the responsibility of the state to guarantee and defend its security and it is through that recognition that the state gains its legitimacy. The implication, then, for the realist approach is that there can be no security in the absence of authority. In this way, a theorist according to the realist approach is limited to studying national security.

However, placing the state as the referent object of security has been criticised on several grounds. The centrality of the state as the referent object of security is not investigated by realism but rather assumed and taken as a given. States are presented as self-regarding, rational actors, often conceived in anthropomorphised terms, where cooperation or

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32 Ibid., pp. 78-79. Hobbes also argued that states gain their legitimacy by guaranteeing the security of their inhabitants against external and internal threats.
conflict is simply the product of their competition for power. Whether this competition for power derives from human nature (Morgenthau) or from the anarchic international system (Herz, Waltz, Walt), states act solely in their self-interest in order to protect what they define as their national security. In other words, by specifying the state as the only referent object of security, realism assumes but does not explicate that there is “a particular form of individual rationality in state action as both the source and outcome of that anarchy.”

This objectification of the state implies that the collective good can be served under the needs and interests of the state. Undoubtedly, the security of the individual depends on the security of the state. However, individual security is not necessarily coextensive with state security. Considering the state the ultimate judge about what interests to serve often leads to situations where certain groups are less privileged than others are or even excluded from the discussion on security (e.g. minorities or ethnic groups).

The state often fails to fulfil its security obligations—and at times even becomes a source of threat to its own people. This may be through the direct murder of citizens (as in Yugoslavia and Rwanda), the repetitive violation of human rights (as in South Africa and China) or the redistribution of economic resources towards military purposes and away from development needs (as in India and Pakistan). Furthermore, in order to pursue national security states can put the life of citizens at risk, asking them to fight for it, thus putting the individual at the service of the state. Therefore, Bill McSweeney argues that it is morally wrong to place the state as the referent of security, since the function and purpose of the state is to protect all people. In his view, the state is the instrument, not the object of security, while human individuals should be the subject.

34 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, Supplement 2, 1996, pp 229-254, p. 232. This puts realism’s ontology into question, a point which is examined in section 2.5 of this chapter.
36 Realism has in general been criticised for having no consideration for morality in its analysis and worldview. In particular, the principles of self-help and self-interest of realism, which justify a state’s decision to wage war in order to increase its power, offer no moral restraint and have been challenged by
Placing states at the centre of our thinking about security is according to Ken Booth not only immoral but also illogical. To demonstrate his point he draws an analogy with a house and its inhabitants:

"A house requires upkeep, but it is illogical to spend excessive amounts of money and effort to protect the house against flood, dry rot and burglars if this is at the cost of the well-being of the inhabitants. There is obviously a relationship between the well-being of the sheltered and the state of the shelter, but can there be any question as to whose security is primary?"\textsuperscript{38}

Drawing from the house-inhabitants analogy, Booth concludes that states are the means of security rather than the end. He thus suggests that security should be based on 'emancipation', in which individuals are freed from "those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do".\textsuperscript{39} This way, Booth argues, it is the individuals that become the referent object of security because security and emancipation become virtually synonymous.\textsuperscript{40}

Martin Shaw takes the discussion one step further. He also criticises the overemphasis on the state as the focus of security but he doubts that making individuals the referent of security will help readdress the imbalance. Instead, Shaw believes that 'social groups' are the most appropriate level at which to understand the concept and effect of security. Therefore, he proposes the inclusion of 'society' as a referent of security.\textsuperscript{41}

As can be seen from the above, new approaches suggest that security cannot be restricted to the well being of the state and they call for a deepening of the agenda of security

\textsuperscript{36} the doctrine of the 'just war'. For a consideration of this question see Joel H. Rosenthal, 'Rethinking the Moral Dimensions of Foreign Policy' in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., \textit{Controversies in International Relations: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge} (New York: St. Martinis, 1995), pp. 317-329.

\textsuperscript{37} See McSweeney, 'Identity and Security'; McSweeney, \textit{Security, Identity and Interests}.


\textsuperscript{40} This approach to security is often referred to as 'critical security studies'.

From this perspective, they argue that the focus of security should move either down to the protection and welfare of the individual citizen and social groups or up to the level of international or global security. This does not mean that state security is not important; on the contrary, it is paramount. However, a declared need to secure the state can only be justified in terms of the individuals who are the proper focus of security.

Within these efforts to deepen the concept of security, ‘human security’ is the most frequently used term to frame a broader theoretical concept and propose a practical agenda. In its broadest sense, human security seeks to place the individual - or people collectively- as the referent object of security. Human security puts the individual at the centre of security analysis and policy, and considers the state a collective instrument to protect human life and enhance human welfare.

The term ‘human security’ was first used in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report of 1994, which examined both the national and the global concerns of human security.42 The economist Mahbub ul Haq, who was one of the main contributors to the development of the concept within the UNDP, called upon a new concept of security that is ‘universal, global, and indivisible’ and is reflected in the lives of people, not in the weapons of a country.43 He argued that security is about the ‘security of individuals, not just security of their nations’ in other words ‘security of people, not just security of territory.’ In that way, an individual’s security comes not just from the safeguarding of the state as a political unit, but also from access to individual welfare, wellbeing and freedom.44

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Decision-makers and politicians in some countries are increasingly recognising the importance of human security as a holistic means of conceptualising the sources of insecurity that affect people worldwide. In particular, countries like Canada, Japan and Norway are leading the way in promoting the human security agenda. Yet, while the idea of human security has been widely debated, there is still a lack of a coherence of the concept. A variety of differing definitions make the implementation of human security difficult and unclear. For this reason, security studies scholars, even beyond the realist school, remain sceptical about its usage in international relations. They argue that the concept is too vague and broad to be useful either analytically or practically. From the above it can be concluded that although approaches that focus on the security of the individual rather than the state are valuable contributions to the analysis of security and security policy, if underdeveloped they run the risk of endangering the coherence of the concept of security.

2.4.2 Security for which values?

Directly linked to the referent of security, the second specification concerns the values that need to be secured. The foremost important value, around which all others relate according to realism, is the survival of the state. As Waltz put it: “[s]urvival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have ... The survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured, rather than as a realistic description of the impulse that lies behind every act of state.” In order for a state to survive, it needs to be able to defend its territory from overthrow or attack from other states, to regulate independently its domestic affairs and to be diplomatically and politically autonomous. Therefore, the key values that need to be secured according to the traditional national security conception are the physical integrity, the sovereignty and the political independence of the state.

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45 For a schematic comparison of the various definitions of human security see: [www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/comparison_definitions.pdf](http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/comparison_definitions.pdf) (29.09.2002).
46 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 91-92.
The values that realism privileges take, without a doubt, central stage in the concept of security. After all, the physical survival of the individuals depends largely on the survival of the state. However, advocates of a deeper security concept also call for a deepening of the values, and therefore the goals that security policy should pursue. These values, according to the human security approach, should be about the safety and well-being of “all the people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment.” More specifically, the UNDP report identified ‘a concern with human life [physical safety and well-being] and dignity [freedom]’ as the overarching values of human security. All other values can be put under these two categories. As important values for the individual are among others the ability to satisfy one’s basic needs, a guarantee of fundamental human rights and fundamental freedoms, sustainable economic development, democracy, rule of law, and good governance.

2.4.3 Security from which threats?

All of the realists studied earlier in the chapter emphasise implicitly (Herz, Waltz) or explicitly (Morgenthau, Walt) the importance of military threats as the main focus of security. During the Cold War, the primacy of military power and military threats dominated the investigation of security and was rarely challenged by scholars. According to realism, economic, social and environmental issues only enter the security agenda, if they intrude into the military realm. For instance, an environmental problem of water shortage would only be considered a national security issue if a state threatened to use military force against another state in order to protect its interests. Similarly, economic issues are only related to security insofar as they influence a state’s strategic weight and

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51 An example of this is the relations of Turkey with Syria and Iran over the waters of the Euphrates.
war-fighting potential. Consequently, realism is only concerned with external threats that other states pose to the state.

However, as Peter Katzenstein remarked, “the end of the Cold War has put new national security issues beside the long-standing fear of a nuclear war between the superpowers and their preparations for large-scale conventional wars.” The biggest challenges in the world since the end of the Cold War do not come from the possibility of intrastate conflicts but from a variety of threats, some of which are not orchestrated by state actors. As several research projects have demonstrated, since 1945, most conflicts have been within states, not between states. September 11 was a reminder that non-state actors like terrorist groups and organised crime groups pose serious existential threats to the state and to society.

Apart from that, structural changes in the international system have induced the emergence of a series of new threats. According to Janusz Simonides and Vladimir Volodin, four ‘mega-trends’ are challenging the state-centric, military-focused perception of security. These are democratisation, nationalism, regionalisation and globalisation. Because of these trends, Samuel Huntington argues, the principal conflicts of global politics will no longer be between states but between nations and groups of different civilisations. Technological advances also mean that threats such as biological weapons and information warfare have grown in prominence in the security realm.

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52 Paul Kennedy, for example, who has written extensively on the connection between wealth and power considers that “all of the major shifts in the world’s military-power balances have followed alterations in the productive balances”. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers (London: Fontana Press, 1988), p. 567. On the relationship between security and economics see Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1977).
These changes in the international system have led to calls for a broadening of the concept of security. Many scholars—some more convincingly than others—have argued in favour of the inclusion of a diverse variety of risks in the security agenda. They argued that security should also be about protection from such threats as ethnic cleansing, large-scale population movements, the degradation of the environment, AIDS and others. Although most of these threats are not new, in the past they had been neglected by politicians and academics, as they were overshadowed by the Cold War hostility.

Prominent critics of the traditional definition of security argue that the greatest threats to state survival are non-military and they emphasise the environmental, social and economic threats. Ken Booth argues that the “daily threat to the lives and well-being of most people and most nations is different from that suggested by the traditional military perspective.”

Similarly, in an article published in Foreign Affairs in 1989, Jessica Tuchman Mathews argued that the concept of security needed to be rethought. She concluded that, “[g]lobal developments now suggest the need for...national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues.”

These calls for broadening security as a concept and a policy goal were embraced by advocates of human security. United Nations (UN) General Secretary Kofi Annan rejected the realist understanding of security and argued that “Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms.” Instead, threats to human security may come from seven general categories: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political ones.

Yet, realists have objected to the calls for a horizontal broadening of security for three main reasons. Firstly, Stephen Walt warns that by including non-military issues in the analysis of security, there is a risk of extending the concept into nothingness by opening

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up for everything to be understood in terms of security. According to Walt, broadening the concept of security:

...runs the risk of expanding ‘security studies’ excessively; by this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to ‘security’. Defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.61

Similarly, Mohammed Ayoob notes, an “all-inclusive definition of security . . . runs the risk of making the concept so elastic as to detract seriously from its utility as an analytical tool.”62 This is a valid point. The coherence of the concept might be endangered when a wide variety of issues are seen as security. As Daniel Deudney points out, “if we begin to speak about all the forces and events that threaten life, property and well-being (on a large-scale) as threats to our national security, we shall soon drain them of any meaning.”63

Secondly, a broad definition of security that encompasses a great range of diverse threats may not provide much guidance in constructing policy and can make it difficult to set priorities for action.64 Realists do not reject the importance of non-military issues altogether. However, they argue that these issues, regardless of their significance, are not security issues and should be dealt with by other disciplines. Their concern is that a definition, which is excessively broad, may dilute concern with military issues and compromise the ability of the state to defend its territory.65 As Walt points out, “given the cost of military forces and the risks of modern war, it would be irresponsible for the

63 Deudney, ‘Environmental Degradation’, p. 465. In his article, Deudney argues convincingly against linking environmental degradation with the concept of security.
scholarly community to ignore the central questions that form the heart of the security studies field".66

Thirdly, some realists argue that a broadened security agenda could lead to policy responses that are implicitly more and more militarised.67 This argument is ironically the opposite of the previous one. It implies that the inclusion of new items in the security agenda would increasingly provoke military responses, which would be inappropriate for environmental, social and economic issues. However, this point is less convincing, as it is drawn from the realist assumption that security is primarily guaranteed by military means, which is examined in the final specification to security.

2.4.4 Security by what means?

Security can be pursued in a variety of ways. Depending on the nature of the threat, different means and strategies might be employed. As it has already been mentioned, realism is preoccupied with military action in response to security threats. Although realists acknowledge the importance of diplomacy (Morgenthau), pacific strategies (Herz) and the balance of power in securing the state, they all consider military measures the most appropriate response to immediate security threats and therefore highlight the importance of armaments.

Accordingly, during the Cold War, force was the primary instrument of security and power was equated with military capabilities. However, this approach has been challenged in a convincing manner in the light of developments in world politics. The first blow to the realist approach came with the end of the Cold War and the nature of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was not caused by the use of military action.68 For

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many, this was an early indication that a paradigm shift was required in the pursuit of security.

On the one hand, new security approaches question the state’s goal of providing security unilaterally, a central assumption in the theory of realism. According to Emma Rothschild “the political responsibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these ‘concepts of security’) is itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to non-governmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature and the market.” As alternatives to the unilateralist approach to security, the concepts of collective security, common security and most recently, co-operative security were developed. Although these concepts follow the realist preoccupation with military threats, they highlight the need for international cooperation where conflict is inevitable. Their common element is their focus on multilateral action, confidence building and equity, instead of arms races, competition and deterrence. Their ultimate goal is thus to freed states from the ‘security dilemma’ through cooperation and interdependence.

On the other hand, the realist identification of security with military force is also challenged. The use of military force can be effective in response to direct threats but is counterproductive in dealing with some of the new challenges to security. New approaches highlight that many of the upgraded threats in the security agenda, “notably

70 Collective security, as conceived in the United Nations Charter, is based on the idea that members of a group renounce the use of force among them and pledge to defend any member of the group attacked by external forces.
72 Co-operative security emphasises the process that is required to change the present military based security concept. The concept has several phases in which confidence building and risk reduction proceed along with disarmament and restructuring of defence capabilities. Co-operation, transparency, gradual disarmament, industrial conversion, demobilisation, demilitarisation, even humanitarian intervention all are part of the concept of co-operative security. See Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner. A New Concept of Cooperative Security, Occasional Paper (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1992).
the environment, health, crime, drugs and migration can no longer be contained within national boundaries"73 nor can they be dealt with by military means. The reality of international terrorism, which unfolded after September 11, demonstrated that non-traditional threats cannot be dealt with traditional responses. In a world where airplanes, envelopes, containers, agricultural products and other everyday things may be turned into lethal weapons by terrorist organisations, neither military action nor a balance of power can protect the state and society from them. Security risks that can be resolved exclusively or even primarily by military force are limited, whereas new security threats do not necessary require a traditional military response.

As a result, particularly after the end of Cold War, soft power has become increasingly important in dealing with security issues. This does not mean that military considerations should be downgraded. Political and diplomatic solutions will only work if backed by the necessary military power. However, the focus of security has shifted from crisis management to peacekeeping and conflict prevention through economic and political measures. Reflecting on this, Haq argued that human security could best be achieved through "development, not...through arms."74 The European Union is a characteristic example of an international actor that pursues its security primarily through political and economic means and has thus been described as a 'civilian power'75.

To sum up, this section of the chapter has demonstrated that the concept of security is genuinely contested on various grounds. The challenge to the traditional, realist approach to security can be classified into four separate but interrelated debates, which correspond to the answers different approaches give to the four specifications to security. In the first debate, the concept is deepened from the security of the state to the security of groups and individuals. In the second, the values that security aims to pursue are extended from the survival of the state to the survival of the individual. In the third debate, security is

74 Haq, 'Human rights'.
broadened horizontally to include not only military threats but also economic, social and environmental ones. In the fourth debate, the means by which security is pursued are extended from unilateral, military ones to political, economic and multilateral means (see table 2.1).

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<th>Security for Whom?</th>
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<th>New security thinking</th>
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<th>Security for what values?</th>
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<th>Security by what means?</th>
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<td>Military force, Armaments, Diplomacy, Self-help, balance of power.</td>
<td>Soft power: political and economic means, multilateral cooperation, solidarity, development.</td>
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Table 2.1: Traditional vs. New security thinking

The overall discussion identified the problems with restricting the concept of security to the analysis of states and military conflict, which is central to the traditional, realist approach. At the same time, it also recognised the dangers associated with adopting too vague or all-encompassing definitions of security. Despite these problems with new security approaches, it can be concluded that the narrow approach of realism is no longer adequate in comprehending and pursuing security in the context of the changes in the international system. As John Chipman eloquently puts it “[t]o those who argue that definitions of strategic studies need to be widened, it is right to answer that, having been artificially shrunk in the past 40 years, they are now returning to their natural and necessary proportions.”

2.5 The challenge to realism’s epistemology

The discussion about the broadening of the concept of security from military threats to non-military issues cannot be understood outside the normative elements that it entails. Any effort to produce a body of knowledge over the evolving nature of security is informed by normative and political interests. As Robert Cox famously put it, “[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective … There is … no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space.”

The normative element of some of the new security approaches can easily be recognised—particularly in policy driven approaches, like ‘human security’. One of the characteristics of the debate on security is the competition among policy-makers, academics and pressure groups over the issues that should be included in the security agenda. Environmentalists highlight the importance of pollution problems and climate change, doctors insist on the dangers from HIV and other diseases, economists emphasise the need for financial stability and development and so forth and so on. From a policy perspective, the competition over the inclusion of an issue in the security agenda has to do with an effort to attract attention, mobilise resources and prioritise it over others.

Yet, realists maintain that their analysis of security is free of normative claims and it informed by an objective analysis of interstate relations. Realism is based on the positivist claim that it seeks objective knowledge of the world and describes it ‘as it is’, without being influenced by the analyst’s own views and bias. As John Mearsheimer points out, “[r]ealists maintain that there is an objective and knowable world, which is separate from the observing individual.” The claim to ‘objective’ knowledge is a crucial component of realism’s epistemology, thus leaving little room for normative or subjective suppositions.

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78 This however is contested by proponents of ‘human security’, who argue that development related issues are comparable to security issues in attracting and mobilising resources.

However, the realist claim to objectivity is not well substantiated. Krause and Williams question whether in fact it is ever possible to claim objective knowledge in international relations by presenting multiple interpretations of supposedly 'objectively' observable behaviour.\textsuperscript{80} They believe that "[t]he declaration that the state is the subject of security, and anarchy the eternal condition of international relations, is premised not on objective facts but is grounded in a deeper set of claims about the autonomous nature of subjectivity and its relationship to sovereignty."\textsuperscript{81} According to this view, then, the assumptions and claims of realism serve as an ideological platform in order to justify the political and economic status quo.\textsuperscript{82} Put it simply, realism acts as a rhetorical device to influence policy makers by constructing "a material and objective foundation for political practice."\textsuperscript{83}

This puts realism's epistemology into question. Rather than an objective analysis of security studies, the claim to objectivity is meant to establish realism as the scientific approach and allow it to set the security agenda in traditional terms. In that way, as Ferguson and Mansbach point out, realists managed to perpetuate a false dichotomy: that they are "hard-headed empiricists—in contrast to their quixotic adversaries—whose close reading of history enabled them to discern general laws of politics by means of induction. In fact, the general laws that realists propounded were value-laden assumptions … [that] reflect normative commitments."\textsuperscript{84} Because of the claim to objectivity, realism is not interested in how an issue enters the agenda, as it considers this predetermined and closed, with only state, military issues included in it. The power of realism relies on these

\textsuperscript{80} See Krause and Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda'.
\textsuperscript{82} Wyn Jones, 'Reconceptualizing Security'.
‘objectified’ assumptions and that is why realists have reacted so strongly against the broadening and deepening of security studies.85

Some of the new approaches have moved away from the positivism realism prescribes. Post-positivist approaches question what they perceive as realism’s unfounded truth-claims and the existence of natural laws in international relations and security. Notably, scholars employing some form of constructivism have argued that security issues can be better understood as political constructions through discourse and practice rather than as objective facts, thus challenging the traditional positivist approach to security. This ideational turn in security studies is thus primarily concerned with the impact of norms on security and the importance of subjective perceptions of what constitutes a security threat.86

Starting with Alex Wendt’s famous statement that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’,87 constructivists argue that ‘security is what states make of it’. Although not a theory of international relations, constructivism provides the philosophical foundations for identifying how groups imagine danger, how enemies are labelled and how threats are recognised. Despite the many variations in constructivist approaches, their common characteristic is that they argue that security cannot be understood without including issues of culture88 and identity.89 Therefore, constructivists underline the significance of human interpretation, moral judgement and ideational processes such as social learning, persuasion and norm diffusion in their analysis of the concept of security.

85 As Krause and Williams convincingly argue ‘[n]ot only the field, but its [realism’s] entire worldview is threatened (both intellectually and practically) by new challenges to security.’ See Krause and Williams. Critical Security Studies, p. 43.
88 For instance Katzenstein, Culture of National Security.
89 For instance see the exceptional work of David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Rev. ed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
2.6 The Copenhagen School of Security Studies

Building on and significantly contributing to the conceptual and epistemological debates on security, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde and colleagues have developed a coherent and comprehensive framework to the study of security. This framework is analysed in the most important book-length publication of the Copenhagen School: ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, published in 1998. It is a security framework that is based on two interesting compromises, one conceptual and one methodological, which takes into account and aim to overcome the weaknesses of both traditional and new approaches to security, discussed earlier in this chapter.

Firstly, in regards to the polarised debate between traditionalists, who favour a narrow definition of security and wideners, who call for a more-inclusive redefinition of the concept, the Copenhagen School suggests a middle position. On the one hand, Buzan and colleagues adopt the traditional view that security should be understood as the survival of a referent object (primarily but not exclusively, the state) in face of existential threats. On the other hand, in contrast to the traditionalists, they do not want to restrict the discussion of security to military issues nor to the state as the only referent object. To the military sector, they add political, economic, societal and ecological security sectors, recognising the growing importance of non-military issues.\(^{90}\) By doing so, they seek to widen and deepen the concept of security without destroying the intellectual coherence of security studies.

Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the security framework of the Copenhagen School is grown out of a methodological compromise that synthesises the previous work of its authors. In particular, the Copenhagen School has managed to reach a compromise between Buzan’s neorealist positivism and Waever’s constructivist post-positivism. In his early work, Buzan, a self-proclaimed neorealist, adopted the view

\(^{90}\) The widening of security to encompass five sectors was first proposed by Buzan in 1983, in the first edition of his book ‘People, States and Fear’. Building on that, in the 1998 book, Buzan et al. examined the linkages across these sectors and argued that the level on which security issues are addressed depends on which sector they belong to.
that security threats are out there, to be observed, measured and analysed.\textsuperscript{91} He discussed security on three levels – the sub-state, the state and the international system- but considered the state as the ultimate provider of security and essentially its referent object for all levels. Waever on the other hand, rejected the assumption that threats objectively exist and developed a theory to analyse how issues are constructed as existential threats.\textsuperscript{92} The two authors explain the resulting compromise between their different metatheoretical positions in their collaborative work:

"Although our philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in holding security to be a political construction and not something the analyst can describe as it 'really' is, in our purposes we are closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempted to grasp security constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions."\textsuperscript{93}

The end-result of the compromise between the two authors is a framework that understands security as socially constructed, while attempting to implement an objectivist mode-of-analysis that privileges the role of the state as the primary, but not exclusive referent of security. As with traditional security studies and in contrast to some of the new security approaches (for instance ‘human security’ and critical security studies), the Copenhagen School “reject[s] reductionism (giving priority to the individual as the ultimate referent object of security) as an unsound approach to international security.”\textsuperscript{94} They consider the individual as ‘relatively marginal’ to understanding international security, which in their view is about “the relations between collective units and how those are reflected upward into the system.”\textsuperscript{95} However, unlike traditional studies, they argue that an issue only becomes a security issue when it is presented as such. Thus, they understand security as a ‘self-referential’ practice, because it is in this practice that an

\textsuperscript{91} See Buzan, \textit{People, States and Fear}.
\textsuperscript{93} Buzan et al., \textit{Security: A New Framework}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. p. 207.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p. 208.
issue becomes a security one. This means, “it is the actor and not the analyst who decides whether something is to be handled as an existential threat.”  

In that way, the Copenhagen School scholars move away from the discussion of what security is, which is essentially a normative question, and instead focus on what security does. They define security as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics.” This process they call ‘securitisation’, which is the act of framing an issue as “an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside of the normal bounds of political procedure.” Any public issue, they argue, can be located on the spectrum ranging from ‘non-politicised’ through ‘ politicised’ to ‘securitised’. “Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization.”

The Copenhagen School argues that securitisation should not be considered as necessarily good, because security can be seen as a failure to deal with issues as ‘normal politics’. Security, they say, is at best, “a kind of stabilization of conflictual or threatening relations” and although that makes security better than insecurity, it is not a desired condition to elevate all relations to the realm of security. It is for this reason that they propose that the optimal long-range option is to ‘desecuritise’. ‘Desecuritisation’ means “not to have issues phrased as “threats against which we have countermeasures”, but to move them out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere.” In other words, refers to “the shifting of the issues out of the emergency model and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere” (see figure 2.1).

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98 Ibid., pp. 23–24.
99 Ibid., p. 23.
100 Ibid., p. 29.
101 Ibid., p. 4.
102 Ibid., p. 29.
103 Ibid., p. 4.
2.7 Conclusion

This chapter critically reviewed the ongoing debates on the concept of security, which have lead to the renaissance and re-foundation of security studies. The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that something has changed with security. The traditional realist approach is now seriously challenged by new approaches, both on the conceptual and methodological level. Many scholars have called for a deepening and broadening of security, to include new threats and referent objects. At the same time, new approaches have rejected realism’s positivist epistemology and have turned to constructivism and post-positivism to study security.

At the heart of the debates on security, the Copenhagen School appears to be offering the most complete framework to the study of security. Buzan, Waever and their colleagues eloquently have found the middle way between traditionalists and wideners and between positivists and constructivists. The key concept that they use to explain how an issue enters the security agenda is the notion of securitisation that looks at how issues are discursively constructed as existential threats. The significant contribution of this approach, according to Adrian Hyde-Price, is that it provides the concept of security with a ‘more coherent theoretical basis’, while successfully presenting a “solution to the problem involved in broadening the definition of security without thereby robbing it of its analytical utility.” The next chapter elaborates on the theory.

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of securitisation and analyses the theoretical and methodological framework used for the completion of this research project.
Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the theory and methodology used in this dissertation. The analysis in the previous chapter informed the discussion on new and old approaches to security and set the scene for a more thorough investigation of the framework used to study and understand developments in Greek policies on terrorism and migration. Theory and methodology in this thesis are integral to, and overlap each other and are thus examined together here. The first part of this chapter analyses in more depth the theory of securitisation as developed by the Copenhagen School (section 3.2) and discusses its limitations (section 3.3). The second part outlines how the overall research design is operationalised with reference to the Greek case (section 3.4). It then discusses the particular methods used for the collection and analysis of data for this research project and justifies the choices made (section 3.5).

3.2 The Process of Securitisation

As noted earlier, the Copenhagen School argues that securitisation occurs when a political actor pushes an area of ‘normal politics’ into the security realm by using the rhetoric of existential threat in order to justify the adoption of ‘emergency’ measures outside the formal and established procedures of politics. Ole Waever believes that security is not ‘a reality prior to language’¹; it does not exist before it is uttered. Security is created because of, or through, language. An issue becomes securitised when the term security is mentioned in conjunction with that issue. Therefore, according to Waever, security can be regarded what in language theory is known as a ‘speech act’.² “It is the utterance itself in itself that is the act: by saying it something is done (like betting, giving

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² Waever’s approach draws upon the understanding of speech-acts developed by Austin. See John Austin, How to do Things with Words, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
a promise, naming a ship)." The word security is used by elites in relation to an issue in order to produce hierarchical conditions in which this issue is dramatised and presented as supreme priority. The central question that needs to be addressed, then, according to the Copenhagen School, is "[w]ho can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects?"5

'Securitising actors' are actors that present issues as existential threats to referent objects. These might be individuals or groups, such as politicians and governments. Securitising actors speak in the name of referent objects and have the authority to write legitimate security discourses and choose the policies that legitimise them.6 Their authority and social power usually derives from their position: "Security is very much a structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security."7 Therefore, although in principal nobody is excluded from becoming a securitising actor, the field of security is biased in favour of political elites and 'security professionals'.8

Securitising actors are different from 'functional actors'9 who significantly influence the securitisation of an issue by popularising the security discourse. An example of such an actor is the media, which plays an important role in any securitisation. However, the role of the media in securitising an issue is often subordinated to the political elites. Karmen Erjavec has shown that journalists, blinded by the myth of objectivity, are often reduced to a role of reproducing the discourse of the dominant ideology.10 That happens because

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6 See Waever, Securitization and Desecuritization.
8 Ibid., p. 43.
9 Ibid., p. 31.
journalists often objectify claims that an issue is an existential threat with reference to official statements and the official version of events, as presented by state institutions. In that way, the media become transmitters of the elites’ security discourse, which they legitimise with supporting evidence from the officials that created the discourse in the first place.

According to the Copenhagen School scholars, presenting something as an existential threat does not by itself automatically create securitisation. This is what they call a ‘securitisation move’. An issue is successfully securitised “only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” Uttering security must have a legitimate standing and be accepted by the broader polity for a securitisation move to be completed. Consequently, the audience is as important as the securitisation actors are. The proof that a securitisation move is complete is that “by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures he or she would otherwise be bound by” and has convinced the audience to tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed.

The theory of securitisation does not put restrictions on what issues may be securitised, as long as they follow the ‘grammar of security’, i.e. they are discursively presented as threats to a referent object. In each of the five sectors of security identified by the Copenhagen School the referent object is different. In the military and political sectors, like in traditional security studies, existential threats are defined in terms of the state (survival, sovereignty and ideology). In the economic and environmental sectors, referent objects are less easy to pin down. The range of referent objects in these sectors is very large, including specific economic regimes or even the global market in the economic sector, and any ecological concerns in the environmental sector. Last but not least, in the societal sector the referent object of security is identity. Societal security is thus about

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what news to present and in what order, signifies the influence of subjective factors in the media. See Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Indiana University Press, 1990).

12 Ibid., p. 25.
the protection of "traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom."

Referent objects in a securitising move are not necessarily restricted to one security sector. Linkages are possible across sectors and security issues are often legitimised with regards to more than one referent. Out of the five sectors of security, the most important for the purposes of this study are the political and societal sectors. According to Buzan, political security has to do with "the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy." It is about threats that can undermine the legitimacy or recognition of the state and its institutions. Therefore, the referent object of security is the state, which if not protected from such threats, can be destabilised, weakened and become less able to function effectively.

Societal security is related to situations when states and societies perceive a threat in identity terms. The relation between identity and security is particularly important. On the one hand, there need to be identities (states, nations, communities etc.) in order to be able to speak of their security. Charles Taylor notes that identity provides the reference point for determining "what is right, good, or valuable, or what ought to be done." Identity, he says, looks inward and backward, determining 'what is' and 'what should be'. In that way, it defines the parameters of community and sets out the attributes and beliefs a person must have in order to belong. Thus, Buzan et al. argue that whether migrants or other rival identities are securitised depends upon the importance that the 'holders of the collective identity' place on safeguarding and reproducing a language, a set of behavioural customs, or a conception of ethnic purity.

On the other hand, discourses of security and danger also construct identities. They draw communities together by emphasising the differences between them and those on the outside. As Campbell notes, "a notion of what 'we' are is intrinsic to an understanding of what 'we' fear." Identity is constructed and reinforced by outlining what that identity is not or what it must fear and confront. According to Michael Shapiro then, the making of the 'Other' is clearly linked to how the self is understood. This suggests that the construction of Otherness through discourses of danger is a particular kind of "boundary-producing political performance" because it is by defining what the 'foreign' is that communities also define what the 'domestic' is. Therefore, Ken Booth argues that "what makes us believe we are the same and them different is inseparable from security." 

From the above it can be derived that an important part of the process of securitisation is the political ability to specify a threat to a collectivity and mobilise a 'we' against a supposedly threatening 'them'. This suggests that there is a conceptual link and an intimate relationship between securitisation and Carl Schmitt’s rendering of the political, which considered that deciding on and distinguishing friends from enemies is the essence of politics. As Schmitt argues, "[e]very religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other

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20 See Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988). Similarly, William Connolly notes that "an identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidarity ... Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty", see William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 64.
23 For a thorough analysis on this point see Simon Dalby, 'Geopolitical Change and Contemporary Security Studies: Contextualizing the Human Security Agenda', Working Paper No. 30 (British Columbia: Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, 2000).
antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy”.

Therefore, Huysmans’ description of the process of securitisation captures its meaning best, when he says that:

“Securitisation turns into a technique of government which retrieves the ordering force of the fear of the violent death by a mythical replay of the Hobbesian state of nature. It manufactures a rupture in the routinised, everyday life by fabricating an existential threat, which provokes experiences of the real possibility of violent death. These experiences, named passages to the limit, are the essential ground of authentic political acts and of the authentic self-definition of a political community.”

The theory of securitisation, as developed by the Copenhagen School, provides the most useful framework to analyse the inclusion of issues in the security agenda, by deepening and broadening the concept of security without compromising its conceptual coherence. It also provides a solid framework to analyse developments in Greek policies on terrorism and migration. In regards to these issues, securitising actors and moves are identified in the empirical chapters of this thesis, as well as referent objects and discourses of danger (speech acts), following the framework set out by the Copenhagen School.

However, the theory of securitisation is not entirely free of methodological and conceptual shortcomings. These weaknesses of the securitisation theory are outlined and discussed in the next section of this chapter and are taken into account in the application of the securitisation theory to the Greek case.

26 Huysmans, ‘Question of the Limit’, p. 571.
3.3 Limitations of Securitisation Theory

3.3.1 The problems with the audience

The first limitation of the Copenhagen School security framework is that although it attributes a key role to the acceptance of a securitisation move by an audience, it does not elaborate or even attempt to clarify who that audience actually is. The references to the audience are kept vague and general. Buzan et al. do not clearly explain whether a loud expression of an approval by an audience is needed to assume that the conditions of such an acceptation have fully occurred. Although they do acknowledge that acceptance can be achieved through either coercion or consent, they do not adequately investigate the role of imposition and manipulation in obtaining such an acceptance by the securitisation actors. For instance, in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, the negotiation process through which a securitisation move is completed and legitimised might consider acceptance by the audience less important than in democratic states.27 Even in liberal-democratic regimes though, a society consists of various separate audiences, with competing views, expectations and loyalties. How can the analyst, then, determine who the audience is and then problematise whether it has accepted the securitisation move or not?

One indication for acceptance might be measuring public opinion and analysing public perceptions on what society considers dangerous and threatening. Another more reliable indication is to examine whether society has accepted without widespread protest the imposition of laws and limitations of its freedom, in the face of the existential threat, which otherwise might not had been accepted. In that case, silence from the audience indicates consent and acceptance.

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Perhaps the hesitation of the Copenhagen School to specify who the audience is derives from their conceptualisation of collective identity. McSweeney has criticised the Copenhagen School for “freezing” the notions of “identity” and “society,” and not giving due respect to the insight that identity “is not a fact of society,” but a process.28 He argues that taking identity for granted as an objective fact is problematic because identity “is always a narrating, a story-telling, an active process on the part of individuals which can only be grasped as a process, never as an object.”29 In terms of defining the audience, if the Copenhagen School’s assumption of the existence of a monolithic, collective identity is to be accepted, then that means that society is collectively the audience. However, this would not be a good enough explanation, unless a society is very homogeneous. More convincing would be to follow Williams’ line of thought, which defends the Copenhagen School, pointing out that “it is precisely under the conditions of attempted securitizations that a reified, monolithic form of identity is declared. It is when identities are securitized that their negotiability and flexibility are challenged, denied, or suppressed.”30 In that sense, then, this study takes the view that the security discourse of securitising agents also defines who the targeted audience is and therefore the part of society to which the security processes and discourses refer.

For these reasons, this study adopts Benedict Anderson’s conceptualisation of identity, as a referent of societal security. According to Anderson, identity is not something that is inherent in social groups and communities, but is constructed and transformed within and in relation to how it is represented. Therefore, “[c]ommunities are to be distinguished, not

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by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined'.

This is what Anderson calls ‘imagined communities’.

Although the vagueness with which the Copenhagen School refers to the role of the audience does not directly influence the analysis in the empirical chapters of this thesis, a clarification on that point was required to explain how identity is conceptualised and how the audience is identified.

3.3.2 More than speech-acts

The second and perhaps most important limitation of securitisation theory in terms of the research design of this thesis is that the Copenhagen School relies exclusively on a single mechanism, speech-acts, to explain how an issue is securitised. Although in their collaborative work Buzan et al. differentiate from Waever’s earlier view and acknowledge that it is not only the uttering of the word ‘security’ that is crucial to the specific nature of the speech-act, but also the broader rhetorical performance of which it is a part, they do not develop this aspect of securitisation in their analysis, thus reducing the designation of an existential threat to a purely verbal act or a linguistic rhetoric.

However, there are good reasons to avoid too narrow a focus on speech. First, Michael Williams has convincingly argued that images can also play an important role in securitising an issue. He argues that in today’s world where the televisual media structure the communicative environment, “speech-acts are inextricable from the image-dominated context in which they take place and through which meaning is communicated.” Therefore, visual representations may have performative action that impacts on the speech-act of securitisation and influences security perceptions and policies. As examples of the role of images, Williams points out that the extraordinary images of September 11

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32 Buzan et al. note that “the security speech-act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.” See Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework, p. 27.
or the images of 'shadowy figures' attempting to jump on trains through the Channel Tunnel between France and the United Kingdom may play a key role on how people perceive terrorism and migration respectively, as existential threats.

Second, Lene Hansen and Didier Bigo have also criticised the framework of the Copenhagen School for a biased focus on speech acts, which ignores non-discursive practices. Lene Hansen argued that the focus on the verbal act of speech cannot adequately analyse security situations characterised by imposed silence, especially in gender relations. She notes that "even in the cases of verbal silence, security might be spoken through the body" and used the example of honour killings in Pakistan to demonstrate the bodily performance taking place within the speech act.34 She thus agrees with Judith Butler that "a statement may be made that, on the basis of a grammatical analysis alone, appears to be no threat. But the threat emerges precisely through the act that the body performs in the speaking the act."35

On similar lines, Bigo showed that discourses of danger in societal security issues can also be developed through the implementation of specific security practices.36 He argues that bureaucratic procedures (exclusion versus inclusion), profiling of groups (e.g. migrants) and particular security technologies (e.g. visa, identity control and registration) have effectively the consequence of categorising those who are considered dangerous and unwanted. Therefore, such bureaucratic and technological processes, although not

disconnected from political rhetoric and securitising speech acts, have on their own right the ability to influence how the audience perceives an issue.\textsuperscript{37}

Finally, myths and narratives can also contribute to the securitisation of a societal issue. As noted earlier, an issue is an issue of societal security if a society perceives it to constitute an existential threat to its identity. A collective identity relates to a shared relation to some symbols (e.g. flag, language, history, culture etc) that create boundaries between Self and Others.\textsuperscript{38} To refer to Benedict Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined communities’, the identification of these shared symbols of belonging is a dynamic and on-going process, which helps societies continuously experience common identity.\textsuperscript{39} The problem with the Copenhagen School’s framework is that its exclusive focus on speech-acts reduces the construction of threats to a limited period in time, while ignoring the historical processes through which identity is produced.\textsuperscript{40} Recognising this, Karsten Friis notes that myths can play an important role in projecting imagined common characteristics to a community, often by simplifying and purifying mythical interpretations of the past and historical narratives.\textsuperscript{41} Myths transform meanings into form and can be used by dominant elites to naturalise and legitimise their beliefs, values and policies so as to render them self-evident and inevitable.\textsuperscript{42} In that way, myths can also be used to securitise.

To sum up this critique, although speech-acts are the primary mechanism for the securitisation of an issue, this study also refers to the role of images, security practices


\textsuperscript{39} Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}.

\textsuperscript{40} On this point, see Huysmans’s analysis of the securitisation of immigrants within host societies: Jef Huysmans, ‘Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of “Securitizing” Societal Issues’ in Miles, Robert and Thranhardt (eds), \textit{Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion} (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), pp. 53-72.


and myths in order to analyse the process of securitisation of terrorism and migration in Greece.

### 3.3.3 Norms and reasons for securitisation

The third limitation of the Copenhagen School framework is that it leaves the existence of and respect for rules and norms—an essential part of international politics in Europe—unexplored and unexplained.\(^{43}\) Perhaps surprisingly for a constructivist approach, which reflects the ideational turn in security studies, Buzan et al. pay little or no attention to norms that influence the securitising actors’ decision to present an issue as an existential threat. In fact, the Copenhagen School is not interested in the reasons an actor decides to rhetorically present an issue as a security threat, although these reasons might be different from what is presented and discussed in the public debate in order to legitimise a securitising move.

This dissertation seeks to go beyond what is said in the security discourse and to also identify the reasons it is said and thus the reasons an actor chooses to make a securitising move. One of the aims of the dissertation is thus to investigate why terrorism and migration in Greece became securitised at the time they did. Since international and domestic policies in internal security issues have increasingly been merged through the process of European integration, the reasons for the securitisation of these issues in Greece might not only be restricted to the national level. EU cooperation in internal security issues might have induced a change in preferences of Greek policymakers as a result of interaction and communication. Therefore, apart from domestic factors, the impact of European norms on the Greek elites’ perceptions of these issues is also included in the analysis.

This adds another dimension to the theory of securitisation, as it examines the interplay between national and European factors that triggered and facilitated the emergence of the

\(^{43}\) On a criticism on that point see Sjursen, who argues that “We need a theory that can identify the mechanisms that lead to an accumulation of norms as well as why these norms are accepted” See Helene Sjursen, ‘Security and Defence’ in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds), Contemporary European Foreign Policy (London: Sage, 2004), p. 65.
security discourse. It is no longer sufficient to study the politics of EU members at the state level alone, since cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs issues and European norms have a direct impact on domestic policies. Thus, this study attempts to empirically test how the theory of securitisation works in two levels of analysis, the system level (the European Union) and the state level (Greece).

3.3.4 The question of desecuritisation

Finally, the fourth limitation of the Copenhagen School framework relates to their understanding of desecuritisation as the optimal long-term option. Waever recognises the ethical responsibility and the dangers of securitising societal issues. He argues that 'security' should not be idealised but seen "as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics." Therefore, "the ideal of the securitization approach is – ceteris paribus – desecuritization, that issues are not lifted above normal politics with an urgency and 'necessity' that has often antidemocratic effects."44 Political elites and security analysts, he says, should have a heightened sense of responsibility when they talk security. This is undoubtedly correct.

The problems arise when discussing the actual processes through which an issue that has been lifted in the security realm returns to normal politics. The obvious method, based on the general framework of the Copenhagen School would be to critically challenge the dominant security discourse surrounding a securitised issue, by using speech acts and presenting an opposing discourse to the security one. Huysmans however has pointed out the normative dilemmas of studying security, because even if an analyst wants to transform a securitisation of a particular issue, he or she will have to depend on security

language, which might unintentionally contribute to the securitisation of this issue.\textsuperscript{45} Waever himself also recognised that "[e]ven when one writes about security with the aim of achieving de-securitization or to sensitize everybody to the problems of securitization, one securitizes by way of putting these issues in security terms."\textsuperscript{46} These would suggest that a change in discourse might not be adequate for the desecuritisation of an issue.

In addition, in suggesting desecuritisation as the optimal option, the Copenhagen School underestimates the importance of established frames on policy issues. The concept of policy frames derives from sociology and is related to the concept of 'policy paradigms'.\textsuperscript{47} "Policy frames can be defined as the ideational core of a particular policy field, which contains the dominant interpretation of the underlying social problem and expresses guideposts for action."\textsuperscript{48} Frames emerge once a particular discourse gains prominence and becomes established as the 'correct' or the 'standard' way to define a policy issue. According to Entman, "[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation."\textsuperscript{49} In that sense, the successful securitisation of an issue through the rhetoric of danger can lead to the emergence of a policy frame that contains a normative device with prescriptive value about viewing this issue as a security one.

Once established, policy frames are relatively stable and resist changing, even if the social power relations that facilitated their emergence have changed.\textsuperscript{50} This implies that a security discourse in regards to an issue, once established and institutionalised, might

\textsuperscript{45} Huysmans analyses how security talk about migration can contribute to its securitisation, even if the aim of the analysis is to challenge it. See Jef Huysmans, 'Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security', Alternatives, Vol. 27, 2002, pp. 41-62.
\textsuperscript{46} See Waever, Security Agendas, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{47} On ‘policy paradigms’ see Peter Hall (ed), The Political Power of Economic Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
\textsuperscript{48} Sandra Lavenex, ‘Migration and the EU’s New Eastern Border: Between Realism and Liberalism’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2001, p. 25. Lavenex discusses the two ideal typical frames in the field of immigration and asylum policy, the 'realist' frame of internal security and the 'liberal' frame of human rights and argues that the realist frame is the dominant one.
resist desecuritisation. This happens mainly for two reasons: First, frames shape actors' perceptions and interpretations and influence the course of political action. Research in psychology supports this claim that when an individual or group experience fear or insecurity about an issue, regardless of whether this insecurity is rational or not, a belief structure is created, which is very difficult to change.51 Second, as Didier Bigo has shown, once a security discourse is institutionalised and security measures implemented, it is supported at the bureaucratic level by security professionals, such as police officers, who are driven by self-interest and oppose to the desecuritisation of this issue in order to maintain their professional legitimacy.52

Therefore, from the above it derives that issues may be more difficult to be desecuritised than the Copenhagen School accounts for in its security framework. At best, the Copenhagen School undertheorises the process through which issues return to normal politics, after first being securitised. By that, it is not suggested here that security discourses are rigid and never change and that issues cannot be desecuritised at all. What is highlighted, however, is that this process is more complicated than it is presented in the security framework of the Copenhagen School. Taking the limitations of the securitisation theory into account, the next half of this chapter analyses how these are operationalised in the research design.

3.4 Operationalisation of the research project with regards to Greece

The subject of analysis of this dissertation is the securitisation of terrorism and migration in Greece. Using the security framework of the Copenhagen School, it aims to determine how, as well as why these issues were securitised and, based on these findings, to discuss the implications for policy and theory. To do so, it adopts a social constructivist approach, which is built on the assumptions of a subjective ontology (the world is


socially constructed') and an objective epistemology ('which can be measured and analysed'). Therefore, it rejects positivism and epistemological empiricism that seek to test hypotheses against the 'real world' and instead assumes a post-positivist view that denies the existence of an objective truth. This does not mean that it denies that a material world does exist, but it argues that the world can only be understood through intersubjective frameworks that are mediated by language.

The choice to analyse the issues of terrorism and migration, as opposed to other issues that are making their way in the security agenda of states and international organisations was primarily based on these issues’ significance in the Greek agenda during the 1990s. Despite dramatic changes in Greek policies on migration and terrorism, these have yet to be examined through a constructivist security approach, which can arguably provide a useful framework to understand the reasons and the process through which these policy changes occurred. In addition, the two issues are high on the EU agenda, particularly after September 11 and are often rhetorically and institutionally linked with each other in the European Union.

Initially, the research intended to compare the Greek findings with German policies and experiences on terrorism and migration. However, that plan was abandoned when it became clear that the focus of the research was spreading too thin for a significant contribution to knowledge to be made. Instead, it was deemed more appropriate to analyse the process of securitisation within a single country, with the mind also on developments at the European Union that would put the securitisation process in Greece within the broader European context.

3.4.1 Single case study

The research design chosen here is that of a single-country case study. According to Yin, case studies are empirical investigations of contemporary phenomena within their real-life context, where the boundaries between these phenomena and context are not clearly
evident.\footnote{Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed (California and Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), p. 13.} Yin’s definition points to the problem delimiting the phenomenon itself from its context. This case method has been criticised for not allowing generalisations to be made.\footnote{For instance see Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, How To Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics, 2nd ed (London: Chatham House, 1990).} However, following Flyvbjerg’s arguments, the single case study method, as used in this dissertation, is based on the recognition that context does matter and thus it is possible to make some contingent generalisations. In that sense, Flyvbjerg argues, the single-case method can be seen as containing the ‘power of the good example’.\footnote{As Flyvbjerg points out: ‘The case study is useful for both generating and testing of hypotheses but is not limited to these research activities alone.’ See Bent K. Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’ in Clive Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium, and David Silverman (eds), Qualitative Research Practice (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004), p. 425.}

Both theoretical and practical considerations provided the rationale for choosing Greece as the case study. Yin suggests that a case should be selected either because it is critical for testing a well-formulated theory, or because it represents an extreme or unique case.\footnote{Yin, Case Study, pp. 39-41.} Greece is particularly well suited to apply the security framework of the Copenhagen School and thus identify its strengths and weaknesses. The changes in Greek policies on terrorism and migration during the 1990s and their prioritisation in the Greek agenda indicate that securitisation theory is suitable for unmasking the process and the reasons behind policy-making. As regards to Yin’s second rationale, Greece is a unique case as far as terrorism is concerned, since, unlike other EU countries, terrorism was kept low in the Greek agenda until the late 1990s, despite it being a serious and persistent problem for the authorities for more than twenty-five years. On the other hand, the Greek experience with the sudden increase of migratory flows in the early 1990s was in many ways similar to that of Italy, Spain and Portugal, and thus cannot be considered a unique case.

Apart from that, the choice of Greece as the focus of the analysis had also to do with practical considerations, since it guaranteed easier access to political elites and to resources. However, the decisive factor for choosing Greece as the case study was that
the theory of securitisation had never before been applied to Greek security, which was identified as a gap in the literature that is addressed in this thesis. The next section is about the research methodology and its theoretical underpinnings used in this study.

3.5 Methods

This study is based on a qualitative methodology, which can be described as an “umbrella concept covering several forms of inquiry that help us to understand and explain the meaning of social phenomena with as little disruption of the natural setting as possible.” Security is understood as an inter-subjective and socially constructed practice. Thus, the emphasis of this study is on the security discourse that helps actors to make sense of, and construct the world. According to the Copenhagen School, in order to analyse how issues are perceived and subsequently constructed as security threats “[t]he obvious method is discourse analysis, since ... [t]he defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse.”

Discourse analysis is useful in identifying speech acts and the rhetoric of danger. However, it is not by itself adequate to understand the process of securitisation. A complete analysis should also “draw upon a varied repertoire of sources, newspapers, conversations, theories, and other academic writings on the case”, so that qualified judgments can be made. Since, as already noted, images and practices can also impact on the securitisation of an issue, visible indicators of securitisation need to also be included in the analysis.

The drawback of the above methods however, as the Copenhagen School acknowledges, is that by using them “we will not find underlying motives, hidden agenda, or such. There might be confidential sources that could reveal intentions and tactics ...[and thus,

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59 Ibid., p. 178.
discourse analysis] is a poor strategy for finding real motives."⁶⁰ Since this study also seeks to identify the reasons terrorism and migration became securitised in Greece, apart from discourse and documentary analysis, it also relied upon a set of interviews with Greek elites in order to get in-depth information on the motives and the norms that influenced the process of securitisation. The following sections analyse in more detail how these methods were used in the empirical chapters of this thesis.

### 3.5.1 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis reflects the 'linguistic turn' in the social sciences. Along with the rise of constructivist and post-positivist approaches, this turn signifies the increased importance scholars attribute to language in constructing reality, as opposed to a view of language as merely reflecting reality. Discourse analysis is used in this study drawing primarily on the work of Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.⁶¹ Discourse is understood as "an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena. Discourses frame certain problems; that is to say, they distinguish some aspects of a situation rather than others."⁶² In other words, a discourse represents a system for the formation of statements and discourse analysis implies the study of such networks of statements.

The central assumption of discourse analysis is that language is structured into patterns that play an important role in shaping our understanding of reality. According to this view, discourse is socially shaped as well as socially constitutive. Fairclough and Wodak argue that discourse "is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it."⁶³ Foucault explains that the participants in the discourse attempt to present their view as

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⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 176.
'objective' or 'true'. When such presentations of reality achieve an authoritative status and become dominating, then discourse becomes socially influential and appears as "the only right and possible perspective".  

How influential a statement or a claim is depends on the social authority of the speaker. Opinion leaders, such as politicians, decision-makers, journalists and academics, have the biggest impact on how issues are perceived and in identifying the boundaries of 'legitimate' discourse. Foucault recognises that a statement emanating from a position of social authority "is likely to be more productive than one coming from a marginalized social position." In that way, elites help to define the boundaries of 'commonsense' by defining their proffered positions as 'self-evident' truths and dismissing any competing positions as irrelevant, inappropriate, or without substance. These lead Foucault to suggest that linguistic discourse carries a set of social meanings that reflects the interests of the power elite who create and use it.

However, as Laclau and Mouffe point out, a distinction between the discursive and non-discursive is not possible as both are articulatory social practices that establish meaning. Laclau and Mouffe deploy this conception of the 'discursivity' of social practices and argue that:

Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices. It affirms ... that any distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social production of meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totalities.

Therefore, as explained in section 3.3.2, apart from statements and speech-acts, images, practices and myths are also included in the analysis.

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64 Foucault uses the term 'discursive formations' on such dominating representations. See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge.
67 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 107.
The task of discourse analysis is to explore the form and functions of particular discursive constructions and to indicate how these arise from particular social contexts. This means that discourse analysis does not aim to study reality but instead how reality is represented through language. In particular, it is useful in analysing how ‘truths’ are created in discourse, how social realities and identities are built and the consequences of these. Therefore, with reference to the security framework applied to this thesis, discourse analysis is not used to study the objective importance of terrorism and migration in the Greek security agenda but the process through which these issues were securitised.

Discourse analysis is not a unitary approach. There are many variations of it, carried out in different ways, in a range of disciplines and on different levels of social life. An examination of the literature reveals that there is no precise formula for ‘doing discourse analysis’. However, according to the Copenhagen School, there is no need to use any sophisticated linguistic or quantitative techniques to study the securitisation of an issue. They suggest that all is required is to analyse discourse in its own right in search for speech acts: “The technique is simple: Read, looking for arguments that take the rhetorical form defined here as security.”

More specifically, the rhetorical constructions of security are identified in this thesis through specific linguistic analysis (e.g. choice of words such as ‘problems’ instead of ‘issues’, when referred to migration) followed by thematic analysis. The linguistic analysis seeks to identify “lexical units, argumentation schemes and syntactical means which express unity, sameness, difference”, danger and insecurity. Such means include the usage of anthroponymic generic terms, repetition of words, exaggerations, symbolic language and metaphors (e.g. ‘invasion’, ‘hords’ and ‘waves’, when referring to migration). Metaphors are particularly effective as a linguistic expression of identity, difference and danger. As Lakoff and Johnson point out, the choice of using certain

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metaphors (and omitting others) may create social realities and thus become a guide for future action. "In this sense metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies."72

When deciding what texts to analyse in search of securitisation moves, the Copenhagen School argues that because of the political nature of security, the securitising arguments will stand out and will be able to be traced in various locations and statements. They argue that "[s]ince the security argument is a powerful instrument, it is against its nature to be hidden. Therefore, if one takes important debates, the major instances of securitisation should appear on the scene to battle with each other for primacy".73

Following that approach, discourse analysis has been used in this thesis to analyse statements by securitising actors, verbal or written ones, which were identified in speeches and interviews and were documented in reports and newspapers. In addition, parliamentary discussions on terrorism and immigration were also analysed. This is considered necessary because "while parliamentary debates are a rather limited area of political discourse, they often are one of the main forums where politicians seek to legitimize and justify their policies."74

3.5.2 The Use of Elite Interviews

Since discourse analysis cannot provide answers to the motives behind the securitisation of an issue and the underlying factors that led to it, this thesis also relied upon elite interviewing for the collection of data used in this research. Marshall and Rossman defined elite interviewing as:

"a specialized case of interviewing that focuses on a particular type of interviewee.

Elite individuals are considered to be influential, the prominent, and the well-

72 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 156.
informed people in an organization or community and are selected for interviews on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research.\textsuperscript{75}

During the course of this research project, a set of twenty-five interviews was carried out in Athens, from April 2002 to October 2003. A semi-structured format of interview was followed, with a thematic index of questions being prepared before the interview. This format is considered preferable when interviewing elites because elites usually desire a more active interplay with the interviewer, tend to take over the discussion and resent the restrictions placed on them by narrow, stereotypical questions.\textsuperscript{76}

The people were selected for the interviews on the basis of their authority (political position) and expertise on the subject studied. To this end, the interviewees included the former Prime Minister of Greece Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the former Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos, the EU Greek Commissioner Stavros Dimas, the former Minister of Defence Gerasimos Arsenis, former Minister of Public Order Stelios Paphthemoelis, members of parliament, officials from the ministries of Public Order and Foreign Affairs, as well as migration and terrorism experts. A tape-recorder was used in the majority of these interviews, with the consent of the interviewees, while notes were taken during and after the interview, where the usage of tape-recording was not possible. The majority of the interviewees had no objection to them being quoted; however on occasions, some of them requested not be quoted on certain issues, while two officials requested to retain their anonymity.

The main problem encountered during the interviewing process had to do with gaining access. Because of the elites' busy schedules, it was difficult to arrange for them to see me. While a few interviews were arranged through personal recommendation by people that could get me in touch with the interviewees, the majority of them were arranged after a lengthy process of sending letters and emails and talking to secretaries which eventually

resulted to an appointment. In certain cases, a letter with the key points of discussion was sent upon request, prior to the interview. A second problem had to do with the unwillingness of some interviewees to answer certain questions and with their hesitation to diverge from the party political line.

3.5.3 Documentary analysis
Apart from discourse analysis and elite interviewing, a variety of primary and secondary sources were used to inform the research. These provided the background for the issues studied and as such, they also served as the basis for the identification of the questions raised in the interviews. Primary sources were obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in relation to migration and terrorism, which were useful in the research project. However, a similar written request for statistical data and information from the Ministry of Public Order in relation to migration (crime rates, deportations, state measures against illegal immigration) was without good reason rejected on the grounds of confidentiality, although these data should, by law, be accessible to all. Consequently, for the gathering of these data this thesis had to rely on secondary sources from reports, newspapers and academic papers.

3.6 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the theory and methodology applied to this thesis. The securitisation theory provides an overall productive framework to understand developments in Greek policies on terrorism and migration. What were identified as the limitations of this approach, were discussed in this chapter and taken into account in the research design. The methods employed for the data collection and analysis were discussed as well as how the overall framework is operationalised with regards to the Greek case. The next chapter analyses migration and terrorism at the European level. In particular, it looks at how these issues are dealt with in the European Union and the chronology of their gradual move from normal politics to the realm of security.
Chapter 4: Internal Security in the European Union

4.1 Introduction

The securitisation of terrorism and migration in Greece, which are examined in chapters 5 and 6 respectively, cannot be understood without reference to the broader context in which Greece’s policy response to terrorism and migration took place. As discussed in chapter 1, Greek security policies are increasingly influenced by norms, perceptions and policies at the European level. For this reason, before analysing developments in Greece, this chapter provides the background of perceptions and policies on terrorism and migration in the European Union. By analysing the history of European cooperation on internal security issues, it seeks to identify how are terrorism and migration perceived and dealt with in the EU. The findings of this chapter will then be compared and contrasted to Greek policies and perceptions on these issues.

In most European countries terrorism was dealt with as an important security threat to the state since the 1970s, when groups such as the IRA in Britain, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, Action Directe in France and ETA in Spain inflicted massive harm on non-combatants for political means. Terrorism was also the first internal security issue that entered the European agenda. Subsequently, it is argued, terrorism was kept high on the European security agenda until the Treaty of Maastricht, when it lost momentum and was demoted to a position amidst other internal security concerns in the Third Pillar hierarchy.

Migration, on the other hand, was seen neither as an important issue for the European Communities nor as a threat in the early years of the European project.1 After the Second World War, migration was considered a vehicle of economic reconstruction for the

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European economies. However, due to historical circumstances, following the oil crisis of 1973-1974 and the growth in unemployment rates, Western European governments began to adopt more restrictive immigration policies. As immigration and asylum policy entered the Community political agenda, national fears of immigration were transferred to the European Communities that inherited the Member States’ suspicion and fear of the ‘aliens’. Since the mid-1980s, migration became highly politicised at both the national and the European level and a consensus gradually developed across policy-makers and academics that migration and population movements be interpreted as a security issue. As Jef Huysmans pointed out, in an article on migration and European integration, migration became ‘located in a security logic’.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, resurrected terrorism and brought it to the top of the European and international security agenda. At the same time, the European response to September 11 underlined what can be seen as a two-decade long process: the securitisation of European migration policy, “dramatizing a publicly convenient link between international migration and security.” However, the securitisation of terrorism and migration in the European Union was only reinforced by the terrorist attacks of September 11. The events of September 11 did not initiate the insecurities, uncertainties, ambiguities and complexities in regards to terrorism and immigration policy; rather they accelerated dynamics that were already deeply rooted in the emerging European internal security regime.

This chapter examines the securitisation of terrorism and migration in the EU with reference to both rhetorical constructions of threat and institutional developments in the

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2 After the Second World War, western European countries needed the influx of migrant labour in order to rebuild their ruined economy and thus they admitted about 10 million ‘guestworkers’ from other countries and regions.
European Union. The Copenhagen School is concerned with how issues become security ones through rhetorical arguments that involve a symbolic process and the deployment of politics of fear. Thus, the first part of this chapter provides a critical analysis of the perceived threats posed by terrorism and migration, by referring to the political discourses applied to these issues and determining what is deemed to be threatened (section 4.2).

Discursive constructions of migration and terrorism as security threats through the use of speech-acts played an important role on the securitisation of migration and terrorism in the EU. Yet, it is argued, even before these security discourses were articulated and debated in the public sphere, the foundations for the securitisation of migration and terrorism were laid down in specific historical and institutional sites, within which EU internal security policies developed. Therefore, the second part of the chapter looks at the history of European cooperation on internal security issues. In the process of becoming an internal security actor, the EU committed itself to the creation of an area of ‘freedom, security and justice’. However, the analysis of the history of cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) reveals that the ‘security’ rationale was from the beginning -and still is- far more predominant than ‘justice’ and ‘freedom’. Section 4.2 of this chapter provides an overview of the development of the EU as an internal security actor. Section 4.3 elaborates on non-discursive practices and institutional developments at the European level that included migration and terrorism in a single internal ‘security continuum’. Finally, section 4.4 examines separately the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11 on EU policies on terrorism and migration and argues that they strengthened the previously institutionalised nexus between terrorism, migration and security.
4.2 Terrorism and Migration in the EU: Determining what is being threatened

4.2.1 Terrorism as a threat to the state

There is an extensive discussion in the literature of how to define terrorism and how to distinguish it from other forms of violence, such as partisan and guerrilla warfare and ordinary crime. According to Jenkins, terrorism is "the threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence designed primarily to instil fear." Similarly, Hoffman argues that terrorism is "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change." The object of terrorism is not usually mass murder or profit but the influence of an audience, which witnesses the acts of terrorism. In that way, terrorist groups seek to destabilise the political system by directing their attacks against a government, an ethnic group or a party, in order to change the socio-political status quo, on the national, the regional, or the global level. The state is thus the primary referent object of terrorism and what needs to be secured.

During the 1990s, scholars started to observe changes in the patterns of terrorist activity. Whereas many of the domestic European terrorist groups were gradually defeated, international terrorist groups engaged in a new and more destructive form of violence. This new terrorist strategy, adopted by groups like Al Qaeda, is driven by religious rather than ideological motivations, with terrorist groups being prepared to cause mass casualties to achieve their goals.

At the European Union, terrorism is defined as a diffuse threat. In the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting on 6-7 December 2001, the EU Member States agreed for

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the first time to a common definition, which considers terrorism as a deliberate attack by an individual or a group against a country, its institutions or its people - with the aim of intimidating them and damaging or destroying their political, economic or social structures. An extended list of offences was included in the definition of what constitutes a terrorist act:

"...(i) Seriously intimidating a population, or (ii) unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation: (a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage taking...(e) causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss..."11

Although human rights and social groups criticised the above definition, for being so widely drawn that many ‘ordinary’ crimes could be defined as terrorism, as well as the overall European antiterrorist strategy, for undermining fundamental rights and freedoms, their criticisms were ignored on the face of the existential threats posed by terrorism.12 The successful securitisation of terrorism at the European level means that terrorism is to be combated by any means, regardless of the objections by human rights groups or others.

As discussed in chapter 2, a security threat exists when fundamental values are threatened. The political discourse on terrorism in the European Union legitimises the anti-terrorist strategy with reference to the threats that it poses to the values on which the EU is founded on. For example, the European Council, in its Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism noted:

12 On this, see also section 4.51.
"The European Union is founded on the universal values of human dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; it is based on the principle of democracy and the principle of the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious violations ... of those principles".13

The reference to these values aims to convince the audience, in that case the parliaments of the EU Member States primarily and their citizens secondarily, to accept restrictions to civil liberties and to agree on collective action at the European level in order to eradicate the scourge of terrorism, which is believed to challenge every value that the EU stands for and therefore the future of the EU itself.

4.2.2 Migration as a security threat
Whereas terrorism poses a more direct threat to the state and is closer to the traditional understanding of security, in the sense that it involves the use of force, both in terms of the terrorist acts themselves and often the state’s response to them, migration in Europe is framed as a security threat, despite the fact that it is not per se harmful. Unlike traditional security threats, it does not directly threaten the survival of the state or the society nor is it orchestrated by other states. What is then the source of insecurity that migration is associated to? What is the nature of the threat as perceived by policy-makers and the public? By exploring the rhetorical arguments put forward by political and security elites and reproduced by the media, it is revealed that most anti-immigration discourses are developed around four main axes: a societal, a criminological, an economic and a political one. These are critically reviewed in the next section of the chapter.

The societal axis
According to the Copenhagen School, the primary referent object for the securitisation of migration is related to situations when states and societies perceive a threat in identity

13 European Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.
It is a common characteristic of migration discourses in Europe to highlight the threat that migration might pose to the culture and identity of the host country. Migrants and asylum seekers are often discursively presented as a threat to the communal harmony and the cultural homogeneity of the receiving country and are therefore considered a societal threat. A particular society may perceive threats to its identity from foreigners because of the fear of losing what makes it unique and distinct from other societies. This insecurity derives from a fear that the presence of immigrants could eventually alter the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of the host country, a fear that is often fed by the high birth rates of immigrant groups.

Such discourses, emphasise the distinction between 'us' and 'them', "position[ing] the migrant as the 'cultural other' and shape[ing] the migrant's relation to the society in a conflictual way." In that way, migrants are implicitly presented as inferior and/or dangerous. Suggestions like John Major's of controlling migration by creating "a strong perimeter fence around Europe" highlight the 'safer inside' versus 'unsafe outside' that has characterised European Union policies on migration right from their outset.

For the European Union, the exclusion of third-country nationals helps the Union evolve towards a genuine political and security community. The process of European integration is particularly concerned with the construction of a cohesive European identity. The creation of boundaries and the exclusion of non-members are critical for the manifestation of a collective identity and for the construction of a community based on identity. Therefore, inherent to the securitising discourse on migration is the intention to differentiate self from the other. Migrants represent the 'other', and by identifying the

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15 Not all societies interpret such threats in the same way. Generally, more homogeneous societies feel more threatened by the influx of immigrants and refugees.
ones who do not belong, the EU also defines its political and cultural boundaries and shapes its identity towards the outside world.\textsuperscript{20}

However, according to Ceyhan and Tsoukala, securitising discourses on the societal axis underestimate the fact that all European societies developed and were subjected to multiple migrations and crossbreeding processes throughout their history.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, studies have shown that European countries have for many years been host countries of immigration but the cultural identity of both the indigenous people and the immigrants has in most cases been constantly evolving in a rather harmonious way.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{The criminological axis}

Closely related to the societal axis are the discourses that develop the ‘criminal migrant’ thesis. The distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is the focal point of arguments that put forward migration as a threat to the public order of the host society. Migrants are demonised and associated with criminal activities, drug trafficking and organised crime. They are also often associated with terrorism, a trend that is on the rise, following the terrorist attacks of September 11. In the European Union, by underlying the criminal activities related to free movement, migration and asylum were baptised security issues.\textsuperscript{23} Margaret Thatcher’s statement that “[w]e joined Europe to have free movement of goods ... not ... to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, plant and animal diseases and illegal immigrants”\textsuperscript{24} serves as an example of how migrants were often positioned in the criminological axis, along side other public order threats.

\textsuperscript{21} Ceyhan and Tsoukala, ‘Ambivalent Discourses’ pp. 28-29.
Undoubtedly, large population movements might at times increase the opportunities for criminals to channel their resources through countries by using migrants or bogus asylum seekers as couriers. Large immigrant communities can also potentially provide shelter and anonymity to foreign criminals or terrorists. However, the ‘criminal migrant’ thesis is vastly overstated. Various studies have shown that the links between immigration and increases in crime and drug trafficking are exaggerated.25 Usually, crimes committed by foreigners receive bigger publicity and condemnation than crimes committed by nationals of the host country. This results in the generation of the ‘criminal migrant’ stereotype that is reproduced by the media in many EU member states, thus assuming that migrants are inherently suspect of engaging in criminal activities.26

The economic axis

Migrants are also often seen as an economic threat. The influx of migrants into the European Union each year always attracts attention, especially in the context of high unemployment and slowing economic growth. Migrants may not threaten the economic survival of the receiving countries but they often cause concern in the minds of the host population of economic destabilisation. Some discourses put forward the idea that the influx of economic immigrants might drive down wages and create unemployment, while at the same time it will drive up the cost of housing and other goods.27 In addition, nationals of the host country often fear that they will have to compete with low-paid immigrants for the scarce jobs and services available and perhaps lose jobs to them.

According to Huysmans, the most important dimension of the security discourses in the economic axis relates to welfare provisions. In such discourses, immigrants are presented as putting an additional burden on labour markets and social security systems of host countries and are hence considered a threat to the welfare state. The underlying argument behind these arguments is that immigrants are not part of “us,” therefore, they should not

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25 See Faist, ‘Extension du domaine de la lutte’.
26 See Anastassia Tsoukala, Migration and Criminality in Europe (Athens: Sakoulas, 2001) [in Greek].
fully share the benefits from welfare provisions, which rightfully should belong only to nationals. This linkage between nationality and welfare entitlements is what Huysmans refers to as 'welfare chauvinism'.

The discourses that argue that migration has a negative impact on the host economy are being convincingly challenged. Most economists agree that migration has long-term benefits for the economy, because it provides needed skills and helps boost economic growth. According to George Borjas, skilled migrant workers who fill jobs where there are genuine shortages provide real benefits to the host country. In addition, although unskilled migrants might lower the wages of native workers who are competing with them for jobs like catering, child-care and cleaning, the size of the effect is offset by the gains made by employers who can make higher profits because of the lower wages.

In Europe in particular, there are large skill gaps that migrants can fill, especially since the European birth rate is falling and the population is ageing. According to a report of the division of the population of the United Nations, European economies will need 700 million immigrants for the fifty years to come in order to sustain growth and support their social security systems. Finally, the arguments that present immigrants as a threat to the welfare state are misleading. As the UK’s Home Secretary David Blunkett pointed out, in 2001 immigrants contributed £2.5 billion more in taxes than they consumed in tax-supported services in the UK.

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The political axis

Migration is often perceived as a political threat by the governments of the receiving countries. Weiner catalogued how immigrants may be used as a political force in the host country and argued that their political relationship with their country of origin can affect the bilateral relations of the sending and receiving country. For example, the sending country may try to mobilise its expatriate population to promote its interests in the host country. Moreover, a large immigrant community can put political pressure on the host government to influence its policies towards the sending country.

The biggest concern, however, for policy-makers in relation to migration and population movements has to do with their impact on their own power positions. First, the security discourse is supported by what Bigo refers to as the ‘professionals of security’. Bigo demonstrated that institutions and security agencies such as the police at the national level and Europol at the European level played an important part in constructing the security discourse on migration, in order to advance their own bureaucratic positions and attract more resources.

Second, politicians support the security discourse in order to safeguard their legitimacy and increase their electoral power. No aspect of migration is more unsettling to policy-makers than sudden large-scale movements across borders. Mass influx of migrants and asylum seekers may create the impression that the government is not safeguarding the interests of the people it represents by being unable to effectively control the population flows in the state’s territory. As Leitner points out, population movements “call into question the very meaning of national boundaries and citizenship” and therefore “nation-states feel compelled to deal with such challenges to state power, sovereignty and

35 For instance, this was the case in Germany, where the large presence of Turkish immigrants has led to an increase of friction between the two countries and has put a strain on their relationship.
36 In the words of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, ‘political security ... is about threats to the legitimacy or recognition either of political units or of the essential patterns among them’. Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework, p. 144.
national identity.”38 Being too soft on immigration and asylum can therefore turn to be costly in election time. On the contrary, right-wing parties that adopted anti-immigrant and even racist discourses increased their public support considerably in almost all European countries after September 11.39

Yet, the problem of mass population influx is also often exaggerated.40 The estimations of a drastic increase in the number of immigrants in Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union provoked Europe’s first immigration-induced anxiety in decades, communicating the idea that immigration to the western industrialised countries is out of control and promoting images of hordes of migrants and asylum seekers waiting to flood in.41 However, no mass migration occurred. Even in the early 1990s, when the influx of migrants and asylum seekers to Europe peeked, migrants represented only 5 percent of the population.42 In addition, although short-term and transit emigration from Central and Eastern Europe increased during the 1990s, permanent emigration from these countries declined substantially in that period.43 Finally, according to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the total number of foreigners seeking political asylum in the EU in 2003 was 288,100, the lowest level since 1997 and less than half of what it was in its peak in 1992 (675,460) (see table 1).44

39 The electoral success of Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and the murdered Dutch populist, Pim Fortuyn in Holland after September 11 are the most striking examples. The anti-foreign strain also saw political expression in Austria and Italy, where right wing parties were included in the ruling coalition governments and in Denmark, where the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party doubled its percentage of the vote to 13 percent in November’s 2001 elections.
40 For example, in 1989 the UN High Commission for Refugees argued that 25 million people from the communist bloc would move to the west in the 1990s. In the end, fewer than 2.5 million made the move. Cited in Tom Arbuthnott, ‘Migration in an expanding EU’, BBC News, 8 April, 2002. [online] <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1912956.stm> (20.05.02).
43 For instance, Heather Grabbe has shown that population flows to Germany, including returning ethnic Germans, after an increase in 1991-1992, decreased considerably during the 1990s. See Heather Grabbe, The Sharp Edges of Europe: Security Implications of Extending EU Border Policies Eastwards (Western European Union: Occasional Paper 13, 2001).
44 The number of asylum applications peaked in the early nineties, when two major wars were taking place within Europe itself in Croatia and Bosnia, then more than halved in the mid-1990s, before rising again at the end of the decade largely because of the Kosovo crisis. Since then they have remained fairly steady around 350,000 to 400,000 per year.
To conclude, although migration in Europe was securitised because of political, societal, criminological and economic concerns, the real migration crisis in Europe is not one of numbers or statistical and economic investigations. As Bigo notes, the imaginary social significances of the threat are in permanent shift with the legal speech and the statistical data. The analysis in this section confirmed that threat perceptions in Europe towards migration are somewhat exaggerated. Therefore, Europe’s immigration crisis, as Tesfahuney points out, is primarily “a crisis and fear of the Other, constructed as undesirable and different on imaginary criteria of affinity and inclusion/exclusion-historical, cultural, linguistic, corporeal- that demarcate our spaces versus Other spaces.”


46 Tesfahuney, ‘Mobility, Racism and Geopolitics’.
The securitisation of migration was used to legitimise the EU’s restrictive immigration and asylum policies and to cut back the rights of third-country nationals.\(^4^7\) Although, in recent years alternative economic and humanitarian discourses have opposed and challenged the security discourse that has dominated European migration policy, so far they have failed to change it, because the security discourse has been fully institutionalised in the European Justice and Home Affairs framework.\(^4^8\) The second part of this chapter explores the institutionalisation of the fear for the ‘Other’ by analysing the role of the EU as an internal security actor and the history of cooperation on internal security issues in the EU.

### 4.3 History of European cooperation on internal security issues

#### 4.3.1 The EU as an internal security actor

The changes in the security environment in Western Europe and in various conceptions of security discussed in chapter 2, resulted in a blurring of the distinction between internal and external security. When the threat of a conventional military attack on Western Europe declined, following the gradual reduction of the Soviet threat, the focus of cooperation in the European Community shifted towards internal security issues. As Elke Krahmann pointed out, “within the context of expectations of peaceful change and intergovernmental cooperation ... European governments [we]re increasingly free to address less fundamental security threats than those which challenge[d] their state borders.”\(^4^9\)

In that context, since the early 1990s the European Union intensified its efforts to define its external borders in order to become an internal security actor and evolve into a coherent political territory in which internal borders would be eradicated. As a result, in that period, EU cooperation and policy-making in the area of Justice and Home Affairs arguably experienced the most significant growth from all other areas of the European

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\(^4^7\) Huysmans, ‘European Identity and Migration Policies’, p. 203.

\(^4^8\) On this topic, also see section 4.5.2.

project. The EU members increasingly harmonised their policies and legal systems and devoted more attention and resources to internal security issues.

Some of these issues had been dealt with at the European level from early on in the integration process. The incentive for closer cooperation on internal security issues was provided by the decision of the Single European Act (SEA) to complete the internal market by 1992 and to realise the free movement of people. The European Union had been committed to the free movement of people from its outset. The Treaty of 1957 establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) included it as one of its objectives but referred to it in purely economic terms and was concerned only with workers. From the beginning of the 1970s onwards, the Member States sought to extend this freedom to everyone by increasing cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs in issues such as the crossing of borders, cross-border organised crime, illegal immigration and terrorism. Informal arrangements and working parties were established for sharing experiences, exchanging information and expertise and setting up networks to facilitate contacts between Member States. However, cooperation between Member States was limited to the exchange of information and ideas in the various intergovernmental fora that were created for this reason. Even during the 1980s, when these fora were increasingly linked to the European framework, the intergovernmental character of the cooperation was retained, ensuring that national governments could set their pace and levels.

More specifically, progress in Justice and Home Affairs was slow and confronted with obstacles that affected and limited - and often still do - cooperation and integration in this area. One of the main reasons for this lies in the fact that dealing with internal security issues touches the main function of modern-states, which as Hobbes and John Locke argue, is to guarantee the security of their inhabitants against external and internal

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50 The provision for free movement of persons was introduced by Article 8 of the SEA and envisaged the abolition of controls at the internal borders between the EC Member States.

threats. Therefore, any transfer of power to the European level in regards to internal security issues was seen as weakening the central element of legitimacy and sovereignty of the nation-state. Apart from that, the different legal and administrative structures of the EU Member States posed technical difficulties in cooperation and integration on the sphere of internal security, since any attempts for harmonisation required significant changes in legal procedures, administrative systems and policing at the national level. Finally, different national policy approaches and traditions in the JHA sphere, as well as different threat perceptions in regards to internal security issues posed an additional problem in reaching political consensus in this area.

Despite these obstacles, since the mid 1980s, two parallel processes of ‘externalisation’ and Europeanisation of internal security threats got under way. First, the external dimension of these internal security threats was emphasised, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, indicating the existence of a core belief that the threats to the security of the EU are largely external phenomena (externalisation). Although many European countries had persistent and long-standing problems of domestic terrorism, international and transnational terrorism was emphasised in political discourse as the central focus of European cooperation. In addition, free movement of people within the European Communities led to increased attention to the movement of third-country nationals from outside the Communities to within. In this context, international migration, its irregular/undocumented/illegal component in particular, was seen as a threat to the harmony and security of the Community and hence, restricting migration was “portrayed as an exercise of the right to self-defence.”

Second, the relaxing of internal borders highlighted the need to enhance security at external borders. This meant that Member States had gradually to coordinate their internal security policies at the Community level (Europeanisation). Issues of internal

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52 Ibid.
security that had traditionally been apprehended and tackled at the national level were now increasingly defined and treated as European matters. Both terrorism and immigration policy became gradually Europeanised and linked to the framework of the European Union.

The next sections map these developments by looking at the history of European cooperation on internal security in three phases. The first phase is concerned with the early intergovernmental initiatives on terrorism during the 1970s, when terrorism was introduced in the European security agenda. The second phase sees the construction of an internal security continuum at the European level, where cooperation was extended from terrorism to migration, organised crime, drugs and other issues that were all included in a single security framework. The third phase discusses the institutionalisation of this internal security continuum in the European Union. This phase witnessed the gradual Europeanisation of terrorism and migration but also the relative decline of terrorism, which was displaced by immigration as the principal internal security threat perceived by the countries of the EU.

4.3.2 Intergovernmental initiatives on terrorism

Although, many European countries like Germany, Italy, Spain, France and Britain had a spectacular experience with domestic terrorism, they perceived it as a national issue and were not keen to share sensitive information with each other. However, the increase of terrorist attacks during the 1970s in Western Europe, the realisation of the transnational links between European terrorist groups and the rise of international terrorism with primarily Middle-Eastern origin provided the incentive for cooperation at the European level. The dramatic terrorist attack of the Munich Olympics in 1972, which resulted in the death of eleven members of the Israeli team by a Palestinian terrorist group, highlighted the urgency to upgrade terrorism in the security agenda and seek ways to cooperate in intergovernmental fora.

55 See Pastore, Reconciling the Prince’s two ‘Arms.
Intergovernmental cooperation on internal security issues goes back to 1975 when the so-called 'Trevi Group' was established as a result of a Dutch initiative at the European Council in Rome. The initial aim of Trevi was to enhance mutual assistance in combating terrorism between Member States. Many European states were already engaged in limited police cooperation within Interpol since 1923, but decided to establish a separate regional forum to deal with the rising terrorist threat since “Interpol was not considered suitable for such discussions because of a distrust of its ability to handle sensitive information”. As a result, from 1976 onwards, officials from the Ministries of Home Affairs and from the police and internal security services of Member States met twice a year to discuss internal security issues. Four official Trevi working groups were created for this purpose working on: 1. sharing information and resources in regards to terrorist incidents; 2. exchanging scientific and technical information on police work and training; 3. cooperating on civil aviation security; 4. cooperating on nuclear safety and security; 5. and cooperating in dealing with natural disasters, fire prevention and fire fighting.

The first working group started its operation in 1977, establishing a secure rapid communications network that undertook regular analyses of known and suspected terrorist groups, promoted joint work on terrorist funding and circulated information on other matters. This first attempt for intergovernmental cooperation on terrorism between the Member States of the European Communities signified a consensus among them that terrorism is to be treated as an important security priority that has to be tackled urgently and effectively. These perceptions, however, were not shared by Greece, who joined Trevi, initially as an observer and as a full member after 1981, as it will be discussed in the next chapter.

57 The Group was named after the famous Trevi fountain, near which the Rome European Council took place in December 1975. It was later interpreted into being an acronym for the French ‘Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence Internationale’. The group was originally composed of the then EC members, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries. Greece joined in 1981.
Because of the high security salience and confidentiality of the Trevi meetings, there is little known about the Trevi group’s achievements. However, as the first regular forum of cooperation and delegation on internal security issues, Trevi was important in influencing norms and perceptions of the participating high officials. In that way, as Carl Levi points out, the Trevi group was the precursor and the prototype for the intergovernmental structure instituted under the Schengen Agreements and the Third Pillar of the Maastricht Treaty.\(^6^0\)

### 4.3.3 The construction of the internal security continuum

During the 1980s, the Member States of the European Community gradually extended the scope of intergovernmental cooperation to other issues. Thus, although the original remit of the Trevi Group covered terrorism and internal security, its scope was extended in 1985 to include illegal immigration and organised crime. In 1989, ‘Trevi 92’ was set up to deal specifically with the security implications of the Single European Market and to improve cooperation in order to compensate for the consequent losses to security and law enforcement. The activities of ‘Trevi 92’ included harmonising visa application procedures, facilitating the exchange of information and determining a common list of undesirable ‘aliens’.

In October 1986, the Trevi Ministers decided to also set up an *Ad hoc Group on Immigration*, in order to coordinate national asylum and immigration policies. The Ad hoc Group on Immigration consisted mostly of the same officials that were meeting in Trevi and its tasks included the coordination of visa policies and national rules on granting asylum.\(^6^1\) The group was also in charge of preparing the *Dublin Convention on Asylum* in 1990, which was “designed to allocate responsibility for examining asylum

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\(^6^1\) Declaration of the Belgian Presidency: Meeting of Justice and Interior Ministers of the European Community, in Brussels, on 28 April 1987, SEMDOC database, no. 33.
applications to that member state that played the most important part in the entry or residence of the person concerned.”62 The Dublin Convention rules meant that asylum seekers, once rejected from one member state, are rejected from all and sent back to the country from which they came. Generally, the Convention introduced restrictive rules on asylum applications -the number of which had increased dramatically as European national policies continued to move towards zero immigration- and “ensured, in the long run, that a tight mesh of regulations on the movement of asylum seekers are being introduced in the European Union”.63

The Schengen Treaties,64 initially signed by France, Germany and the Benelux countries in 1985, were another landmark in European cooperation on internal security. The signatory members agreed to establish a genuine free movement of persons within the so-called ‘Schengen area’ by abolishing controls on common internal borders. The agreement included ‘compensatory’ measures against criminality, which, like in Trevi, included provisions and cooperation on both terrorism and illegal immigration. For instance, since 1995, under the Schengen arrangements, a liaison officer in each of the signatory States was designated to coordinate information exchanges in relation to terrorism, drugs, organised crime and illegal immigration.

The experiences of Trevi and Schengen encouraged Member States to institutionalise police cooperation by creating a transnational policing organisation, the European Police Office (Europol).65 The first major stage in the creation of Europol was the formation of a European Drugs Unit (EDU), which started operation on 3 January 1994. The EDU was based in the Hague and aimed “to assist national police forces with regards to criminal

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64 By Schengen Treaties we refer to two instruments, the Schengen Agreement (1985) and the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (1990).
65 Europol was established in the Maastricht Treaty but only commenced its full activities on 1 July 1999, because some Member States had difficulties in ratifying the Europol Convention that was signed on 26 July 1996.
investigations”, without having any powers of arrest. The EDU initially focused solely on the fight against drugs within the European Union but gradually extended to illegal money laundering, immigrant smuggling, trade in human beings and motor vehicle theft and terrorism.

The Trevi Groups, the Ad hoc Group on Asylum and Immigration, the Schengen Treaties and Europol served as ‘effective laboratories’ that helped pave the way for a European migration policy. At the same time however, being primarily preoccupied with internal security, these fora structured the development of migration policy with a clear focus on the security dimension, creating thus a continuum between crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism and immigration. As Bigo observes:

“The issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe.”

The construction of the security continuum signified the European Union’s move towards becoming a unitary security area, where policies on both terrorism and migration were dominated by the defensive and repressive logic of security maintenance and where security became a ‘categorical endogenous value’. It also reinforced the externalisation of internal security threats, with the EU frontiers as the dividing line between a ‘safe(r) inside’ and an ‘unsafe(r)’ outside. In that way, the construction of the security continuum contributed to the securitisation of migration by associating European policies on migration to issues related to terrorism and internal security.

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70 Monar Jörg, ‘Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs, p. 7.
4.3.4 Institutionalisation of the security continuum

During the 1990s, cooperation on internal security issues continued to be institutionalised in the European Union. The treaty of Maastricht identified police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism as a matter of common interest for Member States for the first time.\(^7\) By officially recognising terrorism as a common EU interest the treaty of Maastricht "provide[d] European internal security policing with a solid legal leg" and paved the way for more systematic regulation.\(^7\) The treaty of Amsterdam also specifically mentioned terrorism as a serious form of criminality and outlined three ways of fighting against it: first of all, through closer co-operation between law enforcement agencies (police, customs and other competent authorities in the Member States and Europol); secondly, through closer judicial co-operation; and thirdly, through approximation of Member States' criminal law.\(^7\)

Despite these developments, the legal context in which EU action on terrorism was taking place was problematic for three reasons: first, because of its intergovernmental, sometimes bilateral and certainly fragmented nature; second, because of its complexity, which was enhanced by the fact that EU provisions on the matter often had to be interpreted and aligned with the international provisions in force (e.g. UN conventions); third, because of its outdated character, which did not sufficiently address the profound changes in the nature of terrorism over recent years.

Apart from the legal obstacles in the European Union's policy on terrorism, terrorism was also gradually sidelined in the priorities of the Union. Although terrorism had been the highest priority in the European internal security agenda during the 1970s and 1980s, when the Treaty of Maastricht came into force in 1993, terrorism lost its momentum. The relative decline of terrorism in the security priorities of the EU had to do with the fact that many European governments such as Germany, France and Italy had by then managed to defeat domestic terrorist groups and no longer shared the same sense of

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\(^7\) Maastricht Treaty, Article K1, par. 9.
\(^7\) Treaty of Amsterdam, Article K1 and K3.
urgency of previous years in regards to the terrorist threat. In addition, when the Third Pillar was created with the Maastricht Treaty, the EU shifted its attention to other internal security threats, such as immigration and organised crime. Thus, as Monica de Boer noted “within Europe, it seemed as if the issue of terrorism had temporarily disappeared from the stage.”74 In fact, during the 1990s, the United States were often critical of the EU’s lack of urgency in fully eradicating the terrorist threat.75

Meanwhile, the European Union was also moving towards the development of a ‘true immigration and asylum policy’. Free movement of persons, according to Andrew Geddes “brought with it immigration and asylum policy co-operation and limited integration.”76 With the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, responsibility for developing policy was moved from the Third Pillar to the First Pillar and Community competence was firmly established in the areas of immigration and asylum, paving the way for the Europeanisation of immigration policy.77 In addition, the Tampere European Council, stated for the first time that the objective of Title IV of the Amsterdam Treaty should be to ‘develop common policies on asylum and immigration,’ going beyond the provisions of Article 3(1)(d) of the Treaty.78

However, the Europeanisation of migration went hand-in-hand with its securitisation that had started during the mid-1980s and was further institutionalised during the 1990s. The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam amalgamated the security continuum, reflecting the same logic that characterised previous intergovernmental initiatives on internal security. According to Anderson et al., this happened in three ways: First, through an institutional merging of previous intergovernmental bodies, such as Trevi and the Ad Hoc Group of

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Immigration, with the Maastricht Treaty and the incorporation of the Schengen acquis in the framework of the European Union, with the Treaty of Amsterdam; second, through an instrumental merging, which involved the proliferation of security practices that associated terrorism to migration within established intelligence channels, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS); and third, through an ideological merging, which reproduced the view that migration, terrorism and crime are interrelated issues. Because of the relative decline of terrorism and the new focus on immigration, which institutionally developed within a security framework, some scholars suggested that during the 1990s immigration displaced terrorism as the primary internal security threat in the EU.

A significant breakthrough in the development of the European Union as an internal security actor came with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999. The Amsterdam Treaty defined new responsibilities and objectives for the Community for the creation of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, strengthened the existing institutional structures and put the foundation for the establishment of new ones. The incorporation of the Schengen system in the EU framework gave additional momentum to this growth, while the Tampere European Council described the European area as a unified security space, referring to it for the first time as ‘our territory’.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon accelerated the European Union’s move towards greater integration in the field of internal security. Soon after the terrorist attacks, the EU’s justice and interior Ministers agreed on a set of measures and policies, which would otherwise have taken months or years to

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79 Trevi and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration were amalgamated in the EU Treaty in the form of the Committee established by Article K4 of the Treaty. The K4 Committee, as it came to be known, consists of one official from each Member State, plus one from the Commission and is responsible for overseeing the areas of common interest of the Third Pillar. It comprises of three steering groups, each controlling a number of working groups: First, an Immigration and Asylum steering group; second, a Security, Law Enforcement, Police and Customs group, which includes working parties on counterterrorism; third, a Judicial Cooperation steering group. See Chalk, ‘The Maastricht Third Pillar’, pp. 175-210.


4.5. The impact of September 11

So far, this chapter has analysed the construction of migration and terrorism as security threats in the European Union, looking at both securitising discourses and institutional developments that contributed to the securitisation of these issues within a single internal security continuum. The next section discusses the European Union response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, which reflected and further reinforced the migration-terrorism-security nexus.

4.5.1 The Europeanisation of terrorism

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the US, the EU displayed remarkable unity and unprecedented speed of action. In a draft declaration three days after the attacks, the EU expressed its determination to join the international community in the struggle to eradicate the scourge of terrorism and “make every possible effort to ensure that those responsible for these acts of savagery are brought to justice and punished”.83 The European Union’s anti-terrorist action plan was set out in the conclusions of the special Justice and Home Affairs Council in Brussels on 20 September 2001.84 The action plan gave renewed impetus to a wide range of legislative and operational measures designed
to enhance police and judicial cooperation, to staunch the funding of terrorism, to strengthen internal security and to respond to all forms of terrorist threats.

Many of the measures agreed in response to September 11 were impressive. Following a proposal from the European Commission the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council reached political agreement on a common definition on terrorism and a list of offences treated as acts of terrorism. In addition, in a landmark decision, the Member States agreed on a European Arrest Warrant, which would replace the traditional extradition procedures and would supplant the previous system of extradition between Member States, obliging them to hand over suspects of serious crimes to any other EU country without lengthy and complex extradition procedures.

Moreover, the EU identified and named a common list of terrorist groups for the first time. The list, which was drafted after fierce debate, included three extreme-left Greek terrorist groups, namely the 'Revolutionary Organisation 17 November', the 'Revolutionary Cells' and the 'Revolutionary Popular Struggle'. Apart from that, police cooperation intensified, within Europol and judicial cooperation was enhanced with the activation of Eurojust. Eurojust was designed to improve co-operation between legal systems and national courts and to speed up the process of sharing information and passing evidence from one country to the other, ensuring in that way that there are no safe havens for criminals and terrorists in the European Union.

88 The fiercest debate was about the inclusion of the Basque separatist group ETA in the list. Spain eagerly wanted ETA to be in the list, but France, among other Member States, had hesitations about it, before eventually agreeing to include it.
89 See Den Boer, 'Europeanisation of anti-terrorism', pp. 11-15.
90 Ibid.
Steps forward were also taken towards combating the funding of terrorism with the adoption of financial measures aiming to dry up the sources of terrorist funding. The most important of them was the EU Framework Decision on the Freezing of Assets, agreed on 28 February 2002 in the JHA Council. The framework decision was based on the mutual recognition principle and aimed to allow investigating authorities to quickly secure evidence and seize assets in other Member States. In addition, on 13 November 2001 the EU adopted a Directive on money laundering, which upgraded the Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering.

The significant progress achieved after September 11 signifies the Europeanisation of terrorism. Explaining these, the former President of the Commission, Romano Prodi argued that “the community method is crucial” in order for Europe to respond to the terrorist threat and thus contribute to peace and stability in the world. In his view, the crisis after September 11 “could be seen as favouring integration by stressing the need for action at a higher level than the national one.” The terrorist attacks created the momentum for the EU to increase the depths and the spectrum of cooperation on terrorism, which as an EU official put it, was “a dramatic acceleration of the normal time-scale for completing these things.”

It should be noted however, that almost all of the decisions and measures taken in response to September 11 were firmly in the EU’s agenda from before the terrorist attacks but it had been difficult for Member States to agree on them in the past. For

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instance, the Framework Decision on Terrorism, proposed by the Commission on 19 September 2001, would have been proposed in the third quarter of 2001 regardless of events in the US.\textsuperscript{98} Coming up with a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist organisations had also been a long-standing goal for the EU. In addition, the aim of creating a single European legal area of extradition, which was put forward with the Framework Decision on a Common Arrest Warrant, had been on the negotiating table since the early 1990s but because of the legal and political difficulties associated with it, it was considered a ‘long-term objective’ thought to be implemented by 2010.\textsuperscript{99} Finally, the proposal on the mutual recognition and execution of orders to freeze assets was initially made in November 2000, while the upgrading of the 1991 money-laundering directive had been negotiated since 1999, but it was only after September 11 that an agreement was reached in both cases.

Apart from that, in the aftermath of September 11, terrorism was firmly established as a European security priority and was also brought closer to the Second Pillar of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 2001, the European Parliament called on the Member States “to pool their communications interception resources with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the CFSP in the areas of intelligence-gathering and the fight against terrorism.”\textsuperscript{100} In addition, the European Council Meeting in Seville emphasised the importance of CFSP, including the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), in the fight against terrorism:

“The Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the European Security and Defence Policy, can play an important role in countering this threat [of terrorism] to our security and in promoting peace and stability. Closer cooperation among the Member

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 2.
States is being put into practice to take account of the international situation after the terrorist attacks of September 11."\(^{101}\)

To sum up, the terrorist attacks of September 11 resurrected the threat of terrorism, which had become marginalised during the 1990s and brought it to the top of the European security agenda. They also fuelled a new integrative dynamism in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, leading to the Europeanisation of terrorism. The European Union intensified political, judicial and police cooperation and agreed on a set of measures that would have normally taken years to push through. For this reason, Graham Watson MEP, in an article published four months after the attacks argued that:

>“Osama bin Laden may have done more for EU integration than anybody since former European Commission President Jacques Delors. Certainly, his murderous actions have given a timely and powerful boost to co-operation between EU Member States in the fields of justice and home affairs.”\(^{102}\)

However, these developments cannot be attributed to September 11 alone. As discussed above, the terrorist attacks provided the momentum for the EU to take up the old agenda and to reaffirm tendencies and ambitions that were already in place from before the attacks. In fact, the first signs for the ‘resurrection’ of terrorism were seen after the Tampere Council in 1999, when negotiations started on many of the decisions that were eventually taken after September 11. This re-securitisation of terrorism at the European level coincided with a period that Greece was also securitising domestic terrorism for the first time in its history, as it will be discussed in the next chapter. The next section discusses the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11 on European immigration and asylum policies.

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4.5.2 The strengthening of the security-migration nexus

The European Union’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 reflected and further reinforced the security logic of migration. Migration appeared prominently in the discussion of the campaign against terrorism. The measures adopted by the EU after September 11 and the rhetoric used in reference to immigrants and asylum seekers touched on migration as an issue directly linked to terrorism. The fact that the nineteen perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were foreigners increased the feeling of insecurity towards immigrants, who were -more than ever- coupled with terrorist activities. Thus, it became almost unthinkable to refer to the fight against terrorism without special reference to the threats posed by migration. To reverse the argument, it became equally, or even more unthinkable to refer to migration without referring to security.

As argued earlier, the timing of the attacks coincided with a period of significant progress towards the Europeanisation of immigration. At the same time, the EU was moving towards a more liberal immigration policy, with the security discourse being challenged. After the Tampere meeting, the Commission called in a Communication to the Council and the Parliament for a reappraisal of the ‘zero immigration’ policy of recent years, stating that “channels for legal immigration to the Union should be made available to labour migrants.” In justifying the new policy, the Commission referred to the “growing shortages of labour at both skilled and unskilled levels”, to the “declining and ageing populations in Europe”, and to the increasing problem of racism and xenophobia, which was particularly directed towards migrants and asylum seekers. The Communication concluded that “while immigration will never be a solution in itself to the problems of the labour market, migrants can make a positive contribution to the

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103 European Commission, COM (2000) 757 final, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy’, Brussels, 22 November 2000, p. 2. According to the Communication “it is clear from an analysis of the economic and demographic context of the Union and of the countries of origin, that there is a growing recognition that the ‘zero’ immigration policies of the past 30 years are no longer appropriate”. This is a significant departure from the Council Resolution of 20 June 1994 on limitation on admission of third-country nationals, which stated that “Member States will refuse entry to their territories of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment.” See Official Journal, No. C 274, 19/09/1996, p. 3.

104 Ibid., p. 3.

105 Ibid., p. 25.
labour market, to economic growth and to the sustainability of social protection systems".¹⁰⁶

September 11 interrupted these efforts to liberalise immigration and asylum policy. Not only did the new emphasis on combating terrorism distract attention from other areas of Justice and Home Affairs, but also the association of migrants with terrorism made many Member States retreat to more restrictive policies. For example, Germany’s plan to adopt an immigration law that would allow additional immigration for employment reasons was suspended, following demands to re-evaluate the bill in the light of the terrorist attacks, while Denmark, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom passed tough new laws against illegal immigrants.

In the European Union, all categories of migrants and not only illegal immigrants suffered from the return to more restrictive policies. For instance, two proposed directives in regards to family reunification and the extension of a long-term status to third country nationals were re-written after the attacks in order to “give the member states maximum discretion on whom they allow to enter their territory and in the way they judge who could be a threat to public order as well as to allow them to decide who could be liable to integrate well in their societies.”¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting of 20 September 2001 invited “the Commission to examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments”.¹⁰⁸ This can be interpreted as an attempt to find legal ways to exclude asylum seekers from the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention, focusing in particular on those suspected of terrorist acts. In response to the Council’s request, the Commission issued a working Paper on 5 December 2001, which encouraged states to ‘scrupulously and rigorously’ apply the exclusion clauses, as contained in Article 1(F) of

¹⁰⁷ Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) Brussels, 20 September 2001, SN 3926/6/01 REV 6, paragraph 29.
the Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{109} It also presented legal ways for the Member States to refuse admission of third country nationals for reasons of public policy or domestic security, including in cases of economic immigration, family reunification, long-term residency status and visas for students.

The Commission paper pictured migrants and refugees as potential terrorists and proposed strict measures and amendments to European laws so that there is "no avenue for those supporting or committing terrorist acts to secure access to the territory of the Member States of the European Union."\textsuperscript{110} According to the Working Paper:

"pre-entry screening, including strict visa policy and the possible use of biometric data, as well as measures to enhance co-operation between border guards, intelligence services, immigration and asylum authorities of the State concerned, could offer real possibilities for identifying those suspected of terrorist involvement at an early stage."\textsuperscript{111}

Similarly, in a common position adopted on 27 December 2001, the EU called all Member States to investigate refugees and asylum seekers "for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts."\textsuperscript{112} The wording on the above documents demonstrates the ideological merging of migration, asylum and terrorism and represents another example of ‘speech acts’ that link migration and asylum to security. More specifically, the above documents communicate the message that immigrants and asylum seekers are seen as a high-risk category for committing terrorist acts and thus need special attention.

At the same time, the political discourse that identifies terrorism as being imported to the EU from foreigners, defined earlier in the chapter as ‘externalisation’ of internal security

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. p. 6.
threats, led the EU to seek ways to reinforce controls at its external borders. The Spanish Presidency openly equated the fight against illegal immigration with the war on terrorism, making the ‘war on illegal immigration’ its highest priority. As a result, the Seville European Council of 21/22 June 2002 adopted a plan to form a joint border police force to patrol shores, ports and crossing points against illegal immigrants. In addition, in August 2002 Spain announced plans to create a multi-million euro coast spy system to combat the wave of illegal immigrants that enter Europe via its shores. Another plan proposed by Britain and Spain in the Seville European Council to impose economic sanctions on countries that did not effectively cooperate with the EU in restricting illegal immigration was rejected.

Against the backdrop of these policy developments, the hostility towards immigrants and asylum seekers increased, both on the policy level, where restrictive policies were adopted, and on the societal level, where racism and xenophobia rose. According to Amnesty International UK Director Kate Allen:

“Talk of sending warships into the Mediterranean, of ever-tighter border controls and of limiting aid to countries thought ‘uncooperative’ in taking back unsuccessful asylum applicants - unrealistic or unlawful as such moves may be - creates a climate of heightened public anxiety.”

Admittedly, not all confuse terrorists and migrants. However, after September 11, it became possible to pass from one topic to the other without changing the subject: a conversation started on terrorism could naturally finish on immigration and asylum and vice versa. Furthermore, within the security discourse, the categories of migrants have been blurred, with issues related to asylum, family reunification and legal immigration being mixed with illegal immigration, from which they are conceptually different. As a

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113 Illegal immigration was also one of the five priorities of the Greek presidency that followed the Spanish one.
result, illegal immigrants, labour immigrants and asylum-seekers have all been incorporated into a single policing-repression scheme. Fear and the belief that migration poses existential threats to the Member States appeared to be the driving forces behind the EU's new restrictive policies. All these suggest that after September 11, the security-migration nexus was reinforced and the security discourse of migration remained unchanged, despite the current demographic and economic needs that call for a more liberal EU policy on asylum and immigration.\(^{116}\)

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter analysed developments in relation to internal security in the European Union and in particular European policies and perception on terrorism and migration. The EU has committed itself to the creation of an area of ‘freedom, security and justice’. However, as the analysis in this chapter demonstrated, the ‘security’ rationale is far more predominant than ‘justice’ and ‘freedom’ and has been even further strengthened after September 11. This means that economic, legal and humanitarian considerations have been put into secondary position, since it is ‘security’ that overtakes the discussions.

This indicates that the process of securitisation of terrorism and migration in the EU has been completed and a security discourse has been applied to both issues. In line with the arguments of the Copenhagen School, speech-acts were identified as one of the catalysts for the construction of the security discourse. Migration and terrorism were discursively constructed as security threats by political and security elites, who because of their positions, had the capacity to produce security knowledge about the level and seriousness of these issues. Yet, it was argued that the process of securitisation was not limited to the uttering of speech acts but was also deeply rooted in institutional developments that included terrorism and migration in a single security continuum. From the first European intergovernmental initiatives in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, security was the underlying principle and the driving force for cooperation. This led to the emergence of

European norms, with prescriptive value, which developed in the intergovernmental fora of cooperation on internal security and structured the development of European policies on terrorism and migration in a security framework.

Terrorism was securitised at the European level during the 1970s and remained high in the security agenda until the early 1990s, when it was displaced by other JHA issues in the priorities of the Union. After the Tampere European Council, the EU placed a renewed attention to terrorism, paving the way to significant progress on this area that was accelerated in the aftermath of September 11. On the other hand, the securitisation of migration in the EU evolved gradually from the mid-1980s onwards and continued to be institutionalised during the 1990s. Despite challenges to the dominant security discourse on migration, the events of September 11 reinvigorated the security logic and interrupted the move towards more liberal migration policies. These developments in the European Union provide the relevant background and the broader context in which the Greek’s state policy response took place in relation to terrorism and migration. In the next chapter, the attention of this thesis turns to the analysis of the securitisation of terrorism in Greece.
Chapter 5: The securitisation of Terrorism in Greece

5.1 Introduction
As shown in the previous chapter, terrorism was dealt with as a security priority in all European countries facing domestic terrorist activity and was also the subject of increased intergovernmental cooperation at the European level since the mid 1970s. However, Greece was a unique case in the sense that it was the only EU member that was unable to deal effectively with radical-leftist terrorist groups operating in the country, the most lethal of which was the 'Revolutionary Organisation November 17'. In twenty-seven years of domestic terrorism, no members of any terrorist groups were arrested by the Greek police, until 2002, when substantial progress was finally made and the leaders of November 17 were apprehended and imprisoned.

This chapter argues that the state's failure to curtail terrorist activity in Greece resulted from the erroneous belief that the terrorist groups were not a direct threat to Greek security. In terms of the Copenhagen School framework, it is argued that terrorism was not perceived or dealt with as a security issue until 1999. By exploring the history of domestic terrorism in Greece and the state’s response to it, it is possible to identify three periods that reflect the changes in the way terrorism was perceived and subsequently dealt with in Greece. These periods cover the whole spectrum of securitisation, discussed in chapter 2 (see figure 5.1). The first period (1974-1989) marked the rise of Greek leftist terrorism, and was characterised by the failure of the political elites to recognise the roots, the level and the significance of the terrorist threat. In that period terrorism in Greece was non-politicised. The second period (1989-1999) was characterised by the politicisation of terrorism and the inclusion of the issue in the party-political debate (politicisation). During that period, the first ‘securitisation move’ was attempted but was not successful. Finally, the third period (1999 – onwards) stamped the securitisation of terrorism, which arguably was the catalyst for the arrest of November 17.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how and why terrorism was securitised after 1999, but also to identify why the securitisation of terrorism in Greece was delayed, compared to other EU countries. In order to do so, the analysis explores political discourses on terrorism, as presented in parliamentary discussions and public statements. It also examines the state’s official response through legislative and policing measures adopted since domestic terrorism first made its presence felt in Greece. Section 5.1 examines the rise of domestic terrorism, when it was still a non-politicised issue. Section 5.2 looks at the politicisation of terrorism and section 5.3 analyses in depth the securitisation of terrorism and the resulting apprehension of the terrorist group November 17.

5.2 Non-Politicisation of Terrorism (1975-1989)

5.2.1 The rise of leftist terrorism

During the military junta (1967-1974), a number of resistance groups were formed, aiming to overthrow the colonel’s regime. These were mostly leftist groups, which were founded by university students abroad and which had close connections with each other, based on their common goals and common ideology. The resistance groups contributed to the collapse of the military regime and the restoration of democracy in the summer of 1974, after which most of them were disbanded. However, a small minority of their most extremist members favoured the continuation of their struggle. One of them, Alexandros Giotopoulos, founded the ‘Revolutionary Organization November 17’ in 1975.¹ The

¹ Alexandros’ Giotopoulos was the son of Dimitris Giotopoulos, a renowned 1930s communist theoretician, and close associate of Leon Trotsky - who founded the Soviet Union along with Vladimir Lenin. After his
name ‘November 17’ was chosen after the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the military regime. Giotopoulos was since then the ideological leader and the instructor of November 17 and also the writer of its manifestos, until his arrest in the summer of 2002.

The first act of November 17 came on December 23, 1975 when Richard Welch, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Athens was shot and killed by three unmasked men outside his house, in front of his wife and driver. According to the testimony of Pavlos Serifis, a hospital telephone operator and confessed founding member of 17N, the group had kept Welch under surveillance for a month before Giotopoulos shot Welch from a short distance with a .45-caliber pistol that became the trademark of the terrorist group.3

The group had chosen such a high-profile target for its first act in order to attract international publicity and to establish credibility as a revolutionary organisation. The same night of the attack, 17N sent a proclamation to the Greek press claiming responsibility for the attack. The Welch communiqué claimed that US imperialism was “the number one enemy of the people” and held the USA responsible for “decades of innumerable humiliations, calamities and crimes” inflicted upon the Greek people.4

However, the proclamation was not published in any newspaper. The Greek authorities and press disregarded the possibility that an unknown Greek group could be responsible for the killing. They did not think that a domestic group could act with such precision and efficiency and they believed that professionals from abroad, possibly Arabs, had carried...
out the attack, to undermine Greece’s transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{5} The motives behind the attack were thought to be the worsening of Greek-American and Greek-Turkish relations, so that Greece would be politically isolated. According to other speculations, the killing was the result of internal CIA disagreements related to the succession of the CIA director in the US or to an open CIA-FBI warfare.\textsuperscript{6} Two days after the attack, 17N sent a second proclamation to the Greek press, which was also not published. Starving for publicity, 17N sent its proclamation to the French newspaper Liberation in March 1976 but was ignored.

The group struck again a year later, assassinating Evangelos Mallios, a police captain during the military junta. Mallios had been dishonourably discharged from the police force because he had allegedly tortured prisoners during the dictatorship and was thus presented as a legitimate target.\textsuperscript{7} This time the 17N proclamation was published in both the French and the Greek press on 25 December 1976. The feeling that a new movement was born was originally welcomed in the leftist circles of Athens. The assassination of Pandelis Petrou, another former security officer during the military junta and then deputy director of the special riot police and his driver on 16 January 1980 established November 17 as a revolutionary group, with what was seen by many as a fair cause, which attracted many sympathisers.\textsuperscript{8} By targeting the wicked (junta torturers) and the imperialists (Americans) and taking care never to kill innocent bystanders, the group had managed to “cultivate a Robin Hood image”.\textsuperscript{9}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{5} For instance, one day after the attack the first page of the newspaper ‘Ta Nea’ read: “Great Provocation: Three swarthy men, most likely foreigners, shot dead the CIA chief”. See Ta Nea, 24 December 1975.
\textsuperscript{6} Some had speculated that the event was the CIA taking in its own laundry. Characteristically, some Greek newspapers had the following front page-titles: “CIA assassimates Richard Welch” and “Double-agent Welch executed by the CIA.” See Eleftherotypia and International Herald Tribune, 21 December 1976, cited in George Kassimeris, Europe’s last red terrorists: the Revolutionary Organization 17 November, (London: Hurst & Company, 2001), p. 73. These views were also adopted by some in the United States, see Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA: Revealing the Secrets of the World’s Most Powerful Spy Agency. (New York: Pocket Books, 1994).
\textsuperscript{7} By using the same weapon they used in the Welch killing, 17 November ensured that no other group could take credit for the two assassinations. Since then, the same .45-caliber pistol became the signature weapon of the group.
\textsuperscript{8} In the late 1980s, 6 percent of respondents in an opinion poll said they would vote for the 17 November if it contested elections. See Papachelas and Telloglou, The 17 November Dossier, p. 28.
\end{footnotesize}
5.2.2 The state's hesitant response

At a time when most European states were securitising terrorism and increasing their efforts to deal with the terrorist threat at both the national and European level, the response of the Greek state during the first phase of domestic terrorism was lethargic, inadequate and unplanned. The lack of any coherent strategy in the Greek state's response to terrorism can be attributed to three factors: first, the lack of political consensus on how to deal with the issue; second, the clear misconceptions over the nature of domestic terrorism and third, the unwillingness to restrict civil liberties in order to deter the threat.

Firstly, one of the biggest problems was a lack of consensus as to the definition of terrorism between the two major political parties in Greece, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the New Democracy party. The first attempt to deal with the emerging terrorist threat came in 1978, when the New Democracy government introduced an anti-terrorist bill for the first time, called the ‘Bill to Combat Terrorism and Protect Democratic Polity’ (Law 774/1978). However, the anti-terrorist bill brought about widespread criticism. During the parliamentary debate, all opposition parties characterised it as the first step towards a despotic, undemocratic and tyrannical rule of law. For instance, Andreas Papandreou, the socialist leader of PASOK, argued that Law 774/1978 is “morally, politically and legally unacceptable”. He concluded that the bill was “clearly not about terrorists but aimed instead at putting in place the ideological and political conditions to terrorise the Greek population.” As a result, when PASOK came to power in 1981, the law was repealed and not replaced.

Secondly, there were general misconceptions over the origin and the seriousness of the threat. In regards to the origin of domestic terrorism, conspiracy theories persisted for many years that 17N was either controlled by external intelligence services or imported from outside Greece, perhaps from the Arab world. For instance, according to a 1982

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12 According to some theories, 17N terrorists were coming from abroad for a specific terrorist act and then were leaving the country.

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report of the Greek National Intelligence Agency (KYP), “17N is likely to be a ‘phantom organisation’ that possibly does not exist, but is simply a loosely organised group of isolated anarchists that share a common belief in armed struggle.”13 The reality however was that 17N was indeed a domestic and very much real problem and its origins could be found in the resistance groups to the military regime.

As to the seriousness of the terrorist threat, the Greek authorities downplayed its importance throughout the first phase of non-politicisation of terrorism. The introduction of the anti-terrorism bill in 1978 had primarily to do with the kidnapping of Aldo Moro and the rising number of terrorist incidents in neighbouring Italy, rather than with a real concern over domestic terrorist activity.14 Until the mid 1980s, the authorities perceived domestic terrorism as an ephemeral phenomenon, attributed to a group of extreme left militants, which had auto-dissolved and would not bother Greece again. To this perception contributed the fact that 17N remained silent for 3 years, from 1980 to 1983. Thus, Law Minister, George Mangakis, stated in 1983 that “terrorism in Greece is non-existent.”15

However, contrary to what the authorities expected 17N re-emerged, killing US Navy Captain George Tsantes and his driver in November 1983 and wounding US Army Sgt. Robert Judd five months later, in its first unsuccessful assassination attempt.16 Since then, 17N continued sporadic waves of targeted violence, gradually expanding both its operations and its targets. From simple assassinations requiring minimal logistical planning, the group started employing increasingly sophisticated tactics such as car bombings, rocket attacks and IRA-style improvised mortar bombardments.17

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16 In both attacks, 17N called for a removal of the US military bases from Greece. According to the proclamations “only dynamic mass struggle force them [the bases] out”.
17 A Riot policeman, Nikos Georgakopoulos was killed by a bomb in 27 November 1985. In 1986, 17N rocketed four separate governmental tax offices around Athens. In 1987, eleven US soldiers and nine military officers were wounded in bus bombings. In 28 June 1988 an US Embassy defence attaché Captain
Additionally, 17N diversified its targets by targeting what it called the 'lumpen local capitalist class' that was exploiting the working class and deserved “punishment by the proletariat.” The group carried out several robberies to fund its operations, and included new assassination targets, such as businessmen, newspaper publishers and judges.

The gradual intensification of terrorist activity in Greece did not alarm the Greek political and security elites. Policy makers continued to downplay terrorism as a threat to public order, even as terrorists acted with virtual impunity. They considered terrorist incidents in Greece as isolated occurrences of violence that were in no way central to the Greek political and social life and in no way comparable to the terrorist problems of Italy, Germany or Spain. Law Minister Mangakis noted in his speech to the Parliament:

“What we have in this country is not terrorism but isolated episodes of terrorism like the ones experienced by all nations, even the most peaceful, non-violent ones, such as Austria and Switzerland. For it is nowadays no longer possible for a country not to have endured some form of political violence.”

Thirdly, despite the rise of domestic terrorism, the government was not willing to implement strict anti-terrorism measures that would curtail civil liberties. For that reason, although Law 774/1978 was based on the Italian and German anti-terrorism legislation, unlike them, it did not increase police powers in the areas of search, seizures and detaining of suspected individuals, thus significantly weakening the role of the Greek police compared to that of other European countries. Spyros Kaminaris, a terrorism expert, argued that in a nation that had suffered the junta's wanton use of police brutality,
there was a lot of suspicion and prejudice against any attempts for stricter internal security control.\textsuperscript{21} As a result, due to the limitations in their power, the police forces and the intelligence services failed to make any substantiate progress in identifying the terrorists, missing many opportunities to take advantage of important leads along the way.

The above factors contributed to terrorism remaining non-politicised in Greece during that first phase. In that period, the Greek political and social elites were preoccupied with other issues of national importance, rather than with the terrorist threat. The promotion of social rights and freedoms and the reconstruction of the economy were overtaking the political debates. In the security field, Greek-Turkish relations were the primary, if not the only issue. In many respects, Greek security policy was shaped with a traditional concept of state, military security in mind. Thus, according to Ambassador Dimitri Constanas, "the traditional focus on state military security and on Greek-Turkish relations did not allow the terrorist threat to attract a significant amount of attention or resources."\textsuperscript{22}

5.3 The Politicisation of Domestic Terrorism (1989-1999)

5.3.1 The Bakoyannis killing

With terrorism until then being a peripheral issue in the political agenda, Greece entered a new phase after the assassination of Pavlos Bakoyannis, the first Greek politician to be killed by 17N. Bakoyannis was the chief parliamentary spokesperson of the New Democracy Party and the son-in-law of its leader, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who succeeded Papandreou as Prime Minister in 1990. Bakoyannis was shot dead on 26 September 1989 for his alleged involvement in the Bank of Crete scandal. His killing was a landmark because it marked the end of an attitude of tolerance in both the political establishment and the public. Firstly, it changed how the public viewed 17N. Until his assassination, there was a feeling in the public that the targets of 17N were 'legitimate'.

\textsuperscript{21} Personal interview with Spiros Kaminaris, 27 December 2002.
\textsuperscript{22} Personal interview with Dimitri Constanas, 23 April 2002.
According to Pavlos Tsimas, “the Bakoyannis killing marked the end of an atypical acquiescence and consent of the public to the acts of 17N.”

Secondly, it brought terrorism to the heart of the political debate. This happened because Bakoyannis was the first politician to be targeted by 17N but also because his killing came at a very unstable political period for Greece, after successive weak coalition governments. These contributed to an increase in the polarisation of the party-political debates and to the politicisation of terrorism. In particular, New Democracy accused PASOK for being somehow linked to 17N. This allegation was based on the suspicion that because PASOK was the political transformation of the resistance group PAK, 17N and PASOK could have been drawn from the same group of people. According to a senior Greek politician, the general belief in the New Democracy camp was that even if PASOK was not behind 17N, there was “some kind of suppression, hushing-up, non-disclosure and covering up of information, or a least an emotional bond with some people that PASOK might had suspected to be related to terrorism.” Subsequently, the politicisation of terrorism did not translate to a constructive political debate on how to deal with the terrorist threat but instead to a competition between the two major parties that were trying to capitalise on the issue by gaining short-term political gains.

5.3.2 The role of the US in the politicisation of terrorism

As noted in the previous chapter, in the early 1990s, cooperation in the EU on terrorism continued to be further institutionalised, however it no longer was as high in the agenda as it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, during that period most pressure on Greece to deal with 17N was coming not from Europe but from the United States. The inability of Greece to make any progress in cracking down domestic terrorism had

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24 Three national parliamentary elections took place within a year (1989-1990), because no party had had an absolute majority to become government. After a series of weak governmental coalitions the political deadlock was broken in 1990, when New Democracy rose in power.
26 For instance, one day after the Bakoyannis killing, on 27 September 1989 the newspaper Apogeimmatini had the front-title: ‘Political Leaders: These are the instigators. PASOK is behind the killers’. On the same day, the newspaper Eleftheros Typos had the title: ‘The PASOK-led 17 November strikes again’. 
increasingly threatened Greek-American ties. Repeatedly the American government issued travel advices to American citizens to avoid Greece due to its terrorist record. In addition, the National Commission on Terrorism issued a recommendation that the United States should impose economic sanctions on Greece, until it showed some resolve in cracking down on terrorists.\footnote{National Commission on Terrorism, \textit{Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism}, June 2000. Available from <http://www.gpo.gov/nct/>} The American government ruled out sanctions but instead increased its pressure on Greece to deal with the terrorist threat, offering help in identifying the terrorists and proposing a number of changes in existing Greek legislation.

The US adopted and further fuelled the theories that connected PASOK to 17N, arguing that PASOK is directly or indirectly linked to the terrorists. According to an article published in the newspaper ‘Washington Post’ on 3 November 1999:

"The members of terrorist organizations have been drawn from the same antidictatorial organizations that gave birth to PASOK party. It is reasonable to assume that they don’t want to search every nook and cranny. If the leader of November 17 is arrested and is proved that it was one of the best friends of the leader of PASOK, they will be brought to a very difficult position."\footnote{\textit{Washington Post}, 3 November 1999.}

Similarly, former CIA Director James Woolsey argued that the US government had “strong reasons to believe that high-ranking members of the Greek government know how to go after this organization [17N], if they wanted to, but they refuse to act. I won’t say anything more, but they know who they are... They are protecting the terrorists."\footnote{The interview was published in the weekly Greek newspaper \textit{Pontiki} on 8 June 2000.}

Such views determined the strategy of the American intelligence services that was involved in the search for the 17N terrorists.

However, according to former Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos, despite its good intentions, “the involvement of the US government in the fight against terrorism in Greece did not help, but was harmful, because it directed the investigations on
PASOK.” The international and particularly the US pressures did however contribute to the politicisation of terrorism in Greece because they fired up the political debate and forced the authorities to rethink the nature and the implications of the terrorist threat.

5.3.3 The first unsuccessful ‘securitisation move’

In the early 1990s, the New Democracy government made the first attempt to upgrade terrorism in the Greek agenda and to shift it from normal politics to the security realm (securitisation move). This securitisation move entailed the discursive construction of terrorism as an existential threat as well as the adoption of stricter legal and policing measures.

In the aftermath of the killing of Bakoyannis, the New Democracy government adopted a new anti-terrorism bill in 1990. The bill titled ‘Bill for the Protection of Society against Organised Crime’ (Law 1916/1990) included much stricter provisions on terrorism compared to the previous Law 774/1978 that was abolished by PASOK eight years earlier. It significantly increased police powers in the areas of intelligence gathering and detaining suspects without specific charges, offered protection to judges and their families, increased the reward offered for police informers and forbade the press from publishing proclamations from the terrorist groups. This was the first time that such draconian measures were taken in Greece, which demonstrated the willingness of the government to upgrade terrorism in its priorities and to convince the public about the seriousness of the threat.

In the Parliamentary Discussions for the adoption of the Law, the discussion once again became polarised on whether the need to fight terrorism justifies limitations to social freedoms. According to the government, there could be no freedom when the security of individuals is compromised by the terrorists. Vice President of the Government, Athanasios Kanellopoulos argued that the “question over which social good is more important, freedom or security, is a pseudo-dilemma. The answer to that is simple. In the

30 Personal interview with Theodore Pangalos, 2 January 2003.
face of the security threat [that terrorism poses], the freedom of society as a whole will come before the freedom of the individual."31 Ioannis Kounenos added that: "Personal freedom, in a state that is overtaken by fear created by the terrorists, is not freedom. There can be no social or economic stability... unless every single citizen of this state feels secure about his or her life."32

Not only did the government present terrorism as an existential threat to the state and society but also it tried to legitimise the new stricter measures adopted, with reference to the policies of other European countries. Eleftherios Papanikolaou, in his contribution to the discussions stated:

"...we are only copying policies adopted by other countries that have a long history with domestic terrorism, and who, after adopting stricter measures than those proposed by us, were successful in fighting organised crime and terrorism, and safeguarding the democratic polity and the well-being of their society".33

Papanikolaou referred to the experiences of Italy with the Red Brigades, Germany with the Baader-Meinhof Gang and RAF, France with the Action Directe and cited the adoption of strict laws as the main reason these states succeeded in dismantling the terrorists. Other members of the governing party referred also to recommendations of the European Community and the United Nations, as well as to the intensification of European cooperation on terrorism in the Trevi working groups, in order to legitimise the need for stricter anti-terrorism provisions in Greece.

On the other hand, the opposition parties rejected the need for the new bill. Their opposition to the proposed Law was structured around two main arguments: first, that the problem with domestic terrorist groups in Greece is significantly different from other European countries and second, that it by no means justifies limitations to civil liberties. For instance, Ioannis Skoularikis, speaker of PASOK, stated:

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32 Ibid., p. 4689.
33 Ibid., p. 4681.
"[Greece] does not have a serious problem with terrorism ... but with a few sporadic, spectacular terrorist acts... There is no future for terrorism in Greece because all Greeks are against it... The aim of the proposed legislation is to create a climate of fear in order to restrict the rights of the Greek people and subdue any free spirit."34

Apart from the opposition parties, large sections of the Greek society were also hostile to the new legislation. Public opinion treated the increase of police powers with suspicion and concern over potential infringements and restrictions on civil liberties. However, the clause that provoked the most intense public reaction had to do with the banning of the terrorist communiqués from being published in the Greek press. Until then, 17N and similar terrorist groups in Greece had enjoyed the easiest means of communication with the Greek people. Katsandonis noted:

"They quite comfortably draft their proclamation or their declaration concerning their ideas or their positions regarding the crimes they have committed, they place the text in the wastebasket of ... some public urinal, and reveal by telephone to this or that newspaper the location of the valuable text. And the next day the positions of the ELA or of November 17 are circulated in eight columns on the first page, to be known to the further corner of the nation."35

The publication of the terrorists’ communiqués in the Greek press (Eleftherotypia, Ta Nea, Ethnos) allowed 17N to have access to the public and advertise their ideas freely. Law 1916/1990 tried to put an end to that but instead turned the media against the government, because they considered this provision as a violation of the freedom of speech.36 Several newspaper editors refused to comply with the legislation and continued to publish 17N communiqués, leading to their arrest and imprisonment for their defiance

34 Ibid., pp. 4669-70.
36 Most terrorism experts agree that there is a special relationship between terrorism and the mass media which provides benefits to both. Terrorists advertise and try to legitimise their positions through the media, whereas the media attract more readers and viewers. Thus, Martha Crenshaw suggests that decreasing the terrorists’ access to the mass media will lead to the decline of terrorism. See: Martha Crenshaw, ‘How terrorism declines’ in Clark McCauley (ed), Terrorism Research and Public Policy (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 69-87.
of the law. The widespread political opposition as well as the social reactions to the first serious attempt to upgrade terrorism in the Greek security agenda indicated that the audience was not ready to accept the government’s securitisation move and was not willing to accept restrictions to civil liberties. As a result, when PASOK returned to power in 1993, the bill was abolished and not replaced by other legislation.

Overall, during this second phase (1989-1999), terrorism in Greece became an important issue in the political arena. The politicisation of terrorism resulted in more attention being devoted to it, which however did not help the government come any closer to the 17N terrorists. The securitisation move by the New Democracy government in the early 1990s was not successful because the political parties, the media and public opinion could not come to an agreement about the existential nature of the terrorist threat. In addition, the conspiracy theories, which related PASOK to 17N and were supported by both some Greek political parties and the US misdirected the search for the terrorists, mislead the prosecuting security authorities and led to 10 years being lost.

5.3.4 Failing ideology of 17N

According to Hewitt, a successful anti-terrorist policy is one that reduces the amount of terrorist violence.\(^37\) During the second phase of terrorism in Greece, the state’s response remained problematic, despite the efforts of the New Democracy government to close on the terrorists with the introduction of Law 1916/1990. November 17 continued its violent struggle, increasing the numbers of its attacks that reached a peak of twenty-two in 1991 and adding improvised rocket attacks to its methods. On 16 December 1990, 17N fired two rockets into the European Community headquarters in Athens, arguing that a decade of Greek membership in the European Community (EC) amounted to nothing and had only weakened Greece by leading to a loss of sovereignty in the economic sphere and other policy areas.\(^38\) During the 1990s, the group also targeted facilities and foreign firms investing in Greece in order to demonstrate its disapproval towards developments in the

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38 See 17N: *The Proclamations*, pp. 588-598. The proclamation was originally published in *Eleftherotypia* on 19 December 1990.
Gulf War and the Former Yugoslavia. At the same time, it stepped up attacks against Turkish interests because of Turkey's 'expansionist policies' and efforts to permanently divide Cyprus.  

However, after 1991, cracks gradually started to appear in both 17N's efficiency of action and the group's ideology. The attacks of 17N demonstrated a more fundamentalist attitude towards the practice of violence and were more reckless and less well planned than in the past. It soon became apparent that the group had lost its cool analytical logic, which, according to Kassimeris, was "displaced by a more emotional and nihilistic rationale."  

As a result, in July 1992, in the course of a rocket attack on the Greek Finance Minister Yiannis Paleokrassas during rush hour in downtown Athens, 17N killed a 22-year-old bystander. The group tried to deny responsibility for the civilian's death, blaming the police for deliberately letting the victim die in order to use the incident against the group. Similarly, after firing two rockets at the facilities of the TV station 'Mega Channel' in March 1995, the group claimed that although they had asked for the TV station to be evacuated, the authorities "deliberately refused to do so, so that if there were civilian victims the public would turn against the Revolutionary Organisation 17N."  

These events demonstrated that despite the group's agonising attempts to justify its actions and to legitimise its targets, 17N had started to lose touch with reality, a common fate to most terrorist organisations. November 17 attempted to set out its new political objectives by releasing a 'relaunch' document, the 'Manifesto 1992', which however failed to re-establish 17N to the public eye as a revolutionary group. The group had lost its ability to appear as a popular avenger and could no longer justify the reasons of its

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39 Attacks against Turkish interests included the assassinations of a Turkish Embassy press attaché, Getin Gorgu on 7 October 1991, and the killing of the Turkish Deputy Chief of Mission Haluk Sipahioglu on 4 July 1994.
41 17N: The Proclamations, p. 771.
continuing violent campaign.\textsuperscript{43} Its once lengthy Marxist diatribes on crucial contemporary socio-political issues were replaced by conspiracy-theorising and political paranoia. As Konstandaras noted, "[t]he power granted by the illusion of being invincible and important had corrupted the terrorists beyond the norms of even the corruption that they claimed to be fighting."\textsuperscript{44}

5.4 The Securitisation of Greek Terrorism post-1999

5.4.1 Discursive constructions of terrorism as an existential threat

Greece gradually changed its perceptions and policies on terrorism, at the same time when the European Union was re-securitising terrorism and dedicating more resources to dealing with internal security issues. Since the Tampere European Council, the EU had accelerated its progress towards becoming an internal security actor, with terrorism being one of the important issues, which particularly after September 11 topped the EU security agenda.

In Greece, a significant change of mood in regards to indigenous terrorism first became apparent in the political elites after 1999. The Greek government demonstrated a new determination and an unprecedented sense of urgency to deal with the terrorist threat, which was reflected on the political discourse on terrorism. For the first time, all political parties came to realise the importance of terrorism as a security threat that had to be dealt with immediately and effectively. As a result, since 1999 a process of securitisation of terrorism went under way in Greece, leading to a gradual reappraisal and re-evaluation of all policies and measures against terrorism.

In the public debate, terrorism was presented as a threat to Greek society and national interests. The devastating impact of domestic terrorism on the economy and tourism, as well as on the country's relations with the European Union and the United States were

\textsuperscript{43} According to terrorism expert, Mary Bossis, "the end of the bipolar system of ideology had seen the ending of all Marxist, leftist terrorist groups across Europe. November 17 was the only one still fighting for a lost cause." \textit{Personal interview} with Mary Bossis, 30 December 2002.

\textsuperscript{44} Nikos Konstandaras, 'A family affair', \textit{Kathimerini English Edition}, 20 July 2002.
some of the issues highlighted. For instance, Michalis Chrysohoidis, the Public Order Minister, said in 1999:

"We realise that this has become a huge problem, more serious than perhaps anything else we are currently dealing with... I don’t think it’s too much to say that these terrorist attacks are literally murdering Greece to the point that counter-terrorism has become the government’s top priority."

The worst fears of the Greek government were realised on the 8th of June 2000, when Brigadier Stephen Saunders, a British defence attaché in Greece, was shot dead by two gunmen on motorcycles who fired into his car on a main Athens avenue. November 17 claimed responsibility for the attack in a 13-page declaration that appeared in the daily newspaper Eleftherotypia. According to the 17N communiqué, the group chose the senior British officer not only because the United Kingdom took a leading part in the bombardments of Iraq and Yugoslavia, but also “because the English policy ... even surpassed the Americans in provocation, cynicism and aggression.”

The timing of the terrorist attack, while the Greek government was trying to persuade the international community of its commitment and ability to eradicate terrorism in Greece, shocked the political establishment. All political parties condemned the attack, which also made the Greek public fully understand how harmful 17N was for the international image of Greece. As Chrysohoidis pointed out "I believe that apart from the loss of the unlucky victim, this action primarily harms the interests of the country."

At the same time, the assassination of Saunders brought to an end the conspiracy theories that connected PASOK to 17N. It took place while PASOK was in power and it was

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46 17N: The Proclamations, p. 850. Scotland Yard suggested that 17N targeted the wrong man and that the real target of the group was an American official with the same surname. In response to that, 17N sent another proclamation on 13 December 2000 supporting its decision to assassinate Saunders and claiming that Saunders was the most important target in the history of the group, even more important than the CIA chief in Athens Richard Welch.
extremely harmful for Greek interests and for PASOK itself. Subsequently, although the international news media continued openly to question the honesty and commitment of the Greek authorities in dealing with 17N, the two major political parties in Greece decided to ignore short-term political calculations and put aside their political differences so that they could collectively do everything possible to find the perpetrators of the terrorist act.

Because of this new sense of urgency to eradicate terrorism, a new anti-terrorism bill was adopted in June 2001. This time it was PASOK that brought the bill to the Parliament, which was a significant break from the party’s past, considering that it had previously abolished the two laws of 1978 and 1990, which it had found to be unnecessary and dangerous for civil liberties. Although the anti-terrorist bill was much stricter than the previous two, both New Democracy and PASOK supported it, revealing a political consensus that was missing from previous attempts to upgrade terrorism in the security agenda. The new law gave the police greater powers in arresting suspects and also permitted the use of DNA testing to aid in investigations. Collection of personal data, including phone conversations and videotaping of individuals identified as suspects was also included in the legislation, along with the legal framework for Greece's first-ever ‘witness protection program’ and provisions for granting amnesty to members of terrorist or organised crime groups who turned state's evidence.

In the parliamentary discussions for the adoption of the Law, terrorism was presented as an existential threat. Dora Bakoyanni, the widow of Pavlos Bakoyannis, stated that it is common sense that:

"...terrorism has harmed Greek society in its whole; it does not only affect the victims of the attacks but compromises the highest value of all, which is human life. It is common sense that terrorism has been very costly to Greece on a social and national level...We should let everyone know that the Greek politicians will not accept half-measures but will react to the terrorist threat, although that reaction has already been long overdue."48

The minority parties on the left insisted that the bill endangered civil liberties because it legalised the surveillance of citizens and ensured that secret service agents would not be prosecuted for their actions. To this critique, Law Minster, Michael Stathopoulos replied emphatically that "any restrictions to human rights and freedoms ... are justified in a democratic society, if they are necessary in order to safeguard internal security and public order and to prevent crime."\(^{49}\) Essentially, the political discourse on terrorism changed in the late 1990s and terrorism was for the first time presented and accepted as an existential threat that justifies the use of extraordinary measures that were previously rejected.

5.4.2 The role of images

Apart from changes in the political discourse on terrorism, after 1999 the government also changed completely its communication policy with the public. For the first time the government took initiatives aiming at sensitising public opinion on the serious issue of terrorism. These initiatives were based on textual and visual messages that were designed to remind the public of the consequences and the implications of the terrorist acts.

For example, following a proposal of Foreign Minister George Papandreou, a text under the title ‘One minute of silence’ was broadcasted by all radio and television stations in July of 2000, in which terrorism was characterised as a threat to modern Greece. The text read:

"Terrorism constitutes an insult for the Greeks because of the contempt it displays toward the sanctity of human life, and because it seeks to undermine the social cohesion and political stability. It is a threat for today's Greece. It is totally alien to Greece's philosophy and logic. It is alien to all of our traditions. The battle against terrorism is a priority. A priority not only for the state but also for the Greek people. It is a commitment undertaken by the government and the society's objective is to continue the effort aimed

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 916.
at uprooting terrorism. In every possible way. We owe it to the victims of the terrorists. We owe it to Democracy and its human values. We owe it to Greece.\textsuperscript{50}

In addition, the government encouraged the formation of an informal group consisting of the relatives of the victims of 17N. The group was formed in December 2001 in order to create a social alliance against terrorism.\textsuperscript{51} The relatives of the victims of 17N, who until then had stayed out of the public eye, showed the reality of the consequences of terrorism. In particular, the image of Saunders’ widow after the attack was one of those moments that remain in the minds of anyone who saw it, and it had a political impact.\textsuperscript{52} In addition, the images from the terrorist attacks of September 11 also increased public sensitivity as regards to terrorism, as well as public awareness concerning the seriousness and significance of the terrorist threat.

The changes in the discourse and the communication policy of the government with the public in relation to terrorism clearly intended to shift terrorism from normal politics to the security sphere. Unlike the early 1990s however, the political establishment and the Greek public accepted this time the securitisation move, as they were convinced about the need to accept restrictions on individual freedoms in order to eradicate the terrorist threat. As a result, terrorism became securitised, which justified the adoption of any measures required to deal with it.

5.4.3 Operational measures

The killing of Brigadier Saunders was a landmark in the fight against terrorism and a catalyst for dramatic changes in the operational level. First of all, the Greek authorities sought to establish closer cooperation with French, British, US and other intelligence

\textsuperscript{51} The group adopted the name ‘Os Edo’ (No More), in a clear reference to the Spanish movement against Basque terrorism called ‘Basta Ya’. In a public address the group stated: “The terrorists turn our silence into an excuse. In this way, they continue their terrorist activity without any substantial hindrance. The truth is that the merciless killers have managed to harm not only us but the country as well.” See Kathimerini, 20 December 2001.
\textsuperscript{52} In an emotional statement given in front of her home in Athens, Saunders’ widow called on the Greek people to help track down her husband’s killers, saying they had destroyed both her and her family.
services that were in a position to offer information and technical support to Greece. In the past, no Public Order Minister would retain his sit if he praised Greek cooperation with other countries’ intelligence services, especially with the American ones. For political and psychological reasons that go back to the dictatorship, such polices were very unpopular, even within the security and police forces. This changed after the killing of Saunders. Greece signed new bilateral cooperation agreements on terrorism and organised crime with many countries, including an agreement with the US in September 2000 and with Turkey in 2001. In addition, the 300-strong anti-terrorist squad that was established in 1984 was reorganised, with counter-terrorism experts visiting Britain and America to be retrained in surveillance techniques and bombing analysis. By doing so, Greece hoped to dispel an inherited mentality of exaggerated mistrust. Furthermore, by cooperating with other countries Greece wanted to share responsibility for the investigations. As Police Colonel Houliaras pointed out, this would also mean that “a possible failure of the Greek authorities to capture 17N would also be a failure of our allies that were helping in the search.”

The contribution of the British intelligence that got involved in the hunt for the 17N terrorists after Saunders was killed was particularly important. The Scotland Yard team was very systematic and brought good expertise, developing relevant wiretaps and other technical evidence. In addition, the involvement of the British was not received in the same suspicious and negative light as the American involvement of past years. According to former Defence Minister Gerasimos Arsenis “the British put our search into the right direction because they did not share the preoccupations of the Americans regarding the links between 17N and PASOK.”

Under the leadership of Chrysohoidis and with the help of both British and American intelligence, a new round of investigations began, with a re-examination of all the

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53 Personal interview with Stelios Paphthemelis, 25 April 2002. Paphthemelis was the Public Order Minister from October 1993 to March 1995.
54 Personal interview with Ioannis Houliaras, 5 January 2003.
56 Personal interview with Gerasimos Arsenis, 18 December 2002.
existing information available on 17N. A computerised crime management system was introduced, loaded with all information on 17N in order to compare the files and assist in the cross-linking of information gathered during the history of 17N. Based on the computerised analysis, a report of several hundred pages was produced in June 2001, which offered a systematic overview of the activity of the terrorist group.\(^{57}\)

### 5.4.4 The Arrest of 17N

The securitisation of terrorism and the systematic efforts of the Greek authorities in cooperation with American, British and French intelligence services finally paid off in 2002. The police had begun collecting information from everywhere, creating a climate of persecution. The government had also released information that they were close to 17N and there would soon be arrests of the terrorists.\(^{58}\) Under pressure, in an attempt to show that the organisation was still invulnerable and active, 17N made the mistake that the police was waiting for.

The turning point came as a 40-year-old man, Savvas Xiros, was wounded when a bomb he was carrying exploded prematurely, while he was attempting to blow up the ticketing office of a shipping company in Piraeus harbour on 29 June 2002. A gun discovered near his injured body was found to be the same one taken from a policeman killed during a 1984 robbery attributed to November 17. His fingerprints also matched those found on a car used by November 17 during a 1997 attack. While recovering from his injuries, Xiros, an icon painter by profession, confessed he was a member of 17N and testified giving the names of his associates in the terrorist group, which included two of his brothers, in order to benefit from the provisions of the new anti-terrorist law.\(^{59}\)

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\(^{57}\) Parts of the report were published in the daily *Ta Nea*, 4 June 2002.

\(^{58}\) In the beginning of 2002 the police informally communicated information that they were close to arresting 17N and that they have the names of group members. For instance see Antonis Karakousis, 'The hour of truth is near for November 17', *Kathimerini*, English Edition, 14 January 2002

\(^{59}\) Xiros later claimed that his was drugged in order to give his testimony, an allegation that the Greek authorities reject.
Within a month, nineteen suspected members of the group were arrested, including Giotopoulos, the group's leader and Dimitris Koufodinas, the group's leader of operations. After being heavily criticised for its past failures\(^60\), the police managed to demonstrate exceptional professionalism in dealing with the arrests. The police had been monitoring some of the terrorists for a period of time but was waiting to collect all the required evidence before arresting them.\(^61\) According to a Police Colonel, "the way the Greek police dealt with 17N after the first arrest shows how important, almost existential it was for the police force to prove that it was able and professionally trained to deal with such a great challenge."\(^62\) In the trial of the terrorist suspects, which commenced in Athens in March 2003, fifteen of the accused were found guilty, while another four were acquitted for lack of evidence. Giotopoulos, the group's leader received the heaviest sentence in Greek legal history of twenty-one life-terms.\(^63\)

The arrest of November 17 signified the complete demystification of the group.\(^64\) The 'phantom organisation', according to Mary Bossis, proved to consist of 'ridiculous personalities',\(^65\) most of who did not match the ideological profiles and the revolutionary personalities that most people were expecting to see.\(^66\) The easiness with which those arrested confessed their acts and informed on each other suggested that the ideology they were trying to represent was nothing more than a cover for their murderous acts. In the light of day, the phenomenon of indigenous terrorism in Greece and 17N in particular

\(^60\) Some attributed the inability of the Greek authorities to deal effectively with 17N to the incompetence of the police, which was accused for not sealing off the crime scenes after terrorist acts, thus resulting in evidence being destroyed or lost.

\(^61\) The security authorities had concluded that Alexandros Giotopoulos was one of the 17N leaders about two years before his arrest but did not have enough evidence to prove it, nor had they been able to locate him as he was living under a fake identity. See Kathimerini, English Edition, 'Police trailed prime suspect for 2 years', 19 July 2002.

\(^62\) Personal interview with Ioannis Houliaras, 5 January 2003.

\(^63\) Vassilis Trikkas, General Director of right-wing party Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), expressed a minority opinion that "leading members of 17N are still free, either because the prosecuting authorities are unable or unwilling to arrest them." Personal interview with Vassilis Trikkas, 18 December 2002.


\(^65\) Personal interview with Mary Bossis, 30 December 2002. Surprisingly, most of the 17N suspected terrorists were ordinary people. Among them were a schoolteacher, shopkeeper, telephone operator, and other visible members of mainstream society.

\(^66\) Apart from Giotopoulos, the rest of 17N had seemingly ordinary lives and jobs. Among the 17N terrorists there were an electrician, a retired printer, a beekeeper, a bus driver and a telephone operator.
assumed its true dimensions, destroying the myths, fantasies, suspicions and obsessions that held the country hostage for twenty-seven years.

5.5 Reasons for the Securitisation of Terrorism
What was remarkable in the securitisation of terrorism was that although the terrorist threat had not become any more serious than before—in fact the terrorist incidents were more scarce than ever, with the exception of the period between 1980-83—the political elites were able to come to a consensus about dealing with the issue as an urgent security priority of the country. The most indicative example of the fundamental change that occurred in the way Greece dealt with terrorism were the views and perceptions of PASOK, which had rejected the securitisation of terrorism in the early 1990s but which paved the way for its securitisation after 1999. It is interesting then to explore the reasons for this change that made the political elites decide to upgrade terrorism in the security sphere.

5.5.1 The prospect of the Olympics
One of the main reasons the political elites supported the securitisation of terrorism was the prospect of hosting the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004. The Greek government was aware that its inability to make progress in dealing with domestic terrorism was damaging the international image of Greece. According to Pavlos Tsimas, if there had been no pressure from the Olympics maybe there would not have been such rapid success against 17N. “The Greek authorities would have no motive to invest so much in capturing 17N and to cooperate with foreign intelligence services, if these efforts were not linked to the image of a secure country able to host the Olympics.”

With the Olympics in mind, the US and the EU increased substantially the pressures on the Greek government to catch the elusive November 17 terrorists. For instance, Wayne Merry, a former US embassy staff member who served in Athens, called for the barring

of American athletes from the Athens 2004 Games, if the members of the infamous terrorist group were not brought to justice.\textsuperscript{68} The difference compared to the previous years was that when Greece was receiving international pressures concerning terrorism in the past, the practical element of the Olympics was missing. The American pressures in particular were seen by political elites and public opinion alike as an effort of the US to intervene in Greek politics. The forthcoming Olympics changed that perception and helped the Greek political elites understand that the international concerns regarding terrorism were fully justified and should be addressed urgently and effectively.

The Greek government did not really fear that 17N could strike during the Olympics. This would be beyond both the group’s operational abilities and its ideological platform.\textsuperscript{69} However, the political elites were aware that if 17N was not arrested, that would create the picture of an unsafe country. It was clear that the clock was ticking toward some kind of potential disaster at the Athens Games in 2004, unless drastic measures were taken. For that reason, according to Yannis Valinakis, “Greece developed a more coherent anti-terrorist strategy for the first time, which was structured around the Olympics.”\textsuperscript{70} The new strategy was based on the determination of Greece to prove that it is a safe country committed to dealing with the terrorist threat and in that way maximise the economic and political benefits from the forthcoming Olympics.

5.5.2 The impact of the September 11 attacks

Apart from the Olympics, the terrorist attacks of September 11 provided undoubtedly another important motive for the securitisation of terrorism. The events of September 11 established brutally that terrorism threatens the stability of all countries and all people.

\textsuperscript{68} In an opinion piece published in the ‘Christian Science Monitor’, Merry proposed that the Bush administration must tell Greek leaders “it could not certify Athens as safe for American athletes and fans during the 2004 Olympics if November 17 is not destroyed... The danger of the national humiliation that would follow an American boycott should convince Athens at last that terrorism requires action rather than rhetoric. Greek authorities can deal with this problem if they want to, and Washington should make certain they do”. See Wayne E. Merry, ‘Don't ignore Greek terrorism’, Christian Science Monitor, 14 February 2001. Available from <http://csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/durableRedirect.pl?durable/2001/02/14/text/p11s1.html>.

\textsuperscript{69} Personal interview with Mary Bossis, 25 April 2002.

\textsuperscript{70} Personal interview with Yannis Valinakis, 20 December 2002.
Dozens of Greek Americans were among the victims, and a historic Greek Orthodox Church, St. Nicholas, located next to the World Trade Centre, was destroyed. The attacks demonstrated that in the new international environment, individual states are increasingly unable to prosper by acting alone. After the attacks, Greece joined the rest of the world in expressing full solidarity with the US, as well as practical support in the fight against international terrorism. In addition, Greek Prime Minister Simitis called for closer cooperation in the European Union and within the United Nations in order to promote a stronger collective system based on mutuality and international legality.\footnote{Eleftherotypia, 13 December 2002.}

The impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11 to Greece was twofold. On the one hand, it helped crystallise the Greek perceptions regarding the terrorist threat, thus reinforcing the securitisation of terrorism in Greece that was already under way. Not only did the Greek political elites understand that terrorism was the biggest threat to international security but also they realised that, with terrorism being the central issue in current international relations, the only way to improve Greek-American relations and to establish Greece’s place in the EU, would be by having a spectacular success against 17N. Along with its commitment to cooperate with its European partners in the international coalition against terrorism, Greece also needed to deal urgently with the terrorist problem at home.

In addition, September 11 forced the Greek elites to rethink the dangers from international terrorism acting in Greece. Until September 11, Greek intelligence services were concentrating too narrowly on domestic terrorist groups and in particular on the arrest of November 17, without paying too much attention on international terrorists that could act in Greece. Although Arab terrorist groups had acted in Greece during the 1980s, international terrorism had never targeted the Greek state and was thus not considered a serious threat to Greece. International terrorism was first felt in Greece with the hijacking of two Greek aeroplanes by Arab terrorists (1970, 1973), who demanded and persuaded the Greek government to set free seven Palestinians and two Arabs that
were held in Greek prisons. The most serious incident of international terrorism in Greece occurred on 11 July 1988, when terrorists from the group Abu Nidal opened fire with machineguns and grenades on the “City of Poros,” a Greek ferryboat carrying 471 tourists in the Aegean Sea, killing nine and injuring 98. Yet, these incidents were seen as unconnected to the Greek political life, not related and not affecting Greek interests.

Since then, there was no evidence to suggest that international terrorism was active in Greece. There was a belief that Greece is not affected by international terrorism, because it is not a western metropolis and had never had tense relations with the Arab world. September 11 indicated that this could prove to be an illusion. The prospect of hosting the Olympics would bring Greece in the spotlight. The Munich Olympics massacre in 1972, when eleven Israeli athletes were killed after being taken hostage was a powerful reminder. International terrorist groups in need of publicity would definitely view the Athens Olympics as a legitimate and attractive target. As Mary Bossis noted, “Al Qaeda would not differentiate between Arab-friendly countries or not.” September 11 proved that no country is ready to deal with that level of threat of international terrorism and thus reinforced the political will of the Greek government to deal with 17N, and terrorism in general, urgently and by any means.

5.5.3 The logic of appropriateness and the influence of European norms

Another reason that contributed to the Greek political elites changing their perceptions of terrorism had to do with the influence of European norms. In the 1970s, when European countries started to cooperate on terrorism in the various intergovernmental fora, Greece

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73 Bossis, *Greece and Terrorism*, pp. 143-144.
74 Personal interview with Thanos Dokos, 26 April 2002. Dokos also noted that the Greek authorities were very tolerant towards Middle-Eastern terrorist groups, expecting in return that Greek interests would not be attacked.
75 Personal interview with Mary Bossis, 30 December 2002.
76 The Athens 2004 organisers spent a record $1.39 billion on defending the games against a potential terrorist attack - about the cost of the entire Sydney Olympics in 2000. Greece also received counterterrorism advice from Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Israel, Spain and the USA. See *Eleftherotypia*, 10 September 2004.
was not yet a member of the European Communities. In 1981, Greece joined the Community and started to participate in the European intergovernmental initiatives on internal security, such as Trevis. However, Greece, unlike its European partners, did not at the time consider terrorism an important issue in its national security agenda, which was dominated by traditional security concerns and Greek-Turkish relations in particular. During the 1990s, Greek security policy and thinking became increasingly more influenced by the country’s membership in the EU, yet, by that time, most European countries had already made significant progress in dealing with their domestic terrorist problems and attention at the European level had shifted to other internal security issues. This changed as the EU focused more heavily on internal security and ‘third pillar’ issues in the late 1990s, which coincided with a period that Greece was securitising terrorism for the first time.77

The Europeanisation of Greek security policy led to the gradual change of Greek norms, self-perceptions and political priorities. Increasingly, Greek policies and perceptions were shaped and structured within the framework of the European Union. As a result, this created what March and Olsen call a ‘logic of appropriateness’.78 The Greek elites were influenced by what they considered being the norm in the European Union and were consciously or unconsciously trying to adapt to the European ideas and values. More specifically, norms, values and routines embedded within the European institutions gradually became integrated in the Greek political life, influencing definitions of political reality and policy outcomes.

Schimmelfennig argues that it is often a rational choice for countries to behave appropriately.79 The European institutions’ greater strength is vested in their ability to

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77 In the past Greece was puzzled by the strength of the American reaction to terrorism. Having lived with terrorism for decades, not only Greece but most European countries during the 1990s had a higher tolerance on terrorism compared to the United States. However, the acceleration of cooperation on internal security after the Tampere European Council and the events of September 11 brought terrorism at the top of European agenda. This influenced Greece, who was eager to cooperate with the other Member States in order to demonstrate solidarity and to enhance the country’s new European profile.


define reality for others, so that they internalise the existing order as beneficial to them. The adoption of European norms as regards to terrorism in Greece was partly due to a realisation that there was no other alternative for the country and that the only way to promote Greek self-interests would be through the EU. Ambassador Theodoropoulos suggested that Greece, by falling into line with the EU counter-terrorist norms and policies was perhaps also expecting some sort of return from the EU in other issues, for instance in regards to Cypriot membership. 80 In addition, Greek officials were warned that unless they take drastic measures in dealing with 17N that issue would impede the relations of Greece with the EU and the other Member States. 81

The gradual Europeanisation of Greek policies and perceptions on terrorism was "driven on the one hand by the need to multilateralize policy problems and, on the other, by requirements emanating from Brussels in an era of increasing European integration." 82 Greece had participated in all the European working groups on terrorism since 1981, but was not always willing to cooperate with its European partners. 83 After September 11, Greece demonstrated a new commitment to work together with other Member States in the fight against terrorism, supporting all the measures proposed at the EU level, despite some early reservations on the Common arrest warrant. 84 In addition, Greece proposed a series of initiatives in the framework of the various Mediterranean forums, aiming to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation among the countries in the region. 85

Even before September 11 though, cooperation within the EU helped Greece develop a more coherent strategy on terrorism. Paradoxically, as demonstrated by the analysis of the history of Greek state's response to terrorism, Greece did not have a coherent strategy

80 According to Theodoropoulos, 'The Cypriot accession to the EU was the big gamble and the big blackmail for Greece'. Personal interview with Byron Theodoropoulos, 14 December 2002.
81 Papachelas and Telloglou, The 17 November Dossier, p. 199.
82 Ibid., p. 20.
83 For instance, in 1986 the Greek government refused to comply with an EC decision to impose sanctions against Libya, who was suspected of sponsoring terrorist attacks. See Juliet Lodge, 'The European Community and Terrorism: From Principles to Concerted Action', in Juliet Lodge, The Threat of Terrorism (Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1988).
84 Personal interview with Costantinos Drakakis, 28 April 2002.
against terrorism until the late 1990s. The main reason for that was that the Ministerial leadership and the security officials responsible for terrorism were plagued by a lack of continuity, as they did not stay in position long enough to achieve anything. Yet, as Couloumbis notes, cooperation within the institutions and working groups of the EU was very important for Greece because it “guaranteed some continuity regardless of who was in government or who the Public Order Minister was.”

The securitisation of terrorism in Greece can thus be explained on the basis of rationalist assumptions within institutionalist constraints. Central to the securitisation of terrorism was the Europeanisation of Greece and the socio-political forces that gradually changed Greek self-perceptions and triggered the broadening of the Greek security agenda. At the same time, the Greek political elites realised that it was in the country’s interest to work closely with their allies towards the eradication of domestic terrorism. The pressure from the forthcoming Olympics and the increased anxiety in regards to international terrorism after the terrorist attacks of September 11 induced the Greek political elites to make terrorism the highest priority of the country, thus departing from the traditional security thinking that had dominated Greek security policy until the mid-1990s.

5.7 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the history of the ‘Revolutionary Organisation November 17’ and the Greek state’s response to its terrorist activities. The terrorist organisation November 17 was a unique phenomenon of indigenous terrorism in a non-revolutionary context that persisted in its armed struggle for so many years without any of its members being identified. November 17 was a peculiar example of an older pattern of terrorism that Europe experienced mostly during the 1970s (e.g. the Red Brigades in Italy, Action Direct in France, the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany). In many ways the political violence, the structure and the ideology of November 17 represented an anachronism, given the nature of ‘new’ terrorism.

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86 Personal interview with Theodore Couloumbis, 20 April 2002.
Although 17N had initially achieved a level of public tolerance that was quite stunning, the group, like the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany, it gradually became more and more isolated in public opinion, as it became apparent that "the terrorists were living in a fantasy world and that their ill-conceived actions had no political impact whatsoever."\(^8\) Despite the efforts of 17N to justify its actions by demonising its victims, the original aim of the group to stoke the flames of revolution in Greece was both unrealistic and irrelevant to Greek political and social realities. For that reason, George Kassimeris suggested that 17N was a 'failed group'.\(^8\) The myth of the phantom organisation fell apart completely after the arrests of most of its members in the summer of 2002, most of whom resembled part-time criminals, rather than committed, ideologically fuelled, revolutionary fighters.

An obvious question is raised then: If these were the terrorists, why were they not arrested earlier? According to David Fromkin "the terrorist's success is almost always the result of misunderstandings or misconceptions of the terrorist strategy."\(^8\) The analysis in this chapter revealed that the main reasons the terrorist problem proved to be so resilient in Greece was the failure of the Greek political elites to make a correct diagnosis of the roots, the level and the significance of the terrorist threat. Until 1999 terrorism was not perceived as a very serious threat or as a political priority of the successive Greek governments. There was no coherent counter-terrorist strategy and no systematic and sustained effort to find the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. Most importantly, terrorism was not dealt with as a security issue, since Greek-Turkish relations were overtaking the security agenda.

The securitisation of terrorism reflected a significant change in the perceptions of the Greek political elites in relation to the security priorities of the country, the importance of indigenous terrorism for Greek interests and the self-perceptions of Greece in general. The Europeanisation of Greece was particularly important in triggering these changes and


\(^8\) Kassimeris, 'Greece's Secret Socialist Spectre'.

in influencing Greek norms, ideas and political preferences on terrorism. With mounting pressure from the forthcoming Athens Olympics in 2004, a process of securitisation of terrorism got under way in Greece in 1999. As a result, the Greek government decided to make the fight against terrorism its top priority, and with the help of foreign advisers, employed a systematic method to achieve its target of eradicating domestic terrorism.

Comparing the Greek state’s response to that of other EU Member States, it is evident that Greece was slower in responding to the domestic terrorist threat and did not share the same sense of urgency and commitment in dealing with it. This changed in the late 1990s, when Greece re-evaluated its relations with the EU, its security policy and thinking and essentially its self-perceptions. The resulting securitisation of terrorism was arguably the catalyst for the arrest of November 17 after almost three decades of unpunished terror. The next chapter looks at another issue that was moved from normal politics to the security realm for very different reasons and with different consequences. More specifically, the next chapter analyses the securitisation of migration policy in Greece.
Chapter 6: The securitisation of Greek migration

6.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 4, since the mid-1980s, migration became increasingly politicised at both the national and the European Union level. The security logic of EU policies on migration and asylum served as a legitimising factor for adopting restrictive measures and for cutting back the rights of third-country nationals. Migration in Greece, a recent immigration country, also underwent a similar process of securitisation. An analysis of Greek political discourse and practice demonstrates that migration -its irregular component in particular- has come to be treated predominantly as a security issue.

Until the early 1990s, migration was not perceived as a threat in the Greek official discourse or in the public mind. Most Greeks held in high regard the traditions and principles of ‘Xenios (i.e. hospitable) Zeus’, according to which “to any man with the slightest claim to common sense, a guest and supplicant is as close to a brother”.¹ According to the commands of Xenios Zeus, a foreigner was considered a friend and an asylum seeker a sacred person. Thus, the rising number of foreign workers and asylum seekers during the 1970s and 1980s did not initially cause any reason for alarm in Greece, which was relatively free from preconceived ideas against immigrants. This was reflected in a 1985 survey by the European Parliament on the rise of fascism and racism in Europe, which showed that Greeks were “tolerant and xenophilic and generally free of racial prejudice”.²

However, perceptions that migrants might constitute a threat began to grow in the beginning of the 1990s. Research undertaken by the University of Athens in 1993 revealed that nearly 70 percent of respondents thought that there were too many

immigrants in Greece, while 85 percent considered them a danger to society. Another survey by the Athens Labour Centre (EKA) showed that 61 percent of the public thought that immigrants had a negative impact on society, whereas only 5.8 percent thought that they had a positive one. These statistics demonstrate that the sudden influx of migrants in the early 1990s increased fear and anxiety among the Greek population. On the part of the state, its response was primarily concerned with restricting migration flows, thus pushing migration from the realm of normal politics to the realm of security, to the expense of the rights of migrants and asylum seekers.

This chapter explores the security reasoning behind Greek policy-making on migration, analysing discursive and institutional constructions of migration as a security threat and investigating the reasons the Greek political and security elites supported the security discourse. Section 6.2 critically discusses the most common problems associated with migration, namely the increase in the rates of unemployment and criminality in Greece. Section 6.3 investigates the process of securitisation, analysing official discourse on migration in parliamentary discussions and public debate, as well as legal and institutional developments and practices. Having established how migration became securitised, section 6.4 explores why that happened, identifying deeper motives than those discussed in the public debate. On the one hand, domestic issues, such as economic, social and political considerations and foreign affairs objectives are taken into account. On the other hand, the broader context in which Greece’s policy response to migration took place is also considered, in particular the influence of EU policies and perceptions on migration. The overall analysis contributes to the understanding of Greek migration policy, as this was gradually formulated over the years. Furthermore, as an empirical case study of the securitisation of European migration, it helps identify the dynamics, but also the shortcomings, of the securitisation theory developed by the Copenhagen School.

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6.2 Dangers from Strangers: Myths and Perceptions

As in most European countries, the sudden increase of migration flows to Greece went hand-in-hand with an increase in public insecurity and anxiety. This hostility towards third-country nationals developed around myths and exaggerations, which stereotypically deemed immigrants responsible for many of society’s problems, in particular the rise in the rates of unemployment and criminality in Greece. A closer look at economic and criminological studies and statistics weakens the core of these arguments.

6.2.1 Myth 1: ‘Immigrants are bad for the economy and cause unemployment’

A lot of the public anxiety in relation to immigration in Greece related to the fear that immigrants and asylum seekers would have a negative impact on the local economy and the welfare state. In 1995, 72.7 percent of Greeks were concerned about the impact of immigrants to the economy, despite the lack of empirical evidence that would justify that concern.4 When the first large migratory wave arrived in Greece in the early 1990s, Greece was already facing serious economic problems and uncertainties. Greece had the largest imbalances of all OECD5 countries, inflation at around 20 percent, a growth of GDP of just 0.1 percent and a general government deficit of nearly 20 percent of GDP.6 The influx of migrant workers, the vast majority of whom were undocumented, was expected to add an additional burden to the economy, rather than to contribute to its reinvigoration.

However, many studies have shown that the positive effects from the work of both legal and undocumented migrants on the Greek economy far outweighed the negative ones. For instance, Sarris and Zografakis demonstrated that immigrant workers contributed to

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5 OECD stands for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
6 See Xanthi Petrinioti, Immigration into Greece (Athens: Odysseas-IIR, 1993) [in Greek].
the growth of the country's gross domestic product and kept inflation down.\(^7\) Furthermore, Drettakis showed that immigrants became an essential, dynamic and flexible labour force and important contributors to the social security funds\(^8\), especially in the context of the ageing and declining population of Greece.\(^9\) These findings were confirmed in the interviews conducted. EU Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, Stavros Dimas, pointed out that immigrants made a crucial contribution to Greece’s attainment of the entry criteria for the European Economic and Monetary Union.\(^10\) In addition, Former Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, argued that immigrants strengthened the Greek economy and played a great part in the completion of the construction work carried out in Athens for the 2004 Olympic Games.\(^11\) The only drawback identified by Fakiolas, a migration expert and lobbyist, was the remittances earned in Greece but sent or invested in the sending country.\(^12\)

Regardless of these positive effects of migration on the Greek economy, which are now recognised by the majority of the political elites, a more recent survey conducted by the National Centre for Social Research in 2003, revealed that a significant 64 percent of respondents continued to hold immigrants responsible for the high unemployment rates in Greece.\(^13\) The average unemployment rate in Greece since the 1990s has been over 10 percent, mainly affecting women and young people.\(^14\) However, no evidence suggests that there is a causal relation between unemployment and immigration in Greece.


\(^9\) As Charalambos Tsaridakis pointed out “immigrants could be seen as a lifeline for the Greek social insurance system”. Personal interview with Charalambos Tsaridakis, 2 October 2003.

\(^10\) Personal interview with Stavros Dimas, 17 December 2002.

\(^11\) Personal interview with Konstantinos Mitsotakis, 3 October 2003.

\(^12\) Personal interview with Rossetos Fakiolas, 1 October 2003. The remittances for the Albanians alone are estimated to be 400$ million every year, a considerable amount of money, which is however significantly lower than the remittances from Greeks who live outside the country. See Rossetos Fakiolas and Richard King, ‘Emigration, Return, Immigration: A Review and Evaluation of Greece’s Post War Experience of International Migration’, *International Journal of Population Geography*, Vol. 2, 1996, p. 184.


As early as 1993, the Institute for Employment of the General Confederation of Greek Workers (INE/GSEE) published findings that immigration was not responsible for the high unemployment rates.\(^{15}\) A number of further studies have subsequently shown that immigrants are mostly doing jobs that their Greek colleagues no longer want to do\(^{16}\) and therefore do not displace many Greeks from jobs. Instead, they fill skill and labour shortages in the sectors most needed (agriculture, tourism, construction and handicrafts, manufacturing and as domestic helpers). For instance, according to an empirical study for northern Greece, legal immigrants did not substitute Greeks (the net substitution was estimated to be only 0.5 percent), while irregular migrants substituted only 5.8 percent of jobs previously held by Greeks.\(^{17}\) These findings suggest that although Greek workers in certain sectors were partially replaced with immigrants, particularly in construction and tourism, the overall impact of immigration on the Greek economy was largely a positive one and was not related to the increase in the rates of unemployment in Greece.\(^{18}\)

**6.2.2 Myth 2: ‘Immigrants are responsible for the rise in criminality’**

Apart from economic concerns, the most lasting and intense source of public anxiety in regards to third-country nationals in Greece had to do with the increase of criminality during the 1990s and the perception that migrants were responsible for it. Under the impact of the sudden influx of migrants, society developed a feeling of a loss of security and a ‘moral panic’ arose among the Greek population.\(^{19}\) A specific outcome of this moral panic was the criminalisation of migrants and the subsequent rapid increase of xenophobia in Greece.

\(^{15}\) See Petriioti, *Immigration into Greece*. For a further analysis see Baldwin-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild, ‘Immigration and Unemployment’.

\(^{16}\) This has to with the fact that a lot of Greeks are unwilling to take up jobs that have low prestige or are heavy, such as cleaning or construction jobs. See Rossetos Fakiolas, ‘Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy’, in Russell King, Gabriella Lazaridis and Charalambos Tsardanidis (eds) *Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe* (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), pp. 57-79.

\(^{17}\) See Lianos, Sarris and Katseli, ‘Illegal Immigration and Local Labour Markets’.

\(^{18}\) For this reason, the positive effects of immigration are not distributed evenly in all sectors, since some Greek workers have been affected more than others have.

To some extent, Greek internal security was compromised by the increase in migratory flows. Uncontrolled population movements are connected to a series of illegal activities, such as organised crime (drugs and arms trafficking\textsuperscript{20}) and the very profitable enterprise of human trafficking and smuggling, which increased in Greece during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{21} At the same time, there was also an increase in the counterfeiting and falsification of Greek visas and passports and the selling of stolen passports, which made it difficult for the authorities to identify criminal or undesired migrants upon their entry. This problem of migrant criminality became most intense after the opening of the Albanian prisons in 1990, when a large number of criminals arrived in Greece and engaged in criminal activities.\textsuperscript{22}

Out of all the immigrant groups in Greece, Albanians have the worst reputation, resulting to what has been termed a widespread ‘Albanophobia’. In 1993-94 Albanians had the highest participation in serious crime and homicides (about 75 percent of all homicides committed by all foreigners), while Romanians and Albanians had the highest participation in thefts and burglaries.\textsuperscript{23} Albanians in Greece are stereotypically thought of as unskilled, violent, untrustworthy and dangerous.\textsuperscript{24} According to Magdy Helmy, an Egyptian community representative, the criminal-Albanian stereotype has had an impact on how all third-country nationals were seen in Greece. He stated: “When I first came to Greece in the 1970s there was no xenophobia...There were fewer migrants. The situation

\textsuperscript{20} For instance, approximately 700,000 firearms were stolen from the Albanian army during the riots in 1997, many of which found their way to the Greek market. See Rossetos Fakiolas, ‘Greek Migration and Foreign Migration in Greece’, in R. Rotte and P. Stein (eds), Migration Policy and the Economy (Munich: Hans Seidel Stiftung, 2001), pp. 281-304.

\textsuperscript{21} Migrants depended on traffickers have to spent up to 3000 Euros to enter Greece. They are often taken advantage of and exploited by the traffickers in different ways. For example they are often asked to undertake illegal activities such as carrying small quantities of drugs or engage into prostitution. See Gabriela Lazaridis, ‘Trafficking and Prostitution: The Growing Exploitation of Migrant Women in Greece,’ The European Journal of Women’s Studies, Vol. 8, 2001, pp. 67-102.

\textsuperscript{22} Personal interview with Gerasimos Arsenis, 18 December 2002.


changed with the mass arrival of Albanians. That's when society started to associate foreigners with crime."25

However, the criminalisation and demonisation of Albanians and other immigrants in Greece was based on short-lived trends and is not supported by the statistical data. Vasilis Karydis, a criminology professor, demonstrated that the percentage of irregular immigrants' participation in criminal activities was lower than that of the total Greek population as a whole. According to his statistical analysis for the years 1993 and 1994, the immigrant contribution to crimes of murder, robbery and rape was around 11 percent, and only 6% for robbery.26

Leading criminologist Nestor Courakis agreed that the number of foreigners involved in crime is low, although it is also on the rise. According to 1999 statistics from the public order ministry, out of 8,042 break-ins in 1999, Albanians were found to be responsible for 1,617 and other immigrants (Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians, Iraqis and Poles) for about 950. Greeks carried out the remaining 5,475 offences. Similarly, out of the 1,324 people who were charged with illegal weapons possession in 1999, 1,126 were Greek, 139 were Albanians and the rest were Russians, Romanians and Bulgarians.27 Confirming these findings, Martin Baldwin-Edwards showed in a more recent study, that the immigrant contribution to crime had primarily to do with offences related to their illegal status, i.e. with document forgery (about 70 percent), beggary (65 percent), burglary (33 percent) and robbery (35 percent), whereas for "crimes against life", immigrants constituted only 7 percent and for drugs offences 8 percent of total criminality.28

From the above it can be concluded that although immigrants were partly responsible for the increase in serious criminality, their participation in such crimes “by no means shows

27 See Tzilivakis, ‘What’s wrong with Albanians?’
a dramatic or impressive nature"29 therefore it “cannot justify any particular alarm on the part of the public and even more, any moral panic which can be witnessed as regards to the presence of the immigrant community in Greece.”30 As far as the rise in the rates of non-serious criminality is concerned, this had to do more with the failure of the Greek state to integrate third-country nationals into the Greek social and economic life, rather than with a predetermined inclination of immigrants towards engaging in criminal activities.

To sum up this section, it was demonstrated that the imaginary social significance of immigration as a threat to society is in permanent conflict with the statistical data regarding both economic and criminological concerns in Greece. What is perhaps most surprising is that, although most Greeks reported that they had not personally been affected by the presence of irregular migrants and they often developed friendship ties with them31, migration was collectively associated with threat images and negative stereotypes. The next section analyses the process through which migration in Greece came to be treated as a security issue, a process that was neither inevitable nor natural.

6.3 The Process of Securitisation

According to the Copenhagen School, an issue becomes a security one when it is presented as such. This section analyses the process of securitisation of migration in Greece. It is argued that migration was securitised from the top-down, and that it was public officials, political and security elites that were the main securitising actors. The analysis highlights the importance of speech-acts but also goes beyond the use of language. The following sections examine discursive constructions of migration as a security threat as well as non-discursive practices and measures that institutionalised the links between security and migration.

30 Ibid., p. 114.
31 The majority of Greeks have surprisingly positive opinion about the immigrants they know personally, yet they have a negative impression of immigration in general. See Kasimis, Charalampos, Apostolos Papadopoulos and Ersi Zacopoulou. ‘Migrants in Rural Greece’, Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 167-184.
6.3.1 Discursive constructions of migration as security

Waever’s theory of security as a speech act sheds light on the techniques mobilised to construct the security discourse of migration policy in Greece. Speech-acts are very important because through them political elites and officials are able to define situations and both directly and indirectly determine what reaches the public agenda. According to Teun Van Dijk, because public officials have special access to public discourse (television, newspapers, radio, etc), they “have the most effective means of public persuasion and the best resources for suppressing or marginalizing alternative opinions.”

Official discourse concerning migration in Greece became highly securitised in the early 1990s. Discourse analysis reveals a strong offensive language towards immigrants residing in Greece, which served as the main legitimising factor for the restrictive -at times even xenophobic- responses from the Greek state. The Greek political and security elites used symbolic language, metaphors, exaggerations, inaccuracies and a criminalisation of the ‘Other’ in order to actively promote the construction of migration as a threat, as opposed to a multidimensional social phenomenon.


The foundations for the securitisation of migration in Greece were laid down with the introduction of the ‘Law for Aliens’ of 1991 (Law 1975/1991), which came to replace the previous law that dated back to 1929. The law did not distinguish between economic immigrants, irregular immigrants and asylum seekers. All the above categories were included in the general term ‘aliens’, although they are conceptually different from each other. This blurring of categories of migrants is characteristic of European discourses on migration, which often incorporate illegal immigrants, labour immigrants and asylum-seekers into a single policing-repression scheme.

The Law for Aliens represented the first attempt of the governing elites to securitise Greek migration (securitisation move). In the parliamentary discussions for its introduction, migration was presented as a security threat, shaping in that way the state’s response to migration within a security framework. The main issues in the discussions were related to social anxiety, criminality, unemployment, foreign affairs and national interest considerations.

Presenting the proposed law to the parliament, its sponsor for the Government, Mr Stamatis (MP), explained the security reasoning behind its introduction by emphasising the threats that migration posed to the state, the economy, society and Greek national interests. What was emphatically highlighted throughout the parliamentary debate was the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which entails an implicit assertion that the immigrants are inferior and/or dangerous. Migrants were attributed to be responsible for various problems that society was facing. During his speech, Mr Stamatis stated:

“There are many problems that our country is faced with because of the mass emigration of these people to our country. These are social problems; employment problems; health problems; criminality problems, that we are all witnessing every day.”

In the above example, the speaker used repetition of the word ‘problems’ in order to highlight the negative consequences of immigration, while he also implied that immigration might be related to terrorism and organised crime. Characteristic of his choice of words is that in his short speech he used the word ‘problem’ twenty-eight times in total. Such linguistic representation of migration was common in the political debate during the 1990s, holding immigrants and asylum seekers responsible for practically all the problems that society was facing, and assuming that it is common sense that the ‘aliens’ constitute a serious threat (“we are all witnessing every day”).

Migratory flows were not only presented as a problem, but even more, as an existential threat of absolute priority and importance. This is an essential element for the securitisation of an issue. Mr Stamatis referred to the ‘great national interests’ that were at risk because of the rising number of ‘aliens’ entering the country, suggesting that they were deliberately seeking to harm Greece and that they were serving other hidden purposes:

“And you are all very aware of the national threats that we are facing from the bogus immigrants and the bogus asylum seekers that request to be hosted in our country, while in reality they have other specific missions, missions that covet our own State, our borders and to a great extent our own existence.”35

Further fuelling the notion that immigration poses existential threats, migratory flows to Greece were also often likened to a war or to an invasion, constructing an image of a country under siege that needed to defend itself against a physical attack. In his response to the proposed law 1975/1991, Mr Kotsonis, the speaker for the opposition party PASOK, presented migratory pressures as comparable to the long-standing traditional security problems of Greece with Turkey. He also raised his concerns over the ability of the Greek state and its army to ‘combat’ these pressures and to safeguard its borders. He declared:

“Are the borders uncontrolled? Do we live in an unfortified country? Is our army so dangerously disintegrated that not only Turkish airplanes’ violate our country’s airspace everyday, but also migrants can enter Greece unimpeded?”36

Apart from that, very often the public discourse in Greece constructed a deterministic connection between poverty and criminality.

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35 Ibid., p. 36.
36 Ibid., p. 38.
"Suddenly, Greece started to get flooded with aliens, who enter, stay and work illegally, creating enormous social problems for the state, while they inevitably try to solve their own problems engaging, sadly, in various criminal activities."

Yet, as noted earlier, this rhetorical construction of a continuum between immigration and crime is not verified by statistical evidence. It is also noteworthy that metaphors such as ‘flooded with aliens’ or ‘invasion’, or ‘hungry hordes’, which were often used by the Greek political elites, are a powerful and effective way of creating an image of threat that plays on people’s fear and insecurity.

Mr. Markogiannakis (MP-New Democracy), in his contribution to the discussions, summed up the security logic behind the new immigration law. Responding to the criticisms on the policing and restrictive nature of the law, coming mostly from leftist parties, he justified the need for it by arguing that security concerns should always override any other considerations, including humanitarian ones. This reasoning is in accordance with Buzan’s et al. view that by presenting an issue as a security one the state can claim a special right to use whatever means are necessary to tackle it, including extraordinary means that break the political rules.

Mr Markogiannakis argued:

“What other ways are there for dealing with migration other than by increasing security and policing? (...) I do not think it is right to talk about the stay, accommodation, insurance and education [of the aliens] (...), when our native people are facing so many problems. Why should we take special care of those who came to our country illegally? When immigration in Greece is controlled, when only those who are needed come here and when they only stay for as long as they are needed to stay, then we can talk about all these other issues.”

37 Ibid., p. 35.
39 According to parties of the left, the law should had been less focused on policing and more on human rights considerations.
Most leading speakers also referred to the general migration trends and to developments at the European Community level in order to legitimise the ‘urgent need for the state to acquire this new law’. Mr Kotsonis referred to the new reality with respect to population movements, which was created with the Single European Act and the planned abolition of internal controls in Europe. According to this common view, the subsequent need to increase the controls in external European borders ‘puts heavy responsibility on Greece, who participates in that collective control system’, thus legitimising restrictive migration policies with reference to European recommendations. Furthermore, responding to the criticisms regarding some of the stricter provisions of the law, the Public Order Minister, Mr Anagnostopoulos and Mrs Tsouderou (MP–New Democracy) explained that these were necessary in order to harmonise with the provisions of the Schengen Agreement, although Greece was not yet part of it.

**General speech acts and public statements**

Securitising speech-acts were not limited to the parliamentary setting alone. Greek political, social and religious elites often expressed inaccurate, xenophobic and even racist views. Most commonly, such statements exaggerated the number of legal and irregular immigrants in Greece, their participation in crime and their impact on the Greek economy and society. For instance, former Minister of Public Order Mr Paphthemelis noted in November 1993 that “the indicators of Albanian criminality are increasing constantly and are fluctuating depending on circumstances between 5 and 10 percent of the total criminality in the country.” Similarly, his successor, Mr Valirakis, two years later argued that “aliens are responsible for an increase in the crime rates, which for some types of criminality, has risen up to 40 percent.” Criminology experts have repeatedly rejected these claims. Yet, since such statements came from the highest authority in the Public Order Ministry, they had a tremendous securitising impact on the public mind and strengthened the security logic of Greek migration policy.

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42 Ibid., p. 40.
43 Ibid., p. 36.
In some occasions, extreme xenophobic statements were delivered by people in influential positions. For example, the Metropolitan Bishop of Thessalonica, Panteleimon stated that "Greece is for Greeks, and not for foreigners. We must kick them all out and close our borders." On another occasion, Mr Andreoulakos, an MP for New Democracy, said in a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee in Public Administration: "We have to use guns. We have to kick out the Albanians and if they come back, put them in concentration camps on islands like Macronisos... Greece is under occupation, we cannot go to our country houses anymore!" Such statements received a great deal of negative publicity and condemnation, yet they stayed in people’s mind and increased the anxiety towards the ‘other’.

From the above analysis of parliamentary discussions for the law on aliens 1975/91 and of public statements by high profile elite personalities, including politicians and top-ranking clergymen, it becomes apparent that the official discourse on migration in Greece became highly securitised in the early 1990s. The Greek political discourse that linked migration to security played a crucial part in increasing public insecurity and anxiety. The influence of that discourse can be demonstrated with reference to an example. When the mayor of a village that had imposed a curfew on Albanians was asked why they had decided to do so, he responded that the inhabitants of the village were just doing “what the minister of Public Order asked from the Greek people to do: protect ourselves!” The fact that in this particular village there had only been four thefts reported to the police in the past year, a very low level of criminality, unrelated to immigrants, was not enough to wipe out the negative stereotypes and insecurity that the locals felt towards the ‘aliens’.

The role of the Mass Media

As in most European countries, an important role in the construction of migration as a security threat was also played by the Greek press and mass media that popularised the threat perceptions towards the ‘other’. Studies on the coverage of migration issues from the media show that although it was initially relatively positive, with the focus being on the principles of humanism and solidarity, it changed dramatically once the number of migrants in Greece increased. For the most part of the 1990s, a large part of the Greek media adopted a nationalistic and xenophobic standpoint, opting for shallow, xenophobic images of the migration-induced problems instead of a pragmatic and objective discussion of migrant difficulties and causes of immigration.\(^5^0\) Partly this was because the issue of immigration is a sensitive one and therefore sells well to the public. The sensationalist broadcast coverage presented migrants as people who come to Greece in order to take advantage of the opportunities available, emphasising their responsibility in the crime wave. In many cases, newspaper headlines were misleading by attributing responsibility for criminal acts to foreigners, although no evidence supported this assertion.\(^5^1\) Therefore, as Mitropoulos argues, the media contributed to a particular reinforcing slant to anti-immigrant sentiments: “Almost every violent crime committed by foreigners was granted prime-time coverage, complete with ominous music, re-enactments and special effects”\(^5^2\)

An example of the coverage of migration issues from sections of the Greek press is noted from the Greek daily ‘Eleftheros Typos’:

“Millions of foreign immigrants are drowning unemployment-ridden Greece. Unemployment will become a real plague if the Simitis government does not stop, in time and with every possible means and without hypocritical talk about ‘social


justice', the mass invasion of immigrants mainly from Albania where the situation is continuously aggravating ... If our doors remain open, the invasion will take extreme dimensions and then any corrective move will be impossible ... Our own socialists are responsible for this nightmarish Balkan invasion, which threatens to develop into FOREIGN OCCUPATION and very possibly into ARMED OCCUPATION".\(^{53}\)

However, the role of the media in constructing the security discourse on migration was subordinated to that of the political elites. Triandafyllidou showed that, normally in Greece, news related to migration is reported from the perspective of dominant political actors, such as the government, state authorities, or the police.\(^{54}\) In that way, the Greek media became transmitters of the dominant security discourse on migration, objectifying claims that immigration is a threat with reference to official statements and the official version of events, as presented by the state institutions, even when these were blatantly inaccurate.\(^{55}\) Therefore, although the Greek media played a decisive role in the securitisation of migration in Greece by reproducing negative images of immigration and constructing criminal stereotypes against immigrant workers, it was not itself a securitising actor but a 'functional actor' who significantly influenced the securitisation of Greek migration by popularising the security discourse

6.3.2 Institutionalisation of the security discourse

Apart from discursive constructions of migration as a threat, a set of legal and institutional measures adopted by the Greek state also intensified the perceived links between migration and security. Three main aspects of the institutionalisation of the security discourse are noted here: the role of legal measures, security practices and images.


\(^{54}\) Triandafyllidou, Greece, pp. 149-172.

Legal measures

The legal framework adopted with law 1975/1991 reflected the security logic that drove its initial introduction. Apart from incorporating labour migrants, irregular migrants and asylum seekers into a single category under the general term ‘aliens’, the law introduced a number of provisions that institutionalised the discrimination of third-country nationals and established their perceived inferiority. For instance, the legal framework not only excluded irregular migrants from any public service, such as health care (except in emergency cases) and education, but also penalised the offer of any services to irregular migrants by the public or the private sector. It also forced medical doctors to become informers, demanding that they reported immediately to the police every incident of medical treatment given to undocumented immigrants. In addition, the law provided for imprisonment and fines against any individual who offered hospitality or rented out their house to an immigrant without papers, penalising therefore any form of solidarity to the immigrant community. Finally, it adopted a narrow definition of the refugees entitled to asylum, in order to drastically reduce the number of petitions that were granted asylum status.

These provisions were in a stark contrast to the principle of hospitality prescribed by Xenios Zeus and served as a clear indication of the attempt of the governing elites to securitise migration and exclude ‘aliens’ from society. However, it should be noted that although the law discriminated against irregular migrants, many of its provisions were not implemented in a strict manner, because of the desire of individuals and institutions to help them. For example, while irregular immigrants were refused by law the right to health care, hospitals widely offered their services to the point that in some hospitals immigrants constituted the majority of patients.

Security practices

The institutional framework responsible for the implementation of migration policy in Greece also reinforced the securitisation of migration. An examination of Greece’s ‘defence’ mechanism against irregular migration reveals a great degree of militarization, through which the police and even the army emerged as primary actors in Greek migration policy. The militarisation of migration, a common feature of migration policies in Southern Europe, strengthened the public perception that the issue is a serious security problem that requires the mobilisation of all available resources in order to deal with it effectively.

Three Ministries became involved in the control of the country’s land and sea borders: the Ministry of Public Order, the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Mercantile Marine. The overland controls were divided according to three zones. The first one was along the country’s northern and eastern borders and was patrolled by military units, equipped with devices of advanced technology (such as night detection cameras etc). Greece also maintained minefields along that zone, where more than 80 migrants lost their life since 1990 in their attempts to enter the country illegally. A second zone, covering a distance of 15 kilometres from the borders to the mainland was patrolled by special squads of police officers, who were responsible for cracking down on illegal migration and trafficking of drugs and weapons. The third zone covered the rest of the country and involved the exercise of numerous migration controls in mobile checkpoints by local police units. As far as the sea borders are concerned, these were controlled by both the port police and the navy. A special committee was established at the Ministry of National Defence to coordinate these operations.

The role of images

Apart from that, a particularly strong message that migrants represent a security threat that should be dealt with by any means, even illegal ones, was repeatedly confirmed

59 See Konidaris, Immigration in post-Communist Europe.
through the practice of unofficial expulsions of Albanians ('re-forwarding' was the term used by authorities). The unofficial expulsions were designed to cut down on illegal immigration and often took the form of so-called 'sweep operations'. In these large-scale operations, the police typically blocked whole areas with a high concentration of immigrants, such as construction sites and outdoor markets and carried out street-checks on everyone who did not look Greek. The undocumented individuals were arrested, packed on police buses and immediately taken to the border exits of the country for deportation, without even been allowed to get together their belongings.

According to Greek Law, the practice of unofficial expulsions is illegal if an immigrant has already settled in a place.\(^{61}\) The legal process of deportation would require that the undocumented immigrant is arrested, detained and then presented in front of a deportation court for a decision, which would then be subject to an appeal. Instead of the legal option, the Greek authorities opted for the option of stowing irregular migrants like animals and expelling them, usually in front of the television cameras that they had invited beforehand. Such practices drew images that presented the migrant as a 'carrier of death' who appears to be 'invested with danger, distance, otherness and worthlessness' and has to be destroyed or marginalised by any means because of the existential threats they pose to the state and to society.\(^{62}\)

Other images also played an important part in the criminalisation of migration. This was because some of the most high profile criminal incidents in Greece during the 1990s involved immigrants. For instance, in two separate incidents in May and April 1999, Albanians hijacked Greek buses, took hostages and attempted to take the bus and hostages from Greece to Albania. In another occasion, Sorin Matei, a Romanian immigrant held three hostages, threatening to detonate a hand grenade. After the police stormed the apartment he was in, he pulled the pin of the grenade and killed an eight months pregnant woman, injuring twelve others. According to journalist Pavlos Tsimas,

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these incidents that took place under the uninterrupted coverage of television cameras “strengthened the already dominant views that migration is linked to crime and fuelled public insecurity and anxiety.” Yet, in the later case of Sorin Matei, it should be noted that although Matei grew up in Greece and was of Greek origin from the side of his mother, all the police officers and the media referred to him exclusively as a ‘Romanian criminal’. By repressing his Greek identity from the public, the police and the media wanted to create false impressions and strengthen the criminal-migrant stereotype. The explanation for this falsification is simple: “in our country, if the criminals are not Albanians, they must at least be aliens of other nationality.”

Overall, the analysis of the securitisation of migration in Greece suggests that the construction of the security discourse was primarily an elite-driven, top-down process. That conclusion is supported by the fact that, unlike other European countries, in Greece there were no groups or organisations -social, economic or political ones- that publicly campaigned against migration and its consequences. On the contrary, economic federations and companies were key supporters of migrant workers, recognising their positive contribution to the economy. The security discourse developed through elites’ discursive representations of migration as a security threat (speech-acts), was popularised by the mass media and was institutionalised in the state’s legal and institutional policy framework and practices. This however does not fully explain why domestic actors supported the securitisation of migration. The reasons that the Greek elites adopted and promoted the security logic of migration are examined next.

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63 Personal interview with Pavlos Tsimas, 19 December 2002.
64 Greek Helsinki Monitor, ‘Media Monitoring’.
65 Until 2002, there was no organized political party or social movement with an anti-immigration theory, only a handful marginalised, extremists groups, like the neo-nazi ‘Golden Dawn’. In 2002, LAOS, an extreme right wing party was founded, aiming to follow the success of the likes of Le Pen and Pim Fortuyn. LAOS got 1.5 percent in the 2004 Presidential Elections, well below the 3 percent threshold that is required for a party to enter the Greek parliament. According to LAOS Secretary, Vasilis Trikkas, “in our party we believe that illegal immigration is the most serious open wound and a curse that torments Greece and should be eliminated by any means.” Personal interview with Vasilis Trikkas, 18 December 2002.
6.4 Explanations for the Securitisation of Migration in Greece

6.4.1 Migration as a societal threat

According to the Copenhagen School, whether migration is securitised depends upon the importance that the ‘holders of the collective identity’ place on safeguarding and reproducing a language, a set of behavioural customs, or a conception of ethnic purity.\(^{66}\) The main source of anxiety towards the ‘aliens’ in Greece derived from the perception that they represented a societal threat, i.e. a threat to Greek identity and homogeneity.

The safeguarding of national identity in Greece has traditionally been one of the most sacred priorities of the country. Greece is the most homogeneous country in Europe in terms of religion (Greek Christian Orthodox) and ethnicity.\(^ {67}\) The Greek state was founded on that basis, i.e. the Greek national myth of homogeneity and the differentiation from the ‘Other’. The homogenisation of the Greek population was the result of first, the minority population exchange between Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria during the 1920s, second, the systematic policy of nationalisation of ethnicity and culture and third, the construction of ‘Greekness’, as the defining element of national unity.

Hobsbawm notes that agencies wishing to establish exclusively ethnic identities have to ‘invent a tradition’.\(^ {68}\) The political and cultural discourses, as well as the Greek history course books, underline the traditions, the collective memories and the virtues of the Greek nation, projecting a linear and uninterrupted ethnic and genealogical continuity, from the glorious ancient times to modernity. Kitromilides argues that because of the need for national unity within Greece, uniformity and homogenisation became prevalent norms of the cultural and political discourse and in that way, a tradition was invented. He argues:

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\(^{67}\) According to the 1999 US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices, approximately 94 to 97 percent of the country’s population was Greek Orthodox.

“[The discourse] on a geographical level stressed the unity of Hellenism, of the Greek nation as an integral whole bringing together its constituent parts within and outside the kingdom; and on a historical level it stressed the unity of the Greek nation along a temporal dimension, emphasizing its uninterrupted continuity throughout the centuries from Homeric through Byzantine to modern times.”

In the process of the construction of ‘Greekness’, anything foreign and anything that did not fit the national image was eliminated. For that reason, the state still promotes the idea that there are no ethnic or cultural minorities in Greece, in other words, “the state refuses to recognise that some Greek citizens may belong to some other ethnic, cultural, or national group.” This undoubtedly affects the country’s policies towards immigrants. The increase of immigration in Greece during the 1990s led to the re-awakening of the ethno-cultural or indeed, the national consciousness of Greeks, despite the fact that Greek society was itself the result of multiple migrations and crossbreeding processes.

A clear indication that immigrants are seen as a threat to Greek identity is given by the number of foreigners given citizenship and political rights every year. Only 300–400 aliens not related to a Greek are naturalised annually, a very small number considering the thousands of foreigners who have lived most of their lives in Greece and who are refused naturalisation. The policy towards ethnic Greeks from other countries (so-called co-ethnics) is different. In particular, two groups are treated favourably because of their ethnic origin: Greek-Pontians from the former Soviet Union and Greek-Albanians. Between 1 January 1986 and 29 September 1997, over 90,000 Greek-Pontians were supplied with Greek papers by the state, after verification of their Greek ethnicity.

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70 Triandafyllidou, Greece, p. 150.
71 Ibid., p. 152.
73 For the Greek Law on granting citizenship rights to foreigners see Zoi Papassiopi-Passia, The Right to Nationality (Komotini: Sakkoulas, 2000) [in Greek].
74 Fakiolas, ‘Socio-economic Effects of Immigration’, p. 220. The state grants political rights and citizenship to Greek-Pontians easier than to Greek Albanians. The reason for that is that Greece has
According to the State Council, in order for a foreigner to be characterised as a co-ethnic he or she should ‘have Greek national consciousness’, which refers to some underlying unifying features related to “common descent, language, religion, national traditions and extensive knowledge of the historical events of the nation.” These criteria, Triandafyllidou and Veikou argue, construct a ‘hierarchy of Greekness’ and reinforce the ethnic-cultural-religious definition of the Greek nation. They confirm and replicate the political perception that immigrants are a threat to Greek identity and subsequently only foreigners of a common descent, religion and culture are welcomed to settle in Greece indefinitely. Such measures also reflect the efforts of the state to protect the national identity of Greece against the reality of globalisation and international migration. As Charalambos Tsardanidis pointed out:

“Greece made an incredibly successful, organised effort to create a homogenous state and society, either in the battlefield or in the classroom, which should have been a model for all Balkan countries. Nowadays, because of migratory pressures, multiculturalism can no longer be avoided and as a result Greece is experiencing a cultural shock.”

In another interview, Professor Kontis suggested there was an additional important parameter related to the migration-induced societal insecurity, a parameter that has to do with the geography of Greece and the history of the region. He said:

“Don’t forget that we are talking about a country in the south of Europe, in the Balkans, where the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is a lot more crucial than in other regions. In the Balkans, issues of minorities and identity are related to secessions and territorial disputes. Therefore, it is an ultra sensitive issue for the receiving states.”

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political interests to maintain the Greek minority in Albania. Personal interview with Konstantinos Mitsotakis, 3 October 2003.
76 Ibid.
77 Personal interview with Charalambos Tsardanidis, 2 October 2003.
78 Personal interview with Antonis Kontis, 4 October 2003.
However, as Kontis noted, this threat does not appear to be an immediate one for Greece, because of the geographical distribution of immigrants in the country. A look at the distribution of immigrants by region shows that they are spread all over Greece, with regions closer to the neighbouring sending countries having a smaller concentration of immigrants than all the others. The geographical distribution of immigrants was systematically directed by the Greek state away from the borders, and more towards the mainland and islands, to prevent the emergence of any future territorial problems with neighbouring countries.

Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who was the Prime Minister of Greece in the period 1990-1993, when the first wave of immigrants arrived in Greece, admitted that issues related to identity were taken into account by the Greek government, when developing its response to the sudden increase of migration in Greece. He stated:

"In some areas the number of migrants increased dangerously and we started to worry about the distortion of the Greek national identity in these areas. There was the possibility that immigrants would form minorities, or even majorities, especially in mountain or poor areas, which Greek citizens were abandoning due to economic problems. There was no immediate fear that these could lead to territorial disputes, but we were aware that if the Greek society did not assimilate and absorb the immigrants, they would form a foreign body in our society, which would cause problems and we had to prevent that from happening, by any means."

The public concern over issues of migration and identity often took the form of xenophobia. For instance, there was widespread reaction from a local community near Thessaloniki, when the Albanian A-grade student Ohdise Qena, was chosen to carry the Greek flag at his school parade during a national holiday in October 2000 and again in

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80 Personal interview with Konstantinos Mitsotakis, 3 October 2003.
October 2003. Local residents and parents at his school considered it a national insult and angrily opposed it, prompting the student to bow out in both cases.

Further reactions were fuelled by plans to build a mosque in Athens for the estimated 100,000 Muslims residing in Athens. Athens is the only European Union capital with no officially recognised mosque, yet, until 2001, the Greek Orthodox Church was opposing plans to build one in Athens. The Church’s position was best summed up by Archbishop of Greece Christodoulos who in 2003 said: “The people are not ready to see a minaret in downtown Athens.” A political agreement was finally reached to build a mosque in Peania, 14 miles west of Athens and near the international airport, which however provoked new reactions both from the local community that did not want the mosque in their area and from the church that considered it a problem to the image of Greece if one of the first things tourists see when they arrive in the airport is a mosque.

Although Greece has friendly relations with the Arab world and most Muslim countries, the explanations for this intolerance goes back to the history of the formation of the Greek state, when the tradition of ‘Greekness’ was invented. According to political analyst, Ronald Meinardus, “the Greek state was created in opposition to the Muslim Ottomans, and this opposition is embedded in the collective memory...Islam is associated with the danger in the East” and to the efforts of the Greek nation to liberate itself from the occupation of the Ottoman Empire.

The awakening of national identity in Greece often led to an increase in discrimination towards both legal and irregular immigrants based on their ethnicity or religion and thus raised insuperable obstacles to their full integration in the Greek society. In other occasions, in order for the immigrants to be accepted to society they had to adopt certain

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81 Greece had not given permission for a mosque to be built in Athens since the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923.
83 Ibid. Father Epifanios Economou, the Greek Church’s spokesman is quoted questioning: “Does the first image of Greece a foreigner sees [as he gets off a plane] have to be a Muslim mosque?”
84 Ibid.
cultural and religious characteristics that were compatible to Greek identity. An Albanian immigrant talked to Psimmenos about his imposed identity:

“People used to call me Giorgos. My previous boss gave me this name. Now, the new boss decided to baptise me with his son’s name: Nicos. He was at the church when I was baptised. He believes I should go to church every week and change my manners. The priest says that the route to Christianity is difficult and that I should pray regularly for forgiveness, because my previous life was sinful. I don’t believe in God, but if it’s going to keep me out of trouble while I live here, I have no problem with getting a new name.”85

All the above suggest that the reaction of both state and society to the influx of immigrants in Greece was thus primarily one of fear towards the ‘Other’, which was seen as a threat to national identity.

6.4.2 The role of political and security elites

The ability to control and regulate migration is traditionally considered an important element of national sovereignty. Massenet points out that the state “ceases to be a state if it does not control the implantation of foreigners on its soil.”86 For Greek policy-makers, who, as noted, were the main actors in constructing the security discourse on migration, the sudden increase of migration flows to Greece was very unsettling. A certain myth of control of the borders and of migratory flows must gain wide currency to maintain the legitimacy of the state.87 The inability of the Greek state to control irregular migration was thus undermining the public’s loyalty to some of its most vital institutions and symbols, such as the army, the police, and the government. Losing faith in the state

85 Iordanis Psimmenos, Migration from the Balkans: Social Exclusion in Athens (Athens: Papazisis, 1995), pp. 185-86 [in Greek].
86 Quoted in Grete Brochmann, European Integration and Immigration from Third Countries (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 1995), p 19.
resulted, in certain cases, to people taking the law into their own hands and implementing extreme measures against migrants. For example:

- The local Council of the village Palio Keramidi in Pieria imposed a ‘curfew’ on Albanians by prohibiting them to walk outdoors after sunset.
- The local Council of the village Poulitsa in Corinth banned the sale of alcohol to Albanians and set a maximum daily wage for them to 5000 drachmas (approximately £10), significantly lower than the Greek minimum wage.
- A 57-year old Greek farmer in Livanates, Fthiotida, shot and heavily injured an Albanian man caught stealing potatoes from his field. After the decision of the Prosecutor to imprison him until the trial, inhabitants of Livanates blocked the court building and then the national motorway demanding his release. Two days later the man was released.\(^{88}\)

To protect their legitimacy, successive Greek governments had to be seen as active and able to control migratory flows. They did so through the policy of mass deportations (unofficial expulsions or ‘reforwarding’) of irregular Albanian immigrants. Until 1 January 1998, when the process of legalisation of irregular immigrants got started, the total number of ‘aliens’ deported by the authorities (with formal or no formal procedures) was 1,577,564 people, 1,490,709 of whom were Albanians (see figure 2). This number is incredibly large, bearing in mind also that the total population of Albania is 3,079,100 people. However, there is a simple explanation for it. According to the Ministry of Public Order, approximately 80 percent of the Albanians deported were re-entering Greece, many of them within a week from their deportation.\(^{89}\) This would suggest that mass deportations, apart from being illegal (as noted earlier) and very costly,\(^ {90}\) were also completely ineffective in restricting irregular migration.

\(^{88}\) For an analysis of these and other incidents where Greek citizens took the law in their hands against the ‘threatening’ immigrants see Mitsilegas, ‘Of Words and Guns’.

\(^{89}\) *Eleftherotypia*, 18 August 1994.

\(^{90}\) By the end of 1995, the cost for deportations was around 6.5 billion drachmas (13 million pounds), *Eleftherotypia*, 2 November 1995.
The authorities had realised the futility of the measure of deportations from very early on. As one government official graphically put it, the deportations were “like emptying out the water from a sinking boat, without fixing the leaks”.91 Former Public Order Minister Mr Paphathemelis added that “we have reached the point of sending Albanians on a free excursion to their country along with their prey from here”.92 However, the persistence of the government in this measure had less to do with protection than with a political attempt to protect the legitimacy of the state and “to reassure certain segments of the electorate longing for evidence of concrete measures taken to ensure safety.”93

In addition, political elites in Greece viewed migration as a threat to their own power positions. If they appeared to be weak or incompetent in dealing with the rising number

91 ibid.
94 Deportations refer to the repatriation of Albanians illegally residing in Greece (re-forwarding). Expulsions refer to the repatriation of illegal immigrants of all other nationalities. See Katerina Linos, Understanding Greek Immigration Policy, Paper presented at the Socrates Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 9-10.2.2001), p. 11.
of immigrants coming to the country, they would put in danger their governmental position, the trust of their constituents and their re-election. Since immigration is a hot issue in the public eye, a hard stance on it can translate into electoral success, as shown in many European countries after September 11 (e.g. Austria, France, Holland, Denmark etc). For that reason, in pre-election periods the governing party in Greece rapidly increased immigration checks and deportations of irregular migrants, in order to build up a profile of relentlessness and determination in defending internal security and public order against perceived enemies.

For similar reasons, security elites in Greece also promoted the securitisation of migration. Bigo notes that 'security professionals' view migration not as a political issue but as a national security problem and often try to establish 'a hierarchy of dangers'.95 A survey among police respondents in Greece confirmed that 92 percent of them attributed the increase in crime rates solely to the presence of migrants in the country.96 Since the army and the police entered the realm of migration policy, the professionals of security had high stakes to protect. Army officials, police officers, liaison officers and customs came in a position that they could influence perceptions and policies on migration and thus became securitising actors themselves. In that way, according to Petrinioti, security elites in Greece supported the security discourse on migration in order to justify their struggle for resources and maintain their professional legitimacy.97

Apart from that, political and security elites in Greece often used migrants as scapegoats for various social and economic problems, in order to distract attention from their own failures and inadequacies and at the same time also create a 'threat and siege' atmosphere that served as a subtle form of control and pacification.98 Last but not least, Iosifides adds

96 Karydis, ‘Criminality or Criminalization’, p. 353.
that the failure either to completely control immigration or to legalise and integrate those already living in Greece reflected the governing elites’ “desire to maximise economic benefit from cheap and flexible labour whilst holding off the perceived social costs of family reunion and permanent settlement.”

6.4.3 Foreign affairs considerations

Another, more subtle motive for the securitisation of migration in Greece, other than concerns over political and societal security, was that it served as a platform through which the state tried to promote or defend its national interests. More specifically, Greece often used immigration policy as a means of exercising pressure on neighbouring countries, Albania in particular. For example, the Greek government utilised the policy of mass deportation of Albanians as a convenient political weapon to influence Albanian politics favourably to Greek interests. As a police official noted, “when relations with Albania were good, we turned a blind eye to the illegal stay of Albanians in Greece, but when we needed to put pressure on Albania we made large-scale deportations.”

The massive deportations of Albanian workers could not have been legitimised without reference to internal security concerns that the dominant security discourse on migration provided. Such operations were carried out in December 1991, June 1993, autumn 1994, August 1996 and July 1999 and in each one of these cases there were foreign affairs considerations behind them (see also figure 2). The three most striking examples, out of many, will be mentioned. In August 1994, five ethnic Greek leaders of the Political, Social and Cultural Association of the Greek National Minority in Albania (OMONOIA) were tried and convicted of espionage and possession of illegal arms, following a terrorist incident earlier the same year. In order to convince Albania to release the OMONOIA

100 Similarly, concessions towards Albanian immigrants were used to create a positive climate whenever it was convenient for better investment opportunities and for a better treatment of the ethnic Greeks in return. See Maria Vidali, ‘Living in a Policy Vacuum: The plight of Albanian immigrants in Greece’, Central Europe Review, Vol. 1, No. 21, 1999. Available from <http://www.ce-review.org/99/21/vidali21.html> (10.09.2003).
leaders, Greece expelled more than 100,000 Albanians in autumn 1994. This lead to the release of the OMONOIA leaders in February 1995 on probation and immediately the deportations were halted.  

Similarly, Former Foreign Minister Papoulias noted in an interview that when Sali Berisha, the Albanian President until 1997, wanted to pass a new Constitution with tough regulations towards the Greek minority in Albania “we decided to send him a present, around 150,000 Albanians, who contributed to voting against the constitution, so that they would not be pursued by Greece.” Similar a few months later, Greece used migration policy in order to directly influence the result of the 1997 Presidential elections in Albania. Greece wanted to stop Berisha from being re-elected, favouring Socialist candidate Fatos Nano for President, because Berisha was promoting the strengthening of Albanian relations with Turkey. To achieve its aim, on 27 June 1997, two days before the Albanian elections, the Greek Cabinet took a last minute decision to exclude nationals of border countries (including Albania) from the legalisation programme of irregular migrants in Greece that was about to be adopted in law. This decision would effectively render the legislation meaningless, since the majority of irregular migrants in Greece were from Albania. On the context of the Albanian elections, the exclusion of the Albanian migrants from the legalisation process in Greece was seen as a political failure of Berisha and helped Nano win the elections. Less than a month later, the exclusion clause was removed, giving Nano a big boost for the beginning of his term as the President of Albania. The above examples demonstrate how the Greek government was implementing the security provisions of Law 1975/91 on aliens selectively, according to foreign affairs considerations and foreign policy objectives.

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102 Vidali, 'Living in a Policy Vacuum'.
104 This would mean that Albanians, Bulgarians, Turks and those from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would be exempted from the legalisation process. The logic behind the Government’s decision was that since Albanians will not have the right to claim legal status in Greece, they will be less motivated to come as they will have to work without social protection and employment rights and face deportation. This decision however was unconstitutional and had no legal basis.
6.4.4 The influence of European Union norms

The Greek state’s policy on migration, which was non-existent before 1991 since Greece was primarily an emigration country, developed under the influence of European trends and perceptions on this policy area. The securitisation of European migration, which in chapter 4 was traced back to the Single European Act of 1986 and the decision to implement the free movement of persons had thus a significant effect on how Greece perceived and subsequently dealt with the sudden influx of migratory flows in its territory during the 1990s.

It is difficult to measure accurately the influence of European norms to Greek migration policy. However, a strong sign that the EU had an important impact on the development of Greece’s migration policy is given by the fact that many of the provisions of the Law for Aliens (1975/91) had been modelled on provisions of the Schengen Agreement, which primarily aimed to restrict immigration. This was clearly stated in the Parliamentary discussions for the introduction of the Law, where the Greek elites repeatedly referred to European developments in order to legitimise the restrictive measures adopted at the national level.

After joining the EC in 1981, Greece had participated in the various European intergovernmental initiatives on internal security issues, but its role and its interest on migration-related issues was a limited one. By participating however in these working groups and committees, Greek officials -political and security professionals- developed a deep understanding of European views on migration, which clearly emphasised its security element. According to Police Colonel Ioannis Houliaras, who was head of the Greek delegation in TREVI, the discussions at the European level created the framework within which Greek immigration policies were developed. He said:

“In these intergovernmental meetings we had the chance to discuss with public order and police officials from other European countries, which, of course, influenced our view on migration, in terms of how to best deal with it and of what is expected from us...Greece
did not want to differentiate but to harmonise its migration policy according to European policies."105

In particular, the desire of the Greek state to join Schengen forced significant institutional changes in the way migration was handled and the borders were controlled. Some Member States, especially Germany and France, were reluctant to accept Greece as a full member of Schengen because they questioned the ability of the Greek state to safeguard its borders. Greece was perceived as a ‘soft underbelly’ for the EU, which could become a gate for irregular migrants to the rest of Europe. As a result, Greece received considerable pressure from other EU countries to tighten its policies on immigration and it was seven years from its signature of the Schengen agreement before it was allowed to become a full Member of the Schengen operational system.106

The European Union also enforced the application of advanced technologies of control and surveillance on the Greek borders, which included information exchange with other Member States and a collective analysis of threats, via computer networks and shared information systems. Police Colonel Yiannoulas noted that:

“When Greece was becoming a full member of Schengen, we had to, but we also wanted to, take stricter measures against irregular migration. Thus, Greece: 1. Employed 4600 new border guards. 2. Installed new software and hardware to control passports. 3. Implemented stricter controls within Greece, with check points all around the country…and 4. Made the information exchange with the other European countries a central part of its migration policy.”107

106 Greece was admitted as an observer in the Schengen group in December 1991 and officially signed the Treaty in November 1992. However, it only became a full signatory to the Schengen Treaty on 26 March 2000.
107 Personal interview with Panayiotis Yiannoulas, 5 January 2003. A total number of 100 border crossing points have been modernised to meet Schengen requirements. For the implementation of Schengen in Greece and its influence to Greek immigration policy see Minas Samatas, “Greece in “Schengenland”: Blessing or Anathema for Citizens’ and Foreigners’ Rights”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2003, pp. 141-156.
Throughout the 1990s, Greece continued to introduce policies on immigration in harmony with decisions and recommendations from the European level. The conclusion drawn from interviews carried out on that subject is that both a 'logic of consequences' (exclusion from Schengen) and a 'logic of appropriateness' (diffusion of European norms) influenced how migration was perceived and dealt with in Greece. At the same time, Greece used the European Union to legitimise its policies to the public, by presenting the adopted restrictive, policing measures as deriving from the European obligations of the country.

Nowadays, Greece has become one of the strongest supporters of the development of a more comprehensive and consolidated European immigration policy, making irregular migration as one of the main priorities of its EU Presidency in 2003 and bringing forward proposals for cooperative European border guards and policing initiatives. Through a common European immigration policy Greece seeks to receive technological and economic assistance from the EU, based on the idea of burden-sharing, in order to protect the country’s borders that are also the external frontiers of the EU. Apart from economic reasons, a common European immigration policy could also potentially serve Greece’s strategic interests. According to a Greek official at the Foreign Ministry, a harmonised European policy on immigration could provide some additional security from Turkey’s expansionism in the Aegean Sea. He noted that he had suggested staging an episode with irregular migrants in the Imia/Kardak islets, the sovereignty of which is disputed by Turkey and for which the two countries almost went to war in 1996. By having a European immigration guard dealing with the migrants in these islets, he hoped to achieve a de facto recognition of their status as European territory, thus weakening the Turkish territorial claims.

The overall analysis of the reasons migration became securitised in Greece leads to the conclusion that the Greek elites actively supported the security discourse in order to

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109 Personal interview: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
protect their legitimacy, to increase their power, to maintain the homogeneity and identity of society and to promote national foreign policy objectives. These findings seem to reaffirm Murray Edelman’s argument that a social problem is not an objective entity but a construction that aims to rationalise and legitimise certain policy options to the public, depending on the power holders’ self-interests.110

6.5 Towards Normalisation?
At the end of the 1990s, alternative discourses on migration in Greece challenged the security discourse. The realisation of the economic benefits from immigration,111 the improvement of bilateral relations between Greece and neighbouring countries, and the intense pressure from sending countries and NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International, Greek Helsinki Monitor etc) to improve human rights conditions of immigrants, forced the Greek government to rethink its immigration policy. Consequently, the political discourse on migration, which was previously focussing exclusively on the threats that the ‘aliens’ posed to the state and society, started to deconstruct some of the myths that rendered the ‘aliens’ to be dangerous. For instance, in 1999, Public Order Minister Michalis Chrysochoidis admitted that “the criminality of foreigners has not risen as much as it is believed.”112 Reflecting that political shift, the media coverage also became more moderate, showing an increased sensitivity towards the needs and problems of immigrants. However, there was no consistency and consensus in the new approach, since many political and security elites continued to reproduce the security discourse. Dimitras argues that the inconsistency in the official discourse on migration, which appeared as schizophrenia, was “simply the result of populist petty politics”.113

111 Greek farmers reacted to the massive deportations of Albanians because they needed them to work in the fields. This supports Stavros’ Dimas view that “in the morning many people wanted the migrants working in the fields because they needed them, but in the night they didn’t want them in the village because they were scared of them”. Personal interview with Stavros Dimas, 17 December 2002.
113 Ibid.
The most important measures Greece took towards normalising the problem of irregular migration were the two legalisation schemes that were implemented in 1998 and 2001. Following the example of Italy and Spain and in accordance with EU directives, the government decided to introduce a procedure for legalising economic immigrants who were living illegally on Greek territory for a certain period, granting them work and residence permits for up to five years. Yet, the first legalisation scheme was hampered by bureaucratic insufficiency and by its complexity that made it very difficult for applicants to provide all the necessary papers.

In response to these problems, the government decided to review Law 1975/1991, and replace it with Law 2910/2001, which gave a second chance to irregular migrants to get work and residence permits. The new law was supposed to introduce a more liberal immigration policy compared to the previous one but in effect, it only changed few things. It retained the institutional measures that excluded irregular migrants from health care, education and public services, and continued to treat irregular migration as a crime. Baldwin-Edwards also criticised the law for its provisions on family reunification, which he called the least generous across the European Union. Furthermore, the new law did not recognise or consider the foreigners that arrived in Greece after November 1999, it was not part of a broader long-term policy on how to deal with irregular migrants and most importantly, it did not take any proactive measures regarding the integration of the legal immigrants in society.

The survival of the security logic is also demonstrated by Greece’s policy on asylum, which is primarily concerned with discouraging people from applying for asylum in Greece. The asylum examination process is usually rather long, between 1.5 and 2 years including appeals. While their application is being examined, asylum seekers in Greece have the right to temporary employment but, unlike most EU countries, they are

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114 These decisions were introduced with Presidential Decrees 358 and 359, in 1997.
117 The largest group of asylum applicants in Greece in the past five years was people from Iraq, followed by Afgans, Turks, Pakistani and Nigerians.
refused a subsidy from the state. According to Sitaropoulos, the current Greek policy on asylum aims to resettle asylum seekers out of Greece, in which case maintaining asylum seekers’ marginalised position by not providing welfare becomes part of that strategy.\textsuperscript{118} Evidently, from 2001 to 2002, the rate of recognition of asylum seekers decreased dramatically from 22.4 percent to 1.0 percent (see table 6.1), a trend that continued in 2003 (0.5 percent).\textsuperscript{119}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Total Number of asylum applications & Recognition Rate (%) \\
\hline
1997 & 4380 & 9.5 \\
1998 & 2953 & 11.3 \\
1999 & 1528 & 32.2 \\
2000 & 3083 & 20.1 \\
2001 & 5499 & 22.4 \\
2002 & 5665 & 1.0 \\
2003 & 8180 & 0.5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Recognition Rates of Asylum Seekers in Greece 1996-2003}
\label{table:asylum_rates}
\end{table}

The events of September 11 did not in themselves have a direct impact on the foundations of Greek migration policies, or lead to any significant changes in them.\textsuperscript{120} However, the renewed focus on security at the European level further strengthened the


\textsuperscript{119} The estimation of recognition rates in relation to asylum applications is not always accurate, because recognitions usually refer to past applications and not those of the same year (backlog). However, it gives a very clear picture of trends in states’ policies on asylum.

\textsuperscript{120} According to Stelios Perrakis, “the effort to create a continuum between terrorism and immigration after September 11 is absolutely flawed and is politically and ideologically suspicious”. Personal interview, 1 October 2003.
previously institutionalised security discourse on migration in Greece. At the policy level, this gave the opportunity to Greek authorities to drastically reduce the number of asylum applications granted and to promote its long-standing agenda for closer European cooperation and burden sharing on irregular migration.

From the above it can be concluded that despite the rise of alternative discourses and the introduction of a new law, the security logic remained the focal point of Greek policies on migration. According to Baldwin-Edwards, the new law on immigration and the move towards normalisation appeared to be promoting the interests of various ministries and bureaucrats, rather than the interests and needs of Greece or the immigrant population. Thus, he agrees with Thränhardt that the “bureaucratic decision-making [has] prevail[ed], resting upon a conservative consensus about the upholding of cultural and ‘racial’ homogeneity that has never been shaken.”

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter examined the securitisation of migration in Greece, analysing the process and the reasons migration came to be treated predominantly as a security issue. The Greek case study has many similarities with the Italian and Spanish experiences with migration. The securitisation of migration in Greece was not the result of a public order or economic crisis. It was primarily a crisis and threat of the ‘Other’, which was constructed in the public discourse as undesirable, dangerous and different. Both political practice and public anxiety highlighted the exclusion of immigrants from public life and the lack of any systematic effort to integrate them in society. As a result, since the early 1990s, Xenios Zeus's principles and traditions of hospitality have largely been sacrificed on the altar of security, due to the perceived threats that migrants pose to Greece.

121 Quoted in Baldwin-Edwards, An Analytic Commentary on the Greek Immigration Bill, p. 8
Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 Introduction
This thesis has set out to explore the transformation of Greek security thinking and practice in relation to non-traditional threats and internal security issues. From the beginning of the 1990s onwards, Greece experienced a series of dramatic changes both in its security environment and within the country itself. As a result, the traditional focus on Greek-Turkish relations and military issues that most studies adopt in relation to Greek foreign and security policy can no longer capture the whole range of issues that are included and influence the security agenda. The analysis of Greek policies and perceptions on terrorism and migration, supports the initial hypothesis that both of these issues have come to be dealt with as security ones, through a process of securitisation. This concluding chapter aims to synthesise the findings of the previous chapters and discuss their implications for theory and policy. Section 7.1 revisits the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School and discusses its strengths and weaknesses, based on the empirical findings. Section 7.2 explores the implications of securitisation for Greek policies on terrorism and migration. Finally, section 7.3 considers future work and direction of research.

7.2 Revisiting Securitisation Theory
To analyse developments in Greek policies on terrorism and migration this thesis utilised the theory of securitisation, as developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. By applying the Copenhagen School’s framework to a single-country case study, a number of empirical observations can be derived regarding its strengths but also its shortcomings.

Securitisation theory has been demonstrated to provide a very useful framework to explore and understand Greek responses to terrorism and migration. The theory’s constructivist approach to security was instrumental for demonstrating the ways in which
internal security issues in Greece were escalated and securitised. Both terrorism and migration in Greece have been accepted as security threats, which at the policy level served to legitimise the adoption of exceptional measures that in the past would have been rejected as illegal, immoral or unnecessary. Terrorism was securitised based on the threats that it poses to the wellbeing of the state and the international image of Greece, as a modern and safe European country. Migration on the other hand was securitised because of the perceived economic, societal and public order threats posed by immigrants. As the analysis in the respective chapters demonstrated, the securitisation of both issues has been completed and fully institutionalised in the legal and operational structures of the state.

The framework of the Copenhagen School helps identify how issues are prioritised in the national agenda, ranging from non-politicised to politicised and eventually securitised. This particular strength of the securitisation theory was best demonstrated in the case study on Greek terrorism, where the issue of terrorism went through all three stages, before it was finally accepted as a security priority and an existential threat. During the first period, terrorism in Greece was seen as an ephemeral phenomenon, irrelevant to Greek social and political life and was thus kept out of the agenda. In the second phase, terrorism became politicised and heatedly debated, however a securitisation move in the early 1990s, was unsuccessful because the public was not willing to accept restrictions to civil liberties in order to fight terrorism. Finally, from 1999 onwards, the securitisation of terrorism was competed, reflecting a significant transformation of previous policies and perceptions on the issue.

One of the greatest strengths of the Copenhagen School’s framework is that it reveals the importance of language and discourse in constructing issues as threats, departing from the traditional, realist view that the security agenda is predetermined and closed. As such, it contributes to security studies by no longer trying to give a specific definition of what security is but by focussing on what security does, or in other words by looking at what the implications are for framing an issue as a security one. The analysis of the Greek case demonstrates the importance of perceptions of how issues are dealt with at the policy
level. It can be argued that terrorism represented an objective threat since it first made its presence felt in Greece in 1974, yet it was not dealt as a security priority prior to 1999. On the other hand, since the sudden influx of migratory flows to Greece, Greek policies on migration developed within a security framework, despite the fact that the threat perceptions attributed to immigrants were largely inaccurate or exaggerated. These suggest that an objectivist mode of analysis is inadequate to explain why issues enter the security agenda. Instead, the constructivist approach proposed by the Copenhagen School provides an innovative and sophisticated framework to analyse a broadened concept of security.

However, when applied to the empirical case studies, certain aspects of the Copenhagen School framework appear to be questionable. First, the analysis of the Greek case suggests that the Copenhagen School’s exclusive focus on speech acts as vectors of securitisation is problematic. In line with the arguments of the Copenhagen School, speech acts were identified as one of the catalysts for the construction of the security discourse in Greece. Migration and terrorism were discursively constructed as security threats by political and security elites, who because of their positions, had the capacity to produce security knowledge about the level and seriousness of these threats. Yet, a number of other factors, not associated to political discourse or securitising language also contributed to the move of these issues to the security realm. For instance, the images of the massive ‘sweep operations’ in relation to migration or the images of the 17N victims in relation to terrorism were also influential in the process of securitisation. In addition, myths related to conceptions of ‘Greekness’, based on unified cultural customs and values were instrumental in the securitisation of migration. Apart from that, certain practices such as the legal and institutional discrimination against immigrants in Greece enhanced the public view that immigrants are inferior or dangerous. Similarly, as shown in chapter 4, the securitisation of migration in the European Union was not limited to the uttering of speech acts but was deeply rooted in institutional developments that included terrorism and migration in a single security continuum and thus structured the development of European policies on terrorism and migration on a security logic.
A second limitation of the framework of the Copenhagen School is that it does not consider the importance and influence of norms in the decision to articulate an issue in security terms nor is it interested in the reasons a securitising actor decides to present a non-traditional security issue as an existential threat. This is problematic because it restricts the analysis of the process of securitisation to what is observed and noted in the public debate, which is not always the same as to why actors decide to securitise. For instance, although the main securitising arguments in relation to migration in Greece had to do with criminological and economic considerations, there were also less obvious reasons for its securitisation, such as foreign policy objectives and personal political calculations.

Furthermore, an analysis of the reasons an issue is securitised could help identify the influence of norm diffusion from the European to the national level and determine the interplay between the two levels. In the case of Greece, it was argued that European norms and preferences played a part in the securitisation of internal security issues. This is more evident in Greek policies on migration, which appear to parallel developments in the European Union. On the other hand, norm diffusion in relation to terrorism was delayed and only occurred once Greece moved towards the Europeanisation of its security policy. In particular, the securitisation of terrorism in Greece in the late 1990s coincided with a period that the EU was re-securitising and upgrading terrorism on its agenda. In both cases, a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequences motivated the Greek elites to adapt to European norms.

Although these suggest that norm diffusion played an important role in the securitisation of terrorism and migration in Greece, its exact impact is difficult to be calculated accurately. Would Greece securitise migration regardless of developments in the EU? Given the importance that social and political elites pay on safeguarding Greek identity, culture and religion, this scenario is likely. Would Greece securitise terrorism without the influence of European norms and expectations? Possibly not, as it had previously failed to do so for decades. Essentially, though, regardless of the influence of European norms, domestic actors supported and promoted the security discourse in relation to both issues.
Finally, a third weakness of the Copenhagen School’s framework concerns its view and analysis of desecuritisation, as the optimal goal for any securitisation. The Copenhagen School does not take into account that once the security discourse is institutionalised, it may resist change, even if the social power relations and international influence that facilitated its emergence have been transformed. Both Greek and European policies on migration seem to support that claim. Whereas the securitisation of terrorism is not heavily contested, given also the climate of public anxiety after September 11, opposing discourses have challenged the security discourse on migration at both the national and European level. Such views became more popular in Greece in the late 1990s and were also voiced in the European Commission’s proposals for a reappraisal of the ‘zero immigration’ policy of recent years. According to the Copenhagen School, this could be interpreted as an attempt to desecuritise migration so that it is moved out of the threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere.

However, although the ‘desecuritising move’ was rhetorically embraced by many politicians, in the context of economic and demographic demands for immigration, it did not lead to any significant policy changes. On the contrary, after September 11, the EU retreated to restrictive policies on migration and asylum, reinvigorating the security-migration nexus, whereas the changes in the political discourse on migration in Greece were not translated to any radical changes in policies. At both the national and European level, security continues to be the central characteristic of policies on migration. This would indicate that the process of securitisation is more complicated and resistant to desecuritisation than the Copenhagen School suggests, in particular if the security discourse has previously been institutionalised, as was the case with migration in Greece and the EU. A possible explanation for this is that bureaucrats and security professionals who are involved in the enterprise of providing security do not wish to lose their political legitimacy and are likely to fight against the re-ordering of social practices and state policies in relation to migration.

To sum up, what the above limitations suggest is that securitisation theory should include non-discursive elements such as images, practices and myths to describe the processes
through which an issue is moved into the security realm. It should also pay more attention to the motives behind the decision to securitise and it should explore in more detail the conditions through which an issue returns to normal politics. The next section discusses the implications of securitisation for Greek policies on terrorism and migration.

7.3 Implications for Policy

7.3.1 Terrorism

The analysis of Greek policies on terrorism in chapter 5 contributes to the understanding of the reasons why Greece failed to deal with domestic terrorism for twenty-seven years and discusses the eventual conceptual and operational changes that led to the arrest of the November 17 terrorists. While most European countries were recording decisive strikes against left-wing terrorism, November 17 in Greece continued to act with virtual impunity because of the failure of the state to upgrade terrorism on its security agenda. The securitisation of terrorism in the late 1990s was arguably the catalyst for the arrest of November 17 and can thus be considered a desirable outcome. In fact, the securitisation of terrorism in Greece was long overdue.

The Greek experience with indigenous terrorism is a characteristic example of the vulnerability of liberal democracies in regards to the terrorist threat. Reinares writes that “there is no doubt that sustained terrorism affects society’s willingness to accept restrictions on its liberties for the sake of the personal safety of its members and the survival of the political system.” However, Greek society and sections of the political elites were against any restrictions on social liberties, fearing that this could lead to a police state. The political experience of fascist totalitarian rule in recent Greek history had turned the issue of internal security into a very sensitive one. These sensitivities as

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1 It is a common proposition in the literature on terrorism that liberal-democracies are especially prone to terrorism. For a comprehensive analysis on the liberal response to terrorism, see Peter Chalk, *West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The evolving dynamic* (London: Macmillan, 1996).
regards to social liberties stood in the way of stricter internal security laws, put limitations on the role of the police and resulted in the abolition of the first two anti-terrorist laws that were adopted in Greece. Yet, the changes in Greek self-perceptions, the events of September 11 and the prospect of hosting the Olympics in 2004 provided the incentive for a re-evaluation of policies on terrorism and convinced the public of the existential nature of the threat.

With the arrest of the Revolutionary Organisation November 17, Greece seems to be finally closing a dark chapter of its post-dictatorship history. However, this does not mean the total elimination of terrorism in Greece. European experience shows that after a period of time a new generation of terrorists emerge who tend to act in a fragmented and uncontrolled fashion. It is doubtful that another domestic terrorist group will emerge in Greece in the near future with the operational capabilities and scope of 17N, but it is likely that there will be an increase in the number of small intensity terrorist acts like bombings. Nowadays, the focus of the Greek authorities should inevitably shift to the growing threat from international terrorism, which requires close cooperation within the European Union and the global coalition on terrorism. The challenge for the Greek state is to ensure that democracy will continue to be strengthened in a climate of heightened security.

7.3.2 Migration

From the analysis of migration policy in Greece, it is possible to identify two approaches, or competing frames in the public and political debates. The first approach relates to the conception of immigration as a problem and a threat that needs to be dealt with urgently and by any means (security approach). As mentioned earlier, in recent years, an alternative approach is developing, which focuses on the economic and demographic needs of Greece for immigrants and on the problems that immigrants themselves face (liberal approach). The analysis in chapter 6 demonstrated that the security approach has since the early 1990s dominated Greek political discourse and practice. The political
elites seem to disapprove of the cultural diversity within the country and consider immigrants as a threat to society, to public order and to political stability. The recognition that immigration is primarily a problem, rather than a multidimensional, social phenomenon has been used to legitimise the restrictive, at times even xenophobic policies towards immigrants and asylum seekers. In that sense, it was concluded that immigration in Greece has been securitised.

However, whereas the securitisation of terrorism in Greece was clearly instrumental to the arrest of November 17, the question whether the securitisation of migration in Greece led to a better handling of the problem is less straightforward to answer. On the one hand, the securitisation of migration covered up the lack of a coherent immigration policy and protected the legitimacy of the state and its institutions. It also served as a means of promoting foreign policy interests by exerting pressure to sending countries. Most importantly perhaps, it was used to disguise the new Greek nationalism, which was coupled with fears of ‘contamination’ of the nation’s supposed cultural and ethnic ‘purity’.

On the other hand, the security logic became an obstacle for developing a comprehensive immigration policy with a long-term view. Instead, it limited governmental action to reactive measures that aimed to satisfy short-term needs and political gains. At the heart of immigration policy in Greece, there is a concern with issues related to security, control and illegality. In particular, the focus on irregular migration in all political and public debates had a detrimental effect in the development of concrete policy and management strategy on migration as a whole. A more comprehensive migration policy that also considers the living and working conditions of immigrants, as well as the long-term needs and political and economic objectives of Greece as a host country has not yet been materialised.

It is thus argued that a fundamental review of Greek migration policy is required. A new policy that will not only be interested in maximising benefits from legal and irregular migrants but will also be concerned with the rights and needs of those hosted in Greece.
A new policy that will reflect the principles of Xenios Zeus and not the anti-immigrant hysteria, which has fuelled an increase in xenophobia across Europe. A new policy that will balance security concerns with humanitarian and economic considerations and that will address the reality of globalisation and international migration, without nationalistic outbursts and fear of the ‘Other’.

In practical terms, a number of policy recommendations can be suggested in relation to immigration management in Greece. Since the political and security elites were identified as the main securitising actors, any change in Greek policies on migration will have to be reflected in a change to the political discourse on that issue. As chapter 6 showed, public statements by members of Parliament and representatives of public institutions such as the police and the church contributed to the criminalisation of immigrants and to their social and economic exclusion. Such views from the state that promote racial, ethnic or religious distinctions should be sidelined from public debates, so that a positive atmosphere is created in which migration policy matters can be discussed.

Not only does the security discourse increase public insecurity towards immigrants but also the more negative public opinion becomes, the more difficult it is for the political elites to address the issue in positive terms. Thus, the only way forward is for the political elites to take initiatives and lead rather than follow public opinion in relation to migration. According to Lykovardi and Petroula, the essential elements of political discourse on migration should be “consistency, clarity and coherence, and defining the terms of the debate by fact and not by prejudice”. As discussed in chapter 6, although political discourse and media coverage became more positive towards immigrants in the late 1990s, this change lacked consistency and coherence and did little in eradicating the false negative stereotypes associated to the perceived threats posed by immigrants. For instance, the proliferation of border controls and the massive sweep operations to deport irregular migrants, apart from illegal and immoral, were also proved ineffective, as they failed to restrict irregular migration. However, the persistence of the government in these

3 Kalliopi Lykovardi and Eleni Petroula, ‘Greece’ in Jan Niessen, Yongmi Schibel and Raphaëlle Magoni (eds) **EU and US approaches to the management of immigration** (Brussels: Migration Policy Group, 2003), p. 11.
measures had “less to do with protection than with a political attempt to reassure certain segments of the electorate longing for evidence of concrete measures taken to ensure safety.” Such strategies are in opposition with the clarity and the consistency needed for a long term-oriented migration policy, as they are not sincere about the best ways to deal with it.

In addition, a public dialogue on migration, with the participation of non-state actors would also contribute to better immigration management in Greece and could provide a basis for better understanding of the costs and benefits of immigration, by stamping out the misperceptions and myths related to the phenomenon. In this perspective, non-governmental actors such as employers, trade unions, human rights groups and immigrant communities could play a more active role in the formulation of an immigration management strategy that considers both labour needs and humanitarian aspects of immigration. Based on this dialogue, the governing authorities could objectively reassess Greek immigration policy and develop a better-oriented management strategy that does not only focus on its security elements.

This management strategy should avoid blurring the various categories of migrants under the general term ‘aliens’ and should instead make a clear distinction between legal immigrants, illegal immigrants and asylum seekers. On the one hand, those immigrants that are legally residing in Greece should be integrated in the economic, social and political life of the country. A successful integration process includes recognition of cultural diversity as well as practical measures such as effective promotion of equal opportunities, vocational training, access to social services and civic participation by immigrant communities. In that respect, the process of integrating immigrants in Greece has not yet started.

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4 Bigo, Didier (2002b), ‘To Reassure and Protect, After September 11’, Social Science Research Council, online: http://www.ssrc.org/septl1/essays/bigo.htm
5 Lykovardi and Petroula note that civil society in Greece is relatively young compared to other European countries and has not yet succeeded in becoming an important actor in influencing policy-making. See Lykovardi and Petroula, ‘Greece’, pp. 18-20.
6 Ibid
The absence of provisions concerning the integration of immigrants in Greece derives from the country's view that immigration is a temporary phenomenon. The main policy does not aim at attracting permanent settlers but temporary workers. This relates to an effort to protect national identity and homogeneity and thus only foreigners of a common descent, religion and culture are welcomed to settle in Greece indefinitely, whereas other immigrants continue to be treated as newcomers, even if they have spent most of their lives in Greece. Therefore, for the integration of immigrants in Greece to succeed, a change in the prevailing concept of 'Greekness' is required. More specifically, from criteria of Greekness, which focus on religion, ethnicity and history as the essential characteristics for inclusion or exclusion, Greek society should adopt the views put forward by the Athenian philosopher Isocrates. According to Isocrates, "our city has made the name of Greeks signify not the origin but the intellect so that Greeks are called those who partake in our culture rather than those who are of the same extraction as ourselves". An Isocratic view of immigration would thus not exclude foreigners from society because of their ethnicity or religion but instead would allow them to be fully accepted in the social, political and cultural life of Greece. That would not only require adaptation of immigrants to the Greek society, but also adaptation of the host society to immigrants, whose own identity and diversity should be accepted.

However, a more liberal immigration policy does not mean that the government should restrain from restricting irregular flows. Taking into account the economic and demographic needs for labour immigrants, the government should seek to regulate 'wanted' migrants, while trying to reduce 'unwanted' and irregular migratory flows. Considering that border controls have so far proved ineffective in reducing irregular migration, the focus of the government should shift towards reducing the 'push' and 'pull' factors that lead migrants to move to Greece. Reducing the pull factors would require a stricter control of the national economy and a systematic effort to shrink the underground black market, which enables illegal immigrants to find easy employment. As far as the push factors are concerned, there should be active policies towards the countries of origin of immigrants, notably Albania, "aiming at the financial development

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7 Isocrates lived in Athens between 438 to 336 BC.
and the socio-cultural stability in these countries so that the causes of immigration are nipped in the bud." These initiatives, as well as the overall Greek immigration management, should develop in coordination and accordance to policies in the European Union, which has become a key element of Greek policy-making on migration.

To sum up, the optimal solution for Greek policies on migration is desecuritisation. This could prove to be beneficial to not only the immigrants and asylum seekers, whose rights are compromised, but also to the state and the indigenous population, who could maximise the benefits of legal immigration, while restricting the social costs from illegal and uncontrollable migratory flows. An effective immigration management policy would thus require Greece to:

- Develop a comprehensive migration policy with a long-term orientation, which reviews and identifies past mistakes and aims to learn from them.
- Deal with the whole spectrum of migration types and issues and not be preoccupied with illegal immigration and security.
- Engage in political debates, which are characterised by consistency, clarity and coherence and collect the input of non-governmental actors, such as trade unions, human rights groups and immigrant communities.
- Take active measures towards the integration of legal immigrants in the Greek social, political and economic life.
- Take initiatives towards restricting the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors of immigration.
- Upgrade the legislative and policy framework in line with mainstream European standards and promote European co-ordination in immigration and integration matters.

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8 Economic and Social Committee, ‘Immigration and Stay of Foreigners in Greek Territory’, Opinion No. 38, February 2000. Available from <http://www.oke.gr/english/no38.htm> (27.08.2004). The argument that Greece and the EU should help sending countries develop in order to restrict migration flows from these countries was also shared by several of the interviewees, including Mary Bossis, Ioannis Hoularios, Georgia Papagianni and Theodore Pangalos.
7.4 Concluding remarks and future research

The analysis of the securitisation of terrorism and migration in Greece in this thesis has contributed to the understanding of policy changes that took place in Greece over recent years. The changes that Greece underwent during the 1990s in relation to its self-perceptions and its relation to Europe signify a significant break from the country’s past. In many ways, after almost fifteen years of membership, Greece finally became fully integrated in the European Union, which affected its conception of security and its prioritisation of threats on its agenda.

In the debates within security studies about the concept of security, it is sometimes assumed that dealing with issues as security ones will attract more resources and will result in better handling of a problem, which is why various normative approaches to security compete about the issues that should be included in the security agenda. The assumption that more security is always better has been challenged by the empirical findings of this thesis. Although, securitisation was the answer to Greece’s persistent problem with domestic terrorism, the securitisation of migration has created more problems than it has solved. It has become one of the main obstacles for the development of a substantive approach to migration in Greece and has led to an increase in the hostility between the natives and third-country nationals. Greece of course is not unique in that. Security has become the norm in European migration policies, with most countries experiencing the same anxieties as Greece towards migratory flows and the perceived threats associated with them. Cooperation at the European level has given Member States another platform in which to legitimise and extend exclusive elements of national policy and restrict migratory flows.9

In accordance with the Copenhagen School, it was suggested that the optimal solution for Greece would be to desecuritise immigration and instead deal with it as normal politics. Yet, as noted earlier, how this will happen is less than clear. The institutionalised security discourse has so far managed to withstand the challenge from more liberal approaches to

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migration. The Copenhagen School does not offer any answers as to why and how the governing authorities could come to the decision to desecuritise, particularly since this might affect their own power positions. Noting these, the main challenge facing future research involves theoretically elaborating upon the concept of desecuritisation and developing a framework that can explain and suggest ways for societal issues to move out of the threat-defence sequence. A postmodernist approach can effectively challenge the dominant political discourse on migration and could be a first step. However, desecuritisation will only succeed if backed up and embraced by those actors who have the capacity to produce security knowledge about the level and seriousness of threats within and between states.
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